Japan’s Asian Diplomacy: Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas 9811583374, 9789811583377

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CRITICAL STUDIES OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC SERIES EDITOR: MARK BEESON

Japan’s Asian Diplomacy Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific

Series Editor Mark Beeson Political Science & International Relations University of Western Australia Crawley, WA, Australia

Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific showcases new research and scholarship on what is arguably the most important region in the world in the twenty-first century. The rise of China and the continuing strategic importance of this dynamic economic area to the United States mean that the Asia-Pacific will remain crucially important to policymakers and scholars alike. The unifying theme of the series is a desire to publish the best theoretically-informed, original research on the region. Titles in the series cover the politics, economics and security of the region, as well as focusing on its institutional processes, individual countries, issues and leaders. The book series is Scopus Indexed.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14940

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Japan’s Asian Diplomacy Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University Beppu, Oita, Japan

ISSN 2662-222X ISSN 2662-2238 (electronic) Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific ISBN 978-981-15-8337-7 ISBN 978-981-15-8338-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For my parents, Yoshimatsu Hajime & Kimi, my mother-in-law, Kuroki Kuniko, and my father-in-law, the late Kuroki Eizabur¯ o

Prologue

My research interest in Japan’s diplomatic policy towards Asia was first summarised in a monograph, Japan and East Asia in Transition, which was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2003. Afterwards, my main research concern shifted to regionalism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific with a particular interest in the building of regional institutions. Yet, Japan’s regional policy and relations remained a key ingredient of the study of regionalism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, and I have continuously deepened my insights on Japan’s strategic policies and relations in evolving Asian politics. This monograph is a product of my explicit revisit to Japan’s Asian diplomacy, and this revisit was urged by Prime Minister Abe Shinz¯o who formed the second administration in December 2012. The Abe administration is important as it was formed after the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) gaining power from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and has undertaken its diplomacy in evolving great power politics between the U.S. and China. Abe is a unique prime minister. Not only is he a ‘thoroughbred’ politician with Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke as a grandfather and Abe Shintar¯o, Foreign Minister and a faction leader of the LDP, as the father, but he is also the first prime minister who achieved a comeback in the post-war Japanese politics. Indeed, Abe is generally regarded as a conservative politician who has a strong desire to maintain Japan’s tradition, culture, and international prestige even pursuing the revision of the Japanese Constitution. However, Abe’s personal attributes

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go beyond this simple characterisation, and his public policy surely incorporates an evolving nature between the first administration in 2006–2007, the second in 2012–2014, and the period after the second administration. The foreign policy has been a key policy field to which the Abe administration has paid keen attention. As of January 2020, Abe made 81 foreign visits, which was by far the largest number compared to previous prime ministers. Abe has managed, through this intensive summit diplomacy, complicated diplomatic relations with the U.S., China, India, Australia, and other countries across the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific, and forged relatively stable relations with many of these countries. Abe’s diplomacy is important both in current politics to maintain regional order in Asia and in the long trajectory of Japan’s external policy and relations. I hope that this monograph makes some contributions to elucidate details and key features of the Abe administration’s foreign and security policy towards Asia. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my debt to those who have provided significant assistance to the completion of this volume. In the process of preparing for this book, many scholars have become a source of inspiration and support. I am particularly thankful to H. D. P. Envall, Kai He, Amy King, Michal Kolmaš, Philippe De Lombaerde, Aurelia George Mulgan, Stephen Nagy, Sato Yoichiro, Dennis D. Trinidad, and Vyas Utpal. I also wish to express my deep gratitude to my current affiliation, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU). Although APU is a relatively small and young university with a 20-year history, its internationally oriented academic environments have provided me with valuable intellectual stimulus through participation in international conferences and daily discussions with other colleagues. I also thank the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University. I could deepen my thought on this book project during a visiting research fellowship at the college, and appreciate Greg Fry and Lauren Richardson who realised this visiting research fellowship. Moreover, some parts of the book were presented at the ISA Asia-Pacific Conference Singapore in July 2019, and some parts in Chapter 3 have appeared in High-Standard Rules and Leadership Capacity in Japan’s Mega-FTA Strategy, Asian Survey, 60:4 (2020): 733–54. I also would like to express my gratitude to Vishal Daryanomel and his colleagues at Palgrave Macmillan for their sincere support through the process of turning the manuscript into the present book.

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Finally, I express my deep gratitude to my wife, Mutsumi, and our son, Satoshi. While Mutsumi has offered her willing sacrifices and continuous support, Satoshi has shown keen interest in my research and offered practical assistance in the process of preparing this monograph. My life as a researcher has been sustained by their understanding of my career, allowing me to spend considerable time for research by sacrificing time from family. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Praise for Japan ’s Asian Diplomacy

“This book systematically and innovatively examines Japan’s diplomacy toward Asia under the Abe administration in five distinctive issue areas, including trade, infrastructure investment, maritime security, outer space, and foreign aid. It is an exemplar work that integrates the in-depth knowledge of International Relations theory and rich empirics of area studies in the study of Japan’s foreign Policy. It is a must-read for both scholars and policymakers who are interested in making sense of Japan’s foreign policy in particular and the dynamics of Asian international relations in general.” —Kai He, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University “Combining International Relations theory with key case studies covering trade, investment, security including outer space and foreign aid, Yoshimatsu Hidetaka has brilliantly crafted a systematic analysis of Japan’s foreign policy in Asia. This book is a must read for anyone interested in a deep understanding of Japan’s contemporary policy towards Asia, especially under Abe Shinzo, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister.” —Purnendra Jain, Adjunct Professor in Japanese Studies, University of Adelaide

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PRAISE FOR JAPAN’S ASIAN DIPLOMACY

“Hidetaka Yoshimatsu has written a comprehensive account on the Abe administration’s response to China’s rise in Asia, by taking in consideration Japan’s ideational and material leverage. This book is an important addition to the academic literature on Japan’s international relations and will be required reading for scholars and practitioners alike.” —Giulio Pugliese, Nissan Institute, Oxford University

Contents

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1

Introduction

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The Analytical Framework for Japan’s Diplomatic Policy Towards Asia

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3

Trade Policy in the Mega-FTA Age

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4

Purposeful Commitment to Infrastructure Investment in Asia

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Growing Maritime Security in Ocean Policy

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Outer Space Policy with a Stronger Security Orientation

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The Reformulation of Foreign Aid in Development Cooperation

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Reflections and Prospects

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Epilogue

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CONTENTS

Bibliography

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Index

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Abbreviations

AAGC ADB ADIZ AIIB APEC APRSAF APSCO ARF ASAT ASDF ASEAN ASEAN+3 ASEM ATLA BRI CARICOM CDB CEFP CELAC CEPEA CNSP COPUOS CPTPP CSO

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor Asian Development Bank Air Defence Identification Zone Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation ASEAN Regional Forum Anti-Satellite Air Self-Defence Force Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Plus Three Asia-Europe Meeting Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency Belt and Road Initiative Caribbean Community China Development Bank Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia Committee on National Space Policy Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Civil Society Organisation xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

CSpOC DCC DPJ EAC EAFTA EAS EEZ EU FOCAC FOIP FTA G7 G20 GATT GDP GPS HOP IADC ICoC ICT IGS IMF ISR ISRO ITLOS JA JAXA JBIC JCG JEEPA JICA JIIA JRS JSpOC LCC LDP LMC LNG MAFF MDA METI MEXT MIC

Combined Space Operations Centre Development Cooperation Charter Democratic Party of Japan East Asian Community East Asia Free Trade Area East Asia Summit Exclusive Economic Zone European Union Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Free and Open Indo-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Group of Seven Group of Twenty General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Global Positioning System Headquarters for Ocean Policy Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities Information and Communications Technology Information Gathering Satellite International Monetary Fund Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Indian Space Research Organisation International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Japan Agricultural Cooperatives Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency Japan Bank for International Cooperation Japan Coast Guard Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement Japan International Cooperation Agency Japan Institute of International Affairs Japan Revitalisation Strategy Joint Space Operations Centre Life-Cycle Cost Liberal Democratic Party Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Liquefied Natural Gas Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Maritime Domain Awareness Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

ABBREVIATIONS

MLIT MOD MOF MOFA MOU MSDF NAFTA NEXI NGO NOPS NSC NSPS NSS ODA OECD OECD-DAC ONSP OOF PALM PARC PKO PQI QZSS RCEP ROOs S&T SCO SDF SHNSP SLOC SMEs SSA TICAD TPP TRIPS UNIDO WTO

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Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Ministry of Defence Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Understanding Maritime Self-Defence Force North American Free Trade Agreement Nippon Export and Investment Insurance Non-Governmental Organisation National Ocean Policy Secretariat National Security Council National Space Policy Secretariat National Security Strategy Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentDevelopment Assistance Committee Office of National Space Policy other official flow Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting Policy Affairs Research Council Peacekeeping Operation Partnership for Quality Infrastructure Quasi-Zenith Satellite System Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Rules of Origin Science and Technology Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Self-Defence Force Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy Sea Lines of Communication Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises Space Situational Awareness Tokyo International Conference on African Development Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights United Nations Industrial Development Organisation World Trade Organisation

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

3.1 5.1 6.1 7.1

The policymaking The policymaking The policymaking The trend of the (1985–2019)

structure for the TPP structure for ocean policy structure for outer space policy general account ODA budget

77 122 168 193

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 6.1

Japan-involved key FTAs The order value of overseas infrastructure projects (trillion yen) The ministerial allocation of space-related budget, 2012 and 2019 (billion yen: %)

64 95 169

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Conventions

Japanese personal names follow Japanese convention: family name (surname) followed by given name.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Japan’s position in Asia is evolving in the development of geopolitical and geo-economic conditions in the region. For a long time, Japan as the world’s second-largest economy assumed a crucial regional position by providing capital, technologies, and foreign aid that contributed to sustaining the economic growth and industrial upgrading of the countries in Asia. Japan’s relative regional position declined due to its long-term low economic growth and the advent of other countries, particularly China. Yet, Japan remains a crucial country in Asia as it can assist the economic and infrastructure development of other countries and provide political support for the development of multilateral institutions that offer regional public goods. Japan’s security stance also matters as it assumes a crucial middle-power position in intensive great power politics between the U.S. and China, and Japan-related maritime territorial disputes have a significant influence on the evolution of regional security environments. Japan’s unstable conditions in domestic politics ended in late 2012 with the formation of the second Abe Shinz¯o administration. The administration is of great importance for Japanese diplomacy because it has created a solid domestic political base by lasting for more than seven years and because this longevity has been sustained partially by the people’s satisfaction with outcomes that the administration has produced in foreign and security policy. The administration, which raises ‘proactive

© The Author(s) 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_1

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contribution to peace’ as the fundamental diplomatic slogan, has undertaken constructive diplomacy by combining material resources and ideational means in various policy areas that cover the economy and security. This chapter presents the overall background of the Abe administration’s Asian diplomacy. The following section briefly explains the implications of the Abe administration’s diplomacy towards Asia, followed by a section to overview the development of Japan’s Asian diplomacy. It then reviews past literature on the Abe administration’s Asian diplomacy and elucidates the limitations of past literature. This chapter also offers a brief argument and plan of the book.

The Abe Administration and Its Diplomacy Towards Asia In the new millennium, the presence of Asia in the global economy and world politics has risen significantly. The region as a group has achieved impressive economic growth, being a major source of manufacturing products and dynamic services. Such economic prowess has transformed into political representation, which is typically seen in the large membership of Asian nations in the Group of Twenty (G20) forum. Despite prominent performance in the economy, Asia remains a region of security concern with various inter-state conflicts. While North Korea has jeopardised the stability of Northeast Asia with the continuous development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, Japan has territorial disputes with China, South Korea, and Russia. The border disputes between India on the one hand and Pakistan and China on the other have provoked sporadic skirmishes. Political uncertainty in Asia is seen in terms of great power politics. The relative presence of the U.S. has gradually declined in Asia. U.S. President Obama’s announcement that America was no longer the world’s policeman led to security instability in Asia. The subsequent Trump administration adopted the ‘America-first’ approach, pursuing protectionist trade policy and anti-multilateralism. Not only did such inward-looking diplomacy deteriorate the liberal intentional economic regime but also undermined stable political relations with major U.S. partners in Asia. In contrast, China has steadily raised its political, economic, and military presence in Asia through proactive diplomacy, continuous economic growth, and strength in military capabilities. While China’s diplomatic assertiveness and military offensive became salient in

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maritime affairs, which have raised tensions particularly in the South China Sea, its regional presence rose in the economic domain through the launching of new regional initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The rise of China in the geopolitical and geo-economic domains has a crucial impact on power politics with the U.S. and the foreign and security policies of other states including Japan. Japan’s position in such a dynamic Asia exhibited significant evolutions. Its economic power, the main source of external influence, shrank gradually due to the long-term stagnation from the 1990s. Japan’s ratio in the world gross domestic product (GDP) halved in fifteen years from 17.6 percent in 1995 to 8.6 percent in 2010. The domestic political turmoils after the 1990s produced an unfavourable influence on its foreign and security policy as short-lived administrations particularly after the Koizumi administration in 2001–2006 disturbed Japan from formulating diplomatic strategies from the cohesive and long-term perspective. The second Abe administration, which was formed in December 2012, drastically changed Japan’s diplomatic profile. The administration has secured a long-term reign—more than seven years—thanks to successive victories in national elections. This political stability is particularly salient because the previous six cabinets including his own first cabinet lasted for less than 16 months each, leaving little or no significant legacy in Japanese diplomacy. The solid domestic political base and a long-term reign have provided the Abe administration with considerable leeway to undertake Asian diplomacy from the long-term perspective. Diplomatic performance has become the source of domestic support for the Abe administration as successful results in external policy, coupled with positive outcomes from Abenomics —the administration’s economic policy package—underpinned the nation’s satisfaction with the administration. The Abe administration has undertaken prudent diplomacy in evolving geopolitical environments in Asia. The administration has maintained a close partnership with the U.S., Japan’s sole ally. While most of the political leaders have been struggling to forge stable relations with U.S. President Donald Trump, Abe developed trustworthy relations with him by becoming the first foreign leader to meet him after his election victory in November 2016 (Terada 2019: 1055). Japan under Abe has developed close partnerships with other countries such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, Australia, and India. While Abe

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visited all ten ASEAN countries within the first year of the second administration, he has been one of the key leaders engaging proactively in the development of the quadrilateral forum among the U.S., Japan, Australia and India. Diplomatic tensions with China rose in two years after the start of the Abe administration partly due to a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. However, Japan–China relations gained stability after 2017 particularly through summit diplomacy between Abe and Chinese top leaders. The Abe administration’s diplomacy has been unique in the advocacy of diplomatic ideas. The administration raises, as the fundamental foreign policy tenet, ‘proactive contribution to peace’, which was positioned as the key idea behind the National Security Strategy (NSS), based on the principles of international cooperation (Kitaoka 2014). The Development Cooperation Charter also proclaimed the positive use of foreign aid for peacebuilding operations even opening a chance to give support to foreign armed forces that undertake non-military activities. Furthermore, Abe has made a deep impression by presenting crucial diplomatic slogans such as the Democratic Security Diamond and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. In general, the Abe administration has forged stable diplomatic relations with major countries in Asia except for South Korea with which the administration has serious diplomatic tensions over historical issues such as the comfort women problem. The Abe administration’s foreign and security policy towards Asia doubtlessly has particular uniqueness in Japan’s diplomatic history in the post-World War II period. The administration’s active engagements in political, economic, and security affairs in intensive interactions with the U.S., China, India, Australia, ASEAN, and so on have a significant influence on the international relations of Asia.

The Brief Overview of Japan’s Asian Diplomacy During the Cold War era, Japan was tightly embedded in the Russo-U.S. confrontation. Japan as a key U.S. partner in East Asia functioned as a bulwark against the communist threat. Under the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, which was signed in 1951 and was revised in 1960, Tokyo has provided bases in Okinawa and other parts for Washington to use for the projection of its military power. Under the American nuclear umbrella, Japan pursued economic growth, following the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’.1 After a high economic boom in the 1950s through the 1970s, Japanese enterprises gradually penetrated the East Asian market. The relocation

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of production bases to East Asia was accelerated by the Plaza Accord in September 1985, which led to the high appreciation of the yen. The formation of plural manufacturing bases in East Asian countries constituted the foundation of regional production networks and growing intra-regional trade. Japan also propped up the industrialisation of East Asian countries through the provision of foreign aid, which was used for the development of infrastructure. Japan’s foreign aid policy had distinctive features compared with other western nations by emphasising the ‘self-help’ principle and giving priority on loan rather than grant. Compared with Europe, Asia was underdeveloped in the advance of multilateral institutions for regional cooperation. The European nations have developed various regional institutions on the basis of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Asia did not have inter-governmental institutions for a long time except for ASEAN. Japan took the initiative in founding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) whose first ministerial meeting was held in Canberra in 1989. The APEC has developed into the key regional institution that discusses economic affairs in the Asia-Pacific by organising the summit meeting and other committees. Then, ASEAN-centred institutions were created successively such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, and the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) in 1997. Japan positively supported ASEAN’s multilateral initiative. While Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama’s proposal in 1991 to develop the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) into a forum for political dialogue designed to improve the sense of mutual security constituted one base for the creation of the ARF (Hook et al. 2011: 242–43), Prime Minister Hashimoto Ry¯utar¯o’s proposal in January 1997 to hold a regular top-level meeting between Japan and ASEAN led to the creation of the ASEAN+3. When the Asian economies were hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997– 1998, Japan showed leadership in overcoming this sudden setback. Not only did it hold an international conference to discuss rescue packages for Thailand in August 1997, but it also provided huge funds under the New Miyazawa Initiative, support packages of US$30 billion for the crisis-hit countries. While Japan’s initiative to create the Asian Monetary Fund was not realised, an alternative network of swap agreements developed into the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), a representative full-fledged form of regionalism under the ASEAN+3. The U.S.–Japan alliance was ‘political’ first and strategic second. Because of its overall importance in Japan’s external policies and internal

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politics, the end of the Cold War did not lead to the termination of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty whose prime objective was to defend Japan from the communist threat. Tokyo and Washington sought to redefine their security partnership. The new National Defence Program Outline, formulated in November 1995, reaffirmed the centrality of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty to Japan’s security policy. The Japanese and American leaders confirmed, in the 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, that the Japan–U.S. relationship would remain the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region. Under this new orientation, the geographic scope of the Japan–U.S. security alliance expanded from the previous ‘Far East’ to ‘Asia-Pacific’ (Hook et al. 2011: 140). The revised Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defence Cooperation from September 1997 onwards refers especially to ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security’.2 In the 2000s, the Koizumi administration, which lasted for five and a half years from April 2001 to September 2006, showed a distinctive presence in foreign and security policy. The administration tightened up an alliance with the U.S. by providing unequivocal support for the Bush administration’s war against terrorism. In October 2001, one month after the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the Koizumi administration enacted the AntiTerrorism Special Measures Law, which enabled the Self-Defence Forces’ (SDF) refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean, as Japan’s contribution to the war in Afghanistan as an American ally. When the Bush administration began the Iraq War in March 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichir¯ o immediately declared support for Washington, and his cabinet enacted the Iraq Special Measures Law in July 2003, which authorised the SDF to provide humanitarian relief in Iraq. The Koizumi administration also undertook proactive diplomacy towards East Asia. Koizumi proposed an idea to develop a ‘community that acts together and advances together’ during his visit to Southeast Asia in January 2002. Koizumi’s idea envisioned the building of community on the basis of sincere and open partners between Japan and ASEAN by referring to ASEAN-initiated multilateralism such as the ARF and ASEM, as well as ‘the best use of the framework of ASEAN+3’ (Koizumi 2002). The Koizumi administration’s diplomatic stance also contributed to the creation of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005. Japan was a key supporter for expanding

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the membership of this new institution from the existing ASEAN+3 to include India, Australia and New Zealand, the three democratic nations. After Koizumi’s step-down from the prime ministerial post in September 2006, the three short-lived Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cabinets were formed until September 2009. These administrations attempted to exhibit new diplomatic postures such as the value-oriented diplomacy and the arc of freedom and prosperity and sought to forge closer relations with China through summit diplomacy. However, they were unable to show long-term visions for Asian diplomacy. Because of a landslide victory in the Lower House election in August 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ousted the LDP from the power. The Hatoyama cabinet, the first DPJ administration, gained international attention in foreign and security policy as it advocated a more ‘equal’ partnership with Washington and attempted to forge closer partnerships with Asian nations under the banner of the East Asian Community (EAC). However, the administration’s diplomacy became dysfunctional soon largely because of mistrust in relations with the U.S., and the EAC concept was unable to secure support from the domestic political circles and even from major Asian countries (Hosoya 2013: 153). Despite Hatoyama’s willingness to establish a trustworthy partnership, diplomatic relations with China deteriorated during the DPJ era. In June 2008, both governments had reached a political agreement on cooperation in the East China Sea. The agreement contained joint development in the northern part of the East China Sea and the participation of Japanese legal persons in the development of Chunxiao (Japanese name: Shirakaba) oil and gas field. In September 2010, the boat collision incident occurred in the East China Sea. The Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing boat on suspicion of operating in Japanese territorial waters and obstructing public duties of coast guard personnel by deliberately hitting patrol vessels. The Chinese government reacted to this incident decisively by stopping the export of rare earth elements, suspending ministerial and higher-level exchanges, and postponing talks on a treaty concerning joint gas field development. Exactly two years later, Japan–China diplomatic relations deteriorated further as the DPJ cabinet announced the nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. There are at least three critical features in the trajectory of Japan’s diplomacy towards Asia. First, Japan was tightly embedded into great power politics. Tokyo has maintained a close alliance with Washington, which became the foundation for its overall diplomatic policies including

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those for Asia. The fundamental character of the alliance changed from a security architecture to defend Japan from the communist threat to a regional public good to guarantee security stability in the Asia-Pacific. In the 2000s, the presence of China became far important for Japan’s Asian diplomacy. Beijing’s continuous high growth eclipsed Tokyo’s economic presence, and China began to lead the formation of multilateral initiatives in Asia. China’s maritime offensive intensified in the 2010s in both the East and South China Seas. How to cope with the China offensive through its self-efforts and external partnerships mainly with the U.S. became a key diplomatic challenge for Japan. Second, Japan’s overall diplomatic presence in Asia was not necessarily prominent. Japan maintained extensive economic reach to Asia through the combination of trade, investment, and foreign aid, which underpinned economic growth and industrialisation in major countries in the region. While Japan remained a crucial source of new investment, technology, and foreign aid for Asian countries, its relative economic power declined due to the long-term stagnation after the 1990s and the steady growth of other Asian economies. ASEAN-initiated multilateral institutions embedded Japan into regional cohesion, and Japan has behaved as a supporter of such institutions. Japan’s presence was particularly weak in an ideational initiative. Indeed, ideational concepts such as the EAC and value-oriented diplomacy were advocated, but they were not permeated into other Asian countries. Japan was generally passive about providing meaningful ideas for sustaining a stable regional order. Third, domestic politics mattered in Japan’s foreign and security policy. While the Koizumi administration’s distinctive foreign and security strategies were underpinned by its long-term reign, the Hatoyama administration’s new diplomatic postures were produced as a consequence of power transition from the LDP to the DPJ. Moreover, the unstable administrations that failed to secure the people’s long-term support and the solid backup from the ruling party were unable to formulate and implement effective diplomatic strategies to enhance Japan’s external position and interests. Thus, the administration’s position in domestic politics has a significant effect on its engagement in external policies and relations.

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Literature on Japan’s Asian Diplomacy and Critical Assessment Prime Minister Abe Shinz¯o who organised the second administration in December 2012 has adopted proactive diplomatic postures, pursuing ‘diplomacy taking a panoramic perspective of the world’. The Abe administration has implemented purposeful diplomatic strategies designed to enhance Japan’s international prestige and defend its national interests. For this objective, the administration has positively engaged in the strength of the Japan–U.S. alliance and closer partnerships with Australia, India, and major Southeast Asian countries. The Abe administration’s proactive foreign and security policy has attracted growing interests from scholars in Japanese foreign policy and regional politics in the Asia-Pacific. These studies can be categorised into several groups. The first group has elucidated the Abe administration’s foreign and security policy in evolving regional politics and environments. Suzuki and Wallace (2018) argue that Japan under the Abe administration was confronted with significant geopolitical vulnerability and its responses are largely tentative and incremental, and that political revisionists’ self-limiting postures, in addition to the resource and antimilitarist sensitivities of the public and wider elite, explains this kind of policy responses. Samuels and Wallace (2018) allege that Japan under the Abe administration is ‘pivoting within Asia’ to diversify external balancing to adjust and adapt to potential regional crises and rapid deterioration in its security. In a similar vein, Gaens (2018) contends that Japan’s changing security conditions require a more regionally and globally engaged stance, which led to tighter strategic partnerships with like-minded states in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Oros (2017) examines how the historical legacies of contested war memories, antimilitarist practices and the unequal alliance with the U.S. have influenced new policies and politics in Japan’s ‘security renaissance’, and contends that the Abe administration intensified a nationalistic posture through far-reaching developments in security policy, institutions and practices. The second group has explored the theoretical characterisation of the Abe administration’s stance on and policies for external relations. Some scholars have used a balancing concept in explaining the administration’s foreign and security policy (Grønning 2014; Hughes 2016; Koga 2016; Liff 2019; Pugliese and Insisa 2017). Others have explained Japan’s

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strategic policies vis-à-vis China by relying on a hedging concept (Koga 2018; Lin 2014; Vidal and Pelegrín 2018). Fatton (2019) and Nagy (2017) employ the ‘entrapment and abandonment’ theory for explaining the strategic implications of the administration’s security policies. While the former uses the theory for explaining Japan’s pursuit of multiple policy options, the latter employs it for accounting for Japan’s pursuit of an autonomous defence posture. Furthermore, Lande (2018) and Pugliese and Patalano (2020) explore the nature of the Abe administration’s foreign and security policy in terms of ‘offensive and defensive realism’ and ‘Realpolitik’, respectively. The third group has analysed domestic policymaking in relation to the Abe administration’s external policy. Pugliese (2017) focuses on the administration’s hybrid policymaking authority that rests on a personalised and politicised link between the Prime Minister’s executive office, the Kantei, and bureaucratic apparatuses. George Mulgan (2018: ch.3) and Shinoda (2018: ch.7) elucidate major characteristics in the policymaking process of foreign and security policy under the Abe administration. Several scholars have highlighted government agencies of which the Abe administration made full use. Fukushima and Samuels (2018) and Liff (2018) examine the functions and implications of the National Security Council (NSC), whose establishment is regarded as one of the most important institutional reforms under the Abe administration. The NSC, founded in 2013, was the centrepiece of the ambitious reorganisation of Japan’s foreign and security policy apparatus during the post-World War II period. The fourth group has elucidated the essence and implications of the guiding creed of foreign and security policy, the ‘Abe Doctrine’ (Envall 2020; Hughes 2015, 2017, 2018). For instance, Hughes (2017) argues that Abe’s foreign and security ideal opened a pathway to a radical shift rather than maintaining continuity with the past trajectory, marking a watershed in its security trajectory as an alliance and international security partner. Envall (2020) maintains that the Abe doctrine’s policy ideas are chiefly realist rather than nationalist as they keep strong continuities with past Japanese security practices, and at the same time modify Japan’s realist tradition in a direction to give more focus on immediate strategic challenges. The fifth group has explored Prime Minister Abe’s personal attributes that affect Japan’s foreign and security policy. Several scholars expound Abe’s nationalistic attribute in analysing Japan’s foreign policy. For

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instance, Tamamoto (2018) contends that a nationalist Abe sought to make Japan’s relations with the U.S. more mutual through the rewriting of the U.S.-authored constitution and highlight the need to bolster Japanese military capabilities in preparation for disputes with China over uninhabited islets in the East China Sea. Pugliese (2015) focuses on Abe’s political and ideational affiliation with an arch-conservative political association, S¯ osei Nippon [Japan’s Rebirth], whose members became core supporters for Abe’s political comeback in 2012. Others assert that after forming the second administration Abe has adopted a pragmatic posture to stabilise Japan’s foreign relations and an international order. For instance, Mochizuki and Porter (2013) and Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara (2015) hold that Abe exhibited pragmatism by respecting the 1993 K¯ono statement and the 1995 Murayama statement in order to stablise relations with China and South Korea. Ramirez (2019), in analysing Japan’s foreign and security policy, accentuates the evolving nature of Abe’s world view: from neoconservatism in the first administration to neoautonomy in 2012–2014 and to pragmatic realism in 2015–2016. As the above examination illustrates, the Abe administration’s proactive diplomatic postures and strategies attracted scholars’ growing interests. Their research works analyse multiple dimensions of the Abe administration’s foreign and security policy, and demonstrate the growing importance of Abe diplomacy in international relations of Asia. Despite the accumulation of research on Abe diplomacy, there are still several shortcomings or limitations in the past research. First, the past research has not taken sufficiently the evolving character of policy concern and geographical scope in Japan’s external policy. In terms of policy concern, the past studies have paid much attention to the security field. The security affairs have become increasingly important matters for Japanese diplomacy in drastic power realignments in the Asia-Pacific, and the Abe administration has undoubtedly given priority to security affairs in its diplomacy. However, the economic field has been emerging as a crucial policy area as well, exemplified by the growing importance of infrastructure investment in Asia. Significantly, security and economics have growing complexity in Asia, which is shown by the term, ‘economic-security nexus’ (Pempel 2013). Indeed, several studies have explored the strategic nature of the Abe administration’s economic diplomacy in infrastructure investment (Yoshimatsu 2017; Zhao 2019) and foreign aid (Jain 2018; Trinidad 2018; Yamamoto 2017). Yet,

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the comprehensive and comparative analyses of the economic-security nexus in Japan’s foreign policy have not been undertaken sufficiently. In terms of geographical scope, the past research still puts emphasis on Japan’s foreign policy and relations in the Asia-Pacific. However, the Abe administration’s geographical reach extends from the Asia-Pacific to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as Abe is one of the leading politicians who stress the importance of the geographical concept of Indo-Pacific (Yoshimatsu 2019). Indeed, new research on Japan’s commitments to the Indo-Pacific is emerging (Chellaney 2018; Katagiri 2019; Jain and Horimoto 2016), but these are still fragmented. The past research’s insufficient account of Japan’s commitments to the Indo-Pacific and India’s growing presence in them needs to be addressed. Second, many of the past research works have not adopted a compounded view of Japan’s strategic response to China. One of the core issues in Sino-Japanese relations is territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoryu Islands in the East China Sea, and Japan has exhibited great concern about China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea (Sato 2016; Storey 2013). Given growing tensions with China over maritime security, it is natural to consider Japan’s reactions to the China threat from the realist perspective such as balancing and containment. At the same time, Japan’s strategic stance is highly influenced by the nature and evolution of the Japan–U.S. alliance. Namely, uncertainties in the alliance might induce Japan to consider evolving strategic environments in a prudent manner and take into account multiple policy options other than pure balancing. The past studies have not necessarily explored such aspects sufficiently. Furthermore, given China’s large domestic market and extending economic reach, Tokyo is lured to take more nuanced diplomatic postures to pursue some sort of partnership with Beijing to explore mutual economic gains. The studies that have scrutinised such nuances in Japan’s China policy are still limited. Third, the past studies have not pursued systematic connections between international-level interactions and domestic-level policy formation in the Abe administration’s foreign policy. The systematic links between politics at the two levels have been explored by quite a few scholars represented by two-level game analysists (Patnum 1988; Schoppa 1993). The connections between international-level interactions and domestic-level policy formation are particularly important for the Abe administration. A distinctive feature of the Abe cabinet as Japan’s governing administration is its long-term reign, seven years at the end

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of 2019, and this longevity in power brought about reciprocal effects on domestic politics and external policy. While the long-term reign enabled the administration to formulate far-sighted strategic diplomacy, successful achievements in foreign policy have underpinned the long-term reign of the administration. Moreover, as several scholars have contended, the Abe administration has skilfully managed domestic policymaking and policy formation, which led to successful outcomes in various policy fields including foreign policy (George Mulgan 2018; Shinoda 2018: ch.7). It is necessary to scrutinise background factors that enabled the long-term Abe administration to undertake the proficient management of foreign and security policy. Fourth, the past works have not paid enough attention to the role of ideational elements in Abe diplomacy. A weak interest in the ideational elements is plausible because Japan, for a long time, was not a normmaker but a norm-taker who sought to get benefits from existing institutional and normative systems created by the U.S. and other western countries. However, the Abe administration has been active in presenting rules, standards and principles on the basis of Japan’s character as an advanced democracy and a mature market economy. Several studies have already explored the Abe administration’s positive use of rules and norms and the potential of Japan’s normative power (Asplund 2018; Hatakeyama 2019). It is necessary to explore this aspect comprehensively by examining the Abe administration’s purposeful use of ideas in individual policy fields and explore their integrative implications in Japan’s foreign and security policy.

The Argument in Brief This research seeks to address what strategic orientations are found in Japan’s foreign and security policy in evolving power relations in Asia, and how domestic policymaking systems and an ideational aspiration of the Japanese government have influenced the tangible process of policy formation and implementation. This study addresses these central questions by elucidating foreign and security policies that the Abe administration has adopted towards Asia. This research makes three arguments regarding Japan’s evolving stance on its diplomacy towards Asia. First, Japan under the Abe administration has developed multiple strategies and external connections in its diplomacy towards Asia. These strategies and connections aimed at

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balancing against China’s growing presence, which is revealed in the form of internal/external balancing, hard-/soft-balancing, exclusive-/ inter-institutional balancing, and balancing in grey-zone. At the same time, Japan’s strategies had a hedging orientation as it adopted binding engagement and economic pragmatism in relation to China and pursued external partnerships for dominance-denial. In particular, the strategies in the economic policy field had a strong hedging propensity, partly responding to the U.S. protectionism and partly aiming to secure its own interests in association with Chinese external projects. The adoption of the complicated balancing and hedging strategies reflects Japan’s subtle position in evolving power relations between China and the U.S. Second, the Abe administration has managed foreign and security policy towards Asia proficiently under the high prime ministerial cohesion. Such cohesion was realised through the effective use of the personnel management of entourages, opponents, and experts, the centralisation of policymaking power and functions in the core government offices, and the strategic reframing of existing policies. Fundamental backgrounds underpinning the high prime ministerial cohesion are comprised of Prime Minister Abe’s personal leadership capacity, the dedication of personnel in the prime ministerial executive, and the formation of stable relations with the LDP. Third, the Abe administration has become proactive in making use of principles, standards, and other ideas in implementing foreign and security policies towards Asia. These ideas were employed to attain strategic objectives to check China’s policies and actions and urge Beijing to follow international norms as well as underpin the maintenance of a stable regional order and global governance. The administration has taken advantage of various regional and international institutions as platforms to present and diffuse the principles, standards, and other ideas. In particular, the Group of Seven (G7) and G20 forums under its chair became the main places to present these ideas and explain their implications for Asia and other parts of the world.

The Plan of the Book This study seeks to explore the development and implications of Japan’s foreign and security policy towards Asia with particular attention to the Abe administration. For this objective, Chapter 2 offers frameworks for

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subsequent empirical examinations in specific policy fields. The frameworks consist of three analytical angles: international power transition in general and the rise of China in particular; domestic policymaking under the initiative of the prime ministerial executive; and the advocacy and diffusion of specific rules, principles, and standards. The chapter also presents the three sets of research questions that are pertinent to the three investigative angles and an explanation about the selection of five policy fields. In Chapters 3 through 7, empirical analyses are conducted in five policy areas. Chapter 3 explores Japan’s engagement in multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and its policy implications in Japan’s external strategy. After explaining the development of Japan’s commitments to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), TPP-11, and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), it analyses geopolitical and geo-economic interests behind the promotion of these mega-FTAs and attempts to incorporate high-standard trade rules in them. The chapter also investigates strategies and tactics that the government has employed in order to form a cohesive front in domestic policymaking. Chapter 4 explores Japan’s purposeful commitments to infrastructure investment, which is emerging as a crucial policy issue in Asia. As steady growth in major Asian economies has raised the demand for infrastructure development, Japan has exhibited a renewed interest in infrastructure investment. The chapter examines concrete policies and measures that the Japanese government has adopted and concrete processes for formulating and implementing them. The chapter also investigates geopolitical/geoeconomic implications of infrastructure investment particularly in relation to China, and Japan’s advocacy and diffusion of specific standards for quality infrastructure. The focus of Chapter 5 is Japan’s ocean policy combined with maritime security. The Japanese government formulated ocean policy from various policy angles, but the relative position of maritime security has increased particularly under the Abe administration. The chapter explicates Japan’s geostrategic interests in maritime security by taking into account China’s diplomatic assertiveness and offensive behaviour in maritime affairs and Japan’s growing favour for the use of the rule of law at sea as an international norm. The chapter also examines policymaking structures for ocean policies and growing considerations to national security under the prime minister’s initiative.

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Chapter 6 looks at policy development in outer space and its meanings for Japan’s foreign policy. While Japan’s outer space policy had a strong science and technology-orientation, it gradually incorporated diverse policy objectives including national security. The chapter describes the development of policies and measures after the formulation of the Basic Space Law in 2008. This chapter also explores the domestic policymaking process and strategic implications in policy development as well as Japan’s commitments to developing international norms and the rule of law for outer space. Chapter 7 discusses development cooperation through which the Japanese government offers foreign aid to developing countries. The key attention is given to the Development Cooperation Charter that the government adopted in February 2015, and concrete policies and measures under this new charter. The chapter explores geopolitical and geo-economic facets, which urged Japan to redefine foreign aid policy, and major features in domestic policymaking in which the charter was produced. This chapter also highlights specific ideas used in the new charter and its significance for Japan’s Asian diplomacy. Chapter 8 evaluates evidence in the Abe administration’s Asian diplomacy in the previous five empirical cases. It examines strategic objectives and geopolitical considerations in Japan’s Asian diplomacy, explores specific features in domestic policy formation under the prime minister’s leadership, and elucidates the growing importance of ideational elements such as rules, principles, and standards. Through these examinations, this chapter explores long-term implications of the Abe administration and its external policies in the history of Japanese diplomacy, and Japan’s presence in creating a stable regional order in the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific.

Notes 1. The Yoshida Doctrine is Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s political belief that allows Japan to concentrate on economic development while relying on the U.S. for its security (Catalinac 2007: 78–79; Singh 2008: 306–307). 2. The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defence Cooperation. Available at: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html [accessed March 12, 2018].

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CHAPTER 2

The Analytical Framework for Japan’s Diplomatic Policy Towards Asia

The main objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s foreign and security policy towards Asia. For this objective, it takes into account the research outcomes accumulated by past relevant studies and seeks to go beyond them. As the basic research approach, this book takes up empirical policy fields and examines developments in concrete policies and measures, strategic intentions of political leaders, evolving external environments and regional politics, and complicated domestic policymaking processes. In order to undertake the empirical case-based research in an integrated and rational manner, it is necessary to set up clear research questions and locate them in explicit analytical frameworks. The following three sections provide analytical frameworks and research questions. The analytical frameworks consist of three inquisitive angles, which cover international, domestic, and ideational dimensions, which are linked to the three international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. By setting up the theory-oriented analytical frameworks, this research locates the Abe Shinz¯o administration’s foreign and security policy into the broad perspective of international relations. This chapter also presents research questions that combine the short- to long-term outlooks regarding Japan’s foreign and security policy.

© The Author(s) 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_2

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Power Politics from the Realist Perspective Power Politics in International Relations Realism, the mainstream perspective in international relations theory, asserts that international politics is characterised by conflicts among states that pursue greater power. The realist theory has produced core ideas for understanding international politics such as anarchy, power politics, statecentralism, and a rational state. According to realism, the states are the main organising agents of international affairs and their primary concern lies in the maximisation of self-interest defined in terms of power, and accordingly, the states tend to compete with each other for greater power (Morgenthau 1978). Under the anarchical international system, the states are destined to protect themselves with their own power, and survival and security for this objective are given primary importance in their foreign policies and relations. The pursuit of security tends to produce ‘security dilemma’ in which the efforts a state makes to increase its own security decrease the security of others who, as a result, take defensive steps of their own, which in turn reduce the sense of security of the first state (Miller 2001: 16). ‘A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers’ (Waltz 1979: 72–73). The dominance of international politics by the great powers derives from the logic that while every state has to perform a similar set of functions represented by the maintenance of national security, the degree of performance is reliant on the relative capability of each state. The great powers can secure a higher position in the international system and hold a broader scope of action. The management of relations among the great powers is the primary condition that constitutes international politics, and great power configurations such as a bipolar or multipolar system were examined as a desirable structural system for maintaining world order (Deutsch and Singer 1964; Waltz 1964). The great power politics is generally accompanied by a power transition as an existing dominant power loses its relative capabilities and a secondary great power emerges as a challenger. The dominant state originally has sufficient political, economic, and military power to bear the costs of providing international public goods and thereby maintain international order. However, its capabilities gradually wane due to its role in assuming burdens for the maintenance of the international order. The secondary state that can enhance its capabilities by drawing benefits from

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the existing international system will challenge the present institutions and norms, and ultimately seek to overthrow the international system that is created and sustained by the dominant state (Pease 2003: 48). The power transition among great powers poses a serious challenge for the continuation of the international order and the states in the international system. Under the great power dominant international system, smaller states are forced to formulate prudent foreign policy to defend their national and security interests. They tend to adopt discreet strategies varying from bandwagoning and accommodating to hedging and balancing to secure their interests under pressure from a great power (Kang 2009; Murphy 2010). A big challenge for the smaller states in the great power dominance system is how to respond to uncertainty and unpredictability during the period of power transition between great powers. Japan in Power Transition in the Asia-Pacific In the post-World War II period, the political and security alliance with the U.S. has been the central pillar of Japan’s foreign and security policy. Tokyo and Washington concluded the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951, under which the latter has provided a security guard for the former in exchange for the offer of sites for military bases in Okinawa and other areas as well as budgets for supporting these bases. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regime has given priority to maintaining stable relations with the U.S., making Japan’s foreign and security policy tuned with a political partnership with Washington. Although Tokyo was expected to take more initiatives in managing regional affairs and developing regional institutions in East Asia, it did not respond positively to such an expectation largely due to its consideration to the impact of such initiatives on the alliance with Washington (Yoshimatsu 2018: 132). While Japan was the primary economic power in Asia for more than 40 years until 2009, it remained a junior partner of the U.S., the world’s great power. In the new millennium, another great power emerged in the AsiaPacific: China. China has been a political great power as one of the Power-Five members of the UN Security Council, and a major leader of the developing world. Beijing raised its economic prowess with an average annual growth of 10.1 percent from 1990 to 2011 compared with Japan’s growth at 1.1 percent (Hornung 2014: 97), and China’s gross

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domestic product (GDP) took over Japan’s in 2010. China’s economic power was transformed into military build-up. Chinese military spending was 41 percent as large as Japan’s in 1990, reached to an equal level in 2004, and then became 3.2 times as large in 2014 (Lande 2018: 182). China’s economic power also changed into multilateral initiatives. Beijing began to play a proactive role in developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-China Free Trade Area, and other ASEAN-led institutions (Wang 2005). China’s growing regional presence eclipsed Japan’s regional influence that it had maintained since the 1970s. Japan’s regional presence was also influenced by complicated regional politics formed by other regional actors. ASEAN, a regional organisation that is comprised of relatively small members, took the lead in developing various multilateral fora such as the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and East Asia Summit (EAS). The members have stressed the ‘ASEAN centrality’ in managing regional affairs in East Asia and the AsiaPacific, and its dialogue partners including Japan have paid respect to this concept (Caballero-Anthony 2014). Moreover, India emerged as a newly emerging power in Asia with its steady economic growth. Japan began to develop closer connections to India with a growing interest in the Indo-Pacific framework both because India is a crucial balancer to check China’s increasing influence in Asia and because the Indian Ocean constitutes crucial sea lines of communication (SLOC) for Japan (Yoshimatsu 2019). Under these complicated regional politics, Abe Shinz¯o formed his second cabinet in December 2012. The Abe Administration’s Strategic Response in Power Transition The second Abe administration commenced in worsening diplomatic relations with China. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels in the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This incident provoked fierce reactions from China, leading to a serious deterioration in Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Two years later, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government adopted a policy to nationalise three of the five islets that compose the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which invited growing ‘incursions’ into the waters surrounding the islands by Chinese coast guard ships. In 2013,

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the tension in the waters escalated with a Chinese navy ship locking its fire-control radar on a Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) destroyer in January, and China announced the imposition of the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November. Furthermore, concern about maritime security deepened in the South China Sea as China continued the development of artificial islands and the building of harbours, radar towers, and other facilities on them despite a July 2016 ruling by an international tribunal in The Hague discrediting China’s claim to sovereignty over much of the South China Sea. In the 2010s, China raised its political and economic presence in Asia with new multilateral initiatives: the launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The AIIB, formally established in December 2015 with US$100 billion in capital, steadily elevated its presence as a multilateral development bank to offer funds for developing infrastructure in Asia. The BRI aims to develop economic-oriented practical cooperation and foster trustworthy partnerships with countries concerned by incorporating six overland economic corridors and two sea-routes that cover wide geographical areas from Asia to Europe and Africa and to the South Pacific. Given China’s growing military potential and continuous suspicion towards Japan, the Abe administration is forced to adopt defensive strategies against the China risk. In response to Beijing’s maritime challenges, Tokyo revised its defence strategy, shifting the focus from the north to south-western region to counter Chinese actions in the East China Sea, and improved its naval, coast guard, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities (Singh 2015: 59). In external relations, Japan sought to strengthen strategic links with the U.S., its sole ally, and forge closer political links with Australia, India, and ASEAN members, the regional states that can become partners to check China’s offensive postures. However, there are at least two factors that dissuade the Abe administration from adopting a single-minded strategy to check and balance China. The first is the securing of substantial benefits associated with stable relations with China. Sound bilateral relations with Beijing produces multiple benefits to Tokyo. Internally, the Japanese government desires stable political-security relations with China, a close neighbouring country that has long historical exchanges. Moreover, the Japanese business circles have growing interests in participating in BRI projects that produce huge business opportunities in infrastructure development,

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covering a large number of countries in multiple regions. Externally, the countries in the Asia-Pacific desire secure Sino-Japanese political relations, which is a precondition for a regional order, and expect that their partnership lead to the provision of more regional public goods. The second is related to uncertainty in partnerships with states in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Obama administration adopted the pivot to Asia strategy that included strength in the U.S.-Japan alliance. The subsequent Trump administration, which pushed forward the ‘America-first’ rhetoric and policies as well as an antagonistic posture towards multilateralism, deepened latent Japanese concerns about the U.S. commitment to carry the burden of security in the western Pacific (Pyle 2018: 88; Suzuki and Wallace 2018: 715–18). Japan’s possible partners in the Asia-Pacific have increased economic dependence on China, which made it quite important for these states to maintain stable political relations with Beijing particularly in order to secure substantial economic benefits (Masuo 2019: 445–47). This is even the case for the Philippines and Vietnam, two littoral states that compete with China over territorial claims in the South China Sea. Given these uncertainties in the diplomatic stances of the U.S. and other partner countries, the Abe administration has to adopt a prudent foreign and security policy to deal with the China risk. ∗ ∗ ∗ As the above examination indicates, strategic responses to China risk constitute a key diplomatic concern for the Abe administration. The administration needs to consider strategic options with due consideration to complicated geopolitics between China and the U.S., evolving bilateral relations with China, and partnerships with major states in the Asia-Pacific and India with the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific. By taking into account these elements, this study seeks to address the following three research questions: I-a. What strategies, policies and measures has the Abe administration adopted and implemented in response to regional power transition caused by China’s growing presence and influence in Asia? I-b. How are the administration’s strategic choices towards China’s increasing presence characterised in terms of conceptual frameworks regarding the strategic portfolio of a secondary state vis-à-vis a rising power?

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I-c. What implications do the Abe administration’s strategic reactions to the Chinese ascendancy have for Japan’s external relations and diplomatic position in Asia from the long-term perspective? As for the research question I-b, this study provides some insights in advance, which are derived from past research on states’ strategic choices. Quite a few scholars have presented various concepts or terms for explaining the states’ strategic reactions from balancing and containment to bandwagoning, accommodation, and engagement (Goh 2008; Ikenberry 2003; Mearsheimer 2001; Medeiros 2005; Walt 2005). This study explores the implications of Japan’s strategic responses to regional power transition in terms of two concepts: balancing and hedging. The balancing is one of the key concepts for the study of international relations. For a long time, states’ foreign and security policies under strategic environments have been analysed in the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy. The concept of balancing can be grasped as internal balancing, which occurs when the states invest heavily in defence by transforming their latent power into military capabilities, and external balancing, which occurs when the states seek to form military alliances against the predominant power (Lieber and Alexander 2005: 119). In the new millennium, several scholars have presented new concepts for balancing. A representative of such concepts is soft balancing, which began to surface as new balancing logics in the mid-2000s in order to account for the absence of hard balancing against the U.S. after the end of the Cold War (Ferguson 2012: 202). While hard balancing employs measures such as a military build-up, war-fighting alliance, or transfer of military technology to an ally, soft balancing relies on non-military assets such as economic statecraft, international institutions, diplomatic arrangements, and political alignments (Pape 2005: 17: Paul 2005: 58–59). Moreover, soft balancing intends to constrain and restrict an emerging state from pursuing hegemonic aspirations through threatening policies towards other states, not necessarily aiming directly to undermine or confront the emerging state’s power (McDougall 2012: 3–4; Saltzman 2012: 133). Another crucial concept is institutional balancing. The institutional balancing is a type of balancing behaviour in which a state seeks to constrain and undermine a rival’s power and influence through the creation and development of multilateral institutions (He 2008, 2009). The value of institutional balancing lies in the integration of a state’s strategic intentions and the importance of institutions, and institutional

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balancing can be grasped by various forms such as inclusive, exclusive, and inter-institutional (He 2015, 2018). The concept of institutional balancing has been used, for instance, to explain complicated great power politics in relation to the formation of mega-free trade agreements (FTAs) (Lee 2016). The second concept that this study relies on in exploring the implications of Japan’s strategic responses is hedging. Quite a few scholars have employed hedging as a useful concept to explain a smaller state’s strategic responses to a larger state. However, its definition and causal usage are somewhat vague and confusing. In particular, the past research tends to build upon the concept of hedging in a broad manner to include various sorts of foreign policy behaviour, which weakens the term’s conceptual rigour and undermines analytical values in explaining variations in the states’ foreign policy behaviour (Lim and Cooper 2015: 700–1; Vidal and Pelegrín 2018: 5). On this point, Kuik has produced exceptional research works on hedging, which present a rigid analytical model to explain the smaller states’ policy approach to a rising power (Kuik 2008, 2013, 2016). He defines hedging as ‘a behaviour in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of highuncertainties and high-stakes’ (Kuik 2008: 163). Kuik then examines ‘risk-contingency’ options such as indirect-balancing and dominancedenial, ‘return-maximizing’ ones including binding-engagement and limited-bandwagoning, as well as economic-pragmatism that is located in the middle position. Among the five categorised policy options that Kuik presents, this study does not consider indirect-balancing and limitedbandwagoning. As already explained, the balancing concept is employed in a more illuminating way, and the concept of limited-bandwagoning is not necessarily useful in examining the relatively chilly relationship between Japan and China in the 2010s. Accordingly, this study employs three policy options; dominance-denial designed to minimise political risks of subservience by cultivating a balance of influence among the powers; economic-pragmatism designed to maximise economic returns from a big power by pragmatically forging direct commercial links; and binding-engagement to maximise diplomatic benefits by engaging and binding a big power in various institutionalised bilateral and multilateral platforms (Kuik 2008: 166–71; 2016: 502–6).1 Thus, this study seeks to gain a comprehensive understanding of the influence of power transition in the form of the rise of China on Japan’s

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concrete diplomatic strategies towards Asia. It will elucidate the variety and essence of strategies and policies that the Abe administration has adopted in response to China’s growing presence in Asia, and characterise the strategies and policies by employing various theoretical concepts under the umbrella of balancing and hedging.

