Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing 3031220528, 9783031220524

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PSIR · PALGRAVE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing

Lionel P. Fatton

Palgrave Studies in International Relations

Series Editors Knud Erik Jørgensen, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark J. Marshall Beier, Political Science, McMaster University, Milton, ON, Canada

Palgrave Studies in International Relations provides scholars with the best theoretically-informed scholarship on the global issues of our time. The series includes cutting-edge monographs and edited collections which bridge schools of thought and cross the boundaries of conventional fields of study. Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus University, Denmark, and at Ya¸sar University, Izmir, Turkey.

Lionel P. Fatton

Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing

Lionel P. Fatton Department of International Relations Webster University Geneva Bellevue, Switzerland

Palgrave Studies in International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-22052-4 ISBN 978-3-031-22053-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: abzee/getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Nozomi and Saya, may you learn from the past to build the future.

Foreword

Foreword to Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing by Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. I remember the day Dr. Lionel Fatton asked the question that underlies this book, many years ago. “Why do states begin wars?” He went on to say: “All wars are madness, but especially puzzling is why Japan began the war against the United States.” Why, indeed? Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor and start a war against an enemy much stronger than itself is a mystery. Scholars of International Relations have sought explanations in the irrationality of Japanese thinking at the time. Some saw the source of irrationality in the Japanese culture. Others found the source in the malfunction of the state being hijacked by a small number of groups. It was thus with great pleasure and excitement that I turned the pages of this book to find out Dr. Fatton’s answer. Dr. Fatton argues the cause was overbalancing—not madness. The process of the war began when Japan turned its back to a naval arms control regime in the 1930s. Japan was one of the victors of the First World War and enjoyed a seat among the major powers. And yet, it walked away from the international order and began its path to unilateralism. Japan overbalanced, which led to reactions from the other countries, resulting in a spiral. Security dilemma ensued. Japan seeking to achieve security, in the end, decreased its security by walking away from the naval treaty.

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Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing traces the process through which Japan shifted from adequate balancing to overbalancing. The book shows how certain domestic conditions and international crisis allowed the military and the navy to convince other groups in the foreign policy establishment and the nation of an inflated threat perception, hence the necessity to prepare for war against the United States. Overbalancing was rooted in the perceptual and policy biases of the military institution. The book begins the analysis in the 1910–1920s when Japan’s threat perception toward the United States was benign, even though the relationship was sometimes tense. Japan correctly assessed the American intention not to be malign and sought cooperation with the major powers. This provided the Japanese government with the flexibility to reach a compromise on naval arms control at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. The Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933 was the exogenous shock that changed Japan’s threat perception. With the extensive use of archival materials from both Japanese and English language sources, Dr. Fatton describes the thinking and assessments different groups within the Japanese and American foreign policy establishments had of the Manchurian crisis. While the institutional biases of military services to overbalance may not be unique to Japan, the book shows how the Japanese navy, helped by dysfunctions in the structure of Japanese civil– military relations, successfully disseminated its inflated threat perception to other members of the foreign policy establishment. The Manchurian crisis alarmed many Japanese policymakers as well as the public. The book also illustrates how the economic crisis and the discontent of the Japanese public toward the Japanese government and the distrust of the American government paved the way for the navy to promote its views. The United States was identified to have the capability and the intent to harm the national security of Japan. A strong naval force was the solution to deter and defeat American aggression. Japan overbalanced. The book should be of great interest to many but especially to three types of readers. First, readers interested in the causes and prevention of war will learn greatly from this book. The book shows how international conditions are combined with domestic conditions to produce a preference for overbalancing. Second, readers interested in threat perception will find a process through which certain versions of threat perception are propagated to become the national threat perception. Third, those interested in the history of Japan leading up to the Pacific War will enjoy the

FOREWORD

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detailed account of how the moderate and cooperative foreign policy of Japan changed to a unilateral and non-cooperative one. The question of why Japan moved away from international cooperation and began the path to the war, sadly, is more relevant today than it has been in decades. Will China choose to remain in the current international system? Can the United States and Japan accommodate China? Are the United States, Japan and China balancing adequately? Or are they overbalancing? Do the countries have the necessary institutions to make the correct assessment of the situation? The readers of Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing will find insights into answering these questions. The hope is we will be wiser to make the right choices for the future. Tokyo, Japan

Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki

Preface

As far as I remember, war has always intrigued me. Not because I grew up isolated from human violence, quite the contrary. It did not take me long to realize that human beings are aggressive, brutal and even cruel not because of their nature, but because violence is sometimes perceived as the only way to protect oneself and loved ones. The origin of human violence cannot be condemned. It is rooted in human weaknesses, and actually comes from a noble intention. In society, however, this intention may transform human beings into predators. Homo homini lupus est. And in the society of states, countries repeat the same behavioral pattern. Si vis pacem para bellum. Human history is a tragedy, and war is a fatality. This conclusion was, and still is, the bedrock of my fascination for armed conflicts. In investigating war, one question has particularly puzzled me: how and why the sum of choices made by apparently rational actors can lead to the formulation of irrational policies resulting in interstate conflict? My interest in Japan’s rush to the Pacific War through unfettered naval expansion emerged when I was attending Waseda University, working on Tokyo’s decision to attack the United States in December 1941. Although, after years of study, the reasons behind the decision appeared clearer, I was still unable to understand how the country reached that point where it had the choice between a desperate war and a slow death by suffocation. I felt the need to dig into the topic, and to go back to the origins of a road to ruin for Japan. The present book is the result of

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this intellectual struggle. I hope that it sheds light on some aspects of this particular tragedy. I would like to express my profound gratitude to the persons who provoked my intellectual curiosity for this topic, Professors Ueki Kawakatsu Chikako (Waseda University) and Karoline Postel-Vinay (Sciences Po Paris). I also thank those who helped me in different ways and at different stages of the journey, including Deguchi Tomohiro, Alain Guidetti, Gil Honegger, It¯o Hitoshi, Kond¯o Masaki, Joyce Lacroix, José Lima, Matsuo Ichir¯ o, Maxence Iida, Nuno Pinheiro, Hamilton Chase Shields and Tsukamoto Katsuya. I want to express my sincere appreciation of the support I received from the archive teams of the National Institute for Defense Studies and of the National Diet Library in Tokyo, and from Webster University Geneva in the form of a research grant. Lastly, a special thanks to my friends and relatives who, despite not having been directly involved in the book project, provided me with support, comfort and joy along the way: to the RDF and Interstar crews, Albert, Aubred, Aurèle, Bourbine, Damien, Djamil, Edi, Fabio, Fawzi, Guillaume, Lorenzo, Malek, Marc, Milos, Nourdine, Olivier, Scott, Shyaka, Tuan, Vache and Yann; to my sister and parents for their devotion and backing throughout; to my mother-in-law, who took care of me during my stays in Japan, and to my father-in-law, who put his trust in me before leaving us so soon; to my wife and my daughters, who have always been present for me, helped me understand the real meaning of things and made me a better man. Bellevue, Switzerland

Lionel P. Fatton

Contents

1

Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology The Phenomenon of Overbalancing Why Did Japan Rush to the Pacific War? The Argument Overview

1 1 8 16 21

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Explaining Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and Overbalancing Neorealism and Overbalancing Neoclassical Realism as a Complement to Neorealism Neoclassical Realism, Domestic Factors and Identity Crisis Putting Neoclassical Realism Back on Track Mechanism of Contextual Adaption, Threat Perception and Overbalancing The Foreign Policy Executive and Its Advisors The Mechanism of Contextual Adaption Exogenous Shocks and Threat Perception The Political Construction of Threat Perception The Biases of the Military Institution The Structure of Civil–Military Relations Scope Condition and Paradigmatic Boundaries

25 25 25 29 32 35 39 39 41 44 48 55 61 66

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CONTENTS

Appropriate Balancing in the Naval Arms Control Era, 1920–1931 Improving Threat Perception: Making Peace with the International Community Tense Japan–United States Relations in the Early Twentieth Century Competing Naval Expansions Before the Washington Conference Japan and the League of Nations The League of Nations and Arms Control Prelude to the Washington Conference The Washington Conference Japanese Reactions to the Washington Conference Appropriate Balancing and International Cooperation During the 1920s and Early 1930s Japanese Restraint Toward China From Washington to the Geneva Conference The Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath Prelude to the London Conference The London Conference Japanese Reactions to the London Conference

107 107 114 119 123 126 133

The Manchurian Crisis as an Exogenous Shock, 1931–1933 Exogenous Shock: The Manchurian Crisis The Mukden Incident and Its Aftermath From Manchuria to Shanghai, and Back Again The Settlement of the Manchurian Crisis American Restraint During the Manchurian Crisis American Naval Expansion in the First Half of the 1930s The Construction of Threat Perception Through Securitization Secondary Audience: Socio-economic Background Secondary Audience: Ideological Background The Army’s Securitizing Efforts The Navy’s Securitizing Efforts Primary Audience: Finance and Foreign Ministries Primary Audience: Military Pressure on the Government

139 140 140 146 151 154 167 170 171 174 179 185 193 200

71 72 72 76 80 86 89 93 99

CONTENTS

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Overbalancing and Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, 1933–1941 Inflated Threat Perception and the End of Naval Arms Control The Navy’s Internal Unity Against Arms Control Struggle Over Threat Perception: Drafting Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan Inflated Threat Perception and the Abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty Preparatory Talks for the Second London Conference The Failure of the Second London Conference Overbalancing Through Naval Expansion Japan’s Shift Toward Unilateralism in Foreign Policy Japan’s Overbalancing and the Road to Pearl Harbor Back to the Beginning: The Structure of Japan’s Civil–Military Relations Beyond Japan and the Pacific War Lessons on Overbalancing, Foreign Policy and International Politics On the Neoclassical Realist Agenda

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207 208 208 213 222 227 235 240 240 244 250 259 260 272

Chronology

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Bibliography

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Index

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About the Author

Lionel P. Fatton is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Webster University Geneva and a Research Collaborator at the Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University. His research interests include international and security dynamics in the IndoPacific, China-Japan-U.S. relations, China’s and Japan’s foreign/security policies, civil–military relations and Neoclassical realism. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, specialization in International Relations, from Sciences Po Paris and two M.A. in International Relations from Waseda University and the Geneva Graduate Institute. His publications have appeared in International Relations of the AsiaPacific, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Contemporary Security Policy, among others. His previous book, Japan’s Awakening: Moving toward an Autonomous Security Policy, was published in 2019.

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List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 6.1

International challenge, threat perception and balancing behavior Exogenous shock, inflated threat perception and overbalancing Hypothesis on overbalancing and its scope condition Circular causation between international environment, domestic politics and foreign policy

17 19 69 261

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Convention

This book uses the Modified Hepburn romanization system for Japanese words. Macrons indicate long vowels, with the exception of words that are in common use in English, like Tokyo. The family names of Japanese scholars and historical figures appear first, followed by their given names. The denomination of ships and ideological/historical concepts is given in italics. For the purpose of clarity, the Gregorian calendar is used instead of the Japanese periodization of modern history made according to the name of the reigning Emperor.

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Quotations

“The League was a failure; disarmament was a failure. Perhaps the world should revert to the old days of militarism and engage in armaments race. The Japanese people should fight wars against America and Britain, for unless they are baptized once more by modern warfare, they will not be awakened to the importance of peace.” Reserve Captain Mizuno Hironori “Pour cesser de haïr, il m’a suffi de connaître.” Pierre-Joseph Proudhon

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CHAPTER 1

Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology

The Phenomenon of Overbalancing In the mid-1930s, Japan took a decision that would change the face of the Asia–Pacific region for decades: it withdrew from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relationship between the two Pacific powers, the so-called Washington System. Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, an attack followed by one of the biggest confrontations at sea in human history. By rejecting arms control, Japan overbalanced and began its rush to the Pacific War. Thirty years ago, tragedies of this kind might have seemed features of another era. The end of the Cold War was supposed to open a new age for the international community, characterized by peace and stability, multilateral cooperation, disarmament, the rule of law and economic development. The last two decades have proven the optimists wrong. The United States’ relations with China, Russia, Iran and some other old foes as well as certain partners have deteriorated drastically. Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_1

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infringed on the territorial integrity of two sovereign countries—Georgia and Ukraine—in less than 10 years, intervened militarily in Syria, engulfed in one of the most destructive civil wars ever, and launched a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Libya became another failed state where great power interests clash, similar to Yemen where Saudi Arabia and Iran have fought each other through proxies. China has grown more assertive in its periphery, threatening Southeast Asian and East Asian neighbors. North Korea continues to militarize, whereas Cold War-era arms control agreements are crumbling one after the other. How could it have been otherwise? The myth of hegemonic peace among middle and great powers was doomed to evaporate, and their relations to revert to their brutal dynamics. Conflict is a standard feature of human history. Some scholars of international relations have explained the tendency toward rivalry by emphasizing the nasty and greedy human nature and the domestic characteristics of countries, such as their political regimes and ideologies, their economic systems and their social dynamics.1 Highlighting that throughout history wars have been fought by a wide variety of organized socio-political entities, from tribes to nation-states, and therefore that rivalry cannot be accounted for by domestic attributes, others have identified the anarchic nature of the international system and its consequences for countries’ behaviors as the primary source of conflicts.2 In the absence of a global policeman able to regulate relations between countries, the latter strive to survive by accumulating power for protection, raising concerns about possible hostile intentions and ultimately impacting international stability. Both approaches, domestic and international, have merits. Both are incomplete, however. Domestic arguments advanced by classical realists and others have the advantage of being able to investigate the micro-foundations of conflicts, but provide no clue to understanding the recurrence of war across time and place. The international, or systemic,

1 Raymond Aron. 2004. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Huitième édition. Paris, Calmann-Lévy; Hans J. Morgenthau. 1948. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: A.A. Knopf. 2 Robert Gilpin. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Kenneth N. Waltz. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing.

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approach promoted primarily by neorealists possesses the opposite weakness. Although it helps diagnose circumstantial elements common to different conflicts, it fails to dig into countries’ rationale in using armed forces against others. Kenneth Waltz recognized this saying: The origins of hot wars lie in cold wars, and the origins of cold wars are found in the anarchic ordering of the international arena. The recurrence of war is explained by the structure of the international system. […] Any given war is explained not by looking at the structure of the internationalpolitical system but by looking at the particularities within it: the situations, the characters, and the interactions of states.3

Neoclassical realism, which emanated from flaws in Neorealism, including what was regarded as the latter’s inability to explain the peaceful end of the Cold War, has attempted to reconcile the domestic and international levels of analysis.4 Alexander Reichwein notes that “neoclassical realists accentuate systemic factors as well as cognitive and domestic factors as a common set of intervening variables translating systemic constraints into foreign policy.”5 Given its epistemological orientation and its ability to bridge the two levels of analysis, I consider Neoclassical realism as the most suitable approach for investigating the phenomenon of overbalancing, a highly destabilizing state behavior on which this book focuses. Classical realism cannot account for the recurrence of overbalancing throughout history while, as shown in the next chapter, the main variants of Neorealism fail to satisfactorily explain the phenomenon. Overbalancing is a sub-category of balancing in international affairs. Under anarchy, countries amass military power through the extraction and mobilization of national resources and may forge alliances in order

3 Kenneth N. Waltz, 1988, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4): 620. 4 Another response to the loss of credibility of Neorealism was the emergence of an elaborated form of the sub-paradigm that emphasizes the importance of “structural modifiers,” such as geography and the offense-defense balance of military technology, to explain international dynamics. Jacek Wi˛ecławski, 2017, Neoclassical Realism and the Crisis of the Realist Paradigm in Contemporary International Relations, My´sl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna 57(2): 199. 5 Alexander Reichwein, 2012, The Tradition of Neoclassical Realism, in Neoclassical Realism in European Politics: Bringing Power Back in, ed. Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 34.

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to deter aggression or prevent being put in a position of submission visà-vis stronger opponents.6 Waltz observes that “weakness may invite an attack that greater strength would dissuade an adversary from launching. Excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts. Power is a possibly useful means, and sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it.”7 Inappropriate balancing stands for the failure to reach this amount of power.8 Nonbalancing occurs when a country does not balance, and underbalancing when it does but insufficiently to guarantee national security. The behavior of the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1980s, when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev refrained from entering the new arms race started by American President Ronald Reagan, can be categorized as nonbalancing, while instances of underbalancing include France and the United Kingdom’s restrained security policies toward Germany in the 1930s. Overbalancing denotes the accumulation of too much military power and/or the formation of too strong alliances in view of the threat to a country’s national security.9 The endeavor

6 Kenneth Waltz calls unilateral military buildup and alliance formation “internal balancing” and “external balancing,” respectively. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168. See also: Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 156–7; Randall L. Schweller, 2006, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 9; Stephen M. Walt, 1987, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 12–3. On the advantages and disadvantages of these two balancing behaviors, see: Michael F. Altfeld. 1984. The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test. Political Research Quarterly 37(4): 523–44; John A.C. Conybeare. 1994. Arms versus Alliances: The Capital Structure of Military Enterprise. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 215–35; Gerald L. Sorokin. 1994. Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 298–325. 7 Kenneth N. Waltz, 2008, Realism and International Politics, New York: Routledge,

79. 8 Randall L. Schweller, 2004, Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing, International Security 29(2): 167–8. 9 Overbalancing, as understood here, is different from countries’ ad hoc overreaction to specific international developments, typically during crises. Overbalancing pertains to the formulation of a country’s foreign policy in reaction to the perceived behavior of one or more other countries. Domestic factors revolving around institutional structures and dynamics are central to any explanation of overbalancing. Ad hoc overreaction is not directly associated with foreign policy, and relates more to small group dynamics, constraints on information processing and psychological factors, such as the cognitive biases of policymakers. Moshe Maor, Overreaction and Bubbles in Politics and Policy,

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is illustrated by the military growth and expanding alliance network of Wilhelm Germany in the early twentieth century, which triggered a naval arms race with the United Kingdom and the formation of the Triple Entente, and, as discussed in this book, by Japan’s naval buildup against the United States during the second half of the 1930s and the early 1940s.10 Detrimental counteractions provoked by overbalancing are outlined by a mechanism commonly called security dilemma. Overbalancing endangers the security of other countries, which may respond by increasing their military power, seeking new allies or both. This alarms the country that initially overbalanced. The latter usually perceives its own security policy as defensive, justified and reasonable and the counteractions from other countries as suspicious or reflecting hostile intentions, and in turn reacts. The outcome is a vicious action–reaction cycle of competing military buildups, often dubbed arms race, and possibly of alliance formations that magnifies international tensions and leads to an ever-worsening security situation for all countries, and even to war.11 Overbalancing shares some similarities with the phenomenon of overexpansion. Countries that overexpand project their military power outside their territory, at the expense of others, in an attempt to bolster their security through the absorption of resources, the acquisition or defense of strategic peripheral areas and the like. Inversely to expansion, overexpansion is self-defeating because it leads to overextension and/or counteractions resulting in self-encirclement. Overextension refers to the “persistent expansion into the hinterland beyond the point where costs

in The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science, ed. Alex Mintz and Lesley Terris, Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/ 35427/chapter-abstract/303188901?redirectedFrom=fulltext#no-access-message, accessed 19 October 2022. 10 Richard Sakwa views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastward expansion from the end of the Cold War to the early 2010s as a “spectacular case of over-balancing.” Richard Sakwa, 2018, The International System and the Clash of World Orders, in Multipolarity: The Promise of Disharmony, ed. Peter W. Schulze, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 27. 11 Robert Jervis claims that the security dilemma “appears once we realize that while arming (or making alliances) can end up heightening tensions, making the state less secure, and even producing an unnecessary war, the failure to take such precautions can endanger the state if it is faced by adversaries who will take advantage of its weakness.” Robert Jervis, 2011, Dilemmas about Security Dilemmas, Security Studies 20(3): 416.

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begin to outstrip benefits” and self-encirclement to the formation of an “overwhelming coalition of opposing states.”12 Therefore, if the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 can be considered an instance of expansion, because it prompted only limited international retributions compared with the gains made, Nazi Germany’s endeavor to conquer the Lebensraum was a flagrant example of overexpansion. By pushing into Central and then Eastern Europe, Germany depleted its own resources in quagmires and triggered a counter-coalition made of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, eventually leading to its defeat in 1945. Overbalancing and overexpansion can be understood as belonging to a broader pattern of international behaviors, which I call systemic overreacting . Systemic overreacting are foreign policies that trigger counteractions from other countries and detrimental consequences for national interests, notably through competing military buildups and self-encirclement.13 These behaviors are thus counterproductive, or suboptimal. They are also irrational in view of their outcomes.14 This book focuses exclusively on overbalancing, and despite similarities in regard to repercussions on countries’ national interests, the latter phenomenon must be kept analytically distinct from overexpansion. This 12 Jack L. Snyder, 1991, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 6. 13 The concept of systemic overreacting shares some similarities with Thomas Christensen’s “overactive policies.” The latter include “those that waste valuable resources on areas of peripheral value to national security (e.g., American intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and those that needlessly either increase the number and power of one’s enemies or decrease the number and strength of one’s allies (e.g., Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution).” Thomas J. Christensen, 1996, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 13. 14 The debate on what rationality means in international politics has been polarizing and inconclusive. I here adopt the perspective of John Mearsheimer, who says: “To assume that states are rational is to say that they are aware of their external environment and they think intelligently about how to maximize their prospects for survival. In particular, they try to gauge the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the actions of those other states, as well as how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy. When they look at the different strategies that they have to choose between, they assess the likelihood of success as well as the costs and benefits of each one. Finally, states pay attention not only to the immediate consequences of their actions, but to the long-term effects as well.” John J. Mearsheimer, 2009, Reckless States and Realism, International Relations 23(2): 244.

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is because the impulse behind and the causal mechanisms underlying these two instances of systemic overreacting are different. Overexpansion usually occurs when the international environment offers initial opportunities for expansion, in the form of a power vacuum or an advantageous balance of power for example, whereas overbalancing is an inadequate response to a perceived threat to national security. Moreover, for a country to overexpand outside its borders is more demanding in terms of resource mobilization, and consequently requires a higher degree of political and social consensus, than overbalancing. The central question I address in this book is: Why do countries overbalance given the damaging consequences and the dangers associated with this endeavor? This is an important question. Not only does overbalancing raise the risk of spiraling tensions and conflicts between countries, the phenomenon can also be expected to remain an important feature of international affairs in the twenty-first century.15 As argued in the following pages, overbalancing is closely related to countries’ misperception of their international environment, an inherent characteristic of international politics, but particularly common during periods of systemic stress. Overbalancing is a systemic pathology. If today scholars debate about the degree and novelty of Beijing’s assertiveness amid the intensifying strategic competition with Washington, in the next few decades the debate will likely shift to whether China is overbalancing against the United States.16

15 Inversely, the frequency of overexpansion will most likely continue to decline because, among other reasons: economic wealth is increasingly generated by services and the exploitation of new technologies, reducing the relative value of land and thus the incentive for invasion; the world economy is highly interconnected and prospers on stable supply chains, which are disrupted by territorial expansion; recent conflicts, such as the RussoUkrainian War, have demonstrated that the era of nationalism and communitarianism is not over, making difficult and costly for an invader to control local populations. 16 Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu and Alastair I. Johnston. 2013–2014. Correspondence: Debating China’s Assertiveness. International Security 38(3): 176–83; Björn Jerdén. 2014. The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(1): 47–88; Alastair I. Johnston. 2013. How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness? International Security 37(4): 7–48; Yves-Heng Lim. 2015. How (Dis)Satisfied is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective. Journal of Contemporary China 24(92): 280–97; Camilla T.N. Sorensen. 2013. Is China Becoming More Aggressive? A Neoclassical Realist Analysis. Asian Perspective 37(3): 363–85; Chengqiu Wu. 2020. Ideational Differences, Perception Gaps, and the Emerging Sino-US Rivarly. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 13(1): 27–68;

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Why Did Japan Rush to the Pacific War? I investigate the phenomenon of overbalancing through an in-depth analysis of Japan’s foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s. This case was chosen for five main reasons. First, enough sources are available to track the political construction of threat perception inside the Japanese state apparatus. This is necessary because Neoclassical realism, which agenda I aim at advancing, entails a “detailed historical analysis.”17 Second, partly because Japan and the United States were members of an arms control regime, the Japanese navy produced several studies on the amount of naval power deemed necessary to guarantee national security. These studies not only provide important information on the perception the naval institution had of geostrategic realities, they also clearly identify the United States as the main target of Japan’s balancing efforts. This is necessary because, as Steven Lobell points out, “balancing requires a target. Military spending not directed against another state or states is not balancing.”18 Third, and related to the previous point, the acceleration of Japan’s naval expansion in the mid-1930s was an obvious instance of overbalancing in view of the country’s international environment, maximizing experimental variance. Fourth, refining our understanding of the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of the Japanese case, and from a neoclassical realist perspective, contributes to the Global International Relations research agenda. The latter emerged based on the recognition that “contemporary mainstream IR theory is not much more than an abstraction of Western history interwoven with Western political theory,” the United States enjoying a singular dominance among other Western countries

Minghao Zhao. 2019. Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on USChina Strategic Competition. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 12(3): 371–94; Jianren Zhou. 2019. Power Transition and Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: Why China and the US March towards Strategic Competition? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 12(1): 1–34. 17 Gideon Rose, 1998, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics 51(1): 167. 18 Steven E. Lobell, 2018, A Granular Theory of Balancing, International Studies Quarterly 62(3): 596.

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in the discipline.19 In line with Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, and contrary to post-Western and Postcolonialist approaches, I see Global IR as a pluralistic and inclusive agenda that does not reject Western-centric theories, but subsumes them and urges them to shed their ethnocentrism.20 One way to do so is by investigating non-Western cases to uncover new variables or modify existing ones in light of empirical realities, rendering Western theories more relevant to the non-Western world. Because Neoclassical realism operates domestic factors as intervening variables between systemic stimuli and foreign policy outcomes, it fosters contextualized research that, when conducted on non-Western cases, can help to inductively dewesternize the theoretical construct.21 This is what the analysis pursued in the following chapters does. As will be demonstrated, Japan’s overbalancing against the United States was rooted in institutional dynamics, and more precisely in those revolving around civil–military relations. Neoclassical realists have largely failed to incorporate civil–military relations into their arguments and, when they do, only superficially discuss their impacts on state-society interactions.22 Moreover, I argue that the structure of civil–military relations in Japan favored undue military interventions in politics, and consequently overbalancing, by over-depoliticizing the military institution, an assertion that runs against the American-centrist “Normal School of civil-military relations.”23 This in itself is puzzling, because the structure of Japan’s 19 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, 2019, The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2. 20 Ibid., 300–9. 21 Michiel Foulon and Gustav Meibauer, 2020, Realist avenues to global International

Relations, European Journal of International Relations 26(4): 1213–4. 22 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, 2016, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 73–4. Steven Lobell recognizes that civil–military relations may deviate countries’ behaviors away from the expectations of the neorealist balance of power and balance of threat theories. Steven E. Lobell, 2009, Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63. 23 Vasabjit Banerjee and Sean P. Webeck, 2022, Civil-Military Relations: Through a Perilous Lens, Armed Forces & Society, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X2211 08198, accessed 19 October 2022.

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civil–military relations was specifically dedicated to prevent unwarranted military interferences in politics. Something went tragically wrong. It is important to shed light on what happened. The fifth reason to investigate the case of Japan is the fact that the existing literature fails to satisfactorily account for several of the country’s decisions during the interbellum, calling for a novel explanation. Japan’s behavior on the Asian continent in the early 1930s had sparked American condemnations. Amid the growing influence of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang in China, which threatened Japanese interests, members of the Japanese army in Manchuria bombed a railroad in September 1931 and blamed Chinese soldiers positioned nearby. The incident justified a military intervention that ultimately led to the creation, in March 1932, of the puppet state of Manchukuo. In the meantime, fighting had erupted in Shanghai in late January 1932 between Chinese and Japanese residents, provoking another, although small-scale, military expedition by Japan. Relations between Tokyo and Washington deteriorated, the latter being eager to uphold the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. The situation calmed down after the settlement of the Shanghai and Manchurian crises, however. The former was resolved in May 1932 through a ceasefire agreement; the latter was buried by the Tangku Truce of May 1933 between Japan and China. Although it had announced its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations in early 1933, Japan was keen to recover its status of responsible great power, with the help of the United States and the United Kingdom, and to consolidate the gains made in China. The two Anglo-Saxon countries were eager to keep cooperating with Tokyo on a wide range of issues. No other major international development took place before the Japanese government declared, in late 1934, that it would by the end of 1936 disengage from a naval arms control framework. Japan effectively chose unilateralism over cooperation and military power replaced diplomacy. Tokyo took the risk of a serious worsening of relations with the United States to boost naval capabilities, a choice that would be fatal for Japan as war preparation turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The rejection of naval arms control by the Japanese government and the stunningly rapid reversal of its foreign policy, from international cooperation to unilateral military expansion, are puzzling. The regional environment in Asia was relatively stable at that time, including in China. Tokyo knew that Washington wanted to maintain constructive relations

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and work with Japan to prevent the situation from deteriorating once again. Moreover, Japanese leaders were well aware that withdrawing from the arms control regime would trigger a destabilizing arms race with the United States and be highly damaging to Japan’s relationship with this country, the biggest naval power in the Pacific and a key trading partner.24 In other words, Japan overbalanced.25 Why, given the rather stable international environment of the mid-1930s, did the Japanese government decide to pursue unfettered naval expansion? What explains this flagrant overbalancing against the United States? The leading argument in the literature emphasizes the irrational and spiritual dimensions of the Japanese military thinking to explain the behavior of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which allegedly coerced the government to withdraw from the arms control framework and undertake naval expansion. This line of thought, dissected below, is problematic for several reasons. The Japanese navy’s willingness to disengage from the Washington System, at the center of which lay the arms control framework, is sometimes attributed to an irrational appetite for naval expansion and the fact that the inferior ratios of naval strength imposed upon Japan by the arms control regime were regarded as “badges of dishonor” by naval officers.26 However, the naval status quo in the mid-1930s was not considered advantageous by Japanese sailors. The ability of the navy to command the sea in the Western Pacific and protect Japan against an American offensive was weakening while the capacity of the U.S. Navy to project its superior naval power across the Pacific was improving. Moreover, the 1934 Vinson-Trammell Act aimed at bringing the American navy to treaty limits

24 Robert Jervis notes that the main negative aspect of focusing on unilateral military expansion to guarantee national security is not the cost of arms buildup per se, “but rather the sacrifice of the potential gains from cooperation […] and the increase in the dangers of needless arms races and wars.” He adds that “the greater these costs, the greater the incentives to try cooperation and wait for fairly unambiguous evidence before assuming that the other must be checked by force.” Despite its soundness, this argument fails to provide any clue to understanding the decision taken by Japan in the mid-1930s. Robert Jervis, 1978, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics 30(2): 176. 25 In the same vein, Jack Snyder argues that Japan’s bid for empire during the 1930s was irrational in view of its international environment. Snyder, Myths of Empire, 113. 26 Meredith W. Berg, 1992, Protecting National Interests by Treaty: The Second London Naval Conference, 1934–1936, in Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899–1939, ed. Brian J.C. McKercher, Westport: Praeger, 208–9.

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within eight years. As the Washington System’s unequal naval ratios came closer to be transposed to the battlefield, the Japanese navy approximated the need for parity in naval strength. It was therefore strategically rational for the institution to seek more favorable naval ratios by scrapping the disadvantageous Five-Power Treaty, which enshrined the ratios, renegotiating naval limitations and, if rebuffed by Washington and London, to leave the arms control framework. Strategic considerations were decisive, naval officers’ feelings of dishonor were not. Of course, some sailors resented the constraints imposed upon Japan by the Washington System. But if this caused the navy to reject arms control in the mid-1930s, then it must be explained why these constraints had not tormented high-ranking naval officers during the 1920s. Some of them were true sailors with a strong sense of honor, who had fought wars and were highly respected inside and outside the naval institution, such as Kat¯o Tomosabur¯o, Sait¯o Makoto, Suzuki Kantar¯o and T¯og¯o Heihachir¯ o, the hero of the Battle of Tsushima.27 And regarding enthusiasm for naval buildup, this was a natural impulse of naval officers trained to defend their country. A military institution that looks for maximizing military power cannot be categorized as irrational, although it can be considered shortsighted. Other scholars point out the irrationality of the Japanese navy vis-àvis the prospect of winning a naval arms race against the United States after withdrawing from the Washington System.28 They are correct in that Japan had no chance in the contest if the Americans took the exercise seriously, given the limited capacities of Japan’s shipyards, the lack of access to strategic materials such as steel and the economic difficulties of the country. On the other hand, it was not the role of the naval institution to assess the strength of these different elements of national power. It was rather the responsibility of the government, the Prime, Finance and Foreign Ministers in particular, to strike a balance between the fulfillment of national security requirements and the protection of national interests at large, including socio-economic and diplomatic interests. Moreover, the Imperial Navy was focusing on devising an effective strategy against 27 T¯ og¯o was initially a strong supporter of the Washington System, before revising his position in the early 1930s. 28 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, 2012, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 369–70.

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the U.S. Pacific Fleet, not on winning an arms race. This strategy, jeopardized by the combination of new naval technologies and damaging naval restrictions, required the right amount of specific vessels. To abrogate the Five-Power Treaty and request naval parity through a common upper limit was not necessarily irrational, strategically speaking. At best, the demand for revision would be accepted by the Anglo-Saxon countries. And if Japan had to leave the Washington System, the Japanese navy would recover flexibility in naval expansion. This was at least preferable to remaining passively constrained by unfavorable naval limitations. Lastly, certain scholars interpret as irrational the trust placed by sailors in their ability to defeat the U.S. Navy in case Japan withdrew from the arms control framework. Ian Gow calls “a brand of spiritualism” the position taken by Admiral Kat¯o Kanji during a meeting of high-ranking naval officers held on August 16, 1934, when he declared: “If it is possible for us to decide our level of military power autonomously and to expand and contract this according to the national economy, then our navy, on the basis of increase of moral and self-confidence, which will be produced by this, can expect victory no matter what percentage of national power our potential enemy possesses.”29 In the same vein, Samuel Huntington notes that “the [Japanese] military mind was thus subjective rather than objective, involved rather than detached. Because it was imbued with the national ideology it was difficult if not impossible for it to analyze a military situation in a coldly realistic, scientific manner.”30 These assertions do not match historical facts. The Japanese naval education put a premium on mathematics and physical sciences whatever the department, the assignation and the rank of sailors. Indeed, “naval experts were technical experts.”31 It is difficult to imagine that such people could have discarded scientific and material concerns in fulfilling their duties. Officers like Kat¯ o Kanji were not blind warmongers guided by spiritual considerations. They were certainly shortsighted, but above all naval experts determined to do the job for which they had been trained. This is not to deny the spiritual dimension of the statements made by several naval officers in the mid-1930s. However, it is important to keep 29 Ian Gow, 2012, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics: Admiral Kat¯ o Kanji and the ‘Washington System’, New York: Routledge, 302. 30 Samuel P. Huntington, 1972, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 128. 31 Kiyoshi Ikeda, 2007, Kaigun to Nihon, Tokyo: Ch¯ uo ¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 139.

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in mind that there was no prospect of armed conflict with the United States at that time. What happened in the early 1940s should not blind scholars to the fact that war across the Pacific was almost unthinkable half a decade earlier. Officers eager to get rid of naval restrictions did not run the risk of being proven wrong by events in claiming that, partially due to a superior spirit, the Japanese navy would be able to defeat the U.S. Navy whatever the circumstances. Spiritualism was a tool to prevent other domestic actors from attacking the arguments of those ready to compromise the Washington System. And as shown in this book, it is not certain that the level of preparedness of the Imperial Navy on the eve of the Pacific War was worse than in the mid-1930s. All in all, the decision to disengage from the arms control regime and pursue unfettered naval expansion was rational from the viewpoint of the Japanese navy, an institution tasked with defending national security and interests through the use of naval forces. It is also true that, at the national level, the drastic reorientation of Japan’s foreign policy from cooperative to unilateral security is barely understandable based on the rationality assumption, in view of the anticipated adverse diplomatic and economic consequences. The new policy was neither balanced, sound, realistic, foresighted, wise, nor any other synonym of rationality. Indeed, overbalancing is, by definition, an irrational endeavor. To explain why the Japanese government lost sight of the costs associated with a withdrawal from the Washington System and aligned with the navy’s preferred course of action, the literature emphasizes the tremendous influence the naval institution had on policymakers. Robert Hoover goes as far as saying that, by 1934, the navy had gained “a virtual veto power over government authority on future naval and related matters.”32 Such a claim distorts the facts. Until at least 1936 and the so-called February 26 Incident, a large-scale attempt of coup d’état mainly fomented by army personnel, the military services were constrained by the Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers, as well as by important figures related to the Imperial Household such as

32 Robert A. Hoover, 1980, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements, Denver: University of Denver, 53.

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the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain.33 Therefore, military influence on foreign policy was somehow restricted by the political system at the time Japan actually disengaged from the Washington System, in January 1936, when the country definitively walked away from arms control talks. Depicting the evolution of the military’s political clout during the 1931–1945 period, Samuel Finer notes that “the range of matters the military controlled was very limited at the beginning of this period but grew more and more extensive after 1936, reaching its maximum with the progress of the Pacific War.”34 In the mid-1930s, Japan was not under the thumb of a military regime. The changing attitude toward naval arms control and the decision to reorient foreign policy from cooperative to unilateral security were not forced upon the government by the Imperial Navy. The government was under pressure from the naval institution, but it was not hijacked. It was rather brainstormed, gradually adopting the biased military perspective on international affairs. Consensus on threat perception and foreign policy line was reached among policymakers under the impulsion of the navy, the significance of military influence in the formation of threat perception being demonstrated by the fact that the government did “something they probably would not have done otherwise.”35 Tokyo denounced the Five-Power Treaty in late 1934 and left arms control negotiations a bit more than one year later because a majority in the decision-making circle supported the initiative, considered necessary to protect Japan against what was now perceived as an inherently hostile United States. The government overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.

33 Several personalities were targeted during the Incident, including Prime Minister Okada Keisuke, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantar¯ o, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Sait¯o Makoto, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki and genr¯ o Saionji Kinmochi. The fact that three admirals were targeted (Okada, Suzuki and Sait¯ o) was a major factor that led the naval institution to oppose the coup d’état, sending warships in Tokyo Bay and dispatching sailors in the capital to protect the navy’s properties and interests. The show of force by the two military services during the Incident subsequently enhanced their political influence. Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 306. 34 Samuel E. Finer, 1962, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, New York: Praeger, 167. 35 Richard K. Betts, 1991, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, New York: Columbia University Press, 5.

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The Argument The literature emphasizes countries’ perception of their international environment as a central factor in accounting for the phenomenon of overbalancing. Indeed, the perception of a threat to national security is the sine qua non condition for any kind of balancing, “for when threat is not perceived, even in the face of apparently objective evidence, there can hardly be a mobilization of defensive resources.”36 And because countries “balance against threats rather than against power alone,” policymakers appraise the danger represented by another country based on two main considerations: its ability to inflict harm using armed forces and its intentions.37 A country’s ability to inflict harm depends on its military capabilities and its capacity to project these capabilities. The latter is impacted by geography and the state of military technology: primarily for logistical reasons, a country’s capacity to project its military power declines with distance from the homeland (or forward military bases), while the state of military technology determines the effectiveness of power projection efforts.38 The dimension of intentionality adds to this military component of threat perception. A country recognizes the existence of a threat to national security, and balances, only if it perceives another country as aggressive and harboring hostile intentions.39 The simple hypothesis that comes out of the literature is the following: A country overbalances when, facing an international challenge, it misperceives another country as being more able to inflict harm and/or more hostile than it actually is, a situation I term inflated threat perception. Inversely, when a country underestimates another’s ability to inflict harm and/or hostility, underbalancing ensues because of an understated threat perception. Finally, appropriate balancing results from a correct perception of the other country’s ability to inflict harm and intentions, or accurate threat perception. The hypothesis is depicted in Fig. 1.1.

36 Raymond Cohen, 1979, Threat Perception in International Crisis, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 3. 37 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 5. 38 This is what Kenneth Boulding calls “the great principle of the further the weaker.”

Kenneth E. Boulding, 1963, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, New York: Harper & Row, 78–9. 39 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 37.

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Fig. 1.1 International challenge, threat perception and balancing behavior

This basic hypothesis categorizes Japan’s behavior in the mid-1930s as an obvious case of overbalancing. Regarding the military component of threat perception, the United States certainly had a tremendous potential in terms of naval power, given its industrial capacity. And as already alluded to, the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 aspired to bring the U.S. Navy to treaty limits by the early 1940s. This, combined with the fact that the evolution of naval technology was reducing the strategic distance in the Pacific, jeopardized the ability of the Japanese navy to deter a potential transpacific offensive. Nevertheless, due to the size of the ocean and the lack of potent forward military bases, crossing the Pacific remained an important logistical challenge for the American navy. Although the strategic situation of the Imperial Navy was deteriorating, the ability of the United States to inflict harm to Japan was limited in the mid-1930s. It would take years of naval buildup for the U.S. Navy to be in a position to do so. Japan’s overbalancing is even more flagrant when the dimension of intentionality is taken into account. The American military threat to Japan in the mid-1930s was, in the words of Randall Schweller, “potential, that is, inferred from factors or situations in the external environment or the

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capability of the opponent that may materialize into a danger.”40 In such circumstances, a country waits for unequivocal evidence of hostile intent before balancing, because of the risks associated with misperception and overbalancing. As discussed in depth in Chapter 4, when Japan began to overbalance, there were few if any evidences of hostility from Washington. The latter was eager to maintain constructive relations with Tokyo. Although the United States had undertaken small-scale military maneuvers in the Pacific and issued diplomatic condemnations of Japan’s behavior in China during the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933, Washington had taken care to avoid being regarded as hostile by the Japanese. Moreover, the political mood in the United States was isolationist, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration were focusing on domestic issues, not East Asia. Tellingly, the Vinson-Trammell Act resulted more from domestic incentives than from a desire to keep Japan in check. An objective analysis of the geopolitical situation would have led Japanese policymakers to conclude that the United States would not launch a transpacific offensive unless directly challenged or attacked. But Tokyo came to perceive the United States as intrinsically hostile, an inflated threat perception that spurred the government to overbalance. As it stands, the literature accounts for the causality between threat perception and overbalancing. However, it falls short of explaining why, in view of the geopolitical reality, the Japanese government developed an inflated threat perception in the first place. My ambition is to fill this gap by introducing domestic factors into the equation. In line with Neoclassical realism, I show that Japan’s rush to the Pacific War was caused by a combination of systemic and domestic factors. The material characteristics of the international system, like the distribution of power, impact the foreign policy of countries after having been filtered by domestic variables. Balancing being inherently linked to threat perception, the domestic variables that affect the construction of the perception governments have of their international environment are central to my argument. I argue that a country overbalances when, facing an exogenous shock, an inflated threat perception leads its government to engage in unfettered military buildup and/or in the creation of an extensive alliance network

40 Ibid., 38.

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in line with the advice of the military institution, unduly empowered by a structure of civil–military relations (i.e. national defense regime) that provides no strong safeguards against unwarranted military interferences in politics. As explained later, overbalancing usually takes the form of a massive military buildup. Figure 1.2 illustrates the argument. What I call exogenous shock, the independent variable, denotes the materialization of a sudden and unexpected international challenge to national security. An exogenous shock being, by definition, unpredictable, it changes the nature of the formulation process of threat perception. Institutional routines, which normally sustain and perpetuate threat perception through the publication of documents for example, are sidelined because of their inertia. Indeed, exogenous shocks require a swift assessment of a rapidly evolving international environment. The construction of threat perception reaches the political and governmental levels. At this juncture, threat perception may become a major political issue between domestic entities.

Fig. 1.2 Exogenous shock, inflated threat perception and overbalancing

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This is for two reasons. First, threat perception is inherently subjective, and therefore differs among domestic actors.41 As Jonathan Steinberg put it, “military and diplomatic policy-makers operate against a vision of the world at least in part of their own making.”42 The perceptions held by different entities often clash. Second, debates over the formulation of foreign policy always start with a struggle to (re)define international reality. Domestic actors who have a stake in foreign policy consequently seek to influence their government’s perception in order to advance their interests. The emergence of an exogenous shock provides a golden opportunity to do so. The intervening variable revolves around what I call mechanism of contextual adaption. A government facing an exogenous shock needs insights and advice from various entities to better understand, first, the nature of the international challenge and, second, the policy options at its disposal. The influence domestic actors summoned by the government to share their views have on the formulation of threat perception and foreign policy increases. If government leaders reach a consensus on the fact that national security is endangered by the external challenge, they request expert guidance from the military institution to address the threat. This heightens military clout to a certain level, determined by the preexisting structure of civil–military relations.43 If the structure that regulates civil–military relations, called national defense regime, is weak in the face of undue military interventions in politics, the increase in military influence that follows an exogenous shock may eclipse the leverage other domestic entities have on the government.

41 The term “threat perception” is a pleonasm, because a threat is by definition perceived, and hence subjective. 42 Jonathan Steinberg, 1966, The Copenhagen Complex, Journal of Contemporary

History 1(3): 24. 43 The concept of civil–military relations has been defined differently, and studied from various angles, by historians, sociologists and political scientists. I here adopt the approach of Risa Brooks, who understands civil–military relations as the “relations between political elites and the senior military leadership at the state’s apex.” As detailed in the next chapter, these political elites form the foreign policy executive, responsible for ensuring national security and defending national interests abroad. The military leadership runs the military institution, dedicated to safeguarding national security and interests through the threat or use of force. Civil–military relations are regulated and structured by a national defense regime. Risa A. Brooks, 2019, Integrating the Civil-Military Relations Subfield, Annual Review of Political Science 22: 380–1.

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In such circumstances, the government absorbs the perceptual and policy biases of the military institution. I argue that overbalancing takes its roots in these institutional biases. A country’s ability to inflict harm and, in particular, its intentions are intrinsically difficult to assess, because the assessment is only partly based on tangible clues. Therefore, threat perception is inferred from scattered, limited and sometimes discrepant evidences as well as through predispositions specific to each domestic actor.44 The most pronounced predispositions, or biases, of the military institution are a profound distrust of other countries’ intentions and worst-case analyses of international dynamics. In the other words, the military tends to exaggerate both the hostility and the ability to inflict harm of other countries. If, in the wake of an exogenous shock, the military institution’s leverage on the government heightens substantially, the latter may develop an inflated threat perception. And if so, the government absorbs another and closely related military bias: an appetite for maximizing military power. Overbalancing ensues. As discussed in the next chapter, the scope of application of my hypothesis is restricted by one important condition. When a government develops an inflated threat perception and, in line with the advice of the military institution, decides to boost military power, overbalancing ensues if, and only if, it possesses the ability to extract the national resources necessary to implement the decision. In other words, a government having the motivation to overbalance may lack the capacity to do so.

Overview This book is structured as follows. The second chapter lays down the theoretical background that underlies my hypothesis. It discusses the inability of Neorealism to explain overbalancing, how Neoclassical realism can complement Neorealism in order to do so, and the strengths and flaws of Neoclassical realism. It also shows that the incorporation of domestic variables in an ad hoc manner and the formulation of sui generis arguments have been particularly problematic for the neoclassical realist 44 Dean G. Pruitt, 1965, Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action, in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 399–407.

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agenda. The chapter then turns to my argument. After a depiction of the most important domestic actors in neoclassical realist analysis, I provide detailed explanations of the mechanism of contextual adaption, of the way exogenous shocks impact threat perception and domestic dynamics, and of the political construction of threat perception. I then extract from the literature the biases of the military institution and the structure of civil–military relations most likely to spark overbalancing. Lastly, I discuss the scope condition of resource mobilization and how my hypothesis sits within the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism. Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy from the early twentieth century to the early 1930s. It begins by discussing the lead-up to the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, during which the naval arms control framework at the center of the case study was established. Despite tense relations with the United States, the absence of exogenous shock and of consensus on threat perception prior to the conference provided the Japanese government with the necessary flexibility to reach a compromise on naval arms control. Tokyo’s threat perception subsequently improved. The United States being accurately perceived as harboring relatively benign intentions, the political clout of the Japanese military institution declined, in line with the mechanism of contextual adaption. Japan consequently pursued an accommodating foreign policy during the 1920s, characterized by commitment to arms control and restraint on naval expansion, appropriate balancing vis-à-vis the United States and cooperation with Western countries on issues related to China, the main bone of contention between great powers. The fourth chapter focuses on the exogenous shock provoked by the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933, and its consequences for Japanese threat perception, domestic politics and foreign policy. After a discussion of the events in China, it is demonstrated that Western countries displayed restraint vis-à-vis Japan during the crisis, being eager to maintain constructive relations with Tokyo. Inside Japan, however, certain actors used the Manchurian crisis to shape the political construction of threat perception and advance their vested interests. Through an intense propaganda campaign, the army succeeded in depicting Manchuria as a matter of life and death for Japan. This increased its influence on the formulation of foreign policy, the latter becoming more unilateral and coercive toward China. The navy, for its part, tried to portray the United States as intrinsically hostile to Japan, thus requiring a drastic revision of, and

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if necessary withdrawal from, the naval arms control regime to better protect the country. Given the American policy of accommodation toward Tokyo, the navy initially failed to convince the Japanese government, and Japan continued to balance in an appropriate manner. Chapter 5 discusses how the Imperial Navy internally united around the rejection of the Washington System, enhancing its ability to promote its views to the Japanese government. The perceptual and policy biases of the navy gradually penetrated the decision-making process on foreign policy. The government developed an inflated threat perception, the United States being regarded as inherently hostile, thereby reducing the attractiveness of international cooperation and diplomacy as tools to defend Japan’s national interests and security. The maximization of naval power became the priority. This resulted in the country’s withdrawal from the naval arms control regime. Japan shifted to unilateralism in foreign policy and overbalanced against the United States through unfettered naval expansion. The chapter ends by showing how dysfunctions in the structure of Japanese civil–military relations, engendered by an overdepoliticization of the military, allowed the navy to reach a dominant position and convince policymakers of the threat posed by the United States, and of the necessity to prepare for war. The closing chapter extrapolates from the Japanese case to extract more general conclusions about the phenomenon of overbalancing and foreign policy and, more broadly, international politics. It is first shown that non-democratic countries evolving in tense and unstable international environments have the highest propensity to overbalance, and that countries where the military institution possesses high political influence tend to pursue coercive and unilateral foreign policies. In terms of international politics, a circular causation between the international environment, domestic politics and foreign policy allows comprehending peculiar regional dynamics. Lastly, the chapter highlights how my theoretical construct helps advance the neoclassical realist agenda, including by establishing a hierarchy between domestic factors, threat perception taking methodological precedence over states’ motivation and their ability to mobilize national resources for foreign policy purposes. I close by laying down avenues for future research on overbalancing, and emphasize the necessity for neoclassical realists to identify relevant theoretical frameworks to navigate the high complexity of domestic dynamics, and avoid falling into Innenpolitik.

CHAPTER 2

Explaining Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War

Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and Overbalancing Neorealism and Overbalancing Neorealism struggles to account for the phenomenon of overbalancing. This is due to the sub- paradigm’s assumption that countries are rational egoists seeking security/survival, and its focus on systemic regularities rather than on countries’ specific behaviors.1 Overbalancing, on the other hand, is irrational and sub-optimal because prejudicial to national interests. And although an important feature of international affairs, overbalancing remains the exception rather than the rule. Consequently, the two main sub-groups of neorealist scholars, offensive and defensive (neo)realists, face challenges in explaining overbalancing. For the same

1 Jack Donnelly, 2000, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 64–5; Colin Elman, 1996, Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security Studies 6(1): 43; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, 1999, Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security 24(2): 6–7 and 12–3; Jack S. Levy, 1989, The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence, in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. Volume I , ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 225.

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reasons, this is also the case for overexpansion, the other instance of systemic overreacting. Starting from a similar understanding of the anarchic nature of the international system, the two sub-groups of scholars come to different conclusions regarding countries’ behaviors. For offensive realists, the most important consequence of anarchy is the pervasive uncertainty surrounding countries’ intentions.2 Although one might be convinced that other countries do not have any aggressive motives at the present time, it is impossible to be certain that they will not develop such hostile intentions in the future. Countries are thus constrained to be prepared for the worst. Because they cannot count on others to guarantee their national security, being condemned to a self-help situation, they accumulate as much power as possible even if satisfied by their current level of security and convinced of the peaceful intentions of others. As John Mearsheimer points out, “the system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states.”3 Great powers, for their part, strive for regional hegemony, extraregional hegemony being made impossible by geographical distances between regions. The offensive realist country does not pursue power blindly, however. Because they are rational entities, countries do not arm themselves if they expect this would unnecessarily trigger arms races or the formation of counter-coalitions, but only if bandwagoning by other countries is the most likely outcome.4 Similarly, countries refrain from projecting military power outside their territory if this could lead to overextension or self-encirclement. In other words, they expand only if the international environment provides opportunities to do so at reasonable risks and costs. Mearsheimer notes that “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to

2 Dale C. Copeland, 2000, The Origins of Major War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 200; Dale C. Copeland, 2003, A Realist Critique of the English School, International Studies 29(3): 434–5; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 31. 3 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29. 4 A country bandwagons when it aligns with a superior opponent perceived as aggressive

in the hope that its hostility would be diverted elsewhere. Countries may also bandwagon with the strongest side in wartime to share the spoils of victory. Randall L. Schweller. 1994. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security 19(1): 72–107.

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take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.”5 As such, offensive realists tend to understand instances of overbalancing and overexpansion as systemic mistakes and exceptions that prove the rule of rational behavior. The Hobbesian perspective Offensive realism has of international affairs is not shared by defensive realists. Countries do cooperate under anarchy, being capable of self-restraint. Although the anarchic nature of the international system constrains their behaviors and somehow impedes their ability to collaborate, anarchy “is also permissive in terms of providing an environment in which a degree of shared security might be achieved.”6 One of the main arguments leading these scholars to provide a greater place to restraint and cooperation in world politics is countries’ sensitivity to the functioning and dangers of the security dilemma.7 Bandwagoning is rare, and especially among great powers, so that attempts at maximizing power often result in spiraling tensions and competing military buildups and alliance dynamics.8 Because of policymakers’ sensitivity to the security dilemma, defensive realists assert that while countries strive to amass enough power to protect themselves, they are aware that the acquisition of too much power may lead to a deterioration of their security situation due to the formation of counter-coalitions and/or military buildups by other countries.9 The defensive realist country should not overbalance. In the same vein, countries seldom seek hegemony, even regionally, and are

5 Emphasis added. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21. 6 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 2008, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation

and Trust in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 83. 7 Other arguments include the declining benefits of territorial expansion amid increasingly interconnected and service-oriented economies, the risks posed by nuclear weapons, the frequent domination of defensive military technologies over offensive ones and the fact that countries are more secure than usually assumed by offensive realists, reducing their anxiety and easing cooperation. 8 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 29. 9 According to Kenneth Waltz, “the excessive accumulation of power by one state

or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others.” Indeed, in the words of Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander, “states can and will co-operate to deter or defeat powerful or threatening states.” Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn and Robert O. Keohane, 1999, Introduction, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4; Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, 625.

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doomed to fail if they do. Inversely to offensive realists, defensive realists thus posit that countries’ main concern is not to maximize power, but to maintain an appropriate position relative to others inside the international system. Consequently, the defensive realist country, being rational, rejects systemic overreacting and instead tries to find some sort of arrangement with others in order to undermine hegemonic temptations, maintain the relative positions of units inside the system and prevent some from becoming militarily vulnerable and inviting aggressive designs from others.10 Not all countries are rational, however. Kenneth Waltz recognizes it, as throughout history some “dominant powers have behaved badly,” read irrationally, by overbalancing or overexpanding.11 It remains that those not emulating best practices and not respecting the rule of self-restraint imposed on countries by the international system are punished and may eventually be eliminated through a “process of selection.”12 Modern examples include Napoleonic France, Wilhelm Germany, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Despite their recurrence and far-reaching consequences, Defensive realism does not address instances of overbalancing. They are considered exceptions to the principle of successful emulation of best practices, born out of an irrationality rooted in domestic politics. Because Defensive realism focuses on international politics and systemic regularities, and refrains from investigating domestic dynamics, it cannot explain countries’ specific, and especially deviant, behaviors. As Randall Schweller notes, “Waltzian neorealism makes no assertions about what domestic processes look like, where they come from, and how they influence the way nations assess and adapt to changes in their environment.”13 This has led Waltz to argue that “any theory of international politics requires also a theory of

10 Waltz notes that “force is more useful than ever for upholding the status quo, though not for changing it, and maintaining the status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 191. 11 Waltz, Realism and International Politics, xii. 12 Kenneth N. Waltz, 1986, Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response

to My Critics, in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane, New York: Columbia University Press, 330; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118 and 127–8. 13 Randall L. Schweller, 2018, Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11(1): 28.

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domestic politics, since states affect the system’s structure even as it affects them.”14 Neoclassical realism merges both into a single theoretical framework, and is thus particularly relevant to investigate the phenomenon of overbalancing. Neoclassical Realism as a Complement to Neorealism The neoclassical realist agenda emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to what was perceived as the inability of Neorealism to explain the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the peaceful end of the Cold War.15 The initial objective of Neoclassical realism was to account for deviations in countries’ behaviors from the deterministic expectations of Neorealism. If the anarchic nature of the international system imposes policy choices on countries, the latter are left with a limited or no margin of maneuver and should respond similarly to identical systemic stimuli.16 History shows that this is barely the case. Countries have agency. As Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro spell out, “Neoclassical realism seeks to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints.”17 14 Waltz, Reflections on Theory of International Politics, 331. 15 The label “neoclassical realists” was given by Gideon Rose in 1998 to what he

considered the fourth generation of realist scholars. Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 146. 16 As noted by Kenneth Waltz, “the [neorealist] theory explains why states similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences. The explanation of states’ behavior is found at the international, and not at the national level. That is why the theory is called a theory of international politics.” Kenneth N. Waltz, 1996, International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy, Security Studies 6(1): 54. It is important to note that Constructivism, which rose to prominence in the 1990s as an alternative to Neorealism, also assumes that systemic constraints dictate countries’ behaviors. The main difference with Neorealism lies in the fact that, for constructivists, the (systemic) reality is socially constructed and is consequently subject to change and redefinition. As observed by Michiel Foulon, “such a structural approach—Wendtian [Constructivism] or Waltzian [Neorealism]—ignores the observation that states have different foreign policies under similar structural constraints.” Holistic constructivism, on the other hand, takes into account domestic dynamics and can thus explain deviations from systemic expectations. Michiel Foulon, 2015, Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities, International Studies Review 17(4): 640. 17 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 21.

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Early examples of neoclassical realist arguments include The Weary Titan of Aaron Friedberg, which shows that the United Kingdom failed to properly assess and react to the power shift with the United States in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and The Elusive Balance of William Wohlforth which argues that the neorealist mechanism of balance of power does not explain Cold War dynamics.18 Because Neoclassical realism investigates deviations from neorealist predictions, the latter provide the points of reference of the research. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro state: The baseline is, in effect, a systemic-level independent variable. Specifying a baseline directs the research to ask: How much of the variance in the dependent variable could a structural realist theory explain if the intervening variables posted by a neoclassical realist theory were not present? The value-added of any neoclassical realist theory, therefore, lies in its ability to predict and explain political behavior that a sparer structural realist theory cannot.19

I use Defensive and Offensive realisms as baselines to explore the phenomenon of overbalancing. To reiterate, the defensive realist country should refrain from expanding military power if this is not necessary to maintain an appropriate amount of power and guarantee national security/survival. This is especially the case if the probability of exacerbating the security dilemma is high, and if the other country shows few or no signs of hostility. The offensive realist country should seek an increase in military power only if bandwagoning, not counterbalancing, is expected from the other. As shown in the following chapters, in the mid-1930s Japan did not need to boost naval power to deter the United States from launching a transpacific offensive. Moreover, Washington’s position on Asian affairs did not suggest aggressive designs. Lastly, when the decision was taken to pursue unfettered naval expansion, Japanese leaders knew this would trigger an arms race with the most powerful naval power in the Pacific. These facts are inconsistent with the neorealist baselines, and 18 Aaron L. Friedberg. 1988. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905. Princeton: Princeton University Press; William C. Wohlforth. 1993. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War. New York: Cornell University Press. 19 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

114.

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only by introducing domestic factors into the equation can one makes sense of Japan’s decision. Neoclassical realism views the anarchic nature of international politics as constraining countries’ policy options, not as dictating them.20 Waltz acknowledges this, saying that the systemic reality “can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system [i.e. countries] will respond to those pressures and possibilities.”21 Systemic stimuli “only tell half of the story,” and which policy option is ultimately chosen by countries depends on domestic dynamics.22 Neoclassical realism uses domestic factors as intervening variables between the neorealist independent variables and foreign policy outcomes. In other words, domestic dynamics operate as a transmission belt between systemic constraints and countries’ behaviors, so that countries facing a similar international environment may react differently depending on domestic circumstances.23 Gideon Rose says: [Neoclassical realists] argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.24

20 Jack Donnelly notes that the “structure pushes states in certain directions. It does not mechanically determine outcomes.” Jack Donnelly, 2005, Realism, in Theories of International Relations. Third Edition, ed. Scott Burchill et al., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 40. 21 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 71. 22 Christopher Layne, 2006, Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to

the Present, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 113. Kenneth Waltz also says that “each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 65. 23 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 164. 24 Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 146.

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By injecting domestic variables into the neorealist framework, Neoclassical realism indeed refers back to classical realist scholars like Hans Morgenthau and Edward Carr, who emphasized the importance of factors such as the personalities of leaders and partisan politics in understanding countries’ foreign policies.25 This does not mean that Neoclassical realism rejects Neorealism. Quite the contrary, systemic stimuli remain central in determining countries’ behaviors. Moreover, neoclassical realists usually start with the neorealist assumption that countries prioritize security/survival in the face of external threats.26 Lastly, if neoclassical realists aim at accounting for short-term deviations from neorealist predictions, they generally expect countries’ behaviors to reflect these predictions in the longer term.27 Because the transmission belt between systemic constraints and foreign policy outcomes is imperfect, biased by domestic dynamics, countries sometimes make mistakes for which they are eventually punished. This is in line with the principle of successful emulation of best practices and demonstrates the compatibility between Neorealism and Neoclassical realism, the latter complementing the former. This also shows why the neoclassical realist framework is relevant to explain overbalancing, for which countries are, by definition, sanctioned. Neoclassical Realism, Domestic Factors and Identity Crisis Despite important contributions to Neorealism and the realist agenda as a whole, Neoclassical realism has been criticized by its peers, in particular because of the way scholars have engaged with domestic dynamics. The introduction of domestic factors by neoclassical realists rests on the recognition that the neorealist framework possesses three fundamental shortcomings: policymakers do not always perceive the geopolitical environment correctly; the decision-making process on foreign policy does

25 Edward H. Carr. 1939. Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War. London: Longmans, Green and Co.; Edward H. Carr. 1951. German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars: 1919-1939. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press; Morgenthau. Politics among Nations. 26 Colin Dueck, Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 146. 27 Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, Introduction, 4.

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not always lead to a rational outcome; and policymakers are not always able to mobilize the national resources necessary to implement the chosen policy.28 These domestic-level irregularities, which can be accounted for only by opening the countries’ black box, explain deviations from neorealist predictions. Based on this recognition, neoclassical realists have used numerous domestic intervening variables to explain countries’ behaviors. Some, like Mark Brawley and William Wohlforth, emphasize the centrality of the perception policymakers have of the international environment to understand their strategic decisions.29 Others, including Jeffrey Taliaferro and Fareed Zakaria, focus on the (in)ability of the government to mobilize national resources for foreign policy imperatives.30 Scholars such as Colin Dueck, Nicholas Kitchen and Randall Schweller highlight the importance of strategic culture in shaping the way the government assesses and responds to systemic stimuli.31 And this list of factors is far from being exhaustive. This has led Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro to classify the large array of intervening variables into four “clusters,” namely “leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions.”32

28 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

12. 29 Mark R. Brawley. 2009. Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View. London: Routledge; Wohlforth. The Elusive Balance. 30 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Neoclassical realism and resource extraction: State building for future war. In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 194–226; Fareed Zakaria. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 31 Colin Dueck. 2006. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American

Grand Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Nicholas Kitchen. 2010. Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation. Review of International Studies 36(1): 117–43; Randall L. Schweller. Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics. In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 227–50. 32 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

9. Elias Götz has classified intervening variables according to their causal impact, namely “moderating factors,” “complementary factors” and “primacy causes.” Elias Götz, 2021, Neoclassical Realist Theories, Intervening Variables, and Paradigmatic Boundaries, Foreign Policy Analysis 17(2): Unpaged.

