Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates 9781503626065

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Japan's Dual Civil Society

EAST-WEST CENTER SERIES ON

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Series Editor, Muthiah Alagappa

japan's Dual Civil Society MEMBERS WITHOUT ADVOCATES

Ro bert Pekkanen

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 2006

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

© 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pekkanen, Robert. Japan's dual civil society : members without advocates I Robert Joseph Pekkanen. p. cm.-(East-west center series on contemporary issues in Asia and the Pacific) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-8047-5428-4 (cloth: alk. paper)-ISBN o-8047-5429-2 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Civil society-Japan. 2. Associations, institutions, etc.-Japan. 3· Citizen's associations-Japan. 4· Non-governmental organizations-Japan. 5. Non profit organizations-Japan. 6. Japan-Politics and government-1945- I. Title. 11. Series. JQ1681.P45 2006 2006010316 Original Printing 2006 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 oS 07 o6 Typeset by G&S Book Services in 1oii2 Sabon

A Series sponsored by the East-West Center CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Muthiah Alagappa, Editor

A collaborative effort by Stanford University Press and the East-West Center, this series addresses contemporary issues of policy and scholarly concern in Asia and the Pacific. The series focuses on political, social, economic, cultural, demographic, environmental, and technological change and the problems related to such change. A select group of East-West Center senior fellows-representing the fields of political science, economic development, population, and environmental studies-serves as the advisory board for the series. The decision to publish is made by Stanford. Preference is given to comparative or regional studies that are conceptual in orientation and emphasize underlying processes and to works on a single country that address issues in a comparative or regional context. Although concerned with policy-relevant issues and written to be accessible to a relatively broad audience, books in the series are scholarly in character. We are pleased to offer here the latest book in the series. The East-West Center is an education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, and just Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and the governments of the region.

To my parents, John and Lynn Pekkanen

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables

Xl Xlll

Acknowledgments

XV

1. Introduction

I

2. Japan's Civil Society in Comparative Perspective

27

3. The Regulatory Framework

47

4. Neighborhood Associations and Local Civil Society

ss

5. The Politics of Regulating Civil Society

130

6. Conclusion: Members Without Advocates

I

59

Appendix

191

Notes Bibliography

205 221

Index

239

Figures I.1 The political institutional explanation

15

2.1 Public interest legal persons by number of employees

34

2.2 Numbers of employees by percent of private initiative public interest legal persons

35

2.3 Civil society employment as a percentage of total employment

37

2.4 Number of associational employees per 1oo,ooo population in the Up.ited States, Korea, and Japan

37

2.5 Number of employees in Japanese citizens groups by percentage of groups 2.6 Groups in Ibaraki Prefecture by geographic extent of activity

45

3·1 Number of applications and permissions for NPO legal persons by date

56

38

3·2 Groups established by Japanese Civil Code 3·3 Revenues for environmental groups in six countries by source

73

3·4 Revenues for civil and advocacy groups in five countries by source

75

3·5 Revenues for social services nonprofits in five countries by source

76

58

Xll

Figures

4·I Neighborhood association participation by frequency of participation (1997 national survey)

89

4·2 Neighborhood association participation by frequency of participation (2003 national survey)

9I

6.r Large Japanese and U.S. civil society groups by founding date and percentage of all groups

r6s

6.2 Number of employees in advocacy groups in the United States and Japan by percentage

I76

6.3 Media coverage of JIGS groups by staff size and number of times covered

179

6.4 Research in newspapers in Japan and the United States by source

r8o

Tables

2.I Civil society groups in Japan by type and number of groups

30

2.2 Japan's nonprofit sector by group type, operating expenses in millions of yen, and number of employees

3I

2.3 Japanese organizational membership rates in international context

32

2.4 Comparative civil society professionalization by country

36

2.5 Top ten Japanese civil society groups in international development by membership

40

2.6 Top Japanese civil society groups in international development by staff levels

4I

2.7 Top ten Japanese civil society groups in international development by budget

4I

2.8 Membership of select environmental NGOs in Japan, Germany, and the United States

42

2.9 Largest environmental groups in Japan

43

2.IO Twenty largest Japanese foundations by asset size

44

2.II Twenty largest U.S. foundations by asset size

45

Tables

XIV

3·1 Legal categories of groups in Japan 3·2 Explanation of permitting standards

62 64

3·3 Special public interest promoting corporations by legal category of group gaining tax privileges

68

3·4 The relationship between civil society groups and other political actors in Japan, as rated by the civil society groups

79

4•1 Activities and priority activities of NHAs in Ueda City, Nagano Prefecture

93

4·2 Percentage of neighborhood associations from five regions engaging in specified activities

94

4·3 Party identification of NHA council members and directors compared to the general public

96

4·4 Participation by NHA council members and directors in antinuclear weapons movement by their level of involvement 5·1 Standards considered in framing Article 34 6.1 Legal changes in the regulation of civil society in Japan

97 132

173 A.1 Distribution of types of groups by percentagearea of predominant interest based on NTT phonebook classification 192 A.2 Chronology of NPO law events 194 A.3 NPO law players

197

A.4 Comparison of key points of various NPO law drafts

200

Acknowledgments It is improbable that readers of this particular book are encountering their first scholarly manuscript, so it is unlikely that anyone reading this page is unaware of the enormous debts any writer accrues in producing a volume such as this. I am no exception. Richard Rice, a historian of Japan at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, was the first to teach me about Japan. As a freshman, I took a class about Japan that he eo-taught with Lucien Ellington, and the rest, as they say, is history. As a university professor myself now, I often wonder if I will ever have the kind of impact on one of my students' lives that Richard had on mine. In graduate school, another teacher was equally influential. By then, I knew I wanted to study Japan, but were it not for Susan Pharr, I would never have become a political scientist. That's one debt I owe Susan. Another is that I met my wife in my first ever political science class, a seminar taught by Susan. Each of my committee members played a vital role in my thesis at Harvard. Susan Pharr was the Chair and provided constant intellectual guidance, countless letters of recommendation, and sage advice (not always heeded, to my regret). She was also my Advisor during my time in graduate school and nurtured my development as a scholar at more junctures and in more ways than I can recount here (or probably even remember, to be honest). I hope she will accept a blanket "thank you" for everything. Steve Vogel somehow managed to remain the soul of kindness and encourage me while still providing relentless critiques. Anyone writing a dissertation knows how important both elements are. Dick Samuels of MIT generously took on a graduate student from outside his school. Other students of Dick's will agree that one of his many virtues as a committee member is also his greatest drawback: Dick provides comments to graduate students faster than any other scholar I know. I would hand in chapter drafts to Dick and often get comments back in less than 24 hours. Frankly,

XVl

Acknowledgments

Dick, by the time I handed in a chapter, I was ready for a longer break than that. Theda Skocpol constantly amazed me with her preternatural insightfulness. In a short meeting in her office, she would find problems with my dissertation that I would have never found and then just as quickly offer solutions that I would also have never found. I first sought out Yutaka Tsujinaka because I read and admired his book on interest groups in Japan, Rieki Dantai. He has become my Japanese mentor, providing cogent intellectual critiques of my research and honoring me with generous support and involvement with his own research. We've commented on each other's work on panels in Cambodia, Japan, South Africa, and the United States (so far), and I still find his comments sharp and insightful and his research groundbreaking. The Social Science Research Council sponsors a dissertation workshop in Monterey. It was there that John Camp bell and Pat Steinhoff gave me excellent comments on this project. I was amazed at the attention that scholars of their stature paid to the work of the graduate students. They shaped this book at an early stage. In graduate school, Kim Reimann, who was my classmate at Harvard, Apichai Shipper from MIT, and I formed a "Dissertation Writing Group." Over many years, they have offered good advice and been loyal friends. Muthiah Alagappa, the editor of this series, has been a powerful intellectual guiding force in civil society studies for years. He's also been a powerful force in shaping this manuscript for the better and, needless to say, instrumental in its finding its proper home in his series. Muriel Bell has been consistently supportive of this project and has my deep gratitude. I would like to make a special acknowledgement of the two anonymous reviewers for Stanford University Press. Their reports thoroughly engaged the text and offered superb recommendations. This book is far stronger due to their good work. Many scholars have generously taken time to read and comment on portions of this book in earlier forms or facilitate my research by providing introductions or other suggestions. I would like to thank them all here: Gary Allinson, Takako Amemiya, Simon Avenell, Eva Bellin, Vickey Bestor, Erik Bleich, Jeff Broadbent, Jaeyoung Choe, Gerald Curtis, Christina Davis, Larry Diamond, Jorge Dominguez, Robert Efird, Darryl Flaherty, Michael Foley, Tom Gill, Hana Heineken, Marc Morje Howard, Samuel Huntington, Akira Iriyama, Shu Ito, Rieko Kage, Ikuyou Kaneko, Kazuko Kojima, Jonah Levy, Antonia Losano, Mikitaka Masuyama, Hiroki Mori, Karen Nakamura, Akihiro Ogawa, Takafumi Ohtomo, John Pekkanen, Sarah Pekkanen, T. J. Pempel, Ben Read, Larry Repeta, Frank Schwartz, the late Seizaburo Sato, Karla Simon, Martha Walsh, James White, and Yoshinori Yamaoka.

Acknowledgments

XVll

I benefited from having excellent graduate students at the University of Washington assist me in this research. Yuko Kawato, Hiro Sasada, KiYoung Shin, and Michael Strausz will no doubt one day be thanking their own students in their first books. Marie Anchordoguy, Chair of the Japan Studies Program, has created a wonderful intellectual home at UW. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the following organizations, grants, and fellowships: Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, Henry M. Luce Foundation, University of Tsukuba, Keio University, University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science, Middlebury College, Aspen Institute Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, Social Science Research Council, Japan Society for Promotion of Science, Blakemore Foundation, Japan Foundation, Mellon Foundation, Academy for Educational Development, Harvard University, and the U.S. Department of Education. On my first day ever in Japan, I was met at Narita Airport by my Japanese homestay family, the Tanakas. I have been close with them ever since, living in their house while studying in Japan, traveling with them in Japan, the United States, and Indonesia, and learning more about Japan from them than I have learned from anyone else. I still think of Ikuko Tanaka as my "Japanese mother" and eating her delicious cooking at the table with the family is what really lets me know I've arrived in Japan. I am similarly indebted to Hirokuni Tanaka, Hirotaka Tanaka, Tomomi Okazaki, and Takahisa Tanaka. I first met Taka when he visited our family the summer before I first visited Japan, and I've been close to him for years despite his stunning inability to beat me at Japanese video games. I've enjoyed seeing him, Tomomi, and Hirotaka grow up, marry, have children of their own, and maintain the strong links between our families. I was also lucky with my American family. My father and mother are wonderful people who have supported and nurtured me at every step of my life. Despite being writers, journalists, and authors themselves, my sister, brother, and father never once scoffed at the paltry production of academics or sneered at our love of infelicitous, convoluted, and obscurantist phrasings. I thank my beloved Saadia. She knows why. And I thank our daughter, Sophia, for joy.

Japan's Dual Civil Society

1

Introduction THE LARGEST antismoking organization in Japan, TOPIC, employs one person. Bungaku Watanabe, the lone employee, tells a story that illustrates the surprising influence government regulations can have on the development of civil society organizations. The organization regularly mails its newsletter to the membership. Mr. Watanabe confessed to me that he has, on occasion, found it cheaper to pack a suitcase full of mailings, fly to Korea, and mail them from Korea to Japan. 1 This is because the international postage rate from Korea to Japan is less than the Japanese domestic rate, even with the additional expense of a plane ticket. I could not help but contrast the image of Mr. Watanabe la boring alone in his office with that of the plush office space of the American Cancer Society in midtown Manhattan, one of its 3,400 local units. The American Cancer Society, like other taxexempt American groups, can send a piece of mail to your door for about a penny-barely over the cost of e-mail spam (U.S. Postal Service Publication 417). The influence of the state-including unexpected influences such as the postage-rate example-on the development of civil society organizations is the theme of this book. Observers of Japan are so used to seeing only small civil society groups in the country that they have lost sight of the fact that the absence of large groups presents an analytical puzzle; familiarity with the empirical facts has lulled us into accepting this situation as natural. In fact, Japan's civil society is characterized by many small local groups, but few large professionalized groups-a pattern I term Japan's "dual civil society." However, from an international perspective, it is surprising that Japan's civil society organizations are so small. The two most reliable predictors of a nation's civil society, income and education, also predict which individuals volunteer. Japan is near the top of the world's league tables in both categories. Anecdotally, Japan is seen as rich in social capital. And Japan has a history of citizen activism, for example, the massive environmental movement of the late r96os and early 1970s and the intense protests

2

INTRODUCTION

against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty renewal in 1960. Therefore, it is not enough to take the lack of large civil society groups in Japan for granted; rather, the situation of Japan's civil society needs to be explained. No explanation of Japan's civil society that ignores the role of the state can be considered complete. I define civil society as the organized nonstate, nonmarket sector, as elaborated in the next section. Political institutions, including the regulatory framework constructed by the state, directly and indirectly structure the development of civil society. Using the political institutional argument, I also explain why Japan's civil society can encompass both a history of widespread activism and few large organizations. At a conceptual level, no one would doubt that a concerted effort by the state to smash a civil society group-think of Solidarity in Poland in the 1980s or Falun Gong in China two decades later-could have serious repercussions on how the group develops, whether or not the state's efforts are ultimately successful. Sensational as they are, overt attempts at suppression are not the only way in which states can influence the development of civil society organizations. However, the importance of other elements of a regulatory framework is less obvious. What is the role of the state in the development of civil society? As Bob Edwards and Michael Foley provocatively remark in the introduction to a collection of the most influential recent essays on civil society and social capital, "The civil society argument focuses on the ways in which society organizes itself independently of the state or over against the state. But states arguably shape their societies as profoundly as the reverse. They provide the constitutional, legal, political, and even moral framework within which social organizations arise and operate" (Edwards and Foley 2001, p. 13, their emphasis). In fact, through its direct and indirect structuring of incentives, the state promotes a particular pattern of civil society organization and structures the "rules of the game," which in part determine who plays and who flourishes. At the center of this book is a causal argument: state structuring of incentives accounts for .the pattern of civil society development. As the sole non-Western industrialized democracy, Japan is clearly an important case for students of civil society, and I draw much of the evidence for my argument from the Japanese case. In the context of Japan, the argument is that the pattern of dual civil society organization that we see in Japan today-a plethora of small, local groups (such as nearly 30o,ooo neighborhood associations) and a dearth of large, professionalized, independent organizations (such as Greenpeace)-is explained by Japan's political institutions. A strict legal framework, limited funding pattern, indirect regulations (such as postal regulations), and the profile of opportunities that a state's

Introduction

3

political structure creates for influencing policy-all these factors profoundly affect the development of civil society in Japan. The regulatory framework-rules concerning what kind of groups are allowed to form and state funding for groups-has clear implications, but less obvious are the implications of such incentives as bulk-mailing discounts for nonprofit organizations, which promote mass memberships, or differential access to the policy-making process by interest groups. Overtly and subtly, these measures have had an effect: this is the central argument of this book. My core argument, which I term the "political institutional" argument, is that the Japanese state's influence has shaped the dual civil society pattern of development. However, I also propound three other important, related arguments about the state and civil society in Japan. My second argument is that the postwar history of Japan's civil society is likewise illuminated by a focus on the power of the regulatory framework. This is the "ice age" argument that explains the retreat of citizen activism from the heady days of the late 196os and early 197os.2 My third, or "regulatory contestation," argument contends that the regulatory framework itself is the product of political contestation and can change. My fourth argument is that Japan's dual civil society supports democracy through social capital generation and community building, but largely lacks sizable professional groups that influence the public sphere or policymaking. Thus, Japan's civil society can be characterized as "members without advocates," my fourth and final argument. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section sketches out my definition of "civil society." The same section situates this study in the context of other analyses of interest groups and civil society that have also found a powerful role of the state in shaping the dimensions of organizational life. Following this review, I move on to a fuller preview of the four main arguments of this book just delineated. After this preview, I first consider a pair of rival explanations before returning to the political institutional argument in somewhat more detail by breaking it into the parts that compose it: regulatory framework, political opportunity structure, and other indirect influences. The final section of the chapter provides a road map for the remaining chapters in the book, tying them to the development of the four main arguments.

Reconceptualizing Civil Society Discussions of civil society are too often plagued by vagueness. To make clear my causal claims about the patterning of civil society development in Japan, we must define "civil society." As above, this book defines civil society as the organized, nonstate, nonmarket sector. This definition en-

4

INTRODUCTION

compasses voluntary groups of all kinds, such as nonprofit foundations, charities, think tanks, and choral societies. It includes non profit organizations (NPOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other voluntary or tertiary associations. It is larger in scope than civic groups alone, which more narrowly incorporate participatory organizations. It is also larger than the nonprofit sector, which excludes unincorporated voluntary groups and which is also sometimes limited to groups performing public purposes (Hall 1987). On the other hand, civil society does not include labor unions, trade associations, professional associations, companies, or other market sector groups. 3 It also excludes government bureaucracy, parastatal organizations, and political parties-as well as the family. This definition has some virtues, not the least of which is that it is concise. In addition, because it specifies "organized," it points to countable groups. It also contains the key common elements of most definitions and authors. It excludes market organizations, which feature prominently in some contemporary analyses and in the writings of G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and Adam Smith. Neither does it attempt to delineate a public sphere. 4 Rather, the presumption is that such a sphere requires and is sustained by these kinds of organized groups. This definition also brings into focus the totality of Japan's civil society, including the understudied local groups. 5 Its chief demerit is that it is essentially a negative definition for what is a positive, vibrant sector. Under this definition, it is precisely within this sector that patterns emerge. Civil society is not a dichotomous variable. Rather, attention should be paid to both the number of and participation in organizations and to the type of organizations that exist. Civil society can vary in level and composition from time to time and from place to place. Besides the content of the organization or its aims, civil society organizations in one state might be predominantly affiliated with religious organizations, for example, while in another they might be strictly secular. Some current analysts point to falling participation in civic organizations to argue that American civil society is declining, while others cite the increasing number of foundations, NGOs, and NPOs to make the opposite argument (Putnam 2ooo; Salamon et al. 1999). Rather than viewing this as a paradox, we should analyze this trend (if it is a trend-the dispute still burns hot) as a change in the pattern of civil society. And, of course, under this definition, the Japanese pattern of few large professionalized non profit organizations and many smaller, grassroots organizations snaps into focus. In fact, the political institutional explanation advanced in this book helps us understand the three perhaps most important characteristics of Japan's civil society: its small professional and advocacy sector, its significant local and grassroots component, and its recent increase in size.

Introduction

5

Theoretical Background The state shapes civil society everywhere, not just in Japan. Examining France, Jonah Levy writes, "the organizational dimensions (of civil society) are politically mediated and changeable" (Levy 1999, p. 8), while Cecilia Chessa, looking at Germany, argues, "the state utilizes active and interventionist policies in order to manipulate the entire spectrum of interest representation" (Chessa 2ooo, p. 12). Sometimes, as in the Middle East and socialist Eastern Europe, the state can suppress civil society to a great degree or limit it to the option of social movements (Carapico 1998; Howard 1999 ). In countries where the state is too weak, as in several African cases, the legal infrastructure and other guarantees for civil society are also too fragile for civil society to blossom. However, even when the state does not fall into one of these two extreme categories, we should pay careful attention to how the state shapes civil society, for it does not simply force or raise civil society to a certain level. Rather, the institutions of the state shape the pattern in which civil society itself develops. In nations with a more developed civil society, however, the importance of the state is no less. In so many ways, institutions and how they structure incentives are widely recognized as critical to group formation and operation. This logic applies equally to civil society. In political science, it is not problematic to claim that state actions and institutions, such as legal frameworks, powerfully shape the kinds of interest groups, corporatist arrangements, or labor unions that form in a nation. Many attempts to form labor unions in the United States failed until the federal government recognized their right to organize and provided a framework for peaceful organization drives (Forbath [1989] 1991; Walker 1991). It is also a widely held concept that the regulatory environment provided by the state affects the economic development of a nation by providing incentives for the formation and operation of companies and corporations. Institutions structure which groups form and how successful they are. As Suzanne Berger writes in the introduction to an important collection of essays, "Among the specificities of national experience that have shaped interest group formation, one stands out in the essays as particularly important: the timing and characteristics of state intervention" (Berger 1981, p. 14). Many of the interest groups referred to were economic interests, so her argument parallels the concerns of this book and also shares a common logic. Claus Offe adds in the same volume that the concrete shape and content of organized interest representation is always a result of interest plus opportunity plus institutional status (Offe 1981).

6

INTRODUCTION

Groups organize in response to state policies, either defensively to protect themselves or proactively to gain access to new advantages that require lobbying the state. State intervention affects the interests around which groups organize, as well as the strategies that the groups subsequently adopt, and thus helps to bring about a distinctive pattern of interest groups in each West European nation. In the American context, observers have pointed out that institutional structures created incentives for ambitious civil servants to organize associations for senior citizens three decades before groups designed to enlist the elderly themselves arrived; that the National Rifle Association was launched in close consultation with the Department of the Army in the nineteenth century (to familiarize citizens, as potential soldiers, with arms); that the American Legion was begun during World War I with government support; that the American Farm Bureau Federation started as a collection of advisory committees to county agents organized by the Department of Agriculture; and that modern feminist organizations in their early years received millions of dollars of support from the Kennedy administration before creating a mass membership base (Walker 1991). Indeed, nothing is more central to the development of civil society than the framework of order provided by the state. Our attention should be focused on how the state, directly and indirectly, structures the organization of civil society. Some object to the claim that the state structures the organization of civil society. Perhaps based on the experiences of Eastern European countries in the 198os and 1990s, many observers see the state and civil society as necessarily in opposition or at least hold that the state can play no useful role in promoting the spread of civil society (Miller 1992; Rau 1991; Tismaneanu 1990). This view finds an echo in the position of American conservatives. The state has a kind of reverse Midas touch; wherever it touches, civil society withers (Beito 2ooo; Salamon and Anheier 1996; Schambra 1997). Yet the relationship between civil society and the state is not one of pure opposition. This seems clearly true when we consider how many elements of social order, from property rights to infrastructure, that the state provides and that civil society needs to flourish. Michael Walzer goes so far as to identify the catch-22 of a democratic civil society requiring a strong civil society and a strong civil society requiring a strong and responsive state as "the paradox of the civil society argument" (Walzer 1992, p. 102). As it turns out, evidence from this study sheds some light on this paradox by carefully breaking down the constituent elements of a "strong civil society." Studies of the nonprofit sector and civil society portray three conceptions of the relationship between the state and civil society. First is civil society versus the state, or civil society in place of the state, as mentioned

Introduction

7

above. Second is civil society portrayed as the independent sector or "partner in public service" with the state, in which civil society is another actor with public aims often cooperating with the state in service provision (Salamon 199 5; Smith and Lipsky 1993 ). Third is civil society viewed as a source of social capital and civic engagement (Putnam 1993). Chapter 4 of this book examines neighborhood associations-voluntary groups whose membership is drawn from a small, geographically delimited and exclusive area (a neighborhood) and whose activities are multiple and centered on that same area-as a source of social capital and civic engagement, but also frequently "partnering" with the state in some activities. However, the perspective of this book is distinct from these three conceptions and closer to that suggested in studies by Alagappa (2004a, 2004b, 2004c), Berger (1981), Carapico (1998), Forbath ([1989] 1991), Levy (1999), Pharr (2003), and Walker (1991). Our proper research focus should be on the means by which the state shapes civil society, which necessitates an "unpacking" of civil society. There should be theoretical gains from disaggregation, as civil society is a motley crew. Unpacking also would allow us to fine-tune our analysis of the relationship between the state and civil society. Rather than just searching for suppression or nurturing of civil society, we could look at the patterns that the state creates in civil society and the patterns of statecivil society relations that emerge. This book adopts this perspective on the pattern of development of civil society organizations in Japan and turns to causal arguments about state influence. Arguments This book makes four arguments. The first is the core contention: through legal, regulatory, and financial instruments, the state powerfully shapes the organization of civil society. Differences in these legal, regulatory, and financial instruments create varying incentives for the organization of civil society by the processes of group formation and development and the institutionalization of social movements. In Japan, state actions have promoted one type of group while they have hindered another. Specifically, small local groups, such as neighborhood associations, have been promoted by the state, while large, independent, professionalized groups, such as Green peace, have faced a much more hostile legal environment. Few dispute that a paucity of large professionalized civil society groups call Japan home, while many small local groups do (as documented in Chapter 2)a pattern dubbed here Japan's "dual civil society." 6 Indeed, this pattern is probably grasped by most observers of Japan, which explains in part why

8

INTRODUCTION

the small scale of many of Japan's civil society organizations is taken for granted. However, a focus on professionalization is novel and also explains a second puzzle of Japan: its curious combination of many groups and a "weak" civil society. I term this the "political institutional" argument. The second argument explores the postwar historical development of Japan's civil society through this new analytical lens. The causal understanding of civil society in Japan expounded in the first argument not only explains why Japan's civil society differs from that of other advanced industrialized democracies, but also sheds light on the postwar development of Japan's civil society from politicized activism through an "ice age" of inward-looking consumer-identity focused groups. Part of this argument is an explanation of how Japan's large social movements have failed to institutionalize and leave a lasting organizational legacy. Japanese social movements failed to institutionalize in large part because of the regulatory framework, contributing little or no organizational legacy to Japan's civil society. This second argument, which I call the "ice age" argument, follows as an implication from the central contention of the book about the state shaping civil society. The third argument is that the regulatory structure can change at historical crossroads. Regulatory structure can change, but this process of institutional change is shaped by politics, particularly the role of political parties. A core assertion of this argument is that the regulation of civil society is heavily influenced by politics, and we need to look at the relationships among and motives of political actors to explain the regulatory framework. I focus on the role of political parties, particularly in terms of their shifting electoral needs after the 1994 electoral reform, and on their relationship to the bureaucracy. Chapter 5 contains several case studies spanning more than 100 years to illustrate this assertion, and the conclusion argues that the determinants for regulatory structure hinge crucially on politics. This is the "regulatory contestation" argument. The fourth argument centers on the consequences for democracy. Japan's dual civil society has given it a particular kind of democracy that is at once weaker and stronger than democracies in other nations. Japan has a civil society with networks of association that support social capital and effective government without sustaining a professionalized advocacy community that can contribute new policy ideas or challenge current ones. I characterize this combination, and thus the argument, as "members without advocates." This phrase turns Theda Skocpol's characterization of American civil society on its head to emphasize the participatory contribution but lack of policy influence of Japan's civil society configuration.

Introduction

9

On the one hand, small local groups can help build up stocks of social capital and perhaps improve the performance of local governments. They form a crucial basis of social life. However, small local groups lack professional staff. A group that has a large core of full-time employees, on the other hand, can develop expertise and perhaps even become a player in the policy process in a way that is simply impossible for small local groups without permanent staff. A professionalized group institutionalizes movements and can influence policy and other outcomes down the road; it changes the political landscape. Compare the many old people's clubs (rojinkai) in Japan with the American Association of Retired Persons in the United States (AARP). AARP claims over 3 5 million members (AARP, various years). AARP also boasts I6o,ooo volunteers, 1,837 employees, and, through its dozens of registered lobbyists and more than I 50 policy and legislative staffers, an important influence on policymaking.? The AARP budget in 2003 was $689 million, with $58 million of that going to lobbying activities (legislation and research) and a further $146 million to disseminating AARP publications (AARP, various years). Japanese old people's clubs are neighborhood affairs with limited membership that might be effective in improving quality of life for aged people by providing them with an opportunity to socialize, but they have no professional staff and no impact on policymaking. Indeed, as explored in Chapter 4, there are many reasons to believe these groups effectively promote social capital and benefit their members in day-to-day terms more than a mass membership group, such as AARP. The flip side, however, is that although it is inconceivable that a reform of Social Security could even be mooted in the United States without heavy involvement from the AARP, the Japanese groups did not influence the hotly contested pension reforms of July 2004. 8 The distinction is not in the number of members or volunteers, but rather in the concentration, in the U.S. case, of membership into one organization with professional staff. 9 Original research made a crucial contribution to the success of the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, which compiled gruesome statistics, such as that one in every 236 Cambodians is an amputee, compared with one in every 22,ooo Americans (Price 1998, p. 620). In addition to carrying out and making use of pertinent research, a group must also be able to actively promulgate its message. Greenpeace, for example, has its own media facilities and can distribute photographs to newspapers and circulate video news spots to television stations in 88 countries within hours (Wapner 1995, p. 320). In exploring the fourth argument about the implications for democracy of the dual

IO

INTRODUCTION

structure of Japanese civil society, the conclusion presents analysis of the effectiveness of Japanese civil society organizations in shaping public debates and influencing public policy through the media. Because of their low levels of professionalization-meaning few researchers or media specialists who provide expertise-Japanese civil society groups very seldom influence the public sphere compared with groups in other countries. I argue that these institutional forms have many different implications for politics, policy formation, and government performance, not that one organizational configuration is more effective or "better" than the other. 10 A civil society with few professional groups is less likely to influence public debates or shape public policy. On the other hand, a civil society that generates rich sources of social capital can sustain democracy in other ways. Such, of course, is the Japanese pattern. The reason the Japanese state has structured incentives to promote this pattern of development is, in crude intentionalist terms, to nurture social capital-type civil society groups while discouraging lobby-type civil society groups. Democratic theory sometimes conflates both groups into one category, but the groups can be analytically distinguished for greater theoretical leverage and represent two distinct strains of theories of democracy. 11 These differences are highlighted in the following chapters. For example, Chapter 4 provides strong evidence of how local neighborhood groups contribute to the stock of social capital in Japan. Neighborhood associations are geographically delimited and do not employ professional staff. Instead, they operate through local community membership. There are nearly 3oo,ooo such groups in Japan, with a majority of Japanese belonging to the groups and a substantial number participating in their community-centered activities. Chapter 4 presents evidence that these groups generate social capital. Chapter 6, on the other hand, shows how these groups and others are ineffective in influencing the public discourse in most areas, a finding best understood under the rubric of pluralism. After laying out the fourth argument fully in Chapter 6, I return to this precise question of which configuration might be "better" overall for democracy and make a provocative argument: that Japan's variety of civil society development is not necessarily "worse" for democracy.

An Analytical Framework for Civil Society in Japan This book contends that the state directly and indirectly structures incentives for the formation and development of civil society organizations. This insight allows us to understand why Japanese civil society is distinctive in the international community with reference to the regulatory

Introduction

11

framework that Japanese civil society organizations face. Before turning to the details of that argument, however, we must first review two competing explanations. The two types of explanations are cultural explanations, which claim that Japanese culture explains the pattern of civil society development in Japan, and social heterogeneity arguments, which explain civil society in Japan on the basis of the distribution of preferences among Japanese. Although each has some explanatory merit, they both leave unexplained some important features of Japan's civil society; it is impossible to understand the organization of civil society in Japan today without grasping the impact of state institutions and regulations. Culturalist Explanations of Japan

Culturalist explanations of civil society in general claim that culture determines people's proclivity to form and join civil society organizations and thus determines the prevalence and type of civil society organizations. These arguments are typically couched in the form of explanations of local cultural values that have precluded development of civil society. For example, many analysts see the concept of civil society as alien to Islamic societies (e.g., Gellner 1994; Mardin 1995; Wittfogel 19 57; see also Gole 1994; Norton 1995 and 1996; White 1996). They claim that because of Islamic beliefs or patriarchal tribal social organization, Arab and Islamic societies are suffused with values preventing the development of civil society. Similarly, Latin American civil societies were called weak due to certain aspects of the colonial legacy and subsequent patterns of socioeconomic development that led to extreme geographic and social concentration of power (Oxhorn 1995b). In the context of Japan, such arguments stress that the Japanese are not predisposed to form or join civil society groups. Analysts may posit an underdeveloped concept of charity, philanthropy, or volunteerism (often pointing to use of such loan words as firansoropi and borantia to highlight the alienness of such concepts to the Japanese mindset); claim that Japanese in-group or collective mentality prevents working on behalf of a generalized other or for abstract principles; argue that Japanese identity is tied too closely to other units, such as family or company, to provide "space" for the individual to participate in civil society organizations; or postulate that Japanese are unable to participate in truly horizontal organizations, which civil society organizations by definition are, and so these groups do not flourish (Deguchi 1993; Eccleston 1989; Hayashi and Yamazaki 1993; Ishida 1971; Kaneko 1992; Nakane 1967 and 1978; Nako 1996; Y. Tanaka 1996; van Wolferen 1989 ). Ishida dismisses the concept by

12

INTRODUCTION

noting that "voluntary associations are not a part of [Japan's historical] tradition" (Ishida 1971, p. 61). In all cases, these explanations make two claims. First, they explain the level of civil society organization by culture, expressed as individual proclivities to join or form certain kinds of organizations. Second, they uniformly posit a low level of civil society in Japan because of Japanese cultural characteristics outlined above. To some extent, these arguments appear to contradict other culturalist contentions that the Japanese are "group oriented" (Benedict 1946; Nakane 1967 and 1978; Reischauer 1977). However, cultural explanations of civil society stress that Japanese do not dislike all groups, but rather certain kinds of groups. In particular, Japanese are not fond of groups espousing abstract ideals or involving aid to unknown third parties. Thus, culturalist explanations lead us to expect few of these groups, but many informal, personal, network-based groups. Many subtle cultural arguments resist recasting into the form of a hypothesis. For the purposes of this book, however, I have extracted the following claim: there are few civil society groups in Japan, and groups that espouse abstract ideals or involve aid to unknown third parties are especially few. Cultural constructs influence individuals' framing of social problems and provide a repertoire of organizational responses. By themselves, however, cultural explanations fail to explain the pattern of civil society organizations that has developed in Japan. Although the culturalist hypothesis would predict few instances of volunteerism, for example, this was contradicted by the outpouring of volunteerism in the aftermath of the 199 5 Kobe earthquake, when r.2 million volunteers went to Kobe to join relief efforts and nearly 160 billion yen ($r.6 billion) was donated. The difficulties these spontaneous groups faced in gaining legal status and in institutionalizing, on the other hand, are consistent with the political institutional explanation. Such cultural explanations also do not really account for widespread social movements, volunteerism, or the pattern of civil society organizations that have developed in Japan. 12 Japanese do form groups to help "unknown others," even foreigners. Apichai Shipper presents important evidence on this score. In every other nation, aid groups formed to help illegal foreign workers are formed by "co-ethnics." For example, groups whose mission is to aid illegal Hispanic workers in the United States are formed by Hispanic Americans, but the principle applies outside the United States, too. Shipper points out that Japan is unique in groups formed for the benefit of illegal foreign workers by non-coethnic natives-in other words, Japanese form groups for people with whom they have no ethnic connection. This seems to defy the conventional culturalist wisdom and is pertinent to our investigation of organizational development (Shipper 2001 and 2002).

Introduction

13

Loan words can be used for concepts that fit or come to fit snugly into Japanese culture. After all, even "company" is a loan word from the Meiji era. Although such loan words as borantia (volunteer) are widely used, Japanese are perfectly capable of creating alternative locutions should the new word not fit indigenous circumstances. For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education decided in 2004 to require students to work as volunteers. Many American schools with similar requirements are unfazed by the oxymoron of compulsory "volunteering," but the Tokyo body chose to distinguish these activities by calling them not borantia (volunteering), but hoshi katsudo-a term that means "service activity" and employs a word for "service" that emphasizes disregarding one's own benefit ("ChangingJapanese," Japan Times, December 14, 2004). Given these deficiencies, cultural explanations are insufficient for understanding the pattern of civil society in Japan. In the conclusion, I discuss a more sophisticated argument that reflects how institutions shape frames of understanding, ideas, and strategies of activists. This argument is culturally based but inextricably linked to institutions, and thus I leave it for the conclusion.

Social Heterogeneity Explanations Although cultural explanations fail to illuminate important parts of the pattern of civil society development in Japan, there is another set of possible explanations based on the distribution of preferences in society. These are inspired by an abundant literature that focuses on an important part of civil society: nonprofit groups (DiMaggio 1982a and 1982b; Hall 1987; Hansmann 1980; Powell 1987; Salamon and Anheier 1996; and Weisbrod r988 ). They explain the size of the non profit sector by relating it to the heterogeneity of preferences in the population. In short, where there is greater heterogeneity of preferences for a good (such as education), the nonprofit sector will be larger. Many analysts argue that because governments provide public goods only to the level demanded by the median voter, residual unsatisfied demand for public goods exists and can be supplied by nonprofits (James 1989; Weisbrod 1988; Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986). This explanation is readily testable in a variety of comparative contexts and serves as the basis for the hypotheses discussed later in this chapter. An observable implication of this explanation should be that in sectors or nations where greater heterogeneity (and intensity) of preferences exists over public goods, the market share of nonprofits versus government should be higher (James 1987 and 1989). However, serious problems with the social heterogeneity approach remain, such as its failure to specify in theory why nonprofit firms rather

INTRODUCTION

than for-profit firms arise and its failure to account empirically for why many, if not most, nonprofits do not provide public goods (Hansmann 1987). Much research on the welfare state has shown a variety of international, historical, political, and institutional reasons to have a powerful influence on the development of health, education, and social service sectors, to name a few (Baldwin 1989; Cameron 1978; Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 1996; Skocpol 1993; Swenson 1997). In other words, these researchers have demonstrated that the contours of the nonprofit sector (at least in service provision arenas) are shaped not by heterogeneity of preferences, but by a variety of political (and other) factors. Both of these problems are found when we examine the case of Japan, as even a cursory review of a single sector-education-reveals. In Japan, it is not nonprofits but rather private, for-profit educational institutions-the cram schools {juku)-that meet the surplus demand for education. This is true for both those in catch-up schools (hoshu juku) and those preparing to get ahead in the university entrance exams (shingaku juku, yobiko). In fact, Rohlen observes that "no other country in the world comes close in the percentage of their populations involved in buying private educational advantage" (Rohlen 1980, p. 38). Just as social heterogeneity arguments have trouble explaining the types of schools that exist today, they also cannot account for the historical development of the Japanese educational system. Students attend public elementary and junior high schools in Japan based on the residential principle. There is relatively little stratification and remarkable uniformity in the curriculum. Public high schools, in contrast, admit students based on entrance exams. There is considerable stratification at this level. This is not a result of different preferences in the public based on the stage of schooling. Entrance exams in junior high school or elementary school would have the same public support. Rather, it comes as the historical legacy of the acute high school space shortage of the postwar period, which brought in exams that have endured to the present day (Rohlen 198 3 ). Looking back even earlier, the great change in the educational system of the Meiji period was the elimination of the split between schools for the samurai class and schools for commoners. This did not come about because of any sudden change in social heterogeneity, but rather through explicit government action: a decree in 1872 mandating a unified state educational system. This leap was not inevitable. Indeed, Dore (196 5) points out that the United Kingdom never accomplished it. Although the social heterogeneity explanation has some important insights, it fails to explain important elements of the development of the non profit sector or civil society sector in Japan.

Introduction

15

Political institutional structure

I Regulatory framework

Political opportunity structure

Other indirect influence

I Regulation of group

E.g., bureaucratic dominance

E.g., conflict management strategies

I

I

State re ourcesfunding legitimacy

E.g., postal regulations

I Tax benefit

FIGURE

r.r The political institutional explanation.

Political Institutional Explanation The political institutional explanation focuses on how institutions structure incentives to explain what groups form and operate in civil society. There are three main parts to the political institutional explanation. The first is the regulatory framework, which includes not only the laws and regulations on the books but also the unwritten rules and to the written rules in practice, provision of resources (direct state financing, legitimation, and tax regulation) and implementation of the laws. The second part is the political opportunity structure, which is an indirect influence because it shapes the politically efficacious way for groups to organize. The political structure itself is also a second-order influence because, as argued in the conclusion, politics affects the regulatory framework. The third part consists of other indirect influences, such as postal rates and conflict management strategies. See Figure r.r. The political institutional explanation does not claim that civil society is a product of what state agencies or politicians want to happen, but

16

INTRODUCTION

rather that institutions have effects through structuring action. The focus here is on the regulatory framework as an independent variable, without distinguishing between bureaucratic intentions and politicians' desires in shaping this framework (although Chapter 5's process tracing does shed light on such a distinction). In Japan, this means that at this point we draw no distinction between whether politicians sought to suppress certain {perhaps left-leaning) groups or whether the same groups were seen as undesirable by the bureaucracy.

Regulatory Framework: Legal Regulation of Groups, Finances, and Tax Benefits The regulatory framework has a direct influence on civil society organizations. "Direct" refers to state actions that have an immediate and clear impact on a civil society organization's viability. This can be regulation of a group's legal status or activities, direct financial flows (such as grants and contracts), and tax benefits. In contrast, "indirect" refers to by-products of institutional structure not immediately related to civil society regulation, such as the electoral system. Indirect influences are not necessarily weaker than direct influences, but direct ones are clear and powerful. Direct state actions have profound and far-reaching effects in patterning civil society. As Upham (1987) writes, one of the "major instruments for such control is the manipulation of the legal framework within which social change and its harbinger, social conflict, occur." 13 This category includes legislation about the formation or operation of civil society organizations, financial flows (grants, contracts, etc.), and tax codes relating to such groups. For example, the tax treatment of charitable contributions directly influences charitable giving to civil society groups. A body of research shows the relationship between individual giving in the United States and the 1969 Tax Reform Act, as well as changes in U.S. tax laws in the 198os (Independent Sector 1996, pp. 60-77). The Japanese regulatory framework is examined in considerable detail in Chapter 3, but outlined briefly here. Japan has managed its nongovernmental organizations (hereafter, NPOs, the conventional Japanese term for domestically active groups) with perhaps the most severe regulatory environments in the developed world (Amemiya 1999; Amenomori 1997; Menju and Aoki 1995; Salamon 1997; Salamon and Anheier 1996; Yamamoto 1989, 1995, 1996, and 1998; Yamaoka 1999). In the United States, it is an uncomplicated and straightforward procedure for a group to register as nonprofit and gain legal status as a tax-exempt organization. The United States defines nonprofits technically: nonprofits do not

Introduction

I7

distribute profits to shareholders. 14 Rather than using this concept of nonprofits, Japanese law imposes a category of "public interest legal persons" (or PILP; see Chapter 5 for historical analysis tracing the insertion of the public interest clause into Article 34 of the Uniform Civil Code). This begs the question of who decides what is in the public interest. Stunningly, in Japan, the bureaucracy has a legal monopoly on this decision; it cannot (legally) err in making this determination. Furthermore, Japanese law stipulates that public interest legal person groups can acquire legal status only through the explicit permission of the competent bureaucratic authority and grants this authority continuing powers of supervision and administrative guidance. In other states, these powers are typically dispersed. In many cases, the courts hold out the possibility of appeal for groups failing to gain legal status. On March 24, 2005, in Germany, for example, the administrative high court of Berlin granted the Jehovah's Witnesses incorporation as a public corporation by overturning the decision of the bureaucracy, which had rejected the group's application ("Germany: Jehovah's Witnesses Win Legal Battle" 2005). In Japan, the combination of a discretionary screening function, close supervision of operations, and sanctioning power has a chilling effect on the vitality of the civil society sector. This combination is one of the essential elements that cause the pattern of civil society development we see in Japan. This strict regulation is based primarily on Article 34 of the Uniform Civil Code promulgated in r896. The permitting system has been implemented in such a way that groups whose objectives or styles differ from the permitting ministry find it very difficult to gain approval. De facto, such groups have been barred from legal status by a system reliant on bureaucratic discretion. This is the screening mechanism by which the bureaucrats select the groups that are allowed to organize and those that are not permitted to do so (Menju and Aoki 1995; "NPO ho no kento" 1997; NIRA 1995; Yamamoto 1995 and 1998). For whatever reason, many NPOs could not qualify as legal persons. As mentioned earlier, this puts them at significant disadvantage. The logistical difficulties should not be underestimated, especially for groups that seek to become large, professionalized organizations. Tales abound among civil society organizations of the problems created by their lack of legal status. The director of Wonderful Aging Club (a PILP), Naoki Tanaka, speaks of the time before his group became a PILP in 1988: "Without legal status, the officials at the Ministry of Welfare wouldn't even give me their business cards. In companies, I couldn't even get past the reception" (personal interview, Tanaka Naoki, March 12, 1998, Tokyo). The Asahi Shinbun reports that for over a year, a citizen's group in North Kyushu could not receive the donation of a car from a local company because without legal

I8

INTRODUCTION

status, the donation would seem as if it went directly to the group leader. Another group leader puts it, "To relate to other bodies, legal status is a necessity" (Asahi Shinbun, March 23, I998). The same newspaper also cites the example of an aged-care group that, if it had legal status, would receive about I 2,ooo,ooo yen ($I 2o,ooo) per year from the government, but because it has no legal status as a voluntary association, it receives no money at all (Asahi Shinbun, March 25, I998). Just as it is hard for independent groups to grow large in Japan, it is hard for large groups to remain independent. The mechanics of this rest primarily in an institutional arrangement that places significant monitoring (reporting and investigating) and sanctioning (various punishments, including dissolution of the group) powers in the hands of a single bureaucratic ministry or agency. Even in the abstract, it is easy to realize that if a single agency grants permission for a group to form, monitors it, holds the ability to punish it, and can even dissolve the group entirely (often without effective legal challenge), that agency will hold significant power over the group. In Japan, each public interest legal person has reporting duties to the competent ministry, which retains the power to investigate the group or even to revoke the PILP's legal status. Furthermore, the concomitant tax benefits are not as generous as in other industrialized democracies. A PILP must submit an annual report of activities, a list of assets, accounts of membership changes, and financial statements for the last year, as well as reports on planned activities and budget estimates for the coming year. Even worse, the bureaucrats have insisted on continuing "administrative guidance." 15 Backed by sanctioning power, this administrative guidance forces licensees to comply with bureaucrats' preferences and impairs the independence of the civil society sector. These regulations have been employed in such a heavy-handed way that many observers regard the social welfare legal persons (nonprofit groups active in social welfare activities, explained in detail in Chapter 3), for example, as little more than cheap subcontractors for the government, bereft of the independence necessary to qualify them as true NPOs. The permitting agency can issue directives to the PILP that, if not obeyed, can result in the dissolution of the PILP. The agency can also make on-site inspections and audits. Legal status is just one part of this. Other important resources that the state can direct to favored groups include legitimation (mainly through legal status), public funds, and preferential taxation. Chapter 3 examines in detail taxation and also public funding of civil society organizations, another part of the overall regulatory framework, and concludes that, compared to other governments, Japan provides very little financial support to civil society organizations.

Introduction

I9

The state can often give or withhold another important resource from groups: legitimation. The state's ability to keep its hand on the purse strings of legitimacy is especially strong in Japan, where-according to most analyses-the state's historical and cultural weight is greater than in most, if not all, other advanced industrialized democracies. Legitimation derives from the legal recognition of the social value of civil society groups through the creation of a special class of groups or through the recognition of a particular group as belonging to that sanctioned category (for a discussion of the importance of legitimacy for German civil society organizations, see Zimmer 1999 ). Legitimacy as a resource can be understood in one of two ways. From a rationalist perspective, it is reputation. In other words, state certification effectively tells citizens that a group is aboveboard. Legitimacy can also be understood in a more culturalist context, with the value and importance of legitimacy weighing more or less in different cultural contexts. For the purposes of my argument, legitimacy is a resource that can be withheld or bestowed by the state in Japan and thus nests comfortably within the political institutional framework. This book examines this resource at several points: Chapter 3 considers legitimacy in general terms; Chapter 4 demonstrates the great value that state legitimation holds for Japan's small local neighborhood associations; and Chapter 5 scrutinizes evidence from the effects of the 1998 NPO Law to probe the significance of this resource for civil society groups.

Political Opportunity Structure The regulatory framework makes up a very important part of the political institutional structure that affects the development of civil society. The regulatory framework's effects-whether laws or financial flows-seem fairly easy to make out. However, the regulatory framework alone does not complete the political institutional structure. Two other elements require examination: the political opportunity structure and other indirect influences. By "indirect," I mean unintentional influences on civil society's organization that are, in a way, by-products. I will look at the political opportunity structure first. Japan's political opportunity structure has also had a large indirect influence on the pattern of civil society organization. Political opportunity structure is the "consistent-but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national-dimensions to the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action" (Tarrow 1994, p. r 8 ). I use this term not in the study of collective action or social movements for which it was coined, but rather to indicate the structure of polit-

20

INTRODUCTION

ical opportunities that face individuals seeking to influence politics. The broadening does no violence to the intent of the term, although it clearly removes it from its original locus and usage (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). What is the political opportunity structure facing civil society organizations in Japan that might seek to influence politics? A relatively insulated bureaucracy and uninvolved parliament have shaped how these groups must form in order to be effective. Close coordination with ministries is more important than mass membership, although exceptions, such as the farm lobby, do exist (Richardson 1997; Richardson and Flanagan 1984; Schwartz 1998). Along such lines, Skocpol argues that the increase in U.S. congressional staffers from 6,255 in 1960 to 10,739 in the 1970s to 2o,ooo in 1990 was a key factor in the rise of advocacy groups in the United States (Skocpol 1998). More staffers meant more opportunities for advocacy groups to lobby and get their message across. Japan's parliamentary system provides only three staffers for each Diet member, compared to 26 for each U.S. senator. Correspondingly, there are fewer opportunities for lobbyists to get their message across to Japanese legislators. Nor can Japanese organizations seek to influence a president, since Japan has a parliamentary system. Legislators are not necessarily the right people to influence either. The bureaucracy has long dominated Japanese politics, and one of the most celebrated aspects of the Japanese bureaucracy was its "political insulation." Of course, this meant that the bureaucracy was not susceptible to pressure from outsiders, including civil society groups. What appears to be less appreciated by scholars is that this also significantly decreased incentives for civil society organizations' political activities. Instead, during the heyday of the developmental state, scholars piled accolades on the Japanese bureaucracy. For example, one volume, which grew out of a World Bank study intended to find lessons in the role of the Japanese bureaucracy for developing nations, agreed that Japan was clearly "The Best at the Game" economically and highlighted how Japan's civil service attracted the "best and brightest" of the nation who worked proactively to shape its economy (Pempel and Muramatsu 1995, p. 21). Although this study advanced a nuanced appreciation of the contribution of organizational features, such as the size and competitiveness of the civil service, the authors also gave credit to direct action undert-

:; ......,

>:; ......,

V)

Permitted

FIGURE 3.1 Number of applications and permissions for NPO legal persons by date. SOURCE:

Japanese government data.

