Jurgen Moltmann's Ethics of Hope (Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology, and Biblical Studies) 9780754664819, 9781315590783, 0754664813

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Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope This book develops a thorough account of the sphere of human moral action in sustained dialogue with Jürgen Moltmann. By examining God’s role as promisegiver, particularly in the Christian understanding of resurrection, this work describes the occupancy of both history and space in moral terms. This leads to an understanding of Jesus’ description of ‘the kingdom of God’ to feature prominently in describing both the possibility and content of human moral action. By offering an account of each of the main doctrines found in Moltmann’s corpus – the role of the future, the Trinity, the Holy Spirit and anthropology – this book locates how each contributes to the understanding of ethics from a Christian perspective and subsequently applies these findings to the contemporary issue of poverty and global economics.

ASHGATE NEW CRITICAL THINKING IN RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL STUDIES The Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies series brings high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, international libraries, and student, academic and research readers. Headed by an international editorial advisory board of acclaimed scholars spanning the breadth of religious studies, theology and biblical studies, this openended monograph series presents cutting-edge research from both established and new authors in the field. With specialist focus yet clear contextual presentation of contemporary research, books in the series take research into important new directions and open the field to new critical debate within the discipline, in areas of related study, and in key areas for contemporary society. Series Editorial Board: David Jasper, University of Glasgow, UK James Beckford, University of Warwick, UK Raymond Williams, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, USA Geoffrey Samuel, University of Newcastle, Australia Richard Hutch, University of Queensland, Australia Paul Fiddes, Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford, UK Anthony Thiselton, University of Nottingham, UK Tim Gorringe, University of Exeter, UK Adrian Thatcher, College of St Mark and St John, UK Alan Torrance, University of St Andrews, UK Judith Lieu, Kings College London, UK Terrance Tilley, University of Dayton, USA Miroslav Volf, Yale Divinity School, USA Stanley Grenz, Baylor University and Truett Seminary, USA Vincent Brummer, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands Gerhard Sauter, University of Bonn, Germany Other Titles in the Series: Eucharistic Sacramentality in an Ecumenical Context The Anglican Epiclesis David J. Kennedy Evagrius Ponticus The Making of a Gnostic Julia Konstantinovsky

Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope

Eschatological Possibilities For Moral Action

Timothy Harvie

First published 2009 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2009 Timothy harvie Timothy Harvie has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Harvie, Timothy Jurgen Moltmann’s ethics of hope. – (Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology and biblical studies) 1. Moltmann, Jurgen 2. Christian ethics 3. Hope – Religious aspects – Christianity I. Title 241’.092 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Harvie, Timothy. Jürgen Moltmann’s ethics of hope : eschatological possibilities for moral action / Timothy Harvie. p. cm. – (Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology, and biblical studies) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-6481-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Moltmann, Jürgen – Ethics. 2. Christian ethics – History – 20th century. 3. Eschatology – History of doctrines – 20th century. I. Title. BX4827.M6H37 2009 241.092–dc22

ISBN (hbk) ISBN 978-1-3155-9078-3 (ebk)

2008032690

For David and Linda Harvie

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Contents Foreword   Acknowledgements   List of Abbreviations   Introduction: Eschatology, Ethics and Jürgen Moltmann   The Present Task   The Key Issues   The Path Ahead  

ix xi xiii 1 1 3 8

Part I  Doctrinal Considerations 1 Hope and Promise   Introduction   Eschatology   Promise   Contradiction and Continuity   Exilic Church   Conclusion  

13 13 14 16 23 31 36

2 Hope for the Kingdom of God   Introduction   The Kingdom and Christology   Conclusion  

39 39 41 54

3 Hope and the Spirit of God   Introduction   Aspects of the Spirit’s Person   Foci of the Spirit’s Work   Ethical Motifs Arising from the Current Discussion   Conclusion  

57 57 58 69 86 98

4 Hope in the Triune God   Introduction   Moltmann’s Doctrine of the Trinity   The Socio-ethical Ramifications of Moltmann’s Doctrine of the Trinity Conclusions  

99 99 99 122 143

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viii

Part II  Theological and Topical Considerations 5 Time and Space for Hope   Introduction   Time for Moral Hope   Space for Hope   Conclusion  

147 147 148 161 167

6 Hope for Humanity   Introduction   Human Nature   Dignity and Rights   Moral Action   Conclusion  

169 169 169 181 184 188

7 Hope for the Economy   Introduction   Primary Issues Contributing to Poverty   Outlining an Economics of Hope   From Theory to Praxis   Pragmatic Proposals   Conclusion  

189 189 190 194 201 203 206

Bibliography   Index  

209 221

Foreword I have long waited for a project such as this. After the conclusion of my first three books – Theology of Hope in 1964, The Crucified God in 1972 and The Church in the Power of the Spirit in 1975 – I wanted to write an Ethics of Hope. It did not succeed at that time in spite of several drafts, and then came the themes of the new Systematic Theology, which pressed upon my mind. Instead of an Ethics of Hope, I published the book Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1980) and then God in Creation (1985). This greatly disappointed many of my friends, but I did not yet have all the necessary fundamentals to think through an Ethics of Hope. But since then, this has weighed on my theological conscience as an unfinished task and an unfulfilled wish. Timothy Harvie has just now taken over this desire, and therefore his study, which I have read word for word, has filled me with great joy. He offers nothing less than a theological foundation for an Ethics of Hope. With this Foreword, I want to open the door to walk through his ideas and to invite the reader to work with and think broader regarding a Christian Ethics of Hope. In Part I, Timothy Harvie works through the essential thought of my theological development and places it together systematically. He begins with ‘Hope and Promise’ and comes over to the Christological concept of the Kingdom of God and pneumatology to the social doctrine of the Trinity. He then closes with ‘Time and Space for Hope’, ‘Hope for Humanity’ and ‘Hope for the Economy’. In each chapter are not merely the theological fundamentals, but also what turns out to be the beginnings towards an Ethics of Hope. Brief conclusions summarize the contribution and open questions of each singular chapter. The work of the researcher is very solid. He does not remain on the surface, but goes through the theological theses to the foundation. I myself have learned much from his representations of my theology – its strengths, its weaknesses and its open questions – which does not often occur to me and, in any case, is all too rare in dissertations. Timothy Harvie’s judgements are careful and fair. He exposes the superficial critiques of my theology, and himself uncovers the open questions. I am very thankful to him for this. He has not simply written a dissertation, which is the achievement demanded of a doctoral graduate, but is himself with a theological heart wholly close to the matter. He achieves clarity in the foundations and possibilities of an Ethics of Hope. This makes his work so stimulating and worthwhile. Just now, I will go into two questions that he has put to me. Actually, my answers belong in an afterword, because they assume the book, yet one can understand them as an indication in the Foreword to read these passages in the work attentively. First, on pages 127–30 Timothy Harvie addresses the old problem of how the Spirit of Christ, who saves through word and faith, relates to the general,



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sustaining Spirit of God acting in human culture. He has found a double meaning established in my work because I separate the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit. I do not want this: where Christ is, there is also the Holy Spirit, and that is the experience of the Church. And where the Holy Spirit is, there is also Christ because the social, cultural and cosmic works of the Spirit are going out from the cosmic Christ as is understood in Colossians 1. Can one separate both and, with Calvin, speak of universals but not salvations, and of salvations but not universal works of the Spirit? One cannot equate both, because then the cosmos would be the Church and the Church would be the cosmos. The eschatological goal of God is not the separation of the Church from the cosmos but the ‘divinization of the cosmos’, as Orthodox theology says. One must keep both in view: because the Church understands itself as the beginning and model of God’s new humanity, it presents itself as a world community and an order of peace for the people. That is the ‘universal society’ and ‘single humanity’. It is not the Kingdom of God, although it is the historical anticipation and correspondence of the expectation of the Kingdom of God. Between global reception and the salvific works of the Holy Spirit we find here the anticipated and the promising works of the Holy Spirit. Christianity blends itself in politics, culture and one nature because it has a comprehensive hope where nothing is lost. The cosmic Christ awaits his own in the cosmos. Second, another problem which the researcher raises is the relationship of creaturely life to the inner-Trinitarian life of the living God. Is there here only an unending difference, or also a correspondence upon which to base the indwelling of the infinite in the finite? I have myself always aligned this question with John 17:21. Here correspondence is taught – ‘that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you’ – and admittedly on the basis of indwelling: ‘may they also be in us’. The indwelling taught in the Gospel of John is also reciprocal: ‘we will come and make our home with them’ (John 14:23). It is certainly not so that humanity mimics God and can thus make itself divine. Yet it is so after all that through achieving the incarnation of the Logos and the indwelling Spirit of the Triune God in human community, God is imaged in human actions. What happened through Christ and the Holy Spirit in human history and nature runs after the promise of God to the universal glorification of God. Therein is the redemption of the cosmos sealed. With these two remarks I close my Foreword and give the word to the author of this book. To the reader I say this: take and read, it is worth it. Jürgen Moltmann Tübingen, 28 March 2008

Acknowledgements When engaging in a project such as researching and writing a theological monograph, there are inevitably many people who contribute in various fashions along the way. I would like to begin by thanking Professor Dr Jürgen Moltmann, not only for writing the Foreword to this book, but also for meeting with me some years ago to discuss its theological content and for exchanging numerous letters of correspondence. His encouragement in this project has been overwhelming. This book is a slightly revised version of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Aberdeen. I would like to thank my Doktorvater, Professor John Webster, for his guidance, friendship and immeasurable contribution to this work. He has read several previous drafts and has continued to be a theological encouragement to me even after my time in Aberdeen came to a close. Professor Richard Bauckham and Dr Philip Ziegler were the dissertation examiners for the earlier version of this work, and their comments have been extremely insightful. I would also like to thank Markus Hilbert for reading over my translation of Professor Dr Moltmann’s Foreword and offering helpful comments. I would like to thank Christopher A. Richardson for numerous discussions regarding Professor Dr Moltmann’s theology and continually offering much-needed exegetical insight. He also diligently read over an earlier draft of this book, and his suggestions pertaining to the final chapter have proven to be indispensable. I would also like to thank Julie McAfee for proofreading earlier drafts. Finally, this work is dedicated to my parents, David and Linda Harvie, without whom this project would never have come to fruition. They were my first teachers in Christian ethics, even though I was not always the best student. Naturally, whatever faults remain in the book are the responsibility of the author alone.

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List of Abbreviations CG CoG CPS ET GC SL TH TKG WJC

Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, translated by R.A. Wilson and John Bowden, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993. Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, translated by Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 1996. Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology, translated by Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 1977. Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, translated by Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 2000. Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, the Gifford Lectures 1984–1985, translated by Margaret Kohl, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993. Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation, translated by Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 1992. Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology, translated by James W. Leitch, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993. Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God, translated by Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 1981. Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, translated by Margaret Kohl, London: SCM Press, 1990.

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Introduction

Eschatology, Ethics and Jürgen Moltmann

The Present Task To commence his lectures on the beginning of all things described in scripture, Dietrich Bonhoeffer states: ‘The church of Christ witnesses to the end of all things. It lives from the end, it thinks from the end, it acts from the end, it proclaims its message from the end …. The church speaks within the old world about the new world.’ If theology and the Church live from the end, then it may be argued that the importance of eschatology is not merely for missiology and soteriology alongside its usual association with the ‘last things’, but it also has much to say in regard to Christian ethics. Kathryn Tanner has recently written: ‘Eschatology, or the theology of last things, is a Christian doctrine with a rather direct bearing on ethical questions via its influence on psychological dispositions to act.’ This intersection of eschatology and Christian moral thought experienced a resurgence in late twentieth-century theology. Tanner proceeds to identify Jürgen Moltmann as being the seminal thinker in this movement. She states that Moltmann is ‘probably the best and most influential example of this sort of modern eschatology’. While Tanner’s own proposals for eschatology dramatically diverge from Moltmann’s thought, the impact made by his book Theology of Hope can be seen throughout her discussion. Moltmann himself saw the importance of his eschatology for ethical praxis as early as the mid-1960s, when he proceeded to attempt to write an ethics of hope. He brought an early end to the project, however, ‘because [he] did not know whether reforms or revolution would improve circumstances … [and] because [he] did not have a detailed knowledge of the different fields of action and spheres of life … nothing came of the Ethics’. The continuing need for an ethics of hope derived from Moltmann’s thought has also been noted by Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz. Müller-Fahrenholz states that Moltmann’s comment regarding his own proposed ethics, cited above, ‘is a late but by no means exhaustive answer to a Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3, trans. Douglas Stephen Bax (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), p. 21.  Kathryn Tanner, ‘Eschatology and Ethics’, in Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 41.  Ibid., p. 44.  Jürgen Moltmann, How I Have Changed: Reflections on Thirty Years of Theology, ed. Jürgen Moltmann, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1997), p. 17. 

Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope



question which Jürgen Moltmann kept hearing: What’s happened to your ethics?’ However, Müller-Fahrenholz proceeds to reinforce the difficulties surrounding the possible construction of an ethics in an even more emphatic way than Moltmann’s description in 1997. He writes: Precisely because the horizon and scope of the kingdom of God must be understood universally and cosmically, ecumenically and in terms of humankind, ethics must extend to all spheres of life. But think what that would mean! The worldwide ecological crises and their complicated interdependencies must be treated, along with the world economy with its dependencies, and tendencies towards enrichment and impoverishment. The sciences with their economic dependencies and interdisciplinary ramifications which are becoming increasingly complex would need to be treated along with the media and their networks which are becoming ever more global and totalitarian. It would be necessary to note that the peoples and nations have to fight with their own historical inheritances and violations, that their quest for identity and power in the structure of states sets out from the most varied initial conditions and therefore priorities. And finally, all these considerations would have to end up with human beings. But what are human beings? … This in outline is the great complex of problems which an ‘ethic’ would have to cope with today. Who could manage that? 

With such daunting tasks immediately confronting an ethic of hope, it would appear unlikely that a project such as the one described above should be attempted. Yet Moltmann has maintained his desire to see such a project undertaken. In an essay reflecting on his seminal work Theology of Hope forty years after its publication, Moltmann affirms the continuing need for such a work as an ethics of hope. He writes: ‘After Theology of Hope I always wanted to write an Ethics of Hope, but I was never successful …. It remains a wish for the next generation.’ However, the issue of the increased proliferation of required specialties in numerous fields in order to produce a comprehensive ethics remains. Moreover, although Moltmann has contributed to various ethical discussions and his theology has maintained an eschatological tenor throughout his career, he has never explicitly developed a detailed description of the specific relationship between eschatology and ethics. Because of this, the title of this work – Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope – may prove to be somewhat misleading. It is misleading in the sense that what Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), p. 107.  Ibid., p. 108.  Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Theologie der Hoffnung – von 40 Jahren’, in Hoffnung auf Gott – Zukunft des Lebens: 40 Jahre ‘Theologie der Hoffnung’, ed. Jürgen Moltmann, Carmen Rivuzumwami and Thomas Schlag (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2005), p. 25 (author’s translation). 

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is developed in the pages to follow is not a piece of applied ethics engaging specific moral quandaries or the nature of the Christian virtues. Rather, it is a piece of systematic theology. It is an attempt to theologically describe the sphere of Christian moral action and the means by which this is enabled to take place. Any theological account of human action, and thus moral action, must be understood in the context of God’s saving work in Christ and the eschatological trajectory that salvation has given the created order. In this sense, what Charles Partee has said of Calvin must also here be said of an ethic of hope derived from Moltmann: ‘It is clear that the doctrine of salvation is the context within which, rather than primarily toward which, men [and women] act.’ The primary task of this project is to develop an eschatological account of the sphere of human moral action in dialogue with Moltmann’s work. It will do so by critically engaging Moltmann’s understanding of the salvific work of God in Jesus Christ and its ongoing efficacy in the Holy Spirit. Moltmann famously gives his account a robust eschatological description. Once the theological description of the eschatological framework for Christian faith and action has taken place, the specific role of human moral action may be explored along with an analysis of the precise type of moral action to be construed in an ethics of hope. The Key Issues Moltmann’s theology developed in the post-Second World War era of Germany. He served as a soldier for the German army during the Allied ‘Operation Gomorrah’ attack on Hamburg. Subsequently, he was captured and spent time in Scotland as a prisoner of war. Moltmann’s first reading of the gospel occurred behind the harsh fences of this POW camp. Moltmann proceeded to study theology at Göttingen, where he completed his doctoral studies under the supervision of Otto Weber. Upon graduation, Moltmann spent time as the pastor of a small church in Wasserhorst. Afterwards, he taught at the Kirchliche Hochschule in Wuppertal, but spent the majority of his career at the University of Tübingen. Moltmann’s theological development would proceed over the course of more than thirty years in dialogue with theological and philosophical partners as diverse as Karl Barth, Gerhard von Rad, Max Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School, Eastern Orthodox sources and Jewish Kabbalistic thought.10 A key event  Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), p. 89. Although Moltmann is a creative theologian who makes use of varied sources, his heritage in the Reformed tradition may be seen in this description.  Although Moltmann has published brief accounts of his life in various essays, the most comprehensive account may be found in his recent autobiography. See Jürgen Moltmann, A Broad Place: An Autobiography (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). 10 For genetic studies on Moltmann’s early development and explorations of his intellectual resources, see M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia,



Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope

in Moltmann’s development was his encounter with Ernst Bloch’s Principle of Hope.11 This encounter inspired Moltmann to inquire what had happened to Christian hope in modern theology. He did not seek to imitate Bloch. Rather, in building ‘a theology of hope on the foundation of what [he] saw as the presupposition of the theology of Christianity and Judaism’, Moltmann attempted to develop a theology of hope whose basis was ‘the God of promise and exodus, the God who has raised Christ …’.12 This important differentiation between Moltmann’s theology of hope and Bloch’s philosophy of hope is essential for deciphering precisely what Moltmann means by ‘eschatology’. While this will be explicated in further detail below, a cursory overview is required to suitably discern an accurate starting point for interpreting Moltmann’s eschatological thought. Richard Bauckham has noted the unmistakable centrality of Christology, and particularly the resurrection, in Moltmann’s eschatology. He writes of Moltmann’s Theology of Hope: It might equally well have been called a theology of the resurrection, since the future it addressed was the future of the risen Christ and its theological heart was an interpretation of the resurrection of the crucified Christ as divine promise for the future of all reality.13

This Christological starting place for eschatology means that, for Moltmann, eschatology is foremost God’s action in history, and thereby has soteriological effect. The intersection of Christology, resurrection and divine promise for the future in Moltmann’s thought entails a future orientation for theology which emphasizes divine action that creates a new future which comes to the present through promise. Moltmann’s maintenance of such theological loci for eschatology distinguishes his thought from not only Bloch’s philosophy of hope but also other theological representatives attempting to construct a Christian eschatology. Such representatives may be seen in Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theology of history as well as the eschatology of Kathryn Tanner. For example, Pannenberg envisages the relationship between God and history to be more a case of mutual development than Moltmann. Pannenberg understands ‘the deity of God as the result of a whole complex of history …. The history that demonstrates the deity of God is broadened to include the totality of all events.’14 Moltmann criticizes this broadening out of PA: Fortress Press, 1974). Also Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1987). 11 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 3 vols, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 12 Moltmann, TH, p. 9. 13 Bauckham, Moltmann, p. 3. 14 Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation’, in Revelation as History, trans. David Granskou, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 132–33.

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revelation to include ‘universal history’, arguing that it eventually abandons the particularity of the biblical witness to revelation as that which happens ‘between promise and fulfilment’ and therefore the emphasis on the revealed Word, which Moltmann inherited from Barth.15 Conversely, Tanner seeks to dispense with any future aspect that may be found within eschatology altogether. Rather, she argues that ‘eternal life is an unconditional, already realized possession’ that Christians may participate in within the historical present.16 She argues that such a realized eschatology still spurs on ethical action without hope for a changed future being needed to exercise perseverance in the midst of disappointment: Failure to succeed is not … a reason for despair … hope, then to counter despair in the present comes not from the idea that God is the coming future, but from the fact that, despite appearances to the contrary in a world of sin, God has already in fact assumed our lives.17

Tanner’s eschatology is thus divested of any future orientation. However, in so doing she fails to articulate in what sense human ethical living is already assumed in God if, indeed, sin and its effects are still rampant in creation. Moreover, Moltmann may be distinguished from Tanner’s account in so far as Tanner’s lack of futurity also results in a lack of a defined doctrine of the parousia. Moltmann’s emphasis on the parousia in Christology and the coming of God in eschatology further illustrates the ongoing contribution Moltmann makes to eschatological discourse. However, it must be noted that when approaching Moltmann’s work there are several pertinent issues and difficulties which need to be addressed prior to undertaking a project such as the one described above. The first key issue is the general problematic of how to interpret Moltmann’s theology and its relationship to ethical thought. This is manifested primarily on two conceptual fronts. First, Moltmann is a complex and creative thinker. That this is a problem is seen in much of the secondary literature and its interpretation of Moltmann’s theology. Moltmann’s thought is multifaceted, and his later work especially draws from sources which are unconventional in modern theology. In addition, Moltmann’s method has gone largely unarticulated18 throughout much of his career, thus leaving the various trajectories of his thought misunderstood or not understood within the larger context of the entire corpus of his works. Moreover, Moltmann is a creative thinker, and as a result many of his interpreters lament the lack of conceptual rigour and precision characteristic of more systematic theologians. Moltmann, TH, pp. 78–9. See also Bauckham, Moltmann, pp. 5–6. Tanner, ‘Eschatology and Ethics’, p. 52. 17 Ibid., p. 55. 18 The recent exception is naturally the final volume in his ‘contributions to systematic theology’ (published in 2000) which deals largely with the issues of method. 15 16



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This can make interpreting Moltmann’s thought difficult and in need of a patient, nuanced reading to glean from the text a proper understanding of his eschatology and his ethics. The other conceptual front where interpretation of Moltmann’s work proves difficult is deciphering the precise relationship between his doctrinal work in systematic theology and the ethical commitments expressed throughout his theological and political writings. Much of the literature attempting to engage this aspect of Moltmann’s theology often reads the relationship of theological and ethical discourse in his thought as beginning from antecedent political commitments formed entirely by the current socio-political climate. These prior commitments thus shape his theological assertions to support those anterior political claims. The conclusion of such readings is that Moltmann is simply providing religious justification for a previously held political or ethical commitment, usually construed as socialist.19 This work will argue that the relationship between Moltmann’s doctrinal affirmations and ethical commitments move in the opposite direction. It will argue that Moltmann does not begin with antecedent ethical presuppositions and then mould his theology to fit these concerns. Rather, Moltmann begins with an investigation of theological concerns stemming from the biblical history and then attempts to articulate the moral relevance this theological conception has for the current social situation of humanity. This may be seen in Moltmann’s statement regarding the nature of academic theology: ‘Academic theology is nothing other than the scholarly penetration and illumination by mind and spirit of what Christians in the congregations think when they believe in God and live in the fellowship of Christ.’20 This difficulty of the manner in which Moltmann relates theology and ethics is directly connected with the second key issue engaged in the present work. This second issue involves a discussion of the viability of Moltmann’s understanding of how theological statements affect and shape moral praxis. This issue will be dealt with at some length in the pages that follow, but some introductory remarks merit comment at the outset. In Moltmann’s earlier work, particularly seen in Theology of Hope and his ecclesiology, the moral emphasis is placed on the efficacy of God’s creative work in the resurrection of the crucified in promising and securing a new future for humanity. This moral emphasis is seen in God’s re-orienting human action to a new future ensured through the veracity and faithfulness of God in the economy of salvation through promising words and acts. Such an account of God’s 19 This may be seen prominently featured in the work of Randall Otto and Arne Rasmusson. See Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Randall E. Otto, The God of Hope: The Trinitarian Vision of Jürgen Moltmann (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991). It should be noted that Rasmusson’s work offers a more nuanced reading of Moltmann than Otto’s, but he still views Moltmann as primarily shaped by his politico-historical context. 20 Moltmann, ET, p. 13.

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action as providing both the grounds and means of human moral action in faith receives further depth in Moltmann’s later work through his pneumatology. Here again, divine action is seen as prominent, and a robust pneumatology provides a developed understanding of Christian sanctification. Moltmann also casts the nature of the relationship between theology and ethics in a different manner, pre-eminently seen in his later Trinitarian thought.21 In this second understanding of theology and ethics, Moltmann uses a form of analogy to construe the effect theological statements have on Christian moral living. Moltmann develops his social Trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of God from his interpretation of the biblical history of the Son. The primary Trinitarian motif arising from this description is the Greek notion of perichoresis. Moltmann opposes his understanding of perichoresis to monistic, or what he calls monotheistic, notions of God. Moltmann then applies this theological discussion to politico-ethical praxis by arguing that one’s conception of the divine automatically results in particular human analogues which seek to mirror the divine reality through a political mimesis of God’s inner life. Depending on the prior construal of God as either monotheistic or as Trinity, Moltmann argues that the resultant mimetic activity in the political realm is either totalitarian and oppressive in the case of the former, or communal and liberating in the case of the latter. However, the viability of such a means of construing the relationship between theological doctrines and the Christian moral life in such analogical terms must be tested. Can this viewpoint account for the necessary ongoing work of grace requisite for sanctification? Does it have an adequate account of sin’s effects over creation, and therefore human action also? It will be argued that such an account of the relationship between theological statements and ethical prescriptions cannot adequately account for the full gamut of issues such as those posed in these critical questions. However, it will be argued that there are resources within the wider framework of Moltmann’s eschatological theology to construct a robust account of Christian moral praxis from the standpoint of eschatological hope. Therefore, at this point the pertinent issue of procedure comes to the fore. The present work will listen attentively to Moltmann and endeavour to understand his eschatological thought within the context of his wider theology and the role of ethics therein. The primary goal here is to obtain a precise and accurate comprehension of Moltmann’s thought so that a proper interpretation may be given. This will offer a much-needed corrective to many of Moltmann’s less careful interpreters. A carefully nuanced interpretation will be accomplished by engaging in a close reading of the primary texts found in Moltmann’s vast corpus in constant dialogue with the plethora of secondary literature engaging his work. However, as intimated above, this task of discernment will not be conducted uncritically. That is to say, the task of nuanced interpretation will be closely accompanied by the equally 21 This may be especially seen in Moltmann, TKG, pp. 129–32, 191–202. See also Jürgen Moltmann, Politische Theologie – Politische Ethik (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1984), pp. 32–3.



Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope

important task of critical assessment. At each stage of the argument, the text of Scripture and other prominent theologians will be brought to bear on Moltmann’s theological claims. In doing so, the reader will be able to locate Moltmann within the witness of the biblical materials as well as current theological debate. From this standpoint, the adequacy of Moltmann’s theology and the potential of his thought to aid the development of the Christian moral life from the vantage point of eschatological hope will be deciphered. The result of this procedure will then be a developed theological account of the eschatological nature of the Christian moral life and the potential of eschatology to guide discussions of ethical praxis. Much of the argument will glean favourably from Moltmann, but in so far as it diverges from Moltmann’s thought or attempts to deepen his insights by pressing in directions that he does not explicitly traverse in his writings, this present work is also a piece of constructive systematic theology. This constructive aspect of the current project is most clearly seen in the final discussion regarding the potential of an ethic of hope, such as the one to be developed here, to guide Christian praxis within the arena of global economics and monetary exchanges. Therefore, with these key issues and goals in mind, one may now look more clearly to what lies ahead. The Path Ahead The present work is divided into two main parts, each being comprised of a series of chapters. Part I deals explicitly with the varying doctrinal materials to be found in Moltmann’s corpus. The purpose of this is to display the theological logic of Moltmann’s ethical insights. In pursuing the examination of Moltmann in this way, it will be argued that Moltmann’s ethics do not arrive anterior to theological conviction, thus forming theological arguments according to them. It will show Moltmann first and foremost as a theologian concerned with the Christian gospel whose ethical assertions are formed subsequent to those convictions about the gospel. While some of these convictions will be questioned, it will show that the train of Moltmann’s thought moves in this direction. To accomplish this, Chapter 1 begins with an extended dialogue with Moltmann’s early eschatology. It does so with particular reference to his theology of divine promise and its relationship to history and moral praxis. It will be shown that the resurrection, seen as God’s promise, secures a particular future for creation, and thus orients creation to that future. To accomplish this future, Moltmann argues that God is creating history through the revelatory act of promise giving. The chapter concludes with an understanding that Moltmann defines this eschatological future as the Kingdom of God. Chapter 2 proceeds to define the material content of the Kingdom of God in Moltmann’s thought, and how it may be employed within an ethic of hope. The Christological centrality of the Kingdom will be shown to be essential for Moltmann’s conception of the Kingdom, both in its moral and eschatological

Eschatology, Ethics and Jürgen Moltmann



implications. Morally, the Kingdom is understood in light of the life, ministry and vocation of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah of Israel’s God. Jesus’ life and social relations provide the biblical understanding of what type of ethic is entailed by the Kingdom. Eschatologically, the Kingdom of God is seen in light of both the parousia and judgement of Christ. The impact both of these eschatological occurrences have on moral praxis in Moltmann’s thought will be explored and debated. Subsequent to describing what impact the eschatological motif of the Kingdom of God has on moral praxis, there remains the essential issue of how this eschatological future may be participated in within the midst of an unfulfilled present. Therefore, Chapter 3 enters into an extensive discussion of Moltmann’s pneumatology. Here the distinctiveness of the Spirit’s divine personhood will be followed by a detailed engagement of Moltmann’s understanding of the Spirit’s work in both Church and society. Such an understanding of the Spirit’s nature and work will enable an eschatological ethic of hope to provide a coherent account of how the promised future – the Kingdom of God – may be made historically efficacious for Christian moral life in the present. Part I then concludes with the fourth chapter discussing Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought. Trinitarian thought has become increasingly central in Moltmann’s development. To understand how Moltmann’s eschatological understanding of moral hope may be developed in a scrupulous manner, the primary motifs of the divine promising, the Christological centrality of the Kingdom, and the pneumatological efficacy of the Spirit’s work must be understood from within a Trinitarian perspective. Thus, Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity is explicated along with the means by which he brings his Trinitarian theology to bear on ethical praxis. This will be seen with particular reference to clerical and political matters. Part II of this work takes these doctrinal insights and employs them in theological discussions surrounding the relationship between Christian moral praxis and time, space and humanity. Chapter 5 discusses the moral import the above theological considerations have for an eschatological conception of time and space. The centrality of God’s promising acts and creative work for the Christologically located Kingdom of God are argued to receive temporal application in what Moltmann calls ‘kairological’ time. Here a qualitative understanding of time conditioned by a Christologically centred eschatology is argued to provide a Christian conception of time with a moral description. The ‘kairological’ understanding of time finds its correlate in an eschatological understanding of space called ‘ecological’ space. A qualitative description of space is here given definition by specifically moral description of the eschatological moral hope arising from the person and work of Jesus Christ. Chapter 6 proceeds to give a theological description of the type of moral agents operative in an eschatologically understood framework of time and space such as the one offered in the previous chapter. Thus, the discussion continues with an eschatological understanding of human nature in Moltmann’s thought, which thereby provides the basis for a description of human worth and dignity. Finally, the

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chapter concludes with a description of the type of moral action necessitated by the theological description of human worth within an eschatological understanding of God’s salvific work. The seventh and final chapter attempts to move beyond theory to attainable praxis in a constructive endeavour to provide some prescriptive motifs arising from an ethic of eschatological hope within the realm of global economics. Four contributors to poverty are briefly described prior to a theological description of hope for the global economy. The eschatological ethics of hope developed in this work are then brought to bear on these factors pertaining to poverty in order to illustrate how such an ethic may incorporate the positive, pragmatic proposals in the sphere of monetary exchange. With this overarching summary in one’s purview, the study will now proceed to investigate the beginning of eschatology in Moltmann’s thought: the sure and faithful promise of God.

Part I Doctrinal Considerations

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Chapter 1

Hope and Promise Introduction When Jürgen Moltmann first published Theologie der Hoffnung in 1964, his stated aim was to recover the importance of eschatology from the margins of theological discourse. He sought to recall eschatology from being designated solely as the ‘last things’. Taking his cue from the young Barth, Moltmann states: ‘From first to last, and not merely in epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the present.’ This eschatological emphasis is, for Moltmann, the generative thrust for Christian hope. Hope, eschatologically rooted, has a future orientation without causing the one who hopes to either abandon the present or to ignore or deny the past. On the contrary, for Moltmann Christian hope is founded on the promise of God given in a particular place in history, which creates and secures a new trajectory for history and human existence within history. It is the burden of this opening chapter to work out the meaning and implications of this assertion. Beginning with the arguments laid out in Theology of Hope, this chapter will attempt to explicate and assess Moltmann’s account of promise as it relates to the implications of Christian hope for a moral theology of human action. The argument will begin with an exploration into the necessity and role of eschatology as Moltmann perceives it. If the Christian hope is eschatological in nature and rooted in divine promise, there must be some accounting as to why it is plausible for theology to believe this is so. Therefore, a broad treatment of the centrality of eschatology for hope in will be given, with particular reference to the importance of scripture in Moltmann’s thought. From this vantage point, a more specified account of promise will be articulated. The Christological locus of promise and hope will be brought to the fore, noting the dialectic of cross and resurrection as it forms the shape and content of the promise which constitutes Christian hope. The essential role of cross-resurrection in Moltmann’s articulation of the history of promise will raise the question of the impact of divine promise on Christian Jürgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begrüdung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlichen Eschtologie (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964).  This is exemplified in Barth’s famous statement: ‘If Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing eschatology, there remains in it no relationship whatever with Christ’; Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (6th edn, London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 314.  Moltmann, TH, p. 16. 

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moral action. The question of the trajectory of human action from the standpoint of divine promise needs to be articulated more clearly for an adequate account of a moral theology of hope. Eschatology It has already been noted that from early on, Moltmann desired to reassert the importance of eschatology for Christian theology. For him, Christian hope is inseparable from the future orientation of eschatology, even if eschatology itself is a broader framework than the usually assumed ‘last things’. However, if hope, when eschatologically rooted, does have a future orientation, then this also lends it a historical character which explores and re-conceives the framework of past, present and future: ‘Christian theology speaks of God with respect to the concrete, specific, and contingent history, which is told and witnessed to in the biblical writings.’ This is not to say that Christian hope is a by-product of pure historicity, which is manifested from the natural course of events. Rather, Christian hope is a future that is promised in the past work of God in history which alters the Christian conception of and engagement with the present. For Moltmann, any docta spes begins from the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. He says: Christian eschatology does not speak of the future as such. It sets out from a definite reality in history and announces the future of that reality, its future possibilities and its power over the future. Christian eschatology speaks of Jesus Christ and his future …. In thus announcing his future in the world in terms of promise, they point believers in him towards the hope of his still outstanding future.

By this Moltmann is saying that with the occurrence of a particular event a certain type of momentum is gathered, driving the course of subsequent events toward a certain end. This end, towards which history is now heading, affects what occurs in the present. Therefore, the history of the created order changed decidedly with the resurrection of Christ, thereby promising a qualitatively new type of future, which in turn alters the present existence of the Christian. Christian existence is altered because of this pointing towards the future from the statements of promise given by God in Jesus Christ. From this brief introduction, the priority of hope for Christian theology becomes unambiguous. In addition to Christian theology, hope founded in the cross Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Theology as Eschatology’, in The Future of Hope: Theology as Eschatology, ed. Frederick Herzog (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 1.  Moltmann, TH, p. 17. For a virtually identical delineation in Moltmann’s later work, see Jürgen Moltmann, In the End – the Beginning: The Life of Hope, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), p. 88. 

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and resurrection of Jesus Christ also unequivocally changes the sphere of human action. That is, both human and cosmic history, nature and the whole created order become the space for redemption rather than the theatre for the ongoing victory of death and sinfulness. This is neither to say that the effects of sin are not still felt nor that violence, oppression and injustice are not still at work in human history. Moltmann has neither an over-realized eschatology nor a chiliastic view of history. Rather, in the singular event of cross and resurrection, a new history has been made possible by securing a new future through divine promise. Moltmann is here emphasizing the importance of history as the medium for God’s self-revelatory acts to humanity. In Moltmann’s thought, history becomes both God’s creative work and a sinful status quo which God must overcome. This dialectic of positive and negative views of history is firmly integrated in Moltmann’s theology of promise. In the midst of a history wrought with injustice, turmoil and sin, the promise of God (given definitively in the resurrection of Jesus Christ) secures a new future which contravenes the sinful status quo of the present with a new creative work of God for a redeemed cosmos. This new, creative work secured in the promise is a novum in history which moves towards the present. Therefore, the relationship between promise and history relies heavily on the concept of prolepsis for Moltmann’s construal of eschatology. The raising of Christ from the dead is the proleptic event signifying the universal reign of God. In Pauline language, Christ is the ‘firstfruits’. However, the risen Christ does not merely signify the future universal Kingdom of God, but as its initiator, he is also the means by which this Kingdom comes about: ‘It is not merely said that Jesus is the first to arise and that believers will attain like him to resurrection, but it is proclaimed that he is himself the resurrection and the life and that consequently believers find their future in him and not merely like him.’10 Moltmann argues that his construal of hope is plausible precisely because it is found in the structure of the biblical materials themselves. It is a notable feature of Theology of Hope that the work is primarily influenced by the biblical scholarship



Although Moltmann does maintain a version of millennialism, he rightly critiques all forms of historical millennialism. See Moltmann, CoG, pp. 159–92.  Moltmann, TH, p. 17.  Moltmann is here influenced by the so-called ‘Pannenberg circle’. See Wolfhart Pannenberg (ed.), Revelation as History, trans. David Granskou (New York: Macmillan, 1968). However, Moltmann’s own theology of revelation differs from that of Pannenberg in emphasizing the particularity of divine saving action in history rather than historical events themselves as revealers of the divine. On the similarities and differences between Pannenberg and Moltmann’s view of history, see Michael Gilbertson, God and History in the Book of Revelation: New Testament Studies in Dialogue with Pannenberg and Moltmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 11–19.  1 Cor. 15:20. 10 Moltmann, TH, pp. 82–3.

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of the time.11 In a subsequent essay, Moltmann states that the ‘text’ of his Theology of Hope was the Bible.12 An eschatological reading of hope based on the promises of God is plausible for Moltmann because he views scripture as testifying to this very fact. As will be discussed in greater detail below, Moltmann’s explication of promise-fulfilment motifs is gleaned from the history of Israel’s interactions with Yahweh as borne witness to in the Hebrew scriptures. The influence of biblical scholars such as Gerhard von Rad and Ernst Käsemann can be seen throughout Moltmann’s reading of the biblical materials, particularly the history of Israel and the cross and resurrection of Christ.13 Having highlighted the importance of hope and eschatology for Christian theology, it is essential to systematically explicate the various themes discussed above. To fully engage all the complexities at work in a Christian ethics of hope, a more detailed analysis of the nature and content of the divine promise is needed. However, as will be seen, there are several issues surrounding Moltmann’s use of promise which need further clarification. For example, what is the precise nature of the promise (especially in the cross and resurrection of Christ) as it relates to both the creation of a new history and the contradiction of the old? To put the matter another way, is there nothing of the present state of the world which is redeemable within the current work of the divine economy or must the believer simply await a contradictory world created ex nihilo? It would seem that when attempting to articulate a moral theology of hope, the relationship between Christian action within a world where sin is still present and God’s action to redeem that world through Christ must be brought into clearer relation. By attempting to remove the ambiguity of the relation between sin and redemption, the argument will move beyond Moltmann’s account, even if remaining within its general purview. Promise The integral role of promise for Christian hope may be most clearly seen in Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. That a Christian understanding of hope is rooted in the divine promise has been briefly sketched above, but needs to be explicated more cogently. In defining promise, Moltmann makes seven key points: 11

Richard Bauckham notes exegesis as a particular strength in Moltmann’s earlier theology, even if contrasting it with a more speculative tendency to be found in Moltmann’s later work. See Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), p. 167. 12 Jürgen Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press, 1975), pp. 44–5. 13 See M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1974). Also Bauckham, Moltmann. For a brief overview of the ‘school of hope’ in broader detail, see Walter H. Capps, ‘Mapping the Hope Movement’, in The Future of Hope, ed. Walter H. Capps (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1970).

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(a) A promise is a declaration which announces the coming of a reality that does not yet exist …. (b) The promise binds man to the future and gives him a sense for history …. (c) The history which is initiated and determined by promise does not consist in cyclic recurrence, but has a definite trend towards the promised and outstanding future …. (d) If the word is a word of promise, then that means that this word has not yet found a reality congruous [Wirklichkeitsdeckung] with it, but that on the contrary it stands in contradiction [Widerspruch] to the reality open to experience now and heretofore …. (e) The word of promise therefore always creates [schaffen] an interval [Zwischenraum] of tension between the uttering and the redeeming of the promise …. (f) If the promise is not regarded abstractly apart from the God who promises, but its fulfillment is entrusted directly to God in his freedom and faithfulness, then there can be no burning interest in constructing a hard and fast juridicial system of historic necessities according to a schema of promise and fulfillment …. (g) The peculiar character of the Old Testament promises can be seen in the fact that the promises were not liquidated by the history of Israel – neither by disappointments nor by fulfillment – but that on the contrary Israel’s experience of history gave them a constantly new and wider interpretation.14

In essence, Moltmann’s view of eschatological promise is that this promise is God’s pledge to humanity. It is a pledge to create a qualitatively new future which has already come into existence, in part, through the presence of God making and sealing the promise which has been given. This promise causes those receiving the promise to align themselves with the future that God will bring into existence and therefore may be said to contradict the unfulfilled present. Much of Moltmann’s exegetical support for his account of promise is derived from the Old Testament accounts of Israel’s exodus brought about by God, the instalment of the law as a result, and the subsequent ministry of the prophets. Although substantial space is given to the relationship between Paul and the promise given to the patriarch Abraham, the account of the exodus may be viewed as paradigmatic.15 Through the promise of liberation from slavery by God for free life in a new land, Israelite life in Egypt was no longer commensurate with the creative work of God forging a new history and communal identity for Israel. Moreover, when Israel was wandering in the wilderness, God was leading them not only to a specific geographic locale, but even more so to a new future. God was leading them to a point in and through history where the promise would come to fruition. However, the notions of historicity, promise and God being ahead or in front of Israel were not abandoned once Israel came into the land. They did not 14

Moltmann, TH, pp. 103–4. That the motif of exodus has become essential in liberation theology illustrates its particular usefulness when exploring an ethics of hope. See Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1988). Moltmann’s discussion of Paul and Abraham is found in Moltmann, TH, pp. 148–54. 15

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exchange the God of promise for an epiphany god like other agrarian cultures of the day. Israel’s cultic calendar maintained a memory of the history of promise in the various festivals even as the festivals were incorporated into the agrarian seasonal structure of seedtime and harvest. That this occurred is chiefly due to the fact, Moltmann argues, that there is a ‘permanent overspill’ (ständige Überschüssigkeit) of the promise.16 He writes: The ‘not yet’ of expectation surpasses every fulfillment that is already taking place now. Hence every reality in which a fulfillment is already taking place now, becomes the confirmation, exposition and liberation of a greater hope … the overplus of promise and for the fact that it constantly overspills [ständige Überschüssigkeit] history lies in the inexhaustibility of the God of promise, who never exhausts himself in any historic reality but comes ‘to rest’ only in a reality that wholly corresponds to him.17

The overspill of the promise entails that with every fulfilment there is a residue of expectation. Indeed, there is more than a residue. With each fulfilment of the promise, the expectation of the people is increased. The longing for God grows among the people as God creates a history of promise towards a complete future which encompasses the promise in totality until ‘God may be all in all.’18 Moltmann argues that the divine promise par excellence occurred in the resurrection of the crucified Christ. The resurrection of Christ vindicated the claims, life, ministry and death of Jesus. Moreover, the resurrection is the promise of God for the resurrection of humanity and the new creation of all things. It is so in that Christ’s resurrection creates a history and future where death no longer has the final claim on human life. The resurrection of Christ is the firstfruits of the resurrection of those who are in Christ. Paul proclaimed the cross and resurrection of Christ to the Church in Corinth as of ‘first importance’.19 Paul then views Christ’s resurrection as the source for true hope, which is hope for a life which is different to life as it is presently experienced.20 The resurrection of Christ, when viewed as a promise, directs the believer towards a certain future which God is creating. That the promise made in the resurrection, and thus the ensuing history as a result, is an act of divine creation rather than an inner potentiality within history itself is clear when Moltmann states: ‘The promising God himself creates what he promises;

16

Ibid., pp. 105, 107–8. Also briefly on p. 109. See point (g) quoted above. Ibid., p. 106. 18 1 Cor. 15:28. This passage of scripture is a favourite of Moltmann’s when describing God’s eschatological reality. 19 1 Cor. 15:3. 20 1 Cor. 15:19. 17

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the appearing promise itself opens up the history of his creative activity and, to that extent, cannot be separated as word from that reality which it announces.’21 A rendering of the notion of promise such as the one given by Moltmann has been taken to task for not standing up under analytical scrutiny. Christopher Morse has contended that the structure Moltmann gives to promise does not conform to the logic of more rigorous analyses of language engaged in by analytical philosophers.22 Morse analyses speech-act theory in light of Austin, Searle and others. What he discovers is that Moltmann’s version of the promising act does not adhere to the same structure. He finds that ‘Moltmann’s theory … does not uncover the linguistic character of a promise.’23 What makes Morse’s critique insightful, but in the end unconvincing, is his own excellent reading of both Moltmann and the analytical philosophers. Morse delimits with the greatest clarity the linguistic limits of promise as a speech-act and the existential implications of the one promising, and then contends that Moltmann does not fit that picture. What Morse fails to recognize is that given the biblical structure and the Christological locus of Moltmann’s account of promise, there is no reason why Moltmann’s version must conform to his analytical model. With reference to Morse’s critique, Moltmann maintains that the structure of his view of promise is not speech-act, but history recounted as narrative. He says: If we look first at the history of promise in the Old Testament traditions, we can say that in history the divine promises are communicated to particular people such as Abraham, and are therefore made present through remembrance and narrative …. God’s promises must be understood historically not merely because they were uttered in history, and must ever and again be interpreted afresh in history, but also because they throw open a particular history.24

To state the matter plainly, it is not merely that a promise is a speech-act as Morse contends it must be. Rather, for Moltmann an act of God in history, such as the resurrection, takes the form of promise25 in so far as it secures a new future through the creation of a particular history. It is ‘fundamental’, as Richard Bauckham rightly affirms, ‘that this divine act of raising the dead Jesus to new life is an event – the definitive event – of eschatological promise’.26 The emphasis of cross-resurrection to be found in Moltmann’s view is central and cannot be removed from his eschatological account. This entails an 21 Jürgen Moltmann, Hope and Planning, trans. Margaret Clarkson (1st English edn, London: SCM Press, 1971), p. 17. 22 Christopher Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s Theology (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1979). 23 Ibid., p. 79. 24 Moltmann, ET, pp. 98–9. 25 See Moltmann, TH, pp. 162–3. 26 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 33.

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understanding of promise where both the form and the content of divine promise must be determined Christologically. Picking up again from his description, Moltmann states: If the promise is not regarded abstractly apart from the God who promises, but its fulfillment is entrusted directly to God in his freedom and faithfulness, then there can be no burning interest in constructing a hard and fast juridical system of historic necessities according to a schema of promise and fulfilment ….27

An illustrative passage may be cited when Moltmann states that the resurrection of Christ: shows that in the future possibilities there is an element of necessity in the sense that they can be relied on and are to be expected. The tendencies and latent implications in the resurrection event are drawn out into the future opened up by it. With the raising of Jesus all has not yet been done. The end of death’s domination is still outstanding. The overcoming of all opposition to God is still outstanding ….28

It is clear that this ‘element of necessity’ to be found in the cross-resurrection provides a teleological aspect to history in so far as there is not an element of risk or chance in the surety of the promise’s fulfilment. God is faithful and sovereign to secure the promised outcome. The form of the promise takes place in an opening up of history to the work of God in Christ. It removes the possibility of a different outcome to the one promised because the promise is a divine act of creation. The content of the promise is also found here. The content of the promise is death’s final defeat, sin’s final eradication and the recognition of Christ’s universal lordship. This surety is what clearly differentiates Moltmann’s view of history from a process theology in the vein of A.N. Whitehead: The resurrection of Christ does not mean a possibility within the world and its history, but a new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history …. By the raising of Christ we do not mean a possible process in world history, but the eschatological process to which world history is subjected.29

In this, it is certain that the sovereignty of God maintains primacy because God’s constancy and faithfulness are not in doubt. As Moltmann says elsewhere: ‘We are not able to speak of a “becoming God” but only of the “coming God.” This is

27

Moltmann, TH, p. 104. Ibid., p. 162. 29 Ibid., pp. 179–80. 28

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the difference between eschatology and process theology.’30 Therefore, the issue is divine presence, not divine development. However, to say that Christ determines the form and the content of the promise appears to be more definitive than other conceptions of the future found in Moltmann’s corpus. This can be seen where Moltmann emphasizes the future in terms of potentiality. To be sure, he views the event of resurrection as a generative event of promise, which creates a particular history and secures a particular type of future. Having firmly established this, it would seem, though, that Moltmann sees the future established by the resurrection as possibility. If the form and content of the promise are founded in the resurrection of Christ, in what sense does the future have possibilities? In what sense does the resurrection contain only ‘tendencies and latent implications’?31 The difficulty is clearer when viewing some of Moltmann’s later characterizations of the universe as an ‘open system’32 or the eschatological future as a novum.33 While a more detailed discussion of Moltmann’s theology of history will be carried out in the coming chapters, it is helpful to comment briefly on these issues here. In characterizing the universe as an ‘open system’, Moltmann is attempting to lay stress on the potentiality of the universe to receive the promise or the new work of God’s creative, redeeming activity. The novum is then the actualization of this new work. Again, Moltmann sees this concept of the novum as being biblically based. In his understanding of the Old Testament prophets, Moltmann adumbrates two characteristics for the novum. First, ‘What is new announces itself in the judgment on what is old. It does not emerge from the old; it makes the old obsolete.’34 This is not contrary to what has been stated previously. The novum does not evolve out of natural historicity, but ‘announces’ itself in contradistinction to the previous, unredeemed history. Second, the ‘anticipatory reaching out to the new future which God has promised to create casts back to the analogies of history’.35 When conjoined, these two assertions would appear to say that the novum stands over-against ‘the old’, but does not stand without precedence or analogy. If there were no precedence or analogy, then one of two possible options would appear to be mandated. First, the content, meaning and significance of the new event would be entirely unintelligible due to the fact that the new event would be previously outside the realm of human existence or experience. The second option would be a Marcionite rejection of all that preceded simply on the basis that it was incommensurable with the new.36 That is, what has gone before, which Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, p. 53. Also Moltmann, GC, p. 133. Moltmann, TH, p. 162. 32 Jürgen Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 2003), pp. 33–53. 33 Moltmann, CoG, pp. 27–9. 34 Ibid., p. 27. 35 Ibid., p. 28. 36 Ibid., pp. 28–9. 30 31

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is not in accord with the content of the promise, becomes obsolete. However, the novum is recognized as such precisely by its coherence with the content of the promise as it was previously given in history. Up to this point the present study has assumed without argument that the point of analogy between the old and the new is the divine promise. In his later eschatology, The Coming of God, Moltmann gives no detailed explication of promise in light of his theological developments. However, if one is to take seriously that there is a real continuity between the later work and Theology of Hope,37 then Moltmann’s description of the raised Christ as the novum ultimum could provide a helpful clue. Moltmann states that ‘Just as the raised Christ does not develop out of the crucified and dead Christ, the novum ultimum – the ultimate new thing – does not issue from the history of the old.’38 When viewed in terms of promise within its Christological framework, the above distinctions are clarified with greater coherence than in merely attempting to relate two forms of history. For Moltmann, ‘Christianity stands or falls with the reality of the raising of Jesus from the dead by God.’39 Richard Bauckham astutely notes that for Moltmann, the resurrection of the crucified Christ is a ‘fundamental concept’.40 In light of these bold and essential assertions, it seems odd how Randall Otto is able to maintain that Moltmann does not affirm the actuality of the resurrection.41 Otto claims that ‘Moltmann … tends to found Christ’s resurrection on our hopes’, rather than the reverse.42 From this Otto asserts that ‘for Moltmann and the proponents of hope it is the reappropriation of this biblical symbol as a heuristic device for the purposes of world transformation’ which is ‘revisionist Marxism’.43 However, in light of the above exploration of Moltmann’s thought, it appears far more likely that the reverse is the case. The resurrection is not, for Moltmann, founded on Christian hope, but Christian hope is founded on God’s action in history by raising Jesus from the dead. Here Otto mistakes Moltmann’s claim of the non-verifiability of the resurrection from the standpoint of modern historical criticism for an assertion of the non-facticity of the resurrection.44 However, Moltmann affirms with the greatest clarity that God reveals himself in history. This revelation (Offenbarung) occurs through the historical acts of God’s promising, and for Moltmann, the ultimate act of promise is the resurrection. 37

Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 28. 39 Moltmann, TH, p. 165. 40 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 33. 41 Randall E. Otto, The God of Hope: The Trinitarian Vision of Jürgen Moltmann (Lanham, MD: University Press Of America, 1991), pp. 161–2. 42 Ibid., p. 165 n. 54. 43 Ibid., p. 163. 44 Such misreadings are typical of Otto’s work, a book Richard Bauckham rightly describes as ‘a remarkable example of understanding grossly distorted by polemical determination’. See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 24 n. 6. 38

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Contradiction and Continuity Up to this point the role of eschatology for Christian hope has been examined with particular reference to the centrality of the divine promise. From this it was seen that Moltmann’s contention for a history newly created by God, which reaches culmination in a novum, distinguishes the fulfilled future from an unconsummated present. What is of paramount significance for a moral theology of hope is to explicate what type of historical existence is achieved through this ‘throwing open’ of history by the cross-resurrection of Christ. It is here that Moltmann’s controversial notion of a contradiction (Widerspruch) with history must be explicated with great precision.45 As delineated above, Moltmann’s conviction that a life lived according to divine promise entails being defined by the future. This sets those found in the new creative work of God in contradiction with the status quo. Since this point is essential for an ethics of hope, it is necessary to quote Moltmann at length: [Hope] sees in the resurrection of Christ not the eternity of heaven, but the future of the very earth on which his cross stands…This hope struggles for the obedience of the body, because it awaits the quickening of the body…But on the other hand, all this must inevitably mean that the man who thus hopes will never be able to reconcile himself with the laws and constraints of this earth, neither with the inevitability of death nor with the evil that constantly bears further evil …. Hope finds in Christ not only a consolation in suffering, but also the protest of the divine promise against suffering …. Faith takes up this contradiction and thus becomes itself a contradiction to the world of death. That is why faith, wherever it develops into hope, causes not rest but unrest …. It does not calm the unquiet heart, but is itself this unquiet heart in man …. Peace with God means conflict with the world, for the goad of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present.46

It is noteworthy that redeemed humanity may not attempt to bring about God’s promised future. It is fundamental to Moltmann’s conception of hope that it is God in Christ alone who is able to create an eschatological future. However, a community defined by its hope for the eschatological future does act in ways commensurate with this future. In addition, those defined by the future of the promise of God in Christ’s resurrection may not use whatever means may be available in the unfulfilled present. There is no condoning of the ends justifying the means. Rather, a more apt way of perceiving the tension within an ethics of hope is to say that righteous ends demand righteous means. However, all this demands greater clarification and more discerning precision. 45 This was first noted in point (d) in Moltmann’s description of promise noted above. See Moltmann, TH, p. 103. 46 Ibid., p. 21.

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The issue of continuity and contradiction has been a crucial one for Moltmann throughout all his theological endeavours. In the above citation there are several pertinent facts that demand notice. First, it must be noted that there is a real continuity in Moltmann’s theology between the present creation and the eschatological future.47 It is not that creation has the power to withstand the transience of history or the destructive power of sin. Rather, it is God in his power to give life who allows the continuity between the old creation and the new. As ‘[it] was God who established the continuity between the various separate events’48 for Israel, so it is God who establishes continuity between the old and the new. The continuity is established in that ‘God’s promise [is] for a radically new future, but a radically new future for this world. Just as it is the same Jesus who was crucified and raised, so God’s promise is not for another world, but for the new creation of this world.’49 Moltmann clearly emphasizes that Christian hope as he sees it deals with ‘the future of the very earth on which [Christ’s] cross stands’.50 This can also be maintained from Moltmann’s later works where he conceives of a spatial correlation between God’s creating work ‘in the beginning’ and his eschatological consummation where ‘God may be all in all.’ Moltmann says: [The eschaton] corresponds to the primordial moment …. Just as the primordial moment springs from God’s creative resolve … so the eschatological moment will spring from the resolve to redeem … creation becomes the temple for God’s eternal Shekinah. The temporal creation will then become an eternal creation …. The spatial creation will then … participate in God’s omnipresence. Creation’s departure from time into the aeon of glory comes about through the annihilation of death and the raising of the dead.51

While this passage from Moltmann’s eschatology raises several complex issues which merit lengthy comment, what is pertinent for the present discussion is

47 Contra Douglas J. Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics: The Ethical Significance of the Creation–eschaton Relation in the Thought of Emil Brunner and Jürgen Moltmann (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), pp. 93–115. Schuurman misunderstands Moltmann’s view of the eschaton going beyond creation as the eschaton annihilating creation. Because of this misunderstanding, his undefended proposal of the eschaton re-instituting an Edenic state remains unconvincing. In this regard, Tim Chester is far too reliant upon Schuurman’s work and contrues Moltmann’s eschatology according to the same error. See Tim Chester, Mission and the Coming of God: Eschatology, the Trinity and Mission in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and Contemporary Evangelicalism (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Theological Monographs, 2006). 48 Moltmann, GC, p. 119. 49 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 35. 50 Moltmann, TH, p. 21. 51 Moltmann, CoG, p. 294.