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The multiplication of domestic variables generated by the neoclassical realist agenda comes from a methodological flaw: the tendency to formulate post hoc arguments for explaining countries’ behaviors.33 After having identified inconsistencies with neorealist expectations, neoclassical realist scholars open the country’s black box in search of domestic factors that may account for these anomalies. And because no clear guideline to navigate the complexity of domestic dynamics is provided by the neoclassical realist framework, domestic variables are often introduced on an ad hoc basis, explaining their substantial heterogeneousness.34 As Jennifer Sterling-Folker suggests, “this approach does not […] represent a coherent research program or even a statement regarding what, beyond the permissible condition of anarchy and polarity, is the most important to foreign policy choices and outcomes.”35 The lack of a coherent theoretical framework, coupled with the ad hoc introduction of domestic variables, has triggered a proliferation of sui generis and eclectic arguments. And some depart substantially from the agenda’s initial objective of explaining deviations from neorealist predictions. Wayne McLean, for example, recognizes that Australia’s security policy vis-à-vis China falls in line with neorealist expectations, but takes a neoclassical realist approach to show how policymakers overcome domestic obstacles to policy formulation and implementation through political narratives.36 Michael Becker, Matthew Cohen, Sidita Kushi and Ian McManus, based on the “tenets of neoclassical realism,” account for the use of non-conventional tactics by Russia during its 2014 intervention in Ukraine.37 These arguments are indicative of Neoclassical realism’s identity crisis. While McLean falls into the sphere of Innenpolitik, systemic stimuli composing only the backdrop of the analysis, Becker et al. explore 33 Legro and Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist? 27–32. 34 Kevin Narizny, 2017, On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of

the Newest Realism, International Security 42(2): 170. 35 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 2009, Forward Is as Forward Does: Assessing Neoclassical Realism from a Traditions Perspective, in Rethinking Realism in International Relations, ed. Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison and Patrick James, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 209. 36 Wayne McLean, 2016, Neoclassical Realism and Australian Foreign Policy: Understanding How Security Elites Frame Domestic Discourses, Global Change, Peace & Security 28(1): 1 and 3. 37 Michael E. Becker et al., 2016, Reviving the Russian Empire: The Crimean Intervention through a Neoclassical Realist Lens, European Security 25(1): 112.

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the micros of foreign policy implementation, far from the neorealist search for parsimony. The identity crisis in Neoclassical realism is severe, as reflected by Tatiana Romanova saying that “Neoclassical realism can be seen as the midpoint between the traditions of realism, on the one hand, and liberalism, neo-institutionalism and constructivism, on the other hand.”38 And whereas Adam Quinn asserts that the proliferation of domestic variables sets Neoclassical realism on a “collision course” with Neorealism, scholars such as Jeffrey Legro, Andrew Moravcsik and Kevin Narizny go as far as saying that Neoclassical realism violates central assumptions of Neorealism.39 This, of course, runs against the original purpose of the neoclassical realist agenda, which was to complement Neorealism. Putting Neoclassical Realism Back on Track In order to put Neoclassical realism back on track, one should first reaffirm clearly a central theoretical premise: the primacy of systemic factors over domestic variables in explaining countries’ behaviors. Decisions taken by governments hinge first and foremost on the nature of international dynamics. This allows addressing one of Narizny’s most relevant criticisms, that Neoclassical realism is “fundamentally flawed” because it does not assign clear causal priority to either domestic or system factors.40 Systemic primacy disqualifies from holding the neoclassical realist label arguments that locate the motor of countries’ behaviors at the domestic level, while international factors play no or only a secondary role, thus excluding Innenpolitikers and liberals.41 It also disqualifies arguments that do not prioritize one level of analysis over the other. This is not to say that 38 Tatiana A. Romanova, 2012, Neoclassical Realism and Today’s Russia, Russia in Global Affairs 10(3), https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/neoclassical-realism-and-todaysrussia/, accessed 19 October 2022. 39 Davide Fiammenghi et al., 2018, Correspondence: Neoclassical Realism and Its Critics, International Security 43(2): 197; Legro and Moravcsik. Is Anybody Still a Realist?; Narizny. On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics; Adam Quinn, 2013, Kenneth Waltz, Adam Smith and the Limits of Science: Hard Choices for Neoclassical Realism, International Politics 50(2): 164. 40 Narizny, On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics, 156. 41 Arguing that, according to liberals, what makes countries behave on the international

scene is their domestically formulated preferences, Andrew Moravcsik asserts that “each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the

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these arguments lack value. But if Neoclassical realism wants to affirm its identity, it should first make clear who is in, and who is out. The second step to redress Neoclassical realism is to stop open-ended engagement with domestic dynamics. Although domestic intervening variables lie at the heart of the neoclassical realist effort to amend Neorealism, the agenda’s identity crisis is largely due to the ad hoc incorporation of domestic factors, which as mentioned above results from a lack of solid theoretical foundation. One of the major criticisms made by Jennifer Sterling-Folker is that the various domestic variables advanced by neoclassical realists fail to add up “to a coherent theory with a consistent internal logic that can be applied from one situation to the next.”42 The selection of domestic variables should be justified based on a rigorous theoretical model that complies with the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism. And to be coherent in view of the aspirations of the neoclassical realist agenda, this model should be anchored in the neorealist framework.43 Too often, neoclassical realists assume the influence of the international context on countries’ behaviors, focus on the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy and lose sight of the interplay between systemic and domestic variables.44 The solution, therefore, starts with a proper conceptualization of the transmission belt connecting systemic stimuli and foreign policy outcomes. Kevin Narizny argues that Neoclassical realism “attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable: on the one hand, a commitment to the analytic priority of systemic pressures and, on the other hand, an open-ended engagement with domestic politics. Some neoclassical realists attempt to specify rules for crossing the two levels of analysis, but the result is inevitably arbitrary and incoherent.”45 Failure is not inevitable, however. For the transmission belt to be appropriate for cross-level analysis, it should be rooted in systemic dynamics, seamlessly extend through domestic politics and end with foreign policy decisions.

preferences of other states.” Andrew Moravcsik, 1997, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, International Organization 51(4): 520. 42 Sterling-Folker, Forward Is as Forward Does, 209. 43 Brian Rathbun, 2008, A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the

Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism, Security Studies 17(2): 304. 44 Magdalena Kozub-Karkut, 2019, Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis— A Possible Way of Integration? Teoria polityki 3: 211. 45 Fiammenghi et al., Correspondence, 199.

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Among all the factors proposed by neoclassical realists to address the shortcomings of Neorealism, I argue that only one has this potential: perception, understood as a political construction. Threat perception is a pivotal element in the neoclassical realist agenda, because the difficulty of Neorealism to recognize that government leaders’ perception may differ from the reality of international dynamics has been regarded as an important limitation of the sub-paradigm.46 Threat perception is thus anchored in the neorealist framework. It is also anchored in systemic dynamics, because a government’s perception is the subjective reflection of the international environment.47 Moreover, perception being a subject of political negotiations, it is constructed at the center of domestic dynamics.48 Lastly, perception is linked to foreign policy outcomes because it constitutes the basis on which the government takes decisions.49 To be fair, certain neorealist scholars have integrated perceptual and other cognitive variables into their arguments. Stephen Walt is an obvious example. By arguing that countries “balance against threats rather than against power alone,” thus taking into account the perception countries have of each other’s intentions, Walt brings a welcome improvement in the balance of power mechanism.50 It should be noted, however, that neorealist treatments of perception remain superficial. Threat perception is regarded as a fact, determined by various data collection techniques. 46 Reichwein, The Tradition of Neoclassical Realism, 42; Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 158. John Mearsheimer tellingly states that “some scholars (such as Wohlforth) maintain that […] what really matters for understanding international politics is the picture of the balance that policymakers have in their heads. I disagree […] policymakers usually have a good sense of the actual balance of power […]. Therefore, one need not focus on perception of power to explain how states behave.” Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 422, footnote 2. 47 As Michiel Foulon states, “a version of geopolitical structure is external to the state and binds. However, a perceptual layer at the level of state policymaker affects the operationalization of that structure.” Foulon, Neoclassical Realism, 635. 48 Barbara Kunz and Ilai Z. Saltzman, External and Domestic Determinants of State

Behavior, in Neoclassical Realism in European Politics, ed. Toje and Kunz, 102. 49 Robert Jervis talks about the government’s “psychological milieu,” in which foreign policy is devised while being carried out in the geopolitical reality. Robert Jervis, 1976, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 145. 50 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 5.

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Neorealists do not explore the origins of perception or the process through which perception is constructed, nor do they investigate the way perception relates to the international reality.51 As Neoclassical realism opens the country’s black box, it allows doing so. The agenda assumes that because foreign policy is formulated by members of the government, the perception they have of their international environment is crucial to understanding countries’ behaviors.52 This is particularly the case since, given the complexity of international politics and dynamics, government leaders’ perception of other countries’ intentions and ability to inflict harm using armed forces is often inaccurate.53 As noted by Francis Bacon, one of the founders of modern empiricism, “there is nothing among civil affairs more subject to error than the forming of a true and right valuation of the power and forces of an empire.”54 It is therefore necessary to go beyond the material structure of the international system and to consider threat perception as the first and most consequential intervening variable between systemic factors and foreign policy outcomes. This does not mean that the government’s “perceived geopolitical structure” is the only factor that neoclassical realists should take into account.55 Because threat perception is politically constructed, that is the outcome of exchanges between the government and different domestic entities and of deliberations inside the government itself, the perceptual analysis may imply bringing into the equation other domestic variables related to the decision-making process on and implementation of foreign policy. These variables should, however, respect the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism and remain connected to the neorealist framework to preclude falling again into the trap of open-ended engagement with domestic factors and ad hocness.

51 James M. Goldgeier, 1997, Psychology and Security, Security Studies 4(6): 141. 52 Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 147. 53 Reichwein, The Tradition of Neoclassical Realism, 42; Schweller, Unanswered Threats,

37. 54 Quoted in: Edward V. Gulick, 1955, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 337. 55 Foulon, Neoclassical Realism, 653.

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Mechanism of Contextual Adaption, Threat Perception and Overbalancing To reiterate the argument defended in this book, I argue that a country overbalances when, facing an exogenous shock, an inflated threat perception leads its government to engage in unfettered military buildup and/or in the creation of an extensive alliance network in line with the advice of the military institution, unduly empowered by a structure of civil–military relations that provides no strong safeguards against unwarranted military interferences in politics. Most of the time, overbalancing takes the form of a massive military buildup. The primacy of systemic factors is here respected, overbalancing being a reaction to the materialization of a sudden and unexpected international challenge to national security, an exogenous shock. The perception the government has of the international environment constitutes the transmission belt between the international and domestic levels. While it always possesses roots in the systemic reality, threat perception is a construct of domestic politics, based on which the government deliberates and devises foreign policy. And in the presence of an exogenous shock, relevant domestic dynamics revolve around civil–military relations, the latter having a decisive impact on the formulation of threat perception and on the direction and substance of foreign policy. The hypothesis as a whole is anchored in Neorealism because of the centrality of threat perception and because overbalancing is, by definition, an overreaction by neorealist standards. Lastly, as discussed later, the hypothesis and its scope condition related to resource mobilization fit within the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism. Before examining in detail the different components of the hypothesis, the most important domestic actors in neoclassical realist analysis must be considered. The Foreign Policy Executive and Its Advisors In Neoclassical realism, the government, and more precisely the “foreign policy executive” (FPE), is central because it sits at the juncture of the international and domestic realms. The FPE is typically composed of the

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chief executive (President, Prime Minister, Chairman, General Secretary, etc.) and of important cabinet ministers and advisors on issues related to foreign policy and national defense (e.g. National Security Advisor).56 Two main characteristics differentiate this group of people from other domestic actors.57 First, the FPE has the unique responsibility to defend national interests on the international scene and ensure national security through the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Second, it has access to exclusive and classified information on international dynamics and security issues. These two characteristics put the FPE above other entities when it comes to international affairs. In the words of Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, “although state leaders are drawn from society, their attitudes and preferences change when they experience ‘the view from the top,’ as the privileged information they receive and the raison d’état culture they become imbued in make state actors more than simply representatives of their societal coalition.”58 Important to note is the fact that the FPE cannot always be approached as a unitary entity. Divisions can appear among its members and impact the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Also, the relative influence FPE members have on the decision-making process and the composition of the group itself may evolve over time, again shaping foreign policy. As demonstrated in the following chapters, this was the case in Japan during the 1930s when, capitalizing on a deteriorating threat perception, the Japanese navy and army reinforced their leverage inside the FPE through their ministers, who were growing in authority. The FPE relies on another important domestic grouping to fulfill its responsibilities. As mentioned, the FPE has access to privileged information on international affairs, based on which it develops a perception of the geopolitical structure and deliberates about the options available to defend national interests and security. The said information is provided by the “foreign, defense, and intelligence bureaucracy” (FDIB). The FDIB “refers to the bureaucratic organizations charged with the collection and assessment of foreign intelligence or the formulation of specific policy

56 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

61. 57 Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, Introduction, 25. 58 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

166.

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options for consideration and selection by the FPE, as well as with the implementation of actual foreign and defense policies.”59 Members of the FDIB do not belong to the FPE, which is the only grouping entitled to make the final decision on matters related to foreign policy. This does not mean that the FDIB has no leverage on foreign policy, however. FDIB members collaborate closely with the FPE and regularly attend its meetings through permanent or temporary representatives, such as ministers and special advisors. As discussed in more details later, the military institution is, along with other entities like the Foreign Ministry, an important player within the FDIB, and especially when it comes to security affairs. Having an existential stake in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, the military sometimes seeks and manages to acquire a disproportional influence on the FPE through the provision of information and policy options. The Mechanism of Contextual Adaption The mechanism of contextual adaption is based on the acknowledgment that the FPE needs to call upon different domestic institutions to provide their expertise in order to adapt its foreign policy to specific international circumstances. As such, one of the central functions of the FPE is to coordinate the participation of relevant entities in the decision-making process on foreign policy. The institutions summoned by the FPE are members of the FDIB. The necessity to form a group of specialized entities comes from the fact that the FPE, democratically elected or not, is composed either of politicians with general competences or of specialists in certain domains only, as in the case of a military regime, or both. These people are by themselves unable to comprehensively appraise their international environment and to devise and implement measures to tackle all external challenges. They must rely on the expertise of specialized agencies and ministries to understand the issues at hand, gather relevant information and advice and formulate effective policies. As Graham Allison observes, “political leaders at the top of the apparatus are joined by men who occupy positions on top of major organizations to form a circle of central players. Those who join the circle come with some independent standing.

59 Ibid., 124.

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Because the spectrum of foreign policy problems faced by a government is so broad, decisions have to be decentralized - giving each player considerable baronial discretion.”60 This implies that the relative degree of involvement, and consequently influence, of different FDIB members in the decision-making process on foreign policy reflects, to a certain extent, the nature of the international environment. Two types of environments, representing two extremes of the same spectrum, can be identified.61 Restrictive environments are characterized by international tensions and short-term threats to national security. Permissive environments are peaceful and threats to national security are remote, if present at all. Whether the international system is restrictive or permissive largely depends on the nature of international dynamics and the “temporal proximity of international threats.”62 The FPE of a country surrounded by what is perceived as a permissive international environment does not need to stay in close touch with the military institution and to be constantly seeking its advice in order to overcome the main challenges it faces. This is because these challenges, being of economic, sanitary or other non-military natures, do not lie within the domain of expertise of the military. In other words, the military institution is relatively useless for a FPE operating in a permissive environment. Other entities, like those with expertise in the economic and diplomatic dimensions of international affairs, are summoned by the FPE to provide insights and recommendations. Inversely, the FPE must maintain tight cooperation with the military institution to perform in an unsecured and conflict-prone restrictive environment. If national security is at stake, the expertise and competence of the military become essential for the formulation of foreign policy.63 The FPE may inquire about another country’s ability to achieve certain 60 Graham T. Allison, 1971, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 144–5. 61 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

52. 62 Foulon, Neoclassical Realism, 654.

I understand international threats in the traditional sense of the term, meaning those affecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 63 The principle remains the same for military regimes. Despite the fact that most FPE members have received a military formation, they still need the help of the military institution to assess military capabilities and the ability to use armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy.

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objectives by force, the capacity of its own military to deter or repel an attack or any other questions related to national defense and the use of armed forces.64 Although entities such as the Foreign Ministry remain deeply involved in the decision-making process, others are likely relegated to secondary and tertiary significances. In restrictive international environments, the military is a central player of the FDIB. The fact that the degree of involvement and influence of FDIB members in the formulation of foreign policy varies with the nature of the international environment has extensive consequences for the general orientation and content of this policy. Different entities offer different sets of tools and advice to the FPE. They also have their own position on the way to handle particular external challenges, and more generally on the kind of policy that should be pursued given the nature of the international environment. Although all might be seeking to achieve commonly-defined national objectives, each FDIB member has its own assumptions about how foreign policy should be shaped for this purpose, influenced by its institutional perspective and biases and, sometimes, its vested interests. The FPE absorbs these assumptions, positions and advice before taking decisions related to international affairs. Lastly, each FDIB member possesses a unique perception of external challenges.65 And because “governments perceive problems through organizational sensors,” the FPE’s own threat perception, and consequently the foreign policy it eventually adopts in response to a specific international challenge, are altered depending on which entities take part in the decision-making process and which are given the most attention by the FPE.66 FDIB members act as organizational sensors because the FPE either lacks complete information or is overloaded by information

64 Douglas Bland points out, “even in mature liberal democracies, there is an expectation that military leaders will share in decision-making regarding national defense and the employment of the armed forces with their civilian superiors.” Douglas L. Bland, 1999, A Unified Theory of Civil–Military Relations, Armed Forces & Society 26(1): 11. 65 Kunz and Saltzman, External and Domestic Determinants of State Behavior, 104. 66 Allison, Essence of Decision, 67.

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related to international dynamics, and thus relies on domestic institutions to understand the nature of the external challenges it faces.67 FDIB members sometimes try to influence the FPE’s perception as a way of advancing their institutional interests. An institution wishing to promote constructive relations with another country may want to convince the FPE of the goodwill and benign intentions of that country. Conversely, an entity opposed to such relations may attempt to portray the other country as untrustworthy and malign. To summarize, the mechanism of contextual adaption comprehends foreign policy as the resultant of domestic political forces, which are themselves impacted by systemic dynamics.68 The latter affect the degree of involvement and influence of the different FDIB members in the decisionmaking process, which in turn shapes the orientation and substance of foreign policy, whereas the role of the FPE comes closer to a catalyst of different institutional viewpoints than an engineer of foreign policy. And because the domestic impact of systemic dynamics depends on the perception the FPE has of the geopolitical structure, the formulation of foreign policy is essentially a bargain, sometimes a struggle, between domestic institutions striving to (re)define international reality and to propose the means to address this reality. The following chapters indicate that the struggle over threat perception can be particularly bitter. Exogenous Shocks and Threat Perception International dynamics are characterized by the repetition of interactions between countries and, therefore, usually evolve slowly. Because of the gradual nature of most systemic changes, the degree of involvement and 67 Rathbun, A Rose by Any Other Name, 315; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Robert W. Wishart, 2013, Neoclassical Realism: Domestic Opportunities for Great Power Intervention, in Making Sense of International Relations Theory. Second Edition, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 49. The fact that the FPE struggles processing information often leads to disunity over perception, exposing it to the influence of FDIB members. Lobell, Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy, 62. 68 As Graham Allison notes: “The decisions and actions of governments are intranational

political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government.” Allison, Essence of Decision, 162.

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influence of different FDIB members in the formulation of a given country’s foreign policy remains relatively constant over time. Moreover, the composition of the FDIB is often institutionalized through bodies such as councils and committees and the respective influences of its members are generally regulated by rules of procedure.69 Lastly, the perceptions FDIB and FPE members have of the geopolitical structure are rather stable as they tend to dismiss information that contradicts their preestablished understandings of international dynamics, precluding rapid shifts in perception.70 Institutional routines thus sustain and perpetuate the perception domestic entities have of the international environment. These systemic and domestic factors make FDIB and FPE members resistant to change and, because threat perception and foreign policy are the outcomes of negotiations between them, provide for a certain degree of stability in countries’ behaviors on the international scene. Evolutions in a country’s foreign policy are most of the time only superficial modifications of previous practices, provoked by FPE-related factors such as leadership transitions and particular pledges made by leaders during their ascensions to the apex of the state.71 The composition of the FDIB and its members’ influence on foreign policy are only slightly affected, if at all, by these factors, and consequently the direction and often substance of this policy remain mostly unaltered.72 Important for my argument is that, under such normal and stable international and domestic circumstances, overbalancing is implausible 69 Graham Allison explains that “an action-channel is a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue. […] Action-channels structure the frame by preselecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game.” Ibid., 169–70. 70 Ibid., 81; Robert Jervis, 2005, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, London: Routledge, 117 and 121. 71 Coups d’état are obvious exceptions, because the composition of the FPE, and most likely of the FDIB, changes. 72 Some would point out the administration of the 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, as an exception. However, although it brought important changes in some aspects of the American foreign policy, in relation to international organizations in particular, it also showed continuity in many others. Moreover, changes were made possible by the weakening of the FDIB. Therefore, despite being a partial exception, the Trump Administration also demonstrated the stabilizing effect of the FDIB on foreign policy. See for example: Daniel W. Drezner. 2019. Present at the Destruction: The Trump Administration and the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy. The Journal of Politics 81(2): 723–30.

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given that the adoption of an inflated threat perception by the FPE is very unlikely. Indeed, an inflated threat perception can only be triggered by a drastic change in the international environment. This is because the development of an inflated threat perception necessitates a consensus inside the FPE on the fact that an external challenge endangers national security. As long as the geopolitical structure is stable, the FPE remains undecided or divided on threat perception and continues to absorb various perspectives and advice from different FDIB members, resulting in a nuanced foreign policy of which appropriate balancing and underbalancing are the likely outcomes. In other words, overbalancing is improbable in the absence of both an exogenous shock and a subsequent consensus on threat perception. The usual inertia in terms of threat perception and foreign policymaking is disrupted when the emergence of a sudden, unexpected and threatening change in international dynamics sets off a process of contextual adaption. Because an exogenous shock is unpredictable, the formulation of threat perception is extracted from institutional routines and becomes a matter of debate inside the FPE. The latter reaches out to FDIB members to swiftly assess the nature of the international challenge and its potential consequences for national security and, if deemed necessary, to appraise the means at its disposal to tackle the challenge. An exogenous shock is followed by a period of disequilibrium between the nature of the international environment as perceived by the FPE, which is changing, and the alignment of domestic entities on the formulation of foreign policy. The prevailing FDIB is made irrelevant by the emerging challenge, being no longer shaped for effectively performing its duties of providing the FPE with the insights and advice the latter needs to take the right decisions on foreign policy. The FPE must readjust the respective influences of FDIB members, sometimes enroll additional entities and dismiss others, and in extreme cases start a new process of group formation. To borrow the terms of Bruce Tuckman’s four-phase process, forming-storming-norming-performing, an exogenous shock brings the FDIB back to either the forming or more often storming phase.73 The forming phase implies the reconstruction of the FDIB almost from

73 Bruce W. Tuckman, 1965, Developmental Sequence in Small Groups, Psychological Bulletin 63(6): 386–7 and 396.

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scratch, beginning with its membership. The storming phase is characterized by discussions and disputes over the responsibilities of the different FDIB members and the ways to address the new international challenge. The equilibrium is reestablished when the norming phase is completed and the FDIB is ready to perform properly its role of perceptual sensor and advisor for the FPE in view of the new international environment. At this stage, the FDIB has recovered its stability and efficacy thanks to the modification by the FPE of its priorities and the respective influences of its members, and possibly of its membership and rules of procedure. Because different FDIB members provide different inputs to the FPE, inputs then used to formulate foreign policy, an exogenous shock brings, through the mechanism of contextual adaption, changes of much greater significance to the direction and substance of foreign policy than those coming from purely domestic factors, such as alterations in top government positions. Therefore, I argue that exogenous shocks are the primary cause of the potential acquisition by the military institution of the ability to reorient a country’s foreign policy, resulting in overbalancing because of the biases inherent to the institution. Such shocks threaten national security and trigger a process of contextual adaption eventually advantageous for the military. The FPE becomes more dependent on the institution’s insights, advice and expertise to address the new external challenge, and military influence over the decision-making process on foreign policy consequently increases. Indeed, Samuel Finer observes that periods of international tensions and war, when the “government depends on the military because this is indispensable to its foreign policy,” are conductive to military interventions in politics.74 Harold Lasswell further asserts that a society under a constant threat of war may evolve into a “garrison state” in which the military institution acquires tremendous authoritative and political power. High threat perception leads the country to transform into a technical enterprise in order to develop a permanent and robust ability to guarantee national security.75 The influence of the military institution surges

74 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 75. 75 Harold D. Lasswell, 1997, Essays on the Garrison State, New Brunswick: Transaction

Publishers, 25.

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and military personnel penetrate politics, opening an era of “supremacy of the specialist on violence, the soldier.”76 Before discussing the biases of the military institution and the structure of civil–military relations most likely to lead to the absorption of these biases by the FPE, and thus to overbalancing, the agency domestic entities have in the formulation process of threat perception must be conceptualized. This is necessary because a consensus on the nature and the severity of the threat caused by an exogenous shock is a prerequisite for overbalancing, and building such a consensus is an inherently political exercise. The Political Construction of Threat Perception When, after an exogenous shock, the FPE summoned domestic entities to gather information on the potential repercussions for national security, FDIB members try to influence the formulation of threat perception in order to advance their vested interests. Indeed, if the FPE concurs with the assessment made by a particular FDIB member, the value of the latter is highlighted and the mechanism of contextual adaption increases its leverage over the FPE and foreign policy. As demonstrated later, the military institution has a singular tendency to exaggerate threats to national security. The process through which this military bias impacts the construction of threat perception can be properly conceptualized by reviewing the literature on securitization. The concept of securitization is based on the idea that security is socially constructed, and consequently that which is considered a threat to national security is a matter of perception and negotiation between domestic actors. This implies that the definition of threat coming out of a securitization process may diverge from the international reality. A threat to national security can be perceived as such despite the fact that, objectively, it does not possess the necessary features to have this potential. Michael Williams says that securitization does not “simply describe an existing security situation, but brings it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.”77 Theoretically, an issue can

76 Ibid., 48. 77 Michael C. Williams, 2003, Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International

Politics, International Studies Quarterly 47: 513.

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be securitized even though the threat is materially inexistent.78 While I disagree with the latter assertion, threat perception being always rooted in the systemic reality, the literature on securitization offers precious insights into the political construction of threat perception. The literature is concerned with existential threats to national security that deserve extraordinary responses by the FPE. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde state that securitization “is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labeling it as security an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means.”79 Securitization is therefore the process of putting an international challenge above normal politics with the consequence of legitimizing the implementation of exceptional measures in the name of national security.80 The concept of securitization as presented above possesses weaknesses. To consider that a securitization process is completed only when a challenge becomes perceived as an existential threat puts the threshold too high. The insistence on such a threat comes from the fact that securitization is conceptualized as the failure of routine politics.81 Indeed, for this assertion to be coherent, only securitization processes ending up with the construction of a threat to survival can be recognized as successful, because only existential threats can lead to the interruption of normal politics. This deprives the concept of its potential to explain the political construction of threats of lower intensity, not promoted to the level of threats to survival, but which are nonetheless perceived as endangering national security and maybe requiring the implementation of extraordinary measures as well. 78 Thierry Balzacq argues that successful securitization “does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion.” Thierry Balzacq, 2005, The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context, European Journal of International Relations 11(2): 179. 79 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, 1998, Security: A New Framework for

Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 26. 80 Inversely, desecuritization implies “a moving of issues off the ‘security’ agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation.” Williams, Words, Images, Enemies, 523. 81 Ole Waever, 1995, Securitization and Desecuritization, in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, New York: Columbia University Press, 56–7.

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The bottom line should rather be, in my view, that successful securitization leads the FPE to formulate exceptional responses to politically constructed external threats. These responses thus constitute a departure from previous foreign policies, overbalancing being an obvious illustration. From this perspective, securitization is the process of putting an international challenge at the top of the political agenda by depicting it as a threat to national security, hence the adoption by the FPE of proactive and extraordinary measures to tackle the threat. A non-securitized issue, although maybe a matter of concern for some FDIB and FPE members, is not addressed by the FPE through exceptional actions because it denotes the failure to reach a consensus on threat perception. Inversely, successful securitization triggers consensus on threat perception, reorients the FPE’s priorities toward guaranteeing national security and results in drastic changes in foreign policy through the adoption of extraordinary measures. A securitized issue is raised to the level of primary political significance and takes prominence in the FPE’s decision-making process on foreign policy. Therefore, I argue that securitization does not take place in opposition to normal politics. On the contrary, a threat to national security becomes understood as such when it enters the realm of politics, finds a place at the top of the political agenda and prompts consensus. In the wake of an exogenous shock, whether securitization is successful depends on three factors: the competence of domestic entities in securitizing the international challenge; the receptivity of the audience to securitizing efforts; and the contextual reality in which securitization takes place. The competence of the securitizing entity is a decisive factor in the success of a securitization process, reason why FDIB members are the most likely candidates to carry out the task. As Buzan, Waever and De Wilde point out, “some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security.”82 The securitizing competence of an entity is first determined by its legitimacy when it comes to the external challenge in question, some issues being “the legitimate province of specific persons,

82 Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, Security, 31.

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roles, and offices that can command public attention, trust, and confidence.”83 The military institution possesses, by its own nature, a solid legitimacy to speak on matters related to national security. The competence to securitize also depends on the degree of information asymmetry with the audience. It is easier for an entity to securitize a complex issue not well understood by the audience than one which people are knowledgeable about. According to Thierry Balzacq, “since the audience is not fully informed, for instance, on the temporal proximity of threats, it usually relies on state officials’ discourses because it thinks that the latter, who are the site of constitutional legitimacy, must have ‘good reasons’ to assert, in this case, that ‘X’ represents a threat to a state’s survival.”84 Here again, the military institution holds a clear advantage in the form of information asymmetry when it comes to national security, due to its expertise in, and the complexity of, security affairs. Indeed, the military is the entity most capable of assessing another country’s ability to inflict harm using armed forces. The third element that affects an entity’s securitizing competence is its internal unity. An entity that speaks with one voice possesses a greater capacity to convince other actors. Discussing military institutions, Risa Brooks suggests that “the more united a front military leadership can present, the more pressure they can exert in the leader’s ruling coalition. By cohesion I am interested in the degree which the military leadership is internally unified around a person, position, or ideology.”85 Moreover, when an entity is united, other actors lose the ability to play different internal factions against one another in order to weaken its institutional stance.86 Lastly, an entity’s capacity to securitize is determined by the strength of the opposition by other actors. The securitization process is characterized by power struggles and competing claims about whether a particular

83 Joseph R. Gusfield, 1981, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 10. 84 Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization, 190. 85 Risa A. Brooks, 2008, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic

Assessment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 31. 86 Samuel P. Huntington, 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 87.

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international challenge should be perceived as a threat to national security.87 The greater the number of alternative points of view and the more influential the actors defending these views, the more difficult securitization is for a given entity. Consequently, the ability to securitize is partially a function of the entity’s capacity to gather support for its position from other key actors. The FPE is at the center of this struggle for influence. The FPE moderates claims from FDIB members by highlighting that others have different perspectives and interests that need to be taken into account.88 A strong FPE thus makes securitization more difficult by balancing conflicting perceptions and pushing for compromise. Even if the securitizing entity manages to form an overwhelming coalition supporting its stance, the FPE still possesses the ability to temper the claims and protect the right the minority has to influence the process of threat formulation. Inversely, when the FPE is weak, clashes between FDIB members are frontal and eventually turn to the advantage of the most powerful. This is similar to Samuel Huntington’s “praetorian system,” where “no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict.”89 When it comes to national security, the advantages the military institution has in terms of legitimacy and information asymmetry make the praetorian system an ideal domestic political context for securitization. The securitizing competence of domestic actors must not hide the importance of the audience for successful securitization. Securitization is not the imposition by one entity of its perception of what constitutes a threat to national security, but an “inter-subjective construction of security.”90 Securitization is a dialogue, a negotiation in which argumentation is important. To promote its stance, the securitizing entity uses speech acts that can have performative effects if made according to certain linguistic rules.91 Propaganda posters and leaflets as well as televisual and Internet-related tools can also be exploited by the entity to convey its

87 Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization, 179. 88 Brooks, Shaping Strategy, 32. 89 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 196. 90 Matt McDonald, 2008, Securitization and the Construction of Security, European

Journal of International Relations 14(4): 566. 91 Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization, 180.

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position to the audience.92 The latter plays a decisive role in the process because the ultimate act of securitization is not made by the securitizing actor, but by the audience.93 I argue that the most important audience for a securitizing entity is composed of the FPE and FDIB members. The FPE is central because it ultimately decides on the implementation of extraordinary measures to address external challenges. The FPE is, therefore, the focus of securitizing efforts. The inclusion of FDIB members in what I call primary audience comes from the fact that these actors have influence on the FPE’s threat perception. As mentioned, for an entity to succeed in securitizing an international challenge, it needs the backing of a critical mass of other FDIB members. This corresponds to what Balzacq calls “formal support” to a securitizing move, which he puts above “moral support” because “it is the formal decision by an institution […] that mandates the government to adopt a specific policy.”94 Securitization may remain an internal matter inside the state apparatus, enclosed in confidential talks and reports and isolated from public scrutiny.95 It often happens, however, that the issue is introduced into the public space by the securitizing actor in order to garner moral support for its efforts. Contrary to formal support, which relates to FDIB members, moral support is the realm of the secondary audience, which includes the broader political landscape as well as the civil society. By influencing the perception the secondary audience has of international dynamics, the securitizing entity indirectly induces the primary audience to follow up, pressuring it into responding to emerging public concerns.96 The entity may have failed to gather formal support inside the state apparatus and thus turns to external assistance to reinforce its position toward the FPE and other FDIB members. The secondary audience is particularly receptive to securitizing efforts during periods of socio-economic troubles. When people struggle to

92 McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 568. 93 Williams, Words, Images, Enemies, 523. 94 Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization, 185. 95 Williams, Words, Images, Enemies, 524. 96 Kobi Michael, 1997, The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil–Military Relations: The ‘Discourse Space’ Model and the Israeli Case during the Oslo Process, Armed Forces & Society 33(4): 521.

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make a living and/or at time of social instability, civil societies are vulnerable to political propaganda, especially those providing easy solutions to complex problems. Securitization is here closely related to scapegoating, by which leaders divert popular discontent toward, and unify the social fabric around, a common external challenge portrayed as being responsible for current difficulties.97 The dominant ideology of a country may also help persuade the secondary audience. Those playing with in-group/out-group dynamics, like nationalism, ease the depiction of foreign actors as threats to national security.98 Such ideologies often combine well with socio-economic hardship, the former pumping the societal stress engendered by the latter and using it to fuel a nationalist agenda. The receptivity of both the secondary and primary audiences to securitizing efforts also depends in large part on the contextual reality. Securitization has the potential to shape domestic actors’ perception of the international reality, but it cannot construct this reality by itself. Even if a strong information asymmetry exists between the securitizing entity and the audience, the latter is never as ignorant as to accept a securitizing move that possesses no root in the reality. Balzacq notes that “when the concept ‘security’ is used, it forces the audience to ‘look around’ in order to identify the conditions (the presumed threats) that justify its articulation.”99 Consequently, if securitization is not close enough to the contextual reality, the audience fails to be convinced and rejects securitizing arguments.100 The international reality constitutes the factual substance on which securitization is articulated, reason why threat perception, even if politically constructed, is always anchored in the geopolitical structure. The contextual reality may in some cases constitute a near sufficient condition for successful securitization. The more visible and clear the threat to national security, the less important the competence of 97 This partially explains the surge in populism, which possesses a strong scapegoating dimension, in many Western countries. 98 Daniel Druckman. 1994. Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective. Mershon International Studies Review 38(1): 43–68. 99 Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization, 182. 100 Matt McDonald highlights the necessity that “security pronouncements be […]

‘backed up’” by the reality. McDonald, Securitization and the Construction of Security, 572.

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the securitizing entity and the receptivity of the audience for securitization to succeed.101 At the extreme end of the spectrum, where the threat is perfectly visible and clear, the international reality theoretically becomes a sufficient and self-generating condition.102 The exogenous shock is automatically perceived as a threat to national security by the primary audience, the FPE reaches consensus and securitization loses its significance in the formation of threat perception. Moving closer to the center of the spectrum, securitizing efforts become more important and demanding. Important to note is that successful securitization does not necessarily imply that all FPE members are convinced by the arguments of the securitizing entity. Consensus on threat perception does not mean union sacrée. Some may disagree. But the latter, under pressure by other members of the primary audience, and possibly by the secondary audience, are compelled to capitulate to the voice of the majority and adhere to the dominant narrative. Those who do not are eliminated from the equation by losing office or in more expedient ways. The tyranny of the majority also applies to the formulation of foreign policy, in democratic and nondemocratic regimes alike. Not all the members of the administration of Joseph Biden that reached power in early 2021 had anti-China biases, but they were forced to revise their positions after four years of effective securitizing efforts and China-bashing under the presidency of Donald Trump.103 The Biases of the Military Institution The surge in the military influence that follows an exogenous shock and successful securitization raises the specter of overbalancing because the biases inherent to the institution, namely the tendency to distrust other countries’ intentions, to adopt worst-case analyses of international

101 Similarly, Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro and Steven Lobell talk about the “clarity of signals and information the international system presents to states.” Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, 46. 102 Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization, 181. 103 An example among others: Edith M.

Lederer, 2021, Biden’s Pick for UN Post Calls China a ‘Strategic Adversary,’ Associated Press, January 28, https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-biden-cabinet-linda-thomas-greenfield-diplom acy-china-ec8d520ff1a416b36603dba4e91507e2, accessed 19 October 2022.

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dynamics and to strive to maximize military power, penetrate the decisionmaking process on foreign policy. These are unique features of the military, reason why they are considered institutional biases. The root cause of these biases is the indifference of the military institution to the presumed intentions of other countries when assessing the nature of the international environment. Huntington notes that “in estimating the security threats the military man looks at the capabilities of other states rather than at their intentions. Intentions are political in nature, inherently fickle and changeable, and virtually impossible to evaluate and predict. The military man is professionally capable of estimating the fighting strength of another state. But judging its policies is a matter of politics outside his competence.”104 As determining other countries’ intentions falls outside its domain of expertise, the military institution presumes the worst of these intentions and, building upon this assumption, provides insights and advice to the FPE based on pure military logic and the relative military capabilities possessed by countries.105 Because other countries cannot be trusted, the military institution takes for granted that the worst-case scenarios can materialize. As Richard Betts observes, “the military’s natural professional impulse is toward worst-case 104 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 66.

This is what Michael MccGwire calls the Colonel’s Fallacy. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler depict MccGwire’s thoughts as follows: “MccGwire identified two primary levels of interpretation: those of the foreign policy analyst (where motives and intentions are important) and the contingency planner (at this operational level capabilities are key). It is more difficult to gage intentions (this involves the political and cultural context […]) than extrapolate capabilities (a technical skill); and for military planners, the capabilities of the weapons that might be used against them generally speak more accurately than the political leaders who control them.” Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 59. 105 The archetype of military thinking in this regard is reflected in an article by Klaus Wittmann, then Colonel of the German Armed Forces in active duty, published in 1989. At that time, Mikhail Gorbachev’s diplomacy of détente toward the West was becoming more concrete through measures such as unilateral reductions of armed forces stationed in Eastern Europe. According to Wittmann, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needed to remain cautious about Soviets’ moves. Even though some force reductions had taken place, the military threat from the Warsaw Pact had not disappeared and its military potential could be reactivated at any time. Talking about the necessity to raise awareness about this fact in the growingly peace-minded populations of Western Europe, Wittmann noted that “NATO and its member governments need to make greater and more convincing efforts to explain the menace inherent in superior military potential - in capabilities which are lasting, and quite independent of intentions which may be transient - and the necessity of their reduction or of an adequate counterbalance.” Klaus Wittmann, 1989, Challenges of Conventional Arms Control, Adelphi Papers 239, 7.

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contingency planning for any conceivable disaster. The standard rationale is that enemy intentions cannot usually be perceived with certainty, and even if they are, they can change abruptly (such as in a cabinet or presidium shuffle), while lead-time requirements mean that enemy capabilities cannot be matched in a comparably short time.”106 In other words, the military is intrinsically pessimistic about the present and future of international dynamics. The tendency of the military institution to pursue worst-case analyses distorts its perception of the contextual reality. The international environment is regarded as inherently restrictive and dangerous. This perceptual bias is entrenched in routine institutional practices and dynamics, implying a selectivity in the collection and treatment of information that reinforces negative preconceptions about the geopolitical structure.107 Important for my argument, this bias produces an inflated threat perception. The military not only assumes the hostile intentions of other countries, it also tends to overestimate their ability to inflict harm using armed forces. As Huntington explains: The goal of professional competence requires the military man to estimate the threat as accurately as possible. But the military man also has a professional interest and a professional duty to stress the dangers to military security. Consequently the objective realities of international politics only partially determine the military estimate of the situation. The military man’s views also reflect a subjective professional bias […]. This professional bias, or sense of professional responsibility, leads him to feel that if he errs in his estimate, it should be on the side of overstating the threat. Consequently, at times he will see threats to the security of the state where actually no threats exist.108

Huntington’s reference to the “professional interest” of military personnel points out the temptation the military institution has to exaggerate external threats in the wake of exogenous shocks. Given the functioning of the mechanism of contextual adaption, its securitizing competence and the privileged information it possesses when it comes

106 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 160. 107 Klaus Knorr, 1976, Threat Perception, in Historical Dimensions of National Security

Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 84. 108 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 66.

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to national security, the institution often overstates systemic dangers to enhance its position inside the state apparatus and advance its interests. Because it is responsible for safeguarding national security, depicting an international challenge as a threat provides the military with the perfect platform to attract national budget and upgrade armed forces.109 This political ambition propels the perceptual bias of the military institution which, if absorbed by the FPE, leads the latter to develop an inflated threat perception. Regarding the policy options for guaranteeing national security, the distrust of others’ intentions condemns the country, from the viewpoint of the military institution, to a self-help situation in which it must rely as much as possible on its own arms. And because worst-case contingency planning and institutional preconceptions about the nature of the international environment inflate threat perception, the military inevitably is dissatisfied with its own defense posture and recurrently calls upon the FPE to address deficiencies in national defense. Betts notes that “the soldiers’ responsibility for national security means that they can never be satisfied with the level of preparedness. […] For soldiers to show no interest in gaining additional means to meet future contingencies would be unprofessionally complacent.”110 This constitutes the backdrop of Lord Salisbury’s remark in 1891 that “if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. […] If they were allowed full scope they would soon insist upon the garrisoning of the moon to protect us from Mars.”111 In other words, the military institution naturally seeks to accumulate as much military power as possible, and thus embodies the impetus to overbalance.

109 Wright Mills argues that the objective of the military issue is “to define the reality of international relations in a armed forces in a manner attractive to civilians, and thus the expansion of military facilities.” Wright C. Mills, 1957, Oxford University Press, 220.

institution in securitizing an military way, to portray the to emphasize the need for The Power Elite, New York:

110 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 99.

This constant search for additional military capabilities comes partly from the fact that real practice, namely fighting a determined enemy on the battlefield, barely occurs. This increases the military institution’s uncertainty about its own performance and results in a more-is-better-than-less way of thinking. Peter D. Feaver, 2003, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 70. 111 Quoted in: Richard D. Burns, 2009, The Evolution of Arms Control: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age, Santa Barbara: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, 57.

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To be sure, these biases are necessary features of the military institution. It is its duty to be prepared for any contingency in case the FPE fails to settle or mitigate disputes and ensure national security by peaceful means. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said in 1969, “a strategic planner must be conservative in his calculation; that is, he must prepare for the worst plausible case and not be content to hope and prepare for the most probable.”112 For the FPE, the world is much more complicated than the military perspective suggests. One of its main roles is to coordinate the participation of FDIB members in the formulation of foreign policy. The FPE also has the responsibility to decide which arguments ought to be taken into account and which can be dismissed. This generally leads the FPE to adopt a broader perspective on international dynamics and foreign policy than FDIB members, trapped in their respective domains of expertise.113 The foreign policy that comes out of the decision-making process is thus a resultant, a medley of different insights and advice on international affairs. Consequently, the impact of military biases on the orientation and substance of foreign policy is usually diluted through the decision-making process.114 Overbalancing occurs when the perspective of the military institution becomes so influential that it eclipses the arguments of other FDIB members and distorts the FPE’s perception of the international environment and handling of foreign affairs. In such circumstances, military biases lead the FPE to develop an inflated threat perception and to conclude that accumulating the largest possible amount of military power is the safest way to ensure national security, and this without paying much attention to the potential counteractions from other countries. Because the military institution possesses a self-help mentality, the FPE is pushed to prioritize unfettered military buildup over the creation of an extensive 112 Quoted in: Lawrence Freedman, 1977, United States Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, London: Macmillan, 85. 113 Michael Desch asserts that “civilian leaders are less subject to organizational biases [than the military institution] and have more ‘national’ perspective on defense issues.” Michael C. Desch, 1999, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 6. 114 Richard Betts notes that “political leaders […] have to be more sensitive [than the military institution] to competing nonmilitary needs. Their natural tendency is to ‘satisfice’ rather than optimize, to shave as much as possible from the military estimates of their requirements.” Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 160.

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alliance network. Foreign policy tends to be coercive, unilateral in nature and biased against cooperation with other countries on issues directly or indirectly related to national defense.115 Telling is the fact that the institutional biases of the military to some extent reflect the behavioral patterns Offensive realism attributes to countries. Offensive realists argue that anarchy engenders a profound distrust among countries and consequently confines them to a self-help posture. And because countries perceive the international system as a dangerous place characterized by pervasive uncertainty, they strive to maximize power in order to maximize their security.116 Therefore, Offensive realism may actually depict the behavior of countries inside which military biases have deeply penetrated the decision-making process on foreign policy. In defensive realist countries, the influence of the military institution on foreign policy is lower, and countries seek to maintain an appropriate amount of power to guarantee national security while preventing spiraling tensions with others. There is a difference, however, between the behavior of the offensive realist country and overbalancing. The offensive realist country is expected to refrain from boosting its military power if it anticipates this would lead to vigorous counterbalancing efforts. Inversely, overbalancing denotes the accumulation of too much military power, in the sense that it triggers counteractions from other countries with detrimental repercussions for national interests. The endeavor is not rational. This is because when a country overbalances, the potential reactions of other countries do not enter into the decision-making equation, or at least are not considered determining factors of foreign policy. Domestically, overbalancing means that the military institution, which in any case assumes the worst of other countries’ intentions, has acquired such a high level of influence that other FDIB members either are 115 In the same vein, Julian Schofield observes that “a state’s militarization tends to manifest itself in an aggressive and coercive foreign policy.” Julian Schofield, 2000, Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power, Canadian Journal of Political Science 33(4): 765. 116 Similarities between military biases and Offensive realism are also apparent when

Samuel Huntington states that “the military mind is skeptical of institutional devices designed to avert war. Treaties, international law, international arbitration, the Hague Court, the League of Nations, the United Nations are of little help to peace. The decisive factor is always the power relation existing among the states.” Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 65–6.

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confined to the role of followers in the formulation of foreign policy, or have been neutralized in their opposition to the military. If FDIB members were willing and able to dispute the stance of the military institution on international affairs, they would attract the FPE’s attention to the adverse consequences of overbalancing. The FPE would take their viewpoints into account, and refrain from overbalancing. The Structure of Civil–Military Relations Exogenous shocks and successful securitizations lead to consensus on threat perception and, through a process of contextual adaption, redefine civil–military relations. Huntington argues that the main factors shaping these relations are “societal imperatives,” which include the ideology and constitutional framework of a given country, and “functional imperatives,” or external threats to national security.117 Because societal imperatives evolve only slowly, the essential element accounting for rapid changes in the dynamics of civil–military relations is threat perception.118 Similarly, Morris Janowitz explains the evolution of American civil–military relations during the Cold War by the strategic environment of the period, characterized by the constant threat posed by nuclear weapons and the imperative of maintaining a credible deterrence posture.119 The heightening influence of the military institution on the FPE and the formulation of foreign policy does not necessarily trigger clashes in civil–military relations. FPE and other FDIB members may indeed oppose the growing political clout of the military in the wake of an exogenous shock, especially if they are not convinced by its arguments and see its proposals to tackle the international challenge as too costly or risky. On the other hand, when the threat to national security is highly visible and clear, or when the military institution possesses a strong securitizing competence, the evolution in the FPE’s and FDIB’s perceptions of the contextual reality tends to unfold smoothly, leading these entities to share 117 Ibid., 2. 118 See also: Peter D. Feaver, 1996, The Civil-Military Problematic: Huntington,

Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control, Armed Forces & Society 23(2): 159; Mackubin T. Owens, 2011, US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain, London: Continuum, 21. 119 Morris Janowitz, 1965, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, New York: The Free Press, 418.

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the military perspective on international affairs and to support its way of dealing with the external threat.120 Whatever the potential tensions in civil–military relations, whether the military institution ultimately reaches a dominant position among FDIB members, and thus provokes overbalancing, depends on the structure of civil–military relations prior the exogenous shock. Theoretically, these relations are structured around the separation between the military and non-military realms.121 The military institution is here understood as “a formally organized entity or set of entities responsive to the governmental leaders heading a national state (or equivalent government) and whose functions concern the use of arms to defend that national state or to further its policies in its relations with other nation states or large collective entities.”122 The military is distinct from other domestic entities because it is the only FDIB member tasked with defending national security and interests through the threat or use of armed forces.123 The military institution and the FPE thus have different roles, and the former possesses a more limited sphere of responsibility. Brooks states that FPE members are “individuals who occupy the chief executive office in the state and are in charge of the broad panoply of economic, social, and foreign policies (and who may or may not be elected or wear a military uniform). Military leaders are the individuals who run the military on

120 Michael Desch recognizes this point when he argues that “in a challenging external security environment, civilian and military ideas will converge on realism.” As discussed earlier, the military institution is the genuine depository of the offensive realist perspective on international affairs and of the majority of the tools related to power politics. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 19. 121 As Peter Feaver points out, “separating the civilian and military spheres in theory does not rule out greater or lesser convergence in practice. But if the spheres are not at least analytically distinct, the theory is no longer about civil-military relations.” Feaver, The Civil-Military Problematic, 168. 122 Guy L. Siebold, 2001, Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology, Journal of Political and Military Sociology 29: 140. 123 Some scholars emphasize the internal and cultural characteristics of the military to differentiate it from other entities. Samuel Finer argues that these characteristics include centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, esprit de corps, isolation and self-sufficiency. I here adopt a functional approach. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 7.

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a daily basis.”124 Inversely to the generalist politician, the “specialist of violence” is usually confined to her/his domain of expertise.125 The relationship between the military institution and the FPE is structured by an agreed upon distribution of responsibilities, or “division of labor,” that takes into account the specialized expertise of the military and the comprehensive needs of the FPE.126 This division of labor constitutes a “national defense regime,” where “the relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of ‘principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge’ in matters of civil-military relations.”127 Both the military institution and the FPE thus hold expectations about their respective responsibilities and roles in the decision-making process on matters related to national security. Douglas Bland identifies four central areas in which these expectations apply: “Strategic, sets of decisions about the ends and means of defense; organizational, decisions about the arrangement of defense resources and internal responsibilities; social, decisions about armed forces and society; and operational, decisions about the employment of forces.”128 The national defense regime regulates civil–military relations and enables the military institution and the FPE to cooperate efficiently in view of taking decisions related to national security, to avoid unnecessary overlapping of competences and to preserve a certain degree of autonomy from each other. The military, like all other domestic institutions, cherishes autonomy as a basic rule, whereas the FPE seeks to avert undue military interferences in politics, including in the formulation of foreign policy.129 If the military infringes upon the FPE’s sphere of responsibility

124 Brooks, Shaping Strategy, 3, footnote 3.

Similarly, Samuel Huntington notes that “politics deals with the goals of state policy. Competence in this field consists in having a broad awareness of the elements and interests entering into a decision and in possessing the legitimate authority to make such a decision. Politics is beyond the scope of military competence.” Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 71. 125 Lasswell, Essays on the Garrison State, 48. 126 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 70. 127 Bland, A Unified Theory Of Civil-Military Relations, 9–10. 128 Ibid., 11. 129 Peter Feaver notes that “regardless of what the military agent is asked to do, he would like to do it with the minimum of civilian interference and oversight. As in

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and breaches the national defense regime, the latter automatically pushes back and tries to discipline the institution.130 This is because unwarranted military intervention in politics breaks what Yagil Levy calls the “control exchange,” by which the military pledges submission to political guidance in exchange for resources allocated by the FPE.131 The nature of the national defense regime is specific to each country. What Charles Tilly calls “wielders of coercion” not only extracted capital, built state bureaucracies and raised armies, they also assigned tasks to the military institution.132 The state-building process, peculiar to each country, has thus shaped the spheres of responsibility of the military and FPE. Moreover, it is the perception that the regime has been violated that determines the reaction of actors. This perception is based on past national experiences, because expectations about behaviors depend on them. This implies that the appraisal the FPE makes of what constitutes a breach of the national defense regime varies between countries, and consequently that the FPE’s reaction to military interference in politics is specific to each country. Civil–military relations structured by an unsophisticated and weak national defense regime are the most likely to allow the military institution to reach a dominant position among FDIB members and push the FPE to overbalance. In such circumstances, the regime’s “principles,

traditional organization theory, the military prizes autonomy—policy autonomy, the ability to decide what to do, and implementation autonomy, the ability to decide how to do it.” Feaver, Armed Servants, 64. See also: Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 5–15. 130 Douglas Bland asserts “that unilateral challenges to principles and norms by either the civil authority or the military will probably be vigorously resisted.” Bland, A Unified Theory Of Civil–Military Relations, 18. 131 Levy summarizes the control exchange saying: “civilian control over the armed

forces can be conceptualized in terms of the exchange relations between the military and civilian institutions. The military agrees to limit its autonomy, so its role becomes that of a self-policing, nonpolitical organization focused on its expertise and responsibilities. Subordination is exchanged for the resources that civilian institutions allocate to maintain the military, the legitimation granted to the military, and, as [Michael] Desch emphasized, a large measure of autonomy that these institutions cede to the military in its narrow, technical sphere.” Yagil Levy, 2012, A Revised Model of Civilian Control of the Military: The Interaction between the Republican Exchange and the Control Exchange, Armed Forces & Society 38(4): 537. 132 Charles Tilly, 1990, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 16.

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norms, rules and decision-making procedures” as well as the spheres of responsibility of the military and FPE are not robust and clear enough to provide the FPE with the means to temper military influence and protect the ability of other FDIB members to make their voices heard. Although paradoxical at first sight, I argue that an over-depoliticization of the military institution tends to impede the development of a potent national defense regime and is, therefore, conductive to undue military interventions in politics in the wake of an exogenous shock. This runs against Huntington’s assertion that a sharp separation between the civilian and military realms based on the professionalization of the military institution, what he calls “objective civilian control,” is necessary to prevent unwarranted military interferences in politics.133 The fact that my argument contrasts with the American-centrist “Normal School of civil-military relations,” which originated with Huntington and has been criticized for not reflecting the reality of many non-Western countries, places it within the Global International Relations research agenda.134 As Rebecca Schiff explains: The first major critique of the current theory is that it is historically and culturally bound to the American case. More specifically, the separation of the American military from civilian institutions is based upon a particular standard of professionalism. […] Because the American standard of military professionalism subsequently became the model, it was, as a consequence, exported to nations that had standards, histories, and cultures of professionalism quite different from the western norm.135

133 In the words of Huntington, “civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism. More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between the military and civilian groups which is most conductive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps. Objective civilian control is thus directly opposed to subjective civilian control. Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them tool of the state.” Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 83. 134 Stephen J. Cimbala, 2012, Introduction, in Civil–Military Relations in Perspective: Strategy, Structure and Policy, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala, Burlington: Ashgate, 1. 135 Rebecca L. Schiff, 1995, Civil–Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance, Armed Forces & Society 22(1): 10.

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A major problem in exporting this standard of military professionalism to non-Western cases is that the Normal School assumes the presence of resilient democratic institutions, something that many countries, including Japan during the interbellum, lack. Another trend in the literature on civil–military relations, mostly built on non-Western cases, emphasizes the need for civil–military dialogue and coordination. Schiff argues that undue military interferences “may be avoided if the military cooperates with the political elites and the citizenry” on four issues, namely “the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.”136 The development of a mature and robust national defense regime indeed requires, in my view, cooperation between the FPE and the military institution. Only sustained interactions and shared understandings can distinctly delineate their respective spheres of responsibility, establish safeguards against undue military interventions in politics and equip the FPE with the tools to discipline the military. This is in line with Kobi Michael’s definition of civilian control of the military as the capacity to “arrange the division of responsibility between echelons.”137 The resulting national defense regime provides the FPE with proper flexibility in the formulation of foreign policy and preserves the right of other FDIB members to express their views on international affairs, and thus their ability to attract the attention of the FPE to the detrimental consequences of overbalancing for national interests. Scope Condition and Paradigmatic Boundaries A country with a weak national defense regime is expected to overbalance when, facing an exogenous shock, the FPE absorbs the perceptual and policy biases of the military institution, consequently developing an inflated threat perception and striving to maximize military power. The scope of application of this proposition is limited, however, to countries where the state is able to extract enough national resources to overbalance. The FPE’s resource mobilization capacity thus constitutes the

136 Ibid., 12–3. 137 Michael, The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma, 519.

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scope condition of my hypothesis, such a condition specifying the “circumstances under which the relationship expressed in a hypothesis is expected to hold true.”138 This scope condition falls within the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism, which as discussed earlier is necessary to avoid the trap of ad hocness and maintain the integrity of the agenda. Like states’ perception of the international environment, their capacity to harness national resources in order to adapt to systemic opportunities and constraints has been a core intervening variable of the neoclassical realist agenda since its inception.139 This is because the inability of Neorealism to accommodate the fact that countries may fail in proper resource mobilization has been identified by neoclassical realists as a fundamental shortcoming of the sub-paradigm.140 Even if policymakers correctly assess their environment, they “may not have easy access to a country’s total material power resources,” impeding their ability to formulate and carry out the optimal foreign policy in view of international circumstances.141 As stated by Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, “leaders almost always face a two-level game in devising and implementing grand strategy: on the one hand, they must respond to the external environment, but, on the other, they must extract and mobilize resources from domestic society, work through existing domestic institutions, and maintain the support of key stakeholders.”142 When it comes to unilateral military buildup, the balancing pattern of interest here, the key national resources the FPE seeks to mobilize include manpower, financial, economic and industrial capacities, military-related technologies and strategic materials. In this regard, resource mobilization is both a potential obstacle to adaptation to systemic dynamics and

138 Martha Foschi, 1997, On Scope Conditions, Small Group Research 28(4): 537. 139 Kunz and Saltzman, External and Domestic Determinants of State Behavior, 102;

Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 157 and 161. 140 Reichwein, The Tradition of Neoclassical Realism, 34; Randall L. Schweller, 2003, The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism, in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 334–5. 141 Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 161. See also: Elias Götz. 2019. Enemy at the Gates: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Russia’s Baltic Policy. Foreign Policy Analysis 15(1): 99–117. 142 Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, Introduction, 7.

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a permissive condition in terms of foreign policymaking and implementation. An unhindered ability to harness national resources allows a FPE to balance against an external threat in accordance with its threat perception.143 In such circumstances, resource mobilization has no impact on balancing: a state holding an understated threat perception underbalances or does not balance; an accurate threat perception results in appropriate balancing; and an inflated threat perception leads to overbalancing. It is on the latter scenario that this book focuses, hence the scope condition. On the other hand, difficulties in resource mobilization reduce the intensity of balancing efforts: a state with an accurate threat perception does not balance in an appropriate way, but underbalances and may not balance at all if the FPE cannot mobilize resources; an inflated threat perception does not provoke overbalancing but appropriate balancing or underbalancing, depending on the severity of the obstacles to resource mobilization.144 Figure 2.1 incorporates the scope condition into my hypothesis. A last element related to the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism must be discussed, namely the fact that the agenda usually assumes some rationality in countries’ behaviors and decision-making process on foreign policy.145 As noted several times, overbalancing is an irrational endeavor. Nevertheless, I do not reject the rationality assumption in explaining this balancing pattern, although I operationalize it at the level of domestic institutions rather than at the state level. Indeed, to assume rationality at the latter level loses sense once the country’s black box is opened to investigate the domestic dynamics surrounding the formulation of foreign policy. Given the nature and the complexity of the decision-making process on foreign policy, part of which relates to the political construction of threat

143 This assertion assumes that the resources at the FPE’s disposal, on its national territory or imported, are sufficient for its balancing efforts if fully mobilized. 144 Instances of countries having developed an inflated threat perception but forced to nonbalance are expected to be extremely rare, because this would mean that the FPE is completely powerless in mobilizing national resources. As argued in the concluding chapter, an inflated threat perception provides the FPE with the incentive and the tools to surmount many domestic obstacles to resource mobilization. 145 Foulon and Meibauer, Realist Avenues to Global International Relations, 1214 and

1219.

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Fig. 2.1 Hypothesis on overbalancing and its scope condition

perception, the outcome of this process is most of the time irrational if the referent taken to assess its degree of rationality is the country as a unitary actor. I see foreign policy as a resultant of bargains and struggles between different domestic entities having their own roles, interests and perspectives, the whole catalyzed by the government. As such, it seldom happens that the outcome of the decision-making process corresponds to what is expected from a rational country. But it does not mean that the process that leads to this outcome is not understandable based on the rationality assumption, applied at the institutional level. In other words, irrationality at the state level is explainable while assuming the rationality of domestic actors seeking to perform their duties and advance their interests. A neoclassical realist approach shows that, during the interbellum, the Japanese institutions having influence on the formulation of foreign policy, among which the Imperial Navy, were rational actors, but that the decision-making process was biased by dysfunctions in the structure of civil–military relations, resulting in an irrational outcome.

CHAPTER 3

Appropriate Balancing in the Naval Arms Control Era, 1920–1931

This first empirical chapter, which provides the historical background of the next two, starts by highlighting the tense relationship between Japan and the United States in the early twentieth century. During this period, the Japanese government perceived its international environment as rather dangerous and restrictive, providing the military services with substantial leverage on foreign policy. Nevertheless, in the absence of exogenous shock and of consensus on threat perception, other FDIB members were able to push for accommodation with the great powers. Burgeoning naval arms races eventually led Tokyo and Washington, as well as London, Paris and Rome, to establish a naval arms control regime at the 1921– 1922 Washington Conference. The Japanese FPE subsequently began to perceive its international environment as relatively safe and permissive, and the United States as a partner. In line with the mechanism of contextual adaption, the improving threat perception reduced the degree of involvement and influence of the military services in the formulation of foreign policy. The second part of the chapter discusses the impact of Japan’s improving threat perception and evolving domestic dynamics on foreign policy. In the absence of consensus on threat perception, the Japanese FPE absorbed and struck a balance between various perspectives and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_3

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advice from different FDIB members, the Foreign and Finance Ministries in particular. This resulted in the development of an accurate threat perception, and in the maintenance of constructive relations with other great powers and the formulation of a restrained foreign policy vis-à-vis continental affairs. After the Washington Conference and until the mid1930s, Japan balanced against the United States in an appropriate manner and in compliance with the terms of the naval arms control framework, and this despite dissenting voices inside the Japanese navy.

Improving Threat Perception: Making Peace with the International Community Tense Japan–United States Relations in the Early Twentieth Century Disagreements between Japan and the United States appeared rapidly after the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which left the two countries facing each other across the Pacific. The United States was a new actor in the Western Pacific, having acquired the Philippines in 1899 following its victory over Spain.1 Washington based its policy toward Asia on the Open Door principles, expressed in the Open Door notes of 1899 and 1900, which called for equal trading opportunities in China and the respect of Chinese sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.2 After having defeated Russia, Japan expanded its influence not only in the Korean Peninsula, but also in China’s northeastern Manchuria where settlers and companies gradually monopolized the local market at the expense of the United States and other Western countries. Although Tokyo and Washington had recognized their respective spheres of influence in Korea and the Philippines with the Taft-Katsura Memorandum of July 1905, as early as 1906 the United States was openly calling on Japan to respect the Open Door principles in China.3 The economic and strategic position acquired by Japan on the continent constituted a threat to American interests in the region and a potential note of discord

1 William R. Nester, 1996, Power across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan, London: Macmillan Press, 70. 2 Urs M. Zachmann, 2009, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1895–1904, London and New York: Routledge, 147. 3 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 80–1.