86 as of June 30, 2004 (Japanese government statistics: http://www.npohomepage.go.jp/data/pref.html). Many essentially trade organizations were rejected because they limited membership to those in the trade. This is the obverse of administrative guidance. One could expect a greatly higher number of initial rejections simply from mistakes on the forms. The law then spelled out that the reasons for rejection would be explicitly stated and that the applicant group could reapply. This process, with its explicit publication of information, was envisioned specifically to avoid the uncertainties of administrative guidance and screening. At this stage, the process does not seem to be working entirely as envisioned. The lack of tax benefits has also been a cause of complaint (discussed later in this chapter). In the education field, some groups report difficulties in receiving official funds earmarked only for private school legal persons ("NPO sankai ni shikin mondai no kabe" [NPO participation meets the wall of funding problems]), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 24, 2004). Very impressive numbers of NPOs, however, have formed and gained legal status in only a few years. Figure 3.1 documents this dramatic

The Regulatory Framework

57

increase. In short, despite some early evidence both ways, the NPO Law is on its way to achieving the goals of its drafters. Legal Categories of Groups This section outlines three broad types of groups in Japan: first, PILPs under a narrow definition, which includes only groups directly authorized by Article 34-incorporated associations and incorporated foundations; second, PILPs under a broad definition, which also includes groups authorized by special laws attached to Article 34-social welfare legal persons, medical legal persons, private school legal persons, religious legal persons, and special nonprofit activities legal persons; and finally, other civil society organizations whose legal status is authorized under different laws, such as public charitable trusts and neighborhood associations (see Table 3.1 later in this chapter). Figure 3.2 provides a conceptual mapping of the regulatory classifications along two axes. One axis divides profit from nonprofit entities, while the other divides entities formed to further the public interest from those constituted to advance private interest. The categories of legal groups detailed in the remainder of this chapter are placed in one of the four quadrants. Furthermore, the laws that create the groups are delineated graphically on the chart. At a glance, the reader can see what article and law govern the formation of various groups. In addition, the relationships among the various articles and laws and their concomitant groups are specified. Public Interest Legal Persons- The Narrow Definition Incorporated associations, or shadan houjin, are one of the two types of public interest legal persons directly authorized by Article 34 of the Japanese Civil Code, which provides for "associations with the objective of worship, religion, charity, education, arts and crafts, and other activities for public interest, and not for profit." An association is formed by members, but once it gains legal status, the association has an independent will and existence (legally speaking) regardless of changes in the size of its membership. Associations are given permission to form (kyoka) by applying to the competent government agency. For example, an association that deals with legal issues would have to apply for permission from the Ministry of Justice, while a group concerned with promoting Japan and Trinidad and Tobago amity might apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice, some groups' activities cross boundaries. This causes problems even when Japanese ministries contest jurisdiction among them-

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Public interest Article 34 groups Koueki houjin

School legal persons Religious legal persons Social welfare legal per ons

Article 35 groups

NPO legal persons

Public utilities Infrastructure companies

Medical legal persons

Intermediary legal persons Corporations Profit------------11--------------Nonprofit Companies (including, e.g., Cooperatives limited liability companies) Labor unions

Private interest ~~~

Civil Code Articles IMI Special laws attached to Civil Code Articles

FIGURE 3.2 SOURCE:

Groups established by Japanese Civil Code.

Japanese laws.

selves, as in the dispute between the Ministry of Posts and Telecoms and METI over the telecom industry. For the applicant group, the problems are also great. They must receive permission from all concerned ministries. For example, a group similar to Amnesty International would have to get permission from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Once incorporated, the association operates under a charter of association and is governed by the general assembly of all group members (shain soukai). Incorporated foundation, or zaidan houjin, is the other type of public interest legal person directly authorized by Article 34 of the civil code. The objective for the group must also be "worship, religion, charity, education, arts and crafts, and other activities for public interest, and not for profit," as stated in the civil code. Although incorporated associations are formed around a group of members, incorporated foundations are

The Regulatory Framework

59

formed around an amount of money. The foundation comes into existence to ensure that the funds are maintained and managed to serve a public purpose specified by donors. Technically, the foundation does not have members but is governed by a board of directors in accordance with basic rules laid down by its founders in the charter of the foundation. Permitting procedures for foundations are similar to those for associations, but with an emphasis on capital requirements.

Public Interest Legal Persons- The Broad Definition Social welfare corporations are groups formed under the Social Welfare Business Law, Article 22. This I 9 5 I law was part of occupation reforms. Technically, it is a special law attached to Article 34 of the civil code. As such, it carves out a subcategory of public interest legal persons and specifies different rules for them. Most important, perhaps, is that the rules for permitting are relaxed. These groups, as discussed in Chapter 2, are active in such fields as services for the elderly, children, and handicapped. The single largest group of social welfare corporations consists of daycare centers for children under five years old. The standard of permission is also lower than for PILPs, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare is the most active in permitting these groups. Educational corporations or private school corporations are another type of group whose formation was liberalized by a special law attached during the occupation. The law in question is Private School Law of I949, Article 3· These groups are essentially schools. However, the separate category of educational corporation was meant to ensure greater independence than PILPs under the narrow definition enjoy. These groups were incorporated as foundations before World War II in many cases, and the state had the power to intervene even to the level of dismissing a particular teacher. The Ministry of Education and Culture is the most active in permitting these groups. Religious corporations are again a type of group whose formation was liberalized by a special law attached during the occupation. In this case, the relevant law is the Religious Corporation Law of I9 51, Article 4· These groups register with the Agency for Cultural Affairs under the Ministry of Education and Culture. Medical corporations are in many ways best considered non profit corporations whose business is medical in nature. The Ministry of Health and Welfare is the most active in permitting these groups. Special non profit activities legal persons are the new category of groups created by the I998 NPO Law. It is a category created by a special law

6o

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

attached to Article 34 of the civil code. The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) takes the lead in permitting these groups. Other Groups

Public charitable trust are trusts whose purposes are in the public interest. The category of public charitable trust is based on a I923 law that was not used until I977, when it seemed a potential remedy to problems inherent in the current public interest legal person scheme. The Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorized the first two charitable trusts in I977· Although public charitable trusts have increased in number, there are still very few of these groups. Neighborhood associations (NHAs) are usually not recognized as legal persons. However, some NHAs hold property. Recognizing the operational difficulties that such groups face without legal status, the government responded by creating a new legal category for incorporated neighborhood associations. The government's responsiveness to this issue contrasts with the protracted disputes over the creation of special nonprofit activities legal persons. Intermediary legal person (chuukan houjin) is a new category of legal persons that applies to not-for-profit groups that are not explicitly in the public interest, such as clubs, alumni associations, and trade and business associations. Plans for establishing another not-for-profit category-the intermediary legal person-were announced in 2000. Such groups as alumni associations, trade associations, mutual-aid associations, and neighborhood associations were envisioned as likely seekers of intermediary legal person status. The Intermediary Legal Person Law was enacted as Law No. 49 in 200I and enforced starting in 2002. The Intermediary Legal Person Law distinguishes between two types of intermediary legal persons: unlimited liability and limited liability. 9 Both types are required to have at least two employees (Article 8 I, Section 4, Title 4, and Article I08, Title 4, respectively). An intermediary legal person must register (touki) and meet specific legal conditions, but registration does not entail authorization from the bureaucracy. Compared to other organizations discussed above, intermediary legal persons face minimal regulatory involvement with public authorities, similar to that of joint-stock companies and limited liability companies. A limited liability intermediary legal person must do the following: create the articles of association and obtain approval from a notary (Article Io); appoint a director and an auditor (Article I3); follow the necessary procedures for collecting, allocating, and paying funds (Articles I4, I 5, and I6); conduct an examination of the necessary procedures

The Regulatory Framework

6I

for establishment (Article I 8 ); and register the establishment of the organization at the Legal Affairs Bureau located in the same precinct as the main office (Article I 9). An unlimited liability intermediary legal person must create the articles of association (Article 9 3) and register the establishment of the organization at the Legal Affairs Bureau located in the same precinct as the main office (Article 94). At least 3,ooo,ooo yen (about $3o,ooo) is required to establish a limited liability intermediary legal person (Article I2). The unlimited type has no minimum funding requirement because of its joint liability. There are no rules on the minimum number of contributors, but surplus funds cannot be distributed to members or employees. Under Article 9, based on commercial law, every intermediary legal person must submit a list of assets and liabilities and a statement of profits and losses. A limited liability intermediary legal person must also submit an activity report as well as measures concerning the allocation of surplus funds and management of losses. Unlike PILPs and NPO legal persons, an intermediary legal person does not have to submit a statement of income and expenditure or an inventory of property. Limited liability intermediary legal persons are obligated to open their accounts and statements to the public; unlimited liability intermediary legal persons are not. Because they are based on commercial law, intermediary legal persons are not obligated to submit budget statements. Limited liability intermediary legal persons are required to have at least one auditor. The rate of corporate tax is the same as that for smalland medium-sized corporations (30 percent and 22 percent, respectively, for income under 8,ooo,ooo yen [about $8o,ooo]). At the end of each business year, the total income of the intermediary legal persons, which includes all activities, is taxed accordingly. Since enforcement of the law began in 2002, relatively few intermediary legal persons have been created: only 966 (829 limited liability and I 3 7 unlimited liability) as of April 2004. The current rate of formation is approximately 30 per month. Most are trade and business associations; the number of alumni associations and clubs are far fewer than anticipated during drafting of the law. Because of its narrow nature, the law has had very limited impact on the development of civil society organizations in Japan. Table 3.I summarizes the legal categories of civil society groups in Japan. The type of group is specified alongside the law governing the groups (and date of the law's promulgation), the purpose of the group (as described in the governing law), the permitting agency (or other body), the permitting standard (which determines the level of scrutiny applied and the level of discretionary judgment vested in the permitting agency), and the number of such groups that have already gained legal status.

TABLE3.1

Legal categories of groups in Japan Legal category of group

Governing law (date)

Group purpose, according to governing law

Association

Civil Code, Article 34 (1897)

Associations with the objective of worship, religion, charity, education, arts and crafts, and other activities for public interest and not for profit Foundations with the objective of worship, religion, charity, education, arts and crafts, and other activities for public interest and not for profit Corporations with the objective of social welfare businesses

Foundation

Social welfare corporation Educational corporation Religious corporation

Civil Code, Article 34 (1897) Social Welfare Business Law, Article 22 (1951) Private School Law, Article 3 (1949) Religious Corporation Law, Article 4 (1951)

Corporations for the purpose of establishing a private school Corporations with the purpose of evangelizing, conducting religious rites, and educating and nurturing believers

Central permitting body

Permitting standard

Extant groups

Competent government agency

Permission

11,867

Competent government agency

Permission

Ministry of Health and Welfare Minister of Education Minister of Education

Approval

(kyoka)

12,814

(kyoka)

13,307

(ninka)

Approval

11,765

(ninka)

Certification (ninshou)

183,894

Medical corporation

Medical Law, Article 39 (1950)

Public charitable trust

Trust Law, Article 66 (1923, applied 1977)

Approved CommunityBased Organization Special Nonprofit Activities Legal Persons

Local Autonomy Law 260 (2) (1991) Special Nonprofit Activities Promotion Law (1998)

Intermediary Legal Persons

Intermediate Legal Persons Law (2002)

SOURCE:

Associations or foundations whose objective is to establish a hospital or clinic where doctors and dentists are regularly in attendance or a facility for the health and welfare of the elderly Trusts with the objectives of worship, religion, charity, education, arts and crafts, and other articles for public interest Organizations formed by residents of a community Nonprofit groups whose activities are promotion of health, welfare, education, community development, arts, culture, sports, disaster relief, international cooperation, administration of organizations engaging in these activities, etc. (11 examples) Nonprofit groups whose interests are not necessarily in the public interest

Author analysis. See also Pekkanen 2000c and Pekkanen and Simon 2003.

14,048

Ministry of Health and Welfare

Approval (ninka)

Minister of competent government agency Mayor or town village headperson Economic Planning Agency

Permission (kyoka)

433

Notification (todokede)

841

Certification (ninshou)

7,634

Legal Affairs Bureau

Registration (touki)

966

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TABLE 3.2

Explanation of permitting standards* Permission (kyoka) Approval (ninka) Qualification (nintei) Certification (ninshou) Notification (todokede) Registration (touki) Registration (touroku)

Gives significant bureaucratic discretion. In practice, can approximate kyoka, but technically less bureaucratic discretion is involved. New term for 2001 Tax Reform measures discussed later. Implementation unclear, but likely between ninka and todokede. Level of discretion is unclear from precedent. Automatic approval, given satisfaction of clear criteria. No bureaucratic discretion. Automatic approval. No bureaucratic discretion. Automatic approval. No bureaucratic discretion.

souRCE: Author's analysis. See also Pekkanen 2000c and Pekkanen and Sirnon 2003. *Arrayed in descending order of discretion granted to permitting agency in deciding on application.

Table 3.2 provides a more detailed explanation of the legal of the permitting standards. These permitting standards are specified in the governing laws for the groups of various respective legal categories. Depending on the standard, the permitting body is granted a different amount of discretion in deciding the application. With significant discretion, as with permission (kyoka), the permitting body (usually a bureaucratic ministry or agency) has wide latitude to accept or deny the application. On the other end of the spectrum, a standard of registration (todokede) is unaccompanied by discretion and brings automatic approval (assuming forms are filled out correctly). As the case studies of Article 34 and the 1998 NPO Law in Chapter 5 show, permitting standards have almost always been a hot issue in the framing of laws. Regulation of Group Operations A prominent feature of the regulation of civil society organizations in Japan is that it constrains the autonomy of the groups. In part, this is because the competent ministry has wide supervisory powers over the groups (and the groups' significant reporting responsibilities). More important is the combination of permitting, supervision, and dissolution powers given to a single authority-the competent ministry. Even with the best intentions, the arrangement could have a chilling effect on the independence of the regulated groups. The matrix of law and regulations that encircles civil society organizations is not limited to gaining legal status under various categories. It also encompasses regulations of group

The Regulatory Framework activities and operations, described next, as well as financial support for groups, described later. Reporting The public interest legal person (PILP) has reporting duties to the competent ministry, which retains the power to investigate the group or even to revoke the PILP's legal status. The concomitant tax benefits are often not as generous as in some other industrialized democracies either. Even worse, the bureaucrats have insisted on continuing "administrative guidance." 10 Backed by sanctioning power, this administrative guidance forces licensees to comply with bureaucrats' preferences and impairs the independence of the civil society sector. The director of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (a PILP), Akira Iriyama, puts it well when he says, "Even those like us who make it through and get permission have to suffer from very severe control and guidance from authorities. If I start to talk about the notorious administrative guidance, it'll take days" (Akira Iriyama, remarks at the conference on "Financial Support to NGOs," sponsored by Japan Center for International Education, Tokyo, June 20, 1997). Administrative guidance has been employed in such a heavyhanded way that many observers regard social welfare legal persons, for example, as little more than cheap subcontractors for the government, bereft of the independence necessary to qualify them as true NGOs. In fact, despite the great logistical problems it creates, established foreign groups sometimes actually chose not to become a PILP precisely to avoid bureaucratic interference. In a nationwide Economic Planning Agency (EPA) survey of Japanese NPOs, the most common reason cited for not applying for legal status was that the accounting and finance reporting requirements were too onerous (6r percent of groups listed this reason), and the third most common was the fear that the objective of the NPO, or the content of its activities, could be controlled by the bureaucrats (45 percent) (EPA n.d.; "NPO ho no kento" 1997). A PILP must submit annual activity reports, a list of assets, accounts of changes of membership, and financial statements for the past year, as well as planned activities reports and budget estimates for the coming year. Investigations The permitting agency is empowered to investigate the PILP and can issue directives to the PILP that, if not obeyed, can result in the dissolution of the PILP. The agency can also make on-site inspections and audits.

66

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Dissolution Civil Code Article 68 (r) (iv) provides that PILPs are to be dissolved if the authorizing agency cancels their authorization for the establishment of the corporation. Article 71 of the civil code states that the authorizing agency may cancel their approval of the PILP if the PILP has engaged in activities outside its purposes, as defined in the articles of association, has violated the conditions under which it received approval for establishment, or has violated supervisory orders issued by the authorizing agency. Civil Code Enforcement Law, Article 25, requires an inquiry by the authorizing agency and requires the agency to indicate the reasons for the cancellation to affected parties, who then have the right to a legal proceeding and appeal. It is interesting to note that a cancellation of authorization is interpreted as a response to changed circumstances and not as am initial mistake by the authorizers regarding how much in the public interest the PIP was. Despite the theoretical possibility of appeal, the legal deck is stacked in favor of the authorizing agency-in part because of the considerable discretion attached to the discernment of the public interest (Amemiya 1999; Hayashi 1972, pp. 192-193). The courts are responsible for the distribution of any assets that the PILP held at the time of dissolution, typically to another similar PILP or to the supervising ministry. Taxation Tax benefits are designed to promote the growth of the civil society sector. They are also in part a recognition of how these groups serve the public interest, or the greater good. Greater tax benefits mean more resources are retained by the groups, which in turn spurs their development. Japanese civil society groups have not received tremendously favorable tax treatment. Tax issues are sometimes conflated into a single dimension, but taxation is a complicated subject. For my purposes, I examine only two dimensions of taxation: tax reductions for the operations of groups and tax deductions for contributions (by corporations or individuals) to groups.

Tax Treatment Under the Corporation Tax Law, Articles 4 and 7, PILPs under the narrow definition (associations and foundations) are exempt from corporate income tax except for income gained from profit-making activities. Thirtythree specific types of such activities are listed, but even for these, the tax rate is only 2 7 percent rather than the 37. 5 percent imposed on for-profit

The Regulatory Framework corporations. PILPs are also allowed to exempt up to 20 percent of this income from taxation altogether if it is used to expand their core activities that are in the public interest. PILPs are subject to consumption tax, other indirect taxes, and local taxes. They are exempted from the latter only if their main purpose is the establishment of a museum or the pursuit of studies. PILPs are exempted from several other types of taxation, including the interest earned from endowment funds. These benefits are significant, but they apply to only the small number of PILPs under the narrow definition. Medical corporations do not enjoy the same kind of tax treatment that PILPs do. They are taxed the same as for-profit corporations at the full corporate tax rate, except for medical fees reimbursed by the social insurance system. The exception is for special medical corporations (tokutei iryo houjin) that the Ministry of Finance has certified as being especially in the public interest. These groups are taxed at 27 percent and receive some tax exemptions (e.g., on real estate acquisitions for nurses' training facilities). Social welfare corporations, private school corporations, and religious corporations follow the same basic provisions as the narrow-definition PILPs but face a few limitations. For example, they can deduct the greater of 2 million yen or 50 percent of the income earned from their profit-making activities.

Taxation of Charitable Contributions Making contributions to a PILP deductible from the contributors' tax bill serves the function of increasing resources available to the PILP in a way similar (if less certain because it relies on an intermediate step of the act of giving) to reducing the direct tax bill on the PILP. Qualifying contributions from corporations or individuals to PILPs in Japan can be deducted from the tax bill of the contributor. However, the circumstances under which these contributions qualify is limited. The application of tax deductibility is left in large part to the discretion of the Ministry of Finance (Amemiya 1999, p. 208). Individuals' contributions of up to one-quarter of their annual income minus ro,ooo yen are deductible if given to groups designated by Income Tax Law 78 (2)-(2) as "special public interest promoting corporations (tokutei koueki zoushin houjin) or to designated purposes (shitei kifukin)." These special public interest promoting corporations, or tokuzou as they are commonly known, include 26 corporations based on special laws and closely linked to the government, such as the National Institute for Research Advancement and the Japan Foundation, social welfare corporations, and private school corporations. PILPs can be added to this list by being certified by the Minister of Finance, and 900 have done so. Corporations can contribute to these tokuzou up to limits determined by

68

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TABLE3·3

Special public interest promoting corporations by legal category of group gaining tax privileges Public interest legal persons (narrow definition) Education legal persons Social welfare legal persons Other Total

822 1,125 14,832 189 17,026

SOURCE: Yamauchi 1999, p. 89. Data are from 1996, but newspaper reports show that the public interest legal persons figure has hardly changed as of 2005 (see Mainichi Shinbun, April23, 2005, p. 11).

a formula (1.25 percent of income plus o.r25 percent of paid-in capital). The limited number of groups that can receive a charitable contribution in Japan is shown in Table 3-3- Keep in mind that in the United States, over one million groups can receive charitable contributions that are deductible from individual or corporate taxes. In the Fiscal Year 2oor Tax Reform, provisions were made to allow certain specified nonprofit activities legal persons (NPO legal persons) to gain the status of tax-deductible ("nintei") specified nonprofit activities legal persons (hereafter, tax-deductible NPOs). These provisions were enacted on March 31, 2oor, and became effective on October r, 2oor. Applicants must be NPO legal persons and be certified by the commissioner of the National Tax Agency as having satisfied a list of requirements, detailed later. However, a survey of the r,034 groups granted NPO legal person status by November 1999 (to which 463 responded) found only 5.2 percent "satisfied" with the law. Although legal status itself was an important achievement for nonprofits, the main complaint of the vast majority of these groups (84 percent) was the lack of tax benefits that come with legal status (personal communication, Matsubara Akira, August 20, 1999). Similarly, a government survey found rather unsurprisingly that 96 percent of NPO legal persons agreed that tax benefits were a necessity (Prime Minister's Office of Japan, 2ooo). Civil society organizations wanted a lower tax rate and tax deductibility for contributions made to them. They received only the latter.

Sounds Great-Less Taxing: Defining Tax-Deductibility There are three parts to the tax deductibility gained by tax-deductible NPO legal persons: r. Individuals can make tax-deductible contributions to taxdeductible NPOs to the extent of 25 percent of their incomes

The Regulatory Framework minus ro,ooo yen (about $roo). In other words, an individual making 3,ooo,ooo yen (about $3o,ooo) can contribute up to 74o,ooo yen (about $7,400) and deduct that amount from his or her income for tax purposes. It is important to note that this contribution limit applies to all tax-deductible contributions That is, it sums contributions to tax-deductible NPOs, the special public interest increasing legal persons (a subset of public interest legal persons certified for tax-deductibility and commonly known as "tokuzou," hereafter special public interest legal persons), and social welfare legal persons. 2. Legal persons (corporations, etc.) can make tax-deductible contributions to tax-deductible legal persons. The limit is calculated depending on whether or not the legal person is capitalized. If so, the amount is 0.0125 times income plus 0.00125 times capital. If not, the limit is 0.025 times income. As with individual contributions, this limit applies to all charitable contributions. 3· Bequests can be made to tax-deductible NPO legal persons without incurring inheritance tax. All three of these provisions are identical to the current provisions for special public interest legal persons and social welfare legal persons. Note also that tax-deductible NPOs are not exempt from local taxation. Qualifying for Tax Deductibility The commissioner of the National Tax Agency makes the determination of tax-deductible status. This official can also investigate a group to make this determination (or its removal). There are a number of hoops that a group must jump through to become tax deductible. 11 Reporting duties, for example, are fairly extensive. Groups must file reports every year (within three months of their year's end) to the National Tax Agency. The National Tax Agency permits public access to these documents for three years. The following documents are required: documentation of funding (sources and amounts of income and amount of borrowing); list of activities, services, charges, and object of provision; list of parties engaged in transactions of 50o,ooo yen or more per year with the tax-deductible NPO, their names, and the amounts; conditions for membership, membership fees, recruiting scope, and numbers of members residing in different geographic areas (administrative units); specific accounting of activities engaged in with the contributions (including planned activities) and scope and methods of collecting contributions; contributors' names, addresses, and amounts given; names and compensation of employees; and copies of all documents submitted to the per-

70

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

mitting agency that granted the tax-deductible NPO its status as a NPO legal person. This permitting agency must also attest that the NPO legal person has not violated its own charter or the law. There are also restrictions on activities. Religious and political activities are not permitted. Provisions designed to avoid tax-deductible NPOs from being used as front groups prohibit special relationships with specific persons; contributions to corporations, religious groups, or political groups; and special profits for directors, employees, contributors, or their relatives. Similarly, no more than one-third of employees or directors may be related to each other or be employees, directors, or a relative of a director of a another legal person or group. There are restrictions on expenditures. At least 8o percent of expenditures and at least 70 percent of contributions must be spent on specified nonprofit activities (meaning those activities for which groups formed to perform can receive legal status as NPO legal persons (specified nonprofit activities legal persons). To obtain funding, tax-deductible NPOs must make open and also provide in advance to the National Tax Agency the criteria, methods, and names of individuals by which or whom grantees will be solicited and evaluated. Actual funding decisions must be treated in the same way. Except in times of emergency when notification may follow, notice of transfers of funds overseas must be provided in advance, including date, amount, and recipient. Strict accounting standards are spelled out. There are also three public benefit tests. There is a geographic test, and the tax-deductible NPO must either (I) receive contributions from individuals or legal persons from multiple geographic areas (cities, wards, towns, or villages), with no more than 8o percent from one area, (2) engage in specified nonprofit activities in multiple geographic areas (no more than 8o percent in one area), or (3) spread its funding or service across multiple areas (again 8o percent). A second test includes four provisions designed to prohibit mutual benefit organizations. For example, more than half of the group's activities must not be services or funds for the benefit of members. Nor may more than half of a tax-deductible NPO's activities be for exchange, contact, exchange of opinions, etc. among members. The third public benefit test is the public support test. An accounting formula is provided to determine that at least one-third of the group's total revenue comes from public support via contributions. Both revenue and public support are defined in detail. Revenue does not include such items as government funding (hojokin). Contributions from any individual (or his or her relatives) or legal person count toward the public support total only up to 2 percent of the total contributions. This prohibits

The Regulatory Framework

the group from having the contributions from a single large donor count toward their public support. Contributions from directors, employees, and their relatives count toward public support only under certain conditions. Only contributions of 3,ooo yen (about $30) or more count toward the public support total. In conjunction with the Fiscal Year 2003 Tax Reforms, the government loosened the requirements to qualify for tax-deductible status. Most important, it lowered the threshold of the public support test from one-third to one-fifth of all revenues. In other words, NPOs receiving contributions equal to one-fifth of their total revenue are now eligible for tax-deductible status. The definition of contributions has been revised to exclude contributions of less than r,ooo yen (previously 3,ooo yen) and to exclude bequests that exceed the amount permitted per person, as well as grantsin-aid and commission fees from national and local public organizations and international organizations affiliated with the state. The contributions from one person cannot exceed 5 percent of the total contributions received, an increase from the previous maximum of 2 percent. In calculating the total revenue, the sum must exclude any portion of a contribution that exceeds the 5-percent criterion. The reforms have also removed the requirement that tax-deductible NPO legal persons operate in multiple jurisdictions. Overall, these reforms are fairly minor in and of themselves. Of more significance, as the conclusion argues, is the rapid pace of change-this reform came on the heels of and broadened the reform of only two years earlier. Few groups have qualified for tax-deductible NPO legal person status. Of the r 6,ooo NPO legal persons existing in July 2004, only 24 have met the criteria to become tax-deductible NPO legal persons.

Public Revenues for Nonprofits Subsidies, contracts, and other public funds create resources for civil society organizations that promote the groups' development. Of course, too great a reliance on public funding can raise questions of group autonomy. This is a sensitive issue in the world of non profit management. Even in the United States, however, the state is the greatest single source of revenue for the entire non profit sector. This is true in Japan, as well. What is more interesting, however, is the pattern of disbursement of state resources. The Japanese state has favored social welfare nonprofits, while resources for advocacy groups have been scarce. This is consistent with a pattern of state support of some groups-though at the cost of those groups' autonomy-and discouragement of other groups.

72

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Article 89 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that private organizations not under public control may not receive public funds. This article has complicated state subsidies and contracts for many civil society groups, but its interpretation varies. The Ministry of Health and Welfare is said to be the strictest in interpreting Article 89. Overall, employment in the welfare fields of education, health care, and social services accounts for 8 6 percent of the total employment in Japan's nonprofit sector.1 2 Promotion of social welfare legal persons is so intense that most such groups can be considered, for all intents and purposes, part of the government of Japan. This is also reflected in their tax treatment for charitable contributions (see Table 3.1), which outstrips that of any other group of civil society organizations. The situation is very different when we consider the treatment of groups not so closely allied with the purposes of the bureaucracy. In Chapter 2, we saw how these groups tended to be small in terms of employment and budget, with advocacy groups in Japan averaging only 3·3 5 employees per group. In contrast, the average number of employees for a PILP is much higher. Again, it is advocacy and environmental groups that do not receive great flows of public funds in Japan. For example, although the average non profit in Japan derives nearly half of its revenue from public funds, environmental NGOs must make do with 2 7 percent. 13 In another study of Japan's civil society organizations, Tsujinaka found that 72.9 percent of civic groups (shimin dantai, usually referring to more activist citizens groups) did not have legal status, and only 5.2 percent of them had annual budgets exceeding 100 million yen.; in contrast, 90.9 percent of agricultural and forestry groups had legal status and nearly a third of them had budgets over 100 million yen, and although 29 percent of civic groups had no budget to speak of, all agricultural or forestry groups had funds (Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai 1998). In the same study, Tsujinaka found that civic groups were less likely than other types of groups to be involved in mutualistic relationships with government agencies-providing and receiving information. In a separate study, Tsujinaka and Mori found that civic groups were the least likely of all group categories, at 27.6 percent, to be active on the national (as opposed to local, prefectural, etc.) level (Tsujinaka and Mori 1998). Regulation of civil society groups in Japan is politicized. Several reasons for this exist, including the large amount of discretion in the laws for civil society organization, well-developed tools and habits of administrative guidance in Japan's bureaucracy generally, and the looming role of the state in constituting the public. These result in a wide variation in treatment of different kinds of groups. The largesse that the state bestows upon or withholds from groups constitutes an important resource. Similar to regulations on group formation, the level of funding influences

The Regulatory Framework

73

100 80

= 60 " u

"" ~

40

20 Japan FIGURE

France Privare giving

Germany

Iraly

-Public secror paymenrs

UK -

US Privare fees

3. 3 Revenues for environmental groups in six countries by

source. SouRcE: Adapted from Salamon and Anheier r 996.

group development. The pattern of funding itself reveals a great deal about the relationship between the Japanese state and various groups. Given the contentious history between environmental movements and the state in Japan, it is no surprise to see low levels of state support for environmental groups. Figure 3·3 presents information on the revenue sources for environmental groups. The three bars for each country show what percentage of the revenue for all environmental groups comes from private giving (charitable contributions), private fees (membership fees, sales of group publications, etc.), and financial flows from the state (grants, contracts, etc.). In the United States, for example, over 40 percent of revenue for environmental groups comes from the public sector. Japanese groups receive almost no support from the state, which is quite different from the situation in other advanced industrialized democracies, even if it is not at all surprising based on the arguments and evidence in this book. Analysis of data from the GEPON survey reveals a similar disparity. The GEPON survey targeted the most influential and important environmental groups in Japan and the United States for a detailed investigation.14 In Japan, only 20.4 percent of the most powerful environmental groups-the groups most likely to be able to get subsidies-received subsidies from the government. In the United States, however, almost exactly half of the respondents reported getting such subsidies from the U.S. federal government (author's data analysis of GEPON data). Civil and advocacy groups are another particularly good illustration of the lack of state support because they frequently have an appositional relationship to the state. In fact, these groups are quite small in Japan. They average only 3. 3 5 employees, and their expenditures are only

74

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

36.12 million yen (22.7 percent of the average for all non profits in Japan) (Salamon and Anheier 1997). Civil and advocacy groups show how stingy the Japanese state has been with its resources and how strict in its gatekeeping of legal status. Given the politicization of civil society regulation in Japan, it is precisely for these troublesome groups that we would expect to find the least support from the state. As used in Japanese, the term "citizens groups" (shimin dantai) refers to independent groups formed by citizen activists. These often typify what Americans would call "real" civil society groups. They are engaged in a wide range of activities, and the category itself implies an independence from the state. A government survey found that more citizens groups (37·4 percent) engaged in social welfare activities, such as aged care, child services, disabled services, and similar activities, than any other type of activity. However, there are a number (I 5. 7 percent) of issue-oriented groups as well. They are active on the environment, consumer issues, human rights, gender issues, peace promotion, and similar topics. Many local groups (r6.9 percent) also find themselves under the citizens group rubric, even though they are engaged in crime prevention, traffic safety, and disaster prevention, which are traditionally the domain of neighborhood associations (see Chapter 4). A number of groups (4.6 percent) are active in education, sports, or culture (EPA 1998a). Despite this wide range, the category of citizens groups holds real meaning for Japanese observers and participants, and it cuts across legal categories. Self-described citizens groups can be voluntary groups without legal status, PILPs, social welfar·e legal persons, or even other legal entities (see also Chapter 2). As we might expect from this image of independence, these groups receive very little support from the state. Consequently, despite the possibilities outlined above, very few of these groups actually have legal status. A survey of Tokyo-area citizen groups, for example, found that almost all (82 percent) remain voluntary associations without legal status (Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai 1998, p. 19). The JIGS survey also found Japanese citizens groups to be fairly unlikely to have legal status, with only 27.1 percent reporting it. This is in stark contrast to the roo percent of American citizens groups that reported legal status and to the 94.1 percent of Japanese agricultural groups and roo percent of religious groups that reported legal status (Tsujinaka and Choe 2002b, p. 292). Similarly, 90 percent of civil society organizations in the field of international cooperation lack legal status (JANIC website, http://www.janic.org/en/ whatjanic.html, July 27, 2002). Furthermore, citizen groups are small; very few have large staffs. Recall from Chapter 2 that as a category, they average only o. 5 of a full-time paid employee. Figure 3·4 shows how small state financial flows are to civil and advocacy groups in Japan. This figure

The Regulatory Framework

75

90 80

70 60

c 50 ~

~

40 30

20 10 France Germany Japan UK - Private giving -Public sector payments FIGURE

us Private fees

3·4 Revenues for civil and advocacy groups in five countries by

source. SOURCE:

Adapted from Salamon and Anheier

1996.

indicates what percentage of the groups' total revenue comes from private giving (charitable contributions), private fees (membership fees, sales of group publications, etc.), and financial flows from the state (grants, contracts, etc.). In the United States and the United Kingdom, the public sector is the largest revenue source. In France and Germany, public sector payments and private fees are about equal sources of revenue for civil and advocacy groups. In Japan, however, the public sector provides very little funding for these groups. Citizens groups emphasize their independence. Nevertheless, the price of gaining legal status is often a de facto agreement to employ ex-bureaucrats of the approving ministry. In addition to providing a cozy spot for these erstwhile denizens of Kasumigaseki (the part of Tokyo that houses Japan's bureaucracy), this practice also gives the ministry substantial influence over the group's operations. This is especially true when the bureaucrats assume posts on the board of directors. The latter practice occurs in about one-sixth of the PILPs supervised by the national bureaucracy, while the former occurs in over one-third, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Koueki Houjin Hakusho 1998, p. 124). The flip side of cutting off resource flows to challenging groups is that the state often seeks to eo-opt, or supervise, the groups that do get legal status. Intense supervision and

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

personnel transfers are methods that compromise the independence of many groups. Co-aptation and control are serious issues in Japanese civil society. It is difficult to get a handle on the scale of the topic simply by examining statistics. Qualitatively, most of the interviews I conducted with civil society professionals revealed a degree of mistrust of the state. This was true of both small and large organizations. The fear that the state would seek to control civil society organizations was almost pervasive, as was concern about strategies for maintaining independence. This indicates that Japanese civil society organizations face profound issues in maintaining their autonomy from state influence or control. The pattern of tax benefits also supports the political institutional hypothesis. There is a special subcategory of PILPs called special PILPs. 15 In general, charitable contributions by individuals or corporations are not tax deductible in Japan. However, contributions to these special PILP groups are deductible. Of the 232,776 PILPs in 1997, only 17,000 held this special status. The government has been promoting social welfare legal persons, a subcategory of PILPs, in an effort to deal with such social issues as the aging society (see Figure 3.5). Not surprisingly, every one of the 14,8 32 social welfare legal persons holds special PILP status (Yamauchi 1999, p. 198). As discussed later in this chapter, new tax regulations are in place as of 2001 for qualified subsets of NPO legal persons, but access to

FIGURE

Private giving

-Public sector payments

Private fees

3. 5 Revenues for social services non profits in five countries by

source. SOURCE:

-

Adapted from Salamon and Anheier r 997.

The Regulatory Framework

77

these benefits is strictly restricted. Similarly, resources flow from the Japanese state to certain types of civil society groups. It is simplistic to imagine that the Japanese state has merely suppressed civil society; instead, the regulatory framework, including financial flows, has aided the growth of certain kinds of civil society groups. Recall from Chapter 2 that Japanese employment levels in the state-supported sectors of education, health, and social welfare are twice as high in proportion to international averages as the non-state supported sectors. Employment levels in these three sectors are 56 percent of international averages, although excluding these sectors brings the average to 28 percent (see Table 2.4later in this chapter). 16 Another detailed study of groups in Tokyo and Ibaraki examined the legal status, budget, and number of employees of civil society and interest groups according to their field of activity. Although some attention must be paid to the categorization employed, the study (Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai 1998) uncovered a number of important findings about civil society groups. Primarily, it revealed patterns in which kinds of groups gain legal status more frequently than others. Unsurprisingly, they discovered that citizens groups usually do not have legal status (72.9 percent of the time) and are typically very small. Only 12.5 percent of them have more than ro employees, and 20.8 percent have no employees. NGOs (again, in Japanese usage this refers to groups that have an international focus) also are fairly small. Few NGOs have legal status (24 percent), and 36.4 percent have budgets under 5 million yen (about $5o,ooo). Religious groups are also not large, with only 25 percent having more than ro employees and r 2. 5 percent having no employees. However, as mentioned previously, roo percent of religious groups have legal status. The reason for that and for the fact that there are so many religious groups in Japan (despite very few Japanese in international comparison considering themselves religious) is that it is very easy to form religious legal persons. This is a legacy of the occupation era reforms in which the regulation of civil society organizations was liberalized by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP, the U.S.-led occupation authority for Japan in 1945-52). SCAP was very concerned about ensuring freedom of religion in Japan. One result of that is a high number of religious groups, all of which gain legal status very easily, even though Japan is seldom described as a hotbed of religious fervor. The study also showed high levels of legal status for economic, education, health, and social welfare groups. Even more striking, however, was the size of the agricultural and forestry groups. Both gain legal status with greater than 90 percent frequency. This is not surprising to those familiar with Japanese politics because both sectors are closely linked with the bureaucracy and the Liberal Democratic Party. Forestry groups gain legal status at this remarkable rate even though only 30 percent have a budget over

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 100 million yen ($! million). There are a similar proportion of sports groups with budgets over 100 million yen ($1 million), but fewer than half as many succeed in obtaining legal status (Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai 1998). Comparing citizens groups and forestry groups, the conclusion that it is easier for certain types of groups to get legal status than for others is inescapable. Agricultural and forestry groups, typically closely linked to ministries and the LDP, gain legal status the most easily-or at least at the highest rates. On the other pole, are citizens groups and NGOs. These organizations are typically estranged from the bureaucracy and political parties, and they find it the most difficult to gain legal status-or at least they do so at the lowest rates. Research by the Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai (1998) also sheds light directly on the relationship between permitting bureaucracies and the permitted groups. The researchers categorized groups primarily according to their area of activity. For example, they labeled some groups as agricultural, others as educational, and still others as citizens groups. Then they used questionnaires to find out whether the groups did or did not have certain arrangements with the bureaucracy that had granted the group permission to gain legal status. Any of these relationships would indicate a tie to the permitting agency. Specifically, and in order of increasing "tightness" of the tie, they asked if the group met to exchange opinions with the permitting agency, received administrative guidance from the permitting agency, took in seconded staff from the permitting agency, or offered post-retirement employment (amakudarisaki) for the permitting agency. Across all four measures, they found that the agricultural groups were the likeliest to have such a relationship, and citizens groups were the least likely to do so. The level of staff seconding from the bureaucracy to agricultural groups (22.9 percent) underscores the close relationship between them. This is evinced even more clearly by the number of agricultural groups (17.1 percent) that provide the significant financial benefit of post-retirement employment to the bureaucrats (amakudarsakii). Citizens groups again are the most independent. They take no retired bureaucrats as employees and seldom take administrative guidance (24.6 percent versus 74·3 percent for agricultural groups). They even consult, or exchange opinions, with the bureaucracy less than any other group (15.9 percent versus 48.6 percent for agricultural groups). Indeed, groups with certain legal statuses are much more likely to hire retired bureaucrats. In the JIGS data set, the likelihood of a group with a given legal status hiring retired bureaucrats corresponds closely to the level of administrative supervision of these groups. For example, except special corporations (tokushu houjin, a type of state-owned enterprise), the group most likely to employ retired bureaucrats is a PILP (or zaidan

The Regulatory Framework TABLE

79

3·4

The relationship between civil society groups and other political actors in Japan, as rated by the civil society groups Type of civil society group

RELATIONSHIPS THE CIVIL SOCIETY GROUP RATED AS . ..

*

Excellent (4.5 -5.4)

Good (4.0-4.4)

Fair (3.5 -3.9)

Citizens groups 5.3; Consumer groups, welfare groups, & NHAs 4.8; women's groups 4.6; mass media 4.5 Agricultural groups 6.0; NHAs 5.1; political parties & consumer groups 4.8; bureaucrats 4. 7

Pundits 4.4; labor groups, political parties, & international organs 4.2; agricultural groups 4.1; foreign governments & foreign groups 4.0 Mass media, pundits, welfare groups, & women's groups 4.3; labor unions 4.2; economic groups & citizens groups 4.0

Economic groups & big corporations 3 .9; bureaucrats 3.8

Specialist groups

Pundits 4.9; mass media 4.6; bureaucrats & international organs 4.5

Average

NHAs 4.6; pundits & welfare groups 4.5

Welfare groups, women's groups, NHAs 4.3; labor unions, economic groups, political parties, big corporations, consumer groups, & citizens groups 4.2; foreign governments 4.1; agricultural groups & foreign groups 4.0 Bureaucrats, political parties, & mass media 4.4; labor groups, economic groups, consumer groups, & citizens groups 4.3; big corporations, women's groups, & international organs 4.2; agricultural groups & foreign governments 4.1; foreign bodies 4.0

Citizens groups

Agricultural groups

Big corporations & international organs 3.9; foreign governments & foreign groups 3.9

souRCE: Adapted from Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai 1998. *On a thermometer scale of 1-6, where 6 is the best possible relationship and 1 is the worst possible relationship.

houjin, at r8 percent), and groups with less restrictive supervision and permitting regulations are less likely to hire retired bureaucrats (author's data analysis). Table 3·4 provides further information on the relationships between different types of groups and a variety of other actors. Groups' relationships with political parties, groups in other categories of groups, other groups in their own category, mass media, bureaucracy, international institutions, big corporations, foreign groups, and foreign governments are described on a 6-point scale. A score of 6 indicates perfect alignment, and a score

8o

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

of I indicates absolute opposition, as viewed by the reporting group. The relations fall into three categories: excellent, good, and fair. Table 3·4 displays the kind of relationships that citizens groups, agricultural groups, specialist groups, and "average" groups have with this variety of actors. The best relationship is found among agricultural groups. Citizens groups have their worst relationships with the bureaucracy and the best with other citizens groups. In fact, the bureaucracy-citizens group relationship is the most antagonistic relationship found. Citizens groups view their relationship with their own government even more antagonistically than Japanese agricultural groups view theirs with foreign governments. Given the pressure that the United States has publicly placed on Japan to liberalize its agricultural markets, this is indeed striking. Note, too that neighborhood associations (NHAs) have excellent relationships with both citizens groups and agricultural groups. In fact, NHAs have the best relationships on average with all groups. Their relatively weak showing with specialist groups results from the NHAs' nature as generalist organizations.

Creation of Groups Chapter I discussed how the governments of many countries have directly fostered group formation and cited several examples from the American context. Group creation is not unique to Japan. What is striking is how many of the PILPs owe their existence to bureaucratic intervention. As discussed in Chapter 2, no definitive figures are available, but a glance at the list of PILPs authorized by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), for example, reveals many groups that were set up by METI itself. The same is true of several other ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Construction, and Ministry of Transportation. Corroborating data are also found in the number of PILPs that have ex-ministry personnel on their board of directors. Overall, over a quarter of all PILPs are in this situation and the number rises to over one-half for some ministries, such as the Ministry of Construction. 17 The effect of all these groups is difficult to discern. Many critics, however, charge that they "sap the energy of the civil society space" in Japan, as well as diluting the meaning of PILP status itself. Government agencies create PILPs for several reasons. Sometimes they can not increase staff directly and use. PILPs as a roundabout way to do so. Sometimes the PILPs are for a specific policy, and sometimes they are designed as plum spots (amakudarisaki) for retiring bureaucrats (see Ogawa 2004 on parallels with some new NPO legal persons).

The Regulatory Framework

8r

Legitimation Writing on the American labor movement, William Forbath examines "organized workers' actual encounters with courts and judge-made law [to uncover] the legal construction of a particular form of labor consciousness" (Forbath 1989 [1991], p. 6}. Forbath finds that not only did the law alter unions' strategic calculus, it also went deeper to mold the ideology of the labor movement itself. This had important consequences. A focus on repealing the proliferation of antistrike and antiboycott decrees leveled against the unions left the movement focused on negative liberty and antistatist. This in turn abetted the failure of American unions to put together a broad, class-based redistributive movement, in contrast to some European examples. The point is not the failure of corporatism in America, but rather the legislative framework's molding of a sector in powerful but subtle ways. In Japan, the legislative framework promotes a view of the state as the arbiter of the public good and the legitimator of civil society organizations and enterprises. Although definitive evidence on this point is difficult to find, I noted this attitude throughout my numerous interviews with civil society organization members and leaders and in my participant observation in many seminars with the same. I recall one meeting to discuss impending legislative changes for civil society groups, attended by approximately 200 heads of small civil society groups from the greater Tokyo area. One audience member stood up to mention how the city of Yokohama had created an office to assist NPOs with information. Immediately, a murmur went through the crowd. Then, another head of a small group stood up. Knowing that there was considerable expertise about the law and its procedures in the room, it would have been quite feasible for him to suggest that the assembled members form a similar type of group for their own benefit and that of other small civil society groups. Instead, the gentleman said in a complaining tone, "Why doesn't the Tokyo metropolitan government do something like that for us?" This provoked grunts of agreement from many participants. This anecdote betrays a representative mentality of dependence on the state, even among many civil society group leaders. Even civil society organization leaders themselves look to the state for guidance, and the general public is even stronger in its expectations that the state will legitimate civil society activity. Chapter 4 discusses how legitimacy is a powerful resource for neighborhood associations, and these issues are examined again more broadly in the conclusion.

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Evidence from the NPO Law Most initial NPO applicants under the I 99 8 NPO Law were relatively new groups. A survey of applicant groups through May I999 found that although two applicant groups had been founded before I949, more than half had been founded after the Hanshin earthquake (versus a I997 survey that found the mean year of establishment to be around I98o). 18 What this may mean is that the law's benefits are even more apparent in legitimation than in operations. Established groups initially adopted a wait-and-see attitude, but now thousands have gained legal status. Although the vast majority (76.3 percent) were previously voluntary groups, some groups have even changed legal status from social welfare legal persons or other groups to gain the new NPO legal person status (Prime Minister's Office of Japan 2000). At the start, young groups that would otherwise have had trouble in establishing their reputation used the NPO Law as a shortcut to legitimacy-a way to demonstrate what their group is all about that was not previously available. The Hokkaido group that became the first NPO legal person saw its membership nearly triple (from I30 to 300) within half a year (Asahi Shinbun, May 3, I 999 ). Legitimacy is a resource that groups in Japan gain along with legal status. In fact, the overwhelming majority of NPO legal persons 8r.5 percent) name social trust and recognition as a legitimate group as the benefits they gain from legal status-in a word, legitimacy. This is important because most groups (6o.8 percent) get donations of some kind (Prime Minister's Office of Japan 2ooo). Groups also cite recognition that their goal is not profit (6r.7 percent), ease of getting government contracts (52 percent), and other operational benefits (Nihon Seinen Houshi Kyoukai 2003, p. I93). All this data suggest that the legitimation function of the law is stronger than many anticipated and also underscores the perhaps ironic importance of social legitimation (from the state) for civil society organizations. The lack of legal status diminished the legitimacy of individual groups. By the same token, the long absence of a category of nonprofit legal persons diminished the legitimacy of the sector itself. The rapid rise in the number of NPO legal persons, and their growing size (compared to earlier samples of citizens groups), is itself evidence for the political institutional hypothesis.

Indirect Laws Not only laws that directly regulate civil society organizations have an effect on their development. A variety of other regulations have a similar impact. For example, postal regulations that make bulk mailings cheaper

The Regulatory Framework

for civil society organizations can promote one type of organizationthat with a mass membership base. In the United States, this discount is important in promoting large membership organizations, which rely on the discount to attract and communicate with their widespread membership bases. In Japan, the lack of this discount can make the operation of groups aiming at large memberships quite expensive and thus less likely to succeed. As mentioned in Chapter r, the head of a small citizens group in Tokyo confessed to me that he has, on occasion, actually found it cheaper to pack a suitcase full of mailings, fly to Korea, and mail them from Korea to Japan. Again, this is because the international postage rate from Korea to Japan is less than the Japanese domestic rate-even with the additional expense of a plane ticket. Another example is the political system itself. The United States has a political system with a plethora of "veto points" at which groups can exercise influence. There is a powerful legislature that has weak party discipline and is receptive to groups that can mobilize votes. In Japan, however, support organizations, such as politicians' personal support organizations (kouenkai), that are based on personal ties to an individual Diet member have flourished (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004). A relatively insulated bureaucracy creates a set of incentives for groups that is different from that created by a system such as that in the United States. Of course, a small number of large mobilization and lobbying groups, such as the agricultural cooperatives group Noukyou, do exist in Japan. I expand on the importance of the political system in developing the "regulatory contestation" argument next, in the conclusion. Conclusion As we can see even from the cursory review of the drafting of the Japanese Civil Code given earlier and from the politics behind the NPO Law (discussed in Chapter 5 ), regulatory frameworks do not come about by accident. Rather, they are the end product of a political process. Although Japanese legal scholars and administrators often portray the law as neutral and logical, it is no surprise that we see conflicts about their making. As William Riker wrote of institutions in general, they are the sophisticated equivalent of outcomes. As noted previously, two things about Japanese regulation of civil society stand out-its relatively unchanging nature and its overall restrictiveness (with pockets of permissiveness). Both have their roots in the crucial drafting of the Japanese Civil Code. The civil code, which constrained group formation, in some ways set Japan on a path in which few groups that could lobby for policy change developed.

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Although we surely have to look for reasons other than institutional stickiness for the striking lack of change in Japan's regulation of civil society organizations, the civil code was just as surely influential. The civil code itself and Article 34 are not by-products of some other functions of Japanese law or relics of traditional Japanese culture. They are the products of political contestation. If Article 34 gives the impression to the reader of having been written quite deliberately to make it difficult for social groups to form, this impression is accurate. Although Article 3 5 was written to make for-profit corporations easy to form-all the better to speed economic development-Article 34 for public interest legal persons limited the groups. The case study of Article 34 in Chapter 5 makes the deliberateness ofthe high hurdles apparent. Compared to the dust that settled on the law books from the period after the occupation until 1998, the post1998 period of legal change has been positively vibrant. This, too, must be seen through the lens of politics. Chapter 5 examines these legal changes in detail, and Chapter 6 uses the evidence to advance the third main argument of this book-that the regulatory framework is heavily influenced by politics, particularly by the electoral needs of political parties. Before reaching this point, however, we must turn our focus to the local groups that densely populate Japanese civil society.

