Jonathan Edwards' Social Augustinian Trinitarianism in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 9781593338466, 1593338465

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Jonathan Edwards’ Social Augustinian Trinitarianism in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

Perspectives on Philosophy and Religious Thought 2

Perspectives on Philosophy and Religious Thought (formerly Gorgias Studies in Philosophy and Theology) provides a forum for original scholarship on theological and philosophical issues, promoting dialogue between the wide-ranging fields of religious and logical thought. This series includes studies on both the interaction between different theistic or philosophical traditions and their development in historical perspective.

Jonathan Edwards’ Social Augustinian Trinitarianism in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

STEVEN M. STUDEBAKER

GORGIAS PRESS 2008

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2013 by Gorgias Press LLC

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. 2013

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ISBN 978-1-59333-846-6

ISSN 1940-0020

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication Record is Available from the Library of Congress Printed in the United States of America

For Sheila, Gabrielle, and Max

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents..................................................................................................vii Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................xi Introduction .............................................................................................................1 1 The History of the Interpretation of Jonathan Edwards’ Trinitarianism ................................................................................................11 Nineteenth and early-Twentieth Century Interpretations......................12 Horace Bushnell ...........................................................................................15 Oliver W. Holmes ........................................................................................20 Egbert C. Smyth and Edwards A. Park ....................................................22 Alexander V. G. Allen .................................................................................33 George P. Fisher...........................................................................................38 Benjamin B. Warfield...................................................................................39 Late-Twentieth Century Interpretations...................................................42 Herbert W. Richardson ...............................................................................44 Krister Sairsingh ...........................................................................................54 Amy Plantinga Pauw ....................................................................................62 Conclusion.....................................................................................................64 2 Jonathan Edwards and the Social Trinity .................................................67 The Threeness-Oneness Paradigm ............................................................68 Social Trinitarianism ....................................................................................68 Defining the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm.............................................73 Problems with the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm ..................................77 Plantinga Pauw, the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm, and Edwards’ Trinitarianism .......................................................................................88 Plantinga Pauw and the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm .........................88 Plantinga Pauw, the Augustinian Trinitarian Tradition, and Edwards’ Trinitarianism .....................................................................90 Analytic Analysis of Plantinga Pauw’s Interpretation of Edwards’ Trinitarianism .....................................................................................100 Synthetic Analysis of Plantinga Pauw’s Interpretation of Edwards’ Trinitarianism .....................................................................................104 vii

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JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Conclusion...................................................................................................106 The Augustinian Mutual Love Tradition................................................109 Augustine of Hippo ...................................................................................112 The Mental Triads ......................................................................................113 The Father, the Unbegotten .....................................................................117 The Generation of the Son as the Word of God..................................117 The Procession of the Holy Spirit as the Mutual love of the Father and the Son.........................................................................................118 From Economic Missions to Immanent Processions ..........................118 Thomas Aquinas.........................................................................................120 The Mental Image ......................................................................................121 The Father ...................................................................................................123 The Son........................................................................................................123 The Holy Spirit ...........................................................................................125 The Processions and the Missions...........................................................127 Richard of St. Victor, Bonaventure, and Divine Goodness ................129 Richard of St. Victor ..................................................................................130 Bonaventure ................................................................................................132 Conclusion...................................................................................................133 Jonathan Edwards and the Augustinian Mutual Love Tradition........135 Divine Goodness and Self-Communication ..........................................136 Edwards and the Mental Image ...............................................................139 Image and Analogy: The Soul and Its Relation to the Triune God ...140 Edwards and the Dispositional Soul .......................................................142 Unity and Distinction in the Soul and Its Operations..........................156 The Father as the Self-Subsistent Divine Person..................................167 The Father as Self-Subsistent ...................................................................167 The Father as Absolute God ....................................................................169 The Father as the Fountain of the Godhead .........................................169 The Soul as the Mental Analog of the Father........................................170 The Son as the Idea of God .....................................................................172 Edwards’ Use of Ideas in his Philosophical and Theological Context................................................................................................176 Edwards and the Subsistence of the Son as Idea ..................................184 The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son .........190 The Mental Analogy and the Procession of the Holy Spirit................191 The Holy Spirit and the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son ......193 Edwards’ Pneumatology and the Mutual Love Tradition....................197 The Immanent Processions and the Economic Missions ...................199

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The Immanent Identities and Economic Roles of the Divine Persons ................................................................................................200 The Communicative Nature of God and the Economic Trinity........201 The Order of the Divine Subsistences and Economic Subordination.....................................................................................203 Conclusion...................................................................................................206 5 Jonathan Edwards and the Enlightenment Trinitarian Controversies ..............................................................................................207 Jonathan Edwards’ Trinitarianism and Deism.......................................210 Edwards, the Trinity, and the Goodness of God: An Apology for the Trinity ...........................................................................................212 Edwards, the Trinity, and the Prisca Theologia: An Apology for the Trinity ..................................................................................................219 Jonathan Edwards’ Trinitarianism and the Early-Enlightenment Christian Debates on Divine Person..............................................228 William Sherlock, Robert South, and Jonathan Edwards: Cartesian Persons and the Threat of Tritheism .............................................228 Samuel Clarke, Daniel Waterland, and Jonathan Edwards: Cartesian Persons and the Threat of Subordinationism ...............................242 Conclusion...................................................................................................254 Conclusion............................................................................................................255 Bibliography .........................................................................................................259 Edwards Primary Texts, Collected Works, and Reference Works .....259 Pre-Twentieth-Century Sources...............................................................261 Modern Sources..........................................................................................269 Dissertations................................................................................................289 Name Index..........................................................................................................291 Subject Index........................................................................................................297

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is a revision of my doctoral dissertation completed at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. As such, it is the result, indirectly and directly, of the work, and not to mention the longsuffering, of many people. First, I express my appreciation and heart-felt gratitude to my wife Sheila, daughter Gabrielle, and son Maxwell. Sheila’s perpetual support over the past few years was indispensable; quite simply, without her support this project would never have reached fruition. I also thank Patrick Carey. He was the catalyst for my initial exploration of Jonathan Edwards, the director of my dissertation, and an ongoing source of encouragement. David Coffey (who also served on my dissertation committee), although his work is not directly engaged at length in this book, has been a formative theological mentor and friend both while I was a doctoral student and in the years since I graduated. Michel René Barnes, Julian V. Hills, and Wanda Zemler-Cizewski also served on my dissertation committee. Since they were of immense assistance to me in the production of the dissertation, they receive my appreciation for the current evolution of that earlier project. I thank my former colleagues at Emmanuel College, Franklin Springs, Georgia. Librarian Richard DuPont was always patient with my inter-library loan requests and supported my research with book purchases. I shared three wonderful years teaching in the School of Christian Ministries with the late Joseph Brookshire (go Dawgs), Michael Luper, Tony Moon, Paul Oxley, and Tracy Reynolds. During that time, they encouraged me to persist in revising the manuscript. I am particularly grateful for my current colleagues (faculty and students) at McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario. They provide a nurturing and vibrant academic context. Stanley E. Porter and Phil Zylla, the President and Academic Dean of the Divinity College, also deserve recognition for supplying the resources and the teaching load that give the faculty the most precious commodity of scholarly work—time. xi

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I extend my thanks to Gorgias Press for publishing the book and to Steve Wiggins (Acquisitions Editor) and Katie Stott (Production Editor) who helped in the final preparation of the manuscript for publication. Finally, I appreciate Iain Torrance and Bryan Spinks, editors of Scottish Journal of Theology, for granting permission to include revisions of my article “Jonathan Edwards’ Social Augustinian Trinitarianism: An Alternative to a Recent Trend,” SJT 56 (2003): 268-85, in chapters two and four. Pittsford, New York July 2008

INTRODUCTION In recent years, several scholars have provided systematic theological analyses of Jonathan Edwards’ (1703–1758) trinitarianism.1 They maintain that 1Born October 5, 1703, Jonathan Edwards was the only son of eleven children born to Reverend Timothy and Esther Stoddard Edwards. Destined to the ministry by his father, Edwards studied languages—Latin, Greek, and Hebrew—philosophy, and natural science from an early age. In 1716, he entered Connecticut’s College, later to bear the name “Yale.” Graduating with the B.A. in 1720, Edwards began a Master’s degree at Yale, which he completed in 1722. Between 1722 and 1723, Edwards accepted his first pastorate in a church in New York City. In 1724 he moved to Northampton and served as pastor alongside of renowned New England pastor Solomon Stoddard. After the death of Stoddard in 1729, Edwards served the Northampton church until 1750. He was a key leader in the Great Awakening that occurred between 1734 and 1735. However, after a long struggle with his parishioners that culminated with the controversy in which Edwards refused to administer sacraments and admit to full membership those without a profession of godliness ratified by Edwards, he was forced to leave Northampton. In 1751, he became the pastor of the church in the frontier town of Stockbridge and a missionary to the Native Americans of the area. His years in Stockbridge were among his most productive from a literary standpoint. In 1757, he was elected president of Princeton, but died shortly afterwards in February 1758 of a botched smallpox inoculation. Edwards is best known for his rigorous articulation of Reformed theology— e.g., Freedom of the Will and Original Sin; defense of religious revival—e.g., A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God; and analysis of Christian spirituality—e.g., Religious Affections. He is known in the history of theology as the patriarch of New England Theology. New England Theology was a movement of Reformed theology that exerted strong influence in New England through the middle of the nineteenth century. A vast body of literature is available on Edwards. Starting points for full biographies are Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (1949; reprint, Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian, 1965) and George Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). An excellent starting point for studies related to Edwards is the bibliography by M. X. Lesser, Reading Jonathan Edwards: An Annotated Bibliography in Three

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Edwards’ trinitarianism is a viable resource for contemporary trinitarian theology. Methodologically, these systematic theological analyses are performed in the parameters of what may be called the threeness-oneness paradigm. The threeness-oneness paradigm is the commonplace assumption in modern systematic and historical studies of trinitarian theology—i.e., that all trinitarian theologies ultimately give primacy to either divine threeness or oneness. Eastern Cappadocian trinitarianism and the Western theologian Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) represent the threeness trajectory. The Western Augustinian tradition represents the oneness trajectory. The cateParts, 1729–2005 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). Amy Plantinga Pauw’s use of the threeness-oneness paradigm to interpret Edwards’ trinitarianism is the most significant of these interpreters: see “‘Heaven is a World of Love’: Edwards on Heaven and the Trinity,” Calvin Theological Journal 30 (1995): 392–401; “The Future of Reformed Theology: Some Lessons from Jonathan Edwards,” in Toward the Future of Reformed Theology: Tasks, Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 456–69; “The Supreme Harmony of All”: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); and “The Supreme Harmony of All: Jonathan Edwards and the Trinity” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1990). Robert Jenson is apparently the first theologian to apply (in published form) the Augustinian-Cappadocian paradigm to Edwards’ trinitarian theology. He criticizes Western and Augustinian trinitarianism for introducing an artificial distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity. He argues that the Eastern tradition and the Cappadocians rightly understood these as undifferentiated (Jenson, America’s Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988], 91–98). Sang Hyun Lee maintains that Edwards’ use of the psychological and the social analogies occurs within the framework of his dispositional conception of the divine being (Sang Hyun Lee, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 21, Writings on the Trinity, Grace, and Faith, ed. Sang Hyun Lee [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 2–27). Krister Sairsingh uses the threeness-oneness paradigm to articulate his theory of Edwards’ relational ontology and social trinitarianism (Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Divine Glory: His Foundational Trinitarianism and Its Ecclesial Import” [Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986], 69–73 and 144–51). For less extensive applications of this paradigm to Edwards, see Steven H. Daniel, “Postmodern Concepts of God and Edwards’ Trinitarian Ontology,” in Edwards in Our Time: Jonathan Edwards and the Shaping of American Religion, ed. Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C. Guelzo (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 49 and 54; Michael Jinkins, “‘The Being of Beings’: Jonathan Edwards’ Understanding of God as Reflected in His Final Treatises,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993): 181–83; and Rachel S. Stahle, “The Trinitarian Spirit of Jonathan Edwards’ Theology” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999).

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gories of threeness and oneness form a paradigm that is used to describe the broad development of trinitarian theology and to interpret particular theologians within the two traditions. Amy Plantinga Pauw’s analysis of Edwards is the most thorough application of the threeness-oneness paradigm to Edwards’ trinitarian theology. She systematically applies the threeness-oneness paradigm to interpret Edwards’ trinitarianism and doctrines related to creation and redemption. She concludes that Edwards deployed two distinct trinitarian models: the social and psychological. She contends that Edwards’ use of social language in his trinitarianism indicates that he embraced a distinct social model that stands in continuity with the social model of the Trinity of the Cappadocians and Richard of St. Victor and in discontinuity with the Western Augustinian psychological model of the Trinity. Moreover, she understands Edwards’ social model as an intentional rejection of his Western, Reformed scholastic, and Puritan trinitarian tradition’s emphasis on oneness. In terms of appropriation, she believes that Edwards’ value for modern trinitarian theology lies in his use of the social and psychological models with particular accent on the social model. She suggests that Edwards’ social model of the Trinity and relational ontology is a valuable resource for contemporary trinitarian theology and especially those interested in developing a relational theism. This book endeavors to make two contributions to trinitarian theology: one to current Edwards scholarship and one to the broader scholarship on the history of trinitarian theology. First, it contributes to Edwardsean scholarship by offering an alternative to the current interpretation of his trinitarian theology. More specifically, this contribution to the current discussion of Edwards’ trinitarianism relies on a different methodology that in turn leads to a different interpretation of his trinitarianism. With this methodological consideration in mind, the threeness-oneness paradigm is a modern form of a late-nineteenth century interpretation of the history of trinitarian theology that oversimplifies the trinitarian traditions. My criticism of the paradigm as a hermeneutical grid for interpreting Edwards’ trinitarianism does not mean that I discount its usefulness for broad generalizations on the respective trinitarian traditions particularly in pedagogical contexts. Rather, the paradigm becomes problematic when its generalizations become categories that serve as a template to (mis)interpret the trinitarianism of a particular theologian, such as Jonathan Edwards. I argue that it is essential to read Edwards’ trinitarianism in terms of its historical-theological context. The background of Edwards’ trinitarianism is twofold. First, it includes the long history of Western trinitarian theology

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encompassing trinitarian theologians from Augustine of Hippo to Edwards’ immediate Puritan predecessor, Cotton Mather. Second, it comprises the early-Enlightenment Trinitarian Controversy and rise of Deism. A historical-theological methodology yields an interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarian theology that differs from interpretations that use the threeness-oneness paradigm. I maintain that Edwards used one trinitarian model—the Augustinian mutual love model. Edwards’ use of this model reflects his continuity with a dominant form of Western trinitarianism and early-Enlightenment apologetics for the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. I also argue that the common thesis among interpreters of Edwards’ trinitarianism that he used the disparate social and psychological models is the product of the threeness-oneness paradigm and not of Edwards’ trinitarianism. Moreover, I maintain that Edwards deployed social motifs in the form of the mutual love model and not a distinct social model of the Trinity. In terms of appropriating Edwards for current theology, I will not delve into this task in detail. I focus on the historical-theological interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism that serves as a footing for modern appropriations of his trinitarian theology. Nevertheless, my historical-theological conclusion that Edwards’ trinitarianism stands in continuity with the Augustinian mutual love tradition questions the common criticism that Western Augustinian trinitarianism is monistic and shows that resources are present within the Western tradition itself to speak to the needs of contemporary trinitarian theology and Christian spirituality.2 The second contribution relates to the broader interpretation of the history of trinitarian theology. An increasing number of patristic scholars argue that the threeness-oneness paradigm is an over-generalized account of Augustine’s trinitarian theology and his relationship to Cappadocian trinitarian theology. This study contributes to this body of scholarship by showing that the uncritical acceptance and application of the threeness-oneness paradigm to a later theologian—Edwards—produces a misinterpretation of his trinitarian theology. Before summarizing the development of my argument in the chapters of the book, I believe it is useful to set my work and the current interpretations of Edwards’ trinitarian theology in the broader context of Edwards studies and of contemporary theology. As all theology occurs within a context, so this analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism stands within a flowering renaissance of Edwardsean and 2For a recent example of appropriating the Augustinian mutual love model for Christian spirituality, see Mary Ann Fatula, The Holy Spirit: Unbounded Gift of Joy (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 1998), 53–69.

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trinitarian studies. Perry Miller’s work marks the rebirth of Edwards studies in the twentieth century.3 In the past thirty years, trinitarian theology also has undergone a resurgence in biblical, historical, and systematic theology.4 To continue the discussion of context, a useful question is: why has Edwards’ trinitarianism caught the eye of theologians especially in the past twenty years? Theologians typically focus on thinkers from the past that offer help for present theological issues. The current interest in Edwards’ trinitarian theology is no different. In current theology a strong impulse exists to develop relational theologies. The development of relational theologies comports with the broader phenomenon called postmodernism.5 Postmodernism is difficult to 3The proliferation of scholarly publications on Edwards has significantly increased during the twentieth century. Based on the bibliographic entries and time divisions employed by M. X. Lesser, from 1905 to 1940 the average number of publications per year was 6.88 (36/248). From 1941 to 1964, which Lesser identifies as the period of Perry Miller’s substantial influence, the average more than doubled to 15.95 per year (24/383). Between the years 1965 and 1993, Edwardsean studies again more than doubled reaching the average rate of 40.72 per year (29/1181). For the bibliographies covering the periods of Edwards scholarship and the corresponding interpretations, see Lesser, Jonathan Edwards: A Reference Guide, Reference Guides to Literature (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1981) and Jonathan Edwards: An Annotated Bibliography, 1979–1993, Bibliographies and Indexes in Religious Studies, 30 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994). 4David S. Cunningham suggests that what was once a renaissance of trinitarian theology now appears as a “bandwagon.” He wonders whether the proliferation of trinitarian theologies will lead to its marginalization in theological discourse. In addition, he presents a useful summary of the contributions in trinitarian theology in the early and mid 1990s (“Trinitarian Theology since 1990,” Reviews in Religion and Theology 4 [1995]: 8–16). For an additional orientation to the revitalization of trinitarian theology, see Christoph Schwöbel, “Introduction,” in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 1–30. 5For standard presentations of postmodern thought, see Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon, 1980); Charles Jencks, What is Post-Modernism (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986); Jean François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and History of Literature, ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse, no. 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979; reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). For useful surveys of the central elements and thinkers within postmodern philosophy and theology, see Thomas Guarino, “Postmodernity and Five Fundamen-

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define because it encompasses transformations in physics, cosmology, architecture, art, philosophy, language theory, and theology.6 A chief characteristic of postmodernism that transcends any one academic discipline is the loss of epistemic certainty, which in turn stands in contrast to Modernism’s claim of epistemic certainty by virtue of access to objective truth.7 Postmodernism also seeks to replace, on the one hand, substance-based ontologies with relational ontologies and, on the other hand, individualistic with relational views of human nature and the natural world.8 In light of these tal Theological Issues,” Theological Studies 57 (1996): 654–89 and John Macquarrie, “Postmodernism in Philosophy of Religion and Theology,” in Issues in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ed. Eugene T. Long, Studies in Philosophy and Religion, 23 (Boston: Kluwer, 2001), 9–27. A more exhaustive introductory text is Thomas Docherty, ed., Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 6An excellent collection of essays that discuss postmodern characteristics in the thought, politics, architecture, lifestyles, media, and entertainment of contemporary Western culture is Stuard Sin, ed., The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism (1998; reprint, New York: Routledge, 2001). 7Monika Kilian, Modern and Postmodern Strategies: Gaming and the Question of Morality: Adorno, Rorty, Lyotard, and Enzensberger, Studies in Literary Criticism and Theory, ed. Hans H. Rudnick, 11 (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 1–3. 8For example, in natural resource management, the recognition of biodiversity has led to the shift away from focus on particular species management to multispecies management within their shared habitat (Anne Primavesi, “Biodiversity and Responsibility: A Basis for a Non-violent Environmental Ethic,” in Faith and Praxis in a Postmodern Age, ed. Ursula King [London: Cassell, 1998], 49–52). David R. Griffin argues that “quantum physics undergirds that we are social beings constituted by internal relations . . . [and that] relations are constitutive of one’s identity.” This relational theory of personal identity stands in contrast to the individualism of modernism that defines personal identity in terms of self-consciousness and freedom (Griffin, “Introduction: Postmodern Spirituality and Society,” in Spirituality and Society: Postmodern Visions, ed. David R. Griffin, SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, ed. D. R. Griffin, 2 [Albany, N.Y.: SUNY, 1988], 14–15). James B. Miller also underscores the connection between twentieth-century developments in physics and the relational theory of reality characteristic of postmodernism (Miller, “The Emerging Postmodern World,” in Postmodern Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralist World, ed. Frederic B. Burnham [New York: Harper and Row, 1989], 9– 10). More recently, Niels H. Gregersen notes the tendency within postmodernism to eclipse individualistic with relational theories of personal identity (“Varieties of Personhood: Mapping the Issues,” The Human Person in Science and Theology, ed. Niels H. Gregersen, Willem B. Drees, and Ulf Görman, Issues in Science and Theology, ed. Niels H. Gregersen [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000], 2–4). John B. Cobb, Jr. advocates a postmodern economic theory. He argues that modern growth oriented

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postmodern concerns, many theologians seek to define God in relational categories in contrast to the alleged timeless and static portrayal of God in classical theism.9 The discussion of postmodernism also often centers on the impact of pluralism in theological discourse and the rise of contextual theologies such as liberation, womanist, and environmental theologies.10 I maintain the broader cultural phenomena encompassing intellectual and scientific changes and often characterized as postmodernism, if not the direct cause, provide a context conducive for relational theologies and particularly those that take the Trinity as the foundation for a relational theology.11 The tandem reemergence of trinitarianism and the primacy that postmodernism gives to relation over and against individualism, which is capitalism fueled by continuous increase of individual consumption despoils the environment and dissolves communities. He maintains that a postmodern economic theory replaces the individualistic consumerism of modern economic theory with the welfare of communities as the governing principle (Cobb, “From Individualism to Persons in Community: A Postmodern Economic Theory,” in Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy, and Art, ed. David R. Griffin, SUNY Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, ser. ed. David R. Griffin [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990], 130–40). For his further development of these ideas, see Cobb, Sustainability: Economics, Ecology, and Justice, Ecology and Justice Series, gen. ed. William R. Eakin and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1992). In terms of postmodernism and science, Huyssteen notes that the acknowledgment of contemporary science of the “theory-ladenness” of the collection and organization of data reflects the influence of postmodernism (J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in a Postmodern World [St. Albans Place, London: SCM, 1998], 15). 9Two self-conscious theological efforts to replace the God of classical theism with a relational concept of God are Process Theology and the Openness of God movement within North American Evangelicalism. For examples in Process Theology, see John B. Cobb and David R. Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979), 19–21 and Schubert M. Ogden, “Toward a New Theism,” in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 179–85. For examples in the Openness of God movement, see Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness, Didsbury Lectures, 2000 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 65–111 and John E. Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1998), 140–66. 10Huyssteen, Duet or Duel? 4–6. 11For the current resurgence in the doctrine of the Trinity and its relation to the abandonment of the traditional metaphysical theory of God, see Wolfhart Pannenberg (trans. Philip Clayton), “Father, Son, Spirit: Problems of a Trinitarian Doctrine of God,” Dialog 26 (1987): 250–51.

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said to have permeated Western culture, are not coincidental. Many trinitarian theologians—often labeled social trinitarians—teach that the Trinity provides an ultimate ontological ground for a relational reality—cosmological, ecological, and social-communal—that transcends what they perceive as the dangers of individualism pervading the modern period.12 As postmodernism is a criticism of and effort to replace modernism, so also the current retrieval of trinitarianism is often times marked by a critical and constructive element. A renaissance presupposes an intervening declension. In order for a renaissance to occur, the new, or at the least something different if not new, must replace the old. In other words, the past is a problem that must be overcome with new ways of thinking. Accordingly, many theologians claim that for much of the history of Western Christianity the Trinity was functionally irrelevant for theology and the practical Christian life.13 Among social trinitarians, the Western Augustinian tradition is the problem because it identifies substance and essence or divine oneness as the primary ontological category. In a context in which relation is understood as primary, substance-based theologies are no longer credible. In contrast to Western substance-based trinitarianism, the Eastern Cappadocian and Western Victorine trinitarian traditions take relation or the divine persons as the central ontological category. The retrieval of the Cappadocian and Victorine trinitarian traditions, as some contemporary trinitarians contend, is the antidote to the Western monistic substancebased trinitarianisms. Operating within the above theological context, contemporary Edwards scholars contend that his trinitarianism serves as a viable source for current relational trinitarian paradigms because the relationality of the triune God is the most fundamental component of his thought. Once they portray him as transcending his inadequate Western Augustinian tradition by devel12Social

trinitarianism asserts that the interpersonal communion among the three divine persons is both that which constitutes the divine being and is primary in any reflection on the divine being. For an example of the application of trinitarian theology, and particularly pneumatology, to environmental and social concerns, see Mark I. Wallace, “The Green Face of God: Recovering the Spirit in an Ecocidal Era,” in Advents of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Current Study of Pneumatology, ed. Bradford E. Hinze and D. Lyle Dabney, Marquette Studies in Theology, 30 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001), 444–64. 13Rahner’s lament that the lack of connecting the Trinity to spirituality renders most Christians practical “monotheists” is characteristic (Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel and intro. Catherine Mowry LaCugna [New York: Crossroad, 1998], 9–11).

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oping a relational or social trinitarianism, they set him forth as a historical resource to construct contemporary relational and social trinitarianisms. He is particularly helpful for the current effort to develop relational theologies better suited to the needs of Christian spirituality. The interpretation of Edwards set forth here uses a historicaltheological methodology to show that Edwards consistently used the Augustinian mutual love model of the Trinity and, therefore, stands in continuity with the Western Augustinian trinitarian tradition. Chapter one presents an overview of the history of interpretations of Edwards’ trinitarianism. This section establishes the historical context and emphasizes the unique contribution of this work in Edwards studies. Prior treatments of Edwards’ trinitarianism have not provided a detailed account of the history of scholarly interpretations of his trinitarianism. Chapter two shows that the threeness-oneness paradigm is an unsuitable interpretive framework to interpret Edwards’ trinitarianism, with particular attention given to its application in the work of Plantinga Pauw. To highlight its problematic nature as a hermeneutical template, the chapter first illustrates that the paradigm’s assumptions conflict with the trinitarian theology of Augustine and much recent scholarship on Augustine’s trinitarianism. The over-generalized nature of the paradigm, illustrated by its misinterpretation of Augustine, cautions against its use to interpret individual trinitarian theologians in general and Edwards in particular. The chapter demonstrates second that the use of the paradigm leads to a misinterpretation of Edwards’ relationship to the Western trinitarian tradition. Chapters three and four constructively demonstrate that Edwards’ trinitarian theology stands in continuity with the Augustinian mutual love trinitarian tradition. Chapter three defines five central characteristics of the Augustinian mutual love tradition and highlights the presence of these characteristics in two representative theologians of Western trinitarianism, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. Chapter four shows that Edwards’ trinitarianism embodies the five characteristics of the Augustinian mutual love tradition. Chapter five shows that Edwards’ trinitarianism stands in continuity with the apologetic strategies used to defend traditional trinitarianism in light of various criticisms of the traditional doctrine in the earlyEnlightenment. Criticisms of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity were commonplace in the early-Enlightenment. In the context of the English trinitarian controversy in particular, Edwards’ trinitarian theology aligns with the Athanasian trinitarianism of Robert South and Daniel Waterland in contrast to the tritheistic tendencies of William Sherlock and subordination-

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ism of Samuel Clarke. Edwards, moreover, used common apologetical strategies to defend the doctrine of the Trinity against Deist criticisms of the Trinity. Describing and showing Edwards’ continuity with these earlyEnlightenment trinitarian debates shows that the polemical thrust of his trinitarian writings was not directed toward his Western, Reformed scholastic, and Puritan trinitarian traditions, but to forms of anti-trinitarianism in the early-Enlightenment. Moreover, rather than repudiating his Western trinitarian heritage, Edwards embraced the dominant trinitarian model of that heritage—the Augustinian mutual love model. Finally, for references to Edwards, in most cases I will use the Yale editions. For citations from the Yale volumes, I will cite them according to the title referenced within the volume or the volume title, volume number, and page number (e.g., Treatise on Grace, 21:183); the book’s bibliography provides full bibliographical details. The bibliography has four parts: 1) Edwards Primary Texts, Collected Works, and Reference Works; 2) PreTwentieth Century Sources; 3) Modern Sources; and 4) Dissertations. A couple of exceptions are George Fisher, Egbert Smyth, and Williston Walker. They have publications in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but their entries are all listed in Pre-Twentieth Century Sources in order to keep them together.

1 THE HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF JONATHAN EDWARDS’ TRINITARIANISM In order to establish the context for the present investigation of Edwards’ trinitarianism, this chapter details the history of the interpretation of his trinitarian theology. Previous scholars have not presented the history of the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism in a detailed fashion.1 However, I maintain that it is important because it illustrates the tendency of previous scholarship to overlook and/or misidentify the historical-theological context of Edwards’ trinitarianism. Moreover, it exhibits the tendency to interpret Edwards’ trinitarian theology in terms of the popular theological judgments and attitudes of the interpreter’s context. The interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism can be divided into two historical eras. The first era begins in 1851 with Horace Bushnell’s (1802– 1876) allusion to Edwards’ trinitarianism and ends in 1912 with Benjamin B. Warfield’s (1851–1921) reference to Edwards in his essay on the Trinity. Within this period, Edwards A. Park (1808–1900) and Alexander V. G. Allen (1841–1908) offer the most substantive analyses of his trinitarianism. Edwards’ trinitarian writings are not again the subject of sustained attention until Herbert W. Richardson’s dissertation in 1962. The second period, therefore, runs from Richardson’s dissertation on Edwards’ trinitarianism to the present. For the second era, I chose the dissertations by Herbert W. 1For

instance, Amy Plantinga Pauw only very briefly covers the mid-eighteenth century interpretations and controversy over the suppression of Edwards’ trinitarian writings (Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 13–19). Herbert W. Richardson’s 1962 and Krister Sairsingh’s 1986 Harvard University dissertations on Edwards’ trinitarianism contain no discussion of previous interpretations of Edwards’ trinitarianism (Richardson, “The Glory of God in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in the Doctrine of the Trinity” and Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Divine Glory: His Foundational Trinitarianism and Its Ecclesial Import”). More recently, Rachel S. Stahle’s 1999 Boston University dissertation also lacks a discussion of the history of the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism (Stahle, “The Trinitarian Spirit of Jonathan Edwards’ Theology”). 11

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Richardson and Krister Sairsingh and book by Amy Plantinga Pauw because they are the most substantial contributions to the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism. While Richardson does not use the threenessoneness paradigm, his is the first full-length treatment of Edwards’ trinitarian thought and, for reasons unknown to this writer, is rarely mentioned in the scholarly literature on Edwards’ trinitarianism. Plantinga Pauw and Sairsingh both rely on the threeness-oneness paradigm and are therefore central to this project.

NINETEENTH AND EARLY-TWENTIETH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS Prior to detailing the specific interpretations of Edwards’ trinitarian theology, each section begins with a description of the theological context, which influences the respective appraisals of his trinitarianism. These sections identify the central issues that inform the theological setting of the writer. Moreover, by setting the interpretation of Edwards in the theological context of the interpreter, we can more readily identify those factors influencing their respective evaluation of Edwards’ trinitarian theology. The trinitarian theology of the nineteenth century was decisively shaped by three important developments in the eighteenth century: the rise of Unitarianism, the application of a post-Cartesian theory of person—as a center of consciousness and act—and Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher’s (1768–1834) theory of religious epistemology.2 Although the influence of Unitarianism in nineteenth-century American Protestant theology is clear to students of American Protestantism, the importance of the theories of personhood and Schleiermacher are less so. Yet to understand nineteenthcentury evaluations of Edwards’ trinitarianism, these broader philosophical and theological issues must be kept in mind. For instance, Bushnell’s attitude toward what he called Edwards’ a priori argument for the Trinity can be interpreted only when we consider the influence of Schleiermacher’s religious epistemology on Bushnell. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the notion of person as a center of consciousness and act was applied to the Trinity. Prior to this, 2Claude Welch argues that the emergence of biblical criticism primarily and Schleiermacher secondarily reduced the viability of the doctrine of the Trinity (Welch, The Trinity in Contemporary Theology [London: SCM, 1953], 3). I do not disagree with Welch, but I highlight the impact of the modern post-Cartesian theory of person as a center of consciousness and act and the influence of Schleiermacher’s theory of religious knowledge as factors that reduced the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity. Those two factors are under-appreciated influences in the developments in New England trinitarian thought.

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traditional trinitarianism made a metaphysical claim that God is a triune being that subsists as three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Person meant a subsistent relation of the divine nature. The new trend of assuming that a divine person was equivalent to a human person—a center of consciousness and act—implied tritheism.3 The consequence was that the doctrine of the Trinity came under severe attack and Unitarian, Arian, and Modalistic theories became increasingly popular in intellectual circles. In addition and in the wake of Immanuel Kant, many theologians believed that knowledge of God’s immanent nature was inaccessible to human reason. Schleiermacher accepted this and argued that religious knowledge does not have God as such as its referent, but refers to religious consciousness.4 For Schleiermacher, Christian doctrine cannot refer to God per se because it is expressed in finite terms and God is infinite. This relates principally to the fragmentary and composite nature of language and knowledge. Since God is simple and human language is composite, theology is not ultimately a description of God. Furthermore, since religious knowledge does

3While professor of theology at Harvard, Andrews Norton (1763–1853) chided trinitarians that “a person is a being. No one who has any correct notion of the meaning of words will deny this. . . . The doctrine of the Trinity, then, affirms that there are three Gods” (Norton, A Statement of Reasons for not believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians respecting the Nature of God, and the Person of Christ. Occasioned by Professor Stuart’s Letters to Mr. Channing [Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1819], 4). For valuable introductions to Norton’s criticism of the doctrine of the Trinity, see Donald A. Crosby, Horace Bushnell’s Theory of Language: In the Context of Other Nineteenth-Century Philosophies of Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 179–89 and Bruce M. Stephens, God’s Last Metaphor: The Doctrine of the Trinity in New England Theology, American Academy of Religion: Studies in Religion, ed. Conrad Cherry, 24 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 53–57. Even the trinitarian, Nathaniel W. Taylor, declared, to say that God is three persons in the “ordinary” meaning of the term person is a clear contradiction. In a treatise on the Trinity, Taylor presents a grammatical solution. He argues that oneness must be so defined as to not exclude tri-personality and that tri-personality must be so defined as to not contradict unity (Nathaniel W. Taylor, Essays, Lectures, etc. Upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology, Garland Series: American Religious Thought of the 18th and 19th Centuries, ed. Bruce Kuklick [1859; reprint, New York: Garland, 1987], 3–4 and 12). However, in his explanation of the manner of tri-personality, Taylor flirts with modalism. For instance, he argues that the distinction between divine persons derives from “personal forms of phenomenal action” (Taylor, Essays, 16 and 33–34). 4Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. and ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1928), § 15.1 (pp. 76–77).

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not correspond to the objective reality of God, it is merely the expression of the religious consciousness—the sense of absolute dependence.5 Schleiermacher believed that the doctrine of the Trinity was an unjustifiable addition to the Christian faith. The union of the divine essence with Christ and the Church was true, but to extrapolate from this to immanent and eternal distinctions in the divine essence was unwarranted.6 In turn, he adopted a modalist or Sabellian understanding of the Trinity.7 Moses Stuart (1780–1852) introduced Schleiermacher’s trinitarianism to American theologians in 1835 through his translation and publication of Schleiermacher’s On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity.8

5Schleiermacher,

The Christian Faith, § 50.2 (pp. 195–96). The Christian Faith, § 170.1 (pp. 738–39). 7Robert R. Williams argues that commentators on Schleiermacher’s theology have largely misunderstood his theory of the Trinity. Williams insists, contrary to the common notion, that Schleiermacher did not reject the doctrine of the Trinity as such, but rather only the speculative theories of the immanent Trinity. He also argues that Schleiermacher was not only an economic trinitarian. Williams maintains that Schleiermacher is a genuine trinitarian because he believed that the God revealed in the economy of redemption is identical with God in himself. For instance, since God the redeemer is coincident with God himself, God the redeemer is immanent in God’s being. This is not a speculative approach to the Trinity but one that follows the order of religious epistemology—i.e., from religious experience to knowledge of God (Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978], 139–57). While Williams may be correct to charge that theologians have misunderstood Schleiermacher, the important point for my presentation is that Schleiermacher influenced, whether rightfully or wrongfully understood, the move away from immanent trinitarian reflection among nineteenth-century New England theologians. 8Moses Stuart, “On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity,” The Biblical Repository and Quarterly Observer 5 (April, 1835): 265–353 and 6 (July, 1835): 1–116. Stuart’s scholarly contributions came during his tenure at Andover Seminary as professor of sacred literature. He introduced German biblical critical tools to American theological education. Rather than seeing these as obstructions to faith, he believed they could be used to defend orthodox Christianity. As a member of Andover Seminary, he was a mildly conservative Calvinist. He gained a reputation as a defender of trinitarianism through his critical interaction with William Ellery Channing’s Unitarianism. For background on Stuart, see John H. Giltner, Moses Stuart: The Father of Biblical Sciences in America, Biblical scholarship in North America, ed. Kent H. Richards, 14 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). 6Schleiermacher,

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The problem for New England divines was manifold. Many accepted the premise that knowledge of God’s immanent nature was inaccessible. However, the problem with a modal Trinity is that, while it preserves the doctrine of unity and simplicity, it seems to violate the doctrine of immutability. It does so because the divine persons revealed in time are not eternal subsistences of the divine nature but transient modes of revelation in time. Many solved this problem by affirming that the economic Trinity was grounded in some ineffable eternal distinctions within the divine nature. In this section, I set the interpretations of Edwards’ doctrine of the Trinity in relief with the broader theological trends of the nineteenth century. The interpretations of his trinitarianism reflect the respective authors’ attitude toward the emerging trends to equate divine persons with the subjective notion of person and to reject the feasibility of speculating on the immanent nature of the Trinity. By placing the interpretations in context with the larger theological movements of the time, we are able to see the relationship between the respective interpretations of Edwards’ trinitarian thought and the broader theological currents of the era. Horace Bushnell Horace Bushnell’s reference, in Christ in Theology, to Edwards’ “a priori argument for the Trinity” was the catalyst for scholarly interest in Edwards’ trinitarianism.9 Bushnell mentions his unfulfilled desire to use for illustrative 9Bushnell, Christ in Theology (Hartford: Brown and Parsons, 1851), vi. Bushnell was a congregational minister and theologian. His chief theological contributions were a non-revivalist approach to Christian nurture, a theory of religious language and its concomitant subordination of dogma to intuitive religious experience, and a moral influence theory of the atonement. In later years, Bushnell’s views, particularly the latter two, drew closer to traditional New England theology. His most profound influence came later in the century with the rise of the Social Gospel and American Liberal Christianity. For biographic-background on Bushnell, see Robert L. Edwards, Of Singular Genius, Of Singular Grace: A Biography of Horace Bushnell (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim, 1992). What Bushnell calls Edwards’ a priori argument seems to be what B. B. Warfield described as his ontological argument (Benjamin B. Warfield, “The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity,” in Biblical and Theological Studies, ed. Samuel G. Craig [1912; reprint, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1952], 26). The ontological argument refers to Edwards’ theory that a perfect idea in the mind of God entails existence or being. So that, when God contemplates his own essence in an eternal act of self-reflection or as the object of his own understanding, then that idea, since it is perfect and of God’s essence, produces the subsistence of the second person of the Trinity. For Edwards’ articulation of this theory, see Edwards,

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purposes a manuscript of Edwards on the Trinity hitherto suppressed and omitted from the published writings of Edwards due to its alleged controversial content.10 Although Bushnell’s mention of Edwards’ trinitarianism is brief and based solely on hearsay, nonetheless it is a window into several important elements of mid-nineteenth-century New England Protestant theology. First, Jonathan Edwards was accorded a prominent stature within the American Protestant theological traditions. Second, the doctrine of the Trinity was a topic of vigorous theological discussion. Third, Bushnell’s interest in an a priori argument of Edwards is reflective of a growing distaste Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113–18. In 1851, Horace Bushnell raised suspicions about the orthodoxy of Edwards’ trinitarianism when his requests for access to Edwards’ trinitarian writings were denied by the curators of Edwards’ manuscripts (for further background on Bushnell’s correspondence with the curators, see Richard D. Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” The Crane Review 1 [1959]: 68–76). Apologists for Edwards responded by publishing several of his trinitarian writings. In 1880, Egbert C. Smyth published Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons)—in fact, this text was the extended miscellany no. 1062, now available in Edwards, Miscellanies, 20:430–43. Edwards A. Park followed up with the publication of “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” Bibliotheca Sacra 38 (1881): 147–87 and 333–69. Park’s twopart essay culled sections of Grosart’s Unpublished Writings of Jonathan Edwards of America (Edinburgh, 1865). The Grosart edition was printed for private circulation and does not appear to have affected the controversy engendered by Bushnell. Finally in 1903, George P. Fisher published An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity: With Remarks on Edwards and His Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903). 10The source for Bushnell’s knowledge of the existence of a manuscript on the Trinity by Edwards is not known. Bushnell also wrote several letters of inquiry, though indirectly through other family members, to the custodians of Edwards’ manuscripts requesting access to the unpublished documents on the Trinity. They denied his overtures and he never gained access to Edwards’ trinitarian writings (Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 68–76). Bushnell’s charge of suppression turned out correct. As the correspondence between Edwards’ relatives indicates, the custodians refused to publish Edwards’ transcripts on the Trinity because they were uncomfortable with their contents. The chief factor was presumably Edwards’ teaching of the eternal generation of the Son (Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 72 –80 and Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity, xiii). The writings of Edwards were available to Bushnell in Sereno E. Dwight, The Works of President Edwards with a Memoir of His Life, 10 vols. (New York: S. Converse, 1829–1830). At the time, although severely edited by Dwight, this was the definitive edition of Edwards’ writings.

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for speculation into the immanent nature of the Trinity. This latter point deserves more attention. Bushnell would reject Edwards’ alleged a priori argument for the Trinity on two grounds. First, knowledge of God’s immanent nature is inaccessible to human reason.11 Second, the nature of religious language precludes a priori theological claims. Bushnell believed that religious language is an image or form that only approximately expresses the underlying religious truth experienced. Theology seeks to describe spiritual reality with terms taken from the physical world. Physical terms convey knowledge of spiritual reality because the physical world mirrors spiritual reality. The correspondence between the physical and spiritual is due to the fact that God imbued the world with the immanent Logos that in turn corresponds with human reason (i.e., logos). However, while physical terms are useful to describe religious experience, the correspondence is never exact, and therefore religious knowledge remains symbolic.12 The mistake of theologians is to confuse formal representations with the truth itself. Since language is approximate, a priori arguments are impossible.13

11Bushnell,

God in Christ: Three Discourses delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation of Language (Hartford: Brown and Parsons, 1849), 137 and Christ in Theology, 119. 12Bushnell classified language according to physical-literal and intelligenceanalogous and figurative. Words that describe the physical world are literal. Words taken from the physical realm to refer to spiritual or intellectual phenomena are analogous or figures. This limitation applies to the divine side as well. For God to reveal himself, he must do so in finite forms, which can never fully communicate the infinite. Bushnell uses the ascension of Christ to illustrate how physical terms are used to express divine truth. The Acts of the Apostles depicts Jesus rising into the clouds. Bushnell remarks, “the reality of the ascension . . . is not the motion, but what the motion signifies, viz., the change of state” (Bushnell, God in Christ, 20– 21, 38–53, and 142). For a useful presentation of Bushnell’s theory, see William A. Johnson, Nature and the Supernatural in the Theology of Horace Bushnell, Studia Theologica Lundensia, 25 (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1963), 46–62 and Crosby, Horace Bushnell’s Theory of Language, 19–23. 13Bushnell, Christ in Theology, 15–16. While Bushnell would have had little use for Edwards’ metaphysical discussion of the immanent Trinity, the religious significance he assigned to the Trinity is very similar to Edwards’. Both affirm that the Father plans and sends the Son, the Son enacts the merciful intentions of the Father, and the Spirit is the presence of God dwelling in the soul or the mercy applied. Compare Bushnell, God in Christ, 172–74 and Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:187–91.

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Bushnell’s reference to Edwards’ manuscript on the Trinity is also important because he intimates that it contains controversial elements. While Bushnell may have objected to Edwards’ a priori argument, he would have welcomed his doctrines of the eternal generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit. In contrast, many New England divines believed that these doctrines implied an ontological subordination of the Son and the Spirit because the doctrine of aseity, which means necessary existence and is required for divine status, could not be applied to them.14 The irony of the 14Stuart

makes this criticism of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son; indeed, he rejects as a form of ontological subordination a theory that bases the subsistence or personality of any divine person upon another divine person (Stuart, “On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity,” 91). Stuart also rejects the doctrine as a contradiction in Letters to the Rev. William E. Channing, containing Remarks on his Sermon recently preached and published at Baltimore, 2nd ed. (Andover: Flagg and Gould, 1819), 31. George P. Fisher, himself not far removed from the era of New England Theology, states that the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son had fallen into widespread disuse after Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803) (Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, International Theological Library [1901; reprint, New York: AMS, 1976], 420). Hopkins defended the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son (The Works of Samuel Hopkins, 3 vols., ed. Jacob Ide, Garland Series: American Religious Thought of the 18th and 19th Centuries, ed. Bruce Kuklick [1852–1854; reprint, New York: Garland, 1987], 1:305–10). However, although a New Divinity thinker like Hopkins, Nathanael Emmons rejected the doctrine of eternal generation. Emmons argues that the personal names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are based solely on their economic functions (The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, 6 vols., American Religious Thought of the 18th and 19th Centuries [1860–1863; reprint, New York: Garland, 1987], 2:135–36). New Divinity refers to a proAwakening line of theological reflection originally rooted in the theology of Jonathan Edwards that became dominant in New England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (for a detailed discussion of the New Divinity movement, see Joseph A. Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement: Calvinism, the Congregational Ministry, and Reform in New England between the Great Awakenings [Grand Rapids: Christian University Press, 1981]). Interesting to note is that, in the previous century, Samuel Clarke rejected the strict divinity of the Son based on the argument that the Son’s generation from Father implies ontological subordination (Thomas C. Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Dr. Samuel Clarke (1675–1729): Context, Sources, and Controversy, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, ed. Heiko A. Oberman, 75 [New York: Brill, 1997], 206–16). Proponents of New England Theology accepted the semi-Arian and Unitarian line of reasoning— generation is subordination, but still held to the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather than develop compelling responses to these criticisms, they increasingly reduced the

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allegation that Bushnell departed from New England orthodoxy is that he, like Edwards, grounded the Trinity revealed in time in the immanent generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit.15 Yet for Bushnell the doctrines of the eternal generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit do not refer directly to the immanent Trinity, but nevertheless point to the eternal triune nature of God.16 The purpose of these doctrines is to symbolize that God is one substance, but a substance doctrine of the Trinity to confessional orthodoxy and theological mystery. For a succinct survey of the criticisms and commensurate rejection of the doctrine of eternal generation, see Stephens, God’s Last Metaphor, 21–30. 15Bushnell, “The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth,” The New Englander 12 (November, 1854): 501–2 and Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:129–31. 16In Christ in Theology, Bushnell criticizes Schleiermacher’s modalistic Trinity and the more or less orthodox Trinity of Moses Stuart because both extrapolated from the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity. He agrees that all three begin with the original unity of God, but the error of Schleiermacher is that he asserts that the one God reveals himself in three modes and Stuart argues that since God is revealed as three in the economy of redemption, then He is also three in nature. Bushnell avers that both assert too much. Both transcend the limitations of human language by making claims about the interior nature of God. Reflection on the Trinity should be limited to Scripture and its practical use in the Christian life. Efforts to explicate the interior nature of the deity should be abandoned. The purpose of the triune revelation is to show that God is infinite and that his relationship with people is social or personal. However, at a later point in the text in a manner very similar to Stuart, Bushnell affirms that the temporal revelation of the Trinity is grounded on an immanent and eternal reality in God (Bushnell, Christ in Theology, 119–20 and 184 and “The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth,” 488–89 and 492– 99). In modern theological parlance, Bushnell was more concerned with the economic Trinity than the immanent Trinity. For Stuart’s theory of the Trinity, see his editorial remarks to Schleiermacher’s view in Stuart, “On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity,” 95. Bushnell and Stuart are closer in thought than is evident in Bushnell’s criticism. They shared a common mistrust of metaphysical speculation on the immanent Trinity and univocal application of the word “person” to the manifestations of God in history. Furthermore, both also affirmed that the economic revelations are based on eternal distinctions in God (Stuart, “On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity,” 87– 97 and Bushnell, “The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth,” 488–90). Two useful treatments of Bushnell’s trinitarian thought are Bruce M. Stephens, “The Trinity as the Language of God: Horace Bushnell,” in God’s Last Metaphor, 63–74 and Johnson, Nature and the Supernatural, 138–78.

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“eternally becoming three.”17 Exactly how this takes place we cannot know. Yet, this must be true in some ineffable way because the Trinity revealed in time derives from the eternal mode of the deity’s threefold existence; to affirm otherwise is to contradict the principle of divine immutability.18 In the final analysis, Bushnell’s and Edwards’ formulations of the doctrine of eternal generation are substantively different. Edwards believed that the doctrine corresponded to the immanent personal relations of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. However, their use of the doctrine is similar to the extent that both base the distinctions of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit upon the doctrine. For Bushnell and Edwards, generation and procession define the Son and the Spirit. The difference is that for Edwards these doctrines refer to the real immanent relations of the divine persons and constitute knowledge of the triune God. For Bushnell, they only symbolize the temporal revelation of God’s eternal threefold existence, which threefold existence remains an inscrutable mystery. Edwards stood in the pre-Kantian theological world in which theologians believed that although they saw through a glass darkly they actually saw something of God, whereas Bushnell stood in the post-Kantian one in which knowledge of God is inaccessible to speculative reason. In summary, Bushnell’s interest in Edwards’ trinitarian writings was likely twofold. By referring to Edwards’ a priori argument for the Trinity, Bushnell subtly criticized the epistemological assumptions undergirding the trinitarianism of the New England Theology. The New England theologians assumed a form of knowledge of God no longer credible to the leading philosophy of the day. He also may have known that Edwards taught the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. This fact would have enabled Bushnell to claim the father of New England theology as an ally to his trinitarian theology. Though the exact nature of his interest in and opinion of Edwards’ trinitarianism remains unknown, he was the first to suggest that it was out of step with the trinitarian theology, both traditional and new, of the mid-nineteenth century. Oliver W. Holmes What Bushnell implied, Oliver W. Holmes (1809–1894) brings to a full blown accusation of anti-trinitarianism in his acerbic essay on Edwards.19 17Bushnell, 18Bushnell,

“The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth,” 502. Christ in Theology, 170–85 and “The Christian Trinity a Practical

Truth,” 501–2. 19Oliver W. Holmes, “Jonathan Edwards,” The International Review 9 (July, 1880):

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Although Holmes characterizes Edwards’ pastoral tenure at Northampton as a “reign of terror,” nonetheless he finds one glimmer of hope in the theological writings of Edwards: it is possible that in his later years he developed theological tendencies toward Arianism or Sabellianism and away from the “heathen conceptions [the Trinity] which had so long enchained his powerful, but crippled understanding.”20 Holmes offers no textual evidence for this accusation, but suggests, as did Bushnell, that the editors of Edwards’ published works intentionally omitted these controversial writings.21 Holmes’ interest in Edwards’ alleged deviation from traditional trinitarianism was the hope that the cornerstone of New England orthodoxy would buttress his Unitarianism. As Richard D. Pierce states, “if Edwards could be quoted as a pioneer of the new doctrine [Unitarianism], heterodoxy might even claim to be orthodoxy.”22 Whereas Bushnell’s allegation largely went ignored, except in personal correspondence between Edwards’ relatives and curators of his manuscripts; Holmes’ charge sparked a public call for the publication of the secret treatise(s) on the Trinity.23 Holmes also claimed that Edwards’ God is not a Trinity, but a “quaternity.”24 The fourth person of Edwards’ God is justice. Holmes’ point is that a draconian notion of justice is the most fundamental reality of Edwards’ God. God demands moral perfection from his human subjects all the while knowing that they are unable to render moral perfection due to original sin. The gap between God’s requirement and human performance creates a demand on justice. The affront to divine justice is assuaged by 1–28. This essay is also available in Holmes, Pages from an Old Volume of Life: A Collection of Essays, 1857–1881 (Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1892), 361–401. Holmes is best known for his prominent status among Boston literary elites, including Ralph Waldo Emerson, throughout the nineteenth century. He was also a professor and dean of the Harvard Medical School and a prolific writer on medical topics. Although he was not a theologian and tended toward Unitarianism, he is well known for his antipathy to Calvinism. For biographical background on Holmes, see Edwin P. Hoyt, The Improper Bostonian: Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes (New York: William Morrow, 1979). 20Holmes, “Jonathan Edwards,” 28 and 25. 21Holmes, “Jonathan Edwards,” 25. 22Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 78. 23For a detailed account of the history of Edwards’ trinitarian manuscripts and the private correspondence and concerns over Edwards’ trinitarian writings, see Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 66–80. 24Holmes, “Jonathan Edwards,” 6.

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God’s consignment of the non-elect to eternal damnation.25 However, in the final analysis, Holmes does not intend to suggest that justice is hypostasized in Edwards’ theology; rather, he is using hyperbole to cast Edwards’ emphasis on God’s justice in a pejorative light. In the end, Holmes offered nothing to the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism but unfounded accusation. Despite this, his accusation is important because it motivated Smyth and Park to publish several of Edwards’ key trinitarian texts. Egbert C. Smyth and Edwards A. Park Egbert C. Smyth (1829–1904) and Edwards A. Park (1808–1900) effectively parried Holmes’ allegation of Edwards’ Arianism and/or Sabellianism. Although Smyth follows Park in the development of theological history in nineteenth-century America, he is treated first because his publication of Edwards’ Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption (1880) preceded Park’s two-part exculpatory article in Bibliotheca Sacra (1881). In addition, I chose to treat Smyth and Park together because they represent the formal response to the controversy over Edward’s trinitarianism sparked by Bushnell and Holmes.

Egbert C. Smyth Smyth was appointed Andover Seminary’s Brown professor of Ecclesiastical History in 1863. He ascended to prominence after the resignation of Edwards A. Park from the Abbot Professorship in 1881, and became the co-founder and co-editor of The Andover Review and a leader in Progressive Orthodoxy or the New Theology.26 25Holmes,

“Jonathan Edwards,” 6–9. in 1884 at Andover Seminary, the Andover Review and especially its editorial page was the chief organ for the advancement of Progressive Orthodoxy. Bruce Kuklick summarizes the role of the journal as “the primary vehicle for a nascent liberalism within the religious philosophy of Trinitarianism” (Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985], 217). The editorials were published in book form under the title Progressive Orthodoxy: A Contribution to the Christian Interpretation of Christian Doctrines (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1886). Key treatments of Progressive Orthodoxy and the development of North American liberal theology are Daniel D. Williams, The Andover Liberals: A Study in American Theology (New York: Octagon, 1970) and Gary J. Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805–1900 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001). Additional valuable texts on the movement are Anthony C. Cecil, Jr., The Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park: The last of the “Consistent Calvinists,” Dissertation Series, 1 (Mis26Founded

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Progressive Orthodoxy was a theological movement of the late nineteenth century that replaced New England Theology. In relationship to New England Theology, Progressive Orthodoxy was a move toward theological liberalism because it abandoned the notion of reified dogmas. In the place of static dogmas, it adopted an evolutionary or developmental theory of Christian theology. Yet this development was portrayed as standing in genetic continuity with past Christian thought. Christian theology is the product of and is evaluated by the ever-developing Christian consciousness of God. Progressive Orthodoxy is progressive because it embraces a developmental theory of religious truth and orthodox because the developments in religious knowledge stand in continuity with and evolve out of the past. The doctrine of divine immanence served as the theological foundation for the progress of Christian consciousness and theology. Proponents also believed they were reasserting the centrality of the person of Christ in Christianity. This is in contrast to the legalistic theories of the atonement—satisfaction and governmental theories—that dominated New England Theology.27 soula: American Academy of Religion and Scholars’ Press, 1974), 155–205; Joseph A. Conforti, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Tradition, and American Culture (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 141–44, 198–99, and 216–29. Darwinism and German philosophy decisively influenced Progressive Orthodoxy. Kuklick remarks that, “the intellectual stance of the young academics must be seen, as must that of Progressive Orthodoxy, against the background of German speculation. The perspective of the new generation was another version of the idealistDarwinian mix. Darwin was, roughly, placed in a Hegelian framework” (Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, 198–99). That German thought assisted Andover liberals to replace New England Theology with Progressive Orthodoxy is ironic because Moses Stuart and Edwards A. Park played a key role in the introduction of German theology to American theology students through their use of it in the classroom and promotion of it in Bibliotheca Sacra. 27My description of Progressive Orthodoxy as liberal corresponds to William R. Hutchison’s definition of liberal and classification of the movement in The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1–11 and 76–110. A useful and succinct description of nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury liberal theology is also available in Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 209–13. The characteristics of Progressive Orthodoxy were developed in articles that appeared in The Andover Review: for examples, see editors, “Progressive orthodoxy: Criteria of Theological Progress,” The Andover Review 3 (May, 1885): 466–72; John C. Adams, “The Christ and the Creation,” The Andover Review 17 (March, 1892): 225–37; John W. Buckham, “The Indwelling Christ,” The Andover Review 16 (August, 1891): 167–71; George A. Gordon, “The Contrast and Agreement between the New Orthodoxy and the

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Smyth was also a distant relative of Jonathan Edwards by virtue of marriage. As a result, he received a collection of Edwards’ manuscripts when his father-in-law, William T. Dwight, died in 1865.28 The manuscripts contained a lengthy essay on the triune God’s redemptive activities. Smyth believed that he had found the treatise referred to by Bushnell and Holmes and that its publication would silence the accusations of heterodoxy against Edwards. The essay was published in 1880 under the title, Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption. In fact, the text published by Smyth was Miscellany 1062.29 Old,” The Andover Review 19 (January, 1893): 1–18; and Egbert C. Smyth, “Dogma in Religion,” The Andover Review 14 (November, 1890): 491–508. 28Smyth acknowledges his receipt of the document from William T. Dwight (Egbert C. Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1880], 8). William Dwight was the brother of Sereno E. Dwight and the great grandson of Jonathan Edwards. At the time, two collections of Edwards’ manuscripts were in circulation. The first collection, which served as the basis for Edwards the Younger’s four volume edition of Edwards’ writings and Sereno Dwight’s ten volume edition of the works, passed from Edwards’ estate to Edwards the Younger to Timothy Dwight, then to Sereno Dwight, then to Tyron Edwards, and finally to Edwards A. Park. Sereno Dwight accumulated an additional collection of manuscripts that included copies of Edwards’ writings, letters of Edwards dating from his college years, and early writings that had remained at the Edwards’ homestead in Connecticut. Sereno Dwight bequeathed this collection to his brother William T. Dwight, who in turn gave the manuscript collection to Egbert C. Smyth in 1865. For a detailed account of the transmission of the Edwards manuscript collections, see Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 66–67. 29Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 7–10. Miscellany no. 1062 is available in Edwards, Miscellanies, 20:430–43. The Miscellanies, numbering in excess of 1400, were a series of entries in a theological notebook. Edwards was in the habit of making notes on various topics that often times were later incorporated into his formal treatises. The Miscellanies can be understood as the record of Edwards’ theological brainstorming and, in a few instances such as Miscellany no. 1062, initial theological treatises. For an excellent introduction to Edwards’ use of the Miscellanies, see Thomas A. Schafer, “Editor’s Introduction,” in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 13, The “Miscellanies” (Entry nos. a-z, aa-zz, 1–500), ed. Thomas A. Schafer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 1–109. In 1903, Smyth also published Miscellany 94 with others on the Trinity as an appendix to his essay “The Theology of Jonathan Edwards,” in Exercises Commemorating the Two-Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Jonathan Edwards, Held at Andover Theological Seminary, October 4 and 5, 1903, ed. John W. Platner (Andover, Mass.: An-

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Bushnell’s and Holmes’ charge of editorial suppression was not unfounded; Miscellany 1062 was intentionally withheld from publication by William T. Dwight.30 As to why it was not published, Smyth remarks that there is no clear reason, as the document contains no hint of unorthodoxy.31 However, one possible reason is that the treatise teaches the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son and the correlate doctrine of the economic subordination of the Son to the Father, which seemed to provide fodder for Unitarian assaults on traditional trinitarianism. For the nineteenth-century editors of Edwards’ writings it was decidedly ill advised to publish documents in which the father of New England Theology was defending the doctrines that they were doing their best to repudiate.32 While Smyth’s analysis of the essay is brief, nevertheless three observations are important. First, Smyth discounts as a reason for the essay’s suppression the doctrine of a “‘Social Trinity’ which underlies its argument.”33 dover Press, 1904), 75–93 and Appendix 1.A, pp. 7–33, with the title, “Trinity.” Miscellany 94 is a key text for Edwards’ trinitarian thought because of its early date (1723–1724), length, and substance. Miscellany 94 is now available in the Yale critical edition: see Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:256–63). Miscellany 94 was also previously published in Harvey G. Townsend, ed., The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards: From His Private Notebooks, University of Oregon Monographs: Studies in Philosophy, 2 (1955; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972), 252–58. 30Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 72 –80. Miscellany 1062 and/or perhaps Miscellany 94 are likely the text(s) suppressed by William T. Dwight. In a letter dated April 21, 1851 to Edward W. Hooker, Dwight conveyed his decision to disallow Bushnell to read the trinitarian texts due to “the nature of its contents” (Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 74). Dwight’s collection, which was the later-group of writings compiled by Sereno Dwight, passed to Egbert Smyth. Edwards Park possessed the primary collection of Edwards’ writings. This collection also included a trinitarian text—most likely the text published by Fisher as An Essay on the Trinity—that even though Park would not refuse its publication, he nonetheless was not anxious to do so. He claimed that the manuscript had fallen behind his bookcase and would require a carpenter to extract. To which text—Miscellany 1062 or An Essay on the Trinity— Bushnell referred in the preface of Christ in Theology is unknown as both Park and Smyth confessed ignorance of its identity (Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 68–72). 31Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 10–11. 32Although Emmons was not an editor of Edwards’ writings, he was a central figure in the Edwardsean tradition and emphatically rejected the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit for implying ontological subordination (The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, 2:141–42). 33Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 11.

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This statement contains two important referents: the social Trinity and the argument of the treatise. The argument is Edwards’ articulation of the covenant of redemption and its foundation in the economic subordination of the Son to the Father and the Spirit to the Son. Edwards believed that the order of economic activity was based on the order of personal and immanent subsistence.34 In order to achieve redemption, the Father and the Son enter into a compact—the covenant of redemption. The Father designs the plan of redemption, the Son agrees to forego the glory of heaven for the humiliation of the cross in order to bring the Father’s design to fruition, and the Spirit is the gift conceived by the Father and merited by the work of the Son. The social Trinity refers to the strong notion of divine personhood implicit to the compacting between the Father and the Son in the covenant of redemption. In Edwards’ era and through the mid-nineteenth century, trinitarians often defined the divine persons as centers of personal consciousness or agents of will and act.35 This conception of divine personhood seems almost necessary for the negotiations and compacting in the covenant of redemption. Smyth suggests that Edwards favored a theory that sees the divine persons as three individual agents or consciousnesses.36 Indeed, Edwards asserts precisely that in regard to the Holy Spirit. He wrote, “I think the Scripture does sufficiently reveal the Holy Spirit as a proper Divine person; and thus we ought to look upon Him as a distinct personal agent. . . . [A]nd the Scripture plainly ascribes every thing to Him that properly denotes a distinct person.”37 The problem is that Edwards also adopts the notion that the trinitarian persons are personal distinctions within an abso34Citations to Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity are from the text republished in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 20, The “Miscellanies,” (Entry nos. 833–1152), ed. Amy Plantinga Pauw (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), no. 1022 (pp. 430–43; see esp. 430–32). Previously, the frequently cited source of the Observations was Jonathan Edwards, Treatise on Grace and other posthumously published writings, ed. with intro. Paul Helm (Cambridge/London: James Clarke, 1971), 77–98. 35Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:181. Emmons is a representative of New England Theology that maintained this theory of divine personhood (The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, 2:132–34). Henry B. Smith, a later representative of New England Theology, continued this notion of trinitarian personhood (Henry B. Smith, System of Christian Theology, ed. William S. Karr, 4th ed., revised with intro. Thomas S. Hastings [1884; New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1892], 80). 36Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 16. 37Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:181 (emphasis original).

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lute mind and that they do not severally possess the attributes of personhood—understanding and will. Although Edwards does not define personhood in the Observations, he does so in the Discourse on the Trinity. Edwards defines person as “that which hath understanding and will.”38 Problematic here is that, in the Discourse on the Trinity, Edwards also states that the divine persons possess these faculties only through perichoretic union and not separately as individual persons. For example, the Father has understanding and will because the Son, who is the divine understanding, and the Spirit, who is the divine will or love, are “in Him and proceed from Him.”39 Along with Nathaniel Emmons and Henry B. Smith, Smyth seems to assume that Edwards exclusively adopted a theory that portrays the divine persons as centers of consciousness—i.e., what he calls the social Trinity—because he adopted the covenant of redemption. Yet in Discourse on the Trinity Edwards is closer to Smyth’s conception of God as an Absolute Person with personal distinctions in contrast to three centers of consciousness because each divine person possesses the full attributes of personhood only through union with the others and not individually.40 In the Discourse on the Trinity, Edwards’ Trinity is a Mind differentiated by understanding-idea and will-love. These correspond to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. When these are added together, one mind is the sum. Edwards believed that the problem with the schema is that it depicts the divine persons as attributes of one person and

38Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:132–33. Discourse on the Trinity, 21:120–21. 40Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 16. One further piece of evidence for the judgment that Edwards is closer to Smyth’s view of Absolute Person in contrast to three centers of consciousness is Edwards’ idealism. Smyth notes that Edwards’ trinitarian thought is based on his Idealism. Edwards believed that consciousness was the most fundamental datum of reality. Ultimately, everything is an idea in the mind of God. Non-divine entities exist first as a divine idea and then ad extra by the exertion of the divine will. The Trinity corresponds to the distinctions within consciousness—mind, understanding, and will. Ironically, Smyth notes this, but does not update his view of Edwards’ theory of divine personhood that he presented seventeen years previously in the Observations. For Edwards’ Idealism, see “The Mind,” 6:344 and 356–57 and for his view that the internal distinctions of mind are the pattern for the trinitarian distinctions, see Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113. For Smyth’s interaction with Edwards’ Idealism and trinitarianism, see Egbert C. Smyth, “Jonathan Edwards’ Idealism: With Special Reference to the Essay ‘Of Being’ and the Writings not in His Collected Works,” The American Journal of Theology 1 (1897): 961. 39Edwards,

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not as persons in their own right.41 The result is that God is one Person internally differentiated by the personal properties or acts of understanding and will. Edwards’ tandem use of the mental model of personal distinctions and the affirmation that the divine persons are persons in the sense of individual agents is an apparent contradiction. Two caveats are in order here. First, the purpose of the mental illustration of the Trinity is not to explain divine personhood per se but to show that the notion of triunity is reasonable. Second, the subsisting divine persons, which the intellectual structure illustrates as personal distinctions, nevertheless are understood as persons possessing understanding and will. Although aware of the problem, Edwards does not allow the modern conundrum of depicting God as absolute mind on the one hand and as three personal agents on the other to confound his affirmation of the full personal status of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. He accepted the mental illustration as a rational and useful means of articulating the subsistence of the divine persons. He also accepted that that which is subsisting is fully personal. He did so because he believed that it was the teaching of Scripture.42 Smyth argues that the notion of divine person has developed beyond the depiction of the Trinity as three individual persons. Since a discrete substance can be only one person, God must be one Person with three personal distinctions. Smyth’s Trinity is a Trinity of three personal distinctions in contrast to three persons.43 He intimates that Edwards is to be forgiven for holding to an archaic notion of three persons since he did not have the benefit of modern knowledge concerning the nature of personhood.44 Smyth’s comment may appear arrogant, but when considered in light of Smyth’s developmental theory of religious knowledge, it serves to absolve Edwards from charges of theological provincialism. Smyth believed that the divine Spirit worked within human history to advance religious knowledge; therefore, to chide Edwards for his theory of person vis-à-vis the modern theory is anachronistic because he was not privy to the latest stage in the development of religious knowledge.45 Since doctrinal and cultural devel41Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:132–33. Treatise on Grace, 21:181; Discourse on the Trinity, 21:130–31; and Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:256–57). 43Egbert C. Smyth, The Andover Heresy (Boston: Cupples, Upham, and Co., 1887), 26–30. 44Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 16. 45While Smyth defends the intellectual credibility of Edwards with his theory of theological development, he also believed that the conception of God as one Per42Edwards,

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opment are the result of divine immanence, Smyth can genuinely affirm that, at the least for his time, Edwards articulated the evolving Christian consciousness in the best way possible. Second, Smyth exonerates Edwards of charges of ontological subordination that may arise from his adherence to the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. Smyth points out that the generation of the Son is eternal and not contingent upon the will of the Father, and therefore the Son’s nature is not inferior to the Father’s nature. In addition, the economic subordination of the Son to the Father is not derivative of an ontological subordination. As a result, Smyth concludes that Edwards avoids Arianism.46 Finally, Smyth’s comment, that Edwards “did not regard the subject of the Trinity, in its ontological relations, as a mere blank to human thought,” reveals the fundamental difference between Edwards, later New England Theology, and in general the Reformed tradition.47 Edwards believed that it was useful for Christian theology and spirituality to contemplate and construct intellectual patterns for the immanent trinitarian relations.48 In this respect, he did not reflect his Reformed tradition and was out of step with nineteenth-century theology.49 son with three personal distinctions represented the original faith of the Church. The continuity-discontinuity theory served to legitimate theological change and also enabled the proponents of Progressive Orthodoxy to declare orthodox lineage. For the developmental theory of religious knowledge in Smyth and Progressive Orthodoxy, see editors, “Progressive orthodoxy: Criteria of Theological Progress,” 466– 70; George A. Gordon, “The Contrast and Agreement between the New Orthodoxy and the Old,” 1–3 and 9–12; and Smyth, “Dogma in Religion,” 497, 501, and 503. 46Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 16–17 and Appendix: Note B, pp. 63– 64. 47Smyth, “Introduction,” in Observations, 17. 48Indeed, the immanent trinitarian relations are the basis for the economy of redemption. Ad intra, the triune distinctions are: God absolutely considered—the Father, the eternal act of the understanding, by which the Father generates a perfect idea of himself and thereby generates the Son, and finally, the act of will, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Ad extra, God communicates knowledge of himself—the supernatural light—to the believer, who in turn loves God. Thus, the immanent pattern of triune distinctions— knowledge going forth and reciprocating love—is the pattern for human redemption. God gives the believer knowledge of his excellency and the ability to return love or delight in that excellency (Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1266a [23:213]). 49The common lack of in-depth reflection on the immanent Trinity may be the result of Calvin. For, while Calvin clearly based the structure of the Institutes on the

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In conclusion, Smyth published the Observations to demonstrate the specious nature of the accusations that Edwards’ trinitarian writings contained controversial elements. Smyth argues that Edwards’ theory of divine person was common in its day, but one whose day has passed. In this sense, the content of Edwards’ trinitarian writings contained nothing controversial or of particular relevance for the current theological context. His value for Progressive Orthodoxy lay in his willingness to theologize on the immanent Trinity, which was important to Progressive Orthodoxy and largely ignored by representatives of New England Theology.