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between the two countries.4 In parallel, Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States was a source of tensions that would persist during the interwar period.5 Amid heightening tensions, the United States dispatched, in the summer of 1907, its Great White Fleet on tour across the Pacific in an apparent show of force. The situation calmed down after the fleet anchored in Tokyo in October, but the episode had clearly demonstrated the potential for crisis escalation between the two countries.6 1907 was also the year when both the Japanese and American navies compiled their initial war plans against each other. The two countries undertook a timid diplomatic rapprochement in November 1908. Through the Root–Takahira Agreement, they reaffirmed their commitments not to interfere in each other’s sphere of influence and pledged to respect the Open Door principles in China and to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes.7 However, bilateral relations deteriorated once again after William Taft succeeded Theodor Roosevelt as U.S. President in 1909. His Dollar Diplomacy, backed by loans and trade and aimed at advancing American interests in Asia, clashed with Japan’s position on the continent, and particularly in Manchuria.8 4 Sung-hack Kang, 1981, The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the Northeast Asian Regional Subsystem: The War’s Causes, Outcome and Aftermath, Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science: Northern Illinois University, 155. The situation worsened in 1910 when a convention between Japan and Russia concerning the status of the Korean Peninsula was agreed upon, further frustrating the Open Door principles. Huajeong Seok, 2007, Russo-Japanese Negotiations and the Japanese Annexation of Korea, in Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905. Volume I: Centennial Perspectives, ed. Rotem Kowner, Kent: Global Oriental Ltd., 402. 5 A major immigration crisis was triggered between 1905 and 1907 by the adoption of discriminatory laws against Japanese migrants by the city of San Francisco and the State of California. Nester, Power across the Pacific, 82. 6 Ibid., 82–3. 7 Japan Foreign Ministry, 1965, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, j¯ o, Tokyo:

Hara Shob¯o, 312–3. 8 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 84.

The possibility of war between the United States and Japan was present in the mind of the political leaders of both countries during this period. This led the former to put pressure on the United Kingdom to include a new clause in the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance stating that the obligation to come to the rescue of the ally in case of war with a third party would not apply to conflict with a country that maintained an arbitration agreement with one of the two allies. As the United Kingdom and the United States were at that time on the verge of signing such an agreement, the clause that was ultimately

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The Asia–Pacific was shaken by the outbreak of the First World War in Europe, which greatly reduced the presence and influence of European countries in the region. From Japan’s perspective, the power vacuum left by these countries was both an opportunity to enhance its clout in Asia and its international status and a risk, as the vacuum could be filled by the only other great power not directly affected by the war in Europe, the United States.9 The aggressive foreign policy adopted by Japan at the very beginning of the war aimed at making the best of this vacuum. The military services, deeply involved in and possessing an important influence on the decision-making process, convinced the Japanese FPE that using armed forces was necessary to exploit the opportunity. On August 14, 1914, Tokyo sent an ultimatum urging Berlin to abandon its interests in China’s Shandong Province. On August 23, Japan declared war on Germany. Tsingtao, the biggest town of the province, fell on November 7 after limited fighting.10 Japan also seized Germany’s insular possessions in the Pacific north of the equator, whereas Australia and New Zealand occupied the islands south of the line.11 The ultimate objective of the intervention in the Shandong Peninsula was to take over German interests there and use them as a bargaining chip during negotiations with China to obtain advantages in the more important regions of Manchuria and Mongolia.12 The logical culmination of this way of

inserted in the text of the alliance during its third revision in 1911 would have made it ineffective in case of war between the United States and Japan. The U.S. Senate eventually refused to ratify the arbitration agreement with the United Kingdom, however. Michael A. Barnhart, 1995, Japan and the World since 1868, London: Edward Arnold, 43–4. 9 Frederick R. Dickinson, 1999, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 142. The elder statesman Marquis Inoue Kaoru is reported to have hailed the outbreak of the war in Europe as the “divine aid of the new Taish¯ o era for the development of the destiny of Japan.” Ibid., 35. 10 Ibid., 36. 11 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 87. 12 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 80.

The decision to intervene militarily in China was made before the United Kingdom, Japan’s ally, requested the latter to do so. Herbert P. Bix, 2000, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 146.

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conducting diplomacy, based on a “free trade imperialism” backed by military means, was the Twenty-One Demands of January 1915.13 These demands, forced upon China, forbade the latter from opening new ports to foreign countries. They also granted Japan an extension of its concessions and rights in Manchuria, the control of the Shandong Peninsula, and the ability to dispatch police forces in China and to place advisors in key political institutions.14 This would have turned China into a de facto Japanese protectorate. The United States and the United Kingdom opposed the Twenty-One Demands and pushed Tokyo to temper its ambitions. The Lansing–Ishii Agreement of November 1917, reached between the American diplomat Robert Lansing and his Japanese counterpart Ishii Kikujir¯o, recognized Japan’s special interests in China in exchange for a pledge to respect the Open Door principles.15 Japan nonetheless continued its aggressive policy toward China, especially under the army-backed cabinet of Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake. The Nishihara Loans of 1917 and 1918, aimed at acquiring concessions in northern China through financial support to a local warlord, and a plan for a currency mix of yen and yuan dedicated to advantaging Japan’s economic penetration in China at the expense of other countries, were proofs that the Lansing–Ishii Agreement was not considered sacrosanct by Tokyo.16 In May 1918, amid domestic unrests in Russia following the October Revolution and the sense of insecurity they triggered in East Asia, Japan signed a military agreement with China that granted Japanese troops an important freedom of movement in Manchuria.17 Japan’s distrust of the United States remained high throughout the war, the latter being perceived by Tokyo as harboring hostile intentions. This was reflected by the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916, in which a secret clause provided for the dispatch of troops by both countries in 13 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 81.

Although Japanese leaders unanimously supported the declaration of war against the Central Powers, divergences soon appeared about the way the war needed be conducted. The military, and the army in particular, as well as some bureaucrats fostered a more active role of the institution on the continent. Idem. 14 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 87. 15 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, j¯ o, 439–40. 16 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 163. 17 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, j¯ o, 441–2.

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case China fell under “the political hold of a third country possessing an aggressive tendency,” the United States being obviously, although implicitly, targeted.18 The opposite was also true. The United States and its European partners were worried about the imperialistic nature of Japan’s foreign policy in Asia. During the closing days of the war in Europe, France and the United Kingdom, at that time readying in Murmansk to support the Russian Tsar in his internal struggle, fostered the United States and Japan to intervene in Siberia to launch a two-front attack. Their suspicion of Japanese intentions made necessary a joint operation, or at least the dispatch by the Americans of a technical corps to follow Japanese troops.19 The skepticism of Western countries was rapidly proven correct. If in July 1918 Tokyo approved the American proposal to send a combined force not exceeding 7000 soldiers, subsequent reinforcements led to the deployment of some 70,000 Japanese fighters by the end of October.20 The United States withdrew all its troops by the spring of 1920, and the continuous presence of Japanese soldiers in Siberia became one of the main diplomatic issues between the former partners of the First World War. Competing Naval Expansions Before the Washington Conference During the First World War, Japan’s military services possessed a significant leverage over the decision-making process on foreign policy. The Japanese FPE perceiving the international environment as tense and dangerous, it relied heavily on military insights and advice. The army was able to push for an aggressive policy vis-à-vis the continent, while the navy exploited its role in transporting troops and in controlling Asian waters to advance its interests. Interservice clashes over the orientation of foreign policy were frequent, but the growing share of national budget assigned to the armed forces provided both the army and the navy with financial rewards.21

18 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 144. 19 Ibid., 190–1. 20 Edward J. Drea, 2009, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 143. 21 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 75–6.

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In its quest for budget, the Imperial Navy was helped by the massive naval expansion plan adopted by the United States in 1916. Aimed at building a navy second to none, and thus at reaching parity with the United Kingdom, the American plan provided for the construction of 10 super-Dreadnought battleships and six battle cruisers.22 This plan allowed the Japanese navy to argue that in order to ensure the security of Japan and of its empire, it was necessary for the institution to keep pace with the American naval expansion.23 This argument was credible in view of the Imperial Defense Policy (Teikoku kokub¯ o h¯ oshin) of 1907. Although the document posited Russia as Japan’s main hypothetical enemy (s¯ otei tekikoku), it officially recognized the U.S. Navy as the Imperial Navy’s primary potential opponent, stating that because of geographic, economic, racial and religious factors, a future “collision” between Japan and the United States was to be expected.24 The Japanese navy also played the card of the Pacific. After having occupied Germany’s islands during the war, it promoted on September 12, 1920, a plan entitled On the Matter of Activities by the Fleet sent South that called for destroying the remaining German warships and military facilities in the Pacific.25 The plan was revised nine days later to permit the navy to stay in the region after the completion of military operations. On the eve of budget discussions at the Defense Advisory Council, the navy officially asked the cabinet for the permanent occupation of the islands. By doing so, the naval institution acquired a strategic stronghold on which to base its requests for funds, the army already being in the process of building its own in China. The strategy employed by the navy was effective. Naval budget increased rapidly during the First World War, from 83,260,006 yen 22 Sadao Asada, 2006, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 54. 23 Charles J. Schencking, 2005, Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868–1922, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 202. In November 1918, Kat¯ o Kanji, who would be the Chief Naval Advisor during the Washington Conference and later a staunch opponent of naval arms control, told the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations that if United States buildup program was completed, “it will result in such an extreme disparity as to reduce the Pacific Ocean to an American Lake.” Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 54. 24 Takeharu Shimanuki, 1973, Nichiro sens¯ o igo ni okeru kokub¯o h¯oshin, shoy¯o heiryoku, y¯ohei k¯ory¯o no hensen, Gunji Shigaku 8(4): 4. 25 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 76.

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in 1914 to 316,419,080 yen in 1919.26 During the same period, the budget of the army rose from 87,699,978 yen to only 220,268,028 yen. The naval institution continued its political offensive after the war and, partially thanks to the Pacific plan, its budget topped 483,589,712 yen in 1921, on the eve of the Washington Conference. The army budget amounted at that time to a mere 246,978,665 yen. In the wake of the war in Europe, the situation in East Asia and across the Pacific led the Japanese military services to revise the Imperial Defense Policy of 1907. Rapid and far-reaching changes in the international system required an adaption of Japan’s security policy: Russia was engulfed in a civil war, nationalism in China was growing dangerously and the United States and the United Kingdom were pursuing massive naval expansion programs.27 In the 1918 Imperial Defense Policy, the naval institution agreed to keep Russia as Japan’s main hypothetical enemy, followed by the United States and China, in order to please the army, then eager to boost its military capabilities on the continent.28 In return, Navy Minister Kat¯o Tomosabur¯o and his Chief of General Staff Shimamura Hayao obtained the support of the army for naval expansion. The navy initially planned for an Eight-Eight-Eight Fleet, or three battle fleets each composed of eight capital ships (heavy or armored cruisers and battleships) to be built over an eight-year period.29 This massive plan was rejected by the Diet, Japan’s parliament. The latter nevertheless agreed in July 1920 to finance an Eight-Eight Fleet. The buildup program, to end in 1927, provided for the construction of four battleships of 47,500 tons and four battle cruisers of 41,400 tons.30 The funding for the plan, which went far beyond the financial capacities of the 26 Kaigun Rekishi Hozonkai, 1995, Nihon kaigun shi, dai 7 kan, Tokyo: Daiichi H¯ oki Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 117–9. 27 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 174.

Another factor that led to the revision was the growing concern of top military officials that if the two services were not able to agree on a unified security policy, civilians would be able to exploit military divisions and reduce overall defense spending. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 139. 28 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 174.

The original text of the Imperial Defense Policy of 1918 has never been found. Historians have been able to reconstitute its content based on collateral sources. 29 This meant lying down as well as completing three capital ships per year. 30 In addition to these eight capital ships, the plan claimed 12 smaller cruisers, 32

destroyers, one aircraft carrier and several other auxiliaries for a minimum cost estimated at 761 million yen. Schencking, Making Waves, 214.

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country, was once again helped by developments on the other side of the Pacific. Military expansions in all three major naval powers, which were also the great powers that had been the least affected by the First World War, threatened to engulf them into a dangerous and costly arms race.31 The buildup by the United States was by far the most impressive. The completion of the 1916 program would increase its number of capital ships to 35, and another program approved in 1919 added 16 capital ships for a total of 51.32 With the latter, President Woodrow Wilson was seeking naval superiority over, not parity with, the United Kingdom. London’s naval supremacy, based on a fleet of 42 capital ships, was seriously endangered. Japan’s Eight-Eight Fleet amounted to almost nothing compared with the American programs, worrying Japanese naval officers and policymakers. Moreover, also in 1919, the United States decided to concentrate half of its naval strength in the Pacific, adding a dimension of hostility to its latest construction plan.33 The Japanese FPE’s perception of international dynamics remained dire. Moreover, if 1918 brought peace in Europe, tensions were running high in Asia. The United States and Japan diverged on China, Manchuria and Siberia, on racial problems in California and Hawaii and on the strategic issue of the Pacific islands acquired by Japan during the war, which included the sensitive question of the status of the telegraphic facilities in Yap Island.34 These pending political and strategic matters were paralleled by the rapid naval expansion in both countries. War scares emerged in Washington and Tokyo, each perceiving the military expansion of the other as targeting its interests in Asia. The United States was afraid that Japan would acquire the means to threaten the Philippines

31 Richard Burns notes that the naval arms race was particularly intense on the eve of the Washington Conference, saying “the spring of 1921 witnessed a burgeoning arms race - before the year was out, more than 200 warships would be under construction.” Burns, The Evolution of Arms Control, 27. 32 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 191–2. 33 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 58–9. 34 Jon T. Davidann, 2007, Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941,

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 41.

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and to shield itself and its continental policy from American interferences.35 Tokyo was concerned that the United States would gain the naval power necessary to impose its Open Door principles in China and restrain Japan’s freedom of action in the wider region.36 Japan and the League of Nations At the same time, a new approach to international relations and domestic politics was spreading under the leadership of U.S. President Wilson.37 Domestically, notions such as individualism, constitutionalism and democracy became the mainstream. At the international level, the old model based on power politics and alliances was being transformed into a system of cooperation, open diplomacy, arms control, peaceful settlement of disputes and free trade. For Tokyo, the gap between this new diplomacy and the nature of the foreign policy it had pursued since the second half of the nineteenth century and its emergence as a modern nation-state was enormous.38 Having learned that power politics was the basis for survival in a hostile international environment dominated by Western imperialists, Japan’s priorities in the late 1910s and early 1920s were to unilaterally defend national security and interests and to settle the many issues inherited from the First World War, by force if necessary. Japanese policymakers were also skeptical about the prospect for international peace through benevolent cooperation between countries and were not convinced that the old “war system” was effectively on the verge of being transformed by the new diplomacy.39

35 Americans maintained a certain affinity with China and many businessmen were hoping to economically penetrate a market worth 400 million consumers. Japan’s policy toward northeast China, Siberia and the Pacific raised questions about its ultimate objectives and intentions. Thomas H. Buckley, 1993, The Icarus Factor: The American Pursuit of Myth in Naval Arms Control, 1921–36, in The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor, ed. Erik Goldstein and John H. Maurer, London: Frank Cass, 128. 36 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 58. 37 Akira Iriye, 2007, Nihon no gaik¯ o: Meiji ishin kara gendai made, Tokyo: Ch¯uo ¯

K¯oron Shinsha, 83. 38 Ibid., 85. 39 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 39.

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Unsurprisingly, the two military services were particularly incredulous, while the Foreign Ministry was eager to explore the proposals laid down by Wilson. The former initially imposed their views. During a meeting held in November 1918, Japan’s Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs showed reluctance to endorse Wilson’s agenda. Principles such as open diplomacy and arms control were rejected because secret diplomacy and armed forces were considered key elements of foreign policy.40 Regarding arms control, the Council adopted a statement saying that “it is totally unrealistic to expect that any satisfactory solution will be found to the question. Moreover, it will be disadvantageous for us to be restricted in our armament.”41 The Japanese position began to change, however, as diplomats sent to Paris in preparation for the Peace Conference of 1919–1920 were increasingly confronted by the new standards emanating from Washington. They were particularly stimulated by the idea of establishing an institution to regulate international relations and surprised by the willingness of some great powers, the United States in particular, to avert spoliation of the losers.42 This split the Japanese FPE and FDIB further between those who refused to trust and adhere to these new ideas, and those eager to engage with the West to change the way international politics was conducted. In addition to the fact that Tokyo was accustomed to the old diplomacy and was thus reluctant to change, the position of those skeptical about the new American discourse and unwilling to take the risk of abandoning the old way of doing things was explained by two factors. First, as described above, the international environment surrounding Japan remained characterized by a fairly high level of tensions, legitimizing the argument that the old methods had to be retained. Japan had performed well in such a hostile environment during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, thanks to power politics based on the use of armed forces, alliances and unilateralism in foreign policy. The Wilsonian principles dictated the abandonment of most of the tools that had 40 Akira Iriye, 1974, The Failure of Economic Expansion: 1918–1931, in Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taish¯ o Democracy, ed. Bernard S. Silberman and Harry D. Harootunian, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 240–1. 41 Ibid., 241. 42 Thomas W. Burkman, 2008, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World

Order, 1914–1938, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 30.

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made the success of Japan in war and peace. The new diplomacy was consequently regarded by some in Tokyo as yet another way for Western powers to restrain their country, or as an elegant camouflage of the old diplomacy.43 To this added the suspicion triggered by the obvious double standard of the new diplomacy. The international order to be negotiated in Paris, based among other things on the nation-state and the right to selfdetermination, did not match the Asian reality.44 Asia was still dominated by the empires of Western great powers, despite the fact that these countries were rhetorically calling for a redefinition of international affairs.45 It rapidly became apparent that the principle of self-determination was applicable only to Europe, not to Africa, the Middle East or Asia, where it was substituted by the mandate system. This heightened skepticism in Tokyo about the honesty of Western countries. On the other hand, many Japanese were convinced of the necessity to follow the new trend toward internationalism in order to defend national interests and avoid falling into diplomatic isolation, which was a clear possibility due to Japan’s aggressive policy toward China during the war and as the Siberian intervention was still going on.46 On December 2, 1918, during another meeting of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, the newly appointed plenipotentiary in Paris, Baron Makino Nobuaki, supported the new diplomacy. He stated that “the respect for peace and rejection of high-handedness are trends of the world today,” adding that “conditions have unquestionably changed

43 Ibid., 10.

As Thomas Burkman emphasizes, “Japan’s rugged experience in dealing with the West had taught the Japanese that power, not moral values or international law, dominated the contest of diplomacy.” Ibid., 12. 44 Tomoko Akami, 2002, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45, London and New York: Routledge, 2. 45 Akira Iriye, 1969, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931, New York: Atheneum, 4. 46 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 22.

Akami Tomoko notes that “the Japanese government supported the League [of Nations] not so much because of a commitment to international justice but, rather, because it saw the League as a collective security system of the powers and felt that it was important to be a part of it.” Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, 21–2.

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from the days of the old diplomacy.”47 A week later, he went further by saying that the new diplomacy required the withdrawal of troops from China. A proponent of the old way of handling international affairs, the president of the Kokumint¯ o party Inukai Tsuyoshi, protested that this mindset would end up with “the elimination of all but economics from the fundamental tools of international cooperation.”48 Not surprisingly, Army Minister Tanaka Giichi also opposed Makino. At that time, the Japanese decision-making process on foreign policy was based on a fragile equilibrium between civilians and military personnel. Because of the prevalent distrust of Western countries’ intentions and an international environment perceived as rather unstable and tense, the military institution possessed an important position within the FDIB and a meaningful influence on the FPE and its foreign policy. Given the absence of exogenous shock and consensus on threat perception, however, other FDIB members retained the ability to speak out and promote a policy of accommodation vis-à-vis other great powers. As a consequence of the opposition between a military-backed realist perspective on world affairs and a willingness to cooperate with others, the FPE found a compromise. It decided to work with Western countries toward the establishment of a new international order, in which the relevance of the use of armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy would be somehow reduced, while striving to protect Japanese interests in Asia. More precisely, the resultant of debates among FDIB and FPE members was a foreign policy rooted in the concept of taisei junn¯ o, or “conformity with world trends.”49 Proponents of this compromise were neither liberals nor ingrained realists, but pragmatic statesmen and bureaucrats trying to adapt to new tendencies in international politics while taking into account the nature of Japan’s domestic dynamics. An important figure of this group was Saionji Kinmochi, who would play a key role in Japanese politics during the 1920s and early 1930s as the last genr¯ o (elder statesman).50 The concept of taisei junn¯ o was not antinomic with Japanese nationalism and the defense of national interests. Prime Minister Hara Takashi

47 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 224. 48 Ibid., 225. 49 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 26. 50 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 84.

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declared that adopting a more internationalist approach to world politics was inevitable, and that “the road to a sound internationalism lies through a healthy nationalism.”51 At the heart of internationalism was the establishment of institutions dedicated to regulating international relations. These institutions would be governed by the most powerful countries, reason why Tokyo had interests in not being sidelined and ultimately became one of the four permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations.52 Japanese policymakers considered the League as a forum where they could advance their national interests through coordination with other great powers. The League could also be an obstacle to Japan’s policy toward the continent, however. Tokyo thus sought to conjugate flexibility of action in Japan’s periphery and participation in the new global framework by pushing for the necessary legal arrangements.53 At the 1919–1920 Paris Peace Conference, taisei junn¯ o was reflected by the priorities and behaviors of Japanese representatives. They focused almost exclusively on items that concerned Japan directly and remained relatively passive in discussions about global issues.54 The main objectives of Tokyo were to keep control of Germany’s former insular possessions in the Pacific and to retain its rights in the Shandong Peninsula, including the leasehold of Tsingtao. Global matters like the shaping of the League were put aside as long as Japan’s demands regarding its interests in the Asia–Pacific were not approved. A member of the Japanese delegation, Horinouchi Kensuke, remembered after the Pacific War that “Japan was totally absorbed in issues directly related to its own interests such as Shandong and the Pacific islands. It devoted no attention to matters of

51 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 25. 52 Ibid., xiv.

The Council was originally composed of five permanent members, but the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations. 53 Ibid., 103.

Japan approached the same way the Kellogg–Briand Pact, known as the No-War Pact or Peace Pact in the country, signed in August 1928. Japanese leaders made clear that the treaty did not apply to Manchuria because Japan retained its undeniable right of selfdefense in this region. In the words of Herbert Bix, “on every occasion between 1928 and 1931, the party cabinets sought to leave open the possibility of exercising force in China in the name of self-defense.” Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 224. 54 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 84.

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universal concern such as a peace structure and the international labor problem.”55 Because of the strategic significance of Germany’s former Pacific islands, called nan’y¯ o in Japan, the Imperial Navy was pushing for their annexation.56 Under pressure by the latter, Prime Minister Hara wanted to handle the issue through bilateral negotiations with Germany, but finally conceded to Western powers’ request to involve the League.57 Tokyo was nonetheless confident in obtaining the recognition of the annexation by other countries, thanks to its de facto control of the islands and the secret pledges made by allies during the war to support Japanese claims.58 Japan officially demanded the definite and unconditional annexation of the islands at the Council of Ten on January 17, 1919, less than 10 days after the opening of the Peace Conference.59 This put the United Kingdom in a delicate situation because its dominion Australia was asking for the acquisition of the very same islands. Moreover, the United States was categorically opposed to any kind of annexation, particularly by Japan. Based on a suggestion made by South Africa, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George consequently proposed a mandate system for the islands. The Japanese government was initially reluctant, but settled for the solution of the mandate system because of Washington’s outright opposition to annexation.60 Tokyo secured a Class C mandate on the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Archipelagos, composed of some 700 islands covering more than 2000 square kilometers. The mandate included the island of Yap, which the United States had tried to internationalize because of its Germanbuilt cable facilities linking Hawaii to the Philippines and the Dutch East

55 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 63. 56 Ibid., 69. 57 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 225. 58 These pledges had been made by the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia in

exchange for Japan’s participation in naval convoy operations in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 6. 59 Ibid., 69. 60 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 76–7.

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Indies.61 This type of mandate implied that the islands could not be fortified, although they were administered as integral parts of the Japanese territory.62 Japan also obtained a gradual withdrawal from the Shandong Peninsula, the control of which was cherished by the Imperial Army. The country would be able to keep control of key industries and infrastructures until the completion of the withdrawal. The price to pay was the sacrifice of the only demand not based on narrow national interests that Tokyo made at the conference. The rejection by Western countries of the proposal to enshrine racial equality in the Covenant of the League, which had somehow been forced upon the Japanese FPE by its population, triggered much displeasure in Japan.63 But for a political apparatus under pressure by the army and devising negotiating positions based on the concept of taisei junn¯ o , this was a reasonable price in order to avoid an immediate withdrawal from the Shandong Peninsula. The League of Nations and Arms Control The notion of arms control was enshrined in both Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The beginning of the latter article read: “The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.”64

61 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 71. 62 Ibid., 72 and 129.

The Class C mandate also implied the obligation to control the traffic of arms and ammunitions in the islands in line with the terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, signed in September 1919. Military training provided to local populations was limited to police duties and local defense. The owner of the mandate had to report every year to the Council of the League on the fulfillment of these obligations. 63 Ibid., 85–6. 64 Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, 1924, The Covenant

of the League of Nations, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp, accessed 19 October 2022.

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In the wake of the First World War, the arms control and disarmament movement developed in parallel with the emergence of a revisionist interpretation of the origins of the war.65 The revisionist approach viewed the period prior to August 1914 as characterized by a destabilizing action–reaction cycle of competing military buildups that had increased international tensions and the danger of war through misperception and miscalculation. This interpretation elevated from a minority point of view to the standard thinking on international politics the argument that wars could be accidental and triggered by arms races.66 Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister at the time of the outbreak of the war, summarized the revisionist lessons in these words: The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on other sides. […] Each measure taken by one nation is noted, and leads to countermeasures taken by others. […] Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till […] every government regards every precaution of every other government as evidence of hostile intent. […] The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them - it was these that made war inevitable.67

Because arms control aimed at preventing arms races, it became regarded by some countries as a major instrument of peace along with the mechanism of collective security created by the League. The idea of arms races as a cause of war was widespread in the United Kingdom, which had been engaged in a naval competition with Germany before the war, and rapidly spread to the United States and to a lesser extent to France. The revisionist interpretation of the First World War was also politically motivated. London in particular was trying to appease and reintegrate Germany into the international community, and notions such as accidental conflict and arms race were convenient in order to explain

65 Patrick Glynn, 1990, The Sarajevo Fallacy: The Historical and Intellectual Origins of

Arms Control Theology, in A Discussion of the Origins of Thinking on Arms Control: The Sarajevo Fallacy, ed. Kenneth M. Jensen and Kimber M. Schraub, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 4. 66 Charles Fairbanks, Jr., On the Origins of the Arms Race Paradigm, in A Discussion of the Origins of Thinking on Arms Control, ed. Jensen and Schraub, 75. 67 Glynn, The Sarajevo Fallacy, 4–5.

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the outbreak of the war without putting the entire responsibility on Berlin and its leadership.68 Japanese policymakers were much less influenced by this interpretation of the origins of the war in Europe. They possessed less knowledge about the chain of events that had led to the July Crisis. More important, the First World War had been both profitable and easily fought, Japan not having experienced the deadly European battlefield. Therefore, unlike many European countries, the Japanese government did not fear a “new Sarajevo.” Armed forces were not perceived negatively but as the normal means through which national security and interests were secured. Moreover, some in Tokyo were skeptical about arms control, regarded as a strategy devised by Western countries to maintain an international status quo in the level of national armaments that was advantageous for them, and disadvantageous for Japan.69 The military institution shared this view, and many high-ranking officers in Japan, as well as Army and Naval Attachés in Paris, resisted the insertion of any provision related to arms control in the Covenant of the League.70 Indeed, the military institution was intrinsically biased against arms control. From its perspective, the limitation of armaments impeded the maximization of military power and consequently endangered national security. However, the Army and Navy Ministers, acting as the institution’s representatives to the FPE, were confronted with diverging views from other FDIB and FPE members. The latter highlighted the need to compromise, because rejecting arms control would jeopardize the interest Japan had in preserving productive relations with Western countries. The Army and Navy Ministers ultimately subordinated “their misgivings to the domestic political necessity of compromising with the Hara government and the international political necessity of cooperating with the powers.”71 The military institution gave way to other FDIB members and to the cabinet of Prime Minister Hara, comforted by the fact that, as a permanent member of the Council of the League, Japan could veto damaging initiatives based on Article VIII. Admiral Takeshita Isamu,

68 Ibid., 7. 69 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 73. 70 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 76. 71 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 73.

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member of the Japanese delegation in Paris, also obtained the revision of the article as originally proposed by South Africa. By replacing the last two words of the sentence “the members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety” by “national safety,” he allowed countries to justify their level of armaments based on national security requirements, the sacrosanct concept of power politics.72 Prelude to the Washington Conference The United States was concerned about the ongoing naval arms race. This was not a new worry, Washington having on several occasions during the first two decades of the twentieth century proposed to regulate naval expansion through international agreements.73 In March 1919, American Admiral William Benson and his British counterpart Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss held a tumultuous discussion on the prospect of reaching a naval arms limitation treaty between their two countries.74 During what became known as the Battle of Paris, Benson strongly rejected the request made by Wemyss that the United Kingdom be able to retain naval superiority over the United States. Benson nevertheless agreed in principle to postpone the completion of a number of vessels provided by the 1916 buildup program, and to suspend the 1919 program, in exchange for the insertion of a reference to the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant of the League of Nations. After the Battle of Paris, the United Kingdom sought a rapprochement with the United States in order to work through the League on the issue of naval restrictions. The ultimate failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Covenant of the League put an end to British hopes.75 And Tokyo was naturally unwilling to engage in serious discussions on naval arms control if the United States was not involved. Although the Council of the League established, in May 1920, a committee to discuss arms limitations and a sub-committee dedicated specifically to naval affairs, progresses were slow

72 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 76. 73 Burns, The Evolution of Arms Control, 23. 74 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 75. 75 Idem.

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and Japan resisted any restrictions as long as they did not apply equally to the United States.76 When Warren G. Harding succeeded Wilson as President in 1921, the completion of American naval expansion plans were put on hold and the new administration turned its attention to the possibility of reaching an international agreement to end the naval arms race.77 Harding wanted to demonstrate his leadership in foreign affairs after the failure to join the League of Nations, to achieve naval parity with the United Kingdom, to restrain Japan’s naval expansion and to secure American interests in the Asia–Pacific.78 Domestically, he had to deal with the public’s wish for tax relief and the expected reluctance of Congress to fund the ongoing naval construction programs.79 Growing pacifism in the United States also pressured Harding. This pacifism was reflected by several resolutions introduced in Congress.80 In December 1920, the resolution of Senator David Walsh asked the President to cooperate actively with the Disarmament Commission of the League. The same month, Senator William Borah presented a resolution calling on the three great naval powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, to negotiate an arms control treaty. Borah doubled down in April 1921. The resolution introduced at that time, almost similar to the previous one, was approved in the Senate by 74 votes against none and in the House of Representatives by 302 votes against four.81 After the vote, Harding decided not only to call for an international naval arms control conference, but also to host it. From a strategic point of view, in addition to the possibility of reaching naval parity with the United Kingdom and constraining Japan while reducing naval expenditure, an international conference could help break up the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.82 Although the Harding Administration was not concerned about the prospect of conflict with the United Kingdom in case of war with Japan, it felt uneasy with the fact that Tokyo 76 Ibid., 77. 77 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 192. 78 Buckley, The Icarus Factor, 128. 79 Idem. 80 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 81. 81 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 95. 82 Buckley, The Icarus Factor, 127.

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seemed to use the alliance to get implicit or explicit British approval for aggressive ventures in the Asia–Pacific. A key example was Japan’s seizure of the Pacific islands during the First World War and the subsequent recognition by the League of Nations of their acquisition, two successes reached with the support of London. An international conference could also help resolve pending issues in the Asia–Pacific, like the problem of the mandated islands. The U.S. Navy was extremely concerned about Japan’s possession of these islands. Given their strategic locations, a strong Japanese navy could use them to cut the lines of communication between the United States and its military outpost in Hawaii on the one side, and the Philippines and China on the other.83 Even before the end of the First World War, the Planning Section of the Division of Naval Operations released a report calling for the internationalization of the islands. Following up on this report, the Navy General Board went further and concluded that the acquisition by the United States of the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Archipelagos was a necessity.84 For Japan, the end of the First World War opened a period of high uncertainty regarding its position and capacity to perform in the international system. Although the war had brought easy gains, it had left Japan diplomatically isolated over its behavior in China and later Siberia.85 Moreover, Japanese policymakers had witnessed during the war, through Military Attachés in particular, the advance Western countries possessed in terms of military power and technology. The inferiority of the Japanese military, especially the navy, was obvious in many domains, including air power and submarines.86 To complete the picture, the United States was rapidly expanding its naval power and was increasingly assertive in Asian affairs, while European countries were expected to recover from the war and eventually come back to East Asia.87 Japanese leaders also remained suspicious about the intentions of Western countries and the United States. The apprehension prevailed that the Washington Conference on naval arms control could be used 83 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 95. 84 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 71. 85 Ibid., 28. 86 Ibid., 6. 87 Ibid., 28.

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as a tool to restrain Japan in the Asia–Pacific.88 This concern heightened when, upon the reception of the invitation to the conference in July 1921, the Japanese became aware that Pacific and East Asian issues would be discussed in parallel with arms control.89 The link between the two topics was incomprehensible and illogical for many in Japan, politicians and media alike.90 Nevertheless, the invitation was relatively well received, and the Japanese FPE accepted it, for several reasons. The conference was an opportunity to break with the diplomatic isolation in which Japan was engulfed at that time. The development of constructive relations with the United States and the United Kingdom was regarded by a majority of FDIB and FPE members as particularly important for security and economic reasons.91 In a speech to the Diet in January 1921, Foreign Minister Uchida K¯osai mentioned the issue of naval arms control in the part of his statement dedicated to Japan’s relations with the United States, saying that arms control negotiations needed to be pursued in good faith in order to bring positive results.92 Also, like in Western countries, a pacifist movement emerged in Japan in the wake of the First World War. Although not the most important factor in the policymakers’ decision to participate in the Washington Conference, the movement was supported by prominent parliamentarians such as Ozaki Yukio and triggered pro-naval arms control rallies.93 Moreover, the cabinet of Prime Minister Hara was eager to reduce the influence of the military institution after a period of growing military interventions in politics during the war. This could be done by reaching an international agreement emphasizing diplomacy over the use of armed forces in the conduct of foreign policy.94 In other words, the Hara Cabinet displayed sensitivity to the functioning of the mechanism of contextual adaption.

88 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 65. 89 The American invitation to the conference stated that the objective was “to seek

ground of agreements as to principles and their application to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems.” Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 63. 90 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 82. 91 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 148. 92 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 62. 93 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 81. 94 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 62–3.

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Lastly, and related to the above, Japan’s financial situation was deteriorating and the Hara Cabinet was worried about the negative consequences of increasing military spending. Although budget expansions for the navy and the army were approved after the end of the war, the Japanese FPE was looking for a way out of a dilemma made of financial problems and the risk of politically confronting the military institution over budget restrictions.95 An international arms control conference was perceived as a solution to this dilemma. High-ranking naval officers were briefed by Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo and Finance Vice Minister Nishihara Hajime on the fact that the financial survival of Japan depended on their flexibility regarding naval spending.96 Naval leaders were predominantly sensitive to this argument, which was supported by other FDIB members. The First World War had demonstrated that victory depended as much on the amount of national power, which included industrial, economic and financial capacities, as on the narrowly defined military power. The Temporary Naval Affairs Research Committee, established in late 1915 under the direction of Admirals Yamaya Tanin and Takeshita Isamu, had concluded that the development of national power was a prerequisite for a strong national defense.97 The testimonies of naval officers who had traveled to Europe reinforced this argument that to have an important number of warships was not sufficient to win modern conflicts. Moreover, naval leaders were aware of Japan’s industrial weaknesses and dangerous dependency on external supply for key resources such as steel.98 Japan was unable to keep pace with the American naval expansion, as construction yards and arsenals were already overheating. The Washington Conference On November 12, 1921, during the opening ceremony of the Washington Conference, U.S. Secretary of State Charles Hughes announced a plan for an immediate stop in ship building, a 10-year naval holiday through a moratorium on naval construction and the establishment of a

95 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 80–1. 96 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 58. 97 Schencking, Making Waves, 217–8. 98 Ibid., 218–9.

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ratio of naval strength between the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan.99 More specifically, Hughes proposed that all capital ships planned or in construction be abandoned, that reduction in sea power be made through the scrapping of older ships, that a ratio of naval power be established based on the existing strengths of member states, and that capital ships be the standard for measuring naval strength.100 The establishment of ratios for auxiliary vessels was also included in the original proposal.101 The objective was to achieve, by the end of the 10-year naval holiday, a ratio of 5:5:3 in capital ships between the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, respectively.102 To reach this ratio, Hughes suggested the following figures for the immediate scrapping of capital ships in construction and already built: the United Kingdom would scrap 19 ships for a total of 583,375 tons, the United States 30 ships for 845,740 tons and Japan 17 for 448,938 tons. Three months after the conference, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan would possess, respectively, 22 capital ships for 604,450 tons, 18 for 500,650 tons and 10 for 299,700 tons, representing a ratio of roughly 6:5:3. After the 10-year holiday, the replacement of ships of more than 20 years of age would be allowed and planned to reach a final ratio of 5:5:3, or 500,000 tons for both the United Kingdom and the United States and 300,000 tons for Japan.103 The American diplomatic offensive was carefully calibrated to ensure that the possible failure of the conference would be advantageous for the government. The Harding Administration supported the development of a big fleet but, as mentioned earlier, the reluctance of Congress to 99 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 75. 100 Battleships, the largest capital ships, were considered by the wide majority of naval

officers as the most important naval asset until the Pacific War. They were the standard of sea power and the decisive weapon in battle. Aircraft carriers gradually took over this role during and after the war. 101 Malcolm H. Murfett, Look Back in Anger: The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, in Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, 89. 102 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 109–10. 103 The 6:5:3 ratio and the British superiority attached to it, which would prevail

during the naval holiday, took into account and compensated for the fact that the United Kingdom had to stop building warships during the First World War in order to focus its war efforts on other military domains. Many of its vessels were therefore already overaged during the 1920s. Ibid., 123.

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provide funds for naval constructions and growing pacifism in the United States jeopardized this objective. The rejection of the proposal made by Hughes would have provided Harding with a strong justification for the continuation of naval expansion.104 After the stunning opening of the conference, discussions were held in two separated committees.105 The first was dedicated to naval restrictions (Arms Limitation Committee) and the second to political issues in the Asia–Pacific (Pacific and Far Eastern Committee). The first committee included five countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy), while nine participated in the second (the five countries just mentioned plus China, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal). Negotiations in the Arms Limitation Committee resulted in a treaty signed on February 6, 1922, often called Five-Power Treaty in the literature.106 Article XIX imposed the status quo on fortifications in the Pacific, implying that “no new fortification or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified.”107 Regarding the United States, these limitations covered all its possessions in the Pacific with the exceptions of Hawaii and islands located along its West Coast, Alaska and the Panama Canal. The Aleutians were included in the group of restricted islands, as were the Philippines and Guam. The same restrictions applied to the United Kingdom’s Asiatic possessions east of 110 degree longitude, meaning that Hong Kong was covered by the terms of the treaty. Australia, New Zealand, islands near the coast of Canada and Singapore remained free from limitations. ¯ In regard to Japan, the treaty covered Amami-Oshima, the Ogasawara Archipelago (Bonins), Formosa, the Kuriles, the Pescadores and Okinawa (called Loochoo islands in the treaty). Tokyo reached its objective of

104 John H. Maurer, Arms Control and the Washington Conference, in The Washington Conference, ed. Goldstein and Maurer, 284–5. 105 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 108. 106 U.S. State Department, 1938, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United

States. 1922, Volume 1, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 247–66. 107 Ibid., 253.

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freezing the status quo in Guam and the Philippines, whereas Washington and London were able to retain key forward bases in Hawaii and Singapore, respectively. The Five-Power Treaty also regulated naval strength. The treaty imposed qualitative limits on capital ships, namely battleships and aircraft carriers. Articles V and VI restricted battleships to a maximum of 35,000 tons standard displacement and 16-inch guns, while Part 4 of the treaty set the minimum requirements for vessels to be considered battleships at 10,000 tons and guns of more than 8 inches.108 Aircraft carriers were limited by Articles IX and X to a maximum tonnage of 27,000 tons, with the possibility for each country to build two such warships of up to 33,000 tons. Guns were limited to a caliber of 8 inches, and the minimum displacement of these vessels was fixed at 10,000 tons. The tonnage of battleships allotted to member states was laid down in Article IV. The United States and the United Kingdom obtained 525,000 tons each, Japan was granted 315,000 tons and France and Italy 175,000 tons each. Among the three major naval powers, this reflected the 5:5:3 ratio proposed by Hughes during the opening ceremony of the conference, equivalent to a 60 percent ratio for Japan compared with the naval strength of the United States. Adding Italy and France, the ratio formula agreed upon in Washington was 5:5:3:1.67:1.67. Article VII contained the tonnage of aircraft carriers and provided the United States and the United Kingdom with 135,000 tons each, Japan with 81,000 tons and France and Italy with 60,000 tons each. Similar to battleships, this represented a ratio of 5:5:3 between the three biggest navies and thus a 60 percent ratio for Japan in comparison to the Americans. Article III realized the objective of Hughes for a naval holiday, compelling member states to abandon their naval expansion programs and forbidding them to build or acquire any new battleship during 10 years. Finally, Article XXIII stated that the treaty would remain in force at least 108 Standard displacement was defined as “the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.” Ibid., 264. The term “capital ship,” which appeared in the text of the treaty, is confusing because it was sometimes used to include heavy cruisers, reason why it is here replaced by battleship. Heavy cruisers were vessels close to but below 10,000 tons and generally carrying 6 or 8-inch guns.

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until December 31, 1936. For the treaty to terminate at this date, a country had to issue a notice expressing its intention to withdraw at the latest two years earlier, meaning before December 31, 1934. If the treaty was allowed running after December 31, 1936, it could be terminated two years after a notice of withdrawal was issued by a member state. The Five-Power Treaty did not put any limitation on auxiliary vessels, or warships lighter than 10,000 tons and carrying guns up to 8 inches. The United States wanted to extend the ratio of capital ships to these vessels, but the proposal was met by the strong opposition of other countries, France and the United Kingdom in particular.109 London resisted the idea because, although it agreed to concede parity in battleships and aircraft carriers to the United States, it was not ready to admit overall equality in naval strength with the Americans. The United Kingdom also needed a large number of cruisers to patrol its worldwide empire and was thus eager to keep the ability to build at will in this category.110 Two other treaties, negotiated in the Pacific and Far Eastern Committee, were concluded during the Washington Conference. The first was the so-called Four-Power Treaty between the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and France, signed on December 13, 1921.111 The United States wanted to terminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, regarded as stimulating Japan’s aggressive policy in the Asia–Pacific. Hughes thus made the approval of the status quo on Pacific fortifications contingent upon the scrapping of the alliance, and to compensate Japan and the United Kingdom suggested a loosely worded treaty dedicated to guaranteeing member states’ insular possessions in the Pacific.112 The treaty called on countries to respect their respective rights over islands and to consult with each other in case of dispute. It also provided for the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to take effect at the time of the deposit of the instruments of ratification. This treaty was far from being sufficient to address all pending issues in Asia. The major destabilizing factor in the relations between great powers was China. The United States wanted to restrain Japan’s behavior toward

109 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 157. 110 Murfett, Look Back in Anger, 99. 111 U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, 33–6. 112 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 81.

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this country, but the Harding Administration was categorically opposed to the option of using force for this purpose.113 The Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, reflected the American dilemma of wanting to impose its rules of the game on Japan but without any show or use of armed forces.114 The treaty sanctioned the Open Door principles promoted by the United States since the turn of the century: equal opportunity in trade and industry and the respect of “the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.”115 If these principles were threatened or violated, Article VII stipulated that “there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.”116 This was, to say the least, a weak mechanism for the resolution of disputes that could arise around the highly sensitive issue of countries’ relations with China. The treaty also aimed at providing China with the opportunity “to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.”117 This was considered crucial for member states to avoid conflict over China, allowing them to enjoy a stable and expanding Chinese market that would remain equally accessible to all thanks to the Open Door principles. To achieve this objective, another treaty dedicated to increasing the revenues of the Chinese government through a revision of custom tariffs was signed by the same nine countries.118 Tariffs would be raised as soon as possible to five percent of the value of imported goods, and a review of the mechanism was scheduled to take place four years after the initial increase in tariffs. In their instructions, Japanese delegates in Washington had been asked by their government to keep the East Asian and Siberian issues out of the agenda of the conference by clearly separating them from arms control affairs.119 Inside the delegation, military representatives worked hard to

113 Ibid., 65. 114 U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,

1922, 276–81. 115 Ibid., 278. 116 Ibid., 280. 117 Ibid., 278. 118 This treaty was also signed on February 6, 1922. Ibid., 282–7. 119 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, j¯ o, 529.

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make sure the instructions were respected by their civilian colleagues. Matters such as Japan’s interests in the Shandong Peninsula had to be dealt with through bilateral understandings with China. Tokyo finally agreed to the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty, which applied to the Peninsula, for several reasons.120 The boycott of Japanese goods that began after the Paris Peace Conference, where Japan obtained a gradual withdrawal from the Peninsula, had shown that China was not powerless and that its claims could not be totally ignored. Japanese policymakers were also aware that diplomatic decisions reached in Washington would not automatically have constraining effects on the ground. Moreover, delegates knew that to oppose the United States on the Chinese question could jeopardize the achievement of more important objectives, such as the status quo on Pacific fortifications, and would thus depart from the concept of taisei junn¯ o . Lastly, the delegation that negotiated the Nine-Power Treaty was headed by Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o, the archetype of the Japanese liberal thinker. Japanese Reactions to the Washington Conference The so-called Washington System of treaties was part of the broader post-war international framework that emerged with the creation of the League of Nations and was later completed by the Locarno Treaties of 1925, which instituted peace in Western Europe, and the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928, which aimed at banning war as an instrument of foreign policy. For Japan, the agreements reached in Washington were much more consequential than the others, however. The Washington Treaties formed a complex array of rules addressing political, military and economic aspects of international relations in the Asia–Pacific, and became a roadmap guiding Japan’s foreign policy. The texts of these treaties as well as the spirit they enshrined emphasized cooperation as a way of resolving disputes and maintaining regional stability, the latter being considered a kind of common good. Gradualism, not radicalism, was the key to do so, as reflected by the Nine-Power Treaty and the underlying willingness of member states to help China transform

120 David Armstrong, China’s Place in the New Pacific Order, in The Washington Conference, ed. Goldstein and Maurer, 255–6.

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into a stable and modern country.121 The system effectively reoriented Tokyo’s foreign policy away from the old way of handling international affairs through power politics, armed forces and alliances, to cooperation between major powers based on international laws and norms.122 This epoch-making system allowed Japan to simultaneously ensure national security, defend its national interests and address the Chinese question without endangering its relations with other great powers. Although Tokyo’s security and economic policies often collided during the 1910s, the Washington System helped liberal statesmen like Shidehara to reconcile the two in a coherent foreign policy rooted in international cooperation.123 National security was guaranteed by arms control and the maintenance of constructive relations with other great powers. Japan’s national power could be developed through domestic economic development, the expansion of trade and the penetration of new foreign markets, which also required the cooperation of other countries.124 The adherence of Tokyo to the Washington System thus reflected the Japanese FPE’s ability to strike a balance between the perspectives and interests of different FDIB members. The establishment of the Washington System was followed by a tremendous improvement in Japan’s relations with the United States, what Charles Hughes referred to as the “spirit of the Washington Conference.”125 The atmosphere of détente between the two countries allowed them to settle pending issues that had poisoned their relationship for years. The United States recognized Japan’s possession of the mandated islands in exchange for the promise that no modification would be brought in the islands without the consent of Washington. Freedom of religion and labor was guaranteed and American citizens obtained the right to reside in Yap Island and manage its communication facilities.126 The two countries also settled disputes related to China and the

121 Akira Iriye, 1987, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, London and New York: Longman, 2–3. 122 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 87. 123 Ibid., 85–6. 124 Ibid., 90–1. 125 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 67–8. 126 Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations, 129–30.

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Soviet Union, Japan returning the Shandong Peninsula to the former and withdrawing its troops from Siberia.127 The Washington Treaties were well received in Japan. The country achieved most of its objectives without much sacrifice, or at least less than countries like the United Kingdom, which had to concede parity to the United States and end its century-long naval hegemony in order to put a halt to the arms race.128 Jiji Shinp¯ o, a newspaper known for its liberal orientation, welcomed the outcomes of the Washington Conference and described it as a first step toward further naval disarmament and the establishment of world peace.129 Media were also generally satisfied by the settlement of the Shandong question and the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by the Four-Power Treaty, although some pointed that the latter was a less potent instrument of national security than the alliance.130 Media were more critical of the 60 percent ratio in naval strength.131 Tokyo Asahi, for example, wondered why the Japanese government had accepted such a ratio while the argument that a 70 percent ratio was the strict minimum for national defense was circulating all over Japan before the conference. Kokumin Shinp¯ o, a more conservative newspaper, strongly criticized the ratio. Nevertheless, despite a ratio of 60 percent the naval strengths of the Anglo-Saxon countries, its coupling with the maintenance of the status quo on Pacific fortifications left the Imperial Navy by far dominant, some authors say “supreme,” in a position of “monopoly power” or of “absolute hegemony,” in the Western Pacific.132 Vice Admiral Abo Kiyokazu, chairman of the navy’s Advisory Committee on Arms Control prior to the Washington Conference and participant in the drafting of instructions to delegates, said in a report published in 1927 that the 60 percent ratio was

127 Buckley, The Icarus Factor, 133. 128 Murfett, Look Back in Anger, 89. 129 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 68. 130 Ibid., 68–9. 131 Ibid., 68. 132 James B. Crowley, 1966, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign

Policy, 1930–1938, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 30; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 197; Maurer, Arms Control and the Washington Conference, 283; Murfett, Look Back in Anger, 93.

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greatly advantageous for Japan.133 In his view, accepting the ratio had allowed neutralizing the cornerstone of potential U.S. Navy’s transpacific operations, namely Guam and the Philippines. During the 1920s, most warships used either coal or a process of mixed firing by which burning coal was sprayed with oil to increase its thermal content.134 The short cruising range of these vessels meant that the U.S. Navy would encounter important logistical and refueling problems in reaching the Western Pacific from its closest major naval base, Hawaii, some 3400 nautical miles away from Tokyo.135 The United Kingdom would face even greater challenges in bringing naval power to East Asia.136 Its nearest naval base, Singapore, was located about 3000 nautical miles from the Japanese capital and would be unable to accommodate a large fleet until its upgrade in the late 1930s. After Singapore, the closest first-class base that could support an entire British battle fleet was Malta, 6000 nautical miles away from Singapore. In addition to improving Japan’s strategic position, the Washington Treaties put an end to a naval arms race that could have endangered the country’s economy.137 In early 1921, before the Harding Administration put the 1916 and 1919 buildup programs on hold, the United Kingdom was on the verge of resuming its own construction plans to keep pace with the massive naval expansion taking place on the other side of the Atlantic.138 A failure of the Washington Conference could have provided the necessary incentive for U.S. Congress to approve funds to complete the plans interrupted by Harding. The ensuing arms race between the Anglo-Saxon countries would have forced Japan to build on its own, depleting its financial resources and threatening its economic wealth. Although the Five-Power Treaty was, objectively speaking, strategically advantageous for Japan, the Imperial Navy was less enthusiastic than other FDIB members. Some high-ranking officers, forming what Asada Sadao calls “administrative group,” backed the government of Prime

133 Kiyokazu Abo, 1927, T¯ og¯ ugo gakumonsho heisho igo shink¯ o no gunjigaku, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 104. 134 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 158. 135 Murfett, Look Back in Anger, 93. 136 Ibid., 93–4. 137 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 87–8. 138 Maurer, Arms Control and the Washington Conference, 286.

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Minister Hara Takashi and the outcomes of the Washington Conference.139 This group, led by Navy Minister Kat¯o Tomosabur¯o and his followers, including Abo Kiyokazu, Nomura Kichisabur¯o, Hori Teikichi and Yamanashi Katsunoshin, was primarily located in the Navy Ministry and composed of politico-administrative personnel. These people were in direct contact with the FPE and other FDIB members, and thus understood the need for compromise and for a nuanced approach to international affairs. The administrative group was opposed by the “command group,” made of sailor-type personnel centered on the Navy General Staff and farther away from the FPE-FDIB nexus.140 The command group, headed by Kat¯o Kanji and Suetsugu Nobumasa, would eventually become the dominant force in the naval institution in the early 1930s, propelled by the Manchurian crisis, an exogenous shock, and Japan’s deteriorating threat perception. The group regarded the naval limitations put in place in Washington as an unfair burden imposed upon the navy by politicians eager to satisfy the growing pacifism of the Japanese population.141 More generally, the command group carried the essence of the naval institution: it was deeply distrustful of other countries’ intentions, reasoned by worst-case contingency planning and consequently sought to accumulate as much naval power as possible. Kat¯o Kanji was the perfect illustration of this military mindset. From his point of view, the ratio of naval strength enshrined in the FivePower Treaty was irrational and reflected the hostile intentions the United States harbored toward Japan. Because he considered a 70 percent ratio adequate to defend Japan against the U.S. Navy, but insufficient to attack the United States, the only explanation for Washington’s insistence on the 60 percent ratio was its belligerent motivation. In a telegram to the navy’s Vice Minister and Vice Chief of General Staff sent on December 4, 1921, from Washington, where he attended the conference, Kat¯o argued that the objective of the United States was to destroy Japan’s naval

139 Sadao Asada, 1973, The Japanese Navy and the United States, in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 226–7. 140 Idem. 141 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 69.

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supremacy in East Asia and the Western Pacific and replace it by American hegemony.142 Kat¯o Kanji’s distrust of American intentions was reinforced by the fact that he did not consider the need to mitigate financial and economic problems a rational basis for naval arms control. Such considerations did not lie within his domain of expertise. Therefore, he perceived the United States’ assertion that this was one of the main goals of the Washington Conference as insincere and hiding malign motives.143 Kat¯o presumed the worst of American intentions. It was clear in his mind that a conflict with the United States was inevitable, sooner or later.144 Consequently, Japan had to be prepared and build a navy as large as possible in peacetime in order to be able to defeat the U.S. Navy in war. The Washington System ran against this need to maximize naval power. To push the agenda of the command group forward, Kat¯ o Kanji and Suetsugu Nobumasa took in 1922 the initiative to launch a revision process of the 1918 Imperial Defense Policy. Navy Minister Kat¯o Tomosabur¯o tried to interfere in the drafting process in order to incorporate into the new policy the spirit, if not the terms, of the Washington Treaties, in particular regarding the recent improvement of relations with the United States.145 In line with past practices, however, the general staffs of the two military services held sole responsibility. Indeed, imperial defense policies were traditionally compiled by the general staffs and then submitted to their respective ministers and the cabinet for approval, a rubber-stamping exercise because the Emperor had the final word as Supreme Commander.146

142 Japan Navy Ministry, undated, Kat¯ o ch¯ uj¯ o hatsuuke denp¯ o utsushi, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯usho, B¯oeish¯o. 143 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 104 and 139. 144 Japan Navy Ministry, undated, Kafu kaigi kankei, Kat¯ o ch¯ uj¯ o denp¯ o, Tokyo: B¯oei

kenky¯usho, B¯oeish¯o. 145 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 197 and 201; Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor,

101. 146 Sadao Asada, 1993, The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921–1927, Naval War College Review 46(3–343): 90.

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The new Imperial Defense Policy was sanctioned by the Emperor in February 1923.147 The policy first noted that because the United States had not joined the League of Nations, the relevance of this instrument for the maintenance of international peace was dubious. It then stated, in an implicit but clear reference to the Washington Treaties, that “other new agreements related to the Pacific and East Asia do not address the root causes of the current situation in the Far East,” concluding that “to prevent war through treaties is simply impossible.”148 This realist-inspired recital aimed at demonstrating that diplomatic instruments were impotent to regulate international relations and guarantee Japan’s security. The policy went on to say that given its natural resources and the size of its markets, East Asia was the focal point of the ongoing economic war between great powers, something that would inevitably lead Japan to clash with other countries. Among them, the country with which Japan had the highest probability of collision was the United States. Inversely to the 1907 and 1918 versions, the 1923 Imperial Defense Policy thus identified for the first time the United States as Japan’s main hypothetical enemy. On the other hand, the development of friendly relations was fostered with the two other potential opponents pinpointed by the 1918 policy, China and the Soviet Union. This constituted a clear reversal compared with the two previous versions of the policy, where the army’s chosen adversary, Russia, was recognized as the primary hypothetical enemy of Japan. The 1923 policy noted that the United States had recently started boosting its national power by using its infinite natural resources. Its aggressive economic policy threatened Japan’s position and interests, particularly in China. Issues related to Japanese immigration to Hawaii and California remained a matter of concern and were not expected to be resolved in the near future. Lastly, the Imperial Defense Policy asserted that the United States was reinforcing its military presence in the Pacific and East Asia, that the continuation of its anti-Japanese policy would “one day or another inevitably provoke a collision with Japan” and consequently that “national defense must be taken seriously.”149

147 Takeharu Shimanuki, 1973, Dai ichi ji sekai taisen igo no kokub¯ o h¯oshin, shoy¯ o heiryoku, y¯ohei k¯ory¯o no hensen. Gunji Shigaku 9(1): 65–75. 148 Ibid., 66. 149 Idem.

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That the United States was identified as Japan’s main hypothetical enemy, with which war was inevitable, only one year after the Washington Treaties were signed, has been regarded as a paradox by some scholars.150 This was not. The 1923 Imperial Defense Policy was an attempt by the command group to bias the perception the Japanese FPE had of its international environment. By doing so, the group hoped that a process of contextual adaption would unfold and increase the leverage of the naval institution on the formulation of foreign policy. The ultimate objective of Kat¯o Kanji and his followers was to advance the vested interests of the command group and of the navy as a whole, and in particular to attract budget to compensate for what they perceived as deficiencies in national defense engendered by naval arms control. The command group failed in securitizing the United States for several reasons. The naval institution was internally split between the command and administrative groups over the outcomes of the Washington Conference and the way forward, and was consequently unable to present a unified position to the FPE. The command group was also opposed in its narrative by most of the entities composing the FDIB, the Foreign and Finance Ministries in particular, eager to maintain constructive relations with the United States. Moreover, unsuccessful in convincing the primary audience that the United States represented a threat to national security, the command group did not make the extra-effort to reach out to the secondary audience, the broader political landscape and the civil society, in order to reinforce its position. Lastly, and more important, the contextual reality was far from being favorable to a securitization of the American threat. The Washington Conference and its aftermath had demonstrated the advantages of cooperating with the United States and had reassured many in Japan about the country’s intentions. In the absence of exogenous shock, the formulation of threat perception did not become a matter of political debate inside the FPE and remained confined in institutional routines. This resulted in the development of an accurate threat perception. Therefore, the 1923 Imperial Defense Policy had no concrete impact on Japan’s foreign policy, being toward the United States or the rapidly evolving situation in China.

150 Sadao Asada, From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921–1930, in The Washington Conference, ed. Goldstein and Maurer, 157; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 201.

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Appropriate Balancing and International Cooperation During the 1920s and Early 1930s Japanese Restraint Toward China After the revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing Dynasty, China entered an era of internal instability characterized by the multiplication of centers of power. An estimated 20 million Chinese died during the socalled Warlord Period, between 1916 and the consolidation of Chiang Kai-shek’s power in 1928.151 The Washington System, and more precisely the Nine-Power Treaty, offered a basis upon which a modern and stable China could be built with the assistance of member states. However, the absence of a strong and legitimate central authority prevented the realization of this objective.152 This being the case, foreign countries were reluctant to relinquish their special rights in China for fear that their interests would not be secured by local authorities. In the 1920s, Japan possessed relatively limited interests and a small manufacturing network in China proper, inversely to Manchuria where the Japanese mining and industrial sectors had flourished since the beginning of the century.153 This and other political and strategic factors made Manchuria far more important than China proper for Tokyo, and provided the region with a special place in its foreign policy. The economic, political and military influence of Japan in Manchuria increased tremendously after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.154 One of the main vectors of this influence was the South Manchuria Railway Company, established in 1906 as a joint-stock corporation to handle the concessions obtained through the Treaty of Portsmouth, which had put an end to the war with Russia. By the 1920s, the company had developed an extensive array of trading, manufacturing and mining activities and exercised administrative control over the 400-mile-long Railway Zone that surrounded the railroads of the region. Until the early 151 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 66. 152 Armstrong, China’s Place in the New Pacific Order, 264. 153 Ramon H. Myers, 1996, Creating a Modern Enclave Economy: The Economic

Integration of Japan, Manchuria, and North China, 1932–1945, in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 137. 154 Yoshihisa Matsusaka Tak, Managing Occupied Manchuria, 1931–1934, in The Japanese Wartime Empire, ed. Duus, Myers and Peattie, 98–9.

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1930s, half of the Japanese population in Manchuria was concentrated in the Kwantung Leased Territory, located on the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula.155 The territory also hosted a naval base and military barracks. Its government, the Kwantung Bureau, was in charge of the management of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Manchuria was also militarily and strategically important for Japan. As a buffer separating its Korean colony from the instability of China, the protection of the region was considered a top priority on the continent. The Imperial Defense Policy of 1907 had emphasized the need to defend Korea as well as Manchuria, effectively integrating the latter into Japan’s defense perimeter.156 The Japanese army was tasked with guaranteeing the internal and external security of Manchuria independently from Chinese authorities, reason why a division was permanently based in Port Arthur and six battalions of the army’s special troops, renamed Kwantung Army in 1919, were located in the Railway Zone.157 A wide majority of FDIB members held the view that the maintenance of Japan’s position in Manchuria was a necessity for the country. To do so, Prime Minister Hara Takashi decided in May 1921 to support Chang Tso-lin, the most powerful warlord in Manchuria at that time.158 In the early 1920s, China was divided between several warlords. Chang and Sun Yat-sen, head of the Kuomintang nationalist party based in Canton, were the most influential. By supporting Chang, Tokyo sought to isolate Manchuria from the Chinese turmoil. Problems with this policy began in 1924 when Chang moved his troops out of Manchuria and marched on Beijing, implying the risk of exposing himself and Manchuria to attacks by other warlords.159 Shidehara Kij¯ ur¯o, Japanese Foreign Minister from 1924 to 1927, adopted a policy of non-intervention in Chinese affairs and refused to back Chang Tso-lin in his fight against warlord Wu Pei-fu.160 Similarly,

155 Ibid., 99–100. 156 Shimanuki, Nichiro sens¯ o igo ni okeru kokub¯o h¯oshin, 3. 157 Matsusaka Tak, Managing Occupied Manchuria, 101. 158 William G. Beasley, 1987, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 182. 159 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 124. 160 Sadako Ogata, 1964, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy,

1931–1932, Berkley: University of California Press, 7.

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in late 1925, Shidehara did not support Chang as the latter was facing an internal revolt led by Kuo Sung-ling. In 1927, the Foreign Minister did not send troops to rescue Japanese nationals threatened by anti-foreigner violence in Nanking and Hankow amid Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition. This did not mean that Shidehara was not ready to use armed forces to protect Japan’s interests on the continent. In December 1925, he pushed for a cabinet resolution requesting the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to make clear to all parties in Manchuria that Japan would intervene militarily if its position was endangered by the growing disturbances inside Chang Tso-lin’s clique.161 Shidehara nonetheless based his continental policy on the premise that the maintenance of good relations with China was the most effective way to defend Tokyo’s interests, including in Manchuria.162 What Japan needed most for its development and stability was to reinforce its industry, which depended in large part on foreign trade. The objective of his policy was to preserve productive relations with important economic partners, China being one of them. In the words of Shidehara, “Japan, being closest to China, has an advantage by way of transport costs and she also has the greatest competitive power because of her wages. It must therefore be a priority for Japan to maintain the great market of China.”163 Shidehara considered essential the framework provided by the Nine-Power Treaty and cooperation with other great powers to stabilize China and advance Japanese interests.164 Shidehara’s “soft diplomacy” of economic cooperation and nonintervention in Chinese affairs was pursued amid difficult circumstances, both domestically and externally. Nationalist groups inside Japan that called for a tougher policy toward China were becoming more influential, and China was increasingly unstable.165 After the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek took the lead of the Kuomintang and formed an erratic alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, the ideology of the latter being regarded as one of the

161 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 183. 162 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 8. 163 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 169. 164 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 7. 165 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 91–2.

