John Buridan, Quaestiones Super Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis: Secundum Ultimam Lecturam (1-2) (History of Science and Medicine Library / Medieval and Early Modern Science, 50/25) 9004131655, 9789004131651

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John Buridan, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam)

History of Science and Medicine Library volume 50

Medieval and Early Modern Science Editors J.M.M.H. Thijssen (Radboud University) C.H. Lü thy (Radboud University) P.J.J.M. Bakker (Radboud University)

Editorial Consultants Joël Biard (University of Tours) Simo Knuuttila (University of Helsinki) Jü rgen Renn (Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science) Theo Verbeek (University of Utrecht)

volume 25

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mems

John Buridan, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) Libri I–II

Edited by

Michiel Streijger Paul J.J.M. Bakker Introduction by

Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen A guide to the text by

Edith D. Sylla

leiden | boston

Front cover illustration: manuscript Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 1771, f. 107ra (detail) Back cover illustration: manuscript Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 1771, f. 142vb (detail) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Buridan, Jean, 1300-1358, author. Quaestiones super octo libros physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) libri I-II / John Buridan ; edited by Michiel Streijger, Paul J.J.M. Bakker ; introduction by Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen ; a guide to the text by Edith D. Sylla. pages cm – (History of science and medicine library ; volume 50. Medieval and early modern science ; volume 25) ISBN 978-90-04-13165-1 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-90-04-26235-5 (e-book) 1. Aristotle. Physics–Commentaries. I. Streijger, Michiel, 1974- II. Bakker, Paul J. J. M. III. Sylla, Edith Dudley. IV. Title. V. Series: History of science and medicine library ; v. 50. VI. Series: History of science and medicine library. Medieval and early modern science ; volume 25. Q151.A73B975 2015 530–dc23 2015010899

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1567-8393 isbn 978-90-04-13165-1 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-26235-5 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

To the memory of John E. Murdoch (1927–2010)

∵

Contents Preface

xi Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen

Introduction xiii Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen Guide to the Text xliii Edith D. Sylla 1 Introduction xliii 1.1 The Sources of Buridan’s Question Statements lxvii 1.2 Authors of Questions on Books I and II of the Physics Related to Buridan’s Questions lxx 2 The Questions on Book I lxxvii 2.1 Questions I.1–3 lxxvii 2.2 Physics, I, 1: Questions I.4–I.7 lxxxvi 2.3 Physics, I, 2: Questions I.8–I.10 c 2.4 Physics, I, 4: Questions I.11–I.13 cxiii 2.5 Physics, I, 4–6: Questions I.14–16 cxvi 2.6 Questions I.17–I.19 cxx 2.7 Physics, I, 9: Questions I.20–I.24 cxxviii 3 The Questions on Book II cxxxvii 3.1 Preliminaries and Physics, II, 1: Questions II.1–II.4 cxxxviii 3.2 Question II.5 cliii 3.3 Physics, II, 2: Question II.6 clvi 3.4 Physics, II, 3: Questions II.7–II.8 clxii 3.5 Physics, II, 4–6: Questions II.9–II.12 clxvii 3.6 Question II.13 clxxiv Bibliography

clxxvi

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Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) Libri I–II Conspectus siglorum et compendiorum

2

Liber I Prologus

3

Tabula quaestionum primi libri Physicorum

4

I.1. Utrum scientia naturalis sit scientia de omnibus rebus 8 I.2. Utrum totalis scientiae naturalis debeat assignari subiectum unum proprium 14 I.3. Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis vel quid aliud 22 I.4. Utrum in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingat alia scire et intelligere, scilicet principiata, causata et elementata 30 I.5. Utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oporteat scire omnes causas eius 48 I.6. Utrum sint eadem notiora nobis et naturae 55 I.7. Utrum universalia sint nobis notiora singularibus

59

I.8. Utrum omnis res extensive et situaliter habens partem extra partem sit magnitudo 79 I.9. Utrum totum sit suae partes

93

I.10. Utrum Socrates sit hodie idem quod ipse fuit heri, posito quod hodie additum est sibi aliquid ex nutrimento et conversum in eius substantiam, vel posito quod hodie est aliqua pars ab eo remota, ut si sibi amputata est manus 107

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I.11. Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum

112

I.12. Utrum omnia entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum I.13. Utrum entia naturalia determinata sint ad minimum

118

137

I.14. Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sint contraria 143 I.15. Utrum necesse sit omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito

151

I.16. Utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium, non plura nec pauciora 161 I.17. Utrum generatio substantialis sit forma substantialis vel materia vel compositum vel aliquod accidens eis additum 169 I.18. Utrum generare sit generans vel generatio vel quid aliud

174

I.19. Utrum illud quod in generatione substantiali generatur sit materia vel forma vel compositum 196 I.20. Utrum materia prima sit ens

201

I.21. Utrum forma, antequam generetur, habeat aliquod esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia 210 I.22. Utrum materia sit potentia ad formam generandam I.23. Utrum privatio sit materia privata I.24. Utrum materia appetat formam

217

225 231

Liber II Tabula quaestionum secundi libri Physicorum

241

II.1. Utrum res artificiales sint distinctae a rebus naturalibus

243

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II.2. Utrum ista differentia quam assignat Aristoteles inter naturalia et artificialia sit conveniens, scilicet quod naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus et status, artificialia autem inquantum artificialia nullum habent impetum suae mutationis innatum 249 II.3. Utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata 256 II.4. Utrum definitio naturae sit bona qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens’ 264 II.5. Utrum in istis substantiis materialibus formae substantiales sint principaliter activae suorum motuum et suarum operationum vel magis qualitativae dispositiones illarum substantiarum 271 II.6. Utrum naturalis differat a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus sine motu 284 II.7. Utrum finis sit causa

294

II.8. Utrum pater sit causa filii

302

II.9. Utrum definitio fortunae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens secundum propositum extra semper et frequenter eorum quae propter hoc sunt’ 308 II.10. Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes 316 II.11. Utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet vel solum in contingentibus raro vel ut in paucioribus 322 II.12. Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat monstrum

330

II.13. Utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex fine vel ex materia 337 Index locorum 353 Index codicum manu scriptorum Index nominum 360

358

Preface Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen

This critical edition of John Buridan’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) has had a long period of gestation that deserves some explanation. Although I did not quite realize it at the time, a first start was made in my dissertation, which appeared in 1988. There I presented in outline the textual tradition of Buridan’s Quaestiones on the Physics as a preparation for my edition of the questions on the infinite (III.14–19).1 In the years 1997–2003, I received a generous grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, project 200-22-295) for a research program that studied the commentary tradition of Aristotle’s Physics, 1250– 1700. It included, among other things, the preparation of an edition of Buridan’s Quaestiones on the Physics (secundum ultimam lecturam). Dirk-Jan Dekker, Olaf Pluta and I took up the study of the manuscript tradition and text transmission, and prepared preliminary editions of parts of the text. Olaf Pluta finished a preliminary edition of Books I and II, based on two manuscripts, in 2002. In the same year, Michiel Streijger completed a first edition of Book VI as part of his MA thesis. Dirk-Jan Dekker edited the questions on time (IV.12–16) as part of his Ph.D. dissertation, which he defended in 2003.2 Due to personal reasons and career choices, I had to abandon further work on the edition of Buridan’s text. In 2011, however, after a pause of eight years, Paul Bakker and Michiel Streijger took the courageous and admirable decision to resume work on the material that was available from these previous studies. I am extremely grateful that they were willing to adopt this project and make Buridan’s text accessible to the scholarly community, the more so since, apart from a short-term research grant for Michiel from Radboud University (Nijmegen), the project did not receive

1 J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Johannes Buridanus over het oneindige. Een onderzoek naar zijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie, 2 vols, Ph.D. dissertation, Radboud University, Nijmegen 1988. A few years later, the results of this investigation into the textual tradition were also made available in J.M.M.H. Thijssen, John Buridan’s Tractatus de infinito. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, Liber III, quaestiones 14–19, Nijmegen 1991 (Artistarium. Supplementa, 6). 2 D.-J. Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus († ca. 1360). Een historisch-wijsgerige studie met editie van Buridanus’ Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam), IV, 12–16, Ph.D. dissertation, Radboud University, Nijmegen 2003.

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any extra funding. Paul and Michiel basically had to work on Buridan’s text in the margins of their regular academic occupations. Relying on the results of the research into the textual tradition conducted many years ago by Dirk-Jan, Olaf, and myself, they produced a completely new edition of books I and II of Buridan’s text, which they based on a full transcription and collation of four witnesses, and where necessary, seven more. In the Introduction, I provide a survey of our current state of knowledge of the textual tradition of the ultima lectura of Buridan’s Quaestiones on the Physics and of the main results of the philological studies on which the present edition is founded. I take full responsibility for whatever flaws the reader may find in the method that was followed to establish this edition. In 2010–2011 Edith Sylla became attached to the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science at Radboud University as a visiting professor of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. The ensuing talks at the Center led to the idea to have Buridan’s edition accompanied by a Guide to the text. I am extremely grateful that Edith has made time to write this historical and philosophical guide, which will be of great help in understanding Buridan’s text and in putting it into its intellectual context. The project received continuous support and friendly encouragement from colleagues at the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science at Radboud University and at the Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften (München), for which I offer many thanks. I am also grateful to many colleagues and friends who, over the years, have provided useful help with the project in one version or another: Henk Braakhuis, Stephen Brown, Stefano Caroti, Onno Kneepkens, Christoph Lüthy, and the (former) student-assistants, now on their way to becoming scholars in their own right, Corien Bary, Sander de Boer, Davide Cellamare, Sara Eusebi, and Lyke de Vries. A special salute goes to Julian Deahl, who, back in 1997, was willing to accept the project for publication at Brill and never lost faith, nor patience. A final word of thank goes to Johannes Rustenburg, Ivo Geradts, and Laurie Meijers, of TAT Zetwerk, and to Michiel Thijssen and Sabine Steenbeek, of Brill, for the great care they have taken of this publication. This volume is dedicated to the memory of John E. Murdoch, teacher, colleague, and friend.

Introduction Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen

1

John Buridan’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics

John Buridan (d. ca. 1360) is the author of an expositio and of quaestiones on Aristotle’s Physics, both of which went through multiple redactions.1 There are possibly two different versions of Buridan’s expositio of the Physics, but in what way they differ and how they relate to his quaestiones still needs to be investigated.2 At least two different easily identifiable collections of quaestiones are attributed to John Buridan in the manuscripts.3 One of these has survived in the following six manuscripts: 1. Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek, cod. 2o 342a, ff. 2ra–136vb4 2. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. CA F. 298, ff. 1v–45r 3. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 635, ff. 1a–170a (q I.8 [incomplete] up to q. VIII.14) 4. Toulouse, Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne, cod. 6, ff. 35rb– 141rb (q. II.5 up to q. VIII.15) 5. Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Chigi lat. E.VI.199, ff. 1ra–99vb 1 For Buridan’s life and works, see B. Michael, Johannes Buridan. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters, 2 vols, Ph.D. dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 1985. Vol. 1 contains a detailed overview of Buridan’s academic career. Vol. 2 contains a survey of Buridan’s works and of the manuscripts and editions in which they have been preserved (for Buridan’s commentaries [expositiones and quaestiones] on Aristotle’s Physics, see 2, 560–616). An updated short biography and list of publications is provided in J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘Buridan. John (Jean),’ in: N. Koertge (ed.), New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Detroit 2008, 1: 446–448. 2 A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie (Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, 2), Roma 1968 (Storia e letteratura, 37), 203, has suggested that there are two different redactions of Buridan’s expositio, and has linked each one of them to a different collection of quaestiones. However, her thesis may need to be reconsidered. See also J.M.M.H. Thijssen, John Buridan’s Tractatus de infinito. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, Liber III, quaestiones 14–19, Nijmegen 1991 (Artistarium. Supplementa, 6), xix–xx. 3 See Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 574–609. 4 Cf. W. Gehrt, Die Handschriften der Staats- und Stadtbibliothek Augsburg: 2o Cod. 251–400e, Wiesbaden 1989 (Handschriftenkataloge der Staats- und Stadtbibliothek Augsburg, 4), 148– 149.

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6. Zaragoza, Biblioteca Capitular de la Seo, cod. 15–61, ff. 1r–201v (q I.1 up to q. II.8) The Toulouse, Vatican and Zaragoza manuscripts label this collection as ‘tertium opus.’ This has generally been taken as a reference to Buridan’s tertia lectura, that is, his third redaction or series of lectures on the Physics.5 The other collection, which is the one edited in the present volume, has survived in thirty-two manuscripts and one printed edition published in Paris in 1509. In the manuscript witnesses, this collection is generally referred to as the ‘ultima lectura,’ the ‘ultimate lecture,’ with the overtones of both being the last and the best. The texts of both collections of quaestiones are clearly different. One of the striking variances is that in the earlier collection, Buridan discusses projectile motion and the famous impetus theory in Book VII, whereas in the ultima lectura, this topic has been moved to Book VIII. Previous research has demonstrated that in cases of thematic overlap, the collection of questions labeled the ultima lectura provides a more developed and sophisticated argumentation than the other collection. This may be due to the fact that this collection seems to be an ordinatio, i.e. a version that was authorized by Buridan himself, whereas the other collection probably is a reportatio, or listener’s account.6 There seem to be few, if any, doctrinal discrepancies.7 5 Cf. manuscript Toulouse, 6, f. 141rb: ‘Expliciunt questiones brjdannj magistri tercij operis super 8o Libros phisicorum’ and f. 142rb: ‘Explicit tabula questionum super octo libros phizicorum et sunt de tercio opere brjdannj;’ manuscript Chigi lat. E.VI.199, f. 99vb: ‘Expliciunt questiones reuerendi Magistri bridanj de 3o opere super libros phisicorum;’ and manuscript Zaragoza, 15–61, f. 201v: ‘Expliciunt questiones libri physicorum de 3o opere ordinate per magistrum johannem bridan.’ The two Erfurt and Cracow manuscripts do not bear any such indication. Manuscript Zaragoza, 15–61 contains a mixed version of Buridan’s Physics: some questions are identical with the ‘tertium opus’ (or tertia lectura), others with the ultima lectura edited in the present volume. For details, see below, XXXIII. Note that manuscript Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, cod. G.IV.10, f. 1r, also gives the indication ‘tercii operis,’ even though this manuscript contains a copy of Buridan’s other set of quaestiones (the ultima lectura) (see below, XXVIII). 6 That the ultima lectura is an ordinatio can be inferred from its preface: ‘Bonum, sicut habetur primo Ethicorum, quanto est multis communius, tanto divinius est et melius. Propter quod multorum de discipulis seu scholaribus meis precibus inclinatus ego aliqua scribere praesumpsi de difficultatibus libri Physicorum Aristotelis et hanc illis scripturam communicare, quia non possunt, ut dicunt, multa in scholis audita sine aliquo scripturae adiutorio memoriae commendare.’ See also Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, 367–368. Two of the manuscripts of the ultima lectura explicitly use the term ‘ordinata,’ namely Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 14723 and Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 2163 (see below, XXVII and XXVIII–XXIX). 7 The titles of the quaestiones of the ultima lectura are provided in J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘The Short

introduction

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If the indications in the manuscripts indeed mean that we have Buridan’s tertia lectura as well as his last lecture, the question naturally arises what happened to the previous two series of lectures that Buridan supposedly gave on the Physics. Bernd Michael has suggested that the following two manuscripts contain parts of either the first or second series of lectures or redactions: 1. Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, cod. S.VIII.5, ff. 5ra–74vb 2. Toulouse, Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne, cod. 6, ff. 2ra– 35rb8 Both manuscripts preserve a rather odd collection of quaestiones explicitly attributed to John Buridan, but neither one is identical to the tertia lectura or to the ultima lectura. Up to question VII.3, the Cesena manuscript presents a collection of quaestiones which, in their titles and their argumentation, show similarity with both authentic collections by Buridan, i.e. the tertia and ultima. Also the doctrinal positions seem to be those of Buridan. From question VII.4 up to the end of Book VIII, however, the collection continues with other quaestiones, that in other manuscripts are attributed to Albert of Saxony.9

Redaction of John Buridan’s Questions on the Physics and their Relation to the Questions on the Physics Attributed to Marsilius of Inghen,’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 52 (1985), 237–266, at 240–245. Those of the tertia lectura can be found in M. Markowski, ‘Les Quaestiones super I–VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis de Nicolas Oresme retrouvées?,’ Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 26 (1982), 19–41, at 37–41. Markowski wrongly attributed this collection of quaestiones to Nicole Oresme. See also B. Patar, La Physique de Bruges de Buridan et le Traité du Ciel d’ Albert de Saxe, Longueuil 2001, 2, 350– 385, for a comparison of the titles of both versions. With respect to the impetus theory, the tertia lectura and ultima lectura are compared in Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, 370–378. J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Johannes Buridanus over het oneindige. Een onderzoek naar zijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie, Ph.D. dissertation, Radboud University, Nijmegen 1988, 1, 7–71, compares both versions with respect to the theory of the infinite. 8 See Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 567–571 (Cesena) and 2: 572–573 (Toulouse). 9 See Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 571 and 603, and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Oresme, and a Fourteenth-Century Collection of Quaestiones on the Physics and on De generatione et corruptione,’ Vivarium, 24 (1986), 70–82, esp. 70–72. The latter article wrongly claimed that Albert of Saxony is the author of the entire text in the Cesena manuscript. The Cesena manuscript was also used for the edition of Books VII and VIII of Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones on the Physics. See [Albert of Saxony], Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam ad Albertum de Saxonia attributae, ed. B. Patar, 3 vols, Louvain-la-Neuve, Leuven 1999 (Philosophes médiévaux, 39–41).

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The text of the Toulouse manuscript coincides with that of the Cesena manuscript up to question II.4. From question II.5, its text is identical to that of Buridan’s tertia lectura and is also presented as such (see above). At this stage, it is not clear whether the text partially preserved in the Cesena and the Toulouse manuscripts really is a fragment of Buridan’s first or second course of lectures.10 Since the manuscripts date from 1405 and 1373, respectively, the texts might also be fairly late reworkings of Buridan’s material, complemented by material from other commentaries.11 The choice of the complementary parts has been well-made (Albert of Saxony, and Buridan’s tertia lectura, respectively), for they fit the doctrinal orientation of the reworked part. More research is needed, however, to determine the nature of the sets of quaestiones preserved in the Cesena and Toulouse manuscripts. A number of years ago, Benoît Patar argued that Buridan’s first course of lectures on the Physics should be identified with an anonymous collection of quaestiones preserved in manuscript Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, cod. 477, ff. 60va–163vb. Moreover, he renumbered Buridan’s lectures.12 According to Patar, the ultima lectura actually represents Buridan’s third series of lectures, whereas the tertia lectura in his renumbering has become the secunda lectura. Patar’s thesis, however, goes against the manuscript evidence. First, as mentioned above, the Toulouse, Vatican and Zaragoza manuscripts explicitly designate one specific set of quaestiones as the tertia lectura whereas none of the known manuscript contains any indication of a secunda or a prima lectura. Second, and more importantly, the anonymous text in the Brugge manuscript is in numerous other manuscripts explicitly attributed to Albert of Saxony, but never to John Buridan. So, there is no compelling reason to introduce John Buridan as the author of the anonymous text in manuscript Brugge 477, and identify it as his prima lectura.13

10 11 12 13

This thesis is suggested by Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 602–604. Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 1: 209*–211*, has also suggested that the partial text in the Cesena manuscript has been derived from Buridan’s text. Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 1: 209*–211*. Unfortunately, Patar at times choses to selectively ignore the manuscript evidence. See his baffling statement in Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 1: 399*: ‘Il faut donc affirmer dès maintenant avec force que la Physique du manuscrit 477 n’est pas et ne peut pas être d’Albert de Saxe, quand bien même tous les colophons de tous les manuscrits et de tous les incunables de la planète le lui attribueraient. Il faut au contraire soutenir qu’il s’agit de la première oeuvre connue que Buridan a consacré à la Physique.’ See also J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘Prolegomena to a Study of John Buridan’s Physics,’ American

introduction

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The manuscripts provide quite a number of clues which suggest that the ultima lectura was written in the 50s of the fourteenth century. Edmond Faral was the first to conjecture that Buridan’s quaestiones on the Physics were written before 1357. He drew attention to a passage in Buridan’s commentary on the Meteora that contains a reference to the quaestiones on the Physics: ‘de hoc enim dixi in tertio Physicorum inquirendo utrum sit corpus sensibile actu infinitum …’14 Buridan’s commentary on the Meteora was probably written around 1357, because it refers to a historical event that took place in Paris in 1356. Yet it is not clear which version of Buridan’s Physics is concerned here: in principle, the reference to ‘the third Book of the Physics’ could either be to the tertia or to the ultima lectura. With respect to the dating of the tertia lectura, manuscript Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. CA F. 298 provides us with important information. This copy is dated on 1352; if this date is correct, it gives us the terminus ante quem for the tertia lectura: 1352.15 When we further take into account some additional evidence from the dating of manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Urb. lat. 1489, which preserves a copy of one of Buridan’s expositiones on the Physics, we can even propose an earlier date for the tertia lectura. According to Anneliese Maier, this particular expositio has to be linked to the collection of quaestiones that constitute Buridan’s tertia lectura. The expositio in the Vatican manuscript is dated around 1350. If we accept Maier’s view of the link between the expositio and the tertia lectura, we can conclude that the tertia lecture was written around 1350.16 The dating of the tertia lectura and the reference in Buridan’s Meteora, mentioned by Faral, would bring the origin of the ultima lectura to sometime between 1350 and 1357. This dating finds confirmation in evidence from other mansucripts. Two manuscripts of Buridan’s ultima lectura mention 1357: (1) the colophon of manuscript Zaragoza, Biblioteca Capitular de la Seo, cod. 15–61 (‘Expliciunt questiones libri phisicorum de 3o opere ordinate per magistrum johannem Buridan anno domini mocccolvijo’) and the title index of book I in manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat.

14 15 16

Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 79 (2005), 493–502, for a more extensive criticism of Patar’s conjecture. E. Faral, Jean Buridan. Maître ès arts de l’ Université de Paris, Paris 1950, 80. The date of Buridan’s commentary on the Meteora is mentioned on p. 87. See Faral, Jean Buridan, 36, and Markowski, ‘Les Quaestiones,’ 33. The dating of the expositio is discussed in Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, 368–369. The link between this expositio and the quaestiones of the tertia lectura is discussed in Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, 203.

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2163 (‘Tabula questionum primi libri physicorum ordinata a magistro Iohanne byridano, que quidem tabula inchoata fuit in festo pentecostes Anno dominj Mocccolvijo’).17 This dating can be further narrowed down, by taking into account the findings of a study concerning the doctrinal relationship between Buridan’s and Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones on the Physics. The conclusion of this study, which was based on textual and doctrinal comparisons, is that Albert’s Quaestiones on the Physics are chronologically located between Buridan’s tertia lectura and his ultima lectura.18 When writing his Quaestiones, Albert had no access to Buridan’s ultima lectura. Buridan, on the other hand, knew Albert’s text, and responded to it in his ultima lectura. Since Albert incepted in the summer of 1351, his magisterial Quaestiones on the Physics are to be dated after 1351.19 On the basis of this independent evidence, it seems plausible to conclude that Buridan wrote his ultima lectura between 1352 and 1357. Yet, there still are a few puzzles surrounding the origin of Buridan’s Quaestiones on the Physics which can only be briefly mentioned here. It was, indeed, common practice for Buridan to rewrite his works several times, expanding, reducing or otherwise changing the contents. The origin of the changes might be due to a development of the author’s thought, or to external factors, such as the request of his students. Like most commentaries, Buridan’s Quaestiones too were produced for educational purposes. They are the material embodiment of oral teaching. But how did this transition from an oral to a written

17

18

19

For the Zaragoza manuscript, see below, XXXIII. Concerning manuscript Vat. lat. 2163, note that according to Anneliese Maier ‘1357’ (Mocccolvijo) is a miswriting for ‘1377’ (Mocccolxxvijo), the year mentioned in the colophon of the same manuscript: ‘Expliciunt questiones libri physicorum ab excellentissimo Johanne Byridano Artista edite parysius … Anno dominj Millesimo ccco Septuagesimo septimo Quinto die mensis Novembris finite sunt In Studio paduensi.’ See below, XXIX. See J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘The Buridan School Reassessed. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony,’ Vivarium, 42 (2004), 18–42. J. Sarnowsky, Die Aristotelisch-Scholastische Theorie der Bewegung. Studien zum Kommentar Alberts von Sachsen zur Physik des Aristoteles, Münster 1989 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, n. F., 32), 50, already suggested this order, but since he was focusing on the chronology of Albert of Saxony’s writings, he did not draw out the full implications of this revised chronology for the connection between Buridan and Albert. Cf. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. CA F. 345, which was written in 1360 in Cologne. Its incipit reads as follows: ‘Quoniam dicit Philosophus “a communibus et prioribus prius est inchoandum,” ideo propter informationem inbuicionemque iuvenum scolarium in isto primo libro tanquam pro principio meo volo istam questionem disputare: Utrum scientia …’ See Sarnowsky, Die Aristotelisch-Scholastische Theorie der Bewegung, 18–19, and 49.

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form come about?20 Many commentaries started as so-called reportationes, that is, listener’s notes. In that case, the author almost immediately lost control over his work and the notion of authorial intention becomes fuzzy. But even if one is dealing with a version of a commentary that received the author’s approval, a so-called ordinatio, its reproduction and distribution are still ill understood. Why and when did Buridan, for instance, decide to authenticate his commentary and make it available for a larger audience? Was he, indeed, spurred by the requests of his students, as the preface to the ultima lectura suggests? Or is this a commonplace? And if the ultima lectura was initially written as an aid for students, how did previous generations of students cope with his lectures, given the late date of his Quaestiones? And how did they circulate in the centers of learning? We only know of a few commentaries that went into the system of the university book trade, and thus also safeguarded the reliability of the copies that were distributed (the so-called pecia system). But how was, for instance, Buridan’s commentary multiplied and distributed in Paris? All extant copies are posthumous. Were his lectures of such high quality that they continued to be used for teaching and study, even after the master’s death? And what status should we attribute to the copies of the Quaestiones that circulated elsewhere, for example at the universities of Vienna, Cracow and Prague, where Buridan never taught, and that were disseminated because of curricular requirements there? Only this last question will be taken up below, when discussing the manuscript tradition.

2

Description of the Manuscripts and the Edition of 1509

In a number of manuscripts, the text of Buridan’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) is preceded by a brief preface and each book is preceded by an index of the titles of the quaestiones. In general, the manuscripts have the following incipit and explicit (or a variant thereof):21

20

21

See C. Flüeler, ‘From Oral to Written Commentaries: John Buridan’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,’ in: S. Ebbesen & R.L. Friedman (eds), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy,’ January 10–13, 1996, København 1999 (Historisk-filosofiske meddelelser, 77), 497–521, for a discussion of a similar problem concerning Buridan’s Metaphysics. See also Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 578–580.

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Prooemium: Bonum, sicut habetur primo Ethicorum, quanto est multis communius, tanto divinius est et melius. Propter quod multorum de discipulis seu scholaribus meis precibus inclinatus ego aliqua scribere praesumpsi de difficultatibus libri Physicorum Aristotelis et hanc illis scripturam communicare, quia non possunt, ut dicunt, multa in scholis audita sine aliquo scripturae adiutorio memoriae commendare. Super quibus ego peto et supplico de omissis et minus bene dictis obtinere veniam, de inventis autem, si convenientia aliqua fuerint, multas habere grates. Incipit: Circa principium primi libri Physicorum quaeritur primo quaestio talis, utrum scientia naturalis sit scientia de omnibus rebus. Et arguitur primo quod non quia: nulla scientia est de casualibus et fortuitis … Explicit: … Simul enim Deus simpliciter sine compositione aliqua est unus et trinus, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen. The ultima lectura has survived in the following thirty-two manuscripts:22

22

Besides the manuscripts listed below, Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 581–582, 586–587, and 591, mentions three other manuscript witnesses of Buridan’s ultima lectura: (1) Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. CA F. 357, ff. 1r–95v; (2) Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 15888, ff. 86ra–89va; and (3) Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5408, ff. 1r–112v. However, these manuscripts do not contain Buridan’s text. (1) The Erfurt manuscript contains the first four books of the same (anonymous) commentary on the Physics as conserved in Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 743, 1r–98v, and in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5437, ff. 68ra–141ra. This work has been ascribed to Marsilius of Inghen. See M. Markowski, ‘Katalog dzieł Marsyliusza z Inghen z ewidencjcą rękopisów,’ Studia Mediewistyczne, 25 (1988), 39–132, at 90–95. For a discussion of its authenticity, see Thijssen, ‘The Short Redaction,’ 253–262, and Th. Dewender, ‘Einige Bemerkungen zur Authentizität der Physikkommentare, die Marsilius von Inghen zugeschrieben werden,’ in: S. Wielgus (ed.), Marsilius von Inghen, Werk und Wirkung. Akten des Zweiten Internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, Lublin 1993, 245– 269, at 255–256. (2) The Paris manuscript contains some excerpts of conclusions from Buridan’s ultima lectura (books I, II, III, IV and VIII). See Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 586, and D.-J. Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus († ca. 1360). Een historischwijsgerige studie met editie van Buridanus’ Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam), IV, 12–16, Ph.D. dissertation, Radboud University, Nijmegen 2003, 102, n. 49. (3) The Vienna manuscript contains a copy of Buridan’s Quaestiones on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AL00169730) (including recent bibliography).

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1.

Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—Preußischer Kulturbesitz, cod. lat. fol. 852, ff. 136ra–143vb [= Be]23 Paper and a few leaves of parchment; 14th century; mm. 295 × 205. This manuscript contains several philosophical and theological texts, and only a fragment of Buridan’s text, which begins and ends abruptly (question I.2 to question I.8). More than 100ff. have been removed. Possibly, the provenance of this codex is the Augustinian convent at Erfurt. There is no colophon.

2.

Bratislava, Archív mesta Bratislavy, cod. E.L.5, ff. 3ra–193vb [= Br]24 Paper; second half of the 14th century (finished on July, 7, 1398); mm. 300×210. The manuscript opens with the preface and the title index of Book I. The latter is repeated at the end of the text (ff. 194ra–195ra), with that of the other books. There are no title indexes before or after the individual books. Owners: the codex was copied by the Polish student Georgius Tielesch de Posonio in Vienna (f. 195v) and later came into the possession of Duke Berthold of Radiawn (?). Colophon: Expliciunt questiones physicorum scripte Wienne et finite proxima die domenica ante festum sancte Margaretae anno Domini moccco98o (f. 193v).

3.

Buenos Aires, Biblioteca Nacional, cod. 342R, ff. 1ra–127va [= J]25 Paper; probably beginning of the 15th century; mm 290 × 220. The codex contains other works by Buridan. The text starts with the title index of Book I, followed by the preface. Each book is preceded by a title index. Book V breaks off in q. 9 and lacks q. 10. There is no colophon.

4.

Carpentras, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine, cod. 293 (L. 289), ff. 1–168 [= A]26 Paper; 14th century (1386); mm. 297×220. The text starts with the preface, followed by the title index of Book I. Each book is preceded by a

23 24

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 580–581. Cf. Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 106–107, and J. Sopko, Stredoveké latinské kódexy v Slovenských Knižniciach (Codices latini medii aevi bibliothecarum Slovaciae), Matica Slovenská 1981 (Stredoveké kódexy slovenskej proveniencie, 1), 54–56 (nr. 11). An extensive description of this manuscript is provided in D.A. Di Liscia, ‘“El libro encadenado:” Eine Sammelhandschrift naturphilosophischer Schriften von Jean Buridan (Ms. Buenos Aires, Biblioteca Nacional 342R),’ Vivarium, 39 (2001), 52–86, at 56–62. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 581. See also M. Duhamel, Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France. Départements, 34: Carpentras, 1, Paris 1901,

25

26

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title index. This codex was probably written in Southern France and commissioned by master Johannes Albonis. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones physicorum Buridani de ultima lectura. Deo gratias. (In another hand:) Quas fecit scribi magister Iohannes Albonis M … (?) de Sancto Paulo, anno Domini mocccolxxxvio et in mense madii, et habuit pro scriptura II florenos 9 denarios (f. 168). 5.

Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. CA F. 300, ff. 166ra–285vb [= Er]27 Paper; 14th century (1385); mm. 295×210. The text starts with the title index of Book I, followed by the preface. Each book is preceded by a title index. Colophon: Et sic est finis questionum Phisicorum Aristotelis magistri Buridani per Hermannum de Curis, scripte Prage a Johanne de Arbore anno Domini mocccolxxxv circa festum sancti Gregorii, scilicet in mutacione bursarum ibidem etc. (f. 285vb).

6.

Frankfurt am Main, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, cod. Praed. 52, ff. 1ra–138rb [= B]28 Paper; 14th century (1368; 1384); mm. 285× 215. The preface follows the title index of book I. Each book is preceded by the title index. This codex is a collection of writings on natural philosophy, among which several texts by Buridan. Originally, the codex consisted of two separate parts, which were possibly linked together at the University of Vienna. The first part, which contains our text, possibly originated in Paris, in 1368, the second part in Prague, in 1384. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones libri physicorum lecte parysius per excellentissimum magistrum nomine Brydaen Anno domini 1368o in die felicitatis virginis (f. 138rb).

27 28

147–148, and Ch. Samaran & R. Marichal, Catalogue des manuscrits en écriture latine portant des indications de date, de lieu ou de copiste, 6: Bourgogne, Centre, Sud-Est et Sud-Ouest de la France, Paris 1968, 135. Cf. M. Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in Bibliotheca Amploniana Erffordiae asservantur, Wrocław [etc.] 1987, 49–50, and 176. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 582. See also G. Powitz, Die Handschriften des Dominikanerklosters und des Leonhardstifts in Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main 1968 (Kataloge der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main, 2/1), 125–127. A digital copy of the codex is available on the website of the Goethe Universität in Frankfurt am Main (URL: http://sammlungen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/msma/content/titleinfo/3833510).

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7.

København, Kongelige Bibliotek, cod. Ny kgl. Samling 1801 fol., ff. 1ra–167vb [= C]29 Paper; 14th century (watermarks 1375–1382); mm. 263× 190. The preface precedes the title index of Book I. Each book is preceded by a title index. This manuscript was probably written in the 1380s in Paris and was, until 1393, owned by master Johannes Peraudi Vienensis (France), and was then sold to the Dominican Johannes Theobaldi from the convent in Vienne (France). Colophon: Expliciunt questiones totius libri Physicorum de ultima lectura reverendi philosophi magistri johannis buridani, cuius anima requiescat in pace. Amen. Iste questiones sunt fratris Iohannis Theobaldi conventus Viannensis, quas emit a magistro Iohanne Peraudi oriundo de civitate Vienensi pretio 4or scutorum, que sibi fideliter solvit anno domini moccco nonagesimo iijo (f. 167ra–rb). On f. 117va Johannes Theobaldi is again mentioned as the owner of the manuscript: Iste questiones sunt fratris Iohannis Theobaldi ordinis praedicatorum conventus.

8.

Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 659, ff. 1ra–100rb [= D]30 Paper; 14th century (watermarks around 1366–1380); mm. 290 × 200. The text abruptly starts in the title index of Book I and ends with question VIII.13. Each book is preceded by a title index. The codex originated around 1377 at the University of Prague and arrived after 1416 at the University of Cracow through its owner, Paulus de Worczin. There is no colophon.

9.

Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 660, ff. 1ra–130ra [= E]31 Paper; 14th century (1366); mm. 290×225. The preface is lacking. With the exception of book I, each book is preceded by a title index. This

29

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 582–583. See also E. Jørgensen, Catalogus codicum latinorum medii aevi Bibliothecae Regiae Hafniensis, København 1926, 286. An extensive description of this manuscript is provided in Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 158–166. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 583. See also M. Kowalczyk, A. Kozłowska, M. Markowski, S. Włodek, G. Zathey & M. Zwiercan, Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum medii aevi latinorum qui in Bibliotheca Jagellonica Cracoviae asservantur. Volumen IV numeros continens inde a 564 usque ad 667, Wrocław [etc.] 1988, 422–425, and M. Markowski & Z. Włodek, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in Bibliotheca Iagellonica Cracoviae asservantur, Wrocław [etc.] 1974 (Polonica, 1), 31. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 583. See also Kowalczyk et al., Catalogus codicum, 425–427, and Markowski & Włodek, Repertorium commentariorum, 31–32.

30

31

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codex was written in 1366, in Prague. It was probably taken to Cracow by Polish students. In the beginning of the fifteenth century, the codex was owned by the well-known Polish philosopher and theologian Benedictus Hesse, who was active from 1407 to 1455 at the University of Cracow. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones sub anno incarnacionis domini 1366o feria 2a proxima ante festum beati Luce a magistro Byridano summo ville Parisiensis collecte, Pragis ab Alberto conscripte (f. 130ra). 10. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 661, ff. 1ra–127va [= F]32 Paper; 14th century; mm. 285×225. The title index of Book I is followed by the preface. Each book is preceded by a title index. Buridan’s text is part of a collection and originated outside of Poland, around 1367–1370, possibly in Prague. Colophon: Et sic est finis questionum, que in numero sunt 113 et sunt nimis utiles volentibus discere, cui autem non sunt utiles planum est quod illi nichil boni sapit seu bonum non diligit (f. 127va). 11. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 1771, ff. 1ra–142vb [= G]33 Paper; 14th century (watermarks around 1367); mm. 295 × 220. The preface is lacking. A fragment of a title index, written in another hand, is inserted between f. 26v and f. 27r (but the titles do not match the quaestiones of Book I of Buridan’s ultima lectura). With the exception of Book IV, each book is preceded by a title index. The provenance of this codex is probably Paris. It was copied and possibly owned by Henricus de Cremona.34 From Paris, this codex arrived in Prague, where it came into the possession of the brothers Petrus and Hieronymus Goryn. It was donated to the University of Cracow sometime between 1405 and 1407 by a certain Johannes Willisch, after he had obtained his degree at the University of Prague. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones totalis libri P⟨hysi⟩corum tradite a suptili phylosopho magistro Iohanne Buridani, summo rectore Parisiensi, scripte per manus Hinrici de Cremona oriundi, diebus festivis in vico straminis. Deo gratias et beate virgini, ut est fas (f. 142vb).

32 33

34

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 584. See also Kowalczyk et al., Catalogus codicum, 427–429, and Markowski & Włodek, Repertorium commentariorum, 32. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 584. See also Markowski & Włodek, Repertorium commentariorum, 71, and Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 166–170, for an extensive description of this codex. Henricus de Cremona is not the same person as Henricus de Tremonia, a student of Marsilius of Inghen, as Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 584, believed. See Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 168.

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12. Kremsmünster, Bibliothek des Benediktinerstiftes, cod. CC 169, ff. 3ra– 174vb [= H]35 Paper; the part that contains Buridan’s text is from the beginning of the 15th century (1413); mm. 290×215. The preface follows the title index of Book I. A title index precedes each of the subsequent books. The other part of the codex, dating from 1392 (ff. 175–207), contains a text by Albert of Saxony. Colophon: Et sic est finis huius operis et per consequens omnium questionum super octo libris physicorum Reverendi magistri Biridani et sunt reportate wienne anno domini mo cccco tredecimo die secunda post nunen (?). Amen. Expliciunt questiones reverendi magistri Iohannis Wiridani super octo libris physicorum et est finis huius operis (f. 174vb). 13. Lambach, Bibliothek des Benediktinerstiftes, cod. Ccl. 175, ff. 1ra–158va [= La] Paper; early 15th century (1403); mm. 283× 224. The preface follows the title index of Book I. A title index precedes each of the subsequent books. In addition, there is a title index of all questions of Books I–VIII on ff. 158vb–160va (in a different hand). The codex contains, besides Buridan’s Physics, his commentaries on De anima and Meteora. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones longe Phisicorum date per reverendum magistrum Iohannem Biridan Parisius. Expliciunt questiones Phisicorum Aristotelis edite per reverendum magistrum Iohannem Biridan Parisius reportate in Ulma per me Iohannem de Hammelburg anno domini 1403 in die sancte Felicis hora vesperarum complete (f. 158va). 14. Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, cod. 114 C, ff. 2ra–112ra [= I]36 Paper (ff. 1–153) and parchment (ff. 154–276); 14th century (1366); mm. 293×207. The index of Book I precedes the preface. The other books are also preceded by a title index. The codex contains a collection of texts written in several hands, in the fields of grammar, logic, and natural

35

36

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 584. See also M. Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Austriacis: Admont, Furt bei Göttweig, Graz, Heiligenkreuz, Klagenfurt, Klosterneuburg, Kremsmünster, Linz, Melk, Salzburg, Sankt Florian, Vorau, Zwettl asservantur, Kraków 2008 (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Series 3: Aristoteles mediaevalis), 46–47. See also the online description (URL: http://manuscripta.at/m1/hs_detail.php?ID=35943). Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 585 (and 553). See also M.-L. Grandjean, Bibliothèque de l’Université de Liège. Catalogue des manuscrits, Liège 1875, 326 (nr. 647), and especially

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philosophy. These texts were probably gathered together at a later stage. In the fifteenth century, the codex belonged to the convent of the Crossiers at Huy, in the diocese of Liège. On f. 1ra there is an important indication of the provenance of the manuscript: Tabula questionum libri primi phisicorum magistri Johannis Buridan in vico straminum parisius anno domini moccco66o pronunciatarum. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones tocius libri physicorum magistri Johannis Buridan de ultima lectura finite in profesto philippi et Jacobi apostolorum de mane Parysius (f. 112ra). 15. Oxford, Balliol College Library, cod. 97, ff. 1r–114r [= Ox]37 Paper; 15th century (1402); mm. 343×235. The preface precedes Book I. Title index after each book. Note that the last six quires were bound in the wrong order. The manuscript is a collection of texts on natural philosophy. The copy of Buridan’s texts originated on the continent, and was later carried to England by one of its owners, William Grey (d. 1478). He left his important library to Balliol College. The text breaks off in question V.2 (f. 112vb).38 Colophon: Expliciunt questiones tocius libri Phisicorum edite a reverendo philosopho magistro Johanne Buridani (!) scripte Parisius et finite anno domini mlo cccco2o (f. 114r). 16. Paderborn, Erzbischöfliche Akademische Bibliothek, cod. VVa 12, ff. 1ra– 88rb [= Pb]39 Paper and Parchment; 14th century (1375); mm. 230× 300. Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface comes after the title index of Book I. The manuscript is heavily mutilated. Many folia have been cut out. Only Books I, V, and VIII are complete. Colophon: Et sic finiuntur questiones

37

38 39

A. Pattin, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Belgicis asservantur, Leuven, Leiden 1978 (Ancient and medieval philosophy. Series 1, 1), 97–99. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 585. See also R.A.B. Mynors, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College Oxford, Oxford 1963, 80–81. It is also mentioned in Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 1: 174*. Cf. Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 103, n. 50. Cf. K. Hengst, Ein Jahrhundert Akademische Bibliothek Paderborn. Zur Geschichte des Buches in der mitteldeutschen Kirchenprovinz. Mit einem Verzeichnis der mittelalterlichen Handschriften in Paderborn, Paderborn 1996 (Veröffentlichungen zur Geschichte der mitteldeutschen Kirchenprovinz, 10), 110, and U. Hinz, Handschriftencensus Westfalen, Wiesbaden 1999 (Schriften der Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster, 18), 303, nr. 0659.

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libri totius Physicorum anno domini mocccolxxv die vxiiia mensis Iulii hora tertiarum vel quasi (f. 88rb). 17. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 14723, ff. 2ra–107vb [= L]40 Paper; 14th century (1368; ca. 1370); mm. 298 × 215. The preface comes after the title index of Book I. Each book is preceded by a title index. The codex contains various works in natural philosophy by John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, which were bound together during the fifteenth century. At that time, the codex belonged to the library of the Canons of St. Victor. The copy of Albert of Saxony’s text is dated at 1368. The two other parts are from around 1370. Title index: ⟨T⟩abula questionum primi libri phisicorum per magistrum iohannem buriden ordinata (f. 2ra). Colophon Book III: Explicit liber phisicorum tercius finitus feria 5ta post nativitatem beate virginis hora primarum anno et loco sepe dicto (f. 60vb). Colophon: Expliciunt questiones tocius libri phisicorum de ultima lectura magistri Johannis buridanj. Deo gracias. Amen. Amen. Amen (f. 107vb). 18. Salzburg, Stiftsbibliothek St. Peter (Erzabtei), cod. b.IX.24, ff. 2ra–149vb [= M]41 Paper; 15th century (1417); mm. 298×218; copy of an original from the end of the fourteenth century (1388). Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface precedes the title index of Book I. Question II.3 has been abbreviated, and questions II.4–II.6 are missing. They have been copied in the same hand at the end of the text (ff. 145va–149vb). Both the main text, and the addition of the missing part are concluded by a colophon. Together, they indicate the date of the original and the date of the copy. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones physicorum longe Reverendi magistri Johannis Byridani compilate anno domini mocccoottuagesimo octavo (f. 145va) Colophon: Expliciunt questiones physicorum Johannis Buridani magistri reverendi anno domini millesimo quadringentesimo xviimo (f. 149vb). 40

41

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 585–586. See also Ch. Samaran & R. Marichal, Catalogue des manuscrits en écriture latine portant des indications de date, de lieu ou de copiste, 3: Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds latin (nos. 8001 à 18613), Paris 1974, 379, and W. Seńko, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis publicis Parisiis asservantur: Bibliothèque Nationale, Arsenal, Mazarine, Sorbonne, Ste Geneviève, Warszawa 1982 (Opera philosophorum medii aevi, 5/1–2), 175–202. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 588. See also Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Austriacis … asservantur, 48 (nr. 12) and 58 (nr. 29).

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19. Salzburg, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. M.II.311, ff. 2ra–80vb [= N]42 Paper; first quarter of the 15th century; mm. 314 × 232. The manuscript, which belonged to the library of the bishops of Chiemsee, is incomplete: Books V–VIII are missing, and several individual quaestiones are missing as well. A title index precedes each of the remaining books. The preface comes after the title index of Book I. There is no colophon. 20. Stralsund, Stadtarchiv der Hansestadt Stralsund, cod. 1050, ff. 1ra–156va [= K]43 Paper; end of the 14th century (watermarks: ca. 1385–1400); dimensions unknown. The text is preceded by a title index of Book I, followed by the preface. A title index precedes each of the remaining books. The text breaks off in mid-sentence in question VIII.10. Due to a mistake in the numbering, the questions in Book I after question I.6 have a different numbering. End of Book VII: Et sic est finis questionum septimi libri physicorum magistri Byri⟨d⟩ani (f. 142vb). There is no colophon. 21. Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, cod. G.IV.10, ff. 2r–121vb [= O]44 Paper; 15th century; mm. 288×213. The manuscript is incomplete, and abruptly breaks off in question VIII.1. The text is preceded by a title index of Books I–IV, q. 3, followed by the preface. The incipit of the title index labels this work as ‘tertium opus:’ Incipiunt tituli questionum octo librorum physicorum tercii operis magistri Johannis Bridani (f. 1r). There is no colophon. 22. Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 2163, ff. 1r–159v [= P]45 Paper (and two leaves of parchment); 14th century (1377); mm. 295 × 225. The preface is followed by the title index of Book I. Each book is preceded

42

43 44

45

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 588. See also Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Austriacis … asservantur, 45 (nr. 9). An online description of this manuscript is available on the website of the library of the University of Salzburg (URL: http://www.ubs.sbg.ac.at/sosa/handschriften/mII311.htm). See Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 105–106, for a description. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 588. See also G. Mazzatinti & A. Sorbelli, Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d’Italia, 28: Torino, Biblioteca nazionale, Firenze 1922, 107, nr. 1040. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 588–589. See also A. Maier, Codices Vaticani Latini. Codices 2118–2192, Roma 1961, 119–122.

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by a title index. After Book VIII there is a title index of the entire work (ff. 157v–159v). Incipit of the title index of Book I: Tabula questionum primi libri physicorum ordinata a magistro Iohanne byridano, que quidem tabula inchoata fuit in festo pentecostes Anno dominj Mocccolvijo (should read lxxvijo, according to Anneliese Maier) (f. 1r). Colophon: Expliciunt questiones libri physicorum ab excellentissimo Johanne Byridano Artista edite parysius. Per manus henrici de Austria Anno dominj Millesimo ccco Septuagesimo septimo Quinto die mensis Novembris finite sunt In Studio paduensi (f. 157v). 23. Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 2164, ff. 1r–120r [= Q]46 Paper; 14th century (1398); mm. 335×240. The codex consists of two parts, written by two different copists, of which the first part contains our text. The preface is preceded by a title index of the entire text. Buridan’s text is slightly abbreviated. After the end of each book ‘quaestiunculae’ have been added, which, most likely, are not by Buridan. Colophon: Et sic finiuntur questiones tocius libri phisicorum secundum ultimam lecturam magistri buridani de picardia scripte per manus petri de alamania Anno domini 1398 de quinta die mensis junij etc. (f. 120r). 24. Wien, Bibliothek des Dominikanerkonvents, cod. 107/73, ff. 2ra–186rb [= R]47 Paper; 15th century; mm. 298×212. The title index of Book I precedes the preface. Each book is preceded by a title index. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones librorum physicorum collecte parisius per reverendum magistrum Iohannem Buridanum felicis memorie, cui deus concedere dignetur vitam eternam ex eo quod per longa tempora fidelissime laboravit pro communi bono et profectu omnium volentium artes studere. Amen (f. 186rb).

46 47

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 589–590. See also Maier, Codices Vaticani Latini, 122–129. Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 590. See also M. Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, Wrocław [etc.] 1985, 56–57, and 280.

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25. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5112, ff. 1ra–180va [= S]48 Paper; 15th century (1411–1414); mm. 300 × 210. The title index of Book I precedes the preface. Each book is preceded by a title index. From the colophons at the end of the various books, we can infer that this copy of Buridan’s text was manufactured from 1411 to 1414. Colophon: Et sic est finis huius octavi physicorum et consequenter alii (!) libri Aristotelis physicorum finiti per Conradum de Burgkunstat in Wyenna anno domini moccccoxiiijo feria quinta ante festum sancti Georii in bursa Iohannis Gartner. Qui deo dilectus. Pro quo laudetur sancta trinitas et infinita maiestas per infinita secula seculorum amen. Laus tibi sit, Christe, quia completus est liber iste. Tu es principium et finis. Deus in nomine tuo etc. (f. 180va). 26. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5332, ff. 72va–218rb [= T]49 Paper; 15th century (1413); mm. 299×212. The text starts with the title index of Book I, followed by the preface. Each book is preceded by a title index. This codex is a collection of texts in natural philosophy. One of them is Marsilius of Inghen’s Abbreviationes on the Physics, copied in 1413 by Conradus Holbeyn de Gelnhausen, who graduated at the University of Vienna. He is probably also the copyist of the other part of the codex. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones super octo libris phisicorum aristotilis Reuerendi magistri Johannis Burydani compilate parisius conscripte et finite Wyenne feria tercia ante festum sancti Michahelis archangeli hora 9na Anno dominice incarnacionis 1413 (f. 218r).

48

49

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 590. See also Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter Graecos et Orientales in Bibliotheca Palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum, 4: Cod. 5001– 6500, Wien 1870, 27, and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 57 and 255. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb .ac.at/rec/AL00177324) (including recent bibliography). Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 590–591. See also Tabulae codicum, 103; F. Unterkircher, Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek von 1401 bis 1450, Wien 1971 (Katalog der datierten Handschriften in lateinischer Schrift in Österreich, 2), 2, 138– 139; and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 57–58 and 263. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/ AL00167311) (including recent bibliography).

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27. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5338, ff. 1ra–212ra [= U]50 Paper; 14th century (ca. 1390/95, and before 1400); mm. 295 × 215. Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface precedes the title index of Book I. Colophon: Et sic est finis questionum libri physicorum reverendi magistri Byriden finite (!) in die sancti Stephani in inventione. Mens humilis, studium querendi, vita quieta, scrutinium tacitum, paupertas, terra aliena, hec reparare solent multis obscura legendi (f. 212ra). 28. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5367, ff. 1va–110va [= V]51 Paper; end of the 14th century (1370); mm. 295 × 215. Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface is after the title index of Book I. This codex is the first dated witness of the use of Buridan’s text at the University of Vienna. Explicit: Expliciunt questiones primi libri physicorum per magistrum Johannem Byridanum compilate anno domini mocccolxxo etc. (f. 22ra) Colophon: Expliciunt questiones physicorum etc. (f. 110v). 29. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5424, ff. 1ra–163rb [= W]52 Paper; 14th century (1390); mm. 285×215. Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface precedes the title index of Book I. This codex was

50

51

52

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 591. See also Tabulae codicum, 105, and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 56 and 263. See further A. Fingernagel, K. Hranitzky, V. PirkerAurenhammer, M. Roland & F. Simader (eds), Mitteleuropäischen Schulen II (ca. 1350– 1410), Wien 2002 (Die illuminierten Handschriften und Inkunabeln der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek, 11), 383. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AL00169224) (including recent bibliography). Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 591. See also Tabulae codicum, 110, and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 55–56 and 264. See also Fingernagel et al., Mitteleuropäischen Schulen, 33. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AL00168186) (including recent bibliography). Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 592. See also Tabulae codicum, 122; F. Unterkircher, Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek bis zum Jahre 1400, Wien 1969 (Katalog der datierten Handschriften in lateinischer Schrift in Österreich, 1), 1, 80; and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 55 and 267. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AL00169078) (including recent bibliography).

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copied by a certain Cristannus Vrowyn (Vrowein) de Zusato, student at the Arts Faculty of the University of Vienna since 1388. He remained at the university until the 1430s as master of arts, doctor of medicine, and eventually as dean of the faculty of medicine. After his death, the codex changed hands several times. Colophon: Et sic est finis questionum libri physicorum reverendi magistri Johannis Biridani finite (!) anno domini 1390 in die sancti Stephani prothomartiris per cristannum vrowyn de zusato. In venerabili studio Wyennensi (f. 163r). 30. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5458, ff. 1ra–154rb [= X]53 Paper; 14th century (1365/70); mm. 285× 215. Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface is after the title index of Book I. The codex was written by a certain Andreas (f. 135ra: Explicit ille septimus liber per manus Andree). The codex originated at the University of Vienna, and is, together with codex 5367, one of the earliest witnesses of the study of Buridan’s writings there. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones physicorum magistri Iohannis Wiridani (f. 154rb). 31. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5481, ff. 1ra–96rb [= Y]54 Paper; 14th century (1366–1367); mm. 300 × 210. Each book is preceded by a title index. The preface is after the title index of Book I. This codex is a collection of texts on natural philosophy, written by several copyists at Prague during the years 1366–1367. At some point the codex arrived in Vienna. Colophon of Book I: Expliciunt questiones super primo libro physicorum reuerendi magistri Johannis Byrydani ultimo ab eo collecte per manus Heinrici, sub anno incarnacionis domini mocccolxovyo in vigilia Penthecostes (f. 20v). Similar notes are found on ff. 29v, 48v, 61v, and

53

54

Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 592. See also Tabulae codicum, 128, and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 55 and 270. See also Fingernagel et al., Mitteleuropäischen Schulen, 30–33. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AL00167995) (including recent bibliography). Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 593. See also Tabulae codicum, 131; Unterkircher, Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek bis zum Jahre 1400, 1, 81–82; and Markowski, Repertorium commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis Wiennae asservantur, 54 and 271. See the description available on the website of the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (URL: http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AL00169062) (including recent bibliography).

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84v. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones tocius libri physicorum reuerendi Magistri Byridani brage reportate et in die sancti Agapiti finite. A. lxvio (f. 96v). 32. Zaragoza, Biblioteca Capitular de la Seo, cod. 15–61, ff. 1r–201v [= Z]55 Paper; 15th century (watermarks between 1398–1436); mm. 230× 155. The text has no preface and no title index. This manuscript is a composite of the tertia lectura and the ultima lectura. For Book I, it contains the tertia lectura. Book II is mixed: questions II.1 to II.8 have the tertia lectura; question II.9 is identical with question II.5 of the ultima lectura; and questions II.10 to II.13 have the same text as questions II.10 to II.13 of the ultima lectura. Books III to VIII follow the ultima lectura. Apparently, this copy goes back to an original of 1357. Colophon: Expliciunt questiones libri phisicorum de 3o opere ordinate per magistrum johannem Buridan anno domini mocccolvijo. Laudetur deus. Amen. Summa questionum Cm et 13m questiones (f. 201v). The ultima lectura of the Physics was edited by John Dullaert: Iohannes Buridanus, Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis. Paris: Pierre le Dru for Denis Roce, 1509 [= p].56 The following table gives an overview of the manuscripts (with sigla, approximate date, and provenance):

55 56

The description relies on Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 104–105 (with some corrections). Cf. Michael, Johannes Buridan, 2: 593. See also B. Moreau, Inventaire chronologique des éditions Parisiennes du XVIe siècle, 1: 1501–1510, Paris 1972 (Histoire générale de Paris), 311, nr. 39. This edition has been reprinted in 1964 by Minerva: Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zur Aristotelischan Physik, Frankfurt am Main 1964. A. Pettegree & M. Walsby, French Books III & IV: Books Published in France before 1601 in Latin and Languages other than French, Leiden [etc.] 2012, 330 (nr. 59495) wrongly identify John Dullaert as John of Jandun (d. 1328), mentioning the latter as the editor of Buridan’s text. Note that Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, used the siglum Pa for the Paris 1509 edition. In the present edition, the siglum has been replaced by p.

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Manuscript

Siglum Date

Provenance

Berlin lat. fol. 852 Bratislava E.L.5 Buenos Aires 342R Carpentras 293 Erfurt F. 300 Frankfurt Praed. 52 København 1801 fol. Kraków 1771 Kraków 659 Kraków 660 Kraków 661 Kremsmünster 169 Lambach 175 Liège 114 C Oxford Balliol 97 Paderborn VVa 12 Paris lat. 14723 Salzburg St. Peter b.IX.24 Salzburg UB M.II.311 Stralsund 1050 Torino G.IV.10 Vat. lat. 2163 Vat. lat. 2164 Wien Dominikaner 107/73 Wien ÖNB 5112 Wien ÖNB 5332 Wien ÖNB 5338 Wien ÖNB 5367 Wien ÖNB 5424 Wien ÖNB 5458 Wien ÖNB 5481 Zaragoza 15–61

Be Br J A Er B C G D E F H La I Ox Pb L M N K O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Erfurt (?) Vienna

XIV 1398 XV 1386 1385 1368 1380s c. 1367 c. 1377 1366 c. 1367–1370 1413 1403 1366 1402 1375 c. 1370 1417 XV XIV XV 1377 (1357 [?]) 1398–1399 XV 1411–1414 1413 1390–1395 1370 1390 1365–1370 1366–1367 XV (1357)

Southern France Prague Paris (?) Vienne (Fr.) Paris (?) Prague Prague Prague (?) Ulm Paris Paris Paris (?)

Padova Bologna Vienna Vienna

Vienna Vienna Prague

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Manuscript Tradition and Editorial Method

The present edition of Buridan’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) is based on the results of previous studies of the manuscript tradition carried out by Dirk-Jan Dekker and myself.57 A full collation of two extensive sample passages (questions III.14–III.19 [the Tractatus de infinito] and question IV.12 [Utrum tempus est motus]), in combination with historical research on the provenance of the manuscripts, allowed us to establish that the manuscripts of Buridan’s ultima lectura break into two principal families.58 1. One family includes the manuscripts ACGHIOxPbLNPQTZ. Since the majority of these manuscripts have a Parisian origin, this group can be labeled the ‘Parisian’ family. Within the Parisian family, four groups of related manuscripts can be distinguished: AC, LP, GIQ and HNT.59 2. The other family includes the manuscripts BrErBDEFJMKORSUVWXY. Since most of these manuscripts have a Middle-European origin, this group can be called the ‘Middle-European’ family. The manuscripts of Middle-European origin can be further divided into three groups of related manuscripts: DJO, KMSEr, and UW. The existence of a ‘Middle-European’ family makes historical sense. Buridan taught his entire life at the University of Paris and, sometime after his death, his works came to be required reading at the arts curricula of the universities of Prague, Vienna and Cracow.60 57

58

59 60

See Thijssen, John Buridan’s Tractatus de infinito, xxii–xxxv, and Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 97–170. Manuscripts Be and La have not been taken into account in these studies. Manuscript Be only contains a short fragment (question I.2 to question I.8) of Buridan’s text. Manuscript La was brought to my attention later. Cf. the critical apparatus of the full collation of question IV.12 in Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 112–133. Dekker’s conclusions corroborate the findings of Thijssen, John Buridan’s Tractatus de infinito, xxvi–xxix. For a provisional stemma of the Parisian tradition, see Dekker, De tijdfilosofie van Johannes Buridanus, 156–157. The Prague statutes indicate that texts should be used by a famous master from Prague itself, Paris or Oxford. Apparently, Buridan qualified as such a master. Cf. A. Dittrich & A.F. Spirk, Monumenta historica Universitatis Carolo-Ferdinandeae Pragensis, Praha 1830, 1: 40–41, nr. 8, and 1: 82, nr. 28. At Vienna, students were obliged to use Buridan’s texts for their private exercises. Cf. R. Kink, Geschichte der kaiserlichen Universität zur Wien, Wien 1854, 2: 216, titulus XXVI. See also J. Aschbach, Geschichte der Wiener Universität im ersten Jahrhunderte ihres Bestehens, Wien 1865, 95. From Cracow, we have many commentaries ‘according to the way of Buridan’ (secundum viam Buridani). See Markowski & Włodek, Repertorium commentariorum, 1974, passim.

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However, the division of the manuscripts in these two principal families (and their respective subgroups) is not always as clear-cut as one might hope, given that a significant number of manuscripts contain contaminations. As a rule, the manuscripts belonging to the Parisian family are of better quality than the manuscripts of Middle-European origin. For that reason, the present edition is based on manuscripts belonging to the Parisian family. Nevertheless, the manuscripts of the Middle European branch cannot be dismissed offhand and some of them have been taken into account in establishing the text of the edition. This critical edition of Buridan’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, secundum ultimam lecturam is based upon a full collation of the following three manuscripts: C G P

København, Kongelige Bibliotek, cod. Ny kgl. Samling 1801 fol. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 1771 Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 2163

Manuscript C is used as main manuscript on which the edition is based. As the studies carried out by Dekker and myself have shown, this manuscript contains by far the fewest number of (individual) mistakes. There is repeated evidence that C has been corrected. The text contains frequent deletions, marginal corrections, and occasional allusions to ‘variant readings’ (indicated in the margin by the letters ‘al’ [for ‘alias’] or by the word ‘vel’). The choice of G and P was also based on the relatively low number of (individual) mistakes. In addition to these three manuscripts, the edition made by John Dullaert has been fully collated as well: p

Iohannes Buridanus, Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis. Paris: Pierre le Dru for Denis Roce, 1509.

The Dullaert edition has been included mainly for historical reasons. Up to the present day, it has played a major role in the study of Buridan’s thought. It is one of the many editions from the sixteenth century on which we still depend entirely or in large part for our own knowledge of fourteenth-century philosophy. From a historical perspective, Dullaert’s edition is a very useful testimony, because it contains Buridan’s text as it was read by so many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thinkers (and by contemporary scholars). In the present edition, the text transmitted in manuscript C has been followed wherever possible. In principle, all variant readings of G, P, and p have been indicated in the critical apparatus. The only variants that have been sys-

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Manuscript København, Kongelige Bibliotek, cod. Ny kgl. Samling 1801 fol., 55r

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tematically ignored are the following: ergo/igitur, ille/iste (etc.), item/iterum, variant ways of writing numbers (e.g., decimo tertio/tredecimo/13o), and variation in spelling (e.g., intrinsecitas/intrinseitas). In all these cases, the reading of C (or the most natural reading of an abbreviation in C) has been followed. In those instances in which the reading of C does not seem to make sense, the editors have followed G and/or P (and p), and moved the reading of C to the critical apparatus. It should be noted that C is not very precise in the mood of the verbs (at least according to the standards of classical Latin) and at times offers less elegant readings than G and/or P (and p). Yet, also in those cases C has been followed throughout. All (marginal) corrections in C have been indicated in the apparatus, except in cases in which the corrected text is the same as the text of the three other witnesses (GPp). The ‘variant readings’ proposed by C (in the margins and above the line) have also been indicated in the apparatus.61 Occasionally, when none of the four witnesses CGPp seems to provide a reading that makes sense, or when only the reading of p seems meaningful, the editors have consulted the following seven additional manuscripts. Of these codices minus adhibiti four are from the Parisian family and three from the Middle-European family: A B H L M T U

Carpentras, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine, cod. 293 (L. 289) (Parisian) Frankfurt am Main, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, cod. Praed. 52 (Middle-European) Kremsmünster, Bibliothek des Benediktinerstiftes, cod. CC 169 (Parisian) Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 14723 (Parisian) Salzburg, Stiftsbibliothek St. Peter (Erzabtei), cod. b.IX.24 (Middle-European) Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5332 (Parisian) Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5338 (Middle-European)

In principle, the critical apparatus is negative. Only in cases in which other manuscripts besides CGPp are used is the apparatus positive. In those cases the apparatus indicates immediately after the square bracket which of the manuscripts offers the reading retained in the edition. In question II.4 (p. 2677–18), C provides a text passage that is lacking in G, P and p (and also in AHLT). For this passage, the text of C has been fully collated with B, M and U.

61

On some folia, the marginalia in C are no longer visible because part of the folium has been cut off. This will be indicated as follows: †…†.

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For two passages in Books I and II it has been necessary to consult all surviving manuscripts. Yet, none of the manuscripts provided the reading that one would expect. In these two cases, the reading of the manuscripts has been retained in the edition, whereas the editors’ conjecture has been indicated in the critical apparatus. The first passage occurs in question I.12 (p. 1319–15): Vel arguitur sic: sit virtus levativa a et grave aequalis resistentiae virtuti a sit b. Tunc a non movebit b, sed omne minus posset levare, quia omne minus excederet; et non potest dari minus secundum indivisibile, cum continuum non sit compositum ex indivisibilibus; igitur quocumque minori dato potest dari aliquid aliud intermedium quod est maius illo et minus quam a (one would expect: ‘et minus quam b’); et sic quocumque dato quod a potest levare, adhuc est maius quod ipsum potest levare. The second passage occurs in question II.13 (p. 3459–20): Dico igitur quod ex sanitate producenda in Socrate nullo modo dependet operatio praevia Platonis medici sui, quia nullus diceret quod operatio medici dependeret ex illa sanitate nisi quia medicus intendit illam sanitatem facere et quod haec intentio dependet ab illa sanitate (unde si ita operaretur non intendens illam sanitatem, sicut operatur intendens, quod est possibile, nullus diceret quod ab illa sanitate dependeret eius operatio); sed certum debet esse quod intentio medici non dependet ab illa sanitate producenda; igitur etc. Declaro igitur quod intentio et voluntas medici volentis sanare Socratem non dependet ex sanitate Socratis producenda. Primo, quia illa nihil est. Secundo, quia forte impossibile est Socratem sanari. Sed quomodo ex eo quod nec est nec esse potest dependeret intentio et voluntas Socratis? (one would expect: ‘Platonis’) Punctuation and division into paragraphs are according to modern conventions. The editors have put a colon after the word ‘quia’ whenever it does not have the meaning ‘because,’ but rather serves the function of a colon. The spelling has been homogenized according to classical standard orthography (as, for instance, codified in the Oxford Latin Dictionary). The medieval e for ae or oe has not been retained, and u and v have always been distinguished. All abbreviations have been resolved, including ‘Socrates’ for ‘Sor,’ with the exception of ‘etc.’ (for example in ‘igitur etc.’ at the end of an argument). Literal quotations have been put between single quotation marks. Double quotation marks are only used if they occur within single quotation marks.

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Below the critical apparatus, which contains the variant readings, there is a second apparatus identifying the sources quoted in the text. Only explicit references have been identified. As is to be expected, most references are to Aristotle’s texts, which are identified by title, book, chapter, and pagination of the Bekker edition. If references also occur in the Auctoritates Aristotelis, this is indicated by AA, followed by the number of the Aristotelian work and the number of the relevant auctoritas according to the edition of Jacqueline Hamesse (e.g., ‘AA, 2: 6’ refers to auctoritas 6 on the Physics: ‘Contra negantem principia non est disputandum’). References to Averroes are identified by work, book, commentum, and folium according to the Giunta edition of 1562–1574, unless a modern critical edition is available. References to the Bible are indicated according to the system of abbreviation in the modern edition of the Vulgate. Buridan’s internal references to his own Quaestiones on the Physics have also been indicated, unless they are to the same quaestio in which they occur. References to books III to VIII of the Physics have been traced in John Dullaert’s edition of 1509, with book, quaestio, and folium. Some references are ambiguous, such as the announcement that one should look in such-and-such a book by Aristotle (debet videri). In these cases, it is not immediately clear whether Buridan is referring to his own text (an expositio or quaestiones on the relevant work by Aristotle) or to the appropriate passage in Aristotle in which the issue at stake is discussed. Only if the reference can, indeed, be found in one of Buridan’s own commentaries, has the passage been identified. References to anonymous ‘some’ (aliqui/quidam), and parallel passages in other texts, have not been tracked down. The edition refers to the following sources: Albertus Magnus, Physica. Libri I–IV, ed. P. Hossfeld, Münster 1987 (Opera omnia, 4/1). Aristoteles, Metaphysica. Lib. I–XIV. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden [etc.] 1995 (Aristoteles Latinus, 25/3.2). Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, ed. Iuntina, Venezia 1562–1574 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1962). Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, ed. F.S. Crawford, Cambridge (MA) 1953 (Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Versionum latinarum 6/1). Averroes, Commentum magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis, ed. F.J. Carmody & R. Arnzen, 2 vols, Leuven 2003 (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca, 4). Avicenna, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus, I–III, ed. S. Van Riet, Leuven, Leiden 1972 (Avicenna latinus, 1).

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Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I–IV, ed. S. Van Riet, Leuven, Leiden 1977 (Avicenna latinus, 3). Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, V–X, ed. S. Van Riet, Leuven, Leiden 1980 (Avicenna latinus, 4). Avicenna, Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus primus de causis et principiis naturalium, ed. S. Van Riet, Leuven, Leiden 1992 (Avicenna latinus, 8). Beda (Ps.-), Sententiae, sive axiomata philosophica ex Aristotele et aliis praestantibus collecta, ed. J.P. Migne, Paris 1850 (Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina, 90), 965–1090. Denzinger, H., Enchiridion Symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, Freiburg 1991. Hamesse, J., Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval, Leuven, Paris 1974 (Philosophes médiévaux, 17). Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae, Paris 1518 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1964). Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De anima, II, ed. P.G. Sobol, John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation: An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle’s Book on the Soul, with an Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1984. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De anima, III, ed. J.A. Zupko, John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind. An Edition and Translation of Book III of his ‘Questions on Aristotle’s De anima’ (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays, 2 vols, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1989. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo, ed. E.A. Moody, Cambridge (MA) 1942. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis, ed. M. Streijger, P.J.J.M. Bakker & J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Leiden [etc.] 2010 (Medieval and early modern science, 14). Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis, Paris 1509 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1964). Iohannes de Sacrobosco, De sphaera, ed. L. Thorndike, The Sphere of Sacrobosco and its Commentators, Chicago 1949. Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus, called afterwards Summulae logicales, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972 (Philosophical Texts and Studies, 22). Porphyrius, Isagoge, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Brugge, Paris 1966 (Aristoteles Latinus 1/6– 7). Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, ed. P. Rossi, Firenze 1981 (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi. Testi e studi, 2). Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, ed. L.D. Reynolds, 2 vols, Oxford 1965 (Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis).

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Thomas de Aquino, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M. Maggiòlo, Torino, Roma 1965. Tobler, A., & E. Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, 11 vols, Berlin, Wiesbaden 1925–1995.

Guide to the Text Edith D. Sylla

1

Introduction

For those who wish to know in general the content of John Buridan’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) (henceforth: Quaestiones Physicorum), Books I and II, without reading the Latin texts, the following guide highlights some of the main content of the questions in a way that is meant to put it into its historical context. In addition, for those who wish to use this edition as a primary resource for research, it gives some preliminary indications of how Buridan’s methods of approach and conclusions are related to commentaries on the Physics or other works before and after Buridan’s contributions. Within the history of science, John Buridan is probably best known for having articulated the theory that ‘impetus’ causes the continuation of projectile motion, the acceleration downward of falling bodies, and maybe even the continued rotation of the celestial spheres. Buridan’s concept of impetus is so widely discussed because of its place in studies of the precursors of Galileo or more generally of the background to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Within the history of philosophy, Buridan is best known for his work in logic broadly conceived.1 In his book John Buridan. Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master, Jack Zupko devotes chapters 1–9 to a summary of Buridan’s Summulae de Dialectica, and then chapters 10–16 to the application of Buridan’s philosophical and logical approach to ‘ultimate questions,’ bodies and souls, knowledge, natural science, virtue, freedom, and so forth. Under natural science, Zupko discusses mainly Buridan’s psychology. He thus neglects almost all of what Buridan has to say in his Quaestiones Physicorum, concentrating instead on topics of more relevance to contemporary philosophers. Many previously published studies making use of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum have chosen for examination those passages which are relevant

1 See J. Zupko, John Buridan. Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master, Notre Dame (IN) 2003 (Publications in Medieval Studies). Buridan’s main work in logic is his Summulae de Dialectica. For an English translation (with a philosophical introduction), see John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, ed. G. Klima, New Haven (CT) and London 2001 (Yale library of medieval philosophy).

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to modern science or to today’s philosophy. This means that new studies have more previous analyses to rely on in those areas than in others more central to Buridan’s own concerns. A newer perspective adopted by some historians of medieval philosophy discerns in the fourteenth century the adoption of a logical, analytical, or ‘second intentional’ point of view. In the introduction to his 2002 book on the Physics questions of Lawrence of Lindores (which follow very closely Buridan’s questions), Thomas Dewender describes the earlier historiography of medieval natural philosophy as looking to precursors of Galileo, as in the work of Pierre Duhem, and then later asserting a discontinuity between fourteenth-century natural philosophy and the new science. Dewender quotes John Murdoch writing of the medieval authors, ‘… what one was about in the fourteenth century not only did not lead to Galilei and the like, but was not even pointing in that direction.’2 Dewender goes on to list the so-called ‘analytical languages’ that Murdoch described as the links that unified late medieval science and philosophy and to a lesser extent unified philosophy and theology. These analytical languages include how to talk about measures of motion with respect to cause and effect, paying attention to first and last instants, to maxima and minima, to latitudes and degrees, to the proportions of velocities in motions, and especially, of course, making use of the logica modernorum, including the analysis of the supposition of terms in propositions in connection with their truth or falsity.3 In line with this and other more recent trends, the following guide does not choose topics to highlight in relation to the rise of modern science, nor does it choose topics because of their relevance to the interests of today’s philosophy departments. Rather, it attempts to present Buridan’s text on its own terms and in relation to its own time and place. In The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, Gyula Klima writes:

2 Th. Dewender, Das Problem des Unendlichen im ausgehenden 14. Jahrhundert. Eine Studie mit Textedition zum Physikkommentar des Lorenz von Lindores, Amsterdam 2002 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 36), 24. The quotation is from J.E. Murdoch, ‘Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science and Philosophy in the Medieval West,’ in: R. Imbach & A. Maierù (eds), Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra Otto e Novecento. Contributo a un bilancio storiografico, Roma 1991 (Storia e letteratura, 179), 253–302, at 279. 3 Dewender, Das Problem des Unendlichen, 24–33. See J.E. Murdoch, ‘From Social into Intellectual Factors. An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning,’ in: J.E. Murdoch & E.D. Sylla (eds), The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning. Proceedings of the first International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages, September 1973, Dordrecht 1975 (Boston studies in the philosophy of science, 26), 271–339.

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Because of Buridan’s role in developing a nominalist semantics, the impact of his ideas can hardly be overestimated. To be sure, Ockham was more controversial … But it was Buridan’s careful attention to theoretical detail, coupled with his prudent practical judgment and pedagogical skill, that in his hands could turn Ockham’s innovations into relatively uncontroversial, viable textbook material, capable of laying the foundations of a new, paradigmatically different conception of the relationships between language, thought and reality. And this is what renders the emergence of nominalist semantics the most significant development of late medieval philosophy. In the subsequent two centuries, the new theoretical conflicts that inevitably arose between practitioners of the nominalist ‘modern way’ (via moderna) and those of the realist ‘old way’ (via antiqua) were different in kind from the theoretical conflicts between members within each camp. Conflicts of this kind, to use Wittgenstein’s happy analogy, are no longer about who wins the game, but rather about whose game everybody ought to play.4 Although Klima is obviously writing from a philosophical point of view, his characterization of Buridan seems to fit also Buridan as author of the Quaestiones Physicorum. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jack Zupko writes: Perhaps the most influential Parisian philosopher of the fourteenth century, John Buridan did much to shape the way philosophy was done not only during his own lifetime, but throughout the later scholastic and early modern periods … His most famous work is the Summulae de dialectica (Compendium of Dialectic), a text of astonishing breadth and originality aimed at redeeming the older tradition of Aristotelian logic using the newer, terminist logic of ‘moderns’ such as Peter of Spain and William of Ockham. Buridan applied these analytical techniques so successfully in his metaphysics, natural philosophy, and ethics that, for many of his successors, they were identified with the very method of philosophy, understood as a secular practice, i.e., as distinct from theology.5

4 G. Klima, ‘Nominalist Semantics,’ in: R. Pasnau & C. van Dyke (eds), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, 1, Cambridge 2010, 159–172, at 171–172. 5 J. Zupko, ‘John Buridan,’ in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) (URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/buridan/).

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While Buridan clearly wrote from the perspective of the Faculty of Arts at Paris, was he really unaffected by what was going on at the same time in the Faculty of Theology? A reading of the texts of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum, Books I and II, edited in the present volume, in comparison to contemporary works may complicate the issue of the relation of Buridan’s natural philosophy to theology, a topic that might deserve further investigation.6 In his ‘The Categories, Michael de Massa, and Natural Philosophy at Paris, 1335–1340,’ William J. Courtenay writes: Much of the recent debate over the introduction of Ockham’s thought into Paris and the crisis of the years 1339 and 1340 that led to the so-called anti-Nominalist statute of December 1340 has centered on hermeneutics, semantics, and the logic of propositions. Much of the evidence, however, suggests that a major issue separating the two sides in the debate over Ockham was Ockham’s understanding of the categories and its implications for his natural philosophy. These may seem on the surface, two very different spheres of conflict: hermeneutical principles of language and logic on the one hand, and ontology and natural philosophy on the other. And yet in the eyes of some participants the issues raised in those two spheres were intimately related.7 An examination of Books I and II of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum as edited here helps to make clear just how the logic of propositions and Ockhamist ontology were related. It also provides evidence concerning the relation of Buridan’s thought to that of Ockham. Traditionally, Buridan was understood as the founder of a nominalist ‘Buridan school’ at Paris, with little attention paid to the sources of Buridan’s ideas or doctrinal tendencies. Today, given the state of the evidence, it is difficult to

6 But see also J.M.M.H. Thijssen & J. Zupko, ‘John Buridan, Metaphysician and Natural Philosopher. An Introductory Survey,’ in: J.M.M.H. Thijssen & J. Zupko (eds), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Leiden [etc.] 2001 (Medieval and early modern science, 2), ix–xvii, esp. ix–xi. 7 W.J. Courtenay, ‘The Categories, Michael de Massa, and Natural Philosophy at Paris, 1335– 1340,’ in: J. Biard & I. Rosier-Catach (eds), La tradition médiévale des catégories (XIIe–XVe siècles). Actes du XIIIe Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales (Avignon, 6–10 juin 2000), Louvain-la-Neuve, Paris 2003 (Philosophes médiévaux, 45), 243–260, at 243 (repr. in Id., Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, Leiden [etc.] 2008 [Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 99], 329–346, at 329).

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maintain with confidence that influence always flowed from Buridan to the other Parisians, rather than in the reverse direction. In ‘The Buridan School Reassessed. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony,’ Hans Thijssen writes: Although all I have covered here are a few passages from Buridan’s and Albert’s Quaestiones on the Physics, the main drift of this article is that the common notion of a Buridan school needs to be qualified. I hope that the reader has come to share my thought that the future studies in this area would benefit from a greater readiness to perceive John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Nicole Oresme, Themon Judeus, and Marsilius of Inghen as a small intellectual network of nearly contemporary masters of arts who were familiar with each other’s work and at times responded to one another. This concept seems more adequate than that of a unified Buridan school in explaining the dynamics of conflict and alliance that we encounter in the texts.8 It may ultimately be impossible to distinguish clear lines of influence within this group of nearly contemporary natural philosophers, especially since some manuscripts attribute questions to one of the related authors, while others name a different author—and some manuscripts of questions on the Physics combine questions ascribed elsewhere to one author with questions ascribed elsewhere to a different author.9 More light may be shed on this topic when the editions of the later books of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum are published, as well as the edition of the tertia lectura of Buridan’s Quaestiones on the Physics currently underway by Jean Celeyrette.10 Of course, there was doubtless much transmission of ideas through teaching that did not result in any written product. Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum is in the standard format of fourteenthcentury scholastic quaestiones, which tend to be longer and fewer in number than the questions asked in thirteenth-century works. Much of the content of a scholastic quaestio (using the Latin ‘quaestio’ to refer not just to the question statement but also to the whole discussion and reply) is a repetition with variation of previous quaestiones. The question statement itself is often identical or 8 9 10

J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘The Buridan School Reassessed. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony,’ Vivarium, 42 (2004), 18–42, at 42. See Hans Thijssen’s introduction in the present volume, XV–XVI. As announced in the introduction to Nicole Oresme, Questiones super Physicam (Books I– VII), ed. S. Caroti, J. Celeyrette, S. Kirschner & E. Mazet, Leiden [etc.] 2013 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 112), xxi, n. 29.

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similar to questions in earlier and later commentaries. The question statement is then followed by what are called ‘principal arguments,’ which are usually in favor of an answer to the question that the author will ultimately reject. Then come the distinctions, definitions, and conclusions that the author cites in the ‘determination’ or answer to the question. These may be similar to distinctions, definitions, and conclusions of previous commentators or they may differ. It follows from this structure that to understand the significance of any scholastic question commentary, it is worthwhile to know what earlier, contemporary, and later commentators included in their quaestiones, so that, for the given commentary, the similarity to and difference from other commentaries may emerge. As a first step in this Guide, I have attempted to locate the passages in Aristotle’s Physics and in Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, where relevant, which led to Buridan’s question. I have next looked through a number of question commentaries (or more rarely expositiones on the Physics) and listed the titles of questions that appear to be similar. In a few but by no means all cases, I have looked over the contents of the questions and not only their statement. The authors whose questions are listed are by no means all who might be listed—authors chosen are frequently those whose questions are available in printed form. The authors may be roughly divided into three categories: (1) those whose questions are clearly before the questions of Buridan and the other Parisian authors; (2) those roughly contemporary with Buridan, and (3) those who come some decades or more after Buridan, but show some influence from Buridan. On the cusp between groups (1) and (2) are John of Jandun, William of Ockham, and Walter Burley, with John the Canon (whose real name was Francesc Marbres, see below) as a probable witness to that juncture. Among Buridan’s questions on Books I and II, quite a few he has in common with Aristotelian commentators from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. When authors in category (2) address some new questions, the most common source of the new questions is William of Ockham. In category (3) Lawrence of Lindores and Benedictus Hesse follow Buridan very closely. The author of the commentary ascribed to a certain Johannes Marsilius [Inguen] is not as close. On the cusp between groups (1) and (2).—In the early 1300s, Walter Burley had been a fellow of Merton College at Oxford, where he wrote a number of commentaries on Aristotle’s works, including an exposition and questions on Aristotle’s Physics, as well as a number of logical works. Burley’s early Expositio et quaestiones librorum Physicorum is extant only in manuscript Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, cod. 448 (409), so I have not made great use of it here. But Burley afterwards went to Paris to study theology and there

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taught the Physics, resulting in his final Expositio in libros octo De phisico auditu, printed eleven times between 1476 and 1609.11 In his final Expositio Burley complains loudly about Ockham’s innovations in the realm of physics. Books I–IV of the final Expositio were completed by March 2, 1326. I take this work as the first hard evidence of the reception of Ockham’s ideas on natural philosophy at Paris.12 Of the known and printed Parisian commentaries on the Physics from the early to the mid-1300s that may provide evidence of what Buridan was exposed to as a student before the reception of Ockham’s innovations, an appropriate one is that of John of Jandun, which reveals what was going on at Paris before the influence of Ockham was felt.13 For almost two-thirds of Buridan’s questions on Book I of the Physics (15 of 24), questions with the same or very similar titles can be found in Jandun’s commentary (see following table).

Book I John Buridan I.3

I.5

I.6 I.7

11

12 13

Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis vel quid aliud Utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oporteat scire omnes causas eius Utrum sint eadem notiora nobis et naturae Utrum universalia sint nobis notiora singularibus

John of Jandun I.2

Utrum ens mobile vel corpus mobile sit scientiae naturalis subiectum

I.3

Utrum ad perfectam scientiam de aliquo causato omnes causas cognoscere oporteat Utrum eadem notiora simpliciter sint et quoad nos Utrum universalia notiora quoad nos sint ipsis singularibus

I.4 I.5

Walter Burley, Expositio et quaestiones librorum Physicorum, manuscript Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, cod. 448 (409), 172–543, and Id., Expositio in libros octo De phisico auditu, Venezia 1501 (repr. Hildesheim 1972). See E.D. Sylla, ‘Walter Burley’s Practice as a Commentator on Aristotle’s Physics,’ Medioevo, 27 (2002), 301–372. John the Canon may also be a witness, particularly since he names so many contemporary individuals. See John of Jandun, Quaestiones super 8 libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venezia 1551 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1969).

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Book I John Buridan I.9

Utrum totum sit suae partes

I.11

Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum I.12 Utrum omnia entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum I.13 Utrum entia naturalia determinata sint ad minimum I.14 Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sint contraria I.15 Utrum necesse sit omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito. Vel alii formant sic quaestionem: utrum possibile sit ex nihilo aliquid fieri I.16 Utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium, non plura nec pauciora I.20 Utrum materia prima sit ens I.22 Utrum materia sit potentia ad formam generandam

I.23 Utrum privatio sit materia privata I.24 Utrum materia appetat formam

John of Jandun I.10 I.14 I.16 I.16 I.18

Utrum totum distinguatur a suis partibus vel cum illis idem sit Utrum infinitum sit ignotum Utrum naturalia ad maximum et minimum terminata sint Utrum naturalia ad maximum et minimum terminata sint Utrum rerum naturalium principia sint contraria

I.22 Utrum ex non ente simpliciter sive ex nihilo aliquid fiat

I.21

Utrum principia rerum naturalium tantum tria sint I.19 Utrum materia prima sit ens I.25 Utrum potentia materiae essentialiter sit idem cum ipsa substantia materiae—I.26 Utrum materia habeat in se infinitas potentias I.23 Utrum privatio sit rerum naturalium principium I.27 Utrum materia ipsa formam appetat

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In Book II, Jandun has six questions (just under half of Buridan’s questions) with titles similar to those in Buridan:

Book II John Buridan II.4

Utrum definitio naturae sit bona qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens’ II.6 Utrum naturalis differat a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus sine motu II.7 Utrum finis sit causa II.9 Utrum definitio fortunae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens secundum propositum extra semper et frequenter eorum quae propter hoc sunt’ II.12 Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat monstrum II.13 Utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex fine vel ex materia

14

15 16

John of Jandun II.1

Utrum definitio naturae sit bona

II.4

Utrum entia mathematicalia sint abstracta a sensibilibus14

II.10 Utrum finis sit causa15 II.12 Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae per accidens16

II.14 Utrum monstra sint intenta a natura II.15 Utrum rei naturalis necessitas ex eius materia quoquo modo dependeat

Jandun has another question on mathematics and a hint of a third. Question II.5. is: An entia mathematicalia sint abstracta a materia intelligibili aut debeant definiri per materiam intelligibilem. Question II.7 (Utrum naturalis philosophus habeat considerare materiam primam) starts out as follows: ‘Utrum istae scientiae mediae sint magis naturales quam mathematicae, sed de hoc quaeretur cum sophismatibus, et quaeretur nunc circa sequens capitulum Quoniam autem natura dupliciter dicitur. Et primo quaeratur utrum naturalis philosophus habeat considerare materiam primam’ (Jandun, Quaestiones Physicorum, 34rb). This is question II.10 in Jandun, apparently occurring so late because he had not had time for it earlier. Question II.13 asks: Utrum natura agat propter finem. In question II.11, Jandun asks: Utrum in coelestibus corporibus contingant aliqua casualia et fortuita.

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Most of the questions that Jandun and Buridan have in common may be categorized as questions that arise either from wanting to emphasize an important point in Aristotle’s text or from wanting to clear up an obscure point. A few questions may have had sources in Averroes’ comments. Of all the questions in both Jandun and Buridan, most are also in Radulphus Brito’s commentary on the Physics (I.3, I.5, I.6, I.9, I.14–16, I.20, I.23–24, II.6, II.7, II.12, and II.13), while most of those not in Brito are found in Roger Bacon and/or Thomas Wylton. Only two questions appear first in Jandun: ‘Whether all natural entities are determined to a maximum and a minimum’ (I.16) and ‘Whether chance and fortune are causes per accidens’ (II.12). In the second case, the question obviously arises from the text. Of the questions in Buridan that are not in Jandun, a significant fraction find their likely source in Ockham, either directly or possibly via Walter Burley, Nicole Oresme, or Albert of Saxony. Of the questions in Buridan’s Book I that do not have counterparts in Jandun, the first two questions do not pertain in particular to Book I of the Physics, but were questions like those often asked at the start about any of Aristotle’s books, covering topics often included in expositiones, such as describing the subject of the following book. Actually, Jandun’s first question, ‘Whether there may be science of natural things’ (Utrum de rebus naturalibus possit esse scientia), held the place in his Quaestiones held by questions I.1, I.2, and I.4 in Buridan’s commentary, although the specific questions asked and many of the issues dealt with as well as the analytical tools used are not the same. When Buridan comes to question I.4, he acknowledges that he has descended to the text proper (descendendo ad textum). Buridan’s question I.10 about personal identity when the parts of the human body change diverges from Aristotle’s text to discuss a particular example, but it also raises the more general question of numerical identity. Questions I.17, I.18, and I.19 raise issues related to the logica modernorum, the supposition of terms, and ontological minimalism. Buridan assumes that there is no accident existing in the outside world for which the word ‘generation’ supposits. ‘Substantial generation’ supposits for the substantial form generated, he writes (I.17) and ‘to generate’ supposits for the generator (I.18). In response to question I.19, Buridan expounds Aristotle’s statement that matter is not made, nor form, but the composite, in part by saying that what Aristotle says corresponds to common speech rather than being technically precise. In question I.21, Buridan rejects the idea of Anaxagoras that there is a bit of everything in everything, as well as Albert the Great’s concept of incomplete form preceding generation. In general, in the questions Buridan shares with Jandun and in his new questions, Buridan’s responses are distinguished from those of Jandun by the

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use he makes of the logica modernorum and, more specifically, of nominalist semantics. Clearly, Buridan worked on the basis of previous sets of questions on the Physics, as well as from the text of the Physics itself, not to mention other works by Aristotle and earlier questions on these other works. But to this material he added questions to which the logica modernorum could be fruitfully applied. Of the seven questions in Buridan’s Book II that are not found in Jandun, Buridan’s questions II.1–3 and II.5 do not arise naturally out of Aristotle’s text: in questions II.1–3 Buridan responds to issues that had been raised by Ockham concerning the existence of added forms of artificial things, and in question II.5 he deals with a problem that had previously been discussed in commentaries on the Sentences (and also by Walter Burley in his Tractatus primus) whether qualitative forms can generate new substantial forms in the absence of substantial forms. In question II.8, Buridan discusses whether the father is the cause of the son, which is one way of asking whether something, to be considered an (efficient) cause, must exist at the time of the relevant effect or proposition concerning it. Questions II.10 and II.11 follow question II.9 in addressing Aristotle’s chapters on chance and fortune. Jandun had a second question on chance and fortune, namely his question II.11, ‘Whether in the celestial bodies any chance and fortune occur’ (Utrum in coelestibus corporibus contingant aliqua casualia et fortuita), a question that arose from the text associated with Averroes’ comment 46.17 Then, instead of a third question on chance and fortune, Jandun turned to the difficulty of supposing final causes in inanimate natural things that cannot recognize ends.18 Buridan’s question II.10, then, ‘Whether chance and fortune are causal agents’ (Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes), which he answers by concluding that they are efficient causes, does not seem to represent a novel approach. His question II.11, ‘Whether chance and fortune are found in what is equally likely to occur or not to occur, or only in contingencies that rarely occur or less often than not’ (Utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet vel solum in contingentibus raro vel ut in paucioribus), arises, he says, from a disagreement between Avicenna and Averroes. This question was

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Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 46, in: Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, 4, Venezia 1562–1574 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1962), 65L–M. Jandun, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.13, 38rb: ‘Quaeritur hic primo utrum natura agat propter finem. Arguitur primo quod non quia: quod non cognoscit finem non agit propter finem.’

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present also in the commentary of Radulphus Brito.19 Overall, then, Buridan’s main divergence from the question list found in Jandun for Book II concerns his attention to artificial things and to the question whether qualities can bring about substantial forms. Conversely, nearly all of the questions that appear in Jandun but not in Buridan are questions that might arise naturally from the texts of Aristotle and Averroes. Jandun seems to have surprisingly many questions about prime matter. It might be noted that Oresme’s last question on Book I (I.21) is whether prime matter determines for itself some quantity (Utrum prima materia sibi determinet aliquam quantitatem), on which topic he has some interesting insights.20 Aristotle’s Books I and II are of similar length, but Buridan’s questions on Book I are more than twice as long as his questions on Book II. Buridan obviously paid Book II less attention, but Jandun too has nearly twice as much on Book I as on Book II. Given that Buridan and others lecturing on Aristotle’s Physics at Paris at this time produced expositions of Aristotle’s text, as well as independent questions, it was not necessary that a person responsible for a series of questions on a given text raise all the questions that the given text might give rise to. When, as is the case with Buridan’s questions II.4 and II.9, the question is framed to ask whether Aristotle’s definitions (of nature and of fortune, respectively) are good, one could suppose that the master’s purpose is to take advantage of a second opportunity to explain and justify Aristotle’s positions. In the case of other questions on the text, there was already a history of earlier commentators disagreeing about the proper view to take on the issues raised by the text, so that Buridan, in effect, takes a position within the field of alternative views expressed by earlier commentators. Marsilius of Inghen, in his Abbreviationes of questions on the Physics, lists the questions that are ‘usually asked’ (queri solet) at various points. Walter Burley’s final Expositio of the Physics, resulting from lectures he gave at Paris in the 1320s, contains only shorter doubts and not long questions, but, as mentioned above, provides as part of the exposition evidence of the introduction of the ideas of William of Ockham into the Parisian milieu. I do not know of a Parisian commentary on the Physics before Buridan that shows the influence of Ockham and takes a nominalist position. However, in the student notebook of Etienne Gaudet found in manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 16621, there are found a short excerpt from Ockham’s Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, material from Oresme’s Quaestiones 19 20

Walter Burley explains the origin of the puzzle in Aristotle’s wording. See below, CLXX, n. 209. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.21, 161–167.

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super Physicam, and Buridan’s work De puncto, which is supposed to have been written about 1335.21 There are few questions in Ockham’s Quaestiones on the Physics related to Books I and II (Ockham’s questions on the Physics are not organized by Aristotle’s books). Because there is evidence that Burley knew Ockham’s work at Paris in the 1320s, but there is little agreement about which works in particular he knew, I also note in what follows discussions similar to Buridan’s found in Ockham’s Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis. An example of how Burley’s doubts may cast light on the sources of Buridan’s questions is his third doubt on Book II: But one may doubt this, because modern philosophers say that artificial things do not bring in things or forms distinct from natural things to their subjects. And they try to show this in many ways. First because artificial things either are made by the combination of natural things with each other, as in a bed or a house or a castle, or something of this sort. Or they are made by subtraction of parts from a whole, as when a statue [is carved]. Or they are made by transfiguration, as when, without any addition or removal, something is changed from one figure to another. But in whichever of these ways artificial things are made, in no way is there a new form.22

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See William of Ockham, Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Prologus et libri I–III, ed. V. Richter & G. Leibold, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1985 (Opera philosophica, 4), 8*. See also J. Celeyrette, ‘La Questio de puncto de Michel de Montecalerio en réponse à Jean Buridan,’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale e littéraire du Moyen Age, 75 (2008), 369–449, at 370, and Id., ‘An Indivisibilist Argumentation at Paris around 1335: Michel of Montecalerio’s Question on Point and the Controversy with John Buridan,’ in: C. Grellard & A. Robert (eds), Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Leiden [etc.] 2009 (Medieval and early modern science, 9), 163–182, at 166. In De puncto Buridan accepts Ockham’s view that ‘point’ is a privative term (164). Burley, Expositio in Physicam (1501), 37ra: ‘Sed circa hoc contingit dubitare, quia moderni philosophantes dicunt quod res artificiales non important res vel formas distinctas a rebus naturalibus tanquam a suis subiectis. Et hoc intendunt multipliciter declarare. Primo quoniam artificialia vel fiunt per coniunctionem rerum naturalium ad invicem, ut scamnum, domus vel castrum et huiusmodi. Vel fiunt per substractionem partium ab aliquo toto sicut statua. Vel fiunt per transfigurationem, ut cum aliquid sine aliqua additione vel ablatione mutatur de una figura in aliam. Sed quocumque istorum modorum fiant res artificiales, nullo modo fit aliqua forma nova.’ Cf. S. Caroti, ‘Modi rerum e res artificiales in alcuni commenti parigini alla Physica del secolo XIV,’ in: S. Caroti & R. Pinzani (eds), Ob rogatum meorum sociorum. Studi in memoria di Lorenzo Pozzi, Milano 2000 (Collana del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università di Parma, 17), 190–213.

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A note in the margin of the Basel manuscript of Burley’s Expositio identifies the ‘modern philosophers’ (moderni philosophantes) as ‘Hocham.’23 And indeed, what Burley reports concerning what ‘modern philosophers’ say is found in three places in Ockham’s work on the Physics, but most completely in his Expositio, near the start of Book II. Ockham’s argument, as reported by Burley—whether artificial things such as houses have a new distinct form beyond the forms of their components—lies behind Buridan’s first and third questions on Book II (questions which are not found in John of Jandun). Ockham’s particular argument about artificial things being made by combining previously existing things, by subtracting from a previously existing thing, or by simply moving around parts of an existing thing, is not found as such in Buridan’s questions, but it is found in Albert of Saxony’s related question.24 Similar precedents in the work of Ockham can be found for other questions found in Buridan but not in Jandun. Authors roughly contemporary with Buridan (category 2).—The current scholarly consensus is that the Quaestiones on the Physics of Nicole Oresme, which make frequent use of the concept of ‘modi rerum,’ must have been composed before the condemnation of John of Mirecourt in 1347, which cast a shadow over modi rerum.25 Jürgen Sarnowsky has argued that one version of Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones on the Physics provides evidence that he knew Buridan’s tertia lectura on the Physics, while Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum (secundum ultimam lecturam) reveal knowledge of Albert’s Quaestiones. Thus, despite the fact of Buridan’s having compiled earlier versions of his questions that preceded the commentaries of Oresme and Albert of Saxony, the version of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum edited in the present volume may well be reacting to Oresme and/or Albert.26 Since the Quaestiones of Oresme have recently

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Manuscript Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. F.II.30, 35v. See [Albert of Saxony], Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam ad Albertum de Saxonia attributae, II.4 (Utrum res artificiales distinguantur a rebus naturalibus), ed. B. Patar, Louvain-la-Neuve, Leuven 1999 (Philosophes médiévaux, 40), 325: ‘Secunda conclusio: quaelibet res artificialis est ens naturale vel entia naturalia. Probatur: pro cuius probatione supponatur primo quod rerum artificialium quaedam sunt per coniunctionem plurium rerum naturalium, sicut est domus; quaedam vero per ablationem aliquarum partium, sicut fiunt sculpturae et imagines; quaedam vero per solam transpositionem partium seu aliam situationem partium, sicut fit (sit ed.) figura cerae per impressionem sigilli.’ See the introduction to Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, xxv (and n. 52). See J. Sarnowsky, Die Aristotelisch-Scholastische Theorie der Bewegung. Studien zum Kommentar Alberts von Sachsen zur Physik des Aristoteles, Münster 1989 (Beiträge zur Ge-

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been published from the sole known manuscript, special attention is paid to them in this Guide. On the other hand, since the situation of the questions of Albert of Saxony and of Marsilius of Inghen remains much less obvious, less will be said about them. Perhaps the publication of this edition of Buridan’s work, when it is complete, will provide the basis for later comparisons with the commentaries of Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and of the various other members of the Parisian group. One aspect of Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam is worth reporting at this point, namely that in the text Oresme mentions Ockham and Walter [i.e., Burley] by name and in addition scribes have sometimes written their names in the margins. Here are some examples: 1. In Oresme’s question I.13, ‘Whether of any natural transmutation there are only three principles or if there are three principles of natural things’ (Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis sint tantum tria principia vel si sint tria principia rerum naturalium),27 Aristotle is said to have implied that there are three principles, namely matter (or the subject), the form that is induced in the subject, and the privation of the form existing earlier. Others, however, argued that there are only two principles, namely the matter (or subject) and the form introduced—this on the grounds that privation seems to be nothing. Averroes in his comment 77 had said that privation is not a principle of natural transtamution. Oresme continues: ‘Against this Ockham would argue that transmutation is nothing but the thing transformed, namely the matter; but of matter there are not three principles.’28 2. Beyond Books I and II, Oresme refers to Ockham in connection with Book III.6, ‘Whether motion is a successive thing or a flux distinct from permanent

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schichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, n. F., 32), 50–51. Thijssen, ‘The Buridan School Reassessed,’ 40–41, sets Buridan’s tertia lectura about 1350, Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum shortly after 1351, and Buridan’s ultima lectura composed sometime between 1352 and 1357. See also Hans Thijssen’s introduction in the present volume, XVII–XVIII. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.13, 94–103. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.13, 97–98: ‘Secundo infero quod privatio non est principium per se transmutationis naturalis; et hoc dicit Commentator commento 77, sed bene est principium per accidens rei generate. Contra hoc argueret Ocham: transmutatio non est nisi res transmutata, scilicet materia; sed materie non sunt tria principia; ergo transmutationis non sunt tria principia.’ The editors provide a reference to Ockham, Expositio, I, cap. 15, § 10, 167. What Ockham is arguing here is similar to what Buridan argues in his question I.18.

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things, such as the mobile and the thing acquired, to which the motion is [directed]’ (Utrum motus sit res successiva sive fluxus distinctus a rebus permanentibus, cuiusmodi sunt mobile et res acquisita, ad quam est motus).29 Against the idea of a successive thing is the argument that the parts of a flux do not exist, because one part is always in the past and the other future. Therefore one can respond to Aristotle by distinguishing, as Ockham, saying some things exist not perfectly but incompletely, of which something is always future as in successive things.30 3. Earlier, in connection with his question I.5, ‘Whether being is univocal to substance and quality’ (Utrum ens sit univocum ad substantiam et ad accidens),31 Oresme uses the word ‘occamica’ (Ockhamist) in saying: ‘Nor is the Ockhamist gloss valid by which it would be said that “ens” is said equivocally of a collective multitude and of one thing.’32 This fits with Buridan’s discussion of artificial things—a house may be one artificial thing although it is in fact many natural things, namely, stones, pieces of wood, etc. 4. With regard to Oresme’s question I.9, ‘Whether the knowing of any whole depends on the cognition of its parts’ (Utrum cuiuslibet totius notitia dependeat ex cognitione suarum partium),33 Oresme cites Burley in proving his third conclusion that it is not necessary to know all the homogeneous quantitative parts distinctly: ‘Third if it were necessary to know the parts of homogeneous parts, such that by parts in act would be understood parts that can

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Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, III.6, 331–335. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, III.6, 335: ‘Quinto partes talis fluxus non sunt, quia una est preterita et alia est futura. Respondetur quod eodem modo arguitur de sono quod non est, ideo respondetur distinguendo ad Aristotelem, sicut Ocham: aliqua dicuntur esse non in actu perfecto sed incompleto, cuius semper aliquid est futurum, cuiusmodi sunt successiva.’ The editors suggest as a source for this passage Ockham’s Tractatus de successivis, ed. Ph. Boehner, The Tractatus de successivis attributed to William Ockham, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1944 (Franciscan Institute Publications. Philosophy Series, 1), 64, and q. 38 of the Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1984 (Opera philosophica, 6), 49735–40. In the latter work, Ockham quotes Averroes, In Physicam, IV, comm. 88, saying that successives like motion and time do not have complete being, but that they are completed by the action of the mind (animae). Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.5, 31–39. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.5, 35–36: ‘Nec valet glosa occamica qua diceretur quod “ens” dicitur equivoce de multitudine collectiva et de re una.’ The editors here refer to Ockham’s Summa logicae, I, 38, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál & S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1974 (Opera philosophica, 1), 107. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.9, 62–70.

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exist per se, as Walter says, then we would know nothing, because I don’t know how many parts there are in a man, but they are infinite for us.’34 The editors of Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam suggest other passages in Ockham and Burley corresponding to passages in which Oresme does not associate a name with an opinion. For instance, in the body of Oresme’s question II.4, ‘Whether artificial things are distinguished from natural things’ (Utrum artificialia distinguantur a naturalibus), the editors suggest Burley for ‘those who think that an artificial form is a real accident’ and Ockham for ‘others for whom it is only a word predicated by accident or contingently.’35 The relevant point here is that Oresme is very aware of some of Ockham’s main theses relating to the supposition of terms in propositions in connection with physics. Given the degree of similarity between the existing written quaestiones of Buridan, Oresme, and Albert of Saxony, it appears beyond question that a given Master of Arts teaching Aristotle’s Physics at Paris not only had previously listened to lectures providing expositions of the Physics (at Paris or elsewhere) and not only had been present at disputations of questions on the Physics, but also had on his desk or in a nearby library manuscript copies of the quaestiones of earlier masters, whether in the form of reportationes (listener’s notes) or as ordinationes (versions edited by the presiding masters). Even some students likely had access to such manuscript copies. Thus new sets of quaestiones were not freshly created out of whole cloth. In Buridan’s case in particular, his Quaestiones Physicorum certainly contains whole sentences and passages surviving from his teaching twenty or even thirty years earlier. As already noticed, Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones almost certainly were composed starting from a base in an earlier version of Buridan’s Quaestiones, while Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum (secundum ultimam lecturam) were apparently composed knowing what Albert of Saxony had included in his Quaestiones.36 Evidence that Buridan knew Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam will be pointed out below, for instance concerning ques-

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Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.9, 69: ‘Tertio si oporteret cognoscere partes partium homogenearum, ita quod per partes actu intelligerentur partes per se potentes existere, sicut dicit Galterius, tunc nihil cognosceremus, quia ego nescio quot sunt partes in homine, sed infinite sunt quoad nos.’ The editors provide a reference to Burley, Expositio in Physicam (1501), 20rb. Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, II.4, 192. See Sarnowsky, Die Aristotelisch-Scholastische Theorie der Bewegung, 50–51. See also above, LVI.

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tion I.4.37 Less will be said about the relation of Buridan’s questions to those of Albert of Saxony or Marsilius of Inghen, because of the remaining uncertainties about authors and chronology, and because others are currently hard at work on these questions.38 John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and Themon Judaeus have been classified by historians as Parisian ‘nominalists,’ ‘Ockhamists,’ or, insofar as they were known in later periods, as ‘moderni.’ There is no doubt that Ockham’s ideas and approaches influenced the moderni at Paris even though there is no evidence to show that Ockham was ever physically present in Paris, unless on his way to Avignon.39 There is no doubt that 37 38

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See the introduction to Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, xxv (and especially the references in n. 52). The current scholarly consensus is that there are extant at least two versions of Buridan’s Quaestiones, and there probably once existed at least two versions each of the Quaestiones of Nicole Oresme and of Albert of Saxony. The work printed in 1518 (reprinted by Minerva in 1964, and mistakenly included in the Opera omnia of John Duns Scotus) with the title Quaestiones subtilissimae Johannis Marcilii Inguen super octo libros Physicorum secundum nominalium viam is now thought not to belong to Marsilius of Inghen, but to an unknown author. Here I propose to identify Johannes Marsilius Inguen with one Johannes Marsilii (or Marcilii) associated with the University of Prague at the end of the fourteenth century (see below). Authentically by Marsilius of Inghen is now thought to be Marsilius of Inghen, Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venezia 1521, which begins, ‘Incipiunt subtiles doctrinaque plenae abbreviationes Physicorum editae a praestantissimo philosopho Marsilio inguem doctore Parisiensi.’ The Abbreviationes does not have separate questions, but groups of doubts, often introduced by a phrase like ‘Iuxta quod quaeri solet utrum extensio substantiae sit res distincta a substantia extensa,’ 3vb. The abbreviation of Books I and II fills ff. 2r–8r. Most of the doubts correspond to questions in Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum. They are listed individually in the following guide, but they do not always correspond to the abbreviation as it exists. See J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘The Short Redaction of John Buridan’s Questions on the Physics and their Relation to the Questions on the Physics Attributed to Marsilius of Inghen,’Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 52 (1985), 237–266, and Th. Dewender, ‘Einige Bemerkungen zur Authentizität der Physikkommentare, die Marsilius von Inghen zugeschrieben werden,’ in: S. Wielgus (ed.), Marsilius von Inghen, Werk und Wirkung. Akten des Zweiten Internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, Lublin 1993, 245–269. See W.J. Courtenay, ‘The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham,’ in: P.V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, Cambridge 1999, 17–30 (repr. in Id., Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, Leiden [etc.] 2008 [Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 99], 91–105). Courtenay (Ockham and Ockhamism, 100) writes: ‘The normal route from London to Avignon would have taken Ockham through Paris, which was probably his first direct contact with that university city and convent.’

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Ockham’s work influenced the Quaestiones Physicorum of Buridan, and likewise the Quaestiones on the Physics of the other Parisian moderni, which is not to say that they always agreed with Ockham.40 Did some of Ockham’s ideas have an impact at Paris as early as the 1320s while others were not received until the 1330s or until the 1340s, when they appear in the commentary on the Sentences of Gregory of Rimini?41 We know that when Walter Burley lectured on the Physics at Paris in the 1320s, he revised what he had said about the Physics earlier (probably at Oxford in the first decade of the fourteenth century) to protest Ockham’s nominalist innovations.42 By the time of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum (secundum ultimam lecturam) several waves of reaction and counter reaction to Ockham and Ockhamists had swept through Paris. William J. Courtenay has studied the presence in Paris of Ockham’s ideas and of Ockhamism particularly through the lens of censures and statutes, especially the ‘Ockhamist’ statutes around 1339–1341.43 Was there a group of masters or students at the university that considered themselves, or were considered by others, to be ‘Ockhamists’? As mentioned above, the word ‘occamica’ appears in the text of Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam as well as in university 40

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William J. Courtenay, in particular, has devoted considerable attention to the influence, or lack of influence, of Ockham and Ockhamists in Paris. See his ‘The Debate over Ockham’s Physical Theories at Paris,’ in: S. Caroti & P. Souffrin (eds), La nouvelle physique du XIVe siècle, Firenze 1997 (Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, 24), 45–63 (repr. in Id., Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, Leiden [etc.] 2008 [Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 99], 267–284). See also E.D. Sylla, ‘Transmission of the New Physics of the Fourteenth Century from England to the Continent,’ in: S. Caroti & P. Souffrin (eds), La nouvelle physique du XIVe siècle, Firenze 1997 (Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, 24), 65–110. For the influences of the Oxford Calculators on Parisian theology, see J.E. Murdoch, ‘Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons,’ in: M.P. Cosman & B. Chandler (eds), Machaut’s World. Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century, New York 1978 (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 314), 50–86. Cf. Courtenay, ‘The Debate,’ and Id., ‘The role of English Thought in the Transformation of University Education in the Late Middle Ages,’ in: J.M. Kittelson & P.J. Transue (eds), Rebirth, Reform and Resilience. Universities in Transition 1300–1700, Columbus (OH) 1984, 103–162, at 121–122: ‘It is one of the striking things about Gregory’s commentary that it is the first at Paris to reflect this new interest and may be in part the means by which others were stimulated to look into the important contributions of recent English thought.’ See R. Wood, ‘Walter Burley’s Physics Commentaries,’ Franciscan Studies, 44 (1984), 275– 327, and Sylla, ‘Walter Burley’s Practice.’ See chapters 9–15 in Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism, 157–346.

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documents or their rubrics. What was the activity lying behind the use of such a term? Did it relate to the Faculty of Arts or to the Faculty of Theology, or to both? This leads to another group of questions that have to do with the impact of theology, and in particular of censures, on the work of members of the Faculty of Arts such as Buridan, who was a secular, never joined a religious order, and never studied theology. Stefano Caroti and the other editors of Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam confidently date them to before 1347 on the grounds that in that year John of Mirecourt was censured in part for making use of the concept of ‘modi rerum.’ This concept is freely used in Oresme’s Quaestiones on the Physics, but not in his later works. Was there any impact on Buridan? After the reception of nominalist semantics in Paris and before 1347, there were two extremes to the understanding of what accidents and motions or other actions might consist in. On the one hand, accidents, motions or other actions could be real forms inhering in substances and, on the other hand, they could be nothing in the external world, or nothing beyond the substances involved, but only concepts in human minds, or words. Oresme in his Quaestiones super Physicam, can be understood as favoring a middle way, in which a ‘mode of a thing’ is less than a real thing and yet actual (those who study Oresme write of ‘degrees of being’). From this perspective, one might say that when Socrates is sitting, sitting is a mode of Socrates’ presence in place, but not a real form inhering in his body. When John of Mirecourt made use of modi rerum in his commentary on the Sentences, he was censured for saying that this approach would be probable or worthy of consideration, faith aside. Mirecourt had written in his commentary on the Sentences that there are three different ways in which the semantics of intellection or sensation may be understood. In the first sense intellections and sensations are actions of the intellective and sensitive powers. In the second sense, intellection and sensation are nothing, or no things. Rather they are modi se habendi rerum.44 In the third sense, which according to Mirecourt

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Cf. S. Caroti, ‘Les modi rerum … encore une fois. Une source possible de Nicole Oresme: le commentaire sur le livre 1er des Sentences de Jean de Mirecourt,’ in: S. Caroti & J. Celeyrette (eds), Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio. Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle, Firenze 2004 (Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, 52), 195–222. See also S. Kirschner, ‘A Possible Trace of Oresme’s Condicio-Theory of Accidents in an Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology,’ Vivarium, 46 (2010), 349–367. Kirschner suggests (353) that Mirecourt might have got the idea of modi rerum from Oresme rather than the reverse.

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is the common one, intellection and sensation are qualities existing in the soul, which God can independently cause to exist and put wherever God wishes.45 Mirecourt does not say more about the first approach, but we can hazard the guess that it was rejected by those, like Ockham, who argued that the only really existing things are substances and qualitative forms. If, according to the third sense, the intellection of a human being or the illumination caused by a light source is a real qualitative form existing in the mind or in the medium, then God could cause that intellection or illumination directly without a secondary cause. But then neither the intellection nor the illumination could be said to be caused by the mind or the light source. In that case a person could hate God without demerit (if God, and not the individual, caused that hatred to exist in the person or at least allowed it to happen). The second opinion avoids the morally undesirable consequences of the third opinion, and Mirecourt says he would prefer it, if he dared. This apparently was not acceptable to some critics, who reasoned that the second approach would limit God’s absolute power to cause accidents to exist independently of substances (something that is supposed by faith to take place in the Eucharist). A mode of being seems not to be a real independent feature of the world if it cannot pass the test that God can cause to exist separately any real thing. Not even God can cause sitting to exist without anything sitting. How can there be a grin without a body (as the grin of the Cheshire Cat sometimes appears in Alice in Wonderland)? In his second apology Mirecourt says, not that he finds to be very persuasive the view that thinking or will is not a thing distinct from the soul, nor that it is a view held by many wise thinkers, and so forth, but only that the view is probable 45

See F. Stegmüller, ‘Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt,’ Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 5 (1933), 40–78, 192–204, at 67: ‘(1) Quod intellectio creata sit actio potentiae intellectivae et sensatio sit actio potentiae sensitivae. (2) Alia opinio posset esse et forte, si liceret eam ponere, multum probabilis, quae poneret quod actio nihil est nec motus nec intellectio, sed modi se habendi rerum, et ista opinio … diceret quod nullam actionem causae secundae posset Deus agere se solo … (3) Alia opinio posset esse, quae communiter tenetur, quod intellectio non est actio nec volitio nec sensatio, sed sunt quaedam qualitates subiective (summe ed.) existentes in anima, quas Deus posset causare se solo et ponere ubicumque vellet. Et illa opinio … diceret quod Deus se solo facere posset quod anima intelligeret obiectum et odiret proximum et etiam Deum, sed non demeritorie, et etiam quod erraret; et multa talium non haberet haec opinio pro inconvenientibus. Neutram istarum opinionum assero, licet prima magis placeat multis modernis. Secundam tamen libentius dicerem, si auderem. Eligat studens quam voluerit’ (Sent. I, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1, prop. 1 & 3).

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in the sense that its opposite is not known to be true, nor is its opposite an article of faith, and so forth.46 If this seems complicated (and I have omitted several clauses from my paraphrase), Mirecourt’s statement of his preferred position in his first apology is even more complicated. There the questionable proposition that Mirecourt is said to have endorsed is a straightforwardly Ockhamist position that every thing that exists is a permanent thing and that all motion is the mobile or what is acquired by motion.47 Again there are three ways in which such a position may be applied to intellection. The first way is like the third way in the first apology, making intellection to be a quality existing in the mind, which has the implication that God could bring it about that a man hated God (had the quality in his mind) without being responsible or guilty. The holders of this position think this result is not unreasonable (inconveniens). The second opinion assumes that there are such qualities, but that there are also actions accompanying them. It is not enough to have a quality in the mind, but the mind has to be bringing it about. Similarly if God acting alone brought about heat like that of fire, it would not be the heat of fire, because fire did not cause it. The third opinion is like the second, except that the action that accompanies the quality is said to be nothing and moreover that no action of a creature is an absolute thing. Mirecourt says that if it were not so unaccustomed he would prefer the third position, to say that action is not any thing, rather than saying it is the thing produced or the agent.48 There is much more in Mirecourt’s apologies, but Caroti highlights the questioned propositions that involve modi rerum and an expressed preference for more extreme claims that motions and actions are nothing, or no thing in the external world, because he takes them (and Mirecourt’s censure) as a possible 46

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See Stegmüller, ‘Die zwei Apologien,’ 200–201: ‘Vicesima sexta: Quod probabiliter potest sustineri cogitationem vel volitionem non esse rem distinctam ab anima, immo quod est ipsamet anima; et sic sustinens non cogeretur negare aliquam propositionem per se notam, nec aliquam auctoritatem admittendam.—Unus sensus potest esse iste, quod hoc sustinerent multi sapientes, et istum non habui, immo quicumque sustinerent hoc, proterve videntur sustinere, potissime cum rationes meliores sint ad oppositum et dicta sanctorum magis expressa, quae oporteret distorte glossare et contra mentem eorum exponere.— Alius sensus potest esse iste, quod oppositum eius non est scitum, nec est articulus fidei, nec talis propositio, quae non possit glossari vel exponi, et sic cepi ly “probabiliter.”’ See Stegmüller, ‘Die zwei Apologien,’ 67: ‘Quadragesima quinta propositio habetur in tertio articulo secundae quaestionis prologi: Istae propositiones sive sint verae sive falsae, tamen a pluribus conceduntur: Omnis res est res permanens, omnis motus est mobile vel res acquisita per motum.’ These texts, from Stegmüller, ‘Die zwei Apologien,’ 67–68, are included in Caroti, ‘Les modi rerum … encore une fois,’ 197–198.

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explanation for why Oresme, after his Quaestiones super Physicam, no longer took such an interest in modi rerum. If after the condemnation of 1347 it was no longer desirable to make use of modi rerum, might this explain, for instance, why we find Buridan in the Quaestiones Physicorum accepting that motion is a real accident inhering in a moving body?49 Buridan does not mention the censure in making his argument. Is it possible that Buridan might have made use of modi rerum or might even have followed Ockham in denying that motion corresponds to any real form or substance in his pre-1347 works on the Physics? Did Masters of Arts adhere to statutes and condemnations without drawing attention to that fact? Might Buridan have disagreed with Ockham, when he did disagree, because he was writing after certain of Ockham’s ideas had been condemned? In particular, might Buridan have been affected by the list of Ockham’s theses that led to Ockham being called to Avignon in the 1320s, or might he have been newly affected by the so-called Ockhamist statutes or rulings at Paris in 1339 and 1340?50 Alternately, why was Buridan so strongly opposed to the use of the concept of ‘complexe significabilia’ sometimes taken as a pair to modi rerum? On the other hand, Ockham was also opposed to such constructions; it is not necessary to suppose that the avoidance of modi rerum or complexe significabilia must have resulted from condemnations. When Buridan answered a question like I.8, ‘Whether everything extended and having parts outside parts in place is a magnitude,’ which seems to be a question quite separate from theological issues, might his answer be understood to have unstated theological implications? Paul Bakker has shown how Buridan’s consideration of the theological doctrine that in the Eucharist accidents exist independently of substance could lead to a recharacterization of what it means to be a substance and what it means to be an accident even in natural cases and not only where miracles have occurred.51

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See S. Caroti, ‘Oresme on Motion (Questiones super Physicam, III, 2–7),’ Vivarium, 31 (1993), 8–36. See J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200–1400, Philadelphia 1998 (The Middle Ages Series), esp. chapter 3 (‘False Teaching at the Arts Faculty: The Ockhamist Statute of 1340 and Its Prelude’) and chapter 4 (‘Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Mirecourt: Censure at the Faculty of Theology in the Fourteenth Century’). On the controversy over the statutes ca. 1340, see Courtenay, ‘The Debate.’ See P.J.J.M. Bakker, ‘Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being,’ in: J.M.M.H. Thijssen & J. Zupko (eds), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Leiden [etc.] 2001 (Medieval and early modern science, 2), 247–264, and Id. ‘Inhérence, univocité et sépara-

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In question I.8, Buridan comes to the conclusion that the magnitude of a body is something additional and not to be explained simply by substance or quality, but what is this magnitude? It seems to be a mode. He poses that there is a body of a foot and that outside of it everything else is annihilated by divine intervention. Then God rarefies the body until it is two feet in size. It exists differently before and after the rarefaction, but not in relation to anything extrinsic. Hence the difference must be intrinsic. These different modes of the thing are what we call magnitudes, Buridan says (9011–14). To the objection that what prevents compression of a body is its rarity, distinct from its matter or form, Buridan concedes that rarity may be the magnitude or dimension that he is searching for (903–6). The point to be made here is that with regard to various concepts such as modi rerum there may or may not be theological implications as well as natural ones. While not attempting to answer questions on the importance of theology or censures, this guide will from time to time point out passages in Buridan’s questions that might provide relevant evidence. In sum, in the following survey of Buridan’s questions on Books I and II of the Physics, attention will be paid to elements within the questions that seem to reflect the direct or indirect influence of Ockham or, more generally, of nominalist logic or semantics, or that might reflect the influence of theology. Because we are dealing with the last version of Buridan’s Quaestiones, it is obviously difficult to be certain what Buridan might have thought or said in the previous decades. Is it possible to argue that a comparison of Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones to Buridan’s Quaestiones (in whatever versions) indicates a stronger or more immediate impact of Ockham on Albert than on Buridan? Alternately, might one argue, as I was tempted to do in an earlier paper, that as an older man Buridan was more fully formed before the impact of Bradwardine’s De proportionibus velocitatum in motibus or the works of the Oxford Calculators, which would explain why Buridan seems to pay less attention to mathematics than either Oresme or Albert?52 Preliminary exploration seems to suggest that Albert of Saxony’s Quaestiones Physicorum contains passages closer to passages in William of Ockham’s Expositio of the Physics than what is found in Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum.53 Such questions will only be raised here and

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bilité des accidents eucharistiques: observations sur les rapports entre métaphysique et théologie au XIVe siècle,’ in: J.-L. Solère & Z. Kaluza (eds), La servante et la consolatrice. La philosophie dans ses rapports avec la théologie au Moyen Age, Paris 2002 (Textes et traditions, 3), 193–245. Cf. Sylla, ‘Transmission of the New Physics.’ See Thijssen, ‘The Buridan School Reassessed.’ Although Albert agrees with Ockham in denying that quantities are separate forms, to further disentangle the positions of Buridan

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not answered. It remains to those who make use of the present edition of Buridan’s Quaestiones to consider whether Buridan’s work on the Physics was likely influenced by Ockham from the beginning of his career in the 1320s, or whether this influence came later. Did the various censures or statutes from 1339 through the 1340s have a differential impact on the various Parisians? 1.1 The Sources of Buridan’s Question Statements As a starting point, I assume that many of Buridan’s questions are linked to the text of the Physics. Some questions expound Aristotle’s text and try to clear up difficult passages. Another set of questions deals with topics that had been introduced by Averroes’ long commentary on the Physics and the issues that he added to the bare Aristotelian text. For instance, the question whether, in order to have scientific knowledge of something, it is necessary to know all its causes, seems to come from Averroes. Further, there are some questions that reflect differences of interpretation or opinion between or among various thirteenth-century Aristotelian commentators or between them and Averroes or Avicenna. Beyond sources in earlier commentaries on the Physics, some of Buridan’s questions or replies arose from the application of logic to the clarification of issues, especially from an Ockhamistic or nominalist application of logic to science, rather than from the text of Aristotle alone. Of the questions, or of the tacks taken in answering questions, that do not have known precedents in earlier question commentaries, the most frequent source of questions has to do with issues raised by a nominalist approach to logic, as represented by Ockham’s Summa logicae or Buridan’s own Summulae, if not more directly by Ockham’s own Expositio of the Physics. As in Klima’s reference to Wittgenstein quoted above, Buridan is playing, at least in part, a different game than that played by commentators of the 1320s such as John of Jandun and Walter Burley. John of Jandun’s questions on the Physics are like those of Buridan except that Jandun has not adopted nominalist semantics, whereas Buridan has. Moreover, Buridan is addressing Ockham’s minimalist ontology within the framework of nominalist semantics. Although Buridan is unusual for having spent his whole career in the Faculty of Arts, there might also be questions in a Physics commentary arising from the juxtaposition of Aristotelianism and Christian faith. This is obviously the and Albert, it would be important to compare also the work of William of Ockham, who discusses the subject in so many different contexts, that one would have to inquire which of Ockham’s works might have been influential—when the chronology of Ockham’s works is also contested.

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case at the end of the Physics where Aristotle attempts to prove that the world is eternal. According to Buridan himself, it is also the case in Book IV, where Aristotle attempts to prove that a vacuum is impossible, whereas the Parisian condemnations of 1277 had asserted that God by his absolute power could do anything that is not a logical impossibility, for instance that God could annihilate everything inside the sphere of the moon, leaving a spherical vacuum.54 In one passage of the Quaestiones Physicorum Buridan refers to the statutes at Paris according to which masters in the Faculty of Arts were not supposed to determine purely theological questions, as for instance concerning the Trinity, and, if they faced questions that were both theological and natural, were supposed to determine them in accordance with Christian faith and to refute arguments contrary to faith. Buridan seems to have been more familiar with current issues in theology than might have been anticipated. If members of religious orders or someone like Walter Burley or Nicole Oresme wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle after studying theology, this could perhaps have been expected, but how might Buridan have negotiated the institutional boundaries between theology and the Faculty of Arts? In Books I and II, if Buridan is influenced by theological issues, the influence is more likely exerted silently than explicitly. This is something to keep in mind in reading Books I and II, but not something that has been treated definitively here. As a possible resource for answering such questions, the present guide includes references to the questions on the Physics traditionally attributed to John the Canon (Johannes Canonicus). This work names contemporary theologians such as Peter Aureol, Francis of Marchia, and Landulph Caracciolo as the holders of particular opinions. Chris Schabel has recently discovered that the questions attributed to John the Canon were authored by an Augustinian canon of Tortosa Cathedral named Francesc Marbres, a Catalan from Barcelona, who was Master of Arts at the University of Toulouse around 1330. Whether or not he studied theology at Paris, he obviously knew what was going on in theology there.55 Where previous research has shown theological sources of posi-

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See E.D. Sylla, ‘Ideo quasi mendicare oportet intellectum humanum: The Role of Theology in John Buridan’s Natural Philosophy,’ in: J.M.M.H. Thijssen & J. Zupko (eds), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Leiden [etc.] 2001 (Medieval and early modern science, 2), 221–245. See C. Schabel, ‘Francesc Marbres, a.k.a. Iohannes Canonicus,’ Bulletin de philosophie médiévale (forthcoming). Radulphus Brito is another Parisian author before Buridan who wrote questions on the Physics and was active in the Faculty of Theology. A. Zimmermann, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350, Leiden [etc.] 1971 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte

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tions against which Buridan argues—for instance in the work of Nicholas of Autrecourt—this is mentioned here, although in many other cases the aliqui or quidam against whom Buridan argues remain to be identified by future research. Finally, where a question in Buridan is included in the commentary of the College of Coimbra on Aristotle’s Physics, this fact is noted because, in their voluminous references to earlier literature on each question, the Coimbra Jesuits most frequently cite commentaries on the Sentences and other theological works despite their own commentary being on Aristotle’s Physics. In later centuries, especially in Eastern Europe, Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum (secundum ultimam lecturam) were extensively used as an explicit resource in teaching and in writing new sets of questions on the Physics. So, for instance, there is Benedictus Hesse’s Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Hesse’s work includes among other questions, all of the questions that Buridan asks on Books I and II, together with Hesse’s own discussions, reports of the opinions of others (for instance John Wyclif), and his own answers in which he sometimes notes how later authors agreed or disagreed with Buridan.56 Earlier there is Lawrence of Lindores’ commentary, which also has many questions very close to Buridan’s. Hesse used Lindores as a source for his knowledge of Buridan.57 In the following survey of Buridan’s questions, I include, first, references, if relevant, to the text of Aristotle’s Physics (giving Bekker numbers) and of Averroes’ commentary on it (giving comment numbers). This is followed by a list of previous, contemporary, and later question commentaries on the Physics in which the same or similar questions were asked. In most cases Buridan’s main conclusions are summarized or translated into English along with notable distinctions or other arguments. In a few cases, reference to other commentaries is used to begin an inquiry into how Buridan’s thought fits into its intellectual context or reference is made to the secondary literature concerning the issues involved.

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des Mittelalters, 9), 182–190, has published the list of questions of his commentary on the Physics, and W.J. Courtenay, ‘Radulphus Brito, Master of Arts and Theology,’ Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin, 76 (2005), 131–158, has reconstructed the dates of his career in Paris. Benedictus Hesse, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. S. Wielgus, Wrocław [etc.] 1984. Some of Lindores’ questions have been edited by Dewender, Das Problem des Unendlichen.

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1.2

Authors of Questions on Books I and II of the Physics Related to Buridan’s Questions I have chosen to look at 21 previous, contemporary, and subsequent commentators on the Physics. The works consulted are the following, arranged according to the three chronological categories mentioned above: (1) commentaries whose questions are before the questions of Buridan; (2) those roughly contemporary with Buridan; and (3) those who come some decades or more after Buridan. Group (1) is subdivided into two sub-categories: commentaries written before the 1320s (1a) and commentaries written in the period just before Buridan began his teaching career (1b). Group 1a: Commentaries Written before the 1320s This group contains the following four works: 1. Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros octo Physicorum, ed. F.M. Delorme & R. Steele, Oxford 1935 (Opera hactenus inedita, 13) (= Roger Bacon).—There are a very large number of questions each of which may be only a paragraph long. I list only those that are similar to Buridan’s questions. In one case, I cite Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum, ed. F.M. Delorme & R. Steele, Oxford 1928 (Opera hactenus inedita, 8) (= Roger Bacon [2]). 2. William of Chelveston (?), Quaestiones in Physicam, manuscript Cambridge, Peterhouse Library, cod. 192, ff. 37ra–119va (= William of Chelveston [?]). I have chosen to list these questions because so many of them are similar to Buridan’s questions.58 I have not seen the actual content of the questions except for the ones I read for a paper published in 1979.59 There are 39 questions on Book I. I have not listed all his questions, and my matches to Buridan’s questions are sometimes guesses. William was a fellow of Merton College Oxford in 1284 and again in 1300–1301. According to Silvia Donati, these questions are probably not by William of Chelveston, but by William de Bonkes, who was also Master of Arts at Oxford in the late thirteenth century.60 If William of Chelveston did not write the longer set of questions

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For the list of questions, see Zimmermann, Verzeichnis, 163–169. E.D. Sylla, ‘The a posteriori Foundations of Natural Science,’ Synthese, 40 (1979), 147–187, at 165–167 (and notes). See S. Donati, ‘Per lo studio dei commenti alla Fisica del XIII secolo. I: Commenti di probabile origine inglese degli anni 1250–1270 ca.,’ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 2 (1991), 361–441, at 371–372. On William de Bonkes, see A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, 1, Oxford 1957, 219–220 (Balliol College, prob. 1291, still in 1293).

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in manuscript Cambridge, Peterhouse Library, cod. 192, he may have written the questions on ff. 1ra–36vb in the same manuscript. Another author who wrote rather similar questions on the Physics at about this time was Johannes de Wacfeld, ca. 1294–1295. 3. Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones in Physicam I–VIII, manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 18160, ff. 3ra–79vb (= Radulphus Brito).61 Only selective questions will be listed here. According to Courtenay, Radulphus began the study of theology by 1299 and incepted as Master of Theology in 1313–1314. He would have continued to teach in the Faculty of Arts while studying theology.62 4. Thomas Wylton, Quaestiones in Physicam, manuscript Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, cod. S.VIII.2, ff. 2r–141v (= Thomas Wylton). Wylton has 44 questions on Book I and 12 questions on Book II, so that several of his questions may relate to one of Buridan’s questions.63 Without a more detailed study, exact matches cannot be made with assurance. Cecilia Trifogli is working on Wylton’s questions on the Physics. Group 1b: Commentaries Written in the Period Just before Buridan Then for what questions were asked on the Physics in the period just before Buridan began his teaching career, I have looked at the following nine works: 1. John of Jandun, Quaestiones super 8 libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venezia 1551 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1969) (= John of Jandun). This commentary gives an indication of questions asked at Paris before the logical turn associated with William of Ockham. 2. William of Ockham, Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Prologus et libri I–III, ed. V. Richter & G. Leibold, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1985 (Opera philosophica, 4) (= William of Ockham [Expositio]). Ockham’s Expositio provides the best match with Buridan, but on occasion I mention also some of his less important physical works, as follows. 3. William of Ockham, Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1984 (Opera philosophica, 6) (= William of Ockham [Quaestiones]). 4. William of Ockham, Brevis summa libri Physicorum, ed. S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1984 (Opera philosophica, 6) (= William of Ockham [Brevis summa]). 61 62 63

For the list of questions, see Zimmermann, Verzeichnis, 182–190. See Courtenay, ‘Radulphus Brito.’ Unpublished list of questions distributed by John E. Murdoch.

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5. William of Ockham, Summula philosophiae naturalis, ed. S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1984 (Opera philosophica, 6) (= William of Ockham [Summula]). 6. Walter Burley, Expositio in libros octo De phisico auditu, Venezia 1501 (repr. Hildesheim 1972) (= Walter Burley [Expositio]).64 At the end of the volume there is a list of dubia (ff. 266vb–268ra). Book I has 30 dubia and Book II has 20. The numbering here is my own. 7. Walter Burley, Expositio et quaestiones librorum Physicorum, manuscript Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, cod. 448 (409), 172–543 (= Walter Burley [Expositio et quaestiones]).65 This work was likely composed at Oxford before the works of Jandun and Ockham. 8. Walter Burley, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, manuscript Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. F.V.12, 108r–171v (= Walter Burley [Quaestiones]).66 Many of the questions listed in the table of contents no longer are present in the manuscript. Some of the questions listed exist as part of the Expositio et quaestiones in manuscript Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, cod. 448 (409).67 Similar questions are in manuscript Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, cod. 512 (543).68 I cite only the Basel questions here. 9. Francesc Marbres (alias John the Canon), Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, Venezia 1520 (= Francesc Marbres).69 This commentary was composed ca. 1325. The printed editions of this work differ from most of the other commentaries considered here in that they frequently list by name

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The 1972 reprint of this volume by Georg Olms Verlag has been given the title In Physicam Aristotelis Expositio et Quaestiones, although this title does not appear in the work itself, the closest approximation being the explicit: ‘Finit expositio Gualterii de Burlei Anglici in libros octo de phisico auditu Aristotelis una cum questione eiusdem Gualterii de primo instanti et ultimo’ (266vb). See Sylla, ‘Walter Burley’s Practice.’ See Wood, ‘Walter Burley’s Physics Commentaries.’ For the list of questions, see S. Harrison Thomson, ‘Unnoticed questions of Walter Burley on the Physics,’ Mitteilungen des Instituts fur Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 62 (1954), 390–405, at 394–396. See Wood, ‘Walter Burley’s Physics Commentaries,’ 307–310. The latter questions are listed as anonymous in Zimmermann, Verzeichnis, 226–227. See above, LXVIII and n. 55. Titles of questions from manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 3013, as in P.J.J.M. Bakker & D.-J. Dekker, ‘Antoine Andrée ou Jean le Chanoine? A propos de l’authenticité du commentaire de la Physique conservé dans le Ms. Cambridge, Gonville et Caius College, 368 (590),’Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 42 (2000), 101–131.

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contemporary holders of opinions such as are usually referred to as ‘aliqui’ or ‘quidam.’ Among the authors cited by Francesc Marbres are Francis of Marchia, William of Ockham, Walter Burley, Landulph Caracciolo, Francis of Meyronnes, Thomas Anglicus, John Duns Scotus, Gerard of Odo, and others. Although Buridan’s work has been taken by Jack Zupko as evidence for the origins of secular philosophical culture, it may turn out that there is more influence of theology and ecclesiastical rulings than first meets the eye. I have looked at Francesc Marbres’ commentary as a resource for looking at intertextualities between the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Theology. Group 2: Works of Buridan’s Approximate Contemporaries in Paris In what follows, I have listed questions from the printed versions of Albert of Saxony and from the Abbreviatio of Marsilius of Inghen, but I have rarely attempted to investigate the content of these questions, nor of the earlier versions of Buridan’s questions in relation to the ultima lectura edited in the present volume. I list the questions of Hugolinus of Orvieto simply because they appear to be related, although I have not examined the content of the questions. The recently published edition of Nicole Oresme’s Questiones super Physicam is, however, so rich in evidence relevant to Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum that I have made some initial forays into its content: 1. Nicole Oresme, Questiones super Physicam (Books I–VII), ed. S. Caroti, J. Celeyrette, S. Kirschner, & E. Mazet, Leiden [etc.] 2013 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 112) (= Nicole Oresme). 2. Hugolinus of Orvieto, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Physicorum, ed. W. Eckermann, Der Physikkommentar Hugolins von Orvieto OESA. Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnislehre des spätmittelalterlichen Augustinismus, Berlin [etc.] 1972 (Spätmittelalter und Reformation, 5) (= Hugolinus of Orvieto). This work is contained in a manuscript dated 1352. Since they are conveniently available in print, conclusions from this work are noted as showing some influence of Ockhamist approaches. The questions are numbered continuously, not by book. 3. Albert of Saxony, Quaestiones eximii Doctoris Magistri Alberti de Saxonia in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, in: G. Lokert (ed.), Quaestiones et decisiones physicales insignium virorum, Paris 1516 (= Albert of Saxony).70 The question

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Edition available online through the website of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (URL: http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10195484_00005.html).

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titles in this edition are by and large like those published in the edition of Benoît Patar, except that two questions on Book I in Patar are not in the 1518 edition.71 4. Marsilius of Inghen, Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venezia 1521 (= Marsilius of Inghen).72 I have used the tabula quaestionum at the end of the volume. All the questions for Books I and II appear on ff. 2–8, and very differing attention is paid to the questions, while more space is devoted to additional questions that arise, but are not included in the tabula. Marsilius writes at the start (f. 2ra) that to the extent that he can, he will abbreviate the books of natural philosophy as they are usually read at Paris (‘pro meo posse philosophie naturalis libros Parisius legi solitos abbreviabo’). Group 3: Commentaries Written Some Decades or More after Buridan Finally, I shall refer to questions from the following four later works, mainly to show that the influence of Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum continued in later centuries: 1. Johannes Marsilii (?), Quaestiones subtilissimae Johannis Marcilii Inguen super octo libros Physicorum secundum nominalium viam, Lyon 1518 (repr. [ascribing the work to Marsilius of Inghen] Frankfurt am Main 1964) (= Johannes Marsilii [?]).73 Most now consider the author of this set of questions— once published, with some doubt as to the author, in the Opera omnia of John Duns Scotus—as unknown. According to Harald Berger, the author might be one Johannes Marsilii (or Marcilii), who determined in the Arts at Prague in 1396.74 This seems to be the best hypothesis yet offered, which would put a

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[Albert of Saxony], Expositio et quaestiones, vol. 2. Edition available online through the website of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (URL: http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0009/bsb00090905/images/index.html?seite =0001&l=de&viewmode=1). Edition available online through the website of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (URL: http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10139261_00005.html). Personal communication in a letter of 8.10.1996. Berger refers to the Liber decanorum Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Pragensis, ab anno Christi 1367 usque ad annum 1585, Pars I, Praha 1830 (Monumenta historica Universitatis Carolo-Ferdinandeae Pragensis, 1/1), 314. He suggests that the ‘Inguen’ in the 1518 printing is an addition by the printer ‘due to the association with the famous Marsilius.’ I thank Prof. Berger for his kindness.

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date for this set of questions at the very end of the fourteenth century, about the same time as Lawrence of Lindores, the author of the following work. 2. Lawrence of Lindores, Quaestiones Physicorum, as in Th. Dewender, Das Problem des Unendlichen im ausgehenden 14. Jahrhundert. Eine Studie mit Textedition zum Physikkommentar des Lorenz von Lindores, Amsterdam 2002 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 36) (= Lawrence of Lindores). Thomas Dewender has the titles of the questions for Lindores’ entire book and has edited questions I.1–5, and 10; III.13–18; VI.9–10, and VIII.3. Lindores taught in the Faculty of Arts at Paris in the years 1395–1403. In 1405, he returned to Scotland, where he taught at St. Andrews. As late as 1438, Buridan’s work was the basis of logic teaching at St. Andrews. In 1438, after protests, masters were allowed to teach using the work of Albert the Great or other philosophers accepted by the Church. 3. Benedictus Hesse, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. S. Wielgus, Wrocław [etc.] 1984 (= Benedictus Hesse). Essentially all of Buridan’s question titles are contained in this work, along with numerous references to Buridan by name, together with many additional questions. In many cases, Hesse may have learned about Buridan’s questions through Lindores, whose work he cites even more often than Buridan’s. According to Stanislaw Wielgus, Hesse’s questions can be dated to 1421 in Cracow. 4. Collegium Conimbricense, Commentarii in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Lyon 1594 (repr. Hildesheim 1984) (= Conimbricenses). The Conimbricenses often report names of individuals who held various positions. Since the point of listing similar questions in other sets of Quaestiones on the Physics is as a guide to research, I list the questions in Latin rather than translating them into English. My renditions of Buridan’s conclusions in English are sometimes paraphrases rather than literal translations. When one looks at the lists of related questions below, a feature that immediately pops out is that there are many questions in Buridan’s Books I and II nearly identical to questions in earlier commentaries, whereas there are other questions that seem to begin with Buridan. In Book I, there are six questions that have few or no precedents in earlier questions on the Physics. The first two concern the subject matter of natural science: I.1 I.2

Whether natural science is a science of all things Whether one proper subject should be assigned to the whole of natural science

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The third new question (I.4) concerns Aristotle’s opening sentence of the Physics: I.4

Whether in every science from the knowledge of principles, causes and elements it is possible to know and understand other things, for instance what has principles, is caused, and has elements

Then there are three new questions related to the logica modernorum that address the supposition (suppositio) of the terms ‘substantial generation’ and ‘to generate,’ and then ask what exactly is generated in substantial generation, whether it is the matter, the form, or the composite: I.17 Whether substantial generation is the substantial form, or the matter, or the composite, or some accident added to them I.18 Whether to generate is the generator, or generation, or something else I.19 Whether that which is generated in substantial generation is the matter, or the form, or the composite The core of Buridan’s response is that the term ‘substantial generation’ supposits for the substantial form gained in what is generated.75 This may seem peculiar, but the constraint is that categorematic terms in propositions should stand or supposit for individual things existing at the time of the proposition (or before or after, if ampliation is involved). The opponents of the project that Buridan is part of here object that the analysis seems to be too weak—that the terms in contradicting propositions may be said to have the same supposition. Thus ‘God’ in the proposition ‘God exists’ may have supposition for God, while ‘God’ in the proposition ‘God does not exist’ also has supposition for

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To understand this it is necessary to understand the medieval theory of the supposition (suppositio) of terms. In Buridan’s Summulae de Dialectica, Treatise 4 is on the topic of supposition. See Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, 219–302. For the doctrine of supposition in medieval logic, see the articles by Alain de Libera (‘The Oxford and Paris Traditions in Logic’) and Paul Vincent Spade (‘The Semantics of Terms’) in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny & J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600, Cambridge 1982, 174–187 and 188–196. For more detail, see E.P. Bos (ed.), Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited. Acts of the 17th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics held at the University of Leiden (2–7 June 2008), Leiden 2013 (special issue of Vivarium, 51 [2013]).

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God.76 In response to such concerns Buridan proposes analyzing negative propositions in terms of paired affirmative propositions. So to judge the falsity of the proposition ‘God does not exist’ one need only consider the supposition of the terms in the true proposition ‘God exists.’77 Thus one can deal with propositions about non-existing things. What Buridan strongly opposes here is the postulation of such external entities as ‘complexe significabilia’ (or complexly signifiable things) as if one would want to analyze propositions about generation by referring to a conglomeration of generators and things generated over time. As the person who described question I.18 in the table of questions recognized, the key issue in this question is the notion of ‘complexe significabilia,’ which Buridan strongly rejects.78 In Book II, the first three questions concerning artificial things are also an innovation in the tradition of questions commentaries on the Physics. These questions were introduced into the discourse by William of Ockham (see discussion below).

2

The Questions on Book I

Buridan’s first seven questions on Book I are related to Aristotle’s first chapter— in fact the first three questions set the stage before Buridan even turns to the text itself. Since logical and epistemological interests are central to Buridan’s approach, I describe these questions in greater detail than will be typical in this guide. 2.1 Questions I.1–3 Question I.1—Whether natural science is a science of all things (Utrum scientia naturalis sit scientia de omnibus rebus).79 This question is not found in the

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As indicated below, Buridan in question I.18 adopts a position in this particular case censured in relation to the work of Nicholas of Autrecourt. See Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism, 127, n. 2. See question I.18, 1885–10. See question I.18, 18216–24. On the notion of ‘complexe significabilia,’ and its reception in fourteenth-century Paris, see J. Biard, ‘Les controverses sur l’objet du savoir et les complexe significabilia à Paris au XIVe siècle,’ in: S. Caroti & J. Celeyrette (eds), Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio. Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle, Firenze 2004 (Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, 52), 1–31. The table of questions for Book I includes also the following subtopics for question I.1: ‘Quot modis dicitur esse de aliquo scientia demonstrativa. Quomodo metaphysica est

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earlier quaestiones on the Physics examined here but it is found in expositiones as will be discussed shortly. This question is also found in: 1. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum de rebus naturalibus sit scientia tamquam de subiecto (I.1) 2. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum scientia naturalis sit scientia de omnibus rebus (I.1) 3. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum philosophia naturalis sit considerativa de omnibus rebus (I.3) 4. Conimbricenses: Sitne philosophia naturalis vere ac proprie scientia an non (Prooemium, q. 2) To give his reply to question I.1, Buridan first distinguishes several senses of the notion of ‘science’: It is readily noted that scientific knowledge properly speaking (i.e. demonstrative knowledge) is the habit of a conclusion acquired by a demonstration or demonstrations. But several things come together in a demonstration, that is premises, the conclusion, the terms from which the premises and conclusions are constituted, and also the things signified by those terms. We are said to have scientific knowledge of all these things, although not in the same way, but equivocally, that is for diverse reasons, but proceeding from one reason for which the name was first imposed (914–21). Properly speaking demonstrative knowledge is said of the conclusion that is demonstrated. (921–22). Secondly, scientific knowledge is said of the premises, because by them the conclusion is demonstratively known. (922–23). Third, indeed, scientific knowledge is said to be of the signifying terms, because from them are composed the conclusion demonstratively known or the premises by which it is known (923–102). Fourthly, however, scientific knowledge is said to concern other things which are not propositions or signifying terms, because those things are signified by the terms from which the conclusion or the premises of the demonstration are composed. In this way and not otherwise we are said to have scientific knowledge of the heaven and the stars, of heavy and light

scientia communis et omnes aliae scientiae speciales. Quomodo de singularibus potest esse scientia demonstrativa’ (44–6).

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things, of plants and animals, of God and of the intelligences, of health and sickness, of virtues and vices, and so forth for many other things. Indeed, it is obvious that we do not seek to have scientific knowledge in the first three ways except to have scientific knowledge in this fourth way. The practitioner (artifex) would not care about propositions and terms unless because of them he believed he had knowledge concerning things he intended to do or to procure for use (102–12). Based on his initial distinctions in reply to the first question, Buridan reaches the following conclusions: 1. No science demonstrates all conclusions: no other science except geometry—not physics and not metaphysics—demonstrates that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. (1014–17). 2. In the same way no science concerns all premises in the sense of demonstrating by means of them (1018–19). 3. In the fourth way (that related to things, not terms or propositions) natural science considers or concerns all things as signified by the terms of the premises and conclusions which, or by which, it demonstrates. As was previously argued, the terms ‘generable,’ ‘ingenerable,’ ‘corruptible,’ ‘incorruptible,’ ‘mobile,’ ‘immobile,’ signify or stand for (supponunt pro) all things. Natural science concerns all these terms and from them forms many propositions through which and by which it demonstrates (1020–26). 4. From all terms, metaphysics forms propositions which, and by which, it demonstrates. Not the geometer, but the metaphysician, seeks to know what a triangle is, what it is to have three angles, whether to be a triangle is the same as to have three angles, what thing is a man, humanity, and to be a man, and whether these are the same or different, and so forth. Only the metaphysician considers quiddity absolutely (nullus … artifex considerat de quidditate simpliciter nisi metaphysicus) (115–11). 5. Physics or mathematics (geometry) does not form from all terms propositions which, or by which, it demonstrates. The geometer does not form any proposition from the terms ‘God,’ ‘animal,’ ‘stone,’ ‘man,’ etc., and the physicist does not form propositions from the terms ‘substance,’ ‘essence,’ ‘unity,’ ‘identity,’ or ‘God,’ unless assuming these from metaphysics (1112–16). Conclusion 4 shows why metaphysics is said to be the common science and conclusion 5 shows why all the other sciences are called special—in fact, an important aspect of Buridan’s reply is to emphasize the Aristotelian conception that there is not one universal natural science of all things, but rather many

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separate scientific disciplines with their own individual boundaries. In reply to a doubt, Buridan explains that there can be a science of singulars ‘ex condicione vel suppositione,’ in the sense that necessary and true propositions can be formed from singular terms. He has replied to this question, he says, using metaphysics: Metaphysics … shows how to distinguish physics from mathematics and metaphysics. It is often customary to treat some metaphysical questions in the special sciences, because the special sciences must presuppose the determinations of these questions from metaphysics, but the practitioner of the special science does not find that the point at issue has already been treated in the superior science (metaphysics), so he takes on the role of metaphysician (ascendunt ad tractandum eas induendo sibi habitum scientiae superioris) (129–18). Question I.2—Whether one proper subject should be assigned to the whole of natural science (Utrum totalis scientiae naturalis debeat assignari subiectum unum proprium).80 1. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum totali scientiae naturali sit assignandum unum subiectum proprium et adaequatum (I.2) 2. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum totali scientiae naturali debeat assignari unum subiectum proprium (I.4) Buridan also answers question I.2 from the point of metaphysics and concludes: 1. In every complete science, consisting of several conclusions and processes, it is necessary to assign a single subject, from the unity of which the science is said to be one, as physical science is said to be one and to differ from metaphysics and mathematics (172–8). 2. In the whole of natural science, a single proper subject should be assigned. Anyone who does not want to concede this will not be able to say rationally to what science a given conclusion belongs (1811–24). 3. The subject of natural science is not the subject in which the science inheres, namely the mind (anima), because that subject is common and indifferent to every science (191–5). 80

The list of questions for Book I continues: ‘Unde scientia totalis habeat unitatem secundum se et ab aliis distinctionem. De condicionibus subiecti proprii in totali scientia assignandi’ (48–10).

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4. The subject is not some thing (aliqua res) existing beyond the mind (196–13). 5. The subject is not called the subject because something is predicated of it in any conclusion whatsoever (qualibet) of the science (1914–206). 6. It is not called the subject because every passion which in that science ought to be predicated of something is predicated of it (207–10). 7. It is called the subject of the science because it is the most common genus among what is considered in the science and does not transcend the boundaries of the science, and because it plays the role of subject with respect to the primary and principal passions of that science, and because nothing is considered in that science except insofar as it is attributed to it, because then the whole science can be said to be one, although it is assembled from many and very diverse parts, as from the unity of the prince an army composed of soldiers, servants, teams of horses, and carriages is said to be one (2011–25).81 Question I.3—Whether mobile being or something else is the proper subject of the whole of natural science (Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis vel quid aliud).82 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

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William of Chelveston (?): Utrum haec scientia sit de ente mobili (I.2) Radulphus Brito: Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum in hoc libro (I.1) Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum ens mobile vel corpus mobile vel substantia mobilis vel corpora naturalia vel motus sit subiectum scientiae naturalis (I.2) Francesc Marbres: Utrum substantia finita in suo conceptu communi inquantum naturalis sit primarium subiectum et adaequatum philosophiae naturalis (I.1) John of Jandun: An ens mobile vel corpus mobile sit scientiae naturalis subiectum (I.2) Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum obiectum scientificum scientiae naturalis sit aliqua entitas extra animam (I.1)83

Compare Ockham’s views in his Expositio of the Physics (below, n. 91). The list of questions mentions the following notable points for question I.3: ‘Quod nulla scientia praeter metaphysicam considerat terminos substantiales secundum rationes pure substantiales. Quomodo scientia naturalis subalternat sibi prudentiam et omnes artes’ (412–14). Hugolinus, Quaestiones Physicorum, I.1, 13: ‘Quarta (conclusio) est quod significatum totale conclusionis est obiectum scientiae. Ex quo patet quid sit obiectum scientificum scientiae naturalis, quia significatum totale conclusionis demonstratae in scientia naturali.’

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7.

Albert of Saxony: Utrum scientia naturalis consideret de ente mobili tamquam de subiecto proprio et adaequato (I.1) 8. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum totius scientiae naturalis (I.3) 9. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium et adaequatum scientiae naturalis (I.5) 10. Conimbricenses: Sitne physiologiae subiectum ens mobile an non (Prooemium, q. I.4) In this question Buridan proposes two conclusions: 1. In physics or mathematics a substantial term ought not to be assigned as the proper subject, in the sense that it is substantial and not connotative, because such terms pertain only to metaphysics, which alone considers the quiddities of things absolutely. When natural science considers a man or a plant or water, this is not according to their quidditative concepts, but with respect to their motions and operations (242–9). 2. The term ‘mobile being’ should be assigned as the proper subject of natural science. The natural scientist does not have to know whether motion is a being or something or one, but to know which motion is one motion. Thus a natural scientist does consider the terms ‘being’ and ‘one’ in a restricted way, but not absolutely and universally, because the latter would transcend the limits of natural science, while ‘mobile being’ does not transcend the limits. The term ‘mobile’ is the subject with respect to the first and most common passion of natural science, which is the disjunct term ‘to move or to rest’ or the term ‘motion or rest’ (257–265). In reply to objections, Buridan says that it does not make a great difference whether one says ‘mobile’ or ‘mobile being’ is the subject of natural science. Adding ‘being’ to another term does not change its signification. Moreover, he admits that in a certain way natural science subalternates to itself prudence and the arts, which go beyond natural science insofar as they concern our actions and utility. Mobile being, then, is the subject of natural science insofar as its consideration is speculative. Of these three initial questions, I.1 and I.2 are not related to any particular text in Aristotle’s Physics. Nor were these questions asked in these terms by previous authors of question commentaries on the Physics. But in raising the question of the subject of natural science Buridan was doing nothing new—there was in fact an established pattern of asking a question about the subject matter of

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the given science at the beginning of commentaries on the works of Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas begins his exposition of the Physics as follows: Because this book, the Physics, upon which we intend to comment here, is the first book of natural science, it is necessary in the beginning to decide what is the matter and the subject of natural science.84 Distinguishing natural science from metaphysics, which studies things that never exist in matter or do not universally exist in matter, and from mathematics, which studies quantities that exist in matter but are abstracted from it, Aquinas defines the subject matter of natural science as ‘things which depend upon matter not only for their existence, but also for their definition.’85 The Expositio of the Physics found in manuscript Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, cod. 477, and attributed to Albert of Saxony begins with a preface before turning to the direct exposition of the text.86 According to manuscript Brugge 477, natural science is divided into nine parts. The first part is contained in the Physics and concerns mobile beings in general, not limited to any one kind of motion.87 There are alternative expositions of Aristotle’s first paragraph, it continues, one of which assumes Aristotle has two main conclusions and the other that there are three main conclusions. Manuscript Brugge 477 concludes its preface saying that according to the first exposition the conclusions are (1) that in natural science one should begin from causes, and (2) that in natural science one should begin from universal causes. But according to the alternative exposition, there is a middle conclusion, that in natural science one should proceed from effects to causes. The first exposition seems to agree better with Aristotle’s text, manuscript Brugge 477 says, but Averroes (the Commentator) understands the text in the second way.88 Just before this

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Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, tr. R.J. Blackwell, R.J. Spath & W.E. Thirkel, revised edition, Notre Dame (IN) 1999 (first ed. New Haven [CT] 1963), 1. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 2. [Albert of Saxony], Expositio, ed. Patar, vol. 1. Benoît Patar believes he has shown that the works in manuscript Brugge 477 are by John Buridan, but other scholars have not accepted this transfer of authorship from Albert of Saxony, credited in the manuscript, to Buridan. Since Patar’s editions from Bruges 477 are conveniently available and are closely related to the work of Buridan, even if Buridan was not the author, they are relevant to understanding Buridan’s Quaestiones. In what follows, the manuscript number will be used in place of a name of the author. Manuscript Brugge 477, 1ra (ed. Patar, 1: 5). Manuscript Brugge 477, 1vb (ed. Patar, 1: 11).

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closing statement, the exposition says that this will be seen more fully in a question.89 Buridan’s position in the questions of the ultima lectura follows that of Averroes, saying that according to Aristotle the acquisition of natural science proceeds from effects better known to us to causes better known to nature. If Buridan’s definitions of demonstrative science are compared to those of his predecessors, it is obvious that in basing science on propositions and demonstrations, he represents the fourteenth-century logica modernorum as associated with William of Ockham. This point of view is fully evident in Buridan’s work on logic.90 In general terms, the logica modernorum analyses the truth or falsity of propositions based on the supposition of the terms within the propositions (where terms are said to supposit or stand for things in the world), and distinguishes between things (res) existing in the external world and concepts existing in the mind, which are taken to be real, but incorporeal. Many different terms occurring within propositions may supposit for the same thing or things in the external world, but have different connotations or conceive of these things in different ways. At the same time, there are many terms and concepts that do not correspond to individual substances in the external world or their qualities. When Ockham and other scholars denied that a term such as ‘motion’ (motus) referred to or supposited for any separately existing thing in the external world, so that the truth or falsity of propositions involving the word ‘motion’ would have to be analyzed without assuming the existence of motion as a thing (a substance or a qualitative form) for which a term could supposit, those resisting this approach might complain that, when a body moves from one place to another, something more is involved than the changing truth or falsity of propositions. Of course, when Ockham said that there is no single form in the external world corresponding to the term ‘motion’ as it appears in a proposition, he was in no way denying that motion occurs. As will be seen in the discussion of Buridan’s later questions and conclusions, Buridan was very much involved in questioning the relation of words or concepts to things in the external world. For Buridan the word ‘science’ (scientia) means knowledge as a habit or habits in human minds related to propositions connected together in demonstrations. In the above lists of related questions from earlier question commentaries, no text earlier than Buridan is listed for Buridan’s questions I.1 and I.2. Nevertheless, it appears that Buridan’s discussion depends directly or indirectly on the work of Ockham. In his Expositio Physicorum, Ockham already presents scientific disciplines as mental habits

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concerning collections of propositions organized into demonstrations in which the terms have supposition for things in the external world.91 After his first two questions, which provide evidence of a new approach that may be associated with Ockham, Buridan turns to question I.3, which, in contrast to the first two questions, had been addressed by many earlier commentators on the Physics.92 Both John of Jandun and Walter Burley had asked whether mobile being or mobile body (corpus mobile) or even mobile substance is the subject of the whole of natural science. Benedictus Hesse reported in the fifteenth century that Giles of Rome and Albert the Great had held that mobile body is the subject of natural science, but this is not valid, according to Hesse, because natural science considers things that are not bodies, such as substantial or accidental forms.93 Alternately, earlier expositors

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See among relevant passages: Ockham, Expositio, 7: ‘Philosophia naturalis est collectio multorum habituum;’ 10: ‘Tamen pro dictis aliquorum auctorum qui videntur assignare unum subiectum talium scientiarum, est sciendum quod non intendunt quod aliquid sit proprie subiectum primum totius, sed intendunt dicere quod inter omnia subiecta diversarum partium est aliquod unum primum aliqua primitate, et aliquando unum est primum una primitate et aliud est primum alia primitate … In philosophia naturali primum subiectum primitate praedicationis est substantia naturalis vel aliquid aliud, et primum primitate perfectionis est homo vel corpus caeleste vel aliquid tale;’ 10–11: ‘Circa primum dicendum est quod philosophia naturalis considerat de substantiis sensibilibus et compositis ex materia et forma principaliter, et secundario de aliquibus substantiis separatis. Ad cuius intellectum est sciendum quod omnis scientia est respectu complexi vel complexorum. Et sicut complexa sciuntur per scientiam, ita incomplexa ex quibus complexa componuntur sunt illa de quibus illa scientia considerat. Nunc autem ita est quod complexa quae sciuntur per scientiam naturalem, non componuntur ex rebus sensibilibus nec ex substantiis, sed componuntur ex intentionibus seu conceptibus animae communibus talibus rebus. Et ideo proprie loquendo scientia naturalis non est de rebus corruptibilibus et generabilibus nec de substantiis naturalibus nec de rebus mobilibus, quia tales res in nulla conclusione scita per scientiam naturalem subiciuntur vel praedicantur. Sed proprie loquendo scientia naturalis est de intentionibus animae communibus talibus rebus et supponentibus praecise pro talibus rebus in multis propositionibus;’ 12: ‘Dicendum est quod scientia realis non est de rebus, sed est de intentionibus supponentibus pro rebus, quia termini propositionum scitarum supponunt pro rebus.’ For the earlier discussion, see S. Donati, ‘Una questione controversa per i commentatori di Aristotele: il problema del soggetto della fisica,’ in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit, Berlin 1989 (Miscellanea mediaevalia, 20), 111–127. Benedictus Hesse, Quaestiones Physicorum, 25. According to Hesse (26), the Commentator held that naturale et natura is the subject (but this perhaps applies only to Book II of the Physics) or substantia mobilis. Hesse counts Buridan as holding that the subject is

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might have preferred ens mobile over corpus mobile because they thought that Aristotle’s De anima was a part of natural philosophy or because they thought that natural philosophy dealt with the motion of angels, which are not corporeal. In his analogous question I.2, John of Jandun rehearses the differences of opinion at length. While he tends to side with Thomas Aquinas (said to be the best expositor among the Latins) that ens mobile is the subject of natural science, he claims that Thomas did not really argue for his point of view.94 For his part, Buridan makes no mention of such a difference of opinion among the expositors, but concludes simply that ens mobile or just the mobile is the subject of natural science. With this much established as a base, Buridan turns to the text of the Physics itself. 2.2 Physics, I, 1: Questions I.4–I.7 Question I.4—Whether in every science from the knowledge of principles, causes, and elements it is possible to know and understand other things, for instance what has principles, is caused, and has elements (Utrum in omni

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mobile. See also the following passage from the commentary on the Physics of Chrysostomus Javellus, Quaestiones naturales super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Lyon 1567 (edition available online through the website of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek [URL: http:// reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10169864_00005.html]), I.1, 1–3: ‘In hac quaestione invenio duas vias magis famosas: una tenet quod ens mobile et non aliud est subiectum, intelligendo de subiecto adaequato philosophiae naturalis. Alia tenet quod corpus mobile et non ens mobile est subiectum adaequatum in philosophia naturali. Primam viam tenet Beatus Thomas, cui concordat Iandunus in I Physicorum, q. 2, et Grandaeus. Secundam tenet Albertus in I Physicorum, tract. 1, c. 3. Et quoniam tenemus viam Beati Thomae esse ad mentem Philosophi et Commentatoris, ideo in hac quaestione sic procedemus … Et quoniam aliqui Moderni assumentes nomen Thomistarum nesciunt hanc rationem Beati Thomae defensare contra Aegidium et Iandunum, inter quos est Petrus Pomponatius Mantuanus in lectura sua super libros Physicorum, ideo dicunt Beatum Thomam non fuisse huius opinionis nisi dum esset iuvenis. Tunc enim scripsit super 8 libros Physicorum. Deinde in sua aetate senili scripsit super libros De coelo et tenuit illic corpus mobile esse subiectum quasi seipsum corrigens. Verum quia antiquiores Thomistae tenent mentem Beati Thomae absolute fuisse quod ens mobile et non corpus mobile sit subiectum adaequatum in hac scientia, ideo intendo defensare rationem Beati Thomae contra Aegidium et Iandunum.’ Jandun, Quaestiones, I.1, 2vb: ‘De ista quaestione est diversitas inter expositores Aristotelis. Antiquior enim expositor est sanctus Thomas, qui putatur fuisse melior inter latinos. Dixit enim quod ens mobile est hic subiectum, sed non probat expresse multum, nec solvit argumenta facta in contrarium, saltem in sua expositione super hunc librum, quia forte non videbatur ei difficultas in hoc, nec erat fortassis revocatum in dubium in suo tempore.’