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Moltmann’s affirmation of the continuity of this creation with the eschatological consummation. However, there is a more prominent emphasis on the contradiction between the present and the future for which the Christian hopes. By way of reminder, it will be helpful to recall Moltmann’s statement that: Hope finds in Christ not only a consolation in suffering, but also the protest of the divine promise against suffering …. Faith takes up this contradiction and thus becomes itself a contradiction to the world of death. That is why faith, wherever it develops into hope, causes not rest but unrest …. It does not calm the unquiet heart, but is itself this unquiet heart in man …. Peace with God means conflict with the world ….52

The most pressing question, given the genuine continuity with the present creation, is what exactly is being contradicted? To probe the matter further, it may also be asked what is the nature of this ‘contradiction’? Is it a total refutation of life as it is presently perceived both within and without the Christian confession? Given the previous analysis of the genuine continuity for which Moltmann contends, it is clear that the last of these questions must be responded to in the negative. However, the initial two inquiries remain. To answer the first of these questions, ‘What is being contradicted?’, one must first recall that Moltmann has a future orientation in his conception of hope. Thus, it is the present that is contradicted. But one may not say only this. It is not the present which is unconditionally contradicted, but rather the ‘unfulfilled present’.53 However, it remains unclear how this ‘unfulfilled present’ relates to the temporal present as a whole. That is, if it is the sinfulness of a present where the promised future has yet to be consummated which is contradicted, how does this contradiction relate to the created order in its entirety? Subsequently, how does this contradiction relate to the current, sovereign, redeeming work of God in the present? Beginning with the ‘unfulfilled present’, it is clear throughout the course of Moltmann’s theological career that he views the issue of theodicy as possibly the greatest challenge to theology. Moltmann states, ‘Theology has only one problem: God,’54 and then elsewhere affirms that for him, ‘the question of God is deeply bound up with the experience of suffering’.55 The suffering of the world poses the question of God to theology56 and raises a ‘crisis of relevance’ within Christianity.57 52

Moltmann, TH, p. 21. Ibid. 54 Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public Relevance of Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), p. 5. 55 Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1991), p. 26. 56 Moltmann, Hope and Planning, pp. 31ff. 57 Moltmann, CG, pp. 8–18. 53

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Therefore, the ‘unfulfilled present’ as Moltmann sees it is where there is injustice, poverty, violent oppression, discrimination and wanton destruction of nature, thus showing disregard for God’s good creation. Moltmann sees these as sin, which is justified in Christ and finally overcome in the eschaton for which Christians hope.58 Moltmann sees such structural sins as a status quo which must be overcome through the divine promise. This sin, from human perspective, supplants the possibility of change for the future and thus removes hope from human existence. He says: ‘The simple prolongation of the status quo no longer provides a future for which it is worth living.’59 It is against such a status quo that an eschatological hope guiding Christian living becomes subversive: ‘The theology of hope is not a theory about universal history, nor is it an apocalyptic prediction. It is a theology of combatants, not onlookers.’60 However, this seems to be at odds with previous statements made above regarding history as divine creation. Is the present a sphere of the creative work of God, or a sinful and lost world on the brink of damnation? More precisely, has history experienced the salvific redemption of the divine economy in totality, or is it still under the rule of sin? Or, alternatively, are Christians engaged in the present somehow between the aeons, as it were? This is where Moltmann only offers hints at directing a path between these options which must be taken further for greater clarity in explicating a moral theology of hope. On the one hand, it is uncontested that sin is still present on some level and affects human engagement in the present. This sin is contrary to moral living which might bear witness to and be commensurate with the mode of existence promised in the divinely consummated future. On the other hand, Moltmann unabashedly affirms that in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the entire course of history and creaturely life has been irrevocably altered. This newly promised future is a divine act in Christ creating a new history. To fully grasp the complexity of the situation, it is again necessary to quote Moltmann at length:

58 It is a real strength of Moltmann’s work that he continually brings these notions to the fore in theology. However, it is a weakness that he often appears to limit sin only to social realities. See Moltmann, SL, pp. 121–43. What are missing here are not the social aspects of sin, but sins which are not usually classified as ‘structural’. Some of these may include lust, gossip, rage or slander. A Pauline conception would more likely be willing to include both side by side (Rom. 1:29–31; Gal. 5:19–21; 1 Cor. 11:20–22). It should be noted, though, that Moltmann does at times qualify his use of the phrase with ‘structural sin’, although he does question the doctrine of universal or ‘original’ sin. See Moltmann, SL, pp. 124–8. 59 Jürgen Moltmann, Creating a Just Future: The Politics of Peace and the Ethics of Creation in a Threatened World, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1989), p. 2. 60 Moltmann, CoG, p. 146.

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My stress on the contradiction between promise and reality, and between hope and experience, has often been misunderstood and criticized as ‘abstract.’ However, for me it is concrete, determined by the crucifixion on Golgotha of the bearer of the promise by the imperial powers, and by his raising from the dead through the God of hope. Yet in the discipleship of the crucified Christ, by virtue of the life-giving Spirit, there are varying historical situations. There are situations which must be called messianic – situations where the world is actively changed so that it may be brought to manifest its character as God’s world, in correspondences to God’s kingdom and his righteousness and justice. But there are also what we have to call apocalyptic situations of passive resistance to powers and situations opposed to God, in which all that remains is suffering and martyrdom. In the first case the world offers possibilities for action which accords with God; in the second case the door to these possibilities is closed. But in no case is there compulsion to a total rejection of the world …. On the contrary, changing the world and resistance to the powers that destroy the world and themselves belong together in an ethics of hope for the future of this world in the kingdom of God.61

Here there appears to be a possible way out of the conundrum. Moltmann argues that there are two situations within the world in the present. The first set of circumstances are those situations which adhere to the life of the Kingdom in accordance with the will of God for creation. These are called ‘messianic’. The second set of circumstances are (structurally) sinful, opposed to God’s rule, and rebel against God’s desires for humanity. These situations are called ‘apocalyptic’ and require resistance. Such a description offers greater clarity to the complexities at work between sin and righteousness in the world prior to the fulfilment of hope to be found in the eschatological consummation of God’s Kingdom. However, it appears to compartmentalize reality into differing spheres: one sphere rebellious, the other righteous. Such a compartmentalization seems to again be at odds with the universal scope of God’s promise, sovereignty and glory which will be revealed.62 Moreover, it would appear that the change, which hope attests to, is – at least in part – brought about by human actions rather than the sole work of God. The latter of these options is more in line with the trains of thought explored in Theology of Hope. Speaking of such issues, Moltmann states: ‘The question of theodicy is not a speculative question; it is a critical one …. It is a practical question which will only be answered through experience of the new world in which “God will wipe 61

Moltmann, ET, pp. 100–101. For this assertion regarding Christianity’s claim of God’s universality in relation to other peoples, see Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-modern? Response to Miroslav Volf’, in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, ed. Richard Bauckham (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), p. 262, where Moltmann states: ‘It is true that according to the Johannine Jesus “in my Father’s house are many dwelling places”, but it is the one house of the one God for all that.’ This is also much of the motivation for Moltmann’s universalism, for which see Moltmann, CoG, pp. 245, 248–9. 62

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away every tear from their eyes.”’63 Elsewhere Moltmann states that ‘[the world] may be brought to manifest its character as God’s world’ through faithful human action.64 However, if Christian hope is brought to fruition solely by God’s act, then in what sense are creaturely actions, which adhere to the content of eschatological hope, generative of the character of this world as God’s world? Questions such as this remain largely unanswered in the Moltmann corpus, and thus one must go further to provide both clarity and possible correction to a misunderstanding in Moltmann’s work. Taking an idea found early in Theology of Hope, that God is creating a new history which will attain consummation in the fulfilment of divine promise, a way may be found to sort through these varying notions of continuity and contradiction with the present. Moltmann describes the ‘interval’ between promise and fulfilment as a Zwischenraum, literally a ‘between-space’.65 This ‘between-space’ is created by the ‘In-kraft-setzung der Verheißung’.66 Taking these notions further, it may be said that the promise of God in Jesus Christ creates a dynamism in history which sets-in-force a space for a certain type of historical living. This betweenspace is heading toward a new future adumbrated in the promise while at the same time creating opportunity for humans to enter into this space created by God’s work in Jesus Christ. This between-space is in essence the content and form of the promised future (as explicated above in discussing the promise made in the dialectic event of cross-resurrection), but enacted through the creative work of God in such a way that in Christ humans may now participate in this space. The space is in contradistinction to the world as it preceded the creative work in the promise while at the same time re-creating that world through a settingin-force bringing history to consummation. In this sense, Christian hope and the fulfilment of the promise remain entirely the work of God and yet simultaneously remain a sphere for human participation. Thus, the first question, ‘What is being contradicted?’, is answered – that which has not yet been re-created by God in Christ via the divine promise. This new outlook, which has moved beyond Moltmann’s explication of the matter, also answers the second question posed, ‘What is the nature of this contradiction?’ This contradiction is not a confutation of creation-in-thebeginning. It is instead a re-creation of the world which overcomes the power of sin and opens up creaturely reality not to pure possibility, but rather to relationship with the God who has made and sealed the promise. This divine work continues

63

Moltmann, TKG, p. 49. Moltmann, ET, p. 101. 65 Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, p. 93. It is interesting that Moltmann opts for this phrase (translated ‘interval’) rather than the more usual Abstand, Pause or Intervall. 66 Ibid., p. 138. Literally, the ‘setting-in-force of the promise’ communicates a dynamism absent from the English translation of ‘validation’. This is also noted by Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s Theology, p. 35. 64

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until God eschatologically proclaims: ‘Behold, I make all things new.’67 In this sense, the continuity of a moral theology of hope is the gracious action of God, the contradiction is the conquering of sin. Such a construal of Christian hope as the one sketched above is radically different from those whose emphasis appears to lie almost entirely on human action to create a future. Rubem Alves contends that ‘[h]uman liberation is the result of man’s responsible activity …’.68 Alves criticizes a view of hope which maintains a strong emphasis on transcendence as being Platonic.69 He therefore proposes two alternatives: (1) messianic humanism, and (2) humanistic messianism. Humanistic messianism has humanity as its starting point and is the ‘only resource’ for hope. On the other hand, messianic humanism believes ‘in the humanizing determination of the present’.70 However, when Alves uses messianic humanism (his preference of the two), the meanings of the terms become conflated and the distinction between them is virtually indistinguishable. ‘When [messianic humanism]’, says Alves, ‘pronounces the name “God,” it is referring to the power for humanization that remains determined to make man historically free even when all objective and subjective possibilities immanent in history have been exhausted.’71 It can be seen that God is not one who stands over against humanity as a transcendent Trinity who atones for human sin and therein provides redemption. God is now an immanent process which is a power of humanization. The implications become clear that this kind of God is the provider of hope when Alves is still able to posit ‘man as his own liberator’.72 It is now human ‘action [which] is the midwife of the future … human activity can add to the new world’.73 Indeed, it appears humanity is ‘helping God’:74 ‘[W]hen man’s hope informs his action, man thrusts himself upon the world as power.’75 It appears power is the only version of human freedom Alves can perceive as authentic. This is due to the fact that Alves is incapable of conceiving of a personal transcendence over humanity which is not thereby oppressive. It appears that Alves is unable to affirm that God can be both the sole source of salvation and creator of history as well as a beneficent giver of life. However, if one is able to hold together God as love76 and God as the power of salvation in the resurrection

67

Rev. 21:5. Rubem A. Alves, A Theology of Human Hope (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1969), p. 16. 69 Alves makes this precise claim regarding Moltmann. See ibid., p. 59. 70 Ibid., p. 98. 71 Ibid., pp. 98–9. 72 Ibid., p. 99. 73 Ibid., p. 136. 74 Ibid., p. 144. 75 Ibid., p. 138. 76 1 John 4:8. 68

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of Christ,77 this should not provide the dissatisfaction it does with Alves. It is the maintenance of this dialectic of God as Lord of history and life-bestowing liberator which Moltmann maintains in his eschatology through the motifs of promise and resurrection. What has been argued thus far is an attempt to sketch a theology of the sovereignty of God by a theological exploration into God’s work in the cross and resurrection within an eschatological perspective. This chapter has explored Moltmann’s view of hope and has attempted to move beyond some of its internal difficulties while remaining within its general purview. The task is now to return to a discussion of the ethical implications of hope. Christian living, when conducted from the standpoint of hope in God’s promises, locates itself within this Zwischenraum which has been set in force by the event of promise. Thus, as Honecker has argued, Christianity must not be abstract in the form of the Enlightenment, but rather be particular to the Christian hope provided in Christ.78 Christian hope maintains a critical role of contradiction to all that seeks to locate itself outside the salvific work of God in Christ made possible in the cross and resurrection. This salvific event is the event of promise which is finally consummated in an eschatological future. Therefore, the cross-resurrection of Jesus discriminates itself from ‘civil religion’. Civil religion is ambiguous and provides only ‘rhetorical ornament’ as religious confirmation of the state’s desires, that is, providing divine legitimization for the state.79 Therefore, what is needed is a description of the type of people that are located within this between-space and their relationship to the world in rebellion to this new, creative work of God. To aid this, one may now explore what Moltmann describes as an ‘exodus church’.80 Contrary to the roles that modern society81 accords to the Church (cult of the absolute, cult of the private, or social institution), the church must ‘display a kind of conduct which is not in accordance with these …. If the God who called them to life should expect of them something other than what modern industrial society expects and requires of them, then Christians must venture an exodus and regard their social roles as a new Babylonian exile.’82

77

Rom. 1:4. Martin Honecker, ‘Eschatologie und Zivilreligion’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 50, no. 1, 1990: 40–55. 79 Ibid., p. 48. Speaking of a nation states’ invocation of God, Honecker says: ‘But what then is the sense of the invocation dei? It is simply rhetorical ornament …’ (author’s translation). 80 Moltmann, TH, p. 304. 81 Ibid., p. 305. 82 Ibid., p. 324. 78

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Exilic Church The resurrection of the crucified Christ also entailed the creation of a people to live in this Zwischenraum described above. The promise was literally a pro-missio. The resurrected Christ instructed the disciples to ‘go out into all the world’.83 Moltmann puts the matter clearly when he says: ‘All Easter appearances are simultaneously Berufungvisionen.’84 However, as delineated above, this ‘going out’ in the world is a going out as those who no longer adhere to the sinful structures of the world. Rather, as those who are located within the creative work of God in the crossresurrection of Jesus Christ, the Church lives commensurately with the content of the future promised in Christ’s resurrection. It lives according to its hope. In other words, the Church lives eschatologically. This sets the Church in contradiction with the sinful status quo of the present: ‘If that which is Christian does not correspond to reality that can be known or experienced, the observed contradiction between the word of God and reality can become … an argument … against reality itself.’85 The author of 1 Peter describes this in a twofold movement. The Berufungvisionen of the apostles created by the resurrection of Christ formed the Church as ‘a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people’. However, this new identity thereby entailed them becoming ‘aliens and exiles’ with regard to the sinful status quo of the world and they must therefore ‘abstain from the desires of the flesh which wage war against the soul’.86 Likewise, Moltmann exhorts the Church to engage in what he calls a ‘Babylonian exile’.87 This exilic existence for the Church will call it to live as a people different from the roles assigned to it from modern society. Moltmann defines ‘modern society’ as the public life which arose from modern industrialization.88 He means ‘in negative terms, not the state and not the family, but that sphere of public life which is governed by the conduct of business, by production, consumption and commerce …’.89 Moltmann sees two primary 83

Matt. 28:16–20. Moltmann, ‘Theology as Eschatology’, p. 34. 85 Moltmann, Hope and Planning, p. 16. 86 1 Peter 2:9–11. 87 On the biblical usage of exile or ‘diaspora’ and its importance for ecclesiology in the New Testament with contemporary significance, see Kurt Niederwimmer, ‘Kirche als Diaspora’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 41, no. 3, 1981: 290–300: ‘This way of Diaspora becomes a natural recognition of Christian existence as eschatological’ (ibid., p. 294; author’s translation). 88 Many of Moltmann’s descriptions of modern society were influenced by Ernst Bloch. See Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight, 3 vols (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). See also Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, pp. 16–19; Bauckham, Moltmann, pp. 7–22, and Gerald O’Collins, ‘The Principle and Theology of Hope’, Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 21, 1968: 140. 89 Moltmann, TH, p. 305. 84

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historical events as root causes of modernity: (1) the plundering of land and peoples by the conquistas in what would later become the Americas beginning in 1492, and (2) the growth and development of science and industry in a way which is exploitative of nature.90 Moltmann describes the two situations as foundational for modern society: ‘In 1492 the foundation was laid for the new world order which still exists today.’91 The results of these two forces were, according to Moltmann, an acquiring and assertion of power: Right down to the present day Bacon’s motto ‘knowledge is power’ holds good. And scientific knowledge is power over nature and life. From science … Europe acquired that instrumentalizing knowledge which enabled it to use the resources of the colonized world …. God and gold were the most powerful incentives of the conquista and were its driving power.92

Regarding the results of the Baconian use of the sciences and nature from within the present context of the ecological crisis, Moltmann can say: The crisis of the modern world is not due merely to the technologies for the exploitation of nature; nor can we put it down to the sciences which made human beings the lords of nature. It is based much more profoundly on the striving of human beings for power and domination.93

Through these events of conquest, both of peoples and nature, modern humanity interpreted its history as progress. To this Moltmann responds: ‘Isn’t history, pictured as progress, always at the same time an instrument of domination … isn’t history pictured as progress, also an instrument for subjecting nature to the will and intentions of human beings?’94 The driving motivations behind these material conquests developed out of hope for the Christian symbols of a new world and a new time, although manifested through human endeavour.95 The result of these influences and trends was not only the creation of modernity. It also created what Moltmann calls ‘sub-modernity’.96 Moltmann describes the difference between modernity and sub-modernity as follows: When in 1517 Luther nailed up his reforming Theses on the door of the castle church in Wittenberg, and the Reformation in Germany began, Hernando Cortes was sailing to Tenochtitlan, Mexico. In 1521, when he conquered the city of the Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, pp. 6–9. Ibid., p. 6. 92 Ibid., p. 8. 93 Moltmann, GC, pp. 20–21. 94 Ibid., p. 125. 95 Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, pp. 8–9. 96 Ibid., pp. 11–17. 90 91

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Aztecs, Luther stood before the Reichstag in Worms, under the ban of church and empire. When Lessing and Kant were publishing their Enlightenment treatises, hundreds of thousands of black African slaves were being sold out of Africa to America every year …. So the progress of the modern world has always been acquired only at the expense of other nations, at the expense of nature, and at the expense of coming generations …. The memories of the perpetrators are always short, while the memories of the victims are long.97

While this is certainly a schematic reading of a complex history explicated as such for rhetorical power, what Moltmann has attempted to delineate is a reading of modernity which highlights injustice as one of its primary attributes. He does this by attempting to view this history from the perspective of the numerical majority of the world’s population, who were the victims of modern Europe. It should be made clear that Moltmann does not consider the contributions of Luther, Kant and others to be either superfluous or worthless. However, what he does consider inappropriate is that modernity has used oppression and violence as a means to advance and perpetuate itself in the name of ‘progress’. Moltmann describes such narcissistic and violent tendencies in modernity as ‘adolescent as boys who knock each other down or girls who preen themselves in front of the mirror’.98 Such character traits in modernity are ‘not the temporary crisis of a developing world civilization. It is a congenital defect of the civilization itself.’99 In contrast to the utilitarian use of human life, which Moltmann sees in modernity’s making of and engagement with sub-modernity, he affirms: ‘In God’s eyes nothing created is a matter of indifference.’100 What has particular import for the discussion at hand is Moltmann’s description of modern society as the topos and kairos where the Church presently locates itself. He discusses modernity neither as a phenomenon of culture per se, nor merely as a history of ideas stemming from the Enlightenment and the elucidation of Cartesian certainty in humanity’s ego. Rather, Moltmann describes modern society primarily in ethical categories and as a series of moral choices in favour of maintaining power and the perpetuation of a sinful status quo. It is within this ‘civil society’ where the Church must carry out an exilic existence. It is in this situation that a people living commensurately with the promised future of God contradict the nature of political existence in modern civil society. Christians, living in the between-space of the newly created history in the crossresurrection of Jesus Christ, adhere to the particularity of this event in both form and content. This is the aim of what Moltmann calls ‘political theology’, which sets itself in critical distinction from ‘civil society’: ‘The determining subject of the new political theology … is Christian existence in its difference from general 97

Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 163. 99 Moltmann, WJC, p. 65. 100 Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, p. 110. 98

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civil existence, and the church in its difference from society and state.’101 Otto inaccurately claims that these types of categories cloud all of Moltmann’s thinking and that they are the real motivation for any eschatological claim he makes. He continually asserts that Moltmann is merely engaging in ‘revisionist Marxist thought’.102 Otto claims that for Moltmann, ‘The invocation of the concept of biblical eschatology seems … to be simply a popular pictorial device heuristically reinterpreted in the light of Marxist philosophy for the purposes of worldwide revolutionary activity.’103 However, from the above discussion of Moltmann’s eschatology with its emphasis on the resurrection, it would appear the opposite of Otto’s reading is more likely the case. Indeed, Moltmann affirms: ‘The referend of history is not human existence concerned with its selfhood, but the God of whom one spoke in Israel always in connection with unique persons and events.’104 The Church’s existence will entail political engagement, but its goal is not Marxist revolution, but rather Christian faithfulness: ‘It has no desire to “politicize” the church … its aim is to Christianize the political existence of the churches and of Christians …’.105 It is in light of these ethical and eschatological considerations that Moltmann exhorts the Church to live according to its hope in a ‘Babylonian exile’106 or as an ‘Exodus community’ (Exodusgemeinde).107 Moltmann defines the Exodusgemeinde as follows: ‘The title “Exodus Church” is meant to focus attention on the reality of Christianity as that of the “pilgrim people of God”, as described in the Epistle to the Hebrews …’.108 If, according to Moltmann, modern society has made space 101 Ibid., p. 44. On the particularity of the Christian belief and living in the context of ‘civil’ society or ‘civil religion’, see Honecker, ‘Eschatologie und Zivilreligion’, p. 42. 102 Otto, The God of Hope, pp. 99, 163 and elsewhere. To be sure, Moltmann engaged in Christian–Marxist dialogue, but critiqued Marxism as wanting a future without God even as he critiqued some Christian theologies for wanting God without a future. Otto’s misreading conflates Moltmann and Marxism completely without regard to genuine and decisive differences, particularly the importance of Christ’s cross and resurrection. The reading of Moltmann’s eschatological hope in this chapter has illustrated that purely humanist Marxist thought does not provide an accurate account of either the main tenets or the more subtle nuances of Moltmann’s thought. 103 Ibid., p. 102. Bernard Ramm also noted some of the revolutionary implications of Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. Although Ramm is critical of these implications, he correctly sees these ethical implications as a result of the antecedent and constitutive theological considerations of Christian hope. Otto inaccurately reverses the order, and thus misconstrues both Moltmann’s intentions and theological stance. See Bernard Ramm, ‘Ethics in the Theology of Hope’, in Toward a Theology of the Future, ed. David F. Wells and Clark H. Pinnock (����������������������������������������������������� Carol Stream,���������������������������������������� IL: Creation House, 1971), pp. 189–216. 104 Moltmann, ‘Theology as Eschatology’, pp. 16–17. 105 Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, p. 44. 106 Moltmann, TH, p. 324. 107 ������������������ Ibid.������������� , pp. 304–38. 108 �������������� Ibid.��������� , p. 304.

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for itself in a manner which separates itself from sub-modernity in ways which are oppressive, violent and unjust – that is to say, sinful – then this modern society cannot not be a homeland of the Church. The Church lives in the between-space (Zwischenraum) created by God which has been opened up by divine promise in the cross-resurrection of Christ awaiting the consummation of that promise. This calls the Church to be a sojourning people in a land which is not their home as they live and engage the world as citizens of the home which has been promised by God. The ‘homeland’ which the Church awaits has been promised by God in accordance with the will of God for the redemption of creation: ‘Christianity’ has its essence and its goal not in itself and not in its own existence, but lives from something and exists for something which reaches far beyond itself. If we would grasp the secret of its existence and its modes of behaviour, we must enquire into its mission. If we would fathom its essence, then we must enquire into that future on which it sets its hopes and expectations.109

It must be remembered that here again, promise becomes pro-missio. This mission is in contradiction to the sinful status quo of modern society, as described above, and leads the Church into a resistance against such modes of living. On the contrary, the ethical mode of living in the between-space created by God is commensurate with the content of the promised reality. It is here that Moltmann employs the biblical motif of the Kingdom of God: The Church lays claim to the whole of humanity in mission. This mission is not carried out within the horizon of expectation provided by the social roles which society concedes to the Church, but it takes place within its own peculiar horizon of the eschatological expectation of the coming kingdom of God, of the coming righteousness and the coming peace, of the coming freedom and dignity of man.110

Such faithful conduct is essential as part of the worship of the Church: ‘Worship is not replaced by ethics; rather ethics are made worship.’111 This life in adherence to the Kingdom causes the Church to be more than a contradictor of the world. Rather, it is in its contradiction that the Church becomes ‘a diaconate in the world’.112 It should be emphasized that this prominent role accorded to creaturely moral action within the divinely created Zwischenraum by 109

�������������� Ibid.��������� , p. 325. �������������� Ibid.��������� , p. 327. 111 Jürgen Moltmann, The Open Church: Invitation to a Messianic Lifestyle, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press, 1978), p. 77. 112 Jürgen Moltmann, ‘The Diaconal Church in the Context of the Kingdom of God’, in Hope for the Church: Moltmann in Dialogue with Practical Theology, ed. and trans. Theodore Runyon (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1979), p. 21. 110

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no means usurps the sovereignty of God or the necessity of the consummation of the promise to be God’s work: The results of merely human efforts would be a human kingdom – but no kingdom of God …. If we want to speak in a Christian manner of the kingdom of God and his lordship, then we must look to Jesus alone and not to ourselves, to his history and not to our own.113

This service to the world, which at times will necessitate contradiction to the world, is moral action in adherence to the content of the promised Kingdom of God. This Kingdom living is unattainable under human power alone. It is accomplished in the power of the Spirit:114 Our life is a fragment …. The life which is reborn … becomes a fragment of the coming beauty of the Kingdom of God …. Thus with the fragmentary life in the Spirit there is already beginning now the eternal life in the midst of a life which is leading to death.115

This life is the life of the Kingdom. It is the life accomplished for us in Christ and empowered by the Spirit to the glory of the Father. As such it is redeemed, newly created life, and yet it is fragmentary. It is fragmentary because it is not yet consummated. Conclusion The present discussion began with an examination of Moltmann’s theology centred on hope within its eschatological context. From this many vital themes came to the fore. Eschatology, as a newly created history rooted in the revelatory acts of God found in historical acts of promising as witnessed to in scripture, forms the broad basis of Moltmann’s conception of hope. From a more narrow perspective, the particular nomadic life of Israel arising from the promise given to Abraham, enacted in the Exodus and definitively given in the cross-resurrection of Christ, are the constitutive events newly creating history for a divinely promised future. When understood as such, Christian hope allows for a space of conduct in the world, which contradicts sinfulness in witness to the resurrected Christ in service to the world. The content of this moral action in Christian living is a life commensurate with the Kingdom of God. However, up to this point in the present argument the actual material content of this Kingdom of God has been largely left unarticulated. Having established a 113

���������������� Ibid.����������� , pp. 21–2. ���������������� Ibid.����������� , pp. 32–3. 115 Moltmann, The Open Church, p. 40. 114

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basis from which to conduct a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Christian hope and Christian living, it is necessary to explore the nature of the Kingdom with greater precision. If the Kingdom of God is promised definitively in the cross-resurrection of Jesus Christ, then the relationship between the Kingdom and Christology as it pertains to Christian hope needs further clarification. In addition to this, it was noted above that the Kingdom, though founded on the work of Christ, is pneumatologically empowered. Therefore, when articulating the relationship between the Kingdom of God, hope and cross-resurrection, an ethics of hope must firmly locate itself within a robust Trinitarian context. Once these relationships are explicated with sufficient lucidity, the discussion may then return to the manner in which the Kingdom of God exists – and even confronts – modern society. It is with this task which the following chapter will occupy itself.

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Chapter 2

Hope for the Kingdom of God Introduction The Synoptic tradition summarizes Jesus’ ministry and proclamation as follows: ‘Now after John was arrested, Jesus came to Galilee, proclaiming the good news of God, and saying, “The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God has come near; repent, and believe in the good news.”’ The ‘good news’ proclaimed by Christ was that of the Kingdom of God. To this point in the present study, Jürgen Moltmann’s theology of hope has been explored within its eschatological perspective. The emphasis on divine revelation through God’s word of promise in history was shown to be particularly important for Moltmann. This divine promise creates a history oriented to the future, but also creates a Zwischenraum where Christians live commensurately with the promises of God in contradiction to an unfulfilled present. The existence within this between-space creates even greater expectations within the eschatological life of the Christian through its inextricable connection with the infinite God who is the promise-giver. This promised future was argued to be the final consummation of the Kingdom of God. That the Kingdom of God was central to Jesus’ life, proclamation and ministry makes it comprehensible how this theme would find a vital role in Moltmann’s Christologically centred eschatology. However, the material content of what the Kingdom of God and its socioethical ramifications has thus far remained on the periphery. Moltmann affirms that: ‘Theology springs out of a passion for God’s kingdom and its righteousness and justice …. In that passion, theology becomes imagination for the kingdom of God in the world, and for the world in God’s kingdom.’ Regarding Christian ethical engagements, he later says: ‘The church is about proximity to the kingdom of God, and about the experience and praxis of the justice and righteousness of that kingdom.’ The importance of the biblical doctrine of the Kingdom of God in Moltmann’s thought for both theology and ethics is unambiguous. What is needed, 

Mark 1:14–15. Moltmann, ET, p. xx.  Ibid., p. 15.  This has been noticed by Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, in his book The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001). The original German title for Müller-Fahrenholz’s book is Phantasie für das Reich Gottes. Die Theologie Jürgen Moltmanns. Eine Einführung. See also Heino Falcke, ‘Phantasie für das Reich Gottes: Der theologische Weg Jürgen Moltmanns’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 61, no. 2, 2001: 154–62. 

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then, is a systematic appraisal and critical analysis of Moltmann’s description of the constitutive elements of God’s Kingdom. The remaining task of the present chapter is to elucidate what precisely is Moltmann’s conception of the Kingdom. However, upon closer examination this is a far more difficult task than one might originally assume. This is in part due to Moltmann’s own ambiguity on the subject. What makes the task even more challenging within the confines of the present study is the fact this ambiguity becomes particularly noticeable when Moltmann employs the concept of the Kingdom of God in discussions with Church praxis or ethics. Often he will use the Kingdom of God as a formal concept in critiquing unjust or – as described in the previous chapter – structurally sinful situations. He rarely, however, employs the Kingdom of God as a material concept in articulating his view of the nature of the eschaton for which the Christian hopes. To state the matter more clearly, Moltmann will use the notion of the Kingdom of God as a foil to critique societal situations he perceives to be unjust, but less often will employ the notion to offer a positive description of the content of Christian hope. Thus, it would appear that when attempting to develop a theology of the Kingdom with precision from Jürgen Moltmann’s thought, the use he makes of the Kingdom – be it formal or material – requires careful, critical examination. Tensions surrounding the relationship between theological affirmations and ethical statements in Moltmann’s thought were noted early on by George Hunsinger. He comments that ‘the whole area of epistemology remains obscure in Moltmann’s thought’. Admittedly, Moltmann’s later books on the doctrine of God and Christology have attempted to clarify what he means by the Kingdom of God, though questions remain. Therefore, the primary task of this chapter is to explicate and assess Moltmann’s understanding of the Kingdom of God. To accomplish this, the present argument will offer a critical analysis of the material content of the Kingdom of God as it is expressed within Moltmann’s thought. This critical analysis will attempt to glean the positive contributions Moltmann has made to this particular theological theme while clarifying some ambiguities and contradictions in Moltmann’s thought. In this way, the present study aims to move beyond some of the more narrow limits of the ethical implications Moltmann draws from his interpretation of the Kingdom. To do this it will be necessary to carry the eschatological discussion of hope introduced in the first chapter further by incorporating a more thorough investigation of Moltmann’s Christology which examines Jesus within his social context. This will be coupled with an ancillary discussion of the important motif of ‘the coming of God’ (particularly as it relates to Christ’s role as judge) and its implications for a consistent articulation of what the consummation of God’s Kingdom implies for humanity and Christian ethical living in the  George Hunsinger, ‘The Crucified God and the Political Theology of Violence: A Critical Survey of Jürgen Moltmann’s Recent Thought, Part 1’, Heythrop Journal, vol. 14, no. 3, 1973: 277–8.  Ibid., p. 277.

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present. However, as noted above, these complex themes require clarification of Moltmann’s material understanding of the Kingdom of God and its use in both theological and ethical discourse. The Kingdom and Christology For Moltmann, the person of Jesus Christ is essential for a proper understanding of the Kingdom of God. He takes as his starting point the centrality of the Kingdom for Jesus of Nazareth in his life, vocation, and ultimately death and resurrection as the Messiah of God. Also, Moltmann maintains a firm understanding of this life, ministry and salvific work of Christ in death and resurrection as eschatological. Beginning with a discussion of Moltmann’s Christology, and prior to moving on to his doctrine of the Trinity, the material content of the Kingdom will be expounded with the aim of providing a clarified position from which to describe an ethics of hope. From the time he wrote The Crucified God, Moltmann affirmed that the Kingdom of God was inextricably linked with the person of Jesus. He says Jesus’ preaching of the Kingdom ‘is tied to his person and cannot be transferred to anyone else…’. For Moltmann, to think of Jesus as the Messiah is first of all to ‘ask what the word “messianic” meant for Judaism’. From this perspective, the person and life of Jesus can only be properly understood in light of his Jewish heritage and the prophetic promises of God found in Israel’s history as witnessed in the Hebrew scriptures. As such, Jesus presents both an affirmation and challenge for both Christianity and Judaism. Affirmatively, the Kingdom of God manifested in the person of Jesus provides both Judaism and Christianity with a common point of connection via a shared theological heritage. The challenge, however, is twofold. The challenge to Christianity is to view the world eschatologically. That is, the eschatological challenge to Christianity is to recognize the world as that which has not yet experienced the fullness of redemption or the consummation of the Kingdom. This is in contradistinction to an internalizing tendency Moltmann finds in some aspects of Christianity. The challenge to Jewish thought is to answer the question: ‘What divine will is really expressed in the mission and spread of

 Moltmann, CG, pp. 121, 123 (‘daß seine Verkündigung unabtretbar und unübertragbar an seine Person gebunden ist …’; Moltmann, Der gekreuzigte Gott, p. 114). See also Moltmann, ET, p. 130.  Moltmann, WJC, p. 1.  Ibid., pp. 28–32.

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Christianity?’10 Again, this challenge is linked to Jesus’ person as the saviour of the nations and to daily prayer for the coming of God’s Kingdom.11 This connection between Jesus’ person and God’s Kingdom leads Moltmann to explore Jesus within his social context, especially in his relationships with people through his proclamation and acts, particularly his healings. For Moltmann, Christ’s proclamation and his acts must be seen together.12 In line with certain prophetic texts in Isaiah (Is. 52:7), Moltmann sees Jesus’ proclamation as a herald of the Kingdom, but as one empowered and sent by the Spirit in unique ways. However, as the unique Son of God, Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom is inextricably linked with his person and mission in his relationship with his Father whom he called ‘Abba’. He says regarding Jesus’ preaching: ‘In the very act of its announcement, the messianic era is already put in force.’13 However, this preaching is not the fulfilment of the Kingdom, but rather the breaking in of the Kingdom which awaits its eschatological consummation: ‘The gospel is the light which salvation throws ahead of itself [Das Evangelium ist der Vorschein des Heils]. It is nothing less than the arrival of the coming of God in the word.’14 This proclamation is a gospel which, according to the gospel of Luke, is proclaimed to the poor.15 Moltmann defines the term ‘poor’ broadly. They are ‘the hungry, the unemployed, the sick, the discouraged, and the sad and suffering. The poor are the subjected, oppressed and humiliated people’.16 Jesus’ proclamation does not eliminate hunger of the poor per se, but proclaims to the poor ‘their future in the kingdom of God’ and offers them ‘a new dignity.’17 Notably, the counterterm for ‘poor’ is not rich, but ‘“the man of violence”, who makes someone else

Ibid., p. 37, contra Gerhard Sauter, who sees no mutual challenge between Judaism and Christianity, but rather views their ‘common hope’ as one and the same without Christological differentiation. See Gerhard Sauter, ‘Eine gemeinsame Hoffnung von Juden und Christen?’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 63, no. 5, 2003: 346–61. 11 Moltmann, WJC, pp. 36–7. 12 Ibid., p. 95. 13 Ibid. See also Moltmann, CG, p. 123. 14 Moltmann, WJC, p. 95. 15 Luke 4:18. 16 Moltmann, WJC, p. 99. Rasmusson has critiqued Moltmann’s concept of ‘the poor’ as being abstract and needing concretion before it can be useful in ethical discussions. See Rasmusson, The Church as Polis, p. 77. Earlier, Moltmann stated that poverty ‘extends from economic, social and physical poverty to psychological, moral and religious poverty’. It would appear that in Moltmann’s later Christology he is limiting ‘poverty’ more to socioeconomic phenomena. See Moltmann, CPS, p. 79. 17 Moltmann, WJC, pp. 100, 101, respectively. Here Moltmann cites Matthew 5:3, perhaps untenably, as evidence. Moltmann also notes that the proclamation of the Kingdom is not merely to the poor, but also discovers the Kingdom among the poor (p. 100). See also Moltmann, CPS, pp. 126–30. 10

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poor and enriches himself at the other’s expense’.18 Moltmann will appear later to use the term with ‘rich’ synonymously, but in such cases the term ‘rich’ should be understood as those who are in the position of benefiting themselves at the expense of the other. The nearness of God’s Kingdom in Jesus’ proclamation calls these rich to total conversion. They are meant to change and seek liberating community with the poor if they are to be included as citizens of the Kingdom. However, these suggestive ethical comments regarding Christ’s proclamation of the Kingdom of God are not taken further. If the Kingdom and therefore the proclamation of the Kingdom are bound to Christ’s historical person, then it is left unclear how a continuing proclamation of God’s eschatological consummation of the Kingdom may still conduct a transformative work among those who do violence to the poor. To offer clarity, Moltmann could have made explicit the connection between his ‘Spirit-Christology’19 and the ongoing work of the Spirit, in Paul’s terms ‘the Spirit of Christ’, through the divine work of justification in aligning sinners toward the eschatological Kingdom. It is through a person’s confrontation with Jesus in his person and his proclamation as the Son of God that the Spirit engages in a redemptive and reconciling work on the creature to bring her or him out of rebellion and sin into deference to and worship of God. This work changes the ontological and moral status of the creature from one of fallen sinfulness to new creation, thus enabling the creature to live within a new ethical state commensurate with the eschatological Kingdom of God. In this way there is a dialectic of present change and continued waiting for the eschatological consummation in the life of a person. This could be viewed in light of the scriptural comment that: ‘now we are children of God, and what we will be has not yet been made known. But we know that when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. Everyone who has this hope in him purifies himself, just as he is pure.’20 This could perhaps be a helpful way to interpret Moltmann’s comment that ‘God’s lordship is the presence of his kingdom, and God’s kingdom is the future of his lordship.’21 In addition to Jesus’ proclamation, Moltmann also views the Kingdom being bound with Jesus’ person through his acts, notably his healings and exorcisms.22 18

Moltmann, WJC, p. 99. On the positive and negative aspects of Moltmann’s ‘Spirit-Christology’, see Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), pp. 207–8. 20 1 John 3:2–3. 21 ‘Gottes Herrschaft ist die Gegenwart seines Reiches, und Gottes Reich ist die Zukunft seiner Herrschaft’; Moltmann, WJC, p. 98. 22 This is a key element which differentiates Moltmann from Pannenberg, the latter of whom appears to limit the association of Jesus’ earthly life and the Kingdom to proclamation. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, ed. Richard John Neuhaus (5th printing, Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 53–68. It should be noted, however, that Pannenberg does affirm the uniqueness of Jesus’ life and ministry in his divine sonship. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 303. Although for 19

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Despite such acts being commonplace in the ancient world, Moltmann contends that these acts, when performed by Jesus, are: unique; for this context is the dawn of the lordship of the divine life … the healing of the sick among the people are not a phenomena of the kind that was common coin in the ancient world …. Nor were they secondary phenomena attendant on Jesus’ message which can just as well be dispensed with. They are themselves the message.23

In line with Moltmann’s earlier eschatological thought, the presence of the Kingdom in Jesus’ healing ministry creates contradictions with the present circumstances of hurt and wounded people in a world still awaiting the fulfilment of God’s promises.24 For Moltmann, this is particularly noticeable in the exorcisms recorded in the synoptic gospels. He finds it significant that the first ones to declare Jesus’ Messiahship in Mark’s gospel after his baptism are demons.25 Again, the presence of the Kingdom in Jesus’ healing in no way diminishes the eschatological character of the Kingdom. Rather, the healings and exorcisms are to be viewed as the signs of the Kingdom, whereas salvation is its fulfilment. The dialectic of signs and salvation may be seen as the Christological correlate in Jesus’ ministry of the promise-fulfilment schema described from the history of Israel and the promise of resurrection described in Theology of Hope. Through an act of healing, Jesus makes the Kingdom present in the life of the afflicted and oppressed. In choosing to eat and commune with those who are rejected by the affluent authorities, Christ brought the Kingdom tangibly near in his person through these acts. This does not mean, however, that the fulfilment of Pannenberg ‘announcing the nearness of the divine reign’ was ‘at the heart of the message of Jesus’, it is such only in a sense similar to the ‘preliminary disclosure’ of Israel’s prophets. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmanns, 1994), pp. 259, 247, respectively. 23 Moltmann, WJC, pp. 104–5. For a different reading of Jesus’ healings, exorcisms and teaching as relating not to the dawning of the eschatological Kingdom but rather to a divine epiphany of the ‘Holy One of God’, see Berthold W. Köber, ‘Jesus – der Heilige Gottes: Die Heiligkeit Jesu im Zeugnis der Synoptiker in ihrer Bedeutung für Theologie und Glauben’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 62, no. 4, 2003: 304–17. 24 See Moltmann, TH, pp. 103–4. 25 Mark 1:23–4. See Moltmann, WJC, p. 105. Latin American theology has also noticed this conflictual nature of the Kingdom in both Jesus’ acts and proclamation as a conflict with that which is ‘anti-Kingdom’. See Jon Sobrino, Jesus The Liberator: A Historical-theological Reading of Jesus of Nazareth (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oats, 1994), pp. 89, 160, respectively. Moltmann has always had connections with Latin American theology, though not without tensions and controversy. Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz has argued these tensions are formative for Moltmann’s thought, although Falcke maintains he over-emphasizes its importance for Moltmann’s development. See Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, pp. 123–6; Falcke, ‘Phantasie für das Reich Gottes’, p. 156.

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the Kingdom has come. On the contrary, in the same fashion as the promises to Israel, the presence of the Kingdom in the life and ministry of Jesus creates greater expectation of eschatological fulfilment when complete healing and life are made available. These partial and temporary healings (all those reported to be healed by Christ eventually experienced death) create an even greater longing for complete and universal healing in salvation. This salvation is awaited in the promised resurrection of humanity and made possible through the resurrection of Christ from his crucifixion. In this, Moltmann maintains a dialectic of possible human involvement in the kingdom of God. On the one hand, the material content of the Kingdom, as expressed in liberating proclamation of the justifying grace of God who engages and reconciles sinners as ‘Abba’, is available for creaturely participation. Humanity, vitalized by the Spirit who was also with Jesus as Messiah, engages a world full of violence, structurally oppressive situations and human brokenness in a manner which contradicts the present state of sinfulness. As such, Christians live as a people who adhere to the life promised in the Kingdom of God and live commensurately with their identity as citizens of this Kingdom.26 On the other hand, fulfilment of this promise cannot be brought about by human ability, even ability understood within a robust pneumatological framework. The fulfilment of the promise comes only with the resurrection of the dead, which is entirely dependent on the beneficent work of God. Thus, there is both an open and a closed aspect to the possibility of human participation in the Kingdom of God. It is open ethically to human involvement as life empowered by the Spirit to live commensurately with the eschatological Kingdom of God through liberating praxis and restoration of the earth. It is closed to human involvement in the sense that consummation of the Kingdom can only come about through the eschatological working of God – that is, the resurrection of the dead and redemption of the cosmos. This eschatological emphasis, which has been discovered in Jesus’ words and deeds, created a longing for the day when these hopes would be fulfilled. After the resurrection of Christ from the dead, the resurrection of all the dead became a universal hope.27 This directed the prayers and longings of the Church to ask for Christ’s return, or parousia, in supplication.28 It was recognized that the hopes for the Kingdom promised in the resurrection of Christ and experienced in part through Jesus’ proclamation and healings would be consummated with the eschatological coming of Christ. Moltmann also takes up this hope, but reverses the question and asks what the parousia means for Christ.29 Because of this reversal, Moltmann 26

Eph. 2:12–13, 19. 1 Cor. 15:20–24. 28 This supplication for the return of Christ may be seen in the Maranatha prayer of the early Church. See Rev. 22:20. 29 Such a move can be seen elsewhere in Moltmann’s work and has contributed to certain aspects of his theological insights. See Moltmann, CG, p. 201; Moltmann, TKG, p. 21. Dealing specifically with the parousia, see Moltmann, WJC, p. 316. 27

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discusses the parousia not in his eschatology, but in his Christology. With this in mind, the connections between Christology and the Kingdom of God in Moltmann’s thought must now be brought into connection with his understanding of the eschatological coming of Christ. The image of ‘the way’ of Christ is essential for Moltmann’s Christology and is witnessed to in the very structure of the work.30 The parousia is the final phase of Christ’s way which also brings the consummation of God’s Kingdom. He says: ‘Christ’s parousia … does not merely “unveil” the salvific meaning of Christ’s death. It also, and much more, brings the fulfilment of the whole history of Christ, with all that it promises; for it is only with Christ’s parousia that “the kingdom that shall have no end” begins.’31 The Kingdom of God, it was noted above, is inextricably connected with the person of Jesus for Moltmann. Thus, the fulfilment of the promised Kingdom is achieved with Jesus’ coming. It is with this coming that Moltmann early on differentiated his eschatology from utopian hope.32 Moltmann emphasizes the contradiction of the promised future with the present (rather than a natural progression within history) by clarifying what he means by the eschatological ‘future’ (Zukunft). To do this, he differentiates between the future as futurum and as adventus.33 To clarify the nature of the parousia and its meaning for the Kingdom of God, Moltmann defines the German term Zukunft by extrapolating two linguistic alternatives to speak of the future. The first term, futurum, speaks of the future arising as a natural outcome of events experienced in the present. That is, it describes the future as that which develops out of the present. Futurum is a realization of the potentialities of the present as they extend towards the future. Conversely, the second term, adventus, reverses the temporal framework and speaks of that which comes. It is not the present developing into the future, but rather the potentialities of an open future coming toward the present and changing its lived characteristics. Moltmann defines his understanding of future as adventus. Thus, Moltmann speaks of the future (Zukunft) as the advent of God in Christ:

See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 205. Moltmann, WJC, p. 319. 32 Moltmann’s acceptance of Ernst Bloch was not uncritical. For Bloch, the fruition of utopian hopes arose out of the flow of history. It developed out of the past and present into the future. Moltmann differentiated himself from Bloch by asserting that Christian eschatology does not arise from history, but contradicts unfulfilled history; Bloch, The Principle of Hope. On the relationship between Moltmann and Bloch, see Bauckham, Moltmann, pp. 7–22, and briefly, Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, pp. 196–7. 33 Moltmann made this clarification early on, but takes it up again in his Christology. See Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Antwort auf die Kritik der Theologie der Hoffnung’, in W.D. Marsch (ed.), Diskussion über die ‘Theologie der Hoffnung’ (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1967), pp. 210ff; Jürgen Moltmann, The Future of Creation, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1979), pp. 29–31. Pertaining to the present discussion, see Moltmann, WJC, p. 317. 30 31

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If we call the destiny of Jesus ‘resurrection from the dead’, then we do not see his history as being separate from the divine future or Zukunft, which brings the Wholly Other as what-makes-wholly-other. If this future or Zukunft is made present in Christ, then and because of that the present determined by him becomes the germ of what is to come …. The presence of justification and reconciliation is the start of this transforming and changing Zukunft of the divine righteousness in an unrighteous and unreconciled existence.34

What the parousia of Christ brings is the fulfilment of the Kingdom of God. This inauguration of the Kingdom entails God’s righteousness prevailing over the present contradictions of suffering in the world and establishing justice rather than sin. However, Moltmann perceives various options with which to portray this advent of the Kingdom and judgment. The first, which is Moltmann’s option, is ‘the righteousness of God which creates justice’.35 Moltmann adroitly conceives of the Kingdom of God involving the judgment of God as one which establishes the finality and universality of God’s righteous rule. With this, the Kingdom of peace and healing comes to complete fruition: ‘God’s righteousness and justice creates peace. That is the meaning of the divine judgment.’36 Regarding God’s arbitration between those who are the victims of sinful actions in history and those who committed such acts, Moltmann affirms: It is quite clear that the divine righteousness which is under discussion … has nothing to do with rewards and punishments. It is a righteousness that creates justice and puts people right, so it is a redemptive righteousness (Isa. 1.27). ‘The day of the messiah’, like the day of Yahweh, is ultimately not a dies irae, a day of wrath. It is the day on which peace begins. By passing judgment on injustice and enmity [Durch das Gericht über Unrecht und Feindschaft], the messiah creates the preconditions [Voraussetzungen] for the universal kingdom of peace.37

With this perspective, Moltmann rejects the second option, which he describes as ‘the apocalyptic law of retaliation’.38 Moltmann describes this judgment as one that occurs individually and sees recompense given for works done in the present life. The apocalyptic law of retaliation conveys a divine judiciary which settles ‘[t]he conflict between the good and the godless, true believers and idolators, the children of light and the children of darkness’ at a Last Judgment.39 With this image of judgment, ‘the idea of divine righteousness which creates Moltmann, The Future of Creation, p. 30. Moltmann, WJC, p. 334. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 335. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., p. 336. 34 35

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justice recedes in favour of the righteousness which merely establishes facts and reacts accordingly’.40 Thus, the eschatological judgment of Christ, for Moltmann, is the act which institutes the Kingdom of God with finality. This Kingdom, which came near in the life of Jesus of Nazareth through liberating proclamation to the poor, table fellowship with sinners and outcasts, and healing for those who were broken, is consummated through the judgment of Christ. Therefore, Christ’s judgment mainly functions in a role of establishing these things with perfection: Judgment must be expected too, together with the consummation of Christ in the glory of God, for the perfecting of the kingdom includes the ending of injustice …. The judgment of the living and the dead is one more reason to hope for Christ’s coming; it is not a subject for fear …. He will not judge in order to punish the wicked and reward the good, but so as to make the saving righteousness of God prevail among them all …. The expectation of the Last Judgment must be integrated into the expectation of Christ, not vice versa. It must not become the projection of suppressed guilty fears, as a way of satisfying a masochistic lust for self-punishment. Nor, of course, must it become a projection for the notorious self-excuses of men and women …. The crucified One will be the judge, and he will judge according to his gospel. His saving righteousness will renew the world.41

Prior to engaging the ethical results arising from Moltmann’s perception of the eschatological judgment (which ushers in the Kingdom at Christ’s parousia), summary and clarification are needed regarding the precise nature of this judgment. It was noted above that through the distinction between the future (Zukunft) as futurum and adventus, Moltmann favours a conception of the eschatological future as adventus. For Moltmann, this means that the eschatological future – realized in the Kingdom of God – does not develop out of the natural course of events germane to the history of the unfulfilled present. Rather, the Kingdom of God comes to the present history of unfulfilment and structural improprieties to contradict it with the final, eschatological establishment of God’s rule. In this way, the promise of the Kingdom, secured in the resurrection of the crucified Messiah, contradicts the present time of sin with the coming future of God’s righteousness. This parousia of Christ, for Moltmann, includes a judgment, but not condemnation. Rather, Moltmann construes the eschatological judgment in a manner which makes it synonymous with the establishment of righteousness and an eschatological justification of the sinner. While Moltmann conveys his interpretation of what the eschatological judgment means for the Kingdom of God, he is less clear how this may occur. The judgment ushering in the Kingdom establishes a sphere of justice and 40

Ibid. Ibid., p. 315.

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righteousness where injustice and sorrow are no more. But how does this occur, and what is the role of the sinner, the oppressor or the ‘man of violence’ described in Jesus’ earthly vocation? In attempting to understand how Moltmann’s conception of judgment might be supplemented to provide broader theological support, the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg may provide the discussion with a helpful dialogue partner. Pannenberg makes much use of the category of purification.42 Beginning with the apostle Paul’s comments in 1 Corinthians 3:12–13, Pannenberg emphasizes judgment as the purgation of that which is sinful or works done in folly which are useless due to their deficit in bringing honour to Christ. The judged person ‘will suffer loss’ but will themselves be saved: ‘The possibility of this salvation at the judgment, however, depends on the relationship to God that on God’s side rests on Christ’s reconciling death and on our side on baptism and faith.’43 At Christ’s parousia, this purifying judgment is ‘the first and decisive function of Jesus’.44 However, this purifying judgment extends beyond the bounds of the Church. For those who have lived outside the historical availability of the Church’s proclamation of the reconciling work of Jesus for the Kingdom of God, Christ’s judgment would be meted out according to a person’s lived adherence to the virtues exemplary of the Kingdom: ‘For them the fact of personal encounter with Jesus through the church’s preaching, which depends on contingent and historical factors, cannot be decisive for eternal salvation. In their case what counts is whether their individual conduct actually agrees with the will of God that Jesus proclaimed.’45 In this ‘the message of Jesus’ regarding the material content of the Kingdom of God ‘is the standard of judgment’.46 ‘Thus the fire of judgment is purifying, not destructive, fire.’47 This brief detour via Pannenberg’s doctrine of judgment as purification provides depth and broader exegetical support to a theology of Christ’s judgment. This may offer a possible account for how an understanding of the role of judgment may be buoyed with more exacting theological argument. The Christological locus is maintained and the judgment experienced at the parousia is seen as instantiating the Kingdom of God by contradicting an unfulfilled present Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 611. 43 Ibid., p. 612. 44 Ibid., p. 613. 45 Ibid., p. 615. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 619. It must be noted, however, that Moltmann goes beyond Pannenberg in the universal scope of salvation. Pannenberg maintains, in light of some stark phrases in scripture, that some may not see salvation. He says: ‘In view of the plain NT statements on the matter we certainly cannot rule out the possibility of the eternal damnation of some. In certain cases nothing may remain when the fire of the divine glory has purged away all that is incompatible with God’s presence’; ibid., p. 620. For Moltmann’s mature theological arguments supporting universal salvation, see Moltmann, CoG, pp. 235–55. 42

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through the establishment of righteousness and justice in creation. This comes to completion in the resurrection of the dead secured through the promise given in Jesus’ own resurrection. In this sense, Moltmann can affirm that the ‘purpose of judgment is not condemnation. Its purpose is the re-socialization of the sinner in the kingdom of God.’48 It appears that Moltmann jettisons a stronger notion of judgment for two reasons. The first reason is theological. The second reason is ethical, and is derivative of the first. Moltmann is concerned that an apocalyptic notion of judgment is detrimental to a doctrine of God and does not have the crucifixion at its centre. Thus, Moltmann can state: ‘Because psychologically it has done so much to poison the idea of God [Gottesvergiftung], it is high time to discover the gospel of God’s judgment and to awaken joy in God’s coming righteousness and justice.’49 A stronger notion of judgment is Gottesvergiftung, according to Moltmann, because it lacks a Christological grounding in divine revelation: But if Jesus is the judge, can he judge according to any other righteousness than the law which he himself manifested [offenbart hat] – the law of love for our enemies, and the acceptance of the poor, the sick and sinners? Can the righteousness which the Last Judgment serves be any righteousness other than the righteousness of God which creates justice and redeems …? Does theology not involve the Christian faith in inward contradictions if what is expected of the great Judgment is something different from what God has revealed [offenbart hat] in Israel’s history and the history of Jesus Christ? … It is an eschatological question. But theologically it can be decided only in the framework of Christology.50

For Moltmann this theological assertion of apocalyptic judgment, which he sees as theologically unwarranted, has also led to inadequate ethical assertions. In affirming a notion of apocalyptic judgment, or hell, Moltmann sees religious justification for torture on earth. In addition to some biblical references, he cites examples from the Iranian revolution and prisoner camps in the Second World War as examples.51 This leads Moltmann to conclude: In the world of the imagination the two kinds of torture lent force to one another. Earthly torture was supposed to anticipate the eternal tortures of hell, thereby averting them; and the eternal tortures of hell were thought to justify earthly torture …. Anyone who is against torture and protests when ‘life is made hell’ 48 Jürgen Moltmann, Jesus Christ for Today’s World, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1994), p. 142. 49 Moltmann, CoG, p. 235. 50 Ibid., pp. 236–7. 51 Moltmann makes reference to Prov. 23:14, Matt. 5:30 and 1 Cor. 5:5 in the Christian tradition. See Moltmann, Jesus Christ for Today’s World, p. 59.