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biggest threats by Japanese politicians.166 Chiang declared in July 1925 the Kuomintang the only government of China, and one year later began the Northern Expedition aimed at subduing warlords and at unifying the country. By the spring of 1927, Chiang had moved half way north to Beijing, had established his new capital in Nanking and had turned against the Communists. At that point, Shidehara was replaced by Tanaka Giichi as Foreign Minister, who also assumed the post of Prime Minister by taking over Wakatsuki Reijir¯o. Tanaka did not modify the economic aspects of the foreign policy pursued by Shidehara in China. He was also willing to coordinate to some extent his China policy with other great powers and to cooperate with these countries on matters not related to China, such as arms control and trade at large.167 However, if good relations with great powers were maintained for political and economic purposes, Tokyo’s interests on the continent were defended by armed forces if necessary. Indeed, Tanaka displayed a greater propensity to intervene directly in Chinese affairs. For him, Shidehara’s policy of non-intervention based exclusively on economic and diplomatic instruments was insufficient to properly protect Japanese interests.168 The “strong diplomacy” of Tanaka thus put greater emphasis on the use of force.169 For example, he dispatched troops twice in the Shandong Province, in 1927 and 1928, to protect Japan’s interests endangered by the northern move of the Kuomintang.170 In Manchuria, Tanaka’s strong diplomacy translated into a stronger backing of Chang Tso-lin in order to prevent the Kuomintang from extending its influence to the region. This was supposed to avert the spread of the Chinese civil war into Manchuria. But Chang went out of Manchuria in 1924 and by 1926 controlled a large portion of northern China. With this series of successes and his expanding power, Chang became increasingly uncontrollable and irritated by Tokyo’s meddling in his affairs, and began to contemplate

166 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 101–2. 167 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 101. 168 Ibid., 100. 169 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 9. 170 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 163–4.

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hegemony over the whole country.171 A major clash with the Kuomintang, which was heading north, was unavoidable and threatened to bring war to Manchuria, something Japan was determined to avert. As the soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek were dangerously approaching Chang’s positions, Tanaka publicly warned both sides on May 18, 1928, that Japan would intervene to prevent hostilities from spreading into Manchuria.172 Tanaka also urged Chang in a private message to withdraw to Manchuria before the arrival of the Kuomintang in Beijing. If the withdrawal was not undertaken in due time, Tokyo would revoke its support and close the border to block the retreat of Chang. In parallel, the Kwantung Army was ordered to prepare for a military expedition dedicated to disarming Chang’s troops in case he rejected the Japanese demand.173 Without any realistic alternative, Chang retreated to Manchuria. The objective of Tanaka was to separate China proper, expected to be soon governed by Chiang Kai-shek, from Manchuria, which would be controlled by Chang Tso-lin under the supervision of Tokyo. After the latter agreed to withdraw north of the Great Wall, Tanaka sent a message to Chiang telling him that, once in Manchuria, Chang would not be allowed to go south again.174 Chiang occupied Beijing on July 3, and his government still based in Nanking was recognized on the 25th by the United States, soon followed by the United Kingdom.175 A stabilization of the relationship between the two Chinese warlords was on the verge of being achieved. If Tanaka saw the withdrawal of Chang Tso-lin to Manchuria as the best way to secure the interests of his country, many field officers of the Japanese army did not share this point of view. These officers wanted, among other things, to be able to deploy troops and ensure public order in Manchuria on their own. They thus regarded Chang as an obstacle to more responsibilities for the army.176 Chang was killed in the blowing up of his train on June 4, as he was returning to Manchuria. The main culprit, a Colonel of the Kwantung Army named K¯ omoto Daisuke, was 171 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 12. 172 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 186–7. 173 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 12. 174 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 187. 175 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 102. 176 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 14.

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convinced that the solution to Japan’s problems on the continent was the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese forces and its separation from China proper.177 The assassination of Chang had tremendous consequences in China, Manchuria and Japan. In South and Central China, where the population was already upset by Japan’s expeditions to the Shandong Province, it triggered a wave of anti-Japanese protests and the expansion of boycotts of Japanese goods.178 This in turn led Japanese business circles active in China to call on the Tanaka Cabinet to improve economic relations with this country. Facing the failure of his interventionist policy, Tanaka had no choice but to mend ties with China. Japanese troops were soon totally withdrawn from the Shandong Peninsula, Tokyo signed a tariff agreement with the Nanking government in February 1929 and one month later recognized the Kuomintang as China’s government. When Tanaka fell from office in July 1929, his policy was more oriented toward cooperation on Chinese affairs with member states of the Nine-Power Treaty than unilateral actions. In Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded his father as the main warlord of the region and undertook a rapprochement with Chiang Kaishek, despite Tokyo’s efforts to prevent him from doing so. The Tanaka Cabinet had failed to punish the plotters of the death of Chang Tso-lin, causing his son’s resentment and an even greater will than his father to escape from Japanese influence.179 Chang Hsueh-liang canceled an agreement on railroads reached in May 1928 between his father and Japan and negotiated the formal reunification of Manchuria and China proper with the Kuomintang.180 On December 29, 1928, flags of the Kuomintang were raised over public buildings in Mukden, reflecting the allegiance of Manchuria to the Nanking government. Not surprisingly, the anti-Japanese movement that had developed in China proper began spreading in Manchuria, creating frictions between Japanese residents and the local population.181 Problems were numerous, including property issues, the rise in the price of accommodations for 177 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 187. 178 Ibid., 188. 179 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 16. 180 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 188; Nester, Power across the Pacific, 102. 181 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 17.

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Japanese and Koreans and oppositions to Japanese infrastructure, mining and industrial projects. Moreover, local requests for the return of the leaseholds held by the South Manchuria Railway Company multiplied. The latter, the heart of Japan’s interests in the region, was also threatened by a railway network plan promoted by the Kuomintang and linking Manchuria to the Chinese port of Yingkou. With the integration into the network of the new port of Hulutao, under construction at that time, the South Manchuria Railway Company and the harbor of Dairen would face harsh competition from China. The economic situation of Japanese citizens in Manchuria was deteriorating rapidly. In addition to the intensifying competition with local Chinese and companies coming from China proper, the consequences of the Great Depression that reached Manchuria in 1929 led them to call on the Japanese government for a return to a strong policy.182 Feeling that they were being abandoned by Tokyo, several missions were sent to the homeland to raise awareness among political circles of the faith of their fellow countrymen. Their demands were naturally backed by the Imperial Army, and the Kwantung Army in particular. Despite these difficult circumstances, Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o revived his soft diplomacy as soon as he returned as Foreign Minister in July 1929, following the fall of the Tanaka Cabinet.183 For him, a foreign policy that antagonized China and Chinese people held no promise of efficiently protecting Japanese interests, as Tanaka’s policy had demonstrated. In the spring of 1930, an agreement was reached with the Nanking government, providing China with autonomy in tariff setting in exchange for a pledge to keep unchanged custom duties on key Japanese items for a period of three years.184 Negotiations toward the end of extraterritorial rights for Japanese in China proper were well-advanced at the time of the Mukden Incident of September 1931, which triggered the Manchurian crisis.185 Until the materialization of an exogenous shock with the Manchurian crisis, the Japanese FPE was able to tame the influence of the military 182 Ibid., 18 and 38. 183 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 96. 184 Japan Foreign Ministry, 1966, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, Tokyo:

Hara Shob¯o, 161–2. 185 Japan was nonetheless trying to maintain extraterritoriality in South Manchuria and Kwantung, much like the United Kingdom did in Shanghai. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 172–3; Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 4.

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institution. The Foreign Ministry, backed by the Finance Ministry, dominated the decision-making process on foreign policy. Indeed, in spite of problematic developments in Chinese affairs, the FPE regarded its international environment as relatively safe, not least because its perception of the United States was accurate and had radically improved in the aftermath of the Washington Conference. From Washington to the Geneva Conference In parallel to the maintenance of good relations with China, Japan was eager to engage other members of the Washington System. Despite opposition by some elements inside the navy, Tokyo entered a period of close cooperation on arms control with the United States and the United Kingdom. This was reflected by the declining attention the Japanese government paid to the naval institution, which in turn demonstrates that the Japanese FPE perceived the two Anglo-Saxon countries as holding relatively benign intentions. The navy as an institution suffered extensively for its loss of political clout amid a process of contextual adaption. In the wake of the Washington Conference, the cabinet substantially reduced the budget of the navy, justifying its policy by the fact that national security was not based exclusively on military assets but also on financial and industrial capacities.186 Japan’s economic situation was difficult, in particular after the earthquake that devastated the region of Tokyo in 1923, and the lever provided by the Washington System allowed political leaders to impose budget cuts on the navy.187 The share of naval budget fell from 32.5 percent of the national budget in 1921 to 26.2 percent in 1922, 18.1 percent in 1923 and 15.3 percent in 1924, and then stagnated between 14.8 and 15.5 percent until 1932.188 Between 1921 and 1923 alone, naval budget shrank by more than 200 million yen, or almost half, from 483,589,712 yen on the eve of the Washington Conference to 275,144,360 yen in 1923.189

186 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 30. 187 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 209. 188 Kaigun Rekishi Hozonkai, Nihon kaigun shi, 117. 189 Naval budget continued to fall afterward, reaching 248,458,182 yen in 1924 and

229,003,163 yen in 1925.

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Budget cuts were an abstract notion, figures written in the book of the Finance Minister. The abandonment of naval buildup programs and the scrapping of warships were much more visible and concrete expressions of the consequences of the Washington Conference. The hope of building an Eight-Eight Fleet, the cherished objective of the navy that seemed at hand in 1921, was buried by the Five-Power Treaty. The cruisers Atago and Takao as well as the battleships Kii and Owari under construction at that time were scrapped, whereas the cruiser Akagi and the battleship Kaga were converted into aircraft carriers.190 The constructions of four additional cruisers were canceled. The cumulated tonnage of vessels composing the Japanese fleet fell from 1,033,797 tons in 1922 to 854,085 tons in 1923.191 In the years immediately following the Washington Conference, if Japan was not balancing in an appropriate manner against the United States, it was underbalancing. Instead of the Eight-Eight Fleet, the Japanese navy fell to a Six-Four Fleet of old ships reinforced by three aircraft carriers, a type of vessel that had yet to convince sailors of its relevance for naval operations.192 Buildup programs drafted by the Navy General Staff during the 1920s were systematically revised down, when they were not utterly rejected, by the Finance Ministry or the government.193 9457 naval personnel, including some 1700 officers and warrant officers and 5800 petty officers, were discharged in 1922 out of a total of 80,518 the previous

190 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 197. 191 This was the first time in the modern history of the navy that such a large reduction

of the fleet was implemented. The only two other instances of contraction were the periods 1880–1881 (from 24,475 tons to 23,993 tons) and 1903–1904 (from 252,730 tons to 236,558 tons). Kaigun Rekishi Hozonkai, Nihon kaigun shi, 148–51. 192 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 99. 193 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 209.

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year.194 Nine out of 10 admirals were subsequently pushed to retirement.195 Lastly, the number of students who entered the Naval Academy in 1922 represented less than a fifth of the enrollment in 1921.196 Beyond Japan, arms control efforts continued. After post-war political tensions calmed down in Europe thanks to the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Treaties, the League of Nations established in December 1925 the Preparatory Commission for the General Disarmament Conference.197 The Commission, composed of League members as well as the United States and the Soviet Union, met three times between May 1926 and May 1927 to prepare for a conference aimed at devising arms control measures in all dimensions of military power: air, ground and naval.198 Discussions rapidly came to a stalemate, however, as two blocks opposed each other over two main issues. A group of land powers led by France rejected the proposal that trained reserves be included in the determination of the level of ground forces, while the other group headed by the United Kingdom insisted this be the case.199 Because the Central Powers defeated during the First World War, first among which Germany, had been denied the possibility of maintaining reserves by the Versailles settlement, the proposal would have biased the calculus of the amount of ground forces against France and its partners. The second issue concerned the method to be used to limit sea power. Paris again led a group of minor naval powers that called for setting a single and general tonnage ratio.200 Each country would be able to 194 The number of naval personnel fell from 80,518 in 1921 to 71,061 in 1922. During the same period, the number of civilians working for the navy increased by 306, from 7643 to 7949. The total number of people in the navy, both uniformed personnel and civilians, fell by 9151 between 1921 and 1922, from 88,161 to 79,010. Kaigun Rekishi Hozonkai, Nihon kaigun shi, 57. 195 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 100. 196 Asada, The Revolt against the Washington Treaty, 89. 197 Richard W. Fanning, The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray,

in Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, 109. 198 Three sub-commissions were created to discuss arms control in these three

dimensions of military power. Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 159. 199 Brian J.C. McKercher, Of Horns and Teeth: The Preparatory Commission and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926–1934, in Arms Limitation and Disarmament, ed. McKercher, 177. 200 Ibid., 177–8.

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continue building in any category of warship as long as the total tonnage it was assigned with was not exceeded. The advantage for these countries was obvious. They would have the right to build a large quantity of often small and defensively efficient vessels, like submarines, whereas great naval powers would be forced to build in all categories to defend their maritime interests with well-balanced fleets. The United States and the United Kingdom opposed this proposal and sought to preserve a system of tonnage ratio per category, similar to the method used in the Five-Power Treaty.201 In view of these insolvable divergences in points of view between the two blocks, and to pull the discussions out of the League of Nations, U.S. President Calvin Coolidge took in February 1927 the initiative to invite the members of the Five-Power Treaty to a conference on naval arms control.202 For logistic reasons, the conference would take place in Geneva. As expressed by a proposal drafted by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg during discussions in the Preparatory Commission, the Americans wanted to extend the ratio of capital ships agreed upon in Washington to auxiliary categories below 10,000 tons.203 France flatly rejected the invitation, which led Italy to do the same. There were several reasons for this rejection.204 Paris did not want the discussions to be held outside the framework of the League, where it had managed to take the lead of the European group of land powers. A naval conference à la Washington would inversely put France in a position of minor naval power. Paris also held fast to its idea of a general tonnage ratio, whereas the Americans made clear that the objective of the conference would be to negotiate the extension of the Washington ratio of capital ships to other categories. Lastly, France’s geopolitical situation was very different from the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. More vulnerable to ground and air attacks than sea attacks, the French wanted the first two dimensions of military power to be taken into account in arms control discussions.

201 Fanning, The Coolidge Conference of 1927, 110. 202 McKercher, Of Horns and Teeth, 178. 203 Fanning, The Coolidge Conference of 1927, 111. 204 Idem; Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 159.

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Tokyo was somehow reluctant to accept the invitation.205 The 1924 Immigration Act, which included the Asian Exclusion Act, and the 1925 grand maneuver of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific triggered anti-American feelings and suspicion in Japan. More important, an expansion plan in auxiliary warships approved in 1923 would push Japan’s strength in these categories over a 70 percent ratio compared with the United States by 1928. The Japanese negotiating position would thus be reinforced if the conference was delayed. Naval arms control was nevertheless regarded by the cabinet of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯o and a wide majority of FDIB members as necessary. Japan was still struggling with the economic and social consequences of the 1923 Great Kant¯o earthquake and had to face a new challenge with the sudden outbreak of a banking crisis.206 Tokyo accepted the American invitation. The Japanese FPE adopted a flexible position on arms control, as reflected by the instructions to the delegates in Geneva, approved on April 15, 1927.207 The instructions did not include any explicit figure regarding the ratios of naval strength, only stating that delegates needed to prevent the ratios for auxiliary vessels from being settled “below what is required for our national security.”208 The ongoing expansion plan in auxiliaries, expected to be completed in 1928, was nonetheless considered essential and had to be continued. As mentioned, the plan would de facto provide Japan with a 70 percent ratio in auxiliaries vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy. As had been the case during the Washington Conference, to ensure Japan’s national security, broadly defined, was the main prerequisite for achieving an agreement. Technical figures and strategic requirements drafted by naval experts were interpreted as mere guidelines. The head of delegation in Geneva, Admiral Sait¯o Makoto, was therefore provided with flexibility in negotiating with other countries and was able to play with different components of national defense to reach a satisfactory arrangement. Measures related to Pacific fortifications and to different categories of surface auxiliaries and submarines could be weighed against

205 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 160–1. 206 Fanning, The Coolidge Conference of 1927, 115. 207 Japan Defense Ministry, National Institute for Defense Studies, 1969, Kaigun gunsenbi, 1: Sh¯ owa j¯ uroku nen j¯ uichi gatsu made, Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 365. 208 Idem.

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each other to find a consensus. In other words, space was provided for the exercise of diplomacy, which in itself was regarded as an instrument of national security. The equilibrium between FDIB members allowed the Japanese FPE to endorse a nuanced and constructive approach to the Geneva Conference. The Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath Despite Japan’s flexibility, a confrontation between the United States and the United Kingdom led to the total failure of the 1927 Geneva Conference. From the very beginning of the talks in June, the position of the two Anglo-Saxon countries diverged over a number of issues, including the rights and duties of neutral and belligerent countries at sea in wartime.209 Because modern warfare was perceived as characterized by attrition, London expected naval blockades to be an important strategic instrument during the next war. The United Kingdom thus wanted to restrict the freedom of neutral countries at sea, as their immunity could nullify the impact of blockades. The United States, on the other hand, insisted that the rights of neutrals be maintained, with the exception of ships carrying embargoed items. The main problem between the two countries remained the cruiser category, however. The United Kingdom, with its global empire, its numerous naval bases around the world and the latent threat of conflict in continental Europe, needed a large quantity of light cruisers to secure its lines of communication, reason why it invoked the “doctrine of requirements” for this sub-category.210 The British delegation also sought to tighten qualitative restrictions on auxiliary categories, making warships smaller and less expensive to build.211 Thanks to a global network of naval bases, British vessels did not need an extensive cruising range to fulfill their missions. The size of their hulls and tanks could be modest. The United States possessed very different strategic requirements and sought the exact opposite of the United Kingdom. In anticipation of a future conflict with Japan, the U.S. Navy had to be able to cross

209 Japan Navy General Staff, 1929, Gunshuku to kokub¯ o, Kaigun to kokub¯ o shis¯ o no fuky¯ u, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 23. 210 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 162. 211 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 234.

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the Pacific with long cruising range vessels and then win a naval battle for which big ships and big guns were considered the key assets. A large number of warships was not required as long as the American naval strength was indexed to the Japanese one through an advantageous ratio.212 Washington consequently rejected the original British proposal: 600,000 tons of auxiliaries and more than 50 light cruisers represented a far too large amount of vessels, and it would not necessarily be effective against Japan as the U.S. Navy needed heavy cruisers.213 The Anglo-American struggle over the cruiser issue reflected the more political and symbolic question of equality at sea. If the United Kingdom, the undisputed naval hegemon until the First World War, had agreed to grant the United States parity in capital ships and battle fleet strength at the Washington Conference, it was not ready to relinquish its overall maritime superiority.214 A large quantity of auxiliary vessels was necessary to keep this superiority and secure a global empire, reason why the British delegation advocated “relative parity according to needs” with the United States.215 On the other hand, the Americans sought a navy “second to none,” which meant strict and mathematical parity with the United Kingdom. With such diverging positions adopted by the two biggest naval powers of the day, the Geneva Conference naturally broke down in August 1927. Overall, the failure of the conference was due to a lack of political motivation in the capitals of the three countries. Being Calvin Coolidge, Stanley Baldwin or Tanaka Giichi, all were eager to maintain naval strength at an adequate level, and because the Five-Power Treaty would remain in force until 1936, none had the incentive to push for a risky breakthrough once discussions reached a stalemate.216 Conversely, the failure of the conference was politically cost-free. Japan was able to keep a low profile

212 Idem. 213 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 162. 214 Capital ships were mainly used during encounters between battle lines, and from

London’s point of view these were only a small part of wartime naval operations, and an even smaller part of the use of maritime power in general. In other words, parity in capital ships did not mean equality at sea. Maurer, Arms Control and the Washington Conference, 277. 215 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 162–3. 216 Fanning, The Coolidge Conference of 1927, 122–3.

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and avoid any blame for the collapse of negotiations. The Japanese delegation even managed to give itself an image of mediator between the Anglo-Saxon countries.217 The failure of the Geneva Conference gave the Coolidge Administration a strong justification to start a new naval expansion cycle, after a period of restraint following the Washington Conference. Shortly after the end of the conference, the government announced a program that provided for the construction of 25 heavy cruisers and one aircraft carrier.218 The U.S. Navy General Board had pressed hard for such a program since it remained concerned about the consequences of the FivePower Treaty for its ability to cross the Pacific. The acquisition of several heavy cruisers was considered essential to compensate for the lack of naval bases in the Western Pacific.219 If the Senate, in approving the program in February 1929, reduced the number of planned heavy cruisers to 15, the pace at which they would be built was impressive, with five to be laid down each year during the 1929–1931 period.220 Moreover, even after its scaling down, the program would leave the United States with 23 heavy cruisers by 1935, an imposing fleet compared with both Japan and the United Kingdom.221 The American naval expansion was massive, and if the renewed buildup activities of France, Italy and Japan were taken into account, a dangerous naval arms race of even greater intensity than before the Washington Conference was in sight in the late 1920s.222 Similar to its American counterpart, the Japanese navy was, initially, not unhappy with the failure of the Geneva Conference. The positive achievements of the Washington Conference, including the Five-Power Treaty, remained in force.223 Moreover, the expansion plan in auxiliaries approved in 1923 and scheduled to be completed in 1928 could continue and provide Japan with a 70 percent ratio in these categories compared

217 Buckley, The Icarus Factor, 138. 218 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 173. 219 Stephen W. Roskill, 1976, Naval Policy between the Wars. Vol. II: The Period of

Reluctant Rearmament, 1930–1939, London: Collins, 23–4. 220 Congress ultimately provided funds for only 10 of the 15 heavy cruisers. Ibid., 24. 221 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 235. 222 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 173 and 175. 223 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 203–4.

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with the U.S. Navy.224 Supplementary replenishment programs adopted in 1926 and 1927 would further increase Japan’s naval strength. At the next naval conference, which was expected to take place in 1931 as this year marked the beginning of the replacement period of overaged battleships according to the Five-Power Treaty, Japan’s sea power compared with the United States would be more advantageous and its negotiating position stronger.225 However, the launch of the latest and massive American buildup program forced the Imperial Navy to devise yet another naval expansion plan to keep pace with the U.S. Navy. In September 1928, the Navy Ministry and General Staff began discussions on a new replenishment program to further expand the fleet of auxiliaries and on the replacement of battleships, Japan being allowed to lay down one such vessel each year from 1931 until the potential expiration of the Five-Power Treaty in late 1936.226 An agreement was reached in March 1929 between Navy Minister Okada Keisuke and the recently appointed Chief of the Navy General Staff, Kat¯o Kanji. The new program would run until 1936 and provide for the construction of four battleships, five cruisers, eight destroyers, 32 submarines and other auxiliaries, amounting to a total of 112 ships for 190,249 tons.227 In response to the American naval expansion, a special focus was put on heavy cruisers and the replacement of six old 5000 tons vessels by the new 10,000 tons version. The Operations Division of the Navy General Staff released a statement in support of the new buildup plan, dedicated to convincing civilians to fund it.228 It asserted that several studies and fleet maneuvers had demonstrated the absolute necessity of maintaining at least 70 percent of the American strength in heavy cruisers, something possible only with the new program. The speed, cruising range, firepower and polyvalence of these warships made them central elements of the Japanese navy’s strategy. This strategy, reflected in the General Plan for the Employment of the Empire’s Armed Forces, contained in the 1923 Imperial Defense Policy,

224 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 162. 225 Ibid., 174. 226 Ibid., 181; U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, 263. 227 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 181. 228 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 235.

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aimed at the early destruction of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and military facilities in the Philippines and Guam.229 The U.S. Pacific Fleet would then be enticed to the Western Pacific, and its strength would be worn down through attrition by Japanese vessels during its transpacific journey. Finally, Japan’s Combined Fleet would engage and defeat the American fleet in a final battle. Heavy cruisers were central to both the attrition phase and the decisive encounter. On the other hand, their possession by the U.S. Navy threatened the Japanese war plan. In May 1929, Navy Minister Okada began negotiating with Finance Ministry officials to fund the new buildup program. The prospect of obtaining satisfaction was high for the naval institution. After all, civilians would understand that the navy was reacting to the massive American naval expansion, and was asking for the means to balance appropriately and avert underbalancing. If Japan did not react, its ratio of surface auxiliaries compared with the United States would fall to 65 percent in late 1931 and 54 percent by the end of 1933.230 The situation was even more alarming in the heavy cruiser category, with a 47 percent ratio in 1933. However, as information reached Tokyo that a naval arms control conference was in preparation, the decision was taken to suspend the budgetary discussions until after the conference.231 To the dismay of the Imperial Navy, priority was, once again, given to naval limitations over naval expansion by the Japanese FPE. Prelude to the London Conference The Kellogg–Briand Pact of August 1928 provided new impetus to the Preparatory Commission for the General Disarmament Conference, which restarted work in April 1929.232 The arms control discussions at the League of Nations were in many respects similar to those that had taken place before the 1927 Geneva Conference, however. Progress was slow and delegates rapidly realized that no breakthrough could possibly happen before advances were made on naval arms control. This time, the

229 Shimanuki, Dai ichi ji sekai taisen igo no kokub¯ o h¯oshin, 69. 230 Japan Navy Ministry, Advisory Committee on Arms Control, 1928, Gunbi seigen

taisaku kenky¯ u, dai 3 satsu, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 37. 231 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 181. 232 Ibid., 176.

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United Kingdom took the initiative to call for an international conference, which would be held in London. The invitation, issued in October 1929, expressed the British desire to negotiate limitations in all categories of vessels, to abolish submarines and to postpone the replacement period of battleships provided by the Five-Power Treaty.233 The invitation was generally well received in Japan. Media stressed the need to appoint influential politicians as plenipotentiaries, so that technical and military considerations would not interfere with diplomatic negotiations and impede the success of the conference.234 The timing of the British invitation was almost perfect from the point of view of Japanese domestic politics. Hamaguchi Osachi had recovered the premiership in July 1929 with a pledge to push for “cooperation abroad, disarmament inside.”235 The deflationary policy adopted by the new cabinet required important budget cuts and the Wall Street Crash added to this financial incentive to pursue naval arms limitation.236 Hamaguchi also wanted to return to the gold standard, something possible only if constructive relations were preserved with the United States and the United Kingdom. Tokyo accepted the invitation on October 16, 1929. The Japanese navy had begun preparing for future naval arms control talks shortly after the collapse of the Geneva Conference. Two months later, Navy Minister Okada Keisuke had asked the Advisory Committee on Arms Control to compile a report on which the naval institution could base its approach to the next conference. The report, released in October 1928, was drafted by 20 officers under the supervision of Vice Admiral Nomura Kichisabur¯ o, reason why it is often called Nomura Report in the literature.237 The report stated that auxiliary vessels were the most important elements of national defense after battleships, but that naval expansion in these categories had to take into account financial constraints. The construction of auxiliaries needed to be planned in a harmonious manner between strategic and financial imperatives. The Japanese position at

233 Ibid., 183. 234 Tatsuji Takeuchi, 1936, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, London:

George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 283. 235 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 80. 236 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 176 and 183. 237 Japan Navy Ministry. Gunbi seigen taisaku kenky¯ u.

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the next conference had to be based on the amount of auxiliaries so acquired while considering the defense requirements of other countries. The broad approach to national security adopted by the report, which included financial and diplomatic dimensions, proves that the highest level of the naval institution was still dominated by the administrative group of moderates. It also demonstrates that the Finance and Foreign Ministries had the upper hand among FDIB members, their accurate perception of the Anglo-Saxon countries as partners rather than potential opponents being shared by the FPE. This balanced attitude toward naval arms control did not prevent the Advisory Committee from asserting the importance of retaining at least 70 percent of the strength of the United States in surface auxiliaries, with a particular emphasis on heavy cruisers. An underlined section of the report noted that a 70 percent ratio in auxiliaries was “absolutely necessary for national defense” in view of several strategic studies undertaken in the past.238 This absolute necessity had to be made clear by the Japanese delegation to the next conference, and if the desired ratio could not be obtained, compensations needed to be provided by the United States and the United Kingdom in order to address deficiencies in national defense. The report concluded by laying down a few guidelines for the coming arms control negotiations. The Japanese delegation had to strive to prevent limitations from being imposed on submarines and to obtain 70 percent of the Anglo-Saxon countries’ naval strengths in surface auxiliaries. Regarding the latter categories, an additional objective was to secure a total of 400,000 tons of vessels. All in all, this would allow the Japanese government to save money from naval expenditure while keeping intact the level of national security. The delegation also needed to avert the breakdown of the conference, and if this was inevitable, to avoid taking the blame by displaying its desire to reach an agreement through proactive diplomatic efforts. Moreover, the Five-Power Treaty and the limitations imposed on capital ships had to be protected by clearly secluding them from the talks on the restriction of auxiliaries, which could stalemate like during the Geneva Conference. This shows the high value the Advisory Committee attributed to the agreement reached in 1922. The report indeed concluded that from a long-term perspective on national security, the continuation of naval arms

238 Ibid., 36.

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control and the implementation of new restrictions were more needed than ever, given that no disadvantageous limitations on auxiliaries were imposed on Japan. Precise instructions to delegates were worked out during the second half of 1929. In late June, Navy Minister Okada issued a policy paper that recognized as essential the maintenance of 70 percent of the American and British naval strengths in auxiliary vessels.239 Among auxiliaries, a special emphasis was put on the need to obtain this ratio in the heavy cruiser category, whereas flexibility in the construction of submarines had to be sought. The final instructions were approved by cabinet decision on November 26, 1929.240 The document stated that Tokyo was ready to pursue not only arms limitation, but also reduction as a way of preserving peace and reducing the burden of naval expenditure, given that the level of armaments agreed upon posed no threat to member states. The document then laid down what became known as the Three Fundamental Principles, or the Japanese strategic requirements that needed to be respected at the conference. These principles were an overall 70 percent ratio in surface auxiliaries compared with the United States, a similar ratio in the heavy cruiser category and the maintenance of 78,000 tons of submarines. The London Conference The London Conference opened on January 21, 1930. Like in Geneva three years before, the cruiser issue rapidly became the central point of contention. For the Japanese delegation, the solution was to grant the two Anglo-Saxon countries 150,000 tons of heavy cruisers each and Japan 105,000 tons, setting a ratio of 70 percent in this category.241 Because Japan possessed 108,400 tons of heavy cruisers at that time, it would have to reduce its tonnage by 3400 tons, but the maintenance of the 70 percent ratio would have satisfied the Japanese navy. This proposal was rejected by the other countries, the United States in particular. The latter needed a large quantity of heavy cruisers with

239 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 181. 240 Japan Defense Ministry, Kaigun gunsenbi, 378–9. 241 Japan Navy Ministry, Head of Naval Affairs Bureau, 1931, Rondon kaigi ni okeru

gasaigo taido kettei no tenmatsu, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 6–7.

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great cruising range in order to compensate for the lack of forward naval bases in the Pacific. During preparatory talks with the British, the Americans had expressed willingness to reduce the number of the 10,000 tons heavy cruisers they requested from 23 to 21, but they were certainly not ready to be left with only 15 in line with the Japanese plan.242 The other problem was that the United Kingdom insisted on retaining a large number of light cruisers to secure its worldwide empire.243 London also wanted to maintain overall parity in cruisers with the United States while reducing the latter’s amount of heavy cruisers to a lower level. The equilibrium between light and heavy cruisers was difficult to find. After a series of bilateral negotiations, the two Anglo-Saxon countries eventually agreed in mid-February that the United States would be granted 18 heavy cruisers and the United Kingdom 15, in exchange for a large amount of light cruisers attributed to the latter.244 Washington was willing to reduce once again its number of heavy cruisers, from 21 to 18, provided that Tokyo accepted 12 ships in this category. This was insufficient for Japan, however, because this would push its ratio below 70 percent of the American strength. Satisfied by the deal reached with the Americans, the British seemed at that point ready to grant Japan 13 heavy cruisers, which would have represented a ratio of 72 percent compared with the United States. The positions of the Anglo-Saxon countries on several issues were gradually getting closer to each other and the Japanese delegation was seriously concerned that they could form a common front and impose their terms on Japan. To prevent this from happening, the head of delegation, former Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯o, tentatively entered direct talks with his American counterpart, Secretary of State Henry Stimson.245 However, progress was made difficult by the huge media attention their meetings attracted. The responsibility to continue the discussions was consequently passed to a lower level, with Ambassador to the United Kingdom Matsudaira Tsuneo and U.S. Senator David Reed in charge.246 The telegram 242 Ibid., 7. 243 Ibid., 7–8. 244 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 179. 245 Japan Navy Ministry, Rondon kaigi, 9. 246 Ibid., 10.

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containing what became known as the Reed–Matsudaira Compromise reached Tokyo on March 15. In addition to parity in submarines at 52,700 tons and the possibility to replace in 1943 the two old heavy cruisers of the Furutaka-class, the compromise granted Japan an overall ratio of 69.75 percent in surface auxiliaries compared with the United States (367,050 against 526,200 tons).247 Among auxiliaries, Tokyo obtained 70.3 percent in the destroyer category (105,500 against 150,000 tons), 70 percent in light cruisers (100,450 against 143,500 tons) and 60.2 percent in heavy cruisers (108,400 against 180,000 tons). The Japanese navy reacted to the Reed–Matsudaira Compromise through a draft compiled by the Naval Affairs Bureau. Sometimes called Hori Draft, by the name of Rear Admiral Hori Teikichi, head of the Bureau, the document was sent to the Foreign Ministry on March 22.248 The draft addressed two points on which hopes for improvement remained. It proposed that Washington delayed the planned construction of its last three heavy cruisers until the next naval conference and, as a compensation, transferred the 30,000 tons lost in this category to light cruisers.249 This would leave the United States with 150,000 tons of heavy cruisers against Japan’s 108,400 tons, thus a ratio of 72 percent. Second, the Bureau sought the relocation of 12,800 tons from the destroyer and light cruiser categories in order for Japan to reach 65,500 tons of submarines. In a document written at that time and released for internal record in 1931, Hori Teikichi discussed the Three Fundamental Principles and the ongoing negotiations in London.250 He noted that flexibility was allowed regarding the request for an overall 70 percent ratio in surface auxiliaries, and that even if the desired tonnage of submarines was ultimately denied by the Anglo-Saxon countries, Japan had to recognize that the latter had made serious concessions compared with their initial positions. Hori remained attached to the request that the construction of the last three American heavy cruisers be delayed until the next naval conference. Nonetheless, for diplomatic, military, financial and economic reasons, the

247 Japan Defense Ministry, Kaigun gunsenbi, 387–8. 248 Ibid., 387. 249 Ibid., 387–8. 250 Japan Navy Ministry. Rondon kaigi.

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need to avert the collapse of the London Conference was paramount in Hori’s mind. Hori argued that the precedent of the Geneva Conference and its aftermath provided Tokyo with a “proper warning” of what could happen if the London negotiations failed.251 Because of their arguments and inability to reach an agreement in Geneva, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom had deteriorated dramatically, both had come to regard the other as hostile and competing naval expansion programs had ensued. Tokyo needed to maintain constructive relations with Washington and London in order to cooperate on many aspects of international affairs, and especially on China. If these relations worsened, China would take advantage of the situation, resist Japan and threaten its interests on the continent. Inversely, productive collaboration with the two countries had been, and would remain, advantageous for Japan in dealing with China. Hori concluded that this trilateral cooperation was necessary for the maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia and the world. Moreover, if the London Conference broke down, naval expansion would be revitalized and Tokyo’s ratio in naval power would most probably fall below 60 percent vis-à-vis the United States. The latter’s industrial capacity for ship building was at least three times higher than Japan’s, and the failure of the conference would provide the Americans with the necessary political impetus to use this capacity. Indeed, Hori observed that U.S. Congress was particularly sensitive to international factors when it came to approving naval buildup plans. If the unwinnable arms race in which Japan would be engulfed in case the conference collapsed was compared with the acceptation of the Reed– Matsudaira Compromise, the former was much more destabilizing and disadvantageous for Tokyo. Lastly, Hori asserted that the outcome of the next war would be determined by the amount of national power possessed by countries, and that sea power constituted only one element of national power. Japan needed robust trade, economic and financial relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries to develop its national power. If these relations deteriorated, Japan’s international position in terms of national power would inevitably decline and bring new security challenges. Its financial situation would be

251 Ibid., 15–6.

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gravely affected and naval expansion could be undertaken only through an increase of taxes or of the share of national budget dedicated to the navy, something the Diet would certainly oppose. For all these reasons, if the London Conference failed, Japan would face acute crises, both domestically and externally. Hori concluded that rejecting the Reed–Matsudaira Compromise and risking the collapse of the conference would be a grave mistake and an irrational decision for Tokyo if the pros and cons were carefully weighed against one another. The cabinet of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi shared this perspective. Once again helped by a relative equilibrium among FDIB members, the Japanese FPE adopted a balanced position between the necessity of international cooperation and the respect of the Imperial Navy’s strategic requirements. The final draft of what would become the London Treaty reached Tokyo on April 19. It was approved without modification by the cabinet one day later and was finally signed in London on April 22.252 In his instructions sent that day to the delegation in London, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o justified the government decision by saying that an arms race would destabilize international relations, endanger national security and cause war, and that signing the treaty was the only way to avert naval competition between Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom.253 In addition to these three countries, France and Italy joined the treaty, which would remain in force until December 31, 1936, a conference being planned in 1935 to discuss naval arms control in the post-1936 period.254 In Article 1, these countries decided to postpone the replacement period of battleships agreed upon in Washington until after the expiration of the Five-Power Treaty, in late 1936. This was considered necessary to prevent competing buildups because of the large number of vessels that could be replaced. The 1922 treaty indeed stated that during the 1931– 1936 replacement period, the United States and the United Kingdom were allowed to lay down 10 ships each, Japan six and Italy and France three each.255 252 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 235. 253 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 158–9. 254 U.S. State Department, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United

States. 1930, Volume 1, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 107–25. 255 U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, 259–63.

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Submarines were qualitatively restricted by Article 7, which fixed the upper limit at 2000 tons and 5.1-inch deck guns.256 Member states were nevertheless permitted to retain or build three submarines of up to 2800 tons and mounting 6.1-inch guns. Part III of the treaty, which contained the quantitative limitation on submarines as well as the restrictions on other categories of auxiliary vessels, was not approved by Italy and France and thus applied only to the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. The quantitative limit on submarines was set for the three countries at 52,700 tons, in line with the Reed–Matsudaira Compromise. Although this was considered insufficient by the Imperial Navy, which was looking for 78,000 tons, the Japanese delegation obtained the right to lay down 19,200 tons of submarines as replacement during the life of the treaty, of which a maximum of 12,000 tons could be completed before December 31, 1936. This was an important concession made by the Anglo-Saxon countries, as this allowed the Japanese navy to keep improving its submarine technology and construction capacities. The qualitative limit on destroyers was fixed at a maximum of 1850 tons and 5.1-inch guns. In quantitative terms, Tokyo was provided with 105,500 tons and the Anglo-Saxon countries with 150,000 tons each, putting at 70.3 percent Japan’s ratio compared with these countries. Only 16 percent of the total tonnage allotted to member states in this category could be used to build destroyers of more than 1500 tons. This was consistent with a recommendation contained in the 1928 Nomura Report of the Advisory Committee on Arms Control, which aimed at reducing the size of American destroyers in order to impede transpacific operations.257 Cruisers were defined as ships weighting between 1850 and 10,000 tons and mounting guns between 5.1 and 8 inches. Two sub-categories were created to resolve the equation that had led to the failure of the Geneva Conference. Vessels equipped with guns larger than 6.1 inches were considered heavy cruisers and those with guns equal or smaller than 6.1 inches were light cruisers. In the latter sub-category, Japan obtained 100,450 tons, the United States 143,500 tons and the United Kingdom 192,200 tons, providing

256 Countries could retain the submarines equipped with guns exceeding 5.1 inches they possessed before April 1, 1930. 257 Japan Navy Ministry, Gunbi seigen taisaku kenky¯ u, 32.

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the Imperial Navy with a ratio of exactly 70 percent the strength of the U.S. Navy. Regarding heavy cruisers, Japan was granted 108,400 tons, the United States 180,000 tons and the United Kingdom 146,800 tons, leaving Japan with 60.2 percent of the tonnage possessed by the Americans. In terms of vessels, Japan could retain 12 heavy cruisers, the United States 18 and the United Kingdom 15. Nevertheless, the Japanese delegation was able to delay the construction of the last three American heavy cruisers until the next naval conference. Article 18 granted the United States the right to reach 15 heavy cruisers by 1935, the year the conference was scheduled to take place. Washington could either convert each of the remaining three 10,000 tons ships to 15,166 tons of light cruisers, or lay down these vessels but not before 1933, 1934 and 1935, in view of their completions in 1936, 1937 and 1938. As Japan was about to complete the four ships of the Takao-class, bringing the total number of heavy cruisers it possessed to 12, the country obtained a de facto tonnage ratio of 72.3 percent until 1935, 67.8 percent in 1936, 63.8 percent in 1937 and 60.2 in 1938, assuming that the United States built its last three heavy cruisers in line with the schedule provided by the London Treaty.258 The total tonnage allocation in surface auxiliaries was 314,350 tons for Japan, 473,500 tons for the United States and 489,000 tons for the United Kingdom, thus a ratio of 66.4 percent for Tokyo compared with the Americans. If submarines were added to these figures, Japan obtained 367,050 tons, the United States 526,200 tons and the United Kingdom 541,700. This meant an overall Japanese ratio in auxiliaries of 69.75 percent the strength of the U.S. Navy. Tokyo came close, and some argued that it managed to fulfill two of the Three Fundamental Principles at the London Conference. Japan was 0.25 percentage point away from a 70 percent ratio in overall auxiliary tonnage. This was a success, despite the fact that the Three Fundamental Principles had sought such a ratio in surface auxiliaries, for which Japan got a 66.4 ratio. Tokyo also obtained a de facto 72.3 percent ratio in

258 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 139.

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heavy cruisers until the next naval conference.259 Moreover, the conclusion of the London Treaty almost eliminated the incentive for naval expansion in the United States. Until 1934 Washington would make no effort to build to treaty limits, leaving the Japanese navy with about 80 percent of the strength of the U.S. Navy.260 Only the tonnage of submarines was deficient and far from the initial objective of retaining 78,000 tons in this category. Japanese Reactions to the London Conference A wide majority of actors in Japan supported the London Treaty, leading them to clash with some elements in the navy and their followers outside the naval institution. Although the navy had before the London Conference undertaken propaganda campaigns to educate the population and media on the need to respect the Three Fundamental Principles, the Japanese society was overwhelmingly positive about the outcome of the conference and the concessions made by the Anglo-Saxon countries.261 The most influential newspapers also welcomed the London Treaty, especially because it was expected to ease the financial burden of naval armaments at a time when Japan and the world were engulfed in economic crises.262 The fact that public opinion resolutely backed the treaty as a remedy against growing poverty and economic deprivation helped the government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi to justify its naval arms control policy.263 The cabinet asserted that Japan’s national security was guaranteed under the terms of the London Treaty, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij¯ ur¯o telling the Diet that “none but extreme pessimists could possibly contend that the amount of strength to be allotted to Japan during the period ending in 1936 will prove fatally short of the needs 259 This was recognized by many Japanese naval officers, mostly holding positions in the Navy Ministry. Navy Vice Minister Yamanashi Katsunoshin was a strong proponent of the argument that the objective of maintaining a 70 percent ratio in heavy cruisers had been achieved in London. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 64. 260 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 237. 261 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, 303–4. 262 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 80. 263 Atsushi K¯ oketsu, 1996, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku: Ajia taiheiy¯ o sens¯ o no saikent¯ o,

Tokyo: Ch¯uo ¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 6–7.

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of our national security.”264 The necessity to maintain a constructive triangular cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom was the other major argument advanced by the government to justify its policy.265 The Emperor, his entourage as well as the majority of elder statesmen, including genr¯ o Saionji Kinmochi, backed the Hamaguchi Cabinet and welcomed the agreement reached in London.266 The Foreign Ministry praised the Japanese delegation for having met its objectives during the conference.267 The institution indeed considered that the Three Fundamental Principles were satisfied by the London Treaty. This largely positive reception of the treaty contrasted with the position of another segment of the civil society and political apparatus, smaller but vocal, that rejected the London Treaty. Some newspapers criticized the approval of inferior ratios of naval strength, imposed upon Japan by the Anglo-Saxon coalition, and the fact that the Three Fundamental Principles had not been respected.268 This position was shared by the army, the opposition Rikken Seiy¯ukai party as well as nationalist groups.269 The first major confrontation triggered by the London Conference was fratricide, however, and occurred inside the naval institution between the command and administrative groups. At that time, these groups became known respectively as the “fleet faction” (kantai-ha) and “treaty faction” (j¯ oyaku-ha), because of their diverging positions on the London Treaty.270 The fleet faction was determined to hold firm to the Three Fundamental Principles, whereas the treaty faction was prepared to make concessions if the price to pay for not doing so was the collapse of negotiations. The treaty faction, mainly located in the Navy Ministry, included high-ranking officers such as Okada Keisuke, Sait¯ o Makoto and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantar¯o, and officers of lower rank like Kobayashi

264 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 247. 265 Seiichi Imai, Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen, in Pearl Harbor as History,

ed. Borg and Okamoto, 60. 266 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 208. 267 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 69–70. 268 Ibid., 81. 269 K¯ oketsu, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku, 7. 270 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 135; Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 67 and 82–3.

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Seiz¯o, Hori Teikichi and Nomura Kichisabur¯o.271 They supported the efforts of Navy Vice Minister Yamanashi Katsunoshin who, during and after the London Conference, distanced himself from and tried to contain Chief of General Staff Kat¯o Kanji and his followers. The fleet faction, formed around Kat¯o Kanji and the General Staff, included Vice Chief of Staff Suetsugu Nobumasa and the head of the Staff’s First Division, Kat¯o Takayoshi.272 The faction was backed by Kaneko Kentar¯o and Hiranuma Kiichir¯o, members of the Privy Council (S¯ umitsuin, advisory body to the Emperor), as well as by Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, member of the Supreme Military Council (Gunjisangikan). The faction could also count on the priceless support of legendary Fleet Admiral T¯og¯o Heihachir¯o, also a member of the Supreme Military Council. Lastly, the fleet faction was attracting a growing number of lowand middle-ranking officers dissatisfied with party politics and eager to voice their opposition to the government. For the fleet faction, the restrictions imposed by the London Treaty jeopardized the naval strategy developed during the 1920s to face the American threat. The 52,700 tons of submarines obtained at the conference left the Japanese navy short of two squadrons, or 16 boats, compared with what naval planners regarded as a minimum.273 This shortage would make difficult the seizure of the Philippines and Guam in the early stage of a war and would negatively affect the navy’s capacity to monitor the movement of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, without mentioning the attrition phase which would be dangerously disrupted. Moreover, the relative amount of heavy cruisers was considered deficient for both the attrition phase and the decisive battle, during which they would play a key role as quasi-battleships.274 Although Japan was provided with the desired ratio of light cruisers, these vessels were deemed too small and not powerful enough to replace heavy cruisers. Maybe more important, Japan could build a very limited amount of warships until the expiration of the London Treaty in late 1936. While Washington could construct about 350,000 tons of vessels, Tokyo was 271 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 206 and 209. 272 Ibid., 210; Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 70–1 and 77. 273 Masanori It¯ o and Roger Pineau (trans: Andrew Y. Kuroda and Roger Pineau), 1962, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 23. 274 Sadao Asada, 2007, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays, Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 133.

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granted only 50,000 tons, among which the most important categories of heavy cruisers and submarines were not included.275 Only naval aviation, ships below 600 tons and, under certain conditions, between 600 and 2000 tons, were free from limitations.276 Japan effectively started its naval construction holiday in 1930, with important consequences for the maintenance of naval technology and building capacities and a profound psychological impact on the naval institution. More than the Five-Power Treaty, the London Treaty impeded the ability of the Japanese navy to maximize naval power, running against an inherent institutional impulse. It also reduced its strategic flexibility, the quasi totality of the naval assets that would have allowed adapting the strategy against the U.S. Navy to new circumstances or devising a new one being now restricted. Kat¯ o Kanji and the fleet faction did not give up on naval construction, however, and secured compensation from the government. Post-London Conference naval expansion programs were called Circle Plans (Maru keikaku), the first one being approved by the cabinet in November 1930 and ratified by the Diet in early 1931.277 Covering the 1931–1936 period, the plan was dedicated to building to treaty limits in restricted categories, to expanding the fleet in unrestricted ones and to establishing a strong naval air arm. More precisely, it provided for the construction of 32 vessels in restricted categories, 27 in unrestricted ones and for doubling the size of the naval air forces.278 The 32 warships in restricted categories included four Mogami-class light cruisers, to be laid down between 1931 and 1934 and completed between 1935 and 1937.279 Because Japan had reached its quota of 8-inch guns heavy cruisers, the Mogami-class vessels were equipped with 15 6-inch guns positioned in five triple turrets and carried armors capable of resisting

275 The 50,000 tons figure did not include the 19,200 tons of submarines Japan was permitted to lay down as replacement before the end of 1936. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 139; Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 55. 276 U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1930, 113. 277 Eric E.N. Causton, 1936, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 238. 278 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 238–9. 279 Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 239.

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8-inch shells. By March 1933, Japan had already built to 95 percent of the strength allowed by the London Treaty. Japan’s naval buildup was nonetheless pursued in conformity with the terms of the treaty, and the country balanced in an appropriate manner against the U.S. Navy.280 If the latter was widely regarded as a competitor in Japan, no consensus on threat perception existed. Despite the efforts of the fleet faction, the political influence of the Imperial Navy suffered from an accurate and relatively good perception of the United States. The Japanese FPE successfully coordinated the participation of various FDIB members in the formulation of foreign policy and accommodated their different perspectives and recommendations. This resulted in a restrained and nuanced foreign policy. Ensuring national security was an important objective of the government, but to address the economic crisis and its consequences and protect Japan’s interests on the continent, which implied the maintenance of constructive relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, remained the top priorities. The ratification of the London Treaty by the Hamaguchi Cabinet was a victory for the ruling Rikken Minseit¯o party, for those advocating good relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries and for moderates inside the naval institution. More importantly, this was the victory of those who wanted Japan to play an active and constructive role in an international system guided by international law and cooperation among great powers. Japan’s stance in 1930 was similar to the one of the United States and the United Kingdom. It was one of the leading powers and guarantors of the stability of the system that had been established during the 1920s through several international agreements. However, an exogenous shock would soon, through a process of contextual adaption, destabilize Japan’s domestic politics and drastically reorient its foreign policy.

280 Japan violated the London Treaty on a small scale, regarding gun elevation angles for example, but not more than the United States.

CHAPTER 4

The Manchurian Crisis as an Exogenous Shock, 1931–1933

This chapter makes the transition from the third to the fifth chapter by discussing the event that would ultimately alter the Japanese FPE’s perception of the threat posed by the United States: the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933. The first part explains that the crisis amounted to an exogenous shock, because being a sudden and unexpected international challenge to Japan’s national security. However, although tensions between Japan, the United States and other great powers increased amid Japanese military expeditions in China, the crisis did not result in the materialization of a highly visible and clear threat to national security from the United States itself. The latter displayed restraint and even a rather sympathetic stance vis-à-vis Japan. Moreover, despite renewed naval buildup by the United States, Washington gave no sign of aggressive design toward Tokyo. Nothing justified a radical modification of the Japanese FPE’s perception of the United States. The second part of the chapter shows that, because an exogenous shock occurred during the Manchurian crisis, the FPE called upon different FDIB members to share their views on the consequences of the crisis for Japan. The formulation of threat perception was extracted from institutional routines and became a matter of debate inside the FPE. The Japanese army, deeply involved in China, worked hard to securitize the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_4

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crisis, depicting it as a matter of life and death for Japan. The objective was to influence the process of contextual adaption in order to enhance the army’s political clout and help the institution promote its interests and policy recommendations regarding continental affairs. The army’s securitizing efforts were successful. The Japanese FPE relied more heavily on the military service for insights and advice and adopted a more unilateral and coercive policy toward China. On the other hand, while the Japanese navy succeeded in persuading the society at large and a growing number of party politicians that the United States constituted a threat to national security, it initially failed to fully convince the FPE, disadvantaged by the contextual reality. In the absence of consensus on threat perception, Japan continued to balance in an appropriate manner against the United States.

Exogenous Shock: The Manchurian Crisis The Mukden Incident and Its Aftermath In the early 1930s, the restrained policy championed by Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij¯ ur¯o and his vision of international relations as a cooperative exercise were increasingly contested inside Japan. For proponents of a policy focusing on national security requirements and the unilateral defense of national interests, the world remained characterized by power politics and the inevitability of war, despite a temporary surge in pacifism after the First World War.1 In such an international environment, Tokyo needed to adopt an independent foreign policy instead of relying upon other countries and international instruments like the Washington System. The latter, and the Nine-Power Treaty in particular, were considered out of touch with the East Asian reality.2 This perspective, shared by many officers of the Japanese army, implied a proactive policy based on military means to protect Korea, Manchuria and Japan’s interests from growing nationalism in China. For these people, the foreign policy pursued by Shidehara was utopian, while the approach adopted by Tanaka Giichi had shown its inefficiency in bringing a solution to the Manchurian problem. The diplomacy of Shidehara was also discredited by the worldwide economic crisis and restrictive trade measures implemented by various 1 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 96–7. 2 Ibid., 102.

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countries to protect their economies. These measures were pointed out as a proof that Tokyo could not rely on international cooperation to advance its interests.3 Moreover, the economic situation in Japan was deteriorating rapidly. The value of Japanese exports fell by 43 percent between 1929 and 1931, with Japanese companies dealing with China and those producing silk for the American market being particularly affected.4 The value of exports to China and Manchuria fell from 18.3 to 15.5 percent of the total during this period, whereas those to Formosa and Korea rose from 18.1 to 23.3 percent. It was obvious, therefore, that trade with colonies was more robust than trade with independent political entities. Manchuria became portrayed in Japan as an “economic lifeline,” and to take full control of the region was regarded by some as an important part of the solution to economic problems.5 An increasing number of politicians and military officers advocated a reinforcement of the Japanese presence and influence in Manchuria. This would allow for expanding agricultural production, acquiring necessary raw materials for the industry and resettling unemployed citizens to productive works in Manchuria.6 In 1931, the domestic pressure on the Japanese FPE to be proactive in Manchuria grew further. In the spring, the Foreign Minister of the Nanking government, Wang Zhengting, announced his policy guidelines to build a strong and unified China. These guidelines included five points: the recovery of tariff autonomy, the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the return of international settlements, the return of leased territories and the recovery of rights on railroads and coastal trade.7 The Kwantung Leased Territory, home of Japan’s military and industrial power in Manchuria, was one of the areas to be returned, and the South Manchuria Railway was on the list of railroads to be recovered. The threat from the Kuomintang to Japan’s position in Manchuria was taking a concrete expression. On July 1, fighting broke out between Chinese and Korean farmers in Wamposhan, at the border between Manchuria and Korea, over the digging of irrigation ditches. Widespread attacks on Chinese citizens and properties followed in the Korean Peninsula, leaving at least 127 people 3 Ibid., 106. 4 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 188–9. 5 Ibid., 190. 6 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 108. 7 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 18–9.

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dead, while Japanese authorities failed to stop the violence. The boycotts of Japanese products that ensued were perceived by many Japanese as a deliberate policy of the Nanking government and of Manchurian warlord Chang Hsueh-liang.8 Adding to the heightening tensions and the antiChinese sentiments in Japan this incident provoked, Kwantung Army’s Captain Nakamura Shintar¯o was executed shortly thereafter by Chinese troops as he was traveling in North Manchuria. It was amid this atmosphere of crisis, both in Manchuria and in Japan, that the so-called Mukden Incident occurred. On September 18, 1931, some elements of the Kwantung Army bombed a section of the South Manchuria Railway north of Mukden, provoking fighting between Japanese railroads’ guards and Chinese soldiers.9 Japanese reinforcements were sent from Mukden, whereas the entire city was occupied by Japanese troops the following morning. On September 19, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, Honj¯o Shigeru, cabled his hierarchy in Tokyo that, given the situation on the ground, his troops needed to guarantee public order in the whole of Manchuria and requested more soldiers to do so.10 Army Minister Minami Jir¯ o replied to Honj¯o later the same day, saying that although the initial reaction of Japanese troops had been appropriate, the government wanted to prevent the spread of the conflict. In Manchuria, however, Japanese soldiers advanced rapidly in total disdain for the orders issued by Tokyo. Changchun fell on September 19, and Antung, Fenghuangcheng and Yingkou on the 20th. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Miyake Mitsuharu, then convinced Honj¯o to take advantage of reports of unrests in Kirin and Harbin and seize these cities.11 The decision to march on Kirin was taken in the early morning of September 21 and the town fell without resistance later in the day. The occupation of Kirin was a major event because it meant the control by the Kwantung Army of the totality of South Manchuria. It was also a setback for the Japanese FPE. Moreover, also on September 21, the 39th Mixed Brigade of the Korean Army had crossed the border without authorization to bring help to the Kwantung Army, an authorization

8 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 228. 9 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 59. 10 Ibid., 60–1. 11 Ibid., 64 and 67.

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that theoretically could be given only by the Supreme Commander, the Emperor.12 On September 23, the cabinet of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯o held a meeting during which the majority of FPE members, and especially Foreign Minister Shidehara and Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke, opposed any further action by the Kwantung Army.13 Many also refused to fund ongoing military operations, but eventually gave ground due to the insistence of the Army Minister. The following day, the Chief of the Army General Staff sent a message to the Kwantung Army expressing the government’s strong opposition to any move into North Manchuria.14 After the conquest of Kirin, Japanese troops were preparing for crushing an alleged unrest in Harbin, in North Manchuria. The Kwantung Army, through the order issued by the General Staff, obeyed the government and refrained from pushing north. This was the first success of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in its efforts to control the situation on the ground since the beginning of the military intervention.15 The FPE as well as many political, financial and business figures wanted to prevent the conflict from spreading in order to avoid international isolation and retributions that could affect the Japanese economy. They also feared the increasing military expenses an enlarged conflict would imply.16 The momentum for the Kwantung Army, which strongly desired to expand its area of operation, was losing steam. On October 8, the army bombed Chinchow (Jinzhou), close to the Great Wall, as a way to put pressure on civilian and military authorities in Tokyo. The aerial bombing of a urban center triggered strong resentment in European capitals, still traumatized by the emergence of this type of military operation on their

12 Soon after the initial reports reached Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was engaged in battle with Chinese soldiers north of Mukden, Army Minister Minami pressured the government to allow sending reinforcements from Korea. Despite Minami’s assertion that the responsibility for the decision belonged to the army as the advisor of the Emperor on matters related to supreme command, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯o and Foreign Minister Shidehara remained firm in their refusal. Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 153. 13 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 66. 14 Ibid., 68. 15 Ibid., 131. 16 O. Tanin and E. Yohan, 1934, Militarism and Fascism in Japan, New York:

International Publishers, 170.

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soils during the First World War.17 Moreover, the international community at that time expected Japan to refrain from other destabilizing actions and to enter direct talks with China. The Wakatsuki Cabinet faced two major difficulties in controlling the situation in Manchuria. It had to work through the Army Minister to restrain the Kwantung Army and implement its policy of non-enlargement of the conflict. The problem was that Minami Jir¯o himself had limited leverage on the ground and was less influential than the Chief of General Staff, who was closer to the Kwantung Army.18 The behavior of the opposition Seiy¯ukai party was another obstacle. The latter joined army officers in supporting the military intervention, in criticizing the management of the crisis by the government and in calling for an independent foreign policy focused on Japan’s national interests, not on the position of Western countries.19 This put considerable pressure on the FPE, already blamed for the deteriorating economic situation in Japan, and prevented it from openly confronting army authorities in regard to Manchuria. Until the end of 1931, the FPE, the majority of FDIB members as well as moderates in Japan held out hope of halting the spread of the conflict and settling it without antagonizing other countries. The government achieved limited but meaningful successes, including the evacuation of troops from Tsitsihar on November 24 and the suspension of the march on Chinchow on November 27.20 In its first official statement about the Manchurian crisis released on September 24, the Wakatsuki Cabinet had indeed pledged to make every efforts to prevent the situation from deteriorating, and in a reply sent the same day to the League of Nations had declared that it was ready to withdraw troops to pre-crisis positions in consultation with the Chinese, if conditions in Manchuria permitted.21 Nevertheless, the stance of the Japanese FPE toward the Manchurian issue gradually evolved and its opposition to the initiatives of the Kwantung Army softened. By mid-November, the cabinet had formulated

17 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 82. 18 Yale C. Maxon, 1957, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military

Rivalry, 1930–1945, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 83–4. 19 Gordon M. Berger, 1977, Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 39. 20 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 131. 21 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 181–2.

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additional conditions for the withdrawal of troops, including the establishment of a new political regime in Manchuria.22 This evolution in the position of the Wakatsuki Cabinet was explained by two main factors. The government increasingly feared a frontal clash of highly destabilizing consequences in case it tried to restrain the Kwantung Army. In addition to the uncompromising stance of the latter regarding its plan for a new regime in Manchuria, on October 17 the military police arrested a group planning a coup d’état in Tokyo and composed mainly of army officers and members of the ultranationalist society Sakurakai.23 The plan allegedly involved the Battalion Commander of the Imperial Guards and some of his companies and aimed at establishing a military dictatorship that would purge the scene of political parties and of the Emperor’s entourage. Among those to be assassinated figured Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯o, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o, Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke, Imperial Household Minister Ichiki Kitokur¯ o, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantar¯o and leaders of the main political parties. The discovery of the plot put tremendous pressure on the FPE to compromise with the army. Japanese public opinion was also changing. Following the Mukden Incident, a growing number of personalities of relatively liberal convictions began expressing anti-Chinese views and calling on the government to adopt strong measures to tackle Japan’s problems on the continent.24 The Wakatsuki Cabinet understood that running against this trend could gravely endanger its authority. The FPE was weakened by its inability to take the upper hand in the Manchurian crisis and destabilized by the increasing pressure coming from the army. Wakatsuki tried to form a coalition government with the Seiy¯ukai to counter the army, a proposal to which the latter party’s president Inukai Tsuyoshi was receptive. But disunity inside the ruling Minseit¯o party, and in particular the defection of Minister of Home Affairs Adachi Kenz¯o, who sought the support of both Seiy¯ ukai leaders and the army to topple down the Wakatsuki Cabinet, led to the fall of the latter on December 10.

22 Imai, Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen, 61–2. 23 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 95–6. 24 Ibid., 105–6.

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Wakatsuki was replaced by Inukai as Prime Minister. The Inukai Cabinet was willing to cooperate with the army but only as long as the crisis did not deteriorate significantly and remained contained within northern China. Unfortunately, the situation on the ground worsened considerably in January 1932. From Manchuria to Shanghai, and Back Again On January 1, 1932, the Kwantung Army occupied Chinchow and enlarged its perimeter of operation to Shanhaiguan at the request of the self-proclaimed governor of the Fengtien Province, who had called on Japan to suppress bandits. The operation, undertaken with reinforcements from Korea, was designed as a preventive measure in view of an increase of troops initiated by Chiang Kai-shek in the region.25 The fall of the strategically important city of Chinchow put an end to China’s influence in Manchuria, and triggered concerns in the international community as Japan’s military activities on the continent reached a new stage with the complete subjugation of Manchuria.26 The Inukai Cabinet tried to reassure the United States and other great powers. It stated that Tokyo would continue to fulfill its duties under the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty and respect the Open Door principles in Manchuria, and that it would seek the support of the Americans to do so.27 The Japanese FPE nonetheless emphasized that the evolution of the situation in China and its chronic instability needed to be taken into account in the application of the Nine-Power Treaty, because these circumstances had not been anticipated at the time of the Washington Conference. By denying it had violated international agreements and by justifying the actions of the Kwantung Army in reference to these treaties, Tokyo actually reaffirmed its commitment to the international system established after the First World War.28 The position of the Inukai Cabinet became even more difficult when, in late January, hostilities spread to Shanghai. The coastal city was home

25 Katsumi Usui, 2006, Mansh¯ u jihen: Sens¯ o to gaik¯ o to, Tokyo: Ch¯uo ¯ K¯oron Shinsha,

137. 26 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 144. 27 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 194–5. 28 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 16; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, 371.