Edwards A. Park Edwards A. Park was a central figure on the theological landscape of midnineteenth-century New England.50 The completion of his tenure as professor and president of Andover Seminary marks the terminus of the New England Theology.51 Like Smyth, Park responded to the call for the publiTrinity, nonetheless he warns against unprofitable speculation into its immanent nature (Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., ed. John T. McNeill and trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library of Christian Classics, 20 [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960], 1.13.20 [1:144] and 1.14.29 [1:159]). 50Park served multiple positions at Andover: professor of sacred rhetoric from 1836 to 1847; professor of systematic theology from 1847 until 1881; and president from 1853 to 1868. He was the premier Congregational theologian and purveyor of New England Theology in the nineteenth century. He co-founded with Bela Bates Edwards the scholarly journal Bibliotheca Sacra in 1844. The journal was a key organ for propagating the Andover version of Edwardseanism and New England Theology. A full-length treatment of Park’s theology is available in Cecil, The Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park. Frank H. Foster, a former student, provides a theological analysis of Park in A Genetic History of the New England Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1907), 471–540. Foster also wrote a biography on Park: The Life of Edwards Amasa Park, (S.T.D., L.L.D.), Abbot Professor, Andover Theological Seminary (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1936). A scholarly consensus has emerged regarding Park as the end—and in the case of Foster, the full flowering of the Edwardsean tradition—of the trajectory of New England Theology, see Cecil, The Theological Development of Park, 155–205; Joseph A. Conforti, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Tradition, and American Culture, 141–44; Foster, A Genetic History, 472; Bruce Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, 43; and Williams, The Andover Liberals, 1. 51Park created the term, New England Theology, to describe the modified Calvinism of the New Divinity movement and Andover Seminary. In terms of theology, it is characterized by the synthesis of free will and divine sovereignty—also known as “Consistent Calvinism.” The utilization of revivalistic methods for elicit-

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cation of the withheld trinitarian writings of Edwards that began quietly with Bushnell and had reached a clamor by 1880.52 In a two-part article that appeared in Bibliotheca Sacra in 1881, Park published a series of Miscellanies on the Trinity and extracts from Alexander B. Grosart’s previous publication of the Treatise on Grace.53 Three points in Park’s analysis are worth noting. First, Park maintains that Edwards’ unpublished writings on the Trinity are tentative theological reflections and do not reflect his fully developed thought on the subject.54 For example, Park states that the charge of Sabellianism arises from a misguided interpretation of Edwards’ ambiguous char-

ing conversion also differentiates it from Old Calvinism, the Princetonians, and the Unitarianism of Harvard. As a trajectory of thought, New England Theology began with Edwards, developed through New Divinity representatives such as Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803), Nathanael Emmons (1745–1840), and, according to Park, was embodied in the theology of Andover Seminary. For succinct discussions of the New England Theology, see Conforti, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Tradition, and American Culture, 108–44 and Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, 43–65. 52For a detailed description of the published and private calls for a resolution of the controversy surrounding Edwards’ alleged trinitarian heterodoxy, see Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 68–80. 53For Park’s articles, see “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” Bibliotheca Sacra 38 (January, 1881): 147–87 and (April, 1881): 333–69. The Grosart text was published in 1865 for private circulation under the title, Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jonathan Edwards of America (Edinburgh). The extract from the Treatise on Grace is in Park, “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 157–77. This extract corresponds to Treatise on Grace, 21:181–97. Park cited three Miscellanies that are quotations that Edwards copied from Andrew M. Ramsay. The first is from a review of Ramsay’s The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, 2 vols. (Glasgow: Robert and Andrew Foulis, 1748–49) in The Monthly Review (March, 1751): 340–48 (for Park’s citation, see “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 179–180 and for the Miscellany, see Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1180 [23:95]). The second and third are extracts from The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion. The transcription in Miscellany 1252 comes from The Philosophical Principles, 42 and 48. The transcription in Miscellany 1253 comes from The Philosophical Principles, 74–85, 88, 91, and 97. For Park’s citation of Miscellanies nos. 1252 and 1253, see “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 180–86 and for the miscellanies see Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 1252 and 1253 (23:184–88). 54Park, “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 150–55. Park delineates six criteria for discriminating between the full and tentative expressions of Edwards’ thought (Park, “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 155–57).

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acterization of the second person as the wisdom or understanding and of the third person as the love of God.55 Second, and related to the first, Park differentiates between Edwards’ doctrine and theory of the Trinity. Doctrine is the basic confessional belief. Park summarizes the doctrine of the Trinity as “the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Spirit is God; the three are distinct from each other by a necessity of their very substance; neither is God without the others; and there is only one God.”56 Theories are speculative attempts to explain the meaning of the doctrine. Park notes three trinitarian theories: the first depicts God as one person distinguished by three ontological modes, which serve as the foundation for certain acts—thus, not economic modalism; the second considers God as three centers of personal consciousness and will; and the third portrays God as divine mind that differentiates itself by the act of self-consciousness and reunites itself by delighting in its selfconsciousness.57 As to doctrinal orthodoxy on the Trinity, Park asserts that Edwards is inviolable. As to his theorizing on the Trinity, Edwards’ theory corresponds to the third model. Park argues that Edwards engaged in these transient episodes in theological brainstorming to alleviate the stress of carrying-out his missionary activities at the frontier outpost of Stockbridge.58 The result is that Park minimizes the theological significance of Edwards’ theory of the Trinity. Park’s judgment is reflective of the reluctance of many mid-nineteenth-century trinitarians to speculate on the immanent Trinity. Frank H. Foster notes that Moses Stuart’s trinitarianism deeply influenced Park’s trinitarian thought. As such, he resisted attempts to plumb the metaphysical dimensions of the Trinity.59 Seen in this light, Park’s deci55Park,

“Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 340–42. 335. 57Ibid., 335–36. 58Ibid., 149–50. 59Foster argues that Park’s trinitarian thought was conditioned by his involvement with the Unitarians. At Andover Seminary, Moses Stuart arose as the ablest defender of trinitarianism against the Unitarians. However, unable to develop credible responses to the Unitarian criticism of traditional metaphysical explanations of the immanent Trinity—e.g., the eternal generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit, Stuart rejected the possibility of knowledge of the immanent Trinity. The most he would claim was that the economic manifestation of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is grounded in an eternal and ontological differentiation in God (Stuart, “On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity,” 91 and Letters to the Rev. William E. Channing, 31). For Park’s trinitarian thought and its relation to Stuart, see Foster, A Genetic History, 496–502. 56Ibid.,

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sion to characterize Edwards’ theorizing on the Trinity as tentative is feasibly more reflective of the tentative value that Park placed on speculation into the immanent Trinity than of Edwards’ own consideration of its value. Third, Park rejected Bushnell’s claim that Edwards articulated an a priori argument for the Trinity and maintained any presence of such an argument is derivative of Edwards’ reading of Andrew M. Ramsay. The a priori argument describes God as an infinite and perfect being. Infinite activity and a consequent infinite effect are entailed in perfection. Since God is an intellectual substance, the infinite act is one of the understanding and the effect of the act is the object or idea known to the understanding. To qualify as infinite, the object of the intellectual act and the idea produced by the act must be of God himself. Since the idea is perfect, it possesses existence and thereby the second person of the Trinity subsists. Again, since God is perfect, a mutual act of love proceeds from the mind conceiving and the mind conceived, whereby the third person of the Trinity subsists; for a perfect act of love also entails existence. Among Edwards’ trinitarian writings, this form of argument is found in the Discourse on the Trinity and the Miscellanies, some of which Edwards copied from Andrew Michael Ramsay’s (1686–1743) The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748– 1749). Whether Bushnell’s hearsay claim of an a priori argument in Edwards was based on textual evidence from the Discourse on the Trinity or the Miscellanies is not clear.60 Perhaps if Park had found the Discourse on the Trinity prior to the publication of his articles, he would not have asserted that Edwards did not possess the argument. The readiness of Park to ascribe the a priori argument to Ramsay is indicative of Park’s distaste for metaphysical speculation.61 Thus, for Park, Edwards’ trinitarian speculations are nothing more than theological diversions to alleviate his anxieties over his pastoral predicaments. Alexander V. G. Allen Alexander V. G. Allen (1841–1908) received his education from representatives of the passing New England Theology, such as Edwards A. Park, but his theological heart was with the emerging liberal Protestant movement.62 60Bushnell,

Christ in Theology, vi. “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” 182–83. 62Allen embraces the two key characteristics of liberal theology at the time: the Incarnation is to manifest God’s presence, rather than to atone for sin and divine immanence as the principle of historical and religious development. Scholars of the era uniformly place Allen within nineteenth-century liberal Protestantism. For examples, see Sydney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: 61Park,

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Allen’s biography of Edwards marks a turning point in the interpretation of Edwards.63 Although Egbert Smyth’s publication of the Observations preceded Allen’s biography of Edwards, Allen’s work is the first substantive interpretation of Edwards’ thought by a member of liberal Protestantism.64 Allen’s biography of Edwards is part of the late-nineteenth-century retrieval of Edwards as a resource for validating the emergent liberal theology of New England. New England Calvinist orthodoxy was no longer the sole proprietor of Edwards’ theological legacy. Allen’s most important scholarly contribution was the interpretation of Christian theological history, set forth in his The Continuity of Christian Thought: A Study of Modern Theology in the Light of Its History.65 This text is important because it provided the template Yale University Press, 1972), 778; Conforti, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Tradition, and American Culture, 160–63; and Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse, 77–78 and 100–1. 63Alexander V. G. Allen, Jonathan Edwards, American Religious Leaders (Boston/New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1891). Allen was raised in the home of an evangelical Episcopal minister. While in seminary at Bexley Hall, Allen’s intellectual orientation was converted to the thought of F. D. Maurice and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. He transferred to Andover Seminary and completed his studies under Edwards A. Park. Allen spent his teaching career in the Episcopal theological seminary in Cambridge. An older and hagiographic biography on Allen is by his former student, Charles L. Slattery, Alexander Viets Griswold Allen, 1841–1908 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911). Perhaps most useful for a brief introduction to his life and work is Sydney E. Ahlstrom, “Introduction to the Reprint Edition,” in Alexander V. G. Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought in the Light of Its History (1887, 4th ed.; reprint, Hicksville, N.Y.: Regina, 1975), 3–5. For a synopsis of his theology, see George L. Blackman, Faith and Freedom: A Study of Theological Education and the Episcopal Theological School (New York: Seabury, 1967), 304–16. 64My analysis of Allen’s treatment of Edwards is theological in nature; Conforti examines Allen’s work from a cultural and literary perspective. He states that Allen was part of a larger nineteenth-century cultural project to reconstruct New England’s Puritan past. The purpose was to retrieve the moral, political, and cultural ideals of New England’s Puritan heritage. By neglect, Calvinism was exorcised from this historical reconstruction (Conforti, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Tradition, and American Culture, 145–85). Allen’s theological analysis of Edwards is consistent with Conforti’s thesis of retrieval for current cultural use. Allen dismisses, as irrelevant relics of the past, doctrines, such as freewill and original sin, that were previously identified as Edwards’ central contributions to New England Theology. According to Allen, his value to modern theology lies in his doctrines of divine immanence, the supernatural light, and the religious affections. Thus, the theological contributions of Edwards correspond to important facets of the New Theology. 65Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought: A Study of Modern Theology in the Light of its History (1884; reprint, Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1912).

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for his interpretation of Edwards’ location within and contribution to the development of Christian theology. In The Continuity of Christian Thought, Allen presents the history of religious thought as oscillating between the dialectical poles of divine immanence-pantheism and transcendence-Deism.66 According to Allen, Judaism and Platonism represent the pre-Christian emphasis on divine transcendence and the ancient Greek religions represent the emphasis on divine immanence.67 Allen maintained that Christian theology, particularly as developed by Clement of Alexandria and Athanasius, synthesized the poles of immanence and transcendence in the doctrine of the Trinity.68 Allen called the Christian synthesis of divine immanence and transcendence in the Trinity Greek theology. However, Allen believed that a dialectic process characterizes history, and therefore, the synthesis achieved in Greek theology led to the antithesis of Latin theology. Allen argued that the root of the Latin emphasis on transcendence is the philosophy of Neoplatonism and the theology of Augustine.69 Allen saw the prominence given to divine immanence in 66Other Edwards scholars of this period also used the dialectical poles of transcendence and immanence to interpret theological history in general and Edwards in particular, see I. Woodbridge Riley, American Philosophy: The Early Schools (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1907), 170 and Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity, 40. 67Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought, xv, 2, 43–44, and 79–80. 68Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought, 92–93. 69According to Allen, Neoplatonism depicted God as distant and wholly other than the world. The distant God of Neoplatonism was accentuated by Augustine’s debilitating doctrine of original sin, which was the product of the cultural collapse that Augustine witnessed. The cause-effect relationship that Allen sees between Augustine’s doctrine of original sin and the cultural events is indicative of the interplay that he believed existed between theology and culture (Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought, 3 and 269–70). For a succinct presentation of his theory, see Allen, “The Theological Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century,” The Princeton Review 10 (July–December, 1882): 263–82. Egbert Smyth presents a fair criticism of Allen’s portrayal of transcendence in material terms. The Latin traditions’ emphasis on transcendence—i.e., a distant deity—is metaphysical or ethical in nature and not, as Allen implies, spatial or material (Smyth, review of The Continuity of Christian Thought: A Study of Modern Theology in the Light of its History, by Alexander V. G. Allen, The Andover Review 3 (March, 1885): 288. Ironically given its affinity for transcendence, Allen also positively regarded the union of Christian theology with Neoplatonism in the fourth and fifth centuries. Specifically, the nous, as the intermediary between the unapproachable absolute divine being, was used to explain Christ as the divine Logos and mediator between God and human beings (Allen, The Continu-

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the nineteenth century as a retrieval of true Christianity. The emphasis on transcendence in the Latin tradition was an unfortunate parenthesis in the life of the Christian church.70 Allen taught that the doctrine of the Trinity reconciled the two dialectic poles of transcendence and immanence by conceiving the Father as God transcendent, the Son as God immanent in the world—as universal rational principle and as God incarnate in Jesus Christ, and the Spirit as constituting the union of the Father and the Son—i.e., the union of transcendence and immanence. Allen also reasoned that the ontological Trinity was necessary to maintain the synthesis of divine transcendence and immanence. Furthermore, and contrary to many New England divines, he believed the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son safeguarded the immanent triune distinctions.71 A common practice of New England divines in the eighteenth century was to ground the divinity of Christ in the doctrine of the atonement. In the satisfaction theory, since God’s justice demands perfect holiness, only a perfect sacrifice meets that standard. Since only God is perfect, then only God can satisfy the requirement. Since Scripture portrays Christ’s life and work as meriting acquittal of sin, he is divine. As Allen pointed out, all that is necessary to undermine the deity of Christ, and also by implication the Trinity, is a different theory of the atonement.72 Once the economic Trinity is abandoned it is but a short step to rejecting the immanent Trinity or vice versa. Allen was correct because the governmental and moral influence theories that became popular in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries do not require a divine mediator to accomplish the atonement.73 ity of Christian Thought, 92–93). 70Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought, 426 and 438. Allen believed that the positive receptions of Schleiermacher and Hegel were the chief indicators of the restoration of divine immanence to the Christian church. 71Allen, The Continuity of Christian Thought, 430–31 and Jonathan Edwards, 349–57. 72Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 353–54. 73Members of New England Theology especially favored the governmental theory. In this theory, Christ’s death and suffering does not satisfy a principle of distributive justice, but is a public declaration that God abhors sin (George Nye Boardman, A History of New England Theology, Garland Series: American Religious Thought of the 18th and 19th Centuries, ed. Bruce Kuklick [1899; reprint, New York: Garland, 1987], 230–42; Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, 413; and Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America [Boston: Starr King, 1955], 217–21). The moral influence theory portrays Christ as a moral exemplar. The work of Christ was to exhibit what it means for human beings to live in proper relationship with God their Father rather than to satisfy a principle of divine justice (Boardman,

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Allen interpreted Edwards as an example of the re-emergence of the concern for divine immanence and its synthesis with transcendence.74 Allen’s dialectic paradigm of the development of Christian thought shaped his interpretation of Edwards. The importance of Edwards’ trinitarian thought is twofold. First, in contrast to the common temper of his age, he maintained the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son as the foundation for the immanent Trinity. He stands in continuity then with Greek theology, Athanasius, and the Nicene theology.75 The doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son provided a foundation to maintain eternal and necessary distinction within the divine essence and the divinity of Jesus Christ. The second enduring significance of Edwards to American religion is his renewal of a theology of divine immanence. Edwards’ move to a theology of divine immanence is clear in his notions of the supernatural light, religious affections, and pneumatological doctrine of grace. These all are based on an immanent work of the Spirit in the human soul.76 Moreover, Edwards, like Allen, took the Trinity as the fundamental datum of the Christian faith.77 For Allen, Edwards’ trinitarian thought was useful as a historical precedent for the trinitarianism of the New Theology of which he was a leading exponent. While praising Edwards’ trinitarianism, Allen’s final analysis is that it exhibits a deficient Christology. Allen argues that Edwards, basing himself on an antiquated doctrine of original sin, gave preeminence to God’s sovereignty and the Spirit’s role in sanctification. For instance, Edwards taught that the Spirit dwells in and sanctifies the human soul. Allen queries, “why could he not also have maintained . . . that the Logos or Divine Reason also indwelt humanity, so that mankind was constituted in Christ, and shared with Him in the consubstantial image of the Father? If love [i.e., the Holy A History of New England Theology, 242–48 and Foster, History of Christian Doctrine, 441–44). Important to note in both the governmental and moral influence theory, the work of Christ is not primarily for God—i.e., to satisfy divine justice, but it is for human persons. In the former, Christ’s death shows human beings that God is displeased with sin and, in the latter, his work provides human beings with a moral pattern to follow. 74Nearly a century later, Douglas J. Elwood also argued that Edwards represents a third way or a synthesis of theism and pantheism (Elwood, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards [Ph.D. diss., Columbia University Press, 1960], 1–11). 75Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 348–57 and 372. 76Ibid., 67–72, 218–32, and 360–61. 77Ibid., 373 and for Allen’s affirmation, see The Continuity of Christian Thought, 431.

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Spirit] may indwell as a personal force in the soul, why not also the Divine Reason?”78 Allen believed that the Son was the rational and personal presence of God in the world. Although Edwards recognized the “beauty of Christ” in nature, he would not identify Christ in any way with human nature.79 Since the destiny of humanity is tied to Christ and Edwards placed no value on humanity per se, Christology necessarily plays no constitutive role in his theology.80 Allen’s criticism is that while Edwards emphasizes divine immanence in some areas of his theology, he ultimately undermines divine immanence by refusing to say that Christ is immanent as the rational principle of human nature. George P. Fisher In connection with the bi-centennial commemoration of Edwards’ birth, George Park Fisher’s (1827–1909) publication of An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity (1903) introduced the most significant text of Edwards on the Trinity to the world of Edwards studies, but with the least profound commentary.81 Fisher transcribed An Essay on the Trinity from the collection of Edwards’ writings housed in the Yale University Library.82 The Discourse on the Trinity is important for two reasons. First, it answered the suspicion of the existence of and brought to a close the call for a publication of a treatise on the Trinity penned by Edwards. Second, it is the longest writing of Edwards devoted to discussing the immanent Trinity. Unfortunately, Fisher limits his evaluation of the treatise to two affirmations. Edwards taught a theory of tri-personality that avoids tritheism and he is consistent with Nicene theology.83 In terms of Edwards’ trinitari78Allen,

Jonathan Edwards, 373. 374–75. 80Ibid., 376. 81Edwards’ treatise on the Trinity is also available in Discourse on the Trinity, in Writings on the Trinity, 21:113–44. Fisher indicates that he has no intention to evaluate the contents of the treatise, other than to affirm its consistency with Nicene theology (Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity, xv). Fisher’s academic preparation was at Yale and Andover and two years in German universities. In 1854, Fisher returned from Germany and began his teaching career at Yale that continued until his retirement in 1901. He is most noted for his introduction of rigorous German historical analytical skills and for his apologetics for the rationality of the Christian faith. A critical biography on Fisher is not available and secondary references to him are rare (American National Biography, s.v., “Fisher, George Park”). 82Pierce, “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 72. 83Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity, 56. 79Ibid.,

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anism, Fisher’s most useful contribution is an appendix that notes the affinity between Edwards’ trinitarian theology and Augustine’s trinitarianism.84 Additionally, Fisher highlights the fact that Bushnell’s trinitarianism, as his thought shifted from a Sabellian to an Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, converged with Edwards’ doctrine.85 The “Introduction” to the treatise is valuable as a general guide to Edwards’ thought and Fisher’s interpretation of the Edwardsean tradition.86 Moreover, with the publication of An Essay on the Trinity, Fisher, by noting Edwards’ continuity with Augustine and Nicene theology, closed the scandal over Edwards’ trinitarianism initiated over fifty years before by Bushnell. Benjamin B. Warfield Benjamin B. Warfield (1851–1921) was an important architect of the Princeton Theology.87 Warfield is best known for his articulation, along with Archibald A. Hodge, of the doctrine of biblical inerrancy and apologetics for conservative Reformed theology.88 Warfield’s analysis of Ed84Ibid.,

Appendix 3, pp. 139–40. 73. 86Ibid., 3–74. For a more thorough analysis of Edwards by Fisher, see Fisher, “The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards,” in Fisher, Discussions in History and Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1880), 227–52. 87For background on Warfield, see W. Andrew Hoffecker, Piety and the Princetonian Theologians: Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, and Benjamin Warfield (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981) and his condensed essay “Benjamin B. Warfield,” in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985), 65–91. 88The definitive statement of the Princetonian doctrine of biblical inerrancy is Alexander A. Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield, “Inspiration,” Princeton Review 2 (April, 1881): 225–60. Hoffecker argues that reducing Warfield’s significance to inerrancy is a limited appreciation of Warfield’s theological contribution. He suggests that Warfield was a multifaceted theologian who interacted with the leading thinkers and intellectual movements of his time (Hoffecker, “Benjamin B. Warfield,” 74). I do not disagree with Hoffecker on Warfield’s breadth of interaction, but his lasting influence is tied to his doctrine of inerrancy and the role it played in the ensuing development of fundamentalist evangelicalism and neo-evangelicalism in the mid and late-twentieth century. For the use of Warfield’s doctrine of biblical inerrancy by a modern Evangelical, see John Gerstner, “Warfield’s Case for Biblical Inerrancy,” in God’s Inerrant Word: An International Symposium on the Trustworthiness of Scripture, ed. John W. Montgomery (Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany, 1973), 115–42 and his later essay in the text published by the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy: “The Contributions of Charles Hodge, B. B. Warfield, and J. Gresham 85Ibid.,

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wards’ trinitarianism, while brief, is important because it is the first analysis based on the Discourse on the Trinity then recently published by Fisher. Warfield calls Edwards’ theory of the subsistence of the divine persons an ontological proof of the Trinity.89 This refers to Edwards’ notion that God’s eternal act of self-reflection generates the second person of the Trinity. The idea produced in the understanding is that of the divine essence. Since it is a perfect idea it necessarily exists; hence, the second person of the Trinity subsists as the divine idea of the divine essence.90 Warfield criticizes the theory as a form of tritheism. He argues that if Edwards’ theory is true, then the idea is in reality a second God and the mutual love a third God.91 Warfield’s criticism of Edwards should be set in relief with his rejection of all analogies of the immanent Trinity.92 For Warfield, the immanent Trinity is a matter of revelation and remains an inscrutable mystery to reason. God is known as Trinity because he reveals himself as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Efforts to construct analogies from the created realm are useful to the extent that they reveal the superiority of the trinitarian God. That is, the Trinity reveals a God that is moral and personally related to his creation.93 Warfield’s trinitarian thought, which serves as the prism for his interpretation of Edwards, is consistent with the attitude of the Princeton Theology toward trinitarian reflection and also bears affinity with the common trend of the time to argue that the economic Trinity is indicative of an immanent Trinity, which is unknowable to human reason.94 The discussion of the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries illuminates the ironic fact that EdMachen to the Doctrine of Inspiration,” in Challenges to Inerrancy: A Theological Response, ed. Gordon R. Lewis and Bruce Demarest (Chicago: Moody, 1984), 347–81. Also, my opinion that the doctrine of biblical inerrancy is Warfield’s enduring contribution does not entail an endorsement of Ernest R. Sandeen’s thesis. Sandeen argues that the Princetonians created, without historical precedent, the doctrine of inerrancy to ward off challenges to the authenticity of Scripture arising from biblical Higher Criticism (Sandeen, The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism 1800–1930 [1970; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978], 103–31). 89Warfield, “The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity,” 26. 90Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113–21. 91Warfield, “The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity,” 27. 92Ibid., 23–24. 93Ibid., 27–28 and 34–36. 94For the low estimation on theorizing on the immanent Trinity, see Charles Hodge’s definitive statement of Princeton Theology, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (1871; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1940), 1:478.

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wards, by virtue of his willingness to theorize on the nature of the immanent Trinity and its role in redemption, more closely resembles the latenineteenth-century evangelical liberal theologians—e.g., Smyth, Allen, and Fisher, than the earlier Edwardsean—Park—and later-Princetonian evangelical theologians—e.g., Warfield. Also remarkable is that in the hands of these interpreters, Edwards often becomes a tool to validate the theological view of the relative interpreter. Bushnell and Holmes hoped to find warrant respectively for modalism and Unitarianism. According to Park, Edwards’ theorizing on the Trinity was a soothing distraction that took his mind off the strains of frontier mission work in Stockbridge, but it was certainly not a serious theological endeavor. Thus Park’s analysis of Edwards’ attitudes toward the Trinity comports with his own low estimation of the value of theorizing on the immanent Trinity. For Allen, Edwards represents the renaissance of Greek theology’s accent on immanence and, therefore, he provides historical warrant for the emerging liberal theology. More recent interpretations of Edwards’ trinitarianism also find in Edwards resources to validate current theological trends. After Warfield, the next contribution to the study of Edwards’ trinitarianism is Richard D. Pierce’s “A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity” (1959). However, Pierce offers little analysis of Edwards’ trinitarian theology and focuses on documenting the details surrounding the suppression of Edwards’ trinitarian writings in the mid-nineteenth century.95 Herbert Richardson wrote the first full-length treatment of Edwards’ trinitarianism in 1962.96 Thus, a fifty-year gap spans between Warfield’s and Richardson’s analyses of Edwards’ trinitarian theology. According to Max Lesser, the bibliographer of Edwards’ literature, Perry Miller dominated Edwards’ studies between 1940 and 1964. Common topics of publications treating Edwards’ thought in the period from Warfield to Richardson are freedom of the will, revivalism, Edwards’ relationship to Calvinism, the sovereignty of God, Idealism, and Mysticism.97 The lack of interest in Edwards’ trinitarianism may also result from the broader neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity among American theologians in the first half of the twentieth century.98 The most notable trinitarian theologies produced in the 95Pierce,

“A Suppressed Edwards Manuscript on the Trinity,” 66–80. W. Richardson, “The Glory of God in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in the Doctrine of the Trinity” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University 1962). 97Lesser, Jonathan Edwards: A Reference Guide, 133–243. 98For example, a search in the ATLA Religion Database between 1887 and 1949 yields only two pieces on the Trinity; both of which were written in 1949. 96Herbert

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United States in this period are Claude Welch’s In His Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology (1952) and Leonard Hodgson’s The Doctrine of the Trinity: Croall Lectures, 1942–1943 (1944). The former adopts Barth’s concept of divine person as mode of being and the latter adopts a social concept of the Trinity. Richardson’s analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism occurred at the germinal period of a renaissance in trinitarian theology that continues today.

LATE-TWENTIETH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS Herbert W. Richardson’s 1962 Harvard University dissertation initiated the second period of the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism. Inspired by Perry Miller, Richardson’s work took place within the late-1950s and 1960s revival of Edwards scholarship. However, another quarter of a century would pass until Edwards’ trinitarian thought would become the object of a second full-length treatment. From the mid-1980s to the present, increasing numbers of Edwards scholars have devoted attention to Edwards’ trinitarianism.99 While many of these works are worthy of attention, this section 99The growing scholarly interest of Edwards’ trinitarianism is evident in the literature, with Plantinga Pauw’s Supreme Harmony of All the first book length treatment of Edwards’ trinitarianism. First, an increasing number of dissertations devoted solely to his trinitarianism have appeared over the past decade. In addition to the dissertations by Richardson, Sairsingh, and Plantinga Pauw, Rachel S. Stahle provides a detailed description of Edwards’ trinitarian theology and its relationship to other theological topics (Rachel S. Stahle, “The Trinitarian Spirit of Jonathan Edwards Theology” [Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999]). I will not directly engage Stahle’s work for two reasons. I agree with her thesis that, for Edwards, the Trinity was foundational for his development of other doctrines. Although Stahle accepts Plantinga Pauw’s interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism via the psychological-social analogy paradigm, she does not make it a central assumption to her analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism. Robert W. Caldwell, III completed a dissertation at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School with the title “The Holy Spirit as the Bond of Union in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards” (2003) and published it as Communion in the Spirit: The Holy Spirit as the Bond of Union in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards, Studies in Evangelical History and Thought (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2006). Second, monographs on Edwards include sections on his trinitarian theology. For examples (listed in chronological order), see Roland André Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards: An Essay in Aesthetics and Theological Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 148–61; Robert Jenson, America’s Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 91–98; Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, exp. ed.

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(1988; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 185–210; and Stephen H. Daniel, The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in Divine Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 102–29. Third, articles and essays (again in chronological order) treating Edwards’ trinitarianism have been published in scholarly journals and books. See Bruce M. Stephens, “The Trinity as the Glory of God: Jonathan Edwards and his Successors,” in God’s Last Metaphor: The Doctrine of the Trinity in New England Theology (Chico, Calif.: Scholars, 1981), 1–20; Michael Jinkins, “‘The Being of Beings’: Jonathan Edwards’ Understanding of God as Reflected in His Final Treatises,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993): 161–90; Plantinga Pauw, “‘Heaven is a World of Love’: Edwards on Heaven and the Trinity,” Calvin Theological Journal 30 (1995): 392–401; Steven H. Daniel, “Postmodern Concepts of God and Edwards’ Trinitarian Ontology,” in Edwards in Our Time: Jonathan Edwards and the Shaping of American Religion, ed. Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C. Guelzo (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 45–64; Sang Hyun Lee, “Jonathan Edwards’ Dispositional Conception of the Trinity: A Resource for Contemporary Reformed Theology,” in Toward the Future of Reformed Theology: Tasks, Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 444–55; Amy Plantinga Pauw, “The Future of Reformed Theology: Some Lessons from Jonathan Edwards,” in Toward the Future of Reformed Theology: Tasks, Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 456–69; Richard M. Weber, “The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards: An Investigation of Charges against Its Orthodoxy,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44 (2001): 297–318; Steven M. Studebaker, “Jonathan Edwards’ Social Augustinian Trinitarianism: An Alternative to a Recent Trend,” Scottish Journal of Theology 56 (2003): 268–85; Plantinga Pauw, “The Trinity,” in The Princeton Companion to Jonathan Edwards, ed. Sang Hyun Lee (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 44–58; and Oliver D. Crisp, Jonathan Edwards’s God: Trinity, Individuation, and Divine Simplicity,” in Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 83–93. Fourth, monographs that place the Trinity at the center of their interpretation of Edwards have begun to appear. William J. Danaher Jr.’s The Trinitarian Ethics of Jonathan Edwards (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004) and Amy Plantinga Pauw’s Supreme Harmony of All are the most extensive examples. However, also see Stephen R. Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001). Holmes argues that Edwards modified the Reformed doctrine of God’s glory by identifying glory with the triune relations between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, rather than with divine power. Holmes shows that Edwards successfully interpreted the doctrines of creation, redemption, and election through the concept of triune glory. Finally, a critical edition of Edwards’ trinitarian essays have recently been published: see, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 21, Writings on the Trinity, Grace, and Faith, ed. Sang Hyun Lee (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

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focuses on three—Richardson’s (1962), Krister Sairsingh’s (1986), and Amy Plantinga Pauw’s (1990 and 2002).100 I examine Sairsingh and Plantinga Pauw’s work because the threeness-oneness paradigm is central to the development of their interpretations and appropriations of Edwards’ trinitarianism. I chose to cover Richardson’s dissertation because it is the first substantive and exhaustive interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism and, for reasons unknown to me, other Edwards’ scholars often pass over it without comment—Sairsingh’s dissertation and Danaher’s monograph are the notable exceptions.101 Herbert W. Richardson

Summary Herbert Richardson’s Harvard dissertation is the first study devoted exclusively to Edwards’ trinitarian theology. Richardson argues that prior treatments of Edwards are flawed because they interpret his thought through a unitarian prism. These writers reduce Edwards’ thought to a theological center that corresponds either with the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. He argues that Edwards scholars “make him into a theologian of the Father, with a cosmological concern at the center of his thought; or a theologian of the Son, with epistemological motifs dominating the whole; or a theologian of the Spirit, where ethical action and his doctrine of benevolent love are seen as the essential element.”102 Richardson argues that these are

100Amy Plantinga Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All and “The Supreme Harmony of All: Jonathan Edwards and the Trinity” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1990) and Krister Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Divine Glory: His Foundational Trinitarianism and Its Ecclesial Import” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986). 101A possible reason is that Richardson’s work appeared prior to the renaissance in trinitarian theology that occurred in the later-twentieth century. Nevertheless, his work should still be referenced if for no other reason than it is the first major study devoted exclusively to Edwards’ trinitarian theology. 102Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 19 and 18–16. He identifies Squires, MacCracken, and Holmes as those who interpret Edwards as a theologian of the Father; Hodge, Warfield, and Gerstner as those who interpret him as a theologian of the Son; and Bellamy, Hopkins, Porter, and Allen as those who interpret him as a theologian of the Spirit or inner life and ethics (see Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 26).

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deficient renderings of Edwards thought because they fail to grasp the trinitarian structure of his theology.103 Richardson contends that Edwards stands in continuity with the Reformed tradition, which includes theologians such as Augustine, Calvin, and Barth. Reformed means that a theologian takes the Trinity as the staring point of theological reflection.104 Richardson believes that the relegation of the doctrine of the Trinity to mystery and obscurity is the problematic of the Western theological tradition. The Trinity is not taken as an ontological category in Western theology. At best, Thomism argues that the relationship between God and world is analogical; at worst, Protestantism assumes that the relationship is equivocal or contradictory. In both cases, the result is that the Trinity is reduced to theological mystery and devotional insignificance. Edwards refused to participate in this denigration of the Trinity and in contrast made it the foundation of his theology. The trinitarian center of Edwards’ theology is clear in the trinitarian structure of creation. Richardson believes that for Edwards’ the relationship between God and world is univocal. Creation bears a trinitarian ontological structure because it corresponds to the triune divine being.105 Prior to discussing the specifics of Richardson’s presentation of Edwards’ trinitarianism, this section sets forth his overall methodology. Richardson uses a dialectical method to interpret Edwards’ relationship to the intellectual currents of his time.106 Richardson argues that the Enlightenment produced two competing epistemological starting points: the philosophical and the mythological. These poles of thought also may be described as rationalism and voluntarism. The early Enlightenment is characterized by a philosophical epistemology. The rational power or understanding of the soul is central and directs the will. The world is understood in terms of rationality and form and substance and essence. For Edwards, the influence of Locke is determinative. According to Locke, simple ideas are produced in the mind through the senses. Knowledge consists of the mind’s combi103Richardson,

“The Glory of God,” 18–20 and 25–26. 5, 7, 17–18, and 28. Richardson’s placement of Augustine under the category of the Reformed tradition is interesting vis-à-vis the common criticism that Augustine starts with the unity of essence and the Trinity is only a collateral consideration. 105Ibid., 7–18. 106Richardson shares Allen’s dialectical hermeneutic. However, whereas Allen’s dialectic is immanence-Greek versus transcendence-Latin that is synthesized with Edwards’ trinitarianism, Richardson’s poles are rational and volitional synthesized with Edwards’ affective trinitarian ontology. 104Ibid.,

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nation of these simple ideas to form complex ideas. While the assortment of simple ideas in the mind is undivided in the actual substance of the object, knowledge is the product of the mind’s interpretation of the manner in which these simple ideas relate in the object. The problem that emerged was that reason never knows if it is truly discerning the relation of its ideas. In other words, one can never know if the mental constructions correspond to the real world as it is. The mind then only knows its interpretation of the world and does not know the essence of things. This opened the door to skepticism because the objective world is not known in itself, but only the mind’s interpretation of sense data is known.107 Richardson characterizes later Enlightenment epistemology as mythological. The mythological movement assumed that empiricism led to skepticism and, therefore, turned to the will as the governing principle of reality. Process and flux characterize reality. Since substance or essence is inaccessible, relation is central. Rationality is the product of and consistent with the feelings or affections of the soul. Utilitarianism is the end result of this movement because truth is that which satisfies desires.108 Edwards, according to Richardson, synthesized the disparate philosophical and mythological movements with a third way: a trinitarian ontology. The trinitarian ontology enabled Edwards to give ontological significance to reason and will with the additional category of affection or feeling. The addition of the category of affection replaced the notion that the soul consists of the two faculties of understanding and will. In Edwards’ psychology, the role of the understanding is to know objects of sense perception and reflection. The will is the mind’s consent to the relation between objects or the consent that constitutes relation between the subject and object. The affection grasps the unity of all things.109 However, before detailing more thoroughly the role of these in human experience, I first outline the role of the understanding, will, and affection in the Trinity. 107For

Richardson’s judgment that empiricism terminates in skepticism, see “The Glory of God,” 57–58. 108For Richardson’s description of the philosophical and mythological currents of the Enlightenment, see “The Glory of God,” 14–18, 310, and 334–49. 109Richardson uses dialectic to distinguish Edwards’ psychological role of affections from the Anselmian-Thomistic traditional emphasis on the intellect and the Victorine-Bonaventura traditional emphasis on volition. Edwards, in prototypical fashion with Schleiermacher, used the category of affection to synthesize these hitherto disparate trends (Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 256–57). Alexander Allen also saw Edwards as a bridge to later nineteenth-century Romanticism (Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 68).

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According to Richardson, Edwards’ Trinity centers on the excellency and happiness of God. Excellency is the triune structure or personal relations of the trinitarian God. Richardson interprets Edwards’ theory of the divine persons in the following manner. The Son is the idea of God. God’s eternal act of the understanding or self-conscious reflection on the divine essence produces the divine Idea. This is the rational form of God; it corresponds identically with the subject and is, therefore, a repetition of God. Thus the Son is the eternal Object or Idea of the divine self-consciousness. The Holy Spirit is the Father’s love for the Son. The Holy Spirit corresponds to the divine will. As the Father’s love, the Holy Spirit is the unitive principle or the relation of the Subject and Object. Richardson maintains that the psychological model is dominant in contrast to the mutual love model because Edwards emphasizes the Father’s love for the Son and not the Son’s reciprocal love for the Father. The immanent love or act of will unites Subject and Object into One; therefore, oneness is inherently pluriform and rational form and will are inherently united in the Trinity. Edwards refers to this triune structure of God as excellency.110 Happiness is the affective feeling of delight in the structure of the triune God. Edwards attributes happiness to the Father. The Father is the affection, feeling, or happiness that is the product of the union of the Subject-Object through Love. This happiness or joy entailed in this immanent union is the affection or self-consciousness of the Godhead. Selfconsciousness is the awareness of the unity of understanding and will. Affection then is happiness produced by the unity of the understanding and will.111 Richardson argues that Edwards taught that creation is a repetition of the structure or excellency of the immanent Trinity.112 The world does not reflect God analogically, but is a univocal repetition of the triune God; that is, the triune God and creation correspond in a one-to-one manner.113 Creation repeats ad extra the object, relation, and affection—pluriform oneness—of the Trinity. Richardson states, “God’s trinitarian being is the ontological structure of the creation. On a cosmic level, the form of creation, its essence, or Idea, is the Son of God. The motion of creation, all its relations and harmonies, is the Spirit of God.”114 Creation, therefore, corresponds to 110Richardson,

“The Glory of God,” 220–41. analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism is available in chapter six of “The Glory of God,” 220–90. 112Ibid., 330. 113Ibid., 5–9. 114Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 5. 111Richardson’s

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the persons of the Trinity. The objects of creation correlate with the Son or the divine understanding. Individual objects exist in a nexus with all other objects; in other words, entities exist in relations and not apart from those relations. The relations constituting the connectivity of all entities correlate with the Holy Spirit or divine will. The relation of entities in creation mirrors the relatedness of Son and Father through the Spirit. In Edwards’ terminology, relation is “being’s consent to being.” The Father consents to the being of the Son by loving him. In the Trinity, relation—the union of the Subject and Object-Idea by love or will—is a constitutive component of divine being. The Holy Spirit, as love, unites subject and object; therefore, relation is constitutive of the eternal being of the Trinity. Richardson uses the term univocity to express the identical relationship between God and creation. He defines univocity as “[t]he form of God’s internal life as Trinity, and the form of the world are identical.”115 For Richardson, Edwards’ philosophical notion of the univocity of creation and the divine being is a radical alternative to Thomism that teaches an analogical relation between God and creation and to Protestantism that teaches an equivocal relation between them. According to analogy, while God is not identical with creation, a continuity of some sort exists between God and creation. According to Protestant equivocity, God and world are contradictory. At this point, Richardson seems to assume the dialectical theology of the early Barth as the Protestant way of contemplating the relationship between God and world.116 Edwards’ notion of the univocal relationship between God and creation is a radical new synthesis of the dialectical poles of Thomism and Protestantism. According to Richardson, Edwards also affirms that human beings are univocal with the divine being. For instance, Richardson writes: Edwards does not think that the psychological triad is a mere vestige, or analogy, of the Trinity. Rather, he understands it to be a direct image—a repetition of the divine life in the life of the mind. By virtue of the univocity of being, Edwards understands happiness-knowledge-and love to be the very persons of the Trinity. For Edwards, knowledge is not simply relatively appropriate to the Son; rather, it is the Son. Love is the Spirit, and Happiness is the Father. God possesses no essential transcendence over the mind and the cosmos. Rather, they participate in, and repeat, His being perfectly.117

115Ibid.,

5. 12–13. 117Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 277 (emphasis original). 116Ibid.,

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As a repetition of the Trinity, human psychology and knowledge reflect a trinitarian ontology. Richardson argues that the trinitarian ontology of creation is the basis of human psychology and knowledge. The human soul consists of the two faculties of understanding and will. Distinct from but inclusive of the understanding and will, the affections are the most fundamental capacity of the soul.118 In this sense, the structure of the human being repeats the excellency or the structure of the triune God. When the person perceives an object of sense experience that object produces a repetition of itself—i.e., an idea—in the mind.119 In addition, since relation is constitutive of being, the relations between objects are seen by the mind as it consents to the relations impressed upon the mind by those relations.120 In other words, since the relations between entities are real, these relations are perceived by the mind through sense experience. Thus, understanding—the perception of the world by idea—and will—the consent of the mind to the relation between objects—work together in the process of knowing. The affection is the sense of the mind that perceives the interrelationship of all objects and relations in a unified whole.121 Affections are a metaterm or ground of the mind and they are not a faculty alongside of the understanding and will.122 The affective capacity of the mind encompasses the understanding and will and feels the inherent unity of objects and relations.123 The affection is the capacity of the soul to delight in the unified whole of reality. The mind is able to see the harmonious whole of creation because the mind is a repetition of the Trinity. The human mind repeats God’s consciousness in the understanding, will, and affective capacities.124 Furthermore, when the mind feels the unity of the whole, which is Godconsciousness, it has God’s own consciousness.125 The process of human 118Richardson,

“The Glory of God,” 46, 229, and 258. Richardson’s description of these ideas in Edwards bears a striking similarity to these terms as used by Schleiermacher. Indeed, on at least two occasions, he suggests that Edwards’ thought anticipated that of Schleiermacher (ibid., 202, 245, and 257). For Schleiermacher’s theory of the relationship between the understanding, will, and affections, see Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, § 3 (pp. 7–12). 119Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 71–74. 120Ibid., 77. 121Ibid., 243. 122Ibid., 201–16 and 240. 123Ibid., 258. 124Ibid., 254–55 and 277. 125Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 254–56.

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knowledge, culminating in the affective sight of unity, corresponds to the happiness of the immanent Trinity.126 Thus being and knowledge are grounded in a trinitarian ontology. The trinitarian ontology and corresponding epistemology is a synthesis of the philosophical and mythological because knowledge is not reduced to skepticism, which was the decided implication of Locke’s epistemology, nor mythology, which exalts process over fixed form or will over reason, because feeling or affection sees the unity of the whole. The univocity of created being with God’s being also has epistemological fruits. Since the ontology of creation is univocal with the trinitarian ontology, the relations between objects, perceived by the mind, are real relations because they are based on the relation of the Father and the Son through the Spirit. Furthermore, since creation is a repetition of the Trinity ad extra, the relation between objects is constitutive of being and not merely accidental qualities or the mind’s subjective interpretation of being.127 All objects and relations between objects exist within a unified matrix. The cosmos, therefore, is a unity of multiplicity. This complex unity correlates with the affection or happiness of the deity or the Spirit, who is the unity of the Father and Son.128

Analysis Richardson’s work is a fine example of a thorough application of a reductive center methodology. That is, Edwards’ thought is interpreted in terms of a center—trinitarian ontology. The assumption is that his entire theological system can be interpreted in light of this fundamental notion. While this methodology may be legitimate, Richardson’s explication of Edwards’ center is bedeviled with a significant problem; namely, his understanding of Edwards’ psychology. According to Richardson, Edwards taught that the human mind or soul is composed of the understanding, will, and affection. The affection(s) is/are a comprehensive term for the unity or consciousness of the soul, whereas the understanding and will are its constitutive faculties. Richardson’s understanding of Edwards’ psychology is the basis for his analysis of Edwards’ trinitarian ontology. And although Richardson calls it a trinitarian 126Ibid.,

259. 2–3, 330, and 365. 128Ibid., 367. Note that Richardson argues that Edwards inconsistently identified the Father and the Spirit as the unifying principle or the oneness of the Trinity (ibid., 373–74). 127Ibid.,

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ontology, it is really an affective ontology.129 Affection is the basic ontological notion. In the Trinity, the Father, as affection, is the transcendent term in which the Son and the Spirit or understanding and will are united. In other words, the Father is the oneness or consciousness of the deity because affection comprehends understanding and will. Furthermore, cosmology rests on an affective ontology. The cosmos ultimately exists as a pluriform whole; the affection of the cosmos is the ultimate reality of the cosmos. Knowledge too is affective. The mind knows when the affection of the soul grasps the unity of the cosmos amidst its diversity. In contrast to Richardson’s psychological morphology of understanding, will, and affection, Edwards taught that the soul or mind consists of two faculties: the understanding and will. The affections are punctuated exertions of the will.130 The affections are not distinct from the will or a comprehensive term for the understanding and will, nor a faculty that grasps the unity of being.131 Indeed, Richardson’s interpretation of Edwards’ theory of the affections mirrors his own religious psychology.132 Richardson confuses the affections with the fundamental orientation of the soul. Edwards refers to the orientation of the soul with the terms new spiritual sense, new dispositions, and new principles of nature. He defines principle of nature as, “that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any

129Richardson acknowledges this when he comments, “it is the affection, therefore, which is the ontological principle of Edwards’ thought” (Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 287). 130Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:96–101. According to Edwards, the will is always inclined to or away from an object presented in the understanding. The will is never indifferent. Yet, degrees of inclination exist. The will does not consider all objects with the same level of inclination or repugnance. Affections describe the strong inclinations of the will; for example, love and hatred. For instance, I have an inclination of the will to eat chocolate chip cookies, but this inclination is not as strong as my love for my wife. The latter is affection, whereas the former is merely an inclination of the will. Edwards sets forth his psychology in the opening statements of Discourse on the Trinity. He wrote, “though the divine nature be vastly different from that of created spirits, yet our souls are made in the image of God, we have understanding and will, idea and love as God hath” (Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113). In this succinct definition of the soul, the affection plays no constitutive role. 131Edwards used the terms sense of the heart, heart, feelings, will, and affections interchangeably; see Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 782 (18:459–60). 132Richardson, Toward an American Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 56–58.

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particular manner or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul.”133 The soul is disposed to God or self. Affections describe the zealous inclination or will of the soul toward or away from an object. The inclination is determined by the basic orientation of the soul. Edwards argues that true religion consists in the affections because the orientation of the soul is fully manifested through the activity produced by the inclination or the will. True religion does not consist in the commitment of the intellectual capacity alone. Knowledge of divine truth is not sufficient. The disposition of the soul is fully manifested when the mind sees spiritual truth and loves the truth and issues forth in acts, which are the product of the knowledge and love of spiritual truth. The affection is essential because without it the soul would not act. The impact of Richardson’s misinterpretation of Edwards’ psychology undermines his thesis because his argument for Edwards’ trinitarian ontology, cosmology, and epistemology collapses without his theory of the role of the affections in Edwards’ thought. One case in point is the impact of this misunderstanding of Edwards’ psychology in Richardson’s discussion of the taxis of the immanent Trinity. He argues that Edwards followed the order of the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Father. This order corresponds to Richardson’s psychological order of understanding or idea, will or love, and affection. Richardson summarizes in this way: “Edwards understands these three—happiness, knowledge, and love—to be the three persons of the Trinity: the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit.”134 The Son and the Spirit precede the Father in the order of nature. The Father is last in order because he is the happiness or affection arising from the unity of the understanding/Son and will/Holy Spirit. As a consequence, the Father is no longer portrayed as the fons et origo of the Trinity. Richardson remarks that the inability of Edwards’ theory to account for the generation of the divine persons is the failure of his trinitarianism.135 The advantage of this concept is that since the Father is the happiness or unity 133Edwards,

Religious Affections, 2:206. I cite this passage because Richardson uses it to show that feelings or affections are the ground or foundation of the soul (Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 205–6). Richardson’s description of Edwards’ theory of the relationship between the understanding, will, and affections bears a striking similarity to Schleiermacher’s viewpoint (Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman, intro. Rudolf Otto, The Library of Religion and Culture [New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958], 26–47). 134Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 258. 135Although Richardson refers to the “generation” of the persons of the Trinity, more appropriately generation refers to the manner of the Son’s subsistence and procession to the Spirit’s subsistence (ibid., 274).

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of the Son and the Spirit, Edwards does not start with an abstract notion of divine being and then proceed to divine persons, but starts with a trinitarian notion of being. The Father as happiness presupposes knowledge and love or the Son and the Spirit.136 Richardson’s analysis of Edwards’ trinitarian texts invites several critical remarks. First, Edwards taught that the trinitarian taxis is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.137 Contrary to Richardson, Edwards placed the Father first in the order of subsistence. Indeed, the priority of the Father is assumed in the economic subordination of the Son to the Father and the Spirit to the Son in the covenant of redemption. Moreover, theologians who start with the Father in the order of nature or subsistence are not guilty of starting with a theory of abstract being. Richardson’s criticism that to start with the Father is equivalent to beginning with abstract being is due to the failure to distinguish between the Trinity considered “in fieri (in the process of becoming) and in facto esse (as already constituted).”138 Trinitarians, who begin with the Father in the order of immanent subsistence, assume that although theological language describes the Trinity as becoming (the generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit), it does not imply a temporal ontological order because God exists eternally as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Additionally, besides being inconsistent with Edwards’ order of the Trinity, Richardson’s order of the Trinity is incomprehensible. If the Father is not first in the order of subsistence, then from whence does the Son arise? As Richardson explains, the Son is the idea of God. An idea or object of perception/reflection presupposes a perceiving/reflecting subject. A personal subsistence must precede—although not temporally, but in the order of nature—the Son or idea because the Son is depicted as subsisting as the idea produced by an eternal act of self-conscious reflection. However, Richardson’s order of the Son, the Spirit, and the Father does not allow a personal subsistence prior to the Son. A second problematic aspect of Richardson’s analysis of Edwards’ thought is that he posits that the relationship between God and world is univocal. He believes that a one-to-one correspondence exists between the trinitarian being of God and the cosmos. Summarizing, he writes, “God possesses no essential transcendence over the mind and the cosmos. Rather, they participate in, and repeat, His being perfectly.”139 Richardson’s 136Richardson,

“The Glory of God,” 274–75. Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131. 138I owe this insight to David Coffey; see Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 51–52. 139Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 277. 137Edwards,

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purpose for asserting a univocal relationship between God and world is correct. He rightly underscores that for Edwards the world is not a discrete system, as it was for the Deists, but it is contingent upon divine agency for its existence. Richardson believes that Protestant theologians abandoned the notion of analogy and adopted contradiction between God and world in the wake of the Enlightenment. If God and world could not be harmonized according to the rationalist criteria of the Enlightenment, then the Otherness of God would serve to vindicate his divinity. Richardson may also be correct in terms of the larger reaction of Protestant theology to the Enlightenment, but he overstates his case and neglects Edwards’ clear description of the relationship between God and world in terms of analogy.140 Edwards maintains that while the subsistence of the Son as idea and the Spirit as love bears a resemblance to the human acts of understanding and will, nevertheless human reason cannot fully grasp the manner of this subsistence. The point here is that reason approaches, but does not fully apprehend the immanent subsistence of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit because a one-to-one correspondence between the Trinity and the human soul does not exist.141 Human knowledge of the Trinity is analogical— because the human being is analogous to divine being. Edwards does not portray God as entirely Other. God is present within the created order, but not identical with it. Krister Sairsingh

Summary Krister Sairsingh follows Herbert Richardson’s analysis of the immanent Trinity. His treatment of Edwards contributes to Edwardsean scholarship by showing the relationship between Edwards’ trinitarianism and ecclesiology. Sairsingh argues that Edwards’ relational ontology is the cipher to interpret his trinitarianism. The relational ontology of the Trinity is then used as the theological foundation to develop a relational ecclesiology. The key to Edwards’ relational ontology is the philosophical concept of excellency and the theological notion of the glory of God. Excellency and the glory of God function synonymously in Edwards’ thought.142 Sairsingh maintains that these two concepts are equivalent because in Edwards’

140Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113. Discourse on the Trinity, 21:99 and Freedom of the Will, 1:376. 142Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 63. 141Edwards,

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thought both refer to divine personal relations.143 God’s glory and excellency consist in God’s triune nature. In philosophical terms, excellency is the mutual consent or relation between objects that in turn constitutes their being. In Edwards’ terminology, relation is “the consent of being to being.”144 The mutual consent of being to being is excellency. Excellency, therefore, is a relational and ontological term. Excellency denotes relation because it is the consent or relation between objects. It is ontological because relation constitutes being. According to Sairsingh, relation or excellency is the fundamental ontological category. Furthermore, he believes that the notion that relation is constitutive— and not merely accidental—of being stands in contrast to the Aristotelian theory that substantial form is the fundamental ontological category.145 A relational ontology means that being is inherently pluralistic and dynamic. Sairsingh argues that Edwards—by understanding glory in terms of excellency—modified the traditional Calvinist notion of the glory of God, which emphasized God’s absolute power. The glory of God does not consist in his sovereign power, but in the relations of consent between the divine persons.146 In other words, the triune relations of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the glory of God. God’s glory is characterized as excellency because it refers to the inherent relational nature of the divine being. The importance of casting God’s glory in terms of excellency is that God’s being is necessarily pluralistic and dynamic. Excellency implies triunity: a subject consenting, an object of consent, and consent itself.147 The glory of God is displayed ad intra and ad extra. Ad intra, the glory of God is the relations of mutual consent between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. He portrays the Father as the affection or happiness of God, the Son as the divine idea of self-reflection, and the Spirit as the eternal act of the divine will or mutual love of the Father and the Son.148 Despite obvious affinities with the psychological analogy, Sairsingh believes that Edwards’ conception of the Trinity is not merely another rendition of the self-differentiated absolute subject model of the Trinity because relations of mutual consent constitute each person. The important point for Sairsingh is that the divine persons are constituted by their relationships to

143Sairsingh,

“Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 63. “The Mind,” no. 1 (6:336). 145Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 40, 45, and 285. 146Ibid., 200–1. 147Ibid., 64. 148Ibid., 105–44. 144Edwards,

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the other divine persons.149 Sairsingh calls this a “societal model of the Trinity.”150 Since mutual relations of consent constitute the Trinity, God’s being is inherently relational and dynamic. Since God is the foundation and source of all being, being is inherently social or relational; hence, Sairsingh argues that Edwards developed a relational or social ontology. Sairsingh’s important contribution is noting that the ad intra glory of God is the pattern for the ad extra glory of God. Ad extra, God manifests his glory in a primary and a secondary way. The church, as a community of consent, is the primary manifestation of the glory of God and creation, as a system of harmonious consent between entities, is the secondary repetition of the glory of God.151 Creation and the church depict the glory of God because they are systems of consent or entities existing in relation. Creation and particularly the church are described as the glory of God because they correlate with the internal glory of God. That is, the symmetry of created entities in the cosmos and the saints in the community of the church are images of the mutual consent of the Father and the Son through the Holy Spirit.152 The church, understood as the community of saints, is the apex of God’s manifested glory ad extra. Furthermore, the triune God is the ontological basis and structure of the church. The social being of the Trinity is the ontological basis for the saints’ fellowship with one another in the community of the church and with God. As the Spirit unites the Father and the Son in love, so the Spirit is sent to unite the saints one to another in the community of the church and to the immanent fellowship between the Father and the Son.153 On a structural level, the union of the saints in a society of mutual consent mirrors the immanent trinitarian relations. The Father and Son are united together by virtue of their mutual consent to each other and so the saints are bound together in a community of love because of

149Sairsingh,

“Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 158 and 285–86. 207. 151Sairsingh argues that the church is the primary image of the Trinity or the glory of God because it consists of intelligent beings—those beings possessing the twin faculties of mind: understanding and will. Intelligent beings more perfectly reflect the divine glory because they are able to know and consent to the universal system of being, whereas non-intelligent beings are simply parts within the system of being (Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 214–52). 152Ibid., 190–91. 153Ibid., 160–61 and 205–8. 150Ibid.,

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their common consent or love to God.154 In both cases, the Holy Spirit is the love that unites the consenting parties. The saints are differentiated from other people because they possess true virtue. True virtue is consent to being in general or to God. God is referred to as being in general because God is the source of and co-extensive with all created being. God is absolute being because without God nothing exists. To consent to being in general, put simply, means to love God. To love God, means that a person seeks God’s glory or end in creation. Since God’s glory consists of mutual consenting relations between the divine persons— i.e., the mutual love between the Father and the Son, the church, as the community of those who possess true virtue, manifests the divine love through the social love of its members.155

Analysis I agree with Sairsingh’s thesis that for Edwards the Trinity is the ontological basis and pattern of the church. The mutual love model serves as the structure for Edwards’ understanding of redemption. Although Sairsingh does not identify Edwards trinitarianism with the mutual love model, but a “societal model” of the Trinity.156 Salvation consists in being drawn into the fellowship between the Father and the Son through the Spirit. Believers share in fellowship because the Spirit of God enables them to know and love God by virtue of knowing and embracing the Son through the indwelling Spirit. In the following, I want to interact with several aspects of his interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarian theology and particularly its relationship to the Western trinitarian tradition. Sairsingh’s interpretation of subsistent relations in Edwards’ trinitarianism exhibits a significant tension. On the one hand he maintains that the immanent taxis is the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Father; on the other, he suggests that the order is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.157 The inconsistency is due to his adoption of Herbert Richardson’s understanding of the subsistent relations.158 Sairsingh follows Richardson’s interpretation 154Sairsingh,

“Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 208. 225–42. 156Ibid., 207. However, what Sairsingh calls Edwards’ social model is in fact the mutual love model (e.g., ibid., 65–67). 157For the first order ibid., 116–17 and for the second order ibid., 63–65 and 126–27. 158Sairsingh’s discussion of the subsistence of the Father is essentially a reproduction of Richardson’s interpretation (ibid., 105–27 and cf. Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 256–79). 155Ibid.,

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that the Father is the happiness of the deity. Happiness has an ontological significance. Entities exist only in relation with other entities. The relations of consent between entities are excellency. Happiness is the mind’s perception of excellency. The height of human happiness is the perception of the excellency of the Trinity—the divine society of mutual consent. Applied to the Trinity, the Father, as happiness, is the delight that arises from the harmony of consent between objects; that is, the Father is the happiness deriving from the unity of subject and object. The order of subsistence therefore is the Son, the Spirit, and the Father. The benefit of identifying the Father as happiness is that he cannot be conceived as existing without the Son and the Spirit. Quoting Richardson, Sairsingh says the Father is “the idea of being as being-three.”159 This is important to Sairsingh because he believes that the problem with the classical description of the Father as the fons et origo is that it conceives the Father as existing prior to and independent of the Son and the Spirit. Sairsingh redefines the fons et origo to comply with the Father as the happiness of the Godhead. The Father is the fount of deity because the social community of the Trinity consists in the happiness of consent. The Father is not the source of subsistence, but is the ground of deity because he comprehends the deity.160 In contrast to Sairsingh’s order of the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Father, I maintain that the order of the immanent subsistence of the divine persons in Edwards’ thought is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Specifically, I disagree with Sairsingh’s description of the Father as happiness for three reasons: first, the Father is the fount of the deity; second, happiness is attributed to the Holy Spirit; and third, the logical implication of Sairsingh’s order of the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Father is that God is a quaternity or the subsistent relations of the divine persons are irrational. The first two points relate to the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarian writings, whereas the third is a theological criticism. First, Edwards taught that the Father is the fount of the deity in the sense that the Father is the source of the personal subsistence of the Son and Spirit.161 The order of subsistence is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Son is begotten by the Father’s reflexive act of self-reflection. The Holy Spirit proceeds as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.162 159Sairsingh,

“Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 123. 116–27. 161Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:134–35. The Father is the co-, but principal source of the Holy Spirit. Thus, Edwards affirmed the filioque (Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135). 162Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131 and 134–35 and Miscellanies, no. 94 160Ibid.,

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Sairsingh’s objection to this order of subsistent relations is that the Father is prior to the Son and the Spirit. Since the Father exists as Father irrespective of the Son and the Spirit, the relational theory of divine personhood and, by implication, relational ontology are undermined. However, Sairsingh, like Richardson, fails to appreciate the distinction between contemplating the Trinity in fieri and in facto esse. Trinitarian theologians do not consider the Father, in facto esse, as existing as an undifferentiated oneness prior to the Son and the Spirit.163 Indeed, the Father cannot be the Father without the Son. The utilization of becoming language—i.e., in fieri—to describe the generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit admits to no temporal process. God never existed other than in the triune relations of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Sairsingh’s charge that the subsistent order of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit implies that the Father existed prior to and independently of the Son and the Holy Spirit overlooks this essential point of trinitarian theology and analogous use of language. Second, Edwards clearly identifies the Holy Spirit as the happiness of the deity.164 Sairsingh bases the interpretation of the Father as happiness on a passage in Edwards’ treatise Concerning the End for which God created the World. Sairsingh quotes, “the whole of God’s internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz., his infinite knowledge, his infinite virtue or holiness and love, and his infinite joy or happiness.”165 According to Sairsingh, knowledge is attributed to the Son, love to the Holy Spirit, and happiness to

(13:260). 163Sairsingh argues that the order of subsistence that begins with the Father assumes a notion of being as an “undifferentiated oneness” (Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 125). 164Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:129–30 and Miscellanies, no. 117 (13:283). For instance, Edwards says, “the honour of the Father and the Son is [that] they are infinitely happy and are the original and fountain of happiness, and the honour of the Holy Ghost is equal for He is infinite happiness and joy itself” (Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135). 165Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 117. The presence of the word love in this citation is a textual variant. Love does not appear in the Yale edition (The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. John E. Smith, vol. 8, Ethical Writings, ed. Paul Ramsey [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], 528) nor in the Worcester edition (The Works of President Edwards, 4 vols., reprint of the Worcester edition, vol. 2, “Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World” [New York: Leavitt, Trow, and Co., 1849], 253). Richardson adds the word in brackets in his citation from the Worcester text.

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the Father.166 However, this identification is an extrapolation beyond the text. Sairsingh’s attribution of knowledge to the Son, holiness to the Spirit, and happiness to the Father derives from a misinterpretation of Edwards’ theory of the soul, which is the image of the Trinity. Sairsingh follows Richardson’s analysis that the affections or feelings are the primary category of the soul. The affections, as the ontological ground of the soul, comprehend the understanding and will. When Sairsingh reads Edwards’ statement that God’s internal glory consists in knowledge, holiness, and happiness he interprets these as referring to the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Father. However, holiness and happiness both refer to the will. Just prior to the sentence quoted by Sairsingh, Edwards clarifies, “now God’s internal glory, as it is in God, is either in his understanding or will. The glory or fullness of his understanding is his knowledge. The internal glory and fullness of God, which we must conceive of as having its special seat in his will, is his holiness and happiness.”167 Happiness is not properly distinct from love or holiness and both of these are attributed to the will. Happiness relates to love in the same way that an idea relates to the act of self-reflection. The Son is eternally generated as idea by the eternal act of self-reflection. Thus, a distinction pertains between the act of self-reflection and the idea produced by the act. The Holy Spirit proceeds as the happiness of the deity by the eternal and mutual act of love between the Father and the Son. As idea is the product of self-reflection, so happiness is the product of mutual love. Another way to say this is that generation is equivalent to the act of self-reflection and procession is equivalent with the act of love. The product of self-reflection is idea and the product of love is happiness. To be in love is to be happy.168 The benefit of this interpretation is threefold. First, it is consistent with Edwards’ theory that the soul and divine nature have two types of operation: one of understanding and one of will. In addition, the order of the personal subsistences of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is coherent. The Father generates the Son as idea by an act of self-reflection. The Holy Spirit proceeds by the mutual act of love between the Father and the Son and is, therefore, the happiness of God. Finally, this interpretation is a 166Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 117. Cf. Richardson, “The Glory of God,” 259. 167Edwards, End of Creation, 8:528. 168This interpretation of happiness is also consistent with Edwards’ discussion of happiness in Miscellanies, no. 198 “Happiness” (13:336–37).

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credible rendering of both the statements found in the End of Creation and the Discourse on the Trinity.169 Third, to identify the Father as happiness implies either a quaternity of divine persons or an incoherent order of subsistent relations. As I argued in the section on Richardson’s analysis, the generation of the Son as an idea of reflection requires a self-reflecting subject. Furthermore, the procession of the Holy Spirit as mutual love requires two subjects.170 According to Sairsingh, affection, in the order of nature, is subsequent to the act of understanding and will. Affection or happiness is the feeling of the soul when the mind sees its relationship within the universal system of being and consents to that system of being. Since affection is subsequent to the act of intellect and will, Sairsingh maintains the order of the Son, the Spirit, and the Father. The problem is that the order of the Son, the Spirit, and the Father requires a divine quaternity in order to rationally explain the subsistence of the divine persons. Unless a form of the deity is posited as subsisting prior to the Son, then to explain the generation of the Son as an idea of self-reflection is impossible because no subject exists to self-reflect and thereby to generate the Son as an idea of self-reflection. The ineffable deity is also required for the subsistence of the Spirit as mutual love because the Son must be loved and return love to another subject. The Father cannot be the source of the generation of the Son or procession of the Spirit because he subsists as happiness, which follows the generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit. In sum, to portray the Father as the third subsisting person leads either to a divine quaternity or a trinitarianism that is irrational.

169Cf.

135.

Edwards, End of Creation, 8:528 and Discourse on the Trinity, 21:129–31 and

170Sairsingh

assumes that the acts of intellectual generation and volitional procession presuppose a subject when he remarks, “Edwards takes God’s internal glory to refer to the dynamic movement within God from direct existence to its two reflexive operations” (Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 127). However, this is in contradiction to the order of the Son, the Spirit, and the Father because the Father is the “direct existence” of God; the Son is generated by the first reflexive operation; and the Spirit proceeds by the second reflexive operation. In this scheme, the Father subsists as the self-reflecting subject, the Son subsists as the idea, which, since the idea matches the subject from which it is generated, is also a subject, the Holy Spirit subsists as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.

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Amy Plantinga Pauw

Summary Amy Plantinga Pauw’s The Supreme Harmony of All is the first published book-length analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism. It unites two strands of contemporary scholarship that have seen a remarkable renaissance in the past sixty years: Edwards studies and trinitarian theology. Her book is a revision and extension of her Yale University dissertation (1990). In addition to this text, she edited volume twenty in the Yale critical edition of The Works of Jonathan Edwards and several articles and an essay on Edwards’ thought.171 In continuity with the dissertation and the Richardson and Sairsingh line of interpretation, Supreme Harmony of All emphasizes the relational and social aspects of Edwards’ trinitarianism.172 Plantinga Pauw’s primary interpretive judgment is that Edwards’ trinitarian thought oscillates between the disparate psychological and social models of the Trinity.173 Her use of the psychological and social model template reflects adoption of a bi-polar paradigmatic interpretation of the history of trinitarianism common in modern theology. The paradigm supposes that trinitarian theology developed along dialectic trajectories. The Western Augustinian tradition stresses divine unity and utilizes the psychological model of the Trinity. The Cappadocians of the Eastern tradition and Richard of St. Victor of the Western tradition emphasize the divine persons and use the social model of the Trinity. Moreover, as a hermeneutical starting point, the paradigm assumes that particular theologians invariably take either divine unity or divine threeness as axiomatic in their trinitarianism. Plantinga Pauw argues that Edwards’ genius lies in his use of both the disparate psychological and social models of the Trinity. She interprets Edwards’ immanent and economic trinitarian theology and its relation to the doctrines of creation and redemption in terms of the categories of the psychological and social models.

171The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 20, The “Miscellanies,” (Entry nos. 833–1152), ed. Amy Plantinga Pauw (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); “‘Heaven is a World of Love,’” 392–401; “The Future of Reformed Theology,” 456–69; “Where Theologians Fear to Tread,” Modern Theology 16 (2000): 39–59; and “The Trinity,” 44–58. 172However, her work shows no direct acquaintance with Richardson, but does reference Sairsingh. 173For the presentation of the threeness-oneness paradigm, see Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 30–55.

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After describing the psychological and social models in chapter one, she devotes the subsequent chapters to illustrating the role of these conflicting trinitarian models in Edwards’ immanent and economic trinitarianism. Chapters two and three treat the role of the psychological models in the immanent Trinity. Chapter two argues that Edwards rejected the Reformed scholastic practice of locating the excellency or perfection of God in divine oneness or the simplicity of the divine substance and replaced it with a relational ontology that perceives the unity of God to reside in the relations of mutual consent that constitute the triune God.174 Yet curiously, she describes Edwards’ relational ontology as it relates to the immanent Trinity in terms of the psychological analogy, which she suggests is the primary analogy of the scholastic simplicity traditions.175 Chapter three illustrates that the robust social interaction between the Father and the Son in the covenant of redemption exhibits Edwards’ use of the social model in his reflections on the immanent Trinity.176 Chapters four and five argue that Edwards’ theology of creation and redemption incorporates in unresolved tension both the psychological and social models of the Trinity. For instance, Edwards’ depiction of the Holy Spirit’s economic role in sanctification and glorification as the emanated mutual love of the Father and the Son that draws the saints into the ambit of trinitarian and ecclesial fellowship reflects the Spirit’s impersonal identity as the act of divine love in the psychological model.177 Using the psychological model, Edwards aligns the Son’s immanent identity as the Word of God with his economic work of revelation—written and preached. Since the Son is the subsistence of God’s self-knowledge, he is the divine person that reveals knowledge of God.178 Alternately drawing on the social model, Edwards emphasizes the personal agency of the Son in the covenant of redemption, the incarnation, and union with the saints.179 The final chapter summarizes Edwards’ use of the psychological and social models in his reflections on the immanent and economic Trinity. She suggests that modern theology should adopt the “multi-lingual character” of Edwards’ use of the psychological and social models of the Trinity to express the varied facets of the triune God and redemption. Critically, she notes that the relations depicted among the divine persons may imply 174Plantinga

Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 69–80. 80–89. 176Ibid., 92. 177Ibid., 121–22. 178Ibid., 123–24. 179Ibid., 139–50. 175Ibid.,

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tritheism, reflect excessive anthropomorphism, mirror the hierarchical social world of Puritan New England, and that the ideal of trinitarian mutual love was unattainable and resulted in the alienation of Edwards from his parishioners.

Analysis My primary criticism of her interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism is that the use of the threeness-oneness paradigm leads to the misinterpretation that Edwards deployed two distinct trinitarian models—psychological and social. Edwards used only one model of the Trinity—the Augustinian mutual love model, which is a variation of the psychological model. And although Edwards emphasized the social themes of loving union between the Father and the Son and the saints, he did so in the context of the mutual love model rather than a distinct social model. The strictures of the threeness-oneness paradigm seem to prohibit Plantinga Pauw from noting Edwards’ consistent use of the mutual love model and lead her to see social themes as evidence of a distinct social model of the Trinity. I detail my criticisms of her application of the threeness-oneness paradigm to Edwards’ trinitarianism in chapter two and, therefore, do not treat them here. These most recent treatments of Edwards’ trinitarianism share the current concern to replace individualistic conceptions of human nature with social notions and to redefine classical theism in order to provide a God that is inherently relational and dynamic. They also share the conviction that Edwards’ trinitarianism is a rich resource for this contemporary project. Herbert Richardson argues that Edwards’ trinitarianism provides a wholistic cosmology. All created entities exist in a symbiotic matrix just as the Son, the Spirit, and the Father subsist in an eternal nexus of love. Krister Sairsingh states that Edwards’ foundational category is a trinitarian relational ontology. Sairsingh maintains that God’s relational nature is the form for all of created reality and finds its highest expression in the social nature of the church. Plantinga Pauw argues that Edwards decisively departed from Western Augustinian trinitarianism and developed a robust social theory of the Trinity by utilizing the thought of Richard of St. Victor and the Cappadocians.

