John Duns Scotus and the Principle "Omne Quod Movetur Ab Alio Movetur"

Citation preview

Franciscan Institute Publications Philosophy Series No. 15

13 X 3601

Edited by Allan B. Wolter, O. F.M.

S143

no.15

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS AND THE PRINCIPLE

"OMNE QUOD MOVETUR AB ALIO MOVETUR"

by Roy R. Effler, O. F. M.

OMNIA

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y.

and E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM

F. SCHÖNINGH PADERBORN, GERMANY

1962

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARIES

FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

PHILOSOPHY SERIES 1. The Tractatus de Successivis Attributed to William Ockham. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. , Ph. D. 1944. 2. The Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of William Ockham. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. , Ph. D. 1945. 3. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. By Allan B. Wolter, O. F. M. , Ph. D. 1946. 4. Intuitive Cognition . A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics. By Sebastian Day , O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1957 . 5. The de Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus. A Revised Text and a Translation. By Evan Roche, O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1949 (exhausted). 6. Psychology of Love according to St. Bonaventure. By Robert P. Prentice O. F. M., Ph . D. 1957. 7. Evidence and Its Function according to John Duns Scotus. By Peter C. Vier, O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1951 . 8. The Psychology of Habit according to William Ockham. By Oswald Fuchs, O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1952 (exhausted) . 9. The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creature according to William Ockham. By Matthew C. Menges, O.F.M. , Ph . D. 1952. 10. Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham. By Damascene Webering, O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1953. 11. The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure. By Sister Emma Jane Marie Spargo, Ph. D. 1953. 12. Collected Articles on Ockham . By Philotheus Böhner O. F. M. Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert O. F. M. 1958. 13. Motion, Time and Place according to William Ockham. By Herman Shapiro. 1959. 14. Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae. By Geoffrey G. Bridges, O.F. M. 1959. HISTORY SERIES 1. Three Saints ' Lives. By Sister M. Amelia Klenke , O. P. , Ph . D. 1947 . 2. Seven More Poems by Nicholas Bozon. By Sister M. Amelia Klenke, O. P. , Ph . D. 1951 . 3. The History of St. Bonaventure University. By Mark V. Angelo , O. F. M. Ph . D. 1961 .

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS AND THE PRINCIPLE "OMNE QUOD MOVETUR AB ALIO MOVETUR"

Franciscan Institute Publications . Philosophy Series No. 15 Edited by Allan B. Wolter, O. F. M.

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS AND THE PRINCIPLE "OMNE QUOD MOVETUR AB ALIO MOVETUR ”

by Roy R. Effler, O. F. M.

DEUSMEUS ETOMNIA

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE , N. Y.

and F. SCHÖNINGH PADERBORN, GERMANY

E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM 1962

BX 3601 S173 10.15

Nihil obstat: Allan B.Wolter, O. F. M. , Ph. D. , L. G. Innocant Daam, O.F.M. , S.T.D. , I.C.D. Provincial censors

Imprimi potest: Vincent Kroger, O. F. M. , M. A. Minister Provincialis Nihil obstat: Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M. , S.T. D. , D. Litt. et Hist . Orient. , L. G. Diocesan censor

Imprimatur:

† Joseph A. Burke Episcopus Buffalensis

To My Students : Past, Present and Potential

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to record my indebtedness to all those who helped me in preparing this treatise . First comes to mind the late Fr. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. , Ph.D. , L.G. , who assured me that Duns Scotus' doctrine on the cinesiological principle was a viable topic . I am also deeply grateful to Fr. Eligius Buytaert , O.F.M. , S.T.D. , D. Litt . et Hist . Orient. , L.G. , current Dirctor of the Franciscan Institute, for his continued encouragement, interest, and advice. Most especially, I wish to thank my major professor, F. Allan Wolter , O.F.M. , Ph.D. , L.G. , for all his instructions, corrections, and the important leads he gave me in approaching various pertinent teachings of Duns Scotus . Most truly, it has been a high privilege to have come under the tutelage of these three eminent Franciscan scholars. Consequently, I am further grateful to the Very Reverend Fr. Romuald Mollaun, O.F.M. , S.T.D. , a former Minister Provincial of the Franciscan Province of St. John the Baptist , Cincinnati, Ohio, who first arranged this privilege for me, and to his successor, the Very Reverend Vincent Kroger, O.F.M. , M.A. , who provided for a continuation of this privilege, and who was most understanding during the course of mygraduate studies and while work was being done on this dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

XI

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL NOTES

I

I. Plato . 2. Aristotle

I 2

3. Philoponus and Simplicius 4. Arabian and Jewish Philosophers a) Averroes b) Alfarabi and Avempace c) Abraham Ibn Daud and Moses Maimonides 5. Adelard of Bath 6. St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas

4 5 5 6

a) The Physical versus the Metaphysical Character of the Motion Proof • 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

b) The Meaning of the Principle of Motion for St. Thomas St. Bonaventure and Other Franciscans Henry of Ghent . Godfrey of Fontaines Duns Scotus William of Ware . Various Scotists and William Ockham . Hervaeus Natalis Thomas de Vio Cajetan · Francis Suarez Various Contemporary Thinkers . a) Opponents of the Principle of Motion b) Defenders of the Principle of Motion c) Proponents of a Modified Principle of Motion

CHAPTER II

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

6 7

7 12 14 15 16 16 17 19 20 21 22

23 24 29 30

· THE POSITION OF DUNS SCOTUS IN GENERAL 32

Preliminary Precisions. The Delimitation of the Sphere of Self- motion The Possibility of Self-motion . The Requirement of Propinquity Self-motion and the Principle of Causality . Self-motion and the Dignity of Nature Self-motion and Unlimited Perfection Self-motion as a Denial of the Stationary Self-motion and the Ordered Unity of the Universe VII

33 37 40 42 43 45 45 46 47

VIII

Table of Contents

CHAPTER III - DOES SELF-MOTION DISSOLVE INTO THE MOVER AND THE MOVED ? . A) Self-motion and Primary Motion . 1. St. Thomas ' Argument from Primary Motion . 2. The Application of the Distinction of Primary Mover and a • · Thing Moved Primarily . . . . 3. Two Senses of Primary Motion . 4. Scotus ' Answer to the Argument from Primary Motion . • • 5. A Heavy Body and Primary Motion of Causality . 6. A Summary of Scotus' Answer ·

·

55 56 57 59 62

ཆརུཚ

95

C) Self-motion and Relative Opposites CHAPTER IV — PARTICULAR AREAS OF SELF-MOTION .. A) Self-motion and Coeval Accidents · 1. Non-coeval and Coeval Accidents 2. Self-motion and Non-analogical Coeval Accidents

54 54

62 64 64 66 67 67 72 75 76 81 92

B) Self-motion and the Concepts of Potency and Act . 1. The Doctrine of Henry of Ghent . 2. Criticism of the Ghentian Doctrine 3. Limited Agreement of Scotus with Henry 4. Various Meanings of the Term ' Potency' • a) Modal Potency b) Potency as a Principle 5. The Threefold Meaning of Act • 6. Scotus' Refutation of the Potency and Act Argument 7. The Concept of Virtual Act · 8. The Principle of Motion and Metaphysics

52

98

•

· B) Self-motion and the Problem of Gravity • 1. Argument from the Simultaneity of Cause and Effect . 2. Argument from the Possibility of a Heavy Thing Moving a • Light Thing 3. Argument from the Cause of Rest in a Place 4. Argument from the Possibility of a Heavy Thing Breaking through a Continuous Object 5. Argument from the Different Velocities of the Free Fall of • Heavy Objects 6. The Aristotelian Support of Scotus' Teaching on Gravity . a) Potency to Primary Act and Potency to Secondary Act . . b) An Objection from the de Generatione . c) Scotus' Answer •

98 98 ΙΟΙ

103 104 110 III III 112 112

113 115 115 115 d) An Objection from the Physics 116 e) Scotus'Answer 117 f) The Concept of Natural Motion . 7. Self-motion and the Aristotelian Doctrine of a Prime Mover 120 8. The Scotistic Theory of Gravity More Precisely Considered · 124 126 9. Duns Scotus and the Principle of Inertia

IX

Table of Contents C) The Local Motion of Animals • 1. The Push-pull Theory 2. The Position of Duns Scotus ·

· 128

· 129 130 3. Qualitative Change Basic to the Local Motion of Animals · · 131 D) Quantitative Change - Growth and Nutrition · 133 I.. A General Defense of the Stand of Scotus · 2. The Counter Argumentation of Godfrey of Fontaines • 3. The Biological Makeup of an Organism and the Process of Nutrition · 4. Nutrition a Form of Self- motion 5. The Aristotelian Distinction : Pars secundum Formam and Pars secundum Materiam . · • 6. Food as the Cause of Growth E) Qualitative Change or Alteration 1. The Theory of Seminal Reasons 2. Duns Scotus and Seminal Reasons 3. Is a Seed Capable of Self-motion ?

133 134

134 135 137 138

139 · 140 • 140 . 142

146 F) The Intellect an Active Potency 1. Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 147 2. Intellection Demands an Active Cause • 148 3. The Object not the Total Cause of Intellection 149 a) The Teaching of Godfrey of Fontaines 149 b) The Basis of Godfrey's Position 152 153 c) The Opposition of Scotus to Godfrey 4. The Intellect not the Total Cause of Intellection 154 5. The Object and the Intellect the Causes of Intellection • · 155 · • 156 6. The Theory of Partial Causes . G) The Will an Active Potency 1. The Object not the Total Cause of Volition 2. The Will not the Total Cause of Volition

159 161 162

3. The Intellect and Will Cocauses of Volition 4. The Will the Principle of Contingent Action 5. Nature versus Will.

163 164 165

- CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

167

CHAPTER V

A) The Reports of Scholars on Scotus' Teaching .

167

B) The Principle of Motion and the Subject of Metaphysics . ·

175 180

C) Duns Scotus and the Prima Via of St. Thomas .

BIBLIOGRAPHY • •

191

INDEX .

197

PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to present the teaching of Duns Scotus on the celebrated principle , omne quod movetur ab alio movetur (everything which is in motion is moved by another) . Our choice of this topic was occasioned by Sir Edmund Whittaker's book, Space and Spirit.¹ This provocative little work restudies the philosophical problem of reasoning to the existence of God and in particular reviews the five ways of St. Thomas in the light of modern physics . To a man schooled in modern science , Whittaker insists , the famous five ways present serious difficulties. These difficulties the eminent mathematician and scientist would lay bare to philosophical theologians in order that they may work towards the construction of a sounder and more up to date natural theology. At the same time, Whittaker would point out to his colleagues in science that the obstacles to a valid natural approach to God are not as formidable as has often been thought . On the contrary, our richer and deeper understanding of nature by way of modern physics and astronomy offers " new prospects and possibilities" in the approach to deity.2 In spelling out his message, Whittaker operates quite continuously on the historical level, and in this way reviews, more or less in combination, the significant theories and developments in the history of natural theology and science . In this historical conspectus , due credit is given to St. Albert and St. Thomas,

but most especially, to the medieval

Franciscan school , the philosophy of which is "the direct ancestral form of modern science. " Because of their partiality for concrete experience and observational methods, the representatives of this school " avoided , in a greater or less degree , the erroneus Aristotelian physics and cosmology." Understandably enough, such a fresh and provocative treatise as Whittaker's Space and Spirit has not gone unrecognized by scholars .

1 2 3 4

(Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948). Ibid. , 129. Ibid., 31-34 . Ibid. , 48 .

ΧΙ

XII

Preface

P. J. McLaughlin , a Doctor of Science, greatly praises the little work, but admonishes "that Whittaker's approach is essentially that of the physicist ." This is especially the case when he treats the notion of cause.5 Not so

favorable,

however,

is the critique of T. Crowley,

a

professional philosopher. The latter points out that Whittaker seriously errs concerning the real nature of metaphysical science, how it is independent of and to be distinguished from the special sciences. This is the great underlying error of practically all of Whittaker's critique of the five ways. Because of this fundamental error, Whittaker fails to distinguish physical from metaphysical causality and to appreciate "the metaphysical principle that ' no thing can change itself,' which is the keystone in St. Thomas' first argument . Whittaker's failure to see metaphysics as an autonomous science is also scored as a serious error by the eminent Louvain philosopher, Canon Fernand Van Steenberghen." Nor is it historically true, according to Van Steenberghen, that the five way of St. Thomas are essentially committed to Aristotelian physics . On the contrary, and much to his credit, St. Thomas effects a progressive liberation of metaphysical principles from essential commitments to ancient science . 8 Now it is not our purpose here to discuss the relative merits and demerits of Whittaker's study of the various historical theories of the universe and their relation to the philosophical approach to God. Nor do we attempt any adequate treatment of the question concerning the autonomous or non-autonomous character of metaphysical science , although there is no gainsaying of the supreme importance of this issue. We believe that many of Whittaker's fecund suggestions might find their rightful fulfillment in a modest and limited philosophy of nature , but which would in no wise replace an autonomous metaphysics as the chief and commanding philosophical science of God . But the discussion of such broad issues is entirely beyond our scope. Whittaker reports that Duns Scotus rejects the principle of motion , omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.

Now at least from the standpoint

5 "Modern Science and the Five Ways, " The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, LXIX (1947) 273 283 288. 6 "St. Thomas and Sir Edmund Whittaker," The Irish Ecclesiatical Record, LXIX ( 1947 ) 1066-82 . "La physique moderne et l'existence de Dieu, " Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLVI ( 1948) 386 . 8 Ibid., 382-83 : or il est manifeste que le progrès de la pensée de saint Thomas s'est fait dans le sens de l'affranchissement des principes métaphysiques mêlés aux conceptions caduques de la science péripatéticienne. • Op . cit., 45-46.

Preface

XIII

of science and its history, this is no small matter. For based on this cinesiological principle and intimately bound up with it, as Whittaker points out, is the whole spectacular astrophysical system of the Stagirite . This principle had to be jettisoned, before modern science could really get started.10 Now it is the purpose of this treatise to tell the full story of Scotus ' rejection of the cinesiological principle. This story should also prove interesting and instructive for philosophers. For while Whittaker approves of Duns Scotus' rejection of the principle, nevertheless, the Scotistic conception of metaphysics is importantly different from that of Whittaker. For the Subtle Doctor, metaphysics is built upon empirical fact or facts ; it is not built upon physics,¹¹ as Whittaker advocates.12 Thus the eminent mathematician's rejection of the cinesiological principle might be explained away on the basis of his denial of the autonomy of metaphysics. But Duns Scotus' rejection of the principle admits no such facile explanation, for it in no wise presupposes the view that methaphysics is essentially dependent on physics. This is a significant fact and might well engage the attention of philosophers . Among Christian philosophers, Duns Scotus is a most forthright proponent of metaphysics as a science of being, and it is largely in the role of a metaphysician that he argues the falsity of the cinesiological principle . While others might think that an analysis of the metaphysical concepts of potency and act guarantee the motion principle an unimpeachable metaphysical character, the analysis of these same concepts, according to Duns Scotus, shows the cinesiological principle not to be a genuine metaphysical principle at all. 10 Ibid., 25-28. Cf. also Philip Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1957) , 91–95 . According to Albert Mitterer, the cinesiological principle connects with a whole physical world view, the geocentric world of ancient and medieval science. Cf. "Der Bewegungssatz (omne, quod movetur, ab alio movetur) nach dem Weltbild des hl. Thomas und dem der Gegenwart, " Scholastik , IX ( 1934 ) 513-15 . Concerning the principle of motion and the modern identity of matter and motion, cf. Wolfgang Buechel, "Quantenphysik und naturphilosophischer Substanzbegriff," Scholastik, XXXIII ( 1958) 174-78 . 11 Wolter, Allan B., The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1946 ) , 66–71 130 ; Borgmann, Pacificus, " Gegenstand , Erfahrungsgrundlage und Methode der Metaphysik, " Franziskanische Studien, XXI ( 1934) 101 : Schon in einem Jugendwerke, den Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, entschiedener dann in seinem Hauptwerke, dem Opus Oxoniense, bekennt sich Skotus, wie gesagt, zu dem Ideal einer autonomen, der Physik nicht nach-, sondern vorgeordneten und deshalb von der Naturwissenschaft gänzlich unabhängigen Seinsmetaphysik. 12 Op. cit., 103—04 .

XIV

Preface

But it must not be thought that the Scotistic critique of the motion principle proceeds merely by way of analyses of pertinent metaphysical concepts. On the contrary, repeated recourse is made to the facts of experience, and this is decisive. For according to Scotus, a genuine metaphysical principle is never contradicted by experience .

Such

contradiction can only show that a particular principle is simply a false statement . It is to be pointed out here that our study will not treat the cinesiological principle exclusively in relation to the philosophical problem of proving the existence of God. Already in Aristotle and the philosophic thought after him, the principle is given rather wide application and is made to operate in the solution of various scientific and philosophic problems. It is precisely in reference to these other problems that Scotus gives his most extended treatments of the cinesiological principle. 13 However, the connection between a study of the cinesiological principle and the proof from motion for the existence of God is clear and obvious . And since scholars have discussed the relation of Scotus to this proof, we too will take up this matter in the last chapter of our dissertation. There we will offer an evaluation of the prima via of the Angelic Doctor from the standpoint of Scotistic doctrine. In presenting Scotus' doctrinal positions, in rethinking his concepts , in reconstructing his arguments, we have not taken any special pains to make him look good. The reputation of the Subtle Doctor is well established. Hence examples and illustrations which presuppose medieval Aristotelian physics and astronomy, and which were used by Scotus himself, have not been suppressed in our treatment . This does not mean of course that these outmoded notions are given our approval. A full modernization of Scotus ' thought has been put aside in favor of historical accuracy . Our special concern here is prompted by the fact that as yet no scholar has presented Scotus ' doctrine on the motion principle both completely and accurately. To the discerning reader, therefore, is left the task of distinguishing those elements which are now outmoded from those other elements which are of continuing value to living philosophy. 13 One will look in vain for any mention of the cinesiological principle in the De Primo Principio or in that question of the Ordinatio where Duns Scotus embarks on his demonstration of the existence of an Infinite Being (Ord. , I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1 , II 148-215) . The motion argumentation Scotus offers for the infinity of God operates with the concept of efficient cause. It does not employ the cinesiological principle ( Ibid. , 189-201).

Preface

XV

In preparing this treatise, use was made only of the definitely authentic works of Duns Scotus as presented by the Commissio Scotistica in Lineamenta Bibliographiae Scotisticae, Uriel Smeets, (ed. pro manuscripto ; Rome, 1942) . The Lineamenta contains further abundant data on the editions of the works of Duns Scotus together with an extended bibliography of other works dealing with his life, doctrine, writings, cult, the Scotistic school, and its influence . Of great informational value is also the more recent work by Odulphus Schaefer, Bibliographia de Vita Operibus et Doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis ac Mariani Saec. XIX-XX (Rome, 1955) . For further information on the works of Scotus, confer Ephrem Longpré , La Philosophie du B. Duns Scot (Paris, 1924) , 15-51 288-91 ; Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot Introduction a Ses Positions Fondamentales (Paris, 1952) , Appendices, 670 ff. As to the various codices and editions of the Ordinatio, abundant information is provided in the new Vatican edition : Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Opera Omnia (Vatican City, 1950) , I 9*—139 *. In treating a Scotistic topic, there is always the problem of basing one's study on reliable texts. In this, the four tomes of the recent critical Vatican edition have been a great boon to us, in particular tome III , which contains question 2 of distinction 3 (245-330) . In this question, the topic of our investigation is treated in extenso, and almost every essential element of our dissertation appears in it. The one question of distinction 25 of Book II of the Opus Oxoniense gives extended treatment to the motion principle. The doctrinal position defended here was later changed and amended by Scotus himself, and this change is reported in the Additiones magnae secundi libri. Fortunately again, for this particular question (d . 25 q . 1) we have the text prepared by Carl Balić in Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les Quatre Livres des Sentences (Louvain , 1927) , Appendices, 264-301. Carl Balić has also edited another question which regards the same doctrinal issue . This text (" Une question inédite de Jean Duns Scot sur la volonté," Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, III (1931 ) (191-208) is also used in our study. Although the De Primo Principio of Duns Scotus is not one of the major sources of our study, still on occasion it is referred to, and use is made of the revised text by Evan Roche, ( St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1949) . In all other cases, we have followed the Vivès edition of the Opera Omnia of Duns Scotus . But in reading question 14 of Book IX of the commentary on the Metaphysics (VII 582-606) , which investigates our topic

XVI

Preface

ex professo, and which constitutes the backbone of our treatise, we continuously conferred the incunabula text : questiones subtilissimae super libros metaphysicae Aristotelis (Venetiis, 1497) , and in some instances, the Balliol manuscript, 234. The fact that we are without a critical edition of this key question of the commentary on the Metaphysics is certainly regrettable, but the doctrinal reliability of our study, we believe, remains intact. For we have investigated our topic in all the authentics works of Scotus and have found a doctrinal agreement not only between the commentary on the Metaphysics and other parts of the Vivès edition , but also between the same commentary and questions of the critical Vatican edition, one of which treats the cinesiological principle in extenso . Again we encountered the fact of basic doctrinal agreement between the commentary and the questions edited by Carl Balić. Doctrinal agreement of the various treatments of our topic throughout the Vivès edition and further doctrinal agreement (aside from the doctrinal change referred to above) of these treatments with the texts cited, we believe, constitute a reasonable guarantee of the doctrinal reliability of our dissertation, at least from the standpoint of the texts used in preparing it. List of Principal Abbreviations Used for Scotus' Works Ord., I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 307-08 . Ordinatio, Book I distinction 3 part 3 question 2, tome or volume III (Vatican edition) page 308 included . Op. Oxon., II d. 2 q. 10, XI 523—46. Opus Oxoniense, Book II distinction 2 question 10, volume XI (Vivès edition) page 523 to page 546 included. Rep. Par., II d. 25 q. u . , XXIII 210. Reportata Parisiensia , Book II distinction 25 the only question, volume XXIII page 210. Metaph. , IX q. 14, VII 582–83 . Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Book IX question 14, volume VII page 582 to page 583 included . Quodl., q. 15, XXVI 120-25 . Quaestiones Quodlibetales, question 15 , rest read as above. Ordinatio and Opus Oxoniense are two variant titles for one and the same work. The title Ordinatio is used when references are made to the Vatican edition . This is the title used by the editors. The title Opus Oxoniense is used when references are made to the Vivès edition . This is the title most frequently used by scholars in articles and monographs on Duns Scotus .

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL NOTES

efore presenting the teaching of Duns Scotus on the principle of motion (omne quod movetur ab alio movetur) , it will be instructive to review the history of this principle in Western thought. Unfortunately, this review must need be very sketchy and piecemeal . A complete and altogether satisfactory historical study of the cinesiological principle would require a separate volume of no small dimensions . Nonetheless, the following series of historical indications, we believe, will serve to point up the issue which engages the mind of Scotus. 1. Plato. Most worthy of note is an argument in the 10th Book of the Laws of Plato which concludes to the existence of God or gods. This argument appeals to the motion in the universe and insists that this motion is to be explained by a soul or mind which is a self-moving principle.¹ According to the eminent authority in the philosophy of Plato, Alfred Edward Taylor, this notion of a self-moving mover constitutes a significant difference between Platonic and Aristotelian theology. A self-moving principle is an ultimate for Plato . Not so for the Stagirite, since every instance of self-motion breaks down into two opposing elements, a mover and something moved . For everything which is in motion is moved by another.2 Taylor hardly overplays this difference between the two great philosophers of Grecian antiquity. Interestingly enough, this difference 1 Leges, in Platonis Opera, ed . Firmin Didot (Paris, 1852 ) , II Part II 893 b-896b. Cf. also Phaedrus, I 245C-245e . The Greek and Latin text of the argument found in the Leges is presented in convenient form by Renatus Arnou, De Qinque Viis Sancti Thomae Ad Demonstrandum Dei Existentiam (Rome, 1949) , 11-15. For an English presentation, cf. translation by B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato (New York, 1937) , II 634—39 . An excellent reworking of Plato's argument is to be found in Alfred E. Taylor's article, "Theism, " Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh, 1921 ) , XII 262-64. The Platonic argumentation is more briefly presented by D. J. B. Hawkins, The Essentials of Theism (New York, 1950) , 46–49. 2 Platonism and Its Influence (New York, 1927 ) , 113—14 ; Plato : The Man and His Work (New York, 1936), 491-92 .

2 Philosophy Series No. 15

I

2

Chapter I

is already pointed out by Averroes.³ St. Thomas, however, who is famous for his synthesizing of Platonic and Aristotelian thought, sees no real doctrinal disagreement here . This view he puts forth in his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle . Sed hic loquitur de motu secundum quod est actus imperfecti, id est existentis in potentia, secundum quem motum indivisibile non movetur, ut in sexto probatum est, et hic assumitur. Et sic patet, quod Aristoteles, ponens, omne quod movetur, ab alio moveri ; a Platone, qui posuit aliquid movere seipsum, non dissentit in sententia, sed solum in verbis.5 2. Aristotle. The acknowledged author of the principle of motion is Aristotle, for whom it is a fundamental principle of his philosophy of nature. In the Physics, it is proven by lengthy inductive argumentation and finally leads the Stagirite to admit a whole host of unmoved movers . " The principle is also operative in Aristotle's treatment of the free fall on of bodies and the problem of violent motion . 8 The meaning of the principle of motion for Aristotle is that nothing can have the source of its movement in itself. Thus a thing in motion must necessarily be moved by another being distinct from it . Accordingly, a distinction must always be made between the mover and the moved, and all the while a particular being is in motion, this motion must be continuously caused in it by another. " 3 In Physic., VIII com. 42 , in Aristotelis Stagiritae Omnia Quae Extant Opera, ed. Iuntas (Venetiis, 1552) , IV 173 ; Ista est declaratio in qua sustentatus est Aristoteles in hoc, quod motum ex se componitur ex motore, qui non movetur, et ex moto : non ex se, ut Plato dicebat. • Steenberghen , Fernand Van, Aristotle in the West, tr. Leonard Johnston (Louvain, 1955) , 182-87. De Physico Auditu, VII 1 , in Doctoris Angelici Divi Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, ed. L. Vivès (Paris , 1871-1880) , XXII 588. (References to the works of St. Thomas will be made to the Vivès edition, unless otherwise indicated .) Cf. also Eugen Rolfes, Die Gottesbeweise bei Thomas von Aquin und Aristoteles (Cologne, 1898) , 88-91 ; D. J. B. Hawkins, op. cit. , 49. Physic., VII t . 1-14, IV 141-45 (VII C. 1—2 241b-245b) ; VIII t. 27-33, IV 165-69 (VIII c. 4 254b- 256b) . In citing passages and sections of the works of Aristotle, we first refer to the book and text number of the editio Iuntina (cf. footnote 3. ) , and then in parentheses, to the Bekker edition (Berlin, 1831-1870) . 7 VII t. 3-9, IV 140-42 (VII c. 1 242b-243a) ; VIII t. 33—54, 169–80 (VIII c . 5-7 256a- 260a) . Concerning the problem whether Aristotle teaches monotheism or polytheism, cf. Philip Merlan, "Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, " Traditio , IV ( 1946) 1—30. In particular, cf. pp. 25-29 for Aristotle's teaching on this matter, as it is presented in the Physics. 8 Consideration of Aristotle and the free fall of bodies is made later, Ch . IV 104. A limited discussion of the problem of violent motion follows shortly. • Physic. VIII t . 30 , IV 167 (VIII c . 4 255a) . Cf. also John O'Neill, Cosmology (New York, 1923 ) , 249 ; Pierre Duhem, Le Système du Monde (Paris, 1954 ) I 371-72 ; Anneliese Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der Scho-

Introductory historical Notes

3

This distinction of the mover and the moved is a cardinal point of Aristotelian doctrine on motion . It is expressed by the principle , everything which is in motion is moved by another. Most appropriately, this principle might be called the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved. It is to be noted that the cinesiological principle does not necessarily require that the mover and the moved be found in two distinct substances. Such is not the case in reference to living beings. Theirs is the prerogative of moving themselves. Hence while the mover must always be distinct from the moved, it is not necessarily extrinsic to the total thing in motion.10 It also appears to be quite clear that Aristotle holds the principle as a physical principle. Accordingly, it is applicable to the various changes undergone by bodies : substantial change, but more especially, quantitative and qualitative change, and preeminently, local motion.¹¹ As we shall see, the Aristotelian cinesiological principle encounters difficulties, when applied to the natural motion of light and heavy things (the levia and gravia) .12 But perhaps a more serious difficulty comes to the fore in its application to instances of violent motion, as in the case of the motion of a projectile. Upon first consideration , however, it seems that the principle is most clearly verified in the case of projectile motion . For when one throws a ball up into the air, obviously the ball is moved by another, the hand of the thrower. 13 But then the question is, what moves the ball after it has left the hand of the thrower ? What accounts for the continuation of the upward movement ? Aristotle himself recognizes this difficulty and offers a solution . The medium, whether air, water, or something else, is the mover. For the original mover not only imparts motion but a power to move to the medium , and this power is continuously relayed to the higher strata of lastischen Naturphilosophie (2d ed.; Rome, 1951 ) , 114-15 ; Gérard Verbeke, "La preuve du Premier Moteur, " Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLVI (1948 ) 153. 10 Duhem, Pierre, op . cit. , 175 : Certains êtres sont les principes de leur propre mouvement ; en eux , la même substance est, à la fois, mobile et moteur; ces êtres sont les êtres animés. Cf. also Gérard Verbeke, art. cit., 156. 11 Ibid. , 160. Cf. also O. Hamelin, Le Système d'Aristote (Paris, 1931 ) , 310-14, 334-36. 12 Ch . IV 103—24 : 13 Aristotle, Physic. , VIII t. 28, IV 166 (VIII c. 4 254b) : Et maxime moveri ab aliquo id, quod movetur, in eis, quae praeter naturam movetur, est manifestum, propterea quod manifestum est ab alio moveri . Cf. also Johann Stufler, "Der hl. Thomas und das Axiom : Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur, " Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie , XLVII ( 1923 ) 372.

2°

Chapter I

4

air, as the projectile ascends upward.14 In this way, the principle of motion is preserved intact, and at the same time, no intrinsic principle of motion is ascribed to the projectile . The ascription of such a power to the projectile would be particularly inadmissible, because we have here a case of violent motion.15 3. Philoponus and Simplicius. The solution of Aristotle to the problem of projectile motion is not accepted by the sixth century Aristotelian commentator, John Philoponus . For this thinker accords moving power not to the medium but to the projectile itself.16 Thus when the ball continues to ascend upward, the continued upward ascent is caused by a certain moving power given the projectile by the original thrower. Thus the projectile moves itself in its upward ascent. This explanation of the commentator constitutes what was later known as an impetus theory. The precise scientific value of the theory as presented by Philoponus has been variously evaluated.17 But what interests us here is whether the theory involves a denial of the cinesiological principle, and whether Philoponus, therefore, is rightly to be put down as a very early, if not the first, opponent of the Aristotelian principle. In the opinion of Simplicius, a contemporary of Philoponus, the answer to the preceding question would be affirmative . For Simplicius refuses to locate the cause of continued projectile motion purely and simply in the projectile itself. In making this refusal, moreover, he expressly appeals to the Aristotelian principle that everything in motion is moved by another.18 But perhaps the doctrine of Philoponus does not neccessarily entail a denial of the Aristotelian cinesiological principle . A modern scholar, James A. Weisheipl, holds that " the theory of impetus is strictly an Aristotelian development" and " follows from Aristotle's principles.'19

14 Physic. VIII t . 82 , IV 195 (VIII c. 10 267a) . Cf. also Anneliese Maier, op. cit. , 117. 15 Weisheipl, James A., "Natural and Compulsory Movement, " The New Scholasticism, XXIX ( 1955) 54-55. 16 Duhem, Pierre, op . cit. , 382-83 ; Weisheipl, James A. , art. cit. , 55—56 . 17 Duhem, Pierre, op. cit., 398 ; Maier, Anneliese, op . cit. , 113-14 ; Weisheipl, James A. , art. cit., 51-52. 18 Clarissima commentaria in octo libros Arist. de Physico Auditu, VIII com. 104 (Venetiis : apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1566) , 482 : Sed si proiicientem sagittam dicimus aeri motum permanentem ingerere, atque tradere, Haec igitur dicta cur non sagittae hunc motum dare illum dixerimus, sunt a me, cum decreverim tueri illas duas orationes : aliam dicentem, omne, quod movetur, ab aliquo moveri, . . . 19 Art. cit. , 61 .

Introductory historical Notes

5

More cautiously, Anneliese Maier sees it as a departure from the Stagirite but also at the same time as a modification and correction of his doctrine.20 To belabor the obvious, it might also be pointed out that the theory of impetus is elaborated within the framework of Aristotelian science and is most fully intelligible within this framework. It does not seem, therefore, that Philoponus ' theory represents an absolute and unqualified rejection of the Aristotelian principle of motion. For granted that a projectile is moved by an alien power forced into it, the distinction between the mover and the moved remains intact. The imparted power is the active mover which causes motion in the passive projectile , which is the recipient of motion. Now it might still be urged that Philoponus' theory disturbs the distinction between living and non-living beings . Only living beings, Aristotle says, have the power of self-motion.21 But this distinction between living and non-living beings might be understood according to some added qualification , for it is not altogether clear whether Aristotle denies all self-motion to inorganic bodies, such as light and heavy things in their natural motions. The Stagirite's doctrine on gravity, as Anneliese Maier has pointed out and as will be indicated later, does not constitute a completely harmonious theory.22 4. Arabian and Jewish Philosophers . Surely, great credit is due John Philoponus for his independent rethinking of Aristotelian motion doctrines. Nor does he appear to be alone in this. Galen, a member of the late Peripatetic school is critical of the Aristotelian demonstration of the principle of motion. So Averroes reports. But Galen and many others, in the opinion of Averroes, err in their understanding of Aristotle.23 a) Averroes himself professes full acceptance of the Aristotelian doctrine. The active cause and passive subject of motion must be

20 Op. cit., 126. 21 Physic. VIII t. 29 , IV 167 (VIII c. 4 255a) : A quo autem non adhuc manifestum, ut cum movetur praeter naturam ; etenim ipsa a seipsis dicere impossibile est ; vitale enim hoc, et animatorum est proprium. 22 Ch . IV 112-13 . Cf. Anneliese Maier, op . cit., 115. 23 Physic. VII com. 1 , IV 139 : In hoc tractatu incipit perscrutari utrum omne motum habeat motorem, cum appareat sensui aliquid moveri ex se, absque eo, quod distinguatur motor a motu sensu , ut in quattuor elementis. Et quidam dicunt quod ista demonstratio, quam induxit in hoc tractatu, non est vera, adeo, quod Gal. fecit in hoc tractatum , in quo nititur declarare corruptionem istius demonstrationis ... Quoniam hoc intellectum fecit Gal. et multos homines errare in intentione huius demonstrationis : et existimaverunt quod ex istis propositionibus propositis hic non sequitur illud, quod intendebat concludere .

6

Chapter I

distinct, and thus motion always involves a mover and the moved 24 For the Mussulman , the motion principle leads to a medium theory in reference to the problem of free fall . This will be taken up later.25 As for the Stagirite himself, the principle also provides argumentation for the existence of God or a prime mover, 26 and this argumentation is physical, as Averroes conceives the whole philosophical problem of proving the existence of God as being a task of natural philosophy and not of metaphysics.27 b) Alfarabi and Avempace. But some two centuries before Averroes, Alarabi, the "second teacher" of Mohammedan scholasticism adapts the Aristotelian doctrine and uses the principle of motion in proving the existence of God.28 Avempace, another Mussulman thinker of the earlier part of the 12th century, employs the principle of motion in determining the cause of free fall . His understanding of the principle, however, is peculiar and differs from that of Averroes. The Avempacian teaching will be considered later.29 c) Abraham Ibn Daud and Moses Maimonides . Two Jewish philosophers and contemporaries of Averroes, Abraham Ibn Daud30 and Moses Maimonides31 also adopt the Aristotelian argumentation for the existence of God . Maimonides, moreover, together with Alfarabi and Averroes, is held to be a source of St. Thomas' argument from motion.32 5. Adelard of Bath. Among the scholastics of the West, the principle of motion makes its first appearance at the beginning of the 12th century in the Quaestiones naturales of Adelard of Bath . Owing to his travels in 24 Physic. VII com . 1-3 , IV 139–41 ; VIII com. 27—33 , IV 165—69. 25 Ch . IV 105 . 26 Physic. VIII com . 34—44, IV 169–175 ; Epitomes in Libros Metaphy. tr. 4, VII 181 . 27 Physic. I com. 83 , IV 22 : Sed notandum est , quod istud genus entium, esse scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali. Et qui dicit quod prima Philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat. Haec enim entia sunt subiecta primae Philosophiae, et declaratum est in posterioribus Analyticis quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subiectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestum per se, aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. 28 Hamui, Fr. Robert, Alfarabi's Philosophy and Its Influence on Scholasticism ( Sydney, 1928) , 38 . 29 Ch . IV 124-26. 30 Husik, Isaac, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1944) , 207 : Nothing can move itself. While is it true that the form of a thing determines the kind of motion it shall have, it cannot in itself produce that motion, which can be caused only by an efficient cause from without. Cf. also p . 217 . 31 Arnou, Renatus, op. cit., 73-78 ; Husik, Isaac, op . cit. , 257–58. 32 Hamui, Fr. Robert, op. cit., 40 footnote 1 ; Husik, Isaac, op . cit. , 207 ; Meyer, Hans, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans . Frederick Eckhoff (St. Louis, 1944) , 237 .

Introductory historical Notes

7

Greek and Arabian countries, Adelard gained a wide knowledge of Greek natural philosophy and thus got acquainted with the Aristotelian 33 argumentation for an unmoved mover, which he adopts.3 6. St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas . The principle of motion receives clear and decisive introduction into scholastic thought later, when Aristotle becomes more completely known to the West. Here much credit goes to Albert the Great . The eminent Father of Latin Aristotelianism subscribes to the Aristotelian view that the condition of being in motion demands a mover distinct from the moved. This teaching is employed by Albert in a proof for the existence of God.34 It also determines his solution to the problem of free fall.35 Among the scholastics, St. Thomas is perhaps best known of all for his adoption of the principle of motion. It is operative in his treatment of the problem of free fall,36 but St. Thomas' most celebrated use of this principle is in his argument from motion for the existence of God. This argument appears in several places of the works of the Angelic Doctor.37 a) The Physical versus the Metaphysical Character of the Motion Proof. Although in the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas refers to the argument from motion as the manifestior via, still it is not so easy to determine the precise nature of this argument.38 This is evident from 33 Baumgartner, M., " Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster, 1896) , II 109—10 footnote 5 ; Überweg, Friederich, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie (Berlin, 1928 ) , II 232 ; Verstärkt wird diese Annahme durch die Tatsache, daß Adelard wohl als der erste im lateinischen Abendland den aristotelischen Gottesbeweis aus der Bewegung reproduziert . 34 Grunwald, Georg, " Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster, 1907 ) , VI 108-10. 36 Ibid. 35 Cf. Ch. IV 107-08 . 37 Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2 a. 3 , I 17—18 . Cf. also De Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Gentiles, I c. 13 , XII 14—19 ; De Physico Auditu , VIII 9, XXII 652-57 ; Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Compendium Theologiae, ed. Friedrich Abert (Würzburg , 1896) , c. III , 23—24 . 38 Various explanations are offered as to why St. Thomas applies the epithet manifestior to the argument from motion. Simple and interesting is the explanation of Étienne Gilson . "Because movement is immediately perceptible to sense knowledge, let us start from the fact that movement exists . The only superiority of this " way," with respect to the other ones, is that its point of departure is the easiest to grasp .” (History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages [New York, 1955 ] , 370. ) Joseph Owens is more explicit in explaining the more manifest character of the prima via. "The starting point, motion in general, with the particular instance of alteration and local motion , is much more evident than is substantial change.' Owens sees substantial change as the starting point of the secunda via. ("The Conclusion of the Prima Via, " The Modern Schoolman, XXX [ 1953 ] , 214.) According to A. Boehm, St. Thomas refers to the argument from motion as the prima et manifestior via, because the argument had wide acceptance

8

Chapter I

the varied interpretations given to it by scholars . First there is the question concerning the physical versus the metaphysical character of the motion proof and its key principle, everything which is in motion is put in motion by another. According to Albert Mitterer, St. Thomas' principle of motion is physical and thus applies solely to the motion of bodies : local motion, quantitative, qualitative, and substantial change. Mitterer's most minute and penetrating study is a severe critique of St. Thomas' teaching. The principle of motion is a consequence of Aquinas' outmoded hylomorphic doctrine on the constitution of bodies and is fundamental to the ancient scientific world view, which is now also outmoded.39 Josef Santeler also considers St. Thomas ' motion proof to be of a physical nature. This is the view which he cautiously favors after studying the argument in the different works of St. Thomas. The physical character of the proof, as it is presented in his commentary on the Physics, appears quite clear. But the precise meaning of the term 'motion' in the prima via of the Summa Theologica does not admit of such facile determination . Argumentation can be made in favor of a broad acceptation of the term, since St. Thomas explains motion by means of the general notions of potency and act. In the end, nevertheless , Santeler prefers to interpret the less clear presentation of the Summa Theologica in the light of the clearer and more extended presentation of the Summa contra Gentiles, and therefore, the proof in the Summa Theologica is to be given a physical status.40 Another view of the Thomistic motion argument is that of Vincent Edward Smith . According to this scholar, the proof from motion in the among contemporary philosophers. ("Autour du Mystère des ' Quinque Viae' de Saint Thomas," Revue des Sciences Religieuses, XXIV [ 1950] , 229.) In harmony with A. Boehm's explanation is that of D. J. B. Hawkins. "The First Way is described in the Summa Theologica as especially obvious (manifestior) . This epithet should probably be interpreted in the light of the much lengthier formulation of the proof in the Summa contra Gentiles, where Aquinas employs all the resources of Aristotelian physics to conclude, as Aristotle had done, to the existence of the first unmoved mover. Such a proof would, for the mediaeval man, have conjured up a mental picture in terms of contemporary astronomy, and in this way would have been for him manifestior. For us now, and reduced to its metaphysical essentials as it is in the Summa Theologica, it could hardly be said to be more obvious than the Second or Third Way. " (A Sketch of Mediaeval Philosophy [London, 1946] , 87.) 39 Mitterer, Albert, " Der Bewegungssatz (omne, quod movetur, ab alio movetur) nach dem Weltbild des hl. Thomas und dem der Gegenwart, " Scholastik, IX ( 1934) 372—99, 481—519 ; Wandel des Weltbildes von Thomas auf Heute, Schriftenreihe ( 1935, Innsbruck) , 13 , 67—68. 40 Der Kausale Gottesbeweis bei Herveus Natalis nach dem ungedruckten Traktate de cognitione primi principii ( Innsbruck, 1930) , 15-18.

Introductory historical Notes

9

commentary on the Physics is a purely physical demonstration, although it is hemmed about by a metaphysical periphery. The argument from motion presented in the two Summae is not a purely or strictly philosophic consideration but rather represents the work of a theologian, who is striving for a " rational possession of natural ' preambles of faith' which he knew historically by revelation. "41 So the philosophical proof for a prime mover pertains fully to natural philosophy and is even absolutely essential to metaphysics . It is the privilege of the latter science, however, to expand our knowledge of the prime mover, the existence of which is first of all established in physics.42 This subordination of metaphysics to physics Smith presents as the authentic doctrine of St. Thomas. The relationship of the two sciences so conceived and the purely physical character of the motion proof maintained testify to the highly empirical character of St. Thomas' thought. Quite differently from Mitterer, Smith finds no fault with the argument from motion and its principle . Rather this argument is hailed as one of the most splendid achievements of Aquinas and is "the authen43 tic prolegomenon to any future metaphysic. ' Another view of the motion proof, quite different and in many respects opposed to that of Smith, is the view of Joseph Owens . This scholar, quite widely known in American Thomistic circles, understands the proof from motion in the light of a Thomistic doctrine of existential act, the real distinction between essence and existence. In this way, the proof is a metaphysical argumentation not only in the Summa Theologica, but also as it seems, in St. Thomas' commentary on the 7th and 8th Book of the Physics, in his commentary on the Metaphysics, the de Potentia, the Compendium Theologiae, and the Summa contra Gentiles. Part of St. Thomas' treatment in his commentary on the 8th Book of the Physics, Owens asserts, is simply a faithful presentation of Aristotelian argumentation, which is physical. But here St. Thomas functions. 41 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, "The Prime Mover : Physical and Metaphysical Considerations, " XXVIII (1954) 85, 89. 42 Ibid., 79-91 . 43 Ibid. , 94. It is to be noted that Smith himself does not expressly speak of a subordination of metaphysics to physics. In fact, on the contrary, he speaks of metaphysics as an independent science. To us, however, it seems that there would result from Smith's view a subordination , albeit qualified, of metaphysics to physics . For the proof for a prime mover, which is held to be strictly physical, is also held to be "mandatory for the metaphysician" (p. 90) . "... the philosophy of St. Thomas requires such a proof (the proof for a Prime Mover) as the necessary approach to metaphysics without which metaphysics, as a science, cannot come into existence . " (p. 80)

ΙΟ

Chapter I

as a reporter. Owens also admits genuine Aristotelian elements in the two viae ex parte motus in the Summa contra Gentiles . Yet even here the Aristotelian argumentation undergoes the most profound changes, as it is rethought by the Angelic Doctor in terms of his metaphysical doctrine of existential act.44 Owens' evaluation of the various presentations of St. Thomas' motion argument agrees in part with the evaluation previously made by Joseph de Vries. According to this scholar, St. Thomas' treatments of the motion principle in his commentary on the Physics remain on the physical level, although in the 10th lectio of the 8th Book, the principle takes on a metaphysical character. Similarly in the Summa contra Gentiles, the motion principle appears in both its physical and metaphysical acceptation . In the Summa Theologica, however, the motion principle is purely metaphysical.45 In defending the metaphysical character of Aquinas ' motion argumentation, de Vries accords a significant role to the notion of an increase in being . This point will be taken up later. No appeal, however, is made to the real distinction between essence and existence . Neither is any such appeal made by Jean Paulus. With painstaking care, this scholar makes a textual study of St. Thomas' cinesiological arguments in relation to their sources in the Physics and the Metaphysics of Aristotle. It is mainly in dependence on the Metaphysics of the Stagirite, as Paulus points out, that Aquinas presents a motion argument of a strictly metaphysical nature.46 This manifestly metaphysical argumentation is given in both the Summa contra Gentiles (the third argument of the prima via) and in the Summa Theologica , where motion is appealed to not according to its physical but metaphysical aspects, and where it is explained by means of the laws of potency and act . Since these laws are the laws of being itself, the motion argument becomes a metaphysical affair and successfully concludes not merely to a higher although subordinate being or mover, but to the absolutely 44 "The Conclusion of the Prima Via," The Modern Schoolman, III (1953) 33-53 109-121 203—15 . 45 "Das Weltbild der neuen Physik und die alte Metaphysik, " Scholastik, X (1935) 85-86 . 46 " Le Caractère métaphysique des preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, IX ( 1934) 148 : C'est dire que le mouvement ainsi considéré n'est point du ressort de la science physique, mais seulement de la philosophie première. Aussi voyonsnous que le présent argument, encore qu'utilisé en l'un ou l'autre endroit de la Physique, n'est développé explicitement qu'au livre de la Métaphysique ; et c'est de là que l'extrait saint Thomas.

Introductory historical Notes

II

unmoved mover, the Pure Act which is God.47 In those places where the motion argument is not construed metaphysically, then as a valid physical argument, it but attains a subordinate mover but not God . This at least, as Paulus explains, is how St. Thomas understands the variant motion arguments he presents and adapts from Aristotle.48 It is to be noted that Paulus bases his study chiefly on the extended text of the Summa contra Gentiles . This procedure enables him to defend his view with undeniable cogency. Nevertheless, he remains highly sensitive to difficulties. For in both his commentary on the Physics and the Metaphysics, St. Thomas gives us to understand that the physical renderings of the motion argument conclude to God . Taking full cognizance of this interpretation of the physical constructions of the motion argument and its discrepancy with the interpretation Paulus arrives at on the basis of the Summa contra Gentiles , the eminent scholar offers the following explanation : "It seems therefore that Saint Thomas has not ceased to hesitate between two interpretations, and that he has given indication of these hesitations in works where he attempts to explain the works of Aristotle ; whereas he chooses the interpretation which accords the best with his personal views in works where he teaches in his own name ."49 A final view that might be considered here is that of Canon Fernand Van Steenberghen . According to this most distinguished thinker, the proof from motion, as it is presented in the Summa Theologica, is disengaged from commitments to Aristotelian science and is evolved on a purely metaphysical level . In the Summa contra Gentiles , however , the proof is worked out under the full light of Aristotelian physics and astronomy.50 A complete review of the various studies made of Aquinas ' proof or proofs from motion would take us too far afield and would not be to our purpose. Hence we have simply sampled some representative views offered by scholars of repute, and practically all of whom are admirers

47 Ibid., 146–49 . 48 Ibid. , 151-53. 49 Ibid., 153 footnote 1 : Il semble donc que saint Thomas n'ait pas cesse d'hesiter entre deux interpretations, et qu'il ait laisse entendre ces hesitations dans les travaux ou il tachait a expliquer les oeuvres d'Aristote ; au lieu qu'il choisit l'interpretation qui s'accorde le mieux avec ses vues personnelles, dans les oeuvres ou il enseigne en son nom propre. 50 "Le problème philosophique de l'existence de Dieu, " " La physique moderne et l'existence de Dieu, " Revue Philosophique de Louvain , XLV (1947) 163 , 383 .

12

Chapter I

of St. Thomas. 51 No doubt all of them have made substantial contributions in their way towards a solution of the problem of the physical versus the metaphysical character of Aquinas ' proofs from motion . 52 b) The Meaning of the Principle of Motion for St. Thomas. Aside from the physical versus the metaphysical character of the motion proof, what is the meaning of the principle of motion for St. Thomas ? Does it mean that the active agent and passive recipient of motion must be really distinct ? From many passages in St. Thomas, it appears that an affirmative answer is to be given to this question . 53 Such is also the understanding of the motion principle among Thomists. Explaining Aquinas ' proofs for the existence of God, Étienne Gilson writes : "All movement has a cause and that cause must be other than

the very being that is in motion ; when a thing seems to be self-moving, a certain part of it is moving the rest . "54 Another forceful explanation of the Thomistic teaching is presented by James A. McWilliams . The Physics of St. Thomas should convince anyone that if by "changing thing" you mean that a thing can change itself, your statement is irrational, for nothing can have such a nature . The subject of change is never changing, it is being changed . The thing which is undergoing change is a patient, a "possible," and it needs an agent distinct from itself to effect the change . 51 A truly monumental work we have not considered is that by William Bryar, St. Thomas and the Existence of God (Chicago, 1951 ) . This author shows a remarkable sensitivity to the relativity of Aristotelian language used by St. Thomas. His treatment of the motion proofs of the Summa Contra Gentiles ( 155-201 ) is particularly illuminating. 52 In our presentation of the various studies of Aquinas' motion proofs, we reserved the last two places for Paulus and Van Steenberghen, not so much because we judge their solutions the most acceptable, but simply because of the excelling eminence of these two thinkers in the world of scholarship. In the opinion of D. Salmon (Bulletin thomiste, IV [ 1935] 604-10) , Paulus' essential stand is decisively and definitively demonstrated. Nevertheless , Salmon insists that still more important work remains to be done. For Paulus' treatise does not take into account the tremendous influence of Arabian philosophy and especially Averroes on St. Thomas' proofs from motion. Indeed, the Arab factor and other sources, such as the Aristotelian commentators, cannot be neglected or lightly dismissed in working out a full and scientific solution to this historical problem. And to this, Santeler would surely add that a full solution to the problem would also demand extensive investigations and comparative studies of the proof from motion, as it is presented by St. Thomas' contemporaries. (Cf. Santeler , op . cit., 18.) 53 De veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Gentiles, I c. 13 , XII 18 : Relinquitur ergo, quod una pars ejus est movens tantum, et altera mota ; et sic habetur idem quod prius, scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile ; Commentum in Primum Librum Sententiarum, d . 8 q . 3 a. 1 , VII 112 : ... impossibile est aliquid movere seipsum nisi secundum diversas partes, ita quod una pars sit movens et alia mota ; sicut etiam in animali est anima movens et corpus motum. Cf. also Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, q. 22 a. 3 , XV 147. 54 History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955) , 370.

Introductory historical Notes

13

So completely have we lost sight of the fact that change is pati, that there is in modern languages no real synonym for the Latin " patitur" or "passio." The truth is that when change is predicated of what we call "changing things, " it cannot be correctly expressed by either an active or an intransitive verb, but only by a passive. These things are not changing, they are being changed . 55 From these quotations and the texts of St. Thomas, the teaching of the Angelic Doctor appears to be this : the active agent and passive recipient of motion must be really distinct . This distinction between . the mover and the moved would seem to hold, whether the principle of motion is given a physical or a metaphysical construction. Nonetheless, Joseph de Vries explains St. Thomas' principle of motion in such a way as to deny or at least to impair this distinction between the mover and the moved. Because St. Thomas reconstructs the motion proof into a metaphysical argument, the principle of motion, according to de Vries, comes to mean this : whenever there is an increase, an enrichment of being or a perfecting in being, the thing which hitherto has been imperfect never alone of itself causes increase in being in itself ; rather this increase in being is possible only insofar as there is another distinct thing, over and above the thing which is to be perfected, which other thing already actually possesses this perfection in itself ; and in the attainment of its new perfection, the thing which is to be perfected is in some way dependent upon the thing which already possesses this perfection . 56 According to de Vries ' understanding of the cinesiological principle, a thing which is to receive some perfection in being is never alone of itself the cause of this perfection . We italicize the word ' alone, ' because it is italicized in the German . The italics unquestionably indicate that de Vries attributes a special importance to this word , alone. ' By using

55 Physics and Philosophy (Washington, D. C. , 1945) , 27. 56 A close translation of de Vries' statement would make for an awkward rendering of his thought. Our adaptation, we believe, presents his thought faithfully. The original German is as follows : Wo es eine Seinsbereicherung, Seinsvervollkommnung gibt, da ist es niemals das bisher unvollkommene Wesen, das sich allein aus sich heraus zur Höherentwicklung nur insofern möglich, als es außer und letztlich über dem seiner Vollkommenheit erst zustrebenden Wesen ein anderes gibt, das diese Vollkommenheit, (insoweit sie reine Vollkommenheit ist) schon wirklich in sich trägt und von dem das erst fortschreitende Wesen in seinem Fortschreiten irgendwie abhängig ist. (" Das Weltbild der neuen Physik und die alte Metaphysik, " Scholastik, X [ 1935 ] 86. ) Such is de Vries ' understanding of St. Thomas' motion principle. This understanding of the principle, moreover, he presents not as his own view in the capacity of an independent philosopher, but as the very doctrine of St. Thomas. It is to be noted, however, that de Vries does not support his interpretation by any citations to the works of the Angelic Doctor.

14

Chapter I

this word and by so emphasizing it , de Vries seems to imply that a thing which is to receive some new perfection can be an active cause of this perfection. St. Thomas' principle of motion, therefore, allows that a thing can reduce itself from potency to act , but it cannot effect this reduction by itself alone. Thus one and the same thing can be both active and passive in reference to one and the same perfection, but it cannot be the total or adequate cause of this perfection . 7. St. Bonaventure and Other Franciscans . Among the early Franciscan Masters, St. Bonaventure appears to give restricted acceptance to the principle of motion . The moved is distinct from the mover in the case of natural or physical motion . But this distinction does not apply to a spiritual substance and its powers. The will, for example, moves itself, and an angel is capable of local self-motion. In these cases, one and the same thing is both mover and moved, although the same thing is mover and moved according to two different aspects . 57 In his proofs for the existence of God, the Seraphic Doctor does not adopt the Aristotelian argument from motion. 58 In this matter, his preference is for metaphysical considerations. Matthew of Aquasparta, however, a Franciscan who lectured at Paris after the Seraphic Doctor, takes over the argument from motion . 59 The Aristotelian argument is also accepted by Richard of Middleton , 60 a Franciscan who lectured at Paris after Matthew and before Duns Scotus. But the Aristotelian argument, as we shall soon see, was never destined to gain wide acceptance among the Franciscan Masters. 57 Commentaria in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, I d. 37 a. 2 q. 2 n. 4, in S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia ( Quaracchi , 1882—1901 ) , I 659 : Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod movetur differt a motore ; dicendum, quod in naturali motu verum est, ubi nihil movet se, quia nihil reflectitur supra se propter alligationem cum materia ; sed non est verum in voluntate, quae est instrumentum se ipsum movens ; et virtus, quae est in substantia spirituali, potest supra substantiam reflecti , et ita movens idem esse cum mobili, tamen non secundum idem : quia Angelus habilis est ad moveri ex parte ipsius quod est sive substantiae vel materiae, si habet materiam, sed ad movere ex parte formae, sive ipsius quo est vel virtutis activae. 58 Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Trinitatis, q. I a. 1 , V 45-49; Étienne Gilson and Philotheus Boehner, Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie (Paderborn , 1953 ) , III 503-05 ; Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1946) , 132-37 ; Georg Grunwald, op . cit . , 123-32. 59 Daniels, Augustinus, " Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im dreizehnten Jahrhundert," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster, 1909) , VIII 54. Daniels presents a pertinent text from Matthew's commentary on the Sentences, I d. 2 a. I q. I. 60 Ibid., 87. Daniels_presents a pertinent text from Richard's commentary on the Sentences, I d. 3 a. 1 q. 3.

Introductory historical Notes

15

The cinesiological argument of the Stagirite is also to be found in such diverse thinkers as Siger of Brabant, 61 Giles of Rome, 62 and Henry of Ghent . 63 Siger's acceptance of the argument is in line with his integral Aristotelianism, and for him,

as well as for Giles65 and Henry, 66 the

principle of motion is operative in their solution to the problem of the free fall of bodies. 8. Henry of Ghent. The Ghentian's understanding of the motion principle merits special consideration . For with him, there is a very clear and definite restriction of the principle. Insofar as the principle asserts a real distinction between the active cause of motion and the recipient of motion, it applies only to the motion of material beings . For example, it applies to the local motion of animals and the natural motion of light and heavy things. But in reference to the activity of a spiritual faculty such as the will, a real distinction between the moved and the mover cannot be admitted, since the faculty is spiritual and simple in nature . Henry allows that the will can be distinguished as mover and moved, but this is only a distinction of the mind (distinctio rationis vel intentionis ) . For the Ghentian, therefore, the Aristotelian principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved is restricted to the sphere of bodily motion and change.67 61 Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote, ed . Philippe Delhaye, VIII q. 4, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1941 ) , XV 193-94. 62 Daniels, Augustinus, op. cit., 78. A pertinent text is given from Giles' commentary on the Sentences, I d. 3 q. i a. 3 . 63 Grunwald, Georg, " Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster, 1907) , VI 114 . 64 Maier, Anneliese, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (2d ed.; Rome, 1952 ) , 159–60. 65 Ibid. , 160-61 . 6 Santeler, Josef, Der kausale Gottesbeweis bei Herveus Natalis nach dem ungedruckten Traktate de cognitione primi principii (Innsbruck, 1930) , 19. 67 Magistri Henrici a Gandavo, Doctoris Acutissimi et Celeberrimi, Archdiaconi Tornacensis , Aurea Quodlibeta, ed . Seravalli Veneti (Venetiis, 1608) , IX q. 5, 85 : Hic autem movens, & motum differunt sola ratione, & ad plus intentione, & hoc non sicut diversae potentiae, sed sicut vires unius potentiae. Unde ad probandum quod tale quid quod est omnino simplex secundum rem possit movere seipsum, nullo modo valet dictum medium, immo magis valet ad oppositum, quia si hoc grave, & leve, & animalia movent seipsa, quia in ipsis est invenire diversa secundum rem quibus distingui possunt movens, & motum, ergo ex opposito cum talia diversa non possint inveniri in voluntate, sequitur quod nullo modo possit movere seipsam, & verum est tali motu, quali illa movent se, & e converso si voluntas, quia propter suam simplicitatem est virtus conversiva super se, potest movere seipsam , ut movens, & motum omnino sint idem secundum rem, sequitur quod gravia & levia, & animalia, quia sunt materialia nullo modo possunt se movere, ut movens & motum sint omnino idem secundum rem. Cf. also Josef Santeler, op . cit. , 19-20.

16

Chapter I 9. Godfrey of Fontaines . The Ghentian restriction of the cinesiological

principle is strenuously opposed by Godfrey of Fontaines . For Godfrey, the Aristotelian principle is a metaphysical principle of absolute validity. It applies universally without exception . In every motion and change, therefore, the agent and recipient principle are always two distinct things, and in the case of bodily motion, the two principles must occupy different places.68 But the cinesiological principle holds not only of bodily activity but also of the spiritual activities of the intellect and will. Hence both of these faculties are totally passive in regard to their proper acts. They are merely the passive recipients of cognitive and volitional acts , which are actively caused by another principle really distinct from them.69 Whereas Henry holds the will to be simpliciter activa, Godfrey holds the faculty to be simpliciter passiva.70 10. Duns Scotus . Henry's defense of the will as a self-movent principle is continued on in Duns Scotus, "¹ but the Subtle Doctor goes still further in opposing the Aristotelian cinesiological principle . For the Franciscan Doctor, as we shall see, it is not a necessary principle even in the sphere of bodily change . For while motion always requires a cause, bodies can move and change themselves. This self-motion, moreover, can be so radical and fundamental that it precludes dissolution into two parts, the one moved and the other movent. But Scotus' main insistence is that the principle of motion is not a metaphysical principle . This leads him into lengthy argumentation against Godfrey of Fontaines, - argumentation which is not carried on in connection with any proof for the existence of God, but rather in connection with such questions as the activity versus the passivity of the intellect and the activity versus the passivity of the will. This indicates that Scotus is not concerned with the dismounting of some particular argument for the existence of God, but rather with the development of a positive and constructive philosophy and theology. 68 Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . J. Hoffmans, q. 2, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1924 ) , IV 26 : Sed ista non valent ; immo universaliter est dicendum quod, ubicumque aliquid existens in potentia ad aliquem actum fit in actu secundum illum, oportet quod agens et patiens differant re et subiecto, et cum hoc situ et loco in corporalibus. 69 Cf. Ch. IV 152 161-62 . 70 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. , X q . 9 , 165 : Ista nobis restant pertractanda per ordinem, dicendo, quod voluntas simpliciter (et) omnino activa est, quo ad actum volendi , (et) nullo modo passiva nisi a seipsa quo ad actum volendi, secundum quod de potentia ducitur in actum, (et) quo ad affectiones gaudii , (et) delectationis (et) huiusmodi ab obiecto ut dictum est. Cf. also Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, tr . Ernest C. Messenger (3d English edition : New York, 1938 ) , 261 . 71 Cf. Ch. IV 159–66.

Introductory historical Notes

17

The defense of self-motion, especially in the sphere of human activity, turns out to be a defense of the dignity of man and human freedom . The whole story of the Scotistic rejection of the cinesiological principle and positive defense of self-motion will be told in the following chapters. This protracted study will show Scotus an original thinker of no small dimensions. Admittedly, Henry of Ghent before him excluded the motion principle from the sphere of spiritual activity. But not all of Henry's argumentation in support of this restricted exclusion is accepted by Scotus . This will be indicated later. 72 The lengthy defenses of the motion principle by Godfrey of Fontaines suggest that the principle had other opponents . Godfrey himself mentions various objections bearing on local motion , quantitative change, and qualitative change . But these are stock objections, already brought up by Aristotle and Averroes.73 Thus Godfrey's real adversaries appear to be thinkers who accept the motion principle only according to some qualification or restriction, as does Henry of Ghent. Duns Scotus, therefore, appears to be the first thinker to launch an extended, thorough, and all-out attack on the cinesiological principle in practically all of its significant applications . II. William of Ware. In this complete opposition to the motion principle, however, the possibility should be left open that Duns Scotus is influenced, to a greater or lesser extent and in a positive way, by preceding thinkers, and in particular, by his master William of Ware. Significantly, the latter rejects the Aristotelian argument from motion, because it involves two false implications : a denial of the self-motion of an angel and a denial of the self-motion of the will . Deum autem esse potest ostendi ex motu . Haec est via et sententia Aristotelis VIII Physicorum et Commentatoris XI Metaphysicae . Aristoteles sic arguit : Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur ; sed non est abire in infini72 Cf. Pacificus Borgmann, " Die Stellungnahme des Duns Skotus zum Aristotelisch- Thomistischen Bewegungsgesetz : Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur," Wissenschaft und Weisheit, IV ( 1937 ) 40 ; cf. also Ch . III 65-67. 73 Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, VI q . 7 , in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1914 ) , III 167 : Item, solent etiam induci plures instantiae contra id quod dicitur quod oportet per se et primo movens et per se et primo motum esse distincta subiecto, scilicet de motu gravis deorsum et e converso. Possum addere de motu gravis sursum , scilicet de ascensu aquae in urinali vel in clepsydra sive in canteplora et huiusmodi ; item, de motu ferri ad adamantem, in quibus non apparet motor distinctus ; item, quod non secundum locum solum, sed etiam secundum alterationem et augmentum idem moveat se ipsum ut de aqua calefacta quae revertitur ad frigiditatem maiorem quam sit frigiditas aeris continentis, ut prius inductum est. Item, nutriens se ipsum uniendo sibi nutrimentum extendit quantitatem suam. Item , cum haec etiam sunt exempla inducta a Philosopho et Commentatore de libro de Morte et Vita .