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of close to 26,000 Japanese and 60,000 foreigners from other countries, mainly the United States, the United Kingdom and France.29 The wide majority of them lived inside the International Settlement and the French Concession, areas recognized as neutral by the international community. Unlike in most other Chinese cities, any action against Chinese soldiers in Shanghai automatically involved the interests of other great powers.30 Relations between Japanese residents in China proper and the local population had become increasingly tense in late 1931 and early 1932 in the wake of the Mukden Incident and amid anti-Japanese manifestations. Late at night on January 28, as tensions were reaching a climax, Japanese soldiers rushed without warning into an area of Shanghai where the heavily armed Chinese 19th Route Army had built barricades. The fighting that ensued rapidly spread to other parts of the town.31 The Japanese FPE, following the advice of several FDIB members, the Foreign Ministry in particular, was highly sensitive to the stances of other countries and to the international opinion in general during what is often called the First Shanghai Incident. Tokyo took care to consult with others, especially France, the United Kingdom and the United States, regarding the protection of foreign nationals in Shanghai.32 The Inukai Cabinet also asked at an early stage for the help of these countries to facilitate negotiations with China toward the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Chinese troops out of the city.33 Given the important interests other great powers possessed in Shanghai, the Japanese government feared more than anything the spread of the conflict, a concern shared by military authorities in Tokyo.34 In addition to this sensitivity to other countries’ positions, the Inukai Cabinet worried that the Shanghai crisis might complicate the settlement of the Manchurian issue, reason why it treated the two as completely

29 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 160–1. 30 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 143. 31 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 164. 32 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 197. 33 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 143. 34 The Army and Navy Ministers called on their troops on the ground, the 9th Division and the 3rd Fleet respectively, to refrain from any action that could lead to a deterioration of the situation.

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separated.35 Moreover, the German-trained 19th Route Army was a formidable adversary for both the Japanese army and navy. The landing forces of the latter, led by Rear Admiral Shiozawa K¯ oichi, were at one point in such difficulties that they had to make a humiliating appeal for help to the army.36 Prime Minister Inukai adopted a proactive posture during the Shanghai crisis. He personally endeavored to settle the dispute as quickly as possible and tried to work through the Emperor to control soldiers on the ground. Eager to come to terms with Chinese authorities in order to prevent the crisis from escalating, the Japanese FPE ultimately agreed to a ceasefire plan compiled by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Although this triggered resentment on the side of the army, the cessation of hostilities through international mediation was reached on May 5, 1932.37 Despite the fact that the First Shanghai Incident had attracted worldwide attention and had provoked the direct involvement of great powers, Japan came out of the crisis relatively unaffected. The Inukai Cabinet had managed to keep the Shanghai and Manchurian issues separated from each other and was still hoping that, after the successful settlement of the former, the Manchurian crisis could be resolved in a way that would satisfy other countries.38 Unfortunately for the Japanese FPE, staffs of the Kwantung Army remained firm in their demand to establish strict control over Manchuria. Because they were aware that colonization was not appropriate under current domestic and international circumstances, they opted for the creation of a Manchurian government that would act under the guidance of Japan. During the first two months of 1932, while Tokyo was focusing on the situation in Shanghai, the Kwantung Army orchestrated a local independence movement to provide popular legitimacy to the new regime.39 Chinese provincial leaders established the Northeastern Administrative Council and issued a declaration of independence on

35 Imai, Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen, 62–3. 36 K¯ oketsu, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku, 13–4. 37 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 205–6. 38 Matsusaka Tak, Managing Occupied Manchuria, 104. 39 Ibid., 104–5.

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February 18.40 Manifestations were organized to give the impression of public support. Puyi, the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, was enthroned as head of state on February 29. The independence of the new country, called Manchukuo, was eventually proclaimed on March 1, and its Constitution promulgated on March 9. The Japanese FPE initially abstained from recognizing Manchukuo. Inukai and his cabinet wanted to avoid being seen as acting in violation of international agreements and to prevent diplomatic confrontation with other great powers.41 The Shanghai crisis scarcely settled, international pressure on Japan was still high. The domestic position of the government was equally difficult. Its restrained foreign policy provoked exasperation in nationalist groups and in some military circles. Inukai publicly condemned both leftist and rightist extremisms and stated that the solution to Japan’s political, economic and ideological problems was to increase the influence of the Diet over other political entities.42 In this atmosphere of tension, Inukai was assassinated on May 15, 1932, by a group of young army and naval officers and was temporarily replaced as Prime Minister by Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo.43 On May 22, Admiral Sait¯o Makoto was chosen by genr¯ o Saionji Kinmochi to form a non-partisan government.44 In the meantime, on March 18, the provisional government acknowledged the reception of the notification by Manchukuo of its creation. It also recognized that Manchukuo needed assistance in regard to political and economic affairs, defense, transport and communications.45 Nevertheless, Tokyo again refrained from extending formal recognition to the new country, eager despite the death of Inukai to find a way out of the Manchurian crisis that would satisfy all countries.46 The cabinet headed by Sait¯o Makoto faced even greater difficulties than its predecessor in maintaining constructive relations with the great powers. The establishment of Manchukuo was a fait accompli that ran against Washington’s policy of non-recognition of military aggression, a 40 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 17; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 130. 41 Imai, Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen, 62. 42 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 151–2. 43 Ibid., 152–3. 44 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 179–80. 45 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 113. 46 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 145.

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stance increasingly popular in the international community. To pursue a policy of cooperation with the great powers, Tokyo had no choice but to continue denying that its behavior in Manchuria contravened international agreements. Japan’s new Foreign Minister, Uchida K¯osai, told members of the Lytton Commission, created by the League of Nations in December 1931 to investigate the Mukden Incident and its aftermath, that the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg–Briand Pact had not been violated.47 Japanese troops had reacted in self-defense and had therefore not breached the Pact. And the establishment of Manchukuo did not run against the Nine-Power Treaty because the new country, created through an indigenous movement, was not a signatory and thus fell outside its scope. In the summer of 1932, the Japanese FPE came under growing pressure by public opinion, media, military authorities and political parties to recognize Manchukuo and assume its responsibility as protector of the country.48 On June 14, the Diet unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the Sait¯o Cabinet to extend recognition.49 On August 25, during the 63rd session of the Diet, Seiy¯ukai member Mori Kaku declared that recognizing Manchukuo would proclaim that Japan “now defiantly rose from her traditional diplomacy characterized by servility” and had embarked on “a voluntarily independent diplomacy.”50 On the other hand, the cabinet wanted to avoid provoking the other great powers, and thus strived to withhold the recognition of Manchukuo at least until the release by the Lytton Commission of its final report.51 Nevertheless, increasing domestic pressure made inevitable a reorientation of Tokyo’s policy toward Manchuria. On August 27, the government issued a report laying down its new policy to handle the Manchurian problem and Chinese affairs in general. 47 Rustin Gates, 2013, Meiji Diplomacy in the Early 1930s: Uchida K¯ osai, Manchuria, and Post-withdrawal Foreign Policy, in Tumultuous Decade: Empire, Society, and Diplomacy in 1930s Japan, ed. Masato Kimura and Toshihiro Minohara, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 193–4. 48 Military authorities were nonetheless eager to avoid tensions with other countries. On August 1, Navy Minister Okada Keisuke told Harada Kumao, the private secretary of genr¯ o Saionji, that the Chiefs of General Staff of the two services would do their best to avert frictions with the United States and the Soviet Union. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 163. 49 Ibid., 158–9. 50 Ibid., 160. 51 Ibid., 159.

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The report noted that Japan had to be ready to withdraw from the League of Nations in case the latter voted a resolution against its stance on Manchuria.52 Although the importance put on the relationship with the League was downgraded in the new policy, the wish to preserve friendly relations with other great powers remained intact. The Sait¯o Cabinet considered that the positions of these countries in and outside the League were different, being selfish actors disregarding international norms and seeking to protect their national interests when behaving outside the framework of the Geneva-based institution.53 Consequently, the report asserted that withdrawing from the League would not prevent Japan from cooperating on matters of common concern with important countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.54 In regard to the continent, this implied clearly separating issues related to China proper from those concerning Manchuria. Tokyo was eager to collaborate with these countries on Chinese affairs, but would privilege unilateralism toward Manchuria. Such was the compromise found by the Japanese FPE, squeezed between growing domestic pressure and the insistence of several FDIB members on the necessity to maintain constructive relations with the great powers. Tokyo formally recognized Manchukuo on September 15, 1932. The government justified this decision in such a way as to make it appear compatible with international agreements, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg–Briand Pact in particular. The Sait¯o Cabinet declared that it had recognized the new state because the latter had been created in accordance with the rights of self-defense and self-determination of the local population in a country, China, unable to properly protect the interests and properties of its citizens.55 The Settlement of the Manchurian Crisis The final report of the Lytton Commission was released on October 1, 1932. Not surprisingly, the report was critical of Japan. It denied that the operations of Japanese troops during the night of September 18 and 19

52 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 207. 53 Idem. 54 Ibid., 208–10. 55 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 18.

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were undertaken in self-defense, and asserted that Manchukuo was not the outcome of a genuine indigenous movement but of a plan orchestrated by Japanese civilians and military personnel.56 The report also stated that the maintenance of Manchukuo in its current form would have destabilizing consequences in the region and that it needed to be replaced by a special administrative regime under Chinese sovereignty.57 Under this regime, Japan’s rights and interests would be guaranteed through a new bilateral agreement with China. The Japanese government rejected the report and its recommendations and on March 24, 1933, notified the League of Nations of its intention to withdraw from the institution.58 Tokyo could not accept a report that depicted Japan as the aggressor and, more important, that impacted its relationship with Manchukuo. Given the nature of the report’s recommendations, staying in the League was incompatible with the Japanese policy of recognition of and support to the new country.59 Although Japan’s withdrawal marked a drastic departure from its previous policy of collaboration with the League, in which the country had been very active as a permanent member, it also reflected its desire to maintain productive relations with other great powers. Because the League, under the pressure of small countries, took position against Japan over the Manchurian issue, the Sait¯o Cabinet broke ties with the Genevabased institution to prevent the disease represented by the Lytton Report from infecting its relations with the great powers. International cooperation outside the League was indeed a growingly important objective for a large majority of FPE and FDIB members at that time.60 The policy formulated by Foreign Minister Uchida K¯ osai after the disengagement from the League was almost similar to the one pursued

56 Société des Nations, Commission d’étude, 1932, Appel du Gouvernement Chinois: Rapport de la Commission d’étude, in VII. Questions politiques, 1932, 1–16, ed. Société des Nations, Geneva: Publications de la Société des Nations, 77 and 105. 57 Ibid., 140 and 144. 58 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 172–3. 59 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 18. 60 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 175.

This is the reason why some scholars, like Inoue Toshikazu, explain the Japanese decision to withdraw from the League in the context of international cooperation. Toshikazu Inoue, 1994, Kiki no naka no ky¯ och¯ o gaik¯ o: Nicch¯ u sens¯ o ni itaru taigai seisaku no keisei to tenkai, Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 50.

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beforehand.61 Tokyo would continue collaborating with great powers, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, on issues of common interest and on matters related to China proper while respecting the latter’s integrity and sovereignty. Japan would remain uncompromising regarding Manchukuo, however. This policy aimed at preventing Japan from being isolated on the international scene after the multilateral basis of its diplomacy had been weakened by the withdrawal from the League. Bilateral and minilateral cooperation needed to be deepened and unilateralism used exclusively vis-à-vis Manchukuo. Uchida’s policy was received with different degrees of skepticism by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.62 Nevertheless, Japan ultimately managed to mend ties with all of them. Manchukuo was appraised as a domestic issue. There, Uchida urged the Kwantung Army to show restraint. He also sought to secure Japan’s economic interests in China through the promotion of peace and stability, Chiang Kai-shek being perceived as a key player to do so.63 But despite the cautious and cooperative policy put in place by Uchida, the Sait¯ o Cabinet was still struggling to control the Kwantung Army on the ground. On May 7, 1933, Japanese troops pushed south of the Great Wall and a few days later announced the annexation of the Jehol Province by Manchukuo.64 The outer districts of Hebei and Chahar Provinces met the same fate, but without public proclamation. The Japanese FPE did not give up on its objective of stabilizing the situation in China. On May 31, the Tangku Truce Agreement was reached between the Kuomintang and Japan, by which the former recognized Manchukuo and the latter’s new acquisitions.65 The agreement also provided for the creation of a 30-mile wide demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall, in the eastern part of the Hebei Province. Following the May 1932 settlement of the First Shanghai Incident, the Tangku Truce effectively fixed Sino-Japanese relations.66 Chinese guerillas continued to be active in Manchuria, but the troops of the two countries would not 61 Gates, Meiji Diplomacy in the Early 1930s, 200. 62 Ibid., 205–6. 63 Ibid., 201. 64 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 271–2. 65 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 274. 66 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 94.

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clash with each other for the next four years despite recurrent pressure put by the Kwantung Army on Chinese provinces bordering the demilitarized zone.67 Relations with Japan having been stabilized, Chiang Kai-shek began focusing on fighting the Communists. The Tangku Truce Agreement also meant the end of the Manchurian crisis for the other great powers. The truce allowed Western countries to redirect their attention toward more urgent and concerning issues, particularly in Europe where Adolph Hitler had reached a dictatorial position in Germany.68 The United Kingdom made efforts to improve relations with Japan, the United States was eager to cooperate with Tokyo on matters of common concern and the Soviet Union agreed to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, which had been a point of contention between the two countries.69 American Restraint During the Manchurian Crisis The Manchurian crisis constituted an exogenous shock for Japan. It was a sudden and unexpected international challenge potentially endangering the country’s national security. As discussed in the second part of this chapter, the Imperial Army successfully securitized the crisis and Manchuria, and then Manchukuo, became perceived in Tokyo as an economic lifeline and a buffer for the colony of Korea that needed to be protected at all costs. The mechanism of contextual adaption strengthened the leverage of the army on the FPE and its foreign policy toward the continent, the latter becoming increasingly coercive and unilateral regarding Manchurian affairs. Inversely, the exogenous shock that occurred with the Manchurian crisis did not provide a suitable contextual reality for the securitization of the threat posed by the United States. Indeed, the reactions of the great powers to the events in China did not justify a radical modification of the Japanese FPE’s perception of and foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States or other members of the Washington System. Actually, these countries were rather sympathetic to Japan.70 The United States even took care

67 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 272. 68 Imai, Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen, 64. 69 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 272. 70 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 67.

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to avoid being regarded as hostile in order to prevent the Japanese military services from securitizing its presence in the Pacific and East Asia. The relative passivity of great powers during the Manchurian crisis was explained by several factors. Governments in the United States, the United Kingdom and France were absorbed by domestic issues, mainly socio-economic in nature, and regarding external affairs were more concerned about developments in Europe than in Asia.71 These developments included the growing influence of the Nazis in Germany and later the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, none of these three countries’ core security and economic interests in China were threatened by Japanese actions.72 As long as hostilities did not spread outside Manchuria, they were unwilling to put much pressure on Japan. And when this happened, as in Shanghai in early 1932, they chose to cooperate with Tokyo to settle the crisis as rapidly as possible. Lastly, Washington, London and Paris realized that it was difficult to restrain Japan short of the use of force.73 Because they were neither ready nor able to do so, they decided to appease rather than to adopt a firm stance, which could be counterproductive by antagonizing Japan and enhancing the influence of extremist elements inside the country. The Soviet Union was in a different position. The country was geographically closer to the turbulences and had more interests at stake in Manchuria, including the ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Moscow was thus worried about Japan’s behavior on the continent. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union shared the concerns of Western European powers regarding political developments in Germany and was equally focusing on its internal economic situation.74 Moreover, the insufficient state of preparedness of its military in Asia was a restraining factor for the country.75 Moscow consequently refrained from taking measures that could provoke Japan, even selling the Chinese Eastern Railway, to prevent the latter from heading north. The Soviet Union did not turn openly

71 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 118. 72 Ibid., 116–7. 73 Ibid., 118. 74 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 72–3. 75 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 67.

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against Tokyo until 1935, when it announced the creation of a front against fascist countries in which Japan and Germany were included.76 The only great power that did not hesitate to adopt a defying stance against Japan was Germany.77 Being the main agent of change in Europe, Germany was less concerned about European developments and was eager to improve relations with China to get access to key raw materials. The latter also offered an impressively promising market for the export of German goods and weapons. Berlin did not refrain from providing Chiang Kai-shek with military experts to reorganize his army, including one of the most decorated, General Hans von Seeckt, triggering strong objections from Tokyo. The United States was in a peculiar position: the country was engulfed in domestic problems, but was sticking to a foreign policy based on international agreements and running against Japanese actions in Manchuria. For Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, the latter succeeding Hoover in March 1933, the situation in East Asia was the third priority after domestic issues and European affairs.78 Roosevelt’s political platform during the presidential campaign did not even mention Japan. This apathy for the Manchurian crisis came in part from the limited interests the United States possessed in northeast China.79 A few hundred of its citizens lived in Manchuria and Standard Oil and some tobacco companies were the only representatives of American business circles. In 1929, American exports to Manchuria amounted to 12 million dollars, whereas imports were as small as valuing 500,000 dollars. When the Mukden Incident occurred, Washington did not consider it as an urgent matter.80 This did not mean that the United States was not concerned by the possible consequences of the incident. The Department of State approached the issue from the perspective of the Kellogg–Briand Pact. Japan’s behavior in Manchuria had the potential of being highly destabilizing for the entire post-First World War rules-based international

76 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 117. 77 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 25. 78 Wayne S. Cole, The Role of the United States Congress and Political Parties, in

Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 304. 79 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 65. 80 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 117.

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order, the Pact being one of its key pillars and Tokyo a signatory.81 The main priority for the United States during the Manchurian crisis was to preserve the integrity and credibility of international treaties and to clearly show that they were not, in the words of Secretary of State Henry Stimson, “scraps of paper.”82 The initial position of Washington regarding a possible violation of international treaties by Japan was that the Mukden Incident had been plotted by the Kwantung Army in total disregard for the stance of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯o and his cabinet.83 The Americans could interpret the incident in two different ways: they could assume that the Japanese government knew about or supervised the operations, or that troops on the ground took the initiative against the will of the cabinet. In the former case, the United States had to take firm actions against Tokyo to protect the international legal order. But if the latter was assumed, doing so would only enable the Imperial Army and its supporters to justify their aggressive policy and increase their political leverage by using and possibly securitizing the threat represented by the United States. As long as the involvement of the Japanese government in the Mukden Incident was not proven and the situation on the ground did not deteriorate extensively, international treaties could be protected without running the risk of provoking Tokyo. During a press conference held on September 19, a few hours after the incident, Stimson declared that he did not think the Kellogg–Briand Pact had been violated because the bombing of the railroad and the subsequent fighting were undertaken by isolated Japanese soldiers acting without permission from their hierarchy or government.84 One day later, the head of the State Department’s Far Eastern Affairs Division, Stanley Hornbeck, stated that Washington would refrain from saying whether the events in Manchuria breached the Pact, and that the Permanent Court of International Justice was in a better position to address this issue as both Japan and China were members of the institution.85

81 Norman A. Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 25. 82 Ibid., 27. 83 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 75. 84 Ibid., 64–5. 85 Ibid., 65.

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During the days that immediately followed the Mukden Incident, the Hoover Administration learned that the Wakatsuki Cabinet was trying to restrain the Kwantung Army and to prevent any reinforcement of troops from being sent to Manchuria, facts that supported its earlier conclusion that the Japanese government could not be held responsible.86 On September 22, Secretary of State Stimson proposed to adopt a wait-andsee posture in order to maintain flexibility toward developments on the ground and to strengthen the influence of Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o in Tokyo. Stimson’s proposal was approved by Hoover. The diplomatic approach adopted by Stimson was of the most cautious nature. He agreed with Japan that direct negotiations between Tokyo and Nanking was the best way to settle the dispute. He was also determined to help moderates in the Wakatsuki Cabinet get the upper hand over the military and hardliners. This meant refraining from any action that could be presented by the latter as a proof of American hostility.87 And when China threatened to move closer to the Soviet Union in case the United States continued to refuse providing support to Nanking, Stimson told the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires in Washington: “We have not attempted to go into the question of right and wrong […] we are not taking sides […] we are ‘playing no favorites’.”88 In other words, the United States wanted to remain neutral. When on September 22 the British representative to the Council of the League of Nations, Robert Cecil, proposed to dispatch military observers to monitor the situation on the ground, Stimson strongly objected.89 The latter knew this would be interpreted in Japan as an act of improper foreign interference, weakening the position of Foreign Minister Shidehara. On September 24, U.S. Under Secretary of State William Castle summoned the British Ambassador to Washington, Francis D’Arcy G. Osborne, to express dissatisfaction with the aggressive attitude of Cecil.90 For Castle, Cecil disregarded the specificities of Asian mentality by calling for a policy of international interference, which would inevitably lead to a reinforcement of Japanese nationalism. Castle’s argument was not 86 Idem. 87 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 72. 88 Idem. 89 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 70–1. 90 Ibid., 72.

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intended to be grounded in facts, but aimed at making clear to London that Washington opposed any penalty against Japan over the Mukden Incident. Similar to the Department of State, Congress was reluctant to openly criticize Tokyo. Being in the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, the most powerful parliamentary entity on foreign affairs, or in its counterpart in the House of Representatives, many congress(wo)men estimated that Japan’s behavior in Manchuria violated the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty.91 Nevertheless, they feared being involved in a crisis in a far-distant region where their country possessed no vital interests, and thus refrained from taking a firm stance on the issue. Unfortunately for Henry Stimson and his team, the situation on the ground deteriorated, culminating with the bombing of Chinchow on October 8. Japan was now widely regarded as having deliberately enlarged hostilities in contradiction with its international engagements.92 If immediately after the Mukden Incident the United States had been eager to give Tokyo a chance to show its attachment to the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, providing the Wakatsuki Cabinet time to solve the crisis bilaterally with China, it could not ignore the shock provoked in Western societies by the attack on Chinchow.93 Washington had the choice between economic sanctions and diplomatic protests. For Herbert Hoover, however, economic sanctions were equivalent to war and neither he nor the American military were ready for that.94 In a cabinet memorandum issued in mid-October, the President noted that the United States “had never set out to preserve peace among other nations by force.”95 The Hoover Administration nonetheless thought it had a moral obligation to react.96 Economic penalties and the use of force having been discarded, applying diplomatic pressure on

91 Cole, The Role of the United States Congress, 308. 92 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 87. 93 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 11. 94 Hoover’s military advisors estimated that the United States would need another four to six years of preparation to be able to defeat Japan in war. Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 27. 95 Ibid., 28. 96 The United States was at that time the only country that opposed Japan’s

intervention in Manchuria on moral grounds. Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 117–8.

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Japan while trusting the Chinese capacity to prevent new advances by Japanese troops was the only way to handle the crisis.97 One day after the bombing of Chinchow, Stimson called on the League of Nations to pressure Japan and China into respecting the Kellogg– Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty.98 The State Secretary also authorized the American Consul in Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert, to attend sessions of the League’s Council in order to raise international attention to the ongoing crisis in East Asia. Even so, Stimson sent strict instructions.99 Gilbert could only join discussions related to the possible dispatch of observers and to the Kellogg–Briand Pact, and was ordered to remain passive and to withdraw as soon as the Pact was mentioned by one of the Council’s members. Stimson was satisfied when France took the initiative to invoke the Pact, although he was not ready to back the move.100 To the surprise of other countries, Gilbert left the Council long before the end of the general debate on the Manchurian crisis. For Washington to officially make the link between the Pact and the crisis was too important a diplomatic gesture at that time. This would arouse American public opinion and consequently reduce the flexibility of the Hoover Administration in handling the crisis.101 The dispatch of observers was now considered more feasible and a better option to pressure Tokyo. It would leave the primary responsibility to solve the dispute to Japan and China while making sure the settlement was compatible with international treaties. When the Council of the League reconvened in mid-November, Japanese troops had not withdrawn into the Railway Zone as requested by a resolution adopted on October 24.102 In view of the lack of progress on the ground, some League members were mulling enacting economic sanctions against Japan. This proposal was received coldly by the Americans, unwilling to back strongly-worded resolutions and even less eager

97 Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 28. 98 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 87. 99 Gary B. Ostrower, 1983, The United States and the League of Nations, 1919–1939, in The League of Nations in Retrospect/La Société des Nations: Rétrospective, ed. United Nations Library Geneva, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 132–3. 100 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 94. 101 Ibid., 93–4. 102 Ibid., 97.

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to take economic measures that were synonymous of a first step toward war for the Hoover Administration.103 The diplomatic struggle of the United States with the League of Nations temporarily stopped at the same time as Japan’s, when on December 10 the resolution that established the Lytton Commission was adopted. Washington had supported the proposal, made by Tokyo on November 21, to create such a commission and had worked to convince other countries to accept it.104 The resolution gave Japan time to settle bilaterally its dispute with China and provided the United States with the guarantee that recommendations based on international treaties would be enshrined in the commission’s report. The Hoover Administration hoped this would allow Tokyo to reorient its policy vis-à-vis Manchuria in line with international expectations.105 In late December, several reports about the chronic instability in Manchuria reached Washington, leading Henry Stimson to warn the Japanese Ambassador against a ground offensive on Chinchow.106 Such a move would demonstrate to the world that the operations of Japanese troops were not dedicated to suppressing banditry in the region, but to enlarging Japan’s territorial basis through military aggressions. If this happened, it would become increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain its policy of accommodation toward Japan as the American and world public opinions would be asking for stronger measures. Stimson learned that Japanese soldiers had advanced on Chinchow on January 2, 1932, and immediately started working on a diplomatic note of protest. Two identical notes were handed to the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors on January 7.107 What became known as the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition stated that the United States would refrain from recognizing any agreement or situation arrived at between China and Japan in a way contrary to the Kellogg–Briand Pact or the Nine-Power Treaty.108

103 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 115. 104 Ibid., 117. 105 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 19. 106 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 139–40. 107 Ibid., 142–3. 108 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 194.

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The release of the notes was an important diplomatic gesture for the United States, being the first truly American initiative to restrain Japan’s behavior in Manchuria. It reflected, however, the small margin of maneuver the Hoover Administration possessed. Pressured by public opinion to act in defense of China, but afraid that responses like economic sanctions and even an unofficial boycott of Japanese goods would push Tokyo toward militarism, the release of the Stimson Doctrine was the maximum the American government could do to preserve the integrity of key international treaties.109 It was also a sign of weakness because the doctrine mirrored the hope, unevenly shared among American officials, that the Japanese aggression could be stopped through the mobilization of the world opinion alone.110 Stimson partially reached his objective. The doctrine of nonrecognition was widely supported by audiences in the United States and Western democracies, where peace movements eager to protect international instruments dedicated to averting war, the most symbolic being the Kellogg–Briand Pact, had arrived at maturity during the 1920s.111 The doctrine also satisfied isolationists who were cautious of keeping the United States out of the troubles in East Asia, whereas pro-China components of the American society were provided with the assertion that the country had to be treated fairly. Congress(wo)men overwhelmingly backed Stimson’s initiative.112 Three weeks later, fighting between Japanese and Chinese soldiers broke out in Shanghai. Inversely to Manchuria, the United States had important commercial interests in the coastal city, where thousands of its citizens lived. From Washington’s perspective, the dispatch of Japanese troops would allow Tokyo to enforce a blockade of the Yangtze River, the door of American trade with China and the center of its economic activities in the country.113 Moreover, Nanking, the capital of the Kuomintang, the only force that the Americans regarded as capable of stabilizing China, was located only 300 kilometers away. The United States thus had many reasons to take a firm stance against Japan and to try strengthening 109 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 142–3. 110 Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 32. 111 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 137–8. 112 Cole, The Role of the United States Congress, 308. 113 K¯ oketsu, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku, 14.

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the position of Chiang Kai-shek.114 The Military Attaché to the American embassy in Tokyo, Isaac Johnson, told the Navy Minister’s private secretary, Takagi S¯okichi, that the First Shanghai Incident made a collision between their countries difficult to avert.115 The Hoover Administration decided to support the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. The Americans saw the boycott as a way to establish a more equal balance of power between China and Japan, and feared that if they opposed the boycott the Nanking government would turn to militaristic means that would exacerbate tensions.116 In addition, Henry Stimson thought that his government needed to guarantee the safety of American nationals on its own, and on January 31 the Manila-based U.S. Asiatic Fleet was sent to Shanghai. The dispatch of the fleet was not intended to provoke Tokyo.117 The Commander of the Japanese forces in Shanghai, Admiral Nomura Kichisabur¯o, and his counterpart of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Montgomery Taylor, cooperated well during the crisis. One year after the incident, Taylor and his fleet would visit Japan and be welcomed by Nomura as well as Lieutenant General Araki Sadao and Rear Admiral Shimada Shigetar¯o.118 The Hoover Administration also publicly reaffirmed during the First Shanghai Incident that Washington would only fight for continental United States, not for Asia.119 Nevertheless, Stimson was now ready to send a message to Tokyo through the use of military assets. In mid-February, he decided to keep the Scouting Fleet on the American West Coast after maneuvers in the Pacific, instead of returning it to the East Coast.120 Until then, the Battle Fleet and the Base Force had been located in the Pacific while the Scouting Fleet and the Control Force had operated in the Atlantic. The relocation of the Scouting Fleet to the Pacific made the American naval

114 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 156–7. 115 K¯ oketsu, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku, 14. 116 Usui, Mansh¯ u jihen, 157. 117 Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 207. 118 Idem. 119 Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 29. 120 Ibid., 29–30.

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presence in this ocean much more important than in the Atlantic.121 The relocation was exclusively a diplomatic gesture and was not dedicated to preparing for military operations against Japan. As Stimson later recalled: It was not a concentration at Hawaii, the Orange plan [i.e. war plan against Japan] jumping-off point. The fleet was not ready to jump anywhere. It did visit Hawaii, as scheduled, for a critique after maneuvers, but then returned to the west coast. The concentration lay in retaining the Scouting Force, much lesser half of the fleet, on the west coast instead of sending it home to the east coast.122

Maybe the most important American diplomatic offensive during the First Shanghai Incident was a public letter Stimson sent on February 23 to William Borah, chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. The letter for the first time officially and explicitly linked Japan’s behavior in China to the Washington Treaties. In the missive, Stimson reaffirmed his non-recognition doctrine and added that if Tokyo continued to violate the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Hoover Administration would be compelled to denounce the Five-Power Treaty.123 Stimson thus hinted at the possibility of resuming naval expansion and fortifying military facilities in Guam and the Philippines if Japan’s aggression was not interrupted.124 The February 23 letter, which inversely to the January 7 notes targeted exclusively Japan, was more concrete and aggressive in its terms. But if Stimson wanted to send a firm message to Tokyo, he took care to do this indirectly in order to avoid the United States being perceived as hostile in Japan. The letter, although intentionally released publicly, was addressed to Senator Borah and not to the Japanese government. This reflected the cautious approach adopted by the Hoover Administration since the beginning of the Manchurian crisis and its efforts to prevent the Japanese military and hardliners from using American diplomatic measures to increase their leverage over the government. A few days later, President Hoover instructed Under Secretary of State William

121 This would be the case until the creation of the Atlantic Fleet in 1941. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 25. 122 Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, 207. 123 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 165. 124 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 159.

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Castle to publicly deny that Washington was mulling taking economic sanctions against Japan.125 The end of the First Shanghai Incident provided the United States with a break in regard to East Asian affairs and its relationship with Japan. During the year 1932, the creation of Manchukuo under the guidance of the Kwantung Army and its subsequent recognition by the Japanese government did not lead to a modification, but to a reaffirmation, of the doctrine of non-recognition formulated by Stimson.126 Franklin Roosevelt, who succeeded Herbert Hoover in March 1933, largely stuck to his predecessor’s foreign policy toward Asia. He maintained the Stimson Doctrine and continued to call for the respect of international treaties, declaring on January 17, 1933, that “American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties.”127 Roosevelt wanted even more than Hoover to avoid challenging Japan’s position in East Asia, and to do so was ready to compose with the new reality in Manchuria.128 He also took great care not to provoke Tokyo in order to avert the domestic strengthening of the Japanese military. Any sort of reliance on armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy was consequently ruled out by Roosevelt.129 Congress was as reluctant as the President to take actions that could antagonize Tokyo. Although many congress(wo)men felt sympathy for China and disliked the way Japan was behaving in Asia, they were prevented from putting pressure on the American government to react forcefully to Japanese provocations by more important economic concerns at home, and by a strong aversion to involvement abroad.130 Influential Senators from the Middle West like Gerald Nye and William Borah were also opposed to providing the Japanese army with justifications for its expansionist and militarist policy, being through naval expansion or other proactive gestures by the United States.

125 James C. Thomson, Jr., The Role of the Department of State, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 93. 126 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 28. 127 Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 32–3. 128 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 28. 129 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 142. 130 Cole, The Role of the United States Congress, 309–10.

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Fortunately for Roosevelt, the situation in northeast China improved shortly after he took office. The Tangku Truce Agreement reached by Japan and China in late May 1933 put an end to the Manchurian crisis and hostilities between the troops of the two countries stopped, with the exception of isolated skirmishes in the demilitarized zone. By that time, bilateral relations between Washington and Tokyo had improved dramatically, and a majority in the Department of State estimated that Japan was showing a genuine will to recover its place as a responsible country in the community of great powers.131 The Roosevelt Administration, focused on recovery plans for the American economy, turned to adopt a passive and almost disinterested attitude toward East Asia and Manchuria in particular.132 Japan thus came out relatively unharmed from the Manchurian crisis and First Shanghai Incident and averted international isolation, although events on the ground had been perceived by other great powers as the first open defiance of the Washington System.133 Japan’s disengagement from the League of Nations was the last major challenge faced by the United States in regard to its policy of accommodation toward Tokyo until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. If Japan learned something from the Manchurian crisis, it was that the gap was huge between the criticisms made by Western democracies at international fora and in the media, and they were relatively soft in this case, and the actions they concretely took, basically none.134 More important for my argument, the accommodating policy adopted by Washington during the Manchurian crisis did not betray any obvious sign of hostility vis-à-vis Tokyo. And if, as shown below, the American ability to inflict harm using naval forces increased in the first half of the 1930s, this did not justify a drastic change in threat perception. In 1934, the Japanese FPE would nonetheless begin to perceive the United States as a belligerent country that threatened Japan’s national security. In other words, Tokyo would develop an inflated threat perception in view of the relatively benign intentions of Washington, and would eventually overbalance.

131 Gates, Meiji Diplomacy in the Early 1930s, 204. 132 Thomson, Jr., The Role of the Department of State, 94. 133 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 20. 134 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 179.

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American Naval Expansion in the First Half of the 1930s Under the Roosevelt Administration, the United States started rebuilding its navy, left stagnating since the 1921–1922 Washington Conference. This initiative was only loosely related to the situation in East Asia and pertained primarily to domestic factors, the main ones being the pressure exerted by the U.S. Navy on the government and the economic situation in the United States. Moreover, there was no apparent evidence that Washington had an aggressive design in undertaking naval expansion, something that otherwise could have affected the Japanese FPE’s perception of the threat posed by the United States. After the 1930 London Conference, the U.S. Navy was still struggling to find a way to shoulder transpacific operations, and put pressure on the government to build to treaty limits and to develop naval bases in the Pacific. A document entitled Estimate of the Situation and Navy Basic for Orange War, released in May 1932, assessed that the strength of the American fleet was 50 percent below treaty limits and that Japan’s ratio in auxiliary vessels compared with the United States was 88 percent.135 Moreover, the London Treaty had provided the U.S. Navy with only 50 cruisers, both light and heavy, against the 70 requested by the Navy General Board.136 The treaty also granted the Japanese navy a large number of auxiliaries and equality in submarines, the latter being particularly threatening for the U.S. Navy.137 With such deficiencies in naval power, sending the fleet across the Pacific without adequate bases was dangerous. The development of naval bases in the Pacific, both existing and potential, was essential from the perspective of the navy. Admiral Joseph Reeves, who became Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet in early 1934, emphasized the importance of bases at Midway.138 In 1935, the Navy Department conducted a study showing that Kiska (Aleutians), Guam and Samoa had to be turned into subsidiary bases in case of crisis, and that if the Washington Treaties were denounced a major forward base needed to be built in the Philippines.139 Naval infrastructures in the latter 135 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 174. 136 Ibid., 67. 137 Ibid., 83. 138 Ibid., 174. 139 Ibid., 236.

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country were considered vital for the navy to undertake a transpacific journey and then operate in Asian waters. Despite continuous pressure by the navy, little would be done for the development of naval bases until the late 1930s. Arms control was firmly fastened to the American political agenda and pacifism and isolationism remained strong in the United States.140 The expansion of naval strength through new buildup plans was therefore essential for the U.S. Navy to keep Plan Orange against Japan a realistic operational guideline. Similar to naval bases, however, the navy faced major challenges in promoting naval expansion. Both the Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations had great difficulties advocating naval buildup in time of economic crisis and in the face of a public opinion attached to isolationism and holding a profound aversion toward military assets.141 Not a single keel was laid down during the last three years of the mandate of Herbert Hoover. Franklin Roosevelt was equally reluctant to push for rearmament during his first months in office despite his reputation as a “Big Navy Man,” having been Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the 1910s.142 The navy did not give up, and wisely used the restrictions set by the London Treaty to justify budget requests. Through the concept of “treaty navy,” or the fact of building to treaty limits, it brought aspects of legality, responsibility and restraint to its demand for naval expansion.143 This helped the Roosevelt Administration convince Congress that an enlargement of American naval power was rational and in line with its foreign policy based on international agreements and non-involvement abroad. Roosevelt also regarded naval expansion and big naval budgets as a means to fight the economic crisis affecting the United States. Shipbuilding was a labor-intensive activity that could be used as part of a Keynesian policy dedicated to stimulating employment and private spending.144 In the context of his New Deal(s), Roosevelt pressed Congress to approve the National Industrial Recovery Act in June 1933. The Act, aimed at reviving the American economy, facilitated naval expenditures

140 Ibid., 237. 141 Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, 206. 142 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 209. 143 Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, 206. 144 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 210.

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by categorizing them as relief measures.145 In early August, 238 million dollars were released under the Act for the construction of 32 warships, including six 10,000 tons and 6-inch guns Brooklyn-class cruisers, with an additional five such vessels being planned under the regular budget of the navy.146 In March 1934, Congress passed the Vinson-Trammell Act, which provided for the construction of 102 vessels and 1184 airplanes.147 This impressively massive buildup program, which would almost double the size of the U.S. Navy if the constructions already approved in 1933 were taken into account, was presented by Roosevelt as a proof of Washington’s resolution to build to treaty limits by 1942.148 Congress’ sanction of the Act did not mean the funds necessary for its implementation would be provided, however. For example, the Navy General Board asked in May 1935 for immediately starting the construction of a 35,000-ton battleship, to be completed by fiscal year 1937. About one year later, the Navy Department demanded the building of an additional battleship. Roosevelt rejected both demands, because his administration was at that time in dispute with Congress regarding New Deal legislations.149 The potential approval of the battleships was postponed until 1938. In endorsing the Vinson-Trammell Act, Roosevelt had of course in mind the situation in East Asia and Japan’s aggressive behavior on the continent, as well as European dynamics. Nevertheless, other and more important factors entered into the equation. These included the Keynesian policy of economic revitalization at the top of the President’s political agenda, his personal affinity with the navy and the pressure put by the latter on his administration. In early 1934, the Roosevelt Administration maintained a strong aversion to the use of armed forces in foreign policy, the relationship between Washington and Tokyo was relatively friendly and tensions between Japan and China had declined tremendously following the Tangku Truce Agreement of May 1933. The decision taken by Roosevelt to press for the

145 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 161–2. 146 The number of Brooklyn-class cruisers built through the National Industrial

Recovery Act was scaled down to four in early 1934. 147 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 204. 148 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 210. 149 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 232–3.

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adoption of the Vinson-Trammell Act in 1934 was based on domestic incentives rather than on the desire to deter Japan or hinder its continental policy. Tellingly, at the peak of the Manchurian crisis in 1932, a bill similar to the Act had been rejected by the Hoover Administration.150 More important, in convincing Congress to pass critical bills related to naval expansion, Roosevelt mentioned neither the situation in East Asia nor the need to keep Japan in check through military means. Even assuming that the President wanted to rebuild the navy for this purpose, which is unlikely, he was prevented from openly saying so by the strong pacifism and isolationism he faced inside and outside Congress.151 The concept of “treaty navy” was a much more convenient argument to persuade congress(wo)men and public opinion. Therefore, there were little rationales for the Japanese FPE to comprehend the renewed naval expansion of the United States as directed against Japan. The foreign policy pursued by Roosevelt remained one of noninterference in Chinese affairs and his administration did not provide any evidence of aggressive design toward Japan, being through naval buildup or diplomatic gestures. The ability of the United States to inflict harm on Japan using naval forces was without doubt increasing, but its naval expansion was undertaken in accordance with arms control restrictions and with the objective of reaching treaty limits by 1942. There was no apparent reason why American politics and foreign policy should have changed the Japanese FPE’s perception of the threat represented by the naval presence of the United States in the Pacific.

The Construction of Threat Perception Through Securitization The Manchurian crisis was an exogenous shock. The Japanese FPE consequently summoned FDIB members to gather information on the potential repercussions of the crisis for national security. It was not clear how and to what extent Japan’s security would be impacted by the events in northeast China. As the formulation of threat perception became a matter of debate inside the FPE, the military services strived to impose their perspective to enhance their influence and advance their interests. 150 Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, 215. 151 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 210.

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Because it was deeply involved in Manchuria, the Imperial Army possessed a strong securitizing competence. The Japanese socio-economic and ideological contexts of the early 1930s also helped the army securitize the Manchurian crisis by making the civil society and the political landscape, the secondary audience, receptive to its propaganda. The situation was more complicated for the Imperial Navy. The institution’s involvement in Chinese dynamics was minimum and its domain of expertise, naval warfare, was hardly relevant in the context of the Manchurian crisis. Moreover, except in China, the international environment surrounding Japan was relatively safe and permissive and the country faced no short-term threat from other great powers. Washington was indeed sticking to a cautious and accommodating policy toward Japan. And the majority of FPE and FDIB members were working hard to preserve constructive relations with great powers, the United States in particular. In this regard, the Washington System received renewed political attention as the last institutionalized structure connecting Japan to the great powers after Tokyo’s disengagement from the League of Nations. The navy sought but initially failed to depict the United States as a threat to national security, which would have steered the mechanism of contextual adaption to its advantage. Secondary Audience: Socio-economic Background The economic situation in Japan drastically worsened in the early 1930s, after a long and difficult period marked by the post-First World War recession, the devastating Great Kant¯o earthquake of 1923, Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods from the mid-1920s onward and the 1927 Sh¯ owa Financial Crisis.152 The socio-economic crisis of the early 1930s was initially a financial crisis, triggered by the combination of the Wall Street Crash of late 1929 and the ill-timed reintroduction of the gold standard by Tokyo. Eager to readjust the Japanese economy, which had been growing abnormally and in a bubble-like manner for most of the post-war period, and to improve the competitiveness of Japanese goods abroad, Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke reestablished the gold standard at an artificially high exchange

152 Iriye, The Failure of Economic Expansion, 265.

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rate and lifted the embargo on gold in January 1930.153 This decision was based on the assumptions that the world economy would remain stable and that Japan would continue attracting capital and credits from the United States. The financial crisis that originated in New York and rapidly spread to the whole industrialized world put enormous pressure on Japan and made the maintenance of the gold standard impossible. The financial panics that shook Germany and Austria led to a swift reduction of gold reserves in many countries during the summer of 1931.154 On September 21, the United Kingdom departed from the gold standard by suspending the convertibility of the pound to gold, a measure that was soon extended to all dominions and overseas territories with the exception of South Africa. Amid speculations that the Japanese government would follow up and reintroduce the embargo on gold, domestic and foreign banks started purchasing American dollars in large quantity, accelerating the depletion of Japan’s gold stock that had begun with the removal of the embargo in early 1930.155 Takahashi Korekiyo, Finance Minister in a new cabinet headed by Inukai Tsuyoshi, reestablished the embargo on gold and abandoned the gold standard in mid-December 1931, after three months of struggle by the previous government to stabilize the situation and avert speculative moves. The decision triggered harsh criticisms from Japanese citizens, who perceived it as benefiting speculators and financial interests at their expense.156 The worldwide and Japanese financial crises rapidly impacted the real economy and the living standard of the population, first through a decline in trade. Between 1929 and 1931, the value of Japanese exports fell by 43 percent, affecting most heavily farmers in the silk industry whose products were intended for the American market and trading companies active on the Chinese market.157 The latter were also penalized by boycotts of Japanese goods and the growing competition brought into China by

153 Katsur¯ o Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 290. 154 Takafusa Nakamura, The Yen Bloc, 1931–1941, in The Japanese Wartime Empire, ed. Duus, Myers and Peattie, 171. 155 Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, 291. 156 Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 159. 157 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 188.

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British businessmen after London abandoned the gold standard, making their products cheaper.158 As the economic depression reached Japan, the policy of fiscal retrenchment adopted in late 1929 by the government had catastrophic consequences, in particular in rural areas. By mid-1931, domestic prices had fallen to their 1916 levels.159 The price of a bushel of rice declined from an equivalent of 4 dollars in 1928 to 1.4 dollars in 1932, whereas the bale of raw silk fell from 690 to 150 dollars over the same period. The income from rice and silk productions consequently dropped from 1.5 billion yen in 1929 to 922 million in 1932 and 778 million in 1933.160 To this particularly difficult economic conjuncture for farmers added the fact that about half of them rented the lands on which they worked, spending half the value of their production to pay landowners.161 The level of indebtedness of Japanese peasants reached 7 billion yen in 1932 and sporadic famines erupted in rural areas.162 The situation was only slightly better in urban centers, where the industry was struck frontally by the domestic depression and the decline in foreign trade. The unemployment rate in the private sector had already increased during the second half of the 1920s, but the trend accelerated dramatically in the early 1930s. If 1926 was taken as the year of reference, the ratio of employed people was 91.1 percent in 1929, 82 percent in 1930 and 74.4 percent in 1931.163 In parallel, the real cash earning of factory workers fell from 105.3 percent of the 1926 value in 1928 to 90.7 percent in 1931 and 88.1 percent in 1932. By 1932, the urban middle class was affected to such an extent that it joined peasants and factory workers in opposing the political establishment and big companies, held responsible for the socio-economic crisis that was ravaging Japan.164 The economic depression widened the gap

158 Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 159. 159 Ibid., 159–60. 160 Tanin and Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan, 152. 161 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 100. 162 Tanin and Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan, 152. 163 K¯ oz¯o Yamamura, The Japanese Economy, 1911–1930: Concentration, Conflicts,

and Crises, in Japan in Crisis, ed. Silberman and Harootunian, 308. 164 Tanin and Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan, 151.

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between rich and poor, while the economy increasingly came under the control of vast industrial groups, the zaibatsu.165 The grave socio-economic crisis of the early 1930s put the Japanese population in a position of high receptivity to political propaganda and potential securitizing efforts, as people were looking for a change and easy solutions to their problems. Ideological trends combined with socioeconomic hardship to provide a fertile ground for the securitization of external challenges. Secondary Audience: Ideological Background In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the population in Japan was engulfed in growing nationalism directed against Western countries and China. In addition to the socio-economic crisis, which made people vulnerable to scapegoating narratives, anti-Japanese immigration laws in the United States and expanding Chinese nationalism were factors of this nationalist upsurge. During the Manchurian crisis, Japanese nationalism became tinted by a militarist dimension. Many people came to regard the military as the only entity that could help Japan face its multiple problems. This ideological environment enhanced the receptivity of the secondary audience to securitizing efforts, easing the depiction of an international challenge as a threat to national security, and strengthened the legitimacy of the military as a securitizing actor. The fundamental ideology based on which Japanese nationalism developed during the interwar period was not homogenous, different schools of thought cohabiting inside the “nationalist reform movement.”166 Nonetheless, the central place attributed to the Emperor, the support to imperialist initiatives abroad and anti-Western biases were common elements to almost all nationalist thinkers. Two ideologists in particular left their marks and were representative of the movement: Kita Ikki and ¯ Okawa Sh¯umei. ¯ Until they split in the first half of the 1920s, Kita and Okawa worked together and formulated what would become the basic ideology of the nationalist movement in the 1930s. Their ideology was most explicitly laid down in a book published by Kita in 1923 and entitled Nihon kaiz¯ o h¯ oan

165 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 100. 166 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 23.

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taik¯ o (A General Outline of Measures for the Reconstruction of Japan). The main objective of the two thinkers was to develop the strength of Japan and allow the country to expand its influence abroad. ¯ On the domestic side, Kita and Okawa attacked frontally what they considered the divisive forces in Japan: capitalism, which triggered class conflicts; political parties and their governments, which engendered political struggles; and Western ideas that weakened the Japanese and Asian spirits of the population.167 For them, the only way to overcome these divisive forces was to restore the union between the Emperor and the people through direct imperial ruling, a union that should become the backbone of the socio-political system. Equality between people needed to be promoted and social classes abolished. To fight capitalism, they borrowed from National Socialism. Kita for example advocated the abolition of private property, the nationalization of key industries and the equal redistribution of national wealth by the government. Regarding Japan’s relations with other countries, the socialist basis of ¯ their ideology prevented Kita and Okawa from openly promoting interventions abroad. They therefore justified their imperialist agenda by the need to defend the poorest countries against the colonialist tendencies of the West, especially the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.168 To do so, Japan had the right to go to war. Kita in particular emphasized the role Japan had to play as the leader of the Asian race in opposing the domination of white people. ¯ Kita and Okawa disbanded in the early 1920s. They did not differ over the general orientation of their ideology but over the way their projects of reform needed to be implemented.169 There was first a question of timing and causation between domestic reforms and external actions. For Kita, domestic reforms could be undertaken before or in parallel to expansion abroad, but they remained the central element for the reconstruction of ¯ Japan and thus deserved the greatest attention. Conversely, Okawa argued that only an external crisis resulting in an upsurge of nationalism inside Japan could trigger the necessary domestic reforms. Second difference, Kita thought that the main agents of change would be low-ranking military officers, and thus maintained relations with several of them. On the

167 Ibid., 23–4. 168 Ibid., 24. 169 Ibid., 25.

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¯ other hand, Okawa expected a single person, a national hero, to lead the nationalist reform movement and was closer to middle-ranking officers. The nationalist ideology was popularized by two factors that gained in influence during the second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s. First, the cult of the Emperor began spreading into the Japanese society. The ¯ Emperor being central in the ideology of Kita, Okawa and other intellectuals of the nationalist reform movement, this reinforced their arguments and credibility and helped attract sympathizers. The imperial institution had weakened under the reign of Yoshihito due to his poor health and lack of charisma, and because the Diet, political parties and Prime Ministers became politically more powerful during the so-called Taish¯o Democracy era.170 Advisors surrounding the young Hirohito, regent since November 1921, were eager to restore the status and the aura of the Imperial Household. The imperial ideology was increasingly disconnected from the reality of the population, however, and they had to invest more efforts and make greater use of coercion and artifices to promote it.171 This resulted in the refinement of ideological concepts, the most important being the kokutai, which placed the Emperor at the center of the socio-political system. Initially a very ambiguous notion, it was worked out in detail and the crime of “altering the kokutai” was first enshrined into law with the Peace Preservation Law of 1925.172 Around the time of the enthronization of Hirohito in 1928, the concept of hakk¯ o ichiu (the eight corners of the world under one roof) was revived and became intimately associated with the reign of the new Emperor. This concept was purely expansionist in nature, promoting the extension of imperial ruling to the whole world. Kokutai and hakk¯ o ichiu provided ¯ new impetus and tools to people like Kita and Okawa to advance their domestic agenda and imperialist ideology.173 The enthronement of Hirohito was itself a spectacular ceremony dedicated to uniting the population around the figure of the Emperor. The

170 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 83. 171 Carol Gluck, 1985, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period,

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 282. 172 Idem. 173 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 200–1.

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appeals to nationalist values and Japan’s ancestral history that accompanied the enthronization released powerful emotions into the social fabric, conflicting with democratic values and non-interventionist policies abroad and reinforcing the nationalist reform movement.174 The second factor that helped nationalist thinkers spread their ideology was changes in the domestic and international environments. The propaganda of the nationalist reform movement and of the entourage of the Emperor had difficulties penetrating deeply into the society until the early 1930s. To be sure, liberal organizations that promoted democracy and accommodating foreign policies toward countries like the United States and China were already challenged by nationalist groups during the 1920s.175 The anti-immigration Asian Exclusion Act of 1924, for example, had weakened the position of these organizations. Targeting primarily Japanese and Chinese, the Act was felt as a humiliation in Japan and contributed to the negative image of the United States.176 It remains that until the early 1930s, the general mood was relatively liberal and the Japanese population was inclined to defend democratic values and maintain constructive relations with other countries. In the early 1930s, changing circumstances gradually modified the stance of public opinion and enhanced its receptivity to the nationalist ideology. The socio-economic crisis resulted in growing distrust of political parties and of their domestic and foreign policies and increased the attractiveness of scapegoating narratives.177 In parallel, the Chinese nationalist movement expanded and overflowed into Manchuria, threatening the position of Japan in a region presented as vital to its economic prosperity. This led a growing number of people to become sympathetic toward calls for a more active and unilateral policy to safeguard the country’s interests on the continent.178 During this period, the nationalist propaganda portrayed the government and its policies as weak and unable to solve the multiple problems

174 Ibid., 203. 175 Sadako Ogata, The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations in Japan, in

Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 469. 176 Tomiko Kakegawa (trans: Shumpei Okamoto), Press and Public Opinion in Japan, 1931–1941, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 535. 177 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 81. 178 Ogata, The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations, 469.

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faced by Japan. This weakness was reflected by Tokyo’s deference to the League of Nations in the Chinese and Manchurian affairs, and to the United States and the United Kingdom inside the Washington System.179 Those who attacked the London Treaty of 1930, for example, asserted that an inferior ratio of naval strength had been imposed upon Japan by the Anglo-Saxon coalition in order to keep the country down.180 Nationalist groups propagated a feeling of “crisis in national defense” among the population by exaggerating the deficiencies in naval power. The opposition Seiy¯ukai party joined these criticisms to topple the Minseit¯ o cabinet, spreading further the impression of national crisis in Japan. The popular feeling was increasingly anti-internationalist and more and more Japanese came to perceive their country as vulnerable to a hostile coalition of foreign powers, being in the security domain where the latter had voluntarily put Japan in a position of inferiority through the Washington System, or in the economic domain where Japan had no control on exchange rates and the fluctuation of the trade balance.181 The population began to turn against the government and its foreign policy of accommodation, which principles and orientation were judged out of touch with the reality.182 Inversely, the ideology of the nationalist reform movement resonated during this period of national crisis. With its socialist and imperialist dimensions, it held the promise of tackling socio-economic issues at home and bringing a rapid solution to the Chinese problem.183 The military, acting in the name and under the supervision of the Emperor, would be the key actor of this drastic reorientation of Japan’s domestic and foreign policies. On the eve of the Mukden Incident, the Japanese population was more receptive than ever before to nationalist and militarist propaganda.184

179 Idem. 180 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 6. 181 Ibid., 5. 182 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 109–10. 183 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 24–5. 184 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 6.

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The Army’s Securitizing Efforts The stance of public opinion evolved rapidly following the first clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops in Manchuria, from a general reluctance to support military initiatives to a more divided attitude, and ultimately to the backing of these initiatives. Until fighting erupted on the continent, the imperialist themes of the nationalist reform movement penetrated to a certain extent into the population, but the latter remained a mainly passive recipient of the propaganda. After the Mukden Incident, the Japanese population turned active.185 This evolution did not come automatically and without an active indoctrination by the army and its affiliated nationalist groups. For institutional and budgetary reasons, the army had a strong interest in exaggerating both the importance of Manchuria for Japan and the unstable situation in the region, and in creating an enthusiastic atmosphere around the military intervention. The army used the outbreak of hostilities to tighten its grip on the society and to strengthen its influence on the Japanese FPE. It took advantage of its growing legitimacy and favorable position inside the political landscape following the loss of credibility of political parties and, based on the high receptivity of the population to nationalist and militarist propaganda, securitized the Manchurian crisis. The latter became perceived by the people as a matter of life and death for Japan. By doing so, the army was able to obtain the support of the secondary audience for its domestic and foreign agendas. This put enormous pressure on the primary audience, the Japanese FPE and other FDIB members, to come to terms with the army. Even before the Mukden Incident, as instability was growing in Manchuria, the army became increasingly active politically and spoke publicly against cuts in military spending and arms control initiatives. During a meeting of regional and division Commanders in mid-1931, Army Minister Minami Jir¯o said that arms control was “a sellout” and urged those present to protest the policy of military retrenchment pursued by the FPE.186 The speech was later made public by Minami himself in order to reach the largest number of officers possible. Thereafter, Chief of General Staff Kanaya Hanz¯ o and other prominent army

185 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 203. 186 Ibid., 229.

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figures such as General Suzuki S¯oroku expressed publicly their opposition to decrease in military expenditure. One of the main obstacles to these propaganda activities was the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors issued in 1882, which requested them to “neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics.”187 Nevertheless, high-ranking army officers justified their political interventions, dedicated to defending their institution and perspectives on foreign policy, by the growingly unsecured international environment. Army Minister Ugaki Kazuhige, the predecessor of Minami, said in January 1931 after having been questioned in the Diet about public speeches made by officers: “It is true that we military men should not be influenced by public opinion and should not participate in politics. On the other hand, we bear the responsibility for national defense. If national defense policy is imperfect, our nation will be in danger. This being so, our discussion of national defense issues should not be regarded as meddling in politics.”188 If the logic behind the argument of Ugaki was dubious, its efficacy was tremendous: as long as security policy was deficient and national security jeopardized, the military had the right, and also the duty, to intervene in politics. The military was allowed to openly criticize the FPE’s security policy, because the latter lay in its domain of expertise. This led the army to use the most powerful instrument in its toolbox to advance its institutional interests and policy recommendations: the assertion that Manchuria was the lifeline of Japan and that it was under threat.189 Manchuria was portrayed as essential not only for strategic

187 Roger F. Hackett, 1964, The Military: Japan, in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 344. 188 Shigeo Misawa and Sabur¯ o Ninomiya (trans: Michael K. Blaker), The Role of the Diet and Political Parties, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 325. This argument was used recurrently by high-ranking military officers during the 1930s. ¯ In January 1934, Army Minister Hayashi Senj¯ ur¯o and Navy Minister Osumi Mineo were questioned by parliamentarians about military meddling in politics, the latter arguing this ran against national interests. Hayashi denied any such meddling by army officers while reminding the Diet that it was the duty of the military services to defend the country ¯ in case of emergency. Osumi for his part emphasized that some scholars interpreted the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors as forbidding addiction to politics, not involvement in it. Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 97–8. 189 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 268.

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and military reasons, protecting Korea against the Chinese turmoil, but also economically as a place where agricultural and industrial productions could be developed and the surplus of Japanese population relocated. Therefore, anything that endangered Japan’s position in the region was a threat to the country itself, and required the adoption of extraordinary measures. For the army, these measures included a proactive foreign policy aimed at definitively solving Japan’s problems on the continent. This was extraordinary in the sense that it implied a drastic change in foreign policy. Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o’s soft and economic diplomacy had to be abandoned in favor of a policy dominated by the army and which would make a greater use of armed forces. This discourse became the thread of the army’s securitizing efforts during the Manchurian crisis. First of all, the army needed concrete facts to demonstrate the reality and severity of the threat to Japan’s interests in the region. The first incident used by the army was the murder of Captain Nakamura Shintar¯o by Chinese troops in July 1931.190 The propaganda worked to some extent. Japanese newspapers covered the event with sensationalized headlines and editorials supporting the army’s call to handle the Manchurian problem with more strength.191 The region was already at the center of media attention in early July, with daily coverage of the clashes between Chinese and Korean farmers in Wamposhan and of the subsequent Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods.192 Nevertheless, it took another incident for the army to reach its objective of securitizing the situation in Manchuria. When the Kwantung Army bombed the railroad section north of Mukden on September 18, 1931, army authorities jumped at this chance. In the wake of the Mukden Incident, the army displayed the whole of its propaganda tools to securitize the event and mobilize Japanese people behind its domestic and foreign agendas. First, the army took over the nationalist reform movement.193 From indoctrination to threats of physical violence and terrorism, nationalist groups proposed a vast array of instruments useful to its securitizing efforts. Moreover, these

190 Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 142–3. 191 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 168. 192 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 228. 193 Takashi It¯ o (trans: Shumpei Okamoto), The Role of Right-Wing Organizations in

Japan, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 496.

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groups acted as a link between the army and the population that allowed the former to better penetrate the latter.194 In exchange for their help, the army provided nationalist groups with financial and other rewards as part of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common ideological motivations. The army also used military-affiliated organizations such as the Imperial Military Reserve Association, the Greater Japan Youth Association and the Greater Japan National Defense Women’s Association. Their capacity to reach people, especially in rural areas, made them effective tools in the hands of the army to gather popular support.195 Mass media were possibly the most powerful propaganda instruments and complemented the use of military-affiliated organizations. While the latter helped the army discourse penetrate into rural communities, the manipulation of mass media performed the same task in urban centers. During the interbellum, the whole urban population was addressed by three main media: newspapers, radio and films.196 The control of media became increasingly strict in the early 1930s, the Manchurian crisis representing a turning point in a process that would lead to their total submission to the state in the second half of the decade.197 Not surprisingly, the army played a decisive role in this process. From the beginning of the crisis onward, army officers did not hesitate to threaten newspapers and other media of physical reprisals in case they deviated from what the military institution considered the politically correct version of events.198 The perception the Japanese population held of the situation in Manchuria was completely biased, triggering strong support for the initiatives of the Kwantung Army. Tellingly, the real causes of the Mukden Incident would not be known in Japan until after the end of the Pacific

194 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 137. 195 By 1936, the Reserve Association would reach a membership of 3 million through

some 14,000 local branches, whereas other similar organizations would add another 10 million people under the influence of the military. Richard J. Smethurst, 1974, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community, Berkley: University of California Press, xiv. 196 Sh¯ uichi Kat¯ o, The Mass Media: Japan, in Political Modernization, ed. Ward and Rustow, 240. 197 Kakegawa, Press and Public Opinion in Japan, 536. 198 Kat¯ o, The Mass Media, 245.

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War.199 Media reported in great detail military developments on the ground but never paid serious attention to the origin of the fighting. They simply spread the official version provided by the army and its propagandists: hostilities were provoked by Chinese aggression in Manchuria, and thus the Kwantung Army was acting in pure self-defense.200 The most liberal newspapers were no exception.201 The propaganda deployed by the army ultimately paid off and an upsurge of nationalism and enthusiasm for military conquest emerged among Japanese people.202 This wave of patriotism and war fever led to mass demonstrations in support of the army and gatherings to cheer troops leaving for Manchuria, whereas a volunteer force of some 600,000 men dedicated to protecting Japan against foreign invasions was established with donations made by citizens.203 The population was convinced that the military intervention, the creation and recognition of Manchukuo and other important decisions taken during the Manchurian crisis, such as the disengagement from the League of Nations, were necessary because Manchuria was Japan’s lifeline. These extraordinary measures were justified in the eyes of the Japanese because they were vital to the survival of their country. Not only did these actions allow protecting Japan’s rights and interests in Manchuria, they also held the promise of solving existential socio-economic issues at home.204 Although there were isolated oppositions, the overall trend was genuinely militaristic in nature and supportive of the use of armed forces to settle Japan’s problems on the continent. The stance of liberal organizations, which had reached the peak of their influence during the 1920s, paralleled the popular mood. Despite concerns that troops on the ground might go out of control and that hostilities in Manchuria could spread to China proper and endanger Japan’s relations with other great powers, no liberal organization spoke up

199 Kakegawa, Press and Public Opinion in Japan, 537. 200 Ibid., 537–8. 201 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 146. 202 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 256. 203 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 149. 204 Ibid., 146.