Domestic Politics from the Liberal Perspective Domestic Politics in International Relations The realists regard a state as a unitary, rational actor, and accordingly, the state’s external policy is deemed as a rational response to constraints imposed by power politics in the international system. According to this realist logic, the state’s domestic political conditions do not constitute important variables for shaping its foreign policy and relations. This realist perspective has been influenced by Kenneth Waltz’s stress on the third image—the role of the structure of the international system—rather than the second image—the role of domestic structures and politics—in explaining the state’s foreign policy and relations (Waltz 1959). However, in the reality of international relations, the states under similar international conditions often exhibit different policy preferences for external policies and relations, or the state sometimes adopts diverse foreign policies in different policy fields or issue-areas. In order to provide a rational account for such phenomena, liberal scholars of international relations have stressed the need of highlighting policy formation and interest coordination at the state’s domestic political level. The consideration of domestic structures and politics is important for integrating the foreign policy analysis approach into the mainstream perspectives of international relations that include realism and constructivism (Kaarbo 2015). However, liberalism has been the key theory that pays due attention to domestic structures and individual differences with a belief that the international system has a less than overriding influence (Doyle 2008: 59). The liberals’ due attention to domestic structures and politics is seen in the interdependence theory that takes into account the meaningful influences of multiple channels formed by non-state domestic actors on the states’ foreign relations (Keohane and Nye 2001). The liberals then developed various approaches and theses that incorporated domestic structures and politics: the two-level game approach (Conceição-Heldt 2013; Putnam 1988; Schoppa 1993); the

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democratic peace thesis (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001); or the societal actor-focused liberal approach (Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997; Schirm 2013). In analysing a state’s foreign policy in terms of domestic politics, a particularly important is to explore how an initial idea or preference possessed by a political leader develops into a concrete foreign policy in domestic political structures and processes. The policymaking structures and institutions offer settings and conditions where various political actors interact in pursuit of multiple political objectives and complicated political interests are coordinated in the interactions. Moreover, bureaucratic politics within the government matters in real policy formation. Indeed, bureaucrats are expected to implement policies and measures according to instructions from the political leaders, but they sometimes play a more autonomous role in formulating and executing public policies. In particular, inter-ministerial conflicts over the jurisdiction of policy issues have a significant influence on the policy formation process. As long as public policies have a significant impact on the diverse segments of the society, major societal groups and political parties that rely on support from them seek to make their interests and assertions reflected in the policymaking process. Thus, various factors in domestic policymaking impinge on the development of public policies including foreign policy. A crucial question is how Japan’s policymaking system in relation to foreign policy is characterised. The Development of the Policymaking System in Japan For a long time, Japan’s policymaking process was characterised by the cabinet supported by the LDP-bureaucracy partnership (Shimizu 2018: 11). The long-term power grip enabled the LDP to enhance the function of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), its main deliberation body, in shaping and checking public policy. The PARC, which consists of 14 divisions attached to each ministry and a number of investigative and special committees, functions as a central organ that examines and approves any bills or policy plans before being submitted to the Diet. The power of the LDP was also strengthened as LDP politicians, who are called zoku giin (policy tribes), played a critical role in the policymaking process with an accumulation of knowledge and expertise in specific policy fields with dense links to societal groups.2 The central bureaucracy holds strong power in policymaking with the capability to determine public

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policy goals, draft most legislation, and control the national budget. The bureaucrats pursue the policy goals with a wide range of tools from formal industrial, monetary, and fiscal policies to informal administrative guidance. As for the concrete relationship between bureaucrats and LDP politicians, the former surely managed detailed works for making policies and laws, but the latter retained the power to block or pull teeth policies that contradicted their core interests (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1997). The political and administrative reforms after the 1990s had a significant impact on the policymaking system. The drastic change in the electoral system from the medium-sized to small district in 1994 had a crucial effect on power relations within the LDP. The party, which had appointed plural candidates in each district under the medium-sized district system, was obliged to select one candidate under the small district system. The shift to the new system contributed to enhancing the authority of party president as his or her popularity among voters, combined with the policies set by the party, exerted a crucial influence on the result of the election (Mishima 2019: 113; Uchiyama 2010a: 11–12). The prominent position of the bureaucracy in policymaking was transformed through a series of administrative reforms after the late 1990s. In January 2001, institutional reforms to strengthen the function of the Cabinet were introduced. The reforms contained the clarification of the prime minister’s legal right to submit a proposal to the Cabinet, the enhancement of the Cabinet Secretariat’s functions and organisations, the establishment of the new Cabinet Office, the introduction of state ministers with special missions, and so on (Mishima 2019: 108–9; Tanaka 2007). Koizumi Jun’ichir¯ o was a representative prime minister who made full use of reformed administrative apparatuses. Koizumi took advantage of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), which did not necessarily play a prominent role in policymaking.3 Koizumi employed the council as a key weapon to proceed with domestic structural reforms by blocking resistance from bureaucrats and conservative LDP members (Uchiyama 2010b). The council took over the initiative from bureaucrats, to a considerable extent, in agenda-setting, the starting point of the policymaking process. In particular, the four members selected from the private sector made bold proposals to cut in the vested interests of bureaucrats. Moreover, the Koizumi cabinet set up quite a few administrative headquarters under the Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office, collected

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talented bureaucrats from ministries and agencies, appointed many ministers of state for special missions, and thereby established the Kantei-led policymaking system in which the Cabinet drew up bills (Makihara 2016: 76). After Koizumi stepped down in September 2006, the subsequent three LDP administrations under Abe Shinz¯ o, Fukuda Yasuo, and As¯ o Tar¯o lasted for one year each. Then, the DPJ formed the government after earning a victory in the Lower House election in August 2009. The DPJ had criticised the bureaucracy-dominant policymaking system during the LDP era, and appealed to the public that the party would realise a shift to the politicians-led policymaking system. The first DPJ government, the Hatoyama cabinet, established new administrative bodies such as the National Strategy Bureau and the Government Revitalisation Unit, and strengthened posts for politicians such as senior vice-minister and parliamentary secretary in order to realise the politicians-led policymaking. However, the control of bureaucrats by the so-called ‘three politically appointed top posts’ (seimu sanyaku)—the minister, senior vice-minister and parliamentary secretary—did not work effectively because those in sub-cabinet positions of senior vice-minister and parliamentary secretary were rarely enrolled in actual decision-making (George Mulgan 2016: 269). The politicians-led policymaking tended to lead to the exclusion of bureaucrats from the policymaking process rather than the effective control and management of them, failing to create the transparent policymaking process and produce desirable policy outcomes. The exclusion of bureaucrats created serious confusion in policy formation by yielding weak coordination and collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats. Eventually, the DPJ regime collapsed in three years. The Policymaking System Under the Abe Administration Prime Minister Abe, after coming back to power in December 2012, created policymaking structures that were significantly different from those under the previous DPJ cabinets. The Abe administration enhanced the Kantei-led policymaking by strengthening the ‘prime ministerial executive’, which is comprised of the prime minister and his executive office, as well as its policy and administrative support apparatus (George Mulgan 2018: 2).4 The Kantei’s key members consist of the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, three deputy chief cabinet secretaries—one administrative and two parliamentary secretaries—the prime minister’s executive

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secretaries (s¯ ori hishokan) and special advisers (s¯ ori hosakan).5 An unofficial meeting among senior Kantei members (Seifuku Kanb¯ o Ch¯ okan ¯ Kaigi) has functioned as a supreme decision-making body (Oshita 2017: 133–34; Tazaki 2014: 26–45). The meeting involving the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, three deputy chief cabinet secretaries, and chief executive secretary has been held in 10–15 minutes almost every day, and judgements on the majority of important policy issues have been made there. The Abe Kantei strengthened its grip on bureaucrats by realising the integrated management of the personnel of senior bureaucrats. In May 2014, the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat, which has the authority to manage some 680 posts and candidates for posts at the level of deputy bureau director-general and above. More concretely, the head of the bureau, a deputy chief cabinet secretary, prepares a list of candidates by taking into account personnel evaluations by relevant ministers, ministers propose candidates for posts, and the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, and ministers make the final ¯ decision on the posts (Mori 2019: ch.7; Oshita 2017: 192–200). The Abe Kantei guaranteed the real function of the bureau by allocating its first head to Kat¯o Katsunobu, a parliamentary deputy chief cabinet secretary. Abe created a strong impression of politicians-led policymaking by displacing bureaucrats’ expectation that the post would be assumed by ¯ Sugita Kazuhiro, the administrative deputy chief cabinet secretary (Oshita 2019: 331–32). Moreover, the Kantei-centred policymaking is bolstered by the empowered Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office. These two administrative bodies constitute the ‘core government offices’ being integral to formal power resources available to the prime minister to buttress his executive leadership (George Mulgan 2018: 3). In particular, the two agencies function as the secretariats of policy councils that the prime minister sets up in order to prepare for policy programmes at his initiative (Mishima 2019: 108). After the formation of the second Abe administration, the presence and function of the Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office in policymaking increased significantly. While the number of staff at the Cabinet Office increased slightly from 2283 in 2012 to 2333 in 2017, the number at the Cabinet Secretariat grew by 1.4 times from 807 to 1125 in the same period. The increase in the number at the two offices was noticeable because the overall number of staff at the government

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agencies decreased from 299,758 in 2012 to 297,025 in 2017.6 Furthermore, the number of internal bureaus, offices, and sections managed by three deputy chief cabinet secretaries in the Cabinet Secretariat increased from 14 in November 2012 to 30 in August 2015, while the number of policy councils set up within the Cabinet Office grew from 66 to 83 in the same period (Miyazaki 2016: 61–62, 66). The expansion of internal organs and councils within the Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office implies that these two administrative agencies enhanced authority and functions to cut into policy domains managed by the pre-existing ministries and agencies. Prime Minister Abe has formed distinctive relations with the LDP. Most LDP leaders consolidated their political positions within the party by gaining support from key factions and their bosses. Abe has been less dependent on such faction politics, relying on support from ruling party politicians with similar political creed. In fact, the members of several Diet members’ leagues have given strong support to Abe. The representative of such leagues is S¯ osei Nippon [Japan’s Rebirth], which was founded in 2007 with some 70 members. As its original name, Shin Hoshu Seisaku Kenky¯ u Kai [True Conservative Policy Study Group] indicates, this is a conservative gathering that pays respect to Japan’s tradition and culture, and aims to reform the post-World War II Japanese political systems. Abe has assumed the chair of this group since 2009 when Nakagawa Sh¯oichi, the first chair, and Abe’s political ally, passed away. There are at least two additional gatherings of politicians who are sympathetic with Abe’s conservative political belief: Sai-Charenji Shien Giin Renmei [Diet Members’ League for Supporting Challenge Again], which was formed in 2006 as a cheer team for Abe, and Nippon Kaigi [Japan Conference], a highly conservative group that is comprised of some 300 bipartisan politicians (Abe Shinz¯o wo Kangaeru Kai 2015: 92–93). Moreover, the Hosoda faction—Seiwa Seisaku Kenky¯ u-kai, or Seiwa-kai—to which Abe belongs has maintained the largest number among LDP factions. Since Abe suspended his membership on the occasion of becoming prime minister, his reliance on the faction, the Seiwa-kai, is less significant compared with the previous prime ministers (George Mulgan 2018: 57). However, the Seiwa-kai has a special connection to Abe as this faction originates from the T¯ oka-kai, the faction that Abe’s grandfather Kishi Nobusuke established. The fact that the faction to which Abe belongs maintains the largest number of the party members has given him certain relief in relation to the LDP and its politicians.

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∗ ∗ ∗ Indeed, a number of research has explored the functions and characteristics of the policymaking system after the second Abe administration (George Mulgan 2018; Maclachlan and Shimizu 2016; Pugliese 2017; Shinoda 2018: ch.7). However, very few studies have undertaken comprehensive and concrete research on the administration’s subtle manoeuvring of policymaking in increasingly important Asian diplomacy. The study of this issue is particularly important because the Abe administration has given a special concern to diplomatic issues among public affairs, and foreign and security policy in Asia has been a main pillar of the Abe diplomacy. This study seeks to make contributions to this research issue by examining the concrete functions and implications of the prime ministerial executive in several policy fields in Japan’s foreign and security policy. This study seeks to address three research questions regarding this aspect: II-a. How has the prime ministerial executive of the Abe administration consolidated the centralised management of policy formation and implementation in specific fields of Asian diplomacy? II-b. What factors enabled Abe and his executive office to enhance Kantei-led policymaking control and the effective use of policymaking apparatus concerning foreign and security policy towards Asia? II-c. What implications do the presence and function of the prime ministerial executive during the Abe administration have for the future trajectory of the Japanese policymaking system? As for the research question II-b, this study presents three-layered analytical angles that are pertinent to ‘prime ministerial cohesion’. The prime ministerial cohesion implies the degree to which the prime minister creates a centripetal force around him and his executive office by winning consent from other political actors about his policy preferences and policy management. Under the high prime ministerial cohesion, the prime minister is able to manage the government smoothly in pursuing his determined policy goals. Under the low prime ministerial cohesion, persistent divisions create fragmented policymaking in which the prime minister is confronted with various ‘veto players’ in taking a coherent and effective policy initiative.7 Given that the veto players exist in both the executive and legislative branches, the prime ministerial cohesion is pertinent to an

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internal unifying force in the executive as well as stable and cooperative relations with ruling politicians in the legislative. This research hypothesises that the prime ministerial cohesion is dependent on three-layered variables. The first-layer variable is the personal leadership capacity of the prime minister. The management of the government is heavily reliant on the leadership of the prime minister, the chief executive who holds privileges to appoint the cabinet members and control all functions of the executive. The leadership style and leadership vision of prime ministers surely had a crucial effect on concrete outcomes in Japanese diplomacy (Envall 2015). Prime Minister Abe has already gained the right to be called one of the ‘great prime ministers’ as he assumed the prime ministership for more than eight years in total, the longest period for all prime ministers including those under the Japanese Imperial Constitution. As long as longevity in power becomes possible with continuous support from the nation and Abe’s popularity is based on positive evaluations on the outcomes of public policies, Abe should hold specific leadership capacity to lead his administration to produce such policy outcomes. In particular, Abe is a peculiar leader as the first prime minister who made a comeback in the post-World War II period, and it is necessary to explore how this unique political career cultivated his leadership capacity. The second-layer variable is the presence and dedication of personnel in the prime ministerial executive. As the past research has demonstrated, a key feature of the Abe administration’s policymaking is the strong presence and role of the Kantei (Pugliese 2017; Shinoda 2018: ch.7). The strong presence and role of the Kantei lead to the so-called ‘Kantei diplomacy’, which is a much more extensive and institutionalised phenomenon than the conventional model of ‘political leadership in diplomacy’ (George Mulgan 2020). Going beyond the prime minister’s political leadership in managing foreign affairs, the Abe Kantei might have some distinctiveness in the aspiration and dedication of personnel, which constitutes the prime ministerial executive and engage in the administration’s policy management. The key Kantei personnel who are involved in the policymaking process might have specific attributes that might serve to show their willingness and devotion to sustain the duration of the Abe administration. The third-layer variable is pertinent to government-ruling party relations. Japan adopts the parliamentary system in which the head of government is assumed by the president of the majority party.

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The executive and legislative branches in the parliamentary system are interdependent, and the continuation of the executive rests on the confidence of the assembly as the government can be removed—generally by the lower chamber—if it loses that confidence (Heywood 2019: 343). The long-term reign of the Abe administration becomes possible as the ruling LDP has not openly criticised the administration’s policy formation and execution. The long-term trend of zoku politicians’ declining influence on policymaking and the deteriorated role of factions within the LDP undoubtedly gave considerable leeway that Prime Minister Abe can show a more policy autonomy in relation to the LDP (Mishima 2019: 109–12). Going beyond these structural factors, Abe is likely to perform political manipulations to draw support for his policy management from individual politicians in the ruling party. Besides, the Abe administration should have created a solid political base within the LDP, which guaranteed support for the administration and its smooth policymaking and policy implementation.

The Diffusion of Ideas from the Constructivist Perspective Ideational Elements in International Relations In the early 1990s, rationalism that includes neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism was confronted with a new challenge from constructivism. The constructivists who recognise the limitation of the materialist approach in rationalism stress the importance of incorporating intangible assets such as norms, values, identities, cultures, and ideas into an analysis of international relations (Kratochwil 2000; Wendt 1992, 1999). According to the constructivists, the international system is a social construct that is intersubjectively understood by states, and is transformed and reproduced by their social interactions. In accounting for the states’ behaviour and interactions in the international system, the ideational elements, in addition to material power, need to be taken into account. The development of constructivism as an international relations theory, coupled with new orientations in neo-institutionalism in comparative politics, produced a series of idea-oriented research. These scholars interrogated theoretical backgrounds, values, and implications of the idea (Blyth 1997; Campbell 1998; Jacobsen 1995; Laffey and Weldes 1997;

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Yee 1997), and searched for its application to empirical issues of international relations (Checkel 1997; Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993a; Mendelson 1998). The ideas, which are defined as ‘subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions’, influence policy development in various manners (Parsons 2002: 48). Not only do the ideas help political actors internally to determine their own preferences or to understand the causal relationship between policy goals and several means to reach the goals, but they also assist them externally to legitimise their specific policies and programmes and make them accepted by other actors. When the political actors use ideational elements to persuade other actors to accept and adopt their views of what to think and do, such persuasiveness depends on cognitive arguments to define the problems to be solved and to propose solutions to them and normative arguments to make appeal to the norms and principles of public life (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016: 323–26). Several scholars in political science have directed their particular interests to articulating ideas’ two roles in the political process (Blyth 2003; Kat¯o 2009; Tannenwald 2005). The first is a ‘constitutive role’ in which ideas serve to specify the interests and preferences of political actors. The ideas help the political actors to develop an interpretation and meaning of specific phenomena, matters, and programmes, and set up specific policy objectives on the basis of the interpretation and meaning. The second is a ‘causal role’ in which the political actors take advantage of ideas to attain a specific objective. The political actors deliver their values and causal beliefs, create collectively shared expectations within a group, and thereby attain desired political outcomes. In pursuing the second role, the political actors seek to gain and expand support for their own ideas through symbolic language, agenda-setting, policy framing, institutional embedding, and so on. In the real scene of international relations, a state employs ideas in order to achieve various diplomatic goals: to raise its national interests and international status, counter likely threats from an adversary state, or sustain a stable international order and global governance. When ideas incorporate normative values, the skilful use of them contributes to raising the state’s international status as a normative power or constrain policies and actions of the adversary state. Moreover, ideas can serve as an important vehicle to create and maintain a stable international order that is based on common norms, rules, and understandings. The ideas can coordinate diverse interests among the states avoiding unintentional

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conflicts, and such a function becomes particularly effective when they are embedded in multilateral institutions. Thus, the state can take advantage of ideas for attaining multiple diplomatic goals. The Advocacy of Ideas in Japan’s Foreign Policy In the post-World War II period, Japan achieved steady economic growth under the liberal international economic order. In the high economic growth era from the 1950s through the 1980s, Japan accepted liberal rules and norms that were sustained by multilateral institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Group of Seven (G7). Even after Japan accumulated significant economic power, it was a norm-taker, not a normmaker, and Japanese diplomatic style was characterised by ‘leadership from behind’, ‘karaoke diplomacy’, or ‘quiet diplomacy’, which indicated an invisible and passive posture in the surface, not making significant contributions to the maintenance of a stable international order (Hook et al. 2011; Inoguchi and Jain 2000; Rix 1993). In the 2000s, the Japanese government began to show a new posture to take advantage of specific ideas in advancing its Asian diplomacy. A representative is ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ during the first Abe administration in 2006–7. During this period, both Prime Minister Abe Shinz¯ o and Foreign Minister As¯o Tar¯o stressed universal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law in Japan’s foreign policy. As a concrete strategy to promote the liberal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, As¯o advocated the necessity of building an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ around the outer rim of the Eurasian continent through diplomacy that would emphasise these universal values (As¯o 2007). The arc of freedom and prosperity was a new innovation in Japanese diplomacy in that it combined the geopolitical perspective with the values and interests of freedom and democracy (Suzuki 2019: 122; Yamamoto 2020: 7–8). Although the arc of freedom and prosperity was alive in the short term as the first Abe administration lasted only for one year, it would have a significant influence on Japan’s diplomatic approaches after the second Abe administration. Another example of Japan’s new diplomatic posture is found in the Hatoyama administration under the DPJ regime in 2009–10. Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio presented the East Asian Community (EAC)

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concept, a new vision for multilateralism in Asia, which was based on the recognition of common cultural identity among Asian nations. Given its timing after the global financial crisis, the EAC concept attracted international attention. Hatoyama originally considered that Japan would assume a leading role in creating a new order in East Asia, but stress on self-reliance and distance from a partnership with the U.S. hindered the Hatoyama administration from pursuing such a role. The EAC concept was not understood sufficiently even among political leaders in Asian countries with which Hatoyama hoped to cooperate for communitybuilding. In the 2000s, several administrations pushed forward specific concepts as key diplomatic ideas in Japan’s diplomacy towards Asia. This new trend implies a shift from quantity-oriented to quality-oriented diplomacy with a willingness to take advantage of ideational elements in addition to material resources represented by official development assistance (ODA) (Suzuki 2019: 122). However, the administrations were unsuccessful in diffusing the ideas broadly and gaining the recognition of them from other countries largely because each administration lasted for one year or so. The reborn Abe administration is completely different from the previous administrations as it lasted for more than seven years, a sufficient period to develop and appeal particular ideas for enhancing Japan’s diplomatic position in Asia and making contributions to sustain a stable regional order. The Role of Ideas in the Abe Administration’s Diplomacy The Abe administration has been willing to employ symbolic concepts in propelling key policy initiatives. This tendency was found on both domestic and external fronts. On the domestic front, Abe has been skilful in sloganeering or political ‘marketing’ of his ideas by harnessing specific catchphrases or concepts (George Mulgan 2018: 63–64). The representative catchphrases are the three-arrows of Abenomics, the promotion of dynamic engagement of all citizens [ichioku s¯ o-katsuyaku], or workstyle reforms [hatarakikata kaikaku], which were used to attract public interests and mobilise public opinions towards certain policy ends. On the external front, Abe has presented specific catchphrases such as ‘proactive contribution to peace’ and ‘diplomacy taking a panoramic perspective of the world’. Furthermore, Abe has advocated prominent concepts in advancing his diplomacy such as the ‘Democratic Security Diamond’

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and ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, which incorporate liberal values of democracy and freedom. The presentation of symbolic concepts or policy ideas has two significant implications for the Abe administration’s diplomacy particularly in intensive great power politics. First, the presentation implies a rational response to the reality that Japan’s relative material power has diminished in Asia. Japan can compensate for dwindling material capabilities, which is typically shown in shrinking economic power and the diminished amount of ODA, by the strategic use of ideational elements. This implication is particularly important in relation to China. The Chinese government has reserved massive financial resources accumulated through long-term high economic growth, which undoubtedly eclipsed Japan’s financial influence in Asia. Japan might counter China’s growing material capability by the effective use of ideational elements, and check Beijing’s diplomatic behaviour by presenting and diffusing internationally accepted rules, principles, and standards. China is originally less willing to rely on laws and rules as Chinese society tends to be governed by the people not by the law. Moreover, since China joined the advanced nations-led international system rather late, it is less accustomed to international rule-making. Japan can take advantage of the rule-oriented domestic society and longterm involvement in the international rule-making system in order to protect its national interests and preserve its international presence. Second, the making and dissemination of common rules and standards as specific policy ideas facilitate policy harmonisation with advanced nations that share values, norms, and principles. In this respect, a particularly important is relations with the U.S. The U.S. Trump administration has made it clear to pursue American economic interests rather than the maintenance of liberal principles and multilateral systems. The administration’s protectionism and anti-multilateralism raised a serious concern about the preservation of a liberal international order for many states including its alliance partners. Japan, in collaboration with other likeminded partners such as Australia and the European Union (EU), is likely to resist the weakening of the liberal international regime by playing a more assertive role in presenting and diffusing liberal-oriented principles and standards. The Abe administration is likely to have a renewed interest in disseminating particular principles and rules to sustain the liberal international order and global governance after the emergence of the Trump administration.

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∗ ∗ ∗ The Abe administration has strengthened preferences for taking advantage of rules, principles, and standards for attaining specific diplomatic objectives in undertaking its foreign and security policy towards Asia. Such preferences are likely to influence the initiative and development of concrete policies and strategies in specific policy fields. This study seeks to address three research questions regarding such aspects: III-a. What sorts of ideas has the Abe administration possessed, presented, and diffused with what policy objectives in undertaking its foreign and security policy towards Asia? III-b. How has the administration sought to make these ideational elements shared with other states by taking advantage of existing multilateral institutions and inter-state interactions? III-c. What implications does the Abe administration’s employment of ideational power in foreign and security policy for Japan’s role conception in Asian international relations? As for the research question III-b, this study presupposes a particular analytical framework, which is based on the past development of an ideational approach. The value of an idea as a concept for constructivism lies in its function for intersubjective understandings and meanings among the actors concerned. In particular, in order that an idea plays a causal role in persuading the actors concerned to change their preferences and engage in specific actions, the idea needs to be interpreted and accepted as legitimate and appropriate for guiding their actions. A political actor seeks to make the idea shared with other actors as a prerequisite for making them change their preferences and actions, and thereby produce particular political outcomes. Accordingly, it is crucial to examine how the political actor engages in the sharing of a particular idea and how such sharing is achieved. Ideas and institutions have been used concurrently in analysing political change and policy development (Blyth 2002; Lieberman 2002; Sikkink 1991). The ideas and institutions perform mutually reinforcing functions in policy development. On the one hand, institutions offer settings where ideas are presented and promulgated. Ideas are originally beliefs possessed by individuals, and their intersubjective functions require grounds where they are advocated and explained, and institutions provide such grounds.

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Moreover, ideas have a prolonged influence when they are embodied in institutions because institutions help to collect interests in ideas and legitimise their values. On the other hand, ideas can become a catalyst in developing and transforming institutions as they can have an influence on the design and objectives of institutions, and transform the power and interests of political actors involving in institutions. In particular, ideas, by offering both a scientific and normative critique of existing institutions, allow the political actors ‘to challenge existing institutional arrangements and the patterns of distribution that they enshrine’ (Blyth 2001: 4). This study presupposes the two sorts of idea sharing in relation to institutions. The first is ‘simple sharing’ in which institutions function as settings for idea presentation. The simple sharing implies the presentation of ideas at the meetings of regional and international institutions and the inclusion of ideas into formal statements issued at the meetings. The ideas in this case do not necessarily have a deep impact on other actors’ policy behaviour because the presentation of ideas is a onetime action, not producing prolonged effects. However, the presented ideas have a potential to become a roadmap to help actors concerned to develop preferences for specific policy outcomes under conditions of uncertainty by clarifying policy goals, the causal relationship between the goals and alternative means, and principles incorporated in the means (Goldstein and Keohane 1993b: 13–17). Moreover, the presented ideas might serve to define cooperative solutions to problems by selecting between multiple Pareto-optimal potential outcomes (Gofas and Hay 2008: 16). They bring different views and perceptions among actors in a group together, being sometimes regarded as focal points to promote the accord of attention and interests.8 The second is ‘embedded sharing’. Political actors seek to embed particular ideas in intergovernmental arrangements or multilateral institutions as common platforms. The ideas, which are embodied into the intergovernmental arrangements or policy initiatives by multilateral organisations, have a prolonged influence on policy development with the power to change the incentives and interests of actors concerned, and thereby change their policy actions (Goldstein and Keohane 1993b: 20–24). In particular, once ideas become the shared understanding of the ‘right’ way in institutions, they hold normative meanings and values, which encourage involved actors to perceive the ideas as appropriate, acceptable, and legitimate rather than just useful instrumental means to an end. Accordingly, the political actors that hope to use ideas for

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pursuing specific policy goals seek to make ideas embodied in multilateral institutions and develop them into new normative frameworks. In addition to the above two sorts of structure-based sharing, this study postulates an actor-based sharing as ‘sharing with an adversary’. The value of ideas lies in the extent to which they are diffused and accepted as common platforms to influence the normative and cognitive beliefs of actors in a group. In this context, the acceptance of an idea by a leastlikely actor, an adversary against the advocate, has a strong appeal to other actors who are sceptical about the value of the idea. In international relations of Asia, China has been the key adversary state for Japan as the two states have repeated various conflicts over the territory and historical memories and have competed for regional leadership in East Asia. Therefore, Beijing’s understanding and acceptance of Tokyo’s ideas make a significant impact on the sharing of ideas among states in Asia.

The Summary of Analytical Angles This study seeks to analyse the development of foreign and security policy towards Asia under the Abe administration, which becomes a dependent variable. In the previous sections, three analytical angles are presented: systemic power transition; domestic policy formation; and the presentation of ideational elements. From these three analytical angles, three independent variables are identified; China’s regional ascendancy and growing influence; the Kantei-led policymaking process and apparatus; and the advocacy of rules, standards, and principles. China’s growing regional ascendency coupled with the U.S. power decline has a significant influence on the perception of Japanese political leaders particularly the prime minister, and such perception becomes a crucial source of new policy initiatives. The new policy initiatives are changed into concrete policies through the specific domestic policymaking process in which the prime ministerial executive in the Kantei exerts centralised control over the formation and implementation of the policies. The Japanese government advocates and diffuses new rules, standards, and principles as crucial means to attain specific diplomatic goals, and such ideas are shared through inter-state interactions as well as regional and international platforms, and are sometimes embedded into intergovernmental arrangements or multilateral institutions. In analysing the presence and function of the international, domestic, and ideational variables, two issues need particular attention. The first is

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mutual interactions among the three variables in shaping Japan’s foreign policy in Asia. The degree of the perception of China risk influences the extent of the prime minister’s perception of the need to propel a new policy initiative. The presence of international standards and principles is dependent on the need to maintain and advance normative governance, and the utility of such ideas is highly influenced by the degree of acceptance by other regional states particularly China. Second, the presence and function of the three variables need to be explored with due consideration to other elements pertinent to the variables. The degree of success in responding to China risk effectively is closely relevant to strength in an alliance with the U.S. and the formation of possible partnerships with other regional states. While the main focus in domestic politics is the prime ministerial executive-led policymaking within the executive branch, relations with ruling politicians have significant influences on the success of adopting and implementing necessary policies in a timely manner. Furthermore, the utility and influence of principles are closely relevant to the presence and development of bilateral and multilateral institutions where these ideas are introduced and diffused.

The Selection of Policy Areas as Case Studies This research focuses on individual policy areas as empirical cases. The individual policy area approach as a case study method has at least three advantages. First, focus on individual policy areas contributes to undertaking an in-depth examination of empirical cases. This approach allows scrutiny of policy development and a careful investigation of the influence of international, domestic, and ideational factors in policy development. Second, focus on multiple policy issues has strong values for comparative analysis. The comparative analysis of the policy development process and key variables functioning in the process serves to illustrate similarities and differences in the multiple cases of the target of the study. Third, the individual policy area approach enables us to draw a solid generalisation of findings in the study by purposefully selecting cases in various policy areas. Difficulty in generalising the findings beyond the case studied is often raised as a major weakness of the case study method. However, a prudent selection of cases enables us to overcome this difficulty and help to draw a firm generalisation of findings in empirical cases. The selection of cases in different policy fields and/or in different time-frames is such a prudent way.

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This research seeks to undertake a comparative study of Japan’s foreign and security policy in Asia by selecting cases in five diverse policy areas. This study posits that the selection of cases in traditional and newly emerging policy areas by bringing together the economic-security facets of Japan’s diplomatic policies and relations in one place can make contributions to raise the validity of research by achieving a higher generalisation of findings from empirical cases. Accordingly, one traditional and one newly emerging area are selected each from the fields of international political economy and national security. This research also focuses on a special policy area where Japan has used considerable diplomatic resources in order to make contributions to the international community and such contributions have led to enhancing Japan’s overall foreign profile. The traditional area in international political economy is trade. International trade has been the main target of the study of international political economy with its pivotal position in economic activities. In particular, international trade has constituted an essential condition for economic growth for Japan, a country poorly endowed with natural and energy resources. While Japan has imported natural and energy resources necessary for industrial upgrading, it has exported manufactured products to overseas markets and acquired foreign currency. In accordance with global trends towards trade liberalisation under regionalism and bilateralism, the Japanese government has adopted evolving trade policies, which led to the development and proliferation of FTAs. This research considers trade as one case by taking into account its importance for the Japanese economy and evolving nature in Japan’s trade policy. The newly emerging area in international political economy is infrastructure investment. With the high economic performance of the newly emerging economies in Asia, the demand for infrastructure investment increased sharply in the 2010s. The Asian Development Bank’s report on infrastructure in Asia indicates that investment needs for infrastructure in the developing Asian region will be US$1.7 trillion per year, or US$26 trillion in total, between 2016 and 2030, if the region is to maintain its growth momentum, eradicate poverty, and respond to climate change (ADB 2017). Japan has been a major supporter for developing infrastructure systems in Asian countries by providing funds for constructing ports, roads, railways, and so on. In the 2010s, infrastructure investment emerged as a renewed policy issue for Japan as it contributes to reinvigorating the Japanese economy through the export of integrated

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infrastructure systems. This is a key point why this research picks up infrastructure investment as an independent case. The two policy areas, ocean and outer space, are considered from the standpoint of national security. The ocean is a representative global commons that provides human beings with various benefits such as fishery resources, SLOC, stable environments, and so on. The ocean affairs have been a key concern for Japan that is surrounded by the sea on all sides. The combined area of Japan’s territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is approximately 4.47 million square kilometres, 12 times as large as the land area, making Japan a key maritime nation in the world. The ocean is important for Japan in light of national security due to territorial disputes with neighbouring states over islands in the seas. In particular, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea constitutes one of the most crucial diplomatic issues for Japan, and China’s assertive diplomacy and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea are a major concern for Japan. It is necessary to explore Japan’s engagement and strategies to manage these maritime affairs that constitute a major security challenge for Japan’s Asian diplomacy. Outer space is emerging as a crucial policy area for national security. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed over space development during the Cold War era, China has rapidly caught up with the U.S. and Russia in space capabilities by initiating various programmes for developing satellite constellation, a space station, and so on. Outer space is particularly important in national security as advanced military weapons are dependent on information provided by satellites and outer space facilities. From the 1960s, Japan engaged in space development programmes from a purely science and technology standpoint. In the new millennium, Japan has gradually incorporated defence and security perspectives in its space development programmes, and this new orientation offers a valuable case that is linked to national security. In addition to the above four policy areas, this research picks up foreign aid/development cooperation as the fifth case. Development cooperation through foreign aid is crucial economic statecraft, and this tool has been used to attain various diplomatic objectives including security ones (De Haan 2011). Foreign aid has functioned as Japan’s pivotal diplomatic means to influence its foreign relations and elevate Japan’s international status largely because Japan’s peace constitution restricts military operations. Although Japan’s status as a foreign aid power declined after it

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became the primary provider of foreign aid in the early 1990s, development assistance remains a crucial foreign policy apparatus to underpin various initiatives from economic and human resource developments to build-ups of maritime facilities. The Japanese government has strengthened preferences regarding foreign aid as a strategic tool to attain national interests, locating it in a broader conception of development cooperation. The development cooperation is important in bridging together political, economic, and security dimensions in relation to Japan’s position in evolving regional politics.

Notes 1. Kuik (2008: 170) considers that dominance-denial may not be targeting a particular power on the premise of ASEAN’s collective interests in blocking the emergence of one great power to dominate Southeast Asia. This study applies the concept of dominance-denial towards a situation where a particular power raises its presence and influence to dominate international affairs in a particular policy field. 2. Zoku giin are defined as ‘LDP Diet members who exert, formally or informally, a strong influence on specific policy areas mainly at the LDP’s PARC’ (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987: 20). The LDP politicians, who have assumed positions such as political vice-minister, chairman and vice-chairman of PARC divisions as well as chairman of the Diet’s standing committees, have accumulated special expertise and influence concerned with policy formation and implementation. 3. The CEFP was an outcome of the administrative reform in January 2001. The council was established within the Cabinet Office as a consultative body to facilitate the prime minister’s leadership in managing overall economic and fiscal policies and deliberations on basic principles of fiscal budgets. The council is comprised of eleven members: the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, the minister of state for economic and fiscal policy, other relevant ministers (Ministers for Internal Affairs and Communications, Finance, and Economy, Trade and Industry), Governor of the Bank of Japan, and four private-sector experts. 4. George Mulgan (2018: 3) makes an important point in differentiating the prime ministerial executive from the formal political executive. While the former is made up of the prime minister and other Kantei members as well as the core government offices, the latter consists of the prime minister and other cabinet members. 5. The executive secretaries consist of chief executive secretary (seimu hishokan) and other executive secretaries (jimu hishokan) who are

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dispatched from the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Economy, Trade and Industry as well as the Police Agency. 6. Kokka K¯ omuin no Teiin: Kaku-nendomatsu Teiin [The Number of National Public Servants: Capacity at the End of Each Fiscal Year]. Available at: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jinjikyoku/files/h29 0401_teiin [accessed January 31, 2020]. 7. The veto players are defined as ‘individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo’ (Tsebelis 1995: 289). 8. The concept of ‘focal point’, which was originally introduced by Schelling, is referred to as the ‘point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do’ (Schelling 1960: 57).

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Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schirm, Stefan. 2013. Global Politics are Domestic Politics: A Societal Approach to Divergence in the G20. Review of International Studies 39 (3): 685–706. Schoppa, Leonard J. 1993. Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases But Not Others. International Organization 47 (3): 353–386. Shimizu, Masato. 2018. Heisei Demokurash¯ı-shi [The History of Democracy in the Heisei Era]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shob¯ o. Shinoda, Tomohito. 2018. Seiken K¯ otai to Sengo Nihon Gaik¯ o [Japan’s Regime Shift and Postwar Foreign Policy]. Tokyo: Chikura Shob¯ o. Sikkink, Kathryn. 1991. Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Singh, Bhubhindar. 2015. The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy. Asia Policy 19: 49–64. Suzuki, Kazuto. 2019. Nihon wa Riberaru Kokusai Chitsujo no Ninaite ni Nari eru no ka [Can Japan Be a Bearer of Liberal International Order?]. Kokusai Seiji 196: 116–132. Suzuki, Shogo, and Corey Wallace. 2018. Explaining Japan’s Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability. International Affairs 94 (4): 711–734. Tanaka, Toshiyuki. 2007. Naikaku Kin¯ o Ky¯ oka no Genj¯ o to Kongo no Kadai [Current Status and Future Issues of the Enhancement of Cabinet Function]. Ripp¯ o to Ch¯ osa, 263. Tannenwald, Nina. 2005. Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda. Journal of Cold War Studies 7 (2): 13–42. Tazaki, Shir¯ o. 2014. Abe Kantei no Sh¯ otai [The Identity of the Abe Kantei]. Tokyo: Kodansha. Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25 (3): 289–325. Uchiyama, Y¯u. 2010a. Nihon Seiji no Akut¯a to Seisaku Kettei Pat¯an [Actors and Policymaking Patterns in Japanese Politics]. Kikan Seisaku Keiei Kenky¯ u 3: 1–18. ———. 2010b. Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Vidal, Ll. López i, and Àngels Pelegrín. 2018. Hedging Against China: Japanese Strategy Towards a Rising Power. Asian Security 14 (2): 193–211. Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power. Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 105– 120. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University. ———. 1964. The Stability of Bipolar World. Daedalus 93 (3): 881–909.

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———. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Wang, Jianwei. 2005. China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium. In China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, 159–200. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46 (2): 391–425. ———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yamamoto, Raymond. 2020. Understanding Abe’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision Through Japan’s Development Assistance. Issues & Insights 20 (1): 7–11. Yee, Albert S. 1997. Thick Rationality and the Missing ‘Brute Fact’: The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas. The Journal of Politics 59 (4): 1001–1039. Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. 2018. Japan’s Role Conception in Multilateral Initiatives: The Evolution from Hatoyama to Abe. Australian Journal of International Affairs 72 (2): 129–144. ———. 2019. The Indo-Pacific in Japan’s Strategy Towards India. Contemporary Politics 25 (4): 438–456.

CHAPTER 3

Trade Policy in the Mega-FTA Age

In the globalisation era, major countries in the world have deepened economic interdependence and international trade has functioned as a key driver of economic interdependence. The formation of free trade agreement (FTA) networks has made great contributions to expand international trade and cross-border business operations. The FTAs serve to integrate the national economies into external markets by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers and promoting the harmonisation of various trade-related rules. In particular, the formation of the so-called megaFTAs, which include a large number of counties in different regions, becomes a driving force for creating more connected and freer markets in the world. For a long time, Japan was not a proactive player in the global game of FTA formation. Even after it converted the basic stance to promote FTAs in the late 1990s, progress on negotiations on them was slow for more than 10 years. In the late 2010s, Japan consolidated its status as a key centre of the mega-FTA formation. Not only did it conclude the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Japan-European Union (EU) Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) in 2018, but it also became a major driver of negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Japan stands in a position to take the lead in advancing broader and

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deeper trade liberalisation by linking these mega-FTAs that have a pervasive impact on the international trading system and global economic governance. The main objective of this chapter is to examine the development of Japan’s trade policy mainly under the Abe administration. It first depicts Japan’s engagement in FTAs in bilateral and multilateral settings in the Asia-Pacific. It then investigates ideational elements to which the administration has paid due attention and geopolitical objectives that it pursued in the FTA strategy. Moreover, this chapter examines how the Kantei’s leadership has created a cohesive domestic front by overcoming resistance from societal and political circles to market liberalisation through FTAs.

The Growing Presence of FTAs in Trade Policy The expansion of international trade was a key premise of economic growth for post-war Japan, and thereby its government committed positively to multilateral trade negotiations. Japan proposed the holding of the Tokyo Round (1973–79) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system. In order to express its enthusiasm for the successful conclusion of the negotiations, Japan offered tariff reductions on the largest number of items among the participating members and carried out the first round of tariff reduction in advance of the agreed time schedule (Komiya and Itoh 1988: 204). Even during the period when major trading partners shifted their priorities from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism, Japan adhered to multilateralism. It was in the late 1990s when the Japanese government began to investigate worldwide trends of regional economic integration, merits and demerits of such region-based approaches, and possible policy options (Munakata 2001: 99–100). After shifting its trade strategy from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism, Japan began to engage in the formation of bilateral FTAs, targeting partners in the Asia-Pacific region. It selected Singapore as the first FTA partner, signing the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement in January 2002, and then concluded FTAs with Mexico in September 2004, with Malaysia in December 2005, and with Thailand in April 2007. In these FTAs, Japan offered the concession of aid and technical cooperation in exchange for the protection of its agricultural market. In the case of the Japan-Malaysia FTA, for instance, Japan agreed to offer food processing and preservation technologies and assistance to establish

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a certification system in the wood-based industry in exchange for the relatively low level of liberalisation in the agricultural sector. Consequently, the liberalisation ratio in terms of trade value basis in Japan’s FTAs with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines was 91.6–94.1 percent while the partners’ offers were 96.6–99.3 percent (Urata 2015: 60). By the mid-2000s, East Asian countries finalised the formation of possible bilateral FTAs and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-centred minilateral FTAs. The formation of an East Asia-wide FTA was recognised as the following step. However, talks on this FTA did not go smoothly largely because two competing proposals were made by two regional rivals, China and Japan. At the 7th ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) summit in October 2003, China proposed studying the feasibility of a free trade area in East Asia, and subsequently ASEAN+3 members engaged in research on the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). The rationale for the EAFTA was that production networks and supply chains had been developed most significantly among the ASEAN+3 members, and harmonising rules of origin (ROOs) among these countries could produce tangible benefits (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011: 14). At the second East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting in January 2007, Japan suggested an idea of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia (CEPEA) as a proposal to counter the EAFTA. The rationale for the CEPEA among 16 EAS members was that economic gains were projected to be larger than those from the EAFTA. The two trade architectures were put in parallel development. In August 2009, economic ministers received the phase-II reports of the EAFTA and CEPEA and agreed to pursue the establishment of four working groups on ROOs, tariff nomenclature, customs-related issues, and economic cooperation. In August 2011, China and Japan jointly proposed the formation of a regional FTA in East Asia at the ASEAN+3 and EAS economic ministers’ meetings. In November 2011, the joint proposal was integrated into the ASEAN Framework on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was agreed among ASEAN leaders. The negotiations on the RCEP, which began in May 2013, did not make steady progress. Although 20 rounds of senior officials’ meetings and five ministerial meetings were organised by the end of 2017, the members could reach an agreement in only two—small- and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) and economic cooperation—out of the fifteen fields. On the sidelines of the 12th EAS meeting in November 2017, leaders of 16 member countries issued the Joint Leaders’ Statement on

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the Negotiations for the RCEP. In this statement, the leaders confirmed their resolution ‘to ensure that RCEP delivers its potential to be a key driver of growth and equitable economic development, and serve as a pathway to further integrate our economies’ (China Daily 2017). In July 2018, Japan hosted the 5th RCEP intersessional ministerial meeting, the first gathering held at a non-ASEAN member country. The ministers reaffirmed their resolve to work together towards the early conclusion of negotiations with due attention to allowing the economies with different development levels to actively participate in and benefit from an open and inclusive regional economic integration. Although the leaders of the member countries pursued the conclusion of negotiations within 2019, they were unable to find a political compromise on remaining difficult issues. Another crucial multilateral FTA in the Asia-Pacific is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). This FTA developed from the TransPacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, which entered into force in May 2006. The U.S. participation transformed this small FTA into a significant trade architecture. After the Bush administration’s formal announcement to begin negotiations on full membership in the TPP in September 2008, Australia, Vietnam and Peru decided to join TPP negotiations. The formal talks on the TPP began among eight members in March 2010, and Malaysia, Mexico, and Canada joined later. The participation in TPP negotiations became a controversial political issue in Japan. The cabinets under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gradually consolidated a political will to participate in TPP talks, but a formal decision on the participation was passed to the subsequent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration. In March 2013, Prime Minister Abe Shinz¯o formally announced Japan’s participation in the TPP talks, and four months later Japan joined the 18th round of TPP negotiations held in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Afterwards, Japan engaged in intensive negotiations with other TPP members in general and with the U.S. in particular. While Japan contributed to promoting negotiations on trade rules such as intellectual property protection, it adhered to keeping five ‘sanctuary’ agricultural products—rice, wheat, sugar and starch, dairy products, and meat (beef and pork)—as exceptions to tariff elimination. After negotiations in five and a half years, the twelve TPP members reached a broad agreement in October 2015. Japan agreed to reduce its 38.5 percent duty on beef to around 10 percent over more than 10 years,

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and slash tariff on pork from a maximum of ¥482 (US$3.97) per kilogram to around ¥50 (US$0.41) over the same period, and to expand a quota for U.S. rice at 50,000 tons annually for the first three years then to 70,000 tons in stages over 10 years. Although Japan was eventually forced to accept market-opening measures on politically sensitive agricultural items, it could gain relatively advantageous results with 95 percent of tariff abolition rate compared to 99–100 percent for other members. The formation of the Trump administration in the U.S. changed the fate of the TPP. The administration demonstrated policy preferences for economic nationalism and anti-multilateralism to preserve American employment opportunities and industrial competitiveness. Donald Trump, who had announced the withdrawal from the TPP during the election campaign, signed an executive order to pull out of the agreement just after the start of the administration in January 2017. The Trump administration also forced its trade partners to begin renegotiations of existing FTAs such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Korea-U.S. FTA. Furthermore, the administration sought to make the anti-China ‘poison pill clause’, which was included in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, as a model for other trade agreements. Such an attempt surely aroused serious concern about the maintenance of the free and open trade regime. Japan first sought to pursue all possibilities to maintain the original TPP that included the U.S. During an unusual trip to New York to meet unofficially with president-elect Trump in November 2016, Abe attempted to persuade Trump to stay the U.S. in the TPP (Terada 2019: 1055). When Abe held a summit meeting with Trump in Washington in February 2017, he tried again to induce Trump to stay in the TPP, stressing its values as a pact with the most advanced rule of trade and investment for the standards in the twenty-first century. Although Trump shared the recognition that the U.S. and Japan supported free trade in the post-war period, he did not agree to return to the TPP. Given clear U.S. preferences for bilateralism rather than multilateralism, Japan converted its TPP strategy to pursue an agreement among the remaining members. On April 13, Abe organised a meeting of six FTA-related ministers in order to discuss the treatment of the TPP without the U.S. (the TPP-11). After listening to opinions from the ministers, Abe proclaimed that ‘we work on the TPP-11, carefully watching international climates’ (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2017a). After the holding of the Japan-U.S. Economic

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Dialogue on April 18, the Japanese government formally revealed its will to propel the TPP-11. The joint statement issued at the Japan-U.S. summit in February 2017 included a phrase that ‘Japan continuing to advance regional progress on the basis of existing initiatives’.1 Accordingly, Japan took the lead in reinvigorating negotiations among the TPP members except for the U.S. The trade ministers of the eleven members, who gathered in Vietnam in May 2017, reaffirmed the balanced outcome and strategic and economic significance of the TPP, and tasked senior officials to launch a process to assess options to bring the agreement into force and to complete this process by an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled in early November. In the subsequent negotiation process, Japan exhibited clear-cut leadership. Tokyo stood at an advantageous position to propel negotiations as it had already completed the ratification of the original TPP and the enactment of relevant domestic laws by December 2016. In negotiations on the TPP-11, Japanese agricultural groups demanded the revision of promises on market access, which were made in negotiations with the U.S. However, the Japanese government kept the stance not to revise the promises since such a revision on market access would invite similar requests from other members to change provisions on services, investment, government procurement, and so on. Japan’s persistence was highly appreciated by other members (Shinoda 2019: 10). After the ministerial meeting in May 2017, the first senior officials’ meeting took place at Hakone, Japan in mid-July. After the second senior officials’ meeting in Australia in late August, Japan proposed holding two more meetings before the end of October (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2017c). In the subsequent process, three working groups were organised to deal with legal aspects, intellectual property rights, and other fields. The officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and Ministry of Welfare and Labour helped the working groups by offering useful advice on legal aspects and intellectual property rights (Shinoda 2019: 10). In September and October, negotiations among senior officials were held in Japan where settlement on concrete issues was advanced. As it was planned, the eleven members agreed on the core elements of the CPTPP at a ministerial meeting in Vietnam in November. Japan hosted three out of the four senior officials’ meetings between two ministerial meetings in Vietnam in May and November. Moreover, the Japanese Minister

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of Economic Revitalisation Motegi Toshimitsu assumed co-chair of the ministerial meeting in November, engaged in intensive talks with other ministers, and proposed an agreement plan. Japan continued its efforts to reach the final conclusion after the agreement on core elements of the CPTPP. Two controversial issues remained: a conflict over the treatment of labour right legislation between Vietnam and Mexico; and Canada’s request to protect cultural policy space. Abe dispatched Motegi to Vietnam in late December and to Mexico in early January so as to encourage Vietnam and Mexico to find a compromise. Motegi encouraged his Vietnamese counterpart to settle the issue through a side letter, and got an accord on this settlement from the Mexican Secretary of Economy Ildefonso Guajardo. As for the treatment of Canada’s request, Japan adopted a strict approach. At the senior officials’ meeting in Tokyo in late January, Japan prepared for two agreement plans: the TPP-11 and the TPP-10 that excluded Canada. Although Canada expected that Mexico as a NAFTA partner back its request, Guajardo had agreed during Motegi’s visit not to give support to Canada. Eventually, the Canadian negotiator agreed to separate the culture provision from the agreement and make it a side letter (Shinoda 2019: 11). The eleven members signed the CPTPP in Chile in March 2018. After the agreement came into force on December 30, 2018, the first CPTPP Commission meeting took place in Tokyo in January 2019. Thus, Japan under the Abe administration proactively engaged in the promotion of mega-FTAs (Table 3.1). A distinctive characteristic in commitments to mega-FTAs was determined leadership. Japan played an important role in concluding negotiations on the original TPP. Moreover, it exhibited firm leadership in initiating and concluding negotiations on the CPTPP as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appreciated Japan’s contributions, personally thanking ‘Prime Minister Abe for hosting the recent talks and for his leadership on reaching this positive outcome’.2 Japan also began to play a positive role in finalising negotiations on the RCEP after it concluded talks on the CPTPP.