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scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingat alia scire et intelligere, scilicet principiata, causata et elementata).95 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 1, 184a9–11; Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 1. 1. Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum naturalis possit demonstrare per causas (I.2) 2. Nicole Oresme: Utrum cognitio unius rei faciat ad cognitionem alterius (I.1)96 3. Albert of Saxony: Utrum cognitio scientifica causati dependeat ex cognitione suarum causarum (I.2) 4. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum Philosophus prius debeat determinare de causis quam de effectibus (I.1.1) Utrum ex una notitia possit alia fieri (I.1.2) Utrum ex causis contingat cognoscere causata (I.1.3) 5. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum cognitio unius rei dependeat ex cognitione alterius rei (I.2) 6. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingat alia scire, scilicet principiata, causata et elementata. Et hoc est quaerere utrum ex cognitione causarum contingat devenire in cognitionem effectuum (I.4) 7. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum, contingat scire principiata, causata et elementata (I.7)

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See the many subtopics listed in the table questions for Book I.4: ‘An de substantia possumus habere conceptum simplicem. Quot modis unus conceptus simplex potest fieri ex alio vel ex aliis. An hoc praedicatum “est” secundo adiacens potest demonstrari de aliquo subiecto. Quod non oportet omnem demonstrationem reducere ad primum principium complexum, nec quantum ad evidentiam praemissarum nec quantum ad evidentiam consequentiae. An in demonstrationibus propter quid praemissae debent esse causae conclusionis vel scientia praemissarum causa scientiae conclusionis vel res significatae rerum significatarum. Et utrum demonstrationes mathematicae sunt demonstrationes propter quid’ (416–25). These subtopics seem to pick out the passages in which Buridan is responding to previous authors including Oresme and Nicholas of Autrecourt. Here Oresme makes arguments to which Buridan responds (Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.1, 6): ‘Tunc sit prima conclusio quod nulla simplex cognitio, id est incomplexa et intuitiva, dependet ex aliqua alia tali … Secunda conclusio est quod omnis cognitio dependens ex alia debet esse complexa. Probatur, quia talis debet esse consequens … sicut cognitio substantie est dependens ex cognitione accidentium … Et ad hoc sequitur unum corollarium. Probatur quod nulla cognitio substantie dicitur esse incomplexa et intuitiva sive simplex, sed ex tali cognitione solum cognoscuntur accidentia sensibilia. Patet statim, quia omnis talis cognitio dependet ex cognitione accidentium; et sequitur: “est dependens, ergo non est incomplexa” per secundam conclusionem.’

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Although he may have inherited the statement of the question itself from earlier authors, Buridan is fully engaged with contemporary as well as earlier authors in his reply to question I.4. In addition to Avicenna and Robert Grosseteste, Buridan draws upon the opinions of anonymous contemporaries. The question involves many difficulties, Buridan says. The first difficulty is whether from the knowing of one thing, the knowing of another can arise in us (335–6). There are two kinds of knowing (notitia): complex (or propositional) and incomplex. Some say that no incomplex knowing arises from something else, first, because no knowing of one thing leads to knowing another except in virtue of a logical inference; but there is no consequence except from one proposition to another. Second the holders of this view infer as a corollary that we know no substance by incomplex knowing, because we do not come to know substance except by knowing accidents, and therefore in virtue of an inference, which does not exist except in complexes (i.e. propositions). The arguments here described and the corollary are found in question I.1 of Oresme’s questions on the Physics.97 Buridan disagrees, and posits two conclusions in reply: 1. Some incomplex knowing arises from something else, because there is incomplex intellective knowing, and all intellective knowing is produced by something else … The minor of the main argument is clear because at least the first intellectual knowing comes into being from sensitive knowing, and universally all intellective knowing must come from sensitive, either mediately or immediately, since any intelligent being must speculate by phantasmata (3314–342). 2. We have a simple concept of substance, because the concept of a man (from which is taken the substantial term ‘man’) is a concept of substance if man is a substance, and that concept does not supposit except for substance, because, if it supposited for an accident or for the composite of an accident and substance, then it would not be true that man is a substance, because neither is an accident a substance, nor is a composite from substance and accident a substance, but precisely a substance is a substance. Every concept, whether complex or incomplex, should or may correspond to a spoken term. Otherwise we may not express our concepts to others, and disputation and teaching would perish. I suppose this. Then I also suppose that every term corresponding to a complex or incomplex concept, if it should be

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See the conclusions quoted from Oresme’s question I.1 in the preceding note.

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defined, must be defined by terms corresponding to simple concepts from which it is composed (343–353).98 According to Buridan, there are four ways in which we can move from one item of knowledge to another without drawing a consequence from one proposition to another: 1. First, objectively (obiective), because if there is some knowing in the exterior sense and some in the common sense, then the knowing in the external sense is the object of the knowing of the common sense. Likewise sensitive knowing serves as the object of intellective knowing (3613–16). 2. Second, elicitively (elicitive), as Avicenna says: from what is sensed, that is color or figure or motion, the estimative power elicits a non-sensed meaning (intentionem), for example friendship or enmity. Therefore the sheep fears and flees from the wolf and follows the shepherd. The mind is much more noble than fire, but fire, by generating heat can by means of that heat generate lightness and rarity. So it is reasonable that the mind, by means of one knowing can generate another knowing following naturally from it (3617–24). 3. Thirdly, abstractively (abstractive), because at first I have a concept confusedly and representing substance and accident at the same time. Later, when what is white becomes black, I can recognize that the white thing or substance is different from whiteness. Thus, by abstracting, a universal concept arises and a singular concept (3625–376). 4. Fourthly, from two simple concepts the intellect can form a third simple by forming a proposition. Having the concepts A and B in mind, one can form the proposition ‘A is B’ or the proposition ‘A is not B’ (377–12). Then, turning from incomplexes to complexes, Buridan addresses the opinion that it is not possible to know ‘this exists’ from ‘that exists’ if the things are different from each other. In reply, he states four further conclusions: 1. Concerning some subject it is possible to demonstrate that it exists (demonstrari hoc verbum ‘est’ secundum adiacens). This is clear first through the determination of Aristotle in Posterior analytics, II, where he posits four

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See G. Klima, ‘John Buridan on the Acquisition of Simple Substantial Concepts,’ in: R.L. Friedman & S. Ebbesen (eds), John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences 1300–1700, København 2004 (Historisk-filosofiske meddelelser, 89), 17–32.

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questions whose answers may be known by demonstration or definition, as Robert Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) says. Among these is the question ‘whether it exists’ (si est), which is not determined or known by definition … and therefore it is knowable by demonstration (3824–3921). 2. It is not necessary that every premise of a demonstration is known and evident by reduction to the first principle (i.e. the principle of non-contradiction), for many principles of demonstration become known to us by sense, or by memory or through experience, without the necessity of demonstrating them in some other way, as is said in Posterior analytics, II. In Posterior analytics, I, Aristotle says that the indemonstrable principles of demonstrations are not much fewer than the conclusions (4012–26). 3. It is not necessary that the inference (consequentia) in every demonstrative syllogism be made evident by reduction to the first principle, since syllogisms in the first figure, if they are properly formed, are, and are said to be, perfect with respect to the evidentness of the inference in such a way that they cannot be proved to be good inferences by more evident inferences (411–5). 4. In some cases, by the proposition ‘A exists,’ not alone but with another premise, I can demonstratively know the conclusion ‘B exists,’ even though A is other than B, and B other than A. For example, if a man exists a heart exists (416–15). In these conclusions, Buridan is arguing directly against arguments associated with Nicholas of Autrecourt.99 Elaborating the argument that demonstrations are possible, Buridan states conclusions explaining the relations between

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Nicholas of Autrecourt is famously associated with the argument that every demonstrative argument must be traced back to the first principle, i.e. the principle of non-contradiction. Autrecourt writes to Bernard of Arezzo: ‘Ex eo quod aliqua res est cognita esse, non potest evidenter, evidentia reducta in primum principium, vel in certitudinem primi principii, inferri quod alia res sit,’ in: L.M. de Rijk, Nicholas of Autrecourt: his Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo. A critical edition from the two Parisian Manuscripts with an introduction, translation, explanatory notes and indexes, Leiden [etc.] 1994 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 42), 64. See Zupko, John Buridan, 184–202. See also J.M.M.H. Thijssen, ‘John Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt on Causality and Induction,’ Traditio, 43 (1987), 237–255. Not recognizing that Buridan is responding to Oresme as well as Autrecourt, Thijssen was not convinced, in 1987, that Buridan was replying to Autrecourt. On Oresme’s role in the discussion, see C. Grellard, Croire et savoir. Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’Autrécourt, Paris 2005 (Etudes de philosophie médiévale, 88), esp. 246–252.

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premises and conclusions in demonstrations propter quid (on account of what) and quia (that): 1. Whether in a demonstration propter quid or in a demonstration quia, it is not necessary for the premises to be the cause of the conclusion, because the conclusion may be formed before the premises and without the premises (427–11). 2. In every demonstration, whether quia or propter quid, the knowledge (scientia) of the premises is the cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, or perhaps the knowledges (scientiae, plural) of the premises are the causes of the knowledge of the conclusion … In Posterior analytics, I, Aristotle says that it is necessary not only to know the premises before the conclusion (praecognoscere), but it is also necessary to believe in and know them more strongly than the conclusion. According to Robert Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) this sort of causality is a kind of efficient causality. This is said here briefly because it pertains to another place (4212–26). Demonstrations quia differ from demonstrations propter quid as follows: when the middle by which the demonstration is made signifies the cause of what is signified by the conclusion, the demonstration is propter quid. If the reverse is the case, then the demonstration is quia. This much established, Buridan goes on to explain that in mathematics the distinction between propter quid and quia demonstrations does not apply in the same way as in natural science: Doubt: we commonly say that mathematical demonstrations are propter quid, but the cause is not signified by the premises or the middle. For example, a triangle is demonstrated to have three angles equal to two right angles through the middle that the exterior angle is equal to the two interior angles opposite to it. But this is not the cause of the truth of the conclusion, because if there were no exterior angle (if everything outside the triangle were annihilated), the triangle would still have three angles equal to two right angles (4312–19). Reply: I believe that commonly in mathematical demonstrations between the things signified by the middle and those signified by the terms of the conclusion there is not a relation of cause to what is caused or vice versa, as is sometimes the case in natural demonstrations. We more properly know propter quid in natural science than in mathematics. We commonly call mathematical demonstrations propter quid because we are paying

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attention not to the things signified but to how the naturally more evident knowledge of the premises causes the knowledge of the conclusions (4320–446). In reply to the main question and in reply to the principal arguments Buridan elaborates and refines his position: Therefore, finally, the answer to the question is that from the knowledge of principles, causes, and elements we can know their effects (scire principiata, causata et elementata). In this case, I do not care about the distinction between these terms … This conclusion is clear from experience (447–14). Just as other natural things have faculties that enable them to heat, so humans have a natural faculty to assent to truths.100 The positions that Buridan takes in this and similar questions lead Gyula Klima to write about Buridan’s ‘essentialist nominalism.’101 Question I.5—Whether in order to know some effect perfectly it is necessary to know all its causes (Utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oporteat scire omnes causas eius).102 Aristotle, Physics, I, 1 (no particular passage). Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 1, f. 6D–E. ‘quoniam omnis, qui dicit se scire aliquid, non dicit hoc nisi quoniam scivit illud per suas omnes causas propinquas et remotas; et hoc invenitur in omni qui aliquid scit in veritate aut secundum existimationem; et quod in ista propositione conveniunt omnes considerantes, adeo quod etiam Sophistae, ut dixit in Posterioribus.’

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Walter Burley also expresses this view in his questions on the Posterior analytics. See E.D. Sylla, ‘The Status of Astronomy between Experience and Demonstrations in the Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics of Robert Grosseteste and Walter Burley,’ in: A. Fidora & M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Erfahrung und Beweis. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2007 (Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel, 14), 265–291, at 291. G. Klima, ‘The Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan,’ The Review of Metaphysics, 58 (2005), 739–754. The table of questions continues: ‘Quod conclusiones mathematicae non possunt perfecte sciri per solam mathematicam. Quod mathematicae scientiae non sunt certissimae. An aliquid potest perfecte sciri et quomodo’ (427–52).

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William of Chelveston (?): Utrum ad perfectam cognitionem de re ostendendam oporteat cognoscere omnes causas (I.4) 2. Radulphus Brito: Utrum ad hoc quod aliquid sciatur perfecte oporteat omnes causas cognoscere propinquas et remotas (I.4) 3. Thomas Wylton: Utrum ad cognitionem perfectam rei dependentis in esse ex omni genere causae requiratur cognitio omnium causarum remotissimarum sicut et propinquarum (I.7) 4. John of Jandun: An ad perfectam scientiam de aliquo causato omnes causas cognoscere oporteat (I.3) 5. Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum ad perfectam notitiam habendam de aliquo causato oporteat praecognoscere omnes causas (I.D.1) 6. Nicole Oresme: Utrum omne scibile habens causas sciatur per illas (I.2) 7. Albert of Saxony: Utrum ad perfecte cognoscendum aliquam rem oporteat omnes causas illius cognoscere (I.3) 8. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum ad perfectam cognitionem causati requiratur cognitio omnium suarum causarum (I.1.4) 9. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum perfecta cognitio causati dependeat ex cognitione omnium suarum causarum (I.3) 10. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum ad perfecte cognoscendum aliquem effectum oporteat habere notitiam omnium causarum (I.9) 11. Conimbricenses: An perfecta cuiusque rei cognitio omnium causarum intelligentiam deposcat (I.1.1) Buridan’s replies to questions I.5 and I.6 continue to deal with the nature of human knowledge, while admitting that human knowledge is never perfect. It was Averroes’ text which had suggested that for scientific knowledge, one should know all the causes of a given effect. In reply, Buridan distinguishes between knowing scientific propositions and knowing the things signified by the terms of the propositions. In reply to question I.5, he argues: There is no absolutely perfect scientific knowledge except divine knowledge—nothing is perfect except God (4921–502). With regard to demonstrated conclusions (scitum immediatum), Buridan writes: 1. To know the conclusion ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’ perfectly as a conclusion it is not necessary to know in detail all the causes of that conclusion, nor also all the causes of triangles, because the conclusion is known perfectly as a conclusion by demonstrations reaching the conclu-

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sion evidently on the basis of evident premises (otherwise it is not known perfectly as a conclusion); but the demonstrations evidently proving the conclusion make no particular mention of God, of the human intellect, or of many other things that are causes of all conclusions and of all triangles; therefore etc. (5011–19). 2. The said conclusion is not known perfectly by geometry alone. The reason for this is that the conclusion is not known demonstratively perfectly unless the premises are self-evident (per se nota) or demonstrated from premises that are self-evident … The principles of geometry which must be used to demonstrate the conclusion and all other geometrical conclusions are not self-evident, but very dubious, unless they are made known by another science. I declare this, because it is very doubtful, and was doubted by the ancients, whether a body is composed of indivisible points or rather always divisible into divisible parts. Geometry cannot deal with this doubt using geometry—it must be dealt with by physics or metaphysics. Nevertheless, a geometer must assume that a continuum is not composed of indivisibles because, if a continuum were composed of several indivisibles, many geometrical conclusions would be false (5020–5119). 3. Mathematics is not the most certain science, because it is necessary that the principles of demonstration be more certain, better known, and believed more strongly than the conclusions. But the principles of mathematics are conclusions stated and proved in another science. Therefore that other science must be more certain. Therefore Aristotle proves expressly in the preface to the Metaphysics that not mathematics, but metaphysics is most certain (5124–524). But then why does the Commentator say that mathematical demonstrations are in the first (i.e. highest) degree of certainty and why does everyone declare that mathematical demonstrations are the most certain?—I say that this is not absolutely true, but it is said because, if the principles of mathematics are assumed, the way of demonstrating mathematical conclusions from those premises is the most certain and most orderly (525–10). With regard to the things signified by the terms of demonstrated conclusions (scitum remotum), such as a stone or a horse, it is possible to know something such as a horse by a perfectly known conclusion. In this case, it is not necessary to know all its particular causes (5218–24). But it is not possible to know something like a stone by all the conclusions by which it might be known. I believe that no human unless God or in heaven (about which I say nothing here) has known anything perfectly. Many, many terms signify and supposit for a stone and many propositions could be formed from these terms that have never been formed or demonstrated (533–14).

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Directly responding to the question, Buridan concludes that it is impossible for someone to know any stone perfectly unless he knows in particular all its causes according to their special concepts. It is certain that to know a stone or a mote, sleep or wakefulness, is very difficult or impossible for us. It is a big thing for us if we know several of the main causes of such effects (5322–548). Question I.6—Whether the same thing is more known to us and to nature (Utrum sint eadem notiora nobis et naturae).103 Aristotle, Physics, I, 1, 184a17–22. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 2, f. 6L. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

William of Chelveston (?): Utrum ea quae sunt nota simpliciter, sint notiora nobis (I.5) Radulphus Brito: Utrum sint eadem nobis nota et secundum naturam nota (I.5) Thomas Wylton: Utrum universaliter eadem sint nobis nota et naturae (I.9) John of Jandun: An eadem notiora simpliciter sint et quoad nos (I.4) Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum eadem sint nobis nota et naturae nota (I.5) Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum eadem sint notiora nobis et naturae (I.D.2) Nicole Oresme: Utrum ordo doctrinae scientiae naturalis incipiat a minus notis naturae (I.3) Albert of Saxony: Utrum eadem sint nobis notiora et naturae (I.4) Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum eadem sint notiora nobis et naturae (I.1.5) Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum eadem sint nobis notiora et naturae (I.4) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum eadem sint notiora nobis et naturae (I.5) Benedictus Hesse: Utrum non eadem sint notiora nobis et naturae (I.11) Conimbricenses: Quaenam sint nobis notiora cognitione distincta (I.1.2)

In reply to the sixth question, Buridan follows Averroes’ view that Aristotle is saying that we learn the principles of natural science from experience. He concludes: 1. Some things are more known to us that are not more known to nature, and conversely. Thus sensible natural composites are more known to us than their causes, i.e. prime matter and substantial forms (while the latter are more known to nature). Likewise motions and operations of natural things 103

The table of questions continues: ‘Quid vocatur nobis notius et quid vocatur naturae notius’ (53–4).

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are more known to us than their active and passive principles (while the latter are more known to nature). And likewise inferior (i.e. terrestrial) things are more known to us than God and the intelligences (while the latter are more known to nature) (573–8). 2. Some things are more known than others both to us and to nature. Averroes says that this is true in mathematics. But it was said earlier that perhaps with respect to the things for which the terms of mathematical demonstrations stand there is not an order of cause to what is caused. Therefore, properly speaking, those things are not more or less known, insofar one is referring to those things, although the knowledges of the premises are the causes of the knowledges of the conclusions, as was said elsewhere. Even with regard to some natural things this second conclusion is evident. Sensible objects are more known to us than their sensible species or even than their intelligible species; and nevertheless the objects are more known to nature because they are the causes of (the species). Also many influences of the heavenly bodies on the inferior realm are hidden from us. Therefore the stars are more known to us than their influences, since the latter are insensible; and nevertheless those stars are also better known to nature, since they are the causes of the influences (579–23). 3. Aristotle’s statement (that not the same things are more known to us and to nature) is not true de virtute sermonis, as he states it, because he states it universally, in that the negation precedes the subject and predicate. The proposition ‘not the same things are more known to us and absolutely’ is equivalent to ‘nothing is equally known etc.’ Aristotle, however, intends by his statement to say indefinitely that some things are more known to us and less known absolutely, and vice versa (5724–583). Question I.7—Whether universals are more known to us than singulars (Utrum universalia sint nobis notiora singularibus).104 Aristotle, Physics, I, 1, 184a24 and 184b1–6. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 2–3. 1.

Roger Bacon: Quomodo universale sit nobis notius et naturae: quaeritur quid illorum sit notius quantum ad naturam. Quaeritur quid sit nobis notius horum105

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The table of questions continues: ‘Unde provenit quod intellectus potest idem intelligere aliquando universaliter et aliquando singulariter et sensus non nisi singulariter. An res intelligitur prius universaliter magis quam minus universaliter. Distinctio de singulari vago et de singulari determinato’ (56–9). Ed. Delorme & Steele, 17–18.

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Thomas Wylton: Utrum magis universalia sint nobis magis et prius nota (I.10) John of Jandun: An universalia notiora quoad nos sint ipsis singularibus (I.5) Francesc Marbres: Utrum magis universalia nobis sint prius nota ab intellectu nostro (I.2) William of Ockham (Expositio): expositio of Physics, tt. 2–4 (184a20–24)106 Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum magis universalia sint nobis prius nota quam minus universalia vel quam singularia (I.D.8)107

Ockham, Expositio, 25: ‘… tamen ab universalibus debet primo incipere, et hoc quia a tota communitate universalia sunt prius nota quam particularia et etiam quam minus universalia, quia scilicet nullum particulare vel minus commune est ita faciliter notum toti communitati sicut universalius, et hoc quia diversa particularia sufficiunt ad faciendum notitiam magis universalis et tamen unum particulare non sufficit ad faciendum notitiam alterius particularis. Verbi gratia, omnes homines habent notitiam istius communis “animal,” et non omnes homines habent notitiam istius speciei “leo” nec istius speciei “capra” forte, et sic de aliis; et tamen aliqui ita noverunt hanc speciem “leo” sicut hoc commune “animal,” et alii ita noverunt hanc speciem “capra” sicut hoc commune “animal,” et ita de diversis speciebus … Unde unus per unum individuum acquirit universale et alius per aliud, et ita a communitate non primo scitur particulare; immo aliquando numquam scitur vel cognoscitur aliquod particulare determinatum et tamen universale cognoscitur.’ Burley writes (Expositio in Physicam [1501], 9vb–10rb): ‘Videtur quod non … In oppositum videtur esse Philosophus hic. Huic dubitationi dicunt quidam quod magis universalia sunt nobis prius nota quam minus universalia … Alii autem dicunt quod magis universalia sunt nobis prius nota, hoc est, sunt nota prius toti communitati quam minus universalia, quia magis universale cognoscitur per cognitionem cuiuscumque inferioris ad ipsum. Modo apud aliquos unum est inferius et apud alios aliud, sed non apud quoscumque … Et sic magis universale facilius cognoscitur a tota communitate quam minus universale, verbi gratia omnes homines habent notitiam huius communis “animalis,” quia apud omnes gentes est aliqua species animalis, scilicet bovis vel capre etc., sed non omnes homines habent notitiam huius speciei “leo” nec forte huius speciei “capre,” et sic de aliis. Et tamen aliquis ita novit hanc speciem “leo” sicut hoc commune “animal,” et ita est de aliis speciebus. Et sic a tota communitate prius et facilius cognoscitur universale quam particulare. Unum tamen particulare facilius cognoscitur ab aliquo quam suum universale, et aliud particulare facilius cognoscitur ab alio quam suum universale. Dicunt igitur quod Philosophus loquitur hic de una notitia tradenda toti communitati humane per doctrinam, et quia toti communitati universalia sunt prius nota, ut visum est, ideo dicit Philosophus quod magis universalia sunt nobis prius nota, quia primo sunt nota toti communitati cui hec doctrina est tradenda. Sed tamen apud aliquem erit magis et prius notum particulare ipso universali. Sed in rei veritate hoc nihil valet, quia secundum glosam illam nullus homo posset devenire in cognitionem principiorum rerum natura-

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Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum prima notitia rei naturalis sit notitia universalis vel notitia singularis (I.2)108 Nicole Oresme: Utrum universale sit prius notum quam singulare vel minus universale (I.4) Albert of Saxony: Utrum universalia sint priora singularibus vel minus universalibus in cognitione (I.5) Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum universalia sint notiora singularibus (I.1.6) Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum universalia sint notiora minus universalibus (I.5) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum universalia sint nobis notiora singularibus (I.6) Benedictus Hesse: Utrum universalia sint notiora nobis suis singularibus (I.14) Conimbricenses: Sintne maxime universalia notiora nobis cognitione confusa actuali an non (1.1.3)

Finally, in the very long (20 pages in the present edition) question I.7 Buridan expounds in detail his view of the experiential or a posteriori foundations of

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lium secundum doctrinam quam Philosophus hic tradit. Et ideo predicta opinio non valet … Item ridiculum est dicere aliquid esse magis et prius notum toti communitati, tamen nulli persone communitatis, cum communitas nullam habeat notitiam nisi notitiam personarum de communitate. Et confirmatur quia: communitas est quedam relatio que non habet cognitionem aliquam inquantum est relatio; ergo etc. … Circa quam dubitationem est intelligendum quod cognitio est duplex, scilicet confusa et distincta, sive perfecta et imperfecta. Ideo videndum est quid est primo cognitum ab intellectu nostro via generationis in utraque cognitione. Et dico quod prius cognitum ab intellectu nostro cognitione confusa via generationis est singulare quod fortius movet sensum. Ad quod probandum primo suppono quod intellectus noster intelligit singulare …’ Among Hugolinus’ conclusions are the following (Hugolinus, Quaestiones Physicorum, I.2, 13–14): ‘Prima conclusio est quod omnis entitas est singularis … Quinta quod omne universale est tantum signum vel naturale vel tantum ad placitum institutum. Sexta quod universale, quod est signum naturale, est tantum in anima subiective. Secundus articulus … Prima conclusio est contra istum doctorem (Ockham): quod praeter omnem actum intelligendi et habitum aliquod repraesentativum in anima est ponendum, quod intentio vel species vel conceptus nuncupatur. Secunda est quod non omnis talis species seu conceptus est universale. Tertia est quod omnis intentio seu conceptus, qui est universale, est conceptus fictus ab anima vel formatus. Quarta est quod conceptuum illorum, qui dicuntur universalia, quidam sunt naturaliter repraesentativi, quidam vero ad placitum instituti. Tertius articulus … Prima conclusio est quod prima notitia simpliciter ipsius intellectus primitate generationis est notitia intuitiva … Quarta est quod huiusmodi primo cognitum ab intellectu primitate generationis est singulare de genere accidentis.’

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natural science. Contrary to what the statements of the questions might lead one to expect, the issue is not really about the classic problem of universals, but about how humans gain empirical knowledge. Buridan does reject the existence of Platonic universal forms, stating instead that everything that exists is an individual thing. Not only sense begins from particulars, but also intellect. He concludes: It is necessary for humans to understand singularly before universally, because it is necessary for humans to understand with some sensitive cognition before an intellective one; but we posit that by sensitive cognition nothing is understood except singularly; therefore etc. (6414–18). The principal question may be determined by saying that the intellect knows a thing singularly before universally, because sense does not know things except singularly, whether it is an exterior or an interior sense, that is with that confusion of position and way of existing in the sight of the knower. Thus the sense represents the sensible object to the intellect with this sort of confusion, and as the object is first represented to the intellect, it first understands the thing. Therefore with this sort of confusion the intellect can know the thing also singularly. And this also appears from what is said, namely that by abstracting the intellect understands universally. And again, since the representation on the part of the sense is in a singular mode, if the intellect, from this sort of representation, does not understand singularly, it could not be said afterwards how it could understand singularly (705–17). Having stated his determination, Buridan nevertheless addresses at least two contrary opinions that assert that the intellect first knows universally and then, after reflection, comes to know singulars. Or, as another modern opinion asserts, perhaps we first know not singulars and not the most universal, but lower level universals—for instance knowing quadrupeds before animals in general. Averroes had understood Aristotle to say that we first know confused singulars and later come to know universals. Aquinas, on the contrary, understood Aristotle to say that we first know universals and then come to know individuals.109 Buridan’s interpretation of the text follows the reading of Averroes,

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Chrysostomus Javellus explains this difference of opinion on the ground that in the text of Aristotle known to Aquinas the text reads ‘Sunt autem primum nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis,’ whereas the Arabic known to Averroes as translated to Latin reads:

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rather than that of Aquinas. He quotes Averroes’ explanation that Aristotle in the text is not talking about absolute singulars, such as Socrates, or this man, but about terms that are less universal, as a species is less universal than a genus (6420–23). According to Buridan, some moderns think that we first know what is less universal (7213–14). This explanation seems manifestly against Aristotle, so the holders of this view distinguish between notitia confusa and notitia determinata (735–9). This, however, is also invalid. So others suggest that universals are more known to the community, if one species is known to some and another species to others (7322–743). Both Ockham and Burley had mentioned this argument, Ockham supporting it and Burley rejecting it. Buridan also rejects the argument but finally concludes that we first know ‘vague singulars’ (singulare vagum). Following Avicenna’s discussion of what we perceive as a man walks toward us, seeing that it is some man before recognizing Socrates, and so forth, Buridan responds to the question by concluding that we first know things by more common concepts, but nevertheless we perceive singulars (7413–7517). 2.3 Physics, I, 2: Questions I.8–I.10 Having established in the first seven questions the features of demonstrative science as he sees them, Buridan turns to questions that enable him not so much to exposit the text of the Physics as to elaborate or deploy the tools of nominalist semantics. Questions I.8–I.10 show this clearly. All three replies involve what has been called ‘Ockham’s razor’ and all three deploy the tools of logic to answer the question. Question I.8—Whether everything extended and having parts outside parts in place is a magnitude (Utrum omnis res extensive et situaliter habens partem extra partem sit magnitudo). Aristotle, Physics, I, 2, 185b3–4. See also 186b13–14. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Radulphus Brito: Utrum substantia sit divisibilis secundum se (I.10) Thomas Wylton: Utrum in substantia extensa per quantitatem alia sit extensio formaliter ab extensione quantitativa (I.20) John of Jandun: An substantia materialis sit per se in partes eiusdem rationis divisibilis (I.9) Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum substantia solum sit divisibilis per quantitatem (I.7.) Utrum sit aliqua alia extensio materiae quam extensio quantitatis (I.14) ‘Et illa quae primo sunt apud nos evidentia et manifesta sunt mixta, scilicet composita proprie.’ See Javellus, Quaestiones Physicorum, I.5, 21. See also Averroes, In Physicam, the Aristotelian text related to comm. 3, 7C.

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Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum substantia et quantitas realiter distinguantur (I.D.15) Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum quantitas continua sit aliqua entitas distincta realiter ab omni substantia et qualitate (I.3)110 Nicole Oresme: Utrum ens sit univocum ad substantiam et ad accidens (I.5)111 Albert of Saxony: Utrum omnis res extensa sit quantitas (I.6)

Hugolinus, Quaestiones Physicorum, I.3, 15, concludes: ‘In secunda decisione ponuntur aliquae conclusiones et ostendetur per rationes efficaces quantitatem non esse rem aliam a substantia et qualitate. Prima conclusio est quod conceptus quantitatis non est conceptus mere abstractus, sed connotativus … Quinta est quod omnis quantitas est substantia vel qualitas, accipiendo non disiunctivam propositionem, secundum quod est de disiuncto praedicato. Sexta conclusio est quod nulla est quantitas quae ab omni substantia et ab omni qualitate realiter sit distincta.’ Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.5, 34–37, says: ‘Primo igitur notandum est quod substantia est res que per se existit et proprie … Secundo notandum quod accidens potest ymaginari tripliciter: uno modo quod sit vera forma inherens substantie … Secundo modo, quod accidens nullo modo preter animam sit alia res ab ipsa substantia subiecta, sed solum sit ipsa substantia taliter se habens, secundum quod de ea dicuntur diversa predicata, et sic accidens non esset aliud a substantia nisi predicatum, et isto modo dicunt aliqui (the editors refer to Ockham, Summa logicae, III, 3, 18, 666) de quolibet accidente excepta qualitate. Tertia via alia est, et posset ymaginari quod accidens non esset proprie forma extensa vel inherens secundum primam viam, nec solum substantia vel predicatum vel terminus iuxta secundam viam, sed esset aliquid tale esse aut tantum esse … Tunc pono conclusiones. Prima est ista: quod “ens” dicitur equivoce de substantia et accidente … ita quod proprie et vere dicitur de substantia, secundario de accidente … Nec valet glosa occamica qua diceretur quod “ens” dicitur equivoce de multitudine collectiva et de re una … Secunda conclusio est ista, quam dico probabiliter et cum correctione; et est quod de intentione Philosophi videtur quod nullum accidens est forma seu essentia secundum primam viam expositam in notabili sive primum modum … Ultima conclusio est quod omne accidens proprie loquendo est aut tantum esse aut tale esse aut ad aliquid esse aut aliquod tale, que non sunt significabilia proprie aliquo communi nec aliquo nomine substantivo. Et hoc dicit Aristoteles quasi in omnibus locis … Tertia conclusio, que deberet precedere, est ista: quod nullum accidens est substantia nec qualitas nec quantitas nec relatio etc. … Nec valet dicere quod qualitas distinguitur a substantia, et quantitas non vel relatio, quia omni modo per hoc per quod solvuntur rationes probantes quantitatem distingui, solvuntur de qualitate, ut patet inducendo.’ See also question I.6 (Utrum omne accidens habeat subiectum adaequatum, loquendo secundum viam positam in quaestione praecedenti), 40: ‘Respondeo quod accidens est tale sicut dictum est in alia questione, et differt multum ab aliis modis dicendi, et magis concordat dictis Aristotelis, et facilius solvuntur difficultates, ut videbitur postea.’

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Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum extensio substantiae sit distinctum ab ipsa substantia (I.2.1) 10. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum quantitas sit res distincta a substantia et qualitate (I.8) 11. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum quantitas sit res distincta a re quanta, id est a substantia quanta (I.7) 12. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum omnis res extensive et situaliter habens partem extra partem sit sua magnitudo, id est utrum res extensa sit sua extensio vel utrum res magna sit sua magnitudo vel utrum substantia sit quantitas (I.19)112 This question obviously responds to Ockham’s having denied that there are separate quantitative forms in the external world.113 In a footnote to the list of parallel questions above, some text from Oresme has been noted to indicate a possibly more immediate context for Buridan’s response. Buridan’s question I.8 has an odd structure. He first argues that everything extended and having parts outside of parts is a magnitude, using six arguments of those who accept this opinion (i.e. not necessarily arguments he himself agrees with). Then he argues the contrary using thirteen authorities and arguments to which many others acquiesce. The question is very difficult, he says. Many and especially the moderns agree with the first six arguments that every extended thing is a magnitude. And it is difficult to demonstrate the opposite—the majority of the thirteen arguments to the contrary are sophistical. For those who may want to hold that every extended thing is a magnitude, he will reply to the thirteen (mostly sophistical) arguments to the contrary as if he (Buridan) were of the opinion that every extended thing is a magnitude. Despite his refutations of the thirteen arguments, however, Buridan makes a sudden turn and concludes that not every extended thing is a magnitude. And he gives an experiment using the difficulty of compressing a bellows to show that there must be magnitude beyond substantial or other accidental forms.114 He then argues for this conclusion with other persuasions and answers the six

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Ockham argues against the reality of quantity as a separate form in so many places that it is difficult to detect where Buridan may have picked up the conversation. Note that the text of Oresme here already mentions a ‘glosa occamica.’ See above, n. 32. For an extensive analysis of Buridan’s question, see A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, 4), Roma 1955 (Storia e letteratura, 52), 139–223 (‘Das Problem der Quantität oder der räumlichen Ausdehnung’), esp. 199–223. See Latin text below, 8722–892.

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principal arguments at the start, which he refers to as arguments ‘in oppositum,’ as they are in fact against his conclusion. Here what is puzzling in the structure is that Buridan has replied to the thirteen arguments originally labeled ‘oppositum’ (811–2), which actually are in favor of the position he adopts, on the grounds, he says, that many of them are sophistical and so that those who want to uphold the position that quantity is not an added form beyond substance or quality will know how to respond to the arguments made against them. Then Buridan does not demonstrate that quantity is an added form, but simply ‘declares’ it and supports it by means of the experiment using a bellows. By what possible routes might Buridan have ended up with a response to this question in this form? Did he in an earlier version argue in favor of the view that quantity is not an added form, which he now rejects? Some pieces of evidence that might help explain Buridan’s odd inclusion of arguments against the position he adopts are the following. (1) This question is related to questions that had appeared in previous commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, I, in particular such questions as Utrum substantia materialis sit per se in partes eiusdem rationis divisibilis, which is question I.9 of John of Jandun’s questions on the Physics. Buridan’s question has a basis in the text of Aristotle’s argument against those of the Presocratics who had said that there is only one fundamental element, Aristotle writing ‘si est substantia et quantum, duo sunt et non unum quod est.’ The meaning of this passage and Aristotle’s intended argument were not clear, and so expositors tried to explain its meaning. (2) Aristotle and most scholastic Aristotelians understood the quantity of matter as its extension, and they appeared strangely unable to conceive of a second type of quantity of matter, such as the quantity of matter now called ‘mass.’115 In attempting to grasp a second kind of quantity of matter scholastic Aristotelians turned to Averroes’ concept of dimensiones interminatae, which were conceived as indeterminate extensions. Comments on this text in Aristotle’s Physics often included discussions of dimensiones interminatae.116 (3) William of Ockham famously denied that the extension of body or matter is an accidental form distinct from the

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In fact, in Newtonian physics one might distinguish gravitational mass from inertial mass and it takes some doing to learn to think of mass as different from weight. For Aristotelians, the (same amount of) matter may be transformed from water to air, in which case it will occupy much more volume, and will have no weight, but rather lightness. In this context, Oresme’s question I.21 (Utrum prima materia sibi determinet aliquam quantitatem) is of interest (Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.21, 161–167). On the notion of ‘dimensiones interminatae’ (or ‘indeterminatae’) see S. Donati, ‘La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano,’ Medioevo, 14 (1988), 149–233.

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extended substance or quality, thereby reducing the really distinct categories to two: substance and quality.117 So Buridan’s main task here becomes confronting the arguments of Ockham and others that magnitude is not some separate reality in a body. In his theological works, Ockham had used his denial of quantity as a separate form in explaining the mode of Christ’s presence in the transubstantiated Eucharist: Christ is there in a definitive way and not a circumscriptive way.118 He is not extended in place, but this does not mean that he lacks anything that was true of him when alive, since magnitude is not anything different from substance or quality.119 Among the thought experiments that Ockham used to argue that substance would still have extended parts even if a supposedly separate magnitude were removed was the argument that if any two things are really distinct, God may annihilate the prior one while the other remains. If one had an extended body and God destroyed the supposedly distinct magnitude, then, Ockham argued, the parts of the matter would still be in different places.120 Buridan reports and replies to this argument by saying that the substance or matter would still have parts, but that they would not be extended.121 One might suppose that Buridan at first accepted Ockham’s position and included in earlier versions of his questions on the Physics replies to arguments against it. Then he might have come up with the experiment with the bellows as evidence that magnitude is in fact something positive, but decided to retain his refutations of the arguments against Ockham’s position, either, as he claims, to provide resources for students who might want to defend that position, or perhaps simply not to throw away arguments that he had earlier found convincing. In the tertia lectura, however, Buridan already argues for the old 117

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Although Petrus Johannis Olivi argued for a similar position earlier, there is plentiful evidence that Buridan’s discussion derives from Ockham’s rather than Olivi’s. See Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 209–218. To be in place definitively, is to be wholly in every part or point, whereas when something is in place circumscriptively, it is spread out over the whole place, with one part in one place and another part in another place. See E.D. Sylla, ‘Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist,’ in: J.E. Murdoch & E.D. Sylla (eds), The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning. Proceedings of the first International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages, September 1973, Dordrecht 1975 (Boston studies in the philosophy of science, 26), 349–396. One of the many places in which Ockham makes this argument is in his Tractatus de quantitate, q. 3, a. 2, ed. C.A. Grassi, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1986 (Opera theologica, 10), 54–64. The same argument is used by Buridan; cf. 8014–22. See 9120–26.

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view that quantity is a separate form and already has the experiment with the bellows to defend it.122 So why does Buridan in the ultima lectura add responses to arguments against the Ockhamist view, when he is now rejecting that view? In manuscript London, Wellcome Institute for the History of Science, cod. L. 15, question I.9 of a series of questions ascribed to Albert of Saxony, the question is raised Utrum quantitas sit alia res a substantia et qualitate, and the statement appears: Concerning this question there are two opinions. One is that quantity is not another thing; the other opinion is that quantity is another thing, etc. Either opinion is probable and may be upheld.123 According to Benoît Patar the questions in the Wellcome manuscript perhaps represent Albert’s earliest attempt to write questions on his own, whereas earlier he had used Buridan’s questions as the basis of his own course (thus leading to the set of question in manuscript Brugge 477, which Patar wants to identify as the earliest known version of Buridan’s questions). According to Jürgen Sarnowsky, on the other hand, the questions in the Wellcome manuscript are later than the best known and widely disseminated questions on the Physics by Albert of Saxony.124 In her 1955 book Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Anneliese Maier has an extended study of the reception of Ockham’s views on quantity.125 She argues that the Parisians in the 1320s were 122

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See B. Patar, La Physique de Bruges de Buridan et le Traité du Ciel d’Albert de Saxe, Longueuil 2001, 2: 21–22 (collation of three manuscripts of the tertia lectura: Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, cod. CA F. 298; Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 635; and Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Chigi lat. E.VI.199). Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 2: 278: ‘De ista quaestione sunt duae opiniones. Una opinio est quod quantitas non est alia res; alia est opinio quod quantitas est alia res etc. Quaelibet opinio est probabilis et potest sustineri.’ Patar calls the Wellcome manuscript a ‘version particulière’ (1: 147*). According to Patar, this manuscript, dated 1408, is in part a copy of manuscript Brugge 477 and in part a work of Albert of Saxony. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 222, reports that according to Marsilius of Inghen, the opinion that quantity is not something in addition to the extended thing is probable (probabilis), while the opinion that the extension of substance is something distinct from substance is more probable (probabilior). See Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 1: 431*–436*, esp. 434*, and Sarnowsky, Die AristotelischScholastische Theorie der Bewegung, 451–460. See above, n. 113.

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reacting to Ockham and not to Petrus Johannis Olivi, who had earlier expressed similar views. The first author to respond to Ockham in detail, she says, was Francis of Marchia, in his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, which likely was delivered orally between Christmas 1319 and Easter 1320.126 If Marchia’s response was this early, on Maier’s chronology it preceded several of the works in which Ockham expressed his views. Maier argues that Marchia must have been responding to the treatment of quantity in Ockham’s earlier treatise De sacramento altaris. Current dating of Ockham’s works, however, puts the opusculum on quantity and on the sacrament of the altar later than Francis of Marchia.127 Although Maier does not consider them interesting enough to discuss in detail, the list of Marchia’s arguments in favor of a distinction between quantity and substance or quality that she includes in a footnote appears to be similar to the arguments found in Buridan’s question I.8.128 Several of these

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For the dating of Marchia’s commentary on Book IV of the Sentences (including current bibliography), see T. Suarez-Nani & W. Duba, ‘Introduction,’ in: Francis of Marchia, Reportatio IIA (Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum) qq. 1–12, ed. T. Suarez-Nani, W. Duba, E. Babey & G.J. Etzkorn, Leuven 2008 (Ancient and medieval philosophy. Series 3, II/1), xi–lxxxix, esp. xxiv–xxx. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 203. Some scholars argue that Ockham’s works on the sacrament of the altar were after 1323, because Thomas Aquinas is called a saint, and he was canonized in that year. Marchia’s work would seem to be evidence, however, that Ockham’s rejection of quantity as a separate category was earlier. The editors of Ockham’s Summa logicae argue that Ockham’s Expositio of the Physics was earlier than the Summa logicae, which cites at least Books I–V, and that the separate works on the sacrament of the altar were after the Summa logicae. All of this seems perhaps to leave Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences as the only work early enough to have been an influence on Marchia. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 205 (and n. 10): ‘Praeterea arguo ad propositum sic: quarum proprietates et passiones sunt distinctae, et ipsa inter se sunt distincta; sed proprietates et passiones substantiae, quantitatis et qualitatis sunt distinctae; ergo etc. … Praeterea: illud quod habet contrarium est aliud ab eo quod non habet contrarium; sed secundum Philosophum qualitas habet contrarium, ut albedo nigredinem, non autem quantitas; ergo etc. Praeterea: motus intensionis et remissionis est alius a motu augmenti et detrimenti; motus autem augmenti et detrimenti est alius a generatione; ergo et termini istorum sunt distincti … Praeterea: obiectum commune quinque sensuum est aliud ab obiecto proprio cuiuslibet; sed quantitas secundum Philosophum secundo De anima est obiectum commune quinque omnium sensuum, diversae autem species qualitatis sunt subiecta propria cuiuslibet eorum; ergo etc. … Praeterea: Philosophus octavo Physicorum probat quod quantitas est propria ratio essendi in loco … ergo quantitas est alia a substantia et qualitate, quorum neutrum est ratio essendi in loco. Sic ergo patet ex intentione Philosophi expresse quod quantitas est alia res ab aliis generibus quibuscumque.’

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arguments appear in most or all of the versions of questions about quantity transcribed or edited by Patar.129 Anneliese Maier dated Buridan’s Quaestiones on the Physics (secundum ultimam lecturam) to not long after 1328, and she assumed that Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony were influenced by Buridan’s position, especially by his use of the experiment involving a bellows to show that magnitude is a real form different from substance and matter. As already mentioned, however, the current view is that Albert of Saxony’s questions on the Physics were written after Buridan’s tertia lectura and before his ultima lectura, all three works being produced in the 1350s. If this latter chronology is correct, the following interesting (hypothetical) result emerges: Buridan’s replies to arguments against the view that quantity is a separate form were not in his tertia lectura, but they were in Albert’s Quaestiones and then they appear in Buridan’s ultima lectura.130 So Albert of Saxony could be the immediate source of Ockhamist arguments in Buridan’s ultima lectura, rather than Buridan’s reading of one or more of Ockham’s works directly.131 However, there is another possible explanation for Buridan’s rejection of Ockham’s move to deny separate quantitative forms, arguing that if there were separate quantitative forms, then God could, by his absolute power, annihilate the quantitative form leaving the substantial and qualitative forms, which would still be extended without a separate quantitative form. In the theses from Ockham censured in Avignon in 1326, the 21st article complained that Ockham had repeated the opinion saying that substance and quantity are the same and had not disproved it, indeed he responded to the arguments in diverse places according to the opinion and rested with the opinion in one place.132 Elsewhere in his Quaestiones Physicorum (IV.8) Buridan cites the oath taken by 129

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Patar, La Physique de Bruges, 2: 19–25 (Annexe I); 2: 228–237 (Annexe III); 2: 274–287 (Annexe IV). E.g. Annexe I, 2: 21 (Utrum omnis res extensa sit magnitudo): ‘Ad istam quaestionem respondeo secundum viam antiquam quod nulla substantia est magnitudo sive quod materia non est magnitudo … Tunc pono quod vesica impleatur aere …’ This hypothesis can be checked once Jean Celeyrette publishes his edition of Buridan’s tertia lectura. The arguments appear in the present edition of question I.8 on 8318–8721. Note that Buridan makes use of his answer to question I.8 in his reply to question II.3 (2573–11). See A. Pelzer, ‘Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censurés, en Avignon, en 1326,’ Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 18 (1922), 240–270, at 261: ‘Recitat opinionem dicentem quod substantia et quantitas sunt eadem res nec tamen reprobat, immo secundum eam respondet in diversis locis ad argumenta et in ea in uno loco residet.’ Although the order of condemned theses may not be determinative, this thesis occurs within a series of theses on the sacrament of the altar.

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Arts Masters at inception saying that if they deal with any question touching both the arts and theology, they should resolve it in accordance with the faith and should disprove any arguments for the other side. Buridan (and Oresme, for that matter) could be acting in accordance with the oath in rejecting Ockham’s views on quantity.133 Interestingly, in relation to the current view that Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam can be dated to before 1347 because it makes extensive use of the concept of ‘modi rei,’ which was condemned in the case of John of Mirecourt in that year, Oresme does not make use of modi rei in his discussion of artificial things. A term that may be taking the place of modi rei in the discussion of artificial things is ‘dispositio.’ From Oresme’s use of modi rei elsewhere, it would appear that this concept could have been made use of to avoid the extremes of assuming separate real qualitative forms, on the one hand, and following Ockham, in effect, in simply denying any difference of form on the other hand, even, in the case of Oresme, reducing the real things in the world to substances.134 This could fit with Nicholas of Autrecourt’s flirtation with physical atomism.135 Question I.9—Whether a whole is its parts (Utrum totum sit suae partes). Aristotle, Physics, I, 2, 185b11–14. 1. 2. 3.

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Radulphus Brito: Utrum partes sint eaedem toti (I.11) John of Jandun: An totum distinguatur a suis partibus vel cum illis idem sit (I.10) Francesc Marbres: Utrum totum per se sumptum dicat aliquam entitatem tertiam distinctam realiter ab omnibus partibus suis simul sumptis (I.5)136 See Bakker, ‘Aristotelian Metaphysics,’ and Id. ‘Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité des accidents eucharistiques.’ See S. Caroti, ‘Nicole Oresme et les modi rerum,’ Oriens-Occidens. Cahiers du Centre d’histoire des sciences et de philosophies arabes et médievales, 3 (2000), 115–144, at 115: ‘Après la réduction opérée par Ockham des catégories aristotéliciennes aux seules substance et qualité, la théorie (j’ utilise le mot dans un sens très large) oresmienne des modi rerum, telle qu’elle résulte de son commentaire sur la Physique d’Aristote, mérite sans doute d’être prise en considération parmi les différentes positions en compétition dans les querelles philosophiques du Moyen Age tardif, ne serait-ce que pour le courage dont elle témoigne du fait d’ implications théologiques fort dangereuses.’ See C. Grellard, ‘Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Atomistic Physics,’ in: C. Grellard & A. Robert (eds), Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Leiden [etc.] 2009 (Medieval and early modern science, 9), 107–216. In this question, William of Ockham is not cited by name, but he is cited in the response to question I.9 ‘Whether matter indicates some actual entity separable by some power from

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Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum omnes partes simul sumptae sint idem quod totum (I.D.16) 5. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum totum sit aliqua entitas distincta ab omnibus partibus simul sumptis (I.5) 6. Nicole Oresme: Utrum totum sit suae partes aut res distincta a partibus (I.7) 7. Albert of Saxony: Utrum totum sit suae partes (I.7) 8. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum extensio substantiae sit res distincta a substantia extensa (I.2.2) 9. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum totum sit suae partes (I.9) Utrum notitia totius dependeat ex notitia suarum partium (I.11) 10. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum totum sit suae partes (I.8) 11. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum totum sit suae partes (I.22) 12. Conimbricenses: Distinguaturne totum re ipsa a suis partibus simul sumptis an non (I.2.1)

all form’ (Utrum materia dicatur aliquam entitatem actualem praecisibilem per aliquam potentiam ab omni forma). In question I.9, it is said that ‘one opinion, which seems to be of William of Ockham, is that number is not distinct from those things on which it is founded’ (‘una opinio etiam videtur Gulielmi Ocham quod numerus non est distinctus ab illis supra que fundatur’ [Francesc Marbres, Quaestiones Physicorum, I.9, 22vb]), which is similar to the argument of ‘one other’ (‘unus alius’) in question I.5. Thus ‘unus alius’ in question I.5 may also be Ockham. In question I.5, the argument of ‘unus alius’ that the whole is not distinct from the parts states that, if the whole were distinct, then: ‘numerus ternarius esset quaternarius. Probatur quia: quandocumque aliqua unitas additur tribus, constituitur numerus quaternarius. Cum ergo in numero ternario sint tres unitates, per te autem additur aliqua unitas quam dicit ternarius preter tres unitates, ergo erit ibi quaternarius addita unitate’ (15rb). Cf. William of Ockham, Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, cap. 10, ed. G. Gál, St. Bonaventure (NY) 1978 (Opera philosophica, 2), 220: ‘Ulterius de numero sciendum est quod numerus non est aliqua una res distincta a rebus substantialibus et qualitatibus, sed est unum praedicabile de multis simul sumptis, et de nullo illorum per se sumpto, sicut haec est vera “Sortes et Plato sunt duo,” et tamen haec est falsa “Sortes est duo,” et sic de aliis. Eodem modo posset dici quod si numerus ternarius, binarius et huiusmodi supponant praecise pro rebus et non pro intentionibus animae nec pro vocabulis, tales de virtute sermonis sunt verae “Sortes et Plato sunt binarius numerus,” “Sortes, Plato et Ioannes sunt ternarius numerus,” et sic de aliis.’ There is much more to this question than has been covered here. In his question I.5 Francesc Marbres also mentions the opinions of Peter Aureol, Francis of Marchia, John Duns Scotus and the ‘formalizantes.’

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Aristotle himself indicates that question I.9 is not relevant to the Physics at this point: There is, indeed, a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps not relevant to the present argument, yet deserving consideration on its own account— namely, whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, and in what way they can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what way they are more than one.137 Buridan remarks that the question pertains to metaphysics rather than physics, but says that it is treated here because Aristotle raises it. There are five principal arguments quod non based on authority and an additional seventeen arguments based on reason. Then there are six arguments in oppositum, all based on authority, the last of which comes from the Athanasian Creed.138 Buridan begins his reply to question I.9 with the conclusion that a whole is not one of its parts. This, he says, should be conceded as a principle per se notum and commonly conceded (9715–17). Anyone who denies it would have to deny that every whole is greater than its part. But the real question is not whether a whole is one of its parts, but whether it is all of its parts. Before answering this question, Buridan lays out an armamentarium of logical distinctions needed to reply (9912–25). Very common ways of speaking in which a whole is called by a part are, he says, improper. The word ‘whole’ (totum) can be used categorematically or syncategorematically. In the latter case ‘whole’ is taken as a universal sign distributing the word ‘part,’ so that the ‘whole man’ is equivalent to ‘of a man any part.’ Whether the whole is the same as its parts will also depend on whether the parts are taken in the conjoined sense (coniunctim) or in the divided sense (divisim). In the divided sense the whole is not its parts, but in the conjoined sense the whole is its parts. According to Buridan, great proof of the latter conclusion comes from the authorities cited. I believe, he says, that the rational soul and the body are one man and the Athanasian Creed in which this is said, is approved by the Church (10012–21). To the authorities, Buridan adds probable arguments. Even accepting Aristotle’s opinion on the eternity of the world, matter would not be perpetual if, when matter is divided, what resulted would not be the same 137

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Aristotle, Physics, I, 2, 185b11–14, tr. R.P. Hardie & R.K. Graye, in: J. Barnes, (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton 1984 (Bollingen Series 71/2), 315–446, at 317. ‘For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and Man is one Christ.’ See below, 9713–14.

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matter (10022–28). When weights are put on a scale, they balance just the same whether they are considered as parts or as wholes (1011–8). Nothing should be posited in nature without purpose ( frustra), but all appearances can be saved without positing a whole distinct from its parts (10118–20). After further elaborating his response in the case that ‘whole’ is taken syncategorematically, Buridan replies to the principal arguments. He undermines the force of the authoritative statements from Aristotle by explaining what Aristotle really intended. To a quotation from Averroes, saying that ‘when substances have been naturally unified, they become one by a superadded intention,’ he says that Averroes’ statement should be entirely denied in the sense that Averroes meant it, because he posited it to deny the divine Trinity, wanting to say that if God is really three, i.e. in persons, and is substantially one and undivided, it is necessary that something be added, but this is false and heretical. Moreover it is not relevant to the point at issue: although there is unity and trinity in God, there is not whole and part (10221–27). Turning to the rational arguments, Buridan says that although there are very many nit-picking logical arguments, there is little sense in them (ibi sunt infinitae cavillationes logicae et pauca sententia) (10311–12). Statements about wholes and parts that are very customary are nevertheless improper ways of speaking. A whole is not divided into its parts, because once divided the whole no longer exists, so, properly speaking, one should say that the parts are divided from each other. To explain what is meant by propositions about wholes and parts not only is it necessary to distinguish categorematic and syncategorematic senses, and compounded and divided senses, but also to distinguish between determinate and confused, and between confused and distributed (and merely confused) suppositions of terms. All in all, Buridan’s reply to question I.9 involves very little exposition of Aristotle’s text and generous application of nominalist logic or semantics. Buridan’s responses to many other questions in Books I and II similarly are more about the application of nominalist semantics than about interpretation of Aristotle’s text. Question I.10—Whether Socrates today is the same as he was yesterday, assuming that today something from nutrition is added to him or converted into his substance; or posited that today some part of him is removed, for instance that a hand is amputated (Utrum Socrates sit hodie idem quod ipse fuit heri, posito quod hodie additum est sibi aliquid ex nutrimento et conversum in eius substantiam, vel posito quod hodie est aliqua pars ab eo remota, ut si sibi amputata est manus).139

139

This question may be compared to a more generic way of asking the question found

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1. Nicole Oresme: Utrum totum sit suae partes aut res distincta a partibus (I.7)140 2. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum amota aliqua parte ab aliquo toto vel sibi addita remaneat idem totum quod prius (I.10) 3. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum Socrates sit idem hodie qui fuit heri, posito quod in eo fuerit facta mutatio per additionem vel ablationem alicuius partis (I.9) 4. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum Socrates qui hodie est, sit idem homo qui heri erat (I.23) This question really arises from Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione I, 5, 321b11–16. In Buridan’s commentary on that work, question I.13 is ‘Whether what is augmented remains simply the same before and after’ (Utrum id quod augetur maneat simpliciter idem ante et post). This is applied to Socrates, as in Aristotle’s view it is only animated bodies that may remain the same in augmentation and diminutition.141 Buridan’s answer to question I.10 in his Quaes-

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in Albert of Saxony’s question I.8: Utrum ex additione alicuius partis ad aliquod totum, similiter ex remotione alicuius partis ab aliquo toto, fiat aliud totum (as in manuscript Brugge 477) or Utrum ex additione alicuius totius ad aliquod totum fiat aliud totum et similiter ex remotione alicuius totius ab aliquo toto fiat aliud totum (as in the edition of 1516: Albert of Saxony, Quaestiones eximii Doctoris Magistri Alberti de Saxonia in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, in: G. Lokert [ed.], Quaestiones et decisiones physicales insignium virorum, Paris 1516 [URL: http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/ bsb10195484_00005.html]). Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, I.7, 53: ‘Secunda conclusio est, pro qua est notandum quod quedam sunt corpora animata, et alia sunt inanimata. Tunc est conclusio quod non propter amotionem alicuius partis cuiuscumque fit aliud totum in rebus animatis, nec etiam propter additionem. Hoc probatur quia: sequitur quod ego non essem ille qui fui heri et qui fui natus; et sic de aliis inconvenientibus. Et confirmatur per Aristotelem primo De generatione (I, 5, 321b11–16), ubi dicit quod illud quod proprie augetur, scilicet animatum, manet idem in utroque termino, scilicet in augmento et diminutione, et tamen fit ibi additio et subtractio. Ultimo ibidem quod est idem homo a principio ad finem.’ John Buridan, Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis, I.13, ed. M. Streijger, P.J.J.M. Bakker & J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Leiden [etc.] 2010 (Medieval and early modern science, 14), 111–113: ‘Quaeritur tertio decimo utrum id quod augetur manet simpliciter idem ante et post. Et arguitur quod non quia: (1) Totum est suae partes, ut communiter dicitur; sed partes non manent eaedem, immo adveniunt et defluunt; igitur quaestio falsa. (2) Secundo. Si illud quod advenit hodie per augmentationem vocetur a et totum residuum vocetur b, constat quia Socrates nunc est a et b simul. Et tamen Socrates heri non erat a et b, sed erat b tantum. Igitur Socrates non est idem hodie quod erat heri … Tertia conclusio quod homo a principio vitae usque ad finem remanet idem

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tiones Physicorum is relatively brief and consists only of making distinctions. Numerical identity can be understood in three ways: (1) totaliter, which is the most proper sense. In this sense, few things are numerically identical because there are constant small changes at least. (2) Things are partially numerically identical when important or principal parts do not change, for instance the intellect, in the case of human beings. In this sense a person is the same today as many years before. And (3) things may be considered numerically the same when they are connected successively, as a river is considered the same river even though different waters flow through it. This last sense is not numerical identity in the proper sense. All the principal arguments may be resolved by means of this distinction of senses. Question I.10 seems to follow from question I.9. The first principal argument quod non is that Socrates is not the same today and yesterday, because it would follow that a whole would be the same as its part—this same argument is used in Buridan’s question I.13 on De generatione et corruptione. Buridan does not treat it as a major question. 2.4 Physics, I, 4: Questions I.11–I.13 In the next section, Buridan’s questions are largely ones that arise from Aristotle’s text and that had been asked by previous commentators. They are closely linked to Aristotle’s arguments against various of the Presocratics. Question I.11—Whether the infinite as infinite is unknown (Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 4, 187b8–9. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Radulphus Brito: Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum (I.16) John of Jandun: An infinitum sit ignotum (I.14) Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum infinitum sit ignotum (I.2.3) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum (I.10) 5. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum (I.25) Buridan’s reply to question I.11 is relatively short given that infinity is treated more thoroughly in Book III. John of Jandun had already asked the same partialiter, immo secundum partem nobilissimam et principalissimam, quia secundum animam intellectivam, quae totaliter manet eadem semper. Et ex hoc possumus concludere quod simpliciter loquendo et sine addito homo manet idem a principio vitae usque ad finem.’

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question. Buridan replies that the infinite is known to us because we know such propositions as ‘every substance is a being,’ and the terms of such propositions supposit for infinitely many things, taking ‘infinite’ in the syncategorematic sense. In saying that the infinite is unkown to us, on the other hand, Aristotle is taking the term ‘infinite’ categorematically, to refer, for instance, to a magnitude that is actually infinite, which we could not know, because the actual infinite is not measurable by any measure. Neither could an actually infinite multitude be counted. These were the senses that Aristotle intended. Question I.12—Whether every natural entity is determined by a maximum (Utrum omnia entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum).142 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 4, 187b14–21. 1. John of Jandun: An naturalia ad maximum et minimum terminata sint (I.16) 2. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum in rebus naturalibus detur aliquod minimum vel maximum simpliciter (I.4) 3. Albert of Saxony: Utrum cuiuslibet speciei sit dare maximam materiam sub qua potest esse aliquid individuum illius speciei (I.10) 4. Nicole Oresme: Utrum in qualibet specie sit dare maximum naturale (I.11) 5. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum et minimum (I.3.1)143 6. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum entia naturalia sint determinata in magnitudine (I.12) Utrum potentia activa terminetur per maximum in quod potest (I.14) Utrum potentia activa terminetur per maximum effectum quem potest producere (I.15) 7. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum omnia entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum (I.11) 142

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The table of questions continues: ‘Quomodo est dare maximum et quomodo non. Quod omni longo est aliud longius tam in rectis quam in curvis. Quomodo potentia determinanda est per maximum vel per minimum’ (520–22). Marsilius of Inghen, Abbreviationes Physicorum, 4ra, writes: ‘Hic quaeri solet utrum entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum. In quo multa consueverunt quaeri. Primo: utrum est dare maximum sive in corporibus sive in lineis. Secundo: utrum sit dare maximam velocitatem vel tarditatem. Tertio: utrum sit dare maximam materiam in qua vel ex qua forma potest generari vel permanere. Et quarto: utrum entia sunt ad maximum terminata, et de his hic. Quinto: utrum sit dare maximam resistentiam in qua virtus activa (accidentia ed.) potest agere. Sexto: utrum sit dare maximum effectum quem virtus activa potest. Septimo: utrum sit dare maximum spatium per quod vel in quo visibile potest videri, et de his in primo Celi. Octavo: utrum sit dare maximum tempus per quod ens naturale potest durare, et de hoc secundo De generatione videatur.’

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8. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum entia naturalia habentia partem extra partem sint determinata ad maximam quantitatem (I.26) 9. Conimbricenses: Utrum res naturales ad maximum et minimum definitae sint necne (I.3–4, q. un.) In reply to question I.12, Buridan says that if the whole cosmos is taken as one thing, then there is a maximum entity that exists. On the other hand, God could create something larger. Similarly, there is currently a largest human being and a largest fire, but God could create larger ones. Buridan is uncertain whether there is a maximum fire possible by natural means—some think there is not, saying more straw may always be added to the fire, but Buridan doubts it. He believes that Aristotle intended that every natural body is determined by a maximum, but that could be a maximum quod sic or a minimum quod non. Continuing on to discussions of maxima and minima such as were becoming widespread in the fourteenth century (for instance in the Regulae solvendi sophismata of William Heytesbury), Buridan discusses whether there is a maximum line (he says no), a maximum motion (again, no), a maximum duration (the duration of God), or a maximum intensity (not if God’s power is taken into account).144 Concerning powers to lift weights, to see at a distance, and so forth, Buridan gives only probable conclusions. Question I.12 carries on at great length concerning such distinctions of maxima and minima, and in this way represents the ‘new physics’ of the fourteenth century, going beyond the contents of Aristotle’s Physics, and applying analytical languages or rules in the sense of Heytesbury to maxima of all types. Buridan is clearly aware of the ideas of the Oxford Calculators including Bradwardine’s rule for the proportions of proportions in velocity of motion and the measures of motions with respect to effect—measuring rotations by the fastest moved point or by the middle degree of motion. Of the 19 pages devoted to this question in the present edition, 13 are exercises in this kind of analysis. The question pointedly notes that the discussion does not apply to mathematical indivisibles which are regarded as imaginary or conceptual. Question I.13—Whether natural entities are determined by a minimum (Utrum entia naturalia determinata sint ad minimum). 1.

William of Chelveston (?): Utrum sit ponere minimum in naturalibus (I.20)

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Cf. the eight applications of maxima in Marsilius of Inghen’s Abbreviationes Physicorum cited in the preceding note.

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Thomas Wylton: Utrum contingat accipere universaliter minimum naturale et loquor secundum esse eius universale (I.25) 3. John of Jandun: An naturalia ad maximum et minimum terminata sint (I.16) 4. Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum sit dare minimum naturale (I.D.19) 5. Albert of Saxony: Utrum sit dare minimam materiam de cuius potentia possit educi forma naturalis (I.9) 6. Nicole Oresme: Utrum in qualibet specie sit dare minimum naturale (I.10) 7. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum in qualibet specie sit dare minimum naturale (I.13) Utrum sit dare minimum agens a quo potentia passiva potest pati (I.16) 8. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum omnia entia naturalia sint determinata ad minimum (I.12) 9. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum entia naturalia sint determinata ad minimum (I. 27) 10. Conimbricenses: Utrum res naturales ad maximum et minimum definitae sint necne (I.3–4, q. un.) Concerning question I.13, Buridan begins to deal with the continuum, which will be covered more fully in Book VI. While the divisibility of the continuum is never exhausted, it is not possible for the continuum to be divided infinitely in act. There is a quantity of a given type of body so small that no smaller quantity of the same type could exist independently for long—it would rapidly be corrupted. On the other hand, every body however small has a part smaller than it. Aristotle and Averroes seem to say that in generation or corruption there is a first part that is generated or corrupted all at once.145 Certainly by divine power smaller parts could exist, but the question here is what is possible naturally. 2.5 Physics, I, 4–6: Questions I.14–16 In questions I.14–I.16, Buridan draws upon nominalist semantics to try to resolve puzzling parts of Aristotle’s text. Question I.14—Whether, of any natural transmutation, the intrinsic principles are contraries (Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sint contraria). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 5, 188a19; 189a10.

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Cf. E.D. Sylla, ‘Averroes and Fourteenth-Century Theories Of Alteration: Minima naturalia and the Distinction between Mathematics and Physics,’ in: P.J.J.M. Bakker (ed.), Averroes’ Natural Philosophy and its Reception in the Latin West (forthcoming).

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

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Radulphus Brito: Utrum principia sint contraria (I.21) Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum principia sint contraria (I.9) John of Jandun: An rerum naturalium principia sint contraria (I.18) Albert of Saxony: Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis sint principia contraria (I.11) Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia sint contraria (I.18) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sint contraria (I.13) Benedictus Hesse: Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sint contraria (I.29) Conimbricenses: Utrum prima contraria sint rerum naturalium principia an non (I.5.2)

Concerning question I.14, Buridan begins by asserting that the contraries of concern are significant terms rather than things in the external world. Accordingly, he concludes: 1. Of no substantial generation are the intrinsic principles contraries (14522–23). 2. Of no generation of heat are the intrinsic principles contraries, because, although the generation of heat and the corruption of cold occur simultaneously, nevertheless the generation of heat is nothing but the heat that is acquired, and the corruption of cold also is nothing but the cold which is removed (this all is asssumed here)—indeed heat or cold are not composed of contraries, but only of gradual parts of the same nature (14611–18). 3. Then according to Aristotle’s understanding, of any transmutation the intrinsic principles are contraries, that is, the terms by which the words for transmutation are expounded are contraries, taking the notion of ‘contrariety’ very loosely. For example ‘generation’ and ‘corruption’ are expounded with the terms ‘being’ and ‘non-being,’ which are mutually repugnant to each other, and whitening will be transmutation from not-white to white (1475–24). According to the preceding and the intention of Aristotle, Buridan explains, besides contraries there must also be an underlying subject for all types of natural transmutation, if not for creation. This subject or matter is not opposed to the other principles. This leads to the next conclusion according to Aristotle: 4. Of everything that undergoes transmutation as a composite of a subject and what it acquires or loses, the principles are contraries, that is they are named

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by contrary words suppositing for them, and which are required to express the term and the nature of the transmutation, that is of the generation and corruption. The contrary terms at issue are ‘form’ and ‘privation’ or equivalent terms, and with them is required the word ‘subject’ or ‘matter,’ to which nothing is contrary (1499–21). Thus Buridan has explained Aristotle’s claim that in transmutation there are contraries and an underlying substratum in a second intentional way: when we describe transmutation we use terms that are contraries. This sort of answer sometimes led Buridan’s contemporaries to object that motion involves more than the changing truth and falsity of propositions. Question I.15—Whether it is necessary for everything that is made to be made from a preexisting subject (Utrum necesse sit omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito). Or others state the question as follows: whether it is possible for anything to come into being from nothing (Utrum possibile sit ex nihilo aliquid fieri).146 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 4, 189a33–37. 1. 2.

Radulphus Brito: Utrum aliquid possit fieri ex non ente (I.15) Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum materia prima sit generabilis (I.15) 3. Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum materia sit ingenita et incorruptibilis (I.15) 4. Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum illud ex quo aliquid generatur sit ens vel non ens (I.D.24.) 5. John of Jandun: An ex non ente simpliciter sive ex nihilo aliquid fiat (I.22) An materia prima sit per se generabilis et corruptibilis (I.29) 6. Albert of Saxony: Utrum sit possibile aliquid fieri de novo, nullo subiecto presupposito (I.13) 7. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum omne quod fit fiat ex subiecto praesupposito (I.5.1) 8. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum aliquid possit fieri ex nihilo (I.17) 9. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum necesse sit omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito (I.14) 10. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum necesse sit omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito (I.31) Utrum generatio differat a creatione (I.32)

146

The table of questions continues: ‘Utrum aliquid potest fieri ex non ente vel ex nihilo. Quomodo per inductionem imperfectam sciuntur principia in scientia naturali’ (62–4).

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Must there always be a substratum to change? To question I.15, Buridan replies that he believes by faith and not by any proof except the authority of Sacred Scripture and of the doctors of the Catholic faith, that God created an angel and heaven and earth ex nihilo. Naturally, everything that is made comes from a pre-existing subject, but this too cannot be demonstrated. Averroes tried to demonstrate it, but in doing so he was laboring against the Christian faith. Question I.16—Whether there are three principles of natural things, neither more nor less (Utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium, non plura nec pauciora). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 6, 189a11; 189b17–18. 1. 2.

William of Chelveston (?): Utrum principia sint tantum tria (I.23) Radulphus Brito: Quaeritur de numero principiorum utrum sint plura vel pauciora (I.22) 3. Thomas Wylton: Utrum sint tantum tria principia (I.27) Utrum in quolibet genere sint tria principia transmutationis naturalis, quae principia sint eiusdem generis praedicabilis, sicut accidit in generatione substantiae (I.28) 4. Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum sint tantum tria principia (I.14) 5. John of Jandun: An principia rerum naturalium tantum tria sint (I.21) 6. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum sint tantum tria principia rerum naturalium (I.6) 7. Albert of Saxony: Utrum rerum naturalium sint tantum duo vel tria principia (I.12) 8. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum tria sint principia rerum naturalium (I.5.2) 9. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium et non plura nec pauciora (I.19) 10. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum tantum tria sint principia rerum naturalium sic quod non plura neque pauciora (I.14) 11. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum rerum naturalium tantum tria sint principia (I.22) 12. Conimbricenses: Sintne tria principia rerum naturalium an non (I.6–7, q. un.) Buridan’s reply to question I.16 disagrees with Aristotle, saying that of any given composite substance there are two, not three intrinsic principles: matter and form. In any one thing (suppositum) there is only one substantial form. Concerning natural transmutation, the term ‘generation’ supposits for the substantial form that the matter acquires or loses. This is a simple principle. But now it

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has been concluded that there are not three principles, but two or none, how can we explain Aristotle’s statement that there are three principles? Aristotle says that there are three because he includes privation, as well as matter and form, where form and privation are contraries, while the third, namely matter, is not contrary to the others. This has been made clear already. ‘Matter’ and ‘privation’ are distinct in thought, but the same in reality. Thus Buridan, in good nominalist fashion, reduces the number of separate things existing in the external world. Lest the recipient of this conclusion be tempted to reject it, Buridan elaborates his approach in questions I.17–I.19, which are new with Buridan and are treated at length. Buridan’s replies to questions I.17–I.19 test the viability of nominalist semantics. 2.6 Questions I.17–I.19 Question I.17—Whether substantial generation is the substantial form, or the matter, or the composite, or some accident added to them (Utrum generatio substantialis sit forma substantialis vel materia vel compositum vel aliquod accidens eis additum). 1. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum generatio formae substantialis sit forma substantialis quae generatur (I.16) 2. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum generatio substantialis sit forma substantialis vel materia vel compositum vel aliquod accidens superadditum (I.44) In reply to question I.17, Buridan concludes: 1. The term ‘substantial generation’ does not supposit for an accident added to the matter, form, or the substantial composite, because although it may be necessary for us to understand accidents first before we arrive at the substantial concepts of substances, nevertheless after we arrive at the substantial concepts of water or air, then, setting aside all further understanding of accidents, if we understand that water previously does not exist and later exists, we understand that water has been made ( fieri). If we understand further that this water has been made by a natural agent from a pre-existing subject, we understand that it was generated naturally. Therefore the term ‘generation,’ or ‘creation of substance,’ does not signify or connote anything but the substance that is generated, and perhaps with it the subject presupposed, namely matter, and the form that it acquires, and those things or some one of them previously did not exist and later existed (1705–16). 2. The term ‘substantial generation’ does not supposit for matter, so substantial generation is not matter. Matter is the most proper subject susceptible

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to generation and corruption and it is not a subject susceptible to itself (17112–17). 3. The term ‘substantial generation’ does not supposit for the substantial composite, because, as has been said, matter is the most proper subject susceptible to generation, and it is not susceptible to the composite, since it is a part of the composite and it does not undergo itself (17123–26). 4. The term ‘substantial generation’ supposits for the substantial form. This is clear from what has been said … Just as a man is made white, although he is not made absolutely, so matter is formed by such a form, even though it is not made absolutely (17127–1727). Thus there are no individual supposita for the term ‘generation’ appearing in propositions other than the substantial form newly appearing in the matter acted upon. In reply to a principal argument, Buridan admits that generation is an action or a passion, but says that it is not true that every action or passion is an accident such that it is not a substance. Rather, accidental terms belonging to the category of accidents may well supposit for substances. Will this understanding be sufficient to account for the truth or falsity of propositions about generation? Question I.18—Concerning ‘to generate’ (just as was asked, in question I.17, concerning generation), whether to generate is the generator, or generation, or something else (Utrum generare sit generans vel generatio vel quid aliud).147 1. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum generare sit generans vel generatio vel aliquod aliud (I.17) 2. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum generare sit generans (I.45) Question I.18 is the longest question in Book I (22 pages in the present edition). It starts with 21 principal arguments and contains more than one set of conclusions. After the principal arguments, Buridan says: These are the arguments with which many wish to prove (convincere) that it is necessary to posit in reality complexly signifiables (complexe significabilia) distinct from the things for which incomplex simple terms 147

The table of questions continues: ‘De complexe significabilibus. Unde ex parte rei propositiones dicantur verae vel falsae. Quod nulla propositio mentalis significat falsum. Quod istarum propositionum “Deus est” et “Deus non est” neutra significat plus vel aliud quam alia extra animam nostram’ (610–13).

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supposit. And thus that a man generates (hominem generare) is not the man generating, nor, consequently, is to generate the generator (1789–12). To the contrary, Buridan argues that nothing more is necessary for generating than the generator and the subject and the substantial form. If by the generator the form is in the subject, when previously it was not, then there is generation and to generate and to be generated, setting all else aside. Therefore to generate is one of these or nothing (17813–17). Buridan then states nine conclusions and replies to objections: 1. To generate is some thing or some things (aliquid vel aliqua) (17825–1794). 2. To generate, or to do good, or for God to create (Deum creare), or for Socrates to cut wood (Socrates lignum secare), and so in other (similar) cases, is not a proposition (1795–23). 3. To generate and to be generated is not the same (so in the case that fire a generates fire b, to generate and to be generated is not the same in these) (17924–1803). 4. To generate is not the subject of generation (1804–8). 5. To generate is not the form which is made in the matter (1809–11). 6. To generate is not the composite which we say is generated (generari) (18012–13). 7. To generate is not the generator and that which is generated together (18014–24). 8. To generate is not an accident other than the generator or what is generated (18025–1814). 9. To generate is the generator (1829–15). Among his arguments for conclusions 8 and 9, Buridan reports the argument that when we say that the light comes from the Sun or depends on the Sun there is something else involved (a dispositio) besides the light and the Sun. As a counterargument Buridan says that if God creates an angel, then nothing else need be involved besides God and the angel, no added disposition. In the broader intellectual context at Paris at this time, there were many arguments, saying, for instance, that God by his absolute power could bring about the existence, say, of evil thoughts in a person’s mind. But if God did this, would the thoughts then be the thoughts of the given person? Seemingly not. By his nine conclusions, Buridan brags of having avoided a multitude of irrational entities:

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In this way an infinite multitude of irrational entities are avoided, which some call complexly signifiables, while they cannot say where they are, nor whether they are substances or accidents, creator or creatures. Those who posit complexly signifiables posit that from eternity it is and was that the Antichrist will be generated and will speak. They also say that a chimera not to exist was from eternity, and since such things were not God, it is necessary that at least they were from God. And everything that is from God, if it is not God, is a creature. Therefore it follows that there were creatures coeternal with God, which is unsuitable to say. And in general infinite absurdities follow from that opinion (18216–24).148 Thus Buridan construes the supposition of terms related to generation in the same way that Ockham construed the reference or supposition of terms related to motion in general, accepting the existence only of individual entities. After replying to the first five principal arguments, Buridan interrupts, saying: And if I have said otherwise in the Metaphysics, nevertheless both ways of speaking exclude the fictitious complexe significabilia. The mode I follow now appears to me to be true.—And it should be noted that I do not intend to deny (negare) complexe significabilia, indeed I believe that every thing is complexly signifiable. God, indeed, who is supremely simple, is signified by this complex ‘God is God’ (Deum esse Deum) or ‘God is three and one’ (Deum esse trinum et unum), etc. (1841–7). After replying to the sixth through twelfth principal arguments, Buridan states eight new conclusions about the truth and falsity of propositions (18721–1906) as an aid to replying to the remaining principal arguments: 1. A true categoric affirmative proposition de inesse and de praesenti is true because however it signifies to be, so it is (qualitercumque significat esse, ita est) (18723–24). 2. Such a proposition about the future, if it is true, is true because however it signifies (things) will be, they will be (18725–26). 3. And similarly for the past (18727). 4. And for possibles, according to the preceding requirements (18728–29). 5. In assigning causes of truth of propositions about possibles one should

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Among the authors who posited complexe significabilia were Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini. See Biard, ‘Les controverses.’

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change the phrasing according to the requirements of times, for instance ‘that Aristotle could be generated:’ this is true because however it (the proposition) signified something to be possible, thus it was possible (1881–4). 6. To be noted well because it is a principle of many others: supposing the formation of contradictory propositions and all required to their formation, then, whatever else is required on the part of the things signified for the truth of the affirmative is required for the falsity of the negative; and whatever suffices for the truth of the affirmative, that also suffices for the falsity of the negative (1885–23). 7. This is also notable: supposing as before the formation of contradictory propositions and the requirements for their formation, nothing else is required for the truth of the negative nor for the falsity of the affirmative. This is proved because if the proposition ‘the horse does not run’ or ‘the stone does not exist’ is in some intellect that formed it, and if everything else was annihilated except God and the intelligences or the intellect which are required for the formation of that proposition, or in addition, if nothing were required for the existence of that proposition except God, then if all other things were annihilated, still that proposition would be true and the affirmative proposition contradicting it would be false, if they were formed (18824–1894). 8. From this follows the conclusion that the negative should not properly be said to be true if as it signifies so it is in reality, but because the affirmative contradicting it, if it were formed, would somehow signify something to be or to have been, which is not or was not, etc., according to the exigency of diverse propositions whether of being or of possibility, of the present, of the past, or of the future, as was said before, such that from the defect of something required for the truth of the affirmative proposition, the negative proposition is rendered true (1895–1906). In this context, Buridan says that, although the term ‘being’ may signify the same thing as the term ‘true’ and the term ‘non-being’ may signify the same as ‘false,’ where being and non-being apply to things in the world (as when God says: ‘I am the way, the truth, and life’), here he is using ‘true’ and ‘false’ to apply only to complexes (i.e. propositions) in which the mind combines (in affirmations) or divides (in negations) (19019–1912). He then goes on to posit some short conclusions which assume (whether it is true or false) that it is impossible for a chimera to exist, so that ‘that a chimera exists’ (chimaeram esse) is nothing and cannot be. Likewise ‘that a man is an ass’ (hominem esse asinum) is nothing and cannot be. The first conclusion is that a chimera cannot be understood, nor can it be signified by any word or

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phrase, and similarly ‘that a man be an ass’ cannot be understood by anyone nor signified by any word or phrase (19118–20). This is proved because in all these propositions the subject terms stand for nothing, and every affirmative proposition in which the subject term stands for nothing is false while the negative contradictory to it is true. But these propositions are negative; therefore they are true and to be conceded. The third short conclusion is that the proposition ‘God is God’ and the proposition ‘God is not God’ signify nothing other and nothing more or less in reality outside our mind than each other (19315–22). The differences between the two propositions are operations of the intellect or modes and not things outside the mind (19326–1944). Thus in this whole question Buridan is attempting to construe the truth and falsity of propositions by examining the suppositions of the terms of the proposition and allowing personal supposition of terms only for individual real things (setting aside for the moment material supposition for words or other non-physical things). That this issue would be foregrounded in a question about ‘to generate’ can be explained by considering that in Aristotelianism, generation of a new substantial form is taken to be instantaneous (although it may come after an alteration that occurs over time). Ockham, Buridan, Oresme, and others deny that there are any real indivisibles such as points or instants in the natural world. Propositions concerning generation are taken to be true at a certain time or over a period of time, though they may refer to prior or succeeding times. In his Summulae de Dialectica, Buridan writes: The fourteenth part concerns the loci from generation and from the thing generated. And the greatest difficulty is to be discussed in natural science, namely, what kind of thing generation is, i.e., for what thing or things the name ‘generation’ supposits. Therefore, on the basis of conclusions established in natural science I assume that where purely successive things such as time are concerned, the thing’s being and its coming to be are the same, and the same applies to its corruption. For this day is only when it is coming to be, and it is coming to be only when it is … In the case of things that are permanent by nature, however, as is the heat of water, the generation of the thing is not the thing itself, but the thing will be, so that at a precise time when the generation of the heat B is, the heat B is not, but will be, and also at the precise time when the heat B is, then its generation is not, but was … But in the case of things of a permanent nature this is not valid: ‘A is; therefore, the generation of A is,’ nor is it conversely, but rather this is valid: ‘A is; therefore the generation of A was’ and ‘the generation of A is; therefore A will be’ … Again, many other points

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could be noted here concerning generation and the thing generated that have been noted concerning the efficient cause and its effect, since the agent is the generating thing.149 Buridan applies this sort of reasoning in a sophism: ‘No change is instantaneous:’ P.1 Proof: every change is either in an indivisible instant or in some divisible time; but nothing is in an indivisible instant, for there are no indivisibles in time, as has often been assumed; therefore, every change is in divisible time, and everything that is such is to be called temporal and not instantaneous. O.1 The opposite is argued, for at least the creation of our intellective soul is instantaneous. For since it is indivisible, it is necessary that the whole come to be simultaneously, not one part after another, and such a coming to be we call instantaneous change; therefore, etc. We should note that it is not the logician’s task to determine whether an instant is some thing, and if so what it is. Rather, we only assume that there is no indivisible thing in the continuum that is the terminus of the continuum, as many people imagined concerning points in lines and instants in times. Nevertheless, we say that that thing comes to be in an instant which is such that after nothing of it was, the whole of it is altogether at once so that no part of it is earlier in time than another part … It is obvious that there is indeed instantaneous change; therefore, the sophism was false. But then, for this reason we may ask when such a change occurs, and what sort of thing it is. To this I reply that as far as our present discussion is concerned such an instantaneous change is the thing itself that is thus said to come to be, and the thing’s coming to be is only the becoming and the thing that comes to be, and being created is the creation and the thing created, and in general to be thus changed (mutari) is only the change (mutatio) and the thing changed (mutatum). Therefore, being changed or change occurs (est) when the thing changed exists (quando est mutatum), and there never is a change save when the thing changed exists, but the thing changed certainly exists when there is no change, for the names

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Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, 449–450. For the Latin, see John Buridan, Summulae. De locis dialecticis, 6.4.14, ed. N.J. Green Pedersen, Turnhout 2013 (Artistarium, 10/6), 74–75.

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‘thing changed’ and ‘change’ agree in that they both appellate two times, one at which the thing is or was, and another at which the thing is not or was not.150 The text continues. It is difficult to understand Buridan’s point, but it appears that his position in the Summulae may differ from his position in question I.18 of the Quaestiones Physicorum. In any case the comparison of texts makes it clear that the problem Buridan is facing has to do more with proper logical analysis than with physics per se. Insofar as this program is like that of Ockham, this might explain why there was discomfort among some at Paris in this time concerning the doings of the ‘Occamistae.’ Question I.19—Whether that which is generated in substantial generation is the material, or the form, or the composite (Utrum illud quod in generatione substantiali generatur sit materia vel forma vel compositum). Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, 1, 190b11–12. 1. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum illud quod in generatione substantiali generatur sit materia, forma vel compositum (I.18) 2. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum illud quod generatur in generatione substantiali sit materia, forma vel compositum (I.45) As compared to question I.18, this question is slightly less logical and slightly more physical. Buridan concludes his answer to question I.19 by saying: We should not, because of the diverse ways of talking about motion, alteration, and generation, come to different conclusions. As in motion the form that is acquired is motion and not the subject, so in generation form is the generation and not the subject (19912–16). These things having been noted, I say that the matter and the form and the composite all are said to be generated, but in diverse ways, and by the same generation, any one of them is said to be generated in its own way. (1) Form is said to be generated because it is the generation and because it exists totally when before it did not exist. (2) Matter is said to be generated because it is subjected to that generation, and because it is formed with such a form with which it was not previously formed, and not because it

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Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, 950–951. For the Latin, see John Buridan, Summulae. De practica sophismatum, 9.7.9, ed. F. Pironet, Turnhout 2004 (Artistarium, 10/9), 138–139.

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exists when it previously did not exist. So it is not said to be generated or made absolutely, as a man who is heated is not said to be made, but to be made hot. (3) The composite, however, is said to be generated because it is composed of the generation and of the subject of generation, and because it is when previously it was not—but this applies not to it primarily but to the form (19917–29). Aristotle’s statement that matter is not made, nor form, but the composite, can be expounded by saying that he is talking according to common speech, which does not perceive form and matter distinctly. Or there may be a better exposition … Sometimes the abstract term is verified of the concrete and vice versa (19930–20019). Although these three new questions I.17–I.19 and Buridan’s answers are not directly related to Aristotle’s text and had not been dealt with by most earlier commentators, they are important for nominalist semantics, because much of what Aristotle does say at the end of Book I concerns privation, where privation seems to be nothing—what then can the term ‘privation’ supposit for? The author of the Summulae (Peter of Spain) had said that every proposition signifies something true or false.151 What then does the proposition ‘A chimera does not exist’ signify in re? It cannot be a chimera, because chimeras do not exist. This had led to the conclusion that the proposition ‘A chimera does not exist’ signifies in re the complexly signifiable ‘a-chimera-not-existing’ or ‘that a chimera does not exist’ (chimaeram non esse). How Buridan dealt with Aristotle’s statements about privation will be discussed below. 2.7 Physics, I, 9: Questions I.20–I.24 Question I.20—Whether prime matter is a being (Utrum materia prima sit ens).152 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 9, 192a5–6; Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 79. 1.

Roger Bacon: Utrum materia sit medium inter ens et non ens. Utrum materia sit ens in potentia vel actu153

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Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summulae logicales, I.7, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972 (Philosophical Texts and Studies, 22), 3: ‘Propositio est oratio verum vel falsum significans.’ The table of questions continues: ‘Quid debeamus intelligere per “substantiam per se subsistentem.” Quomodo debeat intelligi quod materia prima nec est quid nec quale nec quantum’ (616–18). Ed. Delorme & Steele, 44–46.

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

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William of Chelveston (?): Utrum materia sit ens (I.25) Utrum materia de se sit ens actu (I.26) Radulphus Brito: Utrum materia prima sit aliquid (I.25) Thomas Wylton: Utrum materia sit ens (I.29) Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum materia prima de se sit ens in actu (I.10) Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum materia de se habeat aliquem actum (I.9) Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum materia prima sit aliquid in actu habens formam (I.D.23) John of Jandun: An materia prima sit ens (I.19) An materia prima sit substantia (I.20) Francesc Marbres: Utrum materia dicat aliquam entitatem actualem praecisibilem per aliquam potentiam ab omni forma (I.9)154 Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum materia prima sit ens in pura potentia (I.7) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum materia prima sit ens (I.19) Benedictus Hesse: Utrum materia prima sit ens (I.48) Conimbricenses: Insitne rebus physicis materia (I.8.1) Utrumne materia divina virtute absque omni forma substantiali cohaerere possit an non (I.8.6)

In the preceding questions privation has been reduced to another way of speaking about matter, but is matter a being? Perhaps surprisingly, Buridan replies to question I.20 that matter is indeed a being: The opposite is argued, because it (matter) is substance, and nature, and principle, and cause, and part of a true being. I posit briefly several conclusions: 1. Matter is a being, because otherwise the affirmative propositions that have just been stated would not be true, namely that matter is substance, and nature, and cause, and principle. 2. It is a being in act, not only in potentiality, because to be only in potentiality is not to be. But prime matter not only can be but is, as has been said. 154

Francesc Marbres, Quaestiones Physicorum, 21vb–24va. This question mentions Averroes (Commentator), Peter Aureol, Thomas Anglicus (Wylton) and all his followers (who take the negative side), William of Ockham (who says that number is not distinct from the things on which it is founded), Francis of Marchia, and Gerard of Odo general minister of the order of minors (‘Geraldi Odonis generalis ministri ordinis minorum’ [elected 1329], who says that indeterminate quantity is part of the plurality of parts of matter).

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3. Matter is act and would be act, even if it existed without substantial or accidental form inhering in it (20116–20213). The word ‘being’ (ens) predicated simply about some subject signifies the same as ‘being in act’ (ens in actu), Buridan notes. Furthermore, there is no difference between essence and existence (20223–25). The essence of man is nothing other than the being (existence) of man, and the being (existence) of man is the man who is. Therefore the essence of man is the man who is (20225–2032). What then about possible or potential beings, as when it is said that the soul of Antichrist is in potentia? Buridan answers that the words ‘potential,’ ‘can,’ and ‘possible’ supposit for things that do not exist but that can exist: these words amplify (ampliant) the subject terms of which they are predicated to supposit in this way (2049–17). Buridan makes a similar use of ampliation of supposition in Book II to explain the relation of final causes, in one interpretation, to their effects. Prime matter, Buridan admits in conclusion 4, is never without a substantial form or quantity or several qualities by which it is in act—at least this is the case unless God should choose to conserve it in existence without forms, which, however, he does not consider here (20418–23). And even if matter should be without any substantial or qualitative form inhering in it, nevertheless it would have parts and quantity in the sense of the parts being countable (20424–30). When Aristotle says that prime matter is not qualified or quantified but is pure potency, what he means is that prime matter in itself is not extended nor qualified by sensible qualities that can be sensed by us. When Aristotle says that prime matter is not a thing (quid), he means, Buridan says, that matter is not this thing (hoc aliquid), but he does not deny that it is something (aliquid) (2051–17). Buridan concludes question I.20 by raising and responding to four further doubts (20518–20823). Question I.21—Whether form, before it may be generated, has some substantial being in matter distinct from this matter (Utrum forma, antequam generetur, habeat aliquod esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 9, 192a33. 1. Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum inter materiam primam et formam primam sit materiae compositae et formae compositae (I.13) 2. Francesc Marbres: Utrum forma generabilis ante sui generationem habeat aliquod esse reale distinctum ab essentia materiae (II.1) 3. Albert of Saxony: Utrum formae generandae ante eius generationem aliquid eius praeexistat in materia (I.18)

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4. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum forma substantialis ante sui generationem habeat aliquod esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia (I. 20) 5. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum forma substantialis ante sui generationem habeat esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia (I.50) In reply to question I.21, Buridan deals not only with the views of the Presocratics, such as Anaxagoras, discussed by Aristotle, but also with the view of Albert the Great, one of the rare instances of his naming a medieval Latin author. Buridan’s principal conclusion is the following: Before substantial generation, nothing of the form which is generated (or to speak more truly, which is the generation) pre-existed. In the case of intensible forms, however, such as heat, half (medietas) of the complete heat which will be may precede the other half (alterius medietatis) (21416–20). If the forms to be generated do not exist in some partial way before generation, is there any potency in the matter? This is taken up in the next question. Question I.22—Whether prime matter is a potency to the form to be generated (Utrum materia sit potentia ad formam generandam).155 1. Thomas Wylton: Utrum potentia sit de essentia materiae (I.33) 2. Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum potentia sit de essentia materiae (I.16) 3. John of Jandun: An potentia materiae essentialiter sit idem cum ipsa substantia materiae (I.25) An materia habeat in se infinitas potentias (I.26) 4. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum potentia materiae sit aliqua res superaddita eius essentiae (I.8) 5. Albert of Saxony: Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis materia sit principium (I.14) 6. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum materia prima sit potentia ad formam generandam (I.21) 7. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum materia sit potentia ad formam generandam, id est utrum potentia materiae ad formam generandam sit ipsamet materia vel sit aliquid aliud superadditum ipsi materiae (I.51) 8. Conimbricenses: Utrum omnes ac solae formae ordinis naturalis e materiae subiectivae potentia educantur (I.9.12)

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The table of questions continues: ‘De diversis modis capiendi “potentiam”’ (622).

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In reply to question I.22, Buridan begins as follows: This question appears easy if the meaning of the terms is known. Such terms are ‘active power’ and ‘passive power.’ As God is omnipotent as an active potency, so matter is a passive potency, which can be acted on by natural agents (21822–2195). Then he draws the following conclusions: 1. Matter is a passive potency and a receptive potency of the forms to be generated. This passive potency is not a relation to form added to the matter—it would be absurd and vain to add such a relation. Just as God can act without an added relation, so matter can receive form without such an added relation. Indeed, relation in creatures is only an act of the mind referring and comparing things to each other (2195–2206). 2. The powers of matter, by which the matter is disposed to receive such or such a form, are not the matter itself, but are distinguished from it and from each other. They are diverse with respect to diverse substantial forms. They may be called potencies or impotencies (22022–2214). In reply to a principal argument from Averroes, Buridan explains: The same thing according as it is in potency to diverse acts is called by different names, as the same soul is called a vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, etc., potency … And similarly the same matter is said to be a potency to fire, to air, or to water, etc. And thus it is the intention of Averroes (the Commentator) that the names of potencies are multiplied while the matter of which those names are said truly remains the same. So there is a diversity of names in thought, but not a diversity of things for which those names supposit—indeed it is the same thing (22324–2244). How then is matter a passive potency and also a privation? This is the topic of question I.23.

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Question I.23—Whether privation is matter deprived (of form) (Utrum privatio sit materia privata).156 1.

Roger Bacon: An privatio sit aliquid aut nihil. Quid sit privatio. Quid addat privatio supra materiam157 2. Radulphus Brito: Utrum privatio sit per se principium rerum naturalium (I.24) 3. Thomas Wylton: Utrum privatio sit de essentia materiae (I.35) Utrum privatio sit ens (I.36) Utrum privatio sit per se principium fieri vel transmutationis (I.37) Utrum privatio sit principium esse rei (I.38) 4. John of Jandun: An privatio sit rerum naturalium principium (I.23) 5. Walter Burley (Quaestiones): Utrum privatio sit principium naturale (I.17) 6. Francesc Marbres: Utrum privatio sit aliqua entitas formaliter existens, circumscripto omni opere intellectus (I.10)158 7. Albert of Saxony: Utrum privatio sit res distincta a materia (I.16) 8. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum privatio sit ipsamet materia (I.7.1) 9. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum materia sit cognoscibilis prima (I.20) 10. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum privatio sit materia privata (I.22) 11. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum privatio et materia sint idem numero et differant specie (I.38) Utrum privatio sit materia privata (I.52) 12. Conimbricenses: An privatio sit ens an non (I.9.7) Utrum privatio vere principium rerum naturalium sit an non (I.9.8) In reply to question I.23, Buridan makes use of the notion of supposition and of nominalist semantics in general. The point of departure is the following passage identifying ‘being deprived’ and ‘privation:’ It seems to me that this question can easily be resolved by saying that deprived and privation are the same; and matter is deprived; therefore matter is privation (2264–5). That what is deprived is privation can be clarified by the following (semantic) rules:

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Table of questions continues: ‘Diversae expositiones huius nominis “privatio”’ (623–24). Ed. Delorme & Steele, 58–61. Francesc Marbres, Quaestiones Physicorum, 24va–26rb. This question cites John Duns Scotus (Sent. I, d. 26), Thomas Anglicus (Wylton), and Peter Aureol.

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One rule is that if a concrete term supposits for something and an abstract term also supposits for something, and if the abstract term does not signify or connote something other than that for which the concrete term supposits, then it is necessary that the abstract and the concrete terms supposit for the same thing and that they may be affirmatively verified of each other. In this way I believe that the following propositions are true: ‘entity is being,’ ‘deity is God,’ ‘continuity is the continuous,’ ‘magnitude is what is big,’ and so on for many other propositions. The word ‘entity’ does not signify or connote anything that the term ‘being’ does not supposit for. Similarly ‘deity’ signifies nothing that is not God (2266–14). Another rule is that also in the preceding case, namely when both a concrete term and an abstract term supposit for something, even if the abstract term signifies or connotes many things other than those for which the concrete term supposits, provided that it supposits for none of the others, it is necessary that it would supposit for the same things for which the concrete term supposits (22615–19). According to the preceding rule, a power is able (potentia est potens), will is willing, paternity is the father, privation is deprived, etc. But the following propositions are false: ‘something white is whiteness,’ ‘what is ensouled is soul,’ ‘a rich man is richness,’ and so forth, because the abstract term signifies something other than that for which the concrete term supposits and in these propositions it also supposits for something else (22711–15). In a third way the question can be resolved by saying that we can understand the same thing by the term ‘privation’ and by the phrase ‘matter lacking a form which it has innately.’ And in this way privation is the matter lacking that form, as for a man to run is the man who runs. And if by ‘privation’ we want to understand the same as meant by the phrase ‘such a form being able to be in matter and no such form being in it,’ then privation would be the form in potentiality, just as that a soul may be is a soul in potentiality. In this way privation is nothing, but it will be or can be (22815–22). All these ways of solving the question mean the same thing as far as things are concerned, and all are true. According to these diverse expositions, it is necessary to respond differently. It seems to me that Aristotle more nearly holds to the first way. Therefore he says that matter and privation are the same thing in number. For this reason, I also hold to this way, not however disproving the others, but more nearly approving of them (22823–29).

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Question I.24—Whether matter desires form (Utrum materia appetat formam).159 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, I, 9, 192a18–22. 1.

William of Chelveston (?): Utrum materia semper appetat formam (I.38) Utrum materia appetat formam propter privationem (I.39) 2. Radulphus Brito: Utrum materia appetat formam (I.28) 3. Thomas Wylton: Utrum materia appetat formam (I.30) Utrum materia appetat formam per privationem formaliter (I.31) 4. Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum materia appetat formam (I.16) 5. John of Jandun: An materia ipsa formam appetat (I.27) An privatio sit materiae appetendi formam causa (I.28) 6. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum materia appetat formam (I.9.1) Utrum quodlibet ens diligat se permanere (I.9.2) 7. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum quodlibet ens naturale appetat sui permanentiam (I.22) 8. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum materia prima appetat formam (I.23) Utrum omne ens appetat se permanere (I.24) 9. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum materia appetat formam (I.54) 10. Conimbricenses: Utrum materia formam appetat (I.9.4) Buridan’s final question on Book I again involves a perplexing statement in Aristotle’s text involving the ‘appetite’ of matter for form. Before replying, Buridan distinguishes between possible meanings of the notion of ‘appetite’ as applied to animate and inanimate things—matter does not have sense or intellect, and could not have desires in the way that humans or animals have them. Natural appetite is directly from nature and is not mediated by cognition. Buridan begins his reply as follows: This question appears difficult to me … What we see and experience in ourselves we attribute to God and the intelligences and to natural things other than ourselves by analogy (similitudo proportionis). Thus from what is more known to us we come to knowledge of things less known to us (2336, 23629–2372). 159

The table of questions continues: ‘Quod appetitus materiae est idem quod materia. Quomodo privatio dicitur causa appetitus, cum sit idem quod materia. Distinctiones appetituum. Quomodo secundum proportionem adinventam in nobis illa praedicata “appetitus,” “intentio” etc. attribuuntur aliis. Ad quid valeat, cum res sit eadem, sibi attribuere tot praedicata vel nomina distincta secundum rationem’ (626–75).

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Then he concludes: 1. Matter desires the form to be generated in the way of desire or longing (or concupiscence), because what is naturally perfectable is inclined to the good through which it is innately perfected, for the reason that it is directed by God and the intelligences, according to what Averroes (the Commentator) says in Metaphysics, Book XII: nature operates perfectly and as it was ordained, even though it does not know it … (23410–16). 2. Matter desires the form that it has by means of pleasure and delight, because when something is naturally inclined to a given state, it naturally rests in that state with delight; but it was said that matter naturally is inclined to the form to be generated; therefore, etc. Also as desire is for having something, so delight is to having it (23424–2352). 3. Matter does not desire form with an animal appetite. This is clear because it does not know (2353–4). 4. Matter desires form with a natural appetite, because it desires; and it does not desire with an animal appetite, as has been said; therefore with a natural appetite (2355–6). 5. According to Aristotle, matter seeks the form to be generated by the way of desire on account of the privation of that form, in that privation is the cause of desiring, in the good sense, which will be given later … When there is a lack of food in the stomach, hunger results, which is the appetite or desire for food. This concomitance of lack and desire would not be the case unless one was the cause of the other; but desire is not the cause of the lack, but rather the reverse. We desire because we lack and need something (2357–16). 6. The appetite by which matter desires form is not a thing distinct from matter. This may be proved as it was proved of potency. Something distinct would be posited in vain ( frustra) if everything can be saved without it. But it can be saved, as will be clear if the arguments made for the opposite side can be resolved (23517–20). 7. Matter and appetite differ according to reason (secundum rationem). That is, these terms are imposed to signify the things that they signify according to diverse reasons, because otherwise the terms ‘matter’ and ‘appetite’ would be synonyms … The term ‘appetite’ is a relative term connoting the goodness of the object, but the term ‘matter’ is not (23528–23610). To the principal question: Intention is not properly ascribed to anything but agents (agens), but, improperly and passively, intention is ascribed to matter. And that intention is to have in potency the similitude of the form and to be able to receive it, and this whole potentiality is nothing but the matter. Concerning this appetite, it should be said that matter in itself is

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determined to suffer (ad patiendum) and receive indifferently from any agent that approaches it, and it is not determined in itself to receive from one in such a way as not to receive from another, as a wretched poor person is determined to earn money any way he can, whether carrying wood or digging the earth, etc. But an agent has a more noble intention, because he has an actual similitude of the form to be generated, and he has a more perfect appetite, because he has a greater determination. This is no surprise because an agent is nobler than what is acted on (passum) (23824–2398). Matter desires a form that it has, not in the way of desire, because it is not needy, but in the way of pleasure and delight. And it seeks what it does not have in the way of desire. Nor does it follow that it seeks nothing (nihil, what does not exist), because the word ‘desire’ (appetitus) amplifies the supposition of the term to include the future (23921–25). Thus in his answer to the last question of Book I Buridan has already broached one of the main topics of Book II, namely nature. Like Aristotle, Buridan believes that the cosmos has a nature and a design: there are built in reasons why things happen as they do in the inanimate as well as the animate realms. This nature has been implanted in the world by God: the inanimate beings in the world carry out God’s design without self-awareness, largely by forces transmitted to the terrestrial realm from the heavenly bodies as they rotate. As Buridan says, human beings attribute to God and the intelligences and to natural things, by analogy, what we see and experience in ourselves. He seems to think that we are not entirely mistaken in doing so.

3

The Questions on Book II

Aristotle’s Physics, Book II, has nine chapters. Buridan asks 13 questions distributed over the book. Chapter 1 concerns nature and the definition of nature. Buridan’s question II.4 is directly related to Aristotle’s text, asking whether Aristotle’s definition of nature is a good one. Aristotle’s chapter 2 addresses the distinction between mathematics and natural science. Buridan’s question II.6 takes up the main topic of this second chapter. In chapter 3, Aristotle begins to discuss the various sorts of causes—final causes, efficient, material, and formal causes. In relation to final causes, Buridan asks in his question II.7 whether the end or goal ( finis) is a cause, for instance, if a doctor intends to heal a sick person and for this reason compounds medicines and gives them to the sick person to drink, whether health is the cause of the intention of the doctor, of the compounding of the medicines, and of the drinking thereof, etc. Concerning

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efficient causes, Buridan asks in question II.8, whether the father is the cause of the son, this being open to doubt because the father may already have died when the son is born, but, more basically, because it may be assumed that at the time of stating the proposition ‘Socrates (the father) is the cause of Plato (the son),’ Socrates may no longer be alive. In chapters 4–6, Aristotle turns to the topic of chance and fortune (casus et fortuna). In question II.9, Buridan asks whether the definition of fortune is good, in which it is said that ‘fortune is the accidental cause of events that occur rarely (extra semper et frequenter) in the realm of things that are done for a purpose (secundum propositum).’ In question II.10, he asks whether chance and fortune are acting causes, and in question II.11 he discusses whether chance and fortune are found in contingent events that are equally likely to happen as not to happen (contingentes ad utrumlibet). After summarizing what he has established about causes in chapter 7, in the last two chapters of Book II Aristotle discusses the place of necessity in nature, where things act for a purpose (chapter 8), and what the foundation of this necessity is (chapter 9). On the topics of these chapters, Buridan asks whether, when nature produces a monster, it intends that monster (question II.12), and whether the necessity of natural operations arises from the end sought or from the matter (question II.13). This leaves questions II.1–3 and 5 without a close link to Aristotle’s text. Beyond questions II.1–3 and, later, question 5, the rest of Buridan’s questions on Book II seem to arise fairly naturally from Aristotle’s text, although question II.11, whether chance and fortune are found in things just as likely to occur as not (contingentes ad utrumlibet), or whether they are found only in things that occur rarely or less often than not, arises from a disagreement between Avicenna and Averroes over the interpretation of Aristotle’s text more than it arises from the text itself. 3.1 Preliminaries and Physics, II, 1: Questions II.1–II.4 Almost certainly, it was William of Ockham’s commentaries on the Physics that led at least indirectly to the concentration on artificial things in Buridan’s first three questions. This can be seen in Ockham’s various commentaries on the Physics, as listed below, and in Walter Burley’s final Expositio of the Physics, composed while he was teaching at Paris in the mid to late 1320s during or after his study of theology. I have quoted earlier Burley’s report about what modern philosophers (obviously Ockham) say about artificial things.160 The division of ways to make an artificial thing into three possibilities—by addition,

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Burley, Expositio in Physicam (1501), 37ra. See above, LV (and n. 22).

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subtraction, or transfiguration—is also found in Ockham’s arguments against separate artificial forms, saying that they are usually produced making use only of local motion. If, for instance in the case of compounding medicines, a new substantial or accidental form is produced, that is done by nature, whereas the human agent only brings the substances into proximity to each other. If we accept the argument that Nicole Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam is before Buridan’s Quaestiones Physicorum (secundum ultimam lecturam) because it makes such frequent use of the notion of ‘modi rerum,’ censured in 1347, then it might be relevant to note that Oresme concludes that there are distinct artificial forms. Like Buridan, Oresme devotes three questions to artificialia. In reply to his question II.4, whether artificialia may be distinguished from naturalia (Utrum artificialia distinguantur a naturalibus) Oresme concludes that everything artificial is said to be such by an accidental form distinct from the subject and from other natural forms.161 One motive for this conclusion is that humans commonly behave as if forced to this conclusion. Aristotle and almost all of philosophy seem to suppose that there are such artificial forms. It should be noted, however, that Oresme holds that some (and maybe all) accidents are only modi rerum and not separate absolute forms.162 Might the fact that Buridan does not obviously appear to be responding to Oresme in these initial questions of Book II mean that he is avoiding the discussion of modi rerum? We have seen that in Book I, in the questions on the supposition of terms related to generation, he comes out strongly against the notion of ‘complexe significabile,’ which many historians see as closely connected to that of ‘modi rerum.’ Question II.1—Whether artificial things are distinct from natural things (Utrum res artificiales sint distinctae a rebus naturalibus).163 Aristotle, Physics, II, 1, 192b16–32. Averroes, In Physicam, II. comm. 2–3.164

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Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, II.4, 192: ‘Et sit prima conclusio quod omne artificiale dicitur tale per formam accidentalem distinctam a subiecto et ab aliis formis naturalibus. Verbi gratia es dicitur “statua” per talem figuram quam habet in re preter intellectum.’ See the various articles of Stefano Caroti on Oresme and modi rerum in the bibliography. The table of questions continues: ‘Quare res dicatur naturalis vel artificialis’ (2415). Cf. Aristotle’s Latin text as in Averroes, In Physicam, 48G: ‘Lectus autem et indumentum, et si quid huiusmodi aliud genus est, secundum quod quidem sortitum est praedicationem unamquamque, et quatenus est ab arte, ne unum quidem habet impetum mutationis innatum, quatenus autem accidit ipsis lapidea aut terrea esse, aut mixta ex his, eatenus habent.’

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Roger Bacon (2): Utrum forma artificialis sit substantialis vel accidentalis (II.10)165 Radulphus Brito: Utrum formae artificiales debeant dici naturales (II.2) William of Ockham (Expositio): II, 1, t. 3, an artificial operation does not produce an absolute form inhering in the natural thing.166 William of Ockham (Quaestiones): Utrum possit sufficienter probari quod artificialia addant aliquid super naturalia (118) Utrum de facto artificialia aliquid addant super naturalia (119) Utrum rectitudo et curvitas importent res distinctas a rebus naturalibus (120) Utrum Philosophus et Commentator ponant formam artificialem distingui a rebus naturalibus (121) Quaestio sine argumentis: quae propositiones sint concedendae in ista materia de virtute sermonis (122) William of Ockham (Brevis summa): II, cap. 1.167 William of Ockham (Summula): An forma rei artificialis sit secundum se totam distincta a qualibet re naturali (I, cap. 20)168 Bacon, Questiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum, II.10, 61. The entire text of the question is: ‘Quod substantialis sic videtur: ex accidente et substantia non fit vere unum; set aliquid artificiale (accidentale ed.) est vere unum; ergo forma artificialis non est accidentalis, set substantialis. Contra: quod advenit post esse rei actuale et completum accidentale est; forma artificialis est hujusmodi, ut patet de se; ergo etc. Solutio: ad hoc dicendum quod forma artificialis ipsi materie ratione qua artificialis substantialis est, set ratione qua naturalis est materia est ipsi materie accidentalis. Per hoc solvuntur rationes.’ Ockham, Expositio, II, cap. 1, § 4, 217: ‘Circa primam totam partem praecedentem est primo sciendum quod quando artifex operatur producendo artificialia, non producit aliquam formam absolutam inhaerentem rei naturali—sicut quando calidum producit calidum, producit unam formam absolutam inhaerentem subiecto et ab eo totaliter et realiter distinctam—, ita quod quando fit domus vel idolum vel statua vel lectus et huiusmodi, non est aliqua res de novo secundum se totam producta.’ Ockham, Brevis summa, II, cap. 1, 25: ‘Naturalia habent in se principium motus et quietis; sed artificialia non habent. Ubi notandum est primo quod ista non est divisio rerum, quia omnino eadem res quae est naturalis est artificialis, sicut eadem res quae est homo est pater … Unde Philosophus vult dicere quod alia est definitio quid nominis artificialis et naturalis, licet pro eodem supponant quando stant personaliter. Et ideo debet concedi quod artificiale est naturale, terminis supponentibus personaliter; nec Philosophus sic negat eam. Secundo notandum quod in generatione artificialium non est productio alicuius novae rei distinctae realiter a re naturali; sed propter motum localem est ibi nova denominatio quae vocatur generatio, largissime loquendo. Et huius causa est quia plura non debent poni sine necessitate …’ Ockham, Summula, I, cap. 20, 208–209: ‘Quia dictum est in praecedenti capitulo domum et huiusmodi destrui per solum motum localem partium ab invicem, et multis videtur contrarium, qui dicunt quod forma artificialium est forma accidentalis distincta a materia

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Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum naturalia differant ab artificialibus (II.D.3)169 Nicole Oresme: Utrum artificialia distinguantur a naturalibus (II.4) Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum formae artificialium sint aliquae entitates abstractae distinctae realiter ab omnibus rebus naturalibus (II.1)170 Albert of Saxony: Utrum res artificiales distinguantur a rebus naturalibus (II.4) Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum artificialia distinguantur a naturalibus (II.1.1) Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum res artificiales distinguantur a rebus naturalibus (II.1) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum res artificiales distinguantur a naturalibus (II.1) Benedictus Hesse: Utrum res artificiales sint distinctae a rebus naturalibus (II.2)

Although Aristotle and Averroes mention artificial things near the beginning of Book II, it appears that we can credit Ockham with leading Buridan to start his questions on Book II with an extended discussion of artificial things. There are many serious doubts connected with this question, Buridan begins, which he will deal with separately. Aside from his question II.2, which deals with the difference Aristotle assigns between artificial and natural things, he asks in question II.3 whether a figure is distinct from a figured thing. If an artificial thing is put together by moving the parts, there is the question whether motion is a thing separate from the mobile and the place. Because of such doubts, Buridan poses alternative hypothetical conclusions. But first he states what the notions ‘natural things’ and ‘artificial things’ actually mean. ‘Natural things’ may include matter and substantial forms and things standing alone which have a nature, such as a horse or a stone. Accidents of such things may also be called natural, even accidents that are not natural to the body they happen to be in, such as warmth in water. On the other hand artificial things are those

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et sibi per artem adveniens, sicut calor naturaliter advenit igni a quo tamen distinguitur realiter, ideo ad maiorem notitiam artificialium et generationis eorum est hic nunc breviter disserendum an forma rei artificialis sit secundum se totam distincta a qualibet re naturali.’ See the text cited above, n. 22. Hugolinus, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.1, 19: ‘Prima conclusio est quod nulla forma artificialis est forma inhaerens distincta ab omnibus formis naturalibus. Secunda est quod nulla forma artificialis est aliqua entitas abstracta distincta ab omnibus rebus naturalibus. Tertia est quod omnis res artificialis est aliqua res naturalis.’

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made by human intellect and will, which would never occur without human action. An example of an artificial thing is an axe. Then Buridan poses the following hypothetical conclusions: 1. If a figure is something distinct from the thing figured, then there is some artificial thing which is not a natural thing, such as a pot or an axe or a statue (2463–4). 2. If local motion is a thing distinct from the mobile and place, then there is some artificial thing that is not natural, such as sawing wood or hammering iron (2465–7).171 3. If local motion is not a thing distinct from the mobile and place, and if figure is also not a thing distinct from what is figured, then neither a house nor an axe is artificial, because the stones and iron of which the house or the axe are made were not made by art (2468–15). 4. Even though a figure were not distinct from the thing figured nor local motion distinct from the mobile and place, nevertheless there would be something artificial which is not natural. Just as terms like ‘dead’ and ‘depicted’ extend (ampliant) terms like ‘man’ and ‘animal’ so that they supposit for things which are not men nor animals, so too many terms extend the terms ‘being,’ ‘thing,’ or ‘one’ so that they have supposition for something which is not a being, a thing, or one. A population is not one thing, but many, and likewise a house is not one thing but many, and nevertheless it is one artificial thing (2475–15). 5. If a figure is not distinct from the figured thing and motion is not distinct from the mobile, then every artificial thing is a natural thing or natural things (often the latter) (24716–21). Despite reaching conclusions unlike Ockham’s, Buridan’s initial questions on Book II, mostly questions not found before the mid-fourteenth century, reflect his nominalist semantics. Question II.2—Whether the difference that Aristotle assigns between the natural and the artificial is suitable, namely that natural things insofar as they are natural have within themselves a principle of motion and rest, but artificial things insofar as they are artificial have no innate impetus of change (Utrum ista differentia quam assignat Aristoteles inter naturalia et artificialia sit conve-

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Note that not only permanent things, but also successive things like sawing and even syllogizing can be called artificial.

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niens, scilicet quod naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus et status, artificialia autem inquantum artificialia nullum habent impetum suae mutationis innatum).172 1. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum in naturalibus principium activum sit intrinsecum passo (II.3) 2. Nicole Oresme: Utrum omne ens naturale habeat in se principium motus et quietis (II.1) 3. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum entia naturalia habeant in se principium motus et quietis (II.1.2) 4. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum ens naturale habeat in se principium motus et quietis (II.2) 5. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum differentia posita ab Aristotele in principio huius secundi inter entia naturalia et artificialia sit sufficienter assignata, in qua dicitur: naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se principium motus et status et artificialia inquantum talia non habent in se principium motus et status (II.2) Utrum aliquod corpus simplex, ut elementum, habeat in se principium suae alterationis activum (II.3) 6. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum verum sit quod dicit Aristoteles assignando differentiam inter rem naturalem et artificialem, scilicet quod naturalia inquantum talia habent in se principium motus et quietis, artificialia vero non (II.3) Among the principal arguments are examples of things that are held to be natural, but do not contain a principle of motion and rest. For instance, the heavens do not have a principle of rest because they always move. Or (assuming that there is no matter in the heaven), the heaven moves itself and does not have a principle of motion within it. Heat and cold are natural, and they do not have a principle of motion or rest. And so forth. Some of the arguments are directed to the use of reduplication, or of words such as ‘insofar as’ (inquantum), in distinguishing natural from artificial things. In response to the principal arguments, Buridan states that Aristotle is only thinking of independently existing things, such as animals, plants, celestial bodies, elements, and so forth, not of matter or forms. The question applies to alterations and augmentations as well as to local motions. Buridan considers only natural and not violent motions. First concerning local motion, he concludes:

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The table of questions of Book II continues: ‘Quomodo intelligentia unita est orbi. An corpora simplicia, scilicet elementa, alterantur ex se active’ (2419–11).

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1. There is some natural thing which (at the moment) has no principle of natural motion or natural rest (as for instance a stone that is undergoing violent motion upward, which has neither natural motion nor rest, so there is no question of its having an internal cause of its natural motion unless, which is unlikely, the terms ‘principle’ and ‘cause’ extend [ampliant] the supposition of the relevant terms to future or possible motions) (25111–21). 2. Taking ‘heaven’ for the combination of orb and intelligence (as Aristotle and Averroes do), a heaven has in itself an active and passive principle. For Aristotle a heaven has no active or passive principle of rest, because he believed that it was impossible for a heaven to rest (2527–19). 3. Every natural being under the orb of the moon has in itself an active principle of its local motion, because everthing is heavy or light, and this active principle is its form or gravity. Here the term ‘active’ extends or ampliates the supposition of the term ‘motion’ to apply to future or possible motion, even if the body is not currently moving (25220–2536). 4. Besides local motions caused by gravity or lightness, every animal has in itself an active principle of its local motion, whether walking or swimming or flying, or at least expansion or contraction. This principle is a soul (2537–10). 5. Every living thing has in itself an active principle of its alteration, namely its nutrition, and its augmentation and diminution, and this principle is also soul. All living things also have a principle of their own corruption and death (25311–19). 6. Averroes poses a sixth conclusion, saying that no simple body, that is one composed of only one element, has in itself an active principle of its alteration or corruption, because it does not have within itself contrary parts that could act on one another. This differs from animals, which do contain contrary parts. But Averroes’ conclusion needs to be qualified, because water, for instance, could be hot in one part and cold in another (25320– 2549). 7. Every natural thing has within itself a principle of resting when it is in a place most suitable to it (existens in sua convenientissima dispositione qualitativa) (2549–18). 8. Every natural thing has in itself an active principle of any natural motion or rest suitable to its health and perfection (25419–22). 9. Finally, to answer the question, it is concluded that Aristotle did not mean to posit a difference between natural and artificial things, because artificial things are natural things and do not differ from them. Aristotle only wanted to distinguish the meanings of the terms ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ (25423–30).

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As Buridan indicates in question II.2, Aristotle distinguishes natural things from artificial things on the grounds that natural things insofar as (inquantum) they are natural have within themselves a principle of motion and rest, whereas artificial things insofar as they are artificial have no innate impetus of change.173 The paradigms of artificial things are houses and statues, which are made by adding or taking away parts.174 Like Aristotle, Buridan believes that a house is constructed by assembling stones, cement, wood, and the like, without any substantial change occurring to the components. They are subjected to local motion in being brought together, and their shapes may be changed by adding or removing parts, or even by molding, as clay might be shaped into brick. But a stone as a part of a house has the same tendency to move downward, unless it is held back, as a stone that is not part of a house. This tendency to move downward the stone has insofar as it is a natural thing and not insofar as it is part of the house, hence the appearance of the words ‘insofar as’ (inquantum) in Aristotle’s definitions. The objection could be raised that some artificial things involve substantial changes as when medicines are compounded. Buridan does not raise this problem, but William of Ockham had raised it, and answered that in such a case it is nature that causes the substantial change whereas the fabricator had only brought the components together.175

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It might be worth noting that the Latin word ‘impetus’ is used in this connection where it is not usually remarked. It had already occurred in the Latin translation of Aristotle’s text of the beginning of Book II quoted above, n. 164. The three ways of making something artificial by addition (a house), subtraction (a statue), or transfiguration (something made of wax) appear in Aristotle, Physics, I, 7, 190b5–9. Ockham, Expositio, II, cap. 4, § 3, 270–271: ‘Secundo notandum est, sicut frequenter est dictum, quod non intendunt Philosophus et Commentator quod in artificialibus sit forma artificialis distincta realiter secundum se totam a materia, sed intendunt quod eadem res primo est res naturalis, puta lignum vel lapis vel aes vel aliquid huiusmodi, et postea per realem transmutationem, saltem localem, est res artificialis, et quod artifex utrumque habet cognoscere … Tamen est advertendum quod aliquando quando artifex operatur, producitur nova res vel destruitur. Quia aliquando non solum res naturalis transmutatur localiter, sicut accidit quando domus fit ex lignis et lapidibus, sed etiam aliquotiens res naturalis recipit unam qualitatem novam inhaerentem, immo etiam aliquando mutatur secundum formam substantialem. Et hoc accidit quando artifex approximat localiter activa passivis naturalibus, sicut per approximationem ignis corrumpit aliquid vel generat; sed tunc concurrit causa naturalis. Et ideo quando artifex solum operatur et non natura, non fit nova res secundum se totam sed tantum adquisitio vel deperditio loci.’

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Question II.3—Whether a figure is something distinct from the figured thing (Utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata).176 1. William of Ockham (Expositio): I, cap. 15; II, cap. 1.177 2. William of Ockham (Quaestiones): Utrum possit sufficienter probari quod artificialia addant aliquid super naturalia (118) Utrum de facto artificialia aliquid addant super naturalia (119) Utrum rectitudo et curvitas importent res distinctas a rebus naturalibus (120) Utrum Philosophus et Commentator ponant formam artificialem distingui a rebus naturalibus (121) Quaestio sine argumentis: quae propositiones sint concedendae in ista materia de virtute sermonis (122) 3. Nicole Oresme: Utrum formae artificiales sint accidentia (II.5) Utrum artifex faciat aliquid novum in re artificiata vel artificiali (II.6) 4. Albert of Saxony: Utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata, verbi gratia utrum aes et eius figura sint res distinctae (II.3)178 5. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata (II.4) 6. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata (II.4) Whereas in his reply to question II.1 Buridan had offered alternative hypothetical conclusions depending on whether motion and figure were supposed to

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The table of questions of Book II continues: ‘De triplici modo se habendi aliquam rem aliter et aliter et quod solus tertius modus arguit generationem vel corruptionem dispositionis permanentis in illa re. Quomodo ars domificatoria est factiva, cum nullam domum faciat’ (24112–15). Cf. Ockham, Expositio, I, cap. 15, § 9, 163: ‘Nec valet dicere quod advenit nova linea vel aliquid huiusmodi, quia alibi ostensum est quod figura, linea, punctus et huiusmodi non est alia res secundum se totam distincta a corpore. Similiter quando domus fit, non est ibi aliqua res secundum se totam nova; per hoc enim solum sine omni re media quod partes taliter localiter coniunguntur, est domus de novo.’ Ibid., II, cap. 1, §4, 217 (continuing from text quoted under question II.1, above, n. 166): ‘… non est aliqua res de novo secundum se totam producta. Et hoc est verum de omni figura, rectitudine, curvitate et huiusmodi, quae ponuntur passiones quantitatis, quia talia non important tales formas distinctas realiter a suis subiectis et inhaerentes eis.’ Albert of Saxony, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.3, 21vb: ‘Quantum ad secundum sit prima conclusio quod nomina figurarum non significant res distinctas a substantia … sed prius dictum est tales terminos non significare rem distinctam a substantia et quantitate … Item si figura esset res distincta a figurato, sequereretur quod quecumque figura posset annihilari manente figurato. Sed hoc est falsum. Nam tunc esset vel esse posset figuratum absque hoc quod esset aliqua figura. Sed hoc videtur implicare contradictionem quod aliquod corpus sit figuratum absque figura.’

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be distinct from the mobile or body, here he proposes to decide between the alternatives. He assumes the truth of what he had concluded in answer to question I.8, namely that no substance is a magnitude, or in other words that in addition to the substantial form and qualitative forms in a body, there is a distinct magnitude. Then he distinguishes two senses of ‘figured’ ( figuratum). First the magnitude is figured, and second the underlying substance is figured through the figuration of the magnitude. Buridan then gives the following conclusions: 1. Every figure is distinct from the figured substance. This is so because magnitude is distinct from substance, so the magnitude is first figured and then the substance secondarily (25713–15). 2. No figure is distinct from what is first figured or, in other words, no figure is distinct from the figured magnitude (25716–17). The same magnitude may first be cubical and later spherical. If, when something changes its figure, you do not want to assume that (many) forms are created and generated, you should concede that figure is not distinct from the figured magnitude. Buridan proves this. And so the principal conclusion is proved using the argument that according to faith, if there are two things distinct from each other, then God can separate them and conserve them separately. But it is not apparent that God could make a figured magnitude without a figure, nor could God make a figure without magnitude and extension—this seems manifestly to involve a contradiction. Here Buridan’s argument is very much like that in the questions of Albert of Saxony, which are thought to be earlier than Buridan’s ultima lectura. There do not seem to be similar obvious links between Buridan’s answers and those of Oresme. In reply to his question II.5, whether artificial forms are accidents, Oresme concludes: (1) no substantial form is from art; (2) no accident following naturally from substantial forms is from art; (3) only voluntary and violent motion of an inanimate thing, done with deliberation, is artificial; (4) (referring to the disposition following the voluntary motion, such as a figure) such a disposition is an accidental form distinct from the subject (i.e. the artificial thing), etc.179 Thus Oresme does not follow Ockham, but sticks with the common view, the view of Aristotle and Averroes, according to which there are distinct artificial forms.

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See Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, II.5, 198–201: ‘Tunc sunt conclusiones. Prima est quod nulla forma substantialis est ab arte … Secunda conclusio est quod nullum accidens

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Thus, assuming that Buridan knew Oresme’s Quaestiones super Physicam before composing his ultima lectura, he had a precedent for diverging from Ockham on this question. He may also have had Albert of Saxony’s work, however, which follows Ockham more closely. After reaching his own conclusions, Buridan lists a number of arguments in favor of the view that there is a separate artificial form. Calling these arguments ‘sophistical,’ Buridan replies. To the argument that if something is moved from being cubic to being spherical there must be a terminus to its motion, namely a figure of sphericity, he replies that in this case there is only local motion and there is a change only in that a different term (i.e. ‘spherical’) is applicable. Local motion does not require permanent termini that inhere in the mobile. He then makes other arguments too numerous to summarize here. So as in his replies to some questions in Book I, Buridan here too provides lists of arguments for alternative replies to the question. The placement of Buridan’s first three questions in comparison to Ockham’s and Burley’s expositions of the Physics supports the belief that Ockham was the source of Buridan’s three initial questions on Book II—out of place as they are in relation to Aristotle’s text and previous commentaries—and Albert of Saxony’s questions even more clearly reflect Ockham’s arguments. On the other hand, one might suppose that there was a theological reason to preserve the existence of special added forms in artificial things, namely the use that had been made of a variation on Aristotelian hylomorphism in the doctrine of transubstantiation of the Eucharist adopted by the Church in 1215. Bread is an artificial thing. Does it have its own substantial or accidental form? Is it the form of bread or the form of the flour or some other component of bread that is transubstantiated into the body of Christ? According to Michael Rota, the current interpretation of Aquinas’ view of the matter is that he thinks that

consequens formas substantiales naturaliter est ab arte … Tertia conclusio est quod solus motus voluntarius et violentus rei inanimate factus cum deliberatione est artificialis; et hoc inter omnes mutationes corporales, quia forte aliqui motus anime sunt artificiales sicut syllogizare vel aliquid tale … Et tunc sequitur corollarium quod omnes mutationes immediate consequentes motum localem absque alteratione qualitatum primarum sunt artificiales. Verbi gratia rarefactio quedam consequens inde, et transfiguratio, et similiter omnes dispositiones inde acquisite, sicut quedam figura, quedam extensio, sonus citare, qui sequitur motum localem; et sic de aliis … Ultima conclusio est quod talis dispositio est forma accidentalis distincta a subiecto, etc. Et non loquor hic de motu artificiali, quia videbitur postea si motus sit res distincta; sed loquor de dispositione consequente, sicut est figura vel aliquod tale.’

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no artifact (such as bread) is a substance in virtue of its form.180 Aquinas says, however, just as Ockham later would say, that as the artifex is constructing the artificial thing, the components may act naturally on one another and hence produce a new substantial form and this may be the case in baking bread.181 It might be objected, Aquinas writes, that since bread is artificial, the new form is accidental, not substantial. He replies that in some cases there are new substantial forms in artifacts, as for instance human beings can produce frogs and serpents artificially—not directly, but by bringing natural forces to bear.182 In one passage, Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s Physics, Book II, as implying that bread, in particular, has only an accidental form, but he leaves it open that some artificial things, including bread, could have their own substantial forms.183 Although there might have been doctrinal reasons for taking a careful approach to the question of substantial forms of artificial things, the tenor of Buridan’s discussion seems to indicate that he is responding to Ockham’s denial of separate forms for artificial things and figures, which stemmed from Ockham’s program of ontological minimalism. Of course, one might wonder whether Ockham did not have theological motivations. As already mentioned, there is a tradition of singling out Buridan as a particularly secular philosopher for his time.184 Based on the opening questions of his commentary on Books I and II of Aristotle’s Physics, the primacy of the terminist logic of the moderni in his work is well-substantiated. On the other hand, in his answer to question IV.6 of the Metaphysics, whether the term ‘being’ signifies substances and accidents according to a single reason or concept (Utrum hoc nomen ‘ens’ significet substantias et accidentia 180 181

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M. Rota, ‘Substance and Artifact in Thomas Aquinas,’ History of Philosophy Quarterly, 21 (2004), 241–259, at 241. Rota, ‘Substance and Artifact,’ 245. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III.75.6. Of course, by asking the question ‘Utrum facta consecratione, remaneat in hoc sacramento forma substantialis panis,’ Thomas takes for granted that there is a substantial form of bread. Rota, ‘Substance and Artifact,’ 246. Rota reports that the mention of the production of frogs may refer to the magicians in Ex. 8, 7. Rota, ‘Substance and Artifact,’ 254–255. For the background of this discussion, see P.J.J.M. Bakker, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250–c. 1400). Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie, 2 vols, Ph.D. dissertation, Radboud University, Nijmegen 1999. As Zupko, ‘John Buridan,’ writes: ‘Buridan applied these analytical techniques so successfully in his metaphysics, natural philosophy, and ethics that, for many of his successors, they were identified with the very method of philosophy, understood as a secular practice, i.e., as distinct from theology.’

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secundum unam rationem sive secundum unum conceptum), Buridan admits that there is an inconsistency between Aristotle and Christian faith on the issue: This question is very difficult in my judgment because Aristotle had a very different opinion about accidents than our faith posits. For I believe that he had the opinion that if a man is white, nothing else concurs with this but whiteness and man. Moreover, although the white (album) and man (homo) are the same, Aristotle believed that to be white (esse album) is not the same as man, because he says in Book VII of this work that in what is said accidentally the thing (ipsum) and to be the thing (esse ipsum) are not the same, nor are white and to be white (esse album) and thus … Aristotle believed that to be white is the same as whiteness (albedo), and to be large (magnum) is the same as magnitude (magnitudo), and to be figured (esse figuratum) is the same as figure ( figura), and so forth. And thus Aristotle believed that by no power could accidents be separated from their subjects, because it seems to imply a contradiction that to be white exists unless something is white.185 Contrary to Aristotle, faith accepts that an accident can be separated from its subject at least by God’s power.186 Thus both nominalist semantics and Christian faith could help to explain what is going on in Buridan’s reasoning

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John Buridan, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum (secundum ultimam lecturam), IV.6, ed. Bakker, ‘Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité des accidents eucharistiques,’ 223– 224: ‘Ista questio est iudicio meo valde difficilis propter hoc, vt puto, quod Aristotiles valde aliter opinatus est de accidentibus quam fides nostra ponit. Credo enim quod ipse opinabatur, si homo est albus, quod ad hoc non concurrit nisi homo et albedo. Modo vltra, quamuis album sit idem quod homo, tamen Aristotiles credidit quod esse album non sit homo, quia dicetur in septimo huius quod in dictis secundum accidens non est idem ipsum et esse ipsum, vt album et esse album. Et ideo, cum esse album non sit homo, Aristotiles credidit quod esse album est idem quod albedo, et esse magnum idem quod magnitudo, et esse figuratum idem quod figura, et sic de aliis. Et ideo vltra Aristotiles credidit quod accidencia nulla virtute sunt separabilia a subiectis suis, quia videtur implicare contradictionem quod sit esse album nisi aliquid sit quod est album.’ Buridan, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IV.6, 227: ‘Nunc dicendum est ad questionem motam, tenendo que debemus tenere ex fide. Dico ergo quod nos tenemus quod per potenciam Dei accidencia possunt separari a substanciis et separatim subsistere et sine substancia sibi subiecta; vnde dicimus quod sic de facto subsistunt in sacramento altaris.’

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in the early questions of Book II of the Physics. It is hoped that the availability of editions of the texts and related texts can further research on such topics. Question II.4—Whether the definition of nature is good, in which it is said, ‘nature is a principle and cause of moving and rest in that in which it is first per se and not per accidens’ (Utrum definitio naturae sit bona qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens’). Aristotle, Physics, II, 1, 192b21–23. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 1–3.187 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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Thomas Wylton: Utrum definitio naturae sit bene data (II.2) John of Jandun: Utrum definitio naturae sit bona (II.1) Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum definitio naturae sit bene data (II.D.5) Nicole Oresme: Utrum definitio naturae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium movendi et quiescendi eius in quo primo et per se’ (II.3) Albert of Saxony: Utrum definitio naturae posita ab Aristotele in II huius sit bona, scilicet: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens’ (II.5) Utrum quodlibet ens naturale habeat in se principium activum et passivum sui motus et quietis naturalis (II.1) Utrum aliquod corpus mixtum vel simplex habeat in se principium intrinsecum sui alterationis (II.2) Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum definitio naturae sit bona, scilicet quod natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens (II.3) Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum definitio naturae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est principium (!) per se et non secundum accidens’ (II.5) Benedictus Hesse: Utrum definitio naturae sit bene posita (II.5) Conimbricenses: Utrum natura recte ab Aristotele definita sit necne (II. 1.2)

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It is worth noting that Averroes opens comment 3 by saying that the definition of nature is manifest or, better, that it is manifest that nature exists. Aristotle’s chapter II.3 begins as follows (Latin as in Averroes, In Physicam, II.3, 50C–E): ‘Quid igitur est natura dictum est, et quid quod a natura, et secundum naturam. Quod autem sit natura tentare demonstrare ridiculum est. Manifestum enim est quod huiusmodi entia sunt multa. Demonstrare autem manifesta per immanifesta non potentis iudicare est quod per seipsum et non per seipsum notum est.’ The second Latin translation has: ‘… est mos eius, qui non potest distinguere inter illud quod est notum per se et notum per aliud.’

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In question II.4, Buridan comes to a question concerning Aristotle’s definition of nature, which in John of Jandun’s Quaestiones was the first question on the text of Book II. Buridan begins his reply by saying that Aristotle’s definition has to be expounded, explaining that the term ‘nature’ signifies both matter and form and supposits for them, not absolutely but in relation to motion and rest. ‘Nature’ and ‘element’ are not terms in the category of substance, he says, but in the category of relation (ad aliquid). After an extensive discussion of the meanings of the terms in Aristotle’s definition of ‘nature,’ Buridan concludes: From this discussion it is concluded that this definition or description of ‘nature’ is very good, because it explicitly indicates the signification and all the connotations of the term. It fits everything about nature and nothing else but nature (26814–17). By Buridan’s time, there was, however, a substantive reason for questioning Aristotle’s definition, and that was expressed in Jandun’s fifth principal argument on this question, not repeated in Buridan’s work, which stated that: The substantial form of an inanimate heavy thing is a certain nature, as is manifest, and it is not a principle of moving and resting in the body it informs, that is in this heavy thing, because, if so, then the heavy body would move itself, the opposite of which Aristotle intends in Book VIII of this work, because this is proper to animals.188 In fact, in Book VIII of the Physics, where Aristotle argues that there must be a first unmoved mover, he denies that heavy elemental bodies move themselves downward, thus contradicting what he had said elsewhere about nature being a source of motion.189 Although Buridan omitted this principal argument, after his determination of the question and just before replying to the principal arguments, he wrote:

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Jandun, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.1, 27rb: ‘Item quinto, forma substantialis gravis inanimati est quaedam natura, ut manifestum est; et ipsa non est principium movendi et quiescendi in eo in quo est, scilicet in ipso gravi, quia si sic, tunc grave moveret seipsum, cuius oppositum vult Aristoteles octavo huius, quia hoc est proprium animalium.’ See E.D. Sylla, ‘Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists on the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies,’ Vivarium, 31 (1993), 37–83.

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It is true however that a great difficulty remains, namely whether substantial forms are the principal agents of the motions and operations, or whether qualitative dispositions (are agents), for instance, whether the substance of fire heats principally or the heat, and whether the substance of earth moves itself downwards or its weight. But there will be a special question on this (26825–29). In this way Buridan introduced question II.5, which is the remaining question in his Book II that has few or no precedents in earlier commentaries. He then replied to his principal arguments. Of Buridan’s six arguments, four are found in John of Jandun’s work. The arguments that Jandun and Buridan have in common mainly concern criteria for good definitions. For instance, Buridan’s second principal argument (which is Jandun’s first principal argument), states that something absolute (nature) should not be defined by something relative (motion). Both Jandun and Buridan reply to this argument that ‘nature’ is in a sense relative, so it can be defined by referring to something relative. In the end both Jandun and Buridan conclude that Aristotle’s definition is a good one, meeting the criteria for good definitions. 3.2 Question II.5 Question II.5—Whether in material substances the substantial forms are principally active with regard to their motions and their operations or rather the qualitative dispositions (Utrum in istis substantiis materialibus formae substantiales sint principaliter activae suorum motuum et suarum operationum vel magis qualitativae dispositiones illarum substantiarum).190 1. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum in substantiis materialibus formae substantiales sint principalius activae suorum motuum et suarum operationum quam dispositiones qualificativae. Verbi gratia in motu gravis deorsum, utrum forma substantialis gravis magis agat et principalius quam gravitas (II.6) 2. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum in substantiis materialibus formae substantiales sint principaliter activae et productivae suarum operationum vel qualitates, sicut verbi gratia, quando aliqua terra descendit deorsum, utrum causa activa illius motus sit forma principaliter vel sit gravitas (II. 9)

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The table of questions of Book II continues: ‘Quod ad actiones illorum inferiorum concurrit agens separatum. Quod forma substantialis est principium activum ad mutationes et quietes sibi convenientes et principalius quam sua accidentia. De violento et naturali tam in alterationibus quam in motibus localibus’ (24120–24).

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3. Conimbricenses: Utrum accidens attingat productionem substantialis formae an non (II.7.18)191 Question II.5 takes up contemporary questions rather than arising naturally from Aristotle’s text, although it arose from a problem concerning Aristotle’s definition of nature which had arisen in preceding decades in connection with ideas about the unity of the substantial form. Buridan asks, for example, whether the substance of fire principally generates fire in something else, or whether its heat (i.e. an accidental form of fire) is the generator. Or if the earth, existing above, descends downward naturally, whether the substance of earth moves itself actively in such a case or whether it is its gravity that moves it, and so forth. To settle this question, Buridan concludes: 1. The first conclusion is that often the effects generated are diverse in species on account of the secondary agents and not the principal ones—not on account of the diversity of the principal agent, because of all the factors, however diverse, the absolutely principal agent is one and the same, namely God, as it is said (27415–19). Often celestial bodies, God and the intelligences, are the principal agents and have greater effect than the elements or elemental qualities (27420–23). 2. The second, corollary, conclusion follows, namely that many substances are generated without the concurrence in their generation of any particular agents equally or more noble than they are, because I do not call the celestial bodies, God, and the intelligences particular agents, but universal ones. Beyond this, for the generation of animals from putrefaction nothing concurs that is equally noble as those animals, and also fish, after they deposit their eggs and their milk (lac) in the water … (27518–26).

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Collegium Conimbricense, Commentarii Physicorum, II.7.18, 293–294. There are said to be two extreme views, one saying that the substantial form of the generator produces no active influx or other action in the generation (holders of this view are said to be listed in question VII.7 of Paulus Soncinas’ commentary on the Metaphysics) and the other held by John Duns Scotus, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, William of Ockham, John of Jandun, and others, who hold that an accident, neither by its own power nor as the instrument of the substance can produce a substantial form. The Conimbricenses reject both of these views and argue for a position midway between them.

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Since there is no particular agent equally or more noble than what is generated, there must be a universal, more noble agent that acts: It appears to me from what has been said that another significant corollary can be concluded further, namely that not only is it necessary to believe by faith but even by natural reason to conclude that for the generation of these lower things, beyond corporeal agents the concurrence of separate and incorporeal agents is necessary, because a new effect never emerges without an agent equally or more noble, since an effect cannot have nobility only from matter; therefore the concurrence of an incorporeal agent is necessary. And it seems to me that this was the major reason why Plato posited separate Ideas and why Avicenna and Themistius concluded that the Giver of forms (dator formarum) is a substance separate from magnitude, i.e. not extended and not having any determinate position in the world, but being present to any part of the world you please and without distance, that is God, who is thus present to and not distant from the whole world and who can act in the whole and in any of its parts (27527–27626). When in a body there are actions that agree with its substantial form, then it is reasonable to ascribe the actions to the substantial form. But if a body acts in a way that clashes with the substantial form, as for instance, when hot water heats something else, then it is reasonable to assume that the qualitative form of heat acts and not the substantial form of water. Every substantial form acts to preserve itself, and that is why, after water has been heated, it will return naturally to the coldness that is natural to it. In the case of the Eucharist, where there is no substantial form of the bread or wine, God miraculously supplies the actions which would have resulted from the substantial forms (2826–13). Question II.5 had been dealt with by Walter Burley in his Tractatus primus, where the question is motivated by issues related to the transubstantiated Eucharist, perhaps entering discussion in the commentary on the Sentences of John Duns Scotus.192 In the Eucharist there is no substantial form of bread or 192

Burley refers to Scotus in the text of the Tractatus primus, manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 817, 207va: ‘Ad sextam quae fuit Subtilis Doctoris, quando dicitur quod calor in agendo non attingit materiam primam et per consequens non potest producere formam substantialem quae est actus materiae primae …’ A relevant text in Scotus, although it does not make reference to prime matter (it is dealing with the Eucharist where prime matter is not involved) is his Reportata Parisiensia, IV, dist. 12, q. 3 (Utrum accidentia in eucharistia possint habere actionem quae competit

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wine, and yet the Eucharist is heavy and falls down—so might it be the accidental form of gravity rather than any substantial form that causes this motion? The same argument holds for qualitative changes involving the Eucharist. Buridan mentions the sacrament of the altar in the sixth principal argument (27222–28). Ultimately, God is the cause of all things and all motions, and, not reaching as high as God, there is the Giver of forms (dator formarum) that might explain generation and corruption where there is no obvious substantial form to explain the action. But, unless one is dealing with miraculous and supernatural situations, in most cases there should also be secondary agents causing the observed effects. Thus in this question, Buridan comes down on the side of requiring something like a dator formarum to explain situations in which an effect seems to be of a higher degree of nobility than its apparent proximate cause. Contrary to the simple stereotype according to which the nominalists adopt ontological parsimony, following ‘Ockham’s razor,’ whereas the realists are not afraid of multiplying entities, here again, as in the case of magnitude in Book I, Buridan accepts more entities whereas Burley, the supposed realist, had said that qualities could produce substantial forms without the assistance of a more noble agent. To this Buridan could justifiably reply that he was not multiplying entities beyond necessity, but rather for good reasons. 3.3 Physics, II, 2: Question II.6 Question II.6—Whether the natural scientist differs from the mathematician in that the natural scientist defines by motion and the mathematician without motion (Utrum naturalis differat a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus sine motu).193 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, 2, 192b22– 194a11; Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 16–20. 1. 2.

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Radulphus Brito: Utrum illa quae considerat mathematicus sint abstracta a sensibilibus (II.5) Thomas Wylton: Utrum quantitas possit abstrahi a materia sensibili (II.4)

eis in subiecto), Lyon 1639 (repr. Hildesheim 1969) (Opera omnia, 11/2), 684–690. The editors of Oresme, Questiones super Physicam, II.3, 187, refer to Burley’s Tractatus primus. See E.D. Sylla, ‘Disputationes Collativae: Walter Burley’s Tractatus Primus and Gregory of Rimini’s Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum,’ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 22 (2011), 383–464. With regard to later books of Oresme’s Physics, they refer many times to Burley’s Tractatus secundus. The table of questions continues: ‘De mathematicis mediis, utrum debeant dici naturales vel magis mathematicae’ (24126–27).

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3.

John of Jandun: Utrum entia mathematicalia sint abstracta a sensibilibus (II.4) An entia mathematicalia sint abstracta ab intelligibili materia vel quaenam sit ipsorum intelligibilis materia (II.5) 4. Walter Burley (Expositio): Dubium est an astrologia sit altera a scientia naturali aut pars eius194 5. Francesc Marbres: Utrum quantitas possit abstrahi a materia sensibili (II.2) 6. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum entia mathematicalia sint res distinctae a naturalibus (II.2) 7. Albert of Saxony: Utrum differentia quam assignat Aristotelis inter scientiam naturalem et mathematicam sit bene assignata, scilicet quod scientia naturalis definit per motum, mathematica autem non (II.7) Utrum scientiae mediae inter mathematicas puras et naturales puras magis sint naturales quam mathematicae (II.8) 8. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum mathematicus differat a naturali (II.3.1) Utrum scientiae mediae sint magis naturales quam mathematicae (II.3.2) 9. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum scientia naturalis differat a mathematica (metaphysica ed.) (II.6) 10. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum naturalis differat a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus non (II.7) 11. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum naturalis differat a mathematico in hoc quod naturalis ea quae definit definit in ordine ad motum, sed mathematicus non (II.10) Utrum mathematicalia sint abstracta a sensibilibus (II.11) Utrum abstrahentium non sit mendacium (II.12) Utrum mathematicalia sint principia naturalium (II.13) Utrum scientiae mediae inter mathematicam et naturalem magis debeant dici naturales quam mathematicae (II.14) 12. Conimbricenses: Utrum scientiae quae mediae appellantur magis naturales quam mathematicae sint an non (II.2, q. un.) Before stating conclusions, Buridan makes a few distinctions: The question may be solved if it is expounded and terms are distinguished. I say therefore that science is not said to be natural in this matter on the basis that it is natural and has natural causes, because in that case all science would be said to be natural. Nor is it called natural precisely because it considers natural things, because mathematics and metaphysics would be natural sciences, because they consider natural things, indeed all things. Neither precisely because it considers nat-

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Burley, Expositio in Physicam (1501), 41va.

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ural terms, because physics and mathematics consider many of the same terms, and indeed metaphysics can consider all terms. But science is said to be natural on the basis that it considers things according to the reasons (rationes) according to which they are said to be natural, and all which the science considers it considers according to the attribution to those reasons. A science is said to be mathematical on the basis that it considers things according to the reasons why they are said to be quantities and measurable and proportional to each other in quantity and measurability. All things the science considers it considers according to the attribution to those reasons. Metaphysics, however, considers things according to the reason according to which they are said to be, or to be entities, etc. … I say also that in this case, a natural scientist (naturalis) is not said to be natural because he considers natural things, but because he has natural knowledge (scientia naturalis) and a mathematician is said to be a mathematician because he has mathematical knowledge, and similarly for metaphysics. I also say that the word ‘nature’ (natura) signifies substance, not absolutely, but in relation to motion, as in the relation of a principle to what has principles, on account of which it is necessary that, in the definition of the word ‘nature’ (natura), there be included motion or the sense of motion (ratio motus). Nothing, however, is said to be natural unless for the reason for which it is called nature, or having a nature, or a result of nature, or a principle of nature, or having or existing by nature. And thus it is manifest that every reason (ratio) according to which something is said to be natural includes in itself or implies the reason (ratio) of the word ‘nature’ (2862–2877). On the basis of these terminological clarifications, Buridan formulates a set of conclusions: 1. Every term pertaining to natural science, if it is perfectly defined as it pertains to natural science, ought to be defined by the term ‘motion’ or ‘mutation,’ ‘to move’ or ‘to be moved,’ or by another term including in its meaning the term ‘motion’ or ‘mutation,’ or equivalent terms (2879–13). 2. No mathematical term, if it is defined precisely in the sense that it pertains to mathematics, is defined by the terms ‘motion’ or ‘mutation,’ etc., because it is not pertinent to the meanings (rationes) of magnitudes and numbers, as far as knowing their measures and proportions to each other are concerned, whether they are moved or not, or whether they are in mobile substances or not (2883–8).

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3. No natural science (scientia naturalis) is mathematical science and vice versa (28813–14). 4. It follows that every natural science differs from mathematical science and vice versa (28816–17). 5. Every natural science differs from mathematical science, and conversely, by the fact that the terms in natural science are defined by motion, etc., and the terms in mathematics are not, understanding this conclusion to mean that if they do not differ in this way essentially or causally, nevertheless they differ in this way in arguments, that is because it is argued and concluded that they differ in this way—just as a swan and a crow do not differ causally by whiteness and blackness, nevertheless in arguments they are said to differ in this that the former is white and the latter is black (28820–2892). 6. Not every natural scientist differs from every mathematician, because there are some who are both natural scientists and mathematicians, because they have both types of knowledge (2893–5). Following these conclusions, Buridan continues by raising a ‘great doubt’ about the so-called middle sciences (scientiae mediae), such as astronomy, perspective (or optics), and music, whether they should be said to be more natural than mathematical, or more mathematical than natural. Thomas Aquinas argues they are more natural, and Averroes claims they are more mathematical. Buridan judges that Averroes has the better arguments. Moreover, these disciplines are commonly counted as mathematical sciences. The most that could be said is that these disciplines are more natural than pure mathematics such as arithmetic and geometry.195 Is there any evidence to explain how Buridan’s conclusions here fit into their context? As can be seen in the above list of questions from the work of other authors, before Buridan a different question was asked about Aristotle’s discussion of the difference between natural science and mathematics than the question raised by Buridan and those who came after him. The earlier authors write about mathematicians abstracting from sensible material, while the later authors write about natural scientists defining their terms in relation to motion, while mathematicians do not. Examination of Ockham’s Expositio of the Physics reveals that Ockham, like Buridan, refers to mathematicians defining their terms without motion.196 But there is more here than meets the

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On the concept of ‘scientia media,’ see I. Mueller, ‘Physics and Astronomy: Aristotle’s Physics II.2. 193b22–194a12,’ Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 16 (2006), 175–206. Ockham, Expositio, II, cap. 3, § 5, 259: ‘Hic Philosophus concludit corollarium ex praedictis,

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eye. Previously, commentators had assumed that substances had within themselves quantative forms and, beyond quantity, qualitative forms, and that the quantity, as more fundamental, could be considered while abstracting from additional qualitative forms that were posterior to quantity. Ockham denied the existence of separate quantitative forms and, in particular, the existence of real indivisible quantitative forms such as surfaces, lines, and points.197 Thus, various meanings of ‘to abstract’ had to be distinguished.198 John of Jandun had distinguished real abstraction in the external world, as juice from a herb, from intellectual abstraction, and he had said that mathematical things cannot be

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dicens quod propter hoc quod istae scientiae considerant de eisdem, sed modis diversis, sequitur quod mathematica abstrahit ab aliquibus quae considerat physica. Nam illa quae considerat mathematica, abstracta sunt intellectu a motu quem considerat physica, quamvis in re extra non sint abstracta ab eis; nec tamen est mendacium in sic abstrahendo, et hoc quia sic abstrahentes non asserunt ista separari, sed assumunt unum per intellectum et dimittunt aliud.’ Ockham, Expositio, II, cap. 3, § 3, 258: ‘Secundo notandum est quod Philosophus non intendit dicere in prima ratione quod corpora naturalia habent longitudinem, superficiem et profunditatem tamquam accidentia realiter distincta ab eis, sed praecise intendit dicere quod corpora naturalia sunt longa, lata et profunda.’ Ockham, Expositio, II, cap. 3, § 5, 263–264: ‘Est ergo dicendum pro intentione Philosophi quando dicit quod abstrahentium non est mendacium, quod multiplex potest esse abstractio per intellectum. Una, quando aliquae duae res sunt coniunctae in esse ita quod simul sunt, vel sicut duo accidentia in eodem subiecto vel sicut subiectum et suum accidens vel sicut materia et forma vel sicut pars et totum, et intellectus intelligit unam illarum rerum et non apprehendit aliam, et hoc est abstrahere: intelligere unam rem non intelligendo aliam, quamvis in re non sit separata una ab alia. Sicut intellectus intelligit aliquando albedinem quae est in lacte et tamen non intelligit dulcedinem … Alia est abstractio quando intellectus a singularibus abstrahit universale, quod quidem universale non est idem realiter cum singulari quamvis declaret et supponat pro singulari, et ideo sine mendacio potest universale intelligi sine singulari. Et huiusmodi abstractio est in omni scientia. Alia est abstractio quando unum praedicabile praedicatur de aliquo subiecto et aliud praedicabile non praedicatur de eodem subiecto vel econverso; ubi tamen propositio enuntians illa duo de se non tamen pro se, est vera. Sicut si dicam quod homo est albus et non dicam quod homo est animal, ex hoc quod dico unam propositionem et non aliam, non mentior. Et talis est abstractio mathematicorum, quia considerant tales propositiones “omne corpus est divisibile,” “omne corpus est longum, latum et profundum,” “omne corpus excedit aliud vel exceditur vel est aequale,” sed tales propositiones “omne corpus est mobile,” “omne corpus componitur ex materia et forma” et huiusmodi non considerant. Et ideo dicitur mathematicus abstrahere a motu et a materia, quia scilicet non considerat utrum illa de quibus considerat habeant materiam distinctam a forma vel non, nec considerat utrum sint nata moveri vel non.’

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abstracted outside the mind from material things.199 In one sense something abstracted could be physically separated, as juice might be abstracted from herbs, but in another sense, the intellect merely considers one thing separately from another, even though in reality they remain together. Before Ockham, it was often said that all quantities really exist in bodies and are never separated in reality from matter, though the mathematician considers them separately. Rather than speaking of abstraction, Ockham preferred the language of one thing being considered without the other. In terms of consideration, there might be a symmetry between natural science and mathematics: just as mathematics does not consider matter and motion (physical things), so natural science might not consider mathematical things. On the other hand, if quantity

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Jandun, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.4, 30va–31ra: ‘Multiplex est abstractio, et per consequens multipliciter aliquid dicitur esse abstractum. Quaedam est abstractio realis et alia intellectualis. Abstractio realis est separatio duorum entium extra animam existentium, quaecumque sint realiter separata, tamen proprie et stricte abstractio dicitur separatio aliquorum duorum, quae prius aliqualiter fuerunt coniuncta, ut dicimus liquorem abstrahi ex herbis, et butyrum ex lacte et huiusmodi. Abstractio intellectualis est duplex: una quae pertinet ad intellectum agentem, alia quae pertinet ad intellectum possibilem … Tunc dico ad quaestionem multa. Primo quod entia mathematica non sunt abstracta a sensibilibus abstractione reali, ad quod mihi sufficit ad praesens illa ratio quae adducta est in principio quaestionis, quia scilicet ipsa sunt coniuncta semper cum sensibilibus in re extra animam. Nunquam enim est nec fuit nec erit linea, quae non sit in aliquo subiecto calido vel frigido, sicco vel humido, vel mobili motu recto vel motu circulari, et similiter est de aliis formis mathematicis. Istae enim cum sint quaedam accidentia, non sunt extra animam nisi insit aliqua substantia nata substare accidentibus sensibilibus … Quinto dico quod ista entia mathematicalia sunt abstrahibilia abstractione quinto modo dicta, quia sunt aliquo modo priora qualitatibus sensibilibus, dicente Commentatore in tractatu De substantia orbis quod primum rerum quae existunt in hoc subiecto sunt tres dimensiones, quae dicuntur corpus. Unitas etiam quae est principium numeri aliquo modo est prior sensibilibus qualitatibus et sunt coniuncta accidentaliter ipsis sensibilibus et non determinant sibi eam per suam naturam … et iste modus abstractionis est alius ab omnibus praemissis, et puto quod est proprius mathematico. Et solet describi sic: abstractio mathematica est intellectio alicuius prioris coniuncti in esse accidentaliter cum suo posteriori, quod quidem prius per suam naturam non determinat sibi posterius. Sed ista descriptio non est propria abstractioni mathematici, quia homo potest intelligi sine albedine tamquam prius accidentaliter coniunctum cum posteriori, quod sibi non determinat, et tamen ista intellectio non esset mathematica, ut manifestum est. Et ideo multum videntur peccare qui definiunt abstractionem mathematicam. Et ideo forte melius esset dicere quod abstractio mathematica est intellectio numeri aut magnitudinis aut passionis istorum, vel proprii principii demonstrati, non intelligendo qualitates sensibiles, nec motus naturales.’

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is considered prior to quality, mathematics could abstract from quality, while natural science does not, and in this way physics would be less abstract than mathematics.200 Buridan, of course, in question I.8 had decided that magnitude is a separate form that explains, for instance, why air cannot easily be compressed without cooling. So he was not in precisely the same position as Ockham on this question of ontology (both Buridan and Ockham seem to have denied the real existence of mathematical indivisibiles, such as points, lines, and surfaces). Nevertheless, in comparison to earlier authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Buridan seems to avoid the implication that mathematicians assume that quantities can exist in reality separate from matter.201 3.4 Physics, II, 3: Questions II.7–II.8 A good deal has been written about question II.7, in which Buridan asks whether final causes in the sense of the goals for which actions occur really satisfy our sense of what a cause should be. How can something that does not exist, such as the hoped-for health of the sick person, exert any kind of action? This disquiet about calling a possibly non-existent thing a cause carries over to question II.8, which discusses the problem how a father can be the cause of the son, if the father does not exist either when the son is born or later on.

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Ockham, Expositio, II, cap. 3, § 5, 264–265: ‘Tamen sciendum est quod abstractio isto tertio modo dicta dupliciter potest accipi, scilicet large, quando scilicet de aliquo subiecto consideratur unum incomplexum et non aliud; et isto modo potest dici quod physica abstrahit a mathematicis, sicut e converso, quia sicut mathematica considerat aliqua praedicata de multis quae non considerat physica de eisdem sed alia, ita e converso. Aliter accipitur ista abstractio stricte, quando scilicet una scientia considerat priora et alia posteriora, vel posterioritate consequentiae vel alia posterioritate, scilicet praedicationis, vel alio modo, scilicet definitionis, vel tali modo. Et isto modo mathematica abstrahit et non physica; et propter hoc dicit Philosophus quod physica sunt minus abstracta quam mathematica.’ There is current consensus among historians that Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony took more interest in (mixed) mathematics than Buridan. See J. Celeyrette, La physique mathématique imaginaire du XIVe siècle, Conférence du 20/01/05 à l’Espace Mendès France, Poitiers (URL: http://stl.recherche.univ-lille3.fr/sitespersonnels/celeyrette/celeyrette Poitiers.html), and Id., ‘La Questio de puncto.’

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Question II.7—Whether the end is a cause (Utrum finis sit causa).202 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, 194b33–195a2; Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 27–38. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Radulphus Brito: Utrum finis habeat rationem causae (II.9) Thomas Wylton: Utrum finis sit causa operationis efficientis (II.5) John of Jandun: Utrum finis sit causa (II.10) Francesc Marbres: Utrum causalitas causae finalis sit causa causalitatis causae efficientis (II.3) 5. Nicole Oresme: Utrum finis sit causa (II.10) 6. Albert of Saxony: Utrum finis sit causa (II.13) 7. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum finis sit causa (II.4.2) 8. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum finis sit causa (II.9) 9. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum finis sit causa operationis agentis. Verbi gratia, supposito quod medicus intendens sanitatem propter eam conficiat medicinas: utrum sanitas sit causa confectionis medicinarum (II.8) 10. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum finis sit causa, id est utrum sanitas propter quam medicus operatur sit finis medici porrigendo infirmo laxativa et potiones (II.21)203

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The table of questions continues: ‘Quod causa dicitur simpliciter vel secundum attributionem sicut sanum; et sic est duplex finis, scilicet dictus primaria intentione et dictus secundaria intentione’ (2421–3). Benedictus Hesse, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.21, 234–235: ‘Respondetur quod sic. Nota: secundum Philosophum secundo De anima, finis est duplex. Quidam est finis “gratia cuius,” et secundum Commentatorem vocatur finis “primaria intentione dictus” vel finis “rei operatae,” et est aliquid praeexsistens operationi agentis dirigens agens in agendo, gratia cuius agens principaliter agit. Verbi gratia, si architector ex praecepto regis faceret castrum, tunc voluntas regis est causa finalis “gratia cuius,” quia voluntas regis praeexsistit aedificationi et dirigit architectorem ad agendum propter ipsum vel gratia ipsius agit. Alius est finis “quo,” et a Commentatore vocatur finis “secundaria intentione dictus” vel finis “operationis et generationis,” et est effectus ab agente ultimate intentus. Verbi gratia sanitas quam medicus intendit ex confectione medicinarum est finis “quo,” quia sanitas est illud mediante quo medicus attingit ultimate suam intentionem, propter quam agit … Istis sic stantibus respondetur secundum unam opinionem, scilicet secundum Buridanum: finis “gratia cuius” est causa, sed finis “quo” non est causa, quia quando agens agit, tunc finis “quo” non est, igitur non est causa … Secundum Buridanum “sanitas” non convenienter respondetur ad interrogationem factam per “propter quid.” Sed cum quaeritur: “propter quid medicus operatur?” Respondetur: “propter sanitatem futuram vel generandam,” et non simpliciter: “propter sanitatem.” Sed secundum Marsilium perniciosum est propter argumenta recedere a communi modo loquendi, scilicet quod finis “quo” non esset causa. Et ergo ad quaestionem respondetur quod tam finis “gratia cuius” quam finis

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11. Conimbricenses: Utrum finis vere ac proprie causa sit an non (II.7.20) Utrum causaliter finis in metaphorica motione consistat an non (II.7.21) Utrum omnis operatio causae agentis sit effectus finis an non (II.7.22) Causetne finis secundum esse intelligibile an secundum existentiam quam in rebus habet (II.7.23) Anneliese Maier has discussed Buridan’s question II.7 in detail, and more recent authors have attempted to improve and correct her analysis.204 In the case of human beings, such as the doctor preparing medicines to cure the patient, the concept of the patient’s future health existing in the mind of the doctor may serve as a cause, but Buridan also believes that inanimate objects somehow are designed such that they carry out God’s plans for the cosmos. In this sense their intrinsic natures are the causes of their motions, such as the fall of heavy bodies or the growth of trees. Some historians of philosophy have found it difficult to believe that Buridan, or Ockham before him, could have believed that inanimate natural things through their intrinsic forms carry out God’s purposes, but Buridan seems clearly to say as much. With regard to human beings, everyone believes that our motivations cause our actions, Buridan writes: It seems to me that everyone by a natural instinct determined as if by nature concedes that the goal is a cause of our operations. Thus if you ask an old woman why she goes to the church or to the market, she tells you ‘in order to hear Mass,’ or ‘in order to buy a tunic’ … Such things that are conceded by everybody ought not to be entirely denied, because in

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“quo” est causa. Cuius ratio, quia quilibet illorum est finalis, igitur est causa … Sed tamen pro concordia opinionum: capiendo “causa” ut ampliat pro illo quod est vel potest esse, tunc dicitur quod finis “gratia cuius” est causa, et etiam finis “quo.” Et tunc ista consequentia non valet: finis “quo” non est; igitur non est causa, quia arguitur negative in terminis ampliativis: abest secundo adiacente, adest tertium adiacens. Sed capiendo “causa” ut non ampliat, tunc respondetur, quod finis “gratia cuius” est causa, sed non “quo.” Et hoc vult Buridanus.’ See Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, 273–335, esp. 300–335. For discussions of others with related ideas, see C. Trifogli, ‘Thomas Wylton on Final Causality,’ in: A. Fidora & M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Erfahrung und Beweis. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2007 (Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel, 14), 249–264. For Ockham, see M. McCord Adams, ‘Ockham on Final Causality: Muddying the Waters,’ Franciscan Studies, 56 (1998), 1–46.