CONCLUSION The survey of the history of the interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism reveals a common tendency. Interpreters use Edwards as a resource to validate their current theological views. Retrieving the thought of past theologians is an important project for contemporary theology. Yet, it should be

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pursued with careful attention to its original historical-theological context and the needs of contemporary theology should not be allowed to exert too much hermeneutical force. The next chapter outlines a frequent way that current Edwards’ scholarship misidentifies the historical-theological context of Edwards’ trinitarianism, by interpreting it through the modern threenessoneness paradigm and its attendant critical assessment of the history of Western trinitarianism.

2 JONATHAN EDWARDS AND THE SOCIAL TRINITY Common among theologians is a paradigmatic understanding of the history of trinitarianism. The paradigm supposes that trinitarian theology developed along dialectical trajectories. The Western Augustinian tradition stresses divine unity and utilizes the psychological model of the Trinity. The Cappadocians of the Eastern tradition and Richard of St. Victor of the Western tradition emphasize the divine persons and use the social model of the Trinity. The categories of threeness and oneness are used as a template to understand the overall development of trinitarianism and to interpret individual theologians within the traditions. In recent years, the threenessoneness paradigm has played a central role in the interpretation of Jonathan Edwards’ trinitarianism.1 Amy Plantinga Pauw’s work on Edwards is the most explicit and thorough application of the threeness-oneness paradigm to Edwards’ trinitarian thought.2 For this reason, this chapter specifically interacts with the use of 1E.g. Steven H. Daniel, “Postmodern Concepts of God and Edwards’ Trinitarian Ontology,” in Edwards in Our Time: Jonathan Edwards and the Shaping of American Religion, ed. Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C. Guelzo (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 49 and 54; Robert Jenson, America’s Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 91–98; Michael Jinkins, “‘The Being of Beings’: Jonathan Edwards’ Understanding of God as Reflected in His Final Treatises,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993): 181–83; Sang Hyun Lee, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Works of Jonathan Edwards, gen. ed. Harry S. Stout, vol. 21, Writings on the Trinity, Grace, and Faith, ed. Sang Hyun Lee (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2–31; Krister Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Divine Glory: His Foundational Trinitarianism and Its Ecclesial Import” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986), 69–73 and 144–51; and Rachel S. Stahle, “The Trinitarian Spirit of Jonathan Edwards Theology” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999). 2Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All”: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); “The Future of Reformed Theology: Some Lessons from Jonathan Edwards,” in Toward the Future of Reformed Theology:

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the paradigm in her interpretation of his trinitarian theology. Krister Sairsingh’s Harvard dissertation also uses the threeness-oneness paradigm to interpret Edwards’ trinitarian theology. He argues that Edwards developed a relational ontology that in turn served as the basis for his social trinitarianism and ecclesiology. Due to the similarities between my critical analysis of Plantinga Pauw’s and Sairsingh’s use of the threeness-oneness paradigm to interpret Edwards’ trinitarianism, I interact Plantinga Pauw’s interpretation of Edwards in the body of the text because hers is the most sustained published account of Edwards’ trinitarian theology in terms of the threeness-oneness paradigm. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that the threeness-oneness paradigm is the lens for her interpretation of Edwards’ relationship to the Western trinitarian tradition and his trinitarian writings.

THE THREENESS-ONENESS PARADIGM This section defines social trinitarianism and argues that the threenessoneness paradigm is an over-generalized understanding of the historical trinitarian traditions. The criticisms of the paradigm set forth here underlie the argument of this project that it is an improper starting point for interpreting Edwards’ trinitarianism. Augustine is the focus of the discussion because proponents of the paradigm identify his thought as the source of Western trinitarianism and fault him for the problems with Western trinitarianism. Plantinga Pauw also accepts the interpretation of Augustine’s trinitarian theology assumed by the paradigm. Although this is an investigation of Edwards’ trinitarianism and not of Augustine’s and I make no pretensions of assuming specialist status in my presentation of Augustine, a comparison of the claims of the paradigm with the writings of Augustine suffices to reveal the paradigm’s fundamental misapprehensions of Augustine’s trinitarian thought. Social Trinitarianism Social trinitarianism emerged as a distinct theological voice in the early and mid-twentieth century in the writings of theologians such as J. R. Illingworth, Leonard Hodgson, and Charles Lowry.3 More recently, social triniTasks, Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 456–69; “‘Heaven is a World of Love’: Edwards on Heaven and the Trinity,” Calvin Theological Journal 30 (1995): 392–401; and “The Supreme Harmony of All: Jonathan Edwards and the Trinity” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1990). 3Early social trinitarians emphasized the subjectivity of the divine persons and

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tarianism features prominently in the thought of Jürgen Moltmann, Leonardo Boff, David Brown, Colin Gunton and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr.4 the role the relations between the divine persons play in informing human social relations. Illingworth defines personhood as self-consciousness that is only fully realized in relationship to the other. Personhood is, therefore, inherently social. He then argues that if God is personal he must be a plurality. He suggests that society and the family unit illustrate the plurality within the Godhead. He writes that “[a] person is as essentially social, as he is an individual, being; he cannot be realized, he cannot become his true self, apart from society; and personality having this plural implication, solitary personality is a contradiction in terms” (J. R. Illingworth, The Doctrine of the Trinity: Apologetically Considered [London: Macmillan, 1907], 144). He also argues that plurality is necessary within the Godhead in order to affirm that God is moral. Since morality refers to our actions towards others, morality is inherently social. For instance, if God is moral, then he must be plural in order to eternally express love (Illingworth, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 136–43). Also see Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity: Croall Lectures, 1942–1943 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944) and Charles Lowry, The Trinity and Christian Devotion (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946). Both argue that the divine persons are centers of consciousness and act and advocate an organic theory of divine unity. Organic unity is the unity of an organism. An organism is a multitude of parts that act in concert. The concerted activity, which in turn actualizes the creature, is organic unity. Thus, organic unity is complex unity. Organic unity stands in contrast to mathematical unity; that is, one simple substance. Interesting to note, given the social trinitarian distaste for psychological analogies, is that Hodgson and Lowry use a psychological analogy to illustrate the Trinity (Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 85–112 and Lowry, The Trinity and Christian Devotion, 79–98). Hodgson points to the unified activities of reason, will, and affections as an example of the unity of the divine persons (Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 85–86 and 95–96). Lowry portrays the generation of the Son in terms of an act of intellection and the procession of the Holy Spirit in terms of an act of dilection (Lowry, The Trinity and Christian Devotion, 105–6). A further point of irony is that social trinitarians identify Hodgson as an early social trinitarian, even though he expressly rejected the social analogy (see Hodgson’s response to Claude Welch’s and R. S. Frank’s criticism of his theory in “The Doctrine of the Trinity: Some Further Thoughts,” The Journal of Theological Studies n.s. 5 [1954]: 52). 4Jürgen Moltmann, Trinität und Reich Gottes: zur Gotteslehre (München: Kaiser, 1980); Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. Paul Burns, Theology and Liberation Series (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1988); David Brown, The Divine Trinity (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985); Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997); and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” Calvin Theological Journal 23 (1988): 37–53, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Social Analogy of the Trinity,” The Thomist 50 (1986): 325–52, “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philoso-

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Twentieth-century social trinitarianism is best understood in terms of its two primary objectives. First, it seeks to replace the theological tendency to conceive of God as a single subject and the divine persons as expressive modes of the one divine subject with the notion that God is a community of three subjects. Second, it desires to provide a theological solution, grounded in the vision of God as a society of loving persons, to social inequities and injustices, which are founded on modern individualism, which in turn pits the individual over and against the other and the community.5 For present purposes, I concentrate on the first project to see the divine persons as individual subjects. The immediate context of the twentieth-century social trinitarian effort to define the Godhead in terms of three divine subjects is the trinitarian theology of Karl Barth and Karl Rahner.6 Barth and Rahner and the work they inspired represent dominant watersheds in twentieth-century trinitarian theology. However, the problematic with Barth and Rahner from the perspective of social trinitarianism is that both represent one-subject models of phical and Theological Essays, Library of Religious Philosophy, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., 1 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 21–47, and “The Fourth Gospel as Trinitarian Source Then and Now,” in Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on His Sixtieth Birthday, ed. Mark S. Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 303–21. 5The twofold program in social trinitarianism has remained constant. For instance, compare Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 85–112 and 183–87 with Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 19 and Boff, Trinity and Society, 9–24. 6Social trinitarians identify Barth and Rahner as the chief representatives of mono-personal trinitarianism and, as such, their polar opposites (e.g., Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 139–48). For an example of a social trinitarian identifying Barth as indicative of the “Western Augustinian tradition,” see Sairsingh, “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Glory,” 75. While social trinitarians may desire to add that their proper context is the Western trinitarian tradition from Augustine to the present, I decline from granting this because it a priori accepts the social trinitarian interpretation and judgment on the history of Western trinitarian thought. For this reason I refer to Barth and Rahner as the immediate context of social trinitarianism. To simply grant the conclusion to social trinitarians that Augustine and the train of Western trinitarians prior to the modern period were mono-personal trinitarians of a Barthian or Rahnerian sort or that Barthian and Rahnerian trinitarian thought is the inevitable terminus of the trajectory of Western trinitarianism must be demonstrated as true and not merely assumed so.

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the Trinity. Barth describes the divine persons in terms of modes of being and Rahner in terms of distinct manners of subsisting.7 For social trinitarians, to construe God as a single subject undoes genuine trinitarianism. The Trinity must be understood as a unity of three divine subjects.8 Social trinitarianism may be defined as the belief that the interpersonal communion among the three divine persons is both that which constitutes the divine being and that which is primary in any reflection on the divine being.9 Although social trinitarians are often known for starting with the plurality of the Trinity in contrast to divine unity, Gary D. Badcock notes that the social trinitarian concern is not so much with plurality as such but the plurality of inner-trinitarian relations.10 The Trinity, as a divine community of mutually related and constituted persons, is the ontological ground for a communal vision of human existence and ecclesiology.11 The divine persons and their interpersonal relations, therefore, are the heart of social trinitarianism.12 Any notion of divine unity must be defined so as to comport with the more fundamental social nature of the Trinity.13 7Barth conceives of God as one subject existing in three modes of being. He expressly rejects portraying the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit as three persons in the sense of three individuals because of its unavoidable implication of tritheism (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. T. Thompson, et al., 5 vols. in 14 [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936–1977], I/1, 400–31). For Rahner, the one divine consciousness subsists in a threefold way. The divine persons then are not three distinct conscious selves, but the awareness of distinction within the one divine self (Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel and intro. Catherine Mowry LaCugna [New York: Crossroad, 1998], 103–15). 8Boff, Trinity and Society, 117–18; Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 229; and Moltmann, Trinität und Reich Gottes, 156–66. 9An excellent resource for the definition, history, challenges, and strengths of social trinitarianism is Thomas Thompson’s article “Trinitarianism Today: Doctrinal Renaissance, Ethical Relevance, Social Redolence,” Calvin Theological Journal 32 (1997): 9–42. 10Gary D. Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 246. 11Jürgen Moltmann argues that the social Trinity teaches that humans only realize their personhood through intimate communion with others—i.e., die Personengemeinschaft (Moltmann, Trinität und Reich Gottes, 173–74). Leonardo Boff states that the Trinity is the ground for union between persons and human community (Boff, Trinity and Society, 133–34 and 148–49). Central to both Moltmann and Boff is the notion that human personhood realized in communal relations with others is the image of God and not the individual. 12Social trinitarian, C. Stephen Layman, maintains, “there is exactly one Su-

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Central to social trinitarianism is the theory of divine personhood. The social trinitarian theory of divine personhood involves two constitutive components. First, a divine person is a conscious center and/or agent of will and act. According to Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., the social trinitarian definition of divine person takes “each person as distinct centers of love, will, and act, and knowledge and consciousness. These three are joined to each other as a complex social unit.”14 The point is that each divine person is an individual. However, the individuality of the divine persons is not an endorsement of divine individualism. Second, the individual identity of each person is constituted through relations of mutual constitution. Social trinitarians insist on the relational nature of personhood because they believe that the exclusive emphasis on discrete centers of knowledge and will runs the danger of construing the divine persons in terms of an individualistic or “modern” notion of person.15 Colin Gunton for example cautions against the Cartesian theory of person because it casts the person as first and foremost a self-conscious subject, which is only accidentally related to other subjects.16 In contrast to this form of divine individualism, Gunton champions a theory of person that takes relation as the central ontological category of personhood rather than as a mere accidental quality. He maintains that “[t]o be personal . . . is not to be an individual center of consciousness or something like that— preme Being, but there are three divine selves. God is identical with the three divine selves in a special relationship. In other words, on this view, God is a social entity, analogous (ontologically) to a marriage” (Layman, “Tritheism and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 5 [1988]: 293). 13Brian Leftow places the social trinitarian strategies for explaining divine unity into three categories. These are “Trinity monotheism”—the three taken together comprise God, “group mind monotheism”—the three divine persons comprise the mind of God, and “Functional monotheism”—the Trinity is a collective of divine persons that act as one. Leftow also presents thorough criticisms of each strategy (Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], 203–49). 14Plantinga, “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” 23. 15Moltmann elaborates that the divine persons are “individuals, who only subsequently enter into relation with one another, [but] [p]erson and relation therefore have to be understood in a reciprocal relationship. Here there are no persons without relations; but there are no relations without persons either” (Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 175 and 172). 16Colin Gunton, “The Concept of Person: The One, the Three, and the Many,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 84–87.

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although that may be part of the matter—but to be one whose being consists in relations of mutual constitution with other persons.”17 Important to note is that the relational theory of divine person includes an aspect of the individualistic notion; namely, that the divine persons are centers of knowledge and act. In other words, the relational notion of person does not deny that the divine persons are individual agents, but affirms that their respective personhood is only fully realized through their relations of mutual constitution.18 Defining the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm The use of the threeness-oneness paradigm is common in current systematic and some historical theologies.19 As a hermeneutical tool, the paradigm 17Gunton, “Being and Concept: Concluding Theological Postscript,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 195. Also see Gunton’s essay, “The Concept of Person,” 87–99. Gunton delineates the difference between person and individual in the following way: “a person is different from an individual, in the sense that the latter is defined in terms of separation from other individuals, the person in terms of relations with other persons” (Gunton, “Trinitarian Theology Today,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 11). Note that Gunton’s “The Concept of Person” and “Being and Concept” speak specifically about human persons, but that he applies this theory of person to the divine persons in “Trinitarian Theology Today,” 12. 18Cornelius Plantinga notes that “[e]ach member is a person, a distinct person, but scarcely an individual or separate person” (Plantinga, “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” 50). 19For examples in systematic theology, see Boff, Trinity and Society, 77–85; Brown, The Divine Trinity, 243–44; Colin Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis in the West,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 32; Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 96–97 and 101; Moltmann, Trinität und Reich Gottes, 166 and 193–94; and John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church, Contemporary Greek Theologians, 4 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 17 and 87–88. For examples in historical theology, see Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 140–41; William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 47 and 60–61; Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976), 52, 56, and 62; Thomas A. Marsh, The Triune God: A Biblical, Historical, and Theological Study (Blackrock, Dublin: Columbia, 1994), 132; and Stephen McKenna, “Introduction,” in De Trinitate: St. Augustine: The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, vol. 45, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), xiv. I mention McKenna’s introduction to Augustine’s De Trinitate because Colin Gunton cites this introduction

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reduces the theological history of trinitarianism to the conceptual idioms of threeness and oneness. The axiomatic starting point for trinitarian reflection defines each trajectory.20 First, the threeness trinitarian tradition starts with the threeness or plurality of divine persons as the most fundamental and determining datum of divinity. The threeness tradition is often associated with Eastern Cappadocian trinitarianism and the Western theologian, Richard of St. Victor. The second trajectory is the Western or oneness model of the Trinity and is associated with Augustine. According to the paradigm, the West starts with the undifferentiated oneness or unity of the divine essence and subordinates all further trinitarian thought to the principle of oneness. The paradigm assumes that the starting point of the threeness and oneness trinitarian traditions is indicated by the analogies that each uses to illustrate the triune God. The Western tradition is dominated by the psychological analogy that finds its classical formulation in Augustine’s De Trinitate.21 In the psychological analogy, the Father is the mind or memory, who, by an eternal act of self-reflection, generates the Son according to knowledge. The Holy Spirit is illustrated as proceeding as the mind’s selflove (the act of will) of its self-knowledge.22 to support the threeness-oneness paradigm (Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis in the West,” 32) and it is also the translation of Augustine cited by Plantinga Pauw. 20For clear and concise definitions of the two trajectories in terms of their relative starting points, see Jaana Hallamaa, “The Concept of Person and God as Trinity of Persons,” in Philosophical Studies in Religion, Metaphysics, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Heikki Kirjavainen, ed. Timo Koistinen and Tommi Lehtonen, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 38 (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1997), 152–54 and Brown, The Divine Trinity, 272. In a recent essay, Colin Gunton, who typically portrays trinitarian theologies in the polarities of Cappadocian and Augustinian, clarifies that the issue is not starting points per se, but the priority and dominance given to either oneness or threeness (Gunton, “Being and Person: T. F. Torrance’s Doctrine of God,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer [Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001], 124). 21Amy Plantinga Pauw adopts this viewpoint in Supreme Harmony of All, 11–12 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 56–57. 22Augustine uses the psychological illustration in three forms or three mental triads. The first is the mind knowing and loving itself (book 9: see The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, gen. ed. John E. Rotelle, part 1, vol. 5, The Trinity, ed. Edmund Hill [Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City, 1991], 9.1–18 [pp. 270– 82]). The second mental triad, which Augustine prefers to the first (Augustine, The Trinity 15.5 [p. 398]), is the operation of the mind remembering, knowing, and will-

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A common variation of the Western psychological analogy is the mutual love model.23 The chief distinction between the psychological and mutual love model is that in the former the Holy Spirit is the Father’s love for the Son and in the latter the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father. In the mutual love model, the Holy Spirit is often referred to as the bond of love that unites the Father and the Son. However, as in the psychological analogy, the structure for this illustration of the immanent trinitarian relations is the mental triad of memory, understanding, and will. Consequently, in both forms of the psychological analogy, the mental operations of one person illustrate the immanent trinitarian relations.24 The three-person analogy is the preferred model of the threeness or Cappadocian/Victorine tradition.25 In this analogy, divine triunity and unity are illustrated by the example of Peter, James, and John, who are three dising/loving itself (book 10: see Augustine, The Trinity 10.1–18 [pp. 286–99]). The third form, and the closest the human being comes to imaging the Trinity, is the activity of the mind remembering, knowing, and loving God (book 14: see Augustine, The Trinity 14.15 [p. 383]). For the significance of the verbal form of the last mental triad, see Walter H. Principe, “The Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person,” in Studia Patristica, vol. 17, three parts, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (New York: Pergamon, 1982), 3:1291–99. 23For Augustine’s formulation of the mutual love model, see Augustine, The Trinity 15.28 (p. 419), 15.37 (p. 424), 15.39 (p. 426), and 15.47 (p. 432). 24Augustine expressly identifies this as the limitation of the mental triad. Whereas memory, understanding, and love are not three persons, but qualities that belong to one person, the divine persons do not belong to one God, but are the one God. Thus, the “monism” that critics accuse Augustine and the psychological analogy of implying is precisely the limitation of the mental triad for illustrating the triunity of God according to Augustine (Augustine, The Trinity 15.12 [p. 403] and 15.42–43 [pp. 427–28]). The social trinitarian William Hasker is a notable exception to this oversight among social trinitarian evaluations of Augustine’s theology (Hasker, “Tri-Unity,” The Journal of Religion 50 [1970]: 8–11). In addition, David Coffey argues that with the mutual love model, Augustine introduces an “interpersonal” model that is distinct from and not merely an intrapersonal model. He maintains this because in the mutual love model the Father and the Son are subjects giving and receiving love. As such, the mutual love model is distinct from the psychological analogy, which relies on intrapersonal categories (Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” Theological Studies 51 [1990]: 194–200 and 220). 25Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 57. Gregory of Nyssa’s use of the analogy is available in Against Eunomius 1.9 (NPNF2 5:56) and On “Not Three Gods” (NPNF2 5:331–32).

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tinct persons sharing a common human nature. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are each distinct divine persons who share an equal, but not a numerically identical essence.26 As a result, the essence or unity of God is generic; the divine persons are particular instances of the generic divine essence.27 Social trinitarians prefer the Eastern or Cappadocian/Victorine tradition because they believe it provides a genuine notion of trinitarian personhood and triunity by virtue of starting with, or taking as axiomatic, the plurality of divine persons.28 The West is criticized as being monistic and modalistic at worst and binitarian at best. Augustine is the bugbear of the Western trinitarian tradition. He is responsible for the West’s preoccupation with the unity of the divine essence and for indelibly stamping the neopla26For an elaboration and utilization of the three man analogy, see social trinitarian Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., “Gregory of Nyssa and the Social Analogy of the Trinity,” 333–34 and “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” 27–39. 27John L. Gresham Jr. points out that the modern social trinitarian use of the three-person analogy differs from its original purpose. The three-person analogy was originally used to illustrate the Trinity, whereas modern social trinitarians use it as a construct for divine unity (Gresham, “The Social Model of the Trinity and Its Critics,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46 [1993]: 331–32). Also, Sarah Coakley argues that Gregory did not start with the three-person analogy and criticizes the practice among social trinitarians of identifying the three-person analogy as Gregory of Nyssa’s central trinitarian rubric. She notes that social trinitarians anachronistically import a notion of person as a self-conscious agent into their reading of Gregory, which results in a tritheistic reading of his trinitarianism. Finally, the ontological order of the Trinity begins with the Father and the epistemological order begins with the Holy Spirit; in both cases the three persons are not the starting point of Gregory’s trinitarian reasoning (Coakley, “‘Persons’ in the ‘Social’ Doctrine of the Trinity: A Critique of Current Analytic Discussion,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], 123–37). Lewis Ayres points out that the three-person analogy, often portrayed as the cornerstone of Gregory’s trinitarianism, was not Gregory’s analogy. The three-person analogy was an accusation of tritheism made by polemical opponents to Cappadocian trinitarianism. They argued that the Cappadocian concept of the Trinity is similar to three individual human beings. Ablabius brought this criticism to Gregory’s attention (Ayres, “On not Three People: The Fundamental Themes of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology as seen in To Ablabius: On not Three Gods,” Modern Theology 18 [2002]: 447– 48). 28David Brown argues that the Cappadocian method of taking as fundamental the plurality of the divine persons is inherently superior to Augustine’s emphasis on divine unity (Brown, The Divine Trinity, 280).

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tonic doctrine of divine simplicity on the theological mentality of the West.29 Having outlined the central categories of the threeness-oneness paradigm, the following material shows that the paradigm is unrepresentative of Augustinian trinitarian theology and, therefore, unsuitable as a methodological starting point to interpret the trinitarian theology of Jonathan Edwards. Problems with the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm This section raises several problems with the threeness-oneness paradigm in general and in particular with its use among interpreters of Edwards’ trinitarianism. The focus here is the role Augustine plays in the paradigm because he receives the greatest attention in the social trinitarian criticisms of Western trinitarianism.

29Christoph Schwöbel asserts that, “it would not be a gross exaggeration to see the mainstream of the history of Western trinitarian reflection as a series of footnotes on Augustine’s conception of the Trinity in De Trinitate. Augustine’s emphasis on the unity of the divine essence of God’s triune being, his stress on the undivided mode of God’s relating to what is not God and his attempt to trace the intelligibility of the doctrine of the Trinity through the vestigia trinitatis in the human consciousness, mediating unity and differentiation, defined the parameters for the mainstream of Western trinitarian reflection” (Schwöbel, “Introduction,” in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwöbel [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995], 4–5). For examples in the secondary literature that link the problem of the West’s trinitarianism to Augustine’s Neoplatonism and the doctrine of divine simplicity, see C. Plantinga, Jr., “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” 45 and Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis in the West,” 31–32, 42–43, and 53–55. Divine simplicity is the doctrine that the essence of God is without composition. Simplicity means that the divine essence bears no accidental properties. All properties are identical with the divine essence. Simplicity also includes unicity of essence and existence. In God, no distinction pertains between essence and existence. Katherin Rogers argues that the primary concept of divine simplicity found in Western trinitarians such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas is the latter notion that teaches that God is pure act (Rogers, “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 32 [1996]: 165–86). For a concise and clear presentation of the doctrine of divine simplicity, see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Absolute Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 353–55. For a thorough discussion of divine simplicity, see Christopher Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 127–35.

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First, scholars that use the paradigm often seem to overlook its historical derivation.30 Amy Plantinga Pauw, for example, describes the psychological model that typifies the Augustinian trinitarian tradition with one brief citation from Augustine’s De Trinitate 9.8 and the social model with an equally brief reference to Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate 3.18.31 Detailed evidence, either from primary or corroborating secondary scholarship, is not provided to support the thesis that Augustinian trinitarianism focuses on divine unity and a distinct tradition associated with Richard of St. Victor stresses divine plurality.32 The paradigm first appears as a hermeneutical template in the latenineteenth-century French theologian Theodore De Régnon (1831–1893).33 30Thomas R. Thompson is a notable exception to the oversight regarding the historical origin of the threeness-oneness paradigm. He acknowledges that the nineteenth century French theologian Theodore De Régnon (1831–1893) originated the threeness-oneness paradigm, which he accepts as valid for categorizing and interpreting the history of trinitarian theology (Thompson, “Trinitarianism Today,” 24–25). Also curiously, LaCugna criticizes De Régnon’s paradigm as simplistic (God for Us, 11), but then later adopts the threeness-oneness categories to describe Augustine and the Cappadocians (God for Us, 96–97 and 101). 31Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 12–15. 32In her dissertation, Plantinga Pauw supports the threeness-oneness paradigm by reference to William G. Rusch’s introduction to a collection of fourth and fifth century primary readings in trinitarian theology and Cornelius Plantinga’s essay “Social Trinity and Tritheism.” Both Rusch and Cornelius Plantinga also accept the threeness-oneness paradigm without noting its historical origins (William G. Rusch, “Introduction,” in The Trinitarian Controversy, Sources of Early Christian Thought [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980], 23–27 and Plantinga, “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” 21–47). For Amy Plantinga Pauw’s reference to these authors, see “Supreme Harmony of All,” 23. 33Theodore De Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainté Trinité, four volumes bound as three (Paris: Victor Retaux, 1892/1898). Although the relationship, if any, between these American theologians and De Régnon is unclear because they do not cite him, in American literature, the practice of portraying the East emphasizing threeness and the West oneness occurs as early as the English translation of Augustus Neander’s, Lectures on the History of Christian Dogmas, 2 vols., ed. J. L. Jacobi and trans. J. E. Ryland (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1858). However, in Neander, the emphasis on the persons in Eastern trinitarianism is more the product of what he describes as its subordinationism, rather than of the divine persons as such (Neander, Lectures, 1:144, 155, 285, and 309). In American trinitarian thought, the practice of interpreting Greek and Latin trinitarian theology in terms of threeness and oneness appears to emerge first in Levi Leonard Paine’s, A Critical History of the Evolution of Trinitarianism and Its Outcome in the New Christology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

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The contemporary dialectical contrast of threeness versus oneness was not the original form of the paradigm. De Régnon divided the history of trinitarianism into the patristic and scholastic eras. In the patristic era, trinitarian theology emphasized the divine persons. The Cappadocians represent the fullest expression of the patristic era. Augustine inaugurated the scholastic era. In this period, trinitarian reflection was occupied with the nature of God. According to De Régnon, the patristic and scholastic eras, while distinguished by their different emphases, do not stand in polar opposition. Rather, the scholastic era derives from and contains the patristic insight of divine persons.34 De Régnon’s patristic and scholastic eras have evolved to become the familiar Cappadocian/threeness and Augustinian/oneness paradigm. Although pointing out that the paradigm derives from De Régnon does not necessarily mean that it is inaccurate, nevertheless, since social trinitarians reduce trinitarian thought to starting points, to show that they start, whether knowingly or unknowingly, with a modification of a latenineteenth century interpretation of the history of trinitarian theology and not the primary historical texts is relevant. Furthermore, among patristic scholars and some systematic theologians, the popular modification of De 1900). Paine casts the trinitarian traditions in terms of Greek and Latin. Athanasius and the Cappadocians reflect the Greek tradition and Augustine the Latin tradition. The similarities between Paine’s description of the differences between Greek and Latin trinitarian theology and the understanding of the traditions advocated by proponents of the threeness-oneness paradigm are quite notable. For instance, Greek trinitarianism understood homoousios to connote generic unity, whereas Augustine misconstrued it to mean numeric unity. The Greeks take the three persons as the central category of the Godhead, whereas Augustine gives primacy to the unity of the essence. The result is that the Greeks possess a genuine threeperson trinitarianism, whereas Augustine portrays God as one person with three personal distinctions. For Paine’s historiography of trinitarianism, see A Critical History of the Evolution of Trinitarianism, 1–96. The threeness/Cappadocianoneness/Augustinian dichotomy is also present in George P. Fisher’s, History of Christian Doctrine, International Theological Library [1901; reprint, New York: AMS, 1976], 143 and 146–47. However, Fisher prefers, what he characterizes as, the Augustinian emphasis on unity of substance because it transcends the subordinationism of the Cappadocian emphasis on threeness. 34For a detailed presentation of De Régnon’s paradigm and a criticism of its application among modern systematic and historical theologians, see Michel René Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 51–79 and “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology,” Theological Studies 56 (1995): 237–50.

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Régnon’s paradigm holds little currency.35 For instance, Edmund Hill suggests that the paradigm “ought simply to be thrown into the theological dustbin.”36 35For Augustinian scholars who are critical of the cliché, “Augustine starts with the unity of the divine essence,” see Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth Century Trinitarian Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 364–83, “‘Remember that You are Catholic’ (serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 8 (2000): 69–80, “The Fundamental Grammar of Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology,” in Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honor of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (New York: Routledge, 2000), 51–76, and “On not Three People,” 445–74; Michel René Barnes, “Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology in its Psychological Context,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 475–96, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 145–76; Mary T. Clark, “Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity: Its Relevance,” Dionysius 13 (1989): 76; David B. Hart, “The Mirror of the Infinite: Gregory of Nyssa on the Vestigia Trinitatis,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 541–61; Edmund Hill, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate and St. Augustine,’” Augustinian Studies 2 (1971): 67–80 and The Mystery of the Trinity, Introducing Catholic Theology, 4 (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), 115; Earl Muller, “The Dynamic of Augustine’s De Trinitate: A Response to a Recent Characterization,” Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 65–91; C. C. Pecknold, “How Augustine Used the Trinity: Functionalism and the Development of Doctrine,” Anglican Theological Review 85 (2003): 127–41; Lucian Tercescu, “‘Person’ versus ‘Individual’, and other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 527–39; and Rowan Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate,” Augustiniana 40 (1990): 317–32. For examples among systematic and historical theologians, see Yves M. J. Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 3 vols., trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury, 1983), 1:77–78; Bertrand De Margerie, The Christian Trinity in History, trans. Edmund J. Fortman, Studies in Historical Theology, 1 (Still River, Mass.: St. Bede’s, 1982), 162; Gerald O’Collins, The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity (New York: Paulist, 1999), 135; Joseph Ratzinger, “The Holy Spirit as Communio: Concerning the Relationship of Pneumatology and Spirituality in Augustine,” Communio 25 (1998): 327 (this is a translation of Ratzinger, “Lo Spirito Santo come communio,” in La riscoperta dello Spirito [Milan: Jaca Book, 1977], 251–67); and Thomas G. Weinandy, The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 55–64. Although accepting that historical trinitarian thought divides into the psychological and social trajectories, William C. Placher attempts to embrace and unite the concerns of both rather than impugn the former for the sake of the latter (Placher, Narrative of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture [Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1994], 65–75).

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Second, a reading of Augustine’s trinitarian writings lifted from their literary and historical contexts buttresses the threeness-oneness paradigm. In an instance of literary decontextualization, Amy Plantinga Pauw describes Augustine’s psychological analogy of mind, understanding, and will in terms of book nine of De Trinitate.37 The problem is not that she does not adequately describe the mental triad of book nine, but rather that this is presented as the definitive form of Augustine’s use of the mental triad, such that to understand this mental triad is equivalent to understanding Augustine’s trinitarianism.38 However, Augustine uses the mental triads in at least five forms to illustrate the doctrine of inseparable external operations,39 the Incarnation,40 and how God is at once three persons and yet only one God.41 In fact, the mental triad of book nine is, according to Augustine, the least effective in illustrating the Trinity.42 Thus, the picture of Augustine’s trinitarianism rests on a selective sampling of texts, which tends to oversimplify his trinitarian thought. The threeness-oneness paradigm also discounts Augustine’s historicaltheological context. The paradigm assumes that the key for understanding Augustine’s trinitarianism is his philosophical background— Neoplatonism.43 Augustine’s doctrine of divine simplicity and consequent 36Hill,

58.

The Mystery of the Trinity, 115. Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 12 and “Supreme Harmony of All,”

37Plantinga

38The weight of Plantinga Pauw’s criticism rests on two passages from Augustine’s De Trinitate—Book 9.11 and 15.28–29. These are used to argue that divine simplicity dominates Augustine’s theology and, as a consequence, steers it toward monism (Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 74 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 56–59). These passages represent a sort of Augustinian canon within a canon. For example, both Colin Gunton and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. cite these two passages for similar purposes (Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis in the West,” 40 and 49–52 and Plantinga, “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” 45–46). Robert Jenson is able to describe the Western tradition, Augustine, and the Cappadocians without reference to a primary text or even a corroborating secondary source (Jenson, America’s Theologian, 91–98 and the endnotes for this section on page 208). Perhaps he felt his treatment of this issue in the Triune Identity obviated the need to cite textual or scholarly sources in the Edwards monograph. 39Augustine, The Trinity 4.30 (p. 175). 40Augustine, The Trinity 15.19–20 (pp. 409–10). 41Augustine, The Trinity 15.40–45 (pp. 426–31). 42Augustine, The Trinity 15.5 (p. 398). 43Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis in the West,” 32–

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formulation of divine unity in terms of an undifferentiated substance is the product of the overriding influence of Neoplatonism.44 In contrast, some patristic scholars argue that in the fourth and fifth centuries Neoplatonism did not exist as a discrete catalog of ideas and doctrines.45 In addition, the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is used to “show” that Augustine was neoplatonic and is argued to mitigate any genuine notion of divine plurality, is in fact found in Augustine’s predecessor Hilary of Poitiers,46 who, according to social trinitarian Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., “strongly tended toward three-person pluralism.”47 The point is not to deny that simplicity is consistent with Neoplatonism, but rather to reject the argument that Augustine’s adherence to divine simplicity is evidence of the domineering influence of Neoplatonism on his thought and that it necessarily mitigates genuine triunity. In contrast to the assertion that Neoplatonism shaped Augustine’s doctrine of divine unity, the decisive context of Augustine’s doctrine of 33, 38–39, 42–43, and 47. The charge of Neoplatonism serves a similar purpose to the terms liberal and conservative in political discourse. These terms are rhetorical devices that are used to impugn and discount an opponent’s position in lieu of substantive discussion of issues. Similarly, the characterization of Augustine and the Western tradition as neoplatonic is used to justify the out of hand dismissal of their trinitarian theology (for an example of such usage, see Robert Jenson, The Triune Identity: God according to the Gospel [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982], 127–28). 44Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 59–60 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 25, 54, and 56–57. Although he is not a social trinitarian, Jenson finds the doctrine of simplicity so dubious that he hopes that his text will lead to its widespread disuse (Jenson, The Triune Identity, 124). 45Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” 147 and 153 and Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity, Christian Theology in Context (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11–15. Although specifically treating Basil of Caesarea and not Augustine, John M. Rist broadly remarks that the uncritical assumption that fourth century Christian thought was permeated with “Neoplatonism” is no longer sustainable and must be seriously revised (Rist, “Basil’s ‘Neoplatonism’: Its Background and Nature,” in Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic: A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposium, ed. Paul J. Fedwick [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981], 137–220, esp. 137–38). 46Hilary of Poitiers: The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, vol. 25, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1954), 3.2–3 (pp. 66–67). For a concise presentation of Hilary’s and Augustine’s utilization of divine simplicity, see Ayres, “‘Remember that You are Catholic,’” 69– 80. 47Plantinga, “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” 44.

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divine unity is the late-fourth-century pro-Nicene theology of inseparable external operations.48 According to the doctrine of inseparable external operations, in any act of a divine person of the Trinity, the three persons act inseparably. Because the divine persons operate inseparably, they have the same nature. Unity of operation infers unity of nature. The doctrine of inseparable operations appears as Augustine’s doctrine of divine unity over a long period of time and in diverse literary forms. For example, this doctrine is present in Epistle 11—Augustine’s earliest trinitarian writing (389),49 Sermon 52 (410–412),50 in later writings—Letter 187 (417) and Tractate 20 (418– 419),51 and throughout De Trinitate.52 48That Augustine understands himself to be theologizing within a received confessional tradition is made clear by his comment, “just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably. This is also my faith inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith” (Augustine, The Trinity 1.7 [p. 70]). For recent discussions of this doctrine and Augustine’s relationship to it, see the following patristic scholars: Ayres, “‘Remember that You are Catholic,’” 39–82; Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” 143–76; Clark, “Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” 76–77; and Basil Studer, The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of Hippo: Christocentrism or Theocentrism? trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1997), 104–6. Pro-Nicene refers to a mid and late-fourth century strategy for defending the unity of the Godhead among Nicene trinitarians (i.e., those who accepted homoousion). They argued that because the divine persons, particularly the Father and the Son, have the same power, they have the same nature. Arguing for the unity of nature among the divine persons on the basis of their possession of the same power was prevalent among Greek (e.g., Gregory of Nyssa) and Latin theologians (e.g., Hilary of Poitiers). For the development of pro-Nicene trinitarian theology, see Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy and Michel René Barnes, “One Nature, One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-Nicene Polemic,” in Studia Patristica, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, 29 (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 205–23 and Barnes, The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 125–72 and esp. 169–72 for a summary of the relationship between power and divine unity in pro-Nicene trinitarian theology. 49St. Augustine: Letters, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 1, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1951), 25–29. 50Sermons (part 3), Sermons 51–94, on the New Testament (vol. 3), trans. Edmund Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn, N.Y: New City, 1991), 50–62. 51St. Augustine: Letters, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 4, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1955), 232–33 and St. Augustine: Tractates on the Gospel of John 11–27, trans. John W. Rettig, vol. 79, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,

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The implication of the observation that Augustine’s theory of divine unity is the doctrine of inseparable operations is that, contrary to the threeness-oneness paradigm, Augustine’s doctrine of divine unity is not radically different from that of Gregory of Nyssa’s—i.e., a Cappadocian theory of unity.53 The affinity between Augustine’s theory of divine unity and Gregory of Nyssa’s also underlines the point that the decisive background of Augustine’s theory of divine unity is theological and not neoplatonic. Epistle 11 is particularly germane to this point because it underscores that a theological tradition and not primarily the philosophical principles of Neoplatonism shaped Augustine’s earliest notion of trinitarian unity—inseparable operations mean inseparable nature.54 The following comparison of Gregory and Augustine illustrates the conceptual similarity between their theories of divine unity. Gregory of Nyssa reasoned that because the operations of the divine persons are one, so also is their nature one. Gregory stated, “the oneness of their nature must needs be inferred from the identity of their operation.”55 Augustine maintained that “just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably.”56 Gregory’s and Augustine’s lines of reasoning are not identical, but their notion of divine unity is nearly the same. Gregory is concerned to show that common operations indicate common nature. Thus, he argues from the unity of operation to the unity of nature. Augustine is responding to the perceived tension between the biblical attribution of certain works to certain divine persons and the received confessional formula that the inseparable nature of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit means that they operate inseparably. Yet how is it that the Fa1988), 163–77. 52Augustine, The Trinity 1.7–8 (p. 70), 4.30 (p. 175), 15.5 (p. 397), and 15.20 (p. 411). 53The doctrine that inseparable operations infer one power is taught by Augustine’s Western predecessor Ambrose of Milan (see The Holy Spirit, in Saint Ambrose: Theological and Dogmatic Works, trans. Roy J. Deferrari, vol. 44, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963], 1.12.131 [p. 82], 2.10.101 [p. 131], and 2.13.148 [pp. 148–49]). However, I compare Augustine and Gregory to underscore the ahistorical nature of the claim made by the threeness-oneness paradigm that Augustine’s theory of divine unity is radically dissimilar to the Cappadocians. 54Ayres, “The Fundamental Grammar of Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology,” 56. 55Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Trinity (NPNF2 5:328) and also On “Not Three Gods” (NPNF2 5:333–35). 56Augustine, The Trinity 1.7 (p. 70).

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ther, the Son, and the Spirit operate inseparably, but that the Father is named singly as addressing the Son at the Baptism at the river Jordan? The difference between Gregory’s and Augustine’s interaction with the theology of “common operations, therefore, common nature” is that Gregory seeks to demonstrate its veracity, whereas Augustine assumes its veracity—i.e., “inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith”—and endeavors to reconcile the doctrine with biblical accounts that seem at odds with it.57 Gregory reasons from common operations to common nature. Augustine’s thought moves from the inseparability of the persons or common nature to their inseparable work or common operations. This is not due to a minimization of the economic Trinity in Augustine’s trinitarianism, but rather indicates that for Augustine the doctrine of “common operations, therefore, common nature” was part of his received trinitarian tradition.58 Important to note is that Augustine uses the mental triads to illustrate the doctrine of inseparable operations. The mental triads are not used, as social trinitarians maintain, to portray God as an undifferentiated unity of essence, but rather, to show how one divine person can be named singly in a divine act, as for example the Son in the Incarnation, yet in that event the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit operate inseparably.59 They are an attempt to solve the apparent tension between the confessional formula of inseparable operations and the biblical data. More specifically, Augustine’s mental triad of memory, understanding, and will illustrates the temporal manifestations of the divine persons in the following way. Although the divine persons exist and act eternally as the inseparable Trinity, they manifest themselves singly. Memory, understand57Augustine,

The Trinity 1.7 (p. 70). fact, Augustine’s trinitarian reasoning is thoroughly economic. The Incarnation of the Son is the epistemic foundation of knowledge of the triune God because the Incarnation reveals the divine missions and thereby the eternal processions of the divine persons. For Augustine’s economic trinitarian reasoning, see The Trinity 4.1–4 (pp. 152–55) and 4.24–31 (pp. 169–77). Edmund Hill and Basil Studer also maintain that for Augustine the immanent Trinity is known only through the economic Trinity. Hill remarks that “the economic Trinity is the transcendent Trinity revealed” (Hill, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise de Trinitate and St. Augustine,’” 78 and Studer, The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God, 109). The argument that Augustine’s trinitarian reflection is economic rebuts the allegation of scholars, such as Gunton, that Augustine discounts the role of the economic Trinity and the Incarnation for knowledge of the Trinity (Gunton, “Trinitarian Theology Today,” 3–4 and “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis of the West,” 33–34, 42–43, and 51). 59Augustine, The Trinity 4.30 (p. 175) and Sermon 52, 20–23 (pp. 60–62). 58In

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ing, and will typify the metaphysical inseparability of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and their single manifestation. It does so because memory, understanding, and will can only be named singly, yet each term presupposes the activity of the other two. For instance, a person cannot recall an event from the memory without the simultaneous act of the understanding and will. Thus, while the recall of an event is legitimately appropriated to the memory, it involves the acts of the understanding and will as well. So, while we say the Son is incarnated, the Incarnation also includes the work of the Father and the Spirit. Thus, the mental triad illustrates the compatibility between the confession of inseparable operations therefore inseparable divine nature—i.e., Augustine’s doctrine of divine unity—and the biblical attribution of certain acts to a single divine person.60 Moreover, the doctrine of inseparable operations assumes a doctrine of unity that takes the three divine persons as the irreducible datum of divinity and, therefore, does not imply that God is ultimately a self-related monad.61 At this point, I address the social trinitarian criticism of the Western theory of the simplicity of the essence and advocacy of generic essence in its place. The threeness-oneness paradigm assumes that the Western Augustinian doctrine of divine unity flattens the divine persons into the ineffable simple divine essence and precludes a genuine plurality of persons within the Godhead. Social trinitarians argue that the result is a doctrine of the Trinity that is triune in name only and that necessarily reduces to modalism.62 However, this opinion is often not shared by the historical figures and texts that social trinitarians interpret. 60Augustine,

The Trinity 4.30 (pp. 175–76). Letter 120, Augustine remarks that “[i]t remains for us, then, to believe that Trinity is of one substance and that the essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself” (St. Augustine: Letters, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 2, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 18 [1953; reprint, New York: Fathers of the Church, 1966], 314; also 304 and 310–11). Near the end of book fifteen of De Trinitate, Augustine states, “such is the inseparability that reigns in that supreme trinity which incomparably surpasses all things, that while a triad of men cannot be called a man, that triad is called, and is, one God. Nor is it a triad in one God—it is one God. Nor is that triad like this image, man, which is one person having those three things; on the contrary, it is three persons, the Father of the Son and the Son of the Father and the Spirit of the Father and the Son” (Augustine, The Trinity 15.43 [p. 428]). 62The reduction of trinitarian thought to the “either, or” of modalism or genuine personal plurality is superlatively illustrated by C. Stephen Layman’s casting of the trinitarian options in terms of either the modalist analogy or the social analogy (Layman, “Tritheism and the Trinity,” 292–93). 61In

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Plantinga Pauw argues that the trinitarian formula produced at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 is a clear instance of the overbearing influence of the doctrine of simplicity.63 To show that the Council obliterated the personal distinctions for the sake of simplicity, she quotes from the confessional statement of the council: “each of the persons is that reality, namely, the divine substance, essence, or nature.”64 The citation from the Fourth Lateran Council is decidedly one-sided. Taken alone, the citation shows the Council losing the personal distinctions within the simple essence. In contrast to this interpretation, in the first section of the extended sentence that is the context of Plantinga Pauw’s citation, the Council maintains that the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is the irreducible deity. The Council confesses, “that there is one highest, incomprehensible and ineffable reality, which is truly the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the three persons together, and each person distinctly; therefore in God there is only Trinity, not a quaternity.”65 This statement shows that the Council re63Plantinga

Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 26. The Fourth Lateran Council is often blamed for codifying the doctrine of simplicity in the Western tradition (e.g., Brown, The Divine Trinity, 242–43 and 291; Jenson, The Triune Identity, 124; Plantinga, “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” 38–39; and Lee, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Writings on the Trinity, 21:22). 64Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 26. 65Jacques Dupuis, ed., The Christian Faith: In the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, 6th rev. and enl. (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1996), 148–49. The council’s rejection of “quaternity” repudiates the notion that an inscrutable substance stands behind the three divine persons. Thus, when it says one divine nature and three divine persons, it does not mean that the nature is ontologically distinct from the persons. The modern incarnation of the charge of quaternism is that the divine nature is a substratum in which the divine persons adhere. The impression given is that Western theology perceives God as existing as a mono-substance, which later added to itself three persons. For instance, Colin Gunton states that Calvin’s distinction between subsistence and essence is “the characteristic sin of Western trinitarianism, of seeing the persons not as constituting the being of God by their mutual relations but as in some way inhering in being that is in some sense prior to them” (Gunton, “Being and Concept,” 201). Zizioulas also makes a similar criticism of Western trinitarian theology (Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 17 and 40). However, this is a profound misunderstanding of Western trinitarian theology. Like it or not, human reasoning must divide and conquer so to speak. In order to understand the triune God, we speak in terms of the divine nature and persons, while presupposing the metaphysical identity of each (for instance, Augustine clarifies “the essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself” [Augustine, Epistle 120, 314]). The distinction between subsistence and essence is used to speak of the individuation of the essence without the division of the essence. As Thomas Aquinas stated,

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tained the integrity of the divine persons; God is irreducibly three divine persons. Although she does not interact with the Fourth Lateran Council in Supreme Harmony of All, her evaluation of the doctrine of divine simplicity and its negative consequence for Western trinitarianism is in continuity with the opinion set forth in the dissertation.66 To conclude section one, the threeness-oneness paradigm, at the very least, over-generalizes the Augustinian trinitarian tradition. The paradigm does not reflect the theologians and texts it purports to represent. The preceding analysis of the paradigm suggests that it is unsuitable to serve as the methodological and hermeneutical starting point for the historicaltheological analysis of Jonathan Edwards’ trinitarian theology and, for that matter, other historical trinitarian theologians and texts. The next section illustrates how the use of the paradigm leads to a misunderstanding of Edwards’ relationship to the Augustinian trinitarian traditions and of his trinitarian thought.

PLANTINGA PAUW, THE THREENESS-ONENESS PARADIGM, AND EDWARDS’ TRINITARIANISM This section treats Plantinga Pauw’s interpretation of Edwards’ location within the history of trinitarian theology and her argument that Edwards used disparate social and psychological models of the Trinity. Although I sharply reject her thesis that Edwards’ trinitarian thought oscillates between the psychological and the social models of the Trinity, I maintain that her work on Edwards is indispensable for students of Edwards because it is still the most thorough treatment of Edwards’ trinitarianism from the perspective of systematic theology. Plantinga Pauw and the Threeness-Oneness Paradigm Plantinga Pauw’s application of the threeness-oneness paradigm to Edwards’ trinitarianism has evolved from her dissertation to her published book, but her acceptance of its fundamental categories has remained constant. In her dissertation she associates the oneness tradition with Augustine and the psychological analogy, which emphasizes divine unity and the “such a relation [subsistence of the divine nature; i.e., a divine person], however, when compared to the essence does not differ really, but only conceptually” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ [England: Blackfriars, 1964], 1a.39.1 [p. 101]). The relations remain distinct because they are the manner of the individuation of the essence, but the essence is one and the relations are identical with the essence. 66Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 59–69.

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threeness tradition with the Cappadocians and the social analogy, which emphasizes the divine persons.67 In The Supreme Harmony of All, she uses Richard of St. Victor to represent the threeness tradition and the social model rather than the Cappadocians.68 Nevertheless, her understanding of the differences between the psychological—i.e., Augustinian—and social— i.e., Cappadocian/Victorine—models is unchanged. In continuity with the definition of the psychological and social models in her dissertation, she writes in her book that the psychological analogy portrays the Trinity in terms of a “human mind knowing itself and loving itself” and the social analogy compares the Trinity “not to a single human soul, but to a family, society, or communion of friends.”69 Although she does not indicate the reason for replacing the Cappadocians with Richard of St. Victor, she portrays the trinitarian traditions paradigmatically in terms of the differing emphases of divine unity and divine threeness, whether the contrast is Augustinian-Cappadocian or Augustinian-Victorine. Additionally, she consistently maintains that Edwards’ used both the opposing psychological and social models of the Trinity.70 Plantinga Pauw also accepts the premise of the threeness-oneness paradigm and the common criticism advanced by social trinitarians that the 67For

instance, she wrote “I distinguish and analyze the connections between two separate strands in Edwards’ trinitarian thought, centering around his use of the social and psychological analogies for the Trinity.” To elaborate on these analogies, she writes, “I will be following historians of doctrine in my use of the technical terms psychological analogy and social analogy to designate two main traditions in trinitarian reflection. The first finds an image of the Trinity in a single person knowing and loving himself, while the second portrays a relationship between distinct persons” (Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 20). 68Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 11–12 and 14. Though in a footnote she associates Edwards’ social model with the Cappadocian tradition (Supreme Harmony of All, 14, footnote 51). She also correlated Edwards with St. Victor in her dissertation (Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 49 and 53–54). She states that Edwards’ trinitarian theology reflects the two major trinitarian traditions in “western medieval theology: the Augustinian, and the alternative initiated by Richard of St. Victor” (Supreme Harmony of All, 11–12). However, Edwards’ access to the thought of St. Victor, whether direct or indirect, is unsubstantiated. Moreover, the identification of Richard of St. Victor as a Western social trinitarian that stands in contrast to Augustinian trinitarianism is common; for examples, see Fortman, The Triune God, 191–94 and Hill, Three-Personed God, 78–79 and 225–26. 69Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 12 and 14. 70Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 10–15, 30–55, and 183–92 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 20.

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adoption of the doctrine of divine simplicity by the Augustinian trinitarian tradition indicates the decisive influence of Greek metaphysics.71 The doctrine of simplicity is the source of the extreme emphasis on divine oneness in medieval scholastic, Reformed scholastic, and Reformed Puritan trinitarianism. Indeed, the concern to maintain the unity of the divine essence is so strong that it undermines a genuine emphasis on divine threeness.72 Important to note is that Plantinga Pauw is only one step removed from De Régnon in her negative analysis of the role of the doctrine of divine simplicity in Western scholastic trinitarianism. In her dissertation, she bases her appraisal of the Augustinian tradition’s overemphasis on divine oneness on Vladimir Lossky’s text In the Image and Likeness of God.73 Although Lossky’s reliance on De Régnon is most evident in his text The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church,74 the influence of De Régnon also pervades his interpretation of Eastern and Western trinitarianism set forth in the text In the Image and Likeness of God.75 Her use of Lossky highlights the link between De Régnon, the modern social trinitarian version of the template, and Plantinga Pauw’s use of the threeness-oneness paradigm to interpret Edwards. Plantinga Pauw, the Augustinian Trinitarian Tradition, and Edwards’ Trinitarianism Beginning with the threeness-oneness paradigm leads to a misunderstanding of Edwards’ relationship to his theological predecessors. Plantinga Pauw believes that Edwards developed his trinitarianism primarily in reaction to the Augustinian scholastic tradition of trinitarian theology.76 The problem 71Plantinga

Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 59–60. 59–69 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 25, 28, 48, and 54. 73Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 48, footnote 56. For Lossky’s critique referenced by Plantinga Pauw, see Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John E. Erickson and Thomas E. Bird (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 83–86. 74For Lossky’s use of the De Régnon paradigm, see The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 56. Unfortunately, the editors of the English translation of Lossky’s The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church omitted many of the references to De Régnon in the original French edition titled Essai sur la théologie mystique de l’Eglise d’Orient (Paris: 1944); see Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” 57–58. 75Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, 75–77. 76She presents Edwards’ thought in contrast to the Reformed and Puritan Scholastics, which she identifies as Augustinian trinitarians (Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 27–39 and 57–89 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 29–75). She does 72Ibid.,

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with identifying the Augustinian scholastics as Edwards’ antagonists is that it appears to assume that he was operating with the same attitudes toward the Augustinian trinitarian tradition as do modern social trinitarians. Moreover, a closer comparison of Edwards’ writings and Reformed scholastic texts’ suggests more continuity than discontinuity in their thought. The following assesses the relationship between first Edwards’ and Richard of St. Victor’s trinitarian theology and second the doctrine of simplicity in Edwards and Reformed scholasticism.

Edwards and Richard of St. Victor Plantinga Pauw maintains that Edwards represents the emphasis on threeness and the social model found in Richard of St. Victor. St. Victor portrays the Holy Spirit as the divine person who shares in, as the recipient of, the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The Spirit is not the mutual love of the Father and Son itself; thus, the Spirit is not equivalent with the act of mutual love between the Father and the Son, but the Father and the Son conjointly love the Spirit and the Spirit shares in this mutual love between the Father and the Son. The Spirit’s sharing in the mutual love of the Father and the Son satisfies the gratuitous nature of love—i.e., to give without receiving. The mutual love of the Father and the Son is not gratuitous or perfect because the Father and the Son give and receive love from each other. Furthermore, in order to share or enjoy the mutual love between the Father and the Son, the Spirit too loves the Father and the Son; such that, each divine person is loved by the other two.77 Like St. Victor, Edwards argued for the plurality of the Godhead from the principle that God is love.78 Unlike St. Victor, Edwards believed that love is brought to its full expression in the mutual love of the Father and the Son and does not require their mutual love to be shared (condilectus) with a third—i.e., the Holy Spirit. For Edwards, the Holy Spirit is not the third in which the mutual love of the Father and the Son is shared, but the act of not ignore the early-Enlightenment trinitarian controversies, but she does not understand these as the central context for Edwards’ reflections on the Trinity (Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 21–26). 77Richard de Saint-Victor: La Trinité, intro. and trans. Gaston Salet, Sources Chrétiennes, ed. H. de Lubac and J. Daniélou, 63 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1959), 3.14–20 (pp. 199–213). For a recent and comprehensive discussion of Richard’s trinitarianism and its relationship to social trinitarianism, see Nico den Bok, Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St. Victor (†1173), Bibliotheca Victorina, 7 (Paris: Brepols, 1996). 78Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:263–64).

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the Father and the Son’s mutual love. Although they both give the concept of divine love prominence in their trinitarian reflection, Edwards expounds it within the categories of the Augustinian mutual love model whereas St. Victor developed a distinct model that presupposes three subjects giving and receiving love.

Edwards and the Scholastic Doctrine of Simplicity Plantinga Pauw believes that the doctrine of divine simplicity dominated the Western trinitarian tradition. Simplicity precludes a genuine theory of triunity and produces an over-emphasis on divine oneness.79 In contrast to the Reformed Puritan tradition, she contends that the doctrine of simplicity played no central role in Edwards’ trinitarianism and consistently downplays Edwards’ explicit affirmations of the doctrine of divine simplicity.80 She argues that because Edwards abandoned the traditional view of simplicity he, therefore, departed from the Reformed scholastic trinitarian tradition’s tendency to perceive God in impersonal terms.81 Her conclusion that the doctrine of simplicity plays an ambiguous role in Edwards’ trinitarianism is problematic because in order to support this assertion she compares Edwards’ statements on the Trinity with, for example, Francis Turretin’s (1623–1687) account of divine simplicity.82 Unsurpris79For examples of Plantinga Pauw making this charge, see Supreme Harmony of All, 59–60 and 75–76 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 28, 35, 43, 49, 54, and 59. 80For examples of her dismissal of Edwards’ use of simplicity, see Plantinga Pauw, “‘One Alone Cannot be Excellent’: Edwards on Divine Simplicity,” in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, ed. Paul Helm and Oliver D. Crisp (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 115–25; Supreme Harmony of All, 69–75; and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 34, 36, and 44. For Edwards’ affirmation of divine simplicity, see Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113; Freedom of the Will, 2:377; and Miscellanies, no. 135 (13:295). 81Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 69–80 and 185 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 35. She does not claim that Edwards completely rejected the doctrine of simplicity, but that it plays no integral part in his trinitarianism, in contrast to the Reformed scholastics who took simplicity as the controlling category for trinitarian reflection (Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 69–71 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 28, 36, and 41). She is correct that Edwards infrequently uses the term. However, as I show below, Edwards assumed the doctrine of simplicity in his trinitarian reasoning. 82Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 70 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 44–45. Her reference to Edwards is Miscellany 94, “Trinity” (Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 [13:256–63]) and to Turretin “the Simplicity of God” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2 vols., trans. George M. Giger, and ed. James T. Dennison,

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ingly in the texts cited, Turretin emphasizes unicity of essence and Edwards maintains plurality of persons. However, this comparison is improper because simplicity and Trinity are distinct loci in scholastic theology. A proper historical theological methodology compares two theologians discussing the same topic. For instance, if Turretin’s and Edwards’ theories of the Trinity or threeness are the subjects of comparison, then the samples of comparison must come from writings in which both authors specifically treat the Trinity. In the passage cited by Plantinga Pauw to show that Turretin’s theory of simplicity mitigated genuine threeness, Turretin underscores threeness when he writes, “simplicity in respect to essence, but Trinity in respect to persons. In this sense, nothing hinders God (who is one in essence) from being three persons.”83 When credibly compared, Edwards’ and Turretin’s statements on triunity are very similar.84 To conclude that Edwards abandoned the Western and Reformed scholastic doctrine of simplicity requires a more feasible comparison of texts. In addition, to compare Turretin and Edwards without consideration of their different historical contexts thwarts an accurate understanding of their thought. Turretin wrote the Institutes in mid-seventeenth-century Geneva, prior to the emergent threats to trinitarianism in the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment. Edwards wrote his trinitarian theology in mideighteenth-century New England. In other words, he worked out his trinitarian theology in the midst of the mounting threat to traditional trinitarianism in the early- to mid-Enlightenment. To overlook the historical context, and thereby decontextualize Edwards, and then assume the identity of EdJr. [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P & R, 1992], 3.7.9 [1:193]). 83Turretin, Institutes 3.7.9 (1:193). 84Turretin’s trinitarianism resembles Edwards in the following ways: first, he adopted the theory of emperichoresis, which includes the notion that the Spirit is the bond of immanent fellowship between the Father and the Son and of believers to God; second, he perceives the divine persons as individual agents of activity; third, he describes the Father as the first subsistent of the divine nature (the “fountain of the deity”), who generates the Son and co-spirates the Spirit; and fourth, the order of economic activity follows the order of immanent subsistence (Turretin, Institutes 3.23.8 [1:255], 3.23.13 [1:257], 3.25.7 [1:267], and 3.27.16 [1:280–81]). Also, in contrast to Plantinga Pauw’s argument that Reformed scholastic trinitarianism is Sabellian and portrays God as a self-related monad, Turretin does not endorse modalism or the reduction of the persons to a quality of the divine essence, but understands the three persons as the irreducible Godhead (Turretin, Institutes 3.25.3 [1:266], 3.25.7 [1:267], and 3.25.18 [1:270]). However, unlike Edwards, Turretin found little use for analogies of the Trinity from creation, such as the human soul (Turretin, Institutes 3.25.4 [1:266]).

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wards’ attitude toward Western scholastic trinitarianism with that of modern social trinitarians is anachronistic. I contend that Edwards’ stronger interest in the Trinity proper relative to Turretin derives precisely from his context; that is, the rising threat to traditional trinitarianism in the Enlightenment. Deists, Socinians, Semi-Arians, and Trinitarians all agreed on the simplicity of God; divine simplicity was not under dispute, but rather the reasonableness of the Trinity was the polemical point. So then, the different emphases exhibited in Turretin on simplicity and Edwards on the Trinity is an improper basis to posit that Edwards diverged from the Reformed scholastic tradition because it is an inadequate comparison and it overlooks their differing historical contexts.

The Role of Simplicity in Edwards’ Trinitarianism The doctrine of simplicity plays an integral role in Edwards’ trinitarianism. Edwards’ doctrine that the Son subsists by an act of generation and the Spirit by one of procession presupposes the doctrine of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity is the ground, moreover, for his identification of the divine persons with the divine essence. Consequently, far from a marginalized doctrine, simplicity was a central presupposition for Edwards’ understanding of the trinitarian God. Edwards’ belief in the inseparability of act and existence in God reflects his continuity with the Reformed scholastic doctrine of simplicity.85 Edwards’ notion that no distinction pertains between act and existence is the basis for his belief that the act of generation and procession entail existence. This concept of the generation of the Son as idea and procession of the Spirit as love assumes the unicity of act and existence—i.e., simplicity— because the respective acts of generation and procession entail existence. The generation of the Son occurs by the act of the divine understanding. The Son is the idea produced by the understanding’s act of self-reflection. The procession of the Holy Spirit occurs by the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The Spirit subsists as the mutual love between the Father and the Son. The Son subsists as the idea and the Spirit as love because the acts of understanding and love are indistinguishable from the divine essence. This means that if the essence is not simple, then the acts of generation and procession would not entail existence, but since God is simple, the Son and the Holy Spirit necessarily exist as products of acts of generation and procession.

85Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:116–17.

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Edwards’ identification of the divine persons with the divine essence is also problematic for Plantinga Pauw’s view that simplicity is not integral to Edwards’ trinitarianism because she believes that the identification of the divine persons with the one divine essence indicates a strong notion of simplicity.86 Yet in Miscellany 308, Edwards did precisely this when he wrote, “[t]he Father understands, the Son understands, and the Holy Ghost understands, because every one is the same understanding divine essence.”87 In other words, each divine person understands because each is identical with the one understanding essence. Plantinga Pauw cites Miscellany 308 as an instance of Edwards’ “infrequent and idiosyncratic” use of the “simplicity tradition.”88 However, Edwards’ use of simplicity to avoid tritheism is “idiosyncratic” only if one has presupposed that his use of social language in his trinitarian writings necessarily mitigates the doctrine of simplicity and indicates a contrary social model. Her interpretation of Edwards’ identification of the divine persons with the divine essence as uncharacteristic of his trinitarianism indicates that the threeness-oneness paradigm shapes her evaluation of Edwards’ trinitarian texts. Plantinga Pauw is correct that Edwards did not entirely accept the Reformed Puritan trinitarian tradition. Edwards criticized two aspects of the Reformed Puritan trinitarian tradition. First, he deemed inadequate the Reformed tendency to depict the Holy Spirit solely as the applier of the benefits of redemption because he believed it reduced the Spirit to an instrumental role in soteriology. Second, he criticized the identification of God’s attributes with God. However, does Edwards’ criticism of these two points of the tradition warrant the conclusion that he repudiated that tradition? Or, is the judgment that he modified and/or misunderstood the tradition more appropriate? I believe that the latter conclusion—Edwards modified and misunderstood—best fits Edwards’ relationship to the Reformed Puritan trinitarian tradition. Edwards believed that the Reformed tendency to depict the Spirit’s soteriological role in instrumental terms subordinated the work of the Spirit to the work of Christ.89 Since the instrumental role of the Spirit in the work of redemption is directly tied to the distinction between the objective and sub86Plantinga

Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 65–67 and 70–73 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 38–43. 87Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 308 (13:392). 88Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 70–71. In the dissertation, she calls Edwards’ identification of the divine persons with the divine essence in Miscellany 308 “puzzling” (“Supreme Harmony of All,” 70). 89Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:190–91.

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jective aspects of redemption, it is necessary to describe this distinction. The distinction between the objective work of Christ and the subjective work of the Spirit is commonplace in Reformed theology. Although Protestant scholasticism gives the objective-subjective paradigm its most refined form, it is also found in the earliest reformers and throughout the Protestant tradition.90 Justification is the keynote objective aspect and sanctification is the central subjective aspect of salvation. Justification is objective or extrinsic because it consists primarily of the remission of sins and declaration of righteousness by virtue of the imputed righteousness of Christ.91 Due to its penal emphasis, justification is linked with Christ’s work on the cross. Consequently, justification is Christocentric because the Spirit’s work is not constitutive of justification.92 The Spirit plays only an instrumental role in justification by drawing the person to faith in conjunction with the written and/or declared Word of God.93 Sanctification is the subjective or intrinsic transformation of the believer. The Spirit is the primary agent of sanctification.94 Although Protestants maintain that justification and sanctification are not separated, nevertheless they believe that justification and sanctification must be kept distinct

90This

paradigm is present in Martin Luther’s soteriology. Some argue that Melancthon introduced forensic or objective justification to Lutheran theology e.g., Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “The Holy Spirit and Justification: The Ecumenical Significance of Luther’s Doctrine of Salvation,” Pneuma: The Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies 24 [2002]: 26). However, this is not sustainable because Luther utilized the conceptual categories of extrinsic righteousness (imputation) and intrinsic renewal in the 1515/1516 Lectures on Romans (Luther’s Works, vol. 25 Lectures on Romans: Glosses and Scholia, ed. Hilton C. Oswald, trans. Walter G. Tillmanns and Jacob A. O. Preus [Saint Louis: Concordia, 1972], 245, 257, 334, 336, 340, and 370). For this tendency in Calvin, see Institutes 3.11.2 (1:727) and 3.11.11 (1:738–41). And for its presentation in Turretin, see Institutes 17.1.10 (2:691). 91Calvin, Institutes 3.11.2 (1:727) and 3.11.11 (1:738–41). This latter passage is important because Calvin clarifies that justification is not an intrinsic righteousness, but rather an imputed righteousness that stands “outside” of the believer. Also see Turretin, Institutes 16.6.1–3 (2:666–67). 92Indeed, Calvin expressly maintains that the righteousness of Christ imputed in justification is not to be confused with the Spirit’s renovation of the soul (Calvin, Institutes 3.11.23 [1:753]). 93Turretin, Institutes 15.1.5–7 (2:502–3). 94For an example in Edwards’ Puritan theological background, see William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John D. Eusden (Boston: Pilgrim, 1968), 1.27– 29 (pp. 160–71).

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in order to preserve the gratuitous nature of justification.95 If justification and sanctification are not distinguished, then justification may be identified with or based on the process of sanctification. To conflate justification and sanctification undermines salvation by grace through faith.96 The result is that sanctification is not the primary datum of soteriology. A person does not look to their progress in sanctification for assurance of salvation, but to the righteousness of Christ—justification. The intention of the distinction of justification and sanctification is to preserve the gratuitous nature of salvation, nevertheless it subordinates sanctification to justification. The distinction between justification and sanctification also produces a subordination of pneumatology to Christology. It does so because Protestant soteriology subordinates the subjective aspect to the objective aspect of salvation. Sanctification is not denied nor intentionally minimized, but since the crux of salvation is forensic justification, sanctification necessarily plays a secondary role.97 Since sanctification is the primary soteriological work of the Holy Spirit, his work, by implication, is functionally subordinate to the work of Christ. Directly related to the subordination of the Spirit in Protestant scholasticism is the instrumental role of the Holy Spirit. The notion that Christ achieves and the Holy Spirit applies the benefits of redemption highlights the instrumental role of the Holy Spirit. For instance, the structure of Calvin’s Institutes reflects an instrumental theory of the Spirit’s work. Book two describes how Christ’s work achieves redemption. Book three details how the Holy Spirit administers that redemption.98 Eminent Puritan theologian, William Ames, also portrayed the Spirit as the agent of redemption’s application.99 The portrayal of the Spirit as the agent that applies the benefits of Christ’s redemption subordinates the Spirit’s work because the Spirit’s work is not constitutive of salvation. Salvation is accomplished by the work of Christ on the cross. The Holy Spirit serves only to administer the various blessings earned by Christ. Edwards sought to solve the subordination of the Spirit in Reformed theology by giving the Spirit an equal role in the work of redemption. However, his solution was only half successful. On the one hand and in continuity with the Reformed tradition, Edwards retained the objective concept of 95Turretin,

Institutes 17.1.10 (2:691). Institutes 3.11.11 (1:739) and 3.11.23 (1:753) and Turretin, Institutes 16.2.9–10 (2:640). 97Calvin, Institutes 3.14.21 (1:788). 98Calvin, Institutes 3.1.1 (1:537). 99Ames, The Marrow of Theology 1.24 (pp. 149–52). 96Calvin,

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justification and subjective notion of sanctification and the subordination of pneumatology to Christology implicit to that soteriology.100 On the other hand, he restored the Spirit to an equal position in the work of redemption by defining the Spirit as the gift of redemption.101 He argued that the Spirit does not merely apply the benefits of redemption procured by Christ, but rather that the Spirit is the benefit of redemption. Edwards believed that defining the gift of redemption as the communication of the Spirit to the believer elevates the Spirit’s role to an equal role with Christ’s in the administration of redemption.102 Thus, in respect to this aspect of his Reformed tradition, Edwards modified it. In respect to the scholastic maxim, “everything that is in God, is God,” Edwards seems to have misunderstood it. Plantinga Pauw maintains that Edwards’ rejection of the “maxim amongst divines that everything that is in God is God which must be understood of real attributes and not of mere modalities” should govern the readers’ understanding of Edwards’ additional usage of simplicity and, furthermore, shows that he “selfconsciously departed” from the Reformed scholastic and Puritan doctrine of simplicity.103 While her observation that Edwards hesitated to accept the identification of divine attributes with God is correct, it does not imply that he rejected simplicity, but that he failed to understand the scholastic maxim. Edwards’ discussion of the topic clearly reveals his muddled understanding of the doctrine. For instance, Edwards queries, “[i]f a man should tell me that the immutability of God is God or that the omnipresence of God and authority of God, is God, I should not be able to think of any rational meaning of what he said.”104 Of course, the doctrine does not intend to say that immutability is God. If this were the case it would be as nonsensical as saying that finitude is human nature. The statement is true in the sense that the mode of human existence is temporal, but human nature is not finitude. More properly, we would say that human nature is finite. In other words, the phrase, “the immutability of God,” is a nominal adjective phrase that describes the subject God. The modification of the syntax to 100See

Edwards’ sermon “Justification by Faith Alone,” 19:147–242. Religious Affections, 2:375. 102Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:189–91 and Discourse on the Trinity, 21:136–38. 103Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:132. Also see Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 72 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 34 and 44. For the doctrine in Protestant Reformed scholastic theology, see Turretin, Institutes 3.27.5 (p. 278) and in Medieval scholastic theology, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.3.3–4 (pp. 29–35) and 1a.27.3 (p. 130). 104Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:132. 101Edwards,

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“God is immutable” captures the meaning of the doctrine. For whatever reason, this explanation eluded Edwards. In addition, the primary intent of the maxim is to exclude composition in God.105 The divine attributes do not exist discretely in God. However, his inability to grasp this scholastic tenet does not mean that he “self-consciously departed” from the Reformed scholastic and Puritan doctrine of simplicity.106 It simply means that he was unclear as to the meaning of this particular tenet of scholastic theology. His lack of clarity on the doctrine is readily evident in his endorsement of a theological point that is equivalent with the scholastic tenet that “everything that is in God is God.” In the paragraph preceding the one in which Edwards rejects the scholastic theory, Edwards maintains that the divine attributes of God are indistinguishable from his being as God.107 Within the Godhead, Edwards allows only the distinctions between the divine persons. The divine attributes denote God’s relation to something other than God. For instance, in relation to human beings, God is eternal; but God does not possess the attribute of eternity in a fashion discrete from his other attributes.108 Edwards’ affirmation of the indistinguishable nature of the divine attributes indicates that, despite his protestations otherwise, he affirmed the essential point of the scholastic maxim that “whatever is in God, is God.” Plantinga Pauw argues further that because Edwards was frustrated with the oneness of his trinitarian tradition, he largely rejected the doctrine of simplicity. Yet in both instances of disagreement with the Reformed Puritan tradition, Edwards does not raise the issue of threeness-oneness. Whereas she contends that Edwards’ negative assessment of the scholastic identification of the divine attributes with the divine essence should exert hermeneutical control over his other references to simplicity, I maintain the reverse; his aspersion, based on his misunderstanding, of the scholastic identification of the divine attributes with the divine essence is the anomaly in his 105Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.3.3, reply 1 (pp. 29 and 31) and Johannes Wollebius, Compendium Theologiae Christianae, in Reformed Dogmatics: J. Wollebius, G. Voetius, and F. Turretin, ed. and trans. John W. Beardslee, Library of Protestant Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 38–39. 106Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 72 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 34–35. 107Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131–32. Moreover, Edwards’ argument for the simplicity of God is nearly identical to Aquinas’ denial of composition in the divine essence (Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.3.3, reply 1 (pp. 29 and 31). 108Edwards remarks that the divine attributes “are not distinct real things . . . but mere modes and relations” (Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:132).