Commitments to High-Standard Rules in Mega-FTAs In promoting FTA policy, Japan has paid due attention to high-standard trade rules. The term ‘high-standard’ here means realising trade and investment liberalisation in a wide range of sectors and unifying rules

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Table 3.1 Japan-involved key FTAs Name

No. of members

Year initiated

12/11

2010/2017

16

2013

Japan-EU EPA

2

2013

China-Japan-Korea FTA

3

2013

Japan-U.S. FTA

2

2018

TPP/CPTPP RCEP

Status as of June 2020 CPTPP came into force on December 30, 2018 Ended 30 rounds of negotiations Came into force on February 1, 2019 Ended 16 rounds of negotiations Came into force on January 1, 2020

Note The initiation year implies the year when formal negotiations began Source Made by the author

and regulations with broad coverage of policy areas. It also means the pursuit of common rules and disciplines in policy fields that are not covered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO): ‘WTO-plus’ rules. The high-standard, WTO-plus rules are conducive to promoting trade facilitation and deeper economic integration among participating members of FTAs. Japan attempted to realise the incorporation of high-standard trade rules in negotiations on mega-FTAs. However, the evaluation of Japan’s contributions to produce high-standard trade rules is nuanced. Several studies contend that the structure and contents of the TPP were largely U.S.-tailored, and Japan’s contribution was smaller even compared with other members such as Australia, Canada, and Chile (Allee and Lugg 2016; He 2019: 134). This evaluation is based on the fact that Japan, who joined TPP negotiations relatively late, directed its prime concern to protecting its agricultural sector from market liberaliation. However, Japan contributed to progressing negotiations in specific issueareas. Just after joining negotiations in July 2013, Japan assumed the chair of the working group on intellectual property, which deliberated on difficult issues such as generic drugs, the period of copyright protection, and geographical indication. Three months later, Japan also hosted an emergency meeting on intellectual property. Japan’s entry into the negotiations was crucial in fracturing the near-unanimous opposition to the U.S. proposals and contributed to the ultimate retention of several TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-plus provisions

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in the final clauses of the intellectual property chapter (Townsend et al. 2018: 92). In spearheading negotiations on the CPTPP, Japan’s primary goal was to maintain the high-standard nature of the original TPP by keeping its text as intact as possible. This goal was necessary for preparing a common platform to accommodate the U.S. when the Trump administration would alter its stance on trade policy or in the event that Trump would be succeeded by a more TPP-friendly president. More crucially, the goal would serve to maintain ‘momentum on making rules to cover its production network across the Asia-Pacific region’, making the pact a cornerstone for a future economic order in the region (Watanabe 2018: 30). The formation of high-standard trade rules in a broad range of fields such as investment, services, electronic commerce, and intellectual property protection was expected to be the foundation for facilitating global supply chains and value chains. The Japanese government considered that trade rules on which the original TPP members agreed would contribute to the creation of advanced and sophisticated value chains and thereby economic growth in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. During negotiations on the CPTPP, several members demanded the revision of the original agreement. Malaysia and Vietnam, in particular, were unwilling to keep the high-standard rules because they had accepted the relaxation of domestic regulatory rules in exchange for greater access to the U.S. market. Katakami Keiichi, the chief Japanese negotiator, led discussions on how to realise the high-standard rules of the original TPP at a preparatory meeting in Toronto in early May 2017 (Cabinet Secretariat 2017). The statement issued at a ministerial meeting on May 21 included a sentence that the ministers agreed ‘to launch a process to assess options to bring the comprehensive, high-quality Agreement into force expeditiously’.3 The term, expeditiously, was adopted for avoiding the wide range of revisions of the original agreement. In the final CPTPP text, 22 clauses were suspended, out of which 11 items were relevant to intellectual property protection that the U.S. set as its priorities in the original TPP. The CPTPP as a twenty-firstcentury agreement contained new rules in various areas such as electronic commerce (ch.14), government procurement (ch.15), state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies (ch.17), intellectual property protection (ch.18), environment (ch.20), and so on. Japan accepted some of these rules, including the environmental ones, for the first time. Although Japan, in parallel to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, had not set up an

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environmental chapter in previous FTAs, it was positive in accepting the rule in the CPTPP as contributing to sound competition in the level playing field. Moreover, Japan agreed to assist Vietnam to revise its environmental protection law and to help Malaysia to strengthen the administrative capacity of its Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Matano 2018: 5). Japan’s adherence to high-standard trade rules had a significant influence on negotiations on the RCEP. Whereas the major concern in the negotiations was directed towards tariff elimination, Japan encouraged other members to take up trade rule issues such as electronic commerce and intellectual property protection as key agendas in parallel to tariff elimination. In so doing, Japan attempted to transfer high-standard rules and high-level market openness achieved in the TPP/CPTPP to the RCEP. For instance, the chapter on intellectual property proposed by Japan in October 2014 contained some TRIPS-plus measures that resembled those found in the final text of the TPP, such as the expanded scope of patentability, patent term extension, and data exclusivity (Townsend et al. 2018: 93). The negotiations on trade rules are generally time-consuming as the harmonisation of such rules cuts into domestic regulations and institutions of the member countries. The developing members in particular had a serious concern that the adoption of high-standard rules would restrain domestic regulations and institutions including the scope of industrial policy. Accordingly, Japan sought to mitigate the developing members’ concern through support for capacity building in the formation of trade rules. During the ASEAN Economic Ministers Roadshow to Japan in April 2017, Sek¯o Hiroshige, Japanese minister of METI, proposed the planning of the Japan-ASEAN Cooperation Package for RCEP Establishment, in which Japan would assist ASEAN members to develop human resources in electronic commerce, intellectual property protection, and efficient trade procedures. Japan, which had already provided developing ASEAN members with support for human resource development in legal systems on intellectual property rights, sought to strengthen such commitments in relation to the RCEP. Japan is generally regarded as a protectionist-oriented country due to the notorious guard of the agricultural sector. The societal groups and their sympathetic politicians repeated political actions to resist the opening of the farm market, and the government protected this politically sensitive sector with import quotas and high tariffs. This fact does

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not imply that Japan has committed to stubborn protectionism covering a wide range of sectors. On the contrary, it has a long history of sticking to trade liberalisation. With Japan’s growing commitments to multilateralism in the 1970s, the so-called ‘GATT fundamentalists’ who held a solid belief in trade liberalisation principles were fostered among the economic policy authorities (Cortell and Davis 2005; Hatakeyama 2015: 248). They kept momentum to promote market liberalisation under the multilateral trading system, and by the early 1980s, Japan’s average tariff level became considerably lower than the corresponding levels of other major developed countries (Komiya and Itoh 1988: 206). Japan regarded trade liberalisation as a common standard to be pursued by all members of the GATT. From such a standpoint, Japan was, for a long time, reluctant to shift from multilateralism to bilateralism and regionalism. The GATT fundamentalists considered that the formation of regional trade arrangements such as customs unions and free trade areas, which were exceptionally admitted in the GATT 24 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 5, ran counter to the GATT principles (Hatakeyama 2015: 249). Consequently, Japan adhered to GATT/WTOcentred multilateralism even after other major countries shifted their preferences to regionalism through the formation of FTAs. Japan’s adherence to trade liberalisation had a significant impact on trade policy adopted by the Abe administration. Japan stuck to highstandard liberalisation in negotiations on the RCEP, which led to a confrontation with China. Beijing, which was under the pressure of the TPP with high-standard trade rules, regarded the RCEP as an alternative regional FTA that would have a lower level of ambition for market liberalisation and was sensitive to concerns among countries with varying levels of development through special and differential treatments (Katada 2018: 3). The Sino-Japanese confrontation was seen at the 5th RCEP ministerial meeting in September 2017. Sek¯o Hiroshige asserted that it was crucial to make the RCEP a high-quality agreement. Immediately after this statement, Zhong Shan, the Chinese commerce minister, rebutted that the most crucial matter was to achieve an early conclusion rather than to waste time by caring about quality too much. While Singapore gave support to Japan’s stance, Thailand got into line with China to pursue an early conclusion (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2017b). Japan’s persistence in trade liberalisation showed more prominence in complicated politics on the commercial policy after 2016. As already

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explained, Trump launched his ‘America-first’ policy, exhibiting a willingness to challenge the liberal trade regime without hesitation to adopt protectionist policies even towards long-term political partners including Japan and the EU. An equally crucial incident was the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU (Brexit), following the result of the referendum in June 2016. Brexit kindled moves towards nationalism and disintegration in other parts of Europe and raised opposition to freer movements of goods, capital, and people. In intensive moves towards economic nationalism and market disintegration, Prime Minister Abe considered that the creation of high-standard trade rules through mega-FTAs would serve to preserve the liberal international economic order. On this point, the conclusion of the CPTPP was a major milestone. Abe stated, at a press conference after attending the APEC summit in November 2017, that: I believe we took a major step forward by achieving an agreement at the TPP ministerial meeting led by Japan. We truly succeeded in taking a powerful step forward towards creating a 21st-century global economic order. This message from Japan, that as the standard-bearer for free trade, we will work to extend free and fair high-standard economic rules around the Asia-Pacific region and across the world, had high impact, I believe. (Abe 2017)

In his speech at the 5th RCEP intersessional ministerial meeting in July 2018, Abe stressed the importance of creating a free and rules-based fair market by referring to new liberal rules of electronic commerce and the rules that firmly protect intellectual property. Abe particularly stressed the importance of advancing free and fair rules in order to make the entire RCEP economic zone a base for innovation and to establish economic rules in the new era (Abe 2018). Such policy preferences were repeated at the 26th APEC summit and the second RCEP summit in November 2018. Thus, Japan has sought to introduce high-standard trade rules regarding electronic commerce, intellectual property protection, stateowned enterprises, and so on. Japan played a leadership role in producing the CPTPP in order to keep the high-standard nature of the original TPP. Japan also sought to transplant WTO-plus trade rules achieved in the TPP/CPTPP into the RCEP, which would make the agreement a high-standard FTA. After the emergence of the Trump administration,

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Japan sought to maintain the liberal trade regime in order to counter economic nationalism and anti-multilateralism pursued by the administration. Abe repeatedly stressed the value of high-standard trade rules as a crucial means to protect the global economic order and the liberal trade regime.

Geopolitical Elements Affecting Japan’s FTA Policy In the 2010s, Japan strengthened a strategic orientation in its FTA policy, and Prime Minister Abe’s decision to participate in TPP talks in 2013 was influenced by such strategic consideration. Given that diplomatic relations between Japan and China worsened sharply after the nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in September 2012, the Abe administration sought to consolidate political and military links with Washington in order to urge Beijing to exercise self-restraint in its approach to disputes in the East China Sea. The close partnership was particularly important as diplomatic relations with the U.S. deteriorated under the previous DPJ government. The Abe administration sought to participate in the U.S.led TPP talks as a cornerstone of the re-assurance of an alliance with Washington. In the policy speech to join TPP negotiations in March 2013, Abe declared that ‘the significance of the TPP is not limited to the economic impact on our country. Japan is creating a new economic zone with our ally, the United States’ (Abe 2013b). Importantly, the value of the TPP for strengthening political-security partnerships with the U.S. is confirmed in the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan’s fundamental principle of national security formulated in December 2013. The section entitled ‘Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance’ contains the following passage: In the area of economy, Japan and the U.S. aim to achieve economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in a rules-based and transparent manner, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations…. In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a more multifaceted Japan-U.S. Alliance. (Cabinet Secretariat 2013: 21)

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In addition to the positioning of the TPP as a linchpin to strengthen bilateral links to the U.S., Japan located the TPP as a useful vehicle for coalition-building with like-minded countries on the basis of universal values. Abe stated, at the Diet speech in February 2013, that ‘my diplomacy is based on ‘strategic diplomacy’, ‘diplomacy that emphasises universal values’, and ‘insisting diplomacy’ to protect national interests. I will rebuild the injured Japanese diplomacy and clarify Japan’s firm position standing in the world’ (Abe 2013a). The policy speech to join TPP negotiations includes a sentence that ‘other countries who share the universal values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law are joining’ (Abe 2013b). The influence of the China shadow continued in subsequent negotiations, and this influence was pertinent to both geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions. In September 2013, U.S. President Obama stated that ‘America is not the world’s policeman’ in his speech on Syria. In accordance with the change in the U.S. security stance, China escalated its aggressive maritime behaviour. It became apparent in 2014 that Beijing engaged deeply in building artificial islands at unprecedented speed to bolster its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and China’s unilateral actions encouraged political leaders of the U.S. and Japan to reassess strategic values in the TPP. In April 2015, Ashton Carter, U.S. Secretary of Defense, stated that ‘passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier’ (Carter 2015), and Abe echoed Carter’s statement by contending, in a speech at the U.S. Congress, that ‘the TPP goes far beyond just economic benefits. It is also about our security. Long-term, its strategic value is awesome’ (Abe 2015). In the geo-economic dimension, Japan and the U.S. were apprehensive about China’s growing presence through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and subsequent influences on global rule-making. During the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping took advantage of being the hosting chair and tried to recruit members for the AIIB. During this APEC summit, leaders of TPP members issued a joint statement, which confirmed that ‘the benefits of the agreement serve to promote development that is sustainable, broad based and inclusive, and that the agreement takes into account the diversity of our levels of development’.4 This statement was a reaction to China’s initiative in the APEC meeting (Shinoda 2019: 7). The concern about China’s presence in global rule-making through the AIIB was shown in statements by American and Japanese leaders. Obama stated

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in January 2015 that ‘China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules’ (Obama 2015). Abe cared about China’s move to develop the AIIB. In the Japan-U.S. summit in April 2015, Abe warned against China’s AIIB initiative to ensure fair governance, and shared a view with Obama to lead negotiations on the TPP towards a prompt conclusion.5 The development of Japan’s trade policy in 2013-16 was influenced by complicated domestic and international factors, but the China factor undoubtedly assumed a crucial position. Given intensified maritime tensions with China in the East and South China Seas, Japan regarded the TPP as a crucial means to counter China’s assertive diplomatic postures and aggressive maritime actions, regarding the U.S. as the partner to pursue this strategic objective. This orientation is theoretically interpreted as ‘exclusive institutional balancing to alienate the target state from an institution and rely on the cohesion of the institution to impose pressures on the target state’ (He 2015: 215–16). The nature of exclusive institutional balancing was reinforced by Japan’s aspiration to locate the TPP as leverage to forge political partnerships among like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which shared universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Thus, Japan’s policy and behaviour to join the TPP and make substantial contributions to the successful conclusion of its negotiations can be explained by the strategic term of exclusive institutional balancing. The Trump administration’s inward-looking commercial policy had a significant impact on Japan’s trade strategy. The administration’s policy preferences for anti-multilateralism and protectionism brought about negative influences on the preservation of the liberal trade regime. Moreover, the administration’s protectionism was directed towards bilateral commercial relations with Japan. For instance, the Trump administration decided, in March 2018, to impose duties based on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on imports of steel and aluminium, making Japan a target of this protectionist policy. Tokyo was apprehensive about demands on new initiatives and measures that the Trump administration would like to take in order to rectify long-lasting U.S. trade deficits with Japan. Japan sought to hedge against the unpredictable U.S. commercial policy by creating the international climate to oppose protectionism and anti-multilateralism through two initiatives in FTAs. The first was

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the early conclusion of negotiations on the CPTPP. The conclusion of this first multilateral trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific could help to preserve a liberal trade order and maintain momentum for multilateralism in the world. The agreements in the CPTPP also could be used as a non-negotiable foundation towards the U.S. demands in its attempt to conclude a bilateral FTA with Japan. Moreover, the CPTPP was expected to function as a stimulus to encourage American exporters and their associations to exert pressure on their government to consider a return to the TPP seriously in order to avoid competitive disadvantage against their rivals in the Japanese and other Asian markets. The second was the swift conclusion of the JEEPA. The negotiations on the JEEPA that began in April 2013 did not make steady progress, and Japan and the EU postponed a goal to reach an agreement by the end of the year twice in 2015 and 2016. However, political determination changed such a stagnant climate. Just after coming back from Washington in February 2017, Abe sent Imai Takaya, chief executive secretary to the prime minister, to Brussels in secret, and Imai agreed with European Commission chief Jean-Claude Juncker on a schedule to express a broad agreement at an EU-Japan summit on July 6 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2017d). This schedule reflected Abe’s willingness to send a clear message to sustain the liberal economic system against protectionism just before the Group of Twenty (G20) Hamburg Summit on July 7–8 where Trump would join. Japan and the EU accelerated negotiations on the JEEPA. Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio and European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström held direct and telephone talks five times from December 2016 until early July 2017 when the two parties reached an agreement in principle. The joint statement at the 25th EU-Japan summit in July 2018 referred to the JEEPA’s value to demonstrate to the world the firm political will of Japan and the EU to keep the flag of free trade waving high and powerfully advance free trade as the model of high-standard, free, open and fair trade and investment rules in the twenty-first century. While the Abe administration adopted a hedging strategy against the unpredictable commercial policy adopted by the U.S., it maintained a cautious stance on China’s involvement in the TPP framework. When trade ministers of the TPP-11 held a meeting in Chile in March 2017, delegates from Mexico and other Latin American countries told their Japanese counterparts that they would put stress on economic integration through the Pacific Alliance framework, if Japan had no intension of

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promoting the TPP-11 (Asahi Shimbun 2018). Significantly, China joined the TPP ministerial meeting for the first time as an observer by taking an opportunity that the Chile government invited China to a meeting relating to the Pacific Alliance. The prospect of growing partnerships between China and Latin American countries through the Pacific Alliance framework surely urged Japan to take the lead in negotiations on the TPP-11 (Terada 2019: 1056–57). In talks on renegotiations on the TPP, Chile and Peru exhibited a willingness to include China as a new member of the pact. Japanese chief negotiator Katakami led arguments towards the issue of how to promote renegotiations at a preparatory meeting in early May 2017. The statement issued at a ministerial meeting on May 21 included a sentence that the ministers ‘underlined their vision for the TPP to expand to include other economies that can accept the high-standards of the TPP’.6 The phrase ‘accept the high-standards’ substantially blocked the hope to make China participate in the pact. After negotiations on the CPTPP completed in March 2018, Japan began to show a clearer leadership in accelerating negotiations on the RCEP, searching for collaboration with China. As already explained, SinoJapanese confrontation over the treatment of high-standards trade rules was a crucial factor that hindered the smooth progress of negotiations. Tokyo began to show a flexible posture towards Beijing in negotiations. In bilateral summits, Abe and Chinese leaders confirmed the need to promote collaboration on the early conclusion of the RCEP. When Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made a formal visit to Tokyo in May 2018, Abe and Li confirmed that the two governments would strengthen cooperation regarding negotiations for the RCEP and the Japan-China-Korea FTA. The leaders’ stance influenced practical talks at the working level. During the 23rd RCEP negotiations in Bangkok in July 2018, Iida Keiya, deputy director-general of the Economic Affairs Bureau, MOFA, requested his Chinese counterpart to cooperate towards finalising negotiations within the year, suggesting Japan’s flexible postures in the period of rule applications and the selection of the exclusion items (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2018). Afterwards, the Japanese and Chinese governments confirmed the early conclusion of RCEP negotiations in diplomatic channels such as the 5th Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue in April 2019 and the 12th Japan-China-Korea economic and trade ministers’ meeting in December 2019. Japan surely located the strength of the free trade system and the early conclusion of negotiations on the

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RCEP as crucial agendas for positive engagement with China, and utilised institutionalised bilateral and multilateral platforms for discussing them. In brief, protectionism and anti-multilateralism adopted by the newly formed Trump administration urged Japan to pursue independent and self-reliant trade policy. The Japanese government enhanced its efforts to accelerate negotiations on the CPTPP and JEEPA. In this overall trend, Japan began to adopt a flexible posture towards China, searching for collaboration in realising the early conclusion of negotiations on the RCEP. Japan’s new posture could be interpreted as binding-engagement to engage and bind China in bilateral and multilateral institutions given a new evolution that the protectionist Trump administration produced a risk to undermine the maintenance of a liberal economic order.

The Skilful Management of Domestic Trade Policymaking For a long time, Japan’s trade policymaking was characterised by significant fragmentation because organised interest groups exercised clout over trade policy in their respective issue-areas and bureaucratic sectionalism was intense as co-equal ministries operated under the unanimity rule (Solís 2016: 305). The absence of a strong headquarters on trade policy, like the U.S. Trade Representative, surely constituted a major cause of the lack of coherence in Japan’s trade strategy and internal divisions even in the process of trade negotiations. The Abe administration sought to overcome the flaws of the fragmented trade policymaking by raising the involvement of the Kantei’s executive offices and their members in the formation of FTAs. In negotiations with the U.S. government, Kawai Katsuyuki, a special advisor for foreign affairs to the prime minister, played a crucial role in forging stable Japan-U.S. relations, particularly through commitments to the members ¯ of the U.S. Congress (Oshita 2017: 215–20). Indeed, Kawai failed to create a climate to encourage Trump to return to the TPP table but made contributions to the holding of the Abe-Trump summit meeting in February 2017 and the basis for their stable relations afterwards (Yamaguchi 2017: 53–57, 106–7). After the announcement of joining TPP negotiations in March 2013, the Abe administration established comprehensive administrative systems to prepare for negotiations. The government set up the Council of TPPRelated Ministers within the Cabinet as a supra-ministry decision-making

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body. The council was comprised of six members—the minister of state for economic revitalisation, chief cabinet secretary as well as the ministers of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), MOFA, and METI—and the prime minister joined the meeting as needed. Importantly, Kat¯ o Katsunobu, Sek¯o Hiroshige, and Sugita Kazuhiro, three deputy chief cabinet secretaries who were not the formal members, attended almost every meeting.7 The meeting was organised 15 times by September 2015, one month before a broad agreement on the TPP, and the members received a report on the progress of negotiations and decided on following step directions. Under the council, the Governmental Headquarters for the TPP was set up within the Cabinet Secretariat. Tsuruoka K¯oji, a senior MOFA bureaucrat, assumed the chief negotiator who headed the international negotiation team with some 70 members. In addition, Sasaki Toyonari was appointed as the chief domestic coordinator to lead the domestic measures team with some 30 members. The appointment of Sasaki, an ex-bureaucrat of MOF, indicated a new innovation by purposefully avoiding the allocation of this post to METI or MAFF, which had strong connections with domestic societal groups and thereby were vulnerable to their pressure (Shimizu 2018: 334). The domestic measures team implemented the mandates to undertake coordination with ruling politicians and major societal groups, and provide the nation with information about the merits of the TPP membership. The establishment of the ministerial meeting and the headquarters for the TPP was authorised by a formal recognition as a cabinet decision in May 2013. After the start of the second Abe administration, decisions on major policy issues were often made among Abe, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister As¯ o Tar¯o, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, and Amari Akira, whose grouping was called the ‘3As + 1S’ (Abe Shinz¯o wo Kangaeru Kai 2015: 84; Kujiraoka 2016: 112; George Mulgan 2018: 38– 39). As¯o, Suga, and Amari forged a solid alliance transcending factions in support of Abe’s return to power, and gained Abe’s ultimate trust as key supporters in the cabinet (Shimizu 2018: 325–26). In March 2013, Abe commissioned Amari as the minister of state in charge of TPP issues who had the supreme power over other ministries in controlling the government’s domestic and external policies. Amari’s appointment represented Abe’s determination to lead his political decision on TPP participation to assured success.

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Amari recognised Abe’s determination and asked Abe to give him full power for TPP negotiations. This request came from Amari’s bitter experiences in Japan-U.S. trade negotiations as the minister of METI in that his initiative was disturbed by the U.S. negotiator’s tactic to undertake separate talks with the ministers of MOFA and MAFF (Kujiraoka 2016: 112). Afterwards, Amari supervised the overall TPP team skilfully with the backdrop of Abe’s absolute trust. Amari undertook tough negotiations with his counterpart U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, not accepting his demands to make concessions on opening the agricultural market. Certainly, Amari’s determined stance during negotiations was supported by Abe’s complete trust. For instance, in September 2014, Amari got angry with Froman’s sudden reversal from the previous position and left the table midway through the second day and did not come back. When Amari reported to Abe this result with anticipation to resign the post, Abe stated that ‘it is all right, and please proceed with negotiations at your own will. I completely trust you’ (Sankei Shimbun 2015). The Abe administration created a strong team within the Kantei to manage domestic and external affairs regarding the TPP. The Council of TPP-Related Ministers as ‘a supreme executive entity’ that combined the formal political executive—key cabinet ministers—and the prime ministerial executive—chief and deputy chief cabinet secretaries—had the power to oversee the TPP strategy by overriding inter-ministerial divides. The formation of a coherent negotiations line from the minister of state for TPP issues to the chief negotiator as well as the creation of the chief domestic coordinator in charge of restraining domestic opposition formed the solid foundation for advancing TPP negotiations smoothly (Fig. 3.1). Just four days after reaching a broad agreement on October 5, 2015, the Japanese government approved the creation of the Headquarters for TPP Comprehensive Measures within the Cabinet, which was comprised of all cabinet members with the prime minister as director-general and chief cabinet secretary and the minister of state for economic revitalisation as vice directors-general. On the same day, the headquarters held the first meeting where the Basic Policy Regarding Comprehensive Measures in Response to the Broad Agreement on the TPP was presented. The Comprehensive TPP-Related Policy Outline was adopted at the second meeting on November 25. The swift move to adopt concrete measures in reaction to the broad agreement implied that the Kantei considered possible backlashes to the agreement very seriously, and had prepared

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Fig. 3.1 The policymaking structure for the TPP (Source Made by the author from documents issued by the Cabinet Secretariat)

for measures for the backlashes in accordance with the progress of negotiations. The development and success of Japan’s FTA strategy have been heavily dependent on one specific policy field: the agricultural sector. This is because a series of pro-liberal trade initiatives have been confronted with persistent resistance to the market opening from protectionist agricultural groups and their sympathetic politicians. Japan has retained an internationally uncompetitive agricultural sector with weak price competitiveness of farm products, which resulted from the small scale of operation. Under such conditions, the agricultural groups have retained strong political lobbying power. The Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA), which holds more than 10 million full and associate members under wellorganised national and prefectural units, has cultivated close connections with MAFF in the executive and sympathetic LDP politicians who have strong interests and specialisation in agricultural issues in the legislature. A significant policy direction that the Abe administration showed in relation to the promotion of mega-FTAs was the reframing of the agricultural sector in the growth strategy. The administration regarded the agricultural policy as a part of industrial policy, seeking to promote

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reforms to turn the farm sector into a profitable industry with growth potential. The initiatives for such reforms encompassed long-standing rice production regulations, the restructuring of the JA system, the controlled system of milk distribution, and the building of domestic and international value chains for export expansion (Honma and George Mulgan 2018). Moreover, the export expansion of agricultural products became a key policy agenda with a numerical target to double the export value from ¥450 billion in 2012 to ¥1 trillion by 2020 as a part of the growth strategy. In January 2016, the government set up the Working Group on Strength in Export Power of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Industries. The working group formulated the Strategy for Strength in Export Power of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Industries after holding ten meetings by May. The TPP and other FTAs were positioned as an engine to promote agricultural reforms towards developing the farm sector into a growth sector. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, whose father managed a strawberry farm in Akita Prefecture, had keen interests in agricultural issues, and sought to revitalise the agricultural sector by ¯ promoting its ‘sixth industrialisation’ (Oshita 2019: 296–300).8 The Kantei adopted two tactics to strengthen the foundation for promoting liberal-oriented agricultural policy. First, the Kantei transferred the mandate to formulate reforms in the agricultural sector from MAFF to the Cabinet. In May 2013, the Headquarters on Creating Dynamism through Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Industries and Local Communities was established in the Cabinet. In accordance with the establishment of this body, the Headquarters on Promoting the Recreation of the Food and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Industries, which MAFF established in November 2010, was formally abolished. Moreover, the Regulatory Reform Promotion Council and the Industrial Competitiveness Council led discussions on the Farmland Intermediary Management Institutions, and the Regulatory Reform Promotion Council formulated the agricultural reform plan in May 2014. Both councils, which were set up in the Cabinet, did not include representatives from the agricultural sector as the members (Uchida 2018: 147). MAFF holds the Council of Food, Agriculture and Rural Area Policies, which was established in 1999 under the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Area, and the council’s key task was to investigate and deliberate on the basic policy of agricultural administration. However, the council did not discuss agricultural policies embodied in Abenomics such as the revision of rice production regulations and the restructuring of the JA system

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(Honma 2018: 7). The Kantei surely transferred the authority and functions to discuss fundamental issues regarding the agricultural sector from MAFF to the Cabinet. Second, the Kantei promoted reforms within MAFF through the skilful management of bureaucratic personnel. In June 2016, Okuhara Masaaki, former director-general of the Management Improvement Bureau, was appointed as administrative vice-minister of MAFF. This appointment was extraordinary because it was customary for the administrative vice-minister post of MAFF to be promoted from director-general of the Fisheries Agency or the Forestry Agency, which is the designated seat of the next vice-minister. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga highly evaluated Okuhara’s performance in promoting bold reforms of the JA system, which indirectly sustained the administration’s FTA promotion. Suga also propelled the first exchange of personnel at the director-general level between MAFF and METI. Suematsu Hiroyuki, former director-general of the Rural Development Bureau at MAFF, was appointed as directorgeneral of the Industrial Science and Technology Policy and Environment Bureau at METI. In exchange, Inoue K¯oji, former director-general of the Industrial Science and Technology Policy and Environment Bureau, became director-general of the Food Industry Affairs Bureau at MAFF, which deals with the export of agricultural products. Two years later, Suematsu returned to MAFF as administrative vice-minister, succeeding Okuhara. It was unusual to take office as vice-minister directly from another ministry or agency, which was realised by Suga’s strong will to continue internal reforms of MAFF through manipulating its senior post. In Japan, the ‘party versus government’ phenomenon worked to limit the power of the prime ministerial executive, inviting ‘the result that the government often failed to get its trade policy initiatives through the policymaking process’ (George Mulgan 2019: 21). Accordingly, how to manage likely resistance from politicians who held close ties with agricultural groups and thereby work for keeping their interests—the so-called norin zoku (agricultural tribes)—was a crucial issue in managing the policymaking process to produce desirable outcomes in trade policy. In announcing participation in negotiations on the TPP, Abe moved carefully but quickly to gain an understanding from ruling politicians who were cautious about the participation. In so doing, Abe approached influential norin zoku. Just after the U.S.-Japan summit in February 2013, Abe made a phone call from Washington to Et¯o Taku, agricultural viceminister and a prominent norin zoku, in order to ask him to persuade

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the agricultural groups to recognise the necessity of the TPP participation. After coming back to Tokyo, Abe directly asked Et¯o to undertake behind-the-scenes activities towards the agricultural groups (Sakuyama 2015: 183–84). Abe also made a phone call to Nishikawa K¯ oya, another representative norin zoku, in order to ask him to set up a new organisation within the LDP to consolidate the party’s opinions on the TPP. This request was unusual because no one had expected that a big task be given to Nishikawa, who was defeated in the 2009 Lower House election and just regained his legislative seat in December 2012 (Nishikawa 2017: 47). Nishikawa as the chair of the LDP’s TPP Affairs Committee formulated the Resolution Regarding the TPP Measures, which regarded it as an achievement of the administration’s diplomacy that the Japan-U.S. joint statement in February 2013 confirmed that ‘the elimination of tariffs without sanctuaries’ was not a prerequisite for joining TPP negotiations (LDP 2013). In the subsequent negotiations process, Nishikawa adopted realistic postures that helped the government to promote the progress of negotiations. For instance, he proposed investigating possible tariff lines for the five sacred products, to be included in the target of liberalisation, in order to avoid prolonged negotiations. Despite opposition from other norin zoku, Nishikawa adhered to the policy to allow the reduction and elimination of tariffs on these products (Nishikawa 2017: 173–77; Uchida 2015: 241). Abe’s commitments to Nishikawa K¯oya and Et¯o Taku continued at the later stage. Nishikawa lost a legislative seat at the Lower House election in October 2017, but Abe appointed him as an advisor to the LDP’s Headquarters for the TPP and JEEPA. This appointment reflected Abe’s desire to promote domestic coordination on agricultural affairs smoothly, expecting Nishikawa to play a coordinator role among the government, ruling party, and agricultural groups as he did in the process of negotiations on the original TPP. As for Et¯ o, Abe appointed him as a special advisor to the prime minister in October 2018. Et¯o’s key task was to take responsibility for expanding the export of agricultural products. Abe adopted a tactic to take advantage of influential norin zoku to dampen opposition from other zoku members and agricultural groups by providing them with important posts in the government and the LDP. This tactic was adopted immediately after Abe’s decision to join TPP negotiations and continued to the period after the conclusion of the negotiations. The Abe Kantei also constrained opposition to reform programmes from MAFF bureaucrats by employing strengthened power in personnel control for manipulating senior posts at the ministry.

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Conclusion In this chapter, I examined the development of Japan’s trade policy by focusing on the Abe administration. Before the emergence of the second Abe administration, Japan had forged bilateral FTAs with major trading partners in the Asia-Pacific. The Abe administration has intensively engaged in negotiations on mega-FTAs such as the TPP, the RCEP and the JEEPA. Particularly important was the TPP. Japan’s positive commitments contributed to the successful conclusion of negotiations on the TPP in October 2015. After the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, Japan took the lead in promoting negotiations on the CPTPP, which led to the conclusion in March 2018. In Japan, protectionism in the agricultural sector has been the main area of political debate in trade policy and surely disturbed the progress of FTA policy. At the same time, Japan has earnestly pursued overall market liberalisation even during the GATT era, and this preference continued in the mega-FTA era. Japan sought to include high-standard trade rules that would create unified rules and regulations with broad coverage of policy areas even those not covered by the WTO. After the formation of the U.S. Trump administration, the Japanese government intensively engaged in the early conclusion of mega-FTAs in order to maintain momentum on the liberal trade regime against the administration’s protectionism and anti-multilateralism. The Abe administration employed the FTA policy as a strategic means to strengthen political ties with the U.S. and other regional states that share common values. Such strategic consideration, which constituted a crucial foundation for Japan’s willingness to join and promote TPP negotiations, could be interpreted as exclusive institutional balancing to counter China’s growing influence in both geopolitical and geo-economic domains. Being faced with uncertainty in the commercial policy adopted by the Trump administration, Japan began to pursue a new strategic purpose with hedging nature to restore sound political relations with China, searching for collaboration in achieving the early conclusion of negotiations on the RCEP and thereby sustaining a liberal international trade regime. Domestic politics has had a significant influence on trade policy formation in Japan. In particular, agricultural groups have resisted market liberalisation through FTAs, organising opposition activities involving sympathetic politicians. Such opposition activities hindered the progress

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of the FTA formation from the 1990s. The Abe administration proficiently managed domestic politics on trade policy to produce successful outcomes in FTA formation. The Kantei established comprehensive administrative systems to prepare for negotiations and promoted internal reforms of MAFF as the foundation for promoting liberal-oriented agricultural policy. Furthermore, Abe adopted a policy to make use of several influential norin zoku to promote smooth coordination with other zoku members and the agricultural groups to accept market liberalisation under FTAs. Japan under the Abe administration doubtlessly played a prominent role in propelling the FTA formation in the Asia-Pacific. China has consolidated its political and economic presence through distinctive initiatives such as the AIIB. The ultimate goal of Japan’s trade strategy is the inclusion of China in the open trade architecture by accepting liberal trade rules. In order to achieve this goal, Japan is required to promote further multilateral cooperation by getting other countries involved in and making the liberal principles embedded into regional economic institutions.

Notes 1. Joint Statement, February 10, 2017. Available at: https://www.mofa.go. jp/files/000227768.pdf [accessed November 23, 2018]. 2. Justin Trudeau’s Davos Address in Full. Available at: https://www.wef orum.org/agenda/2018/01/pm-keynote-remarks-for-world-economicforum-2018/ [accessed January 23, 2019]. 3. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, Ministerial Statement. Available at: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/naiyou/pdf/hanoi/170521_tpp_ hanoi_statement_en.pdf [accessed November 10, 2018]. 4. Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders’ Statement, November 10, 2014. Available at: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/pdf/2014/11/141110_tpp_ china_statement(e).pdf [accessed October 18, 2017]. 5. Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, April 28, 2015. Available at: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000250.html [accessed November 13, 2017]. 6. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, Ministerial Statement. Available at: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/naiyou/pdf/hanoi/170521_tpp_ hanoi_statement_en.pdf [accessed November 10, 2018]. 7. Sek¯ o transferred his position from deputy chief cabinet secretary to the minister of METI in August 2016.

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8. The sixth industrialisation implies the industrial upgrading of the primary agricultural sector by combining the elements of the secondary industry such as processing and the tertiary industry such as dining-out.

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China Daily. 2017. RCEP Leaders Reaffirm Commitment to Reach FTA Agreement, November 15. Available at: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201 711/15/WS5a0d3028a31061a73840ad32.html. Accessed 21 Nov 2018. Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis. 2005. When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan’s Internalisation of the GATT/WTO. Review of International Studies 31 (1): 3–25. George Mulgan, Aurelia. 2018. The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Ministerial Executive. London: Routledge. ———. 2019. The Politics of Trade Policy. In Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan, 2nd ed., ed. Jeff Kingston, 15–30. London: Routledge. Hatakeyama, Noboru. 2015. Keizai T¯ og¯ o no Shin Seiki [Economic Integration in the New Century]. Tokyo: T¯ oy¯ o Keizai Shinp¯ osha. He, Alex. 2019. The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, Financing, Expansion and Challenges of Xi’s Ever-Expanding Strategy. CIGI Papers 225. Available at: https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2019-09/aponid258591.pdf. Accessed 22 Apr 2019. He, Kai. 2015. Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific. International Politics 52 (2): 208–222. Honma, Masayoshi. 2018. Abe Seiken-ka no N¯ ogy¯ o Seisaku no Tenkai [The Development of Agricultural Policy Under the Abe Administration]. Mondai to Kenky¯ u 47 (2): 1–24. Honma, Masayoshi, and Aurelia George Mulgan. 2018. Political Economy of Agricultural Reform in Japan Under Abe’s Administration. Asian Economic Policy Review 13 (1): 128–144. Katada, Saori N. 2018. East Asia’s Rising Geoeconomics and the Strategy for Japan. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 4. Kawai, Masahiro, and Ganeshan Wignaraja. 2011. Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects and Challenges. Journal of Asian Economics 22 (1): 1–22. Komiya, Ryutaro, and Motoshige Itoh. 1988. Japan’s International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955–1984, In The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context, ed. Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, 173–224. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kujiraoka, Hitoshi. 2016. Dokyumento TPP K¯ osh¯ o: Ajia Keizai Haken no Yukue [Document, TTP Negotiations: The Direction of Economic Hegemony in Asia]. Tokyo: T¯ oy¯ o Keizai Shinp¯ osha. Matano, Shinya. 2018. USTR no Kangae ga Han’ei sareta CPTPP no Kanky¯ o-sh¯ o [The Environmental Chapter of the CPTPP That Reflects the USTR’s Views]. Mitsui Bussan Senryaku Kenkyuj¯ o Report, September. Available at: https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/ja/report/detail/__icsFiles/afi eldfile/2018/09/20/1809c_matano.pdf. Accessed 23 Mar 2019.

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LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). 2013. TPP Taisaku ni Kansuru Ketsugi [Resolution Regarding TPP Measures]. Available at: https://www.jimin.jp/policy/ policy_topics/pdf/pdf091_1.pdf. Accessed 8 Aug 2019. Munakata, Naoko. 2001. Nihon no Chiiki Keizai T¯ og¯ o Seisaku no Keisei [The Formation of Japan’s Regional Economic Integration Policy]. In Nicch¯ u Kankei no Tenki [A Turning Point of Japan-China Relations], ed. Naoko Munakata, 85–129. Tokyo: T¯ oy¯ o Keizai Shinp¯ osha. Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 2017a. K¯ oki Neratta TPP 11 [The TPP 11 Aiming at a Chance], April 23. ———. 2017b. Ts¯ush¯ o Batoru, Ajia S¯ ozatsu-sen (J¯ o) [Trade Battle: Competition over Asia (First)], September 12. ———. 2017c. Ts¯ ush¯ o Batoru, Ajia S¯ ozatsu-sen (Ge) [Trade Battle: Competition over Asia (Second)], September 13. ¯ ———. 2017d. Nichi¯o EPA Owaku G¯ oi no Butaiura [Behind the Scenes in the Broad Agreement of the JEEPA], July 9. ———. 2018. B¯ oeki Sens¯ o Nihon wa (2): Ky¯och¯ o to Kensei [Japan in Trade War (Second): Cooperation and Checking], August 7. Nishikawa, K¯ oya. 2017. TPP no Shinjitsu [The Truth of the TPP]. Tokyo: Kaitakusha. Obama, Barack. 2015. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, January 20. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-202015. Accessed 19 Apr 2017. ¯ Oshita, Eiji. 2017. Abe Kantei: Kenryoku no Sh¯ otai [The Abe Kantei: The Identity of Power]. Tokyo: Kodansha. ———. 2019. Futari no Kaibutsu: Nikai Toshihiro to Suga Yoshihide [Two Monsters: Nikai Toshihiro and Suga Yoshihide]. Tokyo: MDN Corporation. Sakuyama, Takumi. 2015. Nihon no TPP K¯ osh¯ o Sanka no Shinjitsu [The Truth of Japan’s Participation in TPP Negotiations]. Tokyo: Bunshind¯ o. Sankei Shimbun. 2015. TPP Nichibei Ky¯ ogi Butaiura [Behind the Scenes in Japan-U.S. TPP Talks], October 26. Shimizu, Masato. 2018. Heisei Demokurash¯ı-shi [The History of Democracy in the Heisei Era]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shob¯ o. Shinoda, Tomohito. 2019. Two-Level Game Analysis of Japan in the TPP Negotiations. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 2057891119865025. Solís, Mireya. 2016. Japan and East Asian Economic Regionalism. In The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics, ed. Alisa Gaunder, 297–308. London: Routledge. Terada, Takashi. 2019. Japan and TPP/TPP-11: Opening Black Box of Domestic Political Alignment for Proactive Economic Diplomacy in Face of ‘Trump Shock’. The Pacific Review 32 (6): 1041–1069.

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Townsend, Belinda, Deborah Gleeson, and Ruth Lopert. 2018. Japan’s Emerging Role in the Global Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Regime: A Tale of Two Trade Agreements. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 21 (1–2): 88–103. Uchida, Ry¯ unosuke. 2015. TPP K¯osh¯ o to N¯ osei Kaikaku [TPP Negotiations and Reform in Agricultural Policy]. Seisaku S¯ oz¯ o Kenky¯ u 9: 231–257. ———. 2018. N¯ okyo Kaikaku to EPA Taisaku: N¯ ogy¯ o Seich¯ o Sangy¯ o-ka no Seiji Katei [JA Reform and EPA Countermeasures: The Political Process Towards Turning Agriculture into a Growth Sector]. Seisaku S¯ oz¯ o Kenky¯ u 12: 127–153. Urata, Shujiro. 2015. Postwar Japanese Trade Policy: A Shift from Multilateral GATT/WTO to Bilateral/Regional FTA Regimes. In The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy, ed. Aurelia George Mulgan and Masayoshi Honma, 41–70. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Watanabe, Yorizumi. 2018. Tariff Wars and the TPP: The Japan-US Trade FaceOff Under Trump. Global Asia 13 (2): 26–31. Yamaguchi, Noriyuki. 2017. Ant¯ o [Dark Struggle]. Tokyo: Gent¯ osha.

CHAPTER 4

Purposeful Commitment to Infrastructure Investment in Asia

The development of infrastructure has strong connections to a country’s economic growth as it offers the foundation for social and industrial upgrading. Infrastructure investment also contributes to expanding business activities in various fields from transport and energy to information and communications technology (ICT). At the same time, infrastructure investment is related to international relations as cross-border support for infrastructure development creates a diplomatic partnership between a country that offers funds for infrastructure investment and a country that receives them. This is a main reason why infrastructure development is examined from the foreign policy perspective as well as the economic one. For a long time, Japan was the main Asian country that provided developing countries in the region with capital, foreign aid, and advanced technologies. These resources were used for developing physical infrastructure that was indispensable for industrial development and the upgrading of the people’s social life. As China has accumulated economic power with high growth and steady industrialisation, it emerged as another source of infrastructure investment in Asia. After Chinese leaders announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013, its presence in infrastructure investment became particularly salient. Japan has reformulated its policies and measures for infrastructure investment in accordance with China’s growing presence in this field. © The Author(s) 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_4

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This chapter seeks to analyse the development of Japan’s involvement in infrastructure development in Asia. It first examines purposeful policies and measures for infrastructure exports and investment, which were first adopted by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government. It then explores concrete ways that the Kantei took the lead in shaping and executing the policies and measures. The chapter also investigates geopolitical and geo-economic objectives that the Abe administration has pursued in its purposeful infrastructure policies. Moreover, it explores ideational elements that the administration has pursued in evolving international climates regarding infrastructure investment.

Internal and External Policies for Infrastructure Exports and Investment Japan’s purposeful commitment to infrastructure exports and investment in Asia began under the DPJ government as a strategic policy in the form of the deployment of integrated infrastructure systems overseas. The DPJ government in 2009–12 formulated policies and measures to support Japanese companies’ advancement in overseas infrastructure projects. In September 2010, the government established the Ministerial Meeting on the Deployment of Integrated Infrastructure Systems in order to discuss the possibilities of and strategies for offshore deployment by focusing on specific fields or specific countries. Individual government agencies strengthened internal organs to deal with this policy issue. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) organised the Promotion Headquarters on Deployment of Integrated Infrastructure Systems in October 2010, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) set up a new senior post of director-general for international affairs and two new sections within the Policy Bureau in order to facilitate integrated policy formation for supporting the deployment of infrastructure systems. The second Abe administration succeeded interests in the deployment of infrastructure systems overseas from the DPJ government. Just after the formation of the second cabinet in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe Shinz¯ o instructed relevant ministers to consider policies to support the export of the world’s up-to-date infrastructure systems at the third meeting of the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalisation (Inaba 2013: 87). In response to Abe’s instruction, the Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy (literally translation is the Ministerial Meeting

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on Strategy Relating Infrastructure Export and Economic Cooperation) was established within the Cabinet Secretariat in March 2013. Under the initiative of the council, the government published the Infrastructure Export Strategy two months later. Afterwards, the government has formulated a follow-up version of the strategy every year, which took into account the development of environments surrounding infrastructure development. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sustained the government’s initiatives in expanding the export of infrastructure systems by forming the Special Committee on Comprehensive Strategy Research Concerning Infrastructure Export and Economic Cooperation within the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). The committee has been headed by Nikai Toshihiro, the chair of the LDP’s General Council and a well-known kensetsu/d¯ oro zoku (construction/road tribe).1 The government has adopted various measures to sustain the expansion of infrastructure exports and investment. It undertook economic cooperation reforms for yen loan in order to promote Japanese companies’ participation in public-private partnership (PPP) projects, and expanded the scope of tied loan for projects under the Special Terms for Economic Partnership (STEP).2 The government also strengthened overseas investment, financing and insurance functions of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI). In addition to the reforms in existing programmes and institutions, the government set up new organisations to prop up infrastructure investment. The Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN) was established in October 2014 in order to strengthen commitments to the urban and transport infrastructure development of countries with rapid urbanisation. Besides, the Fund Corporation for the Overseas Development of Japan’s ICT and Postal Services Inc. (JICT) was organised in November 2015 so as to sustain business actors’ offshore operations in telecommunications projects, broadcasting services, and postal services through financing, dispatching experts, and other assistance. A distinctive feature in the Abe administration’s commitments to expanding infrastructure investment overseas was that it located infrastructure investment as a part of Japan’s diplomatic strategy. Such a feature was revealed in the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), which Prime Minister Abe launched at the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia in May 2015. In this new initiative, the Japanese

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government promised to provide US$110 billion for quality infrastructure investment in Asia from 2016 to 2020. On the sidelines of the Group of Seven (G7) Ise-Shima Summit in May 2016, the government announced the ‘Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure’ initiative. In this renewed initiative, the government promised to provide US$200 billion from 2017 to 2021 to be allocated to infrastructure projects in wider fields including natural resources and hospitals. In order to assist the common understanding of quality infrastructure investment and diffuse investment contributions to the development of respective local economies, the government published the quality infrastructure investment casebook.3 As the concept of PQI indicates, the Japanese government puts stress on ‘quality infrastructure’. The quality infrastructure is a particular type of infrastructure that puts stress on economic efficiency in terms of low life-cycle cost (LCC), inclusiveness, safety and resilience, sustainability, as well as convenience and amenities. The low LCC means that better quality materials and manufacturing require less maintenance, repair works, and fewer inspections (Pavli´cevi´c and Kratz 2017: 19). The quality infrastructure investment incorporates these elements of infrastructure, and pursues harmonisation with socioeconomic development and development strategies of developing countries, and thereby contributes to the local society and economy. In May 2018, Finance Minister As¯o Tar¯o proclaimed the creation of the Global Facility to Promote Quality Infrastructure Investment for Environmental Preservation and Sustainable Growth (QI-ESG). This new financial scheme within the JBIC aimed to provide financing support for infrastructure development that was expected to reduce greenhouse gases or contribute to protecting the global environment, including those related to renewable energy, energy savings and green mobility solutions (JBIC 2018a). The JBIC has offered financial support, under the scheme, for the export of a gas-fired combined cycle power plant by a Japanese company to the United Arab Emirates, renewable energy projects in Vietnam, and so on. As an effective way to produce outcomes in infrastructure investment, the Japanese government strengthened partnership with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Japan has maintained the dominant position in the bank by assuming its largest share (15.7 percent) and sending its senior bureaucrats to the post of president from the bank’s start in 1966. The ADB’s two major missions have been the uprooting of poverty and

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support for infrastructure development in Asian countries. The collaboration with the ADB was an effective way to sustain Japan’s initiative in providing quality infrastructure by enhancing the bank’s capacity to provide support for infrastructure needs in Asia. The ADB and JICA began a new initiative for supporting private infrastructure projects. In March 2016, the two organisations reached an agreement to set up a new trust fund called the Leading Asia’s Private Infrastructure Fund (LEAP). The LEAP invests in infrastructure projects in energy and power generation, water and urban infrastructure, transport, and ICT through modalities such as PPPs, joint ventures, infrastructure concessions, and corporate financings. The ADB and JICA also agreed to provide another US$10 billion (US$5 billion each) over five years to support long-term infrastructure projects through co-financing to sovereign borrowers. This agreement aimed at promoting quality and sustainable public infrastructure development by taking advantage of the ADB’s multitranche financing facility. In advancing infrastructure investment as a diplomatic means, particularly important was the formation of reliable international partnerships. In this respect, a key partner for Japan is the U.S. The Japanese and U.S. governments established two bilateral institutions regarding infrastructure cooperation under the framework of the Japan-U.S. Economic Dialogues. The first is the Public-Private Sector Roundtable Discussion on U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Third Country Infrastructure. The government agencies and private companies of the two countries have discussed concrete ways to expand cooperation to assist the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and produce projects such as the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in Southeast Asia, which would accept the export of LNG from the U.S. The second is the Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership, which began with the signature of a memorandum of cooperation in November 2017. The partnership covered the support of developing energy infrastructure, the establishment of systems for procuring infrastructure in third countries, and the exchange of related information. The two governments advanced bilateral partnership for infrastructure investment into concrete actions. During U.S. Vice-President Mike Pence’s visit to Tokyo in November 2018, Pence revealed a new plan to allocate US$60 billion to support infrastructure projects in countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The Japanese public and private sectors would provide funds of US$10 billion, which would become a total of US$70 billion (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2018).

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Another important partner for Japan’s infrastructure investment is India. The country became a crucial recipient of Japan’s infrastructure investment as its government decided, in December 2015, to adopt Japanese high-speed railway technologies (the shinkansen system) for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed railway project. Japan’s partnership with India extended to support for infrastructure development in the latter’s neighbouring countries. When Abe held a summit meeting with his Sri Lankan counterpart Ranil Wickremesinghe in April 2017, Abe pledged to provide grant aid of ¥1 billion for the enhancement of Trincomalee Port. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka in the following month, Modi and Wickremesinghe agreed on the joint management of oil tanks at Trincomalee Port. Moreover, Abe and Modi agreed at a summit meeting in November 2016 to promote joint collaboration in Africa particularly the development of industrial corridors and networks. Modi then announced the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank held in Ahmedabad, India in May 2017. The two governments sought to integrate Japan’s financial funds, advanced technologies, and supply chain efficiency with India’s labour forces and historical commercial and business links to Africa. Significantly, the Abe administration began to show a willingness to promote cooperation with China in infrastructure investment after 2017. In a speech at the 23rd International Conference on the Future of Asia in June 2017, Prime Minister Abe announced that Japan would consider positive participation in China’s BRI under several conditions. Abe then confirmed this new policy with Chinese leaders. Abe held summit meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 11 in Vietnam and with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang two days later in the Philippines. Abe and the two top Chinese leaders confirmed the need to discuss how to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the region and the world including cooperation on BRI projects. Afterwards, concrete moves to search for Japan-China collaboration in infrastructure investment developed. When Premier Li made a formal visit to Tokyo in May 2018 for the first time as he assumed the premier post, the two governments concluded a memorandum on business cooperation in third countries. The memorandum referred to the establishment of a new committee for the promotion of business cooperation in third countries under the framework of the Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue in order

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to hold intensive discussions among various government agencies with the involvement of business actors (METI 2018). Sino-Japanese collaboration on infrastructure investment towards third counties deepened swiftly. In September 2018, the first meeting of the Committee for the Promotion of Japan-China Business Cooperation in Third Countries took place in Beijing. During Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2018 that accompanied more than 500 business executives, the first Japan-China Forum on Third Country Business Cooperation was held. The forum produced 52 memorandums of cooperation between private companies and organisations. In this regard, a collaboration between development banks is particularly important in sustaining private initiatives in infrastructure projects for third countries. In October 2018, the JBIC signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the China Development Bank (CDB) in order to promote cooperation for projects in third-country markets in which Japanese and Chinese corporations would be involved. Moreover, the two banks organised the Japan-China Third Country Market Financing Cooperation Forum in May 2019. The cooperation between the JBIC and CDB is important for offering financial support for overseas joint projects and creating new business opportunities for Chinese and Japanese companies. The Sino-Japanese partnership has produced practical outcomes. For instance, Japanese and Chinese companies began to engage in five concrete projects in the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand such as the construction of a high-speed railway and the expansion of ports and an airport (Maikaew 2019).