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order to prove the opposite one cannot adduce anything more probable or more widely conceded. Therefore, the difficulty is not put to rest unless by seeing how what is nothing may be the cause of what is (29518–2962). While accepting final causes for conscious agents, Buridan only improves upon the statement by saying that the final cause is not the goal to be obtained ultimately, which does not exist at the time of the action, but the conception of the goal in the mind of the actor (2962–6).205 Alternately, using the notion of extension or ampliation (ampliatio) of the supposition of the terms of a proposition, Buridan says that the word ‘cause’ amplifies or extends the supposition of the terms in the proposition to apply not only to presently existing things, but also to future or possibile things, such as the intended health (2966–11). Buridan and others see a problem with this argument, however, because if the intended goal causes the action of the agent, will not the things that God creates be the cause of God’s action? But God’s action cannot be caused by inferior things. Buridan then turns to distinctions made by Averroes between the end by which ( finis quo) and the end for the sake of which ( finis gratia cuius), and between the end primarily intended ( finis prima intentione) and the end secondarily intended ( finis secundaria intentione). In the case of inanimate objects, Buridan concludes: Concerning the intentions of non-intelligent agents or of agents not acting by reasoning, I believe that the order in intending and desiring is according to the order of the apparent result (operis apparentis), the reverse of what happens with us. On account of this it is well said that what is better known to us, is less known to nature. It was said in Book I that the intent or desire of a natural agent does nothing but determine it to do this or that. So fire is first determined to heating, then with the superior causes it is determined to generate fire in the matter already heated and prepared (disposita). If, therefore, it were asked ‘what is the cause on account of which fire heats,’ I would respond that the cause is not the fire to be generated, but is its form and its heat, and God, for the sake of whom it acts, co-acts. And if other responses were given, they would be in an improper sense according to the predetermined ways (30021– 3018).

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Cf. also 30015–20.

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Question II.8—Whether the father is the cause of the son (Utrum pater sit causa filii).206 Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, 3, 194b31. Buridan uses this question to raise the issue whether an efficient cause must exist when it is an efficient cause. Others ask more general questions about (the whole of) chapter 3. 1. Radulphus Brito: Utrum causa et effectus simul sint et non sint (II.10) 2. Thomas Wylton: Utrum causa in actu et effectus in actu simul sint et non sint (II.6) 3. Walter Burley (Expositio et quaestiones): Utrum causa particularis in actu simul sit et non sit cum effectu particulari in actu (II.11) 4. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum quattuor causae sint quattuor res distinctae realiter (II.14) 5. Nicole Oresme: Utrum causa efficiens sit causa (II.8) Utrum cuiuslibet rei naturalis sint tantum quattuor causae (II.7) Utrum materia et forma sint causae (II.9) 6. Albert of Saxony: Utrum cuiuslibet rei naturalis sint quattuor causae et non plures neque pauciores (II.9) Utrum omne efficiens sit causa illius cuius dicitur causa efficiens (II.10) Utrum de aliquo sit evidens quod ipsum sit efficiens producens (II.11) 7. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum efficiens sit causa (II.4.1) Utrum cuiuslibet rei naturalis sint quattuor causae (II.4.3) Quae sint proprietates causarum (II.4.4) 8. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum cuiuslibet rei naturalis sint quattuor causae (II.7) Utrum sit aliqua causa efficiens (II.8) 9. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum pater sit causa filii (II.22) As if the discussion of final causes with the difficulty that the supposed final cause might not exist when it was supposed to be causing had led Buridan to think whether a similar problem exists even for efficient causes, he asks next whether a father can be considered the cause of his son if, in fact, the father has died. Buridan begins by listing some of the many senses in which the word ‘cause’ is used. Something can be a cause if another thing depends on the cause for its existence. Or something might have been a cause of the coming into being of a second thing, even if that second thing was now independent. Third, a second thing might depend on a first thing for its perfection. Fourth, something could be said to be a cause metaphorically. Buridan goes on to list another five ways in which something could be said to be a cause, and says

206

The table of questions adds: ‘Quod materia dicitur causa secundum attributionem ad principalem intentionem’ (2424–5).

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there could be others. Then his answer suddenly breaks off with Buridan saying that he has mentioned the more common and significant possible ways of explaining how a father is or is not the cause of the son. 3.5 Physics, II, 4–6: Questions II.9–II.12 Question II.9—Whether the definition of fortune is good in which it is said ‘fortune is the accidental cause in relation to what is proposed as occurring not always or frequently, of things which happen on account of it’ (Utrum definitio fortunae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens secundum propositum extra semper et frequenter eorum quae propter hoc sunt’). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, 5, 197a5–7, 33–36; Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48. 1.

Thomas Wylton: Utrum casus et fortuna habeant esse in rebus (II.7) Utrum aliquid eveniat a casu et hoc specialiter comparando ista corpora ad motum corporum supracaelestium (II.10) Utrum aliquae eveniant a casu in comparatione ad causalitatem primi principii (II.11) Utrum in corporibus supracaelestibus aliquid eveniat a casu (II.12) 2. John of Jandun: Utrum in caelestibus corporibus contingant aliqua casualia et fortuita (II.11) Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae per accidens (II.12) 3. Nicole Oresme: Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes per accidens (II.11) Utrum aliquid possit fieri a casu (II.12) Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate (II.13) Utrum illa divisio sit bona in qua dicitur quod quaedam est fortuna bona et quaedam mala (II.14) 4. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae per se vel per accidens (II.15) 5. Albert of Saxony: Utrum definitio fortunae data ab Aristotele sit bona, scilicet: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens extra semper et frequenter secundum propositum eorum quae propter hoc sunt’ (II.13) 6. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum aliquid fiat a fortuna (II.5.1) Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes (II.5.2) 7. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum aliquid fiat a casu vel a fortuna (II.10) Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa omnium quae fiunt (II.11) Utrum definitio fortunae sit bona (II.12) 8. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum definitio fortunae sit bona qua dicitur: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens secundum propositum extra semper et frequenter eorum quae propter hoc sunt’ (II.10) 9. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum definitio fortunae sit bene posita (II.27) Utrum divisio fortunae sit bene posita (II.28) 10. Conimbricenses: Sitne fortuna et fatum in rebus an non (II.3–6.1)

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We think that fortune exists because people commonly say that many things happen to us by fortune, and it would be absurd to say that many things happen because of what is non-existent. Buridan concludes: 1. Fortune exists (3101–2). 2. We ought to concede that fortune is the cause of the fortuitous effect, i.e., of that which we say is or becomes or eventuates by fortune (3107–9). 3. Fortune should be described by the fortuitous effect or by the term or terms suppositing for fortuitous effects (31012–14). 4. The fortuitous effects are those that happen without the intention of the agent (31022–23). 5. The fortuitous effect is an accidental effect, and fortune is an accidental cause (3111–2). 6. The fortuitous effect is contingent and does not happen always or frequently; fortune is an accidental cause not always or frequent with respect to that of which it is said to be fortune (31112–14). 7. Fortune is said to be the cause of those effects which are because of this, i.e. which we would have acted to achieve if we had foreseen them (3122–3). 8. We say that those people who act for a reason (a proposito) are fortunate or unfortunate when as a result of their actions something good or bad occurs that was not expected and rarely happens (3128–11). 9. This definition of ‘fortune’ is very good: fortune is the accidental cause of those things that occur because of it not always or frequently and affect those that have intent. This definition explicitly explains the signification and connotations of the word ‘fortune’ and is convertible with it. Where there is no intent, the word ‘chance’ (casus) is used rather than ‘fortune’; the word ‘chance’ has a broader application and includes ‘fortune’ (31225– 31324). In reply to the principal arguments, Buridan says that, like many other words, ‘fortune’ has multiple meanings and may be used equivocally, analogically, or metaphorically. Fortune in its first intention is said of our intellect or will by which the effect occurs to us without our intent. If the heavens or God are concurrent causes of these effects, we may also include them in fortune.

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Question II.10—Whether chance and fortune are causal agents (Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes). 1. Radulphus Brito: Utrum fortuna sit causa aliquarum entium (II.12) Utrum fortuna sit causa divina (II.14) 2. Albert of Saxony: Utrum aliquid fiat a casu et a fortuna (II.15) 3. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes (II.11) 4. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes (II.30) To articulate his answer, Buridan formulates the following four conclusions. 1. Chance and fortune ought not to be called final causes for the same reason that they are called chance and fortune, because those causes should not be called final of which the effects, for the reason for which they are their effects, are not ordered to any end. They are called casual and fortuitous because they are not ordered to an end (3183–7). 2. Chance and fortune, insofar as they are called chance and fortune, should not be called material causes, because casual and fortuitous effects in comparison to the causes with respect to which they are called casual and fortuitous ought to have a certain extraneousness and unnaturalness, because they occur without intention and not always or frequently. But these effects have no extraneousness or unnaturalness with respect to matter, because matter naturally is in potency to the inherence of all forms and possible dispositions, and it is naturally determined to none (31821–3193). 3. It should be said that chance and fortune, insofar as they are called chance and fortune should not be called formal causes, because these very forms of casual and fortuitous effects result; but the same thing is not made or does not occur by means of itself. Therefore these forms are not chance or fortune (3198–11). 4. Chance and fortune, for the reason for which they are called chance and fortune, ought to be called efficient causes, because they should be called causes and they are not final, material, or formal causes (31919–22). The third principal argument, that monsters result from chance, is ascribed to Albert the Great. Buridan responds that, with respect to matter, monsters are not difformed or unnatural but should be called casual effects with respect to the agent.

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Question II.11—Whether chance and fortune are found in what is equally likely to occur or not to occur (contingentes ad utrumlibet), or only in contingencies that rarely occur or less often than not (Utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet vel solum in contingentibus raro vel ut in paucioribus).207 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48. This question was raised by a difference of opinion between Avicenna and Averroes.208 1. Radulphus Brito: Utrum casus et fortuna habeant esse circa contingens ad utrumlibet (II.15) 2. Thomas Wylton: Utrum quae eveniunt ad utrumlibet possint dici evenire a casu (II.8) Utrum a contingenti ad utrumlibet aliqua actio possit procedere (II.9) 3. Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum casus et fortuna habeant esse solum in minori parte (II.D.16)209 Utrum contingens aequaliter reperiatur in potentiis activis (II.D.17) Utrum reperiatur in potentiis passivis (II.D.18) Utrum aliquid sit necessarium respectu unius et possibile in maiori parte respectu alterius et possibile in pauciori respectu tertii (II.D.19) 4. Albert of Saxony: Utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus aequaliter (II.16) 5. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet casus et fortuna (X.5.3)

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The table of questions adds: ‘Quomodo agens se habet multipliciter ad utrumlibet ad suum effectum. Quod idem est respectu unius ut in pluribus et respectu alterius ut in paucioribus’ (24210–12). For this difference of opinion, and for Buridan’s position, see S.V. Knebel, ‘Volo magis stare cum Avicenna. Der Zufall zwischen Averoisten und Avicennisten,’ in: A. Speer & L. Wegener (eds), Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter, Berlin [etc.] 2006 (Miscellanea mediaevalia, 33), 662–676. Cf. Burley, Expositio in Physicam (1501), 48vb: ‘Intelligendum est hic quod Philosophus non concludit expresse in textu istam conclusionem, scilicet quod casus et fortuna sunt in his que fiunt in minori parte, ut exponit Commentator, sed concludit istam conclusionem, scilicet quod casus et fortuna sunt in his que sunt extra hec, id est extra ea que fiunt semper et frequenter, id est casus et fortuna sunt in his que nec fiunt semper nec frequenter. Sed super hoc Commentator movet questionem difficilem, que est illa: quoniam ex quo casus et fortuna sunt in his que nec fiunt semper nec frequenter, et illorum que nec fiunt semper nec frequenter quedam fiunt in minori parte et quelibet equaliter et ad utrumlibet, est hec questio, videlicet utrum casus et fortuna habeant esse in utrisque, scilicet tam in contingentibus equaliter quam in contingentibus in minori parte. Circa quam questionem Commentator facit septem …’ Burley’s discussion of this and the three related doubts, as above, extends to f. 50va.

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6. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum in contingente ad utrumlibet possint reperiri casus et fortuna (II.13) 7. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet (II.12) 8. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum fortuna et casus reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet vel in contingentibus ut raro vel in contingentibus ut in pluribus (II.31) According to Buridan, this question is considered difficult on account of the fame of Avicenna and Averroes, who disagree on it. Averroes gladly disagrees with Avicenna when he can, Buridan comments. Then Buridan quotes Averroes’ arguments against Avicenna at length. Avicenna says that chance and fortune are found in what is contingent ‘ad utrumlibet,’ or might equally happen or not happen. Averroes has four conclusions against Avicenna: 1. It is incongruous to say that the same thing is necessary with respect to one cause and contingent with respect to another, because it would follow that nothing is naturally necessary or contingent (3256–10). 2. Avicenna defines ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ poorly and ineptly by referring to external impediments. Averroes then gives different definitions of ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent,’ saying that in what is necessary there is no possibility of default, while in the contingent there is that in whose nature there is a possibility of deficiency (32513–25). 3. No efficient cause is contingent ad utrumlibet, because what is indeterminate has the nature (ratio) of matter and not form; but an agent has the ratio of form (3263–5). 4. Chance and fortune are not found in what is contingent ad utrumlibet, because they are efficient causes, and efficient causes are not ad utrumlibet. For this reason Aristotle rightly left ad utrumlibet out of consideration (32615–26). Buridan opposes Averroes’ arguments and sides with Avicenna. He concludes: 1. A free agent can be ad utrumlibet (3273–5). 2. If there are many agents, it may be ad utrumlibet whether they act in a given case (3276–8). 3. The agent and what is acted on both influence the result: it is ad utrumlibet whether the result of coitus will be a boy or girl (3279–11). 4. Even if an agent has a determinate effect with respect to what is intended, it may have an effect ad utrumlibet with respect to what is not intended (32712–13).

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5. Even with respect to what is intended, the result may be contingent ad utrumlibet, as happens in games of chance (32717–20). Something such as the death of Socrates may be necessary with respect to the efficacious will of God, Buridan argues, but contingent with respect to the will of the King. Avicenna’s definitions of necessary and contingent actually follow from Averroes’ definitions, as Averroes himself admits. In the end, Buridan chooses to stand with Avicenna. Given the attention that Burley pays to these issues, it might be worth comparing Burley’s extensive discussion to Buridan’s. Question II.12—Whether nature producing a monster intends the monster (Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat monstrum).210 This question leads to a discussion of final causes in nature where nature itself was not thought capable of intent. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II, 8–9; Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 82. 1. Radulphus Brito: Utrum monstra sint peccata quae accidunt in materialibus sicut a natura (II.22) Utrum monstra sint in plantis sicut in animalibus (II.23) 2. John of Jandun: Utrum monstra sint intenta a natura (II.14)211 3. Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum monstra sint producta a casu (II.D.25) 4. Nicole Oresme: Utrum natura intendat aliquod monstrum (II.15) 5. Albert of Saxony: An natura intendat producere monstrum (II.15) 6. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat monstrum (II.8.1) 7. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum monstrum intendatur a natura (II.15) 8. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat monstrum (II.13)

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The table of questions adds: ‘Quomodo diversis modis solent monstra provenire’ (24214). Jandun quotes long sections from Albert the Great in discussing the occurrence of monsters. See, for example, Jandun, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.14, 39va: ‘Formae omnium sunt in terminis, id est in corporibus caelestibus, in quibus est terminus totius corporeitatis; quod sic intelligo quod cuilibet speciei istius mundi inferioris correspondet aliqua constellatio, vel configuratio caelestis, cuius virtus diffunditur ad istum mundum inferiorem cum ipsis luminibus stellarum. Et hoc pulchre docet Albertus in suo commentario super librum De somno et vigilia, ubi sic dicit: lumen caeleste diversimode situatum vehit ad nos omnes virtutes orbis. Et propter hoc etiam dicit Aristoteles in primo Meteororum quod ex necessitate iste mundus est contiguus superioribus lationibus et corporibus superioribus localiter motis, ut omnis virtus eius gubernetur inde.’

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9. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum hirundines, formicae et araneae et cetera bruta servantes ordinem in suis operationibus, agant secundum artem et secundum deliberationem (II.36) Utrum definitio monstri sit bene posita (II.37) Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat producere monstrum (II.38) Buridan chooses to answer this question using the tools of logic (per logicam). He concludes: 1. No nature intends a monster. The intent of an agent directed by the best and infallible knower is never for what is bad or superfluous or defective; but every monster, for the reason for which it is called a monster, is said to be bad or defective or superfluous (3336–10). 2. A monster is indeed intended by nature, because sometimes monstruousness is only a defect, as for instance if there is born a man without hands or feet, and the defect is only a defective thing, as a privation is no other than a lack of matter, and thus this monstrosity or that monster is no other than a man, and that man was intended by nature, and that man is a monster or a monstrosity. Therefore a monster or a monstrosity was intended by nature (33312–18). The difference in meaning between these two conclusions results from word order, i.e. whether the word refering to the man or monster comes before the verb ‘intend’ or after. Buridan attributes intention to nature, just as intention is attributed to humans. A person may want and desire some liquid in a container that he thinks is good wine, whereas actually it is dirty water. Therefore, if you point to the liquid, it is true that the man wants and desires it, but not under the description ‘dirty water.’ Verbs like ‘desire,’ ‘wish,’ ‘know,’ ‘appear’ and so forth make the words following them ‘call’ (appellare) the descriptions according to which they are intended or desired, etc. Therefore it does not follow that ‘the one coming I recognize (cognoscere), therefore I recognize the one coming.’ Nor does it follow that ‘the water I desire (appeto), therefore I desire the water.’ For this I desire to drink, and this is water, therefore water I desire to drink, and nevertheless I do not want to drink water. Analogously as we apply the words to ourselves, we ought to ascribe ‘intend,’ ‘desire’ and so forth to nature. To explain the truth further we should know that from many diverse causes and ways monsters may arise. One way they arise from the matter—from defect or superfluity; another way from the agent, which may be too weak, and sometimes from the defect or badness of the container, such as the sac in which the foetus is contained.

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3.6 Question II.13 Question II.13—Whether in natural operations necessity arises from the end or from matter (Utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex fine vel ex materia).212 Aristotle, Physics, II, 8–9; Averroes, In Physicam, comm. 87–92. 1. 2.

Radulphus Brito: Utrum necessitas in naturalibus sumatur ex fine (II.24) John of Jandun: Utrum natura agat propter finem (II.13) Utrum rei naturalis necessitas ex eius materia quoquo modo dependeat (II.15)213 3. Walter Burley (Expositio): Utrum necessitas in naturalibus sit simpliciter vel ex suppositione (II.D.26) 4. Nicole Oresme: Utrum omnis effectus naturalis sit ex necessitate finis (II.16) 5. Hugolinus of Orvieto: Utrum necessitas reperta in rebus naturalibus proveniat ex materia vel ex fine (II.6)214 6. Albert of Saxony: Utrum in dispositionibus et operationibus naturalibus necessitas sit ex fine vel ex materia (II.16) 7. Marsilius of Inghen: Utrum necessitas in rebus naturalibus proveniat ex parte finis vel ex parte materiae (II.8.2) 8. Johannes Marsilii (?): Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate (II.14) Utrum necessitas in rebus naturalibus proveniat ex parte materiae vel ex fine (II.16) 9. Lawrence of Lindores: Utrum natura agat propter finem (II.14) Utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex parte materiae vel ex parte finis (II.15) 10. Benedictus Hesse: Utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat propter materiam vel propter finem (II.39)

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The table of questions adds: ‘Quot, quae et qualia requiruntur ad ordinem entium nobis in hoc mundo apparentem. Quod ex sanitate producenda non dependet operatio medici nec intentio eius. Quomodo hirundo intendit pullos et nidum et quo ordine et a quo provenit ille ordo’ (24216–19). Jandun, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.15, 40ra: ‘Circa istam partem quaesitum fuit utrum omne agens naturale sit intrinsecum passo, et supra capitulum de casu et fortuna, utrum omnia veniant (!) de necessitate. Sed istas quaestiones ordinavi inter sophismata prolixius exquisita. Quod autem de necessitate etc. Quaeritur hic utrum necessitas effectuum naturalium dependeat ex materia rei naturalis.’ Hugolinus, Quaestiones Physicorum, II.6, 24: ‘Prima conclusio est quod aliqua necessitas reperta in rebus naturalibus est propter materiam. Secunda conclusio est quod causa huius necessitatis est finis … Prima conclusio est quod omnis effectus naturalis est res contingens. Secunda est quod in rebus naturalibus nihil de necessitate evenit, sed omnia eveniunt contingenter.’

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According to Buridan, doubtless (sine dubio) this question is difficult because it accompanies or follows the question that was asked concerning the final cause, which was difficult enough. He begins by conceding that ultimately all good order in natural operations and dispositions comes principally from God. That end is truly the first and principal cause of the whole universe. After God there come a diversity of secondary causes necessary to produce the observed diverse natural effects. God and prime matter alone are not sufficient to explain the diversity of transmutations and effects. The celestial bodies are the causes of many diverse transmutations and effects in the sublunar world. Beyond God, prime matter, and the celestial bodies, other more particular causes are needed to explain the diversity of natural effects—in the same area where the effects of the heavens are similar, there arise many different species of animals and plants. Among these particular causes are the seeds (semina) of animals or plants, and the varying dispositions of matter that produce frogs or flies. Natural agents in the end act for the sake of themselves and for their own ends, to produce the best and most noble state in which they can naturally exist. Beyond this they act in the end for God, so that they may be assimilated to God to the extent that nature permits. Overall it is the ends or final causes that have the greatest influence. This said, there remains the doubt whether the ultimate ends, as health coming from what the doctor does, or as the chicks that arrive after the nest is built and the male and female come together—whether, that is, the preceding operations depend on and have their order from (ex) the final effects. Buridan thinks they do not, as he said in the earlier question on final causes. It does not appear to him that the order can depend on what does not actually exist. Aristotle, however, seems to believe the opposite, and Buridan recites several of his arguments. Since there is much and excellent scholarship on Buridan’s treatment of this issue, the reader is directed there for further information.215 215

See the literature cited above, n. 204.

Bibliography This bibliography contains all publications cited in the Introduction and the Guide to the Text. For the sources referred to in the edition, see above, XL–XLII.

Primary Sources [Albert of Saxony], Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam ad Albertum de Saxonia attributae, ed. B. Patar, 3 vols, Louvain-la-Neuve, Leuven 1999 (Philosophes médiévaux, 39–41). Albert of Saxony (?), Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, manuscript London, Wellcome Institute for the History of Science, cod. L. 15. Albert of Saxony, Quaestiones eximii Doctoris Magistri Alberti de Saxonia in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, in: G. Lokert (ed.), Quaestiones et decisiones physicales insignium virorum, Paris 1516 (URL: http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/ display/bsb10195484_00005.html). Aristotle, Physics, tr. R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye, in: J. Barnes, (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton 1984 (Bollingen Series 71/2), 315–446. Averroes, In Physicam, in: Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, 4, Venezia 1562– 1574 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1962). Benedictus Hesse, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. S. Wielgus, Wrocław [etc.] 1984. Collegium Conimbricense, Commentarii in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Lyon 1594 (repr. Hildesheim 1984). Francesc Marbres (alias John the Canon), Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, Venezia 1520. Hugolinus of Orvieto, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Physicorum, ed. W. Eckermann, Der Physikkommentar Hugolins von Orvieto OESA. Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnislehre des spätmittelalterlichen Augustinismus, Berlin [etc.] 1972 (Spätmittelalter und Reformation, 5). Javellus, C., Quaestiones naturales super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Lyon 1567 (URL: http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10169864_ 00005.html). Johannes Marsilii (?), Questiones subtilissime Johannis Marcilii Inguen super octo libros Phisycorum secundum nominalium viam, Lyon 1518 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1964). John Buridan, Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis, ed. M. Streijger, P.J.J.M. Bakker & J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Leiden [etc.] 2010 (Medieval and early modern science, 14).

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Thijssen, J.M.M.H., ‘The Short Redaction of John Buridan’s Questions on the Physics and their Relation to the Questions on the Physics Attributed to Marsilius of Inghen,’ Archives d’ histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 52 (1985), 237–266. Thijssen, J.M.M.H., & J. Zupko, ‘John Buridan, Metaphysician and Natural Philosopher. An Introductory Survey,’ in: J.M.M.H. Thijssen & J. Zupko (eds), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Leiden [etc.] 2001 (Medieval and early modern science, 2), ix–xvii. Trifogli, C., ‘Thomas Wylton on Final Causality,’ in: A. Fidora & M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Erfahrung und Beweis. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2007 (Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel, 14), 249–264. Unterkircher, F., Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek bis zum Jahre 1400, 2 vols, Wien 1969 (Katalog der datierten Handschriften in lateinischer Schrift in Österreich, 1). Unterkircher, F., Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek von 1401 bis 1450, 2 vols, Wien 1971 (Katalog der datierten Handschriften in lateinischer Schrift in Österreich, 2). Wood, R., ‘Walter Burley’s Physics Commentaries,’ Franciscan Studies, 44 (1984), 275– 327. Zimmermann, A., Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350, Leiden [etc.] 1971 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 9). Zupko, J., ‘John Buridan and the Origins of Secular Philosophical Culture,’ in: S. Caroti & J. Celeyrette (eds), Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio. Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle, Firenze 2004 (Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, 52), 33–48. Zupko, J., ‘John Buridan’, in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) (URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/ buridan/). Zupko, J., John Buridan. Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master, Notre Dame (IN) 2003 (Publications in Medieval Studies).

Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam) Libri I–II

Conspectus siglorum et compendiorum A B C G H L M p P T U

Carpentras, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine, cod. 293 (L. 289) Frankfurt am Main, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, cod. Praed. 52 København, Kongelige Bibliotek, cod. Ny kgl. Samling 1801 fol. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 1771 Kremsmünster, Bibliothek des Benediktinerstiftes, cod. CC 169 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, cod. lat. 14723 Salzburg, Stiftsbibliothek St. Peter (Erzabtei), cod. b.IX.24 Iohannes Buridanus, Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis. Paris: Petrus le Dru impensis Dionysii Roce, 1509. Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, cod. Vat. lat. 2163 Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5332 Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. 5338

add. al. m. codd. corr. del. hom. inf. inv. lin. marg. om. praem. ras. rep. seq. spat. sup. transp. †…†

addidit alia manu codices correxit delevit homoeoteleuton infra/inferiore invertit lineam margine omisit praemisit rasura repetivit sequitur spatium supra/superiore transposuit locus corruptus

AA AL PL

Auctoritates Aristotelis Aristoteles Latinus Patrologia Latina

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Bonum, sicut habetur primo Ethicorum, quanto est multis communius, tanto divinius est et melius. Propter quod multorum de discipulis seu scholaribus meis precibus inclinatus ego aliqua scribere praesumpsi de difficultatibus libri Physicorum Aristotelis et hanc illis scripturam communicare, quia non possunt, ut dicunt, multa in scholis audita sine aliquo scripturae adiutorio memoriae commendare. Super quibus ego peto et supplico de omissis et minus bene dictis obtinere veniam, de inventis autem, si convenientia aliqua fuerint, multas habere grates. 1 Prologus et tabula quaestionum primi libri Physicorum desunt in G 2 sicut] ut p ‖ est multis] multum P 3 divinius … melius] est melius et divinius Pp 4 difficultatibus] definitionibus p 5 et] om. P ‖ scripturam] add. illis P 6 possunt] possent p ‖ audita] om. P ‖ aliquo] alicuius Pp 7 supplico] add. ut P 8–9 conventientia aliqua fuerint] quae fuerint convenientia p : quae fuerint P 9 grates] add. et bonorum scholarium orationes p 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, I, 2, 1094b9–11; cf. AA, 12: 5

⟨Tabula quaestionum primi libri Physicorum⟩

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Tabula quaestionum primi libri Physicorum. ⟨1⟩ Prima quaestio utrum scientia naturalis est scientia de omnibus rebus. Quot modis dicitur esse de aliquo scientia demonstrativa. Quomodo metaphysica est scientia communis et omnes aliae scientiae speciales. Quomodo de singularibus potest esse scientia demonstrativa. ⟨2⟩ Secunda quaestio utrum totalis scientiae naturalis debeat assignari unum subiectum proprium. Unde scientia totalis habeat unitatem secundum se et ab aliis distinctionem. De condicionibus subiecti proprii in totali scientia assignandi. ⟨3⟩ Tertia utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis vel quid aliud. Quod nulla scientia praeter metaphysicam considerat terminos substantiales secundum rationes pure substantiales. Quomodo scientia naturalis subalternat | sibi prudentiam et omnes artes. ⟨4⟩ Quarta quaestio utrum in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingit alia scire et intelligere. An de substantia possumus habere conceptum simplicem. Quot modis unus conceptus simplex potest fieri ex alio vel ex aliis. An hoc praedicatum ‘est’ secundo adiacens potest demonstrari de aliquo subiecto. Quod non oportet omnem demonstrationem reducere ad primum principium complexum, nec quantum ad evidentiam praemissarum nec quantum ad evidentiam consequentiae. An in demonstrationibus propter quid praemissae debent esse causae conclusionis vel scientia praemissarum causa scientiae conclusionis vel res significatae rerum significatarum. Et utrum demonstrationes mathematicae sunt demonstrationes propter quid. ⟨5⟩ Quinta quaestio utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oportet scire omnes causas eius. Quod conclusiones mathematicae non possunt

2 physicorum] add. ordinata a magistro iohanne byridano quae quidem tabula inchoata fuit in festo pentecostes anno domini millesimo trecentesimo quinquagesimo septimo P 3 quaestio] add. est p 4 aliquo] aliqua P 4–5 metaphysica] add. dicenda Pp 5 scientiae] add. et omnes aliae P 6 potest esse] est P 8 unum subiectum] inv. P 11 tertia] add. quaestio p 15 quaestio] om. P 17 conceptum simplicem] inv. p 18 alio … aliis] aliis vel ex alio P ‖ secundo] secundum Gp 20 nec] ut C 22 propter quid] semper P 23 causa] om. P 24 significatae] add. per terminos p 24–25 mathematicae sunt] metaphysicae sint P 26 quaestio] om. P ‖ perfecte sciendum] inv. p 27 omnes causas eius] suas causas P ‖ mathematicae] metaphysicae P

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perfecte sciri per solam mathematicam. Quod mathematicae scientiae non sunt certissimae. An aliquid potest perfecte sciri et quomodo. ⟨6⟩ Sexta quaestio utrum sunt eadem notiora nobis et naturae. Quid vocatur nobis notius et quid vocatur naturae notius. ⟨7⟩ Septima quaestio utrum universalia sunt nobis notiora singularibus. | Unde provenit quod intellectus potest idem intelligere aliquando universaliter et aliquando singulariter et sensus non nisi singulariter. An res intelligitur prius universaliter magis quam minus universaliter. Distinctio de singulari vago et de singulari determinato. ⟨8⟩ Octava quaestio utrum omnis res extensive et situaliter habens partem extra partem est magnitudo. ⟨9⟩ Nona quaestio utrum totum est suae partes. ⟨10⟩ Decima quaestio utrum Socrates est hodie idem quod ipse erat heri, posito quod hodie additum est sibi aliquid ex nutrimento et conversum | est in eius substantiam, vel etiam posito quod ab eo aliqua pars sit remota, ut si amputata sit sibi manus. ⟨11⟩ Undecima quaestio utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum est ignotum. ⟨12⟩ Duodecima quaestio utrum omnia entia sunt determinata ad maximum. Quomodo est dare maximum et quomodo non. Quod omni longo est aliud longius tam in rectis quam in curvis. Quomodo potentia determinanda est per maximum vel per minimum. ⟨13⟩ Tredecima quaestio utrum entia naturalia sunt determinata ad minimum. ⟨14⟩ Quarta decima quaestio utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis | naturalis principia intrinseca sunt contraria.

1 perfecte] manifeste p ‖ solam mathematicam quod] mathematicam solam quia P ‖ mathematicae] metaphysicae p 3 sexta quaestio] om. P ‖ sunt eadem] inv. P 4 vocatur naturae] praem. etiam p : naturae etiam vocetur P 5 quaestio] om. P 7 et1] om. p ‖ intelligitur] intelligatur p 8 universaliter magis] inv. P ‖ minus universaliter] inv. p 9 et] add. etiam p 10 quaestio] om. P 12 quaestio] om. P 13 quaestio] om. P 14 additum est sibi] est additum sibi P : sibi est additum p ‖ aliquid] om. C ‖ est2] om. P 15 etiam posito] inv. p ‖ ab … sit] ab eo est aliqua pars P : aliqua eius pars sit p 16 sit] est p 17 quaestio] om. P 18 ignotum] add. quod nihil etiam est ignotum P : add. quod nihil est tibi ignotum p 19 quaestio] om. P ‖ omnia entia sunt] omnia entia naturalia sunt P : entia naturalia sint p 20 quod] add. in P : quomodo p 21 aliud] aliquid Pp 21–22 determinanda est] est determinata P 22 vel per] et per P : vel p 23–24 tredecima … minimum] om. (hom.) P 23 sunt determinata] determinabilia sunt C 25 quarta decima quaestio] tertia decima P ‖ naturalis] om. Pp

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⟨15⟩ Quinta decima quaestio utrum necesse est omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito. Utrum possibile est ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Utrum aliquid potest fieri ex non ente vel ex nihilo. Quomodo per inductionem imperfectam sciuntur principia in scientia naturali. ⟨16⟩ Decima sexta quaestio utrum sunt tria principia rerum naturalium, non plura neque pauciora. ⟨17⟩ Decima septima quaestio utrum generatio substantialis sit materia, forma vel totum compositum vel accidens eis superadditum. ⟨18⟩ Decima octava quaestio utrum generare est generans vel generatio vel quid aliud. De complexe significabilibus. Unde ex parte rei propositiones dicantur verae vel falsae. Quod nulla propositio mentalis significat falsum. Quod istarum propositionum ‘Deus est’ et ‘Deus non est’ neutra significat plus vel aliud quam alia extra animam nostram. ⟨19⟩ Decima nona quaestio utrum illud quod in generatione substantiali generatur est materia, forma vel compositum. ⟨20⟩ Vicesima quaestio utrum prima materia sit ens. Quid debeamus intelligere per ‘substantiam per se subsistentem’. Quomodo debeat intelligi quod materia prima nec est quid nec quale nec quantum. ⟨21⟩ Vicesima prima quaestio utrum forma, antequam generetur, habeat aliquod esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia. ⟨22⟩ Vicesima secunda quaestio utrum materia prima est potentia ad formam generandam. De diversis modis capiendi ‘potentiam’. ⟨23⟩ Vicesima tertia quaestio utrum privatio est materia privata. Diversae expositiones huius nominis ‘privatio’. ⟨24⟩ Vicesima quarta quaestio et ultima utrum materia prima appetit formam. Quod appetitus materiae est idem quod materia. Quomodo privatio

1 quinta decima quaestio] quarta decima P 2 est … aliquid] sit aliquid ex nihilo p 5 decima sexta quaestio] quinta decima P ‖ naturalium] add. et Pp 7–8 decima septima … superadditum] om. P ‖ sit materia forma] est forma materia P 8 totum] om. p ‖ eis] ex C 9 decima octava quaestio] sexta decima P 10 unde ex] utrum a P 11 dicantur] dicuntur P ‖ vel] aut Pp ‖ quod] quia p 12 et] om. P 13 aliud] om. P 14 decima nona quaestio] septima decima P ‖ illud] om. P 15 materia] post forma p : add. vel P 16 vicesima quaestio] octava decima P ‖ prima materia sit] prima materia est P : materia prima est p ‖ debeamus] debemus P 17 subsistentem] existentem p 18 prima] om. Pp 19 vicesima prima quaestio] nona decima P ‖ generetur] generatur P 20 aliquod] aliquid C 21 vicesima secunda quaestio] vicesima P ‖ prima] om. P 22 capiendi potentiam] om. P 23 vicesima tertia quaestio] vicesima prima P 25 vicesima … ultima] vicesima secunda P : vicesima quarta quaestio p ‖ prima appetit] appetit p : appetat P

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dicitur causa appetitus, cum sit idem quod materia. Distinctiones appetituum. Quomodo secundum proportionem adinventam in nobis illa praedicata ‘appetitus’, ‘intentio’ etc. attribuuntur aliis. Ad quid valeat, cum res sit eadem, sibi attribuere tot praedicata vel nomina distincta secundum rationem. 1 sit … materia] sint idem P 2 in] om. P 3 appetitus … aliis] attribuuntur aliis scilicet appetitus intentio etc. P : appetitus attribuuntur aliis p ‖ valeat] valeant p 3–4 res … attribuere] sit eadem res attribuere sibi Pp

⟨i.1⟩

⟨Utrum scientia naturalis sit scientia de omnibus rebus⟩ Circa principium primi libri Physicorum quaeritur primo quaestio talis, utrum scientia naturalis sit scientia de omnibus rebus.

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⟨1⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non quia: nulla scientia est de casualibus et fortuitis, ut habetur secundo huius. Item nulla scientia est de entibus per | accidens, ut habetur sexto Metaphysicae. Etiam nulla scientia est nisi de veris et necessariis et universalibus, ut habetur primo Posteriorum et sexto Ethicorum. | Et cum multa sunt casualia et fortuita, multa sunt entia per accidens, multa sunt falsa et singularia et non necessaria, igitur nec scientia naturalis nec aliqua alia scientia est de omnibus rebus. ⟨2⟩ Secundo ad idem. Si esset aliqua scientia de omnibus rebus, ipsa esset aeque communis sicut metaphysica, quod est contra Aristotelem prooemio Metaphysicae et quarto et sexto. Item sequeretur quod aliae scientiae super|fluerent, cum ipsa esset de omnibus rebus; consequens est absurdum; igitur etc. Nec valet dicere quod ipsa est de omnibus rebus, sed non de omnibus modis, quoniam illi modi sunt aliquae res; ideo si ipsa esset de omnibus rebus, ipsa esset de omnibus modis.

4 circa … talis] circa principium primi libri physicorum primo quaeritur p : circa librum physicorum primo quaeritur G : quaeritur primo igitur P 5 sit] est GP 6 et arguitur primo] arguitur primo P : arguitur G 7 ut] quod G ‖ item] om. P 8 ut] quod G ‖ etiam] om. P 9 et2] add. de G ‖ ut] quod G ‖ posteriorum] physicorum p 10 et cum] et tamen P : cum G ‖ sunt1] sint G ‖ et fortuita] inv. p 11 sunt] sup. lin. C : om. p ‖ nec] nulla P 12 scientia] om. GP 13 ad idem] praem. principaliter arguitur G : om. P ‖ aliqua scientia] om. P 14 sicut metaphysica] metaphysicae P ‖ aristotelem] add. in Pp 15 metaphysicae … sexto] add. metaphysicae G : metaphysicae et libro sexto metaphysicae p : quarti et sexti metaphysicae P ‖ sequeretur] sequitur G 16–17 consequens … etc.] consequens est absurdum p : om. P 17 valet] debet P ‖ sed] et p ‖ de2] sup. lin. C : om. P 18 quoniam] quia p ‖ si ipsa esset] cum est p 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a18–21 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 2, 1026b3–4; cf. AA, 1: 151 9–10 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 18, 81b6; 33, 88b31–32; cf. AA, 35: 95; cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 3, 1139b20–21, 23; cf. AA, 12: 109 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 1, 982a20–b10; IV, 1, 1003a22–26; VI, 1, 1025b1–17

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⟨3⟩ Tertio scientia naturalis nihil intromittit se de multis conclusionibus in geometria vel arithmetica probatis, ut quod triangulus habet tres etc. ⟨4⟩ Et Aristoteles dicit secundo huius quod moventia non mota non amplius sunt physicae considerationis. 5

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Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Non de pluribus intromittit se arithmetica quam physica; et tamen arithmetica intromittit se de omnibus rebus, quia considerat communiter istos terminos numerales ‘unum’, ‘duo’, ‘tria’ etc., qui supponunt pro omnibus rebus. ⟨2⟩ Item scientia naturalis considerat istos terminos ‘mobile’, ‘immobile’, ‘corruptibile’, ‘incorruptibile’, qui supponunt pro omnibus rebus, et format ex eis propositiones et conclusiones quas demonstrat. Et hoc est considerare de omnibus rebus. Notandum est faciliter quod scientia proprie dicta, quae vocatur demonstrativa, est habitus conclusionis per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisitus. Ad demonstrationem autem plura concurrunt, scilicet praemissae, conclusio, termini ex quibus constituuntur praemissae et conclusiones, et etiam res significatae per illos terminos. Et de illis omnibus dicimur habere scientiam, licet non eodem modo, sed aequivoce, scilicet secundum diversas rationes, attributas tamen ad unam a qua nomen primo impositum est, procedunt. Nam proprie scientia demonstrativa dicitur esse de conclusione quae est demonstrata. Secundo etiam dicitur esse de praemissis scientia, quia per eas conclusio demonstrative scita est. Tertio vero dicitur esse

1 nihil] add. se p 2 tres] add. angulos Pp 3 dicit secundo huius] in secundo huius dicit P : etiam dicit in secundo huius G ‖ quod moventia] moventia autem G 4 sunt] sup. lin. C : ante amplius Pp 5 oppositum] rep. C : praem. in p ‖ quia] quod G 6 et tamen] sed P 8 tria etc.] tres P 11 format] add. in marg. aristoteles P 13 rebus] om. P 14 est faciliter] om. P 15 conclusionis] om. GPp ‖ demonstrationes] de omnes P 17 conclusio] et conclusio et p 17–18 conclusiones] conclusio GP 18 etiam] post res G : om. Pp ‖ et2] om. P ‖ illis omnibus] inv. p : his omnibus G : omnibus his P 18–19 dicimur habere scientiam] dicimus habere scientiam P : dicitur haberi scientia p 20 rationes] add. sup. lin. intentiones C : intentiones P : intensiones G 20–21 tamen … procedunt] tamen ad unam a qua nomen impositum primo est procedunt G : tamen ad unam a qua nomen primo impositum est P : procedunt ad unam a qua nomen primo impositum est p 22 est demonstrata] demonstratur p ‖ etiam dicitur] inv. G 22–23 scientia] ante dicitur (22) P 23 eas] ipsas P ‖ demonstrative] demonstrata P 3 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 7, 198a27–28; cf. AA, 2: 87

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scientia de terminis significativis, propterea quod ex eis constituta est conclusio demonstrative scita vel etiam praemissae per quas illa scitur. Quarto modo autem scientia demonstrativa dicitur esse de aliis rebus, quae non sunt propositiones neque termini significativi, quia illae significantur per terminos ex quibus conclusio sive praemissae demonstrationis | constituuntur. Sic enim et non aliter dicimus habere scientiam de caelo et de astris et de gravibus et de levibus, de plantis et de animalibus, de Deo et de intelligentiis, de sanitate et aegritudine, de virtutibus et vitiis et sic de | multis aliis. Immo manifestum est quod non quaerimus habere scientiam tribus primis modis nisi propter habere scientiam illo quarto modo. Non enim curaret artifex de propositionibus et terminis, nisi per hoc crederet habere scientiam de rebus circa quas intendit agere et sibi utilia procurare. Tunc igitur ponendae sunt conclusiones. Prima est quod nulla scientia est de omnibus conclusionibus tamquam demonstrativa earum. Nec enim physica nec metaphysica nec aliqua alia scientia vel ars intromittit se de demonstrando hanc conclusionem quod omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis nisi geometria. Eodem modo ponitur et apparet secunda conclusio | quod nulla scientia est de omnibus praemissis tamquam demonstrans ex eis. Tertia conclusio quod quarto modo scientia naturalis considerat vel est de omnibus rebus, scilicet tamquam de significatis per terminos conclusionum et praemissarum quarum et per quas ipsa est demonstrativa, quia sicut prius arguebatur, isti termini ‘generabile’, ‘ingenerabile’, ‘corruptibile’ et ‘incorruptibile’, ‘mobile’ et ‘immobile’ significant omnes res et supponunt pro omnibus rebus; et tamen omnes terminos illos considerat scientia naturalis et ex eis format multas propositiones quas et per quas demonstrat. Non enim 1 scientia] sup. lin. C : om. GP ‖ propterea quod] quia P 2 demonstrative] demonstrativa p 3 modo autem] modo p : autem GP ‖ dicitur] ante scientia G 4 illae] illi G 5–6 constituuntur] sciuntur p 6 enim] etiam Cp ‖ dicimus] add. nos Gp ‖ de2] om. GPp ‖ astris] astro C ‖ et3] om. GPp 7 de1] om. GPp ‖ de3] om. GPp ‖ de4] et P ‖ de5] om. GPp 8 aegritudine] aegritudinibus P ‖ multis] post aliis p : om. P 9 scientiam] ante habere P : add. de p 10 propter] per G ‖ illo] om. P 11 per hoc] per eas P : propter hoc Cp 13 tunc] nunc P 14 prima] praem. quarum G : add. conclusio P 15 enim] corr. in marg. ex etiam C : etiam p ‖ metaphysica] mathematica p 16 vel] nec G ‖ de] in marg. C : om. G ‖ de demonstrando hanc] ad demonstrandum illam P 16–17 quod omnis] quod P : om. p 17 aequales duobus rectis] aequales duobus etc. G : etc. p 18 modo] om. G ‖ et apparet] om. P 20 conclusio] add. est P ‖ considerat vel] om. GP 23 isti termini] om. Pp ‖ generabile] add. et P ‖ et] om. Gp 24 et1] om. p 25 omnes] sup. lin. C : om. Pp ‖ terminos illos] inv. GP 26 multas propositiones] inv. P ‖ quas et] om. CG ‖ non] nulli p

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est dubium quod ipsa considerat istos terminos ‘generabile’, ‘corruptibile’, ‘mobile’, ‘mu|tabile’; sed oppositorum est eadem scientia demonstrativa; igitur sequitur quod considerat illos terminos ‘ingenerabile’, ‘incorruptibile’, ‘immobile’ et ‘immutabile’. Quarta conclusio est quod ex omnibus terminis metaphysica format propositiones quas et per quas demonstrat. Non enim geometra, sed metaphysicus habet quaerere et scire quae res est triangulus, quid est habere tres angulos, utrum sit idem triangulus et habere tres angulos, quae res est homo et humanitas et esse hominem, utrum illa sunt idem inter se vel diversa et sic de aliis. Nullus enim artifex considerat de quidditate simpliciter nisi metaphysicus, sicut debet videri sexto Metaphysicae. Quinta conclusio est quod non ex omnibus terminis format physica vel mathematica propositiones quas vel per quas demonstrat. Geometra enim nullam propositionem format ex istis terminis ‘Deus’, ‘animal’, ‘lapis’, ‘homo’ etc., nec physicus format aliquas propositiones | ex istis terminis ‘substantia’, ‘essentia’, ‘unitas’, ‘identitas’, ‘Deus’ etc. nisi supponens eas a metaphysica. Et per quartam conclusionem apparet quare metaphysica dicitur scientia communis, et per quintam conclusionem apparet quare omnes aliae scientiae vocantur speciales. Sed tamen de quarta conclusione est dubitatio propter terminos singulares. Dicitur enim: de singularibus non est scientia. Quomodo igitur metaphysica formabit ex terminis singularibus propositiones scibiles et demonstrabiles? Hoc videtur impossibile. Respondetur quod nulla scientia habet scire vel demonstrative inquirere utrum Socrates est vel non est. Sed tamen ex suppositione quod hoc nomen

1 quod ipsa] quin ipsa p : quod P ‖ generabile] add. et P 2 mobile] add. et GP ‖ sed] add. cum p ‖ est eadem] inv. Pp ‖ demonstrativa] considerativa GP 3 sequitur quod] etiam ipsa P ‖ ingenerabile] add. et P 4 immobile] praem. et GP : om. p 5 est] om. P 6 per] ante quas1 P ‖ geometra] geometer G 7 quaerere et scire] scire et quaerere P ‖ triangulus] add. et p 8 angulos1] add. et P ‖ angulos2] add. et P 9 hominem] add. et P ‖ sunt] sint p 10 enim] om. G 12 est quod] est ista quod P : om. p 13 mathematica] add. sup. lin. seu geometria C 13–14 geometra enim nullam] non enim geometer aliquam P 14 animal lapis homo] anima homo lapis P : lapis vel animal p 16 unitas] post identitas p : om. P ‖ supponens eas] supponeret eas P : sumendo eos p 17 et per quartam] per quartam autem G ‖ dicitur] vocatur GP 19 vocantur] add. scientiae P 20 dubitatio] dubium P 21 enim] add. quod Gp ‖ quomodo] del. et add. in marg. alias communis P 22 formabit] format G 23 hoc] add. enim p 25 est2] add. utrum socrates est homo vel animal GPp 11 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VI, q. 1 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 32vb–33va)

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‘Socrates’ est terminus singularis significans singulariter aliquem hominem qui est, metaphysicus habet quaerere et demonstrative scire utrum est eadem forma qua Socrates est Socrates et qua Socrates est homo vel animal, vel etiam utrum in Socrate sit idem Socrateitas et humanitas vel etiam Socrates et Socrateitas. Sic enim ex condicione vel suppositione est bene scientia de singularibus, quia sic ex terminis singularibus formantur bene propositiones necessariae et verae, scibiles et demonstrabiles. Et hoc debet videri magis in septimo Metaphysicae. Quomodo autem debeant distingui physica, metaphysica et mathematica, | debet videri sexto Metaphysicae. Ideo determinatio praesentis quaestionis non est per physicam, sed per metaphysicam. Saepe enim consuetum est aliquas quaestiones metaphysicales tractare in scientiis specialibus propter hoc quod illae scientiae speciales habent a metaphysica praesupponere determinationes illarum quaestionum, | sicut etiam in arte medicinali medici solent tractare valde multas conclusiones speculativas per scientiam naturalem propter hoc quod medici indigent illas praesupponere a scientia superiori, et cum non inveniant eas tractatas in libris scientiae superioris, ascendunt ad tractandum eas induendo sibi habitum scientiae superioris. Ad rationes principales. ⟨1⟩ Dicendum est quod, quando dicunt philosophi nullam esse scientiam nisi de veris et necessariis, ipsi intendunt de his quae sciuntur tamquam

1 singulariter] simpliciter C 2 metaphysicus] add. enim p ‖ demonstrative scire] inv. p ‖ est2] post eadem (3) P : in G 4 vel etiam1] etiam G : om. Pp ‖ vel1 … humanitas] vel etiam utrum in sor†…† sorteitas et hu†…† in marg. C ‖ sit idem] est idem P : est eadem p ‖ et] vel p 4–5 etiam socrates] inv. G 5 socrateitas] add. sint idem p ‖ ex] consimili G ‖ scientia] ante est P 6 terminis] om. P 8 magis] ante debet (7) p 9 debeant] debeat P ‖ physica] add. et Gp 9–10 metaphysica et mathematica] mathematica et metaphysica P 10 videri] add. in P ‖ ideo] immo etiam GP : immo p 10–11 praesentis quaestionis] inv. p 11 per2] om. Gp 12 quaestiones] conclusiones P 13 habent] habet G 13–14 praesupponere] supponere GP 14 etiam] om. G 15 medici] post tractare G ‖ conclusiones speculativas] conclusiones specificas G : quaestiones speculativas P 16 hoc] om. P ‖ illas] haec C : hoc p ‖ praesupponere] supponere GP 17 cum non inveniant] quomodo inveniunt p ‖ libris] libro C 18 induendo] inducendo p 19 ad rationes principales] tunc respondendum est ad rationes P 20 dicendum est quod] praem. ad primam G : ad primam P ‖ philosophi] physici GPp ‖ esse scientiam] inv. G 21 veris et necessariis] necessariis et veris G 8 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, q. 20 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 54ra–54va) 10 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VI, qq. 1–2 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 32vb–54rb)

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conclusiones demonstrabiles vel demonstratae. Non enim sunt conclusiones demonstrabiles vel demonstratae, nisi sint verae et necessariae et non falsae neque contingentes loquendo de necessitate et contingentia eodem modo quo haec nomina solent appropriate attribui propositionibus. Sic enim intendunt philosophi, quando dicunt quod non est scientia de entibus per accidens, sed solum de entibus per se. Ipsi | enim per ‘entia per accidens’ in sic loquendo non intendunt nisi propositiones contingentes, per ‘entia per se’ propositiones necessarias. Quando enim dicitur quod de casualibus | non est scientia, hoc debet intelligi quantum ad propositiones raro et contingenter veras, propter hoc quod earum veritas dependet ex actione casus vel fortunae raro contingente. Sed tamen haec omnia possunt significari per terminos multos ex quibus formantur propositiones verae et necessariae, scibiles et demonstrabiles. Et sic tractatur de omnibus istis in scientiis demonstrativis. Quando etiam dicitur quod non est scientia de singularibus, intelligendum est quod propositiones singulares non sunt demonstrabiles. Et quare hoc sit et quomodo sit verum, debet videri septimo Metaphysicae. Res tamen singulares singulariter existentes sciuntur tamquam significatae per terminos. Termini enim universales significant res singulariter existentes. ⟨2–4⟩ Omnes aliae rationes procedunt manifeste secundum conclusiones superius positas praeter ultimam, quae erat auctoritas Aristotelis de moventibus non motis. Sed de illa auctoritate dicetur in principio octavi libri. Et sic est finis primae quaestionis primi libri Physicorum. 1 demonstratae] determinatione sed add. in marg. alias demonstratae P 2 vel demonstratae] om. GP ‖ et2] om. GP 3 neque] et P ‖ eodem] eo GP 5 philosophi] physici G 6 de entibus] om. P ‖ per entia] de entibus P 7 in] ut P : om. G ‖ contingentes] add. et GPp 9 quando enim] et quando p : item eodem modo G ‖ casualibus] add. et fortuitis Pp ‖ hoc] om. p 12 omnia] corr. ex nomina C : nomina p ‖ significari] considerari G 13 et3] ideo GP 14 tractatur] post istis GP 15–16 intelligendum est] intelligitur P 16–17 et … quomodo] et quomodo et quare hoc P : quod quomodo et quare p 17 videri] add. in P 18 singulares] praem. omnes p : omnes GP ‖ significatae] om. p 18–19 terminos] add. etc. P 19 universales] corr. in marg. in singulares C 20 omnes aliae] iterum aliae G : aliae autem P 21 superius] prius p ‖ aristotelis] add. quae erat p 22 libri] om. P 23 et … physicorum] et sic finitur quaestio P : etc. p : om. G 17 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, q. 20 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 54ra–54va) 22 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VIII, q. 1 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 109ra–vb)

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⟨Utrum totalis scientiae naturalis debeat assignari subiectum unum proprium⟩

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Secundo quaeritur utrum totalis scientiae naturalis debeat assignari subiectum unum proprium.

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Et voco totalem scientiam naturalem habitum congregatum ex omnibus conclusionibus demonstratis in libris naturalibus per demonstrationes naturales, ita quod illas reseco quae in dictis libris inveniuntur demonstrari per habitum superiorem, scilicet per metaphysicam. De illis enim non sit cura ad praesens, quia non sunt de integritate scientiae naturalis.

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Igitur arguitur quod in totali scientia naturali non debeat assignari subiectum unum proprium quia: ⟨1⟩ Quaererem ubi esset illud, an in libro Physicorum vel in libro De generatione, vel in libro tuo vel in meo, an in intellectu tuo vel in meo; et non potest bene responderi; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Secundo illud non est subiectum, cui scientia naturalis inhaeret, scilicet anima, quia illud non est proprium scientiae naturali, sed commune omni scientiae. Nec esset subiectum de quo dicitur praedicatum in conclusione, quia nullum est unum in omnibus conclusionibus scientiae naturalis, sed sunt multa et diversa in diversis conclusionibus. Nec esset subiectum dictum respectu passionis, | quia in scientia naturali sunt valde multae et

4 secundo quaeritur] inv. P : consequenter quaeritur secundo p : quaeritur consequenter secundo G 5 unum] ante subiectum (4–5) p : add. et G 6 naturalem] om. P 7 demonstratis] determinatis sed add. in marg. vel demonstratis C 8 reseco] reputo sed add. in marg. alias reseco P : intendo exludere p 10 quia] add. illae GP 11 igitur arguitur] inv. GPp ‖ debeat] debet P 11–12 subiectum unum] inv. GPp 13 quaererem] quaereretur p ‖ esset illud] est illud scilicet P ‖ vel] an P 14 vel1] an Pp : etiam an G ‖ tuo1 … meo1] tuo vel meo GP : meo vel in libro tuo p ‖ an in] vel in p : an G ‖ tuo2 … meo2] tuo vel meo GP : meo vel in tuo p 15 potest] posset GP ‖ igitur etc.] om. P 16 secundo] item p ‖ est] esset Gp ‖ inhaeret] inhaereret p 17 illud] add. subiectum GPp 19 unum] tale sed add. sup. lin. unum C 19–20 scientiae … conclusionibus] om. (hom.) P 21 dictum] determinatum p ‖ multae] om. G

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_006

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diversae passiones habentes diversa subiecta propria et non est aliquod unum | sibi proprium. Nec illud subiectum esset aliqua res extra animam, quia qua ratione esset ille homo, eadem ratione esset ille lapis vel illa planta. Et si nullum praedictorum sit subiectum proprium scientiae | naturalis, non apparet quid aliud potest poni subiectum eius proprium. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem primo Posteriorum dicentem quod una scientia est quae est unius generis primi, partes et passiones eius considerans. Et per illud ‘genus primum’ expositores intendunt subiectum proprium illius scientiae, a cuius unitate totalis scientia dicitur una et a quorum diversitate scientiae dicuntur diversae. Et Aristoteles manifeste in eodem primo Posteriorum illud genus primum vocat subiectum, cum dicit quod non contingit ex aliquo genere descendentem demonstrare. Et exponit quid per ‘genus’ intendit dicens quod tria sunt in demonstrationibus, scilicet passiones, quae in conclusionibus demonstrantur; et dignitates, ex quibus fit demonstratio; tertium autem est genus subiectum, cuius passiones et per se accidentia ostendit demonstratio. Et addit quod dignitates possibile est easdem esse diversarum scientiarum, sed genus subiectum alterum est. Nec contingit ex uno genere in aliud demonstrantem descendere, nisi unum genus sit sub alio genere, sicut est de scientia subal|ternata ad subalternantem, sicut de musica ad arithmeticam. Hanc totam sententiam plane declarat Aristoteles in primo Posteriorum.

1 diversae] add. conclusiones et p ‖ et non] nec p ‖ est aliquod] in marg. C : aliquod GPp 2 illud] om. G ‖ esset] debet esse G 3 ille1] om. p ‖ ille2] om. p ‖ illa] om. p 4 nullum] nomen C 5 potest] posset GP 6 oppositum] praem. in p 7 eius] illius p 8 expositores] add. antiqui GP 9 totalis scientia] inv. GP ‖ a2] om. G 10–11 manifeste … vocat] in eodem primo posteriorum manifeste illud genus primum vocat p : in eodem primo posteriorum vocat manifeste illud genus primum P 11 cum] ideo p 12 ex aliquo] de alio P ‖ descendentem] corr. in marg. ex demonstrantem C : om. p ‖ demonstrare] add. in marg. alias demonstrantem descendere C ‖ exponit quid] exponitur quod P 13–14 passiones] passionibus G 14 conclusionibus] generibus G 15 est] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 17 est] om. P ‖ nec] neque P 18 ex] de GPp ‖ aliud] add. genus GPp ‖ demonstrantem] demonstrative Pp 19 genus sit] inv. p 20 sicut] ut GPp 20–21 sententiam … aristoteles] scientiam demonstrat aristoteles plane G ‖ declarat] add. sup. lin. vel determinat C 21 in] om. GPp 6 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 28, 87a38 10–21 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 75a38–b6, 75b14–17

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Et idem etiam intendit Aristoteles quarto Metaphysicae dicens quod, sicut omnis sensus unus est unius generis sensibilis, sic scientia una est unius generis scibilis, ut grammatica una ens omnes speculatur voces. Dicit Aristoteles etiam ibidem quod illud genus subiectum non oportet semper esse unum secundum univocationem, sed sufficit bene quod sit unum secundum analogiam et secundum attributionem. Ideo ipse concludit unam esse scientiam quae speculatur ens inquantum ens et quae huic insunt secundum se, scilicet quia ens est unum genus commune omnibus, licet non univocum, sed analogum. Et sic Aristoteles toti metaphysicae assignat subiectum proprium et adaequatum, scilicet hoc genus ens. Propter cuius subiecti communitatem dicit metaphysicam esse de omnibus considerativam.

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Ista quaestio non est proprie physica, sed logicalis vel metaphysicalis, quia communis est omni scientiae. Sic enim quaeri potest de geometria vel medicina vel de qualibet alia scientia. Sed oportet auditores | huius scientiae talia scire, quia statim quaeritur de unaquaque scientia quid sit subiectum proprium in ea, a cuius unitate scientia illa habet unitatem, cum sit ex multis diversis congregata.

1 aristoteles] add. in Pp ‖ dicens quod] dicens G : quod p 2 unus] om. P ‖ sic] add. et GP : add. etiam p ‖ est2] om. P 3 ens] existens G : del. C 3–4 dicit aristoteles etiam] et dicit aristoteles GPp 4 ibidem] idem G ‖ illud] om. P ‖ semper esse] inv. G 5 univocationem] corr. sup. lin. ex unionem C : unionem GPp ‖ bene] om. p 6 secundum] om. GPp 7 quae huic] quae C : huic G 9 sic] om. p ‖ metaphysicae assignat] metaphysici significat G 9–10 subiectum proprium] subiectum sibi proprium p : unum subiectum P 10 propter cuius subiecti] semper cuius subiectum G 11 metaphysicam … considerativam] metaphysicam de omnibus esse considerativam Pp : metaphysica est de omnibus considerativa G 12 proprie physica] proprie physicalis p : physica P ‖ metaphysicalis] metaphysica GP 13 sic] sicut G ‖ vel] de G : om. P 14 vel de qualibet] vel de quacumque p : et qualibet GP 15 statim] add. et saepe P ‖ unaquaque] qualibet p ‖ sit] est p 16 in ea] om. G ‖ illa] om. p 17 diversis] om. p ‖ congregata] add. sup. lin. seu composita C 1 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 2, 1003b19–21 4 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 2, 1003a33–35 6 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 2, 1005a14–15 11 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 2, 1005a15–17

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Pono igitur conclusiones. Prima est quod in omni scientia sic totali, scilicet aggregata ex pluribus conclusionibus et processibus, oportet assignare aliquod unum ex cuius unitate totalis scientia dicatur una scientia. Verbi gratia oportet aliquod unum assignare ex cuius unitate totalis physica dicitur una scientia distincta contra metaphysicam et mathematicam, et aliud unum assignare ex cuius unitate totalis | metaphysica vocatur esse una scientia distincta contra physicam et mathematicam, et sic de aliis. Ista conclusio patet, quia numquam multa quorum quodlibet est unum aliquod in actu dicuntur unum nisi propter aggregationem eorum in eodem loco vel subiecto (ut quod multi lapides dicuntur unus cumulus et multi homines unus populus) vel propter unam continuationem vel colligationem eorum (ut quod multa ligna vel stramina dicuntur unum onus) vel propter ordinem vel attributionem omnium illorum ad unum principium illorum ad quod omnia alia attribuuntur (ut quod exercitus dicitur unus propter attributionem omnium ad unum principem) vel aliquo alio modo, ita quod omnino necesse est assignare causam et rationem quare illa dicuntur unum sic inter se et non cum aliis. Sed in totali scientia naturali multae et diversae sunt conclusiones, et cuiuslibet scientiae partialis est unus habitus scien|tificus in actu distinctus ab habitu scientifico alterius. Et tamen omnes illi habitus partiales dicuntur esse una scientia totalis naturalis distincta contra mathematicam et metaphysicam. Igitur necesse est assignare causam et rationem propter quam illa dicantur sic esse una scientia.

1 igitur] add. aliquas GPp 2 sic totali] sic totale P : totali p ‖ scilicet aggregata] scilicet (sup. lin.) aggregata C : scilicet aggregatum P : congregata p ‖ pluribus] corr. ex physicis C : physicis P 3 et] om. G ‖ assignare] assignari p 4 totalis] talis P ‖ dicatur] dicitur P ‖ scientia2] om. p 4–5 aliquod unum assignare] aliquod assignare unum G : assignari aliquod unum p 6 assignare] assignari p 7 totalis] add. mathematica dicatur una scientia distincta contra physicam et metaphysicam et aliud unum assignare ex cuius unitate totalis P ‖ vocatur esse] vocatur p : dicatur GP 7–8 physicam et mathematicam] mathematicam et physicam P 9–10 unum aliquod] inv. GP 10 propter] per G ‖ eorum] earum p 11 vel] add. in eodem p ‖ ut quod] quod patet quia p 12 homines] add. dicuntur p ‖ vel1] om. p ‖ propter unam] propter P : per G 13 ut quod] ut C : et p ‖ dicuntur unum] faciunt unus P 14 vel] seu GP : add. ordinationem seu p ‖ omnium illorum] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ principium] praem. primum G : primum P 15 quod2] add. est P 17 necesse] necessarium G ‖ et] vel P 17–18 unum sic] inv. GP 18 non] om. G 18–19 et diversae sunt] sunt diversae GP 20 alterius] add. scientiae p 21 naturalis] ante totalis GP : om. p 22 mathematicam et metaphysicam] metaphysicam et mathematicam GP : metaphysicam p ‖ causam et] om. P 23 quam] quid p ‖ dicantur sic esse] sic dicantur P : dicantur esse p

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Nunc igitur inquirendum est de causa huiusmodi unitatis. Et primo manifestum est quod causa huius non est ex eo quod illae conclusiones sunt ad invicem continuae vel colligatae, quia hoc non habet locum nisi in corporeis. Nec etiam ex eo quod sunt congregatae in uno subiecto, scilicet in eodem intellectu, quia sic non esset physica distincta a mathematica et a metaphysica. Igitur necesse est dicere quod omnis talis totalis scientia dicitur una scientia ab unitate alicuius considerati in ea propter attributionem omnium aliorum in ea consideratorum ad ipsum secundum illas rationes secundum quas in ea considerantur. Et hoc, | quodcumque ipsum fuerit, vocamus subiectum | proprium in illa assignandum. Ideo concluditur secunda conclusio principalis, scilicet quod in totali scientia naturali, immo in omni scientia totali, assignandum est unum subiectum proprium. Et hoc iterum confirmatur quia: si accipias in mathematica duas conclusiones, quae sunt a et b, et in metaphysica duas, quae sunt c et d, et quod omnes illae conclusiones sint diversorum subiectorum et diversorum praedicatorum et per diversa media demonstratae, tunc tu non poteris dicere rationem quare a et b sunt unius scientiae et quod etiam c et d sunt unius scientiae et quod tamen a et c non sunt unius scientiae, nisi per hoc quod a et b reducuntur vel attribuuntur ad aliquod unum ad quod c et d non reducuntur, et quod etiam c et d reducuntur ad aliquod unum ad quod a et b non reducuntur. Et si tu hoc non concedas, tu non potes rationabiliter assignare de qua scientia debet esse aliqua conclusio tibi proposita, quod est inconveniens.

1 nunc] praem. etiam G ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 2 causa huius] inv. P : huiusmodi causa Cp 3 vel] et G 3–4 corporeis] add. sup. lin. alias coreis (?) C : corporibus p 4 congregatae] praem. simul P : simul colligatae G ‖ uno] eodem GP 5–6 a1… metaphysica] a mathematica et metaphysica P : contra metaphysicam et contra mathematicam G 6 igitur] ideo G ‖ omnis talis totalis] omnino totalis talis P 7 scientia ab] ex p ‖ considerati] consideratorum GP 8 consideratorum] add. sup. lin. alias scitorum P 9 considerantur] consideratur G ‖ ipsum] om. p 10 illa assignandum] ipsa considerandum P 11 scilicet] om. G 12 omni scientia] add. sed del. tali C : omni tali scientia P : tali scientia G 14 hoc] om. G 15 sunt1] sint p ‖ in] om. G ‖ sunt2] sint p ‖ c et d] d et c P 16 et diversorum] et p : om. G 17 tu] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ non] enim G 18 etiam] om. P ‖ sunt2] sint p 19 quod1] om. G ‖ et1 … scientiae2] nisi propter hoc (add. sup. lin. et) quod (add. sup. lin. tamen) a et (add. sed del. b) c non sunt unius scientiae sed del. C 20 reducuntur vel attribuuntur] attribuuntur et reducuntur p ‖ aliquod] om. p 20–21 reducuntur] attribuuntur p 21 quod etiam] om. p ‖ reducuntur] attribuuntur p ‖ aliquod] aliud Gp 22 hoc non concedas] non hoc concedas G : hoc concedis p ‖ potes] poteris P 23 debet] debeat GP

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Tertia conclusio quod tale subiectum in scientia naturali assignandum non est subiectum cui ipsa scientia inhaeret, scilicet anima, quia | illud subiectum est commune et indifferens omni scientiae; ideo per tale subiectum non potest assignari distinctio huius libri vel huius scientiae ad illam, ut physicae ad mathematicam. Quarta conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum non est aliqua res praeter animam existens, quia oporteret assignare an illud subiectum esset homo vel equus, aer vel aqua, caelum vel intelligentiae. Et si diceretur quod illa res est natura, tamen oporteret dicere an illa esset materia vel forma, an natura hominis vel plantae, ignis aut caeli; quod non potest convenienter dici. Et iterum sic non posset assignari differentia physicae ad metaphysicam, cum utraque de omnibus rebus consideret, prout scientias dicimus esse de rebus extra, scilicet quae non sunt propositiones neque termini significativi. Quinta conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum non dicitur ex eo quod de ipso dicatur praedicatum in qualibet conclusione illius scientiae, quia nihil est tale, immo sunt diversa saepe in diversis conclusionibus, et quia de tali subiecto primo totalis scientiae dicitur primo Posteriorum quod in omni scientia oportet de subiecto praesupponere quid est vel quia est. Et hoc etiam manifeste habetur in principio sexti Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur: ‘similiter autem, si est aut non est genus circa quod versantur’, puta ipsae scientiae, ‘nihil dicunt’. | Super quod dicit Commentator quod nulla scien-

1 conclusio] add. est GP ‖ tale] totale P ‖ assignandum] post est (2) P 2 ipsa scientia] ipsa scientia (in marg.) C : illa scientia p : ipsa GP 4 potest] possit P : posset G ‖ libri vel huius] om. (hom.) GP ‖ illam] aliam p 5 mathematicam] metaphysicam G : praem. metaphysicam vel ad p 6 quod huiusmodi] quod huius P : huiusmodi p ‖ aliqua] om. p 7 existens] ante praeter (6–7) GPp ‖ assignare] assignari P 8 aer] praem. vel P : aut asinus G ‖ aqua] add. vel P ‖ intelligentiae] intelligentia GP 9 est] esset G ‖ tamen] tunc p ‖ tamen … natura] om. (hom.) G ‖ illa] sup. lin. C : om. Pp ‖ an2] om. P 9–10 natura2 … ignis] forma ignis vel hominis vel plantae p 10 potest] possit G : posset P ‖ et] cum p 11 sic non posset] non possit sic G ‖ metaphysicam] mathematicam G 12 omnibus rebus] corr. sup. lin. ex omni re C : omni re GPp ‖ consideret] considerat p ‖ scientias] scientiam P 14 huiusmodi] huius P 15 in] corr. sup. lin. ex de C : de p ‖ illius] add. sup. lin. unius C 16 nihil] non G ‖ et] add. etiam GP : etiam p 17 subiecto] substantia G ‖ totalis scientiae] inv. GP 18 praesupponere] supponere G : ponere P ‖ vel] et GPp 20 autem] add. nec P : nec G ‖ non] nec p ‖ versantur] versatur G : add. principia p ‖ ipsae] ipsis G 21 dicunt] add. in marg. seu differunt C ‖ super quod] super quo GP : supra quod p ‖ nulla] nisi G 17 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 1, 71a11–16; 10, 76a31–36; cf. AA, 35: 5 19 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1025b15–17 21 Cf. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, VI, comm. 1, f. 144L

2vb P

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3vb p

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tia, neque universalis neque particularis, demonstrat de subiecto suo si est. Sed hoc non est sic verum universaliter de subiecto conclusionis, de quo in ea dicitur praedicatum, quia in secundo Posteriorum ponit Aristoteles unam quaestionem | demonstrative scibilem, quam vocat si est, quae terminatur in demonstrando de subiecto conclusionis hoc praedicatum ‘est’. Quod quomodo possit fieri et debeat, debet videri in illo loco. Sexta conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum non dicitur ex eo quod de ipso debet demonstrari omnis passio quae in illa scientia debet demonstrari de aliquo, quia etiam nullum est tale, sed saepius diversae passiones demonstrari debent de diversis subiectis. Septima conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum dicitur ex eo quod est genus communissimum inter considerata in illa scientia non transcendens metas illius scientiae, et quod se habet per modum subiecti respectu primarum et principalium passionum illius scientiae, et quod nihil in illa scientia consideratur nisi inquantum habet attributionem ad ipsum, quia sic ex eius unitate potest dici totalis scientia una, quamvis sit congregata ex multis et multum diversis, sicut ex unitate principis multa valde diversa, ut milites, famuli, equi, quadrigae et currus, | dicuntur unus exercitus ex eo quod omnia ad principem unum habent attributionem. Tale igitur genus dicitur in aliqua scientia subiectum proprium et adaequatum, non quia expresse contineatur in conclusione qualibet illius scientiae, sed quia in qualibet conclusione aliquid consideratur sub ea ratione secundum quam habet attributionem ad ipsum, scilicet quia vel est pars eius vel passio vel principium vel passio passionis aut partis eius, vel forte quia sibi oppositum vel alicui parti aut passioni | ipsius et sic de multis aliis attributionibus. 1 demonstrat] declarat G 2 est … universaliter] sic est verum universaliter P : est universaliter verum p 3 quia in] quia si P : et in p ‖ ponit] posuit p 4 quaestionem] add. sup. lin. conclusionem C : conclusionem p 5 conclusionis] add. et per p ‖ quod] quia G 6 fieri] post debeat GPp ‖ debet] debeat P 7 huiusmodi] huius P 8 debet1] debeat GP ‖ debet2] debeat P 9 etiam] om. p ‖ est] om. G 11 quod huiusmodi] quod huius P : huiusmodi p ‖ ex] om. p 13–14 primarum et principalium] add. et communissimarum GP : primorum principiorum et communissimarum p 15 sic] tunc p 16 totalis scientia] inv. P ‖ congregata] aggregata p 17 principis] principiis G ‖ multa] add. et p ‖ ut milites] et multiplices P 19 ad … attributionem] habent ad principem unum attributionem GP : habent attributionem ad unum principem p 20 adaequatum] add. vero G 21 conclusione qualibet] inv. GPp 22 aliquid] post consideratur P : aliquod G ‖ ea] illa GPp 22–23 attributionem … scilicet] ad ipsum attributionem p 23 quia vel] inv. GPp 24 passionis] add. eius p ‖ oppositum vel] oppositum aut G : omni aut p ‖ aut2] vel P : om. G 25 multis aliis] inv. Gp 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, II, 1, 89b24–25, 31–34; cf. AA, 35: 98

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Quid autem sit illud genus quod in illa scientia naturali assignandum est tamquam subiectum proprium, dicetur in alia quaestione.

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicendum est quod illud genus est in anima mea quantum ad scientiam meam, et in anima tua quantum ad scientiam tuam. Et non est idem numero in me et in te, sed consimile, sicut etiam non est scientia naturalis eadem in numero in me et in te, sed similis. ⟨2⟩ In positione declaratum est quid sit dicendum de alia ratione. Et sic est finis quaestionis secundae.

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Sequitur tertia. | 1 illa] om. GPp 3 ad] praem. tunc igitur P 5 in anima tua] om. C ‖ scientiam2] om. G ‖ et2] om. C 6 sicut] sic P ‖ etiam] et p 6–7 non … eadem] non est idem G : est scientia naturalis non est eadem P 7 in1] om. Gp ‖ similis] consimilis p 8 in] praem. et p ‖ in … ratione] quid autem dicendum est ad alias rationes satis patet per ea quae dicta sunt P ‖ declaratum] add. in marg. aut determinatum C 9–10 et … tertia] et sic finitur quaestio P : haec de quaestione p : om. G 2 Cf. inf., I, q. 3

3vb C

⟨i.3⟩

⟨Utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis vel quid aliud⟩ Consequenter quaeritur tertio utrum ens mobile sit subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis vel quid aliud. Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Nec hoc ens nec illud et sic de aliis; igitur nullum. ⟨2⟩ Item mobile est passio entis naturalis sicut risibile hominis; igitur ens mobile non debet poni subiectum proprium in hac scientia. Consequentia patet, quia non ratione mobilitatis, quia sic habet rationem non subiecti, sed passionis, ut dictum est. Nec ratione entitatis, quia sic pertinet ad metaphysicam. ⟨3⟩ Tertio ens quiescibile non ponitur ibi subiectum; igitur nec ens mobile. Consequentia patet, quia ita bene natura est per se principium quietis sicut motus, ut patet per suam definitionem; ideo aeque bene scientia naturalis debet considerare ens quiescibile sicut ens mobile. ⟨4⟩ Quarto non debet assignari idem subiectum proprium totius scientiae naturalis et partis eius; sed in parte eius, scilicet in scientia libri Physicorum, non assignatur aliud subiectum proprium quam ens mobile in tota sua communitate; igitur hoc non debet assignari subiectum proprium totalis scientiae naturalis.

4 consequenter] om. P 4–5 proprium totalis] totius p 7 nec1] om. p ‖ ens] in marg. C : om. GPp ‖ aliis] singulis Pp 8 mobile] praem. ens G ‖ entis naturalis] inv. P 9 debet] add. dici seu p 9–10 consequentia patet] om. p 10 patet] add. in marg. quia subiectum et passio communiter distinguuntur contra invicem antecedens patet quia iste terminus mobile connotat motum super hunc terminum ens item si etc. vel hoc esset ratione huius termini ens vel ratione huius termini mobile non ratione huius termini mobile C ‖ habet] habent G 11 ut dictum est] om. p 13 tertio] secundo p ‖ ibi subiectum] inv. G 14 bene] om. GPp 15 bene] om. GPp 16 considerare] considerari G : assignare P 17 quarto] item p ‖ proprium] om. P 18 scientia libri] libro P 19 aliud] aliquod GP ‖ proprium] om. p ‖ tota sua] inv. P 20 subiectum proprium] inv. P ‖ totalis] totius p : om. G

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_007

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⟨5⟩ Item cum tale subiectum dicatur subiectum respectu passionis, ut dicebatur in alia quaestione, illud non debet poni subiectum proprium scientiae naturalis, de quo nulla passio probatur in scientia naturali; sed in ea nulla passio videtur probari vel invenitur probari de illo termino ‘ens mobile’; igitur etc. ⟨6⟩ Sexto ens mobile | non se extendit ad omnia considerata in scientia naturali, quia ibi bene consideratur de immobilibus, ut de primo motore; igitur etc. ⟨7⟩ Septimo Commentator in secundo huius dicit subiectum huius libri esse naturam et principia naturalia; non igitur hoc genus ens mobile. Oppositum dixerunt communiter omnes expositores. Et hoc probatur ratione quia: ⟨1⟩ De ipso determinatur in hac scientia et de suis partibus et etiam passionibus et suis principiis et aliis in attributione ad ipsum. ⟨2⟩ Item dictum est in alia quaestione quod oportet assignare huic scientiae subiectum proprium; et non apparet aliud quod melius est assignandum subiectum quam ens mobile; igitur etc. Notandum est quod non quaerimus hic de subiecto cui scientia inhaeret, nec de subiecto prout distinguitur contra praedicatum, nec de subiecto de quo omnis passio illius scientiae probetur, sed de subiecto quod est genus communissimum etc., prout haec omnia dicta sunt in alia quaestione.

2 illud] idem G 3 probatur] praedicatur p 4 videtur probari vel] om. GPp ‖ probari2] praedicari p 6 sexto ens] item ens p : sexto GP 9 septimo] item p 9–10 subiectum … naturam] quod subiectum huius libri est natura G 10 non igitur] inv. P ‖ mobile] add. igitur etc. p 11 oppositum … expositores] oppositum communiter dixerunt omnes expositores P : in oppositum dicunt communiter expositores omnes p ‖ communiter] add. sup. lin. antiqui C ‖ hoc] etiam P 13 et etiam] et G : om. p 14 suis] om. GPp 15–16 assignare huic scientiae] huic scientiae assignare Gp : huic scientiae assignare aliquod P 16 non apparet aliud] aliud non apparet p 16–17 est assignandum subiectum] est assignandum (in marg.) subiectum C : potest (posset p) assignari GPp 18 est] om. P 19 prout … subiecto2] om. (hom.) G 20 probetur] add. in marg. seu omnes passiones probantur C 21 etc.] om. G ‖ haec omnia] inv. p 2 Cf. sup., I, q. 2, 2011–25 9 Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 3, f. 49I–K 1811–13 21 Cf. sup., I, q. 2, 19–20

15 Cf. sup., I, q. 2,

2va G

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4ra p 3rb P 4ra C

liber i

Pono igitur conclusiones. Prima est quod in physica vel mathematica non debet assignari tamquam subiectum proprium aliquis terminus substantialis | ea ratione qua est terminus substantialis, scilicet non connotativus, quia tales termini pertinent | ut sic ad solam metaphysicam, quia ipsa sola habet considerare | quidditates rerum simpliciter, ut hoc debet videri sexto Metaphysicae. Unde si naturalis considerat de homine, de planta et de aqua, hoc non est secundum conceptum simpliciter quidditativum, sed respective ad suos motus et operationes. Et hoc patet sexto Metaphysicae per Aristotelem, ubi dixit quod physica scientia est circa quoddam genus entis, scilicet quia circa talem substantiam in qua est principium motus et status. Et quod hoc sit secundum illam rationem attributivam ad motum, hoc apparet per illud quod postea ibidem dicit, scilicet quod nullius ipsorum quae in scientia naturali definiuntur est ratio, id est definitio, sine motu. Et idem etiam dicitur in secundo huius. Unde non est credendum, sicut aliqui male imaginantur, quod metaphysicae consideratio consistat in rationibus generalibus substantiarum et accidentium, immo ipsa descendit ad terminos specialissimos considerans de unoquoque eorum simpliciter quid est, sicut debet videri sexto Metaphysicae. Physicus enim non habet scire quid homo est substantialiter, sed quibus motibus et operationibus, quomodo et per quae membra et per quales virtutes ipse est innatus movere et moveri, agere et pati. Et si physicus aliquando intromittat se dicendo quid est homo aut quid est os vel caro, hoc

2 vel mathematica] et in mathematica P : vel in metaphysica p 3 terminus] add. pure P ‖ est] om. p 3–4 terminus] add. pure P 4 scilicet non] id est quod non sit p 5 ipsa] om. p 6 simpliciter] singulariter G ‖ hoc] om. GPp ‖ sexto] septimo p 7 de2] et G ‖ et] om. Pp 8 simpliciter] simplicem G ‖ respective] relative G 9 per … dixit] ubi dicitur GPp 10 scientia] om. P ‖ quia] om. p 12 hoc] om. p 13 ibidem] idem P ‖ dicit scilicet] dicitur p 14 et idem etiam] idem ergo p ‖ dicitur in] dicit P 16 consistat] constat p ‖ generalibus] generabilibus p 17 descendit] descendet P 18 eorum] illorum p : om. P ‖ quid] quod p 19 enim] sup. lin. C : ante debet (18) GPp 20 operationibus] add. et GPp 21 est] sit GPp ‖ et1] vel P 22 aliquando intromittat se] aliquando intromittit se G : intromittit se aliquando p : aliquando intromittit se de P ‖ aut] et p ‖ quid est os] quid os est G : os P 6 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1025b10–15 9 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1025b19–20 13 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1026a1–3 14–15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b12–23 18–19 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VI, q. 1 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 32vb–33va)

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ipse non facit quantum ad definitionem quidditativam, nisi forte supponat hoc a metaphysico, sed hoc facit quantum ad descriptionem sumptam ex motu vel opere vel aliis consideratis in ordine ad motum vel operationem. Unde primus et communissimus terminus substantialis sive non connotativus ponitur subiectum proprium in metaphysica, ut ille terminus ‘ens’ vel ‘res’ vel ‘aliquid’. Secunda conclusio est quod ille terminus ‘ens mobile’ est subiectum proprium in scientia naturali assignandum, quia ille est terminus communissimus inter considerata in scientia naturali et non limites transcendens scientiae naturalis. Isti enim termini ‘ens’, ‘unum’, ‘idem’, ‘diversum’, ‘res’, ‘aliquid’ sunt bene termini universaliores, sed de istis terminis non considerat simpliciter et universaliter naturalis vel mathematicus vel aliquis artifex specialis. Naturalis enim non habet scire utrum motus est ens vel aliquid vel unum, et per consequens nullum accidens esse unum. Et ita geometer nescit | utrum triangulus sit ens vel aliquid vel unum. Sed physicus bene scit quis motus est unus motus et geometer quae figura est unus triangulus vel quae figura est ens triangulus. Unde sicut non sequitur ‘ens exercitus, igitur ens’, ‘unus exercitus, igitur unum’, ‘ens domus, igitur ens’, ita naturalis nescit utrum sequitur ‘ens motus, igitur ens’, ‘motus unus, igitur unum’. Immo non sequitur ‘ens mobile, igitur ens’, ‘unum mobile, igitur unum’ propter ampliationem. Nec geometra scit utrum sequitur ‘ens triangulus, igitur ens’, ‘unus triangulus, igitur unum’. Naturalis igitur bene considerat istos terminos ‘ens’ et ‘unum’ restrictos, sed non simpliciter et universaliter, | quia transcendunt suos limites. Sed ille terminus ‘ens mobile’ | non transcendit.

1 ipse] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 1–2 supponat hoc] inv. p 2 metaphysico] metaphysica P 3 motu vel opere] opere vel motu p : motu et opere P 7 ens] om. GP ‖ est2] sit P 8 ille] om. p 9 et] om. P ‖ limites transcendens] inv. GPp 10 idem] add. et p ‖ diversum res] inv. P ‖ aliquid] add. et huiusmodi Gp : add. et huius P 12 mathematicus] metaphysicus G 13 scire] scientiae G ‖ vel1 … unum] aut unum aut aliquid p 13–14 et … unum] BPU : et per consequens etiam nullum accidens esse (est est G) unum AGHLMTp : add. in marg. aliter etiam utrum accidens est unum C 14 et] om. p ‖ geometer] geometra p 15 triangulus sit] triangulus est Gp : circulus est P ‖ aliquid vel unum] unum vel aliquid p 16 et geometer] geometra p ‖ unus2] om. p 16–17 vel … triangulus] om. (hom.) p 16 figura2] res G : om. P 17 triangulus] add. in marg. et quid est ens triangulare C 18 igitur] om. G 18–19 ita … ens] om. (hom.) C 18 naturalis] etiam physicus p ‖ sequitur] sequatur Pp 19 motus unus] inv. GPp ‖ immo] tertio G 21 geometra] geometer GP ‖ sequitur] sequatur p 22 igitur2] enim p 23 restrictos sed] sed restrictos et G ‖ suos] post limites (23–24) p : praem. in GP

2vb G

4rb C 3va P

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Deinde ille terminus ‘mobile’ se habet per modum subiecti respectu primae et communissimae passionis scientiae naturalis, quae est ille terminus disiunctus ‘moveri vel quiescere’ vel ille terminus ‘motus vel quies’. Omne enim mo|bile movetur vel quiescit, si ipsum est; et si ipsum non est, tamen est aptum moveri vel quiescere. Etiam in attributione ad illum terminum considerantur omnia quae in physica considerantur. Nam de motu et quiete, de actione et passione et universaliter de transmutatione et speciebus eius determinatur in scientia naturali secundum quod sunt passiones entis mobilis et specierum eius. De natura etiam et de materia, forma, fine et de efficiente determinatur in scientia naturali non secundum rationem communem causalitatis, videlicet prout sunt causae in essendo, sed secundum rationem restrictam, scilicet prout sunt causae entium mobilium in movendo vel transmutando sive active sive passive sive terminative. Et ita etiam, si consideretur in scientia naturali de magnitudinibus et figuris, hoc non est praecise secundum rationem magnitudinis aut figurae, mensurae vel mensurabilis, sed prout tales magnitudines aut figurae expediunt vel impediunt ad tales motus vel operationes. Et haec apparent satis sufficere ad hoc quod ille terminus ‘mobile’ vel ‘ens mobile’ concedatur subiectum proprium in scientia naturali assignandum una cum hoc quod non appareat aliud quod convenientius posset dici. Sed tamen contra hoc est obiectio fortis quia: sequeretur quod scientia totalis naturalis contineret omnes artes et prudentiam, scilicet moralem philosophiam totam; quod videtur impossibile et contra Aristotelem sexto Ethicorum, qui ibi distinguit ab invicem illos habitus intellectuales. 1 terminus] add. ens G 2 quae est] qui est C : quia p 3 disiunctus] distinctus G ‖ moveri] movere Cp ‖ quiescere] add. movens vel quiescens p ‖ quies] add. dicitur passio p 4 et] etiam P : vel p ‖ est2] add. ens C ‖ tamen] corr. sup. lin. ex non C : tunc p 5 moveri] movere C : natum movere p 6 illum] secundum G 7 nam] non G ‖ quiete] add. sed G ‖ et3] om. C 8 speciebus eius] de harum specierum G : de horum speciebus Pp 10 etiam et] inv. p ‖ forma] et forma et p ‖ et de2] et Gp : om. P 11–12 videlicet] scilicet G 12 rationem restrictam] rationes restrictas G 13 sunt causae] sunt G : causae P 14 terminative] determinative C ‖ consideretur] consideratur p 15 magnitudinibus] imaginibus p ‖ praecise] post magnitudinis (16) G 16 aut] et GPp ‖ tales] om. P 17 expediunt] add. in marg. ordinantur seu C 19 haec apparent] hoc apparet Pp 20 concedatur] consideratur G ‖ proprium] om. p 21 appareat] apparet GPp ‖ posset] possit p 22 est] sit G 23 prudentiam] prudentias G 25 ibi distinguit] distinguit sic p : distinguit P 24–25 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 3, 1139b15–17; cf. AA, 12: 108

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Et iterum est dubitatio utrum debeamus magis dicere quod ‘ens mobile’ est subiectum proprium huius scientiae vel quod ‘mobile’ dimittendo ‘ens’. Ad secundam harum dubitationum dico quod ego non facio magnam differentiam in proposito inter illum terminum ‘mobile’ et illum terminum ‘ens mobile’, quia licet hoc nomen ‘ens’ simpliciter sumptum habeat intentionem communiorem, tamen sumptum cum additione, ut dicendo ‘ens homo’, ‘ens album’, ‘ens exercitus’, non addit supra terminum cui apponitur. Omnino enim convertitur ‘homo’, ‘ens homo’, et ‘homo’ et ‘unus homo’, ‘domus’ et ‘ens domus’, et ‘una domus’ et ‘domus’, sicut expresse determinat Aristoteles quarto Metaphysicae. Ideo etiam dicitur primo Elenchorum quod eadem est definitio hominis et unius hominis, propositionis et unius propositionis. Et nihil est propositio vel domus, | si non sit ens propositio et una propositio vel etiam ens domus vel una | domus, et sic de aliis. Sed tunc ad primam dubitationem dicendum est quod, sicut metaphysica propter communitatem suae considerationis subalternat sibi quodam modo omnes alias scientias, sic etiam quodam modo scientia naturalis subalternat sibi moralem (prudentiam et omnes artes), quia subiectum physicae praedicatur de subiectis illarum. Tamen propter diversum modum considerandi de eis prudentia et artes exeunt a naturali scientia. Scientia enim naturalis | de omnibus motibus et mobilibus considerat speculative sive in universali sive in speciali et in hoc consistit, nihil considerando quomodo illa per nostram operationem voluntariam possint converti in bonum nostrum. Prudentia autem et artes hoc a naturali supponentes considerant quomodo illa valeant per nostram voluntariam operationem in humanum bonum converti, scilicet in nostram honestatem, utilitatem vel delectationem. Et ita posset restringi quod ille terminus ‘mobile’ est subiectum scientiae natura-

1 est] add. ibi P 2 proprium] om. P ‖ quod] om. P 3 ego] om. p 4 et] add. inter p 5 mobile] om. G 6–7 ens album] om. G 7 supra] super G : super istum p 8–9 et1 … domus3] unus homo domus ens domus una domus Gp : domus ens domus una domus P 9–10 aristoteles] add. in G 13 etiam] om. GP ‖ vel2] et Gp 14 dubitationem] rationem G ‖ sicut] om. P 16 omnes] om. GP 17 sibi] add. scientiam GP ‖ omnes] alias p 18 subiectis] substantiis GP 19 naturali scientia] inv. GPp ‖ enim] autem p 20 speculative] add. sup. lin. specifice C : specifice p 20–21 sive in universali] rep. G 22 possint] possunt G 23 autem] om. P 24 voluntariam operationem] inv. GPp 25 scilicet in nostram] in nostram scilicet P : add. voluntatem G ‖ honestatem] add. et P 26 quod] quia P ‖ subiectum] add. proprium GP 10 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 2, 1003b26–27; cf. AA, 1: 91 ‖ Cf. Aristoteles, De sophisticis elenchis, 6, 169a8–10; cf. AA, 37: 12

3ra G 4va C

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lis non secundum omnem rationem secundum quam considerari potest, sed solum prout de eo considerandum est speculative. 4va p

4vb C

Nunc ad ra|tiones. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dictum est prius quod ille terminus ‘ens mobile’ qui est in mente mea est illud subiectum quantum ad scientiam meam. Et si in mente mea sint plures tales vel simul vel successive, ego omnes reputo pro illo uno subiecto, sicut si essent plures scabini electi ad gubernandum villam vel exercitum, illi reputarentur tamquam unus princeps. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod, licet iste terminus ‘mobile’ debeat dici passio in respectu termini substantialis, scilicet in respectu subiecti metaphysicae, in scientia naturali non consideratur tamquam passio, sed tamquam subiectum primum. Naturalis enim, sicut dictum fuit, non intromittit se de subiectis prioribus, scilicet de terminis substantialibus. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod ille terminus ‘quiescibile’ non debet poni hic subiectum primum, tum quia mobile est in plus, quia secundum Aristotelem aliqua sunt mobilia, quae non sunt quiescibilia, tum quia ‘quies’ et ‘quiescibile’ sunt termini privativi, qui sunt posteriores terminis positivis. ⟨4⟩ Ad quartam dico quod ille terminus ‘mobile’ ponitur aliter et aliter subiectum in totali scientia naturali et in parte quae traditur in libro Physicorum. Ponitur enim subiectum in totali scientia naturali prout ipsum et partes eius et passiones et alia sibi attributa sunt considerata tam secundum rationes eorum communes quam secundum speciales. Sed in hoc libro ponitur subiectum secundum quod consideratio restringitur ad passiones et rationes communiores sine descensu ad specialiores. Et in sequentibus libris scientiae naturalis erit descensus ad magis specialia. |

1 rationem secundum quam] respectum secundum quem P 3 nunc] tunc igitur respondendum est GPp 4 ens] om. p ‖ qui] quod P 5 subiectum] add. proprium G ‖ quantum] tamquam P 6 successive] add. illos p 7 essent] post scabini P ‖ electi] add. simul p ‖ gubernandum] add. simul P : add. simul unam p 8 illi] ipsi p 9 aliam] secundam p ‖ est] om. p 10 in1] om. p ‖ in2] om. p 10–11 metaphysicae] add. tamen GPp 12 subiectum primum] proprium subiectum p 13 subiectis] substantiis Pp 14 dico] dicendum est p ‖ poni hic] inv. GPp 15 primum] proprium p ‖ tum] tamen sed add. in marg. alias tum P : causa est p 16 quies] motus G 18 quartam dico] aliam dicitur p 20 ipsum] add. sit G 21 eius] om. P ‖ considerata] considerabilia Pp : consimilia G 22 eorum] earum G 24 rationes] add. communes et P ‖ sequentibus] subsequentibus G 25 scientiae] scientia p ‖ erit] est p 4 Cf. sup., I, q. 2, 214–5 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, VIII, 6, 260a15–16

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⟨5⟩ Ad quintam potest dici quod aliquando primae passiones aliquorum subiectorum sunt ita de eis manifestae quod non probantur de eis, sed supponuntur. Vel sufficit quod earum causae vel principia declarentur. Sed ita fit hic, quia declaratur naturam esse principium motus et quietis in omni eo quod naturaliter movetur et quiescit. ⟨6⟩ Ad sextam dicitur quod non oportet subiectum praedicari de omnibus consideratis in scientia. Sed aliquando sufficiunt alii modi attributionum ad ipsum, verbi gratia partis integralis ad suum | totum, principii ad suum principiatum, privationis ad suum habitum etc. De primo igitur motore consideratur tamquam de principio mobilis et | motus, scilicet movente primum mobile et agente primum motum. ⟨7⟩ Ad auctoritatem Commentatoris dicendum est quod Commentator non intendebat ibi loqui de subiecto proprio totalis scientiae naturalis, sed volebat specificare subiectum illius secundi libri Physicorum. Cum igitur dixit subiectum ibi esse naturam et principia naturalia, voluit dicere quod consideratio secundi libri est declarare quid est natura et de quibus dicitur, et etiam declarare quaedam principia communia doctrinae supponenda in posterum in totali scientia naturali. Haec de quaestione. 1 quintam] aliam p ‖ primae] propriae p 1–2 aliquorum subiectorum] inv. p 3 vel1] sed p ‖ sed] quod GP 4 fit hic quia] hic fit quod p : sit hic quia GP 5 naturaliter] natura G ‖ movetur et quiescit] quiescit vel movetur P 6 sextam dicitur] sextam dico G : aliam dicitur p ‖ non] quandoque G 8 verbi gratia] utputa G ‖ partis integralis] ABLP : partes integrales CGHMTUp ‖ suum totum] inv. P ‖ principii] ABL : corr. in principium C : principium GHMPTUp ‖ suum2] om. GP 9 privationis] ABGHLP : corr. in privatio C : privatio MTU : privationes p ‖ suum] in marg. C : om. GPp ‖ etc.] om. p ‖ primo igitur motore] motore igitur primo GP : primo motore igitur p 11 motum] mobile G 12 est] om. P 14 volebat] volebant G ‖ subiectum] om. G ‖ igitur] ibi P 15 voluit] add. in marg. habere C 16 consideratio] add. istius G : add. illius Pp ‖ est2] sit P 17 declarare quaedam] quae P 19 haec de quaestione] et ita sit P : etc. p : om. G

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⟨i.4⟩

⟨Utrum in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingat alia scire et intelligere, scilicet principiata, causata et elementata⟩

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Quaeritur quarto consequenter descendendo ad textum, scilicet utrum in omni scientia ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum contingit alia scire et intelligere, scilicet principiata, causata et elementata.

4vb p

⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod non quia: ex minus notis non sciuntur notiora; sed principia in naturalibus sunt minus nota quam effectus propter hoc quod effectus sunt magis sensibiles; igitur etc. Et hoc exprimit Aristoteles dicens: ‘sunt autem primum nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis’, id est composita naturalia, quae sunt effectus materiae et formae. Et addit: ‘posterius autem ex his fiunt nota elementa et principia dividentibus haec’. Nec valet dicere quod, licet effectus sunt nobis notiores, tamen causae sunt notiores naturae, si|cut dicit Aristoteles; ideo propter illam notioritatem possunt ex his notificari causata. Contra quia: ex quo illae causae non sunt nobis notiores, tunc ex eis non fit nobis scientia, nec etiam naturae, quia natura non addiscit. ⟨2⟩ Et iterum, sicut dicit Aristoteles, ex effectibus nobis notioribus oportet procedere ad sciendum causas; igitur non e contrario, quia esset

6 consequenter] ante quaeritur p : ante quarto G : om. P ‖ descendendo … scilicet] om. G 7 ex] add. praeexistenti p 8 principiata] principata p 9 primo] om. GPp 10 quam effectus] om. GP 11 sensibiles] scibiles p 12 primum] principia G 12–13 id est] et G 16 ideo] praem. et P 16–17 notioritatem] notiorem G 17 his] eis GPp ‖ causata] notitia G 18 contra] et nota P ‖ quo] eo G ‖ tunc] et G 19 fit] fiet P 20 sicut] sic C ‖ notioribus] notiores G 21 contrario] converso GPp 11–14 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a22–23 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a22–23

16 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a17–21

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_008

20 Cf.

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circulatio et in primo Posteriorum dicitur quod circulo demonstrare est impossibile. ⟨3⟩ Item universaliter videtur quod impossibile est ex notitia unius cognoscere alterum vel fieri cognitionem alterius, quia oporteret scire de illa praepositione ‘ex’ quod genus causae ipsa designaret. Nam cognitio causae non est causa materialis cognitionis effectus nec causa formalis nec causa finalis nec causa efficiens, immo intellectus agens. ⟨4⟩ Item res cognoscitur per suam similitudinem; et similitudo unius non est similitudo alterius, nisi illae forte sint eiusdem rationis, cuiusmodi non sunt principia et principiata. ⟨5⟩ Item si | dicis quod ex notitia ipsius a fit b notum, ego quaero utrum ad hoc quod fiat notitia ipsius b sufficiat notitia ipsius a, scilicet cum intellectu, phantasmate et specie intelligibili, vel non. Si sufficit, tunc semper noto a erit notum b, quod est falsum, quia tunc cognito uno statim fierent nota omnia quae ex illo cognosci possunt. Si vero dicis quod non sufficit, tunc non fiet ex a notitia ipsius b. Et ista ratio tangit unam difficultatem supposito quod, positis causis sufficientibus alicuius effectus, necesse est sequi illum effectum, si non intervenerit impedimentum. Pono igitur casum quod Socrates non est occupatus nec impeditus a studio sive per famem sive per somnum sive per alium modum et quod ipse | vult studere et pro posse addiscere conclusiones geometricas et quod sibi nota sunt principia in geometria supponenda. Tunc videtur sequi quod necesse est sibi statim fieri scientiam primae conclusionis et sic consequenter secundae et tertiae | et sic deinceps, quod experimur falsum. Et consequentia patet, quia in casu praedicto sunt positae causae sufficientes ad sciendum primam conclusionem; igitur cum non sit

1 circulo] circulariter p : circulatione P 3 item] om. G ‖ est] om. G 3–4 cognoscere] cognosci G 4 oporteret] oportet p 5 praepositione ex] propositione GP ‖ quod] add. esset P ‖ ipsa] ipsius p 6 causa3] om. G 7 causa] praem. etiam Pp : etiam G 8 unius] praem. rei G : add. rei Pp 9 illae forte sint] forte illae sint Pp : forte sunt G ‖ cuiusmodi] om. G 11 si] add. tu p 11–13 ego … phantasmate] om. G 12 sufficiat] sufficit p ‖ intellectu] add. et p 13 intelligibili] add. in marg. vel sufficit G 14 notum b] inv. p ‖ statim fierent] inv. GPp 15 cognosci] nosci P ‖ dicis] dicas GPp 16 a] ea GP 18 alicuius] alios G ‖ illum] om. P 19 pono igitur casum] ponitur casus igitur G ‖ est] sit p 20 somnum] somnium p 20–21 sive3 … modum] vel alio modo GPp 22 supponenda] supposita G 23 sibi statim fieri] statim sibi fieri P : statim sic fieri p : statim sibi G 24 sic1] om. GPp ‖ consequenter] add. statim Pp 26 sufficientes] efficientes G ‖ sit] est P 1 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 3, 72b25

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impedimentum nec resistentia ex parte intellectus, necesse est statim sequi scientiam illius primae conclusionis. Sed tu diceres quod non erant positae causae sufficientes, quia cum praedictis oportet formare syllogismum ex habitis principiis. Sed tunc ego dico quod saltem sufficientes causae erant positae ad formandum illum syllogismum; igitur statim debet sequi eius formatio et consequenter scientia conclusionis. Et iterum, quia prima conclusio cum dictis principiis et intellectu erant causae sufficientes ad sciendum secundam conclusionem, statim debebat sequi scientia secundae conclusionis et sic consequenter. Nec in his debet esse mora temporis, cum in intellectu non sit aliquod resistens praedictis. Ponimus enim quod non esset in intellectu habitus contrarius, sed solum principia scientiae. Sic enim ex causis sufficientibus debet statim et instantanee sequi effectus. ⟨6⟩ Iterum revertitur ad arguendum quod non posset fieri notum unum ex alio quia: de uno ad aliud non est evidens consequentia propter hoc quod consequentia non est evidens nisi secundum reductionem ad primum principium. Et talis consequentia non potest reduci ad primum principium, quia primum principium fundatur in contradictione et contradictio debet esse eiusdem de eodem secundum rem et secundum rationem. Unde si a et b sint alia ab invicem, numquam est contradictio | a esse et b non esse. Igitur non est evidens consequentia dicere ‘a est, igitur b est’. Et sic de quibuscumque aliis quantumcumque propinquam habentibus habitudinem ad invicem.

2 primae conclusionis] inv. G 3 diceres] add. forte P ‖ sufficientes] efficientes ad sciendum primam conclusionem sed del. G 4 oportet] oportebat p ‖ syllogismum] syllogismos C 5 ego dico] ego dicam GP : dicam p 6 illum syllogismum igitur] syllogismum illum G ‖ debet] debeat G : debebat Pp 8 et1] om. p 9 conclusionem] add. sup. lin. cum seu et C : add. et p ‖ debebat] corr. in marg. ex debeat C : ante statim Pp : debeat (ante statim) G 10 et sic consequenter] om. G 11 sit aliquod] sit aliquid Pp : fit aliquid G 12 ponimus] ponamus p 13 sic enim] sicut etiam p ‖ et] om. P 14 sequi] consequi G 15 revertitur] revertor Pp : revertatur G 16 evidens consequentia] inv. p 19 primum] ipsum P 20 eodem] add. et Pp ‖ rationem] nomen p 21 sint] corr. ex sunt C : sunt GPp ‖ ab] an G ‖ est] esset p 23 quantumcumque] quantum G

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Oppositum apparet per Aristotelem in principio huius libri dicentem: ‘quoniam quidem intelligere et scire contingit circa omnes scientias quarum sunt principia et causae aut | elementa, ex horum cognitione’ etc.

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Ista quaestio et rationes adductae ad eam implicant in se plures difficultates. Et prima difficultas est utrum ex notitia unius potest nobis fieri notitia alterius. Et cum sit duplex notitia, scilicet complexa et incomplexa, quidam de incomplexa dicunt quod nulla notitia incomplexa fit per aliam, quia non fit una notitia per alteram nisi in virtute consequentiae; sed consequentia non est nisi complexi ad complexum; igitur etc. Secundo inferunt illi corollarie quod nullam substantiam cognoscimus notitia incomplexa, quia non venimus in notitiam substantiarum nisi per notitiam accidentium; igitur in virtute alicuius consequentiae, quae non est nisi complexorum. Sed huic opinioni ego non assentio; ideo pono contra eam duas conclusiones. Prima est quod aliqua notitia incomplexa fit per aliam, quia aliqua est notitia incomplexa intellectiva; et omnis notitia intellectiva fit per aliam; igitur aliqua notitia incomplexa fit per aliam. Maior concedenda est, quia si cavillator vellet eam negare, saltem ipse concederet notitiam intellectivam complexam; et oportet complexam | esse compositam ex simplicibus (non enim dividitur in infinitum, sicut divideretur continuum); et notitia intellectiva non est composita ex sensitivis; igitur est composita ex intellectivis simplicibus. Sed etiam minor principalis rationis manifesta est, quia saltem primam notitiam intellectualem oportet fieri ex sensitiva et universaliter omnem notitiam intellectualem oportet fieri ex sensitiva vel mediate vel immediate, cum intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasmata speculari, | ut habetur tertio De anima. Propter quod etiam dictum est primo

1 apparet] arguitur p ‖ principio] primo GPp ‖ libri] om. Pp 2 intelligere et scire] scire et intelligere P 3 et] aut Gp : om. P ‖ causae aut elementa] elementa aut causae P ‖ etc.] om. G 4 adductae] post eam p ‖ in se] post difficultates P 5 et prima] una p ‖ nobis] om. p 6 et1] om. p 8 alteram] aliam p ‖ in] om. p 9 inferunt illi] inv. GPp 13 ego] om. p ‖ ideo] ergo P 15 intellectiva1] ante notitia1 G : ante incomplexa Pp 20 sensitivis] sensitiva p 21 simplicibus] om. C ‖ etiam] om. P ‖ manifesta est] inv. P 23 oportet … sensitiva] ex sensitiva oportet fieri p : oportet fieri ex notitia sensitiva P ‖ vel] om. G 24 est] sit p 25 etiam] et P 1 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a10–12; cf. AA, 2: 1 25 Aristoteles, De anima, III, 8, 432a8–9; cf. AA, 6: 167

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Posteriorum quod deficiente nobis aliquo sensu deficit nobis scientia de obiecto proprio illius sensus. Secunda conclusio est quod de substantia habemus conceptum simplicem, quia conceptus hominis, a quo sumitur iste terminus substantialis ‘homo’, est conceptus substantiae, si homo est substantia. Et ille conceptus non supponit nisi pro substantia, quia si supponeret pro accidente vel pro composito ex accidente et substantia, tunc non esset verum quod homo est substantia, quia nec accidens est substantia nec compositum ex substantia et accidente est substantia, sed praecise substantia est substantia. Et etiam ille conceptus supponendo pro substantia non connotat aliquod accidens aliud ab ipsa substantia, quia tunc non esset de praedicamento substantiae, sed accidentis, sicut iste terminus ‘albus’ vel ‘magnus’ vel ‘pater’ etc. Illi enim termini ita supponunt pro substantia et non pro alio sicut ille terminus ‘homo’, sed exeunt a praedicamento substantiae propter connotationem. Igitur tales conceptus substantiales a quibus sumuntur termini de praedicamento substantiae nec sunt conceptus aliquorum accidentium nec compositorum | ex substantiis et accidentibus, sed solum substantiae vel substantiarum. Et si quis dicat quod sint complexi, tunc complexi sunt et compositi ex simplicibus, cum in resolutione conceptuum non sit processus in infinitum. Et tunc illi simplices non erunt nisi substantiarum, cum compositi ex eis non essent nisi substantiarum. Igitur substantiarum sunt conceptus simplices. Iterum omni conceptui sive complexo sive incomplexo debet vel potest correspondere terminus vocalis. Aliter non possemus aliis exprimere conceptus nostros et perirent tunc disputatio et doctrina. Hoc ego suppono. Deinde etiam | suppono quod omnis terminus correspondens conceptui

1–2 de obiecto proprio] om. G 3 est] add. ista p : om. G 6 supponit] supposuit P 7 accidente et substantia] substantia et accidente GPp ‖ quod] om. P 9 sed] om. G 10 et] sed GP ‖ etiam] post conceptus p 12 magnus vel] om. G ‖ pater] parvus p 14–16 propter … substantiae] om. (hom.) P 15 igitur] om. G 15–16 tales … sunt] ABLMT : tales conceptus speciales a quibus sumuntur termini de praedicamento substantiae nec sunt G : talis conceptus substantialis a quo sumuntur termini de praedicamento substantiae nec sunt C : talis conceptus substantialis a quibus sumuntur termini de praedicamento substantiae nec sunt HU : talis conceptus substantialis a quibus sumitur terminus de praedicamento substantiae nec est p : nec sunt P 19 et] om. p 20 simplices] add. conceptus G 20–21 non … essent] et compositi ex eis non erunt p 23 sive1] om. G 25 perirent tunc] periret tunc Pp : tunc periret G ‖ ego] om. p 1 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 18, 81a38–40; cf. AA, 35: 70

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complexo vel composito, si debeat definiri, oportet quod definiatur per terminos correspondentes conceptibus simplicibus ex quibus ille est complexus vel compositus. Propter hoc enim dicitur quod definitio indicat explicite illud quod definitum significat implicite. Unde Aristoteles in prooemio huius dicit quod nomen definitum totum quoddam et indistincte significat, utputa ‘circulus’, definitio autem ipsius dividit in singularia. Ex his sequitur quod terminus definibilis non potest correspondere conceptui simpliciori quam terminus per quem definitur, immo potius e converso. Sed constat quod termini substantiales non definiuntur per terminos accidentales, sed e converso. Igitur termini accidentales non sunt simpliciores, sed e converso (dico quantum ad conceptus correspondentes). Quod autem accidens definiatur per substantiam et non e converso apparet manifeste septimo Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur quod substantia prior est accidente ratione, notitia et tempore. Et probando quod sit prior ratione, id est definitione, dicit quod necesse est in uniuscuiusque accidentis ratione rationem substantiae esse. Si ergo conceptus accidentis est resolubilis | definitive in conceptum substantiae et non e converso, sequitur quod conceptus substantiae est simplicior vel formaliter vel virtualiter. Iterum cum non sit processus in infinitum in definitionibus, sed necesse est devenire ad terminos indefinibiles, et definitiones proprie non sunt nisi terminorum substantialium, ut declaratum est septimo Metaphysicae, et termini substantiales non definiuntur per terminos accidentales, ut ibidem dicitur, sequitur quod est devenire ad terminos substantiales indefinibiles. Sed talibus terminis, scilicet substantialibus et indefinibilibus, correspondent conceptus substantiales simplices. | Si enim corresponderent eis conceptus complexi et compositi ex simplicibus, ipsi essent definibiles et defini-

1 debeat] debet p 2 simplicibus] singularibus G 3 indicat explicite] explicat et indicat C 4 prooemio huius] inv. p 5 nomen] om. p ‖ quoddam et indistincte] spat. sed add. in marg. distincte (?) G 6 autem] om. G ‖ dividit] dividitur p ‖ his] istis p 7 simpliciori quam] simplici tamquam p 9–10 e converso] econtra P 10 e converso] add. et p 11 conceptus] terminos C 12 apparet] patet p 13 prior est] inv. p 15 ratione] om. p ‖ si ergo] inv. P 20 est] sit Pp ‖ devenire] post indefinibiles P ‖ sunt] sint p 22 definiuntur] definiantur GP 24–25 correspondent] corresponderent p 25 simplices] rep. G ‖ corresponderent] correspondent P 25–26 conceptus] om. P 26 simplicibus] similibus G 26–36.1 definitione] definitive p 4 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184b11–12 12 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 1, 1028a32–33 14–15 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 1, 1028a35–b1 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 5, 1031a1–14 22 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 1, 1028a35–b1

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tione resolubiles per terminos et in terminos correspondentes illis conceptibus simplicibus ex quibus illi complexi essent compositi. Item si conceptus substantialis | hominis sit complexus, ponatur quod hoc sit ex tribus simplicibus, scilicet a, b, c. Tunc si nullus conceptus substantiae est simplex, a non erit nisi conceptus accidentis, et similiter nec b nec c. Igitur totum complexum ex eis non erit conceptus nisi accidentium et non substantiae, cum totum nihil sit praeter partes. Sed hoc est absurdum, scilicet quod conceptus substantialis hominis non sit nisi conceptus accidentium. Igitur etc. Nunc ad rationes illius opinionis. Ad primam dicendum est quod bene fit una notitia ex alia sine consequentia alicuius propositionis ad aliam propositionem vel ad alias propositiones tripliciter. Primo quidem obiective, quia si sit aliqua notitia in sensu exteriori et aliqua in sensu communi, tunc notitia in sensu exteriori se habet per modum obiecti respectu notitiae sensus communis. Et etiam notitia sensitiva se habet per modum obiecti ad notitiam intellectivam. Secundo etiam elicitive, sicut dicit Avicenna quod virtus aestimativa ex intentione sensata, scilicet coloris aut figurae aut motus, elicit intentionem non sensatam, puta amicitiae vel inimicitiae. Ideo ovis timet et fugit a lupo et sequitur pastorem. Et hoc non est mirum; cum anima sit multum nobilior virtus quam ignis et tamen ignis generando calorem potest consequenter mediante illo calore generare levitatem et raritatem, rationabile est quod anima mediante una notitia posset consequenter generare aliam naturaliter consequentem ad priorem. Tertio etiam modo abstractive, ut quia habeo primo conceptum confuse et simul repraesentantem substantiam et accidens, ut cum percipio album. Non enim solam albedinem video, sed album. Et cum postea percipio idem

1 et] om. G 3 sit] add. conceptus P ‖ ponatur] ponamus GPp 4 b] et b et p 4–5 substantiae] substantia P 5 erit] esset p 6 complexum] compositum G ‖ erit] esset p 9 accidentium] ante conceptus2 (8) G : accidentis C 10 nunc] tunc Gp : tunc igitur P 11 bene] om. p 12 ad2] om. p 13 tripliciter] quadrupliciter p ‖ sit aliqua] sit alia P : alia G 14 exteriori1] om. G ‖ et … exteriori2] om. (hom.) p ‖ aliqua] alia GP 15 et] om. G 17 etiam] add. modo P 18 sensata] sensati C : sensitiva P ‖ coloris] colore G ‖ intentionem] notitiam G 20 et2] om. G ‖ anima] praem. enim p : natura G ‖ multum] multo Pp 22 generare] gignere GP 23 posset] possit P : potest p ‖ generare] gignere GP 24 consequentem] sequentem P 25 etiam] om. Pp ‖ abstractive] abstractivo G ‖ habeo primo] inv. P 26 cum] ante ut G : om. C 27 solam] solum P ‖ et cum] et P : cum G 17 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de anima, pars 1, cap. 5 (ed. Van Riet, 89)

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manere et mutari de albo in nigrum, iudico aliud esse hoc ab albedine. Et tunc | intellectus naturaliter habet virtutem dividendi illam confusionem et intelligendi substantiam abstracte ab accidente et accidens abstracte a substantia. Et potest utriusque formare simplicem conceptum. Et sic in abstrahendo fit conceptus universalis ex conceptu singulari, sicut debet videri tertio De anima et septimo Metaphysicae. Sed iterum quarto modo ex duobus conceptibus simplicibus potest intellectus formare tertium simplicem formando propositionem. Habitis enim in intellectu | conceptibus a et b simplicibus intellectus libere potest formare illam propositionem ‘a est b’ vel ‘a non est b’. Et sic illa propositio est composita ex a et b non praecise, sed aliud concurrit quod significatur per copulam affirmativam vel negativam. Aliter esset idem propositio affirmativa et propositio negativa, cum totum sit suae partes. Et aliter etiam nihil aliud in mente corresponderet huic orationi imperfectae ‘homo albus’ et huic propositioni ‘homo est albus’, quod est falsum. Et oportet quod illud tertium concurrens sit conceptus simplex, cum nec sit a nec sit b nec sit a et b simul, sed sit aliud distinctum, quod est formale propositionis mentalis, | cuius distinctione affirmativa et negativa mentales de eodem subiecto et de eodem praedicato distinguuntur. | Et illum simplicem conceptum format intellectus ex conceptibus a et b concurrentibus vel effective vel in aliquo alio genere causandi sine consequentia propositionis ad propositiones vel propositionem. Et ex dictis patet quod etiam non valet ratio corollarii quod illa opinio voluit concludere, sicut nec illud corollarium.

1 manere et mutari] moveri et mutari p : movere et mutare C ‖ aliud esse hoc] hoc esse aliud p 2 tunc] om. G ‖ naturaliter] naturalis P 3 abstracte1] abstractive p ‖ abstracte2] abstractum G : abstractive p 4 simplicem conceptum] inv. P ‖ et sic in] et sic etiam Pp : tunc etiam G 5 singulari] simpliciori G 8 propositionem] compositionem P 10 vel] add. istam Gp ‖ est3] om. G 11 aliud concurrit] inv. P 12 esset idem propositio] eadem propositio esset p 13 propositio] om. Pp ‖ et aliter etiam] et etiam G : etiam aliter p : et aliter enim P 16 sit3] om. P ‖ sit4] similiter P 17 sit aliud] est aliud Pp : aliud est G 18 distinctione] add. est p ‖ mentales] mentalis G 19 de] om. G 20 in] om. p 21–22 propositiones vel propositionem] propositionem vel propositiones Gp : propositiones P 23 et] om. p ‖ etiam] ante patet p ‖ corollarii] quae dixit G 23–24 illa opinio voluit] illa opinio volebat Gp : opinio illa volebat P 6 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De anima, III, q. 8 (ed. Zupko, I, 64–89); cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, qq. 15–20 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 50rb–54va)

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His autem visis de conceptibus incomplexis aliqui opinantur quod non est possibile scire hoc esse per illud esse, si hoc et illud sint alia ab invicem. Quod probant primo quia: non est evidens consequentia, cum non possit reduci ad primum principium, sicut prius arguebatur. Secundo quia: videtur eis quod omnino impossibile sit demonstrare aliquid esse vel quod impossibile sit demonstrare aliquam conclusionem in qua affirmatur de aliquo subiecto hoc verbum ‘est’ secundum adiacens, quia non posset inveniri medium quod esset notius de illo subiecto quam hoc verbum ‘est’. Unde statim videtur quod in syllogismo esset petitio principii. Verbi gratia volo demonstrare quod a est et syllogizo sic: b est, et a est b, igitur a est. Constat quod in minore propositione ego iam accipio quod a est. Non enim possum scire quod a est b, nisi prius vel simul sciam quod a est. Et iterum in syllogismo demonstrativo nec ad maiorem sine minore nec ad minorem sine maiore debet sequi conclusio gratia formae, quia superflueret alia praemissa; sed ad illam ‘a est b’ sequitur quod a est; igitur illa propositio ‘a est b’ non potest esse praemissa ad syllogizandum demonstrative quod a est. Et quando dicitur contra istos quod Aristoteles credidit demonstrasse primam materiam esse et primum motorem esse vel etiam primam causam esse in demonstrando statum in causis, ipsi respondent quod non est ita, sed Aristoteles demonstravit quod aliqua materia est prima materia, quod aliquis motor est primus motor, quod aliqua causa est prima causa. Sed illam opinionem non credo esse veram; ideo contra eam pono conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod de aliquo subiecto potest demonstrari hoc verbum ‘est’ secundum adiacens. Hoc patet primo per determinationem Aristotelis secundo Posteriorum, ubi ipse ponit quattuor quaestiones vere

1 aliqui] praem. et complexis G : add. etiam de complexis (conceptis P) Pp 2 illud1] aliud C ‖ sint] sunt P 3 est] om. G ‖ cum] corr. sup. lin. ex quod C : quae p ‖ possit] posset G : potest Pp 4 ad] in P 5 secundo quia] secundo quod GP : et quia p ‖ omnino] om. p ‖ impossibile sit] inv. G 5–6 aliquid … demonstrare] om. (hom.) Gp 7 secundum] secundo P 8 posset] potest p ‖ quam] quod G 9 unde statim] statim bene G 10 syllogizo] syllogizatur G ‖ a] om. P 11 minore] minori GPp ‖ ego iam] ego non P : om. G 12 vel] rep. G 13 et] om. p 14 gratia formae] ergo forte P 15 alia] aliqua C 18 quod] om. p 19 esse2] om. P ‖ etiam] om. p 20 in1] om. P ‖ causis] add. sed del. unde C : add. unde G 21 materia2] add. et p 22 motor2] add. et GPp 24 conclusio] om. p 25 secundum] secundo P 26 aristotelis] add. in p 26 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, II, 1, 89b24–25, 89b37–90a1, 90a6; cf. AA, 35: 98

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scibiles, scilicet aut demonstratione aut definitione, prout dicit Lincolniensis. Inter quas est quaestio si est, quae non determinatur vel scitur definitione, sed solum quaestio quid est. Igitur ipsa est scibilis demonstratione. Item si conceditur quod Aristoteles | demonstravit vel quod demonstrabile est aliquam causam esse primam causam vel aliquam materiam esse primam materiam, tunc igitur ante erat dubium utrum aliqua causa est | prima causa. Si hoc erat dubium, ita etiam erat dubium utrum prima causa est. Et postea ex praemissis evidentibus et scitis factum fuit evidens et scitum quod aliqua causa est prima causa et simul etiam fuit evidens et scitum quod prima causa est. Et hoc est esse demonstratum, scilicet ex evidentibus | et scitis esse evidens et scitum, cum ante esset dubium. Et illi pro valde modico fuerunt decepti. Debuissent enim vidisse in secundo Priorum quod una potestas syllogismi est posse plura concludere. Quidquid enim sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens. Cum igitur isti concedebant quod est bona consequentia ‘a est b, igitur a est’ vel etiam ‘aliqua causa est prima causa, igitur prima causa est’, tunc ex quibuscumque | praemissis sequitur quod aliqua causa est prima causa, ex eisdem sequitur quod prima causa est. Ideo si illae praemissae erant scitae et evidentes et manifestum est quod ex eis sequitur illa conclusio quod prima causa est, nos concedemus et sciemus quod prima causa est, quod ante dubitabamus. Et hoc est illam conclusionem demonstrative esse scitam. Unde notandum est quod, si fuerint alicuius syllogismi duae praemissae evidenter scitae, ex quibus sequuntur multae conclusiones prius dubiae, puta c, d, e, quamvis una sequatur evidentius quam alia, tamen quando notificatum fuerit quod quaelibet illarum sequitur, oportebit concedere et scire quamlibet illarum conclusionum. Et quaelibet illarum erit demonstrative 1 demonstratione aut definitione] demonstrative aut definitive p 2 determinatur] terminatur Gp 2–3 definitione] definitive p 3 demonstratione] demonstrative p 4 si conceditur] si concederetur G : si consideretur C : sicut conceditur p ‖ quod2] om. P 7 causa1] add. et GPp 8 et postea] composita G ‖ et2] om. C 9–10 aliqua … quod] om. (hom.) P 11 et3] om. P 14 concedebant] concedant G : concedunt Pp 17 causa1] om. P ‖ est2] add. et p 18 erant] erat G ‖ et2] om. p ‖ est] sit P : add. sup. lin. sit C 19 illa] una C ‖ prima causa est] BLMUp : add. prima causa AP : add. causa T : add. sequitur illa conclusio quod prima causa est prima causa CG : aliqua causa est prima causa H ‖ concedemus et sciemus] enim concedimus et scimus p 20 quod2] quid G ‖ dubitabamus] dubitamus G 21 demonstrative esse] inv. Pp 22 est] om. p 23 evidenter] evidentes et p 24 sequatur] sequeretur p 26 illarum erit] illarum esset p : earum erit P 1 Cf. Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in libros Analyticorum posteriorum, II, 1 (ed. Rossi, 287) 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica priora, II, 1, 53a3–14

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scita per illas praemissas, si fuerit per se notum vel sufficienter determinatum quod quaelibet illarum conclusionum sequatur ex illis praemissis. Item isti etiam arguunt, ac si non posset esse demonstratio nisi ex praemissis categoricis, quod est falsum. Potest enim esse ex hypotheticis. Verbi gratia ad demonstrandum quod prima causa est sumeretur ista maior evidens ‘si non est processus in infinitum in causis, prima causa est’; et tunc, si demonstrari posset illa minor quod non est processus in infinitum in causis, concluditur demonstrative quod prima causa est. Vel etiam sic arguendo: vel prima causa est vel omnis causa habet causam priorem; et tunc, si potest demonstrari quod non omnis causa habet causam priorem, demonstratum erit quod prima causa est. Et sic de multis aliis modis. Secunda conclusio contra illos est quod non oportet omnem praemissam demonstrationis fieri notam et evidentem per reductionem ad primum principium. Multa enim principia demonstrationum fiunt nobis nota per sensum vel per memoriam vel per experientiam absque hoc quod oporteat ea aliter demonstrare, sicut habetur secundo Posteriorum. Et iterum, cum non sit procedere in infinitum in demonstrationibus, ut apparet primo Posteriorum, necesse est devenire ad demonstrationem cuius nulla praemissa erit amplius demonstrabilis. Et cum illius demonstrationis sint ad minus duae praemissae, vel neutra earum erit primum principium vel | saltem una illarum non erit illud primum principium. Et quocumque modo dicatur, illa praemissa quae non est primum principium est nota et sufficiens ad demonstrandum sine hoc quod indigeat | probari per primum principium. Immo in primo Posteriorum demonstrat Aristoteles quod necesse est principia demonstrationum indemonstrabilia non esse multo pauciora conclusionibus; de quo ibidem videat qui voluerit.

1–2 vel sufficienter determinatum] add. in marg. declaratum C : vel sufficienter declaratum Gp : et declaratum sufficienter P 2 quod … conclusionum] de qualibet illarum conclusionum quod p ‖ sequatur] sequitur P 3 posset] possit p 4 hypotheticis] hypothesis C : compositis P 5 sumeretur] sumetur GP : sumatur p ‖ maior] add. et P 7 si] om. P ‖ posset] possit p ‖ minor] add. scilicet p 8 concluditur] concludetur Gp : concluderetur P ‖ etiam] om. Pp 9 vel1] quod G 11 erit] est P : esset p 12 contra illos est] est contra illos in marg. C 14 nobis nota] inv. p 16 aliter] alicui P ‖ demonstrare] demonstrari Gp 19 praemissa] post erit p : praemissarum P ‖ amplius] add. demonstrativa et p 20 sint ad minus] ad minus sunt P ‖ praemissae] add. tunc Pp 22 dicatur] dicant G 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, II, 19, 100a3–9, 100b3–5; cf. AA, 35: 125 18 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 19–22 24 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 32, 88b4

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Tertia conclusio est quod non oportet omnis syllogismi demonstrativi consequentiam fieri evidentem per reductionem ad primum principium, quoniam syllogismi primae figurae sunt et dicuntur perfecti quantum ad evidentiam consequentiae tali modo quod non potest per consequentias evidentiores probari esse bona consequentia, si debito modo formati fuerint. Quarta conclusio est quod in quibusdam | per illam propositionem ‘a est’ non solitariam, sed cum alia praemissa, ego possum demonstrative scire illam conclusionem ‘b est’, licet a sit aliud quam b et b aliud quam a. Verbi gratia non est tibi notum ad sensum quod cor est, sed tibi notum est ad sensum quod homo est. Igitur tu argues: si homo est, cor est; sed homo est; igitur cor est. Minor patet ad sensum. Et maior erit tibi nota, quando demonstratum erit quod non potest homo vivere | sine corde. Et ex hoc etiam quod apparet nobis motum esse concludimus motorem esse in virtute illius alterius praemissae quod non potest esse motus sine motore. Et sic de multis aliis. Et ex praedictis apparet quomodo rationes quas illi adducebant ad suam opinionem non valeant contra conclusiones positas. Omnes enim procedunt secundum praedeterminata. Nunc dictis terminatis difficultatibus restat statim alia difficultas, scilicet cum dicimus ex causis et principiis sciri principiata et causata, quae res sint illae causae vel principia, vel quae res sint etiam illa principiata vel causata. Cum enim ex praemissis vel per praemissas dicamus scire conclusiones et illae praepositiones ‘ex’ et ‘per’ dicantur designare habitudinem causae ad causatum vel causarum ad causata, dubitatio statim oritur utrum praemissae debeant esse causae conclusionis vel scientiae praemissarum scientiae 1 demonstrativi] add. in marg. conclusionem seu C 4–5 potest … consequentia] possunt per consequentias evidentiores probari esse bonae consequentiae GPp 7 solitariam] solitarie p 8 conclusionem] conclusio G ‖ sit] om. G 9–10 tibi2 … sensum] tibi est notum ad sensum p : om. P 10 argues] add. sic Pp 11 erit tibi] est tibi P : erit p 12 homo] ante non G 13 quod apparet] inv. P ‖ motum] notum P 14 de] in P 16 et ex praedictis] ex praedictis igitur (sup. lin.) C : et ex dictis p 17 non valeant] nihil valeant P : nihil valebant p 17–18 procedunt] concedunt G 18 secundum praedeterminata] corr. ex per determinata C : secundum prius determinata p : praedeterminata G 19 nunc dictis terminatis] nunc terminatis dictis G : nunc igitur terminatis istis dictis P : et tunc iterum determinatis dictis p 20 dicimus] add. quod G ‖ et1] vel Pp ‖ sciri] scire p ‖ et2] vel P 21 vel1] add. illa Pp ‖ vel2] et GPp ‖ sint etiam] inv. P ‖ principiata vel causata] causata vel principiata P 22 scire] sciri G 24–25 praemissae] add. in demonstratione Pp : praemissa in demonstratione vel praemissae G 25 scientiae1] scientia GPp ‖ praemissarum] add. debeat esse causa P

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conclusionis vel etiam res significatae per terminos praemissarum rerum significatarum per terminos conclusionis. Et cum hoc etiam consequenter est difficultas quomodo in his dicendum est similiter vel differenter quantum ad scientiam et demonstrationem propter quid et quantum ad scientiam et demonstrationem quia est. De his igitur pono aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod sive in demonstratione propter quid sive in demonstratione quia non oportet praemissas esse causas conclusionis, quia potest conclusio formari ante praemissas et sine praemissis, immo saepe ante ponitur conclusio probanda, antequam probetur et antequam sit aliqua praemissarum; ideo nec in | esse nec in fieri dependet ex praemissis. Secunda conclusio est quod in omni demonstratione quia sive propter quid scientia praemissarum est causa scientiae conclusionis vel etiam scientiae praemissarum sunt causae scientiae conclusionis. | Quod enim prius est naturaliter altero, et ad cuius esse sequitur alterum, et non potest illud alterum esse sine illo, illud est causa illius alterius. Sed prius naturaliter oportet habere in anima scientiam praemissarum quam scientiam conclusionis, et ex scientia praemissarum sequitur naturaliter scientia conclusionis in anima. Et cum conclusio demonstrabilis fuerit dubitanda, non habebitur de ea scientia nisi prius scitis praemissis etc. Unde primo Posteriorum dicit Aristoteles quod non solum oportet praecognoscere prima, id est praemissas, sed etiam oportet credere eis magis et scire quam conclusionem. Quod probat quia: propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis; sed propter scire praemissas nos scimus conclusionem; igitur etc. Et secundum Lincolniensem huiusmodi causalitas est in genere causae efficientis. Haec autem hic dicuntur breviter, quia pertinent ad alium locum. 4 est] om. P ‖ differenter] dissimiliter P 5 est] om. GPp 8 quia1] add. est p 9 saepe ante] etiam saepe p ‖ ponitur] proponitur P 10 antequam1] quam P ‖ sit] om. P 11 ex] a p 12 est] om. G ‖ demonstratione] add. sive GPp 13 vel] add. sed del. quia C : add. quia G 14–15 prius est] inv. GPp 15 sequitur] post alterum p : consequitur G 17 in anima] ante habere p : post praemissarum P 18 ex scientia] scientiam P 19 dubitanda] dubia Pp 20 prius] om. P ‖ etc.] igitur etc. p : igitur P : om. G ‖ dicit] dixit p 21 praecognoscere] cognoscere p 22 oportet … magis] magis oportet credere eas G : magis oportet eas credere Pp 23 probat] probatur Pp ‖ quod unumquodque] LMT : unumquodque ABCGHPU : quod est quodque p ‖ illud] ipsum p 24 conclusionem] conclusiones GPp 25 huiusmodi] huius P 26 breviter] ante hic GPp 20 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 72a28–29, 36–37; cf. AA, 35: 30 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 72a29–33 24–25 Cf. Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in libros Analyticorum posteriorum, I, 2 (ed. Rossi, 101)

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Tunc est dubitatio: cum enim in omni demonstratione scientia praemissarum sit causa scientiae conclusionis et in nulla demonstratione praemissae sint causae conclusionis, quomodo igitur illa differunt ab invicem demonstratio quia et demonstratio propter quid? Respondetur quod, quando medium per quod fit demonstratio significat causam eius quod significatur per conclusionem, tunc est demonstratio propter quid, et si e converso, tunc est demonstratio | quia. Vel quando taliter se habere res, quod inde sunt verae illae praemissae, est causa taliter se habere res, quod inde conclusio est vera, tunc est demonstratio propter quid et e converso est de|monstratio quia. Et haec suppleantur in primo Posteriorum. Tunc certe bene videtur dubium de demonstrationibus mathematicis, quas communiter dicimus esse propter quid et tamen non sic significatur causa per praemissas vel per medium. Verbi gratia triangulus demonstratur habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis per hoc quod angulus extrinsecus est aequalis duobus intrinsecis sibi oppositis. Et hoc non est causa veritatis conclusionis, quia si non esset angulus extrinsecus, sed quod omnia extrinseca huic triangulo essent annihilata, non minus ille triangulus haberet tres angulos aequales etc. Et ego credo quod communiter in demonstrationibus mathematicis non est ex parte rerum significatarum per medium et per terminos conclusionis habitudo causae ad causatum vel e converso, sicut est aliquando in naturalibus. Ideo magis proprie loquendo scimus in naturalibus propter quid ita est | quam in mathematicis. Verum enim est quod luna eclipsatur propter hoc quod terra interponitur inter eam et solem, sed non est verum proprie loquendo quod triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis propter hoc quod angulus extrinsecus etc. Haberet enim, licet nullus esset angulus extrinsecus. Sed tamen illas demonstrationes mathematicas solemus vocare propter quid, quia cum ex parte rerum significatarum non sit habitudo ali-

1 tunc est] sed tunc est ibi GPp 2 scientiae] ante causa sed corr. C : post conclusionis G 3 sint causae] sunt causae P : sunt causa p ‖ illa] om. GPp 7 quia] add. est p 8 habere] habent p ‖ est causa] add. sed del. in tali C : add. in G : est causam P : et in p 9 habere] habendo GPp 10 quia] add. est p 12 tunc] praem. et GPp ‖ bene videtur] inv. GP : videtur bene esse p 13 esse] om. p 14 demonstratur] dicitur P 15 per] propter P 15–16 extrinsecus … intrinsecis] intrinsecus est aequalis duobus extrinsecis p 16 hoc] haec p 19 etc.] duobus rectis GPp 22 sicut] add. enim P 23 ideo … naturalibus] om. (hom.) p 24 quam] om. p ‖ enim est] est etiam CG : etiam est P 25 eam et solem] solem et lunam p 26 angulos … rectis] etc. P 27 nullus] non GPp 29 quia cum] quod cum G : quamvis p

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qua causae ad causatum, nos solum attendimus ad causalitatem scientiae ad scientiam et vocamus demonstrationem propter quid quae procedit ex propositionibus naturaliter evidentioribus et magis scitis ad propositiones demonstrabiles et innatas sciri per illas magis scitas; et sic est in mathematicis. | Ubi autem ex parte rerum est habitudo causae ad causatum, nos aliter distinguimus demonstrationem quia et propter quid, sicut ante dictum est. Nunc igitur finaliter dicendum est ad quaestionem quod ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum possumus scire principiata, causata et elementata. Et non curamus modo de distinctione illorum nominum. Haec enim nomina significant causas de quattuor generibus causarum, sed hoc nomen ‘elementum’ restringitur magis ad causas intrinsecas et hoc nomen ‘principium’ dicitur maxime proprie de causa efficiente. Et istis nominibus utimur permiscue, quando large utimur eis. Dicta igitur conclusio patet per experientiam. Saepe enim admiramur de his quae videmus ignorantes unde et quomodo eveniunt, et invenientes causam scimus iam unde et quomodo eveniunt et cessat admiratio. Et aliter etiam perirent demonstrationes vere et proprie dictae propter quid. Et omnino, cum maxime propinqua et essentialis sit habitudo causarum ad causata, eo quod causata habent esse per et propter suas causas, ideo cum dictum sit quod bene ex scientia unius potest nobis fieri scientia alterius, hoc maxime debet concedi, quod ex scientia causarum possit | nobis fieri scientia causatorum. Tunc ad rationes ante oppositum. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicendum est quod universaliter omnis scientia per demonstrationem debet esse ex nobis notioribus. Et si per scientiam unius fiat nobis scientia alterius, oportet nobis illud esse notius eo modo quo per scientiam ipsius habetur scientia alterius. Modo bene verum est quod ut in pluribus effectus in naturalibus sunt nobis notiores quam causae quan-

1 nos] add. enim p ‖ attendimus] intendimus G ‖ scientiae] add. et p 2 demonstrationem … procedit] demonstrationes propter quid quae procedunt P 4 demonstrabiles] dubitabiles Pp ‖ innatas] ignotas p ‖ magis] ante per P 5 nos] add. autem P 6 et] om. P 7 igitur] autem P 10 significant] significat G ‖ quattuor] quibuslibet P 11 restringitur magis] inv. P 12 et] add. de P 14–15 unde et quomodo] quomodo et unde P 15 eveniunt] eveniant p : veniunt P ‖ iam] om. p ‖ unde et quomodo] quomodo et unde P 16 eveniunt] eveniant p ‖ et2] om. Pp ‖ etiam] enim P 17 et omnino] om. p 18 sit] ante et3 (17) p ‖ per] add. in marg. eas C : add. causas p 19 bene] om. p 21 possit] potest p 22 tunc] et (om. GP) tunc respondendum est GPp ‖ ante] in GPp 23 ad primam] om. P 25 fiat] fit p 26 habetur scientia] habemus scientiam p ‖ bene verum est] verum est bene P ‖ ut] om. P

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tum ad quia ita est. Scimus enim manifeste quod luna eclipsatur videntes hoc et ignoramus causas propter quas eclipsatur. Ideo ex esse | causatorum nobis manifestorum studemus ad sciendum esse causarum. Sed numquam est possibile quod de effectibus habeamus notitiam propter quid sunt, nisi ante habeamus notitiam causarum. Ideo ex illis causis scitis | per effectus quantum ad quia est, nos revertendo super effectus procedimus ad sciendum propter quid effectus sunt, quoniam illae causae sunt nobis notiores quam propter quid effectus. Et sic est utrobique processus ex nobis notioribus. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod ibi non est circulatio prohibita vel disconveniens, quia utrobique sine petitione principii est processus ex notioribus, sed altero modo, quia primo quantum ad quia est, secundo quantum ad propter quid est. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles esse licitum. Dicit enim: ‘circulo quoque demonstrare est impossibile nisi altero modo’. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod cognitio causae bene est causa effective scientiae causati. Quamvis enim intellectus sit principale agens post Deum ad formandum in se ipso actum intelligendi, tamen species intelligibilis causata in eo ab obiecto bene est dispositio eius necessaria ad agendum illum actum intelligendi. Et ita, etiam si intellectus format in se scientiam conclusionis, tamen scientia praemissarum est in eo dispositio necessaria praevia ad hoc faciendum, prout haec debent magis videri tertio De anima. Dispositio autem agentis principalioris | ad agendum reducenda est ad genus causae agentis, sicut dispositio passi ad patiendum reducenda est ad genus causae materialis.

2 hoc et] huius etiam G ‖ ideo] igitur P 4–5 propter … notitiam] om. (hom.) G 5 per] scitur C ‖ effectus] add. nobis notiores p 6 nos] om. P ‖ procedimus] procedemus P 6–7 sciendum] scientiam p 7 sunt1] ante effectus p : om. P 8 quam] om. p ‖ effectus] add. sunt GPp ‖ est utrobique] inv. GPp 12 est] add. et GPp 14 modo] duorum modorum p 15 aliam dico] aliam dicitur Pp : alteram dicitur G ‖ bene] add. dicitur sive p ‖ causa] om. P ‖ effective] effectiva GP : effectiva cognitivae p 17 se] semet GPp 20 tamen] cum C 21 faciendum] sciendum P ‖ haec debent magis] haec magis debent Gp : hoc magis debet P ‖ videri] add. in GPp 22 reducenda] reducta sed add. in marg. reducenda C : reducta G 23 reducenda est] reducenda (corr. in marg. ex reducta) C : reducta est G 24 materialis] add. in marg. seu agentis C 14 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 3, 72b25 21 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De anima, III, q. 15 (ed. Zupko, I, 160–176)

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⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod quodam modo causa gerit similitudinem causati et causatum quodam modo participat similitudinem causae. Propter quod dictum est septimo Metaphysicae quod omne quod fit fit a sibi simili, scilicet formaliter vel virtualiter. ⟨5⟩ Item ad aliam rationem, quae est difficilis, videtur mihi esse dicendum quod in processu scientifico de praemissis ad conclusionem et de primis conclusionibus ad ulteriores nos saepe impedimur per ligationes sensuum vel occupationes circa aliqua. Et si non fuerimus sic impediti habentes maiorem demonstrationis faciendae, deficit nobis minor vel e converso. Et si maiorem et minorem in promptu habeamus, tamen non habemus ordinationem earum in syllogismo. Et saepe cum illis habemus in intellectu plurimas alias propositiones et tunc ex voluntate libera est, si volumus procedere, quod cum propositione a iungamus propositionem c vel d et sic de aliis. Et non possumus ad scientiam conclusionis intentae pervenire, | donec determinate, immediate et ordinate hanc cum illa coniunxerimus. Quod est aliquando difficile valde, quia apparet intellectui quod per propositionem c debeamus venire ad intentum, cum tamen hoc non sit verum. Ideo voluntas determinat intellectum ad cogitandum de c et ad coniungendum a cum c et ita non potest | pervenire ad intentum. Ubi autem esset determinatio per naturam non concurrente actu libero voluntatis, ego crederem quod semper ex causis sufficientibus positis sequitur effectus, nisi interveniret impedimentum.

1 quodam … gerit] causa quodam modo gerit p : causa gerit quodam modo P 3 omne] omnino G 4 scilicet] vel p : add. vel P : add. universaliter C ‖ virtualiter] materialiter P 5 item] om. GPp ‖ aliam] quintam p ‖ esse] om. p 6 conclusionem et] conclusiones et G : conclusiones P 6–7 primis] praemissis P 8 occupationes] add. eorum GPp ‖ aliqua] alia GPp 9 demonstrationis] add. sciendae vel p ‖ vel] et GPp ‖ et] tamen p 10 habeamus] habemus p 10–11 ordinationem] ordinationes p 11 saepe] add. tamen p 12 tunc] cum G 13 quod] om. p ‖ iungamus] coniungamus P ‖ c vel d] add. vel f G : c vel f P : scilicet d vel f p 14 intentae pervenire] intentae provenire G : debitae pervenire p 15 coniunxerimus] coniungamus p 16 valde] ante difficile Gp : om. P 18 cogitandum] add. in marg. determinandum cognoscendum C : cognoscendum p ‖ de c et] d et c p ‖ coniungendum] cogitandum P 20 libero] liberae P ‖ quod] quia P 21 sufficientibus positis] inv. P ‖ sequitur] sequeretur Gp 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 7, 1032a23–25

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⟨6⟩ De ultima ratione dictum est quod bene et certe fiunt nobis evidentiae ex naturali inclinatione intellectus ad veritatem. Si enim ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum, quare non esset intellectus naturaliter inclinatus ad assentiendum multis veris et ad dissentiendum multis falsis? Sic enim assentit principiis et dissentit oppositis eorum sine probatione vel improbatione. Haec de quaestione illa. 1 est] add. in positione p ‖ bene et] saepe p ‖ fiunt nobis] inv. GP 2–3 est naturaliter inclinatus] naturaliter inclinatus sit Pp 3 esset] est G ‖ intellectus] add. noster p 3–4 inclinatus] om. P 4 veris] om. G 5 principiis] om. G ‖ dissentit] dissentis G 7 haec … illa] etc. GPp

⟨i.5⟩

⟨Utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oporteat scire omnes causas eius⟩ Quaeritur quinto utrum ad perfecte sciendum aliquem effectum oportet scire omnes causas eius.

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Et arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Metaphysica est perfecta scientia, immo ceterarum perfectissima, | ut habetur prooemio Metaphysicae. Et similiter mathematica est perfecta scientia, cum demonstrationes mathematicae sint in primo gradu certitudinis, ut dicit Commentator secundo Metaphysicae. Et tamen illae scientiae non procedunt per omnes causas, immo Commentator in isto prooemio dicit quod mathematicus procedit solum per causam formalem et metaphysicus solum per tria genera causarum, scilicet efficientem, formalem et finalem. Et omnino puri mathematici nihil demonstrant per causam finalem vel per causam efficientem, sicut apparet tertio Metaphysicae. ⟨2⟩ Secundo per nullam scientiam scitur illa conclusio ‘triangulus habet tres’ etc. nisi per geometriam. Igitur per geometriam scitur quantumcumque | perfectissime sciri potest. Et tamen geometria non intromittit se de omnibus causis illius conclusionis. Omnis enim conclusionis causa est intellectus agens vel intellectus possibilis, de quibus geometria nihil se intromittit.

4 quaeritur quinto] add. consequenter G : praem. consequenter p 5 scire] post eius p 6 et arguitur] arguitur P : arguitur primo p 7 perfecta scientia] inv. P 8 habetur] add. in P : patet in p ‖ et] om. p 8–9 perfecta scientia] inv. P 9–10 mathematicae … certitudinis] seu mathematicae †…† primo gradu certitudinis in marg. C 9 sint] sunt P 10 secundo] septimo C ‖ metaphysicae] add. in marg. et primo posteriorum G ‖ illae scientiae] scientiae istae p 11 immo] igitur Pp 12 dicit] ante in (11) GPp ‖ procedit] procedat P : om. C 13 scilicet] om. GP ‖ efficientem formalem] inv. G 14 puri mathematici] pure mathematice G : pure metaphysice P 15 per causam] om. p ‖ sicut apparet] ut patet p 16 secundo] praem. item p 17 tres] add. angulos Gp : add. angulos aequales duobus P ‖ igitur per geometriam] om. (hom.) G 18 tamen] cum C 20 nihil se] inv. Gp 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 2, 938a4–5, 9–11; cf. AA, 1: 27 10 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, II, comm. 16, f. 35K 11 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 1, f. 6C 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, III, 2, 996a29–34

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⟨3⟩ Item sequeretur quod nullus posset scire perfecte aliquem effectum, quod videtur inconveniens. Consequentia patet, quia si scientia effectus debeat dependere ex scientia causarum suarum omnium, necesse est, si effectus ille debeat perfecte sciri, quod omnes causae suae sciantur perfecte. Et hoc apparet impossibile. Nullus enim homo apparuit nisi Deus, qui perfecte sciret Deum et omnes stellas, immo omnibus philosophis remanserunt multa dubia de Deo et de numeris stellarum. ⟨1⟩ Oppositum videtur velle Aristoteles in principio istius libri. Dicit enim: ‘circa omnes scientias quarum sunt principia aut causae aut elementa’; et per haec nomina intendit | omnia genera causarum. Et postea dicit: ‘scire arbitramur unumquodque, cum causas primas cognoscimus et prima principia usque ad elementa’; et per hoc intendit tam causas propinquas quam remotas. Ideo satis expresse manifestat quod ipse intendit omnes causas. ⟨2⟩ Item quamdiu contingit quaerere et dubitare de aliquo, tamdiu illud non est perfecte scitum. Sed si alicuius effectus aliqua causa fuerit ignota, contingit de illo effectu quaerere et dubitare propter quid est quantum ad illam causam. | Igitur non est perfecte scitus. Quaestio supponit unum, postea quaerit aliud. Supponit enim quod de aliquo, immo de aliquo effectu, possumus habere perfectam scientiam et postea quaerit utrum ad illam habendam oportet cognoscere omnes causas illius effectus. Et tam suppositum quam quaesitum est dubitabile. De supposito manifestum est quod, si volumus loqui de perfecto simpliciter, nihil est

1 sequeretur] sequitur Gp ‖ scire perfecte] inv. GPp 2 consequentia patet] om. P 3 suarum] ante causarum p : post omnium G 3–4 necesse … perfecte2] om. G 4 perfecte2] om. p 5 homo] om. P 6 remanserunt] manserunt p 7 dubia] add. et p ‖ deo … numeris] deo et de numeris (corr. in marg. ex natura) C : deo et de naturis G : deo et naturis P : naturis et etiam de numeris p ‖ stellarum] add. ergo etc. G : add. igitur P 8 videtur velle aristoteles] videtur intendere aristoteles P : videtur esse philosophus C : intendit aristoteles p ‖ principio istius libri] primo istius libri G : principio huius libri P : littera puta in prooemio huius p ‖ dicit enim] dicens p 9 scientias] om. p ‖ aut1] et p ‖ elementa] add. ex horum cognitione p 11 causas] add. eius p 11–12 principia] add. et GP 12 intendit tam causas] intelligit omnes causas tam p 13 intendit] intelligit p 14 quamdiu] tamdiu C ‖ tamdiu] quamdiu C 14–15 illud non est] non est illud p 17 causam] add. fuerit p 18 quaestio] praem. ista p : add. ista P ‖ supponit unum] inv. p ‖ postea quaerit aliud] praem. et GP : et aliud quaerit p 19 immo] add. quod G 21 illius] eiusdem P 22 volumus] add. sic C 8 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a10–12; cf. AA, 2: 1 AA, 2: 2

10 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a12–14; cf.

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perfectum nisi Deus, ut patet quinto Metaphysicae, et etiam nulla est simpliciter perfecta scientia nisi scientia divina, quae est ipse Deus. Sed tamen est dubitatio, si volumus loqui de scientia perfecta non simpliciter, sed in genere scientiarum humanarum. Et cum loquimur de scientia demonstrativa, expedit distinguere duplex scitum: unum potest vocari scitum immediatum, quod est conclusio demonstrata; aliud potest vocari scitum remotum, quod est res significata per terminos conclusionis demonstratae. Et credo quod nos non curaremus scire conclusiones, nisi per hoc crederemus habere scientiam de illis rebus.

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Pono igitur conclusiones aliquas. Prima est quod ad sciendum perfecte per modum conclusionis illam conclusionem ‘triangulus habet tres’ etc. non oportet scire in speciali omnes causas illius conclusionis nec etiam omnes causas triangulorum, quia conclusio scitur perfecte per modum conclusionis per demonstrationes eam evidenter concludentes et ex omnibus praemissis evidentibus (et aliter non scitur perfecte per modum conclusionis); sed demonstrationes evidenter concludentes praedictam conclusionem nullam mentionem facerent in | speciali de Deo et intellectu humano et de multis aliis quae sunt causae omnium conclusionum et omnium triangulorum; igitur etc. Secunda conclusio poni potest quod dicta conclusio etiam per modum conclusionis non | scitur perfecte per solam geometriam. Et ratio huius est, quia conclusio non scitur perfecte demonstrative, nisi praemissae sint per se notae vel ex per se notis demonstratae, ut apparet primo Posteriorum et etiam primo Topicorum, ubi dicitur quod demonstratio est syllogismus ex

1 nisi] add. solus P ‖ patet] apparet GP ‖ etiam] illa G 1–2 simpliciter] om. p 2 tamen] bene GPp 5 loquimur] loquamur GPp 6 unum] add. scitum p ‖ vocari] vocare G 6–7 demonstrata] demonstrativa p 7 vocari] vocare G 8 nos] om. G ‖ curaremus] curamus p 10 aliquas] om. GPp 11 modum] medium P 12 etc.] angulos aequales duobus rectis GPp 13 illius conclusionis] om. P ‖ illius … causas2] om. (hom.) p 14 modum] medium P ‖ demonstrationes] demonstrationem P 14–15 eam evidenter] inv. GPp 15 ex … evidentibus] ex evidentibus praemissis Pp : evidentibus praemissis G 16 modum] medium P 17 mentionem facerent] inv. P 18 et1] add. de Pp 20 modum] medium P 23 demonstratae] determinatae P ‖ apparet] patet p 23–24 et … topicorum] om. P 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 16, 1021b30–32 23–24 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 71b20–22; cf. AA, 35: 12; cf. Aristoteles, Topica, I, 1, 100a26–29

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veris et primis aut ex eis quae per prima et vera principium suae cognitionis sumpserunt (et per ‘prima’ intendit per se nota); sed principia geometriae quibus oportet uti ad demonstrandum illam conclusionem | et omnes alias conclusiones geometricas non sunt per se nota, sed multum dubia, nisi fiant nota per aliam scientiam. Hoc ego declaro, quia magnum dubitabile est et fuit apud antiquos utrum corpus fuit compositum ex punctis indivisibilibus vel non, sed esset divisibile in semper divisibilia. Et illam dubitationem non potest geometra tractare per suam scientiam, sed tractanda est per physicam vel per metaphysicam. Sed tamen geometer habet supponere quod continuum non sit compositum ex indivisibilibus, quia si esset compositum ex pluribus indivisibilibus, plurimae conclusiones geometricae essent falsae. Haec enim esset falsa ‘omnem lineam per aequalia dividere contingit’, quia sic non posset dividi linea composita ex punctis imparibus indivisibilibus. Ideo etiam omnes conclusiones illam sequentes et ex ea dependentes essent falsae vel dubiae, immo etiam prima conclusio et per consequens aliae. Supponit enim quod omnis circuli omnes lineae ductae a centro ad circumferentiam sunt aequales. Et sic supponit omnem | circulum habere centrum, quod vere sit medium circuli per aequidistantiam ad circumferentiam. Et hoc esset falsum, si linea componeretur ex punctis indivisibilibus. Caperem enim circulum cuius diameter esset quattuor punctorum. Tunc nullum illorum esset tale medium. Igitur omnino principia supposita in mathematica et conclusiones ibi probatae praesupponunt illud dubium quod corpus non sit compositum ex indivisibilibus, quod non scitur nisi per aliam scientiam. Item ex his concluditur tertia conclusio, scilicet quod mathematica non est scientiarum certissima, quia oportet principia demonstrationum esse certiora, magis scita et magis credita quam conclusiones; sed principia 1 et1] om. Pp ‖ eis] his GPp ‖ principium] principia G ‖ cognitionis] generationis G 2 prima … nota] primam intendit per se notam P 4 multum] multa p ‖ fiant] fiat G 5 hoc ego] hoc P : haec ergo p 6 fuit2] esset Pp 7 vel non] om. G 8 potest geometra] potest geometer Gp : ponit geometer P ‖ tractanda est] inv. G 9 vel] et P ‖ sed] et Pp 11 pluribus] om. GPp ‖ plurimae] omnes paene p : omnes physicae P ‖ geometricae] geometriae GPp 12 per … contingit] contingit per aequalia dividere G : licet per aequalia dividere p : per aequalia dividere P 13 non] om. P ‖ punctis] in marg. C : om. GPp ‖ imparibus] paribus p : add. vel P 14 etiam] etc. p 15 conclusio] add. geometriae falsa p 15–16 supponit enim] supponit P : supponunt p 16 omnis circuli] omnes trianguli et p ‖ ductae] deductae P 17 supponit] supponunt p 19 linea] om. P ‖ punctis indivisibilibus] inv. P 20 enim] om. P 21 supposita] sumpta p ‖ mathematica] metaphysica P 22 ibi probatae praesupponunt] ibi probatae supponunt GP : reprobatae supponunt p 23 aliam] add. sup. lin. illam C 24 item ex] et ex P : ex G : et p ‖ concluditur] add. corollarie p ‖ scilicet quod] scilicet p : quod G 25 scientiarum] scientia P ‖ principia demonstrationum] inv. P

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mathematicalia sunt conclusiones declarandae et probandae in alia scientia; igitur illam aliam scientiam oportet esse certiorem. Et ideo expresse Aristoteles prooemio Metaphysicae probat non mathematicam, sed metaphysicam esse simpliciter certissimam. Sed tunc quare dicit Commentator quod mathematicae demonstrationes sunt in primo gradu certitudinis et omnes clamant mathematicas scientias esse certissimas? Dico quod hoc non est simpliciter verum, sed hoc ita dicitur, quia suppositis principiis mathematicis modus demonstrandi conclusiones mathematicas ex illis principiis est certissimus et ordinatissimus. Si igitur debeamus perfecte scire aliquam conclusionem mathematicam, | oportet perfecte scire praemissas per quas infertur usque ad prima principia mathematica. Et si aliquod illorum principiorum non sit perfecte notum, sed demonstrabile, oportet praescire praemissas per quas demonstratur et sic usque ad principia | indemonstrabilia per se nota. Et tunc illa conclusio mathematica non erit ante perfecte scita. Et sic potest perfecte sciri per modum conclusionis. Tunc ergo dicendum est de scito remoto. Et sit exemplum de lapide vel de equo. Equum igitur esse perfecte scitum potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quia est scitum per aliquam conclusionem perfecte scitam per modum conclusionis; alio modo, quia est scitum per omnem conclusionem per quam sciri potest. Et primum horum modorum credo esse possibilem. Sed ad sciendum perfecte non oportet scire in speciali omnes causas eius, sicut iam prius dictum est. Et ego nunc dico | et dixi prius ‘scire in speciali’, quia cito et faciliter omnia sciuntur in communi vel communissime tamquam res significatae per terminos conclusionis demonstratae. Nam si ego scio quod omne ens est esse suum et essentia sua, ego habeo in communi scientiam 1 mathematicalia] mathematica GP : mathematicae p 3 aristoteles] add. in Pp 4 esse simpliciter] inv. G 6 gradu] ordine Pp ‖ omnes clamant] omnis clamabat P 6–7 mathematicas … certissimas] mathematicas esse scientias certissimas P : mathematicam esse scientiam certissimam p 8–9 quia suppositis] quia sumptis p : quod suppositis GP 9 mathematicis] mathematicae G 10 ex illis principiis] om. P 11 debeamus perfecte] inv. G 12 ad] om. p 13 et] om. G 16 non erit ante] et non ante erit GP : erit non ante et p ‖ et] om. P 19 de] om. Pp ‖ igitur] enim G 20 est scitum] inv. P 20–21 modum] medium P 22 primum] principium P : primo p ‖ possibilem] possibile p ‖ sed] add. quia G 24 et2] ut G ‖ speciali] add. est G 25 tamquam] sicut C 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 2, 982a25–28 5 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, II, comm. 16, f. 35K

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de omnibus, tam de causis quam de causatis, cum illi termini supponunt pro omnibus rebus. Sed de secundo modo, scilicet quomodo lapis potest sciri perfecte, scilicet per omnes conclusiones per quas sciri potest, manifestum est quod sic lapis non potest sciri perfecte, nisi demonstratae sint omnes conclusiones demonstrabiles quarum aliquis terminorum supponit pro illo lapide vel significat illum lapidem. Et sic ego credo quod numquam homo, nisi fuerit Deus vel in patria beatus, de quibus nihil dico, scivit aliquam rem perfecte, quia isti termini ‘ens’, ‘idem’, ‘unum’, ‘substantia’ vel ‘accidens’, ‘causa’ vel ‘causatum’, ‘corruptibile’ vel ‘incorruptibile’ et plurimi alii termini | supponunt pro illo lapide et significant illum lapidem; et tamen numquam fuerunt alicui tot conclusiones demonstratae, quin ex dictis terminis multae essent formabiles et demonstrabiles, quae apud illum numquam fuerunt formatae vel demonstratae. Et omnino, quamvis haec sit concedenda, quod omnem conclusionem demonstrabilem potest scire homo, tamen haec est a me neganda, quod possibile est ab homine omnem conclusionem scibilem et demonstrabilem esse scitam et demonstratam. Igitur dicerem quod non est possibile quod ab aliquo homine lapis sit ita perfecte scitus quod omnis conclusio scibilis vel demonstrabilis sit sibi scita vel demonstrata, quae potest formari ex terminis supponentibus pro lapide vel significantibus lapidem. Postea directe respondendo ad quaestionem pono istam conclusionem quod impossibile est aliquem scire perfecte lapidem, scilicet per omnes conclusiones per quas est scibilis, nisi ille sciat omnes causas illius in speciali, licet non secundum singulares conceptus, quia quaestiones dubiae quibus possunt correspondere conclusiones scibiles et formabiles de | illo termino ‘lapis’ sunt ‘ex quot | et ex quibus secundum speciem potest talis lapis esse vel fieri intrinsece, sive materialiter sive formaliter?’ et similiter ‘a quot et a quibus secundum speciem potest fieri talis lapis?’ et ‘propter quos fines 1 de3] om. G ‖ cum] quia p ‖ supponunt] supponant P 5 demonstratae] determinatae P 6 demonstrabiles] determinabiles P 8 beatus] ante in GPp ‖ dico] add. modo Pp : dicam modo G 10 termini] om. Pp 13 essent formabiles] fuissent formales GP ‖ et demonstrabiles] et determinabiles P : ac demonstrabiles p 14 formatae] factae P ‖ omnino] ideo p 16 a] apud GPp 17 et1] ac p ‖ dicerem] dicemus p 19 vel1] et GPp ‖ vel2] et GPp 20 potest] posset GPp ‖ vel] et GPp 22 postea] post P ‖ respondendo] respondeo G ‖ quaestionem] add. ego Gp 24 illius] eius GPp ‖ speciali] add. scilicet p 25 quaestiones] conclusiones p 26 et] om. GPp ‖ de illo] ex isto P : ex p 27 quot] quod G ‖ ex] om. Pp 28 similiter] consimiliter G : simpliciter p ‖ quot] quod G 29 a] om. GPp ‖ fieri] post lapis G

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natura fecit ipsum?’; et non scitur perfecte lapis, nisi determinatae et scitae fuerint huiusmodi quaestiones et conclusiones; et tamen non sciuntur, nisi omnes causae lapidis fuerint scitae secundum speciales conceptus earum; igitur etc. Et certum est quod sic scire perfecte lapidem vel festucam, somnum vel vigiliam est nobis valde difficile vel impossibile. Et est nobis magna res, si ad specialem notitiam plurium et principalium causarum huiusmodi effectuum possumus pervenire sciendo quod illae sunt huiusmodi effectuum causae et quomodo.

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam concedendum est quod metaphysica est scientia perfecta, quia per eam scitur perfecte aliqua conclusio per modum conclusionis. Sed forte sic non est geometria perfecta, sicut dictum fuit. Sed tamen nec metaphysica nec alia scientia sic est perfecta quod per eam sciantur omnes conclusiones quarum termini supponunt pro lapide vel pro festuca, sed ad hoc exigitur cognitio omnium generum scientiarum et artium. ⟨2⟩ Ad secundam dico quod illa conclusio ‘triangulus habet tres’ non scitur per modum conclusionis demonstratae sine geometria nec per geometriam simpliciter sine scientia per quam sciuntur principia supponenda | in geometria. Sed tunc etiam illa conclusio scibilis est per modum rei significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium. Et sic scitur per plurimas scientias. Et non scitur sic perfecte, nisi sciantur omnes eius causae, sicut ante dictum est. ⟨3⟩ Alia ratio procedit secundum ea quae concessa fuerunt in positione etc. 1–2 et scitae fuerint] fuerint et scitae p : fuerunt et scitae P : fuerint scitae G 2 huiusmodi … conclusiones] conclusiones huiusmodi et quaestiones G : huius conclusiones et quaestiones P : huius conclusiones et conclusiones p ‖ et2] om. p 3 lapidis fuerint] lapidis fierent C : lapidum fuerint p : lapidum fuerunt P ‖ conceptus] conclusiones P 4 et] om. P ‖ sic] om. P ‖ vel] velut G 6 notitiam] in marg. C : om. GP 6–7 huiusmodi effectuum] huiusmodi effectum G : huius effectuum P : effectuum p 7 huiusmodi] huius Pp 9 ad] praem. tunc Gp : praem. tunc igitur P 10 est2] sit GPp 11 quia] et C 12 forte] post sic P : post est p ‖ tamen nec] cum C 14 supponunt] supponant p ‖ pro2] om. GP ‖ ad] ex G 15 cognitio] add. sup. lin. congregatio C : congregatio p 16 secundam] aliam p ‖ tres] add. angulos etc. (om. p) GPp 17 conclusionis demonstratae] determinatae P ‖ sine] in CG 18 quam] add. scientiam p 19 tunc etiam] iterum etiam GP : iterum p 20 sic scitur] om. p 21 scientias] om. C 22 est] ante ante P 23 ratio] add. satis GP ‖ concessa fuerunt] inv. P 23–24 in positione etc.] in conclusione etc. p : etc. P : om. G

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⟨Utrum sint eadem notiora nobis et naturae⟩ Quaeritur sexto utrum sint eadem notiora nobis et naturae.