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forcefully against the military intervention.205 Some, like Christian organizations, called for peace and for putting rapidly an end to the conflict, but none took a stance against the army or engaged in organized protests. Given the aggressive propaganda of the army and affiliated groups and its favorable reception by the population, liberal organizations had no choice but to adopt the official line of thought, intentionally or not. The League of Nations Association of Japan, for example, asserted that the root causes of the conflict were Chinese nationalism and a decade of brainstorming dedicated to turning Chinese people against Japanese. Almost all political parties, pressured by a growingly nationalistic population, eventually came to support the army. The universal manhood suffrage, introduced in 1925, had heightened the sensitivity of parties to the state of public opinion.206 During the 1920s, the Japanese society was characterized by a relative heterogeneity and thus saw the emergence of parties with different ideologies and positioning across the political spectrum. In the early 1930s, under the impulsion of the army propaganda, the society became homogenous and gradually forced parties to adopt a position close to the prevalent discourse in order to attract voters and survive. The whole political spectrum moved to the right. This was the case of the main political parties, the Minseit¯ o and the Seiy¯ukai. Although the cabinets headed by their respective Prime Ministers tried to avert the enlargement of hostilities during the first few months of the Manchurian crisis, none of them strenuously opposed the military intervention. The Seiy¯ukai not only declared that it was ready to work with the army to address the crisis, it also criticized the Minseit¯o cabinet of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijir¯ o for its indecisiveness and restraint.207 The then-opposition party took advantage of the propaganda of the army to pressure and weaken the Minseit¯ o, succeeding in replacing Wakatsuki by Inukai Tsuyoshi in December 1931. Similar to the leading parties, the majority of leftist parties progressively adapted their political platforms to the new domestic reality. The Nihon Kokka Shakait¯o (Japan National Socialist Party), for example, backed the military conquest of Manchuria by stating that this was the only way for Japan to prosper and then redistribute the benefits equally among

205 Ogata, The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations, 470–1. 206 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 6. 207 Tanin and Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan, 159.

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the Japanese population.208 Imperialism was presented as necessary for the creation of a more equal society at home and the development of the welfare state. The only party that refused to adapt and continuously opposed the army, the Nihon Musant¯o (Japan Communist Party), would be forcibly dismantled in late 1937.209 The Navy’s Securitizing Efforts After the end of the Manchurian crisis, during which the army had monopolized political discourse, the Japanese navy began working to convince the FPE that withdrawing from the Washington System might be needed to guarantee national security. The government, on the other hand, was attached to cooperative security, and a unilateral approach to foreign policy had been adopted exclusively on affairs related to Manchuria and later Manchukuo. Moreover, the Washington System took on renewed importance after Japan’s disengagement from the League of Nations in March 1933. Foreign Minister Hirota K¯ oki, for example, regarded the system as the central pillar of a new framework of international cooperation.210 Inside the navy, a growing number of officers considered that leaving the naval arms control regime would be advantageous. The conviction that the Imperial Navy would be able to make the best of new technologies and warship designs and take the upper hand over the U.S. Navy reduced the attractiveness of arms limitations. Recent technological developments provided the solution to deficiencies in naval strength and strategy and thus deserved to be exploited, even if this meant leaving the Washington System.211 This was the main argument used by the proponents of the withdrawal against those reluctant to abandon the Washington System and thereby risk a naval arms race with the United States. If Japan left the system, 208 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 146. 209 Robert A. Scalapino, 1967, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan:

The Failure of the First Attempt, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 375. 210 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 21. 211 Stephen E. Pelz, 1974, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London

Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 30 and 35–6.

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the navy would be able to focus on building in the warship categories best suited for its strategic requirements. This would enhance its ability to defeat the U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific, and thanks to the newly acquired flexibility in naval construction, this could be done without increasing, and even while reducing, naval expenditure.212 And a memorandum handed to the Emperor in May 1935 by Chief of General Staff Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu asserted that the navy could anyway maintain a ratio of between 70 and 80 percent of the naval strength of the United States for the next 10 years.213 The confidence many officers had in the navy’s ability to use new technologies and ship designs to move ahead of the U.S. Navy in case of arms race was reflected in buildup plans drafted for the post-Washington System era. A document released in October 1933 by Commander Ishikawa Shingo contained a 10-year buildup program, based on the assumption of a breakdown of the Washington System triggering an arms race between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries.214 The program aimed at developing warships qualitatively superior to their American and British counterparts. It called for the construction of four heavy cruisers twice the size of those allowed under the London Treaty, which were limited to 10,000 tons, and carrying 12-inch guns and able to cruise at 40 knots with reinforced armors capable of withstanding 8-inch shells. The masterpiece of the plan was the construction of five giant battleships carrying 20-inch guns and equipped with underwater armors capable of resisting 10 torpedo hits.215 Due to their firepower and the long range of their shells, these vessels would provide the Japanese navy with a decisive advantage in the final battle between the fleets.216 Once completed, these ships would suddenly raise Japan’s strength in capital ships from a 60 percent inferiority under naval restrictions to absolute superiority. Moreover, they would provide the Imperial Navy with a fiveyear lead in the arms race with the United States, the time estimated necessary for the latter to develop 20-inch guns, provided that Japan’s

212 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 242. 213 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 205. 214 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 294. 215 Idem. 216 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 205.

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project be kept secret.217 If the Americans followed up, Japan could then use its five-year lead to build even bigger battleships. The U.S. Navy would also face a major logistical problem as the Panama Canal could welcome vessels of up to 45,000 tons, whereas the first generation of Japanese super battleships would approach 70,000 tons.218 In formulating such buildup programs, naval officers did not pay attention to the potentially devastating diplomatic and economic consequences of an arms race. These considerations did not lie within their domain of expertise, and they rather focused on maximizing sea power. The challenge was to convince a FPE that promoted international cooperation and friendly relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries. To do so, the Japanese navy needed first of all to prove that the United States represented a threat to national security under the Washington System as it stood in the wake of the 1930 London Conference. If so, the navy’s strategic requirements would have to be respected at the next naval conference. Otherwise, Japan’s security would be endangered to such an extent as to justify the adoption of extraordinary measures by the government, namely withdrawing for the naval arms control framework and pursuing unfettered naval expansion. The navy took advantage of the propaganda undertaken by the army during the Manchurian crisis. The latter had put the secondary audience in a receptive mood toward military narratives and had made Manchuria, a region over which the policies of Tokyo and Washington conflicted, the lifeline of Japan. The navy had thus indirectly acquired more legitimacy to speak out and was in a more favorable position to securitize the United States. The link between the Manchurian issue and the alleged threat posed by the U.S. Navy under the Washington System remained to be drawn, however. The navy’s securitizing efforts were based on the fundamental assertion that the U.S. Navy’s primary mission was to protect American interests in Asia, and that for effectively doing so it needed an advantageous ratio of naval power to cross the Pacific and defeat Japan in its own waters.219 China and the different approaches adopted by Tokyo and Washington 217 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 294–5; Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 242. 218 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 294; It¯ o and Pineau, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 16. 219 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 193–4.

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toward this country were therefore the underlying stakes behind the issues of naval strength and arms control. The imposition of an inferior ratio upon Japan, which was deemed insufficient to ensure national security by many inside the Imperial Navy, was considered part of a strategy aimed at granting the U.S. Navy the ability to defend by force American interests, which included upholding the Open Door principles and the territorial integrity of China. The Manchurian crisis was a perfect opportunity for the Japanese navy to promote its narrative. Manchuria became regarded in Tokyo as Japan’s lifeline, and as international tensions grew, the possibility of conflict with the United States increased and the importance of obtaining an adequate ratio of naval strength was magnified. The American threat was gradually materializing, and the contextual reality became more conductive to securitization. Nonetheless, although Washington took some diplomatic and other measures against Japan in response to its behavior in Manchuria, overall its foreign policy remained accommodating. An active effort by the navy was therefore required to make the most of the crisis. During the first months of the Manchurian crisis, the navy was on the whole negative and at best neutral toward the actions of the Kwantung Army on the ground. The institution most of the time adopted a passive attitude, something heavily criticized by the army, which needed the military services to stand strong and united against the cautious policy of the o NobuJapanese FPE.220 According to the testimony of Admiral Kond¯ take, recorded after the Pacific War, what was happening in Manchuria was initially not of great importance for the navy.221 The First Shanghai Incident marked the beginning of a change in the position of the navy, which since the end of the First World War had basically ignored Chinese affairs and had made no efforts to stay informed of developments in China.222 The navy maintained a naval presence in the region and, after hostilities broke out in the coastal city in late January 1932, was eager to show that this presence and the budget that came with it were valuable for the defense of Japan’s interests.223 The growing involvement of the naval institution in Chinese affairs was paralleled by

220 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 91–2. 221 K¯ oketsu, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku, 10. 222 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 93–4. 223 K¯ oketsu, Nihon kaigun no sens¯ o k¯ osaku, 13.

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more attempts at expanding its influence in Japanese politics. This is because the navy used the crisis on the continent for its securitizing efforts which, amid international tensions over China, aimed at depicting the United States as a threat to national security. The navy’s increasingly positive stance toward the continental policy of the army thus came “from the recuperation of this policy to play against the Washington System.”224 The propaganda campaign of the navy genuinely began in the second half of 1933 and was dedicated to pushing the Japanese FPE to change its approach to national security by emphasizing the advantages of a unilateral approach. The timing of the campaign was in large part due to the fact that until 1933, the attention of the Japanese population and political establishment in regard to international affairs was focused on Manchuria and then Manchukuo. Japan’s disengagement from the League of Nations in March 1933, and the Tangku Truce Agreement two months later, put an end to the Manchurian crisis and resulted in a decline in propaganda activities by the army and affiliated groups.225 This provided the navy with greater space to advance its interests and reorient public attention toward another problem Japan was facing, the Washington System and the coming Second London Conference on naval arms control. Helped by a sense of international isolation that emerged in Japan after the withdrawal from the League, naval propagandists created an atmosphere conductive to the manipulation of the secondary and primary audiences. They spread the feeling that because Japan was isolated and still militarily involved on the continent, an armed conflict with the AngloSaxon countries over China was more likely than before.226 In such circumstances, the argument that an adequate level of naval power was more necessary than ever to defend the country against external threats gained in credibility. If the navy was unable to protect Japan, the empire being built on the continent would not last long due to the international isolation and hostility it had triggered. Inversely, if the navy was strong enough to deter other countries from intervening militarily in Asia, and to repel them should they try, Tokyo would be able to consolidate its position on the continent and even undertake new initiatives similar to the

224 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 66–7. 225 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 273. 226 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 239.

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creation of Manchukuo, which was widely regarded as a success.227 Japan’s continental policy and initiatives, on which the survival of the country depended according to the propaganda of the army, were successfully portrayed as inseparable from the navy’s capacity to defend Japan, and thus from the issue of naval arms control.228 Through this narrative, the link was drawn between the situation in China, the threat posed by the United States and the Washington System. The revision of the naval arms control regime was presented as essential if Japan wanted to maintain a reasonable level of protection for its coastal areas and position on the continent. In October 1933, during discussions ¯ on new foreign policy guidelines, Navy Minister Osumi Mineo declared that “in order to ‘reject absolutely’ American interference in East Asia, it would be necessary to build up naval strength beyond the limits imposed by the disarmament treaties.”229 The stance of the navy was also reflected in a memorandum released by the Navy Ministry in the autumn of 1934, which stated: “If by any chance the coming naval conference should recognize the traditional discriminatory ratios, our Empire will forever be ordered around by the Anglo-American powers, and it is obvious that our Empire will go to ruin. This is the reason why the coming conference has far greater consequences to our Empire than the Washington and London conferences.”230 As argued by the memorandum, the modification of the Washington System was not important, it was a matter of survival for the Japanese empire. Thanks to the army, the vision of Manchuria/Manchukuo as the lifeline of Japan had been integrated by the secondary audience during the Manchurian crisis. The navy used this precedent and stated that in order to defend this lifeline, and consequently Japan itself, a revision of the Washington System was needed. Under the system as it stood after the 1930 London Conference, the U.S. Navy and, to a lesser extent, the Royal Navy represented threats to national security because the ratio of naval strength provided to the Imperial Navy was insufficient to face and resist these fleets in Asia.

227 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 297. 228 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 239. 229 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 23. 230 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 197.

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This rhetoric was reinforced by two concrete developments presented by the Japanese navy as proofs that the threat posed by the U.S. Navy was real. The first was the decision of Secretary of State Henry Stimson in mid-February 1932 to retain the Scouting Fleet on the American West Coast. Although this was a purely diplomatic measure, dedicated to putting pressure on the Japanese government amid the crises in Manchuria and Shanghai and taken without any intention to use the Scouting Fleet as reinforcement for a transpacific offensive, the move resulted in a much higher concentration of American sea power in the Pacific than in the Atlantic.231 Presuming the worst of American intentions, the Japanese navy pinpointed this as a testimony of Washington’s hostility. The second development came later with the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, aimed at bringing the American navy to treaty limits within eight years. Until that time, the relative strength of the Imperial Navy had been increasing and reached 80 percent of the U.S. Navy in 1934, naval expansion not receiving much attention from the American government while Japan had almost built to treaty limits.232 The Act was a turning point in this regard. Although the approval by Congress did not necessarily mean that the funds for its implementation would be provided, the symbolic value of the Act was important in both the United States and Japan.233 Moreover, the fact that naval construction under the Act focused on building a “balanced fleet” fit for long distance sailing did not fail to raise concerns inside the Japanese navy and, through its propaganda, in Japan as a whole.234 The Japanese navy used these developments to back its argument that to revise the Washington System was essential.235 The threat to national security posed by the United States was now obvious, not only because the country’s ability to inflict harm using naval forces was increasing, but also because it was perceived as hostile to Japan. The navy took advantage of the tools used beforehand by the army during its propaganda campaign over Manchuria. The naval institution 231 Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, 207. 232 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 297. 233 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 210. 234 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 354. 235 Ibid., 296.

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benefited from the control exerted by the army over mass media, which was at that time stronger than ever. Moreover, the nationalist reform movement was still active, although it had somehow lost its dynamism after the settlement of the Manchurian crisis. In addition to using the movement as a tool to reach out to the population, the navy played with the threat of unrests by nationalist groups and young sailors, who were heavily represented among those groups, to put pressure on the Japanese FPE.236 A central element of the naval propaganda was the notion of 1935 and 1936 as years of national crisis, called issenkuhyakusanj¯ ugo-roku no kiki in Japanese.237 The idea, often used by naval officers in public speeches and writings, was that because the United States was using the Washington System to keep Japan in a position of inferiority, whereas the latter needed a higher ratio of naval power to ensure national security, the naval conference scheduled to take place sometime during those years would be the theater of a major clash between the two countries.238 In order to prepare for this clash, prophesied to escalate international tensions, the navy openly advocated a greater participation of the two military services in politics, and the implementation of drastic political and economic reforms. The propaganda campaign of the navy would ultimately be successful, first of all toward the secondary audience. The atmosphere of crisis generated in Japan led the population to perceive the military as the only actor capable of running the country amid serious challenges. And a drastic revision of the Washington System became regarded as necessary to allow the navy to protect Japan against growing external threats. This perspective was shared by the Japanese society at large, and increasingly by party politicians who, like during the Manchurian crisis, chose to adapt their position to the evolution of public opinion. Yamamoto Teijir¯ o, member of the Seiy¯ ukai, urged the government in late 1934 to abrogate the naval treaties as this corresponded to the “steadfast and unalterable desire of the people.”239 Similarly, in November

236 Ronald H. Spector, 2001, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan, London: Cassel & Co., 41. 237 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 85. 238 Ibid., 94–5. 239 Misawa and Ninomiya, The Role of the Diet and Political Parties, 337.

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1934, Minseit¯o member Tomita Tsunejir¯ o called on the cabinet to adopt a firmer stance toward naval arms control because “Japan’s demands on the disarmament question [were] proper and reasonable” and respected the wish of the Japanese population.240 In saying “Japan’s demands,” Tomita was actually referring to the requests made by the Imperial Navy. Through naval propaganda, the secondary audience began to doubt the relevance of the Washington System as an instrument of foreign policy. The cooperative approach to national security that had been promoted since the early 1920s by party cabinets, like-minded military officers and others, was discredited. It had failed to bring the peace dividends it had promised, the hostility of the United States toward Japan being now an unquestionable reality for the majority of Japanese people. In this new reality, partially created by the navy, a unilateral approach to security was considered the most appropriate. The sense of crisis and vulnerability gradually reached the primary audience. Pressured and influenced by the secondary audience, FPE and FDIB members became more critical of naval arms control and refrained from openly defending the Washington System as important for Japan’s national security. Primary Audience: Finance and Foreign Ministries The Finance Ministry was key in coordinating economic and foreign policies, a role that took renewed importance during the economic crisis of the early 1930s. The ministry was therefore a central player within the FDIB. Although its political influence weakened due to shortcomings in tackling Japan’s economic problems, the ability of the institution to hinder military interferences in the formulation of foreign policy remained strong until the assassination of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo in 1936, during the so-called February 26 Incident.241 Prior to 1936, the gradual change in the ministry’s position on foreign policy, regarding both its economic and diplomatic dimensions, thus reflected more a rapprochement with, than a submission to, the perspective of the military. The financial and economic crises that struck Japan in the early 1930s, combined with unwise and untimely decisions by the FPE, finished

240 Idem. 241 Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, 288.

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discrediting economic liberalism in the country.242 The failure of the 1933 London Economic Conference to reinforce the free trade system, based on international cooperation, was another reflection that this approach to economic development, prioritized during the 1920s, was no longer sustainable.243 As global capitalism was crumbling, the alternative represented by the creation of trade and monetary blocs gained in attractiveness.244 It was in this context that the Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria. The army’s depiction of Manchuria as Japan’s economic lifeline consequently resonated inside the Finance Ministry. As international tensions grew over the Manchurian crisis, the idea of economic autarky secured public support and reached the highest political levels. The region was presented by the army as the tool that would allow Japan to resist economic blockades, decrease its vulnerability to fluctuations in the world market and solve its problem of surplus population. Former Army Minister Minami Jir¯o, for example, justified during a lecture to the Emperor and his entourage in January 1932 the plan to establish Manchukuo by emphasizing Japan’s needs for raw materials and territory.245 For Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, convinced by the army propaganda, the invasion of Manchuria offered new opportunities to redress the Japanese economy. By siding with the army and its discourse on the centrality of Manchuria for the future of Japan, he hoped to resolve the problems he was chiefly responsible for addressing. Domestically, the Finance Ministry implemented a Keynesian-oriented policy of deficit financing and support to the expansion of the war industry.246 This required an important amount of raw materials that Japan lacked, making the country dependent on the United States and the United Kingdom for

242 Haruo Tohmatsu and Hedley P. Willmott, 2004, A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of War to the Far East and the Pacific, 1921–1942, Lanham: SR Books, 17. 243 Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, 295. 244 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 267. 245 Ibid., 266–7. 246 Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, 292.

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supply, but the aggressive devaluation of the yen to boost exports weakened the purchasing power of Japanese companies.247 This increased the value of new territories abroad. Therefore, the Finance Ministry backed the efforts of the army to take over Manchuria, rich in raw materials. After the cabinet headed by Sait¯o Makoto recognized Manchukuo in September 1932, the ministry followed up in treating the new country as totally separated from China proper and focused on its development through heavy investments.248 In doing so, Finance Minister Takahashi ignored the rules of the Four-Power Consortium, established in May 1920 with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and which made consultations with other members compulsory if one them wanted to extend public loans to the central or local governments in China.249 The Finance Ministry remained somehow cautious not to antagonize other great powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.250 This was partially because Manchukuo was not a source of raw materials important enough to replace the Anglo-Saxon countries in this role. In other words, autarky was not possible with only the takeover of Manchuria. The decision of the ministry to fix the new currency of Manchukuo to the silver standard, and not to the yen, was an indication that the institution adhered to the Japanese FPE’s pledge to uphold the Open Door principles in the region and its desire to accommodate the United States.251 Nevertheless, the Finance Ministry largely agreed to the policy recommendations of the army regarding Japan’s relations with China, and undertook a major reorientation of its economic policy for this purpose. 247 This devaluation triggered adverse reactions from key economic partners, with Australia, Canada, the Dutch East Indies and the United States enacting boycotts of Japanese goods. The reorientation of exports to Latin America provoked the United States further. The growth in export trade would be an important factor in the ultimate recovery of the Japanese economy. Ibid., 294–5. 248 Ibid., 292. 249 Mark Metzler, 2006, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the

Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 127. 250 Finance Minister Takahashi was, for example, ready to work with Frederick LeithRoss in 1935 toward the establishment of a framework for cooperation between the United Kingdom and Japan, dedicated to reforming and stabilizing the Chinese monetary system. Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, 296. 251 Ibid., 293.

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As reflected by the support provided to the military intervention in Manchuria, the ministry began, during the early 1930s, to regard armed forces as an important instrument of foreign policy and as part of the solution to Japanese economic problems. The securitizing efforts of the army were paying off inside the primary audience. This tendency toward the adoption of the military perspective on international affairs was also present inside the Foreign Ministry. In the early 1930s, the institution was divided between three main factions holding different approaches to foreign policy. The first faction, called “EuropeAmerican faction” by Usui Katsumi, was led by Shidehara Kij¯ ur¯o and prominent diplomats such as Sat¯o Naotake.252 The faction recognized the overwhelming power of Western countries and thus advocated a policy that emphasized the maintenance of constructive relationships with them as well as the importance of economic considerations. China was not regarded as a colonial area and healthy relations were generally fostered with this country. This faction was dominant during the 1920s, but its influence rapidly declined after the Mukden Incident.253 The second faction, named “Imperial Way Diplomacy faction” by Usui, was represented by Shiratori Toshio.254 The faction promoted continental expansion and alliances with totalitarian countries, Germany and Italy in particular, in total opposition to the Europe-American faction. In Asia, it aimed at expelling Western influence from the region, even at the cost of a major armed conflict.255 Before the Manchurian crisis, the approach to international affairs advocated by this faction was thus radically different from the FPE’s foreign policy, and was very similar to the perspective of the army. The third faction revolved around the figure of Arita Hachir¯o, and is therefore called “Arita faction” by Usui.256 Other prominent members included Uchida K¯osai, Hirota K¯oki and Shigemitsu Mamoru. The group was positioned somewhere between the Europe-American and Imperial

252 Katsumi Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, in Pearl Harbor as History, ed. Borg and Okamoto, 146. 253 Satoshi Hattori, Japan’s Diplomatic Gamble for Autonomy: Rethinking Matsuoka Y¯osuke’s Diplomacy, in Tumultuous Decade, ed. Kimura and Minohara, 216. 254 Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 147. 255 Hattori, Japan’s Diplomatic Gamble, 216. 256 Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 147.

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Way Diplomacy factions. It was pan-Asiatic in the sense that it advocated a special role for Japan in a revamped Asian order, and highlighted the need to push other great powers to recognize this role and refrain from intervening in China.257 Nonetheless, conflict with the Anglo-Saxon countries had to be avoided, if possible. Contrary to the Imperial Way Diplomacy group, the Arita faction rejected the idea of joining hands with countries like Germany and Italy, and ran against the Europe-American faction by promoting strong measures vis-à-vis China. The policy line of the Arita faction was close to the one that began to prevail in the Finance Ministry under the leadership of Takahashi Korekiyo. Among the three factions, only the policy championed by the EuropeAmerican group was unacceptable for the army. Its multilateralism and restraint toward the continent left little room for the use of armed forces, and thus excluded the army from any meaningful role in foreign policy.258 Conversely, the Imperial Way Diplomacy and Arita factions granted the army a more important role. The orientation of the former in particular was in line with the foreign policy fostered by the army. The Arita faction, although more cautious about the use of force, would not hesitate to resort to armed forces if this was necessary to revamp the existing international order in Asia. The Arita faction eventually came to dominate the Foreign Ministry after the Mukden Incident and constituted its core group throughout the 1930s.259 Similar to the Finance Ministry, the increasing clout of the faction reflected the consequences inside the Foreign Ministry of the securitizing efforts undertaken by the army during the Manchurian crisis. A growing number of staffs became convinced that the protection of Manchuria was worth the use of force because it was the lifeline of Japan. At the apex of the ministry, leaders of the Arita faction received support from various political actors of the secondary audience. The foreign policy promoted by the ministry gradually changed, influenced by the discourse of the army. The Arita faction reached a dominant position during the Manchurian crisis instead of the Imperial Way Diplomacy faction, closer to the military, because the propaganda of the army had not been as effective as to

257 Hattori, Japan’s Diplomatic Gamble, 216. 258 Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 147. 259 Hattori, Japan’s Diplomatic Gamble, 216.

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lead the whole political landscape to blindly follow its line of thought on foreign affairs. Some cautious and liberal voices remained active and influential in and around the FPE, including those of genr¯ o Saionji Kinmochi and Prime Ministers Sait¯ o Makoto and Okada Keisuke, the latter replacing Sait¯o in July 1934. Nevertheless, the newly acquired supremacy of the Arita faction revealed the changing orientation of the Foreign Ministry, which undertook a rapprochement with the army. During the Manchurian crisis and the non-partisan cabinets of Sait¯o and Okada, the Foreign Ministry was headed by Uchida K¯osai and then Hirota K¯oki, two prominent figures of the Arita faction. No real dualism existed between the policy line of the Foreign Ministers and the perspective of the army on Chinese affairs.260 On the other hand, Uchida and Hirota diverged from the army position in the sense that the will to keep friendly relations with Western countries, the United States in particular, was a major characteristic of their foreign policy. Both implemented a policy that sought to maintain reasonably good relations with other great powers while providing Japan, and especially the army, with an important margin of maneuver on the continent. In other words, the two Foreign Ministers tried to reach a difficult compromise between their willingness to avoid antagonizing Western countries and the need to accommodate the ambitions of the army. The policy formulated by Uchida during the Manchurian crisis was telling in this regard. From his assumption of the post of Foreign Minister in July 1932 to the disengagement from the League of Nations in March 1933, Uchida defended the argument of the army that the Chinese aggression in Manchuria was the main cause of the crisis and that the new status quo in the region needed to be recognized by other countries.261 His objective was not to provoke the great powers, but to maintain a policy of cooperation with them while solving once for all Japan’s problems in a region now regarded as the lifeline of the country.262 The so-called Scorched Earth Statement made by Uchida in the Diet in late August 1932 reflected this objective. The Foreign Minister illustrated his determination in regard to Manchuria by saying that he was ready to make Japan a scorched earth instead of compromising with China and

260 Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 133. 261 Idem. 262 Gates, Meiji Diplomacy in the Early 1930s, 194.

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other countries on the issue.263 In line with the army, Uchida thus hinted at the fact that Manchuria, as Japan’s lifeline, was worth fighting for. On the other hand, he emphasized that the creation of Manchukuo and its forthcoming recognition by the Japanese FPE would not violate the Nine-Power Treaty.264 He also believed Tokyo would be able to preserve good relations with other countries if it worked seriously to convince the international community of the rightness of its policy. After the end of the Manchurian crisis, the pan-Asiatic dimension of the Arita faction became more visible. In addition to a shift in priorities away from Manchuria, this was due to a series of developments in China proper. The Chinese market was becoming more important for Japan amid growing protectionism worldwide, but the boycotts of Japanese products threatened its access to the market.265 In parallel, the American policy of loan extension to China was regarded by the Foreign Ministry as contributing to the civil war still present in the country and as dangerous for both Tokyo’s interests on the continent and Manchukuo. The panAsiatic orientation was best exemplified by a speech delivered by Hirota K¯oki on the floor of the Diet in January 1934.266 Hirota granted Japan the exclusive responsibility to guarantee peace in Asia, and as such the right to oppose any assistance to China by other countries.267 Similar to its policy toward Manchuria, the pan-Asiatic approach of the ministry, under both Uchida K¯osai and from September 1933 onward Hirota, was underpinned by the perception that armed forces were an important element of Japanese foreign policy. Foreign Vice Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru was one of the main architects of the policy pursued by Hirota. Like the army, he wanted to expel foreign troops from China and to abolish the Chinese maritime customs service.268 From his viewpoint, now that the Manchurian crisis was over, Tokyo bore sole responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability

263 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 256. 264 Gates, Meiji Diplomacy in the Early 1930s, 195. 265 Yamamura, The Role of the Finance Ministry, 295–6. 266 This speech became the basis of the so-called Am¯ o Doctrine, issued three months

later through the voice of the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Information Division, Am¯ o Eiji. Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 135. 267 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 114–5. 268 Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 137.

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in Asia. In order to fulfill its duties, Japan needed a military strong enough to impose its leadership on China and to defend the homeland and its possessions on the continent against foreign threats, the Soviet Union and the United States in particular.269 Pan-Asianism was consistent with the arguments of ideologists such as ¯ Kita Ikki and Okawa Sh¯umei, with imperial concepts like hakk¯ o ichiu and with the nationalist reform movement in general, which was now under the control of military personnel. Most of all, the foreign policy implemented by the Arita faction was highly impacted by the securitizing efforts of the military services, and by their growing influence on the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, the Washington System became regarded by many ministry officials as a burden.270 This change in the perception of the arms control regime was triggered by the naval propaganda, which had successfully portrayed the Imperial Navy as the only bulwark against a hostile and well-armed United States. The strategic requirements of the navy thus had to be respected whatever the consequences for Tokyo’s relationship with Washington. The front of FDIB members that, during the 1920s, had averted undue military interferences in the decision-making process on foreign policy was disintegrating. The number of alternative points of view on international affairs inside the primary audience declined as military services were gathering support for their positions. The Japanese FPE was increasingly vulnerable to military narratives. Primary Audience: Military Pressure on the Government During the Manchurian crisis, the Japanese FPE was gradually penetrated by the unilateral and coercive approach to foreign policy advocated by the military. While their perception of the international environment was evolving, the cabinets of both Wakatsuki Reijir¯ o and Inukai Tsuyoshi were under pressure by a secondary audience growingly supportive of the army’s way of handling external challenges. The military influence on the FPE increased. The rapprochement of the Inukai Cabinet with the army regarding the Manchurian issue was reflected by the entry into the FPE itself of people who adhered more closely to the policy line of

269 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 189–90. 270 Usui, The Role of the Foreign Ministry, 136.

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the military institution. In other words, the first effects of the exogenous shock and securitization inside the FPE began to be felt, and the mechanism of contextual adaption was set off, during the premiership of Inukai, between December 1931 and May 1932. The new arrivals in the FPE, representatives of FDIB members, included Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, who replaced Inoue Junnosuke and regarded the invasion of Manchuria as an opportunity to solve Japan’s economic problems. The new Army Minister, Araki Sadao, was more open to a proactive continental policy than his predecessor, Minami Jir¯ o.271 In regard to the Foreign Ministry, Inukai himself assumed the ministerial position until mid-January 1932, before being succeeded by Yoshizawa Kenkichi, a career diplomat, in office until the fall of the cabinet in mid-May. But behind the position of Foreign Minister, the Arita faction was growing more powerful inside the institution as the accommodating policy of the Europe-American group was being discredited by the army propaganda and events in China. As mentioned, the Arita faction called for a strong policy and a special role for Japan on the continent. Military influence on the formulation of foreign policy continued to be important under non-partisan governments. New Prime Minister Sait¯o Makoto was an Admiral and thus did not have the disadvantage of being a party politician like Wakatsuki and Inukai, a status increasingly criticized and looked at with suspicion in Japan. The stance of the Sait¯o Cabinet toward the army and its demands amid the Manchurian crisis was not different from its predecessor. Indeed, FPE members remained almost the same, with Army Minister Araki and Finance Minister Takahashi being reappointed. However, after a two-month transition period during which Sait¯o assumed the position of Foreign Minister, Uchida K¯osai took office, representing the first accession of the Arita faction to the ministerial level. The Sait¯o Cabinet also stayed under the pressure of the secondary audience. The crisis in Manchuria was not over, neither on the ground where fighting continued nor regarding the future status of the region. During the summer of 1932, public opinion, media and even political parties and the Diet urged the FPE to officially recognize Manchukuo. Yet, Prime Minister Sait¯ o was cautious not to unnecessarily provoke other great powers, the latter strongly discouraging Tokyo from recognizing

271 Matsusaka Tak, Managing Occupied Manchuria, 113.

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the new country.272 For Uchida, however, the extension of formal recognition to Manchukuo was inevitable, although this would preferably be done without antagonizing other countries.273 The FPE being pushed by the army and a majority in Japan to adopt a unilateral and more coercive policy toward Manchuria, but concerned about the international repercussions of such a policy, the Foreign Minister was instrumental in titling the balance in favor of domestic expectations. Uchida reassured other FPE members that, with the right diplomatic narrative, international reactions to the recognition of Manchukuo could be managed and constructive relationships with the great powers maintained. Satisfied, the Sait¯ o Cabinet formally recognized Manchukuo in September 1932. It sought to make the recognition appear compatible with relevant international agreements in order to mitigate negative consequences for Japan’s relations with great powers. This did not change the fact that the FPE had sided with the army and its supporters by adopting a unilateral approach that disregarded the positions of key partners, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. Indeed, The FPE had reached consensus on the fact that Manchuria/Manchukuo was Japan’s lifeline, and therefore that extraordinary measures had to be implemented for its protection. The cabinet’s justification for its decision to recognize the new country was exclusively dedicated to limiting diplomatic damages. The government of Prime Minister Sait¯o also disengaged from the League of Nations in March 1933. This was another victory, although symbolic, for the army, its followers and members of the nationalist reform movement. It reflected the fact that the unilateral policy they advocated had taken precedence over the multilateral orientation that had characterized Japanese foreign policy during the 1920s, represented in part by its active participation in the League. Again, Foreign Minister Uchida was an influential voice behind the argument that to withdraw was the only way to bury the Manchurian issue and keep healthy relations with other great powers outside the Geneva-based institution. And again, the FPE accepted this line of thought. Following Japan’s disengagement from the League, the Tangku Truce Agreement of May 1933 put an end to the Manchurian crisis. Western

272 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, 159. 273 Gates, Meiji Diplomacy in the Early 1930s, 195.

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countries could now turn their attention to the more worrying situation in Europe. In Japan, the Sait¯o Cabinet and Foreign Minister Uchida worked for mending ties with great powers outside the framework of the League, eager to cooperate with them on various issues of common concern, including matters related to China proper and economic affairs. Regarding Manchukuo, now considered part of Japan, no interference by other countries was accepted by the FPE, although investment opportunities remained available.274 Hirota K¯oki replaced Uchida as Foreign Minister in September 1933 and continued the latter’s policy of accommodation toward other great powers. He fostered a “diplomacy of harmony” with them and the establishment of a new framework of international cooperation centered on the Washington System.275 Prime Minister Sait¯o, the majority of FPE members in his cabinet and even some high-ranking army officers shared the same objective, eager to stabilize the situation in China and secure the gains made in Manchuria.276 If the securitization process orchestrated by the army had reached most of its goals, the securitizing efforts of the navy had fallen short of its ambition to drastically revise the naval arms control regime. Consensus on the fact that the United States posed a real threat to Japan’s national security had yet to emerge among FPE members. Consequently, Japan abided by naval limitations and continued to balance appropriately. Domestically, the end of the Manchurian crisis led to a decline in social unrests, war fever and nationalist sentiments. The Japanese population was gradually losing its militarist and expansionist appetite.277 This was because the securitizing move of the army had focused on Manchuria. Now that Japan’s lifeline was secured, diplomatically through an improvement of relations with the great powers and militarily with the creation of a demilitarized zone between Manchukuo and China, no threat to national security could be used for military propaganda. This was not to the advantage of many in Japan, and especially the navy. Aware that passivity would lead to a loss of support for their policy lines, military services and affiliated groups restarted their propaganda activities through

274 Ibid., 200. 275 Iriye, Nihon no gaik¯ o, 114–5. 276 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 21. 277 Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 273.

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movies and documentaries praising war and patriotic values.278 It was at this point that the navy’s securitization campaign intensified. In September 1933, amid weakening popular backing for the military and renewed efforts by the latter to revive this support, the Five-Minister Conference (Goshy¯ o kaigi) was established. The new body reduced the number of ministers responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, or FPE members, to five, namely the Army, Navy, Finance, Foreign and Prime Ministers.279 The Conference was powerful: when it took a decision, the rest of the government had no choice but to approve it.280 The new organ was created under the impulsion of the military services, particularly the army, eager to reinforce their grip on the decision-making process on foreign policy. This was no coincidence. Through the creation of the unofficial and extraconstitutional body, the military institutionalized its newly acquired influence inside the FPE and prevented its possible decline amid weakening popular support. Moreover, by restricting the decision-making circle to only five ministers, the relative clout of the two Service Ministers over their counterparts expanded.281 Inversely, the establishment of the Five-Minister Conference resulted in a drastic reduction of the leverage of political parties.282 In a context of non-partisan cabinets where key ministerial positions, including those parts of the Conference, were held by non-partisan figures, the new organ meant the end of the parties’ direct access to the formulation of foreign policy. The creation of the Five-Minister Conference also reflected the changing perception FPE members had of their international environment. After the exogenous shock of the Manchurian crisis and through securitization, the latter became perceived as more dangerous and restrictive and a better coordination with the military was judged necessary for Japan to perform in this environment. The FPE needed more inputs of good quality from the military services in order to devise a foreign policy

278 Idem. 279 Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, 96.

The Five-Minister Conference also served as the main decision-making body on domestic policy, until it was replaced by the Liaison Conference in 1937. 280 Ibid., 116. 281 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 232. 282 Misawa and Ninomiya, The Role of the Diet and Political Parties, 334.

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in which the use of armed forces was regarded as an increasingly potent instrument. In other words, the establishment of the Conference was a concrete institutional expression of the ongoing, and biased, process of contextual adaption.

CHAPTER 5

Overbalancing and Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, 1933–1941

This last empirical chapter concludes the case study with a discussion of the drastic reorientation of Japan’s foreign policy in the mid-1930s. The first part describes how the Japanese navy, beset by strategic concerns, internally united around the rejection of the Washington System, allowing the institution to more strengthfully confront the FPE on the issue of naval arms control. In parallel, the navy’s securitizing efforts intensified, gradually modifying the FPE’s perception of its international environment. Consensus on threat perception was reached among members of the FPE. The main priority of the latter became the defense of Japan and of its continental interests against what was now regarded as a belligerent and inherently hostile United States. In view of Washington’s relatively benign intentions and continued compliance with arms control restrictions, the FPE thus developed an inflated threat perception. To face the American threat, Japanese policymakers relied on the navy’s expertise and followed its recommendations regarding the level of sea power deemed necessary to counter the U.S. Navy. Japan officially withdrew from the Washington System in late 1936. The second part of the chapter explains how military biases penetrated the decision-making process on foreign policy, resulting in a radical shift of the latter toward unilateralism and disregard for the stance of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_5

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other great powers. In terms of security policy, the process of contextual adaption and the consequent surge in military influence led Japan to overbalance against the United States. Domestic obstacles to resource mobilization weakened extensively, to such an extent that the ensuing naval arms race ultimately exhausted the Japanese economy. Lastly, the defects in the structure of Japan’s civil–military relations dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century are analyzed. It is shown that the over-depoliticization of the military had engendered a weak national defense regime, characterized by a chronic lack of collaboration between the FPE and the military institution and the absence of proper safeguards against unwarranted military interferences in politics. Once military clout began to rise, nothing could bend the curve. Overbalancing was the logical outcome.

Inflated Threat Perception and the End of Naval Arms Control The Navy’s Internal Unity Against Arms Control The Manchurian crisis was regarded by an increasing number of Japanese naval officers as having gravely impacted the relationship between Japan and the United States. More sailors began to think that diplomacy having failed to maintain friendly ties between the two countries, the navy and its highest authorities had to be entrusted with the protection of Japan against the growing American threat. And to do so effectively, the naval arms control regime needed to be drastically revised.1 In other words, some sort of securitization process took place inside the Japanese naval institution itself, the propaganda activities of officers having access to the public space influencing the perception younger sailors had of the severity of the threat constituted by the American naval presence in the Pacific. As the navy’s internal unity against the Washington System grew, its capacity to influence the FPE increased, whereas other FDIB members lost their ability to play different naval factions against one another in order to weaken the institution. Naval developments on the other side of the Pacific reinforced the navy’s deteriorating threat perception. The maintenance of the U.S.

1 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 239.

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Scouting Fleet on the American West Coast after the 1932 annual exercise was strongly felt by naval officers. A cable sent to Tokyo in May of the same year by the Naval Attaché in Washington, Captain Shimamura Sh¯osuke, in which he stated that the purpose of the move was to restrain Japan’s margin of maneuver in China, reflected the mainstream interpretation of the American decision inside the navy.2 The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 raised further concerns among sailors. Less visible than the impressive increase in the number of warships provided by the Act, but more worrying, was the qualitative leap being made by the U.S. Pacific Fleet.3 The development of American naval aviation made the execution of the attrition phase of the Imperial Navy’s strategy against the United States more difficult, while the reinforcement of the naval base in Hawaii and the great importance put on support and auxiliary vessels eased potential transpacific operations.4 The strategic distance in the Pacific, which had protected Japan, was also reduced by new technologies. The two main technological innovations that came to fruition during the 1920s, and which were exploited under the VinsonTrammell Act, were the conversion of naval fuel from coal to oil and the development of turbines. The use of oil had the effect of reducing the amount of fuel needed to cruise a given distance, with the thermal content of oil being twice as high as that of coal.5 This meant that for a given hull, and more precisely fuel stockpiling chamber, a boat could sail twice as far with oil as with coal.6 Oil boilers also became smaller, saving space that could be used to stockpile a larger amount of fuel. Turbines were widely introduced by 2 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 188–9. 3 Ibid., 187–8. 4 The modernization process of the U.S. Navy is summarized by David Evans and Mark Peattie as follows: “During the great expansion of American naval strength during the 1930s, what is noteworthy is not the augmentation of the U.S. battleship force, but the increase of other and sometimes new elements of sea power: the strengthening of the naval air arm, the modernization of the submarine fleet, the substitution of carrier aircraft and long-range reconnaissance planes for cruisers in the scouting role, the improvement of the navy’s logistic capacities through the construction of high-speed tankers, and the development of effective technique for refueling at sea, to name the most significant.” Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 354. 5 Ibid., 158. 6 Loading time was also shortened with oil, accelerating replenishment at sea or at

forward bases. Another advantage of oil, more tactical in nature, was the fact that it

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navies during the early 1920s, replacing steam engines. They improved the efficiency of fuel combustion by providing the ability to heat without a dangerous upsurge of pressure.7 Similar to the conversion from coal to oil, turbines dramatically lengthened the cruising range of warships by decreasing fuel consumption for a given horsepower and by saving space to stockpile fuel. This was particularly the case with the creation of “superheated” systems in the late 1920s, which made fuel combustion even more effective thanks to the increase in temperature.8 The speed and firepower of vessels had improved, their cruising range had doubled since the establishment of the Washington System in 1922 and naval aviation provided new instruments to project power across the Pacific.9 When the growing power projection capabilities of the U.S. Navy, most perfectly reflected by the apparition of the heavy cruisers of the Pensacola, Northampton and Portland classes, were seen through the lens of the fixed inferior ratio of naval strength determined by the arms control framework, it was apparent that the Imperial Navy was losing the ability to defend the Western Pacific and East Asian waters. Indeed, “by the spring of 1934 the Japanese navy had concluded that its strategic situation had become unbearable.”10 Therefore, the Japanese naval institution gradually united around the stance of the fleet faction, formed around Kat¯o Kanji and the Navy General Staff. The navy reached consensus on the fact that it needed no less than parity in overall naval strength to deter the United States from launching a transpacific offensive and to destroy the American fleet in case it nonetheless did. This was because “Japan has traditionally contended that it needed a 70 percent ratio to have a fifty-fifty or slightly better chance in a main-fleet engagement in the Western Pacific, but this ratio no longer seemed adequate, given the drastic reduction in the strategic

produced less smoke than coal and therefore made vessels less vulnerable to enemy’s detection, and consequently attrition. 7 Turbines also allowed gaining in stability by lowering the center of gravity of warships and by saving weight and volume for a given propulsion power. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 157. 8 Along with new materials that made turbines more resistant to high temperature, these systems also mitigated the negative effects of corrosion and erosion and improved the endurance of engines. Ibid., 246. 9 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 199–200. 10 Ibid., 187.

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distance of the Pacific.”11 Naval parity was presented by the navy not only as a matter of national security and survival but also as a necessity to keep morale high among sailors. By the early summer of 1934, institutional consensus on parity was such that the moderate argument claiming that an 80 percent ratio would be acceptable became taboo.12 The first major document that enshrined the request for parity was a position paper on the forthcoming Second London Conference released in October 1933 and approved by the Navy General Staff on November 21.13 Written by Commander Ishikawa Shingo, member of the Staff in charge of armament affairs, the paper advanced three proposals that became the basis of the navy’s position toward the conference. The first proposal was the abandonment of the unequal naval ratios imposed by the Five-Power Treaty and London Treaty. The second was the assertion of the right to parity through the creation of an upper limit of naval tonnage common to all member states, within which each would be free to choose the categories of warships to prioritize in terms of naval buildup. The last proposal was the abolition and scrapping of capital ships, namely battleships and aircraft carriers. The demand for parity through a common upper limit represented a rupture with the past. Although the idea of such a limit for auxiliary vessels was raised during the 1920s, notably by the Advisory Committee on Arms Control in a report published in May 1925, it was at that time based on the assumption that the ratio in capital ships would remain unchanged at 5:5:3.14 Parity in auxiliaries was then regarded as a compensation for the inferior ratio in capital ships. Inversely, in late 1933, the Navy General Staff asked for parity in sea power with the United States and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the General Staff did not request parity in each category of vessels individually, but in overall tonnage. This was typical of naval experts. They wanted to acquire as much flexibility as possible to fulfill their institutional missions. With such flexibility, which had been gravely

11 Ibid., 190. 12 Ibid., 193. 13 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 298. 14 Japan Navy Ministry, Advisory Committee on Arms Control, 1925, Gunbi seigen ni

kansuru kenky¯ u, Washinton kaigi go, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 11.

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affected by the London Treaty, the Staff would be able to devise effective strategies against foreign navies by prioritizing naval expansion in the most relevant categories of warships. In other words, the Staff aimed at making the Washington System strategically insignificant. Reflecting the growing influence of the General Staff and of the fleet faction inside the naval institution, the latter began to publicly defend the request for parity in the early summer of 1934.15 In parallel, the navy’s recommendations for the Second London Conference were finalized and sent on June 27 to the army for approval. The main points of these recommendations were the demand for parity under a maximum limit of naval tonnage, and the fact that Japan needed to leave the conference if the Anglo-Saxon countries did not answer positively to this demand.16 Having convinced the army, high-ranking naval officers met on August 16 and gave their final endorsement to the recommendations. Shortly there¯ after, Navy Minister Osumi Mineo publicly asked for the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty.17 To denounce the treaty did not close the door to the conclusion of another arms control agreement with the Anglo-Saxon countries. In order to negotiate new naval limitations and reach parity, it was necessary to abrogate the Five-Power Treaty first, as the failure to do so would result in the maintenance of the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships. The treaty could be terminated on December 31, 1936, at the earliest, and a notice had to be issued two years in advance.18 Therefore, if the navy wanted the termination of the treaty on the last day of 1936, it had to push the Japanese FPE to send a notification of withdrawal by December 31, 1934. Regarding the London Treaty, the wide majority of the modalities and limitations it contained would automatically end on December 31, 1936.19

15 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 193. 16 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 298. 17 Ibid., 301. 18 U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, 265. 19 The two exceptions were the part related to the use of submarines and other vessels against merchant and neutral ships, which would remain in force indefinitely, and articles on the definition and qualitative limitations of aircraft carriers and on the disposal of vessels, to run as long as the Five-Power Treaty was in force. U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, 123–4.

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If, theoretically, the navy’s call to abrogate the Five-Power Treaty did not mean that a new agreement could not be concluded to replace it, a wide majority inside and outside the naval institution was aware that the request for parity would be unacceptable for the United States.20 Consequently, and given the high level of influence the navy had acquired on the FPE by the summer of 1934, the move was regarded by many in Japan as tantamount to declaring the end of the naval arms control era. In July 1934, at the time when the navy was explaining its position to the army, ¯ Navy Minister Osumi told Army Minister Hayashi Senj¯ur¯o that the naval institution had reached “a determined consensus that the breakdown of [the Second London Conference] could not be helped.”21 Struggle Over Threat Perception: Drafting Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan As already discussed, until 1934 the securitizing efforts of the navy failed to drastically change the perception of FPE and other FDIB members had of the threat posed by the United States. As the naval institution gradually united around the rejection of the Washington System, its securitizing competence grew. The navy redoubled efforts to depict the United States as hostile and to convince the FPE of the pertinence of its recommendations on arms control, namely the need for naval parity and the readiness to withdraw from the Washington System if the Anglo-Saxon countries did not respond positively to this request. In 1933 and 1934, the different assumptions held by the navy, on the one hand, and the FPE as well as the majority of other FDIB members, on the other, about the possibility of improving relations and settling pending issues between Japan and the United States were at the center of political debate. The Japanese government assumed the feasibility of reaching a comprehensive understanding with its American counterpart over their respective policies toward Asia. If such an understanding was achieved, a drastic revision of the Washington System would not be necessary to guarantee Japan’s national security, because the two countries would have nothing to fight over. Moreover, to seek an extensive modification of the naval arms control regime would be diplomatically

20 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 193. 21 Idem.

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counterproductive by making more difficult a rapprochement with the Americans. That is, the Japanese FPE did not perceive the United States as inherently hostile. Conversely, the navy assumed that the two countries’ policies in Asia were irreconcilable because formulated on contradictory bases. A détente between them, if reachable, was doomed to be short-lived. This being the case, and given the animosity of the United States, Japan had to be ready for war. The Imperial Navy, which bore responsibility to defend the country and its empire against the U.S. Navy, needed to be provided with the military assets it deemed necessary for the fulfillment of its institutional missions. In order to maintain an adequate level of naval power, a drastic revision of the Washington System was essential. The respective positions of Rear Admiral Yoshida Zengo, chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, and T¯ og¯o Shigenori, head of the Europe-America Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, reflected this difference in perspectives between the naval institution and the FPE and other FDIB members: “T¯ og¯o, a strong advocate of Japanese-American détente and a supporter of naval limitation, strenuously opposed the navy’s parity demand, saying it would lead to a naval race and end in a JapaneseAmerican war. Yoshida countered that if the two nations were to fight, treaties that limited Japan’s naval buildup would be disadvantageous.”22 Both were right, and wrong, depending on what was assumed about the prospect of improvement in the relationship with the United States, and consequently about Washington’s intentions. In other words, the political debate revolved around the formulation of threat perception. A major step in these debates as well as in the gradual reorientation of Japan’s policy vis-à-vis naval arms control was the compilation of a document entitled Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan, released by the Foreign Ministry on November 30, 1933.23 Japan was then at a critical juncture. At stake was whether the Japanese FPE would extend the use of the coercive and unilateral approach to foreign policy adopted during the Manchurian crisis to other international issues, or reserve this approach

22 Ibid., 192. 23 The final document as well as the details of the discussions that took place during

drafting are found in: Japan Foreign Ministry. 1933. Teikoku no taigai seisaku kankei ikken, Goshy¯ o kaigi kankei, Tokyo: Japan Center for Asian Historical Records.

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exclusively to affairs related to Manchukuo and focus on minilateralism and cooperation with other great powers regarding these other issues.24 The first draft of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan was discussed in a meeting of the Five-Minister Conference on October 20. Recognizing that the creation of Manchukuo had triggered adverse reactions by great powers, the document asserted that it was necessary to formulate a diplomatic strategy aimed at maintaining constructive relations with them and at avoiding isolation on the international scene. This was considered “vital to prevent the 1935 entanglement,” by which the Foreign Ministry was referring to the Second London Conference.25 The ministry thus directly challenged the navy by stating that the supposedly forthcoming national crisis of 1935–1936, a key element of the naval propaganda against the Washington System, was preventable through diplomacy. Concrete measures to avert tensions with the United States were also deemed important, including the timely dispatch of a special envoy to Washington and efforts to convince American media that the continental policy pursued by Japan was wise and stabilizing. Unsurprisingly, the naval institution reacted, through a statement ¯ delivered by Navy Minister Osumi at the same meeting of the Five¯ Minister Conference. Osumi declared that in the wake of the Manchurian crisis, the most threatening international development would be an alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom which, apart from presenting obvious strategic disadvantages, could galvanize China and the Soviet Union against Japan. To prevent such a situation from happening, Japanese foreign policy had to be formulated around five main principles. First, Manchukuo needed to be rapidly developed and natural resources exploited for the benefit of Japan. Second, friendly relations with the Soviet Union had to be promoted and military preparations against this country to be put aside in order to avoid provocations that could lead Moscow to redirect its attention to East Asia. Third, the Japanese FPE needed to keep a strong policy toward China while trying to push the different political factions in the country to adopt a pro-Japanese stance.

24 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 21. 25 Japan Foreign Ministry, Teikoku no taigai seisaku kankei ikken, 5.

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¯ With the fourth and fifth principles, Osumi addressed Japan’s relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, its partners in naval arms control. Concerning the United Kingdom, their diverging global economic policies and their respective positions toward East Asian affairs made a collision between the two countries likely. The FPE needed to strive to maintain a good relationship with London, however, and could use the ¯ increasingly complicated situation in Europe for this purpose. Osumi also declared that the policy of the United States in Asia would become growingly opposed to Japan’s policy toward Manchukuo and China. The FPE had to try promoting constructive relations with Washington, but remain firm in rejecting any measure taken by the Americans against the foundation of Japan’s continental policy. To do so, military preparedness was ¯ necessary. In this regard, an annotation of Osumi’s statement affirmed that the consequences of naval arms control needed to be carefully considered. ¯ The part of the Osumi statement on Japan’s relations with the United States, and to a lesser extent with the United Kingdom, perfectly reflected the navy’s securitizing argument. Their respective policies in Asia were fundamentally incompatible and made growing tensions inevitable. Japan needed to be militarily ready to resist these two countries, and to do so the FPE had to pay particular attention to the negative impact of arms control on naval preparedness. The Anglo-Saxon countries thus represented a threat that had to be dealt with primarily through a revision of the Washington System, not diplomatic means. ¯ In his statement, Osumi also attacked the army by saying that military preparations against the Soviet Union had to be stopped and an improvement of relations with this country fostered. This was a strong provocation, the Soviet Union having been the army’s main hypothetical enemy and its principal budget justification since the release of the 1907 Imperial Defense Policy. The army reacted by submitting recommendations for the revision of the first draft of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan, which had been adopted by the cabinet of Prime Minister Sait¯o Makoto on October 21. The army document stated that the 1935–1936 national crisis had to be prevented and that the FPE “must ensure national security in a manner that would avert the breakdown of the [Second London Conference].”26 This remained the official stance of the army until the

26 Ibid., 88.

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summer of 1934, the institution being opposed to Japan’s withdrawal from the Washington System because the navy would then be entitled to call for a greater share of the national budget to protect the country and win a probable arms race against the United States. The navy fought back. It tabled a revised draft in which it highlighted that the establishment of Manchukuo had not only caused “ripples in the world,” as the first draft of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan already noted, but had also sparked “changes in the Far East that will trigger important counteractions” by other countries.27 The emphasis was thus put on Japan’s growing vulnerability to foreign interventions, in line with the navy’s securitizing efforts aimed at exaggerating threats to national security to justify the implementation of extraordinary measures. Likewise, the feeling that Japan was encircled by a coalition of hostile countries was promoted. The naval institution asserted that the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union could coalesce against Japan “at any occasion” because of the metamorphose in international relations provoked by the Manchurian crisis.28 An alliance between the two Anglo-Saxon countries was restated as the worst-case scenario, which had to be avoided at all costs but also anticipated by the FPE. The whole part of the first draft concerning Japan’s relations with the United States was erased and replaced. The navy’s revision was composed of three points. First, despite the fact that anti-Japanese sentiments in the United States had somehow subdued following the end of the Manchurian crisis, the root cause of the problems in bilateral relations had not disappeared. The fundamental issue was the orientation and substance of Washington’s foreign policy toward Asia, which was incompatible with Japan’s continental policy. Although the FPE needed to try pushing the Americans to revise their policy in order to build a mutually beneficial relationship, such diplomatic initiatives were not sufficient. In parallel, restrictions on national defense, namely, the naval limitations imposed upon Japan by the Washington System, had to be made appropriate through diplomatic maneuvers. This is because the second point asserted that the Americans would most likely continue to oppose Tokyo’s policy in Asia, and therefore that military preparations had to be undertaken. That is, although diplomacy

27 Ibid., 70. 28 Idem.

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could be useful, a coherent foreign policy could not disregard the importance of military power. Consequently, Japan had to stand firm against the United States, and the Japanese FPE was asked to direct resources toward the development of national power and the improvement of military capabilities. The third point directly tackled the issue of naval arms control by insisting that the Five-Power Treaty had to be abrogated. This was judged necessary to secure an appropriate level of sea power at the Second London Conference. The navy also advocated anti-American propaganda activities to strengthen Tokyo’s negotiating position during the conference. Actually, the naval institution not only hoped to better prepare for the forthcoming arms control talks but also to increase its leverage on the FPE by obtaining the support of the secondary audience through the further securitization of the American threat. Naval arms control was thus addressed through the lens of the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States. This was not surprising, as the threat represented by the U.S. Navy was the main justification for the Imperial Navy’s call for a drastic revision of the Washington System. Lastly, the navy attacked the Foreign Ministry over its emphasis on the need to devise a diplomatic strategy to maintain friendly relations with other great powers and prevent the 1935–1936 national crisis. The naval institution modified the text of the first draft by stating that a strategy was “vital to settle the 1935 entanglement to our advantage.”29 In other words, the crisis over the revision of the Washington System was inevitable, and the Foreign Ministry had to focus on finding a way to make this crisis profitable for Japan while breaking with the unequal restrictions imposed upon the naval institution. For the navy, the most urgent business was the advancement of Japan’s national power, meaning military and especially sea power. All possible obstacles to the strengthening of national power had to be removed. Naval arms control was explicitly cited as a major impediment in this regard. Responding to the demands for revision of the military services, the Foreign Ministry recognized, in a document released on November 13 and entitled The Five-Minister Conference’s Propositions and their Inconsistencies with the Fulfillment of Defense Preparations, that the Japanese

29 Idem.

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military had to be able to face external threats. Therefore, particular attention needed to be paid to the development of national power. On the other hand, foreign policy had to be based primarily on diplomatic means in order to maintain peace and regional stability. The document thus asserted that “the need for strengthening military preparations to face threats from and contempt by other countries is not incompatible with diplomatic measures.”30 Constructive relations with great powers needed to remain the basis of Japan’s foreign policy. Regarding its relationship with the United States, bilateral tensions were not considered a fatality, their root cause being Washington’s misunderstanding of the situation in East Asia. With proper diplomatic initiatives dedicated to showing the Americans the stabilizing nature of Tokyo’s policy toward the continent and its relevance to address regional problems, the Foreign Ministry was confident that “tensions between the two countries will appease by themselves.”31 To promote the “traditional friendship” between Japan and the United States was the only way to avert conflict and make the Pacific Ocean an area of peace.32 Consequently, the Second London Conference was approached based on the need to prioritize the maintenance of healthy relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries over military preparations. The Ministry also agreed that an increase in the ratio of sea power allotted to Japan was necessary in view of the growing dissatisfaction of the Japanese population with the Washington System. This was a direct consequence of the navy’s securitizing efforts and of the pressure put by the latter on the FPE. Nevertheless, to reach an arms control agreement was posited as the main objective of Tokyo at the forthcoming conference. The Ministry even proposed that offensive naval capabilities be restricted and defensive assets promoted under the new agreement, which shows that it sincerely believed Japan needed to, and could, remain part of a modified version of the Washington System. The latter was still regarded by the Foreign Ministry and the FPE as the central piece of Japan’s cooperation framework with the other great powers.33 30 Ibid., 106. 31 Ibid., 109. 32 Ibid., 110. 33 Iriye Akira summarizes the basic stance of the Foreign Ministry and Japanese FPE in

late 1933 in the following words: “[Foreign Minister] Hirota and his cabinet colleagues accepted the faits accomplis, especially the independence of Manchukuo, and sought to

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The final version of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan, issued on November 30, took into account most of the demands for revision of the military services. The army, for example, obtained the deletion of the part of the first draft stating that peaceful means had to be used to adapt Sino-Japanese relations to the new situation in East Asia. The question of which between military and diplomatic instruments would be prioritized in the implementation of Japan’s foreign policy toward China was thus left unanswered, a formula that represented a clear readjustment to the requests made by the army. Regarding the demands of the naval institution, the final document maintained that mutual understanding and the development of friendly relations with the United States were Tokyo’s main objectives, although it recognized that if diplomacy proved ineffective and the Americans continued to oppose Japan’s continental policy, the FPE would have to take a firm stance to resist the United States. The document also retained the insistence of the Foreign Ministry on the need to use the Second London Conference, and the Washington System in general, as tools to cooperate with the Anglo-Saxon countries on matters of common concern and to advance Japanese interests. The navy’s request for a more assertive arms control policy was taken into consideration, however. The final document emphasized the necessity to remove the damaging naval limitations imposed upon Japan by the Washington System. For this purpose, and inversely to the first draft, it contemplated the possibility of abrogating the Five-Power Treaty, in which case it was deemed “vital to consider an alternative plan” to arms control.34 The Foreign Ministry was thus aware that to denounce the treaty was almost equivalent to renounce naval arms control as a diplomatic instrument. The evolution of the Ministry’s stance on arms control since the adoption by the cabinet of the first draft of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan on October 21 was impressive, in terms of both substance and rapidity. From an omission to mention the issue of naval ratios in the

stabilize Japan’s foreign affairs on that basis. This, they reasoned, could be done without rejecting the Washington Treaties outright. In other words, they were interested in reestablishing the framework of international cooperation, outside the League to be sure, but through a modified Washington System.” Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 21. 34 Japan Foreign Ministry, Teikoku no taigai seisaku kankei ikken, 123.

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first draft, the Ministry changed its position and supported an increase in the ratios in the document released on November 13, to finally contemplate denouncing the Five-Power Treaty in order to provide Japan with an adequate level of naval strength. Therefore, in a little more than one month, the Ministry went from ignoring the stance of the navy on arms control to considering a drastic reorientation of foreign policy, a shift from cooperative to unilateral security, in line with the recommendations of the naval institution. This evolution can only be explained by the fact that the Ministry initially underestimated the determination of the navy to get rid of unfavorable naval restrictions and, more importantly, its capacity to mobilize the secondary audience and influence FDIB members to achieve its objectives. The Ministry did not take into account the position of the navy when it first drafted Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan. It approached the Washington System not from a military perspective, but as a useful diplomatic instrument to mend and improve ties with the Anglo-Saxon countries. The Ministry then devised, after revisions, a policy largely in line with the aspirations of the navy, backing the latter’s desire to revamp the Washington System. The ability of the naval institution to penetrate the FPE and interfere in the decision-making process on foreign policy caused the turnabout of the Ministry. This did not mean that, in late 1933, the Foreign Ministry and the Japanese FPE had changed their mind on naval arms control or had decided to denounce the Five-Power Treaty. They remained attached to this diplomatic tool and aimed at preserving the Washington System as the center of the cooperation framework among great powers, although its terms might need to be modified.35 After all, Prime Minister Sait¯o Makoto had been a prominent member of the treaty faction, an accommodating head of delegation to the 1927 Geneva Conference and a strong proponent of the ratification of the London Treaty. Nevertheless, the Sait¯o Cabinet had to make concessions because of the pressure exerted by the naval institution and the secondary audience, effectively mobilized through securitization. More importantly, the

35 Iriye Akira notes that “at that time only a handful of officials in Tokyo were calling for an outright rejection of the whole Washington System and for a definition of an entirely new framework of national policy.” Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 24.

