Japan's Changing Political and Security Role 9789814377850

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PACIFIC STRATEGIC PAPER 5

EliCH! KATAHARA is a postdoctoral fellow in the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCq at the University of California, San Diego. Before taking up his current position, he was a Lecturer in Japanese Politics in the Department of Political Science and Research Fellow in the AustraliaJapan Research Centre , both at the Australian National University.

The Pacific Strategic Papers focus on current issues in the field of strategic studies pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region . The series is aimed at a broad readership that ranges from the serious academic specialist to the wellinformed observer in the corporate and public sectors. Many of the Pacific Strategic Papers originate from studies conducted by the Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSP) of the Institute. The Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSP) was set up in 1981 to encourage study of various security issues and developments affecting the Asia-Pacific region. The Programme is based at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies under the overall supervision of its Director , who is guided by a regional committee, a Programme Planner, and a Co-ordinator. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development , and political and social change . The Institute is governed by a twenty-twomember Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government , the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director , the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

PACIFIC STRATEGIC PAPERS

JAPAN'S CHANGING PO I . ICA AND S CURITY ROLE Domes ic and In ernational Aspects E.IICHI KATAHARA

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved . No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical , photocopying, recording or otherwise , without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 1991 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its sppporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data Katahara , Eiichi Japan's changing political and security role : domestic and international aspects. (Pacific strategic papers ; 5) 1. Japan-Politics and goverment-19452. Japan-Military policy. 3. Asia, Southeastern-National security. I. Title . II . Series. DS501 I598 no. 5 1991 sls91-172199 ISBN 981-3035-98-6 ISSN 0218-1924 Typeset by Avant Garde Typesetting and Publishing Services Printed and bound in Singapore by Prime Packaging Industries Pte . Ltd.

Contents

v

Acknowledgements Introductio n

3

I.

The PoUcy Context

ll .

Dom ·c PoU thel9

Ill.

The Gull War and J pan' Putur Security Role

18

IV.

Regional Security and th Future of th Japan·U .S. Alliance

23

V.

Political and Economic Role in the Asi•·Paclfi c Region

28

Vl.

Coocl

31

and Security Policy Change in 6

Appendic a feJUe Program Outline National 1. feJUe Program (FY 1986·901 Tb Mid -~rm 2.

35

No

48

List of Abbreviati ons

58

42

Acknowledgements

2

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

security policy agenda for the 1990s and beyond: • the Gulf crisis and Japan's future security role; • regional security and the future of the Japan· U.S. alliance; and • Japan 's economic and political security in the Asia-Pacific region .

I. The Policy Context

Sinoe a country's security policy is a function of both international ful to provide a ketch of these and d m c conditi ns, it urity a.r rang ments n conditions so that the ev luti n of japan' be placed in a wider ntext . First. the lntemati naJ ituation . Three road changes in ioternati nal security affairs that have taken place during the postwar decades are particularly relevant to Japan.1 The first w a relative ~n of American po er in r latioo to th t of its allies . The of th countrl of W tern Bur pe and Bast Asia economic u brouJhl about a shift ln lh global eli lribution of wealth and power, thus endinJ the en of American economic preponderance of the 19501 and 1960s. By th late 19 . japan had attained economic gr t power status, emerging the world 's second la.rg t e nomy . national product (GNP) in dollar-denominated with i per capita terms exoeedina lh t of the nited Stat .• The second major change w lh attainment by the Soviet Union of the tatws of a military uperpower in both conventional and oudear capabilities.• This change . coupled with a r I tive de lin.e in American power, led W hington t.o urge its alii . including Japan . to shoulder more of th burden of common defence . Along with this . the growth In Soviet mmtary capabiliti during lh 1 7 and 19 0 i.oduced important chang in Japan ' d fen policy . urity affair Tb third broad change in postwar intern tiooaJ relevant to japan's consideratio of curity policy concerned the u • on the global political growing importance of "Third World

4

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

agenda. 6 Local and regional conflicts and the problems of economic development and regime change spilled into the Cold War politics of the superpowers and became a continuing factor in global political calculations. In this context, Japan was called upon to play a greater role in promoting economic development in Third World countries. Since the mid-1980s, even more dramatic changes in international security affairs have been under way. President Mikhail Gorbachev's commitment to perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) provided opportunities for revolutionary changes in political and economic configurations not only in the Soviet Union but in other countries, especially those in Eastern Europe .7 By the late 1980s, both the United States and the Soviet Union had begun a fundamental rethinking of their broad relations and national strategy and , in particular, embarked on a review of their military doctrines and force structures .8 Alongside the evolving international environment, domestic political and economic conditions in Japan have also undergone important changes during the postwar period . What is significant here is the fact that , while the legal and political constraints on growth in Japan 's defence capabilities remain intact , a national consensus emerged on the desirability of the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the Japan -U.S. security arrangements. In the first three decades of the postwar period, domestic opinion on defence issues in Japan was seriously divided. Japan 's major political opposition parties were adamantly opposed to the basic framework of Japan 's postwar security arrangements : the SDF and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty .9 Hence , an immediate and primary goal for Japanese defence policy in the postwar decades was to establish wider public support for the government's views on defence , and at least on the maintenance of the SDF and on the value to Japan of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the two pillars of Japan 's security policy . By the early 1980s, the debate on Japanese security had shifted from confrontational exchanges on the constitutionality of the SDF to more informed argument on questions of the degree and nature of Japan's defence build-up and the problems of strengthening Japan-U.S. security arrangements .10 Indeed, what has been challenged since the early 1980s is the "conservative pacifism" that postwar Japanese prime ministers, most notably Shigeru Yoshida , constructed and consolidated as the basic security posture for Japan. 11 With the emergence of Japan as an economic great power, policy makers in Tokyo began a search , which still continues, for an expanded economic and political role for Japan in the sphere of international affairs .12 This came about not only

Policy Context

5

from foreign pressures but from broad changes in Japanese politics, including the resurrection and resilience of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the 1980s, accompanied by growing bipartisanship on foreign policy issues within Japan itself. 13 While the Liberal Domocratic Party (LOP) continued to hold firm control of the Lower House in the February 1990 election, the future of Japan's political scene became unclear. The liberalization of agricultural markets, the Recruit Cosmos scandal, and the victory of the Japan Socialist Party (or the Social Democratic Party of Japan, hereafter the SOP) in the Upper House election of July 1989 led to a realignment of political parties. The future trend is, therefore, likely to be towards coalition governments. The LOP would need to accommodate Komeito , the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and possibly some members of the SOP in an effort to pass government bills in the Upper House, where the LOP lacks a majority of the seats.•• On the other hand , the SOP would strive to draw Komeito and the DSP into its policy platform, thus forging a coalition against the ruling LOP. If a coalition government is formed by the SOP and its followers some time in the 1990s or in the early twenty-fust century, its impact on Japan 's security policy would certainly be considerable and would have far-reaching implications for Japan-U .S. security relations as well as for regional security .15 Another important domestic factor that has affected Japan 's security policy was the end of the era of high economic growth in the mid1970s. It follows that the imperative of fiscal austerity arose as a result of deficit fmancing of the national budget , which had an impact on the politicizatioo of defence budget-making in the early 1980s, culminating in the abolition of the one per cent of GNP limit on the defence budget in January 1987.16 This notwithstanding , Japan has been able to sustain remarkably stable economic growth in recent years , a growth generated strongly by increased domestic demand. Externally , both the United States and the Soviet Uruon have been undergoing a fundamental reassessment of their global strategies . The future shape and n.a ture of Japan 's security policy will necessarily be conditioned by changes in superpower global en gagements and regional politico-strategic and economic developments on the one hand , and Japan 's domestic political and economic situation on the other. For the purpose of this study, it suffices that Japan's security policy in the 1980s and in the early 1990s can be usefully considered within the broader policy context discussed above.

II. Domestic Politics and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

Within a context that has been conditioned by changing international and domestic developments , it is the politics of policy making that produce particular policy decisions. The policy making process, necessarily compounded by considerations of political and bureaucratic power, embodies a crucial variable: the power of ideas. It is policy ideas , or the perceptions of policy makers, that play a central part in major policy decisions .17

Policy Ideas

Japanese defence policy making is a highly politicized process. It is a process characterized by conflict and consensus building through interactions among many bureaucratic and political actors, including the prime minister , the Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) , the Defense Agency UDA). the Ministry of Finance (MOF). pro-defence Liberal Democratic Party politicians boeizoku, and other domestic actors, as well as overt and covert pressures from the United States. In the broader process of policy making , public opinion and the mass media play a significant role in setting limits on the range of government decisions and actions.18 Five major policy ideas or perceptions seem to have underpinned the development of current Japanese security policy. These are : • the perceived need to develop a national consensus on security issues ;

Do1ttesffc

Pol/tiel Cllld S«cttri()l Polley Cha"'e In the 1980s

7

nomic ecurity ; and arge int rnationaJ re ponsibilities as to di

ed I he n C"Cd

8

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

into successive defence build-up programmes and the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (Appendix 1) . It should be noted, however, that for legal and domestic political reasons, Japan cannot become fully autonomous either in conventional or in nuclear capabilities. Therefore, the idea of self-reliance in defence had to be pursued in conjunction with the strengthening of the Japan-U .S. alliance, which, in effect, provided for the ultimate defence of Japan. 23 This brings us to the third policy preoccupation: the perceived need to bear a greater share of the defence burden, thus strengthening the Japan·U .S. alliance system . While seeking to achieve a greater degree of self-relian ce in conventional defence , Tokyo has embarked on a strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance structure since the midto-late 1970s. Persistent U.S. pressure on Japan to assume a greater share of the common defence burden and the perceived Soviet military threat prompted Tokyo to pursue a policy in this direction . There are. however, problems and uncertainties affecting the future shape and nature of the Japa n-U.S. alliance which will be discussed later. Fourth , Japa nese security policy makers believe that Japan 's physical sec urity is in extricably linked to its economic security. Japan ca n neither survive nor prosper without access to overseas mark ets . foreign e ne rgy, and food resource s ensured by the maintenan ce of an ope n international trading system . The Report on Comprehensive National Security , publis hed in 1980, is an indication of Tokyo 's emphasis on economic security .l-6 Th e fact that the majority of Japan 's foreign economi c aid goes to Asia exemplifies Japan 's enduring conce rn for economic development and political stability in th e regio n as well as for its pursuit of economic interests .:zs Finally , the idea that Japan , as an economic great power . must bear its fair share of international responsibilities has been on Tokyo 's policy agenda since th e 1980s . In a November 1987 policy speech to the Diet , Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita declared that "Japan henceforth must establish itself as a country that contributes to the international co mmunity and that it must use its wealth and vigour to benefit the world ... . Japan 's survival and development are premised on world peace and prosperity• .2" At the Toronto summi t of G7 nat ions in June 1988. Prime Minister Takeshita launched an ambitious pla n to spend USSSO billion in foreign aid over five years and outlin ed proposals to ease debt problems i.n the Third World .27 While many observers question Japan 's capacity for a global leadership role , the implications of Japan e mba rking on an international leadership role for future configurations of the global balance of power deserve serious consideration .