The Growing Influence of the Kantei in Infrastructure Policy As already explained, purposeful commitments to the deployment of integrated infrastructure systems overseas began during the DPJ era. The DPJ government located the deployment as a concrete means to promote the Japanese industry’s integration with the Asian economy. The New Growth Strategy, which was formulated in June 2010, stipulates that ‘Japan will establish a framework for strenuously supporting private companies’ initiatives in the field of infrastructure with “one-voice and in a united front” approach’, aiming to expand the market of exports to ¥19.7 trillion by 2020.4

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The DPJ government, which lasted only for three years, were unable to exhibit clear-cut initiatives in most policy fields. The deployment of integrated infrastructure systems overseas was an exceptional case. This was largely because this strategy was promoted under the explicit leadership of one politician: Sengoku Yoshito. Sengoku as the minister of state for national strategy began formal deliberations on the deployment of infrastructure systems overseas by organising a working-level meeting in April 2010. The establishment of the Ministerial Meeting on Deployment of Integrated Infrastructure Systems was approved at the first meeting of the Council on the Realisation of the New Growth Strategy in September 2010. Sengoku became the chair of this ministerial meeting and led discussions there. Prime Minister Abe has repeated severe criticisms of the policy management of the previous DPJ government, particularly in speeches in relation to national elections. Despite such political rhetoric, the Abe administration had the flexibility to follow and develop the successful policy initiatives of the DPJ government, and the deployment of infrastructure systems overseas is one of such initiatives. The Abe administration emanated the style of establishing a ministerial meeting as the central body to supervise policy development and adopting a numerical target to confirm outcomes from the development. The Abe administration set up the Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy. The council was comprised of seven ministers, which covered key economic ministries such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Ministry of Finance (MOF), MLIT, and MOFA. In particular, Abe’s close political allies, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister As¯ o Tar¯o, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide and Amari Akira, the minister of state for economic revitalisation, joined the council at its start in March 2013. While Amari resigned the post in January 2016, As¯o and Suga have remained as the key members for more than seven years. The council’s meeting was held 46 times— roughly once per two months—as of February 2020. Indeed, the time for discussions at each meeting is less than one hour, but the council has functioned as the headquarters to oversee policies and measures for infrastructure exports and investment, which are formulated and implemented by multiple government agencies. The Abe administration has traced the development of policies and measures through the formulation of the Infrastructure Export Strategy. In May 2013, the Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy

4

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approved the first strategy, which explicitly presented a numerical target of tripling infrastructure sales from ¥10 trillion in 2010 to ¥30 trillion by 2020. The attached document contained concrete sales targets in major fields: ¥9 trillion, ¥7 trillion, and ¥6 trillion in energy, transport, and ICT, respectively. The strategy also formulated five concrete guidelines: the promotion of PPP for strengthening companies’ global competitiveness; support for finding and fostering human resources; the acquisition of international standards; support for fields in the new frontier; and the promotion of securing stable and inexpensive resources. Afterwards, the Infrastructure Export Strategy was revised each year by adding new content and tactics, and confirmed the expansion of the order value of overseas infrastructure projects (Table 4.1). The Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy as the central body to propel the deployment of infrastructure systems overseas has performed three key functions. First, the council authorised the government’s engagements in infrastructure exports and investment. The council has deliberated on the follow-up of the Infrastructure Export Strategy every year. Moreover, the council has checked the progress of the PQI and the Expanded Partnership as well as individual strategies in major industrial sectors and policy fields. Through such commitments, the council has empowered the government’s fundamental policy initiatives in infrastructure exports and investment. Second, the council has coordinated the policies and operations of government agencies that are pertinent to infrastructure exports and investment. The Infrastructure Export Strategy issued in May 2017 Table 4.1 The order value of overseas infrastructure projects (trillion yen) Field

2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Energy Transport ICT business ICT equipment Fundamentals Life circumstance New areas Total

3.8 0.5 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.3 0.7 10.3

5.6 1.0 5.7 3.4 1.8 0.4 1.1 19.0

4.4 1.3 6.0 3.1 1.7 0.5 2.8 19.8

4.7 1.3 6.1 2.9 2.2 0.5 3.5 21.2

4.5 1.7 6.6 2.9 2.9 0.4 4.1 23.1

5.1 2.2 6.9 2.9 2.8 0.5 4.4 24.8

Source Compiled by the author from data in documents presented at the Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy

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required government agencies to formulate an overseas expansion strategy in individual policy areas, and the strategies were formulated in 14 policy areas including ICT, electricity, railway, space, and so on. The council has picked up specific issue-areas at the meetings and discussed current conditions and challenges from a broader and long-term perspective. Third, the council has strengthened the government’s strategy for expanding infrastructure exports and investment by accrediting new tactics and schemes. For instance, the export of urban infrastructure by municipal governments was taken up at the 9th council meeting in March 2014. This policy area was important in transferring management knowhow possessed by local governments in combination with the sales of hard infrastructure. Moreover, the council approved a new policy to support infrastructure investment in third countries at the 39th council meeting in October 2018. The partnerships with the U.S., India, China and others for expanding cooperative projects in third-country markets constituted a pillar of underpinning Japanese companies’ offshore operations in the infrastructure field. A major flaw of the Japanese bureaucratic system has been sectionalism, turf battles among ministries (Muramatsu 1994: 25–32; Shinoda 2000: 5–10). The sectionalism has tended to produce inter-ministerial conflicts, impeding the executive from formulating persistent and cohesive strategies. The deployment of infrastructure systems overseas is a typical policy area that tends to invite sectionalism because various government agencies including MLIT, METI, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) are involved in this policy area. The Kantei established the centralised coordination system, making the management council the super-ministerial body to authorise basic strategies and policy directions as well as coordinate and integrate diverse policies and measures undertaken by multiple government agencies. The individual ministries have formulated and implemented policies and measures under their jurisdiction, following the basic strategies and policy guidelines offered by the management council. In the polity implementation process, the Kantei exhibited a new initiative. The top-level sales diplomacy is effective in expanding the export of infrastructure systems that are relevant to large-scale national projects in foreign countries. The top leaders’ direct commitments to selling Japan’s high-quality products and elemental technologies have a strong appeal to government officials and business groups in a partner

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country. Prime Minister Abe recognised the value of top-level sales, and the number of his top-level sales pitches increased from 10 in 2012 to 34 in 2013 and kept the same level afterwards. Abe’s foreign visits accompanied an economic mission. For instance, 117 representatives from 43 corporations accompanied Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Myanmar in May 2013 (Sasaki 2014). The chairman or senior executives of Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) often joined the economic mission. Unlike conventional cases when Keidanren coordinates the selection of accompanying companies for the government, the Kantei asked relevant ministries to pick up individual companies with high technologies in industrial sectors, in which the governments of countries for planned visits would have strong interests (Yomiuri Shimbun 2013). The Kantei demonstrated outstanding representation in the policy implantation process. Such representation has been shown in policy meetings with the private sector. Close partnership with the private sector is particularly important because private companies are the exact players who engage in infrastructure businesses. In April 2016, Izumi Hiroto, a special adviser to the prime minister, held a meeting with senior members of Keidanren to explain the government’s policies towards the export of infrastructure systems (Sh¯ ukan Keidanren Taimusu 2016). Izumi held a similar meeting with the Keidanren executives in September 2017 and July 2018. The senior staff of other ministries such as MLIT, METI, MOFA, and MIC as well as government-affiliated organisations such as the JICA, JBIC and NEXI joined the meetings. Keidanren is the actor that has urged the government to locate the export of infrastructure systems as a key national strategy,5 and it is natural to organise regular meetings with Keidanren, the most influential business association in Japan. Izumi’s representation has extended to the implementation of infrastructure policy in relation to foreign governments. When Japan was at the final stage of competing for a high-speed railway project in Indonesia, Abe dispatched Izumi in July and August 2015 as a special envoy to the prime minister to deliver Japan’s final proposals on the project. At that time, the Chinese government also sent Xu Shaoshi, Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, as a special envoy to deliver proposals on the project (Yoshimatsu 2018: 726). While China sent the head of a government agency, Japan dispatched a special adviser at the Kantei. Izumi also led the Japanese group at the Japan-Philippines

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Joint Committee on Infrastructure Development and Economic Cooperation whose first meeting was held in Tokyo in March 2017.6 Izumi’s representation was outstanding given that his Philippine counterparts are two ministers, Carlos G. Dominguez, Secretary of Finance, and Ernesto M. Pernia, Secretary of Socioeconomic Planning, National Economic and Development Authority. The Kantei-centred policymaking is demonstrated by the fact that Izumi Hiroto has supervised the meetings with Keidanren’s senior members by encouraging participation from other ministries and government-affiliated organisations. Moreover, Izumi, one of the five special advisers to the prime minister, represented the Japanese government like a minister in meetings with foreign delegates. Izumi’s prominent role derived from his unique career as a Kantei member. Izumi is one of the key personnel of the prime ministerial executive as he has retained the post of a special adviser for more than seven years since January 2013 after retiring from MLIT. Izumi had joined the Kantei for two years from July 2002 as deputy director-general of the Headquarters on Urban Revitalisation, and even before assuming this post, Izumi had developed close connections with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide when Suga was a councillor of the Yokohama city (Mori 2019: 70–72, 85). Importantly, the Kantei leadership was seen in the establishment of cooperation with China in infrastructure investment. As already explained, Abe announced a new policy direction to join the BRI in June 2017. Just before this announcement, Abe sent two executives to the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017. One is the LDP’s Secretary-General, Nikai Toshihiro who has been known as a pro-China politician with strong connections to Chinese political circles. Nikai, who joined the forum as the Japanese representative, offered to Chinese President Xi Jinping a letter from Abe, which called for ‘shuttle diplomacy’, periodical visits of top executives, in order to establish stable ¯ political relations between Japan and China (Oshita 2018: 343–45). Another executive is Imai Takaya, chief executive secretary to the prime minister. Imai met with Yang Jiechi, China’s top diplomat who had been promoted to the Politburo, to convey Abe’s wish to improve ties with Beijing including conditional support for the BRI. Imai’s meeting with Yang was unusual since Yang normally sees his Japanese counterpart, Yachi Sh¯otar¯o, Secretary-General of the National Security Council’s Secretariat (Terada 2019: 1063–64). Yang visited Japan in late May, and held a meeting with Abe, Yachi and Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio.

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Yang’s visit was a symbolic event to illustrate the improvement of SinoJapanese diplomatic relations. Imai played a key role in paving the way for the Abe administration to participate in China’s infrastructure initiative and reconstructing high-level diplomatic connections between China and Japan. The expansion of infrastructure exports and investment is a typical case when the Kantei’s key members, a special advisor and chief executive secretary, were deeply involved in the policy-implementation process. They represented a policy direction that the Kantei would like to push forward in infrastructure policy, behaved like a supra-ministerial agency or a minister in meetings with domestic stakeholders and senior executives of foreign governments, and played an envoy role in delivering the prime minister’s policy preferences.

The China Factor in Japan’s Infrastructure Investment Japan’s renewed interest in infrastructure exports and investment had much to do with China’s growing presence and commitments to infrastructure investment in Asia. In autumn 2013, the Chinese government launched a new diplomatic vision, the BRI, which was comprised of the Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt. Geographically, the BRI extends to 65 countries with 60 percent of the world’s populations, and its development projects incorporate six overland economic corridors and two sea-routes that cover from Asia to Europe and Africa and to the South Pacific. Although the BRI itself is a broad vision to expedite various kinds of cooperation with countries in a wide range of regions, infrastructure development assumes a special position. The Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, published in March 2015 by the Chinese government, paid special attention to infrastructure development by providing concrete contents regarding target fields such as transport, energy, and information, and giving priority to development in road connections and traffic management.7 The BRI has close links to another diplomatic initiative: the AIIB. The AIIB initiative was first announced during Xi Jinping’s visit to Southeast Asia in October 2013, and the bank was formally launched in December 2015 with US$100 billion in capital and 57 founding members. The AIIB as a multilateral development bank aims at providing funds for the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors

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such as transport and telecommunications, energy and power, and rural infrastructure and agricultural development. Both the BRI and AIIB had geo-economic objectives to counter the regional influence of the U.S. and Japan. The BRI, as a grand strategy to ward off pressure from the Asia-Pacific through the U.S.-induced Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), sought to extend China’s economic and diplomatic reach to the westward region by avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. and its allies centred on the TPP. The establishment of the AIIB, which would become a crucial source of funding for infrastructure development as an alternative to Japan-supported ADB, could be viewed as Beijing’s attempt to compete with Tokyo in setting agendas and terms for Asian development (Smith 2017: 27). China’s commitments to infrastructure investment through the BRI and AIIB have produced positive outcomes. In 2013–18, Chinese companies directly invested more than US$90 billion in countries along the Belt and Road route, an average annual growth rate of 5.2 percent, and the value of newly signed foreign contracted projects exceeded US$600 billion, an average annual growth rate of 11.9 percent (Belt & Road News 2019). Moreover, the BRI expanded its activities by launching a green development coalition in 2019 as a platform for policy communication, the sharing of environmental knowledge, and the transfer of green technologies (He 2019: 18). The AIIB has raised its international presence by increasing the number of members from 57 at its foundation in December 2015 to 100 by August 2019. The bank approved 46 normal projects and eight projects under special fund by August 2019, covering countries mainly in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.8 The number of heads of state and government who joined the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation increased from 29 at the first meeting in May 2017 to 37 at the second one in April 2019. Japan’s commitments to infrastructure investment had at least three strategic elements to react to China’s growing presence in this policy field. The first is relevant to differentiation in institutional commitment. Japan launched the PQI as a new institution by taking into account China’s regional initiative. Since Japan had already stressed the value of quality in development at summit meetings with several Southeast Asian countries, the advocacy of the PQI is not entirely new (Koga 2016). The importance of this advocacy lay in that the PQI was a strategy to counter China’s growing influence in infrastructure investment in Asia. The PQI was announced just a month before the founding member nations would

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sign the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in June 2015 (Basu 2018). The amount of US$110 billion that Abe announced in relation to the PQI could be interpreted to compete with the AIIB, which had a proposed capital base of US$100 billion. Moreover, Abe stated, in the speech to announce the PQI, that ‘we no longer want a “cheap, but shoddy” approach’, stressing importance to ‘choose the long-lasting or high-quality item even if the price is a bit higher’ by looking at the entire LCC (Abe 2015). Japan intended to contrast its quality investment with Chinese one that was characterised as less transparent in the bidding process and weak in governance standards for protecting the environment and local communities. The PQI was a crucial means for Japan to make a qualitative strategic contrast between its own provision of public goods and the Chinese (Wallace 2019). Japan’s attempt to strengthen its support for infrastructure investment through collaboration with the ADB also derived from an intention to counter China’s institutional initiatives. The ADB has searched for collaboration with the AIIB, engaging in, for instance, co-financing for four projects by March 2018. Yet, the Japanese government sought to keep the ADB’s presence as a main source of infrastructure investment in Asia. In so doing, Japan sought to accentuate differences between the ADB and AIIB. In launching a new fund for promoting the integration of high-level technology and innovative solutions in May 2017, Finance Minister As¯ o stated that ‘enhancing the quality of infrastructure is important in realising sustainable economic growth. Japan welcomes and supports ADB’s initiative to incorporate advanced technologies into projects’.9 As this statement shows, Japan sought to differentiate the ADB’s operations from the AIIB’s by stressing quality infrastructure and sustainability. The Abe administration’s strategy to advance the PQI and collaboration with the ADB had much to do with China’s new institutions of the BRI and AIIB. The PQI was presented with an intension to neutralise the influence of China’s BRI, stressing different nature to offer quality infrastructure. The strengthened connection to the ADB through the JICA also aimed at holding out against China’s AIIB initiative, seeking to defend the ADB’s existing presence as a major multilateral development bank to provide funds for infrastructure development in Asia. Thus, Japan’s strategy to promote the PQI and partnership with the ADB could be interpreted as a strategy of inter-institutional balancing to counter China’s political initiatives through the BRI and AIIB by launching a

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new institution and reinvigorating the existing institution under its strong influence. The second is relevant to the promotion of infrastructure investment through joint commitments with major partners such as the U.S. and India. The U.S. government raised concerns about the declining political and economic presence in the growing Asian economic zone. In particular, the government, which was apprehensive about China’s purposeful attempt to embrace Asia under its political and economic influence through infrastructure investment, recognised the need to launch a new initiative in providing the U.S.-tailored support for infrastructure investment. A strategically important in the U.S. initiative was that the establishment of a new fund for infrastructure investment was announced under the framework of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The FOIP was a new strategic concept that Japan first launched in 2016, and the U.S. government endorsed its value later. The FOIP aimed at grasping the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean as a united area and developing the Indo-Pacific region in a free and open manner. The concept of the FOIP, which pays particular attention to maritime affairs, embodies the strategic intention of countering the Maritime Silk Road of the BRI. Japan had a plausible reason to collaborate with the U.S. initiative to counter China’s support for maritime infrastructure in Asia. Japan’s partnership with India in infrastructure investment had much to do with maritime security concerns caused by China. The maritime security in the Indian Ocean has been key anxiety for Japan because its sea lines of communication (SLOC) for oil imports pass through the ocean. Accordingly, Japan has cared about China’s growing connection to and influence on the countries surrounding the Indian Ocean through infrastructure investment. Japan also needed to check China’s maritime strategies and actions in the Indian Ocean because they are linked to maritime affairs in the East and South China Seas. China’s maritime policies and behaviour were growing anxiety for India as well. Beijing extended its strategic footprint to the Indian Ocean littorals with the development of ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar as the ‘String of Pearls’ to contain India’s maritime presence (Brewster 2017). Accordingly, Japan and India had shared interests in preparing for a risky situation that China’s increasing presence in the countries surrounding the Indian Ocean might change power balance and invite instability in maritime security in the region.

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Japan’s commitments to infrastructure investment through partnerships with the U.S. and India can be regarded as dominance-denial, a strategy to block China’s overwhelming presence that will permit freer use of power to attain its diplomatic objectives. The U.S., Japan, and India share concerns about China’s over-presence as the key provider of infrastructure investment in Asia and the possible use of such economic prowess as leverage to attain political-security objectives. They have forged a bilateral partnership in developing alternative financial sources for developing counties as a means to cultivate balance-of-political power designed to minimise political risks associated with China’s dominant position in the supply of funds for infrastructure investment. The third is relevant to the securing of economic benefits through forging closer commercial links with China. Sino-Japanese partnership in infrastructure development aims primarily at promoting cooperation for third countries. The cooperation for third countries is not distinctive as Japan has promoted similar partnerships with other countries such as Turkey and Singapore, in addition to the U.S. and India.10 A distinctive feature of the partnership with China was its positioning as a part of a collaboration for the BRI, which provides numerous projects for infrastructure development in wide regions extending from Asia to Europe and Africa. Reflecting on such a feature, the two governments established the comprehensive committee and the practical forum involving public and private actors in order to promote collaboration on BRI projects smoothly. The Sino-Japanese partnership in infrastructure investment had much to do with the Japanese government’s response to the concern and interest of the Japanese business circles. The Japanese big business group had a strong desire to join international projects pertinent to the BRI. Keidanren and the China Centre for International Economic Exchanges organised the first Japan-China CEO and Former Senior Officials’ Dialogue in Tokyo in November 2015, and the participants confirmed a direction to exploit markets in third countries including the development of infrastructure and the BRI in Asia. The connection with BRI projects was particularly important because the growth rate of Japan’s export of infrastructure systems began to come down in 2015 when BRI projects entered into full operations. The order value of overseas infrastructure projects increased from ¥10.3 trillion in 2010 to ¥19.0 trillion in 2014, but achieved a small increase to ¥19.8 trillion in 2015 and to ¥21.2 trillion in 2016 (Table 4.1). According to the 2017 Survey Report

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on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies, China gained the first ranking in a desirable country for the mid-term business operations for the first time in five years (JBIC 2017: 25–26). This result reflected Japanese firms’ growing interest in forging closer tieups with Chinese enterprises in exploring markets in China and in third countries. The positive response to the business interests was necessary for the Abe administration in advancing the strategy of global outreach, one of three plans for the growth strategy to encourage private investment, the third arrow of Abenomics, the Abe administration’s economic policy package. Thus, Japan’s pursuit of a closer partnership with China in infrastructure investment can be interpreted as economic pragmatism to maximise economic benefits by pragmatically developing direct commercial connections with China. While Japan began to show interests in partnership with China from economic pragmatism, China also found renewed concern with tighter economic relations with Japan. Intensive trade frictions with the U.S. have produced a negative impact on the Chinese economy and industry. The Chinese government recognised the need to loosen the JapanU.S. partnership, and regarded Japan as an alternative source of some advanced technologies. As for partnership in BRI projects, China expected Japan’s potential to be a window for collaboration with third countries, combining its financial resources with a soft image that Japan has developed through its long-term foreign policy (Tomisaka 2019: 52). Significantly, Jiang (2019) holds that Sino-Japanese competition in infrastructure investment led to the development of new dynamics and new norms such as tied commercial financing, heavy government involvement, and respect for host-country forms of governance. This implies that the two countries find it relatively easy to harmonise their commitments to infrastructure investment. Harmonisation in commitments between the two economic powers will lead to the efficient use of resources for infrastructure development. However, the prospect for Sino-Japanese collaboration in infrastructure investment is still uncertain as this collaboration is reliant on ambiguous strategic conditions particularly unpredictable U.S. foreign policy, and the two governments settled for a more modest endeavour to encourage business cooperation in third-country markets (Solís 2020: 10). One feasible way to consolidate their partnership is to integrate it in broader institutional frameworks involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Korea, and raise the nature of regional public goods for infrastructure investment.

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In summary, Japan’s growing engagement in infrastructure investment in Asia derived from complicated strategic interests in relation to China. The advocacy of the PQI and collaboration with the ADB aimed at protecting Japan’s own presence in infrastructure investment in reaction to China’s new initiatives of the BRI and AIIB. Japan gradually strengthened partnerships with the U.S. and India in order to prevent China from establishing a dominant position in infrastructure investment, which would enhance its political leverage on the recipients of Chinese investment. At the same time, Japan began to pursue practical cooperation with China, which would enable Japanese companies to secure profitable gains from involvement in BRI projects.

The Four Standards for Quality Infrastructure Investment In exploring participation in the BRI, Prime Minister Abe attached conditions. When Abe announced the change of policy to participate in the BRI in June 2017, he referred to ‘be open to use’, ‘transparent and fair’, ‘economically viable’, and ‘the soundness of the debtor nation’s finances’ in considering cooperation on the BRI (Abe 2017a). Abe then explicitly formulated the four standards—openness, transparency, economic efficiency, financial soundness—at the Press Conference following his attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2017, as follows: As for the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, we look forward to this initiative making contributions in a forward-looking way to the peace and prosperity of the region and the world by adequately incorporating the thinking held in common by the international community regarding the openness, transparency, economic efficiency, financial soundness, and other such aspects of the infrastructure. Japan wishes to cooperate from this viewpoint. (Abe 2017b)

The four standards imply that projects for infrastructure development should proceed with in an open and transparent process, and need to pay respect to economic efficiency in view of LCC. Moreover, support for infrastructure investment should not impose huge financial burdens on recipient countries, which would disturb the sound development of their economies.

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Japan has sought to make the four standards for quality infrastructure investment shared broadly in regional and global settings. On the regional front, the quadrilateral framework became a crucial place. The joint statement concerning energy, infrastructure and digital connectivity cooperation issued during Vice-President Pence’s visit to Tokyo in November 2018 contained a phrase that ‘infrastructure investment rooted in principles of transparency, market-based financing, open infrastructure, and debt sustainability’.11 In the joint press statement issued at Abe’s visit to Darwin, Australia, in the same month, Abe and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison confirmed their commitments to enhancing connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with openness, transparency, economic efficiency, and debt sustainability.12 The four standards were then referred to in the quadrilateral framework. At the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Consultation in the same month, senior officials in charge of foreign affairs committed to supporting broad economic development that fosters the development of quality infrastructure based on international standards such as openness, transparency, economic efficiency, and debt sustainability.13 The four standards have been accepted in multilateral settings beyond Asia. The importance of the four standards was confirmed by European nations. The chair’s statement of the 12th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in October 2018 contained phrases: ‘transport systems and infrastructure that are environmentally, socially and fiscally sustainable, financially viable, affordable and accessible’ and ‘to promote transparency, a level playing field and innovative funding mechanisms’.14 The phrases implied that European nations gave consent to the introduction of more disciplines in infrastructure investment. The European Union (EU) members’ accord coincided with a new policy direction to regard Japan as a crucial partner who shares liberal and open values since the U.S. Trump administration introduced and maintained inward-looking, anti-multilateral diplomacy. Japan sought to promote the institutionalisation of the four standards for quality infrastructure investment. In November 2014, the APEC economies endorsed the APEC Guidebook on Quality of Infrastructure Development and Investment at the Committee on Trade and Investment. The guidebook stressed three key elements of quality: the achievement of optimal LCC with considerations for service performance and durability; the mitigation of social and environmental impacts; and the ensuring of safety and adequate maintenance systems. METI proposed formulating a revised version of the guidebook, and

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the APEC economies endorsed the new version at the Committee on Trade and Investment in November 2018 (METI 2019a: 44). The new guidebook contained elements that ensure the quality of: stability/safety/resiliency; job creation/capacity building and transfer of technologies; social and environmental sustainability; alignment with development strategy/openness/transparency/fiscal soundness; and economic and financial soundness, local high-quality development, costeffectiveness including LCC and utilisation of markets (APEC 2018). These elements reflect the combination of the four standards and the five principles for promoting quality infrastructure investment that the Japanese government had confirmed in the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in May 2016.15 Japan, then, completed the institutionalisation of the four standards by taking advantage of the Group of Twenty (G20) forum under its chair. A Japanese representative to the G20 Buenos Aires Summit in 2018 expressed his government’s willingness to upgrade the four standards as an international ideal for quality infrastructure investment.16 When G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors held a meeting in Japan in June 2019, they adopted the statement entitled the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment. This 1800-word document spells out six principles regarding common strategic direction and aspiration, which include openness, transparency, economic efficiency, and financial sustainability.17 The adoption of the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment had significant implications for diffusing the four standards for quality infrastructure investment. Japan could refer to the G20 Principles in subsequent multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) summit and the China-Japan-Korea trilateral summit. Other countries have also referred to the G20 Principles for common guidelines for infrastructure investment. For instance, foreign and defence ministers of the U.S. and Australia, at the 29th Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations in August 2019, pledged to apply the G20 Principles to projects in the region. Furthermore, senior officials of Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India, at their consultation in November 2019, explored ways to enhance coordination on quality infrastructure based upon international standards such as the G20 Principles.18 The G20 Principles also produced various references such as the Global Infrastructure Hub’s Quality Infrastructure Investment Casebook and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation

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and Development (OECD)/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Reference Note on the Governance of Quality Infrastructure Investment (Umirdinov 2019: 13). The four standards gained normative values as it is embedded into the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, which has been increasingly used by states and international organisations as a shared expectation about the states’ appropriate behaviour on infrastructure investment. There was a specific background factor for Japan’s advocacy of the four standards: the appearance of the negative impacts of China’s infrastructure investment. As already explained, China’s commitments to infrastructure investment through the BRI have made steady progress, gaining growing international attention. At the same time, China’s over-presence in infrastructure investment provoked debt problems in recipient countries. According to the IMF data, the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debts in the total GDP for 37 low-income developing countries increased from 0.3 percent in 2007 to 4.2 percent in 2016 for Chinese credit, while the ratio decreased from 7.4 percent to 2.2 percent in the same period for the Paris Club nations (IMF 2018: 51).19 The debt problem is crucial in bilateral relations between China and the recipients of Chinese funds. A typical case is found in Sri Lanka. Hambantota Port in the country was developed by Chinese state-owned enterprises, and the Sri Lankan government approved a deal in late 2016 to lease 80 percent of the port to China Merchants Port Holdings for US$1.12 billion for 99 years. Sri Lanka’s national debt stood at around US$64 billion, or 76 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and it owed China over US$8 billion (Chung 2018: 321). A high-speed railway project in Laos provoked a serious debt problem, and Chinese loans to the Maldives mushroomed to more than one-fourth of the country’s annual GDP. According to a study of the Centre for Global Development, eight countries are at a particular risk of debt distress among the 68 countries identified as potential BRI borrowers (Hurley et al. 2019). In addition to the heavy financial burdens of the recipient countries, Chinese investment in infrastructure projects provoked additional problems. The projects lacked transparency in the bidding process, and Chinese firms engaged in economically infeasible projects, relying on inputs from the government. Moreover, the collusive relationship between Chinese investors and corrupt local elites and a lack of publicly available data on investments and contracts raised anti-Chinese sentiments in the local communities (Lamb and Dao 2017).

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The problem of China’s infrastructure investment had much to do with weak involvement in international governance systems. The advanced nations have developed multilateral institutions to manage the international investment. The OECD members have undertaken infrastructure investment, adhering to the principles of openness, transparency, and fairness embodied in the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2016: 72). Moreover, the 22 creditor countries have discussed payment problems of debtor countries through the Paris Club. Since China is not a member of such advanced nations’ clubs, its policies and practices regarding infrastructure investment did not necessarily take into account international norms and practices. Given debt-trap and other problems associated with China’s infrastructure investment, the advocacy of the four standards for quality infrastructure investment surely had strategic objectives. Japan and the U.S., who cared about China’s growing geo-economic presence, took advantage of international standards as a useful tool to delineate China’s behaviour in infrastructure investment. The advocacy of the four standards aimed at articulating problematic aspects in Chinese infrastructure investment, which would have a negative impact on China’s presence in infrastructure investment particularly through the BRI. In addition to the above geo-economic objective, Japan’s advocacy of the four standards for quality infrastructure investment aimed at urging China to behave as a responsible player by paying respect to the standards of global governance. As already explained, Japan showed interest in promoting collaboration with China in infrastructure investment in third countries, established bilateral institutions to underpin joint efforts, and produced practical outcomes. Accordingly, Japan did not pursue a single-minded strategy to constrain China’s infrastructure investment by stressing its flaws in terms of the four standards. Japan’s advocacy of the four standards aimed to ‘engage with China with the objective of shaping it as a responsible actor and upholding the highest standards of global governance in accordance with international norms’ (Basu 2018). In fact, Japanese leaders have directly appealed the importance of the four standards to Chinese leaders and business executives. During a visit to Beijing in October 2018, Prime Minister Abe joined the first Japan-China Forum on Third Country Business Cooperation, and stated that ‘it is important, in infrastructure investment, to create projects in line with international

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standards such as openness, transparency, economic efficiency, and financial sustainability of target countries’ (Abe 2018). In this speech, Abe used the term, international standards, six times. Consideration of global governance was particularly important in growing fragility in the international economic system. During a summit meeting in Beijing in October 2018, Abe and Xi Jinping confirmed three tenets for developing new Japan-China relations: from competition to coordination under international standards; not threaten each other; and to develop a free and fair trade system together. The third tenet implied that Japan and China would collaborate to maintain the liberal trading system against growing protectionist movements. Abe committed to maintaining the international standard-oriented economic system in the world, and located the four standards as a part of such commitments. Moreover, the four standards have the potential of creating a common ground between China and the U.S. allies. When China’s BRI projects are implemented with due consideration to the four standards, the BRI shares liberal ideals with the FOIP that the U.S. and its allies seek to push forward (Kawashima 2019a: 159). A crucial question is to what extent China endorsed the four standards for quality infrastructure investment. When Abe presented the four standards to Chinese Premier Li at a summit meeting in May 2018 and to Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2018, these Chinese leaders provided no responses (Kawashima 2019b: 10). However, China’s endorsement of the four standards is seen in an indirect manner. The Japanese corporations have adhered to a policy to promote business partnerships with Chinese companies under the strict conditions of the four standards, and this adherence is reflected in concrete agreements. For instance, the MOU between the JBIC and CDB confirms that the two banks ‘will provide financial support based on the global standards such as openness, transparency, economic viability, debt sustainability, and compliance with laws and regulations’ (JBIC 2018b). The adoption of the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment implies that China as a member of the G20 forum endorsed the four standards for quality infrastructure investment. According to Japanese officials who involved in negotiations on the principles, China was initially cautious about the new principles but became willing to accept the idea as it saw the economic and financial benefits of promoting high-quality infrastructure (Kajimoto 2019). Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his keynote speech at the opening

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ceremony of the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019, highlighted building the infrastructure of high quality, sustainability, risk resilience, reasonable pricing, inclusiveness and accessibility under the BRI (Xinhua 2019). These elements resonate with the four standards for quality infrastructure investment. The four standards for quality infrastructure investment reflect the principles of international standards such as the OECD guidelines in international investment. Japan’s advocacy aimed at accentuating the four standards as key guidelines for governance that should be observed by all countries that undertake infrastructure investment. Japan successfully raised the legitimacy of the four standards by embedding it into the guiding principles of multilateral institutions such as the APEC and G20. China as a member of the G20 forum endorsed the four standards and its political leaders began to give importance to normative disciplines in infrastructure investment.

Conclusion This chapter examined Japan’s strategies for infrastructure exports and investment. The Japanese government has strengthened commitments to infrastructure exports and investment by reforming existing policies and programmes and establishing new organisations to underpin infrastructure investment. The government launched new initiatives such as the PQI and the Expanded Partnership to show its willingness to support infrastructure development in Asia. Japan’s engagement in infrastructure investment extended to external connections. The government supported a closer partnership between the JICA and ADB and began purposeful partnerships with the U.S., India, and China. In formulating and implementing policies for infrastructure exports and investment, the Kantei maintained a strong grip. The Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy, which was formed within the Cabinet Secretariat, has functioned as a super-ministerial agency to authorise basic strategies and policy directions for infrastructure exports and coordinated various policies and programmes implemented by individual ministries. Moreover, the Kantei’s key members, a special advisor and chief executive secretary, played a significant role in promoting infrastructure policies by representing the government in meetings with domestic private actors and senior executives of foreign governments.

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The geopolitical and geo-economic elements had much to do with Japan’s renewed commitments to infrastructure investment. China’s new initiatives of the BRI and AIIB contributed to raising its political and economic presence in broader regions from Asia to Africa and Europe. Japan adopted a strategy for inter-institutional balancing by stressing the PQI and collaboration with the ADB. At the same time, Japan’s collaboration with the U.S. and India aimed at denying China’s intension to establish a dominant position in support of infrastructure development. Furthermore, Japan adopted economic pragmatism to pursue collaboration with China in infrastructure development in third countries. Significantly, Japan put stress on ideational elements in its commitments to infrastructure investment. The Japanese government has repeatedly emphasised the four standards for quality infrastructure investment— openness, transparency, economic efficiency, financial soundness—as a guiding principle that should be considered in providing funds for projects in infrastructure investment. The government strove to make the four standards shared with other countries through the quadrilateral framework and the ASEM, and successfully made it a common understanding by embedding it in multilateral institutions such as the APEC and G20. The four standards, which gained international attention in growing debt-trap problems associated with China’s infrastructure investment, aimed both to undermine China’s intension to broaden the sphere of influence through infrastructure investment, and to introduce more disciplines in infrastructure investment as means to advance global governance. Infrastructure exports and investment are becoming important policy issues for Japan as they surely contribute to sustaining the Japanese economy that is unable to achieve steady growth relying primarily on domestic demands. As infrastructure development became a crucial condition for economic and social development for developing countries and China has elevated its presence in this policy field, strategic consideration is added to Japan’s engagement in infrastructure exports and investment. As long as China remains a key player in infrastructure investment, Japan is required to continue its efforts to encourage China to abide by the international standards of global governance.

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Notes 1. Nikai assumed the chair of the LDP’s General Council from September 2014 until August 2016 before becoming the party’s Secretary-General. 2. The STEP, which was introduced in July 2002, aimed at providing yen loans for projects in which Japanese technologies are used. 3. Shitsu no Takai Infura T¯ oshi Jirei-sh¯ u [Case Examples of Investment in Quality Infrastructure], September 2015. Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000083884.pdf [accessed May 2, 2017]. 4. On the New Growth Strategy, June 18, 2010, Cabinet Decision. Available at: http://www.npu.go.jp/policy/policy04/pdf/20100706/20100706_ newgrowstrategy.pdf [accessed April 12, 2015]. 5. Keidanren has published position papers regarding the export of infrastructure systems almost every year since 2009. In its 2009 position paper, it stressed the need to strengthen soft infrastructure through economic partnership agreement (EPA) and utilise official development assistance (ODA) strategically towards the development of necessary hard infrastructure. 6. Dai 1-kai Nichi Firipin Keizai Ky¯ oryoku Infura G¯ od¯ o Iinkai (Kekka) [The First Meeting of the Japan-Philippines Joint Committee on Infrastructure Development and Economic Cooperation (Result)], March 27, 2017. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/ press4_004434.html [accessed July 12, 2019]. 7. Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, March 28, 2015. Available at: http:// en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html [accessed October 15, 2016]. 8. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Approved Projects. Available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html [accessed October 6, 2019]. 9. ADB Establishes Fund to Promote High-Level Technology—Japan First Donor, May 6, 2017. Available at: https://www.adb.org/news/adb-est ablishes-fund-promote-high-level-technology-japan-first-donor [accessed July 18, 2017]. 10. Dai 39-kai Keiky Infura Senryaku Kaigi, October 17, 2018 [The 39th Meeting of the Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy]. Available at https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keikyou/dai39/siryou1. pdf [accessed January 23, 2019]. 11. Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on Advancing a Free and Open IndoPacific through Energy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooperation. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000418502.pdf [accessed October 4, 2019].

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12. Joint Press Statement: Visit to Darwin by Japanese Prime Minister Abe, 16 November 2018. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/ 000420402.pdf [accessed September 25, 2018]. 13. Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Consultations. Available at: https://www. mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000099.html [accessed December 15, 2018]. 14. Chair’s Statement of the 12th ASEM Summit. Available at: https://asean. org/chairs-statement-12th-asem-summit/ [accessed October 25, 2019]. 15. The five principles are ‘economic efficiency in view of LCC as well as safety and resilience against natural disaster’, ‘ensuring job creation, capacity building and transfer of expertise and know-how’, ‘social and environmental impacts’, ‘alignment with economic and development strategies’, and ‘resource mobilisation through PPP’. 16. G20 Buenos Aires Summit, December 1, 2018. Available at: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/ecm/ec/page25e_000291.html [accessed November 17, 2019]. 17. G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment. Available at: https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/g20/ annex6_1.pdf [accessed November 27, 2019]. The six principles are: maximising the positive impact of infrastructure to achieve sustainable growth and development; raising economic efficiency in view of LCC; integrating environmental considerations in infrastructure investments; building resilience against natural disasters and other risks; integrating social considerations in infrastructure investment; and strengthening infrastructure governance. 18. U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations (“The Quad”), November 4, 2019. Available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-india-japan-con sultations-the-quad-2/ [accessed January 2, 2020]. 19. The Paris Club, which was founded in 1956, is an informal group of creditor nations whose objective is to find workable solutions to payment problems faced by debtor nations. The club consists of 22 permanent members, including most of the western European nations, the U.S. and Japan.

References Abe, Shinz¯ o. 2015. The Future of Asia: Be Innovative—Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia, May 21. Available at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_ abe/statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html. Accessed 16 June 2016. ———. 2017a. Asia’s Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia—Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on

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the Future of Asia, June 5. Available at: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/ statement/201706/1222768_11579.html. Accessed 14 June 2018. ———. 2017b. Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Attendance at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, ASEANRelated Summit Meetings, and Other Related Meetings, November 14. Available at: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201711/_00007. html. Accessed 10 Jan 2018. ———. 2018. Prime Minister Abe’s Speech at the Japan-China Forum on Third Country Business Cooperation, October 26. Available at: https://www.kan tei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2018/1026daisangoku.html. Accessed 18 Dec 2018. APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). 2018. APEC Guidebook on Quality of Infrastructure Development and Investment. Available at: http://mddb.apec.org/Documents/2018/SOM/CSOM/18_csom_014a pp11.pdf. Accessed 3 Sept 2019. Basu, Titli. 2018. Japan’s Belt and Road Puzzle, Decoded. The Diplomat, February 28. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/japans-beltand-road-puzzle-decoded/. Accessed 26 Apr 2019. Belt & Road News. 2019. Belt & Road Countries Trade Exceeds $6 Trillion from 2013 to 2018, April 20. Available at: https://www.beltandroad.news/ 2019/04/20/belt-road-countries-trade-exceeds-6-trillion-from-2013-to2018/. Accessed 13 May 2020. Brewster, David. 2017. Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean. Geopolitics 22 (2): 269–291. Chung, Chien Peng. 2018. What are the Strategic and Economic Implications for South Asia of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative? The Pacific Review 31 (3): 315–332. He, Alex. 2019. The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, Financing, Expansion and Challenges of Xi’s Ever-Expanding Strategy. CIGI Papers 225. Available at: https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2019-09/aponid258591.pdf. Accessed 22 Apr 2019. Hurley, John, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance. 2019. Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective. Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 3 (1): 139–175. IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2018. Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low-Income Developing Countries-2018. IMF Policy Paper, March. Available at: https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/ PP/2018/pp021518-macroeconomic-developments-and-prospects-in-lowincome-developing-countries.ashx. Accessed 18 Mar 2019. Inaba, Kazuo. 2013. K¯ ots¯ u Infura Yushutsu Shien Seisaku ni tsuite [The Policies for Supporting the Export of Transport Infrastructure]. Unyu Seisaku Kenky¯ u 16 (1): 86–89.

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JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation). 2017. Wagakuni Seiz¯ ogy¯ o Kigy¯ o no Kaigai Jigy¯ o Tenkai ni Kansuru Ch¯ osa H¯ okoku (Dai 29-kai) [The 29th Survey Report on Overseas Business Development of Japanese Manufacturing Companies]. Tokyo: JBIC. ———. 2018a. JBIC Launches Global Facility to Promote Quality Infrastructure Investment for Environmental Preservation and Sustainable Growth. Available at: https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/news/news-2018/0628011154.html. Accessed 2 May 2019. ———. 2018b. JBIC Signs MOU with China Development Bank, October 26. Available at: https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2018/ 1026-011525.html. Accessed 12 Sept 2019. Jiang, Yang. 2019. Competitive Partners in Development Financing: China and Japan Expanding Overseas Infrastructure Investment. The Pacific Review 32 (5): 778–808. Kajimoto, Tetsushi. 2019. World’s Top Economies Lay Out Principles on Debt Sustainability at G20 Meet. Reuters, June 9. Available at: https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-g20-japan-infrastructure/worlds-top-economies-lay-outprinciples-on-debt-sustainability-at-g20-meet-idUSKCN1TA09U. Accessed 2 Dec 2019. Kawashima, Shin. 2019a. Japanese Diplomacy and the ‘Improvement’ in SinoJapanese Relations. Asia Policy 26 (1): 156–160. ———. 2019b. Nicch¯ u Kankei no Yukue: G 20 Osaka Samitto wo Mae ni [The Future of Japan-China Relations: Before the G20 Osaka Summit], May 20. Available at: https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source= web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwids9irl63oAhUXfd4KHdVBD 2gQFjABegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Ffpcj.jp%2Fwp%2Fwp-content% 2Fuploads%2F2019%2F05%2F8b16b320ce5eb988d253b403d8352da5.pdf& usg=AOvVaw1XlzftTYrt12oFiiXh4zdu. Accessed 19 Jan 2020. Koga, Kei. 2016. Japan’s ‘Strategic Coordination’ in 2015: ASEAN, Southeast Asia, and Abe’s Diplomatic Agenda. Southeast Asian Affairs 2016 (1): 67–79. Lamb, Vanessa, and Nga Dao. 2017. Perceptions and Practices of Investment: China’s Hydropower Investments in Vietnam and Myanmar. Canadian Journal of Development Studies 38 (3): 395–413. Maikaew, Piyachart. 2019. Japanese, Chinese Company Reps to be ‘Matched’ with EEC. Bangkok Post, March 22. Available at: https://www.bangko kpost.com/business/news/1649400/japanese-chinese-company-reps-tobematched-with-eec. Accessed 22 June 2019. METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry). 2018. Japan and China Conclude Memorandum on Business Cooperation in Third Countries, May 18. Available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/0510_003. html. Accessed 23 Jan 2019.

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———. 2019. Taigai Keizai Seisaku no Genj¯ o to Kongo no H¯ ok¯ o-sei [Current Status and Future Direction of Foreign Economic Policy]. Available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/sankoshin/tsusho_boeki/ pdf/006_02_00.pdf. Accessed 12 Sept 2019. Mori, Isao. 2019. Kantei Kanry¯ o [Bureacrats at Kantei]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯ u. Muramatsu, Michio. 1994. Nihon no Gy¯ osei: Katsud¯ o-gata Kanry¯ o-sei no Henb¯ o [Japan’s Administration: Transformation of Active Bureaucracy]. Tokyo: Chuo K¯ oronsha. Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 2018. Nichibei, Indo-taiheiy¯o de 8 Ch¯ o-en T¯oshi [Japan and the US Invest ¥8 Trillion in the Indo-Pacific], November 13. OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). 2016. Multi-Dimensional Review of Uruguay: Volume 2. In-Depth Analysis and Recommendations, OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: https://doi.org/10/1787/9789264251663-en. Accessed 3 Nov 2019. ¯ Oshita, Eiji. 2018. Kanji-ch¯ o Hiroku [The Secret Records of the SecretariesGeneral]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun Shuppan. Pavli´cevi´c, Dragan, and Agatha Kratz. 2017. Implications of Sino-Japanese Rivalry in High-Speed Railways for Southeast Asia. East Asian Policy 9 (2): 15–25. Sasaki, Kensh¯ o. 2014. Abe S¯ ori no Toppu S¯erusu ni tsuite [Prime Minister Abe’s Top-Level Sales]. Available at: http://kensho.jcpweb.net/hunsenki/140813105923.html. Accessed 15 Nov 2015. Shinoda, Tomohito. 2000. Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister. Westport, CT: Praeger. Sh¯ ukan Keidanren Taimusu. 2016. Kokudo Ky¯ ojin-ka to B¯ osai Kanren wo Fukumu Infura Shisutemu Yushutsu [The Reinforcement of National Land and Export of Infrastructure Systems Including Disaster Prevention], No. 3268, April 28. Available at: http://www.keidanren.or.jp/journal/times/ 2016/0428_05.html. Accessed 5 Aug 2019. Smith, Sheila A. 2017. Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Consequences for Asia. In The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, 2nd ed. ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, 21–37. New York: Routledge. Solís, Mireya. 2020. China, Japan, and the Art of Economic Statecraft. Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World, February. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ FP_202002_china_japan_solis.pdf. Accessed 8 July 2020. Terada, Takashi. 2019. Japan and TPP/TPP-11: Opening Black Box of Domestic Political Alignment for Proactive Economic Diplomacy in Face of ‘Trump Shock’. The Pacific Review 32 (6): 1041–1069. Tomisaka, Satoshi. 2019. Aratana Nicch¯ u Kankei [New Japan-China Relations]. Kaigai Jij¯ o 67 (2): 41–53.

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Umirdinov, Alisher. 2019. Generating a Reform of the BRI from the Inside: Japan’s Contribution Via Soft Law Diplomacy. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 19-E-076. Wallace, Corey. 2019. Japan’s Strategic Contrast: Continuing Influence Despite Relative Power Decline in Southeast Asia. The Pacific Review 32 (5): 863– 897. Xinhua. 2019. Xi Stresses High-Quality, Sustainable Infrastructure Under BRI, April 26. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/26/c_1 38011602.htm. Accessed 12 Dec 2019. Yomiuri Shimbun. 2013. Abe Gaik¯ o Keizai Zenmen ni [Abe Diplomacy, the Economy in Front], May 27. Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. 2018. New Dynamics in Sino-Japanese Rivalry: Sustaining Infrastructure Development in Asia. Journal of Contemporary China 27 (113): 719–734.

CHAPTER 5

Growing Maritime Security in Ocean Policy

The ocean is a crucial global commons, which provides human beings with various benefits such as mineral and fisheries resources, transportation routes, and stable global climates. In order to govern this global commons, the UN has introduced and developed maritime legal systems under the Law of Sea. At the same time, the ocean is a source of international conflict as it is directly linked to national security in the form of sovereign territories, the securing of natural resources and sea lines of communication (SLOC), and naval exercises. Japan is surrounded by wide sea space with the world’s 6th largest territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Accordingly, Japan regards itself as a maritime state (kaiy¯ o kokka), making the protection of wide territorial waters and airspace over it one of the key national policies. The maritime affairs are particularly important for Japan both because it has conflicts with its neighbouring countries over maritime territories and because it is dependent on maritime trade for a large portion of imports particularly crude oil from the Middle East. The Japanese government has formulated ocean policy from a broad perspective including resource exploration and environmental protection. However, security concerns gradually rose in the midst of growing difficulty in external relations regarding maritime affairs. Such security consideration should be particularly salient for the second Abe administration that began in growing maritime tensions © The Author(s) 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_5

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with China. The administration should have adopted various policies and measures to protect ocean interests such as strength in internal capabilities and institutions, the formation of closer ties with partner countries in dealing with maritime issues, and the promotion of an ideational approach to appeal specific principles for maintaining maritime order. The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the development of Japan’s ocean policies in general and maritime security strategies in particular. Such policies and strategies are analysed from three angles. The first is geopolitical factors that urged the Japanese government to embed new policy orientations and measures in the existing ocean policy framework. The second is the advocacy and diffusion of a particular idea that the government has adhered to in order to preserve maritime order that is indispensable for maritime nations like Japan. The third is the development of domestic policymaking mechanisms pertinent to the ocean policy and growing consideration to maritime security in the development. Before undertaking concrete analyses from the three angles, the following section depicts the development of ocean-related policies in Japan.

The Basic Act on Ocean Policy and the Development of Ocean-Related Policies The basic legal framework for ocean policy was created during the first Abe administration. In April 2006, a multi-partisan study group on the law on ocean policy was set up with the participation of legislative members and private experts on maritime affairs. The group organised a discussion meeting ten times until December 2006 before producing the guidelines for ocean policy and the outline of a basic law on ocean policy (Terashima 2012: 175–76). The guidelines stressed an urgent need for establishing a new framework to address ocean issues especially for a basic ocean law in support of comprehensive management of ocean policy (Hayashi 2014: 107–8). The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and the New Komeito, on the basis of proposals from the study group, prepared for the draft of a new law. The Basic Act on Ocean Policy (hereinafter, the Act) was enacted in April 2007 and came into force on July 20, the Day of Sea. The Act aims to realise a new ocean state by contributing to the sound development of the economy and society, improve the stability of the lives of the citizenry, and contribute to the coexistence of the oceans and mankind

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(Article 1). The Act lists up twelve basic measures in Articles 17–28, which were based on the guidelines for ocean policy offered by the study group. Not only do the measures include new areas such as the development, use, and conservation of the EEZ and continental shelves but they also contain conventional areas such as securing maritime transport, for which a comprehensive and systematic approach is required (Terashima 2012: 178). After the enactment of the Act, the government set up two policymaking bodies. The first is the Headquarters for Ocean Policy (HOP), which is comprised of all cabinet members. The Act stipulates the establishment of the headquarters under the Cabinet with the prime minister as its director-general and chief cabinet secretary and newly created the minister of state for ocean policy as vice directors-general. It was very rare that the head of government assumed the chief of an organisation for governing a specific policy area of ocean (Yomiuri Shimbun 2007). The main tasks of the HOP are to formulate and implement a basic plan on ocean policy, and coordinate ocean-related policies across all government ministries and agencies. The second is the Advisory Council for the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, which was established in October 2007 under the Headquarters. The advisory council consists of ten experts from various ocean-related fields, appointed by the prime minister every two years, and is commissioned to deliberate on major issues regarding maritime policies and give recommendations to the director-general of the HOP. The Secretariat of the HOP was set up first in the Cabinet Secretariat and then moved to the Cabinet Office in April 2017 with the new name of the National Ocean Policy Secretariat (NOPS). The secretariat coordinates ocean policies that are handled by various ministries such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (Fig. 5.1). The Act stipulates the formation of a basic plan on ocean policy every five years. The first Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was approved as a cabinet decision in March 2008, and the second version in April 2013. The third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was adopted by the HOP, and was approved as a cabinet decision in May 2018. The third Basic Plan, which became more substantial in length compared with the second one, raises ‘the challenge towards a new maritime nation’ as a new policy theme and spells out policy directions such as the maintenance of comprehensive maritime security, the promotion of industrial use of the ocean, the maintenance

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Fig. 5.1 The policymaking structure for ocean policy (Source Made by the author from documents issued by the Cabinet Office)

and protection of the maritime environment, and improvement in scientific knowledge. In accordance with the formulation of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, the HOP has approved the Time Schedule for the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. The time schedule for the third Basic Plan, which was formulated in October 2018, spells out the planned implementation of each measure in 2017–23 and budgets for each measure handled by a ministry/ministries in the jurisdiction. As a part of measures to maintain ocean interests, the Japanese government began to give greater attention to the protection of remote islands. In particular, sparsely populated or uninhabited outlying islands need special attention as they are important for ensuring territorial security and sustaining the fisheries industry, and at the same time are vulnerable to a sudden intrusion by an adversary state. In April 2016, the Act on Special Measures Concerning Conservation of Inhabited Remote Border Islands and Maintaining Local Communities on Specific Inhabited Remote Border Islands was enacted, and the HOP adopted the basic policy for fleshing out the act one year later. The basic policy included measures to increase the number of inhabitants, nationalising

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the islands, and improving port facilities. According to the basic policy, the government designated 148 outlying islands in 29 areas as ‘inhabited outlying border islands’ and sought to nationalise them and boost their population. The 148 islands include the Yaeyama Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, around which Chinese official vessels had appeared frequently. The Cabinet Office set up a new grant with ¥5 billion in 2017 so as to subsidise expenditures of measures by local governments. In addition to these soft, institutional policies, the Japanese government strengthened material capabilities in relation to the south-western [Nansei] islands. The National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, which was issued in December 2013, called for developing sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the Self-Defence Force (SDF) to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. The government adopted a series of measures to enhance its troop presence in the islands: the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles on Miyako Island to defend the Miyako Strait in November 2013; the increase in the number of fighter aircraft based at Naha Air Base; and the building of the first new military base at Yonaguni Island in more than four decades in April 2014 (Easley 2017: 76). Moreover, the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) established the 9th Air Wing in January 2016 and newly formed the South-western Air Defence Force in July 2017. These build-ups served to realise persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in preparation for an immediate response in the case of contingencies. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), the primary agency in charge of patrolling and safeguarding Japanese waters, has also strengthened patrol capabilities in the southwestern islands. In March 2016, the JCG inaugurated on Ishigaki Island a full-time Senkaku patrol unit dedicated to safeguarding the waters around the Senkaku Islands: 606 personnel, ten large 1500-ton patrol ships and two helicopter-equipped patrol vessels were stationed on the small island, located only 170 kilometres from the Senkaku Islands (Pajon 2017: 125). Japan has strengthened partnerships with other states for maritime affairs. This is particularly the case for the alliance with the U.S., in which maritime defence has become a crucial component. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation, which was revised in April 2015, explicitly stipulates that ‘the two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation’.1 As for operations to defend maritime areas in Japan, the SDF has primary responsibility for

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the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and for other associated operations, while the U.S. Forces conduct operations to support and supplement the Japanese troops’ operations. The U.S. government strengthened defence cooperation with Japan focusing on maritime security. In January 2013, the U.S. Air Force began surveillance flights using advanced Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, and U.S. Marine Corps transportation in Okinawa was modernised through the introduction of the MV-22 Osprey to replace its ageing CH-46 helicopters (French 2018: 79). Moreover, the U.S. and Japanese maritime forces intensified collaborative activities. In order to strengthen the defence of remote islands, the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) has carried out the joint amphibious exercise ‘Dawn Blitz’ and ‘Iron Fist’ with the U.S. Marines. The two states have intensified their joint operations. In May 2018, for instance, the first exercises of the newly formed Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade were conducted with the MSDF as practical exercises conducted outside SDF bases in waters off the west coast of Kyushu and Tanegashima Island (MOD 2018: 322). The strengthened defence partnership between Japan and the U.S. was underpinned by the Abe administration’s successful removal of constitutional barriers to overseas operations of Japanese armed forces. Even before returning to power in December 2012, Abe explicitly revealed his determination to realise the introduction of collective self-defence to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is the cornerstone of Japan’s territorial defence in East Asia (Lindgren 2019: 352–54). The administration reinterpreted the Japanese Constitution in a cabinet decision on July 1, 2014 to allow for the exercise of collective self-defence, beyond the individual self-defence, which enabled Japan to defend an ally or partner if it is under attack. Abe entrusted K¯ omura Masahiko, Vice-President of the LDP and his long-term ally, to negotiate with the party’s coalition partner, the New Komeito with a self-appointed ‘party of peace’. K¯omura as the chair of the Ruling Coalition on the Development of Security Legislation helped Abe’s determination to introduce collective self-defence by clarifying conditions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence (Mishima 2019: 108). In September 2015, then, the administration completed the passage through the Diet of security-related bills such as the Law on Response to Contingencies, the Law to Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, and so on. The legislation envisaged to enhance Japan-U.S. security cooperation such as

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the protection of U.S. ships carrying Japanese nationals, the defending of U.S. warships under attack close to Japan and the U.S. military against ballistic missile attacks (Hughes 2016: 143). The Japanese and U.S. governments directed their attention to capacity building for third countries. The April 2015 joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, the so-called 2+2 meeting, referred to ‘continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in Southeast Asia, including through the provision of coastal patrol vessels and other maritime security capacity building endeavors’.2 In 2012–16, Japan organised six seminars on underwater medicines in Vietnam where experts shared knowledge and lessen about the basics of underwater medicine, education systems for underwater medicine, and real-life examples of underwater illness. The three out of the six seminars were conducted as a joint seminar with the U.S. and Australia.3 Moreover, during the 2+2 meeting in August 2017, Foreign Minister K¯ono Tar¯o proclaimed that Japan would implement assistance totalling US$500 million in 2017–19 to support capacity-building programmes of maritime security for coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region. The announcement at the 2+2 meeting indicates the importance of policy harmonisation with the U.S., and Japan’s special role in ‘intra-spoke’ collaboration with America’s partners around the Indo-Pacific (Envall 2016: 17). Japan has forged closer links with India in maritime security. In March 2016, the Japanese government decided to engage in the development of power plant facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which are located in crucial sea lines of the Malacca Strait. Not only do the facilities help improve the lives of the population on the islands but they are also expected to assist India’s ability to upgrade its evolving maritime and triservice bases on the islands (Lynch and Przystup 2017: 17). Japan and India have promoted maritime defence cooperation. For instance, the two states undertook joint maritime exercises regularly twice per year in 2016– 18, and signed the implementing arrangement for deeper cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian Navy in October 2018. Japan-India partnership extended to multilateral cooperation involving the U.S. and Australia. In July 2017, MSDF vessels joined the maritime exercise Malabar 2017 as a formal member for the first time. The joint exercise was a crucial development of the U.S.-Japan-India cooperation in the defence and security field. Two months later, the second JapanU.S.-India trilateral ministerial dialogue was held in New York. The three ministers agreed to strengthen trilateral cooperation in the fields of

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maritime security and regional connectivity and work together to disseminate and embed fundamental values such as freedom of navigation and the rule of law. Japan has committed to the development of a forum among four democratic states. Japan proposed the establishment of a quadrilateral framework among Japan, the U.S., India, and Australia, and this proposal was realised through the holding of the first quadrilateral consultation among senior officials in charge of foreign affairs on the sidelines of the 12th East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting in November 2017. This quadrilateral consultation developed into the first quadrilateral foreign ministers’ meeting in New York in September 2019. Furthermore, a quadrilateral consultation among defence authorities took place in India in January 2018. Japan has maintained dialogues with China regarding maritime affairs. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made a formal visit to Tokyo in April 2007, the two governments agreed to develop communication mechanisms between the defence authorities of the two governments. One year later, the first meeting of the joint working group for this objective was organised in Beijing, and a broad agreement was reached at the third meeting in June 2012. However, subsequent talks were suspended largely due to maritime tensions such as the Chinese trawler incident in September 2010 and Japan’s nationalisation of the disputed islands and a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations two years later. The fourth meeting took place in January 2015, and two governments continued meetings. When Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made a formal visit to Tokyo in May 2018, the two governments exchanged the memorandum on a maritime and aerial communication mechanism between defence authorities, and the mechanism commenced operation in the following month. The mechanism consists of three components: annual and expert meetings between defence authorities; a hotline between the defence authorities; and onscene communication measures between vessels and aircraft. The first annual and expert meeting took place in Beijing in December 2018. Moreover, the two governments concluded an Agreement on Search and Rescue Regions during Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2018. This agreement was expected to forge mutual trust between Tokyo and Beijing by developing a cooperative system for search and rescue activities in maritime accidents in surrounding ocean areas.