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political debate on threat perception was slowly turning to the advantage of the navy, the latter succeeding in casting doubt among FDIB and FPE members on the genuine intentions of the United States. The compromise found by the Foreign Ministry, and endorsed by the FPE, was to let the door open to the possible abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty in the most important document on foreign policy. The drafting of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan was thus an important step toward the withdrawal from the Washington System and toward overbalancing. Inflated Threat Perception and the Abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty The year 1934 marked a turning point in Japan’s arms control and foreign policies. The Japanese FPE came under intense pressure to adapt its stance to the demands of the Imperial Navy. By the end of the year, the FPE had decided to abrogate the Five-Power Treaty, thereby paving the way for an all-or-nothing renegotiation of naval limitations at the Second London Conference. Actually, Tokyo had chosen to reorient its policy from cooperative to unilateral security, despite the far-reaching consequences this would have for Japan’s relations with the other great powers. After the release of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan, the two military services pressured the Foreign Ministry to widen the range of the instruments made available to the FPE for its implementation. The army wanted its role regarding the continental aspects of the policy to be firmly recognized, pointing out that diplomacy was not the only means through which Japan’s position and interests could be protected. The situation on the continent having calmed down, the army focused mainly on the reform of the Japanese administration of Manchukuo.36 The navy, for its part, was eager to exert more influence on the FPE’s arms control policy ahead of the coming conference in London and to keep open the possibility of withdrawing from the Washington System. The pressure put by the navy on the Sait¯o Cabinet increased from early 1934 onward, as the institution was internally uniting around the fleet faction. The latter, and Kat¯ o Kanji and Suetsugu Nobumasa, in particular, were active in political maneuvers and did not refrain from raising the prospect of unrest among sailors in case the FPE hinted at rejecting

36 It¯ o, The Role of Right-Wing Organizations, 499.

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their requests.37 In June, when a spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry declared that the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty needed to be used only as a last resort, naval personnel violently reacted.38 One month later, some 60 officers ranked Captain and above signed a memorandum drafted by naval authorities requesting the termination of the treaty. Nonetheless, the Japanese FPE continued to try containing the navy and its growing influence on the formulation of foreign policy by launching several diplomatic initiatives. The most important was dedicated to improving relations between Japan and the United States. In mid-May 1934, Foreign Minister Hirota K¯oki proposed a two-power agreement that would delimit the spheres of influence of the two countries in Asia and guarantee each other’s territorial possessions in the region.39 One of the objectives of the initiative was to counter the navy’s assertion that the threat represented by the United States justified a drastic modification of the Washington System. The Sait¯ o Cabinet reasoned that the two countries “would never risk a violent clash so long as the boundaries of their respective spheres of influence were clearly drawn.”40 If such an agreement was reached, the central argument of the naval institution’s securitizing move would be discredited, moderates in the FPE would win the bitter struggle over threat perception and the pressure exerted by the navy on the government would ease considerably. Unfortunately for the Sait¯o Cabinet, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected the proposal, regarded as contrary to the Washington Treaties and the Nine-Power Treaty in particular. This tremendously reduced the margin of maneuver of the Japanese FPE and Foreign Ministry. The navy used this diplomatic failure to reinforce its assertion that, because of American hostility, foreign policy could not be based on the assumption of a future rapprochement with the United States.41 Placing primacy on military preparations was therefore essential. The Sait¯o Cabinet fell on July 6, 1934, and was replaced two days later by a new government under the premiership of Okada Keisuke. Admiral Okada was the heir of a naval tradition of devotion to arms control and 37 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 241–2. 38 Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, 175–6. 39 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 198. 40 Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War, 23. 41 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, 198–9.

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to the prevention of the arms races that began with Kat¯o Tomosabur¯ o in the early 1920s, and was thus opposed to the stance of the navy toward the Washington System.42 The vast majority of FPE members, namely, the Prime, Army, Foreign and Finance Ministers, were initially reluctant to the idea of denouncing the Five-Power Treaty and putting at risk the whole system of naval arms control. Doing so could have dramatic financial consequences at a time of economic difficulties, would deepen Japan’s international isolation and could potentially lead to an alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom.43 For the army, to these incentives to resist the navy added the concern that a withdrawal from the Washington System could trigger an arms race that would distract the budget away from the army.44 The new FPE, composed of the members of the Five-Minister Conference, was still opposed to the navy’s policy line on arms control. Apart from the strength of this opposition, an additional problem for the naval institution was its inability to reach the Emperor in order to pressure the Okada Cabinet. The appointment of Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu as Chief of the Navy General Staff in February 1932 was partially dedicated to providing the institution with an easier access to the throne.45 Fushimi failed in this regard, however. On July 12, 1934, he was severely reprimanded when he handed a sealed letter to the Emperor explaining the position of the navy on arms control. Hirohito pointed that it was not the role of the Chief of Staff to privately appeal to him and that it was the responsibility of the government to tackle this issue.46 The Emperor was at that time kept out of sensitive political matters by his entourage.47 ¯ Navy Minister Osumi Mineo was tasked with breaking up this front and pushing the FPE to implement the demands of the naval institution, the priority being given to the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty. 42 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 194-5. 43 Asada, The Japanese Navy and the United States, 241. 44 Army Minister Hayashi Senj¯ ¯ ur¯o expressed this concern to Navy Minister Osumi

Mineo on July 20, 1934. The latter replied that the Anglo-Saxon countries would anyway coalesce to face Japan and that the navy needed to be prepared for this inevitability. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 193. 45 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 292. 46 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 194. 47 Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, 97.

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¯ A few days after Okada assumed the premiership, Osumi made clear to other FPE members that decisions taken by the Five-Minister Conference under the Sait¯o Cabinet had to be upheld by the new government.48 The Navy Minister specifically mentioned three principles concerning naval arms control that had been agreed upon in late 1933. Although the nature of these principles is not precisely known, it has been argued that they might correspond to a document discussed during a meeting of the Five-Minister Conference on October 3, 1933, and which stated: We will strive to find a solution to the disarmament problem without jeopardizing Japan’s national security, which is based on its particular geographical requirements. We will also, in seeking revision of the Washington and London treaties, try to come to an understanding with the countries concerned that will provide us with a favorable settlement. At the same time, Japan’s national security must be guaranteed, to the point of disrupting the [Second London] conference if necessary.49

¯ Osumi put increasing pressure on the FPE during the month of August, including through intense lobbying activities and by publicly asking for the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty.50 Prime Minister Okada continued to resist the naval institution for a few weeks. But facing the intransigent attitude of the latter, the growing dissatisfaction of a large part of the secondary audience, galvanized by the navy’s securitizing efforts, and the evolving position on naval arms control of key FPE members, the Army and Foreign Ministers, in particular, Okada had no choice but to capitulate to the voice of the majority. This capitulation was forced upon the Prime Minister by the Imperial Navy’s victory in the 48 Imai, Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen, 65. 49 Ibid., 67, endnote 17.

Interestingly, these three points were almost similar to the revisions of Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan asked by the army. A notable difference between the two texts was that the latter emphasized the need to avert the breakdown of the Second London Conference. The army’s revisions read: “The arms control issue must be settled through cooperation up to the point where Japan’s national security, based on its specific geographic characteristics, is jeopardized. It was hoped that an agreement toward the advantageous revision of the Washington and London treaties could be reached beforehand with the countries concerned, but this hope did not materialize. It remains that national security must be guaranteed while preventing the breakdown of the coming conference.” Japan Foreign Ministry, Teikoku no taigai seisaku kankei ikken, 88. 50 Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, 97.

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struggle over threat perception. By late summer 1934, most members of the Five-Minister Conference had developed an inflated threat perception. The FPE reached a consensus on the fact that the United States was inherently hostile to Japan, and naval leverage on the formulation of foreign policy surged. On September 7, 1934, the Okada Cabinet decided to denounce the Five-Power Treaty. The document adopted at that time noted that the FPE needed to firmly defend Japan’s stance during the coming preparatory talks in order to come out of the Second London Conference with an improved security posture.51 During the talks, Tokyo would request parity with the Anglo-Saxon countries through a common upper limit settled at a low level of sea power, as well as the restriction of offensive naval assets and the promotion of defensive ones. For these demands to be effectively asserted, the Five-Power Treaty would be abrogated before the end of the year. The decision to denounce the Five-Power Treaty was formalized during a cabinet meeting in November. The screening committee of the Privy Council then approved the decision in only two hours and the plenary followed through right afterward.52 The Supreme Military Council gave its consent on December 19, and the notification of withdrawal was sent to Washington on December 22.53 The notice was formally handed to the U.S. Secretary of State on December 29, in accordance with Article XXIII of the Five-Power Treaty, which made the United States its depositary.54 On December 31, 1936, Japan would be freed from the naval limitations agreed upon at the Washington and London Conferences, the London Treaty automatically terminating on that day. Again, this did not mean that Japan had definitively left the naval arms control regime established in the early 1920s. Concretely, the notification of withdrawal only implied that the Five-Power Treaty could not be revised nor extended at the Second London Conference and that a new agreement had to be concluded for Japan to remain in the regime. But

51 Japan Foreign Ministry, 1934, Kaigun gunshuku yobi k¯ osh¯ o ni taisuru teikoku seifu h¯ oshi kettei no ken, Tokyo: Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, 3–4. 52 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 163. 53 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 303. 54 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 287.

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any new agreement would need to be based on the principle of parity in naval strength, the Imperial Navy having accompanied its demand for withdrawal with such a request, which was accepted by the Japanese FPE. By late 1934, naval officers had gained such influence over the decision-making process on foreign policy that their strategic requirements became Tokyo’s negotiating baseline for the coming arms control conference. Consequently, the diplomatic margin of maneuver left to delegates to the Second London Conference was almost inexistent. And the request for naval parity made a successful conclusion of the latter virtually impossible, the United States being absolutely opposed to the idea. Japanese policymakers, both military and civilian, were aware of that.55 After December 1934, if for Japan to remain in some sort of arms control framework and to continue cooperating on security affairs with the Anglo-Saxon countries was not theoretically unfeasible, it was pragmatically and politically unworkable. Military biases made a reorientation of the Japanese foreign policy from cooperative to unilateral security inevitable. Preparatory Talks for the Second London Conference The notification of withdrawal from the Five-Power Treaty issued by Tokyo in late December 1934 triggered the organization of a naval conference in 1935. According to Article XXIII of the treaty, such a notice had to be followed within one year by a meeting of member states.56 Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom, through their Ambassadors in London, had already begun talks in view of the next conference before the release of the notification, however, because the automatic termination of the London Treaty in December 1936 made necessary the negotiation of new limitations. Japan’s participation in the preparatory talks was prudent until the fall of 1934, as the outcome of domestic debates over the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty and the navy’s request for parity was unclear. The Japanese Ambassador to London, Matsudaira Tsuneo, remained vague

55 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 302. 56 U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,

1922, 266.

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on Tokyo’s demands and waited for the arrival of the navy representative, Rear Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who would bring with him the Japanese proposal for the Second London Conference enshrined in the document adopted by the Okada Cabinet on September 7.57 The first meeting in which Yamamoto participated took place on October 23. The position conveyed by Yamamoto reflected perfectly the stance adopted by the navy toward arms control negotiations. Japan requested parity in naval strength with the Anglo-Saxon countries through the creation of a common upper limit at a low level of total tonnage.58 The upper limit, within which member states would be free to choose the categories of vessels to prioritize in terms of naval buildup, would be established in line with the needs of the most vulnerable country, Japan. To this demand was attached another calling for the abolition of offensive warships, namely, capital ships and heavy cruisers, whereas destroyers, light cruisers and submarines were spared and labeled as defensive. Therefore, offensive vessels were those with the greatest power projection capabilities, and the most suitable to undertake transpacific operations. The Japanese position was justified by advancements in naval technologies. Yamamoto stated that the lengthened cruising range of warships, greater speed and improvements in firepower technology provided the attacking fleet with a strategic advantage over the defender.59 Although Yamamoto, for obvious reasons, did not say it explicitly, the assumption was that these technological innovations affected the efficacy of the Imperial Navy’s attrition phase and thus endangered its strategy against the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which had acquired the ability to operate in East Asian waters. The categorization of defensive and offensive vessels, and the demand for the abolition of the latter, were dedicated to restraining the power projection capabilities of the American fleet. Capital ships and heavy cruisers, the main vectors of sea power, would be prohibited, while

57 Japan Foreign Ministry, Kaigun gunshuku yobi k¯ osh¯ o ni taisuru teikoku seifu h¯ oshi kettei no ken, 3–4. The instructions to Yamamoto for the preparatory talks are reproduced in: Japan Defense Ministry, Kaigun gunsenbi, 460. 58 Japan Navy Ministry, Naval Affairs Bureau, undated, Sh¯ owa j¯ u nen kaigun gunshuku kaigi yobi k¯ osh¯ o ni okeru nichi-ei-bei sangoku no shuch¯ o tekiy¯ o, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 2–3 and 47–8. 59 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 200.

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important assets for Japan’s attrition phase—light cruisers, destroyers and submarines—could be built flexibly within the common upper limit. Similarly, the request for parity and reduction in overall naval strength, which constituted the cornerstone of the Japanese position, would make sure that after having depleted during the transpacific journey, the power of the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be insufficient to challenge the Japanese navy in the Western Pacific. Tokyo’s proposal was presented as the best way to ensure the security of all member states under new technological conditions. These conditions had made unequal naval ratios unproductive and had forced countries to rechannel their shipbuilding efforts toward unrestricted categories in order to protect themselves. In an article published in March 1936, Kat¯o Kanji said that the Japanese proposal was dedicated “to alleviate tensions by a treaty guaranteeing mutual non-aggression and limiting the powers to a level that will be the same for all of them and so low that none can adopt a challenging attitude, thereby discouraging aggressive ambition.”60 In other words, by reducing the naval tonnage of member states to a low and equal level, and by ideally abolishing capital ships and heavy cruisers, Tokyo aimed at making an American transpacific offensive unrealistic. In this case, Japan’s security posture would be almost perfect and therefore satisfactory for naval experts. Yamamoto and the Japanese delegation in London made clear to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts that an agreement on quantitative limitations, that is the common upper limit, was a necessary first step before other issues could be discussed, including qualitative restrictions.61 Yamamoto, facing the firm rejection by the United States and the United Kingdom of the demand to prohibit capital ships and heavy cruisers, softened his stance and, on October 26, called instead for a substantial reduction in tonnage in these categories. This concession remained in line with the Imperial Navy’s general objective to make strategically unfeasible transpacific operations by the United States. Moreover, the Japanese delegation was inflexible on its other requests and made no other compromise during subsequent meetings.62

60 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 307. 61 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 297. 62 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 296.

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The concession made by Japan on the issue of capital ships and heavy cruisers did not lead to any progress. The overall Japanese position was rebuffed by the Anglo-Saxon countries, the idea of a common upper limit in naval tonnage being regarded as counterproductive and unrealistic.63 For Washington and London, naval parity did not mean equal security for member states, because each had specific strategic requirements and vulnerabilities. Norman Davis, the head of the American delegation during the preparatory talks, declared at the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1935 that “a moment’s consideration of the widely varying defensive needs of individual nations makes it evident that equality of naval armament not only fails to give equal security but that, on the contrary, it is utterly incompatible with equal security.”64 The continuation of the ratio system was the only way to ensure the security of all countries. Although the United Kingdom was initially more open to discussion with Japan than the United States, it ultimately concluded that naval parity based on an upper limit would endanger the defense of its worldwide empire.65 There is no doubt that the Japanese delegates knew the AngloSaxon countries would oppose their demands. In addition to information obtained about talks held by the United States and the United Kingdom during the summer of 1934, Tokyo was aware that the two countries had in the past rebuffed an almost similar proposal by France. During negotiations in the League of Nations’ Preparatory Commission for the General Disarmament Conference, Paris had called for the establishment of a single general ratio under which countries would be allowed to build in the vessel categories they most needed.66 Although parity was neither required nor demanded, Washington and London had opposed a system that would have permitted smaller naval powers to regain strategic flexibility and focus on building defensive boats like submarines, whereas they themselves were forced to assemble balanced fleets to defend their global maritime interests. The method of ratio per category was the only one the Anglo-Saxon countries could accept.67 63 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 164. 64 J¯ uji Enomoto, undated, Shinbun kirinuki, Tokyo: B¯oei kenky¯ usho, B¯oeish¯o, 1. 65 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 297. 66 McKercher, Of Horns and Teeth, 177–8. 67 Fanning, The Coolidge Conference of 1927 , 110.

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Behind the statement that naval parity did not mean equal security, the rejection of the Japanese demands by the United States and the United Kingdom was based on concrete strategic considerations that reflected the stance of their respective naval institutions. Like in Japan, increased international tensions had, through a process of contextual adaption, provided the Anglo-Saxon navies with a better access to their governments’ decision-making process on foreign policy. The failure of the World Disarmament Conference that opened in February 1932 in Geneva reflected the important influence military institutions had acquired on governments worldwide in the early 1930s. The conference was dedicated to formulating restrictions in the three dimensions of military power—air, ground and naval—but any hope of reaching an agreement seemed remote as soon as it began.68 This was because most countries did not contemplate the political and diplomatic dividends they could extract from an arms control treaty. They rather focused on respecting the strategic needs of their military institutions, something made essential by the rapidly deteriorating situations in Europe and Asia. The Board of Admiralty, for example, made clear to the British government that it would not accept further limitations of sea power, except those aimed at reducing the tonnage and gun caliber of capital ships, two qualitative restrictions that were strategically advantageous for the Royal Navy. The Board also told politicians that it had acquiesced to the 1930 London Treaty only “for a strictly limited period” and that its position now had to be respected.69 The international context had changed, and the navy needed to be given a greater say in the formulation of foreign policy. The government agreed with this line of thought. The United States was then an exception because President Herbert Hoover considered the conclusion of an arms control agreement important for domestic consumption ahead of the November 1932 presidential election. On June 22, the head of the American delegation in Geneva, Hugh Gibson, proposed the so-called Hoover Plan, which provided for a reduction of member states’ ground forces by one-third, of battleships and submarines by the same ratio, of aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers by one-quarter, and for the abolition of bombers.70 Other

68 McKercher, Of Horns and Teeth, 183. 69 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 86. 70 McKercher, Of Horns and Teeth, 186.

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countries, not having the same domestic political objectives and incentives as Hoover, rejected the plan for strategic reasons.71 The deteriorating international environment increased the probability that countries would have to defend their national interests by force and consequently made it vital for governments to pay attention to the strategic requirements of their military institutions. The margin of maneuver of delegations in Geneva was strongly limited because their instructions focused almost exclusively on the military dimension of arms control, preventing diplomatic and political tradeoffs. The possibility of reaching an agreement thus depended on the ability to reconcile countries’ irreconcilable strategic needs. The root cause of the failure of the World Disarmament Conference “lay with the changing international situation which, for the major powers, saw the problems tied to national security and defending interests become increasingly critical.”72 If in 1932 the Hoover Administration was not penetrated by the military perspective on international politics as heavily as other great powers, because of its focus on domestic affairs, the American government soon became more sensitive to the growing pressure applied by its naval institution. During the preparatory talks for the Second London Conference, the position of the U.S. Navy General Board, and the ability of the navy to defend American interests in Asia, became the center of attention of politicians and the basis of their approach to naval arms control. Before the arrival of Yamamoto in London and his statement on Tokyo’s requests for the coming conference, the General Board, based on the precedent of the 1930 London Conference, wrongly anticipated that submarines and increases in naval ratios would lie at the heart of the discussions with Japan.73 In line with these expectations, American envoys in London agreed with their British counterparts during the summer of 1934 to stand firm against the Japanese demand for higher ratios and to work together toward the abrogation of submarines, or at least a drastic reduction in tonnage.74 Yamamoto’s proposal for a common upper limit and the prohibition or strict limitation of offensive vessels forced the U.S. Navy to adapt its stance to this relatively unexpected initiative.

71 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 137. 72 McKercher, Of Horns and Teeth, 183. 73 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 284. 74 Ibid., 291–2.

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The proposal put the American navy in a difficult position.75 On the one hand, the Japanese demands for a low-level parity in naval strength and for the abolition or strong restriction of capital ships and heavy cruisers would make transpacific operations almost impossible to undertake. On the other hand, if rejecting the proposal meant the breakdown of the Washington System or retaining only certain qualitative limitations on warships, the U.S. Navy would lose a useful justification for naval expansion: the objective of building to treaty limits defended by President Franklin Roosevelt. Between the ability to fulfill one of its main institutional missions and a political argument for naval buildup, the navy eventually chose the former. The U.S. Navy General Board regarded Japan’s requests as proofs that Tokyo was seeking absolute naval hegemony in the Western Pacific in order to impose its own rules in East Asia.76 If politicians wanted to prevent this from happening and preserve the ability of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to protect American interests in the region, the Japanese proposal needed to be utterly rejected by the Roosevelt Administration. Admiral William Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, expressed this position during a meeting at the State Department, saying: “If we desire to give adequate support to the policies which we have been following in the past, such as the Open Door, the Nine-Power Treaty, the KelloggBriand Pact, etc., then we must possess adequate naval force.”77 In this regard, he added that the ratios agreed upon in Washington and London “must be maintained at all costs […]. Without [them], we could exercise no strength in the Far East.” For the U.S. Navy, the preservation of the Washington System as it stood after the 1930 London Conference was essential for the success of a potential use of naval forces as an instrument of coercion in Asia. The fact that naval officers regarded warships this way was normal, being in line with their institutional interests and missions and their understanding of armed forces as a central element of foreign policy. More telling was the fact that American politicians adopted the same perspective when approaching the issue of naval arms control. In the United States too, the perception the government had of its international environment was

75 Heinrichs, Jr., The Role of the United States Navy, 210. 76 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 201. 77 Idem.

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changing, the latter becoming more dangerous and restrictive. Consequently, the relevance of the navy’s insights and advice on foreign policy increased. An important number of people in the entourage of Roosevelt pointed out to the President the necessity of maintaining a large navy.78 It did not mean that they fostered the use of naval forces to defend American interests in Asia, many of them being highly reluctant to this idea and eager to preserve the Washington System as a diplomatic instrument to keep cooperating with Tokyo.79 Rather, the objective was to give teeth to the American foreign policy, showing Japan that the United States had the capacity to back this policy by force and deterring the country from further continental adventurism. The U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William Bullitt, told Roosevelt that retaining a fleet larger than the Imperial Navy in the Pacific would help avert war with Japan.80 Ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew warned the President that the only way to preclude Japan from imposing a Pax Japonica in East Asia was to maintain the ratios of sea power as they were following the 1930 London Conference. Such arguments reflected the position of the U.S. Navy. This way of thinking about naval arms control ultimately reached the top of the American government. President Roosevelt rejected Japan’s demand for parity during the preparatory talks, saying that granting the country such a naval strength was equivalent to condone its violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and Open Door principles in China.81 Based on this recognition, Washington took an aggressive stance against Tokyo, telling the latter through the Consul General in New York, Horinouchi Kensuke, that it was ready to enter a naval arms race using the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act should the Second London Conference break down.82 Moreover, the head of the American delegation during the 1934 talks, Norman Davis, warned Yamamoto Isoroku that if the conference failed, the United States and the United Kingdom would join hands to outbuild Japan.

78 Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 34. 79 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 201. 80 Graebner, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese, 35. 81 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 200. 82 Ibid., 201.

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Facing the firm opposition of the Anglo-Saxon countries to the Japanese demands as well as the inflexibility of the naval institution and FPE in Japan, Yamamoto understood that the chances of reaching an agreement at the coming conference were virtually nil. After coming back to Tokyo in late 1934, he told Privy Councilor It¯o Miyoji that “the outlook for the next year is almost hopeless. We will have to think in terms of second-best measures.”83 The Failure of the Second London Conference The final instructions to the Japanese delegates to the Second London Conference, issued in November 1935, were worked out on the basis of the gloomy picture brought back by Yamamoto. Not surprisingly, the near certainty acquired during the preparatory talks that the Japanese requests would be rejected by the Anglo-Saxon countries did not change the approach of the FPE to arms control negotiations, the latter remaining faithful to the stance adopted on September 7, 1934. At the conference, Japan would demand nothing less than parity through a low-level upper limit in naval tonnage, the navy being opposed to any concession on this issue.84 The only change compared with the instructions for the preparatory talks was that Tokyo would seek the abolition of capital ships only, sparing heavy cruisers like other auxiliary vessels. The margin of maneuver of the delegation in London was almost inexistent, as was the one of the FPE and the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Hirota K¯oki was left with almost no space to devise a diplomatic strategy for the Second London Conference. The best he could do to provide a semblance of flexibility to the delegates was to insert in the instructions the possibility for Japan to achieve parity in naval strength by stages.85 He also hoped that, through backstage maneuvers, a rift between the United States and the United Kingdom over contentious issues could be provoked, leading to the breakdown of the conference like in Geneva in 1927.86 If Tokyo’s demands were rebuffed, as it would most likely be the case, the primary objective of the Japanese delegation would

83 It¯ o and Pineau, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 15. 84 Japan Defense Ministry, Kaigun gunsenbi, 467–8. 85 Ibid., 468. 86 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 313.

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be to withdraw from the Washington System while preventing Japan from bearing the full responsibility for the move.87 The growing clout of the fleet faction and the important control acquired by the naval institution over the formulation of arms control policy resulted in the nomination of Admiral Nagano Osami as the navy representative to the Second London Conference. The moderate and relatively open-minded Yamamoto Isoroku was replaced by a hardliner and protégé of Kat¯o Kanji in order to make sure that Japanese delegates would not retreat when opposed by the Anglo-Saxon countries.88 Indeed, “when the delegates met in formal conference in December 1935 with the hard-lining Adm. Nagano Osami taking over Yamamoto as the ranking naval officer of the Japanese delegation, the last possibilities for agreement had already been foreclosed.”89 At the Second London Conference, which opened on December 9, 1935, Tokyo based its demands on the principle of fuky¯ oi fushinryaku (no threat, no invasion).90 According to this principle, only parity at a low level of naval strength and the prohibition, or at least drastic reduction, of offensive vessels would place countries in strategic postures guaranteeing that none of them could effectively use naval forces against another member state.91 The Japanese proposal was presented as the only way to achieve mutual security. Inversely, the unequal ratios enshrined in the Five-Power and London Treaties threatened Japan’s national security. During the first weeks of the conference, Nagano argued for the Japanese proposal and specified that the common upper limit would be applicable only to Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom, the three major naval powers.92 He also made clear that the Japanese delegation was not prepared to discuss any qualitative limitations on warships before an agreement was reached on the quantitative aspects of Tokyo’s requests. The principle of fuky¯ oi fushinryaku reflected the military biases brought to Japan’s arms control policy by the Imperial Navy. Through 87 Berg, Protecting National Interests by Treaty, 216. 88 Ibid., 220. 89 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 298. 90 Japan Defense Ministry, Kaigun gunsenbi, 467. 91 Japan Navy Ministry, Sh¯ owa j¯ u nen kaigun gunshuku kaigi yobi k¯ osh¯ o ni okeru, 47–8. 92 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 314.

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this principle, the latter sought the ability to fulfill its main institutional mission, which was to deter the United States from undertaking a transpacific offensive and, if deterrence failed, to destroy its fleet in the Western Pacific. The navy was looking for perfect security, something that could be achieved only at the expense of other countries. For Washington to approve the Japanese proposal meant abandoning naval forces as an instrument of foreign policy in Asia, something the Americans were not ready to do. The United States and Japan held similar assessments of the strategic consequences of both the Washington System and the common upper limit, but the two countries’ interpretations of what this implied for the defense of their national interests naturally differed. For the Americans, the naval restrictions enshrined in the Five-Power and London Treaties granted the two countries equal security: they made unrealistic an American attack on Japan proper while allowing the U.S. Navy to protect the Philippines.93 Conversely, low-level parity in naval strength forestalled the defense of the colony. On the other hand, Tokyo argued during negotiations that by providing the U.S. Pacific Fleet with the ability to operate in the Western Pacific and protect the Philippines, the Washington System threatened Japan’s homeland because the fleet could easily head north from these geographic locations.94 Only the common upper limit could avert this. The assessments made by the two countries thus mirrored each other. This in itself did not prevent them from reaching an agreement and could have actually facilitated negotiations by easing discussions on the strategic consequences of naval arms control. The problem was that both the United States and Japan approached arms control through the lens of their naval institutions’ strategic requirements, pushing political and diplomatic considerations into the background. This was because bilateral relations in the mid-1930s were characterized by relative tensions and mutual distrust. Naval forces were therefore regarded by Washington and Tokyo as a central element of foreign policy, in line with the mechanism of contextual adaption. Consequently, the strategic needs of the two countries frontally clashed in London, precluding any diplomatic arrangement that could have paved the way for an arms control agreement.

93 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 203. 94 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 318–9.

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The respective institutional missions of the U.S. Navy and Imperial Navy were not different from the time of the Washington Conference. In the early 1920s already, the ability of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to transit through the Western Pacific was considered essential to protect the Philippines and American interests in Asia, a threat that needed to be addressed by the Imperial Navy. The major difference between the early 1920s and the mid-1930s in terms of naval arms control was that, at the time of the Second London Conference, to enable the fulfillment of these missions through compliance with the strategic requirements of their navies was the main objective of the American and Japanese governments. This was not the case during the Washington Conference. In the early 1920s, arms control measures coupled with the state of naval technologies prevented the United States from intervening militarily in Asia and granted the Japanese navy supremacy in the Western Pacific. The Imperial Navy thus obtained the ability to accomplish its institutional mission, inversely to the U.S. Navy that lost the capacity to undertake a successful transpacific offensive. Because bilateral relations were improving and relatively positive at that time, the United States did not need to base its foreign policy toward Asia on the assumption that it could have to use naval forces in the region. Instead of risking the collapse of the conference by pushing for an agreement more advantageous for its navy, Washington was satisfied with the Four-Power Treaty, which guaranteed member states’ insular possessions in the Pacific, and the Nine-Power Treaty that endorsed the Open Door principles in China. It is impossible to know with certainty what would have been, in the early 1920s, Japan’s behavior in case the Five-Power Treaty ran against the institutional mission of the Imperial Navy. Nevertheless, given the priorities of the government of Prime Minister Hara Takashi as well as the upper hand the FPE had over the naval institution in the formulation of foreign policy, it is likely that Tokyo would have chosen compromise rather than confrontation and isolation in an international system in formation. Similar to the United States, the main objectives of the Japanese FPE during the Washington Conference were to build constructive relations with other great powers and to put an end to the naval arms race, not to provide its naval institution with the means to fulfill its mission. In the mid-1930s, following the Manchurian crisis, the United States could not make the faith of the Philippines and the defense of its interests in Asia dependent only on loosely worded diplomatic guarantees, which

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efficacy was contingent on the goodwill of member states. In view of relatively tense relations with Japan and the latter’s expansionist tendency, Washington needed to be prepared to back its foreign policy by force. Fortunately for the United States, advancements in naval technologies had sublimed the benefits extracted from the higher naval ratios sanctioned by the Washington System, providing the U.S. Pacific Fleet with the capacity to threaten Japan in its own waters. Therefore, the American government was inflexible in its position that the system had to be maintained as such and utterly rejected Japan’s proposal for a common upper limit. In Japan, the deterioration of relations with the United States, misrepresented and overemphasized by successful securitization, raised fears that the latter would use sea power to support its foreign policy in Asia. To grant the Imperial Navy the capacity to prevent the Americans from intervening militarily in the region became regarded as vital not only by the institution but also by a majority in the FPE and the society as a whole. Improvements in naval technologies jeopardized the ability of the Japanese navy to perform its mission, and the only way to restore it was to either scrap totally naval limitations or enact new ones based on low-level parity in naval strength. This concern overwhelmed diplomatic, financial and economic incentives to mend ties with the United States. As reflected by the nature and content of the discussions between their delegations, Japan and the United States were in the impossibility to find any sort of compromise during the Second London Conference, trapped into antagonistic positions dictated by the strategic requirements of their naval institutions.95 The military aspects of naval arms control took precedence over its political and diplomatic dimensions. Although the situation in regard to the United Kingdom was slightly different, the latter also opposed the Japanese proposal, saying that parity through a low-level upper limit in naval tonnage was inconceivable because, inversely to Japan, it was both a Pacific and European naval power.96 On January 13, 1936, a little bit more than one month after the beginning of the conference, Nagano Osami received instructions from Tokyo asking for the withdrawal of the delegation if the Japanese requests were not met. Two days later, Japan left the Second London Conference and

95 Idem. 96 Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 314.

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the naval arms control framework established during the early 1920s.97 The country abandoned cooperative security for unilateral security, and because the Washington System was the last major international regime to which Japan was a member following the disengagement from the League of Nations, it entered a “non-treaty era” (muj¯ oyaku jidai) and a genuine state of “national crisis” (hij¯ oji Nippon).98 Indeed, “isolation was the price Japan had to pay” for withdrawing from the system.99 The United States, the United Kingdom and France ultimately reached an agreement on March 25, 1936.100 Intended to remain in force until December 31, 1942, the Second London Treaty did not contain any naval ratio or quantitative restriction, and qualitative limitations on the principal categories of warships were almost the same as those agreed upon during the Washington and 1930 London Conferences. The main innovation of the treaty was the establishment of a sophisticated mechanism for the exchange of information on member states’ naval buildup programs.

Overbalancing Through Naval Expansion Japan’s Shift Toward Unilateralism in Foreign Policy Relations between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon countries were not completely severed by the former’s withdrawal from the Washington System, and cooperation continued on several matters of common interest. Moreover, despite Tokyo’s disengagement from naval arms control, some in the United States and the United Kingdom still hoped to use instruments issued from the system to mitigate tensions in Asia and the Pacific. London, for example, proposed a tripartite agreement that would have extended the application of Article XIX of the Five-Power Treaty, related to the status quo on the fortification of Pacific islands, beyond December 1936, when Japan’s notification of withdrawal would take effect.101 In the same vein, President Franklin Roosevelt floated 97 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 323–4. 98 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 164. 99 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 204. 100 United Nations Library & Archives Geneva. 1936. Naval Treaty, signed in London,

25 March 1936. https://archives.ungeneva.org/traites-navals-traite-naval-signe-a-londresle-25-mars-1936. Accessed 19 October 2022. 101 Thomson, Jr., The Role of the Department of State, 97.

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the idea of a comprehensive neutralization of the Pacific in November 1936.102 Both initiatives failed to gather the necessary support inside their respective countries, however. It remains that in terms of foreign policy, the Japanese FPE had decisively chosen the path of unilateralism. On January 21, 1936, less than one week after the Japanese delegation left the Second London Conference, Foreign Minister Hirota K¯oki took the floor during a session of the Diet to expose his vision for the non-treaty era.103 More than half of his speech was dedicated to Japan’s responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia. The trilateral relationship between Japan, China and Manchukuo, and security cooperation with the latter, would be the bases and the main instruments of his foreign policy. The relations with the United States and the United Kingdom following Japan’s withdrawal from the London Conference were addressed in only a few sentences. In regard to London, Hirota declared that friendly relations needed to be promoted based on mutually beneficial trade and economic exchanges. With respect to the United States, the Foreign Minister asserted that relations of a similar nature could be maintained, and conflict avoided, as the two countries were now active in different geographical spheres. Therefore, Japan’s foreign policy in the post-Washington System era would focus on East Asia, where the country would defend its interests unilaterally and without any consideration for the stances of the Anglo-Saxon powers, which were expected not to interfere in regional affairs. The compilation of two documents, Fundamentals of National Policy (Kokusaku no kijun) and the 1936 version of Imperial Defense Policy, were other and more concrete examples of Japan’s shift toward unilateralism in foreign policy. Following Tokyo’s notifications of its intention to leave the League of Nations and the Washington System, two decisions that would become effective at the end of 1936, the Japanese military services strived to influence the decision-making process on foreign policy in order to advance their institutional interests in the non-treaty era. The navy took a decisive advantage by rapidly working on a position paper. In mid-March 1936, the institution established three committees “to study and formulate naval policy” and “prepare naval armaments that will give

102 Ibid., 98. 103 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, ge, 324–9.

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confidence in national defense in view of the fact that at the end of [1936] naval treaties will expire.”104 The outcome of their work was a document entitled Outline of National Policy (Kokusaku y¯ ory¯ o ), released in April. The document stated that Japan needed to expand southward, and “as a matter of course prepare to face opposition from the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands,” the latter possessing the Dutch East Indies.105 Japan had to be ready for armed conflict with these countries and with the strongest Pacific power, in particular, the reason why the document concluded that “naval armaments must be expanded to cope with the traditional policy of the United States in the Far East.”106 In other words, the idea of a southward advance was used by the navy to justify maximizing naval power.107 The Outline also touched upon aspects of foreign policy more closely related to the army. It provided for a limited increase in military forces on the continent to deter offensive actions by the Soviet Union and fostered the development of Manchukuo. These two aspects were inserted into the document to please the army, which was focusing on defending Japan’s continental interests.108 After the release of Outline of National Policy, inter-service negotiations began over the revision of Imperial Defense Policy, last updated in 1923. Sanctioned by the Emperor on June 8, 1936, the final document identified the United States and the Soviet Union as Japan’s two main hypothetical enemies and granted the United Kingdom and China the status of secondary threats.109 The two military services thus kept their traditional hypothetical, and budgetary, opponents. Not surprisingly, being a compromise between the navy and the army, Imperial 104 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 207. 105 Toshihiko Shimada and Masao Inaba, 1964, Gendai shi shiry¯ o, dai 8: Nicch¯ u sens¯ o,

1, Tokyo: Misuzu Shob¯o, 355. 106 Idem. 107 As Asada Sadao argues, “as far as the navy was concerned, the real object of the

southward advance was to build up armaments against the United States.” Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 208. 108 From the perspective of the army, the main concern at that time was the military reinforcement of the Soviet Union along the border with Manchukuo, where in 1935 the latter possessed three times the number of infantry divisions and five times the number of aircrafts of the Kwantung Army. The possibility of an alliance between the Soviet Union and China was another cause of uneasiness for the army. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 182. 109 Shimada and Inaba, Gendai shi shiry¯ o, 356.

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Defense Policy failed to decide whether the southward expansion or the defense of Japanese interests on the continent would be given priority. It nonetheless provided the two services with the military assets necessary to face their respective enemies in war, which for the naval institution included 12 battleships, 12 aircraft carriers, 28 cruisers, 96 destroyers and 70 submarines. The new version of Imperial Defense Policy mirrored the appetite of the military services for power maximization. To justify naval expansion and its quest for budget, the navy continued to push for enshrining the idea of a southward advance into an official document related to foreign policy. This first led the Five-Minister Conference to adopt Principles of National Policy on June 30, 1936, a document almost similar to Outline of National Policy released by the navy in April.110 Fundamentals of National Policy was subsequently approved by the FPE on August 7, after intense negotiations during the month of July between the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers, who strived to devise a unified and coherent foreign policy. Fundamentals of National Policy reflected the tremendous influence acquired by the naval institution on the FPE and the formulation of foreign policy. The document stated that “in both its diplomatic and security dimensions, national policy must be based on the maintenance of the empire’s foothold on the continent and on an advance into the South Seas.”111 Regarding the former aspect, the army needed to be provided with the proper resources to resist the Soviet Union and maintain Japan’s continental position, a formulation that was of course advantageous for the institution. However, the document also noted that Japan had to avoid provoking the Soviets and even seek a non-aggression pact with Moscow, the priority being to expand south while stabilizing the northern front. The southward advance was thus the active aspect of the policy, although it was explicitly said that it needed to be implemented peacefully. This was a clear victory for the navy, the institution being attributed equal importance with, if not more importance than, the army as an instrument of foreign policy. The document asserted that despite the peaceful nature of the advance, the navy had to “make the preparations in naval armaments necessary to secure the command of the sea in the Western Pacific

110 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 184–5. 111 Shimada and Inaba, Gendai shi shiry¯ o, 361.

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against the United States.”112 Therefore, “as Foreign Minister Hirota K¯oki recollected, the real aim of the ‘Fundamentals of National Policy’ was to justify fleet expansion after the Washington and London treaties expired.”113 The institutional biases of the Imperial Navy were absorbed by the Japanese FPE and deeply penetrated the decision-making process on foreign policy, and this to such an extent as to eclipse the position of other FDIB members. Adopted the same day as Fundamentals of National Policy, Imperial Diplomatic Policy (Teikoku gaik¯ o h¯ oshin) incorporated the general orientation of the former and detailed the diplomatic strategy that had to be put in place to address the threats to Japan’s national security resulting from its implementation.114 The diplomacy conducted by the Foreign Ministry was thus dedicated to mitigating the negative consequences of a unilateral and expansionist foreign policy formulated in line with the interests of the two military services, and of the navy in particular. Japan was ripe for overbalancing. Japan’s Overbalancing and the Road to Pearl Harbor To command the sea in the Western Pacific, that is to deter the U.S. Pacific Fleet from entering the region and to defeat it if it did, was the main institutional mission of the Japanese navy during the arms control era, and remained so in the non-treaty era. What had changed was the means through which this mission would be fulfilled. Following the Second London Conference, the notions of cooperative security and arms control were definitively forgotten and unilateralism, namely unilateral naval expansion, became the exclusive focus of the naval institution. The latter used the idea of the southward advance, to be undertaken mainly at sea, to justify its claims for budget and improve its military preparedness. The Imperial Navy pushed the FPE to implement an expansionist policy and maximize naval power. Japan overbalanced, the United States responded, and a naval arms race ensued. Japan’s first naval buildup program after its withdrawal from the Washington System was the Third Circle Plan (Maru 3 keikaku), often called

112 Idem. 113 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 208. 114 Shimada and Inaba, Gendai shi shiry¯ o, 363–5.

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Third Replenishment Program in the English literature.115 The Navy Ministry and General Staff began discussing the Plan in 1935, before the Second London Conference, the FPE approved it in 1936 and its implementation started in 1937. The Plan provided for the construction of 827 aircrafts and 66 warships, among which the super battleships Yamato and Musashi and two aircraft carriers of the Sh¯ okaku-class.116 The remilitarization and modernization of older vessels were also projected, including for the pre-First World War battleship Hiei. In the United States, naval expansion was going on under the 1934 Vinson-Trammell Act, dedicated to bringing the American navy to treaty limits within eight years through the construction of 1184 airplanes and 102 vessels.117 The Act put great emphasis on new assets of sea power such as naval aviation, aircraft carriers, submarines and logistic and support capacities. Naval power being still centered on battleships, the Roosevelt Administration also approved, in June 1936, the construction of two new warships in this category, to begin as soon as the replacement of older ships would be authorized by the terms of the naval treaties.118 They would become the 35,000-ton North Carolina and Washington battleships, built between 1937 and 1941 and endowed with great speed, strong armors and advanced fire-control systems. The first major buildup program launched by the United States after Japan’s official withdrawal from the Washington System in late 1936 was the Second Vinson Act of 1938. Mainly aimed at countering the Japanese naval expansion, the Act provided for the construction of 69 vessels, representing an increase of 20 percent of the naval strength of the U.S. Navy.119 The country was still subjected to the naval limitations imposed by the treaty signed with the United Kingdom and France in March 1936, during the Second London Conference.120 Therefore, the enactment of the Act was only made possible by an agreement to invoke the escape

115 Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 174; Tohmatsu and Willmott, A Gathering Darkness,

92. 116 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 357. 117 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 204. 118 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 354. 119 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 240. 120 The Second London Treaty came into force on July 29, 1937.

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clause of the treaty, contained in Article 25, reached between the three countries in March 1938.121 In the meantime, Japan had launched two War Preparation Acceleration Plans (Senbi sokushin keikaku) in 1937 to expedite certain aspects of the Third Circle Plan, including the modernization of large warships, the construction of smaller auxiliaries and the conversion of merchant boats for fleet service.122 Two other such acceleration plans were enacted in 1938 and 1939 with more or less the same objectives. The last of these plans was authorized in parallel with the second major post-Washington System buildup program of the Japanese navy, the Fourth Circle Plan (Maru 4 keikaku). The Plan was approved in September 1939, one year earlier than initially scheduled, in response to the Second Vinson Act. Given the speed of Japan’s naval expansion at that time, the Act would have left the Imperial Navy 300,000 tons and a thousand aircrafts short of the U.S. Navy in only five years.123 The Fourth Circle Plan was thus essential for Japan to keep pace with the United States. Bigger than the Third Circle, it provided for the building of 80 vessels, including two new Yamato-class colossal battleships.124 If up to this point, the Japanese naval institution had stood up to the challenge of the arms race with the American navy, it definitively lost the competition in 1940. The Third Vinson Act of June and the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act of July 1940 made it impossible for Japan to follow up. The former increased the naval strength of the United States by 11 percent through the construction of 25 warships and 1500 airplanes.125 The Two-Ocean Act was much more impressive. It enlarged the size of the U.S. Navy by 70 percent, adding 11 battleships, 18 aircraft cruisers, six heavy cruisers, 25 light cruisers, 115 destroyers and 43 submarines.126 The two Acts combined “amounted to more than 2 million tons, four times Japan’s

121 Arthur J. Marder, 1981, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941, New York: Oxford University Press, 14; U.S. Library of Congress, Second London Naval Treaty. 122 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 357. 123 Ibid., 358. 124 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 240. 125 Idem. 126 Tohmatsu and Willmott, A Gathering Darkness, 83 and 92.

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Third and Fourth Replenishment Programs put together (560,000 tons), and four times Japan’s projected air power.”127 Tokyo tried to respond to these astronomical buildup programs, being more than ever engulfed in a unilateral approach to national security, and began investigating the possibility of a Fifth Circle Plan (Maru 5 keikaku). A rough draft, ready in January 1941, called for twice the amount of construction of the Fourth Circle and comprised three Yamato-class battleships, two heavy cruisers, three aircraft carriers, 32 destroyers and 45 submarines.128 Even if the Plan was enacted, which many in Japan doubted due to the heavy burden this would put on a fragile economy, it was far from sufficient to catch up with the United States. Indeed, “to have even matched the American program of 1940 Japan would have had to double the proposed [Fifth Circle], and already in 1940 there were doubts about whether Japan could fulfill the provisions of the current Fourth Program.”129 In the early 1940s, half a decade of sustained naval expansion and growing military involvement in China had put extraordinary pressure on the Japanese economy. In late 1936, when Tokyo’s decisions to withdraw from the Washington System and the League of Nations took effect, the FPE had approved a national budget of 3 billion yen for the fiscal year 1937–1938, representing a yearly increase of 31 percent.130 Half of this budget was consumed by the military services. And the share of the Imperial Navy surged from 73 million yen in fiscal 1935–1936 to 206 million in 1937–1938, a rise of 183 percent in two years.131

127 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 240.

George Baer notes that under these two programs “the United States was building more surface combatants than it had in commission, and it had three times as many ships under construction as Japan did.” He adds that the acts were “greater than the funding of a decade of Japanese naval construction.” George W. Baer, 1994, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 169. 128 Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 217. 129 Hedley P. Willmott, 1982, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific

Strategies to April 1942, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 61. 130 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 186. 131 In fiscal year 1937–1938, Japan possessed one of the largest naval budgets of the

world. Stephen Roskill converted the naval expenditure of great powers in pound sterling and compared them for fiscals 1935–1936 and 1937–1938: Japan, 43 to 122 million pounds (increase of 183 percent); United States, 98 to 114 million (17 percent); United Kingdom, 60 to 105 million (70 percent); France, 23 to 27 million (17 percent); Italy,

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Japanese heightening military spending was financed by tax hikes on alcohol products and incomes and by the issuance of bonds. In parallel, large imports of raw materials from the continent and of finished goods from the United States to feed the war industry negatively impacted Japan’s trade balance.132 All these elements weakened the foundations of the Japanese economy and increased uncertainty about the ability of the country to continue on this path, a trend that worsened in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Because of economic difficulties and a chronic lack of national resources, the Fifth Circle Plan was put on hold and only two War Preparation Acceleration Plans were enacted before the beginning of the Pacific War in December 1941. The first, approved in May 1941, provided for the construction of nine small and nine medium-sized submarines, and of a few defensive warships with limited cruising range.133 Adopted three months later, the second Plan called for building one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, 26 destroyers and 33 submarines. Needless to say, these two Plans were insignificant compared with the naval expansion undertaken at that time by the United States. The confidence naval officers initially put in Japan’s capacity to win an arms race against the U.S. Navy was in retrospect irrational. The country could not follow up with the massive American buildup programs, and its ratio of naval strength vis-à-vis the United States consequently fell below what had been acquired through the Washington System. A study released by the Japanese Navy General Staff in July 1941 showed that Japan had 320,000 tons of vessels under construction, whereas the amount in the United States was 900,000 tons.134 The study concluded that Japan

14 to 19 million (30 percent); Germany, 57 to 121 million (113 percent). The actual figures for the United States were higher than those provided by Roskill, however, as the latter do not include the funds issued by the New Deal agencies. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 326. 132 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 186. 133 John R. Pritchard and Sonia M. Zaide, 1981, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The

Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-two Volumes, New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 26,668–9. 134 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiy¯ o Sens¯o Genin Kenky¯ubu, 1962–1963, Taiheiy¯ o sens¯ o he no michi— Kaisen gaik¯ o shi, Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 324. An American study presented at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East depicted an even worse situation for Japan. As of December 7, 1941, Japan had 88 warships under construction for a total tonnage of 375,459 tons (one super battleship of

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would possess 65 percent of the naval power of the United States in late 1942 and 50 percent in late 1943.135 Naval officers thus realized that they were losing the race.136 On the other hand, the primary concern of the Imperial Navy was not to win an arms race against the American navy but to fulfill its institutional missions and maintain the command of the sea in the Western Pacific. And, even considering the relative decline in Japan’s sea power, it remains to be proven that the strategic position of the Japanese navy on the eve of the Pacific War was worse than a decade earlier, following the imposition of new naval limitations by the 1930 London Treaty. By the early 1940s, flexibility in naval expansion acquired by withdrawing from the Washington System had allowed Japan to develop key naval assets for the attrition phase, to place bombers on Pacific islands and to build super battleships expected to be decisive during the final battle thanks to the extended range of their shells.137 In large part due to this flexibility, the study by the Navy General Staff mentioned above stated that the Japanese navy would have a chance of defeating the U.S. Navy as long as it retained more than 50 percent of the latter’s naval strength, which was the case in mid-1941.138 In the same vein, Chief of Staff Nagano Osami declared during an Imperial Conference that took place a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor that “if [the Americans] challenge us in a combat we are ready to meet them with a hopeful prospect of success.”139 Conversely, in the mid-1930s, naval officers estimated that nothing less than parity in naval power could provide the Imperial Navy with the ability to keep supremacy in the Western Pacific. Therefore, by rejecting arms control, the naval institution somehow managed to improve the efficiency of its strategy against a quantitatively superior U.S. Navy. Strategic flexibility allowed the Japanese navy to orient buildup plans toward the most relevant categories of warships to 62,000 tons was excluded from the calculation because its construction was suspended shortly after the keel was laid down), while the United States was building 1321 vessels for 2,431,937 tons. Pritchard and Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 26,649. 135 If outdated vessels were taken into account, the ratios were 75 percent and 60 percent, respectively. 136 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 356–7. 137 Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 35–6. 138 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiy¯ o sens¯ o he no michi, 324. 139 Pritchard and Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 36,375.

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fulfill its missions and be prepared to defeat the American fleet in the Western Pacific.140 The price to pay was an arms race and a declining ratio of naval strength vis-à-vis the United States. To summarize, whether the strategic posture of the Japanese navy was better in the mid-1930s or early 1940s is unclear. But the decision to withdraw from the Washington System was not totally irrational from the viewpoint of the Imperial Navy. After all, the latter was a military institution naturally attracted by the maximization of sea power. If the decision was not necessarily irrational at the institutional level, it definitely was at the national level. The disengagement from the Washington System destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating Japan’s relations with the United States and other great powers, further isolating the country. The sudden shift from cooperative to unilateral security triggered a naval arms race which occurrence was beyond any doubt for Japanese policymakers. Considering Washington’s relatively benign intentions and continued compliance with arms control restrictions, the FPE developed an inflated threat perception and overbalanced, and the United States reacted. The arms race exhausted the Japanese economy and heightened tensions and mutual suspicion between the two countries, precluding any diplomatic arrangement over contentious issues such as China. On the background of the Manchurian crisis, the rejection of naval arms control by Japan was thus a decisive step in a chain of events that ultimately led to the decision to bomb Pearl Harbor, and to the ruin of the country. Back to the Beginning: The Structure of Japan’s Civil–Military Relations In the mid-1930s, the Imperial Navy was striving to secure the command of the sea in the Western Pacific, inside or outside the naval arms control framework. The adverse diplomatic, financial and economic consequences of disengaging from the Washington System were not taken into account in the calculation of the naval institution. This was not its role to do so, its sphere of responsibility being limited to protecting Japan against potential transpacific operations by the U.S. Navy. Inversely, these foreseeable 140 The other reason why naval officers expressed confidence in defeating the U.S. Navy was that they could not openly say, without losing face, that they were not ready for a showdown with the United States after half a decade of intensive shipbuilding efforts.

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consequences should have been of paramount importance to the Japanese FPE, responsible for safeguarding national interests at large. They should have convinced the FPE of the necessity to refrain from overbalancing and to keep cooperating with the United States on arms control. This was particularly true since Tokyo maintained relatively tense but stable relations with Washington, and because the latter displayed no sign of aggressive design and had no intention of interfering in East Asian affairs, being absorbed by domestic issues amid Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives. The Japanese FPE began to perceive its international environment as more conflict-prone and restrictive in the wake of the exogenous shock of the Manchurian crisis, enhancing military influence over the decision-making process on foreign policy through the mechanism of contextual adaption. Securitizing efforts by the navy subsequently biased the perception of the FPE. And securitization was so powerful that the FPE eventually developed an inflated threat perception vis-à-vis the United States. The naval institution reached a dominant position among FDIB members, leaving no room for dissenting voices that could have forced policymakers to focus on the detrimental consequences of overbalancing. Dysfunctions in civil–military relations were the root cause of this undue military influence and interference in politics. They explain why the FPE absorbed the navy’s perceptual and policy biases, prioritized naval strategic requirements over diplomacy and international cooperation, and engaged in unfettered naval expansion. Defects in the structure of civil–military relations dated back to the early Meiji era, when Japan’s modern military services were created and the national defense regime regulating these relations was established. After a long period of isolation, Japan was pulled out of its hiding place and forced to confront the power politics brought by Western countries to East Asia. The Treaty of Kanagawa of March 1854 opened two Japanese ports to trade with the United States, and was followed by similar agreements with the United Kingdom and Russia.141 In July 1858, the American diplomat Townsend Harris obtained much more with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce.142 The latter effectively opened parts of Edo (Tokyo), Osaka and Kobe to trade and granted foreigners in

141 Japan Foreign Ministry, Nihon gaik¯ o nenpy¯ o narabini shuy¯ o bunsho, j¯ o, 1–6. 142 Ibid., 17–20.

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Japan extraterritoriality rights. Like the Treaty of Kanagawa, this agreement became the basis of others with the United Kingdom, Russia, France and the Netherlands.143 This series of treaties, especially because of the element of extraterritoriality, brought Japan closer to unequal treatment by Western countries. This put the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Japanese feudal government, in a difficult position, blocked between the prospect of gradually falling under the domination of these countries and the risk of conflict if their demands were rejected. Japanese leaders, who had only limited experience in dealing with the West after centuries of relative autarky, looked at China as a point of reference for facing the new external challenges. Japan had witnessed the imposition of unequal treaties on China, after the latter resisted Western demands and was then defeated by the United Kingdom in the First Opium War of 1839–1842. During the second half of the 1850s, when Japan came under growing Western pressure, China was being crushed by the United Kingdom and France amid the Second Opium War.144 Because Japanese leaders perceived the Qing Dynasty as more powerful than the Tokugawa Shogunate, they chose to avoid conflict with Western countries and accepted the terms of the agreements mentioned above.145 These interactions with the West had tremendous impacts on Japan’s domestic dynamics. The accommodating policy of Tokugawa leaders provoked the rebellion of daimy¯ o , or regional lords, opening a period called bakumatsu.146 The Shogunate was already criticized by some lords for having accepted the first series of treaties with Western countries in the mid-1850s. Then, during negotiations with the United States on the 1858 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Tokugawa leaders sought advice from Emperor K¯omei, and later his sanction of the treaty to reinforce the legitimacy of their policy of cooperation with the West. As the Emperor initially refused to give his approval, the Shogunate and the court split and a decade of domestic instability began.147 From the western parts of

143 Barnhart, Japan and the World, 7. 144 The United States was involved in limited military operations in support of the

Anglo-French coalition. 145 Nester, Power across the Pacific, 37. 146 Bakumatsu means “end of the bakufu,” the name given to the Shogunate. 147 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 1.

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Japan, the Ch¯osh¯u and Satsuma clans led the revolt against the Shogunate while hostility and attacks against foreigners surged.148 The bakumatsu period ended in November 1867 with the abdication of the last Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu. Threatened by Ch¯osh¯u and Satsuma, the Shogun left Kyoto for Osaka while the two clans obtained the consent of the new Emperor Mutsuhito to overthrow the Shogunate. Daimy¯ o troops seized the Imperial Palace in January 1868 and the imperial restoration, known as the Meiji Restoration, was proclaimed.149 The Boshin War that ensued between the Shogunate and its followers and daimy¯ o from western Japan, now allied with the throne, culminated in the victory of the latter in 1869. After the collapse of the Shogunate, leaders of the Meiji Restoration focused on domestic reforms to stabilize the country.150 The nationwide unifying and modernizing project that resulted in the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 also aimed at solving the dilemma Japanese leaders faced in their relations with the West. They were striving not to fall victim to Western imperialism, but were aware of the need to avoid confrontation because of Japan’s weaknesses, in terms of military strength in particular. If Japan wanted to resist Western countries, protect its national sovereignty and maybe find a place at the table of great powers, internal unification and modernization was the only way ohei (rich country, strong out.151 The motto of Meiji reformers, fukoku ky¯ military), reflected this mindset. This triggered much unrest and numerous rebellions, including the Saga Rebellion of 1874, led by Et¯o Shinpei, and the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 under the leadership of Takamori Saig¯o. The latter was the most important and erupted mainly out of the rejection of the creation of a unified national army that meant the disappearance of the samurai as a distinct social class.152 The suppression of the Satsuma Rebellion, the

148 Barnhart, Japan and the World, 8. 149 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 7. 150 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 12–3. 151 The United States played a relatively minor role in this process, although it was in

many regards at its origin. Conversely, Germany, France and the United Kingdom were very influential in shaping Japan’s institutional and legal reforms. Nester, Power across the Pacific, 54–5. 152 Barnhart, Japan and the World, 10.

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last serious opposition to the nation’s unifying and modernizing project, marked the end of domestic instability. As the centralization of the military and political apparatus moved forward, leaders of the Meiji Restoration continued to fear military intervention in politics led by statesmen and regional lords. They consequently put in place a series of rules dedicated to forestalling such interventions. The path chosen was to make the nascent military institution apolitical by strictly isolating it from the political world, based on the principle of separation between the military and the government (hei-sei bunri shugi). Meiji leaders first enacted rules to directly restrain the military. In 1878, the army released the Admonition to Soldiers. Military personnel had to refrain from “questioning imperial policies, expressing private opinions on important laws, or criticizing the published regulations of the government.”153 Two years later, the government published the Regulations for Public Meetings and Associations. They prohibited soldiers on active duty and those assigned to the first and second reserves from entering political groupings and participating in political meetings. Lastly, in 1882, the Emperor issued the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. The document requested them to “neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics but with single heart fulfill your essential duty to loyalty.”154 Interferences in politics by military personnel were also sanctioned by the army and navy penal laws. In parallel, Meiji reformers put the power to command troops out of reach of both statesmen and military administrators. The General Staff Bureau, operating under the supervision of the Army Ministry, was abolished and replaced in 1878 by an autonomous General Staff Headquarters responsible to the Emperor.155 The Chief of Staff was appointed by the latter and was independent of the Army and Prime Ministers. His right to bypass the two ministers and report directly to the Emperor on matters under his responsibility (iaku j¯ os¯ o ) was codified in 1885, at the time of the reorganization of the cabinet system. Finally, Article 11 of the 1889 Meiji Constitution stated that “the Emperor has the supreme command of the

153 Hackett, The Military: Japan, 344. 154 Idem. 155 The navy would not possess an independent General Staff until 1893, as it was lagging behind the army in terms of institutional development. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 49.

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Army and Navy.”156 Given his prerogatives, the article was interpreted by constitutional scholars as empowering the Chief of Staff with the right of supreme command (t¯ osuiken): the ability to issue orders about military operations and strategies in the name of the Emperor.157 The Prime and Service Ministers had absolutely no authority over matters associated with the command of troops. Service Ministers were only responsible for the administration of the military institution. The 1885 reorganization of the cabinet system granted them authority over affairs related to budget, personnel and the acquisition of military assets.158 The ministers had to report to the Prime Minister in these regards. And Article 12 of the Meiji Constitution read: “The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.”159 The article was understood as requesting the Army and Navy Ministers to assist the Emperor in these tasks.160 According to these legislations, Service Ministers were the military personnel most involved in the formulation of arms control policy, issues surrounding the level of armament being connected to the acquisition of military assets and the peacetime standing of the military. In the naval institution, the unwritten tradition was that the government, through the Navy Minister, was responsible for the matter and that decisions on arms control were taken considering the perspective of the Chief of the Navy General Staff.161 The Prime Minister thus theoretically had a certain control over administrative affairs, as Service Ministers belonged to his cabinet and reported to him. However, this control was weakened by the fact that the latter were customarily nominated by their services and chosen from the list of active officers. This implied that if the military services were dissatisfied, they could refrain from such nominations to block the establishment of the government or withdraw their ministers to

156 Japan National Diet Library, 1889, The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, https:// www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html, accessed 19 October 2022. 157 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 74. 158 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 64. 159 Japan National Diet Library, The Constitution. 160 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 74. 161 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 135.

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bring it down.162 This undermined the ability of the Prime Minister to interfere in military affairs in ways that displeased the services. Meiji reformers structured Japan’s civil–military relations in order to strictly separate the spheres of responsibility of the FPE and the military services, hoping that this would hinder unwarranted intervention in politics by the latter. Over the years, the principle of separation resulted in a dual government (nij¯ u seifu). The military sphere was extremely robust against FPE interference, especially when it came to strategic and operational matters, protected by the right of supreme command. On the other hand, the military services were sometimes able to penetrate the government sphere to advance their institutional interests, usually through their ministers who acted as their representatives to the FPE. The over-depoliticization of the Japanese military institution impeded sustained collaboration with the FPE. The two entities cohabited but essentially lived in two different realms, therefore precluding the development of a mature national defense regime that would have enabled them to cooperate efficiently while preserving a certain degree of autonomy from each other.163 Although their respective spheres of responsibility were relatively well delineated by rules, the military and the FPE lacked a shared understanding of the norms and principles governing their relations. And as Douglas Bland notes, “alterations of norms and principles account for conflict in civil–military relations.”164 Telling in this regard was the so-called “debate on supreme command,” which emerged when the cabinet of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, backed by the Navy Ministry, bypassed the opposition of the Navy General Staff and endorsed the 1930 London Treaty.165 The fleet faction invoked the right of supreme command to prevent the ratification of the agreement. Its legal argument was that this right provided the Staff with veto power on decisions related to the level of naval armament, because these decisions had direct consequences for war plans,

162 Hackett, The Military: Japan, 346. 163 Samuel Huntington observes that “the legal structure of civil-military relations in

the Japanese state was essentially one of military independence. The government was divided into two spheres: military and civil.” Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 130. 164 Bland, A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations, 10. 165 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 126.

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and thus for strategic and operational matters.166 Although the treaty was eventually ratified, the confrontation with the FPE greatly disrupted the navy’s internal discipline and marked the end of the “controlled navy” (t¯ osei aru kaigun), established during the second half of the nineteenth century based on the British model of predominance of the Navy Ministry.167 The debate on supreme command revealed the immaturity of Japan’s national defense regime, statesmen and naval officers clashing inconclusively over diverging interpretations of standards of behavior and decision-making procedures. Moreover, the national defense regime possessed no proper safeguards against undue military intervention in politics. The system of dual government gave the cabinet no effective tool to discipline the military and temper its influence among FDIB members and on the FPE itself. Meiji reformers basically counted on military self-restraint regarding interferences in politics, in line with the rules enacted in the late 1870s and early 1880s. This was insufficient and naive. When, facing the exogenous shock constituted by the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933, the FPE sought insights and advice from the military to navigate the changing international environment, it opened the Pandora’s Box. Military clout over the decision-making process on foreign policy grew. The latter became more coercive and unilateral, provoking negative international reactions which were used by the military services for their securitizing efforts, further enhancing their political influence. A vicious circle was set off, which the government was unable to break given the weakness of the national defense regime. Other FDIB members, and ultimately the FPE itself, rallied to the services. Japan espoused the perceptual and policy biases of the military and overbalanced.

166 Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics, 209. 167 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 67.

CHAPTER 6

Beyond Japan and the Pacific War

This concluding chapter draws lessons from the analysis pursued so far. The first part discusses the phenomenon of overbalancing as well as foreign policy and international politics in general. It is demonstrated that countries where the military institution possesses high political influence tend to pursue coercive and unilateral foreign policies, while those where military clout is low privilege a cooperative approach to international affairs. This leads to the conclusion that non-democratic countries are the most likely to overbalance. Moreover, the emphasis my neoclassical realist model puts on the impact the perceived geopolitical structure has on domestic politics allows arguing that overbalancing usually occurs in dangerous and restrictive international environments. In terms of international politics, because of the circular causation between the perceived geopolitical structure, domestic dynamics and the nature of countries’ foreign policies, international and security interactions are expected to remain geographically clustered, and the world characterized by peculiar regional dynamics and areas of peace and war. The second part closes the book with a discussion on the neoclassical realist agenda. Having shown the agenda’s potential to go beyond the explanation of deviations from neorealist expectations and to address

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_6

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issues of international politics, I argue that the analysis of threat perception should be given methodological precedence over the investigation of states’ motivation and their ability to mobilize national resources. This is because a state’s perception of the international environment determines to a large extent its motivation and priorities and its capacity to extract resources for foreign policy purposes. This hierarchy between domestic factors helps systematize the inquiry, while easing the search for parsimony. Finally, I lay down avenues for future neoclassical realist research on overbalancing. I also emphasize the necessity to identify relevant theoretical frameworks to navigate the high complexity of domestic dynamics and state–society relations in countries evolving in relatively peaceful and permissive international environments.

