Japanese Religions and Globalization [1 ed.] 9780415811705, 2012032162, 9780203066614

Citation preview

Japanese Religions and Globalization

Ugo Dessì

ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN ASIAN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

Japanese Religions and Globalization Ugo Dessì

an informa business

ISBN 978-0-415-81170-5

www.routledge.com

,!7IA4B5-ibbhaf!

J a p a n e s e

R e lig io n s

a n d

G lo b a liz a tio n

This book analyzes the v ariety o f ways through w hich Japanese religions (Buddhism , Shinto, and new religious m ovements) contribute to the dynam ics of accelerated globalization in recent decades. It looks at how Japanese religions provide m aterial to cultural global flow s, thus acting as carriers of globalization, and how they respond to these flow s by shaping new global identities. The book highlights how, paradoxically, these processes of religious hybridi­ zation may be closely intertw ined w ith the prom otion of cultural chauvinism . It shows how, on the one hand, religion in Japan is engaged in border negotiation w ith global subsystem s such as politics, secular education, and science, and how, on the other hand, it tries to find new legitim ation by addressing pressing global problem s such as war, the environm ental crisis, and econom ic disparities left unsolved by the dom inant subsystem s. A significant contribution to advancing an understanding of m odern Japanese religious life, this book is of interest to academ ics working in the fields of Japanese studies, A sian history and religion, and the sociology of religion. Ugo D ess ì is a lecturer at the Institute o f Religious Studies at the U niversity of L eipzig, G erm any. He has published w idely on Shin B uddhism and Japanese religions.

R o u tle d g e

S t u d ie s in

A s ia n

R e lig io n

a n d

P h ilo s o p h y

1

Deconstruction and the Ethical in A sian Thought E dited by Youru Wang

2

An Introduction to Daoist Thought Action, language, and ethics in Zhuangzi Eske M øllgaard

3

R eligious Com m odifications in A sia M arketing gods E dited by Pattana K itiarsa

4

C hristianity and the State in Asia Com plicity and conflict E dited by Julius B autista and F rancis K hek Gee Lim

5

C hristianity in Contem porary China Socio-cultural perspectives E dited by F rancis K hek Gee Lim

6

The Buddha and R eligious Diversity J. Abraham Velez de Cea

7

Japanese R eligions and G lobalization Ugo D essì

Japanese Religions and Globalization

Ugo Dessì

ROUTLEDGE

Routledge Taylor & Francis G ro u p

L O N D O N A N D N EW YORK

First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, M ilton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Sim ultaneously published in the USA and C anada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, N ew York, N Y 10017 R outledge is an im print o f the Taylor & F rancis Group, an inform a business © 2013 Ugo D essì The right o f Ugo D essì to b e identified as author o f this work has been asserted b y h im /h er in accordance w ith sections 77 and 78 o f the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. N o p art o f this book m ay b e reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, m echanical, or other m eans, now know n or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any inform ation storage or retrieval system, without perm ission in w riting from the publishers. Tradem ark n o tice: Product or corporate nam es m ay be tradem arks or registered tradem arks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. B ritish L ibrary C ataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from th e British Library L ibrary o f C ongress C ataloging in P ublication D ata Dessì , Ugo. Japanese religions and globalization: Ugo Dessì . p. cm. – (Routledge studies in A sian religion and philosophy; 7) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Japan Religion. 2. Globalization. I. Title. BL2202.3.D47 2013 200.952-dc23 2012032162

–

ISBN: 978-0-415-81170-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-06661-4 (ebk) Typeset in Tim es N ew R om an by Sunrise Setting Ltd, Paignton, UK

C o n te n ts

A u th o r's note Acknowledgm ents

Introduction Religion and globalization 4 Japanese religions within globalization 6

vii viii

1

1

The risk o f cultural bias: definitions and phases G lobalization, cultural bias, and the definition o f religion 11 C ultural bias and phases o f globalization 17

11

2

‘One true world religion among many others ’ ？ Global identities and religious pluralism 24 Japanese religions and inclusivism 29 Japanese religions and exclusivism 35

24

3

Shaping new glocal identities G localization leaning to external sources 40 G localization leaning to ‘n a tive’ sources 47

40

4

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change G localization and cultural chauvinism 55 R esistance to change and cultural chauvinism 64

55

5

G localization overseas Virtual bridges, glocalization, and cultural chauvinism 69

69

6

Carriers o f globalization Japanese relig io n s’ influence over other religions and cultures 83

83

vi

Contents

7

Border negotiation in global society (I): religion and politics Japanese religions and politics 100

8

9

Border negotiation in global society (II): religion, education, and science Japanese religions and public education 115 Japanese religions and science 121

98

115

Addressing global problem s G lobal problem s and religious institutions 131 G lobal problem s and religious NGO s/NPO s 135

129

Conclusion

142

N otes Bibliography Index

150 157 184

A u t h o r ’s N o te

In this volume, Japanese is rom anized according to the m odified H epburn system. Japanese characters are provided on first occurrence of relevant term s in each chapter. Follow ing convention, Japanese nam es are w ritten w ith the surnam e first. Unless otherw ise specified, the translations are m ine w herever the titles are in Japanese and G erm an.

A c k n o w le d g m e n ts

A n earlier version of this book was w ritten to satisfy the requirem ents for the H abilitation (the G erm an qualification for a full university professorship) granted to the author by the U niversität Leipzig (Fakultät f ür G eschichte, K unst- und O rientw issenschaften) in 2012. In this connection, I would like to thank the H abilitationskom m ission and the three reviewers, professors C hristoph Kleine, H ubert Seiwert, and G alen A m stutz, for their w arm appreciation of my work and valuable com ments. I am also grateful to Dorothea Schaefter and Jillian M orrison, of Routledge, and to two anonym ous referees for their precious com m ents. M any thanks also go to Ian Reader for his comments. This research has been made possible by the kind collaboration, during my residence and fieldw ork in Japan (especially 2009-2010), of m any people among the religious groups analyzed, whom I would like to w arm ly thank collectively here. I also w ish to thank Professor Yuki Hideo and Ms Kaw arazaki Keiko of the NCC Center for the Study of Japanese Religions in Kyoto, and several colleagues w ithin the Japanese A ssociation for Religious Studies and the Japan Association of Religion and Ethics. M any friends have also been very helpful in various ways. I would like to express here my special thanks to K anno Rui, M artin Repp, K ikuchi M asum i, Yamamoto Joho, my friends at M ikoan, H ishiki M asaharu, and Yamauchi Sayoko. The Institute of Religious Studies of the Universitat Leipzig has offered me, since May 2011,a quiet environm ent in w hich to complete the m anuscript. In this connection, I would like to thank my colleagues and the students of my sem inar on Japanese Religions and G lobalization for their feedback. Earlier versions of parts of chapters Three and Four appeared in the Journal o f Religion in Japan 1/2 (2012). Last, but not least, the com pletion of this book would have been hardly conceivable w ithout E lisabetta’s continuous encouragem ent, com m ents, and support. Leipzig, July 2012.

I n tr o d u c tio n

Terms related to globalization have been increasingly incorporated in ongoing com m unication w ithin the Japanese religious world. In line w ith this trend, a publication such as the G urokaru Tenri ク'、 ローカノレ天理 (Glocal Tenri), the bul­ letin of the research institute of the new religious movement Tenrikyo 天 理 教 ， has been issued since 2000 w ith the explicit intent of addressing issues related to globalism and localism ; the president of the Z en-nihon B ukky ōkai 全 日 本 仏 教 会 (Japan B uddhist Federation) has recently signed, together w ith other world religious leaders, the Global Appeal to End Stigm a and D iscrim ina­ tion Against People A ffected by Leprosy; columns in the Kō sei shinbun 佼 成 新 聞 (Kōsei newspaper), the official megaphone of another new religious movement, R isshō K ōseikai 立 正 佼 成 会 ， , explain to readers the true (religious) m eaning of the word globalization; and references to globalization and various global issues are constant presences in the annual peace proposals and in other w ritings by Ikeda D aisaku 池 田 大 作 ,，the president of Sōka G akkai International (SGI), the religious organization th at is perhaps at the forefront in th is process of incor­ poration. These few exam ples hint at the various guises in w hich globalization term inology may find its way into the language of Japanese religious organiza­ tions. N eedless to say, at the general level all this reveals an increased and even genuine interest by religious people in Japan in issues related to the world at large. One m ay ask, however, to w hat extent the discourse on globalization w ithin Japanese religions m ay also be accom panied by their actual involvem ent in the dynam ics of globalization. A ccording to the Japanese scholar of religion, Inoue N obutaka, there are good reasons to argue that this is the case. Inoue claim s that Japanese culture has been involved in the globalization process at least since the tim e of the dra­ m atic m odernization of Japan following the Meiji R estoration (1868), w hich was largely dependent on the massive im port of w estern cultural elem ents. This involvem ent is also reflected, he argues, in the m issionary activities of Japanese religions overseas that steadily increased after freedom of religion was granted by the post-w ar Constitution, and w ith the subsequent em ergence of Japan as a m ajor world econom y (Inoue 1990: 8-10). W ith the more recent dram atic development of inform ation system s, however, the interplay betw een globaliza­ tion and religion becom es more apparent. For example, according to Inoue, the

2

Introduction

increased flow of inform ation facilitates the em ergence of “neo-syncretism ” (neo-shinkurechizumu ネ 才 • シンクレチズム ),，a phenom enon involving the “inten­ tional appropriation of elem ents from other religions” (tashūky ō no y ōso no shutaitekina saiy ō 他 宗 教 の 要 素 の 主 体 的 な 採 用 ）w ) ithin the context of a free religious m arket (Inoue 1990: 6 -7 ). In this connection, he has more recently argued for the em ergence, especially since the 1970s, of a distinctive typology of new religious movements, the “hyper-religions” (haipā-shūkyō) ノヽイノぺー 宗教), where the juxtaposition of elem ents from a variety of sources is accom panied by a distinctive indifference tow ard traditional religion (Inoue 2007a: 468). Inoue also relates the easier access to inform ation about alm ost any religion to the pro­ gressive erosion of the distinction betw een religious professionals on the one hand and lay practitioners or occasional users on the other (Inoue 1997: 92-4 ). Still another peculiar feature of Japanese religions in the global age is repre­ sented, he argues, by the appearance of organizational form s analogous to those of the m ultinational corporations – such as in the case of Sōka G akkai 創 価 学 会 , Sekai Ky ūseiky ō 世 界 赢 世 教 , and s h i k a r i 真 光 (（Inoue 1997: 85-6 ). As Inoue him self acknowledges, this aspect had already been analyzed by N akam aki H irochika, who has defined m ultinational religion as “one that conducts its propagation activities across m ultiple national boundaries, on the analogy of m ultinational enterprises” (N akam aki 1991: 235). At a m ore general level, the relevance of religion in the dynam ics o f globalization has also been noted by other Japanese scholars, such as N akano Tsuyoshi, who has focused on the pro­ liferation of identity claim s, religious fundam entalism , and nationalism that accom panies globalization at the local level (N akano 2001), and Yamanashi Yukiko, who has related the progressively em erging consciousness of the world as a unity to the ongoing search for religious pluralism found am ong religions worldwide (Yam anashi 2004). Beside supporting the view that Japanese religions m ay be actively involved in global dynam ics, these exam ples are revelatory of a certain dependence of the em erging Japanese scholarship on this subject on them es that have been m ainly elaborated in the general debate on globalization in Europe and N orth A m erica. W ithin this scholarly fram ew ork it is w idely acknowledged – despite the variety of em phases and approaches on specific aspects of globalization such as the economy, governance, and culture – that the development of the m arket economy, the new inform ation m edia, civil transportation, and tourism have played a decisive role in the dram atic increase in m aterial and cultural exchanges that are taking place around the globe, and that there has been in the last part of the tw entieth century a dram atic acceleration in these dynam ics. O n this basis, it may be argued that present-day globalization is characterized by an unprece­ dented intensity, pervasiveness, and rapidity. The continuous flow of inform ation from other places and cultures and the grow ing m obility of people them selves have also dram atically increased the chance to encounter new and alternative worldviews, and to be influenced by foreign cultural elem ents at the local level. Jan N ederveen Pieterse, a scholar who has particularly insisted on globaliza­ tion as “a process of hybridization that gives rise to a global m elange” (N ederveen

Introduction

3

Pieterse 2009: 65) aptly synthesizes these basic ideas on global dynam ics as follows: H ybridization as a process is as old as history, but the pace of m ixing accel­ erates and its scope w idens in the wake of m ajor structural changes, such as new technologies that enable new phases of inter cultural contact. Contem porary accelerated globalization is such a new phase. (N ederveen Pieterse 2001: 222) Thus, global society appears to be characterized by a grow ing interconnection among its parts that involves a dram atically intensified potential for the relativization of worldviews and values. M oreover, the fact that more and more people introject stream s of these cultural flow s and are sensible to the relativization they prom ote leads to a grow ingly reflexive awareness of the world as a “single place,” and to the inclination to think and act (be it im plicitly or explicitly) on a globally m inded b asis. This idea is especially related to the w ork of Roland Robertson, who has forcibly argued that, globalise – defined in the im m ediate context as consciousness of the (prob­ lem of) the world as a single place … is not simply a m atter of an increasing awareness of the challenge of other cultures but also of w hat is very m islead­ ingly called the ‘global village’ … W hat we also have to acknowledge is that there is clear evidence of an even m ore direct concern w ith the them e of globality. Debates are occurring in a num ber of societies on the extent to w hich societies should be or becom e ‘global,’ and the degree to w hich they should m odify their cultures and traditions so as to make the global ‘system ’ work more adequately . . . In one way or another, civilizations and, more tangibly, societies (even individuals) are being constrained to fram e their particular modes, negative or positive, of global involvement. (R obertson 1992: 132) As daily reality constantly shows, the interconnectedness that is prom oted by globalization does not necessarily correspond to harm ony and m utual under­ standing. R obertson him self has w arned his readers that “to speak of the world becom ing a single place … does not in and of itself say anything about global unification in any idealistic respect” (R obertson 1991: 283). Leaving aside prob­ lems such as econom ic exploitation and grow ing inequality that accom pany the globalization of m arket economy, it m ay be observed that the cultural dynam ics of global society, far for prom oting harmony, reveal in m any cases a specific potential for a one-way relativization from the center to the periphery, and there­ fore hom ogenization and cultural im perialism . This aspect, w hich is im m edi­ ately apparent in phenom ena such as the worldwide diffusion and influence of products of the U nited States entertainm ent industry, has been the object of various studies, among w hich are those on M cD onaldization started by G eorge R itzer (R itzer 1998).

4

Introduction

O n the other hand, notw ithstanding the asym m etry and the selective nature of the processes of cultural dissem ination and the risks of cultural im perialism , it is also apparent that globalization im plies m uch more than this one-way relativismtion leading to cultural hom ogenization. One simple reason for this is that glo­ balization carries the potential to prom ote the volatilization of any worldview or code of values, at the periphery and the center of global society. M oreover, while in m any cases cultural flow s from the center to the periphery may be prom inent in the dynam ics of globalization, there is always the possibility of counter-flows from the periphery to the center (b a n n e r 1987; A ppadurai 1990; N ederveen Pieterse 1994; Tom linson 1996). This applies to any kind of ideas and cultural elem ents, once they enter the dynam ics of global diffusion. A nother factor that runs against the identification of globalization and homogenization is the resistance to relativization and hom ogenization offered by actors at the local level, w hich m ay also take the shape of cultural chauvinism or ethno­ cultural defense (Beyer 1994). A third im portant factor underm ining the possibility of a thoroughgoing cul­ tural homogenization has been em phasized by various studies focusing on glocalization, hybridization, creolization, and other sim ilar concepts. D ifferent though their em phases and applications m ay be, these term s generally refer to the fact that global ideas tend to be adapted in distinctive ways in different cultures.1 G lobalization produces a variety of local interpretations, and induces shaping of new identities in an attem pt to reach some kind of conform ity to global patterns. Im ported ideas acquire a distinctive flavor at the local level, and m ay in tu rn be exported as global cultural item s and exert some influence on other cultures, including the dom inant ones. To be m ore precise, rather than the opposition betw een global and local we should take into account their m utual im plication: the local is always the product of previous hybridization, and diversity produced at the local level provides the content for global cultural flows. A ccording to this view, there is no global w ithout the local and vice versa. R elig io n an d g lo b a liza tio n Religion has progressively occupied a m eaningful position w ithin the stream of studies on cultural globalization at least since the tim e of Robertson’s early pub­ lications on this subject in the 1980s. W hile Robertson’s scholarship has espe­ cially insisted on the interdependence of the global and the local (glocalization), and the role played by religion in the definition of new local identities and the legitim ization of collective action,2 other contributions have analyzed the inter­ section of religion and globalization from different perspectives. The focus on significant aspects such as religious ‘fundam entalism ’ (with a certain overem­ phasis), relativization, the repositioning of religion at the system ic level, and its role as a carrier of globalization has contributed to the proliferation of studies on this topic3 to the point that, a few years ago, a careful observer such as Lionel O badia said that it was “already becom ing difficult to outline the entire body of works devoted to religion and globalization” (O badia 2010: 477).

Introduction

5

A n extensive review of the vast literature on religion and globalization goes beyond the scope of the present work. However, I th in k it is possible to integrate some of these ideas and my previous work (Dessì 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012) into the fram ew ork discussed above, to provide an approach that is com prehen­ sive enough to analyze the role played by religion w ithin globalization. a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

At the level of religious communication, religions may respond to the relativization of worldviews and values prom oted by globalization by acknowledging the presence and equal dignity of other religions and repositioning themselves as ‘one true w orld religion among m any other true world religions’ (religious pluralism), by acknowledging some degree of truth in other ‘inferior’ religions (religious inclusivism ), or by denying their value altogether (religious exclusivism) (Hick 1983; cf. Freiberger and Kleine 2011: 441-3). G lobalization also produces a variety of local interpretations in the religious field. Religions respond to cultural flows (including religious and non-religious elem ents) by shaping new glocal identities or contributing to these processes (Robertson 1992). W ithin this fram ework, glocalization m ay lean to selected external sources that are then adapted to local circum stances or to selected ‘native’ sources (which may also be the result of previous indigenization) and im ply more or less explicit goals such as ‘reviving the origins’ or the ‘invention of tradition.’ Again, the same religion may follow different patterns of glocalization when im planted in a new cultural environm ent.4 Religions may resist the relativization of worldviews and cultural homogenization, oppose change and hybridization, and reject selected cultural/ religious elements. Contextually, religions may also strongly reassert the value and superiority o f their own tradition, and prom ote form s of cultural chauvin­ ism. W here religions have been implanted, they m ay offer resources to local com munities to preserve their cultural identity. Religion is an integral part of the cultural flows that characterize global soci­ ety. As is im m ediately visible from the role played by religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism in the early phases of global history, reli­ gion has been in the past a carrier of globalization, and continues nowadays to provide an important contribution to the flow o f cultural exchanges world­ wide (Lehmann 1998). The dram atic acceleration o f the process o f globalization and the increasing reflexive awareness o f globalization are inextricably linked to the develop­ ment of global m arkets and new system s of com m unication and inform ation that respond to the logic o f dom inant social subsystem s such as the econ­ omy, science/technology, politics, and the media, w hich are functionally dif­ ferentiated from religion and whose scope has becom e global. Religion plays a part as a distinct subsystem in global society, but is often at a dis­ advantage because m any priority functions do not find legitim ation in reli­ gious authority. Thus, at the system ic level, religion often engages in border negotiation w ith the dom inant subsystem s and even com petes w ith them (Beyer 1994, 2000).

6 Introduction f)

At the system ic level religion also tries to find new legitim ation and a new role within globalization by addressing residual problems: namely, those press­ ing global problems (war, environmental crisis, poverty, social alienation, etc.) that are left unsolved by dominant subsystem s such as the economy, science/ technology, and politics (Beyer 1994, 1997).

J a p a n ese relig io n s w ith in g lo b a liza tio n Based on the discussion above, it is possible to sketch a fourteen-item typology that is flexible and comprehensive enough to address the role specifically played by Japanese religions w ithin global dynam ics in the last few decades. The use of sub-types and m ixed types below highlights the distinction betw een processes taking place in Japan and those taking place overseas, the distinction betw een glocalization leaning to ‘native’ sources and that leaning to external sources, and those cases where glocalization/hybridization is accom panied by a distinctive em phasis on the superiority of Japanese religions. Types (1), (2), and (3) below concern the three m ain attitudes tow ard other religions on the world religious map presented in point (a) above, based on John H ick’s threefold distinction (pluralism , inclusivism , exclusivism ). Item s (4), (5), (8), and (9) are sub-types of the phenom enon of glocalization sum m arized in point (b) above, and take into account varieties of glocalization (leaning to ex tern al/‘native’ sources) and different contexts (Japan/overseas). Item s (7) and (11) are sub-types of resistance to hom ogenization and cultural chauvinism presented in point (c) above, w hich take into account different contexts (Japan/ overseas). Item s (6) and (10) are m ixed types of glocalization and cultural chau­ vinism applied to different contexts (Japan/overseas). Type (12) refers to point (d) above and the role of Japanese religions as carriers of globalization. The last two types refer to points (e) and (f) above, and take into account the system ic level from different perspectives: type (13) focuses on border negotiation betw een religion and other subsystem s in Japan, w hile type (14) focuses on system ic repo­ sitioning through engaging w ith residual problem s. Thus, the following typology attem pts to encom pass the different ways in w hich Japanese religions are involved in the process of globalization: 1 . Japanese religions acknowledge the equal dignity o f other religions w orld­ wide. This involves a repositioning and the shaping o f a new global identity, according to the claim to be ‘one true world religion among many other true w orld religions’ (religious pluralism ). 2. Japanese religions perceive other religions as approxim ations of the truth and therefore inferior (religious inclusivism ). 3. Japanese religions explicitly deny the value o f other religions (religious exclusivism ). 4. Japanese religions in Japan select and adopt foreign cultural/religious elements as resources to shape new glocal identities (glocalization leaning to selected external sources).

Introduction

7

5. Japanese religions in Japan select ‘native’ religious elem ents as resources to shape new glocal identities (glocalization leaning to selected ‘native’ sources). 6. During this process o f glocalization in Japan (types 4 -5), Japanese religions emphasize the superiority o f Japanese culture/religion (glocalization and cultural chauvinism). 7. Japanese religions in Japan reject foreign cultural/religious elem ents (resist­ ance to homogenization, cultural chauvinism). 8. Japanese religions overseas select and adopt foreign cultural/religious ele­ ments as resources to shape new glocal identities or/and attract new followers (glocalization leaning to selected external sources). 9. Japanese religions overseas select Japanese ‘n ativ e’ religious elem ents as resources to shape new glocal identities or/and attract new follow ers (glocalization leaning to selected ‘native’ sources). 10. During this process of glocalization overseas (types 8-9), Japanese religions emphasize the superiority of Japanese culture/religion (glocalization and cul­ tural chauvinism). 11. Japanese religions overseas reject foreign cultural/religious elem ents in an attempt to preserve their own identity (creation of virtual bridges, resistance to homogenization, cultural chauvinism). 12. Japanese religions influence other religions and cultures that in turn adopt Japanese religious elements as resources to shape new glocal identities (global cultural flows and glocalization). 13. Japanese religions negotiate borders w ith global subsystems such as politics, education, and science (repositioning and border negotiation at the systemic level). 14. Japanese religions attem pt to reassert their role in global society through addressing pressing social problem s that are left unsolved or even created by the dominant social subsystem s (repositioning and perform ance at the systemic level). In the following chapters, this typology is used as a starting point for analyz­ ing a wide range of Japanese religions w ithin accelerated globalization. In C hapter Two, I analyze how Japanese religions relate them selves to the issues of pluralism (type 1), inclusivism (type 2), and exclusivism (type 3). The chapter focuses on the H ieizan Shūky ō Sam itto 上匕歡山宗教サミット （Religious Summit at Mt Hiei) organized by Tendaish ū 天 台 宗 and other Japanese religious institu­ tions as well as various form s of interreligious dialogue prom oted by Risshō K ōseikai as thoughtful m anifestations of pluralism . Then, I present other evi­ dence to show how in the latter new religious movem ent an underlying tendency to inclusivism m ay also be traced. A sim ilar approach also em erges from the case studies of the Zen-nihon B ukky ōkai 全 日 本 仏 教 会 (Japan B uddhist Federation) and J ōdo Shinsh ū 浄 土 真 宗 , where a certain inclination to present B uddhism as a superior form of spirituality is recognizable. In the last section of this chapter, I illustrate Sōka G akkai’s shakubuku 折 伏 （to break and subdue) cam paign as a paradigm atic form of religious exclusivism .

8 Introduction Chapter Three focuses on the varieties of lo c a liz a tio n in Japanese religions, in order to show how new religious identities may be form ed by either external (type 4) or ‘native’ (types 5) sources. Here, starting from the religious im plica­ tions of the hisabetsu buraku 被 差 别 部 落 (discrim inated-against ham let people) issue, I illustrate how the discourse on hum an rights has been adopted and indigenized in Jōdo Shinshū , Sōt ōshū 曹 洞同宗 ，and Jōdoshū 浄 土 宗 . Then I present the em pirical cases of Shinto’s 神 道 and Sōt ōshū ’s concern for the environm ental crisis, to show how ideas about ecology may be com bined w ith selective readings of the religious tradition to reconfigure new religious identities closer to the glo­ bal com m unication network. In C hapter Four, I first analyze global dynam ics at the intersection betw een glocalization and cultural chauvinism (type 6). In this connection, I explore how the incorporation of the theme of ‘lost continents’ and the figure of Jesus Christ in new religious movements such as M ahikari and Kōfuku no K azakh 幸 福 の 科 学 is functional to the claim of the superiority of Japanese culture over other cul­ tures. In the second section, I present a critique of individualism as a ‘w estern’ value in traditions such as Shingonshū 真 言 宗 ，Shintō, and Sōka G akkai as an em pirical case to illustrate how Japanese religions are active w ithin globalization not only in the field of religious com m unication and in the form ation of hybrid form s at the local level, but also as a force resisting change and cultural homogenization (type 7). Chapter Five deals w ith the same dynam ics explored in the previous two chap­ ters w ith reference to Japanese religions overseas (types 8-11). The first part presents the em pirical case of the adoption of m editational techniques in N orth A m erican Jōdo Shinshū , w hich are generally discouraged in traditional ortho­ praxis, in order to m eet the expectations of a grow ing class of global spiritual seekers. Then I introduce the case of Zen B uddhism presented and practiced as a sort of ‘supra-religion’ in non-Japanese settings, in order to show how the glocalization of Japanese religions overseas m ay also be accom panied by form s of cultural chauvinism . In C hapter Six, we tu rn our attention to the role of Japanese religions as carri­ ers of globalization (type 12). In this connection, I start from a b rief discussion on the popularization of Z en B uddhism outside Japan to focus in more detail on one of its intriguing developments, the establishm ent of a tradition of C hristian m onks, priests, and nuns who practice m editation and are acknow ledged as Zen m asters. I also present the M acrobiotics movement, through w hich religious elem ents from the Japanese (and C hinese) tradition have been divulgated in num erous countries, as another em pirical case. The last part of this chapter focuses on another way through w hich Japanese religions exercise their in flu ­ ence over other cultures: namely, establishing organizations or foundations that prom ote and fund academ ic work at the international level. Here, I analyze the cases of organizations such as the B ukkyō D endō Kyōkai 仏 教 作 道 協 云 (Society for the Prom otion of Buddhism ), and the Shinto H okusai A k k ad ネ申道 国 際 学 会 (International Shinto Foundation).

Introduction

9

Chapters Seven and Eight focus on the system ic level, to investigate how Japanese religions negotiate borders and com pete w ith other social subsystem s that dom inate global society (type 13). As for the relationship betw een religion and politics, I analyze the cases of Sōka A k k ad and its offshoot, the K ōm eitō 公 明 党 Party, as well as Kōfuku no K azakh and its political arm , the Kōfuku Jitsugentō 幸 福 実 現 党 . Further analysis exam ines other m odalities of religious involvem ent in politics and the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine and Shinto national­ ism, w hich are related to the separation of state and religion found in the Japanese Constitution. Closely linked to this topic is the issue of the separation of religion and public education, w hich I present in connection to the recent revision of the Fundam ental Law of Education. I approach border negotiation betw een religion and science w ith reference to the recent debate on bioethical issues fueled by the revision of the O rgan Transplant Law, in which various denom inations of Japanese Buddhism , Shinto, and new religious movements have actively taken part. In the last chapter, I approach the system ic level in order to analyze how Japanese religions address global residual problem s (type 14). Here, I illustrate how engagem ent against war, poverty, social alienation, and other relief and social welfare activities may represent for individual religious organizations, reli­ gious netw orks, or religion-based non-governm ental organizations (NGOs) and non-profit organizations (N PO s) an occasion to find a role for religion in global society and a new source of legitim ation. Since we are dealing w ith a typological distinction, we should expect to find that the abovem entioned aspects are often m ixed together in em pirical and his­ torical reality. Moreover, different typologies may also be sim ultaneously present in the same religious context. Even those religions that seem to react to globaliza­ tion rather negatively may model their strategies after im ported and m odern m odels, in order to construe an im age of them selves that is im plicitly global: namely, im bued w ith global worldviews and values (this is the case, for example, of m any of the so-called invented traditions). In other words, religion (as other social actors) can be at the same tim e ‘against’ globalization and ‘w ithin’ globali­ zation. Phenom ena related to new religious movem ents in Japan may som etim es reveal a clearer link to the dynam ics of globalization, but we w ill see that this does not m ean that traditional religions and form s of inform al religiosity are not actively involved in the process. I m ust w arn readers that in this book (apart from some exceptions in chapters Five and Six) the m ain focus w ill be on the institutional level, that is to say, on the different ways through w hich the aforem entioned dynam ics affect (im plicitly or explicitly) the global consciousness of Japanese religious institutions. W hether or not effective and coherent religious action may follow from the development of these global dynam ics and hybridization is not the m ain concern of this book. And, needless to say, it is not suggested here that one should necessarily find the same dynam ics and trends at the individual level. I should also clarify that, although there may also be other factors – such as institutional repositioning of religion w ithin Japanese society, or even what is perceived by m any as the decline

10 Introduction of traditional religion in Japan – underlying some of the religious phenom ena analyzed here, these factors are not (and cannot be) the focus of the present study. Similarly, readers who are expecting to find here a discussion of intriguing them es such as the Aum incident and religious responses to the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunam i should tu rn to other sources. In other words, this is not a com prehensive overview of religion in contem porary Japan, but an analysis of the global im plications of several selected case studies in term s of the typology presented above. Before we proceed in exam ining Japanese religions w ithin accelerated globali­ zation, however, we m ust clarify two m ethodological issues closely related to our analysis. O ur focus on Japanese religions as a global phenom enon requires that we take into account the risk of cultural bias, and that we make an effort to avoid anything in our approach that would attem pt to apply to other cultures patterns that are specific to our own culture. In the next chapter, I discuss this problem in connection w ith two crucial points. The first concerns my w orking definition of religion, w hich should possibly function also in a ‘non-w estern’ context such as the Japanese one. The second point concerns the concept of globalization and its applicability to the Japanese religious context, w hich I w ill discuss w ith refer­ ence to the different phases of globalization in Japan.

1

T h e

r is k

o f c u ltu r a l b ia s

D e fin itio n s a n d p h a s e s

G lo b a liza tio n , cu ltu ra l b ias, an d th e d efin itio n o f relig io n By its very definition, the study of Japanese religions w ithin globalization requires a supplem entary dose of caution against the risks posed by cultural bias. Since we are dealing w ith religion as a global phenom enon, the uncritical application of E uropean (‘w estern’) categories about religion and globalization to the Japanese context would be not only contradictory and detrim ental to our analysis but would also even count as a contribution to some form of cultural im perialism . In this chapter, this point w ill be addressed w ith reference to two sensitive methodologi­ cal issues, namely, the definition of religion and the periodization of globalization. The activity of defining religion is notoriously one of the most problem atic in religious studies, and probably also one of the most revelatory of the degree of cultural bias of those who undertake it. Two well-known examples are offered in this sense by R udolf O tto， s idea of “the holy” (das H eilige) and M ilton Yinger’s reference to the “ultim ate problems of hum an life,” both heavily indebted to Christian thought (Otto 2004; Yinger 1970: 7). The critique of such ‘essentialist’ approaches and their scarce applicability to a broader range of religious phenom ­ ena has led some scholars, following in the footsteps of N inian Smart, to abandon the search for a lowest com mon denom inator of all religions, thus relying on the idea of fam ily resem blances betw een various religious form s. If for Sm art “the search for an essence [of religion] ends up in vagueness” (Sm art 1989: 12), how­ ever, his w ell-known approach focusing on seven different dim ensions of religion (practical, experiential, narrative, doctrinal, ethical, social, and m aterial) is not without its difficulties. A part from the apparent lack of focus, one of the m ain problem s is that, as noted by Tim othy Fitzgerald, he “continued to distinguish betw een religions and religion-like ideologies on the criteria of the sacred located in the supernatural” (Fitzgerald 1996: 226). O n the other hand, Fitzgerald’s extrem e conclusion that the category of “religion” should be abandoned altogether and that religious studies should merge in cultural studies is not much more con­ vincing (Fitzgerald 1997, 2000). Interestingly enough for our purposes, Fitzgerald often relies on the Japanese case to argue that religion is an ideological category: the category religion operates at a superficial level w ith Japan and serves to obscure rather than illum inate Japanese realities. The idea that there exist a

12

The risk o f cultural bias num ber of separate religions in Japan that can be studied and analyzed in a decontextual way is a category m istake deriving from the history of w estern im perial expansion, the im position of a w estern ideological distinction betw een religion and the secular, and the Japanese reaction to w estern threats at the tim e of Meiji. (Fitzgerald 2000: 181)

As Ian Reader has correctly pointed out, however, w hat Fitzgerald seem s to overlook is that “distinctions betw een the ‘religious’ and the ‘non-religious’ have been a recurrent element in Japanese history since at least the eighth century onwards,” and m ay be evinced from a num ber of cases, such as the policies of the R itsuryō governm ent, the ōbō-buppō 王 法 • 仏 法 (im perial law vs. B uddhist law) dichotomy, the particular rights accorded to B uddhist tem ples and Shinto shrines, and the existence of a class of priests differentiated in m any ways from ordinary society (Reader 2004; cf. K leine 2012). M oreover, Fitzgerald’s tendency to take at face value the self-description of Japanese people as ‘non-religious’ m ay also be seen as a contribution to the perpetuation of a typically Japanese ideological construct.1 The com m on Japanese understanding of the term ‘reli­ gion’ is in fact still very much indebted to the way Shintō ネ申道 and traditional religious values were m anipulated in the S e iji period in order to create an ideol­ ogy for the m odern nation-state, w hile form ally acknow ledging the principle of freedom of religion (which was codified in the 1889 Constitution) that could facilitate, among other things, the revision of unequal treaties w ith the w estern colonial pow ers.2 In a contribution specifically focusing on the issue of defining religion in the global age, Frank Lechner has advocated a “pluralistic approach.” Since “there is no single accepted definition of religion as a distinct category w ith a universal core,” he proposes “to tu rn this predicam ent into a virtue by advocating plural­ ism: the com petitive pursuit of alternative definitions, all serving potentially fruitful agendas, could m axim ize our cognitive gains” (Lechner 2003: 68, 80-81). N eedless to say, this may indeed be a viable position as a general approach to the state of the field, provided that it rem ains open to the critical exam ination of the possible ideological underpinnings em bedded in this variety of alternative defi­ nitions. If it is true, as Lechner him self notes, that definitions also m atter because “they structure research agendas” (Lechner 2003: 68), our approach to Japanese religions in global society requires the adoption of an adequate definition of reli­ gion, w hich m ay acknowledge religion as a social fact; be solid yet flexible enough to function also in ‘non-w estern’ contexts, notably in Japan, where m ain­ stream religiosity generally focuses on practices related to obtaining worldly benefits rather than on ‘ultim ate concerns’ or doctrine (Reader and Danube 1998); and possibly allow the distinction betw een religion and other social subsystems, w hile telling us som ething about w hat religion does. In the book Religion and G lobalization published in 1994, w hich is also the first m onograph on this them e, the sociologist, Peter Beyer, adopted a definition of religion based on Nik las L ehm ann's theorization on social system s. Following

The risk of cultural bias

13

L ehm ann's assum ption that religion finds application in “the problem of the sim ultaneity of indeterm inableness and certainty (or transcendence and im m anence),”3 Beyer affirm s here that “religion is a type of com m unication based on the im m anent/transcendent polarity, w hich functions to lend m eaning to the root indeterm inability of all m eaningful hum an com m unication, and w hich offers ways of overcom ing or at least m anaging this indeterm inability and its constquences” (Beyer 1994: 6). W ithin this fram ework, Beyer argues, “the im m anent is the whole world, the whole of perceptible reality, all m eaning communicable among hum an beings” that “cannot as such be the subject of com m unication, because we cannot distinguish it from anything that it does not encom pass.” Thus, the transcendent “serves to give the im m anent whole its m eaningful con­ text,” although it “can only be com m unicated in im m anent term s.” From this standpoint, Beyer observes, the function of religion is to lend m eaning to the whole, and, additionally, to address “core problems in hum an life” such as “failure, insecurity, disappointm ent” (Beyer 1994: 5). Beyer’s adaptation of Luhm annian them es was suggestive, but at the same tim e one was left w ith the im pression that his form ulation was coming close to conceptions of religion focusing on ulti­ mate concerns or the ultim ate m eaning of life – w hich would hardly apply, for example, to form s of religiosity m ainly concerned w ith w orldly benefits (such as the case of Japan). From a broader perspective, it may perhaps also be suggested that this approach did not allow a sufficient distinction betw een religion and metaphysics. Indeed, Beyer has subsequently distanced him self from this defini­ tion of religion. He has presented “blessed/cursed” as the central religious code, and has attem pted to indicate some of the problem s underlying the dichotomy transcendent/im m anent: L uhm ann’s suggestion of transcendent/im m anent, much like the sacred/ profane distinction cham pioned by Eliade and D urkheim , while designating reasonably accurately the same comm onality, seem s to underdeterm ine the negative religious pole too much and thus m isses a good portion of what more fundam entally structures actual religious com m unications in today’s world, nam ely the avoidance of or struggle against religiously determ ined evil (as opposed to ju st the moral pole, ‘bad’). M ore critically, perhaps, it is too close to the this-w orldly/other-w orldly distinction w hich is more germ ane to some religions or subsections of religions than others. (Beyer 2006: 85) A nother scholar unsatisfied w ith the Luhm annian dichotom y transcendent/ im m anent, K arel D obbelaere, argues that this definition does not apply to worldaffirm ing new religious movements, because they “are not concerned w ith the problem s of sim ultaneity of transcendence and im m anence, since they focus only on the im m anent, on everyday life, on the secular” (D obbelaere 2004: 237).4 However, it m ay be observed that also in D obbelaere’s definition, according to w hich religion is “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to a supraem pirical, transcendent reality that unites all those who adhere to it into a single

14

The risk o f cultural bias

moral com m unity” (D obbelaere 1981: 38; 2004: 230), there are some problem ­ atical elem ents. Here, the D urkheim ian idea that religion necessarily unites participants in a “single m oral com m unity” (D urkheim 2001:46) seem s far too exclusive. A classical objection is that such approaches focusing on collective identity fail to take into account the possibility of egoistic and utilitarian coop­ eration, and the conflictual aspects of m orality.5 Forging a collective identity m ay well be only one of the possible functions of religion, and it would be rather difficult to apply this idea to specific religious phenom ena found in Japan. One m ay consider, for exam ple, most of the form al m em bers (danka 擅 家 ) of trad i­ tional B uddhist tem ples, who discover they belong to a certain denom ination only at the tim e of a funeral in the family, or w ithin the context of the veneration of their own ancestors; the solitary and fugacious worship at one of the small street-shrines for the bodhisattva Jizō (Jizō-d ō 地 蔵 堂 ); or the buying and hold­ ing of an am ulet (o-m am ori お 守 り ) for passing the college exam ination. A nother interesting definition of religion has been proposed by Luther M artin, according to whom “religion is (a) a social system (b) legitim ated by claim s to the authority of some superhum an pow er” (M artin 2000: 141). This form ulation has the m erit of avoiding any reference to ethno-culturally biased ideas such as that of the ‘ultim ate m eaning of life’; refers to the issue of authority, w hich is pertinent to secularization theory; and allows the distinction betw een religion and other social subsystem s. However, M artin’s claim that “the special function of religious system s is to identify and m aintain the m arkers of collective identity for the social entity” (M artin 2000: 143) is problem atical as m uch as D obbelaere’s reference to “m oral com m unity,” unless “collective identity” indicates, more neutrally (and somewhat tautologically), som ething like ‘utilizing the same mode of com m unication.’ A sim ilar reference to superhum an powers has been recently made by M artin Riesebrodt, who defines religion as “a complex of religious prac­ tices w hich lies on the prem ise of the existence of generally invisible personal or im personal superhum an powers.”6 However, R iesebrodt does not directly address in his definition the issue of religious authority, which, it is assum ed here, is cen­ tral w ithin a functionally differentiated social context to explain how religion’s way of legitim izing its claim s differs from those of other subsystem s. Moreover, religious authority would also be an im portant tool for analyzing undifferenti­ ated social contexts, where various kinds of social action tend to be legitim ized in religious term s. Therefore, differently from R iesebrodt’s assum ption that “definitions of religion should not assum e, for exam ple, that religion is a social subsystem institutionally differentiated from politics and the econom y” (Riesebrodt 2004: 5), I think that a w orking definition of religion should possibly also take into account instances where religion is actually “differentiated from politics and the economy,” especially if this definition serves for the study of religion in global society. The sociologist, M ark Chaves, has based his analysis of secularization on the notion of religious authority, of w hich he has provided the following definition: “a social structure that attem pts to enforce its order and reach its ends by control­ ling the access of individuals to some desired goods, where the legitim ation of

The risk of cultural bias

15

that control includes some supernatural component, however w eak” (Chaves 1994: 755-6; cf. W eber 1980: 29). A lthough this definition is not about religion as such, and Chaves m akes it clear that “this argum ent to replace religion w ith religious authority applies only w ith respect to secularization” (Chaves 1994: 770), his approach to authority proves to be useful in order to sketch an alterna­ tive definition of religion that may also apply to the Japanese case. One of the fruitful ways to approach the problem of a w orking definition of religion suitable for investigating Japanese religions w ithin the context of globalization is to take into account the fact that each of the various subsystem s em erging as a result of secularization has not only its own function but also its own m edium – namely, the subsystem ’s own specific way of legitim ating its claims. M oreover, the fact that the less the social system is functionally differentiated, the more the reli­ gion’s function tends to overlap w ith those of other spheres of social life should be acknowledged. The general case of Japan is, of course, that of a highly dif­ ferentiated society, although the presence of undifferentiated areas m ay also be noticed. As in the case of pow er for the political subsystem , and scientific truth for science, religion also has its own medium: the authority of some agency beyond the intersubjectively observable phenom ena. The subjective aspect of this approach clearly em erges from Jan Platvoet’s definition of religion: “Religion” may then be defined as any behavior w hich believers interpret as com m unication, direct or indirect, betw een them selves and beings whose existence and activity cannot be verified or falsified but whom the believers believe to exist and to be active, directly or indirectly, in their lives and envi­ ronm ent. A nd “a religion” may be defined as the netw ork of reciprocal rela­ tionships w hich a believer, or a group of believers, believes to exist w ithin him , her or itself and the non-verifiable/non-falsifiable beings w hich they believe to exist and to be active in their lives. (Platvoet 1990: 195; cf. Platvoet 1999: 262) Given the problem atical status of concepts such as the ‘superhum an’ or the ‘supernatural’ that feature in sim ilar approaches to the definition of religion, this agency w ill be characterized here through the category of super-em pirical (or m eta-em pirical).7 If we consider the variety of Japanese religious experience, instances of such agencies would include the kam i 神 , the BUDDHAS and bodhisattvas, various kinds of ‘sp irits’ (e.g. the ancestors), and other m ore elusive com ­ ponents such as tentō/tendō 天 道 ，a variation of the Chinese concept of the Way of Heaven (Ch. tiandao), the B uddhist D harm a, and the Pure Land. A sim ilar point has been made by W outer H anegraaff in his analysis of New Age beliefs Finally, another im portant issue that needs to be addressed here is how religion differs from other subsystem s in functional term s. In this connection, C haves’s discussion on secularization as declining religious authority seem s to offer a valuable clue. Leaving aside his reference to the “supernatural,” Chaves suggests that the function of religion is that of “controlling the access of individuals to some desired goods.” These “goods” can be “otherw orldly or this w orldly, general or

16

The risk o f cultural bias

specific, psychic or m aterial, collective or individual” and include a w ide variety of item s because w hat really m atters is not the content of these goods but rather the way the access to them is legitim ized. Chaves lists goods such as “deliverance from sickness, m eaninglessness, poverty, desire, sin,” and other positive ones such as “eternal life, nirvana, utopian com munity, perfect health, great w ealth” (Chaves 1994: 756). Given the flexibility of this fram ew ork, to these goods one m ay well add not only social solidarity and integration (or a ‘m oral com m unity’) and ordered fam ily relationships, but also other item s such as proper behavior, love, sex, happiness, success, political power, knowledge, supernorm al powers, protection from m isfortune, and liberation for oneself and others. Based on the discussion above, I think that a w orking definition of religion m ay be sketched. For the present study of Japanese religions w ithin the context of globalization, then, I w ill consider religion as a social subsystem characterized by the fact that it legitim ates its claim s – namely, controlling the access of individuals to certain “goods” (otherw orldly or this w orldly, psychic or m aterial, collective or individual) —through the authority of some super-em pirical agency. The less the social system is functionally differentiated, the more religion tends to be indistinct from spheres of social life related to the production and distribu­ tion of goods, the adoption of binding decisions, the production of knowledge, teaching, healing, etc., and to legitim ate these activities in its peculiar way. It m ay also be observed that this w orking definition is hardly narrow er than m ainstream em ic understandings and representations of religion in Japan. As far as the com m on self-representation of Japanese people as ‘non-religious’ is con­ cerned, it is apparent that the present w orking definition sim ply em braces a broader variety of em pirical phenom ena, including those – such as calendrical rituals, and more or less inform al visits to, and activities in, shrines and temples – that are perceived by most Japanese people as “non-religious” (cf. Fujiwara 2006; Ama 1996: 8-16; and Davis 1992: 231-51). Another authoritative emic representa­ tion of religion is em bedded in the Japanese Religious C orporations Law (Shūkyō hōjin h ō 宗 教 法 人 法 )，where A rticle 2 provides the crucial criterion for the offi­ cial recognition of applicant organizations as “religious corporations” (shūkyō hōjin 宗 教 法 人 ) . Here, a “religious organization” (shūkyō dantai 宗 教 団 体 ) is defined as one “w hose m ain objective is the dissem ination of its doctrines, the conduct of rituals and functions, and the education and nurture of believers” (shūkyō no kyōg i o R o m e , g ish iki g yōj i o okonai, oyobi shinja o kyōka ikusei suru koto o shutaru m okuteki to s u r u 宗 教 の 教 義 を ひ ろ め ，僮 式 行 事 を 行 い , 及 び 信 者 を 教 化 育 成 す る こ と を 主 た る 目 的 と す る ) . Interestingly enough, this definition has been criticized by the Shinto institutions on the following grounds: The Religious Corporations Law lists the requirem ents for a religious group to be recognized, the first being the dissem ination of its doctrine. However, Shinto has no doctrine. Thus it has no text that expresses Shinto doctrine in words. O n this point, if the law were to be applied strictly it would be diffi­ cult for Shinto shrines to receive recognition as legal religious bodies. At the risk of exaggeration, we m ust recognize that a situation could arise in

The risk o f cultural bias

17

which a Shinto shrine would be told, “If you w ant to be recognized as a reli­ gious body, you m ust change the content of your faith, because you do not m eet the requirem ents for being recognized as a religious body.” (K isala 1997: 67; cf. Teeuwen 1996) W hile from the em ic perspective of Shinto the characterization of religion provided by the Religious Corporations Law is too restrictive, the professed absence of “doctrine” in this (or any other) Japanese religion would not under­ m ine the applicability of our w orking definition. As far as the field of religious studies (shūkyōgaku 宗 教 学 ）in Japan is concerned, an authoritative source is provided by the recently revised Shūkvōgaku jite n 宗 教 学 事 典 (D ictionary of Religious Studies). This text, w hich is also listed am ong the study m aterials for the recently instituted exam ination for the certificate of “specialist in religious culture” (shūkyō bunka shi 宗教文イ匕士)9, does not go beyond a general outline of the classic functional, substantial, and m ixed definitions of religion elaborated by w estern scholarship and the m ost recent developm ents (Kawase 2010; Fukasaw a 2010). A nother of the introductory textbooks to religious studies that also figures in the same list distinguishes betw een an institutional/cultural approach to the m eaning of religion, and another related to the subjective level, w hich focuses on a “transcendent existence” (chōetsuteki sonzai 超 越 白 勺 存 在 ) variously identified w ith gods, buddhas, spirits, and ancestors (Inoue 2011: 14). It may be also seen that in this case our w orking definition is hardly less inclusive than the one im plied by this emic understanding. Finally, another relevant emic representation of religion in the Japanese context is w orth m entioning here: namely, the entry on religion in the standard K ōjie n dictionary: Beliefs or observances related to gods, any transcendent absolute, or sacred things set apart from profane things and interdicted, and their system atic rela­ tionship. Its devotees jointly associate in a (religious) spiritual community.10 It m ay be easily noticed how this entry is patterned after D urkheim ’s defini­ tion of religion, and that w ith its reference to a “transcendent absolute” (chōetsuteki zettaisha 超 越 的 絶 対 者 ）and a “spiritual com m unity” (seishinteki kyōdō shakai 精ネ申白勺共同社会 ) appears to be more restrictive than our working definition, as already discussed above.11 In addition, it m ay be argued that the division betw een “sacred things” (shinseina mono ネ 申 聖 な の and “profane things” (hizokuna mono 卑 俗 な も の ) found here is less flexible than our refer­ ence to a generic class of goods, the access to w hich is controlled through the authority of some super-em pirical agency. C u ltu ra l b ias and p h a ses o f g lo b a liza tio n The second m ethodological issue that w ill be addressed in this chapter relates to the applicability of the category of globalization to the Japanese religious context. Here, this point w ill be discussed w ith reference to the possibility of

18

The risk o f cultural bias

identifying different phases of globalization in Japan. Thus far, various models have been proposed for the chronology of globalization, from cyclical ones to linear ones localizing the beginning of this process at different points in history. A characteristic often shared by these scholarly approaches, however, is the per­ ception of the central role played, if variously defined, by m odernity w ithin the whole process (cf. Scholte 2005; Cam pbell 2007). In fact, there is a tendency to establish a direct connection betw een the em ergence of the w estern powers, the spread of the world m arket, and m odernization. The resulting picture is in m any cases that globalization comes to be seen as som ething originating in Europe and em anating from the “W est” to different parts of the world starting as early as the voyages of exploration. A reaction to this form of Eurocentrism has been offered by Shmuel Eisenstadt and other scholars, who have attem pted to form ulate an alternative approach to m odernity. Eisenstadt made his point very clear in the opening of his contribu­ tion to the w inter 2000 issue of D aedalus entirely dedicated to the them e of “M ultiple M odernities,” w hich was soon to becom e very popular in the social sciences: The notion of “m ultiple m odernities” denotes a certain view of the contem po­ rary world – indeed of the history and characteristics of the m odern era – that goes against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourse. It goes against the view of the “classical” theories of m odernization and of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s, and indeed against the classical sociological analyses of M arx, D urkheim , and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in one reading of his work. They all assum ed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program of m odernity as it developed in m odern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that em erged there would ultim ately take over in all m odernizing and m odern societies; w ith the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world. (E isenstadt 2000: 1) W ithin this stream of studies, the idea of a “multiple pattern of globalization” is strongly em phasized, in w hich m odernity itself is continuously and variously reinterpreted at the local level (Eisenstadt 1999: 294). A lthough this notion of m ultiple m odernities provides a corrective to the idea o f a globalization sub­ stantially em anating from Europe and N orth A m erica, it m ay be observed, how­ ever, that it still rem ains dependent on the assum ption that non-w estern societies owe their access to global dynam ics to the original im pulse given by w estern m odernity and its organizational and institutional dim ensions. C haracteristic of E isenstadt’s approach is in fact the basic assum ption that “the ‘original’ m oder­ nity” first em erged in Europe and “later expanded throughout the w orld” (Eisenstadt 1999: 284). N eedless to say, the theorizers of the “m ultiple m odernities” paradigm are not alone in their criticism of the w esternization model. As already m entioned in the Introduction, in the late 1980s various scholars focusing on the cultural

The risk o f cultural bias

19

dim ension of globalization started underm ining the possibility of w esternization as a thoroughgoing cultural hom ogenization. Just to m ention a few examples, scholars such as U lf H annerz and John Tom linson have forcibly argued that world culture is “marked by an organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniform ity” (H annerz 1990: 237), and that the w esternization thesis greatly “underestim ates the cultural resilience and dynam ism of non-W estern cultures” and “their capacity to ‘indigenise’ W estern cultural im ports” (Tomlinson 1996: 27). The controversial issue of w esternization has also been approached by the afore­ m entioned N ederveen Pieterse, who notes how, in social science, globalization and m odernity tend to go hand in hand. Sim ilarly to M arxist ideas on the devel­ opm ent of the world m arket, he argues, globalization centered on m odernity “begins in and em anates from Europe and the W est,” and is in effect “a theory of w esternization by another nam e” (N ederveen Pieterse 2009: 67). Interestingly for our discussion, N ederveen Pieterse is also one of the scholars who have recently insisted on the idea of “oriental globalization” (N ederveen Pieterse 2006: 411). The em ergence of this new paradigm , according to which global history is not centered on Europe but rather on the “E ast,” is especially indebted to the scholarship of academ ics com ing from different disciplines such as Janet Abu-Lughod, A ndre G under Frank, K enneth Pom eranz, Eric Jones, and John Hobson, who have focused their research on different geographical areas. One of the characteristic claim s em erging from w ithin this new trend of studies is that there is enough historical evidence to suggest that for a very long tim e in the past the central regions in the world econom y (and culture) have been the M iddle East (partially India) and China. A ccording to Hobson, the role of M ecca as global trade hub lasted from about 500 c e to the end of the first m illennium . At that tim e, East Asia, and notably China, em erged as the w orld’s leading trad­ ing power, and rem ained in this position until the nineteenth century (Hobson 2004: 61-73). This new perspective is revealed to be very useful when we look at the place occupied by Japan and Japanese religions w ithin globalization, espe­ cially because it provides the ground to rethink the com m on assum ption that Japan’s entry into global dynam ics was alm ost com pletely dependent on the w estern influx received after the Meiji Restoration beginning in 1868. In fact, there are reasons to believe that Japan was w ithin global dynam ics well before the end of the nineteenth century, and that relativization, hybridization, and func­ tional differentiation also played a distinctive role in early historical phases of (proto-) globalized Japan.