3 Philosophy Series No. 15

18

Chapter I

tum : igitur est devenire ad aliquod movens immobile, vel quod moveat se ; sed quod aliquid moveat se est impossibile, quia tunc esset in potentia inquantum movetur et in actu in quantum movet, quod est impossibile. Sed revera illa via de se non valet , quia per illam probationem posset probari quod angelus non moveret se nec voluntas esst movens se ipsam, quod est contra Anselmum . Si autem dicatur quod non movet se, quia est actus purus, iam peteretur quod debet probari.74 William's objection against the cinesiological argument, as is clear, is really against the motion principle, and the two points of his objection are not only accepted but also amplified by Scotus.75 Also significant is William's appeal to the authority of St. Anselm, who held the will to be an instrumentum se ipsum movens.76 St. Bonaventure also indicates that he is under the same Anselmian influence." It is not unreasonable , therefore, to view Scotus ' opposition to the motion principle, especially in its broad metaphysical acceptation, as a certain fidelity to traditional Augustinianism. Philipp Frank, in one of his most recent books, explains how the Aristotelian and medieval cinesiological principle is bound up with a theory of "natural place" and a whole system of celestial mechanics. 78 Part of this celestial system is a prime mover, which Aristotle reasons to on the basis of the cinesiological principle and which St. Thomas identifies with God . In this way, the principle is not merely a formulation of physical mechanics, nor is it merely applicable in the sphere of astronomy, but it supports conclusions of a metaphysical, religious, and ethical nature. In some way, all this gives rise to a religious world picture which becomes deeply entrenched in medieval man. As we have seen, the idea of a prime mover was regarded by Thomas Aquinas as proof of the existence of God . Thus it was an essential point of the world picture, very definitely related to religion . It had very deep roots in medieval thought or, as we like to say today, in the behaviour pattern of medieval man.79 74 This text, taken from William's questions on the Sentences , q . 14, is presented by Augustinus Daniels, " Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert, " Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster, 1909) , VIII 91 . 75 Op. Oxon. , II d . 2 q . 10 , XI 523—46 . Cf. Ch . IV 159–66 . 78 De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio, XI , in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, ed . Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946) , II 283-84 : Voluntas quidem instrumentum movet omnia alia instrumenta quibus sponte utimur, et quae sunt in nobis - ut manus, lingua, visus , et quae sunt extra nos ut stilus, et securis ; et facit omnes voluntarios motus : ipsa vero se suis affectionibus movet. Unde dici potest instrumentum seipsum movens. 77 Cf. this chapter, p. 14 footnote 57. 78 Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. , 1957) , 91–95 . 79 Ibid ., 95 .

Introductory historical Notes

19

These statements of the celebrated scholar are interesting and even curious. No doubt the cinesiological principle reaches out its tentacles far and wide in Aristotelian thought, and to a notable extent , in the thought of Aquinas. But that the prime mover reasoned to on the basis of the cinesiological principle is in any way essential to medieval religion, that this prime mover has " deep roots in medieval thought " or "the behaviour pattern of medieval man, " - these views hardly approximate the truth of the matter. Among the thinkers of the West, the cinesiological principle hardly had any recognition before the middle of the 13th century. Approximately at that time, it is taken over by St. Albert and St. Thomas. But such a leading figure as St. Bonaventure does not use it in his proofs for the existence of God. William of Ware, a contemporary of Aquinas, impugns and rejects the principle on theological grounds . Then before the thirteenth century is run out, the cinesiological principle is extensively attacked by the medieval philosopher and theologian , Duns Scotus, on scientific, philosophical, and theological grounds. If the prime mover proof with its key principle has such a precarious existence in the academic and university life of the the second half of the 13th century, we may be quite sure that it does not become so deeply absorbed into the religion and "behaviour pattern of medieval man." But perhaps the motion principle gains ascendency in the 14th century and later. But again such is not the case, for Duns Scotus' critique of the principle has notable and wide influence . It now remains for us to give a few indications of this influence. 12. Various Scotists and William Ockham. Here mention might first be made of various Scotists , who follow their master in rejecting the universal validity of the cinesiological principle. In this group are to be found Petrus Tartaretus, 80 Claudius Frassen, 81 Franciscus Pontelongus, 82 Hieronymus de Montefortino, 83 and F. Cherubini . 84 According to Chossat, the Scotists actually won out in defending their position . But in this they were aided to no little extent by the scientific movement 80 Lucidissima Commentaria in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum et Quodlibeta Ioannis Duns Scoti Subtilium Principis, II d. 2 q. 10 (Venetiis : apud Heredes Simonis Galignani de Karera, 1583 ) , 113—20. 81 Scotus Academicus , II q . 1 concl . 3 (Rome, 1900) , IV 212-15. 82 Disputationum Philosophicarum Pars Secunda , VIII concl . 9 (Patavii : Ioannis Baptista Pasquatius, 1662 ) , 529-30 . Here Pontelongus repeats Scotus' two interpretations of the cinesiological principle, according to which the principle would be valid. These two interpretations we consider later in Ch. IV 120-21 123-24 . 83 Summa Theologica, q. 53 a . incidens (Rome, 1901 ) , III 186–88. 84 Cursus Philosophicus ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis ( Rome , 1904) , I 522—24.

3.

20

Chapter I

of the times.85 William Ockham , who fathered new and very refined doctrines on motion , also gave strong and added support to the Scotistic rejection of the motion principle. It is often to him rather than to Duns Scotus that credit is given for showing the inacceptable character of the cinesiological principle.86 13. Hervaeus Natalis. But perhaps the most interesting of all is the influence of Scotus ' critique on Hervaeus Natalis, a Dominican who later became the Master of his Order and who was an ardent defender of St. Thomas . In his commentary on the Sentences87 and the tract de Verbo, 88 Hervaeus upholds the universal validity of the cinesiological principle. For on this depends the force of the motion proof for the existence of God. If the motion principle is not valid in the sphere of spiritual activity, then the Prime Mover proof cannot conclude to a mover which is altogether unmoved , but only a mover which cannot be the subject of corporeal motion . This difficulty , attendant to a restricted acceptation of the motion principle, was already indicated by Duns Scotus.89 In view of the fact that Hervaeus upholds the universal validity of the motion proposition in two of his works , one would expect him to give first place to the motion argument in his de cognitione primi principii, where he presents in extenso his proofs for the existence of God. But such is not the case . He neither defends the motion proof nor attacks it. Rather with painstaking care , he shows that the objections against the arguments from motion do not hold against the argument from efficient causality.90 85 "Dieu ( Son Existence), " Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris, 1911 ) , IV 933 : Mais la subtilite des scotistes triompha, aidee sans aucum doute par tout le mouvement scientifique qui devait abouter a Galilee et a l'application de la mathematique a l'étude des mouvements reels. 86 Shapiro, Herman , Motion, Time, and Place according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1957) , 62 : His ( Ockham's) analysis shook the belief in the inviolable character of the everything that is moved principle, and provided ingress for further investigations of a fruitful order. Cf. also p . 51-55 . Cf. Ernest A. Moody, " Galileo and Avempace," Journal of the History of Ideas, XII ( 1951 ) 399. 87 II d . 19 q. 1 : Impossibile est idem et secundum idem per essentiam et moveri. (This quotation is taken from Josef Santeler, op. cit., 26.) 88 The following quotation is given by Josef Santeler (op. cit. , 26) from the de Verbo : Si in aliquibus idem esset movens et motum, tunc non valeret ratio philosophi ad probandum primum esse immobile, quia ratio sua fundatur super hoc : quia omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Si ergo in spiritualibus hoc non teneret, cum primum motum sit natura spiritualis , non sequeretur ex hoc primo, quod primum movens sit totaliter immobile, sed solum quod non moveretur corporali motu . 89 Op. Oxon., I d . 8 q . 5 , IX 736. 90 Tractatus de cognicione primi principii , (Cod . Vat. Lat . 862 ) 14r : Quantum ad primum sciendum, quod movere et moveri et facere et fieri differunt, quia alia est habitudo facientis ad factum et moventis ad subiectum

Introductory historical Notes

21

In his positive proofs for the existence of God, Hervaeus Natalis is heavily dependent on Duns Scotus. 91 Hence quite reasonable appears the opinion of Santeler that Hervaeus neglects the proof from motion not only in the intersts of constructing a proof on commonly accepted grounds, but also because his belief in the universal validity of the cinesiological principle had been shaken by the criticisms of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus . 92 14. Thomas de Vio Cajetan . In commenting on the prima via of St. Thomas, Thomas de Vio Cajetan refers to Scotus and his rejection . of the Aristotelian principle of motion. 93 But the issue is not argued. The cinesiological argument is simply evaluated in the light of the Summa contra Gentiles and is accepted as valid, but with this reservation : it does not immediately conclude to the existence of God . The unmoved mover reached by this proof is no more unmoved than a spiritual soul or a celestial body and its soul . Identification of the unmoved mover with God requires additional argumentation . 94 motum. Nam faciens comparatur ad factum , quantum ad id, quod produciter ab ipso, quia movens presupponit ipsum subiectum, quod movetur, inquantum movens est. Sed bene comparatur ad actum, qui motus est, sicut ad id, quod producitur ab eo vel ad ipsam compositam (Ipsum compositum) racione ipsius motus. Unde quando aliquid movetur, ut quando homo dealbatur, non dicitur subiectum motus fieri simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia dicitur fieri homo albus : illud autem, quod proprie est effectus ipsius facientis simpliciter dicitur fieri . Hoc autem pro tanto adduxi, quod dato, quod esset dubium, utrum idem secundum idem possit moveri ita, quod illud idem sit principium activum et susceptivum motus, tamen non est dubium, quin impossibile sit idem et secundum idem esse causam activam sui ipsius, quia sequeretur, quod idem presupponit seipsum et pro eodem nunc esset ens et non ens, quod impossibile est . (This quotation is taken from Josef Santeler, op. cit. , 27.) 91 Santeler, Josef, op. cit. , 48-55. 92 Ibid. , 28 : Man könnte vermuten, diese Wendung des Philosophen erkläre sich aus dem Bestreben , die Gottesbeweise, diese kostbaren Stücke aus dem scholastischen Lehrgut, auf einem Unterbau sich erheben zu lassen, der nicht selbst auf Stützen ruht, die nicht allen großen Scholastikern tragfähig und fest erscheinen . Viel wahrscheinlicher jedoch scheint die Annahme, Herveus selbst sei unter der Wucht der gegnerischen Argumente bezüglich des Bewegungsgrundsatzes in der allgemeinen Form wankend geworden ; denn wie wir aus den Streitschriften gegen Heinrich von Gent wissen, war unser Theologe durchaus nicht der Mann der Kompromisse . 93 Angelici Doctoris Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologica in quinque Tomos Distributa cum Commentariis Thomae de Vio Cardinalis Cajetani, Ia q. 2 a . 3 (Patavii : ex Typographia Seminarii, 1698) , I 22 : Contra hanc enim Scotus in materia de gravibus, & levibus , & voluntate, & c. arguit, & quoniam hoc esset exire nostros limites, erit de hoc quaestio specialis . 94 Ibid. & sic istae rationes habent plurimum disputationis , eo quod prima via, ut in primo contra Genti. cap. 22 dicitur, non ducit ad motorem magis immobilem, quam sit anima intellectiva ; secunda autem , ut dicit Averr. non ducit, nisi ad corpus coeleste, & ejus motorem .

22

Chapter I

Cajetan also seems to view the motion argument as a physical consideration . At least, he does not assert that the term ' motion ' should be taken in a broad, metaphysical sense. Insistence on a metaphysical acceptation of the term is later made by Bañez.95 15. Francis Suarez, the eminent master of 16th century scholasticism, also views the motion principle as a physical statement and abandons it as an instrument for proving the existence of God . Because of its physical character, the principle could not lead one to a supramundane being.96 But aside from its probative value in demonstrating the existence of God, is the motion principle a valid formulation ? According to Suarez, the principle of motion does not seem to be valid in reference to every kind of motion . But if correctly understood , it enjoys probability.97 This correct understanding reveals the tremendous influence of Scotus on the Doctor Eximius.98 Correctly understood , Suarez explains, the motion principle does not assert the necessity of a real distinction between the active and recipient principles of every effect. In other words, that one and the same thing be both active and passive in reference to one and the same perfection, this is not forbidden by the bare notions of active and recipient principle. If these notions cannot be verified in one and the same thing, the reason for this must be sought in some other circumstance . Thus the possibility of at least some things moving themselves is left fully open , and Suarez defends self-motion as a fact in the sphere of living and immaterial beings. Self-motion, moreover, as for Duns Scotus, is always restricted to the production of effects different in nature from their efficient principles. In admitting self-motion in these cases, cases of equivocal causation, Suarez invokes the Scotistic notion of virtual act.99

95 Chossat, M. , art. cit. , 933-34. 96 Disputationes Metaphysicae, dispt. XVIII sect . 7 no . 2 , in Francisci Suarez Opera Omnia, ed . L. Vivès ( Paris , 1856-1878 ) , XXV 633 ; dispt. XXIX sect. I no . 7 , XXVI 23 : Hoc autem medium per se ac praecise sumptum multis modis invenitur inefficax ad demonstrandum esse in rerum natura aliquam substantiam immaterialem , nedum ad demonstrandum primam et increatam substantiam . Cf. also Nikolaus Junk, Die Bewegungslehre des Franz Suarez (Innsbruck, 1938) , 61 . 97 Suarez, Francis, op. cit. , loc. cit.: et imprimis omitto, principium illud in quo tota illa ostensio fundatur : Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, adhuc non esse satis demonstratum in omni genere motus vel actionis , ... Ibid ., no. 8 : Deinde ponamus ut verum illud principium, omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur (est enim revera probabilius, recte intellectum) , . . 98 Concerning the dependence of Suarez on Scotus, cf. P. Borgmann, art. cit., 42. 99 Suarez, Francis, op. cit., dispt . XVIII sect. 7 no . 54 , XXV 649 : non esse de ratione causae efficientis ut sic, ut ratio agendi et patiendi sint in re distinctae, vel subjecto, vel entitate integra, aut partiali , sed quoties-

Introductory historical Notes

23

Suarez limits strict self-motion to living and immaterial beings. In reference to the changes undergone by non-living bodies, he subscribes to the principle of motion . But even in this restricted sphere, he admits and faces the various difficulties which the motion principle encounters, especially those difficulties bearing on the natural downward motion of heavy things and the natural upward motion of light things . In explaining the natural motion of light and heavy things, an appeal is made, although not exclusively, to the agent which generated these things. In this, Suarez departs from Scotus and is more in line with Aristotle and St. Thomas. For Suarez, therefore, the motion principle is correctly understood and valid when restricted to the bodily changes of non-living beings and those changes of living beings which are not proper to them as living. The Suarezian justification for this limited acceptance of the motion principle is the Aristotelian distinction between living and non-living beings. Only living beings can fully and properly move themselves.100 16. Various Contemporary Thinkers . Mention has been made of the metaphysical interpretation given the cinesiological principle by Bañez . After this author, the principle is also made to be expressive of the famous theory of physical premotion.101 This particular rendering of the cinesiological principle , however, proves to be inacceptable to other thinkers. Hence various other metaphysical interpretations are offered . In this way, the cinesiological principle takes on a varied and undeniably complicated history.102 cunque id reperitur (quod est frequens), provenit ex aliqua particulari ratione, ... Quae quidem necessitas universalis est in actione univoca, ex illo principio quid idem non possit simul esse in actu et potentia. In actione autem aequivoca non ita universaliter urget illud principium, neque aliud quod universale sit , . . . ; dispt . XXIX sect. I no . 7, XXVI 23 : ... multa sunt quae per actum virtualem videntur sese movere et reducere ad actum formalem, ut in appetitu seu voluntate videre licet, ... (The important notion of virtual act will be explicated later in Ch. III 81-82 . ) 100 Junk, Nikolaus, op . cit. , 63-65. 101 Chossat, M. , art. cit. , 934. The interpretation of the cinesiological principle in terms of the doctrine of physical premotion has been shown to be foreign to the mind of St. Thomas . Čf. Johann Stufler , art. cit., 369—90. 102 Chossat, M. , art. cit.: Les thomistes bannéziens font donc de l'argument du premier moteur un argument métaphysique, ex ratione metaphysica, non ex medio physico . Il en est de même des différentes espèces de néothomistes, qui ne sont pas bannéziens ; ils ont recours pour soutenir cet argument à diverses notions sur la limitation des êtres finis, sur la composition des êtres, sur l'acte et la puissance, etc. , dont se servaient, il est vrai, les thomistes à l'époque où ils défendaient encore contre les scotistes la valeur de l'argument de saint Thomas pris au sens de l'antériorité du mouvement de translation , mais qui n'ont aucun rapport telles qu'elles sont entendues par les néo-thomistes avec l'argument ex medio physico . Cette inter-

24

Chapter I In more recent years, as we have seen, the most praiseworthy efforts

have been made to clarify the motion argument and its key principle. Still a nodding acquaintance with neoscholastic philosophic literature makes clear that the cinesiological proof continues to take on widely different interpretations and is given diverse evaluations. A complete review of the varied presentations of the motion argument among neoscholastic authors is impossible for us here, and criticism of the argument by such men as Bergson and LeRoy will be ignored altogether. Accordingly, we will confine ourselves to professed Thomists or at least those thinkers who are in some way favorable to the scholastic tradition . But among this large group, our attention must needs be focused on certain representative men, and even in reference to this select representation, we will not be able to point out all the differences , even deep and significant ones, to be found in their presentations of the cinesiological proof and its principle. a) Opponents of the Principle of Motion . For the purposes of our study, three views of the motion principle among contemporary thinkers can be singled out. First , there is the view that the motion principle is simply false, and consequently, to be rejected . As was indicated in the Preface, this is the position of Sir Edmund Whittaker. According to Whittaker, the prima via of St. Thomas, together with its key principle, accepts the Aristotelian view that "the changing world of nature is not a self-contained system, " but requires an external prime mover. This is argued to from an explanation of motion in terms of potency and act . Whittaker reconstructs St. Thomas' argumentation in short order and at once indicates what he considers to be an unwarranted assumption . nothing can be reduced from potency to act, except by something that is in a state of act ; thus fire, which is actually hot, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot . He ( St. Thomas) then assumes that the same thing cannot be both in act and in potency at the same time and in the same respect ; hence the thing initially in the state of act, which brings about the reduction , cannot be identical with the thing initially in that is to say, a thing the state of potency, which undergoes the reduction cannot be both mover and moved ; whatever is moved must be moved by another - omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.103 The cinesiological proof of St. Thomas Whittaker finds to be excessively a priori, and he approves of the criticism of the Franciscan vention récente du néo-thomisme a fait de cette question le carrefour le plus systématique de toute la théologie, et on s'y querelle aujourd'hui en pleine obscurité. 103 Op. cit., 34-35 .

Introductory historical Notes

25

scholars that the motion principle is not established on experience . The eminent scientist repeatedly insists on the necessity of external observation in testing the truth of such a principle and also in determining the meaning of the various words employed in its proof. In this connection, Whittaker expresses the opinion that various words used in proving the cinesiological principle are taken in metaphorical senses.104 A very interesting difficulty Whittaker presents against the cinesiological principle is the case of the free motion of a star. "Consider a star which has never been near enough to another star to be appreciably influenced by it, and which therefore has always moved, and is still moving, in a straight line through interstellar space . This star is continually changing its location , and is therefore " moved ; " but the whole. point of the law of inertia is that in motion of this type there is no "mover." The star has never been subjected to any influence whatever, and yet its position is continually changing ; it is "moved . " 105 "Later Aristotelians, unable to ignore the difficulty, have contended that the star must have received an impulse at the Creation , and this impulse, which is still present in the star as it moves, is an instrument of the mover ; the impulse is in act in the star, while the star is in potency to succeeding locations : thus the impulse is in fact the mover, so that the star does not move itself. To this argument it might be replied that the impulse is not aliud, something other than the star, but is part of the description of the state of the star: it is an attribute or quality or "accident" of the star itself ; and this explanation cannot easily be fitted . into the scheme of St. Thomas ' concepts, . . . ” 106 Earlier Aristotelians , of course, could explain the motion of the star in another way, namely, by an appeal to the soul of the star or some celestial star driver . But obviously, such an appeal involves out of date science, the astrophysics of Aristotle . Whittaker's basic and overall objection is precisely this : the cinesiological principle is bound up with Aristotelian science which has long been discredited . In support of this assertion, he makes an extensive appeal to the history of modern science. 107 From the standpoint of Scotistic teaching, as we shall see, Whittaker's critique of the cinesiological principle is not without defects . Nor is his confrontation of the principle with modern science so close and so well worked out as that of Albert Mitterer . To his advantage, the 104 Ibid., 134-35. 105 Ibid., 50–51 . 106 Ibid. , 136 . 107 Ibid. , 25-28 48 85.

26

Chapter I

latter thinker is genuinely conversant with scholastic philosophy, and in particular, exhibits an intimate and detailed knowledge of Aquinas ' teaching on the motion principle . But Mitterer, likewise, holds the motion principle to be a part , in fact, the main principle of now outmoded Aristotelian science . Modern Energy Physics has made it abundantly clear that motion pertains to a body essentially. For every body and the whole world of bodies are energy systems . This is true of every atom and molecule, of the bodies of sense experience, of further and higher systems of these bodies, and finally of the whole world. According to modern science, therefore, motion enters into the very heart of all corporeal matter and of every corporeal substance, such as the electrons of atoms and the molecules of gases.108 For St. Thomas, substantial form and accidents belong to the specific being of bodies. In a similar way, according to modern teaching, "motion belongs to the being of individual bodies. An atom is no atom, a gas is no gas without motion . To speak after the manner of St. Thomas, no body would physically be the sun, the element of fire, air, specifically luminous, warm , light without motion . And because motion is already in physical primary matter, motion belongs not only to the specific but to the generic being of all bodies, which are composed of the same kind of matter. In general, being a body is equivalent to being an energy system, and being an energy system is equivalent to the motion of physical matter. But then the forms of St. Thomas would be in modern language not only a definite, delicate, and minute structure made up of physical atoms, but also and essentially a definite motion of these atoms."109 For St. Thomas, motion first comes to a body "as the result of outside circumstances (per accidens) . According to present day knowledge, motion is already long there, and indeed by the very nature of the

108 Art. cit. , 375. Cf. also 397. 109 Ibid.: Bewegtsein gehört zum Sein der Körperindividuen wie bei Thomas Wesensform und Akzidentien zum spezifischen Sein der Körper gehören. Atom ist kein Atom, Gas kein Gas ohne Bewegtsein . Kein Körper wäre, um Thomasisch zu reden, physikalisch Sonne, Feuerelement, Luft, spezifisch licht, warm, leicht ohne Bewegtsein . Und weil die Bewegtheit schon im physikalischen Urstoff ist, so gehört sie nicht bloß zum spezifischen, sondern zum generischen Sein aller Körper, die aus dem gleichen Stoff bestehen. Körpersein im allgemeinen heißt Energiesystem sein, und das heißt Bewegtsein des physikalischen Stoffes . Thomasische Formen aber sind dann in heutiger Sprache nicht bloß ein bestimmter Bestand, Fein- und Kleinbau aus physikalischen Urstoffteilchen, sondern ebenso wesentlich ein bestimmtes Bewegtsein von ihnen.

Introductory historical Notes

27

case (per se) . For the being of bodies, for example, the being of light , the being of warmth, is physically and manifoldly motion. "110 Undeniably, matter can be passively acted upon, but most significantly, it can be active. In fact, it not only can , but it is compelled and constrained to activity and motion both in reference to itself and other bodies . Thus St. Thomas' view that matter is per se at rest and unmoved is not only foreign to but conflicts with modern physics, which holds that matter is per se and essentially active.111 Mitterer, of course, views the cinesiological principle as a physical statement , 112 but he does not fail to take into account the metaphysical construction of the principle by others which would leave it unaffected by any progress in science. A metaphysical construction of the principle, however, he considers to be an unsuccessful salvaging process and subterfuge.113 Whittaker discountenances the same metaphysical effort and views it as a betrayal of St. Thomas, who sought to reach God from a study of nature.114 Along with Mitterer, Pacificus Borgmann likewise considers the motion principle to be a remnant of an antiquated physics, and accordingly puts aside the motion argument.115 At the same time, however, he develops a new and quite original motion argument for the existence of God. This argument is a metaphysical demonstration , based on neither ancient nor modern science but on experience.116 This fact is significant, for it implies that a rejection of the Thomistic cinesiological proof is not necessarily bound up with a denial of the autonomy of meta110 Ibid. , 375-76 : Erstens sind Körpersubstanz ( Stoff, Form ) und Akzidentien an sich (per se) auf Ruhe bedacht und unbewegt. Bewegtheit kommt erst infolge äußerer Umstände (per accidens) hinzu . Nach heutiger Erkenntnis ist sie längst da, und zwar an sich (per se) . Denn das Sein der Körper (z. B. Lichtsein, Warmsein) ist physikalisch vielfach ein Bewegtsein. 11 Ibid., 387, 391-92 , 399, 510. 112 Ibid., 481 : Es könnte erstens zweifelhaft erscheinen, ob Thomas unter Bewegtsein das Aristotelische, eigentliche und physikalische Bewegtsein meint oder auch das Platonische uneigentliche Bewegtsein des Tätigseins und Bewegens . Allein er meint das erstere. Cf. also 483 . 113 Wandel des Weltbildes von Thomas auf Heute . Schriftenreihe (Innsbruck, 1935 ) , 167 . 114 115 Op. cit., 12 40 85-86. ,, Gegenstand, Erfahrungsgrundlage und Methode der Metaphysik“, Franziskanische Studien , XXI ( 1934 ) 99–103 . According to Borgmann, St. Thomas works towards a liberation of the cinesiological argument from Aristotelian astronomy. The Thomist proof, however, retains its intimate tie-in with the Stagirite's physics (p . 100) . 116 " De argumento chronologico existentiae Dei sumpto ex continua entium temporalium succedaneitate, " Franziskanische Studien, XXXIV (1952) 365—76. Cf. also Philotheus Boehner, "A Proof for the Existence of God according to Fr. Pacificus Borgmann , O.F.M. , ” Franciscan Studies, XXIV (1943) 374-86.

28

Chapter I

physics as the philosophical science of God.117 Whether rightly or wrongly, this autonomy of metaphysics is clearly not appreciated by Whittaker, 118 and perhaps not by Mitterer.119 Another forthright opponent of the cinesiological proof and its principle is Joseph Rickaby. Like Mitterer, Rickaby opposes the argument on scientific grounds and finds it to be in conflict with modern physics. This his view is presented in Studies on God and His Creatures . 120 In a note given in his translation of the Summa contra Gentiles, his view is again pointedly stated . I refrain from translating the rest of this lengthy argument, based upon the treacherous foundation of Aristotelian Physics . See Aristotle, Physics, VII, VIII ; Metaphysics , XI , 7. Whoever will derive an argument for the divine existence from the mechanism of the heavens must take his principles from Newton, not from Aristotle. Besides Motion he must take account of Force and Energy, not to say of Cosmic Evolution . He must know not only the motion of impact, as when a row of ninepins knock one another down from a push given to the first, but also the motion that is set up by gravitation . Aristotle knew nothing of gravitation ; and only half knew the inertia of matter declared by Newton's first law of motion . He supposed that motion, of its own nature, not only needed starting but also needed continual keeping up by some continually acting cause. He did not know that the question with a moving body is, not what there is to keep it in motion, but what there is to stop it. It would be a mistake to represent the Aristotelian argument of the Prime Mover as referring to some primitive push, or some rotary motion started in the primitive nebula, at the first creation of matter . Matter, to Aristotle, to Plato, and to the Greeks generally, is eternal, not created . I need hardly add that between an immovable Prime Mover and a Personal God a wide gulf intervenes which Aristotle does not bridge over. See however Chapter XXIII of this Book. The whole idea of a Prime Mover has vanished from modern Physics . The whole universe , as we know it, is a congeries of sun-and -planet systems -some of them apparently still in process of formation -- arranged possibly in the shape of a huge convex lens . These bodies act and react on each other. And besides these molar motions there are also molecular motions quite as 117 With great force, Borgmann defends the primacy and autonomy of metaphysics as the philosophical science of God. Cf. " Gegenstand , Erfahrungsgrundlage und Methode der Metaphysik, " Franziskanische Studien , XXI ( 1934) 138—50 . 118 Op. cit., 68—72 103 . 119 Art. cit., 506 : Aber was folgt daraus ? Daß nicht bloß Ontologie eine Hilfswissenschaft der Physik, sondern umgekehrt auch diese eine Hilfswissenschaft der Ontologie ist , ... ; 519 : Ich will noch optimistischer sein und meinen, daß unsere Gotteserkenntnis von der fortschreitenden Erkenntnis der Schöpfung und allgemein unsere Metaphysik von dem Fortschritt der Physik nur gewinnen kann. Cf. also by the same author " Physik und Metaphysik, " Franziskanische Studien, XXIII ( 1936) 245-64 . 120 (New York, 1924) , 33-39.

Introductory historical Notes

29

real. The causes of these motions are innumerable forces . The study of them carries us back to consider the ' primitive collocation ' of the forces of the universe, a collection whereby they were arranged in a ' position of advantage,' so that out of their interaction has ensued this orderly world, and in our earth, a fit habitation for living things . 121 b) Defenders of the Principle of Motion. Now there is a second group of thinkers who have an altogether different view of the cinesiological proof. They find no fault, at least no important fault, with the argument and simply state the principle of motion without any change, just as it is found in St. Thomas : quidquid movetur ab alio movetur . George Hayward Joyce is such a thinker. In his Principles of Natural Theology, 122 he writes : This truth was expressed by the Schoolmen in the saying, Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur, 'Whatever is in motion is being moved by something other than itself. ' The immediate agent of motion need not indeed be external to the substance in which the motion takes place ; but it must at least be external to the part which is the immediate subject of change. If a thing is destitute of a particular form of being, it cannot be itself the source from which it receives the actualizing process by which that form of being is attained. Nemo dat quod non habet. Perhaps the clearest modern exponent of the motion principle without any added qualifications or modifications is Vincent Edward Smith . In his Philosophical Physics , 123 he writes :

121 Of God and His Creatures (Westminster, Maryland, 1950), 11 . 122 (New York, 1923 ) , 89. 123 (New York, 1950) , 82. R. Garrigou -Lagrange , whose work, God, His Existence and His Nature (tr. Rose Bede ; St. Louis, 1934) is a standard treatise in Thomistic Natural Theology, also presents the cinesiological principle without any appended qualifications . Cf. I 264 278-79 . At times, however, the renowned author seems to deflect from an unqualified acceptance of the principle . On p . 282 , he writes : "Diversity presupposes identity in things, the changeable presupposes the permanent, and the undetermined, the determined ... Seek not for the permanence which matter or force intrinsically calls for ; it is too evident that they do not possess that attribute, since this matter and this force transform themselves, and this transformation, which is added to their permanence, demands a cause which in itself is not the substratum of the transformations . (The italics have not been added by us but are given in the text of the author. ) Perhaps Jacques Maritain is to be classified among those who accept the cinesiological principle without qualification . But perhaps not, for the eminent philosopher seems to concede strict self-motion , which, although conditioned by external factors , does not break down into the famous two parts, the mover and the moved . At least the theory of the dissolution into two parts is not expressly invoked . "It (a living being) moves itself, but under the action of other factors or energies in the cosmos. The sun activates or " moves " the vegetal to move itself." (Approaches to God, tr . Peter O'Reilly [ New York, 1954 ] , 30) . These words clearly seem to allow that a vegetable, the intellect, and will are at least partial active cases of their own activities . This allowance in turn suggests that Maritain accepts the cinesiological principle in some kind of

30

Chapter I

If anything could move itself, the mind would be relieved of its worry about the mover ; but if nothing can move itself from within then there must be a mover acting from the outside. The reasoning from a movement to a motor thus pivots upon the question of whether a moving thing can move itself. If it cannot, then motion must come from what is not itself, from a mover outside of it . There are two ways of showing from motion the absolute necessity of an outside mover. That a form is united to matter by any motion, neither the form nor the matter can explain . The matter, to repeat, is always potential, and in the case of prime matter, it is purely potential . It cannot act to bring about its union with form because it is not actualized itself until this union has come to pass. Form is also powerless to account of itself for its dualistic union with matter. It is the term of the movement in its proper sense, and it would have to exist at the beginning of the movement to originate the change. Since motion can come from neither of the components within the thing moved, it must of necessity be the outcome of an extrinsic agent. c) Proponents of a Modified Principle of Motion . Now there is a third group of thinkers, those who present the cinesiological proof as a valid argument but change or modify the motion principle. This change is generally expressed in its external, verbal formulation . Pedro Descoqs , for example, does not simply say, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, but omne quod movetur etiam ab alio movetur. Another significant formulation is, nullum ens a se ipso adaequate movetur.124 Now the words ' etiam' and ' adaequate' have a very special significance, which Descoqs does not fail to make clear. In virtue of these words, the cinesiological principle takes on an affirmative or assertive sense as distinguished against an exclusive sense . Accordingly, the principle simply asserts that a thing in motion is moved by another ; it does not exclude that the thing in motion might be moved partially by itself, but nothing can be the total, adequate cause of its own motion . In the case of a self-movent thing, therefore, there is required another cause, distinct from the thing in motion . In this way, the principle of motion comes to mean this : everything which is in motion is moved either by another alone or by itself together with another. A thing in motion is never moved by itself alone.125 This explanation of the motion principle is similar to that of de Vries, whom we have already considered . De Vries, however, presents this assertive sense . Other passages, however, favor an opposing view. In point of fact, Maritain's presentation of the cinesiological principle and argument is a disjointed and good-natured affair, which simply fails to face up to the more precise issues involved . 124 Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis (Paris, 1932 ) I 290, 292 . 125 Ibid., 290. Cf. also Iosepho Hellin , Theologia Naturalis (Madrid, 1950) , 206.

Introductory historical Notes

31

explanation as the historical doctrine of St. Thomas. Not so Descogs. Functioning as an independent philosopher, he takes cognizance of the historical objections against the cinesiological proof, and in particular, the recognition of these objections by Hervaeus Natalis . It is to safeguard his proof from motion against these objections that Descoqs introduces the signifificant word ' etiam . ' If this saving word is not introduced, then the motion principle expresses an absolute denial of self-motion and is open to the valid objections of Scotus and Suarez.126 Nothing can move itself adequately. This understanding of the motion principle is offered by a whole host of neoscholastic authors.127 But is this perhaps a deviation from the authentic and historical doctrine of St. Thomas ? And would Duns Scotus still reject the principle when so understood ? The first question cannot be given adequate treatment in this treatise . The second will be taken up later. Without further preamble, we will now turn to Duns Scotus to study and rethink with him his doctrine on self-motion as to its possibility and factuality and his consequent view of the motion principle.

136 Op. cit. , 291 : ... praecise ratione hujus dubii, addidimus post Scotum vocem "etiam" in enunciato. Isto verbo ceterum rejiciuntur omnes difficultates Scoti et praesertim Suarezii, . . ., quae revera valerent si sensu absoluto sumendum esset axioma. 127 Donat, J. Summula Philosophiae Christianae (Innsbruck, 1929) VI 54—55 ; Hickey, J. S. Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae ( St. Louis, 1934), III 18; Herve, J. M. , Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae (Paris, 1949) , II 16; Bittle, Celestine, God and His Creatures (Milwaukee, 1952), 67-75 ; Steenberghen, Fernand Van, Ontology, tr. Martin J. Flynn (New York, 1952), 113-15.

Chapter II

THE POSITION OF DUNS SCOTUS IN GENERAL

The principle of motion, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, is given extended treatment in several questions of Scotus . In a question which deals with the problem of the activity versus the passivity of the intellect , the principle figures as a major issue and is stated in the form , nihil movet se.¹ The general problem of the relative activity and passivity of the intellect is also treated in a more specific and theological question concerning the blessed in heaven . Are the blessed in heaven active or passive in forming a concept of a creature which is seen in the divine essence ? In the attempt to solve this problem, the cinesiological principle is once again sounded out.³ The motion principle is discussed at length in the problem of the activity versus the passivity of the

1 Ord., I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2, III 245-330. In commenting on this question , E. Bettoni asserts that Scotus opposes Godfrey of Fontaines in translating the principle of motion ( omne quod movetur ab alio movetur) into these two other expressions : nihil agit in se, and agens et patiens distincta sunt subjecto . Cf. L'Ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto (Milan, 1943 ) , 9. Apparently, therefore, we have no argumentation in this question against the principle of motion but only against the other two propositions . This interpretation of Bettoni, in our opinion, is gratuitous . Nor is it backed up by any text. In this very question, the formulation, nihil movet se, is also used (p. 304 ) . Nihil movet se, nihil agit in se, agens et patiens distincta sunt subjecto, nihil patitur a seipso, - - all these expressions are simply variant formulations of omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved . Other authors, moreover, who present Scotus ' doctrine on the principle of motion, appeal to the question cited above or to other questions cited in the next five footnotes . Cf. M. Chossat, "Dieu (Son Existence) ", Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris , 1911 ) , IV 932-33 ; J. Santeler, Der Kausale Gottesbeweis bei Herveus Natalis (Innsbruck, 1930) , 19—21 ; Z. Van de Woestyne, Cursus Philosophicus (2d ed . Malines, 1933 ) , II 110-11 footnote 1 ; P. Borgmann, "Die Stellungnahme des Duns Scotus zum Aristotelisch-Thomistischen Bewegungsgesetz : Quidquid Movetur, ab Alio Movetur " , Wissenschaft und Weisheit, IV ( 1937) 38-42. 2 Quodl. , q. 15, XXVI 118 : Consequenter quaeritur de modo, quo intellectus exit in actum, sive de causa intellectionis, et est quaestio : Posito quod Beatus in patria habeat verbum de creatura visa in essentia divina, utrum respectu illius verbi creaturae, intellectus possibilis habeat se pure passive. 3 Ibid., 119-79 . 32

The Position of Duns Scotus in general 333 will.4 Discussion of the principle is also central in the theological question, whether an angel is capable of local self-motion.5 In Scotus' commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, the cinesiological principle comes up for independent and ex professo treatment under the form of the question, "whether something can be moved by itself ? " The phrasing of the question here indicates, at least to some extent, how Duns Scotus understands the principle. 1. Preliminary Precisions . No doubt Scotus ' understanding of the cinesiological principle can best be gaged from his over-all handling of it in argumentation . In an initial attempt to indicate in a general way its meaning for Scotus, we would first make a point as to the English translation of the principle, quidquid movetur ab alio movetur, or omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. The statement, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, is variously rendered in translations of the works of St. Thomas and in works of authors who employ this statement as a principle . In the translation presented by Anton C. Pegis, the motion principle is rendered thus : "Now whatever is moved is moved by another, . . ." In the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, this rendering is given : " Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, . . . ” 8 Op. Oxon., II d. 25 q. un., XIII 196—224 ; Additiones magnae secundi libri, d. 25 q. 1 , ed . Carl Balić, in Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences (Louvain, 1927) , 264-301 ; Balić, Carl, "Une question inédite de Jean Duns Scot sur la volonté, " Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, III 91931 ) 191–208 . 5 Op.Oxon. , II d . 2 q. 10, XI 523-46. Although this question is theological , the considerations introduced to answer the question are almost all of a philosophic nature and principally concern heavy things (gravia) . Not infrequently Duns Scotus discusses pure philosophy under a theological question. • Metaph. IX q. 14 (An aliquid possit moveri a seipso ? ) , VII 582-606. Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1945) , I 22. The same translation is adopted by William Bryar, St. Thomas and the Existence of God: Three Interpretations (Chicago, 1951 ) , 133 et passim. "Everything that is being moved is being moved by something else" is the translation offered by Joseph Owens, art. cit. , III . Another slightly variant formulation, "whatever is moved is moved by something other than itself, " is offered by Vincent Edward Smith, art. cit., 82. - Provided that one does not understand "everything that is being moved" in an exclusively passive sense, Owens ' rendering appears to be very acceptable . His use of the English progressive form brings out very pointedly that all the while a thing is actually the recipient of movement, it must be receiving this movement from another. Duns Scotus has this understanding of the principle. Cf. Ch. III p. 104. The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr . Fathers of the English Dominican Province (2d ed .: London, 1910) , Ia q. 2 a . 3 , I 24. Cf. also George Hayward Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology (New York, 1923) , 89.

4 Philosophy Series No. 15

Chapter II

34

Of these two translations, our preference is for the second, at least as far as the subject-term of the proposition is concerned . For what is the meaning of the subject, quidquid movetur (omne quod movetur) ? First, does it simply mean a thing which is formally moved , i . e. , a thing which is a recipient of motion or movement ? Or secondly, does it mean a thing which is formally moved, but which is not itself an active cause of the motion but is acted upon by another ? According to this meaning, the subject, omne quod movetur , would be taken in an exclusively passive sense. The truth or falsity of the principle of motion and other related questions, such as whether it is a self-evident or analytic proposition , will be determined first of all by what intelligible elements are packed into the subject-term . If the subject , omne quod movetur, means a thing which is formally moved, not itself causally active but acted upon by another, then surely the cinesiological principle is true. It is even an analytic proposition in the modern sense and a pure tautology. The principle, moreover, would not even deny that a thing can move itself. Self-motion, whether it is a fact or not, would not be covered by such a tautological proposition. Now it is certain that Duns Scotus does not understand the subjectterm of the motion principle in an exclusively passive sense. For in his commentary on the Metaphysics, where the motion proposition is given ex professo treatment, the question posed is "whether something can be moved by itself ?" Hence in Scotus, we have a treatment of a principle which denies self-motion. This denial of self-motion is clearly contained in the predicate term , ab alio movetur, and not in the subjectterm, omne quod movetur. Otherwise, the proposition would be a tautology. For these reasons , we believe that it is better to translate the subject-term by the expression , " everything which is in motion or in movement." This point is also scored by Gérard Verbeke in reference to the cinesiological principle as found in Aristotle. The subject-term of the Aristotelian principle, xtvoúμevov, is to be understood simply as "that which is in motion . " In this way, the principle as a whole comes to mean this : "everything which is in movement is necessarily moved by something distinct from it. " This proposition, as Verbeke makes clear , is not a pure tautology.10 • Metaph., loc. cit. , 582 : An aliquid possit moveri a seipso ? 10 Art. cit., 153 : Si on insiste sur la signification passive de ce sujet, en ce sens qu'il s'agit de réalités qui sont mises en mouvement, qui subissent le mouvement, alors évidemment le principe se réducit à une pure tautologie :

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

35

According to Mitterer, neither does St. Thomas understand the subject of the principle of motion in an exclusively passive sense, the second sense previously explicated . " For the Angelic Doctor attempts to prove the principle.12 Neither do we wish to assert or imply that translaters of St. Thomas or other authors understand the motion proposition according to an analytic or tautological acceptation.¹³ For it can be said in good English : " a thing moves itself, " or " a thing is moved by itself.” Hence the expression, “a thing is moved, " could be non-committal as to whether the thing is moved by another or by itself. But if a thing moves itself, generally or more often we would say, “a thing moves or is moving " Hence the proposition , "a thing is moved," might be construed as embodying a denial of self-motion among its intelligible elements . In this case, of course, nobody would gainsay the principle of motion , for it would be a pure tautology, much like the statement, every effect demands a cause. How useful or useless tautological propositions might be in philosophical argumentation is a matter to be considered . But that such propositions should not be permitted to go unrecognized for what they really are, this is clearly the duty of a philosopher . Hence we ask that our discussion here be not viewed as a jejune belaboring of the obvious. Furthermore, we have introduced this discussion as to translation lest every point of this essay be lost , and lest Scotus be foolishly represented as attacking an analytic proposition . The formula, “everything which is in motion is moved or is being moved by another," is the one, we believe, which brings into clear focus the real problem before us, namely, "whether something can be in motion of itself, " or "whether something can be moved by itself."'14 In other words, are the agent and recipient of motion always and necessarily two distinct things ? The cinesiological principle which gives an affirmative answer to this question is the precise proposition which Duns Scotus knows and rejects. It is the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved . Another item to be cleared up here is Scotus ' understanding of the term ' motion, ' Is motion to be taken in the Aristotelian sense and thus ce qui est mis en mouvement, l'est évidemment par quelque chose. Mais telle n'est pas nécessairement la signification à donner au terme xivousvoV: il peut signifier simplement ce qui est en mouvement, ce qui se meut; alors le principe énoncé prend un tout autre sens ; il veut dire que tout ce qui est en mouvement, est nécessairement mû par quelque chose , distinct de lui. 11 Art. cit., 481-83 . 12 Ibid. , 487-96. 13 The authors more particularly contemplated are those referred to in footnote 7. 14 Metaph., loc. cit.

36

r Chapte II

be restricted to bodies, 15 or is it to be taken more broadly in the Platonic sense and thus be inclusive of such spiritual activities as intellection and volition? In this , Scotus accomodates himself to the variant opinions of his contemporaries. Henry of Ghent, 16 for example , holds to the motion principle but restricts it to bodies. Godfrey of Fontaines, however, gives it much broader meaning and applies it to purely spiritual activities.17 Now while Scotus is opposed to the cinesiological principle even in a restricted Aristotelian acceptation, nonetheless, he makes particular considerations according to the diverse meanings of the word 'motion.' Hence there is discussion of the principle in reference to physical motion and according to all four of the famed Aristotelian divisions of this concept . The motion principle, therefore , is considered as referring to local motion. The question discussed here is, can something move itself locally ? The cinesiological principle is viewed as referring to quantitative and qualitative change . The questions investigated are : can a thing change itself quantitatively, and can a thing change itself qualitatively ? Local motion, quantitative and qualitative change are instances of accidental change. Consideration is also made of the principle in reference to substantial change. Finally, the motion statement is scrutinized in reference to acts of the intellect and will . Accordingly, it is inquired whether the intellect and will are active potencies . 15 Although an independent thinker of great stature, Scotus is conditioned by his times and thinks in the tradition of Greek philosophy . Thus he accepts the Aristotelian divisions of motion or motus (Op . Oxon . , IV d. 1o q. 6, XVII 263 ) and describes motion in terms of potency and act. In his commentary on the Metaphysics ( IX q . 2 , VII 539) , special insistence is made that the potentiality of motion is subjective potency. But for Duns Scotus, as we shall see in Chapter III , analyses of motion in terms of potency and act do not justify the cinesiological principle. 16 Henry of Ghent, op. cit. , X q. 9 , 166 : Unde quandocumque Philosophi probant, quod nihil seipsum per seipsum movet, loquuntur de motu in corporalibus proprie dicto, propter quod dicta ipsorum circa illa non valent ad propositum circa voluntatem, nec omnino consimiliter movet voluntas seipsum, & grave, aut leve, sed multo verius . Et secundum hoc omnes rationes, quas Aristot . indicit primo de anima contra Platonem, quod anima est seipsam movens, quae veritatem concludunt in motibus corporalibus, primo modo dictis : in motibus autem spiritualibus tertio modo dictis nihil omnino concludunt, . . . ; Santeler, J., op. cit. , 20 : Damit wird das aristotelische Bewegungsprinzip bewußt auf das Gebiet der Körperbewegung beschränkt. Scotus refers to the Ghentian distinction in various places. Cf. , e. g., Op. Oxon. , II d . 25 q . un. , XIII 207. 17 Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, loc. cit. , 20 : Unde quod dicitur ab aliquibus quod ita est in corporalibus ubi vere est actio et passio quae sunt motus, qui est actus entis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi, scilicet quod nihil est activum respectu sui ipsius, non autem est ita in aliis, ubi est operatio perfecta et tota simul entis în actu secundum quod in actu, non valet. Cf. also J. Santeler, op. cit., 20.

The Position of Duns Scotus in general 377 These considerations of the motion principle in reference to particular areas of reality will be taken up in Chapter IV of this dissertation. Presently, we are more concerned with the principle in general, viewed according to broader doctrinal elements and argumentation . Hence the term ' motion ' is first taken in the broad so as to include all the various kinds of motion previously indicated . The cinesiological principle asserts that everything which is in motion is moved by another. Scotus is first of all opposed to the universal character of this proposition, and hence he rejects the universal denial of self-motion which this proposition implies. It is his position that some things can be in motion of themselves. Just as the word 'every' is to be stressed in his rejection of the cinesiological statement, so the word ' some ' is to be stressed in his positive defense of self-motion.18 2. Delimitation of the Sphere of Self-motion . While the Scotistic insistence on self-motion might in some respects be similar to the Leibnitzian theory of immanent activity, still it is quite different . For according to Scotus, the sphere of self-motion has definite limits. In a general way, its sphere can be marked out by means of two negative propositions. Then two more positive delimitations will be submitted . i) First, the terminus of self-motion can never be a new substantial form . For as often as a subject receives a new substantial form, the resultant substantial unity must needs be more perfect than the prior entity of the recipient . But the more perfect, in its totality at least, cannot be caused by the less perfect , and hence new substantial unities are not the realizations of self-motion.19 This delimitation of the area of self-activity clearly shows that Scotus, in the elaboration of his thought, is conscious of the principle of causality. ii) Secondly, self-activity can never be an instance of univocal causality, the causality which obtains, for example, between a father and the son he generates. Such is the case, because a univocal cause, according the Scotus , is one which induces in a subject a form which is of the same specific nature as the form or principium quo of the agent's activity. In univocal activity, therefore, the principium quo and 18 Metaph. , loc. cit. , 584 : Hic sic est procedendum , sicut illa positio tenet universalem negativam, et ex hoc concedit quaecumque videntur sequi ; ita primo ostendendum est generaliter, quod aliquid potest agere in se quod est contradictorium illius universalis , et deinde in speciali , in quibus particularis illa habeat veritatem . 19 Ibid., 586. In Op . Oxon . , II d . 2 q . 10, II 529-30, the impossibility of substantial change being an instance of immanent activity is explained in terms of potency and act . This is taken up in Ch. III .

38

Chapter II

the terminus of the activity are of the same specific nature but numerically distinct. Hence univocal activity cannot be self-motion, since such would imply that the subject simultaneously has and does not have a form of the same specific nature.20 (1 ) On the positive side , self-motion must always flow from a principle which is by nature capable of self-motion , and a particular kind of selfmotion demands a particular kind of nature . The self-moving being , moreover, must have a double capability : the one active, the other passive. It must be endowed with an active power or form which can cause some perfection , and it must also have the capacity to receive the very perfection it actively causes . The will, for example, can move or determine itself, because it is an active principle of acts of volition, and at the same time, it is a natural subject of these acts. Water can cool itself, because it is an active principle of this alteration, and it is a natural subject of the quality of coldness. For the same reasons , a living being can warm itself and make itself grow. Wood, however, cannot heat itself, because it is repugnant to the nature of wood that it contains the active power of this qualitative change . Wood, however, does possess the passive capacity to receive heat from another. The sun , according to the ancient and medieval view, cannot make itself warm, not because it lacks the power to heat things, but because as an incorruptible substance, it has no capacity for warmth , which is a quality of terrestrial bodies.21 20 Ord. , loc. cit. , 303-04 : Cum probatur quod ' possibilis' non potest respondeo quod habere causalitatem aliquam , quia ‘ nihil idem agit in se,' illa propositio non est vera nisi de agente univoco, nec illa probatio eius quod tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia' concludit nisi quando agens agit univoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit ; si enim sic aliquid ageret in se, ergo haberet simul ' formam eiusdem rationis ad quam movetur, ' et dum movetur ad illam, careret illa ; ergo simul haberet illam et non haberet, -- saltem hoc sequitur de duabus formis eiusdem speciei, vel de eadem. Cf. also Metaph . , loc. cit.; Quod. , loc. cit. , 178. 21 Metaph., loc . cit. , : Ex istis descendendo in generali patet, quod dicta ratio non probat idem posse in se agere, nisi actione aequivoca, et hoc quando est capax formae, quae nata est terminare actionem aequivocam formae activae jam habitae ; Addit. mag., lo. cit. , 290-91 : Item sequeretur quod nihil quod est causativum alicuius formae esset receptivum illius, quod falsum est, quia vivum continet virtualiter calorem et tamen est receptivum caloris . Item, sequeretur quod nihil aliquale virtualiter esset capax illius perfectionis , quod falsum est, quia natura dedit entibus virtutem per quam possunt acquirere suas perfectiones, ut virtutem augmentativam per quam acquirunt debitam quantitatem, Quodl. , loc. cit. , 179 : Exemplum, Sol est calidus virtualiter, et tamen non potest recipere calorem formaliter, ... huius autem repugnantiae causa communis est Soli et Saturno, quia corpus caeleste non est receptivum qualitatis elementaris , vel cujuscumque corporis corruptibilis, sicut nec e converso. Sic in proposito, aliquod mobile ad formam concomitanter habet aliquid, propter quod

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

39

Whether a thing can move itself or not is generally to be determined on the basis of experience . Later on this basis, it will become increasingly clear that some things, in fact , many things are capable of self-motion, and different things are capable of different kinds of self-motion . This first positive requirement for self-motion , namely, a natural capacity for this type of activity , appears to be such an obvious matter. None the less, it is important . With it at hand, Scotus can readily answer various objections against his position . (2) Secondly, on the positive side, self-motion must always be an instance of equivocal activity . This follows from the second negative delimitation given above . An equivocal cause is one which induces in a subject a form which is not of the same nature as the active form of the agent. The form or principium quo of the agent is different in nature from the form which is effected.22 To make clear the sphere of equivocal activity, it will be serviceable to indicate some of its genera . The latter will be considered at greater length later. Growth, which is an increase in quantity, is always to be placed within the sphere of equivocal activity. For quantity is a passive modification of a substance . Bythis very fact alone, we know that it is different in nature from the active form which produces it . Local motion, likewise, is always an instance of equivocal activity. For the accident of place is not an active form.23 Also many alterations or qualitative changes are the result of equivocal activity . This holds absolutely in reference to passive qualities, such as hardness and softness . Every repugnat sibi virtualiter continere eam, sicut lignum habet aliquid, propter quod repugnat sibi virtualiter continere calorem, sed hoc non est, quia est receptivum caloris, sed quia habet talem formam mixtam . Cf. also Ord . loc. cit. , 305-06. 22 Ibid., 302 : In agentibus autem aequivoce, id est, in illis agentibus quae non agunt per formam eiusdem rationis cum illa ad quam agunt, propositio illa, quod nihil movet se, non habet necessitatem . Cf. also Quodl., loc. cit., 178 ; Metaph. , loc cit., 586. 23 Ibid. Patet tertio, quod omnis augmentatio sit ab agente aequivoco , quia quantitas non est forma activa ex 6. quaestione supra ; omnis etiam motus ad ubi est a movente aequivoco propter idem, quia scilicet nullum ubi est forma activa ; Ord. , loc . cit. , 304-05 : In quantitate autem et ' ubi' nullum est agens univocum , quia in genere quantitatis et ' ubi ' nulla forma est quae sit principium inducendi similem formam, immo - ut generaliter dicatur -- quicumque motus est ' non ad formam activam, ' non est ab agente univoco, quia ex quo forma terminans non est activa, nulla eiusdem rationis est principium agendi ; Quodl. , loc . cit. , 178 : Respondeo , omnis actio, quae est ad formam non activam, est agentis aequivoci , et non univoci, quia si agens esset univocum, forma, qua agit, esset ejusdem rationis cum forma terminante, et illa esset activa. Augmentationum autem et multarum alterationum, et communiter motus localis, termini non sunt formae activae ; igitur movens in istis et universaliter agens aequivocum est in actu aliquo non ejusdem rationis cum termino ad quem mobile est in potentia , . . .

40

Chapter II

quality, moreover, can derive from an equivocal agent, although as a matter of fact, some may have their source in univocal causality.24 The acquisitions of new positions in place, growth, and qualitative change are all at least possible instances of equivocal causality, and later this point will be pressed in showing that they are or can be instances of self-motion . Summarily then, self-motion rests on these two conditions . First , the agent must have a capacity for self-motion ; it must have the capacity to receive the very perfection it can actively cause. Secondly, the agent must be a principle of equivocal activity . These two conditions , moreover, must be verified in conjunction.25 3. The Possibility of Self-motion . After marking out the sphere in which instances of self-motion can be found, we will now take up some general argumentation in its defense . In this, Scotus is much concerned with showing the very possibility of self-motion, since this is denied by Godfrey of Fontaines.26 The possibility of self-motion appears evident from facts of experience. Fire, for example, always goes up or rises . It does not, as in the case of a heavy body, go downward. This tendency of fire to rise is known as its lightness, and this lightness postulates a form, substantial or accidental, intrinsic to the fire and which accounts for its invariable upward ascent . While fire is given this form by its original generating cause, still once the form is given, fire makes itself rise. In this we see that fire is both the active and the passive principle of its upward ascent, and therefore, fire moves itself.27

24 Metaph., loc . cit. , 587 : Multae etiam alterationes sunt ab aequivoco › ut universaliter illae, quae sunt ad qualitates non activas, . .. Omnis etiam qualitas potest esse ab agente aequivoco, licet aliqua possit esse ab univoco . Cf. Quodl. , loc. cit. 25 Metaph. , loc . cit. , 586 : Et ita tenendum est regulariter, quod solum et universaliter tunc potest aliquid in se agere, quando duo ista concurrunt, scilicet quod habet formam, quae est principium agendi aequivoce, et quando cum hoc est capax termini talis actionis. 26 Godfrey of Fontaines, op . cit. , 18-19 : Ad hoc posset faciliter responderi et ex ratione activi et passivi ut ad invicem secundum suas diffinitiones vel descriptiones comparantur, ex ratione potentiae quae convenit passivo , et ex ratione actus qui convenit activo. 27 Metaph. , loc. cit . , 585 : ... multi sunt effectus nati produci ab activo aequivoco et non univoco, patet de levitate in igne generato ; illam formam aequivocam oportet ponere, aut formam substantiae, aut aliam aliquam qualitatem ; ergo habens illam activam per se est levificativum, ut ita loquar, potest autem ista forma esse in aliquo levificabili . Patet in exemplo praedicto, quaecumque enim forma in generante poneretur activa respectu levitatis, eadem est in igne genito, et prior est naturaliter ipsa levitate. Patet, quia est principium ejus activum ; ergo non est contradictio, quod ipsa insit generato, levificante non inexistente, et patet quod potest inesse illi , quare idem sine contradictione potest esse levificativum et levificabile.

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

4I

Self-motion demands that one and the same thing can be both active and passive in reference to one and the same perfection . In the case of fire, it is clear that this situation is fully possible, for it is given as a fact. This possibility also becomes evident from a consideration of the notions of active and passive principle. Viewed in relation to a passive principle, an active principle is one which can reduce to act that which can be reduced to act . A passive principle, viewed in relation to an active principle, is one which can be reduced to act or given some new perfection by an active principle. 28 Here we can think of a sculptor, who makes a block of marble into a statue. The marble, which is the passive principle, is given the act or perfection of being a statue by the sculptor, the active agent . Now there is nothing in the bare notions of active and passive principle to forbid that one and the same thing be active and passive in reference to one and the same perfection . Thus the two notions do not necessarily exclude self-motion . On the contrary, they fully allow, for example, that the will be the passive principle of the very act of volition which the faculty actively causes . For an active principle reduces to act that which can be reduced to act . The primary object of the active is the passive in general, and not some particular kind of passive principle. If some particular active principle cannot reduce a particular passive principle to act, the reason for this impossibility does not flow from the nature of either an active or passive principle as such . Some other and more particular explanation must be sought, such as the particular nature of the two principles involved.29 28 A more complete consideration of the active and the passive will be made later, when we probe the notions of active and passive potency. Cf. Ch . III 77-80. 29 Metaph., loc. cit., 584-85 : Primum probatur, activum quodcumque pro primo objecto respicit passivum tale, non hoc passivum, verbi gratia, tam calefactivum in communi, quam quodcumque calefactivum pro primo objecto respicit calefactibile in communi, non hoc vel illud ; similiter e contrario, passivum ut calefactibile, et hoc sive in communi, sive quodcumque calefactibile respicit pro primo objecto calefactivum , non hoc vel illud, sed in communi. Ex his sequitur, quod quodlibet contentum sub primo objecto alicuius, sit per se objectum ejusdem ; quodcumque calefactivum respicit quodcumque calefactibile pro per se objecto, et è converso, quodcumque calefactibile, quodcumque calefactivum ; Scotus spares no pain to show the conceptual possibility of the simultaneous verification of the active and the passive in the same subject . He argues this possibility along the following lines . X is active , because it produces effect A. Both X and Y can produce effect A. But it is also possible that X is passive in reference to A. No difficulty is encountered here, if we say that X is passive in reference to effect A, which effect is produced by Y. However, there is no repugnance in this that X itself is the very agent of the act A which it receives as a passive principle . For the per se object of X

42

Chapter II More briefly, the argument of Scotus may be put this way. The

primary object of the active in general is the passive in general. Thus any passive principle is per se an object of the active as such . Hence contrary to Godfrey of Fontaines, there is no a priori impossibility in this, that a particular thing is both active and passive in reference to one and the same particular act. Accordingly, therefore, it is a priori possible that a thing is the active principle of the very act it receives, and thus, self-motion is possible. 4. The Requirement of Propinquity. According to the concepts involved, one and the same thing can be active and passive in reference to the same act or perfection . Thus on this score, self-motion may be admitted to be possible . Godfrey of Fontaines, however, appeals to the authority of Aristotle and contests its possibility on still another ground . An active principle must always be sufficiently close to the passive principle upon which it is to work. In other words, the agent must have contact with the passive principle. A sculptor, for example, cannot chisel a piece of marble into a finished statue, unless he can touch the marble with his instruments and has contact with it . But this requirement of propinquity or contact clearly implies that the agent and patient , whether material or immaterial, are distinct entities. But selfmotion admitted, this necessary distinction of agent and patient would go by the board.30 Although Duns Scotus admits the possibility of action at a distance, ³¹ he does not invoke this thoery in answer to Godfrey of Fontaines . This would complicate matters and is not necessary, for the argumentation of the Belgian philosopher is defective on other scores. First, it would deny that a heat-productive form, when actually present in water, would heat the water. Such a denial appears gratuitous. Secondly, Scotus points out the reason why propinquity is sometimes required : distance can prevent the power of the agent from attaining as an active principle of A is any passive principle which can receive A. Since X can receive A, there is no reason why X as an active potency cannot elicit A, the very act which it receives, since A belongs to the primary object of X. Cf. ibid. , 585. 30 Godfrey of Fontaines, op . cit., 19 : Item, alia condicio : quia agens debet contingere patiens ; unde secundum Philosophum, primo de Generatione, agens et patiens non appropinquata sibi ipsis non sunt nata facere et pati . Istae autem condiciones non possunt convenire uni et eidem, neque in materialibus, neque in immaterialibus . Cf. also Duns Scotus, op. cit., loc . cit. 31 Wolter, Allan, Select Problems in the Philosophy of Nature (pro manuscripto : St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1952 ) 245 : Many great scholastics admitted the possibility of action at a distance. Scotus, for instance, employs this notion to explain how angels communicate their thoughts to one another.

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

43

the passive object . But if agent and patient are identical, there is absolutely no problem of overcoming any distance . In a sense , the passive object is more available and more present to the agent, when these two principles are found in the same thing than when they are two distinct things, however close they might be . Furthermore, when the two principles are found in the same thing, the agent would seem to attain its passive object more perfectly, and hence it would be the cause of the effect in a more eminent way.32 Clearly, the requirement of propinquity must be modified . Propinquity is necessary, only if greater presence is impossible. But in the case of self-motion, greater presence is given, for the active and the passive in reference to one and the same perfection are identified in the same thing . 5. Self-motion and the Principle of Causality . One and the same thing, according to Scotus, can be both active and passive in reference to the same act or perfection . Why is contradiction so readily but gratuitously read into this statement ? Because verbally, Scotus suggests, it is akin to the principle that the same thing cannot be cause and caused according to the same respect, that is, a thing cannot actively cause itself.33 Here it should be recalled that self-motion is restricted to an equivocal agent which, by its nature, is capable of causing a particular act . Since the agent is an equivocal cause, it causes a form or act different in nature from its own form. Clearly then , the agent does not cause itself, as it is already in existence, and the act which is caused by the active form is both distinct from and different in nature from it. The

32 Metaph. , loc. cit., 585 : ... approximatio haec non videtur necessaria ad agendum, ut includit distinctionem situs, nisi quando major praesentia non est possibilis inter activum et passivum ; si enim haec praesentia sufficit, multo magis major praesentia sufficeret. Quod probatur dupliciter, primo ducendo ad inconveniens, alioquin si poneretur ignis inexistens aquae, non calefaceret aquam , Secundo probatur idem ex causa, quia non oportet agens esse praesens patienti, nisi quia virtus agentis non potest attingere improportionaliter distans, ut ibi aliquid efficiat . Quod si passum secum esset, nonne perfectius attingeretur a virtute agentis ? Hoc ergo supposito arguitur ultra, cum idem verius est sibi praesens, si est activum et passivum secundum idem, quam aliud posset esse praesens ; ita verissime salvatur illa conditio propter quam appropinquatio requiritur, quando major praesentia esse non potest ; ergo verissime est actio; Op. Oxon. , II d. 2 q . 10, XI 528 : ... et si ipsummet sit receptivum illius actionis vel effectus aequivoci, et carens eo ex quo est maxime approximatum et proportionatum sibi ipsi , non solum poterit causare effectum illum in alio, imo summe causabit istum effectum in seipso. 33 Metaph., loc . cit . , 586 : Sed tantum videtur inconveniens idem respectu ejusdem, secundum idem esse activum et passivum, sicut idem respectu sui, quia in aliis est simile, quod sicut nihil est causa sui, ita nec circulus est possibilis in causis, ut idem respectu ejusdem sit causa et causatum ; ergo si primum possibile sit, et secundum etiam.

...