Domestic Politics and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

9

ln the actual process of policy making, all these policy ideas are intricately enmeshed; they are weighed against each other and against other political pressures arising from changing domestic and international conditions. It has been argued elsewhere that Japanese defence policy making can be best understood in terms of tensions that appear to be operating forcibly in the minds of Japanese security policy makers at three different levels: domestic politics , alliance politics, and military strategy.23 At the level of domestic politics, there is a tension between the policy makers' perceived need to establish a wider public consensus on defence matters on the one hand and , on the other. the need to be mindful of the deep-rooted "conservative pacifism· of the Japanese public. As noted above , whiJ the majority of the Japanese now accept the maintenance of the SOP and the Japan -U.S. Security Treaty. a firm national consensus on Japan ' further defenc build -up and on the further strengthening of the Japan·U.S. allianc structure bas yet to develop. At the level of alliance politi , there i a tension between th poli y makers for Japan 's political independence d ire of Japan and their conception of Japan 's national Inter t on the one hand and , on the other. their con iderations in managing th Japan · . . alliance. In formuJ ling ecurity polici . Japan e poli y maker make allowance for d mesli poHlical and ec n mi c condition s. emph iu lh importan of Japan 's international contributions in the non -military field , and k ep reiterating the daim that Japan -. iU not become a major military power - a ded ratory poli y aimed at everthel . J pane c policy maker dom tic and Asi n audien highly value the allian e relationship with the nited tat e and with continue to trengthen the mutu I curity W hington . At the le el of military str tegy . Japan i tr pp·d between perceptions of its securil)' inter ls on the one h nd and . on the other. the implications o( its entang1em ntln American global trat egy . J pan~ policy make have (or long been concerned with the pabilitie.s in the r •gion . the p~nce of Soviet off ns1ve military rel.ative dedine o ( Ameri n power . and the need (or Japan to disc.h.arge ils international responsibilities. They re also aware that nsiderable nd . becau e of Japan 's strategic vulnerabiliti are domestic poHtical constraints. J pan is unable to de clop offensive power projection capabilities to deal with large -scale military contingencies on its own . These tensions at the levels f dom lie politi . alliance politics and milit.ary strategy ch r d •riz.e dearly th • (r m e of p rcc ptions and ideas of Japanese policy maker during the period under review . The politics surrounding the doption of U1c Mid -Term Defcn~c

japan 's Changing Political and Security Rol~

10

Program (FY 1986-90). discussed below, show how these tensions and the process of their continuing evolution form the very basis of the defence policy making process in Japan.

Adoption of the

198~90

Mid-Term Defense Pro&ram

Much of the 1980s was overshadowed by the Cold War. During that period , Japan sought to attain full·fledged membership in the Western Alliance . The period saw a number of significant security policy developments, including Japan 's commitment to defend 1,000 miles of sea lanes from Tokyo Bay, the adoption and implementation of the 1986-90 Mid·Term Defense Program (Appendix 2). the abolition of the time· honoured one per cent of gross national product limit on the defence budget , and a number of measures aimed at strengthening the Japan·U.S. alliance arrangements . This analysis will focus on the adoption and implementation of the Mid·Term Defense Program because it represents a critical policy decision made in the 1980s with important implications for the future of Japan 's defence capabili ties, for the Japan-U .S. security arrangements, and for the regional balance of power .Z9 Throughout the 1980s, Japanese defence capabilities continued to increase significantly , facilitated by the implementation of the MidTerm Defense Program (MTDP). a multi-term defence build-up program for the period 1986-90. The MTDP was based on the 1976 National Defe nse Program Outline (NDPO). which , in general terms, provides guideli nes for Japan 's defence force development. 30 In November 1982, Yasuhiro Nakasone , former Director-General of the JDA (1970- 71) and a noted nationalist with a strong personality, became Prime Minister . During his time in office, some important elements of Japan 's defence policy were revised with the adoption of the 1989- 90 MTDP and the abolition of the one per cent of GNP limit on defen ce spending. Nakasone set his mind to work out a political climate favourable for revisions of both the NDPO and the one per ce nt rule on defence spending. The major factors behind Nakasone's determination were his concept of national defence (a greater self-reliance for Japan and the st rengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance); geopolitical pressures such as the regional Soviet military build-up; and U.S. pressure on Japan to assume a greater share of the defence burden . He was also convinced that Japan should play a more active and larger political role in the international arena, thereby departing from Japan's traditional low-key posture Y

Domestic Politics and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

11

Nakasone understood that "conservative pacifism" was deeply entrenched in the minds of the public and that any significant move towards revision of security policy would encounter formidable opposition . Nakasone therefore cautiously laid the groundwork for the pursuit of his policy objectives by setting up, in August 1983, a private advisory group, named the Study Group on Peace Problems. The group comprised eleven distinguished members, including Professor Masataka Kosaka of Kyoto University . On 18 Decembe r 1984, the group submitted a report entitled "Comprehe nsive Nati onal Security Policy for the International State Japan ", which , in line with Nakasone 's expectations , called for a review of the NDPO togeth er with the one per cent ceiling on defence spending n The JDA 's drafting of the third Mid-Term Defense Estimate ['59 Chugyo) (covering fiscal1986 to 1990) began , followingJDA Director· General Kurihara's instructions at the meeting of the National Defense Council on 8 May 1984. There was , howeve r , some hard bargaining between the JDA and the MOF at this meeting . Since th e gove rnme nt failed to achieve full funding for th e earli e r Mid -Term Defense Estimates, which fell short of th e NDPO 's defence force levels, the JDA wanted to achieve the NDPO force levels by the third Mid -Term Defense Estimate . However , the MOF insisted on holding down any substantial increase in defen ce spe nding. To counte r the JDA 's bid for a larger increase in defen ce spending . the MOF claimed that th e Mid -Term Defense Estimates were me rely "refe re nce mate rial s" for use by the JDA and therefore were not binding on the governme nt J 3 Pumio lk e uchi , a journalist fo r A salri Shimbun , describes th e bargaining betwee n th e JDA and the MO P: Supposedly the re was a hea ted exc hange between rep rese nt a tives of th e Finance Ministry and th e Defense Age ncy ove r th e wordin g of the instru ctio ns issued at th e mee tin g in the name of defe nse chi ef Kurih ara . The age ncy wanted the di rec tive to state th at th e goals of th e Na ti onal Defense Program Out lin e "w ill be ac hi eved ". At the insiste nce of th e Finance Minis tr y. howeve r, th e passage was revised to read that th e defe nse chi ef "expects to ac hi eve" the outlin e 's goals ' '

On 18 September 1985, the governme nt upgrad ed th e third mid · term defe nce es timate (which was an intra-gove rnm e nt al docum e nt of the JDA ) to a gove rnment programm e , duly rena med as th e Mid · Term Defense Program (MTDP) . 35 Thi s was a vi ctory for Nakasone , the JDA, and the pro-defence members of th e LOP in their bargainin g with the MOP. The official reason for thi s decision was that th e Nakasone governm e nt th ou ght it "advisabl e to indi cate th e government 's responsibility for the direction of [the] defe nse build up in terms of both contents and expenditures from the vi ewpoint that the appropriate civilian control should be expanded ." ·'"

12

japan 's Changing Political and Security Role

The intentions of the government, however, were far more political. First, with the MTDP as a government policy, the JDA's bargaining position vis·d·vis the MOF was upgraded because the JDA now could argue that it would be the government's responsibility to achieve full funding for the attainment of the force levels set out in the NDPO. Second, as Kiyofuku Chuma speculates. this decision clearly reflected Prime Minister Nakasone 's intention to "nullify" the ceiling of one per cent of GNP on defence spending since the estimated cost for the implementation of the MTDP was approximately 18.4 trillion Yen (in terms of value in fiscal 1985). equivalent to 1.038 per cent of the GNP currently projected for the five-year period 1986-90.37 Third, and as a consequence, Tokyo could placate the U.S. defence establishment which had expressed strong dissatisfaction with the slow pace of Japan's defence force development and its imposition of the one per cent GNP limit on defence spending. The stated goal of the MTDP was to attain the defence force levels laid out in the NDPO . However , a closer look at the contents of the MTDP reveals that the government expanded the initially limited scope of military operations of the SDF by interpreting the NDPO flexibly . Ambiguous phrases such as "the possession of the assorted functions required for national defense' and ' limited and small-scale aggression· in the text of the NDPO , allowed the JDA to include new requirements for the defence of sea lines of communication (SLOq . Prime Minister Suzuki had officially pledged this SLOC-protection plan to the United States in May 1981. Also included was a so-called "maritime air defence " [yojo boku] screen, a new security requirement for the defen ce of sea and air approaches to the Japanese home islands .38 The opposition parties and major sections of the press criti cized the government for adopting the MTDP which, they argued , would deviate from Japan 's ' exclusively defensive security posture ."39 The JDA justified the inclusion of new requirements for the defence of sea lan es (and air defence at sea [yojoboku]) in the MTDP on the grounds of the emergence of a new military situation in which potential threats could emanate from the opponents' 'seaborne missiles and mi ssil e-armed aircraft' ..w The 1988 Defence White Paper explains the background to this policy change in the following terms: As military technology bas advanced , the performance and capabili ty of aircraft in terms of speed , operational range and payload have been enhanced , and missiles with longer ranges have also emerged , th e threats from aircraft and missile attacks have greatl y changed . Conseq uentl y. aircraft have expanded their operational radius ove r the sea far from ground bases and , with the use of long· range . stand -off missiles they are able to attack radar sites and

Domestic Politics and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

13

airfields from over the sea, and they have also acquired the capability to attack surface vessels beyond the effective range of opponents' ship-to-air missiles. Judging from the trend of the airborne threat, it has become particularly difficult to effectively deal with seaborne missiles and missile-armed aircraft by using present equipment, and thus it has been necessary to study countermeasur es against such threats. 41

On the basis of the MTDP, the JDA's Study Group for Air Defense at Sea, set up under the newly established Defense Reform Committee in May 1986, has been conducting studies on the modality of an effective air defence system. 42 It should be noted, however, that the concept underlying the new requirements for the defence of sea lanes can be judged as going beyond the confines of the "standard defence force concept" on which the NDPO is based. As Chuma argues, ... the outline (NDPO) is aimed, not at bolstering Japan's defense capability to the point of being able to resist a potential enemy, but at maintaining a minimum necessary defense capability until the enemy's intention of aggression becomes clear.. .. [The MTDP, however,] calls for the ability to •cope with [the] international military situation, • but what this actually means is to have the capability to resist the military strength of a potential enemy. This goes against the NDP0. 43

Moving further in the direction of enhancing the role of the SDF, the Nakasone government also paved the way for a possible expansion of the size of the SDF by announcing that the NDPO's "attached table", in which the force levels of the SDF are set out, could be altered without revising the NDPO. According to the 1986 Defence White Paper: ... when the need arises for a reformation of equipment structure and other systems of the Self-Defense Forces in order to cope with further changes in, for example, the technological standards, the attached table of the Outline can be amended after deliberation and approval by the Security Council of japan and the Cabinet. Even if alterations to the attached table were to be made, this should not be interpreted as an immediate "revision" of the NDPO which would mean a change of the fundamental concept of the NDPO such as the •possession of defence forces capable of effectively coping with situations up to the point of limited and small scale aggression• outlined in the text. 44