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The Influence of China in Maritime Security Sino-Japanese relations over the East China Sea deteriorated just after the start of the 2010s. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two JCG vessels in the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This incident changed the Japanese policymakers’ perception of China, urging them to consider policies and measures to counter Chinese maritime actions more seriously (Hornung 2014: 104–5). Exactly two years later, the Japanese government bought three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from their private owner and nationalised the islands. After this nationalisation, the Chinese government committed to more frequent activities in Japan’s controlled waters and airspace in the East China Sea. For instance, the number of incursions into the waters by Chinese coast guard ships increased 3 in January–August in 2012 to 20 in September–December 2012 and to 21 in January–April 2013 (MOD 2013: 173). The Chinese presence in the East China Sea became a serious concern for Japan in terms of ship size in addition to the number of their appearance. The number of Chinese ships of 1000 gross tons and over increased from 82 in 2014 to 136 in 2017 while the corresponding number for Japanese ships increased slightly from 54 to 62 in the same period (JCG 2019: 2). Just after the start of the Abe administration, the tension in the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalated with a Chinese navy ship locking its fire-control radar on an MSDF destroyer in January 2013. Ten months later, China declared the imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that encompassed much of the East China Sea. Moreover, Beijing has promoted the development of the gas field in the East China Sea. The Chinese and Japanese governments had agreed on the joint development of the gas field in June 2008, but the Chinese government suspended talks on the gas development in relation to the boat collision incident in September 2010. In July 2015, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced that China had been developing new gas fields in the East China Sea, establishing 12 new platforms in the previous two years (Kotani 2017: 38). China’s maritime behaviour became prominent in the South China Sea. After 2014, it was revealed that Beijing engaged in building artificial islands at an unprecedented pace to bolster its territorial claims in the Spratly Islands. China’s actions included the building of harbours, radar towers, and other facilities on these artificial islands, coupled with other

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actions including intensified maritime patrols and energy exploration in disputed waters. On the basis of the development of the artificial islands, China began to militarise some of the occupied areas in the South China Sea. It deployed antiship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jammers to the artificial islands constructed on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, and landed long-range bombers on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands (Kuok 2018). The South China Sea constitutes vital SLOC for Japan as some 95 percent of energy supplies and 40 percent of maritime trade pass through the sea (Fatton 2018: 273). Furthermore, significant connections exist between the South and East China Sea disputes. As a broader navel strategy, China’s control of the two seas aims to undertake antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) activities against foreign navies and acquire the Chinese navy’s access to the Western Pacific outside the so-called First Island Chain (Kato 2010: 19). China’s overall maritime strategy and diplomatic/military behaviour towards rival claimants in the South China Sea would be, more or less, directed at Japan in similar manners. The perception of the China threat in the South China Sea is expressed by a Japanese military executive. Kawano Katsutoshi, Chief of the SDF’s Joint Staff, stated in June 2015 that China’s moves to build artificial islands in the South China Sea provoke ‘very serious potential concerns’, hinting at the possibility that Japan may consider surveillance missions in the sea (Hayashi and Tsuneoka 2015). As will be explained in detail later, the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy strengthened a security orientation in ocean policy. This orientation was highly influenced by China’s maritime activities. On the day when the third Basic Plan was adopted as a cabinet decision, Prime Minister Abe stated that ‘ocean policies are of vital importance for Japan, which is surrounded on all sides by the sea’, and ‘their success or failure will directly affect our country’s national interests’ (Jiji Press English News Service 2018). The term, ‘our country’s national interests’, presupposed China’s maritime actions in various seas. This point is shown in the content of the third Basic Plan, which refers to intrusions into territorial waters by official Chinese vessels, maritime research activities by the Chinese and others in the EEZ without the consent of Japan, and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the seas (Cabinet Office 2018: 44). In the face of China’s growing presence in the waters and airspace surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after the 2010s, Japan exhibited

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a determination to retain the effective control of the islands through the enhanced defence systems and high-end capabilities in missiles and aircraft of the SDF and strength in capabilities and operational presence of the JCG. These measures ‘appear focused primarily on a possible contingency with China’ (Liff 2019: 467), representing ‘a step toward a more assertive arming strategy toward China’ (Lande 2018: 178). These measures surely mean internal hard balancing to counter maritime threats from China. In addition to strength in material defence measures, the Japanese government has sought to enhance the resiliency of remote islands through non-military means. These measures include the adoption of the basic policy for conserving inhabited remote border islands and maintaining local communities there, and the offer of financial support for inhabitants and facilities on the islands. These regulative and financial measures could be regarded as internal soft balancing through which the government reformulated domestic regulations and policies in order to protect remote islands from the possible advance of Chinese incursion. For Japan, the U.S. is the key partner to maintain its territorial sovereignty in the East China Sea. The Abe administration has strengthened defence cooperation with the U.S. such as joint maritime exercises and the deployment of new U.S. air forces. These developments are external hard balancing against growing threats from China in the East and South China Seas. Such a balancing factor was explicitly shown in the August 2017 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. The foreign and defence ministers of the two governments expressed continuing concerns about the security environment in the East China Sea, reaffirming the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the sea. They also ‘expressed serious concern about the situation in the South China Sea and reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral coercive actions by claimants, including the reclamation and militarization of disputed features, that alter the status quo and increase tensions’.4 Importantly, hard balancing measures that Japan adopted towards China had a new balancing element. Smith (2017: 30) takes note of the fact that the revised 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation includes a reference to ‘grey zone’ contingencies, conflicts below the use of military force but which could easily escalate to a military conflict, and introduces a new Alliance Coordination Mechanism in preparation for seamless crisis management cooperation. This development was particularly important as a possible conflict in the East China Sea will be a grey

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zone conflict involving non-military vessels such as coast guard vessels and private fishing boats. Japan and the U.S. have enhanced their capabilities to prepare for such a scenario as balancing against grey zone contingencies. Additional importance in relation to the U.S. is the securing of diplomatic guarantee. The U.S. government has maintained a neutral stance on the sovereignty dispute of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. However, the Japanese government has gained an assurance that the U.S. recognises Japan’s administrative control and thus extends the protection of those islands under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Such an assurance was first provided by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who stated, in January 2013, that the U.S. government acknowledged the islands are under the administration of Japan and ‘we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration’ (Quinn 2013). During a visit to Tokyo in April 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama declared in a joint press conference that ‘let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands’.5 During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington just after the start of the Trump administration in February 2017, the two leaders affirmed that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty covers the Senkaku Islands, and that they oppose any unilateral action that would attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.6 The acquiring of the U.S. guarantee could be regarded as a diplomatic achievement as a strategy of external soft balancing that has a significant impact on restraining China’s escalated actions in the East China Sea. The partnership with India is influenced by China’s maritime advance. China has raised its presence not only in the East and South China Seas but also in the Indian Ocean. China has intensified commitments to port development such as Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, Chittagong Port in Bangladesh, Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar, and Gwadar Port in Pakistan as the strategy of the ‘String of Pearls’ (Brewster 2017). The rise of China affected the partnership between Tokyo and New Delhi, leading ‘to an emerging India-Japan consensus on a whole host of global commons issues, such as maritime security and protection of the sea lanes of communication’ (Rajagopalan 2018a). The partnership with India in the maritime domain has more strategically important implications for Japan. Japan accommodated to India’s strategy to make it politically involved

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in its security affairs for countering China’s offensive in national borders and the Indian Ocean.7 Japan and India are China’s neighbours that hold territorial disputes and serious concerns about its maritime advance. The geographic position that the two states are located on the opposite side of China makes India an ideal partner for Japan in diffusing China’s diplomatic concerns and military power. Namely, India’s growing military capabilities in the Indian Continent and larger presence in the Indian Ocean contribute to diffusing Chinese military resources and diplomatic concerns from East Asia to South Asia and share the buck to prepare for the Chinese risk. Japan and India intensified diplomatic and economic connections in the maritime field and strengthened joint maritime exercises. The strategic values in tighter Japan-India partnership can be understood in the context of China’s maritime advance. The partnership, which contains strengthened joint military exercises and diplomatic arrangements, can be regarded as hard and soft balancing to counter China’s diplomatic offensive and aggressive actions that extend from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean. In particular, the partnership is effective in checking China’s expansive actions from the opposite geographical position. The quadrilateral partnership among Japan, the U.S., India, and Australia is a concrete form of an ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, a strategic idea that Prime Minister Abe exhibited in an article on the website of non-profit Project Syndicate in late December 2012 (Abe 2012).8 The quadrilateral partnership has multiple objectives including support for sustainable development, connectivity promotion, and counterterrorism. However, the key objective is to promote partnerships for creating a stable maritime order in response to China’s diplomatic policies and offensive behaviour. The senior officials in charge of foreign affairs in their quadrilateral meetings reaffirmed shared support for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region where all countries respect sovereignty and international law, and freedom of navigation, and overflight. There are significant differences between Japan and Australia on the one hand and India on the other regarding a regional order under U.S. dominance. While Japan and Australia have sustained the U.S.-led order maintenance, India has preferred multipolarity on the global level rather than the U.S. unipolarity (Satake 2018). Moreover, India had a suspicion on Australia’s diplomacy as its Rudd administration defected from the quadrilateral forum that was formed in 2007. Therefore, it is uncertain and unpredictable whether and how the quadrilateral partnership will develop into a

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solid strategic framework. India’s growing perception of the China threat, Japan’s tighter links with India, and Tokyo’s liaison role in establishing a trustworthy relationship between New Delhi and Canberra will become the foundation for the development of the quadrilateral partnership as a strategic coalition. In particular, the quadrilateral partnership has a value in constituting meshed networks from bilateral to trilateral and quadrilateral. The gradual shift from bilateral to quadrilateral in undertaking substantial cooperative activities raise the legitimacy of the partnership and attract other participants in it. On this point, the quadrilateral partnership has high potential as a tool of exclusive institutional balancing to restrain China’s offensive maritime actions. Abe has exhibited a determination to maintain the sovereign of the Senkaku Islands. At the same time, he expressed a desire for mutual de-escalation and crisis management with China just after the return to power in December 2012. Abe showed such a stance in his statement in February 2013 in Washington: ‘We simply cannot tolerate any challenge now, or in the future. No nation should underestimate the firmness of our resolve. … At the same time, I have absolutely no intention of climbing up the escalation ladder’ (Abe 2013). Moreover, in an article published in Project Syndicate in June 2014, he introduced the fact that an agreement to create a maritime and aerial communication mechanism was made during the first Abe administration, adding that ‘we do not welcome dangerous encounters by fighter aircraft and vessels at sea. What Japan and China must exchange are words’ (Abe 2014). The reconstruction of stable relations represented by the operation of the maritime and aerial communication mechanism between defence authorities in June 2018 can be regarded as an outcome of such a long-term desire. The commencement of the communication mechanism and real practices for effective crisis management are different matters. The three components of the communication mechanism were the same in the broad agreement reached in June 2012, which implied that no components were added in the following six years (Terada 2018). Furthermore, several scholars are sceptical about the assured use of the communication mechanism in light of China’s past practices represented by the ignorance of the China-South Korea hotline established between defence ministers in December 2015 (Mifune 2018: 74). The defence authorities of the two governments did not reach an agreement on the hotline under the mechanism for more than one and a half years after the commencement

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of the mechanism. Despite such difficulty in operationalising the communication mechanism, Japan’s attempt to forge institutional links for crisis management could be interpreted as binding-engagement. Japan sought to minimise the risk of provoking an unintended incident in maritime affairs by engaging and binding China in institutionalised platforms in order to maintain and develop channels of communication and foster mutual trust. Such a strategy contributes to creating a status quo tendency and self-restraint in Chinese actions and prevent maritime issues from entering into further tension. In summary, Japan has adopted multiple strategies to counter China’s maritime offensive. Japan enhanced the material capabilities of the JCG and SDF as internal hard balancing. Tokyo located strong links with Washington as the main balancing strategy, pursuing the assurance for administrative control on the Senkaku Islands. Japan has pursued stronger links with India with an expectation that the state, which also has territorial disputes with China, could become a valuable partner to share the buck to respond to the China threat. At the same time, the pragmatic Abe administration began to improve diplomatic communication and security channels as binding-engagement to avoid a worse scenario in relation to China.

The Advocacy and Sharing of the Rule of Law at Sea One of the key features in Japan’s ocean policy is its commitments to the rule of law at sea. Such commitments have been seen in both domestic and external fronts. The National Security Strategy (NSS), which was formulated in December 2013, regards Japan as a maritime state that ‘has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued “Open and Stable Seas”’ (Cabinet Secretariat 2013: 2). It then stresses the importance of maritime order based on such fundamental principles as the rule of law and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international laws, and envisions Japan’s mission to play a leading role in creating a shared recognition that reinforcement of maritime order should be governed by laws and rules. The Japanese government has made efforts to advance the shared recognition of the maintenance of maritime order through international rules and norms. MOFA organised the first International Symposium

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on the Law of the Sea in February 2015 and the symposium has been held periodically afterwards. The authoritative scholars and practitioners of the law of the sea from Japan and abroad joined the symposium and stressed the importance of maintaining maritime order through the rule of law. Moreover, MOFA sought to deepen the recognition of the importance of the rule of law at sea in the newly emerging Indo-Pacific region. For this objective, the ministry commissioned a research project on issues regarding the rule of law and maritime security in the IndoPacific region to the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). The project adopted the two approaches of an international law study and an individual states-based one (JIIA 2017a, b). On the external front, Japan has played a marked role in promoting the rule of law at sea through support for international organisations. Japan has put stress on the role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and the maintenance and development of the legal order at sea. It has made personnel contributions to the ITLOS by sending two Japanese judges successively, and has been the largest financial contributor since its establishment in 1996. Moreover, Japan has continuously made human and financial contributions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which have played an important role in the operation of the system for defining the outer limits of a continental shelf, and the management of deep sea-bed mineral resources, respectively.9 On the basis of the Japanese government’s engagements in the rule of law at sea, Prime Minister Abe made a renewed commitment to the rule of law at sea. At the 13th Asian Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) in May 2014, Abe presented the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea: states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law; states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. In an article published in Project Syndicate in the following month, Abe refers to his government’s support for the Philippines’ call for a resolution to territorial disputes in the South China Sea as the call was exactly consistent with the three principles of the rule of law at sea (Abe 2014). Indeed, the three principles derive from a conventional tenet that the rule of law should be applied to the sea. Yet, the value of Japan’s advocacy of the three principles, as a part

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of public diplomacy, lies in setting up and appealing the universal principles represented by the observation of international law, not stressing its own assertion in a unilateral manner (Kaneko 2014: 43). Afterwards, the Japanese government stressed the importance of the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea on its website for public relations. The Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty in the Cabinet Secretariat set up a special website to advertise ‘Securing the Rule of Law at Sea’. The website introduces the three principles and provides links to academic articles on Japan’s territorial integrity, which were published by the JIIA and the Security and Strategy Research Institute of Japan.10 The homepage of the Ambassador of Japan to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also introduces the three principles in the section of Japan’s support in the field of maritime security for realising ASEAN 2025.11 Importantly, the Japanese government made efforts to diffuse the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea to the international community. On the regional front, the government sought to disseminate the three principles through multilateral settings. During the 10th EAS meeting in November 2015, Prime Minister Abe stressed the importance of the three principles, stating that coastal states are required, under international law, whether for military use or civilian use, to refrain from unilateral actions that would cause permanent physical changes to the marine environment in maritime areas pending final delimitation.12 The chair’s statement of the meeting expresses that the leaders ‘underscored the commitment of ASEAN Member States and China … to exercise selfrestraint in the conduct of activities; not to resort to the threat or use of force; and for the states concerned to resolve their differences and disputes through peaceful means, in accordance with international law’.13 This phrase reflected the spirit of the three principles. Significantly, Prime Minister Abe, in a speech at the U.S. Congress in April 2015, explicitly spelled out the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea as means to ‘make the vast seas stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans seas of peace and freedom’ (Abe 2015). ‘By renewing this pledge before the US Congress, Abe made it clear that he considers the US an important partner in achieving a rule based order in the Asia-Pacific’ (Khan 2015: 5). Afterwards, the Japanese and U.S. governments confirmed a tight partnership for realising the three principles. The foreign and defence ministers of the two governments, in the joint statement of the Security Consultative Committee in August 2017, reaffirmed

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their opposition to unilateral coercive actions by claimants, reiterated the importance of the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes through full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, and emphasised the importance of compliance with the international law of the sea. In the joint statement of the Security Consultative Committee in April 2019, the ministers expressed strong opposition to unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo, and reaffirmed their commitments to resolve all maritime disputes peacefully without resorting to the threat or use of force and clarify their maritime claims in accordance with the international law of the sea. The repeated references to the three principles in the joint statements imply that the three principles were embedded in the Japan-U.S. alliance as a common norm that Tokyo and Washington pursue through their joint efforts. On the global front, Japan took advantage of multilateral settings with other countries as an opportunity to diffuse the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea. For instance, at the first Japan-Caribbean Community (CARICOM) summit in July 2014, Japan’s willingness to work with the 14 members of the CARICOM in promoting the three principles of the rule of law at sea was confirmed as a pillar for cooperation in addressing challenges of the international community.14 Moreover, the Leaders’ Declaration of the 7th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM7) issued in May 2015 reaffirmed that maritime order should be maintained in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law, and underscored the importance of exercising self-restraint and peacefully resolving international disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force. Since the CARICOM members and Pacific Islands nations are maritime countries, these commitments were meaningful for Japan to share the importance of settling maritime disputes through peaceful means. As a more effective way, the Japanese government sought to make the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea a shared understanding among Group of Seven (G7) members. The G7 Foreign Ministers adopted the Declaration on Maritime Security at their meetings in Lübeck, Germany in April 2015 and in Hiroshima, Japan in April 2016. The deepened recognition about the importance of maritime security led to the holding of the G7 High-Level Meeting on Maritime Security whose first meeting was held in Germany in December 2015.15 In these moves, a crucial outcome was that the three principles on the rule of law at sea were adopted into the G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration issued in May 2016.

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The declaration contains the passage that ‘We reaffirm the importance of states’ making and clarifying their claims based on international law, refraining from unilateral actions which could increase tensions and not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims, and seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means including through juridical procedures including arbitration’. The adoption of the three principles had a symbolic meaning that the G7 members showed a shared recognition that the three principles shall be the base for maintaining maritime order. A crucial aspect of Japan’s advocacy of the rule of law at sea is a connection with Japan’s new diplomatic strategy. Abe presented the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which was originally revealed at the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) held in Kenya in August 2016. The FOIP strategy is based on an assumption that the peace and prosperity of the international society are reliant on a free and open maritime order, and thereby such a maritime order should be fostered from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. The ‘free and open’ implies freedom of navigation and the rule of law, normative beliefs that are applied to the management of ocean affairs and the maintenance of maritime order. The FOIP strategy and the rule of law have close connections, which are shown in the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. It contains a passage that ‘a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law is the cornerstone of a stable and prosperous international society. The government is promoting the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to develop the region into global commons bringing stability and prosperity, without prejudice, to all countries in the region’ (Cabinet Office 2018: 7). The Japanese government presented the three pillars of measures under the FOIP strategy: the promotion and establishment of fundamental values such as the rule of law and freedom of navigation; pursuit of economic prosperity through connectivity strength; and capacity-building assistance to coastal countries and measures for securing peace and stability (MOFA 2017). The capacity-building assistance to coastal countries could be regarded as a part of the strength of the rule of law, and thereby the rule of law constitutes the main pillar of the measures under the FOIP strategy (Aizawa 2018: 76–78). Japan’s advocacy of the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea had much to do with China’s assertive diplomacy and aggressive behaviour in maritime affairs. Japan’s understanding of maritime law may be closer in some aspects to that of China rather than those of the U.S. and the

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European Union (EU). This is typical in its opposition to foreign intelligence gathering activities in a littoral state’s EEZ (Midford 2019: 47–49). However, Japan regarded China’s maritime behaviour as problematic in terms of international rules and norms, and pushed forward the three principles of the rule of law at sea in relation to China. At the 18th Japan-ASEAN summit in November 2015, Prime Minister Abe, ‘emphasising that now is the time to strictly abide by the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea’, stated that Japan would keep encouraging China to play a more constructive and cooperative role towards regional and global issues, while complying with common international rules and norms.16 The advocacy of the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea at G7 forums intended to raise the perception of severe maritime security conditions in Asia among European leaders who did not necessarily pay due attention to them. The repeated advocacy of the three principles at the G7 platforms surely irritated the Chinese government. For instance, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying, at a regular press conference in May 2016, severely criticised Japan’s commitments as ‘Japan, as the host of this summit [G7 Ise-Shima summit], makes selfish calculations and plays petty tricks under the pretext of the G7 summit. What Japan is up to does no good to G7 nor peace and stability in the South China Sea. It is nothing but another clumsy show put on by Japan’.17 More specifically, People’s China criticised Japan’s commitments to the three principles, contending that ‘Japan brought in evil ideas by taking advantage of the G7 summit’s occasion, and inspired the so-called “three principles of the rule of law in the sea” with the South China Sea issue in mind by involving the leaders of other countries’ (People’s China 2016). In summary, Prime Minister Abe presented the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea on his government’s comprehensive commitments to the rule of law at sea. The Japanese government has sought to diffuse the three principles by taking advantage of bilateral and multilateral dialogues. While the three principles became a common norm that Japan and the U.S. pursue in their joint efforts, it was embedded into statements in G7 forums. As the advocacy of the three principles aimed at pointing up China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, the Chinese government strongly criticised Japan’s purposeful actions to diffuse the three principles.

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Growing Consideration to Maritime Security in the Making of Ocean Policy For a long time, the formulation and implementation of ocean policy in Japan were ineffective largely because of the lack of a central policymaking body and an effective system to integrate and synthesise ocean-related policies covered by multiple government agencies. In this regard, a significant development in ocean policymaking was brought about by the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy in 2007. Under this new law, the HOP was established as the central decision-making body for the overall ocean policy, and its secretariat was set up within the Cabinet Secretariat. However, even after the reorganisation of the secretariat as the NOPS in the Cabinet Office in April 2017, the secretariat’s bureaucratic presence within the government was quite small largely because of scare resources. The number of staff at the NOPS was just 34 as of June 2018, and handles a small portion of the national budget. In 2018, the Cabinet Office handled just 0.64 percent (¥5.2 billion) of the total budget for ocean-related affairs (¥812.3 billion), and ¥5.0 billion was relevant to the preservation of remote border island areas. The larger portions of the budget were allocated to MLIT (¥289.2 billion), Ministry of Defence (MOD) (¥269.1 billion), and MAFF (¥153.8 billion).18 Under such conditions, the NOPS in the Cabinet Office sought to raise its coordination role through the effective implementation of the basic plan on ocean policy. The third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy stresses the comprehensive and systematic implementation of various measures pertinent to ocean affairs. In Chapter 2 entitled ‘Ocean Measures for Comprehensive and Systematic Implementation by the Government’, some 370 items are listed up as concrete measures, each of which accompanied the name of the exact government agency/ies that should implement it in order to make clear responsibility for policy implementation and guarantee the feasibility of measures. Moreover, in promoting various measures listed in the basic plan, concrete goals are set up (Plan), the measures are implemented (Do), their progress is grasped and evaluated accurately (Check), and the contents of the activities are reviewed according to results (Action). The third Basic Plan stipulates that policy implementation should follow this PDCA-based process control system. Importantly, the Kantei’s overall coordination role in policymaking and policy implementation was enhanced through the strengthened role and function of the Advisory Council for the HOP. The advisory council

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was originally set up in October 2007 but its meeting was held only five times from its foundation until March 2009, and afterwards the meeting was not held for three years. Takemi Keiz¯o, a key LDP member who joined the study group on the law on ocean policy, encouraged Maehara Seiji, then minister of state for ocean policy, to reactivate the advisory council. The advisory council members were reappointed in May 2012, half a year before the start of the second Abe administration (Takemi 2017). During the Abe administration, the advisory council has undertaken dedicated activities, holding a meeting four times annually in 2013–14 and 5–7 times in 2015–18. Furthermore, the chair of the advisory council became to submit recommendations directly to the prime minister after 2016. In December 2017, Miyahara K¯ oji, the chair of the advisory council, delivered directly to Prime Minister Abe recommendations that contained concrete measures that should be included in the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. The recommendations consisted of the 37-page body text and 110-page added text. This volume was quite substantial compared with the recommendations that the advisory council submitted in November 2012 in relation to the second Basic Plan, which had just a 3-page body text. The Kantei’s growing role in ocean policy is also illustrated by the establishment of a ministerial body concerning the coast guard system. In December 2016, the Abe administration set up the Ministerial Council on the Strengthening of the Coast Guard System, which consists of the prime minister as the head and ministers of the Ministry of Finance, MOFA, MOD, and MLIT as well as chief cabinet secretary. While the council meeting has taken place once a year, it has played a crucial role in confirming current states surrounding the waters of Japan and the strength of the coast guard system. In particular, the council approved the Policy on the Strengthening of the Coast Guard System at the first meeting in December 2016. According to the policy, the government has strengthened the security system of the territorial sea and responding systems to simultaneous occurrences of large-scale incidents, and enhanced systems for maritime monitoring and marine research (JCG 2018: 9). Indeed, the JCG is a relatively small government agency as it is one of four independent organs (gaikyoku) affiliated to MLIT. However, its function is handled by a ministerial body whose secretariat is located in the Cabinet Secretariat. After the start of the Abe administration, the policymaking of national security including maritime security was highly centralised in

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the prime ministerial executive, particularly through the establishment of the National Security Council in the Cabinet and the establishment of the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat (Liff and Erickson 2017). However, the centralisation of the policymaking of the overall ocean policy is still limited because various ministries hold the right and budget to undertake policies under their jurisdiction. Under such conditions, the Kantei’s functions have been enhanced through the effective implementation of the basic plan on ocean policy and the advisory council’s growing representation in policymaking. The Kantei also strengthened its involvement in the coast guard system by setting up an independent ministerial council to deliberate on the strength of the system. A crucial feature of the Abe administration’s ocean policy lay in its attempt to reframe it in terms of national security. Such reframing was apparent in the formulation of the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. In order to prepare for recommendations for the plan, the Advisory Council for the HOP set up the Basic Plan Committee in April 2017, and four sub-groups were established under this committee regarding maritime security, the promotion of ocean resource development, the protection of the marine environment, and the development of human resources (Nakahara 2018). The maritime security was given special attention because this issue was handled by the Ocean Security Subcommittee while the other three themes were treated by a project team. This was the first time that the advisory council set up a subcommittee, not a project team, for deliberations on a specific policy issue. The high position of the Ocean Security Subcommittee influenced the content of the recommendations that the advisory council formulated in November 2017. The 37-page recommendations contained a section regarding the four main issues, and maritime security accounted for 40 percent of the total 20 pages of the section. The content of the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy reflected the importance of national security in the overall ocean policy. The second Basic Plan put stress on maritime resource development, and maritime security was one of two pillars in the maintenance of maritime safety, one of twelve policy items. In the third Basic Plan, maritime security is given a special status. It lists five directions of ocean policy, the first of which is ‘Toward open and stable seas. Protect the nation and its citizens’. The section regarding ‘Basic Policy for Measures Regarding the

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Ocean’ consists of ‘the Basic Policy for Comprehensive Maritime Security’ and ‘Basic Policy for Other Main Measures’. The maritime security was located the above of other main measures. Based on the broad understanding of ocean policy from the standpoint of maritime security, the third Basic Plan gives special attention to maritime security by encouraging the whole government to promote measures that have a direct bearing on bases for maritime security as well as those that support maritime security, which was previously perceived as having a more indirect relationship with maritime security (Cabinet Office 2018: 26). The comprehensive planning of various measures and the inclusion of defence forces in measures to protect maritime interests under the banner of comprehensive maritime security have significant implications for realising ‘a maritime state’ (Eifuku 2018: 5). For a long time, ocean policy, which aims at managing the waters around the Japanese archipelago from a comprehensive perspective, put stress on maritime conservation and the development of resources at sea. The third Basic Plan with a strong emphasis on maritime security made a drastic change from the previous two basic plans, even inviting a criticism that ‘it is unnatural to make such [a] big change on the list of contents of the Basic Plan since it should be made upon the Act which shows twelve basic measure[s] as the contents of the Basic Plan’ (Nakahara 2018: 4). The strengthened positioning of maritime security in the overall ocean policy derived from Prime Minister Abe’s keen concern about maritime security. In a meeting to adopt the third Basic Plan as a cabinet decision in May 2018, Abe stated that ‘with the maritime situation becoming even more serious recently, the government must act as one to preserve open access to the oceans, and hold fast to our territorial waters and maritime rights’ (Harding 2018). Abe has maintained strong interests in ensuring maritime security not only in the waters surrounding Japan but also in oceans in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific as he has shared with political leaders in Asia and the Pacific the importance of maintaining an open and stable order in the oceans at the summit meetings. Significantly, Abe stressed the importance of grasping maritime security in an integrative manner even before the formulation of the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. At the 16th meeting of the HOP in April 2017, Abe clearly mentioned that ‘in the next Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, maritime security will be considered by taking it up broadly, and initiatives will be enhanced on issues such as patrols in territorial seas, the securing of public order, and disaster preventions’.19 The third Basic Plan employs

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the term, ‘comprehensive maritime security’ as ‘a package of measures that takes a broad view of maritime security measures and measures that form the foundation which contributes to the reinforcement of maritime security’ (Cabinet Office 2018: 21). The measures such as law enforcement, disaster relief, resource management, environmental destruction, and illegal migration and smuggling are broadly and widely explained and understood under the subject of comprehensive maritime security (Kanehara 2018). Kanehara Atsuko, a member of the advisory council and the chair of the Ocean Security Subcommittee, commented that the broad perception of the maritime security concept was an international trend, and followed Prime Minister Abe’s instruction at the 16th meeting of the HOP in April 2017 (Eifuku 2018: 3). Thus, the reframing of ocean policy in terms of national security was made in a systematic manner. The Advocacy Council for the HOP, in formulating a new basic plan on ocean policy, had a clear goal to enhance the position of maritime security, and thereby set up a new subcommittee on maritime security, which put stress on maritime security in its recommendations. The reframing was realised by incorporating the concept of comprehensive maritime security, which was suggested by Prime Minister Abe as a key guideline in formulating the third Basic Plan.

Conclusion This chapter examined the development of Japan’s ocean policy and its major features. In so doing, it paid particular attention to three aspects. The first was the influence of geopolitical evolutions particularly China’s assertiveness in maritime affairs. The second is Japan’s advocacy of a new idea as a means to achieve strategic objectives in maritime issues. The third is the formation of ocean policy and discernible changes in it during the Abe administration. Japan’s purposeful commitments to ocean policy began with the enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy in 2007, which introduced policymaking apparatuses such as the HOP and the Advisory Council for the HOP as well as the formulation of a basic plan on ocean policy every five years. In efforts to maintain ocean interests, the Japanese government expanded support for protecting remote islands and enhanced material capabilities to safeguard Japanese waters through the strengthened SDF and JCG. The willingness to protect ocean interests extended to external

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connections by intensifying maritime cooperation with the U.S. and India and developing a maritime and aerial communication mechanism with China. Japan’s commitments to maintaining ocean interests had much to do with growing concern about and tangible threats from Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas. The Japanese government strengthened regulative systems to enhance the resiliency of remote islands and improved material capabilities to protect Japanese waters as internal soft and hard balancing against China’s diplomatic policies and offensive actions in the East China Sea. The stronger institutional ties and maritime exercises with the U.S. and India were external soft and hard balancing in response to China’s growing presence in various seas from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Japan set up a formal communication mechanism with China as a way of binding engagement to avoid the occurrence of a maritime contingency. The Japanese government has maintained strong interests in the rule of law at sea, offering human and financial support for international organisations dealing with maritime issues and organising international symposiums and research projects. Following such experiences, the government has pushed forward the Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea in an integrated manner. The three principles were first presented by Prime Minister Abe in May 2014, and the government has diffused it through various regional and international platforms. Particularly important was the recognition of the three principles as a common norm pursued through Japan-U.S. partnership and the successful incorporation in G7 statements. Since the three principles presuppose Chinese maritime actions, its incorporation in the G7 statements invited an explicit criticism from China. While the Japanese government set up a more autonomous administrative system for ocean policy, the function of the NOPS, the secretariat to the HOP, was limited in terms of personnel and budget. Under such conditions, the NOPS sought to formulate a systematic ocean policy through the effective implementation of the basic plan on ocean policy. The presence of the Kantei in the making of ocean policy was enhanced through the strengthened functions of the advisory council and the establishment of a ministerial council for the coast guard system. The Kantei’s substantial influence on the ocean policy was demonstrated in the reframing of the policy in terms of national security. Prime Minister Abe’s keen interests in national security were embedded in the process of

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formulating the third Basic Plan, which raised the position of maritime security in the overall ocean policy.

Notes 1. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015. Available at: https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/shishin_2015 0427e.html [accessed June 2, 2017]. 2. Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000078186.pdf [accessed June 2, 2017]. 3. N¯ oryoku K¯ ochiku Shien Jigy¯o, Betonamu [Project for Supporting Capacity Building, Vietnam]. Available at: https://www.mod.go.jp/j/ approach/exchange/cap_build/vietnam/index.html [accessed July 30, 2019]. 4. Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, August 17, 2017. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/st/page4e_000649.html [accessed May 3, 2018]. 5. Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan, April 24, 2014. Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.arc hives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-presid ent-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan [accessed April 13, 2018]. 6. Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, February 10, 2017. Available at: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page3e_000652.html [accessed April 15, 2018]. 7. In March 2016, the Japanese government decided to engage in the development of power plant facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean. During the Doklam Plateau stand-off between China and India in June-August 2017, the U.S., India and Japan carried out the Malabar joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal. 8. In this short article, Abe recommended ‘a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific’. Abe apparently regarded the diamond linkages as a counter to China’s growing influence as he warned that the South China Sea is on the verge of becoming a ‘Lake Beijing’. 9. International Law, December 2, 2019. Available at: https://www.mofa. go.jp/policy/inter_law/law/index.html [accessed November 2, 2018]. 10. Securing the Rule of Law at Sea. Available at: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ ryodo_eg/law/law.html [accessed November 2, 2018]. 11. Japan’s Support in the Field of Maritime Security for Realising ASEAN 2025, January 2016. Available at: https://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/ asean2025/jpasean-ps01.html [accessed November 8, 2018].

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12. The 10th East Asia Summit Meeting, November 22, 2015. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_000426.html [accessed June 10, 2017]. 13. Chairman’s Statement of the 10th East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015. Available at: http://www.asean.org/wp-content/ uploads/images/2015/November/10th-EAS-Outcome/Chairmans%20S tatement%20of%20the%2010th%20East%20Asia%20Summit%20Final.pdf [accessed June 10, 2017]. 14. Press Release: Japan–Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Summit Meeting: Japan’s CARICOM Policy. Available at: https://www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/files/000047229.pdf [accessed November 10, 2019]. 15. The second and third meetings were held in December 2016 in Japan and November 2017 in Italy, respectively. 16. The 18th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting, November 22, 2015. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_000422.html [accessed October 13, 2017]. 17. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on May 25, 2016. Available at: http://pg.china-embassy.org/eng/ fyrth/t1366744.htm [accessed October 13, 2017]. 18. Heisei 30-nendo Kaiy¯ o Kanren Yosan no Gaiy¯ o [The Summary of 2018 Ocean-Related Budget] Available at: https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/pol icies/budget/pdf/h30/gaiyou_h30.pdf [accessed January 18, 2020]. 19. Headquarters for Ocean Policy, April 7, 2017. Available at: https://japan. kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201704/07article1.html [accessed March 30, 2018].

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CHAPTER 6

Outer Space Policy with a Stronger Security Orientation

In the new millennium, major states in the world have intensified their commitments to the development of military communications satellite systems as well as to satellite services that cover various areas such as communications/broadcasting, weather forecasting, and remote sensing. The development of space programmes also have positive effects on the resolution of major global issues such as global warming, climate change, and natural calamities. Furthermore, outer space is a representative global commons, whose management needs to take into account the global governance perspective. Given these multifaceted features of outer space, national space policy is related to various issue-areas such as science and technology (S&T), social and industrial development, and national defence and security. The international relations of outer space exhibit crucial development. During the Cold War era, the fierce space race was repeated between the Soviet Union and the U.S., and China gradually consolidated the status of the third space great power—in addition to the U.S. and Russia— after the end of the Cold War. Other actors such as the European Union (EU), Japan and India emerged as new players by launching satellites for various purposes and promoting S&T programmes for outer space. In Asia, outer space is becoming another domain of inter-state competition in the 2010s as steady economic growth has directed policymakers’ concern to the development of space programmes. While major countries © The Author(s) 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_6

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in Asia including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members have engaged in regional cooperation through two multilateral institutions—the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO)—their space programmes incorporate the nature of a budding space race. Japan’s engagement in space programmes began in the 1960s with a strong S&T orientation. In the new millennium, the Japanese government formulated more systematic policies for outer space by adopting a basic law on space policy and developing tighter policymaking structures. In this development, a basic orientation in space policy extended from just S&T to industrial development and national security. In particular, China’s rapid development of space capabilities kindled a security concern among Japanese policymakers, and Japan’s space policy began to take into account the China shadow. The objective of this chapter is to analyse the development of Japan’s space initiatives and concrete policies by paying attention to the Abe administration. It first depicts the development of domestic policies and programmes as well as external partnerships concerning outer space. It then elucidates geopolitical factors that urged the Japanese government to embed new orientations in its outer space policy. This chapter also examines the domestic policymaking process whereby the government formulated new policies and measures, and explores the government’s engagement in the development of international norms for outer space.

The Basic Space Law and the Development of Space Policy For a long time, Japan’s policy for space development was peculiar compared with those of other major states, not taking into account a security purpose. This was largely because of ‘the exclusively peaceful purpose resolution’, a Diet resolution adopted in May 1969. The resolution, which reflects the spirit of the pacifist constitution, stipulates that space programmes are conducted by the civilian sector not by the defence sector, and the development of S&T is made for exclusively peaceful purposes. From this baseline, the National Space Development Agency (NASDA), an S&T agency promoting space development for practical use, and the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), an organisation under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) in charge of the academic side of space

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exploration, undertook space development for ‘non-military purposes’ (Hashimoto 2015: 65–66).1 The tenet of exclusively peaceful purpose was transformed with the enactment of the Basic Space Law (hereinafter, the Law) in 2008. The Law is based on six fundamental principles: peaceful utilisation, the improvement of people’s lives, industrial promotion, the development of human society, international cooperation, and environmental-friendliness. The Law stipulates that one of the objectives of Japanese space activities is to ensure international peace and security as well as to contribute to the national security of Japan (Articles 3&14). This phrase implies that the law finally aligned Japan’s interpretation of peaceful use of outer space as nonaggressive in accordance with accepted international interpretations, and space development would be possible for national security objectives (Pekkanen 2020: 30). Furthermore, the Law authorised the creation of a headquarters for space policy and a new ministerial post for space policy. The establishment of the minister of state for space policy had a significant implication for clarifying administrative and political responsibility for space development (Suzuki 2011: 204). There are two organisations that are related to the making of space policy. One is the Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy (SHNSP) within the Cabinet. The SHNSP, which consists of all cabinet ministers, is the top-level decision-making body for building a comprehensive national space policy, and its director-general is the prime minister and vice directors-general are chief cabinet secretary and the minister of state for space policy. The Secretariat of National Space Policy, a bureaucratic body under the Cabinet Secretariat, functions as the secretariat of the SHNSP. The other is the Committee on National Space Policy (CNSP), which was established in July 2012. The committee is a consultative body to the prime minister who appoints its members. The CNSP, which is composed of seven (later nine) experts, conduct investigations and deliberations on crucial issues regarding policies for the development and utilisation of space, including the basic plan on space policy and guidelines for expense estimates (Fukushima and Hashimoto 2016: 29– 30). The Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), a bureaucratic body within the Cabinet Office, was established as the secretariat of the CNSP. The ONSP, which would be reorganised into the National Space Policy Secretariat (NSPS) in 2016, has functioned as the chief bureaucratic body for space policy.

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In conforming to Article 24 of the Law, the government has formulated the basic plan on space policy, a fundamental document that provides basic policy orientations concerning space programmes. The first Basic Plan on Space Policy was formulated in 2009 and the second version in 2013. In January 2015, the SHNSP decided on the third Basic Plan on Space Policy as a 10-year development plan envisioning the following twenty years. The plan sets forth three goals of space activities: ensuring space security; promoting the use of space in the civilian sector; and the maintenance and strengthening of the space equipment industry and scientific/technological bases. In accordance with the formulation of the third Basic Plan, the SHNSP approved the first Implementation Plan of the Basic Plan on Space Policy in December 2015. The implementation plan, which is revised annually, shows development schedules for major space projects with timelines for more than ten years and depicts each ministry’s responsibility for pursuing policy objectives written in the basic plan (Wakimoto 2019: 3–4). After the adoption of the third Basic Plan on Space Policy in January 2015, the Japanese government has promoted several space programmes that were related to the defence and military sector. The first is the development of positioning satellite systems. The government has developed the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), Japan’s global positioning system (GPS) overlay. The government launched the first satellite, Michibiki, which afforded high-precision positioning unaffected by mountains or tall buildings in 2010, and completed the four-satellite constellation system in November 2018. The creation of this constellation system led to significant contributions to improving positioning accuracy in the Asia-Pacific region. With the planned completion of a seven-satellite constellation around 2023, Japan would be able to create an independent regional positioning, navigation and timing capacity. The second is the enhancement of defence communications and information-gathering capabilities through satellite systems. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) launched an X-band defence communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018. The Kiramekis, as the first satellites owned and operated by MOD, are used for information communications of extremely important command and control in unit operations. The ministry intended to realise a threesatellite system with all of the three X-band defence communications satellites as quickly as possible by achieving the development of Kirameki-3

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(MOD 2018: 331). The government also launched a new informationgathering satellite (IGS) in March 2017 and plans to eventually create a ten IGS constellation system (Nagai et al. 2017: 2). The third is the development of stronger space situational awareness (SSA), which can perform constant surveillance against space debris and suspicious satellites. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and MOD have pursued individual plans regarding SSA. On the one hand, JAXA has pursued a plan to deploy radar with an ability to monitor low orbit satellites at altitudes under 1000 kilometres and a groundbased optical telescope with an ability to monitor geostationary orbit satellites at altitudes of approximately 36,000 kilometres (MOD 2018: 331–32). On the other hand, MOD has engaged in the development of multiple radar antennas with an ability to monitor a geostationary orbit in Yamaguchi Prefecture in the western edge of Honshu (the mainland) with the establishment of the SSA operating system at Fuchu Air Base in Tokyo (Uchikura 2018). Through the combination of these developments, Japan would establish a more effective SSA system. Importantly, the relationship between JAXA and MOD/Self-Defence Force (SDF) changed in the process of enhancing space capabilities and developing space facilities. JAXA, an S&T-oriented civilian organisation that holds a strong peaceful orientation, did not necessarily forge close ties with the defence agencies even after the enactment of the Law. This fundamental character gradually changed under the Abe administration. In March 2014, JAXA and the Technical Research and Development Institute—currently, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), an independent organ affiliated to MOD—concluded a comprehensive partnership agreement, followed by personnel exchanges between JAXA and MOD (Okumura 2017: 13).2 In 2017, MOD and JAXA concluded a partnership agreement that would provide the framework of general cooperation concerning SSA, with an appendix to the agreement concerning the design and construction of the SSA system. Afterwards, the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) and JAXA have organised technical coordination and discussion meetings for the construction and operation of the SSA system, which constituted a foundation for creating a space unit at the ASDF in 2020 (Uchikura 2018). Thus, Japan has striven to establish reliable and independent space capabilities through various programmes for developing satellites such as the QZSS, IGS, defence communications satellites, and so on. In this process, JAXA and MOD/SDF strengthened partnerships for space

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programmes by concluding collaborative agreements. In particular, they have strengthened engagements in developing an effective SSA system through personnel exchanges and technical cooperation. Japan has promoted cooperation with other states in advancing space policy. On the bilateral front, the main partner for this objective is the U.S. The Japanese and U.S. governments set up two institutions to propel bilateral cooperation on space development (MOFA 2019a). The first is the Japan–U.S. Space Security Dialogue whose first meeting at the deputy director-general level took place in 2012, and the following meetings have been held periodically. This dialogue has paid particular attention to space domain mission assurance including resilience of space assets. The second is the Japan–U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space. The first gathering of the dialogue on the basis of a whole-of-government approach was organised in March 2013, and an additional five meetings were organised until July 2019. The participants from the growing number of government agencies and affiliated organisations have exchanged views on bilateral cooperation in a wide range of issue-areas and confirmed their activities at multilateral forums regarding outer space. On the basis of talks at the dialogues, Japan and the U.S. have produced concrete outcomes for space security cooperation. In May 2013, the two governments concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on SSA services and information sharing, which triggered the start of two-way SSA information sharing in 2014. In May 2014, the two governments agreed that Japan’s JAXA would provide information on the orbit of space objects for the Joint Space Operations Centre (JSpOC) of the U.S. Department of Defence. Moreover, the Japanese and U.S. governments shared the importance of outer space in partnership for the overall security strategy. The revised Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defence Cooperation adopted in April 2015 set up an independent section regarding space security cooperation for the first time. In this section, the two governments pledged to ensure the resilience of their space systems, enhance cooperation in SSA and maritime domain awareness (MDA), and share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. In accordance with the deepening of defence cooperation in the space field, the defence authorities have set up a bilateral institution to discuss collaboration on outer space. In the same month when the revised guidelines were announced, the Japan–U.S. Space Cooperation Working Group

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among defence authorities was established, and six meetings were organised until February 2020. The working group has deepened dialogues on broader areas such as the promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, closer information sharing, and cooperation for nurturing and securing experts (MOD 2018: 331). In accordance with tighter institutional connections, the defence authorities of the two governments have promoted practical cooperation in the space domain. In 2015, Japan participated as an observer in a multilateral table-top exercise on SSA organised by the U.S. Strategic Command, and became a full-fledged participant the following year (Fukushima 2017: 7). In October 2018, Japan joined the 12th Schriever Wargame at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, which explored critical space and cyberspace issues set in 2028. Moreover, the two governments plan to station SDF liaison officers on a permanent basis at the Combined Space Operations Centre (CSpOC) in Vandenberg Air Force Base to share and coordinate information (Yamashita 2019).3 Thus, cooperation on outer space has become an increasingly important pillar for the Japan–U.S. security alliance. Not only have the two governments developed bilateral institutions to deliberate on various issues regarding space policy but they have also engaged in practical exercises in the space domain. In particular, the two governments have deepened institutional connections between defence authorities and JAXA’s involvement in such links. Another important partner for Japan in outer space is India. The Japan–India space partnership started as S&T collaboration between JAXA and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) with an arrangement concerning consideration to potential future cooperation in the field of outer space in October 2005. In November 2016, the two agencies signed an MOU, which envisioned cooperation on space science technology and applications, covering satellite communications and navigation, exploration and space sciences, earth observation, research and development in space systems and space technology, space industry promotion, and so on. JAXA and ISRO deepened a partnership by signing further agreements: an implementation arrangement concerning joint lunar polar exploration mission in December 2017; and an implementation arrangement concerning cooperation on validations, improvement, and applications of rainfall products using satellite images and ground measurements in June 2018.

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Political will elevated Japan–India space partnership to a higher level. In the joint statement issued in September 2017, Abe and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi applauded a deepened partnership between JAXA and ISRO on a number of areas including earth observation, satellite-based navigation, space sciences and lunar exploration, and stressed the importance of enhancing comprehensive space cooperation. The leaders’ political initiative led to a shift from S&T-oriented cooperation to cooperation under formal institutional frameworks. During the Japan–India summit in October 2018, Abe and Modi decided to launch an annual dialogue for bilateral cooperation in outer space. Japan became the second partner for outer space dialogue for India, following the U.S. whose formal partnership with India began in March 2015. The first meeting of the Japan–India Space Dialogue took place in March 2019. The participants discussed various issues including space security, SSA, cooperation between JAXA and ISRO, space industries, global navigation satellite systems, space-related norms, and so on. On the multilateral front, Japan has led the operation of the APRSAF. The APRSAF, which started in 1993 under MEXT’s leadership, has held an annual meeting as a platform for exchanging views and information among engineers and project managers who were directly involved in space development. The APRSAF has developed as an informal institution with soft rules and practices with a flexible and voluntary membership, collecting participants from space-related organisations in more than 40 countries in the Asia-Pacific and other regions. The main agendas at the annual meeting have been related to applied technologies in employing space systems, and outreach and training have been conducted through a series of parallel projects and working groups (Moltz 2016: 131; Suzuki 2011: 220). It is noteworthy to mention India’s positive commitments to the APRSAF. New Delhi co-hosted the forum’s annual meeting twice: one under the theme of ‘Space for Human Environment’ in 2007; and the other of ‘Space Technology for Enhanced Governance and Development’ in 2017. Moreover, India held one of four seats at the forum’s executive committee up to 2021 thanks to its positive contributions (Smart 2019: 36–37).