4

Neighborhood Associations and Local Civil Society AN EXAMINATION of local civil society groups, primarily the neighborhood associations (NHAs ), further develops two of the main arguments of this book: the importance of state structuring for the development of civil society, or the "political institutional" argument; and the implications for Japanese democracy of the particular pattern of civil society development in the country, or the "members without advocates" argument. Let me make clear the relationship of this chapter to each argument, in turn, before providing a brief roadmap of the chapter's structure. The argument for state structuring of Japan's dual civil society has focused so far mainly on barriers and impediments, but the story of local civil society groups is quite different. For example, neighborhood associations are a form of civil society organization that is widespread throughout Japan, but much rarer in other advanced industrialized democracies. In Japan, nearly everyone is formally a member of an NHA. The nearly 30o,ooo small, local groups have a long history spanning periods of spontaneous origin, proliferation, subsumation by the state, abolition by SCAP, rebirth, and present activity. However, one key element in their history is the centrality of government policy to their spread and current prominence. The case of the NHAs shows how government policy has shaped civil society by spurring the development of a particular class of civil society organization. Neighborhood associations are not the only small, local groups in Japan, as discussed in Chapter 2. Associated groups, such as children's and elderly people's groups, are also discussed here. However, neighborhood associations are the most widespread of the local civil society organizations. Their prevalence is one reason the chapter focuses on NHAs. Another is that they are virtually unstudied in English. The third

86

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

and most important reason is their relevance to the political institutional hypothesis. Finally, this chapter focuses on NHAs because they exemplify a pattern of state-society interaction that challenges Western models and theories by blurring the state-society boundary. 1 Once again, NHAs themselves are merely the best example of this phenomenon. Other such groups and positions include traffic councilors, civil liberties commissioners, and the many local branches of the Japan National Council of Social Welfare. This last group blurs the state-society boundary by promoting local volunteer activities and helping to deliver social services to millions of individuals throughout Japan through nearly r9o,ooo voluntary welfare commissioners (minsei iin). Japan's astonishingly low number of welfare professionals was once seen as an expression of Japanese culture in welfare provision, but the role of the state in propagating the system is now recognized (Goodman 1998; Estevez-Abe 2003). In fact, as discussed at the end of this chapter, the NHAs and these other organizations force us to reconsider assumptions about the state's role in fostering social capital formed by studying state-civil society boundaries in Western contexts. Neighborhood associations are merely the most prominent and widespread of all these groups in Japan. Neighborhood associations illustrate important aspects of the fourth main argument of the book as well. Japan's civil society is one of "members without advocates"-strong in promotion of social capital, but limited in the ability to contribute to policy debates through advocacy. In its concluding sections, this chapter specifically examines evidence on how local groups, such as neighborhood associations, produce and sustain social capital. These sections also examine how NHAs have a limited impact on policymaking, even though they could potentially serve as an organizational framework. I argue these two phenomena are related. The all-inclusive and local membership of NHAs bolsters their contributions to social capital but handicaps the groups from acting on political issues that do not enjoy unanimous or near-unanimous support from residents. This chapter proceeds to give a comprehensive understanding ofNHAs while highlighting the key elements that drive the arguments reviewed above. The chapter first discusses the nature and role of neighborhood associations in Japan. A brief historical perspective traces the importance of the state in the spread of NHAs throughout Japan. A discussion of stateNHA relations explores these linkages in greater depth. The conclusion frames the findings of the chapter in terms of the two main arguments mentioned above.

Neighborhood Associations

What Are Neighborhood Associations? Neighborhood associations are an important aspect of civil society in Japan. They are based on residential proximity, most often comprising from roo to 300 households. There are around 3oo,ooo NHAs in Japan, and nearly all Japanese are members in one NHA or another. The members pay dues, choose leaders, and participate in a variety of activities. Their activities are centered on the local community, ranging from cleaning up a local park and running neighborhood watch-type programs to organizing local athletic meets or children's outings and running local festivals. Their activities also include cooperation with local government, primarily in disseminating information from the government to local residents. No commonly used definition of neighborhood associations exists in Japan. 2 I define them here: Neighborhood associations are voluntary groups whose membership is drawn from a small, geographically delimited, and exclusive residential area (a neighborhood) and whose activities are multiple and are centered on that same area.

This section describes the state of NHAs in contemporary Japan, beginning with a discussion of the numbers of NHAs and the level of participation in the groups. Both are quite high in international perspective, even though participation and membership are voluntary. Next, the chapter examines NHAs' activities and reviews organizational features of the NHA, such as leadership selection and how the NHA forms a core or nucleus organization from which many other local groups arise. A number of misconceptions have flourished about NHAs both inside and outside Japan. These most commonly take one of three forms: (I) NHAs are not civil society organizations, but compulsory parts of the state; (2) NHAs are the exclusive domains of certain elements of society, notably small business owners who support the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and are not representative of the general populace; and (3) few people participate in NHAs. Each of these views is erroneous. Although NHAs are linked to the state, there can be no misunderstanding: they are autonomous organizations that are not part of the state. This misconception probably stems from the wartime period when NHAs were truly part of the state. NHAs do exhibit a degree of conservative overrepresentation in membership and leadership, but it is actually quite a small degree and many liberals also participate. Finally, many people participate in NHAs. I address this final misperception first.

88

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

Participation

As far as numbers of groups, NHAs are the most common form of civil society organization in Japan. There are 298,488 neighborhood associations operating in Japan, although the terms used for them vary from place to place. 3 Few nationwide figures are available on the number of households per NHA or on participation rates. However, precise data is available for the 8,691 groups that have acquired legal status. Most (50.6 percent) of these groups have fewer than 300 member households. Only a few (13.1 percent) have more than 1,ooo members ), but one in five (20.4 percent) have between 501 and 1,ooo members. The most common (35·7 percent) size for these neighborhood associations, however, is 101-300 households (Ministry of Home Affairs 1992). This seems to represent a "typical" size for a neighborhood association-at least one with legal status. However, there may be some bias in the figures. Groups that have legal status often acquire it to assist with management of assets, such as land. Because larger groups may be more likely to have such assets, the size of these groups may be larger on average than most NHAs. No national-level data that comprehensively survey all neighborhood associations are available. However, we do have detailed surveys and studies of various regions around Japan by a number of scholars. In general, this research portrays neighborhood associations as being of a similar size to the expectations set by the government data on NHAs with legal status. For instance, Ouchi's detailed research on all of the neighborhood associations (with and without legal status) of Yokohama shows similar variation. Ouchi found that in April 1987, membership in NHAs varied from seven households to 3,074 households, 20.7 percent of the NHAs comprised fewer than 100 households, and 32.0 percent comprised between 100 and 399 households (Ouchi 1990, p. 242). As with the government data, a "typical" size for NHAs seems to be about 100-300 households. Because NHAs are, by their nature, restricted to a set geographic area, participation rates are calculated by the percentage of the residents of that area who are formal members of the NHA. Although membership rates are impressive, not every member participates beyond paying dues; membership alone does not imply active participation. However, many people do participate in the NHAs. It would be a mistake to think that very few people are active in NHAs. In fact, participation levels, especially in international perspective, are startlingly high. A 1976 survey by the Prime Minister's Office showed that 6o percent of those surveyed participate in their local neighborhood associations (cited in Kage, unpublished, p. 9 ). Although the figures differed slightly, a

Neighborhood Associations No response

Occasionally

Somerimes

ever

I

FIGURE 4.1 Neighborhood association participation by frequency of participation (1997 national survey). SouRCE: Japan Broadcasting Survey, March I997; N 5 2,947. Accessed November 9, 2003, at http:// roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu

1979 public opinion survey revealed patterns of participation along the same lines. The survey showed that most people (55 percent) were involved in their NHA. Of these, many (31 percent) were only occasional participants, but 11.2 percent described themselves as active and 7.2 percent reported having served as leaders of the NHAs (cited in Robertson 1991, pp. 165-166). One of the most remarkable things about NHAs is that participation could actually be increasing. At the least, surveys from the 1970s found that participation levels were lower (55 percent in 1979 and 6o percent in 1976) than in more recent surveys (71 percent in 1997 and 72 percent in 2ooo). 4 The 1997 data are presented in Figure 4.1. The total participation numbers have also risen. If participating " often" in 1997 can be taken to mean the same level of participation as "active" in 1979, then the number of active participants rose over those nearly two decades. Although more detailed studies are needed to be certain of this trend, we can at least feel reasonably assured that NHAs continue to be quite active and enjoy widespread participation. This might surprise those who have seen social changes, such as the rise of single-person households,

90

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

apartment buildings, and weakening social ties (sometimes interpreted as moral decay), challenge such organizations as the NHAs. The dedication of millions of Japanese to the local communities and to the NHAs must surely be the most important factor staunching this predicted decline in NHA participation. However, the state has also been lively in its defense of NHAs, as detailed later. State bureaucrats play an important role in sustaining the continuing vitality of the NHAs. These national surveys are largely replicated by several good regional studies. In his study of Yokohama, Ouchi found that only a handful (5.4 percent) ofNHAs had less than 50 percent membership. Despite this anemic showing from some NHAs, most had enviable membership rates. Two-thirds of the NHAs had over 90 percent membership rates, with a further r6.8 percent having 70-90 percent membership (Ouchi 1990, p. 242). Studying three neighborhoods in Tokyo, White states, "Data both from [NHA] officials in our three [areas] and from other studies support an estimate that approximately one in four or five [NHA] members attends general meetings or participates in other activities, with participation low in the suburbs" (White 1982, pp. r 54-15 5 ). White notes that some specific NHA activities draw more participation. In surveys, onequarter to one-half of residents said they had participated in hobby or athletic events or helped distribute information materials. Ninety percent of a sample of three suburbs of Kyoto and Osaka used NHA garbage pickup sites or helped with community cleanup or streetlight repair. 5 How often do people participate in NHAs? A national survey found that the most common level of participation was once a year (45 percent), but a majority of those involved in NHAs participated at least once a month in NHA activities (see Figure 4.2). 6 In short, a majority of Japanese participate in NHAs, and a substantial minority of them participate very actively, but nearly all Japanese are members of an NHA. Whether this shows wide participation or widespread apathy is in some ways a question of the glass being half full or half empty. However, in comparative context, having half the adult population of Japan active in any organization seems to constitute a tremendously vital enterprise. 7

Are NHAs Really Voluntary Associations? Are NHA compulsory organizations? Certainly the membership rates are reminiscent of reported election results in Communist states. These membership rates, especially when compared to lower participation rates, are so high as to seem to suggest that joining an NHA may not be completely voluntary. However, the key point to keep in mind is that NHA

Neighborhood Associations

91

More than 4 times a week 2 - 3 time a month

Once a month A few times a year

FIGURE 4.2 Neighborhood association participation by frequency of participation (2003 national survey ). SOURCE:

Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo

2003,

p.

1 47;

N 5 607.

membership involves paying dues. Except for some apartment buildings where the fee is included in rent, anyone who does not wish to join simply does not pay the dues, while it takes a positive action to become a member. The fact that many people may join NHAs through social pressure from neighbors who are active NHA members does not diminish the act of joining. For example, cleaning a local park together is a typical NHA activity. Many Japanese may feel that having to clean the park is bothersome and do so only out of social obligation, but many others feel pride in working together and keeping their local park pristine. 8 Social pressure to join voluntary associations is hardly unique to Japan. It strikes me as quite likely that some members of Rotary Clubs, the Boy Scouts, or other exemplary civic organizations in the United States joined at least partly out of social pressure of some form or other. However, it seems impossible to consider the remarkably high rates of participation in the NHAs without also considering social capital, explored more fully later. Many Japanese participate in NHAs less out of an intrinsic desire to engage in their activities than because they feel that to do otherwise would affect their reputation with neighbors. Naturally,

92

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

widespread participation in NHA activities also reinforces the norm of participation and increases the visibility (and thus potential consequences) of deviance. If a resident in Japan chooses to defect from NHA activities, there is no storming of his or her house by enraged neighbors or other forms of physical coercion. Rather, residents typically say that residents fear they might not be fully engaged in the neighborhood's social network, which could cause inconveniences in daily life. A common example might be that a resident who belongs to the NHA and is away from home when expecting an important package would feel more confident in asking other neighbors to help. By participating in the NHA, the resident signals that he or she is trustworthy and abides by the norms of reciprocity that enmesh the residents. This means that he or she merits helpful and considerate action by neighbors. In this way, the NHA sustains and is sustained by the social network of the community. Membership fees vary, but are typically less than 1,ooo yen ($1o) a month. For many Japanese, it is probably easier to pay the modest fees than to fly in the face of neighborhood custom or risk mild ostracism. Some people join NHAs out of a passion for neighborhood activities, but many also join as a matter of course (see Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo 2003, p. 52). However, one government survey asked whether people wanted to actively participate in NHAs (not whether they actually did or not) and found that 57·9 percent desired to participate actively (EPA 1998b, Shiryou [Appendix], p. 16). It is unclear whether this figure includes people who are not actually participating actively but nonetheless report that they would like to do so. Although this figure is lower than the actual active participation rate reported in 1997 and 2ooo, it seems to indicate that most people who participate are doing so because they would like to participate. As Bestor puts it, NHA "leaders say that no one is forced to join, while noting that no households refuse to belong. Both statements are probably true" (Bestor 1989, pp. 165-r66). In some ways, this is social capital: defection is constrained by norms and networks, not coercion. Because social compulsion is not coercion, NHAs are voluntary organizations. In fact, it is because this kind of enmeshing in social networks constitutes and sustains social capital that NHAs are so valuable to the Japanese state. Activities What exactly do people do in a neighborhood association? There is a great deal of diversity among NHAs in this, as in many other respects. Bestor's excellent study of the pseudonymous Miyamoto-cho, a Tokyo neighborhood, illustrates many of these activities. For example, festivals include

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93

TABLE4.1

Activities and priority activities of NHAs in Ueda City, Nagana Prefecture Ueda NHAs performing the activity

Ueda NHAs that consider the activity a priority

Activity

(%)

(%)

Constructing or maintaining parks Organizing the local festival Organizing local sports events Running club activities Publishing newsletters Running study groups Supporting affiliated children's groups Supporting affiliated elderly people's groups Supporting affiliated women's groups Supporting affiliated youth groups Building or maintaining a community center Cleaning gutters, rivers and streams, and roads Crime prevention, fire prevention Distribution of government notices* Cooperating with government collections* Presenting petitions from residents to local government* Support of politicians*

39.5 85.5 79.0 75.8 26.6 39.5 89.5 83.1 51.6 24.2 83.9 91.1 84.7 89.5 87.1 84.7

6.5 32.3 21.7 24.2 5.6 0.8 26.6 11.3 0.0 3.2 13.7 45.2 32.3 16.1 10.5

25.0

2.4

Yasui 1985, p. 210. • Activities related to government or politicians; N

31.5

SOURCE:

= 408.

Bon Odori, the big summer festival of the dead, cherry blossom viewing outings in the spring, and New Year's Day celebrations. On another score, "children's outings are frequent and tend to be enjoyed by adults as much as by children; adults often go on the excursions with no child in tow. Each summer sees a trip to a public swimming pool an hour away, with 30-40 kids and two dozen adults. There are also more elaborate events every year, such as a hike on the seashore. The women's auxiliary also has regular trips to hot springs" (Bestor 1989, p. 157). A common cavil of NHAs is that they are creatures of the government with no autonomy and simply provide low-cost services as the lowest layer of local government. However, a review of the NHAs activities should make it plain that this is not the case. Although the majority of NHAs do engage in some services, primarily information dissemination, in exchange for payment from local government, the range of activities goes far beyond this, as shown in Table 4.1. The picture that the reader should come away with is that of a vibrant organization engaged in a wide range of community services and activities. NHAs are independent civil society organizations that nonetheless have a close relationship with a

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

94

TABLE 4.2

Percentage of neighborhood associations from five regions engaging in specified activities

Activity Maintaining roads, rivers, streetlights Festivals Athletic meets Cultural & educational activities Nature conservation Crime & fire prevention Disseminating information from local government Making demands on government

Osaka city (urban) (506)*

Chiyoda ward, Tokyo (urban) (67)

Saitama middle class apartments (suburban) (29)

Shigeki machi (rural) (92)

Kaminaka, Fukui prefecture (rural) (39)

34.2

31.3

31.0

72.8

84.6

46.8 30.4 9.1

70.1 50.7 31.1

89.7 86.2 62.1

67.4 40.2 14.1

81.6 82.1 56.4

11.3

19.4

27.6

9.8

33.3

50.0

73.1

65.5

42.4

79.5

68.4

73.1

82.8

77.2

84.6

39.5

52.2

82.8

65.2

87.6

Adapted from Kikuchi 1990, p. 224. *Number in parentheses is number of NHA in the area; total N = 733.

SOURCE:

government that understands how valuable they can be. Far from being merely "cheap subcontractors" for local government, NHAs are engaged in a large number of independent, community-based activities. Table 4.1 shows the activities of NHAs in Ueda City, Nagano Prefecture. Yasui surveyed the NHAs in this medium-sized city on their activities (Yasui 198 5 ). The table shows what percentage of city NHAs engage in various activities, as well as what percentage of city NHAs consider that activity to be one of their priorities. Looking at both figures gives us a good sense of what it is that NHAs do. Again, no nationwide data is available for us to compare with Yasui's detailed study of Ueda. However, there are several other examinations of NHA activities in other areas of Japan (see, for example, Bestor 1989, Appendix). Despite the different categorization of activities by different researchers, NHAs across Japan display broad similarities in their roles. Naturally, with 30o,ooo groups spread across all of Japan, there is variation. Table 4.2 summarizes one of the few studies that compare NHAs across several different regions. Kikuchi looked at NHAs in Osaka (Japan's third largest city), the business district of Tokyo, Saitama Prefecture

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95

(suburban Tokyo), a rural town (Shigeki), and a village in Fukui Prefecture (Kikuchi 1990). Although the 733 NHAs that he looked at come to far less than r percent of the total in Japan, his study does provide variation across regions. In addition, he examined rural, suburban, and urban NHAs alike. His findings confirm our impression that NHAs are engaged mainly in community activities, although most of them also disseminate information from the local government. In terms of budget expenditures, too, it would seem that community activities dominate NHAs. For example, Bestor's local NHA had expenditures (at roo yen to $r) in the following categories: meetings $88 r.o7; maintenance $2,9ro.8r; streetlights $1,727.42; sanitation $951.57; contributions $r,r88.oo; liaison $1,393·70; youth group $r,381.23; shrine $r,126.oo; congratulatory and condolence $r6o.oo; clerical and office $544.60; events $2,726.04; traffic policy $211.90; equipment $r67.50; fire watch $r48.6o; transport $r3.8o; miscellaneous $76.90; subsidy to women's auxiliary $5oo.oo; subsidy to old persons' club $3oo.oo; festival $r,ooo.oo; auditing $2oo.oo; reserve $3oo.oo; balance forward $369.27; recycling campaign earnings $2,524.63; recycling campaign balance forward $4,968.88 (Bestor 1989, p. 282). Other research on Yokohama city NHA shows that 24.5 percent of its budget is spent on festivals and other large meetings (Ouchi 1990, p. 247). Who Belongs? NHAs, Political Parties, Gender, and Politicians

The wide participation in NHAs has already been discussed. It must also be noted that this participation comes from a wide spectrum of the population. Although neighborhood associations are sometimes criticized as being appendages of the LDP or conservative social elements in the neighborhood, this view is inaccurate. In fact, NHA leaders tend to be more active in politics, not more conservative. NHA leaders are representative of the populace, and, after all, the LDP has been the most popular party in Japan for many years. Data are not available for NHA membership and party affiliation. However, we can address this issue indirectly through data that are available. If conservatives are overrepresented in NHAs and dominate the leadership positions, we would expect the supra-NHA coordinating bodies to be filled with conservative supporters. However, as Table 4·3 shows, there is a diversity in party support even in this study of nine cities across Japan. This table also compares the percentage of the vote received by each of the parties in the 1983 House of Representatives election, held the same year as the survey of NHA council members. Data on how the "no party" respondents voted is not available, but it is clear that NHAs are not the exclusive preserve of conservatives.

96

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS TABLE

4·3

Party identification of NHA council members and directors compared to the general public THEIR PARTY IDENTIFICATION

LDP*

CGP*

DSP**

JSP**

JCP**

Other

Individuals

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

General public in election NHA council members who have served as director NHA council members who have not served as directors All NHA council

45.7

10.1

7.2

19.5

9.3

7.3 1

No party

46

3

5

16

5

36

5

5

15

3

35

39

4

5

15

4

32

24

SOURCE: Figures for the general public come from percentages of the vote received by parties in the December 12, 1983, House of Representatives election. Figures for NHA council members are based on lwasaki 1985, p. 434. *Conservative parties: Liberal Democratic Party, Clean Government Party. **Liberal parties: Democratic Socialist Party, Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist Party.

Table 4·4 shows that many of these leaders were involved in protests against nuclear weapons, typically (but not exclusively) a leftist issue in Japan. Combining the two tables, we see that NHA leaders are more involved in politics, not simply more conservative. Scott Flanagan et al. find that "neighborhood associations (chounaikai) and local retail dealers' shop associations (shotenkai) tend to be tied into conservative networks, but not in every case. Conversely, the self-government associations (jichikai) in high-rise apartment complexes and labor unions tend to have progressive ties, but this is not universally so" (Flanagan et al. I 99 I, p. I27). Writing about a conservative area in the I96os, Curtis observes that viewing the NHAs of Beppu as part of the LDP would be going too far but notes also that many people in the NHAs are generally sympathetic to conservative policies and conservative party politicians (Curtis I97I, p. III). Whatever voter mobilization and socialization is going on, it is clearly not all one way. It is really supporters of the Clean Government Party, rather than liberals, who were underrepresented. The only national survey with data on gender and age breakdowns for NHA participation shows that men participate in NHAs more than women (Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo 20o3,P· 4I). However, there is strong

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TABLE 4·4 Participation by NHA council members and directors in antinuclear weapons movement, by their level of involvement ACTIVITY

% ofNHA

council directors who ... for the movement % ofNHA council (nondirectors) who ... for the movement Total SOURCE:

Attended meetings (%)

Collected signatures (%)

Donated money (%)

Signed petition (%)

Did nothing (%)

Opposed movement (%)

4

5

11

31

46

3

3

3

7

25

57

5

3

3

8

26

54

5

lwasaki 1994, p. 434.

anecdotal evidence that women in fact participate more than men, but more studies are needed before these findings can be considered conclusive. The same survey shows a correlation between the length of time in residence and NHA participation, as well as a correlation between a desire to remain living in an area and NHA participation. These findings seem more plausible and indeed unsurprising-people who are attached to their neighborhoods are more likely to participate in the NHAs. A perceived decline in such attachment, driven by changes in mobility and commuting, spurs local government officials to find policies to stem a feared slide in NHA participation. Despite, or perhaps because of, their surprisingly catholic character, NHAs are important in local politics. Kyoji Wakata claims that "of all the local organizations which local politicians try to make their base (jiban), the most important is the organization called the neighborhood association" (Wakata 1994, p. 174). Basically, the NHA provides an opportunity for local candidates to meet face to face with voters and press the flesh. In return, the NHAs often are able to extract political commitments or help on local issues in the local Diet. NHAs also typically work with politicians of any party, as long as they support local demands. Of course, other NHAs refuse to have anything to do with local politicians, preferring to remain aloof. My interviews with many national and local (prefectural and city/ town/village level) politicians and NHA leaders confirm that politicians

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

attempt to use NHAs for electoral mobilization. My impression is that NHAs are most effective, however, at mobilization for the city level of political office, rather than the national level, as we would reasonably expect. Because of their nature, NHAs encompass a range of political views and risk alienating members or creating brutal internecine strife if political support becomes overt. Aware of the risks, NHAs generally avoid coaptation by politicians. Curtis provides the most extensive description of how NHAs can be used to mobilize support for LDP politicians in his seminal Election Campaigning Japanese Style. However, my interviews with LDP Diet members after the electoral reform of 1994 reflect a different pattern (differences might be the result of the conservative sentiment prevalent in Curtis's research area, small sample size, changing campaign strategies after electoral reform, or changes in the NHAs themselves). National Diet members and their staff in both urban and rural areas report that they view NHAs as an important way to reach voters. 9 However, they do not count on NHAs to mobilize voters. Instead, they "piggyback" onto NHA meetings. For example, by arrangement, a sympathetic NHA member will alert the Diet member (or candidate) about the time and location of a meeting. The Diet member will then drop by and make a few remarks. An LDP Diet member commented, "I give a little talk at the community hall, then engage in question and answer session .... I do this about 10 times a month. The most important point is to establish a direct connection, rather than only engaging with politics through TV or the newspaper" (LDP Diet member from Ishikawa Prefecture, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 6, 2004). A Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Diet member explained his NHA strategy: "The chair of the NHA is not supposed to be involved in politics. They have to be neutral, in principle .... [Still,] when I first started campaigning in this constituency, one of the first things I did was to visit the hundreds of NHA heads in this district-over 300 . . . . I followed up by going to New Year's Parties [of the NHA], maybe 150 of them ... then to their festivals, and so on ... " (DPJ Diet member from Tokyo, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 3 I, 2004). Visiting NHA events is a common practice that politicians of any stripe engage in as frequently as they can secure invitations. Another LDP Diet member complained, "I don't use NHAs [for reaching voters] per se, but at the end of the year, I go to the NHA New Year's parties, and the Lions Club New Year's parties, and the firefighter groups' New Year's parties, rotating amongst them all" (LDP Diet member from Chiba, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 26, 2004). It is important to realize that neither the NHA nor its events are organized for the candidate, and, more generally, the politicians have little

Neighborhood Associations

99

control over these events. Rather, the candidate recognizes the NHA as a valuable organizational forum for reaching out to voters. LDP politicians seem particularly comfortable, in general, with group-based campaign strategies. I also noted that LDP politicians had a predilection for choosing NHA heads as the head of the politicians' local support organization (koenkai). The reason is that such individuals are typically well liked and well respected in the community and have a wide personal network from which to draw for the campaign. Politicians use NHAs as much as they are able to for electoral campaigns. Still, they recognize that NHAs contain people with varying political sympathies. An LDP Diet member from Kochi Prefecture explained the limits: "Most NHAs are fundamentally unwilling to involve themselves in politics because people with various ideas are all members. Most NHAs [in my constituency] maintain neutrality because if they get used for politics, functions such as garbage disposal, guiding the physical education of children, etc. will break down" (LDP Diet Member, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 26, 2004). However, NHAs are only one of the many organizations that politicians utilize to reach voters; NHAs do not function as cogs in LDP political machine. After all, both LDP and Democratic Party of Japan Diet members told me in interviews that they utilized NHAs as much as possible as part of their electoral campaigning or in connection with their personal support organizations (koenkai). The reason for their use is not that NHAs naturally collect politically like-minded people, but that NHAs organize people. Politicians speak at events organized by a tremendous variety of groups in an effort to connect with voters. NHAs provide a superb venue for a politician of any political stripe who is representing the district or attempting to do so. This is no different in the United States. Richard Fenno, in his classic study of U.S. politicians in their districts, quotes one U.S. congressman: You can't create crowds. So you go where people meet. That means you spend more time talking to groups like the Chamber [of Commerce] than you do to people who live along the road here .... The great mass of people you can't reach. They are not organized. They don't have institutions you can plug into. The leadership, the elite runs along the top of all the institutions, and you can reach them, but not the people generally. (Fenno I 978, p. 2 3 5) The U.S. congressman would no doubt have been delighted to give talks at NHAs, as Japanese politicians sometimes do. And perhaps NHAs, by organizing voters along residential lines-giving politicians something they can "plug into"-address some of the problems to which the quote refers: that organized interests may not be representative, but because of their very organization, they have privileged access to politicians.

100

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

Other Organizational Features Two other organizational features of NHAs stand out. The first is leadership patterns, including the process by which the head of an NHA is chosen. The second is the role of an NHA as a nucleus for other localitybased organizations. Leadership selection methods vary widely among NHAs. Rotation among households is probably the most common method of choosing the president of the NHA now, although there is both regional and intraregional variation. A 1973-7 5 survey showed that the outgoing president typically recommended his or her successor (Nakata 1995 [1981], p. 86). However, more recent research indicates that rotation among households is more common, accounting for nearly two-thirds of NHAs in a local analysis (Taniguchi 1985, p. 281; Ouchi 1990, p. 243). The point is that leaders are not in any way selected by the local government. Rather, leadership selection occurs autonomously. This seems to have been the case in the pre-war period as well. Writing on Tokyo NHAs before the rise of militarism, Hastings observes, "Perhaps most important, there were virtually no bureaucrats or educators to be found among the leaders of the neighborhood associations. So, the associations were not, in actuality any more than in origin, a simple extension of the leadership of the police, the ward office, or the educational hierarchy. The leadership of the neighborhood associations reflected the essentially local orientation of the institution" (Hastings 1995, p. 81). This possible trend toward an increase in rotation as means of leadership selection may have its roots in social changes. White points to this while at the same time noting earlier abuses: "One cannot overlook the conformism, partisanship, parochialism, and authoritarianism which have traditionally characterized the [NHA]. It is our position, however, that the social and attitudinal base which previously supported such behavior no longer exists in metropolitan Japan" (White 1982, p. 26 5 ). Bestor sees both sides of the argument about leadership selection by consensus: "The selection process may seem authoritarian, arbitrary, and totally under the control of a self-perpetuating oligarchy. Critics of the [NHA] (who voice their criticism mainly by their absence) argue that these characterizations-not only of the selection process but of [NHA] affairs generally-are correct. But [NHA] supporters maintain that the lengthy rounds of discussion among leaders and other residents preceding these and most other decisions automatically provide checks and balances in the decision-making process .... Supporters argue that, through the lengthy process of consultation (nemawashi), residents have ample opportunities to air their opinions and raise any objections, and that the only ones who

Neighborhood Associations

IOI

have no voice in such decisions are those who exclude themselves by choosing to abstain from [NHA] affairs" (Bestor 1989, pp. 188-189). A more pressing problem seen by local government officials is the passing of a generation that valued involvement in neighborhood affairs. Across the country, many officials confided in me about their concerns that the current leadership of NHAs was aging and that the younger generation was not as attracted to leadership positions in the NHA, which can be, after all, very time consuming. 10 It is unclear whether or not this is an indication of a generational change, such as that described by Putnam in the United States (Putnam 2ooo). However, it is much on the minds of local government officials. Apart from leadership selection, patterns of NHA decision making are also interesting. Bestor writes that no one in Miyamoto-cho, the area of his anthropological study in Tokyo, "doubts the centralized nature of decision-making ... both the formal powers to make decision and the implicit influence required to set the [NHA's] agenda reside with its top leaders." 11 Steiner also warns that consensual decision making is a dual-edged sword; voting is avoided at rural NHA meetings, with a preference for recommendation and consensus, but exclusiveness and ostracism as sanction are the flip side of this group cohesion (Stein er 196 5, p. 21 I). Robertson is perhaps the strongest in holding this view. After participant observation in the Gakuen Nishi Chounaikai (GNC), by far the largest NHA in the area of her fieldwork, she concludes that the GNC was "a virtual oligarchy" because of members' apathy and officers' arrogance (Robertson 1991, p. 158). A more important organizational feature of NHAs is how they often form a nucleus for affiliated local organizations of several types. This feature is important for two reasons. The first is that it helps to structure local civil society. Second, by lowering the transaction costs for group formation (by providing an organizational nucleus and physical facilities, such as meeting space), NHAs may be an effective way of promoting groups that sustain social capital. Ouchi observes that "in this way, voluntary associations intersect with the neighborhood associations and create their own widening networks in the area .... " In addition, even more closely affiliated, as subgroupings, with the NHAs are such groups as the park protection group, the library group, the physical fitness group, children's group, elderly persons' group, and women's auxiliary (Ouchi 1990, p. 271; Ajisaka 1994, p. 299; see also Kurasawa and Akimoto 1990). The elderly persons' groups and women's auxiliaries are often subgroups of the NHA, and in any case, membership is usually overlapping. However, these groups do have separate existences, including separate meetings, separate dues and often separate (smaller) subsidies from local

102

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

governments. Typical activities for the elderly persons' groups include visiting local health facilities, studying history, traffic safety, and trips to hot springs. They also contribute to social capital formation, of course, as mentioned later in the conclusion. Neighborhood associations are a diverse lot. However, the previous review makes clear that they are voluntary associations that engage mostly in community activities. This does not mean that these groups have no relationship to the state; rather, the point is that NHAs are true civil society organizations. As discussed later, their relationship with the state involves government support that contributed mightily to the spread of NHAs, as well as a continuing level of involvement that frequently involves attempts at coaptation. History of Neighborhood Associations The origin and development of NHAs shed light on their role as civil society organizations with a strong relationship to the state. This section provides a brief review of the history of the NHAs that emphasizes their heritage as a spontaneous social organization form, but one that was spread through the workings of the state. This mixed heritage is the essence of the importance of NHAs for my broader argument. The spontaneous origin of NHAs as a social organization helps to establish their credentials as civil society organizations. However, these organizations only existed in certain parts of Japan, involving an estimated less than ro percent of the population. The state in the 1920s was crucial in the spread of NHAs throughout all of contemporary Japan. This demonstrates the power of the state not merely to inhibit the development of civil society organizations, but to promote them as well. This power is what gives the Japanese state its influence in shaping the civil society. Conventional wisdom traces the origins of NHAs to Japan's medieval period. Certainly, informal, quasigovernmental or compulsory neighborhood associations have played a significant role at different times in Japanese history. Many Japanese scholars' accounts seem to support this view by portraying the self-governing urban area, or chou, as the forerunner of the neighborhood association. For example, Korekazu Ueda traces the origins of NHAs to mutual defense and fire-prevention groups begun by neigh boring households in Kyoto (Ueda 198 5). These may have been similar to the tower societies linked to the high social capital areas of Northern Italy in Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work. Although the chou no doubt had an impact on local administration and perhaps serve as a cultural template, they are not the direct ancestors of

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103

neighborhood associations. Rather, urban NHAs emerged spontaneously in the early part of the twentieth century. However, the reasons for their origin and spread may be differentiated. They spread in part because of social factors, such as in response to the Kanto earthquake, but also owe their uniformity and rapid spread in part to the state.

Precursors to the Neighborhood Association Often cited as a predecessor to the NHAs, kumi were neighborhood groups of households "bound together by residential proximity and reciprocal aid. Consisting of up to r 5 households, kumi functioned as joint work and assistance subunits of the village. Together the members of a kumi planted rice, prepared for festivals and ceremonies, handled funerals, built and repaired homes and roads, and often provided capital, credit, and especially labor for one another" (Noma 1993, p. 84r). Steiner differentiates between rural areas, with a strong tradition of kumi, and urban areas. The NHAs of the rural areas, "these groups in their present formalized appearance did not arise spontaneously, but ... there was at least an informal social unit on which the formal organization could be based" (Steiner 1965, p. 217). Hastings traces the precursors of NHA in this way: "In fifteenthcentury Kyoto, a machi was a row of houses .... The members of the machi were mutually responsible and mutually liable for fire and crime prevention and protection. In the sixteenth century, townsmen representatives (machi soudai) virtually governed Kyoto. The Tokugawa political order, although it by no means permitted urban autonomy, depended upon townsmen and their self-governing units for the administration of the cities. In Osaka, ... townsmen administered the civilian sectors of the city. They conducted inquiries, transmitted communications, collected taxes, regulated commerce, and kept records" (Hastings 1995, p. 73). However, she is explicit in denying any direct link between these groups and neighborhood associations. Japanese conventional wisdom holds that neighborhood associations are very old and descended from even older and more venerable East Asian institutions. The five-man groups (gonin gumi), the system of town elders (machi soudai), town managers (sewanin), justices of the peace (toshiba), young men's groups (wakashuukai), and the local religious associations (ujiko shuudan) are among the institutions that are sometimes invoked as the pre-Meiji forerunners of the neighborhood associations .... The neighborhood associations ... were not direct lineal descendants of Edo administrative units, ... Further, specified evidence offered as proof that the neighborhood associations were directly descended from Edo institutions does not stand up well under scrutiny.... The neighborhood associa-

I04

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

tions, however, were neither revivals of the urban past nor urban versions of the village. As noted above, there was virtually no continuity between these twentiethcentury institutions and their putative Edo ancestors. The neighborhood associations were voluntary and inclusive of all households in the area. The membership of the Edo institutions was compulsory and usually limited to landowners, homeowners, and estate managers. In Edo, even the five-man groups may not have included tenants, who made up 6o percent of the population. (Hastings r 99 5, pp. 74-75; see also S. Tanaka 1990, p. 3 r)

In his local area, Bestor finds that, "By the early years of the current (Showa) period (I926-I989), no remnants of groups that originated in agrarian Kumodani were significant enough to be included in the comprehensive lists of town and lower-level associations, institutions and organizations compiled in preparation for the amalgamation ofEbara-machi into Tokyo" (Bestor I989, p. 64). Rise of the Neighborhood Associations Setting aside the discussion on their historical origins, the modern NHA developed in the twentieth century. From the turn of the century, small numbers of neighborhood associations formed spontaneously. However, the growth period for NHAs was the I92os, spurred by government introduction of sanitary associations. Seven out of IO NHAs extant in I940 were formed in the Showa period (I926-I989), 23 percent in the Taisho period (r9I2-1926), and only 7 percent in the Meiji period (r868-r9r2) (Akimoto I990). Membership in NHAs grew dramatically in the I92os, and by I 9 3 3, 77 percent of Tokyo households were enrolled in neighborhood associations. Even in budgetary terms, in I 9 3 5, the total budget of Tokyo's NHAs was equivalent to one-eighth of the city's tax revenue (Hastings I995, p. 72). The NHAs evolved from these various voluntary associations, as well as organizations centered around local shrines whose activities included organizing the festivals. However, the key to their rapid spread was the adoption of a government-created form, the sanitation association. Although not aimed directly at creating NHAs, the sanitation associations provided the institutional form that NHAs assumed. This development is a curious mixture of spontaneous and autonomous local impulses for association with government-inspired organizational templates. As Hastings puts it, "Although the government directive on sanitation unions provided their form, and the government relief policy at the time of the earthquake hastened their proliferation, the initiative for the founding of the neighborhood associations and the commitment to their perpetuation came from local residents" (Hastings I995, p. 79).

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Many analysts see the establishment of neighborhood associations as a part of Taisho democracy. Shigeyoshi Tanaka asserts that the view that NHAs were all imposed from above is mistaken and that "if anything, the administrative response came somewhat later than the general movement" for the formation of NHAs in the period. Still, without the administrative push, NHAs would not have covered Tokyo so quickly. For example, in the Kanda ward of Tokyo in this period, 61 of the 112 NHA were converted voluntary associations. Most of these voluntary associations were formed between 1890 and 1914. Of the 112 NHA, 22 were formed before 1919, and 70 between 1920 and 1924. Even of these 70, however, all but four were formalized from some pre-existing organization (S. Tanaka 1990, pp. 33 and 40). Hastings's view is that "the Tokyo neighborhood associations emerged from the interaction between local voluntary organizations and the government. After the Meiji leaders abolished the Edo forms of local organization, the landlord and estate managers, through their ties with their tenants, continued to dominate the local affairs not subsumed under the Metropolitan Police. In the new Meiji order, there was no formal mechanism for carrying out certain activities that defined the community. Thus, from time to time, groups of residents organized on an ad hoc basis to carry out a shrine festival or to see young men of the neighborhood off to war. A fire in Kanda in 1881 inspired the residents of neighboring Shitaya ward to set up an elaborate system of fire watches, for example. Many local organizations simply defined themselves as friendship societies. Such local groups sometimes organized on the basis of the chou. They had a wide variety of names, and they tended to have specialized and limited functions" (Hastings 1995, p. 76). Hastings contends that although "the relationship between Shinto shrine associations and the neighborhood associations was complex ... the evidence suggests that the neighborhood associations absorbed the shrine organizations rather than that the shrines begat the neighborhood associations" (Hastings 1995, p. 76). Hastings emphasizes the somewhat indirect role that the government played in spurring the spread of NHA: In a law that went into effect on July I, I 900, Tokyo prefecture prescribed the establishment of sanitation unions in each city and village to prevent the spread of disease and to disseminate knowledge of sanitation.... The significance of the regulation of I 900 for future of local organizations in Tokyo was that it designated the chou as the basic unit of organization within the cities and required the head of every household to join. Many of these sanitation unions eventually withered away for lack of funds .... Nevertheless, their creation established the form that the neighborhood associations would take: an organization composed of all household heads in the officially designated chou . ... By the I92os, most sanitation unions

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had become part of a neighborhood association .... Gradually, the functions of the various shrine and friendship associations were assumed by organizations having the form of the sanitation union. (Hastings 199 5, pp. 77-78) Dare also points to the importance of sanitary associations as templates for the spread of neighborhood associations (Dare 1958, p. 272). Another spur to the proliferation of NHA was the Kanto earthquake of 1923. Hastings sees that it "provided the impetus to spread the neighborhood associations to every part of Tokyo. The associations proved their value as civil defense organizations through their activities on the day of the disaster and during the period of disorder that followed. Where formal associations already existed, the members assembled to fight fires and evacuate those in danger. ... Neighborhood associations were invaluable in administering relief programs in the weeks following the disaster.... In their answers to the survey in 1934, 21 percent of the associations in the old section of the city gave the earthquake as the impetus for their founding" (Hastings 199 5, pp. 78 -79; see also Stein er 196 5, p. 219). Tanaka and Dare agree in seeing the earthquake as proving the NHAs' value to local residents (especially in organizing help for the police and rescue work) who later founded other NHAs and, at the same time, stimulating government interest in promoting and utilizing these NHAs (S. Tanaka 1990, p. 42; Dare 1958, p. 272). Shigeyoshi Tanaka also emphasizes the establishment of sanitary associations under Government Order 16 of 1900, highlighting the significance of this regulation that specifically included all residents, not just landowners. Tanaka's interpretation is that the government was taking the position that all residents in an area would be organized, not necessarily only for sanitation (S. Tanaka 1990, p. 33). Documents from that time make it clear that although the formal sanitary associations incorporated the entire city, only about half of the areas in the city had active associations (S. Tanaka 1990, p. 34). Still, by the beginning of the 1930s, NHAs existed in every ward, and more than a third of all NHAs had been founded in the spurt years from 1923 to 1927 (Dare 1958, p. 272). Commenting on the later spread of NHAs, Tanaka writes, "In the background, it can not be denied that the central government's intentions were at work," while conceding that neighborhoods exist as a unit and that is why the voluntary associations formed there (S. Tanaka 1990, p. 2 7). Tanaka finds multiple reasons for the rapid spread of NHAs in the 1920s, including push from the government as well as internal spontaneous organization. In government documents (including sample constitutions, membership fees, etc.) from October 1924, Tanaka sees an indirect attempt to foster (ikusei) the NHAs. The second political reason for the spread is the passage of universal manhood suffrage in 192 5.

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Politicians tried to use NHA for mobilization of voters. Although few NHAs supported specific candidates, 77 percent of ward representatives had been president or vice president of an NHA previously (S. Tanaka I 990, pp. 38-40 ). In other words, NHAs were more effective at training leaders than at serving as bases for electoral mobilization. Neighborhood Associations Under Militarism In some quarters, the image of NHAs as a branch of government, and one characterized by spying on neighbors, still persists. It may owe much to the transformation of the NHAs during Japan's militarist period. During this time, NHAs were subsumed into the national mobilization of Japan and later incorporated into local government for use as a means of social control. After the I93I Manchurian Incident, as Japan's war in China deepened, the government used NHAs for air-raid training and similar tasks. In I940, NHAs were made part of the local administration, wholly swallowed up into government. Participation was made compulsory. Their responsibilities included rationing, civil defense, and propaganda. The tonarigumi system (neighbor groups) brought together units of IO to I 5 households for allocating government bonds, public health, rationing, civil defense, and fire fighting. They were used for transmission of information and for securing public cooperation. They were also an effective means of social control. Abolition and Revival of NHA The allied occupation forces, or SCAP, were determined to abolish the neighborhood associations (see, for example, Norbeck I967, Masland I946, and Braibanti I948), which were seen as the means by which the militarist government imposed tight control over the populace. To the "policy makers of the American Occupation, choukai were fundamentally undemocratic-John Embree compared them to the German Nazi's party organization-and they were marked for abolition" (Bestor I989, p. 75 ). Steiner writes, "When the [NHA], uniformly established throughout Japanese cities in I940, engaged in rationing goods, digging shelters, fighting fires, or even in propagating patriotism, their activities were accepted and approved of by many as necessary for a nation at war. But many others chafed under the pressures of regimentation and were glad to be rid of them" (Steiner I96 5, p. 228). Nonetheless, Tanaka writes that there was no grass roots movement among Japanese for abolition of the neighborhood associations and most people welcomed their return (S. Tanaka I990, p. 47). 12

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In 1947, SCAP abolished Japan's 21o,ooo neighborhood associations. They also wrote regulations to try to ensure that NHAs did not continue under other names. In 1952, the Japanese government reversed the ban on NHA. Neighborhood associations were allowed to form as voluntary, independent organizations. Despite SCAP's efforts, NHAs quickly resurfaced and by 1956 were functioning in 98 percent of Japan's municipalities (Bestor 1989, p. 75; Curtis 1971, p. 109).

NHAs Today As noted above, one of the most remarkable things about NHAs is that participation is, apparently, increasing even today. Social critics who have seen such demographic changes as the rise of single-person households, apartment buildings, and weakening social ties (sometimes interpreted as moral decay) challenge the fabric of Japanese society must be surprised and pleased at this development. The dedication of millions of Japanese to the local communities and to the NHAs plays an essential role in preventing this predicted erosion of NHA participation. However, the state has also been proactive in its defense of the NHAs. Local government officials have often monitored the NHA situation even more closely than have social critics. In their daily work, they see the great benefits of the NHAs to the local government and community. One former Kanagawa prefecture official turned scholar of local administration described the belief that NHAs make substantial positive contributions as taken for granted by local officials. Indeed, in dozens of conversations I never heard a local government official challenge this assumption. It is thus no surprise that many officials have worked actively to maintain membership and participation. These activities include distribution of pamphlets that encourage participation and visits to NHAs by city officials. Frequently visited are new apartment buildings where an NHA has not yet been established. Local officials do their best to encourage the formation of NHAs in such places. In interviews, many local officials expressed great concern about possible declines in NHA participation. One important reason why NHAs have maintained or even increased participation in post-war Japan is surely the diligent efforts of the local arms of the state.

Government-Neighborhood Association Relations The specific means the state has used to support NHAs are varied and discussed in greater detail later. Here I address the question of why the state has worked so hard to promote this type of group. Although this is

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addressed more fully later, as well, one important reason has already surfaced several times: social capital. Japanese government officials do not necessarily use this term themselves. Although they refer to the strength of community or human ties instead, their goals for the NHAs are entirely consistent with social capital. The indirect and direct benefits of NHAs are to produce social capital and to assist in administration. Neighborhood associations, however, do not challenge the state. They are by definition limited to a set geographic area and do not have professional staff. In contrast to issue-oriented civil society organizations, they have received active support from the government. This reveals the pattern of state preferences. Second, this favorable environment has allowed NHAs, which themselves are civil society organizations, to flourish. They encompass in formal membership nearly all Japanese. Third, the pattern of government support has raised questions of coaptation and the independence of the NHAs. This attempt to compromise the autonomy of civil society groups is again characteristic of the Japanese state's efforts. In this way, the case of the NHAs illuminates key aspects of my argument. Especially in contrast to issue-oriented civil society organizations, the state's preferential treatment of NHAs is explained by the NHAs cooperative nature and even more so by the fact that their geographical limitations prevent NHAs from ever professionalizing or developing an informational challenge to the state. On another note, NHAs as vital civil society organizations show the possibilities for active participation in civil society organizations that exist in Japan. At the same time, the Japanese state's continuing (and arguably sometimes successful) attempts to eo-opt NHAs reveal its uneasiness with truly independent civil society organizations. NHAs have been in existence in their modern incarnation throughout the postwar period and in earlier forms for much longer. Their stable organization disproves any notion that Japanese culture may be unconducive to volunteering, as in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake of 1995, or to social movements, as in the environmental movement, but not to long-term commitments of the kind needed to build enduring civil society organizations. Indeed, the stable organization of NHAs can be important corroborating evidence to the second main argument of the book, mentioned in Chapter I and largely advanced in Chapter 6: the political institutional framework explains the disconnection between social movements and enduring organizational legacies and the overall postwar historical trajectory of Japan's civil society development. Nonetheless, despite the danger of coaptation, NHAs are surely civil society groups, a committed form of local participation, and despite the hostile regulatory environment that

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many issue-oriented civil society organizations face the NHAs have, if anything, benefited from positive government support. In other words, the success of the NHAs supports my argument that the state has been crucial in shaping civil society in Japan. The issue of the relationship between the state and neighborhood associations is important to my overall argument of how the state shapes civil society in Japan and has also been important to the interpretation of NHAs in Japan. A common criticism has been that NHAs are not autonomous civil society organizations, but rather creatures of the government or even nothing more than the lowest level of local administration. Previously, I disputed this simplistic view with evidence of the breadth of NHA activities and means of leadership selection. Later, I will add evidence from the budgets of NHAs, analysis of which local organizations respond to local problems, and surveys of local residents to support this contention that NHAs are independent civil society organizations, not creatures of the government. Another critique of NHAs has been that they are merely front organizations for the LDP or feudal vestiges of authoritarianism run by oligarchies. This critique was also discussed previously. It is clear that many NHAs and local governments enjoy mutually beneficial relationships. The relationship is usually one in which the local government pays some small sum of money to the NHA for services, typically information dissemination or collection. This fee is not enough to control the NHA by any means. In return, the NHA uses its channel to the government to press the claims of its residents, often for such items as road or street light maintenance. It is a two-way street, not a purely vertical relationship of government subcontracting. Nor should it be forgotten that some NHAs do not carry out any kind of services for the government, preferring to stand aloof. Most also exercise discretion over government requests, refusing some while accepting others. Neighborhood Associations as Appendages of Government Steiner perhaps went furthest in espousing the position that NHAs are simply an unpaid citizen volunteer force performing tasks for the government. While admitting that there are a few "functions of a social character, such as arranging for festivals around the local shrine," Steiner put it bluntly that most functions of the NHA "simply require cooperation in affairs that really belong to the city. The city, for example, provides adequate street lighting for the more important streets, but local groups may be formed to erect light poles in quiet side streets, to turn the lights on in the evening and off in the morning, and to exchange the bulbs when necessary. The city police man the police boxes and do some patrolling,

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but the same local group or another one may also make the rounds at night and protect the shops and-houses against burglary or against fire by negligence. Sometimes such a group provides additional facilities for garbage disposal. Often it engages in 'civic education,' as by distributing leaflets, or it fosters, with the avowed purpose of curbing juvenile delinquency, practice in such traditional sports as judo or kendo" (Steiner 1965, p. 70). Steiner also wrote, "At times the associations engage in the collection of municipal taxes. For the assistance which they thus render to the city government they frequently receive a subsidy. They then become in fact adjuncts to the local administration while also functioning as pressure groups vs. government" (Steiner 196 5, p. 222). Let us set aside for a moment the thrust of the social capital research agenda that having voluntary groups perform tasks that "belong" to government may have salutary side effects. Let us also take at face value the deep connection with Western practices that assumes certain institutions properly carry out certain functions. Even so, the earlier sections of this chapter have clearly demonstrated that government services do not monopolize or dominate the activities of the NHAs. Although some of the same critiques could be made even today, Steiner was describing the NHAs of an earlier period. The harshest critic of the NHAs studied them more than 40 years ago, in the aftermath of the U.S. occupation. At that time, not just Steiner but many other observers viewed NHAs in the context of Japan's militaristic government. There are no good surveys showing what activities NHAs carried out during that period. The activities of NHAs today seem far more centered on community than on performing state duties. In any event, Steiner's harsh assessment seems out of place today. Bestor notes, "Scholars frequently assume that neighborhood associations are little more than appendages of the government itself; conflict or disagreement between them and the government presumably occurs only in times of crisis. In the pages that follow, I will show that this is not the case ... " 13 Bestor also writes on how local government sees the NHAs: "Civil servants therefore see [NHA]-the lowest institutions to which responsibilities are delegated (despite their legal standing as independent citizens' groups, not arms of the government)-as agents of the government's making and under its control, there to do the government's bidding .... Government officials ... seek to have [NHA] and other local groups carry out many aspects of local administration, but frequently have to do so through circuitous means. Despite the reluctance of [NHA] leaders to be seen as agents of the government, liaison with ward offices is today a major part of the responsibilities of Miyamoto-cho's [NHA]

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leaders and occupies much of their time and effort. The closest and most frequent contacts are with the shutchoujo (the ward government's branch office)" (Bestor 1989, p. 106).