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for other people must get rid of this apocalyptic friend–enemy thinking. As long as there is a hell for God’s enemies – and ours – in religion, there will also be direct and indirect justifications for torture chambers on earth.52

Moltmann desires to counter such (un)ethical uses of judgment Christologically. In a move similar to that made in his Christology and his eschatology, Moltmann argues that if it is the same Jesus who was crucified that is judge, then ‘the tortured Christ mean[s] the end of torture, because he is the end of every possible justification of torture, whether it be religious or secular’.53 Then, maintaining the dialectic of cross-resurrection, Moltmann states: Resurrection also means: the dead return, those who have gone rise again, the nameless are called by their names. That is judgment. Ultimately the murderers will not triumph over their victims …. If the judge of the torturers is called Christ, then these torturers are confronted by someone who has been tortured. That is the moment of truth. The mask falls. The torturer recognizes himself for what he is. That is judgment.54

Therefore, Moltmann argues that an apocalyptic notion of judgment is both inadequate and inappropriate for a Christian understanding of the Kingdom of God because it lacks Christological warrant. Moreover, this view of judgment at the parousia of Christ can be used to justify unethical actions such as torture, which must also be critiqued Christologically. The impact of the above discussion is of utmost importance for a theology seeking to explore the moral implications of Christian hope and the Kingdom of God. In the resurrection of the crucified Christ, God gave a history-creating promise for a future which contradicts the sin and suffering experienced in the present. This promised future is the final consummation of the Kingdom of God. For Moltmann, this promised Kingdom of God is indissolubly linked with the person of Jesus Christ. Thus, the Christological locus of the Kingdom must be maintained if an understanding of the Kingdom is to be a Christian understanding. Moltmann maintains this Christological focus while extrapolating its eschatological nature by examining the life, vocation and person of Jesus. In Jesus’ proclamation and deeds, he embodies the Kingdom and brings it near. The signs given by Jesus create an increased expectation for salvation (as did the promises given to Israel). This salvation takes on universal scope with the promise for the resurrection of the dead and redemption of the cosmos. The universal scope of the Kingdom is consummated with the parousia of Christ in his universal lordship. Therefore, both the earthly ministry of Jesus and his eschatological advent have ethical implications for Christian morality. 52

Ibid., pp. 60–61. Ibid., p. 64. 54 Ibid., pp. 67, 69. 53

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Jesus’ embodiment of the Kingdom in liberating proclamation to the poor, table fellowship with sinners and outcasts, as well as his healings of sick and rejected people, may be participated in by Christians in the present. Jesus, as one sent out by the Holy Spirit,55 showed what type of living was commensurate with the Kingdom. Thus, Church indwelt by the same Spirit submits itself in deference to God and faithfully adheres to the divine will. In this way, the Church maintains its identity as a people of promise. This promise for the Kingdom of God provides not merely the knowledge, but also the means to live in faithful discipleship. The Church does this as an exodus community, or a contrast society (Kontrastgemeinschaft).56 That is, because the Church is a people of promise, the present state of reality is no longer commensurate with lived Christian identity. Therefore, as an exodus community or contrast society, the Church lives in contradistinction to every aspect of present life which does not conform to the content of the promised Kingdom. This content is determined Christologically from within the believing community: ‘Christology emerges from Christian living and leads into Christian living.’57 This insight led the present investigation to explore the nature of the fulfilment of the divine promise for the Kingdom of God. For Moltmann, this fulfilment, exemplified in the resurrection of the dead, occurs at the parousia of Christ. As Christ’s future with the Kingdom is described as adventus, Jesus comes as judge of the world and contradicts the present characterized by sin and brokenness with the establishment of his Kingdom of righteousness and justice. The ethical implications of this construal of Christ’s judgment were explored in contradistinction to what Moltmann calls ‘the apocalyptic law of retaliation’. However, it is this final point which must be critically examined. Is Moltmann’s theology of Christ’s eschatological judgment, which consummates the Kingdom of God with his coming, adequate for the biblical description of this event? Moreover, are the ethical improprieties Moltmann is concerned with necessitated by a stronger view of judgment? To be sure, Moltmann argues for a Christological locus for all theological statements regarding eschatological judgment. He also is emphatic in insisting that a theology of judgment not be either a ‘projection of suppressed guilty fears’ or ‘a masochistic lust for self-punishment’.58 These are elements which both theology and ecclesial life would do well to learn. However, even with this in mind, it would seem that such a one-sided view of judgment and its ethical ramifications may not be warranted. To examine a possible alternative, the discussion will now turn to a brief examination of certain passages in the book of Revelation to explore what theological options may be available for an ethics of hope. The goal of the following discussion is not to argue for the merits or shortcomings of Moltmann’s proposed universalism. Rather, the following argument will have a more narrow 55

Matt. 3:16; Mark 1:12. Moltmann, WJC, p. 122. 57 Ibid., p. 43. 58 Ibid., p. 315. 56

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focus in exploring possible ethical alternatives that may be derived from a more exegetically grounded view of Christ’s judgment. When studying the book of Revelation, the historical context of ancient Rome must be kept firmly in view. The prophetic critique of Rome’s military power as a beast and economic affluence and oppression as a harlot provide the contextual backdrop for the seer’s vision of Christ’s judgment.59 The primary Christological symbol in Revelation is that of the Lamb of God.60 This symbol, using exodus and Passover imagery, keeps the image of the crucified Christ firmly in the forefront of the reader’s purview. Yet the visions in Revelation also perceive Christ as judge of those who do evil. In the context of an economic critique of Rome61 found in the eighteenth chapter, the seer continues describing the scenario playing out before him to portray Christ’s judgment: Then I saw heaven opened, and there was a white horse! Its rider is called Faithful and True, and in righteousness he judges and makes war …. He is clothed in a robe dipped in blood, and his name is called The Word of God. From his mouth comes a sharp sword with which to strike down the nations, and he will rule them with a rod of iron; he will tread the wine press of the fury of the wrath of God the Almighty. On his robe and on his thigh he has a name inscribed, ‘King of kings and Lord of lords.’62

In this image of judgment, the coming of Christ sets right the unjust actions of the Roman state. For those who have wrongly suffered violence at the hands of the Imperium, that violence will come to an end because with the judgment of Christ there is a cessation of the idolatrous Imperial rule. Thus far, Moltmann would be in agreement. However, this judgment goes beyond what Moltmann envisions as the establishment of righteousness. It also appears to go beyond a purgation solely of sinful elements within society. Indeed, the form of Christological judgment envisioned at this juncture in Revelation appears to be dramatic in its scope and horrific for those who experience it. Moreover, it does appear to contain a strong element of violence against those who are perpetrators of injustice. How is one to thereby escape the negative ethical implications Moltmann fears from images such as these? Revelation itself provides a clue. A judgment such as the one described above is not an arbitrary event in Revelation, but rather the response to a promise. In a vision where the Christological symbol of the Lamb is at the fore, the sixth chapter of Revelation describes the See Richard Bauckham, The Theology of the Book of Revelation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 35–7. 60 Revelation 5:6–10ff. 61 See Richard Bauckham, ‘The Economic Critique of Rome in Revelation 18’, in The Climax Of Prophecy: Studies on the Book of Revelation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), pp. 338–83. 62 Revelation 19:11–16. 59

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opening of the fifth seal. In this vision the saints are shown as those who are the victims of violence: ‘They cried out with a loud voice, “Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long will it be before you judge and avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the earth?”’63 Here the saints appear to fall into the desires Moltmann rightly rejects above. That is, they desire the suffering of their oppressors and long to see their undoing. The divine injunction responds with neither compliance nor a command to take up arms against the oppressors. On the contrary, they were ‘told to rest a little longer’ and await the judgment of the Lamb.64 The saints described here in Revelation are not instructed to respond in like manner for their persecutions. Rather, they are called upon to persevere.65 It would appear that in these places an apocalyptic vision of judgment in no way legitimizes unethical actions such as torture. Rather, the eschatological judgment of Christ, which brings the Kingdom of God, functions as a corrective and chastisement for any human presumption which might seek to carry out this judgment of its own accord. Thus, the ethical ramifications for a stronger perception of Christ’s judgment can be exegetically supported to bring a cessation to human violence as being incommensurate with a proper human response to the promise of God’s Kingdom. It would appear that with the vision of Revelation, it is not Christ’s judgment that brings human violence, but rather human attempts to idolatrously usurp the role of lord and judge (such as the Roman emperor), which lies solely with Christ. Conclusion Thus far, the study has attempted to delineate more clearly the material content of the Zwischenraum created by the divine promise for the future. This ‘interval’ is a sphere created by God in history where Christian ethical engagement lives commensurately with the promised future, but in contradistinction to an unfulfilled present. It does this by characterizing the Church as an ‘exodus community’ or ‘contrast society’ whose lived characteristics adhere to the Kingdom of God. Moltmann defines the eschatological Kingdom of God in Christological terms. This necessitated an investigation into Moltmann’s description of the life and vocation of Jesus Christ. It was discovered that Jesus’ embodiment of the Kingdom entailed table fellowship with sinners, liberating proclamation and praxis for the poor, and healing to those who are broken. These foretastes of the Kingdom are open 63

Revelation 6:10. Revelation 6:11. As with the nineteenth chapter, the judgment (here specifically attributed to the Lamb) is also described as being most unpleasant for those who undergo it (Revelation 6:16–17). 65 G.K. Beale, The Book of Revelation: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 394. Beale rightly notes that the saints in 6:9–11 are requesting a vindication of God’s righteousness, but downplays the request of the saints for an avenging of their own blood upon those who inhabit the earth. See ibid., p. 392. 64

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to present participation by those empowered by the Holy Spirit to do so. These participations create even further longing for the universal coming of the Kingdom in Christ’s parousia which brings the resurrection of the dead. It was then argued, contra Moltmann, that the eschatological judgment of Christ acts as a corrective to unjust human action in the present by maintaining a clear deference to the future of Christ’s judgment. In arguing this, the broad structure of the argument outlined in Theology of Hope was maintained, but brought into clearer focus and taken further by addressing specific theological issues surrounding human conduct. This provides an example of how eschatological hope for the Kingdom of God may govern Christian moral action through strong theological grounding. The argument supporting a theology of eschatological hope informing Christian moral conduct must still be taken further. Moltmann maintains that while for the sake of clarity and precision Christology must be discussed in its own right, it cannot be divorced from its Trinitarian context. This was especially seen in Moltmann’s articulation of a ‘pneumatological Christology’. Therefore, the present discussion will move forward by examining the pneumatological ramifications of an eschatological understanding of Christian moral hope. Maintaining a Christological locus as the starting point, theological discussion of the Kingdom of God will go on to investigate this theme within the doctrinal affirmation that God is Triune. Moltmann’s ‘universal pneumatology’ (ganzheitliche Pneumatologie) will provide the link between Christ’s eschatological work for the Kingdom of God and the availability of human participation in the moral dimensions of the Kingdom within history. From this, the subsequent implications for a moral theology of hope will be articulated.

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Chapter 3

Hope and the Spirit of God Introduction The trajectory of the work thus far has sought to critically explicate the manner in which Moltmann’s theology of hope has ethical import for Christian life and thought. It has been argued that Moltmann’s conception of eschatological, Christian hope is rooted in the divine promise as witnessed to in the history of Israel narrated in scripture. This motif of promise reaches its zenith in the resurrection of the crucified Christ. This resurrection acts as the sealing of the divine promise for the consummated Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God was made manifest in the life, vocation and death of Jesus. It is rooted in his person and inextricably united with him. Through Jesus’ healing ministry, table fellowship with ‘sinners’ and the poor, through the exorcism of demons and openness to the other, he embodied the nature of the Kingdom. For any ethical theology seeking commensurability with the Kingdom of God and its centrality in the person of Jesus, the material content for such a theology must adhere to the contours of Christ’s person and vocation. However, if the Kingdom of God is indissolubly connected with the person of Jesus of Nazareth in his historical specificity, how may the Kingdom be perceived to be working in the present? More precisely, how may theology understand the Kingdom of God to shape Christian action in the present if the promised Kingdom is manifest in Jesus Christ and still awaiting its consummation? For Moltmann, the answer lies in pneumatology. It was briefly noted in the previous chapter that Moltmann argues for a Spirit-Christology. This Spirit-Christology does not necessitate a denial of a two-nature Christology, but rather attempts to bring to light features of the Spirit’s impact on the life of Christ within a Trinitarian framework. Spirit-Christology was featured in the Synoptic gospels as well as some post-apostolic fathers. The Kingdom of God was empowered in Christ’s life because of his identity as the Son stemming from his relationship with the Father. To complete the Trinitarian framework of Jesus’ life, Moltmann understands this relationship to occur in the power of the Holy Spirit, thus inaugurating the Kingdom of God. It is the ongoing historical efficacy of the Spirit which constitutes the continuing presence of the Kingdom of God in Church and world. This in no way denigrates the future horizon of Christian hope for the Kingdom, but rather



Moltmann, WJC, p. 74. See Jan Veenhof, ‘Pneumachristologie’, Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 59, no. 4, 2003: 312–15. 

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structures the initial fulfilment of the divine promise, which creates a surplus of expectation and hope for the eschatological novum. It is the aim of this chapter to analyse and assess the impact of Moltmann’s pneumatology on the current theological description of an eschatological understanding of Christian moral action. This will be accomplished initially by examining the specificity of the Spirit’s personhood, particularly in its relationship to Christ and the eschatological future. Having completed this, the discussion will progress to develop how Moltmann understands the Spirit’s work in both its anthropological and cosmological dimensions. Several ethical motifs arise from Moltmann’s understanding of the Spirit’s work, such as a theology of life, liberation and sanctification. Criticism of certain aspects of Moltmann’s pneumatology will need to be made, thus providing greater coherence with where the present work has diverged from Moltmann previously. Also, to seek a firmer theological ground to discuss certain implications Moltmann elucidates from his work, a more biblically argued understanding of the Spirit’s immanence must be developed. With this overview in mind, the discussion may now begin with an investigation to Moltmann’s understanding of the Spirit’s person. Aspects of the Spirit’s Person Moltmann differentiates his view of the Holy Spirit from other theologies on two primary issues. First, Moltmann eschews the tendencies of German idealism to convey the Holy Spirit in terms of the human spirit or the ‘spirit’ of history. Following Barth, Moltmann affirms a necessary division between the divine Spirit and creaturely humanity. In his 1929 lectures, Barth clearly affirms ‘that God’s life, which is styled in the Bible as also Spirit, Holy Spirit, for this reason is not identical with what we recognize as our own created life of the spirit or the soul’. Moltmann would likewise agree with Barth in affirming that the Holy Spirit’s ‘true continuity’ with humanity is ‘that in the revelation of God to the human spirit [the Holy Spirit] is not present in any other guise than the eschatological one’. In this, Moltmann emphasizes the divinity of the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity. As such, the Spirit, in its divinity, is not to be equated with either human will or creaturely reality. Rather, the Holy Spirit is God and is to be both worshipped and glorified together with the Father and the Son, as the Nicene Creed affirms. However, Moltmann criticizes Barth’s understanding of eschatology as dealing with a non-temporal eternity, rather than ‘with the future of the new creation of all things’.  Karl Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological Basis of Ethics, trans. R. Birch Hoyle (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993), p. 3.  Ibid., p. 59.  Moltmann, SL, p. 7. This is similar to Moltmann’s criticism of Barth made in 1964. See Moltmann, TH, pp. 50–58. It should be noted that Moltmann fails to account for Barth’s

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The second issue which distinguishes Moltmann’s pneumatology is the Trinitarian emphasis he maintains, thus clearly specifying the Spirit’s personhood. Moltmann clearly specifies the Spirit’s unique subjectivity so as to avoid possible misunderstandings which may arise from his own Spirit-Christology. Certain pneumatologies working from a Spirit-Christology framework conflate the person of the Spirit with the person of Christ, particularly the glorified Christ after his resurrection. One such example is that of Hendrikus Berkhof. Berkhof argues that Christ and the Spirit are ‘identical’ and ‘the Spirit is Christ in action’. Citing John 7:39 and 1 Corinthians 15:45, Berkhof states: ‘Christ, as the risen and exalted Lord, is the Spirit.’ Therefore, the resurrected and exalted Lord is the ‘new manifestation of the Spirit’. Moltmann criticizes Berkhof as advocating a binity within the Godhead which is contradictory to the biblical witness of the history of God in Christ. For Berkhof, the Spirit is merely Christ’s efficacy. Therefore, Berkhof surrenders a Trinitarian theology in favour of a modalist one.10 In contradistinction to both German Idealism and modalist trends, Moltmann attempts to ground his pneumatology from within ‘the Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world’.11 From within this broader Trinitarian framework, Moltmann states: ‘The Spirit of God works in history as the creator of a new future and as the new creator of what is transient for this future.’12 This is to in no way downplay the role of the Father and the Son, but rather to emphasize the uniqueness of the Spirit’s role in the Trinitarian workings of God.13 The Trinitarian history of God with the world begins with the history of the promise. This history of promise culminates in the cross and resurrection of Christ. In the cross, the Son of God seeks solidarity with the suffering of this world and, as the apostle Paul states, God ‘made him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the righteousness of God in him’.14 In the resurrection, the power of death was conquered and the promise for life made sure. As noted from Paul’s comment above, this history of God in the world has soteriological effect. Its soteriological rooting the eschatological nature of the Spirit’s presence in divine promise and his emphasis on the future orientation of the eschatological Spirit. See Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life, pp. 59–68.  Veenhof, ‘Pneumachristologie’, pp. 316–20. Veenhof locates Berkhof among recent Spirit-Christologies, although Berkhof’s understanding of the Holy Spirit is more adequately understood as a ‘Christological-pneumatology’.  Hendrikus Berkhof, The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1982), pp. 25, 26, respectively.  Ibid., p. 26.  Ibid., p. 27. 10 See Moltmann, SL, p. 13. 11 Moltmann, CPS, p. 5. 12 Ibid., p. 191. 13 Ibid., p. 64. 14 2 Cor. 5:21.

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effect is to make participation in the saving righteousness of God available to all. This is what is experienced in the Kingdom. In turn, this participation in God’s Kingdom moulds the nature of Christian life to be commensurate with the salvific and ethical content of the Kingdom. This eschatological way of life is in tension with the unfulfilled present: ‘The messianic history of life runs counter to the history of the suffering of the world which leads to death, and approaches it from the future.’15 This has salient ramifications for the life of the Church as those who bear witness to the crucified and risen Christ. Those whose life adheres to the divine promise have yet to experience the consummation of the promise and therefore live in contradistinction to the unfulfilled present. If the person of Jesus and his vocation are the embodiment of God’s Kingdom, then the completion of Christ’s mission in his suffering on the cross likewise has import for a theological description of the Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world. It is in reference to these concepts that Moltmann may repeatedly use the phrase ‘the history of God in the world’. If this phrase were to be taken in isolation from the broader theological context explicated by Moltmann, then it could appear as though God were to be located within, or perhaps confined by, time and history. However, if God is creating history,16 through the divine Spirit and the possibilities available in the promise, this cannot be the case.17 In this regard, Moltmann clarifies the issue: [T]he theology of the cross also has cosmological dimensions, because it sees the cosmos in the eschatological history of God. For the ‘history of God’, whose nucleus is the event of the cross, cannot be thought of as history in the world, but on the contrary makes it necessary to understand the world in this history …. The ‘history of God’ is no ‘inner-worldly’ possibility, but on the contrary the world is a possibility and a reality in this history …. The history of God is then to be thought of as the horizon of the world; the world is not the be thought of as the horizon of his history.18

Thus, it would appear more likely that, for Moltmann, the Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world is not a historicizing of God, but rather a theologizing of history. This history occurs through the soteriological events of Christ’s cross 15

Moltmann, CG, p. 165. Moltmann, TH, p. 104. 17 Such critiques are common among those engaging with Moltmann’s conception of the immanence of the Spirit in creation. See, Mark W.G. Stibbe, ‘A British Appraisal’, Journal of Pentecostal Theology, vol. 4, 1994: 12. See also Dietrich Korsch, ‘Gottes Geist – der Geist des Lebens: Aussichten und Schwierigkeiten gegenwärtiger Pneumatologie’, Theologische Rundschau, vol. 58, no. 2, 1993: 207–12. While there are problems with this, as will be discussed below, the pneumatological relationship with history should not be included among them. 18 Moltmann, CG, pp. 218–19. 16

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and resurrection via the divine promise. With Paul, Moltmann sees the Spirit at work in Christ’s resurrection.19 Because of the soteriological import of Christ’s death and resurrection, the Trinitarian history of God means justification. It is the power of the Holy Spirit which mediates this salvific history to humanity: ‘For the Spirit leads to the fellowship of Christ and consummates the messianic kingdom.’20 Moltmann goes on to claim that this mediation occurs through the Church: ‘In the longer range history of the Spirit the church is a way and a transition to the kingdom of God. It lives in the experience and practice of the Spirit from the eschatological anticipation of the kingdom.’21 In this way, ‘the church is the eschatological creation of the Spirit’.22 This gloss on the role of the Spirit in its intra-Trinitarian relationships, particularly the inauguration of the Church in the Kingdom of God, shows how Moltmann’s understanding of the Trinitarian history of God illustrates the unique specificity of the Spirit’s person vis-à-vis the Father and the Son. Just as Moltmann sees the specificity of the Spirit’s person exhibited in the broader framework of the Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world, so he also understands the Spirit’s unique subjectivity to be displayed within the more narrow framework of the life and vocation of Jesus Christ. Moltmann states: Jesus’ history as the Christ does not begin with Jesus himself. It begins with the ruach/the Holy Spirit …. We are starting with a pneumatological Christology, because we discover that the efficacy of the divine Spirit is the first facet of the mystery of Jesus. In this way we are taking up Israel’s messianic history of promise as the presupposition of every New Testament Christology, and are developing Christology out of the Jewish contours of the messianic promise.23

It is this history of the Spirit with Jesus which, according to Moltmann, is the purpose of the gospel narrative of the virgin birth24 and brought to a place of primacy in the synoptic accounts of Jesus’ baptism. It is the influence of the Spirit on Jesus that empowers his earthly ministry. The miraculous works, healings, exorcisms, proclamation and life of Jesus were given vitality and authority through the Spirit’s work. To be sure, Moltmann does not downplay the uniqueness of Christ in justification through the cross and resurrection. Rather, he attempts to understand Christ’s work within its broader Trinitarian setting. In this way, Moltmann can say:

19

Rom. 1:4; 8:11. Moltmann, WJC, pp. 248–50. See also 1 Tim. 3:16 and 1 Pet. 3:18. Moltmann, CPS, p. 3. 21 Ibid., p. 35. 22 Ibid., p. 33. 23 Moltmann, WJC, pp. 73–4. 24 Ibid., pp. 78–87. 20

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If the fullness of Yahweh’s ruach/the Holy Spirit was alive in Jesus, then this energy is also the worker of all his works …. In considering Jesus’ baptism and his endowment with the Spirit too, we have to understand the Spirit as the creative energy of God and the vital energy of everything that lives. In the Old Testament traditions, the Spirit is also the divine saving power through which God led Israel out of slavery into the land of freedom. In thinking about the power of the Spirit in Jesus as well, we have to proceed from this saving experience of Israel’s, which was an experience of the divine Spirit … the continuing presence of this Spirit implies the beginning of the end-time deliverance of men and women, the new creation and the manifestation of God’s glory. The continuing presence of the Spirit in Jesus is the true beginning of the kingdom of God, and of the new creation in history.25

Thus, Jesus and the Holy Spirit are distinct in Moltmann’s thought, although not to be conceived in isolation from one another. For Moltmann, these two persons of the Trinity share a mutual influence on one another and also with the Father, with a different person having a more primary role in the distinct phases of the Trinitarian history.26 Although the Trinitarian history and unique work of Christ play a primary role in Moltmann’s understanding of the personhood of the divine Spirit, it is not limited to these. As Moltmann’s pneumatology matures, he increasingly conceives of the personhood of the Spirit being manifest in cosmological or universal categories. He does this while maintaining the transcendent emphasis of the Spirit’s person and ontological differentiation from the created order, which he inherited from Barth.27 In Moltmann’s more recent work, the person of the Spirit has taken on a more prominent role when compared with his earlier dialectical and Christological motifs. There are two primary avenues of thought Moltmann explores when utilizing more cosmological and universal language to describe the Spirit. The first area is in Moltmann’s doctrine of creation, which despite being firmly placed within a Christological perspective, incorporates a robust pneumatology to discuss God’s person in the creation of the cosmos. This pneumatological emphasis in Moltmann’s Gifford lectures is a part of what he calls an ‘ecological doctrine of creation’ (ökologische Schöpfungslehre).28 This ‘ecological’ view of creation ‘takes as its starting point the indwelling divine Spirit of creation [einwohnenden göttlichen Schöpfungsgeist ausgeht] …’.29

25

Ibid., pp. 91–2. This will be explored in greater detail with reference to the inner-Trinitarian relations in the next chapter. 27 Laurence W. Wood, ‘From Barth’s Trinitarian Christology to Moltmann’s Trinitarian Pneumatology’, Asbury Theological Journal, vol. 55, no. 1, 2000: 59–60. 28 Moltmann, GC, p. 1. 29 Ibid., p. xiv. 26

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The second avenue of thought from which Moltmann derives a cosmological view of the Holy Spirit is his interpretation of the ruach of Yahweh in his exegesis of the Hebrew scriptures. A primary text for Moltmann in this regard is Joel 2:28–9 (seen in eschatological perspective through Acts 2:16–21): ‘And afterward, I will pour out my Spirit on all people. Your sons and daughters will prophesy, your old men will dream dreams, your young men will see visions. Even on my servants, both men and women, I will pour out my Spirit in those days.’30 In this and other scriptural passages, Moltmann sees what he calls an ‘immanent-transcendence’.31 The phrase ‘immanent-transcendence’ is used by Moltmann to express the close proximity the Spirit has with the creature (immanence) while maintaining the essential otherness of the Spirit as divine (transcendence). This immanenttranscendence is connected with the Spirit’s eschatological work, thus linking it with Christology. Therefore, Moltmann can affirm ‘that it is pneumatology that brings Christology and eschatology together. There is no mediation between Christ and the kingdom of God except the present experience of the Spirit …’.32 This eschatological trajectory of Moltmann’s pneumatology is for the re-creation of all things, therefore his understanding of the Spirit’s person in ‘creation-in-thebeginning’ must first be explicated. In God in Creation, Moltmann emphasizes the Spirit as one who indwells and creation as the place of the Spirit’s indwelling. Müller-Fahrenholz notes that this accent on indwelling is what makes Moltmann’s theology ‘ecological’. That is, by understanding the root of the word ‘ecological’ to stem from the Greek word oikos, the connection with Moltmann’s view of the Spirit’s immanence is clear.33 In creation, as in all of God’s works within creation, the work is conducted in the power of the Holy Spirit. Moltmann understands this view of the Spirit to be illustrated in scripture. Therefore, he says: According to the biblical traditions, all divine activity is pneumatic in its efficacy. It is always the Spirit who first brings the activity of the Father and the Son to its goal. It follows that the triune God also unremittingly breathes [inspiriert] the Spirit into his creation. Everything that is, exists and lives in the unceasing 30

In this instance, Moltmann is referencing Luther’s Bible (1545). Luther translates the passage: ‘Und nach diesem will ich meinen Geist ausgießen über alles Fleisch, und eure Söhne und Töchter sollen weissagen; eure Ältesten sollen Träume haben, und eure Jünglinge sollen Gesichte sehen; auch will ich mich zur selben Zeit über Knechte und Mägde meinen Geist ausgießen.’ Moltmann interprets the Spirit being poured on ‘all flesh’ in terms of all creation, including both human and non-human creation. See Moltmann, SL, pp. 56–7, 212; Moltmann, GC, pp. 98–103; Jürgen Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), p. 12. 31 See, with critique, Korsch, ‘Gottes Geist – der Geist des Lebens’, p. 211. 32 Moltmann, SL, p. 69. 33 See Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, p. 154.

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inflow of the energies and potentialities of the cosmic Spirit. This means that we have to understand every created reality in terms of energy, grasping it as the realized potentiality of the divine Spirit. Through the energies and potentialities of the Spirit, the Creator is himself present in his creation. He does not merely confront it in his transcendence; entering into it, he is also immanent in it.34

Moltmann argues that an ecological understanding of creation requires ‘a new kind of thinking about God’. He maintains: ‘The centre of this thinking is no longer the distinction between God and the world. The centre is the recognition of the presence of God in the world and the presence of the world in God.’35 Moltmann uses the Eastern doctrine of the ‘energies’ of the Spirit to describe faith’s perception of the Spirit’s indwelling.36 These energies of the Spirit are for the vivification and sustaining of life in creation. Through the living energies of the Spirit, Moltmann argues that God is open to creation and indwells creation. The energies communicated to creation by the Spirit are not merely for creationin-the-beginning, but also bring creation into eschatological perspective.37 This eschatological immanence of the Spirit is present to the Christian through Christ’s salvific work accomplished in the cross and resurrection. Therefore, this construal of the Spirit as immanent adheres to the Pauline affirmation of the Christian being the ‘temple of the Holy Spirit’.38 Furthermore, Moltmann states that: the God who has made the world through his wisdom, and keeps it in existence through his Spirit, has always entered into it as well. God the Spirit dwells in creation, preparing it to be the place of glorification. We must only distinguish between the one indwelling and the other. They are not the same, and they do not take place on the same level.39

Moltmann argues that this eschatological trajectory of creation-in-the-beginning stems from the coupling of God’s resolve to be both Creator of the universe and Revealer of the divine glory. Indeed, for Moltmann the two are inextricably linked and to separate them would be facile. God’s freedom is not an arbitrary act of the will, but rather stems from the divine resolve and freedom that cannot be manifested in ways other than those that adhere to the divine nature, which

34

Moltmann, GC, p. 9. Moltmann specifically cites Psalm 104:29–30 to illustrate the dependence of creation on the presence of Yahweh’s ruach. 35 Moltmann, GC, p. 13. 36 For a Protestant interpretation of the Eastern concept of energeia and the person of the Spirit with social implications, see Andreas Schüle, ‘Gottes Geist in geistloser Zeit’, Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 60, no. 1, 2004: 62–79. 37 Moltmann, History and the Triune God, pp. 70–79. 38 1 Cor. 6:19. See also 1 Cor. 3:16. 39 Moltmann, GC, p. 150.

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is love.40 This act of love entails divine communion with the creature and a resolve to reveal the divine glory in the Kingdom of God. In fact, Moltmann speaks of God’s decision to reveal the divine glory as being anterior to his resolve to be creator. Indeed, the former is a necessary predicate of the latter. He states: The creation of a world different from himself is the first step towards realizing this eternal resolution to reveal the glory that is the essence of this nature. God decides for the kingdom first of all, and then for creation. Consequently it is the kingdom that determines creation, and creation is the real promise of the kingdom. So although it is certainly true that a revelation of God’s will is present in creation first of all, creation’s goal and end is the eschatological revelation of God’s nature in glory.41

Moltmann conceives of this divine resolve for creation through the Kabbalistic doctrine of zimsum. ‘Zimsum means concentration and contraction, and signifies a withdrawing of oneself into oneself.’ Therefore, for Moltmann, ‘The existence of a world outside God is made possible by an inversion of God.’42 The presupposition for Moltmann’s use of zimsum is God’s omnipresence. Therefore, in order for God to create something which is other, God must first of all create space where the divine presence is not. In this way, Moltmann contends, God ‘contracts’ Godself in order that creation may by brought out of the nihil. Moltmann’s understanding of zimsum has three implications: 1. God makes room for his creation by withdrawing his presence …. 2. God ‘withdraws himself from himself to himself’ in order to make creation possible. His creative activity outward is preceded by this humble divine self-restriction [Selbstbescheidung Gottes]…. This self-restricting love [Diese sich selbst bescheidende Liebe] is the beginning of that self-emptying of God which Philippians 2 sees as the divine mystery of the Messiah…. 3. If God is creatively active into that ‘primordial space’ which he himself has ceded and conceded, does he then create ‘outwards’? Of course it is only through the yielding up of the nihil that a creation ex nihilo is conceivable at all. But if creation ad extra takes place in the space freed by God himself, then in this case the reality outside God still remains in the God who has yielded up that ‘outwards’ in himself.43

Moltmann goes on to interpret his understanding of zimsum in Trinitarian terms, but with special implications for pneumatology: ‘The Father is the creating origin

40

1 John 4:8, 16. Moltmann, GC, p. 81. 42 Ibid., p. 87. 43 Ibid., pp. 87–9. 41

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of creation, the Son its shaping origin, and the Spirit its life-giving origin.’44 As the ‘life-giving origin’, the vivifying energies of the Spirit give life its vitality: ‘The One who gives life to the world and allows it to participate in God’s eternal life is the creative Energy – the Spirit.’45 One potential problem with Moltmann’s conception of zimsum is the possibility that such considerations introduce history into the being of God, thereby limiting God to the vicissitudes of the created history. Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson maintain precisely this, and therefore reject Moltmann’s interpretation of divine immanence. Such a view of divine immanence, they maintain, ‘calls into question the deity of God’.46 According to Grenz and Olson, Moltmann fails to preserve any notion of divine transcendence by dissolving God into history. However, to read Moltmann in such a way is to misunderstand him. Celia Deane-Drummond has accurately noted that ‘Moltmann’s use of zimsum serves to reinforce the distance between creator and creation …’.47 Moltmann uses the concept of zimsum to emphasize God’s otherness, God’s distinction from creation, and thereby to assert God’s transcendent divinity. This is amply seen in the presuppositional problematic which brings Moltmann to deal with zimsum vis-à-vis the divine immanence. The problematic is the relationship between God’s omnipresence and the existence of a spatial sphere which is not God. It is precisely because God is uncreated, eternal and other that the living ruach is required to create and sustain life. It is because of the necessity of God’s transcendence for the creation and continued existence of the universe that Moltmann later emphasizes the immanence of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, it is precisely this use of such concepts to emphasize the transcendence of God over creation that draws criticism from process theology.48 This is not to say that Moltmann’s use of zimsum is not without its problems. Deane-Drummond is correct in noting that Moltmann becomes increasingly speculative on the immanent life of the Trinity prior to the work of creation. She comments that Moltmann at times seems unconcerned regarding of the analogical nature of human speech about God, thus resulting in a commentary on the inner life of the Godhead, which at times seems unwarranted.49 Thus, if the Spirit is immanent in creation through the Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world, the teaching of zimsum does stress the divine transcendence, but lacks 44 Ibid., p. 98. See also Moltmann, TKG, pp. 108–14. Pannenberg has critiqued this aspect of Moltmann’s doctrine of creation precisely for lacking a sufficiently Trinitarian understanding of creation. See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, pp. 14–15, 20–21. 45 Moltmann, GC, pp. 97–8. 46 Stanley J. Grenz and Roger Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), p. 186. 47 Celia Deane-Drummond, Ecology in Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), p. 103. 48 John B. Cobb Jr, ‘Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological Theology in Process Perspective’, Asbury Theological Journal, vol. 55, no. 1, 2000: 115–28. 49 Deane-Drummond, Ecology in Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology, pp. 191–2, 300–305.

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theological warrant in the economy of salvation described in scripture: ‘Just as it is dangerously speculative to think of the Son without reference to his incarnation,’ argues Bauckham, noting an early strength in Moltmann’s Christology, ‘so it is dangerously speculative to think of the Spirit without reference to his indwelling.’50 Moltmann’s adaptation of zimsum offers a brilliantly formulated solution to the problem he sees as existing in the doctrines of creation and pneumatology, but it strays from a thoroughgoing dialogue with the biblical texts. To cite Bauckham again: ‘With the tendency of some of Moltmann’s later work towards undisciplined speculation is closely linked a degree of hermeneutical irresponsibility …. Moltmann too often falls back on the mere citation of texts in a pre-critical manner.’51 Moltmann more adequately maintains biblical coherency when discussing the Spirit in eschatological dimensions as the power of the resurrected life and the life of the eschatological new creation. The life-giving role of the Spirit finds its eschatological correlate in the resurrection of the dead and the new creation of all things. Paul cites the Spirit as being at work in the resurrection of Christ, while the book of Acts records the person of the Spirit empowering the community of Christ.52 This Spirit is the seal, guarantee and stamp of salvation and participation in the Kingdom of God through the resurrection.53 It is from this eschatological divine promise given in Christ for the Spirit that Moltmann understands creation to be enacted through this selfsame Spirit: ‘The experience of the eschatological reality of the Spirit leads to the conclusion that this is the same Spirit in whose power the Father, through the Son, has created the world, and preserves it against annihilating Nothingness.’54 It is this unique work of the Spirit alongside, or in conjunction with, the Father and the Son that allows Moltmann to maintain the unique personhood of the Spirit ‘as an independent subject’.55 The eschatological tenor of Moltmann’s pneumatology is easily incorporated into the wider framework of his thought. However, it also provides a deepening of his understanding of how the eschatological future maybe be conceived to be both coming towards the present and at work in the present. This has mutually affecting implications for how Moltmann understands the person of the Spirit and the eschatological framework of hope, which shapes moral action. In this regard, the second aspect of Moltmann’s more universal speech regarding the person of the Spirit must now be addressed prior to discussing the Spirit’s work and the ethical motifs derivative of these.

Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 164. Ibid., p. 167. 52 Rom. 8:11; Acts 2:4, 16–21, 33. 53 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:1–5; Eph. 1:13–14. 54 Moltmann, GC, p. 96. 55 Ibid., p. 97. 50 51

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The primordial histories recorded in the Genesis narrative cannot be seen separately from Yahweh’s covenant-making and salvific promises to Israel.56 Indeed, it was in light of Israel’s history of promise that it understood Yahweh to be the creator of all things. Therefore, Moltmann argues that the increasingly universal context of the Spirit’s working in the history of promise receives its impetus from the revelation of Yahweh’s ruach in scripture. Moltmann states: The history of Christ and the history of the Spirit accordingly stand in continuity to Israel’s history with Yahweh, ‘the almighty God’ …. For Israel, the Exodus history belongs in the wider framework of Abraham’s history of promise [Verheißungsgeschichte Abrahams], and this history of promise [Verheißungsgeschichte Abrahams] belongs in the wider framework of creation history.57

Moltmann understands the widest framework of creation history to be gleaned as the natural implications of Yahweh’s covenant history of liberating promise with Israel. It is from the perspective of this history of promise that Israel retrospectively understands its God to be the only God and creator of the cosmos. The emphasis on the promises to Abraham (stated twice in the German) is to specify its relationship to its fulfilment in Christ, its presence through the Spirit and the revelation of God as Father.58 In continuity with Theology of Hope, Moltmann argues that this presence of the Spirit in the history of promise creates a surplus of hope with universal ramifications. He says: ‘The “rebirth to a living hope” contains a surplus of hope which only the eternal life of the new, future world can fulfil. It is important to understand this eschatological immeasurability in the experience of the Spirit.’59 It is from within this history of promise that Moltmann delineates the personhood of the Spirit as follows: ‘The personhood of God the Holy Spirit is the loving, selfcommunicating, out-fanning and out-pouring presence of the eternal divine life of the triune God.’60 It has been noted that Moltmann does speculate beyond what is warranted by the history of divine promise, but his primary insights stem from the Spirit’s work in salvation history. He does this without subsuming the personhood of the Spirit into that of the Son or Father, but rather maintains the specificity of the Spirit in the Triune communion. The Spirit may be identified through its acts, but ‘[t]he subject remains transcendent to his acts’.61 With this perspective of the personhood of the Spirit in mind, the particular works of the Spirit may be drawn out which are relevant for human ethical life. There are 56 See Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, trans. D.M.G. Stalker (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1962), pp. 129ff. 57 Moltmann, SL, p. 102. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 152. 60 Ibid., p. 289. 61 Ibid., p. 286.

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other aspects of the Spirit’s personhood relevant to Moltmann’s conception, but these preliminary comments have restricted themselves to those insights which have the most direct impact on an ethics of hope. Therefore, the discussion may move on to analyse the particular works of the Spirit, which help to clarify the nature created sphere that provides the context for Christian moral action. Foci of the Spirit’s Work The Spirit’s Work in the Church In the above appraisal of Moltmann’s conception of the Spirit’s personhood it was briefly noted that Moltmann affirmed it is the Spirit which brings eschatology and Christology together. It was also noted that he perceived this to be mediated by the Spirit through the Church. In the Spirit’s empowerment, the Church becomes the fellowship of the Kingdom of God in the present through communion with Christ as the parousia is expectantly awaited. As Moltmann says: ‘For the Spirit leads to the fellowship of Christ, and consummates the messianic kingdom.’62 In order to articulate the work of the Spirit for the Kingdom in a comprehensive manner, the Spirit’s work in establishing the Church as a ‘contrast community’, which lives in light of the eschatological promise, must be explored further. However, Moltmann notes that more than theological description or societal adaptation is needed. He states: What is required today is not adroit adaptation to changed social condition, but the inner renewal of the church by the spirit of Christ, the power of the kingdom. The theological doctrine of the church will consequently allow itself to be guided by the inner unrest which is agitating the church.63

This agitation is caused by the ‘goad of the promised future’64 made present through the Spirit in the Church as it expectantly lives in hope, awaiting the parousia of Christ and resurrection of the dead. However, for Moltmann the Church is not to be defined institutionally, but rather Christologically. Commensurate with the surplus of expectation to be found in the divine promise and the increasingly cosmic-universal conceptions of the Spirit’s person, the work of the Spirit with its moral ramifications likewise takes on broader dimensions. Moltmann defines the location of the Church by the promise of Christ’s presence in the world. The Spirit is at work where Christ has promised to be present, thus providing a broad, societal and ecological framework in which to conceive of Christian moral action. Therefore, the ‘Church in the 62

Moltmann, CPS, p. 3. Ibid. 64 Moltmann, TH, p. 21. 63

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power of the Spirit’ is where the efficacies of the coming Kingdom of God are seen to be manifest. In this way, ‘Christian social ethics in the present must take their bearings from the future reign of God, because the reign of God is the Spirit’s historical project.’65 To this end, the Church works for the glorification of God: ‘The goal is not the glorification of the church but the glorification of the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit.’66 Just as Moltmann resisted a stark demarcation between the work of Jesus and pneumatology in his Spirit-Christology, so he likewise resists isolating the Spirit’s work and Christ. This is not to fall into the modalist patterns Moltmann firmly rejects. Rather, it is to see the divine movement in the economy of salvation within a Trinitarian framework. Each person of the trinity is active within God’s work, though the emphasis or primary role is seen to change from person to person in the differing phases. It is in this way that the Spirit’s work in the Church for the Kingdom of God is substantiated by Christ’s promise to be present in the world. Therefore, the Church is established and actualized by Christ: ‘“Without Christ, no church.” This simple sentence expresses an incontrovertible fact. There is only a church if and as long as Jesus of Nazareth is believed and acknowledged as the Christ of God.’67 To discern the location of the Church in the world and in history, Moltmann does not begin by turning to institutional structures. Rather, he proceeds in his exploration via the thesis ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia. With this premise as his starting place, Moltmann inquires of the promises of Christ. More specifically, where Christ has promised to be present, there the Church is. Once more, the character of God’s revelation ongoing in history is through the divine promise. Through the promises of Christ, Moltmann notes three loci of Christ’s presence, and therefore also the Church: ‘By virtue of his identifying assurance’ Moltmann sees Christ present in (1) ‘the apostolate, in the sacraments, and in the fellowship of the brethren’, (2) ‘the least of the brethren’, and finally (3) ‘his own self in his parousia’.68 For Moltmann, the apostolate means ‘to sum up the medium of the proclamation through word and sacrament, as well as the persons and community of the proclaimers’.69 Through the salvific work of Christ in cross and resurrection, the apostle Paul may describe its soteriological effect as reconciliation. This reconciliation in Christ creates the Church through proclamation of the gospel, and the Church carries that word forward in pneumatic efficacy: ‘God himself was reconciling the world to himself in Christ, not counting men’s sins against them. 65 Peter Althouse, Spirit of the Last Days: Pentecostal Eschatology in Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann, Journal of Pentecostal Theology Supplement Series (London: T&T Clark International, 2003), p. 68. 66 Moltmann, CPS, p. 11. 67 Ibid., p. 66. 68 Ibid., p. 123. 69 Ibid.

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And he has committed to us the message of reconciliation. We are therefore Christ’s ambassadors, as though God were making his appeal through us …’.70 For Moltmann, it is the work of the Spirit which joins the Christological Word with the apostolic word of proclamation. Speaking of Christ, Moltmann says: He identifies himself with the apostolic word and joins the human word of his witnesses with the eschatological word. He unites the powerlessness of his witnesses with his own fullness of power in the assurance of the Spirit. This gives the human word its authority, without doing away with its human character.71

Therefore, the Church in its apostolic function, through proclamation, sacrament and liberating fellowship, lives in the presence of Christ by taking part in the eschatological reality of the Spirit. Secondly, Moltmann notes Christ’s promise to be present among the ‘least of the brethren’. According to Jesus’ eschatological discourse in Matthew 25, as judge he separates those who belong to him and those who do not according to how they treated the hungry, the stranger, the naked, the sick and the imprisoned.72 In this way, the Church lives out the mission of Christ for the Kingdom of God in being empowered by the same Spirit which was with Christ during his earthly ministry. The Spirit creates the Church as a particular people who live in light of the good news, the gospel: ‘[The church] is the vehicle of the gospel of freedom, not a schoolmaster for the nations. It is not the church that has the gospel; it is the gospel that creates for itself a people of the exodus, which is the true church of Christ.’73 Living as a people of the liberating good news, that is, as an exodus people, the Church seeks solidarity with the hungry, thirsty, naked, sick and oppressed. According to Moltmann: the question is not how people or happenings outside the church respond to the church, but how the church responds to the presence of Christ in those who are ‘outside’, hungry, thirsty, sick, naked, and imprisoned. It is not a question of the integration of Christians outside the church into Christianity in its ecclesiastical form; it is a matter of the church’s integration in Christ’s promised presence: ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia.74

Richard Bauckham has asked potent ecclesiological questions dealing with this particular aspect of Moltmann’s conception of the pneumatological work. Despite Moltmann’s rejection of Rahner’s ‘anonymous Christians’,75 Bauckham 70

2 Cor. 5:19–20. Moltmann, CPS, p. 123. 72 Matt. 25:31–46. 73 Moltmann, CPS, p. 84. 74 Ibid., p. 129. 75 Ibid., pp. 153–4; Moltmann, WJC, pp. 61–3. 71

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asks: ‘Why should it not be desirable that this anonymous work of the Spirit come to explicit confession of Jesus Christ?’76 This question has much validity, to which Moltmann has not fully responded. It would appear that a detailed conclusion must be put in abeyance until the universal scope of the Kingdom of God expressed in Moltmann’s pneumatology is more fully explicated. However, some preliminary suggestions may be made. Briefly stated, when considering the theological nature of ‘mission’, Moltmann envisages two separate but inter-connected forms of mission: quantitative and qualitative.77 For Moltmann, quantitative mission is evangelical, while qualitative mission is ethical.78 The goal of quantitative mission is ‘to awaken faith, to baptize, to found churches and to form a new life under the lordship of Christ. Geographically this mission proceeds to the ends of the earth.’79 ‘Qualitative mission’, on the other hand, ‘takes place in dialogue …. In dialogue religions change, Christianity included, just as in personal conversations the expressions, attitudes and views of the partners alter …. We do not lose our identity, but we acquire a new profile in the confrontation with our partner.’80 It would appear that the shape Christian identity takes could act as a criterion for the nature of the dialogue and action in qualitative mission. In the discussion regarding the interplay of identity and relevant praxis in The Crucified God, Christian identity must be shaped by the crucified Christ and his mission.81 However, in Moltmann’s later pneumatology this identity becomes more ethically defined. The eschatological interactions of the Spirit shape, and even create history: ‘The Spirit of God works in history as the creator of a new future and as the new creator of what is transient for this future.’82 This creation of a new history is made possible by the work of Christ in his mission and resurrection, which brought the Kingdom of God.83 This inter-working of the Son and the Spirit are in accordance with the promises of God and make the eschatological future secure. Moltmann states: ‘The interactions between Christ and the Spirit must be understood as forces

76 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 149. Rasmusson has also noted the lack of ‘conversion’ motifs in Moltmann, despite an emphasis on discipleship. See Rasmusson, The Church as Polis, p. 77. 77 This distinction was made four years earlier by Gustavo Gutiérrez. See Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, pp. 83–6. 78 Moltmann, CPS, p. 152. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 ‘Christian identity can be understood only as an act of identification with the crucified Christ, to the extent to which one has accepted the proclamation that in him God has identified himself with the godless and those abandoned by God, to whom one belongs oneself’; Moltmann, CG, p. 19. 82 Moltmann, CPS, p. 191. 83 Ibid., p. 192.

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of historical movement and should be seen in the light of their goal.’84 If, according to Moltmann, it is pneumatology that brings Christology and eschatology together and this mediation occurs in the Church, he sees two avenues of access to the community of Christ. They are: (1) through faith in Christ mediated through Word, sacrament and fellowship, and (2) through work for the Kingdom in political action and praxis commensurate with the Kingdom.85 This aligns with Moltmann’s earlier statements regarding the quantitative and qualitative mission of the Church. However, Moltmann does not explain how it is possible to maintain these two means of access separately. That is, to what extent is it possible to have the latter without the former? To what extent may the Spirit’s work be experienced outside of confession of Christ? Indeed, Moltmann states: ‘The relation of the church to the Holy Spirit is the relation of epiklesis …’.86 It may be accepted that Moltmann is correct in placing the presence of Christ through his promise as the signs of the Church, but he appears to miss the point when he separates confession of Christ from ethical praxis in the Spirit. He thus puts asunder what necessarily belongs together. This appears to be the thrust of the Pauline argument in the epistle to the Philippians when the apostle associates service in the manner of Christ’s humiliation with the eschatological confession of Christ’s lordship.87 Prior to moving on to the final place of Christ’s promised presence – the parousia – the first two locales must be seen together to provide added depth of understanding to a moral theology of hope. This is particularly seen in the inter-relationship Moltmann sees between the Spirit, resistance and consolation. Through the resurrection of Christ from the dead, the future resurrection of all the dead and the coming of the eschatological Kingdom are secure. This reality of the future Kingdom is mediated historically through the work of the Holy Spirit. In this way, Moltmann sees the ‘triumph’ of the Kingdom as it: works on the possibilities of the creative Spirit in the world of death in a twofold way: it produces attitudes both of resistance and of consolation. Without resistance, consolation in suffering can decline into a mere injunction to patience. But without consolation in suffering, resistance to suffering can lead to suffering being repressed, pushed aside so that in the end it actually increases. In this double function of resistance and consolation the liberating feast becomes a ‘messianic intermezzo’ (A. A. Van Ruler) on the risen Christ’s way to the new creation of the world.88

84

Moltmann, SL, p. 233. Ibid., pp. 242–3. 86 Ibid., p. 230. 87 Phil. 2:1–11. 88 Moltmann, CPS, p. 113. 85

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It would appear that if Christian ethical action is initiated by ‘the goad of the promised future’ stabbing ‘inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present’89 because of the cross and resurrection of Christ, then it is the Spirit which impels Christian action for the Kingdom in history and empowers it for God’s glorification. The Spirit provides the impetus for Christian living in eschatological hope. In this way, the Spirit connects Christ’s presence in the apostolate and the poor together. It is the mission of Christ which provides eschatological empowerment in the Spirit. Therefore, Christ’s presence should not be segregated in the two spheres of apostolate and poor, but rather should be connected. In this way, the extent to which the Church is present among Christ in the poor may act as a critical mechanism to evaluate the legitimacy of its apostolicity. Similarly, confession of Christ may also act to differentiate between the Church and work for the Kingdom, and human pretension to elevate the self to be a pseudo-Messiah. In this way, the Church ‘exists as a factor of present liberation, between remembrance of [Christ’s] history and hope of his kingdom’.90 Therefore, it would appear more theologically suitable to understand Moltmann’s two ways of access to the community of Christ not as separate variables allowing multiple means of participating in the Kingdom, but rather as two aspects of the single movement of the Spirit in God’s Trinitarian history with the world. These are not then separate means of access, but rather mutually conditioning and interpreting manifestations of Christian living. Christ’s promised presence in the apostolate and poor are inseparable, and reciprocally enlighten and support one another: ‘The apostolate says what the church is. The least of Christ’s brethren say where the church belongs.’91 These find their fulfilment in the promised parousia of Christ. Christ’s presence in his coming parousia, that is his future (Zukunft Christi),92 is integrally connected with his presence in the apostolate and the poor. The present experience of the Spirit among believers is understood eschatologically. Therefore, the Spirit orientates Christians not only to Christ’s presence in the apostolate and poor, but also to Christ’s future advent in glory. Likewise, the future of Christ’s parousia mutually shapes the Christian understanding of the presence of the Spirit. Moltmann says: For the primitive church the ‘end of the world’ expected in his future was not merely the close [Abschluß] of history but the key [Schlüssel] to an understanding of the history of Christ, the history of the Spirit, and the history of the world. People remembered his history, experienced the Spirit and saw world history in the light of his future …. The character of promise in the history of Jesus, the eschatological character of his cross and resurrection from the dead, the 89

Moltmann, TH, p. 21. Moltmann, CPS, p. 75. 91 Ibid., p. 129. 92 Ibid., p. 130. 90

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hopeful character of faith and the unique nature of the experiences of the Spirit, which point beyond themselves, would be incomprehensible without this future orientation towards Christ’s parousia and would hence ultimately themselves be null and void.93

In this, it may be argued that the Spirit directs attention, service and ethical praxis not to itself, but to the presence of Jesus. Therefore, the Spirit points and testifies94 to another in revealing the promised presence of Jesus in the apostolate and poor in the present. These are then done in light of the Zukunft Christi, by which the moral content of the Kingdom of God is properly seen in eschatological perspective. The Spirit enables the Church to partake in the coming Kingdom by living commensurately with its ethical mandates even as the consummation is awaited in the resurrection of the dead. In this, the liberating sovereignty of God is firmly kept in view as the catalyst and sustaining presence to the Church’s moral engagement for the Kingdom. Moltmann states: It is not faith that makes Jesus the Christ; it is Jesus as the Christ who creates faith. It is not hope that makes the future into God’s future; it is this future that wakens hope. Faith in Christ and hope for the kingdom are due to the presence of God in the Spirit.95

To fulfil its mission in the present, through moral engagements which exhibit the future Kingdom, the Spirit empowers the believing community through the gifts of various charismata. These charismata are tokens of the eschatological future in the present which are given by the Spirit of God to enable the Church to live according to the Kingdom of God: ‘It is the Spirit who, as the power of the kingdom, gives a foretaste of the new creation in the feast.’96 For Moltmann, this is the sphere where ethics and worship converge. Moltmann states that ‘worship is not replaced by ethics; rather ethics are made worship’.97 Ethics and worship converge precisely where Christian praxis locates itself, not within institutional frameworks, but within the eschatological history of hope shaped by the promise of God in Christ. Moltmann argues that discussions of ministry and charisma are pursued along too narrow theological lines because ‘the participants in the discussion do not see the wider context – the manifestations of the church’s life in the eschatological history of Christ and the Trinitarian history of God’.98 The creation of the historical efficacy and pragmatic effectiveness of the Church’s action within this history is made possible by the 93

Ibid., p. 131. John 15:26–7. 95 Moltmann, CPS, p. 197. 96 Ibid., p. 257. 97 Moltmann, The Open Church, p. 77. Also Moltmann, CPS, p. 271. 98 Ibid., p. 289. 94

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work of the Spirit. It would appear that the ethical Zwischenraum of tension inaugurated by the promise of God in the death and resurrection of Christ is sustained by the indwelling, empowering presence of the Spirit. The Church is located within this pneumatically created ‘between-space’. In reference to the apostolicity of the Church, Moltmann says: In the power of the Holy Spirit the church experiences itself as the messianic fellowship of service for the kingdom of God in the world … here too the Spirit is not to be apprehended in the ministries of the church, but the church, with its manifold ministries and tasks, is to be conceived in the movement and presence of the Spirit.99

With the Holy Spirit, the eschatological new thing becomes the new thing in history.100 Moltmann affirms that the charismata are the eschatological gifts of the Spirit to the community of Christ for the empowerment of living commensurately with the Kingdom. These charismata include, though are not limited to, ethical engagements whose content adheres to the promised eschatological future. In this way, the charismata are given to the community of Christ for the renewal of God’s people, the renewal of all the living and the renewal of the earth.101 In this way, the charismata are the presence of the coming future in the historical present. This is certainly coherent within the Lukan perspective of the coming of the Spirit in fulfilment of the eschatological promise cited by the prophet Joel.102 What Moltmann does not appear to discuss in detail, however, is that the charismata are not only the presence of the future Kingdom in part, but are also limited by the eschatological consummation of the Kingdom. In this way, they have an important but limited role whose final telos surpasses the charismatic means of accomplishing this goal in history. The early Church noted how the various charismata, while signifying the work of the Spirit, were merely a fragment of what was hoped for in the eschatological future. The apostle writes: Love never fails; but if there are gifts of prophecy, they will be done away; if there are tongues, they will cease; if there is knowledge, it will be done away. For we know in part and we prophecy in part; but when the perfect comes, the partial will be done away.103

99

Ibid. Ibid., p. 295. 101 Moltmann, The Source of Life, pp. 22–5. 102 Acts 2:14–21. 103 1 Cor. 13:8–10 (NASB). 100

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Although Moltmann does not explicitly discuss this eschatological limitation of the charismata, it certainly coheres within the wider framework of his eschatology. Althouse has noticed that for Moltmann, the sending of the Spirit is the ‘eschatological sacrament of the kingdom’.104 What this indicates is that ‘in Moltmann’s eschatology God is moving towards humanity from the transcendent future. At the same time, history is being drawn towards the eschaton through the activity of the Spirit.’105 Therefore, the work by the Spirit witnessed in the community of Christ both exhibits the lived characteristics of the Kingdom, but also awaits the Kingdom’s final coming which surpasses the present in eschatological potency. When the future of God’s Kingdom comes, the present mechanisms (the charismata) leading history temporally and qualitatively towards the Kingdom will be no longer needed. It has been noted, however, that the Spirit’s work in the charismata is a part of a broader sphere of pneumatic dynamism in the world. The community of Christ, for Moltmann, is beyond institutional boundaries, and may be seen wherever Christ has promised to be present. Therefore, the charismata of the Spirit also receive a broader explication as the Spirit is understood to be at work in society and world. With this, Moltmann is attempting to understand the work of the Spirit, and therefore also the Church, to be beyond the German Volkskirche. This becomes increasingly apparent in Moltmann’s mature pneumatological writings, where he understands the pneumatic efficacies of the Kingdom to be present in the wider societal sphere. As the Spirit is at work in the whole of creation and the redemption of new creation, Moltmann’s pneumatology becomes progressively universal in its scope. This is particularly true of its ethical manifestations. This is exhibited in the German subtitle of his mature pneumatology: Eine ganzheitliche Pneumatologie. Therefore, the present discussion must continue along similar lines and inquire into the Spirit’s work in the broader societal sphere and deduce its subsequent moral outcome. The Spirit’s Work in Society It was described above how Moltmann conceives of the work of the Spirit to be beyond the institutional framework of the Church. The promised presence of Christ in the apostolate, the poor and the parousia by no means excludes the ecclesiastical work of the Spirit, but Moltmann’s pneumatological understanding moves beyond such ecclesiastical boundaries. This has been intimated above in the description of Moltmann’s conception of the immanent presence of the Spirit in creation. The Trinitarian person of the Holy Spirit, as partaker in the work of creation, is likewise the Spirit of life. Understood as such, Moltmann is able to draw ethical implications from a pneumatology which emphasizes the Spirit’s efficacy for life. He states: Althouse, Spirit of the Last Days, p. 167. Ibid., p. 113. See also Moltmann, CPS, pp. 295–6.