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Arguitur quod sic: ⟨1⟩ Per Commentatorem hoc dicentem ita esse in scientiis mathematicis. ⟨2⟩ Item quaecumque | sunt tibi vel mihi notiora, illa sunt notiora animae meae vel tuae; sed anima mea vel tua est natura; igitur illa quae sunt nobis notiora sunt notiora naturae. ⟨3⟩ Iterum causae sunt causatis notiores secundum naturam, ut omnes communiter concedunt. Sed etiam sunt nobis notiores, quia per eas cognoscimus causata; et numquam posset aliquis scire sibi dubia per illa quae adhuc essent magis aliqualiter dubia. Igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Iterum vel erit sermo de natura nostra, et sic idem erit nobis notius et naturae; vel de natura non cognoscente, et tunc non est ad propositum, quia nihil est sibi notius | vel minus notum; vel de natura divina, quae est Deus, et sic nihil est sibi notius unum quam aliud, quia omnia sunt sibi perfectissime nota | sine aliquo defectu vel diminutione. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem dicentem: ‘non enim ea quae nobis nota et simpliciter’, id est non sunt nobis eadem notiora et naturae. Haec enim expositio manifeste apparet per verba Aristotelis praecedentia et sequentia et per omnes expositores.

3 quaeritur] add. consequenter G ‖ sint] sunt GPp 4 arguitur] praem. et G 5 hoc dicentem] qui dicit hoc p 6 tibi vel mihi] tibi sive mihi p : mihi vel tibi P 7 mea vel tua] tua vel mea P 7–8 quae … notiora2] sunt nobis notiora et p : non sunt nobis notiora CG 9 ut] et P 11 posset] possit G 12 aliqualiter] vel aequaliter Pp 13 erit1] esset p ‖ erit2] om. p 14 et] add. sic P 15 vel2] si p 16 sic] tunc GPp ‖ unum] om. p 17 aliquo] add. de aliquo G ‖ diminutione] demonstratione G 18 ea] eadem Pp 19 nota] add. sunt G : notiora p ‖ eadem] ante nobis Pp : om. G 20 manifeste] om. G ‖ verba] add. ipsius G 5 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 2, f. 6M 18 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a18; cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 71b33–72a1; cf. AA, 35: 15

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In hac quaestione implicantur plures difficultates. Primo, quid est notius naturae et quid nobis? Secundo, cui naturae notius est illud quod est nobis minus notum? Tertio, quare vocamus notius simpliciter illud quod est notius naturae, et non illud quod est notius nobis? Quarto directe de quaestione. Ad primum respondet Commentator quod causae sunt notiores naturae quam sua causata, sed nobis sunt notiora quae sunt magis, certius et evidentius sensibilia vel etiam facilius ex sensibilibus deducibilia. Ad secundum etiam respondet Commentator quod non dicitur aliquid notius naturae quia natura cognoscit, sed causae naturalium dicuntur notiores naturae, quia si ipsa cognosceret et ageret per cognitionem, illae causae essent sibi notiores, cum ipsa ab illis causis incipiat operari. Et hoc apparet esse dictum de natura agente. Alii dicunt quod illa natura cui causae sunt notiores est Deus, non quia in Deo sit diversitas et ordo cognitionum (Deus enim simplicissima cognitione cognoscit omnia), sed quia in ipsis rebus cognitis est ordo et quod illum ordinem Deus cognoscit. Et per hoc ipsi solvunt, ad tertium dubium dicentes quod illud debet dici magis simpliciter, quod dicitur in ordine ad Deum, quam illud quod dicitur in ordine ad nos. Ideo simpliciter vocatur notius quod naturae dicto modo dicitur notius. Aliter respondetur ad secundum dubium, scilicet quod illud dicitur nobis notius, quod est nobis notius in demonstrando quia est, eo quod de naturalibus et sensibilibus prius cognoscimus quia sunt quam propter quid sunt. Sed illud dicitur notius naturae, quod est nobis notius in demonstrando propter quid est, eo quod talis demonstratio est secundum modum et ordinem processus naturae, scilicet a causis ad causata. Et per hoc etiam solvitur tertium dubium. Quia demonstratio propter quid est potior et faciens perfectius scire, ideo illud simpliciter dicitur notius, quod est notius in processu demonstrativo propter quid.

1 primo] prima p 2 secundo] add. etiam G : secunda p ‖ est2] post notum (3) P 3 tertio] tertia p 4 quarto] quarta p 5 primum] primam p 6 notiora] evidentiora sed add. in marg. vel notiora G 6–7 certius et evidentius] evidentius et certius GP : et evidentius et certius p 7 sensibilibus] sensibus Gp 8 secundum] secundam p 9 notius] rep. C ‖ cognoscit] cognoscat p 10 cognosceret et ageret] ageret et cognosceret C ‖ cognitionem] agnitionem p 14 et] vel P 15 cognitis] cognoscibilibus P 16 cognoscit] cognoscat p ‖ ad] om. p 17 magis] ante debet Pp ‖ simpliciter] add. notum P 19 quod] quam P 24 eo quod] quia P 25 causis] causatis p 26 dubium] add. nam Pp 28 demonstrativo] demonstrando G 5 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 3, f. 7D 8 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 3, f. 7D

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Tunc igitur directe respondendum est | ad quaestionem et ponuntur conclusiones. Prima est quod aliqua sunt notiora nobis, quae non | sunt notiora naturae et e converso. Sic enim se habent ad invicem composita naturalia nobis sensibilia ad suas causas, scilicet ad primam materiam et ad formas substantiales. Sic etiam se habent ad invicem motus et operationes naturalium ad principia activa et passiva eorum. Sic etiam se habent ad invicem | illa inferiora ad Deum et intelligentias. Secunda conclusio est quod aliqua eadem respectu | earundem sunt nobis et naturae notiora. Hoc enim dicit Commentator esse verum in mathematicis. Sed dictum est prius quod forte, quantum ad res pro quibus supponunt termini demonstrationum mathematicarum, non est ordo causae ad causatum. Ideo non est ibi proprie loquendo notius vel minus notum quantum est ex parte illarum rerum, quamvis praemissae sint bene notiores et certiores conclusionibus, et quod scientiae praemissarum sint causae scientiarum conclusionum, sicut alias dictum est. Sed tamen haec secunda conclusio manifesta est in quibusdam naturalibus. Obiecta enim sensibilia sunt nobis notiora quam species sensibiles ipsorum vel etiam quam species intelligibiles; et tamen cum hoc sunt naturae notiora, quia sunt causae earum. Et etiam plurimae influentiae corporum caelestium in illa inferiora sunt nobis occultae. Ideo stellae sunt nobis notiores quam illae influentiae, cum sint insensibiles; et tamen illae etiam stellae sunt notiores naturae, cum sint causae illarum influentiarum. Ideo concluditur tertio quod non est vera propositio Aristotelis de virtute sermonis sicut ipse ponit eam, quia ponit eam universalem, eo quod negatio praecedit subiectum et praedicatum. Haec enim propositio ‘non eadem

1 tunc] nunc G ‖ directe] post est p : om. P 3 quae non] rep. G 4 sic] sicut p 5 ad3] om. P 6 sic] praem. et P ‖ etiam] enim G 6–7 motus … invicem] om. (hom.) P 7 principia] prima p ‖ se habent ad] habent se G 9 est] om. G ‖ earundem] eorundem P : eiusdem p 10 verum] add. sunt nobis notiora et naturae G 12 demonstrationum] ante termini p : conclusionum P 12–13 causatum] causata p 13 notum] add. secundum naturam p : add. sed notum P 14 sint bene] bene sunt Gp 15 scientiae … causae] scientiae praemissarum sunt causae p : scientia praemissarum sit causa P 16 tamen haec] cum hoc P 18 ipsorum] ipsarum P 19 quia] quae G 20 in] et G 21–22 cum sint insensibiles] quia sunt sensibiles p 22 tamen] cum C 24 tertio] tertia p 25 quia ponit eam] om. p 26 praecedit] add. et Pp 10 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 2, f. 6M 11 Cf. sup., I, q. 4, 4320–23 16 Cf. sup., I, q. 4, 4212–14

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sunt notiora nobis et simpliciter’ valet istam ‘nulla eadem sunt nobis’ etc. Sed per hanc propositionem Aristoteles intendebat istam indefinitam quod aliqua nobis notiora sunt minus nota simpliciter et e converso. Et forte quod ipse locutus est universaliter, quia non intendebat hic nisi de comparatione compositorum naturalium sensibilium et operationum suarum ad primam materiam et ad formas substantiales. Et restringendo ad huiusmodi comparationem propositio esset universaliter vera. Omnes rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis possunt reduci ad sensus suos veros secundum praedicta etc. 1 notiora nobis] inv. Pp ‖ et] add. sup. lin. naturae C ‖ sunt nobis] om. Pp 2 hanc] hac G 5 suarum] add. sensibilium Pp 6–7 huiusmodi comparationem] huiusmodi comparationem (corr. ex compositi) C : huiusmodi operationem G : huius comparationem P 9 etc.] om. P

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⟨Utrum universalia sint nobis notiora singularibus⟩ Quaeritur septimo utrum universalia sunt nobis notiora singularibus. 5

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⟨1⟩ Arguitur quod non per Aristotelem primo Posteriorum dicentem quod nobis notiora sunt quae sunt proxima sensui; et illa dicit esse singularia, universalia autem dicit esse a sensu remotiora. ⟨2⟩ Et idem habetur prooemio Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur quod maxime universalia sunt nobis difficillima ad cognoscendum, quia sunt a sensu remotissima. ⟨3⟩ Iterum quae | sensui sunt notiora, nobis sunt notiora, ut statim allegabatur ex primo Posteriorum et prooemio Metaphysicae. | Et hoc est rationabile, quia cognitio nostra intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva. Sed in primo huius dicit Aristoteles expresse quod universale quidem notum est secundum rationem, singulare autem secundum sensum; ratio quidem enim universalis, sensus autem particularis. ⟨4⟩ Item in illo prooemio videtur esse | intentio Aristotelis quod definitum est nobis notius partibus definientibus. Quod ipse sic probat: totum est nobis notius suis partibus; definitum autem totum quoddam est ad partes definitionis, iuxta dictum Porphyrii quod species componitur ex genere et differentia, sicut statua ex aere et figura; igitur definitum est notius. Et

4 quaeritur septimo] septimo consequenter quaeritur G ‖ sunt] sint G 7 dicit esse] post sensu P 8 idem habetur] ideo habetur in p 9 quia] quae G 11 iterum quae] secundo quae P : item quae et rep. G ‖ sunt notiora1] inv. Pp ‖ sunt2] post notiora2 P : om. p ‖ ut] sicut G : sicut iam Pp 12 ex] in P 13 sed] sicut p ‖ primo] principio p 14 quod] om. p 15 rationem] rationes P ‖ quidem] om. p 15–16 universalis] add. est Pp 16 autem] vero P 18 definientibus] definibilibus C 19 quoddam est ad] quoddam ad P : est quoad p 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 72a1–5; cf. AA, 35: 16–18 8 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 2, 982a23–25; cf. AA, 1: 15 12 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 72a1–4; cf. AA, 35: 16; cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 2, 982a23–25; cf. AA, 1: 15 14 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 5, 189a5–8; cf. AA, 2: 27 17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184b10–12 20 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 11, 12–16 (ed. Minio-Paluello, 18)

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hoc etiam videtur per experientiam manifestum. Rustici enim statim habent conceptus specierum definibilium, ut hominis vel equi, sed non habent conceptus definitivos huiusmodi specierum. Igitur definitum est nobis notius. | Et tamen partes definitionis, scilicet genus et differentia, sunt universaliores specie definita. Igitur non est verum quod universalius sit nobis notius. ⟨5⟩ Iterum universalia vel sunt in anima vel ideae separatae, sicut posuit Plato; talia autem non sunt nobis notiora singularibus extra animam existentibus et sensui apparentibus. ⟨6⟩ Iterum solet dici quod universalia sunt nobis nota per abstractionem a singularibus; sed oportet prius singularia esse nota intellectui quam ipse potest ab eis aliquam aliam notitiam abstrahere; igitur etc. ⟨7⟩ Iterum genus assimilatur materiae et differentia formae et species composito; materia autem omnino minus nota est et forma et composito; igitur genus, quod est universalius, est etiam minus notum et differentia et specie. ⟨8⟩ Item quae sunt sensui propinquiora, sunt nobis notiora, ut dicitur primo Posteriorum; sed species est propinquior singularibus sensibilibus quam genus; igitur species est nobis notior genere, licet genus sit universalius. ⟨9⟩ Item si universalia essent nobis notiora, sequeretur quod metaphysica esset prior aliis scientiis via doctrinae, cum ipsa sit de universalissimis, quae essent notissima et facillima; et talia, scilicet faciliora, sunt priora via doctrinae, ut habetur quinto Metaphysicae. Modo illud consequens est falsum, scilicet quod metaphysica sit prior via doctrinae, quia ipsa solet ultimo addisci. ⟨1⟩ Oppositum determinat Aristoteles in isto prooemio. Dicit enim quod oportet procedere ex nobis notioribus in ea quae sunt nobis minus nota. Ideo

1 etiam videtur] inv. G ‖ manifestum] manifestam p ‖ statim habent] inv. P 2 conceptus specierum] conceptum rerum p 3 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ nobis notius] inv. G 5 igitur … notius] om. P 6 vel2] add. sunt p 8 sensui] sensibus p 9 sunt nobis] fiunt nobis G : fiunt P ‖ nota] notiora C 11 potest ab] possit ab Pp : possit G 12 et1] om. p 13 et1] om. G ‖ et2] om. C 14 et1] om. P 16 dicitur] dicebatur Pp 20 notiora] add. singularibus p ‖ sequeretur] sequitur G 21 via] viae G 22 facillima] facilia P : specialissima p 23 via] viae G 27 oportet] add. nos p 6–7 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 6, 987b7–18 17 Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 2, 72a1–4; cf. AA, 35: 16 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 11, 1018b30–34 26 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a17–21

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concludit dicens: ‘unde ex universalibus in singularia oportet procedere’, scilicet quia universalia sunt | nobis notiora. Et hoc persuadet Aristoteles quia: sicut totum sensibile, puta compositum naturale, est notius secundum sensum quam suae partes, scilicet quam materia vel forma, ita totum intellectuale est notius quantum ad intellectum quam suae partes; sed universale est quoddam totum intellectuale respectu suorum inferiorum, quia universale multa comprehendit tamquam partes, ut dicit Aristoteles; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Iterum primo probatur hoc per signum Aristotelis, scilicet quod pueri primo appellant omnes viros patres et omnes feminas matres, posterius autem determinant unumquodque horum, tamquam cognoscentes | primo confuse et universaliter viros et mulieres et postea magis determinate et singulariter. ⟨3⟩ Et Avicenna super hoc ponit signum ma|nifestius quod tu videns a longe Socratem venientem primo percipis et iudicas esse corpus, ignorans adhuc utrum sit animal aut lapis aut dumus. Postea appropinquas et iudicas quod est animal, nesciens utrum homo vel equus aut asinus. Postea iterum scis quod est homo, sed nescis adhuc utrum Socrates vel Plato. Et ultimo iudicas determinate et singulariter quod est Socrates et non Plato neque Iohannes. Igitur prius cognoscis illum sub conceptibus universalibus quam sub conceptibus specialioribus vel singularibus. In ista quaestione latent multae difficultates. Prima est quid debeamus intelligere per ‘universale’ et ‘singulare’. Et de hoc distinguendum est, quia quaedam dicuntur universalia in causalitate.

2 quia1] quod C 3 sensibile puta] om. p 4 vel] et Pp 5 quantum ad] apud GPp 6 quoddam totum intellectuale] totum intellectuale p : totum quoddam integrale P 8 primo probatur hoc] primo probatur G : hoc probatur Pp ‖ scilicet] om. p 9 primo] primum GP ‖ omnes feminas] omnes mulieres P : feminas p 10 unumquodque horum] inv. GPp ‖ primo] prius G 11 et universaliter] om. p 13 et] item G ‖ super hoc ponit] ponit super huiusmodi G ‖ videns] vides G 14 iudicas] add. hoc p 15 aut1] vel G ‖ aut dumus] aut domus P : om. Gp ‖ appropinquas et] appropinquans tu G 16 homo vel] homo P : om. p ‖ aut] vel Gp 17 et] om. P 18 singulariter] simpliciter Gp 19 cognoscis illum] praem. tu P : tu cognoscis illud p : cognovisti illum G ‖ universalibus] universalioribus p 20 sub conceptibus specialioribus] sub specialioribus P : specialioribus p : sub specialibus G ‖ vel] et P 22 universale et singulare] universalia et singularia P 1 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a23–24 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a24–26 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184b12–14; cf. AA, 2: 5 13 Cf. Avicenna, Liber primus naturalium, tract. 1, cap. 1 (ed. Van Riet, 11)

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Sic enim quod est causa plurium dicitur universalius in causalitate et opposito modo singulare in causalitate dicitur quod est causa unius solius. Sic enim Deus est universalissimus, quia est causa omnium aliorum, et consequenter intelligentiae post Deum sunt universalissimae et consequenter corpora caelestia. Et de tali modo universalium dicit bene Aristoteles prooemio Metaphysicae quod maxime universalia, scilicet Deus et intelligentiae, sunt difficillima ad cognoscendum, quia sunt a sensu remotissima. Alia dicuntur | universalia in praedicatione, significatione vel suppositione termini alicuius significativi, sicut illum terminum ‘animal’ diceremus universaliorem illo termino ‘homo’, quia praedicatur de pluribus et significat plura; omnis enim homo est animal et non e converso. Et illo modo singulare dicitur terminus significativus supponens pro uno solo et universale terminus supponens pro pluribus, prout debet dici et specificari in logica; et tanto est universalior, quanto supponit pro pluribus. Et ex huiusmodi terminis componuntur propositiones categoricae tamquam ex subiectis et praedicatis. Et horum terminorum aliqui vocantur mentales | et aliqui vocales et alii scripti, sicut est de propositionibus. Sed primi et principales sunt mentales. Nam scripti vel vocales non dicuntur termini, nec universales nec singulares, nisi ea ratione qua repraesentant nobis terminos mentales universales vel singulares. Ideo solum hic curamus de mentalibus. Sed iterum secundum Platonem alio modo dicuntur universalia in essendo extra animam, videlicet quod illud quod extra animam significatur immediate per terminum singularem est res singularis, ut Socrates vel Plato, hic homo vel ille, et illud quod ad extra significatur immediate per terminum universalem est res universalis extra animam distincta a re singulari et a rebus singularibus, ita quod ille ponebat praeter conceptum animae nostrae hominem universalem per se subsistentem, quem vocabat ideam hominum singularium et quidditatem eorum. Et dicebat terminum supponentem pro 1 in] om. C 1–2 opposito] eodem p 3 est1] dicitur P 5 aristoteles] add. in p 8 vel] et P 9 alicuius] aliqui p ‖ sicut] sic P 10–11 significat plura] inv. P 13 prout] add. hoc GPp ‖ dici et specificari] specificari Gp : speculari P 14 huiusmodi] huius P 16 et2] om. Pp 16–17 vocales … scripti] vocales aliqui scripti P : scripti et aliqui vocales p 18 nec2] vel p 19 repraesentant nobis] praem. exterius p : exterius nobis reputant P : ulterius repraesentat nobis G 22 quod1] om. p ‖ extra animam2] aliquid extra GP : ad extra p 23 immediate] in mente CG 24 illud] id p ‖ ad] aliquid G ‖ immediate] ante significatur p : post universalem (25) P : in mente G 25 res universalis] inv. P ‖ re] om. p 26 conceptum] conceptus G 27 subsistentem] existentem GPp 6 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 2, 982a23–25; cf. AA, 1: 15 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, I, 6, 987b7–18; VII, 14, 1039a24–33

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illa idea esse | vere et affirmative praedicabilem de unoquoque termino supponente pro aliquo homine singulari. Et tunc esset quaestio praesens utrum talia universalia essent nobis notiora singularibus. Sed in octavo Metaphysicae reprobata sunt huiusmodi universalia, immo omnis res singulariter existit diversa ab unaquaque aliarum rerum, ita quod numquam possibile est terminum supponentem praecise pro una re affirmari vere de termino supponente pro alia praecise. Immo si Socrates est homo, eadem res est penitus Socrates | et homo. Et ideo sic non sunt ponenda universalia praeter animam distincta a singularibus. Ideo bene dicit Aristoteles prooemio De anima quod universale nihil est vel posterius est rebus singulariter existentibus extra animam. Nihil enim est secundum illum modum quem ponebat Plato, sed bene est universale quod est terminus sive conceptus in mente, quo simul indifferenter concipimus plures res singulariter extra animam existentes. Et ille conceptus bene est posterior illis rebus singularibus, quia ab eis obiective causatur. Et satis manifestum est quod illae res singulariter existentes extra animam sunt nobis notiores quam huiusmodi universalia seu universales conceptus in anima existentes. Hoc enim suppono pro nunc, quidquid alii dicant. Si autem universale et singulare dicantur aliis modis, tamen de illis modis non curamus ad praesens, sed solum quaerimus et curamus de universalibus et singularibus prout sunt termini mentales, scilicet conceptus quibus anima concipit plures res simul indifferenter vel unamquamque earum divisim et singulariter.

2 homine singulari] homine singularium P : hominum singularium p 3 essent] esset G 4 octavo] septimo GPp ‖ huiusmodi universalia] omnia huiusmodi C : huius P 5 omnis] om. P ‖ singulariter] simpliciter G ‖ existit] add. ita ut sit p : existunt et sic est P ‖ ita] om. GPp 6 re] om. GP 7 de] pro p 8 est penitus] inv. GPp ‖ et ideo] et P : ideo Gp 9 distincta] post singularibus p 10 dicit] ostendit P ‖ aristoteles] add. in p ‖ universale] add. vel GP 10–11 vel posterius est] vel est posterius G : aut posterius p 11 singulariter] simpliciter G ‖ existentibus] post animam p ‖ est2] add. universale p 12 ponebat] probat sed add. sup. lin. ponebat C ‖ quod est] om. p 13 in mente] invicem G 15 ab … causatur] est ab eis obiective causatus Pp 16 singulariter] simpliciter G 17 huiusmodi] huius P 18 pro nunc] ad praesens GPp ‖ quidquid alii] quamquam alii aliter p 19 et] aut p 20 quaerimus et curamus] quaeramus P : curamus G : om. p 21 sunt … scilicet] termini mentales sunt P 22–23 concipit … divisim] contingit plures res simul indifferenter vel unamquamque earum divisim cognoscere sed add. in marg. seu concipit C 23 singulariter] simpliciter GPp 4 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 8, 1033b20–29 10 Aristoteles, De anima, I, 1, 402b7–8; cf. AA, 6: 6

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Et potest tunc quaestio dupliciter formari. Uno modo utrum conceptus universalis sit prius notus nobis quam conceptus singularis. Et de illo modo quaerendi non intendebat Aristoteles. Potest tamen breviter de hoc dici quod, cum eaedem res possunt | concipi universaliter et singulariter, scilicet conceptibus universalibus et conceptibus singularibus, si illae res prius concipiantur universaliter quam singulariter, verisimile est quod etiam illi conceptus universales | possunt cognosci prius a nobis quam cognoscimus conceptus singulares, et si e converso, etiam e converso. Et ideo non restat nobis quaestio utrum universalia sunt nobis notiora singularibus nisi ad illum intellectum utrum res innatae sint prius cognosci a nobis universaliter quam singulariter, hoc est dictu utrum prius cognoscimus res secundum conceptus universales quam secundum conceptus singulares vel e converso. Et de hoc ponitur prima conclusio communiter concessa quod necesse est hominem cognoscere prius singulariter quam universaliter, quia necesse est hominem prius cognoscere aliquid cognitione sensitiva quam intellectiva; et tamen nos ponimus quod cognitione sensitiva nihil cognoscitur nisi singulariter; igitur etc. Sed tunc restat quaestio de cognitione intellectiva, utrum scilicet prius intelligimus rem universaliter quam singulariter. | Et Commentator distinguit duplex singulare, scilicet singulare simpliciter, quod est terminus discretus, ut ‘Socrates’ vel ‘hic homo’, et singulare in respectu, id est minus universale. Sic enim species diceretur singularis respectu generis. Et illo modo capiebat Aristoteles ‘singularia’ in illo prooemio, cum dicit quod ex universalibus in

1 dupliciter formari] inv. GPp 2–3 universalis … singularis] universales sint prius noti nobis vel conceptus singulares P 3 intendebat] intendit p 4 potest] posset GPp ‖ possunt] possent G : possint p 5 universaliter et singulariter] simpliciter et universaliter G 6 si] sed G 7 etiam] om. P 8 cognoscimus] cognoscamus GPp ‖ si] om. P 9 etiam] et p ‖ sunt] sint GP 10 intellectum] sensum GPp ‖ innatae sint] innatae sunt GP : ignotae sunt p 11 prius cognosci] prius cognoscibiles Cp : post nobis P ‖ singulariter] add. et p 12 cognoscimus] cognoscamus GPp 13 vel] quam C 14 et] om. G ‖ concessa] add. scilicet GPp 15 cognoscere prius] add. rem G : add. esse p : primitus cognoscere rem P 16 hominem prius] inv. G ‖ aliquid] aliqua C 17 tamen] cum C ‖ ponimus] supponimus GPp ‖ cognoscitur] cognoscatur p 19 tunc] om. P ‖ scilicet] licet sed del. C : ante utrum p 20–21 et … simpliciter] om. p 22 minus] om. p 23 et] om. G 24 dicit] dixit GP 20 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 4, f. 7G 24–65.1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a23–24

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singularia oportet procedere, id est ex magis universalibus ad minus universalia. Non enim loquebatur de singularibus simpliciter, quia de eis non est scientia. Sed tamen de singularibus simpliciter est illa quaestio valde difficilis et etiam de singularibus in respectu. Ideo prius tractemus de singularibus simpliciter, scilicet utrum prius intelligimus res conceptu universali quam conceptu simpliciter singulari. Praesens quaestio continet dubitationes valde difficiles. Prima est: cum non sint universalia praeter animam distincta a singularibus, sed quod omnis res existit singulariter, unde provenit quod res aliquando intelliguntur universaliter? Et iuxta hoc est secunda dubitatio unde provenit quod intellectus potest intelligere universaliter et | sensus non sentit nisi singulariter. Et tertia dubitatio est quaestio principalis. Ad primam et secundam dubitationes dixerunt multi et quasi omnes expositores antiqui quod ex eo intellectus apprehendit universaliter, quia est separatus et immaterialis, sic quod non est eductus de potentia materiae nec extensus extensione materiae; ideo non recipit modo singulari, cum ex extensione et divisione materiae proveniat divisio et multitudo individuorum in rebus materialibus. Ista opinio non videtur sufficiens. Primo, quia Deus est summe separatus et immaterialis, sic quod non est eductus de potentia materiae; et tamen non intelligit modo universali sicut nos, quia sicut dicit Commentator duodecimo Metaphysicae, hoc est intelligere res confuse et imperfecte non intelligendo distinctionem singularium, Deus autem | omnia perfectissime et distincte intelligit, licet unica simplicissima intellectione. Sed de hoc est videndum in duodecimo Metaphysicae.

1 ex] de P 2 loquebatur] loquitur Gp ‖ eis] his p 5 tractemus] add. quaestionem GPp ‖ simpliciter] singulariter C 6 simpliciter] ante conceptu2 G : post singulari p : singulariter C 7 praesens] ista GPp ‖ dubitationes] difficultates C ‖ prima] una GPp 8 sed] et P 9 existit singulariter] inv. P 10 hoc] haec p 10–11 intellectus] conceptus P 11 sentit nisi singulariter] potest sentire nisi singulariter p : nisi singulariter potest sentire G : sentire nisi singulariter P 13 dubitationes] dubitationem (ante et1 P) GPp 14 quia] add. ipse Gp : quod ipse P 17 multitudo] multiplicatio p 19 videtur] add. mihi GPp ‖ summe] add. semper P 20 est] om. P 22 hoc] add. scilicet intelligere universaliter p 24–25 est videndum in] videndum est in G : est videndum Pp 22 Cf. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 51, f. 337A–C 25 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, XII, q. 13 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 75ra–75vb)

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Secundo non est verum quod singularitas proveniat ex extensione vel materialitate, quia ita singulariter et distincte ab aliis existit Deus et intellectus noster sicut aliquod extensum, immo etiam terminus universalis ita singulariter et distincte ab aliis existit in intellectu tuo vel meo sicut albedo in pariete. Tertio, quia appetitus sensitivus ita est extensus et materialis sicut sensus; et tamen equus et canis per famem et sitim appetunt modo universali. Non enim hanc aquam vel hanc avenam magis quam illam, sed quamlibet indifferenter; ideo quaecumque eis praesentetur, bibunt eam vel comedunt. Et etiam intentio, potentia vel appetitus ignis ad calefaciendum est modo universali, scilicet non determinate ad hoc lignum, sed ad quod|libet lignum calefactibile indifferenter, licet actus | calefaciendi determinatur ad certum singulare. Et ita etiam potentia visiva est modo universali ad videndum. Dico igitur, sicut mihi videtur, quod una causa in hoc quod intellectus intelligit universaliter, licet existat singulariter et res intellecta singulariter et intellectio etiam singulariter et omne aliud, est quia res intelliguntur non per hoc quod sunt apud intellectum, sed per suam similitudinem existentem apud intellectum. Res autem extra ex natura et essentia sua habent inter se convenientiam et similitudinem, ut suppono et postea declarabo. Modo si sit ita quod sint multa invicem similia, omne quod est simile uni eorum, quantum ad hoc in quo sunt similia, est simile unicuique aliorum. Ideo si omnes asini ex natura rei habent ad invicem convenientiam et similitudinem, oportet quod, quando species intelligibilis in intellectu existens repraesentabit per modum similitudinis aliquem asinum, ipsa simul indifferenter repraesentabit quemlibet asinum, nisi aliquod obstet; de quo postea dicetur. Ideo sic fiet universalis intellectio.

1 proveniat] provenit P 2 singulariter] simpliciter GP 3 aliquod] aliquid G : aliud p 4 singulariter] simpliciter Gp 8 hanc avenam] hanc annonam P : avenam p 9 quaecumque eis] quaecumque res P : quodcumque eis p ‖ eam] ipsum p 10 potentia] positis sed add. in marg. potentiae C : posita p 11 scilicet] om. p 12 lignum] om. GPp ‖ determinatur] determinetur GPp 13 etiam] om. p 15 causa] add. sit G : add. est p 16 universaliter] add. est P 17 intellectio etiam] intentio etiam (om. G) Gp ‖ omne aliud] ratio huius p 19 extra] eiusdem speciei P ‖ et] add. ex p 20 et2] om. G 21 multa] add. ad P ‖ omne] add. illud GPp ‖ eorum] illorum P 23–24 oportet] oporteret (?) C 24 quando] om. G ‖ existens] add. sup. lin. non G : om. p 25 ipsa] quin G 26 aliquod obstet] aliud obstet Pp : aliud obstat G 27 fiet] fit p ‖ intellectio] intentio p : om. G

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Et propter hoc etiam appetitus equi, qui est ratione carentiae cibi et potus, est modo universali, quia non est magis carentia huius quam illius, sed omnium indifferenter. Et ignis etiam per suam naturam intendit et appetit generare non sibi idem, sed sibi simile, quod non fieret magis in hoc ligno quam in illo; ideo intendit et appetit modo universali. Sed tunc est dubitatio fortissima: cum intellectus | numquam intelligat lapidem nisi per eius similitudinem, quare igitur non semper intelligit lapides universaliter, sed aliquando singulariter? Et etiam sensus numquam sentit obiectum suum, ut colorem | vel saporem, nisi per suam similitudinem. Quare igitur non sentit universaliter? Et antequam hoc solvatur, videndum est de eo quod fuit praemissum, scilicet quod res eiusdem speciei habent ex natura rei similitudinem et convenientiam inter se, etiam quantum ad suas substantias. Quod igitur ita sit patet, quia propter earum convenientiam tu nullam viam potes habere ad percipiendum distinctionem rerum eiusdem speciei nisi propter diversitatem extraneorum aut quia simul videntur extra invicem situaliter. Verbi gratia sint duo lapides omnino consimiles in magnitudine et figura et aliis accidentibus et unus hodie tibi praesentetur et cras alius. Tu omnino non poteris scire de illo posteriori utrum sit ille idem qui prius praesentabatur vel alius. Et similiter est de accidentibus, quia si illi lapides sint albi secundum aequalem gradum intensionis et aequaliter magni et ambo sphaerici et sint etiam similes quantum ad omnia alia accidentia, tunc non poteris scire an sit eadem albedo vel alia albedo vel magnitudo aut figura quae posterius ostenditur cum illa quae tibi prius ostensa fuit. Tunc igitur | de illa fortissima dubitatione aliqui dicunt quod haec est natura intellectus quod numquam intelligit nisi universaliter, et etiam haec est natura sensus quod numquam sentit nisi singulariter. Sed hoc est male dictum, quia intellectus format propositionem ex termino singulari et termino communi, ut quod Socrates est animal vel quod

2 carentia] carens p 3 omnium] omnis p ‖ etiam] ideo P 4 fieret] fiet p 6 dubitatio fortissima] inv. GPp ‖ numquam] non C 7–8 lapides universaliter] inv. p 9 suam similitudinem] inv. P 10 igitur] om. p 11 praemissum] promissum p 14 potes] posses P 17 sint] sicut G 18 tibi praesentetur] etiam praesentetur tibi G ‖ omnino] om. GPp 19 poteris] potes G ‖ qui] add. tibi GPp ‖ praesentabatur] repraesentabatur C 20 similiter] add. etiam Gp 21 intensionis] intentionis G 22 similes] consimiles P ‖ tunc] tu GPp 23 albedo1] om. GPp ‖ vel magnitudo] aut magnitudo G : vel (aut p) nigredo Pp 24 tibi prius] inv. p 25 tunc igitur] nunc igitur Gp : nunc autem P ‖ illa] alia G ‖ aliqui] quidam GPp ‖ est] sit C 26 et etiam haec] etiam quod P 29 animal] albus p

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nullus lapis est Socrates; et non posset hoc facere, nisi haberet in se tam conceptum communem quam conceptum singularem. Et iterum, sicut propter ponere differentiam inter sensibilia propria diversorum sensuum exteriorum ponitur alia virtus, scilicet sensus communis, quae utraque cognoscit, similiter etiam, cum ponatur differentia inter universaliter et singulariter concipere, oportet esse unam virtutem utroque modo cognoscentem. Et illa non est sensus ea ratione qua dicitur sensus; igitur illa est intellectus. Dicam igitur, sicut magis videri debet septimo Metaphysicae, quod ex eo aliquid percipitur singulariter, quia percipitur per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis. | Ideo enim Deus omnia percipit distinctissime, ac si perciperet singulariter ea, quia omnia talia sunt in prospectu eius. Sensus autem exterior obiectum suum apprehendit confuse cum magnitudine et situ ad ipsum, tamquam apparens in prospectu eius aut longe aut prope aut ad dextram aut ad sinistram. Ideo percipit obiectum suum singulariter tamquam demonstratum hic vel ibi. Sensus autem interior non potest speciem obiecti, ut coloris vel soni, ab huiusmodi | confusione absolvere et abstrahere. Ideo in somno per phantasiam et sensum communem apparet totum ita esse in prospectu sensus secundum determinatum situm sicut in vigilia. Ideo etiam sensus interior non percipit nisi singulariter. Immo etiam in memorando memoramur rem cum situ, tamquam fuerit in prospectu nostro praesentata sensui secundum determinatum situm. Sed tu diceres: quomodo igitur possum concipere Aristotelem singulariter, cum numquam fuit in prospectu meo? Dico quod hoc non est tibi possibile loquendo proprie, quia non | concipis eum differenter ab aliis hominibus nisi secundum quandam circumlocu-

1 non posset hoc] hoc non potest P 2 communem … singularem] singularem quam conceptum communem P ‖ iterum sicut] iterum si P : ideo sicut p 4 alia] aliqua p 5 similiter] sic p ‖ ponatur differentia] ponamus (ponimus P) differentiam GPp 8 dicam] dico P 8–9 eo aliquid] eo aliud p : hoc aliquid G 9–10 percipitur2 … cognoscentis] rep. p 10 enim] om. P ‖ omnia percipit distinctissime] add. et sic G : percipit omnia distincte P 11 perciperet singulariter ea] perciperet ea singulariter Gp : singulariter perciperet P ‖ quia … sunt] quia omnia clare sunt P : omnia clare sunt quia p 12 obiectum suum apprehendit] apprehendit obiectum P 14 singulariter] simpliciter G 15 interior] exterior G 16 coloris] caloris G : colorum p ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 17 per] propter P 19 etiam1] om. P 22 diceres] dicis P ‖ igitur possum] inv. P 22–23 singulariter] simpliciter G 23 fuit] fuerit Gp 24 dico] praem. ego Pp ‖ hoc] om. p ‖ non1 … possibile] modo est tibi impossibile P ‖ quia] add. tu GPp 25–69.1 circumlocutionem] circulationem G 8 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, q. 20 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 54va)

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tionem, ut quia fuit summus philosophus, magister Alexandri, discipulus Platonis, qui composuit libros philosophiae quos vel quales legimus. Modo licet haec descriptio secundum veritatem non conveniret nisi sibi, tamen ipsa non est proprie terminus singularis, sicut nec ille terminus ‘Deus’ est terminus singularis, licet non conveniat nisi uni soli. Non enim repugnat sibi ex modo significationis vel impositionis quod conveniat pluribus et supponat etiam pro pluribus. Si enim esset alter Deus consimilis, hoc nomen ‘Deus’ conveniret sibi et pro eo supponeret sine nova impositione vocabuli. Ita etiam, si fuisset alius qui fuisset summus philosophus et magister Alexandri, discipulus Platonis, qui composuisset libros philosophiae quos vel quales legimus, illi convenisset dicta descriptio et pro illo supposuisset. Sic autem non est de termino proprie et simpliciter | singulari, quia si hunc in prospectu meo demonstratum voco ‘Socratem’ nomine proprio, non quia talis vel talis, sed quia ille, numquam alteri quacumque similitudine conveniret hoc nomen ‘Socrates’, nisi alia impositione esset impositum ad significandum illum alium et sic aequivoce. Sed forte alio simili demonstrato mihi crederem quod esset Socrates, et non esset Socrates et essem deceptus. Hoc enim non est impossibile. Et ista profundius perscrutanda sunt in septimo Metaphysicae, ubi propter hoc Aristoteles bene ostendit quod singulare non est definibile, quia definitio conveniret aliis. Vide ibi bene, quia profunda est determinatio Aristotelis, si bene consideretur. Sed tunc considerandum est quod intellectus, qui est supra sensum virtus multo potior et nobilior, potest distinguere huiusmodi confusionem. Cum enim percipimus quod ille lapis modo est hic, modo est illic, modo albus, modo niger, sciemus quod ille lapis non determinat sibi quod sit hic vel 1 fuit] om. p 2 legimus] add. etc. GPp ‖ modo] add. quia P 4 sicut] ut P 5 uni] sibi p : om. GP ‖ sibi] om. p 7 etiam] om. GPp ‖ consimilis] add. isti G 8 conveniret sibi] inv. GP ‖ supponeret] post vocabuli P ‖ vocabuli] vocali C 9 etiam] om. p ‖ summus] supremus p ‖ alexandri] add. et GPp 10–11 qui … legimus] etc. Gp : om. P 11 illo] eo GPp ‖ autem] enim P 12 proprie et simpliciter] simpliciter et proprie GPp ‖ si] sic P 14 ille] isti p ‖ alteri] alii GPp ‖ quacumque similitudine] quantumcumque simili (add. sup. lin. sibi G) GPp 15 nisi] add. ex p 16–17 et … socrates2] socratem C 16 sed] et P 17 et1] add. tamen P ‖ et2] add. sic P 18 perscrutanda] perscrutata P ‖ septimo] quinto P 19 propter] per P 20 est2] add. ibi GPp 22 tunc] iterum p ‖ est supra sensum] supra (super P) sensum est GPp 23 multo potior et] multo potentior et p : multum potentior et G : multo P ‖ potior] add. sup. lin. alias potentior C ‖ nobilior] add. et C ‖ huiusmodi] huius p 24 percipimus] perceperimus GPp ‖ est2] om. GPp 25 niger] add. modo rubeus modo pallidus G ‖ ille] hic GPp 18–20 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 15, 1040a8–14; cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, q. 18 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 52vb–53rb)

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illic, albus vel niger. Ideo intellectus potest abstrahere speciem vel notitiam lapidis a specie vel notitia huius situs vel alterius. Et sic intelligitur lapis nihil quantum ad hoc intelligendo de esse hic vel illic. Et tunc indifferenter omnis lapis intelligitur conceptu communi, non magis | hic quam ille. Ex his apparet mihi quod determinari potest quaestio principalis dicendo quod prius intellectus cognoscit res singulariter quam universaliter propter hoc quod sensus non cognoscit eas nisi singulariter, sive sit sensus exterior sive interior, scilicet cum illa confusione situs et per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis. Ideo sic etiam sensus | cum huiusmodi confusione repraesentat intellectui obiectum sensibile. Et sicut obiectum primo repraesentatur intellectui, sic intellectus primo intelligit rem. Igitur cum huiusmodi confusione intellectus potest cognoscere rem et sic singulariter. Et hoc etiam apparet ex dictis, scilicet quod abstrahendo intellectus intelligit universaliter. Et iterum, cum repraesentatio ex parte sensus sit modo singulari, si intellectus ex huiusmodi repraesentatione non intelligat singulariter, non poterit postea dici quomodo potest intelligere singulariter. Aliqui enim fingunt quod propter sui immaterialitatem est primo innatus recipere universaliter, | sed postea reflectitur supra sensum et sic reflectendo cognoscit singulariter. Et huiusmodi reflexionem dicunt dixisse Aristotelem in tertio De anima, ubi dicit quod homo carnem et carni esse aut alio aut aliter se habente discernit. Dicunt enim quod per ‘carnem discernere’ intendebat 1 vel1] aut Pp ‖ ideo] igitur P ‖ potest] post abstrahere P : poterit Gp 2 vel1] et P ‖ huius] huiusmodi C 2–3 et … illic] AMPTU : et sic intelligitur lapis nec quantum ad hoc intelligendo de esse hic vel illic B : et sic intelligitur lapis vel quantum ad hoc intelligendum de esse hic vel illic H : et sic intelligitur lapis vel quantum ad hoc intelligendo de esse hic vel illic p : et sic intelligitur lapis vel quantum ad hoc intelligendo hic vel illic C : et sic intelligitur lapis nihil ad quantum intelligendo de esse hic vel illic L : et sic intelligitur lapis nihil quantum ad huius intelligendo esse hic vel illic G 3 tunc] sic G 4 intelligitur] add. in P 5 ex] praem. et GPp ‖ quod] quomodo P 6 res] add. sup. lin. tam C : om. G ‖ singulariter] simpliciter G 7 singulariter] simpliciter G 9 sic etiam] inv. G : et sic P : etc. sic p 10 repraesentat] praesentat P 10–11 primo repraesentatur] primo praesentatur G : primo repraesentat p : prius repraesentatur P 11 rem igitur] rem ideo G : res igitur C 12 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ et sic] etiam C : om. P 13 abstrahendo] add. etc. Pp 16 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ intelligat singulariter] intelligat simpliciter G : intelligit singuraliter P 17 potest intelligere] possit intelligere Gp : potest intelligi P 18 quod] sup. lin. C : add. intellectus Pp : om. G ‖ sui] suam GPp ‖ innatus recipere] ignarus cognoscere sic p 19 supra] super P ‖ sic] om. p 20 huiusmodi] huius P 21 homo] add. et G : ratio p ‖ carni] carnem p ‖ alio] alia p 22 enim] om. p 21–22 Aristoteles, De anima, III, 4, 429b12–13

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Aristoteles singulariter cognoscere rem et per ‘carni esse discernere’ intendebat universaliter cognoscere. Postea videbatur Aristoteles dicere quod sensus carnem | cognoscit, id est singulariter; alio autem separato, scilicet intellectu, carni esse, id est universaliter, cognoscit. Et tunc vult dicere quod, cum intellectus utroque modo cognoscit, cognoscit alio modo. Et illos alios modos intendit, cum dicit: ‘aut sicut circumflexa se habet ad se ipsam, quae cum extensa sit carni esse discernit’. Et hoc glossant sic quod idem cognoscit intellectus extense, id est directe, et hoc est universaliter; postea circumflexe, id est reflectendo super sensum, id est singulariter. Et ad idem trahunt auctoritatem Commentatoris in eodem tertio dicentis quod intellectus intelligit universale per se et singulare mediante sensu; et glossant: universale per se, id est primo et directe, et singulare mediante sensu, id est secundario per reflexionem supra sensum. Sed ista opinio et verba eius sunt valde extranea. Mirabile enim est quae res sit illa reflexio, cum reflexio proprie non habet locum nisi in corporibus vel corporaliter extensis, et intellectus non est talis. Et maxime, cum a principio intellectus movetur a phantasmatibus, ipse est eis sufficienter et immediate | applicatus, sicut applicari potest vel debet. Quare igitur oportet quod amplius reflectetur ad ea? Nam a principio sufficienter eis applicatus poterat recipere quidquid illa phantasmata poterant ei repraesentare. Nec illi bene exponunt Aristotelem, quia licet concederetur eis quod per ‘carnem discernere’ intendit singulariter cognoscere etc., tamen diceremus quod intellectus carnem vel singulariter cognoscit circumflexe, id est per speciem circumvolutam cum repraesentatione situs et aliorum acciden-

1 carni] carnem p ‖ discernere] discernit CG 2 videbatur] videtur p 3 sensus] add. sup. lin. alias sensitive C : sensitive Gp ‖ singulariter] simpliciter G 4 intellectu] intendit sed add. in marg. per P ‖ cognoscit] cognoscat P 5 cum] om. G ‖ cognoscit cognoscit] cognoscat cognoscit Pp : cognoscit G 6 habet] habent G 7 cum] non G ‖ glossant] glossat CG ‖ quod] quia GPp 9 reflectendo super sensum] reflectitur supra sensum G : cirflectendo (?) (add. sed del. circa sensum) super sensum C ‖ id2] et hoc GPp ‖ singulariter] simpliciter G ‖ et] om. P ‖ trahunt] attrahunt P 10 dicentis] de anima p 11 glossant] glossat G 12 id est1] add. per G : enim p ‖ sensu] add. glossat G ‖ id est2] et P 13 supra] supra vel super C : super Pp 14 enim est] inv. P 15 habet] habeat Gp 17 movetur] om. Gp ‖ ipse] om. p ‖ est] post applicatus (18) P 19 reflectetur] reflectatur Pp 20 applicatus poterat] applicatus potest P : applicato poterat G ‖ illa] eius P 20–21 repraesentare] praesentare GP 23 etc.] om. P 24 vel] et G : om. P 6–7 Aristoteles, De anima, III, 4, 429b16–17 Crawford, 422)

10 Cf. Averroes, In De anima, III, comm. 9 (ed.

9vb P

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tium, sed carni esse sive universaliter cognoscit per modum extensae lineae et liberatae a circumvolutione, scilicet per abstractionem speciei carnis a specie situs etc., sicut praedictum fuit. Nec illi bene exponunt Commentatorem. Cum enim dicit Commentator ‘intellectus intelligit universale per se’, intendit: per se, id est solitarie, scilicet quod ipse solus et non sensus cognoscit universaliter. Sed cum dicit quod intelligit singulare mediante sensu, intendit quod res primo cognoscitur sensu singulariter et hac cognitione mediante cognoscitur etiam statim ab intellectu singulariter.

9va p 8vb G

10ra P

Nunc igitur videndum est ad secundum modum quaerendi, de quo magis intendebat Aristoteles in illo prooemio, videlicet utrum res cognoscuntur prius magis universaliter quam minus universaliter. Et quidam moderni dicunt quod prius cognoscitur minus universaliter. Quod volunt probare multis rationibus. ⟨1⟩ Primo enim credendum est quod animal, quod est genus commune | omnibus animalibus, non est genus propinquum equo et asino, sed est aliud genus propinquius, quod est inferius ad animal | et superius ad equum et asinum. Sed quasi omnes cognoscunt equos et asinos secundum eorum conceptus specificos et non cognoscunt secundum conceptum generalem generis propinqui, | licet illud genus sit universalius; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item minus universalia sunt propinquiora singularibus simpliciter, quae sunt primo cognita sive a sensu sive ab intellectu, ut dictum est; et quae propinquiora sunt primo intellectis debent prius intelligi. ⟨3⟩ Et aliter metaphysica esset prior aliis scientiis via doctrinae, sicut prius arguebatur.

1 accidentium] accidentalium G ‖ carni esse] carnem p ‖ lineae] sup. lin. C : om. G 2 a] et p 4 enim] om. P 5 se] add. et GP ‖ per se] universale sed add. sup. lin. per se P : universale CG ‖ quod] quia Pp 6 cognoscit] intelligit P 8 hac cognitione] cognitione sensitiva P ‖ etiam statim] om. p 10 nunc … est] add. quantum P : nunc igitur veniendum est p : ex his apparet mihi sed add. in marg. tu†…† vi†…† C 11 intendebat] intendit p ‖ illo prooemio] prooemio huius P 12 magis universaliter] inv. P 13 et quidam] quidam enim p ‖ cognoscitur] cognoscuntur p : cognoscimus P 15 genus] om. P 16 aliud] alius G : aliquod P 17 propinquius] om. p 18 quasi omnes] del. sed add. in marg. primo omnes P 18–19 eorum conceptus] inv. Pp 19 cognoscunt] add. eos Pp 20 generis] praem. illius GP : illius p 22–23 quae propinquiora sunt] add. sup. lin. ab C : quae propinquiores sunt P : aeque propinquiora p 23 intellectis] intellectu sed add. in marg. sunt primo intell†…† intellectis C : intellectui p 24 metaphysica esset prior] esset metaphysica prius P

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⟨4⟩ Et si oporteret equum prius cognoscere secundum omnes conceptus generales quam secundum conceptum specificum, sequeretur quod viso equo oporteret multum apponere tempus, antequam homo conciperet ipsum conceptu specifico, quod quilibet experitur falsum. Et quia haec opinio videtur esse manifeste contra Aristotelem, ideo illi ponunt quasdam distinctiones ad salvandum dicta Aristotelis. Quidam enim distinguunt inter notitiam confusam et notitiam determinatam et dicunt quod notitia confusa sunt bene notiora magis universalia, sicut Aristoteles | dicit, sed notitia determinata minus universalia sunt notiora. Sed hoc non valet. Primo, quia Aristoteles loquebatur non solum de notitia confusa, immo etiam de determinata, si determinatam velimus vocare definitivam et demonstrativam. Ipse enim dat ordinem procedendi in scientiis demonstrativis, scilicet quod prius determinandum est de universalibus propter hoc quod sunt notiora et facilius demonstrabilia. Et etiam, cum magis universalia ponantur in definitionibus minus universalium, oportet quod sint notiora secundum definitivam notitiam. Si autem aliquis vellet vocare notitiam confusam illam notitiam rerum quae est secundum conceptus communiores, et notitiam determinatam illam quae est secundum conceptus specialiores, tunc ista est quaestio nostra principalis, utrum prius cognoscimus res confuse quam determinate, id est prius magis universaliter quam minus universaliter. Alii invenerunt quandam fugam dicentes quod unicuique notiores sunt species eorum quae consueverunt esse apud se quam genera, sed non toti genti, immo sic sunt genera notiora. Verbi gratia, quia apud nos sunt porci, lepores et cuniculi, ideo illi sunt nobis notiores secundum suas species quam secundum sua genera, sed non elephantes et similia, quia apud nos non inveniuntur; aliis autem sunt notiores elephantes et cameli etc. Quia apud 1 et] etiam P ‖ omnes] om. p 2 generales] add. ipsius Pp 3 oporteret] oportet p ‖ apponere tempus] inv. GPp ‖ homo] om. P 4 experitur] add. esse G 5 esse] om. P ‖ illi] alii G 6 quasdam distinctiones] quandam distinctionem p ‖ salvandum] add. quodam modo GPp 8 notiora] add. nobis P 8–9 aristoteles dicit] inv. GPp 10 primo … loquebatur] quia aristoteles loquebatur prius P 11 determinatam velimus] determinatam volumus Gp : volumus determinatam P 12 procedendi] om. p 13 scilicet] secundum G ‖ est] om. G 14 quod] quia P ‖ et1] sive faciliora sive P ‖ et2] om. P 16 sint] sunt P : om. G ‖ notitiam] ante definitivam Pp : om. G 19 illam quae est] quae P 19–20 ista … nostra] est quaestio ista P 20 principalis] add. scilicet G : principalior scilicet p 22 quandam] rep. G ‖ notiores sunt] inv. p 23–24 toti genti] toti generi p : contigent G 24–25 sunt porci lepores] positi sunt lapides P 25 et] om. G ‖ suas species] speciem P 26 similia] onagri Pp 27 sunt notiores] inv. Pp ‖ cameli etc.] onagri Pp 27–74.1 apud … eaedem1] igitur species non inveniuntur eaedem apud omnes GPp

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omnes species non inveniuntur eaedem, sed eaedem apud nos, aliae apud alios, ideo species non sunt omnibus notiores, sed universaliora quae apud omnes inveniuntur. Sed ista dicta non valent, quia per experientiam quam ponit Avicenna manifestum est quod etiam animalia quae consueverunt esse apud nos et etiam plantas citius et facilius cognoscimus secundum conceptus | generales quam secundum conceptus specificos. Si enim videas equum de longe, | scies quod est corpus, nescies tamen quod est animal; postea scies quod est animal et nescies utrum est equus, bos vel asinus; postea percipies quod est equus. Similiter de plantis: a longe scies quod est arbor et nescies quae arbor; sed appropinquans scies iam quod non est quercus vel nux, sed dubitabis utrum pomus vel pirus; et tandem scies quod est pirus. Dico igitur cum Aristotele quod prius et facilius cognoscimus res secundum conceptus earum communiores | quam secundum magis speciales. Et ad hoc probandum experimentum praedictum facit fidem quantum ad quia ita est. Sed expedit videre causam propter quam ita est. De qua dicitur quod cognitio nostra intellectiva de|pendet ex sensitiva. Sensus autem, qui non cognoscit nisi singulariter, apprehendit rem dupliciter: uno modo secundum singulare vagum; alio modo secundum singulare determinatum. Voco autem singulare vagum, ut hic homo, hoc veniens, et singulare determinatum, ut Socrates vel Plato. Nam si Socratem video a longe, ego bene sensu iudicabo quod hoc est ille homo vel illud animal vel illud veniens, sed nondum potero iudicare an est Socrates vel Plato. Et in iudicando quod est hic homo, non

1 aliae] add. etiam G 2 sunt] add. nobis p ‖ universaliora] univeralia p : notiores C ‖ quae] quia GP 4 valent] patent C ‖ per] om. P 5 manifestum] manifesta P 6 citius] add. sup. lin. scimus C 7 conceptus] add. specialiores vel G : om. Pp ‖ videas equum de] equum videas a p : equum videres a P 8 nescies tamen quod] et nescies quod GP : et nescies utrum p 9 et] add. postea P ‖ utrum] quod p ‖ est equus bos] bos equus G : bos P ‖ postea] tandem P : praem. tandem p 10 equus] add. nescies utrum brunellus et postea percipies quod est brunellus G ‖ et] sed P 11 sed appropinquans] sed a propinquo C : et propinquans p ‖ est] om. G 12 et] om. G ‖ scies] sciens G 14 magis] om. P 15 facit] fecit G ‖ quia] praem. sciendum Gp : sciendum quod P 17 videre] videri C ‖ dicitur] dico GP : ego dico p 18 cognitio] notitia C 21 hoc veniens] om. P ‖ et] add. voco Gp : voco P ‖ singulare2] add. non vagum sed P ‖ ut2] sicut p 22 vel] om. P ‖ nam] om. G ‖ socratem … longe] video socratem G ‖ bene sensu iudicabo] iudico sensu P 23 hoc] sup. lin. C : homo G ‖ vel1] om. Pp ‖ potero] scio P 24 est1] sit p 4 Cf. Avicenna, Liber primus naturalium, tract. 1, cap. 1 (ed. Van Riet, 11)

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habeo alium modum cognoscendi et iudicandi, si sit Socrates, quam si esset Plato vel Robertus. Ideo talis conceptus sensualis et singularis vocatur vagus et confusus. Modo ultra considerandum est quod unicuique universali correspondet unum singulare vagum, et alteri universali alterum singulare, ut homini hic homo, animali hoc animal, corpori hoc corpus et sic de aliis. Et ista individua vaga habent ordinem apud sensum, quia naturaliter sensus prius iudicat quod hoc est hoc corpus quam quod est hoc animal, et prius quod est animal hoc quam quod est hic homo, et etiam prius quod est hic homo quam quod est Socrates vel Plato. Unde postremo inter huiusmodi individua difficillime cognoscitur a sensu res secundum singulare determinatum. Cum igitur dictum sit quod cognitio intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva, debet dici quod illud universale est prius apud intellectum, cui correspondet singulare vagum prius apud sensum; sed individuum vagum universalioris est prius apud sensum quam individuum vagum minus universalis, ut dictum est; igitur etc. Et per hoc soluta est illa ratio apparens quod minus universale est propinquius singulari sensato; igitur est intellectui notius. Dico enim quod, si minus universale sit propinquius singulari determinato secundum praedicationem et descensum de supremis ad illa singularia, tamen hoc non facit ad propositum, quia illud singulare determinatum est difficilis notitiae etiam | apud sensum. Sed unumquodque universale est propinquissimum et immediatum suo individuo vago. Statim enim et immediate ex notitia sensus secundum aliquod singulare vagum consurgit notitia intellectiva secundum universale | correspondens | per abstractionem notitiae rei a notitia situs, secundum quod ante dictum fuit.

1 cognoscendi et iudicandi] iudicandi vel cognoscendi P ‖ si1] corr. sup. lin. in quod C : quod G ‖ esset] sit P 2 sensualis et singularis] singularis et sensualis G ‖ vocatur] add. conceptus P 4 ultra] ultimo p 5 vagum] add. et sic de aliis C ‖ universali] om. P 6 et1 … aliis] etc. P 7 sensum] add. in notioritate Pp 7–8 prius iudicat] prius manifestat C : primo iudicat G 8 hoc1] om. Gp ‖ est1] add. corpus sive C ‖ quod2] add. hoc P ‖ quod3] add. hoc P 9 animal hoc] inv. GPp ‖ quod est1] om. P ‖ etiam] om. Pp 10 quod est] om. P ‖ postremo] posterius P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 11 difficillime] ABGHLMTUp : definitive sed add. in marg. aliter difficile C : difficulter P 13 ex] a GP 16 est prius] inv. G 16–17 universalis … est] universalioris p 17 igitur] om. P 18 soluta] solutum G ‖ illa ratio] inv. P 19 singulari] rep. C 21 de supremis] de superius C : et supremum P 22 etiam] om. p 25 aliquod] aliquid G : aliud p 26 notitiae] notae p 27 secundum quod] sicut Pp

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Sed iterum tu quaereres causam quare sensus facilius cognoscit secundum singulare vagum correspondens universaliori quam secundum correspondens singulariori seu specialiori. Et ego dico quod hoc est, quia est difficile distinguere. Facilius enim est cognoscere confuse quam percipere differentias, specialiter si sint parvae. Qui igitur a longe iudicat visu quod est corpus et ignorat utrum est animal, hoc est, quia non potest percipere distincte differentias quibus animalia differunt ab aliis corporibus. Sed cum videt quod movetur ex se, iudicat quod est animal, sed nescit utrum homo, equus vel asinus, quia nondum potest distinguere figuras et alia accidentia etc. Sed postea percipiens quod est erectae figurae et brevis vultus iudicat quod est homo. Et nondum potest scire utrum Socrates vel Plato, quia nondum potest distinguere minores differentias quibus homines percipiuntur differre ab invicem. Et propter hoc etiam bene dicebat Aristoteles quod totum est notius quam suae partes. Facilius enim est cognoscere totum non distinguendo inter partes quam distincte cognoscere partes. Et non est difficile solvere rationes alterius opinionis. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam enim dico quod tu prius concipis equum secundum conceptum generis propinqui quam secundum conceptum eius specificum. Quod apparet, quia cum a satis longe vides, tu scis quod est animal et quod non est canis nec lupus, dubitas tamen adhuc cuius speciei sit, nondum percipiens differentias quibus equi apparent dif|ferre a mulis et asinis. Et sic tu habes de illo equo conceptum minus communem quam sit conceptus animalis, sed nondum determinate conceptum equi, sed conceptum medium, qui est generis propinqui. Sed tu non attendis quod talem habeas, quia non est ei nomen impositum. Ideo nescis nominare quod animal vides. Sed si 1 quaereres] quaeres GP 2 universaliori] universali p ‖ secundum] om. C 3 singulariori seu specialiori] singulariori seu (add. sed del. specialiori) specialiori C : specialiori GP : minus universali p 4 hoc] ideo P ‖ est difficile] inv. GPp ‖ distinguere] add. in marg. discernere C ‖ enim] om. p 5 percipere] concipere Pp ‖ specialiter] ante differentias P : speciales G 6 qui] quae P ‖ visu] corr. ex sensu C : visum Gp 8 iudicat] manifestat C 9 utrum] add. est P ‖ equus] om. P 10 accidentia] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 11 erectae] directae P ‖ iudicat] manifestat sed add. in marg. iudicat C : om. P 12 utrum] an p : an sit P ‖ distinguere] add. omnes p 13 percipiuntur] dicuntur Pp 14 bene] om. P 15 cognoscere] distinguere p 16 cognoscere] add. inter P 18 enim] om. P 19 secundum] om. p ‖ conceptum eius] inv. G 20 quod apparet] quod patet p : hoc apparet P ‖ a] add. est P ‖ tu scis] eum scis Gp : eum P 21–22 percipiens] add. distincte GPp 26 nominare] imaginari P ‖ vides] praem. tu Pp : tu videas G 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184b24–25

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esset illi generi propinquo nomen impositum, puta b, et peteretur quod animal est, statim diceres quod illud est b. Et sic esset de genere propinquo ad pomum et ad pirum. ⟨2⟩ Alia ratio fuit soluta, quia universalius est propinquius singulari vago priori apud sensum. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dictum fuit quod metaphysica est multum difficilis et sic est posterior via doctrinae, non quia considerat res | universalissime, sed quia non sistit in huiusmodi consideratione, sed descendit ad specialissima quidditative consideranda, et etiam quia considerat | specialiter et quidditative de Deo et de intelligentiis et de aliis etiam secundum reductionem eorum ad ipsum Deum. Et consideratio ista est summe difficilis. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam rationem dicitur quod intellectus tuus est ita habituatus de conceptibus specialibus equi, asini, hominis etc. quod statim potest in illos conceptus venire obiecto praesente. Sed homo ab infantia habet primo conceptus confusiores, scilicet secundum individua vaga confusiora, et magnum tempus apponit, antequam habeat specialiores. Non enim distinguet inter canem et catum. Et hoc notavit Aristoteles dicens quod pueri primo appellant omnes viros patres et omnes feminas matres, posterius autem determinant horum unumquodque. Ad rationes in oppositum dicendum est. ⟨1–3⟩ Quarum plures bene probant | quod sensu prius percipimus res

2 est1] add. hoc GPp ‖ statim] add. quod tu C ‖ quod illud] domine illud P : domine p : om. G ‖ et sic] si p 3 ad … pirum] ad pomum et pirum G : inter animal et equum p 4 fuit soluta] inv. GPp ‖ quia universalius] quod universale C ‖ propinquius] add. universali C 6 multum] valde GPp ‖ est2] post posterior (7) p : om. GP 7 quia1] add. non P : quod C ‖ res] om. P 8 sistit] consistit P ‖ huiusmodi consideratione] his considerare P ‖ specialissima] specialia sed add. in marg. specialissima C : specialia G 8–9 quidditative consideranda] quidditatem considerandam G 10 de3] om. P ‖ etiam] et C 10–11 eorum ad] eorum in GP : earum in p 11 consideratio ista] inv. GPp 12 rationem] om. GPp ‖ ita] om. G 13 asini hominis] hominis et asini p ‖ quod] et G 14 in … praesente] in illos conceptus venire praesente obiecto G : obiecto praesente in illis conceptibus venire P 15 confusiores] confusionis sed add. in marg. confusiores C : confusos P ‖ vaga] add. confusa et C : add. et P 16 habeat] habet p 16–17 distinguet] distingueret GPp 17 hoc notavit] haec vocavit p 18 primo] primum G ‖ omnes2] om. Gp ‖ feminas matres] inv. p 19 horum] om. Pp 20 ad … est] igitur etiam respondendum est ad rationes ante oppositum G : tunc etiam dicendum est ad rationes ante oppositum P : etiam dicendum est ad rationes quae in principio quaestionis fuerunt adductae p 21 percipimus] cognoscimus p 6–11 Cf. sup., I, q. 3, 24 17 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184b12–14; cf. AA, 2: 5

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singulariter quam percipiamus eas universaliter. Unde ex dictis manifestum est quomodo debeat dici ad primam rationem, ad secundam et tertiam. ⟨4⟩ Ad quartam dicendum est quod res non est notior secundum conceptum definibilem, scilicet secundum conceptum specificum, quam secundum generalem, immo e converso. Sed tamen facilius est concipere rem secundum conceptum specificum quam concipere ipsam definitive, quia in conceptu definitivo oportet non solum concipere rem conceptu generis et conceptu differentiae, sed oporteret distinguere inter illos conceptus et scire quod unus est determinativus alterius et quod supponunt pro eodem, et hoc est valde difficile. Et etiam non forte est difficile habere conceptus correspondentes partibus definitionis, sed difficile est illos abstrahere a conceptibus accidentium et eos congregare et ordinare ad hoc quod omnino correspondens sit definitio, ideo est difficile definire. Et hoc modo dicitur definitum notius. ⟨5–6⟩ Ex dictis etiam manifestum est quid debeat dici ad quintam et sextam rationes. ⟨7⟩ Ad septimam dicitur quod non est quantum ad omnia simile de materia et de genere, sed simile est in hoc, quia utrumque est potentiale et determinabile, hoc per formas, illud per differentias. Quia naturaliter determinabile praecedit determinationem, sicut materia est prior in esse forma et composito, sic apud intellectum genus dicitur esse prius differentia et specie. ⟨8–9⟩ De duabus ultimis rationibus satis dictum fuit in quaestione. 12va C

Et sic finitur septima quaestio. | 1 percipiamus] percipimus P 2 debeat] debet p ‖ primam … tertiam] primam rationem et (om. p) ad secundam et ad tertiam Gp : primum et ad secundum et ad tertium argumenta P 3 dicendum est] dicitur P 6 definitive] corr. ex definibilitatem C : definitione P 7 rem conceptu] conceptum P 8 conceptu] om. P ‖ oporteret] oportet GPp 10 non forte] inv. GP 11 illos] res C 12 accidentium] accidentalibus GPp ‖ quod] add. differentia seu C 13 definire] add. in marg. seu diffi†…† C 15 etiam] om. P 15–16 et sextam rationes] et ad sextam rationes P : rationem et ad sextam Gp 17 simile] ante quantum p : similia G 18 et] om. C ‖ in hoc] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ quia] quod G 19 differentias] add. quod G : add. et Pp 20 determinationem] add. ideo GPp ‖ in esse] materie p 21 sic] sicut C ‖ dicitur esse] debet esse Gp : debet dici P 23 duabus] add. enim P ‖ rationibus] add. et quaestionibus G ‖ satis dictum fuit] dictum est satis GPp ‖ quaestione] positione GPp 24 et … quaestio] et sic est finis quaestionis p : et sic sit finis illius quaestionis P : etc. G

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⟨i.8⟩

⟨Utrum omnis res extensive et situaliter habens partem extra partem sit magnitudo⟩

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Consequenter quaeritur octavo de hoc quod dicit Aristoteles ‘si est substantia et quantum, duo sunt et non unum quod est’, utrum omnis res extensive et situaliter habens partem extra partem est magnitudo. Arguitur quod sic auctoritatibus et rationibus tali modo hoc opinantium: ⟨1⟩ Quarto enim Physicorum hoc dicitur, quod si remo|veantur termini et passiones sphaerae, nihil relinquitur nisi materia; et tamen remaneret magnitudo quae illis terminis erat terminata; igitur materia est magnitudo. Et hoc concedentes debent consimiliter concedere de aliis extensis extensionem habentibus. | ⟨2⟩ Item in Praedicamentis dicitur quod album est quantitas per accidens; et illud album est substantia; igitur substantia est quantitas, licet per accidens. ⟨3⟩ Et Commentator in De substantia orbis ponit dimensiones esse coaeternas primae materiae; igitur illae non sunt distinctae a materia. Consequentia ex hoc patet, quia omnes formae materiales, ex eo quod sunt materiales, sunt eductae de potentia materiae et sunt iterum corruptibiles. ⟨4⟩ Item dimensio est praevia passionibus seu qualitatibus secundum quas per se sunt alterationes, scilicet caliditati et frigiditati etc. Unde tertio Caeli dictum est quod indivisibile non potest aliquas passiones recipere nec

4 consequenter quaeritur octavo] add. utrum C : quaeritur octavo consequenter et erit G : quaeritur octavo Pp ‖ quod dicit aristoteles] quod aristoteles dicit GP : quando aristoteles dicit p 4–5 est … quantum] substantia et quantum sunt p : substantia et quantum G 7 tali modo] om. GPp 8 hoc] om. GPp ‖ removeantur] removerentur p 9 remaneret] remanet G 11 concedentes] concedere p ‖ extensis] om. GPp 13 dicitur] dicit G 17 primae materiae] inv. G 19 sunt2] post corruptibiles G 20 praevia] prima P ‖ seu] sive P 21 sunt] ante per GP ‖ et] om. G 22 potest aliquas] possit alias GP 4 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 2, 185b3–4 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 2, 209b9–10 13 Cf. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 6, 5a37–b5 16 Cf. Averroes, De substantia orbis, cap. 1, f. 4B–D 22 Cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, III, 1, 299a19–20

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secundum eas alterari. Et sic dimensio, licet cum substantia, est receptibilis huiusmodi passionum seu qualitatum quae sunt ad invicem contrariae. Ex quo sequitur quod, si illa dimensio non sit substantia, quod aliud a substantia sit susceptibile contrariorum; quod est contra Aristotelem in Praedicamentis. ⟨5⟩ Item omne per se divisibile est quantum vel quantitas. Immo omne quod sic est per se divisibile, quod etiam omni alio circumscripto praeter partes suas ipsum adhuc esset divisibile, est quantitas. Esse enim divisibile est una de | propriis passionibus quantitatis. Sed materia prima vel haec albedo sic est per se divisibilis. Probatio quia: si hac materia et suis partibus manentibus Deus annihilaret omnia alia, adhuc haec materia haberet illas partes; et habens partes est divisibile; ideo adhuc ipsa est divisibilis. Et eodem modo de albedine et aliis extensis. Et confirmatur | fortius quia: omne illud quod omni alio circumscripto haberet situaliter partem extra partem, est magnitudo; sed materia vel albedo est huiusmodi; igitur etc. Minor probatur quia: materia b est modo extensa et habet situaliter partem extra partem; et Deus sine aliquo motu locali ipsius vel suarum partium et per consequens sine appropinquatione vel elongatione illarum partium ad invicem potest annihilare omnia alia remanentibus huiusmodi materia et suis partibus; igitur ipsa adhuc habebit illas aeque distantes ab invicem sicut ante, cum non fuerit motus localis, igitur extra invicem situaliter. ⟨6⟩ Iterum nihil debet poni frustra in natura; sed frustra poneretur magnitudo praeter materiam et formam et qualitates, quas videmus extensionem habere; igitur non est ponenda. Minor patet, quia nulla est ratio cogens ad ponendum talem magnitudinem. Possumus enim omnia salvare sine ea dicendo quod tam materia quam forma quam albedo habent partes suas extra invicem et haberent omnibus aliis circumscriptis. Ideo quodlibet illorum se ipso est magnitudo et non indiget ad sui extensionem alia magnitudine. 1 et sic] sed p ‖ cum] om. P ‖ est] sit C 2 seu] sive GPp 3 quod1] om. G 4 sit] est GP 6 divisibile] ante per G 7 quod2] corr. in marg. ex hoc C : om. G 8 adhuc esset] ad hoc esse P ‖ esset] corr. sup. lin. in esse C 10 probatio] probatur P 11 manentibus] remanentibus p ‖ deus annihilaret] post alia P ‖ haec] om. P 12 divisibile] add. in illas GPp ‖ est2] esset G 13 de albedine] om. p ‖ et] add. de G 22 situaliter] situantur sed add. in marg. situaliter C 24 quas] add. nos G 26 magnitudinem] add. distinctam GPp 27 habent] etc. habet GPp 28 haberent] haberet GP : om. p 28–29 illorum] horum Gp 29–30 alia magnitudine] aliam magnitudinem G 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 5, 4a10–20, 4b14–19

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Oppositum arguitur auctoritatibus et rationibus quibus multi alii acquiescunt: ⟨1⟩ In Praedicamentis enim dicitur quod quantitati nihil est contrarium; sed albedini vel caliditati aliquid est contrarium; igitur albedo vel caliditas non est quantitas. ⟨2⟩ Similiter proprium est quantitati non suscipere magis et minus; qualitates autem suscipiunt magis et minus, ut albedo, caliditas; igitur etc. ⟨3⟩ Et Commentator quarto Physicorum dicit quod quantitas non est de virtutibus activis vel passivis; | caliditas autem et frigiditas sunt virtutes activae et sibi invicem corruptivae. ⟨4⟩ Item in primo huius dicit Aristoteles quod, si est substantia et quantum, duo sunt. Et hoc non sequeretur, si illa substantia non esset distincta a quantitate qua est quanta. ⟨5⟩ Item | illud dicitur etiam ibidem, quod infiniti ratio quantitati congruit et non qualitati vel substantiae nisi per accidens, scilicet si simul et aliquae quantitates sunt. ⟨6⟩ Item sequeretur quod omnis generatio substantialis et omnis alteratio esset motus ad quantitatem; consequens est falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia omnis motus ad quantitatem est augmentatio vel diminutio; et tamen potest esse generatio substantialis vel alteratio sine augmentatione vel diminutione. Sed consequentia patet, | quia vere est motus ad quantitatem per quem quantitas acquiritur; sed per omnem generationem et alterationem quantitas acquireretur, quia acquiritur forma substantialis vel qualitas divisibilis et extensa. ⟨7⟩ Item sequeretur quod esset penetratio corporum, scilicet plura corpora simul indistincta secundum situm, quod Aristoteles quarto Physico-

1 oppositum] add. etiam G 3 quod] quam G 4 aliquid est] inv. GPp 7 magis et minus] om. GPp ‖ albedo] add. et G ‖ igitur] om. G 9 vel] et p 10 et sibi] sui p 11 in] om. Gp ‖ quod] om. Gp 11–12 quantum] add. sunt p 12 sequeretur] sequitur Gp ‖ distincta] distinguenda p : alia G 14 illud … ibidem] illud dicitur ibidem P : ibidem dicitur G : ibidem dicit p 15 et2] om. p 16 quantitates] qualitates G ‖ sunt] add. in marg. sint C : sint Gp 18 et antecedens] et P : etc. Gp 21 vere] ille p 22 quem] quam C 23 et] vel GPp ‖ acquireretur] add. et C : acquiritur Pp 24 qualitas] ABHLMTUp : quantitas CGP 25 sequeretur] sequitur G ‖ quod esset] quod esse p : om. P ‖ scilicet] add. quod essent p 3 Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 6, 5b11 8 Averroes, In Physicam, IV, comm. 84, f. 171L; cf. AA, 2: 144 11 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 2, 185b3–4 14 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 2, 185b2–3; cf. AA, 2: 9 26–82.1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 1, 209a6–7; 6, 213b20

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rum reputat impossibile. Consequentia probatur quia: simul indistinctae secundum situm sunt materia et forma substantialis, albedo et dulcedo in lacte, quorum | quodlibet esset corpus. ⟨8⟩ Aristoteles etiam secundo De anima per hoc quod lumen recipitur in corpore diaphano illo corpore non cedente, arguit quod lumen non sit corpus, quia sequeretur quod duo corpora essent simul in eodem, quod reputat impossibile. Et similiter argueretur de caliditate et albedine et huiusmodi. ⟨9⟩ Item secundo De anima movet Aristoteles illam dubitationem quare habemus plures sensus circa sensibilia communia. Videtur enim quod deberet sufficere quod uno sensu sentirentur sicut sensibilia propria. Igitur videtur natura frustra hoc fecisse, scilicet quod pluribus sensibus sentirentur. Et Aristoteles solvit solutione quae videtur expresse ad propositum nostrum, dicens quod hoc est ita quatenus minus lateant consequentia et communia, ut motus, magnitudo et numerus. Si enim esset visus solus et ipse esset albi, laterent utique magis et viderentur esse omnia idem propter illud quod sequuntur se invicem communiter color et magnitudo. Nunc autem, quoniam in altero sensibili communia sunt, manifestum facit quod aliud quoddam unumquodque ipsorum est. ⟨10⟩ Item Commentator quarto Physicorum dicit quod impossibilitas penetrationis dimensionum est ex terminis mathematicis, hoc est ex ratione corporeitatis. Igitur videtur quod quaecumque plura corpora, et cuiuscum-

1 probatur] patet GPp 2 et1] om. Gp ‖ substantialis] substantiales P : om. G 3 esset] est C 4 anima] add. dicit P 6 sequeretur] sequitur p ‖ simul] om. G ‖ eodem] add. loco p 7 similiter] consimiliter Pp ‖ caliditate et albedine] albedine et caliditate p : albedine caliditate G 7–8 et huiusmodi] om. P 11 sentirentur] sentiretur P 11–12 igitur … frustra] igitur frustra videtur natura G : ideo frustra videtur natura p 13 solutione] dubitationem p ‖ videtur expresse] inv. GPp 14 dicens … est] dicit hoc esse G 14–15 consequentia et communia] consequentia communia C : consequentia et anima P : et communia p 16 albi] alibi CG : albus p ‖ laterent] lateret CP ‖ utique magis] utique nigrum C : nigrum sed add. in marg. alias magis P : utique G ‖ omnia idem] inv. GPp 18 altero] alio G ‖ communia] omnia G ‖ manifestum facit] manifestum scitur (?) C : facit P 18–19 aliud quoddam] aliud quidem G : aliud quod p : illud quidem C 20 dicit] ante quarto p 21 penetrationis dimensionum] penetrationis p : penetrationum P ‖ est2] add. dictu p : add. dictum G 22 igitur] ideo Gp ‖ et] om. G 4 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 7, 418b14–18 13–19 Aristoteles, De anima, III, 1, 425b5–11 20 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, IV, comm. 76, f. 166F

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que sint naturae, impossibile est esse simul. Et hoc ibidem expresse videtur Aristoteles determinare in illo capitulo ‘et per se autem considerantibus’. Vide ibi. ⟨11⟩ Item sequeretur quod magnitudo esset sensibile proprium, quia esset albedo vel caliditas, et albedo esset sensibile commune, quia esset magnitudo. Et sic destrueretur differentia sensibilium propriorum et communium. Immo etiam magnitudo esset sensibile per accidens, quia esset substantia. ⟨12⟩ Iterum huic materiae b, quae modo est pedalis et potest fieri non pedalis, si condensetur, accidit esse pedale; et ab ea potest removeri esse pedale; et ita | materia erit, quando eam esse pedalem non erit. Et haec salvari non possunt, nisi materia sit alia ab illa magnitudine vel pedalitate qua | ipsa est pedalis, ita quod illa magnitudo sit accidens sibi. ⟨13⟩ Item Aristoteles in primo Posteriorum dicit propositiones negativas esse primas et immediatas, in quibus unum praedicamentum negatur de alio. Igitur haec est prima et immediata et per consequens per se vera ‘nulla substantia est quantitas’ et similiter ‘nulla qualitas est quantitas’. Ista quaestio est valde difficilis. Multi enim ponunt, et specialiter moderni, quod omnis res extensa est magnitudo propter auctoritates et rationes prius factas. Et difficile est demonstrare oppositum. Unde rationes quae in oppositum adductae sunt ut in pluribus sophisticae sunt; ideo possunt faciliter evadi. Ne aliquis aliquibus illarum rationum acquiescat tamquam | demonstrationibus, quod esset inconveniens, et ut illi qui volunt istam opinionem

1 sint] sunt P 1–2 expresse videtur aristoteles] aristoteles videtur expresse G 2 illo] secundo CP ‖ considerantibus] desiderantibus p 4 sequeretur] sequitur p 6 et2] om. p 9–10 huic … accidit] haec materia b quae modo est bipedalis potest fieri pedalis si condensaretur accidit ei p 9 b] om. G ‖ modo est] inv. G 10 pedale] pedalem CPp ‖ removeri] removere P 11 pedale] bipedalem p ‖ ita] illa p ‖ pedalem] bipedalem p 12 nisi] add. illa G ‖ ab illa magnitudine] magnitudine illa G ‖ pedalitate] bipedalitate p 13 pedalis] bipedalis p ‖ sibi] om. GPp 14 aristoteles … dicit] in (om. p) primo posteriorum dicit aristoteles GPp 15 negatur] post alio (16) p 18 valde] om. G ‖ difficilis] debilis sed add. in marg. difficilis C ‖ multi … et] ponunt enim multi p 19–20 et … factas] et rationes factas prius p : prius factas et rationes C : et rationes P 20 quae in] quae ad GP : quoad p 21 adductae] deductae CP ‖ sunt2] ante ut GP : om. p 21–22 ideo … evadi] vel faciliter possunt evadi ideo G : vel faciles ideo p : ideo P 22 aliquibus illarum rationum] forte (om. G) illis rationibus GPp 22–23 demonstrationibus] demonstrabilibus p 23 quod] om. P 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 8, 216a27–b2 79b12–20

14 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, I, 15,

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tenere sciant evadere illas rationes quae in contrarium sibi factae sunt, ego ac si essem de illa opinione, volo respondere ad illas rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod illa est indefinita ‘quantitati nihil est contrarium’, ideo vera. Sed universalis esset falsa. Vel dicitur melius ad intentionem Aristotelis quod Aristoteles non intendebat loqui de contrarietate rerum significatarum per terminos de praedicamento quantitatis vel qualitatis, sed de contrarietate | terminorum. Qualitati enim aliquid est contrarium, quia isti termini ‘album’ et ‘nigrum’ sunt contrarii, sed quantitati nihil est contrarium, id est termini de praedicamento quantitatis non sunt invicem contrarii, ut ‘bicubitum’, ‘tricubitum’, ‘corpus’, ‘linea’, ‘duo’, ‘tria’ etc. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam similiter dicitur quod qualitates suscipiunt magis et minus ad istum sensum quod termini de praedicamento qualitatis praedicantur de subiectis suis cum istis determinationibus ‘magis’ et ‘minus’, ut ‘magis album’ vel ‘minus album’. Sed non est sic de terminis de praedicamento quantitatis. Non enim dicimus ‘minus vel magis bicubitum vel corpus aut linea’, licet dicamus ‘maius corpus’ vel ‘maior linea’. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod Commentator intendebat quod de nulla specie praedicamenti quantitatis praedicatur universaliter esse activum neque etiam esse passivum. Sed de multis speciebus qualitatis hoc praedicatur universaliter. Omnis enim caliditas est activa. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod bona est consequentia ‘si substantia est et quantum, duo sunt’ non propter alietatem substantiae a quantitate, sed quia de ratione quantitatis est quod sit divisibilis, et etiam quia saltem in hac praedicatione, si concedatur, | ‘substantia est quanta’ est multitudo secundum rationem, quia illi termini differunt secundum rationem, licet supponunt pro eodem. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod pro tanto dicit Aristoteles quod infiniti ratio quantitati congruit, quia nulla substantia est finita vel infinita, nisi ipsa sit quantitas, sed bene quantitas est finita vel infinita, quae non est substantia

1 tenere] sustinere Gp ‖ sciant] quod sciunt P ‖ illas] om. GPp ‖ in contrarium] in marg. C : om. P ‖ sibi] eis (ante in) G 4 esset] essent p : est P 9 sunt] add. sibi G 10 corpus … etc.] unum duo tria corpus linea P 11 aliam similiter] aliam P : secundam p ‖ qualitates suscipiunt] qualitas suscipit GPp 12 quod] quia isti P 14 vel] om. GP ‖ album] om. p 15 minus vel magis] magis vel minus GPp ‖ vel2] om. P ‖ aut] vel P 16 vel maior] aut maior Gp : aut P 17 aliam] tertiam p 18 universaliter esse] inv. P 20 enim caliditas] enim qualitas C : caliditas P 21 aliam] quartam p ‖ est2] om. G 22 quantum] add. sup. lin. est C 23 divisibilis] divisibile G 24 concedatur] conceditur p ‖ quanta] quantum sed add. sup. lin. quanta C 26 supponunt] supponant Gp ‖ eodem] eadem re G 27 aliam] quintam p 28 congruit] add. etc. G : convenit etc. P : convenit vel congruit etc. p

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vel etiam quae non est qualitas. Et omnino, cuicumque convenit dici finitum vel infinitum, proprie hoc convenit sibi ratione qua dicitur quantitas, non ratione qua dicitur qualitas vel substantia. Haec igitur est per se et primo et universaliter vera | ‘quantitas est finita vel infinita’ et non haec ‘substantia vel qualitas est finita vel infinita’. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod non vocatur motus ad substantiam quia acquiritur substantia quae ante non erat, nec ad quantitatem ex eo quod acquiritur quantitas quae ante non erat; et sic de qualitate et de ubi. Sed vocatur motus aut mutatio secundum substantiam, quando mutatur responsio termini de praedicamento substantiae ad quaestionem quaerentem quid est hoc; et dicitur motus secundum quantitatem, si mutetur responsio ad quantum est, ut quia prius ‘bicubitum’ et post ‘tricubitum’; et sic de quale est et ubi est. Unde licet in augmentatione viventis ita acquiratur substantia sicut magnitudo, tamen quia non mutatur responsio ad quid est, sed ad quantum est hoc, ideo dicitur quod ibi est motus secundum quantitatem et non secundum substantiam. ⟨7⟩ Ad aliam dicunt illi quod penetratio proprie est, si duorum corporum extra invicem existentium situaliter unum intret in alterum illo altero non cedente nec diviso; et hoc est impossibile naturaliter. Sed duo corpora esse simul situaliter, quae numquam possunt esse extra invicem naturaliter, non est penetratio, ut de materia et forma vel subiecto et accidente. Et si aliquis vellet hoc vocare penetrationem, illa non esset impossibilis, sed necessaria naturaliter. ⟨8⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod Aristoteles non intendebat | negare lumen esse corpus, sed negabat lumen esse corpus descendens a sole per motum localem, sicut antiqui ponebant, quia esset penetratio proprie, cum aer non cedat nec dividatur. | ⟨9⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod intentio Aristotelis est quod sic expedit pluribus sensibus sentire magnitudinem, | non ut credamus quod color vel caliditas 2 vel] add. in G ‖ non] add. sup. lin. ea G 3 primo] prima G 6 aliam] sextam p 7–8 nec … erat] et ita de quantitate p 7 ex eo quod] quia P 8 et de] aut p : et P 9 substantiam] substantias p ‖ quando] quia P 11 est] om. p 12 et post] et postea p : post G 13 ita acquiratur] inv. P 14 est1] add. hoc G : hoc est p 15 ibi est] inv. Gp ‖ et] om. Gp 17 aliam] septimam p ‖ proprie] propria CP 18 unum intret] inv. p 19 et] sed G 20 possunt esse] essent G ‖ naturaliter] om. P 20–21 non est penetratio] non se penetrant sed add. in marg. non est penetratio corporum seu C : non se penetrant P 21 et1] vel CP ‖ subiecto et] praem. de Gp : alio P 22 hoc] haec p 24 aliam] octavam p ‖ aristoteles] add. in marg. ex illo dicto in secundo de anima voluit arguere quod lumen non sit corpus et C 24–25 lumen esse] quin (del.) lumen esse C : quin lumen esset GPp 28 aliam] nonam p 29 color] calor Pp

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distinguantur a magnitudine, sed ut sciamus quod aliqua magnitudo est distincta a colore et aliqua a caliditate. Omnis enim color vel caliditas est magnitudo, sed non e converso. ⟨10⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod Commentator erat de adversa opinione et quod non est sibi credendum vel quod solum per illa verba intendebat quod penetratio proprie dicta, si esset, non esset nisi corporum quae tamen erant ante extra invicem situaliter, et quod hoc est impossibile. Aristoteles ibidem bene dicebat quod eadem ratio esset de dimensione vacui et de dimensione pleni, scilicet quantum ad hoc quod, cum prius sint extra invicem, non possunt intrare una in aliam alia non cedente. ⟨11⟩ Ad aliam patet quod, si illa ratio valet, ita concluderetur quod numerus esset distinctus a rebus numeratis et quies a quiescente, quod est falsum. Ideo dicitur quod huiusmodi appropriatio vel communitas non attribuitur sensibilibus propter distinctionem rerum sensatarum, sed propter nomina significantia res sensibiles, et hoc propter rationes secundum quas significant eas, ita quod illi nomini attribuitur hoc praedicatum ‘sensibile proprium’, quod significat res secundum conceptum secundum quem non percipiuntur nisi unico sensu, ita quod istud nomen non nisi pro rebus supponit unico sensu perceptibilibus, | ut color, sapor, odor. Sed illi nomini attribuitur hoc praedicatum ‘sensibile commune’, quod significat res et supponit pro rebus diversis sensibus perceptibilibus, ut quod una percipitur visu, alia tactu etc., ut magnitudo, numerus. Et haec debent perfectius videri secundo De anima. Non igitur est inconveniens quod eadem res significatur per nomen cui hoc praedicatum ‘sensibile proprium’ attribuitur, et per nomen cui attribuitur hoc praedicatum ‘sensibile commune’. Unde cum dicamus

1 distinguantur] distinguatur G 2 colore] calore P ‖ color] calor P 4 aliam] decimam p ‖ dicitur] add. vel Pp 7 impossibile] add. et GPp 7–8 ibidem bene dicebat] bene dicit p 8 ratio esset] inv. Gp ‖ dimensione vacui] dimensione p : demonstratione vacui P ‖ de dimensione2] de demonstratione P : dimensione G 10 una in aliam] una (in marg.) in aliam C : unam materiam P 11 illa ratio valet] valeret Gp : vellent P ‖ ita] ista G 12 esset] deberet esse GPp 13 ideo] non P ‖ appropriatio] appropriatione P 14 sensibilibus] AHTp : sensibus BCGLMP : sensui U ‖ sensatarum] significatarum p 15 hoc] om. Pp 15–16 significant] significat G 16 quod] om. G 18 nisi2 … supponit] supponit nisi pro rebus Pp : supponit pro rebus nisi G 19 sed] si G 21 ut] ita G 22 etc.] om. p ‖ numerus] add. etc. G ‖ haec debent] hoc debet p : hoc debeat G ‖ videri] add. in p 23 igitur est] inv. G ‖ significatur] significetur Gp 24 attribuitur] ante hoc GPp 25 dicamus] dicimus Pp : dicit G 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 8, 216a27–b2 22–23 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De anima, II, q. 12 (ed. Sobol, 187)

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colorem esse sensibile proprium, per hoc non debemus intelligere aliud nisi quia unico sensu secundum speciem omnis color est sensibilis et nullo alio. Sed cum dicitur ‘magnitudo est sensibile commune’, nos nihil aliud volumus intelligere nisi quia magnitudinum quaedam sunt sensibiles uno sensu et aliae sensu alio vel aliis. ⟨12⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod non valet, quia ita argueretur de materia et privatione vel de magnitudine et sphaericitate. Unde materiae accidit esse pedale, id est haec est vera per accidens ‘materia est pedalis’, | et esse pedale potest removeri a materia, id est possibile est quod materia non sit pedalis. Et si haec materia est pedalis, haec est falsa ‘haec materia erit, quando ipsam esse pedalem non erit’, sed bene ipsa erit, quando non erit ipsam esse pedalem. ⟨13⟩ Ad ultimam dicitur quod nos tenemus communiter hanc esse veram ‘actio est passio’ non obstante diversitate praedicamentorum. Aristoteles igitur non voluit negare veritatem propositionis in qua unum praedicamentum affirmatur de alio, sed voluit dicere quod illa | non est quidditativa praedicatio et quod ipsis praedicamentis repugnat primo quidditativa praedicatio affirmativa de se invicem. Et consequenter repugnat hoc etiam suis inferioribus. Numquam enim est possibile quod species de uno praedicamento praedicatur quidditative de specie alterius praedicamenti, sed est semper praedicatio denominativa. Non obstante tamen quod sic possunt solvi et evadi rationes praedictae, ego pono conclusionem quod nulla substantia est magnitudo. Hoc declaratur supponendo quod aer manens idem secundum substantiam potest multum rarefieri et condensari per calefactionem et frigefactionem. Quod experimentaliter apparet, quia si phiala vitrea calefiat super carbones, aer interior

1 intelligere aliud] inv. GPp 2 quia] quod p ‖ color] om. P ‖ nullo] nullus P 3 volumus] velimus G 5 sensu] om. GPp 7 de] om. p ‖ sphaericitate] parvitate sed add. in marg. sphaericitate C 9 id est] quia P 11 esse pedalem] inv. P 13 ultimam dicitur] ultimam dicendum est G : aliam dicendum p ‖ tenemus communiter] inv. p : communiter vel tenemus G 16 alio] altero Pp 17 et quod] et in quid sed add. sup. lin. et quod C ‖ primo quidditativa praedicatio] primo praedicatio quidditativa Gp : prima praedicatio quidditativa P 18 repugnat hoc] inv. Gp 19 est possibile] inv. G 20 praedicatur] praedicetur Gp 22 sic possunt] sic possent p : sine hoc possunt P ‖ et] vel p 22–23 ego pono conclusionem] ego ponam conclusionem p : ponitur conclusio talis P 23 hoc] praem. et Gp 24 supponendo] sic ponendo G ‖ aer] socrates P 25 et1] vel Pp ‖ et2] vel p ‖ frigefactionem] add. et sequitur P 25–26 experimentaliter] experienter p 26 quia] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ calefiat] ponatur p ‖ aer interior] om. p

14ra C

10vb G

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multum rarefit, in tantum quod si os phialae ponatur in aqua culo verso superius, cum per parvam horam | temporis aer interior refrigerabitur, ille in tantum condensabitur quod oportebit aquam ascendere in phialam usque ad mediam eius repletionem, ne sit vacuum, quia aer interior condensatus obtinet minorem locum in subduplo quam ante, cum esset rarior. Postea per experientiam ego suppono quod trahendo vel comprimendo aerem sine calefactione vel frigefactione tu non potes aerem in tantum, scilicet ad duplum, condensare vel rarefacere, sicut dictum est quantum tu potes per calefactionem vel frigefactionem. Quod patet in follibus. Nam si latera follis sint perfecte ab invicem elevata, | ut intra sit aeris plenitudo, et obstruantur bene omnia foramina follis, tu non poteris comprimere latera follis ad subduplum, immo nec ad aliquam notabilem quantitatem. Igitur per compressionem tu non potes notabiliter condensare aerem. Similiter si latera sint | non perfecte, sed medio modo ab invicem elevata, et omnia foramina obstruantur, tu non poteris amplius notabiliter elevare latera follis, ne sit dare vacuum. Hoc tamen tu posses, si posses per tractionem notabiliter rarefacere aerem, sicut tu posses per calefactionem. Tunc igitur quaero quid prohibet quod ego non possum condensare notabiliter aerem existentem inter latera follis per compressionem laterum vel etiam notabiliter rarefacere per elevationem. Constat bene quod causa huius reddi non potest, nisi ponamus dimensionem distinctam a materia et forma, a caliditate et frigiditate et huiusmodi qualitatibus, qua praedicta omnia sunt extensa, sicut uno motu, quem vocamus localem, subiectum cum omnibus sibi inhaerentibus movetur. Sed huiusmodi dimensionem ponendo nos possumus totum salvare. Dicimus enim quod, sicut albedo dat esse album formaliter, sic magnitudo, quae est extensio, dat esse extensum et

1 rarefit] rarefiet p : rarefiat P : om. G ‖ aqua culo] aqua frigida culo p : aquatilo P 2 horam] moram p ‖ refrigerabitur ille] refrigebitur ille p : ille refrigerabatur P 5 cum] dum P 6 per … suppono] per experientiam suppono P : ego etiam suppono per experientiam Gp ‖ comprimendo] deprimendo p 7 aerem2] om. Pp 8 dictum est] inv. p 8–9 quantum tu potes] quod tu potes P : quod hoc potes p : quod hoc potest G 9 patet] add. etiam P 10 follis] follium G : folli P ‖ aeris plenitudo] inv. p 13 compressionem] compactionem sed add. sup. lin. compressionem C : compactionem G 14 sint non] inv. p ‖ elevata] ante ab P 15 poteris] potes G 16 ne] nec P ‖ hoc] quod Pp 18 igitur] add. ego p ‖ quid] quod P ‖ possum] possem C 20 bene] om. Gp 21 huius] om. Gp ‖ nisi] om. p 22 a] ac P ‖ et2] om. GP ‖ huiusmodi] huius P ‖ qua] quibus sed add. sup. lin. qua C 23 sunt] add. in marg. sint C : sint GPp ‖ uno] add. modo C ‖ subiectum] solum C 24 sibi inhaerentibus] sibi adhaerentibus Gp : adhaerentibus P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 24–25 dimensionem ponendo] inv. P 26 extensio] extensa P

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magnum. Et sicut in eodem subiecto plus de albedine dat esse albius et plus de caliditate calidius, ita plus de magnitudine maius et extensius. Ideo etiam, sicut idem prius album | non potest fieri albius nisi per generationem albedinis in eo cum albedine praecedente, nec fieri minus album nisi per corruptionem partis albedinis, ita idem existens magnum non potest fieri maius sine aliqua generatione magnitudinis cum magnitudine praeexistente nec fieri minus existens magnum sine corruptione magnitudinis. Modo ultra dicimus quod in subiectis ad hoc habilibus, sicut ad calefactionem consequitur naturaliter generatio levitatis et ad frigefactionem corruptio levitatis et generatio gravitatis, sic etiam ad huiusmodi calefactionem sequitur naturaliter generatio partialis magnitudinis et ad frigefactionem corruptio. Et credo quod hoc sit rarefactio et condensatio. Raritas enim nihil aliud est in materialibus quam in pauca materia multa magnitudo, et densitas est in multa materia pauca magnitudo. Et dicimus ultra quod de huiusmodi magnitudine non potest aliquid ita notabile generari vel corrumpi per compressionem vel tractionem sicut per calefactionem et frigefactionem, sicut nec etiam de gravitate et levitate. Et sic apparet causa et ratio praedictorum posita sic magnitudine distincta a substantia et qualitate. Sed | videtur mihi quod alii de praedictis non possunt convenienter reddere causam. Cum enim dicunt quod non fiat condensatio vel rarefactio per generationem vel corruptionem magnitudinis, | sed solum per motum localem partium, per quem approximantur undique ad invicem vel elongantur, et ego possum corpora movere localiter pellendo vel trahendo, quid prohibet quod ego non possum comprimere simul partes aeris condensando ad obtinendum minorem locum? Materia enim non obstat, quia plus de materia posset in multo minori loco. | Nec forma substantialis aeris obstat, quia illa tota forma sit in minori loco aere condensato per frigefactionem, sicut dictum est. Nec caliditas obstat secundum se ipsam, licet forte obstet

1 magnum et] manifestum est P ‖ dat] debet p 2 ideo etiam] et p 5 non] nec p 7 existens magnum] om. GPp ‖ magnitudinis] om. Pp 8 subiectis ad hoc] substantiis P 9 naturaliter] generaliter p 10 huiusmodi] huius P 11 corruptio] add. levitatis et generatio gravitatis C 12 hoc] add. fit G 12–13 materialibus] naturalibus P 13 est] om. p 14 huiusmodi] huius P 15 aliquid] aliud p 16 et] vel GPp ‖ etiam] et G 17 et sic] corr. ex sicut C : et sicut P ‖ praedictorum] praedictarum p 18 magnitudine] add. in marg. esse C ‖ qualitate] add. haec est causa P 19 de praedictis] sup. lin. C : praedictis p 20 causam] add. de praedictis C ‖ dicunt] dicant GPp 22 approximantur] appropinquantur p 23 et] etiam P ‖ corpora] corpus P ‖ localiter] om. p ‖ quid] add. sup. lin. enim C : add. igitur P 25 enim] om. p ‖ quia] quem G 26 in multo] add. esse G : praem. esse P 27 quia] quem G ‖ aere condensato] inv. GPp 28 obstat] om. G ‖ obstet] add. forte p

11ra G

14va C 12va P

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inquantum sequitur ad eam generatio magnitudinis. Nam multo plus de caliditate potest in valde minori loco, quia in parvo ignito ferro est multo plus de caliditate. Si tu dicas quod obstat ex parte raritatis quae a praedictis distincta est, ego concedo, quia tunc illa raritas est magnitudo vel dimensio quam ego quaero. Illi enim, sicut non ponunt magnitudinem distinctam a praedictis, ita nec raritatem. Conclusio nostra principalis potest sic persuaderi aliquibus aliis rationibus. Sit enim corpus pedale et omnia corpora sibi extrinseca sint annihilata et rarefiat per potentiam divinam, donec sit bipedale. Constat quod alio et alio modo se habet prius et posterius; et non ad aliquod extrinsecum; igitur intrinsece. Et istos modos ex parte rei alios ab invicem vocemus magnitudines, cum nos ponamus quod non sit prius et posterius alia materia vel alia forma substantialis vel alia caliditas aut frigiditas et sic de aliis. Item si materia esset magnitudo et dimensio, ipsa se ipsa faceret distare; ideo plus de materia plus faceret distare; quod non est necessarium; igitur etc. Item rarefactio esset mutatio vilior quam condensatio quantum esset de se, quod apparet falsum, quia nobilioribus elementis convenit naturaliter maior rari|tas et naturales dispositiones nobiliorum elementorum debent esse nobiliores. Consequentia ex hoc patet, quia ceteris paribus congregatio et unio partium corporis est nobilior quam dispersio, cum virtus unita sit fortior se ipsa dispersa. Et videtur mihi facile respondere ad rationes in oppositum. | ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod Aristoteles illam propositionem non posuit determinando veritatem, sed disputative arguendo ad partem falsam, scilicet quod locus esset materia. 1 ad] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ magnitudinis] add. pluris Pp 2 potest] posset GPp ‖ ignito ferro] inv. GPp ‖ multo] multum G 3 tu] om. P ‖ obstat] hoc stat p 3–4 distincta est] inv. p 4 quia] quod P 5 quaero] credo P ‖ ponunt … praedictis] possunt (add. sed del. non possunt) magnitudinem distinctam a praedictis ponere C : possunt magnitudinem distinctam a praedictis P 7 conclusio] praem. item GPp ‖ nostra] mea P ‖ potest sic persuaderi] posset persuaderi sic p : posset persuaderi P : possit persuaderi G 8 sit enim] si sit p ‖ corpora] om. GPp 11 ab] ad p ‖ invicem] add. seu diversas P 11–12 vocemus] vocamus p 12 nos] om. p 13–14 et … aliis] om. P 15 ipsa2] ipsam CG 16 ideo] ita G 16–17 igitur etc.] om. Pp 18 de] ex GPp 20 naturales] naturaliter G ‖ nobiliorum elementorum] ante naturales Pp 22 corporis] corporum p ‖ sit] est GPp 24 et] ex his dictis p ‖ in oppositum] om. p 25 dicitur] cum dicebatur p 26 disputative] add. etiam GPp

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⟨2⟩ Ad aliam conceditur primo quod album et omne divisibile est quantitas, quia est numerus. Secundo dicitur quod Aristoteles modicam habens sollicitudinem de nominibus, sicut dicit Commentator prooemio Physicorum, saepe consuevit capere nomen concretum loco nominis abstracti, ut semper in secundo De generatione vocat primas qualitates calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum. Volebat igitur dicere quod album est quantum et quod haec propositio | est per accidens, quia non est quidditativa, sed denominativa, cum sint termini diversorum praedicamentorum. ⟨3⟩ Ad auctoritatem Commentatoris potest dici quod non est dimensio aeterna, sed aeternaliter est dimensio, et hoc volebat Commentator dicere. Vel potest dici quod dimensio materiae quae est corporis densissimi est aeterna, quia nec habet contrarium nec repugnat alicui habenti contrarium. Sed ulterius magnitudo, cum illa repugnaret corpori densissimo, ideo est corruptibilis. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod materia dimensionata bene recipit successive contraria, sed non dimensio, sicut si humidum calefieret, humiditas non reciperet caliditatem, sed materia sibi subiecta. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod omne per se divisibile est quantitas, quia est numerus. Sed non oportet quod omne divisibile sit magnitudo. Ad confirmationem dico quod remota magnitudine ab ipsa materia per potentiam divinam adhuc illa materia haberet partes alias ab invicem, sed non haberet partes extra invicem nec intra invicem situaliter, quia ablatus esset situs, qui est ratione magnitudinis. Nec esset localiter nec situaliter pars parti propinqua vel remota, supra vel infra etc., sicut nec intelligentia est extra intelligentiam situaliter. Nec illa materia esset in loco circumscriptive | vel commensurative. Nec inde sequeretur quod illa materia vel aliqua pars eius moveretur localiter, sed forte instantanee, sic sicut Deo placeret, ipsa prius habens positionem sive situm partium fieret non habens positionem et situm, et ipsa prius extensa fieret non extensa, et ipsa prius existens in loco fieret non existens in loco, vel existens in loco circumscriptive fieret in loco non circumscriptive absque hoc quod esset motus localis | vel aliquis

1–2 quantitas] quantitatis C 3 dicit] dicitur G ‖ commentator] add. in p 4 nomen] om. p 6 et] om. G 8 denominativa] add. tantum G 10 aeternaliter] aeterna G 11 quae est] quae esset GP : om. p 13 ulterius] ulterior Pp ‖ repugnaret] repugnet G 15 aliam] quartam bene p ‖ recipit] suscipit p 17 sibi] add. coniuncta et C 18 aliam] quartam p 23 est] esset C ‖ nec2] vel GPp 26 sequeretur] sequitur p 27 instantanee sic] instantanee Gp : instanter P 28 sive] seu Gp 29 et1] seu G : vel p 30 existens2] om. p 3–4 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 1, f. 6F

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motus, sed solum mutatio instantanea, quae non est mutatio proprie, sicut postea de hoc dicetur in aliis libris. ⟨6⟩ Ad ultimam dicitur quod non frustra ponitur huiusmodi magnitudo distincta, quia visae fuerunt rationes cogentes eam ponere, per quas etiam apparet tanta vel maior utilitas illius magnitudinis in natura sicut albedinis vel nigredinis. 11va G

Et sic patet quaestio. | 1 proprie] ante non Gp : om. P 2 de hoc dicetur] dicetur de hoc G 3 ultimam] aliam p ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 4 distincta] om. p 5 vel] et G 7 et … quaestio] et sic est finis istius quaestionis etc. G : et sic est finis omnium rationum p : om. P 2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VI, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 99ra)

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⟨Utrum totum sit suae partes⟩

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Quaeritur nono utrum Aristoteles bene dicit de identitate et diversitate totius ad suas partes. Et est metaphysicae considerationis, tamen solet hic tractari, quia ipse eam movet hic. Ideo nunc fiet quaestio nona utrum totum est suae partes. Arguitur quod non, et hoc sic auctoritatibus: ⟨1⟩ Secundo enim De anima distinguit Aristoteles compositum contra materiam et formam, quae sunt partes eius; igitur compositum non est materia et forma. ⟨2⟩ Item in septimo Metaphysicae: ‘compositum non est elementa ex quibus componitur nec idem eis, ut illa syllaba “ba” non est “b” et “a”’. Quod Aristoteles probat quia: ‘b’ et ‘a’ manent ipsis ab invicem dissolutis, et non manet illa syllaba. Ideo iterum concludit dicens: ‘est igitur aliquid syllaba, non solum elementa (vocalis et consonans), sed etiam alterum aliquid’. ⟨3⟩ Item octavo Metaphysicae: ‘omnium quaecumque plures partes habent et non est ut acervus | quod totum, sed inest aliud praeter totum, est alia causa’.

3 quaeritur nono utrum] consequenter quaeritur utrum p : haec est quaestio nona scilicet de hoc quod G : quaeritur nono P ‖ dicit] add. quod quaestio GPp ‖ et] vel G 4 et] om. GPp 5 nunc … nona] nunc fiet nona quaestio p : pronunc fiet quaestio nona P : haec nona quaestio erit talis G 7 et hoc sic] om. GPp 8 distinguit] dividit GPp 11 item in] item GP : secundo p 12 ut … non] ut syllaba ba non G : nec syllaba ba P 13 aristoteles probat] probat Gp : probatur P 14 syllaba1] add. ba P ‖ dicens est igitur] ergo est p 15 etiam] et p ‖ aliquid] add. alterum C 16 item octavo] item sexto G : tertio octavo p 17 acervus quod] alicuius quod Cp : asserimus quid G ‖ sed … totum2] Cp : sed inest aliquid praeter totum BGHLMPT : sed modo aliquid praeter totum A : inest praeter aliquid totum U ‖ est2] et G : et est alia et est C 8 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 1, 412a6–9; 2, 414a14–16; cf. AA, 6: 37 11–15 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 17, 1041b13–18 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VIII, 6, 1045a9–10: ‘omnium enim quecumque plures partes habent et non est ut aceruus quod totum sed est aliquid totum preter partes, est aliqua causa’ (Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, AL XXV 3.2, 176)

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_013

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⟨4⟩ Et Commentator duodecimo Metaphysicae: ‘cum substantia fuerit numerata, congregatum erit unum per intentionem superadditam’. ⟨5⟩ Item quinto Metaphysicae: ‘bis tria non sunt sex’. Ita communiter omnes allegant auctoritatem. Igitur etc.

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Deinde arguitur rationibus: ⟨6⟩ Primo quod materia et forma sunt partes compositi etiam simul sumpti, et compositum non est pars compositi. ⟨7⟩ Vel etiam sic: materia et forma sunt partes compositi, et tamen materia et forma non sunt partes materiae et formae. ⟨8⟩ Vel sic: compositum est totum ad materiam et formam, et non est totum ad se ipsum. ⟨9⟩ Item totum componitur ex partibus, et non partes ex partibus. Vel sic: ex partibus componitur totum, et non ex toto totum. ⟨10⟩ Item totum dividitur in partes, non totum in totum. Vel sic: totum dividitur in partes, non partes in se ipsas. ⟨11⟩ Item partes sunt in toto, non totum in toto. Vel sic: partes sunt in toto, non partes in se ipsis. ⟨12⟩ Item materia et forma sunt causae compositi, non compositum compositi. | Vel sic: materia et forma sunt causae compositi, non sui ipsarum. ⟨13⟩ Item ipsa materia et forma sunt priores naturaliter composito, et non compositum composito. Vel sic: materia et forma sunt priores naturaliter composito, et non se ipsis. ⟨14⟩ Item sequeretur quod partes essentiales essent partes quantitativae, quod est falsum, quia partes quantitativae sunt extra invicem situaliter, non autem partes essentiales. Consequentia patet, quia hoc compositum est materia et forma, quae sunt partes eius essentiales; et similiter hoc compositum est suae duae medietates, quae sunt duae partes eius quantitativae;

2 numerata] BMTU : naturaliter (in marg.) una C : natura GPp : una natura A : naturata H : om. L ‖ intentionem] intensionem C ‖ superadditam] additam GPp 4 omnes allegant auctoritatem] allegant omnes auctoritatem P : allegant homines auctoritatem p : allegant auctorum (?) (corr. in marg. ex omnes homines auctoritates) C ‖ igitur etc.] om. Pp 5 deinde] quarto p 6 quod] quia Pp ‖ etiam] et p 8 sic] om. P 10 et1] ad sed add. sup. lin. et C 12 item] quinto p 16 item] septimo p ‖ toto3] add. et p 19 compositi] add. et G 20 item ipsa] item GP : nono p ‖ naturaliter] naturales C 23 sequeretur] sequitur p 24 situaliter] corr. in marg. ex totaliter situatae C : totaliter situatae P 27 duae2] om. Gp 1 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 39, f. 322I 1020b7–8

3 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 14,

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igitur illae partes quantitativae sunt istae partes essentiales. Iste enim est syllogismus expositorius et adver|sarius habet concedere praemissas. ⟨15⟩ Item pono casum quod quadratus descriptus in pariete imaginetur dividi in duas medietates, scilicet dextram et sinistram, per lineam a. Et dividatur in duas medietates, scilicet unam superius et aliam inferius, per lineam b. Tunc arguitur sic: si | totum esset suae partes, sequeretur quod medietas dextra et sinistra essent medietates supra et infra; consequens est falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis probatur tali argumento: linea a est inter partem dextram et partem sinistram; sed ipsa non est inter partem infra et partem supra; igitur medietas supra et medietas infra non sunt medietas dextra et medietas sinistra. Sed prima consequentia patet per syllogismum expositorium cuius praemissas concedit adversarius. Nam ille quadratus est medietas dextra et medietas sinistra; et etiam ipse est medietas supra et medietas infra; igitur etc. Vel sic: inter medietatem dextram et medietatem sinistram est linea a; sed inter supra et infra non est; igitur etc. ⟨16⟩ Item sequeretur quod paria essent imparia. Sed consequens est impossibile, quia si paria essent | imparia, sequeretur quod essent non paria; igitur non essent paria; et sic essent paria et non paria, quod implicat contradictionem. Sed prima consequentia patet secundum arithmeticos, quia omnia duo sunt paria et omnia tria sunt imparia; et tamen duo essent tria, quia duae medietates lineae b essent tres tertiae lineae b. ⟨17⟩ Iterum sequeretur quod aequalia essent inaequalia. | Consequens est impossibile, quod probatur sicut in praecedenti ratione. Consequentia tenet ponendo quod lineae g duae medietates sunt a et b. Sed iterum eadem linea imaginetur dividi in duas partes quarum una sit dupla alteri, et sint illae partes c et d. Arguo tunc sic: a et b sunt aequalia ad invicem, sed c et d sunt inaequalia, et tamen a et b sunt c et d. Quod patet per syllogismum 1 partes2] partiales C 2 habet] habent G 3 item] add. ego Gp ‖ descriptus] post pariete GPp 4 et2] add. etiam Gp 5 in] add. suas C ‖ et] om. P 6 sequeretur] sequitur p 7 medietas] medietates GPp 8 et antecedens] etc. GPp 9 partem2] praem. inter Gp : om. P 10 partem1 … supra1] partem (om. P) supra et partem infra Pp ‖ medietas1] medietates G ‖ medietas2] medietates G 11 dextra] om. P ‖ medietas2] om. p ‖ prima] add. etiam Gp 13 medietas2] in marg. C : om. P ‖ etiam ipse] inv. p : ipse et P 14 sic] om. p 15 medietatem] om. p ‖ supra et infra] infra et supra G 17 item sequeretur] undecimo sequitur p 18 impossibile] falsum G ‖ paria1] in marg. C : om. GPp ‖ sequeretur] sequitur p 19 essent2 … non2] praem. paria P : paria non essent Gp 21 tamen] om. P 23 sequeretur] sequitur p 24 praecedenti] praecedente p ‖ tenet] patet GPp 25 quod] om. P ‖ sunt a] sint a Pp : sunt d G 26 dupla alteri] inv. GP 27 arguo tunc sic] tunc arguo sic P : ergo tunc Gp

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expositorium. Nam linea g est c et d; et ipsa etiam est a et b; igitur a et b, quae sunt aequalia, sunt c et d, quae sunt inaequalia. ⟨18⟩ Item sequeretur quod idem esset album et nigrum, quod est falsum. Consequentia patet, si alicuius scuti medietates sunt a et b, et a est album et b nigrum etc. ⟨19⟩ Item partes essent eaedem inter se, quod est falsum. Consequentia patet per illam regulam ‘quaecumque sunt eadem uni et eidem in numero, illa sunt eadem inter se’; et partes essent eaedem toti, quod est unum numero. ⟨20⟩ Item videns Socratem videret aliqua duo de quorum uno nihil videret, quod videtur impossibile. Consequentia patet, quia videret duas medietates Socratis, quarum una est ante et alia retro, cum istae sint Socrates; et tamen de illa quae est retro nihil videret. ⟨21⟩ Iterum a esset maius et minus ipso b et aequale ipsi b, quod videtur impossibile. Consequentia patet ponendo quod b sit duorum pedum et a sex pedum, et quod a imaginetur sic dividi quod prima pars sit trium pedum et quod alia duorum et tertia unius, et illae vocentur c, d, e. Et arguo tunc sic: a est c et d et e, igitur etc. ⟨22⟩ Item haec propositio mentalis ‘omnis homo est animal’ esset simul vera et falsa, quod est impossibile. Consequentia patet, quia in mente est unum totum aggregatum ex quattuor partibus correspondentibus istis quattuor vocabulis ‘omnis’, ‘homo’, ‘est’, ‘animal’; et illae quattuor partes in intellectu non haberent ordinem situs ad invicem propter indivisibilitatem intellectus; ideo qua ratione illud totum | in mente esset haec propositio ‘omnis homo est animal’, eadem ratione esset illa propositio ‘animal est omnis homo’; et tamen haec est vera ‘omnis homo est animal’ et illa altera est falsa; igitur etc. |

1 etiam] om. G 3 item sequeretur] decimo tertio sequitur p 4 scuti] om. GPp ‖ a est] a sit Gp : sunt P 5 etc.] om. GPp 6 item] decimo quarto p 7 illam] illa p : unam C 8 est] esset p 9 numero] praem. in Pp : in numero ergo etc. G 10 item] decimo quinto p ‖ socratem] add. scilicet P 13 de] om. P ‖ videret] videt p 14 iterum] decimo sexto p ‖ maius] add. ipso b GPp ‖ ipsi] ipso P 16 imaginetur sic] inv. GPp 16–17 et quod] et G : om. Pp 17 et1] om. P ‖ d] add. et p ‖ et3 … sic] tunc arguo sic G : ergo tunc Pp 18 d et e] b et d G ‖ igitur etc.] om. G 19 item] ultimo p : om. G 21 aggregatum] congregatum GPp 22 vocabulis] vocalis P 23 haberent … invicem] haberent ad invicem ordinem situs GP : habent ad invicem ordinem situs p ‖ propter indivisibilitatem] propter individuitatem p : indivisibilitatem P 26 tamen haec est] haec tamen esset G ‖ omnis … animal] om. GPp ‖ altera est] om. GPp

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Oppositum arguitur auctoritatibus: ⟨1⟩ Dicitur enim quarto Physicorum quod totum nihil est praeter | suas partes. ⟨2⟩ Dicitur enim primo Physicorum: ‘multa enim itaque unum’, scilicet quia partes plures sunt unum totum. ⟨3⟩ Dicitur etiam quarto Physicorum quod multa metra totum, scilicet quia sunt partes totius mensurae. Unde super hoc dicit Commentator quod mensuratum est plures mensurae | et numerus est plures unitates. ⟨4⟩ Item quinto Metaphysicae dicitur quod aliqua sunt unum, quia sunt continua ad invicem. ⟨5⟩ Item secundo De anima dicitur: ‘sicut pupilla et visus sunt oculus, sic anima et corpus sunt animal’. ⟨6⟩ Item in symbolo Anastasii: ‘sicut anima rationalis et caro sunt unus homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus’ etc. Primo ego dico quod nullum totum est pars eius et quod nulla pars est totum cuius est pars. Et hoc ego credo concedendum tamquam principium per se notum et communiter concessum. Et cavillator volens hoc negare ita deberet illam negare ‘omne totum est maius sua parte’, cum nihil sit maius se ipso, et absurdum est dicere quod aliquid sit compositum ex se ipso et quodam alio. Ex hoc infertur quod locutio, quamvis sit usitata, non est propria, quando fit denominatio totius a denominatione partis. Dico igitur quod haec locutio est valde usitata. Dicimus enim communiter ‘homo est simus’, quia habet

2 enim] om. P ‖ suas] om. GPp 4 dicitur enim] dicitur etiam GP : etiam dicitur p ‖ enim2] om. GPp 5 sunt] sint C 6 quod] quia G ‖ totum] om. CGp 7 quia] quot C ‖ sunt … mensurae] partes sunt mensurae totius GPp 8 et] add. quod GPp 11 dicitur] om. GPp ‖ sunt] om. GP 12 sunt] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 13 anastasii] athanasii p ‖ caro] add. et corpus C ‖ sunt unus] unus est G : est P 14 etc.] om. GPp 15 primo] praem. prima conclusio p 16 ego] om. GP ‖ credo] add. esse Gp 17 volens hoc] inv. GPp 19 aliquid] aliud p 22 a denominatione] ad denominationem Cp 23 communiter] quod Pp 2 Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 3, 210a16 4 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 2, 185b34 6 Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 14, 224a1–2 7 Averroes, In Physicam, IV, comm. 133, f. 205F 9 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 6, 1015b36–1016a2 11 Aristoteles, De anima, II, 1, 413a2–3 13 ‘Quicumque vult salvus esse’ (Symbolum Athanasii), Enchiridion Symbolorum (ed. Denzinger, 52, n. 76)

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simum nasum, et ‘homo crispus’, quoniam habet capillos crispos. Et Aristoteles bene ostendit nono Ethicorum quomodo nos saepe utamur hoc modo loquendi. Ibidem enim movet istam quaestionem utrum philautus, id est amator sui, sit laudandus vel vituperandus, et solvit per distinctionem. Cum enim in homine imaginentur duae partes, scilicet sensualis et intellectualis, et aliquando ab utriusque partis denominatione homo denominatur philautus. Multi enim dicuntur nimis amare se, quia amant partem sensualem, omnia volentes prosequi ad quae appetitus sensitivus secundum se inclinat, ut honores, pecunias, carnales delectationes etc. Et ut haec obtineant, non abhorrent iniustificare aliis. Et tales philauti, id est amatores sui, sunt vituperandi, immo talis amator sui trahit se ad omne vitium. Alii autem dicuntur amare se, quia amant partem intellectualem, | nihil agere volentes quod recta ratio non dictaverit, quae semper deprecatur ad optima, ut dicitur primo Ethicorum. Et tales philauti, id est amatores sui, semper sunt laudandi et glorificandi. Sed tunc quaeritur quis eorum proprie dicitur philautus. Et dicitur quod ille qui amat intellectum, quia homo vel est intellectus vel maxime est intellectus, sicut civitas et omnis congregatio est maxime principalissimum, id est principalissima pars eius. Et Aristoteles notabiliter dicit disiunctive quod homo est intellectus | vel maxime intellectus ad notandum quod simpliciter vel secundum propriam locutionem haec est falsa ‘homo est intellectus’, sed permissiva locutione secundum denominationem totius a denominatione partis concedendum est quod homo est maxime intellectus, id

1 simum nasum] inv. GPp ‖ homo] add. est G : quod est Pp ‖ quoniam] quia GPp 2 bene ostendit] post ethicorum GPp ‖ nos] om. GPp ‖ utamur] utimur P 3 ibidem] ibi Pp 4 laudandus vel vituperandus] vituperandus vel laudandus p 5 partes] partem G 6 homo] om. P 7 amare se] inv. G ‖ amant] curant P ‖ partem sensualem] partes sensuales C 8 quae] corr. sup. lin. ex quod C : quid G 8–9 inclinat] inclinatur C 9 etc.] om. p 10 aliis] add. etc. p ‖ et] etiam P ‖ id est] et G 11 se] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 11–12 alii autem dicuntur] oppositum dicuntur sed add. in marg. alii C 13 semper] om. p ‖ deprecatur] post optima Gp 14 id … sui] om. p 14–15 semper sunt laudandi] sunt semper laudandi GP : sunt superlaudandi p 16 eorum] istorum Gp ‖ dicitur1] dicatur Gp ‖ dicitur2] dicit aristoteles G : respondet Pp 17 qui amat] quia ad P ‖ est2] om. Gp 18 principalissimum] principatum G 19 dicit] dixit p 20 maxime] add. est P 22 permissiva] permissa Gp : purissima P 22–23 a denominatione] ad denominationem p 23 concedendum] concedenda C : notandum P ‖ est maxime] inv. GPp 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, IX, 8, 1168a28–1169a10 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, I, 13, 1102b15–16; cf. AA, 12: 25 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, IX, 8, 1169a1–2

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est quod homo magis denominandus est a denominatione partis intellectivae quam sensitivae, quia illa est | principalior. Quod autem tales sermones non sunt veri secundum propriam locutionem manifestum est, quia omnis intellectus est indivisibilis et non compositus ex anima et corpore; sed homo sic est compositus; igitur homo non est intellectus. Et similiter omne simum est nasus cavus, cum haec sit definitio simi; sed nullus homo est nasus cavus; igitur nullus homo est simus. Sic igitur manifestum est quod secundum propriam locutionem conclusio prius posita debet concedi, scilicet quod nullum totum est sua pars, licet tamen oppositum ponam secundum locutionem impropriam et multum consuetam. Sed tamen ad verificationem dictae conclusionis expedit distinguere de hoc nomine ‘totum’, quia aliquando capitur categore|matice et significat idem quod ‘habens partes integrantes ipsum’. Non enim curamus de aliis modis totius, ut de toto in modo vel de toto universali, quia de illis non quaerit quaestio. Alio modo sumitur ‘totum’ syncategorematice et tunc implicat in se signum universale distribuens hoc nomen ‘pars’, ita quod idem valet dicere ‘totus homo’ et ‘hominis quaelibet pars’ vel ‘totus Socrates’ et ‘Socratis quaelibet pars’. Modo igitur conclusio posita intelligenda est capiendo ‘totum’ categorematice. Si vero capiatur ‘totum’ syncategorematice, tunc dicendum est quod totus homo est pars hominis et totus Socrates est pars Socratis et sic de aliis. Et hoc est manifestum per exponentes. Nam hominis quaelibet pars est pars hominis et Socratis quaelibet pars est pars Socratis et sic de aliis. Sed nulla pars hominis est totus homo, quia nulla pars hominis est hominis quaelibet pars.

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Sed nunc ve|nio directe ad quaestionem, quae quaerebat non utrum totum sit una sua pars, sed utrum totum sit suae partes. Et primo dicam capiendo ‘totum’ categorematice. Et de hoc solet dari conveniens distinctio, scilicet quod haec propositio ‘totum est suae partes’ potest intelligi vel coniunctim vel divisim. Dico divisim, quia de utraque

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2–3 sermones … veri] denominationes non sunt verae CP 3 quia] quod P 4 sed] et GPp 5 omne simum] omnis simus C 6 cavus1] curvus P : sicut corvus p ‖ cavus2] curvus P : corvus p 8 est] om. G 9 sua pars] suae partes P 10 tamen] add. saepe Pp ‖ ponam] ponatur GPp 11 consuetam] usitatam G 14 idem quod] tantum quantum hoc omnino C ‖ integrantes] integratas P 15 vel] om. Pp 16 sumitur] capitur G 18 et2] vel C 20 capiatur] capitur p ‖ totum syncategorematice] inv. P 22 et1 … aliis] etc. P ‖ exponentes] exposita p 23–24 et2 … aliis] etc. P 26 nunc] tunc P ‖ directe] dicere p 27 sit2] est Pp 30 vel1 … divisim1] divisim vel coniunctim Pp ‖ de] data p

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parte sine alia sit verum dicere quod totum sit ista pars. Sed dico coniunctim, quia verum est dicere quod totum est haec pars et illa et illa etc., sed non est verum dicere quod est haec pars vel quod est illa pars. Verbi gratia divisim dicimus quod isti lapides sunt lapides pedales, si uterque est pedalis, sed coniunctim dicimus quod isti lapides occupant spatium duorum pedum. Non enim est verum dicere quod uterque occupat spatium duorum pedum, sed congregatum ex eis. Et sicut dixi de illa ‘totum est suae partes’, ita dico de ista ‘compositum est materia et forma’. Secundum enim sensum divisum resolvitur in hanc | copulativam ‘compositum est materia et compositum est forma’, sed secundum sensum compositum non potest sic fieri. Tunc ponuntur duae conclusiones. Prima est quod secundum sensum divisum haec est neganda ‘totum est suae partes’, quia sequeretur signatis illis partibus, quae sint a et b, quod illud totum esset haec sua pars a et | quod etiam esset haec sua pars b; sed hoc est impossibile, quia dictum fuit prius quod nullum totum est sua pars. Secunda conclusio quod secundum sensum coniunctum haec est concedenda ‘totum est suae partes’. Et magna probatio huius conclusionis est mihi per auctoritates prius adductas. Credo enim bene quod anima rationalis et caro sunt unus homo capiendo ‘carnem’ large pro totali corpore humano. Ille enim psalmus sive symbolum Anastasii in quo hoc dicitur est tamquam approbatus per ecclesiam. Sed etiam rationes possunt adduci satis probabiles. Si enim totum non esset suae partes, sequeretur quod nulla materia esset perpetua etiam concessa opinione Aristotelis de perpetuitate mundi, quod est contra Aristotelem. Consequentia patet, quia si materia b dividatur in duas medietates, ipsa amplius non erit, quia solum erunt suae partes, quae nec sunt ipsa nec fuerunt ipsa; sed illud non est perpetuum, quod prius est et posterius non est; igitur etc.

1 sit2] est GPp 2 et illa etc.] om. Pp 3 est1] om. P ‖ quod est2] quod P : om. p 4 sunt lapides] pedales sunt p : sunt G 6 non … pedum] om. (hom.) p ‖ est verum] inv. P 7 sed] et p ‖ et sicut] sicut enim P ‖ dico] dicam P 9 compositum est] ipsum etiam est P : ipsum est etiam p 11 tunc] praem. et p : adhuc P ‖ duae conclusiones] inv. G 12 sensum divisum] inv. P 13 sequeretur] sequitur Pp ‖ sint] sunt Pp ‖ illud] ubi P 14 esset1] est Pp ‖ a] b P ‖ esset haec2] praem. ipsum G : est haec P : ipsum est p 16 secunda] alia P ‖ conclusio] add. est GPp 17 magna] om. (spat.) P ‖ conclusionis] om. p 18 enim bene] enim P : om. p 20 symbolum anastasii] symbolus anastasii C : symbolus athanasii p ‖ est] ante psalmus C 22 possunt adduci] inv. P ‖ enim] om. p 23 sequeretur] sequitur p ‖ etiam] adhuc sup. lin. C 25 quia] add. quod P ‖ dividatur] dividitur GP : divideretur p 26 amplius non erit] non amplius esset p ‖ quia solum erunt] om. CG 28 igitur etc.] om. P

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Item sequeretur quod duae semilibrae tantundem traherent stateram remota ab eis una libra, quantum traherent cum illa libra. Consequens videtur falsum, quia tunc illa libra nihil traheret, quae tamen est maximum pondus quod est in statera. Consequentia patet per te, | quia si libra dividitur in duas medietates, illae duae medietates tantundem trahunt, quantum trahebant cum libra quae erat totum ipsarum suarum partium; et tamen ablata est illa libra, cum non remaneant nisi partes, quae nec sunt nec fuerunt illa libra. Iterum capio compositum a et formam eius b et materiam eius c. Constat quod non maiorem habet unionem forma ad materiam quam compositum ad materiam et formam. Sed | materia et forma vel sunt unum vel ex eis est aliquod unum. Et si sunt unum, pari ratione poterit hoc dici de composito et de forma et materia. Si non sunt unum, sed ex eis est aliquod unum, tunc ita oportebit ponere quod illud sit quartum ens distinctum a quolibet illorum trium ex quibus ipsum est, sicut oportebat compositum esse unum tertium distinctum a materia et forma. Et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Item nihil debet poni frustra in natura. Sed frustra poneretur illud totum distinctum a partibus, quia sine hoc possunt omnia salvari, ut apparebit, si solvantur rationes illud ponentium. Si vero hoc nomen ‘totum’ capiatur syncategorematice, tunc dico quod duplex est habens partes: unum est cuius quaelibet pars est divisibilis, ut equus, lapis, aqua etc.; aliud est cuius aliqua pars est indivisibilis. In quibus autem quaelibet pars est divisibilis, ego dico quod totum est suae partes. Verbi gratia totus equus est suae partes, ut patet per exponentem. Nam equi quaelibet pars est suae partes. Quaelibet enim pars habet duas medietates et est illae duae medietates secundum dicta prius. Sed in quibus | aliqua pars est indivisibilis, | negandum est quod totum sit suae partes. Verbi gratia non totus homo est suae partes, quia non quaelibet pars eius est suae partes. 1 sequeretur] sequitur Gp ‖ tantundem] totidem p 2–3 consequens videtur] quod est p 3–4 quae … statera] om. p 4 est] sit GP ‖ per te] eo P ‖ dividitur] divideretur p 6 suarum partium] partium P : om. Gp 7 non remaneant] remanent G 8 libra] add. ergo etc. G 9 materiam] materia P 10 habet] habent G 11 materiam et formam] formam et materiam G 12 aliquod] aliud p ‖ poterit hoc] inv. P : hoc poterat Gp 12–13 composito et de] HTU : om. ABCGLMPp 13 sed] add. si P ‖ aliquod] add. in marg. compositum C : aliud p 16–17 quod est inconveniens] om. Pp 18 nihil] vel p ‖ sed] tamen G : et Pp ‖ illud totum] inv. p 19 quia] et G ‖ ut] sicut Gp ‖ apparebit] add. illud p 20 solvantur] salvantur C 21 capiatur] sumatur GPp 23 etc.] om. GPp 25 exponentem nam] exponentes p 27 duae medietates] inv. P 28 sit] est G 29 quia … partes2] om. (hom.) p ‖ eius … partes2] om. G

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Instantia enim est de anima intellectiva, quae non est suae partes, cum sit indivisibilis.

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Tunc ergo respondeo ad rationes in principio quaestionis adductas. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dico quod Aristoteles distinguit compositum contra materiam et distinguit etiam ipsum contra formam, sed non intendit ipsum distinguere contra materiam et formam coniunctim. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dico quod Aristoteles intendit de composito quod est per se unum et est compositum vel mixtum ex pluribus elementis capiendo ‘elementum’ pro eo quod se habet per modum materiae. Tale enim, si sit per se unum, indiget praeter illa elementa quadam alia parte, scilicet forma, secundum cuius | unitatem ipsum est per se unum in actu. Conceditur igitur quod compositum ex materialibus principiis et forma non est illa materialia principia, sed compositum ex materia et forma tantum est materia et forma. Sed quando arguitur quod Deus potest separare materiam et formam ab invicem et conservare eas (tunc enim materia et forma erunt et compositum non erit; igitur illud compositum non est materia et forma), dico quod illud compositum manebit, quamdiu manebit materia et forma, sed non manebit compositum, et totum manebit, sed non manebit totum. ⟨3⟩ Eodem modo dicendum est ad aliam auctoritatem. Loquebatur enim de partibus materialibus. Et per ‘aliam causam’ intendebat formam. ⟨4⟩ Illa autem auctoritas Commentatoris neganda est omnino ad illum sensum ad quem posuit eam. Hoc enim dixit ad negandum trinitatem divinam. Voluit enim dicere quod, si Deus est realiter trinus, scilicet in personis, et est substantialiter unus omnino indivisus, necesse est quod sit additio quaedam et alietas personarum ad substantiam. Et hoc est falsum et haereticum. Nec habet locum in proposito, quia quamvis sit ibi unitas et trinitas, non tamen sunt ibi totum et pars. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dico quod non bene allegata est illa auctoritas, immo Aristoteles ibi dicit et intendit quod semel sex sunt sex et non bis sex vel ter sex, 1 partes] add. quia non habet partes GP 3 ergo respondeo] ergo G : om. Pp 7 aliam] secundam p 9 eo] illo G ‖ si] sup. lin. C : om. G 10 scilicet forma] sup. lin. C : om. P 11 ipsum] ipsa CPp ‖ igitur] add. scilicet C : istud scilicet P 12 principiis] add. in marg. scilicet materia et C ‖ et forma] et (corr. sup. lin. ex est) forma C : om. p ‖ est] om. P 14 quod] quia GPp ‖ potest] posset Gp 15 tunc enim] tunc ergo Pp : ratio igitur G 17 manebit2] add. illa G : manebunt illa p ‖ et] add. illa Gp 18 et] sed C ‖ manebit1] rep. G 21 autem auctoritas] auctoritas p : auctoritates G 22 hoc enim dixit] haec enim ducit p 23 est] esset p 24 est2] om. P 26 ibi] om. P 27 non tamen sunt] tamen non sunt G : tamen non est P 28 aliam] quartam p ‖ allegata est] inv. G 29 semel] solum (del.) et add. sup. lin. alias semel C

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immo bis sex sunt duodecim. Et volebat Aristoteles dicere quod ille terminus ‘bis sex’ non est de praedicamento quantitatis, sed qualitatis de quarta specie. Est enim passio convertibiliter praedicabilis de illo termino ‘duodecim’, qui est de praedicamento quantitatis. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod materia et forma sunt partes compositi et quod compositum non est pars compositi, sed compositum est partes compositi. ⟨7⟩ Ad aliam dico quod materia et forma sunt divisim partes compositi, quia quaelibet est pars compositi, sed coniunctim materia et for|ma sunt compositum. Quando autem dicitur quod materia et forma non sunt partes materiae et formae, dico quod ibi sunt infinitae cavillationes logicae et pauca sententia. Haec enim est indefinita ‘materia et forma non sunt | partes materiae et formae’. Et est vera, quia materia ignis et forma hominis non sunt partes materiae et formae. Haec etiam est indefinita ‘materia et forma sunt partes | materiae et formae’. Et est vera, quia cum pars quantitativa formae sit forma et pars materiae materia, sequitur quod materia et forma sunt partes materiae et formae. Sed si utrobique loquamur de | eadem materia et forma, ut de totali materia huius equi et de totali forma eius, adhuc propositio erit vera, scilicet quod materia et forma sunt partes materiae et formae, capiendo tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati materiam et formam coniunctim, quia concessum est quod compositum est partes compositi. Similiter capiendo terminos a parte subiecti divisim et a parte praedicati coniunctim propositio concedi potest, quia tam materia quam forma est pars compositi, quod est materia et forma. Sed capiendo materiam et formam divisim totum est falsum, quia nec materia nec forma sunt partes materiae nec sunt partes formae, nec materia est pars materiae nec forma formae, ex quo loquimur utrobique de eadem materia et forma. ⟨8⟩ Quando etiam dicitur quod compositum est totum ad materiam et formam, dico quod verum est divisim, quia est totum ad materiam et totum ad formam, sed coniunctim nec est totum earum nec pars earum, sed est illae duae res, quarum quaelibet est pars eius. Sic enim intelligo quod com-

1 aristoteles dicere] inv. p 3 praedicabilis] om. P 5 aliam] quintam p 6 partes] pars p 8 aliam] sextam p ‖ sunt divisim] inv. GPp 9 est] praem. pars P : om. p ‖ coniunctim] coniunctum p 15–16 quantitativa] quantitativae p 16 sequitur] videtur P 17 et formae] rep. P 18 eadem] eisdem P ‖ et1] add. de eadem Gp ‖ ut] et C 19 scilicet] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 22 terminos] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 23 concedi potest] inv. Gp 25 nec2] et GP 26 nec1] add. sic p 27 et] add. eadem GPp 29 quod] add. totum P

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positum est partes compositi, quia est illae res, quarum quaelibet est pars compositi. ⟨9⟩ Ad aliam videtur mihi esse dicendum quod non est propria locutio ‘totum componitur vel est compositum ex partibus’, licet sit maxime consueta. Nam secundum grammaticam ‘componi’ significat ‘cum alio poni’. Ideo pars est quae alteri parti componitur et unitur, vel quae est alteri parti composita et unita. Et cum dico totum esse compositum ex partibus, non debet per hoc intelligi nisi ille sensus, scilicet quod utraque pars est alteri composita. Vel dicitur quod lapidem esse compositum ex materia et forma nihil aliud significat in proposito quam quod materia et forma sunt partes lapidis, quod est verum in sensu diviso, quia utraque est pars lapidis, et in hoc sensu nihil sequitur inconveniens. ⟨10⟩ Ad aliam similiter mihi videtur quod non est propria locutio ‘totum dividitur in suas partes’, licet maxime sit consueta. Sed pars est quae dividitur et separatur a parte, et nihil aliud debemus intelligere, quando dicimus totum dividi in suas partes. Vel si non sit realis divisio, tunc totum dividi in suas partes, ut zodiacum in duodecim signa, nihil aliud significat quam plura et diversa esse, quorum quodlibet est pars eius. Et tunc manifestum est consideranti quod nullum vel nihil sequitur inconveniens. ⟨11⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod loquendo divisim partes sunt in toto, quia quaelibet est in toto, sed coniunctim non sunt in toto, sed sunt | ipsum totum. ⟨12⟩ Ad aliam dicitur concedendo quod loquendo | divisim materia et forma sunt causae compositi, quia quaelibet est causa compositi, sed coniunctim sunt compositum. Et compositum etiam non est causa compositi, sed est causae compositi, quia est illa quorum quodlibet est causa compositi. Materia etiam et forma sunt causae materiae et formae loquendo utrobique divisim, quia materia est causa formae et forma est causa materiae. ⟨13⟩ Similiter ad aliam dico quod materia et forma sunt priores naturaliter composito loquendo divisim, quia quaelibet pars est prior. Et compositum 1 illae] illa G 3 esse] ante mihi G : om. p 6 alteri parti1] alicui sed add. sup. lin. alias alteri parti C : alicui P ‖ componitur] add. sed del. puta parti C : add. puta parti P ‖ est2] post parti2 Gp 7 et unita] sup. lin. C : om. P ‖ esse] est G 8 scilicet quod] corr. sup. lin. ex secundum quem C : quod p 9 vel] add. etiam Gp 11 in2] ex Gp : om. P 13 aliam similiter] octavam taliter p ‖ mihi videtur] inv. G 14 maxime sit] inv. Gp 16 totum2] om. G 17 suas] om. GPp 18 eius] add. sup. lin. vel illius C : illius GPp ‖ et2] om. P 19 nullum vel] om. GPp 20 aliam] nonam p 23 concedendo] similiter GP : om. p 24 causae] causa G 24–25 sed … compositi] rep. p 25 sunt compositum] est compositum vel sunt CP 28 est causa2] causa Pp : causae G 29 similiter] praem. et Gp 30 quaelibet pars] quaelibet Pp : quilibet G ‖ et compositum] rep. G

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etiam est priora | composito. | Et omnino hic dicatur de prioritate, sicut dicebatur de causalitate, quia non est ibi prius naturaliter unum altero nisi quia unum est causa alterius. ⟨14⟩ Ad aliam dico quod coniunctim loquendo partes essentiales compositi sunt partes quantitativae compositi, sed divisim loquendo totum est falsum. Nulla enim pars essentialis compositi est pars eius quantitativa secundum differentiam assignatam inter huiusmodi partes. Sed si partes essentiales volumus vocare omnem partem quae est de integritate et essentia rei, tunc pars quantitativa rei esset bene pars essentialis eius. ⟨15⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod loquendo coniunctim pars dextra et pars sinistra sunt pars supra et infra, sed loquendo divisim totum est falsum. Sed quando arguitur ‘quia coniunctim loquendo haec est vera “inter medietatem dextram et medietatem sinistram est linea a” (nos enim non diceremus divisim quod inter partem dextram est linea a nec quod inter partem sinistram est linea a), igitur bene procedebat ratio’, dico sicut de extra invicem. Licet enim dicamus quod a et b sint extra invicem et non dicamus quod a est extra invicem nec quod b est extra invicem, tamen hoc syncategorema ‘extra invicem’ designat sensum divisum. Sensus enim est quod a est extra b et b est extra a. Ita etiam in proposito haec dictio ‘inter’ designat sensum divisum, quia designat quod dextra sit distans vel divisa a sinistra per a medium et quod etiam e converso. ⟨16–17⟩ De aliis autem rationibus quae arguebant quod paria essent imparia et aequalia inaequalia, perfecte dicetur in tertio libro. ⟨18⟩ Ad aliam conceditur quod idem est album et nigrum loquendo coniunctim, scilicet idem scutum partitum, sed non est verum divisim. |

1 etiam] om. p ‖ priora] prius CG ‖ hic dicatur] inv. Pp : dicetur hic G 2 nisi] non p 5 compositi] ipsius GPp 7 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ sed] corr. sup. lin. ex vel C : vel P 7–8 partes essentiales volumus] partem essentialem voluerimus P : partem essentialem vellemus Gp 9 essentialis eius] inv. Gp ‖ eius] add. ad aliam dicitur quod loquendo coniunctim etc. fenestra fenestra fenestra fenestra fenestra fenestra fenestra C 10 aliam] om. C ‖ pars2] om. P 11 sunt pars] partes sed add. sup. lin. sunt pars C ‖ et] add. pars Gp 12 quia] quod G 15 est linea] om. P ‖ dico sicut de] dico de sicut G : de sitis p 16 licet enim] nam licet Gp ‖ sint] sunt GPp 18 divisum] divisim C 19 designat] significat C 20 designat] significat C 22 rationibus] praem. duabus G : add. duabus Pp ‖ essent] esset C 23 perfecte] post dicetur Gp : om. P 25 idem] illud GPp ‖ sed] om. G 23 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 17 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 60rb)

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⟨19⟩ Ad aliam dico quod regula intelligenda est, quando divisim loquendo illa sunt eadem, ita quod utrumque sit illi idem. ⟨20⟩ Ad aliam videtur mihi quod illa locutio ‘video Socratem’ est secundum denominationem totius a parte, quia quamvis proprie non sit vera, tamen est consuetissima propter quandam appropriationem. Nam quia simum determinat sibi nasum et crispitudo capillos seu pilos, ideo ex simitate nasi dicitur homo simus, et sic de crispo. Nec ista propositio ‘homo est simus vel crispus’ est vera nisi ad illum sensum quia hominis nasus est simus vel hominis capilli sunt crispi. Ita etiam, quia opacum videri determinat sibi superficiem exteriorem | versus videntem, nos dicimus corpus videri, si illius superficies videtur. Sed hoc non est proprie verum, immo haec non est vera ‘ego video Socratem’ nisi ad istum sensum quia video superficiem exteriorem Socratis. Vel aliquando hoc dicitur, quia video solum vestes exteriores quibus ipse est indutus. ⟨21⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod coniunctim loquendo a est maius b et minus b et aequale b, sed non divisim. ⟨22⟩ Ad ultimam dico quod suppositioni distributivae vel confusae tantum vel determinatae in propositionibus vocalibus correspondent | in mente quidam diversi modi intelligendi superadditi conceptibus categorematicis; secundum quos modos intelligendi illi termini mentales aliter supponunt. Et illi modi intelligendi sunt de integritate propositionum. Et sic in propositione mentali correspondente illi vocali ‘omnis homo est animal’ est modus intelligendi additus conceptui designato per hanc vocem ‘animal’, secundum quem supponit confuse et distributive. Qui non est additus sibi in propositione correspondente huic vocali ‘animal est omnis homo’. Ideo non ex omnibus eisdem parti|bus illae duae mentales componuntur; propter quod haec non est illa, sed haec est vera, illa vero falsa. Et sic est finis quaestionis. 1 est] ante intelligenda Gp : om. P 6 capillos seu pilos] pilos vel capillos Pp : pilos G ‖ ex] est quod G 7 dicitur homo simus] dicimus hominem esse simum Gp 8 quia] quod G 9 capilli] pili G ‖ quia] quod G 10 videntem] add. in marg. aliter visus non videntes C ‖ illius] illa eius GPp 11 non est vera] post socratem (12) GPp 12 nisi] nec p ‖ quia] add. ego Pp 13 vel] sed p ‖ exteriores] add. socratis p 14 ipse] ille GP 15 concedo] conceditur Gp : dicitur concedendo P 17 ultimam] add. ego p 17–18 distributivae … vel] confusae vel distributivae et p 19 superadditi] additi GPp ‖ categorematicis] corr. ex syncategorematicis C : categoricis p 22 est2] et G 24 et distributive] om. GPp 26 componuntur] add. in marg. haec C ‖ propter] add. hoc CP 27 est2] om. GP ‖ illa vero] et illa Gp 28 et … quaestionis] quare etc. sequitur p : etc. G : om. P

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⟨i.10⟩

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⟨Utrum Socrates sit hodie idem quod ipse fuit heri, posito quod hodie additum est sibi aliquid ex nutrimento et conversum in eius substantiam, vel posito quod hodie est aliqua pars ab eo remota, ut si sibi amputata est manus⟩ Quaeritur decimo utrum Socrates est hodie idem quod ipse fuit heri, posito quod hodie additum est sibi aliquid ex nutrimento et conversum in eius substantiam, vel posito quod hodie est aliqua pars ab eo remota, ut si sibi amputata est manus. ⟨1⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non sit idem quia: sequeretur quod totum esset idem cum sua parte et sic totum esset sua pars; cuius oppositum dictum est | in alia quaestione. Consequentia probatur posito quod illud quod hodie additum est Socrati vocetur a et totum residuum vocetur b. Constat quod Socrates heri erat illud b. Et si hodie est idem, ipse adhuc est b; sed tamen b est pars eius distincta contra a. ⟨2⟩ Iterum si manus quae hodie amputatur vocetur b et residuum a, tunc Socrates heri erat a et b, cum totum sit suae partes; et ipse hodie non est a et b, cum b sit ablatum; igitur non est idem quod heri. 8 quaeritur decimo] post istam quaestionem est una alia quaestio consequens ad istam scilicet G : quaestio decima est consequens ad (om. P) praecedentem scilicet Pp ‖ est … quod] hodie est idem quod G : est idem hodie quam P ‖ fuit] erat GPp ‖ heri] add. in marg. sequens ad praecedentem C 9 aliquid] aliud p ‖ et] vel etiam C 9–10 eius substantiam] inv. Gp 10 vel] add. etiam Gp ‖ posito] rep. G ‖ hodie … eo] ab eo est aliqua pars GPp ‖ si] om. C ‖ sibi] post est (11) GPp 12 et] om. GPp ‖ sequeretur] sequitur p ‖ totum] om. P 14 probatur posito] probatur ponendo GP : patet ponendo p 15 a] b Gp ‖ totum residuum] inv. Pp ‖ b] a Gp 16 heri … b] heri erat illud a p : erat illud a heri G ‖ est1] ante hodie Pp : om. G ‖ b] illud b P : illud a Gp ‖ sed] et Gp ‖ b] a Gp 17 a] b ergo etc. Gp 18 iterum] add. secundo G ‖ quae hodie amputatur] hodie amputata P ‖ et] om. P 19 hodie] om. C 20 igitur] add. hodie G ‖ idem quod heri] aliquid quod heri seu idem P 14 Cf. sup., I, q. 9, 9715–16

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_014

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⟨3⟩ Iterum sequeretur quod illud quod totum esset corruptum, esset idem quod ante vel maneret idem quod ante, quod est impossibile, cum dictum sit secundo De generatione quod corruptum non potest reverti idem in numero. Consequentia probatur ponendo casum quod hoc dolium sit plenum vino et illud vinum ponatur continere centum vel mille guttas. Tunc si illae mille guttae fuerint corruptae, totum hoc vinum erit corruptum, et tamen remanebit hoc idem vinum. Probatio: ponendo casum quod qualibet hora una istarum guttarum defluat per fundum et corrumpatur et per os supra una gutta ad replendum apponatur, tunc constat quod post remotionem primae guttae et appositionem alterius adhuc erit idem vinum quod ante, pari ratione sicut | Socrates est idem, licet sit aliquid appositum ante ex nutrimento et aliquid deperditum a calore consumente. Pari ratione, si iterum auferatur una gutta et apponatur alia, adhuc erit idem vinum et sic semper. Tunc igitur per mille horas omnes illae mille guttae erunt corruptae et sic illud totum vinum erit corruptum, tamen adhuc remanebit idem vinum. Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Reverteretur opinio Heracliti, scilicet quod non contingeret eundem hominem intrare bis eundem fluvium, quia continue mutaretur per continuam nutritionem et fieret alius quam ante. ⟨2⟩ Item sequeretur quod hoc nomen ‘Socrates’ non esset nomen discretum, quia supponeret pro pluribus diversis, | licet prius et posterius, sicut hoc nomen ‘tempus’.

1 sequeretur] sequitur p ‖ totum esset] inv. Pp : est totum G 1–2 esset2 … maneret] remaneret adhuc Gp : maneret adhuc P 3 potest] poterit G ‖ in] om. GPp 4 probatur] patet G 6 fuerint] fuerunt Pp ‖ tamen] om. P 8 per1] ad CG ‖ et per os] spat. G 9 gutta] add. aquae p ‖ tunc] om. Gp 10 guttae] om. G 11–12 sit … nutrimento] ante aliquid appositum ex nutrimento sit P : sit aliquid appositum ex nutrimento G : sit aliud appositum ex nutrimento p 12 aliquid] aliquod G : aliud p ‖ consumente] add. sed del. et C : add. et GPp 13 alia] om. P ‖ vinum et] et p : om. P 15 totum] ante illud Gp : om. P ‖ corruptum] unum corruptum et p 18 scilicet] om. p 19 hominem] equum p ‖ intrare bis eundem] bis intrare G ‖ continue] continuo p 20 nutritionem] add. sup. lin. alias mutationem C 21 sequeretur] sequitur p 22 diversis] praem. et Pp : om. G 3 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, 11, 338b15–17; cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione, I, q. 24 (ed. Streijger, Bakker, Thijssen, 181) 18 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 5, 1010a13–14

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⟨3⟩ Item quod augetur manet idem, ut habetur primo De generatione; et tamen augetur per appositionem aliquarum partium ex nutrimento. ⟨4⟩ Item sequeretur quod ego numquam alias vidissem te quem ego nunc video, sed vidissem unum alium. Et periret actio iniuriarum et retributio bonorum. Tu enim non es ille qui heri me percussit vel qui heri me defendit ab inimicis. Quare igitur peterem emendam | a te vel quare deberem tibi retribuere? ⟨5⟩ Item sequeretur quod tu qui es hic non fuisti baptizatus, sed unus alius; igitur tu non es Christianus. ⟨6⟩ Item sequeretur quod in eodem die corrumperentur multi Socrates et generarentur multi alii, quia in hac hora ille Socrates est et in hora praecedente non erat, sed unus alius, qui modo non est; igitur iste hodie est genitus et ille corruptus, cum generatio sit mutatio de non esse ad esse et corruptio e converso. Non quaerimus de identitate secundum speciem vel secundum genus, sed de identitate numerali, secundum quam ‘hoc esse idem illi’ significatur hoc esse illud. Et tunc illa quaestio faciliter solvitur per distinctionem. Triplici|ter enim consuevimus dicere aliquid alicui esse idem in numero. Primo totaliter, scilicet quia hoc est illud et nihil est de integritate huius quod non sit de integritate illius et e converso. Et hoc est propriissime esse idem in numero. Et secundum illum modum dicendum est quod ego non sum idem quod ego eram heri. Nam aliquid heri erat de integritate mea quod iam resolutum est et aliquid etiam heri non erat de integritate mea quod post per nutritio-

3 sequeretur] sequitur Gp ‖ ego2] om. Pp 4 vidissem] viderem G 5 percussit] add. ideo G ‖ qui2] om. P ‖ me defendit] inv. p 6 a te] ante emendam Pp : om. G 6–7 deberem tibi retribuere] deberem ego tibi retribuere G : darem tibi retributionem P 8 sequeretur] sequitur p ‖ es hic] inv. Pp 9 igitur tu] ideo tu Gp : ideo P 10 sequeretur quod in] in marg. C : om. GPp 11–12 in hora praecedente] in hora praecedenti G : hac hora praecedenti P 12 est1] add. sup. lin. alias es C 13 et ille corruptus] rep. G ‖ ille] add. sup. lin. idem est C ‖ generatio] generatum p 15 non] praem. item G : modo P 16 numerali] naturali p ‖ idem] om. p ‖ significatur] significat p 18 illa … solvitur] faciliter solvitur quaestio P ‖ per] secundum C ‖ enim] om. p 19 consuevimus] add. seu possumus P ‖ dicere] distinguere sed add. sup. lin. alias dicere C ‖ aliquid] aliud p ‖ idem] rep. G ‖ in numero] om. P ‖ primo] add. modo GPp 20 scilicet quia] scilicet quod P : sic quod G 21 in] om. p 23 ego eram heri] heri eram P ‖ aliquid] post heri2 G : aliud p 24 aliquid] post etiam P : aliud p 24–110.1 per nutritionem factum] nutritionem p 1 Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, I, 5, 321a22–25

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nem factum est de substantia mea. Et sic dicebat Seneca in epistula ad Lucilium quae incipit ‘quanta verborum’: ‘nemo idem in iuventute et senectute, immo nec heri et hodie. Corpora enim nostra rapiuntur fluviorum more’. Et ad illum sensum locutus est bene Heraclitus quod sic continue mutamur quod non contingit hominem totaliter eundem bis intrare fluvium etiam totaliter eundem. Et ad hunc modum capiendi ‘idem in numero’ procedunt bene | rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis ad probandum quod Socrates non sit idem hodie quod fuit heri. Sed secundo modo aliquid dicitur alicui idem partialiter, scilicet quia hoc est pars illius, et maxime hoc dicitur, si sit maior pars vel principalior; vel etiam quia hoc et illud participant in aliquo quod est pars maior vel principalior utriusque. Sic dicit Aristoteles nono Ethicorum quod homo maxime est intellectus, sicut civitas et omnis congregatio maxime est principalissimum, prout allegatum est in quaestione praecedenti. Et exinde etiam proveniunt denominationes totorum a denominationibus partium. Et ita manet homo idem per totam vitam, quia manet anima totaliter eadem, quae est pars principalior; | sic autem non manet equus idem, immo | nec corpus humanum. Et sic bene est verum quod tu es ille idem qui a quadraginta annis citra fuit baptizatus, maxime cum hoc nobis conveniat principaliter ratione animae et non corporis. Et possum te prosequi super iniuriis vel teneor ad remunerandum tibi, quia etiam opera iniuriosa vel meritoria sunt principaliter ab anima, non a corpore. Et sic etiam non dicimus te generari hodie, quia non dicimus aliquid generari simpliciter, nisi generetur secundum se totum vel secundum eius partem maiorem vel principaliorem. Sed adhuc tertio modo et minus proprie dicitur aliquid alicui idem numero secundum continuationem partium diversarum in succedendo alteram

4 illum sensum] istam intentionem GPp ‖ bene] ante locutus G 5 quod … eundem] et non convenit eundem equum totaliter p ‖ etiam] et p 8 sit] est G ‖ fuit] erat G : socrates erat Pp 9 aliquid] aliud p ‖ quia] quod C 10 pars2] om. p 12 sic] add. enim GPp 13 principalissimum] principalissimi G 14 praecedenti] praecedente Gp ‖ etiam proveniunt] inv. G 15 denominationibus] denominatione huius P 16 manet anima] inv. P 17 principalior] add. immo principalissima Pp ‖ sic autem] sed sic Pp ‖ immo] add. etiam Gp 18–19 quadraginta] quinquaginta Pp 19 annis] add. vel G ‖ fuit] fuisti C ‖ nobis] non sed. del. P 20 et1] om. Gp 22 et sic etiam] sic enim P 23 aliquid] aliud p 24 principaliorem] principalem p 25 idem] add. esse P 1–3 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistulae ad Lucilium, 58, 22 (ed. Reynolds, I, 158) 4 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IV, 5, 1010a13–14 12 Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, IX, 8, 1168b31–34; cf. AA, 12: 186 14 Cf. sup., I, q. 9, 9818

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alteri. Et sic Sequana dicitur idem fluvius a mille annis citra, licet proprie loquendo nihil modo sit pars Sequanae quod a decem annis citra fuit pars Sequanae. Sic enim mare dicitur perpetuum et iste mundus inferior perpetuus et equus idem per totam vitam et similiter corpus humanum idem. Et iste modus identitatis sufficit ad hoc quod nomen significativum dicatur discretum vel singulare secundum communem et consuetum modum loquendi. Qui non est verus proprie. Non enim est verum proprie quod Sequana quem ego video est ille quem ego vidi a decem annis citra. Sed propositio conceditur ad illum sensum quod aqua quam videmus, quae vocatur Sequana, et aqua quam tunc vidi, quae etiam vocabatur Sequana, et aquae etiam quae intermediis temporibus fuerunt, vocabantur quaelibet in tempore suo Sequana et continuatae fuerunt ad invicem in succedendo. Et ex identitate etiam dicta secundum huiusmodi continuationem dicimus hoc nomen ‘Sequana’ esse nomen discretum et singulare, quamvis non esset ita proprie discretum, sicut esset, si maneret idem totaliter ante et post. Et per haec dicta apparet manifeste quomodo sit dicendum ad rationes omnes quae fiebant et quomodo procedunt viis suis. 1 citra] om. G 2 citra fuit] citra fuisset Pp : fuit G 3 sic] sicut C 4 vitam] add. dicitur idem G ‖ humanum] sup. lin. C : dicitur G ‖ idem2] om. Pp 5 nomen] nullum p 6 singulare] significare G 6–7 consuetum … verus] consuetam locutionem quae non est vera GPp 7 verum proprie] inv. Gp 8 ego2] est sed del. G ‖ citra] praem. vel C : om. G 9 quod] quia Gp ‖ videmus] video Pp : ego video G 10 quae] om. C ‖ sequana2] om. G 10–11 aquae etiam] inv. P 11 fuerunt] add. sed del. et C : add. etiam G : add. et p 12 et1] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ continuatae] continuae p ‖ ad invicem] post succedendo p 13 huiusmodi] huius P 14 et singulare] om. G 14–15 esset ita proprie] ita proprie sit GPp 17 omnes] ante rationes (16) Gp : om. P ‖ fiebant] add. in principio quaestionis P ‖ suis] add. etc. G : add. et sic finis est P : add. etc. sequitur p

⟨i.11⟩

⟨Utrum infinitum secundum quod infinitum sit ignotum⟩ 15vb P

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Quaeritur undecimo utrum | infinitum secundum quod infinitum est ignotum. Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ De ipso est scientia difficillima | et definitiva seu demonstrativa, sicut habetur in tertio huius et in primo Caeli; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item | hoc non est ignotum, de quo intellectus scientifice enuntiat aliquid; sed Aristoteles credidit quod de infinito vere et scientifice enuntiaretur quod est ignotum; igitur etc. ⟨3⟩ Item si infinitum est ens, ipsum est notum, cum ens universaliter sit primum obiectum intellectus secundum Avicennam. Et si est non ens, adhuc est notum, quia unum oppositorum cognoscitur per reliquum et quia oppositorum est eadem scientia; et ens et non ens sunt opposita; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Quarto primus motor est infinitus, ut patet octavo huius. Et etiam tempus et motus et magnitudo sunt infinita secundum divisionem; et numerus secundum appositionem est infinitus. Haec omnia dicit Aristoteles. Et haec sunt nota in diversis passibus philosophiae, | in quibus determinatur de eis. Igitur etc.

4 quaeritur undecimo] consequenter quaeritur G ‖ est] sit G 7 scientia] om. Pp ‖ difficilima … demonstrativa] difficillima et demonstrativa Gp : definitiva et demonstratio vera P 7–8 sicut habetur] om. GPp 8 in2] om. G ‖ igitur etc.] om. Pp 9 hoc] illud GPp 9–10 enuntiat aliquid] enuntiat aliud G : enuntiat illud p : enuntiatur aliquid P 12 item] tertio G ‖ ens1] add. et P 14 quia1] add. sed del. si C : add. si P ‖ per] corr. sup. lin. ex et C : et P ‖ et] add. etiam P 15–16 igitur etc.] om. GPp 17 quarto] iterum p ‖ patet] add. in GPp ‖ et] om. P 18 sunt] etiam est G : est etiam p ‖ divisionem] corr. in marg. in dimensionem C 19 est infinitus] om. Pp ‖ haec omnia] et tamen ea P ‖ haec2] tamen haec omnia GPp 20 in1] ex P ‖ passibus] passionibus P ‖ determinatur] post eis GPp 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 4, 203b31; cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, I, 5, 271b1–17 13 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, tract. 1, cap. 5 (ed. Van Riet, 31) 17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, VIII, 10, 276b18–26 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 7, 207b1–27

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⟨5⟩ Quinto quaecumque vides, illa tu cognoscis. Et quaecumque tu cognoscis, illa non sunt tibi ignota. Sed infinita tu vides, scilicet infinitas partes continui, quia non tot quin plures; igitur infinita sunt tibi nota et non ignota. ⟨6⟩ Iterum Commentator in tertio De anima dicit quod intellectus intelligit infinita in propositione universali. Oppositum expresse determinat Aristoteles in primo huius et etiam in secundo Metaphysicae.

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Notandum est quod in tertio libro determinabitur quomodo infinitum est vel non est, potest esse vel potest non esse, et ita etiam de infinitis. Et etiam in octavo libro determinabitur de hoc quantum ad infinitatem primi motoris. Sed nunc, quantum ad praesentem librum spectat, pono aliquas conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod omne ens est tibi notum et omnia entia sunt tibi nota, quia tu scis quod omnis substantia est ens et quod omne accidens est ens, et quod omnes substantiae sunt entia et similiter omnia accidentia sunt entia, et quod omne ens est unum et omnia entia sunt multa. Immo etiam de his quae fuerunt, erunt vel possunt esse, tu scis quod omnia quae fuerunt fuerunt entia, et omnia quae erunt erunt entia, et omnia quae possunt esse possunt esse entia. Sed non scires tales propositiones universales, nisi haberes notitiam de omnibus quae significantur per terminos illarum propositionum et pro quibus illi termini supponunt. Et praedicti termini qui sunt singularis numeri supponunt pro omni ente, et illi qui sunt pluralis

1 quinto] item Pp ‖ quaecumque1] add. tu GPp ‖ tu1] om. P 4 tertio] om. G 6 expresse] post aristoteles P ‖ etiam] om. P 8 est1] om. P ‖ determinabitur] declarabitur GPp 9 potest2] post non2 GP : om. p ‖ et1] om. P ‖ etiam2] post hoc (10) P 11 pono] add. breviter G : ponam breviter p : ponere breviter P 13 conclusio] om. p ‖ omnia] add. etiam GPp 15 similiter] etiam P 16 sunt entia] om. GPp ‖ et2] add. quod G 17 fuerunt] add. vel GPp 17–18 quae2 … entia1] fuerunt entia quae fuerunt P 21 propositionum] om. Pp 22 sunt1] om. P 4 Cf. Averroes, In De anima, III, comm. 19 (ed. Crawford, 441) 6 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 4, 187b7; cf. AA, 2: 22 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, II, 2, 994b21–23; cf. AA, 1: 51 8 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, qq. 14–19 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 55vb–65va) 10 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VIII, qq. 9–11 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 116vb–120ra)

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numeri supponunt pro omnibus entibus. Igitur etc. | Sic igitur secundum rationes seu conceptus communes omnia entia praesentia, praeterita vel futura vel possibilia et omne ens praesens, praeteritum vel futurum vel possibile cognoscimus. Ex his infertur secunda conclusio quod infinita sunt tibi nota et infinitum est tibi notum, quia omne quod est vel potest esse, est tibi notum, ut dictum est; similiter omnia quae sunt | vel possunt esse, sunt tibi nota; et tamen infinitum potest esse, scilicet infinitum corpus, et infinita etiam sunt vel possunt esse, ut infinitae partes sunt huius corporis et infiniti homines possunt esse. Hoc suppono ex his quae dicentur in tertio libro, capiendo ‘infinitum’ vel ‘infinita’ syncategorematice. Tertia conclusio sequitur quod nullum ens est tibi ignotum et nulla entia sunt tibi ignota, quia sequitur ‘est tibi notum, igitur non est tibi ignotum’, ‘sunt tibi nota, igitur non sunt tibi ignota’ et e converso. Similiter sequitur ‘ignotum, igitur non notum’, ‘ignota, igitur non nota’. Sic enim se habent termini privative oppositi ad invicem. Quarta conclusio quod omne ens est tibi secundum aliquam rationem vel conclusionem specialem ignotum, secundum quam possit esse notum, et sic de omnibus entibus. Et hoc dictum fuit in quinta quaestione huius primi libri. Et statim sequitur | conclusio quinta quod infinitum est tibi ignotum secundum aliquam conclusionem specialem scibilem et etiam infinita sunt tibi sic ignota. Haec conclusio probatur per conclusionem praecedentem apposito quod infinitum est vel potest esse ens, et sic de infini|tis, sicut prius dicebatur.