What NHAs Do for Government The range of services that NHAs provide for local governments was touched on earlier. Almost all local governments work with NHAs in some form or another. A 1980 Ministry of Home Affairs survey showed that 2,294, or 70 percent, of all local governments used NHAs in their administrative work. Even the 30 percent who responded that they did not employ NHA apparently did do so because 9 5 percent of all local governments used NHA to contact citizens. The means by which local government worked with NHAs varied. By far the most common means was to give the NHA leader itaku, or trust work, for which he was paid and presumably passed the funds to the NHA itself. This occurred in 2,183 of the local governments, although only 170 contracted the NHA itself. Another means to avoid the lack of legal status was for the NHA leaders to form a nominally independent, non-NHA group to cooperate with the local administration. Most of the 214 local governments who said they do not work with the NHA work with these kind of groups. Almost all of these groups are formed by NHA leaders and are only nominally separate entities from the NHAs. Local governments do not seem to face difficulties in transferring funds to NHAs, unlike some other civil society organizations, despite their lack of legal status in most cases. Korekada Ueda calls what NHAs do for government "administrative cooperation activities" and divides these into three categories. The first is contacting and information dissemination. This is the primary service that NHAs provide for government, as a low-cost and reliable means of information dissemination and collection. Clearly, it is because of the nature of the NHA as an inclusive, locality-based organization that this means of information dissemination and collection is effective. Ueda's second category is "other tasks" and includes (a) various surveys, such as national and disaster surveys, (b) personnel recommendations for all committees, such as electoral monitoring committees, and (c) all kinds of mutual-aid disaster schemes and collections. The Ministry of Home Affairs surveyed local governments who utilize NHA in these two categories of tasks. The number of local governments covered by the survey was 3,278. The results revealed that almost all (90.9 percent) local governments use NHAs to dissemination information of some kind. Most local governments also tried to get the NHAs to assist them in communicating with local residents (74.0 percent). A smaller but still

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substantial number of local governments aimed more broadly, attempting to utilize NHAs for dissemination of tax notices (52.3 percent), for gathering survey information (53. 7 percent), or even for exhorting the residents to participate in disaster preparedness schemes (45·5 percent) (cited in Ueda 198 5, p. 444 ). Along these same lines, Nakata studied how local governments in Saitama Prefecture tried to disseminate information. He found that public notices were commonly disseminated via the NHA (this being the chosen means of dissemination 92 percent of the time), but also that local governments sometimes used NHAs to send out tax collection notices, national health insurance documents, national pension documents, election hall entry forms, and even the census (Nakata 1995 [r98r], p. 209). Ueda's third category is "work organizing the locality." This includes nemawashi, or building support by prior consultation, for public works projects. Local government officials visit NHAs in the area to gain support for these projects. This category also includes mobilizing citizens for big projects, such as sports meets, and the government's reliance on information from private individuals to help purchase land for public purposes by supplying news on property coming up for sale (Ueda 1985, pp. 444-448). Bestor also points out the "sense among [NHA] leaders, in Miyamotocho at least, that they are inundated by almost constant, yet uncoordinated requests and demands for their cooperation in government projects" (Bestor 1989, p. 105). Ouchi reports that in Yokohama, NHAs received an average of r 2.4 requests from government for cooperation every month (149 for the year), ranging from 6 to 22 per month. Most of these requests were for communication purposes (Bestor 1989, p. 105). Bestor's anthropological portrait of a Tokyo neighborhood is rich in details of the operations of the local NHA. He provides a crisp portrait of how NHAs engage in information dissemination: Government officials and [NHA]leaders alike view communication as one of the association's most valuable functions. The [NHA] possesses a variety of formal and informal means for distributing and collecting information quickly and cheaply: bulletin boards, circulating message boards, a complex system of liaison officers, informal word-of-mouth communications, and a detailed directory, published every four or five years, listing all neighborhood households, including the name, address, telephone number, and occupation of each household head .... The [NHA's] most thorough communication system is the kairanban, circulating message boards that pass from house to house within each of Miyamoto-cho's 5o or so household clusters .... In theory, the system can pass information to or collect responses from all 7 50 households in a couple of days .... The [NHA] maintains seven bulletin boards (keijiban) scattered around the neighborhood ... (posting) notices of children's outings, recycling schedules, announcements of shrine observances, and the death notices the [NHA] posts whenever any resident dies ....

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The kairanban and the keijiban transmit news only about internal neighborhood matters: announcements of upcoming [NHA], women's auxiliary, and old people's club meetings, trips, banquets, outings, and other activities; information on [NHA] services such as recycling and pesticide spraying; solicitations for the charity drive; notices of the election of officers and the acceptance of a new budget; news of the festivals ... announcements of deaths .... The kairanban and keijiban occasionally carry notices from the local offices and the prefectural police, fire public health, and sanitation departments, and form the ward's tax social welfare, pension and disaster preparedness offices. (Bestor 1989, p. 105)

Bestor also writes that "liaison with neighborhood associations is undoubtedly among the most important of the branch offices' functions ... its staff keeps in almost daily contact with local leaders on a wide variety of issues. The branch office's major mechanism for communications with the individual [NHA] within its jurisdiction is a federation of the neighborhood associations" (Bestor 1989, p. 109). What Government Does for NHAs: Local Corporatism

The efforts by local government officials, through visits, pamphlets, and the like, to support the formation and activities of NHAs have been outlined. Local governments actively support almost all NHAs, even successful ones, first and foremost through the financial flows from government to NHAs. These take both direct and indirect forms. Directly, local governments pay fees for contract (itaku) work undertaken by the NHAs, such as information dissemination. The indirect form consists of subsidies and grants (hojokin and jyoseikin). Either way, the total amounts involved are fairly small. These amounts vary over time and location. For example, in Marugame City in Kagawa Prefecture (a city of 81,176), the subsidy (hojokin) is a nominal $2.80 per household. 14 As seen in the pattern of NHA activities, the relationship with the government does not appear to be dominant at first glance. The government funds are too small to control NHA activities. Nevertheless, government support for the NHAs is a marked contrast from their treatment of other, issue-oriented nonprofit organizations. Government nurturing of NHAs goes beyond fund provision to include an official "seal of approval" that makes it easier for NHAs to encourage participation. Consolidated data on budgets of NHAs throughout Japan is not available. However, several case and regional studies do provide data on budgets for NHA, although most of the cases come from greater Tokyo area. Ouchi found that Yokohama NHAs receive, on average, 14.5 percent of their income from government subsidies (Ouchi 1990, p. 247). Robertson analyzed the budget of the largest NHA in her anthropological field research area ofKodaira. She found that their income of $39,593.00 came

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from membership fees (72 percent), government direct subsidies (9 percent), and additional grants and miscellaneous sources (19 percent). In addition, the city budget provided $32,658.oo in subsidies to NHAs, or an average of $8 5. 50 per NHA. However, funding for streetlights and bulletin boards was provided separately (Robertson 1991, p. 161). Bestor's local NHA had an annual income of $18,278.41, of which $r3,642.oo (74.6 percent) came from membership fees and only $2,48r.oo (13.6 percent) from subsidies (Bestor 1989, pp. 282-283). The official support for NHA is more important than the direct financial flows. With their quasi-official status, NHAs find it easier to collect membership fees even from unenthusiastic residents. It is difficult to quantify the importance of official support for NHAs, but I believe it is very substantial. It is a judgment call, of course, but I believe the legitimation resource is more valuable to NHAs than the financial support from local governments. In this context, keep in mind also the evidence from the implementation of the 1998 NPO Law discussed in Chapter 3· Legitimation is a resource that benefits the groups in several ways. First, it is probably an important reason why many residents join the NHAs, seeing them as official and sanctioned. Second, the feeling of serving a larger public duty, not just the neighborhood, is probably an important psychological reward for many who put in the time to serve as leaders of the NHAs. Meetings with the local government officials probably make these individuals feel important and respected. Third, and most important, the legitimation of the group is crucial to its monopoly in representing the neighborhood. It is a kind of local corporatism. Because the NHA has a privileged relationship with and connection to the state, it seems inconceivable to start a rival NHA in a neighborhood. When interpersonal disputes arise, as they inevitably do in groups that encompass tens of millions of active participants, residents don't split off into new a NHA. Instead, the losers in the power struggle, or those who care less about it, just drop out of the NHA and cede the organization to their rivals. Another benefit NHAs receive is a channel for communication with the local government. This is discussed more in the conclusion to this chapter, under the broad "advocacy" rubric. Conclusions: NHAs and the StateThe Political Institutional Argument This investigation of neighborhood associations has revealed the importance of the role of the state in the spread and continued existence of NHAs. In so doing, it provides evidence for the political institutional

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argument from Chapter I. State support for NHAs exists in striking contrast to the treatment of environmental or citizens groups, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The case of the NHAs shows the importance of the state structuring of civil society in a positive case. Any contention that NHAs would exist in as widespread and vital a form as they do now without state intervention is historically and contemporaneously untenable. The conclusions about NHAs and the state discussed here have three parts. First is a summary that answers the question of why the NHAs exist directly. Second is an important case study of perhaps the only locality in Japan in which NHAs are not strongly supported by local government, Musashino City. This case study sheds light on what we might expect from NHAs today if they were suddenly bereft of governmental support. By implication, it reveals the importance of state support to NHAs. To ensure a balanced view, the third section cautions against going too far in seeing NHAs as dependent on the state and demonstrates why NHAs must be considered civil society groups. · Why Do Neighborhood Associations Exist? 0 bservers offer several different explanations for the existence of NHA in Japan. One popular explanation supported by several scholars is that the neighborhood associations, like their precursors, represent a "fundamental cultural form of Japanese community" (Ouchi 1990, p. 275). Certainly, similar organizations are a recurrent theme in Japanese history. Another, more sociological explanation is that the "institutionalization of the neighborhood association itself is a response to urbanization, the weakening of the informal neighborhood ties." 15 Falconieri calls the neighborhood association a "product of Japanese village orientations carried over into the urban setting" (Falconieri 1990, p. 34). H. D. Smith argues that the NHAs were not merely products of government policies but reflected genuine community desire for a community organization to face urbanization. In a similar vein, Dare sees NHAs as arising as a surrogate or "some substitute for the security and sense of belonging which a rural community provides" (Dare 1958, pp. 258 and 264). Smith claims that government efforts were overshadowed by "moralizing (that) came spontaneously from within the lower and particularly middle levels of Tokyo culture .... The most dramatic evidence of the internal potential of Tokyo culture for mobilizing traditional moral sentiment was the phenomenal growth of neighborhood organizations (chounaikai) . ... Wholly spontaneous organizations, ... the [NHAs] were essentially a means of sustaining local community solidarity in the face of rapid population turnover" (Smith 1978, p. 66). Analysts such as Nakamura down play the role of the

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state, saying, "In the history of neighborhood associations up to today, the times in which neighborhood associations had large scale government intervention are only an extremely few." He adds, "Before the wartime system was established in the early war period, neighborhood associations had very few bureaucratic causes" (Nakamura 1979, pp. 29-32). However, other observers directly challenge the idea that NHAs were "wholly spontaneous organizations." For instance, Akimoto views them as having been essentially propagated by the government (Akimoto 1990, p. 139 ). State influence on NHAs has a complicated heritage, as seen here. The extent and importance of the state's role is still subject to debate. However, the bottom line is that without state intervention, it is difficult to imagine that NHAs could have achieved anything like their current universal spread. Nor is it likely that NHAs would have been as successful in maintaining participation in the face of changes in residential patterns without the organizational resources, legitimation, and financial support provided by the state, as evinced by the Musashino City example in the next section. NHAs have a mixed heritage, or dual origin. The social impulse to form NHAs was spontaneous, yet their spread in the 1920s was aided by government support, even though they enjoyed no formal, legal recognition until 1938 when changes in Tokyo's bylaws gave them official status (Steiner 1965, p. 219). This duality endures in their present status. They flourish in part because of government legitimation and financial support, yet they could not exist or thrive without widespread participation and support.

Musashino City: NHAs without Government Support The best way to test the importance of government support of NHAs in the postwar period is to compare regions where the government actively supported NHAs with regions where the government gave no support to NHAs. I am aware of only one area, however, where the local government did not adopt a policy of supporting NHAs. This area is Musashino City, outside Tokyo. After the official abolition of NHAs in March r 94 7, Musashino decided not to support the groups in any manner (Musashino City n.d. [b ]). The reasons behind this decision lie in the progressive ideals of the leaders of this wealthy city (Musashino City official A, personal communication, November 5, 2003 ). Instead, starting in 1971, Musashino City began building "community centers" throughout the city (Musashino City n.d. [a]). Volunteers man these centers, and they are subsidized by the city government, which also maintains the facilities (Musashino City, 2000).

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However, NHAs have continued to exist in Musashino. In 1999, the city government conducted a survey that found 34 NHAs in the city limits. As discussed later, Musashino is home to many recent arrivals and many who commute to Tokyo. The NHAs tend to be concentrated in the older, more stable neighborhoods. Examination of those particular areas would find higher participation rates. However, of the 63,771 households in all of Musashino in 1999, only 6,280 belonged to NHAs (Musashino City official B, personal communication, Musashino City, November 14, 2003 ). This yields a 9.8 5 percent participation rate, far below the national figures explored earlier. Privately, Musashino City officials confide that they sorely miss the opportunity to work with NHAs and feel that it impairs their efficiency. For example, because the city government does not ask NHAs to circulate notices on kairanban (rotating message boards), they have to resort to posting notices at train stations and in newspaper inserts. This case alone presents strong prima facie evidence that government support has fostered NHA vitality. However, it would be going too far to suggest that state support of NHAs alone raises the national participation rates above a "natural" 10 percent level. Musashino City is in many ways the kind of place where NHAs are normally weaker. Every year 10 percent of the population of the city has moved in within the last 12 months (Musashino City official B, personal interview, Musashino City, November 14, 2003 ). Because Musashino City is conveniently located near Tokyo, a large segment of the population works in Tokyo and lives in Musashino City. As Putnam found in the United States, this splitting of residence and workplace significantly lowers participation in groups (Putnam 2000 ). In addition, the community centers involve many people who might otherwise devote themselves to NHAs (although most NHA leaders are also active as leaders in the community centers). NHAs as Civil Society Organizations In Musashino City, it is indisputable that NHAs are civil society organizations. However, the evidence cited here should demonstrate that around the country, NHAs are creatures neither of the government bureaucracy nor of a particular political party. The range of their activities, their budgets, the political positions of their memberships, and their ability to make demands show that NHAs must be considered independent civil society organizations, albeit ones that have a comprehensive function of liaising with the government (Akimoto 1990, p. 135). In international comparison, neighborhood associations vary in scale, activities,

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and strength of their links to the state. Japan's NHAs are quite different from neighborhood-level organizations in other countries, such as Cuba's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs), Korea's bansanghoe, Vietnam's residents' clusters and residents' groups (cun dan cu, to dan pho), Indonesia's ultra-local rukun warga and rukun tetanga, and China's urban residents' committees (RCs). 16 Interestingly, Japanese groups are the most independent of the state of all these groups (see Pekkanen and Read 2003 for an international comparison). Two additional pieces of evidence bolster this view of NHAs' vitality as civil society organizations. First is the attitude of residents themselves. Most Japanese want NHAs to exist. In a I987 survey, 86.5 percent said that they wanted NHAs around. As a testament to the cohesive power of NHAs in local communities, 62.3 percent of respondents indicated some agreement with the idea that the primary work of NHAs should be to build resident friendship and interaction (K. Yamamoto I98 5, p. 228 ). Another survey showed that 49 percent of residents want NHAs to exist to promote community friendship (shinboku ), 3 I percent for crime prevention or sanitation, and only 6 percent to help government (Ouchi I990, p. 249). The second piece of evidence stems from Kazuhiro Kubo's case studies of two local areas in Fukuda City, adjacent to northern Osaka. Surveys of which local organizations were responding to local problems revealed that the NHAs were in the forefront of the response. This was the case in both local areas, despite other significant differences in the localities. The I6 issue areas identified by the case studies ranged from garbage and wastewater collection to provision of parks and medical, education, and social welfare facilities. In the first of the two areas, the NHAs were found to be responding to I 5 of the issue areas and leading the response in nine areas. A majority named NHAs as leading the response in five of the latter cases and as a plurality in the other four. In contrast, the PTAs led only in addressing education issues, an area in which women's groups were also active. Citizens groups and movements were said to be active in seven issue areas, while political groups were active in only five. Business groups were active only on one issue, as were youth groups, while cultural and sports groups were active in two local issue areas. In the second, newer locality, the NHAs were said to have responded in I I areas, while leading in eight areas, with an absolute majority indicating leadership in six areas. Here also, the PTAs led only in addressing education issues, although women's groups were not active. Business and commerce groups led in two issue areas, including city planning. Citizens groups and movements were active in five issue areas, but political groups

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in none. Youth groups were active in one issue area. Welfare volunteers were active in the welfare issue area in this locality. Cultural and sports groups were active in two local issue areas (Kubo 1985, p. 367). In both areas, the pattern is clear. Neighborhood associations have taken the lead in responding to local issues because the NHAs are truly civil society organizations. In fact, because of their comprehensive and geographic nature, they have responded to more local issues than any of the other civil society organizations or clubs with different organizing principles. As a measure of the degree of independence of NHAs, we might look not only at the instances of NHA activities that had nothing to do with government, but also at the times when NHA opposed the government. Examples of this do exist, but they are quite limited. The issues surrounding such circumstances are discussed in the next section, under the framework of "advocacy" by NHAs.

Conclusions: NHAs as Members without Advocates This second set of conclusions plays a similar role in relating the findings of this chapter to a second main argument of this book: that Japan's civil society can be considered "members without advocates" and that this has important implications for Japanese democracy. In this section, I show that NHAs have constrained advocacy functions yet make important contributions to the creation and maintenance of social capital (or at least, stronger community involvement and relationships characterized by greater mutual trust). Neighborhood Associations and Advocacy Recall the earlier reference to the twin branches of democratic theory, social capital and pluralism. Clearly, neighborhood associations should be viewed in the former branch. NHAs may constitute the bulge in Japan's dual civil society, but such groups by their nature have strict limits. Small local groups, such as neighborhood associations, are much more likely to promote social capital than pluralism, for which large-membership voluntary associations or advocacy groups seem better suited. NHAs cannot develop the professional staff needed to extensively research issues, influence mass media, or lobby politicians. Although the groups do have a channel of communication with the local government about local issues, constitutionally they are groups of members without advocates. In this section, I discuss "advocacy" by NHAs in three aspects. First, the "transmission

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belt" by which NHAs communicate local issues to and make demands on local government. Second, instances in which NHAs opposed government initiatives. Third, a framework by which we can understand why NHAs are inherently disposed to be cooperative with government, except under very limited circumstances. One benefit that NHAs receive in this mutual relationship with local government is an established channel for transmission of local demands. This is the same channel, in reverse, by which government makes requests on local residents. In other words, from local residents to the NHA and through the NHA head to local government officials. The requests that NHAs might make on local government fall into a variety of types. Some requests are environmental in nature and deal with factory or auto pollution, noise, damaged power lines, polluted streams, and the like. NHAs also request use of public facilities for meetings or sports events. Requests for new or refurbished schools, police boxes, streetlights, bypasses, roads, city bus routes, city buses, trains, train stations, curve mirrors, crosswalk signals, traffic signals, broader roads, and much more flow through NHAs to local government offices (Ueda 198 5, pp. 452-453 ). The response is often favorable; neighborhood association requests are taken seriously by local governments. In an example from Kyoto, the records of NHA requests similar to those listed above and of the city officials who attended the meetings in which those requests were made demonstrate this. In fact, some local governments have even issued directives instructing officials to listen to the requests of NHAs (Ueda r98 5, p. 449 ). If anything, some analysts are concerned that NHAs may be too successful in imposing their will on local governments, creating a NIMBY (not in my back yard) resistance to city planning. For example, NHAs frequently oppose the advent of large-scale stores, such as supermarkets. Some NHAs or NHA leaders do have links to politicians, and there is no reason to think these links work only in one direction. In fact, the NHAs' opposition to government policies prompted the 1970s "community policy" of coaptation (Iwasaki 198 5 ). Nonetheless, such cases seem decidedly scarce. Hastings writes, "Neighbors sometimes cooperated with each other in order to protest the actions of the state ... " (Hastings 1995, p. 83). Kikuchi also writes that "in certain periods, their character as a civic group for local residents was strong and [NHAs] were used for the catalyst group or main group for citizens movements opposing corporations or the government on environmental damage" (Kikuchi 1990, p. 231). This opposition to government is a key issue, so let us examine it in a bit more detail. Can NHAs serve as the organizational nucleus of citizen opposition to the state? How frequently does this happen? In fact, there is at least one example of this, as Kikuchi contends. "In

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Tokyo, converted neighborhood associations, and even a converted ward assembly, engaged in a 'garbage war' with each other and the progressive governor to prevent their areas from being the site of, or inconvenienced by, the construction of a garbage treatment facility desperately needed by the city" (Krauss and Simcock 1980, p. 197; see also Rix 1975). Krauss and Simcock speculated that one explanation for the rapid spread of citizens' movements in Japan was their reliance on established community organizations to form an organizational network (Krauss and Simcock 1980 ). The term they borrow, "converted neighborhood association," was coined by McKean. However, McKean herself deflates the concept, noting that such groups are "well known but not really so common" and finding only two such groups in her research (McKean 1980, p. 241). In short, although there is something here, it seems to be less than meets the eye. Cooperation with government is an integral part of many NHAs, while opposition seems to be a more intermittent phenomenon. Why? There are two main reasons. One is the close relationship between government and NHAs that instills a predilection for cooperation. Hastings sees this cooperative attitude as having been successfully cultivated by government support: "To the degree to which the neighborhood associations can be considered successors to the political agitators disguised as sanitation societies of the late nineteenth century or to the spirited neighborhood protests of the early twentieth century, the authorities succeeded in taming their beast. In the years following the earthquake (1923), the neighborhood associations often worked with the authorities, and they rarely became instruments of citizen protest" (Hastings 1995, p. 84). Bestor makes a strong statement of coaptation when he writes that "interaction with the government pervades [the NHA's] structure, its ethos, and its activities." This cooperation with, or influence over, NHAs is facilitated through the formation of networks of neighborhood associationsY As Hastings puts it, "The neighborhood associations and the district welfare committees each operated through a partnership of government cooperation with local volunteers. In the case of the neighborhood associations, the original impetus came from local concerns, but the government eventually succeeded in standardizing the groups and linking them into hierarchies in touch with the local government" (Hastings 199 5, p. 9 5 ). McKean observes that those active in NHAs "are very unlikely to possess an adversary view of the relations between people and the government" (McKean 1980, p. 242). The second reason for cooperation with government is structural: NHAs are small groups without professional staff that include all residents of a limited geographic area. Except for issues on which all residents of the neighborhood agree, NHAs are not a good vehicle for advocating

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an issue, which explains why NHAs opposition is limited to NIMBY-type issues. Even on these issues, NHAs, because of their voluntary and cooperative framework, are only intermittently effective. NHAs are much more effective in demand articulation in limited arenas (the need for a new road, etc.) in which the information is valuable and useful for the government than they are in mounting street protests. If NHAs succeed at advocacy, it is local advocacy only. Even if NHAs are cooperative rather than appositional, the independence and vitality of many NHAs still support the argument that these groups must be considered civil society organizations. De Tocqueville called American organizations "large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the theory of association" (De Tocqueville 1945, p. 125). NHAs are surely also schools, even if all the lessons are not what some would wish. One lesson that is taught well in NHAs, however, is trust and cooperation: in a word, social capital.

NHA and Social Capital The argument about "members without advocates" has a positive aspect as well-the members. The conventional wisdom in local government circles is that strong NHAs improve local government performance and efficiency. NHAs are important to the generation of social capital in Japan. This section highlights this role of NHAs in order to flesh out the larger argument advanced in this book. Because social capital is a contested concept, particularly when applied to new cultural contexts, this section also includes a discussion of the application of the concept of social capital to Japan. In addition to highlighting issues of the state's influence on civil society, NHAs also have implications for social capital theories. Through their cooperation with local government, NHAs can improve government performance, while lowering costs. At the same time, NHAs can contribute to social capital directly and indirectly. For direct contributions, consider the example of cleaning a local park. Of course, it is possible for the local government to hire outside professionals to clean the park. Or the local government could pay the NHA for the same service. Such payment, it must be said, is usually lower than would be paid to the outside professionals. Local residents, however, typically clean their own areas better. At the same time, working together and taking turns to accomplish the cleaning builds social capital in the community. It is interesting to note that in this way, the NHAs build social capital simultaneously with their improvement of government performance. NHA build social capital indirectly as well. NHAs form the nucleus of many other local organizations,

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such as women's clubs, youth clubs, and seniors' clubs. The organizational infrastructure of the NHAs facilitates the formation and operation of these groups. Although AARP in the United States provides aggressive advocacy, the elderly persons' groups in Japan might serve their members even better by creating social capital. Frequent interaction with others is not only enjoyable, but for many elderly people, it has important health benefits. The trips to local health facilities familiarize the elderly with the available health resources and how to access them. They also provide a chance for both health professionals and peers to observe the health of the group members, giving an opportunity for early detection of health concerns. Putnam argued that social connectedness correlates with better health for the elderly in the United States, and these arguments apply in full measure to Japanese NHAs and elderly persons' groups also (Putnam 2000 pp. 327-329). Although we lack specific evidence on the health benefits of NHA and elderly group memberhsip, they clearly constitute social connectedness and may very well contribute to the health and happiness of their members. A glance at NHA activities, as in Table 4.1 for Ueda City, creates the impression that no group contributes more directly to Japan's social capital.18 The informational role they play is surely crucial, with high levels of information flowing through embedded networks that provide multiple opportunities for sanctions. 19 What is the social pressure felt to join NHAs but a demonstration of this in action? Although the limitations of the Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo survey have been discussed above, this survey presents interesting findings about NHA participation and levels of generalized trust at the individual level. It is not surprising that NHA participants are more than twice as likely as nonparticipants to say that they can rely on their neighbors (Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo 2003, p. 171). More importantly, the survey reveals that individuals who participate in NHAs have higher levels of trust of anyone. They are more likely than nonparticipants to agree with the statement that most people can be trusted. This suggests that NHA participation could directly increase levels of trust and thus contribute to the building of social capital, although irrefutable evidence on causal direction is needed to be conclusive. Having just established this strong link between participation in NHAs and social capital, this is an appropriate juncture to step back and discuss in more detail just what social capital means in the Japanese context. NHAs in particular and Japanese organizations in general raise two important questions about the link between organizational participation and social capital. After discussing these questions, I turn to two more issues of international comparisons. One concerns cross-national compar-

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isons of social capital per se and Japan's place within such surveys, and the final issue is the thorniest: the cultural construction of social capital. The first challenge to social capital theory is the role of the state. NHAs are in many ways voluntary and spontaneous organizations. Yet, they were also promoted by the state. 20 If NHAs do indeed contribute to social capital, then we must rethink the relationship between state action and social capital in two ways. First, the state might be able to foster civil society organizations that sustain social capital. Second, some kinds of state demands may actually contribute to social capital. For example, messages circulated on rotating message boards are cheaper to disseminate than other forms of public notice, are more likely to be read, promote contact among neighbors, and stimulate discussion of local issues among neighhors. In other words, the state promotes social capital both by fostering an organizational form and by utilizing that organizational form for its own (administrative) purposes. Alongside state-fostered civil society, we see the outlines of state-sponsored social capital. For development theorists and others concerned with creating social capital through public policy, this is a hopeful turn of thought. At the least, theories of social capital must confront head-on the role of the state. The second challenge is more abstract. In contrast to the horizontal associations that Putnam, in his first formulation of social capital, claims foster social capital in Northern Italy, NHA are often described as vertical. For example: "There would be no question that the neighborhood's social organization was extremely 'vertical.' Yet, the [NHA] acts in the name of an ethos of communal life that implies a certain degree of egalitarianism among Miyamoto-chou's residents. Lacking powers of coercion, the [NHA] could not exist and function without the willing and voluntary cooperation of the mass of ordinary residents at the bottom of the hierarchy.... The [NHA] exists and, in a sense, can only do so against the backdrop of these other, more horizontal ties" (Bestor 1989, p. 192). This points to a more general problem with social capital theory in Japan. Japan may seem rich in social capital and blessed with an effective government (compared to Southern Italy, at least), yet associations in Japan are usually characterized as vertical. However, because social capital theorists have largely moved away from this distinction, the challenge to social capital theory posed by Japanese organizational characteristics does not seem pressing. The third issue relates to cross-national comparisons of social capital. There are three problems with attempts to compare levels of social capital across different states: different organizational forms, general difficulties with survey instruments, and potential differences in the nature of social capital. In Putnam's influential first book on social capital, he

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measured social capital across Italian provinces using measures that, in some cases, were available only in the Italian case, such as turnout for referenda voting (Putnam 1993 ). More generally, we could imagine that the "best" or very good measures of social capital might not be available in every state and that the only truly comparable measures might not be very good measures or, at the least, measures that we would rely on only with considerable caution and many caveats. The second problem, that of survey instruments, is related to this. Trust is an important part of social capital (as are norms generally), yet trust is particularly difficult to compare cross-nationally. Haruya Sakamoto reveals major discrepancies in the measurement of trust in Japan. Sakamoto's critique is especially valuable because he has contributed greatly to an empirical comparison of social capital levels across Japanese prefectures but remains skeptical of extant cross-national comparisons (Sakamoto 2004). Depending on the wording of the question, the level of trust that Japanese exhibit varies dramatically in surveys. For example, the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS) phrases the question one way ("In general, do you think that people can be trusted?") while the World Values Survey (WVS) phrases it another ("Generally speaking, do you think that people can be trusted, or that you can not be careful enough in dealing with people?"). The difference in framing the question leads to the World Values Survey showing nearly double the level of trust that the JGSS survey shows (39.6 percent versus 21.2 percent). The fact that JGSS allows respondents to select "It depends on the situation" (which 63.5 percent did) leads to the opposite result: JGSS shows more people trusting than not trusting (21.2 percent versus 14· 7 percent), while the WVS shows more distrust than trust (52.4 percent versus 39.6 percent). 21 This is a general problem with surveys, not a problem with surveying in Japan. In the United States, for example, the American National Election Survey (ANES) and the World Values Survey were both conducted in 1996, and both asked about membership in groups. However, the WVS results showed 3 3 percent more Americans belonging to groups than the ANES results (Sakamoto 2004). More serious problems arise when these questions are used in crossnational analyses-which is why Chapter 2 relied on a variety of measures. Most of these measures, such as legally incorporated and registered group numbers, are significantly more reliable than survey results. Bias is controlled when the same question is asked longitudinally or in the same cultural and linguistic context. However, in studying Japanese social capital cross-nationally, how the question is phrased in Japanese matters greatly and is independent of the phrasing of the question in other languages. This was vividly illustrated in a major international survey of social trust in Asian states. Commissioned by the Japanese Ministry of Education and

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spearheaded by one of Japan's most eminent and respected political scientists, Takashi Inoguchi, the survey sought to measure levels of trust for various public institutions (the bureaucracy, mass media, political parties, religious groups, the military, the courts, etc.) in Asian states (results are discussed in Inoguchi 200 3, Chapter 3). This survey found that Japanese expressed the lowest levels of trust-lower than people in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. No institution in Japan was trusted by a majority of the people, which was true of no other state (Singapore, for example, enjoyed trust of over 70 percent of respondents for all institutions asked about). The possible absurdity of simply comparing "trust" (and I want to be clear that Inoguchi is too good a scholar to fall into this trap) is revealed by comparing the levels of social trust in the police in Japan and Indonesia. Indonesian police are notoriously corrupt and even routine traffic stops are typically seen by both motorists and most police as an occasion for graft rather than justice. Japanese police have had problems, but no one would recommend that, as a general policy, bribery would be effective in dealing with the Japanese police. However, Indonesians expressed much higher levels of trust in their police (60-70 percent) than Japanese expressed in the Japanese police (40-50 percent) (Inoguchi 2003; see also Inoguchi 2000 and 2002). Although these international comparisons are valuable, we cannot conclude from these figures that the Indonesian police are "better" or actually more "trustworthy" than the Japanese police. Much care must be taken in using cross-national survey data. The fourth general issue with social capital can be thought of as the problem of the social construction of social capital. As mentioned earlier, Putnam's original measures of social capital in Italy were context dependent and not available outside Italy. To take the matter a step beyond measurement, though, it is possible that social capital itself operates somewhat differently in different social settings. This idea will likely strike some as absurdly obvious and others as manifestly wrongheaded. Let me give an example of what I mean. One of the key tenets of social capital theory is the transition from specific trust (and reciprocity) to generalized trust (and reciprocity). Without this, social capital does not function, and trust remains limited to the extant specific human relations. Putnam argued, "Even more valuable, however, is a norm of generalized reciprocity [than specific reciprocity] .... Frequent interaction among a diverse set of people tends to produce a norm of generalized reciprocity" (Putnam 2000, pp. 20-21, emphasis Putnam's). However, there is no reason to assume a priori that the link or transformative process between this frequent interaction and the production of a norm of generalized reciprocity is the same everywhere. In fact, we have many reasons to believe

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that the link between specific social relations and general norms might be different in Japan than in, say, the United States. This strikes at the heart of the problem of cross-national comparisons of social capital. Because social capital cannot be measured directly, indirect measures are employed along with the necessary assumption that these indirect measures are always, and in all states, similarly (and in the same degree) causally related to social capital. However, the process of social capital formation relies on networks and norms, and these assumptions are not necessarily right. In Japan, higher levels of participation in NHAs are correlated with higher levels of trust. This conforms to social capital theory quite well, and we can be somewhat confident in making the causal argument that participation in NHAs creates and sustains social capital in Japan. However, we cannot be sure how much or, as I am about to argue, even whether this is exactly the same as social capital elsewhere. Toshio Yamagishi has made an important argument about the nature of trust in Japan that is relevant to this discussion (Yamagishi 2003 and Yamagishi et al. 1996}. Yamagishi's arguments are based on cross-national surveys of "trust" in Americans and Japanese, and we should keep in mind the problems associated with such a methodology as we consider Yamagishi's claims. However, Yamagishi is aware of these problems and seeks to link his measurements of trust to observable behavior (Yamagishi 2003, p. 282). Yamagishi claims that Japanese actually trust less than Americans, or, rather, that Japanese society relies on creating a feeling of "security" (anshin) rather than trust. The distinction is that trust can be placed in someone without any evidence that it is well-founded. Security, however, assumes that the person being relied on is enmeshed in social networks. Yamagishi's argument is a thought-provoking one. Even ifYamagishi's evidence is not conclusive, his findings make us consider again the link between specific trust and generalized trust, which is the reason behind our digression into Yamagishi's social psychological arguments. It is possible, given his findings, that Japanese social networks and norms produce a greater level of trust, but one that is less portable than American trust. In other words, in analogous situations, Japanese trust (or rely on) an individual more than Americans do when they see some indications than the individual is "in" a linked network. Americans, however, are more likely to trust a totally unknown individual (the figurative "third-party other") than are Japanese. If this conclusion is correct, NHAs are an organizational form that both fits with and reinforces the Japanese-type of trust or reliance exceptionally well. Perhaps Italian choral societies or U.S. civic groups are likely to produce more generalized trust but less of the reliance-type trust.

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On the flip side, Japanese NHAs excel at sustaining the reliance-type of trust, which lubricates social capital well but slightly differently than totally anonymous generalized trust. Although I can take this no further than speculation at this point, I believe that this could well be the case. The evidence presented in this book leads us to consider how Japanese state policies have promoted civil society organizations that seem to foster social capital, while often inhibiting the development of those that promote pluralism. I return to the consequences of this dichotomy in the book's conclusion, revisiting the "members without advocates" argument in a broader context. The promotion of NHAs exists in striking contrast to the treatment of, say, advocacy or environmental groups. The next chapter probes the reasons behind changes to the regulatory framework in Japan through a series of close case studies of each indigenous change since the nineteenth century. Given the already demonstrated variations in and importance of the regulatory framework (for instance, in the persistence of NHAs), this is valuable in itself. Such an investigation also provides crucial evidence for the third main argument of this book, concerning the political determinants of the regulatory framework itself.

5

The Politics of Regulating Civil Society THROUGH A series of process-tracing case studies, this chapter provides detailed evidence for the "regulatory contestation" argument. The Japanese regulatory framework for civil society is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. This framework is the result of political contestation because political actors understand that the regulatory framework plays a powerful role in shaping the development of civil society. This chapter investigates the political forces that shape the regulatory framework through case studies of the changes to the legal framework that have occurred in the postwar period. Such analysis provides critical evidence for the "regulatory contestation" argument. Specifically, this chapter investigates the nature of the political contestation, illuminating the actors and their interests through a set of case studies. The first and most limited is the drafting of the civil code. Second is a detailed case study of the passage of the 1998 NPO Law. Third is an analysis of the 2001 tax reforms and the discussions about a .reform of Article 34 currently underway. Most attention is focused on the 1998 NPO Law because it represents the first significant change in Japan's regulation of civil society groups in a century (excepting occupation-imposed reforms). Such a status makes a process-tracing study of the NPO law especially valuable to a study of the political underpinnings of Japan's regulatory regime.

Drafting of Article 34 Regulating civil society has always been part of a political process. This was true at the start of Japan's modern experience, as it is today. In the drafting ofJapan's Civil Code, 30 years after the Meiji Restoration (1868) put Japan on the path to modernization, the framers made clear choices

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about legal frameworks to regulate civil society organizations. Legal documents, including the framers' notes and a comparison with the original German and Swiss laws that served as models, support a contention that the civil code was written with the intention of creating high hurdles for the organization of civil society groups. There are two key issues involving the civil code: the choice of the permitting standard and the conscious emphasis on "public interest" legal persons. These were attempts on the part of the Meiji oligarchy to place strict limits around the formation of civil society groups. I hasten to add that this was probably done not so much to cripple civil society as to prevent the people from frittering away their energy in civil society organizations and steer them instead to the state goals of nation-building under the slogan "rich nation, strong army." As discussed in Chapter 3, Article 34 of the civil code plays a central role in structuring the legal framework for civil society groups in Japan. The civil code was written during the Meiji state-building period when Japan's twin imperatives were "rich nation, strong army." In the legal realm, these imperatives were paralleled by a desire to demonstrate "civilized" statutes to the Western powers, in part to support calls for the revision of the unequal treaties that Japan had signed earlier. Chapter 3 also showed that the civil code was framed not in a political vacuum, but through politicized contestation. The adaptive and contested nature of the framing of Article 34 is clearly reflected in the path that two critical elements took to inclusion: the permission (kyoka) standard for legal incorporation and the centrality of "public interest" to the groups' existence. I discuss each in turn in this chapter. One of the core principles was that state strength depended on the enforcement of a civil code. Shimpei Eto made this argument in as many words, relating state strength to the domestic legal structure: "Whether a state prospers or declines depends mainly on the enforcement of the national and civil laws" (cited in Ishii 1976, pp. 178-179). Eto's argument implies that strict enforcement of laws leads to a state's prosperity. A state document, the Explication (riyuusho) of the Proposed Amendment of the Civil Code, also explicitly discusses the pros and cons of different principles of regulation of these groups (Imperial Diet n.d.; see also Hironaka 1987 and Moriizumi 1977). This document inventories four different principles observed in the laws of other states that differ in the degree of state control over social groups. The four principles are, in order of strictness, free establishment (jiyuu setsuritsushugi), standards (jyunsokushugi), legal permission (houritsu tokkyo shugi), and sovereign permission (kokuchou tokkyo shugi) (see Table 5.1). The document points out that each of the four principles has merits and demerits. Other states' experiences since the medieval period have shown that a pure form of legal permission is too narrow and produces

REGULATING CIVIL SOCIETY TABLE 5.1

Standards considered in framing Article 34 Standard

Meaning

Free establishment (jiyuusetsuritsu) Standards (jyunsoku)

Organizations can be established freely, as the organizers will. Organizations fulfilling the requirements specified in law can become legal organizations on a more or less auto· matic basis. If an organization meets certain criteria, it is granted legal status. Organizations are given legal status with special permission outlined by a special or relevant law. Organizations can be established with the special permission of the sovereign.

Legal permission (houritsu tokkyo) Sovereign permission (kokuchou tokkyo) souRcE: Author analysis.

obstacles to the development of public spirit and the economy. The standards principle was seen as too permissive, and the free establishment principle was out of the question. Does rejecting the legal permission standard in favor of a lower bareven if not as low as standards-show that Article 34 was meant to be permissive? No. Two things need to be pointed out. First, this legal permission model is highly restrictive-essentially a new law is required for each organization that forms. The Bank of Japan is an excellent example of an organization that is established along these legal lines (Moriizumi 1994). This process would be too cumbersome for every group. Second, the types of organizations given as examples in the Explication of the Proposed Amendment are schools, hospitals, shrines, and temples. In other words, to draft a new law for each school or hospital was seen as too restrictive. The framers described this as "taking the positive aspects of the legal permission principle and the standards principle" (Imperial Diet, cited in Hironaka 1987). Although the framers did not embrace the legal permission standard, which would have been even stricter than Article 34's final standard of "permission" (kyoka, see Table 3.2), this compromise should not be construed as excessive liberalism. After all, the permission principle is a deliberate tightening of the standards principle that retains decisive power in the hands of the authorities. The Explication also mentions that Article 34 would draw from the "most common" practice of German, Swiss, and other states' laws (Hironaka 1987, pp. 93-94). 1 However, a close examination of the process of this borrowing reveals a constriction of the foreign model. The key phrase is "public interest," which, as argued in Chapter 3, has been of critical importance in defining the legal possibilities for civil society groups. How did this phrase come to its central role?

Regulating Civil Society Nobushige Hozumi worked on early drafts of the civil code, and he gleaned material from German laws. The German laws mentioned public interest as one of several purposes, types, or definitions of these organizations, together with welfare, social, academic, or artistic functions. Accordingly, Hozumi's early draft listed public interest as one of several organizational types, together with charity, academic, and technical or skill-based groups. Strikingly, in subsequent drafts, public interest does not rise to a place of prominence, but in fact drops out of the list altogether, only to reappear in a central manner in the final version of Article 34· As can be inferred from the document trail, this reflects shifting fortunes in a debate about the contents of the law. In fact, there was a heated discussion among members of a state committee on the civil code about whether or not to include public interest in the article (Hoshino 1970, pp. 127-129). The NPO Law The leap from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth may seem extreme. After all, the period encompasses Japan's modernization, World War II, the U.S. occupation, and the period of postwar affluence. However, no important change to the Article 34 legal system occurred until 1998. Accordingly, I turn now to the events surrounding the passage of the NPO law. Because of the much greater availability of documents, we can trace the lines of political contestation much more clearly here than in the Article 34 case, but the focus is the same: how does political contestation influence the regulatory framework? Background to the NPO Law 2 On January 17, 199 5, the Hanshin earthquake struck Japan with a magnitude of 7.2. Although the earthquake's epicenter was northern Awaji Island, near Kobe in Western Japan, the aftershocks rumbled through Japanese politics until 1998. The disaster claimed over 6,ooo lives, made 3 so,ooo people homeless, and wreaked massive property damage. From the ruins was born a major change in the way the Japanese state regulates civil society. Since I 896, civil society groups in Japan faced one of the most antagonistic regulatory frameworks among industrialized democracies, as outlined in Chapter 3· The earthquake gave impetus to a movement to redefine state-civil society relations in Japan and led to the promulgation in 1998 of a new Special Non-Profit Activities Law, commonly known as the NPO law (for nonprofit organizations).

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This NPO law deserves our attention for two reasons. First, the NPO law is in itself a major change in the way Japan regulates civil society organizations in three respects. The law allows thousands of new civil society groups to participate more actively in Japanese life. It aims to grant these groups unprecedented freedom from the heavy-handed bureaucratic supervision that has plagued civil society organizations in a nation often characterized as "strong state." And, perhaps most importantly, the law legitimates a new kind of social group and, by implication, a shift in statesociety power balance. The NPO law also deserves our attention because it represents the early fruit of the important changes in Japanese electoral institutions in 1994. These changes in electoral institutions led to altered incentives for political actors, which in turn helped bring about this change in the rules for civil society organizations. The NPO law came about through an unprecedented series of Diet member (DM) bills, legislation proposed by members of Japan's Diet, or parliament. Bureaucrats write most of the legislation in Japan's parliamentary system. In striking contrast, all parties in Japan submitted or amended NPO legislation from 199 5 to 1998. Bills promoting NPOs were submitted by the New Frontier Party (NFP), Sun Party, Heisei Party, Japan Communist Party (JCP), and by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), working with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Sakigake Party, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Politicians responding to new electoral incentives pointedly excluded bureaucrats from the process. Citizens groups participated actively in the creation of the law, and their lobbying altered the law's content. This law could herald a new politics of state-society relations. What is also new here is the process, which was led by legislators responding to changed electoral incentives, influenced by lobbying groups and media, and shaped in the crucible of coalition politics. Viewed as part of a general trend that includes administrative reform, deregulation, DM bills, devolution, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the NPO law augurs a new answer to the old question of who rules in Japan. All of these changes strike at the power of the central bureaucracy. In addition, the process of creating the NPO law gives us our first glimpse of the political changes that many observers predicted after the 1993 elections. Hanshin Earthquake In the aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake, Japan's vertically divided administration was conspicuous in its inability to respond. 3 Japan's strong ministries jealously guard their bailiwicks, and this sectionalism can in-

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35

hibit cooperation or effective action in a crisis. After the Hanshin earthquake, government relief efforts were paralyzed, and jurisdictional disputes prevented effective crisis management. In striking contrast, volunteer groups moved quickly to provide disaster relief. Within two months, more than r.2 million volunteers had gone to the area, and a stunning $r.6 billion (160 billion yen) in donations eventually flowed to the ravaged districts. 4 The magnitude of this outpouring gives lie to the conventional wisdom that Japan lacks a cultural tradition conducive to volunteerism or a civil society; it also provides corroborating evidence that the paltry number of public interest legal persons in Japan is in large measure an artifact of the legal system and not purely a product of Japanese cultural aversion to volunteerism or NPO activities. 5 This realization demands a renewed focus on the role of the Japanese legal system in shaping civil society and thereby highlights the importance of the NPO law. The media quickly took up the dramatic contrast between the government's ineptitude and the volunteers' selfless and speedy activism. The year 1995 was celebrated as "the Year of the Volunteer." 6 Most of the groups were not public interest legal persons (PILPs), which, as creatures of the supervising bureaucracies, were often hamstrung by the same kind of vertical divisions that the ministries themselves faced (NIRA 199 5 ). Public and media pressure mounted on the government to provide legislative assistance to these volunteer groups. As a result of the regulatory straitjacket (described in more detail later), most of the groups active in the relief efforts had no legal status. This meant, for example, that the volunteers were not covered by any kind of work insurance should they be injured or killed in their relief activities; they were considered to be individuals engaged in hazardous behavior. The insurance angle was played up in many media reports and used as a hook to demand legislative change. Hinging as it does on the legal status denied to volunteer activist groups and smacking of ungrateful treatment of the volunteers, the insurance issue resonated powerfully in the media. Reports marveled at the fresh-faced altruists who rushed to the stricken Kansai region. This image spurred first anger at bureaucratic ineptitude and then calls for a revision of the regulation of civil society to harness the energy of the volunteers. This was not a simple matter, however, and the process took three years of intense lobbying, politicking, and compromise. In the end, it was not a "volunteer law," but an "NPO law" that emerged. The following selections should give a clearer picture of the tenor and range of the media coverage. On February 4, 1995, Nihon Keizai Shinbun called for new legislation to support volunteers. It also criticized the bureaucrats for not being bold

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enough in their plans to support the volunteers. As described later, the Economic Planning Agency led a group of r8 ministries and agencies (known as the Related Ministries Interagency Group for the Volunteer Issue, hereafter Interagency Group or IAG) considering revised or new legislation to support volunteer activities. Specifically, the paper found fault with the IAG for failing to propose legal person status for the volunteer groups (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, February 4, 199 5 ). Mainichi Shinbun echoed this criticism on February 20, 199 5, with a front-page headline castigating the National Fire Agency and the National Land Agency for having gone to sleep on support policies. The two agencies had performed a survey in 1991 on volunteers in disaster relief and development of volunteer leaders for such efforts but never implemented the plans. In the harsh light that the media shone on the selfless volunteers and the vertically paralyzed bureaucracy, this failure seemed glaring. In the same article, the newspaper also cast doubt on the progressive legislative intentions of the IAG, linking the government's failure in the emergency to a need for a more independent volunteer sector. On April r7, 1995, Asahi Shinbun also lashed out at the two negligent ministries. Mentioning the IAG, the paper pointed to citizens groups who said that if the bureaucrats continued to lead, the volunteer movement would be harmed. Kyodo Tsushin highlighted citizen groups' criticisms of the IAG early on. Significantly, in view of the furor over the March 20, 1995, sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subways by the Aum Shinrikyo, the news s~rvice also positively portrayed citizens groups' complaints that bureaucratic regulation was stifling group formation. Kyodo Tsuushin related citizens' fears of a "bureaucratic-made volunteer" system and raised the issue of whether or not the new volunteer groups should be allowed to form by kyoka (permission, which implies bureaucratic screening) or by toroku (registration, which implies automatic granting of legal status) (see the Appendix). The wire service also reminded the public that, despite having had half a year to do so, the bureaucrats had not moved forward on legislation as they had promised in February (Kyodo Tsuushin, July 13, r 99 5. The Appendix provides a detailed chronology of the events underlying the passage of the NPO law. Very early on, the media criticized the government not only for its inadequate response to the disaster, but also for failing to have the foresight to support volunteers in the years leading up to the earthquake. These calls easily blended into demands for support of a volunteer or NPO law. Even the initial press coverage often included demands for legislative action and for a more independent role for the volunteer groups, without the plague of heavy-handed government supervision.