14

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

While the table attached to the NDPO still remains the concrete targets of Japan's current defence force development, the implications of this statement are profoundly political. First, it could be argued that this statement virtually nullified the significant imposition of quantitative limits on the size of defence forces in peacetime envisaged in the NDPO . These quantitative limits were a focal point in the defence debate in the early 1970s. Second, the statement effectively dealt with the growing displeasure of the U.S. defence authorities about the force levels set out in the NDPO. Indeed, after this announcement, U.S. officials began to express strong support for the NDPO . At the 16th Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee meeting in Hawaii in January 1986, a forum for working-level defence officials of both sides to have a frank exchange of views on mutual security issues , U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph E. Kelly placed a high value on the concept underlying the NDPO. According to Shinji Yazaki , then Vice Minister of the JDA and a participant in the Subcommittee, There are three points in Kell y's remarks . First, the basic concept of the NDPO fits in with the present Japan-U .S. defence relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Second, should the NDPO be altered significantly , it would cause drastic cha nges to that basi-c fram ework and to the division of responsibilities between Japan and the United States. Third , for Japan to unilaterally possess such defense capability big enough to cope with all the threats of conventional and nuclear arms would be un desirable not only for Japan and the United States but for those countries on the periphery of Japan as well .45

What is clear from Kelly's statement is that the United States does not want Japan to develop an autonomous military capability (which necessarily involves offensive power-projection) in order to cope with the perceived Soviet military threat . The implication here is that Japan 's greater self-reliant defence posture needs to go hand in hand with its greater defence burden-sharing role which it has with the United States. The new requirements for the defence of sea lanes envisaged in the MTDP, therefore, reflect not only Tokyo's search for greater self-reliance in defence but also its response to American requests for defence burden-sharing. This, therefore , represents a further institutionalization of American influence in Japanese security policy making. Notwithstanding all this , with the implementation of the MTDP, Japan's defence force capabilities have increased substantially, with all three services receiving state-of-the-art weapons systems. By 1989,

Domestic Politics and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

15

Japan's defence capability not only became of considerable strength but was widely perceived as such, as described by Richard L. Armitage, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in somewhat sensational terms: Th deal with the formidable Soviet presence in the Far East, the Japanese have more than 50 destroyers in the maritime selfdefense force - more than twice as many as we do in the Seventh Fleet, which covers all of the western Pacific and Indian oceans . By 1990, the Japanese total on hand or on order will increase to 60 destroyers, including two with the Aegis air defense system . In the case of antisubmarine aircraft, we have about 23 P3Cs in the Seventh Fleet; the Japanese will deploy 100 at their bases located in close proximity to Vladivostok. The Japanese air self-defense force has 100 F-4 Phantoms and will have approximately 200 F-15 Eagles by 1990 - 300 is about the number of tactical aircraft we have defending the continental United States. In the 1990s, they will begin deploying more than 100 F-16s enhanced with advanced Japanese avionics and other improvements , the technology from which they will share with us if we so desire .46

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis of the politics of the adoption of the MTDP. First , policy ideas such as the need to establish a national consensus on security issues, the perceived need to achieve greater self-reliance in tandem with increased defence burden -sharing with the United States, and the idea that Japan should discharge international responsibilities , impinged on the process and substance of adoption and implementation of the MTDP . This reveals the interplay of the three basic tensions of Japan 's domestic politics, alliance politics and military strategy, as outlined above . Second, while the role of ministries and agencies involved in the entire process was pivotal, Prime Minister Nakasone took the leading role not only in facilitating the defence force development envisaged in the NDPO but also in going beyond the confines of the NDPO without revising it. He injected his idea of ocean , forward defence posture within the MTDP , while retaining the de fen ce-only philosophy of the NDPO on the one hand , and on the other , took full account of the demands made by the U.S. Defense Department. Third, the policy-making role of LDP politicians was enhanced over time, and there emerged a convergence of the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in the process of policy making. In particular, the prodefence members of the LDP effectively backed the Prime Minister's

16

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

initiative, in addition to supporting the JDA's bargaining position, thus playing an important part in the internal dynamics of policy making. Fourth, strong political pressures from the United States in the form of burden-sharing requests was a critical factor affecting the process and substance of Japan's security policy making. The Japanese political leadership harnessed U.S. pressures for their own policy goals . Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the United States has played unwittingly the role of a strong pressure group in Japan's domestic politics. Fifth, the government cautiously expanded the scope of military operations of the SDF both in geographical and functional terms through flexible interpretation of the NDPO and the accommodation of the security requirements desired by the United States to the text of the MTDP. While keeping the defence-only concept of the 1976 NDPO intact, the government moved forward in nullifying quantitative limits to the size of the SDF stipulated in the table attached to the NDPO . This , of course , led to a positive appraisal of Japanese efforts at defence planning by the United States. James Auer, for example, has written that Nakasone "eliminated obstacles preventing the smooth assimilation of an effective future defense capability . .. . Uapan's) security posture has been significantly bolstered, ... and the prospects are bright for a continuation of Pacific deterrence based on United States and Japanese cooperation, with Japan playing an increasing role ."47 Sixth, the SDF have undergone substantial qualitative modernization and improvement through implementation of the MTDP, which promised replacement of "obsolete" weapons systems with the most sophisticated ones available, and acquisition of new weapons systems that would meet the new requirements for the defence of Japan's sea and air approaches . This reflects not only the perceived need for selfreliance in conventional defence but, perhaps more significantly, Japan's integration into U.S. global strategy. A final point is that the domestic politics and security policy change in the 1980s possessed both positive and negative implications for the Southeast Asian region. Given the size of Japan 's defence budget, which is the world's third largest and is larger than the defence expenditure of all the ASEAN countries combined, and given the military hardware Japan has procured through the implementation of the MTDP, one could now argue that Japan is a regional military power. This line of reasoning clearly undermines Tokyo's repeated claim that Japan would never become a military power. It is, thus , not surprising that

Domutic Politia and Security Policy Change in the 1980s

17

there are persistent misgivings and suspicions about Japanese intentions related to their defence build-up policy. But , the argument presented in this section nevertheless challenges the simplistic . yet gradually prevailing view that Japan , as a great economic power. will inevitably become a major global military power. The essence of contemporary Japanese security policy making must be found , neither in the simplistic notion of Japan's great power ambitions nor in occasional manifestations of Japanese nationalism , but in the internal dynamism of the politics of security policy making. The member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations IASEAN) may feel reassured about Tokyo 's consistent efforts in strengthening its security ties with the United States. While it is true that pressure from the United States bas been a major factor behind Japan's steady process of rearmament , a strong case can be made that the Japan-U .S. alliance constitutes an important limiting factor in Japan's military role in the region, because it confmes Japan's military role to that of essentially defensive missions that supplement American global security missions. Therefore, Japan's increased integration into American global strategy represents a reassuring factor in regional security policy calculations. Perhaps more importantly, however, security policy decisions made in the 1980s such as the adoption of the MTDP and the abolition of the one per cent of GNP limit policy could mean that Japan's defence capabilities will increasingly affect the regional balance of power and even the global balance of power. As James Auer bas put it: ... in the 1980s the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are becoming a meaningful element of the military balance in the Pacific and have indirectly assumed global influence on deterrence . ... Under Nakasone's leadership , the government of Japan abandoned the publicly popular one percent barrier on defense spending ... . and adopted a five-year defense program for 1986-1990, in which Japan's defense prowess is taking a quantum leap forward ... . Given the advances the United States has already made and future advances in the field of smart weapons, Japan 's detection capability will have enormous consequences for regional and global deterrence. ~

Ill. The Gulf War and Japan's Future Security Role ·

There are now great uncertainties about the nature and scope of changes in great power relationships . It may be that the bipolar structure of the postwar world is undergoing a gradual shift towards a multipolar balance of power. If this is the ease, Japan will be required to reassess· the vjability of its postwar security framework so as to meet the new demands and pressures of a more complex multipolar system in the 1990s and beyond. Indeed, the Gulf crisis and war triggered an intense debate in Japan about how Japan could help maintain a stable international order under these rapidly changing circumstances. In other words, many Japanese were forced to think harder about the ways and means by which Japan could contribute to international security. Nevertheless, Japan's response to the Gulf crisis and war, exhibiting its familiar clumsiness of being "too little, too late", confirmed the image of Japan as a distinct international anomaly - an economic great power without commensurate military power and policy leadership. In stark contrast with other Western industrial democracies, Japan's contributions to efforts for international cooperation have been confined exclusively to non-military fields, such as medical support, and transport and communications co-operation. American pressures, including the high-powered "Bush phones"the push-button telephone calls from President Bush to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, requesting Japan's visible, timely and substantial contributions- proved to be a driving force behind Tokyo's decisions on financial and other non-military contributions, as well as behind

The Gulf War and Japan's Future Security Role

19

the drafting of the controversial United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill (hereafter referred to as the UNPC Bill). The UNPC Bill was designed to enable Japan to make significant contributions to the efforts of the UN for resolution of the Gulf crisis, yet it was interpreted by many as Japan's initiation as a full-fledged military power because units and personnel of the SDF were to be allowed to be sent to the Gulf. An intense and heated debate was touched off in the Diet and in the mass media; the debate this time may in fact open up an avenue for new global roles for Japan . On 24 April 1991, after the Gulf war was over, the Kaifu government decided to send Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers to the Gulf to help clear waterways for the first time since the inception of the SDF. This decision , according to Prime Minister Kaifu , was based on the following considerations:•9 • Japan is called upon by the international community to ensure the safety of maritime transportation in the Gulf, thus contributing to the rehabilitation of the war-torn states; • Given the vital importance of oil to Japan , the dispatch of minesweepers is in Japan's national interest; • The dispatch of minesweepers in peacetime without danger of being involved in a conflict is constitutional ; and • Article 99 of the Self-Defense Forces Law allows Japan to send minesweepers to ensure the safety of Japanese ships . It has been reported that both business circles and pro-defence LDP politicians put pressure on the Kaifu government to send the minesweepers sooner rather than later because the monsoon season in the Arabic Sea would be at its peak in June . The opposition parties, except for the Democratic Socialist Party , attacked the government because the dispatch of the SDF is problematical in the light of the Constitution and because the government bypassed a parliamentary debate on the issue .50 The process of Japan 's response to the Gulf crisis and war has indicated that Japan 's security policy making is still bedevilled by fundamental tensions , as discussed previous! y. However, it is important to note that the substance , if not the form , of Japan 's security dilemmas have changed , as have the policy mak ers involved in the process . New arenas for Japan 's security role have begun to suddenly open up . At the domestic political level , the process revealed a tension between the policy makers ' perceived need to establish a national consensus on security matters (note that the central issue concerns the dispatch of the SDF under UN auspices) and , on the other , the need to be mindful of the deep·rooted conservative pacifism of the Japanese public. According to an opiruon survey , conducted by Asahi