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But anyone who really says ‘yes’ to life says ‘no’ to war. Anyone who really loves life says ‘no’ to poverty. So the people who truly affirm and love life take up the struggle against violence and injustice. They refuse to get used to it. They do not conform. They resist.106

It is precisely at this junction between the work of the Spirit and Christian praxis that the connection between eschatology and pneumatology becomes most potent. Indeed, it is within the historical presence of the Spirit for the Kingdom of God that it is seen most clearly that eschatology and a ‘theology of hope … is a theology of combatants, not onlookers’.107 Thus, these connections between the work of the Spirit, an affirmation of life, and the moral ramifications of eschatology must be explored further in order to provide an adequate analysis of Moltmann’s understanding of the Spirit’s work in society. In his epistle to the Romans, Paul discusses in detail how eschatological salvation in Christ is characterized by the present life in the Spirit: ‘For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death.’108 Paul goes on to contrast ‘life in the flesh’ with ‘life in the Spirit’. He says: ‘For the mind set on the flesh is death, but the mind set on the Spirit is life and peace.’109 The antitheses between Spirit and flesh, life and death, are taken up by Moltmann and viewed in eschatological perspective with subsequent ethical import. Moltmann states: Life in God’s Spirit is life against death. It is not life against the body. It is life that brings the body’s liberation and transfiguration. To say ‘yes’ to life means saying ‘no’ to war and its devastations. To say ‘yes’ to life means saying ‘no’ to poverty and its humiliations. There is no genuine affirmation of life [Lebensbejahung] in this world without the struggle against life’s negations.110

According to Paul, this affirmation of life by the vivifying work of the Spirit takes on decidedly corporeal significance because of the promised resurrection secured in Christ’s victory over death: ‘But if the Spirit who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit who dwells in you.’111 To show the full range of the Spirit’s work in the Trinitarian relations, Moltmann broadens these Pauline themes in relating them to eschatology and history. He states: ‘The “Spirit of Christ” effects in us the raising of new energies through the word of the gospel. The “Spirit of God” opens new possibilities round about 106

Moltmann, SL, p. xii. Moltmann, CoG, p. 146. 108 Rom. 8:2 (NASB). 109 Rom. 8:6 (NASB). 110 Moltmann, SL, pp. 97–8. 111 Rom. 8:11 (NASB). 107

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us through the circumstances of history.’112 The Spirit’s role in the creation of a new history for an eschatological future via the divine promise is here made explicit. The Spirit, for Moltmann, provides the promise with its historical efficacy thus making possibilities for the novum instead of the continuance of the sinful status quo. This openness to possibilities offers opportunities for new life which is unfettered, unbound and free of stagnation. Moltmann likens this hope for a new quality of life to that of the ‘landscape of limitless possibilities’ to be found in the life of a healthy child.113 This view of the Spirit’s vivification for life, including bodily life, stems from the promise secured in the resurrection of Christ. The energies of the Spirit for life in the present are the historical outworking of the eschatological fulfilment witnessed to in the Trinitarian history of promise. As noted earlier in this work, the history of promise contains a surplus or an overspill, which provides impetus for increased expectation of the promise’s fulfilment. This overspill and increased expectations have their origin in the partial fulfilments experienced in history. These partial fulfilments are the work of the divine Spirit. Moltmann describes the Spirit’s work in the history of promise as follows: The history of Christ and the history of the Spirit accordingly stand in continuity to Israel’s history with Yahweh, ‘the almighty God’; but ‘the Father of Jesus Christ’ [der Vater Jesu Christi] is identified with the God of the patriarchs [dem Gott der Väter]. For Israel, the Exodus history belongs in the wider framework of Abraham’s history of promise, and this history of promise belongs in the wider framework of creation history. And in the New Testament the history of Christ and the Spirit belong similarly within the broader framework of the history of God the Father, to whom Christ is to ‘hand over the kingdom’ at the end of days, so that ‘God may be all in all’ (1 Cor. 15:28); while this history of the Father’s glorification belongs within the broader framework of the new creation of all things, for the kingdom of glory.114

There are several pertinent elements in this passage which require further clarification for the present discussion. First, it must be noted that the history experienced in the vivifying presence of the Spirit cannot be understood in isolation from the history of promise recorded in the biblical narrative, recounting the calling of Israel through Abraham. In this, Moltmann places emphasis on the particularity of God’s working in the unique history of promise with Israel. The Spirit, as Yahweh’s ruach which likewise testifies to the presence of Christ, is not to be equated with a notion of the Spirit as life itself in ways analogous to the 112

Moltmann, SL, p. 103. ‘Kindheit wird dann zur Landschaft der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten und zum Potential des Anfangens’; Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Kind und Kindheit als Metaphern der Hoffnung’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 60, no. 2, 2000: 95. 114 Moltmann, SL, p. 102. 113

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German Idealism Moltmann eschews. The Spirit is immanently present providing the sustaining energies of life as the loving, sustaining God, but is not a ‘principle of life’ or some other conceptual category segregated from the reality of the Triune God. It is precisely this emphasis that Frank Macchia has misunderstood in his construal of both the nature and extent of Moltmann’s immanentism. He argues: ‘Although Moltmann associates graced life with a quality of life, a life that is affirmed and affirming of others, he assumes an element of grace as part of the very definition of life itself. In this understanding of life, where is life’s true ambiguity?’115 Furthermore, Macchia states: ‘Having an appreciation for the category “Wholly Other” does not, as Moltmann assumes, necessitate a dichotomy between the Spirit and life. By grace, the “Ganz Andere” becomes the “Ganz Ändernde”!’116 It is clear from both the role Moltmann ascribes to the Spirit in creation and redemptive history that he loses neither the distinction between the divine Spirit and created life nor an authentic sense of life’s ambiguities in the grace found within the history of promise. The second pertinent aspect of the above quotation to take note of is the increasingly universal scope of the Spirit’s work for the Kingdom. This second aspect provides an essential element in Moltmann’s pneumatology, but must in no way be separated from the first. Moreover, the universal scope found in this second aspect is predicated on the antecedent presence of the first, and is therefore reliant upon it. The future eschatological Kingdom is universal in scope only because it is the Kingdom of God. It is necessarily the Kingdom of God in order to overcome the sinful status quo of the present, and therefore the efficacious Spirit at work bringing this Kingdom to its consummation must be ontologically distinct from creation, though present within it. As such, the divine Spirit is seen in the economy of salvation revealed through Yahweh’s history with Israel and culminated in the Son’s work in the person of Jesus Christ. Ultimately, for Moltmann, the universal scope of the eschatological Kingdom is grounded in belief in the one God of all that exists, who is leading creation to its eschatological end. Moltmann says: ‘I believe that for the sake of the one God and his one, coming kingdom, and his one single righteousness, I have to try to think universally – to be catholic, in the

Frank Macchia, ‘A North American Perspective’, Journal of Pentecostal Theology, vol. 4, 1994: 27. 116 Ibid., p. 26. Macchia cites this play on words as coming from Jan Milič Lochman. However, Lochman noticed this distinction between the early and later Barth. See Jan Milič Lochman, Reconciliation and Liberation, trans. David Lewis (Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980), p. 161 n. 1. In addition to this, Moltmann makes precisely this same distinction in the German edition of The Future of Creation. This is also noted in A.J. Conyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988). See also Jürgen Moltmann, ‘A Response to My Pentecostal Dialogue Partners’, Journal of Pentecostal Theology, vol. 4, 1994: 65. 115

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best sense of the word.’117 It is through the Spirit’s work in the Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world that this universal Kingdom of God is present in society. The Spirit provides the Kingdom with its historical presence. As the divine Spirit, the Kingdom of God may be present beyond ecclesial boundaries and institutional frameworks, even as God is not merely God of the Church, but God of all that exists. It is in this respect that Moltmann also argues for the availability of the charismata of the Spirit outside the ecclesial community. Moltmann argues that if the Holy Spirit is universal in its efficacy, then the gifts of the Spirit are likewise broadly accessible. Moltmann states: ‘Life is everywhere endowed. There is no such thing as unendowed life. There is only the social undervaluation of certain gifts, and the preference given the others.’118 It is here that the issue of inter-faith dialogue and mutual influencing of different religious traditions comes to the fore. In his later pneumatology, Moltmann is surely not in danger of failing to maintain the specificity of Christian confession, as at times has been argued.119 As he has clearly maintained elsewhere, Moltmann is not aiming at a simple pluralism with other religions.120 Rather, because of the universal workings of the Spirit in the particular Trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world, Moltmann similarly sees the ‘living relationship’ with other faiths to be working towards the ‘single humanity’ and ‘universal society’ experienced in God’s Kingdom.121 In this, the Spirit will be at work among all religions leading to the one future of God, which is fulfilled in Christ. Therefore, the Spirit works contextually to bring about ‘Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic reasons for faith in Jesus’. Moltmann asserts: ‘This must not be condemned as syncretism.’122 Rather, he argues: ‘The syncretism which dissolves Christian identity only comes about if people lose sight of this future, to which Christianity is called.’123 It is from this perspective that Moltmann asserts the charismata are not merely for the building up of Christian community, but are also an end in themselves.124 However, Moltmann’s conception of the dynamic relationship seen in the Spirit’s working outside of the Church, particularly through charismata, remains open to critique. It should be emphasized at the outset that any claim that Moltmann collapses the Spirit into either history or the economy of salvation is unwarranted, given the robust portrayal of the immanent life of God expounded in 117 Moltmann, ‘Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-modern?’, in God Will Be All in All, p. 264. 118 Moltmann, SL, p. 180. 119 See Simon K.H. Chan, ‘An Asian Review’, Journal of Pentecostal Theology, vol. 4, 1994: 35–40. 120 Moltmann, ET, pp. 236–7. 121 Moltmann, CPS, pp. 151, 159. 122 Ibid., p. 162. 123 Ibid., p. 163. 124 Moltmann, SL, p. 184.

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his doctrine of the Trinity.125 For Moltmann, this open ‘living dialogue’ between the religions occurs in the sphere of qualitative mission, and is therefore ethical in tenor. Moltmann believes the broader and more grassroots the dialogue between religions is, the more liberating praxis for the Kingdom of God will take effect in the present: ‘Top-level discussions between privileged persons usually do very little to relieve the suffering of ordinary people. Dialogue is a sign of hope for these people if it is carried on in the interests of their life and liberation.’126 Moltmann further explains the effect this has on an understanding of the Spirit’s work and the moral praxis engaged in by the Church in its communal life in the world: If it is Christianity’s particular vocation to prepare the messianic era among the nations and to make ready the way for the coming redemption, then no culture must be pushed out and no religion extinguished. On the contrary, all of them can be charismatically absorbed and changed in the power of the Spirit. They will not be ecclesiasticized in the process, nor will they be Christianized either; but they will be given a messianic direction towards the kingdom …. For Christianity the dialogue with the world religions is part of the wider framework of the liberation of the whole creation for the coming kingdom.127

The charge to which Moltmann is open is neither pluralism nor immanentism. Rather, in these assertions he is open to the charge of ambiguity. This requires further explanation. Moltmann encourages a perception of the pneumatic efficacies to be found in the wider array of religions and liberating motifs found in society. In this the ‘act of perception transforms the perceiver, not what is perceived. Perception confers communion. We know in order to participate, not in order to dominate.’128 With this self-transforming perception and dialogue, Moltmann maintains a Christological centre. Regarding the variety of charismata, he states: ‘They are not subject to different laws. Being a Christian is indivisible. The yardstick is the same everywhere: the discipleship of Jesus.’129 In this, ‘the church has its true being in the work of Christ’.130 It was noted above that Moltmann affirms it is the Spirit who historically mediates the work of Christ for the Kingdom through the Church: ‘It is the Spirit who, as the power of the kingdom, gives a foretaste of the new creation in the feast.’131 The ambiguity, which Moltmann appears to succumb to, is 125 See Moltmann, TKG, pp. 151–78. Moltmann does not diverge from maintaining the unity of the immanent and economic trinities, but he does clarify his discussion of God with such categories to include a broader framework for doxology. 126 Moltmann, CPS, p. 162. 127 Ibid., p. 163. 128 Moltmann, SL, p. 200. 129 Ibid., p. 184. 130 Moltmann, CPS, p. 69. 131 Ibid., p. 257.

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the subsequent segregation of the work of Christ in death and resurrection and the work of the Spirit made available in society. With the Church, the qualitative (that is, ethical and liberating) mission comes from the accomplished work of Christ in the history of promise among the people who confess his lordship. In society, however, such confession is not needed for the efficacious work of the Spirit in historically mediating the ethical life of the Kingdom. Yet Moltmann fails to relate the two. Why is confession of Christ needed for the Church and not for society in order for the experience of the Spirit which enables a life commensurate with the Kingdom? This question is left largely unanswered in Moltmann’s corpus. It would appear that if Moltmann’s own stated affirmations are to be given more adequate theological footing, then the connections between Christology, pneumatology and socio-ethical praxis need further explication. Moltmann is surely right when he states: ‘In faith we experience the peace of God, in hope we look ahead to a peaceful world, and in resistance to violence we confess God’s peace.’132 The source of the ambiguity appears to be Moltmann’s understanding of a ‘single humanity’ or ‘universal society’ being the goal of the Spirit’s work in the socio-ethical sphere. Moltmann is biblically accurate to interpret the Spirit being at work in all of creation, and therefore by implication the created sphere of human societal groupings.133 However, he maintains the outworking of this to be a ‘universal society’. To be sure, Moltmann views the ‘single humanity’ to be one under Christ’s liberating lordship. This liberating motif is enacted in history through the work of the Spirit. Moltmann locates the historical mediation of Christ’s Kingdom to be located in the Church which may is exhibited where Christ has promised to be present. However, a universal society and single humanity includes those areas where Christ has not promised his presence and the praxis engaged in is counter-intuitive to the praxis of the Kingdom. For example, Christ has not promised to be present among the ‘man of violence’ who is tight-fisted with the resources available to him.134 Moltmann would surely not occlude such individuals from the category ‘human’, but he fails to distinguish the Spirit’s presence among them. This is analogous to the critique made of Moltmann’s account of judgment in the previous chapter. In both cases, Moltmann fails to differentiate the various possible ethical effects of his theological statements and thus does not offer clarity in the ethical and doctrinal portions of his theology. He does emphasize liberation and justification for the oppressor, but does not distinguish between the Spirit’s work in all of society and the role of those who ardently deny Christ’s Kingdom through their lived praxis. Moreover, Moltmann does not give a detailed explanation of how a ‘universal society’ or ‘single humanity’ may come about without it having totalizing effects on those who are already experiencing ‘oppression’ or are among ‘the poor’. Could not more productive dialogue take place to further mutual understanding and loving 132

Moltmann, SL, p. 154. Ps. 104:30. 134 Moltmann, CPS, p. 79. See also Deut. 15:7. 133

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conversation if, rather than aiming toward a single society, the differences were maintained yet without claims to domination, prejudice or violence? Indeed, it would seem more likely that in any attempt to create a universal society, the result is more likely to be homogenization brought about by those who have power and seek to maintain it. Moltmann is surely aware of this danger, but fails to account for it when asserting a single humanity as the goal of dialogue. Miroslav Volf has brought a similar critique when discussing Moltmann’s understanding of eschatological history.135 Volf argues that eschatology must surpass a modern understanding of a universal history to a postmodern understanding of many histories. A universal history violently conflates many histories into the single history of the powerful. While Moltmann clearly argues against the hegemony of the powerful minority, he responds to Volf, saying: If, finally with ‘post-modern’ sensibility for the many and the different, the modern world is reproached with being a dictatorship of uniformity and a uniform culture, then it would also be logical to pass over from modern monotheism to post-modern polytheism, and in becoming post-modern to become post-Christian too.136

In this clarification, it is possible to see both Moltmann’s strength and limitation. The positive aspect is that Moltmann again consistently affirms the particularity of Christian confession and understanding of reality. Since the ‘universal humanity’ is created by the Spirit’s historical work for the Kingdom of God secured by Christ, it is only within this locus that Moltmann’s affirmation of such a ‘single humanity’ is intelligible. However, the ambiguity remains. Taking one’s lead from the biblical testimony of the Spirit’s work in all creation explored above, it may be affirmed that Moltmann is correct in perceiving this divine work to transcend the institutional framework of ecclesiastical structures. What Moltmann fails to do is distinguish between the type of work the Holy Spirit accomplishes in the Church and that which is achieved in society and nature. In his farewell discourse, the Johannine Christ discusses a threefold convicting work of the Spirit.137 In this discourse, the Spirit convicts the world concerning sin, righteousness and judgment. These three are then explained in the following: ‘in regard to sin, because men do not believe in me; in regard to righteousness, because I am going to the Father, where you can see me no longer; and in regard to judgment, because the prince of this world now stands condemned’.138 It would certainly appear that the type of work described by the Spirit in the world (ton kosmon) is of a different sort than the charismata of prophecy, teaching, healings and so on described by Paul to the Churches. It would appear that in the societal 135

Volf, ‘After Moltmann’, pp. 233–57. Moltmann, ‘Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-modern?’, p. 264. 137 John 16:8. The three separate areas of convicting are clearly delimited with the evangelist’s use of the preposition peri. 138 John 16:9–11. 136

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realm, the Spirit brings both individuals and structures to confession of Christ, thereby enabling proper ethical engagements for the Kingdom. Naturally, it may be argued that it is nonsensical to assert a differentiation between the ethical engagements of society and that of the Church which confesses Christ when pragmatic considerations often mirror each other. At first glance, such divisions appear to be artificial. For example, the Church is not at odds with those separate organizations whose aim it is to feed people who hunger in poverty. However, differentiation may be perceived in the telos of such ethical action. For Moltmann the goal appears to be expressed in the symbol of ‘universal society’, and therefore considerations of the Kingdom of God are at times pressed to conform to this symbol. The viewpoint being proposed here is to reverse the order. The Kingdom of God is embodied in the person of Christ and brought about by what he accomplished in his death and resurrection. Therefore, the Kingdom must not be characterized apart from the contours of this particular life. Moltmann would undoubtedly agree with this. The Spirit’s efficacy is seen in the historical mediation and creation of possible participation in this Kingdom in the present. Therefore, this mediation and participation is not accomplished through adherence to certain stipulations or development of certain character traits. Rather, it is accomplished by the Spirit bringing society (both individuals and structures) into a living, submissive recognition of Jesus Christ. In this way, the Spirit is at work through the Church to illustrate how the lived characteristics of the Kingdom, witnessed in the person and vocation of Jesus Christ, are conducted and made efficacious in living relationship with this same Jesus as the resurrected Lord. The Spirit’s work in society, even where ethical praxis mirrors that of the Church, calls society to repentance and living relationship with Christ in order for the Kingdom to be made manifest in the present. Moreover, the Spirit’s efficacious work in society through the manifestation of ethical praxis may act as a critical mechanism against the Church, calling the Church to repentance and greater faithfulness to its own confession. In this way, a more complex and particular understanding of Paul’s statement ‘There are different kinds of gifts, but the same Spirit’139 may be achieved. Also, this provides greater harmony with Paul’s preceding assertion, ‘Therefore I tell you that no one who is speaking by the Spirit of God says, “Jesus be cursed,” and no one can say, “Jesus is Lord,” except by the Holy Spirit.’140 When viewed together, it is seen that confession of Christ and charismata of the Spirit for the Kingdom of God must be seen together. The Spirit is at work in society and nature, but the tenor of that work is differentiated from charismata through the telos of the ethical praxis and confession of Christ.141 139

1 Cor. 12:4. 1 Cor. 12:3. 141 Such a view of ethics may take its lead from Karl Barth’s lectures on ethics in the 1920s, where he begins with the premise, ‘Good means sanctified by God.’ For Barth, this happens in hearing the proclamation of the Word and the command of God. Karl Barth, Ethics, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, ed. Dietrich Braun (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), pp. 15–16ff., 53ff. 140

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These pneumatological considerations bring the present study to a more clarified point. The divine promises given by God to Israel created a history which led to a disconnection with the circumstances of slavery in Egypt. This disconnection occurred via the reception of a new communal identity, inaugurated in the promise for land, progeny and deliverance. This history of liberating promise manifested a surplus of expectation in the people and an overspill of hope in every penultimate fulfilment. The history of promise reached its climax in the death-resurrection of Jesus Christ, thus giving Christian faith its eschatological nature. The promise of a qualitatively new life in the resurrection details the Christian hope for the future consummation of the Kingdom of God. Ethically, the Kingdom is presently available for creaturely participation along the moral contours made possible because of Jesus’ life. This dimension of the future Kingdom is present through the work of the divine Spirit. It has been argued that Moltmann’s conception of the Spirit’s work in Church, society and creation is portrayed in helpful ways in its broad perspective. However, it was seen that ambiguity existed in some of the specific details, particularly a lack of differentiation in the type of work the Spirit does within and beyond ecclesial structures. It was argued that Moltmann was right in perceiving the Spirit at work beyond such structures, but needed clarity and further exegetical and theological grounding to explicate the nature and telos of the relationship between the two spheres of work. To elucidate the matter further, there is a final task to be carried out in regard to the effect of pneumatology within a theological ethics of hope. With the foregoing sketches of Moltmann’s theology of the Spirit’s person and work, the ethical implications were kept in purview, but remained in the background. With the above doctrinal work completed, the discussion may now highlight these ethical motifs explicitly. Therefore, the following section will now turn to analyse these specific motifs. During this ethical analysis, both those points where the present work has agreed and where it has differentiated itself with Moltmann will be kept in mind. The result will be that the particular patterns highlighted will provide the ethical framework for the second part of this work in understanding moral engagements in history, spatiality and human society within an eschatological framework. Ethical Motifs Arising from the Current Discussion With the above discussion of Moltmann’s thought regarding the person and work of the Holy Spirit, several motifs arose which are pertinent for an ethical accounting of Christian hope. These motifs, though being inter-connected, may for the sake of clarity be separated into three key groupings. The three key ethical motifs arising from the current discussion are: (1) life, (2) liberation, and (3) sanctification. Each of these ethical motifs will be discussed from the eschatological perspective of the divine promise in Christ for the Kingdom of God, which is made present in the Spirit.

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Life It was seen earlier in this chapter how Moltmann interprets the immanent presence of the Spirit to be manifest in creation. This occurs both in God’s work of creatio ex nihilo and in the ongoing redemptive efficacy for the eschatological consummation of the created order. From this perspective, it was seen that Moltmann interprets the eastern doctrine of the ‘energies’ of the Holy Spirit to be present in sustaining the created order in its entirety.142 In this sense, Althouse’s assessment is satisfactory when he states: ‘The energy of the Spirit is present, then in all of life. If God were to withdraw the Spirit from creation, all life would cease to exist and become nothingness.’143 However, this comment, though not inaccurate, is still imprecise in its assessment. If the argument were left at this place, Moltmann would still be open to the charge of immanentism or collapsing the Spirit into either nature or history. Therefore, the understanding of the ethical implications of the Spirit for life must be taken further. To provide a more complete understanding of the ethical implications for the production and preservation of life found in Moltmann’s pneumatology, the metaphor of the ‘energies’ of the Spirit must be brought together with the Spirit’s work in vivification. In this, Moltmann’s mature pneumatology intimates a way forward. He says: The dynamic of the life process is always greater than the diversity of the forms of life and the living relationships which the process creates. Life is fathomless, and is more than any individual expression of life. It is these creative living energies which we call the divine Spirit, because it transcends all the beings it creates, and even its own created energies …. It would … be true to say that because God is the Creator, his creative Spirit is the dynamic of the universe and the power that creates community in the widening, differentiating network of the living. The transcendence and immanence of the divine Spirit are not mutually contradictory. They are two complementary aspects of its dynamic.144

This connection of the energies of the Spirit with vivification maintains a future orientation in hope for the Kingdom of God. Moltmann continues: We understand the dynamic better when we begin to think triadically, so as to mediate between the world beyond and this world by way of the forward movement of process. Because the forward direction allows us to perceive the time element – the irretrievability of every event, the irreversibility of future and past, and the partial indeterminacy of that sphere of possibility which we

142

See also, Schüle, ‘Gottes Geist in geistloser Zeit’, pp. 62–79. Althouse, Spirit of the Last Days, p. 138. 144 Moltmann, SL, p. 227. 143

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call future … [can] fan out the network of life’s relationships into the spheres of the possible.145

While this statement appears to provide an unconditioned understanding of the Spirit’s vivifying work for the future, when viewed within the broader scope of Moltmann’s thought, it is recalled that the future itself is conditioned by the creative work of God in the resurrection of Christ. In this sense, ‘knowledge of the future has its stimulus nowhere else than in the riddle of Jesus of Nazareth’. This riddle is that God is ‘for us’.146 With this, Moltmann continues to assert that: The mission of Jesus becomes intelligible only by the promissio. His future, in the light of which he can be recognized as what he is, is illuminated in advance by the promise of the righteousness of God, the promise of life as a result of resurrection from the dead, and the promise of the kingdom of God in a new totality of being.147

It is this same Spirit at work in the resurrection of Christ148 that brings the believer in Christ to obedience, thus working towards the life-giving future. As early as 1964, Moltmann recognized a pneumatological role in this obedience for life: Thus the Spirit is the power to suffer in participation in the mission and the love of Jesus Christ, and is in this suffering the passion for what is possible, for what is coming and promised in the future of life, of freedom and of resurrection. The Spirit subjects man to the tendency of the things which are latent in the resurrection of Jesus and which are the intended goal of the future of the risen Lord. Resurrection and eternal life are the future that is promised, and thereby make obedience possible in the body. In all our acts we are sowing hope …. In obedience, those who have been quickened by the Spirit are on the way towards the quickening of the mortal body.149

It is at this intersection of life, resurrection, pneumatology and obedience where the ethical results of Christian hope begin to take shape. The faithfulness of the Creator to the creation resulted in the self-sacrifice of God for creation seen in the godforsakenness of Jesus Christ on the cross. The Son of God embodied the Kingdom of God and bore the godforsakenness entitled to humanity because of sin. In the power of the Spirit, the Son overcame the power of death and sin, making a qualitatively new form of life available in the eschatological Kingdom. This same Spirit is continuously at work in the community of Christ and the wider 145

Ibid. Moltmann, TH, p. 203. 147 Ibid. 148 Rom. 8:11. 149 Moltmann, TH, pp. 212–13. 146

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framework of society and world. It is here that the Spirit provides the historical mediation of the Kingdom of God in Christ through ethical praxis commensurate with the eschatological promise. If the Spirit is at work for life, and historically mediates this, then the ethical actions of the Church must likewise be life-giving. They must be life-giving not only in their intended outcome, but also with the means used to achieve the outcome of new life. As was stated earlier in this work, an ethics of hope has no notion of ends justifying means, but rather, righteous ends demand righteous means. Viewed ethically, Moltmann’s statements regarding life and war become more comprehensible with this pneumatologico-eschatological context: But anyone who really says ‘yes’ to life says ‘no’ to war. Anyone who really loves life says ‘no’ to poverty. So the people who truly affirm and love life take up the struggle against violence and injustice. They refuse to get used to it. They do not conform. They resist.150

This is certainly commensurate with the qualitative mission Moltmann emphasized in the Spirit’s work for the Kingdom. However, the quantitative mission must also feature more prominently, since it is the resurrection that the divine promise is anticipating.151 Therefore, Christian ethical action not only works to preserve and develop safe environments for the furtherance of life, but also directs people to the promised resurrection secured by Christ through witness. This ethical mandate for life is pragmatically enacted via the second ethical motif arising from the foregoing discussion of pneumatology: liberation. Liberation The promise of God for the eschatological Kingdom in the death-resurrection of Christ, which is historically mediated by the Spirit, enables the Zwischenraum of tension for ethical hope. This ‘between-space’ creates a tension via the newly bestowed communal identity from the promise against the sinfulness of the present status quo, which seeks to maintain its own security and power. In this way, life indwelt by the Holy Spirit liberates every life-towards-death which is nurtured by sin. Therefore, the community of Christ, empowered by the Spirit, contradicts oppression, hunger, poverty and violence with the material content of the Kingdom of God both in witness and action. Thinking ethically, Moltmann can affirm from this standpoint: ‘We can break the spell of creeping acclimatization to the deteriorization in the quality of life brought about by injustice, oppression and man-made catastrophes.’152 In Moltmann’s theology, liberation is best understood in three main categories. 150

Moltmann, SL, p. xii. Moltmann, CPS, p. 152. 152 Ibid., p. 166. 151

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The first category of liberation is freedom. This freedom is defined by the gospel of Jesus Christ for the Kingdom of God. Moltmann affirms that ecclesial proclamation is not a word the Church grasps and purports under its own strength, but consists in the fact that the people of the promise are the Church of the Word. Speaking of the Church, Moltmann states: ‘It is the vehicle of the gospel of freedom, not a schoolmaster for the nations. It is not the church that has the gospel; it is the gospel that creates for itself a people of the exodus, which is the true church of Christ.’153 Relating this freedom found in Christ to the eschatological work of the Spirit, he continues: The church must first of all reflect and represent the lordship of Christ in itself. It cannot adopt its social order from the way in which the society in which it lives is run …. As an anticipation of what the redeemed life will be in the future it demonstrates the alternatives offered by the creative Spirit.154

The alternatives offered by the Spirit in contradistinction to an unfulfilled present lead to liberating freedom: In Christianity as in Judaism, the experience of God’s Spirit awakens new and hitherto unsuspected expectations about life. The experience of the Spirit is the reason for the eschatological longing for the completion of salvation, the redemption of the body and the new creation of all things. Impelled by the Spirit, Christians cry, ‘Maranatha, come, Lord Jesus!’ (Rev. 22:20).155

This cry for the Kingdom to be consummated in Christ’s parousia is ‘impelled’ by the Holy Spirit.156 This new situation enabled by the Spirit creates a Zwischenraum of tension between the Christian and the unfulfilled present. It is when the vivifying efficacies of the Spirit are experienced and the liberating effects of the Spirit’s life are known that the incommensurability of life as it is presently known with the future Kingdom is experienced. It leads from the captivity of sin to freedom in the Spirit. Moltmann states: If there were no such thing as freedom, or if every hope for liberation in us were dead, we should get used to our chains and, once having got used to them, should no longer feel them …. Probably all of us, in our different ways, have got so much accustomed to the negations of life that we do not notice them any more…It is in the negation of the negative first of all that prisoners and people

153

Ibid., p. 84. Moltmann, CPS, pp. 106, 112. 155 Moltmann, SL, p. 73. 156 1 Cor. 12:3. 154

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who have never been able to participate in life experience what is positive in freedom, and a full, true life.157

With the indwelling work of the Spirit, the promised Kingdom is experienced in part. The tension this creates compels the Christian to seek liberating freedom where there is currently bondage. In so doing, the Christian is displaying her or his life as one which has received its constitution from the Kingdom of God in Christ and its potency from the work of the Spirit. The promise of the exodus to Israel gave freedom from captivity, bondage and slavery. The promise of the resurrection in Christ gives freedom from the power of death: ‘Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?’158 Therefore, Moltmann can say: ‘When freedom is close, the chains begin to hurt.’159 This emphasis on liberation to freedom leads to the second main category of liberation found in Moltmann, which is peace. If the Spirit liberates humanity and creation from fear, oppression, poverty and violence, then it must provide an alternative, which it liberates creation for. The apostle Paul states that ‘the mind set on the Spirit is life and peace’.160 There are two elements to keep in mind when regarding Moltmann’s conception of liberating peace. The first element is peace between humanity and God. For Moltmann, this was accomplished in the salvific work of Christ on the cross and resurrection. What is more immediately pertinent for an ethics of hope, however, is the relationship between the Holy Spirit, eschatology and the second element of peace, which is peace in intracreaturely relations. For Moltmann, the liberating power of the Spirit for peace is intimately connected to the vivifying energies of the Spirit for life. As was quoted earlier in this chapter, Moltmann states: But anyone who really says ‘yes’ to life says ‘no’ to war. Anyone who really loves life says ‘no’ to poverty. So the people who truly affirm and love life take up the struggle against violence and injustice. They refuse to get used to it. They do not conform. They resist.161

This is the case for Moltmann, for two reasons. The first reason is that the Holy Spirit, as the creative Spirit indwelling and enlivening creation, does not abandon creation to sin and death, but rather works for its redemption and sanctification. The second reason is that the Spirit is bringing all creation to the Kingdom consummated in the parousia of Christ. In this way, all the current tensions and violence opposed to peace are set in subordination to the coming eschatological 157

Moltmann, SL, p. 75. 1 Cor. 15:55. 159 Moltmann, SL, p. 75. 160 Rom. 8:6 (NASB). 161 Moltmann, SL, p. xii. 158

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Kingdom: ‘These are not the portents [Vorzeichen] of total crisis [der totalen Krise],’ argues Moltmann, but ‘they are always merely signs [Zeichen] of particular and specific conflicts [bestimmter, konkreter Konflikte]. For it is not world crisis [die Krise] that leads to Christ’s parousia; it is Christ’s parousia that brings this world with its crises [dies kritische Welt] to an end.’162 The Spirit is the presence of the eschatological Kingdom manifested in history. It is the presence of God bringing creation, through the promise secured in Christ’s death and resurrection, to the eschatological Kingdom of life and peace. Therefore, those whom the Spirit empowers in the present are led to be non-conformists with the unfulfilled present, which leads to death. The Church, through the work of the Spirit, is empowered to resist in its Zwischenraum of tension, to overcome death with life, violence with peace, and hate with love.163 The third main category of liberation in Moltmann’s work is a concrete application from the two more abstract notions of liberation discussed above. For Moltmann, liberation through the Spirit for the Kingdom of God, expressed in freedom and peace, makes Christian acceptance of poverty inexplicable and unacceptable. Therefore, for the practical outworking of the freedom and peace manifested in the Kingdom to take shape, this requires the eradication of the world’s extreme poverty. Writing in 1997, Moltmann comments on the economic situation of the world’s poor and the current structures which perpetuate such circumstances. He says: The UNO report on human development (1996) points out the dangers that ensue when the many are impoverished through the enrichment of the few. The wealth of 358 multi-millionaires exceeds the total income of the poor countries, in which almost 45% of the world’s population lives …. But this injustice and inhumanity is also growing in the industrial countries themselves. This year, over 100 million people in North America, Europe, Japan and Australia are living below the official poverty line … in the underdeveloped countries the UNO report tells us that 25,000 children are dying everyday of hunger and of diseases which have long since been curable. The globalization of the economy is evidently leading in our societies to a shortfall of solidarity ….164

Moltmann views such circumstances in the present world as being contradictory to the God of the promise. Moltmann contends that the God of the widow, the orphan and the oppressed is not content with such economic structures.165 The divine will for human economics may be summed up in the prophetic statement, ‘He has shown you, O man, what is good. To act justly and to love mercy and to 162

Moltmann, CPS, p. 50. See, Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Friedenstiften und Drachentöten im Christentum’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 64, no. 4, 2004: 285–94. 164 Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, pp. 66–7. 165 Ex. 22:2; 1 Sam. 10:18; Jer. 49:11; James 1:27. 163

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walk humbly with your God.’166 Such desires for human economics are exemplified in the Israelite celebration of the year of Jubilee. In the year of Jubilee debts were to be forgiven, sold property returned to the original owner, slaves were to be freed, and the land was to be laid fallow so the earth might replenish itself. Moreover, if a fellow societal member became poor, they were to be provided for fairly, with justice for the poorer member and without profit to the provider: If one of your countrymen becomes poor and is unable to support himself among you, help him as you would an alien or a temporary resident, so he can continue to live among you …. You must not lend him money at interest or sell him food at a profit.

This view of economics was rooted in God’s liberating acts in history and ongoing covenant with Israel: ‘I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of Egypt to give you the land of Canaan and to be your God.’167 With the book of Isaiah, the year of Jubilee takes on broader significance, which Jesus claimed for his own person and Messianic vocation.168 Moltmann views the ‘economics’ of scripture as contradicting the present situation of injustice described in 1996: What line ought Christianity to take in economics, and what trend ought it to pursue with the means at its disposal? The Old Testament always recognized the earth as ‘the Lord’s property.’ ‘The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof, the world and those who dwell therein’ (Ps. 24:1). Rabbinical exegesis used the word oikonomos at this point …. When in the New Testament Christ is acknowledged as the Lord of God’s kingdom, it means nothing less than this. The ‘house’ of which Jesus is Lord and which is to be kept in order according to his will, is called oikoumene, and ‘those who dwell therein’ are called katoikountes.169

Moltmann argues that God, as Creator, is the true and sole ‘owner’ of the created order. Human beings are mere stewards of God’s good creation. This realm of creation, and humanity with it, sees redemption in the Kingdom of God with the human being undergoing adoption as members of this Kingdom by the Spirit in Christ.170 As heir of this Kingdom, the Church lives commensurately with its ethical qualities, including in the economic realm. This includes an abnegation of the economic values of modern society such as unceasing expansion and constant growth. Moltmann argues: 166

Micah 6:8. Lev. 25:35–8. 168 Is. 61:1–2; Luke 4:14–21. 169 Moltmann, CPS, p. 173. 170 Rom. 8:13–17. 167

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If Christians in the world understand themselves as world-wide Christians … they will strive for this ethic of solidarity and a corresponding new economic orientation. That includes renunciation of further economic expansion in the wealthy countries for the sake of the economic development which is necessary in the hungry ones … this means for Christianity in the rich industrial countries renunciation in favour of the development of the poorer ones. Such a renunciation of values will only be bearable if new values are acquired instead.171

The new values to be acquired are those of the Kingdom of God. Such ‘values’ are more precisely described as the lived characteristics which received ethical and messianic manifestation in the life and vocation of Jesus Christ. This requires a contradiction with the sinful status quo of the present, and results in a ‘betweenspace’ of tension in the Church’s engagement with the world. The Church seeks out Christ’s presence and lives commensurately with the liberating motifs which lead to freedom and peace. This must likewise be carried out in the economic sphere. A failure to do this results in a surrender of Christian hope. Moltmann states: ‘every withdrawal of the presence and living testimony of Christians from any sphere of life would be the equivalent of a surrender of their hope’.172 This is coherent with the injunction of Micah 6:8 to act ‘justly’. Moltmann contends: ‘The most important element for the development of a society that deserves the name “human” is social justice, not economic growth.’173 Ellen T. Charry has challenged Moltmann’s understanding of liberation. Charry affirms that ‘In attending to the world the eschatological foundation of Christian faith finds its proper expression.’174 She proceeds to argue, however, that a ‘hermeneutic of emancipation’ has been a source of the crisis of the alienated modern self rather than its solution. She states: Modern science and economics were created in the name of emancipation and benevolence. If in their maturity science and technology are now revealing unintended negative side effects, calling again for the hermeneutic of emancipation is misplaced. Emancipation is not a one-size-fits-all principle. Sad it is when we need to be emancipated from the means of our emancipation …. Perhaps the difference between [Moltmann and I] is that I now see the hermeneutic of emancipation itself as implicated in the crisis of modernity …. My own suggestion is to encourage Christians to find critical distance on modernity by rearticulating a basic insight of their own tradition: we need God.175

171

Moltmann, CPS, p. 175. Ibid., p. 173. 173 Ibid., p. 174. 174 Ellen T. Charry, ‘The Crisis of Modernity and the Christian Self’, in A Passion For God’s Reign, ed. Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 89. 175 Ibid., pp. 92–3. 172

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Charry’s interpretation is rooted in a perception that Moltmann argues for human identity as constituted by human ability to make promises. Charry’s reading of Moltmann states that the social ills which are present in modernity are within the ability of humans to correct through their own capacity to make and keep promises.176 Charry argues that such faith in human skill for emancipation, and using this as a general social hermeneutic, is misguided because it neglects that fundamentally ‘we need God’. From the reading of Moltmann’s eschatology and pneumatology in particular, it seems Charry may have more in common with Moltmann than she assumes. It has been emphasized that Moltmann does not see emancipation as his general hermeneutic, but rather the Kingdom of God secured in the divine promise, which is given its content through the Son and made historically efficacious in the Spirit. In the essay which draws Charry’s critique, Moltmann states: ‘The values of society and their revaluation represent original tasks of public, Christian theology. From the perspective of its origins and its goal, Christian theology is public theology, for it is the theology of the kingdom of God.’177 For Moltmann, theology speaks publicly only because it is theology for the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God is universal in its scope because Jesus Christ is Lord of all. Thus, any theology that seeks liberating praxis in society and world is not derived from a general hermeneutic of emancipation, but rather the unique promissory history of salvation, which God has with creation. Moltmann maintains that the unique, salvific history of God with Israel and Jesus Christ is constitutive to a Christian understanding of liberation.178 Describing those whose lived characteristics receive their impetus from the particularity of this divine history, Moltmann contends that it is from this vantage point that Christians engage in liberating praxis. He states: ‘As long as the divine promise is not fulfilled, their hearts remain restless. In both good and bad, they become … dissatisfied with all their surroundings, they break through all barriers. Their impulses are immoderate because they have been stimulated by the infinite God.’179 Moltmann’s subsequent discussions regarding human character and human ability to make and keep promises is grounded in this reality of divine promise and is posterior to it. Indeed, Moltmann’s statement regarding ethical, liberating impulses being ‘immoderate because they have been stimulated by the infinite God’ echoes a statement he made twenty-four years earlier when he said that ‘faith, wherever it develops into hope, causes not rest but unrest, not patience but impatience. It does not calm the unquiet heart, but is itself this unquiet heart in man’.180

176

Ibid., p. 91. Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Christianity and the Revaluation of the Values of Modernity’, in A Passion for God’s Reign, ed. Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 24. 178 Moltmann, ‘Christianity and the Revaluation of the Values of Modernity’, p. 25. 179 Ibid., p. 31. 180 Moltmann, TH, p. 21. 177

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The ethical motifs of life and liberation do not stand autonomously in Moltmann’s eschatological framework. They are inextricably connected with his understanding of the history of divine promise in Jesus Christ, the ongoing work of the divine Spirit making Vorzeichen of the promised Kingdom available in the historical present, and the eschatological nature of theology and all reality as defined by Christ. Therefore, these first two ethical motifs find their comprehensibility only within the broader framework of the third ethical motif to be discussed: sanctification. Sanctification For Moltmann, the nature of sanctification is twofold. He states: ‘Sanctification is the discipleship of Jesus, and means coming to life in God’s Spirit.’181 This twofold understanding of sanctification locates the origins of holiness not in human resolve, aptitude or nature, but rather in God: ‘The foundation of sanctification is in the sanctity or holiness of God himself.’182 This foundation in God, as seen particularly in the discipleship of Jesus and empowerment of the Spirit explicitly connects Christian notions of sanctification with the Kingdom of God.183 It has been heretofore argued that Jesus, in his life, vocation, death and resurrection, inaugurated the future Kingdom of God and secured its consummation through the divine promise. These partial fulfilments of the promise through ethical motifs which accord with the Kingdom create an increased longing and expectation for their final fulfilment. God is at work creating history via the promise, and therefore creating the eschatological future through the divine sovereignty. This work of God, made sure by the Father in the death and resurrection of the Son, is made historically available for creaturely participation in the divine Spirit. Therefore, the sanctification of humanity is an eschatological work manifesting the partial coming of the Kingdom of God in contradistinction to a sinful (that is, unsanctified) present. ‘It follows from this that sanctification is an act of God in us and for us, like justification and calling.’184 For Moltmann, this work of God for sanctification is a token and representation of the eschatological Kingdom, which is the new creation of all things. Moltmann argues: ‘In the New Testament the Holy Spirit, as the eschatological “advance gift” of glory and the power of the new creation, is determinative for the idea of holiness.’185 As the power of the new creation, the work of the Spirit may also be described, therefore, as the work of the divine promise which is contemporaneous with the life of the Church in the present. Thus, there is both a negative and positive element to sanctification. Both elements Moltmann, SL, p. 175. See also Moltmann, The Source of Life, p. 48. Moltmann, SL, p. 174. 183 Ibid., p. 175. 184 Ibid., p. 174. 185 Moltmann, CPS, p. 354. 181 182

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receive their bearing from their origin in God through the Christological promise and the pneumatological presence. The negative aspect of sanctification is that the work of the Spirit manifesting the Kingdom among God’s people and the world sets those who submit to this divine work in contradiction with sin and the unfulfilled present. Moltmann outlines this clearly when he says: The all-important thing is to seek harmony with God …. But people who sanctify their lives in this way come up against the ethics of the society in which they live, for God’s will is more important to them than the demands and exactions of the people who have the power. Harmony with God means confronting and confuting a world which runs counter to God and itself.186

Connections with Moltmann’s early Theology of Hope may again be seen. It may be recalled that in the earlier work Moltmann stated: ‘Peace with God means conflict with the world, for the goad of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present.’187 What Moltmann lacked in his earlier work was a broader Trinitarian understanding of precisely how the future was enacted in the present, allowing human involvement to be commensurate with God’s Kingdom, in spite of the continuing presence and influence of sin. This later emphasis on the Holy Spirit allows Moltmann to construct a more detailed account of the relationship between the Christological work in the death and resurrection, the pneumatological efficacy of the future Kingdom in the present, and the opportunity for creaturely participation in the ethical life of the Kingdom. In developing a robust doctrine of the Holy Spirit, Moltmann is able to illustrate the potential for a theological concept of holiness leading to an anthropological one. This human involvement leads to a contradiction with sin, both personally and structurally. In many ways, therefore, a Christian ethics of hope is combative and in a sense rebellious. It is not rebellious against the Triune God or God’s Kingdom, but precisely in submission to God and the nature of the Kingdom, a Christian ethics of hope rebels against sin and the structures of power in this world which perpetuate inequality, poverty, violence and oppression. This constitutes the active work of the creature. Significantly, it is precisely at this juncture that the positive aspect of sanctification is connected to the negative. Indeed, the negative is constituted by the positive aspect of sanctification and loses its bearing and character as Christian if separated from it. The positive aspect of sanctification is the passive work of the creature allowing the divine Spirit to shape and mould its ethical life in a praxis which adheres to the lived characteristics of the Kingdom. It is here that the ethical motifs of life and liberation explored above may be more clearly grounded. Sanctification is not a separate work from the vivifying work of the Spirit for life Moltmann, The Source of Life, p. 48 (emphasis added). Moltmann, TH, p. 21.

186 187

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and liberation, but rather encompasses this work and allows for deeper theological understanding. This hallowing or sanctifying is the divine work of salvation and purification in the economy of salvation. Moltmann’s later emphasis on the Spirit gives this sanctification a more explicitly Trinitarian framework and illustrates precisely how the promised Kingdom may be ethically enacted by Christians in the present. Conclusion This chapter has sought to explicate the particular role pneumatology has in Moltmann’s thought as it pertains to an eschatological understanding of moral hope. It was argued that the primary means of connection between an ethic of hope and pneumatology was through an understanding of the Spirit’s person and work as it is related to Jesus Christ and God’s Kingdom. Specifically, the particularity and transcendence of the Spirit’s person was seen to complement Moltmann’s understanding of the Spirit’s work, both within the Church and society. However, it was argued that Moltmann failed to adequately differentiate between the Spirit’s work in Church and society, and that Moltmann’s emphasis on a ‘universal society’ added to this ambiguity. When explored further, Moltmann’s distinction between qualitative and quantitative mission was helpful in providing clarity, but the division Moltmann maintains between the two appear unwarranted. This led to a discussion of the primary ethical motifs which may be gleaned from Moltmann’s increasingly pneumatological emphasis. Life, liberation and sanctification were all seen in connection with the Kingdom and made possible in Christ. This is seen to be made historically efficacious in the Holy Spirit. These ethical themes are not separate from the promises of God, but rather are elements of the material content of those promises seen in God’s Kingdom being enacted within creation by the indwelling of God’s Spirit. This has alluded to a wider Trinitarian framework becoming more prevalent in Moltmann’s later writings and eschatological theology. Therefore, this present study will conclude Part I with an examination and assessment of Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought. Proceeding from the understanding of God’s promises for the future, their pinnacle in Christ’s death and resurrection, and made available in the present through the Holy Spirit, the broader Trinitarian framework for an eschatological conception of moral hope may now be investigated.

Chapter 4

Hope in the Triune God Introduction Having followed, albeit critically, the trajectory Moltmann’s thought has set for the potential of developing an ethic of hope, this work has traced the ethical implications of an eschatological theology of divine promise with its Christological locus for the Kingdom of God. The tensions and continuities of God’s redemptive work in Christ with the world in the present – created good, yet fallen – were seen to be exhibited in the life and vocation of Jesus, particularly in his cross and resurrection. The implication for this eschatological event of the Son of God for creation is that God creates a new history for a new future. The present moral workings of this future are experienced through the Holy Spirit, thus making the future Kingdom historically efficacious in the present. The main vistas of ethical exploration resulting from this eschatological purview of the work of Christ and the Spirit are the motifs of life, liberation and sanctification. The theological task is not complete, however, unless these explorations are brought back into their Trinitarian context and given practical clarity and precision for moral praxis. Therefore, this study will now carry out the task of explicating Christian hope in the triune God and exploring its potential relevance for Christian life. Moltmann’s Doctrine of the Trinity From the time Jürgen Moltmann published Der gekreuzigte Gott, the doctrine of the Trinity has occupied an increasingly central place in his thought. Indeed, he has lamented what he perceives to be the relegation of the Trinity to the margins of modern theological discourse and Church life in the West. He states: ‘Whether God is one or triune makes as little difference to faith as it does to ethics.’ From this statement it is seen that Moltmann perceives the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity to be twofold. First, it is of utmost importance to Christian faith. For Moltmann, the doctrine of the Trinity is central to the Christian understanding of God. ‘The modern 

Moltmann is here particularly thinking of nineteenth-century Protestant theology, which culminated with Schleiermacher, who consigned the doctrine of the Trinity to the conclusion of his magnum opus. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), pp. 738–51.  Moltmann, TKG, p. 1.

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surrender of the doctrine of the Trinity or its reduction to an empty, orthodox formula’, he says, ‘is a sign of the assimilation of Christianity to the religions felt to be needed in modern society.’ The loss of a robust understanding of the Trinity, for Moltmann, thus results in a profound loss of Christianity’s understanding of its own identity. Second, Moltmann emphasizes the importance of the Trinity for ethics. In this regard, Moltmann was an early voice in a wider array of theologians who perceive there to be praxiological ramifications for the doctrine of the Trinity. As Joy Ann McDougall affirms: ‘contemporary Trinitarian theologians concur that the doctrine should have wide-ranging normative implications for the human person, interpersonal relations, and the social structures and institutions that join human beings together in community’. Moltmann was a major influence on the wider dialogue regarding the ethical import of doctrinal considerations regarding the Trinity. This chapter will therefore follow this twofold importance of the doctrine of the Trinity in Moltmann’s thought. Beginning with an exploration of Moltmann’s theology of the Trinity, the findings discovered there will be assessed and then re-examined in order to divulge its potential ethical relevance. The History of the Son The doctrine of the Trinity is a complex one, whose pedigree in the Christian faith is both long and full of controversy. With the explicit development of the doctrine among the Cappadocians, the scriptures were used as the paramount text in understanding God as Father, Son and Spirit. While there is no systematic delineation of Trinitarian thought in scripture, the canon was clearly recognized as the authoritative text and source for theological inquiry regarding the Trinity. Otto has maintained that Moltmann does not take the scriptural witness as his lead when constructing his doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, Otto maintains that Moltmann’s interpretation of the Trinity stems from antecedent political convictions to which he moulds subsequent theological arguments in order to offer theological support. According to Otto: ‘Moltmann’s God is the nothing, the ideal 

Moltmann, CG, p. 215. On the roles modern society has given the Church and critique, see Moltmann, TH, pp. 304–24.  Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 6.  Randall Otto, ‘Moltmann and the Anti-monotheism Movement’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001: 293–5, 306–8. He argues that Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought and his political theology are merely building on the discredited work of Erik Peterson. Contra Otto’s contention, Moltmann is aware of the arguments against Peterson and has adjusted his arguments accordingly while retaining the strengths of Peterson’s primary insight. See Jürgen Moltmann, Politische Theologie – Politische Ethik (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1984), p. 77.

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of human community projected for the non-historical end … there is no actual God in Moltmann’s theology …. Moltmann’s “coming God” does not exist, but is instead a regulative idea to spur the transformation of contemporary inhumanity into future community.’ Such a serious indictment, however, does not stand upon closer scrutiny of Moltmann’s work. Moltmann clearly maintains that ‘the task of revising the church’s doctrine of the Trinity’ must be done ‘on the basis of the Bible. For ultimately we must always see to it that the liberating force of the biblical witness is preserved and not obscured.’ Therefore, to be biblically adequate, a Trinitarian theology takes its bearings from the biblical testimony of the interpersonal relationships of the three divine persons, with the cross-event forming the central point of reference: ‘The cross is at the centre of the Trinity.’ What Moltmann then gleans from the biblical texts are the relations between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Moltmann depicts the intra-divine relations described in the New Testament in terms of narrative: ‘The New Testament talks about God by proclaiming in narrative [erzählend verkündigt] the relationship of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, which are relationships of fellowship and are open to the world.’10 What this narrative form conveys is dynamism of relationship, which Moltmann conceives as necessary to an adequate hermeneutic of the biblical witness to the triune relations. Within the biblical witness, Moltmann perceives three primary motifs within the history of the Son which point to three alternating orders of relationship between the three divine persons. These orders of relations convey the movement within the Trinity between the divine persons in the differing acts found in the economy of salvation. In the sending of the Son in his earthly vocation (including his death and resurrection), Moltmann interprets the Trinitarian pattern as being: Father → Spirit → Son. In the lordship and exaltation of Christ together with the sending of the Spirit, Moltmann interprets the Trinitarian pattern as being: Father → Son → Spirit. Finally, in the eschatological consummation and glorification, Moltmann interprets the Trinitarian pattern as being: Spirit → Son → Father.11 The paradigmatic event for Moltmann illustrating the first Trinitarian order (Father → Spirit → Son) is Jesus’ baptism by John. The revelation recorded in the gospels as occurring at Jesus’ baptism included the identification of Jesus as ‘beloved son’, accompanied by the descent of the Spirit.12 This event, inaugurating Jesus’ vocation as the Messiah, portrays him as the recipient of this mission from the Father and the Spirit, who take the active roles. This is not to say that Jesus is entirely passive or uninvolved in his baptism, but rather that in the history of the 

Otto, ‘Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,’ pp. 302, 303. Moltmann, TKG, p. 65.  Moltmann, History and the Triune God, p. 82.  Moltmann, TKG, p. 83. 10 Ibid., p. 64. 11 Ibid., p. 94. 12 Mark 1:11, Matt. 3:17. 

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Son, Moltmann identifies the Son as the one being sent. This interaction which the Father and Spirit have with Jesus illustrates the movement: Father → Spirit → Son. Likewise, the twofold event of the divine identification of Jesus’ sonship and the anointing of Jesus by the Spirit indicate a twofold relationship of love. Moltmann argues that the identification of Jesus as the Son by the Father involves a love which is ‘like for like’ (the analogical principle). In the sending of Jesus via the anointing of the Spirit, Jesus is sent out with his mission to Israel, that is, to others. Therefore, the love displayed here is for those who are unlike (the dialectical principle).13 Moltmann first drew this distinction in 1973 when offering a critique of the Aristotelian notion of love.14 At that time, Moltmann criticized this notion of love in which ‘like seeks after like’ when discussing the radical nature of divine love in the incarnation and crucifixion. What is seen here is that God loved what was ‘unlike’ and became what was ‘unlike’ for the sake of saving creation. In his later discussion of Jesus’ baptism, Moltmann deepens his understanding of the analogical and dialectical principles of love and their function in articulating a theology of the Trinity. In the Father’s declaration of Jesus’ identity as the ‘beloved Son’, the analogical principle of love is illustrated. This is a love within God, between two of the divine persons in the Godhead. According to Moltmann: ‘The mutual knowing of the Father and the Son is a mutual loving. The mutual loving of the Father and the Son is a love of like for like. Consequently, it is exclusive.’15 Alternatively, the sending of Jesus by the Spirit in his earthly ministry illustrates the dialectical principle of love. This is not to say that the mutual loving between the Son and the Spirit is that of those who are ‘unlike’. Rather, the Spirit’s role in sending the Son outward to creatures in life and ministry compels Christ to know, to be known, to love and to be loved by those who are unlike. Therefore, the dialectical principle of love describes the Son’s relationship with creaturely existence, which in the synoptic gospels occurs in the Spirit. Moltmann differentiates between the two principles in stating: ‘“Like is known by like” applies to the exclusive relationship of the Father and the Son. “Those who are unlike know one another” is true of the revelation to men and women through the Son. This axiom only permits a Trinitarian interpretation, not a monotheistic one.’16 The importance of this differentiation for understanding Moltmann’s conception of the divine unity will become apparent below. However, the vital point to note for the present discussion is how this differentiation aids Moltmann in interpreting the first Trinitarian pattern of being: Father → Spirit → Son. The second Trinitarian pattern Moltmann describes is: Father → Son → Spirit. In the history of the Son described in the biblical literature, this pattern is witnessed at the Son’s exaltation and the sending of the Spirit. It is with this 13

Moltmann, TKG, p. 68. See Moltmann, CG, pp. 26–8. Moltmann also uses this analogy to address the pragmatic involvement of the Church in socio-cultural interactions. 15 Moltmann, TKG, p. 68. 16 Ibid., pp. 68–9. 14

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second Trinitarian pattern that Moltmann focuses an intensified gaze on the ‘eschatological future’. He states: ‘here we shall show that a Trinitarian structure also underlies the eschatological proclamation of the risen Christ and the Christ who is to come’.17 As in Theology of Hope,18 Moltmann asserts in his doctrine of the Trinity that the resurrection is not verifiable according to the empirical requirements of modern historical criticism (notably, repeatability).19 Rather, Moltmann understands the sightings of the resurrection reported by the women and disciples as a ‘pre-reflection’ which takes on many of the characteristics of promise he outlined in 1964. This includes its correspondence to God’s promising acts to the patriarchs and prophets recorded in the Hebrew scriptures. Moltmann describes the matter in this way: In the calling of the patriarchs, in the people of the covenant, and in the prophets, this coming glory already enters history, pointing the way towards its own consummation. When the crucified Jesus ‘appears’ in glory to the women and the disciples after his death, this then means the pre-reflection of his future in the coming glory of God …. That is to say, his Easter appearances have to be understood as the pre-reflection of his future; and what the disciples see at Easter is, correspondingly, the form taken by anticipating perception.20

The resurrection of Christ is a ‘pre-reflection’ in that it is the portent of the future general resurrection life to be shared by creatures. More than this, however, it enabled the future to become plausible through divine promise by bringing the future hoped for by Israel into the present which is experienced in the risen Christ. Regarding this witness of the disciples, Moltmann elaborates: On the foundation of this eschatological structure of Jesus’ appearances and on the basis of what they themselves saw, the disciples then took up an apocalyptic symbol of hope …. They called this event the resurrection from the dead … what they are saying is: in this one person, ahead of all others, the End-time process of the raising of the dead has already begun.21

This pre-reflection offered by Christ’s resurrection involved a vision of his divine glory and therefore accentuated the disciples’ perception of the uniqueness of his relationship with the Father. When discussing his own revelation of the resurrected Christ, the apostle Paul states that when God ‘through his grace, was pleased to reveal his Son to me so that I might preach him among the Gentiles’, it was God 17

Ibid., p. 83. Moltmann, TH, pp. 172–82. 19 Moltmann, TKG, p. 84. 20 Ibid., p. 85. 21 Ibid. 18

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as the one who reveals and the Son as the one revealed.22 Moltmann interprets this passage as having Trinitarian significance. He argues: ‘God does not reveal “himself”. He reveals “his Son”. The Son is not identical with God’s self. He is a subject of his own. The One who was raised from the dead and who appears in the reflection of God’s coming glory is perceived by Paul as the Son.’23 However, for the significance of the second Trinitarian pattern to be clear, the focus must be on what the resurrection of Christ resulted in. In this, its Trinitarian effect is seen to be twofold. First, the Son ascends and is exalted to the right hand of the Father. From this vantage point, the Spirit may be sent as the second result of Christ’s resurrection. Both of these occur within the economy of salvation and are therefore explicated in soteriology. This pattern of Father → Son → Spirit finally leads to the third Trinitarian pattern, which Moltmann sees occurring in the eschatological consummation of the Kingdom and glorification of God. The third Trinitarian pattern Moltmann perceives in the history of the Son is: Spirit → Son → Father. Moltmann associates this final Trinitarian pattern with ‘eschatological hope’, which he also regards as an event within the Trinity.24 For exegetical support, Moltmann cites – as he often does – 1 Corinthians 15:22–8. In this passage, the apostle Paul states: For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the first fruits, after that those who are Christ’s at His coming, then comes the end, when He hands over the kingdom to the God and Father, when He has abolished all rule and all authority and power. For He must reign until He has put all His enemies under His feet. The last enemy that will be abolished is death. For He has put all things in subjection under his feet. But when He says, ‘All things are put in subjection,’ it is evident that He is excepted who put all things in subjection to Him. When all things are subjected to Him, then the Son Himself also will be subjected to the One who subjected all things to Him, so that God may be all in all.