Chapter II

44

will, for example, does not cause itself, but it does cause an act of willing, which is both really distinct from and different in nature from the faculty. It is very clear, therefore, that Duns Scotus distinguishes the principle of causality from that of motion. Nor is any of his criticism of the latter directed against the former . Under the influence of Scotus, as was pointed out, Hervaeus Natalis carefully notes this distinction of the two principles, for he takes great pains to show that the various objections which can be leveled against the cinesiological proof for the existence of God with its governing principle, - these objections do not hold against the proof for God's existence from efficient causality.34 It is also interesting to note here that there is no confusion of the two principles in St. Thomas. For as Mitterer points out, the Angelic Doctor does not view the cinesiological statement as identical with or simply as another formulation of the principle of causality. Nor does he consider the former to be contained in the latter. For the principle of motion does not assert that motion is caused or demands a cause, but rather that the motion received in a particular subject must needs be caused by another and distinct thing . In other words, the agent and recipient of motion must be two distinct subjects.3 Nor is it hardly accurate to consider the cinesiological principle to be simply an application of the causality principle,36 except in the sense that, in the minds of some thinkers, the latter principle supports and justifies the former . Thus in defending the cinesiological principle, Godfrey of Fontaines appeals to the principle of causality.37 Scotus, of

34 Cf. Ch. I 20—21 . 35 Art. cit., 486 : Noch weniger ist der Satz nach Thomas identisch mit dem Gesetz der Kausalität . Denn Thomas kennt noch viele Spezialfälle dieses Gesetzes, z. B.:,,Was (zwar nicht anders wird, aber) wird , ist verursacht“ , ja selbst: ,,Was zwar eventuell ungeworden ist, aber innerlich nur seinsfähig ist, nicht seinsnotwendig, ist verursacht. " Ebensowenig ist der Bewegungssatz bei näherer Betrachtung inhaltlich das Kausalitätsprinzip . Ein Kausalitätsprinzip müßte uns sagen : Das Subjekt eines Bewegtseins oder das Bewegtsein eines Subjektes ist verursacht. Das Wesen des Bewegungssatzes liegt aber nicht in der Behauptung, daß Bewegtsein verursacht sei (das wäre es auch, wenn es vom Subjekt selbst verursacht wäre), sondern in der Behauptung, daß das Bewegtsein eines Subjektes von einem andern Subjekt verursacht sei. 36 D. J. B. Hawkins explains that Aristotle's principle of motion " cannot be simply identified with a metaphysical principle of causality." But he does speak of it as a " specific application whose terms require to be appropriately elucidated . " (The Essentials of Theism [New York, 1950 ] 50. ) 37 Godfrey of Fontaines, op. cit. , 23 : Quia etiam cum totum compositum per se fiat aliquid , licet ratione formae, sicut fit ex toto composito licet ratione materiae, si illud quod est agens esset etiam patiens et subiectum , idem esset causa efficiens sui ipsius. Cf. also Ch. III 81 .

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

45

course, contests the validity of this appeal, although he holds most firmly to the validity of the metaphysical principle of causality itself. 6. Self-motion and the Dignity of Nature. Another and second general argument in favor of self-motion is that from the dignity of nature . A perfection, Scotus argues, should not be absolutely denied of a nature, when such a perfection lends dignity to the nature. A denial, of course, is reasonable when there are grounds for it , otherwise not . For whenever possible, nature follows the better course. Hence creatures are produced without certain perfections, which they later attain through their own activity. Organisms , for example, grow in quantity and acquire new qualities throughout the span of their existence . Souls are created without intellectual and moral habits , which are acquired later. Surely, a greater dignity accrues to these creatures, if they acquire these perfections through their own activity. Hence active potencies in the strict sense are to be admitted, namely, agents which are the recipients of the acts they cause . Hence self-motion is to be admitted.38 7. Self-motion and Unlimited Perfection . Against this argument, various difficulties are urged . First , the principle of safeguarding the dignity of nature would seem to have sweeping results . For one might go further and accord natures every possible perfection . This would certainly enhance their dignity. But it would also be an absurdity . Likewise, if a thing is the cause of its own perfection , why does it not perfect itself all at once and from the start ?39 These difficulties only make it clear that the dignity of nature principle must be handled with care and cannot be pressed beyond reasonable limits. If natures had every possible perfection at once, then they could not cause anything in themselves . But without this causality,

38 Metaph., loc . cit. , 592-93 : In fine generaliter dicitur, quod nulli naturae negandum est aliquid, quod positum perfectionis esset in tali natura, nisi ostendatur aliunde, quod talis perfectio illi non inest, quia semper natura facit quod melius est, quando fuerit possibile, et non defecit in necessariis. Creaturae communiter producuntur in esse, carentes aliqua perfectione, ad quam natae sunt attingere, puta animata communiter in imperfecta quantitate, sine etiam operibus animae ; alia vero quaedam sine qualitatibus propriis, quaedam sine proprio ubi . Si daretur ejus principium activum respectu talis perfectionis ad quam natae sunt , simpliciter essent perfectiores, quia minus ab extrinsecus dependentes , ergo quandocumque non apparet quod talis natura non habet principium activum respectu talis perfectionis, imo magis videtur quod habet, hoc simpliciter concedendum est, quia hoc dignificat naturam . Cf. also Op . Oxon . , II d. 3 q . 11 , XII 272 . 39 Metaph., loc . cit. , 593 : Contra , quare ergo non statim dicuntur perfecta secundum omnem perfectionem possibilem, quia hoc magis dignificaret naturam ?

46

ter II

Chap

they would not have every possible perfection.40 Then because of its limited power as an agent, a nature might be able to realize a particular perfection only by successive acts . Clearly, the dignity of nature principle must be applied in accordance with facts.41 8. Self-motion as a Denial of the Stationary. Self-motion seems to involve another difficulty, namely, a denial of the stationary in nature . For if something were in motion of itself, then it would always be in motion, at least if it were a natural agent . For the activity here would not depend on some other being, since the agent and patient of the activity are numerically identical . If the intellect, for example , were the active cause of its acts of intellection , it would always be eliciting these acts. Now to deny that some things are at times in motion and at times stationary, that they are sometimes actually active and sometimes at rest, is patently false and contradicts the facts of experience.42 In reference to this problem why an agent would ever cease its selfmoving activity once started,

Scotus

gives various

explanations

to cover different cases . First, a natural or non-free agent could cease its motion, simply because the terminus or goal of its activity has been realized . A heavy thing, for example, would no longer move itself once it reached its proper place . But even if some terminus is not attained , a natural agent can be prevented from acting, or it can be impeded in its activity by some stronger and contrary force or power. Boiling water, for example, will not cool itself when actually being heated by fire . Perhaps an agent is not the total cause of its activity but is dependent on some co-principle. If the latter is not given, the agent will not act . A mother, for example, cannot conceive and generate offspring without the active cooperation of a father. The intellect , likewise, cannot elicit the immanent act of knowing an object, if the object is not present . Neither can the will elicit an act of willing except in conjunction with the intellect knowing an object . For the intellect is a co -principle of the will in its volitional acts . If the agent is of itself free and thus able to act or not to act, then the problem of unending motion is completely 40 Ibid.: Si causalitas auferatur, non haberent omnem perfectionem, cujus sunt capaces ; 41 Ibid.: Respondeo, quia natura quaecumque requirit successionem in aliquibus operationibus, propter imperfectionem virtutis agentis respectu effectus producendi . 42 Ibid., 582 : Item, arguitur per rationem , quae innuitur in 2 de Anima, quia tunc semper tale ageret, si est agens naturale, quia actio illa non dependeret ab extra, ex quo idem est agens et passum, consequens patet esse falsum. Cf. also Ord., loc . cit., 245.

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

47

out of the question . The will is such a potency. It can always remain neutral in reference to an object presented by the intellect.43 9. Self-motion and the Ordered Unity of the Universe . To explain the universe as an ordered whole has always been a goal of philosophers . This is particularly true of the great thinkers of Grecian antiquity . Aristotle, for example, taught that the universe is one, and in explaining this unity, the relation of the parts of the universe and its motion, he proposes his famous principle of motion : everything which is in motion . is moved by another.44 Against the background of Aristotelian teaching is to be understood another objection against Scotus, namely, that the admission of selfmotion violates the unity and order of the universe . For this unity and order postulates an inter-relation and interconnection of things which act upon and are acted upon by one another. Such inter- relatedness can only obtain, if distinct things are active and passive in reference to each other.45 Nor is this inter-relation of things adequately maintained, if it is restricted to the production of effects by univocal causes. Inter-relation , interdependence is more strict in the case of a number of essentially ordered, equivocal causes producing an effect.46 But if the theory of self-motion is accepted , a perfection or act caused by an equivocal agent 43 Metaph., loc . cit., 603 : Ad secundum dico, quod habito termino agens non agit non habito etiam et impediri potest ne agat, per virtutem contrariam fortiorem. Si etiam non est tota causa activa, sed aliud cum ipso , si illud aliud non adsit, non agit, si etiam non habet in quod, vel circa quod agat, non aget. Si iterum alia actio naturaliter praesupponatur suae, illa non posita, non aget. Si tandem est liberum ex se, potens non agere, uno istorum sex modorum potest salvari de quocumque motivo , quare non semper movet se. Exemplum primi , grave quando est in centro . Exemplum secundi , aqua bulliens praesente igne calefaciente, non frigefacit se . Exemplum tertii, in cognitivis, tenendo et objectum et potentiam agere . Exemplum quarti et quinti , nihil intelligens nihil vult communiter. Exemplum sexti, intellectu ostendente aliquid , voluntas potest illud non velle, et sic generaliter patet solutio illius argumenti . Cf. also Ord. , loc . cit., 309- II . 44 Meyer, Hans, Abendländische Weltanschauung (Paderborn , 1953) , I 238 : Das Weltgebäude besitzt die Gestalt einer vollkommenen Kugel (De coel . II , 4 ) und ist nur eines . Cf. also O. Hamelin, op. cit. , 353 ff.; A. Sesmat, "L'Univers d'Aristote," Revue de Philosophie, XXXVIII ( 1938 ) 285-309. 45 Metaph., loc . cit. , 593 : Item, natura proportionavit activum et passivum in universo, non semper idem respectu sui, sed aliud respectu alterius , sicut videtur major connexio in rebus, et ita universaliter dabitur respectu perfectionis possibilis in quocumque aliquod agens , sed aliud ab illo possibili. 46 Ibid. Ad secundum, nunquam actio univoca facit connexionem activorum et passivorum in universo ; nec videtur Philosophus ponere tale agens et effectum, essentialiter ordinata respectu talis tertii , sed secundum aequivoce agentia et effectus , est essentialior connexio. Contra, illam aequivocationem ponis in uno, non autem univocationem ; ergo magis tollis connexionem .

r

48

pte

Cha

II

could be received by the very agent itself, and thus different things would not be active and passive in reference to each other. Again, the theory of self-motion seems to have sweeping results . There would be no reason why, as Godfrey of Fontaines argues, everything would not be both the agent and the subject of the various new perfections it could receive . Thus air and wood would respectively be the causes of their own light and heat. The sun and fire would not exercise any causality but would merely be required to be present.47 Scotus does not deny the unity of the universe, in which there are beings of various grades of perfection, and which are related and ordered in the production of effects . Far from it.48 But he thinks that this unity can be explained independently of the principle of motion. As a matter of fact , Scotus presents a well developed theory of partial and essentially ordered causes.49 But fully to explore this theory here would take us too far afield, and it will come up for discussion later. Hence at this juncture we will simply show how the Subtle Doctor fractures the absolute universality of the cinesiological principle by scoring two minor points . These points, of course, are relevant to the argument concerning the ordered unity of the universe. Now granted an ordered universe, at least the last cause, the cause closest to the effect, could be univocal or equivocal . Nor would there be any derogation of order, if the last agent caused immanently or tran47 Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . J. Hoffmans, q. 2, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1924) , IV 21 : Hoc autem, si veritatem habet, videtur posse poni eadem facilitate in uno sicut in alio, dicendo scilicet quod unumquodque quod est in potentia ad aliquem actum secundum formam propriam , est in actu secundum illam non formaliter, sed virtute ; et per hoc unumquodque erit causa effectiva respectu sui ipsius et unumquodque educet se ipsum de potentia in actum, licet hoc ab aliquibus sine ratione et causa speciali specialiter applicetur voluntati vel cuicumque alii . This argument is presented by Duns Scotus in Ord. , I d. 3 p. 3 q. 2, III 257-58 : tunc poneretur quidlibet in se agere et movere se (utpote quod aer ad praesentiam solis illuminaret se et non sol, et lignum ad praesentiam ignis calefacere se et non ignis) , quia non esset unde probaretur aliquid quod sic esset causativum cuiuscumque novi in se existentis, nec obsistens quin quidlibet esset naturaliter causativum cuiuscumque novi in se existentis. Ex istis probationibus dicunt quod agens et patiens distincta sunt subiecto. Cf. also Metaph . , loc. cit.; Op. Oxon . , II d . 25 q. u ., XIII 200 ; Quod., q. 15, XXVI 178 ; Addit. mag., d. 25 q . 1 , ed . Carl Balić, in Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences (Louvain, 1927) , 287. 48 In Ord. , I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1 , II 172-73 , Scotus gives two proofs for the specific unicity of a first eminent being and a first final cause. These proofs are based on the idea that there is one universe. 49 Cf. Reinhold Messner, Schauendes und Begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Skotus (Freiburg, Breisgau, 1942) , 5—18.

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

49

siently. Consequently, not everything in motion is necessarily moved by another, if the universe is to be an ordered whole. 50 Causes, moreover, essentially ordered in producing an effect, each individually exercise a causality of a different order and nature. An efficient and final cause, for example, are two such essentially ordered causes. They each exercise a different kind of causality. Father and mother, likewise, are essentially ordered agents in the production of offspring, although they are both independent of each other as to their proper causality. Now it might be argued in favor of the Scotistic stand , not without the Subtle Doctor's approval, that the different order and nature of these causes could provide an explanation of the unity of the universe . 51 But this argument cannot be pressed too far. For it is possible, according to Scotus, that two essentially ordered causes, a prior and a posterior cause, are verified in one individual substance or even one nature. But still this would not necessarily imply a denial of the unity of the universe . For the condition of such verification would be this : the substance contains within itself the different grades of perfection necessary to cause the effect in question . A particular substance, however, could hardly have the perfection of all essentially ordered causes, for this would be such an absolute perfection that it could not be contained in a secondary and posterior cause . Scotus gives the example of a bull producing offspring with the help of the sun. It would be hard to see how this animal could have, besides its ordinary reproductive powers, the tremendous and added power of the sun. Thus it could not dispense with the co-causality of the sun in producing offspring. Likewise, the generation of a new human being requires the co-causality of man and woman , although absolutely speaking, all reproductive powers 52 could possibly be located in one being.5 50 Metaph., loc . cit.: et ista est essentialis connexio universi forte, sive ultima causa sit univoca, sive aequivoca cum suo effectu . Et haec connexio ita salvatur, ponendo in eodem rationem ultimae causae respectu effectus, sicut ponendo in alio. 51 Ibid.: Respondeo , causae essentialiter ordinatae respectu tertii effectus, alium habent ordinem in causando, ... et ista est essentialis connexio universi forte ; Addit. mag. , loc . cit. , 273-74. 52 Metaph., loc. cit. , 594 : Respondeo, ratio posterioris causae et alicujus prioris bene possunt concurrere in uno supposito, et forte in una natura, si habeat unitive plures gradus perfectionis principiativos ejusdem effectus , licet non sit omnium causarum ordinatarum, quia alicujus illarum ratio tantam perfectionem absolutam requirit, in qua fundetur, quod illa non potest esse in eodem , in quo est alia minor, in qua fundatur ratio secundae causae posterioris . Haec in particularibus exemplis extremis satis patent. Quomodo enim in bove generante possit esse perfectio Solis , secundum quam cooperatur bovi generanti ?

5 Philosophy Series No. 15

50

Chapter II These examples make clear the qualified position Scotus defends ,

namely, that some things can move themselves. This power of self-motion , as has already been pointed out, must be guaranteed a particular being by its nature. According to medieval Aristotelian astrophysics, for example, the sun can warm or make hot terrestrial bodies, but it cannot make itself such . The reason for this is not because one and the same thing cannot be active and passive in reference to the same perfection. For Saturn, which can make bodies cold but not hot, cannot be made hot by some other substance. The reason why Saturn cannot be made hot is also the reason why the sun cannot make itself hot . According to the ancient and medieval view, they are both incorruptible substances, and warmth is a quality of corruptible bodies . 53 The argument, therefore, that if one and the same thing can be active and passive in reference to the same perfection, then wood, for example, would be able to heat itself, - this argument is a fallacy of non causa ut causa . 54 Whether a thing can move itself or not will depend on its nature, and its nature is to be known from experience. 55 Hence self-motion is to be admitted , and its area is to be marked out in accordance with the facts of experience. In the final analysis, the theory of self-motion offers Scotus little difficulty in reference to the structure and unity of the universe. One reason for this seems to be that the Subtle Doctor does not deem it necessary to maintain a highly and rigidly ordered universe . For him, all things outside of God are radically contingent. If certain really distinct things are active and passive in reference to each other, this will be rooted in their natures. But that these natures exist, and that they are the kinds of being they are, this is basically a contingent affair ultimately dependent on the free will of God. Hence their activity in reference to each other can be characterized only by a limited neces53 Ord. I d . 3 p . 3 q . 2 , III 305 : Exemplum : esse calidum virtualiter in actu et in potentia formaliter, de se non includunt contradictionem vel repugnantiam, et ideo in nullo subiecto includunt repugnantiam quod propter hoc non possint esse simul, nec alterum ibi quia alterum ; tamen sol, qui est tamen hoc non est calidus virtualiter, non potest esse calidus formaliter, propter repugnantiam istorum primo, quia saturnus est frigidus virtualiter et tamen non potest esse. 54 Quodl., loc. cit. Sic in proposito, aliquod mobile ad formam concomitanter habet aliquid , propter quod repugnat sibi virtualiter continere eam, sicut lignum habet aliquid, propter quod repugnat sibi virtualiter continere calorem , sed hoc non est, quia est receptivum caloris, sed quia habet talem formam mixtam ; Ord. , loc . cit.: Si arguas ‘ ergo in omnibus posset idem esse in actu virtuali et in potentia ad actum formalem, et ita quidlibet potest movere se,' respondeo quod in ista illatione est non causa ut causa, 55 The role of experience is stressed by Scotus particularly in his treatment of the self-motion of gravia . Cf. Metaph., loc. cit. , 589.

The Position of Duns Scotus in general

51

sity. 56 In this, of course, we witness a notable deviation from Aristotelian and neo-Platonic cosmological determinism . The Scotistic defense of self-motion on the basis of safeguarding the dignity of nature might strike one as a weak argument . No doubt it is not to be rated as one of the more cogent arguments in defense of his position. Scotus' line of thought, however, appears more convincing when it is applied to angels and men, creatures of recognized dignity. One would certainly expect an angel to have the power of local selfmotion . 57 Reflection on the possible implications of a universal and absolute denial of self-motion is also apropos here. Many sixteenth and seventeenth century thinkers make such a denial and accordingly are involved in some form of mechanism. But the sixteenth and seventeenth century theories of a mechanistic universe have been found defective by way of modern biology and physics. Whether medieval proponents of the cinesiological principle altogether escape the disadvantages of mechanism is an issue we will not discuss here . 58 The teaching of Duns Scotus , however, is clear. Matter or a passive principle in general can efficiently cause its own motion . This possibility, moreover, even turns out to be a fact in various instances. Hence much to his credit, the Subtle Doctor does not raise any gratuitous, metaphysical barrier to the now accepted position of modern science that matter is essentially active .

56 Ovd. , I d. 8 p. 2 q. u. , IV 328 : Ad ultimum dico quod nulla est naturalis connexio causae et causati simpliciter necessari in creaturis, nec aliqua causa secunda causat naturaliter simpliciter vel necessario simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid . Cf. Allan Wolter, " Duns Scotus on the Nature of Man's Knowledge of God , " The Review of Metaphysics, I (1947) 6. 57 Op. Oxon., loc . cit. , 204 : Nec est probabile quod animae separatae vel Angeli, nullo modo possint se movere, sed quod starent immobiliter ubicumque ponerentur, ac si essent in carcere ; Op . Oxon . , II d. 2 q . 10, XI 524 ... igitur cum Angelo insit potentia ad ubi, quod potest acquirere per motum, non est imperfectionis in eo, si habeat potentiam activam respectu ejusdem ; imo videtur esse imperfectionis in eo, si non habeat potentiam activam respectu ejusdem, ex quo repugnat aliis entibus minus perfectis, habere talem potentiam activam . 58 Albert Mitterer sees in St. Thomas a kind of morphodynamism, which is expressed in the principle, omne agens agit per suam formam . Matter itself, however, is construed as being completely passive and inert. (Art. cit. , 384-85.)

5.

Chapter III

DOES SELF-MOTION DISSOLVE INTO THE MOVER AND THE MOVED ?

Self-motion appears to be an incontestable fact of experience . In nature we witness so many instances of it, the growth of plants, and the animals almost continuously moving themselves about from place to place. Hence we are forced to ask what is behind this denial of selfmotion. On what basis can one maintain that simply everything which is in motion is being moved by another ? The fact is that an opponent of the self-motion defended by Scotus would not deny that on the level of ordinary experience many things move themselves . He might even, as St. Thomas for example, define life in terms of self-motion.¹ Still his point would be this : the self- motion we know on the level of ordinary experience ultimately and fundamentally breaks down into a mover and a thing moved : a part which actively moves , as for example, the soul of a living being ; and a part which is passively moved, as for example, the body of a living being. "

1 Summa Theologica , Ia q. 18 a . 1 , I 139 : Primo autem dicimus animal vivere quando incipit ex se motum habere ; et tamdiu judicatur animal vivere, quamdiu talis motus in eo apparet ; quando vero jam ex se non habet aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio, tunc dicitur animal mortuum per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent ; Cf. also Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas , tr. Frederick Eckhoff ( St. Louis, 1914 ) , 146. 2 Summa Theologica , Ia q . 76 a. 4 , I 468—69 : . . . ut sic anima secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars mota ; Stufler, Johann, art. cit., 372 : Aber auch bei jenen Dingen, die sich selbst bewegen, ist es, wie Th . bemerkt, leicht einzusehen, daß in ihnen alles was bewegt wird, von einem anderen bewegt wird. Denn es lassen sich in ihnen verschiedene Teile aufzeigen , von denen der eine den andern bewegt, wie z. B. in den sinnlichen Lebewesen der Leib von der Seele bewegt wird. Godfrey of Fontaines, op. cit. , 23-24 : Sed aliquibus videtur quod unum et idem secundum subiectum, in quo tamen est reperire pluralitatem realem, potest esse activum in se ipsum, quia ratione unius secundum rem poterit agere, et ratione alterius secundum rem etiam in ipso existentis poterit pati. Sic enim poterunt salvari praedictae condiciones quae inter agens et patiens requiruntur ; et idem secundum idem non erit agens et patiens . Ĉf. also Anneliese Maier, op. cit. , 143 .

52

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

53

It is for this reason that the Aristotelian cinesiological principle, as was pointed out in Chapter I , is most appropriately called the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved. Self-motion cannot be an ultimate. It necessarily breaks down into two parts, the mover and the moved. There may be many nuances to a philosophical position such as this , and different thinkers will support it according to their own specifications . Godfrey of Fontaines, for example, maintains that active and passive motion must always reside in two really distinct subjects , and not only does this hold in reference to bodily motion, but also in reference to such spiritual activities, as intellection and volition.4 Henry of Ghent, however, defends the immanent character of spiritual activities, such as intellection and volition. More in line with Aristotle, he restricts the cinesiological principle to the sphere of bodies . Only the various forms of corporeal motion and change break down into two parts.5 But to repeat the question just posed, what is the support of these positions which affirm the so called principle of motion , the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved ? Surely, much of this support is a priori and conceptual argumentation , and hence the radical self-motion defended by Scotus is denied not only as a fact but as to its very possibility. In the present chapter, we will follow Scotus , as he expounds and subjects to a severe critique three different lines of conceptual argumentation in defense of the cinesiological principle. The first argument proceeds from the nature of primary motion ; the second , from the incompatibility of potency and act ; the third, from the nature of a real relation between opposites . The study of these arguments, especially that dealing with potency and act, becomes complicated , but in the end , Scotus finds them destitute of necessity and false. That motion might sometimes break down into two parts, Scotus readily admits ; that it necessarily and always does, this he denies . With much emphasis, therefore, the Subtle Doctor disavows the principle of motion (omne quod movetur ab alio movetur) as a metaphysical principle . In this way, the possibility of self-motion , defended in Chapter II , remains intact , and as will be made emphatically clear in Chapter IV, self-motion is to be admitted as a fact, since it is so abundantly testified to in various areas of experience .

3

4 Cf. Ch . I 15-16 ; Ch . II 36 .

5 Cf. Ch. I 15.

Chapter III

54

A) Self-motion and Primary Motion Defenders of the principle of motion, as was previously indicated, readily admit self-motion on the level of experience. But according to varying specifications, their contention is that this self-motion necessarily breaks down into two parts, the movent and the moved . Thus according to St. Thomas, a body can move itself indirectly and in consequence of one of its parts but not primarily through itself. In other words, a body as a whole cannot be simultaneously movent and moved. 1. St. Thomas' Argument from Primary Motion . Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes three ways in which a thing can be moved or changed. First, a thing can be changed incidentally (per accidens) . We say, for example, that a musician is walking . Actually, a particular man is walking, who happens to be a musician. Secondly, a thing is said to be changed absolutely, because one of its parts is changed . This is change secundem partem. It is said, for example, that the body of an animal is restored to health, because a part of it, such as an eye or the breast, is cured of some disease. There is a third way in which a thing is said to be changed . This is primary motion or change (primo et per se) . This type of change is not a motus per accidens . Nor does it take place in consequence of a change effected in some part of the total body . Rather the body as a whole is changed. The distinction of these three motions (motus per accidens, motus secundum partem, and motus primo et per se) is made from the standpoint of the thing moved . Distinctions corresponding to them can be made from the standpoint of the mover. Thus corresponding to primary motion passively viewed (ex parte mobilis) , there is primary motion in an active sense (ex parte moventis ) . A physician, for example, who cures a patient, is a primary mover. Primo et per se, he moves or effects a change in the patient." Now it is St. Thomas' view that a body cannot change itself in this third way, primarily through itself. Thus primary self-motion is excluded. The Angelic Doctor argues for this view in the Summa contra Gentiles. If a thing moves itself, it must needs have the principle of its movement in itself, else it would clearly be moved by another. Again it must be moved primarily, that is, it must be moved by reason of itself and not by reason of its part, as an animal is moved by the movement of its foot, for in the latter way not the whole but the part would be moved by itself, and one part by De Physico Auditu , V 1 , XXII 495. Cf. also Aristotle, Physic., V t. 1 IV 95 (V c. I 224a) .

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

55

another. Again it must be divisible and have parts, since whatever is moved is divisible, as is proved in 6 Phys. These things being supposed, he argues as follows . That which is stated to be moved by itself is moved primarily. Therefore if one of its parts is at rest it follows that the whole is at rest. For if, while one part is at rest, another of its parts were in motion, the whole itself would not be moved primarily, but its part which is in motion while another is at rest. Now nothing that is at rest while another is at rest, is moved by itself : for that which is at rest as a result of another thing being at rest must needs be in motion as a result, of the other's motion, and hence it is not moved by itself. Hence that which was stated to be moved by itself, is not moved by itself. Therefore whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another. " This argument against primary self-motion is presented by Scotus 8 Very briefly, the Scotistic presentations come down

in several places.

to this. Nothing can move itself primarily. For if a thing were to move itself primarily, then it would be at rest when a part of it is at rest, and it would not be at rest when a part of it is at rest . Since primary selfmotion involves such a patent contradiction , it cannot be admitted, and accordingly the principle of motion, the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved, must be accepted. 2. The Application of the Distinction of Primary Mover and a Thing Moved Primarily. The distinction between a primary mover and a thing moved primarily, which is accredited to Aristotle, is interpreted by Scotus as referring to organic beings which act knowingly.10 But in argumentation, this distinction is used more extensively and invoked as a reason for the denial of self-motion in the sphere of non- organic beings, such as heavy or light things and spiritual substances. " While it might be a questionable matter whether St. Thomas applies the distinction to the activities of spiritual substances, his application of the distinction to the motion of inorganic bodies could hardly be doubted.12 ? Tr. English Dominican Fathers (New York, 1924) , I Ch . XIII, I 24. Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, De Physico Auditu, VII 1 , XXII 586-88 . Op . Oxon ., II d . 2 q . 10, XI 523 540-42 ; Metaph., loc. cit., 583 594-95. Cf. Aristotle, Physic., VIII t . 30 IV 167 (VIII c. 4 255a) . 10 Op. Oxon., loc. cit. , 540 : Ad secundum argumentum (b) dico primo ad auctoritatem illam 8 Phys. quod scilicet omne movens per cognitionem dividitur in duo, quorum unum est primo movens, et aliud est primo motum. 11 Ibid. , 523 : et ex hoc sequitur, quod in quocumque corpore movente se, sit talis distinctio, et ex hoc videtur sequi universaliter, quod in quocumque movente se requiratur talis distinctio. Eadem enim videtur incompossibilitas, quod idem non corpus moveat se primo, sicut quod idem corpus moveat se primo ; sed Angelus non dividitur in duo, . .. Cf. also ibid. , 524. 12 As to the physical versus the metaphysical character of St. Thomas' cinesiological principle, we refer the reader back to Ch . I 7—12 . St. Thomas' insistence on the distinction of the mover and the moved in reference to inorganic bodies comes to the fore in his treatment of the problem of gravity. Cf. Ch . IV 107-08.

r Chapte III

56

What in Scotus ' mind is an extended application of the Aristotelian distinction is the first object of his attack.13 Non-organic beings, according to a view of medieval physics, are in their entirety uniform as to their primary act , and also in their entirety are they in potency to secondary acts. Consequently, the distinction between a movent part and a moved part cannot be verified in them. In explaining the natural motion of inorganic bodies, such as the downward motion of a heavy thing, other medieval thinkers do not insist on some mover part in the body but invoke an external mover, such as an agent of generation . This line of thought will be explored later. 14 For the present suffice it to say, Duns Scotus prefers to accord inorganic bodies the power of self-motion . He finds serious difficulties with the theories of other scholastics and believes his own view to be substantiated in experience . In the sphere of organic beings, however, the distinction between primary mover and a thing moved primarily readily merits acceptance . For the moving power of such beings is an organic power or potency . Thus a distinction can be made not only between the soul and the body as mover and a thing moved , but also possibly between two parts of the body itself. One part of the body would be the mover ; another, the thing moved.15 But still the acceptance of the distinction in the sphere of organic bodies does not mean that the evident self-motion of organic beings necessarily dissolves into the mover and the moved. This will be investigated later according to the indications of experience, when we track down such organic activities as nutrition and growth.16 Here we are concerned with the a priori argument stated above, which contends that the admission of primary self-motion involves contradiction , and therefore, it is to be denied de jure and de facto. 3. Two Senses of Primary Motion . Now how does the Subtle Doctor answer this argument which concludes that nothing can move itself 13 Metaph., loc . cit . , 595 : Quia ergo vanum est Aristotelem adducere hic ad conclusionem hanc generaliter probandam, quod nihil movet se, cum in simplicibus motis nihil valeat, sicut in potentiis animae, . . . Cf. also Op . Oxon., loc. cit. , 540 ; Rep. Par. , II d . 25 q . un ., XXIII 122 . 14 Cf. Ch. IV 107—10 . 15 Op. Oxon. , loc . cit. , 540 : . . . quod scilicet omne movens per cognitionem dividitur in duo, quorum unum est primum movens, et aliud est primo motum ; et ratio hujus est, quia potentia motiva tales moventis est potentia organica, ita quod illa requirit non tantum distinctionem inter corpus et animam, sicut inter movens et motum, sed forte in ipso corpore, in quo virtus organica requirit partem corporis moventem distinctam a parte mota . 16 Ch . IV 133-39. Cf. also Rep. Par., loc. cit.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

57

primarily? This answer is worked out by distinguishing two different senses of primary motion. i) First, there is primary motion of the total object, the motus primo et per se spoken of before . This kind of motion obtains when the property of motion belongs to a particular object and to all its parts . When a stone, for example, falls to the ground, it is in primary motion, because the total object and all its parts are in motion. This primary motion of the total object is distinguished against non-primary motion, according to which an object is said to move or change, because a part of the object moves or changes. In this case, the whole object is not in motion . It is said, for example, that a body is restored to health, because a part of it, such as the chest or the stomach, is brought back to health.17 ii) Primary motion is taken in another and altogether different sense, when it signifies the relation between a subject and an attribute which belongs to the subject as such. Risibility, for example, belongs to its subject, man, as such or primarily. Risibility belongs to its subject necessarily and is predicable of every instance of this subject . Man, moreover, is the first subject to which the attribute of risibility belongs. Thus among such possible subjects as living being, animal, man, Greek, and so on, risibility belongs primarily to man alone. This attribute belongs only to man as such . For there are living beings and animals which are not risible, and there are non- Greeks which are risible.18 This relation of a subject to a primary attribute is a kind of causality or motion . Man , for example, is the cause of the property of risibility. Hence this relation is called primary motion of causality, or more precisely, primary motion of qualified causality. It should be noted here that this motion of qualified causality, at least for Duns Scotus, is motion in an analogical sense . Thus it is to be distinguished both from spiritual activity and any kind of corporeal motion . 19 4. Scotus' Answer to the Argument from Primary Motion . After explicating these two meanings of primary motion , primary motion of the total object and primary motion of causality, we can now take up Scotus' answer to the argument under consideration . According to this argument, a thing cannot move itself primarily, because then it would . be at rest when a part of it is at rest, and it would not be at rest when a part of it is at rest . At the most, this argument only shows that a body 17 Op . Oxon., loc. cit . , 540 ; Metaph . loc . cit. , 594. Cf. Aristotle, Physic. , V t. 1 95 (V c. I 224a). 18 Op. Oxon., loc . cit. , 541 ; Metaph. , loc . cit . Cf. Aristotle, Post. Resol., I t. 36-37 (I c. 4 73b- 74a). 19 Cf. Ch . IV 99–101.

58

Chapter III

cannot simultaneously move itself according to both senses of primary self-motion.20 For in the case of primary self-motion of the total object, motion is proper to every part of the object . Motion is present in the body homogeneously, and both as mover and thing moved. Hence as far as primary self-motion according to the total object is concerned , the total object is at rest if a part of it is at rest.21 This, however, is not true in the case of a thing which moves itself according to primary motion of causality. For this motion is not to be denied of an object , because it is not predicable of another object or part of the same object . Man , for example, does not cease to be a primary source of the property of risibility, because risibility is not predicable of a dog or of part of man, as the body alone or the soul alone . For man is the primary source of the property of risibility. He does not cease to be this source, because risibility is not proper to some one part of him. Accordingly, therefore, man does not necessarily " rest" or cease to move (cause some primary attribute) , because one of his parts is "at rest" or is not in motion . The same can be said of a triangle and its essential nature of being a figure with three angles. The relationship of causality and therefore of primary motion does not cease to obtain between the subject ' triangle' and the attribute ' three-angled figure, ' because the latter concept cannot be predicated of a quadrangle or of one particular angle of a triangle. The relation of primary motion obtains, therefore, even if a part of the subject is not in motion.22 According to Duns Scotus, therefore, a contradiction is involved only upon asserting that a body is primarily self-movent according to 20 Op. Oxon., loc . cit. , 541 : Dico tunc quod ratio Aristotelis in principio 7 . bene probat quod nullum corpus movetur a se primo hac duplici primitate simul, . . . Cf. Metaph. , loc . cit. , 595. 21 Op. Oxon., loc. cit .: quia si movetur a se primo, id est, secundum se totum, igitur motus inest cuilibet parti ejus. Consequentia tenet per hoc, quod totum inquantum movens est homogeneum, et moveri est passio homogenea, passio autem homogenea non inest toti primo hac primitate nisi insit cuilibet parti ejus ; sequitur, quod si totum movetur primo hoc modo quod si pars quiescit, totum quiescit. 22 Ibid. Accipiendo autem aliam primitatem causalitatis praecise, si totum movetur à se primo, non removetur hoc praedicatum, quod est moveri ab ipso, propter hoc quod removetur ab aliquo quod non est ipsum, nec removetur ab ipso propter id quod removetur ab aliquo, quod est aliquid ejus. Si enim triangulus habet tres primo hac primitate, non solum non removetur ab eo habere tres, si removetur a quadrangulo qui nihil est ejus, imo etiam non removetur ab eo propter hoc quod removetur a parte trianguli, puta ab hoc angulo vel illo; igitur et moveri non removebitur a toto, cui primo inest hac primitate, etiamsi removeatur a parte ejus, quae pars non est ipsum ; et ideo si totum movetur hac primitate primo, non quiescit ad quietem partis ; . . .

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

59

both senses of primary motion . But this leaves open the possibility of something moving itself according to one or the other of the two kinds of primary self-motion.23 By asserting that a body cannot move itself according to both senses of self-motion, Scotus would effect a harmony of his teaching with Aristotle. Still this assertion must be carefully understood . In fact , it is substantially modified by Scotus, as he treats a secondary but related question which enters the discussion here. 5. A Heavy Body and Primary Motion of Causality. Before concluding his consideration of the argument from primary motion , Scotus posits the question whether a heavy thing can be accorded primary motion according to the second meaning of this term.24 Admittedly, primary motion of the total object is proper to a heavy thing. When a heavy thing, as a stone for example, falls downward, the whole stone is in motion. According to Scotus, moreover, the stone itself is the active cause of this physical, downward motion.25 At the same time, however, downward motion flows from the nature of a heavy object , as a property flows from its essence . The relationship between a heavy thing and downward motion is much the same as the relation between man and risibility. Hence the significance of the question posed : granted that a heavy thing can move itself according to primary motion of the total object, can it also move itself according to primary motion of causality ? Duns Scotus works towards an answer to this question by distinguishing three complex concepts : 1) (a) downward motion in general of (b) heaviness or gravity in general ; 2) (a) the total concrete downward motion of (b) a particular total heavy thing; 3) (a) the concrete downward motion of (b) a particular part of a total heavy thing. Downward motion in general (1 —a) is a property of heaviness or gravity in general ( 1 -b) . Gravity is the primary source or cause of downward motion . Hence the relationship of primary motion of causality obtains between gravity in general (1- b) and downward motion in general ( -a) . 23 Ibid.... impossibile igitur est totum moveri primo utraque primitate simul, et includit contradictionem, sicut contradictio sequitur, tamen altera primitate praecise, potest aliquod totum moveri a se primo. 24 Ibid. Sed numquid convenit gravi primo moveri deorsum primitate secundo modo dicta ? 25 The question of self-motion in regard to light and heavy bodies is considered at length in Ch . IV 103-28.

60

Chapter III Concept (2 -a) , total concrete downward motion, is also a property

of a particular total heavy thing. Hence the relation of primary motion of causality obtains here also.

Concept (3 - a), concrete downward motion , is a property of concept (3—b) , a particular part of a total heavy thing . And here likewise obtains the relation of primary motion of causality.26 It should also be noted here that concept (1) is predicable of concepts (2 ) and (3) . ( 1 ) is common to (2) and (3) . For the total downward motion of a total heavy body and the downward motion of a part of the body are both instances of downward motion in general. They are homogeneous properties of homogeneous subjects . But concept ( 1 ) , downward motion which is common to both a total heavy thing and a part of it, - this motion is not proper to the total heavy body according to primary motion of causality . For if this motion were proper to the total heavy body in this way, it would not be denied of the total body, even if a part of the body were not in motion . Nevertheless , downward motion must be denied of the total object, if a part of it is not in motion ; for downward motion is proper to a heavy body also according to primary motion of the total object. According to this kind of motion , the total body is at rest, if a part of it is at rest . Hence downward motion as common to both a total heavy body and a part of it is not proper to the total body according to primary motion of causality. This motion , concept (1 ) , is proper to the total body according to primary motion of the total object.27 Before it was stated that the total heavy body is a primary cause of the total motion of the body. But is this statement really true ? For 26 Op. Oxon., loc. cit .: Dico quod possumus loqui de moveri deorsum in communi , vel de hoc moveri , quod convenit huic toti gravi, vel de parte hujus moveri, quod convenit partibus gravis . . . . et sicut moveri deorsum naturaliter in communi inest primo primitate causalitatis praecise gravi in communi, ita hoc moveri totale inest huic gravi totali simili primitate, et hoc moveri partiale quod est pars hujus moveri totalis, inest parti hujus gravis simili primitate ; 27 Ibid. , 541-42 : Et dico quod sicut totum grave et pars gravis sunt homogenea in gravitate, ita moveri totale quod est passio totalis totius, et moveri partiale quod est passio partis, sunt moveri ejusdem rationis ; . . . non ergo hoc totum homogeneum grave movetur a se primo, ita quod moveri, ut est commune sibi , cuilibet parti ejus insit sibi primo secundum hanc primitatem, et quia tunc non removeretur a toto, etsi removeretur a parte . Hoc autem est falsum, propter aliam primitatem necessario concurrentem cum ista, si ista ponatur in subjecto homogeneo respectu passionis homogeneae. Tamen grave etiam hac primitate causalitatis, videlicet praecisae, movetur hac motione , et verum est, quod haec motio totalis non removeretur a totali gravi, propter hoc quod removeretur haec motio totalis a quocumque movetur hac motione totali , nec propter hoc removetur haec motio totalis ab hoc gravi totali.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

61

according to primary motion of causality, motion is not to be denied of a subject, because it is denied of a part of the subject . But if motion is denied of a part of a heavy body, surely, total motion must be denied of the total body. The total heavy body, therefore, is not the primary cause of the total motion of the body.28 In reference to this objection, it is to be noted that we are dealing here with a homogeneous property of a homogeneous subject . The total, homogeneous motion of the body presupposes and depends upon the homogeneous motion of the parts, just as the homogeneous totality itself presupposes and depends on its homogeneous parts. Without the parts, there is no totality ; without the motion of the parts, there is no total motion. But if the parts are granted, and if all the parts are also granted to be in motion, then the total heavy body is the primary cause of the total motion . For if each heavy part is the cause of its own motion, what is the cause of the motion of the total body but the parts themselves taken cumulatively. But all the parts together constitute the total body.29 A position which insists that total motion cannot be proper to a total object according to primary motion of causality on the basis of the previous objection,

such a position would seem to make the

assumption that "whatever is proper to something primarily, that is, according to causality precisely taken, is not denied of it, because something which is not that predicate is denied of something which is not that subject . " This proposition , however, is false in every instance, where a particular subject has a prior subject , and a particular property has a prior property. If a prior property is denied of a prior subject, then a posterior property is to be denied of a posterior subject . Hence in the case before us, if downward motion is denied of part of a total body, then total downward motion must be denied of a total body, because a part and its motion are prior to the total body and its total motion.30 28 Ibid., 542 : Sed objicies, quod saltem removetur a toto gravi motio totalis , si a parte ejus removeatur motio partialis ; ergo motio totalis non inest toti primo causalitate praecisae, vel primitate causalitatis praecisae, quia si sic inesset, nullo modo removeretur ab ipso propter remotionem alicujus alterius praedicati ab eo, quod non est ipsum. 29 Ibid.: Respondeo et dico, quod hoc totale grave, inquantum est tale homogeneum , est ex partibus similibus, et partes istae sunt priores aliquo modo ipso toto, ita quod destructis istis in ratione partium, non manet totum ; ita dico quod non est inconveniens, quod eis insint suae passiones, ut motiones partiales, et quodammodo priusquam motio totalis conveniat ipsi toti, quia et motio totalis componitur ex partium motionibus partialibus, sicut totum grave ex partibus gravis, ... 30 Ibid... et tunc nego hanc propositionem assumptam : Quod convenit alicui primo, id est, secundum causalitatem praecisam, non removetur

62

Chapter III

6. A Summary of Scotus ' Answer. The Scotistic answer to the argument from primary motion might be summarized thus. Bodies are capable of primary self-motion. However, the simultaneous concurrence of primary motion of the total object and primary motion of causality in one and the same total body is impossible. But this impossibility maintains, only if the motion is viewed as common to both the total body and its parts. The total motion of a total body, however, is a primary attribute of the total body, and hence from this standpoint, primary motion of causality can be verified in a body along with primary motion of the total object . In this way, the simultaneous concurrence of the two kinds of primary motion in one and the same body is possible and does not necessarily involve a contradiction. Scotus' answer to the argument from primary motion is undeniably complicated. To a large extent, we believe, this complication arises from his effort not to disagree, verbally at least, with Aristotle.31 But the solidity and penetrating character of Scotus ' thought here can hardly be contested . It might well serve as a source for a modern student who would prefer to give the argument against primary self-motion a more straightforward answer. Before concluding our present consideration , it should be noted again that the argument from primary motion is irrelevant to the selfmotion or immanent activity of spiritual beings, such as the human soul and an angel . At the most , this argument can present difficulties in reference to the self-motion of bodies, for in this area, primary motion of the total object has possible application . But primary motion of the total object, motion which belongs to an object and all its parts, so that the whole is at rest, if a part is at rest , clearly, this kind of primary motion has no application in reference to spiritual beings, since the latter are not composed of parts. Hence the objection from primary motion is necessarily invalid as an argument to support the thesis of the universal denial of self-motion as a fact and as to its possibility. B) Self-motion and the Concepts of Potency and Act Another argument which supports the breakdown of motion into a movent part and a moved part appeals to the concepts of potency and ab eo, quia aliquid quod non est illud praedicatum, removetur ab aliquo, quod non est ipsum subjectum. Haec enim propositio est falsa universalíter, ubi subjectum habet subjectum prius, et passio passionem priorem, tunc enim ad remotionem prioris passionis a priori subjecto, sequitur passionem posteriorem removeri a posteriori subjecto ; ... 31 Scotus' concern for agreement with Aristotle is particularly evident in Metaph., loc . cit. , 594-95.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

63

act. Without question, this is the most celebrated argumentation for the principle of motion. It is rehearsed several times in various passages of Scotus,32 and it is offered as valid by such eminent thinkers as Averroes, St. Thomas ,34 and Godfrey of Fontaines.35 In fact, while St. Thomas attempts to prove the principle of motion in various ways, his proof based on potency and act is considered the most cogent of all and is viewed as giving the cinesiological principle an unimpeachable metaphysical character.36 Some authors, whether rightly or wrongly, dismiss the motion principle on the basis of a conflict with modern science.37 While Duns Scotus would disprove the principle by appeals to experience and the science of his day, still at the same time, he attacks the principle head on by way of metaphysical argumentation . Accordingly, the famous argument from potency and act is subjected to a severe critique, which proceeds by way of a painstaking analysis of the metaphysical concepts involved. The argument for the cinesiological principle from the concepts of potency and act can be read in various authors. Here we will set up the argument at it is found in several passages of Scotus. One and the same thing cannot simultaneously be a mover and a thing moved . For a mover moves only insofar as it is in act , but a thing is moved insofar as it is in potency. But it is impossible that the same thing is simultaneously in potency and act according to the same aspect. Because of this incompatibility of potency and act , self-motion cannot be admitted.38 32 Op. Oxon., loc . cit., 523 ; Op . Oxon . , II d . 25 q. un. , XIII 199 ; Ord., loc. cit., 257 ; Metaph . , loc. cit., 583 ; Rep. Par., Pro. q. 1 , XXII 13 ; Addit. mag., loc. cit. , 286. 33 Epitomes in Libros Metaph . , tr. 4, VII 181 ; Physic. , VIII com. 30, IV 167 . 34 Summa Theologica, Ia q . 2 a. 3 , I 18 : Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur : nihil enim movetur nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur ; movet autem aliquid , secundum quod est actu ; ... Non autem possibile est quod idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa ; . . . Impossibile est ergo quod idem , et eodem motu, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Oportet ergo omne quod movetur ab alio moveri . Cf. also De Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Gentiles, I c . 13 , XII 15–16 ; De Physico Auditu , VIII 8 , XXII 648—49. 35 Op. cit., 19: Item, actus et potentia sunt contraria ; quare non possunt eisdem secundum idem convenire ; 36 Vries, Joseph, de, ,Das Weltbild der neuen Physik und die alte Metaphysik", Scholastik , X ( 1935) 77-90 . 37 Cf. Ch. I 24-30. 38 Op. Oxon. , II d . 2 q . 10, XI 523 : Decimo (a) quaero : utrum Angelus possit movere se ? Quod non, quia nihil idem potest simul esse in potentia, et in actu secundum idem; movens autem, secundum quod movens, est in actu, et motum secundum quod motum, est in potentia ; ergo nihil movet se. Cf. also citations given in footnote 32.

64

Chapter III

I. The Doctrine of Henry of Ghent. In connection with his critique of this argument, Scotus briefly considers some pertinent doctrine of Henry of Ghent . The latter thinker, as we already indicated, subscribes to the motion principle but restricts it to the sphere of corporeal motion. According to Henry, therefore , the self-motion of bodies we observe on the level of ordinary experience breaks down into parts, one which moves and one which is moved . These parts, moreover, are really distinct and accordingly occupy different places. In reference to spiritual activity, however, the Ghentian denies that this activity breaks down into two really distinct parts, the movent and the moved.39 His explanation here, however, does not meet the full approval of Duns Scotus. According to Henry of Ghent , a spiritual faculty such as the will can be known according to two different intentions or concepts . It can be known as an appetite and as free . As free, the will is a form, an act , something active and a mover. As an appetite, it is a material or potential principle, something passive and moved, the recipient of motion . The relation between the will as appetite and as free is conceived after the manner of the relation of matter and form. The first is the potential or receptive element , while the second is the element of act. It is important to note the meaning given to potency and act here, for Scotus, while not excluding this meaning, will also appeal to another acceptation of the terms in explaining away the argument before us. According to Ghentian doctrine, the will as appetite and the will as free are not really distinct . Hence the will moves itself. The whole will is movent, and the whole will is moved . But this admission of self-motion does not violate the principle, the same thing cannot be simultaneously in potency and act according to the same aspect . For the will is not in potency and act secundum idem. As appetite , it is potency ; as free, it is act.440

39 Cf. Ch. I 15. 40 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta, X q . 9 , 164–65 : Et per omnem eundem modum dico, quod voluntas forma libertatis suae, quae est vis quaedam in ipsa, ut alibi declaravimus, a causante voluntatem liberam in anima, & imprimente ei in hoc virtutem suam ad causandum suas proprias operationes secundum iam expositum modum, potest movere seipsam & educere de potentia volendi ad actum volendi, & est tota voluntas movens & mota tota, sed movens ratione, qua est libera, quae libertas est formale in ipsa, & hoc cessante impedimento, quemadmodum dictum est de gravi & levi respectu translationis sursum & deorsum ... Advertendum est circa primum, quod non ponitur potentiale & actuale in voluntate circa diversa re, sicut in gravi & levi, ubi totum ponitur potentiale ratione materiae, & totum actuale ratione formae, quae per essentiam differunt inter se, sed solummodo circa diversa ratione, ponendo totam voluntatem esse potentiale ratione, qua natura est simpliciter, & actuale ratione, qua est libera, quod scilicet natura & libertas non differunt secundum rem in voluntate, etsi secundum

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

65

2. Criticism of the Ghentian Doctrine. As we shall see later, Scotus opposes Henry in his admission of the cinesiological principle in reference to the activities of bodies and animals. But for the most part, he is also opposed to the Ghentian doctrine bearing on spiritual activity . Accordingly, he presents several arguments against this teaching. i) If self-motion is admitted in the will on the basis of the Ghentian explanation, then it would follow that every species would be capable of self-motion. For a species is made up of a genus and a specific difference Thus the formal difference as the principle of act would move the genus, and the genus as the potential and receptive principle would be moved by the formal difference.41 ii) In an essential unity (totum essentiale) , such as results from a union of matter and form, the unity is less than that of the will as movent and as moved. For in an essential unity a real distinction is involved between the essential parts, and the unity is thus a real composite of parts. But in such a unity the form never moves the matter. For example, when hot water makes itself cold, the form of water does not act upon the matter which is passive . Rather the water in its totality is both active and passive.42

rationem, aut intentionem, & propter hoc potentiale, & actuale minus distant in voluntate, quam in gravi et levi, secundum quod in Quolibet praecedente declaravimus distinguendo diversa genera moventium & motorum. Cf. also Josef Santeler, Der kausale Gottesbeweis bei Herveus Natalis (Innsbruck, 1930) , 19—20. Duns Scotus reports the opinion of Henry of Ghent in various places. Addit. mag., loc. cit., 274 : ... dicunt aliqui quod voluntas est appetitus et est appetitus liber, qui differunt intentione. Ipsa igitur inquantum libera transmutat se ad actum, inquantum appetitus est, et ideo inquantum aliud mutatur ; movetur enim, ut appetitus, sed movet, ut libera est. Cf. also Op. Oxon., II d. 25 q. un., XIIÎ 210 ; Rep. Par. , II d . 25 q. u . , XXIII 123 ; Metaph., loc. cit. , 595. 41 Metaph. , loc . cit.: Item, si quaecumque species cum habeat genus et differentiam, quae differunt intentione secundum istos, poterit quaecumque species secundum formam differentiae movere, et secundum formam generis moveri ; Addit. mag. , loc . cit.: Item, quelibet res moveret se, quia moveretur per intentionem generis et moveret ratione differentiae. Cf. also Op . Oxon. , loc. cit.; Rep. Par. , loc. cit. 42 Metaph., loc. cit. , 595—96 : Item, totum essentiale est minus unum quam istud, in quo est tantum differentia intentionis, quia partes essentiales realiter sunt diversae, et veram compositionem realem faciunt, et tamen in tali toto essentiali nunquam forma movet materiam ; ergo multo magis, nec hic : Addit. mag. , loc. cit.: Item, sic posset dici quodlibet compositum movet se ad quamcumque formam, quam recipit ut moveatur per formam, et recipiat per materiam, que plus differunt quam intentione, ut quam appetitus et appetitus liber; Op . Oxon . , loc. cit. Manifestum etiam est quod cum aqua calefacta redit ad propriam naturalitatem et frigiditatem, quod tota aqua agit, et tota patitur ; forma enim non agit in materiam suam quam actu informat. Cf. Rep . Par., loc. cit.

6 Philosophy Series No. 15

66

Chapter III

iii) In fact, Scotus finds it hard even to understand Henry's teaching : as appetite, the will is passive ; as free, it is active . For the ultimate difference of a species is the proximate ground of its specific properties. Man, for example, is risible not simply because he is an animal , but because he is rational . Hence acts of laughter pertain to him not merely as an animal but as a rational being . Since liberty is the most formal or distinctive element of the will , the will precisely as free must not only elicit but also be the recipient of free acts.43 iv) Furthermore, the different concepts or intentions invoked to explain self-motion have only a potential existence in their object , such as the will. Their distinction as actual and complete, according to Henry, exists only in the mind. But if the fact of self-motion demands two different elements, the movent and the moved, then it would seem that these two elements would have to be really distinct in the being. For self-motion is something real and is not, therefore , dependent on an act of the mind.44 But since this distinction of concepts is asserted not to be real and not to represent two distinct things, it follows that the will is active and passive, movent and moved, by reason of the same reality. As free, the will moves ; as appetite, it is moved. But in the final analysis, it moves and is moved by reason of the same reality.45 3. Limited Agreement of Scotus with Henry. To some extent, however, Scotus agrees with Henry of Ghent . For along with the latter, he admits the will as movent is in some way (aliquo modo) distinct from the will as moved . The will is both active and passive . It is active or movent insofar as it is a power of eliciting an act of volition . Therefore, it contains acts of volition virtually. The will is passive and moved, insofar 43 Op. Oxon., loc . cit .: Hoc non bene capio, quia proxima ratio constituendi speciem, cujusmodi est differentia ultima, est proxima ratio recipiendi propriam passionem; non enim recipit homo risibilitatem ratione animalis, sed ratione qua rationalis . Ratio autem formalior voluntatis est magis libera quam ratio appetitus, quare est ratio recipiendi inquantum libera, sicut ratio libertatis est magis ratio constituendi . Cf. also Rep. Par., loc. cit.; Addit. mag. , loc. cit.; Metaph. , loc. cit. , 596. 44 Metaph., loc. cit. , 595 : Contra istud arguitur, quia differentia intentionis non est in re, nisi in potentia, secundum istos, completive autem et in actu, est ab intellectu tantum ; si quae autem differentia requiritur in aliquo ad movere se, cum ille sit effectus realis, oportet quod illa differentia sit realis, quia effectus realis non dependet ab actu rationis. 45 Op. Oxon., loc . cit.: Praeterea, iste Doctor dicit alibi , quod genus et differentia differunt penes intentiones, et dicit quod differentia intentionis non arguit , quod sit res alia et alia ; igitur ipse habet concedere quod voluntas cum agit inquantum libera, et patitur inquantum appetitus, ratione ejusdem realitatis primo agit et patitur. Ideo concedo per eamdem realitatem, primo est voluntas receptiva actus, et effectiva ejusdem, . . . Cf. also Rep. Par., loc. cit., 124 ; Addit. mag. , loc. cit.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

67

as it is deprived of an act of volition but capable of receiving such an act . The will as capable of eliciting an act of volition and the will as capable of receiving an act of volition are two different concepts.46 While the meanings of these concepts are not the same, nonetheless, they are both verified a parte rei of one and the same subject, the will. Hence in one place, Scotus describes this as a formal distinction.47 This application of the famous formal distinction is very interesting. It shows that the real character of this distinction , at least in some of its applications, cannot be pressed too far. The elements distinguished are formally distinct, and therefore , are really (a parte rei) identical. Because of this identity a parte rei, the Subtle Doctor will not allow that the distinguised elements explain away the strict self-motion of the will . Among other considerations, this distinction also shows that the admission of self-motion involves no contradiction . For while one and

the same will is both movent and moved, still the will conceived as movent is not the will conceived as moved . Departing from Henry of Ghent, however, Scotus does not allow this distinction of the movent and the moved to play the dominant role in refuting the argument against self-motion from the incompatibility of potency and act . Rather he falls back on some other very basic and important distinctions of potency and act . 4. Various Meanings of the Term ' Potency .' While the term ' potency' is used quite freely in philosophies of Aristotelian inspiration , few thinkers perhaps are as conscious as Scotus of the numerous equivocations of this term . In questions 1 , 2 , 3 , and 4 of Book IX of his commentary on the Metaphysics, 48 Scotus uncovers the various meanings of potency. It is not for us to indicate all of them here, but those which are more relevant to our study. a) Modal Potency. One very basic distinction , however, and one which is germane to our present study, is that of potency as a mode and 46 Addit. mag. , loc. cit. , 275 : Unde voluntas agit inquantum virtualiter continet volitionem, sed transmutatur inquantum privationem habet actus volitionis. 47 Op. Oxon . , loc. cit. , 208 : Et ideo absurdum est quod nobilissima forma, cujusmodi est anima intellectiva, non habeat potentias activas suae perfectionis accidentalis, et receptivas ejusdem. Et quia non potest in talibus formis dari potentia activa et passiva, quae sint distinctae subjecto, cum non sint potentia organicae, ideo non distinguuntur subjecto, et ideo ibi erunt unitive sine distinctione ratione subjecti, non tamen sine distinctione formali . — This application of the formal distinction tallies with and thus confirms the explanation of this famous Scotistic distinction given by Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1946) , 21 ff, 48 VII 529-52 .

68

Chapter III

potency as a principle.49 As a mode, potency signifies a state or determination of being. On this score, its consideration pertains to Metaphysics, and it is for this reason that it is called metaphysical potency. 50 But even taken modally, potency is still equivocal. It admits of three other divergent meanings. i) First, metaphysical potency can denote mere possibility of existence . In this acceptation, potential being, or rather, possible being, is that to which existence is not repugnant. Compatibility with existence expresses the nature of this possible being quite adequately, and thus it is the transcendental being of Scotistic metaphysics. As Scotus explains, everything which does not include a contradiction in its intelligible makeup is a being in this sense. Thus this possible being, this transcendental being is coextensive with all being. For there is no being which includes in its makeup a contradiction . Accordingly, this possible being is directly opposed to the impossible . A square circle, for example, is not potential or possible , and entitatively, it is nothing . For a square circle is an intrinsic contradiction. 51 This possible being is not precisely opposed to strict logical possibility. Nevertheless, the former is to be distinguished from the latter. Strict logical possibility is not the being of ontology, for according to Scotus' explanation and illustrations in his commentary on the Metaphysics, this possibility is a property of a proposition . A proposition, besides having the values of truth and falsity, can also have other values, such as possibility and impossibility.52 49 Metaph., IX q . 2 , VII 530 : Uno modo potentia dicit quemdam modum entis. Alio modo specialiter importat rationem principii, ... Cf. also ibid . , q. 13 , 581 . 50 Ibid., q. 2 , 531 : Hic ergo videndum est de potentia communius accepta, videlicet ut importat modum quemdam entis in se, sine ratione principii ; et quia Metaphysicus considerat ens et passiones ejus, ideo potentia sic sumpta ad considerationem Metaphysici pertinet ; et ideo propter brevitatem in sermone potest dici potentia Metaphysica. 51 Op. Oxon. , IV d . 8 q . 1 , XVII 7 : ... aliquod ens, hoc est, cui non repugnat esse. Metaph. , loc. cit .: Uno modo opponitur impossibili , . . . et sic possibile convertitur cum toto ente, nam nihil est ens, cujus ratio contradictionem includit . The Scotistic conception of transcendental being has been seriously misconstrued by various authors . For a reliable exposition of this concept, cf. Allan B. Wolter, op. cit. , 65 ff. 52 Metaph., loc. cit.: Et illa potentia est modus quidam compositionis factus ab intellectu , causatus ex habitudine terminorum illius compositionis, scilicet quod non repugnant . Et licet communiter correspondeat sibi in re aliqua potentia realis, tamen haec non est per se de ratione hujus potentiae, et sic possibile fuisset mundum fore ante ejus creationem , si tunc fuisset intellectus formans hanc compositionem : Mundus erit, licet tunc nec fuisset potentia passiva ad esse mundi , nec etiam activa, posito hoc per impossibile, dum tamen sine contradictione posset potentia fore ad hoc activa, ..

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

69

ii) According to another acceptation, there is the potential being which is opposed to the necessary. This is an Avicennian understanding of the word, which is more generally known as the possible or the contingent. This possible being is not necessary in itself but only in its cause. Thus it is to be distinguished from strict necessary being which exists necessarily and of itself. The being of the latter is indefectible, whereas that of the former is defectible.53 Along with the preceding concept, this Avicennian notion of possible or contingent being is presented by Scotus in his commentary on the Metaphysics. But it is not really accepted by him. As an independent thinker, the Subtle Doctor elaborates his own and very refined conception of contingent being.54 But since this is not particularly germane to our present interest, we turn at once to another acceptation of the term 'potency .' iii) In a third sense, metaphysical potency is that which is simultaneously incompatible with its corresponding act . And the act of a thing is that which the thing is when it is no longer in potency. This is metaphysical potency most strictly taken.55 Potency in this sense, along with act, are modifications or determinations of transcendental being, the possible being previously explicated . Potency and act in this third sense are key concepts in the solution of the problem before us. Hence it is imperative that we work along with Scotus towards a most refined understanding of them. In his commentary on the Metaphysics, Scotus posits the question : "are potency and act opposed ?"56 The answer is affirmative, but this must be understood on the basis of the prior distinctions . Metaphysical potency, taken in the third and strictest sense, is opposed to act. The reason is evident . One and the same thing cannot be in a state in which it is about to acquire a certain perfection and simultaneously be in a state in which it has already acquired this same perfection . As Scotus tersely puts it,

53 Metaph., loc . cit. , 532 : Alio modo sumitur potentia, ut opponitur necessario, et sic loquitur Avicenna de possibile 1. Metaph. suae ; et sic dicitur necesse, quod ex se habet entitatem indefectibilem, ens possibile, quod defectibilem. Cf. Avicenna, Avicennae Metaphysica, t . I c. 7 (pro manuscripto: St. Bonaventure , New York, 1948) , 25-29. 54 Cf. Allan B. Wolter, op. cit. , 151 ; Summula Metaphysicae (Milwaukee, 1958), 63-65. 55 Metaph. , loc . cit. , 532 : Tertio modo strictissime sumitur potentia Metaphysica, prout non stat cum actu circa idem, . . . 56 Ibid., 529 : Utrum potentia et actus opponantur ?

70

Chapter III

Ad quaestionem ergo primam dicendum, quod tantummodo potentia Metaphysica, ultimo modo sumpta opponitur actui , quia circa idem habent fieri, et simul esse non possunt.57 In Scotistic metaphysics, potency and act have their place among the disjunctive transcendentals contradictorily opposed . They

are

disjunctive transcendentals because they constitute a primary division of being, a division of being prior to its division by way of the categories. They are contradictorily opposed, because potency spells a negation . of act, and act implies a negation of potency . Every being, therefore , is either actual or potential.58 After establishing this radical opposition between potency and act , Scotus attempts to determine more precisely the nature of this opposition. Hence the further question is posed, are potency and act opposed relatively ?59 Granting opposition between potency and act , we can ask further whether they are related, and whether their opposition is connected with a relation . In order to answer this question , Scotus invokes the distinction between a mutual and a non-mutual relation . The former obtains when the foundation of the relation is found in both of its extremes . The relation, therefore, springs from both of its related members . The relation of similarity, for example, obtains between two white walls. This relation is mutual, because the quality of whiteness, the foundation of the relation, is found in both of the walls . A non-mutual relation obtains when the foundation of the relation is not found in both extremes. In this case, one of the two things is by its nature related to another, but not vice-versa. Knowledge and the object of knowledge, for example, are non-mutually related . Knowledge is essentially related to a known object . But the object is not essentially related to the cognitive act . For the object known is something absolute, and it can be called relative only insofar as something else is related to it. As something absolute, the object functions in the relationship of knowledge merely as the terminus of a cognitive act . And it is one thing to be truly related and quite another to terminate a relation. Another instance of a non-mutual relation is that between God and a creature . A creature is essentially related to God , but God is not related in a corre-

57 Ibid., 532. 58 Cf. Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1946) , 128-29 145 . 59 Metaph., loc . cit. , 530 : Utrum opponantur relative ?