100 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM doctrine of simplicity that is otherwise consistent with the Reformed scholastic and Puritan notion of simplicity. Plantinga Pauw’s thesis is that Edwards utilized the disparate psychological and the social models of the Trinity. She maintains that the other aspects of his thought can be interpreted in terms of either one or the other of these trinitarian models. My contention is that Edwards used one model, not two, and that this model is the Augustinian mutual love model. The next two sections show that reliance on the threeness-oneness paradigm prevents an accurate interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarian theology. Analytic Analysis of Plantinga Pauw’s Interpretation of Edwards’ Trinitarianism This section examines two types of material that Plantinga Pauw uses as evidence for Edwards’ social trinitarianism. The two samples include a specific text—Miscellany 571—and two theological concepts—consent and excellency. The analysis of these texts and concepts suggests that the paradigm exerts hermeneutical control over her interpretation of Edwards’ trinitarianism.

Miscellany 571 and the Social Analogy Miscellany 571 is a central source for Plantinga Pauw’s interpretation of Edwards as a social trinitarian.109 Miscellany 571 treats the soteriological topic of the believer’s future heavenly state. In heaven, believers are united with Christ and, by virtue of this union, they are drawn into intimate communion with the Father. Edwards’ eschatological vision of heaven is based on his trinitarian theology. The salient questions are: first, what trinitarian model does Edwards use to develop his theory of heavenly union and communion? and second, does he presuppose the social-threeness model or the psychological-oneness model? In Miscellany 571, Edwards wrote: For there is doubtless an infinite intimacy between the Father and the Son; and the saints being in him shall partake with him in it, and of the blessedness of it. . . . Christ has brought it to pass, that those that the Father has given him should be brought into the household of God, that he and his Father and they should be as it were one society, one 109She uses Miscellany 571 to argue for Edwards’ social trinitarian vision in, “Heaven is a World of Love,” 396; Supreme Harmony of All, 14 and especially page 142 where she calls Edwards’ trinitarian thought in the miscellany a social analogy; “Supreme Harmony of All,” 47–48, 313–14, and 325–26; and “The Future of Reformed Theology,” 465, footnote 31.

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family; that his people should be in a sort admitted into that society of three persons in the Godhead. In this family or household, God [is] the Father, Jesus Christ is his own natural and eternally begotten Son. The saints, they also are children in the family; the church is the daughter of God, being the spouse of his Son. They all have communion in the same spirit, the Holy Ghost.110

Two types of evidence—terminological and conceptual—are present in this miscellany for determining Edwards’ trinitarian model. First, Edwards explicitly deploys social terms to describe the heavenly fellowship between believers, Christ, and the Father. For instance, he refers to “that society of three persons in the Godhead” and “the household of God.”111 One might conclude from these terms that Edwards presupposed the three-man analogy of the social model. However, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theologians commonly referred to the Trinity as a society or family of three persons.112 Although not commenting specifically on Miscellany 571, Edwards A. Park argues that Edwards’ use of the term society is an adaptation from the word economy. The word economy denotes the management of a household or family. The term economy was applied to the administration of redemption—i.e., the economy of redemption. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century divines referred to the three divine persons as a society or family based on the derivation of the term economy from household management.113 For Edwards, the covenant of grace and re110Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 571 (18:110). added. This phrase appears in Miscellany 571 cited above. In addition to this miscellany, Plantinga Pauw cites Edwards’ phrase, “society or family of the three,” as evidence for his social trinitarianism (Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All,” 55). Although she does not list a textual reference in Edwards for this phrase, it can be located in his Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135. However, the context for this phrase is Edwards’ articulation of his version of the mutual love model and not a social model of the Trinity. 112The widespread use of the terms family and society to describe the Trinity also crossed theological boundaries; see Unitarian William E. Channing, “Unitarian Christianity: Discourse at the Ordination of Rev. Jared Sparks,” in The Works of William E. Channing, vol. 3, 3rd ed. (Glasgow: James Hedderwick and Sons, 1840), 70; and trinitarians Samuel Hopkins, The Works of Samuel Hopkins, 1:67; Moses Stuart, “On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity,” The Biblical Repository and Quarterly Observer 6 (July, 1835): 99 and 102; and trinitarian critic of Channing’s Unitarianism, Samuel Worcester, Third Letter to Rev. William E. Channing on the Subject of Unitarianism (Boston: 1815), 34. 113Edwards A. Park, “Remarks of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity,” Bibliotheca 111Emphasis

102 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM demption is the theological context for the use of such economic language of the Trinity.114 Moreover, the use of social terms is not necessarily indicative of a distinct social model of the Trinity. Even proponents of the threeness-oneness paradigm would agree that the affirmation, “three persons in the Godhead,” is common to both traditions. Social trinitarians do not accuse the Augustinian tradition of denying the Trinity. Proponents of the paradigm simply argue that the Augustinian tradition does not provide a credible notion of divine triune personhood. Thus, the terms alone are insufficient evidence to indicate the trinitarian model used in this miscellany. The trinitarian conceptual framework, which is the basis for Edwards’ theory of heavenly union, is a more decisive source for discerning the trinitarian model presupposed in Miscellany 571. The saint’s heavenly union with Christ and the Father, which is the term of the economy of redemption, mirrors the immanent fellowship between the Father and the Son. The saints are drawn into the immanent communion between the Father and the Son by virtue of their union with Christ. The important hermeneutical question is: what trinitarian model is most compatible with this notion of union with Christ and participation in the immanent fellowship between the Father and the Son? The answer is clearly revealed in Edwards’ statement, “[t]hey all have communion in the same spirit, the Holy Ghost.”115 The referent of “they” is the Father, the Son, and the saints in heaven. Their mutual communion is through the Spirit. The role of the Spirit as the bond of immanent social communion between the Father and the Son and of economic communion between the saints, the Son, and the Father matches the Spirit’s role in the Augustinian mutual love model of the Trinity.116According to the Augustinian mutual love model, the Spirit is the bond of love between the Father and the Son. The Spirit’s immanent relation to the Father and the Son defines the Spirit’s economic role. As the Spirit is the bond of fellowship that unites the Father and the Son, so also, the Spirit is Sacra 38 (1881): 359–60. 114For Edwards’ economic trinitarian use of the term society, see Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431 and 433–35). 115See Miscellany 571 quoted above. 116For a discussion of Augustine’s view that the Holy Spirit is the bond of interecclesial communion and of the Christian’s communion with the Father and the Son, see De Margerie, Christian Trinity in History, 116–21. Note that Plantinga Pauw also misidentifies Cotton Mather’s use of the Augustinian mutual love model to describe the saints union with God and each other as form of social trinitarianism (Supreme Harmony of All, 36). Cf. her citation of Mather in Blessed Unions (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, for Samuel Phillips, 1692), 47–48.

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the bond that unites the believer to Christ and allows the believer to participate in trinitarian fellowship. Plantinga Pauw agrees that the mutual love model is Augustinian and not a social model of the Trinity.117 Therefore, Miscellany 571 does not evince a social model in Edwards’ trinitarian thought.

Consent, Excellency, and the Social Analogy Plantinga Pauw argues that the theological concepts of consent and excellency indicate Edwards’ social trinitarianism and relational ontology.118 In Miscellany 117, Edwards reasoned that since God is excellent by virtue of loving consent to another, then God must be a plurality.119 However, is this plurality constitutive of a distinct social model in Edwards’ thought or, is it again, an instance of the mutual love model? A consultation of Edwards’ notes on “The Mind” and the Discourse on the Trinity clearly shows that he developed the notions of consent and excellency within the framework of the mutual love model. In “The Mind,” Edwards states that the excellence of God is his love for himself and that this love for himself is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the mutual love between the Father and the Son.120 The interpretation of consent and excellency in Miscellany 117 in light of the definition of these terms in “The Mind” is appropriate because Edwards refers the reader of Miscellany 117 to “The Mind” for further clarification of these terms.121 In the Discourse on the Trinity, Edwards maintains that the fellowship between the Father and the Son consists in

117Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 44–45 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 50, 56, and 68–69. 118Consent is an act of the will. The highest expression of the will is love for another, or, according to Edwards’ oft repeated phrase, “beings consent to being” (Edwards, “The Mind,” 6:336–38). Excellency refers to the love between two beings. Another way to say this is that the love or consent between two beings is excellency (Edwards, “The Mind,” 6:362). 119Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 84–85 and “Supreme Harmony of All,” 54–55. For the primary source to Miscellany 117, see Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 117 (13:284). 120Edwards, “The Mind,” 6:364. 121Schafer notes Edwards’ cross-reference to “The Mind” in Miscellany 117 (Miscellanies, no. 117 [13:284], footnote 7). For the cross-reference to “The Mind,” see Edwards, “The Mind,” 6:337.

104 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit, as the mutual loving consent of the Father and the Son, is the excellency of God.122 The exegesis of consent and excellency in these texts is valuable to show that the Spirit’s role in the mutual love model matches the Spirit’s role in what Plantinga Pauw calls Edwards’ social model. The critical question is, why is Edwards’ use of the Augustinian mutual love model, which Plantinga Pauw identifies as a version of the Augustinian psychological model, cited as evidence to argue that Edwards developed a distinct social model?123 The paradigm is determinative. The threeness-oneness paradigm necessitates the interpretation of social language as indicative of a distinct social model because Augustinian trinitarianism is alleged to be incapable, given its monist concept of God, of providing a social dimension to God’s being and a credible notion of divine triunity. However, the reader of Edwards should not presuppose that he operated with the assumptions of the modern threenessoneness paradigm. Once the reader is disabused of the paradigm, the observation is clear that Edwards’ use of social motifs to describe the immanent and economic Trinity occurs within and they are a product of the Augustinian mutual love model.124 Synthetic Analysis of Plantinga Pauw’s Interpretation of Edwards’ Trinitarianism Edwards’ consistent use of the mutual love model is problematic for the thesis that Edwards used both the social and psychological models of the Trinity because it suggests that Edwards employed one and not two trinitarian models. Moreover, the use of Edwards’ mutual love model as evidence 122Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:129–30. Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 44–45. In the dissertation, she refers to the mutual love model as a version of the “monist or binitarian” psychological analogy (“Supreme Harmony of All,” 50, 56, and 68–69). 124Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:187–89. Edwards is not alone in using the mutual love model for a communal or social notion of the Trinity that in turn serves as the form for human social relations. For instance, Mary T. Clark describes Augustine’s mutual love model as the “archetype of community” (Clark, Augustinian Personalism, ed. Robert P. Russell, The Saint Augustine Lecture Series 1969 [Villanova, Pa.: Villanova University Press, 1970], 13). Also see Clark’s more recent essays on the social dimension and significance of Augustine’s trinitarian theology: “Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity: Its Relevance,” 71–84 and “The Trinity in Latin Christianity,” in Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century, ed. Bernard McGinn and John Meyendorff, World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest, gen. ed. Ewert Cousins, 16 (New York: Crossroad, 1985), 276–90. 123Plantinga

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that Edwards possessed a social model is problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, it undermines the case that Edwards used a psychological and a distinct social model and, on the other hand, it undermines the threenessoneness paradigm. First, the use of the mutual love model as evidence of a social model invalidates the threeness-oneness paradigm, which contrasts the Augustinian or psychological model’s emphasis on oneness with the Cappadocian/Victorine social model’s emphasis on plurality. This is the case because the Augustinian mutual love model must be recognized as a social model, but constitutive of the threeness-oneness paradigm is the assertion that the Augustinian tradition, of which Plantinga Pauw notes the mutual love model is a form, cannot yield a social notion of God’s triunity.125 In other words, accepting the mutual love model as a social model calls into question the dialectical interpretation of the history of trinitarianism in terms of threeness and oneness because it admits that a classic expression of the oneness tradition contains robust social themes. Thus, to accept the mutual love model as a social model highlights the paradigm’s inaccurate construal of the trinitarian options in terms of oneness and threeness. However, to reject the paradigm and to recognize that Edwards deployed social language within the context of the mutual love model is to reject the thesis that Edwards utilized the psychological and social analogies as two distinct trinitarian models. Yet the premise that Edwards’ operated with two diverse and ultimately incompatible trinitarian models is at the heart of her analysis of his trinitarianism. Second, if the mutual love model does not constitute a social model, then Edwards’ trinitarian writings cannot be interpreted as possessing a social model of the Trinity. The reason for this is that the texts that Plantinga Pauw uses as evidence of Edwards’ social model are based on Edwards’ mutual love model of the Trinity. Important to note is that she describes the mutual love model as a form of the Augustinian psychological model that is inherently incompatible with a social model of the Trinity.126 Therefore, to reject the mutual love model as a social model is also to reject the claim that Edwards used a social model. I will venture to guess that, while most social trinitarians will grant that Augustine’s mutual love model possesses social motifs, they will not be willing to classify it as a social analogy or 125Plantinga

Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 44–45. her identification of the mutual love model with the psychological analogy, see Plantinga Pauw, Supreme Harmony of All, 44–45; “Supreme Harmony of All,” 55–56, 120, and 134; and “‘Heaven is a World of Love,’” 397. 126For

106 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM social model of the Trinity because the Spirit does not meet the social trinitarian criteria of personhood.127 Furthermore, her assent to the point that Edwards’ mutual love model is not a social model would invalidate her thesis that Edwards is important and useful for contemporary trinitarian theology precisely because he developed a social theory of the Trinity. The following conclusion, therefore, is appropriate: since Edwards’ use of social themes occurs within the mutual love model, the notion that these social themes reflect his use of a distinct social model consistent with the threeness-oneness paradigm is to be rejected.

CONCLUSION The threeness-oneness paradigm in a number of respects rests on a misunderstanding of the history of trinitarian thought and, therefore, is invalid for interpreting Edwards’ trinitarianism. Plantinga Pauw begins her analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism with the assumption of the threeness-oneness paradigm that the history of trinitarian thought reduces to the trajectories of oneness and threeness, which correspond relatively to the psychological and social models of the Trinity. She interprets Edwards in terms of this template and maintains that he used the distinct psychological and social models of the Trinity. She argues that Edwards’ usefulness for modern theology is his ability to incorporate both models into his trinitarian thought. In contrast, I argue that Edwards consistently utilized the mutual love model of the Trinity, which is a quintessential Western Augustinian trinitarian model. The usefulness of Edwards’ trinitarianism for modern trinitarian thought therefore is not to provide an example of one who creatively drew on two contrasting trinitarian traditions and their respective models, but rather to highlight the problematic assumption of the paradigm and social trinitarianism that Augustinian trinitarianism is inherently monistic and inimical to

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owe the distinction between social motif and analogy to Thomas R. Thompson (Thompson, “Imitatio Trinitatis: The Trinity as Social Model in the Theologies of Jürgen Moltmann and Leonardo Boff” [Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1996], 27). As noted previously, social trinitarians often define person in one of two ways. First, a person is a discrete center of consciousness (Plantinga, “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” 23). Second, person is a relational ontological category. Along these lines, Gunton defines person as “one whose being consists in relations of mutual constitution with other persons” (Gunton, “Being and Concept,” 195). However, in the mutual love model, the Spirit is portrayed as the bond of love. A bond is clearly not personal in either one of the social trinitarian notions of person.

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social themes. Moreover, Edwards’ scholars should discard the paradigm as a hermeneutical tool for interpreting his trinitarianism.

3 THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION Locating Jonathan Edwards’ trinitarian theology within the historical trinitarian traditions is, relative to the history of Edwards’ scholarship, a new task. Hitherto, scholars have typically overlooked his doctrine of the Trinity. However, in the last two decades, significant studies have begun to explore his trinitarian theology. Ironically, the current interest in Edwards’ trinitarian theology is as much the result of the contemporary theological context as its marginalization was symptomatic of its earlier ones. The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a profound renaissance in trinitarian theology and spiritualities. During this period the Trinity has moved from being a doctrine of mere confession but taken to have little relevance for the business of theology to one that functions axiomatically in the thought of many Christian theologians. The renewal of the Trinity in the broader context of contemporary theological studies has prompted the reassessment of the doctrine in past thinkers who shaped their theological traditions. Investigations of Jonathan Edwards’ doctrine of the Trinity reflect this re-emergence of the Trinity and re-assessment of its historical sources. Accurately placing Edwards in the broader history of trinitarian thought is central to the task of retrieving him for contemporary trinitarian theology. Amy Plantinga Pauw’s “The Supreme Harmony of All”: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards was the first published volume dedicated to interpreting the nature of his trinitarian theology.1 Although the title indicates the harmony of love that Edwards believed existed between the divine persons, Plantinga Pauw argues that his trinitarian thought oscillates between two fundamentally discordant accounts of the Trinity. She maintains that Edwards eclectically drew on the social and the psychological models of the Trinity. On the one hand, Edwards used the psychological model, which takes the oneness of God as foundational in reflection on the Trinity, and on the other hand, he used the social model, which takes the plurality 1Grand

Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. 109

110 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM of the divine persons as the central category of trinitarian reflection. She holds that Edwards alternated between these two models to articulate the immanent and economic Trinity and doctrines related to creation and redemption. She suggests that Edwards’ “multi-lingual” use of the disparate social and psychological models is his most useful contribution to contemporary trinitarian theology. He serves as a historical source to transcend the impasse that characterizes contemporary debates between proponents of these differing models of the Trinity. Moreover, she recommends his social model of the Trinity and relational ontology as a valuable resource for contemporary trinitarian theology and especially those interested in developing relational theism. On the last score, her account is inviolable. But even though the argument for a diversity of trinitarian concepts corresponds with the legitimate recognition of contemporary theology that no one theological account exhausts the reality of God, it misses the fundamental unity of his trinitarian theology and the symmetry is has with other aspects of his thought. The case developed here is that Edwards’ trinitarian theology consistently reflects the historical facets of the Augustinian mutual love model. Indeed, the mutual love model of the Trinity is the systematic core of his vision of God and redemption. The first step in demonstrating the central role of the Trinity in Edwards’ thought is to establish the historical characteristics of the trinitarian mutual love tradition. The mutual love model of the Trinity has a long history in Western theology. Historians of the Christian traditions identify its origin with Augustine of Hippo (354–430), who they also credit with the popularization of the more well-known psychological or procession model. Although overshadowed by the psychological model, it features prominently in the thought of central Western theological figures such as Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure.2 Stated succinctly, the mutual love model posits that the Father from eternity generated the Son and that the Holy Spirit proceeds and subsists as the mutual love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father. As a trinitarian tradition, the mutual love model embodies certain characteristic features. This chapter identifies and describes the features that constitute the Augustinian mutual love tradition. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define the meaning of tradition. In its limited denotation here, it refers to the five elements that characterize the Augustinian mutual 2Edmund

J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Theological Resources (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 204–17.

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love model in its historical expressions. The five characteristics of the model form a gestalt. The first is the tendency for theologians within this tradition to employ the mental aspects of the mind, such as memory, understanding, and will, to illustrate the immanent Trinity. Recourse is had to the mind and its functions because they are thought to be the imago Dei. The three mental capacities correspond respectively to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The mutual love model is often presented as a variation of the psychological model. Although it historically developed as a variant of the psychological analogy and the intellectual processions of knowledge and will are assumed, the mutual love model is in fact fundamentally different than the psychological model. A later discussion outlines the inter-personal nature of the mutual love model verses the intra-personal character of the psychological one. However, at this point, the focus is detailing Edwards’ thought in terms of its historical antecedents. Second, the Father is identified as the source of divinity. He is the fons et origo of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Third, the Father’s generation of the Son is understood in terms of the act of intellection. The generation of the Son corresponds to the generation of an idea or word in the mind by the act of the understanding. Fourth, the procession of the Holy Spirit corresponds to the highest exertion of the will, which is love. In particular, the mutual love model takes its name from the concept that the Holy Spirit subsists as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Fifth, the activities of the divine persons in the economy of redemption correspond to the immanent processions of the divine persons. The trinitarian theologies of Augustine and Aquinas serve as representatives of the trinitarian mutual love tradition. The reason for selecting them is that they were determinative in shaping the tradition in both Protestant and Catholic theology.3 The presentation here focuses on their basic shared 3For

general histories of trinitarian theology that take Augustine and Aquinas as representative of the dominant Western trinitarian tradition, see Hill, The ThreePersoned God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 53–78; Fortman, The Triune God, 139–53 and 204–10; and Thomas A. Marsh, The Triune God: A Biblical, Historical, and Theological Study (Blackrock, Dublin: Columbia, 1994), 129–61. In terms of the Protestant theological traditions, Paul Althaus notes that while Luther spurned scholastic speculations, his trinitarian theology is Augustinian because it understands the divine persons as subsistent relations (Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966], 199–200). Philip W. Butin argues that Calvin’s trinitarian theology bears a strong imprint of the Augustinian tradition. Butin also emphasizes the Eastern traits of Calvin’s trinitarian theology (Butin, Revelation, Redemp-

112 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM conceptual categories and does not attempt a detailed and exhaustive exhibition of their trinitarian thought. The use of Augustine and Aquinas as representative of the tradition does not ignore the diversity within the tradition. Bonaventure is a case in point. He raises the self-diffusive nature of God to a central place in his theology that is unique within Augustinian trinitarianism. Nevertheless, he uses the parameters of the mutual love model to express the emanation of the divine nature. The concentration on Augustine and Aquinas does not marginalize the diversity within the tradition, but focuses attention on the common features of the tradition. Additionally, we examine the use of the notion of divine goodness in the trinitarian theologies of Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure. The latter two set the stage for a significant emphasis in Edwards and accentuate his place within the Augustinian trinitarian tradition.

AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO The stature of Augustine in the Western theological tradition is perhaps unmatched by anyone who preceded or followed him in post-Apostolic Christian thought. His work on the Trinity is one the clearest examples of his influence in the Western tradition. Although most noted and criticized for fixing the psychological model in the mentality of Western trinitarianism, he is also the historical source of the mutual love model of the Trinity. Unsurprisingly, the five elements that constitute the gestalt of the mutual love model of the Trinity reside in his trinitarian theology. The following discussion exhibits the five characteristics of the mutual love model. These are 1) Augustine’s mental triads; 2) the Father as the unbegotten; 3) the generation of the Son as the Word; 4) the procession of the Holy Spirit as mutual love; and 5) the reciprocity between the economic missions and the immanent processions of the divine persons.

tion, and Response: Calvin’s Trinitarian Understanding of the Divine-Human Relationship [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], 44–45). In Edwards’ Reformed Puritan tradition, the Augustinian tradition is evident in William Ames, Marrow of Theology, trans. John D. Eusden. Boston: Pilgrim, 1968), 1.4 (pp. 88–91); Cotton Mather, Blessed Unions (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, for Samuel Phillips, 1692), 47–48; and John Owen, Pneumatologia, or A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit, vol. 2, The Works of John Owen, D.D., ed. Thomas Russell (1674; reprint, London: Richard Baynes, 1826), 1.3 (p. 64).

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The Mental Triads The psychological analogies are perhaps the most well known feature of Augustine’s trinitarian theology. Augustine turned to the mental images to illustrate the Trinity because Scripture testifies that human beings are created in the image of God. Augustine rejects an inter-personal relational understanding of the image. The following section details why Augustine looked for the image of God in the rational or spiritual nature of an individual human being and the psychological analogies that he used to illustrate the Trinity. Augustine dismisses a community of individuals—father, son, and wife—as the image because he interprets man in Genesis 1.26 as the creation of the individual person Adam. If the image resided in three individuals in relationship, then the passage of Scripture, which identifies the image as one individual, is incongruent. Thus, he believed that, by virtue of the interpretation of the biblical data, the image resides in the individual and not the relations between three individuals.4 The identification of Scripture as the primary reason that Augustine sought an image of the Trinity in the human soul stands in contrast to the thesis that the mental images reflect Augustine’s more fundamental commitment to Neoplatonism.5 Augustine believed that the intellectual soul is that aspect of human nature that mirrors God.6 Since God is Trinity, then the image must in some way, albeit through a glass darkly, image the triune nature of God.7 The mental triads allow Augustine to illustrate individuation within an essence without division or multiplication of the essence.8 In the course of writing De Trinitate, Augustine proposed three mental triads according to which the human intellectual nature images the Trinity. The first mental triad is that of the mind knowing and loving itself and is found in De Trinitate, book nine. The immediate context for the first mental image is book eight. At the end of book eight, Augustine surmises the Trin4Augustine,

The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. Rotelle, part 1, vol. 5, The Trinity, ed. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City Press, 1991), 7.12 (pp. 231–32) and 12.6–7 (pp. 325–26). 5Colin Gunton represents this common criticism that Neoplatonism underlies and shapes Augustine’s theology; see Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity, and the Theological Crisis in the West,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 35 and 47–48. 6Augustine, The Trinity 9.17 (p. 281) and 14.11 (pp. 378–79). 7Augustine, The Trinity 1.18 (p. 77), 9.2 (pp. 271–72), 10.19 (p. 299), 14.6 (pp. 374–75), and 14.23 (p. 390). 8Augustine, The Trinity 9.2–8 (pp. 272–75) and 9.18 (p. 282). He also used them to illustrate the doctrine of inseparable operations and nature.

114 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ity from the principle that God is love (1 John 4:8). The central role that Augustine gives to the principle “God is love” questions the common practice of reducing his trinitarian theology to an emphasis on ontological unity and the common practice of identifying Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure as the primary source of the relational category of love.9 Love implies lover, beloved, and love itself.10 In other words, love implies plurality. In book nine, Augustine turns his attention to discerning an example of the triune nature of love in the creature that comes closest to imaging the Trinity—i.e., the intellectual human nature. Augustine posits that the mind or the knower must have an object of knowledge in order to express love.11 In the case of the mind loving itself, self-knowledge is the term of the mind’s exertion of love. The mind gives knowledge concrete form in a word. A word is a mental representation of the object under consideration.12 In this case, the concrete expression of knowledge—i.e., the word—is the mind itself, that is, self-knowledge.13 Moreover, the mind’s self-knowledge matches itself identically and is, therefore, equal to the mind itself.14 Once the mind’s self-knowledge takes concrete form in the word, the word becomes the term for the mind’s expression of self-love.15 The result is that the word of self-knowledge is joined with the mind through the act of self-love.16 One problem with the triad of book nine is that knowledge and love are relative attributes of the mind, while mind/self signifies the substance of the mind. Edmund Hill remarks, “this trio thus represents, not Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but God, Son, and Holy Spirit.”17 The Son and the Spirit 9E.g.,

Hill, The Three-Personed God, 78–79; Gary D. Badcock (who follows Hill), Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 246–47 and William C. Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 65–67. 10Augustine, The Trinity 8.12–14 (pp. 253–55). 11Ibid., 9.3 (p. 272). 12Ibid., 9.13–18 (pp. 278–82) and 15.19–20 (pp. 409–10). 13Ibid., 9.16 (p. 280). 14Ibid., 9.4 (p. 273). 15Ibid., 9.3 (p. 272). 16Ibid., 9.15 (p. 279). 17Edmund Hill, The Mystery of the Trinity, Introducing Catholic Theology, 4 (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), 126. Hill elaborates that “[k]nowledge and love signify acts, and acts that refer to an object; they are conjugated with the relative preposition ‘of,’ they are used relatively. But mind signifies just a thing, substance. It is said absolutely, without reference. We lack a relative term. This trinity of mens, notitia sui, and amor sui corresponds to God, Son, and Holy Spirit, not to Fa-

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appear as the intellectual and volitional faculties of God. However, one nuance is in order. Augustine expressly warns that in book nine he is not yet speaking directly in terms of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but only in terms of the imperfect human image.18 He is searching for a useful means of illustrating a Trinity that is ontologically one. I raise this potential problem with Augustine’s first mental triad because Edwards adopts the mental image of mind, understanding, and will/love to illustrate the Trinity, but unlike Augustine does not move to the more appropriate image of memory, understanding, and will. The second mental triad is the mind remembering itself, understanding itself, and loving itself.19 The image does not reside in mental capacities or faculties, but in mental activities.20 Augustine believed that the three acts are contemporaneous in the human mind. The mind is ever present to itself— i.e., remembering itself, understanding itself (through a word), and loving itself.21 However, for Augustine the activity of the human mind remembering, understanding, and loving itself is still not the penultimate manner in which the human being images God. According to the third triad, the human mind ascends to wisdom and mirrors most closely the divine being by remembering, understanding, and loving God.22 The human mind’s ability to image God by remembering, understanding, and loving its creator requires the divine grace of the Holy Spirit. In grace, God begins to reform the image, which heretofore was debilitated by sin.23 The image reaches perfection when its vision of God— and thus, its remembering, understanding, and loving God—is perfected in ther, Son, and Holy Spirit” (Hill, “Introduction,” in The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. Rotelle, part 1, vol. 5, The Trinity, ed. Edmund Hill [Brooklyn: New City, 1991], 53). 18Augustine, The Trinity 9.2 (p. 271). 19Augustine, The Trinity 10.17–18 (pp. 298–99) and 14.11 (p. 379). 20Walter H. Principe argues that when Augustine uses the noun forms of memory, understanding, and love they generally function as short hand for the verbal forms of these words. Also, Augustine, when discussing the highest way in which the human being images God, most often uses the verbal forms (Principe, “The Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person,” in Studia Patristica, vol. 17, three parts, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone [New York: Pergamon, 1982], 3:1293–94). 21Augustine, The Trinity 14.10 (pp. 377–78), 14.13 (pp. 381–82), and 14.18 (p. 384). 22Ibid., 14.15 (p. 383) and 14.25 (pp. 390–91). 23Ibid., 14.21–23 (pp. 386–90).

116 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM the eschaton.24 The link between Augustine’s mental triad and Christian spirituality belies Robert Jenson’s criticism that Augustine’s mental images are exercises in abstract speculation divorced from the spiritual life of the believer.25 In contrast, Augustine’s mental triad of remembering, knowing, and loving God is oriented to the devotional life. Mary T. Clark points out that one of Augustine’s primary purposes in writing De Trinitate was to show believers that their spiritual development is directly tied to realizing that they are created in the image of the triune God, which image facilitates their union with the that God.26 The believer draws closer and closer to the trinitarian God through loving contemplation. Furthermore, the object of contemplation is not a monad, but a dynamic triune God, which the human mind is able to grasp, albeit imperfectly until the eschaton, precisely because the triune God created the human being to enter into loving relationship with it. The relations among the divine persons correspond roughly to the mental triads. However, despite the widespread characterization of Augustine’s trinitarian theology in terms of the psychological analogy, his use of the mental triads is somewhat cryptic. For instance, while he says that the triad of memory, understanding, and love images the Trinity, he rarely directly identifies the Father with memory, the Son with word—the product of the understanding, and the Spirit with love or will; although these correlations are clearly implied with the illustration of the Son as Word and the Spirit as love.27 24Note

that while Augustine believes that the spiritual nature of human beings images its creator, the eschatological glorification of human beings images the Son in a unique way. Humans image the Son in a special fashion because they, like the Son, are given a glorified body in the eschatological kingdom (Augustine, The Trinity 14.24 [p. 390]). 25Robert Jenson, The Triune Identity: God according to the Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 116 and America’s Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 92–93. 26Clark, “De Trinitate,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 91, 96, and 99–100. 27For an example of his unambiguous identification of the divine persons with the mental acts of the human mind, see Augustine, The Trinity 15.38–41 (pp. 425– 27) and 15.43 (p. 428). The routine characterization of Augustine’s use of the psychological analogies as symptomatic of his interpolation of Neoplatonism into Christian theology that led inexorably to the fixation on divine unity in the Western trinitarian tradition is also problematic. See chapter two for the case that in contrast to the assertion that Neoplatonism shaped Augustine’s doctrine of divine unity, the

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Augustine’s use of the mental triads exerted tremendous influence in Western trinitarian thought. Yet the important influence of Augustine’s mental triads lies not so much in that subsequent theologians borrowed his mental constructions with exact precision, but in that the intellectual faculties and operations of the human soul became a standard framework for illustrating the immanent processions and relations of the divine persons. The Father, the Unbegotten The chief feature of the Father is to be unbegotten. The Father is God who begets and from whom the Son and the Spirit proceed, but who himself is not from another.28 Augustine describes the Father as the “source of all godhead, or if you prefer of all deity.”29 However, the Father does not exist in any way prior to the Son and the Spirit. In other words, the unbegotten nature of the Father does not imply his ontological superiority to the Son and the Holy Spirit. God as Trinity is the eternal relationships of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.30 The Father is only the Father by virtue of eternally begetting the Son. Because of the unbegotten nature of the Father, Augustine has little to say in respect to his subsistence. The Generation of the Son as the Word of God The Son corresponds to the generation of a mental word by the understanding. As noted previously, a word is a replication by an act of thought of something residing in the memory or is the immediate object of the mind’s perception. Augustine distinguishes between a word represented in the understanding and one derived from and spoken in language. The former refers to the inner mental word and is distinguished from the spoken word. A spoken word is not properly a word, but is an external sign of an inner mental word. His point is that a mental word—one formed by the understanding—corresponds exactly to the knowledge contained in the memory.31 Also, the generation of the Son as Word does not correspond to a human mind remembering one item contained within the memory, but rather, it is similar to a human mind recalling its being or essence. This nudecisive context of Augustine’s doctrine of divine unity is the late-fourth-century pro-Nicene theology of inseparable external operations. 28Augustine, The Trinity 15.47 (p. 432). 29Ibid., 4.29 (p. 174) and 4.32 (p. 177). 30Ibid., 15.45 (p. 430). 31Ibid., 15.19–20 (p. 409).

118 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ance is important because the Son is identical in being with the Father. In other words, when the Father generates the Son as Word, that Word matches the Father identically. The identity of being between the Father and the Son highlights a primary limitation of the human mind to image the Son as Word. In the human mind, the production of a mental word is not identical with the essence of the mind, but it is a modification of the mind. However, since God is simple, being and knowing are indivisible. For God to know himself by a Word entails the being or existence of the Word as precisely that which it represents.32 The Procession of the Holy Spirit as the Mutual love of the Father and the Son The Holy Spirit proceeds as the love or the will of God.33 However, whereas the Father alone begets the Son, the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, although, the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father.34 This does not imply that the Spirit’s procession is a linear movement through the Son and away from the Father; rather, the Spirit proceeds simultaneously from the Father and the Son.35 Augustine understood the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son in terms of love. By virtue of the double procession of the Spirit as love, the Spirit unites the Father and the Son in a communion of mutual love.36 Indeed, because of his unitive function between the Father and the Son the Holy Spirit is the love of God.37 The mutual love model receives its name from the Spirit’s role as the immanent mutual love that unites the Father and the Son. From Economic Missions to Immanent Processions Augustine’s trinitarian reasoning begins with the economic missions of the divine persons and then moves to the immanent processions of the divine persons. More specifically, Augustine’s trinitarian reasoning begins with the Incarnation. Augustine’s reflection on the immanent Trinity begins with the Incarnation because it is the epistemic foundation of knowledge of the triune God. The movement of Augustine’s trinitarian reflections from the 32Augustine,

The Trinity 15.22–24 (pp. 414–16). 15.38 (p. 426) and 15.41 (p. 427). 34Ibid., 15.29 (p. 419) and 15.47 (pp. 432–33). 35Ibid., 15.48 (p. 433). 36Ibid., 15.27 (p. 418). 37Ibid., 15.31 (p. 420). 33Ibid.,

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economic missions to the immanent processions of the divine persons stands in contrast to the common view that assumes that Augustine starts with the unity of God and the psychological analogies. The mental triads serve to illustrate the triune God already inferred from the missions of the Son and the Spirit. For Augustine, knowledge of the immanent relations and processions arises from the economic missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. In regard to the continuity between the missions and processions, Edmund Hill opines, “the economic Trinity is the Trinity revealed” and therefore, the economic Trinity reveals the immanent Trinity.38 Consequently, the economic activities correspond to the immanent processions and vice versa. The missions of the Son and the Spirit, as presented in Scripture (e.g., John 14:15; 15:26; and 20:22), reveal that it is of the Father to send the Son and of the Father and the Son to send the Holy Spirit. The Incarnation or sending of the Son reveals that the Son is sent from the Father. Immanently and eternally, the Father begets and the Son is begotten. Economically, the Father sends and the Son is sent.39 The logic is that to be sent is to be from. The Son’s economic activity to be the one sent from God to reveal God matches his immanent status as the one begotten as the perfect image of God. Augustine continues the relationship between being sent and being from with his discussion of the Holy Spirit. According to Augustine, the epistemological basis for knowing that the Spirit is from the Father and the Son is that both send the Spirit.40 Ultimately, the sending of the Son and the Spirit reveal that the Father is “the source of all godhead, or if you prefer it, of all deity.”41 The Father sends, but is not sent. Since the sendings— economic activities—reveal the eternal processions and the Father is not sent, it belongs exclusively to the Father to be unoriginate within the immanent Trinity. Moreover, the pattern of economic sending yields the immanent generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. Finally, the procession of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son is the pattern for the Spirit’s soteriological activity. Within 38Edmund Hill, “Karl Rahner’s ‘Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise De Trinitate and St. Augustine,’” Augustinian Studies 2 (1971): 78. Moreover, Basil Studer remarks that “[t]he economic Trinity alone reveals the immanent Trinity” (Studer, The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of Hippo: Christocentrism or Theocentrism?, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1997], 109). 39Augustine, The Trinity 4.25–28 (pp. 171–74). 40Ibid., 4.29 (p. 174) and 15.45 (pp. 430–31). 41Ibid., 4.29 (p. 174), 4.32 (pp. 176–77), and 15.47 (p. 432).

120 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM the immanent Trinity, the Father loves the Son and the Son returns love to the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds as this immanent act of mutual love. In terms of the economy of redemption, the Spirit’s economic activity matches his immanent manner of procession. As the Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit, so they shed their love into the hearts of the saints by the Holy Spirit, which in turn unites believers with the immanent fellowship between the Father and the Son and fires their love for each other. Augustine bases his identification of the Holy Spirit as the love of God on 1 John 4:7–19. 1 John 4:7–8 makes two affirmations, stating that “love is from God . . . [and] God from God is love.”42 Augustine connects the two ideas and concludes that the love that is from God is God from God. Augustine sees in 1 John 4:13 and 16 a link between the love that is God from God and the Holy Spirit. In verse 13 God is said to dwell in the believer by the Holy Spirit and in verse 16 the believer dwells in God and God in the believer through love.43 Augustine concludes “so it is the Holy Spirit of which he has given us that makes us abide in God and him in us. But this is precisely what love does. He then is the gift of God who is love.”44 The economic role of the Spirit is the love by which God loves the believer and the believer loves God and the saints. The economic role of the Holy Spirit as unitive love mirrors the immanent procession of the Spirit as the love by which the Father and the Son mutually love one another. This means that the Spirit’s economic role in the ecclesia—both in the redemption of individuals and corporate life of the church—matches the Spirit’s role in the immanent Trinity.45

THOMAS AQUINAS Like Augustine’s, Thomas Aquinas’ theology profoundly influenced the Western theological traditions that followed him. This is true for both 42Augustine,

The Trinity 15.31 (p. 420). Edmund Hill gives the peculiar translation of “deus dilectio est” as “love is God” and “[d]eus ergo ex deo est dilectio” as “love therefore is God from God.” Hill’s translation has Augustine changing the actual text of Scripture. However, the Latin text is faithful to Scripture, and so resists treatment of this sort. See Augustine, De Trinitate Libri XV (Libri XIII-XV), ed. W. J. Mountain and Rev. Glorie, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 50A (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1968), 505–6. Latin translated by David Coffey. 43Augustine, The Trinity 15.31–32 (pp. 420–21). 44Ibid., 15.31 (pp. 420–21). 45Ibid., 6.7 (pp. 209–10) and Letter 187 in St. Augustine: Letters, 232–33.

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Catholic and Protestant traditions, and therefore it is appropriate to discuss his trinitarianism as representative of a dominant form of Western trinitarian reflection.46 I do not intend to argue that the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and Aquinas are identical. Nor will I assume the task of discerning and explicating the differentiating nuances in their respective trinitarian theologies, for that is beyond the scope of the present study.47 The purpose of the following section is to demonstrate that Augustine and Aquinas are appropriately located within a common trajectory of trinitarian theology. With this in mind, I show that Aquinas, like Augustine, utilizes the human mind to elucidate the Trinity, shares a common perception of the generation of the Son as Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, and links the redemptive activities of the divine persons with their respective immanent manner of subsistence. The Mental Image For Aquinas, the human soul is not only useful to illustrate the triune God; it is created with the express purpose to image the triune God. The underlying assumption of Aquinas’ theory that the human soul images God is the notion of exemplar causality. According to exemplar causality, God fashioned the human soul after the divine nature. As a consequence, the human soul mirrors the divine being after which it was fashioned. The resemblance of the soul to its exemplar is formal. Formal similarity means that the soul is proportional or analogous to God. But formal proportionality is not equivalent with formal identity or equality.48 The intellectual nature or form of the soul is that formal quality that differentiates human beings from other creatures of the material creation and that images the spiritual essence of God. Other material created entities bear a likeness to God in that they exist, but it belongs to human beings alone to image God by possession of an intellectual nature.49 In terms of trinitarian theology, Aquinas maintains that 46See footnote three in this chapter for theological histories that identify Aquinas as a key representative of Western trinitarianism. 47Although principally treating the trinitarian theology of Thomas Aquinas, D. Juvenal Merriell argues that Aquinas’ mature trinitarian theology embraced Augustine’s view that the human being most appropriately images the triune God when it knows and loves God (Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas’ Teaching, Studies and Texts, 96 [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990]). 48Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ (England: Blackfriars, 1964), 1a.93.1 (p. 51). 49Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.93.2 (pp. 53 and 55).

122 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM God is one nature in three persons, so he believes the human soul formally images God according to the divine essence and the divine persons.50 The discussion of the divine persons presupposes Aquinas’ theory of processions and relations within a spiritual nature.51 According to Aquinas, a spiritual nature has two fundamental acts or processions. The first procession is the activity of the understanding, which generates a word, and the second is the activity of the will or love, which joins the mind and the idea conceived by the understanding.52 In a spiritual nature, the acts of procession are productive. The act of the understanding produces a word or idea and the act of the will issues forth the subsistence of love. The result is that relations of opposition pertain between the source and product(s) of procession. As Aquinas says at one point, “relations result from actions.”53 The principle is that an act of procession is productive and, therefore, the act of procession produces relations of opposition between the source of procession and the product of procession. The acts of procession and their productions are central to Aquinas’ trinitarian theology because they are the basis of the personal identities of the divine persons.54 Aquinas believed that the human soul imitates the two immanent processions within the Godhead.55 Aquinas’ mental image of the Trinity does not reside in the mental faculties, but in the intellectual processions of understanding and love and their respective subsistent terms. By focusing the image in the acts of procession, Aquinas underscores the dynamic nature of the image.56 He taught that processions account for individuation within a spiritual nature and, therefore, within the Godhead.57 As a consequence, he argued that the human soul emulates the processions of the divine persons by virtue of the intellectual action of the understanding and will/love. In addition, since the Son and the Spirit subsist respectively as Word and Love, the human mind images the Trinity when the human intellectual processions are productive of word and love. Moreover, since the Son is the Word of God and the Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son,

50Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.93.5–6 (pp. 61–71). 1a.93.7 (p. 73). 52Ibid., 1a.27.1–5 (pp. 3–21). 53Ibid., 1a.34.3 (p. 41). 54Ibid., 1a.29.4 (p. 61). 55Ibid., 1a.93.1 (p. 51) and 1a.93.5 (pp. 63 and 65). 56Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity, 208. 57Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.93.7 (p. 73). 51Ibid.,

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the human mind best images God when it has God as the object of its intellectual act of understanding and act of love.58 The Father The Father is the principle of the personal relations in the Godhead. The Father is the principle of the deity because he is unoriginated. As unoriginate or unbegotten, the Father is a principle not from a principle. While the Holy Spirit is unbegotten in the sense that he is not generated but is spirated, nevertheless to the Father alone belongs the characteristic of being a principle not from another. In the Godhead, only one unbegotten is permissible because if two existed then they would not be distinct according to relations of opposition, but by virtue of distinct substances.59 Aquinas defers from understanding principle in terms of cause on the one hand, as if the Father is the cause of the Son and the Spirit, because it implies diversity of substance and, on the other hand, because it connotes ontological subordination. Aquinas uses the term principle to denote order of origin among the subsistences of the divine persons, but which order excludes ontological priority and gradation.60 The common feature between Augustine’s and Aquinas’ theory of the Father is that he is the absolute origin of the generation of the Son and the principal origin of the procession of the Spirit. In addition, the Father’s generation of the Son is understood in terms of the act of intellection and the procession of the Spirit in terms of dilection. The Son The Son is begotten by the intellectual procession of the Word. By virtue of being a product of divine intellectual procession, the Son also is called the image of God. The identity of the Son, as the image of God, rests on the assumption that the Son is the Word of God. For instance, to be the image of something, one must proceed from and bear formal likeness with a

58Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.93.8 (p. 79). Aquinas envisioned three levels of knowing and loving God. The first is the human mind’s natural ability to know and love God, which is common to all human beings. The second is the human mind’s facility to know and love God by grace, but this facility for knowledge and love remains imperfect in expression. The third is the knowledge and love of God by the blessed, which is perfect (Ibid., 1a.93.4 [pp. 59 and 61]). 59Ibid., 1a.33.4 (pp. 17–23). 60Ibid., 1a.33.1 (pp. 5 and 7).

124 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM source. The generation of the Son as the Word of God meets these two conditions. The procession of the Word by the understanding introduces personal diversity within the Godhead.61 Person refers to that which is distinct within a nature.62 For instance, human beings possess their distinct personhood by virtue of the accidental qualities that individuate them from other human beings. In the Godhead, personal distinctions derive not from accidental characteristics but from acts or processions of the divine nature. Procession is a general term that refers to the act of a spiritual nature that yields a subsistent relation. More specifically, the procession of the intellectual capacity is called generation and the procession of volitional capacity is called procession. The processions in the divine nature produce relations of opposition and, thus, individuation.63 The personhood of the Son is defined in terms of the distinction of the Word within the divine nature. In the divine nature, the generation of the Word creates relations of opposition. The Word is the begotten and that from which the Word comes is the unbegotten. Begotten corresponds to sonship and unbegotten to fatherhood.64 Furthermore, since the term person refers to a distinction within a nature, the generation of the Word and the distinction of relation—i.e., unbegotten and begotten—introduced by the Son’s generation manifests personal distinctions in the divine nature. The Word is properly called the Son of God because it is of the nature of the divine understanding to beget a word and it is of the nature of a son to be begotten.65 The Word is a personal subsistence of the divine nature. The doctrine of simplicity safeguards the full deity and personal status of the Son. In regard to the subsistence of the Son as the Word of God, the doctrine of divine simplicity maintains the divinity of the Son on the principle that no distinction pertains between God’s being and knowing; that is, God’s knowledge and being are indivisible.66 In the human mind and the process of knowing, the word, while immanent to the mind, is not identical with it. The idea in the mind is not a discrete subsistence of the person’s spiritual nature, but is an ephemeral subsistence in the mind. However, with God, the word of the understanding is not only immanent to the divine nature, it 61Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.35.1–2 (pp. 43–49). 1a.29.4 (p. 61). 63Ibid., 1a.29.4 (pp. 57–63). 64Ibid., 1a.28.4 (p. 37). 65Ibid., 1a.27.2 (pp. 9 and 11) and 1a.34.2 (p. 35). 66Ibid., 1a.34.2 (p. 35). 62Ibid.,

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is also formally identical with it.67 Since in the divine nature being and knowledge are inseparable and the Word is formally identical with the divine nature, the Word is the divine nature.68 Moreover, the identity of the Word with the divine nature means that the Word is a distinct subsistence of the divine nature.69 The Word is distinct because it is the product of generation, which is necessarily distinct from the source of procession.70 This does not infer two entities each possessing its own nature—i.e., two natures of the same sort, but two distinctions within one nature by virtue of the individuated subsistence of the one nature.71 The Holy Spirit Aquinas portrays the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. He understood love as a power that unites. As the mutual love of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit unites the Father and the Son in a bond of love.72 Aquinas continued to use the processions of an intellectual nature for the conceptual categories to explain the subsistence of the Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For Aquinas, relations produced by the processions of an intellectual nature constitute the identity of the divine persons. Since the Son is the product of the generation of the understanding—i.e., the Son is the Word; the Holy Spirit must correspond to the procession of the will. In an intellectual nature, love is a function of the will. Love then proceeds by the act of the will. As a procession of an intellectual nature, love meets the first condition for a distinct relation or individuation within the divine nature; namely, love is a procession from an origin or principle. A problem arises with naming the relation that subsists by the procession of the will. The terms spiration and procession, which describe the manner in which the Holy Spirit subsists, denote origin and acts and not relations.73 Aquinas admits that a proper term for the procession of will and its constituting relations of opposition is unavailable. Although the Son is easily named from the notion of generation, which fits the concept of the procession of Word by the act of the understanding, to name the relations of op67Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.27.1 (p. 7) and 1a.34.2 (p. 35). 1a.34.2 (p. 35). 69Ibid., 1a.34.1 (pp. 29 and 33) and 34.2 (p. 35). 70Ibid., 1a.34.1 (p. 29). 71Ibid., 1a.34.2 (p. 37). 72Ibid., 1a.37.1 (p. 83). 73Ibid., 1a.37.1 (p. 81). 68Ibid.,

126 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM position and the subsistence produced by the act of the will proves more difficult. Nonetheless, Aquinas argued that the procession of the will yields the relation of spiration, which refers to the source of the procession of will, and procession, which denotes that which proceeds.74 To solve this problem, Aquinas posits that love, like the Word and despite the inadequacy of language, subsists in an intellectual nature.75 The Spirit is a divine person because, as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, the Spirit is a procession from an origin and a distinct subsistence of the divine nature. Moreover, as the bond of mutual love between the Father and the Son, the Spirit is a divine person because the Spirit is the relation of union.76 Due to the ambiguous nature of the relations constituted by the procession of the will, Aquinas concluded that the name of the Holy Spirit is indistinct; that is, it does not signify relationship. He suggests that Scripture adopted the name Holy Spirit to refer to the third divine person because, by virtue of belonging to both the Father and the Son, he is what they both are—i.e., Holy and Spirit. In addition, the term spirit denotes movement toward something and love denotes the propulsion of will to another, therefore, the compound name Holy Spirit captures the meaning of the immanent procession of love within the Godhead.77 The second problem addressed by Aquinas is the nature of the distinction between the procession of the Holy Spirit and of the Son. His solution presupposes the principle that personal distinctions within the Godhead rest on relations of opposition, which in turn arise from processions. He concludes that the double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son—filioque—is the only viable answer. The only way the Spirit can be distinct from the Son is to have a unique relational status. Since relations derive from processions, the Spirit cannot proceed from the Father alone for then the Spirit would be indistinct from the Son. The only alternative is for the Spirit to proceed from the Father and the Son.78 The doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is the backdrop for Aquinas’ teaching that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The procession of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son is necessitated by the assumption that the Father and the Son are the indeterminate principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit. If the Holy 74Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.28.4 (pp. 37 and 39). 1a.37.1 (pp. 81 and 83). 76Ibid., 1a.37.1 (p. 83). 77Ibid., 1a.36.1 (pp. 53 and 55). 78Ibid., 1a.36.2 (pp. 59, 61, and 65) and 1a.37.1 (p. 83). 75Ibid.,

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Spirit were not the mutual love of the Father and the Son, he would proceed from either one determinate principle—i.e., as the Father’s love for the Son alone—or two determinate principles—i.e., first the Father’s love for the Son and second the Son’s love for the Father. The former is inconsistent with the principle of relative opposition constituting personal distinction, since the Spirit would be, like the Son, from the Father alone. The latter introduces two subsisting processions of love; namely, the subsistence of the Father’s love for the Son and the Son’s love for the Father. By positing that the Spirit proceeds as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, Aquinas maintains the notion that the Spirit proceeds from one principle— the Father and the Son.79 That the Spirit proceeds from one principle does not denigrate the full mutuality of the Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The Father and the Son love each other, but the love subsisting between them is one by virtue of its mutuality. The Spirit is not conceived of as two separate loves proceeding from two subjects, but as the mutual love of the Father and the Son subsisting as one love uniting the Father and the Son.80 The Processions and the Missions The key principle of Aquinas’ theology of divine missions is that the temporal missions of the divine persons correspond to the eternal processions of the divine persons. However, unlike Augustine, Aquinas does not reason from the economic missions to the eternal processions. Aquinas explains the temporal missions in light of the previously established eternal processions. In Summa Theologiæ he treats the Trinity in 1a.27–42 and then discusses the temporal missions of the divine persons in 1a.43. Aquinas’ location of the missions implies no minimization of the economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity. Rather, the placement of the missions at the end of the treatment of the Trinity derives strictly from Aquinas’ path of reasoning. He reasons according to the via doctrinæ rather than Augustine’s via inventionis.81 The via inventionis begins with the means by which humans acquire knowledge of God in the created world; namely through created effects, such as nature and divine acts of revelation recorded in Scripture. Aquinas’ 79Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.36.4 (pp. 73–77). Summa Theologiæ 1a.36.4 (p. 75). 81Edmund Hill, “Augustine’s Method in the De Trinitate: A Model for Text Books and Catechisms,” in Gott und sein Bild: Augustins “De Trinitate” im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung, ed. Johannes Brachtendorf (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000), 29–30. 80Aquinas,

128 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM via doctrinæ begins with the articles of faith. As Timothy L. Smith clarifies, the structure of the Summa follows the “order of being: God first, as cause, and all else, in relation to God, as effects.”82 The order of treating the immanent processions first and then the economic missions reflects the broader organizational methodology of the Summa. Since Aquinas begins with God, or what modern theologians call the immanent Trinity, he naturally treats the missions—that is, the economic Trinity—after the immanent Trinity. Nevertheless, the results of Augustine’s and Aquinas’ theologies are quite similar. Augustine argues that the temporal missions reveal the eternal processions, or the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity revealed. Aquinas argues that the immanent processions of the divine persons are the pattern for the economic missions of the divine persons. Regardless of their differing modes of reasoning they both agree that the temporal missions of the divine persons correspond to the eternal processions of the divine persons. Before Aquinas describes the relative missions of the divine persons, he defines the meaning of mission. The primary meaning of mission is to be sent and given. To be sent means to be from a principle and to be present somewhere in a new mode of being. Applied to the Trinity, mission refers to the work of a divine person in sanctifying grace.83 The new place of being is in the soul of the believer.84 Third, Aquinas says that, “a mission is a procession in time.”85 Like a procession, a mission involves the coming forth of a divine person from another—i.e., a coming forth from a principle. A mission is distinct from a procession in that it terminates in time, whereas a procession terminates in the divine nature.86 The distinction between the terminal points seems necessary to avoid economic modalism. Thus, an immanent procession of the divine nature entails the subsistence of a unique divine person, whereas a temporal mission implies the presence of a divine person in a new way of being in creation.87 The mission is a new way of being for the divine person because it refers to the special manifestation of a divine person in the soul in relationship to sanctifying grace and is, therefore, distinct from the general immensity of God. In short, a mission is

82Timothy

L. Smith, Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 20. 83Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.43.1 (p. 211). 84Ibid., 1a.43.3 (p. 217) and 1a.43.6 (p. 225). 85Ibid., 1a.43.3 (p. 215). 86Ibid., 1a.43.2 (p. 213). 87Ibid., 1a.43.5 (p. 223).

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the indwelling of the divine person by grace in the soul of the believer.88 In the economy, Aquinas envisaged visible and invisible missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. The visible mission of the Son was the Incarnation. The Holy Spirit had several episodic visible missions—e.g., the manifestation in the form of a dove at the baptism of Jesus—associated with the visible mission of the Son. The visible missions culminate in the invisible missions of sanctifying grace. I am not treating these specifically because Edwards’ theology of the economic missions corresponds only with Aquinas’ theology of the invisible missions in sanctifying grace. The temporal missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit in sanctifying grace correspond to their manner of eternal procession. The Son proceeds as the Word of God and the Holy Spirit as the Love of God. The procession of the Son and the Spirit comprise the immanent acts of the divine nature. In sanctifying grace, the missions of the Son and the Spirit mirror the nature of their immanent processions. Moreover, the chief results of grace in the soul correlate with the notional or characteristic acts within the divine nature. The Son, as the Word of God, enlightens the mind and the Spirit, as the love of God, kindles the affections of the soul to love God known by the Word.89

RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR, BONAVENTURE, AND DIVINE GOODNESS In identifying the sources of Edwards’ trinitarian theology, it is quite apparent that he relied on several notions that are not dominant features of Augustine and Aquinas’ theology, our representatives of Edwards’ tradition. More in vein with Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) and Bonaventure, he argued for the Trinity on the basis of divine goodness. Although Augustine and Aquinas believed in the goodness of God, they do not give the notion as central of a role in their trinitarian theologies as do St. Victor, Bonaventure, and Edwards. At first glance, the distinct elements may seem to suggest that Edwards tapped an alternative tradition to that of the Augustinian mutual love one. Resolving this issue shows that Edwards was on the one hand eclectic, but also remarkably consistent in using the structure of the Augustinian mutual love model. On the other hand, it shows that the Augustinian tradition was not monochromatic, but rather admitted diverse emphases within its overall trinitarian structure.

88Aquinas, 89Aquinas,

Summa Theologiæ 1a.43.8 (p. 235). Summa Theologiæ 1a.43.5 (pp. 223 and 225).

130 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Richard of St. Victor Edwards’ similarity with Richard of St. Victor is important in light of the fact that several scholars see this connection as a source of a social model of the Trinity in Edwards. Problematic for seeing continuity with St. Victor as a source for a distinct social model in Edwards is that Richard’s trinitarian theology does not really represent a social model, at least as it is expressed by modern social trinitarians. This is not to deny a social dynamic to Richard’s trinitarianism, but to point out that it does not start with or give precedence to the divine persons over the oneness of the divine nature, which is the hallmark of contemporary social trinitarianism. Richard’s theology is an argument for the Trinity from the rational principle of supreme goodness and love, which is similar in nature to Anselm’s argument for the existence of God from the notion of perfect being.90 St. Victor’s thought thus exhibits continuity and departure from the Augustinian trinitarian tradition. The starting point of Richard’s discussion of the divine persons is the notion of divine goodness and its entailment of divine love. In this respect, his development of the Trinity from the interpersonal nature of goodness and love has precedence in Augustine.91 Albeit, Richard gives it a central role absent in Augustine. Richard’s argument derives its conclusions on the Trinity from the rational implications of the terms goodness and love. The guiding principle is that whatever God is God must be so in a superlative way. God is supremely good. Since goodness that includes love is superior to that which lacks it, it follows that God must be love. Since interpersonal love is better than self-love, then God must be a plurality of persons.92 Yet, love requires not only a plurality of persons or two persons, but three for its full expression. The love between two or mutual love is better than self-love because a giving and receiving of love occurs between the two. However, a higher manifestation of love happens when those who experience mutual love share this love with a third and thereby the third person is the recipient of the shared love of the first two. The love between two shared with a third (condilectus) is the zenith of love. Since no greater form of love is imag90Zachery

Hayes, “Introduction,” in The Works of St. Bonaventure, ed. Geogre Marcil, vol. 3, Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, trans. Zachery Hayes (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure University, 2000), 19. 91Augustine, The Trinity 8.12–14 (5:253–55). 92Richard of St. Victor, The Trinity, in Richard of St. Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs, the Mystical Ark, and Book Three of the Trinity, trans. and intro. Grover A. Zinn, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 3.2 (pp. 374–75).

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inable, divine goodness and love requires no less than and no more than three divine persons.93 In addition to accenting a minor theme in the Augustinian tradition, Richard departs from it in two ways. He refrains from using the psychological dimensions of a rational nature to express the manner of the processions of the divine persons and does not regard the personal identity of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. St. Victor believed that the mutual love model is deficient. He did not believe that mutual love is gratuitous—a necessary condition of supreme love—because it includes giving and receiving love. St. Victor maintained that only when the Holy Spirit receives the mutual love of the Father and the Son does love attain the level of utter donation and thereby perfection. The perfection of love therefore transcends mutual love by sharing mutual love with a third. Rather than identifying the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, St. Victor portrays the Spirit as the divine person who shares in, as the recipient of, the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The Spirit is not the mutual love of the Father and Son itself; thus, the Father and the Son conjointly love the Spirit and the Spirit shares in this mutual love between the Father and the Son. The Spirit’s sharing in the mutual love of the Father and Son satisfies the gratuitous nature of love—i.e., to give without receiving. Furthermore, in order to share or enjoy the mutual love between the Father and the Son, the Spirit too loves the Father and the Son. Each divine person gives and receives the three modes of love: love of another, the reception of returned love from the one loved (mutual love), and the reception of shared love (condilectus) or the inclusion in the happiness of the mutual love of the other two.94 Like St. Victor, Edwards argued for the plurality of the Godhead from the principle of divine goodness and love.95 Unlike St. Victor, Edwards believed that love is brought to its full expression in the mutual love of the Father and the Son and does not require their mutual love to be shared (condilectus) with a third—i.e., the Holy Spirit.96 For Edwards, the Holy Spirit 93Richard

of St. Victor, The Trinity 3.4–7 (pp. 376–79) and 3.11–20 (pp. 384–93). de Saint-Victor: La Trinité, intro. and trans. Gaston Salet, Sources Chrétiennes, ed. H. de Lubac and J. Daniélou, 63 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1959), 3.14–20 (pp. 199–213). For a recent and comprehensive discussion of Richard’s trinitarianism and its relationship to social trinitarianism, see Nico den Bok, Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St. Victor (†1173), Bibliotheca Victorina, 7 (Paris: Brepols, 1996). 95Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:263–64). 96For Richard’s argument for the plurality of the Godhead from the principle 94Richard

132 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM is not the third with whom the Father and the Son share their mutual love, but the subsistence of the Father and the Son’s mutual love. Identifying Edwards with St. Victor is appropriate to the extent that both place divine goodness and its logical implication of interpersonal love at the center of their thought, but Edwards expounds it within the categories of the Augustinian mutual love model whereas St. Victor developed a distinct model that presupposes three subjects giving and receiving love. Bonaventure Bonaventure’s trinitarianism is similar with St. Victor’s in that both derive the Trinity from the rational implications of divine goodness. However, whereas Richard argues that goodness necessarily entails the interpersonal sharing of love, Bonaventure sees the Pseudo-Dionysian notion of selfdiffusion as the chief characteristic of divine goodness. Bonaventure’s principle, like Richard’s, appears to be a variation of Anselm’s principle that God is a “‘being than which no greater can be conceived.’”97 Bonaventure includes the notion of goodness in the concept of God as the greatest conceivable being.98 Since God is perfect good and the ability to communicate goodness is better than an inability to do so, the perfection of divine goodness necessarily implies the communication of the divinity. A being that is perfectly good can perfectly communicate itself. The communication of the divine goodness must be intrinsic to the divine nature in order to be a perfect communication. The diffusion of divine goodness in creation is not a perfect communication of goodness because that which is communicated is a lesser being than divinity. Thus, it is not the highest conceivable form of communicating the divine goodness. A perfect diffusion of the divinity will be identical to the divinity. Divine communication does not produce multiple gods because the communication is intrinsic to the divinity.99

that God is love, see Richard de Saint-Victor: La Trinité 3.14–20 (pp. 199–213). 97Hayes, “Introduction,” 19. 98Saint Bonaventure, “The Journey of the Mind to God,” in The Works of Bonaventure, trans. José Vinck, vol. 1, Mystical Opuscula (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild, 1960), 49–50. 99The Works of Bonaventure, trans. José Vinck, vol. 2, The Breviloquium (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild, 1963), 36 and The Works of St. Bonaventure, ed. Geogre Marcil, vol. 3, Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, trans. Zachery Hayes (1979; reprint, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure University, 2000), 254–57.

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Bonaventure maintained that since the divinity is rational in nature it has two modes of intrinsic emanation. These are according to nature and will. He used the mental image of memory, intellection, and love to illustrate the emanations of the divine nature. The natural emanation of the divinity is in terms of a word, just as a created spirit objectifies itself through the inner production of a word. The word or object of thought is an inner procession of the soul. The second emanation is by way of the will in which the mind loves and delights in the word produced by intellection. In the divinity, unlike the created spirit, the emanations are essentially equal to the first originating principle. The word generated by the natural emanation is equal to the intellectual nature that generated it. The result is the diversification of the divine persons of the Father and the Son. The Father generates the Son as his Word. The second emanation according to will is in the modality of mutual love between the Father and the Son, by which mutual love the Holy Spirit subsists.100 Bonaventure’s emphasis on the self-diffusive nature of God as the basis for the Trinity is unique. Nevertheless, he falls within the Augustinian mutual love tradition because he understood the actualization of God’s selfcommunication in terms of the Augustinian framework of the mental image and mutual love model. The generation of the Son as the Word of the Father and the spiration-procession of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son fulfills the self-communicative nature of God. Edwards stands in the tradition of Bonaventure’s theology of the selfcommunicative nature of God that finds expression in terms of the mutual love model of the Trinity.

CONCLUSION This chapter presented the five characteristics of the Augustinian mutual love tradition in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas. Their trinitarian theology exhibits the following common features. First, they illustrate the triune God with a mental image. Second they understand the Father as the unbegotten and the principal source of the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit. They portray the subsistence of the Son in terms of the generation of the intellect and subsistence of a word and the procession of the 100Saint Bonaventure, The Breviloquium, 39–40; “The Journey of the Mind to God,” 33–34 and 50; and Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, 262–63. For placing Bonaventure’s use of the mutual love model in relation to its historical antecedents, see Walter H. Principe, “Saint Bonaventure’s Theology of the Holy Spirit as Love between Father and Son,” The Cord 24 (1974): 235–56.

134 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Holy Spirit in terms of the will and subsistence of the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Finally, they link the immanent processions with the divine missions in such a way that the former defines the latter and the latter reveals the former. The chapter also highlighted the notion of divine goodness in the trinitarian thought of Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure as a precursor for its role in Edwards’ trinitarian theology. I now turn to examine Edwards’ trinitarian theology and its continuity with the Augustinian mutual love tradition.

4 JONATHAN EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION Edwards was heir to the Reformed Puritan tradition that in turn was the child of the sixteenth century Protestant reform movement associated with Geneva and John Calvin. He was also a key defender and promoter of eighteenth-century Reformed theology in New England. His successors, the Edwardseans, developed certain areas of his thought related to the freedom of the will, the moral nature of God, and revivalism into the mid-nineteenth century. Yet at the same time, Edwards was also the benefactor of an additional tradition of thought: the Augustinian mutual love tradition. Nineteenth century evangelicals tended to neglect and sometimes intentionally ignore his trinitarian theology. However, this hitherto largely unexplored dimension of his theology is vital because it provided Edwards with if not the, at the least a key orientating center of his vision of God and redemption. Identifying the precise sources of Edwards’ appropriation of the mutual love model is perhaps impossible because he was not in the habit of documenting them. Nevertheless, it was part of the broader Western trinitarian tradition and to some degree his Puritan heritage. Puritan theologian John Owen (1616–1683) referred to the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son in his Pneumatologia.1 Edwards knew Owen’s text and quoted a section from it that characterizes the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.2 Also, the New England Puritan Cotton Mather (1663–1726) articulated the immanent Trinity in terms of the mu1Works

of John Owen, D.D., ed. Thomas Russell, vol. 2, Pneumatologia, or A Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit (1674; reprint, London: Richard Baynes, 1826), 1.3 (p. 64). Although rejecting the mutual love model as a credible theory of the subsistence of the divine persons, Thomas Ridgeley summarizes it in Commentary on the Larger Catechism; previously titled A Body of Divinity, ed. John M. Wilson (Edmonton, AB: Still Waters, n.d.), 159. 2Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1047 (20:389). 135

136 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM tual love model.3 Despite rare references and identifiable examples in his Puritan predecessors, the text trail of his access to the tradition at least at this time cannot be reconstructed with certainty. What can be done is a presentation of his trinitarian thought vis-à-vis the mutual love tradition’s central motifs. Edwards’ trinitarian theology reflects the five-fold gestalt of the Augustinian mutual love tradition. Like Augustine and Aquinas, Edwards finds the human mind a primary resource for illustrating divine triunity. He compares the Father to the mind, the Son to the product of the understanding, and the Holy Spirit to the will. He correlates the economic roles of the divine persons with the nature of their immanent subsistence and identity. The continuity between Edwards, Augustine, and Aquinas is not an assertion of identical theologies. Rather, it suggests that they share central categories that link their trinitarian thought in a continuum of thought properly called a tradition. Notwithstanding the central influence of Augustine and Aquinas, Edwards also drew on, quite likely without knowing so, Bonaventure’s emphasis on the communicative nature of God and his modification of the mutual love tradition. In the prior chapter, we treated Bonaventure’s retrieval of the Pseudo-Dionysian insight and his integration of it with the Augustinian mutual love tradition last because his work occurs historically after the establishment of the basic contours of the mutual love tradition. However, the principle of divine self-communication serves such a foundational role in Edwards’ trinitarian theology that is deserves first treatment in this chapter.