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Rewriting State-Civil Society Relations: The Legislative Tussle As discussed in Chapter 3, the regulatory framework for civil society groups in Japan is very restrictive in many respects. The press called for new legislation, but the legislative process leading to the passage of the NPO law took three years. The central issues were: (I) the number and type of groups that would be covered by the law and thus able to gain legal status, (2) tax benefits for these groups, and (3) the power of bureaucrats to supervise and sanction these groups. These issues were contested first by legislators against bureaucrats and then by conservative parties against progressive parties (inside and later outside the coalition government). Outside actors, such as citizens groups, the big business peak organization (Keidanren), and labor unions also played roles (see the Appendix). Stage One: Legislators versus Bureaucrats

In the aftermath of the earthquake, the legislative wrangle began almost immediately. The first I o months saw a contest between legislators and bureaucrats over who would write the law, ending in November with the legislators victorious. At the time, the LDP ruled in a coalition that included their longtime liberal opponents, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Although the LDP held many more seats, the SDP's Murayama held the prime ministership. The largest opposition party was the New Frontier Party (NFP), a conservative group. The political parties had incentive to pass a law in response to the overwhelming media outcry and public perception of the volunteers. Bureaucrats were generally unsympathetic but unable to oppose the law publicly for those reasons. The Economic Planning Agency led the IAG, which was formed on February 3, I99 5.7 The ruling coalition formed a group called the Coalition NPO Team (NPO Purojekuto Chimu) to spearhead study of NPOs on February I5. The New Frontier Party (NFP) presented the Volunteer Basic Law to the Diet on March 8. The lines were drawn, but the struggle continued until I998. As befits a significant change in policy, there were many players involved-bureaucrats, party politicians, and citizen lobby groups (see the Appendix). A brief chronological overview of the main events of the political tussle behind the drafting of the NPO law will make the later exposition of key issues clearer. The catalyzing event, the Hanshin earthquake, occurred on January I?, I995· Within days, Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi declared in the Diet that the government would write legislation to sup-

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port the volunteers, possibly including favorable tax treatment and allowing volunteer groups to become PILPs. 8 Even the prime minister (PM) stated in the Diet, "We must think about a system to make it easier for them [volunteers] to operate .... " (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, February 4, I995,P·4l· The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) may seem an odd choice to lead the I8 IAG and to be eventually proposed as the central ministry that oversees the registration of the new NPO groups, yet the EPA was very interested in becoming the agency with centralized supervision over the new NPOs. As a coordinating ministry, the EPA had institutional reasons for seeking this position. In short, the EPA wanted a gemba (jurisdiction over a real area; e.g., a particular industry or set of groups} to help them lobby for a budget. With all the talk of administrative reform in the air, they also wanted a gemba to make their continued existence more secure. Additionally, NPOs seemed likely to increase in size and importance in the future and were an attractive area to administrate. 9 The EPA succeeded in leading the IAG and in getting eventual jurisdiction, if not control, over the new NPOs for three reasons. First, the EPA had been active beforehand in laying the groundwork. In the I990s, the EPA conducted an extensive survey of citizens groups and had done similar surveys on volunteers. Arguably, the EPA had established a degree of expertise. Second, in the immediate aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake, other ministries were busy with disaster relief and blame avoidance, while the EPA moved decisively to position itself in charge of the IAG. Third, Igarashi, then chief cabinet secretary, and Murayama, then PM, both thought that the EPA would be too weak to control the new NPOs. This made the EPA a safe choice, even compared to the other possibilities (the MOHA, PM's Office, or Ministry of Justice). The Ministry of Finance (MOP) was generally indifferent to the new NPOs. However, the Tax Bureau was staunchly opposed to granting any tax privileges to the new category of NPOs (Asahi Shinbun, February I9, I998). Tsujimoto Kiyomi of the SDP cited the MOP as the reason why any NPO law that included tax privileges would not be able to pass: "MOP is a big wall." 10 The MOP would exercise this influence indirectly, through LDP legislators who valued the MOP's opinion. The ruling coalition at the time comprised the LDP, SDP, and Sakigake. The three parties formed an "NPO project team" on February I 5, I 99 5, to investigate and propose legislation on volunteer groups. Each party fielded one Diet member to the Coalition NPO Team.U The LDP representative, Kumashiro, initially held a very conservative position on the law. He did not even see a strong need for a DM's Bill (giin rippo).U However, as discussed later, a combination of factors shifted him into more

Regulating Civil Society progressive view of the NPO law. Indeed, reviewing his testimony in the Diet in support of the NPO law, he comes across as a fervent defender of NPOs. Sakigake's representative, Domoto, was initially disposed toward a strong NPO law. SDP's Goto also preferred a progressive piece of legislation, representing his party's preferences, but was not strongly motivated. He was later replaced by the more active Tsujimoto who was as, if not more, favorable to progressive legislation than Domoto. As a new party, Sakigake in particular looked to establish its electoral base with the NPOs, for reasons discussed in greater depth in the conclusion of this chapter. In short, dim prospects in future single-seat districts necessitated a strategy aimed at proportional representation (PR) seats, for which these NPOs could mobilize votes effectively. This accounts for the great attention Sakigake devoted to the NPO issue. There was a great deal of policy sympathy in Sakigake for this issue, but the importance attached to it also shows the party responding to the new incentives of the altered electoral system. Reflecting this, their second policy booklet was devoted to the NPO issue. 13 Promotion of NPOs (and their international counterparts, NGOs) also fit with SDP policy. Even with the presence of Kumashiro, the Coalition NPO Team represented at least a rival, and at most a peril, to the EPA stewardship of the NPO law process. This touched off a contest between bureaucrats and legislators over the direction of the future NPO law. The rivalry continued until November 1995, when the bureaucrats were routed and, to a great degree, banished from the creation of the NPO law. In February, March, and April, the governing parties, New Frontier Party, and IAG respectively held public hearings about the future NPO law. On November 7, 199 5, the New Frontier Party submitted to the Diet their Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Person Status to Groups Performing Citizens Public Interest Activities. The bureaucrats responded immediately. The following day, the IAG released their interim report to the chief cabinet secretary. The Coalition NPO Team knew a threat when they saw one and quickly persuaded Igarashi to shelve the report and declare that the NPO law would be a DM bill (Kumashiro Akihiko, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 17, 1997). Even the big business peak organization, the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), lobbied for the law to be a DM bill (Tanaka Yasufumi, Keidanren, Social Affairs Bureau, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, October 8, 1997). This was clearly a message to the EPA to keep their hands off. The bureaucrats may have been holding public hearings with the citizens groups, but apparently they were not listening. All of the citizens groups that prepared NPO draft laws themselves had certain consistencies in their desired law. 14 However, the EPA plan disappointed on almost

qo

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every count. The four main points of the interim report were: (I) the NPO law would be a special law attached to the civil code; (2) the groups targeted by the law would be those which "engaged mainly in volunteer activities ... and contributed to the public interest"; (3) the prefectural governments would give permission for the groups to form (ninka), supervise the groups, and be empowered to dissolve them (groups active in two or more prefectures would be considered separately); and (4) tax treatment would be considered separately from legal status. Essentially, this was a proposal for the status quo (see the Appendix). Stage Two: Legislative Politics: SDP and Sakigake versus LDP versus PARC

With the shelving of the EPA-led IAG interim report, the bureaucrats had been handed a decisive defeat. This did not mean, however, that the EPA gave up trying to influence the eventual legislation. The next several weeks saw a renewal of struggle over control of writing the law-this time among the coalition's junior partners and groups within the LDP. The struggle ended when the NPO Coalition Team produced a draft law. In this stage, the bureaucrats had to work indirectly, via the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC). Specifically, an assertive EPA bureau chief named Sakamoto worked through PARC's Commerce and Industry Division. The Coalition NPO Team was led by a freshmen legislator, which made their position weak. Sakamoto had good contacts in PARC's Commerce and Industry Division via his connections to former Prime Minister Takeshita. The Coalition NPO Team was beset by significant policy differences. The vision of the NPO law held by the three parties was different in several important respects. Most important was government supervision. The LDP assumed the need for bureaucratic supervision of the new NPOs as a matter of course. In contrast, the SDP and Sakigake favored the free formation and operation of NPOs (Kumashiro Akihiko, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August I?, I997). The LDP vision turned on the bureaucratic licensing of NPOs, followed by an obligation for the NPOs to file yearly reports to the bureaucrats, and with the bureaucrats retaining the right to revoke the permits for the NPOs' operation. The SDP favored a notification (todokede, meaning automatic approval) system for gaining legal person status, minimal supervision by bureaucrats, and the power for dissolution of the NPOs being held by the courts. 15 (See the Appendix.) These visions were clearly opposed. However, some time after the IAG plan was shelved, the LDP project team softened its position. In the

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interim, Sakamoto had been working through PARC's Commerce and Industry Division in an effort to retain some control over the eventual outcome. The Commerce and Industry Division proposed to the Coalition NPO Team a division of labor for NPO legislation. The proposal was really that of the EPA, sent via the Commerce and Industry Division, and was essentially an offer that the division would decide the tax consequences for the NPO law, while the project team would handle the legal status part of the law. This was an attempt to control the whole process because the division's representatives were senior to those of the LDP project team and, in the end, the EPA plan would prevail. This attempt was quashed by Kato Koichi, who played an active role at the coordinating level for both LDP policy coordination above the PARC level and policy coordination for the three parties in the governing coalition. With the EPA defeated again in this intra-LDP battle, the NPO law rested firmly in the hands of the Coalition NPO Team. The relevant divisions became those among the three coalition partners. The visions of Sakigake and SDP on the one hand and of the LDP's Coalition NPO Team on the other still diverged considerably, but an agreement, the Citizens Activities Promotion Law (provisional name) Draft Law Outline, was worked out and signed on December 14, 199 5. The LDP's Policy Zigzag: To the Left By signing these documents, the LDP had made a significant liberalization in its position. The Citizens Activities Promotion Law (provisional name) Draft Law Outline bears many similarities to the eventual NPO Draft Law submitted to the Diet by the three parties more than a year later and to the NPO law that passed in March 1998. For example, it includes the phrase "beginning with volunteers" and a list of example categories for citizens groups and excludes political organizations. It also requires that the groups "contribute to the public interest" and that membership be open to all. It is a very progressive document that included at least three important differences from the previous system. First, many new groups, including those in the old legal blind spot, would be allowed to form. The second difference was the limiting of the screening ability that the bureaucrats had held under the civil code. Technically, three items were left pending from the agreement. These were the definitions of "public interest" and "volunteer" and the issue of ninsho (permission), which boiled down to what would be the gatekeeping standard. These items were resolved formally in a document titled the "Governing Parties NPO Project Confirmed Matters" issued on February r, 1996. 16 In fact, however, the items in this later document and the December 14, 1995, agree-

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ment were all agreed to in late DecemberY In any event, the February I document gave a liberal interpretation of ninsho, which thereby curtailed the screening powers of the bureaucrats. The third difference was a provision for favorable tax treatment of contributions to groups that "remarkably contribute to the public interest." On February 8, the Coalition NPO Team announced their intention to have a draft law ready by March I 5. In addition, the Three Parties Policy Agreement of January 8, I996, pledged to "complete a draft [law] quickly, and aim at its passage as a DM bill in the next Ordinary Diet session." Taken together, these agreements represent significant concessions by the LDP from their earlier positions. This major shift is explained by the changes in Kumashiro's position. Kumashiro was the sole LDP representative to the NPO project. He was fairly well left alone to do his work with the other coalition members of the team. The December and February agreements reflect his changed stance. What could explain this? In essence, the citizens groups successfully lobbied Kumashiro through a skillful and coordinated effort. 18 Matsubara Akira, head of the citizens group C's, spearheaded the lobbying effort. He describes Kumashiro's metamorphosis in this way: Kumashiro used to be fairly anti-NPO, or at least not have a very sympathetic understanding. He used to say that the government had the responsibility to supervise (kantoku). It took a long time to convince him. It went in stages. At the first stage, he used to think that these kinds of groups were all antigovernment. At stage two, he saw how volunteers were active in Kobe, Rwanda, etc., then changed his mind so that he thought that there were good groups and bad groups. He still felt that bad groups must be filtered by the government. At stage three, he realized that the government can't filter. The most important aspect in lobbying Kumashiro is that AMDA (Asian Medical Doctors Association, a kind of Asian version of Doctors Without Borders), which is a very active and influential NPO, is based in Okayama. It is the NPO pride of Okayama. AMDA also has great relations with MOFA. The most important thing was votes. Also, we showed him that groups which were pillars of the LDP support were also supportive of changes in the law. For example, we showed him how Keidanren [the Federation of Economic Organizations] supported it. We also showed him that seinen kaigi sho [Youth Meeting Place], which is a regional big business' group, also supported the NPO plan. C's is very close to Keidanren. Keidanren always moved indirectly. They moved through C's. I would speak at their conferences or introduce them to the Dietmen. Keidanren has a section of people pushing for NPOs, almost a guerilla outfit inside Keidanren. (Matsubara Akira, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 7, 1997)

Matsubara identifies as important (I) the votes from a prominent group in his constituency, (2) the presentation of NPOs as important social

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actors, and (3) showing that groups which support LDP also support the legal change. It may seem surprising that Keidanren lobbied for the NPO law. In fact, the "guerilla outfit" identified by Akira is the Social Contribution Group of the Social Affairs Bureau. Keidanren's interest in NPOs began in the late 198os. With an increase in Japanese direct investment in the United States, Japanese corporations were often faced with request for donations or other support from American NGOs. At first, the corporations were often not sure how to deal with this kind of group, which was not nearly so active in Japan. Keidanren set up a study group on the NGOs and then formed the 1-Percent Club (for donations) in early 1990. Keidanren went on to found its Social Contribution Promotion Committee in May 1990. Then, in April 1991, the Social Contribution Group was formed. In the aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake, this is the group that was active in coordinating relief donations of money and materials from corporations and channeling them to NGOs and volunteer groups. This group, somewhat isolated and working closely with NGOs, became an advocate for the views of the NGOs within Keidanren. They also had wide scope for this advocacy because they were the acknowledged experts on a subject that had hitherto attracted little attention within Keidanren. Although the claims of the group, along the lines of "NPOs are necessary in order to change Japanese society," may seem at first blush out of character with Keidanren, they in fact bear witness to the changes in Japanese society that made change in the laws regulating NPOs inevitable (Tanaka Yasufumi, Keidanren, Social Affairs Bureau, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, October 8, 1997). Kumashiro may also have been influenced by Kato Koichi's views on providing more volunteers for welfare services. In addition, Kumashiro may have been motivated individually to concede in order to get a law bearing his name. He had certainly already invested a great deal of time on the Coalition NPO Team. At this time, in a rearguard action, PARC's Commerce and Industry Division threatened that if no agreement could be worked out within the Coalition NPO Team, the LDP would have to go with an EPA draft law. Rather than working to extract concessions from the SDP and Sakigake, however, this threat may have made Kumashiro more eager to get an agreement on a DM bill. In sum, the LDP's dramatic policy change over winter 199 5-96 reflects Kumashiro's changed views more than anything else. An alternative explanation of this policy concession might be the fact that the New Frontier Party's draft NPO law, "Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Person Status to Groups Performing Citizens Public Interest Activities," had already been submitted to the Diet on November 7,

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I99 5, and spurred an LDP desire to come to agreement even at a high cost. A third possibility is the LDP's desire to preserve the coalition by conceding to their allies on an important issue. However, none of these alternative explanations can solve the puzzle of why the LDP backtracked so drastically in spring I996. Especially in the light of Kumashiro's testimony in the Diet in May and June I996, a far more plausible explanation lies in Kumashiro's changed views of NPOs. Kumashiro came around to a more liberal position on the NPO law. However, many other members of the LDP did not share his opinion.

The LDP's Policy Zigzag: To the Right When Kumashiro took over the Chairmanship of the Coalition NPO Team in February I996, he still faced divided opinions and ambivalence about the NPO law within the LDP. As Kumashiro himself put it, "Other LDP Dietmen criticized me, saying, your law would even let Greenpeace form in Japan! What kind of a law is that? Greenpeace is an antigovernmental group!" (Kumashiro Akihiko, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August I9, I997) Because of this resistance, the LDP took some time in preparing revisions to Sakigake's draft law, eventually presenting them on April I I, I996. And these revisions took a conservative bent. The LDP proposed revisions to the December I99 5 agreement that significantly watered down the progressive nature of that draft. Although more progressive than the EPA plan of November I99 5, the LDP revisions represent a very conservative approach to the LDP's version of the law. The five main revisions were to (I) remove any mention of favorable tax treatment, (2) permit investigations of the NPOs at any time, (3) strengthen central bureaucratic jurisdiction over the NPOs, (4) limit political activities of the NPOs, and (5) tie the definition of public interest to a strict non profit definition prohibiting revenues above costs. 19 In essence, by overruling Kumashiro's December I99 5 agreement, the LDP had moved back toward its earlier position. These revisions proved unacceptable to Sakigake and the SDP, and a stalemate ensued. Goto, the SDP member of the Coalition NPO Team, took the unusual step of spelling out the differences between the SDP and LDP in a document that was widely distributed to citizens groups. Entitled "The SDP's Basic Thinking about the Citizens Activities Promotion Law (provisional name)," the document was distributed on April n, I996. This document repeated the early commitments by the LDP to pass NPO legislation and called for such legislation to be based on the two agreements of the Coalition NPO Team. The document also stated that the SDP desired (I) to make the process by which NPOs gained legal

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status as close to automatic (meaning not subject to bureaucratic discretion) as possible, (2) "to limit to the smallest necessary extent bureaucratic supervision," and (3) to provide favorable tax treatment to NPOs that especially served the public interest. The public circulation of the document seems intended as a protest against the LDP's recalcitrance. Stage Three: Electoral Politics The Rise of the Democratic Party of Japan As the various documents just discussed show, policy preferences among the parties still diverged considerably. However, if the LDP had zagged back toward a more conservative law, it was to zig yet again toward a more liberal NPO law. The reasons for the move have everything to do with coalition and electoral politics. On April rr, 1996, the Coalition NPO Team convened again, and the SDP and Sakigake representatives expressed their rejection of the LDP's amendments. The team had come to a deadlock, and there seemed to be no way for the Coalition NPO Team alone to solve it. After a May 24 meeting, the Governing Parties Coordination Council decided not to submit an NPO draft law to the Diet during the brief remainder of the session. This decision was roundly criticized by the Nihon Keizai Shinbun on May 27, 1996, under the headline "Irresponsible Politics Exposed by the NPO Draft Law." On May 31, the New Frontier Party submitted the Draft Law to Amend One Part of Legal Person Tax Law to the Diet. LDP Secretary General Kato Koichi had been active before in attempting to push forward an agreement on the NPO law. In addition to his interest in increasing the supply of volunteers for welfare services, Kato was also a prominent proponent of the LDP-SDP-Sakigake alliance. He headed the LDP's Policy Coordination Council and was the chairman of the LDP's Kobe Recovery Headquarters. It is difficult to say which of these factors pushed the coordination council to act, but some analysts give the most weight to the media coverage. Media coverage had been extensive and heavily in favor of a progressive NPO law since the Hanshin earthquake, and the coverage had not wilted away after 199 5. In 199 5-96, Asahi Shinbun had 4,071 articles mentioning volunteers, while Yomiuri Shinbun had 1,165, Mainichi Shinbun 4,074, and Sankei Shinbun 766. 20 Reviewing the coverage in its entirety would be impossible, so only a brief survey is attempted here. Although unlikely allies, the conservative Nihon Keizai Shinbun (also known as the N ikkei), sometimes called Japan's Wall Street Journal, and the liberal Asahi Shinbun had been the most aggressive in calling for a progressive NPO law.

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The two papers came at the issue from different angles. The Nikkei viewed an NPO law as part of administrative reform. Reform in the NPO system would be part and parcel of remaking the Japanese administrative system. In fact, editorials calling for administrative reform often mentioned the NPO law almost in the same breath, as if the two were closely related. The merits of that view aside, the Nikkei wrote often on the NPO law and had influence among the LDP and LDP supporters. 21 The Nikkei also ran a weekly series, in its Thursday evening edition, written by a rotating group of five prominent citizen leaders (including Amemiya Takako and Yamaoka Yoshinori). Setting aside this series, sample Nikkei headlines include the following: "Quickly pass supporting legislation" (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, January 21, 1996); "Hurry up with a NPO law for the citizens"; 22 and "Finish debate on the NPO law and pass it this Diet session." 23 The Asahi Shin bun had a strong policy slant, and its views may not have been as well received by LDP supporters. For this reason, Asahi's support was important for SDP and Sakigake members. One Asahi headline was "The fear of bureaucratic intervention into the NPO draft law" (Asahi Shinbun, April 5, 1996). Asahi also indicated the importance of the NPO law in its editorial on the opening day of a Diet session by listing it as one of the four most important pieces of legislation for the session. 24 Yomiuri Shinbun has a reputation as a conservative paper. However, it is also known to be strong on coverage of laws and has influence with conservative members of the LDP. Yomiuri did not cover the NPO law as much as Nikkei and Asahi, but the coverage it gave was quite favorable. 25 Mainichi likewise provided very favorable coverage. 26 At this point, the Governing Parties Coordination Council requested that the Coalition NPO Team summarize a final report. On June 4, the Coalition NPO Team had a morning meeting and prepared the report "Progress of the Discussions of the Governing Parties NPO Project." The Coalition NPO Team's chairman, the SDP's Goto, submitted this report along with the SDP's draft law to the Governing Parties Coordination Council. The Coalition NPO Team's final report listed four areas of agreement: to make it easier for citizens groups to get legal status by means of a special law rather than amending the Universal Civil Code; to divide the issues of legal status from tax treatment; to submit at the same time separate draft laws about the legal status of citizens groups and tax treatment of citizens groups; and to submit the draft law as a DM bill.2 7 Upon receiving the Coalition NPO Team's report on June 4, 1996, the Governing Parties Coordination Council decided to take over the debate on the NPO draft law from the project team. The council also requested that each of the three parties submit a draft law to the council by June 1r.

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After this, the council assumed full initiative over the law. The council still faced a backlog of work, however, and, on June 18, decided not to submit a NPO draft law during the current Diet session, which ended the next day. The LDP's Policy Zigzag: To the Left, Again During the summer months, it became clear that the Diet would be dissolved in the fall and elections called. In fact, the Diet was dissolved on its opening day, September 27, 1996. The Governing Parties Coordination Council was busy with the discussion of the breakup of the Ministry of Finance, the aged-care law, and the issue of Okinawa-U.S. bases and did not discuss the NPO law until September. When the council turned its attention back to the NPO law, however, it achieved dramatic results. The LDP quickly reversed its earlier objections and broadly accepted the SDP's and Sakigake's position. With some resistance, the LDP conceded on the definition of "public interest" and removing the limitation on political activities of the new NPOs. The final sticking point for the LDP was a definition of the new NPOs. The LDP wanted to limit the new groups to those that would provide service at cost (i.e., no profit margin in the service provision). The reasons for this are discussed later. With the rise of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), however, Sakigake stuck to its guns, and, this last point, too, was soon conceded. On September 19, 1996, the Governing Parties Coordination Council issued the "Agreement on the Citizens Activities Promotion Draft Law (NPO Draft Law)." As the Sakigake news release of the same date rejoices, "The ruling parties have reached an Agreement, in a form in which our party's claims have been accepted in every aspect." 28 Why did the LDP concede so much to the SDP and Sakigake? The reasons concern policy, coalition, and election. One consideration was the aged-care law. In order to meet the growing demands on state resources that this law created, the LDP wanted to provide a larger number of lowcost volunteers. The LDP was accustomed to viewing welfare legal persons in this manner as cheap subcontractors for welfare services. Kato Koichi was among those legislators most concerned with welfare (zoku giin) who saw that the new NPO law might usefully increase the number of welfare volunteers. 29 However, this reason is of less than central importance, and Kato Koichi had other reasons for pushing forward an agreement with the SDP and Sakigake. As mentioned above, Kato was a major proponent of the LDPSDP-Sakigake coalition. This coalition had been tarred from the start with calls that it was an "unholy alliance" and a cynical grab for power. Kato was determined to get one major, new policy initiative agreed on by the

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coalition before the next election was called. Kato himself describes his reasons as being mainly for the preservation of the coalition. 30 This preservation also served as an incentive for the SDP and Sakigake to rejoin a postelection coalition with the LDP, which would need coalition help in the House of Councilors, at least. The effort to preserve the coalition was central to the LDP's compromise. In addition, a third set of reasons had to do with the rise of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). In the tried-and-true tradition of the LDP, a major policy initiative of the opposition party was eo-opted. The DPJ was a staunch proponent of a new NPO law. Indeed, after Domoto, the most active advocate of the NPO law in Sakigake was Yanase Susumu, who left Sakigake for the DP].3 1 Thus, the LDP had a chance to take some wind out of its sails by coming to a progressive agreement on the NPO law. Rather than opposing the NPO law and losing voters, working toward a law in which LDP input would be substantial may have seemed like a better idea to LDP conservatives. Perhaps this early concession might also make it easier to work with the DPJ after the election, should that prove necessary. After the agreement of September 19, 1996, the parties still had to hammer out a draft. The issues to be refined were the definition of the NPO groups, reporting duties, limitations of political activities, investigations by the administration, and revoking of legal person status. By now, these were considered old ground, and an accord was quickly reached. The LDP pushed the hardest to have the law submitted quickly, at the urging of the LDP's leadership, Kato Koichi and Yamazaki Taku. Almost within two weeks, on December 16, 1996, the governing parties submitted the NPO draft law. The DPJ convened hearings with citizens groups on February 5, 1997, about the NPO law. These hearings were by no means pro forma. In fact, because the NPO law was a DM bill, media and citizens groups played an active role throughout the process. The media has already been discussed, but citizens groups were also prominent throughout the process. They courted the media and lobbied the politicians. They mobilized members to fax their representatives about the NPO law. They held numerous study groups about the law, both for mobilization and to education legislators about their positions. In reviewing the evolution of the various governing party law drafts and comparing these with the citizens groups' demands stated in the public hearings, one can see the inclusion of specific citizens groups' positions (see the Appendix). In addition to expressing the opinion that, after progressive DPJ revisions, the NPO law has finally corrected its faults and should pass, the Nikkei goes so far as to say, "The joint amendments by the governing parties and the DPJ reflect the results of discussions

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with citizens groups, and this method of doing things should be highly evaluated" (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 30, 1997). An Asahi Shinbun headline called it "a model of collaboration between citizens and Dietmen." The accompanying article extolled how citizens lobbied both bureaucrats and politicians: "The governing parties at the start had a wide gap from citizens' views [on the NPO law], but have gradually come closer to the citizens' contentions because of the frequent exchange of opinions between the two and the almost monthly citizens group symposia which the Dietmen attended .... Looking back at the process, the role played by citizens' efforts is large" (Asahi Shinbun, June 7, 1997). The Appendix outlines the various plans and drafts of the NPO law. A table there also lists the proposer of the draft, the definition of the new groups to be included, the type of groups expected to gain legal status, the permitting standard and body, and provisions for supervision and dissolution of the new legal persons. The day after the hearing convened, February 6, 1997, the DPJ Policy Coordinating Committee approved the document "DPJ Thinking on the (Governing Parties) NPO Draft Law" submitted by the DPJ's NPO Issue Project Team. This document is very progressive, but not extreme. The DPJ document frequently expounds on the necessity of a vital, independent NPO sector, but the details of the law remain a liberal modification of the governing parties draft, seemingly tailored to ensure the possibility of compromise with the governing parties. 32 The DPJ presented the document to the governing parties eight days later. Following this, the LDP leadership held a policy meeting with the DPJ to discuss the NPO law. The LDP wanted DPJ support to pass the law in the House of Councilors, so they agreed to further concessions on the draft law. Party leaders signed a confirmation document on May 22, agreeing to submit the NPO bill to the Diet with nine amendments proposed by the DPJ. Although all liberalizations, the most significant of these amendments eliminated the need for the EPA to seek opinions of other ministers for NPOs having multiministry jurisdiction, eliminated the requirement of submitting a list of unpaid employees, and created a new category of NPOs for coordinating groups. On May 22, the amended NPO draft law was submitted to the Diet. Debate quickly started in the Cabinet Committee, on May 28. In this discussion, Kumashiro spoke out for the proposed law in surprisingly strong terms. He clearly stated that the law was intended to limit bureaucratic discretion and the ability of bureaucrats to discriminate among applications and to promote many groups gaining legal status. His testimony is important also because it is specifically intended to serve as guidance for the bureaucrats in applying the NPO law. 33 The draft law was approved

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by the Cabinet Committee on June 5 and passed the House of Representatives (the lower but more powerful house) on June 6. The draft law was sent to the House of Councilors (the upper house), but the secretary general of the members of the House of Councilors, Murakami Masakuni, chose not to debate the bill before the Diet session ended on June 18. As a proponent of a conservative coalition, Murakami was an opponent of the LDP's alliance with the SDP and Sakigake. There are probably two reasons the bill passed the House of Representatives but did not clear the House of Councilors. First, the New Frontier Party engaged in immoderate stalling measures from late May to early June, which did not leave enough time for the law to pass the House of Councilors. Second, the House of Councilors was displaying its independence; many upper-house members complained that they were tired of simply rubber-stamping the lower house's bills.

Stage Four: Final Passage The Fall Diet: Final Resistance When the Diet reconvened September 29, 1997, consideration of the NPO bill was delayed for three reasons. First was the controversy swirling around convicted felon Sato Koko's entry into Prime Minister Hashimoto's cabinet, which delayed Diet business in general. Second was the delaying tactics of the Heiseikai, a group of former Clean Government Party Dietmen in the House of Councilors. Third was the continuing friction between the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives. Rumors also circulated that the fate of the NPO law was tied to a bill to introduce a lottery based on winning teams in Japan's professional soccer league. Still, hopes were high for passage of the NPO law in the fall Diet session, which was scheduled to end on December 12, 1997. On November 28, the Parliamentary Strategy Committee of the LDP's House of Councilors made four revisions to the House of Representatives bill that had passed in June 1997. One change was to alter the name of the bill to "Law for Promotion of Special Non profit Activities," with the new legal persons to be called "special non profit legal persons." This revision struck out the previous bill's "citizen" terminology. For many conservative politicians, the term "citizens group" recalls the anti-LDP citizen movements of the 1970s, so although this was a purely cosmetic change, it had symbolic value to conservative politicians. Citizens groups themselves were not unhappy with the change, viewing the new terms as more inclusive. The other revisions made by the committee consisted of a change to prevent violent revolutionary groups from gaining legal status as special

Regulating Civil Society nonprofit legal persons and two minor procedural changes (Asahi Shinbun, February 10, 1998; C's Nyusuretaa, December 12, 1997). The bill then received the active promotion of the SDP and Sakigake, and even the LDP leadership strongly supported it, with a view to maintaining the three-party alliance (Yomiuri Shinbun, December 1, 1997). In the Diet on December 1, Kato Koichi testified to the LDP's determination to pass the law in the fall session (C's 1996, p. 54). Citizens groups organized a letter-writing campaign that produced 1,500 letters to Dietmen (Yomiuri Shinbun, December 10, 1997). The giant Japanese federation of unions, Rengo, also pushed for the NPO law. In October 1997, Rengo cosponsored "citizens hearings" in Tokyo, Fukuoka, and Osaka and summoned the writers of the three NPO bills. Rengo also directly lobbied the parties, especially the DPJ (C's 1996, pp. 50-51). Rengo's surprising bedfellow, Keidanren, also continued its lobbying for the bill. Keidanren lobbied the NPO law's sponsors individually. On October 29, Keidanren also published "A Call for the Quick Passage This Diet Session of the Citizens Activities Promotion Bill (NPO Bill)." The head of Keidanren, Shoichiro Toyoda, also asked Hashimoto to pass the bill, while Keidanren's Social Contribution Committee and 1-Percent Club directly lobbied the LDP's leadership in the upper house (C's 1996, pp. 53-55; C's Nyusuretaa, December 26, 1997). December articles in Mainichi Shinbun, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Yomiuri Shinbun, and Asahi Shinbun called for passage of the law. A Yomiuri Shinbun article on December 10 also explicitly linked the NPO law to the "current trend toward deregulation and decentralization." However, on December 5, 1997, Heiseikai and the Sun Party submitted their own version of an NPO bill, the Citizens Public Interest Activities Legal Person Bill (outline), which, although bereft of the hope of passage, slowed down the ruling coalition's bill. The parties also slowed down discussion of the bill by resorting to a boycott. In the days remaining before the end of the session, Heiseikai's and the NFP's resistance proved insurmountable, and the ruling parties prioritized instead a revision in the laws about depositor insurance (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, December rr, 1997). The Spring Diet: Final Passage The Diet reconvened on January I2, 1998. Three NPO bills were continued from the previous (141st) Diet: the JCP's bill, the Heiseikai and Sun Party bill, and the ruling party's bill amended by the DPJ. Hopes were again high for passage of an NPO law, although citizens groups seemed by now almost wary rather than optimistic. The NPO bills were explained on January 22, and discussion took place on January 27 and February 3 and 5. Revisions were made on

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February 5 by the Executive Discussion Group of the Labor and Social Policy Committee of the upper house. The various parties made final revision requests to the Committee on February 10, and discussions were held on February 12, 17, 19, and 24. The revised bill was named the Law for Promotion of Special Nonprofit Activities and was cosponsored by the LDP, SDP, Komei, and Sakigake (Asahi Shinbun, February 10, 1998; C's Nyusureta, March 9, 1998; Yomiuri Shinbun, February I, 1998). The outstanding issues were the limitations on political activities for the new special nonprofit legal persons (Asahi Shinbun, February 19, 1998). The Minyuren and Komei groups of parliamentarians wanted the limitations to apply only to support candidates, but the Ichiro Ozawa-led Liberal Party and JCP wanted to get rid of the limitations entirely. A compromise was reached with the addition of the liberalizing phrase "not having the objectives (of endorsement, etc.)." (Asahi Shinbun, March 3, 1998). A final compromise, reached on February 24, ended the resistance of the smaller House of Councilor parties. A high-level LDP decision allowed the ruling coalition to agree to eliminate the written guarantee that the new NPOs' main objectives would not be religious activities (Asahi Shinbun, February 25, 1998). Komei, a descendant of the old Clean Government Party and backed by the lay Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai, now agreed to support the bill, which was passed by the Labor and Social Policy Committee in a unanimous vote on March 3 and by the House of Councilors as a whole (217 for and 2 against) on the following day. Even the Liberal Party and the JCP decided not to oppose the law. On March 19, 1998, the NPO law passed the House of Representatives in a unanimous vote.

Political Significance of the I998 NPO Law The impact of the NPO legislation occupied our attention in Chapter 3· Here, we turn to a stark question: Is the 1998 NPO Law a fluke? In other words, is it merely the consequence of a catastrophic natural disaster? The answer is no. In fact, many claim that even if the Hanshin earthquake had not occurred, an NPO law would have been passed within a decade anyway. 34 The visibility of the volunteers only accelerated a process that was already underway, as evinced by the growth of the NPO sector itself. For example, C's, founded in November 1994 (months before the Hanshin earthquake), was formed by citizens groups to spearhead a lobbying campaign for an NPO law. The quasi-governmental National Institute of Research Advancement had already begun comprehensive surveys of the NPO and its legal system. Significantly, politicians had also turned their interest to NPOs. Study groups existed in several parties, and in

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December 1994, Sakigake published its "Report of the Nonprofit Sector Study Group." The political key to the success of the NPO bill lay in the altered political circumstances after 1994, including the changed electoral institutions that altered the incentives for politicians to promote group formation. For Sakigake, and to a lesser extent the SDP, the urgency of the NPO law came to some extent from the electoral changes of 1994. Japan's previous single, nontransferable vote (SNTV) system of electoral districts was replaced by a hybrid system of 300 single-member districts and 200 party list, or proportional representation (PR) seats. For small parties, such as Sakigake and the SDP, it is unlikely that they will display much strength in the single-member districts. Their hope for survival rests more on the PR seats. 35 Organized groups, such as the NPOs, are an excellent mechanism for coordinating votes for these smaller parties in the PR voting. The value of groups who were well-disposed to Sakigake and SDP increased under the new electoral system and thus provided an incentive for these smaller parties to trade their participation in the coalition for LDP support of the NPO law. Another reason for the successful passage of the NPO law was the LDP's willingness to compromise with the SDP and Sakigake. In part, the LDP was following its tried-and-true formula of eo-opting an opposition party's policies. The change in electoral institutions played a part in changing the mind of the LDP, as well. In the old SNTV system, the LDP needed multiple candidates to win in many districts in order to secure a majority in the Diet, which promoted the development of groups within a district dedicated to supporting an individual legislator, not the LDP as a whole. In the new electoral system, the need for these groups as votecoordination mechanisms has vanished. Other kind of groups will be more useful for helping the party to win single-member districts, as explained in Chapter 6. Moreover, the LDP concessions on the NPO law were prompted by the necessities of coalition politics with a viable opposition. The LDP leadership in particular gave in to Sakigake and the SDP to preserve a coalition. The pressures of coalition politics should not be underestimated in top-level decision making. Another electoral pressure facing the LDP as a party was the existence of a viable opposition party, the NFP (now defunct). In fact, the submission of NFP bills to the Diet usually immediately preceded some action by the governing parties, perhaps acting as a stimulus to action. For example, the NFP submitted a draft law to the Diet on November 7, 1995, and the very next day the EPA submitted its "Interim Report" to the chief cabinet secretary. The NFP submitted another draft law on May 31, 1996, and within a week, the coordinating committee took over work on the NPO law from the Coalition

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NPO Team. The NFP submitted another draft law on November 29, 1996, and December 16 of that year saw the governing parties' first submission of a draft law. The NPO law came about in part because of the institutional changes since 1994 that altered the incentives facing politicians and parties. The law was a product of an altered political landscape, if perhaps a transient one, in which the LDP governed via coalition and faced a viable opposition party. Coming after the long period of LDP dominance, the politics of this environment were new in process and in result. The NPO law itself is only one of these repercussions of these institutional changes, but its story illuminates many of the other changes taking place. All of these changes strike at the concentrated power of the centralized bureaucracy and thus may also presage a new era of politics in Japan. As indicated above, Nihon Keizai Shinbun editorializes about NPO and administrative reform as if the two were twins. In fact, they have very different origins, but both could undermine the concentration of power in the central bureaucracy. In the Diet, Kato Koichi recognized this transformative nature of the law when he said, "In order to end the closed situation of the 'development by guidance from above,' we have to plan for the change from the 'large government' in which bureaucrats direct the nation," and continued, "It is not enough just to make the bureaucrat-led big government smaller. The development of independent NPOs and NGOs in which individuals can autonomously participate is also necessary." 36 The new trend toward more DM bills will also lead to diminished bureaucratic command over new laws. 37 In addition, devolution could diffuse central bureaucratic power and its link to the licensing provisions of the NPO law. Because this is a DM bill, MOHA did not provide a model for the prefectures to use in drafting their own implementing legislation.38 Instead, the prefectures themselves were forced to come to terms with their larger relationship with NPOs. Already there is a policy difference between prefectures that aim to promote NPOs (via creation of NPO promotion centers, passage of supporting laws, etc.) and those that have not taken such measures. More closely related is the push for an information disclosure law, a Japanese version of the United States' Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 39 The provision of the NPO law calling for the new NPO legal persons to disclose information publicly, rather than reporting to bureaucrats (who do not then disclose the information) reflects this. Although many unresolved questions remain, all of these issues-strengthening civil society, deregulation, decentralization, DM bills, FOIA-are likely to have a common effect in diminishing the power of the central bureaucracy.

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The NPO law-making process itself is characterized by legislative and coalition politics and extensive lobbying by citizen group, none of which could have happened before 1993. Without the plausibility of the need for coalition partners, elements in the LDP would never have so quickly shifted their stand on the NPO law toward a more liberal regulatory regime. What is important in viewing the making of the NPO law as an expression of post-1993 politics is that the LDP had to actually coordinate policy making itself in a coalition i.e., with other parties and not with the bureaucracy alone. By definition, this leads to more legislative and political action in the Diet and less in the bureaucracy. The locus of action, and power, shifts. 40 This shift in turn changes politics. For example, it increases the possibilities for lobbying pressure by the citizens groups. Because organized groups can deliver votes (as AMDA proved), Kumashiro, as a legislator, was much more receptive to arguments by the citizens groups than the bureaucrats were. 41 Media pressure is similarly more effective on vote-sensitive legislators. The NPO law is the first evidence of these changes, which, should it come to full fruition, are more momentous than any individual bill. From the perspective of the political contestation argument, this shifting power locus itself implies the possibility of regulatory change (elaborated in Chapter 6).

The 2oor Tax Reforms and Reform of Article 34 The final set of case studies are the 2001 tax reforms and the mooted reform of Article 34· Only the tax reforms have been enacted, but they are not nearly as significant as the possible reform of the core legislation of civil society groups in Japan. The

2001

Tax Reforms

After the passage of the NPO law, nonprofits in Japan wanted two changes in tax laws. First, they wanted deductibility of contributions to NPO legal persons. This change did occur, but it did not apply to all NPO legal persons. Instead, only a subset of NPO legal persons are able to receive contributions that can be deducted from the income tax of individuals or corporations ("tax-deductible status"), after being certified by the commissioner of the National Tax Agency, as detailed in Chapter 3· The second change that nonprofits wanted was for NPO legal persons to be taxed at a lower rate (they are currently taxed at the same rate as corporations). This was not a provision of the legislation, but the three parties

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of the governing coalition (the LDP, Koumei, and the Conservative Party) issued a statement on December 14, 2000, stating that this change would be considered "soon," which is significant. The 2001 tax changes came about in part because provisions in the 1998 NPO Law called for a review of the tax system two years after its enactment. Opposition from the Ministry of Finance and from elements of the LDP blocked any changes in taxation at that time, but those in favor were able to call for a later review of the law. This review led to the fiscal year 2001 tax reform provisions for tax deductibility for NPO legal persons, which has since been made even more liberal, as discussed in Chapter 3·

Reform of Article 34? After the difficulties encountered during the passage of the NPO law, it might amaze some readers to know that the government is currently mooting a wholesale reform of Article 34· As noted previously, Article 34 is the core regulation covering not-for-profits in Japan, so any significant reform of this article holds the utmost importance for the legal framework of not-for-profit activity in Japan. Currently, the government is in the early stages of a process that will likely result in major changes to Article 34· Nothing is certain, and no laws are likely to be changed before 2006. However, the contours of the policy discussion can be distinguished through the workings of an advisory council, newspaper reports, and interviews. 42 A key change would be the transformation of Article 34 from a regulation allowing for the creation of public interest legal persons to one allowing for the creation of non profit legal persons (hieiri houjin) (not to be confused with NPO legal persons). The new regulation would affect current PILPs and intermediary legal persons, though not the groups created through special laws attached to Article 34 (including religious legal persons, medical legal persons, and private school legal persons). Whether to include NPO legal persons is still under debate. Another important change would be the shift in the standard by which legal personality is granted to groups, from a permission-based system to a registration-based system. Public interest legal persons are currently granted legal personality by permission (kyoka), which gives the bureaucratic body substantial discretion. The standard of registration (touki), in contrast, confers nearly automatic legal personality. This change should make the process of gaining legal personality much simpler and more predictable, with applications no longer subject to rejection by the bureaucracy for unspecified reasons.

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The third major change concerns taxation. As currently envisioned, the new system will have two or more tiers within the nonprofit legal person category-much as tax-deductible NPO legal persons exist as a subcategory within NPO legal persons. All nonprofit legal persons will probably enjoy some tax benefits; the precise nature and extent are not clear, but most likely their non-profit-making activities will not be subject to taxation. Some nonprofit legal persons will gain greater tax benefits, depending on their contribution to the public interest. Again, it is not certain what standards will apply or what body will determine which activities are in the public interest. Nor is it clear how many tiers will exist, though two or more seems likely. The greater tax benefits may include lower tax rates, fewer activities subject to taxation, and the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions. The anticipated changes will move public interest legal persons to nonprofit legal persons, including intermediary legal persons and possibly including NPO legal persons. Another major change will be that the procedures for gaining legal personality will be drastically loosened from the current discretionary, permission-based system to a less discretionary, registration-based system. Taxation changes remain under discussion, but nonprofit legal persons will probably gain various levels of tax benefits depending on the degree of their contribution to the public interest. (Just who makes that determination and what levels will exist are hotly contested.) Although the final dimensions are unclear, these legal changes will be quite far-reaching and substantial. They will affect tens of thousands of groups immediately and even more in the short term. In the long term, too, this fundamental rewriting of the regulatory framework will have an important effect on the development of Japan's not-for-profit sector. Conclusion The passage of the NPO law reveals for the first time the political conditions under which Japan autonomously initiated a major change in its regulation of civil society. This case also supplies good prima facie evidence on the supporters of the status quo and liberalization. Bureaucrats were the most ardent in their opposition to the new legislation. By extension, we can suppose that bureaucratic dominance constituted an important condition for the maintenance of Japan's regulatory framework until 1998. Once political leaders-because of coalition government and electoral balance-of-power uncertainty-seized control of the process, they instituted this significant liberalization.

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This process did not end with the passage of the NPO law. Tax privileges were granted to NPO legal persons meeting strict criteria in 2000. More significantly, even LDP Diet members are engaged in serious discussions about a fundamental revision of Article 34 of the civil code (Yasuhisa Shiozaki, LDP House of Representatives, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, July ro, 2002). Anyone predicting such a revision as late as 1999 would have been treated to scornful laughter, yet it now seems possible that Japan's regulatory framework will undergo a thorough renovation. The NPO law was the first significant change in the regulatory framework for civil society in the postwar period; Soon after the law passed, tax regulations were loosened not once, but twice, and another category of civil society legal persons (intermediate legal persons) was created. Now, the cornerstone regulation of civil society is up for grabs. How could these changes occur so rapidly and so easily after a half-century of near stasis? How could Japan move from immobilism to rapid change in only six years? The next chapter addresses these issues head-on and also draws out their implications for our understanding of politics and civil society.

6

Conclusion: Members Without Advocates for civil society. The previous chapters demonstrate how politics has powerfully affected the development of civil society in Japan, resolving two of the analytical puzzles posed in the first chapter: Why are Japan's civil society organizations so small in terms of professional staff? And why does Japan also have such a flourishing set of local civil society organizations? In large measure, the answer to both questions is political institutions. This chapter argues that Japan's dual civil society constitutes a civil society of "members without advocates." Japan has a civil society with networks of association that support social capital and effective government without sustaining a professionalized advocacy community that can contribute new policy ideas or challenge current policies. This is not an indictment, but analysis. How and why this matters are discussed later. This chapter summarizes the evidence for the four arguments advanced in the introduction and further develops each of these arguments in turn. The political institutional argument is reviewed first, summarizing the findings of earlier chapters on this central contention of the book. I turn next to the second argument, the "ice age" argument. I provide here a historical narrative of postwar citizens' movements and civil society organizations that uses the regulatory framework and state action to explain one of the early puzzles of Japanese civil society. This historical narrative traces the descent of the massive movements of the 1970s into self-centered consumer and lifestyle movements as the groups confronted an inhospitable state and regulatory framework. This period, dubbed the "ice age" (fuyu no jidai) by activist intellectuals, collapsed with the Kobe earthquake. Most important, I show how the insights from this book's central argument help us to understand and explain this trajectory. PoLITICS MATTERS

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CONCLUSION

Third, this chapter provides an argument-the "regulatory contestation" argument-about why Japan's regulatory framework for civil society has been so rigid for so long and, equally important, why it is changing now. Incidentally, this explanation also provides insight into the narrative of the changes in the fortunes and orientation of citizens' movements described immediately before. The final "members without advocates" argument contends that the configuration of Japan's civil society as a dual structure has profound consequences for policy making. Specifically, Japanese civil society groups are often unable to influence the public debate on various policy issues of interest to them. This final argument is a provocative one which contends that Japan's civil society, long seen as manifestly inferior to America's, might be viewed in an entirely different light.

Dual Civil Society in Japan Professionalized groups have faced restrictive regulations and comparatively limited financial flows. The regulatory framework has had two effects: independent civil society groups have found it hard to grow large, and large groups have found it hard to remain independent. Small local groups, epitomized by the neighborhood association, have been promoted, as shown in Chapter 4· Although state promotion is essential to understanding the spread and prevalence of neighborhood associations, their continuing vitality rests on their connection to society. The evidence from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 shows the importance of the regulatory framework in the patterning of civil society. The low degree of professionalization of Japan's civil society is perhaps best illustrated by examining the proportion of all employees who work for civil society organizations (not for corporations or the state). Recall Figure 2.3 from Chapter 2, which showed how Japan's professional civil society is very small in international perspective. Some cases prove harder to explain than others. For example, neighborhood associations (NHAs), with roots in the spontaneous self-organization of communities in Japan, present a difficult case for the political explanation. Accordingly, a case study of the NHAs provides important evidence in support of the political institutional hypothesis. In fact, although many NHAs, especially in rural areas, formed independently of the state, only state support accounts for the spread of NHAs throughout Japan in the twentieth century. NHAs had formed spontaneously in many areas in Japan by the first decade of the twentieth century, but most (up to 90 percent) modern NHAs exist as a result of government promotions and

Conclusion

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nationwide interventions. The more than 298,ooo neighborhood associations enjoy extremely high participation rates, making them Japan's most prevalent type of civil society group. Culturalist explanations might predict the maintenance of the authentic early NHAs and even expect some NHAs to form in urban areas (as "surrogate villages"), but only government support can explain the spread of NHAs across the country. The example of Musashino City in Chapter 4 provides some evidence that continuing government support also explains how NHAs have maintained their high levels of membership and participation. Although NHAs are independent entities, they often work with branches of local government in disseminating information or maintaining public facilities. Government funds flow to the groups for these and other purposes. The services are provided quite cheaply, yet the money is important to holding these locality-based groups together and may also create social capital-type externalities. For example, when the government pays a neighborhood association to clean or maintain a local park, the work is done more cheaply and better than if professionals were employed. At the same time, civic community is strengthened as locals work together to maintain the area. As shown in Chapter 4, there is also individual-level data that indicates that participation in NHAs is associated with higher levels of social capital, as indicated by higher levels of generalized trust. Despite the state's strong efforts at coaptation, state support for and promotion of the NHAs stands out in contrast to the treatment of other kinds of civil society organizations. NHAs, limited to small geographic areas by definition, cannot challenge the state (e.g., in terms of providing an alternative information source), only support it. While some support is found for the culturalist (but not the societal) explanation in the previous chapters, more is found for the political institutional explanation. In addition, there are several failings in the societal and culturalist explanations that are not shared by the political explanation. In stark contrast to the other explanations, though, the political explanation goes farther in making predictions about the pattern of civil society organizations in Japan. This is not a case of one explanation being totally correct while the others are wholly wrong-if there is ever such a case. An understanding of civil society in Japan that ignores the important ways in which culture drives group formation and dynamics is incomplete. The cultural explanation offers two important insights. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, there is arguably a cultural congruence between NHAs and the distinctive pattern of social capital formation in Japan. Second, as discussed later, a cultural explanation that emphasizes how ideas and strategies are shaped by institutional features is consistent with and augments the political explanation.

CONCLUSION

However, the political explanation provides us with greater analytical leverage in understanding the development of civil society in Japan. It is, moreover, an explanation that has frequently received short shrift in studies of civil society.