5 conclusio] add. scilicet P 7 est] add. et Pp 8 et infinita] rep. G ‖ infinita etiam] inv. p ‖ vel] et Pp 9 huius] huiusmodi p 11 infinitum vel infinita] infinita vel infinitum p 12 quod] om. C ‖ ens] corpus G ‖ entia] om. GPp 13 est tibi1] om. GPp ‖ est tibi2] om. GPp 14 sunt tibi1] om. GPp ‖ sunt tibi2] om. GPp 15 notum] add. et p 16 privative] relativi P 17 conclusio] add. est GPp 18 conclusionem] condicionem p ‖ possit] posset Gp 19 sic] add. etiam Gp ‖ quinta quaestione] inv. P 19–20 primi libri] inv. p 21 conclusio] post quinta Gp : om. P 21–22 ignotum … scibilem] secundum aliquam conclusionem (condicionem p) scibilem ignotum GPp 22–23 etiam … sic] infinita etiam sic sunt tibi Gp : infinita sic sunt tibi P 23 haec] et P ‖ conclusio] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 24 vel] add. quod P ‖ sicut] ut GPp 10 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, qq. 18–19 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 61rb–65va) 19–20 Cf. sup., I, q. 5, 533–21

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Aliae conclusiones sequuntur, quae sunt ad intentionem Aristotelis in hoc loco et sunt capiendo ‘infinitum’ categorematice et similiter ‘infinita’. Quomodo autem debent haec nomina exponi sive categorematice sive syncategorematice sumpta, dicetur in tertio libro. Erit igitur sexta conclusio quod, si esset infinitum secundum magnitudinem, non esset possibile scire quantum ipsum esset loquendo proprie de hac quaestione ‘quantum est hoc?’, quia talis quaestio quaerit certam mensuram qua illud sit mensurabile, ut si quaeratur ‘quanta est virga?’, diceremus quod trium pedum sit vel decem. Et ‘quanta est via?’—dicimus ‘decem leucarum’ vel ‘centum’. Vel ‘quantum est pondus?’—dicimus ‘unius librae’ vel ‘duarum’, et sic de aliis. Infinitum autem nulla mensura est mensurabile, quia manifestum est quod ita resultaret infinitum corpus ex infinitis corporibus pedalibus sicut ex infinitis bipedalibus; et tamen illa corpora non essent aequalia. Ideo si quaereretur ‘quantum est | hoc corpus?’ et responderetur quod illud est infinitum, hoc non esset proprie et determinate respondere. Non enim debet dari eadem responsio ad talem quaestionem, si sit quaestio de his quae non sunt aequalia; et tamen hoc infinitum illi infinito non est aequale. Si vero contra hoc obiciatur ‘quia infiniti ratio quantitati congruit, ut dicitur primo huius, igitur de infinito debita esset responsio, si quaereretur quantum est, dicere quod est infinitum’, respondeo quod hoc nomen ‘infinitum’ est nomen privativum; et in ratione nominis privativi includitur ratio nominis positivi sibi oppositi cum negatione; in ratione autem dicente quid nominis finiti includitur hoc nomen ‘quantum’, quia finitum dicitur quantum terminatum; ideo etiam ratio infiniti est quantum non terminatum.

2 sunt] sic p ‖ infinitum … infinita] finitum categorematice et similiter infinitum P 3 debent] debeant Gp : post nomina P 3–4 categorematice sive syncategorematice] syncategorematice sive categorematice P 5 erit … conclusio] erit sexta conclusio p : sexta conclusio est P ‖ quod] om. GPp 8 quanta] om. P ‖ diceremus] dicimus GPp 9 sit] om. GPp 10 centum vel] centum et Pp : viginti et G 11 duarum] decem P ‖ est] esset GPp 12 quia] unde GPp 13 pedalibus] bipedalibus p ‖ ex] om. P 14 ideo] nam p ‖ et] om. C 15 illud] ipsum GPp ‖ esset] est p 16 debet] valet p 17 est] esset GPp 19 hoc] om. Pp ‖ obiciatur] add. quod G 21 dicere] et diceretur P ‖ hoc nomen] om. P 22 et in ratione] et ratione enim G : in ratione enim p : ratione enim P 23 nominis positivi] praedicti G ‖ dicente] directe P 24 finiti] corr. ex infiniti C : infiniti GPp ‖ includitur … quantum] ponitur hoc nomen quantum vel includitur P : ponitur vel includitur hoc nomen quantum p ‖ finitum] infinitum P 4 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 18 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 61rb–63vb) 20 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 2, 185b2–3; cf. AA, 2: 9

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Sed quia de necessitate et ratione quanti | proprie dicti est quod sit terminatum, quia aliter non esset aliquantum loquendo proprie, ideo ratio infiniti implicat contradictionem, sicut si diceremus ‘homo non risibilis’. Ideo sicut impossibile est esse hominem non risibilem, ita impossibile est esse infinitum vel quantum non terminatum. Sic igitur bene infiniti ratio quantitati congruit quod in eius definitione dicente quid nominis ponitur hoc nomen ‘quantum’, sed hoc est cum negatione eius quod est de ratione quanti. Et omnino propter impossibilitatem huius propositionis ‘infinitum est’, et quia ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet, ego concedo quod, si esset infinitum, ipsum esset quantum et non esset quantum. Quaerenti igitur quantum ipsum esset, esset conveniens responsio et non esset conveniens responsio dicere quod illud esset infinitum. Et de hoc videbitur in tertio libro. Septima conclusio est: si essent infinita secundum multitudinem, non esset possibile scire quot illa essent. Et probatur proportionaliter sicut praecedens. Quaerens enim quot sunt, quaerit certum et determinatum numerum. Octava conclusio est quod, si essent infinita secundum multitudinem, | quae omnia essent ad invicem diversarum rationum specialium, non esset possibile scire quid unumquodque istorum esset secundum suam rationem specialem, quia sic non est possibile intellectum humanum infinita distincte cognoscere. Istas igitur conclusiones tres ultimas et non alias intendebat Aristoteles in illo loco. Illa autem reduplicatio quam ipse apponit dicens ‘infinitum secundum quod infinitum est ignotum’, non ponitur ad notandum universalitatem vel convertibilitatem vel primaevitatem, sed ad specificandum | rationem vel rationes secundum quas dicimus infinitum esse ignotum, scilicet quod si sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem, non est notum quanta sit illa magnitudo, et si secundum multitudinem, non est notum quanta est illa

2 quia] et P 4 sicut … ita] om. p 5 infinitum] finitum P ‖ igitur] enim P : om. G 5–6 quantitati congruit] quantitatis congruet p 6 quod] om. C ‖ quid] quia p 9 quia ad impossibile] quadrupedale P 9–10 infinitum ipsum] infinitum p : ipsum P 11 esset2] post responsio1 P ‖ et … responsio2] om. (hom.) C 12 illud esset] ipsum esset G : ipsum est Pp 13 multitudinem] magnitudinem p 14 illa] ipsa GPp ‖ et] haec p 19 quid] quod p : quantum C 20 distincte] distincta G 22 conclusiones tres] inv. GPp 23 apponit] apposuit G 24 notandum] negandum sed add. in marg. seu notificandum C 25 vel primaevitatem] vel premeditatem P : om. p 27–28 sit2 … quanta] om. (hom.) p 12 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 18 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 62ra) 23–24 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 4, 187b7; cf. AA, 2: 22

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multitudo, et si secundum durationem vel vigorem vel perfectionem, non est notum quanta sit illa duratio vel vigor. Et per haec dicta apparet quomodo omnes rationes prius factae procedunt viis suis. 5

Et sic est finis quaestionis. | 2 vel vigor] in marg. C : etc. Pp : om. G 3 quomodo omnes rationes] rep. G ‖ factae] tactae P 4 viis suis] om. GPp 5 et … quaestionis] et sic est finis etc. p : etc. G : om. P

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⟨Utrum omnia entia naturalia sint determinata ad maximum⟩ Quaeritur duodecimo utrum omnia entia naturalia sunt determinata ad maximum.

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⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod non quia: nullam habens magnitudinem non est determinatum ad maximum; et tamen intellectus humanus nullam habet magnitudinem, cum sit indivisibilis. ⟨2⟩ Item secundo De anima dicitur quod ignis augmentaretur in infinitum, si ei apponeretur combustibile; et tale non est determinatum ad maximum. ⟨3⟩ Item tertio huius dicitur quod in infinitum potest augmentari numerus et in infinitum potest fieri appositio ad determinatam magnitudinem; talia autem non sunt determinata ad maximum. ⟨4⟩ Et omni motu potest esse maior et omni tempore maius, si perpetuus sit motus et perpetuum sit | tempus, sicut opinabatur Aristoteles. ⟨5⟩ Item suppositio geometrica est quod omni magnitudine data contingit dare maiorem; quae esset falsa, si omne corpus esset determinatum ad maximum. ⟨6⟩ Item quodlibet generabile potest aliquando maius esse et aliquando minus; igitur ad neutrum horum est determinatum. Et etiam omne corpus non ad maximam subtilitatem est determinatum nec motus ad maximam velocitatem, immo saepe Aristoteles in argumentis suis in quarto huius et in

4 duodecimo] post haec G ‖ omnia] post naturalia P 6 primo] om. GPp 9 in] secundum P 10 ei] om. GPp 15 tempore] add. potest esse P 16 et] add. si GPp 17 geometrica] in geometria P ‖ magnitudine data contingit] magnitudine data est Pp : magnitudini est G 18 dare] add. magnitudinem Gp 20 aliquando1 … et] esse aliquando maius Pp 21 ad] add. maximum p ‖ omne] om. Pp 23 suis] add. et p 9 Aristoteles, De anima, II, 4, 416a15–16; cf. AA, 6: 86 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 7, 207b1–3 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, VIII, 1, 250b10–252a5; cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, 6, 1071b6–9 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 8, 215a31–216a7; cf. Physica, VI, 2, 232b20–22

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sexto ponit casum quod corpus, in quantacumque proportione voluerimus, subtilietur vel etiam motus velocitetur.

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Oppositum videtur velle Aristoteles in primo huius. Dicit enim quod nec animal nec plantam nec aliquam partem eorum contingit quantamcumque esse magnitudine vel parvitate; et ita videtur intendere de aliis. Et in secundo De anima dicit quod omnium natura constantium positus est terminus et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti. Notandum est quod quaestio non intelligitur de indivisibilibus, sed solum de illis quibus convenit magnitudo. | Notandum est etiam quod, si non sit dare maximum, entia non sunt determinata ad maximum. Ideo de hoc est prima dubitatio, utrum sit dare maximum et quomodo. Notandum est etiam quod magnum, maius vel maximum | dicitur proprie secundum extensionem corpoream; sed secundum quid vel improprie dicitur magnum, maius vel maximum secundum longitudinem vel secundum latitudinem vel secundum profunditatem vel secundum intensionem vel secundum durationem vel secundum potentiam et sic de multis aliis modis. Et in his omnibus vocaretur maximum vel quia omni alio maius vel quia nihil eo maius; vel etiam maximum simpliciter vel maximum in aliquo genere aut in aliqua specie, ut maximum corpus, maximum animal, maximus canis, maxima raritas aeris, maxima raritas aquae et sic de aliis. Similiter etiam maximum potest dici aut de actu aut de possibili, ut quia nihil est maius vel quia nihil potest esse maius. Et sic apparet quod illa quaestio continet multas scrupulositates.

1 casum] casus Pp ‖ quantacumque] quacumque P 1–2 voluerimus subtilietur] voluerimus subtiliatur p : volueris subtilietur G 2 velocitetur] velocitatur p 4 partem eorum] inv. P ‖ quantamcumque] quantacumque (corr. ex quamcumque) C : quantumcumque p 6 quod] om. Pp 8 quaestio] om. G 10 est etiam] etiam p : om. P 11 dubitatio] add. scilicet GPp 13 est etiam] tertio P ‖ dicitur] est C 15–16 secundum] om. P 16 intensionem] intentionem CG 17 multis aliis] inv. P 18 his omnibus] inv. GPp 18–19 vel2 … maius] om. (hom.) p 21 canis] homo Pp ‖ aeris] add. et P ‖ et … aliis] etc. P 22 etiam] enim P ‖ aut2] vel G ‖ ut] aut P 23 vel] aut P ‖ et sic] sed P ‖ quaestio] conclusio p 23–24 continet] add. valde GPp 3 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 4, 187b16–18 6 Aristoteles, De anima, II, 4, 416a16–17; cf. AA, 6: 87

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Primo igitur dicam de maximo proprio, scilicet secundum extensionem corpoream. Et est prima conclusio quod aliquid est maximum sic quia nihil est eo maius, quia in tertio libro ostendetur quod nec est corpus infinitum nec possibile est esse corpus infinitum; modo inter corpora finita quae sunt oportet esse aliquod quo nullum aliorum est maius. Immo etiam aliquid est sic maximum quod est omni alio maius. Et hoc est totalis mundus, si mundus est aliquid, quia dicetur in tertio libro quod extra mundum non est aliqua magnitudo. Sed si non dicamus mundum esse aliquid, licet sit aliqua, tunc suprema sphaera sic est maxima. Ipsa enim est omni corpore quod est per se unum continuum, maior. Secunda conclusio est quod nihil sic est maximum, quin aliquid | posset esse maius, immo impossibile est sic aliquod esse maximum, quin | possit aliud esse maius per potentiam divinam, non per potentiam naturalem, quia per nullam potentiam possibile est esse corpus infinitum, ut dicetur in tertio; et tamen omni finito quod est vel quod potest esse, Deus potest facere maius. Tamen bene concedo istam quod impossibile est omni finito esse aliquid maius. Illa enim differunt sicut composita et divisa ‘omni finito potest esse aliquid maius’ et ‘possibile est omni finito esse aliquid maius’. Nam prima est vera et secunda falsa. Tertia conclusio est quod nullius corporis est aliqua maxima pars ipsius, quia det adversarius quod corporis a maxima pars sit b et residuum sit c. Tunc constat quod c est divisibile in duas medietates, quarum una est continua ipsi b, quia ponamus quod corpus a esset unum continuum et supponamus quod continui nulla pars est indivisibilis. Tunc igitur aggregatum ex b et medietate ipsius c sibi | continua est una pars ipsius a distincta contra

1 dicam] praem. ego p : dico P 4 esse] post infinitum p 5 aliquod] aliquid P ‖ aliquid] aliquod Pp 6 quod] quia GPp 7 libro] huius p : om. GP 9 sic est] inv. P 11 est1] om. p ‖ sic est] inv. p ‖ aliquid posset] aliud posset G : aliud possit p : aliud potest P 12 aliquod esse] inv. G : esse aliquid Pp ‖ possit] posset G 13 aliud esse] inv. p 15 quod2] om. p ‖ esse] existere Pp 16 tamen] praem. licet P 17 illa] istae Pp 17–18 esse aliquid] inv. G 18 et] om. P ‖ nam] et Pp 19 secunda] alia P 20 est1] om. p ‖ aliqua] om. p 21 corporis] corpus P 22 c] corr. sup. lin. ex b C : b G 23 ponamus] ponebamus P ‖ a] post continuum C ‖ esset] est P 23–24 supponamus] supponimus GP 24 aggregatum] congregatum Pp 3 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, qq. 14–19 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 55vb–65va) 7 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 15 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 57vb) 14 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 19 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 64va)

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aliam medietatem ipsius c; et est maior quam b; igitur b non erat maxima pars ipsius a.

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Sed tunc de maximo in genere vel in specie ponitur quarta conclusio quod aliquis est homo maximus sic quod nullus est maior, et aliquis | est maximus ignis sic quod nullus ignis est maior, sed non sic, quin posset esse maior per potentiam divinam. Sed utrum est aliquis homo maximus sic quod ipse est omni homine maior, dico quod hoc ego non possum scire, quia forte ille quo nullus est maior habet alium sibi aequalem; hoc enim est possibile. Et ista sunt satis clara. Sed tunc est dubitatio bene difficilis utrum possibile est esse tantum ignem per potentiam naturalem quod non posset esse maior ignis per potentias naturales sine miraculo. De hoc enim quidam dicunt quod non, quia quantuscumque esset ignis, posset adhuc sibi apponi stuppa, quae igniretur, et fieret totalis ignis maior. Hoc non apparet mihi demonstratum nec hoc credo esse verum. Ideo pono conclusionem quintam quod possibile est esse tantum ignem naturaliter quod non posset esse maior naturaliter. Et hoc demonstrare est difficile, sed potest sic probari supponendo quod omnis virtus in istis inferioribus excepta voluntate humana gubernatur a corporibus caelestibus, ut habetur primo Meteororum. Secundo ego suppono quod non posset esse tantus ignis hic inferius supra terram vel in aere per naturam, etiam per voluntatem humanam, quantus est in sphaera sua super aerem et sub orbe lunae. Et de illo igne qui est super sphaeram aeris non habet locum illud argumentum de stuppa, quia nec natura nec voluntas humana potest illi | igni stuppam applicare. Si igitur sit probatum quod illic potest esse tantus ignis quod non

3 vel] et G ‖ ponitur] ponatur p 4 aliquis1] aliquid p ‖ aliquis est2] om. Pp 5 ignis est] inv. Pp ‖ sic2] om. G ‖ posset] possit p : potest GP 7 hoc ego] inv. G : ego P : hoc esse p 9 satis clara] add. et concessa p : clara satis et concessa P 10 bene difficilis] difficilis Pp : om. G 11 posset esse] possit esse Pp : posset est G ‖ ignis] add. etiam GPp 13 enim] om. G ‖ quantuscumque] quantumcumque G 14 posset adhuc] inv. p ‖ sibi] post apponi Pp : om. G ‖ fieret] add. inde GPp 15 hoc1] praem. sed GPp 16–17 naturaliter] ante esse (16) Pp 17 posset] possit P ‖ maior naturaliter] inv. GPp 18 potest sic] inv. p ‖ supponendo] ego suppono Pp 19–20 habetur] add. in P 20 ego] om. P ‖ posset] potest GPp 21 supra] super p : per P ‖ naturam] add. vel Pp 22 super] supra GPp 23 super] supra GPp ‖ aeris] eius P ‖ argumentum] add. quod erat GPp 24 illi igni] igni illi semper p : illi P 25 illic] corr. ex illud C : ibi p ‖ tantus ignis] inv. G 20 Cf. Aristoteles, Meteora, I, 2, 339a21–23; cf. AA, 5: 2

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possit esse illic maior, probatum erit propositum. Ideo hoc est probandum. Et ad hoc probandum accipio quod possibile est corpora caelestia se habere in dispositione optima, ita quod non est possibile esse in meliori, ad generationem et augmentationem ignis in illa sphaera. Ideo cum mundus regatur a caelo, maxime illic, cum illic non attingat actio voluntatis humanae, sequitur quod ibi potest fieri maximus ignis qui potest fieri. Et quandocumque caelum erit in tali | dispositione, tunc de facto erit maximus ignis ibi, quo nullus naturaliter potest esse maior. Iterum suppono illud quod debet videri sexto Metaphysicae, scilicet si non essent agentia libera in hoc mundo inferiori et quod agentia etiam superiora libera permitterent sine miraculo omnia alia procedere cursu suo naturali, tunc omnia quae evenirent de necessitate evenirent, ita quod omne quod potest evenire in tempore futuro iam inevitabile esset, quin eveniret. Et quale vel quantum possibile est quod eveniat, necesse est quod tale | vel tantum eveniret. Voluntas autem humana non se extendit ad illam sphaeram ignis. Ideo sic omnino actio fieret illic, sicut si non hic inferius esset aliqua voluntas humana libera. Igitur quantuscumque potest illic fieri ignis naturaliter, tantus fieret (dico: semper, si non concurreret per libertatem superiorum agentium variatio). Et ideo non posset fieri maior quam aliquis qui | illic fieret. Adhuc ad idem est alia persuasio assignans causam conclusionis per quandam similitudinem de animabus animalium in istis inferioribus et de anima mundi, quae est Deus. Anima enim animalis mediante corde et calore eius corrigit ineptitudines corporis et reducit corpus ad statum, remittens qualitates et virtutes excessivas et fortificans deficientes aliter et aliter in 1 esse illic] etiam illic esse Pp ‖ probatum erit propositum] propositum erit probatum p 2 et … probandum] ad hoc ergo probandum ego p : et ego P 3 esse] om. P 3–4 generationem et augmentationem] augmentationem et generationem P 4 a] om. p 5 illic1] om. C 9 iterum] etiam p ‖ sexto] septimo p ‖ scilicet] add. quod P : quod p 10 quod] si P ‖ superiora] ante etiam Pp : add. etiam G 11 permitterent] permitterentur GP ‖ procedere] producere C 12 evenirent2] ante de Gp 13 iam] add. indubitabile esset vel P 14 quale] tale p 14–15 necesse … eveniret] necesse est quod tale et tantum eveniat p : tale vel tantum necesse est quod eveniat P : necesse est quod tale et tantum et tantum eveniret G 16 actio] post illic Pp ‖ esset] ante hic GPp 17 quantuscumque] quantumcumque Gp ‖ illic fieri] inv. p 18 fieret] add. hic G ‖ concurreret] concurret P 18–19 per … variatio] variatio per libertates superiorum agentium Pp : impedimentum per libertatem superiorum agentium G 19 et] om. P ‖ posset] potest P 23 corde] corpore C 25 deficientes] corr. sup. lin. ex difficultates C : difficultates G 9 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VI, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 35va–37rb)

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unoquoque membro secundum exigentiam illorum membrorum et operationum sibi debitarum. Aliter enim sequeretur quod, si in corpore calor excederet temperamentum debitum, ut in febre, ipse semper magis et magis excederet, quia magis posset agere et corrumpere suum contrarium quam quando erat contemperatus. Ideo numquam animal per suam naturam reverteretur ad sanitatem, quod est falsum. Sic enim intendit Aristoteles in secundo De anima quod ignis, id est calor, in vivente augmentaretur in infinitum, id est valde ultra debitam quantitatem viventis, nisi esset aliud agens principalius dirigens ipsum, si apponeretur combustibile, id est nutrimentum. Et illud agens principalius est anima, prout ibi vult Aristoteles, quae corrigit et determinat calorem, | ne excedat et etiam ne deficiat. Ita etiam imaginandum est quod anima mundi, scilicet Deus, quantum ad actiones naturales et non miraculosas corrigit etiam mediante caelo errores | mundi inferioris, diminuens elementa excedentia et fortificans deficientia. Aliter sequeretur quod illa quae aliquando excederent numquam reverterentur ad statum, sed corrumperent alia. Sed circa hoc est bene notandum quod una inter ceteras est differentia inter animam animalis et animam mundi. Anima enim animalis non habet dominium super agentia extrinseca; ideo saepe non potest corrigere vel resistere actionibus eorum, sed superatur. Anima autem mundi et caelum dominantur supra omnia alia; ideo nihil obstare potest, quin potest omnia corrigere et reducere ad convenientem dispositionem. Ex quibus videtur esse concludendum quod ad tantam magnitudinem posset ignis excrescere quod Deus et caelum non permitterent ultra, sed reprimerent ipsum. Sed notandum quod forte rationes factae non convincunt quod sit dare maximam magnitudinem quam ignis habere posset, sed convincunt quod est dare minimam quam non posset habere. Et consideretur de hoc, sicut patebit studentibus, iuxta ea quae post dicentur de quibusdam aliis.

2 sequeretur] sequitur Pp ‖ calor] post debitum (3) P 3 febre ipse] febre ipso C : fetore ipse p ‖ et magis] ac magis G : ac maius P 4 quia] et p 6 in] om. Pp 10 prout ibi vult] ut vult ibi p 11 determinat] detinet Pp ‖ etiam ne] inv. Pp ‖ ita] praem. et P 12 quod] de P 14 elementa] add. excellentia vel G : add. seu diminuens P 15 sequeretur] sequitur p ‖ excederent] excederet C 18 dominium super] dominium supra P : divinum super G 19 vel] add. etiam GPp ‖ sed superatur] sed separatur C : si superatur p 20 supra] super GPp 21 potest2] posset G : possit p : possint P 23 posset] possit P 25 notandum] add. est Pp ‖ dare] add. magnam seu C 26 posset] possit P ‖ convincunt] concludunt p 27 posset] potest P 7 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 4, 416a15–18; cf. AA, 6: 86

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Nunc supposito quod sit dare maximum quaestio quaerit utrum omne ens naturale sit determinatum ad maximum. De quo notandum est quod valde magna est multiplicitas in hoc quod dicitur aliquid determinari vel esse determinatum ad maximum vel etiam ad aliquam dispositionem. Primo modo enim a dicitur determinatum esse ad esse b vel ad habere b vel ad esse in b et sic de aliis modis locutionum, quia simpliciter necesse est ipsum esse b vel habere b etc. Et sic diceremus Deum esse determinatissimum ad esse | et ad esse bonum et ad intelligere se et ad amare se etc. Et sic etiam Aristoteles diceret intelligentias esse determinatas ad movere et corpora caelestia ad moveri et ad habere tantas magnitudines quantas habent. Et sic quodlibet cor|pus caeleste est determinatum ad maximum, scilicet quia habet maximam magnitudinem quam habere potest naturaliter et non potest naturaliter habere maiorem vel minorem. Sed illo modo nullum sic corruptibile quod possit non esse est determinatum ad esse vel ad aliquam dispositionem affirmative dictam, sed bene est determinatum ad posse non esse. Unde et ego possum non esse | et non esse homo et semper potero non esse dato quod essem annihilatus; ideo simpliciter necesse est me posse non esse. Nihil igitur tale quod potest non esse est determinatum ad maximum. | Secundo modo a dicitur sic determinatum ad b vel determinare sibi b, quia potest esse, et non potest esse sine b. Et sic quodlibet determinat sibi esse vel esse ens, quia quodlibet potest esse et nihil potest esse sine hoc quod sit ens. Et quodlibet determinat sic sibi se ipsum et ignis caliditatem, quia non potest esse sine caliditate saltem naturaliter. Sed utrum isto modo omne album determinat sibi esse album, dico quod sic secundum unam expositionem et non sic secundum aliam. Nam hoc album potest esse absque hoc quod sit album; ideo non determinat sibi esse album. Potest enim esse nigrum. Sed sic album determinat sibi esse album, quia non est possibile esse album sine hoc quod sit album. Et similiter dico quod album sibi determinat vel non sibi determinat albedinem. Hoc enim album potest esse sine albedine, sed non potest esse album sine albedine. Et ita etiam triangulus

1 quaerit] erat GPp 4 vel1] add. etiam p 5 modo enim] inv. Gp ‖ a dicitur] inv. P ‖ esse] sup. lin. C : om. P 6 b] om. G 8 et1] vel P ‖ et2] vel P 8–9 et3 … se] et ad amare Pp : om. G 10–11 tantas magnitudines quantas] tantam magnitudinem quantam p 11 sic] om. G 14 sic … est] corruptibile quod possit non esse sic est p : sic est corruptibile quod possit non esse P ‖ esse2] add. in marg. alias max†…† C 15 affirmative] active sed add. sup. lin. affirmative C 18 igitur] rep. G 20 sic] om. Pp 23 determinat sic sibi] sic determinat sibi Pp : determinat sibi esse G 25 album2] add. ego P 27 album1] add. et P 29 et] om. P 30 potest esse] inv. P 31 esse] est G

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determinat sibi vel non determinat sibi habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et illo modo nullum corruptibile determinat sibi maximum vel minimum vel aliquem certum gradum magnitudinis. Potest enim aliquando esse maius vel minus, quia omne corruptibile potest condensari vel rarefieri (dico de habentibus extensionem corpoream). Tertio modo aliquid diceretur determinari ad maximum, quia est dare tantam magnitudinem quod non potest eam excellere. Et sic bene intenderet Aristoteles quod omne corpus est determinatum ad maximum, quia est dare tantam magnitudinem, scilicet supremae sphaerae, quod nullum corpus potest eam excellere naturaliter. Quarto modo magis stricte aliquid diceretur determinari ad maximum, quia est dare aliquantam magnitudinem ad quantam potest attingere et non potest excedere. Et sic credo quod Aristoteles intendebat quod omne corpus naturale sit determinatum ad maximum. Dictum enim fuit prius quomodo potest esse maximus ignis, ita quod nullus potest esse maior. Et ita puto consimiliter esse verum et de aere et de aqua et de homine et de equo, immo et de Socrate et Platone, et sic de aliis. Vel si non sit ita dicendum, scilicet quod est dare | maximum ad quod homo potest attingere, sed quod | debeamus dicere quod est dare minimum ad quantum non potest attingere, tunc dicto modo non essent corpora naturalia corruptibilia determinata ad maximum, sed oporteret addere vel mutare locutionem sic quod omne corpus sic esset determinatum ad maximum, quia est dare maximum quo omne minus ipsum potest excedere. Et hoc dictum apparet mihi firmius quam aliquod praedictorum, quia esset verum, sive sit dare maximum ad quod potest pervenire, sive non, sed minimum ad quod non possit pervenire. Utrumque enim, scilicet vel illud maximum vel illud minimum, esset maximum quo omne minus posset excedere. | Dicto igitur de magno simpliciter dicendum est de magno secundum quid, et primo de maximo secundum longitudinem, hoc est dictu de longissimo. Et statim est dicendum quod non est dare longissimum. Quod apparet primo 2 et] om. P 3–4 aliquando esse] inv. P 5 habentibus] add. magnitudinem seu P 6 diceretur] dicitur p : dicetur P 7 eam excellere et] illam excedere P 11 magis … diceretur] add. aliquid P : stricte magis diceretur aliquid p : stricte diceretur aliquid G 13 excedere] add. sup. lin. excellere C ‖ sic] add. ego Pp 14 sit] rep. C 15 maximus ignis] magnus ignis vel maximus P 17 et1] om. p ‖ et2] add. de Pp ‖ et3 … aliis] etc. P 19 quantum] quod p 21 quod] quia GPp 22 sic … omne] om. P 23 ipsum] ipso P 24 potest] possit P 25 pervenire2] venire P 26 quo] quod p 28 magno1] magnitudine G ‖ magno2] magnis Pp : magnitudine G ‖ et] om. GPp 30 est dicendum] dicitur GPp ‖ quod apparet] om. p ‖ primo] rep. C : add. enim P

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in tortuosis et curvis. Non enim est longissima linea gyrativa, sicut ostendetur in tertio libro. Sed etiam, quod est difficilius, ego credo | quod non est longissima linea recta, immo quod omni linea recta est recta linea longior. Suppono enim quod omnis linea habet latitudinem et profunditatem, licet non dicatur linea nisi ratione unius diametri, sicut post dicetur. Suppono etiam quod, si columna fuerit aeque longa ex uno latere sicut ex alio, ita quod ex utroque latere sit decem pedum, et alia columna fuerit deformiter longa, scilicet ex uno latere decem pedum et ex alio latere novem pedum, prima columna erit longior quam secunda in semipede, quoniam longitudo corporis non est solum in eius dextro vel solum in eius sinistro vel in medio, sed est in dextro, medio et sinistro. Ideo non oportet dici simpliciter longum vel tantae longitudinis ex dextro latere solum vel ex sinistro solum, sed coniunctim ex dextro, sinistro et medio. Et si non sit uniformitas longitudinis, oportet referre longius ad minus longum auferendo de longiori latere et apponendo minus longo, ut inveniatur medium. Et hoc etiam probatur per simile quia: si a lucido illuminetur aer ad certam distantiam, puta ad leucam, continue deformiter, ita quod prope lucidum sit lumen intensum et ad finem sit in infinitum remissum lumen, ut omnino nihil ultra sit de lumine, et vocetur ille aer totalis | b et millesima eius pars propinqua lucido vocetur a, quae est valde intense illuminata, igitur tunc non est dicendum quod aer b debeat dici aeque intense illuminatus sicut aer a, nisi tu velis denominare totum ab infinitum parva parte eius dimittendo denominationem secundum omnes alias partes, quod videtur absurdum.

1 et] vel GP ‖ est] om. P 2 tertio libro] tertio huius G : quarto libro P ‖ etiam] om. P 3–4 immo … longior] longior sed del. G 3 recta linea] sup. lin. C : inv. Pp 3–4 longior] add. sup. lin. maior C 4 habet] habeat GP ‖ latitudinem] corr. in longitudinem C : longitudinem G 5 sicut post] ut postea P 8 longa] om. p ‖ latere novem pedum] novem P 9 quoniam] add. sup. lin. alias quae C : quia p 10 solum in eius2] solum in Gp : om. P 11 oportet dici simpliciter] debet dici simpliciter P : debet simpliciter dici Gp 12 ex2] om. G ‖ solum2] om. GPp 14 longiori] longiore G 16 et] om. P ‖ illuminetur] illuminaretur p 17 puta] add. usque Gp 18 in] illud in sup. lin. C : om. G 19 omnino] in domo et P 19–20 eius pars] inv. GPp 21 aer b debeat] a et b debeant P ‖ illuminatus] luminata P 22 velis] velles sed add. sup. lin. velis C ‖ infinitum] infinita Pp 2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 16 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 58rb–59vb) 5 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VI, q. 3 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 96ra)

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Et est etiam aliud simile: si baculus sit deformiter coloratus secundum album et nigrum secundum processum de cono a ad conum b ab albissimo ad nigerrimum, tunc non est hic dicendum quod a cono a debeat denominari albissimum. Pari enim ratione denominaretur a cono b nigerrimum. Et sic simpliciter | loquendo diceretur simul nigerrimum et albissimum, quod est impossibile. Igitur ad simpliciter denominandum oportet recompensare inter partes, ut a medio fiat simpliciter denominatio. Et tunc manifestum est quod mensurantes superficiem quanta sit vel etiam corpus quantum sit, reducunt deformitates ad uniformitatem. Propter quod videtur mihi concludendum corollarie quod non a velocitate | puncti velocissime moti in circumferentia debet denominari simpliciter velocitas motus totalis sphaerae, sicut multi communiter dicunt, dimittendo denominationem ab omni alia parte, cum tamen sit in infinitum maior pars alia. Et certe, si aliquis vellet istam denominationem sustinere tamquam simpliciter bene dictam, oportet dicere quod non deberet attendi proportio velocitatum secundum proportiones moventium ad resistentiam nec etiam secundum proportionem proportionum etc., et sic periret ars comparativa motuum, quam voluit dare Aristoteles in fine septimi Physicorum. Et consequentia ex hoc patet, quia si sint duae molae magnae, similes in magnitudine, figura et pondere et omnibus aliis praeter hoc quod una in sua circumferentia habeat unam partem elevatam ad altitudinem pedis, quae pars sit solum de grossitie unius acus, constat quod illa pars non augmentabit resistentiam in aliqua notabili quantitate, ita quod homines aequalis virtutis non percipient differentiam, quin aequali tempore moveant illas molas ad perficiendum unum circuitum; et tamen, si a punctis velocissime motis denominaretur simpliciter velocitas motus tota1 et] om. p ‖ si baculus sit] praem. sicut C : sit baculus P ‖ deformiter] add. sup. lin. alias uniformiter C : praem. uniformiter GPp 2 ab] add. sup. lin. alias de C : om. G 3 est hic] est Gp : om. P 4 albissimum] add. in marg. quia C ‖ denominaretur] in marg. C : diceretur GPp 5 diceretur simul] dicetur p ‖ nigerrimum et albissimum] albissimum et nigerrimum GPp 8 fiat] fiet P ‖ tunc] ideo GPp 9 etiam] om. GP 12 motus] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ sphaerae] om. P ‖ multi] praem. semper P : om. C 14 maior] post alia GPp 15 oportet] oporteret GPp 16 proportiones] proportionem GPp 16–17 moventium] corr. in motuum C 17 resistentiam] resistentias GPp ‖ etiam] om. GPp ‖ proportionem] corr. in marg. ex propositionem C : proportiones p 18 sic] om. Pp ‖ dare aristoteles] inv. GPp 19 quia] quod P 20 similes] add. sup. lin. seu aequales C ‖ magnitudine] add. et GPp ‖ et2] add. in GP 23 notabili quantitate] parte notabili C 24 percipient] perciperent p ‖ quin] add. in p : nisi C 26 punctis] partibus P ‖ denominaretur] denominetur P 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, VII, 5, 249b31–250b9

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lis molae, una mola moveretur dupliciter velocius quam alia propter punctum supremum illius partis elevatae, a quo multo maior linea describeretur; igitur virtutes aequales moverent resistentias quasi aequales, scilicet sine | notabili differentia, unam dupliciter velocius quam aliam, quod est impossibile. Ex istis dictis, ne | reverti oportet, concluditur quod non est dare motum velocissimum, immo omni motu est alius motus velocior, quia in suprema sphaera in circulo aequinoctiali capiatur pars quam dicis velocissime ibi moveri, quae sit a; illa est divisibilis in partem superiorem et partem inferiorem; et pars superior movetur velocius quam pars inferior; igitur movetur velocius quam a, ex quo velocitas ipsius a non debeat solum attendi ex velocitate unius partis eius, scilicet velocissime motae, sicut etiam dicebatur de velocitate totius sphaerae. Et tunc ego revertor ad ostendendum quod non sit linea recta longissima quia: illa esset diameter mundi ponendo quod mundus sit unum totale corpus, quia illa linea diametralis haberet latitudinem, secundum quam esset divisibilis in tres partes, quarum media esset longior quam aliqua aliarum, quia ipsa esset diameter sphaerae et nulla aliarum esset amplius diameter, sed iuxta diametrum. Et ita etiam diceretur in quadrato. Nam si ibi esset linea longissima, ipsa esset | diameter quadrati, quae vocaretur a; et esset divisibilis secundum latitudinem in tres partes, quarum media esset longior aliis eo quod esset diameter | et non aliae; igitur ipsa etiam esset longior quam a. Hoc enim est ita propter infinitam divisionem magnitudinis et secundum longum et secundum latum et secundum profundum. Nunc sciendum est de maximo secundum durationem. Et statim dico quod quaedam est maxima duratio, scilicet Dei. Nihil enim plus potest durare. Et

2 multo] multum GP 3 scilicet] et P : om. C 4 unam … aliam] una dupliciter velocius quam alia P 6 reverti oportet] oporteat reverti Gp : oporteret reverti P 8 dicis] praem. tu GP : tu dices p ‖ ibi] om. GPp 9 illa] add. scilicet p ‖ partem2] om. P 10 movetur1] moveretur G ‖ pars2] om. P ‖ movetur2] praem. etiam Pp : etiam moveretur G 11 debeat solum attendi] debeat attendi solum G : debebat attendi solum Pp 12 velocissime] velocius Gp : minoris velocius P ‖ dicebatur] videtur C 14 ego revertor] revertor P : revertitur p ‖ recta] in marg. C : om. Pp 15 esset] add. iam P 16 quia] quod P 17 tres partes] inv. P 18 sphaerae] semper P 20 ibi esset] inv. GPp ‖ vocaretur] vocetur P 21 secundum] add. suam GPp 22 aliis] add. sup. lin. seu aliarum longissima C : ante longior GPp ‖ quod] add. ipsa GPp ‖ etiam] om. P 23 hoc … ita] haec enim est causa p ‖ divisionem] add. in marg. dimensionem C 25 sciendum] dicendum GPp 26 plus potest] inv. GP : potest diutius vel plus p

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illa aeterna duratio est indivisibilis, quia est ipse Deus. Sed de puris successivis, sicut est motus et tempus, dicetur in tertio libro quia, licet infinitus sive perpetuus sit motus et etiam tempus, si esset vera opinio Aristotelis de aeternitate mundi, tamen nullus motus esset perpetuus vel maximus secundum durationem, immo omni motu esset motus maior secundum durationem, et sic de tempore. Et hoc in sequentibus declarabitur. Nunc venio ad maximum secundum intensionem formae intensibilis, ut utrum sit dare maxime calidum vel calidissimum et sic de aliis. Et videtur mihi quod loquendo quantum ad potentiam divinam non est possibile esse calidum, quin posset esse calidius, quia suppono ex dicendis in tertio libro quod impossibile est esse caliditatem intensam infinite; et si sit finite intensa, Deus in eodem subiecto posset adhuc generare et creare alium gradum et sic adhuc caliditas esset intensior | quam illa quae erat ante. Sed de actu sive de facto videtur mihi quod non possum scire utrum est aliquid calidissimum, ita quod eo nihil est calidius, quia ponendo casum quod nihil hic inferius sit calidius igne qui est in loco suo naturali tangens sphaeram lunae, et ultra quod ille ignis sit deformiter calidus tali modo quod secundum unamquamque divisionem eius in partem inferiorem et partem superiorem pars superior, scilicet caelo propinquior, sit calidior inferiori, tunc nihil esset calidissimum, sicut dicebatur quod nihil esset longissimum et quod nullus motus est velocissimus. Sed si ponatur aliquis alius casus quod tota pars aliqua sit uniformiter calida, qua nullum sibi extrinsecum

1 est ipse] ipsa est P ‖ puris] pure GPp 1–2 successivis] add. in marg. seu de duratione †…† scilicet motus C 2 et tempus] om. G ‖ quia] quod GPp 3 et etiam] aut P 4 perpetuus vel maximus] maior sed add. sup. lin. perpetuus vel maximus C 5 immo … durationem2] immo omni m†…† motus m†…† durationem in marg. C 6 tempore] add. secundum durationem P ‖ et … declarabitur] et (om. P) haec in sequentibus declarabuntur GPp 7 nunc] add. igitur GPp 7–8 ut utrum] prout sed add. sup. lin. ut utrum C : et utrum P : utrum p 8 maxime] maximum CP ‖ vel] sive GPp 10 posset] possit p : potest P 11 esse … infinite] esse caliditatem infinite intensam Gp : caliditatem infinite intensam esse P ‖ si sit] sic G 12 posset] potest Pp ‖ et] vel GPp 13 adhuc caliditas esset] esset caliditas GPp 14 quod] add. ego GPp 14–15 est aliquid] inv. P 15 eo nihil est] nihil sit eo GPp 19 scilicet … sit] est propinquior caelo et C 20 esset1] est GP ‖ esset2] erat Gp : sit P 21 aliquis] om. GPp 22 aliqua] ante tota GPp ‖ uniformiter] deformiter C 2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 16 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 59va) 10–11 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 15 (ed. Parisiis 1509, f. 57va)

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sit calidius, tunc illa pars est calidissima, qua nihil est calidius intensive. Et non apparet mihi demonstrabile quis istorum casuum sit verus et quis falsus.

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Ultimo possunt aliqua dici de maximo secundum potentiam. Et cum hoc nomen ‘potentia’ sit relativum ad actum, nos non vocamus poten|tiam magnam, quia sit multum extensa. Dei enim potentiam dicimus esse maximam, quae tamen est simplex et indivisibilis. Sed dicitur magna potentia vel parva, maior vel minor ex magnitudine operis vel obiecti. | Aliter tamen et aliter dicimus hoc de potentia activa et de potentia passiva. Potentia enim activa ex eo dicitur maior activa, quia ceteris paribus potest agere in maius passum et cum maiori resistentia et quia ceteris paribus potest in passum producere maiorem vel intensiorem effectum. | Sed potentia passiva ex eo dicitur passiva maior, quia potest pati a minori activo vel quia magis pateretur ab aequali activo. Ideo oportet determinari de magnitudine potentiae in comparatione ad operationem et ad obiectum. Et solent poni conclusiones probabiles. Prima est: posito quod a est potentia levativa ponderis magni, non est dare maximum pondus quod a potest levare. Haec conclusio probatur supponendo quod a proportione aequalitatis vel minoris inaequalitatis agentis ad resistentiam non provenit actio, sed oportet quod virtus agentis excedat virtutem resistentiae. Et quanto est maior proportio maioris inaequalitatis ad resistentiam agentis, tanto agens fortius vel velocius agit vel movet ad distantiam longiorem. Et hoc debet videri septimo huius, ubi dicetur quod, si aliquod movens | movet aliquod mobile aliqua velocitate, idem movens

1 calidissima qua] calidissimum quo Gp ‖ qua] igitur (del.) sed add. sup. lin. alias qua C 2 casuum] modorum P 5 sit] om. P 6 extensa] intensa sed add. sup. lin. seu extensa C 6–7 potentiam … maximam] dicimus esse maximam potentiam p : dicimus esse potentiam maximam P : dicimus potentiam maximam G 7 indivisibilis] individualis C 9 de2] praem. hoc C : om. P 10 ex] om. p ‖ maior activa] active maior GPp 11 passum et] passivum vel Gp : spatium vel P ‖ et2] vel GPp 12–13 ex eo dicitur] dicitur ex eo P : eo dicitur p 13 passiva] passive GPp 14 determinari] determinare GPp 15 et ad] vel GPp 17 prima] add. conclusio GPp 20 provenit] pervenit G 21 virtutem] virtutes G ‖ quanto] quanta p 22 agentis] ante ad1 GPp ‖ fortius] add. agit GPp ‖ agit vel movet] movet vel agit GPp ‖ ad2] in sed add. sup. lin. ad C 23 distantiam longiorem] longiorem distantiam etc. GPp ‖ videri] add. in GPp ‖ dicetur] dictum est GP 24 aliqua] aequali P 23 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VII, q. 7 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 107rb–108rb)

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moveret medietatem illius mobilis duplici velocitate. Ponamus igitur quod a levet b tamquam maximum quod ipse potest levare secundum adversarium. Tunc est aliquantus excessus ipsius a ad b. Tunc ipsi b apponatur pondus tantum quod resistentia sit aequalis virtuti a, et illud quod apponitur vocetur c. Constat quod a non poterit levare compositum ex b et c. Sed quia tunc c est divisibile, auferatur eius medietas et alia medietas remaneat cum b, quae vocetur d. Tunc igitur a excedit compositum ex b et d et per consequens potest levare ipsum. Et tamen ipsum compositum est maius quam b; igitur b non erat maximum quod a potest levare. Vel arguitur sic: sit virtus levativa a et grave aequalis resistentiae virtuti a sit b. Tunc a non movebit b, sed omne minus posset levare, quia omne minus excederet; et non potest dari minus secundum indivisibile, cum continuum non sit compositum ex indivisibilibus; igitur quocumque minori dato potest dari aliquid aliud intermedium quod est maius illo et minus quam a; et sic quocumque dato quod a potest levare, adhuc est maius quod ipsum potest levare. Secunda conclusio similiter ponitur quod non est dare maximam distantiam a qua tu potes videre visibile b. Probatur supposito quod aliqua sit certa distantia a qua tu optime et intensissime videres b, et quanto ultra magis elongaretur, tanto remissius videres ipsum, donec veniret ad talem distantiam quod amplius non posses ipsum videre. Suppono etiam quod, sicut magnitudo est in infinitum divisibilis secundum extensionem, ita forma intensa est in infinitum divisibilis secundum intensionem gradualem; | ideo sicut omni parvo est dare minus, ita omni remisso est dare remissius. Sit igitur secundum adversarium maxima distantia a qua tu potes videre b. Illa visio erit aliquantae intensionis. Ideo a longiori tu videbis remissius. Unde si continue fieret elongatio, illa aliquanta intensio non corrumperetur tota simul, sed prius | remitteretur, sicut esset de corruptione caliditatis in frigefactione.

1 moveret] movet P ‖ velocitate] add. etc. GP : add. et p ‖ ponamus igitur] sicut ponamus C 2 levet] levat GPp ‖ ipse] ipsa p 3 b] add. et GPp ‖ b] om. G 4 virtuti] virtutis CP 5 constat] add. tunc GPp ‖ poterit] poterat G ‖ quia tunc] inv. GPp 6 divisibile] divisibilis G ‖ eius medietas] inv. GPp ‖ remaneat] corr. sup. lin. ex maneat C : maneat P ‖ b] c G 8 ipsum2] illud GPp 9 potest] poterat GPp ‖ arguitur sic] arguitur p : sic P 10 movebit] add. sup. lin. levabit C 11 minus1] maius p ‖ quia] quod C 13 aliquid] om. GPp 14 a] omnes codd., sed exspectes b 15 ipsum] ipsa Pp 16 secunda] tertia P 17 aliqua sit] est aliqua GPp 18 videres] vides G ‖ ultra] ulterius C 19 elongaretur] elongatur G ‖ videres] praem. tu Pp : vides G 20 posses ipsum videre] posses videre ipsum P : potes videre G 25 intensionis] intentionis G 26 fieret] fiet G : fiat Pp ‖ corrumperetur] corrumpetur GPp 27 remitteretur] remittetur Pp

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Sed contra hanc conclusionem est fortis cavillatio quia: ⟨1⟩ Sicut est de distantia ad quam lucidum potest illuminare vel color suam speciem multiplicare, ita est de distantia ad quam visus potest videre, cum per receptionem luminis a lucido vel speciei coloris | a colore visus videat lumen vel colorem; sed est dare maximam distantiam quam lucidum a potest illuminare et per quam color a potest suam speciem multiplicare; igitur etc. | Minor patet, quia color a vel lucidum a non multiplicaret suum lumen vel suam speciem per infinitam distantiam; igitur est dare spatium illuminatum et spatium non illuminatum; et nihil est medium inter illuminatum et non illuminatum, quia illud nec esset illuminatum nec non illuminatum, quod est impossibile; igitur illuminatum et non illuminatum tangunt se invicem; et si mathematice imaginetur punctum contactus, tunc ad illum punctum terminatum est totum spatium illuminatum et non procedit ultra; ideo illud est maximum spatium illuminatum. ⟨2⟩ Et iterum consimiliter arguitur de visione quia: est dare spatium in quo b videretur a te, et aliud spatium in quo non videretur a te, et ista spatia sunt ad invicem immediata; accepto igitur toto spatio in quo non posset videri, tunc in toto spatio infra illud videretur et non ultra; igitur maximum spatium in quo illud videretur esset illud spatium quod de oculo tuo duraret praecise usque ad illud in quo non videretur. ⟨3⟩ Item rationes praedictarum conclusionum videntur fundari super falsum principium, scilicet quod a quantocumque parvo excessu potentiae moventis super resistentiam fieret motus. Nam si ita esset, sequeretur quod formica cadens supra terram moveret totam terram, quod est absurdum. Consequentia patet, quia nos supponimus quod terra sit aequilibrata ad centrum terrae, ita quod si imaginaretur dividi per circulum transeuntem per centrum secundum imaginationem mathematicam, tantum pondus terrae esset ex una parte sicut ex alia, et unaquaque illarum partium tenderet ad

1 sed] om. Gp ‖ hanc] om. P ‖ conclusionem] dubitationem sed add. in marg. conclusionem C 3 ad quam] qua C 4 per] propter p 5 lumen] lucem Pp 7 patet] probatur GPp 12 se] add. ad GPp ‖ mathematice imaginetur] imaginamur P ‖ punctum] punctus G ‖ illum] illud GPp 15 arguitur] add. directe GPp ‖ spatium] add. aliquod P 16 videretur a te1] videtur ab a G ‖ videretur a te2] videretur Pp : videtur G 17 posset] potest p 18 infra] add. vel intra p 19 illud1] om. GPp ‖ quod] add. est G ‖ tuo] add. et G 20 in] de p ‖ in quo] quod (del.) sed add. sup. lin. vel in quo C 22 parvo] om. G 23 ita esset] sit tunc P 24 cadens supra] cadens super Pp : vadens super G ‖ terram1] add. ipsa C ‖ totam] totalem GPp 25 sit] est Gp : est hic P ‖ aequilibrata] add. sup. lin. inclinata G 26 ita] om. P ‖ imaginaretur] imaginetur G 27 pondus] ponderis P 28 esset] est G ‖ unaquaque] add. in marg. utraque C : utraque GPp ‖ tenderet] caderet C

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hoc quod medium sui fieret in centro, nisi alia pars resisteret; sed neutra potest movere aliam, quia ipsae partes sunt aequales ad invicem et eandem virtutem motivam habentes et resistentiam; igitur si uni parti addatur pondus unius formicae, amplius non erit proportio | aequalitatis, sed illa pars cum formica excedet; igitur movebit aliam partem, donec totum fiat in aequilibra sicut prius. Istas rationes oportet solvere per quandam distinctionem. Aliud enim est spatium in quo tu vides b et per quod tu vides b. Nam spatium per quod tu vides b est spatium medium inter te et b, ita quod b non est in illo spatio, sed ultra; et spatium in quo tu vides b est illud spatium in quo consistit b. Igitur ego pono conclusiones aliquas. Prima est quod est dare maximum spatium, in quo, si b esset vel aliqua eius pars, ipsum videretur. Et hoc probat ratio quae nunc fiebat. Et confirmatur dicta conclusio quia: si b est | prope te et ipsum videas clare et continue elongetur, | donec amplius non videas ipsum, constat quod erat aliquod maximum tempus in quo toto tu videbas b, quod est continuum et immediatum ad illud tempus in quo non amplius videbas b; sed illi maximo tempori correspondet spatium in quo erat per illud totum tempus et non amplius; igitur illud est maximum spatium in quo toto videbatur b. Secunda conclusio est quod non est dare maximum spatium per quod tu posses videre b. Et hoc intendebat conclusio quae prius posita fuit. Cum enim quaeritur utrum est dare maximam distantiam a qua tu potes videre b, ego dicam quod, si per hoc quod dicis ‘a qua’ intelligis ‘per quam’ tamquam per medium, tunc non est dare maximam distantiam etc. sive maximum spatium etc. Sed si per illud dictum ‘a qua’ tu volebas intelligere ‘in qua si esset’ etc., tunc est dare maximam distantiam etc.

1 neutra] add. pars p 2–3 ipsae … resistentiam] add. in marg. aequales sunt ad invicem virtutes motivae et resistitivae igitur C : aequales sunt ad invicem virtutes motivae et resistentiae (resistitivae p) GPp 3 igitur] praem. unde P 4 formicae] om. G 5 excedet] excederet Gp ‖ partem] medietatem GPp ‖ fiat] ante totum P : fiet G 6 aequilibra sicut] aequilibra ut P : aequali libra sicut p 8 tu1] om. P 9 spatium] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ te] a G 10 et … b] in marg. C : om. GPp 11 igitur ego pono] igitur pono P : pono igitur G ‖ aliquas] om. GPp 12 prima] add. conclusio P 13 eius pars] inv. GPp ‖ ipsum] nullo modo P 14 et ipsum videas] ut ipsum videas GP : ut videas ipsum p 15 videas] vides P 16 toto] om. Pp ‖ tu videbas] tu videbis p : videbas G 17 illud] aliud sed add. sup. lin. illud C ‖ videbas b] videbis p 18 tempori] tempore P 19–20 videbatur b] videbatur GP : videbitur p 21 dare] om. G 22 posses] potes Pp 23 b] om. G 24 si per] super P ‖ quod2] add. tu p ‖ intelligis] praem. tu Pp 26 per] super P ‖ volebas] videbas P 27 est] esset G

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Et istae duae conclusiones consequuntur se invicem necessario, quia si est dare maximum spatium, in quo, si esset, videretur, tunc per illud non potest videri tamquam per medium, quia oporteret quod esset ultra illud spatium et positum est quod in spatio ul|teriori non potest videri. Ad istas conclusiones sequuntur aliae, sicut communiter bene dicitur. Et prima est quod est dare minimum pondus quod a non potest levare, quia certum est quod in tantum posset excrescere pondus quod a non posset levare ipsum; ideo necesse est quod ad aliquod pondus terminetur virtus; et non potest intelligi quod ad illud pondus terminetur nisi altero duorum modorum, scilicet vel quod posset ipsum levare et nihil maius, et tunc illud esset maximum quod posset levare, cuius oppositum fuit positum, vel quod non potest illud levare, sed posset omne minus levare, et haec est nostra conclusio. Tunc enim illud est minimum quod non potest levare, ex quo potest levare omne minus. Alia conclusio consimiliter est quod est dare minimum spatium per quod non potes videre b, | nisi in tantum minoretur spatium quod propter nimiam propinquitatem auferatur visio. Et probatur conclusio ut prius quia: oportet esse statum et terminum vel ad maximum per quod potest vel ad minimum per quod non potest. Alia conclusio est quod non est dare minimum spatium, in quo, si visibile esset, non videretur, quia cum sit terminus ad maximum in quo videretur, non est terminus ad minimum in quo non videretur. Multae aliae conclusiones possent poni de illa materia, sed forte per iam positas potest apparere earum veritas. Ideo dimitto eas | et solvo illas tres instantias quae fiebant contra priores conclusiones. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam concedo quod est dare maximam distantiam vel maximum spatium quod a lucidum illuminaret et in quo a color faceret suam speciem. Sed per illud spatium tamquam per medium oculus non videret

2 dare] om. G ‖ videretur] sup. lin. C : om. G 3 potest] om. P 5 sequuntur] iam positas consequuntur Pp ‖ communiter] add. et P ‖ et] om. Pp 6 prima] add. conclusio P 7 posset1] possit P : potest p 7–8 posset levare ipsum] posset ipsum levare p : possit ipsum levare P 8 aliquod] aliquid G 10 posset] possit Pp 12 potest] posset p ‖ haec] hoc p 13 est] esset P ‖ potest] posset p 14 omne minus] minimum sed add. sup. lin. omne minus C : minimum G 15 alia] secunda p ‖ consimiliter] similiter Gp : om. P ‖ quod2] add. tu GPp 16 minoretur spatium] minoretur Gp : moveretur P 18 terminum] tantum p ‖ potest] add. vel ad minimum per quod potest G 20 alia conclusio est] tertia conclusio p ‖ spatium] om. p 22 non est] et P 23 de illa materia] om. P ‖ forte] om. G 24 tres] om. G 27 et] om. P ‖ a] sup. lin. C : om. P 27–28 suam speciem] suas species p 28 oculus] oculo P

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illud lucidum vel illum colorem, quia ex quo illud spatium esset medium inter oculum et visibile, oculus esset extra; ideo in eo non fieret species | coloris vel lucis, sed solum usque ad ipsum exclusive. ⟨2⟩ Alia ratio bene probat quod est maximum spatium, in quo visibile, si esset, videretur. ⟨3⟩ Ultima ratio supponit falsum, scilicet quod omnes partes terrae tendunt sive habeant inclinationem ad centrum, quod imaginatur indivisibile. Hoc enim est falsum, immo totali terra existente in suo loco naturali, ita quod non supereminet alicui parti aquae vel aeris, illa totalis terra et quaelibet pars eius nullam habet inclinationem ad amplius moveri deorsum, sed ad quiescere ibi. Si autem aliqua pars terrae sit aliqua parte aquae vel aeris elevatior, illa bene habet inclinationem respectu illius aeris vel illius aquae, ut sit inferius. Sed alia terra, quae nulli parti aeris vel aquae supereminet, est maior et maioris resistentiae quam sit virtus motiva partium supereminentium. Ideo ad movendum totalem terram non sufficit parva pars apposita, sed requireretur valde magna ad vincendum resistentiam totalis terrae, quam habet ex appetitu quiescendi in loco suo naturali, in quo ipsa est secundum se totam et secundum omnes eius partes quae non supereminent etc. Quod autem elementum in suo loco naturali non habeat tractum vel inclinationem ad movendum sursum vel deorsum, dicetur in quarto libro huius. Rationes autem quae in principio quaestionis fiebant non sunt difficiles ad solvendum secundum praedeterminata. ⟨1⟩ Prima enim arguit de indivisibilibus, de quibus non quaerit quaestio. ⟨2⟩ Ignis autem augmentaretur in infinitum, si apponeretur combustibile, nisi rector mundi et caelum | prohiberent. Et etiam condicio non potest adimpleri, quia non sunt combustibilia infinita. Et in positione etiam fuit data alia expositio. 1 esset] est p 2 in eo] post fieret GPp 4 est] add. dare GPp 6–7 tendunt sive habeant] tendant seu habeant P : tendant sive habent p : habeant G 9 supereminet] superemineat Pp ‖ et] vel p 11 ad quiescere] acquiescere P ‖ aquae vel aeris] aeris vel aquae Gp : aeris P 12 illius2] om. G 13 aeris vel aquae] aquae vel aeris GPp 14 maior et] praem. valde G : valde maior vel P : valde et p 16 vincendum] videndum sed del. C 17 loco suo] inv. GPp 19 etc.] om. P ‖ elementum] elevatum G ‖ tractum] tactum p 20 dicetur] add. magis GPp 20–21 libro huius] libro GP : huius p 25 apponeretur] apponetur P 26 prohiberent et] impedirent P 27–28 fuit data] inv. Pp 20–21 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, IV, q. 9 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 74rb–76vb)

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⟨3⟩ In tertio huius videbitur de augmentatione numeri vel magnitudinis in infinitum. Non enim sic potest | naturaliter in infinitum apponi magnitudini quod omnis ma|gnitudo finita data excellatur. ⟨4⟩ Concessum enim est quod non est dare maximum motum vel maximum tempus secundum durationem. ⟨5⟩ Illa suppositio geometrica est vera secundum potentiam divinam, sed Commentator hoc negans dicit quod hoc geometer non supponit, sed quod omni magnitudine finita data potest imaginari maior. Dictum enim est quod corpora corruptibilia non sunt sic determinata ad maximum quod semper sit necesse ea esse maxima. ⟨6⟩ Quod autem Aristoteles aliquando supponit, corpus esse subtiliabile in quacumque proportione volueris et sic etiam esse motum velocitabilem, est verum secundum potentiam divinam et non secundum potentiam naturalem. 2 apponi] rep. P 3 finita data] inv. P 4 enim] om. Pp 7 hoc geometer] inv. Pp 8 enim est] om. P 12 volueris] voluerimus Pp 13 et] om. GPp 13–14 naturalem] add. et sic finitur quaestio P : add. et sic est finis p : add. etc. G 1 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, qq. 14–19 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 55vb–65va)

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⟨Utrum entia naturalia determinata sint ad minimum⟩ Quaeritur tredecimo utrum entia naturalia determinata sunt ad minimum. 5

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Arguitur | quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Sunt in infinitum divisibilia, ut habetur tertio et sexto huius. ⟨2⟩ Item quarto Caeli dicitur quod omni gravi est gravius; igitur omni gravi est minus grave, quo illud est gravius. ⟨3⟩ Item si sit dare minimum ignem et ille sit in aqua, corrumpetur in aqua; et non nisi prius condensetur; ideo fiet minor et sic ille non erat minimus. ⟨4⟩ Item si detur caro minima, illa est divisibilis, quia continua. Vel igitur dividitur in partes quae sunt carnes vel quae non sunt carnes. Si primo modo, tunc est minus minimo, quia pars est minor toto. Si secundo modo, hoc est falsum, quia caro ponitur homogeneum, cuius quaelibet pars recipit praedicationem totius et est eiusdem rationis cum toto, ut quod quaelibet pars aquae est aqua et aeris aer. Sed ad hoc solet dici quod ante divisionem quaelibet pars carnis est caro, sed apud divisionem corrumpitur forma carnis et generatur aliud. Ideo dicitur quod, quamvis omni carne sit caro minor inexistens toti, tamen sic est minima caro quod nulla minor potest seorsum per se subsistere.

4 quaeritur tredecimo] sicut quaesitum est de maximo ita decimo tertio quaeritur de minimo scilicet Gp : quaeritur sicut quaesitum est duodecimo de maximo ita proportionabiliter quaeritur tredecimo de minimo scilicet P ‖ determinata sunt] inv. P : sint determinata p : sunt terminata G 5 arguitur] praem. et G 6 et sexto] om. G 7 omni1 … gravius] corr. ex omne ens grave est gravius C : omni grave est gravius P : omne grave G 10 aqua] aquam Pp ‖ non nisi] enim P ‖ ille] om. P 13 dividitur] dividatur G 15 caro ponitur] corrumpetur p 16 est] erit P 18 sed] om. P 19 apud] add. in marg. post C : post p ‖ aliud] add. et P 20 omni] una P 6 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 7, 207b16–17; cf. AA, 2: 108; cf. Aristoteles, Physica, VI, 6, 237a32– 33 7 Cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, III, 1, 299a30–31

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_017

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Contra hoc obicitur quia: non potest forma carnis corrumpi sine alteratione praevia; et illa alteratio non est instantanea, sed motus temporalis; igitur necesse est illius carnis quam dicis divisam, partes divisas manere aliquo tempore et sic erit minus minimo et per se seorsum subsistens. Item Deus saltem potest illas partes | seorsum conservare, quantocumque tempore vellet etc. Oppositum videtur ponere Aristoteles | contra Anaxagoram in primo huius, scilicet quod sit dare minimam carnem. Dicit enim quod carnis est determinata quantitas et in magnitudine et in parvitate. Propter quod concludit quod ex minima carne nullum segregabitur corpus; esset enim minus minimo. Difficultas est, cum omne corpus naturale sit in infinitum divisibile, quomodo in eis possit esse minimum. Et de hoc ego ponam conclusiones certiores et postea disputando illud quod est obscurius. Prima conclusio est quod inter omnia corpora actu seorsum existentia sine continuatione unius ad alterum est dare aliquod minimum, scilicet quo nullum aliorum est minus, quia licet in infinitum continuum sit divisibile, tamen non est possibile quod sit divisum in infinitum; ideo corpora sic actu existentia seorsum sunt finitae multitudinis et non infinitae; et inter talia esset devenire ad illud quo nullum aliorum esset maius et ad illud quo nullum aliorum esset minus. Et forte sic intendebat Aristoteles quod est dare minimam carnem. Et hoc sufficiebat sibi contra Anaxagoram, quia forte Anaxagoras omnia illa corpora quae dicebat esse in invicem et posse segregari ab invicem, dicebat esse congre|gata simul absque hoc quod aliquod illorum esset alteri unitum per continuationem; et si esset ita, tunc esset | inter illa aliquod minimum et inter omnes carnes sic existentes minima caro. 1 obicitur quia] obicitur quod p : instatur quia P 2 motus temporalis] praem. est Pp : est temporalis motus G 3 dicis] add. esse P ‖ partes] add. eius Pp 4 subsistens] existens P 5 potest] posset p 5–6 quantocumque … etc.] quantocumque vellet tempore P : quantocumque tempore vellet igitur etc. G : quantumcumque vellet p 7 ponere aristoteles] inv. p 8 scilicet … carnem] om. P 8–9 est determinata] inv. GPp 10 nullum] non G : om. P 12 difficultas est] propterea est difficultas p 13 eis possit] eis posset G : eis potest p : eius potest P ‖ ego ponam] ego pono G : ponam P 13–14 certiores] om. P 15 actu seorsum] inv. P 19 existentia seorsum] inv. GPp ‖ talia] illa G 20 esset2] est p 20–21 esset2 … aliorum] om. (hom.) P 21 esset] est Pp 23 in] om. GP 23–24 posse segregari] inv. Pp 24 congregata] aggregata G 25 illorum] eorum p 26 aliquod] aliquid G 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 4, 187b36–188a2

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Ideo Aristoteles supponit minimam carnem (dico ‘supponit’ non simpliciter, sed ad hominem hoc ponentem, contra quem arguit). Secunda conclusio est quod sic est dare parvam quantitatem quod sub tali vel minori non potest naturaliter aliquod corpus seorsum ab aliis de sua specie salvari longo et notabili tempore, sed continue tenderet ad corruptionem et cito corrumperetur a corporibus sibi propinquis. Causa est, quia ex quo illa corpora propinqua non essent eiusdem speciei cum illo, ipsa haberent ei aliqualem contrarietatem, per quam essent corruptiva illius, si esset nimis debilis resistentia; et illud posset esse ita parvum quod nimis esset debilis resistentia ad resistendum tempore notabili. Tamen concedendum est quod non est dare ita parvam magnitudinem, quin caro posset per potentiam divinam conservari | seorsum sub minori sine tendentia ad corruptionem, etiam quantocumque tempore placeret voluntati divinae. Sed dixi quod hoc non fieret naturaliter. Et forte quod etiam hanc conclusionem intendebat Aristoteles dicendo quod entium naturalium determinata est quantitas in magnitudine et parvitate. Tertia conclusio est quod dato passo habente resistentiam est aliqua sic parva quantitas quod nullum agens corporeum sub illa quantitate vel minori posset seorsum agere in illud, quia sic posset esse parva quantitas activi quod virtus activa non excederet resistentiam illius passivi. Quarta conclusio est quod nullum corpus est minimum, quia omne corpus habet partem, | quae est minor eo. Sed tunc est fortis dubitatio utrum sit dare corpus naturale seorsum existens modo praedicto, quod sic sit minimum quod impossibile sit corpus de sua specie similiter seorsum existens esse minus. Et certum est quod per potentiam divinam potest esse minus, sed dubitatio est utrum hoc sit possibile secundum potentias naturales. Aliqui enim dicunt probabiliter quod sic non est dare minimum. Verbi gratia non est sic dare minimam carnem seorsum ab omni alia carne exis-

1 supponit] ponit P ‖ supponit] sic ponit G 4 vel] add. sub P ‖ potest naturaliter] posset naturaliter p : potest P 8 per] corr. sup. lin. ex propter C : propter G ‖ essent] esset G 9 posset] possit P : potest G 10 debilis] add. sup. lin. in C 11 magnitudinem] quantitatem P 12 minori] add. quantitate P 13 etiam] et Gp : etc. p 15 aristoteles] add. in Pp ‖ determinata] terminata Pp 17 est1] om. G ‖ dato passo] dato passo (corr. sup. lin. ex passivo) C : dato passivo G : dato aliquo passivo p : data passione P 19 posset1] potest GP ‖ posset2] potest GP ‖ activi] activa P 20 passivi] passi P 21 est1] om. GP 23 fortis] fortior Pp 28 sic] post est P 29–140.1 existentem] existente G

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tentem, quin posset esse caro minor etiam seorsum ab omni alia carne existens. Quod probatur quia: sicut prius arguebatur, illa caro est divisibilis, cum habeat partem extra partem; et si dividatur, partes apud divisionem non in instanti corrumpuntur, quia oportet esse alterationem praeviam et quia quaelibet pars habet aliquantam resistentiam quam prius oportet remitti quam esse totam corruptam. Et hoc iterum confirmatur quia: si quantumcumque parvus ignis esset in profundo maris, non posset ex eo generari aliud, scilicet aqua vel aer, nisi prius materia eius disponeretur per alterationem praeviam ad suscipiendum formam aeris vel aquae; et ille non corrumperetur, nisi aliud inde generaretur. Sed ultra: quia agens naturale ceteris paribus agit fortius in sibi propinquius quam in remotius, ideo partes exteriores illius | ignis immediatae aquae continenti et corrumpenti fortius sive velocius alterantur ab illa aqua quam pars media. Propter quod partes illae exteriores citius sunt sufficienter dispositae ad generationem alterius formae et ad corruptionem formae ignis quam pars | media. Propter quod citius corruptae sunt illae partes extremae quam media. Ideo post illud pars media adhuc manet ignis ab omni alio igne separatim existens, cum tamen sit minor quam esset ignis quem cepisti tamquam minimum, si pars sit minor toto. Sed tamen contra hanc determinationem videntur esse auctoritates Aristotelis et Commentatoris expressae in octavo huius et in libro De sensu et sensato. Nam in octavo huius dicit Aristoteles: ‘non enim, si infinitum partibile est quod alteratur, propter hoc | et alteratio, sed fit velox multotiens, ut congelatio’. Et Commentator dicit quod hic Aristoteles per ‘alterationem fieri velocem’ intendebat quod fieret subito et in instanti. Et illa glossa apparet esse manifeste de intentione Aristotelis in De sensu et sensato, ubi dicit sic: ‘non est simile in motu locali et in alteratione, quia rationabile est 1 posset] potest GP ‖ caro minor] inv. P ‖ etiam] etc. p 2 arguebatur] arguitur p 3 dividatur] add. in et add. sup. lin. ex C : dividantur Pp 4 corrumpuntur] corrumpentur P 5 quam] non sed del. P 6 et] om. P ‖ si] om. p 7 profundo] fundo GPp ‖ posset] potest GP 8 aliud scilicet] om. P 10 corrumperetur] corrumperentur P 13 alterantur] alterarentur G 15–16 propter … media] om. (hom.) p 16 media] mediae G 16–17 post … media] om. p 16 illud] add. ante P 17 ignis] add. et P 22 si] add. in p 22–23 partibile … alteratur] add. et C : est partibile P 23 fit] sit G 25 velocem intendebat] velocem (add. sed del. alterationem hoc) intendebat (add. sed del. fieri) C : velocem alterationem hic intendebat fieri G : velocitatem intendebat p ‖ glossa] om. G 26 esse] mihi P ‖ et sensato] etc. p 27 est1] esse p 22 Aristoteles, Physica, VIII, 3, 253b23–26 24 Averroes, In Physicam, VIII, comm. 23, f. 359I 26 Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato, 6, 446b28–447a3

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motum localem prius attingere ad medium, quaecumque vero alterantur, non adhuc similiter. Contingit enim totum simul alterari et non | medium prius, velut aquam simul totam congelari’. Et addit Aristoteles quod, si fuerit multum quod calefit aut quod congelatur, habitum ab habito patitur, prius autem ab ipso faciente transmutari necesse est, et simul alterari et subito. Et ex istis dictis apparet fuisse intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris quod in alteratione et generatione et corruptione est dare primam partem quae tota simul generatur, corrumpitur vel alteratur, et non medietas prius. Et haec dicta videntur tenere ex eo quod dicit Commentator fuisse de intentione Aristotelis quod agentia naturalia necesse est esse terminata in qualitate et quantitate ad hoc quod possint agere, ita quod ad agendum non sufficit quantuscumque excessus agentis super resistentiam, sed requiritur determinatus, qui cum fuerit, sequitur actio, et cum non fuerit, non sequitur. Similiter dato determinato agente non quaecumque virtus potest resistere illi, sed est devenire ad tantam parvitatem quod non amplius resistit, et est tunc alteratio vel generatio vel corruptio illius totius simul. Sed tamen videtur mihi quod haec omnia dicta sunt sine aliqua probatione, si sint dicta ad intentionem ad quam nunc ea recitavimus. Et posset glossari dictum Aristotelis quod contingit totum alterari ut congelari simul et non medium prius, quod hoc est verum | dividendo alterabile secundum superficialem divisionem solum, scilicet secundum longitudinem vel latitudinem superficiei | secundum quam agens tangit passum, quia sic unum corpus potest tangere alterum secundum quamlibet partem eius simul et sic simul agere in quamlibet partem eius, non prius in unam quam in aliam. Sed

1 localem] locum P 1–2 prius … simul] †…†us attingere ad medium quaecumque †…† alterantur non adhuc similiter simpliciter †…†git enim totum simul in marg. C 1 attingere] intelligere p 3 velut aquam simul] vel aquam vel P ‖ fuerit] fuit p 4 quod2] om. P ‖ habito] habitu P 5 faciente] patiente p ‖ necesse est] om. G ‖ et1] etiam P : om. p ‖ subito] add. sup. lin. seu cito C 6 et1] om. GPp ‖ istis] post dictis G : his P ‖ et commentatoris] om. G 8 generatur] add. vel Pp 9 ex] om. p 9–10 de intentione] intentionem G 10 est esse] inv. p ‖ terminata] determinata G 11 possint] possunt G : posuit p 12 super] per C 13 sequitur2] add. et Pp 14 determinato] add. de P ‖ quaecumque] quandocumque P 15 devenire] evenire G 17 omnia] om. G ‖ sunt] add. omnino G 18 ad1] add. eam p ‖ ea] ego G 19 ut] ut (?) corr. ex et C : et P 20 quod] corr. in et C ‖ dividendo] add. sup. lin. alias capiendo C 21 superficialem divisionem] inv. P : divisiones superficiales p ‖ solum] add. in marg. simul alias C ‖ scilicet] om. G 22 tangit] tangeret p 23 potest] posset G ‖ alterum] aliud G 24 non] add. enim P 3 Aristoteles, De sensu et sensato, 6, 447a3–7 9 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, VIII, comm. 23, f. 359H–I

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si fit divisio secundum profunditatem seu trinam dimensionem, tunc unum corpus non tangit alterum secundum omnes eius partes, sed solum secundum unam; ideo prius et fortius agit in illam et mediante illa consequenter in aliam, cum necesse sit actionem corporis in corpus fieri per contactum. De rationibus quae in principio quaestionis fiebant apparet satis ex praedictis conclusionibus quomodo procedant. Exponendae enim sunt auctoritates secundum exigentiam dictarum conclusionum. Et sic est finis quaestionis. 1 si fit] sic si P ‖ seu] sive P 3 consequenter] ante mediante Pp 4 cum necesse sit] coniuncte secundum p 5 rationibus] add. autem GPp 6 procedant] procedunt Pp 7 dictarum] om. p 8 et … quaestionis] et sic est P : sequitur alia quaestio p : etc. G

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⟨i.14⟩

⟨Utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sint contraria⟩

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Quaeritur quarto decimo utrum cuiuslibet transmutationis naturalis principia intrinseca sunt contraria. Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Aristoteles dat regulam quod principia non debent fieri ex alterutris; et tamen dicit contraria fieri ex alterutris, ut album ex nigro, musicum ex immusico (et ita per inductionem dicit esse in omnibus quae fiunt). ⟨2⟩ Item ipse dat aliam regulam quod principia oportet permanere; et contraria non manent, immo uno adveniente | alterum corrumpitur propter incompossibilitatem. ⟨3⟩ Item ipse dat aliam regulam quod omnia debent fieri ex primis principiis; et tu nulla posses assignare contraria ex quibus omnia fierent. Ubi enim essent, utrum in aere vel in terra vel in caelo vel in mari, non potest dici, immo multa fiunt non habentia contraria, ut lumen, figura, substantiae et quantitates, quibus nihil est contrarium, ut dicitur in Praedicamentis. ⟨4⟩ Item Aristoteles sic arguit: principia substantiarum debent esse substantiae; et contraria non sunt substantiae, ut | dicitur in Praedicamentis; igitur etc.

4 naturalis] in marg. C : om. GPp 6 arguitur] praem. et G 7 debent] add. in marg. dicuntur C 8 dicit … alterutris] contraria fiunt ex alterutris ut dicit P 9 omnibus] aliis P 10 permanere] manere Pp 11 adveniente] veniente p ‖ corrumpitur] abicitur Pp 14 tu] cum p ‖ posses] possis P ‖ omnia] alia P 15 non potest] nullum posset p 17 et] om. Gp 19–21 item … etc.] om. P 21 igitur etc.] om. Gp 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 5, 188a27–28 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 5, 188a35–b23 10 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 6, 189a19 13 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 5, 188a27–28; cf. AA, 2: 20 17–18 Cf. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 5, 3b24–31; 6, 5b11 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 6, 189a32–34 20 Cf. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 5, 3b24

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_018

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⟨5⟩ Item contraria sunt in subiecto; sunt enim nata fieri circa idem subiectum successive. Sed principia non sunt in subiecto. Quod probo quia: debent esse prima aliorum; et quod est in subiecto non est prius, sed aliquid habet prius se, scilicet illud subiectum; igitur etc. ⟨6⟩ Item vel essent contraria contrarietate positiva vel contrarietate large accepta pro oppositione privativa. Non potest dici quod positiva, quia sic lumen non habet contrarium et tamen fit et transmutatur, nec privativa, quia haec non conveniret nisi generationi et corruptioni, et non motui, quia motus debent esse de affirmato in affirmatum, ut habetur quinto huius, et cum opposita privative non sunt nisi termini significativi, qui non sunt principia intrinseca | generationum naturalium, puta equorum vel plantarum. ⟨7⟩ Item Aristoteles in fine duodecimi Metaphysicae reprehendit antiquos in hoc quod dicebant principia rerum esse contraria.

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Oppositum dicit Aristoteles in principio huius.

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Notandum est quod in quinto huius distinguuntur tres species transmutationis, scilicet generatio, corruptio et motus, id est dicta tria nomina sunt species huius nominis ‘transmutatio’. ‘Generatio’ autem et ‘corruptio’ vel ‘generari’ et ‘cor|rumpi’ exponuntur per ‘esse’ et ‘non esse’ vel secundum quid vel simpliciter. Ex eo enim aliquid dicitur simpliciter generari vel fieri, quia prius non est et posterius est, et generari vel fieri album, quia prius non est album et posterius est album, et e converso de corruptione vel corrumpi. Ille autem terminus ‘motus’ vel ‘moveri’ exponitur sine negatione per duplicem affirmationem, scilicet per hoc quod est idem esse prius sub aliqua disposi-

1 enim] add. apta P 2 quod probo] probo Gp : probatio P 3 prima] principia p ‖ aliorum] add. seu principia P ‖ subiecto] alio P ‖ habet] post se (4) p 4 illud] id p 6 quod] add. oppositione G 7 fit et] sit et G : et sic P 8 haec] hoc Pp ‖ conveniret] convenirent CG ‖ quia2] quod P 9 debent] debet Pp ‖ habetur] dicitur P 10 cum] add. hoc P ‖ privative] privativa p 14 dicit] huius determinat P : tamen determinat p ‖ principio huius] primo huius p : isto primo P 15 est] om. P ‖ quinto huius] isto quinto libro sequenti P 16 est] add. sup. lin. et C ‖ tria] om. P 17 transmutatio] add. et G 18 et1] vel p 18–19 secundum … simpliciter1] simpliciter vel secundum quid p 19 ex] om. p ‖ enim aliquid dicitur] dicitur aliquid P 21 corruptione vel corrumpi] corruptione vel de corrumpi GP : generatione vel de corruptione p 9 Aristoteles, Physica, V, 1, 225b1–5 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, 10, 1075a25–b1 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 5, 188a26–28 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, V, 1, 225a1–b3

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tione et posterius sub alia illi repugnante. Et ad istam intentionem dicitur in quinto huius quod generatio est de non subiecto in subiectum et corruptio de subiecto in non subiectum et motus de subiecto in subiectum. Et Aristoteles hoc exponit dicens: ‘dico autem subiectum affirmative monstratum’. Generatio autem large sumpta dividitur in creationem et naturalem generationem, et corruptio similiter in annihilationem et corruptionem naturalem. Et differunt, quia ad hoc quod fiat generatio naturalis requiritur subiectum praesuppositum cui aliqua dispositio vel accidentalis | vel substantialis acquiritur, quae prius non inhaerebat sibi, et huiusmodi subiectum non requiritur ad creationem. Et ita etiam corruptio naturalis requirit subiectum quod maneat, a quo abicitur dispositio quam prius habebat. Deinde notandum est quod Aristoteles non loquitur in illo loco de contrarietate positiva solum, sed loquitur communiter de contrarietate, prout hoc nomen ‘contrarietas’ se extendit ad oppositionem privativam. Quod patet per inductionem quam facit, scilicet quod album fit ex nigro, musicum ex immusico et immusicum ex musico et consonans ex inconsonante etc. Modo nos supponimus ad praesens quod privative opposita non sunt nisi termini significativi. Et tunc est fortis dubitatio quomodo talia contraria possunt dici principia generationum vel corruptionum naturalium, utputa equi vel plantae etc. Et ego breviter respondeo quod nullius generationis substantialis principia intrinseca sunt contraria. Et haec sit prima conclusio. Quae probatur quia: si per ‘contraria’ intelligas | terminos significativos, illi non sunt de integritate substantiae equi vel plantae vel alterius substantiae; et si loquimur de contrarietate reali, sicut caliditas et frigiditas dicuntur contraria, sic substan-

2 in1] om. P 3 in2] add. non Pp 4–5 monstratum] demonstratum Pp 5–6 creationem … generationem] creationem et generationem naturalem Gp : generationem naturalem et creationem P 7 fiat] sit GPp 9 acquiritur quae] sequitur quia P ‖ inhaerebat] inhaeret P : inerat p ‖ huiusmodi] huius GP 15 ad] om. p 16 nigro] add. et GPp 17 immusicum ex musico] e converso P ‖ inconsonante] inconsonanti P 18 nisi] add. veri p 21 vel1] et P 22 breviter respondeo] bene dico P 23 probatur] add. sic P 24–25 integritate] add. in marg. vel intrinsecitate C : intrinseitate P : intrinsitate G : intrinsice p 25 loquimur] loquaris GPp 26 contraria] contrariae Pp 26–146.1 substantia … componitur] substantiae non habent contrarium nec componuntur p 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, V, 1, 225a1–19 4 Aristoteles, Physica, V, 1, 225a6 16–17 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 5, 188a35–b3

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tia non habet contrarium nec componitur | ex contrariis (unde licet formae substantiales elementorum essent ad invicem quodam modo contrariae, tamen supponimus hic quod non manent substantialiter simul in mixto nec per consequens in aliqua substantia); igitur nullius substantiae principia intrinseca sunt contraria; sed omnis generatio substantialis est substantia (hoc etiam supponitur hic et alias determinabitur); igitur nullius generationis substantialis principia intrinseca sunt contraria. Et pari ratione dico quod etiam nullius corruptionis substantialis principia intrinseca sunt contraria, quia suppono, sicut de generatione suppositum est, quod omnis corruptio substantialis est substantia. Tunc sit secunda conclusio quod etiam nullius generationis caliditatis | principia intrinseca sunt contraria, quia licet simul sint generatio caliditatis et corruptio frigiditatis, tamen generatio caliditatis non est nisi caliditas quae acquiritur, et corruptio frigiditatis etiam non est nisi frigiditas quae abicitur (haec omnia supponuntur hic); caliditas autem vel frigiditas non est composita ex contrariis, immo solum ex partibus gradualibus eiusdem rationis; igitur etc. Et ita diceretur de omni generatione qualitatis simplicis, scilicet quae non est composita ex qualitatibus diversarum rationum. Utrum autem motus principia intrinseca sint contraria videbitur in aliis libris. Motus enim de frigido ad calidum est bene compositus ex corruptione frigiditatis et generatione caliditatis; ideo est compositus ex frigiditate et caliditate. | Sed an illa caliditas et frigiditas sint contrariae inquiretur alias. Sed notandum est quod saepe Aristoteles capit terminos suos materialiter, et ita facit in proposito. Unde quaestio est utrum illorum terminorum ‘gene-

1 habet] dicitur habere P ‖ unde] add. et GP 2 ad] in G 4 igitur] add. sup. lin. seu quasi C 6 etiam supponitur] praesupponitur p ‖ determinabitur] declarabitur GPp 7 substantialis] om. p ‖ dico] dicitur G 8 substantialis] naturalis P 9 suppositum est] om. GPp 11 tunc … conclusio] secunda conclusio est Pp ‖ caliditatis] qualitatis p 12 licet] om. P 13 corruptio frigiditatis] frigiditas G 14 etiam] om. p 15 vel] aut P 17 igitur] om. P ‖ ita] si C 18 scilicet] om. P 19 sint] sunt GP 20 compositus] ante est P 20–21 corruptione … ex] om. (hom.) G 21–22 frigiditate et caliditate] caliditate et frigiditate Pp 22 et] aut P ‖ inquiretur] requiretur P 6 Cf. inf., I, q. 17 19–22 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, V, q. 3 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 85va–86rb); cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 3 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 42vb–44va)

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ratio’ et ‘corruptio’ et ‘motus’, qui sunt species huius nominis ‘transmutatio’, principia intrinseca sunt contraria. Et adhuc per ‘principia intrinseca’ horum nominum non debemus intelligere partes integrantes ea, sed integrantes rationes descriptivas vel expositivas illorum nominum. Et ad illum intellectum ponenda est secundum Aristotelem ista tertia conclusio quod cuiuslibet transmutationis principia intrinseca sunt contraria, id est termini per quos exponuntur nomina | transmutationum sunt contrarii capiendo ‘contrarietatem’ multum large, id est repugnantes, scilicet vel secundum contrarietatem positivam vel secundum privationem et habitum vel secundum contradictionem. Et illi termini dicuntur principia intrinseca, quia sunt de intrinsecitate et integritate rationum vel descriptionum quibus illa nomina exponuntur. Ista conclusio ad illum sensum probatur ex prius dictis quia: oportet istos terminos ‘generatio’ et ‘corruptio’ exponere per istos terminos ‘esse’ et ‘non esse’, qui sunt repugnantes. Et oportet istum terminum ‘motus’, prout est species mutationis distincta contra istas species generatio et corruptio, exponere per terminos significantes dispositiones repugnantes. Motus enim est transmutatio de una dispositione in aliam sibi repugnantem. Modo isti termini vel illae orationes repugnant, scilicet ‘esse dispositum aliqua dispositione’ et ‘esse dispositum alia dispositione illi repugnante’. Et descendendo magis ad specialia ‘albatio’, prout est species motus, describitur quod est mutatio de nigro ad album vel de nigredine ad albedinem. Si autem ‘albatio’ caperetur prout est species generationis, tunc describeretur quod est transmutatio de non albo ad album vel de non esse album ad esse album. Sed iterum notandum est quod potest poni alia conclusio, quae etiam est de intentione Aristotelis in illo loco, et non est illa | conclusio de transmutatione, sed de illo quod transmutatur. Propter quod notandum est quod, cum omnis transmutatio sit generatio vel corruptio vel motus, qui est simul generatio vel corruptio, duo necessa-

2 et] om. p ‖ adhuc per] ad hoc quod G : addit per P 3 debemus] habemus p 4 illorum] horum G ‖ nominum] add. transmutationis p 5 intellectum] sensum Pp 8 scilicet] corr. in marg. in secundum se C 9 privationem] contrarietatem privativam C 11 intrinsecitate] intrinseitate P : intrinsitate p 13 exponere] exponi p 14 repugnantes] add. scilicet vel secundum contrarietatem positivam vel secundum privationem et habitum vel secundum contradictionem p 16 et] om. P 19 et] add. non C 20 descendendo] descendo G ‖ albatio] alteratio p 21 de2] ex P 22 albatio] dealbatio p 23 ad] in P 25 iterum notandum est] notandum P ‖ quae etiam] inv. Pp 27 illo] eo Pp 29 est simul] inv. GPp ‖ vel3] et Pp 29–148.1 necessaria] necessario Pp

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ria | concurrunt ad generationem vel corruptionem naturalem et per consequens ad omnem transmutationem naturalem, licet non ad creationem. Quae quidem duo et quodlibet eorum dicitur fieri et corrumpi, et etiam compositum ex eis dicitur | fieri vel corrumpi, etiam eadem factione et corruptione. Nam secundum praedicta requiritur subiectum ad differentiam creationis. Et illud dicitur fieri non simpliciter, sed cum additione, quia dicitur fieri tale vel tantum vel taliter se habens, ut quod homo fit albus et materia prima fit formata forma aeris qua ante non erat formata, et corrumpitur formata forma aquae qua ante erat formata, id est desinit | vel cessat esse formata illa forma. Deinde requiritur dispositio quae illi subiecto acquiritur vel ab eo abicitur. Et illa etiam dicitur fieri vel corrumpi, quia est, cum ante non esset, vel quia fit illi subiecto adhaerens, cum ante sibi non adhaerebat; et sic de corruptione vel de desinere esse. Et similiter etiam illud compositum vel congregatum ex huiusmodi subiecto et dispositione dicitur fieri, quia est, cum ante non esset, vel quia est compositum ex illis, cum ante non esset compositum ex eis, vel saltem est taliter ex eis compositum vel congregatum, qualiter non erat ante. Tunc igitur manifestum quod illud quod fit tamquam subiectum praesuppositum non oportet quod habeat principia intrinseca diversarum rationum ex quibus integratur, immo in transmutatione substantiali est simplex materia prima. Similiter illud quod fit tamquam dispositio quae illi subiecto acquiritur non oportet quod habeat principia intrinseca diversarum rationum ex quibus integratur, quia forte est forma simplex substantialis vel accidentalis. Sed illud quod fit tamquam compositum ex eis habet principia intrinseca ex quibus integratur; quae sunt illud subiectum et illa dispositio quae sibi acquiritur. Deinde manifestum est quod etiam ad exponendum hoc nomen ‘generatio’ vel ‘generari’ requiruntur tria nomina supponentia pro illis principiis, scilicet pro subiecto praesupposito et pro forma vel dispositione quae sibi acquiritur. Exponitur enim, quia generatio vel generari est in subiecto formam talem prius non inesse et posterius inesse. Ibi igitur ponitur hoc nomen ‘subiectum’ ad differentiam creationis, quae hoc non requirit. Et ponitur hoc 3 dicitur] dicuntur p 4 eadem factione et] eadem factione vel P : factione eadem vel p 6 dicitur] debet P 9 formata1] sup. lin. C : om. P ‖ ante erat] inv. p 11 illa] ita P 12 adhaerebat] adhaeret G : adhaereret Pp 14 huiusmodi] huius P 15 esset] est P ‖ illis] eis P 16 taliter] ante saltem p 17 erat] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 18 igitur manifestum] add. est Gp : manifestum est igitur P 20 integratur] integretur Pp ‖ simplex] simpliciter p 21 materia prima] inv. Pp 23 integratur] integretur Pp ‖ simplex] add. vel Pp 28 generari] generationem P 29 pro2] om. p 30 est] om. P

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nomen ‘forma’ vel ‘formam inesse’, quod supponit pro illa dispositione quae acquiritur. Et ponitur etiam hoc nomen ‘formam non inesse in illo subiecto’ et hoc aequivalet huic nomini ‘privatio’ vel ‘privatum’, quod supponit pro illo subiecto. Idem enim est privatio et materia privata, ut dicetur post. Et manifestum est quod istorum trium nominum duo opponuntur ad invicem privative, scilicet ‘forma’ et ‘privatio’ vel ‘formam inesse tali subiecto’ et ‘formam ei non inesse’. | Tertium autem nulli opponitur, scilicet hoc nomen ‘subiectum’ vel ‘materia’. Tunc ergo secundum Aristotelem poneretur haec quarta conclusio quod omnis | eius quod transmutatur per modum compositi ex subiecto et eo quod sibi acquiritur vel abicitur, principia sunt contraria, id est nominantur per nomina contraria pro ipsis supponentia, requisita ad exponendum | vel exprimendum nomen et rationem transmutationis, scilicet generationis vel corruptionis. Illa conclusio patet ex dictis, quia illa nomina contraria sunt ‘forma’ et ‘privatio’ vel nomina aequivalentia. Et verum est quod cum illis nominibus requiritur aliud nomen quod nulli est contrarium sive oppositum, scilicet hoc nomen ‘subiectum’ vel ‘materia’. Et ideo be|ne dicit Aristoteles indefinite loquendo quod principia, id est nomina principiorum, sunt contraria, scilicet illa nomina ‘forma’ et ‘privatio’, et quod etiam principia, id est nomina principiorum, non sunt contraria, scilicet illa nomina ‘forma’ et ‘subiectum’. Nunc ergo dicendum est ad rationes. Et quamvis illae non concludant contra illa quae dicta sunt, tamen exponendae sunt aliquae auctoritates in eis allegatae. ⟨1⟩ Quando enim dicit Aristoteles quod principia non debent fieri ex alterutris, hoc sic debet intelligi quod unum principiorum non debet fieri essentialiter ex altero, scilicet tamquam ex parte integrante ipsum. Tamen termi-

1 quod] quia G 2 formam non inesse] forma non esse P ‖ in illo] illi G 4 enim] om. p ‖ post] om. G 5 trium] termini p 6 tali] illi GPp 9 ergo] om. P ‖ poneretur haec] poneretur ista Gp : ponetur ista P 11 principia] add. intrinseca P 18 indefinite] indeterminate p : indistincte P : indefinito G ‖ id est] et CG 18–20 sunt … principiorum] om. (hom.) P 20–21 forma et subiectum] subiectum et forma GPp 22 nunc … rationes] add. principales G : tunc ergo dicendum est ad rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis p : tunc ad rationes est dicendum quae fiebant in principio quaestionis P ‖ illae] illa P 23 illa] ea Pp ‖ eis] his P 25 debent] dicuntur P 27 scilicet] sed p 4 Cf. inf., I, q. 23, 2265

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native vel subiective dicimus bene ex privatione vel subiecto fieri formam, id est in subiecto prius privato fieri formam. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam conceditur quod principia intrinseca rei manent in illa re. Sed tamen unum illorum principiorum nominabatur ante generationem tali nomine quo postea non nominatur. Erat enim ante privatio et post non est privatio. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod omne quod fit per modum compositi, ut prius dicebatur, fit essentialiter ex suis principiis, scilicet ex subiecto praesupposito et forma quae sibi acquiritur. Sed tamen nulla sunt principia ex quibus fiat omne quod fit, immo ex aliis et aliis principiis ego et tu facti sumus. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod contraria non sunt substantiae. Sed tamen nomina contraria sive privative opposita bene supponunt pro principiis quae sunt substantiae. ⟨5⟩ Et eodem modo potest dici ad aliam. Sed cum hoc etiam dicendum est quod forma, licet sit in materia tamquam in subiecto, tamen ipsa bene est unum principium, quia quamvis materia sit prior ipsa forma uno modo et sic sit causa et principium, tamen forma etiam est prior alio modo ipsa materia et sic etiam ipsa est causa et principium. Unde dictum est in secundo huius quod causae sunt sibi invicem causae. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam bene concessum est quod eius quod fit principia intrinseca non sunt contraria, sed bene significantur per nomina contraria sive privative opposita. ⟨7⟩ Ad ultimam dicitur quod Aristoteles in libro duodecimo Metaphysicae | loquebatur de principiis entium omnino primis. Sic enim dixit non esse principia contraria, sed unum solum. Unde concludendo | dixit: ‘unus igitur princeps’. Et sic est finis quaestionis. | 3 aliam] secundam p ‖ rei] sup. lin. C : om. G 4 nominabatur] corr. ex denominabatur C : denominabitur G 5 est] om. p 7 aliam dicitur] aliam dico P : tertiam dico p 8 dicebatur] dicitur p ‖ scilicet] om. p 9 acquiritur] add. igitur etc. P 10 fiat] constat P ‖ et aliis] om. P 11 aliam] quartam p 12 contraria] contrarie p ‖ privative] privatione P 14 et] om. G ‖ sed] et P ‖ dicendum] sciendum P 16–17 sic sit] sic G : sit p 17 alio modo] post materia P 18 etiam] om. P ‖ unde] ut P ‖ secundo] primo P 20 aliam] sextam p 21 sive] seu p : sicut P 23 dicitur] dico Pp ‖ libro] om. Pp 23–24 metaphysicae] om. p 24 dixit] dicit p 25 dixit] dicit p 27 et … quaestionis] etc. Gp : om. P 18 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 3, 195a8–9; cf. AA, 2: 68 10, 1076a3

25–26 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII,

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⟨Utrum necesse sit omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito⟩

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Quaeritur quinto decimo utrum necesse est omne quod fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito. Vel alii formant sic quaestionem: utrum possibile est ex nihilo aliquid fieri? Arguitur quod ex nihilo potest aliquid fieri quia: ⟨1⟩ Omnes concedunt Deum esse omnipotentem; et non esset omnipotens, si non posset aliquid facere ex nihilo. ⟨2⟩ Item Deus est infinitae virtutis et infinitus et omne aliud ens est finitum et virtutis finitae. Infinita autem virtus potest effectum reducere de infinita distantia ad actum, et hoc non esset, nisi de nihilo faceret ens. Non enim est infinita distantia de aliquo ente ad aliud ens, cum utrumque sit finitum, ut dictum est. ⟨3⟩ Item agens includens virtualiter omnem perfectionem etiam excellentiori et perfectiori et potentiori modo quam possit alibi inveniri, potest tantum solus, quantum cum quocumque alio; Deus autem sic omnem perfectionem includit; igitur si potest cum caelo et materia et aliis pluribus facere aliquid, puta unam animam, ipse potest eam facere sine illis. ⟨4⟩ Item agens perfectius debet minus supponere ad agendum quam agens imperfectius. Verbi gratia, quia ars est agens minus perfectum quam natura, ideo plus supponit quam natura. Natura enim supponit solum materiam primam, ex qua facit compositum substantiale; ars autem non operatur nisi circa ens in actu per se subsistens. Cum igitur Deus sit agens valde perfectius quam natura, sequitur quod ipse minus indiget supponere. Igitur potest agere | sine materia praesupposita.

5 alii … quaestionem] aliter alii formant quaestionem p : sic P 9 aliquid facere] inv. GPp 13 est] om. P 16 et … potentiori] et potentiori GP : om. p ‖ possit] add. etiam G 17 cum] om. P 17–18 perfectionem] rep. G 18 caelo et] caelorum G 19 unam animam] inv. P ‖ eam] illam G 20 debet minus] inv. Pp 21 minus perfectum] imperfectius G 22 supponit1] ponit P ‖ quam natura] in marg. C : natura G : om. p ‖ supponit2] ponit P 23 facit] format P ‖ autem] enim CPp 24 subsistens] existens P

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⟨5⟩ Iterum materia prima fit; ipsa enim est quae in rei veritate generatur, ut dicit Commentator. Et tamen ipsa non fit ex aliquo. ⟨6⟩ Item forma etiam fit, quia est, cum ante non esset; et non fit ex aliquo, licet fiat in aliquo. ⟨7⟩ Item ex privatione fit illud quod fit tamquam ex termino a quo; et tamen privatio est per se non ens, ut dicit Aristoteles; igitur ex non ente et per consequens ex nihilo fit aliquid. ⟨8⟩ Item primo De generatione arguitur sic: sicut generatio alicuius entis secundum quid fit ex aliquo non ente secundum quid, ut albi ex non albo, ita generatio alicuius entis simpliciter debet esse ex non ente simpliciter; et hoc est ex nihilo. ⟨9⟩ Item argumento antiquorum quia: cum ens fiat, vel fit ex non ente, et habetur propositum, vel ex ente, et hoc est impossibile (si enim ens fieret ex ente, iam esset, antequam fieret). 20ra G 25va C

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Oppositum patet per Aristotelem | in illo primo libro dicentem quod de hac opinione convenerunt omnes qui de natura sive naturaliter locuti sunt, quod impossibile | est aliquid fieri ex eo quod non est. Dicit etiam manifestum esse quoniam semper oportet aliquid subici quod fit. Ista quaestio continet plures difficultates | et naturales et logicales et etiam theologicas. Pluribus enim modis formatur illa quaestio bene differentibus ab invicem. Unus est utrum ex nihilo potest aliquid fieri vel etiam utrum ex non ente potest aliquid fieri. Et si negatio sit negans, manifestum est quod illa propositio est falsa ‘ex nihilo potest aliquid fieri’, quia eius contradictoria est vera, scilicet ‘ex aliquo potest aliquid fieri’ vel ‘ex ente potest aliquid fieri’. Si vero illa negatio expressa vel implicita sit negatio infinitans solum, tunc illae propositiones sunt affirmativae ‘ex nihilo potest aliquid fieri’ et ‘ex non 1 prima] om. P 5 et] om. P 9 secundum quid1] om. GPp ‖ fit ex] fit (sup. lin.) ex C : est ex p : est in P : ex G ‖ secundum quid2] om. Gp 9–10 secundum2 … ente] om. (hom.) P 10 alicuius entis simpliciter] simpliciter entis p 12 item] add. in P 14 esset] add. ens Pp 15 patet] apparet p ‖ libro] om. P ‖ de] in G 16 convenerunt] conveniunt P 18 quoniam] quod non P 19 et1] om. G ‖ logicales] logicas Gp ‖ etiam] om. P 21 ab] ad p 24–25 contradictoria est vera] contradictorium est verum p : contradictio est vera P 2 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 60, f. 36C 6 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a6 8 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, I, 3, 317b4–6 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 8, 191a28–31 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 4, 187a27–29, 35–36; cf. AA, 2: 16 17–18 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190a33–b11

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ente potest aliquid fieri’. Valent enim istas propositiones ‘ex eo quod nihil est potest aliquid fieri’ vel ‘ex eo quod non est ens potest aliquid fieri’. Et tunc dico quod illae propositiones sunt verae, quia ex materia quae modo nihil est, sed forte Deus creabit eam cras vel potest eam creare cras, potest postea aliquid fieri. Et etiam ex aere qui modo non est, sed cras generabitur, potest iterum aliquid fieri, ut aqua vel ignis. Immo etiam, quia hoc verbum ‘potest’ ampliat suppositionem ad possibilia, videtur quod illa consequentia sit bona ‘ex illo lapide quem nunc tibi demonstro potest aliquid fieri, et ille lapis potest non esse ens vel potest nihil esse; igitur ex non ente potest aliquid fieri’. Verum est tamen quod, si tu velles exponere illam negationem infinitantem tali modo ‘ex eo quod est non ens vel ex eo quod potest esse non ens, potest aliquid fieri’, ista propositio esset falsa, quia est affirmativa et subiectum non supponeret pro aliquo, quia nihil est quod sit non ens, et nihil etiam est vel potest esse quod possit esse non ens, sed bene potest non esse ens. Igitur sicut tu vis istas orationes exponere diversimode, ita diversimode dicas eas esse veras vel falsas. Secundus modus quaerendi est utrum possibile est ex nihilo aliquid fieri vel etiam utrum possibile est ex non ente aliquid fieri. Haec enim quaestio et praecedens de qua prius dictum est differunt sicut composita et divisa. Et sensus huius quaestionis est utrum haec est possibilis ‘ex nihilo aliquid fit’ vel ‘ex non ente aliquid fit’. Et videtur mihi quod, si negatio sit negans, tunc illa est possibilis ‘ex nihilo aliquid fit’ saltem per potentiam divinam, quia haec est possibilis ‘nihil fit’ (Deus enim posset omnia conservare in quiete sine aliqua mutatione, et tunc nihil fieret); et tamen sequitur ‘nihil fit, | igitur ex nihilo aliquid fit’. Probatio: ex contradictorio consequentis sequitur contradictorium antecedentis, verbi gratia sequitur ‘ex aliquo aliquid fit, igitur aliquid fit’. | Sed si negatio sit infinitans in illa propositione ‘ex non ente fit aliquid’, tunc est sensus vel quod ex eo quod est non ens fit aliquid, vel ‘ex eo quod 1 istas] istae p 2 et tunc] add. ego P : ego p 3 modo] om. G 5 qui modo] qui p : quae P 6 iterum] om. P ‖ ut] vel G ‖ quia] quod CP 7 suppositionem] supponere p ‖ consequentia] post bona Pp 8 nunc tibi] tibi non P 11 tu] om. p 12 ex eo quod2] ex eo sed del. G 14 et] vel p 15 ens1] add. quia nihil est quod sit non ens et nihil possit esse quod possit esse non ens P ‖ bene] om. G ‖ non esse] inv. P 16 orationes] conclusiones P : rationes p 20–21 et2 … quaestionis] sensus utriusque propositionis P 21–22 haec … vel] ex nihilo aliquid fit vel utrum haec est possibilis P 23–24 ex … fit1] in marg. C : om. G 24 nihil fit] vel sic P 25 in] om. p 26 sequitur] sequeretur P ‖ aliquid fit] inv. p 26–27 probatio] add. quia Gp : probatur quia P 30 quod1] om. p

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non est ens fit aliquid’. | Et prima expositio est falsa, quia implicat contradictionem, scilicet quod aliquid est non ens. Haec | enim est impossibilis ‘aliquid sive praesens sive praeteritum sive futurum est non ens’. Sed secunda expositio est dubitabilis. Haec enim est possibilis, quod equus fit ex materia et forma, et sic similiter illa est vera, quod ex materia et forma fit aliquid, scilicet ille equus. Dubitabile autem est utrum equus est vel non est, quando ipse fit; et hoc alias tractabitur. Si equus est, quando fit, tunc illa est falsa ‘ex eo quod non est fit equus’, quia ipse non fit nisi ex materia et forma, quarum utraque est. Et si equus non est, quando fit, tunc haec est vera, quod ex eo quod non est fit equus, quia fit ex sua forma, quae non est, si equus non est. Alius modus quaerendi est utrum aliquid potest fieri ex non ente. Et tunc de virtute sermonis negatio est infinitans et non negans, cum sequatur copulam. Et etiam propter illud verbum ‘potest’ illud praedicatum ‘non ente’ ampliatur ad supponendum pro his quae possunt esse. Ideo sensus est quod aliquid potest fieri ex eo quod nec est ens nec potest esse ens, et hoc est impossibile. Vel saltem sensus est quod aliquid potest fieri ex eo quod est non ens vel potest esse non ens, et hoc totum est impossibile. Alius modus quaerendi est utrum possibile est aliquid fieri ex non ente, hoc est dictu utrum haec est possibilis ‘aliquid fit ex non ente’. Et tunc, si exponatur quod aliquid fit ex eo quod est non ens, apparet quod est impossibilis. Et si exponatur quod aliquid fit ex eo quod non est ens, tunc est dubitabilis, sicut dicebatur prius.

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2–3 aliquid] aliquod G 5 sic] om. G 6 ille] om. P 8 fit1] hic P 9 tunc] add. est C 10 quae] et haec P 12 de] om. Pp ‖ sequatur] sequitur p 14 ampliatur] ampliat p 17 hoc] om. Pp 18 alius … est1] quartus modus etiam quaerendi est p : tunc sequitur alius modus quaerendi P 20 est non] inv. C 20–21 apparet … impossibilis] om. P 21 non est] inv. C 26 ex] ens p : om. P ‖ bene] om. G 28 notaret] notat P ‖ integraliter] praem. in marg. integraretur seu C : integraretur P : integratur p

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fieret illud quod fieret. Nec curo hic loqui de eo quod fit subiective, sicut diceremus materiam fieri sub tali forma vel hominem fieri album, quia tali non attribuitur ille modus loquendi ‘fieri ex aliquo’, sed ille modus ‘fieri tale vel tantum vel taliter se habens’. Sed quaereretur de eo quod fit sic, quia prius non est et ipsum posterius est, utrum igitur necesse est omne quod sic fit fieri ex subiecto praesupposito ex quo vel in quo fiat. Et tunc pono duas conclusiones. Prima est quod possibile est aliquid fieri sine subiecto praesupposito ex quo vel in quo fiat. Et hanc conclusionem credo fide et non aliqua probatione nisi auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae | et doctorum fidei catholicae. Sic enim Deus fecit et creavit angelum et caelum et mundum. | Et hanc conclusionem intendunt qui dicunt posse aliquid fieri ex nihilo vel etiam ex nihilo aliquid posse fieri. Secunda conclusio est quod necesse est omne quod fit naturaliter fieri ex subiecto praesupposito vel in subiecto praesupposito; forma enim non fit integraliter ex subiecto praesupposito, sed in eo. Sed tamen non puto quod haec conclusio sit demonstrabilis, sed est declarabilis per inductionem in qua non inventa est instantia. Sic eam probat Aristoteles et tale debet reputari principium in scientia naturali. Aliter enim tu non potes probare quod omnis ignis est calidus, quod omne reubarbarum est purgativum cholerae vel omnis magnes vel adamas est attractivus ferri. Et tales inductiones non sunt demonstra|tiones, quia non concludunt gratia formae, cum non sit possibile inducere in omnibus suppositis, sicut dicitur secundo Posteriorum quod multa principia indemonstrabilia fiunt nobis manifesta sensu, memoria vel experientia. Experientia enim ex multis sensationibus et memoriis deducta non est aliud quam inductio in multis singularibus, per quam intellectus non videns instantiam nec rationem instandi cogitur ex eius natu1 hic] etiam Pp 4 quaereretur] quaeritur GPp 4–5 prius … ipsum] ipsum prius non est et p : ipsum prius non est P : prius non est et G 5 sic fit] inv. GP 6 fiat] fit G 7 tunc] add. ego p 8 prima] una GP 10 nisi] add. hoc p 12 posse aliquid] inv. G 12–13 aliquid posse] inv. GPp 16 sed1] add. fit P 17 sit] est P ‖ declarabilis] declaranda P 18 non inventa] inv. P ‖ eam probat] enim probat eam GP : probat enim eam p ‖ et] quod P 18–19 debet reputari] inv. Gp : reputari debet per P 19 potes] posses p 20 est1] sit P 20–21 cholerae vel] colore quod Pp 21 magnes vel adamas] adamas vel magnes G 22 sunt … formae] non concludunt gratia formae quia non sunt demonstrationes P ‖ concludunt] concludit G 23 suppositis] positis P ‖ sicut … posteriorum] in secundo posteriorum dicitur P 24 quod] quia G ‖ fiunt] fiant P 25 vel] et G ‖ experientia enim] experimento enim G : experientia p ‖ sensationibus et] significationibus et p : sensationibus P 27 non] add. est P 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Analytica posteriora, II, 19, 100a3–9, 100b3–5; cf. AA, 35: 125

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rali inclinatione ad veritatem concedere propositionem universalem. Et qui non vult tales declarationes concedere in scientia naturali et morali, non est dignus habere in eis magnam partem. Sed tu dices quod, quamvis appareat mihi quod numquam fit ignis nisi ex lignis vel straminibus vel aliquibus aliis corporibus, tamen non apparet mihi quod illa | ligna sint subiecta in huiusmodi transmutationibus. Respondeo quod hoc iterum infertur, quia non apparet ratio vel necessitas aliqua quare talia requirerentur praevia, nisi aliquid de substantia eorum converteretur in illud quod fit et maneret in eo, et illud est subiectum sive materia. Propter quod Aristoteles concludit compositionem tam in eo quod fit, quia aliquid acquiritur, quam in eo ex quo fit, quia aliquid corrumpitur, et est aliud quod in utroque manet. Aliter nulla esset necessitas quod illud quod fit fieret ex alio praesupposito. Verum est quod Commentator laboravit ad demonstrandum aliter dictam conclusionem. Immo laboravit contra fidem nostram et veritatem ad demonstrandum quod impossibile est etiam per potentiam divinam aliquid fieri sine subiecto praesupposito. Et fuit prima ratio eius quia: non potest esse generatio substantialis sine motu alterationis praevio; et non est possibile esse motum, nisi sit aliquid quod moveatur, et hoc est subiectum praesuppositum. Et haec ratio concedenda est tamquam bona de factione vel generatione naturali, sed de miraculosa creatione omnes praemissae sunt falsae. Secunda ratio Commentatoris fuit quia: si sine subiecto praesupposito aliquid fieret, sequeretur quod impossibile fieri fieret, quod est negandum. Consequentia probatur quia: | si illud esset possibile fieri, oporteret | dicere in quo fundaretur illa possibilitas et quae res illa esset. Illa enim possibilitas non fundaretur in agente, scilicet in Deo. Deus enim non est possibilis fieri, sed potens facere. Aliquid enim non dicitur possibile fieri nisi secundum potentiam passivam, quae non est in Deo. Nec fundaretur

1 propositionem universalem] inv. G 3 habere] post eis G 4 dices quod] dicis quod p : dicis G : diceres P 5 vel1] et G 6 sint] sunt P ‖ in huiusmodi] et eiusmodi P 7 hoc] om. P 8 requirerentur] requireretur p 9 maneret] manet P ‖ est] om. P 12 et] etiam P 13 alio] aliquo P 15 et] add. contra p 19 sit aliquid] inv. G 20 est] add. iam GPp ‖ et2] om. P 21 vel] add. de p 22 praemissae] expresse P ‖ sunt falsae] inv. p 23 fuit quia] fuit quod G : quia p 24 sequeretur] sequitur p : sed P 25 quia] rep. G 10 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b10–13 18 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 62, f. 37F–I 23 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 71, f. 42A–C

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in eo quod fieret, quia illud nihil est adhuc, quando ipsum possibile est fieri. Igitur non esset in quo posset fundari, si non esset subiectum praesuppositum in quo fundaretur. Immo quod plus est, si loquamur de prima creatura, ut si dicamus Deum creasse primum angelum, ille angelus, antequam fieret, non erat possibilis fieri, quia nulla erat possibilitas ad ipsum fieri. Probatio quia: illa non erat Deus (Deus enim non est potentia ad fieri, sed ad facere) nec erat alia res, quia ponimus quod nihil tunc erat nisi Deus. Sed ego dico quod ista ratio tota est soluta. Supponit enim quod possibilitas ad angelum fieri sit aliqua res, sed hoc non est verum, sed potest esse aliqua res, scilicet ille angelus. Cum enim dico ‘angelus potest fieri’, hoc nomen ‘angelus’ et haec oratio ‘posse fieri’ | vel etiam haec oratio ‘possibilitas ad angelum fieri’ non supponit nisi pro illo angelo, qui non est, sed potest fieri. Et ideo in nullo fundatur et nihil est, sed erit ille angelus. Ille igitur angelus, qui nihil est, potest fieri et est possibilis et est possibilitas ad fieri, sed nec illud possibile est nec illud posse fieri est nec possibilitas ad fieri est. Tertia ratio Commentatoris: sequeretur quod esset transmutatum sine transmutatione, quod est impossibile. Consequentia patet, quia quod est factum, cum ante non esset, est transmutatum, et tamen numquam erat transmutatio. Cum enim Deus | fecit primum angelum, ipse Deus non erat transmutatio. Nec angelus, quando fiebat, erat transmutatio, quia nondum erat; ideo nec erat transmutatio nec aliud. Nec potest dari aliud quod esset transmutatio, quia nihil erat nisi Deus, ut dicit adversarius, et postquam angelus factus erat, non amplius erat eius factio vel transmutatio. Ideo patet quod angelus esset factus vel transmutatus absque hoc quod umquam esset eius factio vel transmutatio. Et omnino videtur Commentatori impossibile quod sit transmutatio, nisi sit aliquid quod transmutetur. Et tota difficultas in ista ratione Commentatoris est in sciendo pro quo supponit hoc nomen ‘transmutatio’ vel ‘generatio’ vel ‘corruptio’ vel ‘factio’ vel ‘creatio’, et maxime de transmutationibus indivisibilibus et instantaneis,

1 possibile est] inv. GPp 6 illa] ille G ‖ enim] om. P 9 soluta] ante est P : sophistica p 10 sed1] et Pp 12 fieri] add. angelum p ‖ etiam] om. P 15 qui] quando p ‖ possibilis … ad] possibilitas ad fieri et est possibilis P 16 ad] aliquid C 18 sequeretur] est sequitur Pp 22 fiebat] add. non p 25 eius] om. P ‖ vel transmutatio] et transmutatio GP : vel terminatio p 26 umquam] numquam CP 27 transmutatio] terminatio p ‖ commentatori] commentari p 30 transmutatio] terminatio p 31 et2] sive Pp 18 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 71, f. 42B

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et utrum differunt factio et factum et creatio et creatum, et quomodo. Et de his omnibus declarabitur post. Quarta ratio Commentatoris fuit quia: sequeretur quod res habuit aliquam dis|positionem quam numquam habuit, quod est impossibile. Consequentia patet, quia ex quo a est et prius non erat, ipsum aliquando fiebat; ideo aliquando | illam dispositionem quae vocatur fieri habuit; sed tamen, si non erat subiectum praesuppositum, nihil assignari potest quod illam dispositionem habuit, quia a non habuit illam, antequam esset, nec etiam quando erat, quia tunc non fiebat, sed erat factum. Et difficultas istius rationis sicut praecedentis solvitur in sciendo pro quo vel pro quibus supponunt illa nomina ‘factio’, ‘fieri’, ‘creatio’, ‘creari’ et huiusmodi. De quibus dicetur post. Quinta ratio Commentatoris est quia: si aliquid fieret sine subiecto praesupposito, hoc esset a Deo sine mediatione agentium | naturalium, et hoc credit Commentator esse impossibile propter immutabilitatem voluntatis divinae. Et ista ratio perscrutabitur in octavo huius. Sed tunc, sicut dixi, quamvis sit verum et firmiter credendum quod Deus etiam potest entia facere et creare ex nihilo, id est sine subiecto praesupposito in quod agat, immo primum subiectum, scilicet primam materiam, ipse creavit, tamen hoc non credo esse mihi demonstratum vel demonstrabile per rationes ex sensatis ortum habentes. Unde credo quod rationes quae ad hoc fiebant in principio quaestionis non sunt demonstrativae. Ideo videndum est qualiter solvisset eas Aristoteles et Commentator.

1 et3] vel Pp ‖ et6] om. P 2 declarabitur] determinabitur GPp 3 sequeretur] sequitur p 5 a] om. P ‖ aliquando fiebat] ante fiebat aliquando G 6 habuit] ante illam GPp 7 nihil] vel P 11 vel pro quibus] post nomina P 11–12 creari et huiusmodi] etc. P 12 quibus] quo p 13 quia] quod Gp 14 esset] est P ‖ mediatione] iuvamine et concursu p 15 credit] credidit GPp 16 et] om. P ‖ octavo] sexto G 17 tunc] tamen GPp 18 etiam … nihilo] potest etiam entia facere et creare ex nihilo G : potest entia facere ex nihilo et creare P : entia facere et creare ex nihilo potest p 19 subiectum] corr. in marg. ex principium C : principium G 20 esse mihi] inv. P 21 unde] om. P 22 hoc] haec p 23 qualiter solvisset eas] quomodo eas solvisset p : quomodo solvisset P 2 Cf. inf., I, q. 17 3 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 71, f. 42B 12 Cf. inf., I, q. 17 13 Averroes, In Physicam, VIII, comm. 9, f. 345A–C (?) 16 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VIII, q. 2 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 109vb–110vb)

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⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod agens non dicitur omnipotens ex eo quod possit facere impossibilia fieri, vel ex eo quod possit facere possibilia fieri aliter, quam sint possibilia fieri. Deus enim non posset facere alium deum sibi aequalem. Sed ipse est omnipotens, quia ipse potest facere omnia possibilia fieri eo modo quo sunt possibilia fieri, immo omne quod fit ipse facit et omne quod fiet ipse faciet, sed hoc erit ex subiectis praesuppositis et concurrentibus aliis agentibus particularibus. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dicetur in octavo quomodo Deus est infinitus. Et absurdum est dicere quod sit infinita vel aliqua distantia de non ente ad ens. Si enim sit aliqua distantia, ipsa est ens vel entia vel inter entia. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam conceditur quod Deus est summa perfectio includens virtualiter, non formaliter, omnem aliam perfectionem. Ipse enim non est asinus, sed ipse est virtus potens facere asinum eo modo quo asinus est possibilis fieri. Quem diceret Commentator non esse possibilem fieri nisi concurrente caelo et patre et matre et materia ex qua fit. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod agens perfectius pauciora supponit supra se, sed bene supponit plura sub se. Unde Deus omnino nihil supponit supra se, caelum | autem supponit Deum supra se, id est non ageret nisi Deo perfectius et principalius agente, et ista inferiora supponunt Deum et caelum. Sed e converso est quantum ad infra. Sic enim in faciendo asinum caelum supponit patrem asini et materiam, Deus autem supponit et caelum et patrem | et materiam. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod materia fit subiective, non quod ipsa fit, cum ante non esset. | ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod forma fit in | subiecto praesupposito. ⟨7⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod privatio est ipsum subiectum praesup-

1 ad] praem. ad rationes p 2 vel] add. etiam p 3 sint] fiunt sunt P ‖ enim] om. p ‖ posset] possit Gp : potest P 4 ipse2] om. Pp 8 aliam] secundam p ‖ octavo] add. huius P 9 aliqua distantia] inv. p ‖ non ente] add. sed del. scilicet C : add. scilicet G 11 aliam] tertiam p 13 est virtus] om. p 14 diceret] dicebat p : dicit P ‖ possibilem] possibile p ‖ nisi] non p 15 matre et materia] matre G : materia p ‖ fit] corr. sup. lin. ex fiat C : fiat GPp 17 omnino nihil] inv. P 18–19 perfectius] superius Pp 19 deum et caelum] et caelum et deum p 20 infra] inferiora C ‖ in] om. P ‖ asinum] om. P 21 et2] om. GPp ‖ et3] om. P 22 materiam] matrem P : matrem et materiam G 23 aliam] quintam p ‖ quod2] quia G ‖ fit2] sit p 26–160.2 dicitur … post] dicetur post quod privatio est ipsum subiectum praesuppositum antequam forma sit sibi acquisita Pp 8 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VIII, q. 11 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 119ra–120ra)

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positum, antequam forma sit sibi acquisita. Et de hoc magis dicetur post. ⟨8⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod, si per ‘non ens simpliciter’ intelligas nullo modo ens, haec est falsa, quod ens simpliciter fiat ex non ente simpliciter. Et si per ‘non ens simpliciter’ velimus intelligere illud quod non est substantia actu per se subsistens, sic ens simpliciter conceditur fieri ex non ente simpliciter, quia ex prima materia, quae non est actu hoc aliquid per se subsistens. ⟨9⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod ens fit ex ente, sed aliud ex alio. Ideo antequam fiat ens, erat ens, et non illud quod fit, sed aliud etc.

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⟨i.16⟩

⟨Utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium, non plura nec pauciora⟩

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Quaeritur sexto decimo utrum sint tria principia rerum naturalium, non plura nec pauciora. Arguitur quod sunt plura tribus quia: ⟨1⟩ Principiata sunt plura tribus, ut homines, equi etc.; et tamen diversorum principiatorum et extra invicem existentium oportet esse diversa principia saltem intrinseca; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item dicit Aristoteles quod homo generat hominem et sol. Et sic hominis principia sunt homo et sol, sed cum illis sunt etiam principia ipsius Deus et materia et forma et privatio. ⟨3⟩ Item omnis causa est principium, ut habetur quinto Metaphysicae; et tamen quattuor distinguuntur causae in secundo huius. ⟨4⟩ Item Porphyrius dicit quod decem praedicamenta sunt decem rerum prima principia. ⟨5⟩ Item principia rerum naturalium nec sunt ideae nec sunt universalia apud animam existentia; igitur sunt singularia multiplicata in me et in te et sic de aliis; igitur sunt valde multa. ⟨6⟩ Item si quaerimus de omnino primis principiis, tunc est unum solum, scilicet Deus. Et si quaerimus de aliis, tunc sunt plurima in quolibet genere causarum.

4 quaeritur] add. consequenter G ‖ sint] sunt p : tantum sunt P ‖ naturalium] add. et Pp 6 arguitur] add. primo p ‖ tribus quia] om. P 7 principiata sunt plura] plura sunt principia P ‖ homines] add. et p : hominis P 8 principiatorum] principiorum C ‖ extra] add. se p 11 sed] et G ‖ ipsius] add. scilicet G 12 et1] ut P ‖ et2] om. P ‖ et privatio] om. G 14 tamen] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ quattuor distinguuntur causae] causae distinguuntur quattuor Pp 16 prima] om. P ‖ principia] add. ergo etc. G 17 nec1] non P 18–19 et2 … aliis] etc. P 19 igitur sunt] igitur p : ideo P 20 est] om. P 21 plurima] plura GPp 10 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 194b13; cf. AA, 2: 65 13 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 1, 1013a16–17; cf. AA, 1: 117 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 3, 194b16–195a27; cf. AA, 2: 67 15 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 6, 7 (ed. Minio-Paluello, 12)

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Deinde arguitur quod sint pauciora quam tria quia: ⟨7⟩ Non ponuntur ab Aristotele nisi materia, forma et privatio; privatio autem dicit esse idem numero cum materia. ⟨8⟩ Item Aristoteles dicit quod sufficiens est cum subiecto alterum contrariorum facere absentia et praesentia mutationem; ideo non est ponendum tertium. ⟨9⟩ Item ad agendum et patiendum sufficiunt agens et passum, si fuerint approximata. Quare ergo poneretur aliud? ⟨10⟩ Item vel quaestio quaerit de omnibus rebus naturalibus utrum tria sunt earum principia, vel quaerit de unaquaque illarum, scilicet utrum cuiuslibet sunt tria principia. Si quaerit de omnibus, non est possibile assignare tria tantum. Si quaerit de unaquaque, tunc aeris et aquae sunt duo tantum, scilicet | materia et forma. ⟨11⟩ Item si quaeritur | tam de extrinsecis quam de intrinsecis, tunc sunt quattuor, sicut sunt quattuor causae. Et si quaeritur solum de intrinsecis, | tunc sunt duo tantum, scilicet materia et forma. ⟨12⟩ Item si quaeritur de distinctione principiorum secundum rem, tunc in aere vel in aqua sunt duo tantum, scilicet materia et forma. Et si quaeritur de distinctione secundum rationem, tunc sunt valde plura, quia quaelibet res valde multis nominibus significatur distinctis secundum rationem, immo etiam Deus, qui est res simplicissima, nominatur valde multis nominibus distinctis secundum rationem. Rationes valde possunt multiplicari, sed dimitto eas causa brevitatis.

1 quia] om. P 2 ab aristotele] om. G ‖ materia] add. et p 3 dicit … materia] add. in marg. non ponit in numerum contra materiam quia sunt idem numero ut dicit aristoteles C : non ponit (ponitur P) in numerum contra materiam quia sunt idem numero ut dicit aristoteles Pp : non potest in numero distingui contra materiam quia sunt idem numero ut dicit aristoteles G 4 aristoteles dicit] inv. P ‖ alterum] alterius p 8 approximata] appropinquata Pp 9 vel] om. P 10 earum] om. p ‖ illarum] earum p 12 et] vel GPp ‖ sunt] non sunt tria principia sed P 14 quaeritur] quaeratur p : quaereretur P ‖ de2] om. P 15 quaeritur] quaereretur P 17 de distinctione] rep. G 18 duo tantum] inv. G ‖ scilicet] ut P 20 nominibus significatur] nominibus signatur P : rationibus significatur G 23 valde possunt] praem. plures C : inv. GP : possent valde p ‖ dimitto eas] omitto eas p : dimitto C ‖ causa brevitatis] propter brevitatem Gp 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, 2, 1069b32–34; cf. AA, 1: 259; cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 191a8–17; cf. AA, 2: 17 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b24–27 4 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 191a5–8

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Oppositum ponit Aristoteles in quattuor conclusionibus. Prima est quod non est unum princi|pium tantum rerum naturalium. Secunda est quod nec sunt infinita. Tertia est quod sunt plura duobus. Quarta est quod non sunt plura tribus. 5

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Ista quaestio continet in se infinitas cavillationes et logicas et naturales. Sed primitus ego aufero ab illa consideratione causas extrinsecas sive principia extrinseca, quia de illis non intendebat hic Aristoteles. Item ego non loquor de multitudine principiorum intrinsecorum secundum distinctionem partium quantitativarum, quia infinitae sunt partes materiae, quarum quaelibet est materia et principium materiale. Quaero ergo solum de multitudine principiorum intrinsecorum quae sunt ab invicem diversarum rationum. Sed adhuc quaerendo de huiusmodi principiis quaestio potest esse uno modo de principiis rerum naturalium, alio modo de principiis transmutationum naturalium. Et si quaeratur de principiis rerum naturalium, quaestio potest formari valde multipliciter. Sed solum volo de quattuor modis formandi eam loqui. Primus modus est utrum rerum naturalium principia intrinseca sunt tria et non plura. Secundus modus est utrum omnium rerum naturalium etc. Tertius est utrum rei naturalis sunt tria principia intrinseca et non plura. Quartus modus est utrum cuiuslibet rei naturalis etc. De primo modo quaerendi ponuntur faciliter conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod rerum naturalium principia intrinseca sunt duo et non plura, quia equus et asinus sunt res naturales et formae eorum substantiales, quae sunt duae et non plures, sunt principia intrinseca eorum. Tunc igitur, si illae formae vocentur a et b, ego arguam sic: a et b sunt duo et

2 tantum] omnium p 3 duobus] add. et p ‖ est2] om. P 5 in se] om. Pp ‖ et1 … naturales] naturales et logicales P 7 hic aristoteles] inv. P 8 intrinsecorum] extrinsecorum C 8–9 distinctionem] distantiam G 9 quantitativarum] constitutivarum P ‖ materiae] add. b P : add. meae p 10–11 multitudine] multiplicatione p 11 quae] qui P ‖ ab] ad GPp 13 huiusmodi] huius P 14–15 transmutationum naturalium] transmutationis naturalis p 16 quaeratur] quaeritur p 17 de … loqui] loqui de quattuor modis formandi eam P : loqui de quattuor formandi eam modis p : de quattuor modis formandi eam G 18 est] om. p 19 modus est] modus G : om. Pp ‖ etc.] sunt tria principia P 20 est] modus G : om. Pp 21 modus est] modus G : om. Pp 23 conclusio] om. Pp 26 formae] add. ibi P ‖ sic] om. p 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 6, 189a11–b29

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non plura quam duo; sed a et b sunt principia rerum naturalium intrinseca; | ergo principia rerum naturalium intrinseca sunt duo et non plura. Secunda conclusio est quod rerum naturalium principia intrinseca sunt mille; et loquor semper de distinctis secundum rationem sive secundum speciem, quia dixi quod non curabam de multitudine secundum partes quantitativas. | Conclusio patet, si sumamus mille substantias naturales diversarum specierum compositas ex materiis et formis, ut equum, bovem, lapidem, plantam etc. Tunc illarum mille rerum erunt mille formae substantiales et non plures, quae vocentur a, b, c, d etc. Et arguemus ut prius quia: a, b, c etc. | sunt mille et non plura quam mille; sed a, b, c, d etc. sunt principia intrinseca rerum naturalium, scilicet illarum mille substantiarum; igitur principia intrinseca rerum sunt mille et non plura. Et ita probaretur quod essent decem vel centum etc. Ex his sequitur tertia conclusio, scilicet quod principia rerum naturalium sunt pauciora tribus et quod principia rerum naturalium sunt tria et quod principia rerum naturalium sunt plura tribus, quia non numerando partes eiusdem rationis contra invicem duo sunt pauciora tribus et mille plura tribus, licet non sit ita numerando partes continui contra invicem, ut dicetur in tertio libro. Sed illa esset neganda, quod principia sunt pauciora tribus et tria et plura tribus. Quarta conclusio est quod rerum naturalium nulla sunt principia intrinseca, quia non sunt principia intrinseca de quibus loquimur nisi compositorum ex partibus diversarum rationum; et plurima sunt entia naturalia non sic composita, ut materia et formae substantiales et corpora caelestia et caliditas et frigiditas etc. Sed tu diceres quod non quaerimus nisi de rebus naturalibus habentibus principia intrinseca, ut de substantiis compositis ex materiis et formis. Et tunc loquendo solum de talibus substantiis et loquendo semper non nisi de multitudine secundum diversitatem specificam quinta conclusio 2 intrinseca] ante rerum GPp 3 rerum … intrinseca] principia rerum naturalium G 5 quia] et G 8 erunt] corr. sup. lin. ex essent C : essent p 9 c d] add. e G : c P : d C ‖ quia] om. G 10 c] add. d Gp ‖ mille1 … sunt2] om. (hom.) G ‖ c d] c P : d C 12 rerum] add. naturalium Pp 14 sequitur] arguitur p ‖ tertia conclusio] conclusio secunda P ‖ scilicet] om. G 15–16 tria … tribus] plura tribus et quod sunt tria P 19 quod] add. tria p 20 et] etiam sunt p : om. (ras.) C 21 est] om. G 24 formae substantiales] forma substantiales P : forma substantialis p 26 tu diceres quod] tu dices quod G : tu diceres p : dicis tu P 27 materiis et formis] materia et forma P 28 et1] om. P 29 specificam] add. sed C 19 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 17 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 59vb–61rb)

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erit quod duarum substantiarum sic compositarum, ut | equi et asini, sunt tria principia intrinseca, scilicet duae formae et una materia; et illarum substantiarum non sunt plura principia intrinseca quam illa tria, quia licet materiae sint valde multae numero, tamen non secundum speciem; de qua multitudine loquimur solum. Et ita pari ratione trium substantiarum essent quattuor principia et quattuor substantiarum quinque principia essent et sic deinceps. Sexta conclusio est quod trium substantiarum, ut hominis, equi et asini, non sunt aliqua duo | principia intrinseca, quia quaecumque illa signarentur, ipsa non essent principia nisi duarum substantiarum et non illarum trium. Et sic etiam quattuor substantiarum non sunt tria principia intrinseca nec decem substantiarum sunt quinque vel sex vel octo principia intrinseca et sic de aliis. Tunc de secundo modo quaerendi ego breviter restringo quaestionem ad res naturales quae sunt substantiae compositae, sicut homo, equus, lapis etc. Et quando quaeritur utrum omnium illarum substantiarum sunt tria principia intrinseca vel decem vel centum etc., ego dico quod haec dictio ‘omnium’ potest sumi distributive vel collective. | Et ponuntur duae conclusiones. Prima est quod sumendo ‘omnium’ distributive haec est falsa ‘omnium sunt duo principia’ et haec est falsa ‘omnium sunt tria principia’ et sic de quolibet alio numero, quia sequitur ‘omnium, igitur illarum duarum’ et sequitur ‘omnium, igitur istarum centum’; modo licet illarum duarum sint duo vel tria principia, tamen non illarum centum sunt duo vel tria principia, et licet illarum centum sunt centum principia, tamen non istarum duarum sunt centum principia; ideo de nullo numero esset verum | quod omnium sunt tot principia. Alia conclusio est quod sumendo ‘omnium’ collective verum est dicere de aliquo numero quod omnium sunt tot principia, quia illae substantiae numeratae secundum speciem omnes simul collective sunt alicuius certi numeri. Ponatur igitur quod sint mille. Tunc illarum mille sunt mille prin1 erit] ante quinta (162.29) G : est p 4 sint valde] sint Pp : sunt G 5 et] om. P 6 essent] om. GPp 8 hominis] add. et G 9 signarentur] assignarentur P : assignentur p 12–13 et … aliis] om. G 14 quaerendi ego breviter] quaerendi breviter ego Gp : ponendi breviter ego P 15 etc.] om. Pp 16 illarum] huiusmodi Gp : huius P 17 etc.] om. P 18 distributive vel collective] collective vel distributive p 21 est] etiam G : add. etiam p 22 sequitur] sequeretur GP 22–23 illarum … sequitur] duarum istarum sicut etiam sequeretur P 23 sint] sunt GP 25 sunt] sint Gp 26 quod] quia G 28 dicere] in marg. C : om. GPp 31 igitur] om. GPp

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cipia intrinseca, immo etiam mille et unum. Et illae mille numeratae sunt omnes substantiae loquendo collective, sicut duodecim apostoli sunt omnes apostoli. Igitur omnium collective sunt mille principia vel mille et unum.

28ra C

Sed de aliis duobus modis quaerendi, scilicet in singulari numero, ego ut prius restringo quaestionem, quod non fiat de simplicibus, immo solum de substantiis compositis per se subsistentibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Et tunc breviter pono duas conclusiones. Prima est quod cuiuslibet substantiae talis sunt duo principia intrinseca, scilicet materia et forma. Secunda conclusio est quod nullius talis substantiae sunt plura principia intrinseca quam duo, quia supponimus non esse in uno supposito nisi unam formam substantialem cum ipsa materia. Nec valet instantia, si dicatur quod hominis principia intrinseca sunt cor, cerebrum, hepar etc. Dicendum enim est, prout debet videri primo De generatione vel secundo De anima, quod haec membra non differunt secundum speciem quantum ad rationes substantiales, | sed solum differunt secundum speciem quantum ad rationes accidentales sumptas ex diversis dispositionibus qualitativis vel quantitativis. Sed tunc venio ad quaerendum de transmutationibus naturalibus. Et pono breviter istam conclusionem quod nullius transmutationis substantialis, puta generationis vel corruptionis, sunt aliqua principia intrinseca, quia ego suppono ad praesens quod hoc nomen ‘generatio’ vel ‘corruptio’ vel ‘transmutatio substantialis’ supponit pro forma substantiali quae materiae acquiritur vel abicitur; illa autem est simplex principium et non compositum ex partibus diversarum rationum. Sed tunc remanet dubitatio: cum dictum sit quod nec alicuius substantiae naturalis nec alicuius transmutationis naturalis seu substantialis sunt tria 1 numeratae] om. Pp 4 duobus] om. p ‖ scilicet] om. p ‖ ego] eius P 5 simplicibus] singularibus P 6 generabilibus] generalibus p 8 et tunc] tunc P : et G 9 substantiae talis] generabilis P 11 est] om. p 15 debet videri] inv. Pp 18 vel] aut Pp 23 vel1] et GPp 23–24 transmutatio] terminatio p 25 simplex] simpliciter C ‖ compositum] composita Gp : est composita P 27 remanet] removetur P 28 transmutationis … substantialis] transmutationis substantialis GP : substantialis transmutationis p 15 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione, I, q. 8 (ed. Streijger, Bakker, Thijssen, 80–89); cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De anima, II, q. 5 (ed. Sobol, 58–70)

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principia intrinseca, sed aut nullum aut duo tantum, | quid igitur intendit Aristoteles, cum dicit quod non sunt duo tantum, sed tria et non plura tribus? Respondendum | est quod Aristoteles valde bene concedit quod omnis substantiae per se subsistentis et naturaliter genitae sunt solum duo principia intrinseca, scilicet materia et forma. Hoc enim intendit, cum dicit: ‘manifestum igitur quod, siquidem sunt causae et principia eorum quae natura sunt, ex quibus primis sunt et fiunt non secundum accidens, sed unumquodque dicitur secundum substantiam, quod fiunt ex subiecto et forma’. Substantiae autem per se subsistentis non naturaliter genitae, sed creatae, nullum oportet principium esse intrinsecum, quia non requiritur subiectum praesuppositum. Sed ipse ultra dicit quod secundum rationem sunt tria principia ad illum sensum quod ad exprimendum rationem transmutationis vel generationis vel corruptionis naturalis aut etiam ad exprimendum rationem naturaliter transmutati, | generati vel corrupti necesse est uti tribus terminis secundum rationem distinctis significantibus praedicta principia substantiae factae per se subsistentis. Et illa tria nomina sunt ‘materia’, ‘forma’, ‘privatio’ vel aequivalentia. Quorum duo sunt ad invicem contraria, scilicet ‘forma’ et ‘privatio’, et tertium nulli est contrarium, scilicet ‘materia’, sicut in praecedenti quaestione declaratum fuit satis. Et haec omnia expressit Aristoteles multotiens. Dicit enim quod subiectum est unum numero, sed non unum specie vel ratione, immo duo, scilicet | quia res est eadem pro qua supponunt illa nomina ‘materia’ et ‘privatio’, quae sunt distincta secundum rationem. Et recapitulando dicit: ‘unde est quod, sicut duo dicenda sunt esse principia, est autem sicut tria; et est quidem sicut contraria, est autem sicut non. Et ostensum est quoniam oportet aliquid subici contrariis et contraria duo esse. Sed quodam modo alio non necessarium

1 quid] quod G 7 quod] quot G ‖ siquidem] si idem P ‖ eorum] earum p 8 natura] naturaliter p ‖ sunt1] add. et P ‖ primis] prius p ‖ secundum] solum P 9 unumquodque] add. quod Pp 11 principium esse] inv. GPp 13 sunt tria principia] tria sunt principia intrinseca P ‖ quod] quia GPp 14 vel1] om. P 16 distinctis] distinctam p 18 forma] et forma et Pp : add. et G 21 dicit] dixit GP 22 unum2] om. P 24 recapitulando dicit] inv. P ‖ unde] unum p 25 est2] om. (ras.) C ‖ quidem] quaedam G : quaedam sunt (sup. lin.) C 26 quoniam] quia p 27 quodam] quod p 6 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b16–20 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b29–191a1 20 Cf. sup., I, q. 14, 148–149 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b24–27 24 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b29–32, 191a4–8

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22rb G

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est. Sufficiens enim erit alterum contrariorum facere absentia et praesentia mutationem’. Nam secundum veram rei existentiam ad generationem substantialem concurrunt solum duo principia intrinseca substantiae factae per se subsistentis, scilicet materia et forma. Nam cum materia sufficit forma prius absens et post praesens quantum ad generationem, et e converso quantum ad corruptionem. Sed tamen ad exprimendum rationem huius nominis ‘generatio’ vel ‘corruptio’ non sufficit exprimere illa nomina ‘materia’ et ‘forma’, sed oportet exprimere hoc nomen ‘absentia formae prius vel posterius’, quod aequivalet huic nomini ‘privatio’. Et dicit Aristoteles materiam subici duobus contrariis, id est hoc nomen ‘materia’ in praedicatione denominativa subicitur istis nominibus ‘forma’ et ‘privatio’ vel concretis suis. Dicitur enim prius privata et post formata vel e converso. 24va P

Et apparet mihi quod omnes rationes quae in principio quaestionis fiebant | sunt solutae ex dictis. Cum enim dicit Porphyrius decem praedicamenta esse decem rerum principia prima, non intelligebat per ‘res’ nisi praedicabilia univoca, de quibus tractavit. Cum enim universaliora sint priora secundum rationem minus universalibus, sicut dictum fuit in prooemio, genera generalissima sunt prima omnium universalium univocorum. Omnes aliae rationes procedunt viis suis. Et sic est finis quaestionis.

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1 et] vel P 2 mutationem] mutationum p 3 factae] perfectae p 4 sufficit] add. sup. lin. subicit C 10–11 denominativa] denominative p 13 mihi] om. p 15 prima] ante principia Pp : om. G 16 tractavit] tractabat Pp ‖ sint] sunt GP 17–18 genera generalissima] BHLMTUp : genera et generalissima C : genera genera G : genera generata P : generalissima A 18 universalium univocorum] universalia univocatorum P 19 viis] vis G 20 et … quaestionis] etc. G : om. Pp 14 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 6, 7 (ed. Minio-Paluello, 12) 184a23–25

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17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1,

⟨i.17⟩

⟨Utrum generatio substantialis sit forma substantialis vel materia vel compositum vel aliquod accidens eis additum⟩ 5

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Quaeritur septimo decimo utrum generatio substantialis sit forma substantialis vel materia vel compositum vel aliquod accidens eis additum. Arguitur quod sit accidens quia: ⟨1⟩ Sibi convenit descriptio accidentis. Adest enim et abest subiecto suo, scilicet primae materiae, praeter ipsius corruptionem. ⟨2⟩ Iterum omnis generatio est actio vel passio, sicut generare et generari sunt agere et pati; sed actio et passio sunt accidentia, cum sint de praedicamentis accidentium. ⟨3⟩ Item tam materia quam forma et compositum sunt naturae permanentis; non sic autem generatio, | cum ipsa sit | motus vel mutatio. ⟨4⟩ Item tam materia quam forma quam compositum sunt, quando non est generatio; igitur generatio non est aliquod istorum. Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Motus vel mutatio est de essentia termini ad quem, ut dicit Commentator tertio huius; et terminus ad quem generatio|nis substantialis est forma substantialis, quae nec est accidens nec aliquid de eius essentia est accidens. ⟨2⟩ Item totus intellectus generationis substantialis salvatur sine intellectu accidentis. Sufficit enim ad intelligere quid sit generatio substantialis

5 quaeritur] add. consequenter G ‖ septimo decimo] add. etiam P ‖ generatio] add. formae G ‖ sit] est GPp 8 subiecto] rep. G 10 et] vel P 11 sint] sunt P 13 et] quam G 13–14 permanentis] permanentes Gp 14 sic] om. p ‖ ipsa] praem. scilicet p : om. G 15 quam2] et Pp 16 aliquod] aliquid Gp 19 tertio] secundo G 20 essentia] natura p 21–170.3 item … accidens] intellectus generationis substantialis †…† sine intellectu accidentis sufficit †…† intelligere quid sit generatio †…† ad eam esse intelligere quod substantia †…† non sit et postea sit et quod illa sit †…† generatio non significat nec connotat †…†ns in marg. C 22 quid] quod P 8 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 12, 24–25 (ed. Minio-Paluello, 20); cf. AA, 30: 23 In Physicam, III, comm. 4, f. 87C

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_021

19 Cf. Averroes,

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et ad eam esse intelligere quod substantia illa prius non sit et postea sit et quod ita sit in re. Igitur ‘generatio’ nec significat nec connotat aliquod accidens.

24vb P

Ponendae sunt breviter conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod hoc nomen ‘generatio substantialis’ non supponit pro accidente addito materiae, formae et composito substantialibus, quia licet forte prius oporteat nos intelligere accidentia, antequam deveniamus ad conceptus substantiales substantiarum, tamen postquam devenimus in conceptus substantiales aquae vel aeris, tunc omni intellectu accidentium amplius circumscripto, si nos intelligamus aquam prius non esse et posterius esse, nos intelligimus aquam fieri; et si ultra intelligimus aquam illam fieri ab agente naturali ex subiecto praesupposito, nos intelligimus eam generari naturaliter; igitur haec nomina ‘generatio’ vel ‘creatio substantiae’ non significant vel connotant nisi substantiam quae generatur et forte cum hoc subiectum praesuppositum, scilicet materiam, et formam quae sibi acquiritur, et illa vel aliquod istorum habet prius non esse et posterius esse. Et constat quod illam substantiam vel illam formam esse non est accidens, | sed est illa substantia vel illa forma, sicut videri debet quarto Metaphysicae et etiam videbitur in alia quaestione. Nec ipsam non esse est aliquid additum, sicut dicetur post. Si autem prius et posterius sint accidentia, tunc vel sunt tempus vel partes temporis; et nullus diceret quod generatio asini, quae est hic inferius, esset tempus, quod est motus caeli. Igitur manifestum est quod hoc nomen ‘generatio substantialis’ non supponit pro aliquo accidente addito substantiae quae generatur et materiae et formae eius. Ideo etiam haec non est vera ‘generatio substantialis est accidens’. Nec valet, si dicatur quod non potest esse generatio substantialis sine dispositionibus accidentalibus praeviis. Dico enim quod hoc est naturaliter

2 aliquod] add. aliud P 4 breviter conclusiones] inv. p 5 conclusio] om. GPp 7 antequam] quam GPp 8 substantiales] add. seu p 10 nos] modo p 11 nos] om. P ‖ intelligimus aquam illam] intelligamus illam aquam p 12–13 generari naturaliter] inv. P 15–16 acquiritur] acquiruntur P 16 aliquod] aliquid G ‖ habet] sup. lin. C : om. GP ‖ prius] post esse1 p ‖ posterius] postea p : post P 17 constat] constant p 18 sicut] ut P 19 etiam] om. P ‖ nec] add. etiam Pp 20 sicut] ut P 24 etiam] etc. p 26 nec] non P ‖ potest] posset p 27 dico] dicam GPp 27–171.1 naturaliter verum] inv. GPp 19 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IV, q. 8 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 18va–19rb); cf. inf., I, q. 21 20 Cf. inf., I, q. 21

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verum, sed aliae sunt mutationes secundum huiusmodi dispositiones, quae vocantur alterationes. Ideo conceditur quod hoc nomen ‘alteratio’ supponit pro dispositione accidentali, ut pro caliditate, frigiditate etc. Sed nullum horum est generatio substantialis. Item si forma vel compositum naturale generatur generatione addita, illa generatio haberet esse post non esse; ideo generaretur. Vel generaretur generatione iterum sibi addita (et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens) vel generaretur se ipsa (et tunc pari ratione hoc poterat dici de forma | substantiali). Ideo non erat ponenda generatio addita. Iterum frustra poneretur, quia sine tali addito omnia salvari possunt, sicut apparebit, si manifeste possint solvi rationes adversariorum. Secunda conclusio | est quod hoc nomen ‘generatio substantialis’ non supponit pro materia et sic generatio substantialis non est ipsa materia, quia primo huius et primo De generatione, et ubicumque Aristoteles loquitur de illo proposito, ipse dicit quod materia prima, quam vocat hyle in libro De generatione, est maxime proprie subiectum susceptibile generationis et corruptionis; et ipsa non est subiectum susceptibile sui ipsius. Item sicut omnis motus est actus motivi et mobilis, sicut habetur tertio huius, ita omnis transmutatio naturalis est actus activi et passivi; et materia non est huiusmodi. Item tertio huius dicitur quod generatio est actus generabilis | secundum quod generabile; et materia non est actus alicuius. Tertia conclusio est quod hoc nomen ‘generatio substantialis’ non supponit pro composito substantiali, quia sicut dictum est, materia est maxime proprie subiectum susceptibile generationis; et ipsa non proprie suscipit compositum, cum ipsa sit pars compositi et ipsa non suscipit se ipsam. Quarta conclusio est quod hoc nomen ‘generatio substantialis’ supponit pro forma substantiali. Hoc enim patet ex dictis per sufficientem divisionem et quia forma est cuius maxime proprie materia est subiectum 1 huiusmodi] huius P 2 alteratio] generatio p 3 caliditate] add. vel p : add. et P ‖ nullum] nihil p 5 generatur] corr. ex generaretur (?) C : generetur p : generaretur GP 6 generaretur1] add. et tunc GPp 7 et] add. si P 10 possunt] possent C 10–11 sicut apparebit] ut patebit P 11 si] cum p ‖ possint] possunt P 12 est] om. P 14 aristoteles loquitur] inv. P 15 ipse] om. G ‖ materia prima] inv. Pp 18 actus] accidens P ‖ sicut habetur] in marg. C : ut habetur GPp 19 transmutatio] mutatio p 23 est] om. Gp 24 sicut] ut P 28 enim] om. P 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a31–33; cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, I, 5, 320a2–3; cf. AA, 4: 9 18–19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 2, 202a3–9 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 1, 201a10–14

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susceptibile. Et omnia ad hoc concordant. Commentator | enim dicit quod materia est quae in rei veritate generatur. Et hoc non est ita quod ipsa sit, cum ante non esset. Igitur hoc est ita quod ipsa generationi subicitur, scilicet formae; ipsa enim est generabilis subiective. Sicut enim homo fit albus, licet non fiat simpliciter, ita materia fit formata tali forma, licet non fiat simpliciter. Et sic etiam mutatio, scilicet generatio substantialis, est bene de essentia termini ad quem, quia forma substantialis est ille terminus. Tunc igitur solvendae sunt rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam posset dici quod Porphyrius in descriptione accidentis non intendebat de quocumque subiecto, sed solum de subiecto quod est substantia in actu per se existens hoc aliquid. Tale enim subiectum maneret idem quocumque accidente sibi addito vel ablato, si non interveniret alia mutatio, scilicet adventus vel ablatio formae substantialis. Tale autem subiectum non manet idem apud generationem vel corruptionem substantialem. Vel etiam dicitur quod Porphyrius describebat accidens acceptum pro termino praedicabili, quem vocamus accidens distinctum contra genus, speciem, differentiam et proprium. Talis enim terminus adest et abest, id est vere affirmatur et negatur de eodem subiecto et de eadem re pro qua illud subiectum supponit, praeter subiecti corruptionem, id est | praeter illius rei corruptionem, pro qua illud subiectum supponit et pro qua est verificatio. Sic enim isti termini ‘album’ vel ‘currens’ dicuntur accidentia, quia idem manens prius est album et post non album, prius currit et post non currit. Et ita concedo quod ille terminus ‘generari’ est | accidens, quia de eadem materia manente dicitur vere quod ipsa generatur subiective et post non generatur.

1 omnia] omnes P 2 quae] quod G 4 subiective] add. sic etiam generatio vere est actus generantis et generabilis sicut motum moventis et mobilis forma enim est actus generantis sicut a quo et materia (mihi P) sicut in quo quae quidem materia est generabilis subiective Pp 5 tali] caeli p 6 etiam] om. P ‖ est] et P 8 rationes] add. in (ad P) oppositum GPp 9 posset] potest Pp 10–11 est substantia] inv. P 11 existens] subsistens p 11–12 maneret] manet P 16 acceptum] accepto P 17 quem … distinctum] distincta P 19 et1] vel P ‖ negatur] add. successive Pp ‖ de2] AB : pro CGHLMPTUp 22 vel] om. P ‖ accidentia] accidens p 23 manens] movens p 24 et] om. P ‖ concedo] add. ego Pp 1 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 60, f. 36C Minio-Paluello, 20); cf. AA, 30: 23

9 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 12, 24–25 (ed.

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⟨2⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod omnis generatio est actio vel passio. Sed nego quod omnis actio vel passio sit accidens, ita quod non sit substantia. Bene tamen concedo quod isti termini ‘actio’ et ‘passio’ sunt termini accidentales et connotativi et non termini substantiales, scilicet de praedicamento substantiae. Sed tales termini accidentales, qui dicuntur esse de praedicamentis accidentium, bene supponunt pro substantiis. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod res quae bene sunt naturae permanentis, quando factae sunt, sunt successivae, quando fiunt, sic quod una pars fit post aliam. Si vero sit mutatio instantanea, dicetur post de illa. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dico quod, licet sit idem generatio et forma, tamen propter desinentiam connotationis forma bene manet post, quando ipsa non amplius est generatio, sicut licet sit idem Socrates et scribens, tamen bene | manet Socrates, quando ipse non amplius est scribens. Et sic est finis quaestionis. 1–2 sed … passio] om. (hom.) G 2 omnis] om. p ‖ bene] licet P 3 et] om. G 4 non termini] non P : termini p 5 esse] om. p ‖ praedicamentis] praedicamento P 7 quae] om. p ‖ permanentis] permanentes G 8 sunt2] om. Pp 10 quod] om. P 11 desinentiam] designantiam C : designationem p ‖ post quando] postquam p 12 est] erit P ‖ sicut] sic P ‖ sit idem] inv. P 14 et … quaestionis] etc. sequitur alia quaestio p : etc. GP

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⟨i.18⟩

⟨Utrum generare sit generans vel generatio vel quid aliud⟩ Quaeritur decimo octavo de generare sicut quaesitum est de generatione, videlicet utrum generare est generans vel generatio vel quid aliud.

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Arguitur quod generare non sit generans quia: ⟨1⟩ Ponamus quod generans hominem sit homo vel sol. Constat quod homini vel soli accidit generare hominem; sed homini non accidit homo nec | soli sol; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item Socrates est prius naturaliter et etiam tempore quam ipsum generare Platonem; et idem non est prius se ipso. ⟨3⟩ Item generare vel movere est actus generantis vel moventis, sicut generari vel moveri est actus mobilis vel patientis; et idem non est actus sui ipsius. ⟨4⟩ Item non idem significant terminus de praedicamento substantiae et terminus de praedicamento accidentis; sed ‘generare’ et ‘generari’ sunt de praedicamentis accidentium, scilicet de praedicamento ‘agere’ et de praedicamento ‘pati’, et ‘homo’ est de praedicamento substantiae; igitur homo nec est generare nec est generari, licet sit generans. ⟨5⟩ Iterum suppono quod nihil differunt generare et esse generans. Hoc patet quinto Metaphysicae, capitulo de ente, ubi dicitur: ‘nihil enim refert “homo convalescens est” aut “homo convalescit” aut “homo | vadens aut secans” vel “hominem vadere aut secare”, similiter autem et in aliis’. Tunc arguitur sic: idem est generare et esse generans; et non est idem generans et esse generans; igitur non est idem generare et generans. Maior apparet

4 quaeritur] post octavo G 5 generare … generatio] generare sit generans vel generatio Gp : generatio sit generare vel generans P 7 hominem] add. non P ‖ sol] add. ut (sicut p) dicit aristoteles Pp 8 homini1] homo p 10 et etiam] in P 15 terminus] termini P 16 terminus] termini P 17 praedicamentis] praedicamento G 18 est] post substantiae p 19 est2] om. Pp 20 hoc] praem. et p : add. bene G 22 aut2] vel GPp 23 aut] et G 24 est1] om. P 25 apparet] patet Gp 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 194b13; cf. AA, 2: 65 1017a27–30

21 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 7,

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ex dictis. Minor patet, quia si Socrates generat, ista est vera per accidens ‘Socrates generat’; tamen in septimo Metaphysicae determinat Aristoteles quod non est idem in dictis secundum accidens quod quid erat esse et ipsum, ita quod non est idem musicus et esse musicum, homo albus et hominem esse album vel etiam albus et esse album; igitur similiter non est idem homo generans et hominem esse generantem | vel etiam generans et esse generantem. ⟨6⟩ Iterum aliqui deducunt ad valde magnum inconveniens quia: si est idem generans Socratem et generare Socratem, ita similiter idem est amans Deum et amare Deum vel etiam odiens Deum et odire Deum; si igitur Socrates amat Deum, amare Deum est Socrates, et etiam, si odit Deum, odire Deum est Socrates; et sic idem potest esse amare Deum et odire Deum, quod est valde absurdum, quia semper odire Deum est valde malum et impossibile est quod sit bonum, et tamen amare Deum est valde bonum; modo impossibile est idem esse valde malum a tota specie et esse valde bonum. ⟨7⟩ Item ex quo homo generat | hominem et sol secundum Aristotelem, generare Socratem est homo et etiam generare Socratem est sol; igitur sol est homo per syllogismum expositorium. ⟨8⟩ Item ponamus quod omnis homo currat. Tunc si hominem currere esset homo, pari ratione omnem hominem currere esset omnis homo; quod est impossibile, quia nec aliquid nec aliqua sunt omnis homo. ⟨9⟩ Item posito quod Socrates currat arguo sic: Socrates erit, quando Socratem currere non erit, immo Socratem sedere erit; igitur non est idem Socrates et Socratem currere. ⟨10⟩ Vel arguitur sic: impossibile est simul esse Socratem currere et Socratem sedere; sed non est impossibile simul esse Socratem et Socratem sedere; igitur non est idem Socrates et Socratem currere. 1 dictis] add. et P ‖ generat] generatur (del.) sed add. sup. lin. vel generat C 2 generat] generatur sed add. sup. lin. seu generat C ‖ tamen] praem. et Pp : cum C 3 non … accidens] in dictis secundum (per p) accidens non est idem Pp 4 ipsum] ipsius P ‖ musicus … musicum] post album2 (5) GPp 8 aliqui] alii C ‖ quia] quod G 9 idem2] post est Gp : om. P 10 et2] vel P 11 et] om. P 14 est2] om. P 15 idem esse] inv. P ‖ a … et] etiam et a tota specie (seq. ras.) C 16 homo generat hominem] hominem generat homo P 17 etiam] om. GP ‖ sol est] sol esset p : socrates esset P 20 esset homo] est homo currens C 23 erit2] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ est idem] inv. P 25 vel … currere] om. (hom.) G ‖ esse] del. C 26 sed … sedere2] sed non est impossibile simul esse sor†…† sortem sedere in marg. C ‖ est impossibile simul] impossibile est P 27 currere] corr. sup. lin. ex sedere C : sedere G 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 6, 1031a19–21 AA, 2: 65

16 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 194b13; cf.

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⟨11⟩ Item Deum creare est contingens; sed Deus non est contingens, immo summe necessarius; igitur Deus non est Deum creare. ⟨12⟩ Item equum esse mortuum non est equus nec Antichristum esse generandum est Antichristus. ⟨13⟩ Item chimaeram non esse est aliquid in re. Aliter enim propositio non esset vera; oportet enim ita esse in re, sicut propositio significat, si propositio est vera. Sed chimaeram non esse non est chimaera, quia nihil est chimaera. Igitur chimaeram non esse est aliquid quod non est chimaera. Et multo fortius videtur quod hominem currere est aliquid quod non est homo, quia si propositioni negativae verae debeat correspondere in re aliquod significabile | complexe, multo magis hoc debet credi de affirmativa vera. ⟨14⟩ Item licet nullus equus esset | et nullus etiam esset asinus, tamen haec esset vera ‘nullus equus est asinus’; igitur ita esset in re. Tamen illud ita esse non est equus nec asinus, sed esset equum non esse asinum. Igitur pari ratione, si haec est vera ‘equus currit’, ita esse in re est equum currere et non est equus nec cursus. ⟨15⟩ Item ita est quod Antichristus loquetur, cum hoc sit verum; et illud ita esse non est Antichristus, quia Antichristus nihil est; igitur est quoddam significabile complexe, quod non est homo. ⟨16⟩ Item suppono quod omne verum sit aliquid et quod etiam omnis propositio, immo etiam omnis enuntiatio, significat verum vel falsum, scilicet vera verum et falsa falsum. Et suppono ut prius quod nullus equus est et quod etiam nullus asinus est. Tunc formetur haec propositio in mente ‘equus non est asinus’. | Illa est vera; igitur significat verum. Et illud verum est aliquid, ut dicebatur; et non est equus nec asinus; igitur est significabile complexe, quod non est res significata per aliquem terminum illius propositionis. Et ita debet concedi de aliis.

5 enim] om. Pp 8 chimaera1] om. P 10 negativae] negativa G 11 hoc debet] inv. P ‖ credi] add. sup lin. concedi C 11–12 affirmativa vera] praem. propositione p : affirmativa P 13 equus esset] inv. Pp ‖ etiam esset] inv. P ‖ asinus] add. et P 14 igitur] add. si G ‖ esset2] sit P ‖ tamen] add. sup. lin. cum C : praem. et Pp 15 non est] nec esset Pp ‖ esset] om. p 16 est1] esset G ‖ equus currit] om. P ‖ esse] etiam P 18 loquetur] loquitur G : non loquitur P ‖ hoc] om. P 19 quia antichristus] om. P 21 sit] est GPp ‖ etiam] om. GPp 22 omnis] om. P 23 et1] om. P 24 etiam] om. P ‖ haec … mente] add. sed del. haec propositio C : in mente haec propositio GPp 25 vera] add. et P ‖ illud] om. P 26 ut dicebatur] om. P ‖ non] nec GPp ‖ asinus] add. et P ‖ complexe] om. G 27 et] in marg. C : om. P

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⟨17⟩ Item suppono quod nullum incomplexum est verum vel falsum sive a parte vocis vel conceptus sive a parte rei. Nam in quibus falsum et verum est, compositio quaedam iam intellectuum est, ut dicitur tertio De anima. Igitur nullus equus est verum vel falsum; sed equum esse animal est verum; igitur equum esse animal non est equus. Respondetur quod equum esse animal est verum secundum suppositionem quae dicitur materialis. Sed contra hoc obicitur quod sit verum etiam significative loquendo, quia haec mentalis ‘equus est animal’ est vera; igitur significat verum, ut dicebatur; et non | significat aliud verum quam equum esse animal a parte rei; igitur etc. ⟨18⟩ Et omnino non debemus credere hanc propositionem esse veram ‘Deus est trinus et unus’ nisi quia credimus verum esse quod ita est in re. Unde perprius et principalius credo quod Deus est, quam quod illa propositio ‘Deus est’ sit vera. Igitur cum simplex significabile non sit verum neque falsum, oportet ponere a parte rei complexe significabilia distincta a rebus incomplexe significabilibus. ⟨19⟩ Item aliud significat a parte rei illa ‘Deus est’ quam illa ‘Deus non est’; aliter enim non deberet magis prima concedi quam alia. Sed non potest dici quod a parte rei aliud et aliud significatur per praedictas propositiones, nisi illa sint complexe significabilia. Igitur etc. ⟨20⟩ Item aliquid intelligo per illam ‘chimaera non est’; et tamen non intelligo nisi chimaeram non esse; igitur chimaeram non esse est aliquid et hoc non est nisi significabile complexe. ⟨21⟩ Item haec propositio ‘chimaera est’ est vox significativa | et actualiter tibi significat; aliter enim non deberes negare eam vel concedere. Vel igitur significat solum propositionem mentalem sibi in intellectu correspondentem vel significat aliquid ultra a parte rei. Si primo modo, sic est vera, quia

1–4 sive … falsum] †…† parte vocis vel conceptus sive a parte †…† in quibus falsum et verum est †…†dam iam intellectum est ut dicitur tertio †…† igitur nullus equus est verum vel falsum in marg. C 2 vel] sive P ‖ a] ex G ‖ quibus] quibusdam p ‖ falsum] add. iam GP 3 iam intellectuum est] intellectuum est G : iam intellectuum p : iam intelligendum est P 4 equum] add. non C 5 equum1] add. non C ‖ esse2] add. est C 6 quae dicitur materialis] materialem GPp 8 igitur] ideo GPp 10 credere] post veram C 11 quod] et P 12 quam] et P 14 complexe] complexa C 15 incomplexe significabilibus] significantibus incomplexe C 17 deberet magis prima] deberet magis una P : magis deberet una Gp 18 significatur] significetur GPp ‖ praedictas] dictas Pp : illas G 19 igitur] om. P 20 non2] per ipsam nihil P : per illam nihil p 23 actualiter] actu GPp 24 tibi] add. sup. lin. ibi C : etiam G ‖ enim] om. Pp ‖ negare eam] inv. GPp 26 sic] tunc Pp 3 Aristoteles, De anima, III, 6, 430a28–29

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qualitercumque significat, ita est. Si secundo modo, et cum non potest dici quod a parte rei significet nisi chimaeram esse, sequitur quod chimaeram esse etiam a parte rei significatur per hanc propositionem ‘chimaera est’. Modo cum ista propositio sit vera et affirmativa, necesse est quod subiectum eius pro aliquo supponat vel existente vel praeterito vel futuro vel saltem possibili. Ideo oportet concedere quod aliquid est vel fuit vel erit vel potest esse chimaeram esse a parte rei et hoc non potest esse nisi quoddam significabile complexe. Istae sunt rationes quibus multi volunt convincere quod oportet ponere a parte rei complexe significabilia distincta ab illis rebus pro quibus termini incomplexi simplices supponunt. Et sic hominem generare non est homo generans nec etiam per consequens generare est generans.