20

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

Shimbun, 78 per cent of those interviewed opposed the dispatch of the SDF abroad, and 58 per cent opposed the UNPC Bill, with only 21 per cent expressing their approval of it. 5 1 Another opinion survey of the members of the Lower House showed that less than half of the LDP members expressed strong support for the UNPC Bill and that all the members of the opposition disapproved of it. 52 In an important sense, therefore, the demise of the UNPC Bill meant that concern for public opinion represented a formidable constraint on the government's attempt to achieve a consensus on the dispatch of the SDF abroad for collective security. The decision on the dispatch of minesweepers to the Gulf came only after the war was over but it nevertheless attracted considerable public criticism. 53 At the level of alliance politics, the process revealed an intricate tension between Tokyo's desire for political independence and its conceptions of national interests on the one hand and, on the other, its considerations of how to manage the alliance with the United States. A host of measures announced on 29 August , more than three weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August , included the dispatch of non-combatant personnel serving in transport , medical care and communication branches of the SDF, as well as financial support for U.S. charter planes and emergency economic aid to Egypt, Turkey and Jordan. On 30 August, Tokyo decided to provide US$1 billion for the multilateral forces in the Gulf. All of these , however ' fell short of international expectations and engendered negative reactions , particularly from the U.S. Congress, regarding the level , quality and timing of Japan 's contributions. With U.S. displeasure reaching a new high , Tokyo made the decision to provide a US$3 billion package of aid for peace-restoring activities in the Gulf region and for economic development and evacuee relief for frontline states like Jordan, Turkey and Egypt. 54 After the outbreak of the Gulf war , Tokyo decided to provide an additional US$9 billion to support the U.S.-led multilateral forces fighting in the Gulf. Japan's contributions thus reflected the expressed requirements of the United States. At a press conference on 29 August, Prime Minister Kaifu himself stressed that he would not consider a new security role for the SDF. It was then that the UNPC Bill emerged. It stipulated the involvement of the SDF as units and/or personnel in a Corps. This arose on account of Prime Minister Kaifu succumbing to the demands put forward by the LDP's Big Three - Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa, Chairman of the Executive Council Mutsuki Kato, and Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council Takeo Nishioka. Kaifu's earlier idea of not sending the SDF abroad was thus overridden by the argument put forward by the LDP's new generation leaders that Japan had global responsibilities. Ozawa argued:

The Gulf War and japan's Future Security Role

21

The most importan t task Japan now faces is how to assume its respons ibility in the internat ional commun ity in a way commen surate with its economic might. The significance of the bill is that the government and the governing party have made an importan t judgmen t that this country is to positively assume its expecte d role and respons ibility through U .N .-initiat ed international collaboration. 55 Given the fact that Ozawa had frequently met with U.S. Ambassador

Michael Armacost to discuss Japan's contributions, it could be said that the inclusio n of the SDF in the Bill reflected the LDP leaders' desire for Japan to discharge its internat ional responsibilities, and also their desire to meet and possibly go beyond the requirem ents laid down by the United States. However, the subsequ ent demise of the Bill meant that the earlier concern for the Constitution, and the percept ion of its Asian neighbo urs of what Japan was about to do, prevaile d over its perceiv ed need to embark on a new security role. The Gulf crisis, neverth eless, forced Japan to tackle the question of how internat ional law and order can be effectively maintai ned in a rapidly changin g world. As noted previously, a consens us had been emergin g since the 1980s that Japan should fulfil internat ional responsibilities as a great economic power. In the 1990s, we can envisage an intensification of the pressure s on Japan to move in the directio n of the fulfilment of such responsibilities. Having said this, three significant domesti c changes that are currentl y under way deserve close attentio n. First, the Japanes e debate on security issues has entered a new phase; now, the heart of the issue is Japan's security role for the maintenance of an international order. The scope of the debate ranges from the position of conservative 57 pacifism56 to the idea of dispatching the SDF abroad. In between stand various views and perspectives, includin g the establis hment of a UN standing force and Japan's involve ment in it. 58 Second, the current debate on Japan's security role points to a further develop ment of bipartis anship on security issues. Michisada Hirose, an editorial writer for Asahi Shimbun, identifies four commo n 59 grounds among the political parties: • Japan needs to contribu te to internat ional co-operation for peace not only in terms of money but also in terms of personn el. • The governm ent needs to create a new organiz ation for internat ional co-operation and peace with adequat e revisions of the existing laws . • This organization must be governm ental organization. • The necessit y for the creation of such an organization would

a

22

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

need to be well appreciated by the public as well as by the neighbouring Asian states. Immediately after the demise of the UNPC Bill, the LDP moved to accommodate the Komeito and the DSP in an effort to create a political coalition necessary for new legislation.60 The SDP, on the other hand, began to seek a coalition with the Komeito and the DSP in putting forward a different bill from the one being prepared by the LDP. 61 But given the lack of majority for the LDP in the Upper House, it is likely that the LDP will have to consider seriously the views of the opposition parties. Third, new generation leaders of the LDP, in particular SecretaryGeneral Ichiro Ozawa, and Chairman of the Executive Council Takeo Nishioka, put pressure on Prime Minster Kaifu to accept their idea of allowing the SDF to be sent overseas. It was these individual politicians at the apex of power, rather than JDA officials or personnel of the SDF,62 who twisted the draft bill and injected the SDF into the UNPC Bill . Older generation leaders such as the power broker Shin Kanemaru, Masaharu Gotoda who served as Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Nakasone government, and Kiichi Miyazawa, the leader of a major faction, expressed reservations about an expanded security role for the SDF. 63 The international implications of Japan's response to the Gulf crisis and war are not clear at the time of writing. Some Asian countries, especially China, expressed misgivings about the UNPC Bill as well as the decision to send minesweepers to the Gul£. 64 Singapore , Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia welcomed Japan's efforts toward collective security under the auspices of the United Nations, including a UN peace keeping plan to settle the Cambodian problem. 65 The decisive victory of the U.S.-led multinational forces in the Gulf war has meant that the United States will remain the most credible superpower that can take initiatives in global security affairs. Along with this, some mechanisms of the United Nations peacekeeping operations would be significantly strengthened. In the long run, an international forum for security policy consultations could be created in the region. The focus of this study now shifts to a discussion of regional security and the future of the Japan-U .S. alliance.

IV. Regional Security and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

As the United States reviews its global strategy as well as its forward deployed forces and overseas bases, there is now growing concern , especially among Southeast Asian countries, that reductions in U .S. military deployments would create a power vacuum in the region, and that that vacuum might be filled by some regional powers like Japan, China or India. Tai Ming Cheung of the Far Eastern Economic Review attributes the naval build-up of ASEAN states and their expanding naval co-operation to the real possibility of a U.S. pullout from the Philippines in the next few years . He says: "The U.S . naval presence has been a central pillar of Asia's strategic balance in the past few decades . Any pullout would lead to a power vacuum , at least in the view of regional defence planners, which could see China or India attempting to fill the gap." 66 Many others argue that the reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces in the region will create a power vacuum that "will lead to an expanded military role for Japan ". 67 Former Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan 's proposal that Thai and Japanese navies should take part in joint exercises in the South China Sea was widely criticized by other ASEAN countries. 68 Needless to say, memories of World War II remain deeply rooted in the minds of many Asian people . Jusuf Wanandi , of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta , put it this way: The worry that is in everybody's mind is that if the Americans are really going to withdraw suddenly, somebody else is going to fill the vacuum . .. . if Japan became a regional military power, many Asian countries , including China, South Korea , the Philippines and Malaysia, would be alarmed.69

24

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

Although the long-term prospects of reductions in the superpowers' military deployment in the region are unclear, and worrying prospects for regional conflicts remain/0 in the short and medium term, it is unlikely that the U.S. would leave such a power vacuum to be filled by regional powers, and the chances are the Japan-U.S. alliance will continue to serve as a stabilizing security framework for regional security. It should be stressed that U.S. policy makers are well aware of the danger of creating a power vacuum in the region, as Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, for example, said in February 1990: If we were to withdraw our forward-deployed forces from the Asia-Pacific region, a vacuum would quickly develop . There would almost surely be a series of destabilizing regional arms races, an increase in regional tensions and possibly conflict . ... one of the reasons the United States wants to stay involved in Asia is that our involvement helps promote regional stability.71

The U.S. Department of Defense report , "Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim" , released in April 1990, also observes, A diminution of U.S. commitment to regional stability, whether perceived or real , would create a security vacuum that other major players would be tempted or compelled to fill . Such a scenario would likely produce a regional arms race and a climate of confrontation . Our policies- political , economic , and military - should evolve to avoid such a possibility and to support our unique and central stabilizing role n

Reductions in the U.S. forces , therefore , would likely take place in a carefully measured fashion after extensive consultations with friends and allies in the region .73 It should also be noted that the prospective reductions in the deployment of U.S. forces in the near term are quite modest, about 10 per cent of the existing forces in the region .74 On balance , the key for regional security has been and will continue to be the Japan-U.S. alliance because: 1. it allows the United States to maintain its viable forces in East Asia and the Pacific (so as to deter war) ; 2. it constitutes an indispensable basis for Japan's security planning Uapan 's defence) ; 3. it guarantees against Japan's acquisition of offensive military capabilities (a stabilizing factor); and 4. it reassures many Asian states in the region (reassurance) .75 Having said this, a possibility does exist that a serious conflict could arise from within the coalitions and alliances created and consolidated in the era of the Cold War. This is what Edward Luttwak

Regional Security and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

25

refers to as "an internalization of conflict•, meaning a fragmentation of the grand coalitions of Americans, East Asians, and Europeans, precipitated by U.S.-Soviet detente. 76 In respect of Japan-U .S. relations, Luttwak believes that "With fears of the Soviet Union rapidly waning, the logic now works in the opposite direction, to reveal divisive interests, values, and emotions which are rapidly promoting Japan into the unlikely role of Chief Enemy for many Americans, in lieu of the Soviet Union."77 Indeed, the current climate of Japan-U .S. relations, plagued by perpetual economic frictions and recently further exacerbated by Japan's awkward response to the events in the Persian Gulf, points to a possible crisis at some point in the future. It now appears that dissatisfaction felt by many Americans about Japan's poor contribution to the management of international security as well as its less than open trade practices has been growing to the point of exploding. 78 There have also been disquieting signs of rising nationalism on both sides of the Pacific. 79 No doubt, these developments contain the seeds of the potential rupture of the Japan-U.S. alliance with all its implications for regional security. Under these circumstances, substantial adjustments in the form and nature of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would be necessary. • Japan's increased self-reliant jbut exclusively defensive) security posture. Japan should be responsible for the defence of its homeland and territorial waters. The plans for the defence of sea and air approaches (yojoboku or air defence over the sea) should be pursued within the framework of an exclusively defensive security posture and with extensive consultations with regional powers.80 • Japan's increased financial support for the U.S. forces in Japan. This is apparently designed as a policy of defence-burden sharing. Nevertheless, the idea of having U.S. forces in Japan paid for by Japanese money is problematical, if not inappropriate. Japanese financial control over U.S. forces and facilities would mean that the U.S. control over its own forces stationed on Japanese soil would be diminished. This, in turn, would represent a de facto devolution in the alliance system. It should also be noted that Japan's increased financial support for U.S. forces in Japan is likely to produce a negative public perception both in the United States and Japan that U.S. soldiers are serving the Japanese as their mercenaries. • Establishment of a smooth host-nation support system in time of emergency !including development of effective air and sea lift capabilities). Before U.S. forces in Japan are scaled down substantially, some effective mechanisms should be worked out, so that U.S. forces stationed in Guam, Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States