DIVINE GOODNESS AND SELF-COMMUNICATION The disposition of the divine nature for self-communication is perhaps Edwards’ most fundamental theological conviction. Equally important is his view that God’s goodness arises from the self-diffusion of God. The allied concepts of divine disposition for self-communication and goodness are the basis for his trinitarian understanding of God, creation, and redemption. Edwards believed that the goodness of God consists in the fulfillment of the divine disposition for self-communication. He referred to the goodness of the divine disposition for self-communication in various ways such as the perfection of God, God’s glory, the emanation of God’s glory, and

3Mather,

Blessed Unions (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, for Samuel Phillips, 1692), 47–48.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 137 the diffusion of the divinity.4 He trades, as did Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure, on a philosophical understanding of goodness. For Edwards, goodness is sharing happiness with other persons. Edwards used the term goodness somewhat equivocally. On the one hand, goodness is the product of the communication of happiness. In this sense, it is equivalent with excellency and mutual love. On the other hand, it is interchangeable with the act of sharing happiness. So it can refer to the process of sharing love or the blessedness that characterizes those in love with each other. Despite the nuance of the term, Edwards is clear that a person who possesses goodness must be communicating that goodness with another. In other words, true happiness is not self-enclosed and selfish, but oriented to another. Goodness is the desire and act of sharing happiness or love with another person.5 Goodness resides, therefore, in the interpersonal communication of happiness. In Edwards’ thought love, happiness, and goodness are related concepts. Love constitutes goodness. Love is the act whereby one person shares his or her joy with another person. Moreover, love is social in nature because the beloved desires to return love to the lover and thereby their love is mutual love. Thus, the sharing of love between two persons consummates goodness. Applying this notion of goodness to God, Edwards concluded that since God is the most sublime being, interpersonal love must characterize the Godhead. Put another way, the self-communicative nature of God can find realization only in a plurality of persons intrinsic to the Godhead.6 God must exist as a plurality of divine persons because God cannot infinitely love and thereby communicate happiness to something that is not infinitely good. A created person, whether angelic or human, may be a worthy object of love, but since they lack the perfection of divinity, they are not suitable for an infinite expression of love. The only object that meets the criterion of an infinite communication of happiness is God.7 Therefore, plurality in the Godhead is necessary because the communication of the infinite happiness of God—i.e., love—requires an infinite object of goodness. The mutual love model is the framework for the expression of the divine disposition for self-communication. Following his predecessors such 4E.g.,

Edwards, Ethical Writings, 8:433–35, 438–39, 459–60, and 526–36. Miscellanies, nos. 87 (13:251–52), 97 (13:264), and 104 (13:272). 6Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:262–63). 7Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 117 (13:283–84). 5Edwards,

138 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM as Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas, Edwards believed that a spiritual being has two modalities of activity and procession: one according to intellect and another according to will. In the Godhead, the first emanation brings forth a subsistence of the Word or the Son. The first emanation introduces a diversification of two persons of the divine being, but not a multiplication of divine beings. This is the case because the emanation of the Son from the Father is a relative and internal subsistence of the divine essence. However, the first communication does not complete the divine nature’s disposition for self-communication. An act of interpersonal love remains outstanding. To be sure love prompts the Father to generate the Son. But it is more a recognition of the divinity’s inherent goodness, than an act of love directed toward another person. For example, when a couple conceives a child, a form of love is present in that they believe there is something valuable in passing on their lives through the conception of another human being. However, their parental love directed toward the actual child surpasses the love that prompted the conception or communication of life to another in the first place.8 In order to complete the divine disposition for communication, an emanation of love must occur in the Godhead. But love is best when it is shared between two persons. In the example above, parental love is superior to the love that brings forth new life because it does not only produce life, but adores the life created. But only the child’s reciprocation of love to the parents completes familial love. In a similar way, the Son must return love to the Father to fulfill the divine nature’s disposition to communicate goodness. The communication of happiness presupposes a capacity of reception and return in the recipient of love. For instance, human beings cannot truly communicate human happiness to a pet, such as a dog. One requires another human being to share that happiness in a fully human and personal sense. Edwards’ theory that the genuine communication of goodness requires personal reception and return implies two equal subjects in the divine being. A second subject is necessary to receive the communication of goodness from the initial subject communicating goodness. In the Godhead, the two subjects reciprocally communicating goodness are the Father and the Son.9 The two eternal loving subjects involve a dynamic 8The

essential features of Edwards’ account of the trinitarian God are found in Discourse on the Trinity, 21:109–44. The remaining sections of this chapter describe his trinitarian theology in detail. 9Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 117 (13:373). For more on the communicative nature of divine goodness, see Miscellanies, nos. 97 (13:264) and 117 (13:283–84); “Heaven is a World of Love,” 8:373; and “The Mind,” no. 1 (6:336–38).

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 139 process of subjects giving, receiving, and returning love. The order is important: the Father, after communicating being in the subsistence of the Son, loves the Son, who receives the Father’s love, and then loves the Father in turn. Edwards identified the mutual love that flows forth between the Father and the Son as the perfection of the Godhead and the person of the Holy Spirit. The subsistence of the Holy Spirit as the interpersonal love of the Father and the Son consummates the self-communicative nature of God and, thereby also, God’s goodness.10 The procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit fulfills the fecundity of the divine nature. The first introduces a plurality of persons to the Godhead, which is the precondition for the sharing of love. The subsistence of the Spirit as the interpersonal of the Father and the Son love constitutes divine goodness and thus completes God’s disposition to communicate goodness. The remainder of this chapter details Edwards’ articulation of the self-communication of God in the form of the Augustinian mutual love model.

EDWARDS AND THE MENTAL IMAGE The human mind or soul is Edwards’ dominant resource for illustrating the triunity of God, although he also used the sun to illustrate the Trinity. He compared the Father to the sun itself, the Son to the brightness of the sun as it appears to human sight, and the Holy Spirit to the action of the sun, which includes its internal heating and its heating of objects external to the sun.11 Nevertheless, Edwards favored the soul to the sun because he believed it is a clearer image. His preponderant use of the soul relative to the sun and its service as the foundational image of the Trinity in the Discourse on the Trinity, which is Edwards’ longest and most formal exposition on the Trinity, reflects the superior status he assigned to the soul as an image of the Trinity.12 He used the mind because he believed it was created in the image of God. As such, it should reflect its creator. A reciprocal relationship attenuates between his psychology and his trinitarian theology. The revelation of the Trinity illumines the nature of the human soul and reflection on the soul illumines the triune nature of God. His psychology is, therefore, essen10Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135 and 144 and Miscellanies, no. 97 (13:264). 11Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:138–39 and Miscellanies, nos. 362 (13:434– 35) and 370 (13:441–42). 12Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 370 (13:442).

140 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM tial for understanding his trinitarian theology. In order to develop the interplay between his psychology and trinitarian theology, we turn to examine, Edwards’ belief 1) that the human being is the image of God and, therefore, stands in an analogical relationship to God; 2) that the human soul, bearing the central characteristics of the triune God, is dispositional in nature; and 3) that the intrinsic unity and distinction of the soul illustrates the triune God. Image and Analogy: The Soul and Its Relation to the Triune God The belief that the human soul is created in the image of God provided a theological and ontological basis for Edwards’ turn to the soul for an understanding of the triune God. The scholastic and Reformed-Puritan traditions bequeathed to Edwards an interpretation of Genesis 1:26–27 on the doctrine of the imago Dei.13 Human beings, according to this interpretation, stand in analogous relationship with divine being and the rational human soul, comprised of understanding and will, images the divine. The location of the analogy or image of God arose from a certain exegesis of Genesis 1:26–27. In the Western tradition, theologians interpreted the creation of Adam in Genesis 1:26–27 as the creation of an individual person. They associated the image of God with the individual human’s soul or mind.14 Edwards’ trinitarian and theological writings clearly reveal that he adopted both assumptions. Indeed, that Edwards could cite Genesis 1:26– 27, in the manner of proof-texting, to support the theory that the image consists in the rational soul and its faculties of understanding and will indicates that this interpretation is part of a widely received tradition.15 Also reflecting the tradition, Edwards asserted the principle of analogy between human and divine being when he wrote, in the introductory section of Discourse on the Trinity, “[t]ho the Divine nature be vastly different from that of 13For

an example of the image of God in medieval scholastic theology, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ (England: Blackfriars, 1964), 1a.93.6 (pp. 65–71). For examples in Edwards’ Reformed theological background, see Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., ed. John T. McNeill and trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library of Christian Classics, 20 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), 1.15.7 (pp. 194–95) and William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. James D. Eusden (Boston: Pilgrim, 1968), 1.8.73 (p. 106). 14E.g., The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, gen. ed. John E. Rotelle, part 1, vol. 5, The Trinity, ed. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City, 1991), 12.6–7 (pp. 325–26) and Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.93.2 (pp. 53 and 55) and 1a.93.6 (pp. 65–71). 15Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:166 and Miscellanies, no. 702 (18:287).

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 141 created spirits, yet our souls are made in the image of God, we have understanding and will, idea and love as God hath, and the difference is only in the perfection of degree and manner.”16 As the analog of the divine nature, the human soul consists of two faculties: the understanding and the will.17 One problem presented by Christian Scripture for the human as the image bearer is humankind’s fall into sin and the phenomenon of original sin. Questions arise such as, what are the effects of the Fall on human nature and is the image of God eradicated or harmed? Aquinas argued that in the state of original sin the human soul bears a likeness to God, but that in the state of grace it is conformed to God and, therefore, achieves a closer likeness to its creator. In the former, the human soul is the image of God according to analogy, and in the latter according to conformation. In the state of original sin, the human soul is analogous or proportional to God because it is a rational nature and has two intellectual operations—e.g., understanding and will. However, in the state of grace, the soul is conformed more closely to God by virtue of knowing and loving God.18 Edwards responded to the dilemma of the affects of sin on the image with the distinction between the natural and spiritual image of God in the human soul. According to the natural image, the human soul possesses the powers of understanding and will. By virtue of understanding and will, the human soul knows and chooses between good and evil. However, aside from grace, the soul can not know and love the excellency of God. Through grace, the soul knows and loves the beauty of the divine excellency and thereby has the spiritual image restored.19 His teaching is not unlike Augustine’s and Aquinas’ notion that the human soul finds its highest image of God when it knows and loves its creator through the aid of grace.20 In order to draw the distinction between the natural and spiritual image, Edwards refers to the distinction between the natural and moral attrib16Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113 and Miscellanies, no. 135 (13:295). Religious Affections, 2:96–99 and 206; Freedom of the Will, 1:133 and 148; Miscellanies, nos. 259 (13:367) and 362 (13:435); Miscellanies, nos. 540 (18:88–89) and 541 (18:89); “The Mind,” 6:386; and “Concerning the End for which God Created the World,” 8:529. 18D. Juvenal Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas’ Teaching, Studies and Texts, 96 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), 135–40. 19Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:166 and Religious Affections, 2:256. 20For Augustine, see The Trinity 14.15 (p. 383) and 14.25 (pp. 390–91) and for Aquinas, see Summa Theologiæ 1a.93.4 (pp. 59 and 61). 17Edwards,

142 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM utes of God. God’s natural attributes consist in knowledge and power and his moral attributes consist in his excellency and holiness.21 In terms of the human soul, the difference between the natural and spiritual image derives from the object of knowledge and will. Edwards’ distinction between the natural and spiritual image dovetails with his theology of common and saving grace. Both refer to the influence of the Holy Spirit on the soul, but only the latter is efficacious for salvation.22 Common grace relates to the natural image; that is, it does not enable the understanding and will to enter into salvific knowledge and love of God. By common grace, the person can discern the existence and moral attributes of God. In saving grace, the Holy Spirit infuses a principle of grace in the soul in order that the soul may transcend self-love and truly love God for God’s own beauty and excellency.23 Edwards calls this true love for God religious affection. Thus, in the power of the natural image, the soul remains powerless to break free from selflove, but with the restoration of the spiritual image by the grace of the Spirit the soul regains the ability to know and love the excellency of God. For Edwards, despite the corruption of human nature by sin, the human being images God in its spiritual nature, which consists of the intellectual operations of understanding and will. Having outlined Edwards’ theology of the image of God, it remains to explore his dispositional theory of the human soul and its operations. Edwards and the Dispositional Soul Although Edwards followed the traditional way of locating the image of God in the spiritual nature of human being and its powers of understanding and will, he also introduced a significant modification to the concept. Two psychological theories competed with each other from the medieval era through the modern period. These are voluntarism and intellectualism. The difference between intellectualism and voluntarism is one of emphasis and priority. Intellectualism assigns the lead role in human activity to the intellectual power or faculty of the soul. The will follows what the understanding judges the good and, therefore, it is called the rational appetite. According to intellectualism, the apex of human salvation is the intellectual visio Dei.24 Intellectualism is associated with Thomas Aquinas and Thomism. Voluntarism identifies the will as the determinative power of the soul’s and 21Edwards,

Religious Affections, 2:256. Treatise on Grace, 21:153–65. 23Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:240. 24Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.82.2 (pp. 221 and 223). 22Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 143 God’s activity. It does not discount the role of the intellect, but maintains that the will remains self-determined and, thus, not determined by the judgment of the understanding. Salvation reaches its culmination when the will has the summum bonum as its object. Voluntarism is associated with Augustine, Duns Scotus, and the Franciscan tradition.25 Edwards’ psychology does not fit neatly into either of these categories. It predominantly reflects a certain form of voluntarism, but also incorporates intellectualism. His intellectualist form of Augustinian voluntarism is more appropriately called a dispositional psychology.

Defining Intellectualism and Voluntarism—Scholastic and Augustinian In analyzing Edwards’ relationship to the seventeenth and early-eighteenth century intellectual context, Norman Fiering follows the division of psychological theories into intellectualism and voluntarism. However, he also subdivides voluntarism into Scholastic and Augustinian forms.26 Fiering defines 25For a survey of intellectualism and voluntarism, see Vernon J. Bourke, Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), 55– 76 and 79–100. For more precise treatments, see Bernardine M. Bonansea, “Duns Scotus’ Voluntarism,” in John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 3 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 83–121; Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Sather Classical Lectures, 48 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 127 and 144; and Robert Prentice, “The Voluntarism of Duns Scotus, As Seen in His Comparison of the Intellect and Will,” Franciscan Studies 28 (1968): 63–103. Although treating Calvin, Richard A. Muller provides a useful summary of scholastic intellectualism and voluntarism in “Fides and Cognitio in Relation to the Problem of Intellect and Will in the Theology of John Calvin,” in Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology, ser. ed. David C. Steinmetz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 159–73. 26Norman S. Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’ Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 262–71. Allen C. Guelzo also adopts this tripartite division of theories of the will and places Edwards within the strand of Augustinian voluntarism (Guelzo, Edwards on the Will: A Century of American Debate [Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1989], 3–6 and 208). Augustinian voluntarism corresponds to Bourke’s chapter on “Heart, Affection, and Will” (Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 129–147). Moreover, Richard B. Steele adopts the categories of intellectualism and voluntarism and places Edwards within the tradition of voluntarism (Steele, “Gracious Affections” and “True Virtue” according to Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley, Pietist and Wesleyan Studies, ed. David Bundy and J. Steven O’Malley, 51 [Metuchen: N.J.: Scarecrow, 1994], 61–

144 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Scholastic voluntarism as the medieval voluntarism associated with Scotus and characterized by the affirmation of the self-determining power of the will.27 Augustinian voluntarism shares commonalities with Scholastic voluntarism but its primary concern is with the determinative nature of the disposition of the soul and not the self-determining nature of the will. Unlike its Scholastic counterpart, Augustinian voluntarism identifies the will as the fundamental orientation of the soul and not as an independent volitional power or faculty of the soul. Augustinian voluntarism takes its inspiration from the Apostle Paul’s soul struggle in Romans 7:14–28—“for what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do.” In the seventeenth century, proponents of Augustinian voluntarism often illustrated the determinative force of the soul’s disposition with reference to the Medean paradox—“I see and approve the better course; I follow the worse.” The answer of Augustinian voluntarism to the problem of the conflicted soul is a fundamental orientation directs the human soul toward God or evil. The will is unfettered from the faculty of the intellect, but determined by the soul’s innate disposition toward sin or its reorientation toward God by the infusion of grace.28 Prior to grace, the disposition of the soul leads the person to choose evil contrary to the counsel of manifest reason. Grace transforms the underlying disposition of the soul, which in turn enables the soul to love and serve God.29 Thus, whereas intellectualism affirms that the will follows the intellectual power of the soul and Scholastic voluntarism emphasizes the self-determining nature of the will, Augustinian 62). Steele presents the voluntarism of Edwards and Wesley as the antithesis of Enlightenment rationalism. However, this portrayal overlooks that libertarian voluntarism was essential for the emphasis on freedom and the dismissal of the doctrine of original sin in the rational religion of the Enlightenment. 27Norman S. Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 114. 28Fiering, Edwards’ Moral Thought, 269. 29Norman S. Fiering, “Will and Intellect in the New England Mind,” William and Mary Quarterly 29 (1972): 526–30. As Fiering notes, the appropriation of Augustine in the seventeenth century was influenced by the thought of the Jansenists. In addition, Mary T. Clark argues that Augustine does not subordinate the intellect to the will and is, therefore, improperly called a voluntarist (Clark, “Was St. Augustine a Voluntarist?” in Studia Patristica, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, vol. 18, part 4 [Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian, 1990], 8–13). Whether or not the theologies referred to as Augustinian voluntarism accurately reflect the theology of Augustine is an interesting question, but not relevant to this project. The important point here is that the theology described as Augustinian voluntarism had many representatives in seventeenth-century Reformed Protestantism.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 145 voluntarism underscores the bent of the soul and its determinative influence on all the faculties of the soul. The fascinating aspect of these two forms of voluntarism is that they involve antithetical theories of free will. The Scholastic view tends toward a libertarian theory of free will and the Augustinian toward a deterministic one. The seventeenth-century psychological theories of intellectualism, Scholastic, and Augustinian voluntarism are important to the study of Edwards because they inform Edwards’ Puritan theological background and the early and mid-eighteenth-century New England debates on the nature of religious revival and free will. The Puritans, while they emphasized that grace renovates the whole person, nevertheless alternately assigned preeminence to the faculty of understanding and will. Representing intellectualism and Edwards’ pastoral mentor in Northampton and maternal grandfather, Solomon Stoddard (1643–1729) stated “the nature of man is such that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.”30 He also argued that spiritual knowledge of the excellency of God is the basis for the saints’ love and service to God.31 On the Augustinian voluntarist side, renowned Puritan theologians William Ames (1576–1633) and Peter van Mastricht (1630–1706) assigned leadership to the will in the direction of the soul in faith and virtue.32 30Solomon Stoddard, “That the Gospel is the Means of Conversion,” in Three Sermons Lately Preached at Boston (Boston: Green for D. Henchman, 1717), 71; also see, A Treatise Concerning Conversion (Boston: J. F. Franklin for D. Henchman, 1719), 35. For an excellent essay on Stoddard’s soteriology, which includes the role of intellect and will, see Thomas A. Schafer, “Solomon Stoddard and the Theology of the Revival,” in A Miscellany of American Christianity: Essays in Honor of H. Shelton Smith, ed. Stuart C. Henry (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), 328–61. Additional Puritan representatives of intellectualism are Thomas Shepard (1605– 1649) and John Flavel (1630–1691): see The Works of Thomas Shepard, 2 vols. (1853; reprint, New York: AMS, 1967): The Parable of the Ten Virgins 1.16.1 (1:230) and The Sound Believer 1.5.4 (2:205) and The Works of John Flavel, vol. 3 A Treatise of the Soul of Man (1820; reprint, Banner of Truth Trust, 1968), 1.4 (p. 502). 31Stoddard, “That the Gospel is the Means of Conversion,” 71–72 and A Treatise Concerning Conversion, 33–35. 32Ames, The Marrow of Theology 1.3.1–5 (pp. 80–81), 1.3.18–22 (pp. 82–83), 1.29.10–11 (p. 169), and 2.2.7–8 (pp. 224–25). John Eusden, editor and translator of the English language edition of The Marrow of Theology, locates Ames within the voluntarist tradition of Anselm, St. Francis, and Henry of Ghent (Eusden, “Introduction,” in The Marrow of Theology, 49, footnote 103) and Keith L. Sprunger and F. Ernest Stoeffler identify Ames with voluntarism (Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William Ames: Dutch Backgrounds of English and American Puritanism [Chicago: University

146 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Intellectualism and Scholastic and Augustinian voluntarism continued as dominant psychological theories in Edwards’ time. In the debates on the nature of revival, Charles Chauncy (1705–1787) continued the intellectualist tradition and Edwards embodied Augustinian voluntarism.33 On the nature of free will, Edwards’ Arminian opponents carry on Scholastic voluntarism by accentuating the self-determining power of the will. The revolution of these debates around conflicting psychological theories of action leads some scholars to say that the real difference in the debates on the nature of revival was one of psychology and not theology.34 However, the psychologies assume a theology that makes the psychology palatable to the respecof Illinois Press, 1972], 146 and Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Pietism, Studies in the History of Religions [Supplement to NVMEN], 9 [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965], 139 and 141). On a contrary note, Perry Miller first argues that Ames stamped New England Theology with strong intellectualism, but then softens this claim by admitting that Ames allowed the will independence from the intellect. Miller’s equivocal analysis of Ames is part of his discussion of the tension that intellectualism created within Puritan theology. Miller maintains that intellectualism was a twofold problem for the Puritans. First, if the will invariably follows the understanding, then the subject of grace is the understanding, which in turn implies that regeneration may consist only in religious education. This stands in contrast to the transformational theory of grace, which in turn rests on the doctrine of original sin, taught by the Puritans. Second, since the will always follows the dictate of the understanding, intellectualism is a form of moral determinism that unhinges moral responsibility (Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century [1939; 2d reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963], 248–49). At one point, Ames does speak in terms of intellectualism when he writes, “things exist first in themselves and then come into the senses of men and finally to the understanding, where they can form an idea to direct subsequent operation” (The Marrow of Theology 1.7.15 [p. 95]). However, overall Ames gives precedence to the will and, therefore, is appropriately labeled a voluntarist. For Peter van Mastricht, see A Treatise on Regeneration, extracted from Theologia theoretico-practica (New Haven: Thomas and Samuel Green, 1770), 25– 27 and 37–38. Edwards owned a copy of the 1699 edition of the Theologia theoreticopractica (Edwards, Miscellanies, 13:319, footnote 2). Indeed, at one point, Edwards calls him “the great Mastricht” (Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:337). Sargent Bush, Jr., places Thomas Hooker (1586–1647) within the tradition of Augustinian voluntarism (The Writings of Thomas Hooker: Spiritual Adventure in Two Worlds [Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1980], 223–25). 33Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard, 138–44. 34Alan Heimert and Perry Miller, eds., The Great Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and Its Consequences, The American Heritage Series, ed. Leonard W. Levy and Alfred Young (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), xxxix. Fiering follows the judgment of Heimert, see Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard, 144.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 147 tive parties. For instance, Edwards adopts a form of Augustinian voluntarism because of his theological commitment to a Calvinist doctrine of divine sovereignty, original sin, and grace. He did not adopt a particular form of voluntarism and then seek out a compatible theological system. Moreover, he did not reject strict intellectualism and Scholastic voluntarism because they conflicted with his psychological notion, but rather because they conflicted with his Reformed-Puritan theology.35

Edwards and Intellectualism The important issue is whether Edwards fits within the intellectualist tradition or Augustinian voluntarism. Scholastic voluntarism is not considered a tradition with which to associate Edwards given his virulent polemics against the Arminian notion of the self-determining power of the will and his commitment to a Calvinist notion of divine determinism. Recent Edwards scholars, such as Norman Fiering and Allen C. Guelzo, locate Edwards within the tradition of Augustinian voluntarism.36 Guelzo’s text focuses on the influence of Edwards’ treatise Freedom of the Will in the later35For Edwards’ doctrine of original sin, see Edwards, Original Sin, 3:380–88. For his transformational doctrine of grace, see The Works of President Edwards, vol. 8, Concerning Efficacious Grace (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 403 and 427–28; Original Sin, 3:361–71; Religious Affections, 2:114, 203, and 340–41; and Treatise on Grace, 21: 154–55, 176, and 192. 36Fiering, Edwards’ Moral Thought, 289 and Guelzo, Edwards on the Will, 21, 208, and 213. I highlight Fiering and Guelzo because they represent two different methods of studying Edwards’ thought. Fiering’s is a detailed examination of Edwards based on his earlier study of moral and intellectual movements at seventeenthcentury Harvard University in particular and New England in general—e.g., Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard. Guelzo’s is a broader treatment of Edwards that looks to the subsequent appropriation of Edwards in the New England religious traditions. Additional scholars identifying Edwards with the voluntarist tradition include Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (1948; reprint, Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian, 1965), 184 and 252–56 and Schafer, “Solomon Stoddard and the Theology of the Revival,” 348. In contrast, James Carse and William J. Wainwright emphasize Edwards’ intellectualism (Carse, Jonathan Edwards and the Visibility of God [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967], 57–63 and Wainwright, Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. William P. Alston [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995], 25–26). Also, Williston Walker seems to give precedence to the intellectual capacity of the soul (Walker, Ten New England Leaders, Religion in America, ed. Edwin S. Gaustad [1901; reprint, New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969], 253).

148 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Fiering interprets Edwards’ moral and psychological theory in terms of its historical sources. Fiering correctly locates Edwards within the tradition of Augustinian voluntarism.37 However, Fiering’s rejection of intellectualist elements within Edwards’ psychology is unwarranted.38 He seems to assume a dialectic opposition between the intellect and the will to the extent that Augustinian voluntarism cannot include intellectualist aspects. Although Fiering’s interpretation of Edwards in terms of the dialectic of the rational and volitional or affective aspects of the soul has precedence in Edwards’ scholarship, this dialectic is foreign to Edwards’ thought.39 Dialectical interpretations of Edwards’ psychology overlook the fact that although Edwards’ psychology reflects Augustinian voluntarism, it incorporates within it the intellectualist theory of the relationship between the understanding and the will. His intellectualism derives from his belief that the human is the image of God. Edwards’ theology informs his anthropology. Edwards conceived of God’s activities of creation and sustaining creation in terms of intellectualism. He believed that the entities that comprise the universe ultimately exist as ideas in God’s mind. Substance he argues is the “infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable idea in God’s mind, together with his stable will that the same shall gradually be communicated to us.”40 In another place in “The Mind,” he declares, “corporeal things 37Fiering,

Edwards’ Moral Thought, 261–71. Fiering, Edwards’ Moral Thought, 299. 39Ola E. Winslow also used the dialectic of intellect and affections to interpret Edwards’ religious teaching. She attests that Edwards’ emphasis on heart religion, the emotions, and affections was a reaction to the rationalism of the deists (Winslow, Jonathan Edwards, 1703–1758: A Biography [New York: Macmillan, 1940], 232– 33). More recently, John E. Smith portrays Edwards as part of the larger movement of “heart religion” and Pietism that reacted against the austere rational confessionalism of Protestant Scholasticism (Smith, “Testing the Spirits: Jonathan Edwards and the Religious Affections,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 37 [1981–1982]: 30). While interpreting eighteenth-century North American religious movements in terms of the polarities of evangelical piety and enlightened religion, Sydney E. Ahlstrom notes that Edwards represents a solitary effort to “transcend that dichotomy” (Ahlstrom, ed., Theology in America: The Major Protestant Voices from Puritanism to Neo-Orthodoxy, The American Heritage Series [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967], 33–41). Schultz also argues that Edwards successfully bridged the polarities of intellect and feeling that characterized eighteenth-century religion (Schultz, “The Religious Psychology of Jonathan Edwards and the Hassidic Masters of Habad,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 10 [1973]:716–17). 40Edwards, “The Mind,” no. 13 (6:344). 38E.g.,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 149 exist no otherwise than mentally.”41 Although this may sound similar to Berkeley’s esse est percipi, Edwards is not denying the existence of the material world.42 Rather, he believes that all created entities exist first because they are ideas in the divine mind and second because the divine will actuates their existence in time and space.43 In a note in “The Mind” titled “existence,” Edwards argues that resistance is the basic quality of material entities. Resistance, which gives an entity its identity, is the product of the direct operation of God’s power. Furthermore, the exertion of God’s power is according to divine idea. Resistance then is the “mode of an idea,” or the particular exertion of God’s power to form an entity—i.e., resistance—is by virtue of an idea that informs the particular operation of the divine power. Edwards concludes that the “world is therefore an ideal one.”44 The key is that the exertion of God’s power to instantiate a material entity is according to the divine idea, which is the product of the divine understanding. The idealistic nature of the created universe assumes an intellectualist view of God’s ad extra operation. In discussing God’s disposition to communicate divine goodness ad extra, Edwards notes that the exercise of God’s inclination or will to communicate goodness in creation presupposes the intellectual apprehension of the object by the divine understanding.45 God knows each particular entity that will exist in the temporal-spatial world and then God acts to instantiate that entity’s existence in time and space according to the “train” of ideas in the divine mind. The divine will is directed by virtue of the divine knowledge, which, like human knowledge, is according to ideas. Thus, Edwards conceives God’s ad extra activity in terms of intellectualism. Edwards’ portrayal of the moral nature of God in terms of the understanding and will also sheds light on the relationship between the understanding and the will in the human soul. Furthermore, and essential to the issue of whether Edwards understood the relationship between the understanding and the will according to intellectualism, he portrays God’s moral nature in terms of intellectualism. Divine moral agency consists of understanding and will. The first quality is the understanding by which God per41Edwards, “The Mind,” no. 10 (6:341–42), and also see, nos. 27 (6:350–51), 40 (6:356), 51 (6:368–69), and “Of Being,” 6:204–6. 42George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Jonathan Dancy, Oxford Philosophical Texts, ser. ed. John Cottingham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1.3 (pp. 103–4). 43Edwards, “Of Atoms,” 6:215. 44Edwards, “The Mind,” no. 27 (6:350–51). 45Edwards, “End of Creation,” 8:434.

150 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ceives the difference between good and evil and discerns moral value. The second quality is the will or capacity of choice and the power to act according to the choice of the will. While the function of the understanding to perceive and discern is not strictly limited to reasoning—although God’s perception and discernment is superlatively rational, it is certainly the intellectual power of the divine being and for that reason distinguished from the will. Edwards portrays the divine understanding as adjudicating between good and evil and guiding the divine will as to its choice of the good.46 Edwards believed that the human soul bears the moral image of God precisely because it possesses the moral capacities of understanding and will. Edwards assumes that the faculties of the understanding and will in the human soul, as the image of God, operate in the same relationship as they do in God. The distinction between the relationship of the understanding and will that constitutes moral agency and the particular expression of that moral agency toward an object is important to recognize. In terms of the relationship, the understanding guides the will by presenting it with an object for its operation. In terms of expression, Edwards differentiated between the spiritual and the natural image of God. The difference between the spiritual and the natural image lies not in the functional relationship between the understanding and will, but in the type of objects that the understanding apprehends as good and presents to the will as the object of choice.47 The understanding guides the will in the spiritual as well as the natural image. However, only in the spiritual image is the understanding able to apprehend the beauty of the divine excellency and present it as the object of the will’s operation. His belief that the understanding guides the will is properly identified as a form of intellectualism. Edwards transposed the intellectualist view of God to the human as the image of God. The result is an intellectualist understanding of the relationship between the understanding and the will in the human soul. According to Edwards, the understanding is a comprehensive term that denotes the power of the soul to apprehend and perceive objects. Fiering emphatically rejects the classification of Edwards as an intellectualist because Edwards argued that strictly speaking reason does not determine the will.48 However, Edwards did not limit the faculty of understanding to the power of reasoning. The understanding encompasses the entire power of the soul for the apprehension and perception of objects. In the sermon, “A Divine 46Edwards,

Freedom of the Will, 1:166. Freedom of the Will, 1:166 and Religious Affections, 2:256. 48Fiering, Edwards’ Moral Thought, 289. 47Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 151 and Supernatural Light,” Edwards notes that the power of ratiocination or “inferring by arguments” is only one aspect of the faculty of mental perception.49 The understanding includes the notion of reason, but it is not limited to reason. The crucial point for Edwards’ intellectualism is not whether the will always follows the dictate of reason, but whether the will follows the object apprehended as the good by the intellectual operation of the soul. Edwards’ central theological treatises—Freedom of the Will and Religious Affections—provide evidence of his intellectualist view of the understanding. In Freedom of the Will, his intellectualism is clear when he argues that the will always follows the object that appears most agreeable to the perception of the mind.50 Edwards clarified that “the acts of the will are none of them contingent in such a sense as to be without all necessity . . . because every act of the will is some way connected with the understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is.”51 This phrase highlights the causal connection between the understanding and the will. The greatest apparent good is the motive of the will. For Edwards, the relationship between the motive and the act of the will is causal. The motive is the cause of the movement of the will and the act of the will is the effect of the motive.52 The motive is the cause of the act of the will because it is the term or goal of the will. The seat of the motive is the understanding and, therefore, exists in the mind in the form of an idea. A motive is an idea because the mind apprehends and beholds objects in the form of ideas.53 The motive is not necessarily reasonable, but it is that object determined to be the greatest apparent good at the time of choice and action.54 For instance, Edwards uses the example of an alcoholic who chooses to drink. At the time, the choice to drink appears as the greatest apparent good to the person. But of course, this choice is unreasonable for it is detrimental to the health of the person.55 Nevertheless, the choice to drink is first conceived as an idea and as the object of choice in the understanding. The understanding, therefore, is the power of the soul that apprehends or perceives objects and determines the object that is the greatest apparent good that in turn informs the operation of the will. 49Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” 17:422. Edwards also makes this point in Freedom of the Will, 1:148. 50Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:144 and 217. 51Ibid., 1:217. 52Ibid., 1:225. 53Ibid., 1:142; “The Mind,” no. 60 (6:375); and Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257). 54Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:142. 55Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:143–44.

152 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The mental apprehension of the good or the motive of the will in the form of idea underlines Edwards’ intellectualism. Edwards taught that the determination of the good is in the form of an idea.56 The provenance of ideas is the understanding.57 The understanding apprehends or perceives objects in the form of ideas.58 Whether the understanding is conceived broadly as the faculty of apprehension or narrowly as the faculty of reason, the mode of its apprehension is by idea. Since the understanding apprehends by virtue of mental idea, it is proper to label it the intellectual power of the soul. Additionally, the function of the understanding is to determine the good.59 Since the object of the will is the good, the will follows the judgment of the understanding.60 Therefore, Edwards is an intellectualist because the understanding plays the lead and determining role in its relationship with the will. Edwards did not uncouple the will from the intellect; the will follows the judgment of the intellect. In Religious Affections, Edwards’ intellectualism appears when he states, in regard to the spiritual sense, that “this sort of understanding or knowledge is that knowledge of divine things from whence all truly gracious affections do proceed.”61 The key for intellectualism is that the affections proceed, or as he says later arise from spiritual knowledge. Thus, the expression of religious affection or the operation of the will that is of religious value is the product of the spiritual excellency apprehended by the understanding.62 He is an intellectualist because he links the consent of the will to the idea of the good apprehended by the understanding. The will always acts according to that idea of the good in the understanding. Edwards’ theological and anthropological intellectualism are the backdrop for his account of the doctrine of the Trinity. He used an intellectualist psychological model to describe the processions of the divine persons. The divine persons correspond to the human mind, understanding, and will.63 In the order of origin, Edwards begins with the Father, or as he refers to the Father, God absolutely considered.64 The Father, by an eternal act of 56Edwards,

“The Mind,” no. 67 (6:384). Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113. 58Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:258). 59Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:197, 199–200, and 217. 60Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 212 (13:342–43) and “The Mind,” no. 60 (6:375–76). 61Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:275. 62Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:275. For an additional interpretation of this passage along intellectualist lines, see Wainwright, Reason and the Heart, 25–26. 63Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:138. 64Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131. 57Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 153 self-reflection begets the Son. The Son proceeds as the perfect idea of the divine essence and subsists as the second person of the Trinity. This means that the Son is the product of the divine understanding. The Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the Father for the Son and the reciprocal love of the Son for the Father.65 Love is the superlative expression of the will. The Holy Spirit, as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, proceeds as the act of God’s will. This implies intellectualism for two reasons. First, the movement of the intellect precedes, in the order of nature, the expression of the will. Second, the object or term of the divine will is the product of the divine understanding—the idea of the divine essence. The divine will exerts itself toward the object subsisting by the act of the divine understanding. The precedence given to the procession by intellect to that of the procession by will in Edwards’ trinitarian theology suggests an intellectualist psychology.66

Edwards’ Dispositional Psychology (or, Intellectualist Augustinian Voluntarism) Edwards’ dispositional psychology is a synthesis of intellectualism and Augustinian voluntarism. As previously noted, Fiering correctly identifies Edwards with Augustinian voluntarism, but he assumes that Augustinian voluntarism necessarily excludes an intellectualist theory of the relationship between the understanding and the will. However, Augustinian voluntarism is not primarily concerned with maintaining the indeterminacy of the will relative to the understanding, but affirming the disposition of the soul governs the orientation and operation of both the understanding and will. Augustinian voluntarism is voluntarist in that the will does not always follow the dictate of reason. But, as Edwards notes, the faculty of the understanding refers to the comprehensive ability of the soul to perceive objects and not simply to reason.67 A person may choose a course of action that is contrary to the counsel of reason, but nonetheless perceived as the good by the power of the soul denominated the understanding. In this sense, while the act may not be rational, it seems reasonable and makes sense to the person. Moreover, because the object of the will is determined by the understanding’s apprehension of and judgment of the good, Edwards’ theory is a form of intellectualism.68 Although most Augustinian voluntarists may have 65Ibid.,

21:121 and 131. 21:114–15 and 142 and Miscellanies, nos. 94 (13:261) and 96 (13:263–64). 67Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:148. 68Edwards, “The Mind,” no. 60 (6:375–76) and Miscellanies, no. 212 (13:342–43). 66Ibid.,

154 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM taught that the understanding does not determine the will, the indeterminacy of the will relative to the understanding is not essential to Augustinian voluntarism. Indeed, Edwards’ synthesis of intellectualism and Augustinian voluntarism is a case in point.69 Although Edwards conceived the relationship between the understanding and the will in intellectualist terms, he is fundamentally an Augustinian voluntarist because the underlying disposition or inclination of the soul determines the perception of the understanding.70 Edwards’ teaching 69Puritan

theologian, Samuel Willard, is an antecedent example of the blend of Augustinian voluntarism with intellectualism (Samuel Willard, A Compleat Body of Divinity, Series in American Studies [1726; reprint, with an introduction by Edward M. Griffin, New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1969], 124). Willard was a dominant figure in New England from the late-seventeenth century through the earlyeighteenth century. Willard’s service as president of Harvard College and the fact that his A Compleat Body of Divinity was the first significant folio-size text and systematic theology published in New England testifies to his prominent stature within New England Puritanism. For more information on Willard, see Ernest B. Lowrie, The Shape of the Puritan Mind: The Thought of Samuel Willard (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 70Edwards, “The Mind,” nos. 60 (6:376) and no. 21b (6:348). The notion of disposition is central to Edwards’ theology. In a discussion on the original righteousness of Adam, Edwards maintains that Adam required a righteous disposition of soul in order to act righteously. For, without the righteous disposition, then no righteous acts are possible (Edwards, Original Sin, 3:230–31). Edwards’ granting of precedence to the disposition in relation to act is also applied to the relationship between regeneration and faith. For Edwards, the righteous disposition of the soul is prior to and more important than the explicit act of faith (Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 27b [13:213–14] and no. 77 [13:244–45]). Based on Edwards’ identification of conversion with the transformed disposition, Gerald R. McDermott argues that this implicitly opens the door to soteriological inclusivism and favorably compares to Karl Rahner’s theory of “anonymous Christians.” Moreover, he notes that Edwards’ dispositional soteriology has greater affinity with Catholic soteriology than the classical Reformation soteriology (McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods: Christian Theology, Enlightenment Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths [New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], 132–39 and “The Possibility of Reconciliation: Jonathan Edwards and the Salvation of Non-Christians,” in Edwards in Our Time: Jonathan Edwards and the Shaping of American Religion, ed. Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C. Guelzo [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999], 173–202). For a full treatment that argues for compatibility between Edwards’ and Catholic soteriology, see Anri Morimoto, Jonathan Edwards and the Catholic Vision of Salvation (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Morimoto also proposes that Edwards’ dispositional soteriology opens the door to soteriological inclusivism (“Salvation as

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 155 that the operation of the powers of the soul flows from the disposition of the soul reflects his continuity with the Puritan assumption that in the Christian life being takes precedence to act.71 The power of the disposition to determine the apprehension of the understanding and the desire of the will is evident in Edwards’ distinction between the unconverted and converted soul. In an unconverted soul, the understanding cannot attain to an adequate apprehension of the divine excellency and, thus, cannot love the beauty of the divine being. As a result, since the understanding cannot present the true good as the object of the will, the will is necessarily directed to lesser goods and does not attain to the love of God. The inability of the understanding to apprehend and the will to desire the beauty of the divine excellency arises from the incurvature of the soul’s disposition to itself. Grace transforms the disposition of the soul and enables the understanding to apprehend the true good and present it to the will as the object of its desire. The will in turn loves God. In Miscellany 123, Edwards illustrates the power of the disposition to inform the operation of the understanding.72 He is particularly concerned to show that the dispositional change makes spiritual knowledge possible. It enables the soul to apprehend the idea of God’s excellency and holiness in a new way. Edwards remarks “we cannot have the idea without the adapted disposition of the mind, and the more suitable the disposition the more clear and intense the idea.”73 While Edwards does not mention the term understanding, it is the operation of the soul that he has in mind because the product of the operation of the understanding is an idea(s). Consequently, the dispositional transformation in grace empowers the faculty of the understanding for a new form of apprehension and the will for a new quality of delight. The intrinsic relationship between the disposition of the soul and the operation of its powers of apprehension and will underscores Edwards’ indebtedness to Augustinian voluntarism. However, it is an Augustinian voluntarism that incorporates an intellectualist theory of the relationship between the understanding and the will.

Fulfillment of Being: The Soteriology of Jonathan Edwards and Its Implications for Christian Mission,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin n.s., 20 [1999]: 13–23). 71John von Rohr, The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion, ed. Charley Hardwick and James O. Duke, 45 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 87–89. 72Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 123 (13:286–87). 73Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 123 (13:287).

156 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Unity and Distinction in the Soul and Its Operations Scholarly interpretation on the relationship between the understanding and will in Edwards’ thought divides into two categories. Some hold that, particularly in the sense of the heart and spiritual understanding, the understanding and will are undifferentiated.74 Others maintain that these two faculties, although operating in harmony, nonetheless remain distinct in operation.75 The difference then is on the one hand a monistic theory of the operation of the soul, and on the other a binary operation of the soul. However, previous scholarship has not referenced his trinitarian theology in the discussions on whether the understanding and will are distinct operations of the soul or merged into a single operation.76 Yet, Edwards’ trinitarian theology, in which he applied his psychology, clarifies that the understanding and the will always operate in concert, but nevertheless they also operate in distinction. These two psychological principles are critically important for his trinitarian theology because the distinct operation of the understanding and will is the foundation for his description of the Son and the Holy Spirit as distinct subsistences of the divine 74E.g., Conrad Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal (1966; reprint, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), 13–24; James Hoopes, “Jonathan Edwards’ Religious Psychology,” The Journal of American History 69 (1983): 857; Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 182–83 and 252–56; Ramsey, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Freedom of the Will, 1:49–50 and 57; Schultz, “The Religious Psychology of Jonathan Edwards,” 717–18; and Stephen R. Yarbrough and John C. Adams, Delightful Conviction: Jonathan Edwards and the Rhetoric of Conversion, Great American Orators, 20 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993), 11–13. 75E.g., James Carse, Jonathan Edwards and the Visibility of God, 63; Terrence Erdt, Jonathan Edwards: Art and the Sense of the Heart (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 30–31; Guelzo, Edwards on the Will, 34; Bruce Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 29–33; Herbert W. Richardson, “The Glory of God in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in the Doctrine of the Trinity,” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1962), 238–40 (note that Richardson advances a trichotomous interpretation of Edwards’ psychology—understanding, will, and feelings/affections); John E. Smith, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Religious Affections, 2:12–13; and Harvey G. Townsend, “The Will and the Understanding in the Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards,” Church History 16 (1947): 210–20. 76James Carse refers to Edwards’ formulation of the Trinity to illustrate his thesis that the judgment of the understanding determines the will (Carse, Jonathan Edwards and the Visibility of God, 52–64 and 85–88). However, he does not apply Edwards’ trinitarian formula to the issue of the distinct operations between the faculties of understanding and will and their relation to the soul.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 157 nature. The following discussion examines the three essential elements of Edwards’ psychology that relate to his trinitarian theology. These are 1) the simple nature of the soul or the ontological unity of the faculties of the soul with the soul itself; 2) the functional unity between the operation of the understanding and will; and 3) the operative distinction between the understanding and the will.77

The Ontological Unity of the Soul For Edwards, the soul is a simple entity with two powers of operation— intellection and volition. Edward called these capacities for intellection and volition respectively the understanding and will. His interpretation of the faculties of understanding and will as powers of the soul suggests their ontological unity with the soul. Edwards contrasted his theory of the faculties as powers of the soul with faculty psychology. He understood faculty psychology to teach that the faculties are independent sub-agents within the soul.78 Perry Miller and Paul Ramsey interpret Edwards’ rejection of faculty psychology and adoption of a unified theory of the soul and its powers as derivative from Locke.79 They are correct that Edwards likely accessed his theory that the faculties are powers of the soul through Locke, but the the77Note that Edwards’ psychology is a metaphysical psychology because the mind and its relative operations are identical with the spiritual soul. In his time, Edwards was doing nothing unusual by identifying the intellectual and volitional powers with the spiritual soul, but his psychological theory must not be confused with modern materialist theories of the soul. Wolfhart Pannenberg notes that modern corporeal notions of the uniqueness of human nature have eclipsed the pre-modern Christian theory of the spiritual soul (Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985], 27–28). 78Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:163. For background on faculty psychology, see William T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 94–97 and J. Rodney Fulcher, “Puritans and the Passions: The Faculty Psychology in American Puritanism,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 9 (1973): 123–39. 79Also, Ramsey argues that Edwards moved beyond Locke by rejecting any differentiation between the understanding and the will (Paul Ramsey, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Freedom of the Will, 1:48–50; also, see Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 181–83). For Locke’s censure of faculty psychology and commendation of faculties as powers of the soul for certain activities, see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (New York: Clarendon, 1979), 2.21.5–23 (pp. 236–46) and Nicholas Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125–28.

158 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ory is not peculiar to Locke.80 The view that the faculties are powers of the soul was common among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers.81 Furthermore, Norman Fiering notes that the practice of characterizing preLockean psychology as faculty psychology is misleading because Locke’s criticism of the hypostatization of the faculties, upon which the characterization depends, was directed more to a caricature and extreme versions of late-Scholastic psychological theory than to widely held opinions. As Fiering argues, the unitive nature of the soul and the concomitant belief that the understanding and will are notional acts of the soul was present in Scholastic theology and seventeenth-century New England.82 Nevertheless, Edwards, like Locke, contrasted his view of the understanding and will as powers with the view of them as faculties, but he continued to call the understanding and the will faculties for want of a better term. For Edwards, the faculties of understanding and will refer to the ability or power of the soul to know and choose.83 The import of Edwards’ identification of the understanding and will as powers of the soul lies in the distinction between the faculties as faculties per se and faculties as powers. The distinction between interpreting the understanding and will as faculties or powers is that faculties imply that the understanding and will possess independent agency and action. Powers refer to the ability of the soul to think and will; thus, powers indicate the capacity of the soul to act in certain

80For instance, Edwards states his agreement with Locke on the issue that the faculties are powers of the soul and not separate and disparate sub-agents of the soul (Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:163–64). 81For Locke’s early-Enlightenment counterparts that also taught a unitive theory of the soul and its faculties, see Berkeley, Principles 1.27 (p. 112); René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1.32 (1:204) and Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, med. 6 (2:59); and Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1980), 1.1.1–2 (pp. 1–6). 82Norman S. Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard, 106–9 and Edwards’ Moral Thought, 263–64. For examples in Edwards’ scholarship of characterizing the psychological theories of the early-Enlightenment in terms of the dialectic of scholastic faculty psychology and holistic psychology, see Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 167; Richard A. Hutch, “Jonathan Edwards’ Analysis of Religious Experience,” Journal of Psychology and Theology 6 (1978): 125; and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 181–82. 83Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:137–38 and 175.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 159 ways.84 For instance, in Freedom of the Will, Edwards criticized the Arminian notion of the self-determining power of the will because he thought it implied that the will exists as a power distinct from the agent. Edwards used the moniker Arminian to refer to anyone who rejected divine determinism. As an eighteenth-century polemical term, it has little to do with the theology of Jacob Arminius. In fact, the defining characteristic of Edwards’ Arminians was libertarian voluntarism that understood the will as a faculty separate and free from the intellect, whereas Arminius followed thomisticintellectualism that taught that the will follows the judgment of the intellect.85 In contrast to his libertarian voluntarist counterparts, Edwards attributed actions to agents and not to the powers, such as the will, of agents. In other words, powers—i.e., the understanding and the will—do not act, but agents act by those powers.86 So we do not say that the understanding knows and the will chooses, but that persons know and choose because they possess the powers for acts of knowing and willing. Edwards’ theory that the understanding and the will denote powers of the soul and not discrete faculties dovetailed with his commitment to Calvinist determinism. The unitive nature of the understanding and will as relative powers of the soul and not discrete and separate faculties emerges in his polemic against the Arminian tendency to adopt faculty psychology in order to retain the liberty of the will. The libertarian voluntarism advocated by Edwards’ Arminian opponents presupposed the ontological distinction 84Edwards,

Freedom of the Will, 1:163. the voluntarism of Edwards’ Arminian opponents, see Guelzo, Edwards on the Will, 39–40 and 71–72 and for Arminius’s intellectualism, see Richard A. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 77– 79 and The Works of Arminius: The London Edition, 3 vols., trans. James Nichols and William Nichols (vol. 1 1825, vol. 2 1828, vol. 3 1875; reprint with an intro. by Carl Bangs, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 1:362–63 and 2:189–93. Also, Gerald J. Goodwin argues that the presence and dissemination of Arminianism in New England in the early-eighteenth century is more historical fiction than fact. He maintains that Arminianism was not widespread because the few “heresy” trials dealing with clergy leaning toward Arminianism ended with their ouster and sermons and publications of the period reflect deterministic Calvinism (Goodwin, “The Myth of ‘Arminianism-Calvinism’ in Eighteenth-Century New England,” The New England Quarterly 41 [1968]: 213–37). Goodwin’s thesis controverts Perry Miller’s influential interpretation that early-eighteenth-century New England Puritan theology assimilated to Arminianism through the emphasis placed on human will and reason in covenant theology (Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 108–14 and 252–53). 86Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:163 and 171–72. 85For

160 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM between the intellect and the will. Allen Guelzo remarks that Edwards’ Arminian polemical opponents—e.g., Thomas Chubb and Isaac Watts— accepted compartmental or faculty theories of the soul for the purpose of retaining the inviolable nature of the will.87 The Arminian separation of the understanding and will safeguarded the indeterminate nature of the will. Edwards, on the contrary, desired to underline the determinate nature of the will relative to the understanding. As a consequence, he adopted a theory of the soul that maintains the ontological and relational inseparability of the understanding and the will. The inseparable nature of the soul and its powers means that the will cannot act in independence from the understanding.88 Edwards’ commitment to the determination of the will by the understanding rests on his root conviction that determinism is essential to theism. Edwards believed that determinism and theism—i.e., Calvinism— are intrinsically related because without the former one cannot reason to God from the creation nor is the existence of God necessary for the created universe. To posit an effect without a cause is to make God unnecessary.89 For Edwards, to uncouple the will from the understanding contradicts the cause-effect nature of reality.90

The Functional Unity and Operative Distinction of the Understanding and the Will Although Edwards maintains the ontological unity of the soul, he also assumes operative distinction between the faculties of the understanding and will. As noted, the faculties are not separate parts of the soul, but rather, they are the powers of the soul for knowing and willing. In light of the simplicity of the soul, an important question is: are the operations of the understanding and will really distinct? Paul Ramsey, voicing a common opinion among Edwards’ scholars, suggests that Edwards went beyond Locke’s unitive theory of mind and rejected any differentiation between the understanding and will because the understanding and will are never opposed.91 However, to conclude the non-differentiation of the understanding and the will on the basis of their non-opposition is an unnecessary conclusion. For 87Guelzo,

Edwards on the Will, 56–60 and 64–71. Freedom of the Will, 1:141–48. 89Ibid., 1:181–83. 90Ibid., 1:185 and 186–89. 91Ramsey, “Editor’s Introduction,” 1:49–50 and 57. For additional Edwards scholars who stress the indistinctiveness of the understanding and will, see Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 13–24 and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 182–83 and 252–56. 88Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 161 Edwards the understanding and will are never opposed as to their relative objects of operation, but nevertheless they are distinct operations of the soul. Edwards’ teaching on the relationship between the understanding and the will infers on the one hand functional unity, and, on the other hand, operative distinction. Functional unity means that the understanding and will operate in concert. They operate in concert because the will follows, or is as the greatest apparent good apprehended by the understanding.92 The soul never chooses otherwise than the greatest good determined by the understanding. The understanding and will, therefore, have the same term of operation. Edwards’ commitment to the proposition that determinism is necessary for intelligibility and rationality is the ultimate ground of the functional unity of the understanding and will.93 Operative distinction denotes that while the understanding and will operate in concert they operate distinctly. In other words, the operations of the understanding and will are not identical. In scholastic terms, the understanding and will are notional or characteristic acts of the simple soul. A notional act is an immanent act of a spiritual substance that allows for distinction of act without introducing composition to the substance. Aquinas applied the theory of notional acts to explain the diversity of divine persons according to processions from origins without violating the doctrine of simplicity.94 My use of notional to indicate the immanent and distinct acts of the soul does not correspond to Edwards’ contrast of “mere notional understanding”—i.e., speculative knowledge—and the “sense of the heart,” but to the scholastic denotation of the term. Although Edwards does not employ the technical term, the concept of notional act helps to highlight his teaching that while the understanding and will operate in concert, they nonetheless operate in distinction.95 Furthermore, though these concepts appear at first glance contradictory, they are not so.

92Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:142–44 and “The Mind,” nos. 21b (6:348) and 60 (6:376). 93Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:217 and 225. 94Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.32.1–2 (pp. 101–21) and 1a.41.1–1–6 (pp. 159– 83). Also, for a succinct presentation of Aquinas’ use of notional acts in his trinitarian theology, see David Coffey, Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit, Faith and Culture, ed. Neil Brown, 2 (Manly, N.S.W., Australia: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1979), 16–19. 95Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:272–73 and “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” 17:413–14.

162 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM To illustrate the usefulness of the distinction between functional unity and operative distinction, the analysis of a case study, in which Edwards appears to conflate the understanding and will, is appropriate. In Religious Affections, Edwards comments that there is not “a clear distinction made between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately, in this matter.”96 The context of this passage is Edwards’ definition of the sense of the heart and the spiritual understanding. In the quotation, the phrases “as acting distinctly” and “in this matter” are critical for interpreting Edwards’ statement that appears to flatten the distinction between the faculties of understanding and will. First, the phrase “as acting distinctly” refers to Edwards’ general theory of the relationship between the operations of the understanding and the will. The will follows what the understanding determines as the greatest good.97 Or, in other words, the mind does not determine one object as the good and then the will choose another object. So then, in operation, the will does not operate diversely from the judgment of the understanding, on the contrary, the understanding and will operate in concert. Thus, in the context of the passage in question, when Edwards states that the understanding and will do not act distinctly he underscores that faith and spiritual understanding involve the concerted activity of the understanding and will toward the same object; namely the apprehension of and delight in the divine excel-

96Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:272. For scholars who cite this passage to support the non-distinction between the understanding and the will, see Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 21; Hoopes, “Edwards’s Religious Psychology,” 860; and Anri Morimoto, Jonathan Edwards and the Catholic Vision of Salvation, 14, note 6. Edwards’ notion of the end of creation evinces an additional example of his distinction between the understanding and the will. He consistently portrays the end of creation as the communication of the glory of God to the human understanding and will. God’s glory consists in the ad intra procession of the divine understanding in the person of the Son of God and the procession of the divine will in the person of the Holy Spirit. By the ad extra communication of glory, the saints know and love God. By communicating his glory to the human understanding and the will, God enables the whole soul to participate in the glory of God—i.e., by knowing and loving God. Edwards maintained this position from early to late in life (Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 448 [13:495–96] and “End of Creation,” 8:528–29: Miscellany 448 dates to Sept.–Oct. 1729 [Schafer, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Miscellanies, vol. 13, table 2] and “End of Creation” was completed by early 1754 [Ramsey, “Editor’s Introduction,” 8:7–8; also, see the later Miscellanies, no. 1151 (20:525) and Miscellanies no. 1266a [23:213]). 97Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:217.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 163 lency.98 I call the concerted operation of the understanding and will functional unity. Moreover, I interpret Edwards’ notion that the understanding and will do not act distinctly to mean that they do not have diverse terms of operation. The second phrase, “in this matter,” highlights that Edwards is discussing a specific type of knowledge; that is, the spiritual understanding.99 Spiritual understanding is a species of the sense of the heart or sensible knowledge.100 To define the sense of the heart, Edwards distinguished be98Edwards,

Religious Affections, 2:273–74. Religious Affections, 2:272. 100As Hoopes also notes, the sense of the heart and the new spiritual sense are not interchangeable terms (Hoopes, “Edwards’s Religious Psychology,” 857). Edwards’ scholars have advanced a plethora of interpretations of the sense of the heart. Examples are: 1. John E. Smith describes the sense of the heart in terms of the spiritual understanding. Spiritual understanding is not only notional knowledge, but knowledge in which the soul savors. The sense of the heart or the spiritual understanding, therefore, is the affection of the soul, which necessarily includes knowledge and desire/will, for the beauty and excellency of God (Smith, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Religious Affections, 2:32–33). Smith distinguishes between the understanding, will, and affections in Edwards’ thought. The affections refer to the disposition or orientation of the soul. The affections are the unity of the soul and, thus, inform the operations of the understanding and will (Smith, “Editor’s Introduction,” Religious Affections, 2:11–15). 2. Perry Miller and Leon Chai interpret the sense of the heart in terms of Edwards’ adoption of Locke’s empiricism. According to Miller, the sense of the heart is the mind’s feeling of joy or fear when an idea of sensation is impressed upon it (Miller, “Jonathan Edwards and the Sense of the Heart,” Harvard Theological Review 41 [1948]: 123–29). Chai argues that the sense of the heart refers to the experiential and existential nature of spiritual understanding. Edwards uses the language of sensation, such as tasting the sweetness of honey, to illustrate the evocative and experiential nature of spiritual understanding. Chai assumes that Edwards’ use of the terms perception and sensation are Lockean and so attempts to interpret Edwards’ theory of the sense of the heart in terms consistent with Locke’s empiricism (Chai, Jonathan Edwards and the Limits of Enlightenment Philosophy [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 29–35). Chai’s assumption that Edwards’ teaching that sensations and perceptions arise from external items is peculiarly Lockean and, therefore, Edwards should be interpreted in terms of Locke is problematic because the theory that perceptions derive from external objects whether ideal or material was quite common in the early-eighteenth century. 3. Terrence Erdt argues that the sense of the heart is the disposition of the will that evokes a feeling of delight and love at the apprehension of the divine beauty. 99Edwards,

164 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM tween speculative knowledge and sensible knowledge. The former refers to dispassionate knowledge such as when the mind contemplates a “triangle” or a “square.”101 Accordingly, speculative knowledge entails only the operation of the understanding. Sensible knowledge points to knowledge of an object in which the soul takes delight or displeasure. So, the mind has a sense of the heart or sensible knowledge when it beholds an object with pleasure or distaste. The sense of the heart is not peculiar to saints. Edwards divided sensible knowledge into the categories of natural and spiritual.102 All people have sensible knowledge about various things. In the sermon “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” Edwards illustrated the difference between speculative and sensible knowledge with the knowledge and taste of honey. He notes that a person may have a rational understanding that honey is sweet, but this is substantively different from the knowledge a person possesses that has tasted honey and thereby knows the sweetness of honey. Rational knowledge of the sweetness of honey is speculative knowledge, whereas sensible knowledge is that derived from the taste of the sweetness of honey; sensible knowledge entails rational knowledge, but transcends it by existential participation in the object. When a person has sensible knowledge of the sweetness of honey, he/she delights in the idea of the taste of honey in a way that is impossible for the person with only speculative knowledge of the taste of honey.103 Likewise as a species of sensible knowledge, spiritual Also, Erdt correlates Edwards’ sense of the heart with Calvin’s sensus suavitatis (Erdt, Jonathan Edwards Art and Sense of the Heart, 23–42). 4. Conrad Cherry maintains that the sense of the heart is volitional or affective knowledge. It is not only a feeling, but also a passionate intellectual apprehension of the divine excellency (Cherry, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 19–23). Also, see Michael J. Colacurico, “The Example of Edwards: Idealist Imagination and the Metaphysics of Sovereignty,” in Puritan Influences in American Literature, ed. Emory Elliott, Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, 65 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 70. 5. Paul Helm argues that the new sense is a literal new sixth sense given to the soul that is diverse from the five natural senses. The new sense enables the person to grasp the excellency of God via a new simple idea. However, at the end of the essay, Helm suggests that Edwards’ is indecisive because he does not clearly state whether the new sense is a literal new sense or more of an elevated aesthetic awareness of divinity (Helm, “John Locke and Jonathan Edwards: A Reconsideration,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 [1969]: 51–61). 101Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:272. 102Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 782 (18:460). 103Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” 17:414. Edwards’ use of the

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 165 understanding is devoted or affective knowledge. More precisely, it is knowledge and consequent love of God’s supreme excellency and beauty inspired by the indwelling Holy Spirit.104 When a person has spiritual understanding, it means that the soul knows the beauty of God’s excellency and desires or loves that beauty.105 “In this matter,” to return to the phrase, interprets “as acting distinctly” because it indicates the specific category of knowledge that Edwards has under consideration. “In this matter” refers to Edwards’ discussion of the spiritual understanding, which is a species of sensible knowledge or the sense of the heart. In the context of the sentence quoted above, Edwards contrasts sensible knowledge with speculative knowledge. The specific point of contrast between these two types of knowledge is that speculative knowledge involves only the understanding and the soul remains affectively indifferent to the object apprehended, whereas sensible knowledge involves the concerted operation of both powers of the soul—the understanding and the will. Interpreted in context, the phrase “as acting distinctly” refers to the concerted operations of the understanding and will in spiritual understanding. Finally, the phrase “as acting distinctly” has nothing to do with absolving the operative distinction of the understanding and will in the soul, but rather means that in spiritual understanding the intellectual and volitional powers of the soul share a common term of operation and, therefore, do not act distinctly. Thus, in Edwards’ psychology, the powers of the soul operate in tandem as to their object of operation—hence, functional unity—and distinctly as to the operation of the powers as such— hence also, operative distinction.

sweetness of honey to illustrate the sense of the heart was not new to Puritan theology. Solomon Stoddard, Edwards’ maternal grandfather, compared the light from the Spirit of God that habitually inclines the soul toward divinity with the taste of the sweetness of honey (Stoddard, A Treatise Concerning Conversion, 38). Moreover, the use of the metaphor of taste to depict the genuine faith of the heart in Reformed theology begins with Calvin (Calvin, Institutes 3.2.33 [pp. 580–81]). 104Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:271–72. In the sermon, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” Edwards tightens the connection between the spiritual understanding and divine excellency by often using the phrase “sense of divine excellency,” rather than spiritual understanding (Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” 17:415, 416, and 421). 105Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:273.

166 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM

The Trinity and Unity and Distinction in Edwards’ Psychology Edwards’ teaching that the human soul is the image of the Trinity suggests a hermeneutical principle of reciprocity: as the soul reflects the Trinity, so the Trinity reflects the soul. The fruit of this principle is that Edwards’ application of his psychological theory to the Trinity illuminates in return his psychological theory. We can discern his view of the soul, therefore, by examining his articulation of the Trinity in the psychological terms of the human soul. Edwards’ application of the mental analogy to trinitarian theology supports the interpretation of Edwards’ psychological theory in terms of the functional unity and operative distinction of the understanding and will. First, Edwards assumes that the human soul is an analog of God. Specifically, the correspondence between the human soul and the divine nature resides in that both are spiritual natures consisting of understanding and will.106 Second, Edwards’ theory of the immanent processions and subsistence of the divine persons presupposes the operative distinction of the understanding and will. Edwards emphatically declared that within the Godhead three real distinctions exist: he wrote, “these three, God, and the idea of God, and the inclination, affection and love of God, must be conceived as really distinct.”107 The important point is that if the understanding and will are undifferentiated acts of the soul, then Edwards’ affirmation of three real distinctions in God is nonsensical because he discusses the trinitarian distinctions in terms of the psychological distinctions of the soul. In other words, if he conflated the understanding and will in his psychology, then he would not have at hand a manner of speaking about real distinctions in the Godhead that correspond to the immanent acts of the human understanding and will. Put positively, Edwards’ teaching that real distinctions, which derive from the distinct operations of the divine understanding and will, exist within the Godhead assumes that the operations of the human understanding and will are distinct. They are not ontologically distinct, but distinct as relative subsistent operations of the soul. The distinct subsistent operations of the human understanding and will and their products— i.e., word/idea and love—are the foundation for Edwards’ theorizing on the immanent processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Edwards’ dispositional psychology or intellectualist Augustinian voluntarism corresponds to his theology of the Trinity. Edwards believed that the soul images and is the analog of the triune God. The soul images the Trinity 106Edwards, 107Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113. Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 167 in the subsistent operations of the understanding and will. The distinct subsistent operations of the human mind provide the categories for speaking of the individuation of the divine persons. The Father compares to the selfsubsistent mind, the Son to the subsisting word generated by the understanding, and the Holy Spirit to subsisting love proceeding by the will. Edwards’ intellectualist Augustinian voluntarism also comports with his dispositional understanding of the divine nature. Intellectualism posits the logical precedence of the intellectual power to the volitional power. Augustinian voluntarism affirms that both the understanding and will operate according to the underlying disposition of the soul. The relationship between the disposition of the soul, the understanding, and the will is consistent with his theory that God’s nature is inherently disposed to communicate goodness. The communication of the divine goodness of God finds actualization in the generation of the Son as the perfect idea of the divine essence and the procession of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Now we turn to a detailed examination of Edward’s theology of the Father.

THE FATHER AS THE SELF-SUBSISTENT DIVINE PERSON Relative to the Son and the Holy Spirit, Edwards devoted little theological energy to the personal identity of the Father. Perhaps this curt treatment of the Father is due to the more easily conceived deity and personal status of the Father compared to the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Father is clearly divine relative to the Son and more obviously a person than is the Holy Spirit. The characteristic of unbegottenness defines the personal identity of the Father. Edwards employed three conceptual categories to portray the unbegottenness of the Father: self-subsistence, God absolutely considered, and the fountain of the Godhead. All three notions share the same theological purpose. They highlight the Father’s unique status as the divine person not from another and from whom the others subsist. Moreover and important for Edwards’ location within the Western mutual love trinitarian tradition, he used the mental analogy to define the personal identity of the Father. The Father as Self-Subsistent Edwards teaches that the Father is self-subsistent. He defines the Father as the divine person who is “neither begotten nor proceeds.”108 His terminology matches the traditional terms found in the confessions of his tradition. 108Edwards,

Ghost,” 14:379.

Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257) and “The Threefold Work of the Holy

168 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The Westminster Confession (1647) was the standard benchmark of New England orthodoxy from its acceptance by the Cambridge Synod of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1648 into the nineteenth century and was the primary document of Edwards’ catechesis.109 The Westminster Confession, which is the probable source for the terminology Edwards used to describe the Father, continues the practice established in the Athanasian Creed of identifying the Father as unoriginated deity, or as a nullo. Edmund J. Fortman explains that the Athanasian Creed added a nullo and so developed the theology of the Father, which heretofore was described as the one who generates the Son and the Spirit, to include the notion that the Father is unoriginate.110 The phrase “neither begotten nor proceeds” is a negative description of the Father. The implied positive correlate of these negative terms is that the Father is self-subsistent.111 The theological context for the use of the terms “neither begotten nor proceeds” and self-subsistent is the processions of the divine persons. The negative terms distinguish the Father from the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Father begets the Son. His relation to the Son is, therefore, as unbegotten. The Spirit in turn proceeds from the Father and the Son. The relation of the Father to the Spirit then is as one who does not proceed. Although the double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (filioque) is not a necessary inference from notion that the Father is unbegotten, Edwards did adopt it.

109Edwards’ phraseology “neither begotten nor proceeding” is that of the Westminster Confession 2.3 (the Latin words are nec genitus nempe nec procedens); see Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes, 3 vols., 6th ed., and rev. ed. (1931; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 3:608. Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 94 and 131; Lowrie, The Shape of the Puritan Mind, 6–7; William Sparkes Morris, The Young Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstruction, Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, ed. Jerald C. Brauer and Martin E. Marty, 14 (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1991), 530; Jack Rogers, Presbyterian Creeds: A Guide to The Book of Confessions (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985), 140–41; and Williston Walker, The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism (1893; reprint, with intro. by Douglas Horton, Boston: Pilgrim, 1960), 185 and 195. 110Fortman, The Triune God, 160–61. For background on the Athanasian Creed, see J. N. D. Kelly, The Athanasian Creed: The Paddock Lectures for 1962–3 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 111Edwards, “The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost,” 14:379.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 169 The Father as Absolute God Edwards’ belief that the Father is self-subsistent led him to refer to the Father as “God absolutely considered.” In Discourse on the Trinity, Edwards wrote “the Father is the deity subsisting in the prime, unoriginated and most absolute manner, or the deity in its direct existence. . . . [And] there must be these distinctions in the deity, viz., of God (absolutely considered), and the idea of God, and love and delight.”112 Edwards’ reference to the Father as the primal subsistence of the deity does not infer the ontological subordination of the Son and the Spirit. The Father is God absolutely because in the order of nature (which does not entail temporal succession) his subsistence is logically prior to the subsistence of the Son and the Spirit.113 Indeed, he stressed that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are ontologically equal because they are identical with the divine essence or substance.114 Edwards’ reference to the Father, as absolute God, occurs within his discussion of the processions of the divine persons. Since the Father is selfsubsistent, he is God “absolutely considered.” The notion that the first person of the Trinity is absolute deity often led Edwards to use the impersonal term God rather than the personal name of Father to refer to the first person of the Trinity.115 To call the Son or the Spirit absolute God is not appropriate because they are more properly called the Son of God and the Spirit of God. They are of God because they proceed from God the Father. The Father is self-subsistent and, therefore, is God absolutely considered. Nevertheless, the language of absoluteness in regard to the Father and procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit connotes no sense of ontological subordination. The Father as the Fountain of the Godhead The Father as the fountain of the Godhead was a third metaphor that Edwards adopted to underline that the Father is the source of the processions of the Son and the Spirit.116 He points out that the Father is called the 112Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:130–31. Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:430–31). 114Edwards, “The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost,” 14:379. 115E.g., Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:130–35 and Miscellanies, nos. 143 (13:298–99) and 259 (13:367). 116For Edwards’ use of the metaphor, see Discourse on the Trinity, 21:134–36; Miscellanies, no. 143 (13:298–99); Miscellanies, no. 742 (18:374); and Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431). 113Edwards,

170 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM “fountain of the deity” because the Father is the first subsistence of the divine nature. As first, the Father is self-subsistent. Moreover, the Son and the Spirit have their subsistence from the Father.117 The primary connotation of the term fountain when applied to the Father is that he is the source of the immanent processions of the Son and the Spirit. Edwards’ use of the metaphor of fountain to describe the double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son underlines that the term indicates source of procession and not ontological gradation.118 In addition, Edwards uses the fountain imagery and the order of subsistence as the foundation for the economic roles of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.119 The Soul as the Mental Analog of the Father Edwards’ primary analogy for understanding the immanent Trinity is the human mind or soul.120 The soul consists of the soul itself and two powers of operation called the understanding and will.121 The Father corresponds to the mind or soul. When using the soul as the image of the Trinity, Edwards most often refers to the Father as God. In Miscellany 370, he summarizes the way the soul images the Trinity in the following way: “there is the mind, and its understanding or idea, and the will or affection or love—the heart, comprising inclination, affection, etc.—answering to God, the idea of God, and the love of God.”122 The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit correspond to God, the idea of God, and the love of God. 117Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431). Discourse on the Trinity, 21:134–36 and “The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost,” 14:379. 119Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431–33). 120Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113; Miscellanies, nos. 238 (13:353–54), 259 (13:367), 308 (13:392–93), 362 (13:435), and 370 (13:442); and Miscellanies, no. 896 (20:154–55). 121Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:138. 122Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 370 (13:442). For additional instances of his description of the Trinity in terms of God, idea, and love, see Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113, 121, and 130–32; Miscellanies, nos. 94 (13:256–63), 151 (13:301–2), 179 (13:327), 259 (13:367), 260 (13:368), 309 (13:393), 331 (13:409–10), 370 (13:441– 42), 396 (13:461–62), and 405 (13:468). In Miscellany 1180 (see Miscellanies, no 1180 [23:95]), he also quotes a passage from Andrew Michael Ramsay’s The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, 2 vols. (Glasgow: Robert and Andrew Foulis, 1748–49) in which Ramsay portrays the Trinity as “Spirit conceiving, idea conceived, and love proceeding from both.” Edwards’ citation of Ramsay from the Monthly Review is an excerpt from the Philosophical Principles in which Ramsay summa118Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 171 By comparing the Father to the mind, Edwards’ notion that the Father is the source of the procession of the Son and the Spirit correlates with his theory of the relationship between the mind and its faculties of understanding and will. According to his psychology, ideas and love immanently subsist in the mind by the operation of the understanding and will. Understanding and idea and will and love relate to each other as productive power and product. The correlation of the immanent acts and products of the human mind with the processions and subsistences of the divine persons is striking. As idea and love proceed within the human soul by the operation of the understanding and will so the divine idea—i.e., the Son—and love— i.e., the Holy Spirit—proceed by the operation of the divine understanding and will. The strength of Edwards’ illustration of the Trinity with the human soul is that it highlights the continuity between the human and divine being. The human soul is a real analog of the triune God. Edwards’ mental image of the Trinity mirrors Augustine’s mental triad of mind knowing and loving itself in book nine of The Trinity.123 And thus, Edmund Hill’s criticism of this Augustinian mental triad applies to Edwards’ mental image.124 The weakness of the mental image, as it is used to illustrate the relationships of the divine persons, is that the Son and the Holy Spirit appear as relative subsistences of the Father. According to the image, the Father is God and the Son and the Spirit are the idea and love of God. This imagery is that of one mind with two immanent productive processions. The problem is that the image of mind, idea, and love illustrates God, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and not the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In other words, the image is one person with two immanent operations. According to the image, God or the Father is the absolute term and the Son as idea and Holy Spirit as love are relative terms of God or the Father. The Son and the Spirit are the products of the operation of the Father’s understanding and will. The Son and the Spirit are subordinate to the Father. That is, they are the Father’s relative acts of understanding and will. Augustine’s mental triad of the mind remembering, understanding, and lov-

rizes his arguments presented in the text (Monthly Review [March, 1751]: 340–48; for the segment copied by Edwards in Miscellany no. 1180, see p. 341). 123Augustine, The Trinity 9.2–8 (pp. 271–75). 124Hill, The Mystery of the Trinity, Introducing Catholic Theology, 4 (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), 126 and “Introduction,” in The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, part 1, vol. 5, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn: New City, 1991), 53. See chapter three pages 116–17.