The China Factor in Japan’s Outer Space Policy In developing policies and programmes for outer space, Japan has been conscious of the shadow of China, a space great power in parallel to the U.S. and Russia. China’s substantial commitment to outer space began

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with the launch of its first satellite, the Dong Fang Hong 1, in April 1970. Afterwards, Beijing has accelerated space development programmes, producing marked achievements such as the launch of unmanned and manned space crafts. In January 2007, China conducted its first successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test in destroying a defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite by using the SC-19, a derivative of the DF21C ballistic missile (Kan 2007). China’s destructive test surprised the international community because it broke a common understanding that the governments do not destruct a satellite, a base for collecting information. Although the test involving the destruction of a satellite happened only once in 2007, China is thought to have repeatedly carried out test launches of the SC-19 thereafter (Fukushima and Hashimoto 2016: 20). Additionally, China is said to have performed a test launch in October 2015 of an ASAT weapon known as the Dong Neng-3, a direct-ascent missile that is designed to ram into satellites and destroy them (Gertz 2015). Chinese President Xi Jinping stated the goal of transitioning China from being a ‘major space power’ to being a ‘strong space power’ that would surpass the U.S. as the leading space power by mid-century (Pollpeter 2020: 12). China’s space programmes have developed aiming to achieve Xi’s ambition. In April 2017, China launched the Tianzhou cargo ship that would allow independent, indigenous, and unmanned access to the envisioned space station for logistics delivery. The cargo ship owned a capability to conduct in-orbit refuelling, which matures a general capability that extends access and logistics lines (Goswami 2017). China’s Beidou Satellite Navigation System, which was officially launched as a regional satellite navigation system in 2003, has provided independent positioning, navigation and timing services to users in the Asia-Pacific region since December 2012, and is projected to become a 35-satellite constellation to provide global coverage by 2020 (Xiong and Han 2019: 78). While China successfully landed the Chang’e 4 on the far side of the Moon in January 2019, it plans to launch a Mars explorer in 2020, and construct and operate the international space station, Tiangong, in low earth orbit by 2022. Given that space development is a priority area for the ‘Made in China 2025’ project designed to develop cutting-edge indigenous industries, the Chinese government’s positive engagement in space programmes and technologies will continue further. China has skilfully employed principles and real intentions regarding the development of outer space. Beijing has stressed as principles an

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open-minded approach to space development. For instance, the Chinese government announced in May 2018 that its international space station would be open for participation by all UN members, and applications to scientific experiments on the space station would be extended to academia, private and public companies (Goswami 2018a: 39). The openminded approach serves to demonstrate that China is an enlightened, benevolent state that is able and willing to fulfil other countries’ security and economic needs through the application of space-based capabilities (Pollpeter 2020: 17). As for real intentions, China’s space development is highly linked to domestic-oriented objectives: to enhance national prestige and international status, which underpins the legitimacy of the current government; and to pursue resource nationalism to gain dominance to access and extract space resources such as metals, helium 3 (fusion fuel), and space-based solar power (Goswami 2018b). Additionally, China integrated several space programmes into its grand diplomatic vision: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The 2016 Space White Paper refers to ‘Construction of the Belt and Road Initiative Space Information Corridor, including earth observation, communications and broadcasting, navigation and positioning, and other types of satellite-related development’ as the first of key areas for future cooperation on outer space.4 The link to the BRI implies that space development constitutes a crucial part of China’s integrated strategy to enhance influence on countries in broader regions. North Korea’s development of ballistic missiles since the 1990s surely posed serious threats to Japan’s national security and created the baseline for the development of Japan’s space security. Following North Korea’s launch of the Taepodong-1 missile over northern Japan in August 1998, Japan committed to the development of an indigenous reconnaissance system for the launch of an information-gathering satellite constellation using optical and radar technologies (Berner 2005: 17). Pyongyang’s long-range missile test in July 2006 urged the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Special Committee on Space Development to prepare for a new bill that reflected the national security perspective, which would become the base for the Law (Suzuki 2015b: 403). In ordering the start of deliberations on the third Basic Plan at the 8th meeting of the SHNSP in September 2014, Prime Minister Abe referred to rapid changes in diplomatic and security environments surrounding Japan and a sharp rise of outer space as a factor influencing Japan’s national security. The primary change in the security environments was an increase in the missile

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launching of North Korea: Pyongyang launched 11 ballistic missiles that fell into the Sea of Japan between March and September 2014 (MOD 2018: 492). At the same time, China’s growing space capabilities have had a significant influence on Japan’s space development. The third Basic Plan indicates concerns associated with China’s growing space capabilities as follows: China’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in January 2007, which destroyed a satellite and generated a large amount of space debris, was of great concern to the international community. China, which is rapidly strengthening its space capabilities, continues to develop anti-satellite weapons, and is also seen to be developing devices that can employ laser beams to disrupt the functions of satellites. (Cabinet Office 2016: 6)

The LDP expressed security concerns about China’s advanced space programmes in a more explicit manner. In April 2018, the party’s Special Committee on Space and Ocean Development issued a position paper, entitled ‘Basic Ideas Concerning Defence in the Space Domain: Recommendations’, which contains the following passage: China is rapidly improving space programmes and creation capabilities by working to strengthen A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] capabilities that block military activities in other countries in the surrounding area, establishing a new strategic support unit to complete space, cyber and electronic warfare in a unified manner, and developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that restrict and prevent the use of space. (LDP 2018: 1)

Under the third Basic Plan, the Abe administration accelerated the development of space capabilities such as the completion of a sevensatellite constellation for the QZSS around 2023 and the establishment of an effective SSA system through new telescope and radar facilities. The administration has also pushed forward a closer partnership between JAXA and MOD/SDF, which facilitated the use of S&T capabilities possessed by the former for defence and military objectives. These developments are undoubtedly influenced by the need to enhance indigenous space capabilities and resilience to protect satellites and other space assets in the face of the rapid development of China’s space programmes and capabilities. Indeed, any attack on space assets, using either kinetic or non-kinetic forces, is not prohibited by international rules, and it is difficult to attribute who or what causes an attack on space assets. In this

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sense, an incident in outer space is regarded as a grey zone contingency (Suzuki 2018: 45). However, possible disturbance to Japanese satellites and other space assets is considered to be made by an adversary state particularly China that has high space capabilities and the growing control of outer space. Therefore, the Japanese government recognised the need to monitor Chinese ASAT weapons and space debris. Moreover, Japan had a policy objective to raise monitoring capabilities in outer space so as to observe China’s maritime activities. MOD’s communications satellite system surely elevates Japan’s capabilities to counter China’s growing maritime pressure across the Pacific, particularly the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea (Smart 2019: 51). The development of its own space capabilities is a part of an internal hard balancing strategy that contributes to enhancing the resilience of its own space assets against China’s growing space capabilities and monitoring capabilities towards the moves of Chinese vessels in the East and South China Seas. The China factor assumes a crucial position in Japan’s space strategy in partnership with the U.S. The U.S. political leaders have been increasingly alarmed by China’s steady development of space capabilities. In June 2017, the U.S. government revived the National Space Council,5 and Vice-President Mike Pence, at its first meeting in October, expressed a concern that Russia and China were pursuing a full range of antisatellite technology to reduce U.S. military effectiveness and stressed the need to maintain American leadership in the space domain (Pence 2017). President Donald Trump strengthened commitments to outer space by issuing a series of space policy directives. In December 2017, Trump signed the Space Policy Directive-1 that contained a programme of space exploration such as returning humans to the Moon and possibly sending a manned mission to Mars at a later stage. Trump’s decision is influenced by China’s long-term vision to explore the Moon and Mars. In February 2019, Trump signed the Space Policy Directive-4, which ordered the Department of Defence to begin the necessary process to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch along with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard (Wall 2019). The Trump administration’s new initiatives aimed at fulfilling the promise to make America great in space again and ensuring continuous U.S. leadership in outer space (Tronchetti and Liu 2018). In the face of China’s growing challenges in the development of outer space, the U.S. has deepened the recognition of Japan as a crucial partner.

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The two governments confirmed, at the second meeting of the Japan– U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in May 2014, the importance of enhancing the resilience of space assets essential to the security of both states, and this confirmation had much to do with growing threats to space assets shown in China’s ASAT weapon test (Suzuki 2015a: 58). As the U.S. forces are no longer capable of functioning sufficiently without space assets, the destruction or malfunction of space assets leads directly to a significant decline in the U.S. defence capability. Accordingly, the U.S. government is counting on Japanese satellites as an alternative to its own space assets. In particular, when the U.S. GPS is rendered inoperative for some reason, it would be possible to curb the decline in the U.S. defence capability to some extent if the seven-satellite constellation of the Japanese QZSS would be used (Nakasuka 2015: 147). Japan’s acquisition of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system and the QZSS, increasingly linked together and with U.S. systems via data fusion, provides advanced space technologies that greatly multiply Japan’s deterrent power and the Japan–U.S. alliance’s deterrent power, through both denial and punishment, vis-à-vis China’s capabilities (Kallender and Hughes 2019: 192). As already explained, JAXA and MOD/SDF have striven to establish an effective SSA system by developing new telescope and radar facilities in the western part of Japan. Japan and the U.S. have advanced information collection and sharing between Japan’s JAXA and the U.S. CSpOC. The integration of Japanese SSA into the U.S.-centred global SSA networks is extremely important because the U.S.-centred networks do not cover western Pacific and Asian regions, and Japan’s SSA installations help to cover blind spots including the spaces above China and North Korea. In particular, Japanese SSA capabilities would provide sufficient data to determine whether a given ASAT weapon test is attributable to China or North Korea (Suzuki 2017: 101–2). Japan’s advanced space technologies marked a significant new stage in the development and leveraging of its partnership with the U.S., having a potentially key impact on the U.S.–Japan–China strategic balance (Kallender and Hughes 2019: 193). In accordance with increasing anxiety about China’s challenge to the U.S. supremacy in outer space, Washington raised its expectation on Tokyo’s more commitments, which led to the elevated position of outer space in the Japan–U.S. security alliance. The Abe administration’s growing partnership with the U.S. can be understood as an attempt of external hard balancing to develop joint

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space capabilities and resilience to protect satellites and other space assets against China’s possible attacks. This is a plausible scenario that nonkinetic ASAT weapons would be used prior to the initiation of overt military conflict, effectively creating a grey zone dilemma where intentions are ambiguous and risks of escalation and miscalculation are high (Harrison and Cooper 2016: 4). Therefore, if a confrontation between the U.S. and China escalates to an armed conflict, space would become the first target due to this grey zone nature (Suzuki 2018: 46). The resilience of space assets is particularly important as China recognises that the U.S. military vulnerability lies in reliance on satellites for communications and surveillance, and has developed sophisticated space technologies that would serve to undermine U.S. space assets. Since strategic partnerships on space development between Japan and India just began, substantial outcomes from the partnership have not produced yet. Indeed, Japan and India have a relatively long history of space development, but their independent programmes were confronted with increasing difficulty in competing against China. For instance, China’s Chang’e robotic lunar exploration programme, which plans to land and explore the surface on the far side of the Moon, is considered technologically far superior to India’s ad hoc lunar and Mars robotic missions or Japan’s exploration of the Moon and near-Earth objects (Rajagopalan 2018b). The Japan–India relations in outer space have developed from S&T agencies-based collaboration to the governmental institutions-involved partnership. As confirmed in the previous chapter, Tokyo and New Delhi have deepened a strategic partnership in maritime security, which doubtlessly aimed at countering China’s growing presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Japan–India cooperation on outer space indicates the extension of a strategic partnership in relation to China. The joint lunar polar exploration mission was an outcome from Japan and India’s impatience associated with China’s successful accomplishment with four moon missions between 2007 and 2014 (Rajagopalan 2018a). Japan found a growing value in India as a crucial partner to balance against the development of China’s space capabilities and rising threats from such development. Tokyo began to engage in strengthened S&T collaboration and institutional links with India in outer space as an external soft balancing strategy to counter China’s rapid advances and achievements in space programmes.

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Japan’s intensive commitments to the APRSAF was also influenced by the China shadow. China established the APSCO with eight members in 2008, which grew out from the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA) in 1992 (Siddiqi 2010: 132). The APSCO is a formal intergovernmental organisation that has the APSCO Council as the highest decision-making body and five departments that deal with specific policy issues. The organisation has boosted its influence in the Asia-Pacific region by holding the APSCO Development Strategy Forum and adopting the 2015 Beijing Declaration of the Development Strategy Forum in October 2015. The activities of the APSCO have been directed at education and training in space technology and its applications, and extended to the development and launching of satellites that contributed to the shared interests of the members (Siddiqi 2010: 132–33). China clearly regards the APSCO as a vehicle for regional leadership mainly through programmes for technology transfer to other members including Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Peru, and these members view the organisation as a means of acquiring space know-how and technology (Moltz 2016: 128–29). The presence of the APSCO raised Japan’s anxiety about the eclipse of leadership in space development in Asia. Japan sought to revitalise the APRSAF by adding practical space development programmes to its activities. In 2009, MEXT and JAXA proposed the Satellite Technology for the Asian Pacific Region (STAR) programme, which aimed to produce, launch, and operate small satellites called Micro-STAR and EO-STAR through joint collaboration from participating agencies. This programme implied a crucial change in the forum’s activities as it introduced S&T plans that accompanied concrete technology transfer (Suzuki 2011: 225). Moreover, Japan gradually incorporated diplomatic flavour in the APRSAF, a platform for dialogue and cooperation among civilian engineers and project managers. At the APRSAF-22 in December 2015, for instance, an official of the Japanese foreign ministry introduced diplomatic and security elements in Japan’s space policy (Hoshiyama 2016: 220). Indeed, the APRSAF and APSCO share at least two similarities: both institutions go back to the early 1990s and have pursued a broad cooperative and peaceful vision in the region. However, the two institutions have not held little intersection for space collaboration in Asia (Pekkanen 2019). The APRSAF’s regional influence is still larger than the APSCO largely because of differences in membership. The former

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brought together 384 participants from 29 countries and regions and nine international organisations at the 2018 meeting,6 while the latter had only eight member countries in 2018. However, China has the potential of expanding the membership and activities of the APSCO by linking to the BRI Spatial Information Corridor, which offers member countries access to Chinese space services as part of a larger investment in domestic infrastructure (Smart 2019: 62). Given the potential of China’s growing regional presence through the APSCO, Japan has committed to the development of the APRSAF as inter-institutional balancing by intensifying programmes for technology transfer and diplomatic inputs.

Evolving Policymaking Structures for Outer Space A critical juncture in Japan’s space policy in the 2000s was the adoption of the Law in 2008, which converted the basic objective of Japan’s space policy from the sole focus on peaceful science and research to mixtures with defence technology development. The Law, which aimed ‘to comprehensively and systematically promote measures with regard to space development and use’ (Article 1), made great contributions to enhance the authority and power of the Cabinet in national space policy. The Law stipulates the establishment of the SHNSP as the primary decision-making body for space policy and a ministerial post for handling space affairs. The new policymaking structure aimed at expanding the use of the space system by involving not only MEXT but also other ministries in the policymaking process (Suzuki 2015a: 53). In particular, the SHNSP in the Cabinet reduced MEXT’s authority for formulating national space policy and gained the power to plan and discuss it from a comprehensive standpoint including scientific, economic, or national security aspects (Wakimoto 2019: 3). During the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, the policymaking system for space policy was revised reflecting the spirit of the Law. In June 2012, the Diet passed the Law on Partial Revision of the Law of Establishment of the Cabinet Office, which achieved two important reforms in the making of space policy. First, the CNSP was newly established as an advisory body within the Cabinet Office. With the establishment of the CNSP, the Space Activities Commission under MEXT was abolished. The holding of an advisory committee for space policy passed to the Cabinet Office, and MEXT became one of the ministries responsible for implementing scientific missions that were stipulated in the basic

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plan and the implementation plan (Wakimoto 2019: 10). Second, the ONSP was created within the Cabinet Office as a commanding body for a whole of space policy as well as the secretariat of the CNSP. The ONSP drafts plans for space programmes and communicates budgetary prioritisation to relevant ministries, and report to the prime minister (Anan 2013: 212; Nagai et al. 2017: 2). This means that the ONSP became to wrest the control of space planning from MEXT, which has controlled more than half of Japan’s annual budget for space policy through its oversight of JAXA. Furthermore, the scope of JAXA’s activity changed through the amendment of the Law Concerning JAXA in 2012. According to the amended Article 4 of the law, the activity changed from ‘limited to peaceful purposes’, which was understood as “non-military” in the Japanese context, to ‘based on the basic principles of peaceful uses of space’, which allows to offer necessary technical support to achieve Japan’s overall space policy objectives including defence-related ones (Igata 2016: 20; Nagai et al. 2017: 2). As for jurisdiction over JAXA, MEXT remained the sole competent ministry that can manage matters relating to executives and employees, finance and accounting, and other administrative management (Anan 2013: 214). However, the prime minister as the chief of the Cabinet Office as well as the ministers of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) became competent ministers who have the authority to plan and determine JAXA’s programmes, strategies, and budget that were related to their administrative fields (Fig. 6.1). Another crucial administrative reform regarding space policy appeared in April 2016 under the Abe administration. At the 9th meeting of the SHNSP in January 2015 where the third Basic Plan was adopted, Prime Minister Abe contended that the new plan constituted a historical milestone as the guiding principle for the coming ten-year space policy. Abe instructed the prompt development of working mechanisms to implement the plan steadily by strengthening the function of a chief command of space policy. According to the 2016 reform, bureaucratic bodies regarding space policy were reorganised. The two bureaucratic bodies that dealt with space policy—the Secretariat of National Space Policy within the Cabinet Secretariat and the ONSP within the Cabinet Office—merged into the National Space Policy Secretariat (NSPS) under the Cabinet Office. While this integration was realised as a part of slimming tasks

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Fig. 6.1 The policymaking structure for outer space policy (Source Made by the author from documents issued by the Cabinet Office)

managed by the Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretariat, it contributed to efficient policymaking by removing the duplication of financial and human resources regarding space policy and directly connecting the SHNSP and CNSP. Moreover, the status of the Basic Plan on Space Policy elevated. After this change, the basic plan, which was previously adopted as a decision of the SHNSP, became a cabinet decision. The third Basic Plan on Space Policy was adopted as a decision of the SHNSP in January 2015, and then was adopted as a cabinet decision in April 2016. This change means that the status of the basic plan became higher as a national policy, which is confirmed as the will of the whole cabinet, and its implementation is guaranteed under cabinet responsibility. Japan’s space policymaking structure has been complex involving various ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, MOD and MIC, in addition to MEXT.7 Under such conditions, the Cabinet Office, which holds the NSPS, the secretariat of the SHNSP and CNSP,

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has raised its function as a commanding body to formulate strategic goals for the whole of national space policy and coordinate policy implementation by various ministries. The growing presence of the Cabinet Office in national space policy reflected on the allocation of the national budget. The share of the Cabinet Office in the total space budget increased from 3.8 percent (¥11.2 billion) in 2012 to 9.1 percent (¥27.2 billion) in 2019 while that of MEXT declined from 58.3 percent (¥173.9 billion) to 51.3 percent (¥152.7 billion) in the same period (Table 6.1). One of the most critical features in space policy under the Abe administration was the reframing of space policy in terms of national security. The policy development indicated the growing importance of outer space for Japan’s national security and the government has implemented practical measures to enhance space capabilities including collaboration between JAXA and MOD/SDF. This reframing of space policy was initiated by the enactment of the Basic Space Law in 2008, which changed the interpretation of ‘exclusively peaceful purpose’ from ‘non-military’ to ‘non-aggressive’ or ‘non-offensive’, and allowed MOD to hold greater scope and flexibility to develop, own, and operate satellites for military purposes (Pace 2015: 339; Suzuki 2015b: 403). Importantly, the deepening and substantiation of the reframing were realised under Prime Minister Abe’s explicit leadership. At the 8th meeting of the SHNSP in September 2014, Abe instructed the formulation of a new basic plan, referring to rapid changes in diplomatic and security environments surrounding Japan. It was unusual that the prime minister instructed the formation of a new basic plan on space policy Table 6.1 The ministerial allocation of space-related budget, 2012 and 2019 (billion yen: %) Ministries Cabinet Secretariat Cabinet Office MEXT MOD MLIT Others Total

2012 63.0 11.2 173.9 28.8 9.6 11.5 298.0

2019 21.1 3.8 58.3 9.7 3.2 3.9 100

62.1 27.2 152.7 34.8 5.5 15.2 297.5

20.9 9.1 51.3 11.7 1.8 5.2 100

Source Compiled by the author from data at the Cabinet Office, Space-Related Budget (Available at: https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/budget/yosan.html)

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within two years from the formulation of the previous plan. In addition, it is the same cabinet—the second Abe cabinet—as the time of the previous second Basic Plan, and the members of the CNSP were the same. Accordingly, there was a critical view that the basis for formulating a new basic plan is unclear (Suzuki 2015a: 56). When the second Abe administration began in December 2012, deliberations on the second Basic Plan was ongoing, and its direction did not necessarily reflect Abe’s preferences for strategic connections to national security. In fact, Abe had issued a special instruction in January 2013 that in implementing the second Basic Plan, it should take into account close links to security policy, in accordance with the revision of the National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond.8 Quickly after the start of the second administration, Abe intended to increase national security elements in outer space policy. The third Basic Plan, which was released in January 2015, reflected Abe’s preferences for integrating space policy into the overall national security. Indeed, the previous two basic plans formulated in 2009 and 2013 indicated the sign of change that the government was moving towards the use of space for national security, but were short of going into great detail (Hashimoto 2015: 68). The third Basic Plan completely changed the overall tone in connections between space policy and national security. The plan begins with a reference to the importance of security in the development and utilisation of space, and stresses the need to actively use space on the basis of the National Security Strategy (NSS), which prioritises space as a strategic domain and commits Japan to directly folding space policy into a subset of national defence policy (Kallender and Hughes 2019: 189). The plan points out the need to appropriately examine a future framework for space development and utilisation, given the unique characteristic of Japan’s space development and utilisation to date of not having actively utilised space for security purposes (Fukushima and Hashimoto 2016: 30). The plan is also mindful of raising the competitiveness of the Japanese space equipment industry, which is indispensable for ensuring independent space activities, aiming to elevate the scale of the industry to ¥5 trillion over the next decade. In external relations, the plan stipulates areas for Japan–U.S. cooperation in terms of space security such as satellite positioning, SSA, space-based MDA, remote sensing data policy, and so on. The Abe administration’s reframing of space policy also had an impact on two policy issues. The first is the composition of the CNSP. In May 2018, Abe appointed Oriki Ry¯oichi, a former Chief of the SDF’s Joint

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Staff, as one of the nine members of the CNSP. This was the first time that a former SDF executive was selected as a member of the committee. The appointment of Oriki had a significant implication because he was one of the key members that had been involved in the formation of a series of new security policies under the Abe administration. Oriki was a member of the Advisory Council on the Establishment of a National Security Council and the Advisory Panel on National Security and Defence Capabilities, and assumed the post of an advisor to the defence minister and an advisor to the National Security Secretariat. He gave support to the Abe administration’s defence policy with a belief that the administration’s proactive pacifism is the right policy direction (Oriki 2015: 211). Oriki’s appointment was crucial for integrating the Abe administration’s long-term ideas for defence strategy into outer space policy. The second is a new idea in defence strategy. Abe, at a graduation ceremony of the National Defence Academy of Japan in March 2018, stated that ‘Maintaining advantages in new domains such as cyber space and outer space is now a matter of vital importance for the defence of Japan. We are unable to protect Japan from the range of threats if we are thinking only through the conventional lens of the ground, maritime, and air defence categories’ (Abe 2018). Abe repeated the same statement at the first meeting of the Advisory Panel on Security and Defence Capabilities in August 2018.9 The statement reflects an idea of ‘multi-domain defence force’, which ‘organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies’ (Satake and Maeda 2019: 225). The National Defence Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond and the Medium Term Defence Program FY2019–FY2023, which were released in December 2018, reflected Abe’s thrust of multi-domain defence force. These documents raise ‘acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains’ as the first in priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations. The SDF was required to improve various capabilities that leverage the space domain including information gathering, communications and positioning capabilities, and work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies including JAXA and with the U.S. The above analysis demonstrates Prime Minister Abe’s contribution to the reframing of space policy in terms of national security. The leverage of space policy from national security was triggered by the enactment

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of the Law in 2008. Abe substantiated this reframing by initiating the revision of the basic plan on space policy and sending a security-oriented specialist to the CNSP. Abe also indicated a new direction of defence strategy that considers space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum in an integrated manner.

Commitments to Norm Formation in Outer Space A critical aspect of Japan’s outer space diplomacy is its commitment to the formation of international norms through collaboration with the UN.10 Japan has made human resource contributions to UN agencies regarding space. While Doi Takao, an astronaut of JAXA, served as chief of the Space Applications Section in the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs in 2009–2016, Horikawa Yasushi, technical counsellor of JAXA, assumed the chair of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 2012–2013.11 Furthermore, Aoki Setsuko, a professor of Keio University, became the chair of the Legal Subcommittee of the COPUOS in 2020–2021, after serving as the chair of the Working Group on the Review of International Mechanisms for Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space under the Legal Subcommittee in 2014–2017. In addition to human resource contributions, Japan has given support to the UN’s efforts to advance normative frameworks for managing outer space. The Japanese government has submitted documents to the COPUOS and its two subcommittees, the Legal Subcommittee and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, in which it stressed the importance of international norms in outer space to ensure the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities. More concretely, the government submitted, in April 2016, a compendium of responses to the questionnaire under the agenda item ‘General exchange of information on non-legally binding United Nations instruments on outer space’ at the 55th session of the Legal Subcommittee. The compendium was expected to be a useful reference to other nations and agencies in implementing the UN instruments.12 In particular, Japan has striven to realise the adoption of the guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. In 2010, the COPUOS set up a working group within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee to deliberate on the creation of voluntary guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities. In June 2018, the working

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group ended its operation by setting up 28 guidelines, but the members were unable to reach an accord on 7 out of the 28 guidelines. During the 62nd session in June 2019, the COPUOS formally adopted the preamble and 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. The members also agreed on the establishment of a five-year working group under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee so as to discuss reports on the voluntary implementation of the guidelines and support for the implementation, and explore the possibility of setting up new guidelines (Aoki 2019: 20–21). The adoption of the guidelines had significant implications that the members could overcome differences in views and interests in the growing importance of outer space for national security, reaching an accord on international norms after nine-year deliberations. Japan made efforts to realise the smooth adoption of the guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. After the working group ended its operation in June 2018, Japan took the lead in forming an alliance with other like-minded countries to encourage COPUOS members to implement the 21 guidelines. Japan, in collaboration with the U.S., Canada, and France, made a joint proposal to set up a working group on the implementation of agreed guidelines and related aspects of the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Furthermore, Japan has striven to promote international norms regarding space debris. The Joint Communiqué issued at the Group of Seven (G7) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Dinard, France in April 2019 contained a phrase that ‘given the increasing importance of Space to global prosperity and our security, … we encourage the recognition and development of norms of behaviour, as well as cooperation for addressing the issue of space debris’.13 This inclusion was realised by Japan’s initiative (MOFA 2019b: 5). During the 62nd session of the COPUOS in June 2019, Japan made a technical presentation regarding the removal of space debris and organised a reception with the theme of space debris. Japan has made contributions to the formation of international norms regarding space debris from a scientific standpoint. JAXA proposed technical guidelines for debris mitigation through the activities on the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), an intergovernmental forum to coordinate worldwide activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space. This proposal was based on the advantage that JAXA has accumulated through long-term research programmes on space debris mitigation technologies and measures. In

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fact, the agency established a research team for space debris comprehensive measures, which deliberated on the formulation of international standards and guidelines as well as undertook research on technologies for debris mitigation, low-cost active debris removal, and debris situational ¯ awareness and defence (Onishi 2017). Japan under the Abe administration strengthened its commitments to the realisation of the rule of law in outer space in advancing space policy. The NSS stipulates that Japan involves itself ‘in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace’, participates proactively in efforts to formulate an international code of conduct that aims to prevent experiments of ASAT weapons and avoid collision of satellites, and consequently strives to ensure safe and stable use of outer space (Cabinet Secretariat 2013: 29). The third Basic Plan, by taking into account stress on the rule of law in the NSS, provides concrete policy directions by setting up a section entitled ‘Realisation and reinforcement of the rule of law in outer space’ as one of the three strategies in promoting space diplomacy (Cabinet Office 2016: 25). The policy directions covered the establishment of international rules, particularly through the formulation of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), and contributions to discussions in international conferences in order to play the greatest possible role in the creation of rules by the international community.14 Japan has made efforts to diffuse the importance of international rules and norms in outer space at various international forums. This activity was particularly salient at the G7 meetings in 2016 when Japan assumed the chair. In the Joint Communiqué issued at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hiroshima in April 2016, the section on ‘Space’ was established for the first time, in which the ministers were committed to ‘increasing transparency in space activities, and to strengthening norms of responsible behaviour for all outer space activities’.15 Moreover, the ministers confirmed, in the G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the importance of the observation of international norms in outer space, by reiterating the need to evolve and implement principles of responsible behaviour for all outer space activities so as ‘to strengthen a rules-based outer space environment that enhances its safety, security, sustainability and stability’.16 Japan has also striven to diffuse the importance of international rules and norms in outer space at regional forums. At the second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Space Security Workshop in October 2014,

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Nakayama Yasuhide, a state minister for foreign affairs, raised the creation of international rules as the first of Japan’s space diplomacy, aiming to develop international rules that provide a common understanding to deal with increasing space debris and actions that may cause instability in outer space (Hoshiyama 2016: 217–20). The annual meeting of the APRSAF also became a place to express Japan’s involvement in the creation of international norms. The representatives of the foreign ministry have expressed, at the plenary session, Japan’s willingness to promote the formation of international norms in outer space, which is integral for safe, stable, and sustainable space activities. The Japanese government sought to advance the awareness-raising of international norms in outer space through capacity building in developing countries. In December 2016, the government formulated the Outline of Basic Objectives for Capacity Building with Regard to Developing Countries in the Space Field. One of the objectives of supporting capacity building is to realise and strengthen the rule of law in outer space through fostering and increasing human resources who are familiar with space policy, space law, and space-related technologies. The government has attempted to take advantage of multiple financial resources including official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOFs) to strengthen international space cooperation including the realisation of the rule of law in outer space. While ODA funds have been used for the ASEAN disaster prevention network programme and technical cooperation on the provision of earth observation data using satellites, soft support in the form of the provision of expertise and knowledge as well as human resource development has been still limited such as dispatch of a senior advisor in the satellite positioning system to Thailand and the formulation of the process sheet for space infrastructure in ASEAN (MOFA 2016). Japan’s commitments to the rule of law and international norms in outer space had two objectives. The first is to assist the establishment of global governance in outer space. This aspect is revealed in the fact that Japan has conducted activities for supporting UN agencies through human resource contributions and assistance to the creation of normative frameworks such as the guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities. Moreover, Japan has forged close connections to European nations in advancing global governance in outer space. Indeed, the U.S. has been a key partner to promote the rule of law in outer space and voluntary best practice guidelines, which have been confirmed

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at the annual meetings of the Japan–U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space. In addition to the U.S., Japan has forged close connections with European nations, organising the Japan–EU space dialogue since 2014 and the Japan–France space dialogue since 2016. The international rulemaking in outer space has been one of the key agendas for the dialogues. Given the European nations’ high profile in norm formation, Japan has promoted collaboration with them in order to underpin the creation of global governance in outer space. The second is to encourage China to undertake international normoriented space activities. China’s test to destruct a satellite by an ASAT weapon in 2007 shocked many countries including Japan. Two weeks after the test, Prime Minister Abe charged, at the House of Councillors plenary session, Beijing’s action as conflicting with the international legal frameworks including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Tsuno 2007).17 After this incident, European nations raised their willingness to introduce international norms, which led to the adoption of the ICoC in 2008 and Japan has shared this concern and positively sustained the EU’s activities to create and advance international norms. Given that China has consolidated its status as a space great power with growing space capabilities, it became crucial to urge Beijing to undertake a series of space programmes by observing international norms. The phrase in the third Basic Plan, ‘to boost the transparency of space operations and work to foster mutual trust in order to avoid unexpected situations due to misunderstanding or miscalculation’, presupposes China’s space development programmes (Cabinet Office 2016: 25).

Conclusion The main objective of this chapter was to elucidate the formation and evolution of Japan’s space policy and analyse its implications for Japan’s external policy and relations. The analysis is undertaken from three angles: the influence of geopolitical consideration, evolving configurations in the making of space policy, and commitments to ideational elements relating to outer space. A major milestone in Japan’s space policy was the enactment of the Basic Space Law in 2008, which incorporated security consideration in space policy, shifting from a long-honoured S&T orientation. Under the Law, the Japanese government set up the SHNSP, an independent decision-making body for national space policy, and formulated

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the basic plan on space policy. After the adoption of the third Basic Plan on Space Policy in 2015, the Abe administration implemented various space programmes such as the launch of positioning and defence communications satellites and the strength of the SSA system as well as tighter connections between JAXA and MOD/SDF in undertaking these programmes. Moreover, Japan has cultivated closer partnerships with the U.S. and India by developing institutional frameworks and conducting practical exercises and joint research programmes, and strengthened commitments to the APRSAF, Japan-initiated regional institution for space cooperation. Japan’s space programmes gradually took into account the shadow of China, which achieved rapid improvement in space capabilities in the 2010s. The development of the satellite and SSA systems and tighter links between JAXA and MOD/SDF could be interpreted as attempts of internal hard balancing as they partly aimed to raise resilience for protecting satellites and other space assets in response to the rapid development of China’s space capabilities. In a similar vein, Japan promoted partnerships with the U.S. and India in the space domain as external hard and soft balancing in the face of China’s growing space capabilities. The stronger support for the APRSAF also had balancing nature as China has developed its own international organisation for space cooperation, the APSCO. In the making of space policy, MEXT assumed a special status as it had the sole jurisdiction over JAXA. However, the Cabinet Office has gradually raised its presence as the CNSP has activated its operations and its secretariat, the NSPS, began to coordinate the overall space policy. In this process, Prime Minister Abe instructed the reframing of space policy in terms of national security. The third Basic Plan had a stronger security orientation, making a reference to the NSS and environing the strength of the space equipment industry and a partnership with the U.S. in space security. Abe also raised a security orientation in space policy formation by appointing a former SDF executive as a member of the CNSP. Unlike other empirical cases examined in this study, Japan did not push forward a specific idea or a set of rules in outer space. Instead, it has assisted the creation and diffusion of international norms for managing outer space. For this objective, Japan has made personnel contributions to UN agencies dealing with outer space. Moreover, Japan’s assistant role was clearly shown in support of the adoption of the guidelines for the

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long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Japan also took advantage of its chair position in the G7 forum in order to raise the importance of the observation of international norms in outer space.

Notes 1. In 2003, the NASDA, ISAS and National Aerospace Laboratory of Japan (NAL) were merged into the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). 2. The ATLA was established in October 2015 with some 1800 personnel in order to integrate the MOD and SDF’s equipment-related divisions and to oversee the development, procurement, and export of new weapons systems under centralised decision-making in close coordination with the Kantei (Sakaki and Maslow 2020: 10–11). 3. The transition of the JSpOC to the CSpOC in July 2018 aimed at strengthening the partnership between the U.S. and its allies in safeguarding the space domain. 4. Full Text of White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016, the State Council, the People’s Republic of China. Available at: http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_2 81475527159496.htm [accessed November 3, 2018]. 5. The National Space Council was established in 1988 under the Reagan administration and suspended its activity in 1993. 6. APRSAF-25, Overview. Available at: https://www.aprsaf.org/annual_mee tings/aprsaf25/overview.php [accessed August 12, 2019]. 7. In 2012, MOFA established a new policy unit, the Space Policy Division, within the Foreign Policy Bureau in order to promote space diplomacy and international space cooperation. 8. Naikaku Sori Daijin Shiji Jiko (Uchu Kihon Keikaku) [Prime Minister’s Instructions (Basic Space Plan)], January 25, 2013. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/discource/20130125siji_uchu. html [accessed August 12, 2019]. 9. Advisory Panel on Security and Defense Capabilities, August 29, 2018. Available at: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201808/_ 00043.html [accessed August 19, 2019]. 10. For overall information about Japan’s space diplomacy including its commitments to the UN, see MOFA’s website on space: https://www. mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/space/index.html. 11. The COPUOS was established by the General Assembly in 1959 in order to govern the exploration and use of space for peace, security, and development in the benefit of the people in the world. The committee has two subsidiary bodies: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee, both of which were set up in 1961.

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12. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee 58th Session, Agenda Item 3—‘General Exchange of Views’. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000465352.pdf [accessed September 4, 2019]. 13. Foreign Ministers Communiqué, Dinard, France, April 6, 2019. Available at: http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/g7_-_foreign_ministers_com munique.pdf [accessed October 12, 2019]. 14. The ICoC is a soft law adopted at the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council in December 2008. It is intended to cover both civil and military space activities and includes clauses regarding: minimising the possibility of accidents, collisions or other harmful interference; refraining from intentional destruction of space objects to mitigate the creation of space debris; and notifying the risks of collisions including the operation plan, change of orbit, or re-entry. 15. G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, April 10–11, 2016, Hiroshima, Japan, Joint Communiqué. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/ 000147440.pdf [accessed October 12, 2019]. 16. G7 Statement on Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Hiroshima, April 11, 2016. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000147 442.pdf [accessed October 12, 2019]. 17. The treaty bans the use of weapons of mass destruction in space, and China ratified it in 1983.

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¯ Onishi, Mitsuru. 2017. Sup¯esu Deburi S¯ og¯ o Taisaku Kenky¯ u Ch¯ımu ni tsuite [Research Team for Space Debris Comprehensive Measures]. Available at: https://repository.exst.jaxa.jp/dspace/bitstream/a-is/613704/1/ AA1630052009.pdf. Accessed 29 Sept 2019. ¯ Onishi, Yukito. 2017. Gaik¯o to Sens¯ o no tame no ODA: Kaihatsu Ky¯ oryoku no Mondai-ten [ODA for Diplomacy and War: Problems in Development Cooperation]. Ronsetsu Minshushugi-teki Shakai Shugi 12. Oriki, Ry¯ oichi. 2015. Kuni o Mamoru Sekinin [Responsibility for Protecting the Country]. Tokyo: PhP Kenky¯ ujo. Pace, Scott. 2015. U.S.–Japan Space Security Cooperation. In Handbook of Space Security Policies, Applications and Programs, ed. Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al., 337– 354. New York: Springer. Pekkanen, Saadia M. 2019. Japan, China, and Governing Space Prospects for Competition and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Paper Prepared for the Annual Convention of the Japan Association of International Relations, October 18–20, Niigata, Japan. ———. 2020. Japan’s Space Power. Asia Policy 27 (2): 27–33. Pence, Mike. 2017. Remarks by the Vice President at a Meeting of the National Space Council, October 5. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/bri efings-statements/remarks-vice-president-meeting-national-space-council/. Accessed 24 July 2019. Pollpeter, Kevin. 2020. China’s Space Program: Making China Strong, Rich, and Respected. Asia Policy 27 (2): 12–18. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. 2018a. The Global Space Race, 2.0. The Washington Post, February 13. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/13/space-race/. Accessed 5 Apr 2019. ———. 2018b. A New Space Race in Asia. East Asia Forum, May 18. Available at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/18/a-new-space-race-in-asia/. Accessed 25 May 2019. Sakaki, Alexandra, and Sebastian Maslow. 2020. Japan’s New Arms Export Policies: Strategic Aspirations and Domestic Constraints. Australian Journal of International Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1781789. Satake, Tomohiko, and Yuji Maeda. 2019. Japan: New National Defense Program Guidelines. In East Asian Strategic Review 2019, ed. National Institute for Defence Studies, 206–232. Tokyo: NIDS. Siddiqi, Asif A. 2010. Asia in Orbit: Asian Cooperation in Space. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 11: 131–139. Smart, Benjamin T. 2019. Asian State Responses to China’s Space Power Strategy, Thesis Submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Available at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/ 62802/19Jun_Smart_Benjamin.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 13 June 2019.

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Suzuki, Kazuto. 2011. Uch¯ u Kaihatsu to Kokusai Seiji [Space Development and International Politics]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. ———. 2015a. Nihon no Anzen Hosh¯o, Uch¯ u Riy¯ o no Kakudai to Nichibei D¯ omei [Japanese Security: Expansion of Space Utilization and Japan–U.S. Alliance]. In Gur¯ obaru Komonzu (Saib¯ a K¯ ukan, Uch¯ u, Hokkyoku-kai) ni okeru Nichibei D¯ omei no Atarashii Kadai [New Challenges of the U.S.– Japan Alliance at Global Commons (Cyber Space, Space, Arctic Ocean)], ed. Japan Institute of International Affairs, 51–60. Tokyo: JIIA. Available at: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/resarch/H26_Global_Commons/10-Rising_ Challenges_for_the_Japan-US_Alliance_in_the_Global_Commons_h26.pdf. Accessed 12 Apr 2019. ———. 2015b. Space Security in Japan. In Handbook of Space Security Policies, Applications and Programs, ed. Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al., 397–412. New York: Springer. ———. 2017. A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the U.S.–Japan Alliance and Deterrence in Outer Space. In The US–Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains, ed. Scott W. Harold et al., 91–104. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. ———. 2018. A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US Alliance in Sino-US Escalation Management. In Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation, ed. Nicholas Wright, 44–48. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. Tronchetti, Fabio, and Hao Liu. 2018. The Trump Administration and Outer Space: Promoting US Leadership or Heading Towards Isolation? Australian Journal of International Affairs 72 (5): 418–432. Tsuno, Yoshikazu. 2007. Abe Shush¯o, Ch¯ ugoku no Jinko Eisei Hakai Jikken ni Kenen wo Hy¯ omei [Prime Minister Abe Expresses Concern About Chinese Satellite Destruction Experiment]. AFP BB News, January 31. Available at: https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/2175226. Accessed 29 Oct 2019. Uchikura, Hiroaki. 2018. MOD’s SSA Project: Initiatives Taken by Koku-Jieitai. Available at: http://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source= web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiX9aTWnK3oAhWSQN4KHT D0ANMQFjACegQIARAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jsforum.or.jp%2Fstab leuse%2F2018%2Fpdf%2Fuchikura%2520.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2WTN9BDdS 05tC9QhJIPmeV. Accessed 28 July 2019. Wakimoto, Takuya. 2019. A Guide to Japan’s Space Policy Formulation: Structures, Roles and Strategies of Ministries and Agencies for Space. Issues & Insights Working Pater 19, WP3. Wall, Mike. 2019. Trump Signs Directive to Create a Military Space Force. Space Com, February 21. Available at: https://www.space.com/president-trumpspace-force-directive.html. Accessed 24 July 2019.

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Xiong, Jing, and Fei Han. 2019. Positioning Performance Analysis on Combined GPS/BDS Precise Point Positioning. Geodesy and Geodynamics 11 (1): 78–83. Yamashita, Ryuichi. 2019. Japan to Station Officers at U.S. Base as Part of Space Strategy. Asahi Shimbun, June 5. Available at: http://www.asahi.com/ajw/ articles/AJ201906050060.html. Accessed 16 Dec 2019.

CHAPTER 7

The Reformulation of Foreign Aid in Development Cooperation

Japan has a long history of an aid donor. It became the first non-western donor through the offering of official development assistance (ODA) in 1954 by joining the Colombo Plan to assist developing countries in Asia. Since then, Japan has been a dominant player in providing foreign aid by combining its own experiences of successful economic growth and industrial development. Japan’s ODA coupled with investment by private actors underpinned industrial growth and infrastructure development in the region. As foreign aid assumed a growing position as Japan’s diplomatic tool, its policy orientation gradually evolved. In 1992, the Japanese government made clear its foreign aid philosophy by formulating the first ODA Charter. Such a policy initiative continued in the new millennium by formulating a revised charter in 2003. While the two charters exhibited slight evolutions in reference to benefits to Japan and strategic value, the basic character was the same. The Abe administration added important changes to objectives and methods in Japan’s external aid strategy by reformulating the foreign aid policy as the development cooperation policy in the new Development Cooperation Charter in 2015. In addition to the change of the name, this charter contained new policy orientations that departed from the past foreign aid policy. The new policy orientations are influenced by the administration’s keen interest in using development

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cooperation funds strategically in response to significant evolutions in international environments. This chapter seeks to examine Japan’s development cooperation policy under the Abe administration and elucidate major features in the formation and implementation of the policy. The following section introduces the adoption of the Development Cooperation Charter in February 2015 and concrete policies to materialise the charter. It then analyses how the prime ministerial executive influenced the formulation of the charter, seeking new inputs to attain strategic purposes. In the third section, it investigates geopolitical objectives the government has pursued through the development cooperation policy. The fourth section explores the presence and implications of key ideas that were embedded in the charter.

The 2015 Development Cooperation Charter and Relevant Policies Since the provision of the first ODA in 1954, Japan has made significant foreign aid contributions to assist the economic and social development of developing countries. In the 1990s, it gained the title of ‘an ODA great power’ by assuming the primary position of ODA donor for ten years from 1991. However, Japan’s ODA budget declined after reaching a peak of ¥1.17 trillion in 1997. The ODA budget in 2019 was ¥557 billion, less than half of the peak, and its position declined to the fifth among the members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Despite such a marked decline, Japan’s ODA still has significant implications as development assistance has been regarded as ‘one of Japan’s major instruments of its post-World War II foreign policy—indeed, perhaps the most important’ due to the restriction of military activities under the peace constitution (Tanaka 2016: xvii). The basic document that summarises the objectives, basic policies and priorities, as well as implementation principles/arrangements of Japan’s foreign aid policy is the ODA Charter. The government endorsed the first ODA Charter in 1992 in order to gain a broad understanding of its foreign aid policy at home and abroad and implement foreign aid programmes more effectively. The revised version of the charter was released in 2003, which put emphasis on humanitarian principles and working on global issues in an interdependent world as an objective of foreign aid policy (Takayanagi 2014: 247).

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The Abe administration re-examined foreign aid policy with the formulation of a new charter. On March 28, 2014, Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio proclaimed the necessity of reviewing and revising the 2003 ODA Charter. On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) set up an Advisory Panel of Experts on Reviewing the Official Development Assistance Charter, which was comprised of eight members from academia, business circles, and a non-governmental organisation (NGO). After holding four meetings, the advisory panel submitted a report on the revision of the ODA charter in June 2014. In accordance with discussions at the advisory panel, the government held opinion exchange meetings in four cities through May to September, and requested for online public comments on the draft of the new charter. Furthermore, the government organised public hearings on the draft at four cities. These processes were important for increasing the understanding of and support for development assistance among the public that had not necessarily been very supportive of ODA (Söderberg 2017: 9). In February 2015, the Abe administration approved the Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter. The title of the charter changed from the previous ‘Official Development Assistance’ to ‘Development Cooperation’.1 The change to the Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) derived from various factors. First, the change aimed to grasp development cooperation broadly encompassing various activities for peacebuilding and governance, as well as basic human rights and humanitarian assistance, involving diverse actors from UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to private actors, local governments, and NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs). Second, the change intended to intensify collaboration with other funding such as other official flows (OOFs) and private funding. This reflects the increase of non-ODA funds for the development of developing countries and a willingness to make use of aid money as a catalyst in collecting private funds. Third, the change aimed at facilitating expansion in the scope of recipients for Japan’s development assistance. Previously, the government offered ODA only to countries that were defined by the OECD-DAC as eligible countries whose gross national income per capita was less than US$12,745. The change enabled the government to provide aid funds for the so-called ‘ODA graduates’ when they were confronted with vulnerability due to climate change or natural disasters. Since funds for the ODA graduates were not ODA in terms of the OECD-DAC standard, it was appropriate to use a broad notion of development cooperation for the

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new charter. Fourth, the change intended to raise autonomous nature in development assistance that would make greater contributions as a diplomatic tool for Japan. Kojima Seiji, a former senior official of MOFA, explains the intension of the change as follows: ‘Japan sets the scope of “development cooperation” from its own perspective of carrying out cooperation that is considered necessary for Japan, without being bound by the international definition of ODA, not performing cooperation that is unnecessary’ (Kojima 2016). In addition to the change of the title, the new charter contains several distinctive features. First, it explicitly showed a stance to take advantage of development cooperation strategically to ensure national interests. The inclusion of the term, national interests, into the charter became an agenda for intensive discussions during the process of formulating the 2003 ODA Charter, failing to reach a consensus (Hirano 2015). The charter eventually defines ‘the objectives of Japan’s ODA’ as contribution ‘to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity’, not using the term, national interests (MOFA 2003: 1). The DCC stresses the need ‘to fully recognize that development cooperation is one of the most important tools of Japan’s foreign policy’, and uses national interests in a phrase that ‘a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community is increasingly intertwined with the national interests of Japan’ (MOFA 2015: 2, 9). It further stipulates the substance of national interests such as maintaining Japan’s peace and security, achieving further prosperity, realising a stable, transparent and predictable international environment, and maintaining an international order based on universal values. Second, the new charter opened a chance to give support to foreign armed forces. The 1992 ODA Charter raises ‘any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided’ as one of the four principles for ODA implementation (MOFA 1992), and the 2003 ODA Charter maintains this principle. The principle explicitly prohibited the use of ODA funds for any military purposes on the basis of the peace norm of the Japanese Constitution. While the DCC maintains the principle of avoiding ‘any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts’, it contains a phrase that ‘in case the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light

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of their substantive relevance’ (MOFA 2015: 10–11). This phrase implies that Japan will provide aid funds for foreign armed forces that engage in non-military activities such as disaster relief and those related to people’s lives. The revision was a positive response to the panel report’s world-view that ‘in modern times, military activities in the non-combat field are also spreading, and support for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster relief purposes should not be excluded uniformly because of military involvement’ (MOFA 2014: 6). Third, the DCC puts stress on development cooperation through partnerships with non-governmental actors. The new charter confirms, in the preamble, that ‘various actors including the private sector, local governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in global activities’ (MOFA 2015: 1). It then raises ‘partnerships with the civil society’ and ‘public-private partnerships and partnerships with local governments’ as two of the five pillars for ‘strengthening partnerships’ for the development of developing countries. The portion of ‘strengthening partnerships’ accounts for more than 60 percent of the section of ‘Implementation Arrangements’. The 2003 ODA Charter also presupposes collaboration with NGOs, universities, local governments, and economic and labour organisations. Yet, this collaboration was referred to simply in just one sentence as one of six pillars for the system of formulation and implementation of ODA policy. On the basis of the DCC, the Japanese government has implemented various policies for development cooperation. As the case in the previous charters, it has implemented programmes for addressing global issues and promoting human security. The programmes regarding global issues have covered policy fields such as environment and climate change, disaster risk reduction, resources and energy, as well as food security, and nutrition. The programmes concerning human security focus on health, safe water and sanitation, women’s empowerment, education, and so on. The scope of policy support extends from the formulation of a national strategy and planning of a recipient government to the implementation plan of individual projects. The DCC presupposes two additional areas for development cooperation. First, the government has extended support for realising a peaceful and secure society and sharing universal values. The policies in this category are directed towards developing judicial and legal systems, governance and peacebuilding, and capacity building of law enforcement authorities and government officials. As for the development of judicial

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and legal systems, the Abe administration formulates the revised basic policy regarding support for the development of judicial and legal systems in May 2013. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Ministry of Justice have dispatched legal experts to and accepted trainees from developing countries. In the legal system in Vietnam, for instance, Civil Law, the basic law of private law, as well as Corporate Law and Investment Law, the basic laws of industry, were enacted on the basis of Japanese experts’ drafts (Sugita 2017: 5–6). The second is related to policies to achieve poverty eradication through ‘quality growth’.2 The programmes aim to establish the foundation and driving forces for steady economic growth, through support for the development of industrial infrastructure and industries, as well as the level-up of science, innovation and research including information and communications technology (ICT). In order to prop up quality growth, it is crucial to expand the availability of reliable human resources in developing countries. Japan has engaged in human resource development and education in general, and the fostering of human resources with resilience in developing countries in a way that Japan’s human resources have learned about through crises and disasters (King 2016: 21). A representative example of such commitments is the Innovative Asia Project, in which the government provided opportunities for study and internship in Japan for some 1000 students in top-level universities in Asian developing countries over five years from 2017. Furthermore, quality growth is sustained by the development of economic and social infrastructure, and support for the development was incorporated into a particular concept of ‘quality infrastructure’. As already explained in Chapter 4, the Japanese government began to make renewed commitments to quality infrastructure after 2015, and aid funds have been used for developing infrastructure with safety, resilience, sustainability, and economic efficiency. One of the crucial features of Japanese development cooperation is stress on technical cooperation, which consists of technical and vocational training and higher education in Japan and the dispatch of Japanese experts and volunteers to development field sites for the purpose of hitozukuri (the cultivation of people) (Yamada 2013: 79–80). The JICA has conducted training programmes in partnership with a wide range of government agencies, NGOs and universities through coordination by its 15 domestic offices. The hitozukuri commitments as a part of Japan’s soft power contribute, to a large extent, to developing human resources and

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local institutions of recipient countries and to raising Japan’s image to undertake humanitarian-based support. Importantly, connections between ODA and the Ministry of Defence (MOD)/ Self-Defence Force (SDF) have gradually become prominent. The National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, which was issued in December 2013, stipulated that capacity building assistance would be promoted in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including ODA.3 Collaboration between ODA and SDF is seen in undertaking concrete projects for development cooperation. For instance, SDF used materials procured through the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security project scheme in order to develop a 1.7 kilometre community road and a ditch for drainage in the Na Bari district of Juba, the capital of South Sudan, based on instructions from the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).4 Moreover, the partnership between ODA and SDF was seen in a multilateral exercise called Cobra Gold. In this collaboration, five SDF staff offered medical services and health consultations to rural residents in Thailand. In collaboration with this activity, MOFA provided three primary schools with health facilities with beds and drug shelves by using the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security project scheme (MOD 2014: 277). Despite the emergence of concrete examples of collaboration between ODA and MOD/SDF, the promotion of such collaboration is still challenging largely because the government adheres to a basic rule to demarcate civilian to civilian assistance through ODA and military to military assistance in the form of capacity building through MOD/SDF (Kiba and Yasutomi 2016: 109–10). Lastly, it is necessary to take into account links with the U.S. in Japan’s development cooperation policy. While the DCC makes no reference to the U.S., it presupposes Japan’s specific role in burden sharing with the U.S.: Washington takes military responsibility in wars, whereas Tokyo would thereafter assist in peacebuilding by providing ODA. In the 2000s, such a division of labour was typically seen in Japan’s commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan as it became a main donor for both countries by providing huge funds for peacebuilding and anti-terrorism activities (Söderberg 2018: 312). The DCC envisions Tokyo’s proactive role for peacebuilding, which can be understood partly in harmonisation with Washington’s strategies such as to ‘the U.S. pivot to Asia’ or ‘rebalancing of burdens in Asia’. In this regard, stress on assistance to non-military activities and peacebuilding enabled Japan to escape pressure from the

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U.S. to play a proactive security role that includes a direct military combat role (Sugita 2017: 98–99). In addition to the broad context of Japan–U.S. partnership, Japan has confirmed cooperation with Washington in capacity building for third countries. The April 2012 Joint Statement of the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee, the so-called 2 + 2 meeting, contained a phrase that ‘the Government of Japan, for its part, plans to take various measures to promote safety in the region, including strategic use of official development assistance, for example through providing coastal states with patrol boats’.5 In line with this joint statement, Prime Minister Abe expressed a plan to Philippine President Benigno Aquino to offer ten coast guard patrol ships through a yen loan during his visit to Manila in July 2013.6 The joint statement of the committee in April 2015 also refers to collaboration on capacity building in Southeast Asia through the provision of coastal patrol vessels.7 The U.S. government decided to provide Vietnam with 18 patrol boats in May 2016, followed by the Japanese government’s decision to offer six patrol vessels to Vietnam in January 2017. Given that the U.S. government intensified military links with the Philippines and Vietnam, the statements at the 2 + 2 meeting encouraged Japan to sustain cooperation in maritime security in pursuit of the division of role. The ‘patrol boat diplomacy’, which constitutes a major part of strategic ODA for Japan, played a valuable role in enhancing the maritime capacity of the Philippines and Vietnam.