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

71

sponding manner to a creature . He is, however, the terminus of a creature's relation to Him.60 According to Scotus, potency and act are not mutually related, and hence their opposition does not spring from a mutual relation. This is clearly the case, for things mutually related are simultaneously in nature and definition . This is certainly not true of modal potency and act . By nature, act is prior to potency, and in time potency is prior to act.61 Between potency and act, therefore, there obtains a non-mutual relation of opposition . For potency essentially spells a relation to act. This is evident from its definition : metaphysical potency is that which is simultaneously incompatible with its corresponding act . It is true that act can be described in terms of opposition to potentiality, as we have already done. But this is not necessary. For act stands for something absolute , and is not in its very essence a relation.62 The fact that potency and act are non-mutually related indicates

their peculiar nature as disjunctive transcendentals . Every being is either potential or actual . Potential being necessarily implies actual being; but actual being does not necessarily imply potential being. Potency and act , therefore, do not belong to the disjunctive transcendentals correlatively opposed, such as cause and caused , exceding and exceded. Rather they fit in with the transcendentals contradictorily opposed.63 After these preliminary considerations , we are now prepared to take up Scotus ' final and refined definition of metaphysical potency. Metaphysical potency is the relation of order of the possible essence of something to the existence of the same thing. In its essential makeup, therefore, potency involves a relation, a relation of order. A relation of order is a relation of a posterior to a prior.64 Potential being is temporally

60 Ibid., 532. 61 Ibid.: Non primo modo opponuntur actus et potentia, quia cum talia sint simul natura et definitione, sequeretur tunc, quod actus non esset prior ratione quam potentia ; nec ratio potentiae sumeretur ab actu magis, quam e converso, ... Ibid . , q. 13, 581 : potentia opposita actui prior eo, tempore ; . . . 62 Ibid., q. 2, 532 : Secundo modo opponuntur, nam supponendo significatum nominis, patet quod potentia sic sumpta dicit ordinem ad actum, et ille ordo essentialiter est respectus ad actum ; habens ergo respectum essentialiter ad aliud , inquantum hujusmodi , illi alii non opponitur, nisi relative. Sed hoc non est e converso, quia ratio actus est absoluta , . 63 Cf. Allan B. Wolter, op . cit. , 140-41 145 . 64 Metaph., loc . cit., 533. In Quod. , q . 19, XXVI 260, Scotus explains the concept of order thus : Ordo autem est posterius ad prius . Cf. also De Primo Principio, c . 1 , 2—3 . In explaining the word ' order' in the definition , we think that potency could be called the posterior and act the prior, since act is prior to potency according to nature . However, we have explained order on the basis of time, since Scotus does this in Metaph . , loc. cit. , q. 13 , 581 .

Chapter III

72

prior to actual being ; the latter is temporally posterior to the former. The relation of order also requires two extremes, a foundation and a terminus. All in all, potency essentially involves three elements : 1. a relation, 2. a foundation for the relation , 3. a terminus of the relation . Ad ista intelligendum quod potentia Metaphysica praecise sumpta, scilicet ut abstrahit ab omni potentia naturali, fundatur praecise in essentia, quae dicitur possibilis esse, et est ordo illius essentiae ad esse, tanquam ad terminum, sicut in essentia animae Antichristi fundatur potentia ad suum esse.65 The foundation of the relation is a possible essence ; the terminus of the relation is the existence of this essence. The Antichrist , for example, is in potency to exist . The real foundation of this potentiality is the possible soul of the Antichrist ; the terminus is the existence of this possible soul . Potency in its relational character could perhaps be viewed as the bridge reaching out from the foundation to the terminus. On their own merits, however, both of the latter can be called potential by denominative predication . First, the foundation can be so called because of the potentiality inhering in it as a subject ; secondly, the terminus admits this designation, because the potentiality is ordered to it. Speaking most properly, however, the whole thing, namely, the relation of order between the possible essence (foundation) to existence (terminus) , is called potency . For then the relationship between the foundation and the terminus is taken into account . And to repeat , potency is essentially a relation.66 b) Potency as a Principle. We have investigated Scotus' conception of potency as a mode at some length, perhaps almost to the extent of a digression, in order to distinguish it as clearly as possible from potency in another acceptation. This acceptation is potency as a principle. Potency as a principle signifies either a material or an efficient cause. Hence the Aristotelian distinction of active and passive potency is taken over by Scotus, although modified and rethought with greater precision . 67

65 Ibid., q. 2, 533. Ibid.: Ista autem potentia, quae est inter duo, utrumque illorum potest denominari ; unum ut quasi subjectum, aliud ut quasi terminus ... Sic in proposito, et fundamentum est possibile, potentia fundata in ipso ; et terminus est possibilis eadem potentia, quia eadem est ad ipsum terminum. Sed propriissime et completissime dicitur totum, quando dicitur essentia est possibilis esse, sive potest esse, quia tunc exprimitur habitudo amborum. 67 In his commentary on the Metaphysics (IX q . 3 and q . 4, VII 541-52), Scotus investigates the adequacy of Aristotle's division of potency as a principle and particularly his description of active potency as a principium transmutationis in alio, inquantum aliud est (p . 542 ) . Scotus' criticism of the latter definition scores significant points, but in general, he does not emphasize his differences with Aristotle and prefers to find excuses for the latter's deficiencies.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

73

First the question might be asked , why is potency as a principle restricted to simply these two of the four Aristotelian causes ? This restriction, according to Scotus , is a matter of usage. It is simply a fact that the philosophers and particularly Aristotle employ the term potency in this way and according to this restriction . Some convenient explanation, however, might be sought as to why the term actually received such a restricted usage. Here Scotus does no more than to offer some suggestions . 68 Potency, according to usage, signifies an efficient or a material cause. But a cause always bespeaks a relation . Consequently, potency also bespeaks a relation . The relation signified by potency is readily identified with the relation of a cause to its effect . But this is not the only relation involved in potency as a principle or cause. Other relations which are essential to principles come up now for examination. This further study attempts to reach the fullest understanding of potency as an efficient and receptive cause . It also brings precision to the two Aristotelian concepts of active and passive potency. A cause does not merely bespeak a relation to an effect . An efficient cause, for example, is not merely related to its effect, and a material cause is not merely related to its materiatum. These causes, as well as the other causes of metaphysics, are by their nature essentially ordered , and hence they import relations to one another. This is true of both the causes which are intrinsic to an effect as well as those which are extrinsic . These causes form something of a team. They work together. One of them alone is not sufficient to produce an effect which essentially depends on many causes.6⁹ In his celebrated work, the de Primo Principio, Scotus shows how the four causes concur in producing the same effect and also how they are essentially ordered in their causation.

It is not to our purpose here

to explore all the relations between the four causes but rather those which are implied in potency as active and passive . These relations are 68 Ibid., 545 : Diceret aliquis quod sic, et quod ita potentia convenit formae et fini, sicut efficienti et materiae, licet non sit consuetum illis causis attribuere nomen potentiae, ... Secunda via videtur de intentione Philosophi, qui de ipsa potentia non loquitur, inquantum est principium, nisi ut pertinet ad duplex genus causae, 69 Ibid., 545-46 : Sciendum tamen secundo, quantum ad istum articulum, quod principium non tantum habet relationem ad principiatum, et tale principium ad tale principiatum, puta efficiens ad effectum, materia ad materiatum ; sed etiam unum principium respectum habet ad aliud principium, quia sive sint extrinseca sive intrinseca, haec et illa mutuo nunquam causant, nisi inter se aliquo modo uniantur et concurrant, quia nulla una sufficit ad causandum illud, quod dependet a multis causis essentialiter. 70 Ch . II 14-28 . ...

74

Chapter III

brought to the fore by the various definitions or descriptions Scotus gives of active and passive potency. i) Definitions of Active Potency. "Est autem potentia activa , secundum ejus unam significationem metaphysice loquendo, principium agendi agibile .. " This definition might be rendered thus : active potency is "the principle of doing that which can be done ." One might say that it is the principle of effecting that which can be effected , provided there is no restriction to an effect external to the agent . This definition , as is clear, depicts active potency as a relation to an effect. "... secundum aliam, principium actuandi actuabile. " Active potency is a principle of reducing to act that which can be reduced to act . This definition presents active potency as a relation to another principle, namely a passive or recipient cause. "1 Scotus does not think that a third relation should be admitted here, namely, a relation of an active principle to a form. For just as the relation of active potentiality signifies the agent both as the principium quod and as the principium quo, in a similar way, the relation to an effect signifies the total composite effect as the quod and the form of the effect as the quo . Hence Scotus views the relation of active potency to form as an element of the relation of the active principle to the effect.72 Nevertheless , we do not think that it would be contrary to the mind of Scotus to single out this relation of agent to form . In fact, he himself actually does this to some extent, as we shall see later . 73 ii) Definitions of Passive Potency. "Potentia vero passiva , secundum unam ejus significationem, est principium, ex quo aliquid potest mutari . " Passive potency is a principle by which something can be the subject of or have the capacity for change . This description exhibits passive potency as a relation to a composite effect . "... secundum aliam, est principium actuandi passive ab actu activo. " Passive potency is a principle which can be brought to act by an actually active principle. According to this definition , passive potency can signify a relation to an active principle. "... secundum aliam, est principium actuabile sive informabile ab actu , sive a principio actuali . " Passive potency is a principle which can be informed or brought to act by act or act-principle. 71 Metaph. , loc . cit. , 548. 72 Ibid., 547 : Tertiam, scilicet ad formam, forte non oportet ponere, quia sicut eadem relatio activi denominat formam agentis ut quo, etiam compositum ut quod, ... ; ita ex parte principiati potest dici , quod eadem relatio geniti convenit composito, ut quod respectu agentis et formae ut quo , 73 78.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

75

This definition depicts passive potency as a relation to another principle.74 The various relations of potency as a principle can be exhibited in diagrammatic form in the following way:

A. Active Potency B. Passive Potency

i. relation to an effect { ii. relation to a material cause or a passive principle i. relation to an effect ii. relation to an act or a formal cause iii. relation to an active principle

5. The Threefold Meaning of Act. Just as the term potency is used equivocally, so the term act admits of a basic twofold, and even threefold equivocation . i) First, like potency, act can be taken as a mode of being. Thus it is opposed to potency . 75 ii) Act can also signify a principle, namely, a form which is related to a material cause . Both the form and the material cause in turn constitute an effect . In this case, the potency-principle and the act-principle obtain simultaneously. They are strictly correlative notions, mutually implying each other.76 Potency and act as principles are thus seen to be oppositely different from potency and act as entitative modes. For the latter do not import the relation of a principle to a principle. Neither can they obtain simultaneously, nor are they mutually related . " From the standpoint of potency and act as modes of being, therefore, a form is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act . But if potency and act are taken as principles, then a form is never potency. It is always act. And a form is always act, even if its mode of entity is potential. 78 iii) Act can also be taken in a third acceptation . According to this acceptation, it signifies a composite being which is in act or actually exists . The composite as a composite is no longer in modal potency, but 74 Metaph., loc . cit. , 548. 75 Cf. 69 of this Chapter. 76 Metaph., loc . cit. , 547 : Nam actus illo modo dicitur de forma, inquantum refertur ad materiam cum qua principiat, et simul sunt potentia isto modo et actus, et sunt mutuo relativa, quia sicut potentia hoc modo est respectu alicujus actus, ita et iste actus est alicujus potentiae actus . 77 Ibid.: Tres conditiones oppositae sunt in potentia et actu primo modo sumptis , quia nec unum est in principio respectu principii inquantum principium, nec simul sunt, nec sunt mutua. 78 Ibid.: Unde de primo actu intelligitur, quod forma est in actu quandoque, quandoque in potentia opposita actui, sicut et compositum . Sed de secundo actu et potentia, nunquam forma est in potentia, sed actus, etiam quando est in potentia primo modo, adhuc est actus secundo modo , non potentia.

76

Chapter III

its material principle has been actualized by its formal principle or principle of actuation . Scotus considers this third meaning of act to be less important than the other two.79 After this preliminary spade work, we can now turn to the original argument against self-motion from the incompatibility of potency and act. One and the same thing cannot simultaneously be a mover and a thing moved, because one and the same thing cannot simultaneously be in potency and act according to the same aspect. The latter statement constitutes the famous potency and act law, and it is considered to be the strongest support of the principle of motion. 6. Scotus' Refutation of the Potency and Act Argument. In giving Scotus' answer to the argument, it is first to be stated that he fully accepts the law of potency and act : the same thing cannot be in potency and act according to the same aspect . This principle of the incompatibility of potency and act is accepted, but always according to very precise meanings of the terms involved and according to the various distinctions we have just delineated . As we have seen from our study of Scotus' teaching thus far, potency

and act, taken as modes of being, are opposites . Potency is described as that which is simultaneously incompatible with its corresponding act . Hence the same thing cannot simultaneously be in potency and act according to the same aspect . Water, for example, cannot simultaneously be both actually and potentially hot. The will cannot be both actually and potentially eliciting one and the same act of volition.80 But the same thing can be in potency and act according to different aspects . Water which is actually hot, obviously, is not actually, but potentially cold. The water is simultaneously in potency and act but not according to the same aspect . It is in act as to hotness ; it is in potency as to coldness . Now if the actually hot water were to make itself cold , and thus move itself (change itself qualitatively) , would the principle of the incompatibility of potency and act be violated ? Scotus' answer here is negative, for the water would be in act as to hotness, in potency as to coldness,

79 Ibid.: Compositum autem quandoque existit, licet non sit actus , tamen actus est modus entitatis propriae totius, non tantum entitatis formae. Forte communiter non curatur de illa aequivocatione actus, propter hoc quod actus compositi primo modo principaliter est ab actu secundo modo, nisi inquantum ille est in actu primo modo. 80 Ibid. , q . 14, 596 : quod si potentia accipiatur prout opponitur actui, nunquam idem simul est in potentia et in actu secundum idem, nam quando est aqua calida actu , tunc non est actu frigida, sed potentia tantum.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

77

and in act as to the power of making itself cold . Hence the water would not be in potency and act according to the same aspect.81 The same thing cannot simultaneously be in potency and act according to the same aspect , this principle is valid for Scotus. The terms potency and act in this principle, however, should be taken in their strictest modal meaning. They should be understood as primary differences of being and not as principles . It is by means of the distinction between potency as a mode and potency as a principle that Scotus again and again answers the objection against self-motion from the incompatibility of potency and act . Once this important distinction is grasped, it is evident that the admission of self-motion encounters no difficulties from the potency and act law. 82 But potency and act, as we have seen, sometimes have the meaning of a principle. Consequently, the question can be posed whether potency and act thus understood are incompatible in one and the same thing. This question is complex, and its answer is to be worked out in accordance with the various relations of potency as a principle, which were previously indicated . Potency as a principle is either an efficient or a material cause. Both as an efficient and a material cause, it bespeaks a relation to an effect . The effect could be called act, according to the third meaning of act given above. An example of act in this sense would be a composite effect, such as the will willing or water having the quality of coldness . The effect contemplated in this context would not be the act of volition alone or the quality of coldness alone . Potency as a material cause, as was previously indicated, bespeaks not only a relation to a form or act but also to a composite effect , of which it is an intrinsic principle. Now 81 Ibid. Respondeo, est in potentia secundum terminum motus, in actu secundum principium activum aequivoce respectu termini . 82 Op. Oxon., II d. 25 q. un. , XIII 208 : Cum dicis, quale est agens in actu, tale est passum in potentia, etc. dico quod si accipiatur actus et potentia ut sunt duae primae differentiae entis, sic dividunt omne ens ; unde et hoc ens idem numero dividunt ; et isto modo est contradictio, quod idem sit in actu et in potentia simul respectu ejusdem, quia potentia, ut est differentia entis distincta contra actum, est necessario includens oppositionem vel negationem ejus respectu cujus ponitur potentia, ut album in potentia non est album in actu , quamdiu est in potentia ; et isto modo est impossibile quod aliquid sic existens in potentia, faciat se in actu ; non tamen est necesse omne passum vel motum esse sic in potentia, et agens suum in actu . Ibid., d. 2 q. 10, XI 540 : ... quod quaedam dividentia ens sunt incompossibilia in quocumque, igitur et ista, concedo de istis ut sunt opposita . Opposita autem sunt, prout dicunt modos cujuslibet entis , prout scilicet idem est ens in potentia antequam actu sit, et ens in actu , quando jam est . Cf. also ibid., d. 3 q. 8, XII 200 ; Rep. Par. , II d . 25 q . un. , XXIII 122 ; Addit. mag. , loc. cit., 289.

78

Chapter III

according to this third meaning of act, such a total effect , composed of both matter and form , can be called act . Potency here, therefore , is taken as a principle insofar as it bespeaks a relation to a composite effect, and act signifies the effect . According to these acceptations of potency and act, the same thing cannot simultaneously be potency and act . For nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, or more widely, nothing can cause itself according to any one kind of principle . The will willing, for example, is not an efficient cause of an act of willing, but simply the will is an efficient cause of an act of willing. Consider also a composite being called x , composed of a material principle called y and a formal principle called z . Now the same thing cannot be both x and y ; the same thing cannot be both a material principle - this and nothing more - and at the same time be the composite which is made up of the same material principle and a form . 83 Nevertheless, one and the same suppositum can have two natures, one of which is an active principle, while the other is an effect . Here we meet the relation of an active principle to a form, which was spoken of before . Potency, for example, can be ascribed to a man by reason of some active principle such as the will. At the same time, act is also proper to him by reason of a particular act of willing . Hence potency (efficient cause) and act (effect or form) are simultaneously verified in one and the same suppositum, although they signify two really distinct entities.84 But it is to be remarked here that this is not an accepted use of the term ' act,' one of the three meanings previously indicated . Act as a realized perfection is not received by an active principle as active but as passive . 85 Potency as a principle can also signify the relation of a principle (material cause) to an act (formal cause) , which together constitute a thing. Now according to this relation, potency and act can be simultaneously verified in one and the same thing . Otherwise, no suppositum could be the subject of accidental determinations, nor could a supposi-

83 Metaph., loc . cit. , 596 : Si ad principiatum , si illud dicatur actus , concedo quod nihil idem essentialiter est potentia et actus, quia nulla una essentia seipsam principiat proprie effective, nec in quocumque genere principii . 84 Ibid., 596-97 : Idem tamen suppositum potest in se habere duas naturas, quarum altera sit principium activum , et altera principiatum, et ita est in potentia, hoc est, potens per principium activum, et in actu sive actus propter principiatum .. 85 Ibid. , 597 : ... sed isto modo non consuevit communiter accipi actus pro acto .

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

79

tum be composed of a principle which is potential in reference to another principle which is act.886 Potency as a principle can also signify the relation of a passive principle to an active principle. In this relation , the active principle is not called an act in the sense of a principle, but it could be in act in the modal sense . The passive principle would be potency as a principle. Here again the simultaneous verification of potency and act in the same thing is possible. This means that one and the same thing can be both active and passive in reference to the same act. The will , for example, is an efficient cause of an act of willing. It is also the passive principle or recipient of this act.887 In Chapter II, it was made clear that active and passive potency in reference to one and the same perfection can be found in one and the same thing . Thus it was argued that self-motion is something altogether possible . This argumentation applies here, since potency is taken in the meaning of a passive principle, and act is taken in its modal sense and refers to an active principle which is actually causing some given perfection. The same concepts are involved when Scotus maintains in several passages that one and the same thing can be both a material and an efficient cause in reference to one and the same perfection.88 In this again, he is at loggerheads with Godfrey of Fontaines, who maintains that the same thing cannot be both active and passive in reference to the same perfection . 89 This doctrine also appears to be that of St. Thomas, at least if Farrel correctly interprets the prima via . The proof for a prime mover, according to the eminent scholar, proceeds " from the fact of the passivity of things. " Hence " nothing that is moved moves or changes itself, . . ."90 86 Ibid. Si autem potentia dicat relationem principii ad actum , ut ad aliud principium intrinsecum, tunc accipere quod in nullo uno supposito est, utrumque est accipere, quod nullum suppositum erit compositum ex principio potentiali, et principio quod dicitur actus, quod est falsum . Cf. also Op. Oxon. , II d. 2 q . 10, XI 540 . 87 Op. Oxon. , II d . 3 q . 8 , XII 200 : ... et tamen idem est in potentia, hoc est principium passivum, et in actu, hoc est principium activum ejusdem , Cf. also Metaph. , loc. cit.; Addit. mag. , loc. cit. , 289. 88 Ord., I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 307 ; Op . Oxon . , II d . 25 q . un . , XIII 210 ; Rep. Par. , II d . 25 q. un. , XXIII 124. 89 Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . J. Hoffmans , q. 2, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain , 1924) , IV 23 : ... patet quod non poterit inveniri aliquid idem quod respectu eiusdem sit activum et passivum . ... sed quaeritur utrum illud in quo per se recipitur actus intelligendi sit causa effectiva illius ; et patet quod non. 90 Farrell, Walter, A Companion to the Summa (New York, 1941 ) , I 32-33 ; cf. also Ch . I 12-13.

80

Chapter III The only concession Scotus is willing to make to this teaching is

that "matter which is in pure potency" cannot simultaneously be an efficient principle of the perfection it is to receive . At the same time, however, the Franciscan Master is fully aware that the concepts of active and passive principle, agent and patient, form a pair of contraries. But it is precisely the contrariety between them which is overcome by the agent in the course of its activity . At the end of its activity, the agent makes the patient like to itself. In the case of an equivocal agent, this assimilation is not formal but virtual. The effect, formally considered, imitates its cause in a virtual manner. At the beginning of the causal action, therefore, the contrariety between agent and patient is virtual. This means that the agent contains virtually a form which is formally contrary to the form which the patient already has . Clearly, such contrariety is no obstacle to the simultaneous conjunction of agent and patient in the same subject.92 Scotus ' teaching on the concepts of potency and act , insofar as it relates to the radical self-motion he defends , is to be explored further. At this point, however, we deem it advisable to summarize his doctrine as given thus far. Because of his extreme care not to leave any stone unturned which would reveal the asserted contradiction implied in self-motion, unususal senses of the concepts of potency and act are considered. In our present summary, we will restrict ourselves to the ordinary and more significant meanings of these concepts . First, potency and act taken as modes or primary differences of being are incompatible . This incompatibility is expressed in the potency and act law: the same thing cannot simultaneously be in potency and act according to the same aspect . The term ' potency' and ' act' in this law must be taken in their modal meaning. But when they are thus understood, the possibility of self-motion remains completely intact .

Secondly, if potency and act are taken in the sense of material and formal cause, then they are clearly compatible . No scholastic would contest this compatibility . Thirdly, if potency and act are taken in the sense of a passive and an active principle, once again they are compatible . One and the same thing can be both active and passive in reference to one and the same perfection. 91 Ord., loc. cit.: Cum arguitur, secundo, de causa materiali et efficienti, quod non coincidunt, - verum est de materia quae est in potentia pura, sed non de materia ' secundum quid', quale est subiectum respectu accidentis. 92 Metaph., loc. cit.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

81

7. The Concept of Virtual Act. Nemo dat quod non habet is an accepted principle of scholastic philosophy . Keeping this principle in mind , one can ask the question, how can the same thing be both active and passive in reference to one and the same perfection ? For if an active principle is to bring to itself some particular perfection, then it must already possess this perfection . Nemo dat quod non habet. But if it already possesses this perfection , then the active principle cannot give this perfection to itself. It is argumentation such as this which leads St. Thomas, as Mitterer tells us, to assert that everything which is in motion is put in motion by another.93 Now how does Scotus meet this argument ? Briefly, by means of his concept of virtual act, a key concept in his doctrine, and in which Borgmann sees a certain anticipation of the modern concept of potential energy.94 Duns Scotus admits that if a particular active principle is to cause some perfection, it must already possess this perfection in some way. But the deciding question is , how does it possess this perfection ? In the case of a univocal cause, according to Scotus , the active principle must possess the perfection formally. The perfection must be in formal act . In the case of an equivocal cause, however, the perfection is possessed virtually. The perfection is in act , however, not formal but virtual act. This means that the equivocal agent has the power of causing such a perfection , and that this power is in act or actually exists.95 93 Mitterer, Albert,,,Der Bewegungssatz (omne, quod movetur, ab alio movetur) nach dem Weltbild des hl . Thomas und dem der Gegenwart“, Scholastik, IX ( 1934 ) 493 : Daß aber ein Ganzes als Ganzes zugleich bewegend und bewegt sei, das ist nach Aristoteles-Thomas das Unmögliche. Aber warum ist das nach Aristoteles- Thomas unmöglich ? Es sind immer dieselben Gründe . Wenn ein Ding selbstbewegend, z. B. selbstwarmmachend, wäre, so müßte es warm sein (Morphodynamismus) . St. Thomas Aquinas, De Physico Auditu, VII 1 , XXII 588 : Quod autem est sibi causa alicujus, oportet quod primo ei conveniat : quia quod est primum in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post ; unde ignis, qui sibi et aliis est causa caloris , est primum calidum. 94 Borgmann, Pacificus ,,, Die Stellungnahme des Duns Skotus zum Aristotelisch-Thomistischen Bewegungsgesetz : Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, IV ( 1937) 42 : Der Skotische Begriff des actus virtualis ist auch der modernen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft ganz geläufig. Vgl . den Leibnizischen Begriff der vis activa und den Begriff 'potentielle Energie' in der heutigen Physik. 95 Metaph., loc. cit. , 596 : ... et sic agens quodcumque aequivocum est in actu respectu effectus, non formaliter habens actum similem , quia tunc non esset agens aequivocum , sed virtualiter habens , quia scilicet formaliter habet eminentiorem . Rep. Par. , loc. cit. , 122 : Et cum dicitur, passum est tale in potentia, quale agens in actu, dico quod hoc est verum in actione univoca, et impossibile est quod idem sit in actu ens formaliter tale, et in potentia ante actum formaliter tale ; tamen in actione aequivoca nunquam oportet hoc esse verum, quia ibi agens oportet esse nobilius , et virtualiter tale.

7 Philosophy Series No. 15

82

Chapter III God is said to possess all the perfections of creatures, either formally

or virtually. For example, He possesses the perfection of intelligence formally. The perfection of corporality, however, is His only in a virtual manner. In other words, He has the actual power to make or create bodies. Similarly, the human will possesses virtually a particular perfection, namely, an act of volition . The will is the power in man to cause acts of volition. These acts of volition are, in turn , received by the will as a passive principle. Before the will elicits a particular act of volition, the act of volition is in modal objective potentiality, and the will itself is in modal subjective potentiality to the formal act of volition. At the same time , the will is in virtual act in reference to the perfection of volition . In other words, it is an actually existing power which can elicit an act of volition . Hence we see that there is no contradiction in this situation, namely, that one and the same thing can be in virtual act in reference to a given perfection and at the same time be in potency to the formal act of this same perfection . 96 The latter statement is important. It represents a deepening of the Scotistic position , and shows that all instances of self- motion do not necessarily break down into two parts, the mover and the moved. Those who find contradiction in the radical self-motion defended by Duns Scotus are thus burdened with the duty of showing the incompatibility of virtual act in reference to a given perfection and potency to the formal act of this perfection. One and the same thing can be in virtual act in reference to a given perfection and at the same time be in potency to the formal act of this same perfection . For Duns Scotus, this proposition is true ex terminis. The denial of this proposition is false ex terminis.97 Still in order to establish his position beyond all cavil, the Franciscan Master recounts and rejects various opposing arguments. i) An act in which another act resides virtually, it is argued, is more perfect than the second act in its formal actuality. The first act, therefore, perfects the subject more than the second act, and hence takes away its potency to the second act in its formal actuality.98 96 Metaph ., loc. cit. , 597-98 : Contra responsionem istam, quae in hoc stat, activum est in actu virtuali , et idem est in potentia receptiva formaliter illius, ad quod est illa virtus . Rep. Par. , loc. cit.: ... nihil prohibet ipsum esse simul in actu virtuali , et in potentia formali ad perfectionem talem, quam debet recipere . 97 Op. Oxon., II d . 25 q . u ., XIII 209. 98 Metaph. , loc . cit. , 598 : Tum, quia actus in quo est alius virtualiter, perfectior est illo formali , qui est in virtute ejus ; ergo perficit magis subjectum, et ita tollit potentiam ad formalem magis quam alius formalis . Cf. also Rep. Par., loc. cit.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

83

To this argument, Scotus concedes that an actual being in which a secondary act resides virtually is more perfect than the secondary act in its formal actuality . Nevertheless, if the being possessed of the virtual act is limited, then it is still capable of further perfection . For a formal act, as distinguished from this act possessed virtually, is an added perfection. Thus a particular subject would be less perfect, if it possessed an act only virtually and not formally. Hence a subject in act can be in potency to further perfection.99 ii) It is argued that the actualization of an act brings no added perfection to a subject , if the subject already possesses this act virtually.100 This proposition is false, Scotus answers, when the subject is limited. For the perfection of such a subject, no matter how great it might be, can always be enhanced by the addition of a lesser perfection . Thus the subject without the added perfection would be less perfect than the subject with the perfection . 101 The force of this argument can be brought out by a comparative consideration of substance and accident . Substance per se, according to common admission , bespeaks greater perfection than accident per se. The excelling perfection of substance, however, does not despoil it of potentiality in reference to accidents . Accidental perfection does not simply appear superfluous to substance, for substance plus accidental perfection bespeaks greater perfection than substance alone . 102 iii) A third argument is given against the assertion that a thing can be in virtual act according to some perfection and at the same time in potency to the formal actualization of that perfection. This assertion , it is contended , has the two following inacceptable implications .

" Metaph., loc. cit. , 599 : Ad primam probationem concedatur, quod praecise sumendo utrumque actum scilicet virtualem et formalem, virtualis perfectior est ; quando tamen est limitatus, non est ita perfectus, ut omnem potentiam subjecti excludat respectu formalis, quia ille formalis aliqua perfectio est, inquantum distinguitur a virtuali, et ita secundum illum proprium gradum ejus non perficeretur subjectum, quod haberet solum virtualem . 100 Ibid. , 598 : Tum quia frustra videtur in fieri illa perfectio formalis, praehabita ista virtuali, quia per formalem non fit perfectius illud quod recipit quam prius. 101 Ibid., 599 : Per hoc ad secundam probationem, quod perfectio minor non superfluit in aliquo, quod primo habet majorem perfectionem, nisi illa major omnem gradum perfectionis conferret, quam haberet subjectum habendo illam majorem cum minore ; et hoc nunquam est quoniam illa major est limitata, quia omnis limitata minor est seipsa cum alia. 102 Rep. Par., loc. cit.: ..., quia substantia est nobilior accidente , et nobilitati suae non repugnat posse recipere accidens, nec etiam repugnat enti perfecto efficere ; igitur non repugnat sibi , quin illud efficeret in se propter perfectionem suam. Cf. Metaph. , loc. cit.

7°

84

Chap

ter

III

a) God could be in subjective potency to many perfections which are not proper to Him formally but only virtually. b) The sun would be in subjective potency to many forms which can be generated through its power. 103 Duns Scotus, of course, denies that his position involves these two inacceptable implications. First as to God, His infinite perfection forbids that He be in subjective potency to additional perfections . The addition of a new perfection would also introduce composition into God. But composition is impossible in Him, because it is incompatible with His absolute infinity.104 Even if, per impossibile, a perfection which the divine essence contains virtually were received by it, the divine perfection would not be enhanced, for infinite perfection plus finite perfection is not greater than infinite perfection alone.105 Virtual act and formal act , as Scotus teaches, do not per se bespeak

any repugnance to each other. Hence per se they can be realized in one and the same thing. In some instances , however, their simultaneous realization in one and the same thing might be impossible. But this impossibility would not stem from the precise nature of virtual and formal act but from some other cause.106 In the case of God, this impossibility would arise from His nature as an infinite being. The situation is similar in the case of the sun . The sun cannot be in subjective potency in reference to various perfections such as heat . But this impossibility does not obtain because the sun possesses this quality virtually, but because heat, according to the medieval view, is a quality proper to corruptible bodies alone . Hence the inherence of heat in the sun is imposible because of its incorruptibility.

Saturn contains virtually not heat but coldness .

Although not hot virtually, still Saturn cannot be in subjective potency to heat. The reason again is that heat is a quality of corruptible bodies , and Saturn is incorruptible. This incorruptibility of the heavenly 103 Rep. Par., loc. cit.: . . . , quia sic Sol, qui est virtualiter calidus, esset in potentia ut esset formaliter calidus, et similiter Deus posset esse formaliter tale quale est virtualiter, et per consequens posset esse formaliter asinus . Cf. Metaph., loc. cit. 104 Rep. Par., loc . cit. , 123 : Similiter, exemplum de Deo singulare est, quia Deus habet omnem perfectionem modo infinito, et talis modus excludit omnem componibilitatem . nam actus virtualis in Deo infinitus est, et 105 Metaph. , loc. cit.: ideo si per impossibile formalis inesset, nullo modo esset perfectior, quia finitum cum infinito nihil majus est infinito solo. 106 Ibid., 599-600 : . . . , respondeo generaliter ex ratione actus virtualis et formalis, nunquam est repugnantia quod insint eidem, quia tunc ubique esset repugnantia ; potest tunc unus esse in aliquo, cui alius repugnat ex alia causa, Cf. also Quodl. , q . 15, XXVI 178–79.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

85

bodies provides us with an apt explanation why the sun cannot be in subjective potency to the varied forms which are generated under its influence.107 That a thing be in subjective potency to a perfection which it contains in virtual actuality, - this could be an impossibility . This is not to be denied . But to trace this impossibility back to a repugnance between virtual and formal act is the fallacy of non causa ut causa. It fails as an explanation in other instances, such as when a particular thing cannot be in subjective potency to a formal act, even though it in no wise possesses this act virtually. This indicates that the ground of the impossibility is to be sought in some more special cause, such as the nature of the thing.108 In the final analysis, the principle of motion comes to mean this : the same thing cannot be in virtual act and potency to formal act in reference to one and the same perfection . For Scotus, this proposition is false ex terminis, and accordingly, he affirms the compatibility of virtual act and potency to formal act . It is hard to see how this compatibility can be denied . An opponent might insist on more than virtual containment of every effect in its cause . But to make this insistence is to deny equivocal causality. By definition , an equivocal cause produces an effect which is different in nature from itself. Consequently, the equivocal cause cannot contain its effect formally . And significantly, the fact that the equivocal cause does not contain the effect formally constitutes one reason why it might be able to be the recipient of the very effect it produces . Scotus' teaching on the compatibility of virtual act and potency to formal act appears firmly established and well explains the possibility of self-motion . It is no wonder then that he is followed in this by the great sixteenth century scholastic, Francis Suarez.109 In modern times, the eminent Spanish thinker, Angel Amor Ruibal, also gives Scotus much credit for his penetrating analysis and rejection of the cinesiological principle.110 But another modern thinker, Josef Santeler, expresses the 107 Ibid.; Metaph. , loc. cit .; Rep. Par. , loc cit. unde omnia talia argumenta procedunt se108 Metaph., loc. cit.: cundum non causam , ut causam . Nam ubicumque unus istorum actuum inest, et alius non potest inesse, non est causa impossibilitatis, quia alius inest ; sed ex alia causa speciali , quae si staret sine illo alio actu , adhuc esset causa ejusdem impossibilitatis . 109 Disputationes Metaphysicae, dispt. XXIX sect . 1 no . 7, XXVI 23 . 110 Los Problemas Fundamentales de la Filosofia y del Dogma, VI (MadridBarcelona, a. s. ) , 615 .

86

Chapter III

opinion that Scotus has not given us the final answer to the difficulties involved in a rejection of the famed principle.¹¹¹ Perhaps it is rare that a philosopher ever completely settles a problem. But if Scotus has not settled this problem, then various questions at once suggested are : why does Scotistic doctrine not effect this settlement, wherein lies its defect , and what question does it leave unanswered ? As to these questions, Santeler is not very clear, but apparently, the defect is to be found in the doctrinal elements we have just considered . For according to Santeler, Scotus affirms the perfection of virtual act at the expense of the perfection of formal act . Virtual act contains formal act , and apparently is so richly endowed and possessed that it no longer allows for an increase in being. According to the Scotistic view, causal activity would give rise to a loss of being rather than to an increase thereof. But Scotus , as Santeler reports, does not hide the difficulty from himself, for he clearly teaches that virtual act per se bespeaks greater perfection than formal act per se. A combination of virtual and formal act, however, bespeaks still greater perfec112 tion than either of the two alone.¹ The essence of Santeler's objection , therefore, seems to be this : Scotus' doctrine does not adequately allow for or explain the increase of being involved in the various changes effected by efficient causes . An objection, such as this, immediately suggests this problem : do changes really involve an increase of being, and if they do , what precisely is meant by this increase of being ? Answers to these questions are implied in Scotus ' defense of the self-movent character of the intellect and will . But these questions are more explicitly treated where he inquires concerning the possibility of a creature to create.113 111 Der Kausale Gottesbeweis bei Herveus Natalis nach dem ungedruckten Traktate de cognitione primi principii ( Innsbruck, 1930) , 21 : Eine letzte Antwort in dieser schwierigen Frage hat Scotus damit wohl nicht gegeben. 112 Ibid.: Damit war allerdings die Schwierigkeit des Gegners keineswegs beseitigt. Wenn Scotus die virtuelle Vollkommenheit der Fähigkeit auf Kosten der formellen stark betont, konnte daraus mit Recht gefolgert werden, in dieser Ansicht bedeute die Tätigkeit nicht einen Zuwachs, sondern eher einen Verlust des Seins (Vollkommenheit) . Scotus verhehlt sich die Schwierigkeit nicht, antwortet jedoch mit einer Unterscheidung des unbegrenzten und begrenzten Seins. Beim Unendlichen könne freilich kein Zuwachs hinzukommen, wohl aber beim Endlichen ; mag auch der virtuelle Akt, an sich betrachtet, mehr Vollkommenheit in sich schließen als der formelle, wiederum für sich gesehen , so bedeutet doch die Vereinigung des einen mit dem andern eine größere Vollkommenheit als die eines von beiden allein . 113 Op. Oxon. , IV d . 1 q. 1 , XVI 12—99 ; Rep . Par. , III d. 1 q . 1 , XXIII 531-44. Cf. Allan Wolter, "The Theologism of Duns Scotus, " Franciscan Studies, VII ( 1947 ) 383-89.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

87

According to Avicenna, a creature has the power to create . For in the emanation of creatures from the First Being, a higher intelligence creates the lower intelligence next to it in an entire series of beings . Now it is the contention of Duns Scotus that this Avicennian doctrine can be philosophically disproved.114 First of all, it can be disproved that a creature can create , if the term ' create' signifies an activity which is completely independent of 115 a higher cause. God alone can create in this sense . The term ' create ' can also signify the activity of a subordinate or secondary agent which produces an effect in virtue of a form proper and intrinsic to itself, and which causes this effect independently of the cocausality of a material cause . Creation in this sense would be the production of something out of nothing, that is, not out of any matter.116 This would approximate the Avicennian notion , according to which a creature can create. Again, it is the contention of Duns Scotus that creation by a creature in this second sense can be philosophically disproved, but only according to various specifications. For there is no valid argumentation for showing the general impossibility of a creature to create in this sense . The impossibility of creatures to create " arises not because they are creatures but because they are this or that kind of creature . " 117 In one place, Scotus asserts that it is difficult to deny creatures the power to create according to the second meaning of this term. Et hoc modo accipiendo eam (sc . creationem) difficile est prohibere quin possit creatio competere agenti creato respectu multorum ut respectu formarum subsistentium, cujusmodi sunt Angeli , si sunt formae simplices, et etiam respectu formarum quae non educuntur de potentia materiae ut animae intellectivae, sive respectu formarum accidentalium, ut sunt fides , spes, intelligere, velle et hujusmodi.118 In another place, however, Scotus shows from reason alone that : "I) a pure intellectual created nature, such as that of an angel, cannot 114 Rep. Par., loc. cit . , 539 : De primis autem formis ponit Avicenna 9 . Metaph. cap. 4 quod Intelligentia superior creavit aliam Întelligentiam sibi proximam, non quod omnes Intelligentiae sint a primo immediate productae vel creatae ; sed quod proxima primae Intelligentiae sit a prima Intelligentia, et proxima secundae Intelligentiae sit ab ipsa secunda, et proxima tertiae a tertia, et sic deinceps usque ad ultimam,. 115 Ibid.: ..., et isto modo concedo quod Deus solus creat . Licet enim quodcumque aliud a Deo posset aliud producere de nihilo, necessario tamen praesupponeret aliud agens in actione sua, ut primam causam, et ita non est possibile ist modo aliquam creaturam creare aliquid. Cf. also Op . Oxon., loc. cit., 86. 117 Wolter, Allan B. , art. cit., 388. 116 Rep. Par., loc. cit. 118 Rep. Par., loc. cit.

88

Chapter III

create another substance , for intellection and volition in a creature are accidental. 2 ) No material form can be created by a creature . 3 ) No material form, whether it be accidental or essential, can be a principle of creation."119 Significantly, Scotus does not disallow that an intellectual created nature, such as the human soul, can create such spiritual accidents as acts of intellection and volition . When the will, therefore, elicits an act of volition, it creates in the sense that it produces a new being, and does this not out of any prejacent matter. The new being we are confronted with here is new in a strict sense, for it represents a veritable increase in being. This productive activity of the will, be it remembered, presupposes the cooperation of a coexisting First Cause . Now how does this Scotistic doctrine concerning the possibility or

impossibility of a creature to create relate to the topic of our dissertation ? First, it shows that Scotus' doctrine concerning the compatibility of virtual act and potency to formal act allows that a real increase in being can result from the activities of some efficient causes. In fact, this increase in being is explained eminently well. Doctrines on being and existence are at times some of the most vague and mystifying doctrines to be found in philosophical literature. This is not the case here. For in order to point up the meaning of increase in being , we are simply to look to our own inner experience . In this experience, we get to know what acts of thinking and willing are. At one moment, we are conscious of a particular act of thinking, of which we were not conscious before . We can experience it coming into existence. Since we experience this act, it is something real . Such an act is a being 120 By way of our many acts of thinking and willing, therefore, we get to know real increases of being . We get to know what is meant when it is said that the will, which contains a volitional act in virtual actuality, can cause this act in its formal actuality, which is a real increase in being. A philosopher might well insist that a new being and substance is the result of a substantial change . Thus for example, when a chemist burns hydrogen in oxygen , water results as a new substance. In such a case, water is something new, because its nature is different from both the natures of hydrogen and oxygen in isolation . One might also speak of the new being of an organism in reference to its various parts or 119 Wolter, Allan B. , art. cit. , 387. 120 Ord. , I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 289 : Ad quaestionem respondeo quod intellectio actualis est aliquid in nobis non perpetuum sed habens ' esse ' post 'non-esse, ' sicut experimur.

Does Self-motion sissolve into the Mover and the Moved

89

M

organs. For the parts are organized into a higher unity, Ganzheit, which is more than the sum of its parts. But the new being given in acts of 11.

thinking and willing is something different, and this difference is obvious . These acts represent veritable increases of being. It is simply a marvelous fact, testified to by experience, that man has the power of causing acts of volition and intellection , and thus of causing increases in being. This is surely a fact which lends much dignity to his nature and sets him apart from purely material creatures . At the most, such creatures " can cause a mutation of forms but not their creation or annihilation . "121 But Santeler objects that the Scotistic doctrine on the compatibility of virtual act and potency to formal act does not allow for an increase of being. Now if this increase is looked for in the spiritual activities of the intellect and will, then Scotistic doctrine explains this increase eminently well . But if increase in being is to be found in local motion, quantitative change and qualitative change in bodies, then it is simply to be denied that such change involves a real increase in being, as we have it in the case of thought and volition . It would be up to an opponent to show that in these cases there is a real increase in being , an addition of being which in no wise existed before . Later it will be made clear, particularly in reference to quantitative change, that the change is effected by means of matter.122 Food is the matter out of which and by means of which an organism realizes growth . The organism increases in quantity, and this quantity is real . But this does not mean that there is an increase of being which in no wise existed before. In point of fact, the being involved here existed before under the form of food. Joseph Owens is another scholar who finds serious fault with the Scotistic doctrine of virtual act . As was pointed out in Chapter I , 123 this Thomistic thinker interprets the prima via of St. Thomas in the light of a doctrine of existential act. In the light of this same doctrine, as it appears, he finds fault with the teaching of Scotus. Why is virtual act compatible with potency to formal act in the same subject and in the same respect ? The ultimate answer is that we see examples of the combination ; therefore, there can be nothing contradictory about the combination or we could not have those instances of it. The objection that naturally arises is faced squarely . Formal act contains something more than virtual act . Therefore virtual act cannot fully account for it. 121 According to Duns Scotus, no creature can create a material form. Cf. Allan B. Wolter, art. cit. , loc. cit. 122 Cf. Ch . IV 138–39. 123 Ch . IV 9.

90

r Chapte III

The reply of Scotus has been that the virtual act is of itself more perfect : yet in limited agents the formal adds a less perfect grade which nevertheless is a real addition to the virtual act. Where does this addition come from ? Scotus here seems utterly unaware of any problem at all, for an equivocal agent contains the perfection of its effect in a more perfect way. He writes as though that fully accounts for all the perfection in the effect, even including the added grade.194 According to Owens, the doctrine of Scotus seems to presuppose an Aristotelian background " where the metaphysical explanation of new being is restricted to the realm of form or essence ." Concerning both the Aristotelian and Scotistic explanations, Owens writes further : Neither the one nor the other seems to feel any need to explain the new act of existing that actuates a formal act which before was found only virtually in its cause . Both proceeded as though there were in this regard no problem that called for a metaphysical explanation . From the viewpoint of formal causality alone the equivocal agent may be capable of accounting fully for the different effect. But what accounts for the effect as existentially different ? No answer is forthcoming ; no treatment even is given ; no problem seems to be felt . 125 An answer to Owens' criticism, we believe, has already been given in our treatment of Santeler's objection and in the Scotistic notion of virtual act as explained . But a few added considerations are in order. It is quite apparent that Owens criticizes Scotus in the light of a very particular doctrine of existential act. This doctrine, as is clear from other parts of Owens' article, is that of a real distinction between essence and existence.126 Now it is well known that Duns Scotus rejects the real distinction.127 But in no wise does such rejection imply that he or his metaphysics is not concerned with an explanation of the existence of things.128 This was made indubitably clear in our study of the question whether a creature can create, a question which Owens apparently has not considered . Even in questions which treat the cinesiological principle in extenso, Scotus shows a concern for existence . In a discussion of the intellect as a partial efficient cause of acts of intellection , the Franciscan Doctor writes :

124 "The Conclusion of the Prima Via, " The Modern Schoolman, XXX (1953), 209-10. 125 Ibid. , 210- II. 126 Ibid., 203 127 Op. Oxon., IV d . 11 q . 3 , XVIII 429 : Nescio enim istam fictionem, quod esse est quid superveniens essentiae. 128 Cf. Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus ( St. Bonaventure, New York, 1946) , 65—71 .

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

91

... intellectio actualis est aliquid in nobis, non perpetuum sed habens ' esse ' post ' non-esse, ' sicut experimur.129 Clearly, the words ' esse' and ' non-esse' mean existence and nonS

existence . Certainly, they do not mean a kind of essence or non-essence , which are bereft of all existence . Moreover, it is positively false to say that Duns Scotus gives no explanation or account of this esse post nonesse, the new and added being of an act of intellection . Part of this

‫طمة‬

explanation is the intellect itself as a partial efficient cause.130 A philosopher might reject the Scotistic explanation . This is one thing, but it

P

is quite another and an inexcusable misrepresentation to assert that Duns Scotus offers no explanation . Apparently, Owens meets the text of Scotus with the a priori concep-

25 tion : a metaphysics which denies the real distinction between essence and existence cannot attempt and cannot profess to give an explanation of the existence of things . Until Owens relieves himself of this apriorism , his studies of the metaphysical doctrines of Duns Scotus will invariably result in misrepresentations . But aside from all this, we do not see how the doctrine of the real distinction has any particular relevance to Scotus' teaching on selfmotion. In other words, even if Scotus accepted this doctrine, the acceptance would not alter his position concerning the power of somethings to move themselves . This perhaps can be made clear by reviewing some of the ground already covered, and in doing this, we will speak as concretely as possible. According to Duns Scotus, the will is a partial efficient cause of its own acts of willing. 131 And when the will is actually causing a particular act of willing, we can know this act by intuitive cognition , which is an immediate knowledge of a thing in its existence.132 Furthermore, we can, as it were, point to this act of willing, and on the basis of our intuitive cognition, assert two propositions which are true : this is an act of willing, and this is an existing thing. Hence when Scotus maintains that the will causes an act of willing, he is not saying that the will causes only the essence of an act of willing which is bereft of all existence, or which has only some diminished being other than the being of metaphysics. But neither does Duns Scotus have to go out of his way and make some special insistence that the will causes both the essence of an act of willing and its existence , since he 129 130 131 132

Ord. , I d . 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 289. A fuller explanation of this issue is given in Ch . IV 156-—59. The self-motion of the will is discussed in Ch. IV 159–63 . Cf. footnotes 159, 215 of Ch . IV 148 165 .

Chapter III

92

does not hold to any real distinction between essence and existence. Hence Owens ' view that the doctrine of Scotus presupposes an Aristotelian background " where the metaphysical explanation of new being is restricted to the realm of form or essence ," - this view is misleading and false. But now consider the hypothesis that Scotus holds to the real distinction . In other words, grant that the act of willing is metaphysically composed of two really distinct principles , essence and existence . In this case, the will would be the partial efficient cause of both principles of the volitional act . For Scotus fully allows that the will is the partial cause of the esse or existence of an act of willing. Hence the real distinction granted, the essential position of Duns Scotus remains intact : the will can move itself, the will can contain virtually the very being which it can actively cause and receive in its formal actuality. In his teaching concerning the compatibility of virtual act and potency to formal act, Scotus really seems, contrary to Santeler and Owens, to have given us a solidly established doctrine . The assertion of this compatibility is justified from a consideration of the terms involved, and all a priori arguments against it are destitute of necessity. But whether this compatibility is actually realized in existing things is an issue to be determined by experience . There is no denying that God could have created a world in which nothing would have the power to move itself. But as a matter of fact, He has not done so . There is the other possibility that God creates a world in which at least some things can move themselves . As a matter of fact, this appears to be what He has actually done. There could hardly be anything more foreign to the mind of a modern nuclear physicist than the conception that matter is essentially inert . On the contrary, he holds it to be essentially and more completely active than Duns Scotus himself ever dreamed of. 8. The Principle of Motion and Metaphysics. But we do not think that it is the outstanding merit of Duns Scotus to have effected an anticipation, although feeble, of modern science . To us it seems that his real merit consists in this : the principle of motion is denied the status of a metaphysical verity. This reveals that metaphysics, at least for Scotus, is a science so completely distinct from physics that it can correct itself and is not dependent on physics as to the basic testing of its own metaphysical tenets . In his opposition to the erection of the cinesiological principle into a metaphysical principle, Scotus is chiefly at odds with Godfrey of

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved Fontaines. The Belgian

Philosopher maintains

that

93

metaphysical

principles are strictly universal. Accordingly, they never admit exceptions in individual instances . To deny such a principle in a single instance because of particular difficulties is to deny it in all other instances . Hence if potency and act are compatible in some instances , then they are universally compatible, and in the end , there will be no reason why all motion is not self-motion.133 This line of argumentation we have met before. But here an answer is to be given in terms of potency and act . As has been made abundantly clear, virtual act and potency to formal act are not per se repugnant. Nonetheless, in some instances they cannot be simultaneously verified in one and the same thing . Sometimes only the virtual act of a particular perfection can be verified in an individual thing. Verification or non-verification in particular instances will depend on some third thing, a cause other than the supposed re134 pugnance between virtual act and potency to formal act.1 Hence it does not follow from Scotus' teaching that everything would move itself. It would not follow that wood, for example, would

133 Godfrey de Fontaines, Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, VI q . 7, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1914 ) , III 170 : Tamen ad praedictas dubitationes dissolvendas primo supponimus quod, quia aliqua principia esse certissima oportet, alioquin nihil etiam posset per ea investigari, communia ergo illa principia metaphysicae, quae quodam modo est omnis scientia , debent in qualibet scientia speciali supponi ; et ideo quia ex metaphysica hoc scire debemus quod unum et idem non potest esse in actu et potentia et quod illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid non potest se reducere ad actum secundum illud et hoc pertinet ad metaphysicam, quia est commune omni enti, ideo hoc debemus supponere circa angelos et circa animam et, hoc supposito, alia quae ad ipsam animam specialiter pertinent investigare, nec propter ignorantiam vel dubitationem circa posteriora debemus certissima et prima negare. Si ergo alicui videatur quod, supposito quod voluntas non moveat se ipsam, difficile sit servare libertatem quam sua aestimatione vult ponere in voluntate sicut placet ex hoc posteriori, non debet procedere ad negationem priorum et certorum , sed propter certitudinem priorum quae supponere habet debet studere quomodo illis posteriora concordet. Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans, q. 2, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1924 ) , IV 19-20 : Unde cum actus est potentia dividunt et circueunt totum ens, istae rationes aequaliter sunt cuilibet enti . Et si per eas probatur et conceditur quod in aliquibus materialibus ita est , per easdem probabitur quod etiam in immaterialibus ita est. Et quia ratione in uno ente quocumque deficiet, et in omnibus. Cf. also Duns Scotus, Ord., I d. 3 p. 3 q. 2, III 258 ; Metaph. , IX q . 14, VII 599 . 134 Ibid. , 600 : nam concedo , quod actus talis et talis , sive actus virtualis et potentia ad formalem omnino in nullo repugnant , quia tunc ubique repugnarent , potest tamen alterum illorum alicui tertio repugnare , cui alter inest, et alicui tertio utrumque repugnare . Et secundum hoc quandoque neutrum potest inesse, quandoque utrumque , quandoque hoc sine illo, quandoque e converso .

94

Chapter III

burn itself and not be burned by fire. With much insistence , Scotus scores this point against Godfrey of Fontaines.135 First it can be shown that wood is not at least the total cause of its heat . For if it were such, then it would always be burning itself. This follows because wood, if it were active , would be a natural cause, that is, non-free and determined in its activity . The requirement of the agent being sufficiently close to the passive principle would be fully met, since the wood is surely sufficiently close to itself. Admittedly, the wood is also the total recipient principle . Nor could one reasonably invoke the presence of some unknown impediment, which would only function when fire is absent. Perhaps then wood is a partial cause of its heat. Scotus considers this to be quibbling and invalid . Two partial causes are not admitted in reference to one and the same effect , if one of the causes has the power to produce the total effect.136 To explain the fact that wood does not burn itself, clearly, this does not necessitate recourse to the alledged repugnance between virtual act and potency to formal act . To make such recourse, according to Scotus, involves the fallacy of non causa ut causa . Surely, the more reasonable explanation of the fact that wood does not burn itself is simply the nature of wood . Thus once again we see that a universal and unlimited self-motion does not follow from Scotus ' teaching.137 And as to metaphysical principles, Scotus admits their universality. But neither is a genuine metaphysical principle ever contradicted in individual instances. One criterion of its truth is its agreement with experience. But the so called first and metaphysical principle here contradicts experience and leads to manifest absurdities.138

135 Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, VI q. 7, III 158 : Quis etiam probabit lignum vel corpus aliquod calefieri ab igne ? Immo dicetur quod seipsum calefacit, praesente igne ut causa sine qua non . 136 Ord., I d . 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 309—11 . 137 Ibid. , 305 : Si arguas ' ergo in omnibus posset idem esse in actu virtuali reet in potentia ad actum formalem, et ita quidlibet potest movere se, ' spondeo quod in ista illatione est non causa ut causa, nam ex generali ratione ' actus virtualis et potentiae ad actum formalem' nulla est repugnantia, quia si ex ista ratione esset repugnantia, et in quolibet esset repugnantia ; tamen in aliquo cum actu virtuali concurrit aliquid aliud, propter quod repugnat, sibi quandoque esse in potentia vel actu tale formaliter. 138 Metaph . , IX q . 14, VII 600 : Quod additur de principiis Metaphysicis, verum est, quod sunt universalissima, sed nullum illorum in aliquo singulari recipit instantiam . Signum enim est sermonum verorum confesse se habere his, quae apparent, sed quomodo dicetur illud esse principium, ad quod tot absurda sequuntur .

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

95

The supposed first and metaphysical principle at stake here is this : it is impossible that one and the same thing is in virtual act in reference to a given perfection and at the same time in potency to the formal act of this same perfection. The nature of this proposition as a first and metaphysical principle is simply to be denied. Aristotle, Scotus states, never held it as a first principle and not even as a tenth principle. It cannot be found anywhere in the Metaphysics of the Stagirite . Indulging in a bit of sarcasm , the Subtle Doctor muses that perhaps his opponents have another metaphysics, since they alone seem to be able to recognize the self-evident character of the proposition. It is most strange that this same proposition cannot win the assent of many others, who not only fail to appreciate its character as a first principle but proclaim the proposition to be absolutely false in many individual instances . 139

C) Self-motion and Relative Opposites In his Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes various kinds of opposition : contradictory, contrary, relative, and that of privation and possession . Relative opposition obtains between two things which are related to each other, as for example, cause and caused , the mover and the moved.140 Godfrey of Fontaines appeals to this notion of relative opposition in defending the principle of motion . In the case of a real relation, he contends, relative opposites are compatible in one and the same thing, only if it is composed of quantitative parts really distinct . In all other 139 Ord., loc. cit. , 306-07 : nulla sunt principia metaphysica quae habent multa singularia falsa ; intelligendo autem quod nihil est in actu virtuali et in potentia ad actum formalem, et quod ista repugnantia accipiatur ex ratione actus et potentiae, multa sunt singularia satis patenter falsa, ex quo satis sequitur quod istud non est principium metaphysicum ; Et si omnino contendas quod ' etiam loquendo de actu virtuale et potentia ad formalem actum, sit principium metaphysicum , ' quomodo alii erant ita caeci, et ille solus ' videns,' ut rationem terminorum communium metaphysicorum non possent concipere, et ex eis apprehendere veritatem talis complexi quod ipse ponit ' principium metaphysicum ?' — quod non tantum ab aliis non ponitur " principium, ' immo in multis falsum, et nusquam necessarium ratione terminorum . Metaph . , loc. cit. , 600-01 : Non credo , quod Aristoteles posuisset aliquod complexum esse principium non solum primum, sed nec decimum, ex quo in multis singularibus evidentia absurda sequerentur. ... si inquam est principium primum Metaphysicum , scio quod illud non est in Metaphysica Aristotelis scriptum. Si ipsi habeant aliam Metaphysicam, quomodo soli isti talem intellectum habuerunt, quod terminos istius principii capere poterant, omnibus aliis non potentibus capere ? quia si caperent terminos, et istud esset ut principium primum, statim huic acquiesceretur, quod tamen multi non tantum non capiunt ut principium, imo dicunt simpliciter falsum pro multis ejus singularibus. 140 Metaph., V I. 16, VII 56 (V c . 10 1018a) .

...

er

96

Chapt

III

cases, this compatibility is absolutely excluded . This means, for example, that the will cannot be really related to itself by being both an active and a passive principle of an act of volition.141 Scotus' answer to this argument appeals to a distinction previously delineated . This is the relation of active potency to an act or form and the relation of active potency to an effect of which the form is an element. Now the same thing cannot be related to itself according to the second relation, namely, the relation of an active principle to an effect . This is to say that the same nature or suppositum cannot be both cause and caused in reference to itself. A complication in Scotistic doctrine arises here when the Subtle

Doctor says that producer (producens) and produced (productum) cannot be simultaneously verified in one and the same suppositum. But they are compatible in one and the same nature. This distinction of cause and caused against producer and produced is made in view of the Holy Trinity, where one Person, as God the Son, is produced by another Person, God the Father. The productive activity here involves no dependence of one Person upon another or any causality of one Person in reference to another. But since one Person communicates its own one and the same nature, this divine nature both communicates and is communicated . In this sense, it both produces and is produced . The compatibility of these two notions in one and the same nature is guaranteed by this, namely, the divine nature is perfectly and completely (sine divisione) communicated by one Person to another. While cause and caused are incompatible in the same nature and suppositum, and while producer and produced are incompatible in the same suppositum, mover and moved are compatible in the same suppositum or in the same nature . As explained before, this means that one and the same thing can be both active and passive in reference to one and the same accidental perfection . In no wise does this situation imply that the same thing causes itself or is dependent on itself for its own existence . But it does mean that a thing can be dependent on itself for 141 Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, VII q . 6 , III 337 : ... tertio modo, dicitur unum quod in se complectitur plura non solum essentialiter differentia, sed etiam subiecto et situ, sicut quodlibet corpus quod ratione quantitatis extendentis habet plures partes extra se invicem. Ibid. , 345 : Et ideo relinquitur quod solum secundum tertium modum unius unde et idem potest referri ad se ipsum et esse activum et passivum respectu sui ipsius, ... The teaching of Godefrey is reported very briefly by Scotus in Ord. , I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 257: tunc etiam idem referretur ad se relatione reali, quod videtur impossibile, V Metaphysicae, propter oppositionem talium relationum . Cf. also Op. Oxon., II d . 25 q. u . , XIII 199.

Does Self-motion dissolve into the Mover and the Moved

97

some additional, accidental perfection . The will , for example, depends on itself for the eliciting of a particular act of volition . It is both the active and the passive principle of the act.142 The more fundamental ground of this compatibility of relative opposites, the mover and the moved, in one nature Scotus sees in a kind of infinity which is proper to some finite beings. In the divine nature, because of its absolute infinity, the relative opposites, producer and produced, are simultaneously verified . Now a nature which can both effect and receive further accidental perfections partakes of a kind of infinity. It is not limited to its present level of perfection . But in virtue of its active power to cause added perfections in itself, it is capable of a relatively unlimited development and enrichment in being. 143 According to Duns Scotus, therefore, the notion of a real relation as such does not forbid that it be verified in one single nature. Contrary to Godfrey of Fontaines, one and the same nature can be related to itself according to a real relation . If such is impossible in some particular instance, the explanation of this impossibility is to be sought in some cause other than the bare notion of a real relation . Thus once again, a metaphysical argument in support of the motion principle is dismounted, and ample room is left for self-motion. 142 Ord., loc. cit., 308-09 : Quod arguitur postea de relationibus realibus oppositis, dico quod aliquae ' relationes oppositae' sunt incompossibiles in eadem natura, aliquae non in eadem natura sed in eodem supposito, aliquae nec in eadem natura nec in eodem supposito . Unde ex ratione relationum realium in communi non potest concludi repugnantia earum in eodem. Exempla praedictorum : ' causa et causatum' in eadem natura sive in eodem supposito repugnant, quia si non, tunc idem dependeret a se ; ' producens et productum' non repugnant in eadem natura si natura potest communicari sine divisione, qualis est natura divina, repugnant tamen in eodem supposito ; 'movens et motum ' nec in eadem natura nec in eodem supposito repugnant, quia hic non ponitur dependentia essentialis, qualem ponunt relationes causae et causati , nec ibi ponitur quod idem sit antequam sit, quod ponere videtur ratio producti et producentis, ― sed tantum ponitur hic quod idem dependet a se quantum ad actum accidentalem, sicut motum a movente dependet quantum ad actum accidentalem quem recipit ab eo. Incompossibilitatem ergo aliquarum relationum realium oportet reducere ad aliquam incompossibilitatem priorem, et ubi illa prior non invenitur, ibi nec relationem realium oppositarum incompossibilitas concludetur. Cf. also Metaph., IX q. 14, VII 601 ; Op . Oxon . , loc . cit. , 211 ; Rep. Par. , II q . u ., XXIII 124 . 143 Ord., loc. cit. , 309 : Hoc etiam amplius declaratur, quia sicut istae relationes ' producentis et producti, ' quae sunt repugnantes in eodem supposito, possunt fundari in eadem natura ' illimitata, ' sicut in essentia divina, ita istae relationes ' moventis et moti, ' quae multo minorem habent repugnantiam, possunt fundari in eadem natura ' aliqualiter illimitata .' Quidquid autem est in potentia ad aliquem actum 'formaliter, ' et tamen cum hoc habet eandem actualitatem ' virtualiter' — sicut cum idem movet se - est aliqualiter illimitatum ; ponitur enim non tantum capax illius perfectionis, sed ut causans eam. Ibi ergo, propter illimitationem aliqualem , bene compatiuntur se illae relationes oppositae . Cf. also Metaph., loc. cit.

8 Philosophy Series No. 15

Chapter IV

PARTICULAR AREAS OF SELF-MOTION

In Chapter II it was stated that a new substantial form can never be the terminus of self-motion.¹ Accordingly, the perfection realized by self-motion must needs be an accident, some accidental form or perfection. Now in Scotus we find a twofold distinction of accidents : noncoeval and coeval.

A) Self-motion and Coeval Accidents 1. Non-coeval and Coeval Accidents . First , there are accidents which are not temporally coterminous with their subject . These are non-coeval accidents. Characteristic of these accidents is that they come to their subject by way of change.2 Examples of this type of accident are acts of willing in reference to the will, acts of thinking in reference to the intellect, new additions of quantity in reference to a body. Most emphatically, Scotus defends self-motion as a fact in the broad sphere of non-coeval accidents, and this will be made abundantly clear in the course of the present chapter. Secondly, there are accidents coeval with their subject . These accidents do not come to their respective subjects by way of change, but are bound up with the subject simultaneously with the existence of the latter. As an example of this type of accident, Scotus points to the quantity of a corporeal substance.3 The concept of an accident coeval with its subject might strike one as a strange notion . Scotus also speaks of it as a passio or property. Now this brings to mind St. Thomas' doctrine, according to which the faculties of the soul are proper accidents of the soul . As risibility flows from the essence of man , so the faculties of intellect and will flow from the essence of the soul . Consequently, they are cotemporal or coeval

1 37. 2 Metaph., IX q . 14 , VII 587 : vel non coaevum sibi , et ita per motum vel mutationem . 3 Ibid.: et hoc vel coaevum sibi, et ita sine mutatione, . . . At some length, Scotus defends the position that coeval accidents do not involve change. Cf. ibid., 587-88.