172 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ing itself avoids this problem because these terms are all relative operations of one mind. Unfortunately, Edwards did not adopt the better-suited Augustinian mental triad of remembering, knowing, and loving. As previously discussed, Edwards believed that the human soul imaged God in such a way that if the soul and its faculties were “enlarged infinitely, there would be the Deity to all intents and purposes, the same simplicity, immutability, etc.”125 The infinitely exalted aspects of the soul would correspond to the Godhead in the following way: the mind-Father, the idea as the product of the understanding-Son, and love as the product of the will-Holy Spirit. The result is an infinite mind internally differentiated according to the intellectual operations of understanding and will. It is difficult to see how this analogy supports the ontological equality of the divine persons. Ultimately, the identity of the Father in Edwards’ mental analogy is inadequate. The problem is not so much Edwards’ theology of the Father— i.e., ultimate source of the procession of the divine persons. Rather, the problem is that the Father’s identity in the mental image assumes that the Father is ontologically superior to the Son and the Spirit. The Father appears as the true God and the Son and the Spirit are portrayed as the relative operations of the Father. His mental analogy is consistent with Augustine’s mental triad of book nine of De Trinitate and Aquinas’ earlier use of the mental triad. However, he, unlike them, failed to see its limitations and move to a more suitable analogy of the Trinity. In sum, Edwards’ theology of the Father stands in continuity and discontinuity with the identity of the Father in the Augustinian mutual love trinitarian tradition. In continuity, Edwards uses a mental analogy and identifies the Father as the source of the generation of the Son and principal source of the procession of the Holy Spirit. In discontinuity, Edwards continued to use a mental analogy that implies, even if not intended, the ontological superiority of the Father to the Son and the Spirit.

THE SON AS THE IDEA OF GOD Edwards followed the common Western practice of describing the procession of the Son in terms of the intellectual act of the divine nature. He taught that the Son proceeds by the act of the divine understanding and subsists as the idea produced by that act of the divine understanding. Edwards also described the Son as the image of God, the Logos, and the Wisdom of God, but argued that these derive from his identity as the idea of 125Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 135 (13:295).

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 173 the divine essence.126 Although his account of the subsistence of the Son fits the common Western practice in terms of its general framework, his particular expression contains several unique features. This section sets forth Edwards’ unique manner of portraying the eternal subsistence of the Son in the common intellectual idiom. With few exceptions, scholars of Edwards locate him within the intellectual tradition of Idealism. More specifically and as Michael J. McClymond describes, Edwards’ thought represents a theistic or theocentric idealism.127 The source of Edwards’ theocentric idealism has been the subject of extensive scholarly inquiry, but has produced no conclusive answer.128 He 126Edwards,

Miscellanies, nos. 94 (13:258–60), 151 (13:301–2), and 260 (13:368). J. McClymond calls Edwards’ idealism theocentric because it establishes human knowledge in the divine being in contrast to what he describes as the anthropocentric idealism of the Enlightenment, which locates it in the mind’s phenomenal representation (Michael J. McClymond, Encounters with God: An Approach to the Theology of Jonathan Edwards, Religion in America Series, ed. Harry S. Stout [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 32–34). 128The plethora of interpretations regarding Edwards’ idealism is due in large part to, as Frederick J. E. Woodbridge noted, his “lack of philosophical thoroughness” (Woodbridge, “Jonathan Edwards,” The Philosophical Review 13 [1904]: 395). Edwards did not write a complete and systematic presentation of his metaphysics and philosophy. As a result, the student of Edwards must pine through his various philosophical notebooks titled “The Mind,” “Of Being,” and “Of Atoms” to ferret out his metaphysical and philosophical thought. “Of Being” was composed in three segments over a period of twelve years. The two largest segments were written in the fall and spring of 1720–1721 and April–July of 1723, while the last part was added in the summer of 1732. Edwards began writing “The Mind” in 1723 and completed a large part of it by 1731, but later notes were added in the 1740s and 1750s (for dating, see Anderson, “Editor’s Introduction,” Scientific and Philosophical Writings, 6:181–90 and 325–29). On the availability of European and English philosophical texts to Edwards, the gift of the Dummer chest of books to Yale contained texts of the leading British and Continental thinkers. Edwards likely read some of these and developed his own contribution in light of them. Dummer’s List included, among other texts: Malebranche, Treatise Concerning the Search after Truth (p. 433); Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (p. 435); Norris, An Essay on the Ideal or Intelligible World (p. 487); Descartes, Opera philosophica (p. 482); and Jean LeClerc, Opera philosophica and et al. (pp. 482–83): for a transcription of the list of books sent by Dummer (and to which the above page numbers refer), see Louise M. Bryant and Mary Patterson, “The List of Books sent by Jeremiah Dummer,” in Papers in Honor of Andrew Keogh: Librarian of Yale University, by the Staff of the Library, 30 June 1938 (New Haven: Privately printed, 1938), 423–92. Furthermore, New England thinkers such as Edwards gained entrance to the latest philosophical ideas 127Michael

174 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM

through the dissemination of learned journals. For instance, Edwards was a frequent reader of the Republick of Letters (Norman S. Fiering, “The Transatlantic Republic of Letters: A Note on the Circulation of Learned Periodicals to Early Eighteenth-Century America,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 33 [1976]: 642–60, and esp. for Edwards, see 659–60). Edwards refers to the Republick of Letters in his Reading “Catalogue,” nos. 358, 359, 360, 361, 398, 403, 413, 419, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, and 450. Edwards’ scholars have made the following suggestions as to the source and characteristics of his idealism. 1. George Berkeley—George P. Fisher, Discussions in History and Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1880), 229–30 and An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity: With Remarks on Edwards and His Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 7–40; apparently the first to associate Edwards with Berkeley is Alexander C. Fraser, Life and Letters of George Berkeley: With Many Writings of Bishop Berkeley hitherto Unpublished: Metaphysical, Descriptive, Theological, The Philosophy of George Berkeley, ed. George Pitcher (1871; reprint, New York: Garland, 1988), 182 and 190; and Moses C. Tyler, A History of American Literature, 2 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1879), 1:182. 2. Nicholas Malebranche—Douglas J. Elwood, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University Press, 1960), 26. I list Fiering here because he too locates Edwards within the early-Enlightenment group of thinkers called theocentric metaphysicians—e.g., Malebranche, Berkeley, and Norris. Moreover, he emphasizes the influence of Malebranche (Fiering, “The Rationalist Foundations of Jonathan Edwards’ Metaphysics,” in Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, ed. Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988], 73–101). Mason I. Lowance, Jr., also fits here because he links Edwards’ thought with Malebranche and John Norris (Lowance, “Jonathan Edwards and the Platonists: Edwardsean Epistemology and the Influence of Malebranche and Norris,” Studies in Puritan American Spirituality 2 [1992]: 129–52). Finally, I place Charles McCracken here because although he does not categorically maintain that Edwards borrowed from Malebranche, he argues the similarities between the two are numerous enough to warrant the hypothesis that Edwards knew Malebranche’s work (McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy [Oxford: Clarendon, 1983], 329–40). 3. Arthur Collier’s, Clavis Universalis, or, a new inquiry after truth, being a demonstration of the non-existence, or impossibility, of an external world, British Philosophers and Theologians of the 17th and 18th Centuries, ed. René Wellek (1713; reprint, New York: Garland, 1978)—John H. MacCracken, “The Sources of Jonathan Edwards’s Idealism,” The Philosophical Review 11 (1902): 26–42. 4. Cambridge Platonists—Clarence Gohdes, “Aspects of Idealism in Early New England,” The Philosophical Review 39 (1930): 553–54. 5. Eclectic sources—Nicholas Malebranche, Norris, Berkeley, Cambridge Platonists, and Pierre Bayle—and common response to Locke—Frank H. Foster, A Genetic History of the New England Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 175 likely read Malebranche (1638–1715) and others such as John Norris (1657– 1712) during the latter period of his studies at Yale, but his opinions may be understood as common responses to materialism and Locke. In addition to 1907), 48; H. N. Gardiner, “The Early Idealism of Jonathan Edwards,” The Philosophical Review 9 (1900): 584–91; Richard A. S. Hall, “Did Berkeley Influence Edwards? Their Common Critique of the Moral Sense Theory,” in Jonathan Edwards’s Writings: Text, Context, Interpretation, ed. Stephen J. Stein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 100–1; Stephen R. Holmes, God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 94–96; James Hoopes, Consciousness in New England: From Puritanism and Ideas to Psychoanalysis and Semiotic, New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History, ed. Thomas Bender (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 76–78; Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, 19; Morris, The Young Jonathan Edwards, 137–38; and Harvey G. Townsend, Philosophical Ideas in the United States (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), 39–50. Wallace E. Anderson best fits this category; although, he identifies Edwards as an immaterialist rather than an idealist (Anderson, “Immaterialism in Jonathan Edwards’ Early Philosophical Notes,” Journal of the History of Ideas 25 [1964]: 181–200 and Anderson, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Scientific and Philosophical Writings, 6:29, 75–80 and 94–111). Allen also belongs in this category. He believed that Edwards likely read or had some form of acquaintance with Berkeley, but admits that no direct evidence exists for the supposition of Berkeleyan influence (Alexander V. G. Allen, Jonathan Edwards, American Religious Leaders [Boston/New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1891], 14–18). 6. Spontaneous Generation—Arthur C. McGiffert, Jr., Jonathan Edwards, Creative Lives, ed. Harold E. B. Speight (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), 22–23 and Ola Winslow, Jonathan Edwards, 63–64. 7. Reject Edwards as an Idealist—Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 60–63. 8. Modified Idealism: George Rupp argues that the principle that God is “coextensive with reality itself” is the central tenet of Edwards’ thought and not equivalent with Idealism (Rupp, “The ‘Idealism’ of Jonathan Edwards,” The Harvard Theological Review 62 [1969]: 209–26, esp. 213). For discussions of Edwards’ idealism that do not address his sources, see Clarence H. Faust and Thomas H. Johnson, Jonathan Edwards: Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes (New York: American Book Company, 1935), xxiv–xxxi; A. M. Fairbairn, Prophets of the Christian Faith (London: James Clarke, 1897), 149–71; Leon Howard, “The Mind” of Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstructed Text, University of California Publications, English Studies, 28 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 120–35; McClymond, Encounters with God, 32–34; I. Woodbridge Riley, American Thought: From Puritanism to Pragmatism and Beyond (1915; reprint, New York: Henry Holt, 1923), 28–34 and Riley, American Philosophy: The Early Schools, 126–87; and Egbert C. Smyth, “Jonathan Edwards’ Idealism: With Special Reference to the Essay ‘Of Being’ and the Writings not in His Collected Works,” The American Journal of Theology 1 (1897): 957–58.

176 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Edwards’ idealism, an examination of Edwards’ theory of ideas is useful because his synthesis of the epistemological and ontological role of ideas under the category of divine ideas is indispensable for reading his trinitarianism.129 Moreover, this discussion again underlines his reliance on the principle of analogy between the human soul and the triune God. Edwards’ Use of Ideas in his Philosophical and Theological Context It was once common to portray Descartes’ transformation of the notion of idea as the transition from the pre-modern metaphysical to the modern psychological theory of idea. Prior to Descartes, ideas were theological and philosophical terms that referred to the archetypes in the divine mind. With Descartes, ideas became anthropological terms that refer to the objects of human thought and ideas as divine exemplars faded into the medieval past.130 However, recent scholarship shows that numerous pre-Cartesian theories of ideas were used in early-seventeenth century literature and texts.131 Edwards’ theory of ideas corroborates this vein of scholarship by 129In addition, while the topic of Edwards’ idealism has often been treated in scholarly literature, Edwards’ theory of ideas has not so often been explored. Two notable exceptions to the oversight of Edwards’ theory of ideas are Anderson, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Scientific and Philosophical Writings, 6:1–136 and Chai, Jonathan Edwards and the Limits of Enlightenment Philosophy, 39–55. Chai’s discussion treats the problematic of Edwards’ idealistic philosophy expressed in the terminology of Lockean empiricism and the relationship between the mental idea and the material object of perception. My discussion expands Anderson’s and Chai’s work by highlighting that Edwards synthesized the epistemological and ontological roles of ideas with the notion of divine ideas and that he used the philosophical concept of perfect idea to describe the subsistence of the second person of the Trinity. 130E.g., L. J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), 151; Étienne Gilson affirms this notion of idea in René Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, ed. and commentary Étienne Gilson, Études de philosophie mèdièvale (Paris: Libraire philosophique J. Vrin, 1947), 319; Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy, Studies in Philosophy, ed. V. C. Chappell (New York: Random House, 1968), 96–97; and Robert McRae, “‘Idea’ as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century,” Journal of the History of Ideas 26 (1965): 175. 131Roger Ariew and Marjorie Greene, “Ideas, in and before Descartes,” Journal of the History of Ideas 56 (1995): 87–106 and Emily Michael and Fred S. Michael, “Corporeal Ideas in Seventeenth-Century Psychology,” Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989): 31–48. This issue was also raised in earlier scholarship, see Ralph M. Blake, “Note of the Use of the Term Idée prior to Descartes,” The Philosophical Re-

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 177 illustrating that not only was pre-Cartesian thought characterized with diverse theories of ideas, but that after Descartes metaphysical as well as psychological theories of ideas continued in use. Edwards used the term idea to refer to both an exemplar in the divine mind and a psychological event in the human mind.

Edwards and Ideas as Divine Exemplars Divine ideas are a terminological and conceptual adaptation from Platonism. In the platonic philosophical tradition, divine ideas, as exemplars, are the eternal forms by which divinity knows and creates the entities within the universe. The divine ideas provide a stable reality in contrast to the flux of the material world.132 Appropriating ideas from the Platonic traditions, Christian theologians understood them as the formal exemplars according to which God creates and sustains the entities within creation. The adaptation of ideas as formal exemplars in Christian theology extends to at least Augustine and appears in medieval scholasticism in the thought of Aquinas.133 According to Aquinas, divine ideas serve an epistemological and ontological purpose. They are the divine principles of the production—i.e., exemplars—of created entities and of knowing—i.e., intelligible natures.134 view 48 (1939): 532–35. 132For background on the continuities and discontinuities between the platonic and Christian use of ideas, see W. Norris Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara, Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern, gen. ed. R. Baine Harris, 3 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 109–13 and Bernard McGinn, “Platonic and Christian: The Case of the Divine Ideas,” in Of Scholars, Savants, and Their Texts: Studies in Philosophy and Religious Thought: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 163–66. 133For Augustine’s use of ideas as the formal exemplars of creation and God’s knowledge of creation, see The Fathers of the Church, vol. 70 Saint Augustine: EightyThree Different Questions, trans. David L. Mosher (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), quest. 46 (pp. 79–81). For Aquinas’ use of ideas as exemplars in God, see Vivian Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, ed. Heiko A. Oberman, 69 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 195–273. 134Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.15.1 (p. 63) and 1a.15.3 (p. 71). Also, see Thomas Aquinas, Truth: St. Thomas Aquinas, 2 vols., trans. Robert Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), 3.1 (1:138) and 3.8 (1:166) and Mark D. Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” Review of Metaphysics 38 (1984): 18–20.

178 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The divine ideas are also linked to the doctrine of divine providence. Aquinas argues that for God to order and know the whole history of the universe requires that he also order and know the particulars. Thus, the particular forms or ideas of all entities are in the divine mind.135 Divine ideas also serve an epistemological and ontological role in the theology of Edwards. Epistemologically, God knows by ideas. Ideas are the mode of divine knowledge. Drawing on the principle of analogy, Edwards assumes that since human knowledge is by idea, then likewise is God’s knowledge. In Miscellany 94, Edwards asserts, “the Almighty’s knowledge is not so different from ours, but that ours is the image of [it]. It is by an idea, as ours is, only his [is] infinitely perfect.”136 Entailed in the notion of perfection and in contrast to human knowledge, God’s knowledge via ideas is eternal and not based on temporal succession. However, the divine ideas do exist in a real succession. Edwards often refers to the “train” or “series” of ideas in the divine mind.137 He means that divine ideas do not exist haphazardly in the divine mind as the pattern of created entities, but are arranged in a specific order that thereby fixes the specific order of temporal events. Each created entity has its existence and its relationship to other entities because it directly corresponds to a divine idea and that divine idea’s relationship to other divine ideas. Edwards’ belief that a particular divine idea corresponds to each particular created entity is in contrast to Malebranche’s notion of intelligible extension. Malebranche taught that in God a single concept or archetype of extension contains virtually all the possible particular instances of extension; thus, the particular objects of creation are contained within the concept of intelligible extension and particular divine ideas for each created object are unnecessary.138 Divine ideas also serve an ontological role in Edwards’ theology. They are the ontological or metaphysical foundation of all created entities.139 As the ontological basis for the existence of creatures, divine ideas are the template for the ad extra application of the divine power.140 Substance is, there135Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ 1a.15.2 (p. 67) and Truth 3.7–8 (1:164–66); also, see Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” 20–26. 136Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257) and Discourse on the Trinity, 1:113–14. 137Edwards, “The Mind,” nos. 10 (6:341–42), 15 (6:344–45), and 40 (6:356–57). 138Cf. Malebranche, Elucidations of the Search after Truth, in The Search after Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1980), 626 and Steven Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 54–59. 139Edwards, “The Mind,” no. 34 (6:353). 140Malebranche also held that divine ideas are the basis of the exertion of the

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 179 fore, ideal. Substance is not an unknown substratum that stands underneath the perceived qualities of objects, but rather it is the form of the entity’s resistance or solidity vis-à-vis other entities. Divine ideas serve as the form for the act of the divine power or will to cause a particular form of resistance—i.e., a particular created entity. For this reason, Edwards wrote that resistance is a “mode of an idea.”141 Divine ideas determine the ad extra exertion of the divine power to create and sustain the existence of all creatures.

Edwards and Idea as the Immediate Object of the Understanding In the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century, thinkers as diverse in terms of ontological and epistemological commitments as Berkeley, Locke, Malebranche, and Jonathan Edwards shared a remarkably common psychological theory of idea.142 The two common features of their theory of ideas are that ideas are the immediate object of perception and that ideas derive from some form of perception. Ideas then, which are building blocks of human knowledge, derive from sensation or reflection on inner psychological processes.143 Because they accepted that ideas derive from either sensadivine power to create and sustain the existence of created entities (Malebranche, Search after Truth 3.2.5 [p. 229]). 141Edwards, “The Mind,” nos. 27 (6:351) and 13 (6:344) and “Of Atoms,” 6:215. 142In the following presentation, I focus on the similarities between those who understood idea as an object of intellection because this is Edwards’ view of idea. However, my focus on this notion of idea does not imply that this was the only theory of ideas in the early-Enlightenment. For example, Robert McRae’s research shows that in the early-Enlightenment idea was conceived in three ways: idea as an object, idea as an act, and idea as a disposition (McRae, “‘Idea’ as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century,” 175–90). Moreover, John W. Yolton charts six variations on the term idea (Yolton, “The Term Idea in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy,” in Idea: 6th Colloquio Internazionale, Roma, 5–7 gennaio 1989, ed. M. Fattori and M. L. Bianchi, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 51 [Rome: Ateno, 1990], 237–54). 143For the common acceptance among early-Enlightenment thinkers that idea is the immediate object of the mind’s perception, see Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic, or the Art of Thinking: Containing, besides common rules, several new observations appropriate for forming judgment, trans. Jill V. Buroker, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, ser. ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.1 (p. 26); Berkeley, Principles 1.1 (p. 103); Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 94 (13:258), 308 (13:393), and 446 (13:494–95); Pierre Gassendi, Institutio Logica (1658), critical ed. with trans. and intro. by Howard Jones (Assen, the Netherlands:

180 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM tion or reflection, they rejected innate ideas. Cognitive content, in the form of ideas, comes from a source external to the human mind or from the mind’s reflection on its own operations.144 Although Edwards rejected innate ideas in terms of the specific ideas of knowledge, he accepted that knowledge of God is innate or, at least, that an intellectual tendency to apprehend God is innate. He proposes three reasons for innate knowledge of God. These are: 1) the human mind naturally concludes the existence of God from the natural world; 2) the moral and judicial sense portends the existence of God; and 3) the inborn habit of the mind to induce cause from effect points to the existence of God. However, these categories are not content specific. They refer to intellectual mechanisms and not to specific data.145 Despite the conceptual similarity on the notion of idea as the mental object of thought, a primary divide exists between these thinkers on whether the immediate source or cause of ideas is natural powers in the objects of perception or divine agency. For Locke, objects of mental perception, by virtue of inherent powers, produce ideas in the understanding. While he does note that the ultimate source of powers to produce ideas in the mind is “our Maker,” the objects possess these powers themselves.146 In contrast, Malebranche taught that ideas perceived by the mind are properly divine ideas and are located in the substance of the deity.147 The human van Gorcum, 1981), intro. to part one (pp. 83–84); Locke, Essay 1.1.8 (p. 47); and Malebranche, Search after Truth 3.2.1.1 (p. 217). The specific terms “ideas of sensation and reflection” come from Locke’s, Essay 2.1.2–4 (pp. 104–6). Edwards followed Locke’s terminology (e.g., “The Mind,” no. 66 [6:383] and “Subjects to be Handled in the Treatise on the Mind,” nos. 29 and 31 [6:390]; Miscellanies, no. 238 [13:353]; Miscellanies, no. 782 [18:454]; and Discourse on the Trinity, 21:114–16). However, other thinkers also used the conceptual meaning of these terms, if not the terms themselves. Berkeley says that there are three types of ideas: ideas imprinted on the senses, ideas of the operations of the mind, ideas of memory and imagination (Berkeley, Principles 1.1 [p. 103]). The first notion of ideas correlates with Locke’s ideas of sensation and the latter two, since they share the same source—internal to the mind—correspond to Locke’s ideas of reflection. Also, it should be noted that Malebranche diverges, for he does not classify the soul’s perception of its inner operations as ideas (Search after Truth 3.2.1.1 [p. 218]). 144E.g., Locke, Essay 2.1.1–5 (pp. 104–6); Malebranche, Search after Truth 3.2.4 (pp. 226–27); and Berkeley, Principles 1.1–3 (pp. 103–4) and 1.30 (p. 113). 145Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 268 (13:373). 146Locke, Essay 2.30.2 (pp. 372–73). 147In the theory of ideas and the vision in God, Malebranche’s epistemology

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 181 mind does not see the essence of God, but the ideas that represent modes of participation in the divine essence according to which the divine will fashions the entities that populate the universe.148 The human mind gains knowledge when God wills that the human mind should see the divine ideas.149 In contrast to Malebranche’s location of ideas in God, Berkeley maintains that God causes the ideas to exist in the human mind.150 Edwards’ understanding of the nature and location of ideas does not correspond directly with that of Locke, Malebranche, or Berkeley, but his theory shares similarities with all three thinkers. Whether these similarities evince his direct and eclectic borrowing from these thinkers or indicate his arrival at similar conclusions by virtue of participating in common earlyEnlightenment intellectual streams is not clear. Nevertheless, we can point out the similarities and differences between the theories of Edwards, Locke, Malebranche, and Berkeley. First, like Berkeley and Locke, Edwards believed that ideas are the immediate object of the understanding and that they are located in the hucoalesces with his occasionalism. Upon interaction with the material world, God causes a modification in the soul, which is called sensation. At the same time, God reveals the divine idea to the mind, which corresponds to and thus provides knowledge of the material entity. The idea of perception, therefore, is the archetypal divine idea and gives knowledge of the essence of the sensible object (Malebranche, Search after Truth 3.2.6 [p. 234]; Desmond Connell, The Vision in God: Malebranche’s Scholastic Sources [Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1967], 147–48; Richard J. Fafara, “The implicit Efficacity of the Idea in the Recherche de la Vérité 1,” in Nicolas Malebranche, ed. and intro. Vere Chappell, Essays on Modern Philosophers from Descartes and Hobbes to Newton and Leibniz, 11 [New York: Garland, 1992], 98–102; McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy [Oxford: Clarendon, 1983], 54–68; and Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 141). 148Malebranche, Search after Truth 3.2.6 (p. 231). 149Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 5–6 and 98. 150Berkeley, Principles 1.2–3 (pp. 103–4) and 1.29–33 (pp. 113–14) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, vol. 2, ed. T. E. Jessop, The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, Series Bibliotheca Britannica Philosophica (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949), 214–15. Charles McCracken argues that Berkeley’s theory of idea is inconsistent because, on the one hand, he locates ideas outside of the human mind and in the mind of God and, on the other hand, describes ideas as modes or modifications of the mind. McCracken attributes this tension to Berkeley’s incorporation of Malebranche’s theory of ideas and sensation into his theory of ideas. He believed that this union is incompatible because for Malebranche ideas are in the divine mind and sensations are modifications of the human mind (McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 236–39).

182 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM man mind.151 Edwards’ belief that ideas are within the human mind differentiates him from Malebranche’s notion that the ideas of perception are viewed in the divine mind. Second, Edwards shares with Berkeley and Malebranche the conviction that God immediately causes the mind to perceive ideas in contrast to Locke’s teaching that objects possess powers that cause the idea in the understanding—albeit, even if these powers are ultimately derivative from God.152 Third, like Malebranche, but unlike Berkeley and Locke, Edwards teaches that God immediately causes the mind to perceive ideas upon sensory interaction with the created and material world. Berkeley rejected the perception of ideas on the basis of sensory stimuli and Locke attributed the power for the production of ideas in the human mind to the objects of perception and not the immediate agency of God.153 At this point, it is necessary to address the relationship between Edwards’ teaching that “nothing has any existence anywhere else but in consciousness” and Berkeley’s doctrine that esse est percipi.154 First, Berkeley’s esse est percipi means that since the mind only perceives ideas and only perceived things exist, then only ideas exist. Thus, Berkeley teaches ontological immaterialism. However, Edwards’ apparent immaterialism in “Of Being,” must be interpreted in light of passages in “The Mind.” Taken together, these texts underline that his idealism or his teaching that the divine ideas are the ontological ground for material entities and the epistemological basis for knowledge of those entities provides a theistic ground for the material creation and its relations and does not entail immaterialism. “The Mind” shows that Edwards’ teaching in “Of Being” that things exist only in consciousness means that the ontological foundations of material entities are the divine ideas. A material entity exists only because God possesses a divine idea, which in turn directs the divine will to instantiate the existence of the entity in time and space.155 Edwards wedded the early-Enlightenment epis151Edwards,

“The Mind,” nos. 10 (6:341–42) and 55 (6:371) and Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257–58). 152Edwards, “The Mind,” nos. 3 (6:339), 13 (6:344), and 15 (6:345). 153Berkeley, Principles 1.17–19 (pp. 108–9) and 1.29 (p. 113) and Locke, Essay 2.30.2 (pp. 373–74). For Edwards, see “The Mind,” nos. 3 (6:339), 10 (6:341–42), and 14 (6:344–45). 154Edwards, “Of Being,” 6:204 and Berkeley, Principles 1.3 (pp. 103–4). 155Edwards, “The Mind,” nos. 9–10 (6:341–42), 13 (6:343–44), 15 (6: 344–45), 27 (6:350–51), and 34 (6:353–54). For sources treating Berkeley’s principle that esse est percipi, see Dancy, “Editor’s Introduction,” in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 14–17 and 42–44 and George S. Pappas, Berkeley’s Thought (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), 103–46.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 183 temological and traditional scholastic ontological roles of ideas. The ideas in the human mind—epistemology—and the objects of the material world— ontology—are both the direct product of the divine ideas and divine will. Edwards believed that ideas are the components of knowledge. They are the basis of human knowledge because the ideas by which the human mind knows the objects in the universe correspond to the ideas in the divine mind. For instance, Edwards wrote that truth is the “consistency and agreement of our ideas with the ideas of God. . . . [And] truth as to external things, is the consistency of our ideas with those ideas, or that train and series of ideas, that are raised in our minds according to God’s stated order and law.”156 Although the mind does not perceive the objects of creation immediately, but mediately through ideas in the understanding, the ideas convey certain knowledge because they are instantiated by God after the pattern of the divine ideas.157 The same divine idea is the pattern of the divine power’s creation of the object and production of the idea in the human mind upon its encounter with the object in creation. Thus, ideas in the human mind are genuine objects of knowledge because they derive from the divine ideas, which are the patterns of the objects of creation. The epistemological role of ideas presupposes the ontological role of divine ideas in Edwards’ thought. According to Edwards’ theocentric idealism, material entities derive their existence from the exertion of the divine will in time and space according to the divine idea of the entity.158 In terms of created entities, epistemology and ontology are united because the ontological basis of created entities is epistemological—i.e., the divine ideas. Human knowledge of a material entity is the result of the divine will causing an idea in the human understanding upon interaction with the material entity. The basis of the existence of the material entity and the idea of the entity in the human mind is the same divine idea. Additionally, both the entity and the idea in the human mind are the product of the same divine power. As a consequence, the divine ideas are the central epistemological and ontological category in Edwards’ theocentric idealism because they are the ontological foundation of all created entities and the epistemological ground for the ideas that constitute human knowledge. Although Edwards gives no indication that he was striving to provide an answer to skepticism, nonetheless his theory of ideas provides an answer. First, skepticism was thought to result from the notion that ideas do 156Edwards,

“The Mind,” no. 10 (6:341–42). no. 40 (6:357). 158Ibid., no. 13 (6:344). 157Ibid.,

184 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM not convey the substantial/essential qualities of an object to the mind, but only the secondary qualities, which are nothing more than sense impressions or subjective modifications of the soul or mind. Second, skepticism was the consequence of the theory that ideas stand between the perceiving mind and the object they represent. The mind does not see the object, but the idea of the object. Ideas, therefore, do not convey the objects of perception directly, but indirectly represent objects to the mind and the perceiver does not know if the idea really represents the object of perception.159 Therefore, no certain epistemological basis exists to affirm that human knowledge, in the form of ideas, corresponds to the world as it really is. Edwards’ theocentric idealism in part solves this epistemological problem.160 First, the ontological foundations of all objects of perception are their corresponding divine idea. Second, God immediately causes ideas, as representative objects of the mind’s perception, in the human mind. Third, the ideas caused by God in the human mind upon its perception of an object are formed after the pattern of the divine idea, which is the ontological ground for that object of perception. As a consequence, human knowledge has a sure footing because the epistemological basis of the idea in the human mind and the ontological ground of the object of perception is the same divine idea. Moreover, God is the immediate cause of the existence of both the object and the idea. Edwards and the Subsistence of the Son as Idea Edwards used the notion of idea as the immediate object of the understanding to describe the subsistence of the second person of the Trinity. He used 159Michael Ayers, Locke: Volume 1: Epistemology, The Arguments of the Philosophers, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge, 1991), 15–16 and Yolton, “Ideas and Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (1975): 159. 160Malebranche intentionally used his theory of the vision in God to counter the Skepticism implicit to the Cartesian theories of ideas (Malebranche, Search after Truth 4.11.3 [p. 420] and Oeuvres de Malebranche, vol. 9, Résponse a la troisième letter de monsieur Arnauld, ed. Henri Gouhier [Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1966], 925–26). He believed that the vision in God provided epistemic certainty because human knowledge of material objects consisted of the ideas according to which God fashioned the object. Thus, the ontological foundation of the object and the epistemological basis of human knowledge are identical (Nicholas Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], 61–64 and Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 145–49).

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 185 the very specific term of perfect idea of reflection to illustrate the subsistence of the Son. He described the subsistence of the Son in terms of a perfect idea of reflection because it represents the fusion of epistemology and ontology. Put simply, perfect ideas, on an ontological level, repeat the object of thought.

Defining Terms: Ideas of Reflection and Perfect Ideas of Reflection Edwards used the term idea of reflection in a general and specific sense. First, ideas of reflection are the ideas of the immanent operations of the mind—e.g., love, fear, and thought.161 As such, an idea of thought, love, or fear is a repetition of the mental operation of thought, love, or fear. Edwards nuances his theory with the qualification that ideas of reflection—i.e., of mental operations—are not ideas per se, but the actual repetition of the mental operation.162 For example, to have an idea of thinking about an object is to be thinking about that object.163 Ideas of reflection, therefore, can refer to a repetition of the dynamic processes of the mind. Second, an idea of reflection refers to an idea that represents the mind as an object of thought. In this sense, an idea of reflection is the idea produced in the understanding when the mind views itself. The mind is the object of the mind’s perception. The idea represents the mind as an object, whereas in the former case, the idea is a repetition of a mental process of the mind. Edwards also used the more specific notion of perfect idea. Perfect ideas are essential for understanding Edwards’ trinitarianism because he describes the subsistence of the Son in terms of the perfect idea of the divine essence. He believed that a perfect idea matches exactly the object under consideration. A perfect idea then is a perfect repetition of the object. Key to his theory of perfect idea is that he includes being or existence among the constitutive components of a perfect idea. In Miscellany 94, Edwards clarified that an “absolutely perfect idea of a thing is the very thing, for it wants nothing that is in the thing, substance nor nothing else.”164 A perfect idea ontologically repeats the object represented by the idea because a perfect idea includes all aspects of the object. Edwards takes literally the notion of ideal repetition. He believed that if in an act of reflection, the mind could exactly repeat the ideas of a particular event, then that event would be repeated. 161Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:114–15. Miscellanies, no. 238 (13:353). 163Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:114–16. 164Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:258). 162Edwards,

186 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Edwards uses two examples to delineate the repetitive nature of perfect ideas. First, he says that if a person could engender a perfect set of ideas comprising the ideas of an event an hour past, then that event would be repeated. Second, he teaches that if a person had a “perfect reflex or contemplative idea of every thought at the same moment or moments that that thought was and of every exercise at and during the same time that that exercise was, and so through a whole hour, a man would really be two during that time, he would indeed be double, he would be twice at once.”165 But, Edwards taught that only God can have a perfect idea. The point is that perfect ideas possess ontological equality with the object of perception; hence, he claims that perfect ideas are repetitions of their objects.166

The Son as a Perfect Idea of Reflection Edwards portrays the subsistence of the Son in terms of a perfect idea of reflection.167 As such the subsistence of the Son includes both the repetition of operation and of being. This derives from Edwards’ commitment to the theological tenet that no distinction pertains in God between substance and act. Logically, substance precedes act, for something must be in order for something to act. So, to describe the subsistence of the Son as a perfect idea of reflection under the aspects of the repetition of operation and being, I first describe his subsistence under the aspect of being or substance and second under act. First, the Son, as a perfect idea of the divine essence, possesses ontological/substantial identity with the divine essence. The Son subsists as the terminal product of the eternal act of the divine understanding. The object of the eternal act of the divine understanding is the divine essence. Edwards states that God “views his own essence.”168 By virtue of the divine understanding viewing the divine essence, the divine essence proceeds and subsists in the form of an idea. Edwards describes the idea of the divine essence as a perfect idea. As a perfect idea, the Son is a repetition of the divine essence. Accordingly, he refers to the Son as the “perfect substantial idea” of God.169 The inclusion of being in the divine idea is necessary based 165Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:116. Discourse on the Trinity, 21:114–15. 167For passages on the application of perfect idea to the Son, see Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113–15; Miscellanies, nos. 179 (13:327), 238 (13:354), 260 (13:368), 308 (13:393), 331 (13:409), and 446 (13:494–95); and “The Mind,” nos. 10 (6:342), 34 (6:354), and 66 (6:383). 168Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:116. 169Edwards, Notes on Scripture, no. 335 (15:319–20). 166Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 187 on the principle that in God no distinction pertains between substance and act. If the divine idea did not include being, then God’s self-knowledge would be distinct from God’s being, which violates the principle of the identity of being and act in the divine nature. God’s eternal act of selfreflection is an act of the divine nature and as such that act is identical with the divine substance. This means that the idea produced by the divine understanding’s reflective view of the divine essence is identical with the divine nature. Yet since the idea is a product of the procession of the divine essence by virtue of the act of the understanding it introduces distinction within the divine essence. The idea is a subsistence of the divine nature; this subsistence is the divine person of the Son. Second, the Son, as a perfect idea of the divine essence, possesses the cognitive and volitional dynamism of the divine essence. The idea of the divine essence is not of a static essence, but of a dynamic one. God is a spiritual substance eternally knowing and loving. Since a perfect idea repeats the dynamism of the object of reflection, the idea generated by the eternal self-reflective act of the divine understanding entails that same dynamism of the object of reflection. Since no distinction exists in God between substance and act, the idea of the divine essence must be substance and act. That is, the Son, as the idea of the essence, is the divine essence in substance and act. The idea of the divine essence, therefore, is of the essence eternally knowing and loving. The Son knows and loves the Father from eternity as the Father knows and loves the Son from eternity. This must be the case otherwise the Son would not be the perfect idea or repetition of the divine essence. The Son, as the perfect idea of the divine essence, repeats the being and the divine nature’s twofold eternal acts of knowing and loving. In sum, ideas of reflection are products of the understanding. The understanding and idea relate to each other as productive power and product or term of operation. Edwards describes the personal distinction of the Son in terms of the understanding and idea. A close relationship exists between the divine understanding and idea and the human understanding and ideas. In the human mind, the act of the understanding begets an idea in the mind. The idea is the product of the understanding’s act. In the Godhead, the divine understanding views the divine essence and produces a perfect idea of the divine essence. This idea is called the Son and is the second subsistence of the divine nature. Thus, the Son proceeds by the act of the divine understanding and subsists as the perfect idea of the divine essence.170 170Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131 and Miscellanies, nos. 363 (13:435) and

188 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM It is important to bear in mind that while in the midst of describing the subsistence of the Son in the eighteenth century epistemological terminology of perfect idea, he continued to use the traditional trinitarian vocabulary of begotten/generation, procession, and subsistence of the essence to describe the personal distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit.171

Edwards’ Response to Potential Tritheism Following B. B. Warfield, Paul Helm concludes that Edwards’ theory that God’s eternal act of self-reflection generates the second person of the Trinity implies a form of tritheism and Oliver D. Crisp maintains that it leads to an “infinite number of persons in the Godhead.”172 On two occasions, Edwards responded to the implication that his use of the theory of ideal repetition to describe the subsistence and identity of the Son introduced the possibility of an infinite number of divine persons in the Godhead.173 Edwards’ notion of ideal repetition seems to imply that an infinite number of divine persons would be produced by virtue of the divine persons having an idea of the other divine persons. For example, the Father generates the Son as an idea of the divine essence by a self-reflective act of the understanding. The Son then understands the Father and thereby generates a second idea of the divine essence. This second idea contemplates the Son or Father or both and thereby produces one or two ideas and so on ad infinitum. In Miscellany 94, Edwards advances two solutions to the dilemma of the infinite multiplication of personal ideas in the Godhead. First, the Father cannot produce a second idea by contemplating the Son because the Son is already the idea of the divine essence. For the Father to have an additional idea of the Son is nothing other than the Son because the Son is the 370 (13:442). 171Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:116–19 and 131 and Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257–59). 172Warfield, “The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity,” in Biblical and Theological Studies, ed. Samuel G. Craig (1912; reprint, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1952), 26–27; Helm, “Introduction,” in Treatise on Grace and Other Posthumously Published Writings, ed. Paul Helm (Cambridge/London: James Clarke, 1971), 20–21; and Oliver D. Crisp, “Jonathan Edwards’s God: Trinity, Individuation, and Divine Simplicity,” in Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives, ed. Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 91. Anselm dealt with a version of this problem in the Monologion chs. 61–63 (Anslem, Monologion and Proslogion, with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, trans. Thomas Williams [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995], 73–77). 173Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 94 (13:261–62) and 308 (13:392–93).

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 189 idea of the divine essence.174 Consequently, a repetition of the Son is impossible and ideal repetition underlines the eternal subsistence of the Son. The Father eternally knows himself through the eternal subsistence of the Son. Second, to the criticism that the Son produces a second idea by contemplating the Father, Edwards responds that the Son is the idea of the Father. The Son’s idea of the Father is identical with his identity as Son because the Son is the idea of the Father.175 He applies the same line of reasoning to the query of the Spirit having an idea of the Father. He says that the Spirit’s idea of the Father is the same as the Father’s idea of the Father, which is the Son.176 In Miscellany 308, Edwards offers two additional solutions for the implication of the infinite multiplication of ideas. He identifies the understanding of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit with the divine essence. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit do not each possess an understanding, but each has the same understanding because each one is identical with the divine essence.177 Additionally, he points out that the Father generates the Son as an idea of the divine essence and the Father knows the Son as the divine essence. This solves the problem by rejecting the notion that the idea proceeds distinctly from the essence, which would introduce the multiplication of essential ideas, and asserts that the Son proceeds as a distinction within the essence. The Son, as the idea of the essence, is the divine essence. When the Father, as the unoriginate subsistence of the divine essence, understands the Son, he understands the essence identical with himself.178 Paul Helm and Oliver Crisp argue that Edwards proves too much because his notion of ideal repetition implies not a second person within the Godhead but a second God.179 However, Edwards’ theory does not imply this because in the divine essence the idea of the divine essence and the object perceived—i.e., the divine essence—are identical.180 Helm’s point is true in regard to human knowledge. In human knowledge, an idea is strictly the object in the mind that represents the object of perception. The idea is immanent to the mind and mediates between the mind and the object of perception. The mind, therefore, does not directly see the object of percep174Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:261). no. 94 (13:262). 176Ibid., no. 94 (13:262). 177Ibid., no. 308 (13:392). 178Ibid., Miscellanies, no. 308 (13:392–93). 179Helm, “Introduction,” 20–21 and Crisp, “Jonathan Edwards’s God,” 88–91. 180Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:258). 175Ibid.,

190 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM tion, but perceives the object via the idea in the mind. So then, the idea is the immediate object of perception, but not the object itself. This is true for ideas of sensation and reflection. In terms of ideas of sensation, if the mind sees the object of sensation by ideas, then it is easy to see that the idea is not the object of sensation per se, but the mental representative object of the object of the senses. With ideas of sensation, two entities exist—the object of perception external to the mind and the idea in the mind. In terms of ideas of reflection, the mind’s idea of the mind is still distinct from the mind. The result is that two entities exist—the mind as the object of perception and the idea in the mind that represents the mind. Hence, even with an idea of reflection, the object—the mind—is not directly apprehended, but the idea of the mind is the datum of the mind’s understanding. One exception is ideas of reflection as ideas of mental operations. In this respect, to have an idea of love for an object is to love the object. Therefore, since in human knowledge the idea in the mind is not identical with the object and if it were possible for the human mind to have a perfect idea and thus ontologically repeat the object represented by the idea, then two identical objects would exist. However, in the Godhead, the object of perception— the divine essence—and the idea are identical, so there is no multiplication of divine beings. Edwards’ use of the term idea incorporated aspects common within his historical and philosophical context. He utilized the notion of idea as the product of the understanding to describe the subsistence of the Son. He portrayed the subsistence of the Son in terms of a perfect idea of reflection. As a perfect idea, the Son is a repetition, essentially and dynamically, of the divine nature. Yet the repetition, while providing distinction within the essence by virtue of subsistence, does not entail the production of distinct beings. Next, we examine Edwards’ theology of the Holy Spirit.

THE HOLY SPIRIT AS THE MUTUAL LOVE OF THE FATHER AND THE SON Edwards’ doctrine of the Holy Spirit reflects the mutual love tradition. He portrays the Holy Spirit as the subsisting mutual love between the Father and the Son. The following discussion details the unique way Edwards expressed his pneumatology within the familiar Augustinian framework. It accomplishes this by detailing his continued reliance on psychological structures to discuss the subsistence of the Holy Spirit and the importance of the self-communicative nature of God to the Spirit’s identity as mutual love.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 191 The Mental Analogy and the Procession of the Holy Spirit Edwards’ theology of the Holy Spirit, as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, relies on the psychological structure of the mental image. As Edwards defines the Son in terms of the immanent act and subsistent term of the divine understanding, so he defines the Spirit in terms of the divine act and subsistence of the divine will. Edwards used three ways to describe the subsistence of the Holy Spirit in terms of the act of the divine will: 1) the Spirit as the disposition of the Godhead; 2) the Spirit as the act of the divine essence; and 3) the Spirit as the love of God.

“Spirit” as Substance and Disposition Edwards notes that the word S/spirit has a twofold meaning. First, it can refer to a spiritual substance such as the divine essence, an angelic being, or the human soul. In this manner, we say that God is a Spirit and that the human soul is a spirit. In this usage, the word s/Spirit denotes the spiritual nature of the referent. Second, s/Spirit refers to the disposition, will, inclination, and temper of a spiritual substance. Similarly, Spirit is used to refer to the affection, disposition, and will of God. In trinitarian theology, Edwards trades on the distinction between Spirit as a term of substance and as a term of disposition to distinguish between the divine nature as the divine Spirit and the third person of the Trinity as the Spirit of God.181 The mental analogy is important here because Edwards believed that the divine essence, like the human mind, possesses only two immanent relative attributes—understanding and will.182 Since the Son corresponds to the intellectual power, the Holy Spirit must compare to the volitional power. As a consequence, the terms Spirit and will are univocal and Edwards calls the Holy Spirit the “disposition or temper or affection of the divine mind.”183

The Holy Spirit as the Act of the Divine Essence Edwards taught that the Holy Spirit is the subsistence of the divine nature in “pure act.”184 He applied the notion of the human will as the principal 181Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:122–23 and Miscellanies, nos. 143 (13:299), 146 (13:299), 157 (13:307), and 396 (13:461–62). 182Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 146 (13:299–300). Edwards of course accepts the traditional divine attributes—e.g., omnipotence, omniscience, and aseity, but these are absolute and not relative attributes. 183Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:122. 184Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:108, 111, and 118; Miscellanies, no. 94

192 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM active power of the human soul to the immanent Godhead and subsistence of the Holy Spirit.185 He taught that the Holy Spirit subsists as the eternal essential act of the divine will.186 The Holy Spirit is eternal because the divine will is eternally active or exercised. No potency exists in God. The Holy Spirit is an essential subsistence because no distinction pertains between the eternal exercise of the divine will and the divine essence; thus, the divine nature is simple in terms of its act and being.187 Since the will is eternally active and the act of the essence is identical with the essence, then the act of the divine will issues forth a distinct subsistence of the divine essence. The Holy Spirit is this eternal subsistent act of the divine essence.188

The Holy Spirit, the Will of God, and the Love of God Edwards most frequently calls the Holy Spirit the love of God.189 Divine love is a function of the divine will just as human religious affection and love is a product of the will. For Edwards, the highest expression of the will is love. In Religious Affections, Edwards taught that true religion consists in love. Love is the “chief of the affections, and fountain of all other affections.”190 For Edwards, the affections are a species of will. The affections are the most accentuated and exuberant acts of the will. Since the affections are the highest expression of the will and love is the highest affection, love is the superlative exertion of the will. When Edwards says that true religion consists in love he means love that has the divine excellency as its object. True religion consists in love for God because love for God is the highest form of love.191 Human love is imperfect and cannot attain to an infinite expression of love because it is ontologically derivative; it is a love that ultimately (13:260–61); and “Charity and Its Fruits,” 8:373. 185Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:121 and Miscellanies, nos. 259 (13:367), 362 (13:435), 370 (13:442), and 396 (13:461). 186Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:121–22 and Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:260– 61). 187Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113 and 116–17. 188Ibid., 21:121. 189Ibid., 21:121–23, 129–31, and 138; Treatise on Grace, 21:183 and 186–87; Ethical Writings, 8:132–33 and 370; and Miscellanies, nos. 98 (13:265), 143 (13:298–99), 146 (13:300), 151 (13:302), 220 (13:345), 259 (13:367), 305 (13:390), 310 (13:393), 331 (13:409), 341 (13:415), 370 (13:441), and 405 (13:468). 190Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:106–7. 191Edwards, Religious Affections, 2:96–97 and “The Nature of True Virtue,” 8:540–60.

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 193 derives from God. His concept of perfect love is similar to the notion that perfect being is necessary. Love, like being, to be perfect must not be derived. When Edwards says that the love of the saints for God in heaven reaches a state of perfection appropriate to their created nature, he means that they love God and the other saints with an inviolable love. However, their love is not metaphysically perfect because it is ultimately derived from the love of God. Perfect love is found only in the eternal Godhead.192 Unlike the act of the human will, the act of the divine will must be perfect/infinite, otherwise potency would exist in God, which Edwards denies.193 Since love is the highest expression of the will, a perfect act of the divine will is an act of divine love. The divine will, therefore, must be eternally exercised in love. Perfect love has two requirements. First, the lover must possess the power of an infinite and eternal act of love. Second, the object of love must be infinitely worthy of an infinite and eternal act of love. These requirements are only met in the divine essence.194 In the Godhead, the immanent act of love meets the criteria of perfection because the object of its love is infinite perfection and the consequent exertion of the love is infinite; indeed, the object of the divine love and the act of the divine love is the divine essence. The Holy Spirit is called the love of God because the Spirit is that infinite and eternal love of God, which love is a subsistence of the divine essence.195 The Holy Spirit and the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son Edwards followed a basic contour of the Western trinitarian tradition by identifying the Holy Spirit with the eternal act of the divine will expressed through the immanent act of divine love. He also believed—and this is the heart of his trinitarian theology—that the particular form of divine love in which the Spirit subsists is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The mutual love model was central to Edwards’ advocacy of the reasonableness of the Trinity. He deduced the reasonableness of the Trinity from the moral goodness of God. He taught that God’s moral goodness is inherently selfcommunicative. The immanent self-communication of God necessitates plurality in the Godhead. The structure of the immanent self192Edwards,

“Heaven is a World of Love,” 8:373–74. Discourse on the Trinity, 21:121–22. 194Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:264). 195Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:133–34 and 142 and Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:260–61). 193Edwards,

194 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM communication of the divine goodness and plurality of the Godhead is the mutual love model of the Trinity. This section details Edwards’ theory of the self-communicative nature of God, its relationship to Edwards’ notion of being’s consent to being, and the mutual love model as the form for the immanent self-communication of the divine goodness.

The Communicative Nature of Goodness A foundational principle of Edwards’ trinitarian theology is that God’s moral goodness requires communication within the Godhead that in turn entails plurality.196 Goodness involves interpersonal happiness. The interpersonal communication of happiness is the consequence of the disposition of the divine nature to communicate happiness.197 In other words, true happiness is not self-enclosed, but shares itself with another and, thus, it is not selfish. The communicative nature of goodness means that God is dynamic. The dynamism of goodness means a person who possesses goodness desires to communicate that goodness with another. Edwards applies this dynamic notion of moral goodness to God. He reasons that since God is infinite goodness and infinite goodness requires infinite communication to another, then the Godhead must be a plurality.198 The divine selfcommunication must produce divine-personal diversity because God cannot infinitely love and thereby communicate happiness to a being that is not infinitely good. Edwards ties the love of God to the goodness of God. Love is the dynamic act that constitutes goodness. That is, love is the communication of happiness of one to another. An act of love, therefore, consummates moral goodness. Since goodness is the offspring of love, love is the foundation of the goodness of God. The only object that is infinitely good and thus that meets the criterion of an infinite communication of happiness is God.199 Therefore, plurality in the Godhead is necessary because the communication of the infinite happiness of God—i.e., love—requires an infinite object of goodness.

196Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:263). nos. 87 (13:251–52), 97 (13:264), and 104 (13:272). Edwards used the term goodness equivocally. On the one hand, it refers to the goodness that is the product of the communication of happiness. In this sense, it is equivalent with excellency and mutual love. On the other hand, it is interchangeable with happiness. 198Ibid., no. 96 (13:263–64). 199Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 117 (13:283–84). 197Ibid.,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 195

Communicative Goodness Requires Two Subjects Communicating Goodness Edwards’ communicative theory of goodness requires at least two eternal and perfect subjects communicating goodness. Two eternal loving subjects involve a dynamic process of subjects giving, receiving, and returning love.200 The communication of happiness presupposes a capacity of reception in the recipient. For instance, human beings cannot truly communicate human happiness to a pet, such as a dog. One requires another human being to share that happiness in a fully human and personal sense. Edwards’ theory that the genuine communication of goodness requires personal reception and return implies two equal subjects in the divine being. A second subject is necessary to receive the communication of goodness from the initial subject communicating goodness.201 In the Godhead, the two subjects reciprocally communicating goodness are the Father and the Son.202

Communicative Goodness and Being’s Consent to Being The catchphrase for Edwards’ reciprocal notion of love is being’s consent to being.203 Edwards used a variety of terms to discuss this principle. For instance, he refers to love and being’s consent to being as excellency, beauty, harmony, and mutual love.204 The most important terms, because they are the most consistently used, are excellency and mutual love. Edwards offers “this is an universal definition of excellency: The consent of being to being, or being’s consent to entity” and that “God’s excellence . . . consists in love of himself . . . in the mutual love of the Father and the Son.”205 With these terms he means to convey that the essence of love is agreement, union, and consent to the system of being. For humans, this occurs through participating in the unity of the created universe, human society, loving human relationships, and ultimately fellowship with the triune God.206 Being’s consent to being finds its ultimate expression in the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For in their mutual love, absolute perfect being infinitely consents 200Edwards,

“Heaven is a World of Love,” 8:377. 8:373. 202Ibid., 8:373. For more on the communicative nature of divine goodness, see Miscellanies, nos. 97 (13:264) and 117 (13:283–84); “Heaven is a World of Love,” 8:373; and “The Mind,” no. 1 (6:336–38). 203Edwards, “The Mind,” no. 45 (6:362–63). 204Ibid., nos. 1 (6:336–38), 45 (6:362–63), and “Beauty of the World,” 6:305. 205Ibid., nos. 1 (6:336) and 45 (6:364). 206Ibid., no. 1 (6:336–38). 201Ibid.,

196 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM or loves absolute perfect being.207 Thus, moral perfection is gained because the infinite communication of goodness is given to infinite goodness.

The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son The communication of goodness within the immanent Godhead must be a mutual act of love between the two consenting divine subjects. Moreover, since in God no distinction pertains between substance and act, the immanent and eternal act of mutual love between the Father and the Son issues forth a third subsistence of the divine nature.208 The Holy Spirit is the communication of goodness, in the form of the mutual love of the Father and the Son, within the immanent Godhead.209 The social motifs of Edwards’ trinitarianism emerge under the aspect of the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Edwards used the term society to describe the immanent Trinity on numerous occasions. Indeed, the word has a twofold application in his trinitarian theology. Society denotes first the fellowship and communion that eternally unites the Father and the Son and, second, the order of acting in the economy of redemption arising from the order of subsistent relations.210 In terms of the personal identity of the Holy Spirit, the use of society to indicate communion is important. The economic application is also significant, but it refers to the Spirit’s role in the economy of redemption that properly follows from the Spirit’s immanent personal identity. To distinguish Edwards’ use of the term society from the modern social trinitarian usage, and thus to avoid anachronism, it is necessary to define Edwards’ precise application of the term in his trinitarian theology. Society refers to the fellowship and loving communion between the Father and the Son. The society of the Trinity is the happiness and delight the Father and the Son experience as they mutually love or consent to each another. The Holy Spirit, as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, constitutes the society of the Trinity.211 The Spirit is neither a recipient nor a giver of love, but is the love that binds the Father and the Son in eternal fellowship. The society of Edwards’ Trinity is two divine persons united in loving

207Edwards,

“The Mind,” no. 45 (6:364–65). Discourse on the Trinity, 21:122–23. 209Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:186. 210Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:134–36; Miscellanies, no. 571 (18:110); Treatise on Grace, 21:186; and Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431 and 433–35). 211Edwards, Treatise on Grace, 21:186. 208Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 197 communion by the third person who is identical with that mutual love between the Father and the Son. Edwards’ trinitarian society is clearly Augustinian and not the threesubject trinitarian society of social trinitarianism. Important to note is that in neither its immanent nor economic application is society used in the modern social trinitarian sense of the word. For social trinitarians, society refers to the interpersonal relations between the three divine subjects. Each divine subject gives and receives love. For Edwards, society refers to the communion of love that unites the Father and the Son on the one hand and to the economic relations on the other hand. However, in both cases, only the Father and the Son are properly subjects in the social trinitarian sense of the word. Edwards’ description of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son squarely locates him within the Western Augustinian trinitarian tradition. Edwards’ Pneumatology and the Mutual Love Tradition Edwards’ portrayal of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son includes two characteristics that further serve to locate him within Western Augustinian trinitarianism. First, the Spirit, as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, is passive. Second, the Spirit is the principle of unity within the immanent Godhead. Gary D. Badcock argues that the Spirit’s passivity and unitive function in the immanent Trinity derive from the filioque.212 In this respect, Edwards sits squarely within the Western trinitarian tradition. The Spirit as the immanent act of mutual love is not an actor, but subsists passively. As the act of mutual love between the Father and the Son, the Spirit proceeds as an immanent act of the will within the divine nature. In contrast to the passive subsistence of the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are active co-principles of the Spirit’s procession as mutual love.213 While the Son initially subsists passively as the product of the divine understanding, i.e., idea, he becomes active as a subject receiving and returning love. While the “initial” passivity of the Son is real, in that he subsists solely from another, nonetheless it is not a temporal movement from passivity to activity. The Son subsists, therefore, as an active person within the Godhead. However, the Spirit is neither the object of an act nor a subject who acts. The Spirit is an act, the mutual act of love between the Father and the 212Badcock, Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 75–79. 213Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:130–31 and 140.

198 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Son.214 Edwards’ comment in the sermon “Heaven is a World of Love” succinctly presents these notions: And the Son of God is not only the infinite object of love, but he is also an infinite subject of it. He is not only the infinite object of the Father’s love, but he also infinitely loves the Father. The infinite essential love of God is, as it were, an infinite and eternal mutual holy energy between the Father and the Son, a pure, holy act whereby the Deity becomes nothing but an infinite and unchangeable act of love, which proceeds from both the Father and the Son.215

Edwards does not name the Holy Spirit in this passage, but it is clear from other texts that the infinite act of mutual love between the Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit. In Discourse on the Trinity, Edwards states that the “Holy Ghost is the deity subsisting in act, or the divine essence flowing out and breathed forth in God’s infinite love to and delight in Himself.”216 Related to the passive subsistence of the Spirit and active subsistence of the Father and the Son is the doctrine of the filioque. Edwards believed that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The mutual love of the Father and the Son is a double procession that yields a single subsistence of the divine nature that constitutes the person of the Holy Spirit.217 The Holy Spirit is also the immanent principle of unity between the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit is the bond that unites the Father and the Son in the perfect communion of love.218 The generation of the Son introduces differentiation within the Godhead. The Father and the Son subsist as two subjective poles within the divine essence, although their distinct subjective subsistence does not imply division of the substance. The Father and the Son transcend their differentiation by mutual love, which is the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is the subsistence of the divine nature in love that unites the Father and the Son.219 Edwards’ portrayal of the Holy Spirit as

214Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 376 (13:448). “Heaven is a World of Love,” 8:373. 216Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131. 217Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135; “Heaven is a World of Love,” 8:373; Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257); “The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost,” 14:379; and Treatise on Grace, 21:184–87. 218Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:129–30; Treatise on Grace, 21:186; Miscellanies, no. 376 (13:448); and Notes on Scripture, no. 393 (15:387). 219For examples, see Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 94 (13:260–61), 96 (13:264), 98 13:265), and 143 (13:298–99). 215Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 199 the bond of love that unites the Father and the Son is a key datum for locating Edwards within the Augustinian trinitarian tradition.220 In conclusion of this section, Edwards described the personal identity of the Holy Spirit in terms of the mutual love of the Father and the Son. His philosophical concept of being’s consent to being and theory of the communicative nature of goodness find perfect realization in the subsistence of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Edwards deployed social motifs in the framework of the mutual love model of the Trinity. His consistent portrayal of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son locates his trinitarianism within the Augustinian mutual love tradition.

THE IMMANENT PROCESSIONS AND THE ECONOMIC MISSIONS For Edwards, the immanent identities of the divine persons shape their economic roles in the work of redemption. The correlation between the immanent processions of the Son and the Spirit and the economic missions of the Son and the Spirit in Edwards’ trinitarianism is in continuity with the correlation between the immanent identities and economic missions of the divine persons in the mutual love tradition. The economy of the Trinity derives from the divine nature’s disposition for self-communication. God is intrinsically disposed to the ad extra communication of his goodness. Since God’s goodness is identical with divine triunity, the form of the ad extra communication is the eternal triune subsistence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The following describes the relationship between the immanent identity and the economic work of the divine persons, the communicative nature of God, and the economic subordination of the Son and the Spirit.

220Amy

Plantinga Pauw correctly maintains that portraying the Holy Spirit as the “non-personal bond” between the Father and the Son is one of the central characteristics and limitations—from the perspective of social trinitarianism—of the Augustinian trinitarian tradition (Plantinga Pauw, “Supreme Harmony of All”: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 185 and “Supreme Harmony of All: Jonathan Edwards and the Trinity,” [Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1990], 55). The historical and theological veracity of Plantinga Pauw’s comment is not important. The crucial issue is that Edwards used the precise method of describing the immanent subsistence of the Holy Spirit that Plantinga Pauw identifies as the chief problematic of Western trinitarianism and pneumatology.

200 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The Immanent Identities and Economic Roles of the Divine Persons The immanent identity of the divine persons shapes their economic missions. In End of Creation, Edwards sets forth this principle when he writes, “the emanation or communication (ad extra) is of the internal glory or fullness of God, as it is.”221 The economic order reflects the immanent order of subsistence because the economic Trinity is the ad extra communication of divine goodness, which is the social love realized in the fellowship of the trinitarian God. Edwards’ theory of the relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity is consistent with Rahner’s axiom that the “‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.”222 I am not suggesting that Edwards developed a trinitarian theology identical with Rahner’s trinitarian theology, but only that they share a common principle; namely, as the Godhead subsists by the communication of the divine essence in the modes of knowledge and love, so the ad extra communication of the Godhead corresponds to knowledge and love. The twofold economic emanation of God’s glory corresponds to the twofold immanent emanation in the Godhead. The specific form of the ad extra communication matches the immanent subsistence of the triune God.223 The structural unity between the ad intra and the ad extra communication is so strong that Edwards refers to the latter as the “repetition” and “multiplication” of the former.224 The glory of God consists in the Son, as the subsistence of divine knowledge, and the Holy Spirit, as the subsistence of mutual love. The ad extra communication of God’s glory is the Son, as the revelation of the knowledge of God, and the Holy Spirit, as the communication of the love of God.225 The Son communicates knowledge of God ad extra because ad intra he proceeds by the divine understanding and subsists as the perfect idea of the divine essence.226 The Holy Spirit com221Edwards,

“End of Creation,” 8:528 (emphasis added). Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel and intro. Catherine Mowry LaCugna (New York: Crossroad, 1998), 22. 223Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1266a (23:213). 224Edwards, “End of Creation,” 8:433. 225Edwards, “End of Creation,” 8:528; Discourse on the Trinity, 21:123–24; Miscellanies, no. 1151 (20:525); and Miscellanies, no. 1218 (23:150–53). Edwards’ notion that the ad extra communication of the Son as the revelation of the knowledge of God and of the Holy Spirit as the love of God does not seem far from Rahner’s teaching that in the economic Trinity “[t]he one God communicates himself in absolute self-utterance and as absolute donation of love” (Rahner, The Trinity, 36). 226Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:123–24 and Miscellanies, no. 331 (13:409). 222Karl

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 201 municates the love of God ad extra because ad intra the Spirit proceeds and subsists as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.227 The Father is the source of the ad extra communication of the Son and the Holy Spirit because ad intra he is the principal source of the processions and subsistence of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus, the immanent identity of the divine persons determines their economic role in the communication of the triune God. Indeed, God created the specific form of the spiritual nature of the human soul to receive the economic communication of the triune God. The human soul consists of understanding and will precisely so that it may receive the communication of divine knowledge and love and in turn know and love the triune God.228 The Communicative Nature of God and the Economic Trinity The economic Trinity is the fruit of the communicative nature of God.229 Edwards believed that the divine nature possesses an inherent disposition

227Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:123–24 and 134–35 and Miscellanies, no. 376 (13:448). 228Edwards, “End of Creation,” 8:529 and Miscellanies, nos. 332 (13:410) and 448 (13:495). 229For the most thorough and indispensable treatment of Edwards’ theory of the dispositional nature of the triune God for ad intra and ad extra selfcommunication, see Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, exp. ed. (1988; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 170–210 and “Jonathan Edwards’ Dispositional Conception of the Trinity: A Resource for Contemporary Reformed Theology,” in Toward the Future of Reformed Theology, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 444–55. Also, Edwards’ theory of the communicative nature of God may reflect the strand of English and New England piety and theology identified by Janice Knight as the “Spiritual Brethren.” The Spiritual Brethren stand in contrast to the “Intellectual Fathers.” The difference lies in that the former stressed mysticism and charity whereas the latter emphasized divine power and the contractual covenant. Key representatives of the Spiritual Brethren are Richard Sibbes and John Cotton. Representatives of the Intellectual Brethren are William Ames and Thomas Shepard. However, thinkers from both the Intellectual Fathers and Spiritual Brethren influenced Edwards, which suggests that easy categorization of at least Edwards, not to mention Sibbes and Ames et al, is unlikely (Knight, Orthodoxies in Massachusetts: Rereading American Puritanism [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994], 2–4 and 133–37). Knight’s argument for two strands of Puritan theology directly counters Perry Miller’s theory that New England Puritanism was monolithic (Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century [1939; 2nd reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963], vii).

202 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM to communicate its goodness ad extra.230 The economy or ad extra communication of God is a necessary result of the self-diffusive nature of the divine being. The ad extra communication of the divine goodness is not the result of a deficiency in the ad intra communication—i.e., the procession and subsistence of the Son and the Holy Spirit; but it occurs because of the very possibility of the ad extra communication of the divine goodness. The communicative nature of goodness renders the economic communication necessary by its very possibility.231 The ad extra communication of goodness is the consequence of the perfection of the divine goodness, that is, its intrinsic communicative nature.232 The necessity of the ad extra communication of divine goodness raises the problem that creation is necessary in order to bring the communicative nature of God to perfection. In other words, the necessity of God to create the world suggests that the ad intra communication of divine goodness is insufficient. Although Edwards does not address this problem, based on his theory of the necessary relationship between the divine nature and divine activity a solution can be posed. Edwards’ teaching of divine necessity and divine freedom are consistent with his determinism. According to his determinism, necessary action and freedom are compatible concepts. He applies the same determinist logic to the human being under the power of original sin. The person sins necessarily, yet also freely.233 Similarly, God necessarily acts with righteousness or in accord with the righteousness of the divine nature. Nevertheless, God’s necessary righteousness does not mitigate divine freedom.234 For Edwards, the disposition of the divine nature to communicate goodness is constitutive of God’s moral perfection. God necessarily acts according to the divine nature.235 And, since God’s nature is to communicate goodness, God necessarily communicates goodness.

230Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 1218 (23:150–53). “End of Creation,” 8:420 and 432–33. 232Edwards, “End of Creation,” 8:462. 233Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:432–33. 234Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1:277–80 and 375–83. 235William J. Wainwright makes a similar point when he notes that Edwards “believed that moral agency and freedom are compatible with metaphysical necessity. God can only do what is fittest and best” (“Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe, and the Necessity of Creation,” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder [Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996], 127). 231Edwards,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 203 Yet the problem still remains as to the necessity of the ad extra communication of divine goodness. After all, the ad intra communication of goodness between the Father and the Son is a perfect and infinite communication of goodness. It seems that with the necessity of the perfect and infinite communication fulfilled ad intra, the ad extra communication of goodness is unnecessary and, therefore, gratuitous. Perhaps the solution is to see the ad extra communication of goodness as a consequence of the ad intra communication of goodness and not as a perfection of the divine nature. Although this too seems ultimately unsatisfactory because according to Edwards’ theory of the communicative nature of divine goodness, without the ad extra communication of goodness, God’s goodness is incomplete.236 The Order of the Divine Subsistences and Economic Subordination The economy of the Trinity is the structure and order according to which the divine persons act to fulfill the ad extra communication of divine goodness.237 The economy of the Trinity is the product of the disposition of the divine nature to communicate its goodness.238 The economic order of the divine persons derives from their order of immanent subsistence. Edwards teaches that while the economic order is consensual, nevertheless it is not arbitrary. The order of the immanent subsistences establishes an order of propriety for the economic Trinity. The Father subsists first and, therefore, is the chief executive of the Trinity. The Son and the Spirit are subordinate to the Father in the order of subsistence. However, this subordination is not one of ontology, but one of origin and order of procession. The subordination of the divine persons in the order of subsistence entails a subordination of the divine persons in the economic order. The Son is the second subsistence; the Son subsists from the Father. The Son, while subordinate to the Father, has authority over the Holy Spirit in the economic order. The Holy Spirit is the third subsistence and, consequently, is subordinate to the

236James Beilby also critiques the apparent inconsistency in Edwards thought between aseity and the necessary ad extra self-communication of God in creation: see “Divine Aseity, Divine Freedom: A Conceptual Problem for Edwardsean Calvinism,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47 (2004): 650–58. William Wainwright presents a case for the cogency of Edwards’ notion that creation is necessary given the self-communicative nature of God and the indefensibility of his idea that God must create this specific world (“Jonathan Edwards, William Rowe, and the Necessity of Creation,” 122–33). 237Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431). 238Ibid., no. 1062 (20:431–32).

204 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Father and the Son.239 The Holy Spirit is subordinate to the both the Father and the Son because he proceeds from both the Father and the Son. Thus, the economic order of acting ad extra rests on a certain order and relative dependence of subsistence among the divine persons. Edwards believed that economic subordination is consistent with ontological equality. The economic subordination of the Son and the Holy Spirit does not infer an ontological subordination. The order of subsistence does not imply ontological gradation nor does priority of subsistence in the order of nature imply superiority of nature. The relative dependence of the subsistence of the Son on the Father and the subsistence of the Holy Spirit on the Father and the Son does not entail ontological inferiority.240 The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have the same divine nature and are ontologically equal.241 The distinction of speaking of the immanent Trinity in terms of in facto esse and in fieri is helpful here. Although Edwards did not use these concepts, they capture his teaching. In facto esse, the divine persons are equally divine and subsist eternally. In fieri, theology speaks of the subsistence of the Son and the Holy Spirit in terms of becoming. However, the temporal connotation of the language is not characteristic of the subsistence of the Son and the Holy Spirit considered in facto esse.

The Economic Order and the Covenant of Redemption The economic order among the divine persons is the basis for the covenant of redemption. The economic order is the foundation for the covenant of redemption because the establishment of the order of acting between the divine persons—i.e., the economic order—must be determined prior to the specification of those acts.242 The Father designs and initiates the covenant of redemption. He proposes the covenant to the Son, who deigns to undergo the Incarnation and suffering to accomplish the Father’s plan of redemption. Since the Incarnation and suffering of the Son are beneath the dignity of the deity, the Father cannot unilaterally require the Son to fulfill his role in the designed work of redemption. By freely accepting his role in the covenant of redemption, the Son enters into a new subordination to the Father.243 However, while the Father’s sending of the Son to be incarnate and suffer on the cross is not entailed within the economic order, it is con239Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:430–34). no. 1062 (20:430). 241Edwards, “The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost,” 14:379. 242Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:431–32). 243Ibid., no. 1062 (20:436–37). 240Ibid.,

EDWARDS AND THE AUGUSTINIAN MUTUAL LOVE TRADITION 205 sistent with the prior economic order. The covenant of redemption is consistent with the economy because the Father sends the Son and the Son is sent and follows the will of the Father. While the particular work of Christ’s humiliation is supererogatory and thus merits the gift of redemption, the relational order of the economy remains intact.244

The Holy Spirit and the Covenant of Redemption The Holy Spirit is not a covenanting participant in the covenant of redemption because the work of redemption proposed by the Father and the Spirit’s role in it does not entail any work beneath the dignity of his divine office. In spite of this, Edwards states that the Spirit enters into a new twofold subjection to Christ, but that neither transcends the previously established economic subordination. According to the economic relations, the Son has jurisdiction over the Spirit. In the covenant of redemption, the Father promotes the Son to co-executive because he accepts the humiliation of suffering in the flesh. The Son, as vice-regent, is granted authority over the Spirit that is not strictly implied in the economic relationship. The new twofold subjection of the Spirit to the Son introduced by the covenant of redemption is that the Son has disposal to send the Spirit as the gift of grace and that the Spirit acts under the incarnate Son, that is, as the divine Son united to humanity, which continues into perpetuity.245 In my judgment, Edwards’ argument that the work of the Spirit under the covenant of redemption requires a “new” and “diverse” subordination from that entailed in the economic order is unnecessary according to Edwards’ theory of the economic Trinity.246 For example, Edwards argues that when the Father places the sending of the Spirit at the discretion of the Son this involves a subordination of the Spirit to the Son distinct from the subordination implicit to the economic order.247 However, this is not the case because the authority of the Son to send the Spirit as the gift of grace in the administration of the covenant of redemption is a relationship implied in the procession of the Spirit from the Son. The economy of acting derives precisely from the order of subsistence, which in turn is the product of the divine processions; the order of the economy reflects the order of the immanent subsistence of the divine persons. In addition, his argument that the Spirit’s obedience under the incarnate Son implies a new form of subjection 244Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:437–38). no. 1062 (20:439–41). 246Ibid., no. 1062 (20:439–40). 247Ibid., no. 1062 (20:439). 245Ibid.,

206 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM is invalid. The authority of the incarnate Son to administrate the activity of the Spirit under the covenant of redemption remains linked to his order of subsistence. The Incarnation of the Son does not alter his immanent status as the second subsistent of the divine nature and, therefore, does not affect his administrative authority over the Spirit. Edwards’ immanent and economic trinitarianism possesses remarkable consistency. The personal identities of the divine persons in the immanent Trinity are the pattern for their economic roles. Yet Edwards’ immanent and economic trinitarian theology also contains two problematic features. The necessity of the economic Trinity as the product of the communicative nature of divine goodness seems to render God incomplete without creation and redemption. Moreover, his notion that the covenant of redemption requires a new subordination of the Spirit to the Son fails to recognize that the subordination of the Spirit to the Son in the covenant of redemption is already entailed in the economic order. Finally, by linking the economic roles with the immanent identities of the divine persons and defining the economic roles in terms of the mutual love model, Edwards’ immanent and economic trinitarianism reflects continuity with the Augustinian mutual love trinitarian tradition.