History Matters: Critical Juncture, "Ice Age," and Thaw An understanding of civil society organizations as shaped by the political institutional framework helps us to understand not only the contemporary characteristics of Japanese civil society groups, but also their historical development. I have termed this the "ice age" argument, after an important historical period in Japan's postwar civil society. Meiji Matters: The First Turning Point

In the history of Japan's civil society, three important periods disproportionately influence later developments. 1 These periods are the drafting of the civil code in I 896, the disappointing end of large social movements in the I970s, and a period of "regime shift" (occurring after the end of the Cold War and marked by massive changes in Japanese political parties [see Pempel I998]) best fixed at I996. This section traces out this historical narrative, explaining how an examination of the choices and impact of these periods in light of the argument of this book allows us to weave a consistent story over more than a century of civil society development. Along the way, civil society puzzles are solved, such as how Japan could experience dynamic social movements at some times but freeze the regulatory framework for long periods. When drafting Japan's Civil Code 30 years after the Meiji Restoration (I 8 68) to put Japan on the path to modernization, the framers made clear choices about legal frameworks to regulate civil society organizations. Legal documents (including the framers' notes), examination of progressive drafts, and comparison with the original German and Swiss laws that served as models show that the civil code was deliberately written with the intention of creating high hurdles for the organization of civil society groups. The two key issues were the permitting standard by which groups could be granted legal status and the centrality of a charge to be in the "public interest" for Article 34 groups. Those writing the law knew that choosing a lower bar for formation of legal groups (the "standards principle") would result in many more groups forming and doing so freely. They chose to incorporate elements of a more restrictive principle (the

Conclusion "legal permission principle") in order to maintain control. Similarly, an insistence using on the term "public interest" caused it to be reinserted into Article 34· Both steps represented a desire to place strict limits around the formation of civil society groups. Chapter 5 reviews this case in detail. As that chapter also argues, regulating civil society has always been part of a political process-whether the I896 Civil Code or the I998 NPO Law. The influence of the civil code provisions drafted in I896 is considerable. Core provisions of the civil code in Japan seldom change (making the mooted change of Article 34 even more astonishing). The Meiji period (I 8 68- I 9 I 2) was pivotal in the creation of the modern Japanese state. Institutional shortcomings in the integration of the military with the parliamentary system contributed to the rise of militarism and the Pacific War. The institutions designed at that time to regulate civil society have also had serious consequences. The framing of the civil code constitutes a critically important step in the development of Japanese civil society. The framers intentionally chose strict standards for civil society organizations, while the government focused its energies on the militarization and industrialization of the Meiji era. In the postwar period, however, the same regulatory framework continued, but the occupation changes lowered the hurdles for the formation of social welfare, religious, medical, and educational groups. It is quite possible to argue that the regulatory framework again functioned to promote economic recovery by inhibiting growth of large civil society groups. In recent decades, however, the regulatory framework has been viewed as unsatisfactory by increasing numbers of Japanese. Change has been slow to come, an unintended, or at least unforeseeable, long-term consequence of the Meiji framing. Along the same lines, consider how foundations have a second-order effect on the development of civil society and institutionalization of social movements. Examining the United States, Jenkins finds that: Overall, the foundations have been moderate reformers, funneling most of their support to the moderate wing of the movements and the professionalized groups. But, rather than eo-opting these movements, they have channeled them into professionalized structures. In many respects, this has been a benefit to the movements, allowing them to consolidate their gains and protect themselves against attack. (Jenkins 1998, p. 21 5; for a critical view of foundations' role, see Dowie 2001)

Thus, regulation of foundations has implications beyond simply the foundations themselves, for the development of a host of other organizations, as well. The small size of Japanese foundations is demonstrated in Chapter 2-recall that the largest Japanese foundation would not rank even among the top fifty U.S. foundations in terms of size of assets. Limitations on foundations have not only meant small foundations, but

CONCLUSION

have also had a secondary effect in retarding the institutionalization and growth of succeeding generations of Japanese civil society organizations. Although there are too many factors involved in determining the life cycle of groups to discuss here, many groups grow larger and professionalized over time. The United States has seen that phenomenon over the last fifty years. It takes time for groups to grow large, so even though the regulatory framework in Japan could change overnight, it would take time for large civil society organizations to develop. In addition to simply amassing assets, funding, and staff, such groups need to accumulate legitimacy both for themselves and for the role of civil society organizations in society as a whole. Figure 6.r shows how most large groups were founded decades ago. The groups featured are all U.S. civil society groups with budgets over $ro million annually and all groups in the JIGS survey with expenses over $r million (roo,ooo,ooo yen) annually. The comparison could also be made for organizations with equivalent budgets, i.e., looking only at Japanese groups with expenses over $ro million annually. In fact, that comparison reveals almost identical results (author's data analysis) as those shown in the figure. However, given the generally smaller scale of Japanese groups, which has been discussed at length, the comparison of different budget sizes seems more apt. Of course, the breakdown in dates is arbitrary to a certain degree (chosen for the comparison with the U.S. data). The immediate postwar period saw many groups form in Japan, as did the period of hyperliquidity at the end of the r98os. The main point, however, is that groups amass resources over time, and there is a relationship between age and resources. For the Japanese data, my analysis confirms a positive correlation between age and budget size (significance level p < o.or). Although the absolute number of groups is also different in the U.S. and Japanese data in Figure 6.r, the general relationship holds for both countries. Groups grow in size over time and amass resources. Most large groups were founded many years ago. The Meiji Civil Code profoundly affected the evolution of Japanese civil society, and it is striking how impervious to change that code has been. Despite the high education and income levels of Japanese, there have been very few large Japanese civil society groups in international comparison. The empirical puzzle of "weak" Japanese civil society has obscured the vitality of local Japanese civil society; in fact, both aspects are explained in large part by state action. This historical legacy is not easily altered. Over time, developments like the NPO law and other regulatory changes will have an effect. The fact that it took roo years to enact a major change in the regulation of Japanese civil society is arresting, and it highlights the importance of institutional choice. 2

Conclusion

r65

50 45 40 35

....c 30

"~

~

25 20 15 10 5 0

Before 1994

1955-1969

•us

-

1970-1984 Japan

1985-1992

6.r Large Japanese and U.S. civil society groups by founding date and percentage of all groups. FIGURE

souRCE: U.S. data adapted from Independent Sector r996, p. 24r. U.S. data from I993 · Japanese data from JIGS survey (author's data analysis).

The "Ice Age" of Citizen Activism: The Second Turning Point This brings us to the second turning point: the period during and after the turbulent social movements of the r96os and 1970s. During this period, such movements as the anti-U.S. treaty movement (commonly known as "Anpo") rocked campuses and streets across Japan. Powerful environmental movements in the r96os and early 1970s rose up to transform Japanese policy making, albeit perhaps only briefly. Where did these movements go? Why did Japanese civil society lapse into quiescence (not totally, of course, but certainly in comparison to the ferment of the earlier period)? Although the focus of this book is not to explain the rise of social movements per se, the argument here does explain why social movements failed to institutionalize. Put broadly, the social movements of the r96os and 1970s-which were massive in scale-failed either to achieve their stated objectives (the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was renewed) or to institutionalize-in large measure due to the regulatory framework detailed in this book. It should be remembered that protests

166

CONCLUSION

were so widespread that Herbert Passin wrote an article in the 1962 American Political Science Review in which he felt compelled to caution readers that, despite appearances to the contrary, Japan was "not on the verge of a revolution" (Passin 1962, p. 391). In spite of this tremendous activism, the organizational legacy of the Anpo movement was weak. And, this is in part due to the inhospitable regulatory framework awaiting orgamzers. In fact, comparing the institutionalization of social movements across countries uncovers evidence for the political explanation emphasized in this book while helping us to understand Japan's postwar history. When social movements that are comparable in size arise in different countries, their different forms of institutionalization present a means to test the political institutional explanation. The political institutional argument says nothing about the origin or frequency of social movements (for that see McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994; Zald and McCarthy 1987). Instead, stated generally, the political institutional explanation claims that social movements which are similar in scope but do not result in similar final institutional forms differ because of the influence (direct and indirect) of state institutions. In Japan, quite large social movements do not result in large civil society organizations that institutionalize their aims. This buttresses the interpretation that political institutional barriers are higher in Japan than in other advanced industrialized democracies and thus prevent the development of large independent civil society organizations. Let us consider the environmental movement. The American and Japanese environmental movements involved roughly the same percent of the adult population (6 percent) at their zenith (McKean 1981; see also Broadbent 1998). Japanese groups were lauded as an innovative development in Japanese democracy, promising greater citizen engagement, participation, and voice (McKean 1981). Scholars went so far as to label this "one of the most important and spectacular trends in contemporary Japanese history" (Krauss and Simcock 1980, p. 187). Today, however, the American polity features large, professional, and entrenched environmental NGOs that are involved in almost every aspect of environmental policy in the United States. These NGOs include the Environmental Defense Fund, formed in 1967 amidst "the battle to ban DDT"; the Friends of the Earth, founded in 1969 by a former Sierra Club director who was fired for independent activism; Environmental Action, founded in 1970; and Greenpeace USA, launched in 1971 (Gelb and Palley 1982). The plethora of lobbying opportunities and easy rules for formation made NGOs an attractive option because a German-style Green Party was unlikely to succeed in the U.S. single-member district system.

Conclusion The Japanese groups, by contrast, have melted away like snow in springtime. Recall from Table 2.8 that Japanese environmental groups are dwarfed in membership and budget size by their American counterparts. Tellingly, the GEPON survey of the most powerful environmental groups found that most Japanese groups (77.7 percent) admitted they did not have a policy staff that served as an important resource (author's analysis of Japanese GEPON data set; for details on the GEPON data sets, see the Appendix). A majority of U.S. environmental groups, however, identified a capable policy staff as one of their most important resources (author's data analysis of U.S. GEPON data set). Even successful groups, such as the Nature Conservation Society of Japan (Nihon Shizen Hogo Kyokai), with about rs,ooo individual and r,ooo organizational members and a 30-year history of legal status, are criticized on the grounds that they do not get "openly involved in major political battles or opposes large development projects" (Griffith 1990, p. 3). The reasons for this divergence of result have to do more with different incentives for institutionalization than with variations in the nature of the movements or national culture. In other words, much in line with the central argument of this book, we can see that not just formation and development of social movements, but institutionalization of these movements into organization is a key variable that affects the development of civil society. Miranda Schreurs authored a sophisticated analysis of the development of the environmental movements in Germany, Japan, and the United States (Schreurs 2002). After dismissing arguments based on cultural differences and levels of pollution, Schreurs emphasizes that: differences in the environmental policy communities' strength and effectiveness have a lot to do with institutional structures and the opportunities and barriers they present to environmental actors .... Very important for groups are the access they have to finances, technical and scientific information, qualified staff, and other benefits such as special mailing privileges that facilitate their efforts to organize and mobilize. . .. In Japan, environmental groups have traditionally been kept out of decision-making processes. They have also suffered from limited funding. (Schreurs 2002, pp. 23-26)

Schreurs's findings about these environmental movements buttress the political institutional explanation. The Japanese environmental movement lacks a solid institutional legacy because of the barriers of the regulatory framework, the indirect influences of the mailing system, and the nature of the policy-making process-the core arguments of the political institutional explanation. Japanese civil society activists faced a hostile environment that inhibited any attempts to build organizations out of protest or environmental

r68

CONCLUSION

movements. Coupled with the policy failures of the former, this was daunting. What happened next was that Japanese social movements and civil society movements (and to some extent organizations) turned inward. Unable to win lasting policy victories or institutionalize as organizations, they began to focus on something that was more easily controlled: the individual as a consumer. This is the intellectual genesis of the "lifestyle" movements (seikatsusha) that tried to transform consumers and consumerism instead of society as a whole. However, this also represented a disengagement from advocacy. In other words, rather than seeking to control policy, politics, or society, activists began to urge Japanese citizens to control themselves (as consumers). For this reason, citizen activists referred to this period as the "ice age" (fuyu no jidai) of activism. 3 The very term implies defeat. Although it is not necessary to view these "lifestyle" movements in that way, compared to the dynamism of the citizens' movements that preceded them, they can seem sterile and trivial: the minimalist project of defeated organizers. 4 Of course, even an ice age does not mean extinction. Patricia Maclachlan demonstrates how the consumer movement bifurcated, with the nationallevel becoming dependent on the state, while the local and national levels both pursued the values of "autonomous citizenship" (Maclachlan 2003, p. 232; see also Maclachlan 2002). The educational agenda seems to have paid off in the long run, Maclachlan argues, as consumers "are growing far more independent and assertive in their relations with national governmental actors" in recent years (Maclachlan 2003, p. 232). Maclachlan's powerful analysis probes more deeply into the "distinctive consumer gestalt propounded by movement activists" than this book can attempt (Maclachlan 2003, p. 232). However, her study supports the central arguments of this book in several ways. Maclachlan concludes, "The institutional context of Japanese politics helped shape the development of a dual structure within consumer society, one marked by passive dependence on governmental initiatives at the national level and a more active and independent stance at the local level" (Maclachlan 2003, p. 32). Maclachlan's emphasis on the shaping role of the institutional context resonates with this book's core argument, as does her description of a "dual" national and local structure. Moreover, the recent upsurge in activism seems to coincide temporally with the analysis of this book (and of Pekkanen 2004a) focusing on recent institutional and political party changes. Simon Avenell argues persuasively that by the r98os "civil society advocates and leading activists lionized collaboration and consensus at the expense of contention" and "effectively repudiated the contentious model

Conclusion of civil society implicit in many citizen movements of the r96os and early 1970s" (Avenell, unpublished, p. 4). Avenell's intellectual history is concerned with how the transfiguration of ideas of citizen activism from the r98os to the present day set the conceptual stage for the legitimation of "citizens activities" and the NPO law. However, his insights on these periods are compatible with the institution-centered explanation in this book. The developments discussed above should be viewed as an interaction between ideas and institutions. This is an important point for which a discussion of culture can deepen our understanding. Ideas about citizen activism and civil society's role were shaped over time by the institutionsthe regulatory framework-and this explains in part the turn inward. However, a grasp of these ideas is also important in comprehending the state of civil society and citizen activism in Japan during this period. In other words, the interplay between the two is necessary for a complete understanding.

The Thaw: The Third Turning Point The third turning point is located around the passage of the NPO law. It seems appropriate to date it from January 17, 1995, the day of the Hanshin earthquake. Incidentally, many Japanese civil society activists also mark the modern "birth of civil society in Japan" from the same date. I locate the third turning point on the same day, but for different reasons. For the activists, the date represents a time when civil society groups (or, more accurately, individual volunteering) blossomed in Japan, albeit unexpectedly. I select the date, however, because of the legislative changes that began then and are discussed more fully in the next section. I argue that these changes are even more important than the self-sacrifices of the volunteers after the Hanshin earthquake because the changes in the regulatory framework can sustain the blossoming of civil society and prevent it from fading away like hothouse flowers in the "ice age." This brings us neatly to a discussion of why regulatory frameworks in general, and the regulatory framework in Japan in particular, change.

Determining the Rules of the Game: The "Regulatory Contestation" Argument The regulatory framework is decided through political contestation because, simply put, political actors are aware of the importance of the regulatory framework for civil society. Chapter 5 details the contestation

170

CONCLUSION

over those regulations, spanning more than a century. Political actors are right to recognize that this regulation is important and to contest it because, writ large or small, regulations are literally the rules of the game. They structure incentives, both directly and indirectly, that profoundly influence the development of civil society. We also know that different states at different times have regulated civil society in very different ways. Even confining the scope of our inquiry to advanced industrialized democracies, the variation is considerable. Generally framed, why do different countries regulate civil society differently? Or, more precisely, what accounts for the variations in regulation of civil society organizations across advanced industrialized democracies? This is an important question because access, rather than substantive policy outcomes, is directly at stake in political struggles over the scope and character of associationallife. These contests take place over, rather than within, established "rules of the game" (Clemens 1998; Powell and Clemens 1998}. This recalls William Riker's contention that institutions are the sophisticated equivalent of outcomes. After all, the legal framework regulating civil society is, to a large extent, responsible for the numbers and patterns of institutionalization of civil society. The regulatory environment is the single most important factor determining group formation. In general, several important factors determine the regulatory framework. The first is political parties. In France, associations were actually outlawed between 1791 (after the passage of Le Chapelier Act) and 1901. Policies in this period may be best explained by the equation of the state with the Rousseauistic "general will," which led to a distaste for secondary associations as intrusive in the relationship between state and citizen. More recently, the socialists came into power in 1981 and supported the creation of a number of associations. They also promoted the concept of the "social economy" at domestic and European levels, even to the point of appointing briefly a secretary of state for social economy under Michel Rocard. Peak nonprofit organizations were encouraged. The motive behind all of these policies was that non profits were seen as an essential part of decentralization (Archambault 1997; Levy 1999; Ullman 1998}. The long LDP dominance under the 19 55 system (in which the conservative LDP dominated Japanese political party life from 19 55 to 1993 ), as well as the ideology of the party, can be shown as an important factor in three ways: first, by an analysis of the NPO law, in which the existence of a credible opposition inspired LDP compromise and progressive parties pushed hardest for change (see Chapter 5 ); second, by implication through a comparison with the French example; and third, through an examination of the role and stances of political parties after the change in the electoral system and a weaker LDP (discussed later). Generally,

Conclusion

171

conservative political parties are less likely to promote permissive regulation of civil society organizations. Long LDP dominance explains in part the regulatory stasis of the postwar period. The second important factor determining the regulatory framework is civil society organizations themselves. These groups have been active in lobbying for change in the United States, for example. While the charitable deduction for individuals was incorporated into the U.S. tax code in 1917, it was not until 1936 that firms received the same privilege. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had opposed this deduction but acquiesced after intensive lobbying by the community chest (Hall 1987). In Japan, the severity of the Uniform Civil Code promulgated in r898 meant that fewer groups were around to lobby for change and that these groups were often eo-opted or tied to close relationships with ministries. 5 The rise of new NPOs, such as C's, was shown in Chapter 5 to be important in the case of the NPO law. In general, the more conducive a political system is to interest-group lobbying, the more likely it is that the regulatory framework will promote civil society organizations. Third, institutional factors are clearly important in determining the regulatory framework for civil society organizations. The NPO law demonstrates how even a change in electoral institutions can alter incentives for politicians and have important consequences for civil society policy (e.g., p. r 55). Other implications of the electoral system change are discussed later. In Japan, however, opposition from the bureaucracy also accounts for the country's regulatory pattern. Similarly, institutional factors explain the Japanese bureaucracy's reluctance to promote vibrant, autonomous civil society organizations. Subgovernments, or policy communities, are of particular importance in the Japanese political system. 6 This is true because the "governmental system of Japan is quite fragmented and compartmentalized" due to a weak chief executive, parties that participate in policy making most heavily at the specialized level, bureaucratic power concentrated at the ministry level, and an absence of corporatist bargaining across policy areas (Campbell 1989, p. 6). Moreover, although there are several patterns (the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, LDP, and Japan Medical Association being a politicized policy community), in general, Japan's policy communities are marked by the unusually pervasive power of the bureaucracy. In part because of this fragmentation, getting items onto the agenda requires an unusual degree of consensus in the policy community. In such a situation-high salience of policy communities, "bureaucratic primacy" within them, and the importance of consensus in pushing items onto the agenda-the bureaucracy has a strong incentive to back regulations that retard the formation of autonomous civil society groups.? Although Campbell was writing at a theoretical level, many ob-

CONCLUSION

servers of Japan's civil society might be forgiven for mistaking his general characterization of defensive subgovernments as an apt description of the attitude of Japanese ministries to civil society regulation: "A 'cozy little triangle' trying to hold onto its own can often rely on monopolizing information, manipulating procedures, delaying decisions, simple stubbornness and other means of passive resistance" (Campbell 1989, p. 93). Furthermore, the very fragmentation that engenders the importance of policy communities in Japan made a fundamental rewriting of the civil code unlikely. Meanwhile, Article 34's delegation of permitting along ministerial lines promotes interest groups and experts that are less capable of independent action, as well as creating firmer boundaries for policy communities. The regulatory framework also diminishes the likelihood of issue networks as described by Heclo (1978). Evidence from the JIGS survey supports this view of Japan by revealing organizations' patterns of lobbying and consulting with the government. Groups do lobby, but few of them (5.4 percent) target only political parties. The most common pattern was to lobby only the bureaucracy (38.2 percent)-even more common than lobbying both political parties and the bureaucracy. Citizens groups do not benefit from a policy community. Similarly, almost no citizens groups report being consulted by government ministries or agencies about policy; they are virtually shut out from working with the bureaucracy (Tsujinaka, Pekkanen, and Ohtomo 2005, p. 22). Only groups with full-time professional staff (which neighborhood associations, for example, cannot have) can develop an alternative expertise to participate in the policy community (Shimizu 2000). Another critical issue is independence. While no satisfactory metric for this exists, the regulatory framework for civil society groups in Japan, at least until the NPO law, included many institutional features that diminished the independence of civil society groups. In other words, it is hard for independent groups to grow large in Japan and hard for large groups to stay independent.

Regulatory Frameworks in Japan: Why No Change for So Long and So Much Change So Quickly Now? Until very recently, Japan made a poor case for investigating variation in the regulatory framework for civil society organizations because the country had not had any indigenous major change for a century. In the last few years, though, Japan has experienced a flurry of regulatory

Conclusion TABLE

6.

173

I

Legal changes in regulation of civil society in Japan Foundationallaws 1898 Civil Code Article 34 1923 Trust Law Article 66 (regulation of public charitable trusts) Occupational reforms Private School Law Article 3 1949 1950 Medical Legal Person Law Article 39 1951 Religious Corporation Law Article 4 1951 Social Welfare Law Article 22 Recent reforms 1991 Local Autonomy Law 260 (2) (neighborhood associations) 1998 NPO Law 2001 Fiscal Year 2001 Tax Reform 2001 Intermediary Legal Persons Law No. 49 2002 Amendment to Fiscal Year 2001 Tax Reform Current Discussion of Reform of Article 34 souRCE: Author's analysis.

changes, with more mooted for the near future. To mount a convincing argument about what determines the regulatory framework, we must have an explanation that can account for both the long stasis and the recent spate of changes. Table 6.r shows the major (and some minor) changes in the regulatory framework. What stands out immediately is the clustering of changes into two periods. One was during the U.S. occupation of Japan. We need look no further than the designs of the occupation forces to understand why regulatory changes occurred then. The second cluster of changes is more recent. In 1998 and 2oor, after nearly a half-century hiatus, two new classes of legal persons were created for civil society organizations. Although the NPO legal persons of 1998 were the first new class of legal persons ever created through indigenous legal changes, they were followed by another new class only three years later. In addition, tax benefits were given to civil society organizations (NPO legal persons) in 2oor and made more generous in 2002. Perhaps most important, a fundamental reform of Article 34 is currently being discussed (see Chapter 5 ). This series of changes constitutes a defining characteristic of the period after the third turning point, as discussed in the historical narrative above. But what can explain this as well as the earlier stasis? The answer is party politics, at least for the postwar period of stasis ( r 9 55-9 6} and the period of change (1996-present). Because of the limited number of changes (cases), process tracing, such as that presented in Chapter 5, is very valuable for understanding the

174

CONCLUSION

factors favoring or opposing legislative change. An analysis of the post1998 situation also reveals much about the relationships among the political parties, civil society organizations, and legislative change. Although the smaller, progressive parties were decisive for the NPO law, they were insignificant for later changes or for the mooted revision of Article 34· Instead, there are three important political parties for this discussion: the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Clean Government Party (CGP), and LDP. Let us examine them in turn before offering conclusions. The Democratic Party of Japan is the strongest advocate of these regulatory reforms. It inherited from the Japan Socialist Party close links with labor unions. The D PJ is also the successor of the small parties that pushed for the NPO law and is now the major opposition party in Japan. The DPJ has been active in supporting new civil society organizations as well, seeing them as natural allies. For example, the DPJ manifesto, which was issued with much ballyhoo in the run-up to the November 2003lower-house elections, contains a section on NPOs and their role in society. Specifically, the manifesto calls for a vast expansion of tax benefits to non profit organizations (actually, an increase of 48,ooo percent, to cover 6o percent of all NPOs), increasing to 2o,ooo the number of NPOs providing after-school care, and (rather more vaguely) using NPOs to lower unemployment. NPOs are also increasingly a training ground for DPJ Diet members and staffers. After the November 2003 election, 12 of the DPJ's 178-strong House of Representatives delegation had backgrounds in civil society organizations. This was a dramatic increase, and most (7 of the I 2) were firstterm Diet members, having won election that November. Three others were newly minted second-term Diet members. The development of NPOs as training grounds for DPJ politicians is new and has important implications for support within the DPJ for regulatory framework change. 8 Support for these groups also goes hand-in-glove with the DPJ's policy platform of shrinking the power of the bureaucrats. In other words, the DPJ seeks to empower civil society at the expense of the bureaucracy. Since the Clean Government Party's inception in 1967, it has been closely associated with the civil society organization that gave birth it, the lay Buddhist movement organization Soka Gakkai. It has also nurtured close links to welfare groups, in line with the CGP carving out the welfare space in the policy arena. The LDP's support for regulatory framework change requires more explanation than the support of the DPJ and CGP, given the record of the NPO law process. In fact, however, the LDP's interest in revising Article 34 and in liberalizing the regulatory framework in general stems directly from the incentives offered by the new electoral system (first used in the 1996 election). In short, the LDP has begun to look at NPOs as vote-collection

Conclusion

175

vehicles. Given the declining power of other organizations to deliver votes and the need for a plurality to win a single-member district, NPOs seem attractive-especially because their appeal is greatest among the independent voters who are increasingly crucial to winning elections (and hard for the LDP to reach through its traditional means). On March 30, 2004, the LDP subcommittee (senmon iinkai) on NPOs hosted a symposium as part of an increasing effort to round up the NPO vote for the LDP. The chairman, Yoshio Yatsu, conceded that it would be disingenuous to claim that the party was not hoping to gain votes with these tactics (Asahi shinbun, June 9, 2004). In March 2005, the LDP launched a barnstorming series of "town meetings" that included stops in Tokyo, Sendai, and Fukuoka. These meetings were attended by top LDP leaders, such as Secretary-General Shinzo Abe, and intended to strengthen ties with NPO leaders ("Jimin, NPO to iken kokan" [LDP and NPOs exchange views], Nihon keizai shinbun, April23, 2005 ). LDP politicians have long shown a tendency to favor groups as a means to win votes, of course, and they seem to instinctively regard NPOs in that light. 9 In any event, LDP support for the revision of Article 34 in particular and the regulatory framework in general stems, ultimately, from the newly competitive party system and district elections. In other words, it is tied to the competition with the DPJ both nationally and in plurality districts and abetted by the LDP's desire to target precisely the voters who support NPOs. It is also furthered by the LDP's continuing preference for utilizing groups to mobilize votes. The LDP's support for regulatory framework change is very much a product of politics after the 19 55 system, and it is very different from the LDP's earlier approach to civil society organizations. To recap, an explanation centered on political parties explains both the (postwar) lack of change in the regulatory framework and the current period of rapid reorientation. This trend toward change should accelerate as well. More pro-NPO legislation means more NPOs with more money. More NPOs with more money mean more incentives for lawmakers to push for pro-NPO legislation. The startling emergence of LDP Diet members mooting revision of Article 34 reveals this dynamic. The end point of this cycle remains to be seen, but the trajectory of Japan's civil society may have been changed forever. 10

Members without Advocates Recall the two strains of democratic and civil society theory touched on in Chapter r: social capital and pluralism. In Japan, social capital groups have been promoted, while pluralist interest groups have been

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CONCLUSION

60 50

c.,

u .... ~

40 30 20 10 0

0-4

5-9

10-29

30-99

100+

umber of employee

•Japan

-

US

FIGURE 6.2 Number of employees in advocacy groups m the United States and Japan by percentage. SOURCE: Calculated from data in Tsujinaka and Choe 2002b, p. 298; N 5 r,250 (Japan) and 659 (United States).

discouraged. This resulted in a situation of members without advocatesmany people belong to civil society groups, but few work for them. It could be that this phenomenon of members without advocates is of even greater concern to proponents of liberal democracy than that of "advocates without members" (Skocpol 1998). The direct elements of the state's effort seem to have been directed in this way partly out of a desire to capture the benefits of social capital civil society groups. At the same time, there is concern in the bureaucracy about groups with large professional staffs because it is precisely these groups that develop policy and informational expertise that could rival or undermine the bureaucracy. The structure of Japan's "dual civil society" has been detailed in this book. Chapter 2 in particular showed the weakness of Japan's professional advocacy sector. Figure 6.2 presents another way of looking at the size of Japan's professional civil society sector compared to that of the United States. This figure shows all groups engaging in advocacy activities, broken down by number of employees. Not only are more professionals working in civil society in the United States in total, but the average size of the groups is larger as well. Most groups in Japan engaged in advocacy activities are small, with four or fewer employees. U.S. groups are far more likely to have large staffs. Because civil society is frequently mentioned in debates about democracy, it is important to ask the question, what are the consequences of

Conclusion

I77

Japan's dual civil society for Japanese democracy? Japan's local civil society groups are significant in sustaining social capital and promoting efficient governance. However, its relatively small professional civil society means fewer voices from civil society are heard at the policy level. There are few civil society organizations with the independence and capability to monitor the state, publicize critical perspectives, or propose new policy ideas. Instead, the influence of the corporate sector and the state are relatively large. None of these conclusions will greatly surprise observers of Japan. Rather, this book attempts to contribute an explanation of why Japanese democracy seems muted to some and to show that this is not a cultural inevitability, but rather the outcome of a political process. Chapter 4 detailed how neighborhood associations (NHAs) perform a variety of functions (Table 4.I) and support governmental activities (Table 4.2). By their nature, NHAs are particularly well suited to engage in this kind of community building and government support. However, because they are constitutionally incapable of professionalized advocacy activities, the plethora of NHAs and social capital has not mitigated the advocacy deficit in Japan. One way to understand how ineffective Japanese civil society groups have been in influencing public debates is to compare Japan with the United States. The United States has seen the rise of new public interest advocacy groups, "political interest group[s] whose basis of organization is not built on the vocational or professional aspirations of [their] members or financial supporters" (Berry I998, p. 369). 11 Examples of these groups include AARP, the NRA, NOW, Public Citizen, Eagle Forum, and the Environmental Defense Fund. These groups sometimes offer selective benefits, but their main function is advocacy. Let me discuss an example from the newspaper headlines in July 2005, as I send this text to Stanford University Press. Recall the comparison between Japanese and American organizations for the elderly drawn in Chapter r. The policy debate over social security reform in the United States is still ongoing at the time I write this, but it is already clear that AARP has established itself as a major player in the policy-making process. This is no surprise, given the statistics enumerated in Chapter I and the vigorous AARP Public Policy Institute, created in I98 5 "to conduct objective, relevant, timely, and credible policy research and analysis" (AARP website, http://www.aarp .erg/research/ ppi/about_ppi.html, accessed July I 3, 2005 ). I myself subscribe to an electronic newsletter from AARP entitled the "AARP Policy and Research Update," which covers a wide range of policy and legislation beyond social security.U Japan's old people's clubs, with about the same proportionate membership as AARP, had no public voice in the debate on a major pension reform in 2003. 13 Berry argues that the success

CONCLUSION

of these advocacy groups "in mobilizing large numbers of supporters has worked to make our national interest group system more representative of the interest of the American population" (Berry 1998, p. 370). These groups require large professional staffs in order to be effective, and it is precisely this type of group that faces very stiff legal and practical hurdles in Japan. If the intent behind the Japanese framework was to prevent these groups from forming because of a fear that they would become influential in the policy-making process, evidence from the United States suggests that these fears were well grounded. In the United States, such advocacy groups are the most common type of interest group to be called for testimony at congressional hearings. 14 Moreover, these advocacy groups are mentioned in the media much more frequently than any other type of group. Advocacy groups receive 40 percent of the mentions of interest groups in the press, professional associations get 26 percent, and trade associations 2 3 percent; labor unions, veterans' organizations, churches, and other groups receive only 8 percent (Berry 1998, p. 387). Characterizing Japan's civil society as "members without advocates" highlights the fact that civil society groups have been ineffective as advocates. This is not to claim that some interest groups, such as Nokyo or the Japan Medical Association, have been powerless, but rather to stress the dearth of effective advocacy groups beyond a limited number of industry or professional groups. By and large, Japanese civil society groups do not figure prominently in public debates. For example, a sample of Asahi shinbun articles on politics or political issues in 2001 showed that nearly twice as many articles mentioned individual corporations by name as mentioned any civil society organization (author's data analysis). In other words, in public discussions of politics, corporations overshadow civil society groups. In the JIGS data as well, there is a correlation between staff size and the number of times a group is mentioned in the media. This is not the same thing as having research reported in the media, of course, but it is another indication of the relationship between size of professional staff and the visibility of a group or its ideas. Figure 6. 3 shows this relationship graphically. Small groups (o-4 staffers) get very little, if any, coverage. The overwhelming majority (76 percent) get only a handful of mentions (o -9 ), and only a minuscule number (less than I percent) claim over 50 mentions. Large groups (over 30 staffers), however, are typically featured more prominently. In the JIGS data, there is a positive correlation between number of employees and amount of media coverage (significant to level of p < o.oi) (author's data analysis).

Conclusion

179

80 70 60

....c 0)

::

50 40

0)

c..

30 20 10 0

0-9

10-19 20-49 50+ umber of times covered 0-4 staff -5-29 staff - 30+ staff

FIGURE 6.3 Media coverage of JIGS groups by staff size and number of times covered. SOURCE: JIGS

survey data set (author's data analysis); N

=

r,o92.

Furthermore, American advocacy groups effectively publicize their research through the mass media. Professional staff is essential for independent research. Groups have succeeded in becoming prominent in debates because of the development of this capability. American newspapers publicize research conducted by a variety of sources. Governmental research gets featured more frequently than any other research (30.6 percent of all research featured in newspapers). Advocacy groups are the second most prominent researchers in newspapers, though, with 19.4 percent of all media coverage. This outpaces even academe's 17.6 percent. Independent research institutions get 10.2 percent of the attention and corporations receive 9·3 percent, while think tanks must make do with only 5.6 percent (Berry 1998, p. 379 ). Because few Japanese organizations have professional staff capable of producing research, it is understandable that Japanese civil society groups are not as effective in gaining media attention for their views or their research. Figure 6.4 makes this point graphically. 15 Strikingly little of the research of Japan's civil society organizations is covered by the media, especially compared to the broad coverage that American civil society groups rece1ve.

r8o

CONCLUSION

45 40 35 30

c 25 "'~

~

20 15 10 5 0

Governmenr

Corporations -US

FIGURE

Academe -

Civil society

japan

6.4 Research in newspapers in Japan and the United States by

source. SOURCE: U.S. I99 5 data adapted from Berry 1998, p. 3 79· Japan data from author sample of Asahi

Shinbun and Nihon Keizai Shinbun

~oor-~002.

The government is by far the most significant producer of research that generates news in Japan (42 percent), with an even larger share than the U.S. government gets in American newspapers. Interestingly, academe rates about the same on both sides of the Pacific. The disjunctures are apparent in Japan's limited civil society organizational capability and prominent business voice. By shaping the rules of the game, states determine who can and cannot play (as well as develop policy expertise, etc.), and this affects policy outputs.16 The kind of public interest advocacy groups that is increasingly prominent in the United States is scarce in Japan, due in large measure to the regulatory framework. This scarcity means fewer of these groups are producing independent research and otherwise influencing the public discourse and specific policy debates. Japan's political institutions have created a situation in which civil society has difficulty finding a voice. The deck has been stacked so that few powerful, autonomous civil society organizations will ever exist and be in a position to enter the political fray. This is far different from saying that civil society organizations are suppressed or ignored when they enter the political fray. Although this does not necessarily mean that they are not powerful in shaping public opinion

Conclusion

r8r

or affecting policy outcomes, I do contend that this is the case (and much evidence supports this view). Consider policy debates on moral issues. In many countries, including the United States, civil society groups in the form of religious groups heavily influence the public debate on issues seen as having a moral dimension, such as abortion and euthanasia (Hardacre 1991 and 2003). This is not the case in Japan, despite the large number of religious groups (see Table 4.1 ). Another example is policy change on women's issues. Although essentially toothless, Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) of 1986 guaranteed gender equality in the workplace. Though one might have expected women's groups to have taken the lead in forcing this measure onto the policy agenda, in fact elements of the bureaucracy pushed the issue in order to bring Japan into compliance with the UN's antidiscrimination pledge, which was signed by Japan during 1975, the "Year of the Woman" (Pharr 1990; Upham 1987). For an environmental example, consider the sweeping package of antipollution measures that gave the 1971 Diet the label "the Pollution Diet." Although thousands of environmental groups sprang up between 1965 and 197 5 in Japan, they did not play a role in getting the antipollution measures on the agenda. These groups remained local and disaggregated (Pharr and Badaracco 1986; Upham 1987). Similarly, the bureaucracy, not Japanese environmental groups, took the lead in the passage of the Kyoto Accords (Reimann 2oora, 2oorb, 2oorc, 2002, and 2003). Japanese civil society groups have also been weak on issues ranging from whaling to human rights (fingerprinting of Korean residents, for example) (see Shipper 2002). The case of illegal foreign workers in Japan provides an excellent illustration of just how this works in practice and is worth discussing in detail. Shipper describes how activist civil society groups had, with some success, sought to influence public perception of foreigners in the r98os and early 1990s through the media. From 1983 to 2003, the five large national newspapers (Asahi, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Nihon keizai, and Sankei) carried r,21 r articles on the civil society organizations dedicated to assisting overstayed or illegal foreign workers in Japan. The emphasis in these media reports was on the individual stories and plight of these workers, portraying them sympathetically and the supporting civil society organizations as engaged in noble deeds. In short, the "spin" on illegal foreigner workers was driven largely by civil society organizations. Journalistic reports relied on the groups for information as well as the frame with which to interpret the complex social reality of the workers in Japanese society. However, the civil society groups had success only because they were operating briefly in a vacuum. In 1997, the National Police Agency (NPA) began a strategy of highlighting the crimes of foreigners. Two things about this strategy are

182

CONCLUSION

important to note. First, the strategy worked by presenting official statistics to the media. For example, the annual white paper by the police headlined crimes committed by foreigners. This was communicated almost directly (sometimes almost verbatim) through the media. Second, the statistics were presented in such a way as to maximize the impression that foreigner crime was on the rise. This was done with typical statistical skullduggery, abetted by a convenient tool: overstaying a visa was illegal per se, and this allowed the police to inflate the number of criminal foreigners. Despite lurid headlines warning of a tidal wave of violent crime by foreigners, the number of foreigners arrested for committing non-visarelated crimes actually decreased by about 5 percent each year from 1993 to 1998 (Shipper 2005, p. 306). In other words, the police strategy to portray foreigners as a dangerous and growing threat to Japanese public safety was not necessarily supported by their own data. However, the police strategy worked like a charm. Headlines screaming out "Foreigner Crimes Rise Again" took their toll on the public imagination and public discourse, shaping how Japanese came to view foreign workers and drowning out the very different message that civil society groups had laboriously spun out for the previous decade and a half. During the early 1990s, roughly two-thirds of Japanese were positive toward foreigners in public opinion surveys, but by the mid-r990s, support for crackdowns on illegal foreign workers had increased dramatically. At the same time, the Japanese view of foreigners began to darken. The percentage of Japanese who believed that foreigners would cause a deterioration in the safety and atmosphere of neighborhoods shot up, and the percentage saying that the rights of foreigners should be protected plummeted (Shipper 2005, p. 324). The government's message drowned out the contending message from civil society organizations and shaped public opinion dramatically. This is a well-documented example of the general argument presented previously. Japanese civil society organizations are, in general, bereft of sufficient resources to influence the public discourse and certainly are not able to do so against the resources of the state. As in Chapter r, I want to emphasize that I do not mean that civil society groups wield no influence on policy making, but rather that they have less influence than civil society organizations in other states. Numerous excellent case studies have discussed the influence of civil society organizations on some policy making (Aldrich 200 5; Chan-Tiberghien 2004; Peng 2004; Shipper 2oor). The distinction between comparative analysis and longitudinal analysis mentioned in Chapter r is relevant here. Japanese civil society organizations may wield more influence now than they did decades ago (see Pekkanen 2004a), but that does not mean they are influential compared to civil society organizations in other states. In fact, Japanese civil society organizations themselves seem to agree that

Conclusion they wield little influence in comparative perspective. The JIGS survey asked groups to report on their success in influencing (or changing) policy. Only 14.3 percent of the organizations reported such success. This percentage was lower than that in Korea, less than half of what German organizations reported (32.5 percent) in the German version of the JIGS survey, and a third of what Russian organizations reported (46.5 percent) in the Russian version of the JIGS survey. Japanese groups also reported little success (6. 5 percent) in blocking policies. Again, this was less than Korean groups (rr.r percent) and much less than the Russian (21.2 percent) and German (26.3) groups. At least in terms of groups' perception of their own success, Japanese groups do not have much influence over policy making in absolute or comparative terms. A possible rejoinder is that Japanese groups are not interested in public policy. This is inaccurate, as revealed by the JIGS survey, which has a question specifically on this issue. The question breaks down twenty-two areas of public policy and asks whether the group is interested in these policy areas: "Among national and local public policies, which policy or activity areas are you interested in?" Nearly all of the organizations responded that they are interested in at least one of the twenty-two public policy areas. Such a result demonstrates that all of these organizations (which were randomly selected and thus do not include only the largest groups) have an interest in public policy. This implies that civil society organizations in general have an interest in public policy, but certainly Japanese civil society organizations are interested in public policy (Tsujinaka, Pekkanen, and Ohtomo 2005, p. 12). Another question in the JIGS survey asked organizations to report their evaluations of other actors' influence over policy. Specifically, it asked, "How much influence do the groups listed below have on Japanese politics? Please rate on a scale of I to 7 (7 being the strongest)." Although this necessarily relies on perceptions rather than some "objective" measure of real influence, these groups are often intimately involved in the policymaking process and have a good sense of where the real power and influence lies. In a sense, this also replicates interviews done in case studies in which researchers ask about who has influence, but on a much broader scale. From the results, it is possible to rank which groups the JIGS organizations feel are the most powerful in Japan and to compare these rankings with similar ones from the JIGS surveys in Korea, Germany, and the United States. The central bureaucracy is perceived as the most powerful entity in Japan, with an average score of 6.32 out of 7· The bureaucracy's only real rivals are political parties (6.12). Women's groups are perceived as weakest (3.42), barely exceeded by the category of "NGOs/ citizens groups/residents movement groups" (3.48) and welfare groups (3.49). Foreign governments are seen as powerful (5 .18), at nearly the level

CONCLUSION

of some significant domestic players, such as agricultural groups ( 5 .22), the mass media (5.32), big corporations (5.38), and economic groups and managers (5.65) (Tsujinaka, Pekkanen, and Ohtomo 2005, p. 24). These rankings are interesting in themselves because they reflect the JIGS organizations' view of the world. However, they are also interesting in comparative perspective. Compared to the other three countries mentioned above, the bureaucracy, agricultural organizations, foreign governments, international organizations, and foreign interest groups are ranked much higher in Japan. Local government was ranked only slightly higher in Japan than in the other three countries. Mass media, labor organizations, consumer groups, NGOs, civil organizations, and citizens' movement organizations were ranked lower in Japan compared to the other three countries. Women's organizations and academics ranked slightly lower or about the same. Political parties, economic and business organizations, big firms, and social welfare organizations in Japan were ranked at similar positions as in the other three countries. This relative perception of influence is not conclusive by itself, of course, but it is very much in line with the other evidence presented here.

Conclusion Since the framing of the civil code over a century ago, the Japanese regulatory framework for civil society has promoted the creation of many small local groups, most notably the neighborhood associations, and few large professional groups. Even within professionalized groups, certain sectors are promoted over others. The political institutional hypothesis advanced in Chapter r is the best explanation for this pattern and thus is of enormous importance for students of civil society. Regulatory frameworks vary across countries, and some preliminary reasons for this were advanced previously. Regulatory frameworks also vary over time, even in the same country. The institutions created at the end of the nineteenth century perpetuated their own logic, which meant few large professional groups, which in turn diminished the number of potential lobbyists for a more liberal regulatory framework. After a century, the first major change to this regulatory framework came about in the form of the 1998 NPO Law. The future will likely hold elements of change and continuity, both in good measure. The 1998 NPO Law, 2oor Intermediary Legal Persons Law, and 2oor and 2002 tax reforms are part of self-perpetuating changes that will alter the regulatory framework in Japan. Changes in the political party system and electoral system lie at the root of this progression. By 2004, there were already r 6,ooo new NPO legal persons in Japan -this in itself

Conclusion is evidence of the importance of liberalizing regulations for the growth of civil society in Japan and thus by extension the importance of regulatory frameworks in shaping civil society. However, unless entrenched attitudes regarding the importance of the state in defining the public and the prominence of bureaucrats in the political economy change, administrative guidance and restrictive interpretation of statutes will also continue to be a feature of the regulatory framework. More than anything else, the Japanese case displays the fundamental importance of states in shaping the development of civil society. The state-civil society relationship cannot be perceived in simplistic appositional terms; instead, we must view the relationship in its complexity. State and civil society act on each other and shape each other over time. Japan's political institutions in the late nineteenth century left a profound legacy of an underprofessionalized civil society. In the twentieth century, political actors, mainly the bureaucracy, promoted local, small-scale civil society groups to facilitate efficient governance. Even at the end of the century, however, civil society groups were ill-equipped to effectively shape public discourse, leaving Japan's large number of civil society members without effective advocates. Japan's civil society remains characterized by a dual structure that was created largely by the influence of political institutions. In recent works, both Putnam and Skocpol concur with Berry's empirical findings on the growth of advocacy groups. However, neither shares any sense of optimism about this development (Putnam 2ooo; Skocpol 1998). For Putnam, the issue is acute because it comes in counterpoint to the atrophy of civic engagement. He cautions that the "vigor of the new Washington- based organizations ... is an unreliable guide to the vitality of social connectedness and civic engagement in American communities" (Putnam 2ooo, p. 52). In this context, he cites the example of how Greenpeace used aggressive direct-mail solicitations to ascend to the position of the largest environmental group in the United States in 1990 and then scaled back on these techniques. By 1998, Greenpeace membership had plummeted 8 5 percent (Putnam 2ooo, p. 53). Putnam argues that civic engagement through participation in associations supports democracy by inculcating democratic habits, by serving as forums for deliberation over public issues, and by instilling civic virtues, such as active participation in public life. However, Putnam contends that advocacy groups in which members do not participate, but simply write a check, do not constitute civic engagement as does active participation in civic or other groups. In other words, membership without participation in an advocacy group does not sustain democracy per se. He goes further, however, in arguing that this lack of participation might in fact undermine democracy. Putnam

!86

CONCLUSION

admits that members might get more "bang for the buck" from advocacy groups. Writing a check to a group such as the NAACP might be a time-efficient way to advance an individual's political agenda and more effective in that sense than the individual's own participation in a civic group. However, the explosion of advocacy groups in Washington fails to nurture many desirable traits. Putnam cautions that "Americans at the political poles are more engaged in civic life, whereas moderates have tended to drop out" (Putnam 2ooo, p. 342). The civic disengagement of moderates is a terrible price to pay, and it could lead to ever more highly polarized debates without compromises. Skocpol also notes the proliferation of Washington-based advocacy groups. Coupled with the decline of large cross-class voluntary associations, she terms this development "advocates without members" (Skocpol 1998). Like Putnam, she sees a number of troubling consequences. For one thing, people from privileged backgrounds often interacted with those from humbler circumstances as they rose in these organizations. This interaction has been short-circuited by the new model of organization building. Even more troubling, this decline "magnifies polarized voices" in politics. Advocacy groups need visibility, and clashes with sharply opposed groups are good fodder for media coverage. Foundations, moreover, are active in promoting groups that are clearly on one side or the other of divisive issues. Almost before U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor completed her retirement announcement, civil society organizations on both sides of the spectrum weighed in on the issue of her successor (as I write this no one has yet been nominated). Although judicial appointments in Japan are even more politicized than in the United States, no similar outcry accompanies outgoing judges in the archipelago. Skocpol seems to share Putnam's misgivings that the proliferation of advocacy groups means that the middle is dropping out of American politics. What, then, are we to make of Japan? Long viewed as a poor imitation of America's powerful civil society, should we embrace the idea that Japan has gotten it right? Observers of the United States have bemoaned the rise of special interest groups at the same time that they have waxed effusive on the benefits of social capital. A comparison with Japan can shed valuable light on this point. Looking at Japan, some critics of the United States might say that too little of a good thing can be even worse than too much. Other observers might find the state of Japan in civil society to be salutary, regarding this as precisely the way democracy ought to be promoted-for social capital and not for pluralism. In Japan, the polarization of political debate feared by Skocpol and Putnam alike is not a menace. The dearth of advocacy groups avoids the troublesome

Conclusion consequences of the American proliferation of such groups, and neighborhood associations enhance Japanese governmental performance. Instead of a powerful AARP-like group to influence the policy-making process, Japan's elderly are organized into many small, local old people's clubs, which sustain social capital (as argued in Chapter 5) but not advocacy. Japan lacks AARP, but has NHAs and elderly people's clubs that are in short supply in the United States. One might argue that Japan avoids a cacophonous and destructive polarization, although perhaps at the cost of silence from some members of the choir. However, weighing matters in this way raises different questions. Which configuration of groups serves their members, and the polity, better? Far from seeing Japan as a case of stunted development, must we now ponder whether Japan has in fact gotten civil society right?

Reference Matter

Appendix: Data Sets JIGS DATA SETS

Analysis of the Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS) data set is used in this book. The Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups, consisting of a team of six researchers led by Yutaka Tsujinaka and based at University of Tsukuba in Japan, collected the JIGS data. The team conducted an extensive survey of more than 1,6oo associations in Tokyo and Ibaraki Prefecture in 1997, involving 36 questions and 260 subquestions. Assisted by Japan-based experts and local collaborators, the team has also conducted similar surveys in the United States, South Korea, Germany, and China. The team utilized random sampling of telephone book directories (in Japan, the Nippon Telephone and Telecommunications [NTT] telephone book). Not all groups necessarily have their own telephone line, but this allows the team to also sample groups without legal status. Thus, the JIGS data are more comprehensive than government data and catch many groups that would otherwise be uncounted. The population of the survey consisted of 23,128 organizations listed in the "unions and associations" section of the Tokyo 1997 and Ibaraki 1997 editions of the NTT Town Page (shokugyoubetsu denwachou). There were 21,366 organizations listed in Tokyo and 1,762 in Ibaraki Prefecture. The JIGS team employed random sampling and used the postal service to send out questionnaires. Mailed questionnaires hold several advantages. For one thing, the cost is relatively low compared to other means of gathering data from organizations. In addition, using such a method allowed the team to broaden the sample size far beyond what they could do with detailed case studies or even interviews; using these questionnaires, they were able to conduct large-N research. One of the prime disadvantages to mailing survey questionnaires is that the rate of response can be so low as to call the results into question. However, the JIGS survey enjoyed

Appendix

I92

TABLE A.I

Distribution of types of groups by percentage-area of predominant interest based on NTT phonebook classification (chosen by the phone number's owner) Type of group Unions and associations Academic & cultural Fishermen's cooperatives Economic (business, trade) Social welfare Religious Politics Agricultural cooperatives Forestry & fishery Labor Real number

Population: Tokyo

Population: Ibaraki

Surveyed: Tokyo

Surveyed: Ibaraki

Valid response: Tokyo

Valid response: Ibaraki

42.8

33.0

42.0

29.4

44.2

27.9

14.9

2.4

14.4

3.1

14.1

4.1

0.3

2.6

0.6

3.1

0.3

3.0

20.0

15.2

19.5

12.6

19.4

14.7

3.8 2.0 3.0 1.0

1.9 4.0 3.2 12.2

4.6 2.0 2.9 1.4

2.6 3.1 3.7 18.6

7.0 1.3

3.0 1.0 3.0 15.2

3.1

15.1

3.2

13.1

2.4

17.3

9.0 21,366

10.4 1,762

9.5 3,866

10.5 381

8.4 1,438

10.7 197

1.1

1.8

souRCE: Tsujinaka, Pekkanen, and Ohtomo 2005.

a very high return rate (40 percent on average) and a very high response rate (more than 70 percent). In this survey, the team sent questionnaires to 4,247 organizations (3,866 in Tokyo and 38I in Ibaraki) and received I,638 returns (I,438 from Tokyo and I97 from Ibaraki). The head of the organization or the person in charge of administrative matters usually answered the questionnaire. The valid return rate was 37.2 percent in Tokyo and 5 I. 7 percent in Ibaraki. The team received responses from groups that make up 6.7 percent of all groups listed in telephone directory in Tokyo and II.2 percent in Ibaraki. These are quite large samples. It is important to note that the survey includes economic interest groups that are not considered part of civil society in this book. However, the data are detailed enough to separate out such groups. Table A. I shows the breakdown of the JIGS groups. Tsujinaka has led surveys similar to JIGS in several other countries: Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Russia, Turkey, and the Philippines during the I997-2005 period. These are occasionally referenced in this book. For maximum comparability, the surveys were all similar in format and methodology to the JIGS survey. Naturally, the surveys were

Appendix

193

also tailored somewhat to local conditions where necessary, and response rates and patterns varied across countries. GEPON DATA SETS

The GEPON data sets are surveys of environmental policy-making actors in Japan, Korea, Germany, and the United States. I conducted data analysis only on the Japan and U.S. data sets. Of 129 groups surveyed in May and June 1997, 103 responded to the survey instrument. The actors surveyed included noncivil society organizations, but these were excluded from my analysis. I am grateful to Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka for generously sharing these data sets with me. The remaining tables (Tables A.2 through A.4) provide supplementary evidence for Chapter 5.