Periodizing Japanese globalization As early as the sixth century CE, Japan was involved in the massive flow of cul­ tural and m aterial im ports from C hina and the K orean peninsula (and indirectly from India and C entral Asia), including the w riting system , new technologies, advanced legal and educational system s, bureaucracy, and religions such as B uddhism and C onfucianism , w hich were instrum ental in the enforcem ent of the Yamato rule and the later developm ent of Japanese civilization. For a long period,

20

The risk o f cultural bias

the intensity of these exchanges and the cultural affinities betw een Japan, Korea, and C hina rem ained very strong. In this regard, the presence of a highly inte­ grated cultural area may be postulated, although it is likely that these phenom ena m ainly affected the elites and the institutions. If we follow the alternative para­ digm of oriental globalization, around the tu rn of the m illennium the East A sian region was progressively em erging as the m ainstream of the global economy, w ith C hina as the w orld’s leading trading power. The cultural im pact of this ori­ ental globalization may still be clearly seen in the later N eo-C onfucian emphasis on Chinese civilization as “the M iddle Kingdom ” and the consequent nativist reaction of the School of N ational L earning (K okugaku 国 学 )，according to w hich Japan occupied a central role in that the country was “the land of the kam i.”12 A ctual trade w ent on in C hina after the official “C onfucian” condem ­ nation of foreign trade, when, according to the E urocentric view of history, C hina turned away from m aritim e trade, thus opening the way for the expansion of European trade in Asia. That move actually served to legitim ize im perial policy. But C hina rem ained the unchallenged leading trading pow er until the nineteenth century (H obson 2004: 61-73). This also shows the presence of some degree of differentiation betw een religion and the economy, w hich was func­ tioning according to its own internal logic, and not sim ply on the basis of religious authority. The im pact of the global voyages of exploration, or “Voyages of Rediscovery,” as Hobson ironically labels them (Hobson 2006: 410; cf. Cam pbell 2007: 290), was lim ited in Japan by the ban on C hristianity and the establishm ent of the so-called closed-country (sakoku 鎖 国 ) policy by the Edo shogunate. This is not to say, however, that Edo-period Japan (1600-1867) was disconnected from the dynam ics of globalization. O n the one hand, as has been noted by Robertson, Japan’s partial isolation from the world may be interpreted as a “globally oriented gesture,” a kind of “world w atching” and “a preparation for the extensive global involvement of the tw entieth century and beyond” (R obertson 1992: 85). O n the other hand, and most im portantly, Japan rem ained to some extent w ithin the orbit of China, the leading global power of the day. Hobson claim s that at that tim e China was an example of a neoclassical ideal of a m arket economy, and that also in Japan it is possible to notice a trend tow ard the rationalization and commer­ cialization of the economy. Credit institutions were active there since 1640, and the operation of the money m arket was regulated by a group of ten banks based in O saka. The first Japanese futures exchange appeared in Osaka in 1730. The proto-industrialization achieved during the Edo period helps explain the dra­ m atic econom ic grow th in the post-1868 Meiji period, w hich was higher than that of the industrialized w estern powers (Hobson 2004: 89-92). In this context, grow ing urbanization was one of the im m ediate consequences, and Hobson reports that by 1800 the rate of urban dwellers in Japan was 22 percent, higher than in Europe (Hobson 2004: 91). Functional differentiation in the Edo period is noticeable in other areas. The print revolution in 1590, first w ith the use of movable type and then w ith block printing, led from the monopoly of printing by Buddhist tem ples to publishing

The risk o f cultural bias

21

as a com m ercial enterprise and the predom inance of non-religious publications (cf. Shively 1991: 725-33; Sm ith 1994; Repp 2003). A sim ilar shift in popular culture from the predom inance of the religious sphere to that of the secular sphere is suggested by the idea of ukiyo 浮 世 . Previously used as a B uddhist technical term for the world of suffering, the term came to indicate (with the replacem ent of uki-sorrow w ith its homophone uki-float) a hedonistic worldview, the “floating world” represented in the ukiyo-e 浮 世 絵 woodblock prints and in other popular w ritings of the Edo period (Shively 1991: 730; Repp 2003: 12). At the intersection betw een economy, popular culture, and religious practice lies another exam ple of the ongoing secularization in the Edo period: the emer­ gence of popular pilgrim age and the closer relationship of pilgrim age and recrea­ tion. O riginally, pilgrim age and the relative stations were related to the religious practices of holy persons (bessho hijiri 别 所 聖 ) . From the fifteenth century, and especially in the Edo period, the practice of religious pilgrim age becam e more popular, and pilgrim age underw ent a process of secularization. Sacred geogra­ phy was blended w ith com m ercial and cultural geographies. The pleasure of the trip increased, as well as the association w ith special foods, entertainm ent, and the visit to pleasure quarters. This shift was also suggested by the diffusion of guides that illustrated tem ple legends, and everything to make the trip a pleasure, but no pilgrim songs (Foard 1982; Vaporis 1995). Education in the Edo period was m ostly secular. Education was influenced by C onfucian and B uddhist m oral teachings but was not under the control of B uddhist institutions, rather the governm ent and private individuals. The terakoya 寺 子 屋 schools had originated in the m edieval period to provide elem entary education in tem ples (tera 寺 ) . By the seventeenth century they were by far the m ost num erous educational institutions for com m oners, were unregulated by the governm ent, and were m ainly based not in tem ples but in private halls. The schools included basic instruction in the so-called three R ’s (reading, w riting, and arithm etic), and although B uddhist and Shinto priests could act as teachers, they were a m inority and taught in their private capacities (Kobayashi 1965; Passin 1965). Toward the end of the Edo period, the idea of a national educa­ tional system was discussed, and experim ents were conducted at the local level, preparing the establishm ent of the national system of education in the Meiji period (Kobayashi 1965: 2 95-6). As far as the functional differentiation of religion and politics is concerned, it is w orth m entioning that the unification of the country was also achieved through the defeat o f pow erful tem ple com plexes, not least the Ishiyam a H onganji in O saka. D uring the Edo period, the bakufu exercised stronger con­ trol over Buddhism , through the system of head and branch tem ples (honm atsu seido 本 末 制 度 ) overseen by the O ffice of Temples and Shrines (Jisha B ugyō 寺 社 奉 行 , one o f the highest offices in the shogunate), although pow er rela­ tions could also be negotiated. In addition, the ex traterritoriality of tem ples was abolished.13 The trajectory of the process of globalization in the Japanese context reached a turning point during the period from the Meiji R estoration until W orld W ar II.

22

The risk o f cultural bias

In this relatively short period of tim e, the dram atic m odernization of the country, the structuring of the nation-state, the m assive developm ent of science and tech­ nical knowledge, and a centralized educational system were achieved (K han 1997: 56-78). In 1873, the M eiji governm ent started the prom ulgation of a series of ordinances against the practices of diviners, m edium s, and exorcists, and those who w ith their talism anic prayers interfered w ith the work of doctors. One of the keywords underlying this cam paign was the rem oval of “superstitions.” At the same tim e, beginning in the Meiji period (1868-1912), various religious groups were com pelled to respond to the lim itation of religious freedom and even overt persecution; to the gradual assum ption by the m odern state of m any of the roles previously played by religious institutions; and to the m anipulation/adaptation of Shinto and traditional values, such as filial piety and loyalty, to create an ideol­ ogy for the m odern nation-state that was also effectively incorporated in school textbooks. M ost Japanese religions replied to such dram atic social changes by presenting their tradition as a force compatible w ith the science im ported from w estern countries, and useful for the resolution of various social problem s related to m odernization. In this search for legitim ization, m ost went so far as to actively cooperate w ith the im perialist policies of the new Japanese nation-state.14 This process resulted in the accom m odation of traditional A sian patterns, such as the role of Buddhism as the protector of the state, and the rew orking of C onfucian traditional values from a strongly authoritarian view point. A nother typical reac­ tion to this new scenario was the strong em phasis on Japanese cultural and reli­ gious traditions in opposition to the ‘m aterialism ’ of w estern civilization and C hristianity. Religious reactions to the relativization of traditional values ranged from overt persecution of C hristianity to the development of more sophisticated discourses em phasizing the relationship betw een religion and ethno-cultural values, often subsum ed under the category of “occidentalism .”15 However, only after the end of W orld W ar II did a decisive shift take place in m ainstream religious traditions and Japanese society at large.16 The Japanese C onstitution and the Fundam ental Law of E ducation prom ulgated in 1947 intro­ duced a clear distinction betw een the subsystem s of politics, education, and reli­ gion, w hich strongly contributed to the furth er development of functional differentiation w ithin the social system . The acknow ledgem ent of the principle of freedom of religion paved the way for the em ergence of hundreds of new religious m ovem ents w ithin the Japanese free ‘religious m arket.’ M ost cru­ cially, in the last p art of the tw entieth century the expansion of the m arket economy, international com m unications, and the m ass m edia has led to a speed­ ing up o f the process o f globalization and the spreading of a deeper global consciousness. Thus, there are indications that not only the category of globalization m akes sense in the Japanese context, but also that religion may have had a distinc­ tive role in each phase postulated in our periodization m odel. In the next chap­ ters, I w ill specifically focus on Japanese religions in the last few decades of accelerated globalization. Starting from the typology introduced at the begin­ ning of this volum e, I w ill illustrate how they deal w ith the unprecedented

The risk o f cultural bias

23

relativization of values and intensification of global flow s. In my analysis of contem porary Japanese religions w ithin global dynam ics, I w ill first focus on how they have been tackling the issue of religious pluralism , and how they have been repositioning them selves in relation to other religious traditions. The variety of responses given by Japanese religious institutions to the issue of pluralism w ill be approached in the next chapter through an analysis of selected case studies.

2

‘O n e

tr u e

a m o n g

w o r ld

m a n y

r e lig io n

o t h e r s '?

G lob al id en tities an d relig io u s p lu ralism Since at least the tim e of the W orld’s Parliam ent of Religions held in Chicago in 1893, it has becom e more evident that global dynam ics in the m odern world increasingly encourage, or even force, religions worldwide to take into account the presence of other religions, at both the institutional and individual levels. The first of the three typologies related to the attitude tow ard other religions im plies the case in which Japanese religions accept other religions as equals and are actu­ ally open to religious pluralism (type 1). One im portant im plication here is that those Japanese religions engaged in this endeavor are at the same tim e reposition­ ing them selves on the world religious map. This gesture may be interpreted as globally m inded, since the understanding of one’s own religion is not achieved in isolation but in relationship to a variety of other religions worldwide. If these religions are publicly acknowledged as ‘true,’ the claim to be one among them m ay be advanced. The rationale for this is often based on the assum ption that all religions deserve the same respect and have the same authority because they are m anifestations of the same sacred dim ension, or of an underlying universal reli­ gious truth. O n the other hand, this positive approach to religious pluralism and the quest for interreligious dialogue needs not to be consistent even w ithin the same group, and m ay be found interspersed among other statem ents and attitudes more inclined to inclusivism . A nother observation that m ay be made, especially for sm all religious organizations, is that placing them selves on equal footing w ith large traditions such as C hristianity or Islam can also serve as an additional source of legitim ation. In the following, I w ill approach the issue of global identities and pluralism in Japanese religions through a selection of contem porary case studies that especially relate to Japanese Buddhism and new religious movements.

The religious summit at M t Hiei A grow ing interest in form s of interreligious dialogue is observable in contem po­ rary Japan at least since the early post-w ar years, w hich is accom panied by the distinct tendency w ithin the Japanese religious world to publicly endorse the ideal of religious pluralism (cf. Dessì 2011; N elson 2011). This can be seen in

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'?

25

examples as diverse as the N ihon Shūkyō Renmei 日 本 宗 教 連 盟 (Japanese A sso­ ciation of Religious O rganizations, 1946), the Shin-nihon Shū kyō-dantai Rengōkai 新 日 本 宗 教 団 体 連 合 会 （Federation of New Religious O rganizations of Japan, 1951), the Sh ū k y ō s h a no Inori to Fōr a m u 世 界 宗 教 者 の 祈 り と フ ォ ー ラ ム (Prayer O ffering and World Religious Forum , 1993), and the Kyūdan Fuchs K enkyū sho Konwakai 教 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 （Forum of Research Institutes A ssociated w ith Religious O rganizations, 2002). W ithin this fram ework, perhaps one of the m ost spectacular m anifestations of this effort to prom ote interreligious dialogue is the H ieizan Shū kyō s a m ite 上匕敷山 宗 教 サ ミ ッ ト （ (o fficial translation “Religious Sum m it M eeting on M t H iei”）. Mt Hiei is the religious headquarters of Tendaishū 天 台 宗 , th e tradition of Japanese Buddhism m ainly focusing on the Lotus Sutra and esoteric practices, originally brought to Japan by Saichō 最 澄 (767-822). This denom ination of Japanese Buddhism currently states that one of its three m ain objectives is an interfaith dialogue betw een the religions of the world (the other two being to follow the Buddhist precepts and social work). As one can read on Tendaishū ’s official website, Today, there still exist m any conflicts around the w orld that stem from reli­ gion, ethnic identity, etc. O ur Tendai D enom ination’s basic ideal is that “Anyone who has com passion in their m ind is the same as a Buddha.” This is the firm belief that all sentient beings are the children of the Buddha even if our nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, culture, thinking or sexuality are different. (Tendaishū 2008a) The Religious Sum m it at Mt Hiei is an annual event first held on 3 -4 August 1987, and ever since has been attended by religious leaders from various coun­ tries gathering at Tendaishū ’s religious center in Shiga prefecture “to pray for world peace and prom ote m utual understanding” (Tendaishū 2008a). This event, w hich is w idely covered by the Japanese m edia, culm inates in an interreligious cerem ony including the ringing of a “peace bell” (heiwa no kane 平罕ロの鐘 ) and a silent prayer for world peace by all the participants w ithin the precincts of the Enryakuji 延 暦 寺 tem ple complex. As stated in the proceedings of the first Religious Sum m it at M t Hiei, this m eeting was inspired by the W orld Day of Prayer for Peace held in A ssisi in O ctober 1986, w hen Pope John Paul II invited representatives of other C hristian churches and m ajor world religions to jo in together and pray for world peace. Tendaishū , w hich had been invited along w ith other Japanese religions, was quite effective in prom oting a Japanese ver­ sion of the event the follow ing year through the N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha Kaigi 日 本 宗 教 代 表 者 会 議 (Japan Conference of Religious Representatives), on the occasion of the 1,200th anniversary of the founding of the religious complex of Mt Hiei by Saichō (N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha K aigi 1987: 32, 37). The direct involvem ent of the N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha Kaigi also speaks of the wide acceptance of the value of interreligious dialogue among the Japanese religious world at large, at least at the official level. A nother factor behind the idea of

26

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'?

organizing a Religious Sum mit at M t Hiei was the visit by Pope John Paul II to Japan in 1981. The Pope’s call for interreligious cooperation, and his decision to m ention in his speech to Japanese religious leaders Saichō’s teaching “to forget the self and to serve others” (mōko rita 忘 己 和 J他 ) ，allegedly im pressed Yamada Etai 山 田 崽 練 (1895-1994), the then head priest of Tendaishū , and reassured him on the potentiality of his own tradition to play a m ajor role in m odern society and in interreligious dialogue. Yamada, who saw mōko rita as a fundam ental M ahāyāna teaching and a way to overcome sectarian and group identities and bring about peace on a global scale, was instrum ental in organizing the first m eeting in 1987 (N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha K aigi 1987: 36; cf. Covell 2006). W hat is then the comm on religious ground postulated for these interfaith activities? In the “M essage from M t H iei” (H ieizan m essēj i 比 蔵 山 メ ッ セ ー ジ ) and in the prospectus included in the proceedings of the 1987 Religious Summ it, three points are especially em phasized. The first two are strictly related to each other. O n the one hand, it is claim ed that “a religious m ind is inherent in all hum an beings” (ningen jish in ni hongu suru shūkvō shin 人 間 自 身 に 本 具 す る 宗 教 心 ), and that this religious m ind is the only chance for the salvation of hum ankind in a tim e of crisis and conflict. Therefore, religions and their leaders are responsible for finding “form s of interreligious collaboration” in order to fu lfill their m ission (N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha K aigi 1987: 34). O n the other hand, the search for peace is acknow ledged as “a fundam ental aspect of any religion” (ikanaru shūkyō ni totte konpontekina m o n o い か な る 宗 教 に と つ て 根 未 的 な も の )）（(N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha Kaigi 1987: 32). In this respect, the acceptance of pluralism is strictly linked to the solution of pressing global problem s, another im portant aspect of religious activism w ithin globalization that we w ill explore in m ore detail in the last chapter of this book. Finally, the third point, providing a com m on religious ground for interreligious dialogue, is a reference to a “great power beyond u s” (w arew are o koeta ōinaru chikara わ れ わ れ を 超 え た 大 い な る 力 – interestingly translated as “ Supreme B eing” in the appendices – that is deem ed capable of hearing the trustfu l prayers of all the m eeting participants (N ihon Shūkyō D aihyōsha K aigi 1987: 33,136). The relation of the Religious Sum m it at Mt H iei to the relativization of values and the challenge of pluralism in the global age is also well expressed by the words pronounced by Sugitani G ijun 杉 谷 義 純 ( b . 1942), the then chief adm in­ istrator of Tendaishū , on the occasion of the 10th Religious Sum m it held in 1997. Here we find an even clearer reference to the need to strengthen the ties of soli­ darity among religions, to live in m utual respect, and, m ost notably, to go beyond “the assum ption that one’s own religion is superior to others” (jibun no shūkyō nom i shijō no mono to o m o i 自 分 の 宗 教 の み 至 上 の も の と 思 い ) N ihon Shū kyō D aihyōsha K aigi 1997: 20). Thus, it m ay be seen that, since the Religious Sum m it’s inception, the sum m it has been inextricably bound to events taking place in the religious world at the global level, among w hich the im pulse to interreligious dialogue given by the Second Vatican Council, Pope John Paul II’s global activism , and the increasing awareness of a sense of global crisis in various fields of social life (N ihon Shukyō

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

27

D aihyōsha Kaigi 1987: 37-8). O n the other hand, that Tendaishū ’s repositioning and quest for a new identity through the issue of religious pluralism are a globally m inded gesture is also apparent in official statem ents issued by the denom ina­ tion, where the engagem ent for interreligious dialogue is ju stified as a response to the pitfalls of m odern civilization and their worldwide consequences, and its dependence on the global context is explicitly acknowledged.

Risshō Kōseikai and interreligious dialogue One of the honorary advisors of the N ihon Shiūkyō D aihyōsha Kaigi, the inter­ religious body presided over by Tendaishū that was established for the organization of the first Religious Sum m it at Mt Hiei, was R isshō K ōseikai’s 立 正 佼 成 会 leader, Niwano N ikkyō 庭 野 日 敬 (1906-1999). Niwano, together w ith the sha­ m an N aganum a M yōkō 長 沼 妙 佼 (1 889-1957), had founded this new religious movement based on N ichiren Buddhism in the 1930s, but it was in the post-w ar period that this organization underw ent dram atic grow th and becam e one of the m ajor players in Japan in the interreligious dialogue. Risshō K ōseikai’s success in prom oting religious pluralism is m ostly indebted to the dynam ism of Niwano, whose work is also closely associated w ith the establishm ent in Japan of the Shin-nihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai. In Septem ber 1965 he was in Rome, invited by Pope Paul VI to the last session of the Second V atican Council. Niwano was im pressed by the personal interest shown by the Pope in Risshō K ōseikai’s inter­ religious cooperation, and received further inspiration for his activities. The result of this experience is particularly em phasized in his autobiography Shoshin issh o 初 心 一 生 :1 A ccording to ś ākyam uni, “there are neither two true teachings nor three, but only one. A ll teachings are encom passed by the One Buddha-vehicle.” The true teaching “is only one” ( ‘tada hitotsu de a ru ’ 「た だ 一 つ で あ る 」）：I had never felt the truth of these words so intensely as this before. This can be the bridge to connect not only C hristianity and B uddhism but also the m ultitude of other religions. In this way, it would be possible for religious leaders from all over the world to jo in in a conference for peace. (Niwano 1975: 142-3) At the same tim e, the encounter w ith the Pope provided Risshō K ōseikai w ith a source of further religious legitim ation. N iw ano’s report of his own visit to Rome in the G reat Sacred Hall (D aiseidō 大 聖 堂 ) at Risshō K ōseikai’s headquar­ ters in Tōkyō was enthusiastically welcomed by crowds of followers. The head of the largest world religious organization had officially recognized Risshō K ōseikai and w ished G od’s protection on the organization’s activities for religious coop­ eration. Contextually, the sense of being responsible for a global m ission going well beyond the w elfare of a single organization significantly increased (Niwano 1975: 144-5). In 1969, R isshō K ōseikai becam e a m em ber of the International A ssociation for Religious Freedom (IA RF), originally started by the U nitarians

28

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers， '?

in Boston in 1900, and in 1981 Niwano was elected the association’s tw enty-fifth president. Further contacts w ith religious leaders in N orth A m erica and else­ where led to the establishm ent of the W orld Conference of Religions for Peace (W CRP), w hich held its first m eeting in Kyoto in 1970, presenting itself as “an historic attem pt to bring together men and women of all m ajor religions to dis­ cuss the urgent issue of peace” (W orld Conference of Religions for Peace 1970). W hile Risshō K ōseikai has continued to support the initiatives of the W CRP and its regional branch, the A sian Conference of Religions for Peace (ACRP), and to prom ote other form s of religious cooperation, the idea of the possibility of a com ­ m on ground for all world religions has constantly provided the direction for N iw ano’s efforts. In this short passage, he provides his original understanding of the link betw een religious pluralism and the em erging of a global society: In an age w hen com m unications betw een peoples and countries were poor, there was little possibility of any exchange of inform ation among them , and so people did not understand that their religious ideas stem m ed from a com ­ m on source ... Today things are different. W ith the great advances in tran s­ port and com m unications of m odern tim es, the world has becom e a much sm aller place, and people everyw here are increasingly subscribing to com ­ m on patterns of thought. This trend can only intensify in the future. In such an era, if every religion in the world should continue to be isolated and hold itself apart from others, it would be extrem ely anachronistic . It is because I believe this that I am m aking every possible effort tow ard achieving inter­ religious cooperation. (Niwano 2006: 33, 46; cf. 1977: 72) Thus, Niwano sees the acceptance of religious pluralism as a direct conse­ quence of the dynam ics prom oted by globalization, by the increasing “exchange of inform ation” and the relativization of values. M oreover, he also thinks that interreligious cooperation can, in turn, have a positive effect on people’s religios­ ity, in that the cooperation purifies and improves “those religious people who tend to think insularly and in a self-righteousness m anner by putting them in contact w ith people of other religious faiths” (Niwano 2006: 46). Ultimately, for Niwano the justification of pluralism lies in the belief in a com m on source for all religions that from the B uddhist perspective finds expression in the Lotus Sutra (Niwano 1981: 33), and that would survive the relativizing trend of globalization. A sim ilar sensibility continues to anim ate Risshō K ōseikai’s general attitude tow ard pluralism at the institutional level. In the brochure Rissho K osei-kai: Buddhism fo r Today, w hich offers a broad presentation of this new religious movement to the international public, dialogue and cooperation figure among the m ain activities and are ju stified based on the teaching of the Lotus Sūtra, accord­ ing to w hich “ [t]ruth is universal and all religions are m anifestations of that truth, all life springs from the same source, and thus all people are related and

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

29

belong to one fam ily” (R isshō K ōseikai 2004: 18). In an im portant publication of the Chūō G akujutsu K enkyū sho 中 央 学 術 研 究 所 (C entral Research Institute) to celebrate its th irtieth anniversary, Risshō K ōseikai’s response to the challenge of pluralism is explained as follows: Acknowledging a plurality of values (kachikan no tagensei 価 値 観 の 多 元 性 ) ) does not m ean to consider different cultures and values as superior, but rather to engage in m utual understanding and respect. This is the starting point for a spirit of tolerance and harmony. Then, together w ith the fostering of a sense of unity (ittaikan 一 体 感 )，,w hich derives from the fact that hum an beings live on ‘one earth’ as global citizens ( 'h itotsu no chikyū ’ ni sum u chikyū shimin to s h ite 「ひ と つ の 地 球 」に 住 む 地 球 市 民 と し て ) , the construc­ tion of a superior hum an culture becom es possible. (Chūō G akujutsu K enkyū sho 1999: 211-12) In this passage sum m arizing R isshō K ōseikai’s position on the relativization of values at the end of the m illennium , the choice for pluralism is explicitly related to the reflexive aw areness of being “global citizens,” whose m utual respect is the precondition for creating a better world. And we m ay observe that here the post-w ar repositioning of Risshō K ōseikai as a player w ithin the fram e­ work of interreligious dialogue also em erges in all clarity as a globally m inded gesture. J a p a n ese relig io n s an d in clu siv ism Being actively engaged in religious cooperation does not necessarily entail the full acceptance of other religions as equals. One example is the Rom an Catholic Church, which has em erged, especially since the Second Vatican Council (1962­ 1965) and the activities of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious D ialogue, as one of the m ajor players in this field, encouraging her adherents to prom ote “dia­ logue and collaboration w ith the followers of other religions” (Pope Paul VI 1965). O n the other hand, fundam ental official docum ents such as the Catechism o f the Catholic Church clearly affirm the prim acy of Rom an Catholicism , when they portray other religions as “a preparation for the G ospel” and claim that the Catholic C hurch is “the world reconciled,” namely, “the place where hum anity m ust rediscover its unity and salvation” (Rom an Catholic C hurch 1994: 196). This tendency tow ard religious inclusivism m ay reveal hegem onic claim s, but is also a reaction to the danger of losing one’s own specificity in a world populated by m any religious organizations often engaged in proselytizing activities on a global scale. The resulting pattern is that of a form al adherence to the ideal of a pluralistic society accom panied by the idea that one’s own religion is closer to the truth than other religions (type 2). The im plications of this pattern for our analysis of Japanese religions w ithin accelerated globalization w ill be explored in the following.

30

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'?

Risshō Kōseikai and religious inclusivism Given the unprecedented push tow ard the relativization of values prom oted by global cultural flow s at least since the Meiji period, the need felt among reli­ gious organizations in contem porary Japan to reassert the value of their own tradition is hardly unexpected. In a study on the issue of pacifism in Japanese new religious m ovements, Robert K isala has noted how a religious organiza­ tion actively engaged in interreligious dialogue and officially professing plural­ ism such as R isshō K ōseikai m ay not be completely im m une from these claims. Also in N iw ano’s thought, for example, the idea that “all religions are essentially one” m ay be accom panied by the suggestion that B uddhism is characterized by a fundam ental tolerance (in contrast to the C hristian inclination tow ard intoler­ ance) and can then be qualified as “the m ost im portant religion for hum anity” (K isala 1999: 170-1). K isala suggests that this attitude rem ains in the back­ ground in R isshō K ōseikai, and that N iw ano’s rem arks should be read w ith caution, since they are found in texts such as serm ons that are prone to put excessive em phasis on the role of Buddhism for the salvation of believers (K isala 1999: 171-2). A n analysis of some im portant texts published by R isshō K ōseikai reveals, however, that behind N iw ano’s rem arks there m ay be som ething more than a slip of tongue. In H okekyō no atarashii kaishaku 法 華 経 の 新 し い 解 釈 (A New Interpretation of the L otus Sutra), w hich is presented by the organization as one of N iw ano’s m ost significant publications and is translated into English w ith the title Buddhism fo r Today, Niwano suggests that Buddhism has an additional value, in that, differently from other religions that depend on G od’s revelation, it is based on the personal experience of Sākyam uni and his resolution to attain final awakening (Niwano 1989: 295). Similarly, in another passage from the same book, Niwano im plies that Buddhism is more advanced than other religions because it relies on Sākyam uni’s injunction not to blindly believe, but “to believe after having understood” (rikai shita ue de shinzeyo 理 解 し た う え で 信 ぜ よ ） (Niwano 1989: 354). In C hapter Three, Niwano draws a line betw een Buddhism and m any other religions that have appeared throughout history and progres­ sively lost their power and their appeal to the believers because they have forgot­ ten the im portance of “m erit” (kudoku 功 徳 ) , or focused alm ost exclusively on the rew ard and “m erit in the afterlife” (shigo no kudoku 死 後 の 功 徳 、）(Niwano 1989: 57). Further, in another passage, Niwano expresses an evolutionary view of religion in the attem pt to delineate “w hat religion should be.” A fter having m en­ tioned religions of the “prim itives” such as “the worship of nature” (tennen sūhai 天 然 崇 拝 ) ，“spirit w orship” (seirei sūhai 精 霊 崇 拝 ) ，“totem ism ” (tōtemu sūhai ト ー テ ム 崇 拝 )）and “prim itive pantheism ” (genshiteki ban'yūshin 原 始 的 万 有 神 ） (Niwano 1989: 328-30), Niwano concludes: It m ay be affirm ed that all these religious form s belong as such to a lower stage of development (hikui dankai 低レ、段 階 ) . This is because despite the relationship w ith hum an beings, they have represented, w orshiped, and

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

31

invoked som ething as an absolute presence. The worship and invocation of objects from the anim al, vegetable, and m ineral world cannot be considered a m ature religious belief (ichinin mae no shūkyō shinkō 一 人 前 の 宗 教 信仰 ). (Niwano 1989: 330) For Niwano, anim als, vegetable life, and inorganic m atter are not proper objects of worship and invocation, but belong to the sphere of science. Religions that indulge in this kind of approach to the spiritual dim ension of life are therefore “m istaken and superstitious.”2 A sim ilar inclination to religious inclusivism may be found interspersed in other texts w ritten by the founder of Risshō K ōseikai. For example, in his A B uddhist Approach to Peace, Niwano claim s that “the way in w hich religionists view the world, especially through Buddhism , w ill play a m ajor role in solving the problem s of our deadlocked world” (Niwano 1977: 114). This attitude also em erges from N iw ano， s com m entary on C hapter XX I of the Lotus Sūtra, where he relates the passage on the m ultitude of beings uttering “nam u-shakam uni-butsu 南 無 釈 迦 牟 尼 仏 ” (Homage to Śākyam uni Buddha) to their “all having taken refuge in the Buddha” (kankai kim yō 咸 皆 帰 命 ) : This passage is indeed a prophecy of future events. In other words, it m eans that “at present there are people who do not know the Buddha’s teaching, people who do not try to grasp its deep m eaning even w hen the occasion arises, people who venerate false teachings, people who live their lives m echanically . . . these are people from different stages, but in the future all hum an beings w ill necessarily take refuge in the teaching of the Buddha Śākyam uni” (m irai ni oite wa, kanarazu subete no hito ga o-Shakasam a no oshie ni kim yō suru toki ga k u r u 未 来 に お い て は ，か な ら ず す ベ て の 人 が お 釈 迦 さ ま の 教 え に 帰 命 す る と き が く る ). (Niwano 1982: 154-5) O n the other hand, this attitude does not seem to be confined to N iw ano’s thought. A sim ilar approach also surfaces in the production of his son Niwano N ichikō 庭 野 日 鑛 ( b . 1938), the current leader of R isshō K ōseikai. Sim ilarly to his father, for Niwano, N ichikō Buddhism occupies a distinctive place among religions because it “em phasizes looking deep w ithin oneself,” thus facilitating the eradication of suffering and the attainm ent of peace (Niwano 2008: 141-2). M oreover, his words show how the claim that Japanese spirituality has a special m ission for the salvation of hum ankind still resonates in the ideas of Risshō Kōseikai’s leadership: In general, Eastern philosophy has tended to regard the universe as one in essence and to regard all things – including the natural environm ent and hum an beings – as essentially united and interdependent. In contrast to this approach, the West separates nature and hum ankind, and W estern civilization has been influenced by the idea that hum ankind rules nature. Recently, how­ ever, many learned people in the West have come to see that the traditional

32

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'? W estern view has reached an impasse, and they now strongly urge others to learn from E astern wisdom in order to save hum ankind from ruin. (Niwano 1990: 143)

Here, Niwano N ichikō im plicitly acknowledges globalization’s potential to prom ote the worldwide relativization of values. However, he thinks that now it is tim e to return to eastern (and im plicitly to Japanese) wisdom “in order to save hum ankind from ruin.” And, according to him , this is the only chance left not only for Japanese but also for people in “the W est.” Kisala is certainly right in his call for a cautious evaluation of inclusivist attitudes in Risshō Kōseikai, and it would be unfair to discredit all serious work this religious organization has done to promote pluralism based on these passages. However, the materials exam ined should be taken seriously as a meaningful indication of how acceptance of the challenges of globalization w ithin the Japanese context may be a difficult and insidious task even for organizations seemingly beyond suspicion. The exercise of identifying oneself as ‘one true world religion among many other true world religions’ always rests upon a delicate balance, w ith the constant risk of placing too much em phasis on local values and their global relevance.

Inclusivist approaches in traditional Japanese Buddhism The inclusivist approach found in R isshō K ōseikai, and its occidentalist over­ tones im plying the construction of the putative uniqueness of Japanese values through the opposition of “E ast” and “W est,” is part of a broader trend w ithin Japanese religious history that has been the object of various studies. Previous research conducted by B ernard Faure and R obert Sharf, for exam ple, illustrated how this strategy has been pursued by Suzuki D aisetsu 鈴 木 大 キ出 (1870-1966) and the Kyōto School of philosophy through the selective use of Z en Buddhist elem ents (Faure 1995; Sharf 1993). This ideological structure, w hich claim s the superiority of Japanese spirituality (as the culm ination of a pan-A sian culture) over m aterialist and individualistic w estern culture, is also shown to be deeply rooted in Japanese intellectual history. It m ay be traced, for example, in Meiji Buddhism ’s criticism s of w estern civilization that also found expression at the Chicago W orld’s Parliam ent of Religions in 1893 (K etelaar 1991), and in the antiindividualistic rhetoric found in texts such as the K okutai no hongi 国 体 の 本 義 (Fundam entals of N ational Polity, 1937) sum m arizing the official ideology of Japanese im perialism . These ideas were in tu rn indebted to the eighteenth century K okugaku 国 学 m ovement, and still contribute at the general level to the pervasive discourse on uniqueness in contem porary Japan (nihonjinron 日 本 人 論 ) (cf. Ram belli 1996; Sharf 1993). A n analysis of different strands of religious com m unication in contem porary Japan shows that the endorsem ent of the ideal of religious pluralism m ay not go in m any cases beyond a form al stage. As I have illustrated elsewhere, this ten­ dency tow ard inclusivism is by no m eans lim ited to Risshō Kōseikai, but surfaces from w ithin contem porary Japanese B uddhism (including the aforem entioned

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

33

Tendaishū), Shintō, and several other new religious movements.3 Here, I w ill briefly present the cases of the Zen-nihon B ukkyōkai 全 日 本 仏 教 会 (Japan B uddhist Federation) and Jōdo Shinshū 浄 土 真 宗 (T rue Pure Land denom ination). Today, the large m ajority of Japanese B uddhist institutions are united under the um brella of the Zen-nihon B ukkyō u kai that was established in 1957 and serves as the Japanese representative to the World Fellowship of B uddhists (W FB) (Japan Buddhist Federation 2004: 6 8-9). Since the adm inistration is run by rep­ resentatives of all m ajor organizations, the Zen-nihon B ukkyōkai may also be considered the m egaphone of average Japanese Buddhist attitudes tow ard m odern society. At the general level, this organization shows a positive attitude tow ard religious pluralism . Among the organization’s m ain activities, we find support for the principle of freedom of religion found in the Japanese Constitution, one of the fundam ental prem ises of religious pluralism . M oreover, the Zen-nihon B ukkyōkai prom otes interreligious dialogue by taking part in the N ihon Shū kyō Renm ei and other initiatives (Japan B uddhist Federation 2004: 68-9 ). However, also in this case the acceptance of religious pluralism is not w ithout am biguities. The Z en-nihon B ukkyōu kai’s vision of global society is im bued w ith a sense of crisis, because “the political, econom ic, racial, and religious strife betw een the people of m onotheistic religions and their nations have becom e ever m ore intense, and there seem s to be no rem edy or solution for the stability of the w orld” (Japan B uddhist Federation 2004: 58). The cause of this general crisis leading to “the sickness and degeneration of m inds and bodies, and to the destruction of the social and natural environm ent of the w orld” is attributed by the Z en-nihon B ukkyōu kai to the m odern inclination to polarize our ways of life into extrem es. M odern society fluctuates betw een “intellectualism or m aterialism , absolutism or relativism , eternalism or nihilism , ecclesiasticism or secularism ,” but the respon­ sibility for this kind of thinking is m ainly attributed to “people in the W est,” who easily “fall into this pitfall of polarization.” For Buddhism , however, things are different, since it teaches that polarization “should be avoided as m uch as possi­ ble,” and “recom m ends us to hit the M iddle Point” (Japan Buddhist Federation 2004: 58). Thus, in the preface to the guide book conceived as the official pres­ entation of the Zen-nihon B ukkyōkai to the international public we find the follow ing passage, w hich sum m arizes the organization’s global view: W ith the indiscrim inate terrorist attack in the U nited States on Septem ber 11 of 2001 and incessant w ar and conflict among m onotheistic C hristian and M uslim zealots also happening elsewhere in the world presently, conscien­ tious people have becom e aware that Buddhism offers som ething to rem edy the tension and contribute to world peace. In other words, while C hristians and M uslim s tend to adhere to their own G od as absolute and alm ighty, they seem to disregard other religions as m inor or inferior. On the other hand, Buddhists recognize that the Buddha nature is entailed in every sentient being, and are relatively generous tow ard other religions. This is the reason why Buddhism has becom e spotlighted. (Japan Buddhist Federation 2004: vii)

34

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'?

Sim ilarly to other cases m entioned above, here Buddhist values are prom oted as the solution to pressing problem s of global society. Contextually, the passage advocates an inclusivist standpoint that lays claim to the superiority of Buddhism , and im plicitly of Japanese Buddhism over m onotheistic religions. A nother example of religious inclusivism in the Japanese context is offered by Jōdo Shinshū , and notably by its two m ain branches Jōdo Shinshū Honganji-ha 浄 土 真 宗 本 願 寺 派 and Shinshū Ōtani-ha 真 宗 大 谷 派 . Jōdo Shinshū is a trad i­ tional form of Japanese Buddhism tracing back to the w ork of Shinran 親 鸞 (1173-1262), but it differs from other m ajor traditions in its absolute reliance on A m ida Buddha’s salvific pow er and the consequent relative disinterest in prac­ tices other than the uttering of A m ida B uddha’s nam e (nenbutsu 念 仏 or nam u[nam o]-am ida-butsu 南 無 阿 弥 陀 仏 ) as an expression of gratitude. As I have noted elsew here (D essì 2010b), various official statem ents and activities w ithin institutional Jōdo Shinshū show a positive approach to the issue of plural­ ism, often in com bination w ith a distinctive concern for peace. In a landm ark anti-w ar declaration issued in 1995 (Fusen ketsugi 不 戦 決 議 ) by the Ō ta ni branch dealing w ith the issue of w ar responsibilities, for example, one can find the vow to overcome “all ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious differences” and “to w alk together w ith all people of the world along the path for the creation of a prosperous and peaceful international com m unity which rejects war.” Sim ilar concerns are generally expressed by the other m ajor branch (Honganji-ha) w ith reference to the construction of a “society of fellow com panions” (Shinshū Ōtani-ha 1995; Jōdo Shinshū Honganji-ha 2003). At the practical level, Jōdo Shinshū is also involved, like other traditions of Japanese Buddhism , in form s of interreligious cooperation dom estically and overseas. However, there is evidence that also in the Jōdo Shinsh ū world the choice for pluralism is not accepted without reservation. W hile at the doctrinal level there is an inclination to consider inappropriate other religions for attaining religious liberation (cf. Van B ragt 1990; Takeda 2008), in recent official docum ents deal­ ing w ith the critique of “hum anism ” the issue of religious inclusivism is strictly related to the global context. On the one hand, the “spirit of hum anism ” (hyūm anizum u no seishin ヒ ュ ー マ ニ ズ ム の 精 神 ), nam ely an anthropocentric vision of reality considered an outcome of w estern thought, is deem ed responsi­ ble for global problem s such as the environm ental crisis, poverty, the collapse of traditional values, and the general technologization of various spheres of life. On the other hand, “Buddhist spirituality” (B ukkyō) seishin 仏 教 精 神 ）is presented as the only viable alternative to solve these pressing issues and save hum ankind, since “along the search for a wisdom which can overcome hum anism, there is no other way than that offered by Buddhism” (Shinshū Kyodan Rengō 2000; cf. Dessì 2006, 2010b: 258). In this way, through an updated version of the opposition betw een “eastern spirituality” and “w estern m aterialism /individualism ,” the prim acy of Buddhism over other religions is affirm ed, in evident contradiction w ith the gen­ eral support form ally given by Jōdo Shinshū institutions to religious pluralism. Thus, the cases of the Zen-nihon Bukkyokai and Jōdo Shinshū provide further evidence that, in the contem porary Japanese setting, the option for religious

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

35

inclusivism depends significantly on the global context. This repositioning of Japanese religions entails that inform ation about the religious ‘other’ increasingly circulating in global cultural flow s is seriously taken into account, although not necessarily unbiasedly. M oreover, and m ost crucially, this repositioning shows the presence of a reflexive awareness of progressing relativization and the world as a ‘single place.’ The choice for inclusivism is not som ething m ade in isolation, but in a relationship to a variety of other religions available in the global arena. A nd the choice is made in such a way that the allegedly inherent and uniquely superior qualities of the ‘native’ religion m ay emerge by contrast. Ja p a n ese relig io n s an d exclu sivism W hile inclusivism expresses the idea that one p articular religion has an addi­ tional value over other religions, exclusivism thoroughly denies the value of other religions and rejects the idea of pluralism , strongly affirm ing one’s own religion’s uniqueness and superiority over others (type 3). This attitude m ay be globally m inded to the extent that it is influenced and exacerbated by the increased pres­ ence of other religions, or even by the sense of being invested by a special m is­ sion for the salvation of hum ankind. In other words, it m ay count as both a defensive and aggressive attitude tow ard the dynam ics of globalization and the relativization of values. If we look at early phases of globalization in Japan, one paradigm atic example of religious exclusivism as a response to global dynam ics is offered by the Buddhist reaction to the arrival of C hristian m issionaries in the Meiji period. At that tim e, C hristianity was associated w ith the aggressive colonial policies of w estern powers, which had forced Japan to reopen its ports to com m ercial ships in 1854, and w ith a w idespread sentim ent of repulsion follow ing the ban lasting more than two centuries. Since the last days of the Edo period, B uddhist propa­ ganda had opposed the reintroduction of C hristianity as a pernicious and sub­ versive elem ent, but it was especially at the end of the 1880s that a violent escalation took place. For decades interrupted by periods of relative calm, C hristian com m unities were m ade the object of a zealous cam paign, including anti-C hristian m eetings, disturbances of C hristian m eetings, ostracism at the com m unity level, and even destruction of churches (Thelle 1987: 137-46; 2003). Interestingly enough, this cam paign becam e more aggressive after the M eiji state enacted its C onstitution form ally granting, among other things, freedom of religion to Japanese subjects. The Buddhist justification for this aggressive cam paign was that “C hristianity failed to qualify for religious freedom ,” based on the restrictions posed by the Meiji C onstitution.4 In this connection, Notto Thelle has noted how the m ajor role in this m odern m anifestation of religious exclusivism was played by Jōdo Shinshū , one of the financiers of the Meiji state (Thelle 1987: 147-8). In the following, we w ill approach the em ergence of open religious exclusivism in more recent tim es by focusing on the shakubuku cam paign characterizing Sōka G akkai’s activities in the post-war period at least until the early 1970s. D ifferently

36

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'?

from the above example from the Meiji period, this cam paign was not confined to the rejection of non-Japanese religions and, im portantly for our discussion, may also be significantly related to the dynam ics of acccelerated globalization.

Sōka Gakkai's shakubuku campaign Claim ing a m em bership of more than ten m illion and branches in more than one hundred countries, Sōka G akkai 倉価 '学 会 is acknow ledged as the most success­ ful of the Japanese new religious movements. Founded by M akiguchi Tsunesaburō 牧 口常 三 減 (1871-1944) in 1930, this lay movement based on N ichiren Buddhism was reorganized and renam ed after the w ar by Toda Jōsei 尸 田 城 聖 (1 900-1958), and is currently associated w ith the charism atic leadership of Ikeda D aisaku 池 田 大 作 （b . 1928), since 1979 president of Soka G akkai International (SGI) and honorary president of Sōo ka G akkai. Today Sōo ka G akkai is m ost com m only asso­ ciated w ith the practice of chanting the sacred title of the Lotus Sūtra (daim oku 題 目 ) , th e nam u-m yōhō-rengekyō 南 無 妙 法 蓮 華 経 (Homage to the Lotus Sūtra), and w ith a variety of initiatives for peace. In the C harter enacted in 1995, SGI states that it “shall, based on the B uddhist spirit of tolerance, respect other religions, engage in dialogue and work together w ith them tow ard the resolu­ tion of fundam ental issues concerning hum anity” (Soka G akkai International 2010a: 17). A lthough this claim does not generally correspond to effective coop­ eration w ith other Japanese religious organizations (due also to enduring m utual diffidence), Sōo ka G akkai has taken part in international m eetings such as the World Religions Conference and the Parliam ent of the W orld’s Religions, and in a variety of interreligious activities at the local level. M oreover, Sōo ka G akkai’s representative to the U nited N ations has served as president of the Com m ittee of Religious N on-governm ental O rganizations. Sōka G akkai's public im age as a global player against w ar and for interreligious cooperation is, however, m ostly associated w ith the global activism of Ikeda, who has engaged in dialogue w ith intellectuals such as A rnold J. Toynbee, Lokesh C handra, and Tu W eiming and received honorary doctorates and professorships from dozens of educational institutions worldwide. M oreover, since 1983, Ikeda has annually published a peace proposal, in w hich the ideals of religious tolerance and cooperation are often em phasized, as in this passage from the last proposal published in 2011: I believe it would be valuable for the w orld’s religions to engage in w hat the founding president of our organization, Tsunesaburo M akiguchi (1871-1944), term ed ‘hum anitarian com petition’ – that we conduct dialogue tow ard the shared goal of constructing a culture of hum an rights and, reflecting on our respective origins and histories, m utually strive to foster in people the capac­ ity to take the lead in this endeavor. (Ikeda 2011: 17) Despite this official endorsem ent of pluralism , Sōo ka G akkai also is not im m une from the tem ptation of carving out a special space for itself in the econom y of

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

37

global salvation. One of the hidden assum ptions behind the paradigm of a new civilization that m ay solve the contradictions of m odernity is in fact that N ichiren Buddhism , im plicitly presented as the perfection of East A sian and Japanese spirituality, is to play a central role as the m eeting point of eastern and w estern cultures (Shupe 1991; K isala 1999: 167-8). Thus, m oving from the generic claim that the East A sian region, because of “the depth of its spirituality,” is destined in tw enty-first century East Asia to be “a driving force in hum an history” (jinruishi no kudōryoku 人 類 史 の 駆 動 力 ） （Ikeda 1996: 271), Ikeda can argue that B uddhism is crucial to counter the pitfalls of m odern civilization, w hich alien­ ates individuals from life and hinders the possibility of a full “sym biosis” (kyōsei 共 生 w ith nature. This is possible, he claim s, because of the fundam ental Buddhist view point according to w hich hum an beings, society, nature, and the cosmos form an “indissoluble u n ity ” (Ikeda 1996: 230). Further, a distinction is made by Ikeda between the lesser “H īnayāna Buddhism” (Shōj ō Bukkyō 小 乗 仏 教 ), which is deem ed to be excessively w orld-denying and therefore “to contain ele­ m ents w hich are rem arkably close to nihilism ” (nihirizum u to ichijirushiku kinsetsu suru y ōso o m otte ニ ヒ リ ズ ム と 著 し く 近 接 す る 要 素 を も っ て )，and M ahāyāna Buddhism , w hich im plies in its basic concept of “em ptiness” (kū 空 ) positive understanding and acceptance of life as som ething in constant dynam ic change (Ikeda 1996: 135). Given these prem ises, Ikeda’s decisive assertion of M ahāuyāuna B uddhism ’s, and specifically of N ichiren Buddhism ’s, fundam ental role for the salvation of hum ankind is not unexpected. The lim itations of present-day hum an­ ism – the fact that “hum anity has come to be ordered about by the dictates of desire and its gratification – he argues, can be actually overcome only by a new form of “holistic” hum anism , “that regards the life of the individual hum an as extending out to and em bracing the entire cosm os,” of w hich the “the Lotus Sutra, w hich stands at the pinnacle of the teachings of Gautam a Buddha, repre­ sents the ultim ate crystallization” (Ikeda 1997). A lthough there are indications of the persistence of exclusivist attitudes w ithin the religious com m unity (Ōnishi 2009: 217), this tendency tow ard religious inclusivism in present-day Sōka G akkai indeed represents a much m ilder attitude tow ard other religions w hen com pared to the aggressive proselytizing shakubuku cam paign that accom panied the organization’s dram atic grow th during the post­ war years. W ithin Buddhism , shakubuku 折 伏 (to break and subdue) and shōju 摂 受 (to em brace and accept) are the two canonical ways to relate to other teach­ ings and spread B uddhist teachings. N ichiren 曰 蓮 (1222-1282) em phasized the form er m ethod since he assum ed it was more adequate to the L atter Dharm a-age (m appō 末 法 ) and to countries, like Japan, that he thought were slandering the Dharm a through w rong views and teachings (Stone 1994: 234-5). N ichiren’s choice for the explicit rejection of “w rong view s” opened the way to the historical development of a distinctive tradition of religious exclusivism affirm ing the absolute superiority of N ichiren Buddhism – variously interpreted according to social circum stances and religious sensibilities – that was inherited by N ichiren Shuōshū 日 蓮 正 未 t he m other organization of Sōka G akkai.5 The shakubuku no daikōshin 折 伏 の 大 行 進 （The G reat M arch of Shakubuku) cam paign was

38

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers'?

launched by Toda in 1951 and accom panied by the publication of the Shakubuku kyōten 折 伏 教 典 , a m anual sum m arizing fundam ental teachings and proselyt­ izing techniques, w ith the objective of “propagating Buddhism ” (kōsen rufu 仏 旦 流 布 a nd converting 750,000 fam ilies w ithin a short tim e (M cFarland 1967: 198-9). The general tone of this m anual for the practice of shakubuku is illustrated by the follow ing passage: Religion is som ething that reveals the principle of life (seikatsu genri 生 活 原 理 ) . Therefore, w hen one believes in a m istaken religion, the natural result is that hardship cannot be avoided. Simply put, there is only one right religion (tadashii shūkyō wa tada hitotsu shika naku 正 し い 宗 教 は た だ 一 つ し か な く ），and all other religions are heresies (ja sh ū 邪 宗 a n d false teachings (ja kyō 邪 教 ) . As Śākyam uni said, “There is only the Law of the One Vehicle, neither two nor three.” A nd this very Law of the One Vehicle is N ichiren Shōoshū (kono ichijō no hō koso, N ichiren Shōshū nano de aru こ の 一 乗 の 法 こ そ ，日 蓮 正 宗 な の で あ る ).6 Thus, in the Shakubuku kyōten other religions were criticized and belittled as m istaken. M ainstream traditional Buddhism is portrayed as incapable of giving life guidance to practitioners and leading them to buddhahood, since it lacks a connection w ith the T hree G reat Secret Laws (san daihihō ニ 大 秘 法 t aught by N ichiren, is anti-scientific, and alm ost exclusively concerned w ith funerals (Sōka G akkai Kyōgakubu 1967: 331-2). C hristianity is equally described as lacking any vitality in the m odern setting, being at best em braced at the ritual and notional level, and not as a true religious belief (Sōka G akkai Kyōgakubu 1967: 332). Sōka G akkai’s com petitors in the post-w ar Japanese religious m arket such as the new religious movements Risshō K ōseikai, Reiyūkai 霊 友 会 , and Tenrikyō 天 理 教 are discredited for having originated from false teachers and for being business enterprises disguised as religions (Sōka G akkai Kyōgakubu 1967: 333). According to the text, ancestors and clan deities (ujigam i 氏 神 c annot be the object of true faith but rather of gratitude. The true and only way to perform m em orial services for the ancestors and to revere the kam i 神 as protectors of the Lotus Sūtra is to chant the daim oku (Sōka G akkai Kyōgakubu 1967: 156-7, 168). Based on these prem ises, the shakubuku cam paign was conducted in m ilitary-like fashion and assum ed violent overtones, w ith Toda exhorting his followers to “consider all religions our enem ies” and to “destroy them ” (M urata 1969: 100; cf. A sahi shinbun 1954). Soon, episodes of religious intolerance started appearing in the headlines of the national press involving forced conversions, intim idations, interference in public education, domestic violence, and the destruction of ancestral tablets and other religious symbols (Yomiuri shinbun 1956a, 1956b; A sahi shinbun 1956; cf. B rannen 1964). One m ight be tem pted to see Sōka G akkai’s shakubuku cam paign as noth­ ing but a m odern instance of the exclusivist trend w ith N ichiren Buddhism . A lthough the idea of shakubuku is tightly bound to tradition, it is also possible to observe, however, a m eaningful connection betw een this m anifestation of

‘One true w orld religion am ong m any o th ers’?