Major Features in the Formulation of the New Charter As already explained, the revision of the ODA charter was initiated by Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, who proclaimed the revision in March 2014 at the Japan Journalist Club. Kishida, whose election district is in Hiroshima, has strong interests in the foreign aid policy, a peaceful diplomatic means. Importantly, Kishida has maintained a special connection with Prime Minister Abe as they have forged close links beyond differences in faction and political philosophy since they became a Diet member in the same year of 1993. Kishida joined the first Abe administration in 2006–2007 as the minister of state for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs and has kept key positions since Abe’s return to power in December 2012. In organising the second cabinet, Abe appointed Kishida as the Minister of Foreign Affairs despite no experiences in foreign affairs,

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and made him keep this post until August 2017 when he was transferred to the chairman of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Kishida’s brilliant career undoubtedly reflected Abe’s deep trust in him and a strategic calculation to mitigate the hawkish and conservative image of his administration by employing Kishida, the leader of the K¯ ochikai, the LDP’s mainstream faction that is broadly known as its dovish and liberal character. ODA has been a crucial policy issue for MOFA. Although MOFA is one of the key government agencies to deal with external policy and relations, its presence within the government is not necessarily prominent in terms of the budget, just accounting for 3 percent of the total national budget. ODA has been a key policy area for MOFA, covering more than 60 percent of the ministry’s total budget. As the Japanese government has incurred huge fiscal deficits, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) reduced the ODA budget, which became halved from ¥1.17 trillion in 1997, the peak year, to ¥542 billion in 2015 (Fig. 7.1). MOFA has taken advantage of the Abe administration’s interest in employing foreign aid as a crucial instrument to advance strategic diplomacy, and the declining trend in the ODA budget discontinued in 2015, keeping the level of ¥550 billion in 2016–2019.

Fig. 7.1 The trend of the general account ODA budget (1985–2019) (Source Made by the author from data at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ODA Budget [Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/yosan.html])

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The above explanation indicates that MOFA has kept the grip on foreign aid and development cooperation and its minister took the initiative in reformulating the ODA charter. Unlike the case in other policy fields examined in this study, the Kantei’s direct influence was not obvious in the making of development cooperation policy. However, the Kantei exerted an influence through indirect means to reflect its policy orientations by making development cooperation policy linked to pre-existing strategic visions. The Kantei’s policy orientation was seen in relation to a connection between foreign aid and economic growth. The Japan Revitalisation Strategy (JRS), which was adopted as a cabinet decision in 2013, suggests the implementation of strategic ODA on the basis of three pillars: assistance to international deployment in the economic field; the establishment of a favourable international environment; and the promotion of human security. It then stresses the need ‘to provide Japan’s outstanding technologies and know-how for developing countries and revitalize the Japanese economy’ (PMOJ 2013: 132). As concrete means, it encourages the government to use ODA for economic objectives such as the expansion of infrastructure systems, support for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the securing of natural resources. The connection between economic growth and ODA was confirmed through the expansion of infrastructure systems, which was positioned in the JRS as a crucial means to expand global outreach in the growth strategy, the third pillar of Abenomics, to stimulate private sector investment. As explained in Chapter 4, the Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy within the Cabinet Secretariat approved the first Infrastructure Export Strategy in May 2013. The strategy stipulates that in supporting infrastructure development in emerging countries, it is possible to achieve a win-win composition that balances the economic development of the partner country with the advance of Japanese companies by making maximum use of ODA and support from public financial institutions. The link between economic growth and development cooperation is explicitly spelled out in the DCC. The charter spells out the link between Asia’s growth potential and Japan’s economic growth as follows: Asia has developed into an important market and investment destination for Japanese private companies, and therefore, an extremely important region for the Japanese economy…. the government will promote development cooperation… in order to support the economic development

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of developing countries more vigorously and effectively and to enable such development to lead to the robust growth of the Japanese economy. (MOFA 2015: 12–13)

The DCC also stipulates that ‘Japan’s development cooperation will seek to serve as a catalyst for expanding economic activities, while utilising excellent technology and expertise, and ample funds of the private sector for addressing the challenges faced by developing countries’ (MOFA 2015: 13). These passages indicate that development cooperation should be directed at sustaining the robust growth of the Japanese economy and making use of the private sector’s advanced technologies and know-how. The DCC surely incorporates policy directions to employ foreign aid for the sake of diffusing excellent technologies and know-how possessed by Japanese companies and thereby prop up the growth strategy of the Abe administration. Another policy orientation is a connection between foreign aid and ‘proactive contribution to peace’. The proactive contribution to peace aimed primarily to enhance Japan’s vigorous role in the international community and thereby improve its presence and prestige in the world, and at the same time embrace a more presence of Japan’s defence forces. The National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly refers to the strategic use of ODA in terms of proactive contribution to peace: Japan has garnered high recognition by the international community, by its proactive contribution to global development in the world through utilizing ODA. Addressing development issues contributes to the enhancement of the global security environment, and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts as part of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ based on the principle of international cooperation. (Cabinet Secretariat 2013: 32)

Several parts of the DCC reflects the spirit of proactive contribution to peace. The major part is the provision of ‘seamless assistance for peacebuilding from conflict prevention, emergency humanitarian assistance in the conflict situation, and promotion of conflict termination to emergency humanitarian assistance and assistance for recovery, reconstruction, and development in the post-conflict stage’ (MOFA 2015: 6). The DCC also opened a chance to give support to foreign armed forces that undertake non-military activities such as public welfare or disaster relief purposes. This opening, which is based on contributing to peace and prosperity

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through cooperation for non-military purposes, is also the reflection of proactive pacifism (Dan 2016: 52). Significantly, the reflection of policy orientations embedded in the JRS and NSS on the DCC was skilfully manipulated in its formulation process. Even before starting formal discussions on the formulation of a new charter, MOFA took note of connections to economic growth and proactive contribution to peace as the premise of discussions. In March 2014, MOFA’s International Cooperation Bureau published a document entitled ‘the Revision of the ODA Charter’, which referred to the active and strategic use of ODA specified in the JRS and NSS as the first of the four background factors to be required for the revision of the ODA charter. This document was released exactly the same timing when Foreign Minister Kishida proclaimed the revision of the ODA charter. While Kishida did not mention the JRS and NSS in his speech, the document explicitly showed the direction of the revision by referring to the two strategic documents that the Abe Kantei had formulated. This indication in MOFA’s document was peculiar as a politician of the Social Democratic Party asked, at the Special Committee Regarding ODA of the House of Councillors in April 2015, the reason why MOFA’s document referred to the JRS and NSS as the background for the formulation of a ¯ Masaaki, who joined the advisory panel of experts new charter.8 Ohashi as one of eight members, recalled that the members were told, at the first meeting, that the new charter would have to be consistent with, if not ¯ subordinate to, the NSS and JRS adopted by the Abe cabinet (Ohashi 2016: 340). The report that the advisory panel submitted in June 2014 surely took note of policy directions indicated in the JRS and NSS, and ¯ the DCC was formulated on the basis of the panel report (Onishi 2017: 6). The Kantei’s policy orientations were incorporated into the DCC as MOFA and the advisory panel took into account the JRS and NSS, the two upper-level policy documents that the Kantei had already formulated. As Söderberg (2017: 9) correctly points out, new inputs in the DCC in connection to economic growth and proactive contribution to peace should ‘be understood in relation to both the changes in Japan’s external environment and the strong power of the current Abe Administration, which adopted the NSS and ran on a political platform to restore economic growth in Japan – “Abenomics”’. The Kantei’s reform spirit was shown in the form of defining the direction of reform in development assistance in terms of key fundamental tenets: the growth strategy of Abenomics in the economy and proactive contribution to peace in security.

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The incorporation of proactive contribution to peace into development cooperation policy implied the reframing of foreign aid in terms of national security. For a long time, the connection between ODA and national security had been considered among Japanese policy circles. For instance, the 1994 report of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues, the so-called Higuchi Report, stressed that: We would like to emphasize that the civilian sector of peacekeeping operations and the construction of peace following the settlement of conflicts are important fields of international cooperation for security. In these fields, Japan should be able to make particularly significant contributions. At the government level, official development assistance (ODA) policy, for example, should be positively utilized.9

However, the 2003 ODA Charter did not step into the connection between ODA and national security. The Abe administration reached a new stage in the securitisation of Japanese ODA in an overall policy trend to strengthen a security-oriented external policy. A senior official of the foreign ministry locates the DCC as ‘the third arrow’, following the allowance of the exercise of collective self-defence and the abolishment of the three principles of arms export, in foreign and security policy of the Abe administration (Asahi Shimbun 2015). Hence, the formulation of the DCC ‘should be understood as a well-calculated political manoeuvre aimed to harmonise aid policy with the newly adopted national security strategy’ (Furuoka 2016). Prime Minister Abe sought to achieve the substantial reflection of national security and proactive contribution to peace on development cooperation policy through the purposeful management of personnel. Among government-affiliated organisations, the JICA has assumed the dominant position in Japan’s development cooperation. The agency had implemented technical cooperation since its establishment in August 1974, and became a comprehensive aid institution in October 2008 by taking over yen loans from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and most of the grant aid dispersed by MOFA. Abe appointed Kitaoka Shin’ichi, a prominent political scientist, as the new chief of the JICA in October 2015, eight months after the adoption of the DCC. Kitaoka was one of the key academicians who led the creation of the NSS and the reflection of proactive contribution to peace in Japan’s security

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policy (Matsuoka 2020). Kitaoka assumed an acting chair of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security and a chair of the Advisory Panel on National Security and Defence Capabilities. While the former panel was originally set up in May 2007 during the first Abe administration in order to discuss issues surrounding Japan’s right to collective self-defence, which was considered impossible according to the conventional interpretation of the constitution, the latter was established in September 2013 with the purpose of contributing to the formulation of the NSS and the new National Defence Program Guidelines (Kitaoka 2014). Abe’s appointment of Kitaoka as the JICA chief reflects his desire to promote proactive contribution to peace through concrete policies in development cooperation. Kitaoka states, in his inaugural speech as the JICA president, that ‘By fulfilling my duty as JICA chief, I would like to make surefooted progress in “proactive contribution to peace”, a policy crafted by the Cabinet. I was among those involved in formulating that policy’ (Yomiuri Shimbun 2015b). Kitaoka surely recognised Abe’s expectation on him to lead the JICA’s policies and programmes in the form of serving proactive contribution to peace.

China’s Complicated Influence in Japan’s Development Cooperation As China has accumulated economic power with steady growth, it emerged as a crucial foreign aid donor. Kitano (2019) provides an estimate of disbursements of China’s foreign aid. According to his analysis, China’s net foreign aid showed a steady increase from US$0.7 billion in 2001 to US$5.0 billion in 2012. The amount decreased slightly from US$5.2 billion in 2013 to US$4.9 billion in 2014, and rose sharply to US$6.0 billion in 2015 and maintained a high level in 2016–2018. The significant increase in 2015 was attributable to contributions to paidin capital for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Kitano 2019: 1). In comparison with other OECD-DAC members, China is positioned as the seventh, next to Turkey, which is much lower than expected (Kitano 2018: 5). China has increased the offer of development finance to other countries in the form of OOF, which was not taken into account in Kitano’s net foreign aid amount. The AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, one of the most reliable publicly available sources, provides data on China’s foreign aid including OOF.10 The data regarding the U.S. and Chinese foreign aid in 2000–2014 indicate

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that the number of countries that received more aid funds from China than the U.S. accounted for 65 out of the 116 countries targeted, and 25 out of the 65 countries received more funds from China than the combined OECD-DAC members. The 25 countries included Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Angola, with which China forged strategic relations in terms of maritime security and energy security (Miura 2018: 19–22). China has provided foreign aid in various forms in addition to bilateral arrangements. It has offered funds for development cooperation through regional institutions such as the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (Kitano 2018: 13–14). When the First LMC Leaders’ Meeting was held in Sanya, China in March 2016, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed setting up a 10 billion yuan (US$1.54 billion) concessional loan and a US$10 billion credit line in order to support infrastructure and production capacity cooperation in countries along the LancangMekong (Li 2016). Furthermore, China has offered development funds under the banner of its flagship diplomatic vision: the BRI. The Chinese government has provided various funds for infrastructure development and human resource development through its financial institutions such as the Silk Road Fund, AIIB, Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), and China Development Bank. One Chinese media source reports that in 2015 the China Exim Bank alone funded more than 1000 BRI projects in 49 countries, covering transport, electricity, resources, telecommunications, and industrial parks (Global Times 2016). China’s commitment to development cooperation is sustained by its government’s willingness to deliver distinctive development experiences as a model, which would be an alternative to the western one. The western model is based on an institutional approach in which economic development is achieved through the vitalisation of trade and investment, and such vitalisation is sustained by the institutional guarantee of trade and investment liberalisation. This approach is underpinned by economic liberalism that economic growth is realised through an effective function of the market mechanism with the removal of customs and regulations that impede the free flow of trade and investment (Enomoto 2017: 9). The Chinese model puts stress on economic growth through the creation of demand, which is sustained by the state’s purposeful involvement. The model reflects China’s own development experience in the form of

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‘state capitalism’, in which the central government maintains a strong grip to manage the development of the economy and industry (Kurlantzick 2016). The Chinese government hopes to present a distinctive model for and a new approach to development cooperation. The Chinese model is based on the pragmatic thinking that produces practical outcomes that propel further cooperation among countries involved. The government also pursues a win-win approach in a more equitable way, not just pursuing market liberalisation that would impose serious burdens on developing countries. The new formats are particularly important for protecting and advancing the interests of developing countries that are deemed to be the victims of unjust, undemocratic, and unequal international policies and actions taken by developed countries (Swaine 2016: 3). The Chinese formats enable developing countries to select their own development strategies according to domestic political and social conditions, and the creation of sustainable industries and businesses is a more effective way of uprooting poverty rather than social programmes stressed in the western model. Japan’s new orientation in development cooperation policy had much to do with China’s growing presence in development cooperation. In particular, Japan’s redefinition of foreign aid policy to serve its national interests derived largely from consideration to evolving geostrategic environments in the wake of the rise of China (Jain 2016). Under the new policy in relation to ODA graduates, the Japanese government planned to offer funds for development cooperation to Caribbean countries such as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In January 2015, China organised the first ministerial meeting of the CELAC in Beijing and promised to establish a US$30 billion special fund for its industrial cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. In response to China’s commitments, Japan sought to offer development cooperation to lure the Caribbean countries to its side. Japan hoped to keep close ties with the countries with an expectation of their support for becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. A senior official of MOFA states that ‘the Caribbean Community holds a total of 14 ballots in the UN, and the countries have taken concerted actions in many cases. The effect of Japan’s assistance can be very positive’ (Yomiuri Shimbun 2015a). Moreover, Japan hoped to provide funds for countries in the Middle East. Although the Gulf nations such as Oman and the United

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Arab Emirates are rich oil-producing counties, they required Japan’s technological assistance in areas such as energy-saving and garbage disposal (Yomiuri Shimbun 2015a). The support for the countries was crucial for maintaining the stable supply of energy resources and countering China’s growing presence in the region through the provision of development funds under the BRI (Kamel 2018). In addition to countering China’s growing influence in global settings, Japan’s new policy to offer funds to foreign armed forces operating for non-military purposes was influenced by the Chinese shadow in Asia. The key target of this new policy is countries in Southeast Asia where Japan and China have competed for influence and maritime security conflicts are ongoing. Previously, Japan was unable to provide aid funds for these countries flexibly. In 2014, Japan used ODA funds to provide Vietnam with six used vessels and equipment such as lifeboats and radar, which would help to enhance Vietnam’s maritime patrol capabilities. At that time, the ODA provision was problematic because the Marine Police (Coast Guard) was organisationally under the Vietnamese People’s Army. Accordingly, the Japanese government suggested that Vietnam separate the coast guard administration from its military, and its government implemented administrative reforms to make its Marine Police an independent administrative body (Sh¯ oji 2014: 144–45). Moreover, when former military soldiers from Myanmar went to study at the International University of Japan by receiving tuition fees from ODA funds, the Myanmar government had to transfer them to ministries and agencies separately from the army in advance. Under the revised policy, it became possible to provide aid funds directly for military bodies and personnel without going through such procedures. The revisions of the foreign aid charter under the reorientation of development cooperation policy included an element of internal soft balancing to hold out against China’s rising power in development cooperation. Indeed, the concept of soft balancing is generally used for explaining inter-state relations in the security domain. Yet, this concept is also useful to understand a situation in other policy areas where a weaker state exhibits policy responses to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. The revision of the foreign aid charter had a nature of Japan’s strategic trial to protect its own national interests in the face of China’s growing diplomatic presence underpinned by development cooperation. Namely, the Japanese government revised domestic regulatory frameworks in order to provide developing countries with foreign aid

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flexibly to attain specific diplomatic objectives or strategic goals in the growing shadow of China. Stronger partnerships with several ASEAN members through the strategic use of ODA was expected to enhance their maritime patrol capabilities and balance against China’s growing presence in Southeast Asia. This hard-type development cooperation becomes more effective in combination with soft-type cooperation on the training of military personnel and maritime police, which contributed to the deeper recognition of the rule of law and the freedom of navigation and thereby the development of a network of like-minded nations in East Asia (Jain 2016). The balancing factor in relation to Southeast Asia is also relevant to the partnership with the U.S. in development cooperation. As already mentioned, Tokyo began to provide patrol boats as a part of strategic ODA in policy harmonisation with Washington. The patrol vessels are generally used for various objectives from search and rescue operations to transportation and environmental protection. Japan’s patrol boat diplomacy in partnership with the U.S. constitutes a part of joint soft balancing action to assist littoral states in Southeast Asia to build stronger capabilities to control maritime affairs in the South China Sea. In addition to the reorientation in development cooperation policy, the China factor influenced Japan’s recognition of its own approach to development cooperation. Both Japanese and Chinese approaches to development assistance belong to the Asian aid model, which includes South Korea, India, and other Asian countries. The Asian aid model has several distinctive features compared with the western one: nonintervention in internal affairs of recipient countries; stress on synergetic effects of the trinity of aid, trade and investment; the dominance of loans in association with recipients’ self-help; and an emphasis on economic infrastructure and production sectors (Huang 2016; Shimomura 2012; Stallings and Kim 2016; Yamamoto 2020). Despite these similarities in fundamental character, Japan has sought to differentiate its development cooperation approach from the Chinese one by stressing universal values. The DCC explicitly refers to ‘maintaining and protecting an international order based on universal values’ in the section of ‘objectives of development cooperation’. It then stipulates that Japan provides assistance ‘to share universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law’ as the foundation for effective, efficient and stable economic and social activities (MOFA 2015: 3). The use of aid funds for realising universal values was a new input in the DCC.

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The 2003 ODA Charter refers to ‘efforts to foster democratization, and to protect human rights and the dignity of individuals’, but did not grasp such commitments through the concept of universal values (MOFA 2003: 1). The stress on universal values in development cooperation has two distinctive implications. First, the high regard for universal values derives from a long-term policy orientation. The first Abe administration in 2006–2007 pursued ‘value-oriented diplomacy’, a particular type of diplomacy that puts emphasis on universal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. The emphasis on universal values for development cooperation in the DCC inherits this strategic thinking. The Abe administration’s long-term aspiration for universal values transformed into the use of development assistance for sustaining the realisation of universal values, which was shown in the NSS. The NSS raises ‘Strengthening cooperation based on universal values to resolve global issues’ as one of the five strategic approaches, and affirms the need to ‘utilize its ODA in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights’ (Cabinet Secretariat 2013: 31–32). The second implication is related to strategic relations with China. The emphasis on universal values in value-oriented diplomacy was regarded as a part of the Abe administration’s strategy to counter China’s growing regional influence (Black 2017: 162; Hughes 2008). The emphasis on universal values can serve to forge partnerships with like-minded countries that share similar values against China that adopts an authoritarian political system, not being regarded as sharing universal values. The sharing of universal values through assistance to develop legal and judicial systems, good governance, and democratisation is a policy orientation that the Chinese approach to development cooperation does not incorporate. The high regard for universal values can differentiate Japan’s ideational input from China’s material approach that puts emphasis on support for the construction of hard-type infrastructural facilities. The stress on universal values in the DCC could be interpreted as Japan’s strategy of dominance-denial in relation to China. Japan presents a hybrid approach to provide hard- and soft-type assistance for developing countries. The hybrid approach accentuates political ideals of universal values to which the Chinese development cooperation has not paid due attention. This approach contributes to achieving the building of an equitable and stable social foundation through the acceptance and diffusion of universal values, not through development in hard infrastructure

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alone. Japan sought, by showing an alternative approach to development cooperation, to ward off a situation where developing countries are heavily dependent on Chinese funds, being embraced into the Chinese development cooperation model.

Quality Growth as a Key Idea for Development Cooperation Development cooperation through foreign aid is a unique policy area where Japan has presented and diffused specific ideas. The self-help principle and human security are two representatives of such ideas. The self-help in foreign aid policy implies efforts by a recipient country to pursue true development with an independent spirit by promoting development strategies through its own self-reliant efforts. The Japanese government began to put stress on this principle around the period when Japan became the world’s largest donor superseding the U.S. in 1989 (Udagawa 2017: 115). The 1992 ODA Charter proclaims that ‘Japan attaches central importance to the support for the self-help efforts of developing countries towards economic take-off’ (MOFA 1992). The relative position of the principle rose further as the 2003 ODA Charter declares that ‘the most important philosophy of Japan’s ODA is to support the self-help efforts of developing countries’ (MOFA 2003: 2). The DCC stipulates that ‘Japan will attach importance to building the foundations of self-help efforts and self-reliant development such as human resources, socio-economic infrastructure, regulations and institutions’ (MOFA 2015: 5). The Japanese government has paid due attention to the human security concept in its diplomacy since Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizo referred to it in a policy speech in Singapore in May 1998 (Fukushima 2007: 40). The human security concept was introduced in Japan’s foreign aid policy as the 2003 ODA Charter raises ‘the perspective of human security’ as one of the five basic policies (MOFA 2003: 2). The DCC succeeds the policy orientation to stress human security as raising ‘promoting human security’ as one of the three basic policies to define the direction for development cooperation, stating that human security is ‘the guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan’s development cooperation’ (MOFA 2015: 4). In addition to the traditional ideas of self-help and human security, the DCC presents a new idea for development cooperation. A key revision in the DCC is that ‘quality growth’ was listed as the top of the

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priority issues (Hirota 2016: 1). The quality growth does not aim just at raising economic figures such as gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita but attaining inclusive impacts that benefit as many people as possible in an environmentally and socially sustainable manner (Solís et al. 2015: 9). The quality growth also pays attention to resilience that makes the society withstand and recover from economic crises, natural disasters, and other shocks. The DCC stipulates that ‘in order to resolve the poverty issue in a sustainable manner, it is essential to achieve economic growth through human resources development, infrastructure development and establishment of regulations and institutions as well as the growth of the private sector’ (MOFA 2015: 5). It then contends that such economic growth should be ‘quality growth’. This passage, which puts growth ahead of poverty reduction, was an important departure from the previous charters that raised both poverty reduction and continuous growth as priority issues in parallel (Sakata 2015: 27). The importance of quality growth was originally stressed in the report that the advisory panel submitted in June 2014. The panel report accentuates the diversification, complexity and broadening of development problems to be recognised in the international society in a critical transition stage. It then raises inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience as three keywords to be the compass for Japan’s new development cooperation in response to the development problems (MOFA 2014: 7). The idea of quality growth has significant implications as it incorporates inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience as the guidelines to tackle challenges in development in the evolving international society. The DCC succeeds the stress of three elements—inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience—for quality growth from the advisory panel report. The DCC explains the content of quality growth from the three elements as follows: Such growth is inclusive in that the fruits of growth are shared within society as a whole, leaving no one behind. It is sustainable over generations in terms of consideration to, among other aspects, harmony with the environment, sustained socioeconomic growth, and addressing global warming. And it is resilient, able to withstand and recover from economic crises, natural disasters and other shocks. (MOFA 2015: 5)

The concrete policy issues raised in the DCC are linked to the three elements: inclusiveness in disparity reduction, the empowerment of

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women, and good governance; sustainability in environmental issues and climate change; and resilience in disaster risk reduction. The concept of quality growth was not necessarily invented by Japan. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) took note of the importance of quality growth in development. During the APEC Growth Strategy High-Level Policy Round Table in August 2010, ministers confirmed five components to pursue high-quality growth: balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and secure.11 At the 23rd APEC summit in November 2015, the APEC Strategy for Strengthening Quality Growth was announced as an annex to the Summit Declaration. Thus, quality growth was considered as an idea for a specific type of growth to be pursued through the APEC framework. The uniqueness of Japan’s quality growth lies in redefining the concept in the new evolutions of development problems, and this point was stressed in the advisory panel report with a phrase, ‘diversification, complexity and broadening’ (Hirota 2016: 3). Japan has pushed forward the self-help principle because it is linked to its own development experiences. Japan understood, through its own experiences, the suffering of adapting itself to the western way of thinking, the difficulty of keeping self-initiative beyond such suffering, and the weight of self-initiative that resulted from the difficulty (Takahashi 2011: 176–77). From such an understanding, it considered that assistance to self-motivated efforts by developing countries should be a key component of Japan’s development support (Udagawa 2017: 115). Like the case of the self-help principle, the idea of quality growth is connected to Japan’s own experiences and expertise in socio-economic development. It achieved relatively equal economic growth, diffusing fruits from persistent growth to the broad segment of the society. Japan also overcame environmental problems that occurred in the development process, accumulated environmentally friendly technologies, and developed effective institutions to manage environmental issues. Moreover, policy and social responses to frequent attacks by natural disasters enhanced resilience against natural calamities. The Japanese government sought to diffuse such experiences, lessens and expertise learned in the process of economic and social reconstructions by employing the concept of quality growth. At the same time, the idea of quality growth has a strategic objective. The idea aims at bridging the western aid approach and the Asian one (Yamaguchi 2016: 6). The Asian approach is reflected in the perception of the need for infrastructure development and the growth of the private

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sector as the base for economic growth, while the western approach is shown in the necessity of promoting people-centred development that supports basic human life (MOFA 2015: 5–6). The presentation of the integrated model of these two approaches contributes to accentuating the value of Japanese development cooperation compared with the Chinese. The quality growth puts stress on ‘inclusive’ whereby fruits from economic growth are shared within the society as a whole, leaving no one behind, and ‘sustainable’ in terms of consideration to harmony with the environment and sustained socio-economic conditions. These elements are still weak in the Chinese approach to development cooperation. As the term ‘quality’ indicates, quality growth has similar implications for quality infrastructure, which the Japanese government employed in order to accentuate the values of Japanese infrastructure investment in contrast to the Chinese. Japan sought to diffuse the idea of quality growth through partnership with UN agencies. Prime Minister Abe proclaimed, in a speech at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015, that ‘Japan will first pursue various initiatives to achieve “quality growth”, by which we specifically mean inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth for all, and thereby to end poverty’ (Abe 2015). The value of the quality growth concept was endorsed by UN organisations. For instance, the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) confirms, in its report on the UNIDO-Japan cooperation, that the principle of quality growth resonates with the organisation’s mandate of inclusive and sustainable industrial development (ISID) (UNIDO 2016). Given that the UNIDO’s influence is broadly acknowledged as the only UN specialised agency mandated to promote industrialisation and foster industrial cooperation in developing countries, the agency’s reference to harmony between the ISID and quality growth help Japan to diffuse the idea of quality growth to the international community. Japan has diffused the idea of quality growth through several multilateral meetings. The Joint Statement of the 8th Mekong-Japan summit in September 2016 contains a phrase that ‘the Leader of Japan strongly commended own efforts made by the Mekong countries and stressed its continued assistance in order to promote further development and “quality growth” of the region as a whole’.12 This phrase was important in showing Japan’s explicit methods of development cooperation that is linked to the promotion of quality infrastructure investment. The joint statement of the 9th Mekong-Japan summit in November 2017 also

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refers to quality growth in a passage that leaders of the Mekong countries ‘noted with satisfaction that Japan’s efforts for realising “quality growth” and narrowing development gap have made significant contributions to the region’.13 Japan has stressed the importance of quality growth in development cooperation towards Africa. The Japanese government has regarded ‘quality growth —inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience—’ and ‘human security —capacity building focusing on each individual in Africa—’ as two major approaches to guide Japan–Africa relations.14 More concretely, the idea of quality growth was presented at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. The quality growth became a core theme of the 5th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V) in June 2013. In the Yokohama Declaration 2013: Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa, the leaders of Japan and Africa confirmed that quality growth would be achieved through concerted actions in the promotion of ‘robust and sustainable economy’, ‘inclusive and resilient society’ and ‘peace and stability’.15 The Nairobi Declaration issued at the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in August 2016 also emphasises the value of quality growth that is relevant to a wide range of fields including not only in the high value-added industry but also in areas such as food security, health, climate change, social stability, and security challenges. The Mekong region and Africa are two representative regions where Japan and China compete over influence on development cooperation by developing individual institutions through which the two states formulate various programmes to provide support for development (Hirono 2019; Kraisoraphong 2017).16 The fact that Japan has presented the idea of quality growth in multilateral institutions formed with the countries in the Mekong region and Africa implies the strategic position of quality growth as a normative idea for differentiating its own approach to development cooperation from the Chinese. The idea of quality growth accentuates weak elements in China’s development cooperation, and Chinese leaders began to take into account such elements. At a keynote speech of the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that ‘Building high-quality, sustainable, risk-resistant, reasonably priced, and inclusive infrastructure will help countries to fully utilise their resource endowments’, adding that the massive infrastructure and trade plan would deliver ‘high-quality’ growth for all (Goh and Cadell 2019). Given the growing concern about debt problems in association with

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the BRI, the Chinese leaders recognised the need to appeal the initiative’s validity to sustain the sound development of recipient countries and focused on quality growth as a useful roadmap. As already explained, Japan and China have similarities in fundamental character in development cooperation. While it is still uncertain what new elements will be added to China’s development cooperation under the banner of highquality growth, Xi Jinping’s reference to this concept implies that the idea of quality growth is likely to constitute a new addition to such similarities.

Conclusion This chapter investigated major policies and characteristics of Japan’s development cooperation policy during the Abe administration. In particular, it paid attention to the Development Cooperation Charter that the Abe administration formulated in 2015 and its distinctive characteristics as the guidelines for Japan’s foreign aid and development cooperation. The new charter represents a strong strategic orientation that the administration has pursued by putting national interests in the text and allowing the offer of development assistance to the ODA graduates and foreign armed forces that engage in non-military activities. Under the new charter, the government has implemented programmes for development cooperation, incorporating the new guidelines of the sharing of universal values and quality growth. Unlike other cases examined in this study, the centralisation of policymaking power and functions in the core government offices was not seen at least in the process of formulating the DCC. However, the Kantei’s policy preferences were incorporated into the new charter as MOFA and the advisory panel took into account, in formulating the new charter, the JRS and NSS, the two fundamental documents that the Kantei had already produced. Moreover, Prime Minister Abe sought to achieve the substantial incorporation of the national security perspective into development cooperation policy by appointing a prominent academician who had sustained the Kantei’s new security initiatives as the head of the JICA. The evolutions of the DCC reflected Japan’s willingness to check China’s growing presence as a new aid donor and its aspiration to develop a new development model. While the new policy of providing aid funds for the ODA graduates facilitated the use of development funds for strategic objectives to enhance Japan’s national prestige and secure energy resources, another new orientation to offer aid funds to

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foreign armed forces operating for non-military purposes contributed to enhancing strategic partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. These new inputs were added as a soft balancing strategy by taking into account China’s growing international presence by using development cooperation funds. Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. took a joint action to sustain the capacity building of littoral states in Southeast Asia, which could be interpreted as a strategy of joint soft balancing against China’s growing presence in the South China Sea. Significantly, Japan sought to differentiate its development cooperation from the Chinese by stressing universal values. This attempt was interpreted as a strategy of dominance-denial in response to China’s aspiration to diffuse its own model for development cooperation. In advancing development cooperation under the new charter, Japan took advantage of distinctive ideas. While Japan asserted the value of long-honoured ideas of self-help and human security, it presented quality growth as a new idea for development cooperation. The concept of quality growth was previously discussed under the APEC framework, but Japan presented it with the three contents of inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience by taking into account new evolutions of development issues. The Japanese government has sought to diffuse the idea of quality growth through the UN frameworks and multilateral institutions formed with the Mekong and African countries. The Chinese leaders presented the importance of high-quality growth, which indicates a resemblance to Japan’s idea of quality growth.

Notes 1. The charter defines development cooperation as ‘international cooperation activities conducted by the government and its affiliated agencies for the main purpose of development in developing regions’ (MOFA 2015: 1). 2. I will explain the content and implications of the idea of quality growth later. 3. National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, December 17, 2013. Available at: http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/ agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf [accessed October 12, 2019]. 4. Minami S¯ udan ni okeru ODA Jigy¯o to Jieitai no Katsud¯o tono Renkei [Cooperation between ODA Projects and Activities of the SDF in South Sudan], February 1, 2013. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ press/release/25/2/0201_03.html [accessed October 18, 2019].

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5. Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, April 27, 2012. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/sec urity/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf [accessed April 25, 2015]. 6. At the inaugural 2 + 2 U.S.–Philippine Ministerial Dialogue in April 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged to double military aid to US$30 million and to provide a second Coast Guard cutter. Additional commitments included U.S. troop rotations and joint training in the Philippines, including expanded joint exercises with the navy (Simon 2012: 52). 7. Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, April 27, 2015. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000078186.pdf [accessed October 18, 2018]. 8. Sangiin Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo to ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai Kaigi-roku Dai 3-go, April 6, 2015 [The Minutes (No. 3) of the Special Committee Regarding ODA, etc. of the House of Councillors]. 9. Report of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues. Available at: ‘The World and Japan’ Database: https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/ texts/JPSC/19940812.O1E.html [accessed November 25, 2019]. 10. Since China is not a member of the OECD and its government has not published detailed data on its foreign aid, a comparison between China and other developed countries is intrinsically difficult. However, AidData’s dataset, which is based on data on media, is one of the most reliable public available data sources on Chinese aid (Oh 2019). The Original is available at: https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance [accessed November 23, 2019]. 11. The APEC Growth Strategy High-Level Policy Round Table towards Higher Quality Growth for APEC. Available at: https://www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/2010/docs/gshlprt.html [accessed July 18, 2018]. 12. Joint Statement of the Eighth Mekong-Japan Summit, 7 September, 2016. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000187094.pdf [accessed March 13, 2019]. 13. Joint Statement of the Ninth Mekong-Japan Summit. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000312900.pdf [accessed March 13, 2019]. 14. Japan in Africa. Available at: https://www.japan.go.jp/japaninafrica/ [accessed October 18, 2017]. 15. Yokohama Declaration 2013: Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa, June 3, 2013. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000 053.html [accessed October 18, 2017]. 16. As already explained, China has developed the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) and the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as institutional frameworks to offer development cooperation to the countries in the Mekong region and Africa, respectively.

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CHAPTER 8

Reflections and Prospects

This research sought to elucidate evolving features in Japan’s diplomacy towards Asia under the Abe Shinz¯ o administration. For this objective, the study examined the development of policies and measures as well as their implications in regional, domestic, and ideational politics. Such examinations were undertaken in five empirical cases, which are related to a conventional and a newly emerging policy field in both international political economy and national security as well as the development cooperation field. The findings in the empirical cases reveal complicated evolutions of Japan’s foreign and security policy towards Asia, which were influenced by its position in regional and international politics, domestic policy formation processes, and the strategic use of rules, standards and principles. This chapter explores implications drawn from the analysis of the five empirical cases in the previous chapters by linking to research questions that were presented in Chapter 2. The analytical frameworks of this research were centred on three variables: power transition at the systemic level, the prime ministerial cohesion at the domestic level, and the use of ideas at the ideational level. In exploring the role and functions of these variables, this study presented three research questions in relation to systemic power transition, domestic policy formation, and the representation of ideational factors. This chapter provides answers to these questions by taking into account major findings in the five empirical cases and exploring their policy meanings from a broader perspective. © The Author(s) 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_8

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Geopolitical Influence in Japan’s Asian Diplomacy The Abe Administration’s Strategic Response In all cases examined in this study, the China factor assumed a crucial position in Japan’s diplomatic strategies towards Asia. Japan sought to avoid a likely risk and a negative impact of China’s growing presence in Asia. For this objective, Tokyo took various strategic choices: the joining in and promotion of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) that was formed by major countries in the Asia-Pacific excluding China; the advocacy of the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) that emphasised different characteristics from Chinese infrastructure investment; the adoption of the new Development Cooperation Charter that accentuated different features in Japan’s foreign aid from the Chinese. In maritime security, Japan strengthened the material capabilities of the Self-Defence Force (SDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to retain the effective control of the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the area of outer space, Tokyo sought to develop an effective space situational awareness (SSA) and strengthened positioning and defence communications satellite systems designed to enhance the capabilities of monitoring Beijing’s space and maritime activities. Indeed, Japan’s strategic portfolio in relation to Asian diplomacy pursued multiple objectives including the maintenance of its own strategic stake and commercial interests, the assurance of political-security links with like-minded countries particularly the U.S., the preservation of a regional order through the provision of regional public goods, and support for global governance formation. However, China’s growing political, military, and economic presence in combination undoubtedly constituted a crucial factor in urging Japan to take specific policies and strategies. They were designed to maintain Japan’s pre-existing position and interests against growing China and prepare for likely military pressure in areas of security tension. China’s growing presence had a significant influence on Japan’s external partnership. Japan has strengthened strategic ties with the U.S. by advancing various policy initiatives examined in this study. This was particularly the case in the ocean and space fields. Japan confirmed the partnership with the U.S. for maintaining maritime order in the defence guidelines and promoted bilateral and trilateral maritime exercises involving India. In the space field, Tokyo promoted the harmonisation

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of satellite systems and joined the SSA exercises with Washington. The partnership with the U.S. was also apparent in development cooperation in the form of joint commitments to capacity building in Southeast Asia and in infrastructure investment in the form of joint programmes to offer funds for infrastructure development. These commitments have been made in the growing presence of China, which regards the U.S. as the rival state in international politics. In the 2010s, India emerged as a new strategic partner for Japan. The strategic partnership advanced in various areas including infrastructure investment, ocean development, and outer space. A key factor that encouraged the Tokyo-New Delhi partnership was the growing shadow of Beijing. The stronger ties in infrastructure investment aimed partly at countering China’s growing presence in South Asia and Africa through the BRI. In relation to security, the geographic position that the two states are located on the opposite side of China makes India an ideal partner for Japan in diffusing Chinese military resources and diplomatic interests from East Asia to South Asia. Certainly, Japan’s tightened partnerships with the U.S., India, Australia, and others indicate China’s vital presence in Japan’s strategic diplomacy. Given that declining economic power relative to Beijing makes it hard to opt for a self-reliant contest, Tokyo is forced to depend on external connections to defend itself more effectively. In this context, the states that adopt the democratic political system became the key target for Japan’s strategic partnership. These states, which share universal values such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, are likely to join a like-minded coalition against China, the one-party authoritarian state. Japan has sustained the development of regional institutions partly to pursue strategic objectives. Japan’s advocacy of the PQI was linked to its support for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) whose empowerment was important as China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) emerged as a crucial multilateral development bank to provide funds for infrastructure development in Asia, a major function that the ADB has performed since its foundation. Japan has developed the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) as a multilateral institution to advance space cooperation in Asia by taking into account the shadow of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO), a multilateral organisation that China established in order to take leadership in space development in Asia. Thus, Japan’s stakes in the ADB and

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APRSAF were influenced by China’s attempts to consolidate its regional presence through multilateral institutions of the AIIB and APSCO. Japan and China had significant competition in the development of regional institutions particularly in East Asia. This was significantly the case in rivalry between the China-supported ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) framework and the Japan-induced East Asia Summit (EAS) framework (Teh 2011). This research confirmed that such rivalry in institution-building is seen in a relatively new field of infrastructure investment and a scientific area of outer space. The rivalry in these areas contributes to making the existing overlapping institution-building in Asia more complicated, enhancing a challenging hurdle for institution-based regional cooperation in the region. Significantly, Japan promoted cooperative dialogues with China in several policy areas. This was the case in trade and infrastructure investment. In the trade field, Prime Minister Abe and his Chinese counterparts affirmed the need to promote collaboration on the early conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and on the maintenance of a liberal international economic order. In infrastructure investment, Japan and China developed joint institutions to promote cooperation on infrastructure investment for third countries as a part of the collaboration for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Even in maritime security, Japan and China developed a maritime and aerial communication mechanism that contained a hotline between defence authorities. The development of cooperative initiatives and mechanisms reflect Japan’s realism to recognise China’s growing power and subsequent regional influence and adopt pragmatic strategies to draw benefits and minimise risks from such a reality. Given China’s growing economic prowess and extended commercial arms, the Japanese business found value in joining China-initiated development projects as a feasible way to strengthen global value chains. The Abe administration, which raised the growth strategy as the third arrow of Abenomics, needed to enhance the partnership with the business group. In the maritime field, Japan recognised the necessity of avoiding an unintended conflict with China that intensified activities in the East China Sea, and thereby searched for an institutionalised system for enhancing mutual trust and managing risky practices.

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The Implications of the Strategic Response The Abe administration’s strategic choices towards China’s growing presence can be interpreted by various concepts regarding the strategic portfolio of a secondary state vis-à-vis a rising power. The large portion of Japan’s reactions can be explained by miscellaneous balancing concepts. Japan’s commitments had hard balancing nature in the ocean and space domains. The enhanced capabilities of the JCG and SDF in preparation for likely maritime incidents and stronger satellite systems for information gathering and positioning can be interpreted as internal hard balancing to defend itself against growing threats from China’s rapid advance in maritime and space capabilities. Moreover, Japan has promoted external hard balancing through joint maritime exercises with the U.S. and India and SSA exercises with Washington. The strategies and actions for external hard balancing were underpinned by the development of formal institutional frameworks with the U.S. and India. The bilateral arrangements and institutionalised dialogues with the two states could be regarded as parts of a soft balancing strategy as long as they are used to check China’s growing power and discuss possible counter-measures to such a power rising. Development cooperation under the Abe administration provides an interesting case for exploring strategic nature in Japan’s Asian diplomacy. Some of the key revisions in the Development Cooperation Charter imply internal soft balancing to change regulative frameworks that serve to counter China’s growing influence through development cooperation. This was typically seen in a change to offer aid funds to foreign armed forces operating for non-military purposes, targeting Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, development cooperation on capacity building with the U.S. was an attempt of joint soft balancing targeting third countries, aiming to help littoral states in Southeast Asia to counter China’s maritime offensive in the South China Sea. Japan’s engagement in regional institutions can be characterised by a balancing concept as well. Japan’s support for the ADB in infrastructure investment and the APRSAF in space cooperation had an element of interinstitutional balancing. These two organisations are positioned as formal institutions to secure Japan’s regional influence in competing against China-initiated counter organisations, the AIIB and APSCO. Indeed, the ADB has committed to joint financing with the AIIB in order to meet huge infrastructure demands in Asia. Yet, Japan sought to prop up the

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ADB’s presence in infrastructure investment through a stronger partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and support for programmes in quality infrastructure. Japan’s commitments to the TPP and the quadrilateral partnership could be regarded as exclusive institutional balancing to develop institutions that did not include China. Japan in partnership with the U.S. sought to balance China’s growing economic presence in the Asia-Pacific by developing a new trade institution that would become a focal point of high-quality trade rules and standards of which China is still short. The quadrilateral partnership among Japan, the U.S., India, and Australia primarily aims to maintain maritime order in response to China’s diplomatic policies and offensive behaviour in various seas from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean. This study confirms two crucial features in Japan’s balancing strategy towards China. The first is its complexity. Japan has adopted complicated forms of balancing against China, which took the form of internal/external, hard/soft, and inter-institutional/exclusive institutional. China has a strong aspiration to acquire the status of a global great power in parallel to the U.S. by increasing economic power, political leverage, and military capabilities. Not only does China have ten times as large as the population compared with Japan, but it also adopts the oneparty authoritarian system, a different political system from a democratic Japan. Moreover, China is the key adversary state for Japan as the two states have been confronted over territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the interpretation of histories, as well as maritime and cyber security. Given complicated difficulties in diplomatic relations with Beijing, Tokyo has been forced to adopt complex forms of balancing strategies. The second is the emergence of a new type of balancing. A crucial factor that urged Japan to strengthen the balancing strategy in the ocean and space domains is a grey-zone threat. China’s advances in the seas tend to take a grey-zone form involving coast guard vessels and fishing boats, and an attack on satellites and other space assets also takes a grey-zone form in a sense that it would be difficult to identify the exact cause of the attack. Accordingly, Japan explores realistic responses to such greyzone contingencies particularly through a partnership with the U.S. The strategic responses, which can be termed as ‘balancing in grey-zone’, are important as grey-zone conditions are likely to be created intentionally by China as a ‘hybrid’ strategy that mobilises military, constabulary, and paramilitary means in a coordinated fashion (Patalano 2018).

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Some of Japan’s diplomatic strategies examined in this study had a hedging feature. Japan began to pursue practical cooperation with China on infrastructure projects for third countries. This cooperation associated with the BRI is characterised as economic pragmatism to maximise economic benefits through the practical cultivation of direct institutional and commercial links. At the same time, Japan has promoted collaboration with the U.S. and India in infrastructure investment through bilateral arrangements and the quadrilateral framework involving Australia. This attempt can be regarded as dominance-denial by developing alternative financial sources for developing countries and minimise the political risks of their subservience on China. Japan sought to avoid the risk of China’s dominance that allows it to exercise political leverage through economic means by creating new routes to provide developing countries with funds for infrastructure development. A strategic attempt at dominance-denial was seen in development cooperation as well. Japan put stress on the realisation of universal values in the Development Cooperation Charter. The stress on universal values in the charter aimed at presenting an alternative hybrid model to provide assistance for hard infrastructure mixed with ideational values, and thereby warding off a situation where developing countries are heavily reliant on China’s hard infrastructure-dominant development cooperation. Japan’s trade policy after the emergence of the Trump administration in the U.S. reflected a complicated hedging feature. Japan indubitably played a pivotal role in producing the successful conclusion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), an extension of the TPP that had a strategic orientation to balance against China’s geo-economic presence. The CPTPP, at the same time, aimed at preparing for the growing uncertainty of protectionism under the Trump administration. Japan became willing to conclude negotiations on the RCEP in collaboration with China as an engagement strategy that minimises a risk associated with the U.S. protectionism and anti-multilateralism. The binding-engagement was also seen in the maritime field. Japan has made efforts to develop a maritime and aerial communication mechanism with China in order to diminish the risk of provoking an unintended incident in maritime affairs by engaging and binding China in institutionalised frameworks for the purpose of creating channels of communication and increasing the status quo tendency in Chinese behaviour. The implications of binding-engagement found in this

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study are different from those assumed in Kuik’s research. Kuik (2008, 2013, 2016) locates binding-engagement in the returns-maximising category as an option to maximise diplomatic benefits by engaging and binding a big power. Japan’s binding-engagement found in this study could be located in the risk-contingency category as an option to engage and bind a great power for the purpose of minimising likely risks in relation to this power or another great power. There is a controversy about whether Japan’s China strategy shifted from balancing to hedging in the face of growing uncertainty and risk associated with major strategic evolutions. While some scholars (Koga 2018; Vidal and Pelegrín 2018) argue that Japan adopted a hedging strategy towards China or pursued a strategic middle course between China and the U.S., others (Liff 2019) contend that Japan continued a balancing strategy with the enhancement of its own indigenous capabilities and strength in alignment with the U.S. and other partners. This study provides a nuanced view on this controversy. The balancing definitely constitutes the key in Japan’s diplomatic strategy towards China by taking miscellaneous forms in a wide range of policy fields from the economy to security. In particular, Japan pursues deeper balancing mechanisms with the U.S. in preparation for likely grey-zone conflicts with China in the ocean and space domains. At the same time, significant evolutions in international climates including the unpredictable U.S. foreign policy and the reality of China’s power expansion represented by the BRI diffusion encourage Japan to incorporate realistic and autonomous policy options. Such options have the nature of hedging against a risk associated with uncertainty in international politics in general and great power rivalries in particular. Thus, the balancing nature is persistent in the security domain by adding a new element of grey-zone, while the hedging feature has intensified in the economic field with the growing unpredictability in great power politics. The Prospect for Japanese Diplomacy in Power Transition Japan’s ratio in the world gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 8.6 percent in 2010 to 5.9 percent in 2018 while China’s GDP rose from 9.2 percent to 15.7 percent in the same period. As Japan’s economic power relative to China’s declined significantly in the 2010s, Japan surely needs reliable partners to balance against China’s growing material power. As this study confirms, Japan’s sole ally, the U.S., is the primary partner

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for balancing. However, the U.S. Obama administration began to retreat from external commitments, and the subsequent Trump administration strengthened inward-looking diplomacy. Under unpredictable diplomatic relations with the U.S., Japan regards India as a crucial partner, pursuing closer ties in the political, security and economic spheres. Since New Delhi has long adopted the non-alignment policy, not forging an alliance with a great power, it is still cautious about a close strategic partnership with Tokyo that forges a security alliance with Washington. Accordingly, how to find a feasible way to pursue closer ties with India by not damaging the Japan-U.S. alliance is a crucial diplomatic challenge for Japan. On this point, the proliferation of partnership coalitions is a possible way. The quadrilateral ‘alliance of democracies’ among Japan, the U.S., India, and Australia is one way and a trilateral partnership between Japan, India and Vietnam is another way. This study demonstrated the importance of the economic-security nexus. The economic-security nexus is seen in Sino-Japanese relations whereby both states intensified preferences for using economic policies and linkages as a means to achieve political-security objectives (Pardo 2017). The economic-security connection here implies that the government willingly employs economic instruments such as trade, investment, foreign aid as crucial tools of diplomatic manipulation for attaining political-security objectives. At the same time, the economic-security nexus is connected to a key assertion of the interdependence theory that increased economic interdependence mitigates political-security tensions (Keohane and Nye 2001). The economic pragmatism that Japan pursued in the infrastructure policy surely incorporates this element. As China is rapidly achieving industrial upgrading particularly through the China Manufacturing 2025, its need for securing Japan’s advanced technologies might decline in the near future. However, Japan’s management of environmental sustainability and social stability with a dwindling and ageing population is likely to offer a useful reference for China where these issues are emerging as crucial policy agendas. The pragmatic approach to gain long-term, mutual benefits through closer tie-ups in searching for feasible solutions to complicated socio-economic challenges might expand the leeway for forging a stable political-security partnership. Japan is now at a historical juncture in relation to a strategic trajectory in great power politics. In the past, the U.S. maintained a hegemonic position in the world, and Tokyo just maintained a strategic alliance with Washington as a junior partner. However, the rise of China and the

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waning of the U.S. surely force Japan to reconsider its strategic relations with these two great powers. On a short-time basis, Japan is required to adopt subtle dual-hedging strategies. In relation to China, Japan needs to pursue deeper socio-economic interdependence, positive engagements in projects towards third countries, and harmonised efforts to develop multilateral institutions in Asia, in addition to the multiple forms of balancing strategy. In relation to the U.S., Japan is required to adopt realistic policy options. Not only does Tokyo pursue strength in the political-security alliance with Washington, but it also seeks to embed the alliance into broader strategic frameworks involving other partners. This is a pragmatic strategy to encourage the U.S. to maintain continuous interests in preserving a regional order as the hub of regional political-security coalitions. On a long-time basis, Japan is required to consider its diplomatic position carefully in the power transition. It is often argued that Japan historically adopted a bandwagoning strategy, which is represented by the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, the Tripartite Pact in 1940, and the U.S.-Japan alliance after 1951 (Tsuchiyama 1997). According to this interpretation, Japan will pursue a bandwagoning strategy to strengthen a formal partnership with China particularly when it reaches the status of the global hegemon (Huntington 1996: 236–37). Nagao (2015) presents a different interpretation of Japan’s past alliance strategies, holding that Japan adopted a strategy of forging a partnership with a distant state in order to counter a threat from a nearby state. According to this interpretation, Japan will continuously maintain a close alliance with the U.S. as the main partner to respond to nearby threats from China. Japan incurs triple difficulties in relation to China: persistent Chinese nationalism associated with the history of a victim of Japanese militarism; the reality of territorial disputes in the East China Sea; and China’s ‘otherness’ in terms of political-economic systems. China will remain the key adversary state that poses strategic challenges including specific security threats, not a target for bandwagoning. Under this scenario, the assuming of the keystone of America’s strategic position in Asia remains Tokyo’s primary diplomatic strategy. The crucial challenge for Japan is how to enhance the resiliency of the Japan-U.S. alliance and extend its relationality with other partners and other alliances.