26

Japan's Changing Political and Security Role

could be transferred to the Northwest Pacific when required during an emergency. This would require high levels of interoperability between Japanese and U.S. forces as well as much closer consultation, joint studies on defence (including analysis of threats, warning time and preparation time required for the mobilization of military forces and so on), and exchange of military intelligence enhanced by an advanced surveillance system . In March 1990 Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu outlined the goals of the new international order in general terms: • to ensure peace and security; • to respect freedom and .democracy; • to guarantee world prosperity through open market economies; • to preserve an environment in which all people can lead rewarding lives; and • to create a stable international order founded upon dialogue and cooperation .8 1 Kaifu argued that the key element in an effort to help create a stable international order is the maintenance of close ties with the United States. In his words , Our two economies together account for about 40 per ce.n t of the world 's collective gross national product , and we thus share a heavy obligation to contribute to global peace and prosperity through joint efforts to deal with problems now facing the entire human race. This is the context in which President George Bush and I int e nd to pursue what we have labeled a 'global partnership ' _al

In April 1990, Richard Solomon , U.S. Assistant Secretary of State (for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), argued in a similar vein . The starting point for a global partnership, Solomon believes, is "a shared commitment to fundamental values and common purposes democracy; human rights ; open markets and the free flow of goods , capital and ideas; and concern for the environment ". Solomon suggested four components to this global partnership: security; foreign policy co-ordination; economic co-operation and Japan 's global role . There are several problems with the idea of Japan-U.S. global partnership as a framework for a new international order. The idea itself is ambiguous and hence could be interpreted by other states as a form of great power condominium, an international system dominated and managed primarily by the United States, which forms the nucleus, with Japan and other great powers in orbit around it. It is not clear what roles great powers such as Japan, China, the Western European nations and the Soviet Union would play in the maintenance of an international order.

Regional Security and the Future of the japan-U.S . Alliance

27

Another problem with the idea of a Japan-U.S. global partnersh ip is that it obscures the inevitabl e elements of devolutio n in the JapanU.S. alliance system. Prospect ive reductio ns in U.S. military deploym ents would mean that the U.S. role would probably change from that of the dominan t protector to a supportin g ally, thus letting regional powers including Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN states and Australia bear the primary responsib ility for their own defence and, consequently, regional security. Such a process of devolutio n in the U.S. alliance system, which seems to be currently under way in NATO, would have to be effected in a carefully measured fashion, involving consultat ion among regional powers through both bilateral 83 and multilate ral fora and channels of communi cation. In the long run, a more viable framewo rk for regional security would be one based on multilate ral institutio ns such as the United Nations. The creation of a regional forum designed to encourag e extensive consultat ions and negotiati ons on security issues among the states in the region would help generate a political climate conduciv e to new mechanis ms for regional security. For example, some innovativ e measures for arms control and confidenc e building 84 for the region could be worked out in this context.

V. Political and Economic Role in the Asia-Pacific Region

The main focus of the analysis in the preceding pages has been on significant developments in Japan 's security policy during the 1980s and the early 1990s. It was argued that a changing security policy is the outcome of domestic and alliance political processes, where the shifting perceptions of policy makers play a crucial role in effecting desired policy changes. It was further suggested that the Japan-U.S. alliance will remain the key to the maintenance of regional security, although some adjustments in the nature and form of alliance arrangements will be inevitable . While the debate on Japan 's enhanced security role is highly controversial , it has been widely recognized that the main arena in which Japan could discharge international responsibilities most effectively would be in the area of economic policy. The purpose of this section is to identify problems that will confront Japan as it plays a greater political and economic role in the region. Before discussing this question , it would be useful to canvass some distinctive developments evolving in the East Asian economies and their trading patterns.85 Among many changes currently under way in the regional political economy, the following are of particular note: • East Asia represents the most economically dynamic region in the world; the economic policies of the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) and the major ASEAN countries are outward· looking with exports of manufactured products being a major driving force in economic growth .

Politicol tl1tll Bcoi'IOmic Role i" the Asia-Pacific Region

29

• ln this process, the governments of Bast Asian countries play an important role in promoting rapid economic development, particularly in manufactured exports, and in cultivating a skilled and highly motivated work force . • In the 19808, the eoonomic growth of the NIBs and the major ASBAN countries was predicated o.n an open American market. There is no doubt that the United States has served as an engine of eoooomic growth for the countries of Bast Asia .16 • Since the revaluation of the yen in September 1985, there has been a shift in trading patterns in the region . Japanese money and manufacturing enterprises began to go offshore , as manifested in the massive increase in Japan ' investment in Europe. the United States. Asia and Australia . The doubling in the value of the yen also acx::elerated Japan 's imporu of manu{act"ured product fro m the NlE and the major ASBAN untries. Japan is the ftr t o r second trading partner of most of the countries in the region . Con quentJy . we now have a regional economic system in which Japan and the United States play the crucial role in strengthening the integration of regional economies as absorbers of exports from the region and as sources of capital and techn Logy which are cri tically important to the region's economic development. The regional econ mi ystem abo exhibits a strong trend towards a high degree of economic inter a ti on in trade and in investment within the region . • There bas been a trend towards the development of regional economic institutions, including the Pacific Bconomi Cooperation Conference (PHCCI and the Pacific Basin Economic Council IPBECI . In particular, the newly ·formed Asia Pacific Emnomi Coope ration growing con m about the future of an (APECl forum indicat open , multilateral and non-discriminatory trading sy tern . urrently ruguay Round of trad ' threatened by diffi ulties with the negotiations and per istent protectioni t sen timent in many countries."' • Since the revaluation of the yen in September I 85 . Japan has become the core of the emerging Asia ·Pac:ifi c economi syst •m ... As a provider of capital . technology and foreign u.id , J 1pnn plays a crucial role in emnomic deve.l pment in the region IL'i well 115 in the ma.nagement of a multilateral trading ystem . ,v, noted above , Japan i5 now an important absorber of manufa lured goods from the regional economies. There are problenu. both old and new , with J pan ' increased political and economic involvement in the region . The first is end uring but symbolic: the lingering distrust of the Japanese and the fear of a revival of Japanese militarism . Many observer justify these conce rns

30

japan's Changing Political and Security Role

by pointing to the fact that Japan has failed to acknowledge officially its own past deeds in wartime and that there are some influential Japanese politicians and opinion leaders whose chauvinistic remarks represent a severe case of historical amnesia .~ ' The second problem has to do with a growing perception of Japan as seeking economic prepQnderance in the region . Given the huge volume of Japan's direct investment and flow of aid to regional countri es. there is a perception that Japan has replaced the United States as the chi ef supporter of Asian economic development. 91 There is even a fear that Japan may use its financial and technological power to build a Japanese-designed . Japanese-controlled . industrial structure within the region - a modern version of Japan 's Greater East Asia Co-pro perity Sphere. 93 Perce ptions of this kind have political ramifications of daunting proportions . If the idea of Japan 's economic domination prevails, it will undoubtedly arouse nationalistic sentiments throughout the region . including the United States and Australia. where Japanese investment has been growing rapidly . Nationalism would al.s o be touched off in some sectors of Japanese society, particularly those inte rest s se riou sly affected by the continuing Liberalization of agricultural markets . Finally. the expanded role for Japan in the regional economy could lead to the perception that American political influence in the region has been on the decline . It can be argued that an erosion of America 's politi cal influence in the region would in the long run undermine its commitment to regional security .... An agenda for Japan 's future political and economic role in the region should , therefore. include : • Japan 's desire to gain trust and credibility as a responsible and compassionat e member of the international community by acknowledging the past to be wrong and by acting on its own initiative for the promotion of the welfare of the international community ; • Japan 's willingness to make structural adjustments for the wider economic interests of the region by further opening up its domestic economy so as to absorb manufactured exports from the region ; and Japan's readiness to play a political leadership role for the maintenance of an open. multilateral trading system wilJ be crucial ;96 • Japan 's leadership role in international development assistance by creating a new policy-making structure and a new agenda for foreign aid policy .96

VI. Conclusions

The postwar decades witnessed a significant metamorphosis of Japan 's security arrangements. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces grew into a modern military establishment with increasing combat capabilities and the Japan -U .S. alliance was strengthened substantially . By 1988, Japan 's annual defence budget was the third largest in the world , second only to that of the superpowers, although it remained at the one per cent of GNP level. The strengthened Japanese commitment to the Japan-U .S. alliance bas become evident in joint defence planning, joint military exercises, military technology exchanges , and increased sharing of the maintenance cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan . We have seen how this metamorphosis took place by focusing on the politics of defence policy making. This study has argued that Japan 's security policy making is bedevilled by fundamental tensions at three different dimensions of policy making: domestic politics, alliance politics, and military strategy. Japan 's response to the Gulf crisis bas confirmed that these fundamental tensions have yet to be resolved , but there have been some important domestic changes triggered by the Gulf crisis. Though sufficient support for the UNPC Bill could not be mustered , a growing bipartisanship on security policy issues did emerge, along with renewed debate on Japan 's role in regional and global security, supported by the enhanced power of the new generation leaders in security decision making . While the simplistic notion of Japan 's great power ambitions , reinforced by occasional manifestations of Japanese nationalism , has a popular appeal , political leaders in the Southeast

32

japan 's Changing Political and Security Role

Asian region would need to keep a close watch on the internal dynamism of Japanese security policy making. As this study has argued strongly, it is the politics of policy making that produce particular policy decisions of regional and global significance. It has also been argued that the Japan-U.S. alliance will remain the main key to regional security, and therefore be an essentially reassuring factor. But some questions need to be raised about how the alliance will be managed in the future. Given the likely changes, both domestic and external, it will be necessary for Japan to articulate the future direction of its defence posture more clearly, including the ways in which Japan intends to contribute to the international order both in regional and global terms. Japan must consider at least the following questions: 1. How can Japan maintain its "exclusively defensive" security posture, while enhancing its capacity for self-reliance in defence?; 2. How can it manage its relations with the United States in these circumstances? 3. How can it come to a new modus vivendi and co-operate with neighbouring countries over security in these changed conditions? 4. How can it create workable mechanisms for building confidence and introducing arms control measures in the region? Finally, a case has been made for a strong leadership role for Japan, not only for its own economic and political security in the region but also for the wider interests of the Asia-Pacific region, including the management of an open, multilateral trading system. It is important to note that policy dilemmas with which Japanese policy makers are destined to wrestle in the foreseeable future are not something that the Japanese political leadership can resolve on its own. The emphasis, therefore, has been on the importance of a multilateral approach to security, trade, and other economic issues . Whether or not rising nationalism in Japan, the United States, and possibly in other major powers such as China and India, can be channelled into a constructive international force in creating a new global order remains to be seen. As a final point, perhaps Stanley Hoffman is right to remind us of the significance of domestic conditions to international security: One lesson of the confrontation in the Gulf is the increasing importance of domestic conditions in fostering international conflict, and the difficulty that international society has in coping with its members ' internal affairs .97

Appendices

Appendix 1

Attached Paper

National Defense Program Outline 1. Objectives Japan's possession of a defense capability within the scope permitted by the Constitution is not only a concrete expression of the people's will to safeguard the nation's peace and independence , but also aims - together with the Japan-United States security arrangement - directly at forestalling any aggression against Japan and repelling such aggression should it occur. Concurrently, the very fact that Japan firmly maintains such a defense posture contributes as well to the international political stability of Japan's neighboring region . A major consideration in this regard is the nature of the defense capability which Japan should possess . Assuming that the international political structure in this region - along with continuing efforts for global stabilization - will not undergo any major changes for some time to come , and that Japan's domestic conditions will also remain fundamentally stable, the most appropriate defense goal would seem to be the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression . The emphasis is on the possession of the assorted functions required for national defense , while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support . At the same time, it is felt that consideration should be given to enabling this defense posture to contribute to the domestic welfare through disaster-relief operations and other such programs .