39

religious exclusivism in the Japanese context and the dynam ics of globalization. In this regard, Jacqueline Stone has noted how the tragic events of W orld W ar II actually led Sōka G akkai to a reconfiguration of N ichiren teachings in a global setting. O n the one hand, the destruction brought by the Am erican bombings came to be interpreted as a collective punishm ent of Japanese for having slandered the true B uddhist teachings (Stone 1994: 253). O n the other hand, the activity of shakubuku was understood as a way to rectify the slander of the D harm a that had led Japan to w ar and pacify the country, and, on the global level, as a noble m ission that, by spreading faith in the True D harm a, would prevent such tragedies from ever occurring again. W artim e suffering and postw ar proselytizing were subsum ed w ithin an unfolding global dram a of hum an salvation in w hich Sōka G akkai m em bers played the leading role. (Stone 1994: 254) Thus, it m ay be seen how the vision underlying the shakubuku cam paign con­ ducted by Sōka G akkai in Japan and overseas (cf. Ōkubo 1991; Pereira 2 0 0 8 ) – until it was progressively abandoned in the 1970s – ju stified and encouraged religious exclusivism as the necessary condition to bring about peace and happi­ ness in global society. In Toda’s words, “There are m any people in this world who are suffering from poverty and disease. The only way to m ake them really happy is to shakubuku them ” (M urata 1969: 104).

3

S h a p in g

n e w

g lo c a l id e n titie s

G lo ca liza tio n lea n in g to ex tern a l sou rces G lobalization encourages, or even forces, local actors to select or reject from a pervasive flow of m eanings, worldviews, and values. The incorporation of these foreign cultural elem ents is generally accom panied by adaptation, through which they m ay be made to resonate w ith local traditions, and indeed their very selec­ tion may actually depend on their sim ilarity to preexisting ideas. W hat is adopted m ay also be im agined to various degrees, and not necessarily correspond to fac­ tual or historical reality (cf. Appadurai 1990; Goldstein-Gidoni 2001). However, the result is the em ergence of concrete glocalized form s leaning to external sources, through w hich new identities increasingly aware of the global context are reshaped. Religion in Japan was actively involved in these processes during the early phases of globalization, but the increasing influence of global cultural flow s at least since the M eiji R estoration has stim ulated the creation of religious hybrids in an unprecedented m anner. One fascinating exam ple of this variety of glocalization tracing back to that period of Japanese history is offered by the Shintō w edding ritual. W hile, until the end of the nineteenth century, w eddings in Japan were custom arily private m atters w ithout religious connections, the Shintō w edding ritual (shinzen kekkon 神 前 結 婚 , li terally “w edding before the kam i”) was devised, officially codified, and perform ed for the first tim e in 1900 on the m arriage of the future Emperor Taishō (1879-1926), then crown prince. This ceremony, which thereafter provided (with m inor changes) the standard for sim ilar cerem onies held at Shintō shrines, was elaborated in order to provide Japan, which was claim ing equal status w ith the w estern powers, w ith “an analogue to the C hristian w eddings of European royalty” (Edw ards 1989: 104; cf. Fujitani 1996: 116-21). Thus, from the begin­ ning, the introduction of the Shinto w edding ritual was a globally m inded gesture and a conscious prom otion of glocalization. At the same tim e, as the model spread among the urban upper class, and further to the Japanese m asses, the ritual contributed to the broader strategy to reshape the identity of Japanese people as subjects of an em erging regional power.1 W hile in the case of the Shintō wedding the external cultural input substantially provides the fundam ental idea (of a m ajestic C hristian ceremony) behind the creation of a new hybrid form, in

Shaping new g local identities

41

other instances, such as the em ergence of indigenous C hristian movements in Meiji Japan, the input may provide the entire structure. W ithin the more nativeoriented of these groups, not only is it believed that G od continues to reveal new truths to their founders and that w estern churches may even represent distortions of C hristianity, but also the role played by indigenous elem ents related to ances­ tor veneration, folk religion, Confucianism , and Buddhism may be so relevant that we can speak of “an extension, elaboration, or fulfillm ent of an existing religious tradition” (M ullins 1998: 44). On this basis, M ark M ullins has suggested that these C hristian movem ents m ay be aptly referred to as “New Religions,” sim ilarly to other groups that have em erged in Japan since the end of the Edo period (M ullins 1998: 33). At the very general level, the relevance of religion in Japan for the discourse on glocalization was already acknowledged by Roland R obertson in his influential volum e G lobalization: Social Theory and G lobal Culture, in w hich he claim ed that a few selected internal features of Japanese society related to religion (incli­ nation tow ard syncretism , institutionalized polytheism , and em phasis on p u rifi­ cation) greatly affect Japan’s peculiar form of global involvement, and help explain the country’s capacity to adopt ideas from other cultures and reshape them (R obertson 1992: 102). A lthough the full application of these generalizations to Japan m ay not be w ithout difficulties, the case studies analyzed in this chapter w ill illustrate some concrete ways of how religion in contem porary Japan, sim i­ lar to religion in other world cultures, plays an active role in global dynam ics by prom oting the creation of glocal form s for global use.

The discourse on human rights in traditional Japanese Buddhism A recent exam ple of glocalization leaning to external sources, in w hich religions in Japan select and adopt foreign cultural/religious elements as resources to shape new glocal identities (type 4), is that of various Japanese religions dealing w ith the issue of hum an rights. Perhaps few of the forceful ideas presently circulating in global flow s m ay claim a m ore direct and explicit relationship to European culture than the one according to w hich all hum an beings possess “equal and inalienable rights” (U nited N ations 1948). Tracing back its origins to ancient G reece and Rome, the concept of hum an rights is m ost com m only associated w ith the thought of European Enlightenm ent, through w hich the idea of a set of natural rights pertaining to ‘all m en’ came to be incorporated in the official docum ents of the revolutionary movements in France and the U nited States tow ard the end of the eighteenth century. A fter being adopted by the General A ssem bly of the U nited N ations in 1948 in the afterm ath of World W ar II, the U niversal D eclaration of H um an Rights has served as the standard reference for these principles, and, not infrequently, as an ideological tool used by m em ber states to legitim ize their aggressive foreign policies in the nam e of freedom . A lthough this is not to say that other cultures do not present sim ilar ideas sup­ porting the equality and dignity of hum an beings, the concept of hum an rights in its everyday practical (and political) use in global com m unication is almost

42

Shaping new glocal identities

invariably related to the cultural experience of the so-called w estern countries. The case of Japan is no exception. Together w ith popular sovereignty and paci­ fism , hum an rights (jinken 人 権 ) is among the central ideas of the new Japanese C onstitution of 1947, w hich was developed from a draft prepared by the occupy­ ing A m erican arm y (N eary 2002: 18). A lthough this process was accom panied by a public debate (showing that these ideas were not completely alien to Japanese society), and the C onstitution received a high rate of approval (although it was not approved in a referendum ), it m ay be considered nonetheless as a form of cultural im perialism , w hich also helps explain why “betw een 1953 to the start of the 1990s Japan was not an enthusiastic proponent of hum an rights w ithin the U N ” (N eary 2002: 18-19, 35). Ian N eary has shown that this attitude can be easily related to econom ic issues (such as the possible interference of w orkers’ rights w ith economic grow th) and to the fact that Japan was reluctant to expose itself to criticism from abroad and did not w ant to give indigenous hum an rights organizations the opportunity to use international standards or institutions to exert pressure from outside. (N eary 2002: 35) O f the two issues traditionally associated w ith the infringem ent of hum an rights in post-w ar Japan, discrim ination tow ard the K orean m inority and that tow ard the hisabetsu buraku, the latter has been the m ost relevant to Japanese society as a whole and to the Japanese religious world, to the extent that “in some areas of Japan ‘hum an rights’ has become, for better or worse, practically syn­ onym ous w ith actual or alleged Buraku discrim ination” (N eary 2002: 36). The hisabetsu buraku 被 差 别 部 落 (discrim inated-against ham let people) are a m arginalized m inority of Japanese people popularly associated w ith ideas of pollution and karm a, whose historical form ation traces back to m edieval Japan and especially to discrim inatory policies enforced during the Edo period (Amstutz 2010). At present, there m ay be about three m illion hisabetsu buraku in Japan, and, despite the Law on Special M easures for Buraku Improvem ent Project and the high budget spent by the governm ent betw een 1969 and 1994 on housing and infrastructure, m any continue to be the object of discrim inatory practices such as anonym ous graffiti, name lists, and harassm ent (K itaguchi 1999). Extensive surveys conducted in local tem ples and denunciations by hum an rights organiza­ tions have shown that Japanese religious institutions have also contributed to the problem in different ways, such as using derogatory language, discrim inatory necrologies and posthum ous nam es and giving private investigators access to tem ple registries (Bodiford 1996). In this regard, the closer involvement of Japanese Buddhism in these practices is also specifically related to its almost complete m onopoly in the perform ance of funerary and m em orial rites. The organization most obviously associated w ith the denunciation of these discrim inatory practices and lobbying on behalf of the hisabetsu buraku is the Buraku K aihō D ōmei 咅落角罕方女同盟 (Buraku Liberation League), which is prob­ ably also the biggest organization prom oting hum an rights in Japan. Interestingly,

Shaping new g local identities

43

the B uraku K aihō D ōmei, form ally started in 1955, is the post-w ar continuation of the Zenkoku Suiheisha 全 国 水 平 社 (N ational Levelers’ A ssociation) founded in 1922 by Saikō M ankichi 西 光 万 吉 （1895-1970), the son of a Jōdo Shinshū 浄 土 真 宗 (H onganji-ha 本 願 寺 派 ) tem ple priest, w ith other m em bers of this religious com munity. A lthough the im age of the founder Shinran as a “fellow com panion” (dōbō 同月月) also played a distinctive role in the form ation phase, the Suiheisha prim ary source of inspiration came from M arxist, socialist and C hristian ideas, and this movement m ay be considered an expression of the cul­ tural m ilieu of Taishō (1912-1926) Japan (Totten and W agatsuma 1972: 42; N eary 1989: 9). Thus, in the organization’s founding D eclaration, w hich is considered by m any to be the first to support hum an rights in Japan, we find reference to ideas of “freedom ” (jiy ū 自 由 ) and “equality” (byōdō 平 等 ) , and to “reverence for hum an dignity” (ningen o sonkeisuru koto 人 間 を 尊 敬 す る 事 ( Shinshu Ōtani-ha 1998: 8 -9 ; cf. M ain 2010). Since the m ajority of hisabetsu buraku were traditionally associated w ith Jōdo Shinshuū , increasing criticism com ing from groups such as the Suiheisha urged the religious institutions to prom ote m easures to counter internal discrim ination. A fter the first attem pts in the 1920s through the creation of the Ichinyokai 一 如 会 (U nity A ssociation) by the H onganji-ha, and the Shinshinkai 真 身 会 (（ T he True Body Association) by the Ōtani-ha 大 谷 派 , the post-war years saw the emergence w ithin both m ajor branches of Jōu do Shinshuū of reform movements inspired by the idea of dōbō that were also deeply interrelated w ith the hisabetsu buraku issue (H eidegger 2006: 285-92; 2010). W ithin the H onganji-ha, these movements m erged in 1978 to form the K ikan Undō 基車辛運 動 (Central M ovement), which has been, together w ith the D ōwa Kyōiku Shinkōkai 同 和 教 育 振 興 会 (Association for the Prom otion of D ōwa Education),2 the center for the prom otion of hum an rights and anti-discrim ination activities. In the K ikan U ndō u ’s official program , protecting “hum an rights” (jinken) is presented as one of the m ain issues, and is m ade to resonate w ith selected religious ideas such as those attributed to the founder Shinran em phasizing “the sanctity of life and an equalitarian outlook” (inochi no songen to byōdōkan い の ち の 尊 厳 と 平 等 観 ） （K ikan Undō Honbu Jim ukyoku 2001: 81-2). At present, the acceptance of the discourse on hum an rights w ithin the H onganji-ha and its hybridization w ith the religious idea of dōbō m ay be easily seen in various official statem ents and docum ents (cf. Jōdo Shinshū H onganji-ha 1999, 2001). The glocalization of the idea of hum an rights in this branch of Jōu do Shinshuū is expressed in all its clarity by the head priest (m onshu F間王 ), w hen he affirm s that the fundam ental prem ise for the realization of “a society of fellow com panions” (on - d ōbō no shakai 御 同 月 月 の 社 会 ) is not only “religious teachings” (m i-oshie が 教 又 ) but also “respect for life” (seim ei sonchō 生 命 尊 重 ）and “protection of hum an rights” (jinken y ōgo 人 権 擁 護 ） (K ikan Undō u Honbu Jim ukyoku 2001: 8). In the other m ajor branch of Jōdo Shinshū , the Ōtani-ha, the reform movement D ōb ōkai U ndō 同 月 月 会 連 動 (Fellow Com panions’ M ovement) created in 1962 is, sim ilarly to the K ikan Undō, con­ cerned w ith hum an rights issues especially through the K aihō U ndō Suishin Honbu 解 放 運 動 推 進 本 部 (H ead O ffice for the Prom otion of the Liberation

44

Shaping new glocal identities

Movement), originally founded in 1977 as a further attem pt to cope w ith the hisa­ betsu buraku issue. Among other things, during the Human Rights Week commemo­ rating the adoption by the U nited N ations of the U niversal D eclaration of Hum an Rights (10 D ecem ber 1948), the K aihō Undō Suishin Honbu organizes an annual Exhibition on H um an Rights (Jinken shūkan gyararī ten 人 権 週 間 ギ ヤ ラ リ 一 展 ） in the facilities of the head tem ple in Kyōto. D uring the same period, a parallel exhibition on hum an rights (Jinken paneru ten 人 権 パ ネ ル 展 ) is held in the facil­ ities of the N ishi Honganji in Kyōto, the head tem ple of the Honganji-ha. W hile the incorporation of the idea (and practice) of hum an rights w ithin post-w ar Jōdo Shinshū reform movements has been gradual and not w ithout contradictions, starting in the 1980s it has also found application in other areas, such as gender issues and the discrim ination suffered by form er H ansen’s disease patients (Dessì 2007: 172-82; H eidegger 2006, 2010). A part from Jōdo Shinshū , the hisabetsu buraku issue enjoys in Japan, at the general level, a certain centrality in religious com m unication concerning hum an rights, although there are m eaningful exceptions. A decisive tu rn in the extensive glocalization of these ideas took place in the early 1980s, following the so-called M achida Incident. D uring the T hird W orld Conference on Religion and Peace held in Princeton in 1979, the Japanese delegate and then chief adm inistrator of Sōt ōshū 曹 ?同 宗 (and concurrently president of the Japan Buddhist Federation), M achida M uneo 町 田 宗 夫 (1916-2009), denied the presence in Japan of any kind of discrim ination against m inorities, hisabetsu buraku included, and suc­ cessfully lobbied such that no m ention was made of these problem s in a final report. M achida’s attem pt to protect Japan from external criticism was harshly criticized by Japanese hum an rights activists, and a cam paign prom oted by the Buraku K aihō D ōmei followed, during w hich he was denounced and interro­ gated w ith other religious leaders of Sōtōshū in a series of assem blies (Bodiford 1996: 1-4). W hen, a few years later, M achida was led by this pressing cam paign and increasing debate w ithin the denom ination to apologize for his discrim inatory attitude, Sōtōshū had already started in 1982 the D ivision for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (Jinken Yōgo Suishin Honbu 人 権 擁 護 推 進 本 部 ). Ever since, this division has been com m itted to activities such as organizing conferences, publishing books and booklets on hum an rights, and elim inating discrim inatory necrologies (Bodiford 1996: 5 - 6 , 10). It is significant that Sōt ōshū itself identifies the starting point of its “efforts for the establishm ent of hum an rights and the total eradication of discrim ination” (jin ken kakuritsu, sabetsu kaishō ni m ukete no to rik u m i 人 権 確 立 •差 別 解 消 に 向 け て の 取 り 組 み ) in the M achida Incident (‘Sōtōshū D anshinto H ikkei’ K aitei Iinkai 2008: 128). These ideas have come to be consistently incorporated in Sōtōshū religious com m uni­ cation, and figure prom inently in the denominational slogan “hum an rights, peace, environm ent” (jinken, heiwa, kankyō 人 権 . 平 和 . 環 境 ), where “striving for the protection and im plem entation of hum an rights” (jinken no y ōgo to kakuritsu ni tsutornemasu 人 権 の 擁 護 と 確 立 に 努 め ま す ）is related to the aim of awakening to the teachings of the Buddha and creating a society free of bullying and dis­ crim ination (‘Sōtōshiū D anshinto H ikkei’ K aitei Iinkai 2008: 126; Sōt ōshiū 2009,

Shaping new g local identities

45

2011a). This trend and the concurrent reshaping of a glocal Sōtōshū identity are very clear in the rationale offered by the institutions for their support of hum an rights to the religious com m unity: “W hy do Sōtōshū m onks and priests take the issue of hum an rights very seriously?” ... The profound m eaning of our engagem ent for the eradication of social discrim ination and the enforcem ent of hum an rights (jinken 人 権 ） lies in “the teaching of equality (ningen byōdō 人 間 平 等 ) i nherited from Śākyam uni and our two founders.” The founder of Buddhism , Śākyam uni, and the two founders of Sōtōshū , the revered D ōgen Zenji and Eizan Zenji, taught us this inherent equality of hum an beings based on the spirit of w is­ dom and com passion (chie to jih i no seishin 智 慧 と 怒 悲 の精ネ申） ... A lthough B uddhism and the idea of hum an rights are not the same thing, the B uddhist teaching of the equality of hum an beings and the view point that supports the respect for their dignity have m uch in common. (Sōt ōshū 2011b) The fact that the idea of hum an rights is explicitly associated here w ith funda­ m ental Buddhist concepts such as w isdom and com passion confirm s how far the process of glocalization has gone. W ith the form ation of this hybrid form leaning to external sources (hum an rights), the understanding of aspects of the S ōtōshū tradition itself comes to be significantly related to the global context, and to pow­ erful concepts circulating in global cultural flows. A nother consequence of the scandal created by M achida on the international stage of Princeton has been the creation of the D ōshū ren 同 宗 連 (Joint Conference of Religions Concerned w ith the D ōwa Problem ).3 This interreligious network was form ed in 1981 by fifty-three Japanese religious organizations and three um brella associations, out of the need to accept as an individual task the reflection on “hum an rights in the world” (sekai no jin ken 世 界 の 人 権 a n d “the reality of buraku discrim ination in Japan” based on “a compassionate attitude” (jia i 怒 愛 ) (Jōdoshū 2006: 278; cf. M atsune 1993). One of the Buddhist traditions involved in this network is Jōdoshū 浄 土 宗 . In the preface to the first volume of a series on hum an rights education (jinken kyōiku shirīzu 人 権 教 再 シリーズ ) published by this denom ination, the then C hief A dm inistrator M izutani K ōshō 水 谷 幸 止 (b. 1928) recalls that In Jōdoshū, m any episodes of discrim ination have occurred, starting w ith the bestow ing of discrim inatory Dharm a-nam es, and the effort to support hum an rights centered on the experience of the hisabetsu buraku issue still contin­ ues, after it was started for the first tim e in 1980 w ith the Conference for Prom oting Awareness of the D ōwa Issue (Jōdoshū D ōwa Suishin Kyōgikai 浄 土 宗 同 和 推 進 協 議 会 ). (Jōdoshū 2006: 2) M izutani acknowledges that Jōdoshū ’s active engagem ent in the issue of hum an rights dates back to the afterm ath of the M achida Incident, when the first

46

Shaping new glocal identities

m eetings to discuss and cou nter d iscrim in atio n w ere o rganized. A t th e sam e tim e, he te stifie s th a t in the m eantim e a m assive in co rp o ratio n o f th is d iscourse in religious com m unication had occu rred, w hen, a couple o f sentences later, he affirm s th a t hum an righ ts education provides the fou nd ation s for estab lish ­ ing “the un iv ersal cu ltu re o f ‘hum an rig h ts’” ('jin k e n ' to iu fu h en tekin a bunka 「 人 権 」と い う 普 遍 的 な 文 化 ) w h ich rep resen ts in tu rn “th e p ath to w ard p ea ce” (heiwa e no m ichi 平 和 へ の 道 (J ō doshū 2006: 3). M oreover, M izu tan i exp lic­ itly refers to the aim o f the U nited N ations to m ake th e tw en ty -first ce n tu ry th ro u g h edu cation “a ce n tu ry o f hum an rig h ts” (jinken no seiki 人 権 の 世 紀 ), adding th a t global society w ould be in serio us dan ger if th is objective is not seen as a stric t n ecessity (Jōdoshū 2006: 2). T he g lo calizatio n o f th e official discou rse on hum an rig h ts in Jō doshū w as show n to be at an advanced stage alread y in tw o im p o rtan t docum ents issu ed by th e den om ination in 2001. O ne, th e J ōdoshū A ppeal for H um an R ights in the T w enty-First C en tu ry (Jōdoshū 21-seiki jin ken apīru 浄 土 宗 21 世 紀 人 権 ア ビ ー ノレ) h as th e discou rse at th e do cum ent’s v ery foundations:

You and m e/W e like each other because we are d ifferen t/I am so happy I have been able to m eet you / Your life / Is m y life. W ith our differen t faces, we are all hu m an b ein gs w ith u n iqu e ind ivid ual ch aracteristics. It is v ery im p o rtan t to recip ro cally acknow ledge our diver­ sity (chigau kosei ちがうイ固十生) and to respect each other (jinkaku o so m h ō shiau koto 人格を尊童しあうこと ) . How ever, th ere are cases w hen the advo­ cacy o f freedo m and eq u a lity is accom panied b y acts such as b elittlin g other people, ostracizin g and bu lly in g th em w ith our selfish w ords and actions. It is unforgivable to im p air other peo p le’s d ig n ity and in terfere w ith th e ir h ap ­ piness th ro u g h th ese acts o f discrim in atio n . W ith th is A ppeal, w e resolutely vow to appraise such foolishness w ith candor, to rely on the h eart o f the ven ­ erable nenbutsu tau g h t by our fou nder H ōnen, and to live our lives brightly, righteously, and in am ity. (Jō doshū 2001a) It m ay be seen how, th ro u g h th is A ppeal, th e J ōdoshū in stitu tio n s encourage th e ir follow ers to apply th e idea o f hum an rig h ts to all k in d s o f discrim in atio n , and to accept as a m ission th e pro tectio n o f th e freed om and eq u a lity o f all living bein gs in accordance w ith the teach in g of th e fou nder H ōnen 法 然 (1133-1212). T he official com m entary issu ed b y th e Jō doshū O ffice for P rom otin g A w areness o f the D ōw a Issue (Jōdoshū D ow a S uishin Jim ukyoku 浄 土 宗 同 和 推 進 事 務 局 ) relates th is docum ent to th e ideas o f hu m an rights e n sh rin ed in th e Japanese C o n stitu tio n and to the U nited N ations D ecade for H um an R ights E ducation. S ignificantly, J ō d o s h ū involvem ent in episodes o f d iscrim in atio n is explicitly acknow ledged, w ith p artic u la r reference to th e issue o f th e d isc rim in a to ry D harm a-nam es. W hile expressing th e ir reg ret for such p ast m isdeeds, the Jōdoshū in stitu tio n s in sist here on the need to em brace th ese ideas in order to cou nter all kinds o f d iscrim ination. T his should be done, the institutio ns claim , in accordance w ith the fundam ental teachings o f B uddhism and those o f H ōnen. In particular,

Shaping new glocal identities

47

the latter em phasis on the “equality of all hum an beings” (bannin byōd ō 万 人 平 等 ) is presen ted as th e gu idin g idea for a positive actio n w ith in so ciety th a t can p ro ­ m ote hum an rig h ts (Jōdoshū 2006: 2 8 2 -3 ). T he o th er official Jōdoshū docum ent m entioned above is the D eclaration for the S tart o f th e T w enty-First C e n tu ry (Jōd osh ū 21-seiki ekitō sengen 浄 土 宗 21世 紀 劈 頭 宣言 ), in w hich th e idea o f hu m an rig h ts is related to ano ther fu n d a­ m ental concept in H onen’s religio us tho ught, “acknow ledging one’s ow n ig n o ­ ran ce” (gusha no jika ku 愚 者 の 自 覚 ) . Here it is affirm ed th a t only by tu rn in g back to th is idea “problem s related to p eace, the env ironm ent, m orality, educa­ tio n, and social w elfare” can be actu ally solved (Jō doshū 2001b). T his w ide range o f issues is fu rth e r con nected in th e D eclaratio n to th e basic B u d dh ist concept o f “co-depend ent o rig in atio n ” (engi 縁 起 a nd th e related no tio n o f “harm onious coex isten ce” (tom oiki 共 生 ), w hich H ōnen derived fro m the sev en th -cen tu ry P ure L and C h inese m aster Z en d ō 善 導 (C h. Shandao) (Jōdoshū 2001b). T he sym bolic relevance o f th is official disco urse appears in all its clarity, if one th in k s th a t tom oiki is the central idea in th e slogan H ōnen tom oiki 法 然 共 生 chosen by J ōdoshū for the celebrations o f H ōnen ’s 800th m em orial in 2011. T he con nection b etw een H ōnen and the p ro tectio n o f hum an rig h ts is sim ilarly p resen ted in th e m ore recen t P eace A ppeal (Jōdoshū heiwa apīru 浄 土 宗 平 和 ア ピ ー ル ) of 2008, w here the realizatio n o f one’s foolishness is set as the p reco n d itio n for a deep rep en tan ce o f p ast v io latio ns o f hum an rig h ts b y the religious com m u nity (Jōdoshū 2009). T hus, also in the case o f Jōdoshū the d is­ course on hu m an rig h ts has com e to be in d ig en ized in such a way, th a t trad itio n al teach in g s can speak th ro u g h forcefu l ex tern al ideas and v ice versa. A nd it is apparent how all th is allow s at th e sam e tim e a reshap ing o f Jōdoshū religious id en tity w ith in global society.

Glocalization leaning to ‘native' sources T he shaping o f new religio us iden tities w ith in glo b alizatio n m ay lean to ex ternal sources, as in the cases p resen ted in the previous section, b u t m ay also look at th e trad itio n as a v alid source o f in sp iratio n . In th is case, w e m ay sp eak o f a glocalizatio n leaning to ‘n ativ e’ sources, w here the pervasiveness o f w orldw ide cultu ral flow s and th e grow ing reflex ive aw areness o f th ese dynam ics sp ecifi­ cally stim ulate th e choice o f elem ents fro m th e Japanese religio us trad itio n to form local hybrids (typ e 5). We are not dealing here w ith th e m ere persisten ce and passive app ropriation o f a religious heritage. T hese native sources, w hich m ay also be th e pro duct o f prev iou s ind igenization , are in fact th e outcom e o f a hig h ly selective and creative rea d in g o f th e tra d itio n and deco n tex tu alizin g p ractices, w hose m ain criterio n is m eetin g to som e exten t the exp ectatio n s o f a m o dern and global society. From a h isto rical p ersp ectiv e, the em ergence in Japan o f such new religious identities is evid ent in th e M eiji perio d , w hich w as ch aracterized by the m assive developm ent o f science and te ch n ical know ledge, and by th e creatio n o f new hybrids such as State S hinto and the m y th o f th e em peror as th e divine fath er o f the nation, largely as a respo nse to an acceleratio n in global dynam ics (H ardacre

48

Shaping new glocal identities

1989; G luck 1985: 73ff). C ontextually, w hen Japanese B u ddhism w as subjected to violent attack s and to th e charge o f being a foreign and obsolete trad itio n , its leaders resp on ded to such dram atic social changes b y prom oting, am ong other things, an im age o f th e ir religio n as a m o dern force com patible w ith th e science im p o rted from w estern co u ntries (K etelaar 1990; S nodgrass 2003). O ne ty pical m an ifestatio n o f th is effo rt for th e reco n fig u ratio n o f a new B u ddhism is the w ork o f Inoue E nryo 井 上 円 了 (1858-1919), in w hich B u ddhism is p resen ted as a k in d o f philo sop hical b e lie f in an absolute rea lity (o f w hich kam i 神 and bu d­ dhas are m an ifestatio n s), w hile custo m ary ritu a ls for achieving w orldly ben efits focu sing on ghosts and dem ons are discard ed as m ere su p erstitions (Josephson 2006). A m ore recen t exam ple o f how g lo calizatio n o f Japanese religions m ay lean to ‘n ativ e’ sources is offered by th e ir m o dern concern for ecological issues, w hich w ill be ad d ressed in the next section.

Jappanses religions and ecology A v ery com m on stereo ty p e about the Japanese people is th e ir love and reverence for natu re, alleg ed ly derivin g from an u n sp e cifie d sp iritu a lity and ancient reli­ gious heritage. Since th e Japanese them selves decisively con trib ute to th is rh eto ­ ric, it is not u n ex p ected to fin d it w ith in the context o f S hinto 神 道 ，the Japanese religion th at is perhaps m ost popularly associated w ith trees and the natural environ­ m ent.4 T he lin k betw een in stitu tio n al S hin tō and n atu re is em ph asized in a series o f un d ated pam ph lets p u blish ed by the Jinja H onchō 神 社 本 庁 (A ssociation of S hin tō S hrines) seem ingly in th e 1990s, w hose contents also featu re on its o ffi­ cial w ebsite. T he cover o f one o f th ese pam phlets, sig n ifican tly (and freely) tra n s­ la ted into E nglish as “A n In v ita tio n to S hinto S p iritu alism " (Shintō e no izanai ネ申道への誘レ、)，em blem atically featu res the follow ing caption: E very single com ponent o f th e n atu re does have its ow n divine sp irit, w hich gives us jo y and ben efit. A nd we have b een prayin g for refresh ed life th ro u g h ou r close ties w ith th e M other N ature. It is th ro u g h th is resp ect for th e N ature th a t w e have b een able to cultivate our long sp iritu al trad itio n , and, con se­ quently, h isto ry as a people. (Jinja H onchō 2009c) B esides providing us w ith a usefu l nutshell view of th e basic idea underlying this cam paign, th is m aterial is also w orthy of in terest for the em phasis placed on the key concept of shizen 自 然 (nature), also freely tran slated in the E nglish version as “M other N ature” – presum ably w ith an eye on w estern discussions on ecology. In another o f these pam phlets entitled “C ivilization o f the D ivine F orest” (Kamigami no m ori no bunm ei 神 々 の 森 の 文 明 )，we fin d th e follow ing passage in English: W h en w e th in k o f th e sh arp d ecrease o f fo rests in th e w orld, or o f the d estru c tio n o f th e tro p ical rain forests w hich have a grave in flu en ce for th e env iro nm en t o f p lan et, w e can say th a t it is rem arkable th a t 67 percen t o f

Shaping new glocal identities

49

Japan is still covered b y forests. T his is not only due to the Japanese m on­ soon clim ate, or due to its m oun taino us geography. It is rath er due to the in flu en ce o f Japanese ancient civ ilizatio n w hich resp ected th e forest, u tiliz ­ ing it as holy tree s as w ell. T his long con tinu ing value system o f Japan m ade it possible to keep the forests as its fru its u n til now. (Jinja H onchō 2009a) In th is tex t, w ritte n by th e w ell-know n S h in tō scholar and priest, S onoda M in oru 菌 田 稔 (b . 1936), the fact th a t a large p a rt o f Japan is still forested is d irectly related to th e p ersisten ce o f trad itio n al values ro o ted in “Japanese ancient civ ilizatio n .” N ot surprisin gly , th is civ ilizatio n is id en tified w ith S hinto, the “relig ion o f the fo re st” (m ori no sh ūkyō 森 の 宗 教 )，th a t “has kept th e religious v ision o f th e ancient Japanese u n til now adays w ith out changing it v ery m uch” (Jinja H onchō 2009a; cf. S onoda 20 00 ). In ano ther o f th ese pam ph lets ch aracter­ ized b y a less op tim istic tone, the env ironm ental crisis and other pressin g p rob ­ lem s o f m o dern society are ascrib ed to “th e lack o f aw esom eness, reverence, and ap p reciatio n for n atu re th a t ancient people u sed to have and tau g h t us abo u t” (Jinja H onchō 2009b). O n th e other hand, S hinto is p resen ted as a force able to provide a sp ecific con trib u tio n to resolve the env iro nm en tal crisis: E nv ironm ental issues, afte r all, depend on our self-aw areness o f the p ro b ­ lem s and d eterm in atio n to tak e ou r responsibility. W e o ften say th a t th in g s look d ifferen t according to the view po int. So, S hinto suggests to sh ift a point of view and to look our environm ent w ith the spirit of ‘reverence and gratitu de’ (ikei to kansha no nen 畏 敬 と 感 謝 の 念 )，th a t is, w ith th e sp irit o f p aren tal care for ch ild ren or w ith th e sp irit o f brotherhood. A nd if we could extend th is sp irit to ou r neighbors, to our so ciety m em bers, to our co u n try m em bers, to people o f th e w orld, and to n atu re, too, beyond the d ifferen ce o f thoughts, ethics, religions, th en th is sp irit w ill be the base to fo ster c riteria and m orals ind ispen sab le fo r keeping ou r hu m an life healthy. (Jinja H onchō 2009b) In th is way, S h in tō, because o f its role as the g u ard ia n o f the “sp irit o f ‘rever­ ence and g ratitu d e ’” th a t can be exten ded fro m the fam ily circle to o th er people in the w orld and the n atu ral environm ent, is deem ed to provide a valuable clue to face th e ecological crisis (Jinja H onchō 2009b). S im ilar ideas are also found in other info rm ative m aterial pro duced by the S hinto in stitu tio n s for the public. In the freely d istrib u ted b o ok let guid e to Shinto sh rin es Jinja e y ōkoso 神 社 へ よ う こ そ (W elcom e to Jinja), w hich includes the tran slatio n o f the Japanese tex t into nine different lan guag es, th ese concepts are rep h rased in the follow ing w ay: T here are also m any trees in Jinja. T his is related to the idea o f the ancient Japanese th a t the forest w as a sacred place w here K am i lived. T hus, Shinto and n atu re are insep arab le (Shintō to shizen wa kitte mo kirenai kankei ni

50

Shaping new glocal identities a r u 神 道 と 自 然 は 切 っ て も 切 れ な い 関 係 に あ る ) . In recent years, ecology has becom e a key issue in in tern atio n al society. In th is connection, Shinto em phasises th e im p o rtan ce o f approaching n atu re w ith awe and deep appre­ ciation (ikei to kansha no nen ). (Jinja H onchō n.d.)

In th e sam e vein, a bro chure d istrib u ted by the Ise Jingū P ublic A ffairs H ead q u arters for S h ik in en Sengū (Ise Jingū S hik inen Sengū K ōhō H onbu 伊 勢 神 宮 式 年 遷 宮 広 報 本 部 ) on the occasion of the sixty-second rem oval (shik­ inen seng ū 式 年 遷 宮 ）o f th e G ran d S hrine o f Ise (Ise Jin gū 伊 勢 神 宮 ）ritu a lly (and practically) perform ed every tw enty years, rhetorically asks the reader: “W hat can people do to preserv e n atu re, the dw elling place o f gods and goddesses, and to b u ild a b rig h t fu tu re for all h u m a n k in d ?” (P ublic A ffairs H ead q u arters for S hik inen Sengu 2006). T he reply is em bedded in th e sam e b rochure, w here the ritual rem oval and reconstruction of the shrine are im plicitly presented as the p ara­ digm atic m odel o f a resp ectfu l attitu d e to w ard the environm ent. A s for the ritu al level, it is affirm ed here, “th e sengu expresses th e profoun d resp ect th e Japanese people have for natu re, em bodied in a cerem ony for reg enerating trees. W hile prayin g fo r and th an k in g the sp irit o f th e trees, w oodsm en hum bly fall them .” A t th e p ractical level, the reply is provided th ro u g h m entioning th e “200-year cypress p lan tin g p ro jec t” prom oted by th e Ise Jin gū , and th ro u g h the reference to th e idea o f “recycling,” w hich sig n ifican tly em p hasizes the fact th a t th e m aterial rem oved from the shrine is d istrib u ted and u sed in other sh rin es th ro ughout Japan. In addition, the idea o f S hintō ’s closeness w ith natu re fin d s legitim ation here th ro u g h the claim th a t the practice o f shikinen seng ū w as sta rted about 1,300 years ago u n d er E m peror Tenm u 天 武 ，and has continued u n brok en u n til th e p resent tim e (Public A ffairs H ead q u arters fo r S hik inen Sengu 2006). A ltho ug h th is cam paign w ith in S hin tō has b een developed w ith in th e fra m e­ w ork o f a grow ing aw areness o f ecology in Japan and at th e global level, the respo nses to th is crisis ten d to presen t S hin tō ’s con cern for n atu re in a rather ahisto rical way. A ccording to th is view , the trad itio n al sen sib ility for th e envi­ ronm ent trac es back to the sp iritu a lity and w orldview o f a native ancient civ iliz a­ tion, w hich has v iv ifie d Japanese h isto ry u n til m o d ern ity and its excesses, and has b een p reserv ed in its p ristin e form by S hin tō since tim e im m e m o ria l. A closer look at these assum ptions about th e relation ship b etw een S h in tō and n ature reveals not only th a t th e y are rath er problem atical, but also th a t th ey are quite relevant to our discussio n on th e g lo calizatio n o f religion in Japan. T he firs t o b servatio n here is th at, although th ere is a m eanin gful connection betw een S hintō, the kam i, rice cultivation and the environm ent, concern for nature and ecology has hard ly found u n til recen tly a sig n ifican t place in th e agenda of S hin tō in stitu tio n s (cf. N elson 1996: 223; B reen 2010a). If w e look at th e h isto ry o f m o dern Japan since th e M eiji period , S h in tō ’s p rim a ry co n cern has b een w ith th e strong su p p o rt o f the dom inant official ideology centered on th e d iv in ity of th e em peror, w ith th e pro pagatio n o f prin cip les b ased on the trad itio n al values of lo yalty and filia l piety, and w ith th e perfo rm an ce o f religious ritu als. Even after

Shaping new glocal identities

51

the w ar, reviv ing the con nection betw een religion and th e state has rem ain ed one o f the m ain p rio rities o f th e S hintō w orld, as m ay be seen in th e support for po liti­ cal attem p ts to n atio n alize th e Y asukuni Jinja 靖 国 神 社 (th e sh rin e in Tōk y ō th at w as th e cen ter o f Japanese m ilita rist ideology du ring th e w ar) and in the w ave o f n atio nalism recen tly lead ing to the rein stitu tio n o f the N ational F oundation D ay and law s such as th o se con cerning th e flag and th e national anthem . A t the level o f religious practice, th e m ost conspicuous activ ity o f S hin tō in stitu tio n s p res­ ently consists o f d istrib u tin g am ulets fro m the Ise Jin gū to local sh rin es and households (B reen 2010a). H ow ever, even the claim th a t pre-m o d ern Japanese cu ltu re and S h in tō w ere explicitly and reflexively concerned w ith ecology is far from being unproblem atic. To sta rt w ith, th e idea o f Japanese peo p le’s trad itio n al oneness w ith n atu re is scarcely su b stan tiated . In th is regard, it has b een observed th a t “the pre-m o d ern Japanese despoiled forest and field on a g ran d scale,” th a t esp ecially in th e Edo p erio d “the m onum ental w orks o f th e religious and ru lin g elite consum ed huge qu antities o f the best tim b er,” and th a t p rogressive refo restatio n policies w ere im plem ented fro m the m id -seventeen th ce n tu ry onw ards (H ow ard 1999: 422). From the h isto rical p o in t o f view , w hat em erges is th e im age o f a so ciety th at “p asses th ro u g h cycles in term s o f relative em phasis in forest u se,” oscillatin g b etw een “p rod uctio n” and “spatial and sp iritu a l d o m ination,” rath er th a n o f one exclusively con cern ed w ith p ro tectin g th e env iro nm en t (H ow ard 1999: 423). H ow ever, not only m ay the religious in stitu tio n s have stro ngly co n trib u ted to the past exp loitation o f Japanese forests b u t also, as Fabio R am belli po in ts out, m any elem ents o f p o p u lar disco urses on th e sacredness o f tree s m ight not date b ack to a p rim o rd ial tim e as an o rig in ally Japanese phenom enon, as m any authors believe. O n the contrary, pre-m edieval ideas on the sacredn ess o f trees w ere o ften bo rro w in gs from C h inese and other con tinen tal cultu res th a t w ere subsequently adap ted to native persp ectiv es. (R am belli 2 0 0 1 :4 8 ) In R am b elli’s d eco n stru ctio n o f th is m o dern cultu ral m yth, th ese “ecopietaslik e attitu d e s” are also show n to be “th e resu lt o f stru g g les and negotiations b etw een B u dd hist in stitu tio n s su pp o rted b y th e state and local social stru ctu re s or life-sty les” (R am belli 2 0 0 1 :4 ). In o th er w ords, the S hin tō view o f n atu re and tree s as sacred m ay have b een stron gly in flu e n ced not only by foreign cultu ral im p o rts (e.g. th e B u dd hist b elief th a t the bu d d h a-n atu re is p resen t in all th ing s) bu t also, and in a decisive way, b y the po litics o f pow er o f the religious in stitu ­ tio n s and by th e ir attem p t to sacralize th e v ery m aterial w ith w hich th e y w ere b u ild in g th e ir tem ples and sh rin es (R am b elli 2001: 4 3 -5 9 ). G iven this background, it is tem p ting to see in the recen t attention show n by S hintō in stitu tio n s to the issue o f ecology as not only the continuation of a “tra d i­ tio n a l” rhetoric bu t also, and crucially to our discussion, a specific w ay o f adapt­ ing to global trend s. T he response given b y S hintō to the grow ing global aw areness o f an im pending environm ental crisis is m odulated th ro u g h a selective approach

52

Shaping new glocal identities

to th e trad itio n , w hich em ph asizes th e allegedly im m em orial and resp e ctfu l attitu d e o f Japanese people to a d ivine natu re. In th is way, by lo ok ing to the distan t and im agin ed past, a new id en tity is shaped th a t m ay m eet the grow ing expectations of global society. T he sam e globally m inded read ing o f the religious past also em erges, for exam ple, in the general plan o f the S hintō K okusai G akkai 神 道 国 際 学 会 (International S hintō Foundation), w hich lists “environm ental p ro ­ tection” (kankyō hozen 環 境 保 全 ）as one o f its m ain objectives. Q uite sig n ifi­ cantly, the sam e org anization assigns a prom inent role to th e Shinto relationship w ith natu re (Shintō to kanky ō 神 道 と 環 境 ）in a ch aracterizatio n o f the trad itio n (S hintō K okusai G akkai 2010a, 2010b). A sim ilar concern for repositioning in glo­ bal society m ay be seen in the S hintō choice to adhere in 2000 to the A lliance o f R eligions and C onservation (ARC). N eedless to say, here the sam e rhetoric of the Japanese people w ho felt “the divine w ithin n atu re” and “cam e to hold the ideal of a life that w as in harm ony w ith and u n ited w ith n atu re” is also reproduced, thus confirm ing the pow erfulness o f this reco nfig uration o f S hintō, and its viab ility as a m odern glocal id en tity (A lliance o f R eligions and C onservation 2011a, 2011b). A case show ing som e sim ilarities to th is is Sōt ōshū , w hich in 1995 sta rted a G reen P lan (G urīn puran グリーン• プラン) to p ro tect th e environ m ent and coun­ te r the effects o f global w arm ing ( ‘Sōtōshū D anshinto H ik k ei’ K aitei Iin k ai 2008: 137-9). T his m ovem ent w ith in Z en B u ddhism prom otes a v arie ty o f activ­ ities, such as su rveys on acid rain, collecting d ata from tem ples across th e cou n­ try, and cam paigns for p ro tectin g the ecosystem th ro u g h distrib u tin g inform ative m aterial. A t th e practical level, tem ples and priv ate households are enco uraged to save w ater and en erg y and reduce env iro nm en tal po llu tio n by ad justing the tem ­ p eratu re o f air conditioners, w atching less television , using less hot w ater, and elim inating plastic bags. A lthough th e G reen P lan w as conceived am idst grow ing aw areness o f the in tern atio n al public opinion on ecology and discussions w ith in th e U nited N ations th a t w ould lead a couple o f years later to th e adoption o f the K yoto P rotocol (1997), S ōtōshū carves out a distinctiv e role for itse lf w ith in the in tern atio n al ecological m ovem ent: B uddhism , and in p artic u la r S ōtōshū, has b ee n deeply con cern ed w ith natu re since its inception, and has firm ly m a in tain ed th e sense o f liv in g in harm ony w ith it. T his m ay w ell be called the sp irit o f Z en (Zen no seishin 禅 の 精 神 ). A t p resent, the call for p ro tectin g the environ m ent is beco m in g in creasin g ly p o p u lar all over th e w orld, and everyone easily agrees. B ut one should not th in k th a t ou r G reen P lan has b ee n conceived in such a sloppy way. R ather, harm on io us coexistence w ith n atu re rep resen ts the orig inal sp irit o f S ōtōshū (Sōtōshū no hajim e kara no seishin 曹 洞 宗 の 始 め か ら の 精 禅 )，w hich looks up to th e foun der D ōgen Z enji as a m odel. (S ōtōshū 1996) W h at is im plied here is th at, w hile the env ironm ental crisis and th e response to it em erging at the global level are som ething quite new , S ōtōshū c arries w ith in itself an inh erent sensibility tow ard these issues because the idea o f a “harm onious

Shaping new glocal identities

53

coexistence w ith n atu re” (shizen to no tom oiki 自 然 と の 共 生 ）lies at S ō tō sh ū ’s v ery foundations. T hus, th e religious trad itio n is m eant to provide the sources to face th is crisis prod uced by in d u strializatio n , econom ic developm ent, and con­ sum erism . In th e in tro d u ctio n o f th e official guide to the G reen P lan lau nched by S ōtōsh ū, we fin d th e follow ing passage: It goes w ith out saying th a t relig io n ’s greatest w ish is to release hum an beings from su fferin g ( ‘jin se i-k u ’ no k a ik e ts u 「 人 生 苦 」の角罕決)，b u t in the face of the w orldw ide w orsening o f th e ecological crisis today, to g eth er w ith hum an su fferin g the su fferin g o f the E arth (c h k y ū-k u 地 球 苦 ) has becom e som e­ th in g we cann ot avoid to address. In th e Yuim a-ky ō 糸 隹摩 経 [Vim alakīrtisūtra] , it is w ritte n th a t “I am sick becau se all other bein gs are sick ” (shujō yam u ga yu e ni ware y a m u 衆 生 病 む が ゆ え に 吾 れ 病 む ) . In our present tim e ch aracterized by th e d estru ctio n o f th e environm ent, th is m ust im ply th a t “I am sick becau se th e E arth is sick ” (chikyu yam ū ga yu e ni ware yam u 地 球 病 む が ゆ え に 吾 れ 病 む )，and even th a t “the E arth is sick because I am sick” (ware yam u ga yu e ni chikyu y a m u 吾 れ 病 む が ゆ え に 地 球 病 む ) . For us w ho have em braced B uddhism , th is is som ething about w hich we cannot bu t be positively concerned. (S ōto sh ū 1998a) From th is passage, w e can see how w hat is perceived b y Sōt ōshū as relig io n ’s (B ud dhism ’s) b asic fun ctio n , “to release hu m an bein gs from su fferin g,” is rein terp reted b ased on the ongoing env iro nm en tal crisis. In the presen t condi­ tio ns, the fact th a t “the E arth as a w hole is su fferin g ” cannot be overlooked, and a classic passage from th e Yuim a-ky ō (“I am sick because all other b eings are sick” ) is u sed to exp lain th a t ou r sickness is a consequence o f the E a rth ’s sick­ ness and vice versa. A ll th in g s and livin g bein gs form an interd ep end en t w hole, and B ud dh ist p ractitio n ers are responsible for p u ttin g th is fund am ental M ah āy āna teach in g into p ractice (Sōtōshū 1998a). In the sam e official guide to th e G reen P lan, a fu ll chapter is devoted to ex p laining th e religio us sig nifican ce o f env iro nm en tal activism . H ere, fo r exam ­ ple, th e concept o f “co-depen dent o rig in atio n ” (engi 縁 起 ）is u sed to argue for the in terco n n ected n ess o f all things. Śāk y am u n i’s teach in g s o f th e F our N oble T ruths and th e E ightfold P ath are intro d u ced to explain th a t “d esire” (yokubō 欲 望 ）is th e cause o f hum an suffering and the destru ctio n o f th e environm ent, and D ōgen’s 道 元 (1200-1253) and K eizan’s 璧 山 （1268-1325) love for nature is cele­ brated th ro u g h v ario u s anecdotes and scrip tu ral passages (Sōtōshū 1998b). Sim ­ ilarly, th e Five P rinciples o f G reen L ife (G urīn raifu gokun グリーン . フイフ五訓)， one set o f S ōtōshū g u id elin es for p ro tectin g the en viron m ent, are explained w ith reference to th e trad itio n and the exam ples o f D ōgen and th e ‘second fo u n d er’ K eizan. H ere, for exam ple, the prin cip le o f “not w astin g w ater” is related to D ōg en ’s w ords, “m ay th is w ater serve for a m u ltitude o f people com ing afte r m e,” pronounced w hile he w as p o u rin g into a stream th e rest o f the w ater he h ad not d ru n k (Sotoshu 1998c). A nother prin cip le ex h o rtin g th e religious

54

Shaping new glocal identities

com m u nity to “coexist harm o nio usly w ith n atu re” (shizen to tomo ni ikim ash ō 自然とともに生きましよう) is related to D ōg en ’s and K eizan ’s id e n tificatio n of m o un tains and stream s w ith the B uddha Śāky am uni (S ōt ō shū 1998c). T his extensive use of religious sources to ju stify S ōtōshū’s in stitutional policies, and, even m ore im p ortantly, th e reference to th e “sp irit o f Z en ” (Zen no seishin ) th a t has at its very core th e id ea o f harm o ny w ith natu re, show how global env i­ ronm ental issues provide this trad itio n of Japanese B uddhism w ith the op po rtunity to shape a new glocal im age o f itself. Since th e observatio n m ade above about th e cu ltu ral m yth o f Japanese oneness w ith n atu re also applies to B uddhism , the idea pro m o ted by Sōtōshū o f a Z en trad itio n con cerned w ith ecology since its orig ins is largely factitio u s (Sōtōshū 1998d). T h ro u g h th is selective read in g of trad itio n al sources, how ever, a new religious id en tity is reco n fig u red , w hich tak es seriou sly into account global com m unication related to th e env iro nm en tal crisis, and the concerns and asp iratio n s o f the netw ork o f global actors cooperat­ ing in its circulation.