Lessons on Overbalancing, Foreign Policy and International Politics According to my neoclassical realist model, overbalancing takes root in the institutional biases of the military, which lead the latter to seek the maximization of military power. These biases penetrate deeper into the decision-making process on foreign policy when, following an exogenous shock, the government’s threat perception deteriorates, as the FPE feels the need for military advice and expertise to navigate a more unstable and tense international environment. In such circumstances, and depending on the preexisting structure of civil–military relations, military influence can surge to such a level that the FPE absorbs the perceptual and policy biases of the military, develops an inflated threat perception and overbalances. The model functions based on a circular causation. Through the mechanism of contextual adaption, the perceived geopolitical structure impacts domestic dynamics, which in turn alter the direction and content of foreign policy. And because foreign policy determines the behavior of countries, which are the main units of an international system, the essence of the latter evolves accordingly. Moving beyond Japan and the Pacific War, this causal chain, depicted in Fig. 6.1, can be broken down to extract lessons on the phenomenon of overbalancing and, more broadly, on international politics. Regarding the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, the nature of military biases, namely the tendency to distrust other countries’ intentions, to pursue worst-case analyses of international dynamics and to accumulate the largest possible amount of military

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Fig. 6.1 Circular causation between international environment, domestic politics and foreign policy

power, prompts the institution to promote a coercive foreign policy weighted against cooperation with other countries. Heir of the way Offensive realism understands international relations, the military is the institutional reflection of unilateralism in international affairs, which under specific domestic and systemic conditions can result in overbalancing. It does not mean that the absorption of military biases by the FPE precludes international cooperation, but this severely restricts collaboration on issues directly and indirectly related to national security, the domain of expertise of the military and thus the matter on which it possesses the greatest influence. Countries where the military institution has a powerful leverage on the FPE consequently tend to discard diplomatic and collaborative instruments and to emphasize the strengthening of military power as the most effective way to defend national security and interests. Foreign policy is coercive and unilateral, because the military dominates other FDIB members and eclipses their arguments on international affairs. These countries customarily perceive their international environment as hostile and dangerous, reflecting the biases of the military institution, which acts as a powerful perceptual sensor for the FPE. They also often see themselves as being in a self-help situation and possess a strong aversion to

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dependence on others. The ability of these countries to trust even their closest partners is limited, and especially when it comes to security affairs. A telling example of such countries is North Korea. Being under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il or Kim Jong-un, the reclusive regime has been dominated by the Korean People’s Army. The three leaders have held the position of Supreme Commander of the armed forces and most of their advisors have been high-ranking military personnel. The nature of the country’s foreign policy since its creation in the late 1940s is therefore not surprising. Focusing on maximizing military power to ensure national security and interests, Pyongyang still prioritizes today the development of nuclear weapons and missiles over collaboration with the members of the now-defunct Six-Party Talks. North Korea is sometimes labeled as paranoiac, perceiving other countries as either inherently hostile, the United States for example, or unreliable. Despite the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty and Beijing’s obvious interest in maintaining North Korea as a stable and strong buffer state, Pyongyang looks at Chinese security commitments and economic support with great skepticism. North Korea is the archetype of the offensive realist country. It is no coincidence that its state ideology, Juche, is usually translated as “self-reliance.” The evolution of China’s foreign policy in recent years is another example, although less extreme. What Beijing defines as its “core interests,” namely the preservation of the Chinese political system, stable economic and societal developments and the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, are all closely linked to national security. As such, they are nonnegotiable and worth going to war over. China is open to cooperation on many aspects of international affairs, from climate change and trade to anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations. However, matters related to its core interests are dealt with bilaterally at best, and most of the time unilaterally. This explains persistent tensions in China’s periphery, where the country is involved in territorial disputes, the strong rejection of any criticism of the Communist Party and of its policy in restive regions and the deep attachment to a model of economic development that has so far proven its worth. The increasingly coercive nature of the Chinese foreign policy, which relies more heavily on armed forces to safeguard core national interests, as well as Beijing’s growingly pessimistic assessment of its international environment, the government feeling encircled by American-led alliances,

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come amid a revamp of the country’s civil–military relations. After two decades of poor control over the People’s Liberation Army, the Communist Party began reasserting its authority in the early 2010s, culminating with the reform launched in late 2015.1 The centralization of the command of the military in the Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi Jinping, has enhanced military clout over the decision-making process on foreign policy. Inversely, countries in which the military institution has relatively little influence on the formulation of foreign policy have a greater tendency to cooperate on international affairs. To protect their national interests and security, these countries prioritize diplomacy and collaborative frameworks, such as bilateral, minilateral and multilateral security arrangements, over an approach that puts primacy on military power. Armed forces are not regarded as a central tool of foreign policy, but rather as an instrument of last resort, allowing for the emergence of expectations that disputes between these countries will be solved peacefully. Foreign policy and the appraisal of threats to national security are balanced and nuanced, because military biases are diluted by the insights and advice of other FDIB members. The Foreign Ministry often functions as primus inter pares in the decision-making process. Western European democracies are the best examples of such countries. Since the end of the Second World War, they have privileged a collaborative over a military approach to national security in their relations with each other, resulting in the gradual development of mutual trust and the belief that armed conflicts can be averted through dialogue and compromise. Thanks to their nuanced assessment of external threats, Western European countries delegated part of the responsibility to guarantee their national security to the United States through the creation in April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This further reduced the influence of military institutions in the formulation of foreign policy and opened the door to diplomacy. Most tellingly, the archenemy of Germany, France, began adopting a more cooperative approach, as exemplified by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in April 1951. The comparatively low influence of the military institution on the foreign policy of these countries was an enabling factor of the integration 1 Simone Dossi. 2018. “Upholding the Correct Political Direction”. The PLA Reform and Civil–Military Relations in Xi Jinping’s China. The International Spectator 53(3): 118–31.

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process that ultimately led to the formation of the European Union in the early 1990s. As Andrew Hurrell points out, “the immensely difficult task of politico-military co-operation and security could be left to one side [i.e. the United States]. The acceptance of security dependence was therefore one of the essential compromises on which European co-operation and integration was built.”2 In other words, deep intra-European collaboration was made possible by outsourcing security matters, reducing military clout inside European countries. Turning to the more specific phenomenon of overbalancing, the discussion pursued above and the analysis conducted in the preceding chapters lead to the conclusion that democracies have a lower propensity to overbalance than non-democratic countries. The democratic political system tends to effectively temper military influence in politics. This is particularly the case in Western democracies, where the state-building process has over the centuries contributed to the development of a structure of civil–military relations that neither over-depoliticize the military nor secure the primacy of the institution in the decision-making process on foreign policy. Over-depoliticization impedes sustained interactions between the FPE and the military, and thus prevents the formation of a robust national defense regime based on clearly defined spheres of responsibility and endowed with strong safeguards against unwarranted military interventions in politics. Military primacy allows the institution to bias foreign policy from a position of strength, North Korea being an obvious example. Western democracies’ national defense regimes and political systems mitigate the clout of the military institution over foreign policy for four main reasons. First, national defense regimes institute procedural and legal safeguards against undue military interferences in politics. Second, governments function based on the principle of consensus decisionmaking. This implies that compromises between the different FPE members are necessary to reach decisions on matters related to foreign policy, precluding the military from forcing its views upon the government and other FDIB members. Third, despite the fact that most Western democratic governments possess narrow executive bodies on foreign and

2 Andrew Hurrell, 2003, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, ed. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 48.

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security affairs, the principle of checks and balances provides for parliamentary and judicial oversights. Consequently, the formulation of foreign policy does not easily escape scrutiny and possible opposition by other state institutions. Fourth, Western democracies have vibrant civil societies and free and diversified media and academic environments. These actors pinpoint unwarranted military behaviors and, by conveying various opinions on international dynamics, make a potential securitization of external challenges by the military more difficult. The national defense regime and political system of non-democratic countries often lack some or all of these elements tempering military influence on the decision-making process on foreign policy. It is therefore unsurprising that two of the most evident instances of overbalancing during the twentieth century, Wilhelm Germany before the First World War and Japan in the 1930s, were endeavors of non-democratic countries.3 The national defense regime of democracies may of course be defective. These countries are consequently not immune from overbalancing. And non-democratic governments may find innovative ways to keep the political influence of the military institution in check, creating counter-powers in the form of paramilitary organizations for example. It remains that, overall, overbalancing is the preserve of non-democratic countries. This observation is reinforced by the nature of the scope condition of my hypothesis, resource mobilization capacity. The FPE’s ability to use national resources for foreign policy purposes depends largely on domestic dynamics, and in particular on what Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro call “state-society relations.” These relations are defined as “the character of interactions between the central institutions of the state and various economic and or societal groups.”4 State–society disagreements on issues related to foreign policy reduce the margin of maneuver of the FPE, the latter having to compromise with certain domestic stakeholders while overcoming opposition from others 3 The leverage of the German military on the government grew tremendously in the early twentieth century, before peaking during the First World War, in a sequence very similar to Japan’s. Martin Kitchen. 1990. Civil–Military Relations in Germany During the First World War. In The Great War, 1914–18: Essays on the Military, Political and Social History of the First World War, ed. Ralph J.Q. Adams, 39–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 4 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, 70–1.

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in order to capture national resources. The challenge is especially acute in countries where political institutions, namely “formal institutions, organizational routines and processes, and bureaucratic oversight,” do not insulate the FPE from societal interferences.5 As such, democratic regimes are expected to face more constraints than authoritarian regimes in processing national resources.6 And because difficulties in resource mobilization reduce the intensity of balancing efforts, democracies are less likely to overbalance than non-democratic countries.7 In the same vein, Aaron Friedberg argues that during the Cold War competition, the United States was more constrained than the Soviet Union in harnessing national resources because of “the basic structure of American governmental institutions, the interests and relative strength of various groups (both within the government itself and in society at large), and the content of prevailing ideas, or ideology.”8 The anti-statist bias engendered by these factors denied the American FPE easy access to national resources, impeding its military preparation against the Soviet Union. Coming back to the issue of national defense regimes, important questions are: Why does the military institution possess a high political influence in some countries and not in others? Why do national defense regimes regulating civil–military relations take on different shapes in different countries? This leads to discuss the impact of the international environment on countries’ domestic politics, another section of the causal chain between the perceived geopolitical structure, domestic dynamics and foreign policy. The perception a FPE has of the international environment impacts domestic politics through the mechanism of contextual adaption. This impact can be profound and long-lasting, affecting the country’s national defense regime and even political system.9 This is particularly the case 5 Ibid., 75. 6 Similarly, Fareed Zakaria argues that the inability of the American government to

mobilize national resources explains the United States’ underexpansion during the 1865– 1889 period. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. 7 See Fig. 2.1. 8 Aaron L. Friedberg, 2000, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism

and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5. 9 For a similar argument, see: Peter Gourevitch, 1978, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, International Organization 32(4): 883.

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when the state-building process is in its infancy or is still fragile. In the absence of subsequent drastic changes in the international environment, domestic dynamics and the structure of civil–military relations endure. Countries modeled in a conflict-prone and restrictive environment tend to be less democratic, more authoritarian and endowed with national defense regimes weaker against military interventions in politics than countries shaped by a relatively peaceful and permissive environment. More often, as in the Japanese case and other mature political systems, the domestic consequences of changes in the perceived geopolitical structure are confined to altering the relative degree of involvement and influence of different FDIB members in the decision-making process on foreign policy, and sometimes the composition of the FDIB itself. According to the mechanism of contextual adaption, the more unstable and tense the international environment is, the higher the influence the military institution has on the formulation of foreign policy. This is the reason why unilateralism in foreign policy as well as overbalancing are provoked by systemic dynamics and cannot be explained by domestic and institutional factors alone. If the military is the source of unilateralism and overbalancing, the perceived geopolitical structure is the key variable that determines the extent to which military biases are integrated into foreign policy. North Korea was established in 1948 as international tensions were rising in East Asia, a region fractured by the growing opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The state-building process consolidated during the Korean War of 1950–1953, and the country then stayed at the frontline of the Cold War until the early 1990s. The end of the confrontation between the two superpowers and the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea’s closest partner at that time, only reinforced the perception the government had of its vulnerability to external threats, from South Korea and the United States in particular. No drastic change in the international environment that could have modified Pyongyang’s perceived geopolitical structure occurred during the over 70 years of existence of the country. The understanding by North Korean leaders that their country has always been and remains engulfed in a highly dangerous and restrictive environment accounts for the centrality of the military institution in the political system, its unrivaled influence on foreign policy and thus the latter’s coercive and unilateral nature. In the wake of the Second World War, Western European countries were anxious about the possible resurgence of a strong Germany, which

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could have once again disrupted regional stability, and about the growing threat from the Soviet Union. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, initially dedicated “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” eased this anxiety by ensuring that the United States would prevent the reemergence of the German threat and counter Soviet ambitions in Europe.10 This changed the perception Western European countries had of their international environment, mitigating the sense of insecurity that had predominated in the region for most of the first half of the twentieth century. Consequently, the influence of their military institutions on foreign policy gradually declined, allowing for the emergence of constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation between them. The neutralization of Germany and clear American security commitments were drastic changes in the international environment of Western European countries. Not all Western democracies followed this path, however. The United States was an exception, because the German and Japanese threats were rapidly replaced by an even greater one, the Soviet Union. The military power projection capabilities of the latter, best reflected by its strategic bombers and then intercontinental ballistic missiles, were perceived by Washington as an existential threat to national security.11 The United States remained on high alert during the Cold War, and its military institution maintained a relatively strong influence on the government. Concepts such as the “military-industrial complex” emerged, national security was assured through the maximization of military power and foreign policy tended toward unilateralism in many regards.12 After the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the perception American leaders had of the international environment improved, military influence declined and unilateralism in foreign policy receded. In the relatively peaceful and permissive environment of the 1990s, the government

10 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, The US and Europe: Continental Drift? International Affairs 76(1): 53. 11 Western European countries, although under threat by the Warsaw Pact, were less involved in the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and felt less acutely endangered because of the protection provided by the United States and its conventional and nuclear umbrellas. 12 Alex Roland. 2007. The Military-Industrial Complex: Lobby and Trope. In The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II , ed. Andrew J. Bacevich, 335–70. New York: Columbia University Press.

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focused mainly on domestic issues, especially during the administration of William Clinton, while foreign policy grew increasingly multilateral and cooperative. The 9/11 terror attacks, an exogenous shock, reversed the mechanism of contextual adaption and resulted in an aggressively unilateral foreign policy. Civil–military relations during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations were often tense, particularly over strategic and operational matters related to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, mirroring the expanding military clout.13 Recently, transnational terrorism has been replaced by China and Russia as the main threats to American national security. Given the complex challenges posed by these countries, this will likely sustain military influence for the decades to come. Since 1945, the United States has somehow taken the heat out of the international environment in Europe. This has allowed European countries to pass on part of their responsibility in terms of national security to Washington and to focus on regional cooperation and integration. This has also had consequences for American domestic dynamics and civil–military relations, however. It was the price the United States had to pay for sharing the burden of other countries’ security. On the rewarding side, it is interesting to note that most of the countries where democracy has flourished and national defense regimes have kept military leverage at a low level in the post-Second World War era, from Europe to Japan, Australia and New Zealand, have benefited from American security guarantees. Of course, this phenomenon is explained by a multitude of factors, many of which are country-specific. It remains that the provision by the United States of a relatively permissive international environment was certainly one of them. Regarding overbalancing, this discussion on the impact of the perceived geopolitical structure on countries’ domestic politics leads to conclude that the endeavor should take place only in conflict-prone and restrictive international environments. Indeed, I have hypothesized that overbalancing occurs when the FPE develops an inflated threat perception in the wake of an exogenous shock, which by definition is the materialization of an international challenge to national security. And because, whatever the intensity of the military institution’s securitizing efforts, the FPE’s threat perception always possesses roots in the contextual reality, 13 Thomas Sheppard and Bryan Groves. 2015. Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations: Room for Improvement. Strategic Studies Quarterly 9(3): 62–87.

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it is hard to imagine that a country could overbalance in a relatively peaceful and permissive environment, and this even if its political system and national defense regime grant the military a strong influence on the decision-making process on foreign policy. Therefore, based on the earlier observation that non-democratic countries have the highest propensity to overbalance, it can be argued that the domestic and systemic circumstances under which overbalancing is most likely to occur are when such countries evolve in a tense and unstable international environment. The historical record seems to substantiate this conclusion. The last section of the causal chain, namely the impact of countries’ foreign policies on the essence of the international environment, completes the circular causation between the perceived geopolitical structure, domestic politics and foreign policy. This causation provides a broad picture of the various regional dynamics that compose the current international system, and thus insights into international politics in general. The mechanism of contextual adaption conceptualizes domestic dynamics in such a way as to shed light on the process through which domestic factors interplay with systemic factors in a mutually reinforcing manner. As such, the mechanism allows approaching countries’ behaviors, the interactions between them and international politics. This is in line with the recent aspiration of the neoclassical realist agenda. Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell note: We argue that neoclassical realist theory can explain political phenomena ranging from short-term crisis decision-making, foreign policy behavior, and patterns of grand strategic adjustment of individual states, to systemic outcomes, and ultimately to the evolution of the structure of the international system itself. We, thus, go well beyond the theories of foreign policy behavior associated with the extant neoclassical realist literature, which address anomalous cases for structural realism or seek to explain foreign policy behavior.14

14 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

1. The authors call Type III the latest strain of neoclassical realist arguments interested in international politics. Type I arguments are dedicated to explaining deviations from neorealist expectations while Type II arguments focus on countries’ foreign policies broadly defined as well as grand strategies. Ibid., 12.

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International dynamics are made of the repetition of interactions between countries. Consequently, systemic changes are most of the time gradual and the international system usually evolves slowly. This, in light of the mechanism of contextual adaption, implies that the degree of involvement and influence of different FDIB members in the formulation of countries’ foreign policies remains relatively stable over time. The foreign policy being the resultant of bargains and struggles between domestic political forces, this stability results in a certain continuity in countries’ behaviors on the international scene. And this continuity, in turn, reinforces the prevailing nature of the international system, as this nature is largely determined by the behaviors of systemic units, namely countries.15 Therefore, my neoclassical realist model is not only useful for foreign policy analysis, but it also helps comprehend international politics. Because international and especially security interactions are primarily geographically clustered, different regions are characterized by peculiar and relatively stable dynamics.16 Some, like Europe and North America, have enjoyed rather risk-free and permissive international environments for decades. Most countries in these regions are democratic and the political influence of their military institutions is low to moderate. Their foreign policies are mostly accommodating, collaborative and balanced, strengthening the peaceful nature of regional dynamics. On the other hand, countries in the Middle East have evolved in a restrictive environment characterized by international tensions. A large proportion of these countries are non-democratic. And from Iran to Israel, from Saudi Arabia to Türkiye, military clout in domestic politics is important and foreign policies tend to be coercive and unilateral, fueling regional hostilities. The situation in East Asia is relatively similar, with the notable exceptions of Japan and South Korea, two

15 Robert Jervis, 1997, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 7. 16 This assertion resonates with the concept of “regional security complex” developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. In their words, “anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it.” Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 2003, Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46.

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democratic countries that maintain their military institutions in a submissive position and pursue cooperative foreign policies. As said earlier, these exceptions are partially explained by the security commitments of the United States. American retrenchment would likely constitute an exogenous shock for these two countries, with tremendous consequences for their domestic politics, foreign policies and ultimately regional stability. These regional dynamics reflect a general tendency rather than a robust rule, as many factors other than those mentioned above enter into the equation. It remains that because of the mutually reinforcing pattern of interaction between domestic and systemic factors entailed by the circular causation, these dynamics cannot be easily reversed. The world will likely continue to be composed of areas of peace and war, although their contours will evolve through transfers of tensions and appeasements between regions. Countries at the edge of these regions, such as Türkiye, Eastern European countries, Southeast Asian countries as well as the Japanese and South Korean exceptions, are the most exposed to changes in threat perception, domestic politics and foreign policy, and will thus be at the center of geopolitical struggles between great powers trying to shape international dynamics to their advantage.

On the Neoclassical Realist Agenda By conceptualizing the interplay between systemic stimuli, domestic factors and countries’ behaviors, the neoclassical realist model developed in this book has demonstrated its value in accounting for instances of overbalancing. Some scholars, like Sebastian Rosato and Joseph Parent, would argue that “at least where great power balancing is concerned, one could dispense with domestic variables; strictly systemic factors would still explain most of the historical record.”17 The argument is partially correct in the sense that overbalancing, as a systemic pathology deviating from neorealist predictions, can be expected to remain an exception in international affairs. This should not hinder the investigation of the phenomenon, however. Overbalancing not only has occurred and will continue to occur sporadically, but its international consequences are also such that neglecting it would be irresponsible. Indeed, Japan’s overbalancing in the mid-1930s marked the start of its rush to the Pacific War.

17 Fiammenghi et al., Correspondence, 196.

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My neoclassical realist model provides a useful framework for foreign policy analysis and also helps understand certain aspects of international politics. The potential of Neoclassical realism as a research agenda therefore extends beyond explaining inconsistencies with neorealist expectations. To exploit this potential, scholars should formulate a proper transmission belt for cross-level analysis while aiming at parsimonious explanations of international phenomena. The primacy of systemic factors must be retained and a rigorous theoretical model must be devised to mitigate the temptation of ad hoc introductions of domestic variables and sui generis arguments. Otherwise, neoclassical realists should give up on their ambition to comprehend international politics and limit themselves to foreign policy analysis. I aim at reconciling the need for both parsimonious and detailed analyses of countries’ behaviors and international politics, and at mitigating what William Wohlforth describes as the “cruel but familiar trade-off of rigor and parsimony in favor of richness and detail.”18 Although the departure from purely systemic neorealist models was a welcome development in the realist paradigm, neoclassical realists should not fall into the trap of case-specific arguments. Back in 1998, Gideon Rose warned that “a major challenge [neoclassical realists] confront, however, is their appreciation of the degree to which their central, parsimonious independent variable needs to be studied in conjunction with a variety of messy contextual factors in order to say much of interest about their subject matter.”19 The search for parsimony should remain the priority, whereas the introduction of domestic intervening variables should be kept to the minimum necessary to explain countries’ behaviors and international politics.20 Doing so requires retaining a certain level of abstraction. 18 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, 15. 19 Rose, Neoclassical Realism, 166.

Referring to the risk of falling into case-specific arguments, Rose anticipated that “if neoclassical realists continue to incorporate unit-level intervening variables into their basic power-oriented argument, ironically, they might find themselves bumping into chastened Innenpolitikers coming from the other direction.” Ibid., 170. 20 This is one of the reasons why perception is here regarded as a political construction

resulting from negotiations between domestic entities. To include “leader images” into the equation, or the “set of core values, beliefs, and images” that “inform how leaders process information,” would add an extra layer of complexity, elicit sui generis arguments and endanger the search for parsimony. Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, 62.

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In the mechanism of contextual adaption, the political construction of threat perception acts as the transmission belt between systemic stimuli and foreign policy outcomes. This is one approach to bridging the systemic-domestic divide, and I do not pretend it is the best or the only one. Nonetheless, the mechanism establishes a valuable hierarchy between domestic factors by emphasizing the centrality of threat perception as a political construct. First, and inversely to the other intervening variables suggested by the neoclassical realist agenda, threat perception is domestically built but rooted in systemic dynamics because it constitutes the subjective reflection FPE and FDIB members have of the international environment. Second, the nature of a state’s perceived geopolitical structure determines to a large extent its motivation and priorities in international affairs, and consequently its ability to harness national resources for foreign policy purposes. The search for parsimony thus entails that neoclassical realist studies start with an inquiry into threat perception, the latter taking methodological precedence over other intervening variables. There is no doubt that state motivation is a crucial element for understanding overbalancing, countries’ behaviors and international politics more broadly.21 As Patrick James emphasizes, “hypotheses about the impact of different system structures ultimately depend on assumptions about the motives behind state behavior.”22 And, as already discussed, the ability of states to mobilize national resources is a potentially important intervening variable because it may impact the intensity of balancing efforts as well as other behavioral patterns on the international scene. I argue, however, that threat perception decisively influences states’ motivation, priorities and capacity to harness national resources. To understand how, the “house on fire” analogy offered by Arnold Wolfers provides a useful starting point. He says: “Imagine a number of individuals, varying widely in their predispositions, who find themselves inside a house on fire. It would be perfectly realistic to expect that these individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel compelled to run towards the exit. General fears of losing their cherished possession of life, coupled with the stark external threat to life, would produce the same reaction, 21 Richard Rosecrance, 1995, Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The “Goldilocks Problem” in International Strategy (A Review Essay), International Security 19(4): 160–1. 22 Patrick James, 1995, Structural Realism and the Causes of War, Mershon International Studies Review 39(2): 190.

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whatever the psychological peculiarities of the actors.”23 A house on fire reflects what is here considered a restrictive international environment, characterized by a high level of tensions and short-term threats to national security. The house is not always on fire, however. The international environment is sometimes and in some regions permissive and relatively peaceful, with countries facing no imminent security threats. Wolfers alludes to such an environment in the following terms: A different situation would arise if, instead of being on fire, the house in question merely were overheated. […] The reactions of different inhabitants might range all the way from hurried window-opening and loud complaints to complete indifference. To formulate expectations concerning behavior in an overheated house, one would need intimate knowledge of the varying individual predispositions and of the symptoms by which they could be recognized. Here, then, the decision-making approach would become necessary to supplement vague generalizations about reactions to discomfort that might be deduced from human nature in general, and such supplementation would become the more necessary the less overheated the house.24

The house on fire analogy is relevant to investigate state motivation. Most neorealist scholars take for granted that countries’ priority is security/survival.25 This is a pertinent assumption when the international environment is characterized by tensions and conflicts. On the other hand, neoliberals tend to argue that the acquisition of economic wealth is the main focus of countries. This is, once again, a logical assumption in a benign environment where the probability of armed conflicts is low. In such circumstances, countries have the luxury of putting the objective of 23 Arnold Wolfers, 1962, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 13. 24 Ibid., 13–4. 25 A notable exception is a group of scholars called “motivational realists” by Andrew

Kydd. These scholars argue that countries do not necessarily focus on security/survival and may seek power, influence, territorial expansion or other similar achievements that go beyond the minimum necessary for security/survival. Some neoclassical realists, like Randall Schweller, are classified by Kydd as motivational realists, which is not surprising given the fact that the above-mentioned state motivations contradict a central neorealist assumption. Andrew Kydd, 1997, Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other, Security Studies 7(1): 115–6.

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increasing their wealth for domestic political stability and the well-being of their citizens above national defense. I contend that both neorealists and neoliberals are correct in their assumptions about state motivation, depending on the nature of the international environment in which countries evolve. Like the individuals in Wolfers’ house, the motivation and thus priorities of countries are largely determined by the perception they have of their environment.26 When the perceived geopolitical structure is conflict-prone and restrictive, the FPE adopts neorealist priorities and focuses on national security. To survive eclipses other potential motivations, because the house is burning and physical integrity, if not life, is at stake.27 Inversely, if there is no fire in sight, the FPE feels secure and does not need to dedicate much time and energy to deter aggression and prepare for armed conflict. In a peaceful and permissive environment, the FPE has other priorities than guaranteeing national security and is often motivated by the accumulation of economic wealth and other related objectives. This line of thought is shared by Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, who say: Neoclassical realism stipulates that the foreign policy executive has three sets of goals: (1) to preserve the state’s physical survival and political autonomy; (2) to maintain its power position; and (3) to safeguard all other ideological, religious, political, social, and economic goals they may possess. The foreign policy executive will prioritize the first set of goals. Nonetheless, when a state faces a permissive international security environment, the foreign policy executive may have the luxury of focusing on the second and third sets.28

The fact that state motivation and priorities vary with the FPE’s perception of the international environment has far-reaching consequences for its ability to mobilize national resources for foreign policy 26 Benjamin O. Fordham, The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 256. 27 Hedley Bull, comparing people in domestic societies and countries in the society of states, notes that “unless men enjoy some measure of security against the threat of death or injury at the hand of others, they are not able to devote energy or attention enough to other objects to be able to accomplish them.” Hedley Bull, 1977, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London: Macmillan, 5. 28 Fiammenghi et al., Correspondence, 198.

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purposes. All other things being equal, the more dangerous and restrictive the perceived geopolitical structure, the greater the FPE’s capacity to harness resources to face external threats and the lower the impact of domestic factors on its ability to adapt the foreign policy to systemic dynamics. Of course, this is a tendency rather than a rule. But this tendency allows creating a hierarchy between threat perception and resource mobilization, the pivotal domestic elements of the neoclassical realist agenda. Discussing these two elements, Barbara Kunz and Ilai Saltzman note that “first and foremost, neoclassical realism needs to establish a hierarchy of intervening variables and specify the conditions under which they can be expected to play more or less dominant roles.”29 I argue that threat perception takes precedence over resource mobilization because of its influence on state motivation. As discussed, countries strive to survive and the FPE focuses on guaranteeing national security when the geopolitical structure is perceived as restrictive. Consequently, the raison d’état dominates and provides the FPE with a strong impetus to overcome the domestic obstacles to resource mobilization that may stand in the way of the formulation and implementation of an effective foreign policy. Norrin Ripsman notes that in a conflict-prone international environment, “when the margin of error is minimal, the national security executive will have powerful incentives to ignore domestic political interests and formulate security policy with the overriding goal of securing the state.”30 An acute, and a fortiori inflated, threat perception not only provides the FPE with the incentive to surmount domestic obstacles to resource mobilization, but it also helps the FPE to do so. Once consensus on perception is reached among FPE members, the state can activate institutional levers to push its agenda forward. The decision-making process on foreign policy verticalizes, reducing the number of actors involved and minimizing hurdles to resource mobilization. This does not mean that domestic opposition to the chosen foreign policy disappears completely, but it weakens extensively as the different elements of the state apparatus move in unison under the impulsion of the FPE. Michael Becker et al. observe that “a state’s potential for mobilisation increases in the 29 Kunz and Saltzman, External and Domestic Determinants of State Behavior, 109. 30 Norrin M. Ripsman, Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups, in Neoclas-

sical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 186.

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case of a tangible outside threat.”31 Similarly, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell argue that when the international environment is characterized by tensions and short-term threats to national security, the impact of state– society relations on foreign policy diminishes.32 And as mentioned earlier, the FPE’s ability to mobilize resources depends largely on the nature of these relations. The situation is different when the perceived geopolitical structure is benign and permissive. Because the international environment is regarded as relatively peaceful and the country does not face imminent threats, the FPE does not prioritize national security and instead focuses on acquiring economic wealth and pursuing other foreign policy agendas, such as expanding diplomatic influence inside international organizations, mending ties with another country and so on. What should be the priorities of the state and how to achieve national objectives become subjects of political negotiations. Consequently, the decision-making process on foreign policy horizontalizes and an important number of domestic entities offer inputs to the FPE. In the words of Ripsman, “we should expect domestic actors and interest groups to have the greatest influence over foreign security policy during stable periods when the state faces a low-threat international environment.”33 In such a benign international environment, state–society relations are central to the formulation of foreign policy. If the FPE decides to reinforce national security, through an increase in defense budget and the procurement of new military assets for example, domestic actors privileging other agendas will oppose the move and raise the hurdles to resource mobilization. As such, “the FPE faces the dilemma of mobilizing domestic support for (and defusing potential opposition to) its preferred external strategy.”34 Analyzing foreign policy then requires an in-depth investigation into domestic dynamics, the benign nature of the FPE’s perception bringing the latter to the fore. This does not mean that the analysis falls into Innenpolitik, because it starts with an examination of threat perception, itself rooted in the geopolitical structure. Rather, 31 Becker et al., Reviving the Russian Empire, 118. 32 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

94. 33 Ripsman, Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups, 186. 34 Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics,

94.

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the impact of domestic factors on the FPE’s ability to harness national resources for foreign policy purposes increases and thus deserves more attention than when the state faces an unstable and tense international environment. Take two countries facing radically different international contexts, North Korea and Switzerland. The North Korean government perceives its environment as intrinsically dangerous and consequently prioritizes national security over other potential motivations. FPE as well as FDIB members being convinced that national survival is at stake, they successfully use all the tools at their disposal to suppress domestic obstacles and mobilize resources. During the 2009–2019 period, North Korea’s defense budget as a proportion of gross domestic product was the highest in the world, averaging between 13.8 and 23.5 percent depending on indicators.35 Conversely, the FPE of Switzerland sees the geopolitical structure as relatively benign and focuses on amassing economic wealth and on advancing the well-being of its citizens. The country’s defense budget averaged between 0.7 and 0.8 percent of its gross domestic product during the 2009–2019 period, and the FPE faces serious challenges and opposition from various domestic actors every time it seeks an increase in military expenditures.36 Instances when the FPE perceives the international environment as either perfectly permissive or restrictive are two theoretical extremes of the same spectrum. Most of the time, the FPE is divided on its assessment of international dynamics. Certain FDIB members may try to convince the FPE that the country is gravely endangered in order to advance their institutional interests, and some FPE members may believe it, but no consensus on threat perception is reached. As long as no such consensus exists, the FPE does not prioritize national security over other motivations and state–society relations impede its ability to mobilize resources. In other words, only an intra-FPE consensus on threat perception decisively weakens domestic obstacles to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This is particularly the case when FDIB members unanimously share this perception, and are thus eager to provide the FPE with institutional levers to mobilize national resources with no strings attached. 35 U.S. State Department, 2021, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2021 Edition, https://www.state.gov/world-military-expenditures-and-arms-transfers2021-edition/, accessed 19 October 2022. 36 Idem.

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Several scholars have made arguments going in the same direction. Randall Schweller asserts that “balancing behavior requires the existence of a strong consensus among elites that an external threat exists and must be checked by either arms or allies or both.”37 If the FPE is divided on threat perception, domestic dynamics hinder balancing efforts and nonbalancing or underbalancing ensues. Similarly, Aaron Friedberg notes that one of the main conditions for appropriate balancing is an “internal consensus on the existence, nature, and extent of unfavorable changes, not just in one area but in several simultaneously.”38 The failure of the United Kingdom to mobilize national resources and address its relative decline vis-à-vis the United States in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was due to a lack of consensus on threat perception triggered by “organizational fragmentation.”39 Steven Lobell argues “that the degree of consensus among the FPE and key societal supporters about foreign threats will affect the efficiency and appropriateness of counterbalancing behavior.”40 He explains: I hypothesize that where a shift in a component of power of another state enables a foreign security policy coalition (consensus among FPE and key societal supporters), the FPE is unconstrained, and efficient in counterbalancing. Where a shift in an element of power of a foreign country disables a foreign security policy coalition (no consensus among FPE and societal supporters), the FPE is constrained since there is no agreement on threat assessment. The latter scenario can result in delayed, inefficient, and arguably inappropriate balancing.41

Lastly, the Japanese case shows that resource mobilization eases tremendously once the FPE reaches consensus on threat perception and prioritizes national security. After the United States became perceived as inherently hostile, the priority of the government in terms of foreign policy shifted from the maintenance of constructive relations with other 37 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 171. 38 Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 290. 39 Ibid., 280. 40 Lobell, Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy, 45. 41 Ibid., 46. See also: Hyon Joo Yoo, 2012, Domestic Hurdles for System-Driven

Behavior: Neoclassical Realism and Missile Defense Policies in Japan and South Korea, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 12(2): 326.

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great powers to guaranteeing national security. The FPE activated increasingly powerful institutional levers and obstacles to the mobilization of resources fell one after the other, as reflected by the growing budget dedicated to naval expansion during the second half of the 1930s and the early 1940s.42 The Japanese economy suffered extensively, but this was a conscious choice by the FPE. And the fact that the economy was on the brink of collapse when the Pacific War began demonstrates the colossal capacity a united FPE, backed by FDIB members, has to harness resources. Total war is an extreme example of this, as the perception of a threat to survival triggers the mobilization of all national resources— human, financial and material—in the form of a war economy. History tells us that this can happen in non-democratic and democratic countries alike. It follows from the discussion above that the scope condition of my hypothesis, namely that the FPE must be able to extract enough national resources to overbalance, could tentatively be relaxed in future research to broaden the scope of application of the hypothesis and expose it to greater risk of falsification.43 Indeed, a sufficient capacity to mobilize resources for balancing efforts is expected to result from the development of an inflated threat perception, because I hypothesized that the latter necessitates a consensus inside the FPE on the fact that an external challenge endangers national security. If the hypothesis holds despite the removal of the scope condition of resource mobilization, this potential intervening variable would be proven “irrelevant” in explaining the phenomenon of overbalancing.44

42 Naval budget peaked in 1941, amounting to 1,497,374,987 yen and representing 18.4 percent of the national budget. Kaigun Rekishi Hozonkai, Nihon kaigun shi, 118. 43 William Harris explains, in the context of theory testing: “If investigators take seri-

ously the challenge of exposing theories to greater risk of falsification, a theory’s ability to predict other pertinent results may lead to an increase in its power. It can be exposed to additional phenomena by relaxing its scope. That can be done by replacing a specific scope statement with a less restrictive condition or by removing one of several statements of scope conditions.” William A. Harris, 1997, On “Scope Conditions” in Sociological Theories, Social and Economic Studies 46(4): 125. 44 In the words of Martha Foschi, “when one relaxes a scope condition and proposes (or finds) that the relationship holds regardless of the level of the factor in question, one has identified such a [irrelevant] variable. These variables are irrelevant, but it is of theoretical importance to have shown that this is the case.” Foschi, On Scope Conditions, 538.

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This does not mean that resource mobilization, and state motivation, should not be considered by neoclassical realist scholars, but rather that threat perception takes methodological precedence because on it depends state priorities and the strength of the hurdles to the FPE’s exploitation of national resources. When a state is assessed to perceive its international environment as highly dangerous and restrictive, the explanatory power of the state motivation and resource mobilization approaches is weak. The analysis should be directed toward understanding how dynamics in civil– military relations impact the decision-making process on foreign policy as the latter verticalizes and the military institution gains in political influence. Conversely, when a state’s perceived geopolitical structure is appraised as peaceful and permissive, state–society relations at large should be the object of investigation. This is because the formulation of foreign policy horizontalizes and an important number of domestic actors try to shape the FPE’s priorities in order to advance their interests. It is in such circumstances that the obstacles to resource mobilization are the most potent at affecting the orientation and content of foreign policy, as several entities pursuing different agendas have the ability to put a spoke in the government’s wheel. Parsimonious accounts of countries’ behaviors and international politics also require a systematization of domestic dynamics. Because this book has focused on overbalancing, which most likely occurs in conflictprone and restrictive international environments, domestic politics has been approached through the structure of civil–military relations. This was a deliberate choice based on the recognition that overbalancing involves, by definition, the military institution, and on the conviction that the roots of the endeavor would be found inside this institution. The literature on military sociology and civil–military relations provided the theoretical background to investigate domestic politics. Neoclassical realist studies of countries’ behaviors in benign and permissive geopolitical structures should identify their own theoretical framework to navigate the complexity of domestic dynamics, which is high because comprising state– society relations, and to avoid falling into Innenpolitik. And parsimony should remain the priority. Simplify! Simplify!

Chronology

March 1854: Treaty of Kanagawa (Japan/United States). July 1858: Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Japan/United States). November 1867: Fall of the Shogunate. January 1868: Proclamation of the Meiji Restoration. January 1868–May 1869: Boshin War. 1872: Japan takes control of the Ry¯uky¯u Kingdom, which becomes the Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. 1873: Japan takes control of the Ogasawara Archipelago. 1877: Satsuma Rebellion. February 1889: Promulgation of the Meiji Constitution. August 1894–April 1895: First Sino-Japanese War. April 1895: Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japan/China), Japan obtains Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liaodong Peninsula. 1899–1901: Boxer Rebellion (China). 1899 and 1900: The United States issues the Open Door notes. January 1902: Conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. February 1904–September 1905: Russo-Japanese War. September 1905: Treaty of Portsmouth (Japan/Russia), Japan obtains the southern half of the Sakhalin. November 1908: Root-Takahira Agreement (Japan/United States). August 1910: Japan formally annexes the Kingdom of Korea. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1

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August 1914: Japan enters the First World War on the side of the Allied Powers, then takes control of Germany’s insular possessions in the Pacific and of the Shandong Peninsula in China. January 1915: Japan issues the Twenty-One Demands to China. November 1917: Lansing-Ishii Agreement (Japan/United States). 1918–1922: Japan’s Siberian intervention. January 1919–August 1920: Paris Peace Conference. January 1920: Establishment of the League of Nations. November 1921–February 1922: Washington Conference. September 1923: Great Kant¯o earthquake. 1926: Kuomintang starts the Northern Expedition. 1927: Sh¯owa Financial Crisis. May–August 1927: Japan’s First Shandong Expedition. June–August 1927: Geneva Conference. April–October 1928: Japan’s Second Shandong Expedition. June 1928: Chang Tso-lin is killed by Japanese soldiers. August 1928: Kellogg-Briand Pact. Late 1929: Wall Street Crash. January 1930: Japan reintroduces the gold standard. January–April 1930: First London Conference. September 1931: Mukden Incident. December 1931: Japan departs from the gold standard. January 1932: The United States issues the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition. January–May 1932: First Shanghai Incident. March 1932: Proclamation of the independence of Manchukuo. May 1932: May 15 Incident, Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi is assassinated. May 1932: Admiral Sait¯o Makoto becomes Prime Minister, putting an end to the era of party cabinets. September 1932: Japan officially recognizes Manchukuo. October 1932: The Lytton Commission releases its report. March 1933: Japan decides to withdraw from the League of Nations. May 1933: Tangku Truce Agreement (Japan/China). September 1934: Japan decides to withdraw from the Five-Power Treaty. December 1935–March 1936: Second London Conference.

CHRONOLOGY

285

January 1936: Japan withdraws from the Second London Conference. February 1936: February 26 Incident. December 1936: Japan officially withdraws from the Washington System. December 1941: End of the rush.

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Index

A Accurate threat perception, 16, 68, 72, 106 Adachi, Kenz¯ o, 145 Aircraft carrier, 78, 94, 96, 97, 115, 121, 211, 212, 231, 243, 245, 247, 248 Alaska, 95 Aleutians, 95, 167 ¯ Amami-Oshima, 95 Am¯ o Doctrine, 199 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 73, 90, 97, 101 Antung, 142 Appropriate balancing, 16, 22, 46, 68, 280 Araki, Sadao, 163, 201 Arita faction, 196–201 Arita, Hachir¯o, 196 Arms control, 1, 2, 8, 10–15, 22, 23, 71, 72, 77, 80, 81, 86–93, 98, 100, 104, 106, 110, 114, 116–118, 120, 123–126, 130,

133, 168, 170, 179, 185, 187–190, 193, 200, 203, 207, 208, 210, 212–214, 216, 218–228, 231–240, 244, 249–251, 255 Arms race, 1, 4, 5, 11–13, 26, 30, 71, 79, 87, 89, 90, 101, 102, 121, 129, 130, 185–187, 208, 217, 224, 234, 238, 244, 246, 248–250 Asian Exclusion Act, 118, 177 Asiatic Fleet (U.S.), 123, 163 Australia, 34, 74, 85, 95, 195, 269

B Bakumatsu, 252, 253 Battleship, 77, 78, 94, 96, 97, 115, 122, 124, 130, 169, 186, 187, 211, 231, 243, 245–249 Benson, William, 89 Borah, William, 90, 164, 165 Boshin War, 253

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1

305

306

INDEX

Boycott of Japanese goods, 99, 162, 163 Bullitt, William, 234 C Canada, 95, 195 Castle, William, 158, 165 Cecil, Robert, 158 Chahar, 153 Changchun, 142 Chang, Hsueh-liang, 112, 142 Chang, Tso-lin, 108–112 Chiang, Kai-shek, 10, 107, 109, 111, 112, 146, 153, 154, 156, 163 China, 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 18, 22, 34, 55, 72, 74–80, 82, 83, 91, 95, 97–100, 105–114, 129, 139–141, 144, 146, 147, 151–166, 169–172, 174, 177, 183, 187–190, 195–201, 203, 209, 215–217, 220, 234, 238, 241, 242, 247, 250, 252, 262, 263, 269 Chinchow (Jinzhou), 143, 144, 146, 159–161 Ch¯ osh¯ u, 253 Circle Plan(s), 136 Civil-military relations, 9, 10, 19, 20, 22, 23, 39, 48, 61–64, 66, 69, 208, 251, 256, 260, 263–267, 269, 282 Congress, 90, 94, 102, 129, 159, 162, 165, 168–170, 191 Contextual adaption, mechanism/process of, 22, 41, 44, 46–48, 57, 61, 71, 92, 106, 114, 137, 140, 154, 171, 201, 205, 208, 231, 237, 251, 260, 266, 267, 269–271, 274 Coolidge, Calvin, 117, 120, 121 Cruiser, heavy, 96, 120–123, 125–128, 131–133, 135, 136,

186, 210, 228–230, 233, 235, 246, 247 Cruiser, light, 119, 120, 127, 128, 131, 132, 135, 136, 228, 229, 246

D Daimy¯ o , 252, 253 Dairen, 113 Dawes Plan, 116 Defensive realism, 28 Democracy, 80, 177, 269 Department of State (U.S.), 156, 159, 166 Destroyer, 78, 122, 128, 131, 228, 229, 231, 243, 246–248 Domestic dynamics, 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 68, 71, 83, 252, 259, 260, 265–267, 269, 270, 278, 280, 282 Domestic factors, 4, 9, 18, 23, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 45, 47, 167, 260, 270, 272, 274, 277, 279 Domestic politics, 22, 23, 28, 32, 36, 39, 80, 124, 137, 232, 259, 261, 266, 269–272, 282

E East Asia, 18, 75, 78, 91, 102, 104, 105, 129, 155, 156, 160, 162, 165–167, 169, 170, 233, 234, 241, 251, 267, 271 Emperor, 104, 105, 134, 135, 143, 145, 148, 149, 154, 174–178, 186, 194, 224, 225, 242, 252–255 Et¯ o, Shinpei, 253 Europe, 74, 76, 78, 79, 82, 88, 93, 116, 119, 154–156, 203, 216, 231, 268, 269, 271

INDEX

Exogenous shock, 18–22, 39, 46–48, 50, 55, 57, 61, 62, 65, 66, 71, 83, 103, 106, 113, 137, 139, 154, 170, 201, 204, 251, 257, 260, 269, 272 F February 26 Incident, 14, 193 Fenghuangcheng, 142 Fengtien, 146 Finance Ministry (Japan), 114, 115, 123, 193–195, 197 First World War, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 87, 88, 91–94, 116, 120, 140, 144, 146, 188, 265 Five-Minister Conference, 204, 215, 224–226, 243 Five-Power Treaty, 12, 13, 15, 95–97, 102, 103, 115, 117, 120–122, 124, 125, 130, 136, 164, 211–213, 218, 220–227, 238, 240 Fleet faction, 134–137, 210, 212, 222, 236, 256 Foreign, defense, and intelligence bureaucracy (FDIB), 40–48, 50, 52, 53, 59–62, 64–66, 71, 72, 81, 83, 88, 92, 93, 100, 102, 103, 106, 108, 118, 119, 125, 130, 137, 139, 144, 147, 151, 152, 170, 171, 179, 193, 200, 201, 208, 213, 214, 221, 222, 244, 251, 257, 261, 263, 264, 267, 271, 274, 279, 281 Foreign Ministry (Japan), 41, 43, 73, 75, 81, 98, 113, 114, 128, 130, 134, 144, 146–148, 151, 153, 161, 196–201, 214, 215, 218–223, 225, 226, 228, 235, 237, 240, 241, 244, 251, 263 Foreign policy executive (FPE), 20, 39–50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59,

307

61–68, 71, 74, 76, 79, 81, 83, 86, 88, 92, 93, 100, 103, 106, 113, 114, 118, 119, 123, 125, 130, 137, 139–154, 166, 167, 170, 171, 179, 180, 185, 187–189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198–204, 207, 208, 212–227, 235, 238, 239, 241, 243–245, 247, 250, 251, 256, 257, 260, 261, 264–266, 269, 274, 276–282 Formosa, 95, 141 Fortification, Pacific islands, 95, 97, 99, 101, 118, 240 Four-Power Treaty, 97, 101, 238 France, 4, 28, 76, 85, 87, 95–97, 116, 117, 121, 130, 131, 147, 148, 153, 155, 160, 195, 230, 240, 245, 247, 252, 253, 263 Fushimi, Hiroyasu, 135, 186, 224 G Geneva Conference, 119–121, 123–125, 129, 131, 221 Genr¯ o , 15, 83, 134, 149, 150, 198 Germany, 4–6, 74, 77, 84, 85, 87, 116, 154–156, 172, 196, 197, 248, 253, 263, 265, 267, 268 Gibson, Hugh, 231 Gilbert, Prentiss, 160 Global International Relations, 8, 9, 65, 68 Great Depression, 113 Great Kant¯ o earthquake, 118, 171 Great powers, 2, 10, 22, 26, 27, 71, 72, 74, 79, 81–84, 97, 100, 105, 109, 110, 137, 139, 146–156, 166, 171, 183, 195, 197, 198, 201–203, 208, 215, 218, 219, 221, 222, 232, 238, 247, 250, 253, 272, 281 Great Wall, 111, 143, 153

308

INDEX

Grew, Joseph, 234 Guam, 95, 96, 102, 123, 135, 164, 167 H Hakk¯ o ichiu, 176, 200 Hamaguchi, Osachi, 124, 130, 133, 256 Hanz¯ o, Kanaya, 179 Hara, Takashi, 83, 103, 108, 181, 238 Harbin, 142, 143 Harding, Warren G., 90, 94, 95, 98, 102 Hawaii, 73, 79, 85, 91, 95, 96, 102, 105, 209 Hayashi, Senj¯ur¯ o, 180, 213, 224 Hebei, 153 Hiranuma, Kiichir¯ o, 135 Hirota, K¯ oki, 185, 196, 198, 199, 203, 223, 235, 241 Hong Kong, 95 Honj¯ o, Shigeru, 142 Hoover, Herbert, 14, 156, 158–165, 168, 170, 231, 232 Horinouchi, Kensuke, 84, 234 Hori, Teikichi, 103, 128, 135 Hornbeck, Stanley, 157 Hughes, Charles, 93–97, 100 Hull, Cordell, 223 Hulutao, 113 I Ichiki, Kitokur¯ o, 145 Imperial Defense Policy, 77, 78, 104–106, 108, 122, 216, 241–243 Imperial Navy, 12, 14, 15, 17, 23, 69, 77, 85, 101, 102, 122, 123, 130–132, 137, 171, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 193, 200, 209,

210, 214, 218, 222, 225, 227–229, 234, 236, 238, 239, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250 Inappropriate balancing, 4 Inflated threat perception, 16, 18, 21, 23, 39, 46, 57–59, 66, 68, 166, 207, 226, 250, 251, 260, 269, 281 Innenpolitik, 23, 34, 278, 282 Inoue, Junnosuke, 143, 145, 171, 201 Intervening variable, 33, 38, 67, 273, 274, 281 Inukai, Tsuyoshi, 83, 145, 172, 184, 200 Irrationality, 12, 28, 69 Ishii, Kikujir¯ o, 75 Ishikawa, Shingo, 186, 211 Isoroku, Yamamoto, 228, 234, 236 Italy, 85, 95, 96, 117, 121, 130, 131, 196, 197, 247 It¯ o, Miyoji, 235 J Jehol, 153 Johnson, Isaac, 163 K Kaneko, Kentar¯o, 135 Kat¯ o, Kanji, 13, 77, 103, 104, 106, 122, 135, 136, 210, 222, 229, 236 Kat¯ o, Takayoshi, 135 Kat¯ o, Tomosabur¯ o, 12, 78, 103, 104, 224 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 84, 99, 123, 146, 150, 151, 156, 157, 159–162 Kellogg, Frank B., 117 Kirin, 142, 143 Kita, Ikki, 174, 200

INDEX

Kobayashi, Seiz¯ o, 135 Kokumint¯ o, 83 Kokutai, 176 K¯ omoto, Daisuke, 111 Kond¯ o, Nobutake, 188 Korea, 72, 108, 140, 141, 143, 146, 154, 181 Kuomintang, 10, 108–113, 141, 153, 162 Kuo, Sung-ling, 109 Kuriles, 95 Kwantung Army, 108, 109, 111, 113, 142–146, 148, 153, 154, 157, 158, 165, 181–183, 188, 194, 242

L Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 75 Lansing, Robert, 75 League of Nations, 10, 90, 91, 99, 105, 116, 117, 123, 144, 150–152, 160, 161, 166, 171, 178, 183, 185, 189, 198, 202, 230, 240, 241, 247 Liaodong Peninsula, 108 Locarno Treaties, 99, 116 London Conference, 126, 129, 130, 132–135, 167, 187, 190, 226, 232–234, 240, 241 London Conference, Second, 189, 211, 212, 215, 218–220, 222, 225–228, 232, 234–236, 238, 239, 241, 244, 245 London Treaty, 130, 132–137, 167, 168, 178, 186, 211, 212, 221, 226, 227, 231, 249, 256 Lytton Commission, 150, 151, 161

M Makino, Nobuaki, 15, 82, 145

309

Manchukuo, 10, 149–154, 165, 183, 185, 189, 190, 194, 195, 199, 201–203, 215–217, 222, 241, 242 Manchuria, 10, 22, 72–75, 79, 84, 107–113, 140–142, 144–146, 148, 150, 151, 153–159, 161, 162, 165, 166, 171, 177, 179–185, 187–191, 194–199, 201–203 Manchurian crisis, 18, 22, 103, 113, 139, 144, 145, 148, 149, 154–157, 160, 164, 166, 170, 171, 174, 179, 181–185, 187–190, 192, 194, 196–204, 208, 214, 215, 217, 238, 250, 251, 257 Matsudaira, Tsuneo, 127, 227 Meiji Restoration, 253, 254 Middle East, 82, 271 Military bias(es), 21, 48, 59, 60, 207, 227, 236, 260, 261, 263, 267 Military interferences/intervention(s) in politics, 9, 10, 19, 20, 39, 47, 63–66, 92, 193, 200, 208, 254, 256, 257, 264, 267 Minami, Jir¯ o, 142, 144, 179, 194, 201 Minseit¯o, 137, 145, 178, 184, 193 Miyake, Mitsuharu, 142 Mongolia, 74 Mori, Kaku, 150 Mukden, 112, 142, 143, 181 Mukden Incident, 113, 142, 145, 147, 150, 156–159, 178, 179, 181, 182, 196, 197 N Nagano, Osami, 236, 239, 249 Nakamura, Shintar¯o, 142, 181 Nanking, 109–113, 141, 142, 158, 162, 163

310

INDEX

National defense regime, 19, 20, 63–66, 208, 251, 256, 257, 264–267, 269, 270 National Industrial Recovery Act, 168, 169, 234 Nationalism, 7, 54, 78, 83, 140, 158, 174, 175, 183, 184 Neoclassical realism, 3, 8, 9, 18, 21, 22, 29–39, 42, 44, 67, 68, 273, 276–278, 280 Neorealism, 3, 21, 25, 29, 32, 35–37, 39, 67 New Deal, 168, 169, 248, 251 New Zealand, 74, 95, 269 Nihon Kokka Shakait¯ o, 184 Nihon Musant¯ o, 185 Nine-Power Treaty, 98, 99, 107, 109, 112, 140, 146, 150, 151, 159–161, 164, 199, 223, 234, 238 Nishihara, Hajime, 93 Nishihara Loans, 75 Nomura, Kichisabur¯ o, 103, 124, 135, 163 Nonbalancing, 4, 280 Non-democratic country, 23, 259, 264–266, 270 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5, 263, 268 Northern Expedition (Kuomintang), 109, 110 North Korea, 2, 262, 264, 267, 279 O Offensive realism, 27, 30, 60, 261 Ogasawara Archipelago (Bonins), 95 Okada, Keisuke, 15, 122, 124, 134, 150, 198, 223 ¯ Okawa, Sh¯ umei, 174, 200 Open Door, principles/notes, 72, 73, 75, 80, 98, 146, 188, 195, 234, 238

Opium War, 252 ¯ Osumi, Mineo, 180, 190, 212, 224 Overbalancing, 3–9, 11, 14, 16–19, 21–23, 25, 27–30, 32, 39, 45–48, 50, 55, 59–62, 66, 68, 208, 222, 244, 251, 259–261, 264, 265, 267, 269, 270, 272, 274, 281, 282

P Pacific Fleet (U.S.), 13, 123, 135, 209, 228, 229, 233, 237–239, 244 Pacific War, 1, 14, 18, 84, 94, 183, 188, 248, 249, 260, 272, 281 Panama Canal, 95, 187 Paradigmatic boundaries, 22, 33, 36, 38, 39, 67, 68 Peace Conference, Paris, 81, 84, 85, 99 Pearl Harbor, 1, 249, 250 Perceived geopolitical structure, 38, 259, 260, 266, 267, 269, 270, 274, 276–278, 282 Pescadores, 95 Philippines, the, 72, 79, 85, 91, 95, 96, 102, 123, 135, 164, 167, 237, 238 Port Arthur, 108 Primary audience, 53–55, 106, 179, 189, 193, 196, 200 Privy Council, 135, 226, 235 Propaganda, 22, 52, 54, 133, 171, 174, 177–184, 187, 189–194, 197, 200, 201, 203, 208, 215, 218 Puyi, 149

Q Qing Dynasty, 107, 149, 252

INDEX

R Railway Zone, 107, 108, 160 Rationality, 6, 14, 68, 69 Reed, David, 127 Reed-Matsudaira Compromise, 128–131 Resource mobilization, 7, 22, 39, 66–68, 208, 265, 266, 277, 278, 280–282 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 18, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165–170, 233, 234, 240, 245, 251 Roosevelt, Theodor, 73 Root-Takahira Agreement, 73 Royal Navy, 190, 231 Russia, 1, 34, 35, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 85, 105, 107, 251, 252, 269 Russo-Japanese War, 72, 107

S Saga Rebellion, 253 Saionji, Kinmochi, 15, 83, 134, 149, 198 Sait¯ o, Makoto, 12, 15, 118, 134, 149, 195, 198, 201, 216, 221 Sakurakai, 145 Samoa, 167 Sat¯ o, Naotake, 196 Satsuma, 253 Satsuma Rebellion, 253 Scope condition, 22, 39, 67, 68, 265, 281 Scouting Fleet (U.S.), 163, 191, 209 Secondary audience, 53–55, 106, 171, 174, 179, 187, 190, 192, 193, 197, 200, 201, 218, 221, 225 Securitization, 48–55, 61, 106, 154, 174, 188, 201, 203, 204, 208, 218, 221, 239, 251, 265 Securitizing efforts, 50, 53–55, 140, 174, 181, 187, 189, 196, 197,

311

200, 203, 207, 213, 217, 219, 225, 251, 257, 269 Security dilemma, 5, 11, 27, 30 Seiy¯ ukai, 144, 145, 150, 178, 184, 192 Shandong, 101 Shanghai, 10, 113, 146–149, 155, 162, 163, 191 Shanghai Incident, 147, 148, 153, 163–166, 188 Shanhaiguan, 146 Shidehara, Kij¯ ur¯ o, 99, 108, 113, 130, 133, 140, 145, 158, 181, 196 Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 196, 199 Shimada, Shigetar¯o, 163 Shimamura, Hayao, 78 Shimamura, Sh¯osuke, 209 Shiozawa, K¯oichi, 148 Shiratori, Toshio, 196 Shogun, 253 Shogunate, 252, 253 Sh¯ owa Financial Crisis, 171 Siberia, 76, 79, 80, 91, 101 Singapore, 95, 96, 102 South Manchuria Railway Company, 107, 108, 113, 141 Soviet Union, 4, 6, 29, 101, 105, 116, 150, 151, 153–155, 158, 175, 200, 215–217, 234, 242, 243, 266–268 Standley, William, 233 State motivation, 274–277, 282 Stimson Doctrine, 161, 162, 165 Stimson, Henry, 127, 157–165, 191 Submarine, 91, 117, 118, 122, 124–126, 128, 131–133, 135, 136, 167, 212, 228–232, 243, 245–248 Suetsugu, Nobumasa, 103, 104, 135, 222 Sun, Yat-sen, 108, 109 Supreme Military Council, 135, 226

312

INDEX

Suzuki, Kantar¯ o, 12, 15, 134, 145 Suzuki, S¯ oroku, 180 Systemic dynamics, 36, 37, 44, 67, 267, 274, 277 Systemic factors, 3, 35, 38, 39, 270, 272, 273 Systemic overreacting, 6, 7, 26, 28 T Taft-Katsura Memorandum, 72 Taft, William, 73 Taisei junn¯ o , 83, 84, 86, 99 Takagi, S¯ okichi, 163 Takahashi, Korekiyo, 93, 149, 172, 193, 194, 197, 201 Takamori, Saig¯ o, 253 Tanaka, Giichi, 83, 110, 120, 140 Tangku Truce Agreement, 153, 154, 166, 169, 189, 202 Taylor, Montgomery, 163 Terauchi, Masatake, 75 Threat perception, 8, 15–23, 37–40, 43–50, 53–55, 57, 58, 61, 68, 69, 71, 83, 103, 106, 137, 139, 140, 166, 170, 207, 208, 214, 222, 223, 226, 260, 269, 272, 274, 277–280, 282 T¯ og¯ o, Heihachir¯ o, 12, 135 T¯ og¯ o, Shigenori, 214 Tokugawa, Yoshinobu, 253 Tomita, Tsunejir¯ o, 193 Transpacific operation, 102, 131, 167, 209, 228, 229, 233, 250 Treaty faction, 134, 221 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 251, 252 Treaty of Kanagawa, 251, 252 Treaty of Portsmouth, 107 Treaty of Versailles, 86 Tsingtao, 74, 84 Twenty-One Demands, 75 Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act, 246

U Uchida, K¯ osai, 92, 150, 152, 196, 198, 199, 201 Ugaki, Kazuhige, 180 Underbalancing, 4, 16, 46, 68, 115, 123, 280 Understated threat perception, 16, 68 United Kingdom, 4–6, 10, 30, 73–79, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94–97, 101, 102, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119–121, 124, 125, 127, 129–132, 134, 137, 147, 148, 151, 153–155, 172, 175, 178, 194, 195, 202, 211, 215–217, 224, 227, 229–231, 234–236, 239–242, 245, 247, 251–253, 280 United States, 1, 5–12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 29, 30, 45, 71–81, 85, 87, 89–92, 94–101, 103–106, 111, 114–134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 146–148, 150, 151, 153–168, 170–172, 174, 177, 178, 185–195, 198, 200, 202–204, 207–211, 213–220, 222–224, 226, 227, 229–231, 233–242, 244–253, 262–264, 266–269, 272, 280 U.S. Navy, 11, 13, 14, 17, 77, 91, 102–104, 118–120, 122, 123, 132, 133, 136, 137, 167–169, 185–188, 190, 191, 207, 209, 210, 214, 218, 232–234, 237, 238, 245, 246, 248–250

V Vinson Act, Second, 245, 246 Vinson Act, Third, 246 Vinson-Trammell Act, 11, 17, 18, 169, 170, 191, 209, 245

INDEX

W Wakatsuki, Reijir¯ o, 110, 118, 127, 143, 145, 157, 184, 200 Wall Street Crash, 124, 171 Walsh, David, 90 Wamposhan, 141, 181 Wang, Zhengting, 141 Washington Conference, 22, 71, 72, 77–79, 91–95, 97, 101–104, 106, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121, 146, 167, 238 Washington System, 1, 11–15, 23, 99, 100, 104, 107, 114, 140, 154, 166, 171, 178, 185–187, 189–193, 200, 203, 207, 208, 210, 212–224, 233, 234, 236,

313

237, 239–241, 244, 245, 247–250 Wemyss, Rosslyn, 89 Wilson, Woodrow, 79–81, 90 World Disarmament Conference, 116, 231, 232 Wu, Pei-fu, 108 Y Yamamoto, Teijir¯ o, 192 Yamanashi, Katsunoshin, 103, 133, 135 Yamaya, Tanin, 93, 143, 173, 184 Yingkou, 113, 142 Yoshida, Zengo, 214 Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, 201