Appendix

194

TABLE A.2

Chronology of NPO law events 1994 Early 1994 March 26 November 5 November 29 December 12 December 16 1995 January 17 January 27 February 3 February 8 February 15 February 24 February 28 March 1 March 8 March 15 March 17 March April26 May24

June 27 June 28 September 5 September 26

October 31

Study group on reform of NPO law formed in Japan New Party NIRA publishes "Research Report on the Support System for Citizens' Public-Interest Activities," suggesting revision of Article 34 C's: Association to make a system to support citizens activities formed EPA forms 14th National Lifestyle Shingikai General Policy Committee and publishes "Individual's Independence and Social Participation" Sakigake releases "Nonprofit Sector Research Group Report" Oiso report Hanshin earthquake occurs; volunteer groups active in relief work Chief cabinet secretary says in the House of Representatives Budget Committee that there is intention to write laws to support volunteers 18 concerned ministries and agencies form the "Related Ministries and Agencies Interagency Group for Volunteer" (Interagency Group, or IAG) C's presents prime minister with document regarding set up of new "volunteer law" Governing parties form NPO Project Team and hold first meeting NPO Research Forum releases "Statement Regarding the Reform of the NPO System" Governing parties NPO Project Team convenes first hearing NIRA presents "Request for a Supra-party Approach to the Legal Status of Citizens Groups" to all political parties New Frontier Party submits "Fundamental Volunteer Law" to the Diet C's presents "Proposals Regarding the Two Laws for Promotion of Citizens Activities" Free Human Rights Association presents "Proposal for the Revision of the Public Interest Group Contribution Tax System" New Frontier Party forms NPO Partners IAG holds hearing with three citizens groups (NPO Research Forum, C's, Group to Think about the Basic Infrastructure for Citizens Public Interest Activities) National Social Welfare Association's National Volunteer Activities Promotion Center publishes "Proposal Regarding Support for Volunteer Activities" New Frontier Party announces "Draft Law for Granting Legal Status to Groups Performing Citizens Public Interest Activities" Governing parties NPO Project Team holds second hearing (7 groups) and announces agreement on NPO draft law LDP presents the "Outline of Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" (Kumashiro Akihiko's draft law) to the NPO Project Team Social Democratic Party presents "Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Status to Citizens Activities Groups" and Sakigake presents "Citizens Activities Legal Person Draft Law" (Domoto's draft law) to the NPO Project Team Sakigake publishes "Sakigake's Citizens Activities Legal Person Draft Law"

Appendix TABLE A. 2

November 7 November 8 November 10 November 17 December 14 December 15 1996 January 8 January 11 February 1 February 6 February 8 February 15 February 24 March2 April3 April11 April24 May 31 June 4 June 6 June 11 June 18 June 19 September 19 September 28 September 2 7

November 29 December 16

195

(Continued)

New Frontier Party submits "Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Person Status to Groups Performing Citizens Public Interest Activities" to Diet Economic Planning Agency (EPA) presents to the "Related Ministries lnteragency Group Interim Report" chief cabinet secretary EPA's "Related Ministries lnteragency Group Interim Report" is shelved by chief cabinet secretary Governing parties NPO Project Team presents new consensus draft Governing parties Policy Coordination Group agrees to NPO Project Team's "Draft for Law Promoting Citizens Activities" with one part pending Japan Federation of Lawyers presents its "Proposal Regarding Legal System Regarding Citizens Activities Groups" Governing parties state that they will "aim for passage by Dietman's legislation during the next Diet session" of the "Three Parties Policy Agreement about Granting Legal Person Status" Hashimoto becomes prime minister NPO Project Team agrees on "Governing Parties NPO Confirmed Matters" C's presents the governing parties with "Request Regarding Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" Sakigake proposes "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities (provisional name)" Governing parties NPO Project Team holds third hearing (6 groups) "Open Forum: The NPO Law and Local Government's Role" held by citizens groups in Tokyo "Open Forum: The NPO Law and Civil Society" held by citizens groups in Osaka LDP presents amended draft to NPO Project Team NPO Project Team meets again. Sakigake and the SDP oppose the LDP's amended draft. Process grinds to a halt NFP convenes "Meeting to Exchange Opinions on the NPO Law" NFP submits "Draft Law to Amend One Part of Legal Person Tax Law" to Diet NPO Project Team fails to coordinate views. Debate moves to level of those with policy responsibility. The SDP presents its draft law. LDP announces its "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" JCP announces its "Outline of Non Profit Legal Person" House of Representatives Finance Committee rejects continued discussion on the NFP's "Draft Law to Amend One Part of Legal Person Tax Law," which is scrapped 136th Ordinary Session of the Diet ends Meeting of governing parties policy makers formulates "Agreement on Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities (NPO Law)" Democratic Party of Japan forms 137th Extraordinary Session of the Diet convenes. Diet is dissolved. NFP's "Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Person Status to Groups Performing Citizens Public Interest Activities" is scrapped. NFP resubmits draft law to the Extraordinary Session Governing parties submit "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" to the Diet (continued)

Appendix TA B LE A • 2

1997 February 6 March 14 May22 May28 June 5 June 6 June 18 September 29 October November 28 December 1 December 12 1998 January 12 March 3 March4 March 19 sOURCE:

(Continued)

DPJ Policy Coordinating Committee approves "DPJ Thinking on the (Governing Parties) NPO Draft Law" JCP submits the "Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Person Status to Nonprofit Groups" Governing parties and the DPJ agree on joint amendment to the "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" House of Representatives Cabinet Committee begins discussion on draft laws of the governing parties, NFP, and JCP House of Representatives Cabinet Committee approves "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" Plenary Session of House of Representatives approves "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" and sends it to the House of Councilors 140th Ordinary Session of the Diet closes. "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" is continued for consideration. 141st Ordinary Session of the Diet opens Rengo cosponsors citizens hearings in support of the NPO law Parliamentary Strategy Committee of LDP's House of Councilors revises "Draft Law for Promotion of Citizens Activities" and renames it "Law for Promotion of Special Nonprofit Activities" Kato Koichi testifies in the Diet on LDP's determination to pass the NPO law 141st Ordinary Session of the Diet closes 142nd Ordinary Session of the Diet opens "Law for Promotion of Special Nonprofit Activities" unanimously passes House of Councilors Labor and Social Policy Committee "Law for Promotion of Special Nonprofit Activities" passes House of Councilors 217-2 "Law for Promotion of Special Nonprofit Activities" passes House of Representatives

Author's analysis.

Appendix

197

TABLE A.3

NPO law players The players Political parties Coalition NPO Team

Sakigake

Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP)

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) backbenchers

LDP: Kumashiro Akihiko LDP leadership: Kato Koichi and Yamazaki Taku LDP: PARC's Commerce and Industry Division Governing parties Coordinating Council

LDP House of Councilors

Their positions and roles for the NPO law From its formation in February 1995 (except a period from June to September 1996 when decisions were made at the party leadership level), the NPO Project Team was the locus of the three governing parties' debate on the NPO law. Key players were Kumashiro Akihiko (LDP), Domoto Akiko (Sakigake), and Tsujimoto Kiyomi (SDP). Position: Many groups should be able to form under an NPO law, with minimal bureaucratic supervision. A very small party in the governing coalition (13 members, 1993-96), Sakigake saw NPOs as an important part of its political base. The Sakigake effort on the NPO law was spearheaded by Domoto Akiko. Position: Many groups should be able to form under an NPO law, with minimal bureaucratic supervision. A junior partner in the LDP-SDP-Sakigake alliance, the SDP had been the socialist opposition during the LDP's 38-year monopoly on power (1955-93). The Hanshin earthquake occurred while the SDP held the prime ministership, and comments in the Diet by PM Murayama and Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi committed the government to NPO legislation. Position: Favored heavy bureaucratic supervisory powers, opposed tax benefits, and wanted most new groups to be volunteer-based. Unenthusiastic about a new law. By far the largest party in the Diet, but short of a majority during the coalition period with the SDP and Sakigake. Most LDP members saw NPOs as threats or as "antigovernment" or "anti-LDP" groups. Although eventually futile, LDP backbenchers forced Kumashiro to recant his liberalization in April1996. Position: Initially very conservative, becoming moderate-progressive by end of 1995. Position: Moderate. Mostly interested in brokering a compromise, as these two leaders supported the current governing coalition. Position: Favored heavy bureaucratic supervisory powers, opposed tax benefits, and wanted most new groups to be volunteer-based. Unenthusiastic about a new law. Not interested so much in the NPO law per se as in maintaining the coalition. To that end, brokered compromises between the LDP and coalition partners. The latter were both much more interested in passing an NPO law and in a liberal law. Position: Conservative. Disliked term "citizens groups." Also concerned with being taken for granted by House of Representatives (the lower and more powerful house). (continued)

Appendix TAB LE A.

3

(Continued)

The players

Their positions and roles for the NPO law

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)

Position: Similar to SDP and Sakigake. A liberal party formed before the 1996 elections. By 1998, the second largest party. In early 1997, the DPJ received liberalizing revisions of the governing parties draft in return for legislative support on other issues. Position: Moderate. NFP was the largest opposition party until it splintered into several smaller parties in 1997. Submitted Dietman's legislation on a new NPO law to the Diet several times. NFP was also marginalized in the NPO law-making process. Rather than being an important policy plank for NFP, the interest in the NPO law came mostly from an individual Dietman, Kawamura Takashi. Position: Wanted almost any group to be able to form, with tax benefits and free from bureaucratic supervision. A small opposition party. Repeatedly sent to the Diet a draft law to establish a new category of nonprofit legal persons. However, JCP was marginalized in the NPO law-making process. One of the splinter groups formed after the breakup of the NFP. Mostly concerned with eliminating restrictions on political activities of NPOs. One of the splinter groups formed after the breakup of the NFP. Komei is associated with Soka Gakkai, a vast lay Buddhist organization. Komei was mostly concerned with eliminating restrictions on religious activities of NPOs.

New Frontier Party (NFP)

Japan Communist Party (JCP)

Liberal Party Komei

Bureaucracy Economic Planning Agency (EPA)

Related Ministries Interagency Group for the Volunteer Issue (Interagency Group, or IAG) Prefectural governments MOF

Position: Limited number of groups, primarily volunteer groups, should qualify under an NPO law. No tax bene fits should be given. Bureaucratic supervision should be maintained. Took the early lead on NPO legislation among the bureaucracy, but its influence was dealt a severe blow by shelving of its November 1995 report and by the parties' decision to pursue the NPO law through a DM bill. Position: Similar to EPA, which dominated the IAG. Published an interim report in November 1995. Soon thereafter this committee was ousted from the NPO law-making process by the actions of legislators and Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi. Position: Varied from quite liberal (Kanagawa and Kouchi) to conservative. Mostly passive, waiting for the national legislature to pass a law. Position: Very conservative. However, mostly concerned that any new groups formed were not accorded any tax privileges. MOF was able to prevent any tax privileges from being accorded.

Appendix TAB LE A.

The players Interest groups Citizens groups: C's

Keidanren Media Media: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Media: Asahi Shinbun Media: other souRCE: Author's analysis.

3

199

(Continued)

Their positions and roles for the NPO law Position: Ideally, wanted as many groups to be able to form as possible, with tax benefits and free from bureaucratic supervision. Spearheaded lobbying efforts of citizens groups. Position: Liberal. Social Affairs Bureau of Keidanren actively pushed for a liberal law. Position: Liberal. Pushed for an NPO law as part of administrative reform. Position: Very liberal. Pushed for an NPO law as part of strengthening citizen participation. Position: Liberal.

TABLE A.4

Comparison of key points of various NPO law drafts

EPA 11/95

Definition of new legal persons

Type of groups expected to form

Groups "engaged mainly in volunteer activities"

Volunteer groups (few groups)

LDP

Sakigake (10/95)

(Few groups)

Nonprofit groups with open membership

SDP

12/14/95 Governing parties agreement

Citizen-led nonprofit social participation groups

Permitting standard* and permitting body

Ninka: The prefecture if the operations of the NPO are within one prefecture; agency to be named later if the activities extend to two or more prefectures Ninka: bureaucracy

Nonprofit groups (almost any non profit group)

Todokede: Citizens Activities Promotion Committee

Nonprofit groups (almost any nonprofit group) (Many new citizens groups)

Todokede: Bureaucracy

Ninshou: Unspecified agency

Rules on supervision

Body holding power of dissolution

By permitting agency. Heavy bureaucratic supervision permitted.

Permitting agency

By permitting agency. Heavy bureaucratic supervision permitted. Citizens Activities Promotion Cornmittee. No bureaucratic supervision. Information disclosure requirements. By permitting agency. Minimal bureaucratic supervision.

Permitting agency

By permitting agency. Reduced or minimal bureaucratic superVISIOn.

Courts

Courts

Permitting agency

4/11/96 LDP revisions

Groups contributing to the public interest, and not taking in income above costs for any activities performed

(Limited number of new groups)

Ninshou (This interpretation of ninshou is more conservative, however.): The prefecture if the operations of the NPO are within one prefecture; agency to be named later if the activities extend to two or more prefectures

By permitting agency. Heavy bureaucratic supervision.

Permitting agency

12/16/96 Governing party's NPO draft law

"Independent citizens', nonprofit social participation activities"

Lists 12 categories. Does not inelude coordinating groups. (many groups)

Ninshou: The prefecture if the operations of the NPO are within one prefecture; EPA if the activities extend to two or more prefectures

Permitting agency

Tries to broaden the 12 categories

Ninshou: Accepts jurisdiction of 12/96 draft, but reduces bureaucratic discretion over permitting criteria

By permitting agency. Investigations permitted only on "substantial" grounds. Minimal bureaucratic supervision. By permitting agency. Investigations permitted only on "substantial" grounds. Minimal bureaucratic supervision. Requires clarification of reasons for investigation.

DPJ: 2/97 revisions of 12/96 governing parties draft

Permitting agency

(continued)

TAB LE A.

5/22/97 Governing parties NPO draft law (amended by DPJ)

Definition of new legal persons

Type of groups expected to form

Groups that are nonprofit and for whom the majority of their activities fall into one of 12 categories qualified by definition the group.

Lists 12 categories. More inclusive than 12/96 draft in categories and in requirements for directors of accompanied by precise includes Coordinating groups. (many groups)

4

(Continued)

Permitting standard* and permitting body

Ninshou: The prefecture if the operations of the NPO are within one prefecture; EPA if the activities extend to two or more prefectures. Minimal discretion. Decisions not to grant ninshou must be explanation. Threemonth time limit to decide on applications.

Rules on supervision By permitting agency. Investigations permitted only on "substantial" grounds. Minimal bureaucratic superVISIOn.

Body holding power of dissolution Permitting agency

NFP

]CP

SOURCE:

Citizens groups with half their members living within the same prefecture and with most of their activities in the same prefecture Nonprofit legal person

Geographically restricted. Lists 5 group categories (quite a few groups).

Ninka: By prefectural governor. Groups submit forms drafted by competent central agency or ministry.

By permitting prefecture

Permitting agency

Any nonprofit group

Todokede: Prefectural Nonprofit Legal Person Committee, appointed by governor, but 2/3 of members must be appointed at recommendation of NPOs

Prefectural Nonprofit Legal Person Committee

Courts

Party and government documents.

*In ascending order of strictness, permitting standards are registration, notification, certification, approval, and permission (see Table 3.2).

Notes CHAPTER I

r. Personal interview, Bungaku Watanabe, TOPIC, November 22, 1996, Tokyo. 2. I thank Simon Avenell for introducing me to the term "ice age." Of course, ice age does not mean extinction, and some groups continued to form and remained active (see Maclachlan 2002). 3· The exclusion of labor unions and other market organizations is consistent with my definition of civil society. See also theorists Cohen and Arato (1992) who likewise exclude market organizations. However, the inclusion of economic associations would only strengthen the arguments made in this book. For example, the importance of the legal context for labor organization is well documented in the United States. Including economic organizations in Japan would change the picture of]apanese civil society from a "dual structure" to a "triple structure": many small local groups, large business groups, and a paucity of other large professionalized groups. Because of the widely researched support that the Japanese government has shown to economic associations, this triple pattern would perhaps even more clearly support the arguments made here (Samuels 1987; Tsujinaka 2003). In short, while I have excluded economic groups from this analysis to maintain definitional consistency, their inclusion would only provide additional evidence in favor of my central argument. 4· There are similarities, however, with a proponent of the "public sphere," Juergen Habermas, who writes, "The institutional core of civil society is constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and the economy and ranging from churches, cultural associations, and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned citizens, and grassroots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political parties, labor unions and 'alternative institutions'" (Habermas I 989, p. 20 5). Alagappa (2004a) also provides an excellent discussion of the relationship between the organizational and public sphere perspectives on civil society. 5. Local groups are understudied not only in Japan, but also in the United States. David Horton Smith takes American researchers to task for focusing on

206

Notes to Chapter

I

the nonprofit organizations for which there are good data and seeing only the tip of the iceberg (Smith I994, I997a, I997b, and 2000). 6. However, some multinational surveys such as the World Values Survey show Japan to be low in organizational membership. Other multinational comparisons paint a different picture (see Table 2.3 and Chapter 2). Flatly put, data from within Japan contradict the World Values Survey data and the picture that the data paint. For example, up to 70 percent of Japanese participate in a single type of group alone, the neighborhood associations, as detailed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.I and Chapter 4, pp. 125-I27). 7· Telephone interview, Karen Stewart, AARP Staff, AARP, July 3 I, 2000. 8. In fact, although the comparison between AARP in the United States and Japan's many small local groups of seniors is more apt in terms of scale, it is fascinating to note that there is an advocacy group in Japan dedicated to seniors' issues. The group is the nenrei sabetsu o nakusukai ("group to eliminate ageism"-an NPO legal person in Yokohama). The group explicitly aspires to become a "Japanese version of the AARP." However, it is still a typical]apanese advocacy group, as discussed in Chapter 2-meaning that there is little organization beyond its energetic director, Nobuyuki Kanematsu. 9· Volunteers as a percentage of the population are lower in Japan than in the United States but are still a high percentage-26.9 percent in Japan in I996 versus 48.8 percent in the United States in I995 (Yamauchi I999, p. 59). It is not the level of volunteering that is the issue, but professional staff. IO. Hiroko Shimizu demonstrates the distinction and importance of paid staff versus volunteers. She argues that compared with the United States, few Japanese organizations have paid staff, yet these are crucial to the development of organizational capacity in the nonprofit sector and cannot be replaced by volunteers at the organizational level (Shimizu 2000). See also the work of Jeffrey M. Berry, whose research indicates a correlation between the size of professional staffs in (nonprofessional-based) advocacy groups and their political influence (measured in terms of citations in news media, appearances to testify before Congress, and the citations of research produced by these groups as authoritative) (Berry I998). I I. I am indebted to John Camp bell for this observation. See also Skocpol's argument distinguishing advocacy and membership dimensions of voluntary associations (Skocpol I998). I2. Another contention is that because civil society did not develop indigenously in Japan, it cannot exist there now. With refinement, this argument contends that we cannot expect to see the "public sphere" take the same shape in Japan as in the West. While New Englanders have town meetings, Japanese have public baths. It is a mistake to look for isomorphism; rather, functional equivalents should be sought. There remains suspicion of using the concept of civil society, fearing that it may be too bound up in Western conceptualization to be useful or accurate in a foreign milieu (Callaghy I994). It is sound to admonish not to look for Western groups in a nation and, not finding them, to proclaim the nation bereft of civil society. By analogy, however, democracy did not develop indigenously in many places, and yet it exists in Japan, India, and Germany. The concept is alien yet can be useful in studying the polities of these nations and in comparing these polities

Notes to Chapter

I

207

with others that share certain characteristics. Of course, history matters, in that historical legacies partially determine the nature of the democracies in these countries. The geographic site of the Industrial Revolution does not preclude industrial development in other nations, although the timing and context of this development may affect the outcome. In the same way, it is immaterial that civil society as a concept or as an empirical reality developed in the West. Civil society organizations can be observed and measured in other parts of the globe. Of course, cultural predispositions may have altered the trajectory of the development of civil society and we may have to look for different types of groups or associational activity, but this is a matter for empirical investigation, not assumption. Alagappa provides convincing arguments about the applicability of civil society not just to Japan but broadly in Asia. As he remarks, "Throughout much of Asia, organizations and individuals, self-consciously identifying themselves as belonging to civil society, seek to affect the identity and structure of their respective states, as well as government policy on such matters of political and civil rights, minority and women's rights, the environment and socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, considerations relating to civil society figure in the calculations of the political elite .... [However,] civil society's meaning, nature, and composition will vary with circumstances, not only across countries, but also over time in a country. This assumption is not peculiar to Asia" (Alagappa 2004a, p. 15 ). 13. Upham (1987) meticulously documents the importance of the legal framework in a number of social realms. My own work is considerably in sympathy with his overall approach to the study of law in society, as well as with his conclusions about the way law has structured social conflict (for me, civil society) in Japan. 14. To say that the definition and procedures are straightforward does not mean that the tax treatment of nonprofit organizations in the United States should be seen as unproblematic. The law makes careful distinctions among the classes of nonprofit organizations-there are dozens of different "types" of nonprofits. The most numerous are 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, which receive extensive tax breaks but have constraints on political activities. I elide this discussion because the point here is the distinction between "nonprofit" and "public interest." However, it is relevant to the point at hand that tax treatment in the United States could also become politicized. Berry and Arons (2003) go so far as to argue that 501(c)(3) groups are unjustly hampered by restrictions on their political activities. During the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign, the status of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its political endorsements hit the news when critics accused the government of attempting to intimidate the NAACP because of its support for Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry. The Internal Revenue Service has traditionally been permissive in its implementation of the law, but that standard of implementation could change or the law could change. In 1995, Republican representatives offered a rider to an appropriations bill that tried to limit lobbying by non profits that received federal funding-which could have had a huge impact on the civil society sector. A press release from the office of one of these representatives, Ernest J. !stook, quoted him as saying, "Taxpayers shouldn't be forced to sponsor lobbying groups which disguise themselves as nonprofits." The measure failed. I do not idealize the U.S.

208

Notes to Chapter

I

system or hold it up as a model for Japan. If anything, these American examples serve only to strengthen the argument about the political basis for the regulatory framework of civil society groups mentioned above. I 5. This supervision is established by Civil Code Article 67. Paragraph 2 establishes a "supervision system" (kanshi seido) by the "competent supervising ministry" (shumu kancho). Civil Code Article 84 makes further provisions for fining directors of PILPs that violate instructions from the competent ministry. I6. This has some implications for situating arguments of various scholars. For example, I do not find my arguments at all in contradiction with those of Tsujinaka (2oo2c and 2003, and Tsujinaka, ed., 2002). Tsujinaka's excellent work traces the growth of Japan's civil society over the past several decades, while I focus on placing Japan in comparative perspective and explaining certain patterns in its civil society development. The two are complementary. It is a matter of which questions are being asked. CHAPTER 2 I. Susan J. Pharr used the phrase "the four smalls" in her remarks as a discussant at the "Civil Society Groups and Policy-Making in Contemporary Japan" panel at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting 200 5, Chicago, IL, March 3 I to April 3. 2. Incidentally, in stark contrast to popular perceptions, most Japanese also make charitable contributions. More than three-quarters of Japanese (77 percent versus 89 percent of Americans) make such contributions, although the average amount is only 3,200 yen each (Civil Society Monitor, No. 9, June 2004, p. 2). 3. This is the JIGS data set mentioned in Chapter I and detailed in the Appendix. It is an intensive survey of associations in Tokyo and Ibaraki Prefectures, to which the author had access for data analysis. 4· Yamauchi I997, p. 2I2. Although citizens groups (shimin dantai) are considered the most independent of groups and avatars of "real" civil society, few solid figures are available due to their grassroots nature and differences in classification by analysts. Central government figures typically refer only to groups without legal status. However, the Tokyo city government included groups with and without legal status. Tokyo-area citizens groups typically (82 percent) do not have legal status (Tokyo Municipal Government I996). 5. Cited in Kage, unpublished. Keizai Kikakucho Kokumin Seikatsukyoku [Social Policy Bureau, Economic Planning Agency]. I997· Shimin katsudou repoto: shimin katsudou dantai kihon chousa houkokusho. Tokyo: Ministry of Finance. 6. Data from a Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry (RIETI) survey, cited in Civil Society Monitor, No. 9, June 2004, p. I.

CHAPTER

3

I. See also Pekkanen 20ooc, 200IC, 2002, Pekkanen and Simon 2003, and Heineken and Pekkanen 2004. Some parts of this chapter build on portions of these works.

Notes to Chapter 3

209

2. The provision reads "koeki hojin ha setsuritsu mokuteki no tassei nado no tame, kenzen teki na jigyo katsudo wo eizoku suru no hitsuyo na kakko to shita zaiseiteki kiso wo yu suru" [in order to achieve the objectives for which it was established, the public interest legal person will have a sound financial base]. Note here, too, that this phrase is theoretically subject to a quite liberal interpretation. Bureaucratic minimalist interpretation has been an expression of political will, rather than a close reading of the appropriate laws. 3· Karen Nakamura provides a good example in her study of deaf organizations in Japan (Nakamura, Deaf in Japan, Cornell University Press, 2006). Deaf organizations have generally been treated well in Japan, perhaps because they are often used as conduits for welfare services (itaku). The national organization, the Japan Deaf Federation, has branches in each prefecture, but these branches do not all have legal status (17 have no legal status, 1 is a foundation, 4 are social welfare legal persons, and 25 are associations). Those without legal status cannot get money from the government and are unable to participate in important projects. As Nakamura observers, "It is clearly not in the best interests of prefectural associations to remain unincorporated since they are left out of many of the itaku projects that directly affect their members" (Nakamura 2006, p. 12). 4- A government survey showed that the citizens groups themselves identified the lack of social recognition to be the most serious single consequence of not having legal status. However, although all products of lack of legal status, answers such as "not having staff stability" and "not being able to undertake trust work for the government" and "not being able to sign contracts" were all counted as distinct replies. EPA n.d., 27. 5· C's nyusuretaa, Vol. 22, December 25, 1998, p. 2. Mainichi Shinbun (December 6, 1998) notes that although 3,ooo groups had been expected within the year, only 52 applied on the first day. 6. Noting this phenomenon, Nihon Keizai Shinbun (November 29, 1998) gives an example of a Tokyo group involved in development work in Bangladesh, which says that although legal status is "necessary" for the group, they still have decided to wait and see how the law works in practice. 7· Mainichi Shinbun, December 6, 1998. The piece also notes that despite the law's provisions, bureaucrats feel they still must scrutinize the groups out of a sense of responsibility should the group later misbehave. 8. Of 402 respondent groups (the incomplete survey mentioned above), 8o.6 percent reported being asked for changes to their application by the bureaucracy. Personal communication, Akira Matsubara, August 20, 1999. 9· The distinction is not important for this discussion but is similar to the distinction in corporate law and involves the organizations relationship to its creditors, whether or not the organization can have legal persons as employees, and whether or not an employee assembly, director, and auditor are required. See Articles 97; 38, 45, 51, 102, and 103; and 10 and 96, respectively. 10. This supervision is established by Civil Code Article 67. Paragraph 2 establishes a "supervision system" (kanshi seido) by the "competent supervising ministry" (shumu kancho). Civil Code Article 84 makes further provisions for fines by directors of PILP who violate directions by the competent ministry.

210

Notes to Chapter 3

I I. Note that some of these requirements might be made tax deductible by implementing an ordinance. However, even so, the great likelihood is that they will be altered only very slightly. The provisions can be found on the Ministry of Finance web site at http://www.mof.go.jp/genam 3/zeiooig.htm I 2. In a multinational analysis, Salamon et al. find that this is the largest and "a much higher concentration than the 22-country average (68 percent)" (Salamon et al., I999, p. 25I). I 3· The average for non profits is 4 5.2 percent of funding from public sources (Salamon et al., I999, p. 253; Yamauchi I999, p. I49). 14· The GEPON survey targeted the most influential and important environmental groups for a detailed investigation. The Appendix provides further details, but the essential point is that information from the GEPON survey comes from the most powerful environmental organizations (I oo in Japan and 6o in the United States). I 5. As a civil code system, Japan's tax laws differ in many respects from those in the United States. PILPs are taxed at a lower rate than corporations on activities that are classified as subject to taxation (the United States uses a system of "related activities" instead). However, donations are not tax deductible in Japan, except those made to a very select and numerically small group of tokutei koueki zoushin houjin (special public interest increasing legal persons) commonly called tokuzou. Differences in tax privileges are more complex and include deductible contributions, reduced taxation, and tax-free activities for PILPs. I 6. This also is prima facie evidence that arguments based on labor mobility or social heterogeneity alone are insufficient to explain the pattern of Japan's civil society development. I7. Data are calculated from Koueki Houjin Hakusho I997, p. I24. Thecalculation is 6,9 I 8 of 26,8 26 PILPs. I 8. A survey of applicant groups showed that of 642 groups surveyed, there were 3 8 3 responses. Of these respondents, two groups had been formed before I949; 4, 2, 12, and 6I in the succeeding decades; 75 during I990-94; 214 during I994-99; and I3 new groups. Personal communication, Akira Matsubara, August 20, I999· CHAPTER

4

I. Benjamin L. Read and I have called such organizations "straddlers" (of the state-society boundary) and "ambiguous associations." See Pekkanen and Read 2003 and Read and Pekkanen, forthcoming. 2. However, Robertson cites a definition of NHAs produced by the local government in her suburban Tokyo field research site of Kodaira:

(NHA) are associations spontaneously organized and democratically administered by the local residents. Their purpose is to promote and facilitate neighborliness and mutual aid between members and to raise the quality of their social welfare. (NHA), in short, are nonprofit organizations formed within a specific area of the city and registered with

Notes to Chapter 4

2II

city hall. Excluded from (NHA) status are organizations formed solely for the management of street lights (etc.).

Kodaira-shi seikatsuka 1973 (Kodaira City Civic Life Section), cited in Robertson 1991, p. 154· 3· The most common name is jichikai (32.8 percent), followed by chounaikai (25.7 percent). Other common names include burakukai, choukai, and kukai. The difference in names does not correlate to any difference in activities or organization, and I refer to them all as neighborhood associations. Nakata 1996, p. 276. 4· The 1997 survey was conducted by the quasigovernmental broadcasting company, Japan Broadcasting Company. The 2000 figure comes from Ikeda 2oor. The latter data consists of a national sample with panel and snowballed sample data (n = r6r8) from 2000. See also EPA 1998b. 5· White 1982, p. 155. Source data from Tokyo Shisei Chousa Kai 1971, pp. ro9-II3. Later survey data from Chouhou Gyousei 1976, pp. 9o-ro6 and 248-26!. 6. These data come from a survey commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office. I cite them here because they are the only national-level data available on frequency of participation in NHAs. However, the survey shows some unusual results (discussed later). As a result, I do not believe these data can be considered conclusive, but only preliminary. 7. Although several observers have analyzed NHAs in several countries, the only comparative analyses I am aware of are Nakata 1997 and 2ooo; Nakata, ed., 2000 and Pekkanen and Read 200 3. 8. Because most Japanese are involved in NHAs to some degree, I have had many conversations about NHAs with a wide variety of participants that do not necessarily constitute formal interviews (although many did). Where I summarize such views, they represent my characterizations based on these conversations, and I do not directly attribute them to any particular individual. 9· I base this on interviews with Diet members and staffers on several occasions. For example, during two field trips in June 2004 and one in October 2003, I interviewed a Tokyo Diet member, a Shikoku Diet member, and an Osaka Diet member (House of Representatives, Single-Member District, and LDP in all three cases) at their local offices. I also interviewed their staff, the head of their koenkai (only for Osaka), and local politicians (city and prefectural) affiliated with the national Diet member. I talked about the relationship with NHAs in numerous interviews with Diet members of the LDP, DPJ, and Clean Government Party (CGP) in Tokyo, although typically I did not visit their constituencies. ro. The only data on NHA participation broken down by age is from Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo 2003. These data show that levels of participation are actually highest for people in their thirties. However, as with the gender and overall participation data, this should be taken as preliminary. r r. Bestor 1989, p. r86. However, these top leaders number 25, while there are 45 officer positions (Bestor 1989, p. 282). 12. Dore also notes that even by early 19 53, 3 2 percent of Tokyo residents had not only NHAs but also tonarigumi formed. Of these, 3 percent thought it was

212

Notes to Chapter 4

a bad thing, 20 percent a good thing, and 8 percent didn't know (Dore 1958, p. 455). 13. Bestor 1989, p. 102. Restor's purpose is not to contend the political independence of the NHA, however. Instead, he makes a subtle argument that NHAs are not just political animals or government drones, but also exist for and create community purpose. On this point, he cites (p. 8 5) Allinson: "The mood created by these associations (is) in the end more important than any overt political actions they (may) have taken" (Allinson 1979, p. 205). 14· Yoichi Kimura, Section Chief, Marugame City Municipal Government, Living and Environment Section; personal interview; Marugame City, Kagawa Prefecture, Japan; October 17, 2003. 15. Kikuchi 1990, p. 221. Cf. Tanaka who calls them "one of the fundamental forms of groups of our people" (S. Tanaka 1990, p. 52). 16. The differences are instructive. For example, although CDRs resemble NHAs in their membership base and national spread, they are subject to vertical control by the central government. On CDRs, see Fagen 1969, pp. 69-103. On a spectrum from state domination to strong aspects of civil society, Chinese groups are on the state end of the spectrum. On the RCs, see Read 2ooo, 2001, and 2002; Read and Pekkanen, forthcoming; and Kokubun and Kojima 2002. Significantly, Read identifies recent changes in RCs that could revitalize those organizations or possibly even transform them from appendages of the state into something more like modern Japanese NHAs. Around the world, there are a range of these organizations that straddle or blur the state-society boundary in some important way (created by, performing services for, or supported by the state). See Pekkanen and Read 200 3. 17. Yet Bestor also writes, "In presenting something of the complexity and richness of the social life that local institutions and networks sustain, I have tried to demonstrate that choukai and neighborhoods cannot be characterized in black and white terms. Clearly, many aspects of Miyamoto-cho's formal and informal structure are administrative in character, and the entire ethos of the local community lends itself to potentially political forms of mobilization .... Furthermore, the local government's political and administrative relationships with the neighborhood are complex and bilateral, not unilateral. To be sure, the [NHA]leaders and active members are generally conservative and usually cooperative in their dealings with government. Nonetheless ... Miyamoto-chou defines itself in terms different from and independent of the definitions the local government attempts to impose" (Bestor 1989, p. 266). 18. Note that White says, "The tie between two sets of variables used hereintegration into the machi and informal social participation-is really circular, with those who participate most in the machi also most likely to identify with it as a result and therefore likely to participate even more. The relationship may be initiated causally from either end-homeownership may cause interest and commitment which may lead to participation, and formal invitations to newcomers to participate may lead to awakened interest and commitment through participation itself" (White 1982, p. 16o).

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213

19. Although the network form is superbly conducive to sustaining social capital, the norms may be more open to doubt. Steiner contends, "Observers wondered if neighborhood associations could not become in Tocqueville's phrase 'the grammar school of liberty', such as New England town meetings. But, New England town meetings fostered democracy because discussion was free and voting was democratic without coercion .... But the attitudes that the buraku serves to foster are not those on which a democratic society can be built; in many respects they are antithetical to democracy-which was precisely why Japanese traditionalists wanted to maintain them" (Steiner 1965, pp. 224-225). 20. See Hastings, who writes, "Paradoxically, in Tokyo in the early twentieth century, the proliferation of associations within society was significantly facilitated by the sate, particularly the civilian bureaucracy. The credit for the increased breadth, depth, and inclusiveness of Japanese political participation belongs to the Home Ministry." 21. See Sakamoto 2004, p. 7· My translation of the questions. CHAPTER

5

I. These cognate laws are German Commercial Code 21 and So and Swiss Civil Code 52, 6o, So, and S1 (de Becker 1921, p. S25). 2. For a discussion of the politics behind the passage of the NPO law, see Pekkanen 2oooa, 2ooob, 2001a, 20o1b, 2003a, 20o3b, 2004b, and 2004c. Portions of this chapter dealing with the same topic draw on these works. 3· On a vertically divided administration, or tatewari gyosei, see Samuels, who calls it "the single most important structural feature of Japanese public administration" (Samuels 19S3). 4· C's 1996, pp. 3-4. Hyogo Prefecture figures show that in the eight months after the disaster, 1.3 million volunteers participated in the relief and reconstruction of Kobe (cited in Dentsu Souken 1996, p. u9). Elsewhere, the figures cited are 1.3 million volunteers in the first year, eventually reaching 2 million, and a total of 170 billion yen in donations (Shadan hojin nihon seinen hoshi kyokai 1997, pp. 65 and 71). Kyodo Tsushin put it at 1.2 million volunteers in a release dated less than 6 months after the earthquake (Kyodo Tsushin, July 13, 199 5). 5. Volunteers as a percent of the population are higher in the United States (4S.S percent in 199 5) than in Japan (26.9 percent in 1996), but still high in Japan (Yamauchi 1999, p. 59). It is, rather, the large, independent NPOs that are absent in Japan and present in the United States. 6. As early as July 13, 1995, Kyodo Tsushin used the term "Year of the Volunteer" (borantia gannen). 7· The group (vorantia mondai ni kan suru kankei shocho renraku kaigi) included the Prime Minister's Office, Police Agency, Management and Coordination Agency, Economic Planning Agency (EPA), Environmental Agency, National Land Agency, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transport,

Notes to Chapter 5 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Construction, and Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). 8. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, February 4, I995· Yamamoto Miwa of Sakigake calls this commitment crucial in firmly establishing the NPO law as a DM bill. Yamamoto Miwa, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, July I8, I997· 9· Although this point of view had strong supporters inside the EPA, another camp argued that the EPA should continue to remain uninvolved in supervising actual groups. An aggressive bureaucrat, kyokucho Sakamoto, pushed the EPA decisively toward seeking jurisdiction over the NPOs (EPA bureaucrat, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 20, I999). Although other observers have highlighted the role of Sakamoto, the EPA's actions even after his departure remained consistent. IO. "Okurasho wa oki kabe desu yo." Comment made during Asahi Newstar television program "Za dibeeto" [the Debate] on September 27, I997· I r. The LDP was represented by Akihiko Kumashiro, a former Ministry of Welfare official and a first-term Dietman from Okayama's Second District. The SDP was initially represented by second-termer Masanori Goto, while Sakigake sent Akiko Domoto, a former TBS newscaster. After the elections of I996, Sakigake was nominally represented by Kisaburo Wataumi, a party official, while Domoto's secretary, Miwa Yamamoto, handled the workload. At the same time, Kiyomi Tsujimoto took over for the SDP, replacing Goto, who was re-elected as a proportional representation (PR) candidate of the Democratic Party of Japan. Tsujimoto was a first-term Dietman, a PR representative of the SDP, who had been active herself in volunteer relief activities after the Hanshin earthquake. Initially, though, the Coalition NPO Team was Kumashiro, Domoto, and Goto. I 2. Kumashiro remarks, "We at the LDP thought we could leave the law to the bureaucrats, as normal. But SDP and Sakigake had a strong view not to (maybe because they are used to being in the opposition), so we went along with them." Akihiko Kumashiro, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August I9, I997· I 3. The booklet was Sakigake no shimin katsudo hojin hoan. Sakigake seisaku bukkuretto No.2 (Sakigake I995). 14· As part of their lobbying process, groups prepared draft law versions to express their preferences to the politicians. These include C's (August 2I, I995), Yokohama Workers Collective (February Io, I996), and Nihon Seinen Kaigisho (January I997). More frequently, groups issued written statements or commentaries on the various NPO draft laws, which expressed clear policy preferences. I 5. C's I 996, pp. 6 -7; Sakigake I 99 5. Sakigake's proposal also contained the notification system of approvals and court control over dissolution but went further in proposing a new third-party institution, the Citizens Activities Promotion Committee, for supervision of the NPOs' ongoing activities. This committee was envisaged to be, like the Fair Trade Commission, a neutral watchdog but with its members appointed also from the ranks of nonbureaucrats. The Sakigakeproposed law deliberately sets conditions for as many citizens groups to get legal status as possible, the widest possible entry point. It also specifically avoids supervision by the bureaucrats. The Citizens Activities Promotion Committee is

Notes to Chapter 5

215

proposed in Articles 32-34. In the law, it is not clear, but in the later discussion, Domoto states that these committees would be organized and funded at the prefectural, not central, level. In the discussion after the law, the Sakigake lawmakers speak of the prevailing Japanese policy of high hurdles on NPOs to become legal persons and liberal treatment afterward and say, "The Sakigake thinking this time is to completely reverse that, and make the hurdle as low as possible at the entry level. Make a framework to invite in citizen participation" (Sakigake I99 5, p. 66). They also speak of their attempt to construct a system that will lessen dependence on the state (Sakigake I 99 5, p. 70 ). I6. Again, they were defined in a liberal interpretation. For example, the phrase "beginning with volunteers" and referring to types of citizens groups was spelled out to mean only organizational forms, including, but not limited to, volunteer groups. See Yoto NPO projekuto kakunin jiko [the Three Parties Policy Agreement]. I7. The reason had to do with changes in formal chairmanship. Each chair claimed credit for the advances made while he or she chaired. I8. Kumashiro mentions C's active role in lobbying him and calls Matsubara an effective representative in Kumashiro's book on the NPO law (Kumashiro I998, p. 39). I9. C's I996, p. I r. The last point is opposed to the more common definition of NPOs as groups that do not distribute profits to shareholders or investors. 20. This was a dramatic increase from I992-93, when the figures were 2,I34, 787, 676, and 366, respectively. Sasakawa Peace Foundation, unpublished. 21. Akira Matsubara contends that Nihon Keizai Shinbun was "key in putting pressure on LDP, especially. Nikkei provided the best coverage. They understood the best, wrote the best, and wrote the most and had the most influence." Akira Matsubara, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 7, I997· 22. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, April9, I997· The article also criticizes the LDP for not getting its position together on the NPO law. 23. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 30, 1997. In the body, "By all means, we want the NPO law to be passed this Diet session." 24. In their editorial of the opening day of the Diet session, the Asahi called for the Diet to finish a "mountain of 'homework' on top of administrative reform, the long-term care draft law, NPO draft law, and soccer lottery draft law." The same article noted that "The NPO draft law, which will make it easier for citizens groups to get legal status and operate, passed after both DPJ and Taiyoto supported it in the House of Representatives. However, in the House of Councilors, there is a deeprooted resistance to laws which 'give public endorsement to antigovernment groups.' Both SDP and Sakigake are enthusiastically supporting the law, so it is up to the LDP to keep in step." Asahi Shinbun, September 29, 1997. 2 5. According to some observers, Yomiuri reporters had trouble getting permission to write stories on NPOs. When they did write, the stories were very positive. For example, "NPO hoan ni rikai wo" [Understand the NPO Law], Yomiuri Shinbun, February 8, 1996, and also the series called "NPO no atsui kabe" [The Thick Walls for the NPOs] in August 1996.

216

Notes to Chapter 5

26. For example, the paper called for an NPO law because of a change in society's needs, which brought about a need for a redefinition of the public. The same article shrewdly points out that the Coalition NPO Team could not decide on a definition of "citizens activities" because the parties held different views of the nature of the state. Mainichi Shinbun, July 4, I997· 27. Yoto NPO Purojekuto no giron no keika [Progress of the Discussions of the Governing Parties NPO Project]. Akihiko Kumashiro, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August I9, I997· Akira Matsubara, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August 7, I997· C's I996, pp. I2-I5. 28. C's I996, p. 20. C's Nyusureta, October 29, I996. 29. "Kato Koichi has been interested in volunteers for a long time because of his interest in welfare, so he wanted to raise the number of volunteers who could lower costs for welfare." Akihiko Kumashiro, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, August I9, I997· 30. He also reiterated his philosophical conviction that burgeoning NPOs would prove a liberating and invigorating force in the Japanese body politic. Koichi Kato, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, September 24, 2003. 3 r. In fact, all of the Sakigake representatives, except for Domoto herself, who appear in the Sakigake Citizens Activities Legal Person Law book to advocate a legal change deserted to the DPJ. Specifically, they were Yukio Hatoyama, Susumu Yanase, Fumihiko Igarashi, and Yuuichi Takami. 3 2. For example, it calls tax privileges for NPOs "indispensable" but provides the same period of time to study the issue as the governing parties draft. Shimin katsudo sokushin hoan (yotoan) ni tai suru minshuto no kangaekata [DPJ Thinking on the (Governing Parties) NPO Draft Law]. 3 3· Kumashiro himself says that the "debate in the Cabinet Committee should serve as important reference" for this (for reasons of length, only my English translations are provided here). Kumashiro's other comments include: "For the ordinary good legal person, this law permits no interference at all. ... These I I categories themselves are, obviating decision and without flexibility, defined to be in the public interest. The aim is to limit the amount of discretion [over the definition] .... In contrast to the strict permission [kyoka] system of the civil code, our objective is to establish a system distinguished [sumiwaketa] by its extreme ease of application in the licensing [ninsho] system." Here Kumashiro is also referring to the legal necessity for sumiwake, or distinction from previous laws. "The essence of ninsho is to reduce the realm of discretion for the bureaucrats." From the debate (toben) in the Cabinet Committee of the Diet on May 28 through June 3, I996. 34· A prominent NPO leader, Yoshinori Yamaoka, said, "Even without the Kobe earthquake, we would have had the NPO law by the beginning of the next decade. In November '94, when C's was set up, Matsubara said, and everyone agreed, that it would take another 5-6 years. The quake just sped it up." Yoshinori Yamaoka, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, September I8, I997· 3 5. Suzuki Hiroshi, advisor to Sakigake, personal interview, Tokyo, Japan, September 2 5, I997. The Nihon Keizai Shin bun also notes that "for Sakigake and SDP, the NPO draft law is something on which their parties lives are staked and could even lead them to leave the coalition." Nihon Keizai Shin bun, May 2 7, I 996.

Notes to. Chapter 6

2!7

36. Comments made on March 3, I998, reported in Nihon Keizai Shinbun on March 4, I998, and Mainichi Shinbun on March 4, I998. 37· Asahi Shinbun titled an article "Giin rippo bumu" [Boom in DM Bills] and listed the NPO law as the most prominent example of the new trend. Asahi Shinbun, April 6, I998. 38. Citizen group leaders, rather than MOHA bureaucrats, were called to the prefectures to lead study groups. On July I I, I997, the EPA held a seminar for local governments, where it announced that it would not make trial laws. It also said differences among the local bodies would be acceptable. Both of these facts should spur decentralization to whatever small degree. 39· Both undermine bureaucratic dominance of expertise and information. 40. It follows then that we should see more DM bills proposed and passed if the Diet has increased in salience since I993· Until I993, 30 percent of laws proposed in the Diet were DM bills, and they enjoyed a 36-percent passage rate, while the bureaucrat-drafted bills passed at an 87-percent rate. Statistics from Igarashi I994· 41. Note that the LDP's point man on the NPO law has published a book on the subject (Kumashiro I998). Such credit-claiming activities (deserved in Kumashiro's case) indicate the potential electoral value of this law. The value of the NPO law for the LDP should not, however, be overemphasized. It is also an issue that could have damaged the LDP in an election if the LDP had opposed it; coalition politics, and the role of the opposition, had a great deal to do with the LDP's stance. 42. The discussion of the reform of Article 34 is necessarily preliminary. I base this summary on interviews with members of the civil society groups, Advisory Council members, and Diet members in July and August 2004. See also Asahi Shinbun, July 28, 2004, for a useful, if limited, discussion. CHAPTER

6

r. The first and third of these might be "critical junctures." Collier and Collier define a "critical juncture" as "a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies" (Collier and Collier I99I, p. 29). Although this book does not delve into the circumstances behind the adoption of different regulatory frameworks in other states beyond an illustrative comparison, Collier and Collier also indicate that the comparison is sometimes made in such a manner or even contrasted with a hypothetical (Collier and Collier I99I, p. 29, note I 3 ). Because of the element of choice and debate involved, I believe the framing of the Meiji Civil Code in I896, at least, constitutes a "critical juncture" in the technical sense. 2. This is not to say, of course, that nothing is changing. Such is not my argument. See Pekkanen 2004a for an analysis of precisely what is changing in recent years, and why. 3· For the term "ice age," see Maruyama I98 5, p. 6I, and Harima I986, p. I2, for example.

2!8

Notes to Chapter 6

4· To some, sterile and trivial might seem like "fightin' words." I agree that movements for safe food or a clean environment are meaningful. Given their weak political position, women are involved in some dynamic and predominantly female movements. See LeBlanc I999 for a very good analysis. 5. Perhaps not coincidentally, the number and composition of Japan's civil society groups has begun to change recently. See Mori and Tsujinaka 2002; Schwartz and Pharr 2003; Tsujinaka 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, and 2003; Tsujinaka and Choe 2002a and 2002b; Tsujinaka et al. I998 and 2002; Tsujinaka and Yeom 2004; and Pekkanen 2004a. 6. The literature on subgovernments is extensive. See Walker I977; Kingdon I984; Heclo I978; Campbell I989; and Campbell et al. I989. In the context of Japan, Curtis remarks that, although the term "iron triangles" is an American coinage, "policy making in Japan, more than in the United States, is characterized by the existence of disaggregated policy communities, of a multiplicity of iron triangles" (Curtis I999, p. 54). Elsewhere, the same author comments that these triangles are usually dominated by top politicians or bureaucrats (Curtis I999, p. uo). For recent analyses of changing policy-making contexts, see Pekkanen and Krauss 2005 and Pekkanen et al., 2006. 7· It has perhaps greater incentive to push for the formation of tame groups (gaikaku dantai), which are another striking feature of Japan's associational world. 8. Without providing exact figures, the Asahi shinbun argues that "the number of secretaries and policy staffers with NPO backgrounds is increasing in the DPJ" (Asahi shinbun, June I6, 2004). Figures on Diet members are the author's calculations from Kokkai youran (Diet handbook), various years. 9· However, there will be limits to how effectively NPOs gather votes for the LDP. Few NPOs support the LDP, for one thing. Also, the NPO law itself, because of provisions insisted on by the LDP, places prohibitions on political activities and support of candidates or parties by NPO legal persons. More important, NPOs have yet to demonstrate the ability to deliver votes in the manner of other organizations such as Soka Gakkai or labor unions. IO. We should not expect Japan to now "catch up" to the United States in civil society, a la a modernization school take on how civil society works. Japan's civil society will continue to be deeply shaped by institutional and historical legacies. See Pierson 2004 for a sophisticated discussion of why sequences and timing matter profoundly for politics. I 1. Berry calls these groups "citizens groups," but to avoid confusion with the citizens groups of Japan, I will refer to them as advocacy groups. I2. Only 2 of the I I items in the July I2, 2005, newsletter (vol. I, no. 2) dealt with pensions. Other articles included "AARP Endorses Senate Pay for Performance Legislation for Medicare Providers," "Long-Term Care in Michigan: A Survey of Voters Age 4 5 +" (it is no accident that the survey is of registered Michigan voters, not residents), and "Update on the Older Worker." I 3. See Pekkanen, forthcoming. AARP is frequently mentioned in press reports, both as a political player and as a source of research. The only groups in

Notes to Chapter 6

219

Japan, however, that were mentioned in the national newspapers were economic organizations, namely Keidanren and labor unions, not the "Japanese version of AARP" (nenrei sabetsu o nakusukai) or the old people's clubs. 14. They represented 31.8 percent of all such groups in 1991 (Berry 1998, p. 376). 15. Data for the United States are from Berry 1998 and data for Japan are based on author's data analysis of a sample of Asahi shinbun and Nihon keizai shinbun 2001-2002. The Japanese "corporation" category includes think tanks, which are usually associated with a corporation. The Japanese "civil society" category includes all civil society groups-PILPs, NGOs, NPOs, citizens groups, and professional organizations. The U.S. "civil society" category includes advocacy groups (also called citizens groups), independent research institutions, trade associations, others, labor unions, professional associations, and other categories. 16. Regulation of civil society groups might fit into what some authors have seen as a typical pattern of the Japanese bureaucracy giving in on issues, but doing so in a fashion that does not allow institutionalization of the opposition's claims, in order to influence the nature of social change. See Pharr 1990 and Upham 1987.