4

Glocalization, cultural chauvinism, and resistance to change

G localization an d cu ltu ral chauvinism In th e in tro d u ctio n to the in flu e n tial volum e The Invention o f Tradition, co -ed ited w ith T erence R an ger (H obsbaw m and R an g er 1983), E ric H obsbaw m no ted how th ese “respo nses to novel situ ation s w hich take th e form o f reference to old situ ­ ation s” are to be found in any tim e and place, bu t especially w hen a rapid transform ation o f society w eakens or destroys the social patterns for w hich ‘old’ trad itio n s had b een designed, prod ucin g new ones to w hich th ey w ere not applicable, or w hen such old trad itio n s and th e ir in stitu tio n al carriers and pro m ulgators no longer prove su fficien tly adaptable and fle x i­ ble, or are otherw ise elim in ated : in short, w hen th ere are su fficien tly large and rap id changes on th e dem and or the supply side. Such changes have b een p articu la rly sig n ifican t in the p ast 200 years, and it is therefore reasonable to exp ect these in stan t fo rm alizatio n s o f new trad itio n s to cluster during th is perio d. (H obsbaw m 1983: 4 -5 ) I f th is is tru e, we should expect to fin d a special relationship betw een the for­ m ation o f th ese ‘inv en ted tra d itio n s’ and global dynam ics, w hich te n d to escalate cu ltu ral change and social tran sfo rm atio n to an u n p reced en ted level. Indeed, the relevance o f H obsbaw m ’s d isco urse to glo b alizatio n th e o ry has b een noted by R oland R obertson, w hen he m akes a p arallel betw een “the in vention of lo c ality ” th a t accom panies m o d ern cultu ral flow s and “the in vention o f tra d i­ tio n ” (R ob ertso n 1995: 35). T he h isto ry o f m o d ern Japan afte r the M eiji R estoration , w hen th e rapid and m assive assim ilatio n o f foreign cu ltu ral elem ents and the m o d ern izatio n o f the co u n try led to th e first decisive tu rn in g p o in t in the trajecto ry o f the process o f globalization , has offered p len ty o f m aterial to scholars in terested in these dynam ics. H ybrid form s b riefly m en tion ed previously, such as the in vention o f a S h in tō w edding ritu al and the m y th o f th e em p ero r as th e divine fath er o f the n ation, can actu ally b e u n d ersto o d as p a rts o f th e sam e fram ew ork, w hich saw the em ergence o f S tate S hin tō as the ideology o f th e new natio n -state and its

56

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

im p erialistic m issio n (G luck 1985; H ardacre 1989). T h is p ro x im ity o f th e p h e­ nom enon o f inv ented trad itio n s to “nation alism , th e n atio n -state,” and “n ational sym bols” (H obsbaw m 1 9 8 3 : 13) alread y em ph asized by H obsbaw m m ay thus also be seen in the case o f Japan, w here g lo calizatio n tend s som ehow to in c o rp o ­ rate elem ents o f cu ltu ral chauvinism . T hat th is in clin atio n is not lim ited to Shinto is clearly sh ow n by th e case o f B u d d h ism , w hose ab o v em en tio n ed re c o n fig u ­ ratio n as a m o dern religion com patible w ith science in th e M eiji p erio d w as ch aracterized b y n atio n alist featu res th a t have b een analyzed fro m vario us p ersp ectiv es.1 However, glocalization accom panied by cultural chauvinism need not necessar­ ily or exclusively lean to trad itio n al sources. T his w as su gg ested by th e border­ lin e case o f th e S hinto w edding, w here th e idea o f a m ajestic C h ristian cerem ony provided the m odel for creatin g a new hy brid form . T hat the su p erio rity o f Japanese cultu re m ay be em ph asized d u rin g th e p rocess o f adap tatio n o f foreign elem ents (type 6) w ill em erge m ore explicitly below , in the tw o in te rre lated cases d ealin g w ith th e th em e o f ‘lost co n tin en ts,’ Jesus C h rist, and other sages in som e o f the m ost recen t new religious m ovem ents.

Lost continents, saviors, and cultural chauvinism O ne in terestin g aspect o f the teach in g s o f M ah ik ari 真 光 ，the Japanese new reli­ gious m ovem ent founded in the early 1960s b y O kada Y oshikazu 岡 田 良 一 (1901-1974), is the reference to the m y th o f M u and th e fig u re o f Jesus C h rist.2 W in sto n D avis, w ho conducted p io neering fieldw ork am ong th is group in the 1970s, has in d iv id u ated the m ain source o f O k ad a’s in fo rm atio n on the lost con­ tin en t o f M u in the w ork of Jam es C hurchw ard (1851-1936), w ho w rote a series o f book s on th is topic.3 T he them e o f th is im ag ined lost con tinen t trac es back to th e w ritin g s o f R o sicrucians and T heosophists, w here, for exam ple, it is an in te­ gral p a rt o f the th e o ry o f “ro ot-races,” already sketched in A lfred P. S in n ett’s (1840-1921) E soteric Buddhism p u blish ed in 1883 (S antucci 2008: 41). A ccording to th is view , in c o rp o ratin g a num ber o f religious sources and later expanded by H elena P. B lavatsky (1831-1891) and others, h u m an ity develops th ro u g h a series o f “ro u n d s” or p la n eta ry cycles w ith w hich seven “ro o t-races” and fu rth e r sub ­ races are associated. T he root-race o f the current age is the fifth , the A ry an Race, w hich w ill be follow ed by a six th root race c h aracterized b y th e re-em erg ing o f occult pow ers (already developing in A m erica), and by a seventh root-race, the fu ll developm ent o f hum an sp iritu a lity (S antucci 2008: 4 3 -5 0 ). T he A ry an R ace, how ever, w as p reced ed b y the A tlantean R ace, and earlier by the th ird race th at in h ab ited th e con tinen t o f L em u ria (reaching M adagascar, Sri L an ka, and S um atra), w hich has b een p o p u larly id e n tified w ith M u at least since th e tim e of th e p u blication in 1931 o f Lem uria: The L ost C ontinent o f the P acific by the R osicrucian, W ishar S. C erve (1883-1939).4 W h ile in C h urchw ard ’s account o f M u th e role (and position) o f Japan is at best perip h eral, in O k ad a’s view th e Japanese becom e the orig inal in h ab itan ts o f the lost continent. M oreover, if w e follow D avis’s in terp retatio n , the M a h ik ari’s m yth

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

57

o f the six teen p rin ces o f M u sent out to civ ilize th e w orld m ay be u n d ersto o d as “a Jap an ized version o f th e ‘ro o t-races’ com m only found in the w ritin g s o f the T heosop hists.”5 In th is g lo calized version o f th e them e o f lost lands, M u is id en ti­ fied w ith no less th a n ancient Japan, th en exten din g for 5,000 m iles to H aw aii and ru led b y the E m peror S um era M ikoto, a descendent o f th e god -creato r Su. M u/Jap an is p o stu lated b y O kada to be th e site o f an advanced civ ilizatio n ru lin g the entire w orld, and the source o f w orld cultu re u n til th e co n tin en t’s fin al disappearan ce du rin g th e reign o f R a M u, afte r “nuclear w arfare broke out b etw een M u and its riv als in A tlan tis” and “various cataclysm s – b eg in n in g w ith the fall o f th e Tow er o f B abel – w ere sent by S u-god as a w arn in g to m an k in d .” W ith in the fram ew ork o f th is d iffu sio n ist m odel, M uvian cu ltu re is seen as the o rig in o f all w orld technology, religio us sym bols, and scrip tu res. T hus, it is not su rp risin g th a t fig u re s such as M oses, Jesus, M oham m ed, C onfuciu s, and the B uddha are cred ited as having v isited Japan in order to gain th e ir sp iritu al know l­ edge (D avis 1980: 6 8 -7 2 ; cf. M cV eigh 1997: 7 3 -4 ). In th is regard, it has also b een n o ted how M a h ik ari’s teach in g has b een in flu ­ enced by the Takeuchi (or Takenouchi) monjo 竹 内 文 書 (T akeuchi D ocum ents), alleg ed ly ‘disco vered’ to w ard th e end o f th e n in eteen th ce n tu ry b y the hom ony­ m ous lineage o f S hin tō p riests in Ib arak i prefectu re, and other related w riting s. T he Takeuchi monjo, to g eth er w ith other ‘sacred trea su res,’ w ere the central ele­ m ent in the ultra-n atio n alist new religious m ovem ent estab lish ed b y T akeuchi K iyom aro 竹 内 巨 麿 (1874-1965), w hich w as esp ecially successful am ong the m ilita ry u n til the m ovem ent w as fin ally disband ed in 1936 because o f frictio n s w ith the official State S hin tō ideology.6 T he Jap an -centered rein terp re tatio n o f w orld h isto ry o f the Takeuchi monjo m ay be found in o th er related publications, such as the tex ts p u blish ed in th e 1930s by th e Taiko K en ky ū kai 太 古 研 究 会 (G roup S tudying th e A ncient P ast), one m em ber o f w hich w as O k ad a’s successor, S ekiguchi S akae 関 口榮 (1909-1994), and the bo ok s o f Y am ane K ik u 山根キク (1893-1965).7 T hese docum ents, as anticip ated above, also presen t an altern ative narrativ e o f the life and w ork o f Jesus C h rist, w hich h as b een in co rp o rated b y M ah ik ari. In th ese tex ts, it is assu m ed th a t Jesus trav eled to Japan w hen he w as eig hteen, and th ere w as in stru c ted b y S h in tō p riests and m o u n tain ascetics in secret p ractices th ro u g h w hich he acquired his m agical pow ers. T hen he left Japan and v isited v ario u s regions before arriv in g in G alilea w here he tau g h t w hat he had learn ed in Japan. Jesu s’ preach in g provoked th e reactio n o f the auth orities and h is death sentence, b u t his bro th er Isu k iri too k his place and died on the cross. T hen Jesus em barked at the age o f th irty -six on a long jo u rn e y back to Japan, w here he arrived w ith m any follow ers w ho h ad jo in e d him , and died at th e age o f 118 (C ornille 1994; K necht 1995; D avis 1980: 69). T hese id eas are tau g h t in in term ed iate and advanced courses offered b y M ah ik ari, and not all o f its m em bers are aw are o f them . T hey are sig n ifican t to our discussion, how ever, because th ey show how C h ristian elem ents are in co rp o rated in order to ju s tify the central role played by M ah ik ari in th e salvation o f th e w orld. Sim ilarly, the ad ap tatio n o f the m y th o f the lost con tinen t o f M u, and its cen tral role in the form atio n o f w orld culture,

58

G localization, cultural chauvinism , a nd resistance to change

in cluding C h ristian ity and other religions, w as fu n ctio n al to O k ad a’s aim to “rem ythologize Japan ’s h isto ry ” and “giv in g his ow n follow ers the dom inant place in the u n fo ldin g plot o f th e u n iv e rse” (D avis 1980: 82). A ccording to M ah ik ari, h isto ry culm inates, in fact, in the fin al triu m p h o f the Japanese, the orig inal race (thank s to O k ad a’s m ission as a savior, ano ther biblical m o tif), w hich w ill supersede the C au casian d o m in ation p o stu lated b y T heosop hists and other w estern so u rces.8 M ore recently, th e in co rp o ratio n o f the m y th o f th e lost con tinen ts, o f past nonJapanese religio us fig u re s, and o f other w estern sources m ay be seen in another new religious m ovem ent, K ōfu k u no K agaku 幸 福 の 科 学 . T he teach in g s o f th is new religious m ovem ent fou nd ed in 1986 b y Ō kaw a Ryiūh ō 大 川 隆 法 (b . 1956) are based on th e idea o f a sp iritu al w orld in clud ing d ifferen t realm s, and of a m ultitu de o f etern al sp irits th a t p rog ress th ro u g h rep eated in carn atio n s on E arth . W hile sim ilar view s had b een prev iou sly p resen ted by T akahashi Shinji 高 橋 信 次 (1927-1976), th e fou nder o f G L A (G od L ight A ssociation) (cf. T akahashi 1995: 24 1 -6 4 ; Shim azono 2004: 261-74; W helan 2007: 139-220), they m ay also be seen as an u p d ated versio n o f basic B u dd hist id eas con cernin g the cycle o f reb irth s and th e afterlife, and other beliefs related to sp irit po ssession and g u ard ian sp irits derived from sham anism and folk religion. In Kōfu k u no K agaku, th ese native religious elem ents are b lended w ith other sources, am ong w hich the role o f ideas elaborated w ithin T heosophy is quite significant. To start w ith, the w ay Ō kaw a develops his cosm ogony con cernin g the p la n eta ry consciousnesses o f th e te n th dim ension and th o se o f th e up p er dim ensions is at least rem in iscen t o f B lav atsky’s conception o f p la n eta ry chain s and cycles (cf. S antucci 2008: 4 1 -4 ; C am pbell 1980: 6 3 -4 ; Ō kaw a 1997a: 47). M ore strik in g is the sim ila rity of th e T heosophical idea o f the M ahatm as (alternativ ely know n also as M asters, B rothers, or A depts), th e p erfec ted beings w ho d irect th e sp iritu al evolution of hum an beings, w ith th e sp irits w ho popu late th e u p p er spheres o f Ō kaw a’s m u lti­ dim ensional w orld. A ccording to th e foun der o f K ōfu k u no K agaku, T he hidden w orld o f the n in th dim ension m ay also be called the realm of saviors (kyūseishu no sekai 救 世 主 の 世 界 ) . Those w ho live in th is w orld are saviors and m essiahs and app ear on E arth once every th o u san d years or m ore … [They] determ ine th e ir ind ivid ual resp o n sib ilities according to d if­ ferent eras and th en exercise th e ir efforts. A s a result, each civ ilizatio n and era can develop its ow n distinctive flav o r … A t th e fin a l analysis, the com ­ m on ch aracteristic o f these saviors is th a t th ey provide the p rincip les upon w hich any hu m an civ ilizatio n is b ased (bunm ei no genri 文 明 の 原 理 ). (Ō kaw a 1997b: 2 4 9 -5 0 ) Ō kaw a provides the nam es o f th ese te n saviors or dai-nyorai 大 如 来 (G rand N yorai) livin g in th e n in th dim ension, w ho divide the lig h t o f th e B uddha into its seven com ponents and th en tran sm it th em to th e nyorai o f the eigh th dim ension (Ō kaw a 1997b: 2 6 7 -8 ). T he dai-nyorai are S haka 釈 迦 (Śākyam uni), Iesu K irisuto イエス•キリスト （Jesus C h rist), K ōshi 孔 子 （C o nfucius), M anu マヌ ，M aitorēy ā

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

59

マイトレ一 ヤ 一 （M aitrayer), N yū to n ニュ一 トン（N ew ton), Z eusu ゼ ウ ス （Z eus), Z o ro asu tā ゾロアスタ一 (Z oroaster), M ōse モ 一 セ (M oses) and E n riru エンリル (E nlil) (Ō kaw a 1997a: 234; cf. T akahashi 1995: 245). T he B uddha, C onfucius, Jesus, and M oses are id en tified w ith in T heosophy, to g eth er w ith m any other h is­ to rical fig u re s, as M ahatm as (cf. C am pbell 1980: 54). Even m ore interestingly, the tw o central M ahatm as in the T heosophical trad itio n have b een in co rp o rated in K ōfu k u no K agaku. T hese are K oot H oom i and M orya, th e tw o fig u res (espe­ cially th e form er) w ho alleged ly in sp ired S in nett and B lavatsky th ro u g h th e ir letters (S antu cci 2008; C am pbell 1980: 5 6 -7 ). For Ō kaw a, M ōriya モ 一 リヤ (M oria) is actu ally ju s t ano ther nam e for th e dai-nyorai M oses (Ō kaw a 1997a: 234). In th e case o f th e m ost prom inent M ahatm a found in T heosophy, K oot H oom i, Ō kaw a h im se lf reveals th e connection w ith h is ow n religious th ought. In his account o f th e o rig in s o f hum an life on E arth , Ō kaw a n arrates how, at the tim e o f th e second im m ig ratio n from space th a t o ccu rred 270 m illio n years ago, a m u ltitude o f people com ing fro m the M agellanic C louds lan d ed on E arth . O n th a t occasion, th ree g reat sp irits o f th e n in th dim ension, nam ely, A kem ēne アケメ一 ネ [A chem ene], O ru go n オ ル ゴ ン [O rgon], and K aitoron カイトロン [K aitron] also arriv ed on E arth . A kem ēne is know n in In d ia as th e high sp irit M anu, the leg en d ary creato r o f hum anity. O rugon, w ho is also kn ow n as M aitorēyā N yorai, w as v ery active at th e tim e o f th e con tinen ts o f R am u dia フムディア [L em uria] and A to ran tisu アトフンテイス [A tlantis], but had b een m ostly absent from E arth in the last 10,000 years. K aitoron is know n in T heosophy (shinchigaku 神 智 学 ）as Kū to Fū mī ク一 ト.フ 一 ミ一 [K oot H oom i], and is p rim a rily in charge o f science and technology. In one o f his in carn atio n s in G reece, he w as know n as A ru k im ed esu アノレキメデス[A rchim edes], w hile in his reap pearan ce in m o dern tim es he has b een nam ed N yū to n [N ew ton ]. (O kaw a 1997a: 60 -1 ) In th is passage on the second im m ig ratio n fro m space th a t w as p lan n ed by E ru K an tāre エノレ•カンタ一 レ (El C antare) – the hig hest sp iritu al b eing in K ōfu k u no K agaku – in order to po pu late the E arth , th e lin k b etw een th e M ahatm as and the dai-nyorai o f the n in th dim ension is clearly acknow ledged by Ō kaw a. T he reso ­ nance o f Ō kaw a’s tho ug ht w ith th ese them es found in T heosophy m ay be even m ore apparent if one considers S in n ett’s claim th a t the T heosophical S ociety w as “the only in stru m e n t th ro u g h w hich the M ah atm as are w orking in the w orld to fo ster the g ro w th o f sp iritu a lity am ong h u m an k in d ” (S inn et 1995: 17), and B lavatsk y’s ow n d efin itio n o f the M ahatm a as “a personage w ho, by special tra in in g and education, has evolved th o se h ig her facu lties and has attain ed th at sp iritu al know ledge, w hich o rd in ary h u m an ity w ill acquire afte r passin g th ro u g h num berless series o f re-in carn atio n s d u rin g th e p rocess o f cosm ic evolution” (B lavatsky and Judge 2003: 167). A s in th e case o f M ah ik ari, in K ōfu k u no K agaku the them e o f lost continents has b een in co rp o rated in the fu n d am en tal teach in g s (cf. T akahashi 1995: 238). In

60

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

th is reco n stru ctio n o f the narrativ e, th e succession fro m M u to A tlantis is m ain ­ tain ed , and in contrast to B lav astk y ’s evo lutio nary outlook Mū ム一 （ M u) is d is­ tin g u ish ed from R am udia and p reced ed by it. In w hat app arently is h is m ost auth o ritativ e treatm en t o f th is su bject in Taiyō no h ō 太 陽 の 法 （T he L aw s o f the Sun), Ō kaw a claim s th a t the spot o f th e co n tin en t o f M ū , a fo rm er colony o f R am udia, w as in p resen t-d ay In do nesia and th a t it w as about tw ice th e size o f A u stralia (Ō kaw a 1997a: 261). Mū is p resen ted h ere at len g th as th e site o f a h ig h ly developed civ ilizatio n , w hich firs t em erged out o f the in flu e n ce of R am udia. Ō kaw a w rites th a t th e w ork o f E sukarento エスカレント(E sc a lle n t)la ter know n as Z o ro a su tā – w ho in c arn ate d on the co n tin en t about 20,000 years ago, laid th e fou n d atio n s for the developm ent o f a civ iliz atio n b ased on the en erg y o f su n lig h t. E su k are n to ’s teach in g em p h asized not only th e sp iritu al asp ect o f lig h t and its “ sa cred n e ss” (sei naru mono 聖なるもの ）b u t also its p rac tica l applications: In th is connection, E suk arento , u n d er the su p erv isio n o f K ū to Fū mī – w ho later rein carn ated as A ru k im ed esu [A rchim edes] and N yū to n [N e w to n ]and E n riru ’s scien tific know ledge focu sed on how to am plify the pow er of lig ht … A tria n g u la r and silv er sh inin g py ram id w ith each side m easu ring th irty m eters w as placed at th e centre o f the city. T he solar en erg y absorbed and am p lified here w as th en tran sm itte d to other p y ram id s o f te n m eters p er side placed at th e center o f each block, th e re afte r supplying sm all pyram ids o f one m eter p er side placed on th e ro o f o f priv ate houses. T his tech no log y o f p y ram id pow er w as later p assed on to A torantisu [A tlantis]. (Ō kaw a 1997a: 2 6 3 -4 ) Ō kaw a fu rth e r explains th a t th e M ū civ ilizatio n flo u rish ed out o f th e p erso nal involvem ent o f E ru K an tāre. T he firs t o f E ru K an tāre ’s in carn atio n s, the m y th i­ cal E m peror R a M ū フ •ム一 (L a M u), already found in M ah ik ari and in C h urchw ard’s account o f M u (C hurchw ard 2007: 48), app eared on the continent about 17,000 ago and u sed his psychic pow er to estab lish “an ea rth ly kingdom of G od” (chijō ni kam i no kuni 地 上 に 神 の 国 ) . Am ong R a M ū ’s fun d am en tal teaching s, Ō kaw a lists the idea th a t “G od w as lik e th e sun” (kam i wa taiyō no gotoku 神 は 太 陽 の ご と く )，th a t one should live, sim ilarly to th e Sun, w ith “love and com passion” (ai to jih i 愛 と 怒 悲 ), and th a t one should strive to stren g th en one’s ow n “sp iritu a lity ” (reisei 霊 性 ）(Ō kaw a 1997a: 242, 359, 2 6 5 -7 ). O n these bases, R a M ū not only en su red the p ro sp erity o f th e M ū civ ilizatio n bu t also laid th e fou nd ations for “authentic religio n” (honkakutekina shuky ō 本格白勺な宗教) th ro u g h th e un io n o f politics and religion. Ō kaw a also em p hasizes th e fact th at th e v ery roots o f B u ddhism trac e back to the teach in g o f R a Mū , since the em peror o f M ū and th e B uddha Śāk y am un i are am ong th e seven in carn atio n s o f E ru K an tare.9 A fter R a Mū ’s death, how ever, th ere follow ed a p erio d o f deca­ dence, and his teach in g s w ere fo rgotten by the in h ab itan ts o f th e continent, w hich fin ally d isap p eared ben eath the ocean about 15,000 years ago. B efore th at, som e M uvians escaped in ships, th u s reachin g E ast A sia (V ietnam , Japan, and C hina),

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

61

th e A ndes, and th e A tlantic O cean (Ō kaw a 1997a: 269). H ere, th e A tlan tean civ ilizatio n had alread y sta rted on a con tinen t lo cated in th e area o f the presentday B erm u d a T riangle, esp ec ially th ro u g h the in itiativ e and sp iritu a l g u idance o f Kū to Fū mī : Signs o f th e A tlan tean civ ilizatio n b eg an to app ear 16,000 years ago, about a few hu n d red years before the con tinen t o f Mū w as com pletely subm erged. At th a t tim e Kū to Fū m ī ... ush ered th e civ ilizatio n o f people w ho h ad b een u n til th en fish ers and hunters. H is atten tio n w as attracted b y the m ysterious pow er un d erly in g vegetal life. W hy does one seed sprout and produce stem s, leaves, and flow ers? W hy does a stem grow fro m a bulb? Kū to Fū mī stu d ied such phenom ena for about tw en ty years, and fin ally discovered the essence o f life en erg y (seim ei enerug ī 生 命 エ ネ ル ギ 一 ) . He tho ught: “L ife is in its e lf a storehouse o f energy, and w henever it changes its form a huge conversion o f en erg y tak es place. I f it w ould be possible to retriev e the pow er orig in atin g from th is conversion o f energy, th is could be u sed as a driv in g force for m any applications.” From th a t m om ent, Kū to Fū mī devoted h im se lf to th is ta sk for te n years, and h is study o f the m ethod o f ex tractio n o f th e pow er derivin g fro m th e conversion o f th e life en erg y w as successful. T his w as to provide the driv in g force to th e [A tlantean] civilizatio n. (Ō kaw a 1997a: 270-1) L eaving aside the role played here by K ūto Fū mī , the sim ilarity o f Ō kaw a’s text to R u d o lf S tein er’s (1861-1925) descrip tio n o f A tlan tean tech no log y rep o rted below , w hich th e form er T heo sop hist and founder o f the A nthropo so phical S ociety alleg ed ly too k fro m th e A kash a C hronicle – the m y thical account of “n o n -transitory h isto ry ” accessible to th e in itiates (S teiner 1987: 37) – is striking: T hus th e A tlanteans could control w hat one calls th e life fo rce. A s to d ay one ex tracts th e en erg y o f heat from coal and tran sfo rm s it in to m otive pow er for our m eans o f locom otion, th e A tlanteans knew how to put th e g erm inal en erg y o f organism s into th e service o f th e ir technology. O ne can form an idea o f th is from the follow ing. T h in k o f a kernel o f seed-grain. In th is an en erg y lies dorm ant. T h is energy causes th e stalk to sprout from the kernel. N ature can aw aken th is en erg y th a t rep oses in the seed. M odern m an cannot do it at w ill. H e m ust b u ry the seed in the gro u n d and leave the aw akening to the forces o f natu re. T he A tlantean could do som ething else. He knew how one can change th e en erg y o f a p ile o f g rain into te ch n ical pow er, ju s t as m o dern m an can change the h eat en erg y o f a p ile o f coal into such pow er. P lants w ere cultiv ated in the A tlan tean p erio d not m erely for use as food­ stu ffs b u t also in order to m ake the energies dorm ant in them available to com m erce and industry. Just as w e have m echan ism s for tran sfo rm in g the en erg y do rm ant in coal into en erg y o f m otion in ou r locom otives, so the A tlanteans h ad m echanism s in w hich th ey – so to speak – b u rn ed plant seeds, and in w hich th e life force w as tran sfo rm ed into tech n ically u tilizable

62

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change pow er. T he vehicles o f the A tlanteans, w hich flo ated a short distance above th e ground, w ere m oved th is way. (S teiner 1987: 4 2 -3 )

In Ōkaw a’s account, it w as only afte r the arriv al o f the su rv ivo rs from M ū th a t th e decisive stage in the developm ent o f th e A tlantean c iv ilizatio n could start. T he com bination o f th e ir scientific know ledge and the p reach in g o f K u zānusu クザ一 ヌ ス （ K uzanus), an in carn atio n o f th e dai-nyorai M aito rēy ā ,10 gave the in itial im pulse to th is ta k e -o ff phase, w hile the p eak o f th is new civ iliz a­ tio n w as reach ed w ith the appearance o f Tosu (T hoth), ano ther in carn atio n o f E ru K an tāre. U nder h is leadersh ip and sp iritu al gu idan ce, A tlantis w as even able to su rp ass th e techn olo gical developm ents o f M ū , engaging in endeavors such as th e co n stru ctio n o f airship s and su bm arines fueled th ro u g h the energy created by th e p y ram id pow er, w hich p air w ith the developm ent o f aeronautics and other advanced tech no logy b y the A tlan tean fo u rth root race p o stu lated b y B lavatsky (cf. Ō kaw a 1997a: 273; B lavatsky 1999: 426; S antucci 2008: 48). Ō kaw a w rites th a t afte r Tosu died, the absence o f a strong sp iritu al leadersh ip led to an overem ­ phasis on science (Ō kaw a 1997a: 275). T h ereafter, the prevalence o f m aterialism caused inexorable decay, and th e con tinen t w as p a rtia lly subm erged b y the ocean. From th is center, civ ilizatio n sp read to v ariou s regions, such as S outh A m erica, G reece, and the M iddle E ast, w hose sp iritu al and cu ltu ral lives w ere anim ated by o th er in carn atio n s o f E ru K an tāre and sp irits such as M ōriy a (as M oses) and Iesu K irisu to (Jesus C h rist) (Ō kaw a 1997a: 2 7 4 -8 0 ). A s already m entioned above, in Ō kaw a’s narratio n Jesus C h rist is one o f the dainyorai o f the n in th dim ension, w hose w ork and m ission are quite predictably based on love. Jesus w as already incarnated at the tim e o f the A tlantean civilization as king A gasha アガシャ ，in ancient India as K urishuna クリシュナ (Krsina), and in E gypt as K urario クラリオ (C lario) (Ōkaw a 1997b: 2 7 6 -7 ). Ō kaw a tells us that A bo ut 2 ,0 0 0 y ears ago Iesu K irisu to w as b o rn fro m th e peo p le o f Israel. H e preach ed the teach in g o f love (ai no oshie 愛 の 敎 又 )，and in tim e he w as cru cified . T hen th e phenom enon called ‘re su rre ctio n ’ (fukkatsu 復 活 ） occu rred , and he could m an ifest h im se lf to his disciples .. T h at Iesu did not resu rre ct in h is bo dy is also evident from th e fact th a t he la ter ascended to heaven. (Ōkaw a 1997a: 2 8 4 -8 5 ) Ō kaw a adds th a t the decisive sp iritu al force b eh in d Jesus C h rist’s preaching and resu rrectio n w as H erm es, one o f the incarnation s o f E ru K an tāre, w ho m ade him th e savior and C h ristian ity th e un iversal religion o f the R om an Em pire (Ō kaw a 1997a: 285). E lsew here in Ō kaw a’s w riting s, Jesus C h rist plays a p art in Ō kaw a’s visio n o f th e future. Jesus C h rist w ill be reborn around th e tw en ty -fifth cen tu ry in the new continent o f A tlantis, to p reach his m essage o f love to te rre s­ tria l people and to ex traterrestrial people w ho at th at tim e w ill have reached E arth, w ith the aim o f h arm o nizing th e ir d ifferen t view s (Ōkaw a 1997c: 342, 3 4 6 -7 ).

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

63

C hanges and inco nsisten cies in Ō kaw a’s rep resen tatio n o f Jesus C h rist have b een no ticed by C h ristian H erm ansen. In add itio n to the clear divergence of Ō kaw a’s narratio n from biblical sources, w hich is consequent to Ō kaw a’s claim o f having d irect access to th e sp iritu al w orld, H erm an sen has noted how the role o f C h rist ten d ed to becom e m ore p erip h eral to g eth er w ith th e in creased focus on the m y th o f E ru K an tāre (H erm an sen 2007). T hese ob servations in terestin g ly p o in t to th e sh iftin g im p o rtan ce of bo rro w ed cu ltu ral elem ents in Kōfu k u no K agaku. H ow ever, w hat is m ost sig n ifican t to the presen t discussion is – rath er th a n th e coherence o f th is n arratio n – th e role th a t th is and other b o rrow in gs from other cu ltu ral and religious trad itio n s play in Ō kaw a’s prov idential plan ch arac­ te riz e d b y th e risin g and fallin g o f civ ilizatio ns. To each phase, E ru K an tāre (presently in carn ated as the founder Ō kaw a) provides one or m ore g u idin g spirits, w ho assist in its developm ent u n til th e p ea k is reach ed and d ark en erg y causes som e fu ll-scale n atu ral disaster. T his is also th e case o f our present civilization , w hich is destined, because o f th e excessive em phasis on tech n o lo g y and m ateri­ alism , for a rapid decline and disappearance (Ōkaw a 1997a: 2 8 6 -7 ). It is especially sig n ifican t here th at, in Ō kaw a’s view , Japan is going to play a central role w ith in th is plan. In one o f K ōfu k u no K ag aku’s fund am ental texts, (Ōgon no h ō 黄 金 の 法 (T he G olden L aw s), Ō kaw a w rites th a t at th e tu rn in g o f the m illen n iu m the su n o f the tru th (shinri no taiy ō 真 理 の 太 陽 ）cen tered on Japan (Nihon o chūshin ni 日 本 を 中 む に ）w ill sta rt sh in in g greatly, and w ill g rad u ally rise up … B etw een about 2020 and 2037, Japan w ill becom e the m odern Jerusalem , the w orld M ecca, and th is w ill be its golden age. Japan w ill be praised th ro u g h o u t th e w orld as the place w here th e tru th orig inated . (Ō kaw a 1997c: 322, 324) Sim ilarly, in Taiyō no hō, he w rites: In th e tw en ty -first century, afte r m any decades o f con fu sion h u m an ity w ill create a new civ ilizatio n out o f its ow n ru in s, w hich w ill spread out fro m the A sian region. O rig in atin g fro m Japan (Nihon kara 日本から )，it w ill reach E ast A sia, Indonesia, and th e n O ceania. Som e o f th e ex istin g con tinen ts w ill sin k in due course into the ocean, and a new con tinent o f M u w ill em erge

(mata atarashiki M ū tairiku ga fu jō s h ite また新しきム一 大 陸 が 浮 上 し て ） and becom e th e area o f a great c iv ilizatio n … How ever, the preco n d itio n for the em ergence o f th ese fu tu re civilizatio ns is th a t from now on we w ho are liv in g here in Japan let th e sun o f th e tru th o f B u d dh ist law (Buppō shinri no taiy ō 仏 法 真 理 の 太 陽 ) arise. W h ile th e w orld w ill sin k in darkness, Japan w ill shine as th e sun (Nihon ga, taiyō to natte kagayaku 日本が , 太陽となって輝く ). T he fact th a t you have b een b o rn in Japan in th is specific age m eans th a t you are p a rt o f an im p o rtan t m ission. (Ō kaw a 1997a: 289-91) A lth ou gh in Ō kaw a’s reco n stru ctio n o f the m y th o f M u the central role of ancient Japan as the source o f all civ ilizatio n s is not em ph asized as in M ah ikari,

64

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

we m ay, nonetheless, observe th a t th e adoption o f th is and o th er foreign cu ltu ral elem ents serves the sim ilar p u rp o se o f em p hasizin g the im p o rtan ce o f Japan and Japanese cultu re. T he fou nder Ō kaw a presents h im se lf as the last o f the in c arn a­ tio ns o f th e E tern al B uddha, E ru K an tāre, w ho firs t m an ifested h im se lf on E arth th ro u g h R a M ū , the m yth ical em peror o f the con tinen t o f Mū . In addition, the fact th a t th e M uvian cultu re w as tran sm itte d to Japan by the refu gees w ho escaped th e continent before its fin al d estru ctio n also seem s to im ply an added value. T hus, it em erges quite clearly how, w ith in th e context o f Ō kaw a’s cosm ic vision p o stu latin g th e progressive developm ent o f h u m an k in d ’s sp iritu al perfectio n , the creatio n o f hybrid religious form s dependent on foreign sources m ay be fu n c­ tio nal to the claim o f su p erio rity o f Japanese cultu re over other cu ltu res.11 A nd, co n trary to com m on percep tio n s th a t te n d to p o larize religious attitu d es tow ard glo b alizatio n in te rm s o f eith er acceptance or rejection, th is and the other exam ­ ples illu strate d above show th a t religion in Japan m ay be com fo rtab ly at the sam e tim e ‘w ith in ’ and ‘a g a in st’ global dynam ics.

Resistance to change and cultural chauvinism W hile g lo bally flo w in g cu ltu ral and religious elem ents m ay lead to a v arie ty o f hybrids at the local level and to the creatio n o f new religious id en tities, th ese ele­ m ents m ay also be view ed w ith suspicion or sim ply rejected (type 7). A lthough th is attitu d e p artly overlaps w ith religious exclusivism , it d iffers from the latte r b o th in scope and m eaning. W hile religious exclusivism im plies the denial of other religions as a w hole, here I am sp ecifically con cerned w ith single cu ltu ral or religious elem ents circu latin g w ith in global flow s. M oreover, th is option m ay count as a respo nse to th e relativ izatio n o f values com bined w ith the strong rea s­ sertio n o f th e trad itio n and cultu ral chauvinism , b u t it m ay also sim ply entail resistance to hom ogenization and specific form s o f cultu ral im perialism . A m ean­ ing ful exam ple o f th is option in the Japanese context is offered by Japanese reli­ g io n s’ attitu d es to w ard the idea o f in div idualism , w hich w ill be explored in the follow ing.

The critique o f individualism as a 'western' value R ecent research suggests th a t trad itio n al values such as harm ony, gratitu d e, and au th o rity m ay still be p referred b y Japanese people to in d iv id u alism and th at groupism m ay be an im p o rtan t value for th e large m ajority, despite a certain tend en cy to w ard erosion (Y am ada 2007: 14-18). D espite th e im p o rtan t place occupied by ind ivid ualism in th e post-w ar Japanese C o nstitutio n, ind ivid ualism as a generic te rm ten d s to be easily id en tified b y the Japanese public and in stitu ­ tio ns as a foreign cu ltu ral elem ent and as one o f th e causes u n derlying the loss of valu es and th e decay o f education in co n tem po rary Japanese society (Chūō Kyōik u S hingikai 2006, 2008). W h ile at th e general level th e relevance o f values em p hasizin g harm o ny sp eaks o f th e p ervasiv eness o f th e C o n fu cian legacy in Japanese trad itio n al so ciety (cf. C ollcutt 1991), th is is also v ery m uch related to th e ir selective use m ade afte r th e M eiji R estoration in order to m odel S tate S h in tō.

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

65

O ne o f the m ost rep resen tative official docum ents o f Im p erial Japan, th e K okutai no hongi 国 体 の 本 義 ，show s a parad ig m atic exam ple o f how, d u rin g th is early ph ase o f glob alization , the reactio n to w estern po w ers’ colonialism and th e ir cul­ tu ra l im p erialism in term in g led w ith o ccid en talism and cu ltu ral chauvinism in creatin g a pow erful ideology. H ere the rejectio n o f w estern “in d iv id u alism ” (kojinshugi 個 人 主 義 ) and its in flu en ce up on Japanese cultu re is m otiv ated by the n ecessity to co n trast in d iv id u alism ’s m ost d istu rb in g consequences, such as “the p resen t co n flict in our peo p le’s ideas, the u n rest o f th e ir m odes o f life ” and “the con fused state o f th e ir civ ilizatio n ” (H all and G au n tlett 1949: 5 4 -5 ). C ontextually, in d iv id u alism is co n stru ed as the distinctive featu re o f a stereo ­ ty p e d and hom ogeneous “W est,” in an im age reversing w estern orientalism : T he basic ch aracteristics o f m o dern O ccidental cu ltu res lie in the fact th a t an in d iv id u al is reg arded as an existence o f an absolutely ind epend ent being, all cultu res com prising th e p erfectio n o f th is in d iv id u al being w ho in tu rn is the creato r and d eterm in er o f all values … w herever th is ind ividu alism and its accom panying ab stract concepts developed, concrete h isto rical and national life becam e lost in the shadow o f ab stract th eories. (H all and G au n tlett 1949: 180) W ith in th is fram ew ork, not only is th e co rru p tin g and evil in flu en ce o f in d i­ vid u alism set up as the enem y to be fo rcefu lly countered, bu t also a legitim atio n is pro v id ed to Jap an ’s im p erialism and its u n iv ersal m ission, since “th is should be done for th e sake not only o f ou r natio n but also o f the entire hum an race” (H all and G au n tlett 1949: 55). W hile the en d u rin g force o f such ideas can b e seen in cu rren t d isco urses on Japaneseness (nihonjinron 日 本 人 論 ）(cf. Y oshino 1 9 9 2 :1 7 ,1 9 3 ), at the m ore general level th ey m ay be found in tersp ersed in a v arie ty o f p resen t-d ay Japanese respo nses to d ram atically in creased global cu ltu ral flow s. In th is regard, it should be rem em bered here th a t th e critiqu e o f ind ivid ualism does not n ecessarily entail cu ltu ral chauvinism , and m ay also be sim ply counted as a form o f resistance to cu ltu ral im p erialism and the h o m ogenizing tren d s o f g lo balizatio n. We have already seen th a t the critique o f hum an ism in Jōdo S hinshū presen ted in C hapter Two con tains im plicit references to the w estern concept o f indiv idualism . G iven the trad itio n al p ro x im ity o f th e an ti-in d iv id u alistic rhetoric and its C o nfucian back g ro u n d to S hin tō and B uddhism (also th ro u g h th e idea o f n o -self), it is not su rp risin g to fin d other in stan ces in co n tem po rary Japan w here religio n is in the forefro nt in th is battle. A v ery recen t exam ple o f th is polem ical attitu d e is offered by S hingonshū 真 言 宗 , one o f the larg est denom inations o f Japanese B uddhism founded by Kū kai 空 海 （or K obo D aishi 弘 法 大 師 ，7 7 4-83 5), w ho had b een in itiated in eso teric B u ddhism in C h ina. Today S h ing on shu ’s d o ctrin al focus is still on the eso teric teach in g s and p ractices to attain lib eratio n in th is life, in clud ing m edita­ tio n, the u tteran ce o f m antra (shingon 真 言 ), sp ecific han d g estu res or m udrā, and th e matidala, th e sacred rep resen tatio n s o f the cosm os. T he m ain branch, K ōyasan S hingonshū 高 野 山 真 言 宗 ，is b ased on M t K ōya in w estern Japan,

66

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

w here K ū kai w as g ran te d p erm issio n to b u ild the K ongōbuji 金 剛 峯 寺 tem ple about tw elve cen tu ries ago. T he cu rren t head o f the deno m inational D o ctrin al O ffice (Kyōgakubu 教 学 部 ) , Murakam i Y asutoshi 村 上 保 壽 ( b .1941), has recently in sisted on the relevance o f Kū k a i’s teach in g for m o d ern society, w hich provides him th e fram ew ork to deal w ith the issue o f in div idualism . G iven M u rak am i’s pro m in en ce w ith in K ōyasan S hingonshū (he serves con cu rrently as head o f the In tern atio n al D ep artm ent), and h is closeness to th e head priest, M atsu nag a Yū kei 松 長 有 慶 （b . 1929), it is tem p tin g to see his p o sitio n as rep resen tative o f the den om inatio nal stance. M urakam i acknow ledges the h isto rical sig nifican ce o f ind ivid ualism and its em phasis on hum an rig h ts as the antithesis o f to ta lita ria n ­ ism , b u t he lam ents th a t the ratio n alistic elem ent in h eren t to ind ividu alism has led to “th e replacem ent o f the d ivine sphere w ith hu m an reaso n ” (kam i no za ni ningen risei o sueta k o to 神 の 座 に 人 間 理 性 を 据 え た こ と ） (M urakam i 2008: 162-4 ). W ithin th is context, he claim s, hum an b ein gs attem pt to estab lish th e ir ow n su b jectiv ity as ind ependent ind ivid uals, b u t since th e ir existence lacks at its v ery fou nd ations the u n ifie d and tru e se lf (hontō n o jiko 本 当 の 自 己 )，in the m iddle o f th e am b iguity and stratificatio n lin k ed to th e ir roles w ith in social env iro nm en ts such as the fam ily and th eir w orkplace, they end up being broken dow n into a m ultiplicity o f selves/egos (jiko/ego 自己•エ ゴ ） . . . Such in d iv id u alities are unable to d iscern the fu n d am en tal tru th th a t the su b jectiv ity of the se lf com es firs t into existence w ith in an all-em bracin g system req u irin g solidarity, and th is leads to the loss o f a social eth ics apt to control a m ass o f iso lated in divid uals (kodokuna kojin 孤 独 な 個 人 ). (M urakam i 2008: 166-7) T hus, according to M urakam i, th e fin al result o f the advance o f individualism is a society lacking any capacity to offer a com prehensive system o f values and w here “isolated ind iv id u als” have com pletely lost th e ir sense o f unity. In tu rn , this is deem ed to cause a series o f p ressing problem s such as b u llying, ju v en ile delin­ quency, and discrim ination (M urakam i 2008: 162-7). M urakam i thinks that religion is the only w ay to provide m odern society w ith the n ecessary holistic fram ew ork, and th a t th e esoteric B uddhism of K ū kai reveals in th is connection all its actuality. Kū k a i’s teach in g im plies, for exam ple, th at all form s o f life equ ally p artak e in the sam e u ltim ate source and that we should not lim it ourselves to the exclusive defense o f hum an rights, as in the anth ro po cen tric view o f C h ristian hum anism . B ut this m utual belonging also m eans interdependence and cooperation, nam ely, “the sac­ rifice o f th e se lf” (jiko gisei 自 己 犠 牲 ）(M urakam i 2008: 172-3). M urakam i is eager to clear the w ay from any m isund erstan din g regarding the m eaning o f this “sacrifice of the self,” p resum ably because o f its possible resonance w ith w artim e critiques o f indiv idualism and th e ir ideological im plications: W hat is term ed here “sacrifice of the self” is not som ething done for the benefit o f th e ru ler (the absolute) or the co u n try (the w hole). R ather, it m eans th a t all

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change

67

existence equally shares the sam e “life” (inochi い の ち )，and th at from the fact th at every thin g is interdependent there derives the principle for m oral conduct. (M urakam i 2008: 173) T hus, it m ay be seen how, in M u rak am i’s articu la ted critiqu e o f ind ividualism , w hat is to be sa crifice d is th e se lf as a reified and iso lated entity, w hich opens the w ay to a com passionate attitu d e to w ard other beings and to th e co n stru ctio n o f a b e tte r society. Such rejectio n o f in d iv id u alism is b y no m eans co n fin ed to S hingonshū . In co n tem po rary S hin tō, for exam ple, it continues the trad itio n estab lish ed in docu­ m ents such as th e K okutai no hongi and m ay develop into strong form s o f cultu ral chauvinism . T his overt criticism o f ind ivid ualism w ith in in stitu tio n al S h in tō, w hich w ill also em erge in the follow ing chap ters, is perh ap s found in its p a ra ­ d ig m atic form in th ese reflec tio n s on ed u catio n b y U esugi C hisato 上 杉 千 郷 (1923-2010), late ch airm an o f K ōg ak k an D aigaku 皇 學 館 大 学 (Im p erial L ea rn ­ ing H all U niversity),12 a m ajor S hinto in stitu tio n for th e tra in in g o f priests: A fter the enactm ent o f the F undam ental Law o f E ducation, pressure from w ithin th e G eneral H eadquarters (GHQ ) of the A llied pow ers to reject the Im perial R escript on E ducation becam e stronger. T his led, am ong other things, to the forced adoption by the H ouse o f R epresentatives and the H ouse of C oun­ cillors o f resolutions invalidating the R escript. A s a result, th is groundless interpretation b ased on “the shift from the system o f the Im perial R escript on E ducation to that o f the Fundam ental Law o f E ducation” gained popularity and perm eated Japanese society. T he construction of the Fundam ental Law o f Edu­ cation th at overestim ates respect for the individual (kojin no so m h ō 個 人 の 尊 重 )，individuality (kosei 個 性 )，and freedom (jiy ū 自由 ）now reigns suprem e, and has caused the epidem ic o f individualism (kojinshugi 個 人 主 義 ）and self­ indulgence (h ōjū 放 縦 )，and brought about the decay o f education. (U esugi 2007: 238) In terestin g ly enough, the sam e trad itio n al dislike for in d iv id u alism can be found in Japanese new religious m ovem ents, thu s rev ealing the considerable asso ciation o f th ese ideas w ith th e Japanese religio us w orld as a w hole. In the case o f Sōka G ak kai 倉 価 学 会 ，althou gh m o dern c iv ilizatio n in its search for ind ivid ual freedo m has b een effective in lib eratin g people from v ario u s k in d s o f restra in ts and in en su rin g m aterial w ealth, th e ind ivid ual in w estern cu ltu re is n o thin g bu t an “ isolated b ein g ” (koritsu shita kojin 孤 立 し た 個 人 ）(Ik ed a 1996: 315). In th e end, the fin al resu lt o f th is developm ent has b een “u n b rid led in d i­ v id u alism ” prom otin g c o n flict and the d estru ctio n o f com m unal ties (Ikeda 2006). In Ik ed a D aisak u ’s 池 田 大 作 w ords, W hen we consider the disadv antages o f E u ropean -sty le in d iv id u alism as rad ical ind ividu alism (kyokutanna kojinshugi 極 端 , ぷ個 人 主 義 ) or u ltra ­ indiv idualism (chō-kojinshugi 超 個 人 主 義 )，it m ay be seen th a t its deficiency

68

G localization, cultural chauvinism , and resistance to change lies in the con trap ositio n betw een the state and th e p o stu lated naked [defenseless] in divid ual. Indiv idu al rig h ts are em ph asized to o m uch, and as a result, the organic social environ m ent w ith in w hich in d iv id u als live and act is tu rn e d into som ething extrem ely u n stab le and in secu re (fuanteina m o n o 不 安 定 な も の ). (Ik ed a 1996: 3 3 3 -4 )

H ow ever, E ast A sian cu ltu re show s, “in contrast to the W estern em phasis on in d iv id u alism ,” an in n ate ten d en cy “to see coo peration rath er th a n co n flict, u n ity rath er th a n fragm entation, and ‘u s’ rath er th an ‘m e.’” N am ely, according to Ikeda, it has th e p o ten tial to overcom e th e danger o f “u n b rid led in d iv id u alism ” and prom ote lastin g p eace in th e regio n (Ik ed a 2006). In closing, it is w orth b riefly no tin g here ano ther exam ple fro m K ōfu k u no K agaku, w here th e B udd hist back g ro u n d also plays a decisive role in shaping the critiqu e o f in div idualism . Ind iv id u alism is exp licitly id en tified by fou nder Ō kaw a R yū hō as a “W estern v alu e” th a t tran sfo rm s life into a com petition and leads the “m ind seesaw ing b etw een a h eavenly state and a h ellish state, depending on the outcom e in each com petitive encounter.” In con trast, th e d an ger o f individ ualism is lin k ed to trad itio n al B u d dh ist m otives such as “envy,” “jealo u sy ,” “p o ssessiv e­ ness,” and “h atred ” th a t can be dom inated th ro u g h self-reflection, and, ultim ately, th ro u g h the teach in g s offered by K ōfu k u no K agaku for the salvation o f hu m an­ k in d (Ō kaw a 2010: 3 4 -6 ). T he cases p resen ted in th is chapter illu strate how Japanese religions are active w ith in glo b alizatio n not only in th e field o f religious com m unication and in the form atio n o f hybrid form s at the local level b u t also as a force resistin g change. In th is respect, th e critiqu e o f in d iv id u alism as a w estern value suggests how th e opposition to cu ltu ral hom ogen ization in th e Japanese context m ay rely on trad itio n al C o n fu cian values, B u dd hist view s o f th e self, and even ideological co n stru cts trac in g back to w artim e Japan, th u s show ing a distinctive ten dency to in co rp o rate form s o f cu ltu ral chauvinism .

5

Glocalization overseas

Virtual bridges, glocalization, and cultural chauvinism O ne o f th e p rim a ry fu n ctio n s p erfo rm ed by Japanese religions overseas has h is­ to ric ally b een th a t o f id en tity m arkers for com m unities o f im m ig ran ts (typ e 11). R eligious sp ecialists from variou s (m ainly B uddhist) org anization s follow ed the flow o f Japanese laborers to N o rth A m erica, H aw aii, B razil, and elsew here th at had sta rted at the end o f the nineteenth cen tu ry in order to ensure the perform ance o f essen tial ritu a ls such as those fo r th e ancestors and fun erals. W ell afte r the end o f W orld W ar II, Japanese religio ns w ere m ostly active in p reserv in g (religious) custom s and cultu ral id en tity in a new (and not in freq u en tly hostile) environm ent, and tem ples and other facilities m ain ly w orked as com m u nity centers (T anaka 1999). In th is early ph ase o f globalizatio n, Japanese religions played a role as catalysts for th e creatio n o f v irtu a l bridg es ideally lin k in g th ese new com m uni­ ties w ith Japan. A strik in g exam ple o f th is fu n ctio n is provided by the events follow ing the enforcem ent in th e U nited S tates o f th e Im m ig ratio n A ct (1924), w hich p ractically h alted new arriv als fro m Japan and, at th e sam e tim e, proved to be a w ind fall for th e B ud dh ist tem ples. M any isseis [first genera­ tio n im m igrants] in te rp re ted th e law as extrem ely u n just. A s a result, m any o f them , inclu ding th o se w ho w ere “fence sitters,” becam e m em bers o f B ud dh ist tem ples. T he B u d dh ist tem ples cam e to be perceived as b astio ns o f Japanese cultu re and refuges from the sto rm o f a ho stile society. (T anaka 1999: 6 -7 ) L ater on, w hen, d u rin g W orld W ar II, Japan ese-A m erican s w ere in tern ed in con cen tratio n cam ps, Japanese religions served as a cu ltu ral resou rce to resist hom o genization “against th e cam p ad m in istra to rs’ effo rts to ‘A m erican ize’ the Japanese” and to m ain tain “eth n ic id en tity and so lid arity ” (O kihiro 1984: 220). In B razil, an extrem e m an ifestatio n o f th ese dynam ics m ay be seen in th e p o st­ w ar activ ities o f the S hindō R enm ei 臣 道 連 盟 (L eague o f th e S ubjects W ay), a m ovem ent based on S tate S hin tō ideology th a t enjoyed w ide su ppo rt am ong the com m unity o f Japanese-B razilians. In this case, the quest for cultural identity w ent so far as to negate Japan’s defeat in W orld W ar II and to engage in te rro rist acti­ vities in th e nam e o f the em peror and th e divine m ission o f Japan (Shoji 2008).