98

Particular Areas of Self-motion

99

with their subject . For when the soul is created, these proper accidents are necessarily created along with it, since the soul cannot exist without its faculties.4 But what is the meaning of coeval accident in Duns Scotus, particularly as this expression is used in his discussion of the cinesiological principle ? Is the term to be understood as a property in the strict sense, an essential property, such as risibility in reference to man ? And then could it be said that a metaphysical essence causes this property in the sense of efficient activity ? The precise meaning of coeval accident is not altogether clear, at least in his commentary on the Metaphysics where Scotus defends selfmotion in the sphere of coeval accidents . Accordingly, Hugo Cavellus suggests that in the commentary on the Metaphysics Scotus is either making an accomodation to the opinion of others, or he is not using the expression ' coeval accident' in the sense of a strict property.5 But to us it seems to be in accord with Scotistic thought to take the expression ' coeval accident' broadly enough so as to include properties in the strict sense . But then the relation between a metaphysical essence and its property should not be understood as any kind of physical motion. For Duns Scotus, such an essence cannot play the role of a real active cause. For a metaphysical essence and its properties are formally distinct a parte rei, and formalities are never "the product of a distinct physical causality over and above the causality which brings the thing as a whole into existence ." 4 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Anima, q . u . a . 12 , XIV 117 : Ad septimum dicendum quod tria sunt genera accidentium, quaedam enim causantur ex principiis speciei ; et dicuntur propria, sicut risibile homini : quaedam vero causantur ex principiis individui ; et hoc dicitur, quia vel habent causam permanentem in subjecto, et haec sunt accidentia inseparabilia, sicut masculinum et femininum, et alia hujusmodi ; quaedam vero habent causam non permanentem in subjecto, et haec sunt accidentia separabilia, ut sedere et ambulare. Est autem commune omni accidenti quod non sit de essentia rei ; et ita non cadit in definitione rei ; unde de re intelligimus quod quid est, absque hoc quod intelligamus aliquid accidentium ejus . Sed species non potest intelligi sine accidentibus quae consequuntur principium speciei ; potest tamen intelligi sine accidentibus individui etiam inseparabilibus : sine separabilibus vero esse potest non solum species, sed et individuum . Potentiae vero animae sunt accidentia sicut proprietates . Unde licet sine illis intelligatur quid est anima , non autem animam sine eis esse est possibile neque intelligibile. Cf. also Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Frederick Eckhoff, ( St. Louis, 1944 ) 104 ff. 5 Scholium III, given in the Vivès edition of Duns Scotus , Metaph . , IX q. 14 , VII 586 : Quod probat subjectum efficere suam passionem, vel loquitur in sententia communi aliorum, non in propria, quae tenet non distingui propriam passionem a subjecto, .... vel non de passione stricte sumpta... 6 Wolter, Allan B. , The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus ( St. Bonaventure , N. Y. , 1946 ) , 23 27. Disputa-

8.

100

Chapter IV Mastrius refers to the relation of an essence to its formalities as a

kind of metaphysical emanation . This emanation might be compared to motion or efficient activity, and analogically speaking, it might be said that the relation of a metaphysical essence to one of its essential properties is a motion . In an analogous sense, therefore, the essence is both passive and active in reference to its essential properties, and hence the essence moves itself.8 The example of a coeval accident given by Scotus is quantity. But this is hardly quantity in the strict sense, which is a certain order of the parts of a body among themselves . According to this order, one part is outside another part . Now this internal quantity is altogether essential to a body.10

But there is also local quantity . By reason of this property, the parts of a body coextend with the parts of the place which contains it, and one part of the body is outside the particular place in which another part is to be found . This kind of quantity specifies the ubi or situs of tiones ad Mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum (Venetiis, 1108) , dispt . 6 q. 11 a. 1 n. 211 , I 295 : Ut igitur ostendamus, quo pacto secernatur distinctio formalis a distinctione reali, & rationis, ac etiam virtuali, dicendum est, distinctionem formalem per hoc praecise distingui a reali proprie dicta, quia extrema huius sunt res, quae nimirum sunt propriae existentiae capaces, & physicam causalitatem terminare possunt, sed omnes, & singuli existunt existentia illius integrae essentiae, cujus sunt gradus essendi, . . " Ibid.: ad ejus productionem consequi sequela quadam sive emanatione Metaphysica,... Cherubini, P. F. , Cursus Philosophicus ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis (Rome, 1904 ) , I 522-23 : Ad hujus solutionem nota praeter motum physicum, v. g. potentiarum in sua objecta et etiam emanativum, v. g. passionum ab essentia. In quaesito includitur intentionalis et emanativus, et praecipue physicus motus. Cf. also Grajewski, Maurice, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus (Washington , D. C. , 1944) , 80–81 . 8 Ord . , I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2, III 307-08 : Necesse enim est aliquid idem quandoque esse materiam et efficiens respectu eiusdem, quod apparet, quia alias passio non praedicaretur ' per se secundo modo' de subiecto. Probatio, quia si praedicaretur de ipso ' per se secundo modo, ' est eius causa materialis sicut materia est in accidentibus, quia ponitur in definitione eius ut additamentum. Si etiam est praedicatio ' per se, ' ergo et necessaria : sed quod est sola causa materialis respectu alicuius non habet necessitatem respectu eius, ergo oportet praeter causalitatem materiae ponere in subiecto causalitatem efficientiae, ad salvandam necessitatem . ⁹ Metaph., IX q . 14, VII 58 : sicut de quantitate consequente substantiam corpoream genitam, . 10 Op . Oxon. , IV d. 10 q. 1 , XVII 184 : Dico ergo aliter, (a) quod positio, quae est differentia quantitatis, necessario inest quanto continuo permanenti, et istam oportet salvari in proposito, scilicet quae dicit ordinem partium in toto ; ibid., 186 : pars est extra partem, prout ly extra respicit per se ipsas partes corporis, et requiritur ad positionem, quae est differentia quantitatis, .; Rep . Par. , IV d . 10 q. 1 , XXIV 41 : Quantum ad secundum articulum, dico quod duplex est positio ; una, quae est differentia quantitatis, dicens ordinem partium in totum, secundum quam una pars totius quantitatis est extra aliam .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

ΙΟΙ

a body and thus stands for a relation which is intrinsic to the body itself.11 Normally and according to the ordinary course of nature, every corporeal substance possesses such local quantity. While its position in space might change, nevertheless, the body will never be without some particular local quantity. In this way, some particular quantity can be an accident coeval with its subject, something proper to the subject from the very moment of its generation or coming into existence, and this quantity the subject might retain for an indefinite period of time after its generation. 2. Self-motion and Non-analogical Coeval Accidents. Now the question to be faced here is, what is the active cause of this local quantity ? Later we will see that Duns Scotus fully allows that bodies acquire new positions in place by self-motion. But what about the local quantity a body has from the very first moment of its existence ? Would this quantity necessarily be given the body by the being which generated it, or could this coeval accident be actively caused by the generated body itself ? The view favored by Scotus is that the generated body causes its own local quantity.12 Thus the body would be the active cause of this coeval accident , and it would be such not in an analogical sense . At least,

11 Op. Oxon., loc. cit.: Praesupposito enim ordine partium in toto, positio dicit ultra hoc ordinem partium ad locum, sive ad partes loci vel locantis, hoc est dictu, quod partes coextendantur partibus loci, sicut totum dicitur primo commensurari toti loco, in quo habet ubi , ita quod positio praedicamentum praesupponit positionem differentiam quantitatis, et specificat ubi; Rep. Par. , loc. cit.: Alia est positio, quae est Praedicamentum, quae dicit ordinem partium in loco, vel in toto per comparationem ad partes continentis corporis. This distinction of quantity is elaborated by Scotus in his treatment of the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist . The Scotistic doctrine is presented by Gabriel Buescher, The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham ( St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1950) , 91 : To explain how Christ is present in the Eucharist with His quantity and yet not circumscriptively, Scotus distinguishes a twofold position with regard to the intrinsic parts of a body. According to the first position a body has a certain internal relation or juxtaposition of its parts with regard to the whole. This is quantity in the real sense of the word. Without such quantity a body cannot be a body. Hence, Christ's body in the Eucharist must have this first position, this internal quantity. To illustrate : Given this internal quantity, Christ's head is above His neck, His feet below His ankles, etc. Over and above this first position, Scotus acknowledges a second position of parts which, while presupposing the first position of parts, corresponds to the predicamental notion of situs . This is comparable to external quantity , or to a quantitative mode. As such, this quantitative mode, or local extension, or dimensive quantity, specifies the ubi which a particular body enjoys here and now. It is an extrinsic relation common to but not necessary to all corporeal substances. This relation enables a body to be geographically located with regard to all the other things in the universe . 12 Metaph., IX q . 14, VII 587.

102

Chapter IV

according to Duns Scotus, there appear to be no evident reasons against this stand. For quantity is not an active form , and hence its efficient principle would necessarily be an equivocal cause . But equivocal activity is one of the conditions of self-motion . Furthermore, bodies have the power to move themselves locally, for as a matter of fact and according to varying specifications, they do change their local positions, as we shall see later. Bodies are also altogether capable of taking on new local positions. Hence we see that all the essential requirements for selfmotion are fulfilled in reference to a corporeal substance and its coeval quantity. It is not necessary, therefore, to appeal to the generating agent of a body in order to explain the latter's local quantity. If the generating agent were the cause, it would be such in virtue of some particular power. But a power of the same nature is proper to the generated body. The body as a corporeal substance, moreover, is naturally prior to its local quantity, and hence could cause it . Temporal priority is not necessary.13 Corporeal substance in reference to local quantity is perhaps the clearest example of non- analogical self-motion in the sphere of coeval accidents. We should not think, however, that it is the only instance of self-motion in this sphere. Water, according to the medieval-Aristotelian view, by nature has the quality of coldness. If it is forcibly or violently made hot by some extrinsic agent , it will in turn make itself cold , once the extrinsic agent is removed.¹ Normally when water is generated , it will be cold . This quality of coldness, moreover, would be caused by the water itself the very instant it is generated. Since it can also retain this coldness at

13 Ibid.: si generans aequivoce illam causat, quaero per quid ? per A; in genito est A ejusdem rationis cum A in generante, et prior naturaliter ipsa quantitate, quia in generante poneretur prior natura quantitate in ipso; forma activa prior naturaliter forma inducibili ab ipsa in receptivo potest esse principium inducendi illam in illo ; prioritas enim temporis non requiritur, patet de luminoso et lumine, nec distantia localis, ut supra probatum est ; ergo ita, vel magis genitum causabit in se talem passionem, quam generans ; Op. Oxon., II d . 5 q . 2 , XII 317 : causa non causat effectum , nisi ut prior natura, non prior duratione, nam etsi non sit duratione prior causa quam causans, tamen prior fuit natura . Cf. Quod. , q . 15, XXVI 120—21 . Very instructive is Lychetus' commentary on this passage of the Quodl. (Cf. Vivès edition of Duns Scotus, p. 124.) 14 Op. Oxon., II d . facta, quae subtracto Manifestum etiam est, tatem et frigiditatem,

25 q . u . , XIII 209 : sicut patet de aqua summe calecalefaciente reducit se ad frigiditatem ; ibid. , 210 : quod cum aqua calefacta redit ad propriam naturaliquod tota aqua agit, et tota patitur.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

103

least for a period of time after its generation , this quality appears to be another example of a coeval accident. According to Scotus, it is also another instance of self-motion. After considering self-motion in reference to coeval accidents, we may now pursue our topic further in the more important and broader sphere of non-coeval accidents . In the broader Aristotelian acceptation, motion includes local motion, quantitative change or growth , and qualitative change or alteration . Each of these motions, moreover, can bring to a subject new accidents . Such accidents, because they are new, are non-coeval with their subject . Accordingly, our study of self- motion in the sphere of non-coeval accidents will successively consider the local motion of light and heavy things, the local motion of animals , quantitative change or growth, and qualitative change or alteration . Motion can also be taken in the broader Platonic acceptation so as to include the activities of knowing and willing. These spiritual activities are, likewise, non-coeval accidents, which belong to the soul . Hence our study will further consider both cognition and voluntary activity from the standpoint of self-motion . The sphere of spiritual activity is perhaps the most important and significant part of Scotus' defense of self-motion and rejection of the cinesiological principle. Up till now in our study, we have seen how Scotus minutely analyzes metaphysical concepts to establish his position . The stress , at least, has been on a priori analysis. But this analysis was carried on not to prove self-motion as a fact but rather to show it as something possible, and therefore, to disprove the position of those who deny self-motion as something factual and possible on a priori grounds. For Duns Scotus, the final proof for self-motion as a fact rests with experience . In the following pages, an emphasis on experience will come to the fore, as we review Scotus ' efforts to show against Godfrey of Fontaines that the so called metaphysical principle of motion is false in multis singularibus.

B) Self-motion and the Problem of Gravity One of the most baffling problems to occupy the scholastics in their philosophy of nature is that of the free fall of bodies, or to put it in more medieval language, the natural motion of light and heavy things (the levia and gravia) . Heavy things, such as earth, move downward ; light things, such as fire, move upward. In either case, a motion is given which is not caused by some perceptible external mover. What causes this motion ?

104

Chapter IV

One way out of this difficulty would be to insist on an external mover but invoke action at a distance . But such an explanation would not generally be acceptable to scholastics. St. Thomas denies the possibility of action at a distance ,15 and Godfrey of Fontaines insists on the necessity of a propinquity or contact between the mover and the moved. 16 While Duns Scotus allows for the physical possibility of action at a 17 distance, he does not invoke the latter as an explanation of the downward and upward motion of heavy and light things. Another possible answer to this question is that a light or heavy thing moves itself. This answer is also excluded for various scholastics, and on metaphysical grounds. But this is precisely the answer defended by Duns Scotus , which, Anneliese Maier assures us, represents a definite departure from the thought of his predecessors.18 We now turn to Scotus' several arguments in support of this his view, namely, that a heavy thing in its free fall moves itself. 1. Argument from the Simultaneity of Cause and Effect. The first argument proceeds from the simultaneous character of cause and effect. Every effect, when actually being caused, demands a cause which is actually producing it . Hence when a heavy thing is in a state of actual downward motion, there must be admitted a cause which is actually causing this motion.19 The question is, what is this cause ? i) First, can this cause simply be a thing which removes some impediment to downward motion ? Such a view finds basis in the Physics of Aristotle . A light or heavy thing, according to the Stagirite, is moved either by the cause which brought it into existence or by a cause which removes some obstacle or impediment to its natural motion.20 This Aristotelian view caused the scholastics no small amount of difficulty. That a heavy object is moved downward by the thing that brought it into existence is accepted or at least adapted into a larger theory by some. But not by Scotus, as we shall presently see . The second

15 Summa Theologica, Ia q. 8 a. 1 , I 50 : Ad tertium dicendum, quod nullius agentis quantumcumque virtuosi actio procedit ad aliquid distans, nisi in quantum in illud per media agit. 16 Cf. Ch. II 42 footnote 30. 17 Cf. Ch . II 42 footnote 31. 18 An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (2d ed.; Roma, 1952) , 164 : Die entscheidende Wendung kommt mit Duns Scotus. 19 Op . Oxon., II d . 2 q . 10 , XI 526 : Prima talis : omnis effectus quando in actu causatur, habet causam in actu, quia quod non est, quando non est, non producit aliquid ad esse; igitur quando descensus gravis est in actu, tunc aliquid est causans in actu. 20 Physic., VIII t . 33 , IV 169 (VIII c . 4 256a) .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

105

part of the Aristotelian doctrine concerning the removal of the impediment is likewise inacceptable to the Franciscan Master. For the free fall of a body requires a cause not only to explain the start of this motion but also its continuation during the whole process of descent . Obviously, a thing which simply removes some obstacle or hindrance does not fulfill this requirement.21 For the same reason , the cause of the free fall of a body cannot simply be a thing which strikes against the body. Such a striking cause, moreover, would not account for the downward aspect proper to the motion of heavy objects. It would also be a kind of per accidens cause, and thus would presuppose a per se cause . Hence the striking cause could not be considered a fundamental explanation.22 ii) Another explanation of the free fall of a body is that which appeals to the medium . Such an appeal is made by the Mussulman philosopher Averroes in his teaching on gravity.23 In Scotus a medium explanation is briefly considered , although not accepted . A body, it is argued, repels the air around it . When the air is thus moved, the body necessarily follows it, for otherwise a vacuum would be formed. In this way, the body is moved by the air and not by itself.24 This explanation is dismissed by Scotus. It is his opinion that the vacuum could be avoided in other ways . Why could not some other air move into the vacated area ? But more importantly, would not the body first have to be in local motion in order to repel the surrounding air ? 25 It is this last objection or one similar to it that medieval thinkers raise against the teaching of Averroes.26 Understandably enough, the Aver21 Op. Oxon., loc. cit. 22 Ibid.: neque per consequens ab impellente ipsum grave fertur deorsum, quia pellens non per se movet deorsum, quia in hoc est quasi removens prohibens, et tale movens secundum Philosophum 8 Physic. est quasi movens per accidens, et praeter movens per accidens, oportet dare movens per se efficiens, quia omne per accidens habet reduci ad per se. 23 Maier, Anneliese, op. cit., 153-54 : So kommt Averroes schließlich zu der Lösung, daß das grave sich nur per accidens bewegt ; es bewegt insofern es actu grave ist (also kraft seiner gravitas) das Medium, und das bewegte Medium bewegt seinerseits das grave. Ein fallender Stein bewegt sich also so wie ein Schiffer im Schiff, der das Schiff bewegt und damit per accidens sich selbst. Cf. Ernest A. Moody, " Galileo and Avempace, " Journal of the History of Ideas, XII ( 1951 ) 378. 24 Metaph. , IX q . 14 , VII 589 : Si per rationem pleni , scilicet ne fiat vacuum, quia pellit aerem a se et propter plenum, oportet quod sequatur aere pulsum . 25 Ibid.: quomodo pellit, nisi prius moveatur localiter. Similiter plenum posset salvari per aerem propinquum intrantem locum aeris pulsi , quare lapis intrat. 26 For example, Siger of Brabant , Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote, ed. Philippe Delhaye, VIII q . 20, in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1941 ) , XV 223 : Posterius enim non est per se causa prioris. Medium autem posterius

106

Chapter IV

roistic doctrine of the medium finds little acceptance among subsequent thinkers, although it reappears in Roger Bacon, Peter Aureoli, John Baconthorp, and Walter Burleigh . In all these thinkers, however, the theory is notably modified and changed.27 iii) Could the cause of the free fall of a body be the center of the earth , which draws or attracts the body ? This question suggests the later Newtonian doctrine, and it might surprise one that Scotus considers such a view. But as a matter of fact , various medieval thinkers hold that the place, to be occupied by a falling body, exerts influence in bringing the body to that same place.28 It is also a general scholastic teaching that place attracts a body in the order of final causality.29 Roger Bacon , for example, accords place final causality. But he at the same time clearly teaches that place is a cause in the order of efficient causality ,30 and it is this efficient causality which concerns us here . But what is Scotus ' view as to the center of the earth actively attracting bodies ? A relentless defender of self-motion, he argues against the attraction hypothesis . In fact, he finds it difficult to understand what this attraction is, and how it could accomplish its task. The case is conceived in which no body would be at the center, and in which the whole earth would be removed so that only an ideal center remains. In such a setup, Scotus believes that a body would still tend towards the center. But certainly then the center would not attract the body, 31 for such an ideal entity could not exercise any efficient causality.³ est motu ipsius gravis : prius enim movetur ipsum grave ex se, postea motum ex se movet medium; ergo medium non est per se causa totius motus ipsius gravis ; motus enim in medio posterior est motu gravis. At first Siger subscribes to the doctrine of Averroes , but later he changes his position, as is evident from the quotation given. Concerning this change in his thought, cf. Anneliese Maier, op. cit. , 154. 27 Ibid. Die averroistische Gravitationstheorie hat im lateinischen Mittelalter kaum Anklang gefunden. Sie wird, von ganz wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, abgelehnt. ... Einer gewissen Hinneigung zur averroistischen Lehre, aber meist mit starken Umbildungen oder Umdeutungen, werden wir auch sonst hin und wieder begegnen, so bei Roger Bacon, Petrus Aureoli, Johannes Baconthorp . Auch Walter Burley hält die averroistische These, gleichfalls in etwas modifizierter Form, für nicht ganz irrig. 28 Ibid. , 77-80. 29 Ibid., 180 : Der locus naturalis ist einerseits Finalursache ; das ist selbstverständlich und gilt für alle scholastischen Erklärungen der Gravitation, hat aber in unserem Zusammenhang nichts zu besagen. 30 Questiones Supra Libros Octo Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Ferdinand M. Delorme, VIII , in Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi (Oxford, 1935) , XIII 409 : locus est causa motus in genere finis et etiam efficientis excitantis ; quia movet in genere finis et excitantis efficientis, ... 31 Metaph. , IX q. 14, VII 589 : Si tertio dicatur, quod centrum trahit grave, quis est ille tractus ? numquid per alterationem gravis, vel latio erit per actionem univocam. Similiter per impossibile tota terra amota, idem

Particular Areas of Self-motion

107

This latter consideration would hardly impress a modern and not even many a medieval thinker, such as St. Bonaventure or Roger Bacon. None the less, the Subtle Doctor presents it as an argument in favor of his position . iv) Outstanding in the complex gravity theory of Roger Bacon is the large role played by the heavens . The free fall of a body is caused by a certain virtus caeli, an immaterial form , which permeates the medium. This form is in some special way appropriated by a body in the medium and by the natural place of the body. Thus the free fall of a body is due to itself and its place, although radically, it is due to the virtus caeli.32 While the various elements of the Baconian theory are considered separately by Scotus, he does not present them together as forming one unified doctrine . As to this special appeal to the influence of the heavens , Scotus does not find it acceptable, at least as an adequate explanation of free fall . For the celestial influence is uniform throughout the medium it affects, and hence it does not explain why some bodies move downward while others move upward . By the same token, it would be of no avail to appeal to any other general force which would be continuous with the medium. A principle of a more particular nature must be looked to as the cause of the downward motion of a body.33 v) In the gravity theories of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Peter Olivi , a dominant role is accorded the generator of a heavy body. The explanations of these thinkers , of course , take on varying specifications. St. Thomas, for example , teaches that heavy and light things have a principle of downward or upward movement in themselves, the accidental form of gravity or levity . This accidental form follows upon or results from the substantial form of the body. None the less, it cannot be said that the substantial form is centrum terrae est quod prius, et ad id movebitur gleba . Quid attrahet ? numquid Mathematicum ubi ? Cf. also Op . Oxon . , II d . 2 q . 10, XI 526. 32 Roger Bacon, op . cit. , 398-99 : et sic potest dici grave moveri de se, quia movetur a principio intrinseco, scilicet a forma immateriali, que non est actus ipsius materie gravis ; . . ., sed movetur a forma immateriali quam participat que non est actus materie ipsius, sed virtus ipsa celestis minus complete ab ipso gravi participata, a loco autem deorsum magis complete. For a complete exposition of Roger Bacon's theory of gravity, cf. Anneliese Maier, op. cit. , 177-82 . 33 Op. Oxon., loc . cit. , 526-27 : nec etiam influentia caeli , quia hoc videtur esse fuga recurrere ad agens universale, quia est negare effectus particulares, et causas particulares ; influentia etiam caeli quantum est de se, uniformis est in toto medio, quare ergo unam partem in toto medio moveret sursum, et alium deorsum, nisi poneretur agens particulare determinans ? Cf. also Metaph . , loc . cit. , 589.

108

Chapter IV

the efficient cause of downward or upward movement. Nor is the accidental form an efficiently active principle. The efficient principle of downward or upward motion is the agent which brought the body with such a form into existence . This doctrine of St. Thomas is, substantially at least, faithful to that of his teacher St. Albert.34 The theory of Godfrey of Fontaines agrees in many ways with that of St. Thomas . But there is this difference : Godfrey accords the accidental form of gravity efficient, active causality. Its efficiency, however, derives immediately from its generating agent, and not from the substantial form of the body 35 In the theory of gravity of Peter Olivi, the substantial form of the body is again denied all efficient , active causality. Accordingly, the free fall of a body is due to an impression or impulse originally and immediately given the body by its agent of generation . When all contact is severed between the body and its progenitor , this impulse is the efficient cause of subsequent downward motions of a heavy thing. The doctrine of Olivi appears to grant bodies a real active power for self-motion . None the less , a predominating importance is accorded the agent which brought a particular body into existence. In the final analysis, the latter is the real cause of free fall.36 The appeal to the generating agent as the explanation of free fall is attacked by Duns Scotus , and the Scotistic attack, as Anneliese Maier reports,37 marks a definite change in the history of the problem of gravity. Duns Scotus, of course, does not deny that a body receives its substantial form with its essential properties from an extrinsic agent of generation. This is abundantly clear from previous considerations. A generating agent, therefore, might be looked to as a remote cause of free fall, but it is so remote that an appeal to it does not answer the question under consideration . This question is , what is the actual cause 34 De Physico Auditu , II 1 , XXII 340 : Gravitas enim in terra non est principium ut moveat, sed magis ut moveatur : quia sicut alia accidentia consequuntur formam substantialem, ita et locus ; et per consequens moveri ad locum ; non tamen ita, quod forma naturalis sit motor, sed motor est generans, quod dat talem formam, ad quam talis motus consequitur. Cf. Johann Stufler, " Der hl . Thomas und das Axiom : Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur, " Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, XLVII ( 1923 ) 377—78 ; James A. Weisheipl, "The Concept of Nature , " The New Scholasticism, XXVIII ( 1954) 400-04 . As to the teaching of both St. Thomas and St. Albert , cf. Anneliese Maier, op . cit. , 158-59 . 35 Ibid., 162 : Die unmittelbare wirkende Ursache ist also jedenfalls die akzidentale Form , d..h. die gravitas, aber sie wirkt nach dem Gesagten nicht in virtute formae substantialis, sondern unmittelbar in virtute generantis. 36 Ibid. , 163-64 . 37 Ibid., 164-65.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

109

of the downward motion of a heavy thing when the latter is actually in a state of such motion ? In so many obvious cases, this downward motion or free fall takes place, when all evident contact between the body and its generator has been severed. Perhaps the agent which generated the body no longer exists.38 How then could it be the actual cause of free fall ? Clearly this difficulty is appreciated by Peter Olivi and Godfrey of Fontaines. But their solutions to it do not satisfy Scotus . The cause of downward motion in a heavy object, Scotus argues, cannot be some downward motion antecedently caused in the object by an extrinsic agent, which downward motion then causes further downward motion in the body. For nothing, in reference to itself, can be a univocal cause of some perfection it already possesses. Then as a matter of fact , motion is extrinsic to a heavy body as such . A heavy body is not always or necessarily in a state of downward motion . Perhaps the antecedent motion caused in the body by the extrinsic agent of generation is not actual but habitual , a kind of disposition, as Olivi maintains. If this is the case, then the body moves in virtue of a power intrinsic to itself. This is to admit self-motion and Scotus' position.39 Nor does the theory of Godfrey of Fontaines explain away the obvious self- motion of a heavy thing. According to Godfrey, the immediate cause of downward motion is the accidental form of gravity . This latter form , however, immediately acts in virtue of the agent of generation . In this way the original generating cause , as Scotus interprets Godfrey, remains virtually in the heavy thing and thus moves it.40 But such a highly qualified continued existence does not even guarantee the independent and actual existence of the generator. But this is the existence it must have in order actually to function as an efficient cause. It can readily be admitted that the original generating cause gave the heavy object the power to move . But this power can become so much its own that it can retain this power even when the agent of generation 38 Op. Oxon., II d . 2 q. 10 , XI 527 : nec generans, quia tunc potest non esse ; Metaph., IX q . 14, VII 589 : Verum est, generavit, et quando generavit, fuit; nunc non est, quomodo nunc movet ? 39 Op. Oxon., loc . cit .: Nec istud actu movens, quando actu movet, potest poni actu grave motum, quia nihil movet se univoce ad illud quod habet, et praeter hoc motus est quid extrinsecum gravi, ... Ergo oportet dare, quod sit aliquid intrinsecum ipsi gravi, vel ipsummet per aliquid intrinsecum. Cf. Metaph. , loc . cit. 40 Op. Oxon., loc. cit.: Quia igitur oportet dare aliquid intrinsecum , dicitur quod generans manet in virtute in gravi, et per hoc movet ipsum grave.

110

Chapter IV

no longer exists. Consequently, a heavy thing's active power to move downward must be intrinsic to itself.41 We have now come to the end of Scotus' argument from the simultaneity of cause and effect. A brief recapitulation of this extended proof is in place . When a heavy body is in a state of actual downward motion, there must be admitted an efficient principle which is actually causing this motion . Now this efficient principle cannot simply be an agent which removes obstacles to free fall , or which merely strikes against a heavy body. Neither can this agent simply be the medium, the center of the earth, the heavens, or the agent which brought the body into existence. At least, none of these principles can serve as adequate explanations in the order of efficient causality . The adequate explanation, therefore, is to be looked for in the heavy body itself. Consequently, the active, efficient principle of free fall is intrinsic to the body. 2. Argument from the Possibility of a Heavy Thing Moving a Light Thing. Another and second argument for Scotus ' stand appeals to the possibility of a heavy thing moving a light thing. Sometimes a particular cause can beget motion in another thing only on condition that this cause is first moved by a prior cause. In this case, the particular cause, both as moved and mover, is dependent on a prior cause . A scissors , for example, cuts (moves) a piece of paper. The scissors can do this only on the condition that it is first moved by another, e . g. , Peter. Peter would thus be the cause of the scissors being moved and the cause of it moving another, i . e ., cutting the paper . Now if a light object is attached to a heavy object, the latter can move the former downward . But the heavy object can perform this function only on the naturally prior condition that it is itself moved. Both as mover and moved , the heavy object is dependent on a prior cause, and this very same prior cause which explains the heavy object's moving of another also explains its own condition of being moved. Now the manifest reason why the heavy object can move the light object is the gravity of the former. The intrinsic gravity of the heavy object , therefore, is the cause of its own condition of being moved downward . Thus the heavy object moves itself.42 41 Ibid. Contra istud non manet in virtute, nisi sicut causa in suo effectu ; et quod sic manet, non est ens in se , sed tantum quia manet in suo effectu, et tunc virtus illa respectu motus pertinet ad genus causae efficientis, si generans dicatur efficere, et nihil efficit nisi secundum quod est in actu; necesse est igitur quod efficiens efficiat actu , quia illud quod est efficiens in virtute tantum, non efficit, et ita sequitur adhuc propositum. Cf. Metaph., loc . cit. 42 Op. Oxon., loc. cit .: Praeterea illud quod non movet aliud, nisi prius naturaliter ab alio motum , ab eodem habet quod moveat et quod sit motum.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

III

According to Lychetus, this second argument presupposes the more lengthy and preceding argumentation in favor of the self-motion of light and heavy things.43 Understood in this way, it certainly takes on greater force. Scotus also seeks to strengthen and confirm this second argument by an additional consideration . The fact that a heavy thing can locally move another object shows that a heavy object has active potentiality for downward motion . Now it should be able to exercise this potentiality or power in reference to any object capable of receiving downward motion and which is sufficiently close to it . For this reason, a heavy body is capable of causing downward motion in itself.44 This . line of reasoning harks back to the general argumentation presented in Chapter II.45 3. Argument from the Cause of Rest in a Place. According to a medieval conception, the rest of an object in a place requires a cause which is actually causing this rest, as long as the object continues to be in this condition . Now what is this cause which is simultaneous and coeval with the rest of the object ? It would hardly be anything else than the heavy thing itself. Hence the heavy thing is the efficient cause of its rest , and accordingly, is also the active principle which moves itself to the place of rest. For the rest and the attainment of the rest are from the same cause.46 4. Argument from the Possibility of a Heavy Thing Breaking through a Continuous Object. That a heavy thing can move itself is further proven from the possibility of it breaking through a continuous body . A heavy Sed grave, cui alligatum est leve, cujus levitas non excedit gravitatem ejus, movet illud leve trahendo illud secum ad centrum, et non movet nisi quia motum ; ergo prius naturaliter est motum quam moveat, et ab eodem movetur a quo habet, quod moveat illud sibi alligatum : movet autem illud non per aliud, quam per gravitatem suam, igitur et seipsum. 43 Commentaria, given in the Vivès edition of Duns Scotus, Op. Oxon., loc . cit., 537 . 44 Op. Oxon. , loc. cit. , 527 : Posset confirmari ista ratio, quia quando aliquid habet potentiam activam respectu alicujus formae, potest eam causare in quocumque passo proportionato et approximato. Sed grave habet potentiam activam respectu ubi deorsum, sicut habet respectu illius , quod trahit secum, et ipsummet, quando est extra illum locum, est receptivum illius formae carens ea, et est proportionatum et approximatum sibi ; ergo potest ipsam formam causare in seipso. 45 40-42. 46 Op. Oxon., loc. cit .: Hoc etiam poterit satis patere, si consideretur quod quies requirit causam actualiter causantem, sicut et motus ; tunc enim oportet dare causam coaeve causantem quietem naturaliter gravis cum ipso gravi ; nulla autem causa coaeve causans quietem istam cum gravi, est nisi grave, et per consequens grave effective movet, et per consequens movetur ad illam quietem a seipso, quia ista duo sunt ab eadem causa.

112

Chapter IV

thing can be temporarily prevented from moving downward by some continuous body. However, it is also possible that it overcomes the opposition of the body and breaks through it. The fact of the continuous body being broken through in this way requires an extrinsic cause . And upon the only reasonable admission , this cause is the heavy object. But the heavy body breaks through the continuous body, because it is seeking the center of the earth . Hence that which breaks through the continuous body and that which causes the downward motion in this process are the same thing, namely, the heavy object itself.47 5. Argument from the Different Velocities of the Free Fall of Heavy Objects. A final argument appeals to the different velocities of heavy objects in their free fall . Two different heavy objects can vary in the intensity of their gravity. One is heavier than the other. These two objects, when placed at the same distance from the center of the earth and under the same celestial influences, will move according to different velocities towards the center. The heavier object moves more speedily than the less heavy one . This difference in the motion can be caused only by something intrinsic to the bodies themselves. Hence the downward motion itself is caused by the heavy bodies.48 6. The Aristotelian Support of Scotus' Teaching on Gravity. The tremendous influence of Aristotle on medieval thought is well known. The Philosopher was a highly respected authority, whose teachings were generally not to be contradicted, although they could be interpreted. Now Scotus attempts to establish his doctrinal position on free fall by an extended appeal to the authority of Aristotle . Prima facie at least, this appears to be a strange situation, since it can hardly be doubted that the principle of motion is an Aristotelian doctrine . Likewise, thinkers who preceded Scotus and present theories of gravity at variance with his also make wide appeal to the authority of the Stagirite. 47 Ibid.: Praeterea grave impeditum a motu removet prohibens, si gravitas ejus vincit virtutem illius impedientis vel resistentis, puta, si superponatur alicui continuo, et gravitas ejus superet rationem continuitatis, frangit illud, et sic solvendo continuitatem ejus solvit impedimentum descensus ejus ; hujus autem fractionis, cum sit motus violentus, oportet ponere existentem causam extrinsecam, et non videtur rationabile fingere aliam causam quam ipsummet grave, non autem frangit illud, nisi quia intendit facere se in centro ; igitur ab eodem principio activo habet se facere in centro, a quo habet illud impediens removere . 48 Ibid. , 528 : Hoc etiam declarari potest aliter, quia gravius movetur velocius, et tamen ab eodem, videlicet generante posset generari aliquid gravius, et etiam aliquid minus grave ; et possent ista duo esse in eadem distantia ad centrum et in eadem influentia coeli , igitur difformitas motuum in istis est ab aliquibus intrinsecis.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

113

But from one standpoint at least, this appeal to Aristotle is perhaps not so strange. For as in many other matters, the Aristotelian corpus does not present a unified and harmonious doctrine on gravity. In various passages of the corpus, the natural motion of light and heavy things is explained by four different causes : a generating agent, an agent which removes impediments, nature as an active and intrinsic principle of motion, and gravity as a qualitative form . The uniting of these diverse elements into a harmonious theory was a task which fell to the scholastics.49 In the execution of this task, Scotus appears to be more of an original thinker than a faithful Aristotelian . With much minute analysis, he points out and explains passages which agree with or give plausibility to his own position . Unfavorable passages are subjected to interpretation, and in plying the medieval device of interpretation , Scotus is a consummate master. a) Potency to Primary Act and Potency to Secondary Act. In the Aristotelian distinction between potency to primary act and potency to secondary act Scotus sees a confirmation of his own doctrine . The Philosopher himself introduces this distinction in a discussion of the problem of gravity. 50 Potency to primary act and potency to secondary act might best be explained by examples used by Aristotle and Scotus alike. Potency to primary act is exemplified in the case of a person who is about to acquire the knowledge of some particular science but has not yet realized his objective. Because the particular intellectual habit is not yet acquired, it is in potency to primary act, its first being . But grant that a particular intellectual habit has already been acquired, although presently the habit is not being exercised . Such would be the case of a geometrician, richly possessed of geometrical knowledge but who is not actually thinking geometrical equations and problems. But tomorrow he will be thinking such theorems and problems. Now this situation provides an example of potency to secondary act . The secondary act is the new and additional being which the actual activity of thinking bestows on the intellectual habit or faculty. The actual exercise of the intellectual habit presupposes that the habit, at least in part , has already been acquired and exists. The relation of the exercise to the habit is the relation of something posterior to something prior. Hence the distinction of potency to primary act and potency to secondary act .

49 Cf. Anneliese Maier , op. cit. , 143 151 . 50 Physic., VIII t . 32, 168 (VIII c. 4 255a -255b) . 9 Philosophy Series No. 15

114

Chapter IV

Following Aristotle, Scotus presents another example of this twofold potency. Water, according to the Aristotelian and medieval view, is generated from fire . Fire, therefore , can be in essential and primary potency to become water. After the water has been generated, then it is in accidental and secondary potency to make other objects cold, unless perhaps the water is to be prevented from exercising this activity.51 Applying this distinction of potency to primary act and secondary act to light and heavy things, we can say that a light thing is in potency to primary act when it is about to be generated from a heavy thing. Air, according to the ancient view, is generated from water. Once the air is generated, then in accordance with its nature, it will carry on its activity of rising upward unless impeded . In this way, a secondary potency will be reduced to act.52

Now what is the precise value of this distinction between potency to primary act and potency to secondary act ? It makes clear the real source of the upward and downward movement of light and heavy things . For the primary act of a heavy thing cannot be effected by the heavy thing itself. Water, for example, cannot generate itself. But it can cause a secondary act in itself, namely, downward motion . As Scotus points out, a light thing does not cease to be such, because it is not in its proper place and is prevented from moving to this place.53 The same is true of a heavy thing . A heavy thing must be possessed of gravity. But it is not necessary that it is either in its proper place or actually moving to this place . Actual motion to its proper place is something over and above the primary act of the heavy thing . This motion is a secondary act caused by the heavy thing itself. Briefly, the Aristotelian distinction between potency to primary act and potency to secondary act enables one to distinguish a heavy thing from it natural motion . Since the latter is a transition from secondary potency to secondary act, one can see further why this motion is possibly caused by the heavy thing itself. This view of the efficient causality of the natural motion of light and heavy things also seems to be accepted by Aristotle in another place. In Book IV of the Physics, 54 the Stagirite explains that with the dense and rare are to be associated two pairs of contraries : heavy and light, hard and soft . By way of the first pair of contraries, an object is an

51 Op . Oxon., loc. cit., 524-25. 52 Ibid., 525. 53 Ibid.: Similiter dicit, quod prohibetur cum est in contrario loco, non autem est non leve actu primo, quia est in contrario loco. 54 IV t. 85-86, IV 80 (IV c. 4 217b) .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

115

active source of motion ; by way of the second, an object is passive . Hence again, according to Aristotle, light and heavy things are principles of self-motion . 55 b) An Objection from the De Generatione. But is this really the teaching of Aristotle, and does it truly represent his mind on this matter ? In the De Generatione, the Philosopher gives a list of active and passive qualities and expressly excludes gravity and levity from this list.56 The heavy and light, therefore, are neither active nor passive qualities . c) Scotus' Answer. If levity and gravity are not even passive qualities, Scotus argues, then Aristotle would appear to be involved in contradiction . For in the Physics, he says that the light and the heavy are passive but not active principles. 57 This text from the Physics introduces another difficulty, namely, why light and heavy things are passive but not active. This difficulty will be taken up shortly. But this text of the Physics, which ascribes passive potentiality to the light and the heavy, makes clear that the activity contemplated in the De Generatione is to be taken in a qualified sense. Activity in this sense is the production of a form , in which agent and patient are contraries . An example of this type of activity is provided in the case of a hot thing making a cold thing hot. Now light and heavy things are not active or even passive principles in this particular sense . This is not to deny that they are active and passive in reference to their own local motion. 58 d) An Objection from the Physics . Another objection against Scotus' stand and his interpretation of Aristotle is taken from the Physics of the Stagirite.59 Here it is clearly denied that a heavy thing can move itself. This denial, moreover, is supported by four reasons. First, the capacity for self-motion is a distinguishing property of animals. But obviously a heavy thing, as such at least, is not an animal. 55 Op. Oxon., loc. cit.: Et loquens de contrarietate gravis et levis, dicit, quod secundum hanc contrarietatem erunt activa motus . 56 II t. 8, V 168 ( II c . 2 329b) : Horum autem, Grave quidem & Leve, neque activa, neque passiva ; non enim faciendo aliquid alterum , neque patiendo ab alio, dicuntur. 57 Op. Oxon., loc. cit.: nam in 8. Phys. (sicut pro istis allegatum est) dicit quod habent principium non agendi, sed patiendi. 58 Ibid., 526 : quia ista non sunt principia agendi alia, nec patiendi ab aliis ; et ideo non sunt principia producendi aliquid secundum formam aliquam, de qua productione loquitur ibi , nec principia patiendi ab aliquo agente correspondente tali actioni. Sunt tamen principia activa aliquo modo, respectu motus localis ad ubi, et aliquo modo passiva respectu ejusdem, quorum utrumque expressit ipse in 8. Physic. quod passiva in hoc quod naturalia habent in se principium patiendi, quod activa in hoc quod dicit operationem levis esse alicubi, sicuti scientis est considerare. 59 Physic., VIII t. 38, IV 171 (VIII c. 4 255a) .

9.

116

Chapter IV

Secondly, if a thing has the power to move itself, then it should also have the power to stop itself. Thirdly, one would expect a self-movent thing to be capable of moving itself in different ways . But the natural motion of a heavy object is always downward ; that of a light object, upward. Fourthly, the continuous and homogeneous character of the makeup of heavy and light things does not allow the distinction within itself of two parts, the mover and the moved . Hence self-motion is excluded . In view of these considerations, Aristotle concludes that a heavy or light thing does not move itself. 60 e) Scotus' Answer. In meeting this objection , Scotus presents both general and particular arguments . The latter regard the four reasons just stated and may be reviewed here at once . The first three reasons do not disprove self-motion in light and heavy things . They only show that light and heavy things are not agents which are capable of knowledge and act in virtue of their own knowledge . Only the latter kind of agents , such as are the animals, can stop themselves at various points in their local motion and move in different directions. These first three arguments also show that light and heavy things are not primary movers, for a primary mover must move knowingly.61 As to the fourth reason , a continuous or extended body as extended offers no difficulty to the position of self-motion . In reference to a body which is homogeneous or uniform in composition , such as a heavy body, it is to be conceded that one part of the body does not move another part . But the whole body is in primary act and then causes in itself the secondary act of self-motion . 62 This was already explained in Chapter III in our treatment of primary and secondary motion.63 60 In presenting these reasons , we are following the text of Duns Scotus, Op. Oxon., loc. cit., 524. For their presentation in Aristotle, cf. Physic., loc. cit. , 171-72. 61 Op . Oxon., loc. cit. , 529 : Rationes etiam ejus non concludunt contra me, nam primae tres, quae habent unam vim, ostendunt grave non movere se, sicut agens per cognitionem movet se ; non enim animal posset sistere se citra ultimum terminum intentum, nec etiam posset movere se diversis motibus, nisi ageret per cognitionem ; et ex hoc satis sequitur propositum Philosophi , quod illa non sunt prima moventia, nam primum movens movet per cognitionem . 62 Ibid.: Quarta ratio sua de continuo, non concludit praecise inquantum quantum, sed de continuo, hoc est, quod est ejusdem dispositionis in omni parte ; probat enim quod grave non movet se effective , quia non est pars una in actu, quae potest facere aliam in actu secundum eandem qualitatem, quomodo ipse dicit in de Sensu et Sensato . Et concedo, quod hoc modo pars gravis existens in actu , non causat motum in alia parte , sed totum grave est in actu secundum actum primum, et causat in se actum secundum . 63 56 57 .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

117

The general argument of Scotus against the objection before us is substantially a reformulation and application of the argument given in Chapter II for the possibility of self-motion in general.64 It is not necessary for us to rehearse this argument here. But the question remains, why does Aristotle precisely say that a heavy thing is not an active but a passive principle of motion ? f) The Concept of Natural Motion . To grasp Scotus' answer to this question requires an explication of the concept of natural motion and a turning back to other concepts previously explicated . In Chapter III , it was pointed out that potency as a passive principle bespeaks a triple relation: a relation to an effect, a form, and an agent. 65 Passive potency as a relation to an agent is further subdivided into natural and supernatural. The members of this subdivision will be briefly explained . A natural passive potency bespeaks a relation to a natural agent . The latter is a determined active potency, one which, as it were, automatically produces an effect when the various and requisite conditions are given. A particular building, for example, automatically and in a determined manner produces a cognition of itself in a knowing subject, provided the various natural causes and conditions for such a cognition. are placed. A supernatural passive potency bespeaks a relation to an agent which does not act in this determined and automatic manner. God is such an agent in giving to the soul the beatific vision . For this 66 reason the beatific vision is always a free gift to man.' The distinction between a natural and a supernatural potency is important in Scotistic thought, especially in reference to the problem of the relation of faith and reason and the theology of the beatific vision . 67 By itself, however, this distinction is not relevant to the matter presently before us. It has been introduced here simply to bring into bolder relief another division of passive potency, which is pertinent to our present study. Passive potency also bespeaks a relation to form. Considered in this way, passive potency is divided into natural, violent , and neutral. A

65 40-42. Cf. Op . Oxon., loc . cit. , 528. 74-75. 66 Ord., I Prol. p. 1 q . u., I 35 : Sed comparando receptivum ad agens a quo recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod natum est naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo, supernaturalitas autem quando comparatur ad agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum . Cf. also Metaph ., IX q. 12, VII 578. 67 Wolter, Allan B. , " Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural," The New Scholasticism , XXIII ( 1949 ) 281-317 ; "Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge, " Franciscan Studies, XI (1951 ) 234-39. 64

118

Chapter IV

natural passive potency is a relation of a subject to a form which agrees with the inclination of the subject . The form or act perfects the subject. The intellect in reference to knowledge is such a natural potency, for all knowledge perfects the cognitive faculty and is in accord with the natural inclination of its nature. If a particular potency is neither naturally inclined to a particular form nor to its opposite, then the potency is neutral . A violent passive potency bespeaks a relation to an act or form which is opposed to the natural inclination of the passive potency.Examples of violent potency are excessively loud noise in reference to the ear or poison in reference to a living organism. Another example, which is very pertinent to our study, is upward motion in reference to a heavy thing. This is the famous motion of a projectile, the explanation of which greatly exercised the minds of scholastics . This motion is called violent or compulsory because it is opposed to the natural inclination of a heavy object . For a heavy thing, downward | motion is a natural condition, at least when it is outside of its natural 1 place. Actually, the downward motion of a heavy thing is a classical example of natural motion . 68 Quite different from natural activity as opposed to supernatural, the natural motion under consideration here is the relation of a passive principle to an act or form. According to Duns Scotus, Aristotle has this concept in mind when he ascribes passive potentiality to heavy things but denies them active potentiality. For natural motion belongs to a heavy thing not because it contains the active principle of this motion, but because it has a natural capacity for receiving or inclining to this motion. This is clear, Scotus argues, from the Aristotelian definition of nature: principium motus ejus in quo est primo per se et non per accidens. Now on what basis does motion belong to a thing primarily, per se, and not per accidens ? It does not belong to a thing in this way because it is endowed with an active principle of motion , but because it is passive and a recipient of motion . Grant that the two elements, ' moved' and 'mover' can concur in one and the same thing. This is per accidens. For the first element can be found separated from the second . If the element of ' moved' can be found in one thing without the other, this shows that

68 Ord., loc. cit.: Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad agentem a quo recipit. Primo modo ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra. Naturalis dicitur si naturaliter inclinetur, violenta si sit contra naturalem inclinationem passi, neutra si neque inclinetur naturaliter ad illam formam quam recipit neque ad oppositam. Cf. also Metaph., loc. cit., 577.

11

Particular Areas of Self-motion

119

the element of ' mover' is not essential to motion in the case where both elements concur. A physician, for example, may at times cure himself. But curing oneself is accidental to the act of curing as a natural motion. The act, however, essentially and primarily requires a passive principle or patient.69 Natural motion is the motion which a thing can receive on the basis of a natural aptitude or inclination . Such an aptitude or inclination is rooted in the nature of the thing. It is not rooted in a thing precisely insofar as it has an active principle for some kind of motion . Indeed, the concurrence in one and the same thing of an aptitude and a corresponding active principle is per accidens. To make this clear, we might consider a heavy thing which supposedly is deprived of its active principle of downward motion. Its inclination for downward motion remaining, an extrinsic agent could cause it to move downward, and this downward motion would be natural. Although the concurrence of the two elements ' moved' and ' mover' in one and the same thing is in a sense per accidens, none the less , this concurrence is to be admitted at times. Very often as a matter of fact, natural things are endowed with an active principle of motion . Such are, according to Scotus, heavy and light things . Therefore, at times speaking of the motion of heavy things, Aristotle refers to the efficient principle of motion and the natural principle of motion.70 The latter contrasts with the former, since it is a passive principle .

69 Op. Oxon. , II d . 2 q . 10, XI 528—29 : Tamen propter unum verbum Philosophi, addo ultra , quod motus iste non est naturalis in se, ex hoc quod habet principium activum in se, sed solum ex hoc quod mobile habet principium intrinsecum passivum naturaliter inclinans ad motum, quod patet per definitionem naturae, 2 Physic. quia est principium motus ejus, in quo est primo per se, et non per accidens . Nihil enim est principium naturaliter movendi alicui nisi inquantum est per se , et primo in eo quod movetur, nisi inquantum est passivum ; ergo non est aliquid natura, vel principium naturale alicujus, nisi quia est principium passivum in moto . Hoc etiam patet, quia ideo aliquid movetur naturaliter, quia movetur sicut aptum natum est ipsum moveri . Ita est in proposito , ita quod licet hic, sicut et in multis aliis principium activum sit principium movendi, non tamen propter illud principium activum movetur naturaliter, sed propter principium passivum, propter quod sic movetur ; et hoc est quod subdit Philosophus, postquam dixit quod actus levis est esse alicubi et sursum, tamen dicit ipse : Quaeritur quare movetur in ipsorum loca ? Et respondet : Causa autem est, quia apta nata sunt ibi esse ; et signanter dicit, in ipsorum loca, hoc est, naturaliter moventur in loca illa, quia apta nata sunt ibi esse , id est, habent naturalem inclinationem ad illud ubi ; et hoc modo postea subdit quod habent principium tantum patiendi et non faciendi , scilicet respectu motus inquantum naturalis est. 70 Ibid. , 529 : quasi intercalariter loquitur de principio effectivo hujus motus, et de principio naturali hujus motus , quod tantum passivum est.

120

Chapter IV 7. Self-motion and the Aristotelian Doctrine of a Prime Mover. Scotus'

appeal to Aristotle in establishing his position gives rise to another and more difficult objection . If heavy things can move themselves, then how can the Philosopher maintain that these things are necessarily moved by another ? But that everything which is in motion is moved ―― this principle of motion is unquestionably a leading

by another,

doctrine of Aristotle, for which he gives extended proof, and which concludes to the existence of a prime mover. 71 Scotus' answer to this objection is very interesting, and as Lychetus points out, it involves a very singular interpretation of the Stagirite.72 Nevertheless , considerable use is made of this answer both by Belmond 73 and Bettoni

in determining the position of Duns Scotus in reference

to the principle of motion and the Aristotelian argument for a prime mover. Since the conclusions of our study do not agree with these scholars, and since our evaluation of the passage now under consideration also conflicts with their understanding of it , we will quote this passage in full here in our text and then proceed to reflect on it. Dico quod satis habet hoc ex distinctione potentiae ; ista enim non reducunt seipsa de potentia secunda ad actum secundum, nisi prius reducta fuerint de potentia prima ad actum primum, vel saltem possent reduci ad actum primum. Quod dico pro totis elementis, quae tota secundum ipsum sunt ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia, et tamen quia sunt ejusdem rationis cum partibus suis, non repugnat eis reduci de potentia prima ad actum primum, sicut partes eorum reducuntur . Sequitur ergo, quod omne grave et leve, licet moveat se effective de potentia secunda ad actum secundum, tamen mobile est, vel movetur ab aliquo alio extrinseco a potentia prima ad actum primum ; non enim oportet, quod si omne quod movetur ab alio, quod in omni motu moveatur ab alio, et sufficit Philosopho primum, quia per hoc devenietur ad aliquod aliud ab omnibus istis, quod nec in uno motu, nec in quocumque poterit moveri ab alio, sed est omnino movens immobile.75 From this passage it is clear that heavy and light things, according to Duns Scotus, can actively move themselves . The motion contemplated here is the local motion natural to these things : for heavy objects, downward motion ; for light objects , upward motion . Now this local motion is a transition from secondary potency to secondary act.

71 Ibid.: Sed objicies quomodo Philosophus, si concedat grave sic moveri effective a se, . quomodo habebit principale propositum suum, quod ista necessario moventur ab alio, quod ipse intendit principaliter probare ? 72 Commentaria, given in the Vivès edition of Duns Scotus, Op. Oxon., loc. cit., 540 : Hic Doctor dat singularem expositionem Aristotelis. 73 Dieu, Existence et Cognoscibilité (Paris, 1913 ) , 48 . 74 L'Ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto (Milan, 1943) , 12-13 . 75 Op. Oxon., loc. cit., 529-30.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

121

From this passage it is also clear that a transition from secondary potency to secondary act presupposes a prior transition from primary potency to primary act . This prior transition must be admitted at least as something possible . A heavy thing, therefore , can move itself or reduce itself from secondary potency to secondary act only on the prior condition, at least possible, that it has been reduced from primary potency to primary act . This reduction from primary potency to primary act , moreover, cannot be an instance of self-motion . Thus a heavy object , such as a piece of earth, cannot move itself downward before it is actually generated by some other extrinsic being. Consequently, while the heavy object is capable of self-motion, it is still something moved by another . For it was generated or brought into existence as a piece of earth by some other being. Hence Scotus concludes that " it is not necessary that if everything which is in motion is moved by another, everything be moved by another in every motion." It is to be noted that all the bodies of the sublunary world are possible subjects of motion by another, for these bodies are constituted of one of the four elements, or they are compounded of these elements . These bodies are all possible subjects of substantial change, generation and corruption. The principle of motion, therefore, which Duns Scotus accepts, comes to mean this : everything which changes substantially is changed by another. The principle might also be formulated in this way : nothing can reduce itself from primary potency to primary act. Transition from primary potency to primary act, as we have seen, can be construed. broadly enough to include the production of an intellectual habit in the soul.76 But for the most part, as is clear from the context, this terminology is used here to describe substantial change . Scotus' insistence that nothing can change itself substantially was already pointed out in Chapter II . " So this is not a disturbing feature of his doctrine here, although a modernized theory of substantial change might well make an opposing insistence . But what is a disturbing feature of Scotus' teaching is the althogether singular interpretation he gives to the famed Aristotelian principle of motion . But such interpretations are frequent in medieval writers, who are not to disagree with authorities but are permitted to interpret them. Hence frequent use is made of the principle of polysemia and the principle 76 113. 77 37.

122

Chapter IV

of reverential exposition . 78 And among medieval writers, Duns Scotus is a master in the use of the interpretative devices and artifices in vogue at his time. An outstanding example in Scotus of this " interpreting of an authority" is to be found in his treatment of the illumination theory. Any kind of illuminationism which involves an immediate and direct influence of the divine ideas on the human mind is rejected by Duns Scotus.79 Nevertheless, there is the authority of St. Augustine in favor of such a theory. In the presence of such a great authority, the Franciscan Master takes recourse to interpretation and explains the words of St. Augustine in such a way so as to harmonize them with his own doctrine on knowledge.80 From this interpretation there results what might be called a modified or qualified theory of illumination . But in actual fact this expression stands for a rejection of the theory in any sense of the previous tradition . The passage previously quoted, in which Scotus would show that

his own doctrine is not at odds with the Aristotelian principle of motion, - this passage, we contend, provides another example of this "interpreting of an authority." Hence it would argue much naïveté to conclude from this passage that Scotus innocently believes that he is in agreement with Aristotle . In fact, we have positive textual evidence to the contrary. Treating a theological question in the Reportata Parisiensia, Scotus is quite open in rejecting the Aristotelian principle of motion. Ad aliud, cum dicitur, nihil patitur a se, falsum est, nec oportet agens et patiens esse distincta subjecto, quia manifestum est quod in Angelo fuit mala volitio de novo, et non a Deo immediate, nec etiam totaliter ab extrinseco efficiente, sic enim non fuissent propter hoc damnandi ; igitur ista fuit ab intrinseco ; igitur ibi agens et patiens non sunt distincta subjecto. Nec valet quod Philosophus hoc non vidit, quia multa non vidit, quae oportet Theologos concedere . 81 In departing from an authority, Duns Scotus generally observes the more normal and polite procedure of reverential exposition and interpretation. Passages, therefore , in which he invokes an authority in support of a doctrinal position of his own, should be carefully weighed . 78 A very illuminating account of the use of "authorities" in the middle ages is given by M. D. Chenu in his Introduction à L'Étude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin, (Paris , 1950) , 117-26. 79 Boehner, Philotheus, The History of the Franciscan School , The Oxford School (mimeographed notes) , 42 . 80 Ord., I d . 3 p. 1 q. 4, III 160—71 . 81 II d. 3 q. 4, XXII 596.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

123

Insistence on this point has been made here, because it is not taken into account by Belmond or Bettoni in assessing the passage we have been considering . For on the basis of this passage, Belmond simply affirms that Scotus accepts the argument from motion, but sees in it an application of the principle, causa causae est causa causati.82 This report is vague and misleading. It makes light of the thorough-going opposition of Duns Scotus to the cinesiological principle . On the basis of substantial change, according to Scotus, one can argue to an unmoved mover, and it is allowed that the self-motion of a body presupposes as a prior condition, actual or at least possible, a reduction from primary potency to primary act by another. But these concessions are accessory doctrines to a most fundamental rejection of the cinesiological principle, as it was understood in previous philosophic tradition. Bettoni, likewise, has failed to get at the real and overall significance of the Scotistic argumentation in the quoted passage. That Scotus uses the term ' motion ' here in a highly restricted meaning, that of substantial change or transition from primary potency to primary act , - this is clearly evident and appreciated by Bettoni . But the purpose of this restricted acceptation of motion is simply to enable Scotus to agree externally and verbally with Aristotle, an authority to be respected. Hence there is no real warrant for the broad statement that Scotus accepts the Aristotelian principle and argument from motion , and to assert that Scotus ' exposition is a precision of the principle, this is a gross understatement, out of order in a technical treatise.83 The quoted passage, which we have been considering, must be understood in the light of the techniques and devices, according to which medieval masters interpreted authorities . Then it becomes evident that this passage, far from constituting a proof that Duns Scotus accepts the principle of motion, rather shows that he utterly rejects it in any traditional sense and as a general principle. Any argument, therefore , which uses it in its generality, is likewise to be rejected. Another way of arguing to a prime mover is indicated by Scotus . Although self-motion can be accorded to heavy and light things, still

82 Op. cit. , 48 . 83 Op . cit., 10 : Ebbene , in queste precisazioni di Duns Scoto non vedo proprio in che maniera sia messo in sospetto, come crede il Pluzanski , o addirittura negato, come afferma il Landry, il principio metafisico : "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. " Bettoni himself quotes Lychetus as to the singularity of Scotus' interpretation (ibid. , 12 n. 5) . But we take exception to his other broad statements which do not seem to take this singularity into account . Cf. ibid. , 16.

124

Chapter IV

they do not move themselves as agents which act knowingly. Hence they are not primary but secondary movers. But a secondary mover presupposes a primary mover. Thus while a heavy thing can move itself downward, this does not gainsay that from another viewpoint it is still moved by another. The distinction between primary and secondary mover, therefore, points out another way of approaching the prime mover. 84 8. The Scotistic Theory of Gravity More Precisely Considered. We have now reviewed a variety of arguments in support of Scotus' theory of gravity. According to the Subtle Doctor the principle of free fall is intrinsic to a heavy body. It is now in order to probe more deeply and ascertain more precisely what this intrinsic principle of free fall is . This further study will complement the historical considerations already made and make emphatically clear the fundamental and radical opposition of Duns Scotus to the principle of motion. In explaining the free fall of a body, we have seen how Godfrey of Fontaines invokes a principle intrinsic to the body, the accidental form of gravity. Prior to Godfrey, the Arabian philosopher Avempace also invokes the accidental form of gravity as an explanation of free fall, but significantly, Avempace does not combine the form of gravity with a generating agent in a total theory of free fall. For Avempace, the accidental form alone appears to be quite sufficient to cause and explain free fall . For this form does not merely determine its appropriate matter and account for the fact that a heavy body is such, but it is also an active principle in reference to the very body it determines in the order of formal causality. The form of gravity moves the body which it determines, while the body itself is passive and recipient of the motion . In this way, a distinction is maintained between the mover and the moved . The form is the mover, and the body, the moved. The form functions much like the astral souls of Aristotelian astronomy function in reference to the spheres. For Avempace, as for ancient physicists in general, the condition of being in motion means being moved by something, and this something must be other than that which is moved . Quite peculiar to theArab thinker, however, is the view that the active and passive principles involved are 84 Op . Oxon ., II d . 2 q . 10 , XI 530 : Similiter etiam potest dici , quod in isto motu, etsi moveantur a se effective, non tamen moventur a se, sicut a primis moventibus ; ex quo non movent se per cognitionem, sequitur quod praesupponant aliquid sic movens per cognitionem, et ita licet moveant se effective, non tamen sic, quin moveantur ab alio, licet non sicut a causa proxima.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

125

intrinsic to one and the same heavy body. Thus while the Avempacian theory of gravity staunchly defends the self-motion of heavy bodies, it does this only by breaking down the self-motion into two distinct principles, the mover and the moved.85 The Avempacian theory of gravity meets head-on opposition in Averroes. In the sphere of inorganic substances, the Commentator does not allow the distinction between matter and form to be construed as a distinction between the moved and the mover. "For Averroes, the 'nature' or ' form ' of a material substance is not an entity distinct in actu from the matter of the substance ; it is the act of the matter, not something which acts on the matter. Hence what it acts on, will be whatever its matter acts on ; and this cannot be that matter itself, but only some other material body. " For this reason, along with his acceptance of the principle of motion, Averroes appeals to the medium or environment as an explanation of free fall. A heavy body is a mover, but it does not move itself. It moves the medium, and the medium in 86 turn moves the body.8 Now Duns Scotus, like Avempace, holds that the principle of free fall is intrinsic to a heavy body. But it would be a gross error to construe the Scotistic position as identical with that of the Arab thinker. On the contrary, the doctrine of Scotus is really opposed to the latter. In Chapter III in our discussion of the argument from primary motion, we saw how Scotus gives place to the distinction between mover and moved in the sphere of organic beings . 87 Soul and body, for example, are two really distinct principles and can be viewed as mover and moved . Likewise, two distinct physical parts can be related to each other as mover and moved . Such might be the fact of the matter. But in the sphere of inorganic substances, such as light and heavy bodies and spiritual substances, the distinction between mover and moved has not place, and is not supported by experience or valid metaphysical argumentation. After the manner of Averroes, Duns Scotus is also opposed to any confusion of efficient and formal causality. A formal cause perfects its corresponding matter. It does not produce something in the matter. Such would be the role of an efficient cause . Formal and efficient cause are simply different in their causality, and they are so different that numerically one and the same being cannot be both the efficient and formal cause of one and the same perfection or effect . Consequently, 85 Moody, Ernest A. , " Galileo and Avempace," Journal of the History 87 55. 86 Ibid., 378. of Ideas, XIII ( 1951 ) 377–78.

126

Chapter IV

the ascription of active potentiality to formal cause as such constitutes an error or is at least an abuse of terms . 88 The thought of Scotus, therefore, does not admit the view of Avempace, according to which an intrinsic accidental form of gravity acts upon and moves its matter, which latter is altogether passive. For while the forms of inorganic bodies may well be active and efficient principles, they cannot be such in reference to the matter they determine. What then is the intrinsic principle of the free fall of a body ? The Scotistic answer to this question is succinctly expressed in the words, aliquid intrinsecum ipsi gravi, or ipsummet grave per aliquid intrinsecum.89 By means of the gravity intrinsic to it, the heavy body itself is the active principle of free fall . The very substance of the heavy body with its property of gravity causes downward motion and at the same time receives the downward motion it causes . The radical opposition of Duns Scotus to the principle of motion is clear. Essential to his theory of gravity is the admission of self-motion in an unqualified sense . As for other medieval thinkers, the condition of being in motion might well require both mover and moved . But for the Subtle Doctor, these two aspects can be really identified in one and the same being. 9. Duns Scotus and the Principle of Inertia . Before concluding this section, we would introduce a discussion of a possible connection between the Scotistic rejection of the principle of motion and the modern principle of inertia. Such discussion appears to be apropos here in view of certain doctrinal elements made particularly clear in Scotus' theory of gravity . Prima facie at least , there seems to be a connection between Scotistic teaching and the principle of inertia. In modern mechanics, Philipp Frank tells us,90 the Aristotelian doctrine of natural place and principle of motion are abandoned in favor of the complex law of inertia. Now since Duns Scotus so forthrightly rejects the Aristotelian cinesiological principle, the question suggests itself, does he in some way approach the first law of Newton ? This law asserts that "every body continues 88 Metaph., IX q. 6, VII 562 : forma autem perficiendo materiam , nihil aliud a se causat in materia, quia ipsamet forma est perfectio propria materiae, ... ergo ad materiam alia est omnino relatio formae et agentis ; imo nec possent coincidere in idem numero, et per consequens sicut idem non potest esse agens et forma, respectu principiati, ita nec respectu alterius principii . 89 Op. Oxon., II d . 2 q . 10, XI 527 . 90 Philosophy of Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. , 1957 ) , 91–95 .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

127

in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it . " ' 91 Sir Edmund Whittaker, likewise, sees a conflict between the Aristotelian cinesiological principle and the law of inertia . In pointing up this conflict, as we have seen, he appeals to the case of a star freely moving in interstellar space. Such "a star is continually changing its location" , and quite apparently, there is no mover, for the star is too distant from any other celestial body to be appreciably influenced by it. Later Aristotelians , as Whittaker relates, try to solve this problem by invoking an impetus. An impetus was once given to the star by an external mover, and this impetus, as something other than the star, is the mover and instrument of the original and external mover. But this solution Whittaker finds inacceptable, for he does not see why the impulse has to be " something other than the star. " Could not the impulse simply be " part of the description of the state of the star ? "' 92 In this way, there would not be one part of the star (the impetus) which actively moves and the other part which is moved and which has the task of carrying the movent part along with it . Now in his theory of gravity, Scotus' essential point is much the same as the one Whittaker scores in reference to the star in interstellar space . For in explaining the downward motion of a heavy body, Scotus argues against any kind of entity, which is other and really distinct from the heavy body itself. For the heavy body moves itself downward . Thus motion, for Duns Scotus, does not necessarily require a cause which is external to or really distinct from the being in motion . In the case of the star moving in interstellar space, one might well ask many questions, such as, was the star always moving in this way, and if not, how did it get started ? Here various cosmogonical theories might be invoked, and one might even endeavor to go beyond the theories to some demiurge or God Himself. But all such speculations would simply show how it came about that something here and now moves without having some external mover. Similarly in reference to a heavy body, one might inquire as to its origin, and along with Duns Scotus, appeal to an external agent of generation. But once the heavy body is constituted as such with its own proper nature, there would be no further need of an external agent or some internal really distinct entity to cause its downward motion . 91 Newton, Sir Isaac , Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World, tr. Andrew Motte (Cambridge, 1934) , 13 . 92 Cf. Ch. I 25.