Moltmann perceives two consecutive processes being described in this biblical passage. The first pertains to resurrection. Initially, Paul describes the resurrection of Christ, which he elsewhere describes as being an act of the Spirit.25 Associated with this event is the assurance of the general resurrection of the dead for creation. Paul, in Romans 8, likewise describes this as a function of the Spirit done ‘in Christ’.26 Moltmann states here: ‘But if death is no more, then Christ with his lifegiving Spirit [lebenschaffenden Geist] has made all the dead live. Then his rule 22

Gal. 1:15–16. Moltmann, TKG, pp. 86–7. Here ‘God’ is meant by Moltmann to indicate the Father. 24 Ibid., p. 90–91. 25 Rom. 8:11. 26 Rom. 8:2, 6, 11. 23

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is consummated [erfüllt]. Then his goal is achieved. Then all promises and hopes are fulfilled [erfüllt].’27 This emphasis on the creativity of the Spirit, in bringing the divine promises to fulfilment for creaturely life, again provides the continuity between Moltmann’s theology of promise and his pneumatology outlined earlier in this work. After this soteriological event, Moltmann perceives a second process being described in 1 Corinthians 15. This second process is one occurring within the immanent Trinity. What occurs is the intra-Trinitarian movement between the Son and the Father that, subsequent to all things being subjected to the Son, sees the Son handing over all authority to the Father. Paul, in 1 Corinthians 15, does not stop his description of the eschatological movement between Father and Son with the resurrection because ‘Christ himself is not then as yet complete [vollendet].’28 The eschatological narrative must be taken further: ‘The divine rule was given by the Father to the Son through Christ’s resurrection. In the final consummation [der Vollendung] it will be transferred from the Son to the Father.’29 It is in these two processes that Moltmann describes the Trinitarian pattern to be: Spirit → Son → Father. Moltmann concludes that in the glorification of God, ‘the Father is really the one who receives. In eschatology all activity proceeds from the Son and the Spirit; the Father is the receiver of the Kingdom, the power and the glory, for ever and ever [in Ewigkeit].’30 These discussions of Moltmann’s Trinitarian interpretation of the history of the Son have direct import for his understanding of the immanent Trinity and the ethical motifs which may be gleaned from this. However, prior to discussing those elements, the important event from which Moltmann initially derives his understanding of the Trinity from the divine economy must first be explored. For Moltmann, the primary event in the history of the Son that provides the starting place for a doctrine of the Trinity is the crucifixion. He clearly affirms: ‘The cross is at the centre of the Trinity.’31 Of Jesus’ death, Moltmann states: ‘We can understand it only if we see his death not against his relationship to the Jews and the Romans…but in relation to his God and Father, whose closeness and whose grace he himself had proclaimed.’32 Moltmann explains the differentiation of these three elements in Christ’s ‘historical trial’ in the following way:

27

Moltmann, TKG, p. 92. Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., p. 93. The translation of in Ewigkeit as ‘for ever and ever’ is somewhat misleading. It is better translated as ‘in eternity’. The impact of this for Moltmann’s concept of eschatology and its relation to ethics and time will be dealt with in the next chapter. 31 Moltmann, TKG, p. 83. 32 Moltmann, CG, p. 146. 28

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As a ‘blasphemer’, Jesus was rejected by the guardians of his people’s law. As a ‘rebel’ he was crucified by the Romans. But finally, and most profoundly, he died as one rejected by his God and his Father. In the theological context of his life this is the most important dimension.33

This motif of the rejection of the Son by the Father exhibited in the cross of Christ is inexorably seen in the cry of dereliction and has relevance for Christian moral engagement with structural entities within society. Moltmann states: In the face of Jesus’ death-cry to God, theology either becomes impossible or becomes possible only as specifically Christian theology. Christian theology cannot come to terms with the cry of its own age and at the same time always be on the side of the ruler of this world …. Sharing in the sufferings of this time, Christian theology is truly contemporary theology. Whether or not it can be so depends less upon the openness of theologians and their theories to the world and more upon whether they have honestly and without reserve come to terms with the death-cry of Jesus for God.34

Moltmann’s suggestions regarding the implications of the cry of dereliction for any conception of the relationship between the Father and the Son at the crucifixion has been controversial. In addition to this, the political repercussions Moltmann outlines as a result of his theology of the cross have also stirred heated debate. Dorothee Sölle has argued that Moltmann has portrayed the Father as a sadistic being, whose desire it is to slaughter his own Son. Speaking of Moltmann and the Trinitarian implications of his theology of the cross, Sölle states: ‘The Author is fascinated by the brutality of his God … also here the Trinity is so constituted, that the first person “destroys” the second.’35 Moreover, Sölle maintains that Moltmann’s Trinitarian theology of the cross is ineffective for liberating praxis because it is not oriented towards those who suffer, but rather maintaining the honour of a ‘God’ who disowns and destroys his Son.36 But is this how Moltmann conceives of the event of the cross and its Trinitarian significance? In Moltmann’s theology, is the Father little more than a cosmic sadist revelling in the gruesome torture of his only begotten Son? The plausibility of such a charge depends on the interpretation Moltmann provides of the relationship between God and suffering. Sölle maintains that Moltmann conceives of the Trinity being constituted in the extermination of the Son, which makes the suffering of God manifest. However, it must be questioned whether it is indeed suffering that 33

Ibid., p. 152. Ibid. p. 153. 35 Dorothee Sölle, ‘Gott und das Leiden’, in Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch ‘Der gekreuzigte Gott’, ed. Michael Welker (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1979), p. 115 (author’s translation). 36 Ibid., p. 116. 34

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Moltmann views as constitutive to the Triune being of God. It appears from his developing Trinitarian thought, which Moltmann describes in The Crucified God and The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, that love, not suffering is constitutive for God’s being. He states: ‘“God is love” …. In other words, God does not just love as he is angry, chooses, or rejects. He is love, that is, he exists in love. He constitutes his existence in the event of his love. He exists as love in the event of the cross.’37 It is this love which is manifested in the cross. It is a love for that which is unlike. Moltmann writes: ‘But in the cross and passion of Christ faith experiences a quite different love of God, which loves what is quite different.’38 What, then, is one to make of the relationship between love and suffering in Moltmann’s theology? If Moltmann conceives of love, not suffering, as constitutive to God’s being, then how does the divine love relate to the divine pathos? It appears that in Moltmann’s thought, it is the intra-Trinitarian love which creates an openness between the divine persons in communion with one another. This love then manifests itself in an outward movement in the act of creation where God chooses in freedom that which is not ‘like’. God is open for communion with the creature. In being open in love for the other, God cannot therefore have the quality of apatheia. Moltmann’s contention with the immutability of God is not rooted primarily in a divine predilection for suffering or sado-masochistic tendencies. Rather, it is grounded in the divine nature as love. If God is love, then according to Moltmann he cannot be an apathetic God, but rather must be open to the other in communion. This open communion of love leads to an understanding of a divine sympatheia. It is the divine sympatheia, rooted in love, which allows for the possibility of God’s suffering. Therefore, the suffering of God is derivative from the divine love, not constitutive of the divine nature. Moltmann illustrates this when he says: But if [God] is capable of loving something else, then he lays himself open to the suffering which love for another brings him; and yet, by virtue of his love, he remains master of the pain that love causes him to suffer. God does not suffer out of deficiency of being, like created beings. To this extent he is ‘apathetic.’ But he suffers from the love which is the superabundance and overflowing of his being.39

From this line of argumentation it may be seen that Sölle’s construal of Moltmann’s Trinitarian theology of the cross was inaccurate in so far as the divine love, on her account, is not the guiding concept at play in the passion of the cross. From the vantage point of Moltmann’s understanding of the divine love and passion, Sölle’s second criticism may now be addressed: the perceived ineffectual nature of Moltmann’s argument for positive, liberating, ethical derivatives. 37

Moltmann, CG, p. 246. Ibid., p. 214. 39 Moltmann, TKG, p. 23. 38

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To grasp the unique potential of Moltmann’s Trinitarian conception of the cross for an eschatological ethics, it is necessary to quote him at length. From his broad statements, a more exacting contribution may be proposed. He states: Just as the unconditional love of Jesus for the rejected made the Pharisees his enemies and brought him to the cross, so unconditional love also means enmity and persecution in a world in which the life of man is made dependent on particular social norms, conditions and achievements. A love which takes precedence and robs these conditions of their force is folly and scandal in this world. But if the believer experiences his freedom and the new possibility of his life in the fact that the love of God reaches him, the loveless and the unloved, in the cross of Christ, what must be the thoughts of a theology which corresponds to this love? In that case it is a love which creates its own conditions, since it cannot accept the conditions of lovelessness and the law. Further, it cannot command love and counterlove. As its purpose is freedom, it is directed towards freedom …. God is unconditional love, because he takes on himself grief at the contradiction in men and does not angrily suppress this contradiction …. God allows himself to be crucified and is crucified, and in this consummates his unconditional love that is so full of hope. But that means that in the cross he becomes himself the condition of his love. The loving Father has a parallel in the loving Son and in the Spirit creates similar patterns of love in man in revolt …. Thus its suffering proves to be stronger than hate …. By the death of the Son [the believer] is taken up into the grief of the Father and experiences a liberation which is a new element [ein Novum ist] in this de-divinised and legalistic world, which is itself a new element over against the original creation of the world [die selbst noch gegenüber der anfänglichen Schöpfung der Welt ein Novum darstellt].40

Having argued for the constitutive role of love, rather than suffering, for the divine nature, the ethical derivatives are more readily noticeable. In the cross of Christ, the love of the Son for the Father is shown precisely at the deepest division between them. The Son surrenders in love for the Father to death. Likewise, the divine love manifested in the person of Jesus for the rejected brought the contradiction of a world wanting to maintain the status quo of inequality and indignity. As seen in Jesus’ vocation for the Kingdom, those who are sick are healed, those who are captive are set free, and those enslaved by sin are liberated. This receives greater force in Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought because in Jesus it is God who does these things through the divine love. The love of God is fulfilled on the cross and sealed in the resurrection. The Holy Spirit then makes this love 40

Moltmann, CG, pp. 248–9. The potential for ‘a Novum’ in ethical actions – explicitly mentioned twice by Moltmann here – resulting from the Trinitarian love witnessed in the cross is more obvious in the German, and becomes obscured with the English translation, ‘a new element’.

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historically efficacious in the creaturely realm. Therefore, through the Spirit’s empowerment, the believer is enabled to live commensurately with the ethical content of the Kingdom, which receives consummation in the future promised by God. It is seen precisely here that Christian moral living does not stem solely from an imitation of what is seen in the Trinity. Rather, as seen in this trajectory of Moltmann’s thought, the creature is taken up into the divine communion as an-other (who is ‘unlike’), via a robust pneumatology and is therefore able to participate in and live out of the divine love. The indwelling Spirit ‘creates similar patterns of love’ in humanity, who must therefore by necessity contravene any action or structural system incommensurate with the divine love. In the words of Gerhard Sauter: ‘The Spirit will bring to perfection what Jesus has accomplished.’41 Much of this controversy surrounding Moltmann’s view of the cross and the Trinity, as exemplified by Sölle, is because of the way he relates the ‘economic’ and the ‘immanent’ Trinities. The relationship between the economic and immanent Trinities has been a contentious issue in Moltmann’s theology. Following Rahner’s axiom that ‘[t]he “economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic” Trinity’,42 Moltmann’s main argument in The Crucified God was that the cross of Christ had not only soteriological significance, but Trinitarian significance as well. Walter Kasper criticized Moltmann’s early Christological thought for blurring the distinction between the immanent and economic relations of the Trinity. He says: ‘Without the fundamental distinction between … immanent and economic Trinities … theology is not possible …’.43 Stephanie Hartmann argues that Moltmann takes up (aufheben) Kasper’s critique in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God.44 Hartmann states that Moltmann ‘takes up’ the immanent and economic distinction, or at the very least is mindful of Kasper’s critique in his later Trinitarian thinking. Hartmann argues against Moltmann, however, saying that reinstating a division between God and the world (that is, between the divine economy and the immanent Gerhard Sauter, What Dare We Hope? Reconsidering Eschatology (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999), p. 56. 42 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 22. For a critique, see Randal Rauser, ‘Rahner’s Rule: An Emperor without Clothes?’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, vol. 7, no. 1, 2005: 81–94. 43 Walter Kasper, ‘Revolution im Gottesverständnis? Zur Situation des ökumenischen Dialogs nach Jürgen Moltmanns “Der gekreuzigte Gott”’, in Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmann Buch ‘Der gekreuzigte Gott’, ed. Michael Welker (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1979), pp. 140–48 (author’s translation). It may also be noted that despite the Trinitarian emphasis in The Crucified God, a prominent pneumatology is missing from the work. Such an emphasis on the Spirit does not receive a full articulation until Moltmann’s discussion of the filioque in TKG and his pneumatological doctrine of creation. 44 See Stephanie Hartmann, Trinitätslehre als Sozialkritik? Das Verhältnis von Gotteslehre und Sozialkritik in den trinitätstheologischen Entwürfen von Jürgen Moltmann und Leonardo Boff (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 27. 41

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life of the Trinity) does not necessitate either a division between the concepts of person (Personbegriffs) within the Trinity or between the economic and immanent distinctions of the Trinity. Hartmann argues that Moltmann need not conceive of the uniqueness of the Father, Son and Spirit as being constituted in differing ways of enacting their personhood, or ‘being persons’. Likewise, affirming a difference between Godself and human engagement with God does not necessitate the clear economic–immanent distinction she perceives in Moltmann’s later Trinitarian thought. She affirms that ‘the classic boundary between immanent and economic Trinities cannot be understood as metaphysical …’.45 What Hartmann does not notice, however, is that the immanent–economic distinction in Moltmann’s later Trinitarian thought is grounded in doxology, not metaphysics.46 Moltmann is not seeking to make a division in God by articulating aspects of the immanent life of the Trinity, which is explored mainly in the second half of Trinity and the Kingdom of God. He is rather seeking to explore the opportunities for theological talk about God in faithful response to God’s liberating acts in history, but also to respond in praise for who God is in Godself. He states: ‘… Christian love is not merely a motivation, and Christian faith is more than the point from which action takes its bearings. Being a Christian is also characterized by gratitude, joy, praise and adoration. Faith lives in meditation and prayer as well as in practice.’47 For Moltmann, the revelation of the Trinitarian relations in the divine economy reveals the Trinitarian relations within the being of God. These relations are characterized by openness for the other. Moltmann’s reading of the divine economy into the immanent life of the Trinity proves essential to his understanding of the divine unity. Beginning with the history of the Son, Moltmann perceives the inter-relationships of the three persons of the Godhead as the starting place for an understanding of the Trinity. Moltmann then proceeds from the history of the Son to explicate his interpretation of the immanent, or ‘doxological’, Trinity. Contrary to many of Moltmann’s interpreters, it will be argued that it is actually his understanding of the divine unity, rather than the separateness of the divine persons, which provides the most interesting theological resources for an eschatological ethic. The Divine Unity Moltmann conceives of the Trinity on the basis of the biblical records of the history of the Son. McDougall affirms that ‘his dialectical vision of the Trinitarian life is driven more by soteriological than conceptual necessity’.48 The biblical testimony of the inter-relationships of the three divine persons offers a faithful witness to who God is in God’s self. Therefore, Moltmann adopts a social Trinitarian theology, 45

Ibid., p. 29 (author’s translation). Moltmann, TKG, pp. 7–9. 47 Ibid., p. 7. 48 McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, p. 50. 46

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which uses the notion of perichoresis to describe the divine unity. Moltmann contrasts this perichoretic understanding of God’s unity with two other means of construing the oneness of God: supreme substance and absolute subject. Moltmann argues that the view of God as ‘supreme substance’ originates from the Greek thought of Aristotle and is exemplified in Aquinas’ ‘five ways’. Moltmann states: ‘The cosmological proofs of God proceed from the finitude of the world and contrast this with infinite being.’49 Moltmann contends that the divine nature is defined in reference to the finitude of the natural world, but through negation: ‘That is the via negativa.’50 Starting from a cosmology which perceives the natural universe as ordered and mechanical, the existence of deity is then discerned through a process of ‘deduction’.51 Moltmann’s critique of the view of God as ‘supreme substance’ is twofold, with both critiques being closely connected to one another. Regarding Thomas’ five ways, Moltmann writes: ‘But he did not really prove the existence of God; what he proved was the nature of the divine …. In this way Aquinas answered the question: “What is the nature of the divine?”, but not the question: “Who is God?”’52 Moltmann does not mean by this that he views Thomas to have given an exhaustive account of the divine nature through a description of the supreme substance which must then only be supplemented with the personal traits of God. Moltmann intends to say here that with the cosmological proofs, Aquinas successfully illustrates the plausible existence of a deity. Moltmann considers this to be theologically unsatisfactory. It is so because it is unable to provide an understanding of God as has been revealed in the history of Israel and pre-eminently as the Father of Jesus Christ. If Christian faith believes that the one God has been revealed as Father, Son and Spirit, that is to say, Triune, then the monistic deity described by a description of God as ‘supreme substance’ is inadequate. Moltmann’s second critique of the interpretation of God solely as ‘supreme substance’ stems from the cosmology upon which Aquinas bases his metaphysics. Moltmann affirms that Aquinas’ metaphysics are ‘certainly cogent’ if based on the medieval cosmology. However, this leads Moltmann to question the contemporary usefulness of the five ways: ‘But is this cosmology itself convincing? If the human understanding of reality changes fundamentally, these proofs of God lose their power …. They are irrefutable from the standpoint of their own premises; but these premises can quite well be cut from under their feet.’53 Therefore, if humanity interprets the universe using a differing cosmology to that of Aquinas, the cosmological proofs are no longer deemed compelling. Moltmann claims the eventual collapse of any philosophical or theological view of God is inevitable 49

Moltmann, TKG, p. 10. Ibid., p. 11. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., p. 12. 53 Ibid. 50

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with changing cosmologies and that this is an inherent problem in viewing God as the ‘supreme substance’. Moltmann’s reading of Aquinas as a theistic, philosophical theologian, would be questioned by those who interpret Aquinas more within his premodern context and less through the eyes of subsequent centuries of ‘Thomism’. More recent interpreters, such as Nicholas Healy, take seriously Aquinas’ commitment to scriptural interpretation and its place of primacy in theological inquiry. Moreover, Healy clearly explicates the formative role which the Dominican emphasis on lived obedience to Christ and preaching from the Gospel had on Thomas.54 It is possible that Moltmann’s critique of certain perspectives on God as supreme substance may be warranted if they were brought into dialogue with more recent modern, philosophical or neo-scholastic apologetics. His explicit association of the concept with Aquinas rather than later streams of Thomism, however, may be subject to critique. The second view of divine unity Moltmann sees as problematic is the interpretation of God as the ‘absolute subject’. According to Moltmann, the view of God as ‘absolute subject’ is primarily seen ‘in the rise of European subjectivity’55 and is exemplified in Descartes’ maxim ‘Cogito ergo sum.’ On the grounds of this view, humanity no longer understands itself on the basis of who God is and God’s revelation to humanity. Rather, God can only be understood on the sure grounds of the human subject. The cosmos is no longer the home of human existence, but rather ‘the material for the knowledge and appropriation of the world of man. The centre of this world and its point of reference is the human subject …’.56 The result Moltmann perceives in this is a view of the world as having the human subject as its centre. Therefore, the complex inter-weavings of the world as created and humanity as co-sharers in this creaturely existence become invalid as a means to perceive reality. If the ground of human knowing is to be found in human subjectivity, then human dominance over the other in the quest for knowledge becomes validated. Moltmann states: If man can no longer understand himself in the light of the world and its cohesions, but has to comprehend the world and its cohesions in the light of his own plans for its domination, then it would seem the obvious course for him to look for the mirror in which knowledge of God is to be found in his own subjectivity.57

54 See Nicholas M. Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 24–33, 107–30. 55 Moltmann, TKG, p. 13. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., p. 14.

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The result of this thinking is that ‘knowledge of God in his image is surer than the knowledge of God from his works’.58 Moltmann contends that the notion of God as ‘absolute subject’ limits the mode of God’s revelation to ‘self-revelation’. Because of this, any indirect revelation through God’s works is construed as being either untenable after historical-critical analysis, or an invalid means for comprehension of God’s absolute subjectivity. Moltmann maintains that this modern view of the divine subject was employed in order to provide divine validation for the modern conception of the human: ‘God, thought of as subject, with perfect reason and free will, is in actual fact the archetype of the free, reasonable, sovereign person, who has complete disposal over himself.’59 The theological and ethical consequences of the above positions are what Moltmann describes as the monotheistic notion of monarchy. Moltmann’s conception of divine monarchy is complex and requires careful interpretation if misunderstandings are to be avoided. Moltmann differentiates two ways of life in the Trinity, only one in which it is legitimate to talk of a ‘monarchy’ of the Father. Moltmann differentiates between the Trinity in ‘origin’ and the ‘inner life’ of the Trinity.60 He states: ‘We have to distinguish between the constitution of the Trinity and the Trinity’s inner life.’61 To clearly understand how Moltmann conveys this distinction, it is prudent to begin with what he calls the ‘inner life’ of the Trinity. What Moltmann gleans from the biblical narrative of the history of the Son has direct relevance for the notion of Trinitarian monarchy. He argues that no one person of the Trinity can be said to have universal priority in the divine economy. Rather, as was explained above, in the history of the Son there are changing modes of relations, with the different persons of the Godhead having a more primary role at the differing movements within the divine life. Therefore, in the sending of the Son, the Father took a primary role. In the suffering of the Son, it was the Son who had primacy. In the eschatological glorification, the primary role belongs to the Spirit. Therefore, when considering the life of the Trinity beyond the Trinity in ‘origin’, the metaphor of monarchy is insufficient because it conveys a singularity of rule which does not adequately express the complexities of the 58

Ibid. Ibid., p. 15. 60 Roger Olsen maintains that this distinction found in Moltmann is unhelpful. He maintains that it unnecessarily produces divisions within the divine life and complicates Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. However, Olsen fails to recognize that it is precisely this distinction which allows Moltmann to engage traditional language regarding the Father while eschewing a monistic outworking in creaturely political and clerical life. This will be discussed in further detail below. See Roger Olson, ‘Trinity and Eschatology: The Historical Being of God in Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg’, Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 36, no. 2, 1983: 224. 61 Moltmann, TKG, p. 183. 59

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mutual inter-relationships within the Godhead as expressed in the ‘history of the Son’. The result of all this is that ‘since the Trinitarian Persons are unique, they cannot merely be defined by their relationship to their common substance’.62 Rather, they are first defined by their narrated inter-relationships. Although Moltmann’s goal is to articulate a social doctrine of the Trinity and therefore statements regarding the divine ousia are rare, there are clear elements in Moltmann’s thought which emphatically affirm the unity of divine essence. While Moltmann clearly affirms the unique subjectivity of each divine person, he does not become tritheistic in his understanding by abandoning language regarding a common substance between the persons. He merely maintains that theological discussion regarding the Trinity can neither begin with substance nor understand the totality of the inter-relationships in terms of substance. Moltmann affirms a unity of divine essence within the Trinity with his understanding of the Trinity in origin.63 Regarding the relations in origin, Moltmann writes: ‘But this innertrinitarian “monarchy of the Father” only defines the inner-trinitarian constitution of God, not the world monarchy of a universal Father.’64 Briefly stated, Moltmann maintains the Father as the ‘origin’ or fount of the Son and the Spirit.65 It is with this ‘monarchy’ of the Father in origin that Moltmann maintains a unity of substance between the three divine persons. Theology must maintain ‘the unity of essence between Christ and God …’.66 The Son is not created, as Arius maintained, but ‘proceeded from the substance of the Father and is hence of the same substance as the Father …’.67 In his discussion of the filioque, Moltmann maintains the procession of the Spirit from the Father, and therefore by the same logic the unity of essence with the Father also. However, since Moltmann perceives an unbalanced emphasis in theology on the unity of substance within the Godhead, he spends the majority of his efforts following the biblical history of the Son and describing the inner life of the Trinity. The Divine Communion Moltmann affirms the common substance of the three persons, but believes generic terms – which use potentially monistic language, reduce God to a divine monarchy and obscure the complexities of the tri-unity into either modalism or tritheism – are detrimental.68 According to Moltmann, such ‘generic terms’ are philosophical, anthropological or other terminology (including extended excurses on substance 62

Ibid., p. 171, see also 175. See ibid., pp. 162–7. 64 Ibid., p. 165. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., p. 131. 67 Ibid., p. 164. 68 Ibid., p. 190. 63

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or nature) whose content is supplied by material outside the biblical history.69 Therefore, since Moltmann’s starting place is the biblical history of the Son, he spends much of his efforts deducing what may be said of the inner relations of the three divine persons based on this. This study leads Moltmann to affirm the divine unity as a community, or fellowship. To convey the type of communion envisioned for the Trinity, Moltmann opts for the Greek notion of perichoresis. Moltmann uses the term ‘perichoresis’ to describe the mutual indwelling of the divine persons in unity. Regarding perichoresis, he says: For this concept grasps the circulatory character of the eternal divine life. An eternal life process takes place in the triune God through the exchange of energies …. By virtue of their eternal love they live in one another to such an extent, and dwell in one another to such an extent, that they are one.70

With such language as ‘exchange of energies’ (den Austauch der Energien), ‘circulation’ (der Kreislauf) and ‘dwell in one another’ (wohnen so einander), Moltmann is attempting to convey the intimate, mutual reciprocity of the divine persons in their eternal communion. This mutuality or reciprocity is not merely between three divine subjects. This would result in tritheism. Rather, Moltmann uses ‘perichoresis’ to show that the Father, Son and Spirit live not just toward one another, but also in one another. Moltmann attempts to clarify his understanding of perichoresis in the following passage: The divine persons exist not only in relationships to one another but also, as the Johannine formulations show, in one another: the Son in the Father, the Father in the Son, the Holy Spirit in the Father and the Son, and the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit. This intimate indwelling and complete interpenetration of the persons in one another is expressed by the doctrine of the Trinitarian perichoresis …. For the doctrine of perichoresis combines the threeness and the oneness without reducing the threeness to the oneness or the oneness to the threeness.71

It is through the narration of the interactions of the Father, Son and Spirit that Moltmann attempts to describe the implications for the inner life of the Trinity. He perceives the use of perichoresis as being the only plausible means available to contemporary theology to preserve not only the unity, but also the uniqueness of the persons within the Godhead.72 With the notion of perichoresis, Moltmann is able to 69 See also Moltmann, History and the Triune God, pp. 87–9. Moltmann thinks such ‘generic terms’ would therefore separate God-talk from a necessarily scripturally guided understanding. 70 Moltmann, TKG, pp. 174–5. 71 Moltmann, History and the Triune God, pp. 85–6. 72 Ibid.

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maintain the unity of substance between the three persons while emphasizing the tri-unity of the Godhead as witnessed to in the history of the Son. Randall Otto is sceptical whether Moltmann maintains a unity of substance in his interpretation of perichoresis.73 Otto charts the history of the patristic use of ‘perichoresis’ to its origins in Christology and its description of the hypostatic union of the two natures of Christ.74 Otto claims that Moltmann disregards this ontological basis for the term ‘perichoresis’ used in relation to the divine essence. He states: ‘Jürgen Moltmann stands as the vanguard of theologians who have engaged in such misuse, invoking perichoresis while denying its basis in the one divine nature.’75 Otto does not accuse Moltmann of tritheism, which is insufficient for Christian theology. Rather, he accuses Moltmann of having ‘insufficient ontological basis for any god!’.76 Otto goes on to argue, with some vitriol: Moltmann’s use of perichoresis is clearly conceptual, for, in accord with the Hegelian thrust of his thought, nothing has being till the non-historical and uncompletable end. This is true of human beings, Christ, God, and all things …. The unity of the Son with the Father is one of purpose and will, not nature ….77

Otto maintains that because Moltmann places ontological weight on the future, God evolves into being and unity. However, since the future is ontologically superior, the fullness of divine nature never actually arrives. Therefore, according to Otto, what Moltmann conceives as ‘God’ does not, and cannot, exist. When Otto’s reading of Moltmann’s use of perichoresis is compared with the analysis above, his assertion that Moltmann maintains no sense of ontological unity between the persons of the Godhead is unwarranted. Moreover, given the analysis provided above in this and the preceding chapters, Otto’s interpretation of Moltmann’s explication of the relationship between history and God appears equally flawed. God exists outside of history, and through the divine promise creates a new history. This is pre-eminently seen in the cross-resurrection of Christ. The cross and resurrection of Christ is not an event that merely shapes God from within the history that occurs in this event. Rather, God, from beyond the strictures of history, also performs a new work in the event of cross-resurrection which creates history and makes a novum possible.

Randall E. Otto, ‘The Use and Abuse of Perichoresis in Recent Theology’, Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 54, no. 3, 2001: 366–84. 74 Ibid., pp. 368–72. Otto cites Gregory of Nazianzus and Maximus the Confessor as exemplars of this Christological use of perichoresis prior to John of Damascus’ use of the term in Trinitarian language, which was then confirmed at the Council of Florence (1442). 75 Ibid., p. 372. 76 Ibid., p. 375. 77 Ibid., p. 376. 73

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Otto’s conclusions regarding Moltmann’s use of perichoresis may also be contrasted with an article written three years previously by Ciril Sorc.78 Sorc traces the historical origins of the term ‘perichoresis’ to its Christological roots in Gregory of Nazianzus and Maximus the Confessor. He also follows the historical trajectory through John of Damascus to the Council of Florence.79 Regarding perichoresis, Sorc concludes from the historical and then biblical material that: ‘Only in light of the perichoretic love can we understand John 14–17.’80 Otto maintains that Moltmann denies a unity of substance between the persons of the Godhead. However, Sorc derives from the same historical materials that Moltmann, though engaging in constructive theology, is well within the conceptual purview of the ancient thinkers. Sorc goes so far as to credit Moltmann (alongside Leonardo Boff for Roman Catholicism) with the ‘discovery’ (Entdeckung) of the ancient use of perichoresis for protestant theology and incorporating it into modern Western thought.81 It would appear that in light of the above analysis of Moltmann’s affirmation of a shared divine essence due to the Trinity in origin (though, admittedly this does play a lesser role), Sorc provides the more accurate reading of Moltmann’s thought. Having examined Moltmann’s use of the term ‘perichoresis’ and its place in his Trinitarian thought, we must now examine precisely how Moltmann supplies content to the term ‘perichoresis’ in order to understand the divine communion. This must be examined diligently if one is to understand the ethical implications of his perichoretic thought. The Divine Perichoresis The preceding discussion of Moltmann’s use of perichoresis illustrates the controversy that has surrounded the manner in which Moltmann envisages the divine unity in terms of this ancient concept. It was argued that Moltmann maintains a clearly defined, though at times complex, understanding of a shared essence between the divine persons. This was illustrated in Moltmann’s theology of the Trinity in origin, which allowed for a certain interpretation of the monarchy of the Father as the fount, or origin, of the divine ousia.82 Moltmann spends the 78 Ciril Sorc, ‘Die perichoretischen Beziehungen im Leben der Trinität und in der Gemeinschaft der Menschen’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 58, no. 2, 1998: 100–119. 79 Ibid., pp. 101–3. It is interesting to note that Otto traces precisely the same historical narrative Sorc did three years previously, except with radically different conclusions for how to interpret Moltmann in light of this history. It is notable that Otto does not cite Sorc’s work. 80 Ibid., p. 104 (author’s translation). 81 Ibid., pp. 107–9. 82 This also allows Moltmann to avoid potential difficulties in his ‘universal pneumatology’ which might otherwise be present. One example may be to construe the Spirit as the fount or source of the divine essence rather than being sent by the Father, as is

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majority of his efforts, however, in discussing the nature of perichoresis. His use of perichoresis conceives of a social doctrine of the Trinity expressed in the mutual interpenetrations of the Father, Son and Spirit. This social doctrine of perichoresis describes, not the Trinity in origin, but rather the Triune God in the ‘lived circulation’ of the divine life.83 The primary quality of this ‘lived circulation’ is love. The role of the divine love as constitutive to the being of God has already been discussed above. The ontological nature of love within the Godhead, and not suffering, was the defining characteristic of the divine essence as described in the scriptures. The category of God’s love must now be examined as it specifically pertains to the inter-relatedness of the Father, Son and Spirit in Moltmann’s Trinitarian theology. It may be seen here again that Moltmann begins, via the history of the Son, with the biblical testimony of the inter-relations of the three divine persons. For Moltmann, if the persons of the Trinity are understood from the gospel testimony, they are likewise to be conceived in terms of their relationships with one another. That is, ‘Father’ is not a generic term taken from human experience and attributed to one of the divine persons in order to locate within God certain ‘fatherly’ characteristics perceived in human experience. Rather, ‘fatherhood’ is defined in terms of the relationship of God to Christ; the God whom Jesus called ‘Abba’. Moltmann writes: ‘the name of Father is therefore a theological term – which is to say a Trinitarian one; it is not a cosmological idea or a religiouspolitical notion’.84 Moltmann later clarifies his interpretation of the role of the love of the Father and the Son and its Trinitarian significance. Moltmann distinguishes between Jesus’ second-person address of God as ‘Abba’ and his third-person description of God to the people as ‘Father’.85 The intimacy of Jesus’ exclusive address to God as ‘Abba’ or ‘my Father’ exemplifies, for Moltmann, the relationship of trust between the Father and the Son.86 In addition to trust, it also makes the uniqueness of this relationship clear. The address of the Son to the Father in such trusting, intimate ways illustrates what Moltmann previously called the love of ‘like for like’. Therefore, this illustrates the exclusivity of relationship between the Father and the Son. This terminology is then differentiated in Moltmann’s thought from the term ‘Father’ which Jesus uses when addressing the people’s relationship to God. Moltmann claims that in differentiating between the intimacy of ‘Abba’ and the more formal address of the case with Pannenberg’s theology. This results in the Father having only a marginal role in the outworking of a Trinitarian theology. See, Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, pp. 422–32. Also, Anselm K. Min, ‘The Dialectic of Divine Love: Pannenberg’s Hegelian Trinitarianism’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, vol. 6, no. 3, 2004: 262–4. 83 Moltmann, TKG, p. 176. 84 Ibid., p. 163. 85 Moltmann, History and the Triune God, pp. 11–14. 86 Ibid., p. 11.

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‘Father’, Jesus ‘introduces a certain distance into talk of God’.87 In this regard, Moltmann cites Matthew 11:27: ‘All things have been handed over to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son wills to reveal Him.’ With respect to human life, Moltmann affirms: ‘This rules out all other approaches to the Father: only through the community of the Son Jesus do men and women come to “his Father”.’88 What Moltmann does not do, however, is develop a thorough ontology of the divine relations as defined by love to further his understanding of God’s perichoretic unity. Moltmann would certainly agree with Pannenberg, who says: ‘The changes in modern thought regarding the concept of essence and its position vis-à-vis that of relation have inevitably had implications for theology, and especially for theological ideas of the essence of God.’89 Neither Moltmann nor Pannenberg provide a thoroughgoing account of the impact of relationality on the ontology of God’s unity and essence. For Moltmann, this stems from his relegation of ontological comments regarding unity of substance to the Trinity in origin. While the strengths of Moltmann’s maintenance of the differentiation of the Trinity in origin and the circulatory character of the divine perichoresis have been mentioned, it seems unnecessary to divorce ontology entirely from a discussion of the perichoretic union of the Trinity. An example of a Trinitarian theology that seeks to integrate relational and ontological concepts may be seen in the work of John Zizioulas.90 Being firmly rooted in the Greek Orthodox tradition, Zizioulas argues for a robust ontological framework for understanding the role of communion within the Godhead. He says: The being of God is a relational being: without the concept of communion it would not be possible to speak of the being of God …. The Holy Trinity is a primordial ontological concept and not a notion which is added to the divine substance …. In this way, communion becomes an ontological concept in patristic thought.91

In this, Zizioulas is arguing that the divine substance is not anterior to the particularity of the Triune relations. Rather, since the Father is the origin of both the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit in eternity, relationality becomes the constitutive ontological concept in the divine being. Zizioulas is not 87

Ibid., p. 13. Ibid. Moltmann also cites John 14:9 here. 89 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, p. 367. Pannenberg associates God’s relational essence too closely with the developing history of the world, thus apparently arguing for the necessity of God achieving divinity. 90 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985). 91 Ibid., p. 17. 88

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here arguing that a concept of ‘personhood’ or ‘relationality’ constitutes God, but instead he argues that the human concepts of ‘personhood’ and ‘relationality’ have their ontological grounding in God and are therefore formed and constituted by God.92 Zizioulas is able to do this by distinguishing between the terms prosopon and hypostasis. Zizioulas argues that prosopon was never linked with ontology, whereas, as early as Athanasius, hypostasis was connected with ousia.93 The application of the term ‘hypostasis’ to the differentiation of the three divine persons illustrates for Zizioulas how within the Godhead communion has not only an ontological framework, but the divine substance also consists of the divine communion: ‘The one God is not the one substance but the Father, who is the “cause” both of the generation of the Son and of the procession of the Spirit.’94 While it should be noted that Zizioulas continues to draw hierarchical conclusions in his ecclesiology from his Trinitarian thought,95 which Moltmann would dispute, such a robust ontological framework explored in Orthodox theology may lessen the concerns of those who fear Moltmann’s language of relational perichoresis sacrifices too much of the language of substance.96 Such a framework would also seem to cohere with the ontological nature of love within the Trinity explicated from Moltmann’s thought above. In this way, the terminology used to describe the perichoretic love of the three persons does not necessarily require such an invasive distinction from the terminology used for the ontology of love seen in the Trinity of origin. From this critical reflection on Moltmann’s construal of the nature of perichoresis, it is now possible to provide an adequately detailed discussion of the aspect of perichoresis in Moltmann’s theology which is most amenable to a Christian ethic informed by his thought. This aspect may be summarized with the metaphor of the openness of the divine community. This metaphor of openness 92 Ibid., p. 27. This has also been dealt with in Ian A. McFarland, Difference and Identity: A Theological Anthropology (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 2001). 93 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 36. 94 McFarland, Difference and Identity, pp. 40–41. Stated more precisely, Zizioulas maintains: ‘The basic ontological position of the theology of the Greek Fathers might be set out briefly as follows. No substance or nature exists without person or hypostasis or mode of existence. No person exists without substance or nature, but the ontological “principle” or “cause” of being – i.e. that which makes a thing to exist – is not the substance or nature but the person or hypostasis. Therefore being is traced back not to substance but to person’; Zizioulas, Being as Communion, pp. 41–2 n. 37. 95 Ibid., pp. 230ff. However, it should be noted that Zizioulas downplays hierarchical notions in favour of relational ones between the priest and the community. Despite this, the priest still functions in a somewhat hierarchical role in Zizioulas’s ecclesiology. 96 An example of this concern being expressed by a sympathetic reader of Moltmann may be seen in Joy Ann McDougal, ‘A Room of One’s Own? Trinitarian Perichoresis as Analogy for the God–Human Relationship’, in Wo ist Gott? Gottesräume – Lebensräume, ed. Jürgen Moltmann and Carmen Rivuzumwami (Neukirchen: Vluyn: Neukirchner Verlag, 2002), pp. 133–41.

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in no way leaves behind the preceding discussions of the divine love and the divine communion. On the contrary, those discussions are absolutely necessary for understanding how an ethic of hope may understand the openness of God for the other and its implications for moral life. Moltmann perceives two types of divine openness described in the biblical materials. First, there is an intra-Trinitarian openness between the persons of the Godhead. This openness is witnessed in the open, loving relationship between the Father and the Son, which exists in eternity and is exemplified in the economy of salvation seen in the life of Jesus. Likewise, from the economy of salvation displayed in Jesus of Nazareth, there is an openness of the Son for the Spirit, and vice versa. Finally, as has already been described, in the eschatological glorification there is an openness of both the Father and the Son to the Spirit. This has largely been explored in the preceding paragraphs discussing the history of the Son, the divine communion verses monotheism, and the perichoresis. The second type of openness Moltmann sees in the Trinity is openness for communion with creation. Some of this openness for creation has been explicated in the foregoing discussion on Moltmann’s pneumatology. In addition, Moltmann in no way attempts to ground God’s intra-Trinitarian openness on the historical processes of the divine openness for creation. Rather, Moltmann understands God’s openness to creation to be derivative from the openness between the Father, Son and Spirit. In his discussion of Berdyaev, Moltmann affirms the priority of intra-Trinitarian openness and love as the basis of God’s love for creatures: the love of God for his Other must already be presupposed as a matter of course in the love of God for his son. The creation of the world is nothing other than ‘a history of the divine love between God and his Other self.’ This means that God’s love for the Son also potentially presupposes the Son’s incarnation.97

In saying this, Moltmann intends to explicate the intra-Trinitarian movement as the source for God’s loving movement to humanity and all creation. Moltmann writes: ‘In the tri-unity, the Father eternally loves the Son. That is the love of like for like, for someone that is one’s own. It is not love for the Other. But does the love of like for like not always presuppose love for the “Other” too?’98 Moltmann describes this as God’s ‘longing’ for the Other, that is, God’s creation. This entails a movement within God, and a movement from God to the creature. Moltmann is quick to maintain, however, that any notion of ‘movement’ within the Godhead in no way entails a privation or deficit in God. Moltmann states: If [God] longs for this other, it is not out of deficiency of being; it is rather out of the superabundance of his creative fullness. If we talk about this divine longing, then we do not mean any ‘imperfection of the Absolute’ when we transfer the 97

Moltmann, TKG, p. 46. Ibid.

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principle of historical movement in this way. On the contrary, the lack of any creative movement would mean an imperfection in the Absolute.99

Indeed, for Moltmann, this creative movement of God toward the creature in love and openness ‘is the very proof of divine perfection’.100 It was seen in the second and third chapters of this study that this openness of God for the creature in the economy of salvation happens primarily in Christology and pneumatology, respectively. Christ, as harbinger of the Kingdom, exemplified God’s desires for creation in liberating praxis for the poor, open communion in table fellowship with sinners, and healing engagement with those who are sick and suffering. This eschatologically grounded mode of living is made possible for human engagement by the indwelling, empowering presence of the Spirit. With these Christological and pneumatological motifs explicated, it may be seen that God’s openness for the creature is one that welcomes sinful and suffering humanity into open communion with the Triune God. This divine openness fundamentally alters the moral life of the Christian through justification and sanctification. All of this occurs with the life of the creature in communion with God. This communion, which is made possible by the loving openness of God for the Other, heals humanity of its inability to recognize itself as creature in deference to God as creator and enables humanity to live among others with the same love shown to them by the triune God. This love is exemplified in the life exhibited in the eschatological Kingdom promised by the resurrection of Christ and will be fully realized at the eschatological novum of God’s coming. The Socio-ethical Ramifications of Moltmann’s Doctrine of the Trinity The preceding argument has attempted to explicate Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity beginning with its grounding in the economy of salvation as witnessed in the history of the Son. From this vantage point, several theological issues were brought to the fore. Issues such as the biblical witness to the inter-relationships of Jesus, his ‘Abba’ Father and the Holy Spirit were explicated with reference to the divine economy and the suffering seen in the crucifixion of Christ with its Trinitarian implications. It was also noted that Moltmann perceives theological problems in locating the unity of the three divine persons either in ‘God as supreme substance’ (Gott als höchste Substanz) or ‘God as absolute subject’ (Gott als absolutes Subjekt). Rather, the unity of God in Moltmann’s thought was seen to consist in the perichoretic life of the divine communion. When conceived in terms of perichoresis, the circulation of the divine life revealed an openness for the other on God’s part. More specifically, there was the divine openness in love for one another as divine persons (for that which is like) and the divine openness 99

Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., p. 46.

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in love for the creature (for that which is unlike). This openness enabled a freedom and love which welcomes the creature and all creation into relationship through the work of Christ and the enabling power of the Spirit. From this theological exploration of Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought, more pragmatic considerations must be undertaken to sketch proposals for the structure of an eschatological ethic of hope. This will briefly outline some of the primary features which must be in place to construct an understanding of moral hope and the praxis it endeavours to undertake. To achieve the necessary clarity and precision entailed in deciphering what a Trinitarian perspective may contribute to an eschatological ethic such as the one being developed in this work, some of the ethical antitypes arising from monotheism will first be explored prior to a constructive alternative stemming from the above Trinitarian thought. Beginning with these antitypes to ethical engagement within a Trinitarian perspective, this discussion will begin with two consequences Moltmann perceives stemming from a monadic view of God: clerical monotheism and political monotheism. The Ethical Impact of Monotheism In the same way Moltmann perceives ethical imperatives to arise from a Trinitarian understanding of God, so he also perceives two pernicious ethical consequences arising from the monotheistic view of God with which he charges much of Western theology. These consequences of a monotheistic, that is to say, monadic, view of God are seen in both the ecclesial and political realms. The first of these negative derivatives, clerical monotheism, may be seen in ecclesiastical frameworks which are male-dominated, hierarchically structured and produce a differentiation in status ‘before God’, as it were, between the clerical vocation and the laity. Moltmann sees this in particular to be present in Roman forms of ecclesiastical structures, where he describes the principle being ubi Petrus – ibi ecclesia.101 Naturally, this contradicts Moltmann’s stated ecclesial thesis of ubi Christus – ibi ecclesia.102 For Moltmann, to locate authoritative sovereignty for the Church in a clerical order is in contradistinction with the recognition that the Church is born out of God’s salvific acts in history. It must be questioned, however, whether ecumenical councils, papal encyclicals or theologians have ever affirmed a principle such as ubi Petrus – ibi ecclesia as Moltmann maintains. For example, the Second Vatican Council affirms that Christ, in his incarnation, maintains a certain quality of unity among all humankind: ‘For, by his incarnation, he the Son of God, has in a certain way united himself with each individual.’103 Hence, while the bishop of Rome is the ‘supreme, full and 101

Ibid., p. 201. See Moltmann, CPS, p. 129. 103 ‘Gaudium et Spes’, in Vatican II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, ed. Austin Flannery, OP (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing, 1996), p. 185. 102

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immediate authority over the universal church …’,104 he neither constitutes the Church, nor does his person make up the Church. The council clearly maintains that the Church arose from the person and mission of Christ: This work of human redemption and perfect glorification of God, foreshadowed by the wonders which God performed among the people of the Old Testament, Christ the Lord completed principally in the paschal mystery of his blessed passion, resurrection from the dead, and glorious ascension …. For it was from the side of Christ as he slept the sleep of death upon the cross that there came forth the wondrous sacrament of the whole church.105

As apostolic successor, the papal authority resides in the faithfulness of the tradition expressed in worship through the liturgy. Indeed, Vatican II affirms: ‘Christ is always present in his church, especially in liturgical celebrations …. The church is his beloved bride who calls to its Lord, and through him offers worship to the eternal Father. The liturgy, then, is rightly seen as an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ.’106 It is doubtful that this brief rejoinder would satisfy Moltmann’s concerns regarding papal authority and the exercise of its power. However, Moltmann’s principle of ubi Christus – ibi ecclesia may not be as diametrically opposed to certain Catholic discussions regarding the nature of the Church as he conceives it to be. To be sure, Moltmann would still be uncomfortable with the level of authority given to the Roman See, but his construal of the nature of the discussion in terms of ubi Petrus – ibi ecclesia is more simplistic than the evidence warrants. For Moltmann, the sovereignty of God lies in the self-giving love to overcome the sinful state creation finds itself in. The power and authority necessary for the salvation of humanity lies within the Triune God alone, whose being is constituted in love in se, and who is open for the creature in loving, covenantal relationship. Therefore, this redemptive history is seen pre-eminently in the history of the Son, which witnesses to an open network of loving, life-giving relationships of mutuality between the Father, Son and Spirit. This history is revealed in the promissory words and acts of God, particularly for the Kingdom of God which reaches its epoch in the resurrection of the dead. Therefore, the presence of Christ is the constitutive promise for the Church, and therefore enacts the promissory history in which the Church partakes. Moltmann is in this way able to convey his principle of ubi Christus – ibi ecclesia in Trinitarian terms. The second negative ethical impact Moltmann perceives resulting from monotheism is what he describes as political monotheism.107 According to Moltmann, political monotheism may be seen to originate in the defence made by ‘Christus Dominus’, Vatican II, p. 287. ‘Sacrosanctum Consilium’, Vatican II, p. 119. 106 Ibid., pp. 120–21. 107 Moltmann, TKG, p. 192. 104 105

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the early apologists regarding the rationality of the Christian faith for the Roman state against the charges of atheism.108 This link between the authority of the monotheistic deity and the authority of the emperor was made tangible with the rise of Constantine.109 At root in Moltmann’s reading of political monotheism are the concepts of law and power or force. He states: It is impossible to conceive of any law which is above God, for by the very nature of his being God himself embodies the highest law [höchste Gesetz]. If this divine sovereignty is made the prototype of the sovereignty of the state [Urbild der staatlichen Souveränität], what emerges is a hitherto unknown absolutism of power [unbekannter Absolutismus der Macht].110

The resultant view of God and humanity within the political sphere, which Moltmann critiques, is a removal of God from the relationally constituted realm of humanity. The end product being a far removed and unconcerned divine monarchy separated from the concerns of creation.111 Moltmann affirms that the doctrine of the Trinity, far from being speculation removed from Christian praxis, will directly affect the political outcomes of monotheism. What is primarily at issue for Moltmann is an adequate explication of sovereignty. It has been argued throughout this work that Moltmann maintains the sovereignty of God as being rooted in the divine love, exhibited in the divine promise which overcomes human sinfulness ultimately securing redemption and life through the death-resurrection of Jesus Christ. The divine promise witnessed in this act is also an act of divine creation. That is, in the promise, God creates a new history fraught with possibility for human life, in the power of the Spirit, to be lived commensurately with the justifying, redemptive, liberating and healing life of the Kingdom of God. Moltmann’s aim is to juxtapose this with an opposing interpretation of the relationship between divine sovereignty and political praxis 108

Ibid., p. 193. This charge stemmed from the Christian refusal to take part in the worship practices exemplified in the imperial cult. 109 The historical location of the conjoining of Church and imperial state is often linked with the conversion of Constantine and seen to be verified by Eusebius’ positive construal of the emperor. The complexities surrounding the accuracy of this historical reading are outside the scope of this work, but are mentioned here to provide understanding of how Moltmann conceives of the relationship between Trinitarian faith and political engagement. See Nigel Goring Wright, Disavowing Constantine: Mission, Church and the Social Order in the Theologies of John Howard Yoder and Jürgen Moltmann (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000). See also, Moltmann, TKG, pp. 194–6. 110 Ibid., p. 196. 111 For similar philosophical conclusions regarding monistic monotheism in contradistinction to Christian Trinitarian thought, see Michael Theunissen, ‘Philosophischer Monismus und Christliche Theologie’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 102, no. 4, 2005: 397–408.

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put forward by Carl Schmitt, where he (Schmitt) defines sovereignty as ‘the highest, legally independent, underived power’.112 Schmitt maintains that this sovereignty is maintained by a ‘unity’ of power, which takes monistic form.113 He argues that such sociological conceptions ‘of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development … but also because of their systematic structure …’.114 Thus, for Schmitt the opposite of this unified sovereignty is a pluralistic religious relativism, which he maintains is exemplified politically in democracy: ‘Democracy is the expression of a political relativism and a scientific orientation that are liberated from … dogmas and based on human understanding and critical doubt.’ The result, Schmitt maintains, is that a governmental structure stemming from a monistic interpretation of unity (grounded theologically) is the only model of state governance which could exercise sovereignty (defined as power). This is important for the regular functioning of sovereignty, because for Schmitt, a ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’.115 Schmitt links this definition of a sovereign with his interpretation of sovereignty as power via the importance of one who ‘decides on the exception’. For Schmitt, the exception is an unforeseen peril, or emergency. The ‘exception’ is that which is unanticipated and threatens the current order. Therefore, the sovereign is a unified centre of power (monistically interpreted) ‘who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and order …. The exception … [is] a danger to the existence of the state, or the like.’116 For Schmitt, the importance of sovereignty in such situations is the ability to make a decision.117 This ability to make a decision is important for Schmitt because only this form of authoritative resolve is able to quell conflicts and potential uprisings. He maintains: ‘A class that shifts all political activity onto the plane of conversation in the press and in parliament is no match for social conflict.’118 Indeed, Schmitt claims that ‘the core of the political idea’ is ‘the exacting moral decision’.119 In direct contrast to Schmitt,120 Moltmann argues that the Christian affirmation of God as Triune elicits an entirely different political praxis for faithful Christian living.121 For Moltmann, ‘It is only when the doctrine of the Trinity vanquishes 112 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 17. 113 Ibid., pp. 19, 47. 114 Ibid., p. 36, emphasis added. 115 Ibid., p. 5. 116 Ibid., p. 6. 117 Ibid., p. 53. 118 Ibid., p. 59. 119 Ibid., p. 65. 120 Moltmann, TKG, p. 192 n. 1. 121 See Moltmann, Politische Theologie – Politische Ethik, pp. 31–2. Moltmann mentions the Trinitarian concept of God alongside the recovery of eschatological hope as

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the monotheistic notion of the great universal monarch in heaven, and his divine patriarchs in the world, that earthly rulers, dictators and tyrants cease to find any justifying religious archetypes any more.’122 Therefore, Moltmann explicates four politico-ethical corollaries of his interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. First, Moltmann maintains that if God is understood as Triune, and this understanding is pre-eminently revealed in the cross of Christ and the relation between the Father and Son in the Spirit, then ‘It is impossible to form the figure of the omnipotent, universal monarch, who is reflected in earthly rulers, out of the unity of this Father, this Son and this Spirit.’123 Second, he insists that if a Trinitarian conception of God is adhered to, then monistic power cannot be used as the archetype for human leadership. Rather, as the Father of Jesus Christ, the model is love.124 Third, Moltmann states that the ‘glory of the triune God is reflected, not in the crowns of kings and the triumphs of victors, but in the face of the crucified Jesus …. The glory of the triune God is also reflected in the community of Christ: in the fellowship of believers and of the poor.’125 This is the same principle as that illustrated in Moltmann’s ecclesiology – ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia. Finally, there is a pneumatological principle at work in the ethico-political outcomes of Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought. He writes: Seen in Trinitarian terms, the life-giving Spirit, who confers on us the future and hope, does not proceed from any accumulation of power…he proceeds from the Father of Jesus Christ and from the resurrection of the Son. The resurrection through the life-quickening energy of the Holy Spirit is experienced, not at the spearheads of progress, but in the shadow of death.126

At this point, a critical question may be posed to Moltmann. Following Richard Bauckham, it is possible to express doubts regarding the validity of using the Trinity as a model or divine archetype for human social engagement. This is precisely because the type of perichoretic life maintained by God in se and the social life of creatures needs to be differentiated. Commenting on this ethical use of the Trinity, Bauckham critiques this method of deriving ethical impetuses from the doctrine, saying: According to [this] idea … we are invited to stand outside the … Trinity and our specific relationships to the three Persons, and to view the Trinity as an external evoking a liberating Christian moral praxis. Carl Schmitt is mentioned as the ideological backdrop here too. See also Moltmann’s discussion of a political theology of the cross and political idolatry, explicitly contra Schmitt, in ibid., pp. 55–64. 122 Moltmann, TKG, p. 197. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid., pp. 197–8. 126 Ibid., p. 198.