70

G localization overseas

T he role o f Japanese religions overseas as id en tity m arkers w as pro m in en t u n til th e 1960s, w hen an in creasin g num ber o f non-Japanese follow ers w ere first attracted as a consequence o f th e m issio n ary effo rt by new religio us m ovem ents such as Sōka G ak k ai 創 価 学 会 and Seichō no Ie 生 長 の 家 . And, in not a few cases, the label o f ‘eth n ic religion ’ m ay still be appropriate for the activities of Japanese religious com m unities abroad. In the m eantim e, how ever, processes o f in d ig en izatio n h ad alread y started , such as the creatio n o f hy brid religious form s o f Japanese B uddhism , C atholicism , and A fro -B raz ilia n religio ns in South A m erica, changes in tem ple b u ild in g s’ arch itectu re, and adap tation s to the ritu al stru ctu re – as in the case o f th e in stitu tio n o f Sunday services in N o rth A m erican B uddhism afte r the m odel o f th e C h ristian m ass (cf. Shoji 2003; S eager 1999: 63; A m a 2011: 87-109). A lthough th e in flu en ce exercised by local cultu res in the h y bridization of Japanese religions outside Japan has b een prom inent, new local identities have also been shaped through the use o f Japanese sources (type 9). One significant exam ple o f this m odality o f glocalization o f Japanese religions overseas is th e adoption o f m editational tech niq ues in N o rth A m erican Jō do Shinshū .

Jōdo Shinshū and meditation A t least since th e 1970s, the B u d dh ist C hurches o f A m erica (BCA ), th e um brella o rgan izatio n for Jōdo S hinshū 浄 土 真 京 (H onganji-ha 本 願 寺 派 ) tem ples in the U nited S tates, has m ade several attem p ts to appeal to a larg er num ber o f nonJapanese and lib erate itse lf from the label o f eth n ic religion. A lso p ressed by m otivations such as a stead y decline in m em bership and the desire to prom ote B uddhism as an active force in m o dern A m erican society, the o rg an izatio n and single m em bers started a series o f program s including lectures and m eetings, som e o f w hich w ere later discon tinu ed. O ne o f the m ost su ccessfu l efforts w as th a t of th e C leveland B u dd hist Tem ple in O hio, w hich in the early 1980s h ad h a lf o f its m em bership com posed o f non-Japanese (K ash im a 1990: 30). T h is change w as m ain ly related to the in tro d u ctio n o f Z en m ed itation in the activities o f th e tem ­ ple, as th e th en m in ister, O gui K osh in 小 执 好 臣 （ b . 1940), recalls w ith these w ords in an in terv iew given m any years la ter to the B ud dh ist m agazine Tricycle : W hen I w as a p riest in C leveland, six out o f every te n people p h onin g the tem ple w ere in q u irin g about learn in g to m editate. A t firs t I w as a little hesi­ tan t. I don’t have m uch experience teach in g m ed itation and, as you p o in ted out earlier, Jodo S hinshu trad itio n ally d o esn’t em phasize such p ractices. A nd so I ’d say, “ Sorry, but you have to le arn th a t som eplace else.” Later, I realized , “Wow, K oshin, if you keep going lik e th is, lo sing six out o f ten, you’ll b an k ru p t your store.” So I tho ug ht, “W ell, w hy n o t? ” A nd so I sta rted respo nding to p eo p les’ needs. (S tran d 2006) A m ong the activ ities presen tly offered b y the C leveland B ud dh ist Tem ple to th e com m un ity o f practitio n ers, one fin d s th e custo m ary m em orial services for

G localization overseas

71

the ancestors, D harm a study groups, and, prom inently, sittin g m ed itatio n and a Z en S hin Sangha. T he la tte r group or com m u nity (“ S angha” ）w as fou nded by O gui, and, according to th e tem p le’s w ebsite, it “p ractices the B uddha D harm a th ro u g h m editation, chanting, and discussio n u n d er the gu idan ce o f senior stu d en ts” (C leveland B ud dh ist Tem ple 2011). A s reflec te d by th e nam e itself, th ese activities are a com bination o f Z en (B uddhism ) and S hin (B uddhism ) (Jōdo S hinshū or sim ply S hinshū in Japanese), tw o d istin ct form s o f trad itio n al Japanese B uddhism . A s O gui h im self acknow ledges, Jōdo S hinshū does not trad itio n ally em pha­ size m ed itation as Z en B uddhism does. To be m ore precise, th ere are do ctrin al and p ractical aspects o f Jōdo S hinshū th a t w ould sp ecifically deny legitim atio n to m editation. T h is attitu d e trac es back at least to th e w ork and preach in g of S h in ran 親 鸞 ，w ho u n d ersto o d p ractices such as m ed itation and the perform an ce o f good deeds to be b ased on a conscious effo rt, a “self-pow er” (jiriki 自力 ）th at o b structs b irth in th e P u re L and. T hus, for him th e only w ay to attain religious lib eratio n w as to abandon all th ese p ractices and to rely en tirely on th e grace of A m id a B uddha and his “other-pow er” (tariki 他 力 ）(cf. D obbins 2002: 2 8 -9 ; D essì 2007: 30). T his is w hy the Jōdo Shinshū in stitutions still encourage an under­ standing o f th e basic religio us practice, the u tteran ce o f the nenbutsu 念 仏 ，as a w ay to express on e’s ow n g ratitu d e to A m id a B uddha th ro u g h calling his nam e.1 O gui, how ever, does not see any co n trad ictio n in th e m erging o f Z en and Shin B u ddh ist elem ents: [Interview er:] B ut doesn’t a practice like m editation, w hich relies so heavily on the effo rts of the self, violate the O ther Pow er doctrine o f Shin B uddhism , in w hich we are saved by the m ysterious w orkings of a pow er beyond the self, as em bodied in A m ida B uddha? W on’t th is cause fric tio n w ith the Japanese Shinshu tradition? [O gui:] T he founders o f the v ario u s Japanese schools o f B u ddhism all had to id en tify the u n iquen ess o f th e ir p artic u la r ty p e o f B uddhism in order to be reco g n ized by th e governm ent in m edieval days. So th ey m ade a special effo rt to estab lish u n iqu e trad itio n s. B ut for m e, having done the Z en style of practice and the Jōdo S hinshū style o f living, th ey ju s t seem to m eld to g eth er so th a t I don’t see any co n flict. (S trand 2006) A s h in ted by O gui him self, one fu n d am en tal reaso n b eh in d his in teg ratio n o f Z en m ed itation in N o rth A m erican Jō do S hinshū is the fact th a t he actu ally p rac­ tic ed zazen 坐 禅 u n d er S uzu ki S h un ryū 鈴 木 俊 隆 （1 9 0 4 - 1 9 7 1 )- th e m aster in the Sōt ō shū trad itio n w ho w as in stru m en tal in th e p o p u larizatio n o f Z en on the W est C oast – and K atag iri D ain in 片 桐 大 忍 （1928-1990). O gui th in k s he has b een fo rtu n ate to have h ad the chance to p ractice b o th Z en and S hin B uddhism . H e affirm s th a t he enjoys “th e feeling o f calm ness and p eacefu ln ess th a t com es from zazen ,” but adds th at, th e older he gets, the m ore com fortable he is w ith the feelin g o f b eing em braced by A m id a’s g race (S trand 2006). T he fact th a t O gui

72

G localization overseas

has b een th e “bisho p” (sōch ō 糸忿長）o f the BC A since 2004 seem s to ind icate th at his approach has gain ed considerable in stitu tio n al legitim ation. A t the sam e tim e, his w ork is p art o f a larg er tren d , since already in the 1980s v ario u s m in isters belong ing to the o rgan izatio n h ad alread y in co rp o rated the use o f m ed itatio n in th e ir m issio n ary activities (K ash im a 1990: 3 1 ;T okunaga 2006: 4 5 -6 ). A t present, m editation al sessions are offered in several tem ples in th e U nited S tates. A m ong these, the M idw est B ud dh ist Tem ple in C hicago, w here O gui h im self w as a m inister, also adv ertises Z en S hin M ed itatio n, in clud ing “sittin g m ed itatio n, w alk in g m ed itatio n, and chanting m ed itation” (M idw est B u dd hist Tem ple 2009). A nother tem ple, th e O range C o un ty B ud dh ist C hurch in A naheim (C alifo rn ia), is cred ited w ith h aving doubled its m em bership already in the m id1980s, and still o ffers a m ed itation service con sistin g o f “sittin g m editation, w alkin g m editation, su tra chanting, and a short D harm a m essage” th ree tim es a w eek (O range C o u n ty B u d dh ist C hurch 2011). For one o f the m in isters o f the tem ple, M a rv in H arada, “M editation helps to p rep are our h earts and m in d s for listen in g to the D harm a. It settles, clears, and focuses ou r m ind, such th a t w e are m ore recep tive to listen in g to and tru ly h earin g the D harm a” (H arad a 2005: 1). T hus, m ed itatio n is seen as a p rep a ra to ry step to one basic religious p ractice in Jō do S hinshū (liste n in g to th e B u d d h ist teach in g ), and does not co n trad ict w hatso ever th e trad itio n , since, H arad a claim s, “in our m ed itatio n service, we are not m ed itatin g as som e k in d o f se lf pow er p rac tice to g et en lig h ten ed ,” but “w e are sim ply sittin g quietly, giv in g ou r sc attered h earts and m in ds the oppor­ tu n ity to stop and re fle c t” (H arad a 2005: 1). T he Salt L ake B u d d h ist Tem ple o ffers m ed itatio n session s on S undays (S alt L ake B u d d h ist Tem ple 2011). Its m in ister, Je rry H iran o, sp eak s o f a “ S itting N am o A m id a B u tsu,” w here sittin g m ed itatio n is p ara lleled to th e nenbutsu as a resp o n se in g ratitu d e to A m ida B u d d h a’s grace: To recite the nem butsu as a respo nse or w ith a deep sense o f g ratitu d e th at com es from som ething m ore th a n m y self is m y nem butsu p ractice. W e m ay say th is nem butsu com es from the m ind o f A m id a to m y m ind. In a sim ilar m an n er w hen I sit it is an exp ressio n o f the aw akening o f the m ind o f A m ida w ith in m e. To sit or to say N am o A m ida B utsu, I believe th ey are the sam e. A s I sit, I breath e in and out. A s I recite N am o A m ida B utsu, it is as m y breath. B oth are the m an ifestatio n o f the g reat com passion th a t em braces us all. I sit in N am o A m ida B utsu. (H irano 20 11 :4) A m ong other tem ples th a t have adopted th e practice o f m ed itatio n in a Jodo S hinshū en viron m ent we fin d th e S eattle B etsuin , w hich offers a Sunday m ed ita­ tio n service inclu din g “ S utra C h anting, 2 0 -m inu te m ed itatio n, d iscussion ,” and th e N ew York B u dd hist C hurch, w hich counts chanting and m ed itatio n sessions am ong its ongoing prog ram s (S eattle B etsu in 2011; N ew Y ork B u d dh ist C hurch 2011). The la tte r’s form er resident m inister, N akagaki K enjitsu 中 垣 顕 實 （ b . 1961), presents h is positive approach to w ard m editation al p ractices as “a form o f

G localization overseas

73

k in d n ess,” an expedient device to com passionately help new p ractitio n ers to “u n d erstan d P ure L and B uddhism b e tte r” (Luo 2006). T his w ave of “ Shin m editation” is not lim ited to th e U nited States. T he N ational H eadquarters of the Jodo S hinshu B uddhist Tem ples o f C anada, for exam ple, are quite explicit on the issue o f m editation. The organization’s w ebsite not only claim s th at “there is an increasing dem and from w ith in our tem ples and from those w ish­ ing to jo in us, for ‘quiet sittin g ’ m editation instru ction in addition to chanting m ed­ itation” but also gives d etailed in structio ns on “How to M editate” (Jodo Shinshu B uddhist Tem ples o f C anada 2010a). S tarting from the aspiration “to experience the p art o f your m ind th at is calm ,” the w ebsite th en recom m ends to “try to place your attention on your breathing, rather th an on your thoughts.” In the subsequent steps, elem ents of Jōdo Shinshū practice such as reciting “N am andabu” (abbrevia­ tio n o f nam o-am ida-butsu 南 無 阿 弥 陀 仏 ）and say “T hank you” to A m ida B uddha becom e prom inent (Jodo Shinshu B uddhist Tem ples o f C anada 2010b). Since the issue o f m ed itatio n in Jōdo S hinshū to uches v ery sensible chords, it is not su rp risin g th a t even m in isters w orking in the N o rth A m erican context m ay show a very skeptical attitud e to w ard changes in trad itio n al practice. T he W est L os A ngeles B ud dh ist Tem ple, for exam ple, clearly states: T his tem ple is a Jodo Shinshu tem ple. P ractices such as v isu alizatio n , sit­ tin g or w alk ing m ed itatio n, or con tem plation are not p rim a ry p ractices o f Jodo Shinshu. T his tem ple does not have m ed itation classes, although other Jodo S hinshu tem ples have m ed itatio n sessions. (W est L os A ngeles B u dd hist Tem ple 2011) T he resident m in ister o f the W est L os A ngeles B uddhist Tem ple, F um iaki U suki ( b . 1950), th in k s th a t “ju s t becau se w e have m ed itatio n doesn’t m ean th ese people are going to stay,” and attrib u tes th is grow ing phenom enon to the “H ollyw ood aura o f m ed itation.” In th e end, he caustically argues, “T h ey ’re su perm arket sh opping” (Luo 2 006). Sim ilarly, the O regon B ud dh ist Tem ple in fo rm s v isito rs th a t “our school, Jodo S hinshu, does not prom ote th e p ractice of m editation, rath er we say th e nem butsu ‘N am o A m ida B u tsu’” (O regon B u dd hist Tem ple 2009). T he residen t m in ister, G reg ory G ibbs, explains, “W e don’t w ant to obscure our fu n d am en tal teac h in g ” at th e cost o f app earin g “m ore conservative th an som e” (Luo 2006). D ifferen t attitu d es to w ard th is issue am ong m in isters engaged in m issio n ary activ ities in N o rth A m erica have b een noted by K aw asoe T aishin 川 添 泰 信 （b . 1949), a professor at R yū koku U niv ersity in Kyōto, the largest Jōdo Shinshū educational institutio n affiliated w ith the H onganji-ha. B esides expressing his reserv atio n s about th ese changes, in his rep o rt K aw asoe show s th a t relatively young m in isters b o rn in A m erica are m ore lik ely to accep t the adoption o f m edi­ ta tio n in Jō do S hinshū p ractice. E x perienced m in isters com ing fro m Japan, on th e o th er han d , seem to show a p o sitiv e attitu d e , p ro v id ed th a t m e d ita tio n is condu cted u n d er the gu idan ce o f a m in ister and b ased on Jō do S hinshū teach ­ ings, w hile younger Japanese m in isters te n d to con sid er it as u n related to Jōdo S hinshū p ractice (K aw asoe 2001: 61).

74

G localization overseas

A nother in flu e n tial Jōdo S hinshū scholar, D ake M itsuya 嵩 満 也 （ b . 1958), has called for a fru itfu l discussion in Japan about these N o rth A m erican develop­ m ents, arg u in g th a t “by no m eans should it be ta k en lig htly or tho ug ht o f sim ply as a problem o f self-pow ered p rac tice” (D ake 2005: 109). D ake acknow ledges th a t “am ong scholars o f S hin B ud dh ist stu dies in Japan, th ere are those w ho react negatively up on ju s t h earin g th e w ord ‘m ed itatio n ’” and th a t th is criticism o f m ed itation and other p ractices as w ays to achieve shinjin – the en tru stin g faith in A m id a’s P rim al Vow th a t en su res b irth in th e P u re L and – is m ain ly b ased on the idea th a t “saying the N am e is an expression o f g ratitu d e” (D ake 2005: 108-9). H ow ever, he claim s th a t “attem pts to lim it S h in ran ’s u n d erstan d in g o f th e act of saying th e N am e [the nenbutsu ] to th e sole fu n ctio n o f exp ressin g g ratitu d e are problem atic,” and th a t “th is trad itio n al persp ectiv e is closely lin k ed to attitu d es th a t sought to reject any p ractices before attain in g shinjin, not only m ed itation but also saying th e N am e, as self-pow er” (D ake 2005: 110-11). It is sig n ifican t th a t D ake exp ressed h is rem arks at th e ann ual m eeting o f th e m in isters o f the BC A , w ith in the sym posium on “M editation in A m erican S hin B u ddh ism ” held in F eb ru ary 2005 at S tanford U niversity, and jo in tly o rgan ized by th e In stitu te o f B u dd hist S tudies in B erkeley (the m ajor Jōdo S hinshū edu cational cen ter in N o rth A m erica) and th e S tanford C enter for B ud dh ist Studies. Indeed , th e elec­ tio n o f O gui as the head o f th e BC A in 2004, afte r h is approach had b ee n criti­ cized by th e Japanese h ead q u arters on v ario u s occasions, had th e effect o f calling un p reced en ted atten tio n to the issue o f m editational p ractices in Jōdo S hinshū (T anaka 2006: 30). E arlier in January, all fou r H onganji-ha overseas bishops had exp ressed th e ir su ppo rt for the in teg ratio n o f m editation al p ractices w ith in Jō do S hinshū at an urg en t m eetin g held at the general head q u arters in Kyōto. In ano ther m eeting o f the d irecto rs o f th e BC A and th e m ission in H aw aii, held in M ay o f the sam e year, th is positive approach w as con firm ed , provided th at m ed itation rem ain ed a p relim in ary p ractice for ch ō mom 聴 聞 ，nam ely, listen in g to the Jōdo S hinshū teach in g (T okunaga 2006: 45). L ater in Septem ber, th e Jō do S hinshū scholar and m em ber o f the highest academ ic council w ith in the H onganji-ha (kangaku 勧 学 )，T okunaga M ichio 徳永道 羅 （b . 1941), expressed a sim ilar view at th e tw elfth b ien n ial conference o f th e In tern atio n al A sso ciation o f Shin B udd hist S tudies (IA SB S) held at M usashino U niversity in Tōk y ō . Significantly, T okunaga concluded h is con trib u tio n to the panel on “T he Role and Im p lication o f M editation P ractice in S hin B u ddhism ” w ith th e follow ­ ing rem ark: I w ould lik e to say th a t in order to accom plish chōmon, or listen in g to the teach ing , w hich is to be cu lm in ated in hearin g A m id a’s call, any p ractice should be adm itted. B ut if it does not resu lt in chōmon, it cann ot be regarded as Jōdo S hinshū p ractice. (T okunaga 2006: 48) T he sam e conditional accep tance o f m ed itatio n w ith in Jō do S hinshū p ractice also em erged from the contributions to this conference panel by other tw o insiders,

G localization overseas

75

Im ai K yoya o f th e H onganji In tern atio n al C enter and A rai T oshikazu o f Soai U niversity. In addition, th is open orien tatio n is also found in th e com m ents offered by the respondent to th e panel, IA SBS P resident K enneth T anaka ( b . 1947), w ho even calls for a “p arad ig m sh ift” in th e w ay teach in g and practice are dis­ cussed w ith in th e Jō do S hinshū trad itio n . T his is all the m ore necessary, he argues, because o f the excessive em phasis th a t has b een placed “on the active w orkings o f A m ida’s vow, w hile the seeker is po rtrayed as a ‘pow erless receptacle’ ju s t passively w aiting to receive it” (T anaka 2006: 59). M oreover, T anaka has w arn ed against an u n d erstan d in g o f Z en B ud dh ist m ed itatio n as a p ractice based on self-pow er, and therefore n ec essarily co n trad ictin g the basic teach in g s of Jōdo S hinshū . T anaka argues in stead th a t “m ed itatio n for D ōgen is not a m eans to enlig h ten m en t,” bu t rath er an “ ‘exp ressio n’ o f enlig h ten m en t.” T hus, he claim s, it “ is v ery close to th e S hin u n d erstan d in g o f nem butsu as an exp ressio n o f tru e rea lity or A m id a’s vow ” (T anaka 2006: 57). T hus, it m ay also b e seen th a t am ong th e religio us com m un ity in Japan the em ergence o f th ese hybrid form s o f religio us practice m ay be approached in a positive way, and m ay even be considered an o p p o rtu n ity to reth in k th e general m eanin g o f Jō do S hinshū in co n tem po rary society, as D ake h im se lf h in ts in his p resen tatio n (D ake 2005: 108). V ariously u n d ersto o d as an exp ed ient m eans for m ore easily approaching the N o rth A m erican public, a relax ing techn iqu e, and a p rep aratio n for th e trad itio n al teaching s, th e in co rp o ratio n o f m ed itatio n in Jōdo S hinshū practice overseas is alread y an estab lish ed tren d , w hich is fueling , to som e extent, a debate on the m ean ing of Jōdo S hinshū in m o dern so ciety in Japan. In the m eantim e, new local id en tities are b ein g sh ap ed am ong the over­ seas religious com m unity, in a process th ro u g h w hich the respo nses to the p ress­ in g dem ands p o se d by a g lo b a liz ed w orld draw in sp ira tio n fro m Japanese so urces, th o u g h o rig in a lly belo n g in g not to Jō do S hinshū bu t to an o th er Japanese relig io u s trad itio n . Finally, ano ther facto r related to the h y b rid izatio n o f th e Jō do S hinshū tra d i­ tio n overseas is w orth m ention ing here. N am ely, th ere are also ind icatio ns th at th is process m ay be accom panied by elem ents o f cu ltu ral chauvinism (type 10). T h is aspect is exem plified by th is rem ark by O gui – the aforem entioned leading fig u re in th e m ovem ent for the ad ap tatio n o f m editation al tech n iq u es in N o rth A m erican Jōdo S hinshū – found in his bo ok Zen Shin Talks: I th in k B uddhism is a v ery ben eficial m ovem ent in to d a y ’s society. There are 84,000 paths to go through. There is not one path. B uddhism traveled from India to T ibet and to C h ina to K orea and th en to Japan. N ow it is com ing to A m erica. T he dom estic religion of Japan is Shinto in w hich practition ers w or­ ship 84,000 gods. So w hen m issionaries brought C h ristian ity into Japan, Japanese w ere not b o thered b y O ne G od com ing into Japan. T he O riental religions like Shinto, B uddhism , C onfucianism do not em phasize having The G od, O ne G od, T he R ight G od. T hus, th ere is little h isto ry of bloodshed around religions in Japan. (O gui 1998: 239)

76

G localization overseas

H ere, sim ilarly to other cases illu strate d above, th e su p erio rity o f Japanese religious and cu ltu ral valu es over th o se found in other cu ltu res is im p licitly acknow ledged. W h at O gui is apparently su gg estin g here is th a t th ere is a fu n d a­ m ental im p erfectio n in m onotheistic religions, w hich can u sh er in c o n flict and violence. M oreover, the positive sp iritu al and cu ltu ral elem ents u n derlying th ese religions m ay be easily overlooked b y religious lead ers and th e ir follow ers. O gui recalls h is experience as a tru ste e o f th e W orld’s P arliam ent o f R eligions, w hen he w as shocked by th e “rid icu lo u s” beh avio r o f “som e religio us leaders w ho can­ not sit together.” In th is connection, O gui notes th a t “at tim es M uslim s and C h ristian s have d ifficu lties spending tim e tog ether,” and sig n ifican tly concludes by saying th a t “it’s sad w hen people m iss the essence o f th e ir relig io n s” (O gui 1998: 239). T he im plication here is th a t the p ro p er “essen ce” o f other religions m ay be caught in stead from a m ore refin ed and p lu ralistic view p oint, nam ely th at offered by E ast A sian and Japanese sp irituality.

Trajectories o f Zen Buddhism In a w ell-know n article w ritte n m any years ago, the B ritish scholar o f religion, Ian R eader, recalls h is disap po intm en t w hen he discovered du rin g h is firs t v isit to Japan th at, co n tra rily to h is exp ectatio ns, v ery few Z en B udd hist p riests and tem ples w ere actively involved in the p ractice o f m editation: It did not take long for m e to discover th a t m y p reconcep tion s o f how Z en B uddhism functio ned, at least institution ally, w ere rath er differen t fro m the reality: m ost Z en B u d dh ist tem ples seem ed no different fro m tem ples o f any o th er sect, dealing w ith fu n erals and an cestrally related rite s and bo u n d up w ith social conventions and aspects o f Japanese folk belief, rath er th a n w ith th e en lig h ten m en t d irected au sterities th a t are, at least in the p o p u lar im age, associated w ith Z en. (R eader 1986: 7) O ne o f the problem s connected w ith th is idealized im age o f Z en B uddhism is, as R eader h im self illu strates, th a t it ends up b y “disregarding the w hole sociohistorical context in w hich it has grow n and developed in Japan” and “neglecting the general role and function o f in stitutional B uddhism in Japan” (R eader 1986: 7). A s noted in vario us studies m entioned above, th e iden tification o f Z en w ith m edi­ tatio n is m ain ly dependent on ideas elaborated by the w ave o f B uddhist m odern­ ism sta rted in the M eiji perio d, and by th e w ritin gs of scholars related to the Kyoto School and S uzuki D aisetsu 鈴 木 大 拙 ，one o f th e pivotal fig u res b eh in d the p o p ­ u larizatio n of Z en B uddhism outside Japan. W ithin th is context, also out of the in flu en ce o f E uropean thought, th e role o f in n er religious experience has been overem phasized, w hich has led to the biased presentatio n of zazen m ed itatio n and the search for enlightenm ent as paradig m atic aspects of Z en B uddhism . T his con stellation o f ideas is relevant w hen we look at th e in tro d u ctio n and developm ent o f Z en B u ddhism in A m erica, since during th is pro cess foreign

G localization overseas

77

cu ltu ral elem ents or stereo ty p es have played an im p o rtan t role in shaping new glocal identities (typ e 8). R esearch conducted in the U nited S tates h as ind icated th a t Z en m ed itatio n is the central activ ity in the m ore th a n tw o h u n d red centers and m onasteries estab lish ed and m ain ly freq u en ted by a non-Japanese m em ber­ ship. N ew facilities th a t have p ro liferated from th e 1970s b asically d iffer from the preexisting Japanese A m erican Z en B uddhist tem ples providing (sim ilarly to th eir Japanese co u n terp arts) essen tial ritu a ls such as fu n erals and m em orial rites for the ancestors, and fu n ctio n in g as com m un ity centers th a t focus on activities related to Japanese trad itio n al cultu re (A sai and W illiam s 1999). T he resu lts o f a su rv ey in cluding tw o in flu e n tial Z en groups in th e U nited S tates, th e B erkeley Z en C enter and th e R o chester Z en C enter (and other V ajrayāna and V ip assan ā groups), have show n th a t “m editatio n practice is th e h eart o f B u ddhism for m ost o f th e resp o n d en ts” (C olem an 1999: 97). Sim ilarly, V ictor H ori has noted how the overem phasis on m ed itation has affected the w ay Z en B udd hist practice is u n d ersto o d w ith in the A m erican R in zai context, w here p ractitio n ers ten d to believe th a t “the Z en experience has n o thin g to do w ith in tellectu al study and th o u g h t” and “rep eat as th e ir ju stific a tio n th e Z en slogan ‘N o dependence on w ords or letters, a separate tran sm issio n outside o f sc rip tu re’ ” (H ori 1998: 7 3 -4 ). T his is at odds, H ori claim s, w ith th e kōan 公 案 tra in in g in Japan, w hich custom ­ arily involves “lite ra ry study, m em orizin g long passages o f tex t, w ritin g C hinesestyle co m m entary on kōan, com posing C h inese verses and th e n w ritin g th em in b ru sh ” (H ori 1998: 74). H ori has illu strate d how other asp ects o f ritu a l, teaching , and social o rganization w ith in A m erican Z en centers m ay sig n ifican tly differ from those found in Japanese Z en tem ples. O ne o f th e m ost noticeable o f these tra its is w hat he term s “m anagerial Z en,” th a t is, th e p resence du ring m editatio n al retrea ts o f tw o d istin ct groups, “a sm aller num ber o f ordained m onks and a large num ber o f lay p ractitio n ers,” very few o f w hom w ould “cross the line from lay to o rd ain ed ” (H ori 1998: 6 5 -6 ). A ltho ug h th e d istin ctio n b etw een m onk and lay p ractitio n er is also p resen t in Japanese B uddhism , H ori notes th a t “the R in zai Z en m o n astery does not organize itse lf into tw o gro ups,” and th a t th is d istin ctio n “looks so m ething lik e the fam iliar distinction s betw een m anagem ent and w orker in an A m erican bu sin ess corp o ratio n ” (H ori 1998: 66). T hese obser­ vatio ns p o in t to ano ther distinctiv e asp ect o f A m erican Z en B uddhism , nam ely, the o rien tatio n to w ard lay practice, w hich m ay be perceived by Japanese leaders as a serious problem , esp ecially because o f the presen ce o f A m erican Z en m as­ te rs w ho do not follow celibacy (cf. Porcu 2008: 10). T his in creasin g ten dency to w ard th e laicizatio n o f Z en B u ddhism ce rtain ly m eets the exp ectatio n s and lifestyle o f sections o f the A m erican (m iddle and upper) m iddle class, w hose m em bers are “seeking religious experience and perso n al tran sfo rm atio n over social stim ulatio n and a ffilia tio n ” (Q ueen 1999: xxv). O ne distinctive con trib u tio n to th e affirm atio n o f th is g lo calized form o f Z en has b een given b y Sanbōk y ōdan 三 宝 教 団 , a stream o f Z en B uddhism nam ed afte r the T h ree T reasu res o f B uddhism , and sy n th esizin g elem ents o f th e Sōt ō 曹 洞 and R in zai 臨 済 trad itio n s. It has b een no ted th a t th e in flu en ce o f S anbōk y ōd an on A m erican Z en has b een “out o f pro p o rtio n to its relatively

78

G localization overseas

m argin al statu s in Japan” (S h a rf 1995: 419). T his m ovem ent, w hich w as form ally sta rted b y Y asutani H akuu n 安 谷 白 雲 (1885-1973), stro ngly em p hasizes the exp erien tial dim ension o f Z en and lay practice, as exem plified by th e fact th at Y asutani’s successor, Y am ada K ōu n 山 田 耕 雲 (1907-1989), w as a householder and b u sin essm an (S h a rf 1995: 422). S anbōk y ōd an ’s activ ities caught the atten ­ tio n o f num erous non-Japanese p ractitio n ers, and w ere in stru m en tal in estab lish ­ ing a lineage o f w ell-know n N o rth A m erican m asters. A m ong th ese w e fin d P hilip K apleau (1912-2004), th e foun der o f the R ochester Z en C enter, and R obert A itken (1917-2010), w ho estab lish ed th e D iam ond Sangha. O ne in te restin g asp ect in th e creatio n in A m erica o f th ese hy brid form s o f Z en em p h asizin g elem ents such as m ed itatio n and lay p rac tice is a ce rta in te n ­ dency to p resen t Z en B u ddh ism as a so rt o f “su p ra-relig io n ,” w hich in d ire ctly re a ffirm s th e su p e rio rity o f ea ste rn (and Japanese) sp iritu a lity over oth er cul­ tu res (typ e 10). T h is claim , w hich is easily traceab le in th e abovem entioned lit­ era tu re related to B u d d h ist m o dernism , also fin d s exp ression in the w ork of Japanese Z en B u d d h ist m asters w ho w ere in stru m e n ta l in ex pand ing the N o rth A m erican Z en com m unity. In th e case o f Y am ada, for exam ple, w e m ay observe how th is strateg y is accom p lish ed th ro u g h a double m ove. F irst, Z en is elevated to th e ran k o f “the core o f all B u d d h ist sects,” w hose essence “is th e exp erience called sato ri or se lf-realizatio n .” Second, it is claim ed b y Y am ada th a t “Z en is not a religion , in th e sam e sense th a t C h ristia n ity is a relig io n ,” th u s su ggest­ ing th a t hav ing “no p h ilo so p h ies or theologies attach ed to it,” th is p ec u lia r form o f Japanese sp iritu a lity is ac tu a lly the qu in tessen ce o f any relig io u s ph en o m e­ non (Y am ada 2002: 7 3 -4 ). M ore explicitly, Y am ada’s successor, K ubota Jiun 窪 田 怒 雲 ( b . 1932), exp resses th e idea th a t “p erh ap s only Z en, w ith its aspects o f p rac tice and realizatio n , can be called a relig io n in th e tru e sense o f th e w ord” (S h a rf 1995: 427). A nother m aster w ho has b ee n ex trem ely in flu e n tial in the p o p u larizatio n of Soto Z en in N o rth A m erica, esp ecially th ro u g h th e activ ities o f th e San F rancisco Z en C enter, S uzuki S h unry ū , sim ilarly suggests th a t Z en B u ddhism “m ight not be religion in the u sual sense,” and th a t it m ay be even considered as “religion before religion ” (S u zu k i 1995: 124). A ccording to S uzuki, th is is becau se Z en “em ph asizes th e w orld o f un conscio usness,” w hich is u n rela ted to “organization, bu ild in g b eau tifu l b u ildin gs, creatin g m usic, evolving a philosophy, and so fo rth ” (S uzuk i 1995: 130), w ith th e resu lt th at U sually w hen som eone believes in a p a rticu la r religion, his attitu d e becom es m ore and m ore a sharp angle p o in tin g aw ay fro m him self. B ut ou r w ay is not lik e th is. In our w ay the p o in t o f th e sh arp angle is alw ays tow ards ourselves, not aw ay fro m ourselves. (S u zu k i 1995: 76) It is sig n ifican t th a t th is tend ency to depict Z en B u ddhism as th e h eart o f Japanese sp iritu a lity and im plicitly o f all other religions as a k in d o f allencom passing supra-religion is not un know n am ong N orth A m erican teachers.

G localization overseas

79

B o d h in K jolhede ( b . 1948), the cu rren t leader o f the R o chester Z en C enter, p ro ­ poses the sam e rep erto ire in his afterw ord to K apleau’s The Three P illars o f Zen: How does B uddhism , a non-theistic religion, fin d an accom m odation w ith Judaism or C h ristian ity? M ore easily, it w ould seem , th an vice-versa. The B uddha, w hile denying th at he h im self w as any k in d o f god, refused either to deny or affirm the existence o f G od. T he Z en school, know n since its in cep ­ tio n as a teach in g “beyond w ords and letters, w ithout reliance on the sutras,” po ints to the O rig inal m ind th at precedes all religion. A s such, the teachin gs o f th e Z en m asters have alw ays resonated strongly w ith those of the C h ristian and Jew ish m ystics, as w ell as the teachin gs o f th e Sufis. (K jolhede 2000: 380) T he sam e approach seem s to ch aracterize, m ore in general, the activ ities o f the R o chester Z en C enter, w here Z en B uddhism is p resen ted as not in co n flict w ith other religions because it “po in ts to our O rig in al M ind, w hich ex isted before relig ion w as even conceived” (R ochester Z en C enter 2008). T he W indhorse Z en C om m un ity in N o rth C arolina, also in K apleau’s lin e o f tran sm issio n , sim ilarly claim s th at Z en is a religion free o f dogm as or creeds w hose teach in g s and disciplin es are d irected tow ard S elf-realization, th a t is to say, to the fu ll aw akening th a t S hakyam uni B uddha h im self ex perienced u n d er th e Bo tree afte r strenuous self-disciplin e. In a deeper, broad er sense, Z en refers to th is M ind its e lf – the w holeness and p erfectio n o f all existence, and the liv in g core o f all m ajor religions. (W indhorse Z en C o m m un ity 2011) A nother ty p ical exp ressio n o f the sam e logic is the op position o f w estern and ea ste rn tho ug ht, w here th e latter, due to th e con trib u tio n o f (Zen) B uddhism , com es to be p resen ted as a su p erio r form o f sp iritu a lity avoiding dualism , as in th is passage b y D enn is M e rz e l (b . 1944), w ho w as, u n til 2 0 1 1 , a m aster in the lineage o f th e m aster T aizan M aezum i and S anbōk y ōdan: A ccording to W estern th ou ght, if an u n d erstan d in g is not dualistic, it can’t be logical. T he g reat m inds o f th e E ast, how ever, have long know n th a t there is ano ther logic th a t stem s from a no n-du alistic persp ectiv e. T his so -called B uddhist logic relies on the enlightened view : everyth ing is really O ne M ind. (M erzel 2003: 9 7 -8 ) T hese view s, on th e o th er han d, are not lim ited to th e N o rth A m erica context bu t also fin d curren cy in o th er cou ntries, w here teach ers belon gin g to these lin e ­ ages have based th e ir activities. T he A uckland Z en C entre, estab lish ed in 2003 by tw o disciples o f B o d h in K jolhede, for exam ple, alludes to the sam e con stella­ tio n o f ideas w hen th e centre m entions on its w ebsite th a t Z en “does not require

80

G localization overseas

th a t w e follow a p artic u la r b elief system ,” but rath er “show s a p ath th a t can take us beyond fix ed con cepts” (A uckland Z en C entre 2011). O r, again, the Single G rain o f S and Sangha in N o rth ern Ireland , w hich is lin k ed to th e San F rancisco Z en C enter, sim ilarly claim s th a t “Z en goes beyond religio n and is m ore a ph i­ losophy or w ay o f life ” (Single G rain o f Sand 2007). S till ano ther m an ifestatio n o f cu ltu ral chauvinism related to the g lo calizatio n o f Z en in N o rth A m erica th a t deserves to be b riefly m entioned here is related to th e idea th a t th e U nited States, or m ore in general, the “W est,” “w ould be the site o f Z en ’s fu tu re developm ent” (Iw am ura 2011: 52). A s Jane Iw am ura has noted, th is n arrativ e b eg an to consolidate soon afte r th e post-w ar p o p u larizatio n o f Z en B uddhism in th e U nited S tates, and w as dependent on th e depiction o f Japanese Z en B uddhism as decadent, w hich had sta rted to be featu red in m agazines p u b ­ lish ed in the late 1950s. H ere, arg um en ts such as th e in clin atio n o f Japanese B u dd hist p riests and m onks to d rin k in g and lay p rac titio n e rs’ ignorance o f the basics o f th e ir ow n trad itio n w ere u sed to su ppo rt the claim th a t Japan had lost its sp iritu al pow er (Iw am ura 2011: 53). F u nctio nal to th e em ergence o f th is rhetoric w ere the w ritin gs o f A lan W atts (1915-1973), w ho h ad succeeded S uzuki D aisetsu as the stan d ard b ea rer o f Z en in A m erica. W atts’s descrip tio n o f Z en B uddhism as p racticed in Japanese tem ples as “square Z en ,” nam ely “sp iritu ally rig id ,” cer­ ta in ly co n trib u ted to th e leg itim atio n o f th e view th a t th e tran sm issio n o f th is religious trad itio n to the U nited S tates could be accom panied b y a su bstan tial rev italizatio n (Iw am ura 2011: 5 3 -6 ). C ertainly , as Iw am ura notes, th e percep tion o f A m erica’s resp o n sib ility in the dem ise o f Japanese trad itio n al cultu re m ight have co n trib u ted to the em ergence o f th is lin e o f tho ught. O n the other hand, it is apparent how elem ents o f cultu ral chauvinism play a distinctive role here. W estern cultu re, th o u g h in need o f th e sp iritu al resou rces prov ided by the Z en B u dd hist trad itio n , is also cred ited as the ideal env iro nm en t for th e trad itio n ’s rev italiza­ tion. A t the general level, th is p a tte rn in fo rm s claim s such as th is exp ressed by R obert A itken, one o f the aforem entioned N o rth A m erican Z en m asters: It seem s to m e th a t perhaps the eg a litarian tend en cies o f W estern culture give a strictly lay center lik e th e D iam ond S angha a b e tte r chance to apply th e B u d d h a’s te ac h in g o f n o n d isc rim in a tio n and in te rp e n e tra tio n th a n cen ters w hich still p ractice ordination. (A itken 1988: 79) A n exam ple o f how th ese discourses m ay even su rface at th e academ ic level is offered by th e rep o rt o f a sociologist and Z en practitio n er w ho accom panied his m aster, John D aido L oo ri (1931-2009), on a v isit to several Sōt ō shū tem ples in Japan. A fter the reference to “th e w idely acknow ledged decline o f Z en B uddhism in Japan,” w hich is alleg ed ly “reflec te d in th e fact th a t few o f S oji-ji’s gradu ates either teach or practice zazen once th ey re tu rn to th e ir fam ily tem p les” (F inney 1991: 387), one fin d s th e follow ing rem arks: O n arriv al [at the U nsen-ji], w e are w elcom ed b y the A bbot and th e tem p le’s board o f directors. T ow ard evening, we are trea ted to a m odest banquet w hose

G localization overseas

81

jo v iality , singing and flo w in g sake to g eth er generate, we all agree, th e social h ig h point o f th e pilgrim ag e. E arly next m o rn ing we do zazen, jo in e d b y tw o b o ard m em bers. T hey are obviously un accu sto m ed to it. In flu e n ce d b y his long stay at D oshin-ji, th e younger S uzu ki plan s to b u ild an “A m ericansty le” zendo at U nsen-ji next year. It is ironic, perhaps, th a t a rev italized Z en B uddhism in A m erica is b ein g ca rrie d back to in flu en ce the ancient, bu t w eakened, p ractice in Japan. T his m o rn in g ’s sittin g is a rare event at the tem ple. (F inn ey 1991: 390) T he presence o f sim ilar tra its has also b een show n to ch aracterize som e m an i­ festatio n o f th e so -called E ngaged B uddhism . Ideally trac in g back its orig in s to the w ork o f the V ietnam ese m onk T hich N h at H an h (b. 1926), w ho is cred ited w ith coining the te rm in the early 1960s, th is m ovem ent advocates B uddhism oriented activism to cou nter v ario u s form s o f social su ffering, in clud ing w ar, injustice, and th e ecological crisis. T he te rm has gain ed w ide curren cy especially th ro u g h th e w ork o f the T h ai lay B ud dh ist in tellectu al, S ulak S ivaraksa ( b . 1933), and th e in stitu tio n o f th e In tern atio n al N etw ork o f E ngaged B ud dh ists (IN E B ) in 1989, w hich cu rren tly u n ites “B ud dhists as w ell as no n-B uddhists fro m m ore th a n 20 co u ntries from A sia, E urope, A m erica and A u stralia,” w ith th e objective o f “ in teg ratin g the p ractice o f B u ddhism w ith social action for a healthy, ju st, and p eacefu l w orld.”2 It is in te restin g to note th a t m any o f th e activ ists involved in the E ngaged B u ddhism m ovem ent are actu ally w estern -ed u cated B u d dhist th in k ers, and th at, in not a few cases, th e ir connectio n w ith Japanese B uddhism , notably Z en, is fairly sig nificant. T hom as Y arnall has show n how, especially am ong w hat he calls the “m o dernist” factio n o f th e m ovem ent, w hich em p hasizes the d isco n tin u ity betw een presentday E ngaged B u ddhism and h isto rical B uddhism , it is gen erally assum ed th a t the p o ten tial o f B uddhism for pro m otin g social change can be activated and devel­ oped only w ith in the w estern cu ltu ral fram ew ork. Y arnall notes th a t th is approach to B udd hist social activ ism reproduces “the ty p ical O rien ta list m oves,” nam ely, “reco g n itio n ” (the acknow ledgm ent o f th e alien trad itio n as valuable), “appro­ p riatio n ” (speakin g au th oritatively for th e alien trad itio n ), and “d istan cin g ” (claim ing a p riv ileg ed perspective on the alien trad itio n ) (Y arnall 2003: 308). W ithin th is fram ew ork, the lon ging for a fu lly developed and so cially engaged A m erican or w estern Z en B u ddhism fin d s ex pressio n in th e w ritin g s o f a v arie ty o f authors. F or th e Z en B u dd hist and activist, K en Jones ( b . 1930), Y arnall observes, “ [i]t is only now, in th e m o dern era, th a t we have developed th e m ature persp ectiv e (and the urg en t need) to b rin g out the socio-po litical im plications laten t in the B u ddh a’s p eren n ial te ac h in g s” (Y arnall 2003: 319). A m ong other exam ples o f th is rhetoric, one fin d s th e po et and Z en practition er, G ary Snyder (b. 1930), w ho claim s th a t “C hin ese society effectiv ely b o ttled up th e social im pulse in B uddhism and th ereb y set th e d irectio n o f Z en ,” or N elson F oster (b. 1951), w ho a ffirm s th a t “as Z en m oves w est again, it enters a relatively open env ironm ent th a t m ay allow the sangha to live out its po litics to a g rea ter extent th a n ever b efo re” (Y arnall 2003: 296, 301). W hat em erges here is th e ten d en cy to

82

G localization overseas

in co rp o rate elem ents o f cu ltu ral chauvinism w ith in th e process o f g lo calizatio n o f sources fro m th e A sian and Japanese B u dd hist trad itio n . In deed, the d iscu s­ sion above suggests th a t these and other authors and activists “m ay have con­ stru cted a disengaged h isto ry fo r B u ddhism in order to appropriate for them selves th e title o f ‘inv en tor o f engaged B u ddh ism ,’” thu s w restin g “fro m A sian B udd hists th e au tho rity to in terp ret th e ir ow n trad itio n ” (Y arnall 2003: 305). From th e discussio n above, it is clear how th e hy b rid izatio n o f Z en B uddhism overseas m ay be accom panied by an em phasis on the su p erio rity o f Japanese culture. W ithin th is fram ew ork, th e un d erly in g m otive is th e p ercep tio n o f the “w isdom o f th e E a st” as the solution to th e problem s o f co n tem po rary w estern societies, w hich are seen as too attach ed to ex terio r form s, m aterialism , and in need o f a sp iritu al su pp ort w hich m ay be aptly p rov ided by Z en B uddhism . T he decisive step, how ever, consists in the rem odeling o f Z en as a supra-religion m ain ly focu sed on m editation, in lin e w ith the claim s of last c e n tu ry ’s B u dd hist m o d ern ists and som e o f th e ir w estern epigones. In addition, as the exam ple of th e rhetoric o f th e decline or backw ard ness o f Z en in Japan and A sia show s, the pro cess o f g lo calizatio n o f Japanese religions m ay also be accom panied by ano ther p ec u lia r k in d o f cultu ral chauvinism in d eb ted to the o rien talist p attern , w hich im plies th a t the receiver o f the cu ltu ral in flu en ce is in fact endow ed w ith a po te n tia lity higher th a n th a t o f th e giver, be it at th e social or sp iritu al level.

6

Carriers of globalization

Japanese religions' influence over other religions and cultures O ne o f th e m ost ev id en t reaso n s w hy Japan ese relig io n s can b e rela ted to g lo ­ b a liz a tio n is th a t th e y are, sim ila rly to o th er relig io n s w orldw ide, an in te g ral p a rt o f th e cu ltu ra l flo w s th a t ch a ra c te riz e global society. T h at is, th e y do not ju s t resp o n d to th e ch allen g e o f p lu ralism , h y b rid ize, and g lo c alize , b u t also act as c a rrie rs o f g lo b a liz atio n and p ro m o ters o f change at th e lo cal level (ty p e 12). T h is role play ed by Japan ese relig io n s w ith in global d y n am ics is im m ed iately ap p aren t w hen w e co n sid er th e ir p ro se ly tiz in g a c tiv itie s o verseas. T he p re s­ ence o f d iffe ren t relig io u s tra d itio n s im p o rte d fro m Jap an h as affec ted no t only th e relig io u s b eh av io r o f a v e ry larg e n u m b er o f peo p le in A m erica, E urope, and elsew here (or even m illio n s, acco rd in g to som e o f th e so u rces cited below ), b u t also, in m an y cases, th e w ay th e y lo o k at re a lity and p erfo rm in the so cial arena. T he m issio n ary w ork o f Japanese religions overseas w as in itially lin k ed to the m ig ratio n o f Japanese labo rers to H aw aii and A m erica since th e M eiji perio d, and to the expansion o f the Japanese em pire at th e b eg in n in g o f the tw en tieth century. Tow ard th e end o f the n in eteen th century, tem ples w ere estab lish ed in H aw aii and N o rth A m erica by Jō do S hinshū 浄 土 真 宗 ，J ōdoshū 浄 土 宗 ，Sōt ōshū 曹 洞 宗 ，and R in zaish ū 臨 済 宗 ，soon follow ed by other m ain stream Japanese B u ddh ist den om inations, T enrikyō 天 理 教 ，other org anization s belon gin g to Kyōha S hin tō 教 派 神 追 (S ect S hin tō), and even C h ristian groups. In B razil, the activities o f Japanese B uddhism sta rted in the second decade o f th e tw en tieth ce n tu ry w ith Jōdo S hinshū , w hich w as also at the forefro nt in estab lish in g over­ seas b ranches in K orea in 1877. A s m entioned in the previous chapter, the fac ili­ ties o f th ese groups and other new Japanese religious m ovem ents such as K onkōk y ō 金 光 教 ，Ō m oto 大 本 ，and S eichō no Ie 生 長 の 家 th a t w ere active outside Japan u n til the end o f W orld W ar II fu n ctio n ed alm ost exclusively (w ith som e exceptions) as com m u nity centers for Japanese im m ig ran ts, p erfo rm in g basic religious ritu a ls such as tho se for th e ancestors (R eid 1996). It w as only in the 1960s th a t ano ther phase started , also in con nection w ith the advances in in tern atio n al com m unications, m ostly involving the dynam ism of

84

Carriers o f globalization

new religious m ovem ents. W h ile the v ario u s trad itio n s o f B u ddhism have m ostly continued to fu n ctio n as eth n ic id en tifiers for overseas com m unities o f Japanese, new religious m ovem ents such as Sōka G ak kai 創 価 学 会 ，Seichō no Ie, Sekai K yū seiky ō Izun om e Kyōd a n 世界 救 世 教 い づ の め 教 団 ，PL Kyō dan P L 教 団 , T enriky ō, and Sū k y ō M ah ik ari 宗 教 真 光 have show n su bstantial g ro w th am ong non-Japanese (S him azono 1991; N ak am aki 1994). T he resu lt is th at, at present, several h u n dred th o u san d people arou nd th e globe are d irectly involved in the activities o f som e Japanese religion. M any follow the u p d ated form o f N ichiren B u ddhism p reach ed b y Sōka G akk ai, w hich is also th e larg est Japanese religious o rgan izatio n in the U nited S tates, A sia, and E urope. O thers, esp ecially in B razil, follow th e teach in g s o f S eichō no Ie and Sekai K yū seik y ō Izunom e Kyōdan, bo th belong ing to th e Ō m oto lineage and w ith a strong b ackg ro u n d in S h in tō and folk religion. T h ro u g h the p ro sely tizin g activ ities o f these and o th er Japanese reli­ gions, a com plex o f p ractices m ain ly dealing w ith w orldly b en efits and healing, and valu es (m ainly o f C o n fu cian o rigin) th a t w ere m ostly alien to people outside Japan have now b een in co rp o rated into th e lifesty les o f a sig n ifican t nu m b er o f them , thu s con trib u tin g to the m ak ing o f w hat N ed erv een P ieterse has called a “global m élan g e” (N ed erv een P ieterse 2009). H ow ever, if we have to account for the in flu en ce o f Japanese religio ns w ith in global dynam ics, th is rep resen ts only one p a rt o f a broad er pictu re. It m ay be argued, in fact, th a t m uch o f th is in flu en ce does not derive fro m gro w in g m em ­ bership outside Japan, but rath er fro m a d iffu se p o p u larizatio n o f selected them es th a t have b een in co rp o rated in the w orldview s o f people livin g not only in A m erica and E urope, bu t also in m any other countries. Ideas revolving around rein carn atio n , m editation, and sp iritu al self-im provem ent have becom e in g red i­ ents in p rocesses o f ‘relig iou s brico lag e,’ th e creatio n o f new religiou s iden tities fro m a v arie ty o f sources. In m any cases, th ere is not even the n eed th a t these Japanese sources are perceived as d istin ctiv ely religiou s or adopted by religio usly engaged ind ivid uals, since th ey m ay be easily considered as con stitu en ts or expressions o f a ‘w ay o f life,’ a generic ‘sp iritu ality ,’ or even a fash io n tren d . In o th er cases, religious elem ents can be found em bedded in p ractices and cu ltu ral pro du ctions exp orted fro m Japan to other cou ntries. T his aspect is apparent, for exam ple, in the ubiq uitou s p resence o f Japanese m artial arts studios, in w hich practice is gen erally related to som e form o f b ro ad ly defin ed Japanese (or E ast A sian) sp iritu a lity (S kidm ore 1991; W edem eyer 2 002). A sim ilar ob servation m ay be m ade reg ard in g th e developm ent o f reiki, th e sp iritu al h ealing m ovem ent w ith (som e) roots in Japan (D eh n 2002). In addition, the increasin g w orldw ide in flu en ce exercised by manga and anim e is also w orth m entioning, since these form s o f p o p u lar cultu re m ay be related to Japanese religions. T his is not ju s t because th ese m edia m ay be u sed by religious in stitu tio n s to propagate th e ir teaching s. M ost relevant to our discussion is th a t relig ion and sp iritu a lity m ay be id e n tified as a sp ecific genre o f m anga and anim e and th at, m ore in general, reli­ gious elem ents m ay be found em bedded in a v arie ty o f th ese stories (B ryce and D avis 2010; cf. A lliso n 2008). O ne m ay th in k , for exam ple, o f T ezuka O sam u ’s P hoenix, or acclaim ed anim atio n m ovies such as P rincess M ononoke and Spirited

Carriers o f globalization

85

Aw ay by M iyazaki H ayao in w hich (often id ealized) elem ents related to Shinto and folk religion com e m ore or less exp licitly to th e fore.