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Oppositum arguitur quia: ad generandum nihil oportet plus concurrere quam generans et subiectum et formam substantialem. Si enim ab illo generante illa for|ma sit in illo subiecto, cum ante non esset, erit generatio et generare et generari omni alio circumscripto. | Igitur generare est aliquid illorum vel nihil. Et non est dicendum quod generare nihil sit, quia tunc illa non esset vera ‘generare est agere’. Nec generare est illud subiectum, immo potius generari esset illud subiectum. Similiter generare non est illa forma, immo potius generari esset illa forma, quoniam illa forma non generat, sed generatur. Relinquitur igitur quod generare est generans. Ista quaestio et rationes factae ad eam involvunt in se multas difficultates. Propter quas solvendas ego ponam nunc multas conclusiones et postea etiam quasdam alias. Prima conclusio est quod generare est aliquid vel aliqua. Nam si generare nihil esset, tunc illa esset falsa ‘generare est agere’, immo etiam ista ‘generare est generare’, sicut | illa est falsa ‘chimaera est chimaera’. Nam ex logica supponimus affirmativam esse falsam, si aliquis terminorum non supponat

1 modo] add. in marg. tunc C ‖ cum] tamen (corr. sup. lin. ex cum hoc C) CPp 2 significet] significatur C 4 affirmativa] falsa P 5 supponat] ante pro P ‖ vel futuro] in marg. C : om. G 6 erit] erat P 7 esse2] om. P ‖ quoddam] om. P 8 complexe] add. item rationes (del.) C 9 oportet] oporteat Pp 11 simplices] ante incomplexi Pp : simpliciter C 12 etiam] om. P 13 quia] quod p ‖ oportet plus] inv. GPp 15 sit] fit GP 16 aliquid] aliquod p 17 est] om. P ‖ tunc] cum P 20 immo] quia Pp 23 solvendas] om. p ‖ nunc] om. p 24 quasdam] om. P 25 est quod] om. P ‖ aliqua] add. probatur P 26 etiam ista] inv. G

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pro aliquo vel aliquibus. Sic etiam generari est aliquid vel aliqua; aliter haec esset falsa ‘generari est fieri’. Similiter agere est aliquid vel aliqua; aliter haec esset falsa ‘agere est nobilius quam pati’. Et si etiam benefacere nihil esset, tunc benefacere non esset bonum nec meritorium. Et sic de aliis. Secunda conclusio est quod generare vel benefacere vel Deum creare vel Socratem lignum secare et sic de aliis non est una propositio. Verum est tamen quod | aliquando tales orationes infinitivi modi supponunt materialiter pro aliquibus propositionibus, ut si dicamus quod Deum creare est propositio affirmativa. Sic enim illa oratio ‘Deum creare’ supponit pro illa propositione ‘Deus creat’. Et sic secundum talem suppositionem bene concederetur quod Deum creare vel Socratem currere est una propositio. Sed conclusio quam posui erat intelligenda capiendo omnia praedicta significative sine tali suppositione materiali. Et tunc conclusio est manifesta. Aristoteles enim ponit in Praedicamentis quod secare est agere. Et sic etiam Socratem secare est Socratem agere, immo ibi est praedicatio quidditativa; quod tamen non esset verum, si Socratem secare vel Socratem agere esset una propositio, quia illa propositio ‘Socrates secat’ non est ista propositio ‘Socrates agit’, immo secunda potest esse vera prima existente falsa. Item Socratem benefacere est bonum et meritorium, et non ista propositio ‘Socrates benefacit’, quia aeque unus malus potest eam formare sicut unus bonus. Similiter Socratem odire Deum est valde malum et damnabile, non tamen propter hoc ista propositio ‘Socrates odit Deum’ est mala et damnabilis. Tertia conclusio est quod non est idem generare et generari (unde in illo casu quod ignis a generat ignem b non est in istis idem generare et generari) vel etiam agere et pati aut etiam interficere et interfici et sic de aliis, quia tunc non esset nobilius generare quam generari nec agere quam pati nec creare 1 vel1] add. pro P ‖ haec] ista G 2 haec] ista G 3 agere] generare p ‖ si] sic p 4 tunc] cum p ‖ et … aliis] etc. p 5 est] add. ista P ‖ quod] add. in marg. socratem P 6 lignum secare] inv. GPp 7–8 materialiter] add. et sumuntur G : add. et sequitur P : add. sed del. et sequitur etiam C 8 quod] om. p 9–11 supponit … creare] rep. G 11 currere] creare G 12 quam] add. ego p 16 quod] et Pp ‖ esset2] est G 18 potest] posset p 19 item] add. etiam p ‖ non] add. sup. lin. est C 20 malus potest] malus posset p : malivolus potest P ‖ formare] add. in marg. proferre C 21 bonus] add. et p 22 deum] bonum p ‖ non tamen] inv. P : et tamen non p 22–23 non … damnabilis] om. G 23 propter … est] est ista propositio socrates odit deum Pp 24 est1] om. G ‖ unde] verbi gratia p : verbi gratia sed add. in marg. supponitur P 25 b] add. tunc P 26 etiam1] om. P ‖ etiam2] om. GPp ‖ et2] vel C : aut G 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 4, 2a3

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quam creari, quae sunt inconvenientia. Et etiam verberare | et interficere sanctos martyres fuit valde crudele et iniquum et damnabile, ipsos autem pati fuit humile et bonum et meritorium. Quarta conclusio est quod generare non est subiectum generationis, scilicet prima materia, quia multo fortius generari esset illud subiectum, cum materia movetur et non movet, non generet, sed generetur subiective. Et si dicatur quod tam generare quam generari essent ipsa materia, tunc essent idem, quod esset contra tertiam conclusionem. Quinta conclusio est quod generare non est forma quae a generante fit in materia, quia multo magis generari esset illa forma, cum ipsa generetur et non generet. Sexta conclusio est quod generare non est compositum quod dicimus generari. Hoc probatur ut | prius. Septima conclusio quod generare non est generans | et illud quod generatur simul, quia pari ratione creare esset creans et creatura et videre esset videns et res visa; et haec sunt impossibilia. Probo quia: si creare esset creans et illud quod creatur, et similiter si videre esset videns et res visa, sequeretur pari ratione quod etiam videri esset videns et | res visa et generari esset generans et res genita vel quae generatur; et ista consequentia sunt falsa, quia tunc nihil aliud esset creare quam creari, generare quam generari etc., quod est contra tertiam conclusionem. Sed illa consequentia probatur, scilicet quod pari ratione creare esset creans et creatura, quia: non magis ‘creare’ significat creaturam quam ‘creari’ creatorem nec ‘videre’ rem visam quam ‘videri’ videntem. Octava conclusio est quod generare non est accidens aliud a generante vel genito. Et hoc probatur per omnes similes rationes, sicut probatur de

2 et1] om. p 3 et1] om. p ‖ bonum et] om. P 4 est1] om. p 5 prima materia] inv. P 6 materia] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ movetur … movet] movetur G : om. Pp ‖ generet] generaret P 7 essent1] est GPp ‖ essent2] esset Gp 8 esset] est Gp 10 multo] multum G 11 generet] add. et sic ut prius sequeretur (sequitur p) contra tertiam conclusionem Pp 13 generari] add. et GPp 14 conclusio] add. est Pp 15 quia] et G ‖ esset2] add. res C 16 probo] probatio Pp 17–18 sequeretur pari ratione] pari ratione sequeretur P : sequitur pari ratione G : pari ratione sequitur p 18 esset2] om. P 19 res … quae] quod P ‖ consequentia] omnia P 20 aliud esset] inv. Gp ‖ creare quam creari] creari quam creare P 21 tertiam conclusionem] inv. G 22 creare] creari GP ‖ creatura] add. etc. p 23 significat] praem. connotat vel P : add. vel connotat Gp ‖ creatorem] creaturam P ‖ nec] add. etiam p 24 videri] videre p 26 vel] add. sup. lin. et C : et GPp ‖ et hoc probatur] probatur hoc P ‖ omnes similes] omnes consimiles p : similes P ‖ probatur2] hoc probabatur GP : hoc habetur p

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generatione in prima conclusione praecedentis quaestionis. Si enim prius non sit lumen in hoc aere et post sit in eo lumen a sole omnibus aliis circumscriptis, adhuc esset verum quod lumen generaretur et sol generaret ipsum. 5

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Sed ad hoc respondent cavillantes et dicunt quod lumen esse a sole vel dependere a sole est dispositio addita lumini et soli. Quod est manifestum ex hoc, quia possibile esset solem esse et illud lumen esse et quod tamen illud lumen non dependeret a sole (Deus posset enim ipsum conservare immediate sine dependentia a sole); igitur illa dependentia vel illud dependere a sole est accidens et additum lumini et soli. Contra responsionem vel cavillationem arguitur multipliciter. Primo quia: Deus potest sine aliquo accidente addito creare substantiam unius angeli; et sic creare vel creari non esset accidens additum creanti vel creato; et si hoc potest salvari de creante et creato, videtur quod ita potest salvari de generante et generato. Iterum si | lumen esse a sole esset talis dispositio addita, tunc magis deberet dici quod ipsa esset generare quam generari. Et si diceretur quod ipsa esset generari et generare, tunc esset contra tertiam conclusionem prius positam. Iterum frustra ponitur tale accidens sibi additum, quia revertitur de eo eadem difficultas, sicut erat de lumine. Nam illud accidens est, cum ante non esset, sicut et ipsum lumen; ideo generatur vel a lumine vel a sole et dependet a sole; ideo quaeritur de esse eius a sole vel de dependentia eius a sole, sicut hoc quaerebatur de lumine. Et tunc respondendo ad persuasionem quae in cavillatione ponebatur ego dico quod, si Deus conservat illud lumen sine alio agente vel conservante, non oportet quod illa dependentia luminis a Deo sit aliud accidens 1 prius] om. P 2 hoc] sup. lin. C : om. GP 5 sed] om. P 6–7 est2 … hoc] ex hoc patet GPp 7 et2] om. G 8 lumen] add. immediate p ‖ posset enim] inv. Gp : enim potest P 9 dependentia1] add. eius GPp ‖ dependere a] dependens P 10 accidens] add. aliud Pp 11 responsionem vel] praem. hanc P : hanc responsionem et p : hanc rationem et G 12 potest] posset p 14 et creato] om. C 15 generato] genito GPp 16 tunc] tamen Pp 17 deberet] debet p ‖ generare quam generari] generari quam generare Pp 18 esset1] add. et p ‖ tertiam conclusionem] inv. p 20 sibi] om. GPp 22–24 ideo … lumine] om. G 23 quaritur] quaeretur P : quaereretur p ‖ esse eius] inv. p ‖ a sole2] ad solem C ‖ de2] om. P 25–26 respondendo … ego] respondeo ad persuasionem quae in cavillatione ponitur et p 26 illud] ipsum G 1 Cf. sup., I, q. 17, 170–171

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praeter lumen, | quia iterum illud oportet dependere a Deo et sic in infinitum. Et hoc est magis discutiendum in metaphysica et supponendum ab ea. Possibile est enim illud lumen esse et conservari a Deo et iterum | post nec ipsum esse nec conservari a Deo, eo solo quia Deus sic vult; et ita etiam possibile est illud lumen esse et dependere a Deo et a sole simul et post a Deo tantum, ex eo solo quia Deus sic vult, sine aliquo addito. Nec oportet ex hoc dubitare quod sit mutatio in voluntate divina, prout declarabitur in octavo libro. Nona conclusio est quod generare est generans. Et illa sequitur ex omnibus praedictis conclusionibus per sufficientem divisionem. Posito enim quod generare est aliquid vel aliqua et remotis omnibus praedictis membris in aliis conclusionibus sequitur illud ultimum membrum. Et simili|ter esset dicendum quod generari est illud quod generatur et hominem ambulare est homo ambulans et Socratem diligere Deum est Socrates diligens Deum; ideo etiam est Socrates. Sic enim evitatur infinita multitudo irrationabilis entium, quae aliqui vocant complexe significabilia, de quibus non possunt dicere ubi sunt nec utrum sunt substantiae vel accidentia nec utrum sunt creator vel creaturae. Illi enim ponunt ab aeterno ita esse et fuisse quod Antichristus generabitur et loquetur, et sic etiam chimaeram non esse dicunt fuisse ab aeterno; et cum talia non fuerint Deus, oportet quod saltem fuerint a Deo; et omne quod est a Deo, si non sit Deus, est creatura; ideo sequitur quod erant creaturae Deo coaeternae, quod est iniquum dicere. Et omnino ad illam opinionem infinita absurda sequuntur.

1 illud oportet] inv. P : oporteret illud G : esset illud p ‖ a deo] ab eo p 2 est magis discutiendum] magis est discutiendum G : magis est P 3 est enim illud] enim est illud Pp : enim est aliud G ‖ conservari] conservare G 4 deus sic] inv. P 4–5 et … est] et etiam possibile est G : ista etiam possibile est P : et necessario non est possibile p 5 deo et a] deo et p : om. P 6 aliquo] alio Pp ‖ oportet] oporteret p 7 prout] add. hoc Gp 8 libro] huius p 9 illa] ita p 10 praedictis conclusionibus] inv. P ‖ per sufficientem divisionem] pro sufficiente divisione p 12 similiter] sic P 13 est2] et P 15 etiam est] inv. p 16 quae] quam C 17 vocant] vocabant p ‖ possunt] possum C 18 substantiae … sunt2] scientia vel anima vel P 19 ponunt] possunt P ‖ fuisse] add. et C 20 etiam] om. P ‖ dicunt] vel P ‖ cum] tamen P 21 fuerint deus] fuerint deus (sup. lin.) C : fuerunt deus P : fuerunt a se G ‖ fuerint2] fuerunt G 23 illam] aliam p 24 absurda] om. p 2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, V, q. 8 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 31rb–32ra) 7–8 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, VIII, q. 2 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 109vb–110vb)

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Iam solvendae sunt rationes quae fiebant in principio quaestionis. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam nego quod generare hominem accidat homini vel soli nisi ad illum sensum materialem quod haec est vera per accidens ‘homo vel sol generat hominem’, sicut album diceremus accidere homini, quia haec est vera per accidens ‘homo est albus’, quo non obstante album tamen est homo. | ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam nego quod Socrates fuerit prius quam generare Platonem, immo quandocumque Socrates fuit, generare Platonem fuit. Sed tamen Socrates fuit, antequam ipse esset generare Platonem. Unde generare Platonem fuit, quando non fuit generare Platonem, sicut ille currens fuit, quando ipse non fuit currens. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam nego quod generare vel movere sit actus generantis vel moventis, sed | generatio et motus. Generatio enim est actus quo generans actu generat et quo materia actu generatur subiective, sicut albedo est actus quo homo actu est albus. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dico quod illi termini, licet sint diversorum praedicamentorum, bene supponunt pro eodem et illud idem significant, sed sunt alienae connotationes, quae non impediunt veritatem propositionis, ubi termini supponunt pro eodem. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod idem sunt generare et esse generans. Ideo dico quod est idem generans et esse generans, album et esse album et sic de aliis. Sed in septimo Metaphysicae Aristoteles intendit | quod in dictis secundum se in primo modo dicendi per se, ubi est praedicatio quidditativa, est idem quod quid erat esse et ipsum ad illum sensum quod praedicatum tale quod est definitio quidditativa vel ponitur in definitione quidditativa subiecti, non connotat aliquam extraneam dispositionem circa illud quod subiectum significat. Sed in dictis secundum accidens, id est in praedicatione denominativa, est aliquid aliud, id est praedicatum addit aliquam connotationem circa illud quod subiectum significat, licet supponant pro eodem.

1 iam] ergo Pp : tunc igitur G ‖ in] a GP 2 primam] add. ego P : add. rationem ego p ‖ accidat] accidit P 7 fuerit] fuit G : fuerat P 11 ipse] om. G 12 movere] moveri G ‖ actus] accidens G ‖ vel2] et P 13 sed … motus] om. P 16 illi termini licet] licet illi termini G 18 connotationes] connotationis GPp 20 ideo] om. G 21 est] sunt P 23 se1] add. scilicet Pp ‖ dicendi] dicendum P 24 et] om. p ‖ illum sensum] inv. P 25 vel] om. p 28 aliquid] ad C : om. Pp ‖ praedicatum] praedicatio G 29 circa illud] supra id G 22 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 6, 1031a19–b20

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Et si ego de hoc dixi aliter alias in Metaphysica, tamen uterque modus dicendi excludebat illa ficta complexe significabilia. Sed ille modus quem nunc pono apparet mihi verus. Et notandum est quod ego non intendo negare complexe significabilia, immo credo quod omnis res est complexe significabilis. Deus enim, qui est summe simplex, significatur per hoc complexum ‘Deum esse Deum’ vel ‘Deum esse trinum et unum’ etc. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod Socratem amare Deum est Socrates, quando ipse amat Deum, et similiter Socratem odire Deum est Socrates, si Socrates odit Deum. Sed si Socrates non amat Deum, Socratem amare Deum nihil est, et sic de odire, sicut etiam Socrates amans Deum nihil est, si Socrates non amat Deum. Et concedo quod omne amare Deum est bonum et omne odire Deum est malum; ideo numquam amare Deum est odire Deum. Nec valet syllogismus ille: Socratem amare Deum est Socrates; Socratem odire Deum est Socrates; igitur Socratem odire Deum est Socratem amare Deum. Nam una praemissarum est falsa; nam si Socrates odit Deum, maior est falsa, et si non odit Deum, minor est falsa. Tamen | concedo quod odire Deum erit vel potest esse amare Deum, sicut odiens Deum erit amans Deum; ideo quod est valde malum erit valde bonum (nam odiens Deum est valde malus, et quando poenitebit et amabit Deum, ipse | per Dei gratiam erit bonus). ⟨7⟩ Ad aliam dico quod ‘generare Socratem’ est unus terminus communis supponens indifferenter | pro omni generante Socratem. Ideo praemissae in illo syllogismo erant indefinitae et non singulares. Ideo non erat syllogismus expositorius. Terminus enim discretus adiunctus in obliquo cum termino communi non reddit totalem terminum discretum, sicut ille terminus ‘videns Socratem’ non est terminus discretus. ⟨8⟩ Ad aliam dico quod hominem currere est homo, sicut homo currens est homo, et etiam omnem hominem currere est homo, sicut omnis homo currens est homo. Sed non est verum quod omnem hominem currere est

1 de hoc] om. P ‖ aliter] sup. lin. C : post alias GPp 2 modus] add. significandi p 3 mihi] om. p 4 est] om. GP ‖ complexe] complexa p 5 credo] sup. lin. C : dico G 6 significatur] significat P 7 trinum] aeternum P ‖ etc.] om. P 9 socratem] om. C ‖ si socrates] quando ipse G 10 deum2] add. tunc G 11 sicut] sic G 12 omne2] om. p 15 odire … amare] amare deum est socratem odire Pp ‖ deum2] om. C 16 si2] add. socrates P 17 non odit] amat G ‖ tamen] add. ego Pp 18 esse] add. vel est C 19 malus] malum p 23 et] om. P 24 in] om. G 28 et] sic P 28–29 sicut … homo] om. (hom.) p 1 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, qq. 3–4 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 43ra–44rb)

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omnis homo, sicut non est verum quod omnis homo currens est omnis homo, immo non est verum quod omnem hominem currere est omnem hominem currere, sicut non est verum quod omnis homo currens est omnis homo currens. Si igitur quaeras quid est omnem hominem currere, sic etiam quaeram quid est omnis homo currens. Et constat quod nihil est omnis homo currens, tamen omnis homo currens est homo. Et ita etiam nihil est omnem | hominem currere, sed tamen omnem hominem currere est homo. Sed adducitur ibi una apparens difficultas, posito quod omnis homo currat praeter Socratem et quod Socrates non currit, utrum tunc illa sit vera ‘omnem hominem currere est homo’. Et videtur quod sic, quia aequivalet dicere ‘omnem hominem currere’ et ‘omnis homo currens’; sed omnis homo currens est homo; igitur omnem hominem currere est homo. Sed oppositum arguitur quia: propter distributionem huius termini ‘hominem’ sequitur ‘omnem hominem currere est homo, igitur Socratem currere est homo’; et illud consequens est falsum, quia Socratem currere nihil est, ex quo Socrates non currit. Sed propter istam dubitationem nullus debet retrocedere a praedeterminatis, quia omnino simile est, sicut si ponitur casus quod omnis homo praeter Socratem habeat asinum, utrum igitur cuiuslibet hominis asinus est animal. Ad hoc igitur esset dicendum quod, si intelligeremus quod per illud signum ‘cuiuslibet’ distribueretur simul hoc totum ‘hominis asinus’, ita quod esset sensus ‘omne quod est hominis asinus est animal’, tunc propositio esset vera; nam omne quod est hominis asinus est animal. Sed si intelligamus, sicut debet esse de proprietate sermonis, quod haec dictio ‘cuiuslibet’ distribuat solummodo illum obliquum ‘hominis’, ita quod sit sensus ‘omnis homo est, cuius asinus est animal’, tunc propositio esset falsa, quia esset instantia de Socrate.

1–2 sicut … homo] om. (hom.) G 4 sic] ego GPp 5 et] om. p 6 tamen … currens2] om. (hom.) p 7 sed … currere2] om. (hom.) G ‖ tamen] sup. lin. C : om. Pp 8 sed adducitur ibi] sed ibi adducitur Gp : si ibi adducitur P ‖ posito] add. casu GPp 9 et quod] sed Pp ‖ currit] currat Pp ‖ tunc illa] inv. P : ergo ista p 11 et1] om. GPp 13 currere] add. in marg. et tamen omnis homo currere G 14 sed oppositum] oppositum P : sed positum p 14–15 hominem] omnem P 18 retrocedere] recedere Pp 19 ponitur] ponatur GPp ‖ quod] quia G 20 igitur] om. P 21 ad hoc] adhuc p ‖ esset] est p ‖ quod2] om. P 23 est animal] currit sup. lin. C : om. Pp 24 intelligamus] intelligeremus p 25 sermonis] add. ita C 26 solummodo] solum p 27 est animal] UM : currit ABCGHLPTp ‖ tunc] om. Pp ‖ esset1] est p ‖ esset2] post instantia G : est Pp

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Ita dico in proposito quod, si hoc totum ‘hominem currere’ distribuatur, tunc est sensus ‘omne quod est hominem currere est homo’ et est propositio vera. Et sic concederetur quod ‘omnem hominem currere’ aequivalet huic orationi ‘omnis homo currens’. Sed si dicamus quod solum distribuitur ille obliquus ‘hominem’, | tunc | esset sensus quod omnis homo est, quem currere est homo, et haec est falsa, quia instantia est de Socrate. Nec sic aequivalet ‘omnis homo currens’ et ‘omnem hominem currere’. ⟨9⟩ Ad aliam dico quod, quandocumque Socrates erit, Socratem currere erit, sed non erit Socratem currere, sicut cum Socrates sit currens, quandocumque Socrates erit, Socrates currens erit, sed non erit Socrates currens. ⟨10⟩ Similiter ad aliam dico quod non valet, quia si Socrates modo est Socrates currens, ego similiter arguerem quod non quia: impossibile est simul esse Socratem currentem et Socratem sedentem; et tamen possibile est simul esse Socratem et Socratem sedentem; igitur Socrates non est Socrates currens. Dicam igitur quod, licet haec composita sit vera quod impossibile est esse simul Socratem currere et Socratem sedere vel etiam esse simul Socratem | currentem et Socratem sedentem, tamen haec divisa est falsa ‘Socratem currere impossibile est esse simul cum Socratem sedere’ vel etiam quod Socratem currentem impossibile est esse simul cum Socrate sedente. Immo non solum potest esse simul, sed idem. Socrates enim currens erit Socrates sedens et Socratem currere erit Socratem sedere. ⟨11⟩ Ad aliam dico quod Deum creare est res summe necessaria, sed illa propositio ‘Deus creat’ est contingenter vera. ⟨12⟩ Ad aliam dico quod, sicut equus mortuus non est equus, sed fuit equus, | ita equum esse mortuum non est equus, sed fuit equus; hoc enim participium ‘mortuum’ ampliat suppositionem ad praeterita. Et ita Antichristum esse generandum non est Antichristus, sed erit. Propter solutiones aliarum rationum notanda sunt aliqua, scilicet unde a parte rei propositiones dicantur verae vel falsae. Huiusmodi enim ignoran2 sensus] add. quod Pp 3 aequivalet] aequivaleret Gp 4 homo] add. est Cp 5 esset] est GPp 6 aequivalet] aequivalent GPp 8 dico quod] inv. p 10 socrates2] om. C 11 similiter] om. P ‖ aliam] add. fortiorem rationem p : add. formationem P 12 socrates] om. p ‖ similiter] consimiliter Pp 13 esse socratem] inv. p ‖ socratem2] add. esse C ‖ et2] om. P 14–15 socrates] add. sedens vel p 15 composita] hypothetica P 16 simul2] om. Pp 18 cum] quod C ‖ socratem sedere] socrate sedente p 20 enim] om. G 25 ita … equus3] om. (hom.) P 26 mortuum] motuum G ‖ praeterita] praeteritum p 28 solutiones aliarum] solutionem p ‖ aliqua] add. cum magna (multa P) diligentia GPp 29 dicantur] dicentur G : dicuntur P ‖ vel] aut GPp 29–187.1 huiusmodi enim ignorantia] ignorantia enim G : huius igitur ignorantia P

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tia est causa huiusmodi fictarum et absurdarum opinionum. Suppono igitur cum aliis concorditer quod propositio affirmativa categorica de inesse et de praesenti ex eo est vera, si sit vera, quia qualitercumque significat esse, ita est. Sed illa de futuro non significat aliquo modo esse, sed aliquo modo fore. Ideo si sit vera, non est vera ex eo, quia qualitercumque significat esse, ita est, sed qualitercumque significat fore, ita erit. Ista enim ‘Antichristus erit homo’ est vera, non quia iam ita est, sed quia ita erit. Et sic etiam proportionaliter illa de praeterito, si sit vera, ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat fuisse, ita fuit. Et similiter etiam categorica | de possibili et de praesenti non ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat, ita est in re significata, quia ego suppono quod Deus multas creaturas potest creare, quas numquam creavit vel creabit; infinitos enim homines potest creare, quia non tot quin plures, quia duos, viginti, centum, mille et sic sine statu; et tamen credendum est quod nec infinitos creavit nec infinitos creabit. Tunc igitur aliquis quem potest creare et quem numquam creabit, vocetur c | et hoc nomen imponat vel homo vel Deus ad significandum illum. Tunc igitur haec est vera ‘c potest esse’, et tamen non est ita in re significata per c, quia illud nihil est et quod nihil est nec est ita nec aliter. Igitur talis de possibili ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat posse esse, ita potest esse. Et ista praedicta ad melius memorandum ego signo tamquam octo conclusiones, sive debeant dici conclusiones sive principia. Prima est quod categorica affirmativa de inesse et de praesenti vera ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat esse, ita est. Secunda est quod huiusmodi propositio de futuro, si sit vera, ex eo est vera, quia qualitercumque significat fore, ita erit. Tertia est proportionaliter de praeterito. Quarta est proportionaliter de possibili secundum exigentiam praedictorum. 1 huiusmodi] huius P 2 affirmativa categorica] inv. GPp 5 vera1] add. ipsa Pp ‖ ex eo] om. p 6 sed] add. quia Pp 7–8 proportionaliter] proportionabiliter p 8 quia] om. P 10 est vera] inv. GPp ‖ significat] add. esse p 12 creavit vel] om. GPp ‖ potest creare] inv. P 13 plures] add. et P ‖ duos viginti centum] duos decem centum et P : decem et centum et p ‖ et sic] etc. P 14 quod] om. P ‖ creavit … creabit] creabit nec infinitos creavit p : creavit vel creabit P 15 numquam] non Pp 16 vel1] om. p 17 est ita] inv. G 17–18 per c] om. P 18 illud] illa p : ita P ‖ nec2] add. est p 19 esse] om. G 21 memorandum] removendum sed add. in marg. memorandum C : rememorandum GPp 21–22 conclusiones] om. G 23 quod] quia G 25 secunda] add. conclusio P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 27 tertia] add. conclusio P ‖ proportionaliter] proportionabiliter p 28 proportionaliter] proportionabiliter Pp

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Quinta potest addi quod in assignando causas veritatum illarum de possibili debet mutari locutio secundum exigentiam temporum, ut quod Aristoteles potuit generari; haec est vera, quia qualitercumque significat possibile fuisse, ita possibile fuit. Sexta conclusio est, quae est multum notanda, quia est principium multarum aliarum, quod suppositis formatione propositionum contradictoriarum et omnibus requisitis ad formationem earum, tunc quidquid ultra ex parte | rerum significatarum requiritur ad veritatem affirmativae, requiritur ad falsitatem negativae, et quidquid sufficit ad veritatem affirmativae, illud etiam sufficit ad falsitatem negativae. Ista conclusio probatur cito quia: si aliquid sufficit ad veritatem affirmativae quod non sufficit ad falsitatem negativae, tunc illo posito absque eo quod ultra requiritur ad falsitatem negativae affirmativa esset vera et negativa | non esset falsa, quod est impossibile ipsis formatis. Similiter etiam, si aliquid requiritur ad veritatem affirmativae, quod non requiritur ad falsitatem negativae, tunc possibile est illo non existente negativam esse falsam, et tamen affirmativa non erit vera, quod est impossibile ipsis formatis. Et eodem modo manifestum est e converso, | scilicet quod si aliquid requiritur vel sufficit ad veritatem negativae, tunc omne illud quod requiritur vel etiam sufficit ad veritatem negativae, etiam requiritur vel sufficit ad falsitatem affirmativae. Et eodem modo etiam dicetur in plurali numero, scilicet quaecumque requiruntur vel etiam sufficiunt ad veritatem affirmativae, illa etiam requiruntur vel sufficiunt ad falsitatem negativae et e converso. Septima conclusio, quae etiam est notabilis bene, erit talis quod suppositis ut prius formatione propositionum contradictoriarum et requisitis ad formationem earum, nihil ultra requiritur ad veritatem negativae nec ad falsitatem affirmativae. Hoc probatur quia: si ista propositio ‘equus non currit’ vel ‘lapis non est’ | sit in aliquo intellectu, qui formavit eam, et omnia alia sint annihilata praeter Deum et illum intellectum, quae requiruntur ad

1 potest addi] est P 2 secundum exigentiam temporum] om. P 4 possibile fuit] add. etc. p : fuit possibile etc. P 5 est1] om. Gp ‖ quia] add. ipsa GPp 7 ad] et P ‖ tunc quidquid ultra] tunc ultra quidquid ultra (sup. lin.) C : et quidquid tunc ultra P 8 affirmativae] add. illud GPp 11 sufficit2] sufficiat P 12 eo] hoc P 16 et] om. P 17 et] om. P ‖ est] om. P 18 requiritur vel sufficit] sufficit vel requiritur p 18–19 tunc … negativae] om. (hom.) P 19 etiam requiritur vel] requiritur etiam vel Gp : requiritur etiam et P 20 et] om. P ‖ etiam dicetur] etiam diceretur p : dicendum est P 21 scilicet] om. G ‖ etiam] om. GPp 24 etiam … bene] etiam est bene notabilis Gp : bene est notabilis P ‖ talis] add. scilicet p 29 sint] sunt GPp ‖ illum] intelligentias seu C ‖ quae requiruntur] qui requiritur P

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formationem illius propositionis, vel adhuc si nihil requiratur ad esse illius propositionis nisi Deus, tunc omnibus aliis annihilatis adhuc illa propositio esset vera et affirmativa sibi contradictoria esset falsa, si esset formata. Et ex his sequitur octava conclusio, scilicet quod negativa non debet proprie ex hoc dici vera, quia sicut significat, ita est in re, sed quia affirmativa sibi contradictoria, si sit formata, aliqualiter significat esse vel fuisse, qualiter non est vel non fuit etc. secundum exigentiam diversarum propositionum vel de inesse vel de possibili, de praesenti, de praeterito vel de futuro, sicut ante dictum fuit, ita quod ex defectu alicuius requisiti ad veritatem affirmativae negativa redditur vera. Et similiter propositio negativa ex eo debet dici falsa, quia qualitercumque propositio affirmativa sibi contradictoria, si sit formata, significat esse vel fuisse, ita est vel fuit. Et Aristoteles, cum clare vidisset omnia praedicta, distinguens nomina multiplicia quinto Metaphysicae ponit sive posuit unam significationem huius nominis ‘ens’ vel ‘non ens’, prout idem significat ‘ens’ sicut ‘verum’ et ‘non ens’ sicut ‘falsum’. Nos enim saepe utimur illa significatione, ut de propositione vera nobis proposita affirmativa sive negativa nos dicimus quod ita est et de falsa dicimus quod ita non est. Et per hoc non debemus intelligere quod ita est in re significata, sed solum per ‘ita | esse’ volumus | intelligere quod ipsa est vera et per ‘non ita esse’ quod ipsa est falsa. Hoc exprimit plane Aristoteles quinto Metaphysicae, capitulo de ente. Et Aristoteles etiam in sexto Metaphysicae determinans de praedicta significatione ‘entis’ vel ‘non entis’ dicit quod ens ut verum et non ens ut falsum sunt secundum composi-

1 requiratur] requiritur GPp 2 deus] duo G ‖ aliis] om. P 3 vera] formata P ‖ contradictoria] ante sibi p : add. sua C 5 et] om. Pp ‖ his] istis p 6 ex hoc dici] dici ex hoc P ‖ quia1] quod C 7 vel] om. C ‖ fuisse] add. etc. p : add. et P 8 etc.] et etiam C : et sic P 9 de4] om. Pp ‖ de5] om. Pp 10–11 ita … similiter] om. p 11 et] om. P 12 ex … dici] eo debet dici p : ex eodem dicitur P ‖ propositio] om. Pp 13 fuisse] add. etc. p : add. et P ‖ fuit] add. etc. GPp 14 vidisset] vidisse P ‖ nomina multiplicia] nomina multiplicium G : multiplicia 15 quinto] praem. in Pp ‖ ponit sive] om. GPp 16 idem] om. p ‖ ens sicut] ens quod p : quod P 17 sicut] quod Pp ‖ ut de] in P 18 proposita] add. sive sit Pp 19 dicimus] om. p ‖ per hoc non] per haec non p : propter hoc P 20 per] om. P 21 hoc] sup. lin. C : add. totum P : et hoc totum p : om. G 22 quinto] in secundo P ‖ capitulo] om. P ‖ aristoteles etiam] aristoteles iterum Gp : iterum aristoteles P 23 sexto] octavo p 24 falsum] verum G 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 7, 1017a30–35 22 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 7, 1017a30–35 23 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 4, 1027b17–21, 25–27; cf. AA, 1: 153

32ra C 27vb P

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tionem et divisionem et totaliter circa contradictionis partitionem etc. et quod non est falsum et verum in rebus, sed in mente. Si igitur tu proponas quod equus non est asinus vel quod chimaera non est et respondeatur tibi quod ita est, non debet esse intentio respondentis quod assignet tibi causam quare est vera, sed per hoc intendet concedere quod propositio est vera.

23ra p 25vb G

Istis visis sunt solvendae rationes quae sequebantur. ⟨13⟩ Cum enim dicitur quod chimaeram non esse est aliquid, nego, immo chimaeram non esse nihil est. Et tamen haec propositio ‘chimaera non est’ est vera, quia non taliter est qualiter illa significat esse ‘chimaera est’. ⟨14⟩ Ad aliam dico quod, si nullus esset equus, tunc equum non esse asinum nihil est, sicut dixi de chimaera. Sed si esset aliquis equus, ego bene concederem quod equum non esse asinum est equus qui non est asinus, equum non | currere est equus qui non currit, si aliquis est qui | non currit; sed si omnis equus currit, tunc equum non currere nihil est. ⟨15⟩ Ad aliam concedo illam propositionem ‘ita est quod Antichristus loquetur’ ad illum sensum quod haec est vera ‘Antichristus loquetur’; et ad alium sensum esset falsa. Propter alias rationes est iterum notandum cum diligentia quod, licet uno modo sumatur veritas pro entitate, et sic verum et ens convertuntur, propter quod sic prima veritas est ipse Deus, quamvis ipse sit simplicissimus, iuxta illud dictum divinum ‘ego sum via, veritas et vita’, et huiusmodi verum non habet falsum sibi oppositum, tamen de hoc modo sumendi verum non intendimus ad praesens, sed de vero complexo, cui falsum opponitur, prout dicit Aristoteles quod verum et falsum partiuntur sibi contradictionem.

1 partitionem] participationem CG ‖ etc.] om. P 3 et] om. C 4 est] om. P ‖ assignet] assignat P 5 vera] add. propositio Pp ‖ intendet] add. solum G : intendit solum Pp 7 sunt solvendae] respondetur ad GPp 8 cum] quando Pp ‖ nego] sup. lin. C : praem. ego GPp 10 est vera] ante chimaera (9) Pp ‖ non taliter] totaliter non P ‖ est2] om. G ‖ significat] significaret p 11 si] om. P ‖ esset equus] inv. P ‖ non] om. P 12 est] esset GPp ‖ sicut … chimaera] om. P 13 asinus] add. et GPp 14 aliquis] add. equus P 15 omnis … non] nullus equus currit tunc equum p 17 loquetur] loquitur P ‖ loquetur et] loquitur et p : loquitur P 19 iterum] om. P 20 sic] om. P 21 ipse deus] aliquis P ‖ ipse2] om. GPp 22 huiusmodi] hoc P 24–25 prout dicit aristoteles] prout aristoteles dicit Pp : probat aristoteles C 25 partiuntur] patiuntur CPp 22 Io 14, 6 25 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 4, 1027b19–22

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Et sic verum et falsum non sunt nisi in mente componente vel dividente secundum affirmationem vel negationem, ut ibidem dicit Aristoteles. Et si aliquis dicat in voce vel in scriptura esse verum vel falsum, hoc non est verum formaliter, sed significative tantum. Propositio enim vocalis non dicitur vera | vel falsa nisi quia significat mentalem veram vel falsam, sicut urina non dicitur sana quia sit sana formaliter, sed solum quia significat animal esse sanum. Propositio autem mentalis est vera vel falsa formaliter, immo est ipsa veritas vel falsitas complexa, nec ipsa amplius dicitur vera vel falsa quia ulterius significat verum vel falsum. Si enim in mente formetur ista ‘Deus non est’, est falsa formaliter et nullum falsum significat, nisi dicatur significare se ipsam, quod non est proprie verum, sed extra nihil falsum significat. Non enim verum et falsum sunt in rebus, sicut bonum et malum, ut dicit Aristoteles, sed in mente. Unde iterum quoad hoc ponam aliquas conclusiones breves supponendo, sive sit falsum sive verum, quod impossibile est chimaeram esse; ideo chimaeram | esse nihil est nec potest esse. Similiter hominem esse asinum nihil est nec potest esse. Ista concederet Aristoteles. Tunc est prima conclusio quod chimaera non potest intelligi nec per aliquod nomen significari et similiter hominem esse asinum non potest ab aliquo intelligi nec per aliquod nomen vel per aliquam orationem significari. Hoc probatur quia: in omnibus dictis propositionibus subiecta pro nullo supponunt; et omnis propositio affirmativa in qua subiectum pro nullo supponit est falsa; ideo negativa sibi contradictoria est vera; sed illae sunt negativae; igitur sunt verae et concedendae. 1 vel] et p 2 vel] corr. ex et C : et P ‖ ut] prout P : et C 3 et] quod C ‖ in scriptura esse] scriptura esse p : scriptura esset G : scripto esse P ‖ verum vel] om. P 5 dicitur … falsa] est vera vel falsa dicitur P 6 quia sit sana] om. CG ‖ formaliter] add. in se P 7 autem] tamen P ‖ falsa] rep. G ‖ formaliter] mentaliter C 9 significat] significet GP 10 est1] add. ipsa Pp ‖ falsa formaliter] inv. P ‖ dicatur] dicitur p 11 ipsam] add. et P ‖ verum] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ extra nihil] ad extra nullum p : ad extra vel P 12 verum et falsum] falsum et verum P 14 unde iterum quoad] unde iuxta Gp : iuxta P ‖ ponam] ego iterum pono Gp : pono P ‖ aliquas conclusiones breves] conclusiones aliquas P ‖ supponendo] om. G 15 falsum sive verum] verum sive falsum GPp ‖ est] sit G ‖ esse] add. et GPp 16 esse2] add. et P ‖ esse3] est G 17 potest esse] inv. Pp ‖ ista concederet] istam concederet P : istam concedit G : ita concederet p 18 nec] vel Pp 19 nomen] om. p ‖ significari] significare et figuraliter hominem esse asinum non potest ab aliquo intelligi nec per aliquod nomen significari G ‖ et] om. P 20 nec] vel Pp 21 hoc] quod G ‖ dictis] om. G 23 sibi contradictoria] eius G 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 4, 1027b25–27; cf. AA, 1: 153 sica, VI, 4, 1027b25–27; cf. AA, 1: 153

13 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphy-

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Secunda conclusio est quod nullus potest intelligere chimaeram, quod hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ non significat chimaeram, quod nullus potest intelligere hominem esse asinum et quod haec oratio ‘homo est asinus’ non significat hominem esse asinum. Hoc probatur sic quia: sequitur ‘ego intelligo b, igitur b intelligitur a me’, ‘hoc nomen “b” significat b, igitur b | significatur per hoc nomen “b”’; et ita similiter sequitur ‘aliquis potest intelligere chimaeram vel hominem esse asinum, igitur chimaera vel hominem esse asinum potest intelligi ab aliquo’; sed consequens est falsum, ut patet per conclusionem praecedentem; igitur antecedens similiter. Similiter sequitur ‘hoc nomen vel haec oratio significat chimaeram vel hominem esse asinum, igitur chimaera vel hominem esse asinum significatur per hoc nomen vel per hanc orationem’; et consequens est impossibile, ut patet per priorem conclusionem; igitur et antecedens. Sed statim obicitur quia: hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ vel haec oratio ‘hominem esse asinum’ etiam sumpta significative et non materialiter sunt voces significativae ad placitum. Igitur significant non solum se ipsas vel conceptus sibi correspondentes, quia hoc non es|set | nisi sumere eas materialiter, et cum hoc etiam ista oratio esset falsa ‘chimaera nihil est’ vel ‘hominem esse asinum nihil est’, si illae voces non significarent nisi se ipsas vel conceptus sibi correspondentes, quia et illae voces et illi conceptus sunt verae res. Et non apparet quid aliud illae voces possunt significare, nisi significant chimaeram et hominem esse asinum. Et etiam, cum significare sit intellectum rei constituere, quid intelligis per hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ nisi chimaeram? Respondetur quod praedictae voces et conceptus eis correspondentes significant multa extra animam existentia. Hoc apparet de ista oratione ‘hominem esse asinum’, quae in se includit istos terminos ‘hominem’ et ‘asinum’, qui indifferenter significant omnes homines et asinos. Ideo illa oratio

1 est quod] quod p : quia G 1–2 quod2 … chimaera] per hoc nomen chimaera cum p 2 quod] quia Gp 3 et quod] quod GP : quia p 4 hoc] quod G ‖ sic] om. GPp 5 b] om. C 6 ita] om. G ‖ aliquis] aliquid C 7 chimaera] chimaeram GP 8 sed] hoc G 8–9 conclusionem praecedentem] inv. GPp 9 antecedens similiter] et antecedens GPp 12 et] sed P ‖ conclusionem] rep. G 13 antecedens] add. etiam est falsum Pp 14 obicitur quia] obicitur quod Pp : obiceretur quia G ‖ vel haec oratio] et haec oratio Gp : et hanc orationem P 15 sumpta] sumptis p 16 vel] add. etiam Pp 19 se] semet G 20 et illae] et illi G : etiam illae p ‖ et non] inv. p 21 quid] quod P ‖ possunt] possint Pp : possent G ‖ significant] significent G : significarent p 22 cum significare] significarent p ‖ rei] rem C 23 intelligis] add. tu GP : intelligas tu p ‖ nisi] non G 24 et] add. etiam Gp 25 existentia] add. et GPp ‖ oratione] ratione p 27 et] add. omnes Gp : omnes P 27–193.1 ideo … asinos] om. (hom.) P

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ratione illorum terminorum significat multa, scilicet homines et asinos. Ita quamvis Aristoteles credat quod impossibile est vacuum esse, sicut dicimus de chimaera, tamen diceret quod hoc nomen ‘vacuum’ significat valde multa et extra animam existentia, quia tot et eadem significat implicite, quot et quae sua descriptio dicens quid nominis significat explicite. Et ista descriptio est ‘locus non repletus corpore’, quae omnia loca et omnia corpora indifferenter | significat per istos terminos ‘locus’ et ‘corpore’. Et sic etiam per illud nomen ‘vacuum’ ego omnia loca et omnia corpora intelligo. Et etiam per illam orationem ‘homo est asinus’ vel ‘hominem esse asinum’ ego omnes asinos et omnes homines intelligo. Sic etiam, si detur descriptio huius nominis ‘chimaera’ dicens quid nominis, quae sit ‘compositum ex incompossibilibus componi’, ego per illam descriptionem et per consequens per hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ intelligo indifferenter omnia composita propter hoc nomen ‘compositum’ quod in eius ratione implicatur. Tertia conclusio est quod nihil aliud et nihil plus vel minus significatur a parte rei extra animam nostram per istam propositionem ‘Deus est Deus’ quam per illam propositionem ‘Deus non est Deus’. Probatur quia: si haec propositio ‘Deus non est Deus’ significaret plus vel aliud ad extra quam illa propositio ‘Deus est Deus’, hoc esset pro tanto, quia significaret Deum | non esse Deum; sed hoc est falsum, quia Deum non esse Deum nihil est; ideo per | nullam dictionem vel orationem significatur nec significari potest et a nullo etiam intelligi potest secundum praedicta. Sed tu obicies quia: si illae mentales ‘Deus est Deus’ et ‘Deus non est Deus’ nihil aliud significant una quam alia, quare igitur concedis unam et negas aliam vel etiam quare assentis uni et dissentis alteri? Respondetur quod hoc est non quia alia significant, sed quia eadem alio et alio modo. Et illi modi non sunt res extra, sed sunt duae operationes intellectus, quarum una vocatur compositio conceptuum simplicium, id 1 terminorum] nominum C 2 vacuum esse] inv. p 4 et1] etiam Gp : om. P ‖ significat] significant P 5 dicens] exprimens p 6 omnia2] om. P 7 significat] significant P 8 et2] om. P 9 ego] om. p 9–10 asinos … homines] homines et omnes asinos Pp 10 intelligo] add. et p ‖ detur] declaratur C 11 incompossibilibus] impossibilibus GPp 12 descriptionem] add. intelligo G 13 propter] per C 15 et … vel] nec nihil plus nec C 16 nostram] om. p 17 propositionem] om. Pp 18 quam] quod G 19 propositio] om. Pp 21 vel] add. per p ‖ significatur nec] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 22 etiam] ante a (21) p 23 et] om. P 24 significant] significarent p ‖ igitur] om. p 25 etiam quare] etiam p : quare P ‖ assentis … dissentis] dissentis uni vel assentis P 26 respondetur] respondeo Gp ‖ alia significant] alia significat C : aliud significant P 27 res] add. ad p ‖ duae] illae CP 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 8, 214b12–13, 216b20; cf. AA, 2: 130

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est complexio affirmativa, et alia divisio eorum, id est complexio negativa. Quare igitur compositio conceditur magis quam divisio? Causa est, quia qualitercumque affirmativa significat esse, ita est. Ob hoc enim affirmativa est vera et ob hoc idem negativa est falsa secundum dicta prius.

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Istis sic visis respondetur ad rationes quae sequebantur. ⟨16⟩ Quando enim dicitur quod omne verum est aliquid, concedo, si enuntiatio est aliquid, quia omne verum, scilicet complexum habens contradictorium falsum, est enuntiatio, et de tali vero loquimur. Et omnino concedo quod omne verum, quocumque modo consueto sumamus hoc nomen ‘verum’, est aliquid vel aliqua; ita etiam et omne falsum est aliquid vel aliqua. Et concedo etiam quod omnis propositio vel enuntiatio vocalis significat verum vel falsum, quia significat propositionem mentalem veram vel falsam. Sed propositio mentalis non amplius significat verum vel fal|sum nisi sumendo veritatem pro entitate, ita quod haec nomina ‘verum’ et ‘ens’ convertantur. Sed sic sumendo dicam quod ita propositio falsa et impossibilis, sicut vera, et negativa, sicut affirmativa, significat verum vel vera, quia significat ens vel entia. ⟨17⟩ Ad aliam concedo ut prius quod sumendo verum prout habet sibi oppositum falsum, nihil incomplexum est verum vel | falsum; et ideo nullus equus est sic verum vel falsum. Ideo etiam dico quod equum esse animal nec est sic verum nec est falsum, nisi equum esse animal supponat materialiter. Et dictum est prius quod ista mentalis ‘equus est animal’ nec significat verum nec falsum. Si autem aliqui auctores, ut auctor ille Summularum, dicant quod omnis enuntiatio est verum vel falsum significans, apparet quod ipsi non loquuntur nisi de enuntiationibus vocalibus, quia ipsi prius definiebant nomen et verbum et orationem et per consequens propositionem et | enuntiationem per hoc quod est vox significativa ad placitum etc.

3 affirmativa significat] inv. p 4 hoc] om. P ‖ idem] add. eadem C 5 sic visis respondetur] ergo visis respondendum est GPp ‖ sequebantur] sequuntur p 6 aliquid] add. ego GP 8 loquimur] add. nunc Pp ‖ omnino] add. ego P : omnia ego p 13 vel] aut P 14–15 convertantur] convertuntur p 15 sumendo] add. ego Pp 16 vel] ideo G 18 ut] sicut P 18–19 sibi oppositum falsum] falsum sibi oppositum Gp : falsum oppositum P 19 nihil] vel p 20 est sic] inv. G ‖ etiam] add. ego GPp 21 nec est2] nec GP : vel p ‖ supponat] supponit P 22 et] ut P 23 auctores] doctores G ‖ auctor ille] ille p : sunt P 24 dicant] dicat C ‖ apparet] om. P 25 ipsi prius] inv. P 25–26 definiebant] post orationem (26) p 23 Cf. Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus, I, 7 (ed. De Rijk, 3)

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⟨18⟩ Ad aliam rationem quae incipit ‘et omnino’ etc., ego dico quod ego credo in Deum, in patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum etc. Deinde credo hanc esse veram ‘Deus est trinus et unus’ propter hoc quod ego credo Deum esse trinum et unum, hoc est dictu quod perprius et principalius ego assentio et adhaereo huic propositioni ‘Deus est trinus et unus’ quam isti ‘haec est vera “Deus est trinus et unus”’. Et haec contra dicta non sunt. ⟨19–21⟩ Omnes aliae rationes manifeste solvuntur per conclusiones quae ultimo positae fuerunt et per earum declarationes. Haec de quaestione. | 1 aliam rationem] aliam Pp : ultimam rationem C 2 in2] om. P ‖ et1] in p ‖ et2] in p ‖ etc.] om. P ‖ deinde] add. ego Pp 3–4 deum esse] inv. P 6 vera] add. quod GPp ‖ contra dicta] post sunt GPp 8 ultimo] ultimae p 9 haec de quaestione] etc. G : et sic est finis etc. P : etc. sequitur alia quaestio p

26va G

⟨i.19⟩

⟨Utrum illud quod in generatione substantiali generatur sit materia vel forma vel compositum⟩ Decimo nono quaeritur consequenter ad praecedentia et ad declarationem eorum utrum illud quod in generatione substantiali generatur est materia vel forma vel compositum. Arguitur primo quod illud est materia: ⟨1⟩ Per Commentatorem primo huius dicentem quod materia est quae in rei veritate generatur. ⟨2⟩ Et arguitur ratione quia: sicut subiectum motus se habet ad moveri, ita subiectum generationis ad generari; sed subiectum motus vere et proprie loquendo movetur; igitur subiectum generationis vere et proprie loquendo generatur, quod est materia prima. Et descendendo ad specialia subiectum alterationis vere alteratur, subiectum calefactionis calefit, subiectum motus localis movetur localiter; igitur similiter subiectum generationis sive substantialis sive accidentalis generatur; et hoc subiectum in substantiali generatione est materia prima; igitur illud quod generatur est materia prima. ⟨3⟩ Iterum tertio huius: ‘generatio est actus generabilis secundum quod generabile’. Et cum generatio substantialis sit forma substantialis secundum dicta prius, ipsa non est actus nisi agentis, ut a quo, et passi, scilicet materiae primae, ut in quo; sed agens non ponitur esse generabile, cum ante sit quam

4 quaeritur] ante decimo nono GPp ‖ consequenter] om. C 4–5 consequenter … eorum] om. P 5 eorum] earum p ‖ in … generatur] in substantiali generatione generatur p : generatione substantiali generatur P : generatur generatione substantiali G ‖ est] sit P 6 vel1] om. Gp 10 se habet] ante subiectum p : om. GP 11 vere et] om. C 12–13 vere … prima] quod est prima (post materia P : om. p) materia vere et proprie generatur GPp 15 localiter] add. etc. GP 16 subiectum] solum P 16–17 substantiali generatione] inv. GPp 20 cum generatio substantialis] tamen generatio substantialis cum GPp 20–21 secundum dicta prius] om. G 21 nisi] om. G 22 primae] add. scilicet P ‖ esse generabile] inv. P 8 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 60, f. 36C 21 Cf. sup., I, q. 17, 17127–28

19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 1, 201a10–14

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agat; igitur materia debet poni esse generabilis; et tamen non generatur nisi quia erat generabilis; igitur materia est quae generatur.

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Oppositum arguitur: ⟨1⟩ Auctoritate Aristotelis dicentis quod necesse est illam primam materiam esse ingenerabilem et incorruptibilem et perpetuam. ⟨2⟩ Item septimo Metaphysicae dicitur quod nec materia fit nec forma fit, sed compositum est quod fit; et idem reputo generari et fieri; igitur materia non generatur. Deinde arguitur quod forma fit per se et primo quia: ⟨1⟩ Ipsa secundum se totam | est, cum ante non esset; et hoc est simpliciter fieri. Sed materia non sic est, cum ante non esset; ideo non simpliciter fit. Et etiam compositum licet sit, cum ante non esset, tamen hoc est ratione partis | quae est forma, et non ratione partis quae est materia; ideo hoc | non est per se et primo. ⟨2⟩ Item illud vere et proprie generatur per se et primo, quod secundum se totum producitur ab agente et educitur de potentia materiae; et hoc est forma et nihil aliud. Compositum enim nec producitur ab agente nec educitur de potentia materiae nisi ratione partis suae, scilicet formae; ideo non per se et primo generatur etc. ⟨1⟩ Oppositum iam allegatum est ex septimo Metaphysicae, quod nec forma fit nec materia fit etc. ⟨2⟩ Item sicut albedo non est alba, ita nec generatio est generata; sed generatio est forma, ut ante dictum est; igitur ipsa non est generata; nec igitur ipsa est quae generabatur.

1 materia] add. prima p 2 quia erat generabilis] quod erat generabile Pp 4–5 primam materiam] inv. P 5 ingenerabilem] ingenitam GPp 6 nec materia] materia non P ‖ fit2] om. G 9 et primo] om. P 11 simpliciter fit] praem. sic C : inv. GPp 13 et] om. GPp 14 et] om. P 15 proprie … primo] per se generatur P 19 et] om. P ‖ generatur etc.] generatur (sup. lin.) etc. C : ergo etc. Gp : om. P 20 est] ante iam p 20–21 forma … fit2] materia fit nec forma p 23 dictum est] dictum fuit p : non fuit P ‖ ipsa] illa p 24 est] om. G 4 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a26–29 6 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 8, 1033b17–18; cf. AA, 1: 172 20 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 8, 1033b17–18; cf. AA, 1: 172 23 Cf. sup., I, q. 17, 17127–28

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⟨3⟩ Et confirmatur auctoritate Aristotelis in quinto huius, ubi dicit quod nec motus est motus nec generationis generatio; ideo nec motus movetur nec generatio generatur; igitur forma, cum sit generatio, non generatur.

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Deinde arguitur quod compositum proprie generatur: ⟨1⟩ Auctoritate iam pluri|es allegata ex septimo Metaphysicae. ⟨2⟩ Et primo etiam huius dicitur quod semper compositum est quod fit. ⟨3⟩ Et etiam eius quod generatur principia debent esse materia et forma. Unde dicit Aristoteles primo huius quod, quae natura sunt et fiunt, fiunt ex subiecto et forma. Et tale est compositum. Oppositum arguitur quia: si compositum generetur, hoc non est per se et primo, sed solum ratione partis, cum una pars eius sit ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis.

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Notandum est quod valde diversus modus loquendi est de motu et de generatione vel corruptione simpliciter, quia moveri non dicimus illud quod acquiritur vel abicitur, ut caliditatem, frigiditatem, sed subiectum manens idem; ita non dicimus caliditatem calefieri, sed hominem vel aquam. Sed illud quod acquiritur dicimus generari sive fieri et quod abicitur corrumpi, et non subiectum manens idem. Et oportet considerare causam huius diversitatis locutionis. Causa enim est, quia substantia per se subsistens in actu est nobis nota et vulgo et eam reputamus esse ens simpliciter et principaliter; et ideo de ea quaerimus et respondemus, quando simpliciter quaerimus quid est hoc. Materia autem prima non est | nota vulgo. Igitur motus et mutationes non attribuimus materiae primae, sed substantiae compositae per se subsistenti. Propter hoc igitur illam substantiam per se subsistentem, quae

1 quinto] septimo P 2 generationis] add. est P ‖ ideo] igitur P 5 pluries allegata] prius allegata pluries P 6 etiam] om. P ‖ compositum est] inv. G 7 quod] rep. G ‖ debent] dicuntur P 8 natura] add. in marg. seu naturaliter C 10 generetur] generaretur tamen P ‖ est] esset P 11 et1] om. P 13 est1] om. P ‖ de2] om. P 14 vel] add. de G ‖ simpliciter] similiter C ‖ non dicimus] inv. GPp 15 caliditatem] add. vel P 16 ita] ut Pp 17 dicimus] om. P ‖ et] om. p 18 huius] huiusmodi p 21 et1] om. Pp ‖ quando simpliciter quaerimus] om. CG 22 prima] om. P ‖ igitur] praem. ideo p 23 materiae primae] inv. Gp ‖ compositae] add. et G 24 subsistenti] add. non P 1 Aristoteles, Physica, V, 2, 225b14–16 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 8, 1033b17–18; cf. AA, 1: 172 6 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b11–12 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b20

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in motu manet eadem ante et post, dicimus moveri, alterari, augmentari aut diminui. Sed materiam manentem nec generari dicimus nec corrumpi, immo quia per generationem substantialem substantia per se subsistens est, quae ante non erat, illam dicimus generari, et quia per corruptionem illa substantia non est, quae prius erat, ideo etiam illam dicimus corrumpi. Et non sunt haec male dicta, quia nomina significant ad placitum. Deinde etiam, quia propter praedictam causam nos sic dicimus generari et corrumpi illud quod prius non est et posterius est vel e converso, ideo etiam illum modum loquendi observamus in generationibus accidentium. Si enim homo fiat albus, non dicimus hominem fieri vel generari, sed albedinem, licet dicimus ipsum calefieri vel alterari. Notandum est etiam quod propter istum diversum modum | loquendi non debemus credere, quin proportionaliter se habeat motus ad subiectum motus sicut generatio ad subiectum generationis. Unde sicut in motu forma quae acquiritur est motus et non subiectum, ita in generatione forma est generatio et non subiectum. Istis notatis dico quod tam materia quam forma quam compositum dicitur generari, diversis tamen modis, et | eadem generatione quodlibet illorum dicitur generari suo modo. Forma enim dicitur generari, quia est ipsa generatio et quia secundum se totam est, cum ante non esset. Materia autem dicitur generari, quia subicitur illi generationi et quia est formata tali forma qua non erat prius formata, et non quia sit, cum ante non esset. Ideo etiam non dicitur simpliciter generari vel | fieri, sed cum addito, sicut si homo calefiat, non dicitur fieri, sed fieri calidus. Compositum autem dicitur generari, quia componitur ex ipsa generatione et subiecto generationis, et quia etiam ipsum est, cum ante non esset; sed hoc, scilicet esse, cum ante non esset, non convenit sibi primo, sed ratione partis, scilicet formae, quae est generatio. Tunc igitur dico quod illa auctoritas Aristotelis, quod materia non fit nec forma fit, sed compositum, potest exponi quod hoc dixit secundum vulga1 eadem] om. G 1–2 augmentari aut] augmentari et Gp : augeri aut P 5 etiam] om. p 6 haec] post dicta P 7 propter] per P ‖ et] aut Pp 11 dicimus] dicamus GPp 12 etiam quod] quod p : tamen P ‖ diversum modum] inv. P ‖ loquendi] add. nos G 13 proportionaliter] proportionabiliter p 14 generatio … sicut2] rep. P 17 notatis] add. ego p 18 illorum] eorum G 22 et] om. G 23 et] om. p 24 cum addito] cum additione fieri sub tali forma Pp : generari vel fieri sub tali forma G 25 si homo] inv. GPp 27 etiam] om. p 31 fit] om. Pp ‖ quod hoc dixit] om. p

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rem locutionem non percipientem materiam et formam distincte. Vel | credo quod potest exponi melius, scilicet quod forma non fit tamquam illud totale quod in se includit omne illud cui attribuitur fieri seu generari illa generatione, nec etiam materia fit illo modo, quia nec materia includit in se formam nec e converso, cum tamen utrique attribuatur fieri; sed compositum est quod illo modo fit. Et aliqui volentes hoc ad breviora verba reducere dicunt quod materia generatur subiective et forma terminative et compositum totalitative. Rationes autem quae fiebant, quod materia generatur, concludunt bene quod materia generatur, id est in generatione subicitur. Sed sic dicitur ingenerabilis, quia numquam est verum dicere quod ipsa sit, cum ante non esset, nisi hoc sit per miraculosam creationem. Rationes autem de forma concludunt quod ipsa sic generatur, quia est, cum ante non esset. Et quando arguitur quod albedo non est alba, igitur generatio non est generata vel non generatur, dico quod de hoc dicetur in quinto libro; etiam de illa auctoritate ‘motus non est motus nec generationis generatio’. Et nunc dico quod in multis abstractum verificatur de concreto et e converso, licet hoc non consueverimus in omnibus, ut quod privatum est privatio, potentia est potens, unitas est una, Deus est divinus, deitas est Deus etc. Rationes autem de composito arguunt secundum ea quae praedicta fuerunt. Et sic patet quaestio nona decima etc. 2 fit] sit p 3 includit] add. in marg. claudit C : claudit Pp ‖ seu] sive GPp 4 includit] claudit GPp 5 attribuatur] attribuitur Pp 10 materia … est] ipsa generatur id est P : ipsa generetur et p 11 dicere] om. GPp 12 miraculosam creationem] L : creationem miraculosam U : miraculosum creatorem sed add. sup. lin. seu miraculosam creationem C : miraculosum creatorem ABGHMPTp 13 quia] corr. sup. lin. ex quod C : quod G : add. ipsa p 14 et quando] quando autem Pp 15 generata] genita p ‖ dicetur] dicitur G 16 auctoritate] add. quod GPp 17 nunc] add. ego P : tunc ego p 18 consueverimus] consuevimus p : concederemus P 19 est1] rep. p ‖ deus est divinus] om. GPp ‖ etc.] om. Gp 20 rationes] praem. nunc C ‖ autem] etiam p ‖ praedicta] dicta p 21 et … etc.] et sic est finis etc. G : et sic est P : om. p 15 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, V, q. 9 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 91rb–92va) 16 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, V, q. 8 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 90va–91rb)

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⟨Utrum materia prima sit ens⟩ Vicesimo quaeritur utrum materia prima est ens.

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Arguitur quod non quia: | ⟨1⟩ Septimo Metaphysicae dicitur quod materia nec est quid nec quale nec quantum etc. ⟨2⟩ Iterum ipsa non est nisi in potentia; et tale non est ens, sicut Antichristus. ⟨3⟩ Item ex materia fit aliquid per se; et tamen Aristoteles dicit in primo huius quod nec ex eo quod est neque quod est possibile fieri, nisi secundum accidens; igitur ipsa non est ens. ⟨4⟩ Item ipsa est idem numero cum privatione, ut dicit Aristoteles; quam tamen ipse dicit esse per se non ens. ⟨5⟩ Item Commentator dicit quod ipsa est medium inter esse et non esse; inter quae nihil est medium.

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Pono breviter plures | conclusiones. Prima est quod materia est ens, quia aliter illae propositiones affirmativae non essent verae, quae immediate dictae sunt, scilicet quod materia est | substantia et natura et causa et principium.

3 vicesimo quaeritur] inv. P : quaestio vicesima quaeritur vicesimo p : deinceps quaeritur G 4 arguitur] praem. et GP 7 in] om. G ‖ non est2] non dicitur P : nondum est Gp 9 in] om. P 10 nec] add. est G ‖ neque] add. in marg. ex eo C : add. ex eo p ‖ quod3] add. sup. lin. non C : add. non p ‖ possibile fieri] possibile est (sup. lin.) fieri aliquid (sup. lin.) C : aliquid est possibile fieri p 11 ens] om. GPp 21 et1] om. Pp ‖ et2 … principium] et principium etc. p : om. P 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 3, 1029a20–21; cf. AA, 1: 161 9–10 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 8, 191b18–19 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b24–27 13 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 8, 191b16–17 14 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, VIII, comm. 4, f. 211E; cf. AA, 1: 213

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Secunda conclusio est quod ipsa est ens in actu, non solum in potentia, quia esse solum in potentia non est esse, sed posse esse; materia autem prima non solum potest esse, sed est, ut dictum est. Et hoc patet nono Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur | quod esse in actu est existere rem et esse solum in potentia non est existere rem. Item si materia non esset in actu, sed solum in potentia, tunc ipsa non magis esset quam Antichristus vel forma Antichristi, quae nihil est; et hoc est falsum. Tertia conclusio est quod materia est actus et esset actus, licet existeret sine forma sive substantiali sive accidentali sibi inhaerente. Et ad declarationem huius conclusionis et aliarum sequentium notanda sunt aliqua quae magis habent locum in nono Metaphysicae, ubi appropriate determinatur de actu et potentia. Notandum est quod hoc verbum ‘esse’ simpliciter praedicatum de aliquo subiecto significat idem quod ‘esse in actu’ et hoc verbum ‘posse esse’ significat idem quod ‘esse in potentia’. Aliquando autem tam ‘esse’ quam ‘posse esse’ praedicantur secundo adiacens, ut ‘Socrates est’ et ‘Socrates potest esse’, et aliquando tertio adiacens, ut ‘Socrates est albus’, ‘Socrates potest esse albus’. Sicut igitur significat idem dicere ‘Socrates est albus’ et ‘Socrates est actu albus’, et similiter ‘Socrates potest esse albus’ et ‘Socrates est in potentia albus’, ita significat idem dicere ‘Socrates est’ et ‘Socrates est in actu’, et similiter ‘Socrates potest esse’ et ‘Socrates est in potentia’. Postea etiam notandum est ex quarto Metaphysicae quod in nulla re differt esse ab essentia vel essentia ab esse aut etiam entitas ab ente vel ens ab entitate, ita quod essentia hominis nihil aliud est quam hominem

4 dicitur quod] dicitur p : dicit quod P 9 est1] om. p 10 sibi] sive p ‖ et] item p 11 huius] istius P 14 est] add. igitur GPp ‖ hoc … praedicatum] si hoc verbum esse simpliciter praedicatur P ‖ praedicatum] praedicans in marg. C 15 significat] significante p 17 secundo adiacens] secundo adiacentia p : duo adiacentia P ‖ et] om. GPp 18 tertio adiacens] tertio adiacentia p : tria adiacentia P ‖ albus] add. et p 19 igitur] illa P 20 socrates] om. C 22 est] potest esse C 23 quarto] decimo (corr. sup. lin. ex nono) C 24 aut] vel p ‖ ente] entitate C 25 entitate ita] entitate p : ente ita P ‖ aliud est] inv. GPp 3–4 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IX, 6, 1048a30–31 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IX, 1–10, 1045b28–1052a11; cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IX, q. 2 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 56vb–57ra), qq. 6–8 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 58vb–60rb) 23 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IV, q. 8 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 18vb)

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esse; et hominem esse est homo qui est; ideo essentia hominis est homo qui est. Unde non est credendum quod forma substantialis hominis sit essentia hominis, sed est de essentia hominis tamquam pars essentiae et pars principalior. Et ita etiam materia hominis non est essentia hominis, sed de essentia hominis. Similiter est dicendum de omni alio quod est. Eodem modo etiam dicendum est de entitate et ente. Idem enim est entitas hominis et hominem esse ens, et hominem esse ens non est nisi homo. Item tertio notandum est quod, licet multa entia habeant | esse per causas suae entitatis vel essentiae extrinsecas | active, finaliter vel subiective, tamen omne ens sua sola entitate vel essentia est illud quod est essentialiter et intrinsece. Ideo semper essentia sua manente, omnibus | aliis circumscriptis, esset illud quod ipsum est. Ex his probatur tertia conclusio prius posita quia: eodem modo et non alio materia prima est actu illud quod ipsa est essentialiter et intrinsece, quo ipsa est illud quod est essentialiter et intrinsece (hoc patet per primum notabile); sed materia est essentialiter illud quod est sua entitate vel essentia et non aliquo alio, ut dicitur in tertio notabili; igitur ipsa est actu illud quod est essentialiter sua entitate vel essentia et non aliquo alio. Ex quo sequitur per secundum notabile quod ipsa se ipsa et non aliquo alio essentialiter est actu illud quod est, et esset omni alio circumscripto ipsa manente. Sed ultra dicam quod ipsa non est actu aliquid sine actu. Igitur ipsa est ille actus, scilicet quo essentialiter ipsa est actu illud quod est. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles in nono Metaphysicae, cum dicit quod actus est existere rem, non sicut dicimus in potentia, id est non solum sicut dicimus quod ipsa potest esse, sed quod ipsa est. Et sic ego credo quod loquendo de actu et de potentia simpliciter, scilicet in essendo, omnis res est actus et in actu. Sed tunc dubitatur quomodo concedimus quod anima Antichristi est in potentia. Nam sicut tu dicebas quod materia non est in actu sine actu, ita illa 1 est1] et C 3 essentia1] forma G 4 non est] inv. Pp ‖ hominis2] om. p 5 hominis] add. et Gp ‖ alio] esse p 6 etiam] et p : om. P 7 et2 … ens2] hominem esse ens non est nisi homo in marg. C : om. (hom.) Pp 9 suae] sui P 10 vel essentia] om. G 10–11 et intrinsece] om. P 11 sua] sui P 12 illud] idem C ‖ est] sup. lin. C : om. G 14 illud] id p 15 illud quod est] illud quod ipsa est p : om. P 16 est1] add. ens C ‖ vel] et p 17 alio] add. modo C ‖ dicitur] dicebatur GPp 18 est] om. p ‖ et] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ quo] qua G 19–20 essentialiter est] est essentialiter et C 20 ipsa] ipso p 21 ultra] add. ego P : add. ergo p 22 ipsa] ista p ‖ quod] add. ipsa Pp 23 cum] ubi P ‖ actus … rem] corr. ex actu existere rem est C : actu existere rem est p ‖ non] tamen P 24 id est] om. Pp 25 de2] om. GPp 26 actus] actu p 27 concedimus] concedemus Gp : concederemus P 28 nam sicut tu] non sicut p 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IX, 6, 1048a30–31

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anima non est in potentia sine potentia. Et ubi est igitur illa potentia et quae res est illa potentia? Nam si tu dicis quod illa potentia est in materia, tunc si anima Antichristi est in potentia, ipsa est in materia, quod est falsum, quia ipsa nihil est et quod nihil est nec est | in materia nec in alio. Respondeo quod anima Antichristi est in potentia et quod ipsa est potentia. Et haec omnia dicere nihil plus significant nisi quod ipsa potest esse. Sed tu quaeris: si illa anima est potentia, ubi est illa potentia et quae res est illa potentia? Ego dico quod haec nomina ‘potentia’, ‘potest’ et ‘possibile’ supponunt bene pro his quae non sunt, sed possunt esse, et ampliant etiam subiecta de quibus praedicantur ad sic supponendum. Et sic ego dico quod anima Antichristi est illa potentia, et sic aliquod ens | et aliqua res est illa potentia. Sed tamen illa potentia nec est anima Antichristi nec est aliqua res, sed erit, et sic illa potentia erit actus. Unde ego concederem quod, sicut anima tua se ipsa essentialiter est actus et in actu, ita anima Antichristi se ipsa essentialiter est potentia et in potentia, quia hoc non significat nisi quod ipsa potest esse essentialiter et intrinsece se ipsa. Quarta conclusio ponitur quod semper materia prima est actu quanta et qualis et actu formata forma substantiali. Hoc patet manifeste, quia concedimus quod numquam est sine forma substantiali vel sine quantitate et qualitatibus pluribus, per quas ipsa est actu quanta et qualis etc. Et hoc | ego dico, nisi Deus miraculose velit eam conservare | sine illis, sed pro nunc huiusmodi miracula circumscribo. Adhuc crederem quintam conclusionem esse veram quod, licet materia esset sine aliqua forma sive substantiali sive accidentali sibi inhaerente, tamen ipsa esset actu quanta, quia hoc nomen ‘quantum’ vel ‘quantitas’ extendimus ad numerum; et ipsa sicut nunc est suae partes duae vel tres, ita adhuc esset ipsa illae partes; ideo esset binarius et ternarius; et esse binarium est esse quantum quantitate multitudinis; et esse quantum est esse actu quantum secundum dicta prius.

1 est igitur] inv. GPp ‖ et2] vel P 2 tu dicis] tu dicas Gp : dicas P ‖ si2] om. p 4 et … est2] om. (hom.) Pp 7 illa anima] inv. P ‖ et] vel etiam P 9 potest] potens P 10 ampliant] ampliam G 11 supponendum] add. sic dico P 18 quarta] quinta p 19 qualis] quale P 20 et] vel P 21 qualis] aequalis P ‖ et2] om. p 22 velit] vellet G ‖ conservare] corr. ex observare (?) C : salvare P ‖ sed] et G 23 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ circumscribo] dimitto P 26 hoc nomen] om. P 27 duae] om. p 27–28 ita … ipsa] ita ipsa adhuc esset P : adhuc ita esset ipsa p : ita adhuc esset G 29 esse1] om. p

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Sed tunc est dubitatio quomodo intelligantur verba Aristotelis et aliorum quod ipsa nec est quid nec quale nec quantum, et quod ipsa nec est actus nec in actu, sed pura potentia. Respondeo primo de quanto et quali quod ipsa aliis sibi inhaerentibus circumscriptis non esset quanta quantitate extensionis, quia alias dictum est quod ipsa non sit magnitudo. Ipsa etiam non est qualis illis qualitatibus sensibilibus quibus entia naturalia apparent nobis qualia. Sed de hoc quod ipsa non est quid, dico quod Aristoteles bene concessisset eam esse quid, id est aliquid. Sed volebat dicere quod ipsa non est hoc aliquid, sicut ipse exprimit in principio secundi De anima. Et ego cum Aristotele ponam illam sextam conclusionem quod materia non est hoc aliquid nec potest esse hoc aliquid naturaliter. Et ad hoc intelligendum et probandum ego suppono quod Aristoteles per ‘hoc aliquid’ intendit substantiam per se subsistentem. Materia autem non potest esse substantia per se subsistens naturaliter, sed semper cum aliqua forma. Et sic etiam forma non potest esse naturaliter per se subsistens, sed semper cum aliqua materia, si sit forma materialis, scilicet educta de potentia materiae. Sed statim occurrunt dubitationes. Prima est, quia videtur quod materia est substantia per se subsistens vel quod compositum non est per se | subsistens, quia dictum est prius quod quaelibet res est essentialiter ens se ipsa; ideo per se; igitur materia est per se ens; sed per idem ipsa est ens et existens et subsistens; igitur ipsa est substantia per se existens et per se subsistens. Immo si ponas differentiam inter existere et subsistere per substare, tunc materia est magis proprie per se subsistens quam compositum, quia compositum non substat nisi formis accidentalibus, materia autem substat formis accidentalibus et substantialibus. Si vero dicatur quod hic accipimus ‘per se’ pro ‘solitarie’ (materia enim non subsistit solitarie, quia non sine forma, et | 1 est dubitatio] de dubio G 2 quod ipsa1] rep. P ‖ quale nec quantum] praem. est G : quantum nec quale P 4 quanto] quantitate P 6 sit] corr. ex st C : est sic G ‖ est2] esset GPp 7 apparent] apparerent p 8 quid1] add. ego Pp 9 est2] esset P 10 principio secundi] secundo G 11 ponam] pono GPp ‖ sextam] om. P 11–12 materia] add. prima G 14 intendit] ante per (13) P 15 et] om. P 18 prima] add. dubitatio G ‖ quia] quae P 20–21 essentialiter … est2] om. (hom.) P 21–22 existens et] om. P 22 ipsa] add. materia P ‖ substantia] om. p ‖ existens … subsistens2] subsistens et per se existens G : subsistens sive subsistens P 23 per substare] om. P 24 est … se] magis proprie per se dicitur P 25 non substat] om. P 26 accidentalibus et substantialibus] substantialibus et accidentalibus Pp 27 pro] et G ‖ enim] autem C ‖ non2] add. est P 10 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 1, 412a7

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forma non solitarie, quia non sine materia), tunc si sic dicatur, sequitur quod etiam compositum non subsistit per se, quia non potest sub|sistere sine pluribus accidentibus, ut ignis sine calore. Ideo sic videtur esse dubium quid debeamus intelligere per ‘substantiam per se subsistentem’. Secunda dubitatio est quare Aristoteles idem intelligit per ‘hoc aliquid’ et per ‘substantiam per se subsistentem’, quia non est verum dicere quod omnis substantia per se subsistens sit hoc aliquid, sicut nec omnis homo est hic homo. Nam ille terminus ‘hoc aliquid’ | est terminus singularis sicut iste terminus ‘hic homo’; et terminus singularis non vere praedicatur de termino communi universaliter sumpto. Tertia dubitatio est quid movet Aristotelem ad dicendum quod materia non sit hoc aliquid vel quod materia non sit substantia per se subsistens, cum antiqui ante eum ponebant eam esse substantiam per se subsistentem et hoc aliquid. Quarta dubitatio est quae remansit, scilicet quomodo Aristoteles et alii dicunt quod materia prima est pura potentia et quod ipsa nec est actus nec in actu. Ad primam dubitationem respondeo breviter quod in proposito substantia non dicitur per se subsistens quia per nullam aliam causam sit ens, quia sic Deus solus esset substantia per se subsistens. Nec dicitur per se subsistens quia sit ens se ipsa essentialiter et non aliquo alio, quia sic omnis substantia esset per se subsistens, immo etiam et omne ens. Nec dicitur per se subsistens, id est solitarie per exclusionem accidentium, quia sic nulla substantia materialis esset per se subsistens. Sed solum ad illum sensum vocatur per se subsistens, quia solitarie per exclusionem alterius substantiae cuius ipsa sit pars, ita quod hic per ‘substantiam per se subsistentem’ nihil aliud intelligimus quam substantiam totalem (dico sic ‘totalem’ quod ipsa non est pars alterius substantiae). Ad secundam dubitationem ego dico quod, licet illa pronomina demonstrativa ‘hic’ et ‘haec’ et ‘hoc’ accepta secundum quid, id est cum additioni-

1–2 quod etiam] inv. P 2–3 pluribus] plurimis P 3 ideo] igitur G ‖ esse dubium] inv. G 5 intelligit] intendit GPp 8–9 sicut … singularis] om. (hom.) G 8 iste] om. P 11 est] om. G ‖ movet] moveat G 13 ponebant eam] ponebant ipsam G : posuerunt eam Pp 15 quarta] tertia G 16 prima est] prima sit P : est G ‖ nec1] non P ‖ nec2] add. est p 18 respondeo breviter] dico p 19 aliam] om. P 20 nec … subsistens2] rep. G 21 ipsa] add. et C 22 et] om. G 24 subsistens] ante per1 p 26 hic] om. P ‖ nihil aliud] nihil P : nec aliud G 27 quod] quia p 29 ad secundam] praem. tunc GP : tunc enim ad p ‖ ego] om. GP ‖ illa] add. propter G 30 hic … quid] accepta hic et haec et hoc G ‖ et1] om. Pp

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bus, supponunt bene pro accidentibus, ut ‘hic color’, ‘haec albedo’, ‘hoc accidens’, tamen illud | pronomen ‘hoc’ simpliciter acceptum et sine additione non supponit nisi pro substantia totali per se subsistente. Unde licet cum lapide sint accidentia plurima, tamen si simpliciter quaerimus quid est hoc, non dicimus quod hoc est albedo vel magnitudo, nec etiam dicimus quod hoc est aggregatum ex lapide et albedine etc., sed praecise respondemus quod hoc est lapis. Immo etiam, si quaeramus quale est hoc vel quantum est hoc, nos respondemus quod hoc est album vel bipedale, quia lapis est illud quod est album vel bipedale. Igitur cum ego dico quod per ‘hoc aliquid’ debemus intelligere substantiam per se subsistentem, ego non volo dicere quod aequivaleat dicere ‘hoc aliquid’ et ‘substantia per se | subsistens’, sed volo dicere quod, pro quocumque supponit talis terminus ‘hoc aliquid’ simpliciter et proprie sumptus, illud est substantia per se subsistens. Ideo sequitur quod numquam supponit pro materia vel forma materiali. Ad tertiam dubitationem dicendum est quod ille terminus ‘hoc’ acceptus simpliciter supponit pro substantia per se subsistente. Ideo scivit Aristoteles non omnem transmutationem esse secundum accidentia, sicut crediderunt antiqui, sed illam esse secundum substantiam, propter quam mutatur responsio ad quid est hoc, ut quod prius dicebamus quod hoc est aqua et nunc non dicimus quod hoc est aqua, sed aer. Non est enim sic alia responsio nisi quia hoc | est aliud quam illud erat prius. Sed ubi non mutatur responsio ad quid est hoc, ibi manet eadem substantia et sic est solum mutatio secundum accidentia, ut si aqua calefiat, si quaeritur | ante et post quid est hoc, respondemus idem, scilicet quod hoc est aqua. Tunc igitur, quia materiam primam vocamus primum subiectum transmutationis et subiectum debet manere idem sub utroque termino transmutationis et omnia naturalia in hoc inferiori mundo videmus ad invicem transmutari, sequitur quod oportet semper illam materiam primam manere. Et tunc, si ipsa

1 supponunt bene] supponant bene p : bene supponant G 5 magnitudo] nigredo GP 6 hoc] om. G ‖ aggregatum] congregatum GPp ‖ lapide … etc.] albedine et lapide p 7 hoc1] om. P ‖ etiam] om. P ‖ quaeramus] quaerimus G ‖ vel] om. P 8 nos] om. G ‖ quod] om. G 9 ego] om. G 11 aequivaleat] aequivalet Gp ‖ et] est p 12 supponit] post sumptus (13) G 13 ideo] igitur G 14 vel] add. pro p 15–16 acceptus simpliciter] inv. GPp 17 transmutationem] terminationem p 17–18 crediderunt] crediderant p 19 quod1] quia GPp ‖ hoc2] om. G ‖ et] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 20 hoc] om. G ‖ sed aer] rep. G ‖ est enim] inv. GPp 21 nisi] non p ‖ illud erat prius] prius erat G : illud erat Pp 24 hoc2] om. G 25 materiam primam] inv. P 25–26 subiectum2 … et] om. (hom.) P 27 inferiori mundo] inv. Gp : mundo infinitum P ‖ transmutari] terminari p 28 semper] ante oportet G : super P

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esset substantia per se subsistens, pro qua supponit ille terminus ‘hoc aliquid’, semper maneret idem pro quo supponeret ille terminus ‘hoc’. Quod est falsum, quoniam sequeretur, ut intendunt Aristoteles et Commentator quod non esset transmutatio substantialis, sed solum alteratio, nec esset forma substantialis, sed solum accidentalis. Et modo consimili vult arguere Commentator quod in eodem supposito non potest formae substantiali advenire alia forma substantialis sine corruptione prioris, immo adveniens priori esset accidentalis. Quod utrum sit bene argutum, alibi est videndum. Ad ultimam dubitationem dicit Aristoteles nono Metaphysicae quod aliquando magis proprie | accipimus ‘actum’ et ‘potentiam’ quam nunc acceperimus, scilicet prout haec nomina restringuntur ad motus et ad transmutationes et ad principia motuum et transmutationum. Illo enim modo potentias non vocamus nisi duas vel tres, scilicet activam, quae potest agere vel transmutare, passivam, quae potest pati et transmutari subiective, et resistitivam, quae forte non est realiter distincta ab activa. Et tunc actus huiusmodi potentiarum vocamus motus et transmutationes vel etiam formas vel dispositiones inde provenientes, quae ab illis activis producuntur et in illis passivis recipiuntur. Et sic materia prima non est actus, quia non est motus neque mutatio neque dispositio per motum vel mutationem acquisita, sed pure est potentia passiva. Nec aliis circumscriptis esset sic in actu, | sed per adventum et denominationem mutationum et formarum denominatur actu moveri vel pati, actu alba vel calida etc. ⟨1–2⟩ Et ex his apparet iam satis quomodo sit respondendum ad primam rationem et secundam quae fiebant in principio quaestionis.

1 ille] hic G 2 quo] quibus G ‖ hoc] om. p 3 quoniam sequeretur] quoniam sequitur P : quia sequitur p ‖ intendunt] intendit Pp 5 modo consimili] inv. P 6 quod … potest] quod in eodem supposito non possit Gp : non enim possit P 8 sit bene] bene est G 10 ultimam] quartam p 11–12 acceperimus] accepimus G : accipimus Pp 12 ad2] om. GPp 13 ad] om. GPp ‖ enim] om. p 13–14 potentias] potentiam p 14 agere] add. movere GPp 15 et transmutari] om. G 15–16 resistitivam] resistivam p 16 huiusmodi] huius P 17 potentiarum] add. in marg. seu passionum C 18 inde] exinde G ‖ in] om. P 20 vel] add. per P ‖ acquisita] acquisitam C ‖ sed pure est] et est pura P 22 et denominationem] om. Pp ‖ moveri] movere P 23 etc.] om. P 24 et] om. G ‖ his] istis P 6 Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 69. f. 40L–M 8 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VII, q. 14 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 49ra–50rb) 10 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IX, 3, 1047a30–32

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⟨3⟩ Ad tertiam dicitur quod ex materia fit compositum per se, id est substantialiter et integraliter. Sed quando Aristoteles dixit quod non fit ens ex ente nisi per accidens, ipse per hoc intendebat quod haec non est vera per se et primo ‘ex ente fit ens’, quia non est universaliter verum, scilicet quod ex omni ente fit ens, sed illa est vera per accidens, et non pure per accidens, sed prout ‘per accidens’ distinguitur contra ‘primo’. Saepe enim dicimus per accidens illud quod est per se, si non sit primo. ⟨4⟩ De privatione autem dico quod ipsa sic dicitur per se non ens, quia est non ens in actu illius cuius dicitur esse privatio vel quo materia, quae est privatio, | dicitur esse privata. Tamen vere est ens potens illum actum recipere et potens non esse privatio illius actus. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dico quod non est propria locutio quod materia sit medium inter esse et non esse. Sed hoc dicitur ad talem sensum quod nec ipsa nihil est nec ipsa est hoc aliquid in actu nec etiam ipsa est aliquis actus formalis etc. Et sic est finis quaestionis. 1 dicitur] dico p ‖ id est] et G 2 sed … dixit] sed quando aristoteles dicit p : om. G 3 intendebat] intendit p ‖ est] esset P 4 et primo] prius P ‖ quia] add. hoc P ‖ scilicet] om. GPp 5 fit] fiat Pp ‖ et] sed P 6 saepe enim] inv. P 8 sic dicitur] inv. G 9 est] om. GPp ‖ illius] om. GPp ‖ quo] qua P 10 est1] om. P ‖ est2] om. p 11 illius] talis GPp 12 aliam dico] aliam P : quartam dico p ‖ est] post locutio P 13 quod] quia Pp 14 nec1] add. etiam P ‖ est2] om. p 15 etc.] om. P 16 et … quaestionis] sequitur alia quaestio p : om. GP

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⟨Utrum forma, antequam generetur, habeat aliquod esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia⟩ Quaeritur vicesimo primo utrum forma, antequam generetur, habeat aliquod esse substantiale in materia distinctum ab ipsa materia.

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⟨1⟩ Et aliqui credentes quod sic arguunt sic: ante generationem forma est in potentia; et illud esse in potentia non est materia nec omnino nihil; igitur forma | aliquo modo est distincta a materia. Prima propositio communiter conceditur. Secunda propositio probatur quia: anima quae est in potentia erit anima in actu; sed numquam materia erit anima in | actu; igitur anima existens in potentia non est materia. Tertia etiam propositio probatur quia: si anima in potentia nihil esset, tunc non magis esset quam chimaera; ideo sicut haec est falsa ‘chimaera est chimaera’ propter hoc quod chimaera nihil est, ita haec esset falsa ‘anima in potentia est anima in potentia’; sed hoc consequens est falsum; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item quod omnino nihil est, sicut chimaera, non est possibile produci in esse nec recipi in materia; sed tamen anima quae nondum est generata potest produci in esse et recipi in materia; igitur etc. ⟨3⟩ Item sequeretur quod anima crearetur in generatione naturali; consequens est falsum. Et consequentia probatur quia: ipsa ex nihilo sui fieret. Nec valeret dicere quod per subiectum praesuppositum excusatur creatio, quia omnes catholici concedunt quod Deus potest in anima nostra creando infundere gratiam, quamvis sit subiectum praesuppositum, et etiam animam intellectivam creat, licet recipiatur in subiecto praesupposito, scilicet in corpore.

5 quaeritur vicesimo primo] consequenter est quaerendum G ‖ primo] rep. C 7 sic2] tali modo P ‖ in] om. P 9 distincta] illud distinctum C ‖ materia] add. prima Pp 10 propositio] om. G ‖ quia] quod p 11 sed … actu2] om. (hom.) G ‖ anima3] forma P 12 etiam propositio] etiam p : propositio P 14 est1] esset P 15 esset] est G 17 est1] om. P 20 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 21 et] om. P ‖ sui] om. p 22 valeret] valet GPp 23 quia] quod p ‖ nostra] mea p 24 quamvis] quam nisi P

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⟨4⟩ Item eadem anima est ante generationem in potentia et post in actu; et non est identitas, nisi utrobique sit ens, quia nec ens non enti nec non ens enti dicitur idem vel diversum, ut | habetur decimo Metaphysicae. ⟨5⟩ Item sequeretur quod generatio naturalis esset violenta, quod est falsum. Consequentia probatur quia: tertio Ethicorum describitur violentum, scilicet violentum est quod est a principio extrinseco nullam vim conferente passo; et sic esset in proposito. Materia enim nullam vim confert active. Sed verum est quod ipsa confert passive, sed per hoc non differt naturale a violento, quia etiam omnis actio violenta requirit passivum. ⟨6⟩ Item transmutationis substantialis privatio est principium secundum Aristotelem. Et illa privatio non nihil est, quia non esset principium, nec est materia, sicut arguetur post, nec potest dici quid aliud ipsa sit quam forma substantialis secundum aliquod esse incompletum ipsius aliud a materia; igitur etc. ⟨7⟩ Item plures solent ad hoc allegari auctoritates Commentatoris. Dicit enim in octavo Metaphysicae quod translatio de potentia ad actum non largitur multitudinem, sed perfectionem. Dicit etiam | duodecimo Metaphysicae quod generans apud Aristotelem non congregat inter diversa. Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Primo huius dicitur quod forma sui absentia et praesentia cum materia sufficiens est facere mutationem; non igitur est praesens ante | generationem, sed absens. ⟨2⟩ Item si materia et forma praeexistunt, compositum ex eis praeexistit; ideo nihil substantialiter esset novum post generationem.

1 est] post generationem G 2 non2] nec P 3 decimo] quarto C 4 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 6 est2] fit G 6–7 conferente … vim] om. (hom.) P 9 violenta] violentia p ‖ passivum] passum P 10–11 secundum aristotelem] om. G 11 non nihil est] non nihil (sup. lin.) est nihil C : nihil est p 12 arguetur] arguitur p 15 ad hoc allegari] allegare ad hoc G 16 octavo] sexto P 17 duodecimo] in secundo p 18 apud aristotelem] om. P 20 absentia et praesentia] praesentia et absentia P 21 non igitur] inv. P ‖ ante] corr. sup. lin. in apud C : apud G 24 nihil substantialiter] dicit substantialiter non P ‖ post] fieri per p 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, X, 3, 1054b18–20 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, III, 1, 1110b1–3 10–11 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 191a12–15 12 Cf. inf., I, q. 23, 228 16 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, VIII, comm. 15, f. 224A 17 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 18, f. 304I 20 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 191a5–8

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Anaxagoras dicebat quod, si ex aqua appareat generari aer, ille aer praeexistebat actu in illa aqua, sed propter mixtionem eius cum multitudine partium aquae non apparebat; sed cum ab illa aqua extrahebatur, apparebat; et tunc credimus quod generetur, cum ante non esset, quod Anaxagoras dicebat esse falsum. Sed haec opinio absurda est. Absurdum enim est quod tantus ignis quantus apparet fieri, lateret in ligno parvo vel in candela parva. Et etiam, si in cera candelae latebat ignis propter maiorem multitudinem partium cerae, tunc quando ille ignis segregatur a cera, illa cera remanens deberet adhuc apparere melius et magis pura, quod est falsum. Alii posuerunt esse rei distinctum ab essentia eius et quidditate. Et sic dixerunt formam praeexistere secundum suam essentiam vel quidditatem, sed non secundum eius esse, immo illa quidditas manens semper acquirit esse per generationem et non esse per corruptionem; quod quidem non esse non omnino nihil est, sed est esse in potentia. Sed de hoc est scrutandum quarto Metaphysicae, ubi debet ostendi quod non differt esse ab essentia nec essentia ab esse. Item in proposito frustra poneretur tale esse additum, quia de illo esse reiterarentur omnes rationes et difficultates sicut erant de ipsa forma. 29ra G 25va p

Alii dixerunt propinque praedictis, | videlicet quod forma secundum suam quidditatem est ante generationem et post, sed alio et alio modo, quia ante in potentia et post in actu, ita quod esse in potentia et esse in actu sunt modi essendi additi quidditati formae, unus ante generationem et alius post. Sed ista opinio deficit multipliciter. Primo enim sequeretur quod forma non esset terminus ad quem in generatione substantiali, immo esset subiectum manens idem ante et post; et illi modi essendi essent terminus a quo et terminus ad quem.

2 eius] om. p 4 dicebat] dicit p 6 enim est] inv. P ‖ tantus] tam magnus G 7 candela parva] inv. P ‖ et] om. p 8 ignis] praem. ille Gp : et in lignis P ‖ maiorem] om. P 11 essentia eius] inv. GPp ‖ et sic] et G : sic P 12 vel] et P 13 manens] magis P 14 quidem] om. p 19 reiterarentur] add. sup. lin. alias reverterentur C : revertentur p ‖ erant] erat G 20 praedictis videlicet] praedictis scilicet P : dictis videlicet G 20–21 suam quidditatem] inv. P 23 quidditati] quidditate G 24 sequeretur] sequitur Pp 26 manens idem] inv. G 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 4, 187a20–26 16 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IV, q. 8 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 18va–19rb)

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Et sic iterum sequeretur quod non esset ponenda materia subiecta formae, quia non cogimur ad ponendum eam nisi quia oportet aliquid idem manere ante et post, quod defert transmutationem et terminos transmutationis; et hoc esset quidditas formae. Et iterum, si ille modus essendi qui est esse in actu sit accidens, tunc non est transmutatio substantialis, sed accidentalis solum, cum non nisi accidens solum acquiratur. Et si sit substantia, tunc est materia, forma vel compositum et non aliquod additum. Item omnino frustra ponuntur illi modi, quia de illo modo actualitatis | revertuntur omnes rationes et difficultates quae erant de forma. | Et cum hoc sequeretur quod aer esset quidditative aqua, ex quo quidditas aquae remaneret. Et haec omnia sunt absurda. Albertus autem posuit quod forma praecedit generationem secundum esse incompletum et completur per generationem. Et dicit quod illud esse incompletum est privatio, quae est unum de principiis intrinsecis rerum naturalium, et coagit ad generationem. Ideo generatio est naturalis, non violenta; et est naturalis generatio et non creatio. Et esset creatio formae, nisi illud eius esse incompletum praeexisteret. Sed iterum haec opinio non valet. Primo enim non verum diceret Aristoteles quod materia et privatio sunt idem in numero. Deinde illud quod praeexistit de ipsa forma vel manet ante generationem et post vel non manet; sed quocumque modo dicatur, sequuntur multa inconvenientia. Si enim dicatur quod manet, tunc male dicit Aristoteles quod privatio non manet. Nec etiam esset oppositio privationis ad formam, nec secundum rem nec secundum rationem. Et etiam illud quod de necessitate praeexisteret, non videretur esse eiusdem rationis cum eo quod acquiritur; et sic

1 et] om. P ‖ sequeretur] sequitur GPp 2 cogimur] coguntur p : cogimus C ‖ oportet] post idem G 3 defert] deferat GPp 7 solum] sup. lin. C : om. Pp 8 aliquod] aliquid Pp 9 actualitatis] add. in marg. seu essendi C : actualiter P 10 omnes] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 11 sequeretur] sequitur Pp ‖ esset] est p ‖ quidditative aqua] quidditas aquae sed add. in marg. vel quidditative aqua C 16 naturalis] add. et P 17 et2] sup. lin. C : om. Pp ‖ creatio formae] inv. p 18 eius] om. G 19 iterum] om. P 20 materia et privatio] privatio et materia G ‖ in] om. G ‖ numero] re sed add. sup. lin. numero C 26–27 praeexisteret] praeexistet G 27 videretur] videtur G 13 Cf. Albertus Magnus, Physica, I, tract. 3, cap. 15 (ed. Hossfeld, 70) Physica, I, 7, 190b24–27 24 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190a9–21

19–20 Cf. Aristoteles,

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forma substantialis post generationem esset composita ex partibus diversarum rationum sicut compositum substantiale. Et si esset eiusdem rationis, tunc forma substantialis esset gradualiter intensibilis et remissibilis sicut caliditas, quod non conceditur. Et nulla esset necessitas ponendi primam materiam praeter illud esse incompletum. Si vero illud quod praeexistit de illa forma non manet cum eo quod acquiritur, tunc sequeretur quod formae quae acquiritur et quae est post generationem nihil praeexistebat; | quod enim abiectum est, non est aliquid eius quod manet. Et illud etiam quod sic abiceretur nihil plus proficeret ad salvandum omnia quam forma substantialis praecedens quae in adventu sequentis corrumpitur. Nec debet poni quod illud quod corrumpitur in adventu formae substantialis coagat ad illius generationem. Et omnino de illo quod acquiritur in generatione circumscriptis omnibus praeexistentibus reverterentur omnes rationes et dubitationes quae erant de forma; illud enim crearetur, quia ex nihilo sui fieret etc. Tunc igitur ex his dictis sequitur conclusio principalis, scilicet quod ante generationem substantialem nihil praeexistit formae cuius est generatio vel verius loquendo quae est generatio. Si tamen sit forma intensibilis, possibile est quod perfectae caliditatis | quae erit medietas praecederet generationem alterius medietatis. Dicta igitur conclusio principalis patet ex | omnibus praedictis. Si enim aliquid eius praeexisteret, hoc esset aliquo praedictorum modorum, qui omnes sunt destructi. Tunc igitur respondendum est ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod hoc nomen ‘potentia’ vel ‘in potentia’ ampliativum est suppositionis ad possibilia, si ponatur a parte praedicati. Ideo concedo quod ante generationem anima est in potentia, | quia significat hoc quod anima potest esse. Et tamen ego dico quod illa anima et illud esse in potentia omnino nihil est et non magis est quam chimaera, sed potest esse

3 gradualiter] gradualis p : gradualis vel P ‖ et] vel P 3–4 sicut caliditas] ut caliditas P : rep. G 7 sequeretur] sequitur GPp 8–9 aliquid eius] aliquid illius P : aliquod ens p 9 proficeret] perficeret G 12 coagat] coagit P 14 quae erant] om. P 15 sui] om. p ‖ fieret] add. igitur G 18 possibile] add. enim P 19 perfectae caliditatis] perfectio caliditatis P : perfecta caliditas C ‖ erit] erat p ‖ medietas] add. sup. lin. alias immediate C ‖ praecederet generationem] praecedit generationem GP : praecedit generatio p 20 principalis] ante conclusio Gp : om. P 22 modorum] om. P 23 igitur] om. Gp ‖ respondendum est] dicitur P 25 suppositionis] supponens Pp ‖ ponatur] post praedicati p 26 significat hoc] inv. GPp 27 et1] om. P 28–215.1 sed … et] et potest esse sed P

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et chimaera non potest esse. Illa igitur anima in potentia est anima in potentia, et tamen nihil est, et subiectum supponit pro aliquo, non quod est, sed quod est possibile. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dico consimiliter quod aliquid potest produci in esse quod omnino nihil est plus quam chimaera. Sed tu dicis: quare igitur non consimiliter conceditur quod chimaera potest produci? Dico quod hoc est, quia chimaera nec est nec potest esse, nec est subiectum quod posset eam vel formam eius recipere, nec agens quod posset eam producere. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod differentia talis est inter factionem naturalem et creationem, quia forma quae fit naturaliter, dependet in sua factione non solum ab agente, sed etiam a subiecto in quo fit; ideo dicimus quod educitur de potentia materiae. Sed quod creatur distincte a factione naturali, non dependet in sui factione nisi a Deo; ideo dicimus quod non educitur de potentia materiae. Unde Commentator sic imaginatur quod creatio animae esset, si prius naturaliter fieret a Deo quam ponatur in corpore, licet non prius tempore. Sed in factione naturali agens prius naturaliter transmutat materiam et transmutando eam educit ex ea formam. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod eadem anima ante generationem est in potentia et post in actu, sed illa nihil est ante generationem, sed potest esse et erit. Nec identitas est, sed potest esse et erit. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dicitur | quod generatio dicitur naturalis ex eo quod passum inclinatur naturaliter ad formam quae acquiritur tamquam ad suam perfectionem. In motu autem violento illud quod movetur non sic inclinatur ad motum, sed resistit et inclinatur ad oppositum. Et alias magis dicetur de huiusmodi naturalitate et violentia. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicetur post quod privatio est idem quod ipsa materia.

3 est possibile] possibile est esse P 4 aliam dico] secundam dicitur p 5 sed] om. P ‖ quare igitur] inv. P 5–6 consimiliter] om. P 6 conceditur quod] om. p ‖ quod hoc est] quod est ideo P : hoc p 7 nec est nec] non est nec P : non G ‖ posset] possit GPp 8 posset] possit GPp ‖ producere] add. etc. G 9 aliam] tertiam p ‖ talis] om. P 10 sua] sui Pp 11 etiam a] in G 12 a factione] ab actione P 13 in] a p 14 sic imaginatur] inv. P 15 esset] add. sup. lin. alias erat C ‖ ponatur] poneretur GPp 16 naturaliter] ante prius2 G : natura p 17 materiam] formam alias materiam sup. lin. C : formam G 18 aliam] quartam p 19 erit] esse p 20 identitas est] inv. P 21 ad aliam dicitur] rep. G ‖ ex] om. p 22 inclinatur naturaliter] inv. P ‖ suam] sui G 23 in motu autem] immo in motu C 25 huiusmodi] huius P 24 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, V, q. 6 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 89ra–90ra) 26 Cf. inf., I, q. 23, 2265

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⟨7⟩ Ad auctoritates Commentatoris dicitur quod intentio Commentatoris est quod generans non largitur multitudinem nec congregat inter | diversa quorum quodlibet sit hoc aliquid in actu, sicut plures antiquorum dixerunt ponentes quod non esset generatio vel corruptio nisi congregatio prius dispersorum et actu existentium vel disgregatio prius congregatorum. Et sic est finis quaestionis. 5 prius] per P ‖ congregatorum] add. etc. Gp 6 et … quaestionis] et sic finis est quaestionis P : et sic sit dictum ad quaestionem G : sequitur alia quaestio p

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⟨Utrum materia sit potentia ad formam generandam⟩

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Quaeritur vicesimo secundo utrum materia est potentia ad formam generandam. Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Duodecimo Metaphysicae dicitur quod, si agens fuerit unum et materia una et potentia una, effectus debet esse unus et nulla est causa multitudinis, iuxta illud secundo De generatione quod ab eodem inquantum idem non provenit nisi idem. Hoc debet intelligi, nisi proveniat diversitas | ex parte materiae vel suarum potentiarum. Sed ab eodem agente in eadem materia proveniunt diversi effectus, ut a caliditate caliditas, levitas et raritas etc. Igitur hoc est propter diversitatem potentiarum. Et si potentiae sunt diversae materia existente una, illae differunt a materia. ⟨2⟩ Item nono Metaphysicae habetur quod actus et potentia sunt opposita; et materia non est opposita formae generandae; igitur non est potentia | ad eam. ⟨3⟩ Item illud est potentia ad animam quod potest esse anima; sed hoc non est materia, immo nihil aliud quam anima potest esse anima. ⟨4⟩ Item quod accidit materiae non est ipsa materia; sed Commentator dicit in primo huius quod materiae accidit quod sit potentia omnis formae, et non est potentia de substantia eius. Ad quod probandum ipse ponit triplex medium.

4 quaeritur vicesimo secundo] utrum materia prima G 6 arguitur] add. primo P 8 multitudinis] add. sed del. effectuum C : add. effectuum P : tam multitudinis effectuum p 10 hoc] add. enim GPp ‖ parte] corr. sup. lin. ex diversitate C : diversitate Pp 12 et] om. G ‖ etc.] in marg. C : om. Pp 13 igitur hoc] corr. sup. lin. in hoc enim C : hoc enim G ‖ et si] si autem P 14 materia] add. autem P 15 opposita] oppositae G 18 item] add. sup. lin. sequitur G ‖ illud] aliquid p ‖ quod] ergo G 19 nihil] nullum GPp 20 ipsa] om. G 21 primo] principio P 22 ipse] om. P 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, 2, 1069b28–33 9 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, 10, 336a27–28; cf. AA, 4: 43 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IX, 6, 1048a30–34 21 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 70, f. 41E–F

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⟨4.1⟩ Primo quia: materia est substantia; et potentia non est substantia, sed est ad aliquid. ⟨4.2⟩ Secundo quia: potentiae multiplicantur secundum multitudinem formarum ad quas materia est in potentia, iuxta illud quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus; materia autem non sic multiplicatur, immo eadem recipit multas formas successive; igitur etc. ⟨4.3⟩ Tertio quia: materia non corrumpitur in adventu formae et potentia corrumpitur, quia si materia a est in potentia ad formam b, cum receperit eam, non erit amplius in potentia ad recipiendum eam, et cum illa forma b fuerit corrupta, tunc illa materia nullo modo amplius erit in potentia ad eam, quia non est potentia ad praeteritum, ut habetur primo Caeli.

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Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Aristoteles | secundo De anima materiam vocat potentiam. ⟨2⟩ Et in tertio | huius dicit quod in aeternis non differt esse et posse esse, igitur nec essentia et potentia per locum a coniugatis; modo materia ponitur aeterna. ⟨3⟩ Item sicut se habet forma ad actum, ita materia ad potentiam; sed omnes concedunt formam esse actum; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Item si potentia esset res addita materiae, materia esset in potentia ad illam. Et si hoc per se ipsam, ita standum erat in primo; et si iterum per aliam, procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Quaestio apparet mihi satis facilis, si sciatur quid nominis. Quod sic declaro: Deus dicitur omnipotens non per potentiam sibi additam, sed ipse est illa potentia qua ipse est omnipotens, et ex eo dicitur omnipotens, quia omnia factibilia ipse potest facere et omnia creabilia creare et omnia annihilabi-

1 quia] quod p ‖ et] om. G 3 secundum] per G 4 in] om. G 5 per actus] secundum actus P : per accidens G ‖ autem] enim p ‖ multiplicatur] multipliciter G ‖ recipit] recipiet P 6 multas] post successive p 7 et] sed P 8 ad] add. sed del. recipiendum C : add. recipiendum Pp ‖ receperit] recipit P 10 fuerit] erit p 11 est] add. in G 13 aristoteles … anima] secundo de anima aristoteles P 14 esse2] om. GPp 15 et] nec P 16 aeterna] add. ergo etc. p : add. igitur P 20 hoc] add. sed del. sit C : add. sit Pp 21 procederetur] procedetur Pp 22 satis] om. G 24 et] om. P ‖ dicitur] est G ‖ omnipotens2] add. forma P 25 ipse] om. GP 4–5 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 4, 415a16–21; cf. AA, 6: 56 11 Cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, I, 12, 283b12–13 13 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 1, 412a9–10; cf. AA, 6: 38 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 3, 203b30; cf. AA, 2: 103

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lia annihilare. Dicitur igitur potentia activa, quia potest agere, et potentia creativa, quia potest creare, et sic de consimilibus. Igitur consimiliter ex hoc dicitur potentia passiva, quia potest pati, et potentia receptiva, quia potest recipere, et sic de consimilibus. Sed constat quod materia potest pati ab agentibus naturalibus et potest recipere formas generandas. Igitur sequitur illa conclusio quod materia est potentia passiva et potentia receptiva formarum generandarum. Item hoc patet per descriptiones potentiae activae et potentiae passivae datas quinto et nono Metaphysicae, ubi dicitur quod potentia activa est principium transmutandi alterum, id est est principium quod transmutat | vel transmutare potest alterum, et hoc est agens vel activum; et potentia passiva est principium transmutandi ab altero, id est quod transmutatur vel transmutari potest ab altero, et hoc est patiens vel passivum; cuiusmodi est materia prima; igitur etc. Aliqui tamen voluerunt ponere quod potentia est relatio ad formam addita ipsi materiae. Sed absurde et frustra poneretur talis relatio addita, quia si potest salvari quod Deus potest agere et creare et movere caelum sine relatione addita, cum in Deo non sit aliquid distinctum ab eius essentia, prout videri debet duodecimo Metaphysicae, ita consimiliter potest salvari quod materia potest recipere sine tali relatione addita. Immo sicut alibi magis videndum est, relatio in creaturis non est nisi actus animae referentis et comparantis, scilicet intelligentis res | comparative ad invicem. Nec ille terminus ‘relatio’ est unum decem praedicamentorum, immo ille terminus ‘ad aliquid’.

2 consimiliter] similiter GPp 4 et … consimilibus] om. P ‖ sed] quia G 5 igitur sequitur] inv. P 8 item] om. P 8–9 descriptiones … datas] descriptionem potentiae activae et passivae datam P 10 est2] om. Pp ‖ transmutat] add. alterum G 11 transmutare potest] inv. GPp 13 transmutari potest] inv. GPp ‖ cuiusmodi] cui commune p 14 prima] sup. lin. C : om. p ‖ igitur etc.] om. P 15 aliqui] alii P 17 poneretur] ponetur P 19 cum] add. igitur P ‖ aliquid] aliquod P ‖ videri debet] videbitur P 20 potest1] poterit GPp ‖ potest2] poterit GPp 21 magis] post est P 22 animae] om. G 23 scilicet] et P 24 decem praedicamentorum] de decem praedicamentis P ‖ immo] add. est G 9 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 12, 1019a15–20; IX, 1, 1046a9–13; cf. AA, 1: 219, 220 20 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, XII, q. 4 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 66vb) 21 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, V, q. 9 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 32rb)

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Unde pater est ad aliquid pater et etiam paternitas est ad aliquid paternitas et sic de potentia et si|militudine et huiusmodi. Sed ille terminus ‘pater’ vel conceptus a quo sumitur est relatio qua anima refert et comparat hoc ad illud. Verum est quod aliqui consueverunt uti isto termino ‘relatio’ pro uno praedicamento propter hoc quod supponit pro terminis de praedicamento ‘ad aliquid’ et pro conceptibus a quibus illi termini sumuntur. Notandum est ulterius quod, cum principale activum sit principalis potentia activa et principale passivum principalis potentia passiva, tamen huiusmodi potentiarum principalium multae sunt | dispositiones qualitativae et quantitativae requisitae ad hoc quod principale activum agat et principale passivum patiatur, vel etiam ad hoc quod tali vel tali actione vel passione agens agat vel passum patiatur. Verbi gratia multae dispositiones requiruntur in animali vel planta ad generandum simile sibi, et caliditas in igne requiritur ad hoc quod calefaciat, et species intelligibilis in intellectu ad hoc quod formet actum intelligendi. Et similiter multae dispositiones requiruntur in materia ad hoc quod recipiat formam asini vel ligni vel aeris vel aquae, et aliae requiruntur ad recipiendum formam ignis, aliae autem ad recipiendum formam aquae et aliae ad recipiendum formam animalis vel lapidis vel equi vel bovis etc. Modo rationabile ponendum est et tamquam usitatum quod omnes dispositiones et instrumenta activi principalis ad agendum vocantur potentiae activae, licet non principales, sed dispositivae. Et ita statim ponenda est ista conclusio quod potentiae materiae, scilicet quibus materia est disposita ad recipiendum talem vel talem formam, non sunt ipsa materia, sed distinguuntur ab ea et ab invicem. Sunt enim diversae respectu diversarum formarum substantialium. Et huiusmodi potentiae dicuntur pertinere ad secundam speciem qualitatis. Si enim disponant | ad bonam actionem vel passionem vel si resistant malae actioni vel passioni,

1 pater2] om. G ‖ et] om. P 2 potentia et similitudine] similitudine et potentia P 4 quod] add. antiqui sive p 7 ulterius] sup. lin. C : sed ultra ante notandum GPp 8 passivum] add. sit P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 9–10 qualitativae et quantitativae] quantitativae et qualitativae P 10 activum] add. in marg. seu agens C : agens G ‖ principale2] principium sed add. sup. lin. alias principale C 11 ad hoc] om. G ‖ vel passione agens] vel passione Pp : om. G 12 passum] om. GPp 13 simile sibi] inv. GPp 13–14 requiritur] requirit G 14 intelligibilis in] intelligibiles in p : intelligibiles P 15 formet] format P ‖ et] om. P ‖ requiruntur] om. G 16 ligni vel] ligni p : ignis vel P 17 aliae autem] et aliae G : aliae Pp 18 vel2] om. GPp 19 etc.] om. p ‖ rationabile] rationabiliter GPp 20 et] del. G 22 et ita] ideo P 24–25 diversae respectu] diversimode respectus P 25 huiusmodi] huius P 26 pertinere] participare p 27 vel2] add. etiam G : om. P

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scilicet corruptivae sui subiecti, vocantur potentiae; et si sint impeditivae bonae actionis vel passionis vel disponant ad passiones corruptivas suorum subiectorum, tunc vocantur impotentiae, prout in secunda specie qualitatis utimur praedictis nominibus. 5

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Sed iterum alio modo, sicut tangit Aristoteles quinto Metaphysicae, dicitur possibile vel impossibile prout haec nomina appropriate conveniunt propositionibus. Primitus enim propositio dicitur necessaria, quia quandocumque proponitur, est vera et non potest esse falsa. Deinde propositio dicitur possibilis ex eo quod sua contradictoria non est necessaria. Et dicitur contingens, quia nec ipsa nec sua contradictoria est necessaria. Et sic dicimus quod possibile est commune ad contingens et necessarium, quia neutrius horum contradictoria est necessaria. Cuius autem contradictoria est necessaria, illa est impossibilis. Et illo modo potentia vel possibilitas vel possibile, similiter necessitas vel necessarium, contingentia vel contingens, impossibilitas vel impossibile nihil aliud est quam aliqua propositio. Et quia de huiusmodi potentia vel possibilitate non intendimus ad praesens, ideo non amplius hic discutio utrum universaliter sit bene dictum illud quod nunc est dictum. Sed adhuc alio modo dicitur potentia vel possibilitas, potens vel possibile vel ens in potentia ex eo quod potest esse, sicut Antichristum diceremus esse in potentia vel possibilem et quod est potentia ad Antichristum generari aut formam eius recipi in corpore etc. Et videtur Commentatori et forte | Aristoteli quod huiusmodi potentia vel possibile dicitur secundum attributionem ad potentiam activam vel passivam. Ex eo | enim Antichristus est possibilis vel in potentia, quia iam est principium activum potens ipsum vel formam eius producere in esse et quod est subiectum vel materia potens ipsum vel formam eius suscipere; et 1 corruptivae] corruptioni G : corruptione P ‖ et] om. P 3 qualitatis] om. G 4 praedictis] dictis P 6 vel] et P ‖ conveniunt] conveniant Gp 9–10 dicitur contingens quia] contingens dicitur quia Pp : contingens dicitur quod G 11 contingens] consequens p ‖ quia neutrius] neutra P 12 autem] aut p 12–13 illa est] aut p 13 vel1] om. P 15 aliqua] om. G ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 16 possibilitate] impossibilitate p ‖ hic] om. G 17 est dictum] inv. P 19 ex] om. p ‖ diceremus] add. dicemus G 19–20 in2 … possibilem] possibilem vel in potentia GPp 20 et] vel G ‖ est] add. in p 20–21 aut formam] add. in marg. seu et ad formam C : et ad formam GP : ad formam p 21 in corpore] om. G 22–23 huiusmodi … possibile] huius possibile vel potentia P 23 vel2] et GPp 24 ex] om. p ‖ possibilis … potentia] in (om. G) potentia vel possibilis GP 25 et] vel G 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 12, 1019b21–30

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illud principium activum est Deus et illud subiectum est prima materia. Sed nos diceremus quod ad huiusmodi esse in potentia sufficit potentia activa, quae est Deus. Vel etiam potest dici quod huiusmodi potentia vel possibile dicitur secundum attributionem ad possibilitatem propositionibus attributam. Ex eo enim dicimus Antichristum esse in potentia vel ens in potentia vel possibilem vel quod est potentia ad esse Antichristum vel ad ipsum fieri etc., quia haec est possibilis ‘Antichristus est’ vel ‘Antichristus fit’ etc. Sed tamen verum est quod iterum haec propositio ‘Antichristus est’ non est possibilis nisi propter illam potentiam primam quae potest ipsum producere. | Secundum enim attributionem ad potentiam primam activam, quae est Deus, omnis alius modus potentiae dicitur potentia, ut dicitur quinto Metaphysicae. Et nunc ponitur manifeste illa conclusio quod illud quod dicto modo dicitur esse possibile vel potentia vel in potentia, scilicet quia potest esse et tamen ipsum non est, sicut dicimus de Antichristo, tale non est materia, quia materia est et tale | nihil est. Tunc respondendum est ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod, si agens principale fuerit idem vel consimile et passum etiam principale fuerit idem vel consimile et potentiae etiam dispositivae concurrentes ad agendum vel patiendum vel resistendum vel impediendum fuerint eaedem vel consimiles, sequitur idem vel consimilis effectus, vel si consequuntur hinc inde plures effectus, illi erunt consimiles. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles in dictis auctoritatibus et nihil aliud. Cum enim dicitur quod effectus debet esse unus, non intenditur de unitate numerali, sed similitudinis.

2 nos diceremus] oportet nos dicere G ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 4 huiusmodi] huius P 6 dicimus antichristum] inv. P ‖ ens] add. esse C 6–7 possibilem] possibile G 7 est] add. in p ‖ antichristum] antichristi G ‖ etc.] praem. igitur G : om. P 8 etc.] om. P 10 propter] per G 11 activam] in activa p 12 potentia] add. quae est deus P ‖ dicitur quinto] dicitur tertio G : dicit quinto p 14 nunc ponitur manifeste] tunc manifeste ponitur GPp 15 esse1] om. G ‖ in potentia] impotentia C ‖ quia] add. ipsum G 16 et tamen] cum G 17 quia materia] materia enim G 18 tunc] add. igitur GPp 20 etiam1] om. P ‖ potentiae] add. etc. p 21 dispositivae] dispositiones p ‖ vel3] aut GPp 23 consequuntur] consequitur p 24 et1] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ intendit aristoteles] intendit aristoteles (sup. lin.) C : intenditur Pp 25 quod] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ numerali] naturali p 12–13 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 12, 1019b33–1020a2

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⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod aliquando hoc nomen ‘potentia’ restringitur ad carentiam actus, ita quod virtus aliqua dicitur potentia ad agendum, quando non agit, et dicitur in actu agendi, quando agit; et virtus etiam passiva dicitur in potentia ad patiendum, quando non patitur, et dicitur in actu patiendi, quando patitur. Et illo modo verum est quod illa nomina ‘actus’ et ‘potentia’ opponuntur vel etiam ista praedicata ‘esse in actu’ et ‘esse in potentia’. Sed quando hoc nomen ‘potentia’ accipitur pro virtute activa vel passiva sine connotatione carentiae actus, tunc non opponuntur nec etiam illa nomina ‘esse in actu’ et ‘esse in potentia’ opponuntur, immo quod actu agit est potentia activa. Et ista debent amplius determinari in nono Metaphysicae. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam concessum est quod potentia ad animam accepta pro eo quod potest esse anima non est materia, immo nihil est, sed forte erit anima. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dico | quod potentia principalis ad patiendum vel recipiendum formas generabiles non accidit materiae, immo est ipsa materia subiecta. Sed Commentator intendit quod hoc nomen ‘potentia’ est praedicatum accidentale, id est denominativum de hoc nomine ‘materia’, et non praedicatum substantiale, id est quidditativum. ⟨4.1⟩ Et hoc probat bene prima ratio Commentatoris, scilicet: materia est substantia et potentia est ad aliquid, id est hoc nomen ‘materia’ est de praedicamento substantiae et hoc nomen ‘potentia’ est de praedicamento ad aliquid. Modo termini diversorum | praedicamentorum non praedicantur unus de altero quidditative, sed denominative; tamen bene supponunt pro eodem. ⟨4.2⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod eadem res secundum quod est in potentia ad diversos actus nominatur diversis nominibus vel orationibus, ut anima eadem dicitur potentia vegetativa, sensitiva, appetitiva etc., vel etiam | visiva, auditiva etc. Et similiter etiam eadem materia dicitur potentia ad ignem, potentia ad aerem vel aquam etc. Et sic est intentio Commentatoris quod 1 aliam] secundam p ‖ aliquando] aliter P 3 dicitur1] om. G 5 illa nomina] om. G 6 actu … potentia] potentia et esse in actu G 7 accipitur] capitur p ‖ virtute] non ente P 8 opponuntur] opponitur Pp 9 actu … potentia] potentia et esse in actu G 10 in] om. G 11 aliam] tertiam p ‖ animam] omnia p 12 anima2] add. ad aliam p 13 ad aliam dico] ad quartam dico p : rep. G 14 generabiles] generales Pp 16–17 accidentale … praedicatum] om. (hom.) P 18 probat … ratio] bene probat prima ratio P : bene probat ratio prima G 19 ad] om. GP 20 est] om. G 22 altero] alio G 25 vel] et p 26 appetitiva] appetiva C ‖ visiva] add. vel P 27 auditiva] add. et factiva P ‖ etiam] om. G 28 potentia] vel G : om. P ‖ vel] add. ad G 10 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IX, q. 2 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 56vb–57ra)

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nomina potentiarum multiplicantur nomine materiae manente eodem de quo illa nomina potentiarum dicuntur vere. Et hoc non concludit nisi diversitatem nominum secundum rationem et non concludit diversitatem rerum pro quibus illa nomina supponunt, immo est | eadem res. ⟨4.3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod potentia ad recipiendum formam b non corrumpitur, sed desinit esse potentia ad recipiendum formam b, sicut scribens non corrumpitur, quando desinit esse scribens. Haec de quaestione. 2 concludit] includit p 4 est] om. p 8 haec de quaestione] et sic est finis quaestionis etc. G : etc. P : om. p

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⟨Utrum privatio sit materia privata⟩ Quaeritur vicesimo tertio utrum privatio est materia privata.

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Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Tunc non essent tria principia rerum naturalium, scilicet materia, forma et privatio, ex quo essent idem materia et privatio. Et hoc est contra determinationem Aristotelis. ⟨2⟩ Item Aristoteles dicit Platonem errasse, quia non distinxit inter materiam et privationem. Et dicit contra eum ista verba: ‘nos quidem materiam et privationem alterum dicimus’. Quod ipse probat ponendo differentias inter eas. Quarum prima est quod materiam dicimus non esse per accidens, privationem non esse per se. Secunda est quod materiam dicimus prope substantiam aliqualiter, privationem autem nequaquam. Et alibi etiam dicit ex materia fieri aliquid non secundum accidens et ex privatione secundum accidens et quod etiam in facto esse materia manet et privatio non manet. ⟨3⟩ Item in Praedicamentis dicit Aristoteles quod privari non est privatio nec habere habitum est habitus. Et subdit quod caecum esse non est caecitas; caecum enim esse est privari, non privatio. Quod ipse nititur sic probare: nam si idem esset caecitas et caecum esse, utraque de eodem praedicarentur; nunc vero minime, sed caecus dicitur homo, caecitas vero homo nullo modo dicitur. Et ita apparet esse de privatione et de privato.

3 vicesimo tertio] post haec denique G 5 scilicet] om. Pp 6 essent] esset GPp ‖ est] esset G 9 verba] naturalia P 10 ipse] om. P 11 quarum] om. P ‖ dicimus non] inv. G ‖ esse] ens P 12 non esse] vero non ens P ‖ dicimus prope] ALMTU : dicimus proprie BCGHp : esse P 13 et] om. P 15 quod] om. G ‖ et privatio] privatio autem G 16 item] om. P 17 et subdit quod] quia P 18 privari non privatio] privatio et non caecitas P ‖ ipse] om. P 19 caecum esse] inv. G 21 homo] post modo Gp ‖ et1] praem. esse G : om. P ‖ de2] om. GP 7 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, XII, 2, 1069b32–34; cf. AA, 1: 259 9 Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a4 10 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a4–6 13 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b25–27 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Praedicamenta, 10, 12a35–b1

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Oppositum arguitur | per Aristotelem, | qui dicit quod sunt unum in numero, licet bene differant ratione; modo differentia nominum secundum rationem non impedit veritatem praedicationis, si supponant pro eodem. Videtur mihi quod illa quaestio faciliter posset solvi dicendo quod idem est privatum et privatio; et materia est privata; igitur materia est privatio. Quod autem privatum sit privatio declaratur per aliquas regulas. Una est quod, si nomen concretum supponit pro aliquo et etiam nomen abstractum pro aliquo et nomen abstractum non significat vel connotat aliud ab eo pro quo concretum supponit, tunc oportet quod abstractum et concretum supponant pro eodem et quod de se invicem affirmative verificentur. Sic enim credo quod illae sunt verae ‘entitas est ens’, ‘deitas est Deus’, ‘continuitas est continua’, ‘magnitudo est magna’ et sic de multis aliis. Hoc enim nomen ‘entitas’ nihil significat vel connotat pro quo non supponat hoc nomen ‘ens’, et sic ‘deitas’ nihil significat vel connotat quod non sit Deus etc. Alia regula est quod etiam in praedicto casu, scilicet quod tam nomen concretum quam etiam nomen abstractum supponit pro aliquo, licet abstractum multa significaret vel connotaret alia ab eis pro quibus concretum supponeret, si tamen pro nullo illorum aliorum | supponeret, oporteret quod supponeret pro eodem pro quo concretum supponit. Hoc est per se notum. Si enim supponit pro aliquo et non pro alio, sequitur quod supponit pro eodem. Modo certum est quod hoc nomen ‘privatio’ cum verbo et praedicato non ampliantibus suppositionem ad praeterita vel futura supponit pro aliquo etiam praesente. Aliter tales propositiones non essent verae ‘privatio est principium’, ‘privatio est privatio’, ‘privatio est carentia formae’, ‘caecitas est privatio visus vel carentia visus in oculo’. Omnes | enim hae propositiones, quia sunt affirmativae, essent falsae, si ‘privatio’ pro nullo supponeret; et

1 arguitur] patet GP : apparet p 2 differant ratione] differunt ratione p : differant secundum rationem G 4 posset] potest GP 5 privatum … et2] privatio et privatum G 6 declaratur] declarabitur G ‖ regulas] rationes G 7 supponit] supponat G 8 pro1 … abstractum] rep. G ‖ aliud] illud p 9–10 supponant] supponunt Pp 10 de] om. P ‖ verificentur] add. in marg. seu praedicentur C ‖ sic] si p 13 supponat] supponit G 14 etc.] om. p 15 alia regula] et secunda P : secunda G ‖ etiam] om. P ‖ scilicet quod] si P 16 etiam nomen] nomen P : om. G ‖ licet] add. bene G 17–18 concretum supponeret] concreta supponunt G 18 illorum] om. GP 19 supponit] supponeret G 20 supponit2] sup. lin. C : om. Pp 22 vel] add. ad G 24 privatio est privatio] om. P 25 vel carentia visus] om. P ‖ omnes] omne p 26 quia sunt affirmativae] om. P 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b24–28

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essent etiam falsae, quia sunt de praesenti et de praedicato non ampliante, si non supponeret pro aliquo praesentialiter existente. Igitur concluditur quod hoc nomen ‘privatio’ in dictis propositionibus supponit pro materia, pro qua supponit manifeste hoc nomen ‘privatum’, | vel supponit pro aliquo alio praesente significato vel connotato per hoc nomen ‘privatio’; sed illud non posset assignari. Licet enim connotet aliud, scilicet formam, tamen non pro illa supponit, quia si sit diaphanum sine lumine, tunc tenebra est, quae est carentia luminis in diaphano; et verum est quod hoc nomen ‘tenebra’ connotat lumen cum negatione, sed non supponit pro lumine, quia tenebra non est lumen; igitur tenebra est ipsum diaphanum non illuminatum. Sic secundum praedictam regulam potentia est potens, voluntas est volens, paternitas est pater, privatio est privatum etc. Sed illae sunt falsae ‘album est albedo’, ‘animatum est anima’, ‘dives est divitiae’, | et sic de multis, quia abstractum significat aliud ab eo pro quo concretum supponit et pro illo etiam alio supponit. Et illo modo etiam bene dicit Aristoteles quod materia et privatio sunt unum in numero. Sed non debet dici quod illo modo hoc nomen ‘privatio’ sit nomen verbale ab hoc verbo ‘privo’ vel ‘privor’, sicut illa nomina sunt verbalia ‘dealbatio’, ‘calefactio’, ‘sanatio’, ‘factio’, ‘corruptio’, ‘annihilatio’ et huiusmodi. Sed esset tale nomen, sicut sunt haec nomina ‘praesentia’, ‘carentia’, ‘absentia’ et huiusmodi. Sed ultra, istis non obstantibus, posset convenienter dici quod hoc nomen ‘privatio’, prout esset nomen verbale sicut ‘combustio’, ‘destructio’, ‘ablatio’ et huiusmodi, descenderet ab hoc verbo ‘privo, -as’ vel ‘privor, -aris’ et significaret actum privantis et eius quod privatur, sicut dicimus saepe quod unus privavit alium equo suo vel oculo vel sanitate vel vita etc. Et illo modo pri-

1 essent etiam] inv. P ‖ ampliante] ampliato GP 2 supponeret] supponerent GP : supponent C 6 posset] potest GP ‖ enim connotet] enim connotat P : non connotaret G 7 si sit] sicut P 12 privatum] privata GPp ‖ etc.] add. sup. lin. et sic de multis aliis C : et sic de multis (om. G) aliis GPp ‖ illae sunt falsae] ista est falsa G 13–14 multis] add. aliis Pp 14 ab eo] add. sup. lin. ultra illud C ‖ concretum supponit] inv. P 15 modo etiam] inv. G 17 ab hoc] a P ‖ privo vel privor] privor vel privo P 18 dealbatio] albatio GP : ablatio p 18–19 sanatio … annihilatio] salvatio corruptio factio annihilatio P : om. G 19 et huiusmodi] etc. P ‖ esset] om. G 20 praesentia carentia] carentia posita G ‖ et huiusmodi] praem. essentia p : essentia etc. P 21 istis] his P ‖ posset] possit ad hoc G : potest P ‖ convenienter] consequenter p 22 nomen] om. G ‖ ablatio] albatio P : om. G 23 huiusmodi descenderet] huiusmodi descendit G : huius descendet P ‖ as] vas GP : privas p ‖ vel] om. G ‖ aris] varis P 23–24 significaret] significat G 24 privantis et] om. P ‖ sicut] om. p ‖ saepe] om. G 25 privavit] privat G ‖ suo] om. G ‖ vel … vita] om. G 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190b24–28

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vatio est actus privantis et eius quod privatur, sicut calefactio est actus calefacientis et eius quod calefit, et visio actus videntis et eius quod videtur, et corruptio actus corrumpentis et eius quod corrumpitur subiective. Privatio autem materiae a forma equi vel aeris esset illa mutatio qua materia privatur ab illa forma, et sic esset corruptio substantialis equi vel aeris. Et dictum est prius quod generatio substantialis est forma quae materiae acquiritur et corruptio est forma quae abicitur. Igitur privatio sic non esset materia, sed forma, quando res corrumpitur. Et quando equus est corruptus, tunc corruptio qua corruptus est, nihil | est, sed fuit forma equi. Ita privatio qua | materia est privata forma equi nihil est, sed fuit forma equi, quando privabatur ab illa forma. Et illo modo potest bene intelligi illud dictum Aristotelis in secundo huius quod privatio quodam modo est natura, quia privatio quodam modo est species, id est forma, scilicet non forma quae est in statu permanentiae, sed quae corrumpitur. Adhuc tertio modo posset solvi ista quaestio dicendo quod idem possumus intelligere per hoc nomen ‘privatio’ et per hanc orationem ‘materiam carere forma quam innata est habere’. Et sic privatio est materia carens illa forma, sicut hominem currere est homo qui currit. Et si per hoc nomen ‘privatio’ vellemus intelligere idem quod per hanc orationem ‘talem formam posse esse in materia et non esse talem in ea’, tunc privatio esset forma in potentia, sicut animam posse esse est anima in potentia. | Et isto modo privatio nihil est, sed erit vel potest esse. Et omnes isti modi solvendi in eandem sententiam revertuntur, quantum est ex parte rei. Et sunt omnes veri; nomina enim sunt significativa ad placitum. Et secundum horum diversas expositiones oportet diversimode respondere. Et videtur mihi quod Aristoteles magis tenet primum modum; ideo dicit materiam et privationem esse idem in numero. Propter quod etiam ego teneo illum modum, non tamen reprobando alios, sed potius approbando.

2 calefit] caleficit C ‖ visio] visus G 4 a] et G 7 est forma] formae P 9 corruptus] corrupta P ‖ ita] ista p : non P 11 et … illud] ita potest intelligi bene P ‖ aristotelis] add. quod dicit P 15 posset] potest GP 17 et] om. P 19 vellemus] velimus P 21 et] om. P 21–22 privatio] primo p 22 esse] om. G 23 revertuntur] revertantur P 24 enim] om. P 25 et] add. sic G ‖ horum] eorum GP : earum p 26 primum modum] primo modo P 28 etiam ego] om. P ‖ illum modum] illam modo P ‖ tamen] om. P 29 approbando] probando P 5–6 Cf. sup., I, q. 17, 17127–28 Physica, I, 7, 190b24–28

11–12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 193b19

27 Cf. Aristoteles,

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam | dictum est prius quod substantiae per se subsistentis quae fit vel facta est non sunt nisi duo principia intrinseca, scilicet materia et forma. Sed sunt tria nomina distincta secundum rationem supponentia pro illis principiis et requisita ad exprimendum nomen generationis vel corruptionis naturalis. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dico quod Plato in exprimendo nomen transmutationis naturalis debuisset distinxisse secundum rationem inter materiam et privationem, id est inter haec nomina; quod non fecit; ideo non bene expressit nomen transmutationis naturalis. Quando autem dicit Aristoteles quod materia est non ens per accidens et privatio est non ens per se, dico quod ad videndum intentionem Aristotelis oportet notare cum diligentia quod numquam prima materia est privatio formae substantialis, quia negatio implicita in hoc nomine ‘privatio’ praecedens illum terminum ‘formae substantialis’ distribuit ipsum. Ideo sequitur ‘privatio formae substantialis, igitur cuiuslibet formae substantialis carentia’, quod non est possibile naturaliter. Sed semper prima materia est formae substantialis privatio, quia semper est sub | forma aliqua substantiali; sed quandocumque est sub forma substantiali de una specie, ipsa caret forma substantiali de alia specie; ideo est illius formae privatio; igitur formae privatio, quia ille terminus ‘privatio’ tenetur indefinite. Sed cum nos specifice descendimus ad nomina formarum substantialium, ut si dicamus ‘privatio formae ignis’ vel ‘privatio formae aquae’ et signamus aliquam materiam, quae sit a, tunc ista est contingens ‘a est privatio formae ignis’. Est enim aliquando vera, scilicet quando illa materia est sub forma aquae, et est aliquando falsa, scilicet quando est sub forma ignis. Tunc ego dico quod Aristoteles per ‘esse ens’ vel per ‘esse non ens’ intendebat idem quod ‘esse de essentia’ vel ‘non esse de essentia substantiae per se subsistentis’. Et cum dicebat ‘per se’ et ‘per accidens’, intendebat | quod propositio esset vera per se vel per accidens tali modo quod specificata substantia per se subsistente, ut quod vocetur ignis, et signata aliqua materia, quae sit a, tunc est intentio Aristotelis quod haec est vera per se et necessaria ‘privatio formae ignis non est de essentia ignis’. Immo universaliter est verum quod nulla privatio formae ignis est de substantia ignis. Et hoc intendit, cum dicit quod privatio est 1 ad] praem. tunc igitur Gp 5 principiis] om. P 7 dico] dicitur P 11 dicit aristoteles] inv. G ‖ est non] inv. CP 18 aliqua substantiali] inv. P ‖ sed] et p 20 ideo] add. ipsa P 21 privatio] formae GP : om. p ‖ indefinite] infinite p 23 vel] om. G 26 ego] om. G 27 de] add. substantia vel P 28 subsistentis] subsistens p 30 specificata] specifica Pp 31 ut] sup. lin. C : et P 33–34 formae] om. G

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per se non ens. Sed illa est contingens et vera per accidens, si sit vera, ‘a non est de substantia ignis’, quia aliquando est de substantia ignis et aliquando non. Et hoc intendit, cum dicit quod materia est non ens per accidens. Et sic diceretur de aqua, de equo et planta et de omnibus aliis substantiis specificatis per nomina suarum specierum. Eodem modo intelligitur alia differentia, scilicet quod materia est prope substantiam, privatio autem nequaquam. Materia namque a sic est prope substantiam ignis, | quia aliquando est verum dicere ‘a est de substantia ignis’, sed privatio nequaquam, id est numquam est verum dicere quod privatio ignis est de substantia ignis. De alia autem differentia dico quod ex materia fit aliquid non secundum accidens, immo supple: substantialiter, ad illum sensum quia, cum res est facta, ut ignis, verum est dicere quod illa materia | est de substantia ignis. Sed ex privatione fit aliquid secundum accidens, id est non substantialiter, ad illum sensum quia non est verum dicere facto igne quod privatio formae ignis est de substantia ignis, quoniam illa materia non amplius est privatio formae ignis. Sic etiam est | de alia differentia. Nam materia quae est privatio formae ignis manebit materia ignis igne facto, sed non manebit privatio ignis. Privatio igitur ignis manebit, sed non manebit privatio ignis, sed materia manebit et manebit etiam materia. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam rationem potest dici, sicut Commentator dicit, quod Aristoteles aliquando in Praedicamentis locutus est secundum famositatem et non secundum veritatem de his quorum determinatio pertinebat ad alios libros philosophiae. Vel potest dici quod ipse loquebatur iuxta solutionem ultimam quaestionis prius positam. Nam esse caecum non est caecitas, si hoc nomen ‘caecitas’ ponatur significare idem quod haec oratio ‘in oculo non esse visum’, quia sic vel caecitas nihil est vel est visus qui non est in illo oculo. Haec de quaestione. 1 et] etiam C 2 quia] et p 4 diceretur] dicetur P ‖ de2] praem. et G : om. P ‖ et1] add. de G : de p : om. P 4–5 specificatis] specificis p : om. G 6 alia] eadem p 7 a] om. p 12 supple] om. G ‖ quia] quod G 14 aliquid] om. GPp 15 formae] factio P 18 ignis1] om. G 19 privatio1 … ignis2] om. (hom.) G 20 etiam] et G 21 potest] praem. etiam P : posset p ‖ dici] add. quod C 23 pertinebat] pertinebit G 24 ipse] ille p 24–25 solutionem ultimam] inv. GPp 25 positam] positae G ‖ si] sed p 27 esse visum] est visus P ‖ est2] etiam G ‖ illo] om. GP 29 haec de quaestione] etc. sequitur alia quaestio p : etc. G : om. P 21 Cf. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, V, comm. 18, f. 125K

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⟨i.24⟩

⟨Utrum materia appetat formam⟩ Quaeritur vicesimo quarto utrum materia appetit formam.

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⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod non quia: non cognoscit, igitur non appetit. Consequentia probatur primo per experientiam de nobis. Nam quando tu dormis sine somnio, nihil appetis, sed aliquando somniando tu appetis, quia cognoscis. Secundo quia: appetitus est boni ad prosequendum et mali ad fugiendum; sed non apparet causa quare res naturalis hoc prosequatur et illud fugiat, nisi sciat inter illa | distinguere, quod non est sine cognitione. ⟨2⟩ Item vel appeteret formam quam habet vel aliam, scilicet quam non habet; sed neutro modo. Probatio: primo enim dicit Aristoteles quod non appetit illam quam habet propter non esse indigens. Sed probo quod nec illam quam non habet quia: illa nihil est et sic nihil appeteret vel etiam appeteret nihil. Et iterum quia: formae plures non possunt stare simul in materia, sed ad adventum unius sequitur corruptio alterius; ideo si materia appeteret aliam formam ab ea quam habet, sequitur quod appeteret corruptionem illius quam habet; quod est impossibile, quia forma quam habet est perfectio eius naturalis et nullum ens naturale appetit corruptionem suae perfectionis naturalis. Et maxime, si materia fuerit sub forma perfectissima quam est innata habere, ut sub humana, si appeteret aliam, ipsa appeteret esse minus perfecta quam ipsa sit, et sic appetitus naturalis esset ad malum, quod est inconveniens. | ⟨3⟩ Item sicut in arte est, ita est in natura. Sed in arte de duobus malis quorum necesse est alterum evenire, minus malum eligendum | est tamquam bonum in tali casu. Et similiter de duobus bonis incompossibilibus

3 vicesimo quarto] deinceps G 4 arguitur primo] et arguitur P : arguitur Gp 6 tu appetis] om. P 7 cognoscis] noscitis P ‖ secundo] iterum Gp 9 illud] hoc p 11 formam] om. P 12 enim] om. p 13 probo] probatio P ‖ nec] non appetit P 15 quia] om. G ‖ stare simul] inv. G 16 ideo] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 17 sequitur] sequeretur GP 21 ipsa] om. P 21–22 esse minus perfecta] esse minus perfectum G : aliam minus perfectam C 24 est1] ante in1 GPp ‖ ita est] ita p : sic debet esse P 25 eligendum est] inv. GPp 26 bonis] om. G 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a20–21; cf. AA, 2: 34

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_028

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minus bonum est refutandum tamquam malum et non appetendum. Igitur similiter materia, cum non possit simul habere formam humanam, quae est optima, et aliquam aliam, ipsa debet omnes alias refutare et nullam appetere. ⟨4⟩ Item Commentator dicit quod appetitus materiae nihil aliud est quam illud quod materia habet de motu ad formam; sed aliquando nihil habet de motu, quia est in quiete; igitur saltem tunc nihil appetit. ⟨5⟩ Iterum inquirendo de quidditate appetitus vel ille appetitus esset idem cum materia vel distinctus. Non distinctus, quia dicit Aristoteles quia materia appetit per sui ipsius naturam. Et etiam quaereretur quae res ille appetitus esset et utrum maneret vel corrumperetur in adventu formae, et non posset ad hoc convenienter responderi. Nec potest dici quod sit idem cum materia, quia corrumpitur in adventu formae. Materia enim non amplius appetit for|mam illam propter non esse indigens, ut dicit Aristoteles, sicut tu satiatus non amplius appetis cibum. Et etiam quia appetitus naturalis est inclinatio sequens rem; et idem non sequitur se ipsum. Et etiam quia idem esset dicere ‘materia habet appetitum ad formam’ et ‘materia habet materiam ad formam’. Et haec sunt inconvenientia. Igitur appetitus materiae non est ipsa materia. ⟨6⟩ Item inquirendo de causa appetendi vel materia esset causa appetendi formam, vel forma quam materia habet, vel privatio illius formae quam appeteret. Non enim apparent plura in materia, propter quae materia debeat appetere illam formam generandam. Sed nullum illorum videtur esse causa appetendi illam formam. Probo: primo non materia, | quia tunc, cum ipsa semper maneat, semper appeteret illam, quod est falsum, quando habet eam, propter non esse indigens, et quando est corrupta, propter non amplius posse habere; ideo frustra amplius appeteret. Secundo nec forma quam habet, quia illa habet repugnantiam ad aliam formam; ideo magis resisteret

1 igitur] ita P 2 possit] potest P 3 et1] ad G ‖ alias] om. p ‖ nullam] add. aliam p 6 ad formam] et forma sed add. in marg. alias ad formam P 9 idem] om. p ‖ quia2] quod GPp 10 et] om. P 12 posset ad hoc] possit ad hoc GP : posset aliud p ‖ potest] etiam P 15 et etiam] etiam P : om. p 16 rem] corr. ex naturam rei C : naturam rei Pp ‖ sequitur] consequitur Pp 16–17 etiam quia] inv. GPp 20 item] et iterum G 22 debeat] debet G 24 probo] probatio GPp ‖ tunc cum] tunc P : sicut G 25 maneat] maneret C : add. sic G 27 posse] propter P 28 habet1] add. est causa p 5 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 81, f. 46D 9 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a22–23 14–15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a20–21; cf. AA, 2: 34

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quam inclinaret. Tertio nec privatio, quia illa nihil est aliud quam materia, de qua iam argutum est.

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Oppositum dicit Aristoteles. Et aliter generatio ignis esset violenta, quia esset a principio activo extrinseco et passum nullam vim conferret plus quam grave ad motum sursum, ex quo nihil inclinaretur ad illam formam. Ista quaestio apparet mihi difficilis. Sed notandum est | quod obiectum appetitus est bonum | vel apparens bonum. Unde si appetitus sit circa malum, hoc est ad fugiendum; et fugere malum est bonum. Ideo appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio ad bonum vel apparens bonum. Solet autem distingui appetitus, quia alius est animalis, alius naturalis. Sed contra hoc obicitur quia: anima est natura; igitur animalis est naturalis, cum sit ab anima. Solutio: naturalis potest dici, quia est a natura, et sic animalis est naturalis, vel quia est immediate a natura, sic quod non mediante cognitione est, et sic appetitus animalis non dicitur naturalis. Appetitus animalis dividitur in intellectualem, qui dicitur voluntas, et in sensualem, qui iterum dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. Et dicitur intellectualis, quia mediante cognitione intellectiva, et sensualis, quia mediante sensitiva. Appetitus concupiscibilis dicitur respectu boni vel mali. Sic enim consurgit amor vel odium, complacentia vel displicentia. Et si apprehendatur per modum obtenti et habiti, consurgit voluptas vel dolor, delectatio vel tristitia. Et si apprehendatur per modum non habiti, sed habendi, consurgit concupiscentia vel refutatio, desiderium vel fuga. Appetitus autem irascibilis est circa bonum vel malum apprehensorum sub ratione alicuius arduitatis, et huiusmodi arduitas est difficultas vel periculum vel vindicta. Et si sit difficultas, et appetitus non cadit, tunc est spes, et si cadit, est desperatio. Si autem sit periculum, et appetitus non cadit, tunc est audacia, et si cadit, est timor. Si autem sit medium prohibitivum boni vel 1 inclinaret] declinaret p ‖ illa … aliud] nihil aliud est illa P : nihil est aliud p 3 et] etiam P 5 nihil] non GPp 6 mihi] add. valde Gp ‖ obiectum] add. habitus G 7 bonum2] om. G 8 est bonum] om. P 10 est] om. GPp 11 hoc] add. statim GPp 12 sit] fit G 14 est] ante mediante p : om. G 16 et2] om. P 19 appetitus] add. autem GPp 20 si apprehendatur] si comprehendatur P : sic apprehendatur G 21 obtenti et] optanti et P : om. G ‖ voluptas] voluntas CG 22 apprehendatur] comprehendatur P 24 malum] add. vel cum apprehensione p 25 huiusmodi] huius P 27 cadit1] add. tunc p 28 cadit] add. tunc p ‖ sit] add. periculum p 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a22

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illativum mali et non sit inclinatio nisi ad removendum illud medium, tunc non est nisi difficultas, circa quam est spes vel desperatio. Sed aliquando non solum apprehenditur remotio illius medii, immo etiam est vindicta de eo, et tunc, si appetitus non cadit, est ira, et si cadit, est mansuetudo, non prout mansue|tudo est virtus, sed prout est passio contraria irae. Et tunc iuxta praedicta notandum est quod, quamvis praedicti actus | appetendi non inveniantur proprie et distincte in naturalibus non | cognoscentibus, tamen proportionale invenitur in eis. Ideo secundum hoc ponuntur conclusiones. Prima est quod materia appetit formam generandam per modum desiderii vel concupiscentiae, quia perfectibile naturaliter inclinatur ad suum bonum, per quod innatum est perfici, ex eo quod ipsum dirigitur a Deo et intelligentiis, iuxta illud dictum Commentatoris duodecimo Metaphysicae: ‘natura perfecte et ordinate operatur, licet non cognoscat, tamquam re|memorata’, id est directa, ‘a cognoscente infallibili’, scilicet a Deo; materia autem est naturaliter perfectibilis per formam generandam; igitur etc. Item Deo existente fine omnium, gratia cuius omnia alia sunt et ad ipsum ordinantur, omnia naturaliter tendunt in ipsum, scilicet ut ei, prout est possibile, assimilentur. Et cum Deus sit actus purus et perfectissimus, materia non potest magis assimilari ei quam ex eo quod ipsa perficitur et actuatur per formam. Igitur ipsa ad hoc naturaliter tendit et inclinatur. Item aliter generationes naturales substantiarum essent violentae, sicut prius bene arguebatur. Secunda conclusio est quod materia appetit formam quam habet per modum voluptatis seu delectationis, quia ad quod habendum naturaliter inclinatur, in hoc habito naturaliter quietatur per modum delectationis; sed dictum est quod materia naturaliter inclinatur ad formam generandam; igitur etc.

2 est1] om. p 3 remotio] primo modo P ‖ est] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 4 tunc si] inv. P 6 et] om. P ‖ praedicti] om. p 7 appetendi] corr. in marg. ex appendendi C : impediendi p ‖ inveniantur] inveniatur p 10 prima] add. conclusio G 11 suum] summum G 12 ex] om. p ‖ quod2] add. sed del. in C : add. in GPp 13 dictum] om. P ‖ commentatoris] add. in G 15 infallibili] infallibiliter p 16 igitur] om. p 19 cum deus] inv. P 20 potest magis assimilari] magis potest assimilare G 21 ad hoc] adhuc p 22 naturales substantiarum] inv. p 23 bene] om. P 25 seu] sive P ‖ delectationis] add. seu dilectionis P 26 in] etiam P ‖ quietatur] laetatur p 13–14 Cf. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 18, f. 305D–E

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Item sicut desiderium ad habendum, ita delectatio ad habitum; sed ad formam habendam erat motus desiderii; igitur etc. Tertia conclusio est quod materia non appetit formam appetitu animali. Patet, quia non cognoscit. Quarta conclusio est quod materia appetit formam appetitu naturali, quia appetit; et non appetitu animali, ut dictum est; igitur appetitu naturali. Quinta conclusio est secundum Aristotelem quod materia appetit formam generandam per modum desiderii propter privationem illius formae, ita quod privatio est causa appetendi ad bonum sensum, qui postea dabitur. Probatur igitur ista conclusio quia: posita privatione ponitur appetere | per modum desiderii et remota removetur (verbi gratia posita carentia nutrimenti in stomacho sequitur fames, quae est appetitus seu desiderium cibi); et illa concomitantia carentiae et desiderii non esset, nisi unum esset causa alterius; modo desiderium non est causa carentiae, immo potius e converso. Non enim caremus quia desideramus, immo desideramus quia caremus et indigemus. Sexta conclusio est quod appetitus quo materia appetit formam non est res distincta a materia. Et hoc probaretur, sicut probatum fuit de potentia. Frustra enim poneretur res distincta, si omnia possent salvari sine hoc; sed possunt, ut patebit, si rationes ad oppositum factae possunt solvi. Item sicut materia intendit formam, sic appetit eam; sed intendit eam tamquam directa a Deo sine intentione sibi addita, cum non cognoscat; igitur similiter appetit sine appetitu addito. | Iterum sicut ostendetur post quod natura actualis agentis, scilicet forma, sufficit in intendendo et appetendo productionem formae, ita | in intendendo et appetendo receptionem debet sufficere natura materialis, quae non est nisi ipsa materia. Septima conclusio quod materia et appetitus differunt secundum rationem, id est ista nomina sunt imposita ad significandum ea quae significant

1 desiderium] add. est p 2 motus] modus P ‖ igitur] om. p 4 patet] om. GPp 5 quod] om. P 8 per] propter G 10 probatur igitur] inv. P 12 seu] sive P 13 concomitantia] communicantia G 14 immo potius] om. G 15–16 et indigemus] om. G 18 probaretur sicut] probaretur ut P : probatur sicut p ‖ fuit] est G 19 possent salvari] salvari possunt P 20 ut patebit] sup. lin. C : sicut patebit Gp ‖ factae] in marg. C : om. GPp 21 sic] sed sed add. sup. lin. sic P ‖ eam2] om. G 22 directa] directam C : dilectam P 24 sicut ostendetur] ut ostenditur P ‖ quod] quam p 25 intendendo et] om. Gp ‖ productionem] praem. formam vel p : sicut necesse est P ‖ ita] add. etiam P 25–26 intendendo et] accedendo et P : om. G 26 materialis] add. in marg. alias potentialis C : naturalis P 28 quod] praem. est Gp : est P 29 sunt imposita] inv. GP

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secundum diversas rationes, quia aliter illa nomina ‘materia’ et ‘appetitus’ essent nomina synonyma et sic illae orationes non differrent nisi secundum vocem ‘materia habet appetitum ad formam’ et ‘materia habet mate|riam ad formam’ vel etiam ‘materia appetit formam’ et ‘materia materiat formam’; et haec sunt absurda. Et iterum hoc nomen ‘appetitus’ est relativum connotans bonitatem obiecti, et non hoc nomen ‘materia’, quia aliter non esset verum quod materia eadem aliquando appetit formam per modum desiderii et aliquando non, sed per modum delectationis. Et multae sunt species huius nominis ‘appetitus’, ut dictum est, quae non sunt species huius nominis ‘materia’. Sed | nunc occurrunt duae dubitationes difficiles. Prima est: cum sit idem materia et privatio et appetitus, quomodo est possibile quod privatio sit causa appetitus, cum idem non sit causa sui ipsius? Secunda: cum nos principaliter velimus habere scientiam de rebus naturalibus, quid curamus nos in nostra scientia de illis diversis nominibus vel orationibus, ex quo res est eadem? Ad primam dicendum est quod, sicut materia et forma, quae sunt res simplices, vocantur causae compositi, ita in conceptibus apud animam conceptus simplices vocantur causae conceptuum complexorum et compositorum; modo conceptus materiae, a quo sumitur hoc nomen ‘materia’, est conceptus simplex vel simplicior quam conceptus potentiae, quia ‘potentia’ ultra connotat respectum ad formam. Et ‘privatio’ adhuc ulterius connotat carentiam illius formae. Et adhuc ultra haec omnia ‘appetitus desiderii’ connotat bonitatem illius formae. Ideo non quantum ad res extra, sed quantum ad rationes sive conceptus desiderium supponit et consequitur privationem et privatio potentiam et potentia materiam. Ideo e converso materia sic dicitur causa potentiae et potentia privationis et privatio desiderii. Propter secundam dubitationem est diligenter advertendum quod ea quae videmus et experimur in nobis, nos secundum similitudinem propor-

4 formam2] om. G 5 absurda] obscura G 6 et] om. G ‖ relativum] ante est p : aliquando P 7 quia] et Pp 11 nunc] tunc GPp ‖ est] om. G 13 sui] om. P 14 secunda] add. dubitatio P ‖ principaliter velimus] specialiter volumus P 15–16 vel orationibus] et orationibus P : vel rationibus G 17 dicendum est] praem. dubitationem G : dicitur P 20 materiae] add. sed del. id est C : add. id est Pp 22 ultra connotat] inv. P 23 omnia] nomina P 25 supponit et] supponit et (corr. sup. lin. ex sive) C : om. Gp 27 sic] om. G 29 advertendum] attendendum Pp 30 experimur] experimus C 30–237.1 proportionis] proportiones P

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tionis attribuimus Deo et intelligentiis et rebus naturalibus aliis a nobis, et sic ex nobis notioribus devenimus in notitiam illorum nobis minus notorum. Secundo notandum est quod, quando aliquid agimus, nos percipimus in nobis duos actus, scilicet cognoscere et velle seu appetere. Et illos scimus distinctos esse ab invicem, quia separabiles sunt. Et illi requiruntur in nobis ad agendum. Tertio notandum est quod | cognoscere agibilia est habere descriptionem et similitudinem eorum in nobis, appetere autem determinat nos ad agendum vel | non agendum et ad sic agendum aut sic. Quamvis enim notitiam habeamus domus et requisitorum ad faciendum domum, tamen non operamur, nisi superveniat actus volendi. Ex istis arguimus in Deo intelligere et velle, intellectum et voluntatem, quae licet non differant realiter, tamen secundum diversas | rationes et diversos conceptus attribuimus Deo illa diversa praedicata. Et proveniunt illae diversae rationes originaliter ex diversitate rerum in nobis praedictarum, per quarum notitiam devenimus in notitiam Dei et sibi secundum similitudinem proportionis attribuimus talia praedicata. Modo quia ultra videmus in naturalibus non cognoscentibus quod ignis producit ignem ad sui similitudinem, ideo habet in se quasi descriptionem et similitudinem ignis generandi, et hoc est proportionale ipsi intelligere, et hoc vocamus intendere vel intentionem agentis, quae non est nisi forma eius vel forte qualitates. Sicut enim est potentia remota, scilicet materia prima et agens principale, et potentia etiam propinqua, scilicet materia cum dispositionibus qualitativis requisitis ad talem vel talem formam aut etiam agens principale cum suis instrumentis, ita sunt intentio remota et propinqua proportionaliter. Videmus autem quod ignis est determinatus ad hoc agendum et sic agendum, si passum fuerit praesens, | et hoc est proportionale ipsi appetere. Et haec determinatio non est nisi forma ignis et suae qualitates. Et sic apparet quod est idem in igne intentio et appetitus, intendere et appetere, intendens et appetens. Et differunt haec praedicata in ratione propter differentiam eorum in nobis;

2 in] ad P 3 est] om. P 4 seu] sive P 5 distinctos esse] inv. GPp ‖ quia] om. P 7 est1] om. P ‖ habere] add. et p 8 determinat] dicimus P 9 aut] vel P 10 habeamus] habemus Pp ‖ requisitorum] requisitarum p ‖ tamen] om. P 10–11 operamur] operamus Cp 13 et] add. secundum G 15 praedictarum] repertarum p 16 notitiam2] notiam G 17 modo] e converso P ‖ quia] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 20 proportionale] proportionabile p ‖ vel] sive G 21 nisi] nec P 22 materia prima] inv. p 24 vel] add. ad G 25 proportionaliter] proportionabiliter p 26 et sic agendum] om. p 27 proportionale] proportionabile p 28 apparet] patet p 29 intendere] rep. G 30 in1] om. GPp ‖ eorum] add. repertam P

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propter quae proportionaliter talia praedicata attribuimus igni, sicut dicebamus de praedicatis Deo attributis. Tunc sequitur illa dubitatio quare tot praedicata attribuimus igni vel Deo. Cum res sit eadem, quid curamus de tot nominibus? Solutio: dico quod oportet sic facere, quia aliter nesciremus nec possemus exprimere quantam et qualem causalitatem Deus aut etiam ignis aut alia naturalia habent super suos effectus. Deus enim super effectum quem facit vel creat habet causalitatem non solum sicut in nobis intellectus vel intelligere respectu eius quod facimus, nec solum sicut voluntas et velle, immo secundum suam simplicem essentiam habet causalitatem super suum effectum, sicut haec omnia simul in nobis super effectum nostrum. Ideo ad hoc notificandum oportet ei tot et talia praedicata diversa | attribuere. Igitur ignem intendere ignem est ipsum habere similitudinem et formam innatam producere alium ignem, ut dictum est septimo Metaphysicae quod omne quod fit fit ab agente sibi simili. Aliquo modo verum est quod aliquando utimur hoc nomine ‘intendere’ vel ‘intentio’ | pro determinatione, sed haec est impropria locutio. Sed ignem | appetere productionem ignis est esse ipsum determinatum ad productionem ignis praesente passo. Sed tunc revertamur ad propositum principale. Videtur enim secundum dicta quod materiae non debet attribui aliqua intentio, quia non habet descriptionem alicuius actus vel formae in sua substantia, et nihilominus debet sibi attribui appetitus, cum non sit determinata secundum se ad aliquem actum. Respondeo et dico quod non proprie attribuitur intentio nisi agenti, sed improprie et passive attribuitur intentio materiae. Et est illa intentio habere in potentia similitudinem formae et est posse eam recipere; et hoc totum non est nisi materia. Sed de appetitu dicendum est quod materia secundum se determinata est ad patiendum et recipiendum a quocumque agente 1 quae proportionaliter] quam proportionabiliter p : quae C 3 illa] alia p 5 solutio] solvitur P 6 et] vel p ‖ causalitatem] qualitatem p ‖ aut etiam] aut GP : et p ‖ aut2] et GPp 7 suos effectus] inv. GPp ‖ effectum] add. suum p 10–11 suum effectum] inv. GPp 11 simul in nobis] in nobis simul p ‖ super] supra P 13 ignem intendere ignem] ignem intendere G : intendere ignem p ‖ ipsum] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 14 ut] unde Pp 17 ipsum] om. GPp 18 productionem ignis] producendum ignem GPp 19 tunc] nunc p ‖ enim] om. P 23 actum] add. etc. G 24 agenti] agente G 26 potentia] add. habere P ‖ posse] proprie G 27 dicendum] sciendum G 28 patiendum et recipiendum] faciendum et recitandum P 14 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 7, 1032a23–25

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indifferenter quod sibi advenerit, et non est determinata secundum se ad patiendum ab illo, ita quod non ab alio, sicut miser indigens est determinatus ad lucrandum quocumque modo possit, ut portando ligna vel fodiendo terram etc.; et haec est misera determinatio, quae est appetitus materiae et idem quod ipsa materia. Agens autem habet nobiliorem intentionem, quia habet actualem similitudinem formae generandae et habet appetitum perfectiorem, quia maiorem habet determinationem. Nec mirum, quia agens est nobilius passo. Recolligendo igitur dicamus quod materia respectu formae indifferenter habitae vel habendae habet modum amoris et complacentiae et respectu habendae modum concupiscentiae vel desiderii et respectu habitae modum voluptatis vel delectationis. Actus autem appetitus irascibilis vel proportionalia magis conveniunt | agentibus. Nam prout agens invadit suum contrarium corrumpendo ipsum, attribuitur sibi modus spei, audaciae et irae, et secundum quod aliquando fugit a suo contrario, attribuitur sibi modus desperationis, timoris et pusillanimitatis. Ad rationes principales. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod naturalia non cognoscentia habent certas intentiones et determinationes per hoc quod gubernantur et diriguntur ab agente infallibili, quod est Deus. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dictum est quod materia appetit for|mam quam habet non per modum desiderii, propter non esse indigens, sed per modum complacentiae et delectationis. Et appetit illam quam non habet per modum desiderii. Nec sequitur quod nihil appetat, quia hoc verbum ‘appetit’ ampliat suppositionem ad futurum. Nec ipsa appetendo formam generandam appetit corruptionem eius quam habet, sed quia non potest illam semper habere, ideo indifferenter appetit quam potest habere. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam | potest dici quod, si materia posset semper manere sub forma nobiliori, Deus non ordinasset sibi appetitum ad aliam formam, sed

1 advenerit] advenit p 2–3 determinatus] post lucrandum (3) P 3 quocumque modo] quomodo p ‖ portando] ad portandum C : ad (del.) portandum G ‖ vel] om. P 4 etc.] om. GP ‖ haec est] vere haec G : hoc est p 5 nobiliorem] notiorem p 7 determinationem] denominationem p 9 materia] notitia p 10 et1] vel GPp 12 voluptatis] voluntatis G 12–13 proportionalia] proportionabilia p 14 corrumpendo ipsum] om. P ‖ et irae] om. p 15 sibi] ei P 16 et] vel p 17 ad] praem. tunc igitur GPp 19–20 ab agente] a cognoscente GPp 24 sequitur] add. ex hoc P ‖ appetit] om. p 27 potest habere] inv. P 28 aliam] tertiam p ‖ posset] possit G 29 forma] om. P ‖ ordinasset] ordinavisset G

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quia non potest, non est malum appetere aliam, maxime sub indifferentia. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod Commentator ibi per ‘motum’ non intendit nisi inclinationem ad aliam formam. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dictum est quod appetitus est idem quod materia. Nec appetitus desiderii corrumpitur adveniente forma, sed desinit esse appetitus desiderii. Nec appetitus sequitur materiam nisi quantum ad rationes nominum. Et multum differt sic vel sic dicere propter differentiam secundum rationem. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam et ultimam dictum est quomodo ibi est causalitas, non secundum rem, sed secundum rationes nominum. 41rb C 35ra P

Et sic est finis quaestionum primi libri Physicorum etc. Expliciunt quaestiones primi libri Physicorum. | 3 aliam] quartam p ‖ motum] modum C 5 est idem] inv. P 8–9 secundum rationem] rationum G 10 et ultimam] om. GPp ‖ ibi est] inv. P 11 rem] esse p ‖ nominum] add. etc. G 12–13 est … physicorum] finiuntur quaestiones primi libri physicorum incipiunt consequenter supra secundum eiusdem G : sit finis quaestionum primi P : est finis primi physicorum p

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⟨Tabula quaestionum secundi libri Physicorum⟩

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Tabula quaestionum secundi libri Physicorum secundum processum magistri Iohannis Buridani. ⟨1⟩ Quarum prima est utrum res artificiales sunt distinctae a rebus naturalibus. Quare res dicatur naturalis vel artificialis. ⟨2⟩ Secunda est utrum ista differentia quam assignat Aristoteles inter naturalia et artificialia sit conveniens, scilicet quod naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus et status, artificialia autem inquantum artificialia nullum habent impetum mutationis innatum. Quomodo intelligentia unita est orbi. An corpora simplicia, scilicet elementa, alterantur ex se active. ⟨3⟩ Tertia est utrum figura est res distincta a figurato. De triplici modo se habendi aliquam rem aliter et aliter et quod solus tertius modus arguit generationem vel corruptionem dispositionis permanentis in illa re. Quomodo | ars domificatoria est factiva, cum nullam domum faciat. ⟨4⟩ Quarta utrum definitio naturae est bona in qua dicitur quod natura est principium et causa etc. ⟨5⟩ Quinta est utrum in istis substantiis materialibus formae substantiales sunt principaliter activae suorum motuum et suarum operationum vel magis qualitativae dispositiones illarum substantiarum. Quod ad actiones illorum inferiorum concurrit agens separatum. Quod forma substantialis est principium activum ad mutationes et quietes sibi convenientes et principalius quam sua accidentia. De violento et naturali tam in alterationibus quam in motibus localibus. ⟨6⟩ Sexta est utrum naturalis differt a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus sine motu. De mathematicis mediis, utrum debeant dici naturales vel magis mathematicae.