CONCLUSION Edwards’ trinitarianism stands in continuity with the Augustinian mutual love tradition because it embodies the five central characteristics of that tradition. The purpose of this chapter within the larger scope of this project is twofold. It locates Edwards’ trinitarianism within a dominant historical trinitarian tradition. Furthermore, it counters the theory that Edwards used two disparate trinitarian models—the psychological and social—by showing that he consistently used the Augustinian mutual love model and expressed social motifs within the framework of the mutual love model of the Trinity. The next chapter explores the continuities between Edwards’ trinitarian theology and the trinitarian theologies of his early-Enlightenment context.

5 JONATHAN EDWARDS AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSIES Although Jonathan Edwards’ trinitarian theology stands within a distinct tradition of Western trinitarian theology reaching back at least as far as Augustine, it also intersects with important currents of early-Enlightenment trinitarianism. The Enlightenment was a period of profound intellectual upheaval that placed unique demands on Christian thinkers. Central Christian doctrines, largely unassailable since the patristic era, were suddenly under the scrutiny and judgment of the newly appointed authority of human reason. Not that reason was absent from the preceding intellectual period, but that in the eighteenth century it interloped and displaced the hitherto reigning authorities of Scripture, tradition, and church. Adept Christian theologians learned to defend, re-fashion, and in many cases integrate Christian thought with the emerging and changing intellectual climate. The doctrine of the Trinity was a central breakwater upon which converging intellectual currents collided in the Enlightenment. The story begins in late-seventeenth century England with Socinian and deist criticisms of the doctrine and culminates in its functional irrelevance in the earlynineteenth century, epitomized in Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith (1821–1822). The earlier scenes in the drama are the salient ones for interpreting Edwards’ interaction with the challenges facing the doctrine of the Trinity. Scholars often call these early-Enlightenment debates over the Trinity the Trinitarian Controversy.1 1Modern literature on the early-Enlightenment Trinitarian Controversies includes William S. Babcock, “A Changing of the Christian God: The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Seventeenth Century,” Interpretation 45 (1991): 133–46; Robert T. Carroll, The Common Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet, 1635–1699, International Archives of the History of Ideas, 77 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 86–101; James P. Ferguson, An Eighteenth Century Heretic: Dr. Samuel Clarke (Kineton: Roundwood, 1976); Martin Greig, “The Reasonableness of Christianity? Gilbert Burnet and the Trinitarian Controversy of the 1690s,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 44 (1993): 631–51; Robert T. Holtby, Daniel Waterland 1683–1740: A Study in

207

208 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The Trinitarian Controversies emerged in England and ran there from roughly the 1690s to the mid-1720s. The publication of George Bull’s Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (1685), Socinian teachings in Arthur Bury’s The Naked Gospel (1690), and the series of Unitarian tracts anonymously authored by Stephen Nye and financed by Thomas Firmin mark the beginning of the disputes on English soil.2 They ended with Samuel Clarke’s death in 1729, which concluded the debate between Clarke and Daniel Waterland (1683– 1740).3 The controversies took place on several fronts and involved various figures. On the most basic level, the debates were between non-trinitarians and trinitarians. The former group included Deists and Socinians—also called Unitarians—and Arians. In this respect, the trinitarian controversy was part of the challenge posed to Christianity by Deism. Another layer included debates between theologians who accepted the validity of the doctrine of the Trinity, but disagreed on its proper explanation so as to avoid the pitfalls of tritheism and Sabellianism. For instance, Athanasian trinitarians Robert South (1634–1716) and William Sherlock (1641?–1707) disputed on the proper theological formulation of the Trinity, yet they struggled in common cause against the Socinians—i.e., Sabellians, Arians, and SemiArians.4 In a significant way, the debates between Sherlock and South reEighteenth-Century Orthodoxy (Carlisle: Charles Thurman and Sons, 1966), 12–49; John Marshall, “Locke, Socinianism, ‘Socinianism’, and Unitarianism,” in English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart, Oxford Studies in the History of Philosophy, 3 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 111–82; Thomas C. Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Dr. Samuel Clarke (1675–1729): Context, Sources, and Controversy, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, ed. Heiko O. Oberman, 75 (New York: Brill, 1997); John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Religion: The Age of Enlightenment in England, 1660–1750 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 156–72; G. A. J. Rogers, Locke’s Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature, and Impact of his Philosophy, Europaea Memoria: Studien und Texte zur Geschichte der europäischen Ideen, 3 (New York: Georg Olms, 1998), 143–56; Udo Thiel, “The Trinity and Human Personal Identity,” in English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart, Oxford Studies in the History of Philosophy, 3 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 217–43; Gary Wedeking, “Locke on Personal Identity and the Trinity Controversy of the 1690s,” Dialogue 29 (1990): 163–88; and Maurice Wiles, Archetypal Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 63–134. 2Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke, 179; Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Religion, 156–60; and Wiles, Archetypal Heresy, 66–67. 3Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and Religion, 169–72. 4My use of Athanasian refers to the widespread theory in the earlyEnlightenment that homoousios means one numerical substance. The use of the term here does not assume this is the actual doctrine of Athanasius or Nicaea, but only

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flect the contemporary ones among trinitarians over the proper relationship between the unity of God and the diversity of the divine persons. The English trinitarian controversy framed the larger context of Edwards’ trinitarian writings. By the time explicit anti-trinitarianism emerged in New England in the mid-1750s, the controversy in England had for the most part run its course. For example, Jonathan Mayhew (1720–1766) was a chief New England critic of the Trinity and traditional Reformed Puritan theology.5 He stressed the absolute unity and supremacy of the Father. Since the Father is true God and God is one, then the Son cannot be God in the strict sense of the term. He appears to understand the Son as a glorified person in whom the Father manifested his glory and not as a divine being. He also ridiculed the “scholastic” and “metaphysical” theories of the Trinity promulgated by the Athanasian trinitarians.6 New England divines responded to Mayhew and others by defending the divinity of Christ.7 In a letter (February 11, 1757) to Edward Wigglesworth professor of divinity at Harvard, Edwards registered his concern with the rise of critical attitudes toward traditional trinitarianism and insisted that orthodox responses to the threat must be soon forthcoming otherwise people may conclude that sound refutations are not at hand, which would in turn undermine faith in the Trinity and divinity of Christ. He was unfortunately unable to make a substantial contribution to redressing the problem before he died in 1758.8 The question naturally arises, why did Edwards engage in considerations of the rationality of the Trinity in his writings, when critical attitudes that those in this period who believed that homoousios means one numerical substance believed that they were following the doctrine taught by Athanasius. 5Alden Bradford, Memoir of the Life and Writings of Rev. Jonathan Mayhew, D.D., Pastor of the West Church and Society in Boston from June, 1747, to July, 1776 (Boston: C. C. Little and Co., 1838), 22–28; Henry May, The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 48 and 56–58; Josiah Quincy, The History of Harvard University, 2 vols. (Cambridge: John Owen, 1840), 2:67; and Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America (Boston: Starr King, 1955), 200–8. 6Jonathan Mayhew, Sermons on the following Subjects (Boston: Draper, 1755), 268– 69 and 403; Christian Sobriety (Boston: Draper, Edes, and Fleet, 1763), 57–60; A Defence of the Observations (Boston: Draper, Edes, Gill, and Fleet, 1763), 110–11. The republication of Thomas Emlyn’s (1663–1741) An Humble inquiry into the ScriptureAccount of Jesus Christ (1702; reprint and 5th ed., Boston: Edes and Gill, 1756) also raised the tenor of the controversy in New England. 7E.g., Ebenezer Pemberton, All Power in Heaven (Boston: Fowle, 1756) and Jonathan Parsons, Good News from a far Country (Portsmouth: Fowle, 1756), esp. the appendix that defends the doctrine of the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father. 8Edwards, Letters and Personal Writings, 16:697–700.

210 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM toward the doctrine had not reached as public and widespread of a level in New England as they had in England? One answer to this is that New England theologians had access to the literature of the English debates. Although Edwards did not perceive an immediate need in his early career to publish a defense of the Trinity, he seems to have correctly anticipated that the Trinity, like the doctrines of free will and original sin, was in the sights of the critical rationality developing in the New England form of the Enlightenment. Although his trinitarian writings lack the honed polemical edge of his writings on free will and original sin and those produced in the English controversies, they contain sufficient substance and interaction to situate him relative to these larger debates in England in the earlyEnlightenment. Edwards’ writings on the Trinity intersect with the two primary dimensions of the trinitarian controversy: the debates between trinitarians and Deists and trinitarians among themselves. On the one hand, Edwards explicitly engaged in the defense of the Trinity against the Deists by developing a trinitarian apologetic against its monist view of God. On the other hand, his primary theory of divine person represents the Athanasian form of trinitarianism in the intramural debates among English trinitarians. Moreover, his participation in the early-Enlightenment discussions of the Trinity illustrates the fundamental influence of the Augustinian mutual love model in his thought. The categories of the mutual love model are the bases of his apologetic against Deism and his notion of divine persons.

JONATHAN EDWARDS’ TRINITARIANISM AND DEISM Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) is commonly identified as the Father of English Deism. He reduced religion to five common principles. These are the belief that there is one supreme God, God ought to be worshipped, the moral nature of piety, the necessity of repentance from moral evil, and the future reward or punishment for one’s moral behavior.9 While Cherbury’s five principles were influential to later-Deists, his emphasis on universal reason as the arbiter of natural and revealed religion is his fundamental contribution to the movement.10 If Cherbury was the tinder of English Deism, the publication of John Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious (1696) was its inflammation. In Christianity not Mysterious, Toland rejected the category of mystery in religion and argued that Christian doctrines must con9Lord Edward Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate, trans. Meyrick H. Carré, University of Bristol Studies, 6 (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, 1937), 289–307. 10Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate, 75–82.

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form to reason.11 Contemporary scholarship understands Deism as a movement that pursued civil liberties and religious toleration through intellectual and theological teachings subversive to the traditional state and church institutions. Frederick C. Beiser argues that Toland’s exaltation of reason and dethronement of mystery—hallmarks of Deism—must be understood in terms of Toland’s broader political and social-religious context. His chief political goal was civil liberty and social goal was religious toleration. The preeminent role assigned to reason in Christianity not Mysterious supported both ends. His emphasis on reason undermined clerical and monarchical power by subverting mystery, the ground on which he thought both stood and supported his political goal of civil liberty and social goal of religious toleration. Toland’s rationalism was an intellectual conviction, but one that served larger political and social ends.12 Without denying the social and political goals of the Deists, the issues explicitly debated in respect to Christianity were intellectual in nature—e.g., the rationality of revelation and the Trinity. Moreover, Edwards’ critique of Deism is specifically theological and, therefore, the area of inquiry here. The following discussion highlights two of his apologetic strategies for the Trinity, both of which endeavor to give a rational foundation for the doctrine. On the one hand, he defended the Trinity against the Deists with a rational argument that maintained that the goodness of God necessarily implies a trinitarian God and negates the monist God of Deism. On the other hand, he used the prisca theologia to demonstrate the presence of the doctrine of the Trinity in non-Christian religions and thereby to show that it is not a specious doctrine of mystery and revelation. When Edwards’ apolo11Toland, Christianity not Mysterious (1696; reprint, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1964), 67–176. 12Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the early English Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 220–40. J. A. I. Champion also argues that the English deist controversy was not primarily about epistemological issues—i.e., asserting the authority of reason over revelation, but social issues—i.e., toppling the social and political power of the Anglican clergy (Champion, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and Its Enemies, 1660–1730, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History, ed. Anthony Fletcher [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 1–12). Generalizing more broadly on the role of reason in the Enlightenment, Lucien Goldmann remarks that “reason was the decisive weapon in the practical struggle against despotism, superstition, privilege, ancien regime, and Christianity” (Goldmann, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment: The Christian Burgess and the Enlightenment, trans. Henry Maas (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973], 51).

212 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM getic strategies for the Trinity are placed in their historical-theological context, they suggest that he did not formulate his trinitarian theology to correct an emphasis on divine unity in Western, Reformed scholastic, and Reformed Puritan trinitarianism, but that he penned his trinitarian theology as a conscious, if not public, participant in what scholars of the earlyEnlightenment call the Trinitarian Controversy and critique of Deism. Edwards, the Trinity, and the Goodness of God: An Apology for the Trinity In Miscellany 96, Edwards wrote “it appears that there must be more than a unity in infinite and eternal essence, otherwise the goodness of God can have no perfect exercise.”13 Edwards proceeds to argue that only the trinitarian concept of God allows for the divine communication or exercise of goodness. The doctrine of the Trinity is, therefore, the only concept of God that preserves the goodness of God. His recourse to the Trinity to defend the goodness of God presupposes a critical polemic. The polemical opponents behind this Miscellany are Deists and their criticism of the traditional Christian belief that salvation is available to only those who hear and accept the Christian Gospel. Miscellany 96 is a continuation of the argument of Miscellany 94 where Edwards insists that the Trinity is the reasonable conclusion of rational consideration of the nature of God. In the same Miscellany he illustrates the reasonableness of the Trinity with a mental analogy of mind, idea, and love.14 The value of the analogy is to show the legitimacy of positing unity and distinction in God. Miscellany 96 further demonstrates the reasonableness of the Trinity by arguing for the necessity of the Trinity from the rational principle of God’s goodness. This latter argument gets to the heart of the Deist view of God and its criticism of Christianity. However, before detailing Edwards’ defense of the rationality of the Trinity and counterstroke to Deism, I briefly reconstruct the Deist criticisms against traditional Christian theology that render Edwards’ comments sensible.

Deism and the Scandal of Particularity Gerald R. McDermott convincingly shows that the scandal of particularity was a decisive Deist objection to the traditional Christian view of God and Christian doctrines.15 Particularity refers to the teaching that salvation is de13Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:263). Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:256–63). 15Gerald R. McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods: Christian Theology, Enlightenment Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths (New York: Oxford University Press, 14Edwards,

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pendent on explicit faith in and devotion to Jesus Christ. The scandal is that the majority of human beings throughout history, through no fault of their own, were without efficient means of redemption because they possessed no knowledge of Christ. The limitation of the means of salvation to a relatively brief period of the world’s history and to a relatively small number of its population seemed contrary to the goodness of God. Aside from the intuitive immorality of limiting salvation to those who hear and receive the gospel, reports in the travel literature of the period revealed that many of the cultures outside of Christendom were not the domains of a supposed barbarism but sophisticated and virtuous cultures; the Chinese were a favorite example among Deists.16 According to the Deists, the virtuousness of these non-Christian cultures seriously questioned the necessity of Christian revelation for the religious and moral life of humanity.17 At root, the scandal of particularity is a charge that the traditional Christian teaching that Christ is the exclusive savior is unjust. The charge of injustice rests on the moral principle that persons are culpable only for that which they can or cannot perform.18 Applied to religion, this principle means that those without access to knowledge of Christ cannot be condemned for not living in devotion to him because they have no means to do so. Put positively, justice demands that the means of salvation are equally and universally available to all people in all times.19 The scandal of particularity included the two interrelated issues of revelation or the necessity of revealed religion for salvation and predestination. From the deist standpoint, both of these notions implied a capricious deity because people are arbitrarily consigned to either salvation or perdition. First, the necessity of revelation implied arbitrariness because a very 2000), 17–33. 16Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 58–61 and Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), 247– 54. 17Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (1902; reprint, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1927), 1:81–82. 18Anthony Collins, A Discourse of Free-Thinking, occasion’d by the Rise and Growth of a Sect call’d Free-Thinkers, The Philosophy of John Locke, ed. Peter A. Schouls, 2 (1713; reprint, New York: Garland, 1984), 37 and Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, ed. and intro. Günter Gawlick (1730; reprint, Stuttgart-Bad, Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1967), 250 and 374–75. 19Bruce Marshall, Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Savior in Rahner and Barth (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 1–3.

214 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM low percentage of people in the history of the world received it by accident of birthplace. Prior to Christ, the Jewish people were the holders of divine revelation. After Christ, the Mediterranean and Europe marked the boundaries of revealed religion. In light of its limited reach, Charles Blount (1654– 1693) concluded that revelation is unnecessary. In contrast, he argued that God gave reason to all people, as a universal component of human nature, to discern the dictates of natural religion.20 Deists averred that if revealed religion is necessary for salvation, God knowingly and willingly left the vast majority of human beings without the necessary means to attain it. They insisted that such a notion controverts the goodness and mercy of God.21 In contrast, they maintained that the benevolence of God requires the universal distribution of the means of proper religion. A correlate to the universal availability of the means of religion is the belief that religious truth and precepts must be ahistorical. This is the case because religious truth limited to a particular historical incident—e.g., the crucifixion of Christ—is not universally available. To require knowledge of that historical event is unacceptable because it is not available to all people. Christianity, which links true religion with the historical person of Christ, conflicts with the universal benevolence and ahistorical nature of true religion. Natural religion was, therefore, the Deists’ counterpoint to revelation. According to natural religion, all necessary theological and religious knowledge is ascertainable by human reason.22 Second, predestination impugned the goodness of God because it teaches that God determines the eternal fate of individuals without any reference to their moral behavior. The Deists were not the first to suggest that 20Charles Blount, The Oracles of Reason, in The Miscellaneous Works of Charles Blount, Esq. (London, 1695), 1–4 and 197–98. While sometimes characterized as a cad and crass plagiarizer of Hobbes, Spinoza, and other influential thinkers, John Redwood argues that Blount, despite his unoriginality, is important to the rise of Deism and Free Thought in the early-Enlightenment. Blount’s anti-clericalism, rejection of revelation and miracles, emphasis on religion as morality, and advocacy of toleration kindled the wider and more public promotion of these themes by the Deists later in the seventeenth century (Redwood, “Charles Blount [1654–93], Deism, and English Free Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35 [1974]: 490–98). 21For examples of this argumentation, see Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, 196, 250, 374–75, 401, and 409; Collins, A Discourse of Free-Thinking, 37–38; and John Toland, Christianity not Mysterious, 133–34. 22Peter Byrne, Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion: The Legacy of Deism, Routledge Religious Studies, ed. Stewart Sutherland (New York: Routledge, 1989), 1–4 and 52–61.

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predestination is immoral. James Arminius (1560–1609) in the earlyseventeenth century and the Cambridge Platonists in the mid- to lateseventeenth century expressed moral umbrage toward the Reformed version of this doctrine.23 Herbert of Cherbury expressed the problematic with revelation and predestination: How could I believe that a just God could take pleasure in the eternal punishment of those to whom he had never afforded a method of salvation, and whom he necessarily foresaw as being damned absolutely, with no possibility of escape? I could not understand that people could call that God Greatest and Best who had created men only to condemn them without their knowledge and against their will.24

For Herbert of Cherbury and other Deists, the necessity of revelation for salvation and eternal predestination to salvation or condemnation is immoral and undermines the justice and goodness of God.25 In light of the scandal of particularity, Edwards turned to the Trinity to defend the moral decency of the God of traditional Reformed theology and to argue that the Deist concept of God contradicts the rational concept of God’s goodness.

The Trinity and the Goodness of God Edwards’ trinitarian apologetic against the Deist God served two purposes. It demonstrated the rationality of the Trinity and showed the deficiency of the Deist Unitarian view of God. Edwards used the doctrine of the Trinity to respond indirectly to the Deist charge that the traditional God and doctrines of Christianity were immoral. It is indirect because rather than deal directly with the scandal of particularity, Edwards countered with a flanking attack on the God of Deism. He argued that the Deist God does not meet the requirements of infinite goodness and that only the Christian trinitarian God meets these conditions.

23The Works of Arminius: The London Edition, 3 vols., trans. James Nichols and William Nichols (vol. 1 1825, vol. 2 1828, vol. 3 1875; reprint with an intro. by Carl Bangs, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 1:630 and 2:715–16 and for the Cambridge Platonists’ criticism, see Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason, 146–47. 24Herbert of Cherbury, Pagan Religion: A Translation of “De religione gentilium,” ed. John A. Butler, Dovehouse Studies in Literature, 5; Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 152 (Binghamton, N.Y.: Carleton, 1996), 53–54 and Lord Herbert of Cherbury’s “De religione laici”, ed. and trans. Harold R. Hutcheson, Yale Studies in English, 98 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 119. 25Champion, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, 140–41.

216 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Edwards’ theory of the communicative nature of goodness is the foundation of his criticism of the God of Deism and defense of the Trinity. He believed that goodness requires the communication of happiness to another.26 The superlative communication of happiness that constitutes goodness is love. Since God is good, God must communicate happiness or love. Since God is infinite, God’s communication of happiness or love must be infinite. An infinite communication of happiness requires an object of infinite goodness; otherwise, the object is not commensurate with the quality of the communication. Only God is infinitely able to communicate happiness and an infinite object suitable for an infinite communication of happiness.27 Edwards concluded, therefore, that the communicative nature of goodness requires a plurality within the Godhead.28 Edwards is not unique in arguing for the Trinity from the goodness and love of God. He was following a path taken by Augustine, Richard of St. Victor, Aquinas, and Bonaventure.29 What is notable is that he drew on this traditional theology to counter the Deist’s monistic theory of God. Edwards maintained that the Deist God, conceived as a solitary infinite mind, falls short of the criterion of infinite goodness because it does not allow for the genuine communication of love. The monad simply delights in itself. The monad, as the object of love, does not personally receive and return love, as a person receives and returns love from and to another person, but rather simply delights in itself. Communication requires at least two giving and receiving subjects. In the Godhead, the subjects must be two infinite subjects giving and receiving love.30 However, if God is a solitary monad, a genuine communication is impossible because the object of the communication of love—i.e., the Unitarian/Deist God—is not a subject communicating love to another person. The object of love is personally identical with the communicator of love. This form of love is enclosed and oriented to the self and not to another. The self-love of the Deist God is selfish and, therefore, not good.

26Edwards,

Miscellanies, nos. 87 (13:251–52), 97 (13:264), and 104 (13:272). no. 117 (13:283–84). 28Ibid., no. 96 (13:263). 29E.g., Richard de Saint-Victor: La Trinité, intro. and trans. Gaston Salet, Sources Chrétiennes, ed. H. de Lubac and J. Daniélou, 63 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1959), 3.14–20 (pp. 199–213) and The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, gen. ed. John E. Rotelle, part 1, vol. 5, The Trinity, ed. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City, 1991), 8.12–14 (5:253–55). 30Edwards, Ethical Writings, 8:377. 27Ibid.,

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In contrast, Edwards’ theology of the Trinity portrays a genuine communication of love between two infinite subjectivities. In trinitarian theology, the plurality is personal and not essential. That is, by criticizing the Deist’s unitarian theory of God, Edwards is not teaching a plurality of discrete divine substances or beings, but the necessity of plurality within the divine nature. He used the Augustinian mutual love model to articulate the trinitarian communication of love. The Father and the Son infinitely and mutually love each other. The trinitarian God is truly good by virtue of this mutual love that satisfies the requirement of the communicative nature of goodness.31 His apologetic strategy is on the one hand indirect. The Deists charged that the God of Reformed theology was immoral. Edwards did not respond directly by giving an account of how and why the necessity of revelation and predestination is consistent with God’s goodness but rather skirted the issue and argued that the Deist notion of God is inconsistent with a rational theory of divine goodness. On the other hand, his focus on the moral nature of God gets to the heart of the debate. It indicates that the fulcrum of the debate between Deists and Reformed theologians was over their relative conceptions of the goodness of God.32 Significant regarding Edwards’ argument and its historical context is that he did not begin with Scripture and revealed religion, but with reason and natural religion to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity. Given his early-Enlightenment context, his starting point was a shrewd apologetic strategy. Miscellany 94 exhibits his rational defense of the doctrine of the Trinity. He asserted, “I think that it is within the reach of naked reason to perceive certainly that there are three distinct in God . . . [and] I think it really evident from the light of reason that there are these three distinct in God.” This comment indicates his concern to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Trinity.33 He argued for the Trinity from the commonly accepted principle of the goodness of God. He showed that the Trinity is not an obtuse product of metaphysical flights of fancy or an inscrutable mystery but the necessary postulate for belief in the goodness of God that can be demonstrated on the very terms of the rational religion of the early-Enlightenment—reason. Edwards shared this strategy of criticizing the Deists with Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686–1743).34 Edwards wrote Miscellany 96, in which he 31Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 96 (13:263–64). Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods, 17–19. 33Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 94 (13:257 and 262); emphasis added. 34Ramsay was born at Ayr in 1686 to a family of low social standing. His father was a strict Calvinist, while his mother was an Anglican, who taught her son from 32McDermott,

218 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM outlined his argument that the goodness of God requires a plurality within the Godhead, between January and February of 1724.35 Twenty-six years later, when he read excerpts from Ramsay’s The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748–1749) in the March 1751 issue of the Monthly Review, he must have been delighted for he discovered that Ramsay employed a very similar trinitarian strategy to refute the Deist and defend the trinitarian concept of God. At that time, Edwards copied segments of The Philosophical Principles from the Monthly Review.36 He later obtained a copy of The Philosophical Principles attested by his lengthy quotations in later Miscellanies.37 The parallels between Edwards’ and Ramsay’s formulations of the Trinity and trinitarian apologetic against the Deist concept of God are striking (although unlike Edwards, Ramsay abhorred Reformed theories of predestination).38 They argue that the God of Deism does not meet the criterion of moral goodness. In contrast, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity allows for divine goodness because it accommodates the communicative nature of goodness. Infinite goodness requires the infinite exercise of love to an object worthy of infinite love. Only the divine nature is worthy of an infinite act of love. Moreover, since love is interpersonally communicative, the immanent love of the Godhead must be between two persons giving and receiving love to one another. Also like Edwards, Ramsay uses a version of the mutual love model of the Trinity to define the personal identities and to specify the form of the communication of divine goodness. He an early age to detest the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. In his later teens and early twenties, Ramsay embraced liberal Scottish mysticism and skepticism. In 1710 he left England, traveled to Holland, eventually arriving in Cambrai to visit Fénelon, who converted him to Catholicism. From 1716 until his death in 1743 he lived mainly in Paris earning his way by writing and tutoring children of the nobility. Ramsay is best known for his texts Les voyages de Cyrus, avec un discours sur la mythologie (1727)—translated into English under the title, The Travels of Cyrus (1727)— and The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748). For background on Ramsay, see André Cherel, Un aventurier religieux auXVIIIe siècle André–Michel Ramsay (Paris, 1926); G. D. Henderson, Chevalier Ramsay (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952); and D. P. Walker, The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (London: Duckworth, 1972), 231–63. 35For dating Miscellany 96, see “Table 2,” in Miscellanies, vol. 13. 36Monthly Review (1751): 341 and Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 1180 and 1181 (23:95–104). 37Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 1252 (23:184), 1253 (23:184–88), and 1254 (23:188– 90). 38Henderson, Chevalier Ramsay, 13 and 216.

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portrays the Father as the divine mind conceiving and the Son as the idea conceived. The Father and Son, therefore, are two subjects who infinitely love each other. The personal identity of the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son.39 Ramsay, more clearly and strongly than Edwards, defines the divine persons as “distinct agents,” “self-conscious agents,” and “intelligent beings.” Yet at the same time, he clarifies that the Trinity is not three divine minds consisting of three separate substances, but that the divine persons have the same divine self-consciousness. Here and like Edwards, Ramsay is caught in the inconsistency of his conceptions. In one respect, he thinks of God as an infinite mind. The analogy of the human mind—i.e., mind, idea, and love—gives the impression that the divine persons are merely modes of an intellect. Yet, he also wants to see the divine persons in the Cartesian sense of centers of consciousness and act without its implication of three substances and tritheism.40 No source connection can be drawn in either direction between Edwards and Ramsay. Ramsay’s writings did not influence Edwards’ basic trinitarian concepts because Edwards wrote Miscellany 96 and 94 between January and February of 1724, which was twenty-four years prior to the publication of Ramsay’s The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748–49).41 Ramsay could not have relied on Edwards because Edwards’ trinitarian writings and Miscellanies on the Trinity were not published during Edwards’ or Ramsay’s lifetimes. The similarity between their terms and concepts suggests that they both tapped a common vein of polemical interaction with Deism. However, in my readings of earlyEnlightenment trinitarians texts, I have not discovered this argumentation outside of Ramsay and Edwards. Edwards, the Trinity, and the Prisca Theologia: An Apology for the Trinity Edwards also participated in countering the Deist criticism that the revealed doctrine of the Trinity is irrational and, therefore, inconsistent with rational natural religion. Natural religion is the belief that the source of religious

39Andrew M. Ramsay, The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, 2 vols. (Glasgow: Robert and Andrew Foulis, 1748–49), 1:81–90. 40Ramsay, Philosophical Principles, 1:88–89, 90–91, and 97. 41For the dating of Edwards’ Miscellanies nos. 94 and 96, see Schafer, “Table 2,” in Miscellanies, vol. 13.

220 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM belief and practice is reason and not revelation. It also tends toward practical moral principles and avoids metaphysical constructions.42 Concomitant with the Deist emphasis on reason in natural religion was their rejection of theological mystery. Doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation were discarded as hopeless contradictions to the rational religion of nature and of little use to a person’s practical religious-moral life.43 Along with mystery, the Deists rejected the necessity of revelation, which they generally saw as the source of theological mysteries. They believed that God created all human beings with a rational capacity to deduce the necessaries of religion. Revelation was superfluous. Moreover, the insistence by the orthodox on the necessity of revelation again raised the scandal of particularity. As Blount reasoned, what is necessary for eternal life must be universally given, and since revelation is not universally given, it is not necessary for the religious life.44 Travel literature, bringing stories of the moral virtue of non-Christian cultures, seemed to support the Deist claim that revelation was unnecessary for the religious life. However, traditional Christians did not stand idle as the Deists penned their invective against revelation and its doctrines.

The Trinity and the Prisca Theologia Christian scholars from the patristic era through the Renaissance and the early-Modern period used the prisca theologia—i.e., ancient theology—to account for the similarities between Christian theology and the philosophical and theological ideas of classical antiquity.45 In mid-seventeenth century 42Lord Cherbury’s five principles of natural religion are a case in point (Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate, 289–307). 43For criticism of the Trinity and the portrayal of religion as essentially a moral affair, see Blount, Oracles of Reason and Great is Diana of the Ephesians in The Miscellaneous Works of Charles Blount, 3, 100–1, and 198 and Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, 206. The vacuity of the Trinity for the Christian religious life is also lamented by modern theologians, but in contrast to the Enlightenment critics they do not call for its abandonment but its revitalization in Christian theology (e.g., Babcock, “A Changing of the Christian God,” 133–35; Robert Jenson, The Triune Identity: God according to the Gospel [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982], ix; Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life [New York: HarperCollins, 1991], ix; and Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel, intro. Catherine Mowry LaCugna [New York: Crossroad, 1998], 10–11). 44Blount, Oracles of Reason, in The Miscellaneous Works of Charles Blount, 198–99. 45The most thorough presentation of the prisca theologia is Walker, The Ancient Theology. Patristic apologists used the prisca theologia to show that one could adhere to

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England, Cambridge Platonists, such as Henry More, Joseph Glanvil, and Ralph Cudworth, employed the prisca theologia to counter the scandal of particularity. They used the ancient theology to show that Christian doctrines were revealed to the ancient philosophers and thus were not confined to the environs of Western Europe.46 For example, while Ralph Cudworth traced the origin of idolatry to the Egyptians, he also argued that they possessed a deposit of true religion.47 He taught that the doctrine of the Trinity was included among this original “theology of divine tradition or revelation” given to the Egyptians by Moses and by them passed on to thinkers like Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato.48 Neoplatonism and Christianity and that eminent non-Christian philosophers received their insights from the ancient Israelites. In the Renaissance and into the early-seventeenth century, Christian theologians also sought to demonstrate with the prisca theologia the compatibility of Neoplatonism with Christianity (Walker, The Ancient Theology, 2). The principal texts for the ancient theology were the Hermetica, Orphica, and the Sibylline Oracles and they were thought to predate the Christian era. However, practitioners of textual criticism in the seventeenth century increasingly exposed these alleged ancient texts as forgeries drafted in the second through fourth centuries. For instance, in 1614 Isaac Casaubon refuted the antiquity of the Hermetica by showing that it was written in the Christian era (Anthony Grafton, “Protestant versus Prophet: Isaac Casaubon on Hermes Trismegistus,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 46 [1986]: 78–93; Peter Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 132; and Walker, The Ancient Theology, 10–21). However, not wanting to lose the apologetic value of the ancient theology, adherents developed counter criticisms to the text-critical conclusions (e.g., Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 3 vols., trans. John Harrison [1678; London: Thomas Tegg, 1845], 1.4.18 [1:540–43]). 46Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment, 133–36. 47Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe 1.4.18 (1:518–19 and 531). 48Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe 1.4.36 (2:312–13). Mention of Cudworth’s use of the ancient theology for apologetic purposes is important to the study of Edwards’ use of it because Edwards copied sections from Cudworth’s True Intellectual System that show Aristotle’s and Plato’s belief in the unity of God (Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1343 [23:380–81]). However, Edwards also often used Theophilus Gale’s The Court of the Gentiles, or a Discourse Touching the Original of Humane Literature (five parts, 1669–1678), which, contrary to Cudworth, argued that all true religions derive from the ancient Hebrews and that religious concepts found in the other ancient religious traditions are flawed and misleading. For instance, while Gale noted that the Greek philosophers propounded a theory of the Trinity, he insisted that it was corrupt (Gale, The Court of the Gentiles, 3:48–49). For a comparison of Cudworth’s and Gale’s use of the prisca theologia and evaluation of Plato, see

222 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Early-Enlightenment Christian apologists used the prisca theologia to counter deist claims that natural religion was the product of reason alone, that natural religion obviates the necessity of revelation, and that doctrines such as the Trinity, Incarnation, and mediatory work of Christ were unnecessary obscurities.49 Contrary to the Deists, they argued that the principles of natural religion are not natural at all, but derive from the original deposit of revelation—i.e., prisca theologia—given to various people groups. According to prisca theologia, all ancient cultures were recipients of revelation. The common moral teachings and theological ideas found in the world religions are the vestiges of an original deposit of revelation. The source of this original revelation was most often attributed to the ancient philosophers’ communication with Moses and the ancient Israelites in Egypt, Noah’s sons Shem and Japheth, or to one of the antediluvian figures such as Enoch and Adam.50 Christian advocates of the prisca theologia taught that the theological Sarah Hutton, “The Neoplatonic Roots of Arianism: Ralph Cudworth and Theophilus Gale,” in Socinianism and Its Role in the Culture of the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Lech Szczucki (Warsaw-Łódź: PWN-Polish Scientific Publisher, 1983), 139–45. 49 The ancient theology had two broad purposes in the seventeenth century. On the one hand, orthodox divines employed it to defend the reasonableness of the mysteries of faith and the universality of revelation against Deists. On the other hand, orthodox theologians and Deists used it to support universal reason and natural religion. For instance, in the mid-seventeenth century, the Cambridge Platonists argued for the legitimacy of the concept of universal reason from the presence of common elements of natural religion in the Near Eastern and Mediterranean non-Christian religious traditions. They elevated reason to ward off the religious intolerance of Calvinist Puritans who had recently ascended to political power (Joseph M. Levine, “Latitudinarians, Neoplatonists, and the Ancient Wisdom,” in Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England, 1640–1700, ed. Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 85– 108). The Cambridge Platonists and the Deists shared the epistemological premise of the universal nature of the rational faculty. Based on this assumption, they expected to find similar ideas of natural religion and morality in the world religions (Levine, “Latitudinarians, Neoplatonists, and the Ancient Wisdom,” 95). Later in the century, the Deists extended the logic to reject all mysteries and revelation. 50Walker, The Ancient Theology, 1–2 and 12. For example, Duhalde states as commonplace the opinion that the Chinese received their religious and political ideas from a son of Noah who traveled into Asia after the Flood (Jean Baptiste Duhalde, The General History of China. Containing a Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Political, and Physical Description of the Empire of China, Chinese-Tartary, Corea, and Thibet. Including an Exact and Particular Account of their Customs, Manners, Ceremonies, Religion, Arts, and Sciences, 4 vols., 3d ed. [1735; trans. from the French anon., London: J.

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and religious divergences from Christianity in the non-Christian cultures were the result of a tendency toward religious degeneration.51 Thus, the prisca theologia was an apologetic to the deist claim that revelation is superfluous. Rather than unnecessary, revelation was the primeval source of the so-called natural religion.52

Edwards and the Prisca Theologia In concert with early-Enlightenment apologists for revelation, Edwards adopted the prisca theologia to counter the deist claim that revelation is needless for piety.53 His use of the prisca theologia is largely confined to the Miscellanies. Additionally, many of these are transcriptions from other texts with little of his comment as to their utility. The task then is to determine why he made these transcriptions. I suggest that they provide insight into the current of thought that Edwards found a convincing retort to deist arguments against the necessity of revelation. Gerald R. McDermott points out that the sources that Edwards used for his understanding of many of these ancient religious thinkers were errant.54 Nevertheless, these Miscellanies reveal that Edwards proactively engaged a leading criticism of Deism using, what was in his time, the latest intellectual resources. Edwards used the prisca theologia for three apologetic tasks. The first two relate to defending the notion of revelation in view of Deism’s natural religion. Based on the prisca theologia, Edwards argued the ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero acknowledged the necessity of revelation.55 Edwards’ transcriptions and notes on the prisca theologia document the presence and source of the teachings of natural and revealed religWatts, 1741], 3:15–16). Duhalde’s text was a popular source book for many of the Enlightenment thinkers desiring to emphasize the virtuousness of Chinese culture (Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, 256–57 and 264). The theory that some of the religious ideas of the Chinese were the result of contact with ancient Jews was set forth earlier by Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci in the late-sixteenth century (Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583–1610, trans. Louis J. Gallagher [1942; reprint, New York: Random House, 1953], 106–14). 51Orthodox theologians attributed the degeneration to original sin (McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods, 96–97). 52McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods, 94. 53Gerald McDermott’s text is indispensable for Edwards’ use of the prisca theologia (McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods, 87–109). 54McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods, 187–89. 55Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 953 (20:222–24), 959 (20:239–40), 977 (20:287–88), and 978 (20:288).

224 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ion in non-Christian religious traditions. Edwards often cited doctrines in non-Christian religions that were typically categorized by Deists under natural religion. These included the unity of God, immortality of the soul, future rewards and punishment, moral conscience, and the Noahic deluge.56 Traditional revealed doctrines that his transcriptions show as present in the nonChristian traditions are the Trinity, the necessity of a messiah and mediator, original sin, Edenic paradise, and eschatological judgment.57 The presence of teachings in non-Christian religions typically attributed to revelation and mysteries in Christianity suggests the universality of revelation. These common religious teachings were vestiges of an ancient religious tradition imbedded in the cultures of the world. This ancient tradition derived from contact with Noah, Moses, or the ancient Israelites.58 Edwards credits much of the learning of Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, and Porphyry to contact with the ancient Israelites.59 The important point is that Edwards attributed the presence of the religious notions in non-Christian religious traditions to an original revelation given to these peoples or contact with someone in the linage of the ancient Israelites that transmitted revealed religion to them. Moreover, the echoes of Christian mysteries in the ancient philosophers contradicted the Deists’ claims that doctrinal mysteries and revelation are irrational. For instance, if the revered Greek philosopher Plato taught the concept of a mediator between God and human beings, then it is certainly not irrational for Christians to teach that Christ is the mediator.60

56Edwards,

Miscellanies, nos. 953 (20:222–26), 954 (20:226–27), 975 (20:278–80), 978 (20:288–91) and Miscellanies, no. 1268 (23:214). 57Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 953 (20:222–26), 955 (20:227–29), 970 (20:253–54), 971 (20:254), 992 (20:321–23), 1017 (20:349), 1018 (20:350), 1073 (20:456–58), and 1075a (20:451) and Miscellanies, nos. 1181 (23:95–104), 1236 (23:171), and 1244 (23:176–77). 58Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 350 (13:424); Miscellanies, nos. 953 (20:222–24), 954 (20:226), 959 (20:239–40), 963 (20:247), 969 (20:251–53), and 973 (20:275–77); and Miscellanies, nos. 1236 (23:171) and 1255 (23:190–91). Miscellany 953 is a transcription from Theophilus Gale’s The Court of the Gentiles (edition used by Edwards: 2 vols. [London: vol. 1, 1672 and vol. 2 1677]) and his commentary in support of the prisca theologia. Theophilus Gale, a frequent source of the prisca theologia for Edwards, taught that Plato received his learning from the Jews, but also that this deposit of revelation was corrupted and of no soteriological value (Gale, The Court of the Gentiles, 1:4 and 3:48–49). 59Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 969 (20:251–53). 60Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 971 (20:254).

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Finally, Edwards drew on the prisca theologia to defend the doctrine of the Trinity. He transcribed several citations in the Miscellanies that show the presence of trinitarian ideas in non-Christian religions.61 His transcriptions focus on remnants of the Trinity in Greek and Chinese thought. According to the writers on which he relied and the passages he quoted from these sources, ancient Greek thought contained ideas commensurate with the Christian theology of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.62 In Edwards’ theological traditions, the Father is the first person of the Godhead and as such is self-subsistent, the divine person who is not from another divine person. Similarly, Greek thinkers discussed the first principle that is self-existent. The first principle is the infinite power and supreme cause of all things. Common in Edwards’ trinitarian traditions, theologians also described the Son as eternally begotten from the Father by an intellectual act of the divine understanding. So, the Son is the image, Word, or idea of the Father. The Greeks posited a second hypostasis in the divinity begotten from the first. They described the second hypostasis in terms of the idea, word, logos, reason, and exemplar of the first divine principle. Christian theologians represented the Holy Spirit as the Godhead’s immanent act of love; the Augustinian depiction of the Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son was especially common. The Greeks similarly described

61Edwards drew from several sources to document the presence of trinitarian ideas in non-Christian religious traditions. He cited from Isaac Barrow’s The Works of the Learned Isaac Barrow . . . (1683–1687) because he was famous for citations from the Greek philosophers. Edwards drew numerous passages from Theophilus Gale’s The Court of the Gentiles (1669–1678). Edwards also cited Hugo Grotius’ De veritate religionis Christianae (1627), which was an apologetic text to prepare sailors for contact with non-Christian religious thought and practices. He likely used Simon Patrick’s translation of De veritate (1680) as it is listed in no. 218 of the reading “Catalogue” (“Jonathan Edwards’ Reading ‘Catalogue’ with Notes and Indexes,” ed. L. Brian Sullivan, Works of Jonathan Edwards Office, Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.). He copied passages from Michael Ramsay’s The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748) from the March, 1751 edition of the Monthly Review, pp. 340–48 and later from Ramsay’s text itself. For Ramsay’s use of the prisca theologia, see Henderson, Chevalier Ramsay, 117–29 and Walker, The Ancient Theology, 240–63. He also cited from Philip Skelton, Opiomaches: or, Deism Revealed (1749); Richard Kidder, A Demonstration of the Messias (2nd ed. 1726); and Jacques Basnage, History of the Jews, from Jesus Christ to the Present Time (1708). 62The Greek thinkers mentioned are Marcilius Ficinus, Parmenides, Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, the Pythagoreans, and Sanchoniathon (Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 955 [20:227–29], 970 [20:253–54], and 992 [20:321–23]).

226 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM the third divine principle as love and the active power of the deity.63 On several occasions, Edwards cites the Greek practice of referring to the divine triad as the “Father, the Word or Mind, and the Universal Spirit or Soul.”64 These citations indicate that Edwards found strong echoes of the mutual love model of the Trinity in the teachings of the Greeks. In Miscellany 1181, Edwards copied a section from Ramsay’s Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion that depicts trinitarian notions in ancient Chinese religious thought.65 According to the Chinese sacred texts titled King and its commentators, God is triune. The triunity of the Chinese deity rests on the distinct names and commensurate characteristics that they applied to God.66 First, God is named Chang-Ti.67 Chang-Ti refers to God as self-existent, simple, omnipresent, and the source of all motion and action. The attributes of Chang-Ti correspond with the Christian notion of the Father. Second, God is called Tao. Tao signifies eternal reason, truth, and law. Like Chang-Ti, Tao is omnipresent and infinite. The description of Tao in terms of reason and truth invites association with the Christian doctrine of the Son. Although the transcription does not identify a correlate for the Holy Spirit in the books of King, it does note that the book Tonchu teaches that the oneness that produces all else is in fact a triunity. The “self-existent unity produces necessarily a second; the first and second by their union produce a third; in fine, these three produce all.”68 Moreover, 63Edwards ascribes these teachings to Greek thinkers in, Miscellanies, nos. 955 (20:227–29), 970 (20:253–54), and 992 (20:321–23). 64Edwards, Miscellanies, nos. 970 (20:253–54) and 992 (20:321–23). 65He copied the citation of Ramsay from the Monthly Review of April, 1751. Ramsay adopted the prisca theologia to demonstrate the rationality of the Christian faith in light of deist criticisms. The second volume of The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion is devoted to showing the presence of vestiges of revealed religion in the non-Christian world religions (Ramsay, Philosophical Principles, 2:iii–vi and Henderson, Chevalier Ramsay, 218–26). 66Note that the Protestant practice of associating these Chinese terms with the Christian notion of God began with Jesuit missionaries, particularly Matteo Ricci, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (C. W. Allan, Jesuits at the Court of Peking, Studies in Chinese History and Civilization, ed. Joseph En-pao Wang [Arlington, V.I.: University Publications of America, 1975], 163 and Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, 128–29). 67Duhalde records that the Chinese worshipped Chang-Ti or Tien as the supreme being of the universe (Duhalde, General History of China, 3:16–21 and 27). Note also that Ramsay used Duhalde to understand Chinese religious ideas (Ramsay, Philosophical Principles, 2:179 and 409 and Henderson, Chevalier Ramsay, 219–20). 68Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1181 (23:98). In Miscellany 1236, Edwards cited a

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the philosopher Laotsee speaks of God in trinitarian language. He calls the self-existent source of all being Hi. The source of all knowledge is called Yi. The omnipresence of the deity that animates all life is Ouel. Li-yong, a Chinese commentator, says that Hi, Yi, and Ouel are a triplicity that is one. The correspondence that Ramsay drew, and presumably also Edwards, between the Chinese teachings and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is clear. Hi corresponds with the Father, Yi with the Son, and Ouel with the Holy Spirit.69 Recalling Edwards’ Augustinian mutual love model of the Trinity, it is easy to suppose that he saw instant rapport between his trinitarian model and the notions of the Chinese as presented by Ramsay. Although Edwards did not fully develop an apologetic use of the prisca theologia, I conclude on the basis of these transcriptions and positive uses of the prisca theologia in other areas that it incipiently played an important role in his emerging defense of the Trinity.70 The Deists routinely ridiculed the Trinity as irrational because it derives from revelation and not from natural religion.71 Edwards’ transcriptions of trinitarian teachings in Greek and Chinese religious and philosophical literature suggest that he saw these as an antidote to Deist criticisms. I interpret the transcriptions of the prisca theologia that show affinity between the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and ancient Greek and Chinese religious thought as part of Edwards’ broader polemic against the Deists such as his other anti-Deist writings contained in the Miscellanies and more familiar texts written to defend the Calvinist doctrines of freedom of the will and original sin.72 passage from Philip Skelton’s Opiomaches: or, Deism Revealed that also ascribed this teaching to Laokun (Miscellanies, 23:171). Duhalde recorded that Lao Kiun, leader of a Chinese religious group, taught that “Tao, or reason, hath produced one, one hath produced two, two have produced three, and three have produced all things” (Duhalde, General History of China, 3:30). Three scenarios account for the similarity between Skelton and Duhalde. First, Skelton transcribed the teaching ascribed to Lao Kiun in Deism Revealed (1751) from the English translation of Duhalde, which appeared in 1741. Second, Duhalde and Skelton shared a common source. Third, Skelton copied it from another text, such as Ramsay’s The Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748), which in turn relied on Duhalde or another text recording the teaching of Lao Kiun. 69Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1181 (23:95–99). 70For Edwards’ earlier use of the prisca theologia, see Miscellanies, no. 350 (13:424). 71E.g., Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, 206 and Toland, Christianity not Mysterious, 25. 72Edwards wrote numerous miscellanies under the heading “Christian Religion” that interact with various deist challenges to traditional Christian doctrines, such as revelation, the necessity of a mediator, miracles, and theological mystery. For Ed-

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JONATHAN EDWARDS’ TRINITARIANISM AND THE EARLYENLIGHTENMENT CHRISTIAN DEBATES ON DIVINE PERSON The second set of debates was intra-mural in nature and centered on opposing Christian theories of divine person. The first debates were between William Sherlock and Robert South and the later ones were between Samuel Clarke and Daniel Waterland. These theologians were more or less trinitarian and did not differ on confession of the Trinity, but on the proper theological formulation of the Trinity and the definition of divine person. Sherlock and Clarke both adopted the Cartesian notion that a divine person is a self-conscious being and respectively tended toward tritheism and subordinationism. South and Waterland maintained the traditional concept that a divine person is a subsistence of a rational nature. William Sherlock, Robert South, and Jonathan Edwards: Cartesian Persons and the Threat of Tritheism The dispute over the nature of divine person between Anglicans William Sherlock and Robert South are in a significant way the seventeenth century prototype of the modern debate between Augustinian and social or Cappadocian trinitarians. The polemical labels used to describe the opposing parties remain unchanged. South accused Sherlock of tritheism and Sherlock accused South of modalism.73 More recently, Brian Leftow argues that social trinitarianism is not a form of monotheism whereas Colin Gunton associates Western trinitarianism with modalism.74 However, the Sherlockwards’ anti-Deist miscellanies, see Miscellanies, nos. 125b (13:288–89), 127 (13:291), 128 (13:291–92), 129 (13:292), 131 (13:293), 132 (13:294), 197 (13:336), 204 (13:339–40), 249 (13:361–62), 266 (13:372), 283 (13:380), 382 (13:451); Miscellanies, nos. 514 (18:57–58), 544 (18:89–90), 583 (18:118–19), 596 (18:130–31), and 652 (18:192–93); Miscellanies, no. 953 (20:222–26); and Miscellanies, nos. 1169 (23:87–88), 1170 (23:88), 1234 (23:167–68), 1239 (23:175), and 1340 (23:359–76), which is an extended essay on the viability of revelation in light of Tindal’s Christianity as Old as the Creation. Also see, Freedom of the Will and Original Sin. 73For South’s accusation that Sherlock’s theory reduces to tritheism, see Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, entitled “A Vindication of the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity” (1690; reprint, London, 1693), 119 and Tritheism Charged upon Dr. Sherlock’s New Notion of the Trinity . . . (London, 1695). For Sherlock’s association of the teaching that the divine persons are modes of subsistence of one numerical substance with modalism, see A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God . . . (London, 1690), 139. 74Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins

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South debate did not begin as an intramural one, but as an attempt by Sherlock to defend the Trinity against its early-Enlightenment critics. The rise of Socinianism and Unitarianism in England in the late-1680s was the catalyst for the Sherlock-South debate. Socinianism takes its name from Faustus Socinus (1539–1604). Socinus embraced the humanist methods of biblical textual criticism and interpretation of the late-Renaissance and early-Reformation. Socinian biblicism and rejection of scholastic theology represents an extreme form of the early-Protestant principle of sola scriptura and disdain of scholasticism. Socinus’ distinctive characteristic was a rigorous reliance on the Bible welded to a regulative role of reason in its interpretation. Based on these principles, he rejected the Trinity and taught the uni-personality of God, denied the divinity of Christ and legal theories of the atonement, and defined Christ’s redemptive role in terms of a moral exemplar.75 Socinus introduced his teachings to Poland in 1579 and there the movement flourished well into the seventeenth century until Catholic opposition forced Socinians out of Poland in 1658. Socinian exiles fled to Transylvania, East Prussia, Silesia, and the Palatinate, and finally took firm hold among the Dutch Arminians of Amsterdam and Leyden. Socinian teachings migrated to England in the mid-seventeenth century by way of English merchants and students who brought Socinian writings back to England after their trading and studying in Holland.76 John Bidle (1616–1662) was the first to popularize Socinian teachings in England and is known as the Father of English Unitarianism.77 Bidle is important because he publicly advocated and non-anonymously published Socinian tracts: e.g., John Bidle, A Confession of Faith, touching the Holy Trinity . . . (1648; reprint, London, 1691) and The Apostolical and True Opinion concerning the Holy Trinity . . . (1653; reprint, 1691). The publication of three anonymous collections of treatises between 1691 and 1695 further inflamed the Socinian controversy in England sparked by Bidle’s writings.78 The chief characteristic of (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 203–8 and Colin Gunton, “Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 45. 75H. John McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 4–17. 76McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England, 17–102 and for a detailed account of the early-history of Socinianism, see Earl M. Wilbur, A History of Unitarianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947). 77McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England, 45 and 163–217. 78These are The Faith of One God (1691), A Second Collection of Tracts, proving the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ the only True God (1693), and A Third Collection

230 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Socinianism during this period was Unitarianism; that is, the belief in the uni-personality of God. However, the term was broad enough to include under its aegis Arian and Sabellian theories of the Trinity.79 Sherlock tried to check and dislodge the Socinian build-up with a reasonable account of the Trinity in A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God (1690). His results were ironic. On the one hand, he initiated a heated debate among other Anglican trinitarians, of whom Robert South was his principal antagonist. On the other hand, he seemingly reinforced Socinian critiques of the Trinity’s irrationality by advocating, what was to them and many traditional trinitarians, tritheism. William Sherlock and Robert South were both prominent Anglican divines in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.80 The critical philosophical and theological issue dividing them was their differing theories of divine person. Sherlock represents an early application of a psychological or Cartesian concept of person to the Trinity, whereas South retained the traditional doctrine that a divine person is a distinct subsistence of the divine nature. Sherlock defined person as an intelligent being. A person is a mind. Distinct persons are distinct minds and to multiply persons is to multiply minds. Individuation or the distinction and uniqueness of persons arise from self-consciousness. Self-consciousness individuates because a distinct person is aware of his/her inner thoughts and is unaware of the inner thoughts of other persons.81 Sherlock’s theory of person sits in the watershed of Cartesian psychology, according to which a person is a self(1695). Authorship of several tracts has been attributed to Stephen Nye and several were reprints of treatises by John Bidle (e.g., John Bidle, The Apostolical and True Opinion concerning the Holy Trinity and A Confession of Faith, touching the Holy Trinity). 79McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England, 317–35 and Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-Century England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 119–20. 80For details on Sherlock and South, see Gerard Reedy, Robert South (1634– 1716): An Introduction to His Life and Sermons, Cambridge Studies in EighteenthCentury English Literature and Thought, ed. Howard Erskine-Hill and John Richetti, 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Irène Simon, “Robert South and the Augustans,” Essays and Studies, n.s. 28 (1975): 15–28 and Three Restoration Divines: Barrow, South, Tillotson. Selected Sermons, 2 vols., Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de L’Université de Liège, ed. Irène Simon, fasc. 181 (Paris: Société d’Editions “Les Belles Lettres,” 1976), vol. 1, part 1, pp. 228–74; and Udo Thiel, “The Trinity and Human Personal Identity,” 217–43. 81Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 48–49 and 68.

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conscious mind. Udo Thiel points out that Sherlock modified Descartes’ use of self-consciousness.82 Both define consciousness as the mind’s awareness of its thought.83 However, whereas for Descartes, consciousness is the starting point of rational knowledge because it is an indisputable fact of the mind’s existence, for Sherlock, self-consciousness is the principle of personal individuation.84 Sherlock applied the notion of person as self-consciousness to the divine persons. He maintained that the divine persons are distinguished one from another by their unique self-consciousness. Since each divine person is distinct by virtue of self-consciousness, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three distinct and infinite minds.85 Sherlock’s contemporaries accused him of theological novelty for describing the divine persons in terms of Descartes notion of self-consciousness. Unitarian Stephen Nye called Sherlock the inventor of the “Cartesian Trinity.”86 Robert South charged Sherlock with inventing the terms “self-consciousness” for indicating the distinctions of the divine persons and “mutual consciousness” for expressing the unity of the divine nature.87 Although Sherlock may have been the first to interpret the divine persons in terms of self-consciousness, he was not the first to associate it with personal identity. Appropriating Descartes, John Turner introduced the term to English philosophy and theology with his text A discourse concerning the Messias (1685).88 82Thiel,

“The Trinity and Human Personal Identity,” 220–24. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 1.9 (1.195) and Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 48–49. 84Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.7 (1:195) and Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 49. 85Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 50–51 and 66–67. Joseph Bingham, a disciple of Sherlock, also taught that the divine persons are three individual substances united by a common nature. He expressly rejects the scholastic notion that a divine person is a mode of subsistence as Sabellian (Bingham, On the Trinity, in The English Sermon, volume 2: 1650–1750, ed. C. H. Sisson [Cheadle, Great Britain: Carcanet, 1976], 219–40). 86Stephen Nye, Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity, by Dr. Wallis, Dr. Sherlock, Dr. S—th, Dr. Cudworth, and Mr. Hooker; as also on the account given by those that say, the Trinity is an unconceivable and inexplicable Mystery (London, 1693), 11 and 19. 87South, Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, entitled “A Vindication of the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity” (1690; reprint, London, 1693), 68. 88Thiel, “The Trinity and Human Personal Identity,” 224–31 and Wedeking, “Locke on Personal Identity and the Trinity Controversy of the 1690s,” 166. 83René

232 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Drawing on patristic literature, Sherlock adopted the three-person analogy of Peter, James, and John to illustrate the personal distinctions of the divine persons. He argued that the early church Fathers’ use of the three-person analogy shows that they believed the divine persons are three minds as distinct from each other as are three human persons.89 Robert South and other trinitarians as well as Unitarians accused Sherlock of tritheism for teaching three infinite and distinct minds.90 Nonetheless, he did have defenders. George Bull, an important advocate of the Athanasian Trinity, absolved Sherlock of tritheism because Sherlock taught that only the Father is the fountain of the deity and that the Son and the Spirit are inseparably united to him. Edward Stillingfleet also ratified Sherlock’s orthodoxy. Stillingfleet’s concern was that the intramural squabbles among the trinitarians distracted them from the more important Socinian threat.91 In his own defense, Sherlock warned that concluding that he or the early church Fathers taught three gods from their use of the three-person analogy is calumny. He cried foul because detractors of the three-person analogy wrongly assume that it illustrates divine unity, whereas the purpose of the analogy is only to portray the divine personal distinctions.92 John Gresham corroborates Sherlock’s retort. He notes that the practice of modern social trinitarians of using the three-person analogy of Gregory as the rubric for divine unity conflicts with its original purpose of illustrating the distinction of the divine persons.93 Despite his clarification of the purpose of the three-person analogy, Sherlock faced the challenge of showing how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, conceived as three distinct minds, was not equivalent with three gods. Sherlock’s answer is that the divine persons are distinct, but not divided. He used the concept of mutual con89Sherlock,

Vindication of the Trinity, 104–5. Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, 119–22. Trinitarian theologian, Richard Baldwin, also accused Sherlock of tritheism; see The Doctrine of the Catholick Church, and of the Church of England, concerning the blessed Trinity . . . (London: Richard Baldwin, 1697), 6. Unitarian charges of tritheism against Sherlock include, Nye, Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity, 12; A Discourse concerning the Nominal and Real Trinitarians (London, 1695), 27; and The Acts of the Great Athanasius . . . (London, 1690), 21. 91The Works of George Bull, collected and revised by Edwards Burton, vol. 2, Discourse 1, The Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1846), 3–4 and Babcock, “A Changing of the Christian God,” 142–43. 92Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 104–5. 93John L. Gresham, Jr., “The Social Model of the Trinity and Its Critics,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993): 331–32. 90South,

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sciousness to maintain that although the divine persons are three distinct minds, they are united as one God.94 Mutual consciousness as the principle for the unity of persons is consistent with self-consciousness as the principle of individual personal unity. Self-consciousness is that which circumscribes one person from another person. He applied this principle to the unity of persons and concluded that the unity of multiple persons rests in sharing in the consciousness of other persons. Since self-consciousness is the unity of a person, if one person perfectly participates in the consciousness of another person and that other person also participates in the consciousness of the first person, then a unity of persons results from their mutual consciousness. Sherlock also redefined numerical unity in terms of mutual consciousness. Numerical unity does not refer to the unity of substance or nature per se, although he taught that the divine nature and substance is one. The divine persons are one by unity of mutual consciousness in the same way that an individual person is one according to self-consciousness. That is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have as intimate an awareness of the consciousness of each other as they have of their own.95 The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God then by sharing in the consciousness of one another. Sherlock identified his theory of mutual consciousness with Augustine’s mental triad to exonerate it from the charge of theological novelty. After describing Augustine’s mental triad in book nine of De Trinitate, he wrote, “I need not tell any man, that this is the mutual consciousness which I have described, and by this St. Austin represents the Trinity in unity; and I hope this authority will defend me from the charge of innovation.”96 Drawing on Augustinian mental triads to illustrate the unity of mutual consciousness, he described the Father as the divine mind, the Son as the “reflex knowledge” of the Father, and the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The mind, knowledge of the mind, and love of the mind illustrates mutual consciousness because they mutually interpenetrate each other and remain distinct. In this mental analogy, he presents the divine persons, particularly the Son and the Holy Spirit, as modes of subsis94Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 41 and 104. Over fifty years later, Joshua Allen also used the term mutual consciousness to describe the unity of the divine persons and illustrated the plurality of the divine persons with the three-person analogy (Joshua Allen, Twenty Six Sermons on the most important Subjects of the Christian Religion . . ., 2 vols. bound as one [London: W. Strahan, 1751], sermon one, pp. 45–46 and sermon two, p. 64). 95Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 48–49, 64–65, and 125–26. 96Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 127–28.

234 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM tence. The Son and the Holy Spirit subsist as the terminal acts of intellectual generation and volitional procession.97 His use of the Augustinian mental triad is problematic for several reasons. First, although Sherlock adequately describes Augustine’s mental triad of book nine, he mistakenly interprets it as identical with his theory of the mutual consciousness of three distinct self-conscious divine minds. Second, his portrayal of the divine persons as subsistences of a rational nature conflicts with his fundamental notion that the divine persons are discrete persons by virtue of self-consciousness. Sherlock’s rejoinder to this criticism might be that he uses the mental triads only to illustrate divine unity or mutual consciousness and not divine personhood. I suggest this as his probable response because while Sherlock does not treat the conflict between his Cartesian theory of divine person and notion of divine person in the mental triad, he criticized theologians for accusing him and Gregory of Nyssa of tritheism for using the three-person analogy. He did so because the criticism forces the analogy to bear a notion of unity that is beyond its intent. Sherlock uses the three-person analogy only to illustrate the distinction of the divine persons and not divine unity. However, if his theory of divine unity is inherently inconsistent with his theory of divine personhood, then he has not provided a legitimate illustration of the unity of the divine persons. His mental analogy illustrates the unity of the divine persons conceived as subsistences of a rational nature, but not as three distinct minds. Additionally, his use of Augustine and the mental triad is suspicious because earlier, in Vindication of the Trinity, he argued that portraying the divine persons in terms of mental faculties is tantamount to Sabellianism. In the same section that he used the mental triad to illustrate mutual consciousness, he warned that there is a “vast difference” between the divine persons and the faculties of a mind. The difference lay in that the divine persons are all distinct minds, whereas the mental analogy reduces the divine persons to faculties and powers of a single mind.98 Robert South, the most prominent critic of Sherlock’s trinitarian theology, surmised that Sherlock’s Trinity of three minds is tritheism. His criti97Sherlock,

Vindication of the Trinity, 104–5, 126, and 130–37. Vindication of the Trinity, 66 and 135–36. In a series of sermons on the Trinity, William Payne (1650–1696), a contemporary and supporter of Sherlock, also used the mental analogy to illustrate the plurality of the divine persons and, like Sherlock, then warned of its inadequacies. He noted that the analogy reduces the divine persons to faculties of a mind, whereas the divine persons are “substantial persons and real beings” (Payne, The Mystery of the Christian Faith and of the Blessed Trinity vindicated [London: William Payne for Richard Cumberland, 1697], 32–33). 98Sherlock,

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cisms of Sherlock revolve around their differing theories of person. For Sherlock, a person is a rational mind. Mind and person are equivalent terms. In contrast, South sharply distinguished person from mind and spirit. South reasoned that according to Sherlock’s teaching a mind is an absolute simple being. A mind is a being discrete from other beings and, therefore, to multiply minds is to multiply beings. For South, Sherlock’s teaching that the divine persons are three minds invariably renders three gods.99 According to South, Sherlock committed the logical error of circularity and possessed a misguided understanding of person. South argued that Sherlock’s teaching that self-consciousness constitutes personal identity is circular because the act of self-consciousness presupposes the person. In the order of nature, the formal reason of something precedes the thing. In the context of the discussion of personal identity and self-consciousness, self-consciousness is a personal act that presupposes the existence of the person and, therefore, self-consciousness cannot be the formal reason of personality. The person, as the agent of the act of self-consciousness, precedes, in the order of nature, the act of self-consciousness. South applied this logic to the divine persons and concluded that the identity of the divine persons must precede their acts of self-consciousness.100 In addition, South criticized Sherlock’s understanding of divine unity in terms of mutual consciousness with the same logic. Mutual consciousness, like self-consciousness, is an act of persons in union with each other, and therefore his theory of mutual consciousness presupposes the unity it intends to demonstrate.101 In contrast, South defined person as a mode of being. A mode of being includes subsistence and relation. South clarified that subsistence precedes relation in the order of nature because something must subsist in order for it to be in relation to another subsistence. A divine person then is a subsisting mode of the divine nature. In the Godhead, relations of opposition distinguish the modes of subsistence. The distinct subsistences and relations arise from immanent acts of the divine nature. The act of generation yields the subsistent relations of the Father and the Son. The act of spiration produces the subsistent relation of the Holy Spirit. Spiration produces one subsistent relation because it is an act common to the Father and the Son and is not inconsistent with their relational identity as Father and

99South,

Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, 119–20. Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, 94–97. 101South, Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, 107–10. 100South,

236 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Son.102 Thus, South defined the divine persons as subsistent relations of the divine nature. The different theories of person in Sherlock and South imply fundamentally diverse conceptions of God. For Sherlock, God is a Trinity of three minds and, therefore, three persons.103 For South, God is ultimately one consciousness that subsists in the threefold relations of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The next task is to determine with which of these early-Enlightenment trinitarianisms Edwards’ theology aligns. Edwards does not refer to Sherlock or South in his trinitarian writings nor does he mention these theologians or their texts in his reading “Catalogue,” nevertheless his trinitarian thought is of the same intellectual fabric.104 Yet of the two, his trinitarian theology more closely aligns with South’s. The similarities between Edwards and South lie in their concepts of God, Edwards’ primary concept of divine person, and use of the mental triad to illustrate the personal identity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Nonetheless, Edwards embraced the concern of Sherlock and included a psychological dimension in his theory of divine persons. Resembling South, Edwards conceives of God as an infinite consciousness and rejects the notion that the divine persons are three distinct minds.105 The divine persons do not possess the intellectual capacities of personhood discretely and variously, but rather each divine person is a subsistence of the one rational divine nature. In the Godhead there is one understanding subsisting in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Edwards shares with South a basic view of God as one infinite mind and diverges from Sherlock who teaches that the divine persons are three minds each severally possessing their own understanding and will.106 Edwards maintained that the divine persons are the “same understanding divine essence”

102South,

Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, 240–44. also described God as an infinite mind, but, when he refers to mind, he means spiritual nature and not a specific being. So, when he says God is mind, he means God is an infinite spiritual nature (Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 49, 59, and 114). In contrast, when South calls God an infinite mind, he refers to the concrete being of God. 104Edwards, “Jonathan Edwards’ Reading ‘Catalogue’ with Notes and Index,” ed. L. Brian Sullivan. 105E.g., Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 259 (13:367) and Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113. 106South, Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, 119–20 and Sherlock, Vindication of the Trinity, 67. 103Sherlock

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and do not have a “distinct understanding of their own” and in doing so resolutely repudiated the notion that God is three minds.107 One problem for comparing Edwards’ theory of divine person with Sherlock’s and South’s theories is that Edwards’ trinitarian theology embodies two theories of person: a psychological and an ontological one.108 In addition to complicating the task of historically situating him, these two theories of person introduce tension into his trinitarian theology. He was aware that his notion of divine person as the subsistence of a rational nature clashed with the psychological notion that a person is an agent with understanding and will. For instance, assuming the Cartesian concept of person, he notes “that a person is that which hath understanding and will. If the three in the Godhead are persons they doubtless each of them have understanding, but this [i.e., his trinitarian model] makes the understanding one distinct person and love another.”109 The quotation shows that Edwards’ notion of human personhood was psychological—i.e., “a person is that which hath understanding and will.” Furthermore, he realized that it is inconsistent with his portrayal of the divine persons as the subsistent terms of the intellectual acts of the divine understanding and will. Edwards’ attempt to resolve the inconsistency is unsuccessful but nonetheless highlights his distance from Sherlock. He theorized that each divine person uniquely possesses one attribute of personality. The Father is the mind, the Son is the understanding, and the Holy Spirit is love or the will. Each divine person acquires the other attributes of personhood through what may be called a perichoretic union with the other divine persons. Edwards expressed it this way: In order to clear up this matter, let it be considered, that the whole divine essence is supposed truly and properly to subsist in each of these three—viz. God, and his understanding, and love—and that there is such a wonderful union between them that they are after an ineffable and inconceivable manner one in another. . . . The Father understands because the Son, who is the divine understanding, is in him. So the Son loves because the Holy Spirit is in him and proceeds from him. So the Holy Ghost, or the divine essence subsisting in divine love, understands because the Son, the divine idea, is in him.110

107Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 308 (13:392). Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113; Religious Affections, 2:96–99; and Treatise on Grace, 21:181. 109Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:133. 110Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:133. 108Edwards,

238 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The strength of his formulation lies in maintaining that the divine persons are fully persons only in relation with the others. The problem is that when the divine persons, understood here as the relative attributes of subjectivity and the absolute category of mind, are added together one person— understood here in the Cartesian sense—or subject is the sum and not three divine persons in the psychological sense. Indeed, Edwards’ claim that if the human soul and its powers of understanding and will were enlarged infinitely, God would result, underlines his understanding of the divine persons in terms of relative attributes of subjectivity.111 The aggregate is one person or subject composed of mind with the self-differentiations of understanding and will. Although Edwards does not conclude that this implies a one-subject model of the Trinity, his notion that the divine persons possess full personal attributes through union with the other divine persons entails that God is one subject or one absolute person. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit do not possess the full psychological dimensions of person in their own right, but are the personal distinctions of the one divine subject. Each divine person only possesses full personal attributes through union with the others. The Father is the mind of God, the Son is reduced to the personal distinction of the understanding, and the Spirit is the personal distinction of the will. His solution that the divine persons possess the distinct capacities of personhood—i.e., understanding and will—through union with the other divine persons is not consistent with Sherlock’s theory of the union of three self-conscious divine minds through mutual consciousness. Sherlock believed that the divine persons possess complete psychological aspects of person irrespective of the others. The critical question is, which theory, the psychological or ontological, is dominant in Edwards’ trinitarian theology? A psychological theory portrays a person as a self-conscious agent and an ontological one as a subsistence of nature or an unique mode of being. Although Edwards’ thought reflects both, his primary concept of the divine persons is the ontological one. This is the case because the status of the divine persons in the mutual love model shapes their identities. The mutual love model gives precedence to the ontological notion because the divine persons are fundamentally subsistent relations, which are products of the divine processions. Miscellany 1062 (“Economy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption”) exhibits well Edwards’ assumption of two theories of person and the primary role of the ontological one. He 111Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 135 (13:295).