Popular Zen and meditating Christians O ne ty p ical exam ple o f the circu latio n o f elem ents o f Japanese relig io sity into foreign cu ltu res is offered by th e ‘Z en boom ,’ th ro u g h w hich th is sp ecific tra d i­ tio n (or b etter, a d e-co n tex tu alized and sim p lified form o f it) has com e to be adopted in th e im ag in atio n o f m any people w orldw ide as a sym bol o f Japanese spirituality. A s m entioned above, th e role played by S uzuki D aisetsu 鈴 木 大 拙 in the p o p u larizatio n o f th is form o f B uddhism outside Japan has b een abun­ dan tly docum ented, as w ell as the n atio n alistic overtones o f his dem ythologized version o f Z en B u ddhism (cf. S h arf 1995; B orup 2004). In a recen t study, Jane Iw am ura has illu stra te d th e process th ro u g h w hich, in th e 1950s, fashio n m aga­ zin es in the U nited S tates w ere in stru m en tal in p o p u larizin g the in trig u in g im age o f S uzuki and his Z en tho ug ht, and how th is new in terest in th in g s Japanese reflec te d th e needs o f a new class o f m ass consum ers orien ted to w ard ‘sty le’ as a m eans o f self-expression. C ontextually, the adoption o f Z en m o tifs by the counte rc u ltu ral m ovem ent and th e B eat G en eration m ay be seen as p a rt o f th e ir strat­ egy to cou nter th e h om ogenized ta ste s and valu es o f the A m erican m iddle class (Iw am ura 2011: 2 3 -6 2 ). A sim ilar tren d , w hich is not n ecessarily disconn ected from th e earn est search for a deep er sp iritu al life, m ay be seen in other p arts of the w orld, not th e least becau se o f th e in flu en ce o f cu ltu ral im ages com ing from N o rth A m erica. In the case o f B razil, for exam ple, it has b ee n no ticed how from b eing an obscure relig ion o f Japanese im m ig ran ts and a ph ilosophy and practice for a sm all group o f in tellectu als u n til the 1980s, Z en has becom e visible in m ediascapes as a desired and p restig ious lifestyle for a sector o f the population. M ediascapes have h ad a fu n d am en tal role in estab ­ lish in g B u ddhism as a tren d y choice for B razilian s. H ollyw ood m ovies and celebrities, m ag azines, new spapers, books, w riters, philo sop hers, and th e ir national co u n terp arts have all co ntribu ted to tu rn “B ud dh ism ” and “Z en ” into b uzzw ords. (R ocha 2006: 152) W hile here the reference to A rju n A p p ad u rai’s concept o f m ed iascapes is aim ed at em ph asizing th e role actu ally played by the m edia in the creation of global narrativ es and im ag in ed w orlds (A ppadurai 1990), it should be recalled th a t the ‘Z en bo om ’ has also o ccu rred at a m ore p ractical, and in terp erso n al, level. O ne ty p ical exam ple o f th is dim ension is th e activ ity o f a grow ing num ber o f non-Japanese (m ore or less accredited ) teach ers w ith in Z en m ed itation centers all over the w orld, th ro u g h w hich m any p ractitio n ers have often approached zazen 坐 禅 as so m ething closer to a path o f self-cu ltiv ation , a ‘w ay o f life,’ or sim ply a relax ing techniq ue th a n as a religious practice th a t req u ires a conversion to Z en B uddhism .

86

Carriers o f globalization

A nother aspect o f th is d iffu sio n o f Z en m ed itatio n outside Japan is represen ted by th e cu rio us p resence o f a m o d ern trad itio n o f m o nks/nun s, priests, and lay C h ristian people w ho have b een in flu en ced b y Z en B uddhism w ith out ren o u n c­ ing th e ir ow n faith. T his phenom enon trac es b ack at least to th e involvem ent of H ugo M . E nom iya-L assalle (1898-1990) in th e practices o f S anbōk y ōdan 三 主 教 団 , th e lay-oriented m ovem ent synthesizing elem ents o f th e Sōtō 曹 洞 and R in zai 臨 済 trad itio n s o f Z en B uddhism th a t w as in tro d u ced in the previous chapter. T he fact th at Sanbōkyōd an ’s leaders strongly em phasized the experiential dim ension o f a Z en p ractice tran scen d in g religion rather th a n ritu als and scrip ­ tu res soon caught th e attentio n o f C h ristian practition ers in terested in a fru itfu l dialogue w ith eastern form s o f spirituality. E nom iya-L assalle, a Jesuit w ho spent m ost o f his life in Japan, first practiced zazen m ed itatio n u n d er the guidan ce of H arad a D aiun 原 田 大 雲 (1871-1961), and th en u n d er Y asutani H aku un 安 谷 白 雲 , w ho authorized him to teach. H e continued and concluded his train in g under Y asutani’s successor, Y am ada K ōu n 山田耒井雲，and, as a ce rtified teach er in the Sanbōk y ōdan lineage, conducted reg ular m editation retreats (sesshin 接 心 ) in Japan and E urope u n til his death, authoring variou s books on the subject (R aw linson 1997: 25 6-61). E nom iya-L assalle not only sees no contradiction in the Z en practice o f C h ristian s, bu t even claim s th at “Z en m ed itatio n facilitates reli­ gious faith, and can to som e extent reaw aken it in case it has b een lo st” (Enom iyaL assalle 1995: 84). The idea underlying his claim is th at C h ristian ity and B uddhism bo th are u ltim ately d irected to the experience o f the absolute being, and th a t the form er d iffers fro m the latte r in th a t it tends to characterize th is state o f bliss as the experience o f a perso nal G od (E nom iya-L assalle 1995: 87). N onetheless, E nom iya-L assalle finds the p o ssib ility o f “an in tuitiv e and direct know ledge of G od” in th e trad itio n o f b o th ea stern and w estern C h ristian m ysticism , and spends m uch effo rt com paring the la tte r’s features w ith those o f Z en B udd hist m editation (E nom iya-L assalle 1995: 9 2 , 157-64). T hus, characteristic o f E nom iya-L assalle’s approach is the id en tification o f satori 悟り w ith the know ledge o f G od, w hich rem ained a firm point u n til the end o f his life. In his Zen M editation fu r Christen (Z en M editation for C h ristian s), he expresses th is idea forcefully:

satori is th e direct perceptio n o f the se lf (die unm ittelbare W ahrnehmung des S e lb st) ... from here, the access to the experience o f G od is possible. In other w ords, the real self has a sp iritu al natu re and is so deeply in g rain ed in its source, G od him self, th at it cannot be perceived directly and un reflex ively w ithout any reference to th e A bsolute. “It is a fact th at m an fin d s abode in G od to the extent th at he reaches his ow n self, and he arriv es to his ow n self to the extent th at he arriv es to G od. In order to tru ly fin d G od, one m ust descend to the depths o f on e’s ow n self, w here th ere is no thing b u t the im age o f G od; th is is the stage w here th e se lf disappears and only G od rem ains, w ho can be approached directly, and not th ro u g h the m ediation o f our th oug ht or conscience.” It has b een repeated ly co n firm ed th a t one w ho reaches the depth o f the real se lf there fin ds G od (der M ensch, wenn er zum eigentlichen tiefsten Selbst kommt, zu G ott hin fin d e t). Indeed, at th is stage the se lf dissolves, and

Carriers o f globalization

87

as a result th e B uddhist practition er fin d s in th is experience th e u n ity w ith the w hole or no n-du ality (N icht-Zw eiheit). (E nom iya-L assalle 1995: 88)1 O n th ese grou nd s, E nom iya-L assalle w as able to becom e a Z en m aster (rōshi

老 師 ) in 1980, w ith out feeling any need to abandon the order of Jesuits. Q uite interestin gly , he is not an iso lated case. U nder th e g u idance o f th is pio neering fig u re, m any other p riests p rac tice d zazen and in tu rn beg an to teach th is m editatio n al tech n iq u e to th e ir ow n groups o f disciples, thu s creatin g a so rt o f lineage. To give an idea o f how m any people m ay have b ee n involved in the p ractice o f th is ‘Z en for C h ristian s,’ one o f E n om iya-L assalle’s disciples teach in g in S ardinia at th e p erip h e ry o f E urope, the Jesuit, F rancesco P iras, is cred ited w ith having h ad in his th irty years o f activ ity m ore th a n 10,000 p articip a n ts in his m editatio n al sessions (L’U nione S arda 2011). M ost im portantly, E nom iya-L assalle w as not the only C h ristian priest to be in stru cted w ith in Sanbōkyōdan. A nother o f Y am ada’s disciples, the form er Jesuit p riest and rōshi, R uben H abito, w rites th at during m editational sessions “at least a fo u rth o f the fifty or so particip an ts w ould be practicing C h ristian s” (H abito 1990: 236). A m ong the tw elve priests or m onks w ho com pleted th eir train in g under Y am ada, we fin d the B enedictine, W illigis Jäger ( b . 1925). Jäger, w ho is also a C han (Jp. Z en) m aster in the C hinese Linji (Jp. R inzai) tradition, is based at the B en ediktu sho f in H olzkirchen near Wü rzburg (G erm any), w hich is also the head­ quarters of the W est-Ö stliche W eisheit W illigis Jäger S tiftung (W illigis Jäger F oundation W estern -E astern W isdom ), a foundation th a t he sta rted in 2007 to support research and activities related to Z en and contem plation. H is strong em phasis on th e experiential dim ension o f zazen em erges clearly from his w ords, “ [m] any can argue w hether a C h ristian can valid ly do Z en or teach Z en, or not. T he fact is, I am doing it” (H abito 1990: 235). The controversial positio n o f Jäger w ith in th e R om an C atholic C hurch and th e w eight of his m ovem ent m ay be in ferred fro m th is passage published on th e W est-Ö stliche foundation’s w ebsite: D ispu tes w ith the R om an C atholic co m m u n ity u n d er its th e n lead er C ard in al Jo sef R atzin g er sta rte d in 2000, b ased on th e accu satio n th a t W illig is Jäger w as m ak in g dogm atic le arn in g and tru th s su bject to p erso n al experience. In 2002 he w as b an n ed fro m sp eak in g in public and w ritin g . H ow ever, due to th e size o f h is follow ing, he is ig n o rin g th is b an and has m eanw hile b een released fro m the m o n astery (exclaustration) by m u tual agreem ent. (W est-Ö stliche W eisheit 2011) A t p rese n t, th e B e n e d ik tu sh o f o rg an iz es a w ide ran g e o f ac tiv itie s, in c lu d ­ in g m e d ita tio n a l re tre a ts, in tro d u c tio n s to Z en and re la te d to p ic s, and co u rses su ch as “Z en for L e a d e rsh ip ” and “Z e n -S e ssh in for P sy ch o th e ra p ists” (B e n e d ik tu sh o f 2011). A nother am ong Y am ada’s disciples is th e P allo ttine, Johannes K opp (b. 1927), w ho in 1973 sta rted th e m ed itation p rog ram “L eben aus der M itte” (L ife fro m the

88

Carriers o f globalization

C enter) in the diocese o f E ssen in G erm any. T housands o f people have ta k en p art in his sessions, and a few h u n d red can be co un ted as his disciples. S im ilarly to E nom iya-L assalle, K opp claim s th a t Z en is not in co n trad ictio n w ith C h ristian ity, but rath er pro vid es a v alid su ppo rt to those w ho w ant to realize th e presence of G od in everyday life. T hus, for K opp “the exp erien ce o f Z en does not con stitu te an altern ativ e to C h ristian ity , bu t rath er its realizatio n ” (K opp 1994: 128). E laine M acInnes ( b . 1924) is one o f th e few disciples o f Y am ada w ho w as not b o rn in G erm any. T his C anad ian sister o f O u r L ad y ’s M issionaries com pleted her Z en tra in in g u n d er Y am ada in 1980 to g eth er w ith E nom iya-L assalle (R aw linson 1997: 257), and ever since has b een active in teach in g zazen to inm ates. She w as firs t active in the P hilip pin es and in G reat B ritain , w here she served as the exec­ utive d irecto r o f the P riso n P h oenix T rust. W hen she retire d in 1999, the T rust “h ad p laced m e d ita tio n and yoga te ac h ers in eig h ty -six p riso n s and h ad over five th o u san d read ers o f th e T ru st’s q u arterly new sletter.” In 2004, she founded F reeing th e H um an S pirit, a c h arity th a t prom otes Z en m ed itation and yoga for in m ates in correctio nal facilities, in C an ad a (F reeing the H um an S pirit 2008). For M acInnes, w hose life and w ork have also b een the subject o f the docum en­ ta ry film The F ires That Burn (1995), u se o f Z en m ed itation m ay be seen as a w ay to revive th e C h ristian trad itio n : R eal silence is prayer. T he sp iritu a l trad itio n s o f bo th E ast and W est attest to th is, although th e W estern voice has b een som ew hat b lu rre d for centu ries. In th e old days we freq u en tly heard th e chant '“silentium tibi laus” – silence is the highest and tru e st praise o f G od. T hat b eing so, I th in k Z en w ill even­ tu a lly fin d an appropriate niche in C h ristian ity. (M acInnes 2003: 64) In passing, it should also be rem em bered th a t w hile m ost o f th ese religious sp ecialists involved in th e in itial w ave o f ‘Z en for C h ristia n s’ have b een or are R om an C atholic, one o f th e few exceptions is G undula M eyer ( b . 1930) a p asto r o f th e E vengelisch-L utherische K irche (E vangelical L uth eran C hurch), w ho conducts m editation al sessions in the O h o f Z endo near H annover in G erm any (O h of Z endo 2007). A t th e g en eral level, A ndrew R aw lin so n h as n o ted th a t C h ristia n p a rtic i­ p atio n in Z en B u d d h ist p rac tic e s ad o p ted fro m Japan, alth o u g h not u n iq u e (he cites th e exam ple o f H in d u ism ), “ is d istin ctiv e in th a t th e re are sig ns o f an in cip ien t m ovem ent developing, w hich has not h ap p en ed w ith C h ristia n sanny a sa ” (R aw lin so n 1997: 259). A nd, alth o u g h th is ph eno m en o n is p erh ap s not going to app eal to m asses o f C h ristia n b eliev ers, it n o n eth eless rep rese n ts a m ean in g fu l exam ple o f how Japan ese relig io n s m ay act as c a rrie rs o f g lo b a liz a­ tio n in fo rm s th a t are in d ep en d en t fro m d irec t p ro se ly tiz in g and th e acq u isitio n o f gro w in g m em b ership overseas. It th is w ay, th e y en d up ex ercisin g a so rt o f soft p o w er over oth er cu ltu res, and set in m o tion at th e lo cal level p ro cesses o f h y b rid iz atio n th a t in tu rn are lik e ly to co n trib u te, so oner or later, to global c u ltu ral flow s.

Carriers o f globalization

89

Macrobiotics and religion E sp ecially know n for d ietary p rescrip tio n s, M acrobiotics offers ano ther exam ple o f how Japanese religio us elem ents have found th e ir w ay into other cultu res. T his m ovem ent is in ex tricab ly lin k ed to the fig u re and w ork o f S aku razaw a Y ukikazu 權 澤 如 一 （1893-1966), b etter know n as G eorge O hsaw a, the firs t son o f a sam urai fam ily w ho becam e involved in th e activities o f th e Shokuyōkai 食 養 会 (Food C ure S ociety), an association founded in 1908 by th e su p p o rters o f Ish izu k a S agen’s 石 塚 左 玄 (1850-1910) “science o f cerealism ” （K otzsch 1985: 31). D issatisfied w ith the recen tly in tro d u ced w estern m edicine, Ish izu k a, a m edical doctor in th e Japanese A rm y, developed his ow n th e o ry acco rding to w hich hu m an health depends on the co rrect balan ce o f sodium and potassiu m , w hich can be m ain ly achieved th ro u g h a cereal-based diet. A lthough expressed in a sci­ entific language, Ish izu k a’s new approach w as strongly dependent on his in terest in elem ents o f trad itio n al o riental m edicine, such as th o se related to “ y ing-yang” (onm y ō or in'y ō 陰 陽 ）and “fiv e-elem en t” (gogyō 五 行 ）th e o ry (K otzsch 1985: 2 5 -3 0 ), w hich h ad b een form ally in co rp o rated into Japanese cultu re at least since the seventh ce n tu ry CE. M oreover, Ish izu k a w as also in sp ire d by the w ork o f E k ken K aibara 益車干貝原 (1630-1716), a scholar o f th e E do p erio d w ho had w ritte n on the subject o f food from the p o in t o f view o f N eo-C o nfucianism . E kken ty p ic ally em ph asized the o rig in ally pu re n atu re o f hum an beings, w hich can be recovered w hen harm o ny w ith th e un iv ersal cosm ic prin cip le is tem porar­ ily lost, and th e values o f self-cu ltivation and g ratitu d e (K otzsch 1985: 15-19). T hese id eas stron gly in flu e n ced O hsaw a, w ho firs t developed his ow n system in Japan and F rance, w here he lived and w orked in the early 1930s. A spects of trad itio n al tho ug ht becom e explicit in O hsaw a’s approach, w ho, in h is bo ok Le P rincipe Unique de la Philosophie e t de la Science d 'Ejctrême- O rient (1931), later tran slate d into E n glish un d er th e title Unique Principle: The Philosophy o f M acrobiotics, presen ts his th o ugh t as “In ’yology” (im’y ōgaku 陰 陽 学 )： I shall call th is th e o ry In'yology. In ， y o!ogy is the m ost positive philosophy o f the Far-E ast. It em braces all sciences. I believe it b est enables th e W esterner to u n d erstan d B u ddhism and, th ereafter, all th e m ost profound philo sop hy of the F ar-E ast w here all th e p ractical sciences o f life – m edicine, biology, ec o ­ nom ics, and sociology, for exam ple – are found in one e x tra o rd in ary and h arm o niou s synthesis. (O hsaw a 1973: 7) For O hsaw a, th is In ’yology, w hich he b elieves “ w as inv en ted by the ancient C hin ese em p ero rs,” is none other th a n th e law o f th e tw o com p lem en tary forces o f y in (expansion, fem ale, cold, sw eet, etc.) and yang (co ntraction , m ale, hot, salty, etc.) (O hsaw a 1973: 10). Y in and yang featu re prom inently in his “Twelve T heorem s o f the U nique P rincip le,” w here th ey are intro d u ced as “th e tw o poles o f th e in fin ite p u re expansion” com posing all thin gs, and occupying “th e sixth heaven” w ith in the in fin ite O neness and the order o f universe (O hsaw a 1973: 113; K otzsch 1985: 154-5).

90

Carriers o j globalization

M acrobiotics is p resen ted by O hsaw a as “the biological and physiological application” o f the ancient w isdom , and as a p ractical d iscipline p rov idin g “the stru ctu ra l basis for health and h ap p in ess” (O hsaw a 1965: i x , 1).Since th e “U nique P rin cip le” (m usō genri 無 双 原 理 ) governs th e entire cosm os, good h ealth depends u p on a good balance o f the tw o com plem entary poles in o n e’s w ay o f eating. In the m acrobiotic table, y in and yang foods are listed , w ith th e general p rescrip tio n to use only cereals as the basis for a diet, and to supplem ent them m ain ly w ith vegetables (O hsaw a 1965: 39). T hese d ie tary law s, adds O hsaw a in his Zen M acrobiotics , are p arad ig m atically em b odied in the stan d ard diet fol­ low ed by m onks in Z en B u ddhism along th e ir p ath o f self-lib eratio n (O hsaw a 1965: 18). In th is respect, alth oug h it has b een o p portu nely n o ted th a t O hsaw a’s reference to Z en is largely in stru m en tal, and rep resen ts “a conscious ploy to capitalize on the Z en fashion th en cu rren t in A m erica” (K otzsch 1985: 133, 154), he also considered B u ddhism an exp ressio n o f the sam e u n d erly in g oriental philosophy, and as “the m ore advanced b ran ch ” o f religion from the p o in t of view o f d ie tary ru les (O hsaw a 1965: x, 22, 34, 95). A ccording to O hsaw a, by fol­ low ing th is w isdom o f the E ast not only a healthy condition can b e achieved but also the valu es o f peace, freedom , ju stic e , and h ap piness th a t w ere ch aracteristic o f the ancient o riental civ ilizatio n (O hsaw a 1965: ix, 1 -2). T hus, the m acrobiotic diet also has for O hsaw a a so teriolo gical sig nificance. It is a w ay to reestab lish th e rig ht balance in th e cosm os and to en su re th a t hum an b ein gs can live in harm ony w ith the U nique P rinciple, w hich is in u ltim ate analysis “th e key to the K ingdom o f H eaven” (O hsaw a 1965: 38). A ccom panying the in teg ratio n o f ying-yang th e o ry m ediated by N eoC o nfucianism , we fin d in O hsaw a’s tho ug ht the ty p ical Japanese em phasis on th e trad itio n al value o f g ratitu d e or obligation (on 恩) . In p articu lar, he lin k s th is C o n fu cian (and B uddhist) idea to th e seventh condition o f h ealth , “the m ood o f ju stic e ,” w here obligation is no less th a n liv in g in accordance w ith th e n atu ral order: A ll vegetables and anim als re tu rn te n th o u san d m ore th a n th ey receive. O ne g rain is given to th e ea rth ; th e e a rth gives back te n th o u san d grain s. O ne silkw orm fed by m an gives h u nd red s o f th o u san d s o f eggs plus te n tho usan d yards of silk y arn. Som e fem ale fish give b illio n s o f eggs. Such is th e n atu ral biological law. (O hsaw a 1965: 19-20) T hus th e concept o f obligation, far fro m b ein g th e m ere “discharge o f debt,” extends from g ratitu d e to w ard on e’s ow n p aren ts to o th er people and, ultim ately, to the en tire cosm os as “the absolute jo y o f life ” (O hsaw a 1965: 20). O hsaw a’s last years w ere ch aracterized b y a strong activ ism to sp read the teach in g s o f M acrobiotics. H e trav eled extensively in In dia, A frica, and E urope, w here h is activ ities w ere b ased in P aris, bu t also a ttracted th e in terest o f in tel­ lectu als in o th er co u ntries such as B elgium , G erm any, and Sw eden. In 1959, he v isited for the firs t tim e the U nited S tates, w here som e of h is disciples had

Carriers o f globalization

91

already settled. H ere he gave a series o f lectu res and w rote an in tro d u ctio n to M acrobiotics in E nglish, later published as Zen M acrobiotics (K otzsch 1985: 132). Two o f O hsaw a’s disciples, H erm an A ih ara (A ihara N obuo 相 原 信 雄 , 1920-1998) and K ushi M ichio 久 司 道 夫 （ b . 1926), w ere p articu la rly in stru m e n ­ ta l in estab lish in g a large com m un ity o f p ractitio n ers in th e U nited S tates. A ihara, w ho reach ed N ew Y ork in th e early 1950s, centered his activities on the W est C oast, soon a ttractin g the in terest o f the hippie m ovem ent. H ere he firs t estab ­ lish ed w ith o th er collab orators the O hsaw a F oundation, and later on the G eorge O hsaw a M acrobiotic F oundation, focusing on a w ide range o f activities including the pu blication o f books and m ag azines on M acrobiotics (K otzsch 1985: 168-9). A ctivities on the E ast C oast w ere b ased in B oston, w here K ushi founded, w ith the help o f his w ife, A veline, and other close collaborators, th e E ast W est F oundation and the K ushi F oundation. K ushi has stron gly co n trib u ted to th e sy stem atizatio n o f M acrobiotics and its grow ing po pu larity, exten ding its application to new areas such as m editation, the sp iritu al w orld, acupu ncture, and N ew A ge them es, and adap ting the diet to the need s o f an in tern atio n al audience (K otzsch 1985: 171-2). H is reliance on O hsaw a’s basic teach in g s and com m itm ent to th e ir un d erly in g religious prin cipies are exem plified b y th is p resen tatio n offered to “M ichio K ushi & M acrobiotics” on the official w ebsite o f th e K ushi In stitu te o f Japan, o f w hich K ushi h im self serves as president: T he basic w ay o f th in k in g o f m acrobiotics is v ery sim ple. T hey m ain ly eat un po lish ed cereals in th e local place w here th ey live in th e tim e. T hey take in a natu ral blessin g w ithout doing pro cessing and the refin em en t w ith being n atu ral. T hey practice a p lain and n atu ral m eal m ethod m ak ing a m odel of Japanese trad itio n food, and it is a w ay o f th in k in g to m ain tain th e health of m in d and body. In addition, w e apply O rien t th o u g h t to a m eal to assum e th at a hum an bo dy consists o f th e en erg y balance o f Y ing and Yang, and th ere is a th e o ry to fix th e balan ce o f Y in and Yang b y food in th e core o f m acrobiot­ ics. H ow ever, K ushi M acrobiotics, w hich M ichio K ushi proposes for the first tim e, is not only a sim ple m eal law. It is th e u n iv ersal w ay o f life for the hu m an race to be n ecessary w hen it develops biologically, psychologically, and m entally. It saves people from th e ir extin ctio n, and th ey are to accom ­ p lish fu rth e r developm ent. (K ushi In stitu te o f Japan 2006) A part fro m th e claim th a t M acrobiotics is p resen ted here for the firs t tim e, we fin d in th is passage all the m ain them es o f O hsaw a’s thought, including th e em pha­ sis on the role of th is “u niv ersal w ay o f life” for the salvation of hum ankind. T hese fu n d am en tal topics fin d th e ir classical exposition in The B ook o f M acrobiotics, a com pilation o f K u sh i’s teach in g s firs t p u blish ed in 1977 th a t has becom e the m ost authoritativ e guide to M acrobiotics at the in tern atio n al level (K otzsch 1985: 176-7). H ere th e p rincip les o f y in and yang are presen ted in a ty p ical fashion as “the etern al forces and tendencies governing all phenom ena, visible and invisible,

92

Carriers o f globalization

individual and group, part and w hole, past and fu tu re” (K ushi 1986: 12). In K ushi’s discussio n on th e order o f th e un iverse, th e prin cip les o f y in and yang are illu s­ trated , as in the case o f O hsaw a, th ro u g h th e Twelve L aw s o f C hange o f the In fin ite U niverse, w here th ey fig u re as th e tw o “com plem entary and antagonistic ten d en cies” un d erly in g change (K ushi 1986: 10). Y in and yang are also essen tial in K u sh i’s discussion o f the lo g arith m ic sp iral o f th e un iverse, w hich orig inates fro m In fin ity (variously defin ed as Tai-kyoku , O neness, etc.) and leads to the p rod uction o f life form s th ro u g h th e p o larizatio n o f th e tw o prin cip les (K ushi 1986: 2 9 ff). L in k in g M acrobiotics to th is th eo retical fram ew ork, K ushi not only illu strates yin g and yang foods and th e diet balancin g th ese tw o prin cip les, b u t also in sists on th e idea th a t M acrobiotics is an all-enco m passing w ay o f life w ith im por­ ta n t b eh av ioral im plications. A m ong other religio us elem ents in tersp ersed in K u sh i’s presen tatio n , we fin d here the ch aracteristic N eo -C o n fu cian stress on self-cu ltiv ation , w hose u ltim ate m eanin g is th e h arm o n izatio n o f th e hum an m ind (and body) w ith th e im p erso nal prin cip le o f th e un iv erse (K otzsch 1985: 2 4 0 -2 ). A s K ushi em phasizes, th e achievem ent o f physical and sp iritu a l health depends on a “reo rien tatio n o f th e in d iv id u al,” w hich im plies th e exercise of self-reflectio n upon a v arie ty o f them es, such as “our ow n daily life,” “our daily food and d rin k ,” “our th o u g h t and behavior,” and, significantly, “up on our under­ stan d in g o f th e cosm os” (K ushi 1986: 232). T he trad itio n al value o f g ratitu d e is g reatly em p hasized b y K ushi and p re ­ sented as an ind ispen sable com ponent along the path o f M acrobiotics. For him , “u n less a deep g ratitu d e perm eates our w hole life w e are not tru ly healthy and w hole” (K ushi 1986: 163). N ot unexpectedly, th e sta rtin g p o in t for the p ractice o f g ratitu d e is filia l piety, as in th is passage w ith in his discussion o f “T he W ay o f L ife for H u m an ity ”: R esp ect for p aren ts is th e fo un dation o f every hum an cultu re and civ iliz a­ tion. N o one w ho resp ects and loves his or her p aren ts can su b stan tially dep art from harm o nio us perso n al beh avio r and social relation s . . . P arents love and care for th e ir child ren unconditionally. Sim ilarly, children, w hen th ey grow up, should resp ect and care for th e ir p aren ts unconditionally. It is a n atu ral, u n iv ersal prin cip le o f hum an conduct. I f we do not practice p are n ­ tal love, how ever g reat w e are in fam e, po sition, property, and social in flu ­ ence, w e are w orthless in th e eyes o f th e O rd er o f th e U niverse. (K ushi 1986: 135) H ere, K u sh i’s adherence to the trad itio n al w orldview th a t perm eates Japanese relig io sity is clear. It is only n atu ral, therefore, th a t he lin k s g ratitu d e for the liv in g to th a t fo r d ep arted souls: T h ro u g h respect for our paren ts, w e le arn about our ancesto rs … W e should set a tim e every m o rn ing an d /o r evening, if possible, to exten d our prayers to them , to rep o rt w hat we are doing and to w ish sp iritu al happiness to our

Carriers o f globalization

93

ancestors, togeth er w ith our ded icatio n o f en dless g ratitu d e to th em for the h ard sh ip s and d ifficu lties th ey endured. I f daily prayers are not p ractical, th en every m onth or at least every year, a reg u lar date should be selected to p ray on th e ir behalf. W e m ay offer special m eals on such occasions, and such m eals should not co ntain anim al q u ality food. (K ushi 1986: 136-7) K u sh i’s in sisten ce on th ese trad itio n al Japanese religious th em es has also b een observed by R onald K otzsch, w ho rep o rts th a t th is M acrobiotics teach er “often counsels th e use o f a sm all hom e sh rin e w here offerings can be m ade, in the tra ­ ditional O rien tal fashion, o f rice, salt and te a, and w here pray ers can be said for the w elfare o f th e d ep arted ” (K otzsch 1985: 240). It is easy to see here th e incor­ p o ratio n in M acrobiotics o f th e v ery trad itio n al Japanese religious p ractice of v en eratin g the ancestors in hom e altars (butsudan 仏 壇 ), in front o f w hich prayers, food offerings, and m em orial rites are u su a lly p erfo rm ed. It m ay also be observed th a t th is th em e is accom panied in K u sh i’s tho ug ht by ideas about k arm a and reb irth afte r a tem p o rary re tu rn to th e sp iritu al realm (K ushi 1986: 257– 64). A s in th e case o f O hsaw a, K ushi applies th e idea o f g ratitu d e beyond th e fam ily circle to em brace the entire un iverse. T his aspect is clearly illu strate d b y K ushi in th is passage: R espect for ancestors, how ever, should not be lim ited to only several genera­ tions or even several hundred generations back. R espect for fam ily and tra d i­ tio n should not be lim ited to only direct forebears and descendants or the p articu lar culture, civilization, or religion in w hich we grew up. W hether we are C hinese, Jew ish, or Scandinavian, our respect for ancestors and the past should go back far beyond the b eg inn ing o f w ritten history. It should extend back to th e com m on ancestors o f all hum ankind, all races, all ethnic back­ grounds, and eventually reach our com m on origin: nature, earth, th e universe, and one in fin ity or G od. R espect for ancestors and parents is inseparable from respect for the O rder o f the U niverse, the source and origin of all life. (K ushi 1986: 137– 8) B esides th ese religious them es, the abovem entioned em phasis p laced b y K ushi on the role o f M acrobiotics for the u ltim ate salvation o f th e w orld is also notew or­ thy. For him , as for O hsaw a, the problem s th a t a fflic t m odern society can be solved th ro u g h a so rt o f regen eratio n b ased on M acrobiotics, w hich w ill fin ally lead to a new era, a new “age o f lig h t” th a t has b een p rep ared by v arious religious fig u re s includ ing the B uddha and C on fu ciu s (K ushi 1986: 58). S um m arizing, it m ay be easily seen how the d iffu sio n o f th e M acrobiotics m ovem ent outside Japan has b een accom panied by th e circu latio n o f distinctive religious them es m ain ly derived fro m Japanese C on fu cianism , but also to a lesser degree from o ther sources such as B uddhism . T h ro u g h th e w ork o f K ushi, other d irect disciples o f O hsaw a, and th e ir follow ers, the M acrobiotics m ovem ent has becom e an in tern atio n al force w ith centers not only in N o rth A m erica and

94

Carriers o f globalization

E urope but also in B razil, U ruguay, A ustralia, and elsew here (K otzsch 1985: 219–33). T he K ushi In stitu te claim s th at about tw o m illio n people in the U nited S tates are p resen tly involved in th e practice o f M acrobiotics. O verestim ated th o ugh th ese fig u re s m igh t be, th ey speak nonetheless o f the m ean in g fu l role played by th is m ovem ent in th e w orldw ide tran sm issio n o f Japanese religious elem ents for a global audience.

Funding academic work in the ‘W est' A nother distinctive w ay th ro u g h w hich co ntem p o rary Japanese religions are exercising th e ir in flu en ce over other cu ltures and actin g as carriers o f g lob aliza­ tio n is the estab lishm en t o f o rg anizatio ns or foun datio ns th a t p erfo rm or provide fin an cial sup po rt to a w ide range o f activ ities. M any o f th ese are engaged in social w ork and relief activ ities in Japan and overseas, w hich w ill be d iscussed in th e last chapter o f th is book. O th ers te n d to focus on p u b lish in g and fu n d in g academ ic w ork at th e in tern atio n al level. Perhaps th e m ost renow ned o f th ese found ation s is the b u k k y ō D endō Kyōkai 仏 教 伝 道 協 会 (S ociety for th e P rom otion o f B uddhism ), w hich w as fo unded in 1965 by N um ata Y ehan [ E h a n ] 沼 田 惠 範 (1897– 1994), a m em ber o f a Jō do S hinshū 浄 土 真 宗 tem p le-fam ily (and h im self a priest) and creato r o f the M itutoyo [M itsutoyo] C orporatio n. A lth ou gh the B u k k y ō D en dō K yōk ai p resents itse lf as a n o n -sectarian organizatio n, it is still noto rio usly v ery close to the H onganji 本 願 寺 b ran ch o f Jōdo S hinshū b ased in K yoto w ith w hich N um ata w as affiliated , w hose lead ers and top in tellectu als have v ery often occupied key positio ns w ith in the organization. T he B u k k y ō D en dō Kyōkai states th a t its m ain objectives are the p rom otion of “a m od ern u n d erstan d in g o f th e B ud dh ist sp irit” (B ukky ō seishin no gendaiteki rikai 仏 教 精 神 の 現 代 的 理 解 ), “th e exchange am ong B u dd hists liv in g in Japan and overseas” (naigai B ukkyotō -kan no k ō ry ū 内 外 仏 教 徒 間 の 交 流 ), and “the rea liza tio n o f a p eacefu l w orld so ciety ” (jin ru i heiwa shakai no jitsu g en 人 類 平 罕 ロ 社 会 の 実 現 ) . T hese aim s are b eing p u rsu ed in a v arie ty o f w ays, am ong w hich the d istrib u tio n o f The Teaching o f Buddha (Bukky ō seiten 仏 教 聖 典 ), and fin an cial supp ort for academ ic activities such as th e tran slatio n and p ub licatio n o f the Japanese ed itio n o f th e C h inese B u ddh ist C anon (Taish ō shinsh ū daiz ō ky ō 大 正 新 薈 大 蔵 経 ), scholarships, an d chairs in B u dd hist studies (B u k k y ō D end ō Kyōkai 2009a). The Teaching o f Buddha is a collectio n o f basic B u dd hist scrip tu res th a t has b een tran slate d into dozens o f lang uag es and d istrib u ted w ithou t charge w orld­ w ide in m illio n s o f copies esp ecially in hotels and public facilities (B u k k y ō D endō Kyōkai 2009b). T he E nglish tran slatio n o f the B uddhist C anon w ith its one h u nd red volum es is a huge p roject sta rted in 1982. It is cu rren tly in th e firs t stage, w hich involves th e tran slatio n o f 139 w orks by differen t team s o f B uddhologists in m ajor academ ic in stitu tio n s w orldw ide u n d er th e sponsorship o f the B u k k y ō D end ō Kyōkai. A cadem ic w ork is also fu n d ed by th e o rg an izatio n th ro u g h the B u k k y ō D en dō Kyōkai Fellow ship, and, m ost notably, th ro u g h the N um ata P rogram in B u ddh ist S tudies. T he la tte r p roject w as sta rted in 1984, and directly

Carriers o f globalization

95

fu n d s not only v isitin g professorships but also a N um ata C h air in B ud dhist S tudies at fifte e n m ajor u n iv ersities in N o rth A m erica and E urope, including H arv ard and O x ford.2 It is apparent th a t th e p resence o f a B udd hist o rg anization such the B u k k y ō D endō Kyōk ai w ith in academ ic in stitu tio n s outside Japan m ay be seen at least in tw o w ays. For the N um ata C h air holders, it ce rtain ly provides im p o rtan t, an d even v ital, su pp ort to activities th a t should be in any case an in te ­ gral p art o f the educational offerings o f a top u niversity. For the B u k k y ō D end ō Kyōkai, on th e other hand, it is a w ay to “encourage m ore young people to study B u ddhism in a u n iv ersity settin g ,” w hich is th e p recon ditio n for “th e creation o f a p eacefu l w orld society b ased on B u ddh ism ” (B u k k y ō D en dō Kyōkai 2009d). In other w ords, it provides th e o p p o rtu n ity to exercise a sort o f soft pow er over fu tu re g eneratio ns o f scholars, in th e hope th a t the sp iritu al in flu en ce o f B uddhism m ay po sitively su ppo rt th e ir w ork for a b e tte r society. N eedless to say, th ese tw o view p o in ts m ight not n ecessarily coexist at any tim e w ith ou t som e frictio n , esp e­ cially if one accepts th a t th e academ ic stu dy o f B uddhism should be strictly v alue-free. W h at is m ost relevant to our discussion, how ever, is th a t th ro u g h the N um ata P rog ram an d o ther activ ities th e B u k k y ō D en dō Kyōkai has b ee n effec­ tiv e in p laying on the genuine in terest in Japanese B uddhism am ong the in te rn a­ tio n al academ ia and rein fo rcin g th e p resence and im p o rtan ce o f Japanese religious elem ents in global cu ltu ral flow s. A nother organ izatio n estab lish ed b y the new religious m ovem ent S hinnyoen 真 如 苑 ，the S h inn yo-en F oundation, sta rted a sim ilar p ro gram to fu n d academ ic activities in th e U nited S tates in 1994. S hinnyoen is a m ovem ent strong ly roo ted in Shingon B uddhism , w ith in w hich th e fou nder lt ō S hinjō 伊 藤 真 乗 (1906– 1989) reached th e stage o f dai-ajari 大 阿 闍 梨 (g reat m aster). W hile in co rp o ratin g eso teric p ractices such as the saitō gom a 斉 燈 護 摩 , the fire ritual, the m ain focus o f th is new religious m ovem ent is on sesshin 接 心 , a so rt o f spir­ itu al gu idance th ro u g h m edium s. T he S h innyo-en F oundation states th a t its m is­ sion is “to b rin g fo rth d eep er com passion am ong h u m ankind, to prom ote g reater harm ony, and to n u rtu re fu tu re generations tow ard b uilding m ore caring com m u­ n ities” (S h in n y o -en F o undation 2009), and p ursues th is objective th ro u g h the aw arding of grants, fellow ships, and the sponsoring o f v isitin g professorships and u n iv ersity chairs. T h ro u g h th e Six B illion P aths to Peace in itiative, for exam ple, u n d erg rad u ate and g rad u ate stu dents on N o rth A m erican cam puses receive year­ long stipends to im plem ent p eace-b u ild in g p ro jects (S hinn yo -en F oundation 2010). A m ong o ther in itiativ es, we fin d sup port for academ ic research provided th ro u g h the Shinjo Ito P o stdo ctoral Fellow ships in Japanese B u ddhism and in B u ddh ist S tudies at th e U n iversity o f C alifo rn ia B erkeley, and th ro u g h the Shinjo Ito D istin g u ish ed C h air in Japanese B uddhism at the sam e u n iv ersity (S hinny o-en F oundation 2011). In addition, an oth er new relig iou s m ovem ent w ith a strong back g ro u n d in esoteric B uddhism , A gonshū ??可 含宗 ，,h as b een engaged in such activities, esp ecially by supp o rtin g the K iriy am a C h air for P acific R im Studies at th e U n iversity o f San F rancisco, as w ell as th e School o f O rien tal and A frican Studies (SO A S) at the U niversity o f L ondon thro u g h g ran ts and scholarships. The foun der o f th is new religious m ovem ent, K iriy am a Seiyū 桐 山 靖 雄 (b . 1921),

96

Carriers o f globalization

also received an h o n o rary fellow ship from th e la tte r u n iv e rsity in 2003 (A gonshū 1995, 2002; C enter for th e P acific R im 2011; School o f O riental and A frican S tudies 2011). A n effo rt to sup po rt academ ic w ork overseas th a t is com parable to th a t o f the B u k k y ō D en dō K yōk ai is p erh aps th a t o f the aforem entioned S h in tō K okusai G akk ai 神 道 国 際 字 会 (In tern atio n al S hinto F oundation), a b o dy th a t is also rec­ og nized as a n on-governm ental organ izatio n (N G O ) by th e U nited N ations. G iven the hig h ly controversial n atu re o f th is topic, I w ould rem in d the read er th at w hat follow s is not a critique o f the S hinto K okusai G ak kai as such, but rath er an assessm ent o f its stru ctu ra l sign ifican ce w ith in th e context o f global cu ltu ral flow s – the th em e o f th is chapter. A s stated on its official w ebsite, th is o rg an iza­ tio n w as sta rted in 1994 “to prom ote the academ ic and cu ltu ral stud y o f Shinto and to d eep en u n d erstan d in g o f S hinto in te rn atio n a lly ” (In tern atio n al Shinto F ou nd ation 2009a). O th er in fo rm atio n p ro v id ed here helps co n tex tu alize its presence in the in tern atio n al scenario: T he Intern ational Shinto F oundation w as founded in response to a p ercep tion th at Shinto is w idely m isun dersto od w ith in Japan and overseas. Shinto is still w idely regarded as the source o f th e loathsom e ideology th at drove Japan to w ar in the m iddle o f the last century. In A sia, Shinto is still seen uniquely as the sp iritu al prop for Japanese m ilitarism , w hile, in W estern countries, it has u n til recently b een regarded as u nw orthy of serious academ ic treatm ent. (In tern atio n al S hinto F oundation 2009a) T he sam e concept is rea ffirm ed b y U m eda Y oshim i 梅 田 善 美 (1933– 2 0 1 0 , the late director general of the Shinto K okusai G akkai, w ith reference to the dynam ics o f co n tem p orary society. In a w orld th a t is “stead ily becom ing glo ­ b alized ,” he affirm s, Japan m ust “open th e door to its secluded regio ns,” and give access the in tern atio n al com m un ity to w hat lies “beyond the w all o f State Shinto.” A ccording to U m eda, th is serves for the “ in tern atio n alizatio n o f Japan” and the “aw areness o f Japan in the w orld” (U m eda 2 0 0 9 :1 ). In order to pu rsu e th ese goals, th e S h intō K okusai G ak k ai prom otes activities such as lectu res, conferences, pu blication o f books, religio us and cu ltu ral events outside Japan, and an A nn ual S hinto E ssay C om petition. S im ilarly to the B u k k y ō D end ō Kyōkai, the S hinto K okusai G akk ai h as also b een sponsoring, since 1997, th e estab lishm en t o f u n iv e rsity chairs fo cusing on “ S hinto as the core o f Japanese cu ltu ral v alu es” in v ario u s coun tries. T he firs t o f th ese w as endow ed at the U niv ersity o f C alifo rn ia, S anta B arb ara, and has b een follow ed by others at Z hejiang U niversity, the aforem entioned L ondon U n iversity School o f O riental and A fric an S tudies, and C olum bia U niv ersity (In tern atio n al S hinto F oundation 2009b). T he la tte r ch air is fu n d ed th ro u g h the Toshu F ukam i P rofessorship, nam ed for F ukam i T ōshū 深 見 東 州 （ b . 1951), th e cu rren t p resident o f the Shinto K okusai G ak k ai and controversial lead er o f th e S hin to-based new religious m ovem ent W orldm ate (W ārudom eito ワー ノレドメイト).3 T h ro u g h th ese academ ic activities, and the collabo ratio n o f w ell-know n scholars o f Japanese religions, the

Carriers o f globalization

97

foundation has been able to enhance to some extent the visibility of Shinto at the international level. As is clear from the discussion above, in the Shinto Kokusai Gakkai’s intentions, information provided to the international public should pref­ erably focus on Shinto as “the core of Japanese cultural values,” and emphasize aspects that are not related to State Shinto. It is obviously very difficult to verify to what extent this agenda has been successful. In principle, as suggested above in the case of the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai, it is always possible that some conflict with the secular interests of an academic endeavor may arise. That this may also happen in practice has been suggested by Klaus Antoni, according to whom some academic research on Shinto published by members of the Shinto Kokusai Gakkai may correspond “to the aims of this foundation to free the image of Shinto from all political contamination.” 4 Be it as it may, this issue tells us some­ thing else about cultural flows, namely, that globalization is also a history of omissions. Within global dynamics, cultural and religious elements do not simply cross borders, glocalize, and hybridize, but also undergo preemptive processes of selection before (and after) being entered in these flows, and are thus potentially eligible to contribute to the agendas of global players interested in strengthening their prestige and cultural power.

7

Border negotiation in global society (I) Religion and politics

Taken as a whole, modern society may be conceived as a system within which various subsystems or spheres of social life perform different and complemen­ tary functions. Among these, perhaps the most apparent are those related to the production of goods and scientific knowledge, decision-making, and teaching. In my working definition of religion illustrated in Chapter One, religion is counted as one of these spheres, whose function is to control access to a broad variety of goods, which are not necessarily otherworldly and related to salvation or equiva­ lent concepts, but may also have to do with worldly issues such as health, happi­ ness, and power. It is assumed here that what mainly distinguishes religion from other spheres of social life such as the economy, science, politics, and education is the fact that religion locates its source of legitimation in the authority of some super-empirical agency that lies beyond the intersubjectively observable phe­ nomena. This discussion hints at what is generally referred to in the contemporary scholarly debate as secularization. I employ the term secularization here descrip­ tively, without any reference to an imagined ‘golden age’ when religion embraced everything and regulated all aspects of social life. And, since religion in many respects is an active force involved in a variety of social dynamics, as it has emerged in the previous chapters, there is neither the evidence nor the need to postulate its irreversible decline worldwide, although it may be seen that the reli­ gious sphere hardly occupies a dominant position in many societies. In this regard, it may be noticed how the idea that secularization does not nec­ essarily imply the total demise of religion, the extreme position that has been criticized by various scholars, was already acknowledged by major seculariza­ tion theorists. In an overview of the debate, Olivier Tschannen has illustrated how the element playing a central role at the paradigmatic level in secularization theories is instead functional differentiation. Tschannen observes that the idea of differentiation, which was already present in Emile Durkheim’s work, was made more explicit by Talcott Parsons, though w ithin the framework of his evolu­ tionary view of human history, and is found in the work of Bryan Wilson, Thomas Luckmann, Robert Bellah, Peter Berger, David M artin, and Richard Fenn (Tschannen 1991: 404–5; cf. Dobbelaere 1981: 17–20). Moreover, the role of functional differentiation is prominent in the work on social systems by Niklas Luhmann, and in Karel Dobbelaere’s and Jose Casanova’s secularization theory

Border negotiation in global society (I)

99

(cf. Luhmann 1977, 1982; Dobbelaere 1981: 15–22; 2000; Casanova 1994: 20–25; 2007). Thus, in the present context the term secularization refers to the process of functional differentiation through which social subsystems such as politics, the economy, science, and education become more autonomous from religious claims. This does not exclude that at any point processes of de-differentiation or counter-secularization may take place, through which religion tends to become indistinct from other spheres of social life and to legitimate the latter’s activities through the authority of super-empirical agencies. As already suggested above, it is assumed here that functional differentiation implies a loss of authority by religion at the societal level, although this does not necessarily point to the decline of religious institutions or individuals’ religiosity. This point has been emphasized by Mark Chaves, who has advocated religious authority as the object of secularization – thus understood as “the declining scope of religious authority” (Chaves 1994: 750). W ithin this context, Dobbelaere’s contribution is also worth mentioning; he has distinguished three different levels of analysis concerning secularization, namely, societal secularization (macro level, relating to functional differentiation), organizational secularization (meso level), and individual secularization (micro level). Dobbelaere has indicated that secularization at the macro level is not a valid indicator in evaluating the reli­ giousness of individuals, since the motivational structure at the micro level is more complex. His analysis shows that other factors are at work, among which “individualization of decisions, de-traditionalization, mobility, and utilitarian and expressive individualism,” as in the case of the so-called religious bricolage or individual patchwork of religious meanings.1 Along this interpretive line, the persistency of traditional religious institutions and even the growth of new religious movements do not contradict religion’s general loss of authority at the macro level.A secularized society where religion is formally differentiated from the state (with no suppression of or subsidies for specific groups) develops into a de-regulated market that promotes pluralism (Dobbelaere 2004: 239; Chaves and Cann 1992). The implication is that rational choice theory can function only in a secularized society. Here, religions cannot impose their communication anymore but must try to ‘sell’ it in a competitive market (Dobbelaere 2000: 27). This approach also helps explain the exponential growth of new religious movements in Japan concurrently with the presence of highly differentiated social subsystems. Ideas about ongoing secularization have also been discussed and partially adopted by Japanese scholars, such as Ikado Fujio, Morioka Kiyomi, and Ishii Kenji, after Jan Swyngedouw introduced the debate to Japan in the early 1970s.2 On the other hand, objections such as those of Yanagawa Keiichi, who claimed that secularization theory (as formu­ lated by Wilson and Luckmann) does not apply to the emergence of the Kōmeitō Party from Sōka Gakkai 倉 価 学 会 , and the increasing influence of Shinto 神 道 in the political sphere (Yanagawa and Reid 1979) tend to miss the point, since both religious phenomena may be interpreted as reactions to func­ tional differentiation in the Japanese context and to the marginalization of the religious subsystem.

100

Border negotiation in global society (I)

We may ask, then, what the link between functional differentiation and globali­ zation is. One useful characterization has been provided in this regard by Peter Beyer, who affirm s that the discussion on secularization may be applied to the global context, where functional differentiation is one of the driving forces.3 This is because, he writes, global society can be seen as the “global extension of com­ munication based prim arily but not exclusively on a set of independent but also interdependent technical, instrumental, or functional societal systems” (Beyer 2000: 82). We may observe that the phase of accelerated globalization character­ izing the present historical period and the increasing reflexive awareness of liv­ ing in a single place are the direct consequence of the development of the markets, and new systems of communication and information. All this indicates that the scope of social subsystems such as the economy, science and its technological applications, and politics – especially through the formation of transnational organizations – has become global. Concurrently, ideas such as the separation of state and religion, public secular education, and healing as the mission of modern medicine have increasingly found their way within the flow of cultural inputs that characterize global communication. On the other hand, it should also be acknowledged that the presence of functional differentiation in different world societies does not necessarily follow contact with centers of globalization located in Europe and North America. The example of Edo-period Japan presented in Chapter One shows processes of functional differentiation at work well before extensive contact with the western powers occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century. Rather than expanding from the center to the periphery of world society, then, functional differentiation should be better understood as a polycentric phenomenon. Religion plays a part as a distinct social subsystem in global society, but is often at disadvantage, because many priority functions do not find legitimation in religious authority. Thus, it is assumed here that religion in Japan, as in other cultural areas, often competes with the dominant subsystems in an attempt to reposition itself at the systemic level. Some of the distinctive ways through which Japanese religions negotiate borders with global subsystems such as politics, education, and science (type 13) will be explored in the following section and in the next chapter. In this case, also, my aim is not to give a comprehensive overview of religion in contem­ porary Japan (in relation to politics, education, and science) but to highlight the global relevance of such border negotiations by analyzing a few selected case studies.