36

Appendices

Japan has steadily improved its defense capability through the drafting and implementation of a series of four defense buildup plans. At this time, the present scale of defense capability seems to closely approach the target goals of the above-mentioned concept. This outline is meant to serve as a guideline for Japan's future defense posture in the light of that concept . Based on the information given below, efforts will be made to qualitatively maintain and improve defense capability, and fulfill the purpose of that capability, in specific upgrading, maintenance and operation of defense functions.

2. International Situation An analysis of the current international situation, at the time of drafting this outline, was made as follows : During recent years, the world community has witnessed a pronounced trend toward more diversified international relations. While nationalistic movements have become more active in some countries , simultaneously there has been marked intensification of interdependence among nations. Against this background , the major geopolitical blocs of East and West which center on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and their continued overwhelming military strengths- have continued a dialogue aimed at avoiding nuclear war and improving mutual relations, allowing for certain twists and turns along the path . In many individual regions as well, various efforts are being made to avoid conflict and stabilize international relations . Deeply-rooted factors for assorted confrontations remain within the EastWest relationship revolving around the United States and the Soviet Union, however, and intra-regional situations as well are fluid in many aspects with various elements of instability observable. Within the general neighborhood of Japan, an equilibrium exists, involving the three major powers of the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Tension still persists on the Korean Peninsula, however, and military buildups continue in several countries nearby Japan . Under present circumstances, though, there seems little possibility of a full-scale clash between East and West or of a major conflict possibly leading to such a clash, due to the military balance - including mutual nuclear deterrence - and the various efforts being made to stabilize international relations. Furthermore, while the possibility of limited military conflict breaking out in Japan's neighborhood cannot be dismissed, this equilibrium between the super-powers and the existence of the Japan-US security arrangement seems to play a major role in maintaining international stability, and in preventing full-scale aggression against Japan .

37

3. Basic Defense Corte¥pt (1) Prevention of Armed Invasion Japan's basic defense policy is to possess an adequate defense capability of its own while establishing a posture for the most effective operation of that capability to prevent agression. In addition, a defense posture capable of dealing with any aggression should be constructed, through maintaining the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement and insuring the smooth functioning of that system. Against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability United States. the of (21 Countering Aggression Should indirect aggraalon - or any unlawful military activity which might lud to agreuion lpinat thi.s nation - oocur, Japan will take immediate respoosive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage. Sbould direct agp ·on occur, Japan will repel such aggression at the e by taking immediate responsive action and trying to earliest pouible systematic operation of itl defense capability. Japan integrated, conduct an aggr ion, in principle , without external smaU-.ca.le and limited repel will iltanoe. In cues where the unassisted repelling of aggression is not 'ble, due to acale, type or other £actors of such aggreuion, Japan will ~ continue an unyielding retiatanc:e by mobilizing all available forces until such time cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffmg ucb qpasion.

4. Posture of NatioiUJl De{ert.N In ac:oord.ance with the above defense concepti, Japan will maintain a ddeue capebility of the postures spelled out below and the systems described in Sec:tion V. Tb.i.a defense capability will meet the functional and postural requi.rements out.lined in Section I u to what Japan should possea.s. At the same time, it will be standard.ized 50 that, when serious changes in situations 50 dem•nd , the defense tructure can be smoothly adapted to meet such changes: (1I Setup of Warning and Surveillance Japan's defense structure must possess continuous capability to conduct warning and surveillance misaiona within Japan's territory and neighboring sea and airspace u well to collect required intelligence.

(ZJ Setup for Countering Indirect Aggreulon and Unlawful Actions by Meant of Use of Military Power (i) Japan's defense structure must posaesa the capability to act and take the required atepa to respond to such cues u intense domestic insurgency with ext.ernalauppo rt, organized personnel i.nflltration and arms smuggling, or the covert uae of force in Japan's nearby sea and airspace.

38

Appendices

jii) Japan's defense structure must be capable of immediate and pertinent action to cope with aircraft invading or threatening to invade Japan's territorial airspace . j3) Setup for Countering Direct Military Aggression Japan's defense structure must be capable of taking immediate responsive action against any direct military aggression , in accordance with the type and scale of such aggression . It should be capable of repelling limited and small-scale aggression, in principle without external assistance . In cases where unassisted repelling of aggression is not feasible , it should be capable of continuing effective resistance until such time as cooperation from the United States can be introduced , thus rebuffing such aggression. j4) Setup of Command Communications, Thansportation and Rear Support Services Japan 's defense structure must be able to function in such fields as command communications, transportation, rescue, supply and maintenance , for swift , effective and adequate operations . j5) Setup of Education and Thaining of Personnel Japan's defense structure must be capable of carrying out intensive education and training of personnel at all times for the reinforcement of the personnel foundation of defense capability. j6) Setup of Disaster-Relief Operations Japan's defense structure must possess the capability to carry out disasterrelief operations in any areas of the country when required . Realization of the structuring outlined below for the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces is a basic requirement for maintenance of the defense postures related in Section IV. 5. Posture of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces In addition, special consideration must be given to promoting systematic cooperation among the three branches of the SDF, and to securing maximum efficiency in integrating operations. jl) Ground Self-Defense Force ji) The Ground Self-Defense Force, in order to be capable of swift and effective systematic defense operations from the outset of aggression in any part of Japan, must deploy its divisions and other units with a balance conforming to Japan's natural features. jii) The GSDF must possess at least one tactical unit of each of the various types of forces used mainly for mobile operations.

Appendices

39

(iii) The GSDF must possess ground-to-air missile units capable of undertaking low-altitude air defense of vital areas.

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Force (i) The MSDF must possess one fleet escort force as a mobile operating ship unit in order to quickly respond to aggressive action and such situations at sea. The fleet escort force must be able to maintain at least one escort flotilla on alert at all times. (ii) The MSDF must possess, as ship units assigned to coastal surveillance and defense, surface anti-submarine capability of at least one ship division in operational readiness at all times in each assigned sea district. {iii) The MSDF must maintain submarine units, anti-submarine helicopter units and minesweeping units, providing the capability for surveillance and defense missions as well as minesweeping at important harbors and major straits when such necessity arises. (iv) The MSDF must maintain ftxed-wing anti-submarine aircraft units in order to provide the capability of carrying out such missions as surveillance and patrol of the nearby seas and surface ship protection . (3) Air Self-Defence Force (i) The Air Self-Defence Force must possess aircraft control and warning units capable of vigilance and surveillance throughout Japanese airspace on a continuous basis. (ii) The ASDF must possess fighter units and high-altitude ground-to-air missile units for air defense, to provide the capability of maintaining continuous alert to take immediate and appropriate steps against violations of Japan's territorial airspace and air incursions. (iii) The ASDF must possess units capable of engaging in such missions as interdicting airborne or amphibious landing invasion, air support, aerial reconnaissance, early warning against low-altitude intrusion and air transportation as the necessity arises. Descriptions of the actual scales of organizations and primary equipment under the foregoing concepts are given in the attachment . 6. Basic Policy and Matters to Be Taken Into Consideration The basic goal in improving Japan's defense capability must be the maintenance of the postures outlined in Sections IV and V, with due consideration to qualitative improvements aimed at parity with the technical standards of other nations. In addition to carefully adapting to changing economic and fiscal conditions in harmony with government policies in other fields, the points below should be borne in mind when defense improvements are actually implemented.

40

Appendices Attached Thble Self-Defense Perso nnel Quota

GSDF

Basic Units Units deployed regionally in peacetime Mobile Operation Units

Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units MSDF

Basic Units Anti -submarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations! Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Unitsl Submarin e Units Minesweeping Units Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft Units

180,000 Men

12 Divisions 2 Combined Brigades Armored Division Artillery Brigade Airborne Brigade Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups

4 Escort Flotillas

10 Divisions

6 Divisions 2 Flotillas 16 Squadrons

Main Equipment

ASDF

Anti-submari ne Surface Ships Submarines Combat Aircraft

Apx. 60 Ships 16 Submarines Apx . 220 Aircraft

Basic Units Aircraft Control and Warning Units Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Early Warning Units High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units

28 10 3 1 3 1 6

Main Equipment Combat Aircraft

Apx. 430 Aircraft

Groups Squadrons Squadrons Squadron Squadrons Squadron Groups

NOTE: This list is based upon the equipment structure that the SDF possesses, or is scheduled to possess, at the time of the drafting of this National Defense Program Outline. SOURCE : Japanese Defense Agency, Defense ofjapan 1990, pp . 247-52 (Thkyo, The japan Times, 19901.

41

Appandi

Declsi ns on m.aj r proj ctions in fiscal yearly defen e improvement programs wiU be submitted to the National Defense Council for consultation . The actual scope of such major projections wiU be decided by the Cabinet. aft r consultation with the National Defen e Council.

(11 Bstablishmenl of rusona le tandards for personnel recruitment and conslderati n of me ur aimed at ecuring quality personnel and en.bancio morale. (21 Rfftttlve maintenance and im rovement of defense fa ciliti nd attempts to harm niu such fa Uti with the urrounding communities

through oonsid ration of environm ntal protection, uch as anti · noi m ures. (31 Effect! implement.ad n of equipment cqul Ilion programs, with overall 'dent n of ucb r wift emerg cy resupply, . pla le and I eHl 'ency. Allentl n houJd aLio be edueatioo and trainln give:o 10 the bUlry for edequate do n f th equlpm nt in

qu tion . (4) Lmprovement of lh technical r cb and d opment tem for t.b.e maintenance and im ent of qualitative levda of defense

ry.