128

Chapter IV

According to the view of Scotus , the heavy body itself as a heavy body would cause its own downward motion. In rejecting the principle of motion , Scotus truly breaks with Aristotelian science on a major point . Still to a large extent, he appears to remain within the orbit of ancient science , as is clear from his acceptance of the Aristotelian doctrine of natural place . Also for Scotus, motion continuously requires an active cause, as long as the motion exists. From this standpoint, it seems that he never realizes the higher abstraction proper to the modern principle of inertia. And perhaps should it even be asserted that since Scotus requires a cause for motion , he thereby denies the principle of inertia ? Or to the contrary, does his identification of the mover and the moved in one and the same being prepare the way for or approach the modern doctrine ? It is our preference that these questions be answered by others. We have now come to the end of our study of Scotus ' doctrine on gravity. From a modern viewpoint , the Scotistic theory no doubt appears defective and onesided . The more complex doctrine of Roger Bacon, which is somewhat similar to our modern field theories, appears more acceptable to the physics of our day. None the less, the Scotistic theory is interesting for its originality and certainly merits a place of honor in the history of the problem of gravity. But aside from its scientific interest , our main concern with the Scotistic theory of gravity has been to obtain the fullest view possible of Scotus' stand on the principle of motion . In this, our study has been very illuminating . It shows how radically and fundamentally Duns Scotus is opposed to a cinesiological principle which asserts that a thing in motion must necessarily be moved by some being external to or located within but really distinct from the being in motion.

C) The Local Motion of Animals The local motion of animals presents itself as another instance of self-motion. On the level of ordinary experience at least, it could hardly be doubted that animals can move themselves about from place to place, and according to Aristotle , this active power of moving its body is a distinguishing characteristic of the soul of an animal.93 In Aristotle⁹4 and the Aristotelian tradition , 95 however, it is held that this local self-motion of animals necessarily breaks down into two parts :

93 De Anima, III t. 40, 507 (III c . 9 432a). 94 Physic., VIII t . 27, 165 (VIII c . 4 254b) . 95 Maier, Anneliese , An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (2d ed .; Rome, 1952 ) , 143 : Von selbst können sich nur Lebewesen bewegen,

Particular Areas of Self-motion

129

a part which actively moves and a part which is moved . The organic character of an animal, composed of heterogeneous parts and endowed with a soul, readily allows such an explanation, whereas the homogeneous character of a heavy thing, as we have seen, forbids it . The doctrine of two parts, mover and moved, does not appear to be without difficulties. Can it explain every local motion of an animal,

such as for example, the leap of an animal ? 1. The Push-pull Theory . To this question the answer is given that a leap consists of a push movement and a pull movement . The lower part of the animal strikes or pushes against the higher part and moves it. The higher part in turn draws or pulls the lower part along with it . This push-pull process continues on and constitutes the makeup of a leap . A serpent crawling on the ground provides a most evident example of the push-pull, but the process can be invoked to explain the local motion of animals in general.96 This explanation readily strikes one as ingenious, but is hardly adequate. Scotus presents an opposing argument. In every instance of local motion, there must be something at rest and immobile which functions as a support for the initiation and the continuation of the movement. A sailor, for example, who wishes to start a ship moving a way from the shore where it is at rest , will push against the earth with an oar. The earth at the shore is the immobile thing required for the initiation of the movement of the ship. In the push-pull theory, the requisite immobile object would be provided at the beginning of the act of leaping. But immediately thereafter, it would be lacking. For first the lower part of the animal which rests upon the earth would push against the higher part . The higher part would then pull with it the lower part. But once the lower part is lifted up off the earth, it could no longer strike or push against the higher part, since it is no longer resting on the stationary earth. The requisite immobile object would be lacking after the first push and pull, and hence there could be no additional ones. This would rule out a leap as composed of a series of pushes and pulls. 97

denn jede Bewegung erfordert ein movens, eine Bewegung a se setzt also voraus, daß in dem , was sich selbst bewegt, ein movens und ein motum unterschieden werden können . Cf. also, for example, St. Thomas, De Physico Auditu, VIII 8, XXII 647 ; Godfrey of Fontaines, Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1914) , VI q. 7, III 156-57. 96 Metaph., IX q . 14, VII 590. 97 Ibid .

10 Philosophy Series No. 15

130

Chapter IV

This argument against the push-pull theory, as Scotus intimates, is hardly conclusive . But neither can the theory be rated a satisfactory explanation of the mechanics of a leap . Still the general position that the local motion of an organic body breaks down into two parts, — this position, according to Scotus, appears to be certain and manifest . 98 The specific determination of the two parts as being the lower and higher parts of the body can be put aside in favor of a more general explanation . 2. The Position of Duns Scotus . Among various and other more remote parts of a body, one particular part can have a greater aptitude for being moved, and so it is moved first and then in turn actively moves other more remote parts. This particular part is itself moved by some other still less remote part or perhaps by the cognitive or appetitive power of the soul.99 The soul itself cannot move the more distant parts of the body, except it first move the parts closer to it , which have a greater aptitude for being moved. The heart, for example, is a bodily part more apt for receiving motion from the soul, and hence the soul cannot animate the more remote parts of the body except through the mediation of the heart, except it first give life to the heart . The soul, therefore, moves the total body according to a system of organic parts.100 This system, however, is not characterized by an absolute necessity. For rooted in the soul is the power to move the body without the use of various corporeal parts and organs. In virtue of this non-organic local motion, the soul does not move one part first, and through the 98 Op. Oxon., IV d . 49 q . 14, XXI 476 : Tertio videndum est de illa virtute animae motiva, de qua certum est et manifestum quod est ad unum modum movendi corpus ; . . . est enim virtus in anima ad movendum corpus organice per modum aliarum partium organicarum, sicut patet in motu progressivo, ubi una pars movetur, mota alia per virtutem motivam animae. 99 Metaph., loc. cit.: Et exponi posset Aristoteles de illis duabus partibus in quas potest dividi animal movens se, quod una non sit effective movens aliam praecise, sed alia est aptior, ut moveatur ; ideo prius recipit motum, forte a cognitiva vel appetitiva, vel altera effectivc movente localiter mediante aliqua alteratione, 100 Op. Oxon., loc. cit. , 477—78 : Aliqua perfectio potest competere animae secundum se, secundum quam est principium alicujus effectus ; non tamen potest ipsum exequi in remotiori, nisi exequatur effectum illum in propinquiori, sicut anima non potest animare partem remotiorem a corde, nec dare sibi vitam organice , nisi det cordi vitam , quo mediante influat vitam in coeteras partes magis distantes, sicut patet per Philosophum in lib. de Animalibus, et hoc est, quia cor est magis dispositum ad susceptionem vitae, quam alia pars. A simili ergo, licet aliqua potentia in anima sit ad causandum motum in corpore, tamen impossibile est, quod causet in parte remotiori minus disposita, nisi causet illum in parte propinquiori magis disposita ; et ideo pro aliquo statu in quo pars propinqua est magis disposita quam remotior, non potest anima causare motum in remotiori parte, nisi prius in propinquiori causet motum . ...

Particular Areas of Self-motion

131

intimate satisfactur

mediation of this part affect other and more remote parts. But the soul

position

all its parts with an equal immediacy . Absolutely considered , no part

parts, -t nifest. T

of the body is of such a nature as to forbid this immediate influence of the soul.101

and hig

After the general resurrection, the soul will move the body in this

explanation

non-organic manner, without the mediation of corporeal parts or organs. 102 This constitutes the property of agility which man will possess

other mor

ter aptit tively move ed by:SOC

I appetitim

moves the body from place to place by influencing the whole body and

when his soul is reunited to its body. Agility is not something distinct from the soul's power of organic local motion . According to Scotus , therefore, the soul has this power of non-organic local motion here and now, although in its present state, the soul is impeded in exercising this .103 power.¹

f the body

But now to take up the basic question of our dissertation, is a radical

ter aptitud

and fundamental self-motion excluded from the sphere of the local motion of animals ? Grant that on the level of ordinary experience the

more apt fir animate the tion of the

animal as a whole moves itself, and grant that this self-motion breaks

fore, moves

y e necessit out the use

down into parts which move and are moved . Does this mean that in the end none of these parts move themselves ? In order to work out an answer to this question , prominence must be given to a certain significant feature of the theory of the two parts, the mover and the moved, at least as this theory is accepted by Scotus and applied by him to the local motion of animals .

non-organic hrough the

est de illa st ad unum dum corpus et in motu am animae s uspartibu Ive movens pit motum caliter me

e peters ani fectu ; non m illum in ma cordae,t nte infl hum inlnieb.m io scept uma sit ad et in partse iori magi ita is dispos parte, nisi

3. Qualitative Change Basic to the Local Motion of Animals. When a part of the body is locally moved by another part which is locally at rest, then a qualitative change must be admitted in the latter to account for its initial effective activity. For a part locally at rest, as such at least , does not explain why it can cause local motion in another . In order that one part, not itself in local motion , might cause local motion 101 Ibid. , 478 : Si autem ista eadem virtus possit habere partem remotam ita dispositam, sicut propinquam, potest pro illo statu immediate causare motum in quamlibet partem ; sed exequi motum in parte remotiori mediante propinquiori, est movere organice,aeque autem immediate causare non organice ; ergo eadem virtus animae, quae movet organice, potest movere totum corpus non organice pro statu illo, in quo omnes partes erunt aeque dispositae ad recipiendum motum . Cf. also Op . Oxon . , IV d. 10 q . 7, XVII 277-78. 102 Op. Oxon. , IV d . 49 q . 14, XXI 477 : Praeterea, corpora glorificata post resurrectionem movebuntur ab anima, et non organice, sed totum corpus simul movebitur, non una parte mota, et alia quiescente ... 103 Ibid., 478 : Verumtamen non videtur mihi ponendum , eam aliam virtutem a motiva organice, quia nunquam est ponenda pluralitas sine necessitate .

10°

132

Chapter IV

in another, it is necessary to admit an alteration or qualitative change in the first part.104 Now the significant question is, what causes this alteration ? In his treatment of the local motion of animals , Scotus does not pose this question . But does his teaching otherwise provide an answer ? appears to be the case.

Such

First an initial point should be made clear. If the active cause of the alteration is even partially or to the smallest extent to be found in the part itself, then no matter how we explain the mechanics of local motion , it will ultimately be determined by a part which is self-movent . Thus self-motion or self-activity in the form of qualitative change will be at the basis of the local motion of an animal, whether it involve various movent and moved parts or not .

Such a self-movent part could be the cognitive or appetitive power of the soul . If these two powers in an animal are to any extent selfactive, and if these powers exercise any influence on the local motion of a living body, then self-motion would be at the basis of the local motion of animals . The question of the self-activity of cognitive and appetitive powers will be discussed later, and it will be made clear, at least in reference to man, that cognitive and appetitive powers are active potencies in the strict sense. They move themselves , and it is also commonly held among scholastics that they can determine various bodily activities, such as the local motion of animals . Perhaps a cognitive or appetitive power is not a factor in the local motion of animals, at least not all the time as in the case of unconscious activity or reflex acts . Then there would be some other part of the animal which would actively cause local motion in another part but not in itself. The movent part , however, would have to undergo the alteration previously spoken of. Now there is the question, is this part possibly altogether passive in reference to this change ? Would the change be effected solely by some object external to the part ? This is a question not precisely posed by Scotus. But his thought would hardly support an affirmative answer to this question . At least there could be no valid metaphysical argumentation which would show that the alteration is necessarily effected solely by another, and as to the fact of the matter, Scotistic thought would seem to favor self-motion .

104 Metaph . , IX q . 14, VII 590 : ideo prius recipit motum, forte a cognitiva vel appetitiva, vel altera effective movente localiter mediante aliqua alteratione.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

133

For the local motion of an animal pertains to it as something animated. The animating principle is the soul, and this same soul animates the part which both changes qualitatively and causes local motion in other parts.105 As animated, this part would be capable of being at least a partial cause of its own qualitative change . In this way, the problem before us realizes a certain simplification . For no matter how many different organic parts might be involved in the local motion of an animal , no matter how complicated the relation of these parts might be, in the end the source of movement can be traced back to the soul or some animated bodily part, both of which can function as self-movent principles. This, indeed , constitutes an interesting feature of the Scotistic analysis of the local motion of animals into movent and moved parts. This local motion , which so clearly presents itself as self-motion on the level of ordinary experience, in the end appears to be most fundamentally rooted in self- motion.

D) Quantitative Change - Growth and Nutrition Now that the local motion of animals has been shown to be another instance of self-motion , we can turn our attention to quantitative change and study the activities of nutrition and growth. Here again, according to Duns Scotus, we are confronted with self-motion . 1. A General Defense of the Stand of Scotus. This position can be defended on a general and broad basis . Nutrition and growth pertain to an animated composite being, such as an animal . For such a being, clearly, nutrition and growth mean that it receives renewed or added perfection. But the animated composite is not only passive in this process, it is also the active principle of nutrition and growth. For the composite being is endowed with a soul, in which are rooted the various active powers of vegetative life. Nutrition and growth, therefore, are activities which come forth or proceed from within the animal.106 This immanent character of growth and nutrition is also evident to the senses . For any kind of apparent increase in the size of an animal, 105 Op. Oxon., loc. cit., 474 : Primum est, quod in homine et in quolibet composito sensitivo, est duplex motus : Unus secundum exigentiam elementi praedominantis secundum quantitatem, ... ; alius est motus non ratione talis elementi praedominantis, sed ratione, qua animatum est , et est motus progressivus. 106 Metaph., loc. cit., 591 : animatum quod praefuit augetur . Quid praefuit quod causat quantitatem istam determinatam, quae est terminus illius motus ? Non est dare, nisi quod compositum virtute animae vegetativae, ut principii activi ; . . ., et innuitur illud principium esse animam ; tum, quia agere est operatio vegetativae ut principii activi . Cf. also Op . Oxon . , IV d. 44 q. 1 , XX 163 ; II d . 2 q . 10, XI 524.

134

Chapter IV

which would be effected by some extrinsic agent, would not be true growth. A farmer, for example, cannot simply plaster some external material onto his cattle, if he would increase their weight and value. The cattle must grow from within . Their own intrinsic vegetative power must perform its active role.107 2. The Counter Argumentation of Godfrey of Fontaines. But as in the case of the local motion of animals, so in reference to nutrition and growth, argumentation is made that the obvious self-motion involved here breaks down into two parts, the mover and the moved, the nourishing part and the nourished or increased part . Such is the contention of Godfrey of Fontaines.108 Such a position hardly appears plausible, since according to ordinary sense experience, an animal grows and is nourished as a whole . Every part of an animal is nourished , and growth is a harmonious development of all parts.109 But Godfrey's answer to this line of thought would be that the breakdown escapes ordinary detection , and the two parts are hidden from the senses.110 3. The Biological Makeup of an Organism and the Process of Nutrition. To meet this objection , a brief study of the biological makeup of an organism and its process of nutrition is in order. This will enable us to determine precisely the active principle of this process. Our concern will be primarily with nutrition rather than growth . The distinction between these two processess is , of course, recognized and appreciated by Duns Scotus. Nutrition is the acquisition of a new part which takes the place of a lost part ; growth stands for the acquisition of new parts which do not precisely take the place of lost parts, but rather play a role in bringing a greater quantity to a substance . Nutrition per se does not entail this quantitative increase. The distinction between these two concepts, however, offers no particular contribution or clarification to the problem of self-motion . For it would seem that if one is shown to involve self-motion, the other will involve the same. As to biological makeup, a living body is composed of many heterogeneous parts, such as the diaphragm, the lungs, sense organs, etc. 107 Metaph., loc . cit.: Satis etiam apparet sensui, quod nulla majoratio quantitatis, si fiat ab agente extrinseco, est augmentatio . 108 Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1914) , VI q. 7, III 167 . 109 Metaph. , loc. cit.: nec potest in augmentatione dari pars augmentans aliam, distincta loco et subjecto, quia quaelibet pars aucti est aucta. 110 Op. cit.: In aliis autem est movens per se distinctum sed latens. 111 Op. Oxon. , IV d . 44 q . 1 , XX 189 191–92 .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

135

Because of its excelling perfection, the soul is the principle of these parts . A rather wide diversity of parts, moreover, is required, if the animated composite is to carry on various and diverse activities.112 The heterogeneous parts of the body are further composed of homogeneous parts, various tissues such as flesh. These homogeneous parts, like every part of the body, are also vivified by the soul and are thus rendered capable of vegetative activity. Now it is precisely here that nutrition takes place.113

In nutrition, as was just stated, the body acquires a new part , which takes the place of some older part . This older part , in the course of time, becomes weak and, as it were, worn out . In this condition , it separates from the body and flows away.114 Nutrition makes up for this loss and gives the body a new part . It is essentially a restoration of a lost part. How does this take place ? Food is taken into the body. By means of various separations and purifications, it is prepared so as to be proximately capable of changing into living flesh . These purifications may take place before or after another step in the process, namely, the transmission of the food through delicate passages, such as veins, to certain places or pores which were made empty by the previous loss of other bodily parts. In such pores and under the form of cambium, gluten, or moisture, the food is placed in contiguous contact with a bodily part which requires nourishment . Thereupon, the latter converts the food into living flesh.115 4. Nutrition a Form of Self-motion . In nutrition , therefore, there is first a contiguous juxtaposition of the food and the part to be nourished . Conversion of the food into living flesh takes place, and then there is no longer a mere juxtaposition of the new part and the part nourished . 112 Ibid., 163 : quia vero corpus illud componitur ex multis partibus organicis et heterogeneis , quae distinctio partium requiritur propter multitudinem operationum, quarum anima est principium propter sui perfectionem . 113 Ibid. , 163 164 . 114 Ibid., 178-78 ; Op . Oxon . , III d. 16 q. 2 , XIV 631—32 . 115 Op. Oxon., IV d . 44 q. 1 , XX 188 : Si nutrimentum fuerit per quotcumque sequestrationes, vel depurationes ad hoc deductum, ut jam sit sub forma proxima formae nutriendi , sive hoc fuerit antequam localiter mittatur ad partes nutriendas, sive postquam missum fuerit per virtutem regitivam totius, et hoc per quasdam vias subtiles deservientes tali missioni , cujusmodi sunt venae in corporibus animalium, et alia hujusmodi correspondentia in plantis ; jam istud sub forma cambii vel glutini, vel roris approximatum parti nutriendae, et receptum in poris quibusdam dimissis ex fluxu quarumdam partium secundum materiam , quae praefuerunt ibi, et nunc et fluxu suo reliquerunt poros repletos aliquo humore subtiliori, et ita totum carens densitate in partibus requisita ad bene esse ejus, ibi existens, convertitur in ipsum nutriendum .

Chapter IV

136

For the new part has been generated in the older and preexistent part.116 Scotus stresses this latter point, and it is relevantly important to our present interest . Nutrition is not mere juxtaposition . If it were such, then the immanent character of nutrition might be contested. Viewed on the level of the small, homogeneous parts of the body, nutrition is an immanent act. The efficient activity of a preexistent part induces a new form in the matter of the food and makes it one with itself.117 The active part, therefore, perfects itself by restoring what it lost. Clearly, this is self-motion or self-activity. Explained in this fashion, nutrition appears to be a generation. But does not this constitute a difficulty ? For can generation ever be an immanent act ? Can a thing ever generate in itself a new substantial form ? Nutrition, according to Scotus, is generation but in a qualified sense. For it can be taken to mean simply the induction of a new substantial form in matter, upon the latter being despoiled of some other substantial form . Now this takes place in nutrition . A homogeneous part of the body despoils food of the form of food and actively gives it the form of the body. But nutrition is not generation in an absolute sense, as when the terminus of the act is a separate, new per se unity . In nutrition , the terminus is rather a part of a being. Hence it might be called aggeneration, because the thing generated becomes identified with some other preexisting bodily part and is added to the latter as a continuous part. Nutrition can also be called ingeneration, because a part is generated 118 in a whole, of which it was not previously a part. " It is not the teaching of Scotus that every homogeneous part of a body has the capacity of generating new parts . Some parts are too weak or "impure" for this strenuous activity. The weakness of a part might be due to the fact that it was generated by a weak part. Weakness is

116 Ibid. et sicut ante conversionem juxtaponebatur contigue partibus nutriendi, ita post conversionem juxtaponitur continue aliquibus partibus manentibus. 117 Ibid., 177-78 : in nutritione est aliqua generatio, extendendo generationem ad omnem inductionem formae substantialis in materiam post privationem, quia sicut argutum est, materia alimenti non manet sub forma alimenti , nec sub aliqua alia quam sub forma nutriti, et illam recipit post nutritionem ; ergo etc. Cf. also Op . Oxon . , III d . 16 q . 2 , XIV 634 . 118 Op. Oxon., IV d . 14 q . 1 , XX 178 : non enim dicitur generatio simpliciter, quia non est generatio per se entis, prout illud dicitur per se esse, quod non est pars alicujus. Sed potest dici aggeneratio, quia generatio alicujus, quod per generationem fit idem alicui praeexistenti cui aggeneratur ; vel potest dici ingeneratio, quia generatio partis in toto, cujus non fuit pars. Cf. also ibid., 189 ; Op . Oxon . , IV d . 10 q . 6, XVII 268.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

137

also something which results over a period of time . An originally strong part, for example, which works on food and converts the latter into bodily flesh, gradually loses its strength and in the end retires from active service. Finally, it dies, as it were, and parts from bodily unity.119 5. The Aristotelian Distinction : Pars secundum Formam and Pars secundum Materiam . In connection with the various stages in the existence of a bodily part , Scotus rethinks and explicates two Aristotelian concepts : pars secundum formam and pars secundum materiam, formal part and material part . The distinction between these two concepts brings out all the more clearly the self-movent character of nutrition. Form , according to Scotus, is a principle of being. It can also be a principle of efficient activity, such as are various substantial and qualitative forms . But because of some imperfection, a form by nature capable of efficient activity, might de facto be incapable of exercising this activity. In this condition, however, it continues to be a form as long as it imparts 120 being or functions as a formal cause . The possibility of a form being able to exercise its proper efficient activity and of it not being able to exercise this activity gives rise to two varying acceptations of the expression ' formal part .' In either acceptation, however, formal part does not refer to the form alone, but to the form and its matter. For a formal part as a part of a body must have matter.¹121 According to the first acceptation, a part of the body is called formal, as long as it remains united to the body. For from the beginning to the end of this period, it has the formal being proper to it as a continuous 122 part of the body.¹ According to the second acceptation, the part is not a formal part during the entire same period of time but only and as long as it has the efficacious power of eliciting action strictly proper to the form. Since this power weakens over a period of time and in the end becomes inefficacious, a part is no longer formal towards the end of its existence

119 Op. Oxon., IV d. 44 q . 1 , XX 178 180. 120 Ibid., 179 : forma dat esse et agere; ergo pars secundum formam potest dici quamdiu habet esse secundum formam, vel quamdiu habet agere secundum formam ; et secundum infert primum, licet non e contra ; citius enim deficit alicui actio propter imperfectionem quam esse ; Metaph. , IX q . 6, VII 563 : nulla forma activa est, nisi aliqua substantialis forte, et aliqua de genere Qualitatis . 121 Op. Oxon., loc . cit.: et sive sic sive sic , pars secundum formam non est tantum pars formae, sed includit materiam et formam . 122 Ibid.: Primo autem modo quaecumque pars, dum manet in toto, dicitur pars secundum formam, a principio scilicet periodi suae usque ad finem, quia scilicet tamdiu habet esse .

138

Chapter IV

in the unity of the body. Such would be the case at least in a normal course of events.123 Here it is not merely a question of the part concurring in the activity of some organ or the body as a whole . Nor is it a question of any activity proper to the part as a suppositum when separated from the body . The activity contemplated here is that which is proper to the part as existing in the unity of the body and which can be viewed as belonging to it and not precisely to the whole body 124 The efficacious power of the formal part has two necessary dimensions : definite extensive and definite intensive quantity. A definite extensive quantity is required , because a part, small beyond a certain limit, could not provide adequate residence to an efficacious power. The dimension of intensive quantity is also necessary. For no matter how great the extensive quantity may be, the power must be possessed of at least a minimal degree of perfection in order to exercise its proper activity and withstand opposing and disintegrating forces.125 Corresponding to the two acceptations of formal part are two acceptations of material part . First, a material part is one which has broken off from the unity of the body and has flowed away. It is no longer a continuous part of the body. Secondly, a material part is one which remains a continuous part of the body, but no longer has, or perhaps never did have, the efficacious power of eliciting action strictly proper to the part as existing in the unity of the body and which can be viewed as belonging to it and not precisely to the whole body.126 Scotus does not elaborate these distinctions of formal and material parts in a defense of self-motion . Nevertheless, they give clear expression to his stand concerning nutrition and growth as instances of self-motion. For a formal part , according to the second acceptation given , is an efficiently active principle . At least two actions proper to it are nutrition and growth. The formal part is also the terminus of these activities. Scotus expressly states pars secundum speciem augetur.127 Hence a formal part, according to Scotus' second understanding of this term, is always a principle of self-motion . 6. Food as the Cause of Growth . The opinion might be entertained that food is the active cause of growth . Food nourishes insofar as it is a potential essence ; it causes growth insofar as it is potential quantity.128 123 Ibid. Secundo modo non dicitur pro omni parte periodi pars secundum formam, sed pro illa , pro qua habet virtutem ita efficacem, quod potest sibi competere actio secundum formam . 126 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 127 Ibid. , 188. 128 Metaph., IX q . 14, VII 591 .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

139

Scotus rejects this opinion . Actual quantity per se is not an active potency. A fortiori, potential quantity cannot be such. In nutrition, furthermore, food is despoiled of the form of food . This loss is naturally, if not temporally, prior to the process of growth. Thus it would be hard to see how food could cause growth when it no longer exists . Some causality, however, is to be accorded food in nutrition and in the growing process . It provides the matter which the living being utilizes in nourishing itself and in increasing its flesh . Because food is in potency to the form of flesh, flesh is generated from it but not by it . This generation is nutrition. Because a certain amount of food is in potency to become a determined quantity of flesh, a determined quantity of flesh is generated from it, and the nourishment and growth of a living being result. The food is a material and not an active principle.¹129 Clearly, according to Scotus, nutrition and growth are instances of self-motion. The efficient cause of these processes is the animated composite which grows or is nourished . This proposition conceded, the case is closed, no matter how many difficulties there may be in explaining the more immediate and proximate principles of nutrition and growth . For these two activities pertain to a per se unity which functions as a whole. Still even if we trace these activities down to those minute principles , the homogeneous parts of the body, the self-motion maintains. This self-motion, according to Duns Scotus , cannot be denied on the basis of a distinction between a part which nourishes and a part which is nourished. In a most radical and fundamental way, therefore, nutrition and growth stand as genuine instances of self-motion.

E) Qualitative Change or Alteration After presenting Scotus' defense of self-motion in the sphere of quantitative change, we may now consider his position concerning selfmotion and qualitative change or alteration . Because of a strong empirical tendency, his teaching here is perhaps more solid than profound . And in the main at least, it is not complicated . It should be recalled that self-motion rests on these two conditions : first, the agent must be an equivocal cause ; secondly, it must have the capacity for self-motion . When these two conditions are viewed in reference to qualitative change, two questions are immediately suggested. First, is qualitative change ever the work of an equivocal cause ? Scotus'

129 Ibid., 591-92.

140

Chapter IV

answer to this question is affirmative . Many alterations are effected by equivocal causes, particularly and without exception, those which terminate in non-active qualities.130 A second question suggested is this : are there substances which have the capacity for immanent qualitative changes ? Are there any substances which can alter themselves ? The answer to this question rests with experience , and as a matter of empirical fact, natural agents, when not impeded, can change themselves qualitatively. A pertinent example here is water, which makes itself cold.131 Another example is a seed, which also alters or changes itself qualitatively.132 The latter example is given extended consideration by Scotus. 1. The Theory of Seminal Reasons . The role of the seed in generation and its related activities Scotus treats in a theological question on the maternity of the Blessed Virgin Mary.183 These issues are also considered in his discussions of the traditional Augustinian theory of seminal reasons.134 For St. Bonaventure , a defender of this theory, all matter is replete with rationes seminales. These rationes seminales are forms in a germinal state, which realize full development through their own activity and the influence of certain external agents . These forms are latent in matter, much as a full blown flower is contained in its bud, and the forms realize development through their own activity and certain external influences, much as a bud develops into a flower through its own power and the influences of the soil, moisture, and the sun . All the forms of the sublunary world, moreover, are imbedded in matter in this way, except the rational soul.135 2. Duns Scotus and Seminal Reasons. As to the theory of seminal reasons, Duns Scotus ' position is mainly one of opposition . At least he is opposed to a theory which asserts that all matter is filled with these seeds or potential forms. Such a theory could justify itself in either one

130 Cf. Ch . II 39-40. 131 Op. Oxon ., II d . 25 q . u . , XIII 209 210 ; Metaph. , IX q . 14 , VIII 592 . 132 Ibid . 133 Op. Oxon., III d . 4 q . u . , XIV 191-99 . 134 Op. Oxon., II d. 18 q . u . , XIII 85-96 ; Metaph . , VII q . 12 , VII 394-402. 135 Commentaria in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum , II d . 18 a. 1 q . 2, in S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia (ad Claras Aquas : ex Typographia Collegi S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1901 ) , II , 436–42 ; IV d . 43 a. 1 q . 4, IV 889. Cf. also Étienne Gilson and Philotheus Boehner, Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie (2d ed .; Paderborn, 1954) , III 489-90 ; Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Westminster, Maryland, 1952) , II 274–77.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

141

of two ways : necessary arguments which prove seminal reasons to be realities in matter, or experience testifying to their existence . But none of the arguments in support of a theory with such universal application are necessary. And since beings are not to be admitted without necessity, seminal reasons as realities to be found in all matter are not to be admitted. Secondly, such entities as seminal reasons are not reported in our sense experience of material things, at least not universally. In fact, in some instances their admission would be contrary to the experience of the senses.136 The question remains, does Scotus admit seminal reasons possibly in some natural beings ? Yes, for on the basis of experience there is no doubt that some natural beings produce their like in a mediate manner, and the medium is a seed . A bull, for example , produces offspring by means of a seed . This seed, moreover, is endowed with a form which,

i

for Scotus, is the seminal reason (ratio seminalis) .137 These two terms, seed and seminal reason , although related to each

other, are still to be distinguished and are explicated with precision . › A seed is a body, the form of which nature does not principally intend for its own sake. Rather the form is intended for the sake of another, namely, a being which is to be generated from the seed , and which is like the being which originally generated the seed.138 The nature and finality of a seed can be better understood against the background of a twofold process which reigns in nature . First there is the process of ascent or the process from the imperfect to the perfect . In a seed, for example, the seminal form is replaced by the form of blood, and the latter in turn is replaced by the form of the embyro or some other more perfect form . Various as the steps may be in this succession of forms, the succession as a whole is an ascent towards a more perfect form .

136 Metaph., loc . cit. , 397 : Propter istas duas rationes cum ostendat, nullam esse necessitatem ponendi tales inchoationes, propter illa propter quae praecipue ponuntur, et nunquam ponenda sunt plura sine necessitate , et etiam sensui satis contraria . Conceditur, quod non oportet generaliter in naturalibus ponere tales inchoationes, nec etiam quascumque coaevas materiae transmutabili . Cf. Op . Oxon . , II d . 18 q . u . , XIII 94. 137 Metaph., loc . cit. , 397-98 : Restat ergo inquirere, an in aliquibus naturalibus in speciali, et in quibus ponendae sunt inchoationes, sive rationes seminales, licet non sunt coaevae materiae . Ubi sciendum, quod naturalia immediate producunt similia, quaedam mediate ; quaedam neutro modo ; exemplum, ignis, bos, Sol, vel Angelus . De secundis videtur manifestum, quod ipsa secunda immediate producunt semina, ... .. 138 Op. Oxon. , II d . 18, XIII 93 : Dico, quod semen est corpus quoddam, cujus forma non est intenta propter se, sed propter aliud, ut scilicet ex illo generetur aliquid simile generanti .

142

Chapter IV Secondly, there is the process of descent, the process from the perfect

to the imperfect . A living organism decomposes into a corpse, and then further decompositions take place down to the elements or primary matter.139 Now a seed is a body from which starts a process of ascent . In the end, the ascending process terminates in a perfect form. The seed, therefore, is a kind of imperfect body which is produced by a generating cause, and which is to be the first step in a gradual process of ascent to further and more perfect forms and finally to a perfect form. The latter, moreover, is of the same nature as the original generating cause. 140 While the seed is a body with a particular kind of substantial form, the seminal reason is precisely the substantial form or a quality which necessarily results from this form. The seminal reason , therefore, pertains to the seed as such. The ratio or form of the seed also has a certain correspondence or likeness with both the form of the generating cause and the thing generated in its final state of perfection . Hence the seed itself is said to have a certain uniformity with both its cause and the final form to be realized.141 Because of this uniformity, the seminal reason roughly maps out the path along which the seed must travel in order to reach its final perfection . This is not to say, however, that it is the active cause of the various steps along the way. 3. Is a Seed Capable of Self-motion ? But is the seed capable of self-motion ? Is it an active potency in the strict sense ? The texts of Scotus clearly and repeatedly insist that the seed is not an active principle of generation or the final form : which is the terminus of generation. In the case of a seed which is uniform in itself and homogeneous in its total makeup and parts, such generating power is excluded for three reasons. 1) First, the seed does not exist at the moment of generationHence it cannot be a principle of generation or the terminus of genera139 Ibid . potest distingui in natura duplex processus in forma . Unus ascendendo, ut a forma seminis ad formam sanguinis, a forma sanguinis ad formam aliam, scilicet embryonis vel alterius, et iste processus est ab imperfecto ad perfectum. Alius processus est descendendo e converso, a perfectus ad imperfectiora, resolvendo scilicet in cadaver et in foeces, et sic procedendo usque ad elementa vel materiam primam. Cf. also Op . Oxon . , II d. 15 q. u. , XIII 17. 140 Op . Oxon., II d . 18, XIII 93 : Semen igitur est quoddam corpus imperfectum, productum a generante, ut sit via ascendendi ad ulteriores formas perfectas . 141 Ibid., 93—94 : Quid est ratio seminalis ? Dico quod est aliqua forma seminis, inquantum semen est, et illud, vel est forma substantialis seminis, vel qualitas necessario consequens formam substantialem seminis, . . . ex quo est uniforme respectu geniti vel generantis.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

143

tion . 2) Secondly, the seed is the proximate subject of transformation in generation . Hence it is passive. 3) Thirdly, the seed is less perfect than the terminus of generation . Hence even if it did remain in the act of generation, it could not be the efficient principle. The imperfect cannot be an adequate efficient cause of the perfect.142 Neither is the seed an active principle of generation in virtue of the cause which originally generated it . For the cause is no longer present when subsequent generations take place. In fact, it might not even exist. In this connection, Scotus points out that the cause of a seed and the seed itself are not essentially ordered but accidentally ordered causes. This means that the seed is not dependent on its cause in exercising its own causality. Hence the seed is not an active principle of generation in virtue of its own efficient cause.143 If the seed is not an active principle of generation, is it perhaps an active principle of alterations or qualitative changes in reference to itself ? 144 This question is expressly posed by Scotus in Bk. II of the Opus Oxoniense. The answer given here, prima facie at least, does not fully agree with other statements in Bk. III of the Opus Oxoniense and the commentary on the Metaphysics. In Bk. II the Franciscan Master answers the question posed with a videtur quod non . This negative answer is supported from the uniform character of the seed. The latter will not allow that the seed decomposes itself and then actively works towards a form of higher perfection . Furthermore, if the ratio seminalis were a principle of alteration, it would alter itself. But does it have the power to do something so drastic as this ? Certainly, the seed cannot alter itself to the extent that it would be the active cause of the various and diverse organs of an organic body. This would be forbidden by its character of uniformity.145 142 Ibid., 94 : Primo, quia quod non est non potest esse principium productivum substantiae, sed semen non est in instanti generationis ; ergo tunc non est principium inductivum vel productivum generationis vel termini generationis, nec etiam dum est potest esse principium activum tale, quia semen est aliquid de proximo convertibile in illud quod debet generari, hoc autem habet rationem passivi, non activi. Praeterea, imperfectius non est causa sufficiens activa perfectioris ; sed semen est imperfectius quam res generanda, etiam cum omnibus spiritibus suis ; igitur etiamsi maneret, non posset esse principium activum generationis. 143 Ibid.: sed generans vel seminans, et semen, sunt accidentaliter ordinata, sicut Socrates et Plato ; igitur ad actionem introductivam formae ultimae, non concurrit virtus generantis . 144 Ibid. , 95 : Sed estne principium alterativum praevium illud semen ? 145 Ibid. Videtur quod non, quia si est uniforme, non potest per aliquem gradum entitatis suae vel per qualitatem suam, seipsum corrumpere vel

144

Chapter IV Perhaps not all the alterations a seed undergoes are as major as the

latter. Could there not be lesser ones ? Bk. II of the Opus Oxoniense is silent on this point . The commentary on the Metaphysics, however, clearly allows that certain minor alterations preceding generation could be effected by the seed itself. But such alterations are to be admitted only on the basis of sense experience and in the absence of a manifest extrinsic agent which effects the change. This power of a seed to alter itself must also be restricted to those beings which are generated from a seed in a proper sense.146 In line with this doctrine in the commentary on the Metaphysics,

Bk. III of the Opus Oxoniense states that the seed is an active principle of alterations. What are these alterations ? The alterations caused by the seed as an active potency are the changes immediately preceding the generation of an organic body, and which dispose the seed for the generation . Immediately prior to the generation of an organic body, these three steps can be singled out : I) the seed is moved to the proper place for the generation ; 2) it changes in figure ; 3 ) the seed condenses . Scotus expressly calls this condensation an alteration, and he also expressly states that the seminal reason is the active principle of the alteration preceding generation.147 In Bk. II , however, Scotus denies that the seed is an active principle of alteration. But there he seems to contemplate a more major type of alteration .

"... igitur non potest alterare ad tantam diversitatem

quanta apparet in organis ipsius geniti, scilicet corporis organici . " 148 Condensation would surely be a lesser alteration compared to the

promovere ad ulteriorem gradum, sicut patet de igne et suo calore ; ista etiam qualitas si esset principium alterandi , si alteraret, alteraret se. Praeterea, principium uniforme non est principium activum difformitatis, nisi passivum sit difforme ; sed semen est uniforme et unigeneum, etiamsi est activum, et similiter materia ; igitur non potest alterare ad tantam diversitatem , quanta apparet in organis ipsius geniti, scilicet corporis organici. 146 Metaph., VII q . 12 , VII 399 : ita ponitur in generali, quod non sit ratio seminalis in quacumque alteratione praevia generatione, sed solum in illa, ubi ex sensu necesse est eam ponere ; et hoc est ubi absente agente extrinseco, alterandum ex se perficit, ut fiat generatio, quod in nullis videtur, nisi in genitis ex semine proprie. 147 Op. Oxon., III d . 4 q . u . , XIV 191 : Ad quod intelligendum, sciendum est quod in formatione corporis nostri praecedit motus localis de loco ipsius corporis corrumpendi, ad locum convenientem generatione ipsius corporis organici ex eo. Hunc motum localem sequitur figuratio illius corporis, quae figuratio non est sine motu locali . Tertio, sequitur condensatio illius corporis corrumpendi, quae est quaedam alteratio praecedens generationem corporis densioris ex isto corpore rariori. 148 Op. Oxon. , II d . 18, XIII 95 .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

145

development of an organic body as organic. Hence Scotus' teaching in Bk. II does not deny or conflict with the view that the condensation of a seed is an instance of self-motion . Another point of difference between Bk. II of the Opus Oxoniense and the commentary on the Metaphysics concerns the area in which seminal reasons are admitted . In the latter work, this area is restricted to plants and animals which are produced by way of a seed . In Bk. II of the Opus Oxoniense, Scotus expressly defends the admission of seminal reasons in mixtures in the strict sense, mixtures of juxtaposition, and even in an individual element . A mixture in the strict sense and a mixture which is simply a juxtaposition of individual entities can be the recipients of a quality caused by a heavenly body, and this quality in turn can be a step in a process towards a higher and more perfect form. A heavenly body, for example, could induce in the corpse of an ox a quality which would be a step in a process terminating in the form of a bee.149 In an individual element, according to Scotus, a seminal reason can be admitted only in view of divine power. Here its admission provides an explanation as to how God can cause a mixture from one element, as for example, when He made fishes from water. In this case, however, the seminal reason is called a quasi ratio seminalis.150 In the commentary on the Metaphysics seminal reasons are denied in all three of these instances : mixtures simply, mixtures of juxtaposition, and an individual element . This denial is made on the basis of the principle of parsimony.151 It must be noted, however, that in the commentary on the Metaphysics the meaning of seminal reason contains an element which does not enter its definition as given in Bk. II , and as we have described it above. This element is efficient activity. In the commentary, a seminal reason is described as an active force intrinsic to the seed, which in some way works towards the production of a being 149 Ibid.: Qualiter ergo ponitur ratio seminalis in aliis ab animalibus ? Dico, quod omnia mixta possunt habere rationes seminales , quia a generante recipiunt qualitates, quae sunt viae ad formas ulteriores et perfectiores ; in cadavere enim bovis potest induci qualitas aliqua a corpore coelesti, quae est via ad formam apis, et est similis illi, quae datur a generante univoco, et est ratio seminalis ; potest etiam ratio seminalis esse in non vere mixtis, sicut in mixtis per juxtapositionem ; corpora enim coelestia non semper generant de vere mixtis, sed de mixtis per juxtapositionem, et tale mixtum potest habere qualitatem, quae est via ad formam perfectiorem . 150 Ibid. Item unum elementum potest esse per potentiam divinam, quasi ratio seminalis respectu mixti, ita quod ex uno elemento, potest Deus causare mixtum, sicut de aqua fecit pisces, Genesis primo. 151 Metaph., VII q. 12, VII 397.

11 Philosophy Series No. 15

146

Chapter IV

similar to the generating cause of the seed . The seminal reason is not merely a step on the way.152 In Bk. II of the Opus Oxoniense, therefore, Scotus ' concept of seminal reason is broader than that given in the commentary. This broadening of the concept enables him to bring his own doctrine, verbally at least, more in line with the authority of St. Augustine.153 For this really improper understanding of seminal reason allows for a broader field of possible verfication. It can be applied to qualities which are not active, and as a result in Bk. II , Scotus simply passes over the restricted active character of a seminal reason in the seeds of plants and animals . This is simply left open. In the end , the discrepancy between Bk. II and the commentary on the Metaphysics is a verbal affair, a matter of definition but not of doctrinal contradiction . According to Scotus, therefore, the seminal reason of the seed of a plant or animal is an active potency. The seed is immanently capable of those alterations which, according to the indications of experience, are not to be ascribed to an extrinsic agent . These alterations are lesser qualitative changes preceding the act of generation .

F) The Intellect an Active Potency Scotus' defense of self-motion goes beyond the spheres of local motion, the quantitative and qualitative changes of bodies. It also includes acts of the intellect and will . In this spiritual sphere, moreover, he maintains his position with the utmost firmness . Both the intellect and will are efficient causes of their proper acts.

This essential stand of Scotus is not embarassed by any difficulty in this that perhaps they are not the total cause of their acts . For as long as these two faculties are truly efficient causes of cognitive and volitional acts - no matter how partial or limited their role might be, and no then once matter how numerous or decisive other agents may be, again we see falsified the universal proposition : omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Hence first in reference to the intellect , we inquire here as to whether this faculty is an active potency. This question takes us into the general problem, much agitated by medieval scholastics, concerning the activity 152 Ibid., 398 : in quibus seminibus videtur quaedam vis intrinseca, activa aliquo modo ad productionem similium primis generantibus semina, quae vis indita semini à generante vocatur ratio seminalis. 153 Op. Oxon., II d . 18, XIII 95 : Ex dictis patet, quomodo intelligendum est illud Augustini, tertio de Trinit. capit. nono, quod in elementis mundi hujus ponendae sunt rationes seminales.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

147

and passivity of the intellect and the possible harmonization of these two elements in cognition . 1. Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition . A discussion of this problem must at once take note of the Scotistic distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. This is a phenomenological distinction , which finds abundant proof in ordinary conscious experience, and much to his credit , Duns Scotus appears to be the first scholastic to make extensive use of this distinction and to incorporate it on a large scale into his systematic philosophy.154 Briefly, intuitive cognition is the cognition of an object in its actual existence. It is the apprehension of a present (not absent) object in its actual and concrete existence.155 All the immediate data of consciousness are known to us by intuitive cognition . Not only acts of thinking and volition and emotions, but sensible objects also are spiritually and immediately apprehended by the intellect.156 Now an intuitive cognition, according to Scotus , is actively caused by the object but not entirely. It is also caused by the soul itself or the intellect . The object and the intellect function as partial causes of this cognitive act, and together, they are its total cause.157 This doctrine. of partial causality will be more fully explored later. The only point we wish to score here is that the intellect, on the level of intuitive cognition , is an active principle and hence moves itself. This at least is the teaching of Duns Scotus. Abtractive cognition is the cognition of an object which abstracts from actual existence and non-existence. In other words, it regards an object independently of its existence or non-existence . This type of cognition, which is abundantly testified to in our conscious experience, is mediate knowledge of an object . An example of this abstractive cognition would be the conscious image of some concrete object which once in the past was known by intuitive cognition . Our many

154 Cf. Sebastian J. Day, Intuitive Cognition A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics ( St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1947 ) , xiii . 155 Op . Oxon., II d . 3 q. 9 , XII 453 : Potest enim aliqua esse cognitio secundum quod existens et secundum quod praesens in aliqua obiecti, existentia actuali . Cf. also Sebastian J. Day, op. cit., 50 ; Reinhold Messner, Schauendes und begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Skotus (Freiburg, Breisgau, 1942 ) , 28-29. 156 Op. Oxon . , IV d . 49 q . 8 , XXI 306. Cf. Reinhold Messner, op. cit., 29. 157 Ord. , I d . 3 p. 3 q . 2 , III 300 : Concedo enim quod illam ' imaginem , ' quae est ' sensatio , ' non causat corpus in spiritu ut totalis causa, sed anima causat in se, ' mira celeritate, ' non tamen ut causa tota, sed ipsa et obiectum . Cf. Reinhold Messner, op. cit. , 29-30.

11.

148

Chapter IV

and multifarious concepts of things are also examples of abstractive cognition.158 In his theory of conceptual knowledge, Scotus postulates a species . The latter is not a datum of conscious experience, but it is admitted over and above and as prior to the concept which is given in consciousness.159 Here it does not concern us why Scotus, together with the majority of scholastics postulates the species.160 Later it was discarded by Ockham.161 None the less, both in reference to the species and the concept, Scotus accords the intellect active causality. The intellect and the phantasm as two partial causes concur as the total cause of the intelligible species ; the intellect and the species as partial causes concur as the total cause of conscious intellection or conceptual knowledge.162 Duns Scotus examines the problem of the activity versus the passi-

vity of the intellect at great length and primarily in reference to conscious intellection.163 Because of the importance and relevance of this problem to the topic of our dissertation , we will review the argumentation and conclusions reached by Scotus. In the end, this will take us into his theory of partial causes. 2. Intellection Demands an Active Cause. The first conclusion reached by Duns Scotus is that a conscious intellection demands an active cause . The proof for this conclusion is phenomenological . An actual intellection is given to us as something transient : it exists now but but did not exist 158 Op. Oxon., II d . 3 q . 9, XII 453 : Potest enim aliqua esse cognitio objecti, secundum quod abstrahit ab omni existentia actuali . Quodl. , q. 6, XXV 243 ; q . 13 , 521. Cf. Reinhold Messner, op . cit. , 28-29. 159 Cf. Sebastian J. Day, op. cit. , 108- II . 160 Cf. Reinhold Messner, op. cit., 35-36, Hubert Klug, " L'Activité Intellectuelle de L'Ame selon le Bienheureux Jean Duns Scot, " Études Franciscaines , 41 ( 1929) 122-25. 161 Cf. Sebastian Day, op. cit., 188-201 . 162 Ord., I d. 3 p. 3 q. 3, II 335 : Ad primum argumentum dico quod duplex est actus intellectus respectu obiectorum quae non sunt praesentia in se, qualia sunt illa quae modo naturaliter intelligimus : primus actus est species, qua obiectum est praesens ut obiectum actu intelligibile, secundus actus est ipsa intellectio actualis, et ad utrumque actum agit intellectus, non motus ab eo quod est causa partialis secum concurrens ad illam actionem, licet unum actum intellectus praecedat motio eius ad alium actum. Ad primum autem actum agit intellectus agens cum phantasmate, et ibi intellectus agens est principalior causa quam phantasma, et ambo integrant unam totalem causam respectu speciei intelligibilis . Ad secundum actum agit pars intellectiva (sive intellectus agens sive possibilis, non curo modo) et species intelligibilis sicut duae partiales causae, - et ibi agit pars intellectiva non mota a specie, sed prius movens, id est quasi agens ut species sibi coagat. 163 Ibid., q. 2, 245-330 . Scotus ' teaching on this issue is presented by Hubert Klug, art. cit. , 113—20.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

149

before. Now the entity of such a transient being demands an active or efficient cause . But what is the active cause of intellection ? In some way, this cause is to be identified with ourselves . For an act of intellection or understanding is something which belongs to us . Scotus does not describe intellection as an act which is consciously experienced as an act of the ego, as would a modern phenomenological thinker, but he simply asserts that intellection is an act in us (in nobis) . This means that the active principle of intellection is intrinsic to the rational suppositum which is man . This is attested to by the empirical fact that it is " in our power to understand when we will . " 164 But the object also appears to be an efficient factor in our knowledge . According to Scotus , therefore, both the soul and the object , as contained in an intelligible species, concur in the production of intellectual knowledge.165 The full import of this position is brought out in further conclusions . 3. The Object not the Total Cause of Intellection . The second conclusion reached by Scotus in this : neither the object in itself nor in its species is the total active cause of intellection.166 This conclusion opposes the teaching of Godfrey of Fontaines. a) The Teaching of Godfrey of Fontaines. According to Godfrey of Fontaines, intellection as an activity of some agent cannot properly be ascribed to the intellect . For the possible intellect cannot be the active principle of intellectual acts . Nor can the agent intellect be an immediate active principle of these same acts . Intellection , therefore, is effected by the object which is contained in the phantasm.167 164 Ord. , loc. cit. , 289 : Ad quaestionem respondeo quod intellectio actualis est aliquid in nobis non perpetuum sed habens esse ' post ' non-esse, ' sicut experimur. Istius oportet ponere aliquam causam activam, et aliquo modo in nobis, alioquin non esset in potestate nostra intelligere cum vellemus, quod est contra Philosophum II De anima . Cf. also Quod. , q . 15, XXVI 119 137. 165 Ord. , loc. cit.: Apparet autem hic quod oportet concurrere animam et obiectum praesens, et hoc in specie intelligibili, sicut dictum est in praecedenti quaestione, quia alio modo non est praesens ut actu intelligibile, loquendo de sensibili et obiecto materiali . 166 Ibid.: Dico tunc quod istius intellectionis non est tota causa activa obiectum, nec in se nec in sua specie, 167 Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines also contains quodlibet 9 and 10, ed . J. Hoffmans . Quodl . IX q . 19 , in Les Philosophes Belges (Louvain, 1924) , IV 275—76 : Item, esto quod ita esset, tamen adhuc non posset dici proprie quod intelligere esset ab intellectu ut actio ab efficiente et movente, quia illud ratione cuius non agit ad actum intelligendi nisi secundum quod agit ad hoc quod illud quod debet movere intellectum possibilem habeat actu rationem moventis et obiecti . Obiectum ergo intelligibile habet rationem moventis et agentis respectu intellectus possibilis

150

Chapter IV

But if the active causation of intellectual acts is reserved to the phantasm , then it would follow that the soul is an active principle of cognitive acts. For the phantasy is truly a faculty of the soul . For Godfrey, this constitutes a special difficulty, but one which he does not fail to consider. His solution , which must be consistent with his acceptance of the cinesiological principle, is worked out by means of several distinctions. The soul can be considered in a twofold manner : according to its essence and according to its powers . According to its essence, the soul is definitively present in the body, but it is not the immediate principle of any activity . The soul , considered according to its powers, admits of a twofold subdistinction : the soul considered according to an organic power, such as the phantasy , and the soul considered according to an inorganic power, such as the intellect. An organic power of the soul is one which is attached to some organ or part of the body. The organic power is to be located in this part, and thus it differs significantly from an inorganic power, which per se is not in any part of the body or in the whole body. Now because the phantasy, although a power of the soul , is located in a bodily part distinct from the soul, it has a subject distinct from the inorganic powers of the soul, and consequently, it can move or change the latter. A phantasm or an object shining in the phantasm, therefore , can move the possible intellect and actively cause intellection . Since the agent intellect, however, has no subject distinct from the subject of the possible intellect , it cannot move the latter. By the same token, the possible intellect cannot move itself or be an active cause of intellection.168 educens ipsum de potentia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum illud, et sic intellectus nec ut agens nec ut possibilis posset dici efficere actum intelligendi in se ipso . Sed obiectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et moventis, licet non habeat quod sit obiectum nisi in virtute eius quod habet rationem intellectus agentis ; et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passivi et receptivi . Sic ergo intelligere non potest dici actio respectu intellectus possibilis sic quod habeat esse ab intellectu possibili ut ab agente et movente ; immo potius sic est actio respectu obiecti . Cf. also Quodl. VIII q. 2, IV 23 ; Quod . X q . 14, IV 379 ; Les Quodlibet Cing, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1914 ) , VI q. 7, III 170-71 . Cf. also Duns Scotus, Ord . , I d . 3 p. 3 q. 2, III 256–60. 168 Godfrey of Fontaines, op . cit. , q . 7 , 171–72 : Sed tunc restat maior difficultas de illo obiecto intellectus et voluntatis et de istis potentiis deservientibus intellectui et voluntati quae sic moventer a voluntate, quia omnes potentiae simul subiecto sunt in quantum subiective sunt in anima quae est in toto corpore. Phantasmata, etiam rebus corruptis, remanentia in memoria vel phantasi sunt in eodem subiecto cum intellectu et voluntate et est dicendum quod est considerare animam secundum eius essentiam vel substantiam et secundum eius potentias. Primo modo sic est tota in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius propter eius indivisibilitatem per se et per

Particular Areas of Self-motion

151

According to the Belgian Philosopher, however, it is the function of the agent intellect to illuminate the possible intellect . In some way, it penetrates the latter with light . This illumination is a perpetual affair, but it is not to be construed as any kind of efficient activity . The light of the agent intellect perfects the possible intellect as a formal cause . 169 The agent intellect also illuminates the phantasm, but it does not cause any positive disposition or formal entity in the latter. The illumination here effects no more than a certain removal of obstacles to intellection . Upon this removal, the possible intellect is made actually knowing.170 accidens et sic non est immediatum principium alicuius operationis secundae. Secundo modo sic quantum ad aliquas eius potentias est in aliqua parte corporis determinata, quantum ad aliquas in nulla, scilicet quantum ad intellectum et voluntatem quae non sunt organicae. . . . ita potentiae etiam sensitivae per se ut in subiecto sunt in coniuncto ex anima et corpore sive in corpore et in parte determinata secundam determinatam dispositionem corporis. Intellectus autem et voluntas nec per se sunt perfectio materiae vel in materia, nec etiam in coniuncto nec in aliqua parte corporis, immo ut sic sunt separatae eo quod operatio earum non exercetur per corpus, quia nec per aliquam partem corporis sive per aliquod organum corporale ; et ideo licet anima ut essentia vel forma substantialis sit in illa parte corporis in qua est phantasia et sic de aliis, tamen ipsa sub ratione talis potentiae sive talis potentia quae est intellectus vel voluntas ut sic nec est in hac parte corporis nec in illa, quia in nulla, et ideo dicitur quod substantia animae est coniuncta, potentia vero intellectiva separata, non quia secundum rem non sit subiective in ipsa anima quae est in materia ut perfectio eius, sed quia per se nec est in toto nec in aliqua parte sicut nec operatio quae per eam exercetur. Sicut ergo potentia quae esset in alia parte corporis a parte in qua est phantasia posset, immutari et moveri ab eo quod esset in phantasia, ita potentia quae non est determinata ad partem in qua est phantasia, sed est extra illam sic quod non plus est ibi quam in pede, ab eo quod est in phantasi poterit immutari . Ita autem est in proposito, quia illae potentiae non sunt sic alligatae et immersae materiae sicut aliae, sed sunt dicto modo abstractae et separatae . 169 Ibid., q. 15, 252 : Unde, quia intellectus possibilis qui est huiusmodi actionis et illustrationis quasi materia semper est praesens et subiectus lumini intellectus agentis, dicitur haec actio perpetua . Nec tamen intelligitur quod huiusmodi intellectus agens hoc modo agat in intellectum possibilem secundum rationem causae efficientis ipsum, aliquo modo transmutando et de potentia ad actum reducendo ut sic activum et passivum sint coniuncta subiecto, sed quasi formaliter ipsum suo lumine perficiendo . Sic enim huiusmodi illustrationem facit ipse intellectus agens, ut dictum est, non effective, sed solum formaliter. Cf. also Duns Scotus, Ord. , I d . 3 p. 3 q. 2 , III 258–59 . 170 Godfrey of Fontaines, op. cit. , V q . 10, 37 : ideo videtur dicendum quod huiusmodi actio vel operatio intellectus agentis non est positiva sic quod faciat aliquam dispositionem positivam et formalem subiective in phantasmate ; sed est huiusmodi operatio vel actio per modum cuiusdam remotionis et abstractionis vel sequestrationis unius ab altero, non quidem secundum rem, sed secundum immutandi rationem ; ibid . , 40 : Et non dicitur quod se habeat ad phantasmata sicut ars, quia proprie loquendo actione intellectus agentis non fit aliqua dispositio formalis in ipsis phantasmatibus quasi in materia sed solum fit dicta sequestratio vel arbitratio vel remotio prohibentium et huiusmodi , quo facto virtute ipsius intellectus agentis et in eius lumine fit informatio intellectus possibilis ab ipsa intellectione talis cognoscibilis sive a specie intelligibili quae aliquo modo in lumine intellectus agentis continetur virtualiter. Cf. Duns Scotus, op. cit . , 260-61.

152

Chapter IV

Godfrey's notion of illumination is surely a difficult conception , and an adequate treatment of it we readily leave to others. In the end, he traces back the source of this illumination to God, who made the soul with its various powers . Such recourse enables him to combine his notion of illumination with his position that the agent intellect exercises no immediate efficient causality in the production of intellectual knowledge.171 b) The Basis of Godfrey's Position . Such is the teaching of Godfrey of Fontaines. The intellect is simply passive in reference to its proper acts . Fundamentally, his position rests on the statement that the agent and patient of an activity must be really distinct as to their subjects . This is simply another expression of the principle of motion : the same thing cannot act on itself, or omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. This is held to be an absolute metaphysical principle, which is not to be denied because of any difficulties attending it.172 Now how does the Belgian Philosopher defend the validity of the principle, nihil agit in seipsum, or omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. This is done mainly by appeals to the authority of Aristotle and Averroes and various arguments more of an a priori nature . To instance some 173 examples, he appeals to the nature of an active and passive principle, ¹ the incompatibility of potency and act, 174 the necessarily excelling and prior perfection of an agent in reference to its passive principle, 175 the necessity of propinquity between agent and patient, 176 the incompatibility of efficient and material causality in the same subject.177 A denial

171 Godfrey of Fontaines, op . cit. , VI q. 15, 252 : Qui autem animam creavit per modum causae efficientis, hanc illustrationem fecit istas potentias simul in eadem substantia producendo ; ibid . , 254 : Unde, lux increata essentialiter et realiter est supra mentem et aliquid extra mentem; et quia in virtute illius, lux intellectus agentis et ipsa prima principia virtualiter et immediate in lumine intellectus agentis quodammodo comprehensa efficiuntur, habent vim reducendi nos ad actum cuiuslibet cognitionis nec etiam ipsa lux intellectus agentis nec veritas huiusmodi principiorum in virtute dicti luminis agentis immediate comprehensorum esset incommutabilis nisi essent quaedam participationes illius luminis increati omnino in se immutabilis . Ĉf. also Duns Scotus, op. cit. , 259 261 . 172 Cf. Ch. III 93. 173 Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1924) , VIIÏ q . 2 , IV 18 : Ad hoc posset faciliter responderi et ex ratione activi et passivi ut ad invicem secundum suas diffinitiones vel descriptiones comparantur. 174 Ibid., 19 : Item, actus et potentia sunt contraria. 175 Ibid.: Item, alia est conditio, quia agens est praestantior et prior patiente, secundum Augustinum et Philosophum. 176 Ibid.: Item, alia condicio : quia agens debet contingere patiens. 177 Ibid., 23 : Materia vero vel subiectum nunquam cadit in idem realiter cum aliis.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

153

of the motion principle also leads to an unlimited extension of selfactivity.178 c) The Opposition of Scotus to Godfrey . Now for Scotus, none of these considerations establish the so called principle of motion, and his criticisms of them have already been delineated . The Subtle Doctor , however, ponders other and more particular objections against Godfrey's denial of the self-motion of the intellect . Several of them we will now pass in review. i) An effect cannot exceed its total cause in perfection, and in the case of equivocal causation, the effect is less perfect than the cause . But intellection, the effect to be explained here, is more perfect than a phantasm. If this were denied , then there would be no true intellection in man. Man would not be man, the being whose proper perfection rests in his intellectual and not in his sensitive nature. Hence the phantasm, at least as its role is explained by Godfrey, can hardly be the adequate cause of intellection . The Belgian Philosopher fails to take into account the excelling character of intellection , and accordingly, his theory degrades the nature of the soul itself.179 ii) Furthermore, if the intellect is completely passive in its cognition, it would be out of place to ascribe habits to this power of the soul. For the capacity for ordered thought would be explained by the ordered occurrence of phantasms. At the most, therefore, habits could be admitted in the phantasy faculty but not in the intellect itself. This would imply, for example , that the habit for discursive thought would have to be located in the phantasy . Now this implication constitutes an unusual doctrine, but one which, as Scotus conjectures, Godfrey might readily allow 180 iii) Indeed, the Belgian Philosopher's position has strange implications . No second intentions or logical relations could be caused by the 178 Ibid., 21 : et per hoc unumquodque erit causa effectiva respectu suiipsius et unumquodque educet se ipsum de potentia in actum. 179 Ord. , I d. 3 p. 3 q. 2, III 261-62 : Hoc videtur inconveniens, quia vilificat valde naturam animae. Nullam enim perfectionem videtur phantasma posse causare in intellectu excedentem nobilitatem eius , quia effectus non excedit suam causam, sed deficit ab ea , specialiter effectus aequivocus . Ergo nihil causatur praecise a phantasmate in intellectu, sicut ponit ista opinio. Omnis enim intellectio, aut est perfectior phantasmate, aut nulla erit in homine. Cf. also Quodl. , q . 15 , XXVI 120 141 . 180 Ord. , loc. cit. , 263-64 : Tertio, sequitur quod non oportet ponere aliquem habitum in intellectu , quia ad ‘ ordinate intelligendum ' requiritur et sufficit, secundum istam opinionem, quod phantasmata ordinate occurrant, quae, occurrentia, ordinate moveant intellectum. Sed quod ipsa ordinate occurrant, non potest fieri per habitum in intellectu , quia nihil in passo dat aut saltem per habitum in phantasia possunt moventi ' ordinate movere, ' ordinate occurrere absque omni habitu in intellectu ; igitur etc.