Japanese religions and politics The borders between the religious and political subsystems in Japan are formally set up by the post-war Constitution (N ihonkoku kenp ō 日 本 国 憲 法 ),w hich was practically imposed by the occupying American army upon the Japanese gov­ ernment, and massively introduced into Japanese social life the principles of western democracy. This new course was anticipated by the 1945 Shintō Directive (Shintō shirei 神 道 指 令 ), whose purpose was “to separate religion from the state,

Border negotiation in global society ( I ) 101 to prevent misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faiths, and creeds upon exactly the same basis.” State sponsorship of Shinto, the expenditure of public funds for Shinto shrines, and the propagation of ultra-nationalist war­ time ideology by Shinto, other Japanese religions, and public educational institu­ tions were then outlawed by the American occupying forces (Hardacre 1989: 167– 9). As the text of the Shinto Directive states, these measures were enforced In order to free the Japanese people from direct or indirect compulsion to believe or profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by the state, and In order to lift from the Japanese people the burden of compulsory financial support of an ideology which has contributed to their war guilt, defeat, suf­ fering, privation, and present deplorable condition, and In order to prevent recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into m ilitaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda designed to delude the Japanese people and lead them into wars of aggression, and In order to assist the Japanese people in a rededication of their national life to building a new Japan based upon ideals of perpetual peace and democracy. (Hardacre 1989: 167) Besides enshrining the principle of pacifism (Article 9) and the idea of human rights (especially Articles 10– 40 and Article 97), the new Japanese Constitution enforced in 1947 crystallizes the ‘humanization’ of the emperor, revered until the end of the war as “sacred and inviolable” (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2004a, 2004b), and specifically addresses the issue of the separation of state and religion especially in Articles 20 and 89. Article 20 states that Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. (2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, cele­ bration, rite or practice (shūkyōj ō no kō i, shakuten, g ishiki m ata wa g yōd ji 宗 教 上 の 行 為 , 丨兄?典 , 僮 式 又 行 事 ) .(3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity (shūk y ō kyōiku sono hoka ikanaru shūkyōteki katsudō 宗 教 教 育 そ の 他 い か な る 宗 教 的 活 動 ). (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2004c, 2004d) The same principle is expressed in a different way in Article 89, which states that No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association (shūkyōj ō no soshiki m oshiku wa dantai 宗 教 上 の 組 織 若 し く は 団 体 ), or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority. (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2004c, 2004d)

102

Border negotiation in global society (I)

In this way, freedom of religion (shinkyō no jiy ū 信 教 の 自 由 ）(was guaranteed, especially through Sections 1 and 2 of Article 20, which would open the way to the religious revival in post-war Japan and the emergence of a multitude of new religious movements. On the other hand, Section 3 of Article 20 and Article 89 especially focus on the secularity of the state, which is explicitly forbidden to engage in any religious activities (shūkyōteki katsud ō). In the intention of the drafters of the Japanese Constitution, this would definitively cut away the grounds for a return to State Shinto. Soon after, however, conservative sections of Japanese society were already at work on a return to the very principles of State Shinto. The Nihon Izokukai 日 本 退 族 会 (Japanese Association of [War] Bereaved Families), other right-wing groups and politicians, and religious organ­ izations such as the Jinja Honchō 神社本ノ丁???(Association of Shinto Shrines) and the new religious movement Seichō no Ie 生 長 の 豕 were actively involved in this new wave of nationalism, one of whose top priorities was the reinstitution of state support for the Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja 靖 国 神 社 ) in T ōkyō, which had been registered as a religious body through the Religious Corporations Law (Shūkyō hōjinhō 宗 教 法 人 法 ).4 This shrine, where the war dead were enshrined and deified until the end of the war, was central to the rhetoric of State Shinto militarism, and had thus a symbolic significance for the revival of wartime ideology. This campaign culminated in the presentation by the Liberal Democratic Party of the Yasukuni Shrine Bill in 1969, which was defeated on five different occasions because of the strong opposition by vast sectors of civil society (cf. Murakami 1980: 132; Hardacre 1989: 145; Tanaka 2002: 83, 88; Nakano 2004: 154). A further attempt to support reactionary politics by the Jinja Honchō and other religious organizations was the formation in 1974 of the Nippon o Mamoru Kai 日 本 を 守 る 会 (Association to Defend Japan), which in 1997 merged with the Nippon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi 日 本 を 守 る 国 民 会 議 (National Association for the Protection of Japan) to form the Nippon Kaigi 日本云議 (Japan Conference). This influential organization, with strong ties to right-wing politicians, has been very active in implementing its ultra-conservative agenda, including the enactment of 1999 legislation restoring the flag and anthem as national symbols, the publication of revisionist history textbooks, and support for constitutional revision and a return to the pre-war values of State Shintō (Nippon Kaigi 2011a). Among the current officers of the Nippon Kaigi, we find Prince Kitashirakawa M ichihisa 北 白 川 追 久 and Tanaka Tsunekiyo 田中恆 清 , respec­ tively, chief executive and president of the Jinja Honchō; the chief priest of Yasukuni Shrine, Kyōgoku Takaharu 京 極 局 晴 ； the former head priest of Tendaishū 天 台 宗 , Watanabe Eshin 渡 邊 惠 進 ; the managing director of Reiyūkai 霊 友 会 , Aiyagi Kazuo 青 梆 和 深 ；and the religious leaders of other new religious movements such as Kurozumikyō 黒 住 教 (Kurozumi Muneharu 黒 住 宗 晴 ), Sūkyō M ahikari 崇 教 真 光 （O ( kada Mitsuo 向 田 光 央 ), and Gedatsukai 解 脱 会 (Okano Seihō 岡 里 聖 法 ）(Nippon Kaigi 2011b). Another influential officer of the Nippon Kaigi is ChōSokabe Nobuaki 長 曽 我 部 延 昭 , chairman of the Shintō Seiji Renmei 神 道 政 治 連 盟 (official translation, “Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership”), the political arm of the Jinja Honchō formed in 1969 allegedly as

Border negotiation in global society (I)

103

a reaction to the tide of materialism and individualism characterizing post-war Japanese society (Shintō Seiji Renmei 2011). Members of the Shintō Seiji Renmei are especially active within the Japanese Diet in pressuring for the implementa­ tion of the following agenda: The creation of a society that has a high regard for the honorable Imperial Household and Japanese traditional culture. The enactment of a prestigious new Constitution based on Japanese history and national character. The establishment of state ceremonies for the eirei 英 霊 (glorious [war] spirits) enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine, who have sacrificed their precious lives for the sake of the country. The establishment of an educational system for the cultivation of new gen­ erations of Japanese who can be spiritually rich and have hope for the future of the country. The establishment of a state that can make a positive contribution to the world, and of an ethical state that can be respected by all nations. (Shintō Seiji Renmei 2011) As John Breen has noted, the Shintō Seiji Renmei has been concerned since its inception with “locating the spirit of Shintō at the foundation of Japanese govern­ ance,” based on the emperor-centered and ethically ultra-conservative under­ standing of Shintō that dominated Japanese society until the end of World War II (Breen 2010b: 75). In particular, he has pointed to the activism of this political wing of Shintō in fields such as the reestablishment of the formal links between the emperor, the sacred regalia (the mirror, the sword, and the jewel), and the goddess Amaterasu, the official reintroduction of imperial era names and national holidays, and on various ethical issues (Breen 2010b: 75– 8). On the other hand, these attempts to weaken the borders between religion and politics promoted by institutional Shintō and other right-wing groups have been challenged not only by progressive sectors of civil society, but also by other reli­ gious organizations. At the time of the presentation of the Yasukuni Shrine Bill, for example, organizations such as the Nihon Kirisutokyō Kyōgikai 日本キリスト 教 協 議 会 (National Christian Council), the Shin-nihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai 新 日 本 宗 癌 :団 体 連 合 会 （Federation of New Religious Organizations of Japan), and, from within the Buddhist world, the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai 全 日 本 仏 敎 云 (Japan Buddhist Federation) and especially Jōdo Shinshū 浄 土 真 宗 expressed criticism (Tanaka 2002: 105, 111). One of the most assertive critics of these politics, the Shin-nihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai, also collected more than three million signatures through a petition circulated nationwide (Hardacre 1989: 146). This opposition to the bill was one of the major factors behind the withdrawal from the federation of more conservative organizations such as Sekai Kyūseikyō 世 界 救 世 教 and Bussho Gonenkai 仏 所 護 念 会 , while Seichō no Ie had already seceded in 1957 in line with its ultra-nationalist agenda (Inoue e t a l . 1994: 567;

104

Border negotiation in global society (I)

Nakano 2004: 154). The Shin-nihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai, which includes large organizations such as Risshō Kōseikai 立 正 佼 成 会 , PL Kyōdan PL 教団 , Myōchikai Kyōdan 妙 智 會 教 団 , and Reiha no Hikari 霊 波 之 光 , still maintains a guarded attitude toward attempts to revive State Shinto ideology. The Shinnihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai was, for example, among the religious groups that strongly opposed the series of official visits to Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni sanpai 靖 国 参 拝 ) made by, then, Prime M inister Koizumi Jun’ichirō since tak­ ing office in 2001, on the grounds that they breached the principles of the separa­ tion of state and religion (seiky ō bunri 政 教 分 離 ） and freedom of religion (shinky ō no jiy ū 信 教 の 自 由 ) found in Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution (Shin-nihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai 2001). Within traditional Japanese Buddhism, perhaps the strongest opposition to ultra-conservative attempts to restore the pre-war ties between the Yasukuni Shrine and the state has been offered by Jōdo Shinshū . Jōdo Shinshū has been one of the fiercest opponents of the Yasukuni Shrine Bill and the visits paid by state officials to the shrine, at the institutional and individual level. The major branches of Jōdo Shinshū united in the Shinshū Kyōdan Rengō 真 宗 教 団 連 合 (Shin Buddhist Federation) see in Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine clear state interference in the activities of the shrine, which is a religious organization honoring the eirei, and a serious threat to freedom of religion, and the separation of religion and politics (Shinshū Kyōdan Rengō 2005). In Jōdo Shinshū ’s opposi­ tion to this wave of nationalism, a defense of Article 20 of the Constitution is typically accompanied and reinforced by important religious themes such as those referring to Shinran’s depreciation of the worship of kam i and the enshrine­ ment of spirits (jin g i fu h a i 神 祇 不 拝 ) . It is also significant that members of the Jōdo Shinshū religious community have been engaged since the 1980s in legal action against state violations of these constitutional principles. In the case of the Ehim e tam agushiry ō 愛 媛 玉 串 料 lawsuit, for instance, which was brought in 1982 to denounce the expenditure of public funds by the Ehime prefecture for ceremonies held at Yasukuni Shrine and the local gokoku jin ja 護 国 神 社 (nationprotecting shrines), the leader of the plaintiffs was the Jōdo Shinshū (Ōtani-ha 大 谷 派 ) priest Anzai Kenjō 安 西 賢 誠 (b . 1946). In another well-known lawsuit, the Fukuoka District Court ruled for the first time in April 2004 on the unconsti­ tutionality of Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, and, in this case, the leader of the plaintiffs was a Jōdo Shinshū (Honganji-ha 本 願 寺 派 ) priest, Gunjima Tsuneaki 郡 島 恒 昭 (b .1929). Still another example is the so-called Asia Lawsuit, which received noticeable coverage by the media and was finally ruled out in 2005 by the Ōsaka High Court, which stated that the prime m inister’s visits to the shrine were to be considered both official acts and religious activities, thus vio­ lating Article 20 of the Constitution. Also in this case, the representative of the plaintiffs was a Jōdo Shinshū (Honganji-ha) priest, Sugawara Ryūken 菅原育???憲 (b .1940), while the secretary of the group was the Jōdo Shinshū (Ōtani-ha) priest and scholar, Hishiki M asaharu 菱 木 政 晴 （ b . 1950) (Dessì 2007: 144-63). As mentioned above, a critical stance toward the Yasukuni problem and official visits to the shrine has also been maintained by the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai, which

Border negotiation in global society (I)

105

has submitted various petitions to the government, in line with the organization’s emphasis on the defense of the principles of freedom of religion and separation of religion and state (Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai 2006, 2007), and by various Christian groups. Another way through which Japanese religions interact and negotiate borders with the political subsystem is their more or less direct participation in the elec­ tion process. As Murakami Shigeyoshi recalls in his overview of religion in Japan in the last century, In 1970, the ties between some powerful religious bodies, on the one hand, and the Liberal Democratic and the Democratic Socialist parties, on the other hand, became even stronger. During elections the powerful religious bodies became a large and reliable pool of voters for political parties. The leaders of religious bodies flaunted their religious authority by specifically telling their believers whom to vote for. Powerful religious bodies – Seichō no Ie, Reiyūkai, Bussho Gonenkai, Jinja Honchō, and Sekai Kyūsei-kyō, and members of the Union of New Religious organizations, such as R isshō Kōseikai, Perfect Liberty, and Myōchikai – all became a prominent base for the Liberal Democratic Party (Sekai Kyūsei-kyō also worked with the Democratic Socialist Party). (Murakami 1980: 165; cf. Nakano 2004: 144–70) This form of collaboration between religion and politics has become customary, and, ever since, party and independent candidates have been overtly supported by various religious organizations at election time. It is obvious that through this mechanism, which is allowed by the Japanese legal system, both parts get some benefits. On the one hand, the political parties have access to a reliable pool of voters. On the other hand, we may assume that the endorsement of candidates by religious organizations is not completely disinterested, and that these politicians, even when they are not members of the religious community, are expected to be somewhat sensitive to religious issues. With the recent shift in Japanese politics and the decline of the Liberal Democratic Party since the national election of 2007, some major religious organizations have also reoriented their support. Among the 119 candidates endorsed by the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai in the Japanese general election held in August 2009, for example, sixty-seven were from the Liberal Democratic Party (thirty-five of whom were elected), while forty-nine were from the Democratic Party of Japan (forty-eight were elected), which would gain a landslide victory. In the same elections, R issh ō K ō seikai supported 214 candidates, 198 of whom were elected mostly from the Democratic Party of Japan (Bukkyō taimusu 2009a). In not a few cases, religious institutions have attempted to get involved in Japanese politics in a more direct way. This is apparent, for instance, in the abovementioned activities of the Shintō Seiji Renmei, which acts as a pressure group within the Japanese Diet. Other cases of political action groups within religious institutions are the Seichō no Ie Seiji Rengō 生 長 の 家 政 治 連 合 (Seichō no Ie Political League), which was formed in 1964 by the homonymous religious

106

Border negotiation in global society (I)

organization and remained active until the early 1980s, the Shinshūren Seiji Rengō

新 宗 連 政 治 連 合 (Shinshūren Political League) formed in 1966 by the Shin-nihon Shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai (Inoue et a l . 1994: 564-5; Nakano 2004: 147– 8), and associations such as the Jōdo Shinshū-related Tsukiji Monshinkai 築 地 聞 真 会 (Honganji-ha), and the Kokkaigiin Dōbō no Kai 国 会 議 員 同 朋 の 会 (Ōtani-ha), which still maintain a significant number of Diet members (Chūgai nippō 2009). One of the ways through which such groups may act as outposts for the nego­ tiation of the borders between politics and religion is suggested by this state­ ment by one of the influential politicians associated with the Tsukiji M onshinkai, the Liberal Democratic Party’s Diet member Tanigawa Shūzen 谷 川 秀 善 : In present-day society dom inated by the economy, the education of the heart is being called into question. I think that religious education is nec­ essary from childhood. There are various ways to look at our founder Shinran’s teachings, and I wish that they could be accepted reverently as a faith transm itted from the ancestors, and be learned by influential Diet members. (Jōdo Shinshū Honganji-ha 2009a) Carried one step further, the political involvement by religious organizations has also found application in the creation of new political parties. One of these exper­ iments, the creation of the Shinritō 真 理 兄 (Supreme Truth Party) and its unsuc­ cessful participation in the 1990 Japanese elections, is sadly famous also because of the responsibility of its mother organization Aum Shinrikyō 才 ウ ム 真 理 教 in a broad range of criminal activities culminating in the terrorist attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995.5 Two other cases especially worthy of interest will be illustrated below. The first is the controversial political involvement of Sōka Gakkai 倉 価 学 会 , the largest new religious movement in Japan. The second case relates to the very recent creation of the political arm of another new religious movement, Kōfuku no Kagaku 幸 福 の 科 学 , and its participation in the general elections since 2009.

Religious leaders and political parties Sōka Gakkai’s progressive involvement in Japanese national politics started in the 1950s when the organization was still the lay arm of Nichiren Shōshū 日 蓮 正宗 , a denomination of traditional Nichiren Buddhism, and went hand in hand with its dramatic growth especially fueled by the aggressive shakubuku 折 伏 campaign. Already in 1955, Sōka Gakkai had about fifty of its members elected in local assemblies, and in the following year, three of its candidates were successful in the House of Councillors election. Further successes in subsequent elections opened the way to the creation in 1962 of the Kōmei Seiji Renmei 公 明 政 治 連 盟 (Clean Government League) within the religious organization, which evolved in 1964 into the Kōmeitō 公 明 兄 (Clean Government Party) on the initiative of Ikeda Daisaku 池 田 大 作 , who had become the third president of Sōka Gakkai

Border negotiation in global society (I)

107

in 1960. The organization’s political successes and its reliance on the idea of ōbutsu-m yōg ō 王 仏 具 合 (the fusion of politics and Buddhism) soon attracted the attention of liberal sectors of civil society. The ōbutsu-m yōg ō principle, which is

rooted in Nichiren Buddhism, especially invited external criticism because of its connection with the establishment of a kokuritsu kaidan 国 立 戒 壇 (national ordination platform), interpreted by the liberal public opinion as an infringement of Article 20 of the Constitution and a step toward a return to a state religion (Inoue et a l . 1994: 565– 6; Nakano 2004: 148– 9, 152, 172–3). This criticism together with the events that occurred in 1969– 1970, when Kōmeitō members were accused of preventing the publication of material critical of Sōka Gakkai (genron shuppan jik en ???論 出 版 事 件 ), led the religious organization to distance itself from the political party. In a resolution adopted in 1970, Sōka Gakkai denied any ambition to get the national ordination platform established through a vote by the Diet, and determined that formal separation from the Kōmeitō should encompass the incompatibility of simultaneous appointments as Diet members and officials within the religious organization (Inoue e t a l. 1994: 566; Nakano 2004: 153, 174). In the meantime, the Kōmeitō had become Japan’s third largest political party, with a centrist agenda focusing on social welfare and pacifism, but also asserting Japan’s right to self-defense and to fully participate in the activities of the United Nations (Murata 1969: 169–70). Critical voices did not cease after the party’s formal separation from Sōka Gakkai and despite its financial autonomy, also because it was clear to many observers that the religious organization continued to exercise a strong influence upon the Kōmeitō. In a 1994 interview with the religious newspaper, Chūgai nipp ō, then Sōka Gakkai president, Akiya Einosuke 秋 谷 栄 之 助 ( b .1930), could not but admit that the religious organization was “routinely consulted” on mat­ ters such as “the input of Sōka Gakkai in the selection of Kōmeitō candidates,” though insisting that “the final decision is made by the Kōmeitō itself” (Kisala 1994: 16). Soon after, the battle regarding the revision of the Religious Corporations Law publicly exposed the strong link between Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō officials. The political debate concerning the revision of the law followed the 1995 Aum Shinrikyō incident, and focused on the need to prevent those cases when religious corporations abuse their legal status. It soon became clear, however, that such changes were also consistent with the strategy of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to limit the influence of Sōka Gakkai, which at that time was supporting the Shinshintō (New Frontier Party), a coalition in which the Kōmeitō had temporarily merged together with other opposition par­ ties. In this connection, the Liberal Democratic Party’s move to summon the charismatic Ikeda to testify before the Diet on the revisions, which provoked a heated and passionate reaction from Shinshintō members, proved very success­ ful in exposing the Shinshintō itself as the unreliable paladin of Sōka Gakkai in public opinion.6 This hidden agenda also emerged from public statements by Liberal Democratic Party officials, putting into question the constitutionality of the Shinshintō’s link with Sōka Gakkai, and by the attempts within the same party to draft a Fundamental Law on Religion, which would have prevented

108

Border negotiation in global society (I)

religious corporations, among other things, to support candidates in the elections (LoBreglio 1997: 40, 46; Kisala 1997: 65; Nakano 2004: 258– 61). These dynamics show how the boundaries between religion and politics in Japan, though formally established, are subjected to continuous tensions. Much of the controversy surrounding Sōka Gakkai’s political involvement revolves around interpretations of the principles of freedom of religion and separation of state and religion found in the Japanese Constitution. One typical argument used by Sōka Gakkai to justify its political activism is that Article 20 of the Constitution “does not forbid political activity on the part of religious organizations or mem­ bers of such organizations.” Such prohibition, it is assumed, would be unconsti­ tutional, because it would discriminate against religion and limit the exercise of religious freedom. According to Sōka Gakkai’s view, religious corporations are allowed “to participate in election campaigns and other political activities” on an equal footing with “labor unions, corporations, agricultural cooperatives and other organizations” (Kisala 1994: 15). On the other hand, Sōka Gakkai also claims that the Kōmeitō “has never introduced legislation or exerted political influence to accord Sōka Gakkai any form of special privilege or status” (Sōka Gakkai 2011; cf. 2009: 57). An analogous approach is offered by the New Kōmeitō that was reestablished in 1998 as an independent party and, after having joined the ruling coalition until 2009, is now one of the opposition parties. In the words of Kanzaki Takenori 神 崎 武 法 （ b . 1943), who served as New Kōmeitō’s presi­ dent until 2006, New Komeito has been, and forever remains committed to, the protection of religious freedom and the principle of separation of church and state as stip­ ulated in Article 20 of the Constitution. I wish to declare once again that New Komeito will not in any way favor, or exclude, any particular religious organization. (Kōmeitō 2010) Thus, the party presents itself as a standard bearer of Article 20, which, consistently with Sōka Gakkai’s view, “was never intended to prohibit a citizen or religious organization from participating in the political process.” Accordingly, Sōka Gakkai’s electoral endorsement of Kōmeitō is equated with the support given to other parties by civil groups, labor unions, companies, and various religious institutions in Japan (Kōmeitō 2010). The New Kōmeitō supports its interpretation with the authority of a constitutional scholar, Hamaya Hidehiro, and the opinions of various state officials. Moreover, the New Kōmeitō claims that this interpretation of the principle of the separation of state and religion has never been overturned in any legal case, included those ruled on by the Supreme Court (Kōmeitō 2010). The fact that these views have gained acceptance among politicians and intel­ lectuals does not prevent the relationship between Sōka Gakkai and the New Kōmeitō from being constantly subject to scrutiny, especially in connection with delicate political conjunctures. A major occasion was the unprecedented

Border negotiation in global society (I)

109

participation by the then Kōmeitō in the ruling coalition in August 1993, when the cabinet led by Hosokawa Morihiro was formed (Nakano 2004: 174–5). This shift in national politics interrupted the post-war continuous rule of the Liberal Democratic Party, which soon promoted the institution of a committee to discuss the relationship between the Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai, and heavyweights among the party’s top officials repeatedly expressed their criticism of any interpretation of Article 20 that would not take into consideration “the interference of religion in politics” (shuky ō no kokka e no kainy ū 宗 教 の 国 家 へ の 介 入 ）(Yomiuri shinbun 1993, 1995). The contrasting and apparently dominant view that Article 20 is meant to address the interference of politics in religion, which had already been officially endorsed by the government in 1970, was reiterated in 1994 by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, and even those critical scholars who had previously opposed Japan’s participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations on constitutional grounds kept a low profile, apparently in order not to take sides in the confrontation between the Liberal Democratic Party and Sōka Gakkai (Nakano 2004: 209; Yomiuri shinbun 1994, 1995). From within the religious world, various groups, including Ōmoto 大 本 and Tenrikyō 天 理 教 ，expressed their concern for the possibility that one specific religion (Sōka Gakkai) might be able to exert control over Japanese politics through its support for the ruling coalition (Yomiuri shinbun 1995). Other reli­ gious organizations reacted more vigorously, and came to the point of comparing the advance of Sōka Gakkai and the Kōmeitō to the rise of totalitarianism in pre­ war Germany and Japan. The head of Jōdoshū 浄 土 宗 , Narita Yūkō 成 田 有 恒 (1921–2008), was apprehensive that “as Sōka Gakkai becomes a kind of worship of Ikeda the nation might head towards fascism.” In a sim ilar vein, a top officer of Reiyūkai 霊 友 会 , Shizuta Nobuyuki 鎮 田 順 行 , expressed his fear that “Sōka Gakkai and the Kōmeitō will increase their power and we’ll end up with Ikeda as our dictator” (Kisala 1994: 11– 12). These views certainly reflected a more gen­ eral concern over the political ambitions of influential religious organizations, which periodically gains prominence in the Japanese public debate. The contro­ versy was also fueled by the 1990 unsuccessful attempt by Aum Shinrikyō to launch the Shinritō, and it is not unlikely that the entire pattern of religion’s involvement in Japanese politics may once again be put under close scrutiny with the recent establishment of Kōfuku no Kagaku’s 幸 福 の 科 学 political party. In September 2008, Ōkawa Ryūhō 大 川 隆 法 gave a lecture at the New York branch of Kōfuku no Kagaku, during which he referred to him self and the scope of the religious organization he had founded more than twenty years before in what may seem rather hyperbolic terms: Happy Science [Kōfuku no Kagaku] is the most powerful and famous reli­ gion in Japan. I needed only 20 years to accomplish this. I was first asked for advice by Prime M inister Nakasone in 1988. Then we had Prime M inister Miyazawa who was a member of Happy Science, and after that, we produced a lot of Prime M inisters and Ministers. So I became one of the most influ­ ential kingmakers of Japan. The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Aso, visited

110

Border negotiation in global society (I) Happy Science recently ... I gave him a strategy to become Japan’s Prime Minister. He learned a lot and became the Prime M inister and came to New York to give a speech at the Assembly of the United Nations. It was based on just what I told him. So I am one of the kingmakers of Japan. I can choose a Japanese Prime M inister and I can have a Prime M inister quit in a month. It’s a hidden secret of Japan … Happy Science is the most influential power in Japan. So, if the American President cannot realize some diplomatic pol­ icy, he can just ask me and I can realize it in a week or so. It’s a hidden secret. In Japan, religion has more power than politics. (Ōkawa 2008: 6–7)

One may suppose that Ōkawa was not completely satisfied by Kōfuku no Kagaku’s alleged soft power over Japanese politics, since few months later he officially announced the establishment of the Kōfuku Jitsugentō 幸ネ???実 現 兄 (Happiness Realization Party), the political arm of the religious organization. In a lecture given in April 2009 at the general headquarters of Kōfuku no Kagaku in Tōkyō, Ōkawa outlined the K ōfu k u Jitsugenō sengen 幸ネ昆実現党旦言, the new party’s Declaration. One month later, the Kōfuku Jitsugentō was formally established with Aeba Jikidō 饗 庭 直 道 （ b . 1967) as party leader, amidst the crisis caused by the North Korean nuclear and missile tests. After Ōkawa’s wife, Kyōko きよつ??? ( b .1965), assumed the office of party leader in June of the same year, the Kōfuku Jitsugentō unsuccessfully filed candidates for the Tōkyō Metropolitan Assembly election, and for the Sendai mayoral election (Kōfuku Jitsugentō 2011a). Through an aggressive electoral campaign centered on economic growth and the danger posed by the North Korean missile program (including a revi­ sion of Article 9 of the Constitution and the possibility of a preemptive strike), 337 candidates filed for the House of Representatives election in August; none was elected (Kōfuku Jitsugentō 2009, 2011a). Earlier in June, major national newspapers had published as a full-page advertisement Ōkawa’s proposal for a new constitution (Shin-N ihonkoku kenpō (Ōkawa R yūhō shian 新 • 日 本 国 憲 法 大 ガ 隆 法 試 案 ) . Here, Ōkawa advocates the establishment of a presidential system and a legitimate system of armed forces. Not only is the principle of freedom of religion (shinkyō no jiy ū) considered here as essential, but Japanese citizens are acknowledged in the preamble as “children of the gods and the buddhas” (kam i no ko, hotoke no ko ???の子 , 仏 の 子 ）（Sankei shinbun 2009). In September 2009, Ōkawa quit his post as party president and another of the frequent turnovers took place at the top of the party, which would get its first seat at the House of Councillors only in May 2010, when Democratic Party of Japan member Ōe Yasuhiro joined the Kōfuku Jitsugentō (Kōfuku Jitsugentō 2011a). In the House of Councillors election held in July 2010, no candidates from the Kōfuku Jitsugentō were elected, and later in December, Ōe withdrew from the party (Asahi shinbun 2010). At present, the party leader is Tsuiki Shūgaku 立 木 秀 手 ( b . 1971), formerly Kōfuku no Kagaku’s senior director, while Ōkawa figures as the party’s honorary president and “spiritual leader” (seishinteki shidōsha 精 神 的 指 導 者 ).

Border negotiation in global society ( I ) 111 In its mission statement, the Kōfuku Jitsugentō presents itself as a “conserva­ tive party” committed to democracy and the “realization of an ideal nation from the standpoint of a religious political party” (shūkyō seitō to shite no ‘risō kokka' no jits u g e n 宗教政党としての「 理 想 国 家 」の 実 現 ) . Among the points illustrated in the party’s policy platform, one finds two other direct references to religion, namely its role “as the backbone of ‘true educational reforms’” (shūkyō o bakkubōn to shita ‘shin naru kyōiku ka ika ku ' 宗教をノベックボーンとした「 真なる

教 育 改 革 」）and the realization of world peace based upon a spirit of “religious tolerance” (shūkyōteki kan'y ō 宗 教 的 寛 容 ).7 The significance of these two points emerges more clearly from the party’s inaugural declaration, which also incorpo­ rates elements of cultural chauvinism. This text assigns to Japan a mission of global leadership based on the country’s status as a major world economic power and its model of “religious conciliation” (shūkyō y ūwa 宗 教 ??虫和 ）w hich can offer a way out from international conflicts and religious violence. In order to justify this claim, an idealized vision of Japanese religious history is presented: Japan boasts a history of mutual coexistence for different religions under a spirit of religious tolerance (shūkyōteki ka n ’y ō), a live-and-let-live philoso­ phy which allows all people to enjoy happiness. The realization of peace at the global level based on this spirit of liberty and tolerance more than any­ thing else constitutes the Mission for Japan as a Great Nation. (Kōfuku Jitsugentō 2011b:1 ;2011c:1) Moreover, it is affirm ed that as a consequence of a “colonial Constitution” (shokum inchi kenp ō 植 民 地 憲 法 ）imposed upon Japan from the outside in the aftermath of World War II, “religion has been excluded from society” (shūkyō ga shakaiteki ni haijo sare 宗 教 が 社 会 的 に 排 除 さ れ ), and the values of material­

ism and atheism have become dominant in politics, education, and family life. Thus, another challenge facing the Kōfuku Jitsugentō is the restoration of tradi­ tional values allowing the distinction between “good and evil,” which may work as an antidote to social ills such as bullying, suicide, and increasing criminality. More specifically, as stated in the party’s policy platform, religion should play a central role in “true educational reforms,” through which “the public education system incorporates universal religious education and moral education” (kōkyōiku ni fuhentekina shūkyō kyōiku ya tokuiku o toriire 公 教 育 に 普 遍 的 な 宗 教 教 育 や

徳育を取り入れ ）(Kōfuku Jitsugentō 2011b:1 ;2011c:1). All these themes are elaborated in the five volumes of the K ōfuku Jitsugentō) sengen authored by Ōkawa, which are presented by the Kōfuku Jitsugentō as the party’s guiding document. In the fourth of these volumes, Ōkawa provides a commentary of his proposal for a new Japanese Constitution, and illustrates in more detail articles concerning religious matters. Here he states that the generic reference to “gods and buddhas” (shinbutsu 神 仏 ) in the Preamble embraces all religions, which are protected through Article 2 (freedom of religion) of the same proposal (Ōkawa 2009b: 28). Contextually, the acknowledgment of Japanese citizens as “children of the gods and the buddhas” is intended to provide the idea

112

Border negotiation in global society (I)

of “human dignity” (ningen no songen 人 間 の 尊 厳 ）w ith solid (religious) foun­ dations, which, Ōkawa argues, are lacking in the present Japanese Constitution (Ōkawa 2009b: 30, 27). This also provides the rationale for the establishment of a “religious state” (shūkyō kokka 宗 教 国 豕 )，compared by Ōkawa to those coun­ tries that are organized under the principles of Islam and Christianity (including the United States) – which would represent a complete denial of M arxist – Leninist materialism (Ōkawa 2009b: 27– 9). Most importantly, it is claimed that this would be the starting point for the realization of “the utopia of a buddhaland” (bukkokudo y ūtopia 仏国土ユートピア ) on Earth, characterized by peace and happiness and destined to embrace the entire world (Ōkawa 2009b: 35– 8). Intrinsically related to these discussions is the issue of the separation of state and religion, which emerges at various points in Ōkawa’s work. According to the founder of Kōfuku no Kagaku, while the incipit of Article 20 of the post-war Constitution unequivocally acknowledges the principle of religious freedom, the rest of it is far from being unproblematic. He claims that the provision that “No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority,” was solely aimed at preventing the suppression of reli­ gious groups such as that following the formation of State Shinto after the pattern of western monotheism (Ōkawa 2009a: 103– 5). However, he continues, If we interpret this principle as stating that “religious corporations are not allowed in any circumstances to promote political gatherings, express politi­ cal views, publish books on politics, and make any political statements,” this would corresponds to deny altogether their freedom of expression. It would be like saying that “people who have some kind of belief are not allowed to make any political statements”. (Ōkawa 2009a: 112– 13) According to Ōkawa, this interpretation reveals a discriminating attitude toward the religious world. Similarly to ordinary people, corporations, and any other groups in civil society that engage in political activities without causing particular public concern, religious corporations have the right to do the same, provided that they do not break the laws. When this right is denied, there is an infringement of the basic principles of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution (Ōkawa 2009a: 111– 12). It may be seen that, similarly to the case of Sōka Gakkai and the Kōmeitō, for Kōfuku no Kagaku the aim of Article 20 should be to defend religion from the intrusion of politics but hardly vice versa, which would seem to assign a privileged position to the religious subsystem. This appears to be a necessary prerequisite for the creation of “a country that believes in gods and buddhas” (shinbutsu o shinjiru kuni 神仏を信じる国 ）(Ōkawa 2009b: 27). In this long passage from Eien no h ō 水 返 の 法 （The Laws of Eternity), one of the three fundamental texts in Kōfuku no Kagaku, Ōkawa expresses in unequivocal terms the religious ideas underlying his conception of politics: I think that in our present times the essence of politics is extremely over­ looked. In ultimate analysis, the essence of politics rests on a hierarchical

Border negotiation in global society ( I ) 113 relationship with a ruler and the ruled who are controlled through the use of power. It is patterned like a pyramid, where those on the top are few and those on the bottom are many. It is only with the triangular shape that stability is possible. If it were circular, it would keep rolling and have no stability ... This pyramidal structure is not limited to politics, but also finds application in business enterprises, where in the lower part the regular employees are many, while the numbers decrease when we move up to sec­ tion managers, department chiefs, and executives. Then, at the top we find one single president. For schools, it is the same . This triangular and pyramidal structure is found everywhere, and it is necessary therefore to reflect on its true meaning. Actually, if we look at the spirit world (reikai 霊 界 ) we can see that it is established according to the same pyramidal structure. Those spirits who reside in the fourth dimension are more that those in the fifth dimension and those in the fifth are more than those in the sixth. Thus, to the extent that we move up, the number of spirits decreases, and in the world of the ninth dimension, there are only ten of them. The spirit world is organized in such a way . One may actually conclude that the pyramidal structure found on Earth is an image of the true structure found in the otherworld. In a certain sense, human beings live communally, but in order to hold together as a whole this communal life, the presence of leaders who exercise their control is needed. If each individual just goes on expressing his/her own specific viewpoint, it is impossible to create a unity, and to have orderly action. In other words, the essence of politics lies in the necessity of leadership, and those who are refining their qualities for their mission as leaders are the spirits of the Realm of Light of the sixth dimension. (Ōkawa 1997b: 139– 41) What emerges from this passage is a hierarchical and authoritarian vision of politics, with one leader supported by a mass of people at the bottom. Most inter­ estingly, Ōkawa affirm s here that this social structure reflects the spirit world, which is also organized hierarchically according to a multidimensional model. Thus, the political subsystem finds legitim ation in the realm of the superempirical, and is governed by the spirits of the sixth dimension, who are special­ ized in guiding others. Ōkawa explains that “the essence of the overwhelming power of these leaders is indeed the power of the Buddha” (sono a ttōtekina chikara no honshitsu wa, yahari hotoke no chikara de ari そ の 圧 倒 的 な 力 の 本 質 は , やはり仏の力であら )，by whom they have been chosen (Ōkawa 1997b: 143– 4). As a consequence, these leaders are also able to extend their spiritual guidance to other contexts: The world of the sixth dimension is the place authentically devoted to the inquiry of the thought of the Buddha (hotoke no kangae no tankyū 仏 の 考 又 の 探 究 ) . As a result of their study, the spirits of this dimension acquire their overwhelming power and are able to guide others. They can express with full confidence thoughts such as these: “What I have learned is

114

Border negotiation in global society (I) the thought of the Buddha. According to its principles, these policies have to be implemented, these economic ideas have to be taken into consideration, this artistic form has to be created, and this kind of education has to be implemented”. (Ōkawa 1997b: 144–5)

Thus, the spirits of the Realm of Light and leaders of this world do not limit their mission to the political arena. Their activity and jurisdiction encompass spheres of social life such as the economy, art, and education. In Ōkawa’s reli­ gious thought, which provides the basis for the newly created Kōfuku Jitsugentō, religion is basically de-differentiated from all major social subsystems. They are conventionally acknowledged as separate from religion, but they found ultimate legitimation in religious authority, which is characterized in this case by refer­ ence to the supreme power of Eru Kantāre and the underlying hierarchy of spir­ itual dimensions and beings. Although Ōkawa acknowledges the value of national elections for the formation of a presidential government in his proposal for a new Constitution (Ōkawa 2009b: 49), his fundamental teachings reveal that his ideal is rather that of a charismatic leadership sanctioned by a super-empirical agency, which would be hardly compatible with the principles of modern democracy. From the analysis above, it is possible to see that Japanese religions and national politics are often engaged in border negotiations, which count in fact as the local version of the broader competition between the religious and political subsystems found at the global level. This trend is especially evident in the activ­ ism of some religious organizations, and their creation of religious or religiouslyinspired political parties that directly challenge the autonomy of politics. Here, one typical feature is shown to be the interpretation of Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution in a sense that would acknowledge the freedom of religious exer­ cise, but not necessarily the secularity of the government. On the other hand, the wide support for a gradual return to elements of pre-war State Shintō within the Liberal Democratic Party, and its milder attitude toward Sōka Gakkai after the New Kōmeitō became its partner in the ruling coalition in 1999, indicate that ambiguities in the interpretation of Article 20 may be intentionally exploited by the political subsystem to increase its power. The religious support given by reli­ gious organizations to electoral candidates, too, should be seen within the fram e­ work of this border negotiation between the two subsystems, since it provides both religion and politics with the opportunity to get some immediate benefits.

8

Border negotiation in global society (II) Religion, education, and science

Japanese religions and public education Closely related to the theme of the previous chapter, namely, how Japanese religions negotiate borders with politics at the systemic level, is the issue of the relation­ ship between religion and public education in Japan (type 13), which is formally regulated by the Fundamental Law of Education (Kyōiku kihonh ō 教 育 基 本 法 ). Enacted in 1947, this legislation set the standard for an effective separation of secular public education from politics and religion, and was intended to prevent a return to the ideological overtones of Japanese wartime education. This aim was particularly evident in Article 9 of the law, which stated that The attitude of religious tolerance and the position of religion in social life shall be valued in education. (2) The schools established by the national and local governments shall refrain from religious education or other activities for a specific religion (tokutei no shūkyō no tame no shūkyō kyōiku sono hoka shūkyōteki katsud ō 特 定 の 宗 教 の た め の 宗 教 教 育 そ の 他 宗 教 的 活 動 ). (Monbu Kagakushō 2011) The enforcement of the Fundamental Law of Education led to the removal of religious education as a subject of study from all public schools. However, pre­ war values imbued with Confucianism soon found their way to the classroom, especially after the reintroduction of the teaching of moral education in public schools in the 1950s (Khan 1997: 112– 13, 210). Since it is generally agreed that sectarian religious education (shūha kyōiku 宗 派 教 再 ）should not be part of the curriculum, what pertains to religious morals and the education in religious sen­ timent (jōsō kyōiku 情 操 教 育 ）has been shown to be the most controversial issue in the relationship between the educational and religious subsystems (Filus 2006: 1040). In this regard, the traditional definition of State Shintō as a non-religion has continued to provide the source for ambiguities and political manipulations. In the early 2000s, nationalist sectors of Japanese society interested in weak­ ening the borders between the state, the educational system, and politics cleverly amplified and exploited serious issues such as bullying, classroom breakdown, and increasing crim inality among juveniles to accelerate the return to pre-war

116

Border negotiation in global society (II)

ideals (Filus 2006: 1049). The Central Council for Education (Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai 中 央 教 再 番 議 会 ), an advisory panel to the education minister, issued a report in March 2003 that was meant to provide the basis for draft amendments to the Fundamental Law of Education (Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai 2003). Not unex­ pectedly, concern for education in religious sentiment was one of the priorities on this advisory panel’s agenda. In the draft amendments that were finally approved by the Diet in December 2006, soon after the cabinet led by Prime M inister Abe Shinzō came to power, it is clear how a series of controversial issues are touched on (cf. Franz 2007; Lebowitz and McNeill 2007; Tsujimura 2007: 51–5). Some revisions revolve around the independence of education from politics, such as those concerning the freedom of education from “undue control” in Article 10 of the 1947 draft (presently Article 16), and the appearance of “public spirit” among the values to be esteemed in the Preamble. Other revisions relate more closely to the religious sphere, such as that slightly but significantly modify­ ing Article 9 (now Article 15) by inserting the promotion of “general knowledge regarding religion” (shūkyō ni kansuru ippantekina kyōy ō 宗 教 に 関 す る 一 般 的 な 教 養 ), and the additions to Article 2, the last of which states that one of the aims of education is to foster an attitude to respect our traditions and culture, love the country and region that nurtured them (dentō to bunka o sornhō shi, sorera o hagukunde k ita wa ga kuni to kyōdo o ai s u r u 伝統と文化を尊重し,そ れらをはぐくんで きた我が国と郷土を愛する ), together with respect for other countries and a desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community. (Monbu Kagakushō 2011) During the preparation of the draft amendments by the Central Council for Education, various religious organizations officially expressed their views on education and lobbied to have them recognized by the government. Some of these positions and their relevance for the discussion upon border negotiation between religion and education in Japan will be reviewed in the following.

Loss o f values and religious sentiment Given the Jinja Honchō’s 神干土本庁 (Association of Shintō Shrines) involvement in ultra-nationalist politics highlighted above, it is hardly surprising that the organization has been one the most enthusiastic supporters of the revision proc­ ess of the Fundamental Law of Education, through individual action and in a network of other conservative groups. Together with the Nippon Kaigi 日本 会 議 , the Jinja Honchō backs, for example, the Nippon no Kenkoku o Iwau Kai 日 本 の 建国を祝つ 会 (Association to Celebrate Japan’s Foundation), according to which the Fundamental Law of Education and the Constitution should be changed, because “the tide of extreme individualism created by post-war democ­ racy is spoiling the healthy national consciousness of the state sovereignty”

Border negotiation in global society ( I I ) 117 (Asahi shinbun 2006). One of the forces behind the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education has been the Shintō Seiji Renmei 神 道 政 治 連 盟 ，the afore­ mentioned political arm of the Jinja Honchō, which similarly claims that “due to the climate created by post-war education, the chance to transm it to the young generations the spiritual values of our tradition has been lost” (Shinto Seiji Renmei 2007). Among these values, the Shintō Seiji Renmei lists “the reverence to nature,” “the value of life,” and, significantly, “the religious sentiment going beyond specific sectarian boundaries and doctrines” (tokutei no kyōh a /kyōg i o koeta shūkyōteki j ōs ō 特 定 の 教 派 •教 義 を こ え た 宗 教 的 情 操 ) . It would appear that the promotion of “general knowledge regarding religion” (shūkyō ni kansuru ippantekina kyōy ō) added to Article 15 of the revised Fundamental Law of Edu­ cation stands for the Shintō Seiji Renmei as a formal recognition of the “influence of religion upon Japanese mind,” and the need to teach it in public schools (Shintō Seiji Renmei 2007). In this respect, the draft amendments that passed the Diet in 2006 represent perhaps for the Jinja Honchō a half victory, since the organization has openly criticized, in addition to the failure to delete the reference to “undue control” in Article 10, the lack of any reference to religious sentiment in Article 15 of the revised draft (Tsujimura 2007: 54). It may also be noticed, in this regard, that this is quite consequential for a religious community where the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo 教 育 に 関 す る 勅 語 ）embodying the values of imperial Japan still holds wide currency among leaders and practitioners (cf. Jinja Honchō 2011; Meiji Jingū 2011). The issue of religious sentiment is also present in the reaction offered by the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai 全 曰 本 仏 教 会 (Japan Buddhist Federation), which sub­ mitted as early as February 2003 a petition for the revision of Article 9 of the Fundamental Law of Education (now Article 15) to the Central Council for Edu­ cation (Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai 2003). Here, the cause of various issues such as juvenile delinquency, class and family disruption, and other educational prob­ lems are related to the lack of religious moral education in public schools, which was prohibited by the old Fundamental Law of Education. This excessive disre­ gard of religious education could be overcome, the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai sug­ gested, through the prescription for public schools “to refrain from sectarian religious education for a specific religion” (tokutei no shūkyō no tam e no shddha kyōi k u 特 定 の 宗 教 の た め の 宗 派 教 育 ), which would open the way to general religious education in the classroom.1 What the Zen-nihon Bukkyookai actu­ ally means by “religious education,” however, emerges quite clearly from the following passage: If we take into account the understanding of other cultures in an age of internationalization, there is also an indication that the study of other reli­ gions worldwide is important. However, as far as the reform of Japanese education is concerned, first, fundamental knowledge and understanding of Japanese religions should be provided until the level of secondary educa­ tion. Based on this, the educational effort for the cultivation of a religious sentiment (shūkyōteki j ōsō no ka n ’y ō 宗 教 的 情 操 の 涵 養 ) effective for

118

Border negotiation in global society (II) character-building would be constructive, in accordance with the require­ ments of the time. (Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai 2003)

Thus the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai, though formally acknowledging the separa­ tion between secular education and sectarian religious education, grounds its claims of authority on the assumption that Japanese religions are superior to sec­ ular education and other foreign religious traditions as the instrum ent to build the character of future generations of Japanese. From the systemic point of view, this is certainly another attempt to weaken the borders between the subsystems of religion and education and to expand the scope of the former over the latter. To what extent this strategy may have won support from individual members of the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai, on the other hand, is exemplified by Tendaishū 天 台 宗 , whose standard position on this issue finds expression in this remark published in the official denominational bulletin, the Tendai j ānaru 天百 ノ ' ヤ一ナル (Tendai journal): One of the important political measures planned by Abe Shinzō’s cabinet concerns education. It would be highly appreciated if the [cabinet’s] plan to bring about “Japan as a beautiful country” (utsukushii kuni, N ihon 美しい国， 日本）could pay due attention not only to intellectual, moral, and physical education but also to education involving groupism and religious sentiment (shūkyō j ōsō kyōiku 宗 教 情 操 教 育 ). (Tendaishū 2006; cf. Tendaishū 2003) In this case, we can see how the Tendaishū institutions, among the enthusiastic supporters of the insertion of religious sentiment in public schools’ teaching cur­ ricula, give their overall approval to the political agenda of Abe Shinzō, a Liberal Democratic Party leader who has been particularly assertive in the attempt to weaken the borders among politics, religion, and education in Japan. Among the other influential religious organizations that have taken part in the debate concerning the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education, one finds the Nihon shūkyō Renmei 日 本 宗 教 連 盟 (Japanese Association of Religious Organizations),2 which represents Japan’s five largest religious associations. The Nihon shūkyō Renmei submitted, as early as December 2002, a petition to the Central Council for Education and, in January 2003, a statement expressing the necessity of revaluating the role of religion in public education to counter the loss of values that characterizes modern society (Nihon shūkyō Renmei 2003). Also in this case, issues such as bullying and crim inality among juveniles are related to the loss of social influence by religion.3 According to the text, the dominance of economic efficiency and materialism has led to the neglect of “spiritual culture,” a deficiency that should be addressed by religionists through pressure for the promotion of religious education in public school. Here it is also affirmed that religion has traditionally played an important role in society by providing adequate patterns of behavior, foundations for spiritual life as well as spiritual

Border negotiation in global society ( I I ) 119 care, concern, and respect for others, which are all the more indispensable in the present situation. In this way, despite the specification that all this should be achieved through the promotion of “religion as a cultural phenomenon” (bunka to shite no shukyd 文化 としての宗教)，the Nihon shūkyō Renmei is ostensibly pressing for the reevaluation of religious elements in public education as the source of morality and civic sense. That this role, in the Japanese case, might be mostly played by Japanese religions is suggested by the following passage: We may think that within the process of globalization the search for inter­ nationalism and universality is becoming increasingly important. However, at the same time, the peculiar cultural traits of various countries and people are equally important. Each country presents its own distinctive religious situation. (Nihon shūkyō Renmei 2003) In other words, it may be argued that the Nihon shūkyō Renmei is trying to reconcile two contrasting applications of religious education in public schools, namely as an academic discipline and as the source of moral behavior. This posi­ tion acknowledges the superiority of religious communication over some aspects of secular education, thus implicitly justifying some degree of interference of religion in the educational sphere. Thus, it is apparent how also the Nihon shūkyō Renmei, although less overtly than the Jinja Honchō and the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai, is pressing for the de-differentiation of education and religion. Differently from the other two organizations, the Nihon shūkyō Renmei seems to be concerned about preserving, at least formally, the differentiation of the two spheres. This is mainly attempted through the aforementioned appeal for the promotion of the study of “religion as a cultural phenomenon” in public schools (Nihon shūkyō Renmei 2003). In this case, however, the interference of religion in the educa­ tional system is justified based on the superiority of religious communication, also termed “spiritual culture” (seishin bunka 精 神 文 化 )，over secular education in providing not only the foundations for spiritual life and care but also correct patterns of behavior and concern and respect for others. If religion could exert once again its traditional “influence upon society” (namely, with less functional differentiation), it is maintained, pressing educational and social problems that are caused by “the dominance of economic efficiency and materialism” (that is to say, by the global dominance of technically oriented social subsystems) would be solved (Nihon shūkyō Renmei 2003). To conclude this section, it is opportune to mention that there has also been some form of religious resistance in Japan to these attempts to de-differentiate religion, education, and politics. Given the fact that the Nihon shūkyō Renmei and the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai are umbrella associations of very different religious organizations, and that their positions on the role of religion in public education are presumably the outcome of complex internal negotiations, it is not completely unexpected that some critical positions may also be found among their members. This is the case for example of several Christian organizations such as those

120

Border negotiation in global society (II)

united in the Nihon Kirisutokyō Kyōgikai 日本 キリス ト教協 議会 （National Christian Council), and still others, for which attempts to redefine the role of religion in education and to revive pre-war ideology have caused some alarm bells to ring. It is interesting to note, however, that considerable opposition has been offered also from within the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai, notably from Jōdō Shinshū’s 浄 土 真 宗 two major branches (Ōtani-ha 大 谷 派 and Honganji-ha 本 願 寺 派 ). Within this context, perhaps the most critical voice has been raised by the Kyōiku Kihonho ‘Kaisei’ ni Hantai Suru K ai 教育 基 本 法 「改 正 」に 反 対 す る 会 (Assembly Against the ‘Revision’ of the Fundamental Law of Education), a group including about half the members of the Religious Chamber of the Ōtani-ha Diet (Ōtani-ha Shūgikai 大 谷 爪 呆 議 会 ), w hich in September 2003 issued a document opposing the views expressed by the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai, and protested that the real aim of the reform was to educate citizens who could support a country ready to fight any kind of war (Kyōiku Kihonhō ‘Kaisei’ ni Hantai Suru Kai 2003). Later, in June 2004, the Ōtani-ha issued an official statement, where the revision to the Fundamental Law of Education is seen – similarly to the 1999 Law Concerning the National Flag and Anthem – as further proof of the government’s excessive intervention in the educational sphere to promote nationalism by the distorted views of Japanese history inserted into school textbooks, and other recent polit­ ical measures (Shinshū Ōtani-ha 2004). Though adopting a more cautious attitude, in 2006 the Honganji-ha administration issued two official statements about the revision process, where the superficial way of dealing with such a deli­ cate issue was criticized, and the risk of repeating the same mistakes of Japan’s unfortunate past was evoked.4 Although in Jōdō Shinshū ’s opposition to the revision of Fundamental Law of Education the main focus is on the role of (nationalistic) politics in public education, it is not difficult to notice here the emergence of an alternative pattern emphasizing the autonomy of the educational subsystem and its secular values, rather than the primacy of religious communi­ cation and “spiritual culture.” However, the Jōdō Shinshū position is not without ambiguities. In fact, as far as the individual level is concerned, there are indica­ tions that the large majority of practitioners may see the teaching of religious sentiment in public education in a favorable light. The results of a survey that I conducted in 2008 among local Jōdō Shinshū communities indicates that as much as 41.1 percent of the lay followers and 53.3 percent of the ordained priests support the view that the Fundamental Law of Education should be amended, so that education in religious sentiment can also be implemented in public schools. This is all the more significant if one considers that 17.5 percent of the lay follow­ ers and 15 percent of the ordained priests oppose this view, given the high per­ centage of undecided (Dessì 2010b: 253– 4). The fact that Jōdō Shinshū is a major tradition of Japanese Buddhism does not mean that the organization’s defense of functional differentiation found at the institutional level (but not at the individual level) may represent more than a m inority position within the Japanese religious world. There seems to be rather the tendency among Japanese religious organi­ zations to ground their discourses on the role of religion in public education in the superiority of religious communication over the secular. These claims of

Border negotiation in global society (II)

121

authority may be more or less explicit, but nonetheless speak of a sense of nostal­ gia for the influence once exerted by religion upon society, and religion’s central function in the character-building of new generations of students and citizens. It is perhaps not too excessive to conclude that, for many religions in Japan, the tug of war with the educational subsystem may be in the end even more inviting, and culturally affordable, than that with politics.