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model which human relationships should reflect. This view of our relationship to the Trinity has no biblical basis (significantly, the New Testament does not use the idea of the image of God in this way )….127

This critique may also be taken further within the framework of Trinitarian thought developed thus far in this chapter. The perichoretic communion of the Godhead is used by Moltmann to express the divine unity, via a common fellowship and mutual interpenetration rooted in the Father as the fount of divinity, and therefore necessarily requires conceptual differentiation from the unity that is attainable in creaturely social fellowship. On the surface of the argument, it might appear that Moltmann fails to make this differentiation. Moltmann argues that: According to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the three divine Persons exist with one another, for one another and in one another. They exist in one another because they mutually give each other space for a full unfolding. By existing mutually in each other, they form their unique Trinitarian fellowship…Through their complete self-giving, the Trinitarian Persons are ‘beside themselves’ and wholly in the others. Thus, mutually and together, they become the eternal dwelling. In the doctrine of the Trinity it is not sufficient just to talk about the divine Persons and relationships; their reciprocal indwellings must be perceived as well.128

Moltmann then moves a step further to draw an analogy to human co-existence in creaturely communion with the model of perichoresis: If in a community we take over responsibility for others, these others exist in a certain way in us, at least in our solicitude for them. That is why in Christian faith we say: because Christ is for us and gave himself for us, we are in Christ …. Perichoresis is also called circuminsessio, mutual indwelling, and mutual inhabitatio …. The perichoretic space concept of reciprocal in-existence corresponds on the creaturely level to the concept of the eternal inner-trinitarian indwellings of the divine Persons. Just as through their reciprocal indwellings the divine Persons also form a common space, so community on the creaturely level forms the social space of reciprocal self-development. Created beings have to exist side by side and together, and for this they need wide spaces in which they can move freely.129

The primary question which must be put to Moltmann is whether he is making an ontological analogy, or merely a terminological one. That is, how can ‘perichoresis’ be used to express the uniqueness of the divine mutual indwelling and unity as well Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 167. Moltmann, CoG, p. 298. 129 Ibid., p. 301. 127 128

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as the unity of human communion? In the above quotation, Moltmann states that human unity ‘corresponds’ to the divine unity. However, as Bauckham has noted, there is no biblical warrant for this analogia trinitatis between the Godhead and creaturely relations. Moltmann indeed appears to clearly maintain an ontological differentiation between the divine-human indwelling, even eschatologically, in so far as humans dwell in a creaturely way, while God dwells in a divine way: ‘God remains God, and the world remains creation.’130 However, the terminological confusion resulting from the multiple uses of ‘perichoresis’ opens Moltmann to criticism regarding his understanding of the relationship between the Trinity and human moral engagement. Therefore, to find a satisfactory solution, different avenues must be explored which use more exacting terminology. With this goal in mind, it is helpful at this point to note an alternative stream in Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought, also noted by Richard Bauckham. Bauckham comments that Moltmann also maintains that ‘the life of the Trinity is an interpersonal fellowship in which we, by grace, participate’.131 This second ethical motif arising from Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought has more potential and coheres more fully with the entire trajectory of an eschatological ethic being outlined in this work. Such ‘participation’ may be construed as follows. In the sovereignty of God’s freedom and love, a divine promise is given to creation (having rebelled and enacted sinful living) for justification and redemption through covenant with God. This promise for divine–creaturely reconciliation is pre-eminently realized in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Son. The promise given in the resurrection creates a new history for the created order. In doing so, God also creates a Zwischenraum of tension for those who are reconciled to God in Christ and thereby live in contradistinction to the unfulfilled present of violence, oppression and rebellion. The ethical content of this ‘betweenspace’ is witnessed to in the life of Christ for the Kingdom of God and made historically efficacious by the Holy Spirit. Ethics does not encompass the totality of the Kingdom of God. Indeed, the resurrection of the dead and even the final eradication of suffering and sin can only be accomplished in the consummation of the Kingdom which occurs in the parousia of Christ.132 However, as those living in and engaging with the world from within this divinely created Zwischenraum, the Kingdom of God may be participated in via a moral engagement enabled by the Spirit and made possible by the salvific work of the Son. From this vantage point, it may be seen that an eschatological ethic of hope such as the one being developed in this work is necessarily also a Trinitarian eschatological ethic. In this, the two pitfalls of either a clerical or political monotheism are avoided and a more theologically integrated approach to moral action is firmly rooted in the beneficence of the Godhead. 130

Ibid., p. 307. Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, p. 177. 132 Moltmann, TKG, p. 49. See also Moltmann, WJC, pp. 334–8. 131

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Recognizing the Triune God as the only source and sustainer of moral action within an eschatological framework rooted in divine promise, the defining characteristic of this ethic may now be articulated. It was seen in Moltmann’s thought that love is the primary motif expressed in the inter-personal relations of the Godhead as witnessed to in the history of the Son recorded in the biblical materials. Indeed, with the epistle of 1 John, it may be theologically asserted that ‘God is love.’133 If Christian moral action is welcomed into communion with the Triune God of love, within a space created by God for living commensurate with the Kingdom, then Christian life will be characterized as a fellowship of love. Fellowship of Love Gerhard Sauter has stated: ‘For Moltmann, promise is what God has held out, in the story of Christ, as a prospect in order that we attempt to realize it.’134 The foregoing argument states that Moltmann conceives of God’s promise not as an offer or command to propel human action towards moral living and therefore subsequently having to be accomplished by human effort. Rather, an eschatological ethic informed by Moltmann’s thought will see the divine promise, pre-eminently manifested in the cross-resurrection of Christ, as a creative act by which God brings about a new history and space for moral action. This newly created history and space is indwelt by the Spirit, thus enabling human praxis commensurate with the Kingdom of God. By ‘enabling’, it is meant that through the creative work found in the divine promise and the empowering efficacy of the Holy Spirit, human praxis is placed within a lived sphere of moral engagement where Christian ethics are possible. By ‘commensurate’, it is meant that the moral contours of lived praxis adhere to the material content of ethics within the Kingdom of God. Within this framework, the beneficence of God is made paramount, thus resulting in human moral action. This moral action, while authentically human, is understood to be entirely derivative of the divine grace brought about in Christ. Within this chapter, the loving relationships of Father, Son and Spirit in the divine Tri-unity form the basis of this eschatological act of promise in which Christian moral action takes place in the power of the Holy Spirit. It was also argued that this intra-Trinitarian love is open and welcoming to the creature through God’s economy of salvation. Focusing on the fellowship of love within God, Moltmann draws moral consequences through the method of drawing human moral analogues to Trinitarian life. However, having critiqued Moltmann’s use of such methodology, it would be more prudent to speak of the moral qualities experienced within a divinely created space for human moral action in communion with the Triune God. Stated more succinctly, how may one theologically describe Christian moral life within the Zwischenraum of ethical tension brought about in the divine promise? Moltmann answers this question by once again describing 133

1 John 4:8, 16. Sauter, What Dare We Hope?, p. 134.

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the tension experienced in such living: ‘Just as the unconditional love of Jesus for the rejected made the Pharisees his enemies and brought him to the cross,’ Moltmann argues ‘so unconditional love also means enmity and persecution in a world in which the life of man is made dependent on particular social norms, conditions and achievements.’135 This certainly appears to conform to Moltmann’s earlier statements regarding the effects of the eschatological promise of God on human moral action: ‘Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it. Peace with God means conflict with the world, for the goad of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present.’136 If the loving action of the Triune God resulted in an economy of salvation characterized by the promise exemplified in the deathresurrection of the Son, then what does human action look like within this new eschatological and redemptive situation? Echoing the words of the apostle Paul, Moltmann queries: A love which takes precedence and robs these [unrighteous] conditions of their force is folly and scandal in this world. But if the believer experiences his freedom and the new possibility of his life in the fact that the love of God reaches him, the loveless and the unloved, in the cross of Christ, what must be the thoughts of a theology which corresponds to this love?137

It is the contention of this work that three major moral themes may be gleaned from this line of eschatological thought regarding the Triune love. The three themes are: (1) solidarity through suffering, (2) liberation through love, and finally, to borrow a vivid metaphor, (3) slaying the dragon through love.138 In Moltmann’s Trinitarian work, particularly as it deals with the cross of Christ, a unique emphasis is placed on the motif of solidarity through suffering. This is found primarily in the pathos of God, which Moltmann places in contrast to notions of an apathetic God. In this, God’s openness for humanity in love is again paramount. This salvific work in the cross, according to the biblical traditions, requires a Trinitarian understanding. For Moltmann, this is seen in the biblical record of the Father handing over the Son to godforsakenness and death.139 Moltmann’s Trinitarian interpretation of the cross is often criticized as being unhelpful for dealing with the issues of suffering and injustice in the world. The argument is exemplified in Rahner’s assertion that it is of no help to human

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Moltmann, CG, p. 248. Moltmann, TH, p. 21. 137 Moltmann, CG, p. 248. 138 For the last of these, see Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Friedenstiften und Drachentöten im Christentum’, Evangelische Theologie, vol. 64, no. 4, 2004: 285–94. 139 In this, the apostle’s use of paradidonai is crucial for Moltmann’s interpretation. See Moltmann, CG, pp. 241ff.; Moltmann, TKG, pp. 21ff., and Moltmann, WJC, pp. 172–8. 136

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suffering simply to say that God is in the same predicament.140 That is, if God succumbs to the vicissitudes and trials of history, suffering as humanity does, then how does this aid either in alleviating human suffering or guiding Christian moral action? However, to read Moltmann’s understanding of divine suffering in such a way is to misunderstand him on two counts. First, to construe Moltmann’s understanding of divine suffering as being akin to human suffering is a misnomer. Moltmann qualitatively differentiates between the nature and mode of divine and human suffering. He states: The prophets had no ‘idea’ of God, but understood themselves and the people in the situation of God. Heschel called this situation of God the pathos of God. It has nothing to do with the irrational human emotions like desire, anger, anxiety, envy or sympathy, but describes the way in which God is affected by events and human actions and suffering in history. He is affected by them because he is interested in his creation, his people and his right. The pathos of God is intentional and transitive, not related to itself but to the history of the covenant people …. In the covenant he enters into the world and the people of his choice …. Because creation, covenant and history of God spring from his freedom, his effective pathos is quite different from … [the] divinities of mythical sagas. It is the pathos of his free relationship to creation, to the people and to history. The prophets never identified God’s pathos with his being, since for them it was not something absolute, but the form of his relationship to others.141

It is through developing a conception of God’s freedom that Moltmann differentiates a passive suffering, such as that of creatures, from an active suffering purposively and actively undertaken by God, in the divine freedom, because of the divine love.142 Moltmann explicitly affirms that: ‘God does not suffer out of deficiency of being, like created beings. To this extent he is “apathetic.” But he suffers from the love which is the superabundance and overflowing of his being.’143 Therefore, Moltmann’s contention is not that God suffers and is incapable of overcoming that suffering. Rather, God’s pathos is the result of the divine love, which manifested itself in covenanting with creatures.144 140 Karl Rahner, Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965–1982, trans. Harvey D. Egan, ed. Harvey D. Egan, Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1986), pp. 126–7. See also Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2002), pp. 221–5. In response to Rahner, see Moltmann, History and the Triune God, pp. 122–4. 141 Moltmann, CG, pp. 270–71. 142 Ibid., pp. 229–31, 270. See also Bauckham, Moltmann, p. 103. 143 Moltmann, TKG, p. 23. 144 Ibid., p. 25.

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The second misunderstanding of Moltmann’s construal of God’s relationship to suffering and solidarity exemplified in Rahner’s argument is that God simply succumbs to suffering, but accomplishes nothing in taking suffering into himself. However, Moltmann conveys his interpretation of the matter in a different way. He writes: The concrete ‘history of God’ in the death of Jesus on the cross on Golgotha therefore contains within itself all the depths and abysses of human history and therefore can be understood as the history of history. All human history, however much it may be determined by guilt and death, is taken up into this ‘history of God’, i.e. into the Trinity, and integrated into the future of the ‘history of God.’ There is no suffering which in this history of God is not God’s suffering; no death which has not been God’s death in the history on Golgotha. Therefore there is no life, no fortune and no joy which have not been integrated by his history into eternal life, the eternal joy of God. To think of ‘God in history’ always leads to theism and to atheism. To think of ‘history in God’ leads beyond that, into new creation and theopoiesis.145

It is not simply that God suffers with humanity, but that God in Christ experienced Golgotha. It is through this event, and not a general axiom of suffering, that salvation occurs. This event of love in God, which happens between the Father and the Son and from the Spirit, ‘opens up the future and creates life’:146 ‘What proceeds from this event between Father and Son is the Spirit which justifies the godless, fills the forsaken with love and even brings the dead alive …’.147 It is precisely here that a complete understanding of how Moltmann views the cross and resurrection as two sides of one continuous event is needed. It is not simply that God suffers in the cross, but that in solidarity with sinful, suffering humanity, the Triune God overcomes suffering in the cross, vanquishing it in the resurrection.148 It is with this qualified notion of divine pathos, which may be brought together with the foregoing understanding of God creating a Zwischenraum of tension, that the ethical motif of solidarity in love receives theological clarification. In this connection, Moltmann writes: In the sphere of the apathic God man becomes a homo apatheticus. In the situation of the pathos of God he becomes a homo sympatheticus. The divine pathos is reflected in man’s participation, his hopes and his prayers. Sympathy is the openness of a person to the present of another. It has the structure 145

Moltmann, CG, pp. 246–7. Ibid., p. 247. 147 Ibid., p. 244. 148 Richard Bauckham has emphasized the intimate connection between cross and resurrection in Moltmann’s thought when discussing this aspect of Moltmann’s work. See Bauckham, Moltmann, p. 59. 146

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of dialogue. In the pathos of God, man is filled with the spirit of God. He becomes the friend of God, feels sympathy with God …. He does not enter into a mystical union but into a sympathetic union with God. He is angry with God’s wrath. He suffers with God’s suffering. He loves with God’s love. He hopes with God’s hope.149

It is because God’s pathos is only seen in light of the covenant with humanity that Christian participation in communion with the Triune God through its life in the Zwischenraum is made possible. It is not because mere human analogues are sought in particular definition of the Trinity. Rather, through the divine economy of salvation, creaturely existence is brought into communion with the Triune God and is enabled to participate in the divinely created history through its communal life with the Trinity. This solidarity through suffering in love is pneumatologically enabled so that, through the promise of God, Christian moral action may be taken into the Triune fellowship in the mode of communion between the Creator and the creature. This communion is only through the grace of God, as God’s love for that which is ‘unlike’. This solidarity through suffering, if empowered by the Spirit within the divinely created Zwischenraum of promise, becomes an agent of healing in a broken, unfulfilled society because it likewise invites the world into the same community it presently experiences with the Father, Son and Spirit. In this sense, Moltmann can say: ‘Suffering in a superficial, activist, apathetic and therefore dehumanized society can be a sign of spiritual health. In this sense, we must agree with Freud’s remark, “As long as a man suffers, he can still achieve something.”’150 This solidarity is liberating through the promise found in the cross-resurrection. This solidarity is also a healing made efficacious in the present through the Spirit. It is through this solidarity through suffering that Moltmann’s ecclesial principle ubi Christus – ibi ecclesia is tangibly enacted in Christian moral living. The above explication of solidarity has already anticipated some aspects of the second moral theme to arise from the impact of Trinitarian thought upon an eschatological ethic of hope. The theme of liberation through love may now be clarified and brought into connection with the whole. For Moltmann, this liberation through love takes on two primary characteristics in his work on the crucifixion. Moltmann discusses these two themes, arising from his work in The Crucified God, in terms of the psychological and political liberation of humanity. It may be emphasized again that the openness of the Trinity (that is, communion) to the creature in love provides the theological backdrop for these moral deliberations. Moltmann begins his reflections on the liberating implications of his Trinitarian interpretation of the cross by noting the freedom which this salvific act has created on behalf of human beings: ‘Anyone who follows Paul in speaking of the freedom of the sons of God in faith in Christ must also seek out and present 149

Moltmann, CG, p. 272. Ibid., p. 315.

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this freedom in specific psychological and political terms.’151 Moltmann primarily engages with the challenges of Freud in regards to the psychological liberation of humanity. Nevertheless, Moltmann’s insights have greater moral applicability beyond the scope of his specific dialogue with Freud. It is important to be reminded at this point that Moltmann not only conceives of the cross of Christ as offering a critique of various societal woes, but also offering a trenchant critique of religion as well. For Moltmann, ‘the crucified Christ became more and more “the foundation and criticism of Christian theology.” And for [Moltmann] that meant, whatever can stand before the face of the crucified Christ is true Christian theology.’152 The correlate of this would then also be true. Whatever is unable to stand before the face of the crucified Christ is false, un-Christian theology: ‘The cross is the point at which Christian faith distinguishes itself from other religions and ideologies, from unfaith and superstition.’153 Therefore, human idolatry which takes the form of pretensions to power, repression of healthy self-understanding as creatures of God and recognition of creaturely limits, is quashed by being viewed in light of the humility and death of the Son and overcome in the resurrection. In this, human moral involvement need no longer be self-seeking or engage in self-protectionist apathy. Moltmann contends: The limitations of apathy fall away. Man can open himself to suffering and to love. In sympatheia with the pathos of God he becomes open to what is other and new …. The hindrances of repression are not done away with through the ignorance of grief, anxiety and guilt …. They are done away with through sympathy and love, through the acceptance of what is otherwise unacceptable, through the ability to suffer, and through sensitiveness. When we speak positively here of suffering, we mean in general being affected by something else [die Affizierung durch anderes].154

Again, the themes arising from the love witnessed in the Trinitarian history of the Son is a life-giving openness for the other. However, because these hopes are rooted in the cross and its inseparability from the resurrection, it is not a utopian hope. Instead, it is a hope which enters the eschatologically unfulfilled situations of the present in open, loving solidarity with those who suffer. Thus, as instruments of God empowered by the Spirit for the Kingdom, Christian 151

Ibid., p. 291. Ibid., p. x. The particularity of Christian belief entailed in this view of the cross was not overlooked. Hans Küng opposed this critical nature of Moltmann’s theology of the cross (particular in regard to other religions) and countered by arguing for an ‘open’ theology of the cross. See Hans Küng, ‘Die Religionen als Frage an die Theologie des Kreuzes’, Evangelische Theology, vol. 33, no. 4, 1973: 401–23. 153 Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, p. 110. 154 Moltmann, CG, p. 303. 152

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moral action becomes not just a ‘walking with’ suffering, but a journey towards eschatological healing and redemption. Ethical actions rooted in Christian hope are not utopian projections, but rather created spheres for living through the divine grace enacted in the cross-resurrection of Christ. Therefore, the ‘central symbol of Christian hope, the resurrection, is expressly related to the assumption of all human reality by God, including that reality which is spoilt by sin and condemned to death. It therefore represents a hope which is indissolubly coupled with the most intensive sense of reality.’155 This eschatological understanding of Christian moral living, when seen in Trinitarian perspective, necessarily leads from psychological liberation to political liberation. Having been divested of repressive mentalities and empty utopian perspectives divorced from God’s Trinitarian work in the cross-resurrection of Christ, Christian living is seen in new perspective. Through the work of Christ and empowerment of the Spirit, the Christian is reconciled to the Father and now seen in relationship and living communion with the Triune God. This occurs within a life of grace, explicated ethically as an eschatological Zwischenraum, which then enables lived praxis commensurate with the Kingdom of God. Because of the universal scope of God’s redemption and Kingdom, this necessarily incorporates a liberating political praxis. Throughout his writings, Moltmann has consistently argued that Christian theology is necessarily a political endeavour. Contrary to Rasmusson156 and others, when engaging political concerns from a theological perspective, Moltmann was not attempting to let the political context determine his doctrinal assertions: ‘Political theology is not simply political ethics but reaches further by asking about the political consciousness of theology itself.’157 In affirming political repercussions for theology, Moltmann recognizes that any attempt to limit theological discourse to ethics is reductionistic. Notwithstanding this, Moltmann clearly recognizes that theological statements carry politico-ethical import. Therefore: ‘Political hermeneutics of faith is not a reduction of the theology of the cross to political ideology, but an interpretation of it in political discipleship.’158 The result is that Moltmann is not attempting to usurp theology for purely political motivations, but seeks to critically explore how God-talk is used politically. Therefore, the paramount issue is whether God-talk pertaining to political convictions and actions is buoyed by the God of the crucified Christ or the Baal of the nation.159 The result is that liberation through love, which arises from an eschatological ethic in Trinitarian communion, must move beyond psychological liberation to political liberation. 155

Ibid., p. 312. Rasmusson, The Church as Polis, pp. 12, 49–57. 157 Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, p. 102. 158 Moltmann, CG, p. 318. 159 Moltmann, Politische Theologie – Politische Ethik, p. 38. 156

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The antitypes of a Trinitarian political liberation wrought in love were noted above in the forms of clerical and political monotheism. Keeping this in mind, the liberating effects of the eschatological work accomplished in the Triune love may now be explicated within the political realm. For Moltmann, such a theologically grounded understanding of political liberation is able to counter two crises he sees in Christian life. These are the crises of relevance and identity.160 Moltmann perceives a tension that exists within the modern life of the Church between the desire for the Church to be grounded in its self-understanding, maintaining its identity in an increasingly secularized and pluralistic society and engaging in relevant, political praxis for liberation in society and world. The former tendency can be seen in ‘conservative’ and fundamentalist Churches, while the latter can mainly be witnessed in ‘progressive’ organizations such as the World Council of Churches and various student movements. One emphasizes proper belief and doctrine, while the other maintains the importance of faithful action and praxis. However, Moltmann maintains: ‘in Christian terms evangelization and humanization are not alternatives …. Of course one person cannot do everything, but at least everyone must recognize the other charismata in the body of Christ and the necessity for other work by other people to relieve misery.’161 The alternative between ecclesial faith seen in regeneration of the heart and liberating praxis to alter unjust circumstances in the world is a false one. Moltmann sees liberating political praxis to be the natural outcome of the eschatological impact of the Kingdom of God, made manifest in the loving relationships of Christ and efficacious presence of the Spirit: ‘Certainly Jesus was no Zealot freedom-fighter against the Roman occupation force …. But is there not implicit in his eschatological message of freedom for sinners and of the coming kingdom for the poor a much greater attack against the religiously deified state?’162 If the starting place for Trinitarian thought, according to Moltmann, is the cross of Christ, then political leadership may not co-opt Christian symbols as means of attaining and maintaining power.163 Such a use of the history of the crucified Christ runs counter to the very work of God accomplished in that history. Likewise, the eschatological message of the Kingdom, which was exemplified in cross-resurrection, stands in contradiction to political claims of self-interest. This is precisely because the promise of God for the Kingdom is a promise for openness to that which is other. The Kingdom is witnessed in table fellowship with the poor and liberating relationship with the outcast: ‘The identification of the Pax Romana with the Pax Christi shatters on eschatology.’164 Thus, Moltmann goes on to state: 160

Moltmann, CG, pp. 8–25. Ibid., pp. 22–3. 162 Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, pp. 110–11. 163 For examples of such co-opting in American politics, see David Domke and Kevin Coe, The God Strategy: How Religion Became a Political Weapon in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 164 Moltmann, CG, p. 326. 161

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The authority of God is then no longer represented directly by those in high positions, the powerful and the rich, but by the outcast Son of Man, who died between two wretches. The rule and the kingdom of God are no longer reflected in political rule and world kingdoms, but in the service of Christ, who humiliated himself to the point of death on the cross.165

From this theological recognition of the contradiction to present, unjust circumstances created by the eschatological promise of God in the crossresurrection of Christ, Moltmann goes on to explicate five ‘vicious circles’ in the political realm which necessitate a liberating praxis. This is made possible by the divine–creaturely communion found in the creative love of God. The ‘vicious circles’ are: (1) poverty, (2) force, (3) racial and cultural alienation, (4) the industrial pollution of nature, and finally, (5) senselessness and godforsakenness.166 Of these five ‘vicious circles’, the first two are inter-related in such a manner that public reform of the first must necessarily include reform of the second as part of it. The fourth, dealing with the industrial pollution of the ecosphere, has become a prominent feature in Moltmann’s later writings and has received much attention.167 Because of this, and the economic emphasis which will be explored in the final chapter, this work will not deal explicitly with ecology except where it specifically intersects the political and economic spheres of discourse. Likewise, the third and fifth vicious circles will receive brief explication here, but will only be included in future detailed analyses where their impact will have direct bearing on politico-economic discussions. Moltmann notes that the ‘vicious circle’ of poverty occurs on two interconnected levels. There is the poverty that occurs within a nation, between the country’s elite and corporate or ‘white-collar’ class, and the lower, more destitute classes. There is also the poverty that occurs between nations, such as the disparity between G7 nations and those which are poor. The effects of this poverty are manifold: ‘It consists of hunger, illness and early mortality, and is provoked by exploitation and class domination.’168 Moltmann cites disconcerting evidence to illustrate what he perceives to be the effects of poverty: The UNO report on human development (1996) points out the danger that ensues when the many are impoverished through the enrichment of the few. The wealth of 358 multi-millionaires exceeds the total income of the poor countries, in which almost 45% of the world’s population lives! Commenting on this, 165

Ibid., p. 327. Ibid., pp. 330–32. 167 The works of Celia Deane-Drummond and Douglas J. Schuurman have been mentioned in the preceding chapters. See also Steven Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology: The Ecological Models of RosemaryRadford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995). 168 Moltmann, CG, p. 330. 166

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J. G. Speth, General Secretary of the UNO Development Programme, declared that if present trends continue, the economic drop between industrialized and developing countries will take on dimensions which are no longer merely unjust but are actually inhumane.169

In response to this situation of poverty, Moltmann assesses three ‘dimensions of human freedom’. These dimensions perceive economics and human participation in economics in different ways. The first dimension of freedom Moltmann analyses is ‘freedom as domination’.170 Moltmann elaborates this dimension of freedom by saying: ‘People who understand freedom as domination really know only themselves as determining subjects, and everything else as their property, their object. Freedom is a function of property.’171 This view of freedom is linked to monistic perceptions of personhood because it conceives of the person as an individual who must protect one’s survival and selfinterest as master of oneself. It denies the fundamental relationality of personhood that Moltmann sees pre-eminently manifested in the Trinity and lived out in human communion with the Triune God.172 Community, which involves trust rather than control, counters the individualizing tendency of freedom as domination. The link between domination and associating freedom as property has also been noticed more recently by M. Douglas Meeks. In a provocative reading of the Joseph narrative in Genesis, Meeks describes the coupling of ‘freedom as property’ with domination.173 According to Meeks, God enabled and used Joseph’s economic prowess to preserve the people of Egypt and surrounding nations from starvation. The people could come and sell their wares, money and their stock for the food Joseph had wisely stored in Pharaoh’s warehouses. Once these resources were gone, Joseph claimed and purchased the properties of the people for food. However, Meeks notes an integral shift in the biblical narrative. Eventually, the wares and properties of the people ran out. At this time the people sold themselves to Pharaoh and Joseph just so that they might eat. The people of the nations became slaves for food:174 ‘Since Joseph, the household of Israel and the household of Jesus Christ have been suspicious of storehouses and storehouse economies.’175 Meeks goes further to articulate how

Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, p. 66. The UNDP Administrator is the third highest-ranking official in the United Nations (UN), after the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General. 170 Ibid., pp. 155–8. 171 Ibid., p. 155. 172 Ibid., p. 157. 173 M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1989), pp. 78–9. 174 Gen. 47:19. 175 Meeks, God the Economist, p. 80. See Luke 12:13–21. 169

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God’s distribution of goods cares for all creatures and is at odds with present systems which perpetuate poverty through the continual acquisition of property: Did God unjustly distribute the necessities of life to human beings unequally? With one accord the church Fathers answer no. If God intended to give the necessities of life to all people equally, this meant that private property was neither natural nor inevitable; neither religiously valuable nor necessarily socially meritorious.176

In contradistinction to freedom as domination noted by Moltmann and elaborated by Meeks, there are also the second and third dimensions of freedom. These may be viewed in contradistinction to ‘freedom as domination’. The second dimension of freedom is ‘freedom as free community’:177 ‘Here freedom is not an attribute of the determining subject. It is a qualification of the intersubjective relationships in which and from which the human subject lives. That is the concept of communicative freedom.’178 Appealing to German etymology, Moltmann connects the communal notions of ‘friendliness’ (Freundlichkeit) with ‘freedom’ (Freiheit). Putting the history of words aside, what is important in this context is that Moltmann closely associates the kindness or friendliness shown in community with freedom. This ‘mutual participation is shared life …’.179 With this, it may again be seen that Moltmann clearly asserts that anti-monotheistic motifs must be at work if human society is to experience liberating freedom. The third dimension of freedom, which along with the second contradicts the first, is freedom as ‘the creative passion for the possible’.180 This passion ‘reaches out to the future’ and develops tangible means of living commensurately with Christian hope.181 It may be seen that within the broader purview of Moltmann’s Meeks, God The Economist, pp. 106–7. Meeks cites Acts 4 in this regard. In the background is Max Weber’s famous analysis which located a capitalist ethic of acquiring goods in a post-reformation need for one to confirm their elect status through a display of God’s blessing. This ‘blessing’ inevitably took the form of economic increase. Weber states: ‘The earning of money within the modern economic order is, so long as it is done legally, the result and the expression of virtue and proficiency in a calling …’. He goes on to affirm that this is the spirit of capitalism. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (7th edn, London: Unwin University Books, 1965), pp. 53–4, 64 respectively. 177 Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, pp. 158–9. 178 Ibid., p. 158. Moltmann has Martin Buber’s relational thought in mind here. See ibid., p. 156. Martin Buber’s definitive works on inter-subjectivity can be found earlier in his thought. In particular see, Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Touchstone edn, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Macmillan, 1947). 179 Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, p. 158. 180 Ibid., p. 159. 181 Ibid. 176

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thought being developed in this work, this passion for the possible in participation with the future receives its content from the Kingdom of God brought about in the divine promise and pneumatic efficacy of the Triune God. Through the promise given in Christ and enabled for human participation through the Spirit in the economy of salvation, God counters the ‘vicious circle’ of poverty contested in the Trinitarian event of the cross through a creative passion for the possible. It can now be seen precisely how these latter two dimensions of freedom respond to the second ‘vicious circle’ Moltmann perceives, which is force. Moltmann closely associates poverty with the vicious circle of force. Force ‘is produced in particular societies by the domination of dictatorships, upper classes or those with privileges. It is also produced through the relationships between powerful and weaker nations. The institutionalized rule of force produces counter-force.’182 This cycle of institutionalized violence and revolutionary counter-violence receives international realization in the arms race.183 However, if kindness (Freundlichkeit) is inseparable from freedom, then it entails openness to the other in love, which necessarily brings a cessation of domination through military strength or economic privilege. Cycles of institutionalized violence through military or economic marginalization and counter-violence through revolutionary uprisings are incommensurate for a people regenerated through the cross-resurrection of Christ and indwelt by the Holy Spirit for lives which adhere to the ethical content of the Kingdom of God. This being the case, the Christian life, from the perspective of an ethics of hope, is then a passion for the possible. This passion for the possible is not to be conceived of as attainable through human effort. Rather, from the perspective of an ethics of hope such as the one developed in this work, it is human moral living within a ‘between-space’ created by God and made historically efficacious by the Spirit. This eschatological Zwischenraum cannot be conceived in isolation from the beneficent action of God in the divine economy. Rather, it is conceived as the proper realm within a newly created history for creaturely action in humble and loving deference to the Creator. Therefore, the ‘creative passion for the possible’ may actually be conceived as life in the eschatological Kingdom of God which has drawn near in Christ and the Spirit. The last of the ‘vicious circles’ to be explored are racial and cultural alienation, and senselessness and godforsakenness. These are also closely connected with the freedom as domination discussed and critiqued above. By being placed in subjugation to those with dominance, humans lose their identity and ‘become apathetic cogs in a technocratic mega-machine’.184 These circles, which are the result of those discussed above, effectively remove hope from the daily lives of those who bear the burden of these ‘vicious circles’. In doing so, they perpetuate 182

Moltmann, CG, p. 330. Ibid. See also Moltmann, Creating a Just Future, pp. 16–50; Moltmann, Jesus Christ for Today’s World, pp. 88–90; Moltmann, CoG, pp. 204–8. 184 Moltmann, CG, p. 331. 183

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themselves in cycles of violence which limit one’s ability to perceive the salvific work of God in Christ to experience a life of peace. A Christian ethic of hope, by inhabiting the eschatological space created by God through the promise for the Kingdom, will necessarily be in tension with such vicious circles. To counter such trends in society and world, a Christian ethic of hope may employ the metaphor of slaying the dragon through love. In this respect, Moltmann differentiates between violence (Gewalt) and power or force (Macht).185 By violence, Moltmann means the unjustified application of force (die ungerechtfertigte Anwendung von Zwang). By power (Macht), Moltmann means the overcoming of conflicts.186 Moltmann elaborates by listing various components of overcoming conflicts, such as ‘the power of understanding, the power of redemption, the power of life, in short: the power of life’.187 It is important to note that the summation of these ‘powers’ is conveyed in the same language that Moltmann uses for his pneumatology, that is, the power or force of life. Therefore, the overcoming of violence and conflicts must be seen, within the framework of Moltmann’s thought, as a work of the Spirit first and foremost, and therefore only derivatively enacted through human praxis. Thus, it is witnessed not in human analogues to Trinitarian life, but human communion with the Triune God. Moltmann goes on to refer to two scriptural motifs that may aid in this slaying of the dragon through love. The first of these is the suffering servant of God.188 This carries specific Christological connotations for Moltmann. He connects this motif of bringing peace to the vicious circles in the world through Christ’s work on the cross, which is seen in Trinitarian perspective.189 The second scriptural motif is the commandment to love one’s enemy found in the sermon on the mount.190 Moltmann provocatively notes the profound metaphor used in this passage regarding the sun and the rain. The evangelist records Jesus’ observation that the sun shines on the evil and the good, and the rain falls on the just and the unjust. Moltmann relates this to the present issue of overcoming violence through love by stating: ‘They give life without distinction between good and evil, friend and enemy. The sun and rain are obviously not interested in our conflicts and enmity, but fall on both, that we live in common.’191 The passage in Matthew connects this love of the Father with the command to love one’s enemy. If human agents are regenerated through the work of Christ, living within the pneumatologically empowered Zwischenraum in accordance with the creative promise of the Father, then the only moral action commensurate with this situation is to love with the same impartiality of the Triune God with whom Christians commune. This love is 185

Moltmann, ‘Friedenstiften und Drachentöten im Christentum’, p. 285. Ibid. 187 Ibid. (author’s translation). 188 Ibid., p. 293. 189 Moltmann quotes here Colossians 1:20. 190 Matt. 5:45–6. Moltmann, ‘Friedenstiften und Drachentöten im Christentum’, p. 293. 191 Ibid., p. 293 (author’s translation). 186

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manifested through the efficacious work of the divine Spirit. Three practical steps follow from this Trinitarian understanding of the eschatological perspective.192 First, humanity must cease to recognize the enemy as an enemy, but rather as ‘children of your Father who is in heaven’.193 This recognition of the shared status all humans have as creatures removes boundaries and socially constructed divisions by acknowledging that as creatures, all are loved by the Creator. Second, Moltmann affirms that the other, even the enemy, must therefore be recognized in oneself. This coincides with the command to love one’s neighbour as oneself. Moltmann recognizes here that enmity begins with the dehumanization of the enemy. Therefore, it is important to recognize the other in oneself and thus as one who is valued. Finally, these new situations of relating to others will work to transform a history of suffering (Leidensgeschichten) to a history of compassion (Mitleidenschaft). This compassion (suffering-with) leads to a solidarity which breaks down the dividing walls of hostility. The cross-resurrection of Christ has accomplished this as is witnessed in the removal of the wall of hostility between Jew and Gentile.194 Conclusions This analysis of Moltmann’s developing doctrine of the Trinity within the framework and an eschatological ethic of hope has yielded several provocative concepts. First, the understanding of the eschatological economy of salvation has been deepened by placing it within a Trinitarian context where the mutual inter-relations of the divine persons, as seen in the history of the Son, exhibit an openness in love. This loving openness of God does not remain within Godself as ‘like for like’, but moves beyond in creative, life-giving relationship with the creature as one who is ‘unlike’. The result is the willingness of the Son in freedom to seek solidarity with sinful humanity and provide the way of salvation by taking humanity’s state upon himself and overcome it through the resurrection. This Trinitarian understanding of the dialectic of cross-resurrection allows for a more integrated view of how the eschatological Zwischenraum of tension is achieved, thus creating a new history for the Kingdom of God. Contrary to Moltmann, it was argued that the ethical ramifications of this deepened Trinitarian understanding do not result in a Christian moral life based on mere analogues or imitation of the divine relations. Rather, it has been argued in continuity with the foregoing investigations in this work, that the Christian moral life is enabled through participation in communion with God via a robust pneumatology. The indwelling Spirit then shares the divine love with the creature, thus moulding the creature as an instrument of the divine love to 192

For the following, see ibid., pp. 294–6. Matt. 5:45. 194 Eph. 2:14–18. 193

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share and exhibit this life among fellow-creatures. This resulted in continuing themes of liberation, solidarity and love, but was also given greater praxiological significance through the varying discussions Moltmann provides regarding psychological and political liberation. Part I of this work has largely explored the main doctrinal tenets of Moltmann’s theology and attempted to explicate an eschatological ethic of hope which may be derived from it. In this, some practical discussions were conducted using the motifs of love and liberation. However, little theological work was done to explicitly explore how these doctrinal insights alter an understanding of moral agency and action within the framework of Christian hope. Important theological topics, which have direct import for an ethic of hope, remain to be explicated. Such themes include an eschatological perception of temporal and spatial categories as they particularly involve human moral action. In addition, a more clearly defined theological anthropology, which describes the human being as both a creature and a moral agent, has yet to be examined. Part II of this work will therefore explore these theological options within the doctrinal framework of eschatological hope outlined above. Moltmann has commented extensively on these topics (temporality, spatiality and the human being) and provides many provocative suggestions. As with the preceding discussion, Moltmann will have to be critically engaged on some issues and pushed further on others. The elements which diverge from Moltmann’s thought in the above doctrinal discussions must be kept in mind, however, to adequately perceive the ethic of hope being proposed in this work. The trajectory of thought charted above and in the following chapters on time, space and the human will reach a climax in the final chapter, where an attempt to discern and articulate how eschatological hope might inform Christian involvement in global economics.195 This final chapter will not attempt to provide a comprehensive or universal system of global monetary exchange. Rather, it will attempt to articulate what types of market engagement are commensurate with the Kingdom of God within the divinely created Zwischenraum of eschatological tension. It is to these theological and praxiological discussions that the present work now turns.

195 Here the term ‘economics’ is being used to describe global monetary actions of trade, exchange and market conduct. This is to be differentiated from the above theological understanding of the divine economy. In Chapters 5 and 6, unless otherwise stated, the divine economy as understood within the doctrine of God will be the meaning intended. In the final chapter, the use of the terms ‘economy’ or ‘economic’ will denote things pertaining to the financial market.

Part II Theological and Topical Considerations

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Chapter 5

Time and Space for Hope Introduction Part I of this exploration of Moltmann’s eschatological theology began in the first chapter with an analysis of his early Theology of Hope and its emphasis on the creative work of divine promise. It was seen that Moltmann conceived of this promise as creating an interval of tension with those aspects of creaturely life which exhibited the sinful traits incurred in the fall. This interval of tension was then argued to be a ‘between-space’, a Zwischenraum, created by God through his promise in the cross-resurrection of Christ for the future redemption of creation. The lived characteristics of this between-space exemplify the moral life of the Kingdom of God, which is seen to be enacted in the life, vocation and ministry of the Son, that is Jesus Christ. While aspects of the Kingdom of God, such as the resurrection of the dead, await consummation in the future, the moral elements of the Kingdom may be participated in by humans who are ‘in Christ’, as Paul says. This is made possible in history through the vivifying work of the Holy Spirit, which brings the regenerated person into communion with the Triune God. The preceding analysis was conducted largely in discussion with the particular doctrinal materials found in Moltmann’s corpus. The second part of the present study will glean from those doctrinal discussions to investigate what systematic theology may say in regards to time, space and humanity as they pertain to an eschatological view of moral hope. It will do so by deepening the insights discovered in the first part of this work, and also by investigating how Moltmann conceives of time, space and humanity in light of God’s salvific work in Christ. Prior to beginning this aspect of the current study, a brief caveat must be given. The theological notions of time and space have a complexity rarely seen in contemporary systematics. This complexity is increased by the fact that any discussion regarding time, space and humanity aiming to be comprehensive must necessarily be interdisciplinary. That is to say, many disciplines, such as physics, biology, anthropology, philosophy and critical historical inquiry, all stake a claim to scholarly debates regarding these topics. Moreover, Moltmann’s own intellectual endeavours to articulate theologies of time, space and humanity are varied and widespread. Moltmann speaks of God’s creation of time and space, but also the time and space which God has in himself, be it eternity or omnipresence. 

Moltmann, GC, pp. 104–57. Moltmann, TKG, pp. 108–14; Moltmann, GC, pp. 86–93; Moltmann, CoG, pp. 279–307. 

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To provide an exhaustive analysis of Moltmann’s work regarding these concepts is beyond the scope of this study. This chapter will instead attempt to engage these issues from the more limited perspective of a specifically eschatological account of human moral action. While some of the issues mentioned above must be discussed for the sake of clarification, the aim of the present account is to constructively engage Moltmann’s thought to provide greater depth in understanding a theology of moral hope in eschatological perspective. Time for Moral Hope The discussion of time’s relation to moral hope will begin with the influential understanding of time explicated by Augustine. The prominence of Augustine’s thought on the nature of time and its passage has endured to the present and is Moltmann’s starting place for his own understanding. However, Moltmann also desires to go beyond Augustine and maintain the objectivity of history over against human existence. Having explicated Moltmann’s emphasis on the objectivity of history, the discussion will proceed to Moltmann’s classification of the present as the time of promise and how this relates to moral action. It will be argued that a qualitative description of time (a description of time’s lived characteristics) rather than a quantitative description (successive progress of events) is paramount for a moral theology of hope. With this qualitative description, the metaphor of kairos will be used to illustrate the moral tenor of the present. The discussion will then conclude by arguing for the continuing necessity of a future orientation to eschatology and juxtapose Moltmann’s theology with another contemporary proposal. The question of time is by no means a novel topic in theology. Augustine definitively formulated the nature of the problem for all subsequent theology. In Book XI of the Confessiones, Augustine asks the famous question, ‘What then is time?’ (Quid est enim tempus?). He continues to express his bewilderment at this complex topic when he states: 

For a more general account of Moltmann’s use of time, see Richard Bauckham, ‘Time and Eternity’, in God Will Be All in All, ed. Richard Bauckham (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), pp. 155–93. See also Hong-Hsin Lin, ‘Remembrance and Hope: Augustine’s and Moltmann’s View of Time’, and Ya-Tang Chuang, ‘Eschatological Future and Aeon in Moltmann’s Theology’, in Sino-theology and the Thinking of Jürgen Moltmann/ Sino-Theologie und das Denken Jürgen Moltmanns, ed. Jürgen Moltmann and Thomas Tseng (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 77–94 and 99–124, respectively; A.J. Conyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988); Jean-Louis Souletie, La Croix de Dieu: Eschatologie et histoire dans la perspective christologique de Jürgen Moltmann (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1997), pp. 93–258.  Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 230.

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Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know. But I confidently affirm myself to know that if nothing passes away, there is no past time [non esset praeteritum tempus], and if nothing arrives, there is no future time [non esset futurum tempus], and if nothing existed there would be no present time [non esset praesens tempus].

Regarding the identification of these three temporal modes (past, present, future), Augustine maintains only the present actually exists: ‘For the past now has no existence and the future is not yet.’ Augustine’s solution to the problem of how human knowledge of past or future can exist if they have no being is psychologically orientated. Speaking of past, present and future, he states: ‘In the soul [in anima] there are these three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else. The present considering the past is memory [memoria], the present considering the present is immediate awareness [contuitus], the present considering the future is expectation [expectatio].’ For Augustine, human awareness of time comes from the observation of time’s transience. This transience stems from the created, and therefore finite, nature of time. In contrast to time as a created entity, Augustine asserts that God is eternal and therefore outside of time. Augustine addresses God directly and says: ‘before all times you are eternal Creator of all and understand that before all times you are eternal Creator of all time. Nor are any times or created thing coeternal with you, even if there is an order of creation which transcends time.’ Moltmann shares Augustine’s awareness of the difficulty of speaking of time.10 He states that Augustine’s solution is to introduce human subjectivity into discussions about time.11 Through the temporal motifs of memory, attention and expectation, Augustine’s understanding of time locates the differentiation of temporal modes within the mind. For Augustine, awareness of time and the knowledge of the varying modes of time occur within the subjectivity of the human psyche. Moltmann agrees with Augustine’s association of time with transience, stating that: ‘Time is perceived from changes in Being. Changeable Being is temporal Being.’12 He attempts to go further than Augustine, however, in differentiating between the subjective perception of time within the human psyche and time itself: ‘Yet there remain differences between experienced history and history itself …. We remember only a little of the past. Our memory selects, and changes as time goes on.’13 

Ibid., pp. 230–31. ‘Praeteritum enim iam non est et futurum nondum est’; ibid., p. 231.  Ibid., p. 235.  Ibid., p. 231.  Ibid., p. 244. 10 Moltmann, GC, p. 104. 11 Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 92. 12 Moltmann, CoG, p. 280. 13 Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 93. 

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The objectivity of time over against the human subject stems from its nature as a created phenomenon. Humanity shares this attribute of being created in common with time, and therefore cannot be said to be either the originator of time or the comprehensive judge of what constitutes time, history and the events occurring therein. The objectivity of time as that which is created is exemplified for Moltmann in the claim that time is also irreversible. The irreversibility of time is likewise to be understood as that which is created and experienced through the history of promise that God creates for creatures. Moltmann writes: Theologians … have always shown a predilection for the phenomena of irreversible time in nature, because their root experience, religiously speaking, is Abraham’s and Sarah’s experience of God – the exodus from country … the future which God promises. This experience of God is bound up with experiences of exodus and exile because it is aligned towards a new future through promise and hope. Anyone who follows this divine promise, and starts out afresh with such a hope, always leaves behind a past that will never return and to which he will never come back, and seeks a future that has never yet been. That person’s present experience of God divides the times into a past that can never be regained, and a future that has not yet been reached.14

The irreversibility of time, for Moltmann, is what differentiates creaturely time from God’s eternity. As indicated above, this is witnessed in the transitory nature of time: the irreversible movement of future, present, past: ‘The moment of inception for creaturely time issues from the primordial moment of the time of creation. In the act of creation, time emerges from eternity and fans out into before and after, into future, present and past.’15 This is highlighted in the impermanence of creation: ‘The temporal creation is by definition a creation subject to change.’16 If the present is, for Moltmann, the time in which God is experienced, whereas the future has not yet come into being and the past cannot be regained, then what is the relationship between the present and future of time as it relates to Christian moral action? In what sense can Moltmann claim the future to be a new category of transcendence17 if it is not yet existent and God is claimed to be experienced in the present? The answer to this dilemma may be seen in how Moltmann categorizes the present. He argues that the present is the time of promise. Moltmann relates the transience of the present and the novum of the future through the divine promise given in the present of history: The earthly form of time, however, is the time-hand pointer: future becomes present, and present past. The time of earthly creation is open for the history of 14

Ibid., p. 86. Moltmann, CoG, p. 282. 16 Ibid., p. 283. 17 See Moltmann, The Future of Creation, pp. 1–17. 15

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its salvation and its perdition. In its constructive potentialities, earthly time is therefore the time of promise. The essence of its time is futurity ….18

The irreversibility of time described above is constituted by the creative work of the divine promise (here illustrated with the metaphor ‘time-hand pointer’). The promise orients and opens the present time of history to the future, which is God’s salvation provided for creation through the consummation of the Kingdom. The present is characterized by expectation and anticipation of the novum which is anticipated in the promise and ensured by the divine faithfulness. If this categorization of earthly time being existent, and therefore present, is the time of promise, it is then illuminating to read this within the context of Moltmann’s earlier, more detailed, statements regarding the nature of history and promise. If in fact the present, earthly time is the time of promise, then it is from the perspective of the promise that a sense of history is created: ‘On the ground of the promised future the truth of the world can be experienced as history. The eschatological sense of the event of promise in the resurrection of Christ awakes in remembrance and expectation our sense for history.’19 The effect of the divine promise is that the existential condition of the human being is altered upon receiving the promise. It is so because the promise of God brings the creature into communion with the Triune God in a covenant where such communion was previously impossible. This covenant between God and creatures orients human perspective to the future precisely because the covenant is for the Kingdom of God, which is ensured by the divine faithfulness. This existential reorientation to the future on the part of humanity thus also compels human awareness to contemplate the incongruous nature of their surroundings with the material content of the divine promise for the Kingdom of God. Hence, this creates tension between a person who has received the promise and those elements of the present incommensurate with it. This provides a coherent rationalization of how Moltmann can account for the relationship between time and the human subject. However, it was noted above that this subjective element is only one part of Moltmann’s understanding of time. The objectivity of time has yet to be addressed within a schema of promise. The objective aspect of time and history in relation to the promise of God is initially hinted at in Moltmann’s earlier description of promise. In elucidating various aspects of promise, Moltmann states: ‘The promise takes man up into its own history in hope and obedience, and in so doing stamps his existence with a historic character of a specific kind.’20 From this statement it may be argued that Moltmann perceives the role of the promise not merely to construe history within a new framework of human consciousness, but even more so to construe human existence from within a new type of history provided by God through the promise. How may this be understood? The oft-repeated theme throughout the current study 18

Moltmann, CoG, pp. 282–3. Moltmann, TH, p. 92. 20 Ibid., p. 103. 19

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has emphasized that God creates a new history through the promise. If the divine promise displayed in the cross-resurrection of Christ is a creative act of God, then history is less likely to be interpreted as a linear succession of events progressing of its own accord with the Christ-event seen as the new centre.21 Moltmann’s use of the doctrine of creatio continua illustrates how this ongoing creative work of God may be understood. Moltmann perceives two aspects of the creatio continua: (1) the preservation and sustaining of the world (conservatio mundi), and (2) the new work of God in the consummation of the Kingdom (creatio nova). Moltmann states: ‘A detailed doctrine of the creatio continua must see God’s historical activity under both aspects: the preservation of the world he has created, and the preparation of its completion and perfecting.’22 With the inclusion of both aspects of the creatio continua, Moltmann affirms that both the subjective appropriation of history by humanity and the objective existence of history over against human subjectivity exhibit the characteristics of Christian hope and divine faithfulness respectively: God’s preserving activity manifests hope, and his innovating activity, his faithfulness. But at heart every preserving activity is innovatory, and every innovating activity is preserving. God’s historical activity is then eschatologically orientated: it preserves the initial creation by anticipating the consummation and by preparing the way for the consummation.23

This ongoing creative work of God in the promise creates new history. Moltmann illustrates this point with a linguistic argument. ‘Bara, the unique word for the divine creation, is used much more frequently in the Bible for God’s creation of liberation and salvation in history than for the initial creation of the world.’24 Here Moltmann is explicating God’s creative work for a new history, but he does so to emphasize its ethical import. It should be noted that Moltmann employs the same linguistic argument in a faulty manner in The Coming of God. To express the continuity between creatio originalis and creatio nova, he states: Consequently even the end of the world cannot be total annihilation and new creation. It can only be a transformation out of transience into eternity. This is also indicated by the verb used in Rev. 21:5 – not ‘Behold, I will create’ (Hebrew barah), but ‘I will make (Hebrew asah) all things new.’25 21

Such a view is akin to the linear view of time purported by Oscar Cullmann. See Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History, trans. Floyd V. Filson (London: SCM Press, 1951), pp. 51–60. For Moltmann’s critique of Cullmann, see Moltmann, CoG, pp. 10–13. 22 Moltmann, GC, p. 209. 23 Ibid., pp. 209–10. 24 Ibid., p. 208. 25 Moltmann, CoG, p. 271.

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Richard Bauckham has pointed out the poor linguistic exegesis conducted here by Moltmann. Bauckham argues: ‘Of course, Revelation 21:5 is written in Greek, not Hebrew! The Greek verb it uses (poieo) is used actually in the Greek translation of Genesis 1:1 to translate barah. Moreover, Revelation 21:5 echoes Isaiah 65:17 … where the Hebrew is barah.’26 It should be noted that in the text cited from God in Creation, Moltmann is using the argument in a different manner. In the 1985 text, he is making use of the Hebrew prophets to illustrate God’s creation of a history of liberation. In other words, it is a qualitative, ethical description of time, rather than a quantitative, linear description of time. For an eschatological perspective of moral hope, such as the one being developed in this work, it is this qualitative description of time which is most important. It has been described as a common feature in Moltmann’s thought that the history created by divine promise is in contradistinction to a sinful status quo. This has been described as an interval of tension. This phrase (‘interval of tension’) is used with temporal categories to ethically describe the qualitative characteristics of the present time of promise: If the promises of God create an interval [Zeitraum] of tension between their being issued and their coming to pass, and thereby institute freedom of obedience, then importance attaches to the questions of directions for the filling out of this interval [Zeitraum] and of the existence thus constituted in it …. Promise and command [Verheißung und Geheiß], the pointing of the goal and the pointing of the way, therefore belong immediately together.27

It should be noted here that the word translated as ‘interval’ is not the previous Zwischenraum Moltmann used when initially defining the nature of promise. Whereas just pages before Moltmann used an exclusively spatial metaphor, here he mixes spatial and temporal imagery with the word Zeitraum. Literally, the interval of tension may also be said to be a ‘space of time’.28 This qualitative conception of time in moral terms is described as the time of the ‘freedom of obedience’ (Freiheit zum Gehorsam)29 where the creative promise (Verheißung) of God inextricably belongs with the command (Geheiß) of God for faithful praxis through discipleship. A deeper understanding of these ideas may be achieved by exploring Moltmann’s notion of kairological time. For Moltmann, 26

Bauckham, ‘Time and Eternity’, p. 180. Moltmann, TH, p. 120. 28 It should still be noted that the more common German words for ‘interval’ – Abstand, Intervall, Pause – are still not used here. Instead, Moltmann chooses to use a conjunction, which is commonly translated ‘period’ and requires the German conjoining of two words: Zeit and Raum. 29 See Karl F. Grimmer, Geschichte im Fragment: Grundelemente einer Theologie der Geschichte (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2000), p. 172. Grimmer specifically notes Moltmann’s use of the term Zwichenraum in this regard. 27

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kairos is connected with the manner in which he perceives eternity to be present in time. However, this is not simply to be construed in terms of a quantitative assessment of time’s progress, but even more so in terms of a quality of life: ‘Kairos is “the proper time”, “the favourable opportunity”, “the unique chance.” In the kairological understanding of time “everything has its time.” … The kairological understanding of the present is heightened in the ecstatic experience of the present as “the fulfilled moment.”’30 If the kairos is the fulfilled moment, this is not to be defined by history’s forward movement toward an inevitable outcome. Rather, it is defined in terms of presence, which qualitatively alters the type of life one lives. Thus, Moltmann is able to say: ‘Eternity in time is a category, not of the extensive life, but of the intensive life.’31 Moltmann then continues: Here eternity is not merely simultaneity but also absolute presentness …. Eternal life has nothing to do with timelessness and death, but is full-filled life … we develop a hunger for a life that is eternal … the longing for an eternal present in which we can say to the moment, like Goethe’s Faust: ‘O tarry a while, thou art so fair.’32

At this juncture it must be remembered that this discussion is not intended to exhaustively explore the details of how Moltmann perceives the relationship between eternity and time or the nature of time, history and kairos. The goal of discussing Moltmann’s use of kairological time is to gain better insight as to how these concepts may be deployed in a moral theology of hope. This is best accomplished in juxtaposing the above description of kairological time with the way Moltmann understands what Bauckham has called ‘the modern myth of time’.33 Bauckham lists many features in the modern myth of time, but there is one particularly relevant for its impact on the Christian moral life. He argues: The modern time myth can be seen as an ideology of the powerful, for whom a future continuous with the present represents the continuation and extension of the position of dominance and privilege …. A model of time which requires the future to be extrapolated from the past and the present, which denies alternative possibilities, radical changes, real novelty, unpredictable irruptions in the historical process, is a model in the interests of those who must suppress alternative possibilities if they are to maintain their own power in the future.34

Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 96. See also Moltmann, CoG, p. 290. Ibid., p. 291. Also Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 96. 32 Moltmann, CoG, p. 291. 33 Bauckham, ‘Time and Eternity’, pp. 158ff. 34 Ibid., p. 170. 30 31

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Such a description of the modern myth of time is seen most aptly in Moltmann’s rendering of what he calls ‘historical millenarianism’.35 Moltmann defines historical millenarianism as that ‘which interprets the present as Christ’s Thousand Years’ empire and the last stage [das letzte Zeitalter] of humanity …’.36 Moltmann proceeds to differentiate between two primary types of historical millenarianism: political (politischer Millennarismus) and ecclesiastical (kirchlicher Chiliasmus). Political millenarianism is divided into two subcategories, reflecting the unique histories of Eastern Europe and the West (particularly America) respectively. The political millenarianism of ‘the holy empire’ (Eastern Europe) begins, Moltmann argues, with the rise of Constantine and the theological interpretation given his rule by Eusebius of Caesarea.37 Moltmann describes this characterization of history with the ‘thousand years’ metaphor in the following way: The pax Romana instituted by Augustus and completed by Constantine is the realization of the pax messianica and therefore of the ‘Thousand Years’ empire’. Christianity’s link with political power was now no longer by way of Pontius Pilate, under whom Christ suffered and who had him crucified, but through Augustus, who by means of his ‘tax’ made him a Roman subject.38

Moltmann continues to describe the effect this had on Christian self-understanding and moral engagement in the social-political realm: Like the kingdom of Christ, the kingdom of Constantine began with a cross; but it was not the cross on Golgotha. It was the dream cross that promised him ‘In hoc signo vinces’ – ‘in this cross you will conquer’. With Constantine’s victory over Maxentius in 312, the martyr cross of Christ became a sign of imperial victory …. The cross is the symbol of [state] victory.39

35 Moltmann, CoG, pp. 129–91. For a succinct summary, see Gérard Rémy, ‘Millénarisme historique et espérance eschatologique: à propos de “La Venue de Dieu” de J. Moltmann’, Recherches de Science Religieuse, vol. 90, no. 2, 2002: 187–95. 36 Moltmann, CoG, p. 146. Moltmann’s own option for what he calls ‘eschatological millenarianism’ is unconvincing in both its biblical warrant and logical necessity. Moltmann largely maintains this version of millenarianism to include a future salvation for Israel as a nation. To explore this in detail is beyond the scope of the ethical content of the present discussion. For Moltmann’s position, see ibid., pp. 192–202. For a convincing critique, see Bauckham, ‘The Millennium’, in God Will Be All in All, pp. 123–47. For Moltmann’s response highlighting the importance of Israel as his motivation for millennial thought, see Moltmann, ‘The Hope of Israel and the Anabaptist Alternative: Response to Richard Bauckham’, in God Will Be All in All, pp. 149–54. 37 Moltmann, CoG, pp. 159–61. 38 Ibid., p. 161. 39 Ibid., p. 162.

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Moltmann then traces similar themes through Byzantium and later Eastern European history.40 The historical veracity of placing the entirety of Christendom’s co-option by political forces upon Constantine has been debated. The central issue for the present discussion is the qualitative manner in which Moltmann describes time and history. By using the millennial image of Christ’s reign, Moltmann is able to critique past uses of eschatological metaphors of time in various ethical situations. Moltmann makes a similar argument when he describes the second form of political millenarianism, the metaphor of ‘the redeemer nation’. Moltmann describes this version of political millenarianism as ‘the idea of the nation whose destiny, according to God’s salvific plan, is the redemption of the world’.41 Moltmann sees this to be particularly present in the United States. He argues that the history of America as a pilgrim people gave its people a ‘self-confidence [due to] the feeling of political innocence’ in comparison with the ‘old, sinful European nations’.42 Moltmann argues that such conceptions allowed the millennial ‘redeemer nation’ to memorialize its wars and people. Moltmann states: Together with Thanksgiving Day, Memorial Day is the most important festival in America’s civil religion. It is a sacred ceremony, a religious ritual, a modern cult of the dead …. When ‘this nation under God’ wins the rebirth of its liberty from the sacrificial death of those who have died in battle, it becomes the enduring End-time nation …. The connection we have pointed out between martyrdom and millennium … shows that it is not difficult to interpret death for one’s country and the rebirth of that country’s freedom in the millenarian sense. And the honorific title ‘the nation under God’ suggests this interpretation.43

Moltmann is not entirely unappreciative of the cultural contributions of the United States, nor does he see such millennial notions completely uncontested in American culture.44 However, Moltmann disputes the validity of defining history and time according to one’s own nation state and denoting it as representative of God’s Kingdom.45 The second type of ‘historical millennialism’ Moltmann discusses is ‘ecclesiastical millennialism’. Moltmann sees ecclesiastical millennialism beginning with the historical roots of canon law: ‘The political centralism of the imperium Romanum passed to Rome’s ecclesiastical centralism. The development

40

Ibid., pp. 162–8. Ibid., pp. 168–9. 42 Ibid., p. 171. 43 Ibid., pp. 171–2. 44 Ibid., pp. 172, 174. 45 ‘As a humane dream, the American dream is a good and necessary one; but if it is no more than an American dream, the humane dream turns into its very opposite’; ibid., p. 174. 41

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of canon law out of Roman law already makes this evident.’46 Moltmann argues that this shift allowed the Church to cease seeing itself as a struggling people and begin to interpret its existence in terms of the ‘thousand years’ reign’ and cast itself in victorious and dominant terms.47 Moltmann goes on to claim that Augustine perpetuated this understanding when he ‘viewed the Thousand Years’ empire as already realized in the church’.48 Moltmann states: ‘It is true that Augustine confuted and rejected in no uncertain terms the “millenarii” who dream of a future earthly and physical Kingdom of Christ; but he did so only in order to maintain his spiritual and ecclesiastical present-day millenarianism.’49 Gérard Rémy has debated Moltmann’s interpretation of Augustine.50 Rémy historically locates Augustine’s statements regarding the nature of the Church in his debates with the Donatists and affirms that ‘Augustine, contrary to Luther, never identified the church with the Kingdom. According to the Augustinian source, who can reign with Christ?’51 Rémy’s astute assessment of Moltmann’s reading of Augustine is significant for evaluating Moltmann’s treatment of the tradition. However, what is of immediate import for the present discussion of time is to note that Moltmann sees any ideological interpolation of the eschatological Kingdom into the present as having deleterious ethical effects. This is because, for Moltmann, the present of time and history is the time of promise, not the time of fulfilment (which only occurs at Christ’s parousia). He states: ‘This is the messianic announcement about time: The promised time is here …. The present is the kairos of salvation.’52 The notion of kairos again takes primary place in Moltmann’s discussion of the present time and history and the moral relevance to be found therein. Therefore, if the modern myth of time interpolates the fulfilment of the promise into history, then kairological time may be described as a time between the times. Stated more precisely, kairological time is the time of promise where fulfilment has yet to occur. However, the divine creation of a new history is currently being accomplished. In this sense, ‘interval’ is an apt, though incomplete, translation. This kairological time is pneumatologically indwelt, thus enabling human participation in those aspects of the Kingdom of God which display the moral qualities exhibited in the life and vocation of Christ. In this more detailed sense, it may be understood

46

Ibid., p. 178. Ibid., p. 179. 48 Ibid., p. 181. 49 Ibid. 50 See Gérard Rémy, ‘Millénarisme historique et espérance eschatologique’, p. 197. 51 Ibid. (author’s translation). 52 Jürgen Moltmann, ‘From the Beginning of Time in God’s Presence’, in The End of Time? The Provocation of Talking about God, trans. J. Matthew Ashley, ed. Tiemo Rainer Peters and Claus Urban (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), p. 60. 47

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how it is possible for Moltmann to say: ‘History is the “sacrament” of Christian ethics, not just its material.’53 This way of understanding the ethical import of the present and history does not deter from an understanding of eschatology and moral hope in which the future remains paramount.54 If the present is to be understood in terms of the promise, then it ineluctably determines the future and maintains this orientation to the future. The promise of God creates an interval, a Zeitraum, of tension with the present. It is filled with tension because the full content and scope of the promise is not currently exhibited. A theology of promise is a theology of hope because it creates within the receiver of the promise expectation of a future hitherto impossible. Since this promise and hence future is, in Moltmann’s language, not developing from the present but rather coming toward the present, Christian moral hope in eschatological perspective maintains its future orientation while engaging in ethical praxis in the present. This understanding of promise is essential for Moltmann’s construal of time and history because from this, God is understood as Lord of history.55 This provides greater understanding for Moltmann’s concept of the irreversibility of time in ethical perspective. With this detailed understanding of the relationship between time and divine promise, the unity of time may be seen as coming from the future.56 There have been competing views proposed regarding the relationship between time and eschatology. More recently, Kathryn Tanner has proposed removing the future orientation of eschatology.57 Tanner’s starting point for discussing eschatology is primarily scientific projections of the end of the universe in either a ‘cosmic crunch’ or a slower dissipation of life due to the loss of energy resulting 53

Moltmann, CG, p. 321. Reflecting on his earlier work, Moltmann is able to comment on history as a moral category: ‘In the 1960s we tried to break out of the narrows of existential and personalist thinking, so as to participate in the real human history of conflicts, sufferings and hopes. We discovered “the God ahead of us” as the mainspring of world history’; Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 111. 54 Carl Braaten, although along different lines than Moltmann, argues for a systematic understanding of anticipation and the future as primary to both epistemic and ethical discussions dealing with the present. See Carl E. Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics: Essays on the Theology and Ethics of the Kingdom of God (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1974), pp. 26–42, 105–22. 55 In agreement with Grimmer, Geschichte im Fragment, pp. 171, 173. This would appear to respond to Conyers’s concern regarding the maintenance of a notion of God’s sovereignty over history. See Conyers, God, Hope, and History, pp. 198ff. 56 Grimmer, Geschichte im Fragment, p. 177. See Moltmann, CoG, p. 287, where he uses the distinction of the future of a source of time and the future as a mode of time. 57 See Kathryn Tanner, ‘Eschatology Without a Future?’, in The End of the World and the End of God: Science and Theology on Eschatology, ed. John Polkinghorne and Michael Welker (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), pp. 222–37. Also Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), pp. 97–124.