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Domestic Policymaking in Japan’s Asian Diplomacy The Kantei-Led Policymaking Under the Abe Administration Abe and his executive office consolidated centralised policymaking in Asian diplomacy through several methods in order to bring about desired policy outcomes. In particular, the Kantei-centred policymaking was sustained by Abe’s skilful employment of personnel. Abe employed his close associates proficiently to handle critical diplomatic issues for the administration. As for trade policy, Abe appointed Amari Akira, his close political ally, as the minister of state in charge of TPP issues, and Amari played a decisive role in producing the successful conclusion of negotiations on the TPP. Kawai Katsuyuki, a special advisor for foreign affairs to the prime minister, played an important role in forming trustworthy relations with the U.S. administration. In infrastructure investment, Abe harnessed Izumi Hiroto, a special adviser to the prime minister, and Imai Takaya, chief executive secretary to the prime minister, to promote the export of infrastructure systems and pave the way for participating in China’s infrastructure initiative. Furthermore, Nikai Toshihiro and Kishida Fumio, two of the influential Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) executives, made significant contributions to advance Japan’s new strategies in infrastructure and development cooperation, respectively. Significantly, Abe located key experts in important positions to lead discussions or implement measures in specific policy areas. Abe appointed Kitaoka Shin’ichi, an expert on international politics, as the head of the JICA in order to promote proactive contribution to peace through concrete measures in development cooperation. In the outer space domain, Oriki Ry¯oichi, a former executive of the SDF, was appointed as a member of the Committee on National Space Policy (CNSP), which contributed to delivering strategic viewpoints and security perspectives to the making of space policy. Interestingly, Abe effectively employed dissidents to his policy initiatives in the policy implementation process. In promoting free trade agreement (FTA) policy, Abe appointed prominent norin zoku who had strong connections to agricultural groups to the government and party posts with an expectation that they would play a role in coordinating and mediating delicate relations with the agricultural groups and other norin zoku in the LDP. Given that the Kantei was still unable to impose policies on the LDP over its strong opposition in fields of entrenched vested interests such as agriculture (George Mulgan 2018:

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68), the effective management of the fields through inner-circle members was surely a proficient way to lead complicated policymaking to desired policy outcomes. Prime Minister Abe harnessed his close associates and the right of personnel so as to create favourable climates in promoting difficult policies in a timely manner. Abe employed his entourages for propelling arduous policy issues and initiatives at critical moments, and utilised the right of personnel effectively and flexibly by appointing opponents and experts to key posts to pursue desired policy directions in a pragmatic manner. Indeed, Abe himself did not decide on all the personnel. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide states that he makes the decision on most of the personnel because of the time shortage to consult the prime minister for each personnel, but ask the prime minister’s judgement, reporting to him later about any decisions Suga made himself (Mikuriya 2015: 48– 49). The judicious personnel appointments mixed with Suga’s control of bureaucrats made great contributions to realise Abe’s policy initiatives. Abe and his executive office took the lead in policymaking through the strategic reframing of the existing policy direction. In relation to the promotion of FTAs, policies for agriculture were reframed with a vision of an industrial policy to develop the farm sector as a profitable industry with growth potential through export expansion. The reframing of the existing policy course was apparent in the fields of ocean and outer space. In these policy areas, the Kantei promoted security-oriented policy measures, departing from previous science and technology-led ones. In particular, Prime Minister Abe directly exhibited a security-oriented initiative at the headquarters’ meetings to discuss the formulation of new basic policies. In a similar vein, the foreign aid policy gained a strategic orientation by putting the term, national interests, in the new Development Cooperation Charter and linking foreign aid to proactive contribution to peace. The new charter was also distinctive in locating development cooperation as a means to attain economic growth through the use of Japan’s excellent technologies and know-how. George Mulgan (2018: 1) argues that ‘the Abe prime ministership unequivocally demonstrates the “politics of decision”’, departing from a chronic leadership vacuum or a political leadership deficit, which was common in the cabinets before Abe’s. Abe as a change-maker presented ambitious policy agendas to transform the pre-existing policies and systems across a range of policy areas, and converted key diplomatic policies to new directions. In particular, reflecting Abe’s conservative political

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belief and a strong aspiration to maintain Japan’s tradition and international status, new policy directions were based on a pragmatic calculation to enhance Japan’s national interests in complicated and evolving regional environments. The Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office, the core government offices for the prime ministerial executive, strengthened their authority and functions to formulate and mediate government policies and measures. In promoting policies for the TPP and infrastructure exports, new councils were set up within the Cabinet or Cabinet Secretariat in order to supervise policies and measures covering multiple government agencies. These supra-ministerial organs offered an opportunity where the prime minister or chief cabinet secretary gave direct instructions to other cabinet members who were in charge of implementing concrete measures in individual ministries. In the domains of the ocean and outer space, the Kantei’s overall presence was enhanced through the empowered role and functions of advisory councils whose secretariats are located in the Cabinet Office. The strengthened consultative bodies offered professional views and expertise that were reflected in the basic plans and other policy measures. In several policy areas, the transfer of jurisdiction from individual ministries to the core government offices took place. The Kantei established a new headquarters that deliberated on the future of the agricultural sector in rural areas, which led to the abolition of an organ with a similar function within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). In space policy, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) gradually diminished as the ministry had to share the authority to supervise the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA) management with other ministries particularly the Cabinet Office. The above cases demonstrate the centralisation of policymaking power and functions on the core government offices. The Abe administration often organised new supra-ministerial decision-making bodies in the Cabinet with the Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office serving as the secretariats, and transferred the policymaking authority and functions from individual ministries to the two core government offices. The administration tackled challenging and vital issues by bolstering the Kantei apparatuses as the key magnet for information gathering and as a locus to analyse information through professional knowledge and expertise held by experts. The core government offices, whose authorities were underpinned by the prime minister and chief cabinet secretary, enhanced

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their roles in coordinating and mediating the overall process of policy formation and implementation. The bolstered apparatuses established the policymaking system in which the Kantei first decides the direction that is to be taken and then hands the matter over to individual ministries (George Mulgan 2018: 43). Thus, this research provides the three precise pictures of Kantei-led policymaking: the prime minister and chief cabinet secretary control the management of personnel such as entourages, experts, and opponents; the prime minister shows new policy directions through the strategic reframing of existing policies; and the Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretariat realise the centralisation of policymaking power as the core government offices. The following section explores fundamental backgrounds that enabled the Kantei to enhance these capabilities in managing policymaking. Factors Enabling Kantei-Centred Policymaking This study paid particular attention to the factors that enabled Abe and his executive office to enhance Kantei-led policymaking control and the effective use of policymaking apparatus concerning foreign and security policy towards Asia. In exploring this issue, this research hypothesised that three-layered variables that propped up the maintenance of high prime ministerial cohesion that enabled the prime minister to manage the executive smoothly in pursuing his determined policy goals. The firstlayer variable is the personal leadership capacity of the prime minister. The examination in the empirical cases indicates that Prime Minister Abe undoubtedly displayed his personal leadership capacity. The leadership capacity was demonstrated in miscellaneous manners: employing his political allies and close aides by drawing their trust and loyalty; harnessing effectively key personnel appointments including those for LDP politicians; reframing existing policies or showing new policy directions in a timely manner; and setting up new supra-ministerial bodies in the Cabinet or Cabinet Secretariat. The high leadership capacity that Abe exhibited after his return to power in December 2012 underpinned the solid diplomatic stance and persistence in external strategies. Significantly, Abe cultivated this leadership capacity from his bitter experiences. Abe sustained Prime Minister Koizumi’s Kantei-led policymaking as deputy chief cabinet secretary and chief cabinet secretary. During the first administration in 2006–7, Abe sought to imitate the

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Koizumi style of Kantei-led policymaking by harnessing five special advisers to the prime minister. Abe sought, with a mistaken belief, to realise the top-down leadership through an adviser-based policymaking style by putting his network of friends into this special advisers’ group (Mikuriya 2015: 43). However, this advisers-based policymaking system lacked expertise for leading bureaucrats to desired policy directions and creating internal cohesion to work together to support the Abe leadership. Accordingly, Abe was forced to make a compromise with zoku in the LDP in various policy areas (Uchiyama 2010: 14). Abe had responsibility for the LDP’s loss of power since the humiliating defeat at the 2007 Upper House election paved the way for a ¯ power transfer to the DPJ two years later (Oshita 2017: 102). When Abe returned to the prime ministerial post, he had a strong ‘revenge’ mentality to manage policymaking proficiently. Abe, who learned from harsh experiences during the first administration, was careful about forming and keeping the cohesion of his executive team in the Kantei, harnessing bureaucrats of ministries without making them enemies of the Kantei, and presenting political visions and plans in a speedy manner. Abe states, at the exact timing of six years since the second administration was inaugurated, that ‘I think that setback and experience [during the first administration] have become important fertilizers for the past six years since the second administration started’ (Sankei Shimbun 2018). The second-layer variable is the presence and dedication of personnel in the prime ministerial executive. The empirical analysis revealed crucial roles and devotions offered by Kantei personnel such as Imai Takaya, Izumi Hiroto, Kawai Katsuyuki, and Sek¯o Hiroshige. Their roles covered internal coordination for promoting desired policies and external connections for exploring new partnerships with other governments. Their presence and activities raised the power and authority of the prime ministerial executive and led to the augmentation of the prime ministerial cohesion of the Abe administration. The major Kantei members’ devotions had much to do with Abe’s personal character, which is contrasted to Koizumi’s. Koizumi had charisma that was transformed into the optimal use of the populist technique to appeal directly to the nation for gaining support (Uchiyama 2010: 14). Abe might not possess this kind of charisma, but had a personal appealing that helped him to collect entourages who willingly devoted themselves to maintaining his prime ¯ ministership (Oshita 2017: 107–8).

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Importantly, the presence and role of the Kantei’s executive members were sustained by personal connections to two Kantei bosses: the prime minister and chief cabinet secretary. Izumi Hiroto and Kawai Katsuyuki have forged close links to Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide. Whereas Kawai established a political group called Himawari-Kai to support Suga in 2017, Izumi who maintained personal connections with Suga could join the second Abe administration with Suga’s strong recommendation (Mori 2019: 84–85). Imai and Sek¯o, in addition to other executive members such as Kitamura Shigeru and Hasegawa Eiichi who are long involved in internal affairs, formed personal bonds with Prime Minister Abe. These surroundings, who joined the first Abe administration as an advisor, a secretary, and so on, kept personal friendship with Abe who was in times of personal hardship after the step-down of the prime ministerial post in September 2007 (Yamaguchi 2017: 100–3). The associates had a strong aspiration that their capabilities should be used for Prime Minister Abe since Abe takes their fervent thoughts and places ¯ great trust in them (Mori and Onishi 2019). Like the case of Abe, these surroundings also had a strong ‘second chance mentality’ that led to a firm bond to support and continue Abe leadership. Sek¯o explains close connections between Abe and his associates as follows: the people who view Abe Shinz¯o with favour come together with a compassionate bond ¯ in order to support Abe, never repeating the same failure again (Oshita 2017: 122–23). The third-layer variable is the administration’s management of relations with the ruling party. Typically seen in the liberalisation of the agricultural market, the Abe administration pushed forward policy reforms, which would undermine the interests of the LDP’s core constituency, and such reform programmes should have invited apparent opposition from the party members. Abe avoided such a situation through skilful personnel appointments. He consolidated the political base by allocating crucial posts with a relatively long-term tenure to reliable senior LDP members such as As¯o Tar¯o, Amari Akira, Nikai Toshihiro, Kishida Fumio, and K¯omura Masahiko. Moreover, Abe maintained close connections with associated young politicians such as Sek¯ o Hiroshige, Hagiuda K¯oichi, and Nishimura Yasutoshi by widening their appeal in the Kantei or cabinet. Thus, Abe consolidated overall party support for his administration by forming stable relations with the senior LDP members and gaining strong loyalty from the younger members.

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In addition to connections to individual party members, Abe’s strength in national elections broke the mood to criticise and brake his administration’s policy initiatives. Abe became the first LDP President to win six successive national elections: the December 2012 Lower House, the July 2013 Upper House, the December 2014 Lower House, the July 2016 Upper House, the October 2017 Lower House, and the July 2019 Upper House. Given the fundamental logic that the private interests of politicians lie in staying in office by being re-elected, LDP members would hesitate to criticise the policy initiatives of the Abe administration that delivered successive victories in national elections. In particular, the LDP politicians, who lost their seats in the Diet or were forced to have harsh experiences as members of the opposition party in 2009– 12, felt a deep appreciation for Abe and his administration. The LDP members’ mentality is clearly expressed by Hosoda Hiroyuki, the leader of the LDP’s largest faction: ‘If we say that the party needs to undertake hundreds of debates, holds opposition views, or expresses more dissent from Abe-san, the LDP will lose again. I’ve been punished. The LDP is one. If we hold Mr. Abe back, we’ll become the opposition again’ (Mikuriya 2015: 112). Thus, Prime Minister Abe maintained high prime ministerial cohesion by relying on his own personal leadership capacity as the chief executive. The presence and dedication of entourages in the Kantei contributed to the solidarity of the prime ministerial executive. Furthermore, Abe successfully forged stable partnerships with senior LDP politicians and drew loyalty from the party’s younger members, which were conducive to stable relations with the ruling LDP. The combined functions of these three factors constituted the base for enabling the Abe administration to undertake proficient policymaking management. Long-Term Implications of Policymaking Under the Abe Administration The Abe administration achieved significant transformations in the policymaking system in Japan. Previously, bureaucrats and the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) controlled policymaking. The zoku at the PARC enhanced policymaking capabilities through a long career in one policy field, and maintained strong connections to ministries and

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agencies in the field (Mikuriya 2015: 128–29). This was a sound policymaking system that guaranteed division of labour and effective collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats. The policymaking system in the Abe administration still relies on the ‘party-government’ structure, but shifted from the structure of ‘LDP zoku-relevant ministry’ to ‘partyprime ministerial executive’ with the latter’s dominance (George Mulgan 2018: 71). Certainly, the ascendancy of the prime ministerial executive in the Abe administration is in line with historical sequences: gradual strength in central government apparatuses centred on the prime minister through Abe’s predecessors such as Nakasone Yasuhiro, Hashimoto Ry¯utar¯o, and Koizumi Jun’ichir¯o (George Mulgan 2018: ch.2; Mishima 2019). It is also the fact that Abe is an exceptional prime minister who is a reborn, capable prime minister learning from bitter experiences in the first attempt, and holds very talented and reliable Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide. Furthermore, Abe’s proficient management of policymaking was sustained by at least two unique conditions. First, Abe’s allied young politicians and major Kantei aides, particularly those who were involved in the first Abe administration, were attracted by Abe’s personal character, developing an intersubjective aspiration to sustain his leadership retrial. Second, LDP members who suffered from bitter experiences of out-of-power maintained the mood to refrain from challenging core policies of the administration in order not to create the negative image of the party as a prerequisite for retaining their seats in the Diet. Given that the combination of the two conditions in the administrative and political spheres was exceptionally realised, the Abe administration might not be a general model for a new policymaking style in Japan. Despite such unique conditions, the Abe administration provides some useful clues to be considered for establishing the strong prime ministerial executive. The prime minister needs to show long-term policy visions as a reformist leader and political decisiveness as a convicted politician, which contributes to creating a centripetal force to gain loyalty and confidence from the Kantei and party members. The chief cabinet secretary, the principal supporter for the prime minister, is required to coordinate daily administrative affairs, paying attention to delivering the prime minister’s accurate policy intentions to the entire bureaucratic system. The prime minister’s absolute trust in senior politicians—As¯ o, Amari, Nikai,

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and Kishida in the case of the Abe administration—and the maintenance of high confidence from ruling politicians underpin the stability and continuation of the administration. Finally, it is necessary to refer to unfavourable effects that the ascendancy of the prime ministerial executive is likely to produce. Prime Minister Abe, learning from the failure in the first administration, paid due attention to maintaining close links and communication to individual ministries through positive commitments by the chief cabinet secretary and deputy chief cabinet secretaries. However, the control of bureaucratic personnel through the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs surely makes bureaucrats be nervous not to displease the Kantei. Moreover, the top-down management in a wide range of policy fields and the substantial positioning of ministers as the Kantei’s agents not only undermine a sense of honour among historically prestigious bureaucrats but also weaken bottom-up initiatives from individual ministries. The passive posture of the bureaucrats is particularly problematic in specialised policy areas. In fact, the over-presence of the prime ministerial executive has undermined know-how and diplomatic channels that the foreign ministry has accumulated (Mori 2019: 206–9). The strong Kantei leadership also invites a risk of undermining the presence and function of the ruling party in the legislative branch. The LDP politicians became to exercise self-restraint and eschew intensive intra-party conflicts in order to avoid giving the image of internal divisions to the nation (Tazaki 2014: 232). The low-level policy deliberations, getting into line with policy directions shown by the Kantei, robs the LDP of vigour for argument, a fundamental tenet for a political party. Mikuriya (2015: 113) argues that the LDP during the Abe administration showed a tendency to shift from a struggling party to a friendly club as its members just hoped re-election under the small-district election system. With the declining influence of factions, the LDP members surely care about the popularity of the party that is heavily dependent on the party president, namely the prime minister. The weakened debating capacity and struggle spirit in the ruling party lead to the declining function of the legislative branch, which will lead to the eclipse of democratic governance.

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Rules, Standards and Principles in Japan’s Asian Diplomacy What Ideas for What Objectives? Japan presented various sorts of ideas in advancing its Asian diplomacy in the policy fields examined in this study. It proposed specific principles and standards as ideas that guide international affairs. Prime Minister Abe presented the three principles of the rule of law at sea in order to maintain maritime order through peaceful and rule-oriented manners, avoiding the use of force or coercion. The spirit of the three principles was succeeded to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, a grand diplomatic strategy for the Abe administration, and concrete measures under the vision were relevant to strengthen the rule of law and freedom of navigation. In a similar vein, Japan stressed the four standards for quality infrastructure investment—openness, transparency, economic efficiency, financial soundness—as a guiding principle that should be considered in offering funds for infrastructure development. The four standards implied that support for infrastructure projects should proceed with in an open and transparent process with due attention to economic feasibility, not imposing huge financial burdens on recipient governments. In addition to the above principles and standards, Japan presented other ideational elements. The Japanese government, in negotiations on FTAs, adhered to the inclusion of high-standard rules. The highstandard rules, which aim to make unified rules and regulations in various policy areas even those not covered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), such as electronic commerce, intellectual property protection, government procurement, and state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the government pushed forward an idea of quality growth in development cooperation by making it one of the key principles in the Development Cooperation Charter. This idea aims at achieving growth that has an inclusive impact on a broad range of people in an environmentally and socially sustainable manner with due attention to resiliency in terms of economic crises, natural disasters and other shocks. In the space field, the Japanese government did not present a specific new idea. However, it has assisted the creation and diffusion of international norms for managing outer space, locating such assistance as a pillar of Japan’s space diplomacy. In particular, the government made efforts to realise the smooth adoption of the guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

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Katada (2020) asserts that Japan’s foreign economic policy has, since the late-1990s, shifted to a new state-led, liberal strategy with an emphasis on formal rules, global standards, and regional institution-building. This study supports this assertion in five policy fields including security ones under the Abe administration. The principles, standards and other ideas, which Japan has advocated in the five empirical cases, represent liberal principles that underpin a regional order. The advocacy of high-standard trade rules is relevant to commercial liberalism that positively grasps free trade and an open economy. The advocacy of the rule of law at sea and outer space is linked to institutional liberalism that aims to maintain an international order through the rule of law and international norms. The ideas of quality growth and quality infrastructure contribute to enhancing the level of the people’s living conditions, and in this sense, they are related to value liberalism, which is sustained by democracy and human rights (Yamamoto et al. 2018: 135). Thus, the Abe administration’s commitments to ideas examined in this study cover various components of liberalism that underpin the maintenance of freedom and openness in society. Significantly, Japan has presented several ideas in order to attain strategic objectives. Japan employed particular ideas as a means to counter and restrain China’s diplomatic policies and actions. The advocacy of the three principles of the rule of law at sea had a strong strategic orientation to check China’s aggressive maritime behaviour. The advocacy of the rule of law and international norms in outer space also had a similar strategic flavour of urging China to undertake norm-oriented space programmes. The strategic element was also seen in the economic policy field. Japan used the four standards for quality infrastructure investment as normative ideas to induce China’s disciplined behaviour in infrastructure investment as its support for infrastructure development has caused serious debt problems in several recipient countries. Moreover, Japan presented the idea of quality growth partly to counter China’s development cooperation policy by stressing the elements of ‘inclusive’ and ‘sustainable’, which were still weak in the Chinese approach to development cooperation. Whereas Japan surely employed several ideas to achieve strategic purposes, it presented and diffused ideas with an eye to sustaining a stable international order and global governance. This was typically the case in trade policy. Japan has adhered to high-standard trade rules in order to sustain a liberal economic order, which was threatened by moves towards protectionism and market disintegration. In particular,

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the Japanese government maintained a policy stance to counter the U.S. Trump administration’s policy preferences for protectionism to pursue narrow and short-term domestic interests, keeping a distance from multilateral arrangements. The objective of maintaining international order was also the case in infrastructure investment. Given the growing concern about debt problems associated with infrastructure investment, Japan accentuated the importance of the four standards for quality infrastructure investment as shared guidelines to which the international society should pay attention. In the outer space field, Japan emphasised, through collaboration with the UN, the importance of the rule of law and international norms in order to assist the establishment of norm-oriented policy frameworks that ensure the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities. Dobson (2017) argues that the Abe administration used multilateral mechanisms and institutions, not for the promotion of global governance but more as a means to secure its national interests including a proactive security role and a higher international status. This study holds that the national security perspective surely assumes a marked position in the administration’s ideational diplomacy, but the global governance perspective gradually raised its importance, particularly in the economic policy field. The Sharing of Ideas for Asian Diplomacy Japan sought to make principles, standards and other ideas shared with other states in various ways. On this point, particularly important is the use of multilateral institutions as places where ideas are presented and diffused. The regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Japan-Mekong summit, and the Quad—Japan-U.S.-IndiaAustralia—consultation became the key places where Japanese political leaders presented the four standards for quality infrastructure investment, the three principles of the rule of law at sea, and the idea of quality growth. Japan also took advantage of multilateral connections such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), and the summit meeting with the members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as opportunities to disseminate the idea of quality growth and the three principles of the rule of law at sea. The diffusion of ideas becomes successful when they can draw considerable attention by being presented at broadly known international forums. For this objective, Japan took advantage

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of highly influential international institutions—the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20)—as platforms to express and diffuse ideas. The 2016 G7 summit and the 2019 G20 summit under Japan’s chair provided crucial opportunities to advocate ideas for infrastructure investment, maritime security, and space security. The formal statements issued by the leaders and ministers at the G7/G20 meetings incorporated the ideas that the Japanese government proposed, and these statements surely commanded international attention. The regional and international institutions became the main vehicles through which Japan diffused the principles, standards and other ideas. Japanese political leaders delivered discourses on new ideas and explained their meanings and values at the meetings of multilateral institutions, and the ideas were often referred to in the statements issued at the meetings. The presentation of ideas at the multilateral institutions is, in a sense, a simple policy action, not necessarily yielding a deep impact on the preferences and behaviour of other states. However, the ideas functioned as a roadmap to guide states to consider what was required for in order to create an order in policy fields of infrastructure investment, maritime security, and outer space. They also served as a focal point to direct attention to and deepen interests in liberal principles and rule-based actions in international trade, infrastructure investment and maritime security. In several policy areas, Japan successfully embedded ideas into intergovernmental arrangements or multilateral institutions as common platforms. This was typically the case in the trade field. Japan achieved the incorporation of high-standard rules in the TPP and the Japan-European Union (EU) Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) through close partnerships with the U.S. and EU members. Tokyo then sought to transfer some parts of high-standard rules achieved in these FTAs to the RCEP. By being embodied in the mega-FTAs, the high-standard rules have a prolonged influence as legitimate platforms to underpin the long-term growth of the member economies and sustain the liberal trade regime. The four standards for quality infrastructure investment were incorporated into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Guidebook on Quality of Infrastructure Development and Investment as key components to guide the members’ policies and actions for infrastructure investment. Moreover, the four standards were embodied into the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, which has been increasingly employed by international organisations including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and

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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a shared expectation about states’ appropriate behaviour regarding infrastructure investment. The four standards established normative legitimacy as a common understanding endorsed by representative international organisations that have discussed regional and global economic issues. In development cooperation and maritime security, the ideas’ institutionalisation was realised in a narrow setting. While Japan’s idea of quality growth was embodied into partnership with a UN specialised agency, the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the three principles of the rule of law at sea were embedded in the Japan-U.S. alliance as a common understanding that Tokyo and Washington should pursue through their joint efforts. In the above cases, Japan successfully made particular rules, standards, and principles shared with other states by producing intergovernmental arrangements or formal principles endorsed by multilateral institutions. The ideas embedded in multilateral arrangements of FTAs and guiding standards in the APEC and G20 have raised their legitimacy as appropriate principles that the states are expected to abide by. The ideas embedded in the institutional arrangements as normative platforms gained a broad and prolonged influence to urge the states to change their preferences and actions. Many of liberal-oriented rules, principles and standards that Japan advocated have a key target country: China. The advocacy of the liberaloriented ideas invited complicated responses from China. In RCEP negotiations, Tokyo’s adherence to realise high-standard liberal rules brought about a quarrel with Beijing that assigned high priority to the early conclusion of negotiations. In maritime security, Japan’s repeated advocacy of the three principles of the rule of law at sea at the G7 forum irritated the Chinese government, which led to formal criticism of Japan’s actions. Importantly, China shared Japan’s ideas at least in two policy areas examined in this research. In infrastructure investment, the Chinese government endorsed the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, which incorporated the four standards for quality infrastructure investment, as a member of the G20 forum. Moreover, Chinese leaders’ statements on the BRI began to incorporate liberal principles that contribute to promoting quality infrastructure that Japan has advocated. In development cooperation, Chinese leaders began to take into account the importance of quality growth, which was revealed in their public statements. The Chinese government sought to raise the

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validity of its external commitments to sustain the sound economic development of developing countries by paying respect to the idea of quality growth. The means to share ideas and the goals achieved through the means are diverse in relation to China. Japan purposefully employed global institutions, the G7 and G20, as platforms to advocate liberal-oriented principles and standards that conflict with China’s policy behaviour, such as the three principles of the rule of law at sea and international norms in outer space. Japan took advantage of regional institutions involving China to accentuate the values of its proposed ideas, and sometimes directly appealed to China the values of the ideas. Such actions helped to earn China’s implicit or explicit approvals of the four standards for quality infrastructure investment and the idea of quality growth. These ideas are conducive to raising China’s image as a responsible great power in the international community in the policy fields of infrastructure and development cooperation. The Advocacy of Ideas and Japan’s Role Conception The Japanese government has presented principles, standards and other ideas as shared platforms for managing global commons—outer space and ocean—or global public affairs—infrastructure investment, free trade and development cooperation. The Abe administration’s positive commitments to ideational elements represented Japan’s evolving role conception. While Japanese diplomacy was, for a long time, characterised as invisible and passive posture in the surface, the administration departed from such a diplomatic pattern. The departure began during the first Abe administration in 2006–7 when it pushed forward value-oriented diplomacy that meant an assertive diplomatic posture, helping other countries to pursue specific liberal values that were linked to Japan’s identity and its past experiences of nation-building. The assertive diplomatic style became more prominent in the second Abe administration that presented proactive contribution to peace as a key diplomatic slogan to enhance Japan’s vigorous role in the international community. The presentation and diffusion of ideational elements examined in this study derive from the Abe administration’s fundamental diplomatic postures. How is Japan’s role conception revealed in the advocacy of ideas evaluated in evolving international relations in Asia? Japan, as a proactive second-tier state, sought to play a kingmaker’s role in trade and

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infrastructure investment.1 Japan’s adherence to high-standard trade rules combined with its leadership to wrap up difficult negotiations on the CPTPP implies a kingmaker’s role in maintaining the liberal and open economic regime and vigour for multilateralism. In a similar vein, Japan’s advocacy of the four standards for quality infrastructure investment mixed with its aspiration for quality infrastructure indicates a kingmaker’s role in sustaining global governance in infrastructure investment and development. Such a kingmaker’s role is in line with the Abe administration’s aspiration for proactive contribution to peace. There are two factors that Japan needs to consider in assuming a kingmaker’s role. The first is the formation of ‘concord’ among like-minded countries that pay respect to liberal ideals. Given that the U.S. Trump administration has committed to the anti-liberal commercial policy, the key partner on the globe is the EU that has committed to the maintenance of a liberal international order for a long time. In the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific frameworks, Australia and India become crucial partners for sustaining an open international order. The quadrilateral forum involving Australia and India functions as a crucial platform for inducing the U.S. to return to a position to preserve the liberal order and for becoming the foundation for collecting more like-minded countries. On the basis of partnership with the core members, Japan needs to extend partnerships with other states such as ASEAN members, South Korea, and countries in South Asia. The second is relevant to relations with China. A key challenge for the international society is how to embed China into the existing international order in growing tensions between Beijing and Washington. Japan stands in a unique position in terms of ideational elements as it might build a bridge between western and Asian ideals. Japan and China stood in different international positions in the 2000s: Japan has remained a key member of the western camp while China has become the dominant member of the emerging economies’ group. Despite significant differences in the position of global politics, Tokyo and Beijing have similarities in motivations and features in participating in global governance (Yu 2016). For instance, the Japanese foreign aid model has several similarities in the Chinese one such as non-intervention in internal affairs of recipient countries and the dominance of loans in association with recipients’ self-help (Shimomura 2012; Huang 2016). As this case implies, there is a possibility that Japan might draw China’s positive responses to

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ideational governance when it seeks to develop systems and institutions that combine the virtue of western and Asian values. This perspective is particularly important under the prospect that China under the Xi Jinping regime pursues the achievement of a great China, being unlikely to be integrated into the western values-dominant international system. Prime Minister Abe has been eager to demonstrate Japan’s identity as a member of the western camp, which is shown in his advocacy of universal values. At the same time, Abe has become to pay more attention to Asian values. In a speech at a symposium on Asian values in January 2016, Abe stated that ‘alongside Asia’s growth and steady democratization, the universal values we speak of have become values that cover more people than any other region in the world’, and ‘Asia’s democracy has a distinct mark engraved in it from ancient times, reflecting the values we have held dear for generations’ (Abe 2016). At the 4th Samvad Conference in July 2018, Abe stated that ‘Democracy not as a “foreign species” introduced from the west. Democracy that is spoken of not in translation, but through our native words and concepts’ (Abe 2018). Abe clearly recognised that Asian values are in no way undemocratic, and democracy is an evolving concept as Asian values must be taken seriously with so much of growth in Asia (Gupta 2018). The joint statement issued at the Japan-India summit in October 2018 stipulates that ‘the universal values of freedom, humanism, democracy, tolerance and non-violence, which have been shared between Japan and India . . . underscore the principles for the two countries to work together for the benefit of the Indo-Pacific region and the world at large’.2 Abe and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi incorporated the Asian elements of tolerance and non-violence as key components of values that developed in Asia and have universal applicability. Thus, Abe surely deepened his recognition of the Asian values and expressed such values in the context of a partnership with India. The integration of Asian values in the western values-oriented international order expands the possibility of inducing China to assume a more constructive role for global governance.

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Notes 1. A kingmaker state is unable to compete for leadership in the future international order due to its limited power capabilities. Yet, it can play an important role in facilitating either the existing hegemon’s defence of the current order or a rising power’s challenge to the existing order (He 2018: 99). 2. Japan-India Vision Statement. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/000413507.pdf [accessed September 23, 2019].

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Epilogue

Asia is projected to increase its presence in the international society in the future. Not only has Asia become the world’s largest production base but it has also been producing innovative services and technologies. The economic and business dynamics in Asia will continue further with the existence of countries with high growth potential such as China, India, and Indonesia. Geopolitical tensions will not end in this region as China and the U.S. will compete over acquiring the relative power dominance of the region by making efforts to strengthen partnerships with their supporting states. For good or for bad, Asia will continuously attract key attention from the scholars of international relations and policymakers. Given the prospect of the growth of the Asian economies, the presence of Japan, which has a low birth rate in the ageing society, will decline further in Asia. However, the growing complexity of geopolitics and geo-economics in intensive great power politics between the U.S. and China raises the position of middle powers. Japan, the major ally of the U.S. in Asia, and China’s neighbour with intensive economic and social links, remains a key second-tier state in Asian politics. In this regard, Abe Shinz¯o and his administration’s diplomatic strategies undoubtedly assume an important position in the study of Asian international relations. This monograph sought to examine the development of Japan’s Asian diplomacy during the Abe administration and explore theoretical implications in some aspects of diplomacy. I hope that this research has at © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4

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least four values for the studies of Japanese politics, international relations of Asia, and comparative politics. First, this research scrutinised details of policy development in five policy fields that cover both the economy and security. In particular, it revealed the growing presence of security consideration in the economic fields of trade and infrastructure investment and the fields where a science and technology orientation was previously prominent. This growing security consideration is attributable partly to Abe’s conservative political philosophy to preserve national interests. Yet, it also reflects a growing trend of the economic-security nexus and the broadening policy coverage of the security perspective. Second, this study elucidated Japan’s evolving diplomatic position in Asia. It clarified Japan’s strategic responses to power transition particularly the rise of China, and analysed complicated reactions to it. The reactions were combined in domestic measures, strategic connections to partner countries, and direct relations with China. It found that the U.S. has remained the key partner for checking and balancing the China threat, and the partnership has been deepened in all five cases examined in this study. Moreover, the Abe administration’s interests in the geographical scope expanded to the Indian Ocean by strengthening a strategic partnership with India and advocating the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. It also exhibited seemingly contradictory responses to China, which contained both balancing and engagement orientations in policies applied even to one policy area. Third, this monograph made clear concrete functions of domestic politics variables in Japan’s external policies towards Asia. It demonstrated how the strong prime ministerial executive has managed the policymaking process to achieve desired policy objectives, and what background factors have underpinned the high prime ministerial cohesion. As for concrete policymaking processes, it found how the perspective of proactive contribution to peace or the national interests, which are connected to systemic-level phenomena, was incorporated in domestic policymaking. Fourth, this research confirmed the Abe administration’s proactive use of ideas as strategic tools to attain specific policy goals. The used ideas are diverse from a series of rules to standards and principles, and the degree of sharing with other states is varied. Yet, the administration’s interest in the use of ideas was prominent in all cases, which implies that Japan is shifting its role conception from a follower to the existing normative framework to a kingmaker to play a constructive role in sustaining regional order.

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While this research sought to dig into the complexity of Japan’s Asian diplomacy through the case study approach, it has at least three limitations that induce future research. The first is related to power politics. This study demonstrated that China mattered in various policy dimensions of Japan’s Asian diplomacy, and Japan was forced to adopt complicated strategic responses to a growing China. However, this study is unable to show specific conditions under which Japan pursues particular strategic responses represented by balancing and hedging. Such conditions are also related to external partnerships with like-minded states in general and with the U.S. in particular. The exploration of this issue contributes to deepening an empirical analysis of Sino-Japanese relations and the theoretical scrutiny of the concepts of balancing, hedging, and others. The second limitation is related to the unpacking of policymaking processes. As this study demonstrates, the presence of Prime Minister Abe Shinz¯o and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide has doubtlessly sustained the Kantei-led policymaking. At the same time, their policy preferences are realised through complicated policymaking processes where the Kantei’s executive members are involved in intensive interactions with other government agencies and ruling politicians. This study unpacked such complexities in relation to the trade case but was insufficient in other cases. It is necessary to explore political interactions among key Kantei members, LDP politicians and ministries, and real processes through which the leaders’ policy preferences are transformed into concrete policy outcomes. The third limitation is relevant to the exploration of the impact of ideas. This study demonstrates that specific ideas were presented by the Japanese government in order to diffuse specific values of ideas and attain particular diplomatic objectives in Asia. However, this research is still weak in showing in what processes these ideas are perceived and accepted by other countries and how they developed into new normative frameworks. As long as ideas matter in yielding causal effects to change the states’ policy preferences and policy actions, it is required to undertake in-depth research on these aspects.

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Index

A Abe Shinz¯ o Abe Doctrine, 10 Abenomics , 3, 104 Asian values, 243 development cooperation, 197–98 domestic politics, 10, 32–34, 227–30 first administration, 39, 203, 232, 241 foreign policy, 3–4, 9–10, 24–26, 218–20 leadership capability, 230–31 maritime security, 140–43 national elections, 233 ocean policy, 121–22 outer space, 169–72 personal attributes, 10–11 proactive contribution to peace, 4, 195–98 relations with Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 34, 232–33 supporting groups, 34

use of ideas, 40–41, 236–38 value-oriented diplomacy, 39, 203, 241 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, 4 Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), 155, 178n2 ADB. See Asian Development Bank Advisory Council for the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, 121 Advisory Panel of Experts on Reviewing the Official Development Assistance Charter, 187 Africa, 92, 137, 199, 208 AIIB. See Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), 25 Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF), 123, 156 Amari, Akira, 75–76, 94 anti-satellite (ASAT), 159 Aoki, Setsuko, 172

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy, Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4

281

282

INDEX

APEC. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APRSAF. See Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum APSCO. See Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation arc of freedom and prosperity, 39 ASDF. See Air Self-Defence Force ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), 5, 59, 220 Asia infrastructure demand, 46 multilateral institutions, 5 political uncertainty, 2–3 presence in the world, 2, 247 regionalism, 5 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), 92 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 106 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 90–91, 101, 219–22 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 25, 70–71, 99–102, 219–21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 5, 70, 106–7, 206 Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), 158, 165–66, 219–21 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO), 165–66, 219–21 As¯ o, Tar¯ o, 39, 75, 90, 94, 101 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 5–7, 8, 24, 59, 66 Australia, 41, 106, 107, 131

B balancing

balancing in grey-zone, 129–30, 222 hard balancing, 27, 129, 144, 162, 163–64, 177, 221 indirect-balancing, 28 institutional balancing, 27–28, 71, 101–102, 165–66, 221–22 soft balancing, 27, 129, 130, 131, 144, 164, 177, 201–2, 209–10, 221 bandwagoning, 27–28, 226 Basic Act on Ocean Policy, 120–21 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, 121–22, 128, 139–43 Basic Plan on Space Policy, 154, 170, 174, 176 Basic Space Law, 153, 166 Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 98, 100, 110–11, 208 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 25, 98–100, 102, 103, 105, 108–11, 160, 166, 199, 223 binding engagement, 28, 74, 132–33, 223–24 Blyth, Mark, 43 Brexit, 68 BRI. See Belt and Road Initiative bureaucrats, 30 C Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, 33, 235 Cabinet Office growing power of, 33–34, 229–30 ocean policy, 121, 123, 139 outer space, 153, 166–69. See also Kantei Cabinet Secretariat growing power of, 33–34, 229–30 infrastructure investment, 88–89 ocean policy, 140–41

INDEX

outer space, 153, 167–68 trade policy, 75. See also Kantei Canada, 63 capacity building in development cooperation, 191 in maritime security, 125, 137, 192 in outer space, 175 in trade rules, 66 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 136, 200 case study method, 45 China China Development Bank (CDB), 93 China-South Korea hotline, 132 East China Sea, 24–25, 127 economic development model, 199–200 foreign aid, 198–99 Indian Ocean, 130–31 industrial upgrading, 225 infrastructure investment, 92–93, 99–100, 103–4 maritime security, 126, 127–28 outer space, 158–60 the rise of, 2–3, 218–19, 225–26, 248 South China Sea, 127–28 state capitalism, 200. See also Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Sino-Japanese relations China Development Bank (CDB). See under China collective self-defence, 124, 198 Committee on National Space Policy (CNSP), 153, 166–68, 170–71 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 172–73, 178n11

283

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 223, 242 Japan’s leadership, 65–66 negotiations on, 62–63 political factors in, 71–72 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia (CEPEA), 59 constructivism, 37–39, 42 COPUOS. See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space core government offices, 33, 48n4, 229–30. See also Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretariat Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), 31–32, 48n3 CPTPP. See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership D debt problem, 108, 208 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 60, 88 Democratic Security Diamond (concept), 131, 145n8 development cooperation and economic growth, 194–95 definition of, 210n1 and hitozukuri, 190–91 and proactive contribution to peace, 195–96 and Self-Defence Force (SDF), 191. See also official development assistance (ODA) Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) change of the title, 187–86 features of, 188–89 formulation of, 187, 196 quality growth, 204–5

284

INDEX

universal values, 202–3 Dobson, Hugo, 238 domestic politics in international relations, 29–30 in Japan, 30–32 in Japanese foreign policy, 8 in trade policy, 74–80 under Abe administration, 32–34 dominance-denial, 28, 48n1, 103, 203–4, 223 E East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), 59 East Asia Summit (EAS), 6–7, 59, 126, 220 East Asian Community (EAC), 39–40 East China Sea, 7, 24–25, 69, 124, 127, 129 economic pragmatism, 28, 104, 223 economic security, 225 electoral reform, 31 Envall, H. D. P., 10 Et¯ o, Taku, 79–80 European Union (EU), 68, 72, 106, 179n14 exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 47, 119, 138 F Fatton, Lionel P., 10 focal point, 43, 49n8, 222, 239 foreign economic policy, 237 formal political executive, 48n4, 76 Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), 200 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), 102, 137, 236, 248 free trade agreement (FTA), 57, 58–59. See also individual FTAs

G G7. See Group of Seven G20. See Group of Twenty General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 58, 67 geo-economics, 70, 100, 223–24, 247 geopolitics, 3–4, 9, 39, 70, 247 George Mulgan, Aurelia, 32, 36, 48n4, 78, 228, 234 global governance, 38, 41, 109–10, 175–76, 218, 242 global positioning system (GPS), 163 Goldstein, Judith, 43 Goswami, Namrata, 159, 160 Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security, 191 grey-zone, 129–30, 161–62, 222, 224 Group of Seven (G7), 90, 136–37, 173, 239 Group of Twenty (G20), 2, 72, 107, 239 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation, 6, 123, 129, 156 H Hashimoto, Ry¯ utar¯ o, 5 Hatoyama Yukio, 7, 32, 39–40 He, Kai, 27–28, 71, 244n1 Headquarters for Ocean Policy (HOP), 121–22 hedging, 28, 73, 223–24. See also binding engagement, dominance-denial, economic pragmatism high-speed railway, 92, 98 high-standard trade rules, 63–69, 237–38 Honma, Masayoshi, 78 Hook, Glenn D., 5, 6, 39 Hosoda, Hiroyuki, 233 Hughes, Christopher W., 10, 125, 163, 170

INDEX

human security, 189, 204, 208 I ideas definition of, 38 embedded sharing of, 43–44, 239–40 objectives of, 237–38 and institutions, 42–43 sharing with an adversary, 44, 240–41 simple sharing of, 43, 238–39 two roles of, 38 Imai, Takaya, 72, 98–99 India partnership with Japan, 24, 225 relations with Japan in infrastructure investment, 92, 102–3 relations with Japan in maritime security, 125–26, 130–31 relations with Japan in outer space, 157–58, 164 Indian Ocean, 102 Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), 157–58 Indonesia, 97 Indo-Pacific, 12, 91, 125, 131 Infrastructure Export Strategy, 94–96, 194 Inoguchi, Takashi, 39, 48n2 institutions, 42–43 intellectual property (rights), 62, 64–65, 66, 68 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 123 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), 173 interdependence theory, 29 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), 174, 176, 179n14

285

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 108 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 134 Izumi, Hiroto, 97–98

J Jain, Purnendra, 200, 202 Japan administrative reforms, 31 advocacy of ideas, 39–40 agricultural sector, 58–59, 77–80, 83n8, 227–28 Asian financial crisis, 5 bandwagoning, 226 bureaucrats, 30–31, 33, 79, 228, 231, 235 business interests, 103–4, 97 development of Asian diplomacy, 4–8 diplomacy in power transition, 23–26, 224–26 dual hedging, 226 electoral reform, 31 government-ruling party relations, 36–37, 79 identity, 241, 243 Koizumi administration, 6–7, 31–32 national interests, 128, 188, 228–29 national security, 69, 140–41, 153, 160–61, 169–71, 197, 228 patrol boat diplomacy, 199 policymaking system, 30–32 position in Asia, 1 role conception, 241–43 strategic ODA, 194, 202. See also Abe Shinz¯ o, individual ministries and agencies Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), 155–58, 163, 165, 167, 172, 173, 178n1

286

INDEX

Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA), 77 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 90, 93, 110 Japan Coast Guard (JCG), 123, 127, 141 Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 134 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 91, 190, 197–98 Japan Revitalisation Strategy (JRS), 194, 196 Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA), 72 Japan-India Space Dialogue, 158 Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space, 156 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, 125, 129, 135–36 Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue, 156 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, 4, 5–6, 23, 130 JAXA. See Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency JBIC. See Japan Bank for International Cooperation JCG. See Japan Coast Guard JICA. See Japan International Cooperation Agency K Kallender, Paul, 163, 170 Kanehara, Atsuko, 143 Kantei in development cooperation, 194–96 in infrastructure investment, 96–99 in ocean policy, 139–41 in outer space, 167–69 in the Abe administration, 32–34, 227–30

in trade policy, 76–79 members of, 32–33, 36 research on, 10. See also Cabinet Office, Cabinet Secretariat Katada, Saori N., 67, 237 Katakami, Kenichi, 65, 73 Kawai, Katsuyuki, 74 Kawashima, Shin, 110 Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), 97, 103, 113n5 Keohane, Robert O., 29, 43, 225 kingmaker state, 241–42, 244n1 Kishi Nobusuke, 34 Kishida, Fumio, 187, 192–93, 196 Kitaoka, Shin’ichi, 4, 197–98 Koga, Kei, 100 Koizumi, Jun’ichir¯ o, 6, 31–32, 231 K¯ omura, Masahiko, 124 K¯ ono, Tar¯ o, 125 Kratochwil, Friedrich, 37 Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, 28, 48n1, 224 L Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, 199 Law Concerning JAXA, 167 leadership capability, 36, 230 Li, Keqiang, 73, 126, 199 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kantei, 235 in policymaking, 30 infrastructure investment, 89 ocean policy, 120 outer space, 160–61 Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), 30, 233 trade policy, 80 under Abe, 34, 232–33 liberalism, 29–30, 199, 237 life-cycle cost (LCC), 90, 105, 114n17 Liff, Adam P., 129, 224 liquefied natural gas (LNG), 91

INDEX

M MAFF. See Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Malaysia, 65, 66 Management Council for Infrastructure Strategy, 94–96, 194 maritime and aerial communication mechanism, 126, 132 maritime domain awareness (MDA), 156 Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF), 25, 124, 125, 127 maritime security Japan’s internal policies for, 122–23, 128–29 partnership with India in, 125–36, 130–31 partnership with the U.S. in, 123–25, 129–30 quadrilateral partnership in, 131–32 relations with China in, 126–28, 132–33 maritime state, 119, 133 Masuo, Chisako, 26 Medium Term Defence Program FY2019–FY2023, 171 Mekong-Japan summit, 207–8 METI. See Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Mexico, 63 MEXT. See Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology middle power, 1, 247 Midford, Paul, 138 Mikuriya, Takashi, 228, 231, 233, 235 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), 75, 78–79 Ministry of Defence (MOD), 154–55, 161–62, 169, 191

287

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 66, 75, 79, 106–7 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), 152–53, 158, 165, 166–69 Ministry of Finance (MOF), 75, 193 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 88, 127, 133–34 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), 88, 140, 187, 191, 193–94, 196 Mishima, Ko, 31, 33, 37, 124 MOD. See Ministry of Defence Modi, Narendra, 92, 158, 243 MOFA. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moltz, James Clay, 165 Motegi, Toshimitsu, 62–63 multilateralism, 58, 67 N national budget in ocean policy, 139 in official development assistance (ODA), 186, 193 in space policy, 169 National Defence Program Guidelines, 123, 170, 171, 191 national election, 233 national interests, 38 National Ocean Policy Secretariat (NOPS), 121, 139 National Security Council (NSC), 10, 141 National Security Strategy (NSS), 4, 69, 133, 170, 174, 195–96, 203 National Space Policy Secretariat (NSPS), 153, 167–68 New Growth Strategy, 93 New Komeito, 120, 124 Nikai, Toshihiro, 89, 98, 113n1

288

INDEX

Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), 89 Nishikawa, K¯ oya, 79–80 non-governmental organisation (NGO), 189, 190 norin zoku, 79–80, 227 North Korea, 160–61, 163 NSS. See National Security Strategy O Obama administration, 26, 70–71, 130 Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), 153, 166–67 official development assistance (ODA) history of, 186 ODA Charter, 186–89, 196, 197, 204 ODA graduates, 187 in the space field, 175. See also development cooperation Okuhara Masaaki, 79 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 107–8, 109 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentDevelopment Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), 186, 187–88 Oriki, Ry¯ oichi, 170–71 other official flow (OOF), 175, 187 Outer Space Treaty, 176, 179n17 P Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), 136 Paris Club, 108, 109, 114n19 Patalano, Alessio, 222 peacekeeping operation (PKO), 187 Pekkanen, Saadia M., 153, 165

Pempel, T. J., 11 Pence, Mike, 91, 106, 162 Philippines, 26, 97–98, 192, 211n6 Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). See under Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) power politics, 2–3, 22–23, 41, 225–26, 249 prime ministerial executive, 32, 36, 48n5, 80, 231, 233–35 Pugliese, Giulio, 10, 11

Q quality infrastructure, 207, 237 definition of, 90 four standards for quality infrastructure investment, 105–11, 236, 237–38, 239–40 Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), 89–90, 100–1 quality growth, 190, 204–9, 236, 237, 240–41 Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), 154, 161, 163

R Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, 130, 164 realism, 22–23, 29 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 59–60, 66–68, 73–74, 240 regional public goods, 1, 26, 218 remote islands, 122–23, 124, 129 role conception, 241–42, 248 rule of law, 39, 202, 203, 236–38 rule of law at sea, 134–38, 240 rule of law in outer space, 174–76 rules of origin, 59

INDEX

S science and technology, 151–52, 228 SDF. See Self-Defence Force sea lines of communication (SLOC), 24, 102, 128 security dilemma, 22 Seiwa-kai, 34 Sek¯ o, Horoshige, 66, 67, 82n7, 232 Self-Defence Force (SDF), 6, 123–25, 155, 157, 169, 171, 191, 218 self-help principle, 204–5, 206, 242 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 12, 24–25, 69, 123–24, 127, 128–29, 130, 162, 218 Shinoda, Tomohito, 62, 63, 70 Singapore, 58, 60, 67 Sino-Japanese relations collaboration in infrastructure investment, 92–93 collaboration in maritime security, 132–33 competition in infrastructure investment, 100–2 conflict in maritime security, 24–25, 127–28 confrontation in trade, 67 Japan’s perception of China’s development cooperation, 200–4 Japan’s perception of China’s space capabilities, 161–62 sixth industrialization, 78, 83n8 SLOC. See sea lines of communication Söderberg, Marie, 187, 191, 196 Solís, Mireya, 74, 104 S¯ osei Nippon, 11, 34 South China Sea, 25, 70, 128–29, 138, 162, 202 South Korea, 4, 11, 104 Southeast Asia, 91, 125, 192, 201, 202, 210, 221

289

south-western islands (Nansei islands), 123 sovereignty, 25, 129, 131 space security, 154, 156, 160 space situational awareness (SSA), 155, 156, 157, 163, 218 Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy (SHNSP), 153–54, 166–69 strategic response, 12, 26–28, 218–24, 248 Suga, Yoshihide, 75, 78, 79, 94, 98, 228, 232, 234, 249 Suzuki, Kazuto, 40, 153, 160, 162, 163, 170

T Takemi, Keiz¯ o, 140 Terada, Takashi, 3, 61, 73, 98 Thailand, 5, 93 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), 137, 208 top-level sales, 96–97 TPP-11, 61–63, 72–73. See also Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 64–65, 66 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 223 and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 100 domestic politics, 74–76, 79–80, 227 emergence of, 60 Japan’s participation in, 60 political factors in, 71, 218 US withdrawal from, 61

290

INDEX

Trump administration, 2, 3, 26, 41, 61, 65, 71, 130, 162, 223 U Uchiyama, Y¯u, 31, 231 United Kingdom, 68 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), 207 United States Combined Space Operations Centre (CSpOC), 157, 178n3 decline of, 2, 225–26 National Space Council, 162, 178n5 pivot to Asia, 26, 191 protectionist trade policy, 71, 237–38 relations with Japan in development cooperation, 191–92, 202 relations with Japan in infrastructure investment, 91, 102–3 relations with Japan in maritime security, 123–25, 129–30 relations with Japan in outer space, 156–57, 162–64 and the TPP, 61–62 universal values, 39, 70, 71, 189, 202–4, 219, 223, 243

V value-oriented diplomacy, 39, 203 veto players, 35, 49n7 Vietnam, 26, 63, 65, 66, 125, 190, 192, 201

W Wallace, Corey, 9, 101 Waltz, Kenneth N., 22, 29 Wendt, Alexander, 37 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 64, 236

X Xi, Jinping, 70, 98, 110, 159, 208

Y Yachi, Sh¯ otar¯ o, 98 Yoshida Doctrine, 4, 16n1

Z zoku (giin), 30, 37, 48n2, 231, 233–34. See also norin zoku