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describes the Father and the Son covenanting together in a manner that assumes that the Father and the Son are two distinct persons in the psychological sense.112 However, even while attributing actions to the Father and the Son in the covenant of redemption that imply a psychological notion of person, he continues to use the mutual love model as the framework for the personal relations and identities of the trinitarian persons. He defines the Holy Spirit as a subsistent relation when he states that the Holy Spirit “is the divine love that is between the Father and the Son, he is the bond of union between the two covenanting persons, whereby they with infinite sweetness agree, and are infinitely strongly united as parties joined in covenant.”113 Edwards’ articulation of the covenant of redemption in the framework of the mutual love model shows that his metaphysical notion of divine person is fundamental to his trinitarian theology, but at the same time he considered them to bear the characteristics of subjects. Edwards’ most consistent way of describing the personal identity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is in terms of the relative subsistences of an infinite mind. The Father corresponds to the mind and the Son and the Holy Spirit to the subsistent terms of the acts of the divine understanding and will. The Son is the idea of God and the Holy Spirit is the love of God, and more specifically, the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son.114 This means that Edwards understood the identity of the divine persons in terms of the mutual love model. One further observation is that Edwards realized that the mutual love model posits interpersonal activity.115 The Father and the Son are two persons loving each other. Although the mutual act of love between the Father and the Son in the mutual love model does not necessarily infer a Cartesian theory of person, it entails psychological activity that is consistent with this concept of person. The mutual love model relies on the ontological notion 112Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:430–43). Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:443). Note that this quote is within a three sentence segment of Miscellany no. 1062 omitted from the previously and widely used Helm publication of the Miscellany under the title Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy and Covenant of Redemption. Yale University Press’s edition of Edwards’ Miscellanies includes the sentences (cf. Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1062 [20:443] with Helm’s edition of the Observations, 93). 114For a summary of Edwards’ concept of the divine persons, see Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131–32. 115More recently, David Coffey also makes this case: see Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” Theological Studies 51 (1990): 194–200. 113Edwards,

240 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM of person and incorporates within it psychological dimensions. Although the mutual love model is less effective in indicating the personal activity of the Holy Spirit, the unitive role it gives the Spirit does preserve it. The personal activity of the Holy Spirit is to unite other persons. Edwards’ trinitarianism reflects the integration of the psychological capacity of person with the traditional Augustinian mutual love formulation. Moreover, Edwards’ consistent use of the mutual love model even in texts that assume a Cartesian theory of person warrants the conclusion that he operated with one model of the Trinity and not two models. The apparent duplicity of his theology is not between competing trinitarian models, but differing concepts of personhood. If two models are admitted in Edwards they are the psychological and the mutual love model, but not a social model, unless the mutual love model is granted social status. Edwards’ synthesis of the psychological and mutual love models is a commonplace in heirs of the Augustinian tradition. David Coffey recently has shown that the two models are distinct and possess distinct purposes. According to Coffey, the psychological model presupposes the unity of the divine nature and then moves to personal distinctions, whereas the mutual love model highlights the plurality and interpersonal nature of the divine persons.116 The final similarity between Edwards, Sherlock, and South is their common use of the mental triad in the form of the mutual love model of the Trinity. In a sermon preached before the University of Oxford between the years 1663 and 1670, South used the mental triad to illustrate the reasonableness of the Trinity. He described the Father as the mind, the Son as the emanation of the mind’s understanding, and the Holy Spirit as the procession of the mind’s love for itself. He does not specifically call the Holy Spirit the mutual love of the Father and the Son, but connotes this when he says the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as love.117 South argues that the mental triad illustrates that God is one mind with three distinct personal subsistences. Later, when he wrote Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock’s Book, South did not use the mental triad. He probably did not because Sherlock accused those who portrayed the divine persons in terms of mental faculties of Sabellianism. Sherlock used the mutual love model to illustrate divine unity. He illustrated the unity of mutual consciousness with the mind that knows and 116David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 47–52 and 60. 117Robert South, “The Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity asserted, and proved not contrary to reason,” in Three Restoration Divines, 1.1:265–66.

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loves itself. The mind, self-knowledge, and self-love are distinct but one. Yet while the knowledge and love of the mind are distinct, they are also inseparable because what is known is loved and what is loved is known. He then described the Father as the “original mind,” the Son as the “reflex knowledge of himself” [i.e., the Father], and the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Sherlock’s articulation of the mutual love model is very similar to South’s and Edwards’ formulation of it. But, it must be recalled that Sherlock used the model to illustrate divine unity and not the identities of the divine persons as did South and Edwards.118 Furthermore, he maintained that portraying the divine persons in terms of mental faculties ultimately reduces to Sabellianism.119 In contrast to Sherlock, Edwards used the acts of the divine understanding and will, and not self-consciousness, to describe the individuation and identity of the divine persons. While he, like Sherlock, notes that faculties or aspects of self-consciousness are not equivalent with persons in the psychological sense, he nonetheless continued to use them to portray the personal identities of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Again, Edwards’ method of describing the Trinity more closely resembles South’s than Sherlock’s way. Stepping back to consider the broader context, early-Enlightenment Unitarians and proto-social trinitarians accused those who used the distinctions of the mind to illustrate the Trinity with Sabellianism. The Anglican divine John Wallis used the mental triad of the mind and its acts of knowing and willing to illustrate the divine persons.120 A Sabellian/Unitarian, 118Sherlock,

Vindication of the Trinity, 126–27 and 130–36. Vindication of the Trinity, 66–67. 120John Wallis, The Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, briefly explained in a Letter to a Friend (London, 1690), 16–18. Wallis’ theory of divine person does flirt with Sabellianism. He states that person, when applied to the divine persons, is metaphorical. He distinguishes between the English notion of person as a distinct human being and the Latin concept of person as a social role a human being assumes. According to the Latin meaning, person indicates the various roles, such as spouse and parent, into which one human being may enter. Person then refers to the various relations and offices a human being has with other human beings. Moreover, one human being can be multiple persons by virtue of his/her various offices (Wallis, A Fifth Letter, concerning the Sacred Trinity . . . [London, 1691], 15–20). Applying the Latin notion of person to the Godhead, he styles the Father as God the creator, the Son as God the redeemer, and the Holy Spirit as God the sanctifier (Wallis, “A Second Sermon concerning the Trinity,” in Three Sermons, concerning the Sacred Trinity [London, 1691], 59–61). The divine persons are the names for the three roles and acts of the one God in the economy of redemption. Wallis’ theory, therefore, appears as 119Sherlock,

242 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Stephen Nye charged Wallis, along with South, with Sabellianism. He insisted that if their view represents orthodoxy, then the Socinians are orthodox and could gladly join ranks with them.121 Moreover, Nye used the mental analogy to portray a Sabellian notion of God as one mind internally differentiated by intellect, self-knowledge, and self-love.122 The point here is not to grant the legitimacy of Nye’s allegation of Sabellianism, but to show that in relation to the Sherlock-South debate over the Trinity, Edwards consistently aligns with South. He portrays God as an infinite mind. Using the psychological analogy in the framework of the mutual love model, he defines the divine persons as subsistences of the divine nature. The immanent acts of the divine nature establish the personal identities of the divine persons and not the acts of self-consciousness as taught by Sherlock even though Edwards accorded the subsistent relations with the attributes of a subject. In terms of his historical context, his trinitarian model aligns with South or the Western trajectory of trinitarian thought and is the type accused of Sabellianism by early-Enlightenment Unitarians and proto-social trinitarians. Samuel Clarke, Daniel Waterland, and Jonathan Edwards: Cartesian Persons and the Threat of Subordinationism Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) and Daniel Waterland were the primary characters in the final phase of the English Trinitarian Controversy. Clarke was an important contributor to the defense of traditional Christian thought on several fronts in the early-Enlightenment. His popular Boyle Lectures of 1704 and 1705 were published under the titles A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Religion. Both were designed to counter the religious and philosophical ideas of Spinoza and Hobbes. He also upheld free will against the determinism of Anthony Collins. Nevertheless, the publication of The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity (1712) embroiled him in and inaugurated the next phase of the Trinitarian Controversies.123 Its publication quickly engendered a flood of responses, most of them denouncing, but a few defending it. a form of economic modalism. 121Nye, Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity, 8 and 20–23. 122Stephen Nye, The Explication of the Articles of the Divine Unity, the Trinity, and Incarnation . . . (London, 1715), 48–57. 123For background on Clarke, see James P. Ferguson, The Philosophy of Dr. Samuel Clarke and its Critics (New York: Vantage, 1974) and An Eighteenth Century Heretic; and Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke. A reprint of his works is available

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The principal objections to Clarke revolved around his ontological subordination of the Son to the Father and its implicit undermining of the deity of the Son, which had the appearance of Arianism. When the controversy reached fever pitch, a Convocation of the Church of England met in June 1714 to investigate Clarke’s views. Upon examination of an extract of his teachings, the Lower House concluded that an inquiry was necessary. On June 26, Clarke presented a defense of his position to the Bishops and followed up a week later with a briefer paper of explanation. While the Lower House remained unconvinced of Clarke’s orthodoxy, the Upper House accepted it and ended the proceedings against him on July 5, 1714. Clarke conceded to desist from further preaching and writing on the Trinity, which pledge he skirted by anonymously publishing additional treatises.124 Although the publication of criticisms of Clarke continued, Clarke’s principal opponent was Daniel Waterland.125 Known at the time for his vigorous defense of Anglican orthodoxy against Deism and enthusiasm, he received his most enduring legacy in his debate with Samuel Clarke over the doctrine of the Trinity. An interesting feature of the debate was that both Waterland and Clarke relied heavily on the retrieval of early church understandings of the Trinity. Indeed, their different appropriations of patristic trinitarian theology fueled their dispute. Waterland and others who charged Clarke with Arianism reduced patristic trinitarian thought to three trajectories: these are the orthodox or Athanasian, Arian, and Sabellian.126 Since in Samuel Clarke, The Works, 1738, 4 vols., British Philosophers and Theologians of the 17th and 18th Centuries, ed. René Wellek (1738; reprint, New York: Garland, 1978). 124The documents of the investigation including Clarke’s responses are available in Clarke, Works, 4:535–58. For a more detailed survey of the responses to Clarke’s The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, see Ferguson, An Eighteenth Century Heretic, 59–97 and Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke, 179–86. 125Waterland received his education at Magdalene College, Cambridge. He became the Archdeacon of Middlesex in 1730. Waterland is known as a defender of Anglican orthodoxy and critic of Deism and enthusiasm, but more so for his debate with Samuel Clarke over the doctrine of the Trinity. His theological method incorporated a strong reliance on Scripture, a historiography of the patristic traditions mediated through George Bull, and the Anglican tradition. His collected writings are available in The Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland . . ., 10 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1823) and the modern biography on Waterland is Holtby, Daniel Waterland. 126Daniel Waterland, A Defence of Some Queries relating to Dr. Clarke’s Scheme of the Holy Trinity, in Works, 1.2:146, 159, and 162.

244 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Clarke was neither Athanasian nor Sabellian, Waterland concluded that he must be Arian.127 Waterland relied on George Bull’s Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (1685) for his understanding of the patristic trinitarian traditions.128 Clarke on the other hand drew on the emerging historical-critical work such as that of the Jesuit scholar Dionysius Petavius (1583–1652). According to this scholarship, the patristic era produced four and not three groups of trinitarians. To the Athanasians, Sabellians, and Arians they added the SemiArians.129 127Waterland,

Defence, in Works, 1.2:151–59. of George Bull, vol. 5. 129Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke, 89–102. Theologians and church historians have tended to follow Clarke’s contemporaries’ accusation of Arianism in their assessment of Clarke’s trinitarian theology. For earlier examples of the identification of Clarke as an Arian, see Ferguson, An Eighteenth Century Heretic, 145–49; George P. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, International Theological Library (1901; reprint, New York: AMS, 1976), 371; Levi L. Paine, A Critical History of the Evolution of Trinitarianism and Its Outcome in the New Christology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900), 99–100; and Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, rev. ed., 3d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 443. Semi-Arianism refers to the line of trinitarianism stemming from Eusebius of Caesarea and Basil of Ancyra. They believed that the Son was “like the Father in being” (i.e., homoiousios). Their notion of “like in being” stands in contrast to the term homoousios (“same in being”) adopted by the Creed of Nicaea. For a succinct narrative of the fourth century use of these terms, see Stuart G. Hall, Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 128–47. Also, the commonplace theory in Clarke’s time that homoousios means that the Father and the Son are identical in being was, according to R. P. C. Hanson, not the intended connotation of the term by participants at the Council of Nicaea (Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988], 190– 202). Hanson notes that the meaning of homoousios was fluid in the fourth century and that it was inserted into the Creed of Nicaea to exclude Arius and yet keep the door open to as many other signatories as possible (Hanson, “The Achievement of Orthodoxy in the Fourth Century AD,” in The Making of Orthodoxy, ed. Rowan Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 146). For Clarke’s relationship to the homoiousian theology of the fourth century, see Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke, 89–141. The explanation of the Son’s existence distinguishes the Semi-Arians from the Arians. The Semi-Arians believed that the Son was begotten in eternity from the Father and that the Son was like the Father in every way except ingenerateness. Moreover, the Son was not created “from what is not” as taught by Arius, but he is begotten from the Father (Colm Luibhéid, The Council of Nicea [Ireland: Officina Typographica, Galway University Press, 1982], 55–62). Arians believed that the Father alone was true God, which means that the Fa128Works

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In addition to variant retrievals of early-church trinitarian theology, differing theories of the nature of divine person and the implications following from the doctrine of aseity for the consubstantiality of the Son and the Father divided Clarke and Waterland. First, Clarke, as Sherlock before him, begins with a Cartesian theory of person; a person is an intelligent being.130 In so doing, he diverged from the traditional notion that a divine person is a subsistence of a rational nature. Clarke’s contemporaries noted that differing theories of the divine persons and their relationship to the divine essence was the primary point of agitation. Stephen Nye, an eighteenth-century Unitarian and critic of Clarke, pointed out the primary difference between Clarke and the Athanasian tradition is that the former understands person according to the “English Vulgar, as an intelligent or rational being” and the latter as a rational being’s mode of subsistence.131 Thomas Bennet, an Athanasian trinitarian, noted that the distinguishing feature of

ther is unoriginate and the source of all other being (Colm Luibhéid, Eusebius of Caesarea and the Arian Crisis [Ireland: Officina Typographica, Irish Academic Press, 1981], 17). The Arians believed that the Son was the first and supreme creation of the one God named the Father. He represents the pinnacle of the hierarchy of created being (Luibhéid, The Council of Nicea, 17–30 and 90; Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition [London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1987], 98; and Christopher Stead, “The Word ‘From Nothing,’” in Christopher Stead, Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity: Arius, Athanasius, Augustine, Variorum Collected Studies Series, 224 [Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 2000], 671–84). Hanson remarks that Arius resisted describing the Son as “from the Father” because he thought it connotes that the Son is a consubstantial part of the Father and thus that God is composite (Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 8). Charles Kannengiesser corroborates that a central tenet of Arius was his refusal to identify the Son with the substance of the Father (Kannengiesser, Arius and Athanasius: Two Alexandrian Theologians, Collected Studies Series [Great Britain: Variorum, 1991], 473). Arius’ separation of the Son from the Father rests on the biblical teaching that the Son is from the Father coupled with the theory that God is a self-existent being and, since the Son is begotten, he is a being of a different nature. According to Hanson, the basic meaning of homoousios for Athanasius is the ontological unity of the Father and the Son (Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 436–45). 130Clarke, The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:1, 122, and 155 and A Reply to the Objections of Robert Nelson, in Works, 4:265–67. 131Stephen Nye, The Explication of the Articles of the Divine Unity, the Trinity, and Incarnation, commonly receiv’d in the Catholick Church, asserted and vindicated (London, 1715), 22–23.

246 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Clarke’s trinitarianism was his insistence that the divine persons are separate intelligent beings and, therefore, they do not share an identical essence.132 Clarke maintains that person and substance are coincident. To multiply persons is to multiply specific instances of substances. Two persons necessarily infer two specific substances. The substances are not necessarily different in nature, but they are in number.133 In a letter to the Athanasian trinitarian Edward Wells, Clarke rejects Well’s definition of the Trinity “that in the Godhead there are three persons of the same individual essence.”134 Clarke argues that an individual essence is an individual person. His teaching of the indivisibility of person and substance clashed with the Athanasian understanding of the consubstantiality of the Son. According to the Athanasian trinitarians, one substance can have pluriform subsistence without dividing the substance. The trinitarian God is one substance and subsists in three persons. The Son, therefore, is the same substance or consubstantial with the Father (the same was also affirmed of the Holy Spirit). In contrast, Clarke contends that the Greeks used homoousios to indicate “the agreement of things numerically differing from one another.”135 In other words, contrary to the traditional distinction of substance and person in trinitarian theology, Clarke taught that person and substance are identical and indistinct. Clarke also adopts the principle that all being ultimately derives from one necessary being. He alternately presents this principle in terms of cause and effect. He believed that all effects ultimately derive from one necessary cause. Clarke elaborated this rational principle in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and later applied it to the Trinity.136 The result is a doctrine of personal subordination in the Godhead. Clarke’s trinitarian theology and the dispute it engendered with Waterland stem from his concept of person and rational principle of the relationship between necessary and contingent being or cause and effect. As a result of the combination of the rational principle that all being derives from one necessary being and the Cartesian concept of person, 132Thomas Bennet, A Discourse of the everblessed Trinity in Unity, with an Examination of Dr. Clarke’s “Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity” (London: W. Innys, 1718), 218 and 231–35. 133Clarke, Observations on Dr. Waterland’s Second “Defence”, in Works, 4:500. 134Edward Wells, Remarks on Dr. Clarke’s Introduction to his “Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity” (London: Anthony Peisley, 1713), 21. 135Clarke, Clarke’s Letter to Wells, in Works, 4:239. 136Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in Works, 2:525–29 and The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:122–23.

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Clarke rejected consubstantiality understood as one numerical substance. He outlined three possible meanings of consubstantiality. It can refer to beings with the same specific nature. According to this denotation, the Father and the Son are two separate substances identical in nature and, therefore, they are two Gods.137 The consubstantiality of the Father and the Son may also mean that they are the same individual substance. He dismissed this view as Sabellian and Socinian.138 Finally, it can indicate that the Son derives his substance from the Father. In this sense, the consubstantiality of the Son does not mean that the Father and the Son share the same individual essence, but that they share equality of nature—save aseity, which belongs to the Father alone who is numerically different.139 By understanding the consubstantiality of the Son in terms of being from the Father, Clarke could maintain that the Father alone is truly God and that the Son is divine. The Son is not created ex nihilo and, thereby, a qualitatively different substance from the Father. His being is from the Father and, thereby, a quantitatively different substance from the Father. Clarke’s purpose is to avoid Sabellianism by maintaining that the Father and the Son are two personal beings and Arianism by affirming that the Son is fully divine and not a creature.140 His formulation of consubstantiality fits with his concept of person for it retains the divine persons as distinct intelligent agents. Given his notion of person, consubstantiality as numerical identical essence is impossible and irrational because one instance of a certain category of rational substance is one person. The notion of consubstantiality also comports with the rational principle that only one supreme being—i.e., intelligent agent—exists. The Father alone is the selfexistent source and cause of all being. The Father is one substance and one person. The Son is from the Father but not numerically identical with the Father. Thus, the Son is a distinct substance and person from the Father. The consequence of Clarke’s Cartesian theory of person for his understanding of consubstantiality is apparent in his misinterpretation of Waterland’s notion of consubstantiality. Clarke accused Waterland of tritheism.141 137Clarke,

The Modest Plea, in Works, 4:463. The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:148–49 and 463. 139Clarke, Clarke’s Letter to Wells, in Works, 4:239. Waterland rejected this theory as ditheism (Waterland, Defence, in Works, 1.2:329). 140Clarke, The Modest Plea, in Works, 4:463 and Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke, 106–7. 141Clarke, The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:469–70. For the text in Waterland that Clarke interprets in terms of his own theory of person, see Waterland, Defence, in Works, 1.2:47–48. 138Clarke,

248 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM But, in order to do so and as Waterland objected, he read his own notion of person into Waterland’s account of consubstantiality.142 Admittedly, Waterland’s depiction of a divine person as an “individual intelligent agent” initially invites Clarke’s misreading. However, Waterland immediately clarified that the divine persons subsist in “one undivided substance.”143 Furthermore, Waterland, using the traditional notion of person as a subsistence of a rational nature, articulated the consubstantiality of the divine persons in terms of numerical identity. In other words, for Waterland, person and distinct being or substance are not equivalent terms. While a person is never separated from being or substance, it or they are distinguished by relative subsistences of the substance.144 To summarize at this stage, Clarke believed that person and being are equivalent and that the supposition of numerical identity of substance among three divine persons is absurd. Clarke drew on and applied the Cartesian theory of person to the Trinity and dismissed understanding the divine persons in terms of subsistences.145 He concluded it was inconsistent with the traditional doctrine of numerical identity and, therefore, rejected the doctrine. For Waterland, one substance may have multiple subsistences without dividing the one substance, so the Godhead is one substance subsisting as three persons. Waterland follows the traditional view that a divine person is a subsistence of the divine nature. At the same time, he sees no inconsistency with attributing what Clarke would consider Cartesian personal characteristics to them. In the wake of the twentieth century polarization of trinitarian theology in the categories of divine oneness and threeness, the temptation is to see Clarke as giving preeminence to the divine persons and Waterland as privileging the divine substance over the persons.146 However, such an interpretation is a mistake. Their divergence is not over one who emphasizes the divine persons more than the other, but over conflicting theories of divine persons. Based on the numerical and substantial distinction of the divine persons, Clarke taught that the Son is ontologically subordinate to the Father. The characteristic that distinguishes the substance of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father is derivation. The Father alone is self-existent. He alone is the supreme God because he is God not from another. The Father 142Waterland, 143Waterland,

4:22.

144Waterland,

A Farther Vindication of Christ’s Divinity, in Works, 4:22. Defence, in Works, 1.2:247–48 and A Farther Vindication, in Works,

Second Defence, in Works, 3:339–40. The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:178 146Pfizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Clarke, 101, 135, 203, and 217–20. 145Clarke,

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is the self-existent and necessary being from which flows all other being.147 All derived being, regardless of its mode of derivation, is ontologically subordinate to the Father, who is the source and cause of all other being. This must be the case otherwise two or more ontologically supreme beings would exist, which is inconsistent with the rational principle that the source of all being is one necessary being. Since all being derives ultimately from one source or supreme God and multiple persons mean multiple beings, then only one divine person can be the supreme God. If the Son and the Father, and the Holy Spirit for that matter, are ontologically equal in every respect, then three God’s exist. Since Clarke refused to countenance tritheism, the only solution available, given his theory of person, is the ontological supremacy of the Father and subordination of the Son and the Spirit.148 He contended that since the Son and the Spirit derive their being from the Father from eternity, they are not truly and properly God. Accordingly, for Clarke, God is a term that refers exclusively to one divine person. Among the divine persons only the Father is God in the absolute signification.149 It is not appropriate to refer to the three divine persons or the Trinity as God. The different meaning assigned to the word “God” by Clarke and his Athanasian opponents is significant. As noted, for Clarke, God refers to one divine person singly and principally to the Father. For the Athanasians, God refers to the Godhead consisting of the three divine persons.150 The Son and the Spirit are called God by virtue of receiving a divine nature from the Father. For instance, the Son is called God because he is from the Father and exercises the same power as the Father, but strictly speaking he is not God in an absolute sense. He is divine because he shares 147Clarke,

The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:123–32 and 150–53. In an effort to settle the dispute raised by Clarke, Thomas Burnet extended Clarke’s subordinationism and suggested that the Godhead consists of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but that the Son and the Spirit are distinct, inferior, and created beings relative to the Father. It is difficult to conceive how Burnet thought this theory would find favor when Clarke’s lesser tendency to subordinationism attracted so much vitriol (Thomas Burnet, “The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity,” intelligibly explained: Or, an Essay toward the Demonstration of a Trinity in Unity, from Reason and Scripture [London: J. Roberts, 1720], 58–59). 149Clarke, The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:150–76, 191, and 268– 69. 150Bennet, A Discourse on the everblessed Trinity in Unity, 252 and John Edwards, Some Brief Critical Remarks on Dr. Clarke’s last Papers . . . (London: Ferdinando Burleigh, 1714), 26. 148

250 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM all the characteristics of the Father save aseity. The Son, therefore, does not exist necessarily. The Father eternally produces the Son by his power and will. Clarke had to link the Son’s existence to the Father’s will in order to remain consistent with the rational principle that only one necessary being exists. If the Son existed necessarily, then, given his theory that a person is a discrete instance of substance, two necessary beings would exist. Additionally, the derivation of the Son by the will of the Father assumes that the Father and the Son are persons in a Cartesian sense; that is, they are distinct intelligent beings. Since the Son is a distinct personal being, not a distinct person as in the traditional notion of subsistence of a rational nature, his ontological subordination to the Father is necessary. Clarke gave little specific attention to the Holy Spirit because the reasoning applied to the Son also applied to the Spirit. However, the Spirit, along with being subordinate to the Father, is also subordinate to the Son.151 The Clarke-Waterland debate is a modified reproduction of the one between South and Sherlock. The center of gravity for each dispute is the theory of divine person. South and Waterland understand a divine person as a subsistence of a rational nature and possess a clear theory of numerical substantial unity. Sherlock and Clarke define the divine persons as intelligent beings and thus conclude that three divine persons mean three beings. Sherlock takes the route that ends with tritheism by positing three ontologically equal divine persons, whereas Clarke chooses the way that leads to Semi-Arianism by portraying an ontological hierarchy in which the Father is only properly God and the Son and the Spirit are derivative and subordinate divine persons. In order to situate Edwards relative to Clarke and Waterland we must rely primarily on the texture of his trinitarian theology rather than documented interaction with them. The probability is high that Edwards gained direct access to the trinitarian writings of Clarke and Waterland, but remains circumstantial. In his reading “Catalogue,” he notes two books advertised at the end of Clarke’s The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity (entry no. 537). He cites Waterland’s, A Vindication of Christ’s Divinity: Being a Defense of some Queries Relating to Dr. Clarke’s Scheme of the Holy Trinity (1719), and that it frequently cites and recommends George Bull’s Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (entry nos. 674 and 675). Both references suggest that Edwards possessed copies of these texts, at the least for a time, even if he did not actually own them.

151Clarke,

The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity, in Works, 4:136–41, 150–59, and 179 and Observations on Dr. Waterland’s Second “Defence,” in Works, 4:501.

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The points for comparing Edwards are, on the one hand, Clarke’s consistent definition of divine person as an intelligent being coincident with a discrete substance and, on the other hand, Waterland’s adoption of the traditional notion that a divine person is a subsistence of a rational nature. Complicating the procedure is Edwards’ use of both concepts. In Treatise on Grace, Edwards argues that the Holy Spirit is a divine person because the Spirit is a “distinct personal agent.”152 In his discussion of the covenant of redemption, he presupposes the distinct personal agency of the Father and the Son when they compact together to achieve redemption.153 Here we see the Cartesian and Clarke’s emphasis on person as an independent agent of thought and action. Nevertheless, in his writings specifically treating the personal identity of the divine persons as well as those on the covenant of redemption, he predominantly portrays the divine persons as subsistences of a rational nature. He describes the Son as the subsistence of the divine idea and the Holy Spirit as the subsistence of the mutual love of the Father and the Son.154 The depiction of the divine persons in terms of the subsistence of idea and love is not limited to his theoretical constructions of the immanent Trinity. He also describes the soteriological roles of the Son and the Spirit in terms of the nature of their personal subsistence. The Son is the Word or the revelation of God because he subsists as the idea of God, which is the perfect image of God. The Holy Spirit is the love of God who unites the saints one to another and with the Son and the Father because the Spirit subsists as the immanent mutual love of the Father and the Son.155 The mutual love model, which portrays the divine persons in terms of subsistences of the divine nature, served as Edwards’ primary model for explicating the immanent and economic Trinity. Thus, Edwards’ primary notion of divine person lines up with Waterland’s notion of rational subsistence and not Clarke’s Cartesian concept. Edwards also believed that the divine persons share a numerically identical essence. While the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three distinct persons, Edwards denied that they are “three distinct beings” as 152Edwards,

Treatise on Grace, 21:181. Miscellanies, nos. 1062 (20:435–39) and 993 (20:323). 154E.g., Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:113–23 and 131; Treatise on Grace, 21:186–87; and Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:443). 155Edwards, Charity and Its Fruits, 8:132–33 and 369–77; End of Creation, 8:528– 29; Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135–36; Treatise on Grace, 21:186; and Miscellanies, nos. 1066 (20:446), 1082 (20:465–66), 1084 (20:467), 1142 (20:517), and 1151 (20:525); and Miscellanies, nos. 1218 (23:150–53) and 1266a (23:213). 153Edwards,

252 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Clarke affirmed.156 Moreover, they do not each possess three different understandings, but participate in the one divine essence. He clarified his position in Miscellany 308: In the first place, we don’t suppose that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are three distinct beings that have three distinct understandings. It is the divine essence understands, and it is the divine essence is understood; ’tis the divine being that loves, and it is the divine being that is loved. The Father understands, the Son understands, and the Holy Ghost understands, because every one is the same understanding divine essence; and not that each of them have a distinct understanding of their own.157

Each divine person understands because each is identical with the one understanding essence. His language reflects the theology of homoousios/consubstantiality and doctrine of divine simplicity even though he did not use the technical terms. It is unclear why Edwards did not use the traditional terms homoousios and consubstantiality. It is hard to imagine that he was unfamiliar with them. It is possible that he rejected them as ill suited for his context that held traditional substance discourse as categories inaccessible to human knowledge. Nevertheless, his concept that the divine persons are identical with the single divine essence matches Waterland’s and, what was called at the time, the Athanasian doctrine of consubstantiality. Had Clarke read Edwards’ Miscellany, he would likely have declared Edwards a Sabellian and a Socinian because if the divine persons are not three distinct beings, then they are but mere appearances of one person, which is modalism. Clarke’s fallacy is to assume that the Cartesian theory of person is the only legitimate notion of person to apply to the Trinity. The implications following from the ontological derivation of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father also distinguish Edwards and Clarke. Clarke concluded that ontological derivation necessarily entails ontological subordination. The Son and the Holy Spirit receive their being from the power and will of the Father. Clarke rejects the idea that the Son and the Spirit exist by a necessity of nature. As noted earlier, the combination of Clarke’s theory of person and rational principle that all being derives from one necessary being renders the ontological subordination of the Son and the Spirit a necessity. While Clarke refuses to speculate on the metaphysical manner of their derivation from the Father, he insists that they are ontologically subordinate to the Father. The ontological subordination of the 156Edwards, 157Edwards,

Miscellanies, no. 308 (13:392). Miscellanies, no. 308 (13:392).

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Son to the Father and the Holy Spirit to the Son translates to a hierarchy within the economy of redemption. Edwards maintained that while the Son and the Holy Spirit derive their being from the Father, they remain ontologically equal. In other words, he did not accept Clarke’s principle that ontological derivation necessarily implies ontological inequality. Like Clarke, he taught that the Father’s selfsubsistence distinguishes him from the Son and the Spirit and that the Father is the source or fountain of the Son and the Spirit.158 However, Edwards’ understanding of these concepts reflects more the theological vein of Augustine and Aquinas than of Clarke.159 Despite some similarity, Edwards’ understanding of the ontological equality between the Son and the Holy Spirit and the Father stands in sharp contrast to Clarke’s view on several points. Contrary to Clarke, Edwards ascribed full deity to the three divine persons and not only to the Father. Edwards also argued that while the Son and the Spirit subsist, in the order of nature, posterior to and from the Father, their order of subsistence invokes no inferiority of nature (nor does it imply temporary succession). The Father’s priority in the order of subsistence is the reason that Edwards referred to him as “God absolutely considered” and not because he believed that true divinity belonged exclusively to the Father.160 Furthermore, while Edwards taught, like Clarke, that the Son and the Spirit are from the Father, he did not limit the existence of the Son and the Spirit to the power and will of the Father. If the Son and the Spirit proceed by the will and power of the Father then their existence is necessarily subordinate because their existence is contingent on the Father’s will. Edwards believed that the Son and Spirit proceed necessarily and are equal subsistences of the divine nature. By ascribing the subsistence of the Son and the Spirit to necessary processions, Edwards avoids subordinating the Son and the Spirit under the category of contingent being and their nature to that of the Father. Moreover, the economic order of acting derives from the divine persons’ order of subsistence and not ontological gradation.161 Edwards’ teaching that the economic order follows from the order of subsistence and not an inequality of nature

158Edwards,

Discourse on the Trinity, 21:131 and 135 and “The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost,” 14:379. 159Augustine, The Trinity 4.29 (p. 174) and Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ (England: Blackfriars, 1964), 1a.33.1 (pp. 5 and 7). 160Edwards, Discourse on the Trinity, 21:135. 161Edwards, Miscellanies, no. 1062 (20:430–31).

254 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM also corresponds to Waterland’s theory of the relationship between the order of subsistence and the economy of redemption.162

CONCLUSION Edwards’ trinitarian theology reflects a broad awareness of and interaction with the Trinitarian Controversies of the early-Enlightenment. However, direct acquaintance with its literature is difficult to demonstrate in many cases because Edwards did not regularly document his sources. He read Andrew Michael Ramsay, but after he had written much of his trinitarian writings. His access to and reading of Clarke’s and Waterland’s texts is very likely, but cannot be affirmed with final certainty. Nonetheless, his trinitarian apologetic for the goodness of God, application of the traditional scholastic and Cartesian theory of person to the divine persons, and use of the mutual love model indicate cognizance of apologetic strategies and trinitarian theologies involved in the Trinitarian Controversies. Moreover, these features of his trinitarian theology suggest his intentional participation in the early-Enlightenment discussions of the Trinity. In respect to the earlyEnlightenment Trinitarian Controversies, Edwards critiqued the monism of the Unitarian God of Deism, the tritheistic tendencies of proto-social trinitarians (Sherlock), and the subordinationism of the Semi-Arians (Clarke) and aligned with the traditional Athanasian trinitarian theology. Finally, the early-Enlightenment Trinitarian Controversies reveal two trends of thought emerging around the theory of divine person. The first, represented by Robert South and Daniel Waterland, conceives the divine persons in the traditional scholastic or ontological way as a subsistence of a rational nature. The second, represented by William Sherlock and Samuel Clarke, applies the Cartesian notion that a person is a discrete subject to the trinitarian persons. This second group divides into two sub-trends. Sherlock affirmed the ontological equality of the three divine subjects and gravitated toward tritheism. Clarke maintained the individuality of the three divine subjects and turned to subordinationism. Although Edwards’ thought reflects inconsistent use of the traditional and Cartesian notions of divine person, his overriding concept is that a divine person is a subsistence of the divine nature and, therefore, his theory of divine person aligns with the South-Waterland trajectory of early-Enlightenment trinitarian theology. Edwards’ correlation with the Athanasian trajectory of trinitarian theology underpins the foundational role of the mutual love model for his thought.

162Waterland,

A Farther Vindication, in Works, 4:42–43.

CONCLUSION Current scholars of Edwards’ trinitarian theology maintain that it embodies two models of the Trinity—the psychological and social. These two models respectively represent his alignment with both the Augustinian and Cappadocian/Richard of St. Victor trinitarian traditions. Although they recognize that Edwards used the Augustinian psychological model, they argue that the heart of and the utility of his trinitarian theology for contemporary theology is his social model of the Trinity. This book questions that interpretation and argues that Edwards consistently used one model of the Trinity—the Augustinian mutual love model. The basis for my reappraisal of Edwards’ trinitarianism is the use of a historical theological methodology in contrast to the predominantly systematic theological methodology used by previous interpreters of his trinitarianism. The primary feature of the systematic-theological analyses of Edwards’ trinitarianism is the use of the threeness-oneness paradigm to interpret his trinitarian theology. The paradigm supposes that trinitarian theology developed along dialectical trajectories. The Western Augustinian tradition stresses divine unity and utilizes the psychological model of the Trinity. In contrast, the Cappadocians of the Eastern tradition and Richard of St. Victor of the Western tradition emphasize the divine persons and use the social model of the Trinity. The parameters of the paradigm lead Edwards’ scholars to interpret his use of social terms, such as consent, excellency, and love, to describe the immanent trinitarian relations as evidence for a distinct social model in his thought. Edwards’ scholars argue that Edwards’ trinitarianism embodies two opposite trinitarian models—the social and the psychological. Moreover, they contend that Edwards developed a social model of the Trinity to counteract the monistic tendencies of the Western, Reformed scholastic, and Reformed Puritan trinitarian traditions. In contrast, I suggest that Edwards’ trinitarian theology stands in continuity with the Augustinian mutual love tradition and the earlyEnlightenment apologists for traditional trinitarianism. The basis of this proposal is a historical-theological analysis. A historical-theological analysis of Edwards’ trinitarianism interprets his trinitarianism within his early255

256 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Enlightenment context and, therefore, rejects the threeness-oneness paradigm as a suitable hermeneutical template for the analysis of his trinitarianism. The historical context of his trinitarianism is, on the one hand, the Western Augustinian mutual love trinitarian tradition and, on the other hand, the early-Enlightenment Trinitarian Controversy. Edwards’ trinitarian theology stands in continuity with both contextual horizons. In concert with the larger Western Augustinian trinitarian tradition, Edwards adopted the mutual love model to portray the Trinity. His use of the mutual love model also reflects continuity with apologists for the traditional doctrine of the Trinity in the early-Enlightenment. The research presented here shows that although Edwards used social language, he consistently deployed it within the contours of the Augustinian mutual love model of the Trinity. Moreover, his polemical eye was directed to various forms of antitrinitarianism in the early-Enlightenment and not to Western, Reformed scholastic, and Reformed Puritan trinitarian traditions. The scope of this project is Edwards’ relationship to the Augustinian trinitarian tradition and the early-Enlightenment Trinitarian Controversy. In light of this, three areas of further study remain to be completed. In terms of historical theology, a more detailed analysis of Edwards’ relationship to the Reformed Puritan trinitarian tradition is needed. Although I showed that the elements of the mutual love model are present in important Puritan predecessors of Edwards such as William Ames, Richard Sibbes, and Cotton Mather, the question of his specific relationship to these thinkers was not the primary focus of the work. Beyond noting the general corroboration with his Puritan tradition, I focused on demonstrating Edwards’ continuity with the broader Western Augustinian mutual love trinitarian tradition, of which Ames, Sibbes, and Mather are members, and with the earlyEnlightenment apologists for the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. In terms of systematic theology, the argument presented here that Edwards consistently utilized the mutual love model invites a reevaluation of the relationship between Edwards’ trinitarianism and doctrines related to creation and redemption. This project is especially important given Amy Plantinga Pauw’s systematic-theological analysis of his theology of creation and redemption in terms of the social and psychological models. I suspect that the result of such a reevaluation will find harmony between Edwards’ doctrines of the Trinity, creation, and redemption in place of the inconsistencies in these doctrines presented in Plantinga Pauw’s analysis. Finally, the thesis that Edwards consistently used the Augustinian mutual love model and not the disparate social and psychological models promises an alternative appropriation of his thought for modern trinitarian

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theology. Rather than being an anomaly within the Western tradition, Edwards’ presentation of the social dimensions of this traditional Western model calls into question the common charge that Western trinitarianism is at root monistic. Edwards’ robust relational images of the Trinity and of the saints’ union with the triune God and each other may help to show that Western trinitarianism is not inherently detrimental to a vibrant Christian spirituality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY EDWARDS PRIMARY TEXTS, COLLECTED WORKS, AND REFERENCE WORKS Edwards, Jonathan. An Essay on the Trinity. In Treatise on Grace and other Posthumously Published Writings, ed. Paul Helm, 99–131. Cambridge/London: James Clarke, 1971. ———. “Jonathan Edwards’ Reading ‘Catalogue’ with Notes and Indexes.” Ed. L. Brian Sullivan. Works of Jonathan Edwards office, Yale Divinity School. New Haven, Conn. ———. Observations Concerning the Scripture Oeconomy of the Trinity and Covenant of Redemption. Ed. Egbert C. Smyth. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1880. ———. Treatise on Grace. In Treatise on Grace and other Posthumously Published Writings, ed. Paul Helm, 25–75. Cambridge/London: James Clarke, 1971. Faust, Clarence H. and Thomas H. Johnson. Jonathan Edwards: Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes. New York: American Book Company, 1935. Lesser, M.X. Jonathan Edwards: A Reference Guide. Reference Guides to Literature. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1981. ———. Jonathan Edwards: An Annotated Bibliography, 1979–1993. Bibliographies and Indexes in Religious Studies, 30. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994. ———. Reading Jonathan Edwards: An Annotated Bibliography in Three Parts, 1729–2005. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Perry Miller. Vol. 1, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Perry Miller. Vol. 2, Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. John E. Smith. Vol. 3, Original Sin, ed. Clyde A. Holbrook. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 259

260 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. John E. Smith. Vol. 6, Scientific and Philosophical Writings, ed. Wallace E. Anderson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. John E. Smith. Vol. 8, Ethical Writings, ed. Paul Ramsey. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 13, The Miscellanies,” (Entry Nos. a-z, aa-zz, 1–500), ed. Thomas A. Schafer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 14, Sermons and Discourses, 1723–1729, ed. Kenneth P. Minkema. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 15, Notes on Scripture, ed. Stephen J. Stein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 16, Letters and Personal Writings, ed. George S. Claghorn. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 17, Sermons and Discourses, 1730–1733, ed. Mark Valeri. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 18, The Miscellanies” (Entry Nos. 501–832), ed. Ava Chamberlain. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 19, Sermons and Discourses, 1734–1738, ed. M. X. Lesser. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 20, The “Miscellanies” (Entry Nos. 833–1152), ed. Amy Plantinga Pauw. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 21, Writings on the Trinity, Grace, and Faith, ed. Sang Hyun Lee. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Ed. Harry S. Stout. Vol. 23, The “Miscellanies” (Entry Nos. 1153–1360), ed. Douglas A. Sweeney. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. The Works of President Edwards. Vol. 8, Concerning Efficacious Grace. New York: Burt Franklin, 1968. The Works of President Edwards. 4 vols. Reprint of the Worcester edition. Vol. 2, Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World. New York: Leavitt, Trow, and Co., 1849.

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288 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Warfield, Benjamin B. “The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity.” In Biblical and Theological Studies, ed. Samuel G. Craig, 22–59. 1912. Reprint, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1952. Weber, Richard M. “The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards: An Investigation of Charges against Its Orthodoxy.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44 (2001): 297–318. Wedeking, Gary. “Locke on Personal Identity and the Trinity Controversy of the 1690s.” Dialogue 29 (1990): 163–88. Weinandy, Thomas G. The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995. Welch, Claude. The Trinity in Contemporary Theology. London: SCM, 1953. Wilbur, Earl M. A History of Unitarianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947. Wiles, Maurice. Archetypal Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. Williams, Daniel D. The Andover Liberals: A Study in American Theology (New York: Octagon, 1970. Williams, Robert R. Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978. Williams, Rowan. Arius: Heresy and Tradition. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1987. ———. “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate.” Augustiniana 40 (1990): 317–32. Winslow, Ola E. Jonathan Edwards, 1703–1758: A Biography. New York: Macmillan, 1940. Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. “Jonathan Edwards.” The Philosophical Review 13 (1904): 393–408. Wright, Conrad. The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America. Boston: Starr King, 1955. Yarbrough, Stephen R. and John C. Adams. Delightful Conviction: Jonathan Edwards and the Rhetoric of Conversion. Great American Orators, 20. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. Yolton, John W. “Ideas and Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (1975): 145–65. ———. “The Term Idea in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy.” In Idea: 6th Colloquio Internazionale, Roma, 5–7 gennaio 1989, ed. M. Fattori and M. L. Bianchi, 237–54. Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 51. Rome: Ateno, 1990.

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DISSERTATIONS Caldwell, Robert W., III. “The Holy Spirit as the Bond of Union in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards.” Ph.D. diss. Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2003. Pauw, Amy Plantinga. “The Supreme Harmony of All: Jonathan Edwards and the Trinity.” Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1990. Richardson, Herbert W. “The Glory of God in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Study in the Doctrine of the Trinity.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1962. Sairsingh, Krister. “Jonathan Edwards and the Idea of Divine Glory: His Foundational Trinitarianism and Its Ecclesial Import.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986. Stahle, Rachel S. “The Trinitarian Spirit of Jonathan Edwards’ Theology.” Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999. Studebaker, Steven M. “Jonathan Edwards’ Social Augustinian Trinitarianism: A Criticism of and an Alternative to Recent Interpretations.” Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 2003. Thompson, Thomas R. “Imitatio Trinitatis: The Trinity as Social Model in the Theologies of Jürgen Moltmann and Leonardo Boff.” Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1996.

NAME INDEX Adams, John C., 261 Ahlstrom, Sydney E., 33, 34, 148, 168, 269 Allan, C. W., 226, 269 Allen, Alexander V. G., 11, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 261 Allen, Joshua, 233, 261 Althaus, Paul, 111, 269 Ames, William, 97, 145, 201, 256 Anderson, Wallace E., 173, 175, 176, 260, 269 Anselm of Canterbury, 46, 77, 130, 132, 145, 188, 261 Aquinas, Thomas, 9, 77, 87, 99, 110, 111, 112, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 127, 129, 133, 136, 140, 141, 142, 161, 172, 177, 216, 253, 261 Ariew, Roger, 176, 269 Arminius, Jacob, 159, 215, 268 Arnauld, Antoine, 179, 261 Augustine, 4, 9, 35, 39, 45, 68, 70, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 102, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, 138, 141, 143, 144, 171, 172, 177, 207, 216, 233, 234, 253, 261 Ayers, Michael, 184, 269 Ayres, Lewis, 76, 80, 82, 83, 84, 269 Babcock, William S., 207, 220, 232, 270 Badcock, Gary D., 71, 114, 197, 270 Baldwin, Richard, 232, 262 Barnes, Michel René, 79, 80, 82, 83, 90, 270 Barth, Karl, 42, 45, 48, 70, 270 Beck, L. J., 176, 270

Beilby, James, 203, 270 Beiser, Frederick C., 211, 215, 270 Bennet, Thomas, 245, 246, 249, 262 Berkeley, George, 149, 174, 179, 180, 181, 182, 262 and esse est percipi, 149, 182 Bidle, John, 229, 262 Bingham, Joseph, 231, 262 Blackman, George L., 34, 270 Blake, Ralph M., 176, 270 Blount, Charles, 214, 220, 262 Boardman, George Nye, 36, 262 Boff, Leonardo, 69, 71, 270 Bok, Nico den, 91, 131, 270 Boland, Vivian, 177, 271 Bonansea, Bernardine M., 143, 271 Bonaventure, 110, 112, 114, 129, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 216, 268 Bourke, Vernon J., 143, 271 Brachtendorf, Johannes, 271 Bradford, Alden, 209, 271 Brown, David, 69, 76, 271 Bryant, Louise M., 173, 271 Buckham, John W., 23, 262 Bull, George, 208, 232, 244, 250, 268 Burnet, Thomas, 249, 262 Bury, Arthur, 208 Bush, Sargent, Jr., 146, 271 Bushnell, Horace, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 31, 33, 39, 41, 262 Butin, Philip W., 111, 271 Byrne, Peter, 214, 271 Caldwell, Robert W., III, 42, 271, 289 Calvin, John, 29, 45, 87, 96, 97, 111, 135, 143, 164, 165, 263 291

292 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Carroll, Robert T., 207, 271 Carse, James, 147, 156, 271 Cauthen, Kenneth, 23, 271 Cecil, Anthony C., Jr., 22, 30, 272 Chai, Leon, 163, 176, 272 Champion, J. A. I., 211, 215, 272 Channing, William E., 14, 101, 269 Chauncy, Charles, 146 Cherel, André, 218, 272 Cherry, Conrad, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 272 Chubb, Thomas, 160 Clark, Mary T., 80, 116, 272 Clarke, Samuel, 10, 208, 228, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 263 Clarke, W. Norris, 177, 272 Clement of Alexandria, 35 Coakley, Sarah, 76, 272 Cobb, John B., Jr., 6, 7, 272, 273 Coffey, David, 53, 75, 120, 161, 239, 240, 273 Colacurico, Michael J., 164, 273 Collier, Arthur, 174, 263 Collins, Anthony, 213, 214, 242, 263 Conforti, Joseph A., 18, 23, 30, 31, 34, 273 Congar, Yves M., 273 Connell, Desmond, 181, 273 Costello, William T., 157, 273 Crisp, Oliver D., 43, 92, 188, 189, 273, 283 Crosby, Donald A., 13, 17, 273 Cudworth, Ralph, 221, 263 Cunningham, David S., 5, 273 Danaher, William J., Jr., 43, 44, 273 Dancy, Jonathan, 182, 274 Daniel, Steven H., 2, 43, 67, 274 De Régnon, Theodore, 78, 79, 80, 90 Delattre, Roland André, 42, 274 Descartes, René, 158, 176, 231, 263 Dihle, Albrecht, 143, 274 Docherty, Thomas, 6, 274 Dorrien, Gary J., 22, 274

Duhalde, Jean Baptiste, 222, 226, 227, 263 Dupuis, Jacques, 87, 263 Dwight, William T., 24, 25 Edwards, John, 249, 263 Edwards, Jonathan a priori argument, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 33, 188 consent of being to being, 55, 195 everything that is in God is God, 98, 99 excellency, 29, 47, 49, 54, 55, 58, 100, 103, 104, 137, 141, 142, 145, 150, 152, 155, 163, 165, 192, 195, 255 happiness, 47, 48, 50, 52, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 131, 137, 138, 194, 196, 216 mutual consent, 55, 56, 58, 63 sense of the heart, 51, 162 Edwards, Robert L., 15, 274 Elwood, Douglas J., 37, 174, 274 Emlyn, Thomas, 209, 263 Emmons, Nathaniel, 27, 268 Erdt, Terrence, 156, 163, 274 Fafara, Richard J., 181, 274 Fairbairn, A. M., 175, 263 Fatula, Mary Ann, 4, 274 Ferguson, James P., 207, 242, 243, 244, 274 Fiering, Norman S., 143, 147, 148, 150, 153, 158, 174, 274 Firmin, Thomas, 208 Fisher, George P., 16, 18, 25, 38, 40, 41, 79, 174, 263 Flavel, John, 145, 268 Fortman, Edmund J., 73, 89, 110, 111, 168, 275 Foster, Frank H., 30, 32, 37, 174, 275 Foucault, Michel, 5, 275 Fraser, Alexander C., 174, 264 Gale, Theophilus, 221, 222, 224, 225, 264

INDEX Gardiner, H. N., 175, 264 Gassendi, Pierre, 179, 264 Gerstner, John, 39, 44, 275 Giltner, John H., 14, 275 Glanvil, Joseph, 221 Gohdes, Clarence, 174, 275 Goldmann, Lucien, 211, 275 Goodwin, Gerald J., 159, 275 Gordon, George A., 23, 29, 264 Grafton, Anthony, 221, 276 Greene, Marjorie, 176, 269 Gregersen, Niels H., 6, 276 Gregory of Nyssa, 75, 76, 83, 84, 234 Greig, Martin, 207, 276 Gresham, John L., Jr., 39, 76, 232, 276 Griffin, David R., 6, 7, 276 Guarino, Thomas, 5, 276 Guelzo, Allen C., 143, 147, 156, 159, 160, 276 Gunton, Colin, 69, 72, 74, 81, 85, 87, 106, 113, 228, 276 Hall, Richard A. S., 175, 276 Hall, Stuart G., 244, 276 Hallamaa, Jaana, 74, 276 Hanson, R. P. C., 244, 245, 276 Harrison, Carol, 82, 277 Harrison, Peter, 221, 277 Hart, David B., 80, 277 Hasker, William, 75, 277 Hayes, Zachery, 130, 132, 277 Heimert, Alan, 146, 277 Helm, Paul, 26, 92, 164, 188, 189, 239, 259, 277, 283 Henderson, G. D., 218, 225, 226, 277 Herbert of Cherbury, Edward, Lord, 210, 215, 220, 264 Hilary of Poitiers, 82, 83, 264 Hill, Edmund, 80, 85, 114, 119, 120, 171, 277 Hill, William J., 73, 89, 111, 114, 277 Hodge, Alexander A., 39, 264 Hodge, Archibald A., 39

293 Hodge, Charles, 39, 40, 264 Hodgson, Leonard, 42, 68, 69, 71, 277 Hoffecker, W. Andrew, 39, 278 Holmes, Oliver W., 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 41, 264 Holmes, Stephen R., 43, 175, 278 Holtby, Robert T., 207, 243, 278 Hoopes, James, 156, 162, 163, 175, 278 Hopkins, Samuel, 18, 31, 44, 101, 268 Howard, Leon, 175, 278 Hoyt, Edwin P., 21, 278 Hutch, Richard A., 158, 278 Hutchison, William R., 23, 34, 278 Hutton, Sarah, 222, 278 Huyssteen, J. Wentzel van, 7, 278 Illingworth, J. R., 68, 69, 278 Jencks, Charles, 5, 278 Jenson, Robert, 2, 42, 67, 81, 82, 87, 116, 220, 278 Jinkins, Michael, 2, 43, 67, 278 Johnson, William A., 17, 19, 279 Jolley, Nicholas, 157, 184, 279 Jordan, Mark D., 177, 178, 279 Kannengiesser, Charles, 245, 279 Kant, Immanuel, 13, 20 Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti, 96, 279 Kelly, J. N. D., 168, 279 Kenny, Anthony, 176, 279 Kilian, Monika, 6, 279 Knight, Janice, 201, 279 Kretzmann, Norman, 77, 287 Kuklick, Bruce, 22, 30, 31, 156, 175, 279 LaCugna, Catherine Mowry, 73, 78, 220, 279 Layman, C. Stephen, 71, 72, 86, 279 Lee, Sang Hyun, 2, 42, 67, 87, 201, 279 Leftow, Brian, 72, 228, 280 Lesser, Max X., 1, 5, 41, 259, 260 Levine, Joseph M., 222, 280

294 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Locke, John, 45, 50, 157, 158, 160, 163, 174, 175, 179, 180, 181, 264 Lossky, Vladimir, 90, 280 Lowance, Mason I., Jr., 174, 280 Lowrie, Ernest B., 154, 168, 280 Lowry, Charles, 68, 69, 280 Luibhéid, Colm, 244, 280 Luther, Martin, 96, 111, 265 Lyotard, Jean François, 5, 280 MacCracken, John H., 44, 174, 280 Macquarrie, John, 6, 280 Malebranche, Nicolas, 173, 174, 175, 178, 180, 181, 184, 265 Manuel, Frank E., 213, 280 Margerie, Bertrand de, 80, 102, 274 Marsden, George M., 1, 280 Marsh, Thomas A., 73, 111, 280 Marshall, Bruce, 213, 280 Marshall, John, 208, 281 Mastricht, Peter van, 145, 265 Mather, Cotton, 4, 102, 112, 135, 136, 256, 265 May, Henry, 209, 281 Mayhew, Jonathan, 209, 265 McClymond, Michael J., 173, 175, 281 McDermott, Gerald R., 154, 212, 217, 223, 281 McGiffert, Arthur C., Jr., 175, 281 McGinn, Bernard, 177, 281 McKenna, Stephen, 73, 281 McLachlan, H. John, 229, 230, 281 McRae, Robert, 176, 179, 281 Merriell, D. Juvenal, 121, 122, 141, 281 Michael, Emily, 176, 281 Michael, Fred S., 176, 281 Miller, James B., 6, 281 Miller, Perry, 1, 5, 41, 42, 146, 147, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 163, 175, 201, 259, 277, 284, 286 Moltmann, Jürgen, 69, 70, 71, 72, 282 More, Henry, 221

Morimoto, Anri, 154, 162, 282 Morris, William Sparkes, 168, 175, 282 Muller, Earl, 80, 282 Muller, Richard A., 143, 159, 282 Nadler, Steven, 178, 181, 184, 282 Neander, Augustus, 78, 265 Nicole, Pierre, 179, 261 Norris, John, 173, 174, 175 Norton, Andrews, 13, 265 Nye, Stephen, 208, 231, 242 O’Collins, Gerald, 80, 282 Ogden, Shubert M., 282 Owen, John, 135, 265 Paine, Levi Leonard, 78, 79, 244, 265 Pannenberg, Wolfhart, 7, 157, 282 Pappas, George S., 182, 282 Park, Edwards A., 11, 22, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 101, 265 Parsons, Jonathan, 209, 266 Patterson, Mary, 173, 271 Pauw, Amy Plantinga, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 42, 44, 62, 64, 67, 68, 78, 81, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 199, 256, 260, 283, 289 Payne, William, 234, 266 Pecknold, C. C., 80, 283 Pemberton, Ebenezer, 209, 266 Petavius, Dionysius, 244 Pfizenmaier, Thomas C., 18, 208, 242, 243, 244, 247, 248, 283 Pierce, Richard D., 21, 41, 283 Pinnock, Clark H., 7, 283 Placher, William C., 80, 114, 283 Plantinga, Cornelius, Jr., 69, 72, 82, 283 Prentice, Robert, 143, 284 Primavesi, Anne, 6, 284 Principe, Walter H., 75, 115, 133, 284 Quincy, Josiah, 209, 266 Rahner, Karl, 8, 70, 154, 200, 284

INDEX Ramsay, Andrew Michael, 31, 33, 170, 217, 218, 219, 225, 226, 254, 266 Ramsey, Paul, 156, 157, 160, 162, 284 Ratzinger, Joseph, 80, 284 Redwood, John, 208, 214, 284 Reedy, Gerard, 230, 284 Ricci, Matteo, 223, 226, 284 Richard of St. Victor, 2, 3, 62, 64, 67, 74, 78, 89, 91, 92, 112, 114, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 137, 216, 255, 266, 270 Richardson, Herbert W., 11, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 284, 289 Ridgeley, Thomas, 135, 266 Riley, I. Woodbridge, 35, 175, 284 Rist, John M., 82, 285 Rogers, G. A. J., 208, 285 Rogers, Jack, 168, 285 Rogers, Katherin, 77, 285 Rohr, John von, 155, 285 Rorty, Richard, 5, 285 Rowbotham, Arnold H., 213, 223, 226, 285 Rupp, George, 175, 285 Rusch, William G., 78, 285 Sairsingh, Krister, 12, 44, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 68, 289 Sandeen, Ernest R., 40, 285 Sanders, John E., 7, 285 Schafer, Thomas A., 24, 103, 145, 147, 162, 219, 285 Schaff, Philip, 168, 266 Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E., 12, 13, 14, 19, 36, 46, 49, 52, 207, 266 Schultz, Joseph P., 148, 156, 285 Schwöbel, Christoph, 5, 77, 286 Scotus, Duns, 143, 144 Shepard, Thomas, 145, 201, 268 Sherlock, William, 9, 208, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 242, 245, 254, 266

295 Sibbes, Richard, 201, 256 Simon, Irène, 230, 286 Sin, Stuard, 6, 286 Slattery, Charles L., 34, 286 Smith, Henry B., 26, 27, 266 Smith, John E., 148, 156, 163, 286 Smith, Timothy L., 128, 286 Smyth, Egbert C., 16, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 35, 41, 175, 259, 266 Socinus, Faustus, 229 South, Robert, 9, 208, 228, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 240, 241, 242, 250, 254, 267 Sprunger, Keith L., 145, 286 Stahle, Rachel S., 2, 11, 42, 67, 289 Stead, Christopher, 77, 245, 286 Steele, Richard B., 143, 286 Stephen, Leslie, 213, 286 Stephens, Bruce M., 13, 19, 43, 286 Stillingfleet, Edward, 232 Stoddard, Solomon, 1, 145, 165, 267 Stoeffler, F. Ernest, 145, 286 Stuart, Moses, 14, 18, 19, 23, 32, 101, 267 Studebaker, Steven M., 43, 287, 289 Studer, Basil, 83, 85, 119, 287 Stump, Eleonore, 77, 287 Taylor, Nathaniel W., 13, 267 Tercescu, Lucian, 80, 287 Thiel, Udo, 230, 231, 287 Thompson, Thomas R., 71, 78, 106, 287, 289 Tindal, Matthew, 213, 214, 220, 227, 228, 267 Toland, John, 210, 211, 267 Townsend, Harvey G., 25, 156, 175, 261, 287 Turner, John, 231 Turretin, Francis, 92, 93, 267 Tyler, Moses C., 174, 267 Wainwright, William J., 147, 152, 202, 203, 287 Walker, D. P., 218, 220, 222, 225, 287

296 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM Walker, Williston, 10, 147, 168, 244, 268, 287 Wallace, Mark I., 8, 287 Wallis, John, 241, 242, 268 Warfield, Benjamin B., 11, 15, 39, 40, 41, 188, 264, 288 Waterland, Daniel, 9, 208, 228, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 268 Watts, Isaac, 160 Weber, Richard M., 43, 288 Wedeking, Gary, 208, 231, 288 Weinandy, Thomas G., 80, 288 Welch, Claude, 12, 42, 69, 288 Wells, Edward, 246, 268 Wigglesworth, Edward, 209

Wilbur, Earl M., 229, 288 Wiles, Maurice, 208, 288 Willard, Samuel, 154, 268 Williams, Daniel D., 22, 30, 288 Williams, Robert R., 14, 288 Williams, Rowan, 80, 245, 288 Winslow, Ola E., 148, 175, 288 Wollebius, Johannes, 99, 268 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E., 173, 288 Worcester, Samuel, 101, 268 Wright, Conrad, 36, 209, 288 Yarbrough, Stephen R., 156, 288 Yolton, John W., 179, 184, 288 Zizioulas, John D., 73, 87, 289

SUBJECT INDEX Affections, 46, 49, 51, 52, 60, 129, 152, 192 Arminianism, 146, 147, 159, 229 Athanasian Creed, 168 Atonement, 23, 36, 229 Augustinian tradition, 2, 8, 62, 67, 90, 102, 105, 129, 131, 240, 255 Augustinian trinitarianism, 4, 64, 78, 104, 106, 112, 197 Calvinism, 14, 21, 30, 31, 34, 41, 55, 147, 159, 217, 222, 227 Cambridge Platonists, 174, 215, 221, 222 Cambridge Synod, 168 Cappadocians, 2, 4, 8, 74, 75, 76, 79, 84, 89, 105, 228, 255 Christology, 37, 97, 98 condilectus or shared love, 91, 130, 131 Covenant of grace, 101 Deism, 4, 10, 35, 54, 94, 148, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 243, 254 Determinism, 146, 147, 159, 160, 161, 202, 242 Dispositional soteriology, 154 Divine disposition, 136, 137, 138 Divine essence, 14, 37, 40, 47, 74, 76, 77, 80, 86, 90, 93, 94, 95, 99, 122, 138, 153, 167, 169, 173, 181, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 198, 200, 236, 237, 245, 252

Divine goodness, 112, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 138, 139, 149, 167, 194, 195, 200, 202, 203, 206, 217, 218 infinite object of goodness, 137, 194 Divine mind, 32, 149, 176, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 191, 219, 233 Eastern tradition, 2, 62, 67, 255 Eastern trinitarianism, 78 Emanation, 112, 133, 136, 138, 200, 240 Empiricism, 46, 163, 176 Enlightenment, 9, 10, 45, 46, 54, 93, 144, 158, 173, 174, 179, 181, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 217, 223, 229, 242, 254, 256 Exemplar/s, 121, 176, 177, 225, 229 Fourth Lateran Council, 87 Franciscan tradition, 143 Grace, 97, 115, 141, 144, 155, 205 common grace, 142 principle of, 142 sanctifying, 128, 129 Heaven, 26, 100, 102, 193, 198 Idealism, 27, 41, 173, 175, 182 Edwards' idealism, 27, 173, 175, 176 theocentric idealism, 173, 183, 184 Ideas, 148, 149, 152, 171, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184 complex ideas, 46 divine ideas, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183 ideas of reflection, 61, 185, 190 297

298 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM ideas of sensation, 180, 190 innate ideas, 180 perfect ideas, 15, 29, 40, 153, 167, 176, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 200 simple ideas, 46, 164 Image of God, 51, 71, 113, 119, 123, 139, 140, 141, 142, 148, 150, 172, 251 natural and spiritual image, 141, 142, 150 Immaterialism, 182 in facto esse, 53, 59, 204 in fieri, 53, 59, 204 Incarnation, 33, 63, 69, 81, 85, 86, 87, 118, 119, 129, 204, 206, 220, 222, 228, 230, 242, 245, 265, 266, 283 Judaism, 35 Justification, 96, 97, 98 Liberal theology, 15, 22, 23, 33, 34, 41 Modernism, 6, 8 Monotheism, 72, 228 Mysticism, 41, 201, 218 Natural religion, 214, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223, 227 New England Theology, 1, 20, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 146 New Theology, 22, 34, 37 Ontology, 50, 183, 185, 203 affective ontology, 51 dispositional ontology, 2, 140, 201 relational ontology, 3, 54, 59, 68, 103, 110 trinitarian ontology, 46, 49, 50, 52 Original sin, 21, 34, 35, 37, 141, 144, 146, 147, 202, 210, 224, 227 Pantheism, 35, 37 Patristic era, 79, 207 Perfect being, 33, 130, 193, 195, 196 Person, 12, 27, 28, 49, 75, 86, 113, 124, 137, 138, 142, 145, 151, 153,

164, 165, 186, 194, 216, 220, 230, 231, 233, 235, 237, 240, 241, 245, 246, 248, 249, 254 Cartesian theory, 12, 72, 219, 228, 230, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254 divine persons, 8, 13, 15, 20, 26, 27, 28, 40, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 95, 99, 101, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 152, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 188, 196, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 209, 210, 219, 228, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255 individuation, 87, 88, 113, 122, 124, 125, 167, 231, 241 interpersonal love/communication, 130, 132, 137, 138, 139, 194 relations of opposition, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 235 Platonism/Neoplatonism, 35, 77, 81, 82, 84, 113, 116, 174, 177, 215, 221 Pneumatology, 8, 37, 97, 98, 190, 197, 199 Postmodernism, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 43, 67, 272, 273, 274, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 284, 286 Predestination, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218 Princeton Theology, 39, 40 prisca theologia, 211, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 227

INDEX Progressive Orthodoxy, 22, 23, 29, 30, 265 Pseudo-Dionysian, 132, 136 Psychology Augustinian voluntarism, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 154, 155, 166, 167 centers of consciousness/act, 26, 27, 32, 72, 219 dispositional psychology, 143, 153, 166 divine will, 27, 47, 48, 55, 118, 149, 150, 153, 162, 181, 182, 183, 191, 192, 193 faculty psychology, 157, 158, 159 intellectualism, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 159, 167 last dictate of the understanding, 145 libertarian voluntarism, 144, 159 Scholastic voluntarism, 144, 146, 147 self-determining power of the will, 144, 146, 147, 159 understanding, 14, 15, 21, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 67, 68, 75, 79, 81, 85, 86, 89, 93, 94, 95, 98, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 122, 123, 124, 125, 136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 170, 171, 172, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 197, 200, 201, 223, 225, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 246, 247, 248, 252, 253 voluntarism, 45, 142, 143, 145, 147

299 will, 46, 47, 50, 52, 85, 111, 122, 126, 133, 140, 142, 144, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 170, 191, 192, See Puritan tradition, 92, 99, 135, 140, 256 Rationalism, 45, 144, 148, 211 Reformed scholasticism, 3, 10, 63, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 212, 255, 256 Reformed theology, 1, 39, 96, 97, 135, 165, 215, 217 Religious affections, 34, 37 Renaissance, 220, 229 Revival, 1, 15, 30, 41, 135, 145, 146 Sanctification, 37, 63, 96, 98, 128, 129 Scandal of particularity, 212, 213, 215, 220, 221 Self-communication, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 193, 194, 199, 201, 203 sola scriptura, 229 Soteriology, 95, 97, 98 Soul, 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 60, 61, 89, 113, 117, 121, 122, 128, 129, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 150, 151, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165, 166, 170, 171, 172, 184, 191, 192, 201, 224, 226, 238 analog of God, 141, 166, 170, 171 disposition of, 153, 154, 155, 167 powers of, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166, 170 simple nature of, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 166 spiritual nature, 113, 122, 124, 142, 166, 191, 201 summum bonum, 143 Thomism, 45, 48, 142 Threeness-oneness paradigm, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 44, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89,

300 JONATHAN EDWARDS’ SOCIAL AUGUSTINIAN TRINITARIANISM 90, 95, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 255, 256 Trinitarian Controversy, 91, 207, 208, 254 Trinity ad extra, 27, 47, 50, 55, 56, 149, 162, 178, 179, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204 ad intra, 55, 56, 162, 200, 201, 202, 203 Arianism, 21, 22, 29, 208, 230, 243, 244, 247 Athanasian trinitarianism, 9, 39, 208, 209, 210, 232, 245, 249, 252, 254 binitarian, 76, 104 consubstantial, 37, 209, 245, 246, 247, 252 covenant of redemption, 26, 53, 63, 204, 205, 206, 239, 251 divine unity, 62, 67, 69, 71, 72, 76, 78, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 116, 117, 212, 232, 234, 235, 240, 241, 255 economic missions, 112, 118, 119, 127, 128, 129, 199, 200 economic Trinity, 2, 15, 19, 36, 40, 63, 85, 104, 110, 119, 127, 128, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 251 eternal generation, 18, 19, 20, 25, 29, 32, 36, 37 Father, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 36, 37, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 71, 74, 75, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 152, 153, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 187, 188, 189,

190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 219, 225, 226, 227, 229, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 273 filioque, 58, 126, 168, 197, 198 Holy Spirit, 27, 28, 29, 32, 38, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 69, 71, 75, 76, 84, 85, 87, 91, 94, 95, 97, 102, 103, 104, 110, 111, 112, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 126, 129, 131, 133, 135, 136, 139, 142, 156, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 219, 225, 226, 227, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253 immanent processions, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 122, 128, 129, 134, 166, 170, 199 immanent Trinity, 14, 17, 19, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, 50, 52, 54, 63, 85, 111, 118, 119, 120, 127, 128, 135, 170, 196, 197, 204, 206, 251 inseparable operations, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 113, 117 Logos, 17, 35, 37, 172, 225 Modalism, 13, 14, 19, 32, 41, 76, 86, 93, 128, 228, 242, 252 mutual love model, 4, 9, 10, 47, 57, 64, 75, 92, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 112, 118, 129, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 193, 194, 199, 206, 210, 217, 218, 226,

INDEX 227, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 251, 254, 255, 256 order of subsistence, 53, 58, 59, 170, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 253, 254 Pro-Nicene theology, 83 psychological model, 3, 47, 62, 63, 64, 67, 78, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112, 152, 240, 255 Sabellianism, 14, 21, 22, 31, 39, 93, 208, 230, 231, 234, 240, 241, 242, 243, 247, 252 Semi-Arianism, 18, 94, 208, 244, 250 simplicity, 15, 63, 77, 81, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 124, 161, 172, 252 social model, 3, 4, 8, 57, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 130, 196, 197, 232, 240, 241, 242, 254, 255 Socinianism, 94, 207, 208, 229, 230, 232, 242, 247, 252 Son, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 69, 71, 74, 75, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 102, 103, 104, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 153, 156, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191,

301 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 209, 217, 219, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 266, 273 spiration, 125, 126, 133, 235 Subordinationism, 10, 15, 18, 25, 29, 53, 78, 97, 123, 169, 199, 203, 204, 205, 206, 228, 242, 246, 249, 250, 252, 254 subsistent relations, 57, 58, 59, 61, 111, 196, 235, 236, 238, 242 three-person analogy, 75, 76, 232, 233, 234 triads, 48, 74, 75, 81, 85, 86, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 171, 172, 226, 233, 234, 236, 240, 241 tritheism, 13, 38, 40, 64, 71, 76, 95, 188, 208, 219, 228, 230, 232, 234, 247, 249, 250, 254 Unitarianism, 12, 14, 18, 21, 25, 31, 32, 36, 41, 44, 101, 208, 209, 215, 217, 229, 231, 232, 245, 254, 268, 281, 288 Utilitarianism, 46 via doctrinæ, 127, 128 via inventionis, 127 visio Dei, 142 Western tradition, 4, 62, 67, 74, 81, 82, 87, 112, 140, 255, 257 Western trinitarianism, 4, 9, 65, 68, 70, 77, 87, 88, 90, 112, 121, 199, 228, 257 Westminster Confession, 168