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from increased entropy in an expanding universe. With both of these outcomes resulting in the cessation of human life and, indeed, all natural life on earth, Tanner argues that ‘what is required here is an account of a saving relationship with God that undercuts the religious importance of the question whether the world will end’.58 Tanner maintains that ‘since the world can enjoy this new level of relationship with God whatever its state … [t]he relationship holds whether the world continues to exist or ceases to exist’.59 Yet Tanner fails to describe how a relationship is possible if one partner in the relationship (the world) fails to exist and no longer has a future. She asserts that God maintains this relationship, but does not elaborate how God may maintain a relationship with a being that does not exist. Tanner affirms that humanity is alive in God, but fails to describe in what sense it is human life or even truly alive.60 Stated briefly, Tanner appears to be arguing for what Braaten has called an ‘eschatology sans eschaton’.61 The removal of futurity from eschatology leads Tanner to conclusions in other aspects of her thought which cohere with her eschatology without a future. The first of these is an over-realized eschatology in which eternal life is inserted into the present in spatial terms. She states: ‘Eternal life is also understood in spatial terms so as to become a realm or sphere …. Eternal life infiltrates, then, the present world of suffering and oppression …. Eternal life is a present reality; we possess now, in an unconditional fashion …’.62 The result of this over-realized eschatology for human life, both after death and at the parousia, is that ‘we no longer exist as independent beings apart from God …’.63 The boldness of this statement is confirmed with Tanner’s conception of eschatological human life: ‘The model for this aspect of life in God is the incarnation.’64 Most relevant for an exploration of the moral dimensions of eschatology is the manner in which Tanner conceives of a futureless eschatology and its relationship to social and ethical action. Tanner begins her discussion by stating: ‘criticism of the present is not fuelled primarily by the difference between present realities and what one expects the future to bring’.65 Rather, moral action is undertaken due to its appropriateness as a response to fellowship with God in Christ. Moral action, however, is not in tension with the claim that eternal life is entirely present, according to Tanner. She argues that ‘although everything has already been given 58

Ibid., pp. 103–4. Ibid., p. 104. 60 Tanner, ‘Eschatology Without a Future?’, p. 229. 61 Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics, pp. 8–12. 62 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, p. 112. Tanner also states: ‘eternal life is an unconditional, already realized possession …’; Tanner, ‘Eschatology Without a Future?’, p. 233. 63 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, p. 113. 64 Ibid., pp. 110–12. See also Tanner, ‘Eschatology Without a Future?’, pp. 229, 230, where she uses the language of a hypostatic union with God. 65 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, pp. 119–20. 59

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to us, in a certain sense everything still remains to be done in conformity with that fact’.66 Tanner’s conclusion regarding moral action and an entirely present eschatology is thus without much hope for a genuine difference to be made. She concludes: Irrespective of any likelihood that one’s actions to better the world will succeed, and even though one knows all one’s achievements will come to nothing with the world’s end, one is obligated to act simply because this is the only way of living that makes sense in light of one’s life in God.67

While Tanner’s affirmation that success should not govern Christian moral engagement may be balanced and commensurate with the type of ethic explored thus far in Moltmann’s thought, what is lacking is a theological account for the Kingdom of God. As has been explored throughout this investigation into Moltmann’s thought, a doctrine of the Kingdom of God is inextricably connected with Christology. This Kingdom is displayed in various dimensions of human life. Ethically, it was manifested in the life and vocation of Jesus Christ in the healing of the sick, table fellowship with the poor and the outcast, and the bringing of order and peace to those afflicted with demons. This was not seen to entirely encapsulate the entirety of the Kingdom. The Kingdom of God also entailed the resurrection of humanity and the redemption of the whole created order. This latter aspect of the Kingdom of God brings the former, ethical dimensions to fulfilment. Thus, the ethical dimensions likewise have futurity as an essential part of their make up. Instead of developing a theology of the Kingdom of God, which was central to Jesus’ preaching and ministry, Tanner describes the ethical portion of her ‘eschatology without a future’ in terms reminiscent of Manichaeism. She states that ‘criticism of the present is prompted and complacency about it prevented by a recognition of the disparity between the realm of life and the realm of death as those two realms or powers wrestle for supremacy in the here and now’.68 In light of the non-existence of the world and humanity in the future, Tanner’s positive claims regarding the victory of Christ over evil seem oddly contradictory. Tanner does indeed maintain Christ’s victory over death and human relationship with God after death. However, the manner in which she describes such a relationship appears to be inconceivable in light of the proposed non-existence of human life. By way of contrast, Moltmann’s conception of time and history as creations through the divine promise, thus temporally forming a Zeitraum for Christian moral action, gives a more robust account of God’s activity in the economy of salvation. 66

Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 122. 68 Ibid., p. 120, italics added. Interestingly, Tanner charges those who maintain a future-oriented eschatology with the charge of being Manichean; Tanner, ‘Eschatology Without a Future?’, p. 232. 67

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The faithfulness and lordship of God over history secures both the possibility of a better present through Christ’s work and the Spirit’s indwelling. It also secures a future where God’s promises are fulfilled and the Kingdom is consummated: ‘We do not emancipate ourselves from history altogether, but we enter into the history that is determined by the promised and guaranteed eschaton …’.69 For Moltmann, this is due to the fact that the promise of God creates history: ‘The logos of the eschaton is promise of that which is not yet, and for that reason it makes history.’70 The role of ethics in history, according to Moltmann, may then be summarized in three moves: (1) the ‘eschatological disclosure of reality as history’, (2) the ‘Christological disclosure of reality as world’, and (3) the ‘pneumatological disclosure of reality as confrontation with God’ who creates history in the promise.71 In more recent years, Moltmann has moved beyond conceptions of time and history to describe his understanding of eschatology to also incorporate spatial categories. This is seen most explicitly in his doctrine of creation and his recent eschatology. However, it has been argued throughout this work that spatial categories have been present early on through the concept of the Zwischenraum and that this concept is integral to developing an eschatology in moral perspective. Therefore, Moltmann’s understanding of space and eschatology will be brought into the discussion to provide a broader perspective for a moral theology of hope. Space for Hope When exploring the notions of time and promise as they pertain to a moral theology of hope, it was discovered that Moltmann also made use of an alternate term to describe the interval of tension created by God’s promise in which Christian living is commensurate with the Kingdom and in contradiction with sinful structures in the present. This term, Zeitraum, mixes temporal and spatial imagery and describes the time of the present as the time of promise in which Christian living may exemplify the moral elements found in the Kingdom of God through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The remainder of the preceding section sought to explicate how the promise of God created time for human action which is then orientated toward the future. At this juncture, the study shall return to the primary metaphor of the interval of tension initially used by Moltmann when defining the specific characteristics of the divine promise. This is the term Zwischenraum. This term was previously explored in some detail in the first chapter of this study, with the particularities of Moltmann’s early theology of hope and promise at the forefront. Here, describing the theological context in which such spatial metaphors receive their shape will broaden the implications of the interval of tension for Christian living. In particular, the divine beneficence will be argued to 69

Moltmann, TH, p. 154. Ibid., p. 165. 71 Moltmann, Hope and Planning, pp. 103–9. 70

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be primary with categories of moral space in an eschatological ethic. This will lead the discussion to explore the theological and ethical nature of the Zwischenraum in conjunction with the other doctrinal investigations regarding eschatology and pneumatology to accomplish the goal of understanding the relationship between spatiality and eschatological hope in moral perspective. Here again, we will be unable to explore all of Moltmann’s thought regarding the nature of space as it pertains to God, creation or the eschaton. However, these issues will be addressed as they specifically impact a theological understanding of moral hope.72 Arriving at a biblically coherent theology of space, as reflected in the history of Israel culminating in Jesus Christ, and in dialogue with Moltmann’s theology, is initially made difficult by the fact that Hebrew does not have an equivalent to the German Raum.73 Therefore, a theology explicating the nature of space must begin at somewhere other than a lexical study. Rather, for Moltmann a theology of space necessitates thought about creation and therefore God as Creator. Moreover, for this to be a Christian theology, such a doctrine of creation (and subsequently space) must be ‘a view of the world in the light of Jesus the Messiah’ and the redemptive salvation ‘which has begun with him and which he defines’.74 The result of these observations is an affirmation that in order to begin thinking theologically about space, one ought to begin with thought regarding the divine beneficence. It has been consistently argued throughout the current study that Moltmann’s understanding of promise conveys God’s creative, beneficent act: ‘The promising God himself creates what he promises …,’ writes Moltmann.75 This creative act in the promise is a free act of God. It is neither of necessity nor compulsion that God gives his promise, but rather out of God’s beneficent love. The divine promise creates a new history, but one in which a ‘between-space’ is given where the moral characteristics of the Kingdom are present through the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit. This pneumatic presence and empowerment bring those who are ‘in Christ’ into communion with the Triune God, thus enabling a life commensurate with God’s Kingdom. That the divine promise creates a Zwischenraum of tension reveals that the space God creates is not vacuous. It is given particular characteristics by God’s creative and sustaining work (creatio continua). If a concept of space is being developed in terms of the divinely created Zwischenraum, then it is not primarily understood in terms of measurement of area (quantitative), but in terms of the characteristics of life contained therein (qualitative). This is because, for Moltmann, this experience 72

For a summary of the primary issues and Moltmann’s response, see Thomas Tseng, ‘Die Bedeutung der Raumtheologie Moltmanns für die Natur’ and ‘Antwort von Jürgen Moltmann’, in Sino-theology and the Thinking of Jürgen Moltmann/Sino-Theologie und das Denken Jürgen Moltmanns, pp. 51–70 and 71–5, respectively. 73 Reinhard Gregor Kratz, ‘Gottesräume: Ein Beitrag zur Frage des biblischen Weltbildes’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 102, no. 4, 2005: 419. 74 Moltmann, GC, pp. 4–5. 75 Moltmann, Hope and Planning, p. 17.

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of God is to be interpreted in terms of presence,76 which was previously argued to require a pneumatological understanding. The subsequent result is that this space has both social and moral dimensions.77 The social dimension of space pertains to the nature of human existence as that which is not autonomous, but rather is located within a context and is thus spatially related to other people, objects, nature and the like. Moltmann describes such spatial relationships when he writes: I am in the world, in life, in my country, in my home, and socially I want to be ‘in’ as well. My existence ‘in’ something else or someone else is pre-eminently experienced as social existence: I am in other people and other people are in me. Every child grows for nine months in the womb. After it is born it grows up in a family. It lives, and later works, in society. To make this possible other people must ‘make room’ for the child – grant it a space in which it can live. If the child is to grow, its parents must withdraw; if it is to be free other people must open up free social spaces for it.78

Here Moltmann describes the varying social contexts human beings engage in. He notes the spatial metaphor of being ‘in’ these differentiated social relationships and the inability to comprehend human life apart from these. In this sense, social space may be defined as relational space. As relational space, this social space is the sphere where human action is carried out in such a manner as to be located within an ever-broadening and interweaving framework of mutual influences between human agents. Human life and action cannot be conducted in isolation due to the fact that humans are dependent on being socially situated as an order of creation. This created order is the result of the divine beneficence seen in God’s work as a loving Creator. In conjunction with Moltmann’s concept of social space is the notion of moral space. Indeed, for Moltmann, ‘social living spaces are supplemented by the moral spaces’.79 This moral space is likewise contextually interpreted. It is contextual in the sense that moral action and human decision are made in such a manner that other humans and the whole of nature are affected by the decision-making process, along with its outcomes, and the deciding agent is likewise affected by the decisions of others. Moltmann states: ‘In these moral spaces too we are both subject and object. We decide for ourselves and others decide for us.’80 The intersection of social and moral spaces illuminates important elements in a moral theology of hope. First, human moral action is never conducted in a vacuum. It is done within a wider network of relationships in such a manner that Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 112. Ibid., p. 114. 78 Ibid., pp. 114–15. 79 Ibid., p. 115. 80 Ibid. 76 77

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those relationships are impacted and thus reverberate, to use a physical metaphor, to the wider array of relationships sustained by the affected individuals. Therefore, moral decision-making is never done autonomously as in a Cartesian framework of the all-encompassing ego. Second, because moral actions have a social effect, and cannot be enacted without such effect, moral action cannot be construed as neutral. The very communal nature of such operations necessitated by such moral actions remove the plausibility of neutrality. Therefore, action undertaken in such social and moral spaces will invariably have one of two possible outcomes. Either moral action adheres to the lived characteristics of the Kingdom and therefore positively impacts creation, or contravenes the lived characteristics of the Kingdom and therefore negatively impacts creation. Moltmann encapsulates the intersection of these social and moral spaces, when lived in congruity to God’s Kingdom, as the ecological concept of space.81 The ecological concept of space, for Moltmann, is the space where ‘every living thing has its own world in which to live, a world to which it is adapted and which suits it’.82 Moltmann conceives of the ecological concept of space to have particular implications for the created order. Primarily, the ecological concept of space may be seen as the intersection of social and moral space where creation is enabled to flourish by the Spirit and thus become what God desires for it. This view of space and nature is contrasted with how Moltmann interprets the stance of modern humanity when engaging creation. He states: ‘The reduction of natural environments to these geometrical structures means at the same time their reduction to utilitarian values. Here we shall be taking a different view, and assuming that space is primarily living space.’83 The concepts of kairological time and ecological space are not independent of each other. Rather, ‘The ecological concept of space corresponds to the kairological concept of time.’84 The correlation between the two resides in the idea that all created things are given time and space for living in a manner which allows their intended goal and purpose to be properly enacted.85 The goal and purpose for creation finds its content in the promise of God for its eschatological consummation in the Kingdom. It may be argued further that the notions of kairological time and ecological space receive comprehensive explication in the eschatological notions of Zeitraum and Zwischenraum which are the temporal and spatial categories of the interval of tension created by the divine promise. This time and space is created by the divine promise for creaturely communion with the Triune God in

81 Tseng neglects this important concept in his discussion of Moltmann’s theology of space. This is not overlooked by Moltmann in his response. See Tseng, ‘Die Bedeutung der Raumtheologie’, pp. 51–70; Moltmann, ‘Antwort’, p. 71. 82 Moltmann, GC, p. 147. 83 Ibid., p. 148. 84 Ibid., p. 145. 85 Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 113.

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the eschatological Kingdom. This communion is made possible and this Kingdom made historically efficacious through the vivifying work of the Spirit.86 Moltmann is not alone in recognizing temporal and spatial elements in a politically oriented, moral theology. Recently, Mark Lewis Taylor has employed such notions in his discussion of ‘prophetic spirit’ and its relationship to political activism in America.87 Taylor favours spatial concepts over temporal ones because, he argues, temporal concepts tend to be more easily co-opted by hierarchical structures to perpetuate myths of progress or imperial endeavours.88 There are, according to Taylor, temporal elements in prophetic spirit, but in so far as history is interpreted in spatial dimensions. The spatial dimensions Taylor associates with ‘prophetic spirit’ are ‘broadening and deepening being’.89 For Taylor, the breadth dimension of prophetic spirit denotes history as ‘markedly social’. He continues to say: ‘Prophetic spirit scans, for example, the manifold of social group dynamics, discerning and seeing history as a broad field where some groups with minorities hold power and occupy centers while others are consigned … to outlying spheres, each more peripheral to the center than the last.’90 As the metaphor of ‘breadth’ signifies, this dimension of ‘prophetic spirit’ illuminates the horizontal relationships in human society. More precisely, human action in history (and therefore time) does not merely progress forward of its own accord. It impacts the interweaving features of human life through its multifarious social interactions. If the breadth dimension illustrates the horizontal, social aspects of Taylor’s vision of ‘prophetic spirit’, then the depth dimension illustrates the vertical aspect of human life in history. More precisely, the depth dimension recognizes that human interaction takes place within varying stratified positions of influence and power. According to Taylor, ‘prophetic spirit discerns that our temporal existence is textured also by different levels of life, according to which there are different strata of power and empowerment’.91 The result of this is that ‘Prophetic spirit’s vision and discernment are marked by sensitivity to hierarchy.’92 This deepening function of ‘prophetic spirit’, Taylor maintains, ‘is primarily a spatial one dwelling in the tensions arising from hierarchical domination and social exclusion’ and working to eradicate such domineering and exclusive features in hierarchical structures.93 86

On the intersection of pneumatology, the Kingdom of God and Church life and action, see Viorel Ioniţă, ‘Geist – Reich Gottes – Kirche aus pneumatologischer Perspektive’, Ostkirchliche Studien, vol. 94, no. 24, 1991: 3–17. 87 Mark Lewis Taylor, Religion, Politics, and the Christian Right: Post-9/11 Powers and American Empire (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005). 88 Ibid., p. 98. 89 Ibid., p. 97. The linguistic allusions to Paul Tillich are intentional on Taylor’s part. 90 Ibid., p. 99. 91 Ibid., p. 100. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., p. 102.

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The advantage of Taylor’s analysis is his use of spatial concepts to analyse the ethical parameters of varying aspects of human action in the socio-political sphere. However, there are fundamental problems with his understanding and use of the phrase ‘prophetic spirit’ which limit the viability of its employment within an eschatological interpretation of moral hope. Chief among the theological problems of Taylor’s use of ‘prophetic spirit’ is its conscious exclusion of the necessity of God for the concept. Taylor says: It should be clear that even though the roots of the term ‘prophetic’ … lie in religious traditions that speak of God and Spirit, I do not propose that the ‘spirit’ of prophetic spirit means that we must necessarily proceed to a discourse on God or to notions of ‘divine spirit’.94

Indeed, Taylor appears to give ‘prophetic spirit’ an entirely humanistic interpretation: Prophetic spirit, then, is a profoundly human dimension of the cultural and historical practices constituting social life …. In this sense, this work on prophetic spirit is a plea to use the notion of ‘spirit’ to refer to important dimensions of culture and history that are very much human, but dimensions to which little attention is usually given …. The prophetic is spirit, then, not as divine Spirit or as a kind of being in some metacultural or metahistorical realm; the prophetic is spirit as a distinctive configuration of cultural and historical conditions that enable creative emergence of emancipation.95

According to Taylor, ‘spirit’ is nothing more than simply human emancipation. Such a narrow view of spirit, with its occlusion of the personhood and divinity of the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity, provides not only an incomplete theology of human action, but also a more limited perspective on the human ability to achieve such liberating ends. The problems with Taylor’s proposals regarding ‘prophetic spirit’ are not unlike the problems seen in Rubem Alves’s work earlier. Like Alves, Taylor fails to perceive God in the liberating acts of history and in the varying spatial relationships that make up human interaction. Moreover, Taylor associates revolutionary dynamics96 with ‘prophetic spirit’ in a manner which seems to indicate an unending overturning of circumstances so that humanity and creation may not come to a place of rest. In contrast with Moltmann’s approach, which supplies the material content for liberating praxis with the ethical elements testified to in the biblical 94 Ibid., p. 104. It would appear that Taylor has fallen into the dilemma Moltmann describes as the crises of relevancy and identity. Taylor has opted to be socially relevant while being unable to maintain a distinctively Christian identity. See Moltmann, CG, pp. 8–25. 95 Taylor, Religion, Politics, and the Christian Right, pp. 105, 107. 96 Ibid., p. 108.

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witness for the Kingdom of God, Taylor also fails to provide material content to terms such as ‘liberation’ and therefore is unable to account for occasions when opposing views both cast their argument in terms of ‘liberation’. This is radically different than the Christological centrality of how Moltmann perceives the interaction of eschatology and moral engagement with the world. He says: A ‘theology of hope and development’ must be founded on the Christ event itself if it claims to be Christian. It must think of the mediation between God and man, the kingdom of God and human history strictly in respect of this mediator, his activity, his suffering, his dying and resurrection, and must arrive at an appropriate conclusion. The eschatological rule of God, and with it new creation and redeemed existence, are mediated in history solely through the rule of Christ. But this rule of Christ is the reconciling and liberating rule of the crucified Jesus.97

For Moltmann, the ethical space envisioned in a moral theology of hope is not simply the space of human structures where moral action is attempted through one’s own empowerment to one’s own end. Rather, it is a space created by the promise of God through the death and resurrection of Christ in which human structures are transformed by the efficacious work of the Holy Spirit to manifest the eschatological Kingdom. This space orients Christian moral action, through the divine promise, to the future. The result is that this space is then in tension with those structures, circumstances and actions which are not located within the Kingdom of God or brought about through the beneficent work of God through the Spirit. In addition, in Taylor’s interpretation of ‘prophetic spirit’, human volition is left to its own devices when attempting to engage in liberating activity without any acknowledgement of the necessity of divine action to alter humanity’s relationship to sin. In contrast, a moral theology of hope acknowledges the Spirit’s necessary transformative action to empower and enable human action to adhere to the lived characteristics of the Kingdom of God. Conclusion When conceived eschatologically, human moral action does not occur as a result of its own volition, intention or interpretation of morality. Rather, it is derivative from the promise of God, witnessed in the history of Israel and culminating in Jesus Christ, for the Kingdom of God. The divine promise creates a new history for humanity which is manifested among those who are in Christ. The divine promise also creates an interval of tension, explicated temporally as a Zeitraum and Moltmann, Future of Creation, p. 52.

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spatially as a Zwischenraum within history. Within this ‘between-space’, human action is empowered to live in ways commensurate with the material content of the Kingdom through the efficacious work of the Holy Spirit. The qualitative descriptions of time and space within this interval may be described as kairological time and ecological space. Moltmann defines these descriptions of time and space as being mutually connected through the motif of living in a manner proper to its own existence.98 This ‘proper existence’ is deciphered through God’s revealed intentions for creaturely life, exhibited in the eschatological promise. From this ethical description of eschatological time and space, what remains to be explored is the nature and role of humanity within this time and space. Throughout Moltmann’s career, the dignity of the human being has been a primary motif within both his theological and political thought.99 Having explicated the wider doctrinal framework for an eschatological theology with its ethical implications, and having subsequently explored the impact this has on temporal and spatial concepts, one may now more easily investigate the nature and role of the human being and human moral action within that framework. It is to this question that this study now turns.

Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, p. 113. For example, see Jürgen Moltmann, On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press, 1984). 98 99

Chapter 6

Hope for Humanity Introduction In the previous chapter, the theological insights gained from Part I of this study were utilized in an examination of the moral import of time and space in eschatological hope. This chapter will continue the line of questioning in exploring how Moltmann’s conception of the human being impacts a theological understanding of moral action in eschatological perspective. Furthermore, the question of how such moral action may be conceived of as action undertaken by humans within the eschatological time and space described above will receive more thorough explication. To accomplish this, the chapter will proceed in three movements. First, it will delineate the contours of Moltmann’s understanding of humanity, with particular reference to the issue of the imago Dei and its role within an eschatologically conceived theological anthropology. Second, having established a clear understanding of Moltmann’s conception of human nature, the discussion will continue with an exploration of how Moltmann’s conceptions of human nature result in an understanding of human worth. This will be particularly relevant in assessing how he understands the notions of human dignity and a theological grounding of human rights. Finally, this anthropological portion of the study of eschatological ethics will attempt to articulate an understanding of human moral action from within the perspective of eschatological hope being developed in dialogue with Moltmann’s work. The anticipated outcome will be to provide greater understanding of how Christian moral action may still be said to be human action, although within the greater framework of God’s saving acts in Christ and the empowering presence of the Holy Spirit. Human Nature Moltmann’s most thoroughgoing discussion of human nature is conducted within the context of his doctrine of creation. In his doctrine of creation, Moltmann is not attempting a natural theology, which asks what nature may inform the inquirer about God. Rather, he is attempting to engage in a theology of nature, which

 Moltmann, GC, pp. 215–43. This discussion will focus largely on Moltmann’s doctrine of creation, although important insights can also be gleaned from his later eschatology. See Moltmann, CoG, pp. 58–77.

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‘interprets nature in light of the self-revelation of the creative God’. Because of this, Moltmann argues that a biblical understanding of creation will not be limited to an exegesis of the first chapters of Genesis, but will take the whole of scripture’s testimony into account. Moreover, Moltmann affirms that for a doctrine of creation to be Christian, it must view creation in light of the person of Christ. Stated differently, Moltmann’s theology of creation, in which his anthropology is located, has covenant as its presupposition, rather than vice versa. It was only after Yahweh liberated Israel from Egypt that God’s self-revelation included knowledge of God as creator of all things: ‘The special experience of God which emerged from “God the Lord’s” revelation of himself moulded and interpreted Israel’s general experience of the world.’ Moltmann argues that this revelation is made coherent through the divine promises creating a new history, and therefore, ‘this means that Israel did not merely develop a protological understanding of creation; in the process of so doing it also arrived at an eschatological view of creation’. That is to say, for Moltmann, ‘Creation in the beginning points beyond itself to the history of promise [Verheißunggeschichte] …’. This understanding of creation is reflected in Moltmann’s understanding of humanity, and specifically the imago Dei. As a result, Moltmann’s theological anthropology and his understanding of human nature is informed eschatologically, thus being divided into three main categories which are informed by the varying elements within eschatological history. These divisions are humanity as the imago Dei, imago Christi and gloria Dei. For Moltmann, the imago Dei is the ‘original designation’ of humanity and thus the first step to a theological understanding of human nature. Moltmann does not begin by locating the divine image in humanity by accentuating the importance of one particular aspect of human being that separates and makes it unique among fellow creatures, such as animal and plant life. On the contrary, 

Moltmann, GC, p. 53. Ibid., pp. 4–5, 53–4. Also Jürgen Moltmann, Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present, trans. John Sturdy (London: SPCK, 1974), pp. 17–18. Moltmann takes his cue here from Barth, for whom Jesus was the criterion for all anthropological statements. See Konrad Stock, Anthropologie der Verheißung: Karl Barths Lehre vom Menschen als dogmatisches Problem (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980), p. 19.  Moltmann, GC, p. 54.  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 55.  This is also noted by G. Clarke Chapman, ‘On Being Human: Moltmann’s Anthropology of Hope’, Asbury Theological Journal, vol. 55, no. 1, 2000: 75–7. This threefold designation could also find some affinities in Calvin’s anthropology. See Margaret R. Miles, ‘Theology, Anthropology, and the Human Body in Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion’, Harvard Theological Review, vol. 74, no. 3, 1981: 308. Miles notes ‘three different moments’ in Calvin’s anthropology. These are the ‘before-and-after’ Jesus’ redemptive work in history and ‘the future resurrection of the body’. 

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Moltmann affirms that the ‘human being’s likeness to God [Gottebenbildlichkeit] is a theological term [theologischer Begriff] before it becomes an anthropological one [anthropologischer Begriff]. It first of all says something about the God who creates his image for himself …’. He continues by saying: ‘The nature of human beings springs from their relationship to God. It is this relationship which gives human nature its definition – not some characteristic or other which sets human beings apart from other living things.’ This becomes especially important when Moltmann discusses the effect of sin upon humans as bearers of the divine image. Moltmann poses the question of whether humanity has lost the imago Dei completely, exemplified in Romans 3:23, or whether the image has only been ‘perverted’ as intimated in Romans 1:23. Moltmann states: ‘This is the dilemma: that according to the biblical traditions we have to talk about human beings as God’s image and as sinners at the same time.’10 Moltmann eschews options that seek either to make a division between the ontological and moral quality of humanity as image bearers or view the divine image as beginning solely with the event of justification.11 Aside from these, Moltmann proffers a third option based upon his initial presupposition that the content of the imago Dei is to be located more in God than in humanity. Thus, in relation to the problem of sin and the divine image, Moltmann argues that: The imago Dei is neither the indestructible substance of the human being, nor can it be destroyed by human sin. We have defined it as God’s relationship to human beings. God puts himself in a particular relationship to the human being – the relationship in which that human being is his image. Human sin may certainly pervert human beings’ relationship to God, but not God’s relationship to human beings. That relationship was resolved upon by God, and was created by him, and can therefore never be abrogated or withdrawn except by God himself.12

From this assertion, Moltmann differentiates between the subjective and objective effects of sin on humanity as bearers of the divine image. Subjectively, the human being is ‘wholly and entirely a sinner and godless’. Objectively, however, ‘he remains this designation as long as God adheres to it and remains faithful to him’.13 Therefore, according to Moltmann, because of God’s faithfulness to humanity, 

Moltmann, GC, p. 220. Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 229. 11 Ibid., pp. 230–31. 12 Ibid., pp. 232–3. 13 Ibid., p. 233. Von Horst Seebass has noted similar trends in the Old Testament, with special reference to God’s faithfulness to the people of Israel and God’s identity as ‘Israel’s God’ and Israel’s identity as ‘God’s people’. See Von Horst Seebass, ‘Über den Beitrag des Alten Testaments zu einer theologischen Anthropologie’, Kerygma und Dogma, vol. 22, January–March 1976: 47ff. 

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sin cannot remove the divine image from human nature. This is the theological outcome of Moltmann’s assertion that the imago Dei is dependant upon God rather than an inherent human trait per se which may be identified to distinguish human beings from other creatures. This trend continues in Moltmann’s description of the second stage of the eschatological trajectory to be found in human nature: the imago Christi. Moltmann notes the Pauline emphasis on the person of Christ being the true image of God: ‘Christ is the image and glory of the invisible God on earth.’14 Moltmann also notes Paul’s association of Christ as imago Dei with the divine glory, and therefore claims that the divine image is most readily seen in the resurrection of Christ.15 In fellowship with Christ, as those transformed by the Spirit’s efficacious work made available through the work of Christ in the cross and resurrection, Christians are thus conformed to the image of Christ.16 If this is the affirmation of human nature found in Christ, then a theological understanding of human nature is in this way also to be found within the redemptive history created by the divine promise. As such, human nature may then be argued to have an ineluctably eschatological quality. From within this broader context, Moltmann’s following statement may now be understood: ‘The restoration or new creation of the likeness to God comes about in the fellowship of believers with Christ: since he is the messianic imago Dei, believers become imago Christi, and through this enter upon the path which will make them gloria Dei on earth.’17 This stage of humanity becoming the imago Christi is paramount for an ethics of hope. This is so because it is precisely at this Christocentrically focused point within eschatological history that the Zwischenraum of tension, characteristic of a moral theology of hope, is understood to constitute the sphere of Christian moral action. It is from this point in the eschatological trajectory of human nature that Moltmann’s synopsis of humanity within eschatological history may be understood. His thesis is that ‘For Christians … this [transcendent element of hope] is both a promise and a demand, a present grace and a future still to be attained. Christians therefore live in a tension between faith and hope.’18 Chapman views this relationship between Moltmann’s understanding of human nature and eschatological history to be decisive. Regarding Moltmann’s interpretation of the divine image, Chapman says in ways reminiscent of the above quotation: ‘[O]ur present likeness to God is undefinable, being both indicative and imperative, both gift and task. That is, we are still in the process of becoming human.’19

14

Moltmann, GC, p. 225. See Col. 1:15. Moltmann, GC, p. 225. See 2 Cor. 4:4. 16 Rom. 8:29. 17 Moltmann, GC, p. 226. 18 Moltmann, Man, p. 58. Moltmann also refers to human existence as ‘gift and task simultaneously’. See Moltmann, On Human Dignity, p. 10. 19 Chapman, ‘On Being Human’, p. 76. 15

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This eschatological understanding of human nature as imago Christi is inextricably connected with the divine promise, which creates a new history and thereby tension with the unfulfilled present. This likewise provides a moral depth to Moltmann’s understanding of human nature: For the humanism of the ancient and of the modern world, man is what he makes of himself …. In the Christian faith man discovers his humanity in the fact that in spite of his inhumanity he has already been loved by God, and in spite of his faults has already been called to the likeness of God, and in spite of all the kingdoms of the world, has been taken into the fellowship of the Son of Man.20

The distinction Moltmann is making here between ‘humanity’ and ‘inhumanity’ is a moral one. Moltmann argues that the less structural elements in Church and society bear the lived characteristics of the Kingdom of God, the less ‘human’ and the more ‘bestial’ they become. If humanity bears the divine image, with this unmistakably Christocentric nature, then to become less of the imago Christi is to become less human, in the sense that human beings are intended to bear the likeness of Christ. Humanity is enabled to bear the imago Christi because it is a work of the divine beneficence and has its soteriological basis in God’s election to justification and its moral correlate in sanctification. To grasp Moltmann’s intricate connections between the imago Christi, justification and sanctification, it is helpful to quote him at length: The restoration or new creation of the likeness to God comes about in the fellowship of believers with Christ: since he is the messianic imago Dei, believers become imago Christi, and through this enter upon the path which will make them gloria Dei …. Justification is therefore the beginning of glorification here and now, in the present; glorification is the future completion of justification. Both come about through God’s free gracious election …. So likeness to God is both gift and charge, indicative and imperative. It is charge and hope, imperative and promise. Sanctification has justification as its presupposition, and glorification as its hope and its future. In the messianic light of the gospel, the human being’s likeness to God appears as a historical process with an eschatological termination; it is not a static condition. Being means becoming in this human process.21

This ‘historical process’ envisioned by Moltmann is that of the redemptive history freely given by God through Christ and enacted in the life of the believer by the Spirit. The human being as imago Christi bears this divine likeness as ‘gift and charge, indicative and imperative’. That is to say, the sphere of moral action where humanity, as the imago Christi, fulfils its nature as the divine image is only within Moltmann, Man, p. 114. Moltmann, GC, pp. 226–7.

20 21

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the eschatological sphere created by the free work of God and indwelling of the Spirit. It is as such wholly gift and grace. Likewise, it is the sphere where human beings exist in ways commensurate with the lived characteristics of the Kingdom of God in faithfulness to the divine promise. In this sense, it is task. Mark C. Mattes overlooks the dialectical function present in this aspect of Moltmann’s theology when he draws conclusions regarding Moltmann’s anthropology. He states: Moltmann’s anthropology, in which the human is always an agent and not properly a recipient coram deo, his tendency to see the kingdom as primarily task and not gift, the church as solely a focus for ethics, his quest for a pure society, and his failure to distinguish law and gospel are all grave matters of concern with respect to the constructive adequacy of his theology for justification.22

From the foregoing analysis of Moltmann’s view of human nature, it appears that Mattes’s claim that Moltmann leaves no place for the sovereignty of God’s grace and the inescapable role humanity has as recipient of this grace in the social sphere (rather than producer of this grace) is one-sided. In the entire schema of promise that Moltmann articulates, promise is anterior to demand and gift is prior to task. In each case, it is the former which is brought about by the beneficent grace of God through Christ and enabled by the Spirit, that then issue a call on the moral and doxological23 life of the believer. It is in light of the free, loving grace of God in the gospel that Paul continues to say: ‘Therefore I urge you, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living and holy sacrifice, acceptable to God, which is your spiritual service of worship.’24 When viewed biblically, moral action brought about by God’s free action in Christ issues forth in a ‘therefore’ for human life and action. The final stage, which has already been intimated above, in Moltmann’s understanding of human nature is the gloria Dei. For Moltmann, as human beings become what God wills them to be in Christ, they are eschatologically transfigured by God’s glory. However, they also reflect God to the created order: ‘They themselves are God’s glory in the world …. In glorifying God, the creatures created to be the image of God themselves arrive at the fulfilment of what they are intended to be.’25 Moltmann sees this glorification and transfiguration foremost in the eschatological resurrection of the dead. He argues that the resurrection bears

22 Mark C. Mattes, The Role of Justification in Contemporary Theology, Lutheran Quarterly Books (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), p. 113. 23 Mattes also neglects the increasing emphasis on doxology in Moltmann’s later works. 24 Rom. 12:1. 25 Moltmann, GC, p. 228.

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witness to the unity of the human being rather than a dichotomous duality of soul and body, with the soul being pre-eminent. Moltmann states: The immortality of the soul is an opinion – the resurrection of the dead is a hope. The first is a trust in something immortal in the human being, the second is a trust in the God who calls into being the things that are not, and makes the dead live …. Hope for ‘the resurrection of the body’ permits no disdain and debasement of bodily life and sensory experiences, it affirms them profoundly ….26

The source of this eschatological affirmation of human nature as embodied is again found in the person of Christ. Regarding the resurrection to be found in the gloria Dei, Moltmann states: ‘Christ’s resurrection is therefore not a historical event; it is an eschatological happening … and took place “once for all” (Rom. 10:9) …. If Christ has been raised from the dead, then he takes on proleptic and representative significance for all the dead.’27 Paul connects the glorification of resurrection with the believer’s citizenship in heaven, in contradistinction to Roman citizenship, and the transformation of the believer’s body to be like in form with Christ’s body of glory.28 If the future resurrection exemplifies Christian ‘citizenship’ to belong in the Kingdom of God, then claims to loyalty and service constitutive of earthly geo-political citizenships may potentially contravene this. It may be noted that with the Christological locus of Moltmann’s eschatological trajectory for human nature – as imago Dei, imago Christi, and gloria Dei – he maintains qualities of the human being that are illustrative of human nature as the divine image. For example, Moltmann offers an understanding of humanity as having a mediatorial and priestly role in creation. Of human beings, Moltmann says: They are priestly by nature, and stand before God on behalf of the earth, and before the earth on behalf of God. As God’s earthly image, they reflect the Creator’s glory. They are not merely commissioned by God; they are also the mode of his appearance in his creation. The messianic calling of human beings to be ‘conformed’ – like in form – to Jesus the Messiah brings them into the eschatological history of the new creation: from calling to justification, from justification to sanctification, from sanctification to glorification.29

26

Moltmann, CoG, pp. 65–6. Ibid., p. 69. 28 Phil. 3:20–21. See Moltmann, CoG, p. 70. It is important to note that Roman citizenship was especially important to the inhabitants of Philippi, whereas Paul maintains the superiority of citizenship in heaven. On the history and importance of Roman citizenship in Philippi, see Gordon D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 25–6, 161–3, 378–81. 29 Moltmann, GC, p. 228. 27

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Even here Moltmann understands this priestly role of the human only in Christological perspective. He fails to distinguish, however, between the ways in which Christ is the one true image of the invisible God and eschatological high priest30 and the manner in which humanity reflects and maintains such roles in the creaturely order. For example, it may be queried in what specific manner humans operate as priests in creation in representing creatures to God and God to the wider realm of creatures. In what way or with what attributes is God reflected to creation and the wider sphere of creation reflected before God? Moreover, how may it be claimed that such mediation is intrinsic to the entire human species if such mediation is a strictly eschatological phenomenon which occurs after one is transformed to the image of Christ? It appears that without such a specific Christological explication of such issues, then theological investigation of human nature remains asking similar questions regarding specific human attributes, albeit in a more Christological context.31 This resultant distancing of anthropological questions from their Christological focal point may be seen in Moltmann’s peculiar association of the divine image with the human face. Moltmann argues that: According to the biblical traditions, there is apparently one point at which God’s relationship to human beings is manifested and can be recognized: the human face. It is the human face which becomes the mirror of God: ‘But now we all with unveiled face reflect the glory of the Lord’ (2 Cor. 3:18) …. ‘The face of God’ is a commonly used symbol for God’s turning to men and women in kindness, for his attentive mindfulness and his purposefully directed presence … the whole person is known first of all in his committed attention, and his committed attention first of all in his open eyes and his attentive face. The play of emotions is reflected in the face, and a person’s ‘heart’ is best expressed in his face; and the same is true of the glory of God, when it is perceived in the face of Christ and when it is reflected a thousandfold in the faces of the men and women who behold and recognize it.32

Moltmann’s reasoning for such a close association of the divine image with the human face appears to be derived from eschatological assertions regarding the nature of the Christological relationship with redeemed humanity. Moltmann briefly quotes from various biblical passages commenting on an eschatological seeing as being ‘face to face’.33 Moltmann hopes that the accumulated result of 30

Col. 1:15; Heb. 3:1–11, 4:14, 6:19–20. For a more consistently Christological investigation of the divine image where certain ‘protocols’ are developed with inextricable Christological connections, see Ian A. McFarland, The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005). 32 Moltmann, GC, p. 221. 33 In addition to 2 Cor. 3:18, Moltmann cites 2 Cor. 4:6, 1 Cor. 13:12 and Matt. 17:2. See Moltmann, GC, p. 221. 31

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these citations will argue: ‘That is why the human being’s original designation to be God’s image already implies the eschatological promise of perceiving God “face to face”.’34 However, such exegesis of the biblical texts appears dubious upon closer scrutiny. The Pauline passages Moltmann cites are indeed statements of the eschatological communion in which redeemed humanity will partake. However, such statements of being ‘face to face’ with Christ should be construed as claims regarding the nature of eschatological communion, not statements regarding the physiological importance of the human face as the locus of the divine image. These passages cannot be adequately used to construct ‘a physiognomic doctrine of human likeness to God [Gottebenbildlichkeit]’.35 Moreover, despite the Christological location of such assertions, the centrality of the human face in Moltmann’s argument actually functions to distance the divine image from Christ to a specific characteristic of the human. Such a distancing contravenes Moltmann’s foundational claim that the locus of the divine image is to be found in Jesus Christ, rather than any singular characteristic or set of traits intrinsic to human existence. In addition to the eschatological trajectory of human nature described above (imago Dei – imago Christi – gloria Dei), Moltmann goes further in his understanding of human nature in describing it as also a type of imago Trinitatis.36 This is particularly important for an ethical theology of hope because in this Moltmann desires to emphasize the social reality of human being. Moltmann affirms that the human being is the divine image in the entirety of its existence – both in its bodily and spiritual nature together.37 Viewing humanity in the entirety of its existence brings Moltmann to consider the pivotal role human sociality has in understanding human nature. For this, Moltmann returns to Trinitarian analogies drawn from his perichoretic understanding of God: If the whole human being is designated the image of God, then true human community – the community of the sexes and the community of the generations – has the same designation. In their various communities, human beings are to be understood, not merely as the image of God’s rule over creation, but also as the image of his inward nature …. It is the relations in the Trinity which are the levels represented on earth through the imago Trinitatis, not the levels of the trinitarian constitution. Just as the three Persons of the Trinity are ‘one’ in a wholly unique way, so, similarly, human beings are imago Trinitatis in their personal fellowship with one another.38

34

Ibid., p. 222. Ibid. 36 For a succinct summary, see McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, pp. 113–19. 37 Moltmann, GC, pp. 239–40. 38 Ibid., p. 241. 35

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This Trinitarian analogy to human nature is similar to the clerical and political analogies Moltmann made in his mature doctrine of the Trinity.39 However, the same critical questions that were posed when assessing Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought are also relevant here. Is correspondence the most effective means of construing the role of the Trinity in human interpersonal engagements? In what sense is it possible for human interaction to be of the sort that it may be compared to the inner-Trinitarian relations? How is the uniqueness of the inner-Trinitarian relations to be maintained in its transcendence over the types of creaturely relations witnessed in humanity? In the above quotation it is important to note that Moltmann is not necessarily making an ontological claim regarding human sociality. This may be seen in that he dismisses the constitution of the Trinity as the point of connection with the human as imago Trinitatis. Despite this distinction, however, the difficulties mentioned remain. Therefore, it seems advantageous to pursue a line of inquiry in which alternative explications of human sociality are offered to provide greater comprehension of human nature and how this effects human engagement within an eschatological framework of moral hope. Such a line of inquiry may be seen in both the early and later work of Moltmann. Beginning with Moltmann’s early study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,40 human sociality is understood on different grounds than as imago Trinitatis or analogia relationis. In Bonhoeffer’s early work, he speaks of ‘a fundamental synthesis between social and individual being’.41 The ‘synthesis’ of the individual and the social is constitutive to Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the human being. He frames this understanding in terms of the collective and individual person. Bonhoeffer explains this dialectic in the following way: But the question remains whether, besides the single individual person, there might not be an individual collective person in which the individual participates – one that transcends all individuals but would be incomprehensible without the correlate of personal, individual being …. It is not as if many persons, gathered together, now add up to a collective person. Rather, the person comes into being only when embedded in sociality, and the collective person comes into being together with the individual person. It is neither prior to, nor a consequence of, the individual.42 39

Moltmann, TKG, pp. 191–202. See Jürgen Moltmann, ‘The Lordship of Christ and Human Society’, in Jürgen Moltmann and Jürgen Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, trans. Reginald H. Fuller and Ilse Fuller, ed. Reginald H. Fuller (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967). 41 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church (Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works), trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), p. 75. See also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology, trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), pp. 120–21. 42 Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, pp. 77, 78. Bonhoeffer goes on to state: ‘The human being, by virtue of being an individual, is also the human race’; ibid., p. 115. 40

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For Bonhoeffer, this construal of the human being has direct ethical implications. Regarding the unity of the individual and collective person, he states: ‘Ethical community can only be built upon such integrated people.’43 Moltmann takes this insight from Bonhoeffer and notes that for Bonhoeffer, such a view of human sociality occurs pre-eminently in the Church and therefore requires the centrality of Christ’s gracious action to fulfil the possibility of such an ethical community. Speaking of Bonhoeffer’s work in Sanctorum Communio, Moltmann states: ‘The principle of deputyship, or vicarious action, not only unites the new humanity with Christ but also knits its members together in a new community.’44 Such a community is brought together in Christ so that human being is inextricably connected and reciprocally constituted by human sociality. Despite Bonhoeffer’s use of the term analogia relationis, Moltmann notes: ‘He is obviously not thinking of the resemblance between man and his fellows and between the persons of the Trinity. His whole idea of analogy is based on the real presence of God in Christ, on the “entering of God” into the created order.’45 The result of this first alternate line of inquiry contra Moltmann’s description of humanity as imago Trinitatis is similar to the critique explored earlier regarding Moltmann’s Trinitarian thought. It would seem that communion with the Triune God through Christ’s salvific work and the Spirit’s efficacious presence in history provides a more theologically comprehensive description of humanity within a moral theology of hope. In addition, it also provides a more consistent account of the biblical witness to the work of Christ and the economy of salvation than attempting to merely establish human analogues to the inner divine reality. It also follows Moltmann’s initial criteria that the divine image in humans needs to be established on the one true image of the invisible God: Jesus Christ. Such a rendering of human sociality in a theological understanding of human nature also has important results for an eschatological ethic. As Moltmann says in his study of Bonhoeffer: ‘The crucial

43

Ibid., p. 121. Moltmann, ‘The Lordship of Christ and Human Society’, p. 45. Bonhoeffer states: ‘A Christian comes into being and exists only in Christ’s church-community and is dependent on it, which means on the other human being. One person bears the other in active love, intercession, and forgiveness of sins, acting completely vicariously. This is possible only in the church-community of Christ, and that itself rests, as a whole, on the principle of vicarious representation, i.e., on the love of God’; Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, p. 191. 45 Moltmann, ‘The Lordship of Christ and Human Society’, p. 55. This certainly coincides with Bonhoeffer’s lectures on Genesis, where the analogia relationis is rooted in the associations established by God between fellow creatures and Creator–creature relationships. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3 (Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works), trans. Douglas Stephen Bax (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), pp. 64–6. 44

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issue in social ethics is not the sociology of the church itself but the application of the resultant theological ontology to phenomena of secular institutions.’46 The second line of inquiry, now from Moltmann’s later work, follows the Christological lead established above as an alternative to Moltmann’s imago Trinitatis. In Chapter 2, we explored in some detail how Moltmann understands the person and work of Jesus Christ within the context of his social relationships with those around him. Of special interest was the Messianic identity of Christ as it particularly relates to the presence of God’s Kingdom among the poor, sinners and rejected. Moltmann’s exploration of the gospels in this regard did not isolate his Christology from other aspects of his Trinitarian thought. Rather, the history of the Son in the person of Jesus was identified precisely by his relationship with the Father. Moreover, Moltmann engaged in a pneumatological Christology where the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit in the life and vocation of Christ was seen as essential for a proper understanding of his role as the Messiah. These arguments were then focused in ecclesial and anthropological perspective by exploring the link between the Spirit’s work in Christology and the Spirit’s work in history, the world and human praxis. In all these, it is communion with the Triune God extending from the divine, beneficent love that forms the basis of this moral understanding of the Christian life in eschatological perspective. As such, the eschatological trajectory sketched above of human nature becoming imago Dei, imago Christi and gloria Dei may be seen to cohere with the doctrinal arguments made earlier. Developing and maintaining the soteriological import of such an eschatologically informed Christology and pneumatology – which Moltmann emphasizes in his theology with a focus on the divine economy – retains this link.47 In short, an eschatological theology of moral hope begins with the utter gratuity of God’s grace in the promissory history of salvation. Because of the redemptive work of Christ and the efficacious work of the Spirit, humans may enter into communion with God and live within a particular history and space (a Zwischenraum) as the final consummation of the Kingdom is awaited. An exploration into the moral implications of the eschatological hope to be found in Christ does not cease with a description of human nature. It remains incomplete unless the insights gathered from such a theological exploration of humanity are brought to bear on what may be said regarding human worth and, subsequently, human action. Therefore, the discussion will now proceed to an examination of Moltmann’s understanding of human worth, particularly as it is manifested in his affirmations of human dignity and human rights.

46

Moltmann, ‘The Lordship of Christ and Human Society’, p. 55. The soteriological emphasis of Moltmann’s theology has also been recently noted in McDougall, The Pilgrimage of Love, pp. 13–16. 47

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Dignity and Rights The claim that human beings have equal and intrinsic worth is difficult to maintain as a universal presupposition apart from God’s revelation as creator and redeemer of the world.48 Moltmann does not dispute this notion per se, but rather locates human worth in their identity as creatures loved by God. As is the case for Moltmann’s understanding of human nature, this argument for human worth is located Christologically. Speaking of the whole of humanity, Moltmann writes: If they are all sinners, whether Jews or Gentiles, and fall short of the glory of God, a new hope of righteousness is given them all by the Christ-event: the right to experience the love of God …. What this means for the practical action of Christians in the legal ordering of their society is that they should no longer regard the law under the aspect of a religious law for the whole world, but under the aspect of love. Love, translated into the language of law, means the rights of one’s neighbour and the acknowledgement of the other man.49

It may be seen here that Moltmann maintains a dialectical understanding of human worth. This understanding is to be located in the interplay between the two poles of dignity and rights. For Moltmann, ‘Human rights are plural, but human dignity exists only in the singular.’50 As such, dignity is understood to be anterior to, and therefore also the theological basis for human rights.51 Moltmann describes dignity in potentially confusing terms. He states: ‘Human dignity lies in the fact that each particular human being and all human beings are, in common, human.’52 This tautology would appear to be nonsensical if considered in isolation. However, with the broader theological understanding regarding the nature of human being explicated above (which Moltmann published five years after the original publication of the cited essay), clarity may be given to Moltmann’s concept of dignity. To be human is inextricably to be a creature of God.53 Beyond this, to be human is to be made in the divine image and to have an eschatological trajectory to one’s life by virtue of Christ’s work in cross and resurrection. As such, to be human (as argued above) is not based on a specific quality, which may be said to differentiate humanity from the rest of creation, but rather, based on the faithfulness and nature of God’s relationship lovingly established in Christ. 48

This can be seen in modern existentialists such as Nietzsche, Sartre and Camus. Moltmann, Man, p. 77. 50 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, p. 9. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 For example, regarding the anthropology found in Psalm 8, James L. Mays states: ‘The assumption in the language [of Psalm 8] is that the riddle of human identity is bound up somehow with its being remembered and visited by God’; James L. Mays, ‘What is a Human Being? Reflections on Psalm 8’, Theology Today, vol. 50, no. 4, 1994: 515. 49

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The establishment of human nature, and thereby dignity, in God’s claim on humanity means, for Moltmann, that human existence ‘is gift and task simultaneously’.54 This dual notion of human existence being both gift and task is commensurate with the eschatological theology of promise explored in this work. Through the gracious work of God in history via the divine promise, the newly created history issuing forth from the promise is entirely beneficent gift. However, as this entails the creation of a Zwischenraum, tension is produced with those lived characteristics incommensurate with the material content of the divine promise for the Kingdom of God. Therefore, the task of Christian moral existence is to conduct oneself in ways which adhere to the lived characteristics of the content of the promise. This is accomplished by the pneumatic efficacy of the Spirit in history, thereby returning the present theological reflection back to grace. Thus, Moltmann can affirm: ‘For Christians … this “infinite” is both a promise and a demand, a present grace and a future still to be attained.’55 The basis of human dignity on God’s prior claim, thus entailing human existence to be both gift and task, is analogous to the manner Moltmann conceives of the relationship between human dignity and human rights. God bestows humans with dignity by virtue of his role as loving creator who graciously establishes communion with the creature. Human rights are therefore the necessary task of acknowledging God’s prior claim and declaration of human dignity and engaging in faithful response to that divine claim. Therefore, rights actually receive theological warrant due to their origin in God’s prior claim on human beings.56 For an eschatological theology of moral hope, God’s claim on humanity is pre-eminently manifested in God’s promissory history described in scripture. Specifically, human rights (with their antecedent development from human dignity) are understood in light of the promise for the Kingdom of God made in the cross-resurrection of Christ.57 Due to their origin in God’s claim illustrated in the promissory history revealed in Christ, rights are not understood to be autonomous from such theological reasoning and therefore may not take any form a given society or structural organization deems fit at a specific time. On the contrary, rights must necessarily adhere to the material content of God’s Kingdom precisely because a theological explication of rights makes sense only as a result of God’s prior gracious work. Therefore, any subsequent terms used to interpret a notion of ‘rights’ (for example, justice) may not receive its content independent of God’s eschatological work for the Kingdom. A term such as ‘justice’ is thereby redefined as derivative of God’s promise in the cross-resurrection of Christ and the eschatological existence of Christians in the Zwischenraum created by God. As derivative, it may aptly be employed to describe the type of action necessary Moltmann, On Human Dignity, p. 10. Moltmann, Man, p. 58. 56 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, pp. 21–3. 57 See Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, p. 154. 54 55

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to ensure faithful response to God’s claim, which bestows dignity upon humanity and therefore rights. Such a theological understanding of rights and, subsequently, justice could respond to theological critiques of such notions as made by Stanley Hauerwas. Hauerwas is concerned that much recent theological discussion surrounding justice attempts to ground rights not in God’s claim on humanity, but rather because the poor and oppressed peoples of the earth ‘have claims against us’.58 To illustrate, Hauerwas addresses the way in which poverty and justice is used without being necessarily informed by the Christian gospel. He states: One of the things that bothers me about such discourse is the designation ‘us,’ meaning Christians, and ‘them,’ meaning the poor. Such language inherently presupposes that Christians have no convictions that might not make them poor. As a result we privilege our place as rich Christians who can justify our being rich because we are concerned about justice.59

The central feature of Hauerwas’s critique of rights and justice is that the very framework and thus material content of such notions stem not from biblical witness, but rather from modern liberal society. Contrary to this, it has been argued that within an eschatological theology of moral hope defined by the divine economy testified to in scripture and God’s historic, promissory acts, such language of rights and justice is indeed warranted. Provided the necessary strictures are in place to ensure notions of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ do not stray from the material content of the Kingdom of God found in the biblical witness to the divine promise, the language of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ may be usefully employed to guide Christian moral action. It is precisely at this point where the difficulty of understanding human action becomes particularly acute. To this point in the study, the exploration has largely consisted of an investigation into Moltmann’s eschatological theology and pursues how this may be critically employed for a moral theology of hope – that is, to explain Christian moral action from the standpoint of Christian eschatology as shown in the biblical witness to God’s promises. As such, the question of how one is to understand the precise nature of human action has been put in abeyance. Human action, and therefore Christian moral action, within the framework of God’s redemptive work in Christ will now be explored.

58 Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom? How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are Bad Ideas (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1991), p. 45. 59 Ibid., pp. 46–7.

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Moral Action The relationship between eschatology and moral actions, particularly in deciphering the means to relate the emphasis of the primary divine act in promise and the secondary human act in response, is a complex issue.60 Throughout the current exploration of Moltmann’s eschatological thought, the emphasis has been placed on God’s gracious initiative in the act of creating a new history through the divine promise found in Christ. This creative act of divine promise was described by Moltmann as a ‘between-space’ whose lived characteristics are commensurate with the Kingdom of God as revealed in the life, vocation and mission of Christ. The historical efficacy of the Holy Spirit enables those who are in Christ to adhere to the lived characteristics of God’s Kingdom in its moral dimensions. To adequately delineate the precise manner in which this moral action may be said to be human action requires further explication. This will be achieved by investigating what is the precise nature of human action and what particular type of action is to be construed from an eschatological theology of moral hope derived from Moltmann’s thought. An eschatological account of hope and its moral import will therefore bring into its purview the entirety of the foregoing discussion of both the doctrinal materials and praxiological considerations engaged in thus far and bring it to bear in an account of human moral action. As Moltmann writes: ‘This ethics, then, is Christologically founded, eschatologically oriented, and pneumatologically implemented.’61 The nature of human action within an eschatological theology of hope such as the one being developed here cannot be construed in terms of autonomous human will or engagement with surroundings. Rather, human action is always considered derivative. Eschatology, while finding its content in divine promise and therefore oriented toward the future, begins with the specific reality in history (promise) and ‘announces the future of that reality’.62 The definitive reality, for Moltmann, is the cross-resurrection of Christ. Therefore, Christ determines the form and content of eschatological hope. The future promised in Christ likewise receives its material content from the person of Christ. This content is given specificity through the biblical notion of the Kingdom of God. The material content of this Kingdom, due to its future character as it awaits its sure consummation, is therefore in tension with those aspects of the present which do not adhere to its lived characteristics. This prior work of God in redemptive history is divine action anterior to any human action conducted within a moral theology of hope. God’s creative action in the promise is found in Christ and creates a Zwischenraum as a portent of the future fulfilment of the Kingdom. As such, it may be inhabited and partaken in by 60 Also noted in Hans G. Ulrich, Eschatologie und Ethik: Die theologische Theorie der Ethik in ihrer Beziehung auf die Rede von Gott seit Friedrich Schleirmacher (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1988), pp. 37–44. 61 Moltmann, On Human Dignity, p. 109. 62 Moltmann, TH, p. 17. Also Moltmann, In the End – the Beginning, p. 88.