Appendix 2

On the Mid-Term Defense Program

Adopted on September 18, 1965 by the National Defense Council , and approved on the same day by the Cabinet. With regard to the Mid-Term Defense Program whlch covers the period from fiscal 1986 to 1990, it is decided on as described in the attached paper, to aim , within the basic fram ework of the ' National Defense Program Outline" !adopted on October 29 , 1976 by the National Defense Council , and approved on the same day by the Cabinet ). at attaining the force level therein stipulated. Attached Paper The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 1986-1990)

1. Guiding Policies In improving the defense capability from FY 1986 through FY 1990, the aim is to seek to attain the force level stipulated in the ' National Defense Program Outline " !adopted on October 29 , 1979, by the National Defense Council, and approved on the same day by the Cabinet) , within the basic framework of that Outline. In so doing, the international military situation and the trend of technological standards of other nations shall be taken into account ; and in order to improve efficient defense capabilities so as to be able to correspond to them, efforts shall be made to rescrutinize various defense functions of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces as well as to seek resource allocations on a priority basis . Moreover, special consideration shall be given to the promotion of a cooperative and coordinated relationship among the services, as well as·to demonstrating joint operational effects.

43

ln promoting specific projects, priority shall be given to the following : (1) Bfforta shall be made to improve the air defense capability of the main islands and the capability to protect sea lines of communication in the waters surrounding Japan by improving and modernizing equipment such as aircraft, vessels and surfact-to-air guided missiles. At the same time , taking into account the geographic characteristics of this country, efforts shall be made to improve the capability to counter a landing invasion by modernizing divisions, diversifying formations of divisions , and strengthening such capabilities so as to destroy invading forces in the outer seas and coastal waters. (2) Improvement of the defense capability shall be sought , so as to increase its quality with a proper balance between frontal equipment and logistic support elements. Priority shall be given , especially, to improving the capability of intelligence, reconnaissance , command & communications . sustainability and combat readiness, as well as to reducing vulnerability ; and to promoting technological research and development. Moreover, consideration shall be given to enhancement of the skills level of personnel through improvement, for example, of education and training conditions , and also to improvement of living conditions for personnel. (3) Efforts shall be made to seek the utmost efficiency and rationalization in respect of both improvement and operation of the defense forces .

2. Contents of Major Components (1) Air Defense Capability of Main Islands a. In order to improve and modernize the air defense intercepting capability, fighter-interceptors (F-15) and early warning aircraft (E-ZC) will be procured; and necessary measures will be taken to improve the capability of fighter-interceptors (F-4EJ) after a separate study taking into account the result of test improvement. b. In order to strengthen and modernize the capability of air defense fire power in important areas, surface-to-air guided missiles (Nike-J) will be replaced by surface-to-air guided missiles (Patriot) . and equipment for improving the Hawk will be procured. ln addition , short-range surface-to-air guided missiles, new anti-air machine guns an~ others will be procured . (2) Capabilities to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication a. Escort ships, submarines, minesweepers, missile boats, supply ships and others will be constructed in order to improve and modernize the defense capability using vessels. ln constructing the escort ships, upgrading of anti-submarine capability will be sought and in order to improve anti-ship and anti-air capability, missile equipping will be promoted . ln so doing ,

44

Appendices

taking into account the result of a study which will be conducted separately on the system of air defense at sea, necessary measures will be taken after a study on enhancement of I?erformance of the escort ships' anti-air missile system . b . Fixed wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft (P-3C) , anti-submarine helicopters (including a new type of anti-submarine helicopter to be mounted on vessels) , and minesweeping helicopters (MH-53E) will be procured in order to improve and modernize the defense capability using aircraft. (3) Capability to Counter Landing Invasion a. In order to strengthen the capability to destroy invading forces in the outer seas and coastal waters , surface-to-ship guided missiles will be procured and necessary measures will be taken after a separate study on the successor to the support fighter (F-1) . b . In order to improve and modernize fire power, armored mobility and anti-tank fire power, tanks (including a new type of tank). artillery, armored personnel carriers, anti-tank firearms including anti-boat and anti-tank guided missile launchers, and others will be procured . Moreover, diversification of division formations will be sought, and anti-tank helicopters (AH-lS) will be procured in order to strengthen fire power in the air. (4) Transport Capability and Mobility In order to strengthen transport capability and mobility, transport aircraft (C-130H) and transport helicopters (CH-47) and others, and also transport vessels , will be procured . (5) Intelligence , Reconnaissance and Command & Communications Capability a. In order to improve the capabilities of warning & surveillance and intelligence collection , modernization of the automatic warning and control organization together with improvement in various means of intelligence collecting will be continued. With regard to the OTH radar, necessary measures will be taken after a separate study on its usefulness and other matters. b . In order to strengthen the air reconnaissance capability, some of the existing fighter-interceptors (F-4EJ) will be converted to reconnaissance aircraft . c. In order to enhance command & communications capability, modernization of the defense communication network will be promoted, while various measures, such as utilization of communications satellites, will be positively taken .

Appendices

45

(6) Combat Readiness, Sustainability, and Invulnerability a. In order to enhance combat readiness, some of the tanks will be redeployed to Hokkaido, thereby seeking to improve the initial-stage counter capability in the areas concerned, while promotion of various measures such as making mines and torpedoes operationally ready shall be continued. b. In order to enhance sustainability and reduce vulnerability, promotion of various measures including ammunition stockpiling, procurement of firearms for base air defense and locating important facilities underground, will be continued. (7) Education & Thaining and Rescuing Schemes In order to enhance the systems for education & training and rescuing, aircaft including medium-level jet trainers (T-4), rescue flying boats (US-1A), a new type of rescue helicopter, and training support vessels and others will be procured. (8) Personnel Administration and Hygiene In order to ensure recruitment of the personel required and enhance morale, necessary measures in the fields of personnel administration and hygiene will be positively taken, including improvement of conditions. (9) Facilities Facilities made necessary by the acquisition of equipment and by formation of units and others will be built. Improvement of living conditions of personnel as well as improvement and refinement of existing facilities including those for ammunition and training will be sought as well. Additionally, promotion of measures for the areas in which bases are sited will be continued. (10) Technological Research and Development Research and development will be stepped up, including that for a new type of anti-submarine helicopter (to be mounted on vessels) system, various guided missiles and other equipment and material, thereby seeking improvement in technological research and development. (11) Assistance for Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan In order to facilitate smooth and effective functioning of the Japan-U .S. security arrangements, promotion of various measures to assist the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan will be continued. (12) Others a . Study on in-flight refueling, such as the performance of in-flight refueling aircraft as well as the operational concept, will be conducted.

Appendices

46 Annexed Thble Classification

Kinds of Equipment

Quantity

Ground Self-Defense Force

Tank (Including new type of tank)

246

Artillery Armored Personnel Carrier Surface-to-Ship Missile Anti-Thnk Helicopter jAH-1S) Transport Helicopter jCH-471 Equipment and Material for improvement of Surface-to-Air Guided Missile (Hawk)

277 310 54 launchers 43 24 4 groups and educational unit

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Escort Ship 9 Submarine 5 Others 21 Total of Self-Defense Ships to be constructed 35 (Total Tonnage) (About 69,000 tons) Combat Aircraft 128 P-3C 50 Anti-Submarine Helicopter (Including 66 new type of anti-submarine helicopter to be mounted on vessels) 12 Minesweeping Helicopter jMH-53E)

Air Self-Defense Force

Combat Aircraft F-15 C-130H CH-47 E-IIC Medium-Level Jet Trainer IT-4) Surface-to-Air Guided Missile (Patriot)

87 63 7

12 5 93 5 groups

NOTES: 1. The tonnage of the construction of self-defense ships of the Maritime Self-Defense Force may change as a result of the study on upgrading the capability of the anti-air missile system of the escort ships. 2. The number of combat aircraft to be procured for the Air Self-Defense Force may change as a result of the study on the successor to the support fighter IF-1) . SOURCE: Japan Defense Agency, Defence of japan 1990, pp . 281-85, (Tokyo, The Japan Times , 1990) .

Appendices

47

b . In order to upgrade the capability of air defense at sea, study on an efficient system of air defense at sea using a combination of various equipment, will be expeditiously conducted .

3. Scale of Procurement Among those equipment items shown in the above 2, specific scales of procurement of major equipment are described in the annexed table. 4. Expenses Requirement The ceiling of the total amount of the defense-related expenditures required for the implementation of the Program is estimated at or around approximately Yl8.4 trillion at FY 1985 prices . At the formulation of the budget for each fiscal year, efforts shall be made for further efficiency and rationalization , and the utmost efforts will be made to hold down expenses , while the budget will be determined taking into account , for instance , economic and fiscal conditions at the time, and seeking harmony with government policies in other fields . 5. Program Review and Others The program shall be reviewed whenever necessary, and after three years reformulation of the Program shall be considered, taking into account such factors as economic and fiscal conditions, the international situation, and the trend of technological standards at that time .

Notes

NOTES I.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

See Aust ralian Prime .Minister Bob Hawke 's address to the japanAustralia Dietmembers Friendship League breakfast in Tokyo, 19 Septembe r 1990, published in Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade: The Monthly Reco rd 61 , no . 9 (September 1990): 623 . Takakazu Kuriyama , Vice-Mi nister of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that Japan . as a great power , must strive to ensure its security and prosperity through active participation in international efforts towards the creation of a new international order. See Takakazu Kuriyama, "Gekido no 90 nendai to nihoo gaiko no shintenkai " (The turbulent 1990s and new developments in Japanese diplomacy). Gaiko Forum , May 1990, pp . 122 1. For an abridged versio n published in English, see Takakazu Kuri ya ma , · Assuming Global Responsibilities in a Transition Period ", Economic Eye, Autumn 1990, pp . 4- 8. The · Asia-Pacific region" refers, for brevity, to the countries of Northeast Asia . Southeast Asia , Australia, New Zealand , Canada and the United States. Speci fic referen ce to the circumstances of the countries of Southeast Asia are made where necessary. See. for exampl e, Ronald Reagan 's Natio nal Security Strategy of the United States (Was hington . D.C.: The White House , January 1988). p . 8. Similar observations of the changing international situation in the 1970s can be found in a report . Sogo anzen hosho senryaku [Strategies for Comp rehe nsive National Security]. edited by Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Councillors ' Office (Tokyo : Okurasho insatsukyoku , 25 August 1980). Its English version is the Repo rt on Comprehensive National Security . by the Comprehensive Security Study Group (Tokyo : Foreign Press Center. 2 July 1980) . The rise of East Asia . parti cularly that of Japan , has been the subject of a grow ing deba te not onl y in Japan but perhaps more intensely in the West. By the late 1980s. Japan also became the largest creditor nation in the world . while the United States became the largest debtor nation . See Saburo Okita . "Japan 's Quiet Strength ". Foreign Policy, no . 75 , (Summer 1989). pp. 128- 45 ; Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. , Trading Places: How Amenca Allowed japan to Tak e the Lead (Tokyo : Charles E. Tuttle Company. 1988). p. 6; Ronald Morse . "japan's Drive to Pre-eminence", Foreign Polic}•. no. 69(Winter 1987- 88). pp . 3- 21 ; Statement of Kent E. Calder. "japan as an Economic Superpower: Implications for the U.S. Interests• . East Asia: Cha/lenges (o r U.S. Eco nomic and Security Interests in the 1990's , U.S. Congress . House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Congress . 2nd Session . 29 September 1988, pp . 76- 83. Reagan . op . cit. . p. 8. See . for example . Cabinet Secretariat. Cabinet Councillors ' Office , eds .. Sogo anzen hosho senryaku [St rategies for Comprehensive National Security! . op . cit. . p. 8 and pp . 38- 41.