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Index Italic page numbers indicate material in tables or figures. Page numbers followed by n indicate notes. Abe, Shinzo, 175 activism, 21-22, 165-169; hostile environment towards, r67-r68; Japanese history of, r- 2 Adachi Ward Physicians Association case, 53 administrative guidance, 55, 65, 72, 78 administrative reform, 134, 154 advocacy, 86, r66; advocacy sector, disengagement from, r68; membership and, 2o6nrr; NHAs and, !20-123. See also "members without advocates" argument advocacy sector: correlation between group media coverage and group size, r78-r8o, I79; growth of, r85-r86; in Japan, 4, 177-r8o; Japanese and U.S. compared, 20, 177-r8o; legal status of, 74, 78; number of employees in, I76; professionalization in the, r 59, I76, 178; public revenues and the, 71, 72, 73-74, 75; research and the, 179, I8o; in the U.S., 20, I77-r8o, r85r86; visibility of the, I?8-r8o. See also lobbying groups Africa, 5 aged-care law, 147 Agency for Cultural Affairs, 59 aging society, the, 76 "Agreement on the Citizens Activities Promotion Draft Law (NPO Draft Law)," 147 agricultural groups: budgets of, 72; legal status of, 72, 74; Noukyou, 83; relationships with other political actors,

8o; relationship with permitting agencies, 78; size of, 77-78 Akimoto, Ritsuo, II7 Alagappa, Mithiah, 205n4, 207nr2 Allinson, Gary, 212nr3 alumni groups, 6o, 6r amakudarisaki. See post-retirement employment (amakudarisaki) AMDA. See Asian Medical Doctors Association (AMDA) Amemiya, Takako, 146 American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), 9, r24, I77, 2o6n8, 2r8219nr3 American Cancer Society, r American Farm Bureau Federation, 6 American Legion, 6 American National Election Survey (ANES), 126 American Political Science Review, r66 Anpo movement, r6s-r66 anshin. See security (anshin) anti-U.S. treaty movement, r6s-r66 "Approval and Supervision of Public Interest Corporations" (Cabinet Directive of Sept. 20, r996), 52 Arons, David F., 207n14 Article 34, 49, 51-52, 57-58, 6o, 64, 84; changes to, 133, 174; drafting of, 130133; permitting standards and, 131, 172; public interest and, 50, 52, 13 r, r62-r63; reform of, 130, rs6-r57, 173, 217n42; standards considered in framing, IJ2 Article 3 5, as product of political contestation, 84

Index Asahi Shinbun, I36, 145-146, 149, Ip, I78,2I5n24,2I8n8 Asian Medical Doctors Association (AMDA), I42, I55 associated groups, 8 5 associational density, 39; comparison between the U.S. and Japan, 30, 39; in Korea, 39 associational employees, 36-37, 37· See also professionalization Aum Shinrikyo, I 3 6 "autonomous citizenship," I68 Avenell, Simon, I68-I69, 205n2 Awaji Island, I 3 3 Bank of Japan, I32 Beppu, 96 bequests, 69, 7 I Berger, Suzanne, 5 Berry, Jeffrey M., I77-I78, I85, 2o6nio, 207ni4,2I8-2I9ni3,2I8nii Bestor, Theodore, 92-93, Ioo-Ioi, I04, III-II2, II3-II4, II5, I22, 2I2ni7 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 43 Boissonade, Gustave, 50 borantia, II, !3· See also volunteerism bureaucracy, I8, 20, 52, 83; administrative guidance, 65, 72; bureaucratic discretion (sairyo), 53, 54, 72, I49; bureaucratic interference, 65; failure to respond to the Hanshin earthquake, I34-I35; legislation of the NPO Law and the, I37-140, I 57; limitations of screening abilities of the, I4I, I42; NHAs and, 90; power of the, I34, I 54, I7I-I72, I84; regulatory framework and the, I7I; vertical divisions of the, I34, I35, I36 bureaucratic discretion (sairyo), 53, 54, 72, I49 business associations, 6o, 6I "Call for the Quick Passage This Diet Session of the Citizens Activities Promotion Bill (NPO Bill), A," I 5 I Camp bell, John C., I7I-I72, 2o6ni I CARE, 39, 40, 4I catch-up schools (hoshu juku). See juku (cram schools) charitable contributions, I6, 82, 207n2; bequests, 69, 7I; commission fees, 7I; definition of, 7I; grants-in-aid, 7I; requests by American NGOs for contributions from Japanese corporations,

I43; taxation of, 66, 67-7I, 72, 7677, 2Ioni5; in the U.S., 68, I43, 2Ioni5 charities, 4, I r. See also charitable contributions Chessa, Cecilia, 5 children's groups, 8 5 China, urban residents' comrp.ittees (RCs) in, II9 choral societies, 4 chou, I02-I03, I05 choukai, I07 chuukan houjin. See intermediate legal persons (chuukan houjin) Citizens Activities Promotion Committee, 2I4-2I5ni5 Citizens Activities Promotion Law (provisional name) Draft Law Outline, I4I citizens groups: employment in, 38; legislation of the NPO Law and, I48-I49 citizens groups (shimin dantai), 29, 3 739, 74, Ip, 207n4, 2I7n38; activity on national level, 72; budgets of, 72; employment in, 77; ex-bureaucrats and, 75; independence of, 75-76, 78; influence on legislation of NPO Law, I34; legal status and, 39, 72, 74, 77, 78, 209n4; legislation of the NPO Law and, 142, I5I; lobbying by, I 55; membership in, 38; policy communities and, I72; public revenues and, 73-74, 75; relationships with government agencies, 72; relationships with other political actors, So; relationships with permitting agencies, 78; size of, 77· See also citizens groups (shimin dantai) citizens' movements, I 59 Citizens Public Interest Activities Legal Person Bill, I 51 civic education, I II civic groups. See citizens groups (shimin dantai) Civil Code Enforcement Law: Article 25, 66 civil code tradition, 48. See also Japanese Civil Code civil law, 48-49 civil liberties commissioners, 86 civil society, 46; characteristics of Japanese, 4-5, 2I8nio; comparative perspective on, 27-46; consequences of Japan's dual, I76 -In; decline of U.S., 4; definition of, 2, 3-4, 205n3; dimensions of, 28; as a dual structure, I6oI62, I76-I77; effect of Meiji Civil

Index Code on, I64; "four smalls," 2.7; government influence on, I, 2., 6-7, I62.I, 2.5; growth of in Japan, 4, 2.4; as an independent sector, 7; inward turn of, I68; Japan's postwar history of, 3, 8, 2.5; overview of, 2.9-30; in place of the state, 6; politics of regulating, I30I58; predictors of, I; public policy and, I 59, I6o, I85; quantitative measures of, 2.7-46; relations with the state, I33, I34, I37-I55; as source of social capital, 7; state role in shaping, I85; strength of, 2.4, I 54, I64; taxation and, 66-7I; theoretical background of, 5-7, I75; as a Western concept, 2.o6-2.o7n12.. See also civil society organizations civil society organizations: autonomy of, 64-6~7I,75-7~78, I09, IIO, I6o; budgets of, 77-78; comparative professionalization by country, 36; consulting with the government by, I72.; correlation between age and resources of, I64; correlation between number of employees and geographical scale, 4344; dependence on the state, 8I; employment in, 34, 35, 36, 37, n-78, I76, 176; ex-bureaucrats and, 75, 7879, So; geographical scale of, 43-44, 45, 46; groups in Japan by type and number, 30; growth of in Japan, I64, I69; individual level group participation as statistical measure of, 3I-32.; issue-oriented, I09-no; legal barriers to forming, 47; legal categories of, 6I, 62-63; legal reforms and, 2.4; legal status and field of activity, 77; legal status (houjinka) of, n-78; legitimation by the state, 8I; lobbying by, I72.; local, 85-I2.9, 2.05-2.o6n5; NHAs as, n8-12.o; number of groups as statistical measure of, 2.9-31; professionalization of, 8, Io, 2.4-2.5, 2.7, 32.-46, I 59, I6o, I76; public policy and, I82.-I83, I84, I8 5; public revenues and, 7I-8o; regulation of (see regulatory framework); relationships with other political actors, 78-So, 79; reputations, I9; size of, I, 9, I8, 46, 77-78, I6o, r65; social capital and, 86, 12.8-I2.9; taxation and, 66-7I, I73, I74; types of groups, 6I, 62-63, 192. See also civil society; specific groups civil society professionals, mistrust of the state and, 76

civil society theory, 5-7, I75 Clean Government Party, 96, I 5o, I 52., I74 clubs, 6o. See also specific groups Coalition NPO Team (NPO Purojekuto Chimu), I37-I47, I53-I54, 2.14nii, 2.I6n2.6 coalition politics, I34, I47, 148, I 54 co-ethnics, I 2. collective action, I 9 collective mentality, I I Collier, David, 2.I7ni Collier, Ruth Berins, 2.I7ni Commerce and Industry Division (of the PARC). See Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC) common law tradition, 49 company unit, I I competent ministries, 64, 65. See also permitting agencies conflict management, 2.I-2.2. Conservative Party. See conservatives conservatives: 2.ooi tax reforms and, I 56; legislation of the NPO Law and, I37; NHAs and, 95, 96 consumerism, I68 consumer movements, I68 "converted network association," I2.2. cooperative groups, 2.4 cooperative public interest legal persons, 2.4 corporations (legal persons): tax deductions for charitable contributions, 6769

Corporation Tax Law, 66-67 cram schools (juku). See juku (cram schools) Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups, I9I C's (citizens group), I42., I 52., 2.I4ni4, 2.15ni8 Cuba, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs), I 19 culturalist explanations, I1-13, I6I Curtis, Gerald, 96, 2.I8n6; Election Campaigning Japanese Style, 98 Dantai Kiso Kouzou Kenkyuukai, 78 data sets, 19I-2.o3; GEPON Survey, I93; JIGS data sets, I9I-I93, 2.07n2. deaf organizations, 2.09n3 decentralization, 154. See also bureaucracy democracy, 8

Index Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 98, 99, 134, 148, 175, 216n31; bureaucracy and, 174; legislation ofthe NPO Law and, 147-148, 149, 214nu; manifesto of the, 174; regulatory reforms and, 174; rise of, 145-147; support for civil society organizations, 174 democratic theory, 120, 175 deregulation, 154 devolution, 134 Diet members, NHAs and, 98 direct influence (of government), 16-19 DM (Diet member) bills, 134, 138, 139, 143, 146, 148, I 54, 2I7n4o Domoto, Akiko, I39, I48, 2I4nu, 2I5ni5,2I6n3I donations. See charitable contributions Dore, Ronald, 14, I06, u6, 2II2I2ni2 DPJ. See Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) "DPJ Thinking on the (Governing Parties) NPO Draft Law," I49 "Draft Law Regarding the Granting of Legal Person Status to Groups Performing Citizens Public Interest Activities," I39, I43-I44 "Draft Law to Amend One Part of Legal Person Tax Law," I45 dual civil society, consequences of, 160162, I76-I77 Eagle Forum, 177 Eastern Europe, 5, 6 economic groups, legal status (houjinka) of, 77 Economic Planning Agency (EPA), 38, 6o, I36, 137-14I, 149, 153,214n9, 2I7n38 Edo, 104 educational groups: educational corporations, 59, 72; legal status of, 77 educational system, I4 Edwards, Bob, 2 elderly people's groups, 85, IOI-I02, I24, 177-178, 2o6n8. See also old people's clubs (rojinkai) electoral politics, 14 5- I 5o electoral system, 22; changes to, I 34, I 53, 170-I7I, I84-I85; electoral reform, 8, 2I, 98; incentives offered by the, I74-I75; proportional representation (PR), 21; single member districts (SMD), 2I Embree, John, I07 Environmental Action, I66

Environmental Defense Fund, I66, 177 environmental groups, 4I-43, I8I; budgets of, 42-43, 167; GEPON Survey and, I93; German, 4I, 42; Japanese, 42, 43; membership in, 42, I67; public revenues and, 72, 73, 73; size of, 4I-42; in the U.S., 4I, 42. See also environmental movements; specific groups environmental movements, 1-2, I65, 166-167, I8r. See also environmental groups EPA. See Economic Planning Agency (EPA) Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL), r8I Eto, Shimpei, 49-50, I3I Europe, 48. See also Eastern Europe; specific countries Explication (riyuusho) of the Proposed Amendment of the Civil Code, I3I, I32 Falconieri, G. Ralph, II6 Falun Gong (China), 2 family unit, I I farm lobby, 20 Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), 139, 142-I43, ISI, 2I82I9ni3 feminist organizations, 6. See also women's groups Fenno, Richard, 99 festivals, I 04 financial flows, I 6 Finland, 35 firansoropi, I I. See also philanthropy fire watches, IOS Fiscal Year 2001 Tax Reform, 22, 68, 130, ISS-IS~ IS~ I84 Fiscal Year 2002 Tax Reform, 184 Fiscal Year 2003 Tax Reforms, 7I Flanagan, Scott, 96 Foley, Michael, 2 Forbath, William, 81 Ford Foundation, 43 foreign workers, I81-I82 forestry groups: budgets of, 72; legal status of, 72; size of, 77-78 foundations, 186; asset size of, 43, 44, 45; limitations on, 163-I64; size of, 43, I63 four principles (standards) of regulation, I3J-I32, I32 "four smalls," 27, 46, 207ni

Index France, 5; French Civil Code, 49-50; political parties in, 170; public revenues in, 75 freedom of association, 51 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), I34, I54 freedom of religion, 77 free establishment (jiyuu setsuritsushugi) principle, 131 French Civil Code, 49-50 friendship societies, 105, Io6 Friends of the Earth, I 66 Fukuda City, II9 Fukui Prefecture, 9 5 Gakuen Nishi Chounaikai (GNC), IOI general assembly of all group members (shain soukai), 58 GEPON Survey, 73, I67, 2Ioni4; data sets, I93 German Civil Code, 50 Germany, 5, I7; environmental movement in, I67; German Civil Code, 50; influence of civil society organizations on public policy in, I84; public revenues in, 75 Goto, Masanori, 139, I44, I46, 214nii Governing Parties Coordination Council, I45· I46-I47 "Governing Parties NPO Project Confirmed Matters," I4I government. See regulatory framework; state, the government funding (hojokin), 70, 114 Government Order I6 (I9oo), Io6-I07 grassroots organizations, 4 Green Party, I66 Green peace, 7, 9, 33, 43, I44, I66, IS 5 groups: creation of, So; established by Japanese Civil Code, 58; formation and operation of, 5, 50, 51-57; legal categories of, 57-64; legal status and field of activity, 77, 78; regulation of, I6-I9, 64-66; religious, 51· See also civil society organizations; specific types of groups Habermas, Juergen, 205n4 Hanshin earthquake (I995), 82, I33, I34-I36, I 52, I69, 2I4nu; charitable contributions and, 143; government response to the, I 34-1 3 5; legislation of the NPO Law and, I37, I45; media coverage of the, I 3 5- I 3 6; volunteer groups and, I 34

243 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, I 50, I5I Hastings, Sally Ann, Ioo, I03-I04, I05-I06, I2I, 2I3n20 Hatoyama, Yukio, 2I6n3 I Hayashi, Chikio, 34 health care groups, 72, 77 Heclo, Hugh, I72 Hegel, G. W. F., 4 Heiseikei, I50, I5l Heisei Party, I34 Hiroshi, Suzuki, 2I6n35 hojokin. See government funding (hojokin) Hokkaido, 82 horizontal organizations, u, I25 hoshi katsudi5 ("service activity"), I3 houjinka. See legal status (houjinka) Hozumi, Nobushige, I33 Hyogo Prefecture, 2I3n4 IAG. See Interagency Group (IAG) Ibaraki prefecture, 38, 44-46, 45; study of groups in by field of activity, 77; surveys in, I 9 I "ice age" argument, 3, 8, 25, I 59, I62I69, 205n2; "thaw" or "third turning point," I69 IDNGOs. See international development groups Igarashi, Fumihiko, I37-I38, 2I6n31 ikusei, Io6. See also neighborhood associations (NHAs) incentives, 2, 5, 2 3 Income Tax Law, 67 incorporated associations (shadan houjin), 57 incorporated foundations (zaidan houjin), 58-59 indirect influence (of government), I922 Indonesia, I I 9 information disclosure law, I 54. See also Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in-group mentality. See collective mentality Inoguchi, Takashi, 2o-2I, I27 insurance, I 3 5 Interagency Group (IAG), I36, I37-140 Intermediary Legal Person Law (Law No. 49), 6o, I84; Article Io8, 6o; Article 19, 6I; Article Sr, 6o; Article 9, 6r; Article 93, 6r; Article 94, 61 intermediary legal persons (chuukan houjin), 6o-6I; corporate tax rate and, 6r; limited liability, 6o-6r; rate

244 of formation, 6I; unlimited liability, 6o,6I Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 207ni4 International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, 9 international cooperation groups. See international development groups international development groups, 394I, 40; budgets of, 40-4I; legal status of, 7 4; staffing levels of, 40; top ten groups, by budget, 41; top ten groups, by staff levels, 41; in the U.S., 4I international development NGOs. See international development groups interviews, 8I; with LDP Diet Members, 98; on politics and NHAs, 97, 2IIn9 investigations, 6 5 Iriyama, Akira, 34, 65 IRS (Internal Revenue Service) (U.S.), SI Ishida, Takeshi, II-!2 Islamic societies, I I issue networks, I72 !stook, Ernest J., 207ni4 itaku (trust work), II2, II4 Italy: high social capital areas of, I02; horizontal organizations in, I25; social capital in, I27 Iwai, Tomoaki, 2o-2I JANIC, 40 Japan, 47-48; associational density in, 30, 39; associational employees in, 37; citizen groups employees in, 3 8; democracy in, I2o, I66; environmental groupsin,4I-43,42,43,73, I6?;environmental movements in, 165, I66167; environment for activism in, I6?I68; foundations in, 43, 44, I63; law in (see law, Japanese); legislation process in, I34; lobbying in, I?I; measurement of trust in, I27; modernization of, I3o; nonprofit sector in, 3 I; organizational membership in, 2o6n6; political system in, 83; postwar history of, 109; religious groups in, I8I; size of civil society organizations in, r6s; state-civil society relations within, I 3 3; tax deductions for contributors in, I?I; universal manhood suffrage, passage of (I925), I06-IO?; U.S.-led occupation of (I945-I952), so, 77, III; volunteerism in, 2o6n9; women's issues in, I8I Japan Center for International Education, 6s

Index Japan Communist Party (JCP), I34, ISI, I 52 Japan Deaf Federation, 209n3 Japanese Civil Code, 22-23, 64, 83-84, 2I7n1; Article 25, 66; Article 33, SI; Article 34, I?, 49, so, SI-52, 5?-s8, 6o, 84, I33, I56-I57, I62-I63, 2I7n42; Article 35, 51-52, 84; Article 64, 207ni5; Article 67, 2o7ni5, 209nio; Article 68, 66; Article 7I, 66; Article 84, 209nio; drafting of the, I30-I33, I62; effect on development of civil society, I64; enforcement and, IJI; framers of, I30-IJI; political contestation and, 84, 131; public interest legal persons (PILPs) under, SI Japanese Code of Civil Procedure. See Japanese Civil Code Japanese Constitution, so; Article 2I, sr; Article 89, 72 Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), !26 Japanese Interest Group Survey (JIGS), 38, 39,74, I64, I7~ I78, I9I-I93; civil society organizations' influence on policy making, I83-I84; correlation between group media coverage and group size, I79, 179; JIGS groups, I79, I85 Japan Foundation, 67 Japan Medical Association, I78 Japan National Council of Social Welfare, 86 Japan Nature Protection Association, 42 Japan Socialist Party, 174 JCP. See Japan Communist Party (JCP) Jehovah's Witnesses, I7 Jenkins, Craig J., I63 JGSS. See Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS) JIGS survey. See Japanese Interest Group Survey (JIGS) "joint supervision" (kyoukan), 52 juku (cram schools), I4; hoshu juku (catch-up schools), 14; shingaku juku, I4; yobiko, 14 Kagawa Prefecture, I 14 kairanban (circulating message boards), II3-II4, II8, 125 Kanagawa Prefecture: NHAs and, Io8; NPO Law and, 55 Kanda ward, Tokyo, I05 Kanematsu, Nobuyuki, 2o6n8

Index Kansai region, 133, 135-136 Kanto earthquake, 103, ro6 Kasumigaseki, 7 5 Kato, Koichi, 141, 143, 145, 147-I5o, 151, 154, 216n29 Keidanren. See Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) keijiban (bulletin boards), r 13- r 14 Kerry, John, 207n14 Kikuchi, Miyoshi, 94-95, r2r-r22 Kiyomi, Tsujimoto, 138, 139 Kobe earthquake (1995). See Hanshin earthquake Kochi Prefecture, 99 Kodaira, r I4- I I 5 Komei group, 152, 156 Korea: associational density in, 39; associational employees in, 37; bansanghoe, II9; influence of civil society organizations on public policy in, r 84 kouenkai. See politicians' personal support organizations (kouenkai) Krauss, Ellis, 20, r 22 Kresge Foundation, 43 Kubo, Kazuhiro, 119 Kumashiro, Akihiko, 138-139, 142, 143-144, 149,2I4nii,2I4ni2, 215nr8, 216n33 kumi, 103 Kumodani, 104 Kyodo Tsushin, 136 kyoka (permission to form), 54, 57, 136, 141, 156 Kyoto,9o, 102,103,121 Kyoto Accords, r8r kyoukan. See "joint supervision" (kyoukan) labor unions, 5, 22, 174, 205n3 Latin America, r r law: American, 48; British, 48; Chinese, 48, 49; civil, 48-49; civil code tradition, 48-49; common law tradition, 49; French, 48-49, 49-50; German, 48-49, so, 131, 13~ 133, r6~ 2I3ni; indirect, 82; Italian, so; Roman, 48; Swiss, 131,132, r62, 213nr; translation of legal concepts, 49-50 Law for Promotion of Special Non profit Activities. See NPO Law (Law for the Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Activities) law, Japanese: in comparative context, 48-51; foreign influence on, 48, 4951, 13 I, 132; legal reforms, so; Old

245 Civil Code (kyuuminpou), so; tradition of civil code, 48 LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Legal Affairs Bureau, 6r legal infrastructure, 5 legal permission (houritsu tokkyo shugi) principle, 131, 132, 162-163 legal personality. See legal status (houjinka) legal status (houjinka), 17-18, 22-23, 29, 51, ss; of advocacy groups, 74; of agricultural groups, 72, 74; of citizens groups, 39, 72, 74, 77, 78, 209n4; of economic groups, 77; of educational groups, 77; field of activity and, 77; of forestry groups, 72; of health care groups, 77; of international development groups, 74; legitimation and, 82; ofNGOs, 77, 78; NPO Law and, 82; number of applicants for, ss; operational difficulties without, 53; qualification for, 51-53; of religious groups, 74, n; shift from permission (kyoka) to registration (touki) standard, r 56; of social welfare groups, 77; of volunteer groups, 135-136 legislators, legislation of the NPO Law and, 137-140 legitimation, r8, 19, 51, 52, 55, 81-83; legal status (houjinka) and, 82; NPO Law and, 82; NPO legal persons and, 8 2; as a resource, 8 2 Levy, Jonah, 5 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 20, 78, 87, 134, 153, rss; 2001 tax reforms and, rs6; dominance of, 170; legislation of the NPO Law and, 137, 138139,140-150,151, 15~214nii, 214n12, 217n4r; NHAs and, 95, 96, 98, 99, no; NPOs and, 175, 2r8n9; policy changes within the, qr-rso; reform of Article 34 and, 158; regulatory reforms and, 174-175; revision of Article 34 and, 174, 175 liberals, 96. See also Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); legislation of the NPO Law and, 137 lifestyle movements (seikatsusha), r68 loan words, n, 13 lobbying, r66; lobbying groups; in Japan, 171; in the U.S., 171. See also advocacy lobbying groups, ro, 20, 154, 171; influence on legislation ofNPO Law, I34· See also advocacy groups

Index local civil society groups, 8 5- I 29, 20 52o6n5; social capital and, 86 local corporatism, I 14-II 5 machi, I03, I04 Maclachlan, Patricia, I68 Mainichi Shinbun, I36, I45, 146, I5I Manchurian Incident (I931), I07 Marugame City, Kagawa Prefecture, I 14 Marx, Karl, 4 Matsubara, Akira, 142-143, 2I5ni8, 2I5n2I McKean, Margaret A., I22 media, the, Io, I5 5; correlation between group media coverage and group size, I78-I8o; coverage of research by, r8o; criticism of government response to Hanshin earthquake, I35-I36; legislation of the NPO Law and, I34, I3~I45-I4~I48,I5I;supportfur

volunteer groups, I35-I36 medical corporations, 59, 72; special medical corporations (tokutei iryo houjin), 67; taxation and, 67 Meiji period, the, I30-I3I, I62-I64; emphasis on nation-building during, I31; law in, 48, 49 membership: advocacy and, 2o6ni I; versus participation, 88 "members without advocates" argument, 3, 8, 25, 85, 86, I59-I87; NHAs and, 120-129 men, participation in NHAs, 96-97 Middle East, the, 5 militarism, Io7, III, I63 ministries, 20, 78; ex-ministry personnel on boards of directors, 8o; failure to respond to the Hanshin earthquake, I34-I35; Ministry of Construction, 6o, 8o; Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), 8o; Ministry of Education and Culture, 59, 126; Ministry of Finance (MOF), 67, 8o, I38, I47, I 56; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6o; Ministry of Health and Welfare, 59, 72; Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), II2, I 54; Ministry of Transportation, 8o; parastatal organizations and, 33-34; post-retirement employment (amakudarisaki), 8o. See also bureaucracy Minyuren group, I 52 mistrust of the state, 76 Mitsukuri, Rinsho, 49-50 Miwa, Yamamoto, 2I4n8, 2I4nn

Miyamoto-cho, 92-93, IOI, III-II2, II3-II4, I25,2I2ni7 mobilization, electoral, 83, 98, 99, I07 MOF. See ministries: Ministry of Finance (MOF) MOHA. See ministries: Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) Mori, Hiroki, 39,43-46, 72 Murakami, Masakuni, I 50 Muramatsu, Michio, 20 Murayama, Tomiichi, I37, I38 Musashino City, ns, II7-n8; NHAs in, I6I mutual-aid associations, 6o Nagana Prefecture, 93 Nakamara, Hachiro, II6-II7 Nakamura, Karen, 209n3 Nakata, Minoru, II3 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 207ni4 National Fire Agency, I36 National Institute for Research Advancement, 67, I 52 National Land Agency, I36 National Organization for Women (NOW), I77 National Police Agency (NPA), I8I-I82 National Rifle Association, 6, I77 National Tax Administration, 68, 69, 70 National Tax Agency, 69, I 55 Nature Conservation Society of Japan, I67 neighborhood associations (NHAs), 7, Io, 24, 29-3I, 6o, 2II-2I2nn7-I2; abolition of, I07-Io8, I I7; activities of, 87,92-95, 93, 94; "administrative cooperation activities" of, II2-n3; advocacy and, I20-I23; age and, 9697; assistance in administration, Io9; autonomy of, 87, 93-94, I09, I6I, 2I2ni3; benefits of to the state, I09, I86; budgets of, 95, II4-n5; bureaucracy and, 90; civic education and, I II; as civil society organizations, n8-12o; communication with government and, II4, I20-I2I; compared to similar groups in other countries, II9, 2I2ni6; contemporary, Io8; cooperation with government by, I22I23; coaptation and, 109, I2I; decision-making patterns in, IOI; definition of, 87-I02, 210-21In2; described as vertical, 12 5; egalitarianism

Index of, 125; electoral mobilization and, 98, 99, Io7; explanations for the existence of, n6-n7; financial flows from government to, II4, II5, I6I; gender and, 96 -97; generational change and, IOI; geographical limitations of, I09, I6I; as government appendages, IIOI12; government funding (hojokin) and, II4; history of, I02-Io8; improvement of government performance by, I23; information dissemination by, II2, II3, I20-I2I, I24, I6I; itaku (trust work) and, I q; lack of government support for in Musashino Ciry, II7-u8; leadership patterns in, IooIoi; legal status and, 88, I 12; legitimation and, u5; local civil sociery and, 8 5- I 29; local corporatism and, II4-u6; local government and, Io8, uo, II2-II4; local politics and, 97; in the Meiji period (I868-I9I2), I04, Io5; membership fees and, 92; membership in, 32, 87, 88, 90, I6I; as members without advocates, I20-I29; under militarism, Io7, III; misconceptions about, 87; mutual-aid disaster schemes and collections, I 12; national surveys of, 89, 90, 91, 96-97; networks of, I22, 2I3ni9; NIMBY ("not in my backyard") and, I2I, I22; as nucleus for other locality-based organizations, I oo, I o I- I o 2; as nucleus of citizen opposition to the state, I2II22; numbers of, 87; opposition to government initiatives by, 12I; organizational features of, Ioo-Io2; origins of, I02-I03; participation in, 87, 8890, 89, 91,95-99, Io8, I6I; particulariry to Japan, u8 -I I9; personnel recommendations by, I 12; political affiliation and involvement of members, 95-96,96, 97; political explanation and, I6o-I6I; political parties and, 95-96, 96; politicians and, 9798; precursors to, Io3-I04; regional studies of, 90; regional variations in, 94-95; relationships with other groups, 8o; relationship with government, 93-94, I08-u6; residents' attitudes and, u9; responsiviry to local problems, I I9; revival of, Io8; rise of, I04-Io7; in rural versus urban areas, 95, Io3; sanitary associations and, I04; in the Showa period (I926-I989), Io4; size of, 88; social capital and,

247 IOI-I02, I09, I23-I29, I6I, I77; social networks and, 92; social pressure to join, 9I, I24; state defense of, 90, Io8; state-society interaction and, 86; state support for, II5-I20, I24125; subgroupings of, IOI-Io2; support-building for public works by (nemawashi), II3; surveys by, u2; in the Taisho period (I9I2-I926), Io4, Io5; trust and, I24, I6I; in Ueda City, Nagana Prefecture, 93, 94; as voluntary associations, 90-92. See also

ikusei nemawashi, I I 3 nenrei sabetsu o nakusukai, 2o6n8 Netherlands, 36, 48 New Frontier Parry (NFP), I34, I37, I39, I43-I44, I45, I50, I5I, I53 NFP. See New Frontier Parry (NFP) NGOs. See nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Nihon Keizai Shinbun, I35-I36, I45I46, I48-I49, I5I, I54,2I5n2I, 2I6n35 Nihon Seinen Kaigisho, 2qni4 Nihon Sougou Kenkyuujyo survey, I24

Nikkei. See Nihon Keizai Shinbun NIMBY ("not in my backyard"), I2I, I22 ninsho (permission), I4I, I42 Nokyo, I78 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 4, 39, I 54; budgets of, 77; environmental groups, 72; legal status (houjinka) of, n, 78 non profit foundations, 4 nonprofit organizations (NPOs), 4, 2223, I 54; bias against, 23, I34; employment in, 36; establishment of, I6-I?; in Japan, I6-I9; permitting system and, 52-54; public interest and, 6o; public revenues and, 7I-8o; taxation and, I55-I56; in the U.S., I6-I7 nonprofit sector: comparative perspective on, 35-36; defined with respect to civil society, 30-31; employment in the, 35-36; by group type, operating expenses, and number of employees, 31 Noukyou, 83 NPO Law (Law for the Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Actitivies), the, 22-23, 59-60, 64, 83, II5, I33-I36, 2I6n26; 200I tax reforms and, I5 5I56; administrative guidance and, 55; background to, I33-I34; bureaucratic

Index power and, I37• I4I, I44, I45, I48, I49; case study of the passage of, I 30; chronology of legislative process surrounding, I37-I38, 194-196; conservatives and the, I so; definition of NPOs in, 148; dissolution of groups and, I49; as a DM bill, 214n8; draft laws of, I39-I50, 200-203, 2I4ni4, 2I5n24; effect on regulatory framework, I84; EPA draft law of, J40I4I, I44; events surrounding passage of, I 33- I 56; final passage of the, I 5oI 52; impact of the, 54-57; issues in legislation of, I 37; legal status and, 144-I45, 146, 148, I49; legislative process towards, I37-I55, I74; legislators versus bureaucrats in legislation of, I37-qo; legitimation and, 82; legitimation of "citizens activities" and the, I69; number and types groups covered, I37; number of applicants and, 5 s; permitting standards, I49; political activities and, I47, 148, I 52; political contestation and, I33; political significance of the, I52-I55; public interest and, I44, I47; regulatory framework and, I7I; reporting duties, I48; revolutionary groups and the, I50-I5I; table of players in legislative process, 197-199; taxation and, 56, I37, I44, 145, q6; terminology in the, rso; thaw of "ice age" and the, I69; types of groups, I49 NPO legal persons, 23, 39, I 54, I 58; legitimation and, 82; number of applicants for, 55, 56; reform of Article 34 and, I 56, I 57; restrictions on activities of, 70; restrictions on expenditures, 70; taxation and, I 55, I56-I57; tax-deductible NPOs, 68-69; taxdeductible status and, 68, 69-7I, I55-I56, I 57· See also nonprofit organizations (NPOs); NPO Law (Law for the Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Actitivies) NPO Purojekuto Chimu. See Coalition NPO Team (NPO Purojekuto Chimu) NPOs. See non profit organizations (NPOs) O'Connor, Sandra Day, I86 Offe, Claude, 5 OISCA International, 40 OISCA Japan, 4I Old Civil Code (kyuuminpou), 50

old people's clubs (rojinkai), 9, I77-I78, I86. See also elderly people's groups I-Percent Club, I43, I5I organizational membership, 32 organized interest representation, 5 Osaka: NHAs and, Io3; NHAs in, 90, 94-95 Ouchi, Noboru, 88, 90, IOI, rr3, II4 Ozawa, Ichiro, I 52 parastatal organizations, 33-34, 35, 36 PARC. See Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC) parliamentary system, 20 participant observation, 8 I participation: correlation with trust, 128; versus membership, 88 Passin, Herbert, I66 patriarchal tribal social organization, I I "patterned pluralism," 20 Pekkanen, Robert, 2I2ni6 pension reforms, 9 permission to form (kyoka), 54, 57, I36, I4I, I56 permitting agencies, 64, 65; agricultural groups and, 78; citizen groups and, 78; dissolution of PILPs and, 66; relationships with groups, 78. See also competent ministries permitting standards. See under permitting systems permitting system, 52, 53-54, I72; for associations, 57; for foundations, 59; permission to form (kyoka), 54, 57, 64, I3J, I36, I4I; permitting standards, 64, 64, I3 I, I62; shift from permission (kyoka) to registration (touki) standard, I 56, I 57; for social welfare corporations, 59 Pharr, Susan J., 2I, 207ni philanthropy, I r. See also firansoropi PILPs. See public interest legal persons (PILPs) Plan International Japan, 40-4I pluralism, 120, I29, I75-I76, I86 policy. See public policy Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC), I40-J4I, I43 policy communities, I7I-I72 political contestation: Article 3 5 and, 84; drafting of Article 34 and, I 3 I; NPO law and, I33; political forces shaping, I3o; regulatory framework and, I69-I72. See also regulatory contestation

Index political institutional argument, 3, 7-S, IJ, I5-I~S5-S~ I09, I59, I6I, IS4; environmental movements and the, I 67; institutionalization of social movements as evidence for, I66; legitimation and, S2; NHAs and, 115-120; postage costs and the, I 67; public policy and the, I67; regulatory framework and the, I67; tax benefits and, 76-77; underprofessionalization and, 24-25 political opportunity structure, I5, I92I political parties, 22, IS4-IS5; legislation of the NPO Law and, I74; NHAs and, 95-96, 96; regulatory reforms and, I 7 4- I 7 5. See also specific parties politicians, 20-2I; incentives to promote group formation, I34, I 53, I 54, I?I; NHAs and, 97-9S; politicians' personal support organizations (kouenkai), 83, 99; in the U.S., 99 politics: coalition, I34, I47, 14S, I 54; electoral, I45-I5o; regulation of civil society organizations and, 72-73, I30-I5S Pollution Diet, ISI postage: discounts in the U.S., I, 22; political institutional argument and, I67; postage costs, 22; postal regulations, 22, S2-S3 post-retirement employment (amakudarisaki), 75, 78-79, So prefectures, relationships with nonprofit organizations (NPOs), I 54 private organizations, public revenues and,72 private school corporations, 59, 67. See also educational groups: educational corporations Private School Law (I949), Article 3, 59 professionalization, S, Io, 24, 32-46, 37, I 59; comparative, by country, 36; definition of, 33; media and, 33; public policy and, 33, I 59, I72, 2o6nio; volunteerism and, 2o6nio "Progress of the Discussions of the Governing Parties Non profit Organizations (NPOs) Project," I46 proportional representation (PR), I39, I 53, 2I4n11 protest, 22 public benefit tests: geographic test, 70; public support test, 70-7I public charitable trusts, 57, 6o Public Citizen, I77

249 public funds, IS public interest, so, 52, IJI, I32-I33, I62-I63; definition of "public interest," 54; legislation of the NPO Law and, I4I, I42 public interest legal persons (PILPs), I?IS, 22, 37-39, 47, 52; under a broad definition, 57, 59-60; bureaucratic intervention and, So; dissolution of, 66; employment in, 72; employment of ex-bureaucrats and, 7S-79; founding conditions of, 34; legal status and, 5 I53; under a narrow definition, 57-59, 66-67; NPO Law and, 54-57; number of employees, 34, 35; private initiative, 34-35; public interest and, 54; reform of Article 34 and, I 56, I 57; reporting duties of, 6 5; size of, 33-3 5; special PILPs, 76-77; taxation of charitable contributions to, 67 public policy, 10; advocacy groups and, I77-I7S; civil society and, I 59, I6o, I77, I85; dual structure of Japanese civil society and, I6o; environmental movements and, I65; fragmentation and policy making, I7I-172; NHAs' impact on, 86; political institutional argument and, 167; professionalization and, 33, I59, I72,2o6nio public revenues, 71-8o; advocacy groups and, 71, 72, 73-74; civil groups and, 73-74; disbursement of, 7I; environmental groups and, 72, 73; group autonomy and, 71; influences on group development, 72-73; private organizations and, 72; social welfare nonprofits and, 71; in the U.K., 75; in the U.S., 75 public sphere, 4, 205n4 Putnam, Robert, ror, 118, 124, rS5r86; on horizontal organizations, I25; on Italy, I02, 125, I27; Making Democracy Work, I02 Read, Benjamin L., 2IOni, 2r2ni6 recognition, 82 regime shift, 162 registration (toroku), 57, I56, I57 regulation, four principles of, I3I-I32, I32

regulatory contestation, 3, 8, 22, 25, I30, I6o, I69-I72 regulatory framework, 2, 8, I5, I6-I9, 25, I 59; bureaucracy and, I 57, I? I; changes in, 169, I72-I75, z73; citizen activism and, I69; civil society organi-

Index zations and, 171, 185; effects of, r6o, 185, 207n13; in Europe, 48; factors determining, I70-172; framers of, 130-I31, 162, 163; French and Japanese, compared, I?O-I?I; group formation and, 51-57; institutional factors and, I?I-172; in Japan, 16-19, 47-84; NPO Law and, 171; period of stasis in, 173; political contestation and, 169-172; political forces shaping, 130-158; political institutional argument and, 167; political parties and, I?O-I?I; politics and, 72-73, 74; regulatory classifications, conceptual mapping of, 57, 58; renovation of, 157-158; in the U.S., 16, 47-48; variation across countries, 184 Reimann, Kim, 39 Related Ministries Interagency Group for the Volunteer Issue. See Interagency Group (IAG) Religious Corporation Law (1951), Article 4, 59 religious corporations, 59, 67 religious groups: employment in, 77; formation of, so; Japanese and U.S. compared, r8r; legal status of, 74, 77; size of, 77 religious organizations, 4 Rengo (Japanese federation of unions), !51 reporting, 65; tax-deductibility and, 6970 "Report of the Nonprofit Sector Study Group," 152 research, media coverage of, 179, I8o, r8o residency, participation in NHAs and, 97 revolutionary groups, rso-151 Riker, William, 83, 170 ritsu-ryo codes, 49 Robertson, Jennifer, ror, II4-II5, 210-211n2 Rocard, Michel, 170 Rohlen, Thomas J., 14 rojinkai. See old people's clubs (rojinkai) Roosevelt, Franklin D., 171 Russia, 184 sairyo. See bureaucratic discretion (sairyo) Saitama Prefecture, 94-9 5, r 13 Sakamoto, Haruya, 126, 140, 141, 214n9 Sakigake Party, 134, 2I4-215n15, 216n31; legislation of the NPO Law

and, 138-139, 140-I4I, 143, 144145, 14~ 147,151, 15~214ni~ "Report of the Nonprofit Sector Study Group," 152-153 Salamon, Lester M., 21onr2 sanitary associations, 104, ros-ro6 Sankei Shinbun, 145 Sasakawa Heiwa Zaidan. See Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Sasakawa Heiwa Zaidan) Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Sasakawa Heiwa Zaidan), 43, 65 Sato, Koko, 150 Schreurs, Miranda, 167 SDP. See Social Democratic Party (SDP) security (anshin), 128 shadan houjin. See incorporated associations (shadan houjin) Shigeki, 95 shimin dantai. See citizens groups (shimin dantai); civic groups (shimin dantai) Shimizu, Hiroko, 2o6nro shingaku juku. See juku (cram schools) Shinto shrine associations, ros-ro6 Shipper, Apichai, 12, r8r Shitaya, 105 Sierra Club, 166 Simcock, Bradford, 122 single nontransferable vote system (SNTV), 153 Skocpol, Theda, 8, 185, 186, 2o6nrr Smith, Adam, 4 Smith, David Horton, 205-2o6n5 Smith, H. D., n6 SNTV. See single nontransferable vote system (SNTV) social capital, 7, 9, ro, 120, 159, 175I77, r86; civil society organizations and, 128-129; cross-national comparisons of, 124, 125-128; cultural construction of, 1 24; local civil society groups and, 86; meaning of in Japanese context, 124; measurement of, 127128; measures of, 125; nature of, 125; NHAs and, 92, ror-ro2, 109, 123129, 161, 213n19; organizational forms of, 125; role of the state and, 124-125; social construction of, 127128; state action and, 124-125; statesponsored, 125; trust and, 126 social capital theory, 124-125, 127 Social Contribution Group of the Social Affairs Bureau, 143 Social Contribution Promotion Committee, 143, 151

Index Social Democratic Party (SDP), 134, IJ7-I4I, I4}-I47, ISI-I5J, 214nrr,2I4nr2 social groups, formation of, 50 social heterogeneity explanations, I3 -14 social movements, 19, 21-22, 109, 159, r62, I65-I69; institutionalization of, I6J, I65-r66, r67; inward turn of, I68 social service non profits, 72; public revenues and, 76 Social Welfare Business Law, Article 22, 59 social welfare groups: legal status of, 77; social welfare corporations, 59, 67; social welfare legal persons, r8, 34, 65, 69, 72, 76-77; social welfare nonprofits, 71 societal explanations, r 6 r Soka Gakkai, I 52, 174, 2r8n9 Solidarity (Poland), 2 sovereign permission (kokuchou tokkyo shugi) principle, I3 I special corporations (tokushu houjin), 78 special interest groups, r 86. See also advocacy groups Special Non-Profit Activities Law (1998). See NPO Law (Law for the Promotion of Specified Non profit Actitivies). special nonprofit activities legal persons. See NPO legal persons. special public interest promoting corporations (tokuzou), 67, 68, 69; taxdeductible status and, 76-77 sports groups: budgets of, 78; legal status (houjinka) of, 78 standards (jyunsokushugi) principle, I 3 I state, the: mistrust of, 76; relations with civil society, 133, I34, I37-I55; statesociety boundary, 86 Steiner, Kurt, IOI, 103, Io7, IIO-rrr, 2I3n19 subgovernments, I7I-I72, 2r8n6 Sun Party, r 34, r 5I Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), 77, 85, I07-Io8 Susumu, Yanase, 148 Takami, Yuuichi, 2r6n3 I Takeshita, Noburu, 140 Tanaka, Naoki, 17 Tanaka, Shigeyoshi, res, ro6-I07 T'ang legal models, 49 taxation: bequests and, 69; charitable contributions and, 66, 67-71, 142; Fiscal Year 2oor Tax Reform, 22, 68,

I30, rss-rs6, rs8, I84; Fiscal Year 2002 Tax Reform, r84; Fiscal Year 2003 Tax Reform, 71; Japanese and U.S. compared, 2ronis; legislation of the NPO Law and, I42; local, 69; preferential, r 8, 22; reform of Article 34 and, IS6-IS7; tax benefits, I6, I8, 22, 66, 68, 76-77; Tax Bureau, I38; tax codes, r6, 22; tax-deductibility, 66, 67, 68-71, I7I; tax reductions for operations, 66 tertiary organizations, 4 "The SDP's Basic Thinking about the Citizens Activities Promotion Law (provisional name)," 144 think tanks, 4 Three Parties Policy Agreement, 142 Tilly, Charles, 22 Tocqueville, Alexis de, I23, 2I3n19 Tokugawa political order, 103 tokushu houjin. See special corporations (tokushu houjin) tokuzou. See special public interest promoting corporations (tokuzou) Tokyo: citizen groups in, 74, 207n4; civil society groups in, 8r; Kanda ward, res; NHAs in, 90, 94-9s, rooror, 104-106, II3-IIS, 117, 121I 22; study of groups in by field of activity, 77; surveys in, 191. See also Miyamoto-cho Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education, I3 tonarigumi system (neighbor groups), 107 TOPIC, I toroku (registration), 57, I 56, I 57 Toyoda, Shoichiro, rsr trade associations, 6o, 6 r traffic councilors, 86 trust: correlation with participation, 128; cross-national comparisons of, 128; distinguished from security (anshin ), I28; measurement of in Japan, 127; nature of in Japan, 128; NHAs and, I24, r6r; social, 82; social capital and, 126; of the state, 76; transition from specific to general, r 2 7, 12 8; in the u.s., !28 Tsujimoto, Kiyomi, 2qnrr Tsujinaka, Yutaka, 36-37,39,43-46, 72, 191, 193, 207ni6 Ueda City, Nagano Prefecture, 93, 94, 124 Ueda, Korekazu, ro2, rr2-rr3

Index Uniform Civil Code. See Japanese Civil Code unions. See labor unions; Rengo (Japanese federation of unions) United Kingdom, the, 75 United Nations' antidiscrimination pledge, I8I United States, the: advocacy groups in, 20, I77, I85-I86; ANES survey in, 126; associational density in, 30, 39; associational employees in, 36-37, 37; charitable contributions in, 68, 143; citizens groups in, 7 4; correlation between residence/workplace split and group participation, n8; decline of civil society in, 4; de Tocqueville on organizations in, I23; environmental groups in, 4I, 42, 73, I66, 167; environmental movement in, I66; foundations in, 43, 45, I86; generational change in, roi; groups for the elderly in, I24; growth of groups in, I64; incentives for associations in, 6; influence of civil society organizations on public policy in, I 84; Internal Revenue Service (IRS), p, 207n14; Japanese investment in, I43; labor movement in, 8I; labor unions in, 5; lobbying in, I 6 6, I7 I, I 77; local civil society groups in, 205-2o6n5; NGOs in, I66; non profit sector in, 30-3 I; occupation of Japan (I945-I952), 50, 77, III, I73, I73; policy debates on moral issues in, I8I; political system in, 83; politicians in, 99; postal discounts in, I, 83; pressure on Japan to liberalize agricultural markets, 8o; professionalization of advocacy groups in, I76, I76; public revenues in, 7I, 75; regulatory framework in, 47-48; religious groups in, 18I; rise of the advocacy sector in, 20; size of civil society organizations in, I65; tax deductions for contributors in, I7I; Tax Reform Act (I969) in, I6; tax treatment of nonprofits in, 207-2o8ni4; trust in, 128; volunteerism in, 32, 206n9 University of Tsukuba, I9I Upham, Frank K., 207ni3 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty renewal, 2; movement against, I65-I66 U.S.-led occupation of (I945-1952), I73; changes in the regulatory framework and, I73 Vietnam, II9 voluntary associations, 4, 90-92, I05

voluntary welfare commissioners (minsei iin), 86 Volunteer Basic Law, I37 volunteer groups: Hanshin earthquake and, I34; insurance and, I35; legal status (houjinka) of, I35, I36; media coverage of, I35-I36; public support for, I35-I36, I37; welfare (zoku giin) and, I47 volunteerism, II-I3, I09, 134, I4I; comparison between the U.S. and Japan, 32, 2o6n9, 2I3n5; professionalization and, 2o6nio. See also borantia; volunteer. groups Wakata, Kyoji, 97 Walzer, Michael, 6 Watanabe, Bungaku, I Wataumi, Kisaburo, 2I4nii welfare groups, I84 welfare legal persons, I47 welfare services, I4 7 welfare (zokugiin), I47, I84 White, James, 90, 100, 2I2ni8 Wild Bird Society of Japan, 42 women, participation in NHAs, 96-97 women's auxiliaries, IOI-I02 women's groups, I84 women's issues, I8I Wonderful Aging Club, I7 World Values Survey (WVS), 126, 2o6n6 World Vision, 39, 40,41 WVS. See World Values Survey (WVS) WWF Japan, 42 Yamagishi, Toshio, 128 Yamaoka, Yoshinori, 146, 2I6n34 Yamauchi, Naoto, 36 Yamazaki, Taku, 148 Yanase, Susumu, 2I6n3 I Yasui, Kouji, 94 Yatsu, Yoshi, I75 Year of the Volunteer, I35, 2I3n6 "Year of the Woman," I8I Yeom, Jaeho, 36-37 yobiko. See juku (cram schools) Yokohama, 81; NHAs in, 88, 90, 95, II3, II4 Yokohama Workers Collective, 214ni4 Yomiuri Shinbun, I45, q6, Ip, 2I5n25

zaidan houjin. See incorporated foundations (zaidan houjin) "zoku" Diet members, 20-2I

EAST-WEST CENTER SERIES ON

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