154

Chapter IV

mind, not even the act of comparison inescapably involved in a logical relation . The comparative act would have to be actively caused by the extremes of the relation , which extremes pertain to the phantasy.181 iv) Godfrey's insistence on the total passivity of the intellect also entails theological difficulties . One difficulty concerns the knowledge of an angel. Since an angel has no organic faculties, the distinction between the two subjects of agent and patient cannot be invoked . Of itself, therefore, an angel could have no new thoughts, no matter how vast its habitual knowledge might be. The only escape here would be that God would actively cause new knowledge in an angel . But there is no escape from this difficulty by maintaining that new knowledge in an angel is merely a matter of belief. For an article of belief cannot be at odds with a genuinely true principle. If the principle of motion, therefore , implies a denial of possible new knowledge in an angel, it implies a falsity, and therefore, the principle itself is false.182 v) Another theological argument against the doctrine of Godfrey appeals to the image of the Holy Trinity in the soul of man. The image of the Trinity is to be found in the purely intellectual part of man's nature, and it is there in a distinct manner. For the soul possesses a twofold fecundity, that of begetting knowledge and that of breathing love. Now if the soul itself would not have the active power of begetting knowledge, it would not have the nature of a parent or perform a generative act. Consequently, the image of the Trinity would not be verified in it, for the Father has both the fecundity of generating and of breathing. 183 4. The Intellect not the Total Cause of Intellection . While the object, according to Scotus, is not the total cause of intellection , he also maintains that the soul or the intellect is not the total cause of intellection . 184 This is the third conclusion , and it is supported with the following argument .

181 Ibid. , 267 270-71 . 182 Ibid., 262-63 : Hoc videtur ipse concedere, quia ponit ' angelum posse habere novam intellectionem ' esse mere creditum . Sed hoc non evadit. Nullum enim creditum repugnat conclusioni sequenti ex veris principiis. Cf. Quodl. , q . 15, XXVI 120-21 . For Godfrey's consideration of this difficulty, cf. Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1914) , VI q . 7, III 168-69 . 183 Ord., loc. cit. , 289 : et etiam quia tunc non posset salvari imago in mente ut mens est, quia nihil ipsius mentis haberet rationem parentis. Cf. also Quodl., loc. cit. , 121-22 . 184 Ord., loc. cit .: Nec tota causa intellectionis est anima intellectiva, vel aliquid ejus formaliter. Cf. also Quodl. , loc . cit. , 141 .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

155

If the efficient and material cause of an effect are perfect , sufficiently close to one another, and not impeded, the effect will follow or at least can follow. The effect will always follow in the case of a natural or determined cause ; it does not necessarily follow, but at least can follow in the case of an undetermined or free cause . Now if the soul is the total active cause of knowledge, then it will always be actually engaged in intellection . For the soul itself is the material cause or recipient principle of intellection , and the soul is always present to itself. Furthermore, the intellect is a natural cause, and intellection is a natural activity. This means that it occurs automatically, once the required causes are placed.185 A theory which denies all active causality to the object in intellection might still insist that the presence of the object is necessarily required . But this is a difficult position. On what basis would the presence of the object be a necessary requirement ? To maintain this necessary requirement, an additional cause, over and above the four classical causes, would have to be introduced.186 Scotus also supports his denial that the intellect is the total cause of intellection by other arguments. But these arguments are given the value of probabilities (probabilitates) .187 We omit their consideration here. 5. The Object and the Intellect the Causes of Intellection . Neither the object alone, nor the intellect alone is the total cause of intellection . This double denial leads to the last and affirmative conclusion . The object and the intellect together are the integral cause of intellection and the knowledge born of it . Moreover, since these causes clearly appear to be the only ones necessary, it follows that the total cause of intellection is only these two, the intellect and the object.188 185 Ord., loc. cit. , 251 : Hoc arguitur ratione , quia quando duae causae priores ipsa re, scilicet efficiens et materia, sunt in se perfectae et approximatae et non impeditae, sequitur effectus vel potest sequi . Ergo si anima est totalis causa activa notitiae genitae et ipsa est materia disposita sive subiectum susceptivum respectu eiusdem, et ipsa est semper actu sibi praesens cum sit causa naturalis, semper erit ' intellectio quaecumque' actualis in ea cuius ipsa est causa, et hoc cuius ipsa est causa de se, vel saltem aliqua in quam ipsa potissime potest. 186 Ibid. , 252 : quomodo salvabitur quod ipsum necessario requiritur, nisi ponendo quinque genera causarum ? 187 Ibid., 290-92 . 188 Ibid., 292 : si ergo nec anima sola nec obiectum solum sit causa totalis intellectionis actualis et illa sola videntur requiri ad intellectionem sequitur quod ista duo sunt una causa integra respectu notitiae genitae. Cf. also Op. Oxon . , II d . 3 q . 8, XII 186 ; Quodl . , loc. cit. , 141. The will is also excluded as a proper cause of intellection . This is especially evident in reference to the first act of intellection , which precedes every act of the will. Cf. Quodl. , loc . cit. , 119 .

156

Chapter IV

6. The Theory of Partial Causes . According to Scotus' solution to the problem of the activity and passivity of the intellect, the object and the intellect function as cocauses . They are partial causes , which concur or work together in the production of intellectual acts. To explain this concurrence , we will briefly review the Scotistic theory of partial causes. First of all, an efficient cause is either the total cause of some effect or a partial cause . A total cause is by itself and alone the adequate efficient principle of an effect . A partial cause, on the contrary, unites and concurs with another cause , and in virtue of the unity of this concurrence, produces an effect . While an effect can never have two total efficient causes, it may well have two or more partial causes . 189 The relation or order which obtains between two partial causes is either an essential or nonessential order. Hence the division of partial causes into essentially ordered and nonessentially ordered . In producing an effect, nonessentially ordered partial causes exercise a causality of the same nature. In this sense, they concur equally ( ex aequo ) in their causal activity. An example of such nonessentially ordered partial causes is two horses drawing a wagon.190 Causes can also concur in an unequal manner and in such a way that they are essentially ordered in the production of an effect. This concurrence of essentially ordered causes can take place in a twofold way. i) First, the superior cause moves the inferior cause in such a way that the latter can cause only on the condition that it is first moved by the former . The inferior cause receives the power or form whereby it moves from the superior cause, or the inferior cause derives this form from another source but receives its actual motion for producing an effect from the superior cause. Since the inferior cause causes in virtue of the superior cause and is thus dependent on the latter in its own causality, we can refer to it as a dependent essentially ordered cause. A pertinent example here would be the case of a stick which is moved by a human hand and then at the same time moves a ball . ii) The second way in which essentially ordered causes can concur is this: both the superior and the inferior cause have the power to move in themselves. Hence the superior cause does not move the inferior, nor

189 Ord. , I d . 2 p. 1 q. 1—2, II 173 ; ibid . , p. 2 q. 3 , 230-31 ; Op. Oxon., III d. 1 q . 2 , XIV 65-66. Cf. also Reinhold Messner, Schauendes und Begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Skotus (Freiburg, Breisgau , 1942 ) , 5 . 190 Ord. , I d. 3 p. 3 q . 2, III 293 : Quaedam enim ex aequo concurrunt, sicut duo trahentes aliquod idem corpus. Quodl. , loc . cit . , 142 : causae concurrentes quandoque sunt ejusdem rationis et ordinis, ut plures trahentes navem .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

157

does the former give the latter the power to cause. The superiority of the superior cause consists in this : it has a more perfect power of motion than the inferior cause. An example would be the concurrence of the active potency of the mother and that of the father in the generation of offspring. Between these two partial causes there obtains an order, for one is more perfect than the other . The less perfect potency, however, does not derive its causality from the more perfect, nor is the causality of the inferior contained eminently in the more perfect. Standing on its own feet, as it were, the less perfect cause makes its own contribution . For this reason, the two partial causes are said to be independent essentially ordered causes.191 The various distinctions and subdistinctions of efficient cause, which we have just delineated, are exhibited in the following diagram : total

efficient cause

nonessentially ordered

partial

independent

essentially ordered dependent These distinctions can now be applied to the case at hand . The object and the intellect are not active principles which equally concur in causing intellection . For such equal concurrence implies that one cause has an imperfect causality , for which the other supplies . Thus if one of the causes has a sufficiently high degree of perfection, the other can be dispensed with. In reference to the object or intelligible species and the intellect, an equal concurrence would mean that the species is a power the same in kind with the intellect but of a limited degree of perfection. Thus the object could make up for the lack of perfection in the intellect. Hence granted a species or object of sufficient perfection , the intellect 191 Ord., loc. cit. , 293-94 : Quaedam non ex aequo, sed habentes ordinem essentialem, et hoc dupliciter: vel sic quod superior moveat inferiorem, ita quod inferior non agit nisi quia mota ex superiore, et quandoque causa talis inferior habet a superiore virtutem illam seu formam qua movet, quandoque non, sed formam ab alio, et a causa superiore solam motionem actualem, ad producendum effectum ; quandoque autem superior non movet inferiorem , nec dat ei virtutem qua movet, sed superior de se habet virtutem imperfectiorem agendi . Exemplum primi membri huius divisionis : de potentia motiva quae est in manu, et baculo et pila ; exemplum secundi : si mater ponatur habere virtutem activam in generatione prolis, illa et potentia activa patris concurrunt ut duae causae partiales, ordinatae quidem, quia altera perfectior reliqua ; non tamen imperfectior recipit suam causalitatem a causa perfectiore, nec tota illa causalitas est eminenter in causa perfectiore, sed aliquid addit causa imperfectior, in tantum quod effectus potest esse perfectior a causa perfectiore et imperfectiore quam a sola perfectiore. Cf. Quodl., loc. cit.; Op. Oxon. , II d . 3 q. 8, XII 188.

158

Chapter IV

would no longer be necessary for an act of intellection . This, however, is false.192 It must be concluded, therefore, that the object and the intellect concur in intellection as essentially ordered causes . But neither of these two causes is a dependent essentially ordered cause . For the intellect does not give the object or species a power or motion which enables the latter to exercise its causality. Nor does the object perform such a service in reference to the intellect . In intellection , on the contrary, the object functions as a partial cause by its own power and standing on its own feet. The same is true of the intellect . Hence the intellect and the object are independent essentially ordered causes. While the intellect excels the object in perfection , still each has the proper source of its causality in itself and does not derive it from the other.193 Intellection, therefore, is an effect of two partial causes, the intellect and the object. While every effect demands one per se cause, in intellection this requirement is fulfilled in its two partial causes which are essentially ordered . Each cause has its own independent source of causality. The total cause of intellection, however, is the unity which results from the essential order between the two partial causes . While other scholastics accord the intellect active causality only in reference to the process of abstraction, Duns Scotus accords active causality to the intellect not only in reference to abstraction but also

192 Ord. , loc. cit. , 294 : Obiectum intelligibile praesens in se vel in specie intelligibili et pars intellectiva non concurrunt ut 'causae ex aequo' ad intellectionem, quia tunc alterum haberet causalitatem talem imperfectum, et reliquum suppleret eam ; et si alterum esset perfectum, posset habere in se uno totam causalitatem amborum, sicut si virtus motiva unius esset perfecta , suppleret virtutem alterius : et tunc species esset quasi quidam gradus intellectivitatis, supplens gradum intellectivitatis deficientem intellectui, et tunc si fieret perfectior intellectus secundum gradum talem, posset sine specie et sine obiecto habere actum intelligendi, quod falsum est. Cf. Quodl., loc. cit. , 142-43 ; Op . Oxon ., loc . cit. , 188-89. 193 Ord., loc. cit. , 294-95 : Concurrunt ergo ista duo ut habentia ordinem essentialem . Non tamen primo modo, quia nec intellectus dat obiecto vel speciei rationem suae causalitatis - non enim obiectum natum est, in se vel in specie sui , facere intellectionem per aliquid quod recipit ab intellectu, sed ex natura sua, nec intellectus recipit suam causalitatem ab obiecto vel specie obiecti , sicut probatum est prima ratione contra secundam opinionem . Sunt ergo causae essentialiter ordinatae, et ultimo modo, videlicet quod una est simpliciter perfectior altera, ita tamen quod utraque in sua propria causalitate est perfecta, non dependens ab alia. - To avoid complications we did not take up the problem whether the agent or the possible intellect is the active principle of intellection . A resolution of this problem is not pertinent to the essential issue of our investigation . For a consideration of this problem, cf. Quodl. , loc. cit . , 144-77 ; Reinhold Messner, op. cit., 43-47.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

159

in reference to conscious knowledge itself.194 Both on the level of intuitive and abstractive cognition , the intellect functions as a partial cause, and even as the principal cause. Although in exercising its causality, there is an essential order between it and the object, still the intellect does not derive its power to cause from another but has this power within itself. In knowing, therefore, the intellect most truly moves itself. Thus we see that Duns Scotus is not merely an opponent of the principle of motion . Rather he is the great champion of self-motion. Self-motion, the rejection of which he rejects, is in the end exploited for the purposes of positive and constructive philosophy. As Messner points out, the possibility of self-motion is an underlying law of Scotus' theory of partial causality, which theory in turn is fundamental to his psychology of knowledge.195 Again self-motion and the theory of partial causality are key doctrines in Scotus ' positive psychology of the will . This significant phase of his thought is now to be considered .

G) The Will an Active Potency Not only are intuitive cognition and intellection instances of selfmotion for Duns Scotus. Volition is such in a most emphatic sense. Sense appetition , likewise , seems to come within the sphere of strict self-motion. This view at least finds support in the general, overall teaching of Duns Scotus.196 But concerning the rational appetite, there is no doubt . Its character as a strictly active potency is greatly stressed by Duns Scotus. This is to be expected of the great voluntarist philosopher, who prefers charity 194 Ibid., 15 : Während andere Scholastiker bei der Abstraktion nur den Verstand tätig sein lassen, bei der bewußten Erkenntnis selbst aber nur das Object in der Species, läßt sich voraussehen, daß Skotus bei beiden Tätigkeiten Subject und Object als Ursachen wertet. 195 Ibid. , 14-15. 196 For example, an argument which would deny self-motion to the sensitive appetite on the basis of the incompatibility of potency and act, such an argument would be invalid for Duns Scotus. Furthermore, the Subtle Doctor insists that a vital action cannot have as its total cause some non-living being. The vital action must proceed from the recipient principle of the action at least as a partial efficient cause. (Addit . mag. d . 25 q. 1 , ed. Carl Balić, in Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences (Louvain, 1927 ) , 285-86 ; Ord . , I d . 3 p . 3 q . 2 , III 301 ) . The view we propose here might be opposed on the basis of a text in the Opus Oxoniense (II d. 25 q. u . , XIII 220) . But in assessing this text, it should be remembered that Scotus, in this particular question , defends the opinion that the will is the total cause of volition, -- an opinion which he later rejects . His defense of this opinion points to the freedom of the will. Hence we can understand why he quotes St. John Damascene with approval : Sensitivus ducitur et non ducit, sed intellectivus ducit et non ducitur. These words , especially when viewed in their context in Scotus , do not necessarily deny that the sense appetite is a partial cause of sense appetition .

160

Chapter IV

to intellectual speculation and holds the will to be a more noble faculty than the intellect . Scotus' teaching on the self-movent character of the will comes to the fore in his treatment of the problem of the activity versus the passivity of the will , the problem of the cause of volition. His position is elaborated out of a consideration of two opposing opinions. According to the first opinion , the will is completely passive in volition.197 According to the second opinion, the will is the sole active cause of volition.198 The role of the object in this opinion is to move the will as a final cause, and hence the motion of the object is motion only in a metaphorical sense,199 In both the Opus Oxoniense200 and the Reportata Parisiensia, 201 Scotus subscribes to this second opinion : the will is the total active cause of volition, while the object moves the will as an end, and therefore, in a metaphorical sense . But in the Additiones magnae and the secundae additiones secundi libri, we find a change in his thought . Not only the will, but the object known by the intellect is a per se, partial cause of volition. Hence "the total cause of volition includes the intellect in first and second act, the will in first act, and the object ." 202 197 Balić, Carl, "Une question inédite de J. Duns Scot sur la volonté, ” Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, III ( 1931 ) 192-93 194—99; Addit. mag., d. 25 q. 1 , ed . Carl Balić, in Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences (Louvain, 1927 ) , 265–66. In referring to these two texts edited by Carl Balić, we will refer to the first as textus editus ; we will refer to the second by means of the abbreviated Scotistic title Addit . mag. 198 Balić, Carl, textus editus cit. 193-94 199—202 ; Addit. mag. , loc. cit., 266. 199 Ibid. , 267 : obiectum voluntatis est finis, sed finis movet metaphorice. 200 II d. 25 q. u . , XIII 221 : Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod nihil aliud a voluntate est causa totalis volitionis in voluntate ; ibid. , 223 : appetibile movet appetitum tantum metaphorice, tunc debet intelligi, quod sicut appetibile movet appetitum movet appetitum metaphorice, ita appetitus sic motus movet effective membra ad exequendum, ut acquiratur illud appetibile. 201 II d. 25 q. u. , XXIII 127 : Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quod nihil creatum aliud a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi in voluntate. Cf. also ibid. , 128. 202 Addit. mag. , loc. cit. , 281-82 : Item, non agit libere per se nisi circa per se cognitum, igitur cognoscere non est per accidens requisitum ad velle ; habebit ergo aliquam causalitatem per se in eliciendo actum. Ideo et aliter dixit Oxonie ad quaestionem, quod volitio est per se a voluntate, ut a causa activa, et ab obiecto intellecto ut ab alia causa partiali , ita quod totalis causa volitionis includit intellectum in actu primo et secundo, voluntatem in actu primo et obiectum ; Balić , Carl, textus editus cit. , 202 : Respondeo igitur ad questionem, quod causa effectiua actus uolendi, non est tantum obiectum ut phantasma quia hoc nullo modo saluat libertatem prout ponit prima opinio, nec etiam causa effectiva actus uolendi est tantum uoluntas quemadmodum ponit secunda extrema .

Particular Areas of Self-motion

161

This position of Scotus appears established after he has argued long and hard against the two preceding opinions. We cannot review the many arguments, masterpieces of minute and subtle reasoning, which the Franciscan Master works out. Only sketchy indications of one or the other is possible within the limits of this treatise. 1. The Object not the Total Cause of Volition . Neither the object nor the phantasm can be the total cause of volition . For as natural or nonfree agents, they could not cause contrary acts in one and the same subject, the will. But as a matter of fact, the will is capable of contrary acts in reference to one and the same object . The will can accept (velle) or reject (nolle) a particular object . The possibility of either one of these two acts being caused in the will disallows that these acts are caused by the object or phantasm alone. For the latter can function only as natural or determined agents.203 Scotus also contends that if the known object were the total cause of volition, then the latter would not really be under the power of the will . Thus the very freedom of the will would go by the board . This, indeed, is a most serious consequence of the denial of the will's capacity for selfmotion. Hence Scotus' adamant opposition to the application of the cinesiological principle to the faculty of volition.204 Furthermore, if the phantasm alone were the total cause of volition, then the former would be more noble than the latter. For the phantasm would be an equivocal cause, and such a cause is necessarily more noble than its effect . But any such excelling nobility of the phantasm over the act of volition cannot be conceded.205 This argument is , in particular, against Godfrey of Fontaines, who holds the phantasm to be the precise and total cause of volition . Just 203 Ibid., 196 : agens naturale idem et non impeditum in eodem passo equaliter disposito, non potest causare opposita, hoc enim est de ratione agentis naturalis. Unde 2 De generatione ; idem inquantum idem natum est semper facere idem, et hoc specialiter intelligitur de agente naturali. Sed objectum est mere agens naturale, igitur in eodem passo idem manens non potest causare opposita, igitur si obiectum cognitum causat in uoluntate nolle, non potest causare uelle uel econtra. Cf. Addit. mag. , loc. cit., 267—68 ; Op. Oxon., loc . cit. 201 ; Rep . Par. , loc . cit. 120. 204 Balić, Carl, textus editus cit . , 196-97 : sed hoc ponere , est tollere omnem libertatem a uoluntate, et contingentiam in actibus humanis ; ibid., 202 ; Addit. mag. , loc . cit . , 268 ; Op . Oxon . , loc . cit,; Rep. Par. , loc . cit. 205 Balić , Carl, textus editus cit. , 198 : Preterea , effectus non est perfectior sua causa equivoca totali ; igitur cum phantasma sic sit causa respectu uolitionis et intellectionis , non erit aliqua uolitio aut intellectio aut intellectus perfectior phantasmate, et ita per consequens cum bos possit habere phantasma perfectius quam uoluntas, actus uolendi aut intelligendi noster erit perfectior phantasia aut phantasmate hominis . Cf. Addit. mag., loc . cit., 270 ; Op. Oxon . , loc . cit ., 204 ; Rep. Par., loc . cit. , 121 .

12 Philosophy Series No. 15

162

Chapter IV

as Godfrey opposes the active character of the intellect in reference to intellection, so he is just as adamantly opposed to the admission of any self-motion in the will as a principle of volition. Here again his leading argument is the same. A mover and a thing moved must be distinct as to their subjects. As previously indicated, this is a variant formulation of the cinesiological principle : omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Since the will has no subject distinct from that of the rational soul, the active cause of volition must be sought outside of the rational soul itself. As in the case of intellection, this cause is the phantasm.206 Godfrey's position , therefore, results from an application of the motion principle to the problem of the causality of volition . The various and principal arguments he assembles in support of this principle together with Scotus ' refutation of them have already been reviewed . Also against the position of Godfrey are the several arguments just indicated , which show that the object or phantasm are not the total cause of volition. 2. The Will not the Total Cause of Volition . But neither is the will, according to Scotus, the total cause of volition . For contrary to Henry of Ghent, the intellect knowing an object functions as a partial cause of a volitional act. The object known is not merely a sine qua non requirement.207 In defending this position , Scotus points to the fact that the will loves a present good more intensely than an absent good which is obscurely known. Now what explains the added intensity in one case and the lack thereof in another ? What explains the correlation between the intensity and perfection of knowledge and the intensity and perfection of love ? An explanation is given, if we hold that the object known exercises a real causal influence on the volitional act . But if the cognition of the object is no cause but a mere sine qua non requirement, no explanation of the varied intensity seems to be given.208 206 Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1914) , VI q . 7 , III 170 ; Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed . J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1924), VIIIˇq . 2, IV 21—22 25—26. Cf. also Carl Balić, textus editus cit. , 194–95 ; Addit. mag., loc. cit. , 286-87 ; Op. Oxon . , loc . cit. , 199 ; Rep. Par., loc. cit . , 118-19 . 207 Balić, Carl, textus editus cit., 202 204. For the teaching of Henry of Ghent, as reported by Duns Scotus, cf. ibid., 199. 208 Ibid., 204 : Preterea, uoluntas potest intensius diligere bonum delectabile presens quam absens enigmatice cognitum , sed si cognitio actualis obiecti presentis esset tantum sine quo non respectu actus uolendi, non esset possibile assignare rationem quare dilectio est perfectior respectu boni presentis quam respectu eiusdem tantum enigmatice cogniti, et ideo utrumque est causa et propter hoc quando obiectum quod est bonum delectabile est presens et principaliter cognitum, tunc sequitur actus diligendi perfectior quia perfectius cognitum, perfectius ametur si eque intense ametur.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

163

Appealing to the authority of St. Augustine, Scotus further argues that a free choice would be a blind act, if it were not partially caused by the intellect.209 The authority of Aristotle is also invoked, and various other arguments are marshalled forth , some of which are much the same as the considerations Scotus presents to show that the object is a true causal factor in the production of knowledge.210 The scope of the present study forbids a full exploration of these many and diverse arguments. But it is still to be explained how the causal factors of volition, the intellect actually knowing an object and the will, concur in the production of volitional acts. 3. The Intellect and Will Cocauses of Volition. As in his explanation of the causality of intellection, so here Scotus presents a theory of partial causes, which are essentially ordered. The causes here are also independent essentially ordered causes. Hence both the will and the object known by the intellect function as cocauses and work together in producing an act of volition . Each faculty functions according to its own proper power. Neither receives its actual causation or causative power from the other. Hence both causes function according to their own proper manner of activity. The intellect and the object work as natural or determined causes , whereas the will is always free. It is always within the power of the will to act or not to act . Although one partial cause cannot act without the concurrence of the other, still the will is the principal cause and performs a special role. For it can either use or not use the other partial cause. Hence on the basis of the active determination of the will, the total action of volition is a free act.211 It can be further stated that only the will can be " the total cause of volition in the will insofar as the will freely determines itself to cause an act of willing . "212 This important statement is proven from the nature and implications of contingent action , and this proof in turn provides further evidence of the active causality of the will in reference to volition . 209 Ibid.: Ita uult Augustinus quod uoluntas habet memoriam sed hoc non potest esse nisi quia cum uoluntate concurrit ad causandum actum uolendi, aliter enim liberum arbitrium esset cecum, quia libere uolens inquantum libere uolens esset cecus et ideo liberum arbitrium utrumque includit uoluntatem scilicet et cognitionem . 210 Ibid., 204 199–200 ; Addit. mag. , loc . cit. , 277-78. 211 Balić , Carl, textus editus cit . , 202-03 ; Addit. mag. , loc . cit. , 282-83 Cf. also J. R. Cresswell, "Duns Scotus on the Will," Franciscan Studies, XIII (1953) 153-54 . 212 Ibid., 299 : Nihil aliud a voluntate potest esse totalis causa volitionis in voluntate secundum quod voluntas determinat se libere ad actum volendi causandum . 12

164

Chapter IV

4. The Will the Principle of Contingent Action . A contingent action is such that at the very moment it actually occurs, it would have been possible that it would not occur . Now if an action is contingent, it proceeds from a cause which is determined to one part of a contradiction or from a cause which is undetermined in reference to either part of a contradiction . If the first alternative is posited , then contingent action is denied, because the action would occur inevitably. Hence the second alternative must be posited : the contingent action proceeds from a cause undetermined in reference to either part of a contradiction . If a determinate action is to proceed from the undetermined cause, then the latter must be determined to this action . This determination can spring from the undetermined cause itself X or from another cause Y. If X is necessarily determined by Y, then X will act necessarily and inevitably, and contingent action is denied. But if Y can determine or not determine X to a particular action, then contingent action maintains. And hence Y is not a natural cause . If Y is not a natural cause, then it must be the will. If X, however, determines itself to act, then this determination is either necessary or contingent. If the first, then contingent action is denied ; if the second, then contingent action is maintained . X, therefore, cannot be a natural cause but is the will, because a natural cause acts necessarily, while only the will acts contingently.213 Nor can one argue that the determining cause is the intellect . For the latter faculty cannot determine itself or another faculty to either one of two opposites but only to one of them . If the intellect were to determine itself or another faculty to both of two opposites, a sophism . or paralogism would be involved . Furthermore, the intellect is a natural cause. Its role is to form concepts and to think, and these are natural activities. A natural activity is always a determined activity. Hence if

213 Ibid.: Quod probo sic : supposito quod aliquid contingenter eveniat in rebus ita quod pro illo instanti pro quo eveniat potest non evenire, ut sic evitabiliter eveniat, quero ergo a qua causa illud contingenter evenit aut a causa determinata ad alteram partem contradictionis aut a causa indeterminata ad utramque partem . Si autem a causa primo modo, que est ex se determinata ad eventum eius , ergo non contingenter et indeterminate sive evitabiliter evenit ; ergo evenit a causa que secundum se est indeterminata ad utramque partem ; illam partem oportet determinari ad hoc quod determinate producat ; aut ergo a seipsa aut ab alio ; si ab alio, aut igitur ab alio necessario determinatur et tunc necessario produceret, hoc est inevitabiliter sicut si ex se esset determinata ad alteram partem, si ab alio contingenter determinetur, ergo in potestate eius est determinare et non determinare, illud non est causa naturalis, ergo est voluntas . Si autem a se determinatur, aut ergo necessario et tunc vel opposita produceret vel nihil. Si autem contingenter se determinat illa causa non potest esse, quia omnis alia causa est naturaliter determinans.

Particular Areas of Self-motion

165

it depended on the intellect alone, there would be no contingent activity in this world . 214 5. Nature versus Will. Our discussion here has introduced the opposing concepts, determined and undetermined, necessary and contingent , natural and free. This basic distinction is also referred to at times as 215 that of a nonrational potency and a rational potency.2 Nature and will form a strict dichotomy for Scotus, which is given much prominence in his philosophy. This dichotomy, moreover, makes very clear the highly active character of the will . The will is such a highly active power, because it is a free power. Its freedom is no consequence of the will's character as an immaterial power . Nor is it principally grounded in the intellect . The will is free, simply because it is the undetermined potency which is the will. It can posit either one act or its opposite. It can also act or not act . The will is free, because it is a principle of contingent action. And a contingent action is such that at the very moment it actually occurs , it would have been possible that it did . not occur. 216 Now a final question remains, how do we know that the will is a free faculty ? Here again Scotus avoids a priori considerations and simply 214 Ibid., 299-300 : intellectus non potest determinare ad duo opposita, nunc ad unum et iam ad aliud determinative, quia non potest habere determinationes ad duo opposita ; ergo si determinat ad ambo, ad alterum determinabit sophistice ; ergo intellectus non determinabit voluntatem ad alterum oppositorum nisi prout est paralogibilis ; si ergo ex se determinative non est determinabilis ad unum oppositorum, sequitur quod numquam aliquid contingenter eveniat nisi ut intellectus est perlogibilis et deficiens , quod falsum est ; et sequitur etiam ultra quod cum intellectus divinus non sit paralogibilis quod a Deo non potest aliquid evenire contingenter. Item , intellectus ut est agens est causa naturalis ; est enim principium gignendi verbum, quod naturaliter gignitur, sed causa naturalis est causa determinata ; ergo propter determinationem eius non vitatur quin omnia determinate eveniant et nihil contingenter. 215 Metaph. , IX q . 15 , VII 609 : Aut enim potentia ex se est determinata ad agendum, ita quod quantum est ex se, non potest non agere , quando non impeditur ab extrinseco ; aut non est ex se determinata, sed potest agere hunc actum, vel oppositum actum, agere etiam, vel non agere. Prima potentia communiter dicitur natura, secunda dicitur voluntas. Unde prima divisio principiorum activorum est in naturam et voluntatem . Cf. ibid. , 610-11 ; Op . Oxon., IV d . 49 q . 10 , XXI , 333. Cf. also J. R. Cresswell, art. cit . , 147–48 ; Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, Introduction à ses Positions Fondamentales (Paris, 1952) , 574-78 . 216 Metaph. , loc . cit . , 609-10 : Dici potest, quod hujus nulla est causa , sicut enim effectus immediatus ad causam immediatam comparatur per se et primo, et sine causa media, alioquin iretur in infinitum ; ita causa activa ad suam actionem, inquantum ipsam elicit, videtur immediate se habere, nec est dare aliquam causam quare sic elicit, nisi quia est talis causa . . . quare voluntas illud volet ? nulla est alia causa , nisi quia est voluntas . Ad secundum, a posteriori probatur, experitur enim qui vult se posse non velle, sive nolle . ... Cf. J. R. Cresswell, art. cit. , 147-48 151.

166

Chapter IV

takes recourse to experience . Whoever wills an act , at that very time knows that he could not will it or will something else . Hence the proposition, the will is willing, is a contingent proposition . It is also an immediately evident proposition , simply expressing a datum of experience . Scotus sees no need for proving the indeterminacy of the will by some a priori argumentation from the nature of the will . In fact , he is opposed to this. The will is a free or undetermined cause , a principle of contingent action, simply because it is talis causa, an altogether unique cause.217 On the basis of experience , Scotus proves the freedom of the will. The will can contingently determine itself. In a supreme sense, it is an active potency, a principle of self-motion . It can move itself. Hence in the Scotistic doctrine of the will, we witness the most dramatic refutation of the principle of motion, and at the same time, the most forthright defense of human dignity and freedom.

217 Metaph., loc. cit., 609.

Chapter V

CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

The cinesiological principle asserts that everything which is in motion is being moved by another. From our studies in the works of Duns Scotus, we conclude that the Subtle Doctor rejects this proposition . For it is a universal proposition and implies a denial of the statement that some things can move themselves . According to Scotus, self-motion is possible, and it is given as a fact in areas of corporeal motion (local motion, quantitative and qualitative change) and spiritual activity (intellection and volition) . A) The Reports of Scholars on Scotus' Teaching Prior to our study, various scholars have reported on and given summary explanations concerning Scotus ' position in reference to the principle of motion . Our study and its findings agree, at least in part, with some of these authors but disagree with others . Presently, we will consider these authors individually and according to the chronological order in which their writings fall . i) E. Pluzanski writes that Scotus neither adopts nor criticizes the proof from motion , which "in St. Thomas is the most developed and the most directly borrowed from Aristotle." In fact, according to Pluzanski, the Subtle Doctor does not speak of this proof, and the reason for this reticence is that the principle of motion appears suspect to him.¹ We find ourselves in essential agreement with Pluzanski . But merely to say that Scotus suspects the principle is surely an understatement . He rejects it . The cinesiological principle is a universal proposition, which, for Scotus, is simply false in many individual cases. 1 Essai sur la Philosophie de Duns Scot (Paris , 1888 ) , 141 : Il est curieux que l'argument fondé sur la necessité du premier moteur qui dans saint Thomas est le plus développé et le plus directement emprunté à Aristote, n'est ni adopté ni critiqué par Duns Scot qui n'en parle pas. C'est que le principe sur lequel se fonde l'argument classique du péripatétisme, à savoir que tout ce qui se meut a en dehors de soi la cause de son mouvement, a paru suspect au docteur subtil. 167

168

Chapter V

In the Scotistic doctrine of virtual act , Pluzanski sees the principle of a new physics, a dynamistic conception which is more Leibnitzian than Aristotelian . For bodies, according to Scotus, are not essentially inert, not necessarily dependent on external movers, but possibly selfmovent because of their own native energy and tendency for action . But neither Scotus nor his disciples, Pluzanski adds , exploit the possibilities here in reference to a new physics.2 The limitations of the Subtle Doctor in this scientific direction are hardly to be contested, but they do not, as Pluzanski seems to think, stem from a very timid disapproval of the motion proof. At least Scotus ' rejection of the cinesiological principle is both clear and forceful, and in view of his extended criticism of this principle, it is misleading to assert without qualification , as Pluzanski does, that Scotus does not criticize the proof from motion . By attacking the key principle of the proof, he thereby attacks, indirectly at least, the proof itself. It is true, however, that Scotus does not speak of the classical proof from motion when he embarks on his demonstrations of the existence of an Infinite Being in the Ordinatio, the Reportata Parisiensia, and the de Primo Principio.4 ii) Raymond de Courcerault also reports that Scotus passes over in silence the proof for a prime mover. Two possible reasons for this silence are suggested : the motion proof is simply a special form of the proof from efficient causes ; the motion principle requires too many restrictions.5 The second suggestion is the acceptable one . For our study, we believe, makes clear that Scotus knows the principle of motion as the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved, and that he rejects this principle as a general statement. Hence in our opinion, de Courcerault handles the matter better in a later article where he simply states that Scotus passes over the motion proof because of the rigor with which he treats its general principle . " iii) M. Chossat is another and quite favorable reporter of Duns Scotus ' teachings on the cinesiological principle . Correctly, he points out Scotus' evaluation of the Aristotelian arguments for a prime mover. These arguments do not really conclude to God, the absolutely unmoved

2 Ibid. , 142. 3 Ibid. , 142-43 4 Ord., I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1 , II 148-222. 5 "Le Problème Fondamental de la Théodicée, " Études Franciscaines, XX ( 1908) 707-08. "Duns Scot," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris, 1911 ) , IV col. 1874 .

Concluding Considerations

109

mover. In reporting Scotus' essential stand, the eminent scholar also appropriately draws attention to the important doctrine of virtual act .” But in reporting this essential stand, namely, Scotus' rejection of the cinesiological principle as a universal and necessary proposition, there appears to be a noteworthy defect . This defect lies in a qualification given to Scotus' rejection of the motion principle . En effet, 1. le principe quod movetur, ab alio movetur, entendu dans ce sens qu'un mouvement local précède tout changement n'est pas un principe universel et nécessaire ; car il admet bien des exceptions , specialement dans les êtres libres et vivants.8 Now Scotus' rejection of the motion principle does not hinge on any Aristotelian doctrine of the primacy of local motion . In fact, the principle is considered and criticized independently of its setting and confirmation in the vast astrophysical system of the Stagirite . No doubt Scotus' criticism and rejection of the principle does damage to Aristotelian astrophysics, but Scotus makes no express consideration of this matter. Perhaps this appears to be less important to him, because of the extremely limited and qualified value he accords various Aristotelian physical and astronomical theories. Be this as it may, he is adamantly opposed to any " metaphysicalizing " of the cinesiological principle. Hence his extensive attacks on the metaphysical arguments of his opponents, as for example, the arguments from the metaphysical notions of potency and act.10 In these attacks, no decisive consideration is made of the movements of the spheres and their influence on the sublunary world . Chossat further explains that Scotus accepts the cinesiological principle, but only in a restricted meaning : quod movetur etiam ab alio movetur.11 To say the least, this formulation is misleading, and its acceptability in Scotistic thought will be considered later. The restricted meaning actually given by Scotus is the following : whatever goes from primary potency to primary act is brought to act by another. 12 iv) In his work, Dieu, Existence et Cognoscibilité, S. Belmond does not make any special consideration of the cinesiological principle. But he represents Scotus as accepting the proof from motion which uses this principle. The Subtle Doctor, as Belmond explains, views the proof for a prime mover as an application of the more general proof from efficient causes. Thus the cinesiological proof is really based on the principle,

7 "Dieu (Son Existence) ," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris, 8 Ibid . 1911 ) , IV col. 932. Basly, Marie Deodat de, " Scotus Docens, " La France Franciscaine, 10 Cf. Ch . III 67-80. XVII ( 1934) 76-78. 12 Cf. Ch. IV 120-22. 11 Art. cit. , loc. cit.

170

Chapter V

quod est causa causae est causa causati.13 Belmond's explanation , moreover, seeks its support in a single passage of the Opus Oxoniense, where Scotus attempts to reconcile his teaching with Aristotle.14 No mention is made of other questions in the Opera Omnia , as for example, question 14 of Book IX of his commentary on the Metaphysics, where the Subtle Doctor investigates the motion principle ex professo.15 Belmond's treatment is as unsatisfactory as it is brief. Aside from his neglect of various important passages, in fact, entire questions in Scotus, it is unfortunate that he restricts his attention to the particular passage with which he is exclusively concerned . This passage will be discussed later. v) Writing about a decade after Belmond, B. Landry explains Scotus' stand quite differently . The Subtle Doctor, according to this author, is silent in reference to the celebrated prime mover proof, because he did not admit the major premiss, namely, the principle of motion.16 He also indicates the profoundly dynamistic character of Scotus' doctrine . While Bettoni suggests that Landry merely repeats Pluzanski , ¹7 we find the former's statement of Scotus' stand more forthright and correct . vi) In a monograph on Hervaeus Natalis ' proof for the existence of God, Josef Santeler gives a brief presentation of Scotus' stand in reference to the motion principle and proof. A correct explanation is given as to how Scotus shows that his defense of self-motion does not conflict with the law of potency and act . The key concept in the Scotistic position is thereby given prominence, namely, the concept of virtual act . Scotus ' evaluation of the proof from motion is also indicated : the proof does not reach an altogether unmoved mover. Hence objecting to Belmond, Santeler affirms that Scotus puts aside the motion argument because of the very nature of the proof itself.18 vii) In presenting Scotus ' teaching on the motion principle, Zacharias Van de Woestyne invokes a distinction between motion in a strict or physical sense and motion in a wide or metaphysical sense . In the strict sense, motion is a successive, accidental change of a body ; in the metaphysical sense, motion is any transition from potency to act.19 Motion taken in the first sense, the principle does not exclude self-motion, 13 Belmond, S. Dieu, Existence et Cognoscibilité (Paris, 1913 ) , 48 ff. 16 Duns Scot (Paris, 1922) . 15 VII 582-606 14 Op. cit., loc. cit. 17 Bettoni, Efrem, L'Ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto (Milano, 1943 ) , 8 . 18 Der kausale Gottesbeweis bei Herveus Natalis ( Innsbruck, 1930) , 18-23. 19 Van de Woestyne, Zacharias, Cursus Philosophicus (2d ed .; Mechiliniae, 1933) , II 110-11 n. I.

Concluding Considerations

171

which would be a transition from secondary potency to secondary act . Hence things are not necessarily moved by another according to every respect, nor "are they moved by another as by a proximate cause in every motion.”20 For a defender of the principle of motion, these are serious admissions to make. In fact, on their basis, Scotus concludes that the motion proposition is false as a general principle . If the motion proposition is understood according to the metaphysical acceptation , Van de Woestyne states that then Scotus admits "that the principle is in necessary matter (in materia necessaria) ." But as a most disturbing modification of his statement , the eminent author adds that the "aliud" of the principle is not necessarily to be understood as a thing really distinct from the thing in motion.21 But such a modification is equivalent to a denial of the cinesiological principle, the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved . As a matter of fact, Van de Woestyne seems to understand Scotus' teaching quite well . But at the same time he appears to be afraid forthrightly to state the real position of the Subtle Doctor, who holds the cinesiological principle not to be a valid metaphysical formula but false in multis singularibus . viii) The modern Spanish thinker, Angel Amor Ruibal , is very clear and correct in stating the Scotistic doctrine. The validity of the motion proposition, he explains, is denied by Scotus. This denial, moreover, has a profound influence on subsequent thought . Amor Ruibal also points out the Scotistic teaching that the Aristotelian cinesiological arguments do not successfully conclude to an absolutely immobile being.22 ix) An excellent summary presentation of Scotus and the cinesiological principle is given by Pacificus Borgmann.23 This scholar finds it necessary to disagree with Belmond and Van de Woestyne . Hence he affirms that according to Scotus, the motion proposition admits of many exceptions , and thus it cannot be a valid metaphysical principle. 20 Ibid. , III : Physice principio inspecto, affirmat Scotus quod principium ad motum translationis restrictum non impedit quominus ea quae moventur moveant se effective de potentia secunda ad actum secundum ; scilicet, non sub omni respectu ab alio moventur, seu non in omni motu moventur ab alio tanquam a causa proxima. 21 Ibid.: Metaphysice principio inspecto, admittit Subtilis principium esse in materia necessaria . Attamen addit, quod sola inspectione terminorum non apparet "aliud " in formula expressum realiter esse distinctum ab eo quod in motu est. 22 Los Problemas Fundamentales de la Filosofia y del Dogma (Madrid, 1933) , 615. 23 "Die Stellungnahme des Duns Skotus zum Aristotelisch -Thomistischen Bewegungsgesetz : Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur, " Wissenschaft und Weisheit, IV ( 1937) 38-42.

172

Chapter V

Treatment by Borgmann of the Scotistic position is handled by means of six propositions , all of which have made their appearance and have been explained in extenso in the preceding chapters of our dissertation. We find it necessary to take exception to but one statement of Borgmann : "The proposition : nihil est in potentia et actu secundum idem, holds likewise only for univocal causes." This statement Borgmann bases on a passage in the Ordinatio.24 Here Scotus asserts that the principle , nihil agit in se, holds only in reference to a univocal cause . Then it is added that the proof which argues for this principle from the potency and act law holds (concludit) in reference to univocal causes. But this proof does not conclude or hold in reference to equivocal causes . Scotus does not say, therefore, that the potency and act law holds only in reference to univocal causes, but the proof which uses this principle holds only in reference to univocal causes . For the law of potency and act holds also for equivocal causes , and in this same passage, Scotus shows that the potency and act law does not contradict the fact or the possibility of self-motion . For a thing which moves itself is not in potency and act according to the same aspect . x) Fundamental to Scotus ' doctrine on the causes of cognition and volition (the doctrine which invokes the notion of independent essentially ordered causes) is the possibility of self-motion. This was pointed out in Chapter IV. It is also given prominence by Reinhold Messner in his masterful treatise on intuitive and abstractive cognition according to Duns Scotus. The possibility of self-motion is an underlying law of Scotus ' psychology of knowledge. Accordingly, Messner takes full cognizance of the fact that the Scotistic doctrine on knowledge is at loggerheads with the principle of motion . While the distinguished scholar is not concerned with a full investigation of the Scotistic critique, his statements concerning the motion principle in reference to Scotistic psychology are fully supported by our studies.25 xi) A recent and extended presentation of Scotus ' stand in reference to the cinesiological principle is to be found in Efrem Bettoni's L'Ascesa A Dio In Duns Scoto.26 The latter scholar takes exception to Pluzanski 24 Ibid., 39. The text of Scotus is as follows : nec illa probatio eius quod ' tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia' concludit nisi quando agens agit univoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit; si enim sic aliquid ageret in se, ergo haberet simul ' formam eiusdem rationis ad quam movetur, ' et dum movetur ad illam, careret illa ; ergo simul haberet illam et non haberet, saltem hoc sequitur de duabus formis eiusdem speciei , vel de eadem. (Ord . , I d . 3 p . 3 q . 2, III 304. ) 25 Schauendes und begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Skotus ( Freiburg im Breisgau, 1942 ) , 14-15 . Also cf. Ch . IV of our dissertation, 146–59. 26 (Milano, 1943 ) , 7-18 .

Concluding Considerations

173

and Landry, both of whom represent Scotus as doubting or denying the principle of motion . Neither does Bettoni find himself in agreement with Chossat and Borgmann.27 In the question on the activity versus the passivity of the intellect , Bettoni explains, Scotus does not deny the validity of the principle of motion but is merely opposed to the application of this principle as made by Godfrey of Fontaines . The latter translates the motion proposition into two others : nihil agit in se, and agens et patiens distincta sunt subjecto. Now it is these two latter propositions which Scotus rejects, and Bettoni faithfully reconstructs some of the Scotistic argumentation against them.28

Scotus' criticism of the two cited propositions , according to Bettoni, results in the following conclusions : “ a) nothing can produce in itself its substantial form, . . . ; b) nothing can act on itself by univocal action ; c) in general, it is not repugnant that a particular substance causes in itself a particular effect in the order of quality, quantity, and place . "'29 These three conclusions constitute, according to Bettoni, a precision of the metaphysical principle of motion but give no ground for believing that the Subtle Doctor holds the famed principle in doubt , much less denies it. In fact , Scotus does not even think that his precision of the principle is something new and strange.30 Bettoni, however, considers the explanation of Belmond concerning Scotus' acceptance

of the argument from

motion unsatisfactory.

Scotus knows this argument, he admits the validity of the AverroisticAristotelian argumentation which employs the motion principle . But contrary to Averroes , the Subtle Doctor does not accord this argument an exclusive competency in demonstrating the existence of God. In fact , he prefers a metaphysical argument which leads more expeditiously to a more perfect concept of God, namely, the concept of primum ens.31 Bettoni's treatment of the present topic is not short, and hence an extended acknowledgement of its good points is not in order here . And for the most part, our studies agree with explanations given of the various turns of Scotus ' doctrine . We do not believe , however, that any of these explanations provide any real warrant for the general statement that Scotus accepts the principle of motion. For this principle, taken in any general sense, is again and again denied by Scotus.

27 Ibid., 8, 16. 28 Ibid. , 8-10 . 29 Ibid., 10 : a) che nessum essere può produrre in sè la sua forma sostanziale, ...; b) che nulla può agire in sè con azione univoca ; c) che in genere non ripugnaa qualche sostanza di causare in sè qualche effetto in ordine alla qualità, 30 Ibid . , 10- II . 31 Ibid., II - 12. alla quantità, al luogo .

Chapter V

174

From the Scotistic criticism of the propositions, nihil agit in se, and agens et patiens distincta sunt subjecto, Bettoni concludes that the motion principle, for Scotus, must be understood in the light of these two propositions : nothing can change itself substantially, and nothing can cause a univocal effect in itself. Now since local motion and quantitative change are never instances of univocal activity, and since qualitative change is not necessarily such,32 it follows that the principle of motion must be restricted to substantial change and qualitative change which results from univocal action . Hence the motion principle means this : everything which changes substantially and everything which changes qualitatively by univocal action is changed by another. Consequently, if it is to be a necessary principle, the cinesiological principle must be regarded as excluding from its consideration local motion , quantitative change, and equivocal, qualitative change, not to mention the spiritual activities of intellection and volition . We concede that if the motion proposition is taken in this highly restricted and unusual sense, then it is admitted by Scotus . But when it is taken in other and general senses, then the proposition is rejected by the Subtle Doctor.

First the word ' motion ' can be taken in the general sense so as to signify local motion change, quantitative change, qualitative change, substantial change, acts of intellection and volition . Secondly, motion can be taken in the less general sense so as to signify local motion, quantitative change, qualitative change, and substantial change . Thirdly, motion can be taken in a proper sense, and then signifies only local motion . Fourthly, the word can be taken in a less proper sense so as to include local motion , quantitative change, and qualitative change . Now in all four of these senses, Scotus absolutely rejects the principle of motion as false . The fact that Scotus in one passage understands the cinesiological principle in the restricted and peculiar meaning of substantial change or transition from primary potency to primary act,33 surely, this does not justify such broad statements as : Duns Scotus knew the argument from motion and that, as I believe to have already shown, he admitted the full metaphysical validity of the great law of becoming : "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, " . . .34

...

32 Cf. Ch . II of our dissertation, 39–40 . 33 Cf. Ch . IV 120. 34 Bettoni, Efrem, op. cit. , 12 : Duns Scoto conosceva l'argomento del motio e che, conforme a quanto credo di aver dimostrato, ammetteva la piena validità metafisica della grande legge del divenire : "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur."

Concluding Considerations

175

He [ Scotus] admits the validity of the aristotelic-averroistic process which is riveted to the known principle : "Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur" and confirms therefore his full adherence to this very principle, whatever superficial students of the Subtle Doctor may say,35 If Duns Scotus admits the principle of motion bound up with the aristotetelic-averroistic process, and if he accepts the validity of the argument from motion, then we ask the question, what thinker, prior or contemporary to Scotus, presents this principle and argument which he admits? What thinker, prior or contemporary to Scotus, understands the principle in the highly restricted meaning of univocal , qualitative and substantial change ? In the peculiar meaning of transition from primary potency to primary act ?

B) The Principle of Motion and the Subject of Metaphysics In order to show the real Scotistic position in reference to the proof from motion and its principle, Bettoni makes a special appeal to Scotus' teaching concerning the subject of metaphysics.36 To appreciate the point scored by the Franciscan scholar, it is necessary to review some of the elements of this problem, as it is treated by Scotus. According to Averroes, God and the intelligences are the subjectmatter of metaphysics. Since no science proves its own subject, the proof for the existence of God pertains to physics and to physics alone. According to Avicenna, however, the subject of metaphysics is being qua being. He likewise holds that no science proves its own subject, but since God is not the subject of metaphysics, the proof for his existence can and actually does pertain to metaphysics and metaphysics alone.37 Now while in the final solution to this problem Scotus is more

Avicennian than Averroistic, still he follows neither of the two great Mussulman thinkers in toto . Pursuing a via media, the Subtle Doctor grants that both sciences can reach a primacy : physics, a prime mover ; metaphysics, a first being. The metaphysician's notion of God , however, is more perfect than that of the physicist . The latter's notion of a first. mover is a relative notion ; the metaphysician's notion of a first being is absolute. Furthermore, the metaphysician's notion necessarily implies infinity. The physicist's notion has no such implication . Nor can one 35 Ibid. , 16 : Ammette la validità del processo aristotelico-averroistico che si imperniava sul noto principio : "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur" e conferma quindi la sua piena adesione al principio stesso, checchè ne dicano gli studiosi affrettati del Dottor Sottile . 36 Ibid., 13 ff. 37 Metaph., I q . 1 , VII 28.

Chapter V

176

argue from the bare notion of first mover to first being. Hence it does not seem that the motion proof reaches God at all.38 Most significantly, Duns Scotus prefers the metaphysical approach to God. But does the fact that he merely prefers the metaphysical approach mean that at the same time he fully accepts the validity of the physical argumentation, particularly, the Aristotelian-averroistic argumentation which invokes the cinesiological principle ? An affirmative answer to this question appears to be the view of Bettoni, as is quite clear from the quotations previously given . Therefore, he also finds fault with the statement of Chossat that Duns Scotus, because of his theory of equivocal causality, abandons the proof from motion.39 Since we are in much agreement with Chossat, it behooves us to study this matter further. Scotus expresses his preference for the metaphysical approach to God in Question I of Book I and Question 4 of Book VI of his commentary on the Metaphysics . In these questions, he also states that both metaphysics and natural philosophy can reach a primacy. ... sed tam proprietas considerata in scientia naturali, quam in ista de effectu, non potest sibi inesse, nisi primum movens sit, et nisi primum ens 40 sit; ergo utraque scientia potest probare ipsum esse." Notandum etiam quod Naturalis demonstrat aliquod movens esse primum.41 No doubt these statements constitute a difficulty for our understanding of Scotus, and if one would look to these passages alone , he might reasonably think that Scotus really accepts the Aristotelian motion argumentation. But in reference to these statements, it should first of all be noted that they do not occur in questions which ex professo treat the validity of the Aristotelian cinesiological argumentation and its principle. In both questions the problem under consideration is the subject of meta38 Ibid. Omnis proprietas considerata de effectu, quam impossibile est sibi inesse, nisi talis causa sit, concludit causam esse quia; sed tam proprietas considerata in scientia naturali , quam in ista de effectu, non potest sibi inesse, nisi primum movens sit, et nisi primum ens sit ; ergo utraque scientia potest probare ipsum esse. Tamen ista immediatius, quia generales proprietates entis creati, secundum quod considerantur hic, magis ducunt in cognitionem positivam perfectionum primi entis, per excellentiam, quam speciales conditiones consideratae in aliis scientiis, quia istae magis ducunt in cognitionem privativam, vel aliquam positivam minus excellentem ; minus enim excellens videtur primitas modi tantum, quam esse primum ens simpliciter ; VI q . 4 , VII 348—49 . 39 Op. cit., 16. 40 I q. 1, VII 28. 41 Ibid., 37. Cf. also ibid. , 34 ; VI q . 4, VII 348.

Concluding Considerations

177

physics. In reference to this problem, Scotus sides to a large extent with Avicenna and accepts the view that metaphysics is a science of being as being. In defense of this view, he does not find it necessary to refute the Aristotelian argumentation for a first mover. On the contrary and verbally at least , he appears to accept this argumentation, for he asserts that natural philosophy proves a first mover.

But does Scotus really accept the Aristotelian argumentation ? Other passages, a whole question, and long sections of other questions make it clear that he does not.42 Hence the following interpretation of the passages cited above appears to enjoy some plausibility. In these two questions of his commentary on the Metaphysics, Scotus' chief concern is the subject of metaphysics . Is the subject of this science being as being, as Avicenna maintains ; or is the subject God and the intelligences, as Averroes contends ? A defense of the position Scotus adopts does not demand a refutation of the Aristotelian motion argumentation. His position concerning the subject of metaphysics holds whether Aristotle's arguments are valid or invalid . Consequently, as far as the problem of the subject of metaphysics is concerned, he might as well concede their validity. But from another viewpoint, there is no gainsaying that Scotus could prove his position on the subject of metaphysics all the more forcefully, if he could argue that the proofs for God in philosophy of nature are invalid . The essential stand of Averroes would then collapse altogether. But perhaps Scotus does not think this line of thought to be defensible either. Referring to the Aristotelian motion proofs in the 7th and the 8th Book of the Physics, Scotus asserts that these proofs need exposition, in order that their validity might be maintained. Sed processus isti (qui sunt principales in duobus libris, scilicet VII et VIII Physicorum) indigent maiore expositione ad hoc ut rationes ostendantur valere, et si forte valeant, tamen deminute concludunt , sicut alias ostendetur ; 43 The term ' exposition ' here is loaded. In view of Scotus' devastating criticism of the cinesiological principle and the medieval practice of interpreting authorities, the word ' exposition ' here implies that the proofs as given by Aristotle are invalid. In a strenuous effort to reconcile his thought with Aristotle, Scotus actually gives two expositions of the cinesiological principle . These were indicated in Chapter IV.44

42 Cf. Ch . II 32-33. 44 Ch. IV 120—21 123-24. 13 Philosophy Series No. 15

43 Ord., I d . 8 p. 2 q. u . , IV 281 .

178

Chapter V

Now these two expositions suggest another understanding of Scotus' statements that Physics proves a first mover . The natural philosopher might prove a first mover by arguments which use the cinesiological principle according to the two expositions or interpretations which Scotus actually gives the principle . Thus for example, a natural philosopher could argue to a first mover from substantial change, since, according to Scotus, nothing can change itself substantially.45 Such argumentation, of course, involves a whole theory of substantial change and hylomorphism. There is no denying that such an approach would involve special complications . At the same time, we do not think that it should be excluded here that Duns Scotus might allow for still other arguments for God, or at least some higher being, in natural philosophy. These might be new arguments of the natural philosophy of the future. This view appears reasonable, since the Franciscan Doctor believes in the progressive character of philosophy, and he nowhere proclaims the radical incompetency of natural philosophy to make any contribution towards the problem of proving the existence of God . This means that the natural philosopher would not function simply as a pure physicist in our modern acceptation but would also be a metaphysician . But this approach, not without its special value, would still have definite limitations. It would not attain the excellence of the strict metaphysical approach to God. But no matter what precise interpretation we attach to Scotus' statements concerning physics and its proofs for a prime mover, it cannot reasonably be concluded from these statements that he accepts the full validity of the Aristotelian cinesiological argumentation with its key principle, everything which is in motion is moved by another. For in the very same work, his commentary on the Metaphysics, where these statements are made, he devotes an entire and extended question to the cinesiological principle.46 In this protracted and ex professo study, he unequivocally rejects the principle in its universality. This position is maintained intact, and the argumentation in support of it is again rehearsed in extenso in four other questions of the works of the Franciscan Doctor.47 The many parts and full nature of this argumentation we have endeavored to sound out throughout the course of this treatise. Very clearly, Scotistic thought presents two fundamental objections against the Aristotelian arguments for a prime mover. A first objection

45 Ch . II 37. 46 Metaph ., IX q . 14 , VII 582-603 . 47 Ord ., I d. 3 p. 3 q. 2, III 245-330 ; Op . Oxon . , II d . 2 q . 10, XI 523— 46 ; ibid ., d . 25 q. u . , XIII 196-224 ; Quodl . , q. 15, XXVI 48—179 .

Concluding Considerations

179

is that the principle of motion, on which the arguments rest , is false ; a second objection is that these motion arguments do not really reach God, the Primum Ens, the Ens Infinitum. .. et si forte valeant, tamen deminute concludunt, sicut alias ostendetur ; forte non plus concludunt, nisi quod Primum non movetur, ut corpus, vel ut virtus in corpore, sicut anima movetur per accidens in corpore moto.48 Duns Scotus' perception of this double defect of the Aristotelian cinesiological argumentation has major philosophic significance. It harmonizes with and supports his doctrine of the systematic autonomy of metaphysics . For the Subtle Doctor, it is the task of metaphysics to demonstrate the existence of God . This task, moreover, metaphysics must carry out independently of physics.49 For only by strict metaphysical argument based on experience , will the philosopher reach a God who is not merely a mover or motor cause, a formator or some kind of τεχνίτης, but a God who is the Infinite Being, the ποιητής, and First Principle of the existence of all things which actually exist (actual being) or can exist (potential being) . Putting aside the Aristotelian physical arguments, Scotus fully allows that God can create beings which have the power to move themselves . With this deemphasis on God in the role of a motor cause or technician , there is brought into bold prominence God, the Infinite Being, who is the principle of the existence of all things. 50 While Duns Scotus rejects the Aristotelian cinesiological argumen-

tation through his rejection of the cinesiological principle, he nowhere, as was already stated, maintains the radical incompetency of natural philosophy in arguing to some higher being, some kind of primacy. But such a primacy must be accurately assessed . In the case of the Aristotelian cinesiological arguments, the primacy reached falls short of God, the Infinite Being and Creator of all things .

48 Ord., I d . 8 p. 2 q. u. , IV 281 . 49 Metaph., VI q . 4, VII 348–49. Cf. Pacifius Borgmann , " Gegenstand, Erfahrungsgrundlage und Methode der Metaphysik" , Franziskanische Studien, XXI ( 1934) 101-02 ; Étienne Gilson , “Avicenne et le Point de Départ de Duns Scot, " Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, II ( 1927) , 98-99 117-18 . Our studies do not entirely agree with those of Gilson, especially his statement concerning the validity of the physical proof for a prime mover (p . 98) . Cf. by the same author, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1940) , 442 . 50 Cf. Duns Scotus ' philosophical demonstrations of the existence of an Infinite Being in Ord . , I d . 2 p. 1 q. 1 q . 3 , II 148—243 ; De Primo Rerum Omnium Principio, IV 721-99 . A revised text and translation of the latter work is presented by Evan Roche, ( St. Bonaventure , N. Y. , 1949) . Cf. also Allan B. Wolter, "Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God ," Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXVIII ( 1954) 94-121 . 13.

180

Chapter V

Against Bettoni, it has been our concern that Duns Scotus be put down as an opponent of the Aristotelian cinesiological principle . In this , we are first of all motivated by a respect for historical truth . From our studies, this is the fact of the matter. At the same time, we take pleasure in presenting this fact , for along with Sir Edmund Whittaker,51 we believe that Scotus ' rejection of the Aristotelian principle and his thorough defense of self-motion rank as a first-rate philosophic and scientific achievement . But with equal pleasure , we have briefly indicated Scotus' doctrine of the systematic autonomy of metaphysics . This doctrine ill accords with Whittaker's pleas for a physical approach to God . 52 No matter what phychological values such an approach might offer , it will always be inferior to the metaphysical approach from the standpoint of scientific rigor. If this is not a lesson we are to learn from the Subtle Doctor, it is at least a view that should be most carefully weighed .

C) Duns Scotus and the Prima Via of St. Thomas Before concluding our study, we offer a final evaluation of St. Tho mas' proof from motion in the light of Scotistic doctrine. Since many scholars are of the view that this proof is given its most perfect expression in the Summa Theologica, our attention will be restricted to the argument as it is presented there. This evaluation, however, cannot be an altogether straightforward affair. For this would presuppose that we have fully demonstrated which interpretation among variant and conflicting interpretations is the historical proof of the Angelic Doctor. Such a demonstration has been beyond our scope, and accordingly we simply accept the fact of the important differences in the understanding of St. Thomas ' proof which still continue on among Thomists of repute .53 The text of the prima via is well known and easily available. Here we only quote that part of the via which is pertinent to our study. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur : nihil enim movetur nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur : movet autem aliquid, secundum quod est actu ; movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum. De potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum nisi per aliquod ens actu ; sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet, et alterat ipsum. Non autem possibile est quod idem sit simul in actu et in

51 Space and Spirit (Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948 ) , 45—51 . 52 Ibid., 103-04 . 53 Cf. Ch. I 7-14.

Concluding Considerations

181

potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa ; quod enim est calidum in actu , non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod idem, et eodem motu, aliquid sit movens, et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Oportet ergo omne quod movetur ab alio moveri . 54 What concerns us here is the cinesiological principle : omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. Now first let it be allowed that the principle means that nothing can change itself. In other words , the active agent of motion or change must be necessarily and really distinct from the passive or recipient principle of change . Understood in this way, the principle is unquestionably rejected by Duns Scotus. Consequently, the first way itself goes by the board . In point of fact , when Scotus argues against the principle, this is exactly how he understands it. Now there might be some difficulty in determining precisely the sense in which St. Thomas uses the word ' motion .' Two examples of motion are presented in the proof itself : something hot making wood hot, which is a qualitative change ; a stick being moved by a hand, which is an instance of local motion. But in any event , St. Thomas certainly does not restrict the term ' motion ' to substantial and qualitative univocal change. But this is enough to make Scotus deny the premise, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. The Scotistic rejection of the principle, of course, would be based on a rejection of the proof for the principle which appeals to the incompatibility of potency and act. Any transition from potency to act, according to Scotus, requires a being in act which effects the transition. But it is possible that the very being in act which effects the transition is also the recipient principle of the act which is produced by it . Nor does this situation involve any violation of the potency and act law : the same thing cannot be in potency and act in the same respect. An act of willing, for example, is in objective potency. It can become actual only by being produced by some being already in act, such as the human will . For nothing can produce itself. Now the human will is in act, and it is a power which can actively cause acts of volition . At the same time, it has the capacity to receive the acts of volition it causes, and hence on this basis, is a recipient principle or potency. Before it has actually received some act which it will actively cause, the will is in modal subjective potency to this act . When the will is actually causing a particular act of volition , the modal subjective potentiality has been actualized, and accordingly, the will is no longer in subjective potency Ia q. 2 a. 3, I 17-18.

182

Chapter V

to this particular act, albeit it is still an active and passive potency in the sense of a principle. To assert that the human will actively causes an act of volition and that at the same time it is the recipient or passive principle of this act, - this situation entails no violation of the potency and act law. For this law refers to potency and act taken as modes of being ; it does not refer to potency and act taken as principles . Accordingly, therefore, when an act of volition is in objective potency, it cannot be in act ; if a particular act of volition is in act, the will can no longer be in subjective potency to this act . Precisely because the will is an active principle, a power which can cause its own acts of volition , it contains these acts, prior to their actualization, in a virtual manner. To say that the will contains these acts virtually means that it has the active power of producing them or bringing them into existence . 55 It is to be pointed out here that the will can cause its acts of volition only in dependence on God the primary cause, and hence the will is only a secondary cause, albeit a true efficient cause. In this way, Scotus is in line with the general teaching of scholasticism on primary and secondary causality.56 But that the will, along with all other created agents , is only a secondary cause is a conclusion of metaphysics, which can be proven only after the existence of God and his nature have been demonstrated and determined . Let us now consider how Scotistic doctrine would line up with the cinesiological principle when it is taken not in an exclusive but in an assertive sense . This sense is defended by Descoqs57 and appears to be much the same as that offered by de Vries. 58 Taken in the assertive sense, the principle affirms that everything in motion is moved by another alone or by itself with another. A Latin formulation of this understanding of the cinesiological principle is, omne quod movetur etiam ab alio movetur. According to Descoqs , therefore , a thing can change or move itself. For a mobile thing can contain within itself in virtual act some particular perfection which it will both actively cause and receive as a passive principle. But the mobile being

and this is the important point

55 For a more complete presentation of the Scotistic argumentation from potency and act against the cinesiological principle, we refer the reader back to Ch . III 67-80 . 56 Cf. Ch. III 87. 57 Cf. Ch. I 30-31 . For another treatment of the assertive sense of the cinesiological principle, cf. Iosepho Hellin . Theologia Naturalis (Madrid, 1950) , 206. 58 Cf. C,. I 13-14.