Notes

7.

8.

49

The year 1989 witnessed impressive political changes in Eastern Europe, culminating in the crumbling of Communist parties . U.S. President Bush in November 1989 expressed his support for Soviet reforms by saying •America wants President Gorbachev's reforms, known as perestroika , to succeed, and America wants the Soviets to join us in moving beyond containment to a new partnership." The Australian , 24 November 1989. See , for example , Fred C. lkle and Albert Wohlstetter , Discriminate Dete"ence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office , January 1988) ; James Chace , •A New Grand Strategy' , Foreign Policy, no . 70 (Spring 1988) , pp . 3- 25 ; Edward N. Luttwak , "Do We Need a New Grand Strategy?", Th e National Interest . no . 15 (Spring 1989). pp . 3- 14.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

For an exposition of the traditional Lines of Japanese political parties' foreign and security policies, see , for example , Fukashi Horie and Yu lkei , eds ., Nihon no seito to gaiko seisaku Uapanese political parties and their for eign policies! (Tokyo: Keio tsushin , 1980). See , for example, te timony of Gerald Curtis , U.S. Congress , House , Committee on Foreign Affairs , Subcommittee on Asian and Pacifi c Affairs, United States-japan Relations , 17 March 1982, pp . 379 - 80 ; see also his "Japanese Security Policies and th e United States" . Foreign Affairs 8, no. 4 (Spring 1981 ): 852- 74 . See Chalmers Johnson , "Refl ections on the Dil emma of Japanese Defense" , Asian Survey 26. no . 5 (May 1986) . Mike Mochizulci noted the emerge nce of "Japanese military realism ' as "a visible and legitimate school of thought ", which advocated a closer military collaboration between Japan and th e United States, and an expanded security rol e for Japan in the North-west Pacific . See Mike Mochizulci , "Japan 's Search for Strategy", lntemat'ional Security 8, no . 3 (Winter 1983- 84). See also , Nagai Yonosuke , Gendai to senryaku [The Modern Age and Strategy! (Tokyo : Bungeishunju , 1985) . chapters 1 and 2. See , for example . Zen 'ichiro Tanaka , "The transformation of Domesti c Politics and Its Implications for Foreign Policy in Cont emporary Japan ", in Asia and the Major Powers: Domest'ic Politics and Foreign Policy, ed ited by Robert A. Scalapino et. a! . (Berkeley : University of California Press , 1988). pp . 81 - 109 . See , for example , Takeshige Kunimasa and Michitoshi Takabatake , "Hahei kokkai ' no butaiura " [The behind -th e-scene developments in the Diet session on th e dispatch of troopsj , Sekai , December 1990, pp. 22-39 . The SOP's platform calls for th e disbanding of th e SDF and the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security 1teaty. In recent years , however, th e SOP 's position has been moving to an acceptance of these basic securi ty arrangements. As of September 1989, the SOP 's security policy contains

Note&

50

the following: PI the maintenance of the Japan-U .S. Secu.r ity Treaty for continuity of foreign policy; (2) the maintenance of the SDF under a coalition government; (3) li.miting the annual defence budget within one per cent of GNP; (4f strict compliance with the three non-nuclear principles ; (5) suspension of military exercises with U.S. forces; (6) reduction and withdrawal of U.S. bases in Japan . At this point, there are elements of uncertainty in the JSP's position , which may be clarified in the future . See, for example , Asahi, 27 July, 22 August, 11 September 1989 . The United States is apparently concerned with the implications of the SOP's position regarding compliance with the thiee non-nuclear principles. See , for example, James E. Auer, ·Japan: The Socialists' Defense Rhetoric Is Risky ". International Herald 1hbune , 1 November 1989 .

See J(jyofuku Chuma, Saigunbi no seijigaku [The politics of rearmament] (Tokyo: Chishi.ki sha . 1985) and Akio Karninishi . GNP 1% waku: boei seisaku no kensho [The GNP I% ceiling: An investigation of Japanese defence policy) (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten , 1986) . 17 . There is a large literature on for eign and defence policy making. See inter alia Roger HUsman . Th e Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New Jersey : Prentice-HaB , 1987) . 18 . See ibid ., chapter 12. For an analysis of Japanese public opinion concernin g defence policy , see J.A.A. Stockwin , •Japanese Public Opinion and Policies on Security and Defence• , in japan and World Depression , edited by R. Dore and R. Sin.h a (New York : St . Martin 's Press , 1987) , pp . 111 -34 . 19 . See. for example , Takuya Kubo , ·Heiwaji no boeiryoku· (Defence power in peacetime] , Kokubo 22 , no . 4 (April 1973): 12- 26 and Ushio Shiota. ·Kane to boei" [Money and politics], Chuokoron, May 1986, pp. 16.

148- 49 .

20 . Shunji Taoka , ·Japan 's Role as 'a Member of the Western of the Western Alliance ·· in Challenges to the Western Alliance, edited by Joseph Godson (London: Times Books , 1984) , pp . 125-29. 21. See , for example, Robert Yoshinori Horiguchi, ·The Japanese SelfDefence Force ·, a paper presented at a Conference on The Armed Forces in Asia and the Pacific , Canberra, Department of Political and Social Change , Australian National University, 1 December 1989; and Tahara Soichiro, Yuutsu naru mippei shudan [The melancholic , closed group] (Tokyo: Ushio shuppansha, 1978) . 22. See Kubo, op. cit. and Akio Kaminishi, GNP 1 % waku: boei seisaku no kensho [The GNP 1 % ceiling: An investigation of Japanese defence policy], op . cit. 23 . There is no doubt that the Soviet nuclear forces, both strategic and tactical, both of which can target Japan if the Russians choose, as well as the formidable Soviet conventional power projection forces, (still

Notes

24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33. 34.

51

deployed in the Soviet Far East despite the continuing rapprochement in superpower and Sino-Soviet relations) , are critical factors in any consideration of Japan's security planning. The potential Soviet military threat, at the most elemental level, compels Japan to be allied with the United States. Successive Japanese governments therefore have considered the Japan-U.S. alliance to be indispensable for the defence of Japan, because it would enable Japan to deter all levels of violence including a nuclear war. See Comprehensive National Security Group, Report on Comprehensive National Security, op. cit. See also Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security (Washington, D.C. : Pergamon Brassey's, 1984) . See Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership?", Pacific Affairs 62, no. 4 (Winter 1989-90) : 465- 69 . See, for example, Tadashi Ikeda, "Japan's International Contribution" , Japan Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1989): 3-4. See, for example, Asahi Shimbun 19 June 1988; Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter cited as FEER) 25 August 1988, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 January 1989. See Eiichi Katahara, "The Politics of Japanese Defence Policy Making, 1975-1989" (Ph.D. dissertation, Griffith University, Australia, March 1991) . On 20 December 1990, the Kaifu government approved the Mid-Term Defense Program for the period FY 1991-95. It took into account the recent changes in the international situation as well as the maintenance of defence capabilities as described in the National Defence Program Outline. See, for example, The Japan Times, 21 December 1990 and Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of]apan 1991 (forthcoming). The NDPO, adopted on 29 October 1976 by the Miki government, has been and remains the basis of the current Japanese defence build-up programs. By adopting the "standard defence force concept" [kibanteki boei ryoku koso] and by specifying a set of targets for defence build-up, the NDPO has contributed to a wider public acceptance of the basic framework of Japan's postwar defence policy. See, for example, Mochizuki, op . cit., pp. 156-57. See , for example, "The 1984 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture" , given by Prime Minister Nakasone, published in Survival XXVI, no. 5 (Sep./ Oct. 1984) : 195. See Kokusai kokka nihon no sogo anzen hosho seisaku [Comprehensive National Security Policy for the international state Japan]. Report by the Study Group on Peace Problems (Tokyo: Okurasho insatsukyoku, April 1985). pp . 82-83. See Fumio Ikeuchi "The 1986-90 Medium-Term Defense Plan", japan Quarterly XXXI, no. 4 (October/December 1984): 390- 94. Ibid., p. 391.

52

NOf For the text of the MTDP. see O.fD~M of japanl9 . pp. 268-12. . p. 144: O.feru. of japan I 7, p. 81. J{j yofuku Chuma . ·The 19 90 Defense Plan : Does It Go Too Par •. j apan Qllartvly XXXlll . no. 1 Uanuary/March 1986) : 13- 18. CHfenM of Japan 1 7. pp. 161 - 63 . A.tah1 Slumb&m 1 . 19 September 1 5. See Seiki Nishlhiro's statement cited in J{jyofu.ku Chuma, "Nihon no boe1 ~isa ku no tenkan to kokusai josei" [The turning point in Japanese d fen ce pohcy and the i.nternational ituationl . KoJ!usa1 mondai , no. 312 (March 1986). pp 2 1- 35. Defrru. o{ ]upon 1988, p . 146. Ibid . Chuma . "The 19 6-90 Defen.se Plan ", op . cit. , p. 16. &H1 ltaJtwho 1 6. p. 93: Defense of Japan 1986, p. 81 . See Shlnji Yua.k.i . "Boei kaikaku wa jidal no yosei• [Defence reforms are the needs of the tlmesl . (lnterview) KoJ!u.bo 36, no . 1 Uanuary 1987) : 15: also see Auer 's statement in James Auer and Yozo Kato, "Nichlbd kyo roku no homondai ni tsuite• [Issues of Japan · U.S. defence cooperation! . Gendai no anzen ho.sho . no . 53 (April 1987). p. 7: Defenu of Japan 1 6 . p. 173; A.sah1 Shimbun, 18 January 19 6 . Richard L . Armitage . "Our Security Role in Aala &c Pacific• . Asia-pacific Defense Forum 13, no . 4(Spring 1989) : 11. James E. Auer . "Japan ' Defense Policy•. Cu"ent History 81 , no. 528 (April 19 ): 182. Ibid .. p. 145 . One ha.s some reservations about Auer's claim that Japanese armed forces are becoming a · meaningful ele ment of the military balance in the Pacific•. Thla may be the case aa far as front · hne military hardware · con cerned. but the legal and political constraints on J panese military role remain firm . There are inadequacies in the au ting law pertaining to the mobilization of the SDF, that are not ppreoated by the Westem media. For example . the question of SDF m bi.lwltion in an emergency remains unresolved , although studies on emergency legislation have been under way since 1977. See Defense of japan 19 . pp . 233-93 . M85