2 tabula] praem. sequitur Gp 2–3 secundum … buridani] om. GPp 4 quarum] om. GPp ‖ est] praem. quaestio P : quaestio Gp 5 dicatur … artificialis] dicuntur artificiales vel naturales P 6 est] quaestio G : om. Pp 8 sui motus] inv. P ‖ artificialia autem] et artificialia P 9 impetum] appetitum p ‖ innatum] innatam C : om. P 10 corpora] entia P 11 ex se] esse C 12 tertia est] tertia Gp : om. P 13 rem] res C ‖ et aliter] om. C ‖ solus] solet P 16 quarta] tertia C 17 et causa] om. p 18 est] om. GPp ‖ utrum] add. est C ‖ materialibus] naturalibus P 19 sunt] sint p 20 quod] quomodo p 21 forma] format C 23 quam2] add. etiam P 25 est] om. GPp ‖ mathematico] metaphysico C 26 et] om. G 27 utrum debeant] utrum debeat G : rep. C ‖ mathematicae] mathematici G

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⟨7⟩ Septima est utrum finis sit causa. Quod causa dicitur simpliciter vel secundum attributionem sicut sanum; et sic est duplex finis, scilicet dictus primaria intentione et dictus secundaria intentione. ⟨8⟩ Octava est utrum pater sit causa filii. Quod materia dicitur causa secundum attributionem ad principalem intentionem. ⟨9⟩ Nona est utrum | definitio fortunae sit bona in qua dicitur ‘fortuna est causa per accidens’ etc. ⟨10⟩ Decima est utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes. ⟨11⟩ Undecima est utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet. Quomodo agens se habet multi|pliciter ad utrumlibet ad suum effectum. Quod idem est respectu unius ut in pluribus et respectu alterius ut in paucioribus. ⟨12⟩ Duodecima est utrum natura producens monstrum intendit monstrum. Quomodo diversis modis solent monstra provenire. ⟨13⟩ Tredecima utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex fine vel ex materia. Quot, quae et qualia requiruntur ad ordinem entium nobis in hoc mundo apparentem. Quod ex sanitate producenda non dependet operatio medici nec intentio eius. Quomodo hirundo intendit pullos et nidum et quo ordine et a quo provenit ille ordo. | 1 est] om. GPp 3 intentione2] om. Pp 4 est] om. GPp 6 est1] om. GPp ‖ fortunae] naturae G ‖ in qua] ubi p ‖ dicitur] add. quod p 7 per accidens] add. extra semper et frequenter P : om. Gp 8 est] om. GPp 9 undecima] duodecima C ‖ est] om. GPp 10 quomodo] add. est C 12 ut] om. Pp ‖ in paucioribus] imperantibus C 13 est] om. GPp 14 quomodo] add. diversimode seu P ‖ provenire] evenire C 16 quot] add. et P 17 apparentem] apparent P 19 ille] illi C ‖ ordo] add. etc. et sic finitur tabula quaestionum huius secundi physicorum incipiunt consequenter quaestiones G : add. et sic est finis tabulae secundi libri et continet tredecim quaestiones p : add. et sic est finis tabulae P

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⟨Utrum res artificiales sint distinctae a rebus naturalibus⟩

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Circa secundum primo quaeritur utrum res artificiales sunt distinctae a rebus naturalibus. ⟨1⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic auctoritate Aristotelis | in principio huius dicentis: ‘alia a natura, alia propter alias causas’, scilicet artificialia. ⟨2⟩ Item dicit quod naturalia differunt ab aliis, scilicet ab artificialibus. Quod probat quia: naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus vel suae transmutationis, alia autem nullum habent principium suae mutationis innatum, ut patet secundo huius. ⟨3⟩ Iterum nihil naturaliter est compositum ex aere et figura statuae; sed aliquod artificiale, ut statua, est compositum ex aere et figura statuae, ut dicit Porphyrius et saepe Aristoteles; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Item aliquis motus quo per serram dividimus lignum vocetur b. Et tunc arguitur sic: motus b non est naturalis; sed motus b est artificialis; igitur quoddam artificiale non est naturale et per consequens artificiale est distinctum a naturali. ⟨5⟩ Item suppono quod omnis ars est factiva alicuius. Hoc apparet, quia practicae scientiae distinguuntur a speculativis per hoc quod speculativae finis est scire, practicae vero opus, secundo Metaphysicae; practicarum

4 circa … quaeritur] circa secundum librum quaeritur primo Pp : prima quaestio huius secundi est G 6 et arguitur primo] arguitur GPp ‖ principio huius] add. secundi Gp : secundo huius in principio P 8 ab2] om. GPp 11 ut patet] om. GPp 13 aliquod] aliquid p ‖ dicit] dixit p 14 igitur] om. p 15 et] om. GP 16 sic] om. Pp 17 quoddam] quodam C 18 a naturali] contra naturale G 19 alicuius] add. artificialis p ‖ quia] nam P 21 practicae vero] et practicae Pp : practicae G ‖ opus] add. ut patet per philosophum P 6 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b8–9 11 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b12–19 14 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 11, 13–14 (ed. Minio-Paluello, 18); cf. e.g. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 7, 190a25 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, II, 1, 993b20–21

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autem prudentia sive scientiae morales dicuntur activae, artes vero factivae; igitur omnis ars est factiva alicuius et non factiva alterius rei quam artificialis. Tunc arguitur sic: nulla res naturalis fit ab arte; et res | artificialis fit ab arte (aliter ars non esset factiva rei artificialis, quod est contra suppositum); igitur res artificialis non est res naturalis et per consequens res artificialis est distincta a re naturali. ⟨6⟩ Iterum si de ferro fiat securis, aliqua dispositio acquiritur qua dicitur actu securis illud quod ante non erat securis; sed non acquiritur res vel dispositio naturalis; igitur acquiritur res vel dispositio artificialis distincta a re seu dispositione naturali. ⟨7⟩ Item quidam exercitus est artificialis et similiter quaedam domus est artificialis; igitur convertendo quoddam artificiale est exercitus et quoddam artificiale est domus. Sed iterum sequitur per resolutionem adiectivi substantivati in neutro genere ‘quoddam artificiale est domus, igitur quaedam res artificialis est domus’. Et iterum convertendo sequitur ‘igitur quaedam domus est res artificialis’. Tunc arguo per syllogismum expositorium: haec domus non est res naturalis; et haec domus est res artificialis; igitur res artificialis non est res naturalis et per consequens est distincta etc. Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Omne artificiale fit vel factum est a nobis per intellectum et voluntatem; sed in nobis intellectus et voluntas sunt anima nostra, quae est natura; igitur artificiale | factum est a nobis per naturam. Et omne quod factum est per naturam est naturale. Igitur omne artificiale | est naturale. ⟨2⟩ Iterum sta|tua est res artificialis; et etiam illa statua est res naturalis; igitur idem est res artificialis et res naturalis. Maior conceditur ab omnibus. Minor probatur quia: statua est aes taliter figuratum; et aes taliter figuratum nihil aliud est quam aes; et aes est res naturalis; igitur de primo ad ultimum res artificialis est res naturalis.

1 prudentia] speculativa P ‖ artes vero] et artes dicuntur GP : artes enim dicuntur p 3 arguitur] igitur p ‖ et] sed P 4 artificialis] om. P ‖ suppositum] add. ergo res artificialis non est naturalis quod est contra suppositum G 7 aliqua] add. res seu P 8 illud] id p 10 seu dispositione] sive dispositione P : vel dispositione seu dispositione G 11 et] om. p 12 quoddam] quodam C 12–13 quoddam] quodam C 13 resolutionem] relationem G 14 quoddam] quodam C : quod p 16 arguo] arguitur GPp 18 res1] om. C 19 etc.] om. GP 23 est2] add. a nobis P 25 et] om. P 27 aes taliter figuratum1] res taliter figurata G 28 aliud est] inv. Pp : est (del.) aliud est C

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Circa istam quaestionem sunt magnae dubitationes, quae seorsum tractandae sunt. Cum enim fiant plurimae rerum artificialium per transfigurationem materiae naturalis, dubium est utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata. Et iterum, cum transfiguratio fiat per motum localem partium rei quae transfiguratur, dubium est utrum motus localis sit res distincta a re mobili et loco. Immo etiam fiunt domus et exercitus per motus locales partium ex quibus integrantur domus et exercitus; quae quidem partes sunt res naturales. Item propter illas dubitationes | ego pono conclusiones hypotheticas, quae per determinationes dictarum dubitationum debent reduci ad categoricas. Tamen notandum est quid debeamus intelligere per ‘res naturales’ et per ‘res artificiales’. Primo igitur modo res aliqua dicitur naturalis, quia est natura. Sic enim materia et formae substantiales dicuntur res naturales. Secundo substantiae per se subsistentes dicuntur res naturales, quia habent naturam, ut equus et lapis etc. Tertio accidentia convenientia praedictis naturis vel substantiis dicuntur res vel dispositiones naturales, et maxime si conveniant formae substantiali. Sic enim frigiditas et humiditas dicuntur dispositiones naturales aquae. Quarto modo minus proprie dicuntur adhuc dispositiones naturales illa accidentia quae conveniunt materiae, licet disconveniant formae praesenti. Unde sic calefactionem vel caliditatem aquae diceremus naturalem, quia licet disconveniat formae aquae, tamen convenit eius materiae, inquantum disponit eam ad recipiendum illam formam quam materia naturaliter appetit et ad quam naturaliter inclinatur. Sed artificiale communi nomine dicitur omne illud quod fit a nobis per intellectum et voluntatem et numquam fieret sine actione nostra voluntaria, ut domus vel securis. Vel si simpliciter sic non fiat a nobis, tamen artificiale dicitur illud quod a nobis per intellectum et voluntatem fit taliter se habens, qualiter numquam se haberet sine actione nostra voluntaria, ut ferrum 1 istam] om. p 1–2 tractandae sunt] inv. p 2 enim fiant] fiunt G 2–3 per transfigurationem] transfigurationes p 3 sit] est Pp 3–4 re figurata] figurata G : figurato P 4–5 rei quae transfiguratur] quae transfigurantur p 5 re] om. GPp 6 et1] add. a P 7 integrantur] integratur G 9 conclusiones hypotheticas] inv. G 10 determinationes] doctores p ‖ debent] debebunt p 12 tamen] add. ante Pp ‖ debeamus] debemus G 13 igitur modo] inv. P 14 formae] forma P 15 secundo] add. modo P 16 et lapis etc.] lapis GPp ‖ tertio] add. modo P 17 et] om. P 19 naturales aquae] inv. p ‖ modo] om. Gp 20 adhuc] om. P 22 disconveniat] disconveniant Gp 23 convenit] conveniunt Gp ‖ disponit] disponunt G 27 et2] add. quod P 28 sic non] inv. GPp 29 taliter] aliter P

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numquam sine actione nostra voluntaria se haberet taliter qualiter se habet, quando ex eo facta est securis. 35vb P

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Prima conclusio est: si | figura est res distincta a re figurata, tunc aliqua res est res artificialis, quae non est res naturalis, ut figura potti, securis vel statuae. Secunda conclusio: si motus localis est res distincta a mobili et loco, tunc aliqua res est artificialis, quae non est naturalis, | ut serratio ligni vel malleatio ferri. Tertia conclusio est: si motus localis non est res distincta a mobili et loco et figura etiam non est res distincta a figurato, tunc nec domus nec securis facta est ab arte nec etiam aliqua dispositio domus vel securis facta est ab arte, quia lapides et ligna et ferrum non fiunt ab arte; igitur nec | motus locales eorum fiunt ab arte, cum illi motus non sunt nisi lapides illi etc. Similiter magnitudo ferri non fit ab arte; igitur nec figura securis, cum illa non sit nisi magnitudo figurata. Et si ita est, tunc in praedictis nihil apparet esse quod fiat ab arte. Tamen hac conclusione non obstante salvaretur quod ars domificatoria et ars fabrilis sunt artes factivae domus et securis. Nam licet ignis fecerit te esse calidum, tamen non fecit te; et ita faber facit ferrum esse securim et domificator facit lapides esse domum, sed non faciunt ferrum nec lapides. Contra hoc obicitur quia: te esse calidum est idem | quod tu; igitur si ignis fecit te esse calidum, ipse fecit te. Similiter lapides et ligna esse domum non est nisi lapides et ligna et etiam ferrum esse securim non est aliud nisi ferrum; igitur si domificator et faber faciunt lapides et ligna esse domum et ferrum esse securim, ipsi faciunt lapides et ligna et ferrum. Solutio: dico quod illae consequentiae non valent propter hoc quod illi termini a parte post appellant connotationes suas. Sicut enim non sequitur ‘homo fit homo albus, igitur homo fit homo’, ita non sequitur ‘ignis facit hominem esse calidum, igitur ignis facit hominem’. Dico igitur quod ignis facit calidum, licet nullum calidum faciat ignis, et ignis facit hominem esse

1 numquam] post voluntaria p 3 prima conclusio est] add. quod P : est igitur prima conclusio p ‖ tunc] om. P 4 res1] om. GPp ‖ res2] om. GP ‖ potti] ollae GP 5 conclusio] add. est p 6 est1] ante aliqua P 8 est1] om. G 9 figurato] re figurata P 10 ab1] ex G 10–11 vel … arte1] facta est ab arte seu aliqua dispositio securis P 12 locales] localis p ‖ sunt] sint Gp 13 figura securis] inv. P 17–18 fecerit te esse] faceret te p 18 facit] fecit P ‖ et2] add. ita G 19 facit] fecit P ‖ faciunt] facit G 20 contra] praem. sed G 21 ipse] om. G 22 et2] post etiam p : om. P ‖ aliud] om. GPp 24 et1] om. GP 25 solutio] solvitur P 26 connotationes suas] inv. G 28 esse] om. G ‖ dico] dicam Gp 29 licet] sed P ‖ faciat] facit GP

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calidum, licet nullum hominem esse calidum faciat ignis. Et ita dico quod faber facit securim et domificator domum, sed nec securim facit faber nec domum domificator. Et ita domificator facit lapides et ligna esse domum, sed lapides et ligna esse domum non facit domificator. Quarta conclusio est quod, licet non esset figura distincta a figurato nec motus localis a mobili et loco, tamen aliqua res artificialis esset, quae non esset res naturalis, quia domus vel exercitus est res artificialis et tamen non est res naturalis. | Sicut isti termini ‘mortuum’, ‘generandum’, ‘pictum’ et huiusmodi ampliant istos terminos ‘homo’, ‘asinus’, ‘animal’ et huiusmodi ad supponendum pro eo quod non est homo vel asinus vel animal, ita multi termini ampliant illos terminos ‘ens’, ‘res’, ‘unum’ ad supponendum pro eo quod non est | ens, res, unum. Res enim corrupta non est res et multa entia opinata non sunt entia. Et ita ens exercitus non est ens et unus populus non est aliquid unum et domus est ens domus | et una domus, et tamen nec est ens nec unum nec aliqua res, licet sit ens artificiale et res artificialis. Quinta conclusio est quod, si non esset figura distincta a figurato nec motus localis a mobili, tunc omnis res artificialis esset res naturalis vel res naturales. Et hoc satis apparet ex dictis. Immo etiam satis videtur apparere ex praedictis quia, licet figura esset res distincta a figurato et motus localis a mobili et loco, tamen omnis res artificialis exceptis figura et motu locali esset res naturalis vel res naturales. Ad rationes principales. ⟨1–2⟩ De prima auctoritate Aristotelis et de secunda dicetur in alia quaestione. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod statua non est composita ex aere et figura. Sed intentio Porphyrii est quod ibi est compositio secundum rationem, ita quod definitio huius nominis ‘statua’ est composita ex definitionibus vel rationibus horum nominum ‘aes’ et ‘figura’, sicut definitio speciei ex genere et differentia.

1 faciat] facit G ‖ et] om. P 2 et] om. p ‖ sed] licet tamen P 3 et1] om. P 5 figura] ante non P 6 tamen] add. adhuc GPp ‖ res] om. P 8–9 et huiusmodi] etc. huiusmodi P : etc. p 9 asinus animal] inv. C 12 unum] om. G ‖ et] vel G 14 aliquid] aliquod P 15 nec2] om. P ‖ artificialis] add. etc. G 18 apparet] patet p ‖ immo] rep. G 19 praedictis quia] praedictis quod Pp : dictis quod G 20 mobili et] om. p ‖ exceptis] excepta GPp 22 ad rationes principales] tunc respondendum est ad rationes GPp 23 de2] om. GP ‖ alia] secunda p 26 ibi est] inv. P 23–24 Cf. inf., II, q. 2

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⟨4⟩ Ad aliam diceretur quod, si motus localis non sit res distincta a mobili et loco, tunc motus b est res naturalis, licet non sit motus naturalis, sicut tu es res bona et non es clericus bonus. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dictum est quomodo ars est factiva, licet nullam rem faceret, quia faceret rem taliter se habere. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam diceretur quod ferrum non dicitur securis per dispositionem additam, sed propter sic esse figuratum. Et de hoc magis dicetur post. ⟨7⟩ Ad ultimam dictum est quod domus vel exercitus non est res naturalis, sed est res naturales.

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1 diceretur] dicetur GP ‖ localis] om. p 2 motus2] om. p 4 est2] esset GP 6 diceretur] dicetur G ‖ dicitur] diceretur P ‖ per] propter G 7 magis dicetur] inv. GPp 8 non] add. dicitur res naturalis nec P 9 est] praem. dicitur res naturales et P : om. p 10 haec de quaestione] et sic finitur quaestio P : et sic est finis quaestionis p : etc. G 7 Cf. inf., II, q. 3

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⟨Utrum ista differentia quam assignat Aristoteles inter naturalia et artificialia sit conveniens, scilicet quod naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus et status, artificialia autem inquantum artificialia nullum habent impetum suae mutationis innatum⟩ Consequenter quaeritur secundo utrum ista differentia quam assignat Aristoteles inter naturalia et artificialia est conveniens, scilicet quod naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus et status, artificialia autem inquantum artificialia nullum habent impetum suae mutationis innatum. ⟨1⟩ Ar|guitur primo quod haec sit falsa ‘naturalia inquantum naturalia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus et status’ per multas instantias. Nam propter reduplicationem sequeretur quod omnia | naturalia essent huiusmodi, quod est falsum. Primo, quia caelum est naturale; quod tamen est substantia simplex et sic non habet in se principium sui motus, sed ipsummet est principium sui motus. Et iterum, si haberet in se principium sui motus, tamen non haberet in se principium sui | status, cum non potest | naturaliter stare. Item ad idem instantia est, quia materia prima et quaelibet forma materialis est res naturalis, et tamen non habet in se principium etc., cum sit simplex, ut dictum est de caelo. Aliae etiam instantiae sunt, quia caliditas vel frigiditas sunt res naturales et non habent in se principium etc. Et motus est res naturalis et lumen etiam est res naturalis, et tamen non habent principium etc., quia non apparet 8 consequenter] om. GPp ‖ quaeritur secundo] inv. G ‖ ista] om. GPp 9 est] sit GPp 11 autem] om. p ‖ impetum] principium p 14 ipsis] om. G 15 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 15–16 huiusmodi] huius P 19 potest] possit GPp 21 quia] om. G 22 et] om. G ‖ principium] om. GPp 24 sunt1] om. G 25 habent] om. P ‖ principium] om. GPp ‖ et2] etiam p ‖ motus … lumen] lumen est res naturalis et motus P ‖ res] om. C ‖ etiam] om. G 26 et tamen] et cum G : tamen P ‖ habent] habet C ‖ principium] om. GPp ‖ non2] nec GPp

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_031

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quod lumen possit moveri nec etiam motus, cum in quinto huius dicatur quod motus non est motus neque mutationis mutatio. Iterum si dicta propositio esset vera, sequeretur quod alia non haberent huiusmodi principium, quia reduplicatio designat appropriationem et convertibilitatem. Sed consequens est falsum, quoniam tam voluntaria quam casualia et omnino artificialia habent in se ipsis principium sui motus vel status saltem passivum. ⟨2⟩ Deinde contra secundam propositionem arguitur, scilicet quod haec sit falsa ‘artificialia inquantum artificialia nullum habent impetum mutationis suae innatum’. Nam contra hoc sunt multae instantiae. Securis enim, quae est res artificialis, si esset sursum, caderet deorsum ex se sicut lapis. Et acuties in securi est principium sectionis lignorum. Et horologium artificialiter habet in se principium sui motus localis et candela similiter principium suae combustionis lichini. ⟨3⟩ Deinde arguitur contra differentiam quia: forte res artificiales non differunt a rebus naturalibus, sicut dictum est in alia quaestione. ⟨4⟩ Iterum vel intelligitur de principio activo vel solum de passivo. Si de activo, prima propositio est falsa propter caelum, quia dicit Commentator quod nullum corpus simplex alteratur ex se. Si solum de passivo, differentia est falsa, quia artificialia inquantum artificialia habent in se principium passivum suorum motuum. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem in principio secundi huius. Multae dubitationes implicantur in illa quaestione. Sed notandum est quod quaestio intelligitur de rebus naturalibus quae sunt sub-stantiae per se sub-

1 possit] rep. C ‖ possit moveri] inv. p ‖ dicatur] dicitur P 3 sequeretur] sequitur Gp ‖ non] a naturalibus p 4 huiusmodi] huius P 5 quoniam] quia GP 6 omnino] omnia p 9 impetum] corr. ex impedi- C : principium p : om. G 10 suae] om. GPp ‖ enim] om. P 11 deorsum] om. GPp ‖ et] om. G 12 in securi] securis G 13 habet] habent G ‖ similiter] ante candela G : om. Pp 14 lichini] om. Gp 16 est] om. P 19 ex se] sup. lin. C : om. G 19–20 differentia est] inv. P 20 inquantum artificialia] om. GPp 22 arguitur per aristotelem] ponit aristoteles GPp ‖ secundi huius] corr. ex huius secundi C : inv. P 23 sed notandum est] sed notandum G : notandum tamen P 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, V, 2, 225b14–16 16 Cf. sup., II, q. 1, 24716–21 Physicam, II, comm. 1, f. 48F 22 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b9–19

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sistentes, ut animalia, plantae et corpora caelestia, aer, aqua etc., ut dicit Aristoteles, ita quod non curemus loqui de materia vel de formis | substantialibus aut accidentalibus, quae non moventur nisi cum subiecto in quo sunt. Notandum est etiam quod sunt diversa genera motuum vel mutationum, scilicet generatio, corruptio, augmentatio, diminutio, alteratio et motus localis. Et etiam duplex est principium motus, scilicet activum et passivum. Et de omnibus istis videndum est. Iterum notandum est quod motuum et quietum alii dicuntur naturales, alii violenti. Et nos hic intelligimus de naturalibus et non de violentis. Tunc ponuntur conclusiones, et primo de motibus et quietibus localibus. | Prima | conclusio est quod aliqua est res naturalis, quae nullum habet principium sui motus naturalis nec etiam suae quietis naturalis, quia eius quod nihil est nihil est causa vel principium; sed alicuius rei naturalis nullus est motus naturalis vel quies; igitur nullum est principium et nulla est causa sui motus naturalis vel suae quietis. Maior est concedenda, nisi aliquis vellet dicere quod ista nomina ‘causa’ vel ‘principium’ ampliant terminos ad futura vel possibilia quae non sunt (quod non videtur verum, sed si esset verum, dicta conclusio non | amplius esset concedenda). Minor apparet, nam si lapis b, qui est res naturalis, moveatur sursum violenter, tunc nec quiescit nec movetur naturaliter et ita ipsius nec est aliquis motus naturalis nec quies. Propter secundam conclusionem sciendum est quod intelligentia movens orbem ponitur ab Aristotele et Commentatore quodam modo unita orbi per quandam appropriationem et indistantiam. Et quia non est situaliter extra orbem, licet non inhaereat orbi, ideo sic ponitur quod caelum non 1 animalia] add. vel G ‖ et] om. GP 1–2 ut2 … quod] et ut dicit aristoteles infra p 2 loqui] omnino G ‖ formis] forma C 3 accidentalibus] accidentibus p ‖ subiecto … sunt] add. sed del. per se subsistentes C : substantiae per se subsistentes moventur GPp 4 est etiam] inv. G : om. P ‖ diversa] add. sup. lin. sunt C 6 et1] om. Pp 7 est] add. quod p 8 est] om. P 9 hic intelligimus] inv. P ‖ de naturalibus et] de naturalibus (non add. sed del.) et C : de naturalibus p : om. G 10 tunc] deinde P ‖ primo] prima P ‖ quietibus] add. naturalibus P 11 conclusio] om. p ‖ est2] om. P 13 nihil2] non p 15 suae] om. p 16 vel] et P 18 apparet nam] tamen apparet GP : apparet p 19 tunc] add. enim GPp 20 nec3] add. aliqua GPp 22 intelligentia] intellectus P 23 unita] corr. in unitus P 24 et2] om. P 25 inhaereat] adhaereat P ‖ sic] si P 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b9–11 23 Cf. Averroes, In De caelo et mundo, I, comm. 5, f. 5E–H; cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo, I, q. 4 (ed. Moody, 18)

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moveatur a principio extrinseco, sed potius intrinseco; ideo movetur naturaliter, non violente. Et ideo solet dici quod ‘caelum’ aliquando capitur pro orbe circumscribendo intelligentiam et aliquando pro congregato ex orbe et intelligentia. Et certum est secundum Aristotelem quod intelligentia movet orbem active et orbis movetur passive; ideo motus caelestis intelligentia est principium activum et orbis passivum. Tunc igitur pro secunda conclusione diceretur quod capiendo ‘caelum’ pro congregato ex orbe et intelligentia caelum habet in se principium activum et passivum, sicut congregatum ex pluribus diceretur habere unumquodque eorum ex quibus esset congregatum. | Et etiam si ‘caelum’ caperetur pro orbe tantum, adhuc haberet in se principium activum sui motus, non tamquam partem sui nec tamquam formam sibi inhaerentem, sed tamquam actum sibi dicto modo unitum et non situaliter separatum ab eo. De quiete autem dixisset Aristoteles nullum esse principium activum vel passivum quietis caeli, quia credidit impossibile esse quod caelum quiesceret, nisi quod improprie loquendo aliqui dicunt caelum quiescere quiete opposita motui recto, quia non movetur motu recto; et haec est impropria locutio, quia sic possemus dicere currentem quiescere, quia non movetur motu circulari. Tunc dicendum est de generabilibus et corruptibilibus, scilicet sub caelo existentibus. De quibus ponitur tertia conclusio, scilicet quod omne ens naturale sub orbe lunae existens habet in se principium activum sui motus localis naturalis, quia omne tale est grave vel leve (et sicut dicam de gravi quantum ad motum deorsum, ita intelligendum erit de levi quantum ad motum sursum); omne autem grave habet in se principium activum sui motus deorsum, quo naturaliter descenderet, si esset sursum et non impedi-

1 movetur] in marg. C : om. GPp 1–2 naturaliter] add. et P 2 violente] violenter Pp ‖ et] sup. lin. C : om. P 3 congregato] aggregato G 7 diceretur] dicetur P : dicatur p 10 eorum] illorum P ‖ esset] add. compositum p ‖ et] sed Pp 12 partem] partes C : per esse p 13 modo] rep. G 13–14 de quiete autem] tunc de quiete P 14 dixisset] diceret p 17 movetur] post recto2 p 18 movetur] post circulari (18–19) p 20 scilicet] om. G 21 scilicet] om. GP 22 activum] om. p 23 leve] sed inter haec deb†…†notare quod si lapis quies†…† naturaliter deorsum sua †…† vel gravitas sua d†…† principium activum illius qui†…† non quia proprie loquendo agit †…† quietis, quia tunc intel†…† sed improprie dicitur principium ac†…† illius quietis quod nihil aliud s†…† nisi quia est principium resist†…† illi moventi quod el†…† ipsum ab illo loco add. in marg. C 25 autem] enim C ‖ sui] om. GPp 26 quo] qui p

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tum. Et illud principium | activum est sua forma vel sua gravitas, sicut alibi debet videri. Et ista conclusio non repugnat primae, quoniam hoc nomen ‘activum’ est nomen potentiae quod ampliat suppositionem huius termini ‘motus’ ad motum futurum vel possibilem, licet non sit. Omne enim grave potest naturaliter moveri deorsum; cuius | motus ipsum habet in se principium activum. Quarta conclusio est quod praeter praedictos motus locales qui sunt a gravitate vel levitate omne animal habet in se principium activum alterius motus sui localis, scilicet vel ambulationis vel natationis vel volationis vel saltem dilatationis vel constrictionis. Et illud principium est anima. Quinta conclusio est quod omne vivens habet in se principium activum suae alterationis, scilicet suae nutritionis et augmentationis vel diminutionis suae. Et illud etiam principium est anima. Immo etiam omne vivens habet principium activum quodam modo suae corruptionis. Omne enim vivens per animam ad sui salutem indiget nutriri nutrimento grosso, quod virtute animae convertit in suam substantiam; et per animam etiam mediante calore naturali consumuntur et exhalantur continue aliquae partes corporis subtiliores grossiori et terrestriori remanente; et sic tandem corpus sic efficitur durum et terrestre quod est ineptum vi|tae et sequitur mors. | Sextam conclusionem ponit Commentator dicens quod nullum corporum simplicium, id est quattuor elementorum, habet in se ipso principium activum suae alterationis nec per consequens suae corruptionis, quia alteratio est a contrario vel formaliter vel virtualiter; corpus autem simplex non habet partes ad invicem contrarias. Habet enim partes quantitativas eiusdem rationis. Quod non est ita de animalibus, immo partes animalis sunt bene complexionum quasi contrariarum, ut quod cerebrum est frigidum et cor calidum; propter quod una pars ab alia alterari potest.

2 quoniam] quia p : quin P 3 nomen potentiae] inv. p 4–5 enim grave] inv. p 5 naturaliter moveri] inv. P ‖ ipsum] ipse Gp : om. P 6 activum] om. G 7 est] om. Pp 9 sui … ambulationis] sicut localis p ‖ natationis vel volationis] volationis vel natationis P : natationis vel volitionis G 10 dilatationis vel constrictionis] dilatationis et constrictionis p : delectationis vel contristationis G 11–12 activum] om. p 12 suae alterationis] inv. P ‖ scilicet] vel G ‖ et] om. G 14 habet] add. in se p 15 enim] om. p 16 convertit] convertitur p 17 consumuntur et exhalantur] consumuntur (et exhalantur sup. lin.) C : exhalantur et consumuntur P : consumuntur et exhalant p 18 sic] om. p 19 sic] om. P ‖ et2] add. sic G 20 dicens] scilicet Gp : om. P 21 id est] ut P 23 non] nullas P 24–25 eiusdem] eius P 26–27 et cor calidum] quod calidum sit cor P 2 Cf. inf. II, q. 5 20 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 1, f. 48F

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Sed haec conclusio indiget moderamine. Possibile enim est quod aqua una habet unam partem calidam et aliam frigidam; ideo una pars potest aliam alterare, sicut dicebatur de animali. Et etiam si aqua fuerit calefacta, ipsa remoto calefaciente revertitur etiam ad frigiditatem maiorem aliquando quam sit frigiditas continentis, quod non esset nisi refrigeraretur a se ipsa active, hoc est dictu a principio sibi intrinseco. Et illud principium, ut credo, est forma substantialis aquae. Illa enim est virtualiter frigida, licet sit actu calida. Et sic est contrarietas virtualis sufficiens ad alterationem. Sed in hoc est vera conclusio Commentatoris quod nullum dictorum corporum simplicium existens in sua convenientissima dispositione qualitativa habet in se principium activum alterationis suae remotivae ipsius a tali dispositione, immo potius habet in se principium activum suae quietis in tali dispositione (sic intelligendo: | non quod illud principium agat illam quietem proprie loquendo, sed dicitur activum illius quietis, quia est resistitivum motori intendenti dispositionem contrariam). Et tunc ad talem sensum potest poni septima conclusio quod omne ens naturale innatum naturaliter quiescere habet in se ipso principium activum suae quietis naturalis et sibi convenientis. Et tandem octavo concludi potest quod omne ens naturale habet in se ipso principium activum cuiuslibet sui motus naturalis sibi convenientis ad sui salutem et perfectionem et etiam cuiuslibet suae quietis naturalis, si sit innatum naturaliter quiescere. | Ultimo videtur mihi esse concludendum directe de quaesito quod Aristoteles non intendebat ponere differentiam rerum artificialium a rebus naturalibus, quia res artificiales sunt res naturales et non differunt ab eis. Sed voluit ponere differentiam inter haec nomina vel inter rationes ipsorum nominum ‘naturale’ et ‘artificiale’. Res enim ex eo dicitur naturalis, quia intelligitur habere naturam in se, quae est principium suorum motuum naturalium vel quietum. Sed propter | talem rationem non dicitur artificialis, immo propter aliam, scilicet quia facta est ab arte sub tali dispositione vel taliter se habens.

3 aliam] alteram P : eam p ‖ et] om. P 3–4 calefacta] calida P 4 ipsa remoto calefaciente] ipsa remota caliditate p : remoto calefaciente tali ipsa P ‖ etiam] post frigiditatem GPp 5 refrigeraretur] refrigeretur GP 6 sibi] om. GP 7 aquae] om. P ‖ est virtualiter] inv. Pp 9 in] secundum C ‖ vera] septima p ‖ commentatoris] add. quae dicit p 11 alterationis suae] inv. GP 14–15 resistitivum] resistivum p 16 tunc ad] tunc ad (sup. lin.) C : ad GPp ‖ potest] posset Gp 19 ens] om. p 20 naturalis] add. et GPp 21 sui] suam Gp ‖ etiam] om. G ‖ sit] est p 23 esse] om. P 27 naturale et artificiale] artificiale et naturale G ‖ ex eo] post naturalis G ‖ intelligitur] intendit P 30 quia] quod C ‖ est] om. p ‖ habens] add. etc. G

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dictum est satis de omnibus instantiis ibi positis. Et etiam dici potest quod illa dictio ‘inquantum’ non ponebatur in illis propositionibus ad reduplicandum de omni, sed potius ad specificandum rationes dictorum nominum. ⟨2⟩ Ad illud etiam quod dicebatur contra secundam propositionem conceditur quod securis habet in se principium sui motus naturalis, quia est res naturalis. Acuties autem non est principium activum motus ipsius securis, sed ligni quod secatur. Principium etiam motus horologii est gravitas plumbi a natura existens et non ab arte. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam concessum est quod non hic assignatur differentia rerum artificialium a rebus naturalibus. ⟨4⟩ Ad ultimam visum est quod non solum de principio passivo debeant dicta Aristotelis intelligi, sed etiam de activo. | Haec de quaestione. 1 ad] praem. tunc igitur GPp 2–3 etiam dici potest] etiam potest dici G : potest etiam dici Pp 3 dictio] dicta P 4–5 dictorum] praedictorum GPp 6 etiam quod] inv. P 8 motus] om. P 9 quod] quia P ‖ principium etiam] principium autem p : per ipsum etiam P 10 existens] ante a G ‖ et] om. GPp 11 hic assignatur] inv. GPp 13–14 debeant dicta] debeat differentia G 14 etiam] om. p 15 haec de quaestione] etc. G : om. Pp

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⟨Utrum figura sit res distincta a re figurata⟩ Et quia in prima quaestione huius secundi dubitatum fuit de figura et motu an sint distincta a re figurata et mobili, nunc quaeremus de figura et in sequentibus libris considerabitur de motu. Erit igitur tertia quaestio utrum figura est res distincta a re figurata.

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⟨1⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic quia: accidens est distinctum ab illo cuius est accidens; et Commentator dicit secundo huius quod formae artificialium, quae ut in pluribus sunt figurae, sunt accidentia in subiectis naturalibus, quia aliter non differrent artificialia a naturalibus, quod est contra Aristotelem in illo secundo. ⟨2⟩ Item ut Porphyrius dicit, statua est composita ex aere et figura; et non esset compositio, si figura non esset distincta ab aere figurato. ⟨3⟩ Item statuae factor faciendo statuam nihil faceret; quod implicat | contradictionem. Consequentia patet, quia ipse non facit aes nec facit magnitudinem nec per consequens facit figuram, ex quo illa non esset nisi aes vel eius magnitudo. Oppositum arguitur quia: figurato convenit definitio figurae; igitur figuratum est figura per locum a definitione. Antecedens patet, quia figura descri-

3 et1] om. Gp 3–5 et1 … quaestio] quaeritur tertio P 3 huius … fuit] huius libri dubitatum fuit p : om. G 4 sint] sit G ‖ re figurata] figurato Gp ‖ quaeremus] quaerimus G 6 re figurata] figurato GPp 7 et arguitur primo] arguitur GPp 7–8 ab … accidens] add. in marg. a suo subiecto C : a suo subiecto Gp : a subiecto suo P 8 et] quia sed add. sup. lin. et C ‖ artificialium] corr. ex accidentialium G : accidentalium C 9 quae … figurae] om. C ‖ subiectis] corr. ex substantiis C : substantiis p 10 quia] et GPp 11 in illo secundo] in secundo huius Pp : secundo huius G 12 ut porphyrius dicit] porphyrius GPp 13 compositio] om. P ‖ esset2] add. res Pp ‖ aere] add. et P 14 faciendo] faciens GPp 15 facit2] om. GP 16 facit] faceret GPp ‖ aes vel] om. G 17 eius] ens P 18 quia] om. P 19 locum] locus C ‖ definitione] add. ad definitum P 8 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 13, f. 52L; cf. AA, 2: 92 10–11 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b8–19 12 Cf. Porphyrius, Isagoge, 11, 13–14 (ed. Minio-Paluello, 18)

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_032

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bitur quod ipsa est quae termino vel terminis clauditur; modo etiam figuratum est quod termino vel terminis clauditur. |

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Ego suppono ex dictis alibi quod nulla substantia est magnitudo. Et sic est duplex figuratum: primo magnitudo subiecti figurati dicitur figurata, consequenter substantia subiecta illi magnitudini dicitur figurata. Magnitudo enim aeris dicitur figurata, quia sphaerica vel cubica etc. Et aes etiam ratione suae magnitudinis dicitur figuratum. Unde remota magnitudine a substantia aeris illa substantia non amplius haberet partem extra partem situaliter, licet haberet | partes extra invicem. Ideo aes non amplius esset figuratum. Ideo igitur ad distinguendum inter duplex figuratum vocamus magnitudinem primum figuratum et substantiam secundario figuratum. Tunc ponuntur conclusiones. Prima est quod omnis figura est distincta a figurato quod est substantia. Probatio quia: omnis magnitudo est distincta a substantia, ut suppono; et omnis figura est magnitudo, ut apparebit per aliam conclusionem. Secunda conclusio est quod nulla figura est distincta a primo figurato; vel sic: nulla figura est distincta a magnitudine figurata. Ista conclusio sic declaratur: magnitudo enim cubica remanens eadem potest fieri sphaerica et e converso, ut magnitudo huius cerae. Et sic ista magnitudo manens eadem se habet aliter et aliter prius et posterius tali modo quod de subiecto supponente pro ipsa verificatur idem praedicatum prius affirmative et postea negative. Prius enim est cubica et posterius non est cubica. Et ex hoc prima facie videtur quod cubicitas et sphaericitas sint diversae dispositiones ab invicem et a magnitudine; propter quarum diversitatem illa magnitudo habet se aliter et aliter. Igitur omnes credentes quod figura sit res distincta 1–2 modo … clauditur] in marg. C : om. GPp 3 est1] sit Pp 3–4 est duplex] inv. GPp 4 subiecti figurati] sup. lin. C : figurata G : finita Pp 4–5 consequenter] add. in marg. alias consimiliter P, add. autem Pp 6 quia] add. vel P : quae est G ‖ vel] om. G 7–8 magnitudine a substantia] omni magnitudine P 8 amplius haberet] inv. G 9 extra] alias ab Pp ‖ aes] om. P ‖ amplius esset] inv. p 10 ideo] om. G ‖ vocamus] vocemus Pp 11 secundario] secundarium Pp 12 ponuntur conclusiones] add. in marg. pono duas conclusiones C : pono duas conclusiones G : pono duas conclusiones principales Pp 14 suppono] add. ex prius determinatis P 15 apparebit] apparet G : patebit Pp ‖ conclusionem] add. igitur etc. Gp : add. igitur P 18 enim] in marg. C : om. GPp 19 ista] sup. lin. C : om. G 20–21 tali … postea] om. P 21 postea] posterius p 22–23 prima facie] inv. p : om. P 23 cubicitas] cubeitas P 24 et] om. G 25 habet se] inv. Gp : se habeat P 3 Cf. sup., I, q. 8

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a magnitudine figurata habent dicere quod, si magnitudo cubica fiat sphaerica, quaedam res prius inhaerens illi magnitudini corrumpitur, scilicet cubicitas, et quaedam res alia generatur postea inhaerens illi magnitudini, scilicet sphaericitas. Ideo si potest probari quod non corrumpitur sic aliqua res nec generatur alia, debet concedi quod figura non est res distincta a magnitudine figurata. Probo igitur quod non sic corrumpitur | una res et generatur alia. Et arguitur sic: magnitudo potest sic aliter et aliter figurari per solam approximationem aliquarum suarum partium ad invicem et elongationem aliarum ab invicem; sed per solam huiusmodi approximationem vel remotionem non generatur aliqua res nova quae ante non esset, nec corrumpitur aliqua quae ante esset; igitur etc. | Maior est satis manifesta, ita quod sufficit mihi declaratio exemplaris, scilicet quod si | cera sit sphaerica et imaginentur tres diametri intersecantes se ad angulos rectos, quae vocentur longitudo, latitudo et profunditas, sive a, b, c, et fiat compressio cerae secundum a et secundum b, ita quod extremitates ipsius a approximentur ad invicem et similiter extremitates ipsius b, tunc enim extremitates ipsius c elongabuntur ab invicem et per hoc sine alia mutatione corpus illud, quod ante erat sphaericum, fiet oblongum et non erit amplius sphaericum. Et sic patet maior. Minor etiam probatur. Primo ad hoc quod duae magnitudines extra invicem existentes sint ad invicem propinquae vel immediatae et tangentes, nihil requiritur alicui illarum inhaerens, | sed solum quod sit alia magnitudo inter eas, per quam illae distent ab invicem. Unde quanto erit inter eas magnitudo maior secundum lineam brevissimam de una ad aliam, tanto magis distabunt, et quanto minor, tanto minus distabunt. Item praedicta minor rationis principalis probatur sic quia: per solum motum localem magnitudinum non oportet aliquid generari quod ante non esset vel aliquid corrumpi quod ante esset, saltem si sit naturae permanentis.

1–2 cubica fiat sphaerica] sphaerica fiat cubica CG 2–3 cubicitas] cubeitas P 3 res alia] inv. GPp ‖ illi] om. p 5 debet] debebit Gp ‖ concedi] add. scilicet P ‖ est] sit GPp 8 potest sic] inv. Gp ‖ figurari] add. et p 9 aliquarum] post partium P ‖ aliarum] add. partium P : aliam G 10 huiusmodi] huius P 12 manifesta] ante est Gp : ante satis P 13 exemplaris] exemplarum G ‖ cera] terra p 14 intersecantes] intersequentes C 15 et1] om. p ‖ cerae] terrae p : om. P 18 illud] sup. lin. C : om. P 19 fiet] fiat P ‖ erit] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 20 probatur] om. P 22 nihil] add. adhuc P 23 distent] distant G : sunt distantes P ‖ unde] ideo P 24 lineam] longitudinem (del.) et add. in marg. alias lineam C ‖ brevissimam] longissimam p 25 minus] magis p 26 rationis principalis] praedictae rationis G 27 magnitudinum] magnum (del.) et add. sup. lin. alias magnitudinum C 28 vel] nec p ‖ si] quod Pp

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Hoc suppono ad praesens et declarabitur, quando quaeretur de motu an sit res distincta a mobili et loco. Item conclusio principalis probatur per hoc quod ex fide communiter dicitur quod omnes res alias ab invicem et non communicantes in aliqua parte eadem Deus potest separare et separatim conservare; sed non apparet quod Deus posset facere magnitudinem finitam sine figura vel non figuratam nec figuram sine extensione et magnitudine; igitur haec videntur manifeste implicare contradictionem; igitur etc. Verum est tamen quod aliqui quibusdam sophisticationibus voluerunt probare oppositum conclusionis dictae. ⟨1⟩ Primo quia: | necesse est, si aliquid se habet aliter et aliter prius et posterius, sicut esset magnitudo quae prius esset cubica et posterius sphaerica, quod ibi sit mutatio requirens diversos terminos, cum subiectum ponatur manere idem; sed in huiusmodi mutatione non sunt termini diversi nisi illae figurae; igitur illae sunt ab invicem diversae et per consequens etiam sunt diversae a magnitudine, quae manet eadem. ⟨2⟩ Item impossibile est magnitudinem sic se habere aliter et aliter sine aliqua alietate; et non est ibi alietas nisi figurae ad magnitudinem vel saltem figurae ad figuram, ex quo ultra sequitur magnitudinis alietas ad utramque figuram. ⟨3⟩ Item magnitudini b non accidit magnitudo b; idem enim non accidit sibi ipsi. Sed magnitudini b accidit sphaericitas, quia potest esse sine sphaericitate; potest enim esse non sphaerica. Igitur sphaericitas illa non est illa magnitudo b. ⟨4⟩ Item cras erit haec magnitudo quae nunc est sphaerica; et cras non erit sphaericitas, quia magnitudo non erit sphaerica, sed cubica; igitur non est idem haec magnitudo et sphaeri|citas.

3 probatur] add. sed del. sic C : add. sic P ‖ communiter] ante ex p : om. P 4 dicitur] habetur G 6 posset] possit P ‖ finitam] terminatam p ‖ sine … figuratam] sine figura G : non figuratam Pp 7 figuram] figuratam p ‖ et] vel p ‖ haec videntur] hoc videtur p 10 conclusionis dictae] inv. p : praedictae conclusionis (ante probare (9–10) P) GP 11 se habet] inv. p ‖ aliter1] ad nihil G 12 esset1] se haberet G 14 manere idem] inv. p ‖ huiusmodi] huius P ‖ termini diversi] inv. P 15 illae2] add. figurae P ‖ ab] ad C 15–16 et … diversae] om. (hom.) p 19 magnitudinis alietas] magnitudinis (?) alietas (sup. lin.) C : magnitudinis GP : magnitudo p 21 enim] om. p 1–2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 7 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 50ra–51ra)

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⟨5⟩ Item haec magnitudo potest separari ab hac sphaericitate; et tamen haec magnitudo non potest separari ab eo quod est ipsamet; igitur haec sphaericitas non est haec magnitudo. Et probatur maior quia: ab eo potest haec magnitudo separari sine quo ipsa erit cras; sed ipsa erit cras sine hac sphaericitate. Probatio quia: ipsa erit sine sphaericitate, igitur erit sine illa sphaericitate. Hoc enim argutum est a toto in quantitate ad suam partem. Sic enim sequitur ‘erit sine albedine, igitur erit sine hac albedine’. ⟨6⟩ Item quidquid haec magnitudo est hodie, ipsa cras | erit illud; sed ipsa est hodie sphaericitas; igitur ipsa erit cras sphaericitas. Consequens est falsum; igitur aliqua praemissarum; et non maior; igitur minor. ⟨7⟩ Item si praedictae rationes negentur tamquam falsae, non apparebit aliqua bona ratio ad probandum quod albedo sit res distincta a re al|ba vel caliditas a re calida, quod est inconveniens. Igitur non debent negari et per consequens non debemus negare illud quod concludunt. Sed istae rationes sunt sophisticae. Per similes enim rationes probaretur quod materia privata forma ignis non esset privatio ignis, quod est falsum. ⟨1⟩ Ergo ad primam rationem dicitur quod ibi requiritur mutatio a qua provenit talis diversa locutio. Sed illa mutatio non est nisi motus localis partium illius magnitudinis; qui quidem motus | localis non requirit terminos permanentes et inhaerentes mobili, sicut alias dicetur, et tamen per illum motum localem fit hoc illi propinquum, cum ante esset remotum, vel e converso. Et dictum est prius quod ad esse hoc illi propinquum vel distans nihil requiritur novum inhaerens huic vel illi. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dico quod ibi est alietas partium ad invicem, quae ad invicem appropinquantur vel ab invicem elongantur per motus locales earum; qui quidem motus sunt etiam aliae res. Et non requiritur alia alietas ad hoc quod illa magnitudo sic se habeat aliter et aliter. 2 haec1] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ est ipsamet] inv. P ‖ haec2] om. p 3 sphaericitas … magnitudo] magnitudo non est haec sphaericitas P 3–4 potest haec magnitudo] quod est haec magnitudo potest P 4 cras2] sup. lin. C : om. p 4–5 hac sphaericitate] ista sphaericitate G : sphaericitate ista Pp 5 erit2] etiam p 5–6 illa sphaericitate] inv. Pp 7 erit] om. Pp 8 cras erit] inv. G ‖ illud] sup. lin. C : id p 10 igitur aliqua praemissarum] sup. lin. C : add. est falsa Pp : om. G ‖ et] om. Pp 11 item] tunc G 12 a re alba] ab albo G 14 debemus] om. P 15 enim] om. P 16 esset] est p ‖ privatio] add. formae GPp 17 ergo] ideo P 18 locutio] add. sup. lin. alias locatio C 20 sicut] ut P ‖ et2] om. P 24 ad2] ab GPp 20 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 8 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 51ra–52rb)

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⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod magnitudini b non accidit sphaericitas nisi ad illum sensum quod haec propositio est vera per accidens ‘haec magnitudo est sphaerica’. Unde licet sit idem homo et album, tamen sic diceremus album accidere homini, scilicet quod haec est vera per accidens ‘homo est albus’. Unde sic saepe dicunt philosophi privationem accidere materiae. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dico quod forma argumenti non valet. Sic enim argueretur quod non est idem ille homo et ille albus demonstrato eodem quia: cras erit ille homo et non erit ille albus. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dico quod eodem modo et non aliter potest haec magnitudo separari ab hac sphaericitate sicut hic homo ab hoc albo posito quod ille homo sit albus. Non enim sic potest esse separatio quod haec magnitudo sit aliquando, quando illa sphaericitas non erit. Sed sic | potest esse separatio quod ista magnitudo sit aliquando, quando tamen non sit sphaericitas. Unde haec sphaericitas erit, quando ipsa non erit sphaericitas. Sed adhuc ratio dubitabat utrum haec sit concedenda ‘haec magnitudo erit cras sine hac sphaericitate’. Et dico quod hoc est, sicut est dubitare utrum haec sit concedenda ‘haec magnitudo non erit cras haec sphaericitas’. Et ego credo quod ambae sunt concedendae, quia deficiet connotatio ex parte rei. Sed haec est neganda ‘haec sphaericitas non erit cras haec magnitudo’. Et similiter ista negaretur ‘sine hac sphaericitate erit cras haec magnitudo’. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dico quod ibi est fallacia figurae dictionis mutando quid in quale. Nam hoc nomen ‘figura’ non solum significat aliquid, sed cum hoc connotat esse aliquale. Sicut igitur non sequitur ‘quidquid emisti, | comedisti; emisti crudum; igitur comedisti crudum’, | etiam non sequitur ‘quidquid haec magnitudo est hodie, ipsa cras erit illud; sed ipsa est hodie alba vel sphaericitas; igitur ipsa erit cras alba vel sphaericitas’. ⟨7⟩ Propter ultimam rationem notandum est cum diligentia quod aliqua res manens eadem tripliciter potest sic se habere aliter et aliter quod de ipsa,

2 quod] quia p 3 licet] om. G 4 quod] quia Pp ‖ vera] post accidens p 5 dicunt philosophi] inv. GP ‖ privationem] om. G 7 ille1] om. p 10 posito quod] quia G 11 sit1] est GPp ‖ sic potest] inv. GPp ‖ quod] quia G 12 quando] quod G 12–13 quando … aliquando] om. (hom.) P 12 non] in marg. C : om. G 13 ista magnitudo sit] haec magnitudo sit G : sit ista magnitudo p ‖ quando] et G : quod Pp 14 ipsa non erit] illa non erit p : non erit haec G : non erit P 15 dubitabat] dubitat P ‖ haec sit] inv. P 16 et] add. ego Pp ‖ est2] om. GPp 18 credo] dico G ‖ deficiet connotatio] designant connotationem sed add. sup. lin. alias deficiet connotatio C 19 est] esset GPp 19–20 et … magnitudo] om. (hom.) GP 20 haec] ista p 24 emisti crudum] inv. G : carnes crudas emisti p ‖ igitur comedisti crudum] igitur crudum comedisti G : ergo etc. p ‖ etiam] sup. lin. C : ita GP : item p 28 eadem] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ sic] post se P : om. p

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id est de termino supponente pro ipsa, verificentur praedicata contradictoria prius et posterius, vel etiam quod de illo termino affirmetur et negetur idem praedicatum prius et posterius. Primus modus est, si illud praedicatum sit connotativum alicuius extrinseci. Tunc enim propter existentiam vel non existentiam aut propter aliam et aliam mutationem illius extrinseci possibile est illud continge|re, ut homo est pater, si eius est filius, et illo non existente non est pater. Et homo est dives, si sunt divitiae sibi applicatae, et est pauper, si pereant aut si alteri applicentur. Et corpus a est propinquum corpori b, si non sit aliud corpus intermedium vel vacuum, et est remotum vel remotius, si est intermedium corpus aut minus aut maius. Et propter aliquid sic aliter se habere non requiritur aliqua eius mutatio nec suarum partium. Secundus modus est, si illud praedicatum connotat situm partium illius rei ad invicem. Et tunc ad sic se habere aliter et aliter requiritur motus localis illarum partium vel alicuius earum et nihil plus praeter ea quae ante erant. Ideo cessante motu, qui non est permanens, nihil aliud est posterius quod non esset prius, et nihil etiam erat prius quod non sit posterius. Et sic est de sedere et stare et de esse rectum aut curvum, sphaericum aut cubicum et sic de aliis figuris. Tertius modus est, si illud praedicatum nec connotat aliquod extrinsecum nec connotat habitudinem partium illius rei ad invicem. Et tunc nulla causa apparet mihi naturalis nisi quia illi rei est aliqua res addita, generata vel corrupta. Sic enim est homo albus et non albus vel albus et niger prius et posterius et potest sciri et argui distinctio formarum et accidentium a subiectis suis.

1 ipsa] ipso P ‖ verificentur praedicata] verificetur praedicta G 2 termino] add. vere GPp 4 illud] om. G 5 vel] aut P 6 et aliam] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ mutationem] mutatione G 7 eius est] inv. GPp ‖ illo] ideo filio P 8 sunt] sint P ‖ aut si] vel si GP : vel p 9 et] add. sic P 11 aut1] in marg. C : om. GPp ‖ minus aut maius] maius aut minus GP ‖ aliquid] add. sup. lin. seu idem C : aliud p ‖ aliter] post habere P 12 nec] aut p 13 est si] quia si C : est quia P ‖ connotat] cognoscat sed add. sup. lin. connotat C 14 ad2] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ se] om. G 15 ante erant] inv. G 16 ideo] om. P ‖ qui] quidquid P ‖ est1] erit G ‖ nihil] idem P 17 erat] erit G ‖ sit] corr. sup. lin. ex erat C : est G 18 sedere et stare] stare sedere P ‖ et2] om. GPp ‖ sphaericum aut cubicum] orbicum aut sphaericum G 19 figuris] om. G 20 aliquod] aliquid p 21 tunc] post apparet (22) P 23 est] om. G 24 et2] add. sic GPp 25 subiectis] substantiis Pp

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dico quod, quando dicimus figuram esse formam artificialem vel formam statuae, non | debemus intelligere quod sit forma inhaerens statuae vel distincta a statua et differens a magnitudine statuae, sed solum debemus intelligere quod, sicut homo dicitur albus, quia habet albedinem, quae est forma sibi | inhaerens, ita aes dicitur statua, quia est taliter figuratum. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod statua non est nisi aes. Sed sic intelligitur composita ex aere et figura, quia definitio statuae est composita ex ratione aeris et ex ratione designante quod aes sit taliter figuratum. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dico quod statuae factor facit motum localem propter quem dicimus aes fieri | statuam. Nec aliud assignare debemus per hoc quod dicimus aes fieri statuam nisi aes et partes eius sic localiter moveri. Utrum igitur statuae factor facit statuam, dico quod sic ad illum sensum et non ad alium, quia facit motum per quem partes aeris taliter se habent ad invicem secundum situm quod illud aes dicitur statua. Haec de quaestione. 1 ad rationes] tunc ergo ad rationes principales dicendum est Gp : tunc ad rationes principales dicitur P 2 dico quod] om. G 5 homo dicitur] inv. G 6 ita] sic G ‖ est2] add. aes G 6–7 figuratum] figurata P 8–10 ad … figuratum] om. (hom.) p 11 aliam] ultimam GP 13 dicimus aes] inv. G 15 ad invicem] post situm (16) P 16 statua] add. nullam tamen faciendo scientiam de novo aut accidens per se etc. p 17 haec de quaestione] sequitur alia quaestio p : etc. GP

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⟨Utrum definitio naturae sit bona qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens’⟩

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Consequenter quaeritur quarto utrum definitio naturae est bona qua dicitur: ‘natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens’.

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Arguitur quod non: ⟨1⟩ Primo quia: substantiae non debent definiri per accidentia, immo e converso, ut habetur septimo Metaphysicae; natura autem est substantia et motus est accidens; igitur male definitur natura per motum. ⟨2⟩ Item absolutum non debet definiri per relativum, cum absolutum non includat in suo conceptu aliquem respectum; sed natura est quid absolutum, cum sit substantia, principium vero et causa sunt relativa; igitur etc. ⟨3⟩ Item nec positivum debet definiri per privativum, sed e converso, quia positivum est prius et notius; sed natura est quid positivum et quies privativum; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Item definitio nugatoria non est bona; sed illa est nugatoria tripliciter. | Primo quia dicitur ‘principium et causa’, cum tamen ista sint nomina synonyma sive aequivalentia. Secundo quia dicitur ‘primum per se’, nam ‘primum’ est inferius ad ‘per se’ et nugatio est addendo superius inferiori, ut ‘homo animal’. Tertio quia dicitur ‘per se et non secundum accidens’.

6 consequenter] post quarto G : om. Pp ‖ utrum … est] utrum definitio naturae sit GP : de definitione naturae utrum ipsa sit p ‖ qua] praem. in Pp 8 primum] principium p ‖ et] om. p 10 primo] om. P ‖ immo] nec p 12 motum] add. igitur etc. G 13 absolutum non1] nec absolutum GPp 15 igitur etc.] igitur in definitione naturae non debent poni hi termini principium et causa et per antecedens definitio naturae est male assignata etc. p : om. P 17 quid] om. P 20 tamen] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 21 primum] corr. ex principium (et sup. lin.) C : principium Pp 21–22 primum] principium p 22 et nugatio] nugatoria P 11 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VII, 5, 1031a1–3; cf. AA, 1: 164

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_033

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⟨5⟩ Item idem non est principium oppositorum, nisi forte hoc sit in potentiis rationalibus, ut apparet nono Metaphysicae; sed motus et quies opponuntur; igitur natura non est principium motus et quietis | sive quiescendi et movendi. ⟨6⟩ Item bona definitio debet esse convertibilis cum definito; sed sic non est de ista. Primo quia ipsa non convenit omni naturae; natura enim caeli non est principium movendi et quiescendi, cum caelum non possit quiescere. Similiter, si lapis quiescit sursum per violentiam, natura lapidis non est tunc principium alicuius motus | nec alicuius quietis, quia tunc nullus est motus et nulla etiam est quies cuius natura lapidis est per se principium. ⟨7⟩ Deinde etiam illa definitio non est convertibilis cum definito, quia convenit aliis a natura. Nam ipsa convenit arti saltandi vel cantandi. Ipsa etiam convenit gravitati vel calori naturali in viventibus, quae tamen non sunt naturae, cum sunt accidentia. Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem secundo huius, qui dat istam definitionem tamquam bonam. Et persuadet eam quia: hoc est natura per quod differunt naturalia inquantum naturalia a non naturalibus; | sed sic differunt per habere principium in se movendi etc.

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Exponenda est definitio. Et est notandum quod hoc nomen ‘natura’ significat materiam et formam et supponit pro eis; sed non significat eas absolute, immo respective ad motus et quietes naturales eorum quorum sunt naturae, sicut etiam hoc nomen ‘elementum’ significat materiam respective ad illud quod est ex ea compositum et constitutum. Ideo haec nomina ‘natura’ et ‘elementum’ non sunt nomina de praedicamento substantiae, sed de prae-

1 est] add. per se G : add. per se est p 2 apparet] post metaphysicae P : patet p 3 motus et] et causa G 3–4 quiescendi et movendi] movendi et quiescendi GPp 5 cum] add. suo P ‖ sed] sup. lin. C : om. Pp 8 similiter] add. sed del. etiam C : add. etiam p : add. et G : naturaliter etiam P 10 nullus] unus P ‖ nulla] una P ‖ etiam est] inv. p ‖ est per se] sit per se GP : sit p 12 illa] om. p 13 saltandi] psallendi P 14 etiam] enim Pp ‖ vel] et Pp 15 sunt2] sint GPp 16 secundo huius] om. GPp 18 differunt naturalia] inv. p ‖ sic differunt] inv. GPp 19 principium] post se GPp ‖ etc.] om. p 23 illud] id p 24 est] post compositum P ‖ ea] eo Cp ‖ et1] om. P ‖ ideo] immo P 2 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, IX, 2, 1046b5–6; cf. AA, 1: 222 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b20–23; cf. AA, 2: 50 17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 192b11–15

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dicamento ad aliquid contenta sub hoc nomine ‘causa’ vel ‘principium’. Ideo bene ponitur hoc nomen ‘causa’ vel hoc nomen ‘principium’ in definitione naturae tamquam genus. Deinde notandum est quod haec nomina ‘causa’ et ‘principium’ sunt bene propinqua et saepe utimur eis tamquam synonymis. Tamen proprie distinguuntur secundum rationem, quia principium dicitur ex eo quod est primum vel prius, et causa dicitur ex eo quod ab ea aliud dependet aut in esse aut in fieri vel in taliter esse aut in taliter se habere. Modo omni naturae conveniunt ambae istae rationes. Et ad hoc designandum conveniens fuit dicere quod natura est principium et causa. Et non est ibi nugatio propter causam praedictam. Deinde quia terminus relativus connotat seu dat intelligere suum correlativum vel fundamentum sui correlativi et dictum est quod ‘natura’ significat materiam vel formam respective ad motum vel quietem, ideo oportuit dicere quod natura est | principium movendi et quiescendi. Et possumus exponere illam dictionem ‘et’ pro ‘vel’. In illis enim quae innata sunt moveri ex se natura est principium illius motus, vel activum, si sit natura quae est forma, vel passivum, si sit natura quae est materia; et in his quae innata sunt quiescere natura est principium quietis. Iterum notandum quod hoc nomen ‘natura’ et etiam hoc nomen ‘elementum’ restringunt hoc nomen ‘causa’ vel ‘principium’ ad causas intrinsecas. Quamvis enim forma ignis, quae | est natura, non solum sit principium movendi ipsum ignem, sed etiam sit principium generandi vel transmutandi aliquid extrinsecum, tamen numquam dicitur natura respectu illius extrinseci, sed ipsius ignis in quo est. Ideo ad exprimendum respectu cuius natura dicitur natura posita fuit illa clausula ‘eius in quo est’.

1 ideo] immo P 4 deinde notandum est] notandum est etiam Gp : notandum P 6 ex] om. p 7 primum] principium GP ‖ ea] eo p 8 vel in taliter] vel taliter Gp : ut intelligitur P ‖ aut in taliter] aut (in taliter in marg.) C : aut Gp : aliquid P ‖ omni] cum GP 9 conveniunt … rationes] convenit utraque istarum rationum p ‖ ambae] rep. G ‖ et] om. P 12 seu] vel Gp 14 vel2] add. ad P ‖ ideo] immo P : non p 15 quod] om. P 17 natura1] naturaliter p 17–18 si … vel] vel passivum si si sit natura quae est forma est principium activi sed P 18 his] illis P 19 natura] add. etiam P : naturaliter etiam p 20 notandum] add. est G ‖ et etiam] vel P 21 ad] et P 23–24 transmutandi aliquid] transmutandi (corr. ex terminandi ?) aliquid (corr. sup. lin. ex modum) C : transmutandi aliquod GP : terminandi aliquid p 24 respectu] om. GPp 25 ipsius] eius p ‖ ideo ad exprimendum] immo exterminandum P ‖ cuius] add. naturae P 26 dicitur] rep. P ‖ natura] om. G ‖ eius … est] eius (in marg.) in quo est (sup. lin.) C : in quo est Gp : om. P

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Deinde quia eadem | res est natura et casus, ut habetur in hoc secundo, tamen dicitur natura respectu effectus intenti, respectu cuius dicitur causa per se, et dicitur casus respectu effectus non intenti, respectu cuius dicitur causa per accidens. Ideo ad hoc designandum et ad ponendum differentiam inter haec nomina ‘natura’ et ‘casus’ dictum est quod natura est causa per se movendi etc. Iterum quia causarum et principiorum quaedam sunt principalia et alia sunt tamquam instrumentalia vel dispositiones illorum principalium (principium enim principale passivum est materia et principale principium activum inter principia intrinseca est ipsa forma substantialis, principia autem instrumentalia sive dispositiva sunt accidentia naturalia disponentia materiam et formam ad agendum vel patiendum, sicut caliditas est naturalis dispositio ignis ad calefaciendum et levitas ad movendum sursum; quorum motuum forma substantialis est causa principalis), quia ergo natura non dicitur de illis accidentibus, sed solum de materia et forma substantiali, ideo ad removendum illa accidentia addita fuit illa clausula ‘primum’. Natura enim est causa prima, id est principalis, et principium primum, id est principale, movendi etc. Et sic patet quod non est nugatio dicendo ‘primum per se’, quia | ibi ponitur ‘primum’ tamquam differentia contrahens ‘per se’ ad causas substantiales. Quamvis enim esset | nugatio simul apponere genus et speciem, tamen non est nugatio apponere simul genus et differentiam. Nec est vis, si aliquando in scribendo vel proferendo praeponatur differentia generi, 2 tamen] cum p 4 ideo … designandum] immo designandum hoc P 5 natura et casus] casus et natura Pp 7 iterum] C : deinde BMU 7–18 iterum … etc.] om. (hom.) GPp 7 quia] BCM : om. U ‖ sunt] BCU : add. principia M 8 tamquam instrumentalia vel] C : quasi instrumentalia sive M : quasi instrumenta vel U : instrumenta vel B ‖ illorum] BC : add. principiorum M : istarum dispositionum U 9 principium] C : ante principale2 BU : om. M 10 inter … substantialis] B : est forma substantialis inter principia intrinseca U : est forma inter principia intrinseca M : est inter principia intrinseca et est ipsa forma substantialis C 11 dispositiva] CMU : disponibilia B ‖ disponentia] BC : quae disponunt MU 12 vel] BCM : et U 12–13 est naturalis dispositio] C : naturalis est dispositio U : est dispositio naturalis M : et naturalis dispositio B 13 et levitas] BC : levitas autem U : levitas causa M 14 motuum] BMU : motum C 15 accidentibus] BCM : accidentalibus U ‖ forma substantiali] C : formis substantialibus BMU 16 ideo] BC : igitur MU ‖ removendum] CMU : rectificandum (?) B 16–17 natura enim] CMU : enim non B 17 prima id est] CMU : om. B 18 movendi] BC : ad movendum MU 19 primum] primo P : principium p ‖ per se] om. C 20 primum] principium Pp 21 enim esset] inesset P ‖ simul apponere] inv. p : apponendo simul G : appono simul P 22 apponere] ponere p : apponendo P 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 6, 198a2–3

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ut ‘rationale animal’, vel adiectivum substantivo, ut ‘albus homo’. Sic enim saepe faciunt doctores ordinem praeposterum. Sed secundum naturalem ordinem constructionis intelligamus, ac si differentia esset generi postposita. Sed iterum, quia natura non solum debet esse causa per se movendi et quiescendi, immo etiam debet esse per se in eo cuius est natura tamquam principium substantiale et intrinsecum ipsius, ideo apponitur ‘et non secundum accidens’. Et ita manifestum est quod non est nugatio, cum dicitur ‘per se et non secundum accidens’, quia illae duae clausulae non referuntur ad idem, immo illa clausula ‘per se’ refertur ad illos terminos ‘causa’ et ‘principium’, sed illa clausula ‘per accidens’ refertur ad illum terminum ‘in quo est’, ut qualificetur habitudo naturae tam ad motum vel quietem quam ad illud cuius dicitur natura et in quo est. Ex istis dictis concluditur quod ista definitio est multum bona seu descriptio, quia explicite indicat significationem et omnes connotationes huius termini ‘natura’. Haec etiam definitio convenit omni naturae et non aliis a natura. Nam cum dicitur ‘causa et principium’, excluduntur ultima causata quae amplius non essent causae, si aliqua sint talia. Et cum dicitur ‘per se’, excluditur ratio secundum quam natura non diceretur natura, sed casus. Et cum dicitur ‘primum’, excluduntur accidentia, quae sunt tamquam instrumenta vel dispositiones principalium activorum et passivorum ad agendum et patiendum. Et cum dicitur ‘eius in quo est’, excluduntur causae extrinsecae. Et cum dicitur ‘non secundum accidens’, excluditur omne quod eveniret per accidens in re cuius natura est natura. Verum est tamen quod ibi restat una magna difficultas, videlicet utrum formae substantiales sint principaliter activae motuum et operationum vel qualitativae dispositiones earum, ut utrum substantia ignis calefacit principaliter vel caliditas et utrum substantia terrae moveat se deorsum. Sed de hoc | fiet quaestio specialis. |

1 substantivo] substantivum C ‖ sic] dicit P 3 constructionis] constructiones C 6 etiam] om. P ‖ in] om. P 7 ideo] etiam immo P ‖ et2] om. P 8 est2] add. ibi P 9 duae clausulae] inv. GPp 10 et] est C 12 qualificetur] qualificare P 13 et] om. p 14 istis] his G : om. Pp 14–15 seu descriptio] ante est (14) GPp 16 etiam] post definitio p : enim P 17 a natura] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ excluduntur] concluduntur P 18 causata] causantia p ‖ sint] sunt P 20 primum] principium Pp 20–21 tamquam] om. p 22 eius] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 24 eveniret] inveniretur Pp 26 et operationum] om. p 27 earum ut] earum P : eorum et C ‖ ignis] in marg. C : om. GPp 28 moveat] corr. ex movet C : movet GPp 29 Cf. inf., II, q. 5

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicitur quod nomina de praedicamento substantiae non definiuntur definitione pure quidditativa per nomina de praedicamentis accidentium, licet bene describentur per ea, quia accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, ut dicitur prooemio De anima. Sed cum hoc dictum est quod hoc nomen ‘natura’ non est de praedicamento substantiae, sed ad aliquid. ⟨2⟩ Et per hoc patet | etiam quid est dicendum ad secundam rationem, quia hoc nomen ‘natura’ non est nomen absolutum, sed respectivum. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod nomen positivum non debet definiri per privativum sibi oppositum, sed e converso. Tamen non est inconveniens quod aliquod nomen positivum describatur per aliquod privativum alteri oppositum et quod sit minus notum. Eo modo hoc nomen ‘quies’ non opponitur naturae, sed motui. ⟨ 4⟩ Alia ratio quae | erat de nugationibus fuit soluta in positione. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam potest dici quod motus et quies non opponuntur, sed isti termini ‘motus’ et ‘quies’ opponuntur. Et maxime motus ad aliquem terminum et quies in illo termino non opponuntur, licet forte motus ab aliquo termino et quies in illo termino opponerentur. Sed de oppositionibus motuum et quietum ad invicem dicetur magis in quinto libro. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod natura caeli est principium movendi vel quiescendi; et dictum fuit quod ‘et’ debeat sumi pro ‘vel’. Quando etiam dicitur quod natura lapidis non est principium motus nec etiam quietis, quando lapis movetur vel quiescit sursum per violentiam, videtur mihi quod haec ratio bene arguit, nisi dicatur quod hoc nomen ‘principium’ vel ‘causa’ ampliet suppositionem illorum terminorum ‘motus’ et ‘quies’ ad possibi-

1 ad] praem. respondendum est igitur Gp : praem. respondetur igitur P 3 definitione] post quidditativa p 4 bene describentur] bene describantur Gp : describuntur P ‖ ea] eam P 4–5 magnam partem] inv. p 5 quod quid est] etc. p ‖ dicitur] add. in p 6 cum hoc] cum G : hoc P ‖ de] in P 8 patet … dicendum] etiam patet GPp 9 respectivum] relativum p 10 aliam] tertiam GP : secundam p ‖ debet] dicitur P 10–11 privativum sibi] privativum aut P : nomen sibi G 12 aliquod1] om. P 17 motus2] om. G 18 quies] add. est p ‖ ab] om. P 20 dicetur] diceretur P 21 vel] et p 22 et] add. etiam P ‖ debeat] debebat P : debet p 23 etiam] om. P 24 sursum] add. vel P 25 quod hoc nomen] om. G 26 ampliet] ampliat GP ‖ terminorum] om. G ‖ quies] quietis GPp 5–6 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, I, 1, 402b21–22; cf. AA, 6: 7 20 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, V, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1509, ff. 88ra–89ra)

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lia. Ideo vel oportet hoc concedere vel oportet dicere quod ista definitio ad hoc quod sit convertibilis cum definito indigeat supplemento ampliante suppositionem terminorum ad possibilia, licet non actu existentia, videlicet quod dicamus quod natura est principium activum vel passivum et causa activa vel passiva motus et quietis etc. Et ista nomina ‘activum’ et ‘passivum’, quia sunt nomina potentiarum, ampliant ad possibilia. Ideo natura lapidis quiescentis sursum per violentiam est bene principium activum motus, non motus qui est, sed qui potest esse, si removeretur prohibens. | ⟨7⟩ Ad ultimam dicendum est quod ars saltandi vel cantandi non est principium principale motus saltationis vel cantationis, immo anima, quae movet pedes et pulmonem et alia membra etc. Sed illae artes valent ad modificandum illos motus membrorum provenientes principaliter ab anima. De hoc autem quod dicitur de calore naturali et levitate etc. dicetur magis in quaestione sequente. Haec de quaestione. 1 vel1 … concedere] hoc concedere oportet P 2 ad hoc quod] adhuc p ‖ indigeat] indiget GPp 4 dicamus] dicatur p ‖ vel] et P 5 et1] corr. sup. lin. ex vel C : vel G ‖ etc.] om. G ‖ et ista] haec enim GPp ‖ et3] om. P 6 potentiarum] add. et P 7 quiescentis] quiescens C 8 potest] posset Gp : possit P 9 dicendum est] dicitur P ‖ saltandi] psallendi P : add. dicitur C 10 saltationis] psallationis P ‖ quae] qui G 11 etc.] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 12 provenientes] proveniente P 13 etc.] om. P 14 quaestione sequente] quaestione sequenti G : sequenti quaestione P 15 haec de quaestione] et sic est finis quaestionis P : etc. sequitur alia quaestio p : etc. G 14 Cf. inf., II, q. 5

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⟨ii.5⟩

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⟨Utrum in istis substantiis materialibus formae substantiales sint principaliter activae suorum motuum et suarum operationum vel magis qualitativae dispositiones illarum substantiarum⟩ Consequenter quinto quaeritur utrum in istis substantiis materialibus | formae substantiales sint principaliter activae suorum motuum et suarum operationum vel magis qualitativae dispositiones illarum substantiarum, verbi gratia utrum substantia ignis principaliter calefaciat vel eius caliditas, vel si terra existens sursum descendit naturaliter deorsum, utrum tunc substantia terrae movet se active vel gravitas, et sic de singulis. ⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod qualitates movent et agunt principaliter et non formae substantiales quia: si sit aqua calefacta, ipsa calefaciet corpus sibi coniunctum; et calefaciens non est materia aquae, quia illa nullius est activitatis, nec forma substantialis aquae, quia illa potius frigefaceret vel resisteret calefacienti, cum caliditas sit sibi disconveniens et frigiditas conveniens in tantum quod, prout multi dicunt, aqua calefacta refrigeraret se remoto calefa|ciente vel impediente; | igitur sola caliditas aquae erat calefaciens. ⟨2⟩ Item si aqua frigida frigefaciat naturaliter, tamen frigiditas principalius frigefacit quam substantia aquae. Probatio quia: illud principalius frigefacit, quo posito et altero remoto ponetur fortis et notabilis frigefactio et non e converso; sed posita frigiditate sive in aqua sive in aere, erit frigefactio notabilis, posita autem forma substantiali aquae, si non sit frigiditas, non erit frigefactio notabilis nec velox; igitur etc.

6 consequenter quinto quaeritur] quaeritur quinto (om. quaeritur quinto G) de eo quod in praecedenti quaestione relinquebatur (derelinquebatur P) dubium videlicet GPp 7 sint] sunt G 10 descendit naturaliter] inv. P ‖ tunc] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 11 singulis] aliis GPp 13 calefaciet corpus sibi] calefacit sibi corpus P 14 coniunctum] appropinquitatum sed add. in marg. seu coniunctum C ‖ est1] erit Pp 15 potius] om. p 17 prout multi dicunt] pro nunc multi dicunt quod p ‖ refrigeraret] refrigeret p 17–18 remoto calefaciente] remota calefactione p 19 frigida frigefaciat] frigida frigefacit GP : frigefacit p 21 et1] om. p ‖ ponetur] poneretur GPp 23 non2] nec GPp 24 nec velox] nec velorum (?) C : ut velox p

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⟨3⟩ Item vapor elevatus ab aqua ascendit in aere. Et tunc movens illum vaporem non est agens extrinsecum, quia ex quo ille vapor est calefactus, rarefactus et alleviatus, ipse ascenderet, licet removeretur cale|faciens extrinsecum. Et movens non est forma substantialis vaporis, quia illa est forma substantialis aquae vel simpliciter vel a dominio et forma substantialis aquae non inclinaret ad esse supra aerem. Igitur movens principale est levitas generata in illa aqua vaporosa. ⟨4⟩ Item illud est agens principale, secundum cuius intensionem seu remissionem intenditur vel remittitur actio et secundum cuius varietatem specificam variatur actio specifice. Sic autem est de qualitate et non de forma substantiali. Nam quaecumque fuerit forma substantialis, si est caliditas, erit calefactio, et si est frigiditas, erit frigefactio, et si est levitas erit ascensus, et si est gravitas, erit descensus, et si est maior caliditas, erit maior calefactio, et sic de aliis. Igitur etc. ⟨5⟩ Item si forma substantialis aquae esset frigefactiva naturaliter, sequeretur quod calefactio aquae deberet dici motus omnino et simpliciter violentus; modo consequens est falsum, quia dicimus aquam naturaliter calefieri ab igne. Consequentia probatur per simile. Nam motus terrae sursum dicitur simpliciter violentus, quia terra existens gravis resistit illi motui | et inclinat ad contrarium; modo ita aqua per suam substantiam resisteret calefactioni et inclinaret ad contrarium, scilicet ad infrigidationem. ⟨6⟩ Item magnum argumentum ad propositum est ex eo quod fide credimus de sacramento altaris, videlicet quod ibi accidentia nobis apparentia non habent substantiam sibi subiectam et tamen ita agunt et movent sicut si haberent, scilicet gravitas movendo deorsum, color et sapor movendo sensum, caliditas vel frigiditas calefaciendo vel frigefaciendo, tamquam substantia subiecta nihil ad illos motus conferat, sed quod illae qualitates faciunt haec omnia.

2–3 calefactus] add. et G 3 alleviatus] elevatus P 4–6 vaporis … aquae] aquae quia p 4 illa] om. P 5 a] om. P 6 supra] super G 8 seu] vel GPp 10 specifice] specifica P : om. G ‖ qualitate et] qualitate GP : caliditate p 13 ascensus] assensus C ‖ descensus] ascensus P 14 igitur etc.] om. P 15–16 sequeretur] sequitur Pp 16 dici] dicit p ‖ et simpliciter] om. p 17 dicimus aquam naturaliter] dicitur naturaliter aqua P 20 ita] illa C 21 infrigidationem] frigiditatem sed add. in marg. infrigidationem alias C : frigefactionem p 22 est] ante ad P 22–23 credimus] credamus G 24 ita agunt] inv. P 25 movendo1] moveri P ‖ color] calor p 26 sensum] add. in marg. alias sursum C ‖ caliditas vel] caliditas et P : vel p ‖ vel2] et P 27 subiecta] substantia C ‖ conferat sed] operatur secundum C : operatur G ‖ qualitates] qualitas sup. lin. C : caliditates p

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⟨1⟩ Oppositum arguitur per Aristotelem quia: si illae qualitates agerent et moverent principaliter et principalius quam formae substantiales, sequitur quod definitio naturae magis conveniret illis qualitatibus quam illis formis substantialibus, quod est inconveniens, cum illae qualitates non sunt | naturae, sed formae substantiales. Consequentia manifesta est, quia gravitas terrae per se et primo et principaliter esset principium movendi ipsam terram in qua est | deorsum, quando esset sursum, et quiescendi, quando esset deorsum, et non forma substantialis nisi ratione gravitatis; et hoc dicebat definitio naturae. ⟨2⟩ Item Aristoteles secundo De anima ponit animam esse causam principalem corporis secundum triplex genus causae, scilicet secundum formam, secundum finem et secundum agens. Unde si calor naturalis agit ad operationes vitales, tamen ille ab anima generatur et in agendo dirigitur; propter quod in animali mortuo vel interfecto cessant illae operationes et ille calor. ⟨3⟩ Item nisi animae essent principalia agentia in corporibus | viventium, non posset assignari ratio quare sic fierent diversa corpora et diversa membra eorum in diversis speciebus animalium, cum calor, quantum est de praecisa ratione caloris, sit in omnibus eiusdem rationis, nisi forte sit differentia secundum intensius et remissius. Et sicut videmus de anima in animatis, ita debemus credere de aliis formis substantialibus in aliis corporibus naturalibus, scilicet quod illae sunt causae principales et directivae accidentium et operationum sibi convenientium. ⟨4⟩ Item ignis generat ignem ex ligno; igitur ad hoc substantia est principale agens et non aliquod accidens. Antecedens conceditur tamquam apparens ad sensum. Consequentia ex hoc patet, quia omnia accidentia ignis generantis sunt valde inferioris gradus in perfectione entium quam substantia ignis generati; et non est possibile generatum esse altioris gradus quam sit principale generans; igitur etc. ⟨5⟩ Item semper tenet Aristoteles quod, sicut de ratione materiae est pati, ita de ratione formae est agere; igitur concedi debet quod formae substan1 per] rep. C ‖ per aristotelem] om. GPp ‖ et] vel G 2 sequitur] sequeretur P 3 conveniret] convenit p ‖ illis2] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 4 sunt] sint GPp 5 substantiales] del. et add. accidentales C 6 et2] om. P ‖ esset] praem. etc. P 7 esset1] est C 8 forma substantialis] formae substantiales P 10–11 aristoteles … principalem] secundo de anima dicit aristoteles quia anima est causa principalis P 13 generatur] generantur sed add. in marg. alias generatur C ‖ dirigitur] diriguntur sed add. in marg. alias dirigitur C 14 in] om. GPp 16 posset] possit P 23 ligno] lignis GPp 26 inferioris] inferiores G 10 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, II, 4, 415b9–12; cf. AA, 6: 81 et corruptione, II, 9, 335b29–31; cf. AA, 4: 39

29 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione

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tiales sunt activae. Et si concedantur activae cum accidentibus, rationabile est | concedere quod sint principalius activae quam accidentia, sicut ipsae sunt principaliores in esse et nobilitate. Ista quaestio est difficilis. Et statim apparet mihi credendum quod unus est, sicut dicit Avicenna, dator formarum, qui ad omne quod fit agit tamquam agens commune et primum et omnino principalissimum, et ille est Deus supremus. Sed tamen ad omnes actiones in istis inferioribus, si non sint actiones miraculosae et supernaturales, concurrunt alia agentia, per quae fit determinatio ad talem vel ad talem effectum, ut ex eadem materia calidum et siccum generarent ignem, frigidum vero et humidum aquam, et quod ex eodem nutrimento fieret semen equi et semen asini et tandem equus et asinus. Nullum tamen illorum agentium particularium est simpliciter agens principale nisi Deus.

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Et ex hoc infero duas conclusiones corollarias. Prima est quod saepe effectus geniti | sunt diversi specie propter diversitatem agentium posteriorum et non principalium, nam non propter diversitatem agentis principalis sive agentium principalium, quia omnium factorum quantumcumque diversorum agens simpliciter principale est unum et idem, scilicet Deus, ut dictum est. Item si dimittamus illud agens simpliciter principale, quod | est Deus, tamen in generatione multorum animalium ex putrefactione corpora supercaelestia sunt agentia principalia et principaliora quam elementa vel qualitates elementares. Et tamen caelo similiter se habente, scilicet in eodem tempore, generabuntur animalia valde diversarum specierum propter diversitatem elementorum vel qualitatum elementarium, ut in aqua pisces aut ranae, in aere autem aut in terra muscae et formicae.

4 est1] add. satis P ‖ mihi] om. p 5 sicut … formarum] dator formarum sicut (ut P) dicit avicenna GPp 6 omnino principalissimum] inv. P 7 sint] sunt P 8 alia agentia] agentia illa P 9 vel] add. sup. lin. et C : et P ‖ ad2] om. Pp 10 generarent] generent G : generaret Pp ‖ vero] om. p 12 agens] add. et P 14 et] om. P 15 diversi specie] diversimode spe P 16 nam] om. GPp 20 si] om. P 21–22 supercaelestia] caelestia Pp 22 principalia et] om. GPp 23 elementares] praem. elementorum vel P : elementales G ‖ similiter] simpliciter P ‖ in] om. P 25 vel qualitatum elementarium] et qualitatem elementorum p 26 autem aut] vero vel GPp ‖ et] aut GPp 5 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, tract. 9, cap. 5 (ed. Van Riet, 488–494)

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Item ex ovo perdicis generatur perdix et ex ovo gallinae generatur gallus, quamvis ista ova ponantur in nido sub eadem ave simul, ut sub gallina. Et sic manifeste diversitas specifica illarum avium ex illis ovis generatarum provenit ex diversitate ovorum vel avium ex quibus illa ova provenerunt; et tamen nec illa ova nec aves a quibus provenerunt sunt agentia principalia in generatione illarum avium etc. Quod autem ova non sunt principalia agentia videtur, quia generans principale debet esse altioris gradus quam res genita vel aequalis gradus in perfectione entium; et ovum, cum | non vivat, est multum minoris perfectionis quam sit avis genita habens vitam et sensum. Sed quod aves a quibus ova provenerunt non sunt agentia principalia patet, quia forte sunt mortuae, quando generatur avis ex ovo, et si sunt mortuae, tunc nihil agunt in huiusmodi generatione; | igitur illae non sunt principalia generantia. Immo etiam apparet quod ex diversis dispositionibus materiae proveniunt saepe diversi et dissimiles effectus ab eisdem agentibus, ut quod idem ignis liquefacit et mollificat ceram vel plumbum et coagulat sive durificat lutum vel lateres. Secunda conclusio corollaria sequitur, videlicet quod multae substantiae generantur non concurrentibus ad earum generationem aliquibus agentibus particularibus aeque nobilibus eis vel nobilioribus, quia corpora caelestia, Deum et intelligentias ego non voco agentia particularia, sed universalia; et praeter haec ad generationem animalium ex putrefactione nihil concurrit aeque nobile illis animalibus. Et etiam pisces, postquam posuerunt ova sua et lac suum in aqua, nihil amplius agunt ad generationem piscium ex illis ovis; ideo in eorum generatione nullum agens particulare concurrit aeque nobile illis piscibus. Apparet mihi ex dictis | quod potest ultra concludi aliud magnum corollarium, scilicet quod non solum oportet fide credere, immo etiam per ratio-

1 et] om. G ‖ generatur gallus] generatur gallina p : gallina P : gallina vel gallus G 3 manifeste] add. patet quod p 4 ex2] a Gp ‖ provenerunt et] proveniunt et p : proveniunt P 5 provenerunt] proveniunt P 5–6 in … avium] illarum avium in generatione ergo p 6 autem] add. illa P ‖ agentia] sup. lin. C : ante principalia Pp 7 quia] quod G ‖ debet] dicitur C 9 multum] multo p 10 a] ex p ‖ sunt] sint Gp 11 sunt2] sint GP 12 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ illae] illa GP 13 generantia] praem. agentia P : agentia p 14 etiam] om. P 15 et dissimiles] om. G 16 et1] vel P ‖ durificat] add. sup. lin. simul C 16–17 durificat … lateres] durificat lutum sive lateres p : indurat lapides P 18 secunda … videlicet] alia conclusio corollaria est p : tunc sequitur alia conclusio corollaria P 23 sua] om. P 25 ideo] igitur P 27 apparet … quod] et apparet mihi quod ex istis (his P) dictis GPp 28 etiam] et G

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nem naturalem concludere, quod ad generationes istorum inferiorum necesse est praeter agentia corporea concurrere agens separatum et incorporeum, quia numquam proveniret effectus novus sine agente aeque nobili vel nobiliori, cum effectus ille non posset a materia tantam habere nobilitatem (non enim est possibile agens effectum dare plus quam habeat, nisi agens nobilius concurrat, virtute cuius illud plus eveniat); sed si generentur | animalia ex putrefactione vel etiam pisces ex ovis modo praedicto, nullum est agens corporeum attingens ad materiam generationis aeque nobile vel nobilius illis pisicibus vel animalibus; igitur oportet concurrere agens incorporeum. Quod autem non sit agens aeque nobile corporeum patet, quia nullum est agens animatum corporeum sub caelo concurrens ad generationes illorum; et nullum inanimatum est nobilius animato vel aeque nobile, et specialiter animato anima cognoscitiva. Si vero influentiae corporum caelestium receptae in aere, aqua vel terra sic concurrunt, illae sunt accidentia, quae non possunt esse nobiliora substantiis, specialiter animatis sensitivis. Et si corpora caelestia concurrunt, illa non sunt propinqua nec attingunt ad materiam illorum generabilium; ideo non possunt illam materiam transmutare nisi per virtutes quas influunt in aere vel aqua intermediis; quae quidem virtutes sunt accidentia non nobiliora etc., ut iam dicebatur. Et videtur mihi quod ista fuit maxima ratio propter quam Plato posuit ideas separatas et propter quam Avicenna et Themistius concluse|rant datorem formarum esse substantiam separatam a magnitudine, id est non extensam, nec sibi aliquem situm in mundo determinantem, sed toti mundo et cuilibet parti mundi assistentem praesentialiter et sine distantia, scilicet Deum, qui sic toti mundo praesens et indistans potest agere in ipsum totum et in quamlibet partem eius. Et ob hoc etiam dicebat Commentator duodecimo Metaphysicae quod natura agit perfecte et ordinate, quamvis non cognoscat, | tamquam rememorata et directa a superiori causa cognoscente. 1 naturalem] om. G ‖ generationes] generationem G 3 proveniret] provenit P ‖ novus] nobilior P 4 ille] esse p ‖ posset] add. sup. lin. alias potuit C : possit GPp 5 habeat] corr. ex habet (?) C : habet P 7 etiam] om. P 10 sit] est G ‖ corporeum] ante aeque Pp 14 sic concurrunt] sup. lin. C : concurrunt Pp 15 animatis] add. in marg. animabus C : animabus Pp : animalibus G 18 vel] add. in G 19 non] om. p ‖ dicebatur] add. ergo etc. Pp 20 videtur mihi] inv. p ‖ fuit maxima] est maxima P : fuit magna G 21 quam] quas P ‖ concluserant] concluserunt GPp 22–23 extensam] extensa p 24 praesentialiter] principaliter p 25 deum] om. p ‖ mundo] add. est P 26 eius] sup. lin. C : ante partem G : om. Pp ‖ etiam] om. P 28 rememorata et] om. G 21 Cf. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 18, ff. 303E–305I 26–27 Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 18, f. 305D–E

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Illa enim est Deus supremus, a quo, sicut dicitur secundo Caeli, derivatum est omnibus esse et vivere, his quidem clarius, his vero obscurius.

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Sed nunc dimittamus de principalitate Dei in agendo. Quamvis enim nullum aliud agens sit simpliciter principale, tamen respective in aliis agentibus invenitur principale et instrumentale, sicut anima diceretur principium nutritionis principale respectu caloris | et calor instrumentale respectu animae et faber principale respectu martelli et martellus instrumentale. Dicamus ergo an in motibus et in mutationibus naturalibus forma substantialis debeat dici agens principale respectu qualitatum vel e converso. Notandum est igitur quod, si respectu alicuius effectus fuerunt plura agentia subordinata, quorum unum agit in alterum et non e converso vel quorum unum dirigit alterum in agendo et non e converso, tunc illud quod agit in alterum vel dirigit ipsum dicitur agens principale respectu alterius, ut faber respectu martelli et corpora caelestia respectu istorum inferiorum. Tunc ultra notandum est quod in omni substantia naturali habente formam substantialem in materia inveniuntur aliquando transmutationes vel etiam quietes convenientes illi formae et ad eius salutem et perfectionem, et inveniuntur saepe, et aliquando disconvenientes ei, ut cum aegritudo sit dispositio disconveniens animae et sanitas conveniens, | ideo sanatio et permanentia in sanitate sunt mutatio et quies ei convenientes, aegrotatio autem et permanentia in aegritudine sunt ei disconvenientes. Et sic frigefactio et quies in frigiditate sunt convenientes formae aquae, calefactio autem et quies in caliditate sunt eidem disconvenientes. Ex notatis videtur mihi dicendum primo quod forma substantialis non est principium per se activum ad mutationes et quietes sibi disconvenientes, quia potius resisteret et inclinaret ad oppositum. Omne enim ens naturaliter diligit se permanere, ut dicit Commentator primo huius, et omne perfecti1 secundo] primo p 2 esse] om. P 5 instrumentale] add. sed del. respectu C : add. seu dispositivum Pp 8 et in] aut P 9 debeat] debet P 10 est igitur] om. P ‖ fuerunt] fuerint GPp 11 agentia] add. naturalia p ‖ agit] aget G 15 ultra] ultimo p ‖ substantia] subiecto G 16 aliquando transmutationes] saepe aliquae mutationes p 17 etiam] om. Pp ‖ et1] om. GPp ‖ et2] vel P 18 saepe et aliquando] corr. sup. lin. ex ibi quandoque C : saepe aliquae Pp : saepe G ‖ cum] quamvis CG 19 ideo] praem. animae P : ideo alias tamen sup. lin. (corr. ex cum) C : tamen G 20 in sanitate] om. P ‖ quies] quietes G ‖ ei convenientes] inv. P ‖ aegrotatio] aegritudo C 22 autem] om. p 23 eidem] ei GPp 24 ex] his GPp 26 enim ens] inv. p 27 commentator] add. in P 1 Cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, I, 9, 279a27–30 27 Averroes, In Physicam, I, comm. 81, f. 46F

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bile naturaliter appetit suam perfectionem; ideo enim dictum est | primo huius quod materia appetit formam. Sed dicendum est quod forma substantialis est principium activum ad mutationes et quietes sibi convenientes. Et hoc primo manifestum est de anima in animatis. Anima enim movet ad nutritionem et augmentationem, quoniam si calor ad hoc moveat, tamen non est de ratione caloris simpliciter, secundum quod est calor, nisi calefacere et forte consequenter rarefacere et levificare. Sed diversa membra diversimode figurare hoc oportet esse per aliud agens principalius. Et idem nutrimentum convertere hoc in carnem, hoc in os, hoc in nervum, non est solum ex parte caloris, immo oportet hoc esse ex parte agentis principalioris et dirigentis ipsum calorem. Et illud agens est anima. Sicut enim instrumenta artificis non bene vel male moverent, ut securis, nisi ab artifice dirigerentur, ita nec ignis sive calor in animalibus, nisi ab anima dirigeretur. | Et hoc intendit Aristoteles secundo De generatione reprehendens illos qui actiones convenientes animatis et mixtis attribuebant principaliter igni vel calori, dicens quod illi potentias attribuebant igni vel calori valde organice, auferentes eam quae secundum speciem causam, id est formam substantialem. Et subdit: ‘quocirca si quam maxime facit et movet ignis, sed quomodo movet non vident, quoniam deterius movet quam organa’. Item anima non solum agit cum calore, immo etiam agit ipsum calorem et conservat. Propter quod animal si moriatur vel interficiatur, statim cessat calor ille et corrumpitur et cito fit cada|ver frigidum. Item quando calor in febre excederet proportionem debitam ad alias qualitates, quomodo reduceretur ad statum, nisi anima reduceret ipsum, non

4 et quietes] om. p ‖ est] om. G 5 nutritionem] mutationem p 6 quoniam] quia p 7 est] om. P ‖ nisi] in C ‖ consequenter] communiter P 9 hoc] hic P 10 hoc1] hic P ‖ hoc2] hic P ‖ non est solum] hoc non solum est P ‖ immo] add. etiam G 12 non … male] non nisi male Gp : non nisi male sed corr. in numquam P 13 securis] add. etc. P ‖ dirigerentur] dirigetur G ‖ ignis sive] om. G 14 ab] in G 15 et] sup. lin. C : ex p 15–16 attribuebant] add. ut P 16 calori] add. principaliter p : calore G ‖ illi] add. qui GP ‖ attribuebant] add. propter quas generant p 17 calori] calore G ‖ organice] organi sed del. et add. in marg. errant (?) P ‖ auferentes] add. sup. lin. erant C ‖ quae] et G ‖ causam] causant G 18 et subdit] subdit igitur P ‖ quam] quod P 19 sed] et P ‖ movet2] movent C ‖ vident quoniam] videtur quin p 20 organa] organica p 21 solum agit] inv. G 23 corrumpitur] corrumpetur G 24 excederet] excedit p 1–2 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 9, 192a22–23; cf. AA, 2: 32 14 Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, 9, 335b33–336a3 18–20 Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, 9, 336a12–15

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apparet. Quanto enim calor esset fortior et magis excedens, tanto deberet fortius agere, donec alia essent consumpta, nisi ab alio detineretur et regeretur. Et omnino, cum de simplici ratione caloris et levitatis sit movere sursum et non deorsum, sequeretur quod omnes spiritus, cum sunt calidi, leves et subtiles, moverentur | in animali sursum et non deorsum, nisi esset aliud principalius movens et regens eos, et hoc est anima. Sed cum haec appareant de animatis, ita etiam apparere possunt de inanimatis. Aqua enim, si sit calefacta, remoto calefaciente revertitur ad frigiditatem etiam maiorem quam sit frigiditas continentis; igitur etiam ipsa refrigerat se et hoc videtur esse per formam substantialem. Item quod aqua per suam substantiam agat ad sui refrigerationem et resistat calefactioni ipsius potest inferri per signum manifestum quod, si aqua frigida ponatur in loco calido et calida in loco frigido, aqua calida citius erit refrigerata quam frigida calefacta ceteris paribus. Quomodo autem aqua velociter sit refrigerabilis | apparet in generatione grandinum, ubi fortissima condensatio et congelatio vaporis prius calidi praevenit casui eius deorsum, licet non longe a terra fuerit huiusmodi magna congelatio, ut ostensum est in libro Meteororum. Et si concessum fuerit quod aqua per suam substantiam sit activa ad sui refrigerationem, ita debet concedi quod ipsa sit activa ad quietem eius in frigiditate ad illum sensum quod ipsa est resistitiva agentibus inclinantibus eam removere a frigiditate. Et si haec concessa fuerint de praedictis formis substantialibus, ita debebit concedi de aliis, cum non appareat ratio quare magis de istis quam de aliis. Istis visis | concludendum est tertio quod formae substantiales sunt principia principaliter activa ad mutationes et quietes sibi convenientes et non accidentia eis coniuncta quia: duorum agentium ad aliquem effectum con2 donec] om. G ‖ alio] add. sup. lin. alias anima C ‖ detineretur] determinaretur C 3 ratione caloris] inv. P ‖ levitatis] levitate P 4 sequeretur] sequitur GPp ‖ quod] rep. P ‖ omnes] omnis p ‖ sunt] sint GPp ‖ calidi] add. et P 5 sursum] ante in P ‖ non] nulli GPp 6 eos] om. G 7 cum] quod C ‖ etiam] corr. ex haec C : haec G : om. P 8 remoto calefaciente] remota caliditate p 9 etiam2] om. GPp 10 refrigerat] refrigeraret CG ‖ esse] om. p ‖ per] add. suam Pp 11 suam substantiam] inv. G ‖ agat] agit P ‖ sui] suam P 12 quod] quia GPp 14 citius] cuius G 15 sit] fit G ‖ in] add. de C ‖ grandinum] graduum sed add. in marg. alias grandinum P 16 casui] casum P 17 huiusmodi] huius P 18 libro] secundo p 20 ipsa1] om. P ‖ quod] quia Pp 22–23 debebit] hoc debebat p : hoc debet P 23 cum non appareat] tamen non apparet P ‖ quare] om. p 24 aliis] illis GP 25 istis] his Pp ‖ concludendum est] concluditur P 26 activa] active P 18 Cf. Aristoteles, Meteora, I, 12, 347b34–349a10

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currentium illud est principale respectu alterius quod est activum ipsius et reductivum ipsius ad convenientiam, si fuerit disconveniens, et directivum ipsius in agendo; sed sic se habet anima respectu caloris, ut dictum est, sic etiam se habet aqua respectu frigiditatis et pari ratione ignis respectu caliditatis et sic de aliis; igitur etc. Sed iterum imaginandum est quod, cum ad caliditatem consequitur raritas et levitas et motus vel quies sursum et horum contraria ad frigiditatem, si materia fuerit ad hoc disposita et non sint resistentiae vel inclinationes ad opposita, et cum substantia aquae sit principaliter frigefactiva sui ipsius et conservativa frigiditatis suae, ipsa est principaliter activa densitatis, gravitatis et motus vel quietis deorsum; et ita debet esse de igne quantum ad contraria. Et haec sibi convenientia operarentur formae substantiales semper, si non essent ad oppositum agentia vel resistentia fortiora extrinseca vel si non essent cum illis formis substantialibus dispositiones accidentales ad contrarium inclinantes factae in materia illarum formarum ab agentibus extrinsecis disconvenientiam vel contrarietatem habentibus | cum illis formis substantialibus et dispositionibus sibi convenientibus. Tunc igitur respondendum est ad rationes principales contra praedicta arguentes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam conceditur | quod aqua calefacta non calefacit aliud per suam substantiam, sed caliditas eius calefacit illud. Et puto quod in sic calefaciendo non requiritur principaliter aliud agens calefaciens principalius quam caliditas nisi Deus. Unde quamvis corpora caelestia essent in dispositione magis frigefactiva quam calefactiva, tamen magna caliditas aquae calefactae calefaceret calefactibile in ipsa aqua vel iuxta eam positum. Sed fuerunt alia agentia principaliora a quibus mediate vel immediate proveniebat illa caliditas aquae. | ⟨2⟩ Ad secundam videtur mihi dicendum quod caliditas et frigiditas calefacerent vel frigefacerent aliquod extrinsecum, licet forma substantialis nihil

1 quod est] om. p 5 igitur] om. P ‖ est] om. G ‖ cum] add. naturaliter Pp 6 consequitur] consequatur P ‖ vel quies sursum] sursum vel quies P 7 horum] omnia P 8 sint] sicut G 9 principaliter frigefactiva] inv. p ‖ sui] om. P ‖ suae] add. quod GPp 10 vel] et P ‖ et2] om. P 11 debet esse] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 11–12 operarentur] operabuntur p 13 fortiora] formae p 15 illarum] aliarum C 18 respondendum est] dicendum est Gp : dicitur P 20 aliud] om. P 21 calefacit] facit P 23 quam caliditas] caliditate Pp 24 magna] magis G ‖ caliditas aquae] inv. P 25 calefaceret] rep. G 25–26 sed fuerunt] si fuerint p 26 alia] illa G 28 secundam] aliam P 28–29 calefacerent vel frigefacerent] calefaceret vel frigefaceret Gp

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coageret. Tamen numquam ageret in illud in quo est quantum ad motus vel quietes convenientes illi formae substantiali, quin illa forma coageret, immo principalius ageret secundum modum prius dictum. Ideo sic forma substantialis est principium principale activum in quo est quantum ad sibi convenientia, licet non quantum ad alia. ⟨3⟩ Ad tertiam credo dicendum esse quod movens active vaporem sursum, si cesset agens extrinsecum, non est nisi levitas et forte | caliditas, ad quam consequitur levitas. Et forma substantialis aquae magis est resistens et corrumpens tam caliditatem quam levitatem et reducens se ad statum sibi convenientem. Concessum enim est quod forma substantialis non agit ad tales motus sibi disconvenientes, sed potius resistit. Unde concedendum esset plane quod vapor non movet se sursum per suam naturam, immo non movet se sursum, sed accidens sibi ab extrinseco acquisitum et sibi disconveniens movet ipsum sursum. ⟨4⟩ Ad quartam rationem potest dici secundum praedicta quod non oportet variationem actionis esse secundum variationem agentis principalis, sed est bene secundum variationem agentium inferiorum et instrumentalium. Sed cum hoc dicendum est quod, quantum ad motus et quietes convenientes formae substantiali, in subiecto ipsius variationes operationum magis et principalius sunt secundum exigentiam formarum substantialium et per eas quam per suas qualitates. ⟨5⟩ Ad quintam dicendum est quod in respectu formae substantialis aquae calefactio aquae est sibi violenta et non naturalis, sed in respectu materiae dici potest naturalis, quia est conveniens materiae, eo quod disponit eam ad formam substantialem generandam quam materia appetit et ad quam naturaliter inclinatur. Et esset probabile eodem modo dicere de motu locali terrae sursum. Sed tamen magis | consuevimus motum terrae sursum vocare simpliciter violentum, quia magis sensibiliter et notabiliter apparet nobis resistentia terrae in motu terrae sursum et inclinatio eiusdem ad oppositum quam resistentia aquae in calefactione vel ad oppositum inclinatio. Vel etiam potest dici probabiliter quod motus localis, quantum est de simplici ratione motus localis, non disponit ad aliquam generationem 1–2 tamen … coageret] om. (hom.) G 3 ageret] agerent p ‖ modum] motum C 4 principale activum] inv. P 6 tertiam] aliam G ‖ dicendum esse] inv. GPp 7 cesset] sit p 10 sibi convenientem] inv. GP ‖ enim] tamen P 12 esset] est p 13 movet] movent G ‖ et] om. p 15 potest dici] dicitur P 23 calefactio] calefactivo sed corr. ? C 26 dicere] diceretur P 27 tamen] post consuevimus P 29 motu] motum C ‖ terrae2] om. GPp ‖ inclinatio] declinatio CG 29–30 eiusdem] om. GPp 31 inclinatio] ante ad2 (30) Pp ‖ probabiliter] ante potest P

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vel corruptionem substantialem, immo ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia sunt mobilia localiter, scilicet corpora caelestia. Et ob hoc magis possumus dicere quod calefactio aquae sit naturalis, quia disponit ad generationem alterius naturae, licet sit violenta ipsi aquae. Motum autem sursum non sic dicimus naturalem; ideo simpliciter dicimus ipsum esse violentum. ⟨6⟩ Ad sextam potest concedi quod accidentia bene moverent, licet essent sine forma substantiali, et quod cum eis non oporteret ad movendum concurrere principaliter aliud principale agens sive movens quam Deum. Sed etiam forma substantialis moveret ad dispositiones sibi convenientes, si careret eis, ut aqua ad frigiditatem, | licet nullum esset aliud prin|cipaliter ad hoc movens nisi Deus. Et cum hoc potest dici quod in talibus miraculosis | Deus etiam miraculose supplet actiones quae essent a forma substantiali, si illa esset sub illis accidentibus. Ad rationes in oppositum. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicendum est quod illae qualitates moverent, licet forma substantialis non moveret cum eis, immo etiam licet forma substantialis inclinaret ad oppositum, quia fortiores possunt esse illae qualitates ab alio et ab alio extrinseco inductae quam sit resistentia vel inclinatio formae substantialis in contrarium. Tamen quantum ad motus convenientes formae substantiali, si qualitates eius movent, ipsa movet cum eis et principalius, inquantum ipsa est directiva illarum qualitatum et reductiva earum ad statum sibi convenientem, si deficerent vel excederent et non esset aliud prohibens vel agens fortius ad contrarium. Et ita forma substantialis ad motus sibi convenientes est principium activum primum, id est principale, et non suae qualitates. Et qui vellet istas difficultates evitare in definitione naturae, quas tamen expedit videre, ipse posset dicere quod, si forma substantialis non habeat super accidentia principalitatem in movendo, tamen habet super ea principalitatem perfectionis et nobilitatis in essendo. Et tunc exponeretur definitio naturae quod natura est principium per se activum vel passivum motus aut quietis eius in quo est non secundum accidens primum, id est principale, in essentia et perfectione. Et ita haec dictio ‘primum’ contrahit 1 immo] ideo GPp 2 ob] aliud ab p 5 simpliciter dicimus] inv. p ‖ esse] om. Pp 10 careret] caret G 14 ad] praem. tunc Pp 15 dicendum est] dicitur P 17 illae] om. p 18 et ab alio] et Pp : om. G 19 in] ad Pp 20 movent] moveret C 22 sibi] om. p 23 et] om. P 24 primum] om. C 25 qui] si quis P 26 ipse posset] ipse possit G : posset p 27 super accidentia principalitatem] principalitatem supra accidentia P 28 perfectionis et nobilitatis] et nobilitatem P ‖ et2] om. P ‖ exponeretur] exponetur P 29 quod] quia P ‖ vel] et P 30 secundum] per Pp 31 et ita] ita quod P ‖ contrahit] contraheret GPp

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hoc nomen ‘principium’ ad principium substantiale activum vel passivum excludendo accidentia, sive accidentia essent principaliora in movendo sive non. ⟨2–5⟩ Omnes aliae rationes procedunt | manifeste secundum ea quae determinata sunt in quaestione. Haec de quaestione etc. 2 sive accidentia] om. p ‖ principaliora] principalia P 5 determinata] dicta p ‖ quaestione] positione GPp 6 haec … etc.] et sic est finis huius quaestionis etc. G : etc. p : om. P

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⟨Utrum naturalis differat a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus sine motu⟩ Quaeritur sexto de differentia mathematici ad naturalem sequendo verba Aristotelis sub hac forma, utrum naturalis differt a mathematico per hoc quod naturalis definit per motum et mathematicus sine motu.

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⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod naturalis non differt a mathematico quia: idem non differt a se ipso; sed idem est naturalis et mathematicus, puta Socrates, quia habet utramque scientiam; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Et etiam ultra omnis mathematicus est homo; et omnis homo est naturalis; igitur omnis mathematicus est naturalis et per consequens nullus mathematicus differt a naturali. ⟨3⟩ Iterum si scientia mathematica non differt a scientia naturali, sequitur quod mathematicus non differt a naturali, per locum a coniugatis | et per hoc etiam quod mathematicus non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet scientiam mathematicam nec naturalis nisi ex eo quod habet scientiam naturalem. Et tunc probatur quod scientia mathematica non differt a scientia naturali, et | concludetur quod etiam mathematicus non differt a naturali. Probandum est igitur quod scientia mathematica non differt a naturali. Probatur primo quia: omnis scientia est naturalis; igitur nulla scientia differt a naturali. Consequentia est per se nota. Antecedens probatur quia: effectus est naturalis, cuius causae sunt naturales; sed causae omnis scientiae sunt naturales, scilicet intellectus possibilis, intellectus agens, phantasia et sensus et etiam

5 quaeritur sexto] om. G ‖ de differentia mathematici] rep. G 5–6 de … forma] om. P 5 sequendo] loquendo C 7 et] om. G 8 naturalis non] inv. P 9 ipso] om. Pp ‖ quia] qui GPp 10 igitur etc.] om. G 11 etiam] om. GPp 14 iterum] praem. et Gp ‖ differt] differret C 14–15 sequitur] sequeretur C 15 differt] differret C 16 nisi] post eo P 17 ex eo] om. p ‖ et] sed Pp 18 probatur] probabitur p 19 concludetur] concluditur P 20 naturali] add. scientia et hoc P : add. et hoc Gp 21 a] add. scientia P 23 causae2] post scientiae GPp 24 phantasia] phantasmata p ‖ et sensus] sensus communes sensus exteriores P ‖ etiam] om. P 6 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 193b31–35

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obiecta exteriora (magnitudines enim rerum sunt a natura et naturales). Secundo idem patet, quia scientiae sunt eaedem inter se, quae considerant de eisdem, quia dicitur secundo De anima: | ‘secantur scientiae quemadmodum et res’; sed scientiae mathematicae et naturales considerant de eisdem rebus, ut de magnitudinibus et numeris, immo etiam de eisdem conclusionibus, quia et naturalis et astrologus habent determinare quod terra est sphaerica; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Deinde arguitur quod, quamvis illi differant, quod tamen non differunt dicto modo quia: mathematicus definit per motum et naturalis aliqua non per motum. Mathematicus enim definit numerum quod est multitudo ex unitatibus aggregata, et circulum quod est figura plana una linea contenta, in cuius medio est punctus a quo omnes lineae ductae ad circumferentiam sunt aequales; modo ‘aggregatio’ et ‘ductio’ sunt nomina motuum. Et hoc etiam confirmatur quia: dicit Aristoteles octavo huius quod omnes scientiae utuntur motu. ⟨5⟩ Similiter etiam ostenditur quod naturalis multa definit sine motu. Primo enim definit motum; et non per motum, quia idem non definitur per se ipsum. Secundo etiam definit materiam; et non per motum, cum materia nullum determinet sibi motum et definitum sibi debet determinare definitionem et omnes partes definitionis (aliter enim posset esse sine illis et sic non esset definitio convertibilis cum definito, quod est inconveniens). Tertio quia: multa naturalia non moventur; et tunc non conveniret eis definitio | per motum; ideo non semper conveniret nec converterentur. Quarto etiam quia: ista immobilia considerantur a naturali, et illa non debent definiri per motum. Quinto quia: omnino motus non est de quidditate nec de ratione quidditativa alicuius substantiae etc.

1 exteriora] extrinseca P 2 idem patet quia] idem patet bene quia p : bene patet quod P 3 dicitur] post anima P ‖ secantur] sequantur C : dividuntur p 6 astrologus] astrologi P ‖ est] sit G 7 igitur etc.] om. P 8 quod1] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 8–9 differunt] differant G 9 dicto modo] modo praedicto Pp 10 enim] autem p 13 modo] om. P 14–15 et … motu] in marg. C : om. G 14 etiam] om. P 16 etiam] enim P 17 enim] sup. lin. C : om. G 19 determinet] determinat P ‖ sibi debet determinare] sed determinare sibi P 20 enim] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ posset] potest P 23 conveniret] convenirent G ‖ converterentur] add. etc. G : add. igitur P 24 ista] ita G : om. p 25 omnino] omnis sed add. in marg. seu omnino C 26 etc.] om. GPp 3 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, III, 8, 431b24–25; cf. AA, 6: 162 253b1–2

14 Aristoteles, Physica, VIII, 3,

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Oppositum dicit Aristoteles in isto secundo et in sexto Metaphysicae.

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Quaestio solvetur, si exponantur et distinguantur termini. Dico igitur quod scientia non dicitur naturalis in proposito ex eo quod ipsa est res naturalis et habens causas naturales, quia sic omnis scientia diceretur naturalis. Nec vocatur naturalis praecise ex eo quod ipsa considerat de rebus naturalibus, quoniam mathematica et metaphysica essent scientiae naturales, quia considerant de rebus naturalibus, | immo de omnibus. Nec ex eo praecise quod considerat terminos naturales, quia de multis terminis eisdem considerat physica et mathematica, immo etiam metaphysica de omnibus terminis potest considerare. Sed scientia dicitur naturalis ex eo quod considerat res secundum illas rationes secundum quas dicuntur naturales, et omnia quae considerat ipsa considerat secundum attributionem ad illas rationes. Scientia autem dicitur mathematica ex eo quod considerat res secundum illas rationes secundum quas dicuntur quantae | et mensurabiles et ad invicem in quantitate et mensurabilitate proportionales, et omnia quae considerat ipsa considerat secundum attributionem ad illas rationes. Metaphysica autem considerat res secundum illam rationem secundum quam dicuntur esse vel entia etc., prout haec magis debent videri sexto Metaphysicae. Dico etiam quod in proposito naturalis non dicitur ex eo naturalis quia considerat res naturales, sed ex eo quia habet scientiam naturalem, et mathematicus dicitur ex eo mathematicus, quia habet scientiam mathematicam, et sic de metaphysico. Deinde etiam ego dico quod hoc nomen ‘natura’ significat substantiam, sed non absolute, sed in habitudine ad motum, tamquam in habitudine 2 solvetur] solvitur P ‖ exponantur] exprimantur P 3 ipsa] sup. lin. C : om. G 5 praecise] post eo P : post quod p 6 et] om. p 8 considerat] considerant p ‖ terminis eisdem] inv. GPp 9 considerat] considerant p ‖ etiam] add. et p 11 dicitur] add. scientia p ‖ illas] om. P 12 ipsa] om. P 15 et1] sup. lin. C : vel p ‖ et2] om. P 16 proportionales] proportionabiles Pp 17 attributionem] attributiones C 18 illam … quam] illas rationes secundum quas p ‖ entia] corr. in marg. ex essentia C : essentia G 18–19 etc. prout haec] et pro hoc P 19 debent] debet GP ‖ videri] add. in p 20 non] vero sed add. sup. lin. non C ‖ ex] om. p 21 considerat res naturales] sit res naturalis p ‖ quia] quod Pp ‖ et] add. sic G 22 ex … quia] mathematicus ex eo quod P : mathematicus eo quod p : mathematicus quia G 23 metaphysico] metaphysica G 24 etiam ego] etiam GP : om. p 25 tamquam] ABHLMUTp : tamen C : tam GP ‖ in habitudine2] secundum habitudinem GP 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 193b32–35; cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1026a6–16 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1026a31–32

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principii ad principiatum. Propter quod oportet quod in ratione definitiva huius nominis ‘natura’ ponatur motus vel ratio motus. Nihil autem dicitur naturale nisi ea ratione qua dicitur natura vel habens naturam vel consequens naturam vel principium naturae aut habentis aut existentis a natura. Et ita manifestum est quod omnis ratio secundum quam aliquid dicitur naturale claudit in se vel im|plicat rationem huius nominis ‘natura’. Tunc ponuntur conclusiones. Prima est quod omnis terminus pertinens ad scientiam naturalem, si perfecte definiatur prout pertinet ad scientiam naturalem, debet definiri per illum terminum ‘motus’ vel ‘mutatio’, ‘movere’ vel ‘moveri’ vel per alium terminum implicantem in sua ratione illum terminum ‘motus’ aut ‘mutatio’ etc. aut per terminos aequivalentes. Hoc probatur. Primo enim ille terminus ‘motus’, si non definitur per illum terminum ‘motus’, tamen definitur per aequivalentia illi termino. Secundo etiam iste terminus ‘natura’ definitur per illum terminum ‘motus’, ut ante dictum est. Tertio | alii termini, inquantum pertinent ad naturalem, definiuntur per illum terminum ‘natura’ vel per terminos implicantes in suis rationibus seu conceptibus istum terminum ‘natura’ aut propinque aut remote, cum non dicantur naturales nisi secundum habitudinem ad naturam, ut dicebatur. Unde iste terminus ‘quies’, cum sit privatio respectu illius termini ‘motus’, definitur statim per motum, quia est carentia motus | in subiecto apto nato moveri. Et immobile dicitur, quia non potest moveri, et motor dicitur, quia potest movere, et mobile dicitur, quia potest moveri. Et materia est ex qua fit aliquid; fieri autem est moveri vel transmutari. Forma autem est quae per generationem aut motum acquiritur subiecto motus vel generationis. Et omnino naturalis non considerat hominem, lapidem vel albedinem simpliciter quid est unumquodque illorum. Hoc enim pertinet ad solum metaphysicum. Sed si debeat talia describere

1 ratione] definitione P 2 ponatur] proponatur P 3 vel2] et P 8 ponuntur] pono GPp 9 est] om. G ‖ pertinens] post scientiam p 10 debet] dicitur C 11 mutatio] add. vel GPp 12 terminum] add. in marg. alias terminum evidentem P 13 etc.] om. G ‖ per] om. p 15 aequivalentia] aequivalentiam G 16 ante] om. P ‖ est] fuit Pp 18 implicantes] significantes P ‖ seu] vel P 19 aut1] om. p 19–20 secundum] add. ad P 21 illius] huius Pp 23 dicitur1] dicit p ‖ dicitur2] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 24 et] etc. p ‖ est1] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ qua] quo GP 25 transmutari] terminari p ‖ aut] vel Gp : vel per P 26 subiecto] subiectum P 27 vel] et G ‖ unumquodque] unum quodcumque C 28 solum] ante pertinet P

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descriptione naturali, describet ea per motus et operationes, cum non considerat ea nisi in habitudine ad motus et operationes. Secunda conclusio est quod nullus terminus mathematicus, si definiatur praecise secundum illam rationem secundum quam pertinet ad mathematicum, | definitur per istos terminos ‘motus’ vel ‘mutatio’ etc., quia nihil pertinet ad rationes magnitudinum et numerorum, quantum ad sciendum mensuras et proportiones eorum ad invicem, sive moveantur sive non, sive sint in substantiis mobilibus sive non. Ita enim quattuor essent dupla ad duo secundum rationes numerorum, si moverentur sicut si quiescerent, et ita triangulus haberet tres angulos etc. et ita ex diametro quadrati esset duplex quadratus et sic de aliis. Igitur nihil debet se intromittere definiens pure mathematice de illis terminis ‘motus’ etc. Tertia conclusio quod nulla scientia naturalis est scientia mathematica et e converso. Hoc sequitur ex dictis per syllogismum expositorium in secunda figura, quia nulla scientia mathematica definit terminos suos per motum et omnis scientia naturalis definit terminos suos per motum. Quarta conclusio sequitur quod omnis scientia naturalis differt a mathematica et e converso, quia si hoc est et illud est et hoc non est illud, sequitur per quid nominis huius termini ‘differt’ quod hoc differt ab illo. Quinta conclusio est quod omnis scientia naturalis differt a mathematica et e converso per hoc quod in scientia naturali definiuntur termini per motum etc. et in scientia mathematica non, ita tamen intelligendo conclusionem quod, si non differant per hoc essentialiter vel causaliter, tamen dicuntur differre per hoc argumentative, scilicet quia per hoc arguitur et concluditur quod differunt. Et hoc manifestum est ex dictis. Quamvis enim quaecumque differunt ab invicem differant essentialiter se ipsis, et quamvis cygnus et corvus non differant causaliter per albedinem et nigredinem,

1 describet] describit p 1–2 non considerat] non consideret p : tamen consideret P 2 ea] sup. lin. C : om. G ‖ et] vel GPp 4 secundum1] per G 5 definitur … vel] per illos terminos motus definitur et P ‖ etc.] om. p 7 moveantur] moveatur p 8 substantiis] subiectis P ‖ sive non] om. P ‖ ad duo] BHTUp : duo sed add. in marg. id est ad duo M : om. ACGLP 9 et] om. P 10 angulos] om. Pp ‖ et] om. P 11 quadratus] quadratum Gp : add. etc. P 11–12 definiens pure mathematice] definitio pure mathematica G 12 etc.] om. C 13 conclusio] add. est p ‖ et] vel GPp 14 expositorium] del. C 16 motum] add. ergo etc. Gp 18 et1] vel G 21 et e converso] om. P 22 etc. et] om. P 24 argumentative] arguitive GPp 25 manifestum est] inv. GPp ‖ enim] om. p 26 differunt] differant G ‖ differant] differunt P 27 et corvus] vel corulus P ‖ differant causaliter] differunt causaliter G : differunt realiter P

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tamen argumentative dicuntur differre per hoc quod ille est albus et iste niger. Sexta conclusio est quod non omnis naturalis | differt a mathema|tico, quia aliquis idem est naturalis et mathematicus, cum habeat utramque scientiam. Sed tamen dictum Aristotelis, scilicet quod naturalis differt a mathematico per hoc etc., conceditur ad illum intellectum quod, licet sit idem naturalis et mathematicus, tamen per habere unam scientiam | dicitur naturalis et per habere aliam scientiam dicitur mathematicus; quae quidem scientiae differunt per hoc etc. Sed tunc circa dicta oritur dubitatio de scientiis mediis, puta de astrologia, perspectiva et musica, utrum debeant dici scientiae naturales. Et videtur quod sic, quia considerant istos terminos ‘motus’ et ‘mutatio’ et terminos subiectos et sic habent bene definire per motum. Sed oppositum videtur, quia omnes reponunt illas scientias inter mathematicas et vocant eas mathematicas. Solutio: dico quod omnes reputant illas scientias nec esse pure naturales nec esse pure mathematicas, sed quodam modo medias. Non enim debent dici pure | mathematicae, quia applicant terminos pure mathematicos ad motum. Nec sunt pure naturales, quia demonstrationes earum habent ortum ex principiis et conclusionibus purarum mathematicarum, quamvis applicent huiusmodi principia et conclusiones ad terminos naturales. Sed est dubitatio magna inter doctores utrum illae magis debeant dici naturales quam mathematicae vel magis mathematicae quam naturales. De hoc autem sunt contrarii beatus Thomas et Commentator.

1 argumentative] arguitive Gp : arguitive differunt vel P ‖ quod] quia p 3 mathematico] add. etc. p 4 aliquis] aliquid p 6 per hoc] rep. G ‖ etc.] etiam P ‖ intellectum] sensum GPp 7 habere] om. p 8 scientiam] om. GPp 9 etc.] om. P 10 dicta] hoc G ‖ de2] om. Pp 13 terminos] add. sibi G ‖ habent bene] inv. P 14 videtur quia] videtur quod Cp : arguitur quia P 15 mathematicas] medias sed add. sup. lin. mathematicas C 17 esse] om. Pp 18 debent] debet G ‖ applicant] implicant sed add. sup. lin. alias applicant C 20 purarum mathematicarum] add. in marg. alias purorum mathematicorum C 21 applicent] implicent sed add. sup. lin. alias applicent C : applicant P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 23 sed] add. tunc GPp ‖ magna] magis C : om. Pp ‖ magis debeant] debent magis P ‖ dici] add. scientiae GPp 25 sunt] om. P 5 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 193b32–35; cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 1, 1026a6–16

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Dicit enim beatus Thomas quod sunt magis naturales. Quod probat primo auctoritate Aristotelis, qui loquens de illis dicit: ‘demonstrant autem quae magis physica quam mathematica’. Item postea dicit quod istae mediae contrario quodam modo se habent cum geometria; geometria enim de physica linea intendit, sed non inquantum physica, perspectiva quidem mathematicam lineam intendit, sed non inquantum mathematica, sed inquantum physica. Modo haec dictio ‘inquantum’ nihil videtur rationabiliter notare nisi specificationem ad quam scientiam, naturalem vel mathematicam, pertineret vel magis pertineret haec consideratio. Item beatus Thomas arguit ratione quia: a fine debet magis fieri denominatio; conclusio autem, quae est finis scientiae et demonstrationis, est magis naturalis, cum illae scientiae procedant a principiis mathematicis ad conclusiones naturales; igitur illae scientiae debent magis dici naturales. Item magis debet esse denominatio a formali et contrahente quam a materiali et contrahibili; materiale autem et contrahibile est mathematicum, formale autem contrahens est naturale; igitur etc. Minor patet, quia astrologia considerat de magnitudine mobili, musica de numero sonorum, perspectiva de linea visuali, in quibus contrahibilia sunt isti termini mathematici ‘magnitudo’, ‘numerus’, ‘linea’; contractiones autem formales sunt isti termini naturales ‘mobile’, ‘sonorum’ et | ‘visuale’; igitur etc. Commentator autem tenet partem oppositam, rationabiliter et bene ut puto, scilicet quod istae scientiae mediae debent dici magis mathematicae |

1 sunt magis] inv. G ‖ quod2] et P : et hoc G 2 loquens … dicit] est loquens de illis G ‖ autem] add. et P : om. p 3 physica] ante magis P : add. sunt G ‖ postea] add. etiam Pp ‖ quod] et P 3–4 contrario] e contrario P : scientiae G 5 quidem] om. p 7 haec] hic C ‖ videtur] videretur p 8 specificationem] in marg. C : specificationes p ‖ scientiam] add. scilicet GPp 8–9 pertineret … pertineret] magis pertinet P 10 magis] ante debet P : om. G 12 procedant] procedunt G 13 debent magis dici] debeant dici magis G 14 formali] forma G ‖ et] add. a p 15 materiali] naturali p ‖ materiale autem] materiale enim G : naturale autem p 16 formale autem] et formale Gp : et materiale P 16–20 minor … etc.] in marg. inf. C 17 sonorum] sonoro p : sonore P 18 contrahibilia] contrahibiles P 19 numerus] add. et P 20 mobile] add. et p ‖ igitur etc.] om. P 21 partem oppositam] opposita P ‖ rationabiliter] om. G ‖ bene] add. est C 22 debent] debet G 1 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum expositio, II, lect. 3, 164(8) (ed. Maggiòlo, 84) 2 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 194a6–8 3 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 2, 194a8–11 10 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum expositio, II, lect. 3, 164(8) (ed. Maggiòlo, 84) 21 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 20, f. 55I–L

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quam naturales, quia communiter et simpliciter loquendo conceduntur esse de numero scientiarum mathematicalium et non de numero scientiarum naturalium. Et causa huius est, quia sicut dicitur in secundo huius, praemissae in demonstrativis ad conclusionem se habent sicut finis in operabilibus ad ordinata in illum finem (nec mirum, quia a fine operis est principium speculationis); sed in operabilibus a fine alia denominantur et secundum finis exigentiam ordinantur; igitur scientia magis debet denominari a principiis ex quibus procedit quam a conclusionibus; sed principia radicaliter, saltem ut in pluribus, sunt mathematica; igitur etc. Et confirmatur per hoc quod eadem conclusio, ex eo quod per diversa principia demonstratur (ut quod | haec conclusio ‘terra est rotunda’ demonstratur), ponitur esse de diversis scientiis, scilicet de scientia naturali prout demonstratur secundo Caeli per medium naturale, scilicet per | inclinationem omnium partium uniformiter ad medium propter gravitatem, et de scientia astrologiae prout demonstratur in libro De sphaera per diversos aspectus astrorum etc. Et solvit Commentator auctoritates Aristotelis. Ad primam dicit quod Aristoteles non intendebat illam comparationem quantum ad hoc quod est illas scientias medias esse magis physicas vel magis mathematicas, sed quasi abusiva comparatione quantum ad hoc quod istae scientiae magis possunt dici physicae quam pure mathematicae. Possunt enim dici physicae ita quod istae mediae sunt magis physicae quam mathematicae pure, id est sunt propinquiores physicae quam mathematicae pure. Et ita dicit Commentator de alia auctoritate, scilicet quod per istam dictionem ‘inquantum’ non debemus intelligere quod perspectiva considerat lineam physica consideratione, sed quod considerat eam propinquius physi-

2 et] om. GPp 3 est] om. P ‖ dicitur] videbitur p 4 in demonstrativis] add. scientiis p : in demonstrationibus P : indemonstrabiles G ‖ operabilibus] operationibus Gp 8 procedit] procedunt GP ‖ saltem] om. G 9 per] praem. quod dictum est Pp : ex G 10 ex] om. p 11 demonstratur] om. GPp ‖ esse] post diversis P 13 medium … per] om. (hom.) G ‖ uniformiter] universaliter C 15 etc.] om. GP 16 auctoritates] ad auctoritatem P ‖ dicit] dicitur P 18 magis2] om. G 20 possunt … physicae2] possunt dici physicae GP : om. p 20–21 ita … pure] om. G 21 mediae] duae P 22 physicae] physicis P 23 et] om. P ‖ scilicet] om. p 24 considerat] consideret p : praem. non P 25 quod considerat] quod consideret p : considerat P 3 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 9, 200a15–24; cf. AA, 2: 91 12 Cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, II, 14, 279b1–13 15 Cf. Iohannes de Sacrobosco, De sphaera, cap. 1 (ed. Thorndike, 81–82) 16 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 20, f. 55I–L 23 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 20, f. 55L

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cae considerationi quam geometria, ita quod perspectiva considerat lineam mathematicam non secundum quod mathematica, id est non pure mathematice, sed secundum quod physica, id est secundum quod applicata est terminis physicis. De hoc autem quod dicebat beatus Thomas, quod a fine debet fieri denominatio, dictum est iam quod principia in scientiis demonstrativis quoad hoc sunt sicut finis in operabilibus. Ad aliam dicunt aliqui bene probabiliter quod in scientiis mediis mathematicus ita vel magis habet modum determinationis formalis respectu naturalis sicut e converso. Astrologus enim considerat de motibus per magnitudines et proportiones magnitudinum ad invicem et musicus de sonis numeratis vel numerabilibus et perspectivus de visualibus vel multitudine specierum ipsorum, secundum quod sunt mensurabiles vel proportionabiles secundum mensuras et proportiones magnitudinum. Et cum hoc potest dici quod, sicut iam dictum est, quod magis attenditur denominatio scientiae in proposito a | principiis a quibus demonstrationes habent ortum et vigorem quam a speciebus terminorum. Et certum est quod in | illis scientiis proceditur saepe ad aliquas conclusiones probandas per principia et conclusiones scientiae naturalis vel habentia seu habentes ortum ex scientia naturali, et quantum ad hoc illae scientiae essent magis naturales. Et saepe proceditur ad alias conclusiones per habentia ortum et vigorem ex puris mathematicis, et quantum ad hoc sunt magis mathematicae. Unde astrologia de motibus ut plurimum est magis mathematica et astrologia de iudiciis habet magnam partem magis naturalem. Nunc ergo de rationibus principalibus in principio quaestionis positis dicendum est quod multae | procedunt manifeste secundum praedeterminata.

1 considerationi] consideratione P ‖ geometria] geometrica P 3 est2] om. GPp 6 scientiis demonstrativis] scientiis (sup. lin.) demonstrativis C : inv. p : demonstrationibus GP 7 finis] fines P ‖ operabilibus] operationibus p 8 aliam] add. rationem Pp ‖ bene] om. P 8–9 mathematicus] mathematicum CP : mathematicis p 9 vel] om. G ‖ determinationis] considerationis G 10 enim] in marg. C : etiam p 11 et proportiones magnitudinum] et proportiones magnitudinem p : om. G ‖ invicem] add. mensurabilibus Pp 12 perspectivus] perspectiva GPp ‖ visualibus vel multitudine] visualibus vel multiplicatione P : visibilibus vel multitudine p : visibilibus per multiplicationem G 13 ipsorum] ipsarum GPp 15 quod1] om. GP 19 seu] vel G 23 plurimum] add. et G ‖ magis] post mathematica P : om. C ‖ et astrologia] om. G 25 nunc] tunc GPp ‖ ergo] add. ad rationes principales G 26 est] om. G

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⟨3⟩ Sed tamen de hoc quod arguitur per locum a coniugatis dicendum est quod non sequitur ‘mathematicus est physicus, igitur mathematica est physica’, sicut non sequitur ‘album est dulce, igitur albedo est dulcedo’. In praedicationibus enim denominativis non tenet iste locus, sed in quidditativis. Dicendum est etiam quod non oportet scientias esse easdem, si considerant de eisdem terminis vel de eisdem rebus significatis per terminos, si illae de illis considerant per diversas rationes. Et eadem conclusio potest intrare diversas scientias, secundum quod potest probari per principia diversarum scientiarum. ⟨4⟩ Quando etiam dicitur quod mathematicus definit per motum, ut numerum per aggregationem et circulum per ductionem, dico quod non curat de aggregatione quae est mo|tus, sed intendit quod numerus est multitudo ex unitatibus aggregata, id est multitudo quae est unitates. Si enim Socrates est Parisius et Plato Romae, adhuc ipsi sunt binarius. Nec curat utrum linea ducatur per motum localem a centro ad circumferentiam, sed quod ad centrum et circumferentiam sunt termini eius. Quod omnes autem scientiae utuntur motu est verum in acquisitione earum loquendo de illo motu quo sensus movetur a sensibilibus et intellectus ab intelligibilibus vel a phantasmatibus. ⟨5⟩ Aliae rationes, quae arguunt quod naturalis multa definit sine motu, solutae sunt ex dictis. Unde si materia non determinat sibi quod moveatur, tamen determinat sibi quod sit principium passivum transmutationum naturalium. Haec de quaestione. 1 quod] quia p ‖ locum] locus C 2 est1] om. P 3–4 in … locus] ille enim locus non tenet in praedicationibus (probationibus sed add. in marg. alias praedicationibus P) denominativis GPp 6 est etiam] inv. G ‖ scientias esse] inv. p 6–7 considerant] considerent p : considerantur G 7 per] add. illos P 8 considerant] considerent p ‖ intrare] add. sed del. in C : add. in GPp 9 secundum quod] sicut G 11 quando etiam] et cum p ‖ ut] et P 13 aggregatione] congregatione p 14 aggregata id est] congregata p ‖ unitates] unitas P 15 parisius … romae] pater et plato non P 17 et] add. ad p ‖ sunt] sint p 18 omnes autem] inv. GPp 20 vel] ut G 25 haec de quaestione] et sic patet quaestio etc. G : etc. P : om. p

35ra p

⟨ii.7⟩

⟨Utrum finis sit causa⟩

41va G

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Quaeritur septimo circa capitulum de causis utrum finis sit causa. Verbi gratia, si medicus intendit sanare infirmum | et ob hoc ipse conficit medicinas et dat eas infirmo ad potandum, utrum sanitas sit causa intentionis medici et confectionis medicinarum et potationis earum et sic de aliis. Et si ignis calefacit ligna finaliter ad generandum ignem, utrum ille ignis generandus sit causa illius calefactionis. Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Quod nihil est nullius est causa. Sed ille ignis generandus nihil est, quando est iam illa calefactio. Sanitas etiam illa nihil est, quando medicus | sic operatur. Igitur illa sanitas vel ille ignis non sunt causae praedictorum. ⟨2⟩ Item omnis causa est principium, quinto Metaphysicae; sed finis non est principium, quia principium dicitur ex eo quod est primum vel prius; et finis non est huiusmodi, sed est ultimum. Unde de eodem secundo De generatione dicitur quod habitibus existentibus in materia cessat motus. ⟨3⟩ Vel etiam aliter arguitur sic: omnis causa est prior naturaliter causato, unde Boethius describit causam quod causa est ad cuius esse sequitur aliud; finis | autem non est prior naturaliter, sed ultimo acquiritur, nec ad esse illius alia sequuntur, immo e converso; igitur etc.

3 quaeritur septimo] om. G ‖ circa capitulum] rep. G ‖ circa … causis] om. P 3–4 verbi gratia] om. G 4 ipse] om. P 5 et … sanitas] et dat eas infirmo †…† potandum utrum sanit†…† in marg. C 6 medicinarum] earum P ‖ et3 … aliis] etc. P 8 illius calefactionis] inv. G 9 arguitur quod non] arguitur primo quod non P : om. G 11 iam] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ etiam] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 12 sic] om. G 14 vel] et P 15 et] om. P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P ‖ eodem] eo GPp 16 dicitur] ante secundo (15) Gp 17 aliter] om. GPp ‖ prior] prius P ‖ causato] quam causatum P 19 illius] eius GPp 20 alia sequuntur] alia sequitur P : sequitur aliud finis autem non est prior naturaliter sed ultimo acquiritur nec ad eius sequitur aliud G 13 Aristoteles, Metaphysica, V, 1, 1013a16–17; cf. AA, 1: 117 15–16 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, I, 7, 324b16–17; cf. AA, 4: 16 18 Cf. Ps.-Beda, Sententiae, sive axiomata philosophica ex Aristotele et aliis praestantibus collecta (PL 90, 982)

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_036

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⟨4⟩ Item quod est effectus ultimus aliorum non debet dici causa illorum; sed illa sanitas est effectus ipsius medici proveniens effective ex illis medicinis datis ipsi infirmo; igitur non est causa illorum. ⟨5⟩ Item sicut medicus per suas medicinas et per suas operationes intendit generare sanitatem, ita Deus et intelligentiae per corpora caelestia et motus eorum intendunt generationes istorum inferiorum, ut debet videri duodecimo Metaphysicae. Igitur si propter praedicta diceremus sanitatem istam esse causam medici et medicinarum et suarum operationum, ita deberemus dicere ista inferiora esse causas Dei et intelligentiarum et caeli et motuum caelestium; sed haec apparent inconvenientia; igitur etc. Oppositum dicit Aristoteles. Et probat quia: ⟨1⟩ Hoc est causa quod respondetur ad propter quid; finis est huiusmodi, ut si quaeratur propter quid iste ambulat, dicemus ‘ut sanetur’. ⟨2⟩ Item illud est causa dispositionum et operationum naturalium ex quo proveniunt necessitates et determinationes in operibus et dispositionibus naturalibus et propter quod agentia naturalia agunt; sed finis est huiusmodi; igitur etc. Videtur mihi quod omnes instinctu naturali tamquam a natura determinata concedunt finem esse causam nostrarum operationum. Unde si petas a vetula propter quam causam vadit ad ecclesiam vel ad forum, dicet tibi ‘propter audire missam’ vel ‘propter emere tunicam’. Et si quaeratur a te ‘propter quam causam vadis ad scholas?’, respondes ‘propter addiscere’. Talia autem quae sic ab omnibus conceduntur non debent omnino negari, quia ad oppositum probandum non posset aliquid | proba|bilius et magis concessum adduci, sicut dicit Aristoteles septimo Ethicorum.

1 est] om. p 2 ipsius] illius p 3 ipsi] illi P 7 istam] om. G 8 causam] causa p ‖ deberemus] debemus G 9 ista] haec Pp 11 dicit] determinat GPp 12 quid] add. sed G ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 13 dicemus] diceret G : om. P 14 dispositionum et operationum] operationum et dispositionum GPp 15 operibus] add. sed exp. operationibus C : operationibus GP 16 quod] quid G 18–19 determinata] determinati GPp 19 unde] ut p 20 vadit] vadis G : vadat P ‖ dicet] dicit P ‖ tibi] add. quod GPp 21 quaeratur] quaeritur GPp 22 repondes] respondebis p : respondebis quod P ‖ addiscere] addicere C 23 autem] enim C 24 posset] possit G 6–7 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, XII, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1518, f. 67va) 11 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 3, 194b32–35 25 Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, VII, 1, 1145b1–7

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Ideo non restat difficultas nisi videre quomodo illud quod nihil est sit causa eorum quae sunt. Ad quod dicunt aliqui quod, licet ille finis non sit in actu extra ipsum agens, tamen est in intentione agentis, hoc est dictu quod intenditur ab agente. Non enim est inconveniens quod illud quod nondum est, sed est possibile esse, intendatur et appetatur ab agente. Et sic esse sufficit ad hoc quod sit causa. Et ita oporteret consequenter dicere quod non sequeretur ‘hoc est causa huius, igitur hoc est’, verbi gratia ‘sanitas Socratis est causa huius operationis medicinalis, igitur sanitas Socratis est’, quia hoc nomen ‘causa’, maxime de causa finali, ampliat | suppositionem termini ad futura vel possibilia, quia causa finalis dicitur ex eo quod intenditur et appetitur et haec verba ‘intendere’ et ‘appetere’ sunt dicto modo ampliativa. Sed tunc est alia difficultas, | quia si sanitas futura dicatur causa agentis et suae actionis, quia agens illam praeintendit et vult, tunc sequitur quod ista inferiora erunt causae Dei, quia Deus, antequam agat ea, praeintendit ea et vult, cum ipse nihil agat nisi per intellectum et voluntatem; sed inconveniens est dicere quod aliqua sit causa Dei; igitur etc. Propter hoc igitur notandum quod, sicut sanum dicitur multipliciter et non una intentione (aliter enim animal dicitur sanum, aliter urina et aliter cibus), ita causa etiam in unoquoque quattuor generum causae dicitur multipliciter. Tunc videndum est specialiter de fine. Finis enim dicitur alius quo, alius gratia cuius, alius operationis vel generationis, alius rei operatae vel genitae. Et ut dicit Commentator secundo Caeli, alius dicitur finis prima intentione et alius secundaria intentione. Et idem possumus intelligere per ‘finem dictum primaria intentione’ et per ‘finem gratia cuius’ et per ‘finem rei operatae’.

1 ideo] om. G 2 licet] om. G ‖ in] om. GPp 3 agens] om. G ‖ in] de G ‖ dictu] dictum P 4 enim] om. P 5 esse1] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ appetatur] post agente p ‖ esse2] om. G 6 et ita] et sic G : ita P 7 sequeretur] sequitur GPp ‖ hoc] om. G 8 huius operationis] inv. G ‖ socratis] om. G 10 possibilia] add. et P ‖ ex] om. p ‖ intenditur et] intenditur vel p : attenditur vel G 11 intendere et appetere] intendere vel appetere P : intenditur vel appetitur p : attenditur vel appetitur G 12 est alia] sequitur alia P : est G ‖ difficultas] add. iterum p ‖ si] om. G ‖ dicatur] dicitur G 13 sequitur] sequeretur p 14 causae] causa G ‖ ea1] om. G ‖ ea2] om. p 17 igitur] iterum P ‖ notandum] add. est Pp 18 et] om. GPp 19 ita] om. G ‖ unoquoque] utroque p 20 tunc videndum est] corr. sup. lin. ex vel C : et nunc GPp 22 secundo] tertio G 23 secundaria] secunda Gp ‖ intelligere] post operatae (24) P 24 primaria] pro prima G : prima Pp 22 Cf. Averroes, In De caelo et mundo, II, comm. 17 (ed. Carmody, Arnzen, 299)

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Finis autem operationis dicitur illud ad quod terminatur generatio vel operatio; et hoc est etiam finis secundaria intentione dictus; et etiam vocatur finis quo, quia mediante eo attingitur finis gratia cuius, qui est finis principalis. Et est tanta differentia inter istos fines, quia finis dictus prima intentione est prior aliis in esse et bonitate et perfectione et necessitat et dirigit alia agentia quae agunt propter ipsum, et dirigit ea et actiones eorum. Et secundum exigentiam illius oportet etiam omnes actiones et fines secundaria intentione dictos moderari et ab isto et ipsius gratia omnia alia habent bonitatem et perfectionem. Sic enim Deus est finis omnium naturalium, sive activorum sive passivorum, vel etiam actionum et transmutationum. Sic enim stando | citra Deum homo faciens domum est finis gratia cuius facit domum, et non est sic domus finis eius, quoniam ipse facit domum propter se ipsum et salutem suam. Et si facit eam propter pecuniam habendam, adhuc illa erit propter se ipsum. Et si facit eam propter filios vel amicos, adhuc hoc est finaliter propter se ipsum, quia reputat illos tamquam ipsum et bona ipsorum tamquam bonum suum. Nam ut dicitur in Moralibus, pater quodam modo vivit in filio et amicus est alter ipse. Et non est inconveniens, si agens est finis suae actionis et factorum suorum, quia dicit Commentator in De substantia orbis: ‘finis significat agens significatione necessaria’. Unde et Deus est finis | omnium et agens omnia. Et manifestum est quod Deus est principalis ordinator omnium aliorum; necessitat enim et ordinat caelum in motu suo. Et consequenter per caelum et motum caeli necessitantur et ordinantur ista inferiora principalius quam per agentia particularia, ut patet secundo De generatione. Sed etiam ulterius agentia particularia necessitant et ordinant effectus, quos producunt

1–2 generatio vel operatio] operatio vel generatio Pp 2 et1] om. P ‖ est etiam] inv. GPp ‖ secundaria] secunda GPp ‖ et2] om. P ‖ vocatur] om. p 5 bonitate et perfectione] nobilitate et perfectione P : nobilior et perfectior G : nobilior in perfectione C 6 dirigit] dirigunt P ‖ eorum] earum p 7–8 fines … dictos] fines secunda intentione dictos G : fines secundaria intentione dictas p : finis secundaria intentione dictus P 10 vel etiam] et G ‖ et] vel P 11 enim] add. sup. lin. etiam C ‖ citra deum] scitur a deo G 12 non] om. P ‖ domus] post finis P : deus p ‖ facit2] fecit p 13 salutem] substantiam G 15 hoc] om. Pp 16 ipsum] praem. se P ‖ bona] bonum Gp ‖ bonum suum] bona sua P ‖ ut] cum G 18 si] quod p ‖ quia] add. ut P : add. sicut p 20 et1] om. GP 21 principalis] om. G 22 enim] om. P ‖ motu suo] inv. P ‖ et3] add. per P 24–25 ut … particularia] om. (hom.) G 24 etiam] om. P 25 necessitant et ordinant] necessitat et ordinat G : ordinant P 16–17 Cf. Aristoteles, Magna moralia, II, 15, 1213a11–13 19 Averroes, De substantia orbis, cap. 2, f. 6M; cf. AA, 10: 20 24 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, 9, 336a1–13; cf. AA, 5: 40

42ra G

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liber ii

secundum exigentiam | ipsorum et agentium superiorum. Unde dissimilia agentia dissimiles producunt effectus, et etiam facientes domos pro se ipsis vel aliis secundum exigentias ipsorum diversas faciunt etiam eas diversas, ut dives facit magnam domum et fortem, pauper autem parvam et debilem. Finis autem dictus secundaria intentione est posterior naturaliter agente ipsum et in esse et in perfectione, nisi perfectionem habeat a perfectiori agente concurrente forte cum agente minus vel aeque nobili illo fine. Et ille finis est productus et necessitatus et determinatus in suis dispositionibus ab agente suo vel suis agentibus et habet bonitatem et perfectionem ab eis et ab eorum actionibus. Et ex eo dicitur finis, quia agens intendit et appetit ipsum et quod ab illo ultimo agente producitur. Unde sic ista inferiora sunt fines Dei, intelligentiarum et corporum caelestium. Sic igitur concedendum est quod finis prima intentione dictus vere est causa eorum quae gratia ipsius sunt vel agunt vel aguntur. Nec contra hoc arguunt rationes quae in principio quaestionis factae sunt, sed pro hac conclusione arguunt rationes quae fiebant ad secundam partem quaestionis. Sed concedendum est etiam quod non oportet finem secundaria intentione dictum esse proprie loquendo causam suorum agentium vel actionum praecedentium ipsum, cum haec inferiora non debeant dici causae Dei, intelligentiarum et corporum caelestium. Sed tamen tertio concedendum est quod talis finis secundaria intentione dictus solet dici causa et causa finalis impropria locutione propter similitudinem vel quandam attributionem ad veram causam | finalem, sicut urina diceretur sana propter attributionem ad veram et proprie dictam sanitatem. Similitudines autem propter quas effectus productus ab agente diceretur

1 exigentiam] ordinationem P ‖ unde] om. G 2 dissimiles producunt] inv. G ‖ et] om. GP ‖ se] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 3 vel] add. pro P ‖ etiam] sup. lin. C : om. GPp 4 ut] add. si G : om. P 7 in2] om. P 7–8 perfectiori agente] nobiliori agente vel perfectiori G 8 et] om. P 9 necessitatus et determinatus] determinatus et necessitatus P 10 vel] add. ab Gp ‖ suis agentibus] inv. GPp ‖ habet bonitatem] connaturalitatem G 11 eorum] earum p ‖ ex] ab G ‖ ipsum] sup. lin. C : om. G 12 ultimo agente] inv. GPp ‖ ista] om. P 13 dei] add. et GPp 16 factae sunt] fiebant Pp ‖ hac] ista Pp 18 finem] rep. C 19 proprie loquendo] post ipsum (20) P : corr. ex propria intentione C : propria intentione G ‖ suorum] post agentium p : om. GP 20 debeant] debeat G ‖ dei] add. et GPp 21 corporum] add. vel mobilium Pp 22 tertio] om. P 26 similitudines] corr. sup. lin. ex similes C : similes G ‖ autem] add. causae G ‖ diceretur] add. vel causa G

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finis vel causa finalis agentis secundum modum loquendi attributivum vel similitudinarium possunt poni tales: Primo modo, quia finem | principalem et effectum producibilem agens intendit et appetit. Sed hoc est differenter, quia finem principalem intendit et appetit, ut ei assimiletur quantum eius natura permittit; in hoc enim consistit suum esse optimum et perfectissimum. Sed effectum producibilem intendit et appetit gratia finis principalis, quia producendo ipsum assimilatur quodam modo fini suo principali; in hoc enim largitur illi effectum esse et perfectionem, quemadmodum finis principalis hoc sibi largiebatur. Secundo etiam est similitudo vel attributio, quia unumquodque, quantum participat de esse, tantum participat de similitudine primae causae finalis, scilicet ipsius Dei. Idcirco effectus productus dicitur finis vel causa finalis, inquantum est quaedam participata similitudo primae causae finalis, et etiam ea ratione intenditur et appetitur ab agente. Tertio modo potest dici quod sit ibi similitudo vel attributio, quia quodam modo tam principalis finis | quam ille effectus producibilis ultimo attinguntur ab agente. Effectus enim, quem finem ultimatum vocamus inter ea quae dicuntur fines secundaria intentione, sic ultimo attingitur, quia ultimo producitur in esse. Finis autem principalis, scilicet Deus, sic ultimo attingitur ab agente, quia perfecta assimilatio illius agentis ad ipsum Deum, quantum natura rei permittit, non est per essentiam illius agentis solum nec per perfectiones sibi inhaerentes solum, sed ultra et ultimo per hoc cum praedictis quia illud agens agendo alia vel in alia largitur aliis esse et perfectionem. Et est sciendum quod propter sic ultimo attingere haec utrumque horum accipit nomen ‘finis’, quod est nomen ultimi. Sed effectus productus proprie et vere est ultimus, principalis autem causa finalis vere et simpliciter est primum aliorum.

1 attributivum] om. G 2 similitudinarium] similitudinem G 3 primo modo] inf. lin. C : primo GPp 4–7 sed hoc … appetit] †…† assimiletur quantum eius natura permittit in hoc enim consistit suum esse optimum et perfectissimum sed effectum producibilem intendit et appetit in marg. sup. C 5 assimiletur] assimilatur G 7 gratia] ergo G 9–10 largiebatur] largebatur G 15 et1] om. P ‖ intenditur] attenditur G 16 modo] om. G ‖ sit ibi] sup. lin. C : inv. G 17 tam] causa p 17–18 attinguntur] attingatur P : intenditur et appetitur p 19 secundaria] corr. ex secunda C : secunda GPp 22–23 nec … solum] om. (hom.) G 24 quia] quod GPp ‖ agendo … alia2] agendo alia vel alia C : alia vel in alia in agendo p ‖ et2] etiam P 25 attingere haec] attingere P : attingitur haec p 26–27 proprie et vere] vere et proprie Pp 27–28 primum] principium sed add. sup. lin. alias primum C

51rb C

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300 35vb p

42va G

51va C

liber ii

Item quar|to est quaedam similitudo alia vel proportio conversa in opere exteriori artis et in ratiocinatione propter hoc quod effectus posteriores sunt saepe nobis notiores causis suis prioribus in esse. Sicut enim in opere exteriori sunt quaedam priora naturaliter et alia posteriora, et quod priora sunt causae posteriorum, ut medicinae et operatio medici sunt causae sanitatis sequentis, sic in motu rationis notitia | posterioris effectus est prior et notitia causarum priorum in esse est posterior et est notitia causati posterioris causa in intellectu notitiae causarum praecedentium. Iuxta quod illud est prius in intentione quod est posterius in opere. Et tunc secundum attributionem rerum ad intentiones nos attribuimus rebus intentis ordinem et denominationem intentionum. Ideo effectus ultimatus vocatur causa praecedentium, et quia secundum veritatem est ultimus, vocatur causa finalis. Sed hoc | non debet dici nec intelligi nisi ad istum sensum quod intentio eius est causa intentionis aliorum. Nec valet ratio Aristotelis, ut mihi videtur, nisi ad concludendum praedicta. Non enim ad quaestionem quaerentem propter quid vel propter quam causam responderi debet effectus ultimatus, sed intentio vel voluntas vel causae priores in esse sive termini pro praedictis supponentes. Unde si quaeratur propter quam causam vadis ad ecclesiam, debet dici ‘quia intendo vel volo audire missam’. Et si aliter respondetur, tamen veritas responsionis est ad illum sensum. De intentionibus autem agentium non cognoscentium vel non per ratiocinationem agentium credo quod ordo in intendendo et appetendo sit secundum ordinem operis apparentis e converso quam in nobis. Propter quod bene dicitur quod nobis notiora sunt minus nota naturae. Dictum

1 quaedam similitudo] quaedam p : similitudo P ‖ opere] operatione G 2 artis] om. P 3 suis prioribus] inv. P ‖ in esse] om. G 3–4 in opere exteriori] om. G 4 sunt quaedam] inv. G 5 ut medicinae] ut medicina G : medicinae P 6 sic] corr. ex sicut C : similiter P 7 est2] om. P 7–8 causati posterioris] causati posteriorum P : totalis posteriorum p 8 quod illud] inv. Pp 9 est prius] inv. P ‖ quod] om. Pp ‖ opere et] operatione et Gp : opere P 9–10 attributionem] attributiones p 10 ad] ac G ‖ intentiones] add. earum Gp : intentionem earum P 12 et] om. P ‖ ultimus] add. sup. lin. et P 13 dici nec] om. GPp 15 quaerentem] convenientem p 19 quia] quod p ‖ missam] add. et propter quid medicus dat medicinam quia vult sanare quia intentio et voluntas praecedentes operationem sunt vere causae operationis determinantes et dirigentes operationem Pp ‖ et] om. P ‖ respondetur] respondeatur GPp 20 responsionis] propositionis G 21 autem] om. p ‖ non per] secundum P 21–22 ratiocinationem] rationem sed add. sup. lin. alias ratiocinationem C : ratiocinationem sed add. in marg. alias rationem P : significationem p 22 intendendo] intelligendo C 23 operis] add. sup. lin. operationis operantis C ‖ propter] om. G 24 nota] notiora p

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enim fuit in primo libro quod intentio vel appetitus agentis naturalis non est nisi determinatio illius ad hoc et sic agendum. Modo ignis primitus est determinatus ad calefaciendum, deinde cum causis superioribus est determinatus ad generandum ignem in materia iam calefacta | et disposita. Si igitur quaeratur quae est causa propter quam ignis calefacit, respondebo quod illa causa non est ignis generandus, sed est forma sua et sua caliditas et Deus, gratia cuius agit et qui coagit. Et si dentur aliae responsiones, erunt sensus improprii secundum modos praedeterminatos. Haec de quaestione. 1 agentis naturalis] inv. GP 2 illius] eius GPp ‖ et] ad C 3 deinde] tunc G ‖ superioribus] supercaelestibus G 4 et disposita] om. G 5 respondebo] respondeo G 7 coagit] agit p ‖ responsiones] rationes G 9 haec de quaestione] etc. GPp 1 Cf. sup., I, q. 24, 23725–27

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⟨ii.8⟩

⟨Utrum pater sit causa filii⟩ Viso de causa finali videnda sunt consimiliter aliqua de causis efficientibus. Propter quod quaeritur octavo utrum pater sit causa filii, verbi gratia posito quod Socrates sit pater Platonis utrum Socrates est causa Platonis.

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36ra p 51vb C

Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Effectus debet dependere in esse suo vel saltem in aliqua eius dispositione ex suis causis. Plato autem non sic dependet a Socrate, quia si Socrates moriatur, non minus remanebit Plato et omnes eius dispositiones naturales. Sed tu dices quod, si non dependet ab eo in esse et permanentia, tamen prius dependebat ab eo in fieri et generari. Contra quia: ex hoc sequitur quod Socrates non amplius est causa eius, licet fuerit causa eius, quia non | amplius dependet Plato a Socrate nec in esse nec in fieri. ⟨2⟩ Item nec umquam dependebat Plato a Socrate in fieri, licet forte semen dependeret a Socrate. Semine enim emisso, licet statim Socrates fuisset mortuus, non tamen minus secuta fuisset generatio Platonis. ⟨3⟩ Item si Socrates sit causa Platonis, illa est | causa efficiens; sed non | fuit causa efficiens ipsius nec in esse suo nec in sua generatione, quoniam quando Plato generabatur substantialiter, Socrates nihil agebat, immo forte erat mortuus. ⟨4⟩ Item si Socrates esset mortuus, non esset causa Platonis; sed nihil plus est causa Platonis, si sit vivus, quam si sit mortuus, quia nihil plus dependet Plato a Socrate, si Socrates adhuc vivit, quam si sit mortuus; igitur etc.

3 viso] quaeritur octavo utrum ex quo visum est C 3–4 viso … quod] om. P 3 causa] add. scilicet p 4 octavo] om. CG 5 socrates1 … platonis1] plato sit pater socratis vel e converso G ‖ est] sit GPp 8 non sic] inv. G 10 dices] dicis P : diceres p ‖ dependet] dependeat p 10–11 in … eo] †…† permanentia tamen †…†ependet ab eo in marg. C 11 dependebat] dependet p 12 est] esset P 13 dependet plato] inv. GPp 14 umquam] numquam P ‖ dependebat plato] inv. G 15 dependeret] dependebat G ‖ semine enim emisso] corr. ex de semine emisso C : de semine emisso G 16 secuta fuisset] inv. P 18 causa] om. CG ‖ efficiens ipsius] inv. P ‖ sua generatione] inv. P 19 forte] socrates p 20 mortuus] motuus C 21 mortuus] motuus C ‖ esset2] esse G ‖ sed] om. P 21–22 plus est] inv. P 22 platonis] sup. lin. C : om. GPp ‖ dependet] add. sed del. vel dependit C : add. vel dependit Pp 23 igitur etc.] om. G

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_037

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Oppositum dicit Aristoteles in isto secundo.

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Videtur mihi quod hoc est solvendum per hoc quod nomen ‘causa’ vel ‘causa agens’ et alia nomina causarum dicuntur valde multipliciter secundum valde diversas intentiones, licet attributas ad unam primam intentionem. Prima enim intentione dicitur aliquid causa alicuius, quia ab eo illud dependet in esse suo, ita quod impossibile esset ipsum esse saltem naturaliter, si non dependeret ab illo vel ex illo. Sic enim lux est causa luminis et materia formae et subiectum accidentis et Deus omnium aliorum. Secundo modo dicitur aliquid causa alterius, quia illud alterum dependet ex ipso vel ab ipso in generari vel fieri, ita quod impossibile est ipsum fieri quin fiat ab ipso vel aequivalente vel ex illo vel in illo. Sic enim actu faciens et actu patiens sunt causae eius quod actu fit, ut actu domificans domus quae actu fit. Tertio modo aliquid dicitur causa alicuius, quia ab ipso illud dependet quantum ad ipsum esse perfectum. Verbi gratia sit isto modo a causa et b causatum. Tunc a ex eo dicitur causa ipsius b, quia b dependet ab a quantum ad ipsum esse perfectum, secundum talem sensum quia b est perfectum per a et a est perfectio eius et quod b non esset perfectum sine a vel aliquo alio per quod b esset perfectum, sicut esset | perfectum per a. Sic igitur forma substantialis est causa materiae et scientia vel sapientia causa humanae animae. Et talis causa vocatur causa formalis. Sic etiam accidentia convenientia subiectis quibus inhaerent sunt causae illorum subiectorum, quia sine illis subiecta non essent omnino perfecta, prout possibile est ea esse perfecta naturaliter. Unde sic frigiditas dicitur causa formalis aquae et calor naturalis causa formalis viventis.