Concluding Considerations

183

cannot change itself adequately. It cannot contain a given perfection in an adequate virtual act . Hence granted that the mobile being moves itself, it is also at the same time moved by another. Such is the case in reference to every self-moving cause which is equivocal and finite.59 This position Descoqs defends with the following reason : ... causa aequivoca limitata in perfectione non potest habere perfectionem aequalem et omnino aequivalentem effectus in individuo, qui sit perfectionis etiam minoris, nec valet universaliter principium : "plus continet minus ."60 From our previous studies, it is clear that Descoqs ' reasoning does not harmonize with Scotistic doctrine . But rather than belabor this point, we will refer once again, although briefly, to the example of the will and an act of willing for a clarification of the issue. Now why cannot the will, a limited equivocal cause, be in potency to and contain in virtual actuality numerically one and the same act of willing, which it will later cause and receive in its formal actuality? Such power Duns Scotus accords the faculty of volition . Thus a particular and individual act of willing, which is now actual, was potential prior to its actual existence . For according to Duns Scotus, not only are modal potency and act in the same species, but they are also numerically identical . 61 Does this mean then that the will is the adequate and total cause of a particular act of willing ? Does the faculty contain in adequate virtual act a volitional act prior to the latter's actual existence ? Aside from Scotus ' theory of the will as a partial cause of volitional acts, the Scotistic answer to these questions is negative . For no finite cause can be the adequate cause of its activities. But such an answer presupposes the existence of God as already proven. It presupposes as demonstrated the fact that all beings other than God are dependent and require divine conservation for continued existence and divine concursus for their activities . Once this essential dependence of a finite being on God is appreciated, it follows quite easily that nothing can change itself adequately. Now to interpret the cinesiological principle in the light of this dependence is surely a way of guaranteeing its truth. But such an interpretation completely changes the meaning of the principle, and to 59 Descoqs , Pedro, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis (Paris, 1932) , I 306-07. 60 Ibid ., 307 . 61 Op . Oxon., II d . 16 q . u . , XIII 25 : et hoc modo potentia et actus non sunt tantum ejusdem speciei , sed etiam ejusdem numeri ut dicitur 9 Metaph. Illud enim individuum, quod nunc est in actu , illud idem fuit in potentia. Cf. also Ord. , I d . 7 q . 1. , IV 138 .

184

Chapter V

such an extent, that it can no longer be validly used to prove the existence of God. The fact of self-motion or self-change might well be used as a starting point in proving the existence of God . For if something changes, whether it is changed by itself or another, such a thing is mutable and dependent. And in the final analysis, a mutable and dependent being demands an absolutely immutable and independent being as an adequate explanation. Hence according to Suarez , motion, insofar as it is a sign of dependence and contingency, can support valid argumentation for the existence of God . 62 This view of Suarez, we believe , finds full acceptance in Scotistic metaphysics. For this metaphysics fully allows that potential , mutable, dependent, and contingent being ultimately and necessarily demands a completely actual, immutable, independent , necessary being as its adequate explanation. This is clear from the general nature and makeup of Scotus ' metaphysics . Scotistic metaphysics is the science of the transcendentals, and among the transcendentals, the disjunctive attributes of being occupy a most important position . Disjunctive attributes or transcendentals are those properties which are coextensive or convertible with being in disjunction . Being for example, is either mutable or immutable, potential or actual. It is necessarily one or the other, and if the less noble extreme of two disjunctive attributes is given as a fact in experience, the more noble extreme must necessarily be admitted as an existing fact. For the more noble extreme is the necessary condition of the less noble extreme . This is the famous law of the disjunctive transcendentals, which the Subtle Doctor exploits in the construction of his systematic and scientific metaphysics. 63 In the light of Scotistic doctrine , we conclude that the cinesiological principle in its assertive interpretation is false . The fact that Duns Scotus himself does not specially consider this understanding of the principle is significant . It strongly suggests, contrary to de Vries, that this understanding of the cinesiological principle does not represent the original and historical meaning of the principle. This thorough rejection of the motion principle notwithstanding, it still remains true for Duns Scotus that every mutable being , whether it is changed by itself or by another, bespeaks imperfection and potentia-

62 Hellin, Iosepho, Theologia Naturalis (Madrid, 1950), 216. 63 Wolter, Allan B. , The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1946) , 128–61 . Cf. also by the same author, Summula Metaphysicae (Milwaukee, 1958) , 8-9.

Concluding Considerations lity.

185

Eo ipso, a mutable being is thus necessarily dependent on some

immutable being. A being in motion, therefore, demands an unmoved mover, although the being in motion might be a partial cause of its own motion. And once the existence of God is demonstrated , it can be shown that no finite being or combination of finite beings can be the adequate efficient cause of their activities. It sometimes happens that philosophers find substantial agreement among variant and conflicting doctrines. Perhaps the discovery of some fundamental agreement between Scotistic thought and at least some particular understanding of the motion principle should be made here. This is the view of P. Raymond, who finds a basic agreement between the Thomistic and Scotistic schools in their analysis of the causality of motion . For in explaining motion , both schools appeal to antecedent phenomena which immediately or mediately depend on agents really distinct from beings in motion . Scotists simply make the special insistence that these antecedent phenomena are not necessarily physical causes but can simply be sine qua non conditions . 65 Now let us try to sound out this teaching which P. Raymond ascribes to the Scotistic school by considering a concrete example . Such consideration might throw additional light on the teachings of Duns Scotus himself. Consider Socrates in the presence of an apple. He sees this apple and is attracted to it and finally wants to eat it . The act of the will to eat the apple is in turn followed by various other acts commanded by the will, and thus in the end, we find Socrates actually consuming the fruit . But let us concentrate our attention simply on the act of the will whereby Socrates decides to eat the apple . What causes this act of the will ? According to Duns Scotus, the volitional act is caused by the will as the principal cause and the intellect knowing the object, in this case, a particular apple. Now the intellect knowing the object is not a mere condition but also a true and real, although partial, cause of the act . As previously explained , the intellect and will function as essentially ordered causes and together form one cause in producing the effect , the 64 Ord., I d . 5 p. 2 q . u . , IV 61 : et mutatio de ratione sui dicit imperfectionem, quia potentialitatem, et hoc in mutabili . 65 [Courcerault] , Raymond de, " Le problème fondamental de la théodicée," Études Franciscaines, XX ( 1908) 699 : Avec des nuances dans l'expression de l'analyse qu'elles ont cru devoir faire de la causalité , les deux écoles sont d'accord sur le fond même de la doctrine : toutes deux réclament pour expliquer un devenir nouveau des antécédents, immédiatement ou médiatement provoqués par des êtres distincts de celui qui se meut . La seule difference est que là, où les uns voient une causalité physique, les autres n'y trouvent qu'une causalité sine qua non . Cf. ibid., 696 n. 1 .

186 volitional act .

Chapter V Aside from this one cause, no other secondary cause

functions here and now in producing the effect . But many phenomena could be pointed to as antecedent conditions

of Socrates ' new act of willing. For the apple to cause the desire in Socrates to eat, the apple itself would first have to exist . Then by physical necessity at least, a particular tree must have existed which produced the apple. Likewise , if Socrates is to desire the apple, he also must exist, and his existence in some way demands the prior existence of his parents . But clearly, neither the parents nor the tree are the causes of the particular act of willing we have been considering . The parents would be true causes of Socrates, and they would be related by an accidental order to Socrates viewed in reference to his own acts of causation . 67 As we saw in Scotus' theory of gravity, a heavy body actively moves itself downward to its natural place . But if a particular body is actually to move itself downward, then it is necessary that it is not in its natural place. Hence an antecedent phenomenon of a heavy body's downward motion could be the throwing of the body up into the air by some agent. According to the view of Scotus, however, the agent or thrower would not be the active cause of the downward motion, but the heavy body itself would be the cause. Perhaps a heavy body is impeded from moving itself downward by having been placed on a table . Once the table , the obstacle to downward motion, is removed, then it moves itself downward. The removal of the obstacle is not a cause but a condition for the motion.68 Likewise, if the heavy body is to fall downward, it is first of all necessary that the heavy body exists . Consequently, we might look to some agent of generation which reduced the heavy body from primary potency to primary act . Such a reduction , Scotus expressly teaches, must be the work of an agent extrinsic to the heavy body.69 Now perhaps the principle of motion is to be understood in such a way as to allow that something can move itself, but that this self-motion presupposes antecedent conditions. These conditions may be immediate or mediate. They may even be causes, as in the case of Socrates and his parents. Now one might be tempted to understand the cinesiological principle loosely in this way, in terms of antecedent conditions. But to us, this would only make for confusion, and surely, this is not the historical

66 Cf. Ch . IV 163. 67 Scotus explains the nature of accidentally ordered and essentially ordered causes in Ord. , I d . 2 p. 1 q . I , II 153-55. 68 Cf. Ch . IV 124-26. 69 Cf. Ch . IV 120-21.

Concluding Considerations

187

meaning of the cinesiological principle . Such a loose understanding of the principle would not even satisfy the proponents of the cinesiological principle taken in its assertive sense . For as Iosepho Hellin explains , the proponents of the principle in this sense insist that an active cause must be moved by another over and above the various prerequisites and coprinciples which might be required for its activity . Itaque contendunt, postquam causa activa habeat omnia praerequisita et omne comprincipium ad agendum, ut est, v. c. , species impressa in intellectu, iudicium indifferens ad volendum, adhuc intellectum et voluntatem non posse movere se, nisi concurrente aliquo exteriore agente.70 Even in its assertive acceptation, the cinesiological principle is the principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved . In the case of Socrates and the apple, grant that the apple is produced and is in the presence of Socrates, still another mover would be required , if Socrates is to make the decision of eating the apple. But there is a by far more crucial consideration to be made here . If the cinesiological principle is understood in terms of antecedent conditions, then it can no longer be validly used in proving the existence of God, at least if we accept the teaching of St. Thomas and other scholastics concerning the possibility of an infinite regress in accidentally ordered causes . " This, indeed , is a most serious consequence of this loose understanding of the cinesiological principle, and clearly shows that this understanding of the principle is a deviation from its historical meaning. In proving the existence of God , however, one might appeal to a series of accidentally ordered causes or conditions, and to satisfy a possible opponent, one might even allow that the series is or can be infinite . But valid argumentation would focus on this series as a stream of transient , caused , and dependent beings . Such a stream of transient, caused, and dependent beings would require some other being outside the series which exists simultaneously with them, and upon which the beings in the series depend . In the final analysis, this other being would necessarily be absolutely permanent, uncaused , and independent . But this line of argumentation Duns Scotus himself fully exploits in his

70 Theologia Naturalis (Madrid , 1950) , 209. 71 The kind of invalid argument which would result from this loose construction of the cinesiological principle would be what Vernon J. Bourke refers to as a distortion of a valid proof. It is an argument which appeals to a temporal series of causes and concludes to a first cause. Cf. Vernon J. Bourke, " Invalid Proofs for God's Existence, " Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXVIII ( 1954) 46—47.

188

Chapter V

philosophical demonstrations of the existence of an Infinite Being.72 It is to belabor the obvious to point out that this argumentation is ex via causalitatis. Another pertinent point not to be overlooked here is that the notion of an active cause does not de se bespeak imperfection or dependence . Consequently, if some being causes some new perfection in itself or changes itself, the point to be seized upon in arguing towards the existence of God is not that this being is an active cause but rather the fact that this being is the subject of change and is thus mutable. In the final analysis, an adequate explanation of such a mutable being demands the existence of an immutable being. To repeat, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur is false according to Scotus. At least some things can move themselves : things can move themselves locally; bodies can change themselves quantitatively and qualitatively ; both the intellect and will are active causes of their proper acts. In these cases, the immanent active cause may be no more than a partial cause of the motion produced . But no matter how partial the self-motion may be, it entails a falsification of the cinesiological principle known to Duns Scotus, the famous principle of the distinction of the mover and the moved. In this way, the Subtle Doctor emerges as the intransigent opponent of the doctrine of the absolute passivity of matter and the passivity of the intellect and will . Accordingly, therefore, God has the power to create a creature and endow it with the power to move itself. Thus creatures do not necessarily require any kind of initial kick, shove or push or any continuing kicking, shoving, or pushing from God, although they may do a lot of kicking, shoving, and pushing among themselves. This is not to deny the truths of divine conservation and concursus. But these are truths which are systematically posterior to proofs for the existence of God . Systematically, the activities of creatures are not to be explained in terms of the primary causality of God before His existence has been demonstrated . Now as we look back over his explanation and defense of self-motion, what kind of a thinker do we see in Duns Scotus ? Does he appear to be a rationalistic or essentialist type of thinker, or does he rather stress experience and concrete existing facts ? Certainly, in his critique of the cinesiological principle and defense of self-motion, the great stress and deciding factor is experience . In 72 Ord. , I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1 , II 159-61 . Cf. also Allan Wolter, Summula Metaphysicae (Milwaukee, 1958) , 42—46 59–60.

Concluding Considerations

189

every area of reality where he defends self-motion, he appeals again and again to facts . Then for things which on the basis of experience move themselves, he postulates an actus virtualis, the virtual actuality of a given perfection which can be caused and received in its formal actuality by one and the same thing. This stress on experience , moreover, is made by Scotus in opposition to others, who, according to his judgment, overwork the a priori approach and the method of analysis of concepts and do not look sufficiently to the facts.73 In Scotus' treatment of the motion principle, it is not to be denied that there is much analysis of concepts. But this is done to show that the principle of motion is not a necessary proposition , that the a priori, conceptual arguments of his opponents are inconclusive, and that selfmotion is something altogether possible. But when it comes to affirming self-motion as a fact , then experience is the determining norm. In fidelity to this norm, Scotus will even avail himself of the imperfect biological knowledge of his day, as in his defense of self-motion in nutrition and growth .

In the end, it is experience which falsifies the principle of

motion. Nor need we be surprised that he accords experience such a capital role. For Duns Scotus had been well trained in the empirical tradition which dominated Oxford from the beginning.

73 Metaph., IX q . 14, VII 589 600. 74 Cf. Ch. IV 133-39.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, 4 vols. , ed . Carl Balič et socii , Vatican City, 1950-1957 . Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, 26 vols. , ed . L. Vivès, Paris, 1891-1895. Commentaria Oxoniensia, 2 vols . , ed. Fernández García, Quaracchi, 1912— 1914. Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis, Venetiis , Ioannes Hamann , 1499.

ms. Balliol 234. Additiones magnae secundi libri, ed . Carl Balič, in Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les Quatre Livres des Sentences, Louvain, 1927, 264—301 . "Une question inédite de Jean Duns Scot sur la volonté, " ed. Carl Balić, in Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, III ( 1931 ) 191–208. The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus A Revised Text and a Translation, ed . and tr. Evan Roche, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1949. SCOTISTIC COMMENTATORS Cavellus, Hugo, Commentaria, found in the Opera Omnia Scoti , Vivès edition, passim . Frassen, Claudius, Scotus Academicus, Rome, 1900-02 . Lychetus, Franciscus , Commentaria, found in the Opera Omnia Scoti, Vivès edition, passim. Mastrius, Bartholomaeus, Disputationes ad Mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum, Venetiis, apud Nicolaum Pezzana, 1708. Mauritius de Portu, Commentaria, found in the Opera Omnia Scoti, Vivès edition, passim. Montefortino, Hieronymus, Summa Theologica, Rome, 1900—03 . Pontelongus, Franciscus, Disputationum Philosophicarum Pars Secunda, Patavii, Ioannis Baptista Pasquatius, 1662 . Tartaretus, Petrus, Lucidissima Commentaria, Sive (ut vocant) Reportata, in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibeta Ioannis Duns Scoti Subtilium Principis, Venetiis, apud Heredes Simonis Galignani de Karera, 1583 .

190

Bibliography

191

Amor Ruibal , Angel, Los Problemas Fundamentales de la Filosofia y del Dogma, V, Madrid-Barcelona, s. a. Anselm, St., S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia , ed . Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, Edinburgh, 1946-1951 . Aristotle, Opera Omnia, ed . I. Bekker, Berlin, 1831-1870. Aristotelis Stagiritae Omnia Quae Extant Opera, ed . Iuntas, Venetiis , 1550-1552. - The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed . Richard McKeon, New York, 1941 . Arnou, Renatus, De Quinque Viis ad Demonstrandam Dei Existentiam apud Antiquos Graecos et Arabes et Judaeos Praeformatis vel Adumbratis, 2d ed. , Rome, 1949 . Averroes, Averrois Cordubensis Commentarii , Aliique Ipsius In Logica, Philosophia, & Medicina Libri, in the editio Iuntina of Aristotle, Venetiis , 1550-1552. Balič, Carl, Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des sentences, Louvain, 1927. Basly, Marie Deodat de, "Scotus Docens," La France Franciscaine, XVII (1934) 47-148. Baumgarner, M. , " Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis , " Beiträge zur Geschichte der Pholosophie des Mittelalters, II 4, Münster, 1896. Belmond, Séraphin, Dieu , Existence et Cognoscibilité, Paris, 1913. Bettoni, Efrem, L'Ascesa a Dio in Duns Scoto, Milan, 1943 . Bittle, Celestine, God and His Creatures, Milwaukee, 1952 . Boehm, A. , “Autour du Mystère des ' Quinque Viae' de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, " Revue des Sciences Religieuses, XXIV ( 1950) 217—34. Boehner, Philotheus, and Gilson, Étienne, Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie, 2d ed . , Paderborn, 1953 . History of Franciscan Philosophy (manuscript) . "A Proof for the Existence of God according to Pacificus Borgmann , O.F.M. ," Franciscan Studies, XXIV ( 1943) 374-86. Bonaventure, St. , Opera Omnia, Quaracchi, 1882—1902 . Borgmann, Pacificus , “ Gegenstand, Erfahrungsgrundlage und Methode der Metaphysik," Franziskanische Studien , XXI ( 1934) 80—103 125—50. - "Die Stellungnahme des Duns Skotus zum Aristotelisch-Thomistischen Bewegungsgesetz : Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur, " Wissenschaft und Weisheit, IV ( 1937) 38—42 .

"De argumento chronologico existentiae Dei sumpto ex continua entium temporalium succedaneitate, " Franziskanische Studien , XXXIV ( 1952) 365-76. Bourke, Vernon J., " Invalid Proofs for God's Existence, " Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association , XXVIII ( 1954) 37—49. Bryar, William , St. Thomas and the Existence of God, Chicago, 1951 .

192

Bibliography

Buechel, Wolfgang, " Quantenphysik und naturphilosophischer Substanzbegriff," Scholastik, XXXIII ( 1958 ) 161-85. Buescher, Gabriel, The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham , St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1950. Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, Angelici Doctoris Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologica in quinque Tomos Distributa cum Commentariis Thomae de Vio Cardinalis Cajetani, Patavii, 1698. Chenu, M. D. , Introduction à l'Étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, 1950 Cherubini, F. , Cursus Philosophicus ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis, Rome, 1904. Chossat, J. Marcel, “Dieu (Son Existence) , " Catholique, IV col. 874-984, Paris, 1911 .

Dictionnaire de Théologie

Copleston, Frederick, A History of Philosophy, II, Westminster, Maryland, 1952. (Courcerault de) , Raymond , "Le Problème Fondamental de la Théodicée, " Études Franciscaines , XX (1908) 693-712 . Cresswell, J. R. , " Duns Scotus on the Will, " Franciscan Studies, XIII ( 1953) 147-58 . Combrie, A. C., Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, Oxford , 1953. Crowley, T., "St. Thomas and Sir Edmund Whittaker, " The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, LXXIX ( 1947) 1066-82. Daniels, Augustinus, " Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert, " Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, VIII , Muenster, 1909. Day, Sebastian J. , Intuitive Cognition A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1947. Descoqs, Pedro, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, I, Paris, 1935 . Donat, J., Summula Philosophiae Christianae, VI Theodicea, Innsbruck, 1929. Duhem, Pierre, Le Système du Monde, Paris, 1954 . Farrell, Walter, A Companion to the Summa, New York, 1941 . Fernández- García, Maria, Lexicon Scholasticum Philosophico- Theologicum, Quaracchi, 1910. Frank, Philipp, Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1957. Garrigou-Lagrange, R. , God His Existence and His Nature, tr. Rose Bede, I, St. Louis, 1934. Gilson, Étienne, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, II ( 1927) 89—149 . -The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, New York, 1940 . - Jean Duns Scot Introduction A Ses Positions Fondamentales , Paris, 1952 .

and Philotheus Boehner, Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie, Paderborn, 1953. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York, 1955 .

Bibliography

193

Godfrey of Fontaines, Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, in Les Philosophes Belges, III , Louvain, 1914. - Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans, in Philosophes Belges, IV, Louvain, 1924. - Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans, in Les Philosophes Belges, V Fasc. I-II , Louvain, 1932. - Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. Dom Odon Lottin, in Les Philosophes Belges, XIV, Louvain, 1937Grajewski, Maurice, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus , Washington, D. C., 1944. Grunwald, Georg, " Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, IV, Muenster, 1907 . Hamelin, O., Le Système d'Aristote, Paris, 1931 . Hamui, Robert, Alfarabi's Philosophy and Its Influence on Scholasticism , Sydney, 1928. Hawkins, D. J. B. , The Essentials of Theism, New York, 1950 . Hellin, Iosepho, Cursus Philosophicus V, Theologia Naturalis , Madrid, 1950. Henry of Ghent, Magistri Henrici a Gandavo, Doctoris Acutissimi et Celeberrimi, Archdiaconi Tornacensis , Aurea Quodlibeta, ed . Seravalli Veneti, Venetiis, 1608. Hervé, J. M. , Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, II Paris, 1949. Hickey, S. J., Summula Philosophiae, III , Theodicaea, St. Louis, 1934. Husik, Isaac, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Philadelphia, 1944. Jolivet, R., "La théodicée de M. E. Le Roy, " Revue Apologétique, LI (1930) 129-47. Joyce, George Hayward, Principles of Natural Theology, New York, 1923 Junk, Nikolaus, Die Bewegungslehre des Franz Suarez, Innsbruck, 1951 . Klug, Hubert, “ L'Activité Intellectuelle de l'Ame selon le Bienheureux Jean Duns Scot," Études Franciscaines, XLI ( 1929 ) 113-30 244—69 381-91 517-38. Landry, Bernard, Duns Scot, Paris, 1922. Longpré, Ephrem, La Philosophie du B. Duns Scot, Paris, 1924. Maier, Anneliese, Zwei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2d ed. , Rome, 1951 . -- An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 2d ed . , Rome, 1952 . Maimonides, Moses, The Guide for the Perplexed, tr. M. Friedlaender, 2d ed ., Dover, 1904 . Maritain, Jacques, Approaches to God, tr. Peter O'Reilly, New York, 1954. Mc Laughlin, P. J., " Modern Science and the Five Ways, " The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, LXIX ( 1947) 273-89. Mc Williams, James A., Physics and Philosophy, Washington , D. C. , 1945 . Merlan, Philip, "Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, " Traditio, IV ( 1946) 1—30 . 14 Philosophy Series No. 15

194

Bibliography

Messner, Reinhold , Schauendes und begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Skotus, Freiburg, Breisgau, 1942 . Meyer, Hans, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Frederick Eckhoff, St. Louis , 1944 . - Abendländische Weltanschauung, I , Paderborn, 1953 . Mitterer, Albert, " Der Bewegungsatz (omne, quod movetur, ab alio movetur) nach dem Weltbild des hl. Thomas und dem der Gegenwart, ” Scholastik, IX (1934) 372-99 481-519. - Wandel des Weltbildes von Thomas auf Heute. Schriftenreihe, Innsbruck, 1935 . -- "Physik und Metaphysik, " Franziskanische Studien, 245-64.

XXIII

(1936)

Moody, Ernest A. , " Galileo and Avempace, " Journal of the History of Ideas, XII (1951 ) 163-93 375-422. O'Neill, John, Cosmology, New York, 1923 . Owens, Joseph, " The Conclusion of the Prima Via, " The Modern Schoolman, XXX (1952-1953) 33-53 109-21 203-15. Paulus, Jean, " Le caractère métaphysique des preuves Thomistes de l'existence de Dieu , " Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, IX (1934) 143-53. Plato, Platonis Opera, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford , 1899—1907. Platonis Opera, ed . Ambrosio Firmin Didot, Paris, 1852 . - The Dialogues of Plato, tr. B. Jowett, New York, 1937. Pluzanski, E. , Essai sur la Philosophie de Duns Scot, Paris, 1884 . Raeymaeker, L. De, Metaphysica Generalis, Louvain, 1935. Rickaby, Joseph, Studies on God and His Creatures, New York, 1924 . Roger Bacon, Quaestiones supra Libros Octo Physicorum Aristotelis, ed . R. Steele, fasc . XIII , Oxford, 1935. Rolfes, Eugen, Die Gottesbeweise bei Thomas von Aquin Aristoteles, Cologne, 1898. Salman, D. , (A review of the article by Jean Paulus, “Le caractère metaphysique des preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu ") , Bulletin thomiste, IV (1935) 604-10. Santeler, Josef, Der Kausale Gottesbeweis bei Hervaeus Natalis, Innsbruck, 1930. Schaefer, Odulfus, Bibliographia de Vita Operibus et Doctrine Ioannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis ac Mariani Saec. XIX-XX, Rome, 1935. Sesmat, A. , " L'Univers d'Aristote, " Revue de Philosophie, XXXVIII (1938) 285-309. Shapiro, Herman, Motion, Time and Place according to William Ockham, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1957. Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote, ed . Philippe Delhaye, in Les Philosophes Belges, XV, Louvain, 1941 .

Bibliography

195

Simplicius, Clarissima commentaria in octo libros Arist. de Physico Auditu, Venetiis, apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1566. Smeets, Uriel, Lineamenta Bibliographiae Scotisticae, Rome, 1942. Smith, Vincent Edward, "The Prime Mover : Physical and Metaphysical Considerations ," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXVIII ( 1954) 78—94. Philosophical Physics, New York, 1950. Steenberghen, Fernand Van, "Le problème philosophique de l'existence de Dieu," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLV (1947) 141-68. "La physique moderne et l'existence de Dieu, " Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLVI ( 1948) 376-89. - Ontology, tr. Martin J. Flynn, New York, 1952 . -

Aristotle in the West, tr. Leonard Johnston, Louvain, 1955. - The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century, New York, 1955. Stufler, Johann, " Der hl. Thomas und das Axiom : Omne, quod movetur, ab alio movetur, " Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, XLVII ( 1923 ) 369-90. Suarez, Francis, Francisci Suarez Opera Omnia, ed . L. Vivès, Paris, 1856— 1878.

Taylor, Alfred E., "Theism, " Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics , XII 261-87, Edinburgh , 1921 .

Platonism and Its Influence, New York, 1927 . Plato: The Man and His Work, New York, 1936. Thomas Aquinas, St. , Opera Omnia, ed. L. Vivès, Paris, 1872-1880. - The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr . Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York, 1911—1935 . Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed . Anton C. Pegis, I II , New York, 1945 .

- Of God and His Creatures, an Annotated Translation of the Summa Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Joseph Rickaby, Westminster, Maryland , 1950. Ueberweg, Friedrich, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Bernhard Geyer, II, Berlin, 1928 . Varesius, Carolus Franciscus, Promptuarium Scoticum, ed . Andreas Poletus, I II, Venetiis, 1690. Verbeke, Gérard, "La structure logique de la preuve du Premier Moteur chez Aristote," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, XLVI ( 1948 ) 137—60. Vries, Joseph de, " Das Weltbild der neuen Physik und die alte Metaphysik, ” Scholastik, X (1935 ) 77-90 . Weisheipl, James A. , " Natural and Compulsory Movement," The New Scholasticism, XXIX (1955) 50-81. "The Concept of Nature," The New Scholasticism , XXVIII ( 1954) 377-408. Whittaker, Sir Edmund, Space and Spirit, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948 .

14.

192

Bibliography

Buechel, Wolfgang, " Quantenphysik und naturphilosophischer Substanzbegriff," Scholastik, XXXIII ( 1958) 161-85. Buescher, Gabriel, The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham , St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1950. Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, Angelici Doctoris Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologica in quinque Tomos Distributa cum Commentariis Thomae de Vio Cardinalis Cajetani , Patavii, 1698. Chenu, M. D. , Introduction à l'Étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, 1950 Cherubini, F. , Cursus Philosophicus ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis, Rome, 1904. Chossat, J. Marcel, "Dieu (Son Existence)," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, IV col . 874-984, Paris, 1911 . Copleston, Frederick, A History of Philosophy, II, Westminster, Maryland, 1952. (Courcerault de) , Raymond , " Le Problème Fondamental de la Théodicée," Études Franciscaines, XX ( 1908 ) 693-712. Cresswell, J. R. , "Duns Scotus on the Will, " Franciscan Studies, XIII ( 1953) 147-58. Combrie, A. C. , Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, Oxford , 1953 . Crowley, T., "St. Thomas and Sir Edmund Whittaker," The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, LXXIX ( 1947) 1066-82 . Daniels, Augustinus, " Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert, " Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, VIII , Muenster, 1909. Day, Sebastian J. , Intuitive Cognition A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1947. Descoqs, Pedro, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, I , Paris, 1935 . Donat, J., Summula Philosophiae Christianae, VI Theodicea, Innsbruck, 1929. Duhem, Pierre, Le Système du Monde, Paris, 1954. Farrell, Walter, A Companion to the Summa, New York, 1941 . Fernández- García, Maria, Lexicon Scholasticum Philosophico - Theologicum, Quaracchi, 1910. Frank, Philipp, Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1957 . Garrigou-Lagrange, R. , God His Existence and His Nature, tr. Rose Bede, I, St. Louis, 1934. Gilson, Étienne, " Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot, " Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, II ( 1927) 89—149 . ― The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, New York, 1940. Jean Duns Scot Introduction A Ses Positions Fondamentales, Paris, 1952. and Philotheus Boehner, Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie, Paderborn, 1953. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York, 1955 .

Bibliography

193

Godfrey of Fontaines, Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, in Les Philosophes Belges, III , Louvain, 1914. Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans, in Philosophes Belges, IV, Louvain, 1924. - Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans , in Les Philosophes Belges, V Fasc. I -II , Louvain, 1932. - Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. Dom Odon Lottin, in Les Philosophes Belges, XIV, Louvain, 1937. Grajewski, Maurice, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus, Washington, D. C., 1944. Grunwald, Georg, " Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter, " Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, IV, Muenster, 1907. Hamelin, O., Le Système d'Aristote, Paris, 1931 . Hamui, Robert, Alfarabi's Philosophy and Its Influence on Scholasticism, Sydney, 1928. Hawkins, D. J. B. , The Essentials of Theism , New York, 1950. Hellin, Iosepho, Cursus Philosophicus V, Theologia Naturalis, Madrid , 1950. Henry of Ghent, Magistri Henrici a Gandavo, Doctoris Acutissimi et Celeberrimi, Archdiaconi Tornacensis, Aurea Quodlibeta, ed . Seravalli Veneti, Venetiis, 1608. Hervé, J. M., Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, II Paris, 1949 . Hickey, S. J., Summula Philosophiae, III , Theodicaea , St. Louis, 1934. Husik, Isaac, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Philadelphia, 1944 . Jolivet, R., "La théodicée de M. E. Le Roy, " Revue Apologétique, LI (1930) 129-47. Joyce, George Hayward, Principles of Natural Theology, New York, 1923 Junk, Nikolaus, Die Bewegungslehre des Franz Suarez, Innsbruck, 1951 . Klug, Hubert, " L'Activité Intellectuelle de l'Ame selon le Bienheureux Jean Duns Scot," Études Franciscaines, XLI ( 1929 ) 113-30 244-69 381-91 517-38. Landry, Bernard, Duns Scot, Paris, 1922 . Longpré, Ephrem, La Philosophie du B. Duns Scot, Paris, 1924 . Maier, Anneliese, Zwei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2d ed. , Rome, 1951 . - An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 2d ed . , Rome, 1952 . Maimonides, Moses, The Guide for the Perplexed, tr. M. Friedlaender, 2d ed ., Dover, 1904. Maritain, Jacques, Approaches to God, tr. Peter O'Reilly, New York, 1954. Mc Laughlin, P. J. , " Modern Science and the Five Ways," The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, LXIX (1947) 273-89. Mc Williams, James A., Physics and Philosophy, Washington, D. C., 1945 . Merlan, Philip, " Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, " Traditio, IV ( 1946) 1—30. 14 Philosophy Series No. 15

196

Bibliography

Woestyne, Z. Van de, Cursus Philosophicus II , Ontologia, 2d ed. , Malines, 1933. Wolter, Allan B. , The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, St. Bonaventure, N Y. , 1946 . - "Duns Scotus on the Nature of Man's Knowledge of God , " The Review of Metaphysics, I ( 1947) 3—36. "The Theologism of Duns Scotus, " Franciscan Studies, VII ( 1947) 257-73 367-98. "Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural," The New Scholasticism, XXIII ( 1949) 218-317. "Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge, " Franciscan Studies, XI (1951 ) 231-72. Select Problems in the Philosophy of Nature, (pro manuscripto) , St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1952. "Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God , " Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXVIII ( 1954) 94—121 . Summula Metaphysicae, Milwaukee, 1958 . Wulf, Maurice De, History of Medieval Philosophy, tr. E. C. Messenger, 3d English ed. , I II , New York, 1938 .

INDEX Abstractive cognition : 147-8, 172 Accident : coeval and non-coeval, see coeval and non-coeval accident ; proper, 98-9 Act : as a composite being, 75-6, 77-8 ; existential, 9, 10, 89 ; formal, 81-92 , 189, see act, virtual ; as a mode, 75 ; and potency, see potency and act ; primary and secondary, 113-4, 116, 120-1 , 169 , 171 , 174, 175 ; as a principle, 64, 75, 78, 80 ; pure, 11 ; threefold meaning of, 75-6 Act, virtual : 22 , 81–92 , 170, 189 ; adequate, 183 ; and increase in being, 86-9 ; and potency to formal act, 82-6, 92 , 93 , 94, 95, 183 ; the principle of a new physics, 168 ; and the will , 182 Action at a distance : 42 , 104 Active potency : see potency, active, and principle, active and passive Active principle : see principle, active and passive, and potency, active Actual and potential being : 184 ; see potency and act Adelard of Bath : 6-7 Agent and patient : agens et patiens distincta sunt subjecto, 32 n. 1 , 53 , 152, 173, 174 ; propinquity of, 42-3, 94, 104, 152 ; see principle, active and passive Agility: property of, 131 Albert the Great : XI , 7, 19, 107, 108 Alfarabi : 6 Alteration : see change, qualitative Amor Ruibal, Angel : 85 , 171 Angel : and new knowledge, 154 ; and self-motion, 14, 17, 33 , 51 Animals : local motion of, 5 , 15 , 52 , 103 , 128-33 Anselm , St.: 18 Arabian philosophers : 5-7 Aristotle : XIV, 1 , 10, 11 , 14, 16, 17 , 18, 19 , 21 , 23, 24 , 25, 26, 27 , 168 , 169, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180 ; and gravity, 112-9 ; monotheism vs. polytheism, 2 n. 7 ; and the motion principle, 2-4, 17 ; prime mover doctrine, 28, 120 ; and projectile motion, 3-4 ; and violent motion, 3-4 Arnou, Renatus : 1 , 6 Assertive sense of the motion principle : 30-1 , 182-4 , 187 Astronomy: XI, 18 Attributes of being, disjunctive : 184 Augustine, St .: 122 , 146, 163 Augustinianism : 18 Aureoli, Peter : 106 Avempace : 6, 124–6 Averroes : 2 , 5–6, 17 , 63 , 105 , 125 , 152 , 173, 175 , 176 , 177 Avicenna : 69, 87 , 175, 177, 179

197

198

Index

Bacon Roger : 106 , 107 , 128 Baconthorp, John : 106 Balić, Carl : XV, 33 , 48 , 159, 160, 161 Balliol manuscript : XVI Basly, Marie Deodat de : 169 Báñez : 23 Baumgartner, M: 7 Beatific vision : a free gift, 117 Bede, Rose : 29 Being: attributes of, 184 ; and experience, 88 ; First Principle of, 179 ; increase in, 10, 13—4 , 86–92 ; and intuitive cognition, 91 ; and metaphysics, XIII , 175, 177 ; new, 88-92 ; transcendental, 68 Bekker edition of Aris.: 2 n. 6 Belmond, Seraphin : 120, 123 , 169–70 Bergson, Henri : 24 Bettoni, Efrem : 32 , 120, 123 , 170, 172-80 Bittle, Celestine : 31 Body : an energy system, 26 ; living and non-living, 22-3 ; moved by the soul, 128-33 ; organic, 56 Boehm, A.: 7-8 Boehner, Philotheus : 14, 27, 122 , 140 Bonaventure, St .: 14, 18 , 19, 107, 140 Borgmann, Pacificus : XIII , 17 , 22, 27–8, 32 , 81 , 171 , 172, 173 , 179 Bourke, Vernon J.: 187 Bryar, William : 12 , 33 Buechel, Wolfgang : XIII Buescher, Gabriel : 101 Burleigh, Walter : 106 Cajetan, Thomas de Vio : 21-2 Causality of primary motion : 59-61 Causality, principle of : 43-5 , 81 Cause : accidentally ordered, 186, 187 ; essentially and non-essentially ordered, see cause, partial ; final, 49 ; finite, 183 , 185 ; formal, see act as a principle ; generating, 107-9 ; material, see potency, passive ; metaphy. vs. physical , XII ; more perfect than effect , 153 ; primary vs. secondary, 182 , 186, 188 ; prior and posterior, 49 ; vs. producer, 96 ; receptive , see potency, passive ; simultaneous with effect, 73 , 85, 104 Cause, active : see cause, efficient ; potency, active ; principle, active ; free, 47, see will, an active potency ; no imperfection implied, 188 ; of intellection, 149-9 ; natural, 46, 117 , 155, 165 , see potency, active, natural Cause, determined : 117 , 155 , 165, see cause, active, natural, and potency, active, natural . Cause, efficient : see potency, active ; principle, active ; cause, active ; essentially ordered, 49, 73 ; vs, formal cause, 125-6 ; of gravity, 103-28 ; vs. material cause, 79 ; proof from, 14 n . 13, 20 , 44, 168 , 169 Cause, equivocal : defined, 39, 43, 85 ; examples of, 39-40, 174 ; and growth, 39, 102 ; and local motion, 39 ; possesses its effect virtually, 81 , 85, 153 ,

Index

199

161 , 183 ; and potency and act law, 172 ; and qualitative change, 139-40 ; and Suarez, 22 ; and unity of universe, 47, 48 Cause, partial : 46 ; defined , 156 ; essentially and non-essentially ordered, 47, 48, 49, 73, 156–9, 163 , 172, 185 ; theory of, 156-9 ; the will and object known, 163 Cause, total : 46 ; and the assertive sense of the motion principle, 30 ; defined , 156-7 ; of intellection, 149-59 ; of volition, 161-3 Cause, univocal : 173 ; defined , 37-8 ; possesses its effect formally, 81 ; and the potency and act law, 172 ; sphere of, 39-40, 174 ; and the unity of the universe, 47, 48 Cavellus, Hugo : 99 Celestial mechanics : 18 Change, bodily : see motion of bodies Change, qualitative : and equivocal activity, 39-40 ; and increase in being 89 ; and local motion of animals, 131-3 ; and motion in a gen . and less gen. sense, 103, 174 ; and the motion principle, 3 , 8 , 17 , 36, 173 , 174, 188 ; and non-coeval accidents, 103 ; and self-motion, 39, 139-46, 173 ; and univocal activity, 174, 175 , 181 Change, quantitative : and equivocal activity, 39 ; and increase in being, 89 ; and motion taken in a gen. and less gen. sense, 103 , 174 ; and the motion principle, 3 , 8, 17, 36 , 174, 188 ; and non-coeval accidents, 103 ; and nutrition, see nutrition ; and self-motion, 52 , 133–9, 173 ; and univocal activity, 174 Change, substantial : and motion in a gen, sense, 174 ; and the motion principle, 3 , 8, 121 , 173, 174, 175, 178, 181 , and new being, 88 ; and selfmotion, 36, 37, 173 ; and transition from primary potency to primary act, 121 , 174 Charity : and intellectual speculation, 160 Chenu, M. D .: 122 Cherubini, P. F.: 19, 100 Chossat, M.: 19, 22 , 23 , 32 , 168–9 , 173 , 176 Cinesiological principle : see motion principle Coeval and non-coeval accidents : 98-103 ; analogical and non - analogical, 101-3 ; defined, 98–9 ; meaning in Scotus, 99 ; and self-motion, 100-3 Cocause : see cause, partial Cognition, intuitive and abstractive : 147–8 , 172 Commissio Scotistica : XV Concursus, divine : 183 , 188 Conservation, divine : 188 Contemporary philosophers and principle of motion: 23-4 Contingent universe : 50 Contingent being : as defectible being, 69 ; demands necessary being, 184 ; according to Scotus, 69 Contingent action : caused by the will, 163–5 ; defined , 164–5 ; vs. necessary, 164, 165 Copleston, Frederick : 140 Corruptible and incorruptible bodies : 84 Courcerault, Raymond De : 168 , 185 Creatures and the power to create : 86-8

200

Index

Cresswell, J. R.: 163, 165 Crowley, T.: XII Daniels, Augustinus : 14, 15, 18 Day, Sebastian : 147 , 148 Delhaye , Philippe : 15, 105 Dense and rare things : 114 Dependent and independent being : 184, 187 , 188 Descoqs, Pedro : 30, 31 , 182 , 183 Determinism , cosmological : 51 Dignity of nature and self- motion : 45-6, 51 Disjunctive transcendentals : 184 Distinction, formal : between the will as active and passive, 67 ; between metaphy. essence and properties, 99 Distinction, mental : between mover and moved , 15 Donat, J.: 31 Duhem, Pierre : 2, 3, 4 Duns Scotus : historical position, 16

Earth and gravity : 106 Eckhoff, Frederick : 6, 52, 99 Emanation, metaphysical : defined , 100 ; an instance of analogical selfmotion, 100 Energy, potential: 81 Energy system : 26 Ens Infinitum : XIV n. 13, 179, 188 Essence and existence : and Scotus, 90-2 ; and self-motion , 91 ; Thomist real distinction , 9 , 10, 90 Essence, metaphysical : both active and passive, 100 ; and analogous selfmotion, 100 ; relation to properties, 99 Essentialism and Scotus : 188 Exclusive sense of motion principle : 30-1 , 182 Existence : see essence Experience : and freedom of the will, 165-6 ; and metaphysical principles, 94-5, 188-9 ; and metaphysics, XIV ; its role in Scotus, 188-9 ; and self-motion, 40, 188-9 Faculties, spiritual : 15, 16, 98-9, 103 , see intellect and will Faith and reason : 117 Fallacy of non causa ut causa ; 50, 85, 94 Farrell, Walter: 79 Finite being : not an adequate cause, 183 , 185 ; essential dependence of, 183 First way of St. Thomas : see prima via Five ways of St. Thomas : and Aristotelian physics, XII ; and modern physics, XI Flynn, Martin J .: 31 Food as cause of growth : 89, 138-9 Formal act or actuality : see act, formal Form , substantial and accidental : 26, 37 , 98 , 107-8 , 118, 173 Formal cause : not an efficient cause, 125-6 ; in relation to matter, 125-6

Index

201

Formal distinction : see distinction, formal Formal part : 137-8 Formality : 99, 100 Franciscan school : and modern science, XI ; and motion argument, 14 Franciscan philosophy : 24-5 Frank, Philip : XIII , 18, 126 Frassen, Claudius : 19 Freedom of the will : see will , freedom of Free fall of bodies : 2 , 6, 7, 15 , 103 , 104 , 107, 112 , see gravity Free motion of a star : 25

Galen : 5 Ganzheit : 89 Garrigou-Lagrange, R.: 29 Generating cause : as explan tion of fre fall, 107-9 , 113 , 127 and local quantity, 102 Giles of Rome : 15 Gilson, Étienne : XV, 7, 12, 14, 140, 165, 179 God : as Creator, 87 ; and efficient causality proof, 14 n. 13 , 20, 44, 168 , 169 ; First Cause, 88 ; First Principle, 179 ; as a formator, 179 ; and the free motion of a star, 127 ; Infinite Being, XIV n. 13, 179 , 188 ; and metaphysics, XII , 175-7 ; and modern science , XI ; non-mutually related to creatures, 70-1 ; and the perfections of creatures, 82 ; not in potency to additional perfections , 84 ; Prime Mover, 120, 123–4, 175, 176, 178, see motion argument and prima via ; primum ens, 173 , 175 , 176, 179 ; proof for existence of, XI , XIV, 16, 175 , 179, 187-8 ; Pure Act, 11 ; and selfmoving creatures, 70—1 ; supernatural agent, 117 ; unicity of, 48 n . 48 Godfrey of Fontaines : 16, 17, 32, 36, 40, 42, 44, 48 , 52, 53 , 63 , 79, 92–7 , 103 , 104 , 107 , 108 , 109, 124, 129, 134, 149–54, 161 , 162, 173 Grajewski, Maurice : 100 Gravity: 3, 15 ; accidental form of, 109, 113, 124-6 ; the Aristotelian doctrine, 5, 113 ; explained by attraction, 106 ; explained by the generating agent, 107-9, 186 ; explained by medium, 105-6 ; and primary motion, 59-62 ; problem of, 103-28 , 186 ; Scotistic theory more precisely considered, 124-6 ; and the virtus caeli, 107 Growth: see nutrition and growth Grunwald, Georg: 7, 14, 15

Hamelin, O .: 3, 47 Hamui, R.: 6 Hard and soft things : 39, 114 Hawkins, D. J. B .: 1 , 8, 44 Heavens and free fall : 107 Heavy things : 3, 5 , 15, 23 , 56, see gravity ; different velocities of, 112 ; and primary motion, 59-62 Hellin, Josepho : 30, 182 , 184, 187 Henry of Ghent . 15 , 16 , 17 , 21 , 36, 53 , 64-7, 162 Hervaeus Natalis : 20-1 , 31 , 44 , 86, 170

202

Index

Herve, J. M.: 31 Hickey, J. S : 31 Hoffmans, J : 16, 17, 48, 93 , 96, 129 , 149, 152 , 162 Husik, Isaac : 6 Hylomorphic theory: 8, 178 Ibn Daud, Abraham : 6 Illumination theory : 122 , 151-2

Immanent activity : see self-motion Immutable being : 184, 185, 188 Impetus theory : 4, 5, 25 Inertia, principle of : 25, 28, 126-8 Infinite being : XIV n. 13 , 179, 188 Infinite regress in accidentally ordered causes : 187 Intellect : an active potency, 36, 146-59 , 188 ; activity vs. passivity, 16, 32, 146-8, 156, 173 ; habit of, 45 , 113 ; a natural cause, 155, 164-5 ; the partial cause of volition , 162–3 , 185 ; and the power to create, 88–9 ; a proper accident, 98-9 ; and self-motion, 16, 146–59 ; not the total cause of intellection , 46, 154-5 Intellection : active causes of, 146, 148-59 ; caused by the object and the intellect, 155-8 ; and increase in being, 88–9 ; and motion principle, 53, 174 ; a non-coeval accident, 103 ; more perfect than phantasm , 153 Interpretation device : 113 , 121-3 , 177 Intuitive cognition : 147 , 172 Jewish philosophers : 5-7 John Damascene, St.: 159 Johnston, Leonard : 2 Jowett, B.; I Joyce, Hayward : 29, 33 Junk, Nikolaus : 22, 23

Klug, Hubert : 148 Knowledge, a non-mutual relation : 70 Landry, B.: 170, 173 Leibnitz, G.: 37, 168 LeRoy : 24 Levity : see gravity Light things : see heavy things Lightness of fire : 40 Living beings and self-motion : 3, 5, 22, 23, 52 Local motion : see motion, local Longpié, Ephrem : XV Love: caused by knowledge, 162 Lychetus : 102 , 111 , 120 Maier, Anneliese : 2 , 4 , 5 , 15 , 52 , 104 , 105 , 106, 108, 113 , 128 Maimonides, Moses : 6 Man, dignity of: 17 Maritain, Jacques : 29, 30

Index

203

Mary, Blessed Virgin : 140 Mastrius : 100 Material part : 137-8 Matter: absolute passivity of, 188 ; activity and passivity of, 27 ; eternity of, 28 ; and modern science, 26, 51 ; prime, 30 ; in relation to an efficient cause, 125-6 ; in relation to form, 30, 125-6 Matthew of Aquasparta : 14 Mc Laughlin, P. J .: XII McWilliams, James : 12-3 Mechanics, celestical : 18 Mechanism : 51 Merlan Philip : 2 Messenger, Ernest C.: 16 Messner, Reinhold : 48, 147 , 148 , 156 , 158–9, 172 Metaphysics : autonomy of, XII , XIII , 27–8, 179-80 ; of Duns Scotus, XIII, 177 , 184 ; and the existence of God, XII , 175, 179, 180 ; and the motion principle, 27 , 92-5 , 175-80 ; nature of, XII , 177 ; and physics XIII , 6, 8-9, 92 , 175 , 179 ; science of the transcendentals, 184 ; subject of, 175-80 Metaphysical principles : and ancient science, XII ; and experience, XIV, 94-5 ; their universality, 16, 93-5 Meyer, Hans : 6, 47, 52, 99 Mitterer, Albert : XIII , 8, 9 , 28-8, 35 , 44, 51 , 81 Mohammedan scholasticism : 6 Monotheism : 2 n. 7 Montefortino, Hieronymus de : 19 Moody, Ernest A.: 20, 105 , 125 Morphodynamism of St. Thomas : 51 n. 58 Motion: per accidens, 54 ; in an analagous sense, 100 ; of bodies, 3 , 8, 15 , 16, 53; compulsory, 2 , 3-5, 118 ; different senses of, 22 , 35–6, 103 , 170–1 , 174-5, 181 ; downward, 23, 56, 59-60, 114 , 121 ; free, 25, see motion, natural ; per partem, 54 ; in Platonic sense, 36, 103 ; primo et per se, 54, see motion, primary ; of projectile, 2 , 3-5, 118 ; violent, 2, 3-5, 118 Motion argument for the existence of God : XIV, 1 , 2, 6, 7 , 9, 14 , 15, 17, 18, see prima via ; and Aristotle, 2 ; evaluated , 20 , 168–70, 178–9 ; and Hervaeus Natalis, 1 ; interpreted by Scotus, 120-4 , 177–8 ; and medieval religion, 18-9 Motion, local : 8, 17 , 36 , 38 , 39, гo1 , 102 , 103 , 173 , 174 , 188 ; of animals, 5, 15, 52, 103 , 128-33 Motion, natural : 3 , 117–9 ; Aristotelian sense of, 35-6 ; of heavy things, see gravity ; Platonic sense of, 36 ; and Suarez, 23 Motion, primary : 53-62 ; of causality, 57-62 ; and a heavy body, 59-62 ; two senses of, 56-7 ; of the total object, 57-62 Motion principle : and Arabian philosophers, 5-6 ; and Aristotle, XIV, 2-4, 34, 47 ; assertive sense of, 30-1 , 182-4 , 187 ; and contemporary philosophers, 23-31 ; defenders of, 29-31 ; distinction of the mover and the moved, 2-3 , 5 , 53 , 168, 187 , 188 ; exclusively passive sense of, 3-5; exclusive sense of, 30-1 , 182 ; and experience, XIV, 94-5, 103 , 188–9 ;

204

Index

and Franciscans, 14-5, 17-8 ; history of, 1-31 ; and impetus theory, 4-5 ; and Jewish philosophers, 5-6 ; and living beings, 3, 5, 22, 23 , 52 ; its meaning for St. Thomas, 12-4, 35 ; its meaning for Scotus, 33-7; and metaphysics, XIII , 16, 175-80 ; modified, 30-1 ; opponents of, 24-9; physical vs. metaphy ., 3, 7-13 , 15 , 27-8 ; and proof from motion, see motion argument ; and science, XIII , 26-9 ; and Scotists, 19-20 ; translation of, 33-5 Motus: see motion Mover and moved, distinction of : 2 , 3 , 5 , 6, 7, 13 , 14; 15, 16, 24, 52-4, 56, 64-7, 82, 97 , 116, 125 , 128–9, 134, 162, 168, 187 Mover, primary and secondary : 116, 123-4 Mutable and immutable being : 184 , 185 , 188

Natural Philosophy : see Physics Natural place, theory of: 18 Natural theology : XI Nature, Aristotelian definition of: 118 Nature, dignity of: 45, 51 Nature vs. will : 165–6, see potency, acitve, natural. Nemo dat quod non habet : 81 Neo-scholastic philosophy : 24, 31 Newton, Isaac : 28, 106, 126, 127 Nihil agit in se : 172, 174 Nutrition and growth : 52 , 56, 89, 103 , 133-39, 189 ; defined, 134 ; and generation, 136 ; requiring an equivocal agent, 39

Ockham , William : 19-20, 148 Olivi, Peter : 107-9 Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur : see motion principle O'Neill, John :2 Opposition: argument from relative opposites, 95-7 ; four kinds of, 95 Order of the universe : 47-51 O'Reilly, P.: 29 Organic and inorganic beings : 56, 125 Owens, Joseph : 7, 9 , 33 , 89–90, 92 Pars secundum formam et materiam : 137-8 Passive potency : see potency, passive Passive principle : see principle, active and passive Passivity of matter doctrine : 92 , 188 Patient and agent : see agent and patient Paulus, John : 10-1 , 12 Pegis, Anton : 33 Perfection, unlimited : and self-motion, 45-6, 93-4 Phantasm : 150-1 , 153 , 161 , 162 Phantasy : 150 Philoponus, John : 4-5 Physics (Natural Philosophy) : XI , XIV, 2, 6, 7, 11 , 168, 175 , 176, 178 , 179

Index

205

Physics and metaphysics : see metaphysics and physics Physics, modern : XI , 26, 27 , 28, see science, modern Place, natural : 18 , 126 , 128 Plato : 1-2 Pluzanski, E.: 167–8, 170, 172, 173 Polytheism : 2 Pontelongus, Franciscus : 19 Possibility, logical : 68 Possible being : 68 Potency as defectible being, 69 ; elements of, 72 ; metaphorical, 71-2 ; metaphysical, 69–72 ; modal, 67-72 , 76 , 80 , 82 ; as pssible being, 68 ; primary and secondary, 113-4, 120-1 , 123 , 169 , 174 , 175 ; a relation, 71-2 ; in strict sense, 69-72 Potency and act : XIII , 8 , 14, 62-95 , 171 , 181 , 184 ; the argument from, XIII , 63 , 76–80, 93 , 152 , 181 ; disjunctive transcendentals, 70 ; incompatible, 53 , 69–70 , 76–7 , 181 ; law of, 10, 64, 76-7 , 80 , 170, 172 , 181-2 ; and motion, 8, 114, 170 ; a non-mutual relation between, 70-1 ; primary and secondary, 113-4, 120-1 , 123 , 174 , 175 ; priority, 71 Potency, active : 74-5 , 77-81 , 96, see principle active and passive ; determined, see potency, active, natural ; intellect, 16, 36, 146–59 , 188 ; natural, 46, 117, 161 , 165 , see cause, active, natural ; rational and nonrational, 117, 165, see cause, natural and free ; and self-motion, 38–9 , 41–2 ; in strict sense, 45 ; supernatural, 117 Potency, passive : 64, 74-5 , 77-81 , 96, sce principle, active and passive ; natural, 118-8 ; neutral, 118 ; and self-motion , 38-9, 41-2 ; supernatural, 117 ; violent, 118 Potency as a principle : 72 , see potency, active ; potency, passive ; principle, active and passive Potential and actual being ; see potency and act Premotion, physical, theory of: 23 Primary motion : see motion, primary Prima via of St. Thomas : XIV, 7-14 , 24 , 79 ; and Cajetan , 21-2 ; evauated, XIV, 180–8 ; and existential act, 9 , 10 , 89 ; and Hervaeus Natalis , 20-1 ; the manifestior via, 7-8 ; and modern opponents, 24-9 ; and Suarez, 22-3 Prime matter : 30 Prime Mover : 120, 123-4, see motion argument and prima via of St. Thomas Primum ens : 173 , 175 , 176, 179 Principle, active and passive : 12 , 13 , 14, 15 , 16 , 22 , 27 , 35 , 38 , 40-3, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51 , 52-3 , 81-92 , 152 , 181 , see agent and patient ; potency, active and passive Principles, metaphysical : see metaphysical principles Principle, passive : see potency, passive ; principle, active and passive Producer and produced : 96 Projectile motion : see motion, projectile Propinquity of agent and patient : 42-3 , 94 , 104, 152 Psychology, Scotistic : 172 Push-pull theory : 129-30

206

Index

Qualities, active and passive : 39, 115 Qualitative change : see change, qualitative Quantitative change : see change, quantitative, and nutrition and growth Quantity : not an active form, 39, 102 ; internal, 100-1 ; local, 100-2 , noncoeval accident, 98 Rationalism and Scotus : 188 Rationes seminales : see seminal reasons Receptive principle : see potency, passive, and principle, active and passive Relation : mutual and non-mutual, 70-1 ; real , 53, 97 Religion, medieval : 19 Rest in a place : III Revelation, divine : 9 Richard of Middleton : 14 Rickaby, Joseph : 28 Roche, Evan : XV, 179 Rolfes, Eugen : 2 Ruibal, Angel Amor : 85, 171 Salmon, D.: 12 Santeler, Josef : 8 , 12 , 15 , 20 , 21 , 32 , 36, 65, 85-6, 89, 90, 92 , 170 Schaefer, Odulphus : XV Saturn : 50, 84 Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius : 18 Scholastic philosophy : 26, 29 Science, medieval : 19 Science, modern : XI , XII , 25 , 26, 27, 28, 92 , see physics, modern Scotists and the motion principle : 19 Secondary cause : see cause, primary and secondary Self-motion : of an angel, 14, 17, 35, 51 ; and coeval accidents, 98 ; and the dignity of nature, 45 ; and equivocal causality, 22, 39–40, 139 ; and exexperience, 52, 53 , 103 , 189 ; and the intellect, 16, 146–59 ; and intuitive cognition, 147 ; and life , 52 ; and light and heavy things, 104–28 ; and the local motion of animals, 128-33 ; and non-coeval accidents, 103 ; and partial cause, 188 ; possibility of, 40 ; and the potency and act argument, 76-80, 170 ; and primary motion, 54–62 ; and a Prime Mover, 120-4 ; and the principle of causality, 43-5 ; and propinquity, 42-3 ; and qualitative change, 39, 139-46, 173 ; and quantitative change, 133-9, 146, 173 ; requiring an active and passive principle, 38-42 ; and a seed, 142-6 ; and selfmoving mover, 1 ; and sense appetition , 159 ; sphere of, 16-7, 37-40, 173, 188 ; starting point in proving God's existence, 184 ; and the stationary, 46 ; and Suarez , 22-3 ; and the universe, 47-9 ; and unlimited perfection, 45-6 ; of the will, see will and self-motion Seed : distinguished from seminal reason, 141 ; and self-motion, 142-6 Seminal reasons, theory of : 140-6 Sense appetition : 132, 159 Sesmat, A.: 47 Smeets, Uriel : XV

Index

207

Shapiro, Herman : 20 Siger de Brabant : 15 , 105 Simplicius : 4-5 Smith, Vincent Edward : 8, 9, 29-30, 33 Soft and hard things : 39, 114 Soul: faculties of, 15, 16, 98-9, 103 ; as mover of the body, 128-33 Species, intelligible : caused by the intellect and phantasm, 148 Star, free motion of : 25, 127 Stationary: and self-motion, 46 Steenberghen, Fernand Van : XII , 2, 11 , 12, 31 Stufler, Johann : 3 , 23 , 52, 108 Suarez, Francis : 22-3, 31 , 85, 184 Subject and attributes : 57 Substance and accident : 83 Substantial form : 37, see form, substantial and accidental Sun: not in potency to heat, 84 ; and production of offspring, 49, and selfmotion, 38, 48, 50 Suppositum : 78-9, 96 Tartaretus, Petrus : 19 Taylor, Alfred Edward : I Thomas Aquinas : XI , XII , 2, 6, 7—14 , 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31 , 33, 35, 44, 52, 54, 55, 63, 79, 81 , 98, 99, 104 , 107–8, 179-80, see prima via Thomistic philosophy : 24 Transcendentals : 70 : 184 Trinity, Holy : 96, 154 Ueberweg, Friederick : 7 Unity of the universe : 47-51 Vatican edition : XV, XVI Verbeke, Gerard : 3, 34 Virtual act or actuality : see act, virtual Virtus caeli: as an explanation of gravity, 107 Vivés, L., edition of Scotus : XVI , 2 n. 5 Volition : efficient cause of, 146 ; an increase in being, 88-9 ; and motion principle, 53 , 174, see will ; a non-coeval accident, 98 Vries, Joseph De : 10, 13-4 , 30-1 , 63 , 182, 184 Weisheipl, James A.: 4, 108 Whittaker, Sir Edmund : XI , XII , XIII , 24–5 , 28, 127 , 180 Will : an active potency, 15-6, 36, 41 , 159–66 , 181 , 182 , 185, 188 ; activity vs. passivity, 15, 16, 32–3 , 38 , 41 , 64–7 , 82 , 96, 160-4, 181 , 182 ; as appetite and as free , 64-7 ; capable of contrary acts, 161 ; equivocal cause, 43-4 ; and increase in being, 88 ; instrumentum seipsum movens, 18 ; and intuitive cognition , 91 ; moved by object, 160 ; not a natural cause, 164 ; vs. nature, 165 ; and new being, 88 ; as partial cause, 46, 91 , 92 , 163 , 183 ; power to create, 87-9 ; principal cause, 163 , 185 ; principle of contingent action, 164-5 ; a proper accident of the soul, 98-9 ; a secondary cause , 182 , 186 ; and self-motion, 15 , 16, 17 , 38 , 64-7, 76, 82,

208

Index

92, 159-62, 163-6 ; not the total cause of volition, 46, 91 , 162–3 , 185 ; and virtual act, 82 , 88 , 92 , 182, 183 Will, freedom of: and contingent action, 50, 165 ; and free cause, 46-7, 66 ; known from experience, 165-6 ; self-determination, 163 , 165, 166 ; and self-motion, 17, 46, 161 William of Ware : 17-9

Woestyne, Van de : 32, 170-1 Wolter, Allan B.: XIII , 14, 42 , 51 , 67, 68 , 69, 70, 71 , 86, 87 , 88, 89, 90, 99, 117, 179, 184 Wood and burning : 94 Wulf, Maurice De : 16, 17, 93, 96, 129, 162

MISSIOLOGY SERIES

1. Imperial Government and Catholic Missions in China During the Years 1784-1785. By Bernward H. Willeke O. F. M. , Ph. D. 1948. 2. The Negotiations Between Ch'i- Ying and Lagrené 1844-1846. By Angelus Grosse-Aschhoff, O. F. M., Ph. D. 1950.

THEOLOGY SERIES

1. The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham. By Gabriel Buescher O. F. M., S. T. D. 1950 (exhausted). 2. De Corredemptione Beatae Virginis Mariae. By Juniper Carol , O.F.M. S. T. D. 1950. 3. The First-Gospel. Genesis 3 : 15. By Dominic J. Unger O. F. M. Cap . , S. T. L., S. S. L. 1954. 4. Transiency and Permanence. The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure, by G. H. Tavard , A. A. 1954. 5. The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-middle Scholastic Period . By Kilian F. Lynch, O. F. M. , S. T. D. Vol. I : Texts. 1957.

TEXT SERIES

1. Walter Burleigh. De Puritate Artis Logicae. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. , Ph. D. 1951 (exhausted). 2. William Ockham. Summa Logicae (Pars Prima and Pars Secunda et Tertiae Prima) . Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1951 , 1954 and 1962. 3. Peter Aureoli. Scriptum super primum sententiarum. Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M. , ST.D. , D.Litt.et Hist . Orient., L. G. Vol . I : Prologue-Dist . I , 1953 ; Vol . II : Dist . II- VIII , 1956. 4. Guidonis de Orchellis Tractatus de Sacramentis ex eius Summa de Sacramentis et Officiis Ecclesiae editus studio et cura PP. Damiani et Odulphi Van den Eynde, O. F. M. , 1953. 5. Henry of Ghent. Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum . (Reprint of the 1520 Edition) . Vol. I and II . 1953. 6. St. John Damascene. Dialectica, Version of Robert Grosseteste . Edited by Owen A. Colligan , O. F. M. , M. A. 1953. 7. Gregorii Ariminensis, O. E. S. A. Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum. (Reprint of the 1522 Edition .) 1955.

8. St. John Damascene. De Fide orthodoxa, Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus. Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M. , S. T. D. , D. Litt. et Hist. Orient. 1955. 9. Walter Burleigh. De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior . With a Revised Edition of the Tractatus Brevior. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. , Ph . D. 1955. 10. Henrici de Werla O. F. M. Opera omnia, Vol . I : Tractatus de immaculata conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis. Edited by Sophronius Clasen , O. F. M. , S. T. D. , Ph . D. 1955. 11. Petrus Thomae O. F. M. , Quodlibet. Edited by Sister M. Rachel Hooper, O. S. F., Ph. D. and Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M. , S. T. D. , D. Litt. et Hist. Orient . , L. G. 1957. 12. John de la Rochelle, Eleven Marian Sermons. Edited by Kilian F.Lynch , O. F. M. , S. T. D. 1961 . 13. Paul of Pergula. Logica and Tractatus de sensu composito et diviso. Edited by Sister Mary Anthony Brown , O. S. F. , Ph. D. 1961 . 14. William Ockham . Logicae tractatus minor and Elementarium Logicae . Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. , Ph. D. and Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M. , S. T. D. , D. Litt. et Hist. Orient. (At press) .

WORKS OF SAINT BONAVENTURE

1. De reductione artium ad theologiam. A Commentary with an Introduction and Translation by Sr. Emma Thérèse Healy, S. S. J 1955. 2. Itinerarium mentis in Deum. With an Introduction, Translation and Commentary by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M., Ph. D. 1956.

PRINTED BY FERDINAND SCHUNINGH AT PADERBORN, GERMANT