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humanity because of the historical efficacy of the Holy Spirit. It was noted earlier in this study during the discussion on pneumatology that Moltmann conceives of a genuine work of the Spirit both within the Church and within society. In the Church’s witness, the Spirit ‘identifies himself with the apostolic word and joins the human word of his witnesses with the eschatological word’.63 Because, for Moltmann, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of life, the pneumatic efficacy it gives to the present is in tension with those structures perpetuating the harming of life. With this, the tension created by the divine promise is also seen as tension created by the work of the divine Spirit. Moltmann writes: ‘Life in God’s Spirit is life against death …. There is no genuine affirmation of life in this world without the struggle against life’s negations.’64 Thus, the nature of human moral action is that it is always antecedently made possible by divine action. This divine action is characterized by grace and enables human response by the Holy Spirit. The human response enabled by the Spirit, however, may take different forms. This is manifested in the tension created between the Zwischenraum (where the lived characteristics of the Kingdom are adhered to) and in those moral aspects in the present which are unfulfilled and seek to maintain a sinful status quo. This may be supported biblically by examining Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. Paul, speaking of the gospel which proclaims the cross of Christ, writes: For the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God … we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.65

The one event of proclamation elicits a twofold response dependent on the status of reception to the gospel message. Whereas for those who refuse the status of the message of Jesus as gospel it is a stumbling block and foolishness, to those who hear the message and through the efficacious work of the Spirit respond in recognition of the gospel’s message it is the power and wisdom of God. Thus, a tension is created between the two based on a distinction brought about by the gospel itself. This tension is then manifested in moral action thus differentiating the Spirit’s work in the Zwischenraum and work outside it. The contextual nature of human moral action within eschatological perspective (as dependent upon the prior, gracious work of God) does not, for that reason, make such an action any less authentically human. This may be understood more clearly in differentiating 63

Moltmann, CPS, p. 123. Moltmann, SL, pp. 97–8. 65 1 Cor. 1:18, 23–4. 64

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divine and human action as redemptive and redeemed action, respectively. God’s promissory action in Christ’s cross-resurrection, and its historical efficacy in the Spirit for a qualitatively new future, is redemptive by sanctifying human moral action and enabling human action to be commensurate with the Kingdom. Human moral action within this eschatological perspective is genuinely human action, but its characterization in the passive as ‘redeemed’ highlights its derivative nature. From this brief exposition of the nature of human action, explicating the type of moral action within an eschatological understanding of Christian hope may now be explored more fully. Indeed, much of this work has already been accomplished in explicating Moltmann’s messianic understanding of the Kingdom in Chapter 2.66 It was seen there that the material content of the Kingdom in its ethical dimensions were inextricably connected with the person and vocation of Jesus Christ.67 This was witnessed to primarily in the form of Christ’s social relations with those who were sick, poor, outcast, possessed and oppressed. The ministry of the Son exonerated those deemed to be guilty, shared table fellowship with sinners, fed the poor and healed the sick. Such motifs are no less relevant in the contemporary life of the Church, but discernment is needed. To recall from Chapter 1 of this study, Moltmann notes two types of moral situations in the world. He states: There are situations which must be called messianic – situations where the world is actively changed so that it may be brought to manifest its character as God’s world, in correspondences to God’s kingdom and his righteousness and justice. But there are also what we have to call apocalyptic situations of passive resistance to powers and situations opposed to God, in which all that remains is suffering and martyrdom.68

However, discernment between ‘messianic’ and ‘apocalyptic’ situations is not as consistently transparent as Moltmann at times seems to indicate. Many times structural organizations, state authorities and even Church leaders use or co-opt biblical and theological images for purposes contrary to the lived characteristics of God’s Kingdom revealed in Christ.69 While such a recognition of ‘messianic’ and ‘apocalyptic’ situations, as Moltmann describes them, are useful in guiding an eschatological ethic, deciphering which category any given structural implementation exemplifies can be a difficult task. Eschatological discernment occurs primarily in two inter-related contexts: communal prayer and examination of the scriptures. It has been argued that 66

See Moltmann, WJC, pp. 94–150. Moltmann, CG, p. 121. 68 Moltmann, ET, p. 101. 69 On state use of such theological allusions, see David Nicholls, Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Routledge, 1989). See also Honecker, ‘Eschatologie und Zivilreligion’, pp. 40–55. 67

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Moltmann’s theology has sought to rediscover the biblical description of God’s eschatological work for the Kingdom. Moltmann has stated that the Bible is the ‘text’ of his theology of hope.70 Likewise, ongoing communal reflection on the scriptures, which occurs by hearing the biblical witness to God’s work in Christ, will shape the type of human action conducted within the context of eschatological hope. This was particularly seen in Moltmann’s Christological description of God’s Kingdom as manifested in the life and vocation of Jesus Christ within his social relationships.71 Likewise, within an eschatological theology of moral hope, clear and astute examination of the scriptures is necessary to discern proper Christian action in a given context and era. In this, the biblical witness remains paramount and superior to human decision-making, while within new ethical situations the scriptures may be explored and returned to time and again for fresh insight. Discerning prayer is participated in and allows the Spirit to enable faithful interpretation of the biblical text and enablement to faithful praxis. Moltmann notes three stances in prayer: the prostration, which he associates with Islam, the bowing of the knee alongside folding of hands and closed eyes, and finally, standing upright with eyes opened and hands raised.72 Moltmann associates the two former options with a humiliating subservience characteristic of the homo incurvatus in se.73 Moltmann’s preference for the final stance in prayer stems from his interpretation of the posture as representative of ‘incomparable freedom before God, with God, and above all in God’.74 What Moltmann does not account for, however, is the role of Churchly discernment which occurs in prayer. In discerning, humility is entailed for the creature to recognize and properly respond to God’s revelation in the scriptures. What Moltmann does not appear to differentiate is that humility in prayer does not entail a prayer which is humiliating, and thereby degrading to the creature. The Spirit’s role in prayer is similar to the role described previously. The Spirit indwells creation and is at work enabling creatures to adhere to the lived characteristics commensurate within an ethics of hope for the Kingdom of God.

Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, pp. 44–6. Moltmann states: ‘I … have cast back historically and exegetically to the histories of the biblical tradition, in order with their help to arrive at new interpretations of Christ which will be relevant for the present day’; Moltmann, WJC, p. xv. 72 Moltmann, The Source of Life, pp. 126–31. 73 Ibid., p. 128. 74 Ibid., p. 130. Even when Moltmann describes the three stances as possible stages in a trajectory experienced within prayer, his clear preference for the final stage as superior is evident. 70 71

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Conclusion The burden of this chapter was to clearly explicate the way in which an eschatological moral theology in dialogue with Moltmann may conceive of human nature and moral action within an ethic of hope. Drawing from the doctrinal explorations conducted in Part I of this study, and developing from the eschatological notions of time and space in moral perspective from the previous chapter, human being was primarily understood to be contextual and derivative in nature. That is to say, when biblically portrayed as the divine image, human nature is not to be conceived as such on the basis of a specified set of traits or characteristics intrinsic to the human which may distinguish it from other creaturely life. Rather, it was argued that such a biblical understanding of human nature is more adequately located in the person of Christ as the true imago Dei. This context was the eschatological work of God’s redemptive history, given in God’s gratuity, thus setting humanity on an eschatological trajectory as the imago Christi and gloria Dei. Theologically arguing for human nature to be utterly dependent on God’s faithfulness to humanity thereby allowed for the argument to be made that human worth, seen particularly in dignity and rights, is likewise grounded in God’s gracious love, and on this basis may be considered ‘intrinsic’ to humanity. Establishing human dignity, and therefore rights, in God’s prior claim upon humanity thus illustrated human existence to be both gift and task. As such, this required an understanding of moral action to maintain a particularity commensurate with God’s prior claim in the promise for the Kingdom. This moral action was described as God’s antecedent redemptive action, while simultaneously being humanity’s redeemed action. Such moral action, however, requires discernment through prayer and examination of the scriptures. This study will therefore engage in an illustrative example of such discernment to investigate the praxiological potential of an eschatological theology of moral hope from Jürgen Moltmann’s thought. Therefore, the final chapter of this work will examine the potential an ethic of hope has to inform ecclesial participation within a global, political economy.

Chapter 7

Hope for the Economy Introduction The work conducted throughout the foregoing pages has sought to explore, assess and expand upon Jürgen Moltmann’s eschatological theology with the purpose of offering a theological description of the sphere of Christian moral action. In this regard, the work has been more a theological exploration of what makes ethics possible than a piece of ethical research on any one specific moral quandary. Engaging in this sort of doctrinal description is essential to maintain an account of moral action which is properly Christian – that is, constituted and governed by the gospel’s proclamation of God’s work in Jesus Christ. Beginning with the eschatological parameters established in Moltmann’s early account of promise and hope, it was argued that the divine promise found in the cross-resurrection of Christ created history. More specifically in regard to ethics, it created a Zwischenraum of tension within history where the liberating and life-giving movement of God’s work in Christ is made efficacious through the Spirit. The ethical result is that the lived characteristics of the kingdom may be embodied through moral action both within the Church and without. With this analysis, each of the major doctrinal tenets of the Christian faith (Christology, Trinity, pneumatology, eschatology, creation and anthropology) was considered in some depth as Moltmann interacts with them. The cumulative result is a theological account of what makes ethics possible within the eschatological framework described above. However, to cease the discussion at this point is to stop precisely where Christian ethics should not: the level of abstraction. The theme of economics as monetary exchange has already been alluded to previously in this work. This chapter will now expand upon this theme in bringing to bear all of the foregoing theological considerations upon a discussion of global poverty, economics and Christian moral action. The issue of global economics and extreme poverty are complex and require the expertise of micro- and macro-economics, political science, colonial and post-colonial history and even issues surrounding medicine and health education. Once again, the difficulty surrounding an ethics of hope highlighted by Müller-Fahrenholz regarding the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of moral inquiry is made acute. This does not mean, however, that a basic  On the impact of economics on human self-understanding, inter-relationships and ecclesial engagement with the world, see Stephen Winter, ‘Engaging with Globalization: A Matter of Life and Death?’, Political Theology, vol. 3, no. 1, 2001: 32–46.  Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, p. 108.

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understanding of the central issues cannot be achieved with solid theological interaction and pragmatic suggestions rounding out the discussion. With both these statements of qualification and confidence in mind, this study may now conclude with a brief discussion on the contribution an ethics of hope may make to the issue of economics and poverty. Primary Issues Contributing to Poverty The issues surrounding global economics and poverty are not restricted to monetary exchange, interest rates, supply and demand or the subjects normally associated with the work of economists. Rather, the issues are multifaceted, complex and interconnected. Much of the major work being done by economists on issues surrounding global poverty acknowledges this and accounts for it in their descriptions. For example, Jeffrey Sachs develops a seven-pronged ‘differential diagnosis’, while Oxford economist Paul Collier cites four ‘traps’ which economically failing states are prone to fall into. It is outside the scope of this current work to analyse all the varying avenues of research impacting the countries Collier calls ‘the bottom billion’, but some major motifs can be mentioned here. One major factor that influences the ability of a low-income nation to achieve middle-income status is geography. There are three elements to consider when factoring geography into an account of global economics. First, there is the economic disparity between nations in the north-western quadrasphere of the planet and those in the rest of the world. For example, Jeffrey Sachs notes that the average income of Europe in 1820 was approximately 90 per cent of the average income in Africa today. This illustrates the present divergence from those nations who are among the lowest income earners in the world and those who are the wealthiest. It also illustrates that this growth in divergence between the various geographic locales is a fairly recent phenomenon. The centralization of wealth among such a small portion of the global population entails that a person or community’s geographic locale will necessitate correlative outcomes in terms of personal and communal wellbeing. This in turn will affect a person or community’s ability to prosper and to seek healthy, liberated life. Descriptions such as these are common coin in politically motivated writing and often fail to move beyond the rather unhelpful dualism of market capitalism and social Marxism. Also important See Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2005), pp. 82–8. Also Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done about It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 17–75.  Paul Collier names the countries where extreme poverty is present ‘the bottom billion’ because these countries contain a billion members of the world’s population.  Sachs, The End of Poverty, p. 26.  Ibid., pp. 27–8. 

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to the immediate economic enablement of individual countries which experience extreme poverty are the latter two geographical factors: domestic topography and boundaries marking off a landlocked state. Economists have realized that the topographical structure of a nation’s geography will intricately affect that nation’s ability to improve its economic circumstance. For example, if a nation’s exports consist largely of non-technical goods made in small, remote communities, that community’s ability to gain access to broader domestic or foreign markets will be affected. If a community’s main source of income is llama fur and most of these communities are located in the upper Andes, then lack of infrastructure such as roads, transport and accessibility to urban centres will directly affect the ability of that community to gain from their product. In a similar manner, if a country is landlocked without access to coasts and ports, this is will directly affect the nation’s ability to grow economically. The situation is exacerbated when a landlocked nation does not have natural resources and is situated among neighbouring countries with untrained or corrupt governance. This point is so crucial that Collier states: ‘A reasonable case can be made that such places never should have become countries. However, the deed is done: these countries exist and will continue to do so.’ There is a need to overcome these geographical difficulties if nations in extreme poverty are to improve their economic situation. Domestic infrastructure needs to be built with greater access to more isolated areas in order to prosper local industries in addition to greater international relations with neighbouring states to provide access to sea ports and the mutual benefit of shared economies. A second major factor contributing to extreme poverty is violence through conflict. To label conflict and violence as a ‘contributor’ to poverty may be somewhat of a misnomer. The relationship should rather be seen as reciprocal. Collier notes that ‘Civil war is much more likely to break out in low-income countries: halve the starting income of the country and you double the risk of civil war.’ Similarly, Collier goes on to note: ‘Africa does not have more coups because it is Africa; it has more coups because it is poor.’10 Hence, violence and conflict can be seen also as a result of poverty. However, because the relationship is cyclical, it may also be seen as a contributor to poverty to the extent that what positive security and growth a nation has experienced may be easily countered through the outbreak of civil war. It has been repeatedly noted in this study that Moltmann interprets the



Ibid., pp. 82–8. Collier, The Bottom Billion, p. 57. Collier fails to recognize that historically, the boundaries of these countries in Africa (which is Collier’s focus) were drawn by European colonial powers. This makes his following absolving claim far less convincing: ‘Citizens of the rich world are not to blame for most of the problems of the bottom billion; poverty is simply the default option when economies malfunction’; ibid., p. 157.  Ibid., p. 19. 10 Ibid., p. 36. 

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life-giving power of the Holy Spirit to necessitate a stance of Christians which is in contradistinction to violence and death: But anyone who really says ‘yes’ to life says ‘no’ to war. Anyone who really loves life says ‘no’ to poverty. So the people who truly affirm and love life take up the struggle against violence and injustice. They refuse to get used to it. They do not conform. They resist.11

The violence of conflict is not an abstraction about which theologians and ethicists may simply postulate and surmise. Rather, it affects the daily practicalities of human existence and does long-term damage to the opportunity for life and liberty within communities and entire nations. It likewise uniquely affects those who are most vulnerable in any given society. The devastating phenomenon of child soldiers is only one poignant example.12 Economically, violent conflict destroys the structures in place which may offer assistance through governmental action, safety and aid through various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the security of passage and life to the poor who are forced to become refugees. In short: ‘Civil war is development in reverse.’13 Similarly, it is not merely a cliché to state that ‘violence begets violence’. Statistically, in the countries with extreme poverty, ‘about half of all civil wars are postconflict relapses’.14 With this, highincome nations must also recognize the presence of culpability in perpetuating violence and therefore be more active in bringing such conflict to an end. For example, William K. Tabb noted in 2002 that the United States provided weapons and training in eight out of nine then currently warring countries.15 It is certainly possible that such supply and training may have been with the intention of a longterm end of conflict, but given the statistical likelihood of post-conflict situations relapsing into civil war, this appears to be a dubious methodology. Efforts should therefore be placed on reconciliation through non-violent, political modes to bring resolution to conflict. Therefore, if nations with extreme poverty are to overcome the plight their people find themselves in, there must be a cessation of war and violent conflicts. A third issue contributing to poverty is the proliferation of issues pertaining to disease and the medical needs of a given area. Most obvious is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. It is curious that Collier’s analysis, which largely focuses on Africa, does not give any space to this factor and its relation to poverty. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has occupied too little attention in the halls of policymakers or in 11

Moltmann, SL, p. xii. For a gripping first-person account of a child soldier, see Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007). 13 Collier, The Bottom Billion, p. 27. 14 Ibid., p. 34. 15 William K. Tabb, Unequal Partners: A Primer on Globalization (New York: The New York Press, 2002), p. 92. 12

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governmental legislation. Also, what attention has been given has succumbed to ideological motivation rather than a pursuit of the most expedient and effective measures available to aid the present circumstances with long-term, sustainable solutions. The inadequacy of action has been a non-partisan affair. Sachs states: ‘The Clinton administration stood by while the AIDS pandemic soared in Africa, and the Bush administration’s actions have been too little, too late, and too ideological.’16 In addition to HIV/AIDS, health issues such as tuberculosis, malaria and other preventable or treatable diseases affect the economic ability of a community to provide the basics for life in several ways. The deaths caused by such diseases burden the already taxed medical infrastructure in addition to leaving many orphans with lack of facilities and caregivers to provide the fundamental goods necessary for life. This is compounded by the current high cost of adequate medicines in the pharmaceutical industries. For example, while the actual production cost of an anti-retroviral regimen per year is US$500 or less, the United States market prices are approximately US$10,000.17 It is true that as of 2001 high-income nations were cumulatively giving US$10–20 billion a year in aid to fight malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS. However, this averages out to merely US$10 per American tax payer.18 With the health situation of many of the lowestincome nations in such disrepair, it is difficult to envision a community or nation maintaining the diligence of work and physical energies necessary to provide an economically improved communal life through fulfilling and dignified work. The final contributor to poverty to be discussed here is the commodification of human interactions. Tabb notes that ‘the commodification of all social relations’ is one of the pertinent outcomes of the global economy as it is currently structured and counters a global movement towards justice.19 This commodification of social relations has been given a theological description by Douglas Meeks. Meeks sees three phenomena at work in a global market economy. These are scarcity, satiation and security. Scarcity is not so much a lack of resources or available goods, but rather a lack of access to resources or goods which may (or may not) be available.20 Satiation is an over-consumption of resources or goods exemplified in a lack of sharing which occurs because of perceived scarcity. In this way, satiation and scarcity are mutually related. It is scarcity which leads to the competitive principle, but also leads to selfishness. Meeks then observes: ‘The double-jolting experience of scarcity and satiation in our public household has issued in a compulsion to security.’21

16 Jeffrey Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet (New York: Penguin, 2008), p. 271. 17 Sachs, The End of Poverty, p. 206. 18 Tabb, Unequal Partners, p. 117. 19 Ibid., p. 2. 20 Meeks, God the Economist, p. 60. 21 Ibid., p. 18.

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This compulsion to security then manifests itself in further satiation which thereby increases actual scarcity among those who are unable to gain the necessary security. Such conditions create a market environment where all things become commodities. Time, ability, goods, even people and communities, become commodities which may be used to leverage oneself or one’s interests to gain security through satiation. In this, human interaction becomes a market where some are able to secure goods and those that cannot are either dependent on the charity of those who can, or as is more often the case in the global market, go without: ‘The crisis for the Christian church … is that it has become too much absorbed into the market society in whose logic God’s grace and God’s justice cannot appear,’ writes Meeks.22 He continues by saying: ‘The church simply cannot be such a servant of God’s passion for the world if it is determined by market logic.’23 The commodification of relations entails an interpretation of social interactions which is dictated by gain and monetary benefit. An ethic of hope does not begin with the commodification of relationships, but rather begins with a view which interprets the other as a creature eschatologically located within the anthropological trajectory of imago dei – imago Christi – Gloria dei. Outlining an Economics of Hope Any theological account of Christian moral involvement in global economics must engage human frailty and propensities for elevating self-interest as well as providing a robust account of God’s redemptive work in the biblical history of salvation. It has been the burden of this study to critically engage Moltmann’s work in exploring an eschatological framework for theology, which he has spent the majority of his career articulating. This goal has been sought by remaining within the purview of the liberating motifs found in an eschatological understanding of the Kingdom of God. Indeed, Moltmann has described his theology as ‘passion for the Kingdom of God’.24 For Moltmann, eschatology begins with the act of God’s promise witnessed in history and testified to in scripture. The divine promise begins with God’s calling of Abraham, is seen throughout the history of Israel, and reaches its zenith in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The promise, given in history, creates a new history which orients the receiver of the promise towards the future, which is to be qualitatively differentiated from the present. 25 These issues may be clarified by three of the elements Moltmann highlights in divine promise giving. He writes:

22

Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 39. 24 Moltmann, ET, p. xx. 25 Moltmann, TH, pp. 103–4. 23

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The history which is initiated and determined by promise does not consist in cyclic recurrence, but has a definite trend towards the promised and outstanding future …. If the word is a word of promise, then that means that this word has not yet found a reality congruous with it, but that on the contrary it stands in contradiction to the reality open to experience now and heretofore …. The word of promise therefore always creates an interval [Zwischenraum] of tension between the uttering and the redeeming of the promise … the promise is not regarded abstractly apart from the God who promises, but its fulfillment is entrusted directly to God in his freedom and faithfulness ….26

The promise is given with specificity. Both the historical place and time the promise were given, as was the content of the promise. By virtue of this historicity, the promise given by God speaks not of the lived situation as it is now experienced, but rather as it will be. Therefore, the promise ‘has not yet found a reality congruous with it’, as Moltmann says. Because this is not an act of human promising, which may be liable to human duplicity or inability to ensure the fulfilment of what was promised, but rather an act of God, the promise is not mere wish fulfilment, but an act of creation. The promise of God creates history. More specifically, however, the divine promise creates an interval within history. The term Moltmann uses for this ‘interval’ is unique and has not received due attention in the secondary literature, but has occupied a place of primacy throughout this work. Moltmann describes this interval as a Zwischenraum, literally, a ‘between-space’. This Zwischenraum is not vacuous and thus waiting to be given content from human moral action. Rather, it receives its content and lived characteristics from the content of the promise itself, which is ‘entrusted directly to God in his freedom and faithfulness …’.27 This Zwischenraum, whose content is given through the creative act of God, is then at odds with, or contradicts, the lived characteristics of the history and space in which the promise was given. For Moltmann, this ‘between-space’, which is created by the promising word and action of God in history, is not a static realm in which human moral action may be shaped autonomously from the giver of the promise or its content once it is given in history. It is a ‘setting in force of the promise’ (Inkraftsetzung der Verheißung), thereby creating a new history and space for human action.28 Taking these notions further, it may be said that the promise of God in Jesus Christ creates a dynamism in history which sets in force a space for a certain type of historical living. 26

Ibid. Ibid., p. 104. 28 Ibid., p. 138. This dynamism is absent from the English translation ‘validation’. Moltmann has used identical terminology more recently to describe this element of the divine promise. See Jürgen Moltmann, ‘Theologie der Hoffnung – vor 40 Jahren’, in Hoffnung auf Gott – Zukunft des Lebens, ed. Jürgen Moltmann, Carmen Rivuzumwami and Thomas Schlag (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2005), p. 23. 27

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This between-space exemplifies a new future adumbrated in the promise while at the same time creating opportunity for humans to enter into this space created by God’s work in Jesus Christ. This between-space is in essence the content and form of the promised future (as explicated above in discussing the promise made in the dialectical event of cross-resurrection), but enacted through the creative work of God in such a way that in Christ and empowered by the Spirit, humans may now participate in this space. In an ethic of hope, ecclesial moral action receives its meaning only in connection to Christology and a theology of the Kingdom which is derivative of Christology. Moral action is therefore conducted within the Christological grounding and pneumatic efficacy of the eschatological Zwischenraum. When considering this theological claim in relation to global economics, Stackhouse and McCann’s description of the global market in salvific terms needs to be theologically countered. They state: ‘Creating wealth is the whole point of economic activity …’. They proceed to affirm an open market of capitalization, saying: [W]orking to serve people’s needs in the marketplace may be a holy vocation in and for the salvation of the world …. Indeed, a new form of Christian mission today emerges precisely at this point …. Enhancing the capacity for capitalization in responsible corporations is as much the new name for mission as development is the new name for peace.29

Given the four contributors to the extreme poverty which quells the opportunity for fulfilled and liberated life noted above, a theological counter-argument to Stackhouse and McCann’s claims needs to be offered. Is it true that theology can affirm the goal of economics being the production of wealth, which is a type of salvation for the world? Or is it not more theologically astute, from the standpoint of an ethics of hope for the Kingdom of God, to affirm that the goal of Christian involvement in economics is the affirmation of life and liberty to those who currently are unable to achieve it within the current structures of a global economy? For Moltmann, the material content of the eschatological Zwischenraum is to be understood under the latter category of the Kingdom of God. Moltmann understands the Kingdom of God as being inextricably connected with the person of Jesus Christ.30 The gospels bear witness to this in Jesus’ proclamation and acts. In this regard, Jesus’ self-understanding provided in the gospel of Luke during the reading of the Isaiah scroll in the synagogue is paramount: ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring good news to the poor. He has 29

Max L. Stackhouse and Dennis P. McCann, ‘A Postcommunist Manifesto: Public Theology after the Collapse of Socialism’, in On Moral Business: Classical and Contemporary Resources for Ethics in Economic Life, ed. Max L. Stackhouse, Dennis P. McCann, Shirley J. Roels and Preston N. Williams (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), p. 952. 30 Moltmann, CG, pp. 121, 123.

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sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favour.’31 Three possible ethical derivates may arise from an eschatological understanding of divine promise. The first possible derivative is revolution. The revolutionary possibilities in Moltmann’s theology have been highlighted by sympathizers and critics alike and discussed throughout this work. This interpretation places particular emphasis on the role of promise in contradicting the present. The promise is here interpreted as a thoroughgoing overturning and/or annihilation of the world as it was prior to the giving of the promise. This, however, diverges radically from Moltmann’s clearly specified conviction that the promise entails not a destruction of the world, but rather redemption for the world.32 For Moltmann, eschatological hope rooted in the promise of God exemplified in Christ ‘sees in the resurrection of Christ not the eternity of heaven, but the future of the very earth on which his cross stands’.33 Such revolutionary motifs, often entailing the inclusion of violent resistance, are likewise incommensurate with much of Jesus’ description of the Kingdom found in the sermon on the mount, where it is peacemakers who are the children of God.34 It would also necessitate a type of self-contradiction in God. The self-contradiction in God resulting from revolution would occur due to the robust pneumatology that Moltmann envisions as necessary for human participation to be made possible in the Kingdom. If Paul describes the setting of one’s mind on the Spirit as ‘life and peace’,35 then creaturely participation in the form of revolution would contravene the moral qualities of peace. Therefore, if creaturely participation in the Kingdom requires pneumatological enablement, and this participation took the form of violent revolution, then the Spirit would thereby be seen to contravene its own character as life and peace. The second possible ethical outcome from an ethic of hope is compassion.36 At first glance, this option, proposed by J.B. Metz, appears to be a viable way forward for an ethic of hope. Using compassion as a guiding ethical motif escapes the dangers found in revolution while highlighting important aspects of Christ’s ministry seen in the gospels. In seeing the multitudes, Jesus had compassion on them because they were as sheep without a shepherd.37 Metz proposes using ‘compassion’ to guide ethical and economic conduct in an age of globalization. He says: ‘The name for this pathic existence of hope: Compassion. It denotes, to a certain extent, the world program of Christianity in an age of globalization and its pluralism

31

Luke 4:18–19. Contra Schuurman, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics, pp. 93–115. 33 Moltmann, TH, p. 21. 34 Matt. 5:9. 35 Romans 8:6. 36 Johann Baptist Metz, ‘Compassion – Ein Kapitel politischer Theologie der Hoffnung’, in Hoffnung auf Gott – Zukunft des Lebens, pp. 47–53. 37 Matt. 9:36, 14:14, 15:32; Mark 1:41, 6:34, 8:1 and elsewhere. 32

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of religions and cultures.’38 However, the viability of using ‘compassion’ as a structuring principle in economics and globalization must be critically questioned. By ‘structuring principle’, what is meant are the organizational mechanisms in place to accomplish the full gamut of tasks required to make global economic involvement viable and beneficial for all participants. Compassion, if used as a structuring principle for a global economy, can too easily lead to charity,39 which fosters a continuing dependence of lower economic nation states on higher economic ones. The result of this is a continued subservience, rather than a liberating praxis aimed at equity and mutual recognition of dignity. Compassion, if used as a structuring principle for global economics, does not bring lower economic nations out of their present circumstances, but could rather perpetuate those circumstances by stipulating mechanisms in the political economy which perpetuate dependence within international relations rather than mutual benefit. In the words of Tabb: ‘Systematic disadvantage in a world of unequal power relations has created structural dependence.’40 Therefore, this work proposes a third way of conceiving an ethic of hope within a globalized environment. This is exemplified in the notion of an eschatological Zwischenraum explored above. This ‘between-space’ hints at a way forward which may be described ecclesiologically and eschatologically in spatial terms. Through the event of promise found in the Trinitarian event of the cross, and pneumatological work of the Spirit, the Church is taken up into an eschatological mode of existence lived in ethical commensurability with the Kingdom of God. That is, the Church lives within the eschatological Zwischenraum where lived adherence to the Kingdom of God by people caught up in the divine work and transformed pneumatologically is made manifest. This provides a robust theological account for the ethical life of the Church in a global era. By its very nature as a space and history created by the promise of God and indwelt by the Spirit, thus providing a means of transformed human action, this proposal of a Zwischenraum cannot be used as a new world banking programme. Rather, what it can do is provide structuring principles for Christian moral action within the global sphere even as it lives in tension with the present economics of globalization. The practical mechanisms needed in place to accomplish ecclesial participation in economics in a manner commensurate with the lived characteristics of the Kingdom of God may be better envisaged within the theological framework of an eschatological Zwischenraum. It may operate in a manner similar to what Tabb has called a ‘globalization from below’.41

38 Metz, ‘Compassion – Ein Kapitel politischer Theologie der Hoffnung’, pp. 47–8 (author’s translation). 39 Charity is not here understood as St Thomas Aquinas used the term, but rather in the modern sense of donations to aid the need of others. 40 Tabb, Unequal Partners, p. 58. 41 Ibid., pp. 2–3.

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A cue may be taken from the theological work of Kathryn Tanner.42 Tanner proposes an alternative account with an ‘economy of grace’ which is rooted in God’s gracious action in Jesus Christ. She states: God’s giving is not conditional upon a proper return being made by us for it … [the] cross simply doesn’t save us from our debts to God by paying them. If anything, the cross saves us from the consequences of a debt economy in conflict with God’s own economy of grace by cancelling it.43

In this, the notion of property as exclusive possession is itself a misnomer. Or perhaps to put it another way, it is acknowledged that all things belong to God and are given by God, and therefore, no one person or group may stake a claim to any of God’s gifts over against another. Therefore, Tanner proposes unconditional giving: ‘Your concern is not so much to keep others from what you have, as to see to it that everyone is enjoying what you are.’44 Therefore, ‘Because of God’s unconditional beneficence, need determines a right here …’.45 The result of this changed outlook towards a non-competitive economy entails two outcomes: F����������������������������������������������������������������������������� irst, there is no competition in property or possession. Something can be my property at the same time as it is another’s …. Second, there is no competition between having oneself and giving to other. Giving is not to come at one’s own expense …. And my having is not at any one else’s expense ….46

Tanner takes these two principles and proceeds to make genuinely innovative proposals which move beyond the well-worn dichotomy of Marxism versus Capitalism. This can particularly be seen in her reconceptualization of the notion of welfare.47 However, there is a theological problem with Tanner’s account. This problem does not necessarily lie in her proposal of a non-competitive economy, but rather what is necessary for human beings to willingly participate in such an economy. In short, a doctrine of sin resulting in expressions of greed and selfishness is felt to be acutely absent. Tanner explores the role of sin in politics in an earlier study, but the insights gained there do no work in her theological proposals for economics. The result is a very positive construal of human willingness to alter

Kathryn Tanner, Economy of Grace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005). Ibid., pp. 64–5. 44 Ibid., p. 73. 45 Ibid., pp. 74–5. 46 Ibid., p. 76. 47 See ibid., pp. 99–105. 42 43

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present economic practices.48 Tanner attempts to convince readers that a notion of self-preservation through mutually beneficial economic spirals of relations will produce such selfless motifs as are found in her theological economy. However, wanting to perpetuate a present system, albeit in a vastly different form, would likely be quite unconvincing to those who are the current beneficiaries of the present system. As Miroslav Volf says in a different context: It’s not just that we are calculating rather than generous …. With only our own interest in mind, we try to squeeze the last drop out of those with whom we are dealing …. Laws and regulations do limit excessive abuse; however, they only mark the space in which the war is waged. They don’t eliminate the war.49

Therefore, a theological account of Christian engagement in the global economy must both account for this fact and propose solutions to it. The type of economic life conducted within this Zwischenraum may well be commensurate with a non-competitive economy such as the one proposed by Tanner. However, it also provides a more realistic way forward for immediate action by the Church, for two reasons. First, contrary to Tanner’s approach, it explicitly acknowledges the sinfulness of humanity and need for the beneficent grace of God to alter human selfishness, making non-competitive relations plausible. Second, it allows the Church, as people already living within the pneumatologically empowered Zwischenraum, to engage global economics immediately where it is at, without waiting for higher economic countries, the World Bank and the IMF50 to be convinced of the necessity of changing globalization for greater equity. The Church’s eschatological life for the Kingdom of God will be incommensurate with present structural systems in place and therefore in tension with their stated goals, but it will also bear witness to alternative modes of economic relationships. The final sections of this chapter will propose three economic motifs characteristic of an ethic of hope as seen in the eschatological Zwischenraum. These motifs are consumption, trade and equity. It will then relate these motifs back to the initial discussion regarding the contributors to poverty described at the outset of this chapter.

48 For Tanner’s proposals on sin, see Kathryn Tanner, The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 107–18. 49 Miroslav Volf, Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005), p. 14. 50 Sachs has narrated how organizations such as the IMF are actually determined more by the influence and demands of commercial bank corporations rather than either sound macro-economic practices or concern to find economic solutions for those in extreme poverty. See Sachs, The End of Poverty, pp. 99–104.

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From Theory to Praxis As highlighted at the beginning of this discussion regarding the commodification of economic relations, scarcity has ceased to be a material reality in the economics of the present global era. Rather, scarcity is more a matter of perceived unavailability of resources and goods. This leads to a vast over-consumption of surplus goods in higher economic countries. The UN report on trade and development for 2005 highlights this reality. It states that ‘domestic demand’ and ‘personal consumption’ were the ‘main driving force[s]’ of economic growth in the United States.51 Such levels of consumption are incommensurate within the eschatological Zwischenraum because the mitigating factor of perceived scarcity does not govern eschatological hope, but rather the superabundance of the grace of God. Such an eschatological framework then critiques all consumption beyond what is necessary for healthy life. Excess and surplus are non-existent because such surpluses are liquidated and given for the common good, as witnessed in the early Church.52 Such liquidation and sharing of surpluses is not charity because the idea of ownership can only be attached to God. God, as giver of all gifts, merely entrusts resources and goods to humanity which are then used in ways characterized by God’s Kingdom. Likewise, the sharing of goods is not limited to monetary funds or foodstuffs, but also the riches of culture which are equally necessary for sustaining a life commensurate with the Kingdom where people come from every tribe, tongue and nation. There is no charity, because all have equal claim. That is to say, all things are recognized as given by grace. The motif of trade has already been hinted at from the above discussion regarding consumption. The present method of tariffs on international trade from lower economic nations to higher ones, but not vice versa, is in contradistinction to a life defined by eschatological hope where all things are God’s and therefore entrusted to everyone. The resultant surpluses and therefore consumption from such inequities in trade laws help to perpetuate the most extreme poverty. Such international trade stipulations ‘represent a significant export of capital from developing to developed countries, and a key element in the current phenomenon of global economic imbalances’.53 The differentiation in payments made for primary commodities from lower economic nations (food, clothing, textiles) and manufactured goods from higher economic regions (computers, transistors, telecommunications equipment) continues to be a seminal issue in globalized trade. While several ‘developing nations’ are beginning to expand into the production of manufactured goods, ‘Commodity issues continue to be as relevant as ever for many developing countries …’.54 ‘As a result of these differences, 51 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade and Development Report, 2005 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2005), p. 2. 52 Acts 2:45, 4:3–37. 53 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2005, p. 12. 54 Ibid., p. 88.

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productivity gains in the production of food and raw materials in developing countries translated into lower prices … rather than into higher remuneration for local factors of production.’55 Such differentiation of trade benefits does not occur within eschatological economics, because all work must be equally valued as service rendered unto God. Trade which benefits low-income nations is also made difficult due to the present accelerated growth in middle-income nations such as China and India. Business production through agglomeration of Western enterprise among middle income nations is prohibitive of low income nations entering into global markets with similar goods and production.56 A willingness to invest in the local industries of low-income nations requires risk, but one which Christian businesspeople and organizations should move towards in order to benefit the low-income nations as China and India previously have. In addition, the present lack of diversification in goods available for trade among low-income nations makes subsidies among high-income nations an active measure which perpetuates the inability of the ‘bottom billion’ to gain access into global markets. For example: ‘When the U.S. and European Union trade negotiators jointly proposed that instead of the OECD lowering these production subsidies poor countries might shift to other activities,’ economist Paul Collier ‘personally felt they had crossed the line …’.57 Christians in high-income nations should be active in communicating to their elected officials that such actions are inappropriate. In addition, they should encourage such officials to aid low-income nations in diversifying their trade products and in providing access to global markets, rather than engaging in protectionist policymaking to the contrary. The theological differences between the approaches of high- and lowincome nations to the issues of trade and scarcity have been noted by Stephen Long. Long states: ‘A people who know scarcity and death will often construct theology from the perspective of an original plenitude that overcomes death to promote life, while theologians from more plentiful lands often construct theology assuming the threat of a scarcity that takes consolation in death.’58 Christian participation in a global economy necessitates a refusal to be guided by self-interest, and to rather pursue fellowship with the poor and the sinner, the destitute and the oppressed. This is the ethical content of the Kingdom created in history through the divine promise found in Christ and made efficacious through the Holy Spirit. These motifs regarding consumption and trade receive both their driving impetus and praxiological results from the equity of all human beings before God. Therefore, the continuing differentiation of privilege among members of the global economy resulting from protectionist practices based on perceived scarcity ceases to be a mitigating factor in ecclesial participation in the global economy. On the 55

Ibid., p. 87. Collier, The Bottom Billion, pp. 82–3 57 Ibid., pp. 159–60. 58 D. Stephen Long, Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 133. 56

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contrary, as a community of people living in light of the eschatological promise of God for the Kingdom of God where Christ has table fellowship with the poor and with ‘sinners and tax collectors’, the ‘between-space’ of pneumatologically empowered living acknowledges the necessary equity of all. By enacting the lived characteristics of the Kingdom of God within the space created in history by the divine grace, Christian moral engagement exerts itself in liberating praxis. This life will be in tension with the present economics of globalization, but it does so to witness to the redemption offered to it in Christ, where ‘There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.’59 The acknowledgement of this tension due to the ongoing effects of sin goes theologically further than the present economics of globalization in expressing the eschatological overcoming of sin by Christ’s work and the historical efficacy of the Spirit. Pragmatic Proposals If such are the motifs suggested by an ethics of hope for the global economy, then what pragmatic action can take place to aid the four contributors to poverty noted at the outset of this chapter? These pragmatic suggestions will of necessity require the co-operative approach of Christian organizational structures from various branches of the Church. Such co-operation will acknowledge that the actions proposed here do not have their origin in partisan interest or in either capitalist or socialist philosophy. Rather, such pragmatic proposals are attempts to give practical expression to concrete actions which adhere to God’s Kingdom and Christ’s work already acknowledged in the Christian confession. It is possible that the efficacy of these proposals may be debated by those more knowledgeable in the various fields required to enact them. However, it is my theological hope that such actions are interpreted as pragmatic attempts to give expression to what an eschatological ethic entails. The issue of geography may initially seem insurmountable. How is it possible for ecclesial action along the lines of a ‘globalization from below’ to help topographically remote communities gain access to broader domestic and world markets? Likewise, how may a Christian moral ethic contribute to the growth of landlocked states? Living within the Zwischenraum which may bypass global structures such as the World Bank and IMF may prove to be precisely an advantage to ecclesial communities wanting to live out an ethic of hope as partners of geographically isolated communities. An ecclesial community in a high-income nation may not alter the infrastructure of an entire country, but it can partner with individual communities in geographically isolated areas of lowincome nations. This partnering could provide all-terrain vehicles, the purchasing of extra animals of burden, or even the construction of helicopter pads where 59

Gal. 3:28.

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such is feasible, which would then be owned by the entire community. In the latter case, the Churches of high-income nations could then also provide access to helicopters through the volunteer services of pilots or even co-ordination through other agencies to provide access to such vehicles. Also, Churches could partner with various NGOs to set up global funds whose mandate is to create accessible roads and methods of transport which would then come under the ownership of the geographically isolated communities once their access to urban or even global markets becomes sustainable and profitable. These road-building projects could take the same administrative structure as many of the school- or church-building projects already well established in such organizations. Until that time, the mandate and ownership of such funds and vehicles could fall under the domain of the NGO, which would work with the geographically isolated community to foster growth and sustainable accessibility to a wider market for their goods. In these projects, the goal is ease of accessibility so that the geographically isolated communities may gain sustainable access to larger markets. That violence and poverty are cyclical movements which reinforce the unsatisfactory situation of many people in low-income nations makes this a difficult issue to address. One item is sure. Violent conflict perpetuates the degradation of life and increases the instability of those communities most affected. Due to the mutual reinforcement which occurs between conflict and poverty, an influx of aid given over time to improve the sustainability of peace within nations coming out of situations of conflict will help minimize the likelihood of relapse into violent conflict. Paul Collier notes that aid given in increments over time as stability returns to a nation is statistically more likely to offset the likelihood of conflictual relapse than an immediate surge of aid in the months immediately following a conflict.60 Speaking pragmatically, the average cost of a civil war in a low-income nation is approximately US$64 billion, with approximately two new civil wars started per year during the last decade. This makes the global cost of civil wars more than US$100 billion a year. This is approximately double the global aid budget. Therefore, from a merely cost-effective point of view, an increase in aid given in ways which are statistically shown to decrease the likelihood of relapse into conflict is the most effective use of allocated funds from high-income nations.61 Increased security has been a seminal political issue in high-income nations since 11 September 2001. These devastating attacks have made terrorism a high priority for political authorities since the occurrence of those events. However, a holistic view of security needs to be brought back into view. What needs to be brought into focus is that stabilization through the cessation of conflict in lowincome nations such as Afghanistan and Somalia will result in a correlative increase in security and stabilization for high-income nations. It was a disenfranchised Somali refugee who conducted the London bombings of July 2005. Such violent situations can be avoided through the stabilization and cessation of conflict in Collier, The Bottom Billion, pp. 104–7. Ibid., p. 32.

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such low-income nations. It is a prudent manoeuvre for the security of wealthy nations to aid in bringing peace to troubled low-income nations. Christians and Churches in high-income nations should make this a key element in the public debate on security and continually draw this neglected factor to the attention of elected officials and policymakers. This is not an argument for charity. This is an argument for security. Policymakers who are genuinely serious about security can no longer overlook this key factor. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has already been noted as a key contributor to poverty. It has been repeatedly argued in this work that the embodiment of Jesus’ social relationship with the sick, the poor and the oppressed provides a paramount ethical mandate for the Kingdom of God. In this sense, the various illnesses of those whom Jesus embraced carried social and religious stigmas, thus relegating these individuals to the status of ‘sinners’ from the perspective of religious leaders. Christ’s ministry among such individuals contradicted this interpretation with one where the glory of God and the presence of the Kingdom were seen as seminal.62 The social, moral and religious stigmas attached to HIV/AIDS need to be recognized as false and brought to an end within the Church and society. A Christian ethic of hope will recognize not a faithless people deserving their situation, but the very people to whom Jesus brought the Kingdom through healing and table fellowship. The removal of such stigmas and the entering into of dignified, mutual relationship will bear testimony to God’s eschatological work of the Kingdom where the equity and dignity of all are not contingent on whether one is or is not HIV-positive. Moving beyond the societal and religious stigmas attached with these diseases through the entering of mutually dignifying relationship, the work of moving towards treating the disease must then become a paramount concern. The high cost of anti-retroviral treatments for HIV/AIDS in contrast with the low cost of production must be countered through the lobbying of various groups and Churches. In addition, generic forms of such anti-retroviral treatments must be made available to those in need of them. Various Christian Churches and organizations may band together to raise funds to accomplish this. Such a pooling of monetary resources can then be used to provide generic pharmaceutical treatments for communities particularly affected by the disease, and thus work with indigenous doctors and hospitals with the supply and distribution of these treatments. Such ecclesial monetary gathering campaigns can work together with global events such as World AIDS Day to provide education and awareness for Church congregations, and thus also partner with effective organizational structures already at work on these issues. Finally, the commodification of relationships has been argued to be contrary to a Christian ethic of hope. Christians living in high-income nations must recognize that notions of scarcity which drive domestic and global markets do not apply to their lived experience in a similar manner as is found in other nations. A reconceptualized understanding of what true scarcity is needs to be achieved 62

John 9:1–5.

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through education regarding the divergences of world poverty and the desperate situations of those living in economically failing nation states. Such public awareness education can be conducted in ecclesial settings through sermons and homilies, or service groups organized by local parishes. Moving further, such awareness needs to be conjoined with how a perception of scarcity influences consumption levels. Theological and pastoral work needs to be done to emphasize how compulsions to consumption offer merely a false security which results in a view of human interaction whose value is based on the ability to increase one’s own consumption and perceived security. Such a commodified view of human relations negates the social structures created within the Kingdom of God and presently offered through grace in the divinely created space for moral living. In this, theological notions of solidarity can replace scarcity, and consumption can be revealed as a type of material concupiscence. Love for not only what is ‘like’ but also for that which is ‘unlike’ must govern Christian relationships within an ethics of hope. This love will contrast tendencies to commodify relationships in terms of consumption and security for the benefit of personal or domestic economic gain. Conclusion During the course of this study, there were three theological premises along with three praxiological motifs based on these premises which characterized much of the discussion in developing an ethic of hope from Jürgen Moltmann’s theology. The three theological premises were Christology, pneumatology and eschatology. While much of the discussion has focused on the eschatological nature of God’s promissory acts and an ethic of hope which may be derived from those acts, this understanding of eschatology necessitated anterior claims regarding the nature and work of Christ and the ongoing efficacy of the Spirit. Therefore, conclusions regarding these three theological premises will be articulated in the above order. The praxiological principles being developed from the theological discussions may be summarized in the three motifs of fellowship, liberation and equity which are derivative of the theological premises. From the outset of this investigation into Moltmann’s work, Christology occupied a place of primacy and was the main source of all eschatological assertions. To be sure, the role of divine promise occurred in the biblical history prior to Christ’s coming. However, the specific nature of promise and a theological understanding of those historically prior promises were accessible to theological description only because of the promissory acts of Christ in cross and resurrection. The Christological motifs of cross and resurrection are what made God’s redemptive promise for all creation available to humanity and secured humanity with the hope of an eschatological end in God’s saving work. This Christological act of promise in the resurrection was argued to be precisely the creative act of God drawing the creature to a future orientation through the Christological creation of a new history resulting in an eschatological novum. This Christological locus was the

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basis upon which all subsequent statements regarding eschatology would be made and assessed for their theological adequacy. This Christologically focused orientation to the future via the newly created history received historical efficacy for human action in pneumatology. Creaturely life, as marred by the presence of sin, is unable to merely appropriate the effects of Christology and the new history of its own accord. Rather, the supra-abundant work of God through the Spirit was argued to be necessary for creaturely participation in this created history of divine promise wrought in the person and work of Christ. It is in pneumatology that the historical efficacy of the promised future receives its availability for human moral living in the present. This twofold explication of Christology and pneumatology makes a more robust description of the moral content of eschatology possible. It was argued that the Christocentric focus resulted in the primary eschatological motif being the Kingdom of God. The inextricable connection of the Kingdom to Christology was seen in the life, vocation, proclamation and salvific acts of Jesus Christ. As such, the role of the Spirit in the life and vocation of Christ was also seen to be emphasized in Moltmann’s work. With the Christological locus of the Kingdom of God, eschatology was examined with its moral relevance for human action as grounded in divine promise. Therefore, eschatology was seen to describe history in terms of the creative work of God for a new future. Moreover, with the continuing relevance of pneumatology for an eschatological rendering of moral action in history, Moltmann described an interval of tension in history between the lived characteristics of the Kingdom and the sinful status quo. More precisely, Moltmann’s description of the interval of tension as a Zwischenraum illuminates his perception of this interval specifically as a space for creaturely action within the eschatological work of God. The praxiological content of this eschatological ‘between-space’, in which creaturely action is conducted in light of God’s salvific work in Christ through promissory acts, was discussed largely in terms of fellowship, liberation and equity. The notion of fellowship was described in terms which may be understood as both theological and ethical. Fellowship was described theologically in the sense that the seminal importance of an eschatological ethic of hope was dependant on the antecedent work of the Triune God in reconciliation to establish communion between humanity and God. This anterior work of God created a sphere of action in history, described eschatologically, which was then enabled through God’s pneumatic efficacy. The result is a fellowship to be established in its ethical sense, that is to say, between creatures. The fellowship characteristic of the eschatological Kingdom of God was particularly seen in Christ’s vocation and ministry through table fellowship with the poor, outcast and those deemed ‘unclean’ for either religious or societal reasons. This ethical fellowship took form in liberating activity in light of the liberating work of Christ in the cross and resurrection. As an ethical characteristic of the Kingdom, which has its prior basis in the saving acts of God, liberation was not rooted in a characteristic or trait inherent in human being. Rather, it was argued to

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have its basis in God’s claim on humanity and the relationship which God lovingly establishes through the reconciliatory work of Christ and the Spirit. God’s prior claim on humanity for the Kingdom necessitates a liberating praxis where social, class and economic distinctions, which create an inequity of life through an inability to supply for one’s needs, are no longer present. The liberating praxis resultant from God’s initiative for the Kingdom illumines Christian moral life to recognize the equity of all people in removing sinful structures which perpetuate harmful inequities. The eschatological Kingdom of God is one where people are recognized to be from every tribe, tongue and nation with no particular group taking precedence over another. Indeed, the Kingdom where there is no inequity between Greek or Jew, Scythian or Barbarian, male or female is such precisely because all are one in Christ. God’s prior claim on humanity entails that no one group may stake claim to superiority in an eschatological ethic – be it moral superiority, cultural superiority or economic superiority. When the community of Christians notes these characteristics of the Kingdom of God, it must likewise note the present lack of fulfilment in the world. It does not note the present lack of fulfilment because sin or world takes priority over God’s work for the Kingdom. On the contrary, it notes those unfulfilled aspects in various structural practices in the world precisely because the life graciously given in Christ and enabled by the Spirit – that is, the eschatological life – is in contradiction to the sinful status quo, and therefore in tension with them. In this way, with the assurance of God’s promises for a newly created future, the Church may orient itself to this future and join prior generations in praying ‘Maranatha!’

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Index

Althouse, Peter 70, 77, 87 Alves, Rubem 29, 30, 166 Aquinas, Thomas 111, 112, 198 Aristotle 102, 111 Arius 114 Athanasius 120 Augustine 148, 149, 157 Bacon, Francis 32 Barth, Karl 3, 5, 13, 58, 59, 62, 80, 85, 170 Bauckham, Richard 4, 5, 16, 19, 22, 24, 27, 31, 43, 46, 53, 67, 71, 72, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 148, 153, 154, 155 Beah, Ishmael 192 Beale, G.K. 54 Berkhof, Hendrikus 59 Bloch, Ernst 4, 31, 46 Boff, Leonardo 117 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 1, 178, 179 Bouma-Prediger, Steven 138 Braaten, Carl 158, 159 Buber, Martin140 Calvin, John 3, 170 Capps, Walter H. 16 Chan, Simon K.H. 81 Chapman, G. Clarke 170, 172 Charry, Ellen T. 94, 95 Chester, Tim 24 Chuang, Ya-Tang 148 Church 30, 34, 52, 54, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 82, 83, 85, 89, 90, 122–4, 134, 155, 173, 198, 200, 201 Cobb Jr., John B. 66 Coe, Kevin137 Collier, Paul 190, 191, 192, 202, 204 Constantine 125, 155, 156 Conyers, A.J. 80, 148, 158

creation 1, 8, 15, 18, 20, 24–7, 35, 45, 61–8, 72, 75, 77, 80, 82, 85, 87, 88, 92, 93, 104, 107, 112, 121, 125, 129, 152, 162, 169, 170, 176, 195 Cullmann, Oscar 152 Deane-Drummond, Cecila 66, 138 Descartes, Renee 112 Domke, David 137 ecology/ecological 9, 32, 63, 64, 69 economics 8, 10, 53, 92, 93, 94, 138–40, 141, 144, 189–208 Eusebius 125, 155 Exodus 17, 30, 36, 53, 71, 90, 91 Falke, Heino 39, 44 Fee, Gordon D. 175 Freud, Sigmund 134, 135 Gilbertson, Michael 15 Grenz, Stanley 66 Grimmer, Karl F. 153, 158 Gutiérrez, Gustavo 17, 72 Hartmann, Stephanie 109, 110 Hauerwas, Stanley 183 Healy, Nicholas 112 Heschel, Abraham 132 history 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 39, 46, 48, 51, 54, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66, 68, 72, 74, 76, 79, 81, 84, 85, 92, 96, 101, 102, 103, 105, 110, 116, 125, 133, 134, 151, 152, 153, 154, 161, 170, 182 Honecker, Martin30, 34, 186, Horkheimer, Max 3 humanity 9, 13, 17, 18, 29, 32, 33, 58, 83, 84, 112, 113, 122, 169–88 Hunsinger, George 40

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Ioniţă, Viorel 165 Kabbalism 3, 65 Kairos/Kairological 9, 33 Kant, Immanuel 33 Käsemann, Ernst 16 Kasper, Walter 109 Kingdom of God 8, 9, 15, 27, 35, 36, 37, 39–55, 57, 60, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 86, 88, 91, 92, 95, 96, 103, 108, 122, 125, 129, 137, 141, 142, 147, 151, 160, 173, 180, 182, 196, 198, 201 Köber Berthold 44 Korsch, Dietrich 60, 63 Kratz, Reinhard Gregor 162 Küng, Hans 135 liberation 58, 82, 86, 89–96, 97, 134, 136–7, 144 Lin, Hong-Hsin148 Lochman, Jan Milič 80 Long, D. Stephen 202 Luther, Martin32, 33, 63 Macchia, Frank 80 Mattes, Mark C. 174 Mays, James L. 181 McCann, Dennis P. 196 McDougall, Joy Ann 100, 110, 120, 177, 180 McFarland, Ian 120, 176 Meeks, M. Douglas 16, 31, 139, 140, 193 Metz, Johannes, B. 197, 198 Miles, Margaret R. 170 Min, Anselm K. 118 mission 72, 73, 74, 75 modalism 59, 114 Molnar, Paul D. 132 Morse, Christopher 19, 28 Müller-Fahrenholz, Geiko 1, 2, 39, 44, 63, 189 Nicholls, David 186 Niederwimmer, Kurt 31 novum 15, 21, 22, 23, 58, 79, 108, 116, 122, 150, 151, 206

O’Collins, Gerald 31 Olson, Roger 66, 113 Otto, Randall E. 6, 22, 34, 100, 101, 116, 117 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 4, 15, 43, 44, 49, 66, 118, 119 parousia 5, 9, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 69, 74, 75, 77, 90, 157, 159 Partee, Charles 3 perichoresis 7, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 128, 129, 177 Peterson, Erik 100 political/politics 6, 7, 9, 33, 34, 73, 106, 118, 124–9, 134, 135, 136–8, 155, 178 poor 42, 43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 57, 71, 74, 75, 77, 83, 85, 89, 92, 122, 127, 138, 180, 183, 190–94 praxis 6, 7, 8, 9, 40, 54, 73, 75, 78, 82, 83, 89, 95, 122, 125, 137, 142, 166 prolepsis 15 promise 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 13–37, 39, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 103, 105, 116, 124, 125, 129, 141, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 170, 172, 174, 182, 194, 195 Rahner, Karl 71, 109, 131, 132, 133, 134 Ramm, Bernard 34 Rasmusson, Arne 6, 42, 72, 136 Rauser, Randall 109 Rémy, Gérard 155, 157 resurrection 4, 6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 59, 61, 64, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 83, 85, 86, 88, 91, 103, 104, 105, 108, 116, 122, 127, 133, 134, 136, 143, 174, 175, 182, 197 Sachs, Jeffrey 190, 193, 200 sacrament 70, 71, 77 sanctification 7, 58, 86, 96–8, 186 Sauter, Gerhard 42, 109, 130

Index Schleiermacher, Friedrich 99 Schmitt, Carl 126, 127 Schüle, Andreas 64, 87 Schuurman, Douglas J. 24, 138, 197 Seebass, Von Horst 171 sin5, 7, 15, 16, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 35, 43, 47, 48, 52, 80, 89, 90, 108, 124, 129, 171, 172, 203 Sobrino, Jon 44 Sölle, Dorothee 106, 107, 109 Souletie, Jean-Louis 148 Sorc, Ciril 117 space 9, 15, 24, 28, 33 Spirit (Holy) 3, 9, 36, 42, 43, 45, 52, 55, 57–98, 104, 105, 108, 129, 134, 142, 165, 174, 180, 182, 185, 187, 203 Stackhouse, Max L. 196 Stibbe, Mark W.G. 60 Stock, Konrad 170 Tabb, William K. 192, 193, 198 Tanner, Kathryn 1, 4, 5, 158–60, 199, 200 Taylor, Mark Lewis 165–7 Theunissen, Michael 125 Tillich, Paul 165 time 9, 24, 32, 147–61, 164, 168 torture 50, 51 Trinity/Trinitarian 7, 9, 37, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 70, 79, 81, 98, 99–144, 177, 178

223

Tseng, Thomas 162, 164 Ulrich, Hans G. 184 Vatican II 123, 124 Veenhof, Jan 57, 59 Volf, Miroslav 27, 84, 200 Von Rad, Gerhard 3, 16, 68 Weber, Max 140 Weber, Otto 3 Whitehead, A.N. 20 Winter, Stephen 189 Wood, Laurence W. 62 Word 5, 14, 71, 73 Wright, Nigel Goring 125 WWII 3 Zeitraum 153, 158, 160, 161, 164, 167 zimsum 65, 66, 67 Zizioulas, John 119, 120 Zwischenraum 17, 28, 30, 31, 35, 39, 54, 76, 89, 90, 92, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 153, 161, 162, 164, 168, 172, 180, 182, 184, 185, 189, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201, 203, 207