1 isto] om. p 2 quod1 … solvendum] esse solvendum illud P ‖ quod2] add. hoc GPp 4 valde diversas] inv. p ‖ intentiones] om. G 6 dicitur aliquid] dicitur aliquis p : videtur aliquid G ‖ illud] aliud p 7 esset] est P 8 vel ex illo] om. p 10 dicitur aliquid] inv. P 10–11 illud … ab] dependet illud alterum ab ipso vel ex G 11 vel2] add. in GPp ‖ ita] om. G 12 quin] quando G ‖ ipso] illo GPp ‖ enim] om. G 13 actu2 … domus] fit in actu domificans causa domus est G 15 modo] om. p ‖ causa alicuius] inv. p 17 ex] om. p 19 eius] om. G ‖ esset] est G 21 sapientia] add. est G 22 humanae animae] inv. GPp 23 illorum] om. G 24 subiecta] add. eorum GPp ‖ essent] esset Gp 26 viventis] add. etc. GPp 1 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 3, 194b31

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liber ii

Sed circa istum modum intelligendi causam occurrunt dubitationes. Prima est utrum caliditas isto modo | sit causa aquae, quando aqua est calida. Secunda dubitatio est utrum forma substantialis sit causa materiae quantum ad esse vel essentiam materiae, aut non, et similiter utrum sapientia sit causa animae humanae quantum ad esse eius, aut non, sed solum quantum ad hoc | quod est ipsam esse perfectam. Ad primam dubitationem potest dici quod caliditas aquae bene est causa aquae quantum ad materiam aquae, quia est eius perfectio et sibi conveniens, inquantum illa materia appetit naturaliter illam formam. Sed caliditas aquae non est causa aquae quantum ad formam substantialem aquae, quia non est perfecta per illam, cum illa sit sibi disconveniens et disponens ad eius corruptionem. Quod enim est corruptivum alicuius vel dispositio ad corruptionem eius non est causa eius nec quantum ad ipsum esse nec quantum ad ipsum esse perfectum. Causa enim debet esse conveniens causato, si causatum debet dependere a causa sive quantum ad esse sive quantum ad bene esse. Ad secundam dubitationem videtur mihi dicendum quod forma est causa materiae quantum ad essentiam et quantum ad esse ipsius materiae, et similiter sapientia ipsius animae, quia quando anima est perfecta, idem est ipsa anima et ipsam esse et ipsam esse perfectam, et etiam quia anima non dicitur effectus formalis sapientiae nisi quia ipsa est perfecta per sapientiam; sed constat quod non solum anima, sed etiam essentia animae et esse animae est perfectum per sapientiam; igitur cuiuslibet istorum sapientia est causa formalis et perfectio eius. Sed tamen | illum modum locutionis consuevimus, scilicet quod sapientia est causa animae non quantum ad esse eius, sed quantum ad esse perfectum, volentes per hoc significare quod sapientia non est causa animae quandocumque ipsa est, sed quandocumque anima est perfecta. Deus autem diceretur causa omnium aliorum quantum ad esse, quia est causa eorum quandocumque ipsa sunt. Et sic etiam exponeretur de hoc quod forma substantialis aquae est causa huius materiae.

1 occurrunt] concurrunt P 2 caliditas] post modo P 3 est] om. G ‖ sit] est p 3–4 quantum … materiae] om. (hom.) G 4 vel] add. ad p ‖ aut] vel Pp ‖ et] om. P 5 aut] vel G 7 potest dici] dicitur P 8 ad] rep. p ‖ materiam aquae] materiam aquae (sup. lin.) C : eius materiam G ‖ et] om. G 9 illam] TU : aliam ABCGHLMPp 10 aquae3] om. G 12 est] om. G 13 ipsum] ipsam P 13–14 nec2 … perfectum] perfectum nec quantum ad ipsum esse p 14 debet] dicitur C 15 debet] debeat GPp 18 esse] om. P ‖ et2] om. P 19 ipsius] om. Pp ‖ quia] om. G ‖ est2] add. tamen G 20 ipsam1 … ipsam2] animam esse et animam G : animam Pp 24–25 consuevimus] add. dicere G 26 hoc] quod G 27 ipsa] anima GP 28 autem] enim G 29 quia] quod P ‖ et] om. P 30 huius] om. G

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Quarto dicitur aliquid esse causa alicuius metaphorice solum et similitudinarie ad quandam similitudinem praedicti tertii modi. Nam, quia si forma est causa materiae, dicimus quod materia est formata, et si anima est causa corporis, dicimus quod corpus | est animatum, et si sapientia est causa animae, dicimus quod anima est sapiens et sic de aliis, ideo secundum hanc similitudinem, si aliquod praedicatum denominat aliquod subiectum, nos dicimus dispositionem significatam per illud praedicatum esse causam eius pro quo subiectum supponit, quantum ad hoc quod est ipsum esse tale vel taliter se habere, ut caliditatem esse causam aquae quantum ad hoc quod est aquam esse calidam, et divitias esse causam hominis quantum ad hoc quod est hominem esse divitem, et iniustitiam esse causam | animae quantum ad hoc quod est animam esse iniustam, | cum tamen iniustitia non sit perfectio animae, et visionem esse causam lapidis quantum ad hoc quod est lapidem videri. Et iste non est proprius modus loquendi de causa, quia sic diceremus creationem vel motum esse causam Dei quantum ad hoc quod est Deum creare vel movere. Quinto modo dicitur hoc esse causa illius, quia hoc potest dependere ab eo, licet non dependeat, sive in esse sive in fieri etc. Et haec vocatur causa in potentia. Propter quod Aristoteles dedit unam divisionem in modis causarum de causa in actu et de causa in potentia. Sexto modo dicitur hoc esse causa illius, quia in praeterito hoc dependebat ab illo. Sic enim talem domificatorem dicimus esse causam huius domus factae diu. Et sic patrem dicimus causam filii et non secundum primum, secundum vel tertium modum, immo adhuc secundum intentionem remotiorem dicitur pater causa filii, sicut statim dicetur. Septimo modo igitur hoc dicitur esse causa illius, verbi gratia quod a dicitur esse causa ipsius b, quia b aliquando dependebat in fieri ab illo quod etiam prius dependebat ab ipso a; et potest hoc esse non solum per unum medium, sed etiam per plura, iuxta istam regulam ‘quidquid est causa 1 quarto] add. modo GPp ‖ esse] om. G 2 quia] quod P : om. G 3 et si] si autem P : si Gp 4 et si] si autem P : si Gp 5 aliis] add. et G 6 nos] non P 7 significatam] significativam G 8 quod est] om. P 10 quantum] om. P 11 est] add. esse P 12 sit] est G 13 et] om. G 15 creationem] creatorem C ‖ dei] dicitur sed add. in marg. alias dei P 17 dicitur hoc] inv. P ‖ quia hoc] quia illud p : quod illud P 18 etc.] om. G 19 propter quod] et ideo G 20 de2] praem. non P : om. G 21 modo] om. p ‖ quia] quod P ‖ hoc2] om. P 21–22 dependebat] add. tunc p 22 huius] illius G 24–25 remotiorem] et rationem p 26 modo … dicitur] modo igitur dicitur hoc P : igitur modo dicitur hoc Gp ‖ quod] quia G 27 esse] om. P ‖ quia] quod P 29 etiam] om. P 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 3, 195b4–6

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causae est causa causati’, quae simpliciter est vera in causis essentialiter ordinatis, prout alibi debet videri. Et sic pater est causa filii. Unde sicut prius arguebatur, filius numquam dependebat a patre nec in suo esse nec in sua substantiali generatione, sed in suo fieri dependebat a semine; quod quidem semen etiam in suo fieri dependebat a patre. Et ita etiam tandem diceremus filii causam esse non solum patrem eius, sed et avum et proavum. Et sic etiam consiliatorem dicimus esse causam omnium quae consiliatus postea agit, licet nihil amplius operetur. Adhuc octavo dicitur causa modo valde remotiori, videlicet quod hoc dicitur esse causa illius, quia non est vel non fuit causa oppositi cuius tenebatur esse causa. Sic enim dicit Aristoteles quod nauta, qui cum praesens sit, est causa salutis navis, est etiam causa submersionis navis, cum fuerit absens, licet nihil ad hoc operatur, sed ventus vel unda. Sic enim ex peccato omissionis | accusantur homines et puniuntur tamquam causae malorum contingentium, quae non contigissent, si egissent quae tenebantur agere ex debito. Nono etiam multa dicuntur causae multarum privationum, licet nihil operentur in illas privationes nec in ea quae sunt privata, ex eo quod impediunt vel prohibent alia agentia | per quorum actiones, si non fuisset impedimentum, | secutus fuis|set habitus. Sic enim terram interpositam soli et lunae dicimus esse causam eclipsis lunae, cuius tamen ipsa non est proprie causa, quia non estliud eclipsis lunae quam ipsa luna, et tamen terra non est causa ipsius lunae, nisi hoc sit secundum impropriam locutionem. Adhuc forte multis aliis modis possunt dici causae secundum diversas attributiones ad causas simpliciter et proprie dictas. Sed ista sufficiunt in 1 vera] bona sed add. sup. lin. seu vera C 2 alibi … et] videbitur P ‖ unde] licet bene G 3 arguebatur] arguitur p 3–5 nec1 … patre] nec in suo esse nec in †…† substantiali generatione s†…† fieri dependebat †…† quod quidem semen et†…† fieri dependebat a †…† in marg. C 5 etiam1] post fieri G : om. P ‖ et] om. P ‖ etiam2] om. G 6 et1] om. G ‖ et3] praem. et abavum G : om. P 9 dicitur] modo diceretur G 10 dicitur esse] dicitur P : diceretur G ‖ quia] corr. sup. lin. ex quod C : quod P ‖ oppositi] add. illius P 11–12 praesens sit] inv. GPp 12 est1] dicitur esse G ‖ est2] et CG : praem. et p 13 operatur] operetur GPp ‖ vel] et P ‖ enim] om. P 17 dicuntur] add. esse P 17–18 nihil operentur] nihil operentur (corr. ex operetur) C : nihil operantur P : non operentur G 18 ex] om. p 19 per] om. P 21 causam eclipsis lunae] eclipsim lunae causam P 23 secundum] add. impropriationem sive p 25 possunt] possent P 2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, II, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 11vb–12rb) 11 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 3, 195a13–14

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proposito. Bene enim visum est quomodo pater est vel non est causa filii, de quo quaerebatur. Propter quod alios modos dimitto. Magis enim consueti et principaliores dicti sunt. Haec de quaestione etc. 1 bene enim] unde P 2 quod] quid G ‖ dimitto] praetermitto P 4 haec … etc.] et sic patet quaestio G : et sic sit finis quaestionis P : etc. sequitur alia quaestio p

⟨ii.9⟩

⟨Utrum definitio fortunae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens secundum propositum extra semper et frequenter eorum quae propter hoc sunt’⟩

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Quaeritur nono circa capitulum de casu et fortuna utrum definitio fortunae sit bona in qua dicitur: ‘fortuna est causa per accidens secundum propositum extra semper et frequenter eorum quae propter hoc sunt’. Arguitur quod non quia: ⟨1⟩ Non potest bene definiri quod est immanifestum homini, incertum, extra rationem, non scibile et ens per accidens, cum de ente per accidens non est scientia; sed fortuna est talis, prout determinat Aristoteles; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Iterum ipsa est nugatoria, quia idem est esse per accidens et esse extra semper et frequenter. ⟨3⟩ Iterum arguitur quod ipsa est causa per se. Primo quia: ipsa est idem quod intellectus practicus, ut volunt Aristoteles et Commentator; et tamen intellectus practicus est per se causa agibilium. Et hoc etiam patet, quia non magis casus est causa per se quam fortuna, ut vult Aristoteles; et tamen casus est causa per se, quia est idem quod natura, quae est causa per se; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Et iterum fortuna definitur per effectum fortuitum; et nihil definitur per illud quod non convenit sibi per se; igitur fortuna est causa per se effectus

6 quaeritur nono] add. consequenter p : om. G ‖ circa … et] rep. G ‖ circa … fortuna] om. P 7 in] om. P 10 homini] add. et GP 11 scibile] scibilem G 12 est1] sit GPp ‖ prout] ut G ‖ igitur etc.] om. G 13 esse extra] esse praeter GP : extra p 15 ipsa est1] corr. ex sit ipsa C : ipsa sit Pp ‖ ipsa2] illa p 15–16 idem quod] om. G 16 volunt] voluit P : vult p 17 causa] ante per p ‖ et] om. P 18 casus est causa] (casus est sup. lin.) causa C : casus G ‖ tamen] cum C 19 est idem] inv. p 21–311.24 non … commentator] transp. ante scilicet (304.25) P 21 sibi] post se1 P 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a6–7, 10, 19, 33–36 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a7; 6, 197b2; cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 58, f. 71A–C 18 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a32–35

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_038

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fortuiti. Et hoc etiam confirmatur quia: sicut haec est per se vera ‘natura est causa effectus naturalis’, ita haec est per se vera ‘fortuna est causa effectus fortuiti’. ⟨5⟩ Iterum in agentibus secundum propositum, si eveniat illud quod propositum est et intentum, non dicimus illud esse fortuitum, sed si eveniat praeter intentionem; igitur male dicitur quod fortuna est agens secundum propositum. ⟨6⟩ Item corpora caelestia et motus eorum non sunt agentia a proposito nec sunt causae per accidens. Sed corpora caelestia et motus caelestes sunt fortunae vel infortunae nostrae. Aliter astrologi non vocarent aliquas stellas fortunas et aliquas infortunas, quod est falsum. Et aliter etiam astrologi per corpora caelestia et motus eorum nescirent | iudicare de nostris fortuniis vel infortuniis, quod est communiter falsum. Et ob hoc fortuna communiter depingitur femina movens rotam. Per quam rotam non potest sane intelligi nisi corpus caeleste quod circulariter movetur, et per istam feminam repraesentantem fortunam non possumus intelligere nisi Deum | vel intelligentias moventes corpora caelestia. Igitur fortuna non est causa per accidens nec a proposito agens. ⟨7⟩ Iterum mirabile videtur esse de illa clausula ‘eorum quae propter hoc sunt’, quia effectus non videtur dici propter hoc nisi quia agens agit propter ipsum tamquam intendens ipsum; sed agens effectum fortuitum, scilicet fortuna, non agit propter ipsum nec intendit ipsum; igitur etc. Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Aristotelis, qui in secundo huius dat nobis istam definitionem tamquam bonam.

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Notandum est quod non dicimus nec possumus arguere quod fortuna est nisi quia communiter omnes concedimus multa esse vel fieri vel evenire nobis a fortuna; et esset absurdum dicere quod ab eo quod nihil est multa

1 haec] hoc P 2 haec est] hoc P 5 fortuitum] fortunam C ‖ eveniat] eveniet P 6 dicitur] definitur p 9 causae] om. p 10 aliquas] alias G 11 aliquas] alias stellas G 12–13 fortuniis vel infortuniis] fortunis vel infortunis P 13 est communiter] tamen est Pp 16 non … nisi] nos possumus intelligere G 17 nec] om. C 20 quia1] quod P 21 ipsum1] illum p ‖ sed] quia p ‖ scilicet] vel P 23 auctoritate aristotelis] per aristotelem P ‖ qui] quia G : post huius P 24 tamquam bonam] om. GPp 26 quia] quod P ‖ communiter omnes] inv. GPp ‖ concedimus] concedunt G ‖ vel evenire] post fortuna (27) P 27 et] vel P 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a6–7, 33–36

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evenient. Ideo sic concludit Aristoteles quod fortuna est. Et est haec prima conclusio. Sed iterum, cum dicimus hoc esse ab illo, haec | praepositio ‘a’ vel ‘ab’ designat causalitatem illius ad hoc. Numquam enim diceremus b esse ab a, nisi vellemus significare quod a esset causa ipsius b taliter qualiter. Ideo cum communis locutio omnium non debeat omnino negari et omnes dicunt multa esse a fortuna, sequitur quod nos debemus concedere fortunam esse causam effectus fortuiti, scilicet eius quod dicimus esse vel fieri vel evenire a fortuna. Et haec est secunda conclusio. Sed iterum notandum est quod hoc nomen ‘fortuna’ est de nominibus subiectis huic nomini ‘causa’, sicut quasi iam dictum est; ideo est nomen relativum ad effectum fortuitum. Ideo debemus concludere tertio quod fortuna debet describi per effectum fortuitum sive per terminum vel terminos supponentes pro effectibus fortuitis. Et hoc est etiam rationabile, quia effectus sunt nobis notiores suis causis; ideo rationabile est quod causae notificantur nobis per suos effectus. Propter quod videndum est qui et quales dicuntur effectus fortuiti. Sciendum est igitur quod effectuum a nobis et nostris actionibus evenientium quidam sunt intenti a nobis et aliquando etiam eveniunt non intenti. Modo constat quod illi effectus quos praeintendimus et propter quos agimus, si eveniant, non dicimus quod a casu | eveniunt vel a fortuna. Ideo concludendum est quarto quod effectus fortuiti sunt qui praeter intentionem agentis eveniunt. Sed ultra sciendum est quod causae respectu effectuum quos intendunt dicuntur esse causae per se illorum et illi etiam effectus dicuntur effectus per se | illarum causarum ipsos intendentium. Sed causae dicuntur causae per accidens respectu effectuum praeter intentionem evenientium et illi effectus etiam respectu illarum causarum dicuntur effectus per accidens.

1 evenient] evenirent GPp ‖ concludit aristoteles] inv. P ‖ est haec] inv. GP : hoc est p 3 praepositio] propositio C 4 ad] ab p ‖ enim diceremus] inv. P 5 ideo] igitur P 6 debeat] add. simpliciter et P 7 concedere] dicere p 8 vel1] om. GPp 10 est1] om. Pp 11 nomini] modi C ‖ quasi] om. p 13 vel] add. per GP 14 est etiam] inv. Gp 15 notificantur] notificentur GPp 18 igitur] om. G ‖ nostris actionibus] inv. GPp 19 quidam] quaedam G ‖ etiam eveniunt] inv. P 21 eveniunt] eveniant Pp 24 est] om. p 25 causae] om. CG ‖ dicuntur2] add. esse GP 26 ipsos] ipsorum sed add. sup. lin. alias ipsos C : ipsorum G ‖ causae2] esse P 1 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 196b14–16

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Ideo concluditur quinto quod fortuitus effectus est effectus per accidens et quod etiam fortuna est causa per accidens. Deinde iterum est notandum quod effectuum non intentorum quidam semper eveniunt cum effectibus intentis vel ut in pluribus, et alii nec semper nec ut in pluribus | eveniunt cum eis vel etiam loco eorum. Si igitur semper vel ut in pluribus eveniant cum eis, non dicuntur fortuiti nec a fortuna evenire. Verbi gratia cum nutritione eveniunt senectus et tandem mors; quae non intenduntur a natura nutriente et tamen, quia semper eveniunt, si animal satis vivat, ideo nec a casu nec a fortuna dicimus animal senescere et mori ex senectute. Similiter etiam, quia ut in pluribus eundo ad scholas in hieme tu crotas tunicam tuam, non dicimus quod hoc fit a fortuna, licet hoc non intendas. Ideo concludendum est sexto quod effectus fortuitus est contingens extra semper et frequenter et quod fortuna est causa per accidens extra semper et frequenter eius respectu cuius dicitur fortuna esse. Adhuc ultra notandum est quod effectuum sic evenientium praeter intentionem quidam sunt notabilis bonitatis vel malitiae, ita quod, si perciperentur a nobis, nos intenderemus eos et libenter ageremus propter eos, ut libenter iremus ad fodiendum fossam magnam in vinea, si sciremus quod esset ibi thesaurus. Et illos effectus vocat hic Aristoteles effectus propter hoc, non quia propter eos agamus, quoniam a fortuna eveniunt, sed quia libenter propter eos egissemus, si praevidissemus eos. Alii sunt effectus nullius notabilis bonitatis vel malitiae in tantum quod, licet praevideremus eos, tamen non curaremus agere propter eos nec ad prosequendum nec ad fugiendum. Et tales effectus vocat Aristoteles effectus non propter hoc; et Commentator vocat eos effectus otiosos, et ponit exemplum de casu capilli ad fricationem barbae vel de ruptione festucae ambulando per | domum. Modo constat quod propter tales effectus contingentes numquam homo diceretur fortunatus vel infortunatus, sed solum propter effectus con|tingentes notabilis 1 ideo] item C ‖ ideo … accidens] om. (hom.) G ‖ fortuitus effectus] inv. Pp 2 etiam] est G 3 deinde … notandum] deinde iterum notandum est Gp : unde notandum est P ‖ quidam] corr. ex quod C : quidem p 5 eveniunt] eveniant P ‖ semper] sup. lin. C 6 eveniant] add. vel semper C 7 eveniunt senectus] inv. P 8 intenduntur] intenditur CP ‖ eveniunt] add. ut oportet P 11 crotas] cf. Tobler-Lommatzsch, Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch, II, 1101, croter ‘beschmutzen’ : del. et add. in marg. maculas G : permaculas P ‖ tunicam] rep. G ‖ fit] sit GPp 14 fortuna esse] inv. GPp 15 adhuc ultra] ad hoc ultra G : adhuc ultimo p : om. P ‖ est] om. P 17 et] ut p 19 hic] om. P 20 quoniam] quando GP ‖ eveniunt] veniunt G 21 praevidissemus] praescivissemus Pp ‖ sunt] add. autem P 22 praevideremus] praevidissemus p ‖ tamen] om. P 25 ad] et G 28 propter] per C 24 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 49, f. 67G–H

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bonitatis vel malitiae; ideo causa talium effectuum otiosorum non debet dici fortuna respectu eorum. Ideo concluditur septimo quod fortuna est causa eorum effectuum qui propter hoc sunt. Ultimo notandum quod agentium quidam agunt secundum propositum et deliberationem, ut homines provecti et habentes usum rationis, alia agunt sine proposito, ut inanimata, bestiae, infantes | et fatui a nativitate. Modo quae non agunt a proposito non dicimus proprie fortunari vel infortunari ex suis actionibus, licet multa eis contingant a casu. Sed homines a proposito agentes dicimus fortunari proprie et infortunari, quando ex suis actionibus propositis et deliberatis proveniunt bona vel mala inopinata et raro ex talibus actionibus contingentia. Ideo hoc nomen ‘fortuna’ proprie sumptum non habet locum nisi in agentibus | secundum propositum. Tamen non propter hoc est negandum, quin hoc nomine ‘fortuna’, sicut et quasi omnibus aliis nominibus, utamur aliquando communius quam sit eorum propria significatio, immo etiam aliquando utimur eis metaphorice et similitudinarie et improprie. Sic enim secundum usum communiorem dicimus saepe infantem fortunatum ex fortuniis parentum et amicorum, immo etiam bestias dicimus fortunatas vel infortunatas secundum quod cadunt sub domino bene nutrienti eas vel male. Tamen cum haec non dicantur ita secundum propriam intentionem huius nominis ‘fortuna’, oportet octavo concludere quod fortuna est causa per accidens agens secundum propositum, non sic intelligendo quod effectus fortuitus sit propositus, sed quod alius erat effectus propositus cum quo vel loco cuius provenit effectus inopinatus, quem vocamus effectum fortuitum. Et ita congregando omnia praedicta concludere possumus nono quod ista definitio fortunae est valde bona, scilicet ‘fortuna est causa per accidens eorum quae propter hoc sunt et extra semper et frequenter eveniunt in habentibus propositum’. Haec enim definitio explicite declarat significationem et connotationes huius nominis ‘fortuna’ et est ei convertibilis. Per hoc enim quod dico ‘fortuna est causa’ differt fortuna ab effectu fortuito et 2 causa] om. P 3 qui] quae G ‖ hoc] haec p 4 notandum] add. est G ‖ quidam] quaedam GPp 5 et2] rep. p ‖ alia] alii autem p 6 nativitate] necessitate G 7 quae] qui Pp ‖ non agunt a] agunt sine G 9 proprie et] proprie vel G : et p 11 contingentia] provenientia P 13 et quasi] quasi P : etiam quod G 14 nominibus] rationibus P 15 metaphorice] om. CG 17 saepe] om. G ‖ infantem fortunatum] infantes fortunatos Pp ‖ fortuniis] fortuitis G ‖ et] vel P 18 etiam] add. et Pp : et G 19 domino … eas] domino bene nutriente eas G : dominio bene nutrientium eas p : domino vel nutrientium eas bene P ‖ tamen cum] inv. P ‖ haec] hoc Cp ‖ dicantur] dicatur p 25 et] om. P 27 hoc] haec p ‖ et extra] extra G : om. C ‖ frequenter] add. et G 28 explicite declarat] inv. GPp 30 fortuito] fortuiti G

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ab omni eo quod non dicitur causa. Et cum dico ‘per accidens’, differt fortuna a causis per se. Quod ad bonum sensum debemus intelligere. Fortuna enim est idem quod intellectus practicus, qui est causa per se, ut dicetur post; ideo fortuna non est distincta a causa | per se. Sed quamvis idem sit causa per se respectu effectus intenti et causa per accidens respectu non intenti, tamen in respectu intenti non vocatur fortuna, sed in respectu non intenti, respectu cuius dicitur causa per accidens. Et ad hoc designandum dictum est quod fortuna est causa per accidens, scilicet ad distinguendum secundum rationem inter haec nomina ‘fortuna’ et ‘intellectus practicus’, quae pro eadem re supponunt. Deinde ad specificandum effectum respectu cuius fortuna dicitur fortuna ponitur ‘eorum quae propter hoc sunt’ ad differentiam effectuum otiosorum et ‘extra semper et frequenter’ ad differentiam effectuum aliorum. Et apponitur ‘secundum propositum’ ad differentiam casus et casualium in non habentibus propositum, in quibus non habet locum hoc nomen ‘fortuna’ proprie dictum, | ut dictum est. Unde notandum est quod hoc nomen ‘casus’ secundum eius propriam et primam significatio|nem extendit se non solum ad habentia propositum, verum etiam ad infantes, ad bestias et ad inanimata. Et ideo hoc nomen ‘casus’ est in plus quam hoc nomen ‘fortuna’, tamquam genus ipsius, ita quod haec nomina ‘casus’ et ‘fortuna’ non differunt in significatione nisi per hoc quod ‘fortuna’ addit super ‘casum’ hanc differentiam ‘secundum propositum’. Ideo si | a definitione fortunae illa differentia auferatur, residuum erit definitio casus. Tunc ergo respondendum est ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicendum est quod bene nota est significatio huius nominis ‘fortuna’. Sed intentio Aristotelis est quod sic fortuna est ignota, quia non possumus praescire qui effectus fortunae contingent ex nostris propositis actionibus.

1 cum] om. P 3 idem] add. est p 4 ideo] igitur G 4–5 idem sit] inv. G 6–7 tamen … intenti] om. (hom.) G 6 respectu1] add. non P ‖ in2] om. p 8–9 distinguendum] designandum differentiam P 10 supponunt] supponant P 11 ponitur] propter p 12 hoc] haec p ‖ effectuum otiosorum] inv. P 13 effectuum] om. G 17 est] om. P ‖ hoc] om. p 19 et2] om. P 21 in] om. Pp ‖ per] propter G 22 super] supra G 25 ergo respondendum est] ergo Pp : om. G 28 fortunae contingent] fortuite contingent G : fortuite contingant p : fortuiti contingent P 28–29 propositis actionibus] inv. p 3–4 Cf. inf. II, q. 10, 31812

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⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod ista clausula ‘per accidens’ non fuit ibi posita nisi ad designandum non intentionem effectus fortuiti; ideo cum hoc oportebat apponere ‘extra semper et frequenter’. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod fortuna bene est causa per se respectu effectus intenti, sed non dicitur fortuna ea ratione qua dicitur causa illius effectus, et hoc satis dictum est prius. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam conceditur quod haec propositio ‘fortuna est causa effectus fortuiti’ est ita per se vera sicut ista ‘natura est causa effectus naturalis’. Unde dictum est quod ista clausula ‘per accidens’ non designat nisi non intentionem effectus fortuiti. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dictum fuit quod fortuna non dicitur agens secundum propositum quia effectus fortuitus sit propositus, sed quia fortuna non invenitur proprie nisi in habentibus propositum, et quia effectus fortuitus | debet contingere ex actione a proposito, cum tamen ipse non sit propositus nec intentus. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod quam plurima nomina, sicut ante saepe dictum est, sunt multiplicia; et si non secundum puram aequivocationem, tamen secundum analogiam vel metaphoram seu similitudinem vel aliquam attributionem posteriorum significationum ad primam. Et ita in proposito. Cum omnes effectus fortuiti vocentur qui nobis contingunt praeter intentiones nostras consequenter vel concomitanter ad nostras operationes voluntarias et propositas, fortuna prima intentione dicitur intellectus noster vel voluntas a quo illi effectus dicto modo nobis eveniunt. Sed quia idem effectus provenire potest ex multis causis vel subordinatis vel concurrentibus, possibile est quod corpora caelestia inclinant nos ad multa agenda vel recipienda; quas inclinationes nos ignoramus. Et ita cum ex nostris actionibus concurrentibus talia eveniunt, illa dicuntur effectus fortuiti. Si igitur causa effectuum ex parte nostra vocetur fortuna, sic definitum est hoc nomen ‘fortuna’. Sed si ex parte caeli causas inclinativas ad huiusmodi effectus volumus vocare fortunas, tunc corpora caelestia sunt fortunae. Et omnino, si causam primam, ex cuius scientia et praeordinatione aeterna tales effectus prove-

1 dicendum est] dicitur P 3 apponere] ponere P 4–6 ad … prius] om. G 4 bene est] inv. P 8 fortuiti … effectus] om. (hom.) P ‖ ita] ista C 11 fuit] est P 12–13 invenitur proprie] inv. G 14 cum] dum P ‖ ipse non] ille non p : ipse dum P 17 multiplicia] intelligentia P 18 seu] sive P 19 et] om. P 21 concomitanter ad] concomitanter ob G : communicanter ob C 23 a] et G 26 nos] om. p 27 illa] illi P 28 nostra] nostrum P 29 volumus] velimus Pp 30 omnino] tunc G 31 praeordinatione] add. et p 31–315.1 proveniunt] corr. in eveniunt C : eveniunt G

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niunt, volumus vocare fortunam, tunc Deus | est fortuna. Sed secundum has duas intentiones non definitur hic fortuna. ⟨7⟩ Ad ultimam dictum fuit quod hic non vocantur effectus propter hoc, quia ex intentione agamus propter eos, sed quia sunt notabilis bonitatis vel malitiae, ita quod libenter ageremus propter eos, si praevideremus eos etc. | 1 volumus] velimus GPp 2 duas] om. GPp ‖ hic] om. P 4 notabilis] notabiles G 5 etc.] et sic sit finis quaestionis P

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⟨ii.10⟩

⟨Utrum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes⟩ Quaeritur decimo utrum casus et fortuna sunt causae agentes. 36va (bis) p

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⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod | non, immo causae finales, quia: dicit Aristoteles quod effectus fortuiti, ut receptionis pecuniae inopinatae, infinitae sunt causae multitudine; etenim videre aliquem volens et prosequens et fugiens et visurus. Et haec omnia videntur pertinere ad causas finales, quia scilicet ibimus ad videndum aliquem vel prosequendum etc. | ⟨2⟩ Deinde arguitur quod casus et fortuna sint causae materiales, non agentes, quia: infinitas et indeterminatio conveniunt materiae, non agenti, ut habetur tertio Physicorum; et tamen fortuna est infinita et indeterminata, ut habetur in isto secundo; etc. ⟨3⟩ Item monstruositates sunt a casu; quarum materia est saepe causa ex eius defectu vel superfluitate aut inepta dispositione, prout pulchre declarat Albertus in isto secundo; igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Item idem est casus et natura secundum Aristotelem; sed omnis natura est materia vel forma, secundo huius, quae sunt causae distinctae contra agentem (aliter non essent quattuor genera causarum); igitur etc.

3 quaeritur decimo] om. G ‖ utrum … fortuna] rep. G ‖ sunt] sint Gp 4 primo] om. G 5 receptionis] receptiones GP ‖ inopinatae] add. eundo ad amicum aut fugiendo ab inimico p ‖ infinitae sunt] inv. P 6 causae] add. in P 6–7 volens … haec] velle et prosequi et fugere p 6 prosequens] persequens P 7 ad] add. causam finalem vel G 7–8 quia … etc.] om. p 7 scilicet] si sed add. inf. lin. scilicet C : si G 8 ibimus] ivimus sed add. sup. lin. alias ibimus C ‖ vel] et GP 9 sint] sunt GPp 10 indeterminatio] corr. in marg. ex interminatio C : interminatio G 11 tertio physicorum] secundo huius (ante habetur P) Pp ‖ indeterminata] corr. sup. lin. ex interminata C : interminata G 12 isto] hoc p ‖ etc.] praem. igitur G : om. Pp 13 est saepe] inv. GPp 15 in … etc.] om. p 16 natura] fortuna P 18 contra] add. causam GPp 4 Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a16–17 11 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, III, 6, 207a26–28; cf. AA, 2: 109 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a21 15 Cf. Albertus Magnus, Physica, II, tract. 3, cap. 3 (ed. Hossfeld, 136–139) 16 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 6, 198a2–3 17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 1, 193a29–31; 8, 199a30–31

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⟨5⟩ Item si fortuna esset causa agens, vel illa esset determinata ad producendum talem effectum vel esset indeterminata et indifferens ad illum effectum et suum oppositum. Si esset determinata, hoc esset contra rationem fortunae, quia ipsa est infinita et indeterminata secundum Aristotelem. Si indeterminata et indifferens, tunc qua ratione produceret illum, eadem ratione oppositum; et sic vel produceret ambo opposita, quod est impossibile, vel neutrum et per consequens nihil eveniret a fortuna nec fortuna esset agens. ⟨6⟩ Item si nullus sit effectus fortuitus, nulla est fortuna et sic ipsa non est causa agens; sed certum est quod nullus est fortuitus effectus. Hoc probatur primo quia: omnem effectum videmus provenire ex certis causis et determinatis, ut inventionem thesauri (huius causae fuerunt quia ipse fodiebat vineam suam et alter absconderat ibi thesaurum); et tamen effectum provenientem ex certis et determinatis causis non dicimus fortuitum effectum, quantumcumque raro eveniat, ut eclipsim lunae; igitur etc. ⟨7⟩ Et iterum, si aliquis esset effectus fortuitus, ille non esset contingens. Probatio quia: quando ipse non est, ipse non est contingens nec necessarius, cum nihil sit, et quando ipse est, ipse non est contingens, sed de necessitate, quia primo Peri hermeneias dicitur: ‘omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse’. Posset etiam argui | quod omnia eveniunt de necessitate et sic nihil eveniret a casu vel fortuna. Sed de hoc pertinet ad sextum Metaphysicae; ideo dimitto. ⟨1⟩ Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Aristotelis | in isto secundo. ⟨2⟩ Et etiam quia: fortuna et casus sunt idem quod intellectus et natura, ut dicit Aristoteles; intellectus autem et natura sunt causae agentes; igitur etc.

2 esset] om. P ‖ et] vel C 3 esset2] est G 4 ipsa] illa p 5 indeterminata] indefinita G ‖ illum] illam C 6 vel] om. P 9 nullus] nullo modo G ‖ est2] esset GP 10 fortuitus effectus] inv. GPp 11 omnem] om. p 12 huius] quibus G ‖ ipse] ille p 13 absconderat] abscondebat P 14 effectum] om. GPp 16 aliquis esset] inv. GPp 17 ipse1] ille p ‖ est1] add. tunc GPp ‖ non2] nec GPp ‖ nec] add. est Pp 19 dicitur] add. quod P 20 eveniunt] evenirent P 21 vel] add. a p ‖ hoc] add. tractare P ‖ ideo] add. hic P 4 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a21 19 Cf. Aristoteles, De interpretatione, 9, 19a23–25; cf. AA, 32: 20 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 2, 1026b1–1027a27; cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VI, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 35va–37rb) 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 6, 198a2–3 25 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 6, 198a2–3

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⟨3⟩ Iterum effectus casuales et fortuiti sunt a casu et fortuna; sed haec praepositio ‘a’ notat causam | agentem; igitur etc. Primo dico quod casus et fortuna non debent dici causae finales ea ratione qua dicuntur casus et fortuna, quia illae causae non debent dici finales, quarum effectus ea ratione qua sunt effectus illarum non ordinantur ad aliquem finem; sed effectus casuales et fortuiti ea ratione qua dicuntur casuales et fortuiti non ordinantur ad finem. Et quia omne quod ordinatur ad finem ut sic intenditur propter illum finem, ideo effectus casuales et fortuiti non ordinantur ad finem. Effectus autem illi, inquantum casuales et fortuiti, non intenduntur propter aliquem finem, quia non sunt intenti, ut ante dictum fuit, igitur etc. Nota quod, cum casus et fortuna sint | intellectus et natura, possibile est quod casus et fortuna sint bene causae finales respectu quorundam aliorum, sed non respectu effectuum casualium et fortuitorum, inquantum dicuntur casuales et fortuiti. Notandum est etiam quod, postquam effectus fortuiti acciderint et noti fuerint, non est inconveniens quod ordinentur in certos fines. Verbi gratia, si tu a fortuna fodiendo vineam invenias thesaurum, tu postea potes uti eo et ordinare ad multos bonos fines, sicut et aliam pecuniam tuam. Sed tunc non uteris eo amplius casualiter nec amplius ut sic dicitur effectus casualis. Tunc sequitur secunda conclusio. Et est quod casus et fortuna, inquantum dicuntur casus et fortuna, non debent dici causae materiales, quia effectus casuales et fortuiti in comparatione ad causas respectu quarum dicuntur casuales et fortuiti debent habere quandam extraneitatem et innaturalitatem, cum sic eveniant praeter intentionem et extra semper et frequenter; sed illi effectus nullam habent extraneitatem vel innaturalitatem respectu materiae propter hoc quod materia naturaliter est in potentia ad omnes formas

1–2 iterum … etc.] om. (hom.) G 1 et2] add. a p 2 praepositio] propositio C ‖ agentem] add. sup. lin. alias efficientem C 3–4 ea … finales] om. (hom.) G 4 debent] debet C 5 non] del. G 7–8 et2 … finem1] et quia omne quod ord†…† ad finem ut sic †…† propter illum finem in marg. C 9 casuales] add. sunt P : praem. sunt p 10 non1] add. ordinantur nec P ‖ non sunt] inv. P 12 nota quod] notandum est quod P : notandum tamen quod G : notandum est tamen p 13 sint] sunt GPp 14 fortuitorum] add. non P 16 quod] om. C 18 uti eo] inv. P 19 ad] et P ‖ bonos fines] inv. P ‖ tunc] add. tu GPp 21 tunc … et1] secunda conclusio p 24 quandam] om. p ‖ et2] vel P 25 eveniant] eveniat G ‖ et1] om. p 26 innaturalitatem] naturalitatem P 27 naturaliter est] inv. GPp 11 Cf. sup., II, q. 9, 31017–23

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et dispositiones possibiles inesse et ad nullam est determinata naturaliter, propter quod dicit Commentator quod receptio utriusque contrariorum est sibi naturalis. Notandum est tamen quod effectus casuales et fortuiti bene habent causam materialem, cum non possibile sit aliquid fieri ex nihilo naturaliter. Tamen non vocantur effectus casuales secundum illam rationem secundum quam habent materiam nec etiam in respectu ipsius materiae. Tertio dicendum est quod casus et fortuna secundum quod dicuntur casus et fortuna non debent dici causae formales, quia formaemet effectuum casualium | et fortuitorum eveniunt; idem autem non fit nec evenit a se ipso; ideo illae formae non sunt casus et fortuna. Vel arguitur sic: | effectus | casuales et fortuiti non debent dici casus et fortuna; sed formae casualium et fortuitorum sunt effectus casuales et fortuiti evenientes a casu et fortuna; igitur etc. Notandum est tamen, cum intellectus et natura sint vere causae formales, quod casus et fortuna sunt vere causae formales, sed non sunt causae formales effectuum casualium et fortuitorum ea ratione qua dicuntur casuales et fortuiti, ut intellectus non est causa formalis inventionis thesauri in fodiendo vineam. Quarta conclusio est quod casus et fortuna ea ratione qua dicuntur casus et fortuna debent dici causae agentes, quia debent dici causae, ut dictum est in alia quaestione de definitione fortunae; et non finales nec materiales nec formales; igitur agentes (per sufficientem divisionem). Et illi conclusioni concordat modus loquendi, quia cum dicimus hoc esse ab illo, haec praepositio ‘a’ vel ‘ab’ notat proprie causam efficientem, sicut prius arguebatur.

1 dispositiones] add. sibi GPp 3 est tamen] om. P 4 possibile sit] inv. Pp 5 tamen] quando p ‖ vocantur effectus casuales] vocantur casuales p : vocat effectus casuales G : vocatur effectus casualis P 6 in] om. p 9 formaemet] formae p : fortunae P 10 eveniunt] add. et sunt causae formales etc. p : evenientium extra semper etc. forma autem non P ‖ fit nec evenit] sic evenit nec P 11–12 vel … fortuna] †…† effectus casuales et †…† non debent dici casus †…†na in marg. C 12 formae] fortunae P 13 et1] om. P ‖ casuales] causae casualis P ‖ et3] add. a p 14 tamen] quod P ‖ sint vere] vere sunt G 15 quod] et P 17 inventionis thesauri] inveniendi thesaurum P 19 ea] ex C 20 dictum] praedictum P 21 de] in P ‖ fortunae] naturae sed add. sup. lin. fortunae C 21–22 finales … formales] finales materiales nec formales Gp : formales materiales nec finales P 22 illi] huic GPp 24 praepositio] propositio C ‖ sicut] ut P 24–25 arguebatur] arguebat G 2 Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 67A 21 Cf. sup., II, q. 9

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Ad rationes. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dicendum est quod, si aliquis vadit ad aliquem locum ex eo quod intendit ibi videre amicum vel ex eo quod intendit fugere ab inimico aut prosequi inimicum et in illo loco invenerit debitorem fugitivum a quo fortuite recipiat pecuniam, constat quod, licet videre amicum vel fugere ab inimico concederentur esse causae finales itionis ad illum locum, tamen non essent causae finales receptionis illius pecuniae, cum effectus causae finalis debeat intendi gratia causae finalis. Et iterum velle videre amicum est volens videre et fugere ab inimico est fugiens | et prosequi inimicum est prosequens; et ille volens vel fugiens vel prosequens est per intellectum et voluntatem causa activa illius itionis ad talem locum et per consequens effectuum ex huiusmodi itione contingentium, cuiusmodi est illa receptio pecuniae. Et sciendum est quod saepe ad aliquem effectum concurrunt plures causae activae subordinatae, ut ad illam receptionem pecuniae primo intellectus et voluntas, secundo actus intelligendi et volendi ire, tertio motus membrorum ipsius euntis, quarto illa itio. Et haec omnia sunt causae illius effectus fortuiti, scilicet receptionis pecuniae. Sed tamen intellectus et voluntas, quae idem sunt, sunt causae principaliores. Ideo principalius intellectus dicitur fortuna quam aliquod aliorum. Et ex hoc etiam apparet quare Aristoteles dicit quod eius quod est a | fortuna causae sunt infinitae multitudine. Hoc enim non est verum quantum ad causam principalem, quae est intellectus practicus, sed quantum ad causas subordinatas, scilicet quantum ad actus intelligendi et volendi, quia non est nobis certum neque determinatum quibus actibus | intelligendi et volendi, quibus et quot actionibus nostris, qui et quot et quales sequuntur effectus fortuiti. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam rationem, quae arguit quod casus et fortuna | sunt causae materiales, dicendum est quod indeterminatio bene convenit materiae. 3 amicum] amicam P 4 aut] et P ‖ invenerit] invenit p 5 amicum] amicam P 6 itionis] itinerationis in marg. C ‖ tamen] om. P 7 receptionis illius] inv. G 8 debeat] post intendi P : debeant p ‖ debeat … finalis] †…†tendi gratia causae finalis in marg. C ‖ amicum] amicam P 9 prosequi] persequi G 9–10 prosequens] persequens G 10 volens … est] †…† fugiens vel prosequens est in marg. C ‖ vel prosequens] et prosequens p : et persequens G 11 itionis] corr. in marg. in itinerationis C 12 huiusmodi] huius P ‖ itione] corr. in marg. in itineratione C : ratione P ‖ cuiusmodi] cuius causa p 13 est] om. G 14 ut] om. p 16 euntis] entis G ‖ itio] add. in marg. seu itineratio C 18 principalius] principalis P 19 aliquod] aliquid Pp ‖ et … etiam] etiam ex hoc P 20 a] om. p 22 sed] licet P 24 actibus] actionibus p ‖ quibus2] add. etiam Pp 25 sequuntur] sequentur P 26 aliam] secundam p 20 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a16–19

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Sed etiam bene convenit agenti, non tamen respectu effectus intenti, sed respectu effectus non intenti, qui est effectus fortuitus et casualis. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod monstruositates non sunt deformitates nec dispositiones innaturales respectu materiae, sed respectu agentis intendentis rectum. Ideo nec respectu materiae debent dici effectus casuales, sed respectu agentis. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam concessum est quod casus et fortuna sunt causae formales et finales, sed non inde dicuntur casus et fortuna. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod intellectus qui est fortuna non est causa determinata ex se ad producendum talem effectum quem fortuite videmus contingere, tamen una cum aliis circumstantiis quae concurrunt vel concurrerunt vel concurrent est bene determinatus. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicitur similiter quod omnis effectus bene provenit ex certis causis et determinatis considerando omnes circumstantias hinc inde. Sed tamen actiones intrinsece non erant ex se determinatae nec semper nec ut in pluribus, ut ex talibus causis talis effectus consequeretur. Et loquor solum de operationibus eius qui ex actionibus suis dicitur fortunatus vel infortunatus. Si tamen cum eius operatione capiantur omnes aliae causae concurrentes, tunc haec omnia bene essent determinata ad talem effectum. ⟨7⟩ Ad aliam dicendum est quod effectus aliquis bene est contingens, licet non sit, quia contingentia claudit in se possibilitatem, ideo ampliat terminos ad supponendum pro futuris vel possibilibus. Et cum hoc etiam videndum est in libro Peri hermeneias de sensu illius propositionis ‘omne quod est, quando est’ etc. Similiter de eventu necessario vel non necessario videndum est sexto Metaphysicae etc. 1 non tamen] sed tamen non P 2 et] vel Pp 3 aliam] tertiam p ‖ dicendum est] dicitur P 7 aliam] quartam p ‖ fortuna] fortunae P 9 dicendum] dictum G ‖ fortuna] forma P 10 fortuite videmus] inv. G : videmus fortunate p 11–12 concurrerunt vel concurrent] ABLp : concurrerunt vel concurrerent G : concurrerent vel concurrerunt C : concurrerent vel concurrent P : concurrerunt vel contingerent TU : concurrerunt vel contigerunt H : quae concurrerunt M 12 est bene] inv. GPp ‖ determinatus] determinata P 13 similiter] consimiliter GPp 15 intrinsece] intentae GPp ‖ erant] causantur P ‖ ex se] add. causae p : causae G 17 actionibus] actibus GPp ‖ fortunatus vel infortunatus] fortuitus vel infortuitus p 18 si] sed CP ‖ aliae] eius sed add. in marg. aliae C 20 dicendum est] dicitur P 21 contingentia] contingens P 22 cum] tamen C 24 est] add. necesse est G ‖ videndum] determinandum GPp 25 etc.] quia non requiritur indeterminatio materiae sed agentis p : om. P 23 Cf. Aristoteles, De interpretatione, 9, 19a23–25 1026b27sqq.

25 Cf. Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VI, 2,

⟨ii.11⟩

⟨Utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet vel solum in contingentibus raro vel ut in paucioribus⟩

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Quaeritur undecimo utrum casus et fortuna reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet vel solum in contingentibus raro vel ut in paucioribus. | Arguitur primo quod reperiantur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet quia: ⟨1⟩ Aliter Ari|stoteles non argueret a sufficienti divisione ponens casum et fortunam extra semper et frequenter et non ultra dividens illud in raro et ad utrumlibet. Si enim non invenirentur in utroque, debuisset membrum in quo non inveniuntur exclusisse, sicut exclusit semper et frequenter. ⟨2⟩ Item contingenti ad utrumlibet, si non fuerit intentum, convenit definitio tota fortunae; igitur ad hoc extendit se fortuna. ⟨3⟩ Item ludenti ad taxillos contingens est ad utrumlibet perdere vel lucrari. Et tamen dicimus quod a casu est, si quis in illo ludo lucretur. Vel si perdat, hoc est a casu vel a fortuna, quia sibi convenit tota | definitio fortunae. Perdit enim praeter et contra intentionem suam, quae erat lucrandi, et extra semper et frequenter, ex quo ponimus quod hoc sit ad utrumlibet. ⟨4⟩ Item | Aristoteles in isto secundo arguens quod natura agit propter finem sive ex intentione finis dicit quod omnia quae fiunt fiunt propter hoc, id est ex intentione finis, vel fiunt a casu. Sed constat quod multa de contingentibus ad utrumlibet, immo etiam de contingentibus ut in pluribus, fiunt et accidunt praeter intentionem, ut dicebatur in alia quaestione. Igitur in illis habent locum casus et fortuna. 5 undecimo] consequenter G ‖ utrum] rep. G ‖ in] rep. G 6 vel2] sive Pp 7 reperiantur] reperientur P ‖ contingentibus] om. P 8 aristoteles] post argueret P 10 invenirentur] inveniretur P 11 inveniuntur] inveniretur P ‖ exclusit] excludit p 12 contingenti] contingente P 12–13 definitio tota] inv. P 13 fortunae] add. cum P ‖ extendit se] inv. p 14 ludenti] ludente P 15 quis] quid p ‖ ludo lucretur] ludo lucratur G : lucratur P ‖ vel] add. etiam Pp 16 perdat] perdit GPp ‖ vel a] sup. lin. C : vel GPp 17 lucrandi] lucrari G : add. causa P 19 aristoteles … arguens] in isto secundo aristoteles P 20–21 fiunt2 … est] id est propter hoc fiunt p 21 a] ex P 22 etiam] om. P 23 in alia quaestione] om. p 8 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 197a33–35 19 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 5, 196b17–18 23 Cf. sup., II, q. 9, 3113–5

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Iterum arguitur quod sit in contingente ut in pluribus quia: ⟨5⟩ Aliqui quasi sine discretione dicantur per totam vitam et sic a fortuna. Et e converso etiam aliquibus bene discretis contingunt infortunia quasi per totam vitam, ita quod semper manent pauperes, et sic ut in pluribus. Igitur etc. ⟨6⟩ Iterum effectus naturales et artificiales sunt ut in pluribus; et tamen effectus casuales sunt naturales vel artificiales. Probatio quia: inventio thesauri fodiendo vineam est effectus casualis; et tamen huiusmodi inventio thesauri nihil est aliud quam pecunia vel fossio terrae vel homo fodiens et inveniens vel haec omnia simul congregata; et tamen haec omnia sunt naturalia vel artificialia; igitur etc. ⟨7⟩ Iterum vel intelligitur quod effectus casualis debeat esse raro simpliciter cum non intentione vel intelligitur quod debeat esse raro in ordine ad causas et modum congregationis causarum a quibus evenit. Si dicas quod raro simpliciter, tunc eclipsis lunae esset a casu, quod est falsum, cum de ea sit scientia quomodo et quando eveniet. Si vero dicas quod raro in comparatione ad causas et modum congregationis causarum, tunc effectus casualis esset non solum ut in pluribus, sed semper. Nam quandocumque ita esset quod aliquis abscondisset ibi thesaurum et aliquis ibi foderet, | sequeretur inventio thesauri. Oppositum autem determinat Commentator in secundo huius. Et arguitur ratione quia: ad utrumlibet est te sedere vel stare; et non dicimus te sedere a casu, quando sedes, nec stare a casu, quando stas; igitur etc.

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Ista quaestio reputata fuit difficilis propter famositatem Avicennae et Averrois, qui in ea fuerunt contrarii. Contra enim Avicennam libenter locutus est

1 contingente] contingentibus Gp 4 quod] ut p ‖ manent] remanent GP : remaneant p 7–8 thesauri] add. in p 8 et] om. P ‖ huiusmodi] huius P 9 est] post aliud G : add. adhuc P 10 vel] et CG ‖ congregata et] aggregata et G : congregata P 11 igitur etc.] om. P 12 casualis debeat] casuales debeant p 13 intentione] intento CG 14 congregationis] aggregationis p ‖ evenit] eveniunt p 16 eveniet] eveniat p 17 casualis] corr. in marg. ex totalis C : totalis Gp 18 nam] om. P 19 aliquis2] alter P : alius p 19–20 sequeretur inventio] sequitur inventio Gp : sequeretur eventio P 21 autem] om. GP 22 sedere vel stare] stare vel sedere P 22–23 sedere2 … stas] stare a casu quando stas nec te sedere a casu quando sedes P 21 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 67C–D

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Averroes ubi potuit, immo etiam aliquando ubi non bene potuit. Igitur ego recitabo opiniones eorum, ut videatur quantum habuerunt veritatis.

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Commentator enim recitat opinionem Avicennae in quattuor articulis. Primo enim dicebat Avicenna quod casus et fortuna reperiuntur in contingente ad utrumlibet, quia cum Aristoteles dixisset ea reperiri in contingente extra semper et frequenter (et illud est duplex, scilicet raro et ad utrumlibet), ipse debuisset removisse ad utrumlibet, sicut removit semper et frequenter, si non invenirentur | in contingente ad utrumlibet; aliter ipse fuisset valde diminutus et non dedisset bonam definitionem. Secundo | Avicenna respondet ad istam rationem quod sedere et stare sunt ad utrumlibet | et non a casu. Dicebat enim Avicenna quod sunt ad utrumlibet respectu potentiae motivae et sic respectu eius dicuntur esse a casu; sed non sunt ad utrumlibet respectu appetitus sedendi vel standi, immo respectu appetitus sedendi sedere est ut in pluribus et respectu appetitus standi stare est ut in pluribus; ideo respectu talis appetitus non dicuntur a casu. Et cum hoc etiam quod praeintenditur non dicitur a casu respectu intendentis. Tertio etiam dicebat Avicenna quod idem vel consimile est contingens ut in pluribus respectu unius et contingens ut in paucioribus respectu alterius; immo etiam idem est necessarium respectu unius et contingens respectu alterius, ut dicebat Avicenna. Quarto Avicenna describebat necessarium et contingens, quia necessarium est quod non habet nec habere potest impedimentum extrinsecum, et contingens est quod habet impedimentum extrinsecum. Similiter contingens ut in pluribus est quod habet impedimentum extrinsecum ut in

1 ubi potuit] om. p ‖ immo] om. P ‖ bene potuit] inv. P ‖ igitur ego] ideo G 2 videatur] videantur G ‖ habuerunt veritatis] habuerint de veritate p 4–5 contingente] contingentibus p 6 raro] rarum G 8 non] om. G ‖ invenirentur] inveniretur CP 10 secundo] ideo CG ‖ respondet] respondebat Pp 12 respectu1] om. G ‖ motivae] appetitus sed add. in marg. alias motivae C : appetitus G ‖ sic] add. etiam GPp 13 sedendi vel standi] standi vel sedendi P 13–15 vel … stare] (vel standi immo respectu ap†…† standi stare est ut †…† vel respectu appetitus sed†…† in marg.) sedere C 14 respectu appetitus sedendi] om. P 16 et … etiam] etiam cum hoc P ‖ non] ideo p 18 etiam dicebat] inv. G ‖ vel consimile] om. P 19 unius … respectu2] unius et contingens †…† paucioribus r†…† in marg. C ‖ ut] om. P 21 ut] om. C 22 avicenna describebat] inv. P ‖ necessarium et contingens] contingens et necessarium G 23 non] nec G ‖ habere potest] inv. GPp 3 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 66Gsqq.

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paucioribus et contingens ut in paucioribus est quod habet impedimentum extrinsecum ut in pluribus. Sic recitat Averroes verba Avicennae.

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Et tunc Commentator nititur destruere illam opinionem Avicennae ponendo contra eum quattuor conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod inconveniens est dicere quod idem sit necessarium respectu unius et contingens respectu alterius vel etiam contingens ad utrumlibet respectu unius et ut in paucioribus respectu alterius, quia sequeretur quod nihil esset naturaliter necessarium vel contingens, quod est inconveniens. Consequentia patet, quia omne naturale dicitur naturale ex intrinseco, non per respectum ad extra, cum natura sit principium intrinsecum, ut patet per suam definitionem. Secunda conclusio est quod Avicenna inepte et male definit necessarium et contingens, scilicet per non habere vel habere impedimentum extrinsecum. Nam si ex hoc diceretur | contingens quod habet impedimentum extrinsecum, sequeretur quod omne contingens esset naturaliter necessarium, quod est falsum. Consequentia patet, quia tale debet dici unumquodque, quale esset naturaliter ex intrinseca natura sua circumscriptis extrinsecis quae non sunt de natura sua; sed circumscriptis extrinsecis non esset impedimentum extrinsecum et sic esset necessarium secundum Avicennam; igitur omnia essent naturaliter necessaria. Tunc igitur Commentator dat alias definitiones necessarii et contingentis dicens quod necessarium est in cuius natura non est possibilitas ad deficiendum sive ad oppositum, et contingens est in cuius natura est possibilitas ad deficiendum. Et tunc ultra dicit Commentator quod ad istas veras definitiones necessarii et contingentis sequitur bene illud quod dicebat Avicenna, scilicet quod necessarium non habet impedimentum extrinsecum et contingens habet, quia si necessarium haberet impedimentum, illud esset frustra,

4 illam] om. P 5 eum] eam Gp 7 etiam] om. P 8 et … alterius] et in paucioribus respectu alterius ut in pluribus G : ut in paucioribus et ut in pluribus respectu alterius P : et ut in pluribus respectu alterius p 9 sequeretur] sequitur G ‖ naturaliter] om. P 11 non] ita P 15 ex] del. C 16 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 17 dici] add. scilicet P 18 quale … intrinseca] quale esset ex intrinseca p : naturaliter quale esset extrinseca P 22 igitur] om. G 24 sive] sibi P ‖ est1] om. P 25 et] om. P 27 non] om. P 4 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 66Isqq. 22 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 66M 25 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 66M

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cum necessarium non posset impediri, et si contingens non haberet impedimentum extrinsecum, tunc sua possibilitas deficiendi esset frustra. Tertia conclusio | contra Avicennam est quod nulla causa agens est contingens ad utrumlibet, quia in|determinatum habet rationem materiae et non formae; agens autem habet rationem formae et actus. Et iterum, cum materia sit de se indeterminata, si agens etiam esset indeterminatum, tunc qua ratione ageret unum oppositorum, eadem ratione ageret reliquum; et sic vel ageret ambo opposita simul, quod est impossibile, vel nihil ageret et sic | non esset agens. Dicit igitur Commentator quod natura contingentis ad utrumlibet est natura materiae, quae de se est in potentia ad utrumlibet contrariorum et ad nullum determinata; ideo receptio utriusque contrariorum est sibi naturalis. Hoc autem quod materia recipit uno tempore unum contrariorum et altero tempore alterum provenit sibi ex diversitate agentium sibi applicatorum et ad hoc determinationem habentium. Quarta conclusio contra Avicennam est quod casus et fortuna non reperiuntur in contingentibus ad utrumlibet, quia sunt causae agentes, ut dicebatur in alia quaestione praecedente; et causae agentes non sunt ad utrumlibet, ut modo dictum est; igitur etc. Et ex hoc dicit Commentator quod Aristoteles ponit bonam divisionem trium membrorum sine quarto, scilicet semper, ut in pluribus et in paucioribus, quod intendebat per ‘extra semper et frequenter’, et non curavit de contingenti ad utrumlibet, quia intendebat illam divisionem in agentibus, cum casus et fortuna sint causae agentes, in quibus non est ad utrumlibet, immo omne agens est determinatum ad semper vel ad ut in pluribus, et si sit determinatum non ad semper, sed ad ut in pluribus, tunc aliquando ratione impedimenti contingit quod est ut in paucioribus. Haec est determinatio Commentatoris.

1 posset] possit Gp ‖ et si] et sic p : vel fieri P ‖ haberet] habere P 2 tunc] tamen P ‖ deficiendi] ad deficiendum Pp : om. G 4 indeterminatum] indeterminatam CG 6 etiam] om. P 12 sibi] add. possibilis seu P 14 sibi] scilicet p ‖ et] om. p 16 contingentibus] contingenti G : contingente Pp 17 quaestione] conclusione p ‖ praecedente] praecedenti P : om. Gp 19 ponit] posuit GP 20 ut] et Gp : om. P ‖ in2] om. C 21 contingenti] contingente Pp ‖ quia] add. non p 21–23 quia … utrumlibet] †…†ebat illam divisionem †…†bus cum casus et fortuna †…† agentes in quibus non †…†rumlibet in marg. C 22 in1] de Pp ‖ sint] sunt P 23 est1] om. p ‖ omne agens] omne ens P : agens p 24 ad ut1] ad p : ut P ‖ si] sic p ‖ sed ad ut] sed ut P : vel ut ad p 25 ratione] ratio P : continue G ‖ ut] om. GPp 9 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 67A Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 67B–D

17 Cf. sup., II, q. 10, 31919–25

18 Cf.

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Sed apparet mihi quod ipse non bene procedit contra Avicennam. Commentator enim male ponit contra Avicennam quod nullum agens sit ad utrumlibet respectu alicuius effectus. Primo quia: agens | libere ita potest esse ad utrumlibet et se determinare ad hoc vel ad illud sine aliquo determinante, sicut materia prima esset ad utrumlibet. Secundo de multis agentibus est ad utrumlibet quod agant vel non agant, quia est ad utrumlibet quod materia eis sit vel non sit applicata, ut ad utrumlibet est quod ille ignis comburat stramina vel non comburat stramina. Tertio licet agens sit approximatum passo, tamen ad utrumlibet est quod passum sit dispositum; ideo ad utrumlibet est quod vir coiens cum muliere generet vel non generet puerum. Quarto licet agens sit determinatum respectu effectus intenti, tamen potest esse ad utrumlibet respectu effectus non intenti. Verbi gratia, licet ut in pluribus vadas ad scholas diebus legibilibus et proficias, quia hoc intendis, tamen ad utrumlibet est quod eundo macules in luto sotulares tuos vel non macules, quia ad utrumlibet est quod via sit sicca vel lutosa. | Quinto adhuc respectu effectus intenti et desiderati, | non tamen primi, sed accidentis ex primo, potest agens se habere contingenter ad utrumlibet, ut quamvis lusor sit determinatus ad ludendum ut in pluribus et intendat et appetat lucrum, tamen ad utrumlibet est quod lucretur vel perdat. Ex istis sequitur manifeste quod ineptum est argumentum Commentatoris in quo dicit: ‘casus et fortuna sunt causae agentes respectu effectuum casualium et fortuitorum, igitur non sunt ad utrumlibet respectu eorum’. Non enim est bona consequentia, maxime cum casus et fortuna non dicantur casus et fortuna nisi respectu effectuum non intentorum nec primorum, sed accidentium cum intentis vel loco eorum. Item non bene dicit Commentator quod non sit idem ut in pluribus respectu unius et in paucioribus respectu alterius, quia ut in pluribus est lucrari respectu mercatorum et in paucioribus respectu taxillatorum, et 1 ipse] ille GPp ‖ bene] om. G 4 aliquo] alio GPp 8 vel … stramina2] om. (hom.) G 11 generet … puerum] generat puerum vel non P 14 quia hoc intendis] om. P 15 macules] maculas GPp ‖ in … tuos] sotulares in luto P 16 macules] maculas GP 17 adhuc respectu] inv. G ‖ effectus] add. non P 19 ludendum] ludum P 19–20 et … appetat] incipit et appetit P 20 perdat] perdet P 21 ex] praem. et p ‖ istis] his P ‖ manifeste] om. P 22 in] om. p ‖ agentes respectu] agentis respectu p : agentes respectivi P ‖ effectuum] om. G 23 et fortuitorum] om. P 24 maxime] post fortuna P 26 eorum] corr. sup. lin. ex intentorum C : intentorum G 27 ut] om. GPp 29 et2] om. P 21–23 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, f. 67B–D comm. 48, f. 66I

27 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II,

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etiam ut in pluribus est ambulare respectu cursorum et ut in paucioribus respectu textorum, | et comes in bello vinceret ut in pluribus respectu militis et in paucioribus respectu regis et sic de aliis. Iterum de necessitate consequentis posterioris ex priori necesse esset Socratem mori hodie respectu voluntatis Dei efficaciter hoc volentis, quia contra talem voluntatem non potest contingere impedimentum, sed hoc esset contingens et non necessarium respectu voluntatis regis, quia posset contra eum esse impedimentum. Et ita intendebat Avicenna. Non enim credebat quod illud quod est simpliciter necessarium in essendo posset non esse propter aliquam potentiam vel aliquem respectum. Iterum quamvis descriptiones necessarii et | contingentis quas ponit Commentator sint priores illis quas ponit Avicenna (contingit enim describere per posteriora), ideo non propter hoc debent reprobari illae quas ponit Avicenna. Et Commentator iam approbat eas, quia dicit eas sequi ex suis. Ergo propter haec omnia volo magis stare cum Avicenna et dicere quod casus et fortuna bene habent locum in contingentibus ad utrumlibet. Unde communiter omnes dicunt, si aliquis exponit se actionibus ex quibus ad utrumlibet possunt sequi lucra vel damna, bona vel mala, quod ille imprudenter agit et quod ipse exponit se fortunae. Et hoc satis arguebant rationes ante oppositum, scilicet prima, secunda, tertia et quarta. Verum est tamen quod hoc concedi debet, quod quanto effectus magis fuerint ut in paucioribus contingentes et minime intenti, tanto magis dicimus eos esse fortuitos vel casuales. Et hoc forte volebat dicere Commentator. Et quanto magis attendunt ad effectus intentos et ut in pluribus contingentes, tanto minus proprie dicimus eos fortuitos vel casuales. 1 ut1] om. p ‖ ambulare respectu cursorum] add. et respectu ambulatorum p : cursorum ambulare P ‖ ut2] om. P 2 textorum] sutorum P ‖ vinceret] vincere p 3 et1] add. ut p ‖ et2 … aliis] om. P 4 consequentis … priori] MU : posterioris consequentis ex priori HT : consequentis posteriores ex priori B : consequenti posterior priori G : consequenti posteriore ex priori p : consequenti posterior ex priori L : consequenti posteriori exteriori P : contingenti posterior et add. in marg. ex priori C : contingente posterior est priori A ‖ necesse] necessario G ‖ esset] est P 5 mori] moveri P ‖ efficaciter] efficacis GPp 8 contra] circa G ‖ impedimentum et] impedimentum P : impeditum et G ‖ avicenna] add. et CG 11 et] rep. C 12 contingit] convenit p 14 quia dicit] dicit enim P : et dicit G 17 se] om. P 21–22 effectus magis fuerint] magis effectus fuerint P : effectus fuerit magis p 22 ut] om. GPp ‖ et] etiam P 22–23 dicimus] om. P 23 fortuitos] fortunatos p 24 attendunt] intendit p 14 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 48, ff. 66M–67A

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⟨5⟩ Sed tunc respondendum est ad rationes quae arguebant quod casus et fortuna sunt in contingentibus | ut in pluribus, ut quia aliquibus quasi per totam vitam eveniunt bonae fortunae. Dicendum est quod, licet tali cotidie eveniret unus bonus effectus fortuitus, ut quod hodie inveniret thesaurum | fodiendo vineam et cras ad forum inveniret debitorem fugitivum inopinatum, tamen quilibet istorum effectuum dicitur extra semper et frequenter in comparatione ad causam a qua provenit, ita quod valde raro contingeret quod a tali causa, scilicet a fossione terrae, sequeretur talis effectus et sic de aliis. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam concessum fuit quod casus est natura. Et ita non est inconveniens concedere quod effectus casuales essent res naturales. Sed non dicuntur naturales nec modo naturali evenire respectu causarum respectu quarum dicuntur casuales aut fortuiti. ⟨7⟩ Ad ultimam dicitur quod effectus casualis dicitur extra semper et frequenter respectu causae respectu cuius dicitur effectus casualis vel fortuitus. Sed bene dubitatio est de eclipsi lunae utrum sit a casu. Et credo quod non, quia non vocamus effectus casuales quos cum certitudine possumus praescire quando et quomodo evenient. Et iterum effectus casuales sic debent esse raro ex suis causis, quia nec tales causae, quando agunt, debent ut in pluribus producere tales effectus, nec tales effectus, | quando proveniunt, debent ut in pluribus provenire ex tali causa. Verbi gratia centies foderes terram quod non invenires thesaurum; et etiam centesies inventus est thesaurus quod non semel aut bis erat hoc fodiendo vineam. Eclipsis autem lunae semper, quando evenit, evenit ex similibus causis; ideo non dicitur casualis. Et aliqui non habuerunt pro inconvenienti quod eclipsis lunae diceretur casua|lis respectu intelligentiae moventis lunam et non intendentis illam eclipsim nec aliquem alium motum etc. 1 ad] add. illas Pp 2 contingentibus] contingente GPp ‖ ut2] om. P 2–3 quasi … eveniunt] per totam vitam eveniunt quasi C 4 eveniret] evenerit p ‖ hodie] add. ipse p 5 ad forum] in foro P ‖ inveniret] invenerit p 5–6 fugitivum inopinatum] inv. P 7 a] ex p ‖ provenit] venit P ‖ valde] om. P 8 quod] et p ‖ causa] casu G ‖ sequeretur] sequitur GPp 10 aliam] secundam p ‖ est2] esset GPp 11 concedere] om. P 13 aut fortuiti] et fortuiti P : aut fortuite p 14 ultimam] tertiam p ‖ casualis] totalis p 15 causae] eius G ‖ vel] et P 17 non] om. P ‖ possumus] possimus P 19 quando] quae P 20 producere] procedere G 21 centies foderes] centesies fodere p 22 etiam centesies] etiam centies G : centies P 23 aut] vel P 24 ex similibus] de consimilibus P ‖ ideo] ex consimilibus causis res P 10 Cf. sup., II, q. 4, 2671; cf. sup., II, q. 10, 31812

47vb P 46vb G

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⟨ii.12⟩

⟨Utrum natura producens monstrum intendat monstrum⟩ Circa ultimum tractatum duodecimo quaeritur utrum natura producens monstrum intendit monstrum.

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Et hic vocatur hoc monstrum, quod evenit sub dispositionibus suae speciei disconvenientibus et raro contingentibus, ut si fiat homo gibbosus aut nanus aut cum pedibus tribus aut cum duobus capitibus aut cum sex digitis et sic de aliis.

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⟨1⟩ Arguitur primo quod natura producens monstrum intendit monstrum quia: agens directum ab infallibili cognoscente nihil agit nisi per intentionem; sed natura in suis operationibus dirigitur ab infallibili cognoscente, scilicet a Deo et intelligentiis (unde ex hoc provenit quod natura perfecte et ordinate agit, licet non cognoscat, ut habetur a Commentatore duodecimo Metaphysicae); igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item si natura faceret aliquid praeter intentionem, sequeretur quod in eius actione possent aliqua contingere frustra et aliqua superflua et defectuosa. Consequens est falsum, quia primo Caeli dicitur quod Deus et | natura nihil frustra faciunt, et in tertio De anima dicitur quod natura non abundat in superfluis nec deficit in | necessariis.

4 circa … quaeritur] quaeritur duodecimo circa ultimum tractatum Gp : quaeritur duodecimo P 6 hic … monstrum] hic (sup. lin.) vocatur hoc monstrum C : hoc vocatur hic monstrum G : vocatur hic monstrum P : videtur p ‖ speciei] add. et raro G 7 nanus] manus G 8 pedibus … cum2] om. (hom.) GPp ‖ aut3] om. P 10 primo] om. P ‖ natura] naturaliter p 13 perfecte] ratione sed add. sup. lin. seu perfecte C 15 igitur etc.] om. GP 16 natura] add. ageret vel P ‖ faceret aliquid] inv. G ‖ sequeretur] sequitur p 19 frustra faciunt et] faciunt frustra P ‖ tertio] secundo p 20 deficit] defecit G 14–15 Cf. Averroes, In Metaphysicam, XII, comm. 18, f. 305D–E 18 Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, I, 4, 271a33; cf. AA, 3: 18 19 Cf. Aristoteles, De anima, III, 9, 432b21–23; cf. AA, 6: 168

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_041

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⟨3⟩ Item natura nutrit, augmentat et producit ad finem monstrum vel monstruositatem, ut gibbum vel sextum digitum. Quod non faceret, si ipsum non intenderet. ⟨4⟩ Item ex eo dicimus naturam intendere aliquid, ut oculum vel nasum, quia generat sibi dispositiones convenientes ad similitudinem; sed sic natura facit de membro monstruoso, verbi gratia in sexto digito generat os et nervum et cutem; igitur etc. ⟨5⟩ Item natura intendit et ex intentione agit de possibilibus quod melius est; sed melius est monstrum quam nihil in casu quod non potest fieri rectum; igitur tunc debet intendere monstrum. ⟨6⟩ Item eiusdem rationis specificae est monstrum et rectum, ut homo gibbosus et non gibbosus vel sextus digitus et huiusmodi; igitur natura debet intendere hoc sicut illud. ⟨7⟩ Item hominem intendit et ille est monstrum. ⟨8⟩ Item sicut Aristoteles arguit, in quibus generationibus invenitur finis et etiam invenitur quod prius et quod consequenter ordinatur secundum exigentiam illius finis, in illis intenditur ille finis et alia praecedentia propter ipsum (aliter non esset ratio quare sic ordinaretur processus); sed in generatione sexti digiti | haec inveniuntur vel in formatione secundi capitis; igitur etc. Oppositum arguitur quia: ⟨1⟩ Natura, cum directa sit a cognoscente optimo et infallibili, non intendit mala et peccata; sed monstra sunt peccata in natura, ut dicit Aristoteles; igitur etc. ⟨2⟩ Item omne productum et intentum a natura est naturale; sed monstruositas non est dispositio naturalis, sed innaturalis et naturae disconveniens; igitur non est intenta a natura. ⟨3⟩ Item monstra et monstruositates sunt a casu; quae autem fiunt a casu, illa praeter intentionem agentium eveniunt, ut dictum est prius.

1 nutrit augmentat] augmentat nutritur P 2 gibbum] gibbosum P 6 et] om. P 8 et] om. P 11 rationis specificae] inv. p 12 et2] vel p ‖ natura debet] natura deberet p : ita debet G 13 illud] illum p 14 monstrum] add. igitur etc. G 16 ordinatur] ordinare G : ordinate CP 17 ille finis] om. G ‖ alia] om. P 19 haec inveniuntur] hoc invenitur p ‖ formatione] informatione P 21 quia] quod P 22 directa sit] inv. GPp 23–24 ut … etc.] om. G 28 monstruositates] monstruositas p ‖ a casu1] om. G 15 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 8, 199a9 II, q. 9, 31017–23

23 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 8, 199b4

29 Cf. sup.,

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⟨4⟩ Item sicut est in arte, ita proportionaliter est in natura; sed scriptor, quando peccat scribendo, non intendit illud peccatum, sed semper intendit recte scribere; igitur sic est de natura. ⟨5⟩ Et Commentator dicit naturam non intendere talia monstra.

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In ista quaestione diversi ponunt diversos modos solvendi et diversas distinctiones ad satisfaciendum rationibus praefactis. Quidam enim distinxerunt de natura communi et de natura particulari, vocantes naturam communem seu universalem Deum et intelligentias et vocantes | naturam particularem naturas istorum inferiorum. Et dixerunt quod natura universalis agit sine errore et peccato movendo semper caelum regulariter; ideo illa universalis natura nullum intendit peccatum vel monstrum. Sed naturae particulares propter multa extranea sibi contingentia errant saepe et intendunt monstrum. Et hoc est manifestum de nostra natura, quae est anima nostra. Ipsa enim saepe ex intentione agit mala | et peccat. Alii dicunt quod duplex est natura, scilicet materia et forma. Modo monstruositates sunt disconvenientes formae; ideo natura quae est forma non intendit eas. Sed nullae dispositiones sunt innaturales sive disconvenientes materiae, cum sibi nullam dispositionem determinet, sed sit in potentia ad omnes; ideo non est | inconveniens quod natura quae est materia intendat monstra. Alii dicunt quod natura principaliter et prima intentione intendit rectum et non monstrum; sed secundaria intentione et ex incidenti, cum non possit aliquando propter impedimentum producere rectum, bene intendit monstrum, quia debet intendere de possibilibus quod melius est.

2 peccat] add. in GPp ‖ intendit2] intendebat Pp 4 intendere] intelligere P 5 in] praem. item CP 6 praefactis] praedictis G : praetaxatis P : om. p 7 distinxerunt] distinguunt P : dixerunt p ‖ natura1] add. in P ‖ de natura2] om. P 10 natura universalis] natura communis G : anima universalis p ‖ errore et peccato] peccato et errore P ‖ movendo] om. G 13–14 errant … natura] om. G 13 est manifestum] monstrum est P 13–14 nostra natura] inv. Pp 14 est] in P ‖ mala] malum G 15 peccat] corr. in peccata C 17 est] add. in P 18 sed nullae] nec P 19 materiae] naturae P ‖ dispositionem determinet] dispositionem determinat P : indispositionem determinet C 20 intendat] intendit GPp 23 secundaria] secunda GPp ‖ incidenti] add. scilicet GPp 24 aliquando] aliter C 25 quia] quod P 4 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 82, f. 79K–M

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Alii dicunt quod natura non intendit monstruositatem, quia ista est dispositio disconveniens naturae; sed bene intendit subiectum monstruositatis, ut carnem, os, nervum et digitum. Igitur etc.

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Sed videtur mihi quod ista quaestio vera solutione debet solvi per logicam ponendo duas conclusiones. Prima conclusio quod nulla natura intendit monstrum. Hoc satis probant duae rationes. Prima | est quod numquam intentio agentis directi ab optimo et infallibili cognoscente est ad malum nec ad superfluitatem vel defectum; sed omne monstrum ea ratione qua dicitur monstrum dicitur malum vel defectuosum vel superfluum. Alia erat de similitudine artis ad naturam, quia quamvis ars peccet, tamen non intendit illud. Secunda conclusio est quod monstrum bene intendit natura, quia aliquando monstruositas non est nisi defectus, ut si nascatur homo sine manibus aut pedibus; et defectus non est aliud quam res defectuosa, sicut privatio non est aliud quam materia privata; et sic ista monstruositas vel illud monstrum non esset aliud quam homo; et tamen hominem illum intendit natura; et homo ille est monstrum et monstruositas; igitur monstrum et monstruositatem intendit natura. Et ad declarandum istas duas conclusiones sciendum est quod intentio et appetitus attribuuntur naturalibus non cognoscentibus similitudinarie secundum proportionem ad nos, sicut dixi in primo libro. Modo in nobis intentio et appetitus sequens cognitionem cadunt super res secundum aliquas certas rationes secundum quas illae res apprehenduntur. Verbi gratia ponamus quod in hoc potto sit aqua immunda et mala et ego credam quod sit bonum vinum, propter quod eam intendo et appeto et prosequor.

1 alii] add. autem GPp ‖ quia] et quod P 2 dispositio] om. p 3 et] om. G ‖ igitur etc.] etc. G : om. Pp 4 videtur mihi] inv. p ‖ debet solvi] inv. P : solvi debeat G 6 conclusio] add. est Gp : est P ‖ nulla natura] natura non P 7 prima] una GPp ‖ directi] directa Pp 8 cognoscente est] cognoscente esset Pp : agente esset G ‖ nec] vel G ‖ vel] nec ad p 10 superfluum] add. igitur P ‖ erat] est p 11 non intendit] non intendebat GP : etiam intendebat p 12 quia] et quod P 13 homo] post manibus (13–14) p 14 non est aliud] nihil aliud est G 15–16 illud monstrum] inv. P 16 non esset aliud] non erat aliud Pp : om. G ‖ intendit] intendebat GPp 18 intendit] intendebat GPp 19 et] sed G : om. P 20 cognoscentibus similitudinarie] cognoscentibus singularia P : cognoscibilibus similitudinarie p 24 potto] poculo G ‖ immunda et mala] mala et immunda GPp ‖ credam] credo P 25 sit bonum vinum] vinum bonum sit P ‖ et1] om. P 21 Cf. sup., I, q. 24, 236–238

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Demonstrata igitur ista aqua constat quod hoc ego appeto et intendo. Et ille appetitus meus non fertur in hoc secundum rationem malae aquae, sed secundum rationem secundum quam credo quod sit bonum vinum. Propter hoc igitur ista verba ‘appetere’, ‘intendere’, ‘velle’, immo etiam ‘cognoscere’ et ‘apparere’, faciunt terminos sequentes eos, cum quibus construuntur, appellare illas rationes secundum quas res | intenduntur et appetuntur etc. Propter quod non sequitur ‘venientem cognosco, igitur cognosco venientem’. Nec etiam sequitur ‘aquam appeto, igitur appeto aquam’. Hoc enim desidero bibere, et hoc est aqua, igitur aquam desidero bibere et tamen nolo potare aquam. Igitur secundum proportionem ad nos debemus ista praedicata ‘intendere’ et ‘appetere’ attribuere naturae, ac si natura cognosceret. Modo | si natura cognosceret, illa non intenderet nec appeteret rem | aliquam nisi sub ratione boni et numquam sub ratione mali. Ideo falsa est propositio qua volumus exprimere quod natura appetit vel intendit rem aliquam, si praedicatum sequens significet illam rem secundum aliquam rationem malitiae vel defectus, cuiusmodi est hoc praedicatum ‘monstrum’ vel ‘monstruositas’. Et sic falsum est dicere quod natura intendit monstrum, sed monstrum intendit, sicut erat falsum dicere quod ego volebam bibere | aquam, licet aquam vellem bibere. Sed ultra ad magis explicandum veritatem sciendum est quod ex multis diversis causis et modis solent monstra provenire: uno modo ex parte materiae, alio modo ex parte agentium et aliquando ex defectu vel malitia continentis. Ex materia quidem vel propter defectum vel superfluitatem. Sic enim aliquando fit caput vel bracchium nimis parvum vel nimis magnum et sic de aliis, ita quod sit disproportio alicuius membri ad alia membra. Vel etiam aliquando ex toto deficit vel superabundat membrum, ut bracchium vel pes.

1 hoc ego] inv. P 4 appetere] add. et G : appetitur p ‖ et] om. GPp 5 apparere] add. etiam G : add. etc. Pp ‖ faciunt] rep. C 6 etc.] om. p 8 sequitur] om. G 9 et1] om. G 10 potare] bibere Pp 11 intendere] intelligere P ‖ appetere] apparere C ‖ attribuere naturae] inv. G 12 illa] ipsa GPp ‖ nec appeteret] appetere P 13 sub1] om. p ‖ sub ratione2] secundum rationem GPp 14 exprimere] exponere P 14–15 appetit … aliquam1] intendit vel appetit aliquam rem GPp 15 significet] significat P 16 cuiusmodi] cuius P 18 sed] licet GPp ‖ intendit] intendat Gp : add. natura P ‖ erat falsum] inv. GPp ‖ ego] om. P 19 aquam1] om. P ‖ vellem] volebam GPp 22 modo] om. C ‖ vel] et P 24 defectum] add. materiae P ‖ vel2] add. propter Pp 25 caput vel bracchium] bracchium vel caput G ‖ sic] ita P 26 quod] ut GPp ‖ sit disproportio] sit improportio p : improportio G : in proportione C 27 ut] vel Cp

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Vel etiam aliquando materia est male disposita in suis qualitatibus et non bene oboediens naturae agenti in materia, ut si materia sit nimis sicca, non est bene extensibilis et tunc fiunt nani, et si sit nimis humida et mollis, extenditur nimis et fit excessiva magnitudo vel longitudo non proportionata latitudini et profunditati. Deinde etiam ex parte agentium. Si enim virtus informativa membrorum sit nimis debilis, tunc aliquando non potest materiam sufficienter extendere vel non potest membra sufficienter distinguere et remanent continua quae debent esse distincta. Vel aliquando concurrunt semina diversarum specierum et utrumque trahit foetum ad similitudinem suae speciei et ita generatur animal participans de similitudine utriusque speciei, sicut manifeste contingit de equa et asino in generatione muli; et ita dicunt aliqui contigisse de homine et urso. Adhuc ad foetus generandos concurrunt actiones corporum caelestium. Unde si constellatio multum conveniens generationi porcorum concurreret in generatione hominis, continget ut foetus habeat vultum nimis oblongum ad similitudinem porci, et sic de aliis. Et non est imaginandum | quod caelum per illam constellationem intenderet illam faciem longam ea ratione qua est disconveniens homini, sed ea ratione qua est conveniens porco. Et ita natura semper intendit, quidquid intendit, ratione convenientiae et non ratione deformitatis. Deinde etiam ex parte continentis. Sciendum est quod foetus involvitur in quadam pellicula, ne materia defluat. Et aliquando illa pellicula in aliqua sui parte per violentiam aliquam rumpitur vel etiam superextenditur et sic materia fluit ad locum rupturae vel extensionis et provenit inde valde deformis figuratio vel formatio foetus. Et cum in matrice sunt plures cellu|lae, in quibus possunt simul | formari plures foetus, et aliquando contingit, ut illae cellulae sint bene distinctae superius et non bene inferius vel e converso.

1 materia] ante aliquando G : post est p 2 in materia] om. GPp 3 tunc] om. GPp ‖ nani] om. G ‖ si sit] si G : sicut P ‖ mollis] mobilis G 4 excessiva] corr. ex extens C : extensiva GP ‖ longitudo] largitudo p 5 latitudini et profunditati] latitudine et profunditate P 6 informativa] formativa GPp 8 remanent continua] remaneret continua C : remanent contingentia G 9 diversarum] diversa P 10 foetum] secum C 11 de] add. specie utriusque vel G ‖ utriusque speciei] inv. GPp 12 contingit] constat p ‖ equa] corr. ex aqua C : equo Pp 13 adhuc] om. P ‖ actiones] actione P 14–15 constellatio … concurreret] constellationes multum convenientes generationi porcorum concurrerent P 15 concurreret] concurrat p ‖ continget] contingit P 15–16 vultum nimis oblongum] vultum nimis longum Pp : nimis longum vultum G 16 sic] ita P 17 intenderet] intendat G 21 etiam] om. P 24 inde] ibi GP 25 figuratio] figurato p ‖ sunt] sint GPp 26 et] add. sup. lin. tunc C 27 sint] sunt P

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Et tunc, ubi illae cellulae coniunguntur, remanet foetus indivisus, cum ex alia parte sit divisus, ita ut super unum corpus sint duo capita vel sub uno capite duplex corpus inferius. Et omnino secundum huiusmodi ineptas vel imperfectas cellularum distinctiones vel extensiones vel fracturas dictarum pellicularum, propter quas materiae diversorum foetuum habent aliquam unionem vel materia eiusdem foetus habet nimiam dispersionem, possunt generari monstra valde defor|mia, non quia natura intendat illa peccata, sed semper intendebat rectum, sed cum non posset facere totum rectum, fecit de rectitudine quod potuit. Rationes igitur quae in principio quaestionis fiebant bene probant quod monstra intendat natura, sed non probant quia natura intendit monstra. Rationes vero quae pro secunda parte arguebant etiam probabant quod natura non intendit monstra, sed non probant quin aliquando monstrum intendat natura, sicut etiam est de voluntariis quod aquam volo bibere, sed nolo bibere aquam. Quando etiam dicitur quod omne intentum a natura est naturale, concedo. Et ideo dico quod monstrum est res naturalis et dicitur res naturalis ratione eius quod habet de rectitudine et convenientia; ideo hac ratione dicitur intendi a natura. Sed non dicitur res naturalis, immo casualis et res disconveniens naturae, secundum rationem disconvenientiarum et defectuum; ideo secundum talem rationem non dicitur intendi a natura. Et sic est finis quaestionis paenultimae. 1 tunc … coniunguntur] tamen ibi istae cellulae coniunguntur et P 2 alia] aliqua P ‖ sint] sit C 3 huiusmodi] huius P : om. G ‖ vel] et G 4 cellularum distinctiones vel] praem. huius P : huiusmodi cellularum distinctiones p : huiusmodi dispositiones cellularum G 6 habet] habeat G ‖ dispersionem] disproportionem P 7 quia] quod Pp ‖ intendat] intendit GPp ‖ sed] quod P 8 posset] possit GPp ‖ fecit] facit Pp 10 in] a GP 11 intendat] intendit GPp ‖ quia] quod GPp 12 etiam probabant] praem. bene Gp : probabant tamen P 13 probant] probabant Pp 14 intendat] intendit p : non intendit P ‖ est] ante etiam P : om. p ‖ quod] sicut P ‖ sed] et Gp 16 naturale] add. ego Pp 17 naturalis1] naturales G 19 res2] om. G 20 rationem] rationes G 22 et … paenultimae] etc. GPp

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⟨ii.13⟩

⟨Utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex fine vel ex materia⟩

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Quaeritur tredecimo et ultimo quoad secundum librum Physicorum utrum in operationibus naturalibus necessitas proveniat ex fine vel ex materia. ⟨1⟩ Arguitur quod ex materia rationibus antiquorum. Primo quia: sicut est in arte, ita est in natura; sed in arte facimus domum vel | murum secundum exigentiam materiae ponendo in fundo deorsum lapides grossos, quia sunt graviores, in medio vero terram lutosam, quia est levior lapidibus, et superius ligna, quia sunt inter praedicta levissima. ⟨2⟩ Item sicut videmus de pluvia, ita debemus intelligere de aliis naturalibus proportionaliter; sed pluvia fit et provenit eo modo quo fit et provenit ex parte materiae et non ex parte finis; igitur etc. Probo igitur minorem quod pluvia ex necessitate materiae proveniat quia: ex necessitate aquae et aquosorum oportet quod calefacta fiant rariora et leviora et per consequens quod ascendant vaporando quidquid inde contingit sequi; et iterum necesse est, cum | vapor ad frigiditatem mediae regionis aeris pervenerit, ut infrigeretur | et per consequens fiet gravis et grossa et quod sua ponderositate cadat deorsum, et sic pluvia fit. Igitur patet quod ex dispositione aquae, quae est materia vaporis, sequitur de necessitate vapor et ex dispositionibus vaporis, qui est materia pluviae, sequitur de necessitate pluvia et modus pluendi. Et sic patet quod ex parte materiae proveniunt necessitates in operationibus naturae. 4 quaeritur tredecimo] inv. G ‖ et … physicorum] om. GPp 6 arguitur] add. primo GPp ‖ quia] quod P ‖ est] om. GPp 7 est] om. GPp ‖ vel] et P 8 deorsum] ante in GPp ‖ quia] quod P 9 quia] quae P ‖ lapidibus] om. p 10 quia] quae P 12 proportionaliter] proportionabiliter p ‖ eo … provenit2] om. (hom.) G ‖ quo] add. sup. lin. alias sicut C : sicut Pp 13 et] om. Pp ‖ minorem] add. primo GPp 14 proveniat quia] eveniat quia Gp : eveniet quae P 15 rariora] graviora P 17 pervenerit] pervenit P : provenerit C 17–18 pervenerit … sua] om. G ‖ infrigeretur] infrigidetur p : infrigidatur P 18 fiet] fiat p 19 sic pluvia fit] fit pluvia sic GPp ‖ dispositione] dispositionibus Pp 20 vaporis1] vaporum p 21 qui] quae GPp ‖ sequitur] post necessitate P ‖ et modus] ad motus P ‖ et2] om. P 22 operationibus] operibus Gp 5–6 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 9, 200a1–4

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/9789004262355_042

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Sed etiam probatur secundo quod pluvia non sic fit propter finem quia: hoc videretur esse propter crementum frumentorum et aliorum bladorum; sed constat quod propter hoc non fit pluvia, quia sicut aliquando contingit quod a pluvia crescant frumenta, ita etiam aliquando contingit quod a pluvia corrumpuntur in area; et ita, sicut nullus diceret quod pluvia esset ex intentione perdendi frumenta, ita nec debet dici quod sit ex intentione crementi eorum. ⟨3⟩ Item si necessitas et ordo in operationibus naturae provenirent ex parte finis, sequeretur quod numquam in operibus naturae contingerent peccata. Consequens est falsum, quia contingunt monstruositates, quae sunt peccata. Consequentia tenet, quia finis est quid optimum; modo in his quae ex parte optimi habent ordinem et proventum nihil debet esse malum. ⟨4⟩ Iterum sequeretur quod operationes naturae non haberent ordinem et necessitatem ex fine, nisi natura intenderet finem; sed ita est quod natura non intendit finem, cum non cognoscat ipsum; igitur etc. ⟨5⟩ Iterum etiam ex eo quod nihil est non habent dispositiones et operationes naturae ordinem et necessitatem; et tamen forma generanda, quae est finis, et etiam | terminus generationis et dispositionum materiae praecedentium nihil est, quando fiunt illae dispositiones et transmutationes praecedentes illam formam; igitur etc. Et iterum arguitur quod potius ex materia quam ex alio proveniat necessitas in operationibus naturae quia: ⟨6⟩ Materia est simpliciter necessaria in essendo, fines autem generationum non sunt necessarii, sed contingentes; modo rationabile est quod magis necessitates naturalium proveniant ex causa necessaria quam ex contingente; igitur etc. ⟨7⟩ Iterum saepe fiunt demonstrationes propter quid per ipsam materiam; et tamen necessitas | conclusionis debet esse propter necessitatem praemissarum; igitur propter materiam est necessitas in naturalibus materiam

1 fit] fiat GPp ‖ quia] quod P 2 esse] om. CG 3 propter … fit] non propter hoc fiat p 5 corrumpuntur] corrumpitur p ‖ area] corr. in aera G : horreo sed add. in marg. alias aera vel area C : horrea p 6 sit] fit p 7 crementi] crescendi p 8 operationibus] operibus Gp ‖ provenirent] proveniret GP 9 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 12 quae] add. etiam G ‖ optimi] finis optimum G ‖ esse] est G 13 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 15 cognoscat] cognoscit p 16 iterum] om. P 17 et2] om. P 18 et1] om. P 19 est] add. quod p ‖ fiunt] fuerunt P ‖ transmutationes] terminationes p 20 igitur etc.] om. P 21 et] om. P 24 sed] om. p 25 necessitates naturalium proveniant] necessitas naturalium proveniat p 28 et tamen] corr. sup. lin. ex cum C : tamen P 28–29 et … praemissarum] om. G

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habentibus. Et hoc manifestum est, quia ex parte materiae demonstratur primo De generatione necessitas perpetuitatis generationum et corruptionum in hoc mundo. ⟨8⟩ Iterum si quaeratur propter quid necesse est hominem vel equum corrumpi, respondetur quod hoc est quia habet materiam quae est in potentia ad aliam formam. ⟨9⟩ Iterum si necessitates dispositionum naturalium essent ex fine, vel illae essent necessitates eorum quae simpliciter sunt contingentia, et hoc est impossibile, quia eorum nullae sunt necessitates, vel illae essent necessitates eorum quae simpliciter sunt necessaria, et hoc est contra Aristotelem, qui vocat necessitatem simpliciter | illam quae est ex materia.

57vb C

Oppositum videtur determinare Aristoteles in isto secundo contra antiquos.

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Sine dubio ista quaestio est satis difficilis, quia concomitatur vel sequitur illam quae facta fuit de causalitate finis, quae erat satis difficilis. Et reducendo ad illam | quaestionem ego primitus omnino concederem quod omnis ordo bonus et conveniens in operationibus et dispositionibus entium naturalium provenit principaliter et primo ab illo fine optimo gratia cuius omnia alia sunt et fiunt, agunt vel patiuntur prima intentione, scilicet ab ipso Deo. Et ille finis vere est prima causa et principalis totius universi, ut debet videri duodecimo Metaphysicae. Secundo dico quod necesse est post ipsum Deum ponere alias causas secundum quarum diversitates consequuntur diversitates transmutationum et effectuum in hoc mundo nobis apparentium, quia licet Deus per suam infinitam potentiam et voluntatem liberam posset sine aliis causis

1 et] om. P ‖ est] om. G 2 primo] corr. ex per se C : per se G 2–3 necessitas … corruptionum] perpetuitatis generabilium et corruptibilium sed add. in marg. †…†perpetuitatis generationum †…†ruptionum C 7 necessitates] necessitas G ‖ naturalium] om. P 9 eorum] eo p 13 concomitatur] communicatur sed add. in marg. concomitatur C 18 et fiunt] et Gp : vel P 19 deo] add. et illo deo p ‖ prima causa] inv. G ‖ principalis] add. boni Pp 20 debet videri] patet P 21 secundo] add. ego p ‖ ipsum] om. G 24 posset] potest P 2 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, I, 3, 318a13–27 10 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 9, 200a14, 30–31 12 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 9, 200a5–b8 20 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, XII, qq. 6–7 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 67va–70va)

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concurrentibus producere et creare diversos effectus contrarios sive in eodem tempore sive in diversis, et hoc modo supernaturali et miraculoso, tamen modo naturali non esset possibile quod ab eodem simplici et invariabili provenirent diversi effectus contrarii, ut nunc tales et cras alii, nisi essent aliae causae concurrentes diversae. Nam ut dicitur secundo De generatione, idem inquantum idem et semper eodem modo se habens semper est natum facere idem vel simile et numquam diversa et dissimilia, nisi aliunde proveniat talis diversitas. Tertio etiam apparet mihi quod non potest sufficienter reddi causa talis diversitatis transmutationum et effectuum ex ipso Deo et prima materia, quia sicut Deus propter suam simplicitatem et invariabilitatem non est ex se determinatus nisi modo supernaturali, ut agat ad generandum magis aquam quam aerem vel bovem quam capram, sic etiam materia, cum sit per totum mundum istum eiusdem rationis, quantum est ex se, non est possibile dicere quare ex ea fit hic aer et illic aqua vel hic equus et illic capra, nisi concurrant aliae causae diversae, quarum ex se aliquae fuerint determinatae ad aquam generandum | et non ad aerem vel ad equum | generandum et non ad capram et aliae sint determinatae e converso. Quarto manifestum est quod corpora caelestia sunt causae ordinativae diversitatis plurimarum transmutationum et plurimorum effectuum in hoc mundo provenientium. Certum est enim quod non posset reddi ratio naturalis quare dies sunt longiores uno tempore quam alio, in uno climate quam in alio, quare etiam communiter est multum maior | calor in aestate quam in hieme, nisi diceretur hoc provenire ex corporibus caelestibus. Et aliter periret omnino scientia astrologiae de iudiciis, quod est magnum inconveniens dicere. Quamvis enim corpora caelestia non sic necessitant ista infe-

1 sive] om. p 2 et1] om. P ‖ miraculoso] miraculose P 4 diversi effectus] add. et G : effectus diversi et Pp ‖ ut] et GPp 5 secundo] primo P 6 semper eodem modo] add. sup. lin. alias similiter C : si fuerit similiter G : similiter p : simpliciter P 7 natum] innatum G ‖ simile] consimile GPp ‖ diversa et] om. p 9 tertio etiam] tertio P : secundo etiam C 10 effectuum] add. naturalium GPp 11 quia] et G 12 ut] om. GPp 13 quam1] om. P ‖ vel] om. P ‖ quam2] vel GPp 15 hic1 … aqua] hic aqua et illic aer G ‖ et2] vel P 16 aliae] illae G ‖ aliquae fuerint] inv. P : fuerunt aliquae p : fuerunt aliqua G 17 generandum1] generandam P 18 sint] sunt P 21 provenientium] evenientium GPp ‖ posset] potest P 22 quam1] add. in p 23 communiter] om. p ‖ multum] multo p 24–25 aliter … scientia] omnino aliter periret scientia p : non aliter periret scientia P : ideo aristotelis scientia periret G 26 necessitant] necessitent Pp 5–6 Cf. Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, II, 10, 336a27–28; cf. AA, 4: 43

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riora et nos, quin multis possumus obviare per arbitrii libertatem et quin in omnibus Deus miraculose possit contrafacere, tamen magnam inclinationem | faciunt caelestia ad alios et alios effectus; propter quam ut in pluribus sequuntur illi effectus. Quinto etiam dicendum est quod ad multas diversitates et ordinationes transmutationum et effectuum naturalium in hoc mundo salvandas modo naturali non sufficiunt Deus, corpora caelestia et prima materia, nisi ponantur alia agentia particularia diversa haec ordinantia, quia in eadem plaga terrae, ubi per totum quasi consimiles sunt caelorum influentiae, generantur hic asini, hic caprae et hic quercus et hic pomus et in eodem prato commixtim diversae species herbarum generantur; et harum diversitatum non sunt corpora caelestia sufficientes causae, sed ibi sunt aliae causae particulares, quarum hae determinant ad haec et illae ad illa. Et haec sunt semina animalium aut plantarum vel etiam agentia similia effectibus producendis, ut si ignis generat ignem et aqua aquam. Vel etiam in his quae ex putrefactione generantur causae particulares diversitatum sunt cum virtutibus caelestibus diversae dispositiones materiae, propter quod ex una portione materiae fiunt ranae et ex alia muscae, licet caelo hic et illic uniformiter influente. Sed iterum sexto dicendum est quod, si ex diversis dispositionibus materiae proveniat talis diversitas effectuum, tamen illas diversas dispositiones materiarum oportet reducere in priorem diversitatem agentium. Cum enim materia sit de se indifferens ad omnes dispositiones, necesse est, si haec materia et illa fuerint diversimode dispositae, quod hoc fuerit per diversa agentia sic eas diversimode disponentia. Et ita septimo concludendum est universaliter quod omnis ordo et diversitas transmutationum et effectuum naturalium salvatur ex ordine et diversitate non materierum, sed agentium. Sed ultra considerandum est quod agentia naturalia agunt finaliter propter se et sui ipsius gratia, scilicet ad finem quod se habeant in statu nobilissimo et optimo | in quo possunt esse naturaliter. Et ultra etiam agunt

1 quin1] quia P ‖ possumus] possimus P ‖ libertatem] voluntatem C 2 possit] posset p 3 ut] om. P 5 etiam] om. P 8 haec] hoc p ‖ quia] quae G 9 caelorum] calores P ‖ generantur] ut generentur C 10 et1] om. P ‖ et2] om. P ‖ et3] om. p 11 herbarum] arborum p 12 causae1] esse p ‖ sunt] om. P 13 quarum] qua P ‖ haec1] hoc Pp 14 aut] et P ‖ vel] add. ergo p 16 cum] etiam P 18 licet] nisi P ‖ illic] hic p 20 proveniat] provenit G 22–23 haec … illa] illa materia et haec G 23–24 diversa agentia] inv. Pp 24 eas] ea P 25 et1] om. P 26 salvatur] salvantur G 27 materierum] materiarum Pp 28 considerandum] sciendum P 29 habeant] habeat G ‖ in] add. isto p

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finaliter propter | Deum, ut ei assimilentur quantum natura eorum permittit. Ille enim est status eorum optimus, scilicet quod sic Deo assimilentur. Sic autem Deo assimilantur agendo et largiendo aliis esse et perfectionem, quemadmodum Deus largitur omnibus esse et bene esse. Sic enim dicit Commentator in De substantia orbis quod finis significat agens significatione necessaria. Et ita tandem octavo concludemus quod omnis ordo et diversitas transmutationum et effectuum naturalium provenit ex ordine et diversitate finium. Cum enim proveniant ex agentibus, quemadmodum dictum est, et agentia sint causae finales suarum actionum prima intentione et non e converso nisi sicut alias dicebatur, sequitur propositum. Sed istis concessis restat maior dubitatio, scilicet de finibus dictis secundaria intentione, videlicet de finibus acceptis pro formis vel effectibus ultimo provenientibus per | actiones et operationes agentium, sicut esset sanitas | proveniens ex operatione medici et sicut essent pulli hirundinis respectu operationum praecedentium, scilicet in faciendo nidum et in coeundo, scilicet utrum illae operationes praecedentes dependeant et habeant ordinem ex illis effectibus finalibus et ultimatis. Et ego credo quod non, sicut dixi in quaestione de fine. Non enim apparet mihi quod ex eis quae non sunt dependeant et ordinentur actualiter ea quae sunt. Immo de necessitate, quantum ad actiones non liberorum agentium, ex eis quae sunt et praecedunt sequitur esse et ordo omnium quae posterius eveniunt in tantum quod, si Deus poneretur movere semper corpora caelestia sicut nunc moventur et numquam agere de cetero nisi modo naturali sine miraculo speciali, et non ponerentur alia agentia liberae voluntatis, tunc de omni eo quod eveniret necesse est ex nunc quod ipsum

1 ei] dei P ‖ permittit] promittit G 2 sic2] si P 3 assimilantur] assimilando CG 4 deus] deum C ‖ et] om. P ‖ sic enim] sic vero G : sicut enim C 7 ita tandem] ita etiam tandem P : tandem etiam p : tandem G ‖ concludemus] concludimus P 8 provenit] proveniret p 9 quemadmodum] ut GPp 12 scilicet] om. GPp 14 per] rep. C 16 et in] et etiam in p : etiam in C : et G ‖ coeundo] add. etc. p 17 ordinem] ordines G 19 ego] om. P ‖ dixi] add. prius p 20 dependeant et ordinentur] dependeant et ordinantur P : ordinantur et dependeant G 20–21 actualiter ea] inv. G 21 non liberorum] non liberum G : liberas P 22 praecedunt] procedunt p 24 nunc] modo P 26 omni eo] inv. p ‖ est] esset GPp 5 Averroes, De substantia orbis, cap. 2, f. 6M; cf. AA, 10: 20 11 Cf. sup., II, q. 7 19 Cf. sup., II, q. 7

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eveniret et inevitabile esset, quin ipsum eveniret. Et hoc est declarandum in sexto Metaphysicae. Sed tamen Aristoteles videtur manifeste opinari et determinare contrarium. ⟨1⟩ Nonne illud est causa a qua res dependet in esse et operatione quod respondetur ad quaestionem quaerentem propter quid vel propter quam causam de huiusmodi esse vel operatione? Certe videtur quod sic. Sed finis ille ultimo producendus sic respondetur. Verbi gratia propter sanitatem efficiendam in isto infirmo laborat medicus, propter pullos nidificat hirundo, propter nutriri in hieme mellificant apes. ⟨2⟩ Iterum non est dubium quod medicus propter intentionem sanitatis intendit compositionem medicinae in tantum | quod, si non intenderet sanitatem producendam, ipse non curaret de compositione medicinae. Igitur sicut intendit compositionem medicinae propter intentionem sanitatis causaliter, ita componit illam medicinam propter illam sanitatem producendam causaliter. ⟨3⟩ Iterum ex illis dependent et proveniunt | actiones et ordo actionum ipsorum agentium secundum quorum diversitates diversificantur actiones agentium et ordo eorum; sed secundum diversitates finium ultimo producendorum diversificantur actiones agentium. Hoc apparet. Faber enim secundum artem fabrilem aliter agit quando vult facere martellum, et aliter quando vult facere cultellum; et anima et virtus animae aliter agit et aliter disponit materiam ubi facienda est auris, et aliter ubi faciendus est oculus. Igitur etc. ⟨4⟩ Iterum semper videmus in operibus naturae quod operationes ordinate procedunt per illa media per quae convenientissime produci potest ille finis; et hoc non esset ita, nisi ex illo fine producendo proveniret ille ordo. 1 in] om. GPp 5 nonne] add. enim GPp ‖ dependet] dependit C 6 quaestionem quaerentem] quaestionem quaerentis p : conclusionem quaerentem C ‖ propter1] rep. p ‖ vel] et P 7 huiusmodi] huius P 9 nidificat] praem. nutriendos Pp : nidicat G 10 nutriri] nutrire G 11 quod] quin P 12 compositionem] operationem C 13 non] nihil P 13–14 igitur … medicinae] †…†dit compositionem †…† in marg. C 15–16 ita … causaliter] om. (hom.) G 15 illam1] om. Pp 17 dependent] dependet p 20 actiones agentium] inv. G 21–22 martellum … cultellum] cultellum et aliter agit quando vult facere martellum p : cultellum et aliter martellum P ‖ et … cultellum] †…† quando vult facere †…†llum in marg. C 22 aliter2] om. G 23 materiam] naturaliter P ‖ facienda] faciendus G 24 igitur etc.] om. GP 25 semper] om. G ‖ operibus] operationibus P 2 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, VI, q. 5 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 35va–37rb)

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⟨5⟩ Iterum vel dispositiones praecedentes finem ultimo generandum intenduntur propter illum finem vel a casu est quod fiunt convenientes et ordine | convenienti productioni illius finis; sed non est a casu hoc, scilicet quod fiant convenientes et ordine convenienti etc., quoniam hoc est semper vel ut in pluribus; igitur fiunt sic propter illum finem. ⟨6⟩ Item sicut se habent praemissae ad conclusionem in demonstrationibus, ita illi fines se habent ad ea quae praecedunt illos fines. Haec sit maior. Quae est ex eo manifesta, quia sicut necesse est, si praemissae sint verae, quod conclusio sit vera et non e converso, ita necesse est, si finis talis est, quod antecedentia finem sint vel fuerint et non e converso, et ita talis finis comparatur praemissis et praecedentia illum finem comparantur conclusioni. Et ratio ad hoc est conveniens, quia demonstrationes debent incipere ab eis quae sunt priora in intentione; sed fines ultimi in opere sunt priores in intentione; igitur rationabile est quod illi fines sint sicut praemissae in demonstrativis. Tunc ponitur minor talis quod in demonstrativis conclusiones sint necessariae propter praemissas. Ideo concluditur quod praecedentia fines illos habent ne|cessitatem et ordinationem propter illos fines, et ita illi fines sunt causae necessitatis et ordinis operationum et dispositionum | praecedentium. ⟨7⟩ Iterum illae operationes et dispositiones vel habent necessitatem et ordinem ex illis finibus vel ex ipsa materia, sicut dicebant antiqui. Sed non ex ipsa materia, quia sicut bene dicit Commentator, sequeretur quod in animali omnia ossa et nervi essent inferius, cum sint maxime terrestria, et carnes in medio et sanguis totus et spiritus essent superius propter levitatem, et ita in animalibus testam habentibus tota testa esset inferius; et haec

1 generandum] generandi Pp 2–3 et ordine] rep. G 3 productioni] productivi G 3–4 productioni … convenienti] om. (hom.) p 4 fiant] fiunt G ‖ etc.] igitur P 6 conclusionem] conclusiones GPp 7 se … fines2] om. (hom.) P 8 est1 … manifesta] ex eo manifesta est p : sic manifesta P 9 est1] eum p ‖ finis talis] inv. P 10 finem] fines G ‖ fuerint] add. talia p : fuerunt GP 13 in1] om. G ‖ opere] corr. ex operatione C : operatione G : comparatione P 14 igitur] add. etc. p ‖ sint] sunt P 15 demonstrativis1] demonstrationibus P ‖ demonstrativis2] demonstrationibus P 16 sint] sunt GPp 17 ordinationem] ordinem G ‖ et2] om. P 18 ordinis operationum] ordinationis operationum Gp : ordinationis comparationum P 20 et1] vel P 21 ordinem] ordinationem GPp ‖ illis] talibus P ‖ sicut] ut P 22 sequeretur] sequitur Gp 24 sanguis] ignis P ‖ essent] esset p 25 testam] om. P 21 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 9, 200a1–4 22 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 87, f. 82F–G

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sunt falsa, immo testa fit in eis durior superius quam inferius ad salutem et defensionem illorum animalium. Igitur etc. Hae sunt rationes Aristotelis et Commentatoris, quae omnino videntur concludere quod operationes et dispositiones praecedentes illos fines dependeant in suo esse et sua ordinatione ex suis finibus. Et tamen non apparet mihi quod ita sit. Ego primo venio ad artificialia et ea quae nos operamur per intellectum et voluntatem, eo quod in illis prima facie videtur quod totus ordo praecedentium proveniat ex illis finibus et ob hoc credimus ita esse in natura. Dico igitur quod ex sanitate producenda in Socrate nullo modo dependet operatio praevia Platonis medici sui, quia | nullus diceret quod operatio medici dependeret ex illa sanitate nisi quia medicus intendit illam sanitatem facere et quod haec intentio dependet ab illa sanitate (unde si ita operaretur non intendens illam sanitatem, sicut operatur intendens, quod est possibile, nullus diceret quod ab illa sanitate dependeret eius operatio); sed certum debet esse quod intentio medici non dependet ab illa sanitate producenda; igitur etc. Declaro igitur quod intentio et voluntas medici volentis sanare Socratem non dependet ex sanitate Socratis producenda. Primo, quia illa nihil est. | Secundo, quia forte impossibile est Socra|tem sanari. Sed quomodo ex eo quod nec est nec esse potest dependeret intentio et voluntas Socratis? Hoc apparet mihi absurdum dicere. Iterum si Deus intendit movere caelum et generare ista inferiora, non propter hoc oportet quod caelum vel motus caeli vel ista inferiora sint causae intentionis Dei nec quod aliquo modo intentio Dei dependeat ex illis. Et si hoc potest salvari de Deo, ita poterit salvari de nobis. Nec valet contra hoc illa dissimilitudo quae solet assignari, scilicet quod intentio et scientia Dei est causa rerum, nostra autem est causata a rebus,

1 sunt] rep. G : est P ‖ testa fit] post eis p 3–5 hae … finibus] hae sunt rationes aristotelis et commentatoris qui omnino videntur concludere quod operationes et dispositiones praecedentes illos fines dependeant in suo esse et sua ordinatione ex suis finibus et cum non appareat mihi hic nihil deficit nisi pulchra puella bene ornata vestimentis flagrantibus calceata sotularibus lilipipiatis et ideo quaere eam et invenies al. man. C 3 quae] qui p ‖ omnino] non G 4 operationes] alterationes P 5 sua] praem. in p : om. P 6 tamen non apparet] cum non appareat Gp 7 operamur] operamus C 9 credimus ita] inv. GPp ‖ in natura] nam P 12 medicus] intellectus p ‖ quod] praem. quandoque intendere dependet et P : om. p 12–13 dependet ab] dependet ex Pp : dependeret ex G 13–16 unde … sanitate] om. (hom.) G 16 igitur2] om. P 18 illa] om. p 20 et] om. G ‖ socratis] omnes codd., sed exspectes platonis 21 non] add. tamen P 25 hoc] haec p 26 intentio … dei] scientia dei et intentio P

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40rb p

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quia dicam quod simpliciter hoc est concedendum, quod nihil possumus intelligere naturaliter, quin necesse sit intellectum prius moveri ab aliqua re mediante sensu moto ab illa re, sed non oportet intellectum moveri ab omni re quam intelligit. Ego enim intelligo omnem hominem, si ego scio quod omnis homo est animal, immo etiam intelligo omnes homines praeteritos et futuros, si ego scio quod omnis homo qui fuit fuit animal et quod omnis homo qui erit erit animal; et tamen absurdum est dicere quod intentio mea dependeat aliquo modo ab hominibus qui sunt in Roma vel ab homine qui fuit et qui erit, immo eadem esset intellectio mea praedicta, sive essent infiniti homines sive per voluntatem divinam essent duo tantum. Et ego intelligo materiam primam, et tamen non posset assignari in quo genere causae dependeat intellectio mea ab ipsa materia prima. Et omnino, si habeo conceptum simplicem auri et conceptum montis, ego possum illos conceptus componere simul et cum intentione temporis praesentis, praeteriti vel futuri formare propositionem quod mons aureus est, quod fuit et quod erit; et tales conceptus non dependent ab aliquo monte aureo. Et ita in proposito, si ego intelligo sanitatem | et Socratem et componam quod Socrates erit vel potest esse sanus et quod taliter potest sanari, non oportet quod talium intentionum vel conceptuum sanitas Socratis, quae non est nec forte erit, sit causa nec oportet quod tales intentiones dependeant ex sanitate Socratis. Et si ultra ex huiusmodi intentionibus ego movear ad volendum sanare Socratem, illa volitio non dependet ab illa sanitate | Socratis, | quia si esset impossibile ipsum sanari, cum tamen crederem ipsum posse sanari, adhuc vellem ipsum sanare. Sed haec volitio dependet ab illa intentione et voluntate et omnino actus illi sequentes et illa sanitas dependent et proveniunt ex huiusmodi actibus volendi et intelligendi.

1 simpliciter] similiter P 2 prius] primitus GPp 4 intelligit] intendit G 5 etiam] add. ego p : et P 7 et] om. P 7–8 intentio] add. seu intellectio P 8 dependeat] dependet p ‖ ab2] add. omni GPp 9 et] vel P ‖ esset intellectio] est intentio P 10 infiniti] add. sed del. futuri C : add. futuri Gp : add. et futuri P 11 et tamen] tamen G : cum P ‖ posset] possit P : potest p 12 dependeat] dependeret p ‖ materia] via P 13 si] add. ego GPp ‖ simplicem] corr. sup. lin. ex similem C : similem G ‖ et] om. P 14–15 praesentis praeteriti] inv. G 15 futuri] add. et GPp ‖ est] add. et P 17 ita] ista P ‖ et2] vel p ‖ componam] compono GPp 18 socrates] om. P ‖ vel] add. quod GP 19 intentionum] intellectionum P 20 forte] add. quae P 21 movear] moveor GPp 24 posse sanari] inv. P ‖ sed] om. P 25 et1] add. a p ‖ actus illi] inv. P ‖ sequentes] consequentes p 26 dependent et proveniunt] dependet et provenit p ‖ huiusmodi actibus] huius actionibus P

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Sed de animalibus credo quod hirundo coiens, nidificans et ovificans non plus cognoscit pullos generandos quam arbor frondens et florens cognoscit fructum generandum. | Nec hirundinis coitus, nidificatio et ovificatio dependent in esse et ordine eorum ab illis pullis, sed econtra. Nec illi pulli determinant hirundinem ad sic operandum, sed forma et natura hirundinis et corpora caelestia determinatis temporibus et Deus supremus per suam sapientiam infinitam determinant hirundinem ad coitum, ex quo consequenter sequitur generatio ovorum. Et iterum hirundine sic disposita natura hirundinis cum corporibus caelestibus et Deo determinat illam ad nidificandum et tandem ad ponendum ova et consequenter ad covandum et generandum pullos et ulterius ad nutriendum etc. Et igitur omnia proveniunt ab arte divina et corporibus caelestibus et agentibus particularibus tam extrinsecis quam intrinsecis, quae sunt formae substantiales ipsorum corporum naturalium. Sed tunc est dubitatio de intentione hirundinis utrum hirundo perprius intendit pullos generandos quam ova ponenda et quam nidum faciendum vel econtra, et utrum intentio pullorum generandorum sit causa intentionis ovorum ponendorum et nidificandi, sicut intentio sanitatis producendae est causa intentionis medicinarum componendarum, vel econtra. Ad hoc videtur mihi esse dicendum quod magna est differentia de nobis et de natura quantum ad intentiones et appetitus. In nobis enim intentiones et appetitus sunt distincti ab intendentibus et appetentibus, in natura autem non. Et est e converso de nobis et de natura, ut apparet prooemio Physico-

1 de animalibus] de naturalibus G : de naturalibus ego p : in naturalibus P ‖ non] nihil CGp 2 frondens et florens] frondes et flores p 3 nec] et sic G : aut p ‖ et ovificatio] corr. in marg. ex etc. C : etc. G 4 ordine] add. sup. lin. seu ordinatione C ‖ illi] om. G 5 determinant] add. illam G 7 determinant] determinat P 8 disposita] add. et CG 9 hirundinis] add. disposita CG ‖ deo determinat] deo determinant Gp : deus determinant P 10 tandem ad] om. P ‖ et consequenter] om. p ‖ covandum] cf. Tobler-Lommatzsch, Altfranzösiches Wörterbuch, II, 990, cover ‘brüten’ : add. coheundum C : conandum p : om. G ‖ et3] om. G 10–11 generandum … ad] om. P 11 et igitur] et haec igitur Gp : ergo haec P 12 particularibus] partialibus P 13 quam intrinsecis] om. G ‖ corporum] om. p 16 intendit] intelligit P ‖ quam2] om. G 18 ponendorum] positorum G ‖ nidificandi] nidi faciendi Gp 19 intentionis] sanitatis P ‖ vel] et G ‖ econtra] add. etc. G 20 esse dicendum] inv. P ‖ est differentia] om. P 21 et de] et P : de G 22 intendentibus et appetentibus] intentionibus et appetitibus CG 23 de2] om. P 23–348.1 prooemio physicorum] in prooemio huius Pp 23 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, I, 1, 184a16–21

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rum, quia quae naturae sunt notiora et priora, illa sunt nobis posteriora et minus nota. Si igitur effectus postremo producendi sunt nobis notiores et prius intenti, non sequitur quod ita sit in natura, immo cum non sit intentio et | appetitus naturae nisi potentia et determinatio ad producendum effectum, natura perprius intendit et appetit illud quod perprius potest et innata est primo producere, et mediante illo producto intendit et appetit illud quod innatum est sequi, et sic tandem usque ad effectum ultimate producibilem. Et sic proveniunt omnia posteriora ex illis prioribus et eorum determinationibus et non e converso. Si autem sit alius modus intendendi in naturalibus, ille est intellectus divinus simplex et indivisibilis. Qui quomodo cum tali simplicitate intelligat omnia distincte et quodam modo ordinate, discutiendum est in duodecimo Metaphysicae vel in alia facultate. Tunc ergo ad solvendum rationes Aristotelis, quae prima facie videntur esse contra dicta. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam dictum fuit satis in septima quaestione huius secundi, | ubi multa dicta fuerunt de isto fine, quare et quomodo sibi attribuitur nomen causae. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam dictum est quod in nobis est e converso de intentione ad intentionem et de intento ad intentum. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam est dicendum | quod non ex diversitate rerum producendarum a nobis proveniunt | nostrae diversae operationes, sed bene proveniunt ex nostris diversis intentionibus et ex nostris diversis volitionibus. Sed iam dictum fuit quod illae diversae intentiones et volitiones non proveniunt nec dependent sive in esse sive in fieri ex illis rebus faciendis, immo econtra. De opere autem naturae dico quod anima ex se mediante Deo dirigente deter1 notiora et priora] priora et notiora p : priora et nobis notiora P 2 postremo] postremi P 5 et appetit] om. P ‖ perprius2] prius GPp 6 primo producere] inv. P 7 innatum est] inv. p ‖ usque] om. G 8 sic] om. G 11 intelligat] intelligit P ‖ quodam modo] corr. in quomodo P 12 in1] om. P 13 ad solvendum] solvendum est G : solvendum est ad P : respondendum est ad p 13–14 quae … dicta] qui videntur esse contra dicta prima facie P 14 contra] una G 16 quare et quomodo] quomodo et qualiter G ‖ sibi attribuitur] sibi attribuatur Gp : attribuatur sibi P 20 est dicendum] est dicendum (corr. ex dictum) C : inv. Gp : dicitur P 21 proveniunt1 … bene] †…†nt nostrae diversae †…†es sed bene in marg. C 22 diversis intentionibus] inv. P ‖ ex nostris diversis2] add. operationibus G : om. P 24 econtra] e converso Gp : est e converso P 25 opere] operatione GP ‖ dico] om. p ‖ mediante] et ex G : et a Pp ‖ dirigente] diligente P 12 Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, XII, q. 13 (ed. Parisiis 1518, ff. 75rb–76rb) 15 Cf. sup., II, q. 7, 298–300

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minata est ad distinguendum membra et perficiendum, donec animatum sit in statu perfectissimo, secundum quem assimilatur ipsi Deo quantum potest; gratia cuius Dei sic agebat et sic determinabatur ad agendum. Nec anima ordinabatur in sic agendo ab illis rebus sic faciendis, sed ex se et propter Deum et a Deo sic ordinate procedebat. Et sic dico quod ex diversis operationibus animae proveniunt illi diversi effectus ultimati et non e converso. Unde ad formam rationis dicam quod non secundum diversitatem effectuum ultimatorum causaliter est diversitas operationum praecedentium, sed e converso. Haec tamen illis consonant et e converso, sicut causa debet consonare effectui et e converso. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam conceditur quod ordinate per illa media proceditur per quae talis ultimus effectus attingitur, non quia illa media ex illo effectu | ultimo dependeant, sed quia natura prius erat determinata ad illa media, per quae ultra determinatur ad talem effectum ultimatum. ⟨5⟩ Ad aliam dictum fuit alias quomodo et secundum quas intentiones possumus dicere quod operationes et dispositiones praecedentes sint propter illum effectum ultimum et quomodo non. Et manifestum est quod nihil est ibi a casu, quia natura agens est secundum se determinata primitus ad illas dispositiones et operationes praevias et eis mediantibus ad illos ultimos effectus. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam dicerem quod demonstrationes vere causales et propter quid fiunt aliquando per materiam, aliquando per formam, aliquando per causas efficientes et aliquando per veras causas finales, propter quas agentia sunt et agunt prima intentione. Sed aliquando etiam sunt demonstrationes per effectus posteriores, quia effectus correspondent suis causis, et tales sunt demonstrationes procedentes ex effectibus ultimo productis vel producendis ad praecedentia. Et aliquando tamen illas demonstrationes vocamus

1 perficiendum] ad proficiendum G 2 assimilatur] assimiletur GPp 3 determinabatur] determinabitur P 5 procedebat] praecedebat G ‖ dico] dicam GPp 7 rationis] add. ego Gp 8 ultimatorum] ultimorum GPp 9 causa] illa G 10 et] om. p 11 conceditur] concedo G ‖ per1] ad G ‖ proceditur] procedetur P 12 effectu] defectu G 15 fuit] add. satis G 16 possumus] possimus G 16–17 propter] per G 17 ultimum] ultimatum p 18 est ibi] inv. GPp ‖ se] om. P 21 dicerem] dicentem G ‖ vere] rei G : om. P 23 et] om. P ‖ propter] per G 24 etiam] om. P 25–26 per … demonstrationes] om. (hom.) p 25 quia] et G 25–26 et tales sunt] tales autem P 26 procedentes] praecedentes C 27 et] om. P 15 Cf. sup., II, q. 7

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causales et propter quid ad illos sensus ad quos concessum est alias quod illi effectus ultimati solent vocari causae finales. ⟨7⟩ Ad ultimam conceditur bene quod non ex materia principaliter provenit talis ordinatio et diversificatio operationum, sed a natura agente, quae vere est causa finalis operationum et aliorum sequentium; et hoc, ut credo, intendebat Aristoteles contra antiquos etc. 50ra G 51ra P

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Tunc videre possumus de rationibus principalibus | quomodo procedunt, et sic videbitur de necessitate, de qua quaerebatur, quomodo sit intelligenda. ⟨1⟩ Ad primam de muro vel de domo facienda manifestum est quod non semper omnia graviora ponimus deorsum, sed lateres graves ponimus sursum in tecto. Et etiam dictum est prius quod saepe, non solum in arte, sed etiam in natura, provenit diversitas effectuum ex diversis dispositionibus materiae. ⟨2⟩ Ad aliam de pluvia dicitur quod eadem erat materia pluviae, aquae et vaporis et quod non ex ea principaliter et determinative proveniebat, sed ab agentibus calefacientibus et infrigidantibus illam materiam. Et conceditur etiam quod pluvia non proveniebat ex augmento frumentorum, | sed e converso. Et potest dici quod augmentum frumentorum et plantarum est finis pluviae dictus secunda intentione et causa taliter qualiter alias dicebatur. Nec obstat, si aliquando ex pluvia perdantur frumenta, quia sufficit ad prae|dicta quod ut in pluribus eveniat crementum bladorum. Unde non semper oportet quod ex actionibus naturae consequantur effectus innati sequi, sed ut in pluribus sequuntur, sed aliquando occurrit impedimentum.

1 et] om. P ‖ concessum] add. sup. lin. alias dictum C ‖ quod] et G 2 solent] forent G 3 bene] om. G 5 et aliorum] aliarum p ‖ hoc] add. solum GPp 6 etc.] om. GPp 7 videre possumus] inv. Pp : possimus videre G ‖ procedunt] procedant Gp 8 quaerebatur] add. et G ‖ intelligenda] manifesta G 9 de2] om. P ‖ facienda] faciendum dicendum quod P 10 semper] om. P 11 et] om. P 12 etiam] om. P 15 vaporis] vaporum Pp ‖ determinative] corr. ex terminative C : determinate Gp 16 et2] om. P 17 proveniebat] provenit p 18 augmentum] argumentum C 19 secunda] secundaria GPp ‖ et] est P ‖ causa taliter] causa (add. sed del. causaliter) taliter C : causaliter p 19–20 alias dicebatur] inv. P 20 perdantur] perduntur Gp : producuntur p ‖ quia] om. G 22 semper … naturae] oportet quod semper ex (in G) actionibus naturae Gp : oportet quod ex actionibus naturae semper P 23 sequi] consequi P ‖ sequuntur] consequuntur P ‖ occurrit] post impedimentum p : concurrit P 1 Cf. sup. II, q. 7 19 Cf. sup., II, q. 7

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351

Et dicit Commentator quod, si augmentationes frumentorum non sint per se fines pluviae, scilicet dicti secunda intentione, tamen pluviae est alius finis, scilicet adaequatio elementorum. Tandem enim deficerent aquae, si vapores numquam converterentur in pluviam, sed resolverentur in ignem vel aerem. ⟨3⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod aliquae dispositiones in natura bene sunt uni naturae convenientes, quae essent disconvenientes alteri naturae, sicut frigiditas et humiditas sunt convenientes aquae, quae tamen essent disconvenientes igni. Natura enim agens, cum sit directa simpliciter ab optimo, numquam intendit nisi sibi bonum et conveniens et numquam, quantum esset ex se, ageret sibi disconveniens. Sed tamen ex concursu alterius agentis circa materiam in quam agit intendentis aliam dispositionem contrariam et disconvenientem illi naturae sequitur impedimentum naturae a perficiendo sibi conveniens et ita provenit effectus sibi disconveniens. Sed illa disconvenientia non provenit ab illa natura, sed ab impediente eam intendente dispositionem disconvenientem illi naturae, quae esset conveniens illi impedienti. ⟨4⟩ Ad aliam dicitur quod, si natura non cognoscit, tamen dirigitur a cognoscente optimo et infallibili. ⟨5⟩ Alia ratio conceditur sicut fit secundum praedicta. ⟨6⟩ Ad aliam concedendum est quod materia est necessaria simpliciter in essendo et non finis, nisi ille finis sit de numero agentium superiorum, cuiusmodi sunt Deus, intelligentiae et corpora caelestia. Sed in istis inferioribus non sunt motus et transmutationes et operationes vel etiam fines dicti secundaria intentione necessarii simpliciter in essendo. Ideo de tali necessitate non intendebat hic Aristoteles inquirere, sed intendit de necessitate in consequendo unum ex alio, verbi gratia ex quibus causis | sequitur necessario quod | dentes in homine fiunt acuti anterius et lati posterius et oculi

1 et] ut C 2 fines pluviae] inv. p ‖ secunda] secundaria GPp 4 vel] add. in P 5 in natura bene] naturalium G 6–7 frigiditas et humiditas] frigiditas humiditas G : humiditas et frigiditas P 8 simpliciter] post optimo p 10 concursu] cursu P 11 quam] qua p ‖ aliam] om. P 13 ita] illa G ‖ effectus sibi] inv. P ‖ sed] et P 14 eam] add. et P 15 disconvenientem] convenientem p 16 impedienti] convenienti G 17 si] licet P 18 cognoscente] add. et C 19 fit secundum] om. p 20 concedendum est] conceditur P ‖ materia] add. non P 21 finis1] add. ille P 22 intelligentiae] praem. et GP : intelligentia C 23 et2] vel G ‖ vel] et G 24 intentione] add. et P 25 hic aristoteles] inv. P 27 acuti] acutae G 1 Cf. Averroes, In Physicam, II, comm. 77, f. 77I

51rb P 60rb C

352

50rb G

liber ii

in capite et non in pede. Antiqui enim dixerunt hoc sequi ex eo quod erat materia in ore | subtilior anterius et grossior posterius. Et hoc non est verum, immo materia a principio foetus formandi erat consimilis. Sed hoc provenit ex agentibus. Ex hoc enim quod applicatum est sperma viri materiae foetus formandi provenit necessario, si non sit impedimentum, quod generabitur foetus humanus et formabuntur membra talia et quod in diversis membris diversimode disponetur materia et quod tandem generabuntur oculi et pedes et quod ille videbit et ambulabit. Haec enim omnia ordinate necessitat et determinat natura agens directa a Deo et non ipsa materia. Tamen omnino concedendum est quod materia est causa simpliciter necessaria in essendo et etiam necessaria ad hoc quod fiant illae operationes et dispositiones, quia agentia non possent eas facere sine materia. Sed materia non est causa determinativa et ordinativa huiusmodi dispositionum, immo ipsa ab agentibus determinatur et ordinatur, donec perficiantur effectus ultimati. ⟨7⟩ Ad aliam concedo quod saepe fiunt demonstrationes ex materia, quia ipsa est causa necessario requisita et praesupposita ad hoc quod possint alia fieri ex ea vel in ea. Et Aristoteles etiam bene concedit quod res et dispositiones naturales sunt propter materiam causaliter. Sed materia illa non est causa determinativa illorum, sicut dictum est. ⟨8⟩ Et per hoc patet ad aliam. ⟨9⟩ Ad aliam dictum est quomodo in dictis operationibus sunt necessitates, non tamen simpliciter, sed in consequendo. Et sic est finis huius secundi. Expliciunt quaestiones circa secundum librum Physicorum editae a reverendo philosopho magistro Iohanne Buridano etc. 1 pede] add. vel in culo G ‖ ex eo] ex alio P : om. G 2 posterius] posterior C 3 immo materia] sed haec materia autem P 4 est] om. P ‖ viri materiae] viri materia P : uni materiae p 6 et1] add. quod G 8 quod] om. p ‖ haec] adhuc C : praem. et G : praem. ad p 8–9 ordinate … determinat] necessitat et determinat et ordinat p 11–12 operationes et dispositiones] dispositiones et operationes P : operationes p 12 quia] quae P ‖ possent] possunt P 13 huiusmodi] huius P 14 effectus ultimati] effectus ulti†…† in marg. C 15 concedo quod saepe] conceditur saepius P ‖ quia] quod P 16 possint] posuit G 17 etiam] om. G 19 causa] add. determinata sive G ‖ determinativa illorum] inv. P : determinativa illarum p 20 per hoc patet] add. solutio p : patet per hoc P 21 quomodo] quod P 23–24 et … etc.] etc. et sic terminantur quaestiones secundi libri physicorum G : etc. et sic est finis secundi libri expliciunt quaestiones secundi libri physicorum p : et sic est finis quaestionum secundi libri expliciunt quaestiones secundi libri physicorum et consequenter sequuntur super tertium P 17 Cf. Aristoteles, Physica, II, 3, 194b24–26

5

10

15

20

Index locorum Albertus Magnus Physica i, tract. 3, cap. 15 ii, tract. 3, cap. 3

213 316

Aristoteles Analytica posteriora i, 1 19 i, 2 42, 50, 55, 59, 60 i, 3 31, 45 i, 10 19 i, 15 83 i, 18 8, 34 i, 19–22 40 i, 28 15 i, 32 40 i, 33 8 ii, 1 20, 38 ii, 19 40, 155 Analytica priora ii, 1 39 De anima i, 1 63, 269 ii, 1 93, 97, 205, 218 ii, 2 93 ii, 4 118, 119, 123, 218, 273 ii, 7 82 iii, 1 82 iii, 4 70, 71 iii, 6 177 iii, 8 33, 285 iii, 9 330 De caelo et mundo i, 4 330 i, 5 112 i, 9 277 i, 12 218 ii, 14 291 iii, 1 79, 137 De generatione et corruptione i, 3 152, 339 i, 5 109, 171 i, 7 294 ii, 9 273, 278, 297 ii, 10 217, 340 ii, 11 108

De interpretatione 9 De sensu et sensato 6 De sophisticis elenchis 6 Ethica Nicomachea i, 2 i, 13 iii, 1 vi, 3 vii, 1 ix, 8 Magna moralia ii, 15 Metaphysica i, 1 i, 2 i, 6 ii, 1 ii, 2 iii, 2 iv, 1 iv, 2 iv, 5 v, 1 v, 6 v, 7 v, 11 v, 12 v, 14 v, 16 vi, 1 vi, 2 vi, 4 vii, 1 vii, 3 vii, 5 vii, 6 vii, 7 vii, 8 vii, 14 vii, 15 vii, 17 viii, 6 ix, 1–10

317, 321 140, 141 27 3 98 211 8, 26 295 98, 110 297 8 48, 52, 59, 62 60, 62 243 113 48 8 16, 27 108, 110 161, 294 97 174, 189 60 219, 221, 222 94 50 8, 19, 24, 286, 289 8, 317, 321 189, 190, 191 35 201 35, 264 175, 183 46, 238 63, 197, 198 62 69 93 93 202

354 Metaphysica (cont.) ix, 1 ix, 2 ix, 3 ix, 6 x, 3 xii, 2 xii, 6 xii, 10 Meteora i, 2 i, 12 Physica i, 1

i, 2 i, 3 i, 4 i, 5 i, 6 i, 7

i, 8 i, 9 ii, 1 ii, 2 ii, 3 ii, 5 ii, 6 ii, 7 ii, 8 ii, 9 iii, 1 iii, 2 iii, 3 iii, 4 iii, 6 iii, 7 iv, 1 iv, 2

index locorum

219 265 208 202, 203, 217 211 162, 217, 225 118 144, 150 121 279 30, 33, 35, 49, 55, 59, 60, 61, 64, 76, 77, 168, 347 79, 81, 97, 115 305 113, 116, 119, 138, 152, 212 59, 143, 144, 145 143, 163 15, 152, 156, 162, 167, 198, 201, 211, 213, 225, 226, 227, 228, 243 152, 201 152, 171, 197, 225, 231, 232, 233, 278 24, 228, 243, 250, 251, 256, 265, 316 161, 174, 175, 284, 286, 289, 290 150, 161, 295, 303, 306, 352 8, 308, 309, 310, 316, 317, 320, 322 267, 308, 316, 317 9 316, 331 291, 337, 339, 344 171, 196 171 218 112 316 112, 118, 137 81 79

iv, 3 iv, 6 iv, 8 iv, 14 v, 1 v, 2 vi, 2 vi, 6 vii, 5 viii, 1 viii, 3 viii, 6 viii, 10 Praedicamenta 4 5 6 10 Topica i, 1 Auctoritates Aristotelis 1: 15 1: 27 1: 51 1: 91 1: 117 1: 151 1: 153 1: 161 1: 164 1: 172 1: 213 1: 219 1: 220 1: 222 1: 259 2: 1 2: 2 2: 5 2: 9 2: 16 2: 17 2: 20 2: 22 2: 27 2: 32 2: 34 2: 50

97 81 83, 86, 118, 193 97 144, 145 198, 250 118 137 127 118 140, 285 28 112 179 80, 143 79, 81, 143 225 50

59, 62 48 113 27 161, 294 8 189, 191 201 264 197, 198 201 219 219 265 162, 225 33, 49 49 61, 77 81, 115 152 162 143 113, 116 59 278 231, 232 265

355

index locorum 2: 65 2: 67 2: 68 2: 87 2: 91 2: 92 2: 103 2: 108 2: 109 2: 130 2: 144 3: 18 4: 9 4: 16 4: 39 4: 43 5: 2 5: 40 6: 6 6: 7 6: 37 6: 38 6: 56 6: 81 6: 86 6: 87 6: 162 6: 167 6: 168 10: 20 12: 5 12: 25 12: 108 12: 109 12: 186 30: 23 32: 20 35: 5 35: 12 35: 15 35: 16 35: 17 35: 18 35: 30 35: 70 35: 95 35: 98 35: 125 37: 12

161, 174, 175 161 150 9 291 256 218 137 316 193 81 330 171 294 273 217, 340 121 297 63 269 93 218 218 273 118, 123 119 285 33 330 297, 342 3 98 26 8 110 169, 172 317 19 50 55 59, 60 59 59 42 34 8 20, 38 40, 155 27

Averroes De substantia orbis cap. 1 cap. 2 In De anima iii, comm. 9 iii, comm. 19 In De caelo et mundo i, comm. 5 ii, comm. 17 In Metaphysicam ii, comm. 16 v, comm. 18 vi, comm. 1 viii, comm. 4 viii, comm. 15 xii, comm. 18 xii, comm. 39 xii, comm. 51 In Physicam i, comm. 1 i, comm. 2 i, comm. 3 i, comm. 4 i, comm. 60 i, comm. 62 i, comm. 69 i, comm. 70 i, comm. 71 i, comm. 81 ii, comm. 1 ii, comm. 3 ii, comm. 13 ii, comm. 20 ii, comm. 48 ii, comm. 49 ii, comm. 58 ii, comm. 77 ii, comm. 82 ii, comm. 87 iii, comm. 4 iv, comm. 76 iv, comm. 84 iv, comm. 133 viii, comm. 9 viii, comm. 23

79 297, 342 71 113 251 296 48, 52 230 19 201 211 211, 234, 276, 330 94 65 48, 91 55, 57 56 64 152, 172, 196 156 208 217 156, 157, 158 232, 277 250, 253 23 256 290, 291 319, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328 311 308 351 332 344 169 82 81 97 158 140, 141

356 Avicenna Liber de anima pars 1, cap. 5 36 Liber de philosophia prima tract. 1, cap. 5 112 tract. 9, cap. 5 274 Liber primus naturalium tract. 1, cap. 1 61, 74 Beda (Ps.-) Sententiae, sive axiomata philosophica ex Aristotele et aliis praestantibus collecta 294 Biblia Sacra Evangelium secundum Iohannem 14, 6 190 Iohannes Buridanus Quaestiones super libros De anima ii, q. 5 166 ii, q. 12 86 iii, q. 8 37 iii, q. 15 45 Quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo i, q. 4 251 Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione i, q. 8 166 i, q. 24 108 Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum ii, q. 5 306 iv, q. 8 170, 202, 212 v, q. 8 182 v, q. 9 219 vi, q. 1 11, 24 vi, qq. 1–2 12 vi, q. 5 122, 317, 343 vii, qq. 3–4 184 vii, q. 14 208 vii, qq. 15–20 37 vii, q. 18 69 vii, q. 20 12, 13, 68 ix, q. 2 202, 223 ix, qq. 6–8 202 xii, q. 4 219 xii, q. 5 295 xii, qq. 6–7 339 xii, q. 13 65, 348

index locorum Quaestiones super libros Physicorum iii, q. 3 146 iii, q. 7 259 iii, q. 8 260 iii, qq. 14–19 113, 120, 136 iii, q. 15 120, 129 iii, q. 16 126, 129 iii, q. 17 105, 164 iii, q. 18 115, 116 iii, qq. 18–19 114 iii, q. 19 120 iv, q. 9 135 v, q. 3 146 v, q. 5 269 v, q. 6 215 v, q. 8 200 v, q. 9 200 vi, q. 3 126 vi, q. 5 92 vii, q. 7 130 viii, q. 1 13 viii, q. 2 158, 182 viii, qq. 9–11 113 viii, q. 11 159 Iohannes de Sacrobosco De sphaera cap. 1 291 Petrus Hispanus Tractatus i, 7

194

Porphyrius Isagoge 6, 7 11, 12–16 11, 13–14 12, 24–25

161, 168 59 243, 256 169, 172

‘Quicumque vult salvus esse’ (Symbolum Athanasii) 97 Robertus Grosseteste Commentarius in libros Analyticorum posteriorum i, 2 42 ii, 1 39

357

index locorum Seneca, Lucius Annaeus Epistulae ad Lucilium 58 110

Thomas Aquinas In octo libros Physicorum expositio ii, lect. 3, 164(8) 290

Index codicum manu scriptorum Augsburg Staats- und Stadtbibliothek cod. 2o 342a xiii Basel Universitätsbibliothek cod. f.ii.30 lvi n23 cod. f.v.12 lxxii Berlin Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin–Preußischer Kulturbesitz cod. lat. fol. 852 xxi Bratislava Archív mesta Bratislavy cod. e.l.5 xxi Brugge Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek cod. 477 xvi, lxxxiii, lxxxiii n86, lxxxiiin87, lxxxiii n88, lxxxivn89, cv, cv n123, cxii n139 Buenos Aires Biblioteca Nacional cod. 342r xxi Cambridge Gonville and Caius College Library cod. 448 (409) xlviii, xlix n11, lxxii cod. 512 (543) lxxii Peterhouse Library cod. 192 lxx, lxxi Carpentras Bibliothèque Inguimbertine cod. 293 (l. 289) xxi, xxxviii Cesena Biblioteca Malatestiana cod. s.viii.2 lxxi cod. s.viii.5 xv, xvi

Erfurt Universitätsbibliothek cod. ca f. 298 xiii, xvii, cvn122 cod. ca f. 300 xxii cod. ca f. 345 xviiin19 cod. ca f. 357 xxn22 Frankfurt am Main Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek cod. Praed. 52 xxii, xxxviii København Kongelige Bibliotek cod. Ny kgl. Samling 1801 fol. xxxvi, xxxvii

xxiii,

Kraków Biblioteka Jagiellońska cod. 635 xiii, cvn122 cod. 659 xxiii cod. 660 xxiii cod. 661 xxiv cod. 743 xxn22 cod. 1771 xxiv, xxxvi Kremsmünster Bibliothek des Benediktinerstiftes cod. cc 169 xxv, xxxviii Lambach Bibliothek des Benediktinerstiftes cod. Ccl. 175 xxv Liège Bibliothèque de l’Université cod. 114 c xxv London Wellcome Institute for the History of Science cod. l. 15 cv, cvn123 Oxford Balliol College Library cod. 97 xxvi

359

index codicum manu scriptorum Paderborn Erzbischöfliche Akademische Bibliothek cod. VVa 12 xxvi Paris Bibliothèque Nationale de France cod. lat. 14723 xiv n6, xxvii, xxxviii cod. lat. 15888 xx n22 cod. lat. 16621 liv cod. lat. 18160 lxxi Salzburg Stiftsbibliothek St. Peter (Erzabtei) cod. b.ix.24 xxvii, xxxviii Universitätsbibliothek cod. m.ii.311 xxviii

Vaticano (Città del) Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana cod. Chigi lat. e.vi.199 xiii, xivn5, xvi, cvn122 cod. Urb. lat. 1489 xvii cod. Vat. lat. 817 clvn192 cod. Vat. lat. 2163 xivn6, xvii, xviii, xviiin17, xxviii, xxxvi cod. Vat. lat. 2164 xxix cod. Vat. lat. 3013 lxxiin69

Torino Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria cod. g.iv.10 xiv n5, xxviii

Wien Bibliothek des Dominikanerkonvents cod. 107/73 xxix Österreichische Nationalbibliothek cod. 5112 xxx cod. 5332 xxx, xxxviii cod. 5338 xxxi, xxxviii cod. 5367 xxxi cod. 5408 xxn22 cod. 5424 xxxi cod. 5437 xxn22 cod. 5458 xxxii cod. 5481 xxxii

Toulouse Archives départementales de la HauteGaronne cod. 6 xiii, xiv n5, xv, xvi

Zaragoza Biblioteca Capitular de la Seo cod. 15–61 xiv, xivn5, xvi, xvii, xxxiii

Stralsund Stadtarchiv der Hansestadt Stralsund cod. 1050 xxviii

Index nominum All names mentioned in the book, with the exception of Aristotle and John Buridan, are included in this index. Medieval authors (before ca. 1500) are alphabetically listed according to their first names, modern authors according to their last names. Medieval authors are generally mentioned under their English names, except for lesser known authors and authors whose foreign names are currently used in English scholarly literature. Adam Wodeham cxxiii n148 Albert of Saxony xv, xv n9, xvi, xvi n13, xviii, xviiin18, xxv, xxvii, xlvii, lii, lvi, lvin24, lvii, lvii n26, lix, lx, lx n38, lxvi, lxvin53, lxxiii, lxxiv n71, lxxxii, lxxxiii, lxxxiii n86, lxxxvii, xciii, xcv, xcviii, ci, cv, cv n123, cvii, cix, cxiin139, cxiv, cxvi–cxix, cxxx, cxxxi, cxxxiii, cxli, cxlvi, cxlvi n178, cxlvii, cxlviii, cli, clvii, clxii n201, clxiii, clxvi, clxvii, clxix, clxx, clxxii, clxxiv Albert the Great lii, lxxv, lxxxv, lxxxvin93, cxxxi, clxix, clxxii n211, 213, 316 Anaxagoras lii, cxxxi, 138, 212 Andreas (scribe) xxxii Arnzen, R. 296 Aschbach, J. xxxv n60 Athanasius (Ps.-) (Anastasius) 97, 100 Averroes xl, xlviii, lii, liii, liii n17, liv, lvii, lviiin30, lxvii, lxix, lxxxiii, lxxxiv, lxxxvn93, lxxxvi n93, lxxxvii, xcii–xcvi, xcix, xcix n109, c n109, ciii, cxi, cxvi, cxix, cxxviii, cxxix n154, cxxxii, cxxxvi, cxxxviii, cxxxix, cxxxixn164, cxli, cxliv, cxlv n175, cxlvii, cli, cli n187, clvi, clix, clxin199, clxiii, clxiii n203, clxv, clxvii, clxx, clxx n209, clxxi, clxxii, clxxiv, 19, 23, 29, 48, 52, 55–57, 64, 65, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 91, 94, 97, 102, 113, 136, 140, 141, 152, 156–159, 169, 172, 196, 201, 208, 211, 215–217, 221, 223, 230, 232, 234, 240, 250, 251, 253, 254, 256, 276, 277, 289–291, 296, 297, 308, 311, 319, 323–328, 330, 332, 342, 344, 345, 351 Avicenna liii, lxvii, lxxxviii, lxxxix, c, cxxxviii, clv, clxx–clxxii, 36, 61, 74, 112, 274, 276, 323–328

Babey, E. cvin126 Bakker, P.J.J.M. lxv, lxvn51, lxxiin69, cviiin133, cxiin141, cxvin145, cxlixn183, cl n185, 108, 166 Barnes, J. cxn137 Beda (Ps.-) 294 Bekker, I. lxix Benedictus Hesse xxiv, xlviii, lxix, lxixn56, lxxv, lxxviii, lxxx, lxxxii, lxxxv, lxxxvn93, lxxxvii, xciii, xcv, xcviii, cii, cix, cxii, cxiii, cxv–cxxi, cxxvii, cxxix, cxxxi, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxli, cxliii, cxlvi, cli, cliii, clvii, clxiii, clxiiin203, clxvi, clxvii, clxix, clxxi, clxxiii, clxxiv Berger, H. lxxiv, lxxivn74 Bernard of Arezzo xcn99 Berthold of Radiawn xxi Biard, J. xlvin7, lxxviin78 Blackwell, R.J. lxxxiiin84 Boehner, Ph. lviiin30, lviiin32 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 294 Bos, E.P. lxxvin75 Brown, S. lviiin30, lviiin32, lxxi, lxxii Carmody, F.J. 296 Caroti, S. xlviin10, lvn22, lxin40, lxii, lxii n44, lxiv, lxivn48, lxvn49, lxxiii, lxxviin78, cviiin134, cxxxixn162 Celeyrette, J. xlvii, xlviin10, lvn21, lxii n44, lxxiii, lxxviin78, cviin130, clxiin201 Chandler, B. lxin40 Collegium Conimbricense lxix, lxxv, lxxviii, lxxxii, xciii, xcv, xcviii, cix, cxv–cxvii, cxix, cxxix, cxxxi, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cli, cliv, clivn191, clvii, clxiv, clxvii Conradus de Burgkunstat xxx Conradus Holbeyn de Gelnhausen xxx

361

index nominum Cosman, M.P. lxi n40 Courtenay, W.J. xlvi, xlvi n7, lx n39, lxi, lxin40, lxin41, lxi n43, lxv n50, lxixn55, lxxi, lxxi n62, lxxvii n76 Crawford, F.S. 71, 113 Cristannus Vrowyn (Vrowein) de Zusato xxxii De Libera, A. lxxvin75 Dekker, D.-J. xxn22, xxi n24, xxiii n29, xxivn33, xxivn34, xxvi n38, xxviii n43, xxxiiin55, xxxiiin56, xxxv, xxxv n57, xxxvn58, xxxvn59, lxxii n69 Delorme, F.M. lxx, xcvi n105, cxxviii n153, cxxxiiin157 Dewender, Th. xx n22, xliv, xliv n2, xlivn3, lxn38, lxix n57, lxxv Di Liscia, D.A. xxi n25 Dittrich, A. xxxvn60 Donati, S. lxx, lxxn60, lxxxv n92, ciiin116 Duba, W. cvi n126 Duhamel, M. xxi n26 Duhem, P. xliv Dullaert, J. xxxiii, xxxiii n56, xxxvi, xl Durandus of Saint-Pourçain cliv n191 Dyke, C. van xlv n4 Ebbesen, S. xix n20, lxxxix n98 Eckermann, W. lxxiii Emden, A.B. lxx n60 Etienne Gaudet liv Etzkorn, G.J. cvin126

Gál, G. lviiin32, cixn136 Galilei, G. xliii, xliv Gehrt, W. xiiin4 Georgius Tielesch de Posonio xxi Gerard of Odo lxxiii, cxxixn154 Giles of Rome lxxxv, lxxxvin93 Grandjean, M.-L. xxvn36 Grassi, C.A. civn120 Graye, R.K. cxn137 Green Pedersen, N.J. cxxvin149 Gregory of Rimini lxi, lxi n41, cxxiiin148 Grellard, C. lvn21, xcn99, cviiin135 Hamesse, J. xl Hardie, R.P. cxn137 Harrison Thomson, S. lxxii n66 Hengst, K. xxvin39 Henricus (scribe) xxxii Henricus de Austria xxix Henricus de Cremona xxiv, xxiv n34 Henricus de Tremonia xxivn34 Heraclitus 110 Hermannus de Curis xxii Hieronymus Goryn xxiv Hinz, U. xxvin39 Hossfeld, P. 213, 316 Hranitzky, K. xxxin50 Hugolinus of Orvieto lxxiii, lxxxi, lxxxi n83, xcviii, xcviiin108, ci, cin110, cix, cxiv, cxix, cxxix, cxxxi, cxli, cxli n170, cxliii, clvii, clxvi, clxvii, clxxiv, clxxivn214 Imbach, R.

Faral, E. xvii, xviin14, xvii n15 Fidora, A. xciin100, clxiv n204 Fingernagel, A. xxxi n50, xxxi n51, xxxiin53 Flüeler, C. xixn20 Francesc Marbres (alias John the Canon) xlviii, xlixn12, lxviii, lxxii, lxxiii, lxxxi, xcvii, cviii, cix n136, cxxix, cxxixn154, cxxx, cxxxiii, cxxxiii n158, clvii, clxiii Francis of Marchia lxviii, lxxiii, cvi, cvin126, cvin127, cix n136, cxxix n154 Francis of Meyronnes lxxiii Friedman, R.L. xix n20, lxxxix n98

xlivn2

Javellus, C. lxxxvin93, xcixn109, cn109 Johannes Albonis xxii Johannes de Arbore xxii Johannes de Hammelburg xxv Johannes de Sacrobosco 291 Johannes de Wacfeld lxxi Johannes Gartner xxx Johannes Marsilii (?) xlviii, lxn38, lxxiv, lxxviii, lxxxvii, xciii, xcv, xcviii, cii, cix, cxii, cxiv, cxvi–cxix, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxli, cxliii, cli, clvii, clxiii, clxvi, clxvii, clxxi, clxxii, clxxiv Johannes Peraudi Vienensis xxiii Johannes Theobaldi xxiii

362 Johannes Willisch xxiv John Duns Scotus lx n38, lxxiii, lxxiv, cixn136, cxxxiii n158, cliv n191, clv, clvn192 John of Jandun xxxiii n56, xlviii, xlix, xlixn13, l, li, li n14, li n15, li n16, lii, liii, liiin18, liv, lvi, lxvii, lxxi, lxxii, lxxxi, lxxxv, lxxxvi, lxxxvi n93, lxxxvin94, xciii, xcv, xcvii, c, ciii, cviii, cxiii, cxiv, cxvi–cxix, cxxix, cxxxi, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cli, clii, cliin188, cliii, cliv n191, clvii, clx, clxin199, clxiii, clxvii, clxxii, clxxiin211, clxxiv, clxxiv n213 John of Mirecourt lvi, lxii, lxii n44, lxiii, lxiv, cviii John the Canon, see Francesc Marbres John Wyclif lxix Jørgensen, E. xxiii n29 Kaluza, Z. lxvin51 Kenny, A. lxxvin75 Kink, R. xxxvn60 Kirschner, S. xlvii n10, lxii n44, lxxiii Kittelson, J.M. lxi n41 Klima, G. xliiin1, xliv, xlv, xlv n4, lxvii, lxxxivn90, lxxxix n98, xcii, xcii n101 Knebel, S.V. clxx n208 Koertge, N. xiiin1 Kowalczyk, M. xxiii n30, xxiii n31, xxiv n32 Kozłowska, A. xxiii n30 Kretzmann, N. lxxvi n75

index nominum xxixn46, ciin113, civn117, cv, cvn123, cvi, cvin127, cvin128, cvii, clxiv, clxivn204 Maierù, A. xlivn2 Marichal, R. xxiin26, xxviin40 Markowski, M. xvn7, xviin15, xxn22, xxiin27, xxiiin30, xxiiin31, xxivn32, xxv n35, xxviin41, xxviiin42, xxixn47, xxx n48, xxxn49, xxxin50, xxxin51, xxxin52, xxxiin53, xxxiin54, xxxvn60 Marsilius of Inghen xxn22, xxivn34, xxx, xlvii, liv, lvii, lx, lxn38, lxxiii, lxxiv, lxxivn74, lxxxvii, xciii, xcv, xcviii, cii, cvn123, cix, cxiii, cxiv, cxiv n143, cxv n144, cxviii, cxix, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxli, cxliii, clvii, clxiii, clxiiin203, clxvi, clxvii, clxx, clxxii, clxxiv Mazet, E. xlviin10, lxxiii Mazzatinti, G. xxviiin44 McCord Adams, M. clxivn204 Michael, B. xiiin1, xiiin3, xv, xvn8, xvn9, xvi n10, xixn21, xxn22, xxin23, xxin26, xxiin28, xxiiin29, xxiiin30, xxiiin31, xxivn32, xxivn34, xxvn35, xxvn36, xxvin37, xxviin40, xxviin41, xxviiin42, xxviiin44, xxviiin45, xxixn46, xxixn47, xxx n48, xxxn49, xxxin50, xxxin51, xxxiin53, xxxiin54, xxxiiin56 Minio-Paluello, L. 59, 161, 168, 169, 172, 243, 256 Moody, E.A. 251 Moreau, B. xxxiiin56 Mueller, I. clixn195 Murdoch, J.E. xliv, xlivn2, xlivn3, lxi n40, lxxin63, civn119 Mynors, R.A.B. xxvin37

Landulph Caracciolo lxviii, lxxiii Lawrence of Lindores xliv, xlviii, lxix, lxixn57, lxxv, lxxviii, lxxx, lxxxii, lxxxvii, xcv, xcviii, cii, cix, cxii– cxiv, cxvi–cxxi, cxxvii, cxxix, cxxxi, Nicholas of Autrecourt lxix, lxxviin76, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxli, cxliii, cxlvi, cli, lxxxviin95, xc, xcn99, cviii cliii, clvii, clxiii, clxvii, clxix, clxxi, Nicole Oresme xlvii, xlviin10, lii, liv, clxxii, clxxiv liv n20, lvi, lvin25, lvii, lviin27, Leibold, G. lvn21, lxxi lvii n28, lviii, lviiin29, lviiin30, Lokert, G. lxxiii, cxii n139 lviiin31, lviiin32, lviiin33, lix, lixn34, Lommatzsch, E. 311, 347 lix n35, lx, lxn37, lxn38, lxi, lxii, Lutz-Bachmann, M. xcii n100, clxiv n204 lxii n44, lxv, lxvi, lxviii, lxxiii, lxxxvii, lxxxviin95, lxxxviin96, Maggiòlo, M. 290 lxxxviii, lxxxviiin97, xcn99, xciii, Maier, A. xiiin2, xiv n6, xv n7, xvii, xcv, xcviii, ci, cin111, cii, ciin112, xviin16, xviiin17, xxviii n45, xxix, ciii n116, cvii–cix, cxii, cxiin140,

index nominum cxiv, cxvi, cxxv, cxxxix, cxxxix n161, cxxxixn162, cxli, cxliii, cxlvi, cxlvii, cxlviin179, cxlviii, cli, clvi n192, clxiin201, clxiii, clxvi, clxvii, clxxii, clxxiv Pasnau, R. xlv n4 Patar, B. xvn7, xvn9, xvi, xvi n11, xvi n12, xvin13, xxvin37, lvi n24, lxxiv, lxxxiiin86, lxxxiii n87, lxxxiii n88, lxxxivn89, cv, cvn122, cv n123, cv n124, cvii, cviin129 Pattin, A. xxvi n36 Paulus de Worczin xxiii Paulus Soncinas cliv n191 Pelzer, A. cvii n132 Peter Aureol lxviii, cix n136, cxxix n154, cxxxiiin158 Peter of Spain xlv, cxxviii, cxxviii n151, 194 Petrus de Alemania xxix Petrus Goryn xxiv Petrus Johannis Olivi civ n117, cvi Pettegree, A. xxxiii n56 Pinborg, J. lxxvi n75 Pinzani, R. lvn22 Pirker-Aurenhammer, V. xxxi n50 Pironet, F. cxxvii n150 Plato clv, 60, 62, 63, 225, 229, 276 Pomponazzi, P. lxxxvi n93 Porphyry 59, 161, 168, 169, 172, 243, 247, 256 Powitz, G. xxiin28 Radulphus Brito lii, liv, lxviii n55, lxxi, lxxxi, xciii, xcv, c, cviii, cxiii, cxvii–cxix, cxxix, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxl, clvi, clxiii, clxvi, clxix, clxx, clxxii, clxxiv Reynolds, L.D. 110 Richter, V. lvn21, lxxi Rijk, L.M. de xc n99, cxxviii n151, 194 Robert Grosseteste lxxxviii, xc, xci, 39, 42 Robert, A. lvn21, cviii n135 Roger Bacon lii, lxx, xcvi, cxxviii, cxxxiii, cxl, cxln165 Roland, M. xxxin50 Rosier-Catach, I. xlvi n7 Rossi, P. 39, 42

363 Rota, M. cxlviii, cxlixn180, cxlixn181, cxlix n182, cxlixn183 Samaran, Ch. xxiin26, xxviin40 Sarnowsky, J. xviiin18, xviii n19, lvi, lvi n26, lixn36, cv, cvn124 Seneca, Lucius Annaeus 110 Seńko, W. xxviin40 Simader, F. xxxin50 Sobol, P.G. 86, 166 Solère, J.-L. lxvin51 Sopko, J. xxin24 Sorbelli, A. xxviiin44 Souffrin, P. lxin40 Spade, P.V. lxn39, lxxvin75 Spath, R.J. lxxxiiin84 Speer, A. clxxn208 Spirk, A.F. xxxvn60 Steele, R. lxx, xcvin105, cxxviiin153, cxxxiiin157 Stegmüller, F. lxiiin45, lxivn46, lxivn47, lxiv n48 Streijger, M. cxiin141, 108, 166 Suarez-Nani, T. cvin126 Sylla, E.D. xlivn3, xlixn11, lxin40, lxi n42, lxvin52, lxviiin54, lxxn59, lxxii n65, xciin100, civn119, cxvin145, clii n189, clvin192 Themistius clv, 276 Themon Judaeus xlvii, lx Thijssen, J.M.M.H. xiiin1, xiiin2, xiv n7, xv n7, xvn9, xvin13, xviiin18, xxn22, xxxv n57, xxxvn58, xlvin6, xlvii, xlvii n8, xlviin9, lviin26, lxn38, lxv n50, lxvn51, lxvin53, lxviiin54, xc n99, cxiin141, 108, 166 Thirkel, W.E. lxxxiiin84 Thomas Aquinas lxxxiii, lxxxiiin84, lxxxiiin85, lxxxvi, lxxxvin93, lxxxvi n94, xcix, xcixn109, c, cvin127, cxlviii, cxlix, cxlixn181, clix, clxii, 289, 290, 292 Thomas Bradwardine lxvi, cxv Thomas Wylton lii, lxxi, lxxiii, xciii, xcv, xcvii, c, cxvi, cxix, cxxix, cxxix n154, cxxxi, cxxxiii, cxxxiiin158, cxxxv, cli, clvi, clxiii, clxvi, clxvii, clxx

364

index nominum

Thorndike, L. 291 Tobler, A. 311, 347 Transue, P.J. lxin41 Trifogli, C. lxxi, clxiv n204 Unterkircher, F. xxxiin54 Van Riet, S.

xxx n49, xxxi n52,

36, 61, 74, 112, 274

Włodek, Z. xxiiin30, xxiii n31, xxiv n32, xxxvn60 Walsby, M. xxxiii n56 Walter Burley xlviii, xlix, xlix n11, lii–liv, livn19, lv, lv n22, lvi–lix, lixn34, lxi, lxvii, lxviii, lxxii, lxxiin64, lxxiii, lxxxi, lxxxv, lxxxvii, xciin100, xciii, xcv, xcvii, xcvii n107, c, ci, cix, cxvi–cxix, cxxix–cxxxi, cxxxiii, cxxxv, cxxxviii, cxxxviii n160, cxli, cxlviii, cli, clv, clv n192, clvi, clvin192, clvii, clvii n194, clxvi, clxx, clxxn209, clxxii, clxxiv Wegener, L. clxx n208 Wielgus, S. xxn22, lx n38, lxix n56, lxxv William de Bonkes lxx, lxx n60 William Grey xxvi William Heytesbury cxv William of Chelveston (?) lxx, lxxxi, xciii, xcv, cxv, cxix, cxxix, cxxxv

William of Moerbeke 93 William of Ockham xlv, xlvi, xlviii, xlix, lii–lv, lvn21, lvi, lvii, lvii n28, lviii, lviiin30, lviiin32, lix, lx, lxn39, lxi, lxin40, lxiii, lxv, lxvi, lxvi n53, lxvii, lxxi–lxxiii, lxxvii, lxxxin81, lxxxiv, lxxxv, lxxxvn91, xcvii, xcviin106, xcviiin108, c, cin111, cii, cii n112, ciii, civ, civn117, civn120, cv, cvi, cvin127, cvii, cviii, cviii n134, cviiin136, cixn136, cxxiii, cxxv, cxxvii, cxxixn154, cxxxviii, cxl, cxl n166, cxln167, cxln168, cxli, cxlii, cxlv, cxlvn175, cxlvi, cxlvin177, cxlvii–cxlix, clivn191, clvi, clix, clixn196, clx, clxn197, clxn198, clxi, clxii, clxiin200, clxiv Wittgenstein, L. xlv, lxvii Wood, R. lxin42, lxxiin66, lxxiin67 Zalta, E.N. xlvn5 Zathey, G. xxiiin30 Zimmermann, A. lxviiin55, lxxn58, lxxin61, lxxiin68, lxxxvn92 Zupko, J. xliii, xliiin1, xlv, xlvn5, xlvin6, lxvn51, lxviiin54, lxxiii, xc n99, cxlixn184, 37, 45 Zwiercan, M. xxiiin30