Japanese religions and science The interplay between religion and science certainly occupies a special place in the global public debate, frequently attracting the attention of modern mass media. Prominent issues such as the crusades against abortion or the theory of evolution by Christian institutions are but specific examples of how the religious subsystem may react to the dominance of the scientific subsystem, and to the idea that important areas of social life should be regulated without ultimate refer­ ence to the super-empirical domain. The political subsystem also plays a relevant part in this regard, since the marginalization of specific forms of religious com­ munication often goes hand in hand with the codification of scientific communi­ cation through the legal system. Struggle and opposition are not the only choices left to religion, however, since in many cases a noticeable tendency toward accommodation may be observed. In the case of modern Japan, the expansion of the scope of the scientific system especially followed the intense contact with the ‘western powers’ taking place in the Meiji period, through which the architects of the new nation-state tried to secure the scientific expertise for the modernization of the country and, as sug­ gested by Gerald Figal, the production “of a citizenry that could be easily taught, managed, and mobilized for the good of the nation” (Figal 1999: 77). State pro­ motion (and exploitation) of scientific communication was paired at that time with a thorough campaign against ‘superstitions’ (m eishin 迷 信 )，through which the control of a variety of body and mental practices, including healing and sexu­ ality, shifted from the hands of individuals, village shamans, and healers to that of specialists trained in modern medicine. This campaign was conducted by the Meiji government especially by means of legislation and the introduction of these themes in public education. Orders proscribing “shamans, faith healers, exor­ cists, fortune-tellers, and the like who ‘blinded the people’ with their practices” had already been issued in the early 1870s, and later found their place in the Meiji Criminal Code (Figal 1999: 199). Ethics textbooks were specifically designed to deal with the issue of superstition, including folk practices such as those related to tengu -possession,5 fox-possession, and eye disease, and were enriched with edifying stories (Figal 1999: 93-4). Significantly, among those who most actively cooperated with this government campaign one finds Inoue Enryō 井上円ぶ， who has already been briefly mentioned in Chapter Three within our discussion on glocalization leaning toward ‘native’ sources. Inoue was one of the leading Buddhist intellectuals of his time, and his work is in many respects emblematic of the broader need felt within Meiji Buddhism to find an accommodation with

122

Border negotiation in global society (II)

the advancing forces of modernity and the escalation of nationalism. Anxious to liberate themselves from the label of a foreign and outdated tradition, important sectors of the Japanese Buddhist world strived then to promote a positive image of their religion as a unified camp loyal to the state and compatible with western sci­ ence. Inoue’s commitment in the Ethics Textbook Survey Committee (Shūshin Kyōkasho Chōsa Iinkai), instituted by the government in 1900, and more generally his lifetime research aimed at purging religion from ‘superstition’ were functional and even essential to the ongoing project of shaping Buddhism as a modern reli­ gion, with great emphasis on the transcendent, philosophical, and rational aspects and much less on the practical and ritual domains (Josephson 2006; Figal 1999: 82– 92). This accommodationist pattern found in Japanese Buddhism’s encounter with western science in the Meiji period has had long-term effects, particularly because the accommodationists responded to the urgent need to reposition Buddhism within global dynamics and almost forcibly followed the guidelines set up by the state to create a healthy country of obedient citizens and soldiers. A recent empirical case, related to the controversial issue of organ transplants that has been debated in Japan at least since the early 1980s, shows how contem­ porary Japanese Buddhism and other religious groups may see the claims of the scientific subsystem in a less positive way, and even consider them a threat to be countered through the reassertion of their own religion and traditional values. This instance of border negotiation between religion and science in the last few decades (type 13) will be illustrated and analyzed in the next section.

Traditional values and bioethical issues Until 1997, Japan was one of the very few countries with no legislation recogniz­ ing the condition of brain death (nōshi 脳 死 ).6 The criteria for establishing death were those inherited from the cultural-religious tradition, namely, “cessa­ tion of heartbeat, cessation of respiration, and opening of the pupils” (Hardacre 1994: 585). With the worldwide development of medical knowledge about organ transplants (zōki ishoku 臓 器 移 植 ），th e pressure on Japanese society to conform to international standards defining brain death that could facilitate organ har­ vesting gradually increased: The question of substituting brain death for the three traditional criteria of death would not have arisen in the absence of the possibility of organ trans­ plant. Brain death and organ transplants are linked because organ transplants (except in the case of a single kidney from a living donor or the newer tech­ nique of live donor transplant) are premised upon the inevitable death of the donor, and the success of a transplant from a donor whose heart is still beat­ ing is much greater than from one whose heartbeat has terminated. (Hardacre 1994: 585) Already, in 1983, the Japanese government had established a Discussion Group on Life and Ethics (Seimei to Rinri ni Kansuru Kondankai 生 命 倫 理 に 関 す る 懇 談 会 )

Border negotiation in global society ( I I ) 1 23 in an attempt to create social consensus on this issue, and later, in 1989, the gov­ ernment created a Special Cabinet Committee on Brain Death and Organ Trans­ plant (Rinji Nōshi oyobi Zōki Ishoku Chōsakai 臨 時 脳 死 及 び 臓 器 移 植 調 查 会 ) that submitted its final report in January 1992 endorsing the brain death criterion as the legal standard of death. However, the insertion in the final report of a m inority opinion opposing the committee’s findings showed that no consensus on these bioethical issues had been reached (Hardacre 1994: 587– 8). Indeed, an opinion poll conducted by the national newspaper A sahi shinbun in March of the same year indicated that 41 percent of the interviewed agreed on a definition of death that would take the cessation of heartbeat as a criterion, while 47 percent agreed on the identification of death with brain death (Asahi shinbun 1992). The national debate on brain death and organ transplants became heated, leading to several legal cases (Hardacre 1994: 586). Finally, in 1997, the Organ Transplant Law (Zōki no ishoku ni kansuru hōritsu 臟 器 の 移 植 に 関 す る 法 律 ) was enforced, which set the necessary preconditions for organ transplants, namely, the donor’s prior consent and family consent. Only in this case was brain death acknowl­ edged as legally recognized death. Moreover, organ donations by people under the age of fifteen were prohibited (Nakasone 2006: 295). Because of the restric­ tions posed by the Organ Transplant Law, especially in the case of children, the number of transplants since its enactment was very low when compared to those performed in other countries. Many were forced to go abroad to get donated organs, and this form of ‘transplant tourism ’ was also criticized by the World Health Organization (Yomiuri shinbun 2009a). In time, several revisions to the 1997 Organ Transplant Law were proposed, among which two amendments later subm itted to the Japanese Diet in M arch 2006. The first of these (gener­ ally indicated as Plan A) would remove the age lim it and recognize brain death as legal death. The second (Plan B) proposed to lower the age lim it to twelve. Subsequently two other amendments were submitted, in 2007 and 2009. The former (Plan C) would have m aintained the same age lim it and restricted the legal definition of brain death. The latter (Plan D) proposed to subject donation by those under fifteen to family consent and the deliberation of a third-party panel (Asahi shinbun 2009a). The amendment known as Plan A was finally approved in July 2009, thus facilitating domestic organ donations by children and adults (provided that one does not rule them out before dying) (Yomiuri shinbun 2009b). In the meantime, various religious groups had publicly expressed their views on these controversial bioethical issues. The Nihon shūkyō Renmei had already manifested its concern over the enforcement of the 1997 Organ Transplant Law with the submission of a position statement inviting the Diet to careful delibera­ tion, which “should have the utmost respect for individual views of life and death” (Asahi shinbun 1997). In another official position statement issued in 2009, shortly before the revision of the Organ Transplant Law, the Nihon shūkyō Renmei called for the respect of the dignity of the lives of both donors and recip­ ients of organs, and for the definition of brain death limited only to those cases that are related to organ transplant. This is because, the document claims, most

124

Border negotiation in global society (II)

Japanese people still ground their conception of death on “the three signs” (sanchōk ō 三 徴 候 ）(cessation of heartbeat and respiration, and opening of the pupils) (Nihon shūkyō Renmei 2009). In this way, the Nihon shūkyō Renmei was attempting to oppose the intrusion of the scientific global subsystem in issues of life and death in the name of traditional values. One of the most assertive opponents to the new legislation, the new religious movement Ōmoto 大 本 , early in 1991 issued an official statement opposing the orientation of the Special Cabinet Committee on Brain Death and Organ Transplant, followed by another comment in 1992 when the Special Cabinet finally submitted its final report. In these documents, the identification of death with brain death is strongly criticized on doctrinal grounds. The body is consid­ ered the vessel of the soul (reikon 霊 魂 ), and the two form a unity until the com­ plete cessation of the heart functions allows the soul to depart. From this point of view, which is grounded on the traditional idea of death, brain death cannot but be considered as a partial death, and a dangerous concession to materialism (Omoto Kyōgaku Kensansho 2006: 3). For Omoto, organ transplant following brain death is ultimately no other than a “legalized murder” (satsujin kōi no gōhōka 殺 人 行 為 の 合 法 化 ）(Asahi shinbun 2005). On the same grounds, this group has launched several initiatives such as petitions and a campaign to pro­ mote a “non-donor card” aimed at preventing the harvesting of organs (Bukkyō taimusu 2009b). Another very critical voice in the Japanese religious world is the Ōtani branch of Jōdo Shinshū , which formalized its position as early as 1997 before the enact­ ment of the Organ Transplant Law. The Ōtani-ha characterizes its view in terms of respect for “the dignity of life” (inochi no songen レ、の ち の 尊 厳 ) . Life is not something that can be disposed of arbitrarily by human beings because its work­ ing lies in the super-empirical domain (Amida Buddha), and the postulated iden­ tity between actual death and brain death is thought to lead dangerously to the objectification and privatization of life. Thus, it may be seen in Ōtani-ha official documents that these bioethical issues are more or less explicitly linked to the aforementioned critique of humanism (Shinshū Ōtani-ha 1997; cf. Dessì 2006; 2007: 131– 40). The other major branch of Jōdo Shinshū , the Honganji-ha, has endorsed a comparatively milder position, which values the advantages offered by the new legislation but is aware at the same time of the dangers posed by the application of brain death as a general standard independent from individual convictions (Jōdo Shinshū Honganji-ha 2009b). Among the critical voices, one finds Risshō Kōseikai 立 正 佼 成 会 , w hich has officially expressed its regret about the 2009 revisions to the Organ Transplant Law. According to this organization, which also insists on the “dignity of life” (inochi no songen ), the new dispositions allowing the indiscriminate application of the standard of brain death to all are nothing but a change for the worse, which casts a deep shadow on Japan’s future (R isshō K ōseikai 2009). In this respect, Risshō Kōseikai shares the concerns of many other religious groups by claiming that life continues until the heart and other organs cease performing their func­ tions, and that the donor’s consent is fundamental (Ōmoto Kyōgaku Kensansho

Border negotiation in global society ( I I ) 1 25 2006: 37, 40). The major branch of Rinzaishū 臨 済 宗 , the Kyōto-based Myōshinji-ha 妙 心 寺 派 , has also strongly opposed the Organ Transplant Law, on the basis of the Buddhist teachings of co-dependent origination and the universal possession of buddha-nature, which justify the conception of the mind-body as a spiritual unity and the inherent dignity of all human beings (tanin no songensei 龜 人 の 尊 厳 性 ) （R inzaishū Myōshinji-ha 2009). A more moderate viewpoint within the Zen Buddhist world is that of Sōt ōshū 曹 ??同宗，according to which Zen does not provide a definitive argument for the acceptance or refusal of organ transplant. In addition, the attempt to directly link organ donation with the Buddhist practice of “charity” (fu se 布 施 ) is considered inconclusive. However, this is not meant to imply that from the Sōtōshū perspec­ tive the concept of brain death is without problems, all the more because a general consensus on this issue has not been achieved yet (Ōmoto Kyōgaku Kensansho 2006: 30– 1). Similarly, Tendaishū 天 台 宗 , has focused on the Buddhist concept of fu se , but, differently from the Sōtōshū position, it admits that the donation of organs “can be acknowledged as an act of charity” (fu se no kōi to shite m itom era r e r u 布施の行為として認められる) provided that the donor has explicitly expressed her or his consent. Also from the Tendaishū perspective, however, the actual death of a person should be clearly distinguished from brain death (Tendaishū 1995). Still another important contribution to the debate has been provided by Jōdoshū 浄 土 宗 . The acceptance of the idea of brain death as legal death in Jōdoshū is complicated by doctrinal issues concerning birth in the Pure Land at the time of death, which discourage any superficial and hastened approach to this theme. Moreover, the fact that a social consensus on this problem has not been reached in Japan, and the risk of encouraging the understanding of human beings as sources of organs, which would inevitably lead to a depreciation of human dig­ nity, are also emphasized by the religious institutions. On the other hand, how­ ever, it is affirm ed that the donor’s decision to help another human being should be respected, provided that this choice is “spontaneous” (jihatsuteki 自 発 的 ) and is not conditioned or induced by external factors or agencies (Ōmoto Kyōgaku Kensansho 2006: 11– 15). Similarly, in the case of Nichirenshū 日蓮宗 the denial of brain death as actual death is accompanied by the acknowledgment of one’s decision to be a donor as a “Buddhist act of compassion” (Bukkyō no jih ish in ni kanau kōi 仏 教 の 慈 悲 心 に か な う 打 為 ) th at should not be possibly discouraged (Ōmoto Kyōgaku Kensansho 2006: 64). This overview of religious positions concerning the thorny issue of organ transplant in Japan reveals that there is a consensus on the fact that brain death cannot be uniformly accepted as the death of the individual. Indeed, from a sur­ vey conducted in 2005 by the national newspaper Yomiuri shinbun among eight­ een religious organizations in Japan, the large majority of them was against the proposed revisions to the Organ Transplant Law, and even the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Japan (Katorikku C hio Kyogikai カトリック中央協議会), one of the religious organizations which are closer to the acceptance of brain death as legal death, expressed its doubts (Yomiuri shinbun 2005). The identification of

126

Border negotiation in global society (II)

death with brain death is desirable according to the standards of medical knowl­ edge because the chances for a successful organ transplant are much higher before the cessation of the donor’s heartbeat. However, Japanese religions tend to consider the claims of the scientific subsystem as an intrusion in the life of the individual and a breach of traditional values. What seems to matter most to Japanese religions is not the chance to perform successful organ transplants thanks to the reliability of scientific knowledge, but the link of the individual with the super-empirical sphere, and the reliability of the tradition with respect to the interpretation of the afterlife domain. Thus, the definition of death provides the framework for border negation between the religious and scientific subsys­ tems and for attempts by the religious subsystem to influence political decisions on this issue through lobbying, official statements, and campaigns. Apart from a few exceptions, it would appear that although for Japanese reli­ gions the denial of organ transplantation is not absolute, the timing is crucial. Religious communication depends in this respect on a variety of sources. The influence of Buddhism seems to play an important role, since it is often assumed that as long as the heart is beating the individual is alive, and authorizing the har­ vest of one’s organs would result in inflicting pain on a living being. Moreover, traditional views of life and death typically assume that the departing of the dead is not something abrupt, but implies the presence of a transitional period of time during which the necessary rituals are performed in order to ensure that the spirits reach the other world properly. The lack of one part of the body could also be seen as an obstruction to this process and as the cause of the spirits’ anger. Other reli­ gious elements related to Daoism, Confucianism, and Shinto may work in this case as cultural obstacles to the acceptance of the idea of brain death as actual death. One may think, for example, of the idea that the body should not be desecrated, based on the idea of filial piety, since one should not destroy what one has received from one’s own parents. Or, again, the idea that the body is a microcosm where all parts work in harmony and cannot be replaced or altered (Nakasone 2006). It is also interesting to note that this traditional understanding of the nature of death may be accompanied by the perception that the dualism between body and soul typical of western culture – which is understood as a major factor pressing for the performance of more organ transplants – is hardly compatible with the Japanese religious tradition. This is one of the main themes that have been discussed within the Research Panel for Bioethics (Seimei Rinri Kenkyū Bukai 生 命 倫 理 研 究 部 会 ) of the Forum of Research Institutes Associated with Religious Organizations (Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyūsho Konwakai 教 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 ), an interreligious network uniting most of the religious institutions mentioned above: About the Japanese conception of the body: The conception of the body is essential for the understanding of the issue of brain death and organ trans­ plant. In particular, in the case of Japanese people it may be seen that the dualism of body and soul found in the western philosophical tradition can hardly apply. (Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyūsho Konwakai 2005: 2 1 ;cf. Dessì 2010a)

Border negotiation in global society (II)

127

Leaving aside the fact that this view may appear less obvious, if one thinks only of the ambiguous status of the souls and spirits of the dead in the Japanese religious context, it is clear how, in this case, the struggle for the social relevance of religious communication is not disconnected from some form of cultural defense, which identifies the claims of authority of the scientific subsystems with the danger of one-way globalization imposed by the ‘West.’ Tendaishū offers another meaningful example of this strategy on the organization’s “Questions and Answers” webpages, where the issue of organ transplant is implicitly related to (the critique of) individualism and the danger of cultural imperialism: Q. In the eventuality I am in a state of brain death, I would like to donate my organs, but I have heard that “once you donate your organs you cannot achieve buddhahood.” Is that true? Is there any problem in stating clearly my will to become a donor? A. Views of life and death in Japan and other regions and countries such as Europe and America are different. For example, in Christianity there is the belief that at the time of death the soul ascends to heaven and is resurrected in the reign of God, and for this reason the remains of the body are consid­ ered pure “matter.” Thus, it is not so difficult for individuals and families to offer the body deprived of the soul if it can be useful to others. On the other hand, in Japan there is the sense that “something” remains in the corpse, and therefore, memorial rites are necessary to help the deceased achieve buddhahood. Compared to Europe and America, the attachment to the corpse is stronger, and thoughts such as “once you donate your organs you cannot achieve buddhahood” may arise. Moreover, since Europe and America are permeated by individualism, perhaps it is easier to choose how to end one’s own life or to express one’s own will to be a donor. Since also in Buddhist countries such as Thailand and Taiwan there are examples of how organ transplant may be positively considered as the last act of charity (fu s e ) in one’s life, it cannot be argued that the idea that “once you donate your organs you cannot achieve buddhahood” is based on Buddhism. The fact of becom­ ing a donor is closely related to one’s own values and view of life and death. The opinion of the family is also important. The appropriate decision should be made after having thought by oneself or with one’s own family on the whole concept of life. (Tendaishū 2008b) What is hinted in this advice to Tendaishū followers is that cultural patterns and legislation about medical issues that originated in western countries, where they are related to Christianity and individualism, cannot be simply superimposed upon Japanese society. Although this alarmist tone may be partly justified, this strategy clearly obscures the fact that the adoption of legislative measures that could facilitate the application of medical knowledge, besides being the general orientation of the political subsystem in Japan, might be actually supported by the majority of Japanese. In this respect, it is significant that in another opinion

128

Border negotiation in global society (II)

poll conducted in 2007 by the A sahi shinbun, 47 percent thought that death equals brain death, while 34 percent thought that death should imply the cessation of heartbeat.7 It would perhaps be more appropriate to define this struggle over bioethical issues as the one between two local forms of the almost ubiquitous religious and scientific subsystems, rather than that between the spiritual tradition of the ‘East’ and the material forces of the ‘West,’ as in the often-heard rhetoric of occidentalism. And, in view of the trend that started with the 1997 Organ Transplant Law and continued with its revision in 2009, it would seem that the religious subsystem is at quite a disadvantage with the scientific subsystem, and not very effective in containing the advance of the latter and the legal codifica­ tion of its peculiar mode of communication. From this specific angle, it may be argued that Japanese society is more secularized (functionally differentiated) today than before 1997.

9

Addressing global problems

In January 2010, the then president of the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai 全 曰 本 仏 教 会 (Japan Buddhist Federation) and current head priest of Kōyasan Shingonshū 高 里 山 真 言 宗 , Matsunaga Yūkei 松 長 有 慶 , was invited, together with other world religious leaders, to attend the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Acting as a representative of Japanese Buddhism (Chūgai nippō 2010a), Matsunaga addressed the audience with the following words: The 21st century is a time of turmoil. Because of the amazing advances in science and technology during the last century, we now enjoy an unprece­ dented degree of material prosperity. Nevertheless, we still have not escaped from mental and spiritual suffering. We see all around us the symptoms of a society lacking in normalcy: self-centredness, insensitivity to the pain of oth­ ers, the breakdown of local society and the making of barbaric crimes into a routine occurrence. Looking at the world as a whole, we realize that while the developed nations have achieved some economic success, the disparity between rich and poor is rapidly worsening in the developing nations. The global environment is deteriorating, resources are being depleted and ethnic conflicts and interreligious strife are becoming commonplace. These are the increasingly lamentable circumstances in which we find ourselves. We are hemmed in on all sides and restrained both socially and individually in our mental activities. It is important for us to reflect calmly on our habitually self­ centred ways of living and change what needs to be changed to lead an honest life. It is necessary that we do this to make any fundamental changes in our present circumstances. To achieve that, I wish to emphasize that Eastern cul­ ture – relatively neglected by modern society – and in particular Buddhist culture, contains within it the precise medicine needed to effectively uproot these diseases of modern society. To make some brief suggestions capable of successfully handling the crises of modern society from Mahayana Buddhism, which is the form of Buddhism practiced in Japan, I would like to present the following three points: (1) a holistic approach recognizing the interdepend­ ence of all living things, (2) a pluralistic sense of values and (3) social service based on the awareness that our lives are owed to the world and society. (Matsunaga 2010a: 39; cf. 2010b)

130

Addressing global problems

Matsunaga’s speech is relevant to our analysis of religion and globalization in Japan for at least two important reasons. On the one hand, Japanese culture based on Mahāyāna Buddhism is implicitly presented here as a superior spiritual force due to its non-dualistic approach and its inclination to promote pluralistic values. And it may be easily seen how this unhistorical and idealized view of Japanese Buddhism substantially matches with the inclusivist approach of the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai already discussed in Chapter Two. On the other hand, and most inter­ estingly for the present discussion, Matsunaga emphasizes the fact that contem­ porary global society, despite the advances in science and technology and increasing material prosperity, is in a state of turmoil. Economic development has been accompanied by the exacerbation of pressing problems such as the dis­ parity between rich and poor, the deterioration of the global environment, ethnic conflicts, and interreligious strife. In order to solve these problems, Matsunaga argues, contemporary society needs a radical change away from egocentric atti­ tudes, and religion is able to offer, in this sense, a valuable clue. Japanese Buddhism is thus presented as “the precise medicine” (ryōyaku 良 薬 ) to cure the “diseases of modern society” (gendai shakai no byōkon 現 代 社 会 の 病 根 ）at the spiritual level, through Buddhism’s alleged intimacy with non-dualism and pluralism, and the practical level, through Buddhism’s inclination to engage in social work and “make positive contributions to society” (shakai ni sekkyokuteki ni hatara kika kete 社 会 に 積 極 的 に 働 き か け て ).1 M atsunaga’s understanding of global society and its program to expand the scope of religion reflect a more general tendency within the religious world to mobilize resources, hopes, and people to act as a corrective to the often tragic contradictions of modernity. This specific aspect of religion in a global setting has been addressed by Peter Beyer, who has elaborated the concept of “residual problems” (R estproblem e) found in the work of Niklas Luhmann and applied it especially to the development of religiously-inspired social movements: In spite of their ever increasing power, the dominant instrum entalities leave vast areas of social life underdetermined and create serious problems that they do not solve: everything from problems of personal or group identity and ecological threats to increasing disparities in wealth, power, and life chances both within and between regions. The question for religion and its carriers is, how to take advantage of this situation; or more in the language I am using here, to what extent can residual matters and the religious modal­ ity be linked concretely? (Beyer 1994: 105; cf. Beyer 1997; Luhmann 1977: 58) As suggested by Beyer, the deficiencies of a functionally differentiated global society offer to religion the opportunity to increase its scope. At the same time, to the extent that religion worldwide (including Japan) can be shown to be more or less successfully engaged in countering pressing issues such as war, the environmental crisis, poverty, and social alienation, religion can also find an

Addressing global problems

131

additional source of legitimation, strengthen its public image, and reassert its role in global society. In this chapter, I will explore how this pattern (type 14) applies to the case of various religions in contemporary Japan.

Global problems and religious institutions W ithin the framework sketched above, structural dynamics and problems of glo­ bal society, religious beliefs, the search for the good but also politics of power variously contribute to the emerging of religious agendas and forms of religious social activism addressing global problems. It is hardly surprising that not a few of these religious responses to globalization take the shape of interreligious activities that can contribute, among other things, to the cause of reinforcing the public image of religion as a united front against social evil. One Japanese example of this mobilization is the Hieizan shūkyō Samitto 上匕歡山宗教サミット already analyzed in Chapter Two, whose aim is to promote dialogue among religions and mutual prayer as a viable way to face the global crisis and attain world peace (Nihon shūkyō Daihyōsha Kaigi 1987: 33). A similar approach may be found in the Sekai Shūkyōsha no Inori to Foram u 每界宗教者のネ斤りとフォーラム (Prayer Offering and World Religious Forum) started by Ōmoto 大 本 and its secular branch Jinrui Aizenkai 人 類 紫 善 会 (Universal Love and Brotherhood Association) in 1993. The extent to which the leaders of this new religious movement may be reflexively aware of the dangers of global society and the opportunities offered to religion by the new global dynamics may be seen from the Statement of Purpose (kaisai shushi 開 催 主 旨 ) for the second Forum held in 2002 in Kyōto, which hosted hundreds of delegates from different world religions: Now, humankind is facing an unprecedented epoch of technological revolu­ tion. We can call this a space age from the scientific perspective or a global age from the cultural perspective. Atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had announced the arrival of a nuclear age when the whole of humanity might share a common fate in the extinction of the species. At this point in time, we could comprehend the world as a whole from the global viewpoint of humanity. While denying all violence that impedes human rights, such as violation of the dignity of human life, environmental destruc­ tion, famine, poverty, oppression, discrimination, racism, war and terrorism, we could seek to build an eternal peace grounded in the law and justice. We believe this is humankind’s immediate necessity. The most important tasks of the religions of the world today (w atashitachi shūkyōsha ni ataerareta saidai no sh im e i 私 た ち 宗 教 者 に 卷 え ら れ た 最 大 の 使 ???) are to prevent the spread of inhumane violence such as the dreadful crime witnessed on the 11th September 2001, and to establish fair and peaceful order (kōserna heiwa chitsujo 公 正 な 平 和 秩 序 ) throughout the world.2 As explained in the same text, the aim of the Sekai Shūkyōsha no Inori to Foramu should be mainly accomplished through the creation of a “global religious

132

Addressing global problems

body” engaged in prayers for peace, and “mutual exchange and cooperation” (Dainikai Sekai shūkyōsha no Inori to Fōramu Jimukyoku 2003:10,120). Other organizations tend to tie the commitment to interreligious dialogue and the quest for pluralism to practical issues, as is the case of Risshō K ōseikai 立 正 佼 成 会 supporting the campaign “Arms Down! ” launched by the Religions for Peace Global Youth Network. This initiative seeks the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons and the reallocation of m ilitary funds to development programs though a petition circulating worldwide (Risshō Kōseikai 2010). On a different level, activism for peace may be carried out in a non-interreligious context, such as in the case of Soka Gakkai International, which promotes the People’s Decade for Nuclear Abolition campaign and other initiatives such as exhibitions and petitions aimed at the abolition of nuclear weapons (Soka Gakkai International 2011). It should be recalled here that, especially because of the tragic atomic bomb­ ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, references to the ideal of pacifism (heiw ashugi 平 和 主 義 ) are quite common in self-presentations by Japanese religious institutions (Kisala 1999: 2), although the present commitment and activities for peace found in many of them is not necessarily connected to a deep reflection on the historical role played in Japan by the religious subsystem in promoting con­ flict and violence. In this respect, one of the underlying issues regards the reli­ gious cooperation with Japanese imperialism during World War II, which has been so far thematized at the institutional level by only a minority of Japanese religious organizations. Among these, one finds, for example, Jōdo Shinshū 浄 土 真 宗 , and Sōt ōshū 曹 ???同宗.3 Jōdo Shinshū was the first denomination of Japanese Buddhism to admit its wartime responsibilities through official state­ ments of its two major branches in 1987 (Ōtani-ha 大 谷 派 ）and 1991 (Honganji-ha 本 願 寺 派 ), respectively. The federation of the major Jōdo Shinshū organizations, the Shinshū Kyōdan Rengō 真 宗 教 団 連 合 , establishes a direct relationship between the economic development of a global society based on competition and the sacrifice of a multitude of innocent human beings - a trend that can be coun­ tered through the respect for life (inochi レ、のち) and the ideas of equality and fellowship (on-dōbō/on-dōg y ō 御 同 朋 •御 同 行 ) taught by Shinran (Shinshū Kyōdan Rengō 2008). As I have illustrated elsewhere, within the major branches of Jōdo Shinshū there have also been consistent attempts to put this ideal into practice by the institutions and groups of activists, who have issued official documents and conducted campaigns against any form of violence and post-war attempts to revive symbols of past Japanese militarism (such as the already men­ tioned Yasukuni Shrine) (Dessì 2007: 144– 63). Sōtōshū, another religious organ­ ization that has undertaken a serious reflection on war responsibilities (Sōt ōshū 1992), also frames its approach to the problems of contemporary society within the pattern illustrated above. On the one hand, one finds here the danger posed by international conflict and the rapid destruction of the environment. On the other hand, Sōt ōshū contemplates the construction of a peaceful and tolerant society based on the teachings of Śākyamuni, Dōgen 道 兀 ，and Keizan 璧山 (Sōt ōshū 2003). This denomination of Zen Buddhism incorporates the ideal of

Addressing global problems

133

pacifism in its slogan “human rights, peace, environment” (jinken, heiwa, kankyo 人 権 •平 ロ •環 境 ）already mentioned in our discussion on glocal forms (Chapter Three), and has confirmed its institutional engagement in peace on various occa­ sions, through official statements defending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Renunciation of War), and condemning violence, war, and terrorism.4 Among others, Seichō no Ie 生 長 の 豕 , a new religious movement that has often been associated with ultra-nationalism, repeats the binary pattern involv­ ing the diagnosis of the illness (the side effects of globalization) and the prescrip­ tion of the efficacious cure (religion). The current president (sōsai 総 裁 ) Taniguchi Masanobu 谷 ロ 雅 旦 （ b . 1951) points out that high-speed globalization and the dramatic development of technology are accompanied not only by the environmental crisis and the danger posed by arms of mass destruction but also by the serious threat of “fundamentalism” (genrishugi 原 王 義 ) that can be countered from the standpoint of bankyō kiitsu 万 教 帚 一 taught by founder Taniguchi M asaharu 谷 ロ 雅 春 (1893– 1985), according to which “all religions emanate from one universal God” (Taniguchi 2003: 30). Seicho no Ie has also attempted to find other practical ways to cope with global problems, and has particularly focused on ecology, justifying its engagement with the basic teach­ ing of “being grateful to everything in the universe” (tenchi no banbutsu ni kansha sey o 天 地 の 万 物 に 感 謝 せ よ ) (Taniguchi 2002: 328). Seicho no Ie promotes, for example, a “No-meat” (No-mito ノーミート) campaign to reduce the effects of one of global warming’s main causes, and has launched a long-term program to limit emissions of carbon dioxide in its facilities and to awaken members and the public opinion to these issues (Seichō no Ie o-ryōri burogu 2011; Taniguchi 2010; Seichō no Ie 2011; Taniguchi 2002: 328–32). It may be seen that such activities focused on the environmental crisis are by no means limited to the Seichō no Ie camp. The institutional attempts within Shinto 神 道 and Sōt ōshū to approach ecological issues already illustrated in Chapter Three, for example, may be well interpreted as a way of reasserting the public role of these two religions within the global context. A similar approach may be also found among other new religious movements. The Shin-nihon shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai 新 日 本 宗 教 団 体 連 合 会 (Federation of New Religious Organizations of Japan), for example, has been conducting work to promote recycling, afforestation, and the reduction of emissions especially through the Denryoku Daietto Undo 電力ダイェット運動 (Power Diet Movement) (Shinnihon shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai 2003, 2011). In Reiyūkai 霊 友 会 , a plan for the protection of the environment (Reiyūkai kankyō hōshm 霊 友 会 環 境 方 金十） was launched in 2009, which is prim arily concerned with the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions through an awareness campaign among members, based on the ideas of “life” (inochi いのち ） and “future” (m irai 未 来 ） (Reiyūkai 2009). For other religious organizations, such as Sekai Kyū seikyō Izunome Kyōdan 世 界 救 世 教 い づ の め 教 団 , th e rationale for engagement in environmental issues may be even more anchored to the doctrinal level. The present global crisis is considered by this new religious movement as inherent to the development of a “material civilization” (busshitsu bunm ei 物 質 文 明 ）based on “egoism” (rikoshugi

134

Addressing global problems

利 己 主 義 )， which has lost sight of the “Law of Great Nature” (daishizen no hōsoku 大 自 然 の 法 則 ) . As a consequence of this cosmic imbalance, various problems concerning the environment, health, art, politics, and other spheres have arisen, and the total destruction of the planet is coming closer. However, it is believed that through the main purification ritual called j ōrei 浄 霊 and other practices such as “natural farm ing” (shizen nō h ō 自 然 農 法 ）the right order can be recovered and a paradise on Earth can be established where people live in harmony. Thus, it may be seen that Sekai Kyūseikyō Izunome Kyōdan’s present concern for environmental pollution, besides being in tune with the general reposi­ tioning of Japanese religions within global dynamics, also resonates with specific teachings of founder Okada Mokichi 岡 田 茂 吉 (1882– 1955) (Sekai Kyū seikyō Izunome Kyōdan 2009: 13). Another less visible area of engagement for Japanese religions in relation to the problems of contemporary society, which is related to suicide, should be men­ tioned here. This issue is particularly serious in Japan, where the suicide rate is second only to Russia among the industrialized countries, and is very high espe­ cially among men (about 70 percent). In 2010, the number of suicides nationwide was more than 30,000 for the thirteenth consecutive year since 1998, when it suddenly jum ped up following a severe financial crisis (Yomiuri shinbun 2011; West 2005: 224). In this regard, the increased suicide rate appears to be signifi­ cantly correlated to the side effects of the global economy. While the government and networks of volunteers are trying to cope with this difficult problem through legislative measures, campaigns, and counseling, the Japanese religious world has shown an increasing interest. It is significant that the issue of suicide has figured prominently in the recent discussions within the Kyodan Fuchi Kenkyū sho Konwakai 教 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 （ Forum of Research Institutes Associated with Religious Organizations) (Bukkyō taimusu 2009c; Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyū sho Konwakai 2009; cf. Dessì 2010a), which was mentioned in our discussion on bioethical issues in the previous chapter. This network clearly articulates the pattern already illustrated above in its founding statement, where it is emphasized that the advancement of modern society is accompanied by a series of problems related to peace, human rights, ecology, bioethics, disruption of the family and education, and the loss of traditional values that require a specific response from the religious world (Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyū sho Konwakai 2005: 2). While the activities of the forum have been mostly concerned with the discussion of doctrinal aspects and the need for religious cooperation, within some member organizations there have also been attempts to promote practical action. This is the case, for example, of Jisatsu Bōshi Nettowāku Kaze 自殺防止ネットワーク風 ，a non-profit organization founded in 2008 by an inter­ denominational network of twenty-three Buddhist temples and headed by a Sōtōshiū priest, Shinohara Eiichi 德 原 銳 一 ，th at offers counseling to people in need (Bukkyō taimusu 2009d). More recently, the Honganji branch of Jōdo Shinshū has launched in collaboration with the NPO Kokusai Bifurendāzu Tōkyō Jisatsu Bōshi Sentā 国 際 ビフレンダー ズ東京 自殺防 止センター (the local branch of Befrienders Worldwide) a center in Kyōto, the Kyōto Jisatsu Bōshi

Addressing global problems

135

Sentā 京都 自殺防 止セ ンター , with the objective of offering telephone counseling, training volunteers, and promoting awareness campaigns (Chūgai nippō 2010b). Still another important aspect of social activism within Japanese religions concerns international cooperation, which finds application in fund-raising and relief activities, and in direct involvement in projects on behalf of people in devel­ oping countries and conflict areas. Such activities started to appear in the 1950s, with large organizations such as the Honganji and Ōtani branches of Jōdo Shinshū collecting money and supplies for the victims of the Korean War. Various denom­ inations of Japanese Buddhism and the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai got involved in such social work, establishing a pattern of engagement that, through the fund­ raising for orphans of the Vietnam War in the 1970s and the refugee emergency in Cambodia in the early 1980s, continues to be applied to other afflicted areas by a wide range of Japanese religious movements (Saeki 2003: 247). However, the most significant contribution by religion in Japan for contrasting problems left unsolved by global subsystems such as the economy and politics is perhaps that given through the establishment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-profit organizations (NPOs). Any attempt to overview Japanese reli­ gions’ efforts to reposition themselves in the face of pressing global issues would be incomplete without considering the role played by these religious or reli­ giously-inspired organizations in the area of international cooperation.

Global problems and religious NGOs/NPOs For the international public, the most well-known example of a Japanese religion working as a NGO is perhaps Sōka Gakkai 倉 価 字 会 . tIs worldwide umbrella organization, Soka Gakkai International (SGI), was in fact acknowledged as a NGO by the United Nations as early as 1981, when it was associated with the Department of Public Information (DPI) and the United Nations High Commis­ sioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the Charter adopted by SGI in 1995, the posi­ tive role envisaged for this form of Nichiren Buddhism in the solution of pressing global issues and the overcoming of the present crisis is strongly affirmed: We recognize that at no time in history has humankind experienced such an intense juxtaposition of war and peace, discrimination and equality, poverty and abundance as in the twentieth century; that the development of increas­ ingly sophisticated military technology, exemplified by nuclear weapons, has created a situation where the very survival of the human species hangs in the balance; that the reality of violent ethnic and religious discrimination presents an unending cycle of conflict; that hum anity’s egoism and intem­ perance have engendered global problems, including degradation of the natural environment and widening economic chasms between developed and developing nations, with serious repercussions for hum ankind’s collec­ tive future. We believe that Nichiren Daishonin’s Buddhism, a humanistic philosophy of infinite respect for the sanctity of life and all-encompassing compassion, enables individuals to cultivate and bring forth their inherent

136

Addressing global problems wisdom and, nurturing the creativity of the human spirit, to surmount the difficulties and crises facing humankind and realize a society of peaceful and prosperous coexistence. We, the constituent organizations and members of SGI, therefore, being determined to raise high the banner of world citizen­ ship, the spirit of tolerance, and respect for human rights based on the humanistic spirit of Buddhism, and to challenge the global issues that face humankind through dialogue and practical efforts based on a steadfast com­ mitment to nonviolence, hereby adopt this charter, affirm ing the following purposes and principles. (Soka Gakkai International 2010a: 17)

The awareness that religion can reposition itself in global society by address­ ing critical social problems clearly emerges from this text. SGI claims that the aim to solve these pressing issues and create a peaceful and prosperous interna­ tional society should be achieved through its own “humanistic philosophy,” “dialogue,” and “practical efforts.” The reference to “humanistic philosophy,” namely, Ikeda D aisaku’s 池 田 大 作 interpretation of Nichiren Buddhism, is surely functional to the presentation of a suitable profile for a modern NGO col­ laborating with the secular organization of the United Nations. While what con­ cerns the dimension of “dialogue” has been already mentioned above, the third point emphasized by SGI, “practical efforts,” seemingly refers to both the con­ crete promotion of dialogue and to social work promoted by the religious insti­ tutions at the international level. Among these, we find activities such as support for the Amazon Ecological Conservation Center in Brazil and fund-raising drives to support children of war and refugees (Soka Gakkai International 2010b: 17). At the more general level, SGI’s admission to the United Nations as an NGO dates back to the first wave of Japanese religious NGOs. In an overview of Buddhist NGOs in Japan, Jonathan Watts effectively summarizes some of the motivations behind this shift in the religious scene: Japanese Buddhist NGOs first emerged in the early 1980s in response to the intensifying crisis in Indo-China with the boat people from Vietnam and the mass of Cambodian refugees living on the border of Thailand. Groups like the Buddhist Aid Center (BAC), created in 1982 mainly by priests from the Nichiren sect, were in part a response to criticism in the mainstream media that Buddhism had become irrelevant to modern society and that Buddhist priests had no concern for the general well-being of people. Another factor was the increasing international exposure that Japanese, and Japanese priests in particular, were getting as the economy prospered. Many Buddhist priests active in international aid expressed the shock and embarrassment they experienced on their first visits to crisis areas in Southeast Asia when they found that almost all of the religious-based aid work was being carried out by Christian groups from the West. These experiences set off a significant movement toward international relief activities by not only Buddhist NGOs,

Addressing global problems

137

but also by various official and unofficial organs of most Buddhist sects, both old and new.5 Indeed, the humanitarian emergency in Southeast Asia and the cultural climate of those years led to the establishment of various groups, some of which, the Shanti Kokusai B o ran tiak ai シヤンティ国際ボランティア会 （Shanti [International] Volunteer Association) and the Renge Kokusai Borantiakai れんげ国際ボ ラ ン テ ィ ア 会 （ Renge International Volunteer Association), were active even before the Bukkyō Kyūen Sentā 仏 教 救 援 セ ン タ ー (Buddhist Aid Center) was founded. The Shanti Kokusai Borantiakai originates from the Sōtōshū Tōnan Ajia Nanmin Kyū sai K a ig i 曹 洞 宗 東 南 ア ジ ア 難 民 救 済 会 議 (Japan Sōtōshū Relief Committee [for Southeast Asia]), a committee established in 1980 within the Sōtōshū denomination to assist Cambodian refugees. The follow­ ing year, the committee was renamed Sōtōshū Borantiakai 曹同宗不フンテイア会 (Sōtōshū Volunteer Association) and in 1999, it took the current name when it was officially registered as an NPO (Shanti Kokusai Borantiakai 2011a: 353– 6). In its Declaration, the Shanti Kokusai Borantiakai (SVA) characterizes its social engagement in the following way: The SVA stands on the side of those people who suffer because of problems such as poverty and war around the world, local conflicts, the destruction of the environment, and calamities, and shares their suffering while engaging in activities through which a common solution to these problems can be found. Thus, it aims at the realization of a peaceful (shanti) society where it may be possible to “live together and learn together” (tomo ni iki, tomo ni m a n a b u 共に生き , 共 に 学 ぶ ). (Shanti Kokusai Borantiakai 2011b) Besides providing emergency relief in Japan and abroad, the Shanti Kokusai Borantiakai is presently engaged in a variety of projects in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Afghanistan. In particular, this NPO has worked to estab­ lish elementary schools and libraries, to offer scholarships, and to promote envi­ ronment preservation (Shanti Volunteer Association 2010). The Renge Kokusai Borantiakai, also known as ARTIC (Association for Rengein Tanjōji International Cooperation), was established in 1980 on the ini­ tiative of Shingon Risshū 真 律 宗 in order to face the Cambodian crisis, and explicitly refers to Mahāyāna values as “the practice of compassion” (jih ig yō 怒 悲 行 ） and “the practice of the bodhisattva” (bosatsugy ō 菩 薩 行 ） （Renge Kokusai Borantiakai 2009a). Among other things, this NPO is engaged in social work in Himachal Pradesh (India) to support Tibetan refugees, in Myanmar to build schools, and in Sri Lanka to establish libraries and children’s institutions (Renge Kokusai Borantiakai 2009b). Another two more recently established big organizations, the Āyusu Bukkyō Kokusai Kyōryoku Nettowāk u アーユス仏教国際協力ネットワーク (Ayus Buddhist International Cooperation Network) and the Bukkyō NGO Nettowāku 仏 教 NGO

138

Addressing global problems

ネットワーク (Buddhist NGO Network), are characterized by their interdenomina­ tional stance. The Āyusu Bukkyō Kokusai Kyōryoku Nettowāku (commonly known as Ayus) succinctly presents its rationale and objectives as follows: Ayus is an NGO for international cooperation founded in 1993 in order to open eyes to the realities of the world, and engage from the bottom with prob­ lems concerning peace and human rights such as poverty, injustice, and the destruction of the environment on the basis of Buddhist spirituality (Bukkyō no seishin 仏教の精ネ申) . Ayus is a unique organization, since it is “non­ sectarian” (chō-shūha 超 宗 派 ); namely, Buddhists join on an individual basis, and it promotes international cooperation by supporting other NGOs. (Āyusu Bukkyō Kokusai Kyōryoku Nettowāku 2011a) Here, once again the link between religion and the solution to residual prob­ lems of global society is put forward, since Buddhism is deemed to provide the basis for an effective approach to social reality. Interestingly, this NGO endorses an interpretation of the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism which may justify social action. According to Ayus, the cause of human suffering is not only the “evil afflictions” (bonn ō 煩 ???) or worldly desires but also structural social problems, and NGO activities can give a valuable contribution toward their solution and act as a positive element along the path to the cessation of suffering illustrated by the Fourth Noble Truth (dōtai 道 諦 ）（Āyusu Bukkyō Kokusai Kyōryoku Nettowāku 2011b). The Shanti Kokusai Borantiakai and Ayus also take part in another network mentioned above, the Bukkyō NGO Nettowāku (BNN), which was formally established in 2003 by forty religious organizations and other activists, out of the need to share their experience and awaken the public to these issues (Bukkyō NGO Nettowāku 2004). To date, the Bukkyō NGO Nettowāku’s main tasks remain the coordination of NGOs’ activities, the organization of a seminar on education in international cooperation three times a year, and the update of a directory of Buddhist NGOs. As one may expect, this network justifies its efforts in unequivocal Buddhist terms. On the one hand, the idea of “interdependence” (engi 縁 起 ）is seen as the backbone of a worldview beyond any form of ethnic, religious, and cultural discrimination. On the other hand, it is claimed that the idea of “compassion” (itsukushim i 慈しみ ） can allow a responsive attitude toward suffering originating from problems such as conflict and poverty (Bukkyō NGO Nettowaku 2011a). A distinctive self-awareness of the mission of reli­ giously-inspired NGOs in a global setting may also be seen within the Bukkyo NGO Nettowāku. One of the member institutions, the Nichirenshū Shūmuin 日 蓮 宗 宗 務 院 , writes in the pages of the network’s official newsletter: If the following passage from the Buddhist scriptures (Lotus Sūtra, Chapter XX), “I profoundly revere you all! I dare not hold you in contempt. What is the reason? You are all treading the bodhisattva-path, and shall succeed in becoming Buddhas!” can be applied to our modern times, I think that we

Addressing global problems

139

cannot avoid coming to grips with the problems of the world. This should be done by means of international cooperation, not merely through donations but based on mutual understanding and a common standpoint that rejects poverty and discrimination – precisely because we are, now, in this global age – starting from the initiative of teachers (Buddhist priests), together with many other people, for the construction of a peaceful world.6 Shihō Sanga 四 方 f曽イ加(Four Directions Sangha), the Japanese branch of the international network of Buddhist activists Catuddisa Sangha and a member of the Bukkyō NGO Nettowāoku, is even more explicit in this respect. In the words of the representative and Buddhist priest, Imoto Shōkō 井 本 勝 幸 (b .1964): The globalization of the political and economic systems, rather than offering advantages, is causing a time of deep crisis for humankind, with effects such as the destruction of the environment on a planetary scale, the widening gulf between the rich and the poor, and the creation of a society deprived of humanity where the weak are victims of the strong due to the priority given to profit. The Shihō Sanga movement has started as a “harmonious commu­ nity of Buddhists” (wagō suru B ukkyōto kyōdōtai 和 合 す る 仏 教 徒 共 同 体 ), a generic term for various forms of activism aimed at countering and trans­ forming the present globalization trend by giving concrete shape to a selfgoverning, transnational, and borderless body of Buddhist practitioners based in the domain of religion. This movement aims at the realization of a harmonious and peaceful world (world restoration) by contrasting and opposing political power with the power of religion (Buddhism), through which an autonomous Asian model of the Buddha Land (bukkokudo 佛 国 土 ) can be presented to the world. (Imoto 2008) Here we can see not only the strong assertion of Buddhist identity that would lead to the establishment of a transnational “Buddha Land” but also the equally strong antagonism with the political (and economic) global subsystems animat­ ing the Shihoo Sanga’s position. Together with NGOs/NPOs that are non-sectarian or have progressively dis­ tanced themselves from their parent religious organizations, the presence of members with a strong denominational identity within the Bukkyō NGO Nettowāku is noticeable. Besides the abovementioned Nichirenshū Shūmuin, among them one finds, for example, the Arigatō Kikin ありがとう基金 （Arigatou Foundation), an NPO founded in 1990 by the new religious movement Myoochikai Kyodan 妙 智 智 教 th at supports especially projects for children in many countries, and even religious organizations such as Risshō Kōseikai and Kōdōsan 孝 道 山 , a new religious movement focusing on the Lotus Sūtra (Arigatō Kikin 2011; Bukkyō NGO Nettowāku 2011b). This institutional presence among the members of the Bukkyō NGO Nettowāoku reflects a more general trend within the Japanese religious world, where many

140

Addressing global problems

groups besides Sōka Gakkai have engaged in social work through the action of NGOs and NPOs. Among these, one finds, for example, new religious move­ ments such as Konkōkyō 金 光 教 ， Shinnyoen 真 如 苑 ， and Shinji Shūmeikai 神 怒 秀 明 会 . The premise of Konkōkyō’s social engagement is a critical view of the twentieth century, which, similarly to other cases presented above, is acknowledged as a time full of contradictions and characterized by violence, the environmental crisis, and growing economic disparities. A peaceful twentyfirst century, as claimed in the K onkōkyō sengen 金 光 教 ? ? ? (Konkōkyō Declaration) issued in 2001, is possible only based on a new attitude toward real­ ity that accepts the interdependence of god, humans, and all things (aiyo kakeyo あレ、よ力、けよ) . On this basis, overseas social work is being conducted in NGO form with special focus on the Southeast Asian region (Konkōkyō 2001; Konkōkyō Heiwa Katsudō Sentā 2011). Another of these religious groups active through NGO/NPO work, Shinnyoen, currently supports various projects espe­ cially focused on children in Cambodia, Bangladesh and other areas (Shinnyoen 2009). Shinji Shūmeikai, a group that withdrew from Sekai Kyūseikyō in 1970, is engaged in environmental and other related issues especially through the activities of the NPO Shūmei Intānashonaru 秀明 インターナシ ョナル （Shumei International) founded in 2003 (Shumei Intānashonaru 2011). Instructive though it may be, a detailed description of various forms of glo­ bally minded social work found within institutional Japanese religions, networks of activists, and religious NGOs/NPOs is well beyond the scope of this chapter.7 What is specifically relevant to our discussion here is the way religion in Japan is attempting to find a new source of legitimation, and to develop a repositioning strategy within globalization by addressing pressing global issues that the domi­ nant subsystems are not able or willing to cope with. In this regard, from the wide range of responses to this issue coming from within the Japanese religious world it is possible to notice an increasing and genuine concern for residual problems such as war and violence, the destruction of the environment, economic inequal­ ities, and social alienation. W ithin this context, the global crisis tends to be seen through the lens of a religious sensibility that is deemed to provide a solid, and even decisive, contribution along the way to the solution of these problems. As we have seen above, this new role for religion in the global arena is often claimed through a binary pattern reminiscent of Buddhism, where the side effects of glo­ balization represent the illness, and (Japanese) religion the cure. At the same time, however, one is left with the impression that such claims may not always be free from rhetorical overtones. Are, for example, those religious organizations that started operating in Afghanistan after it was bombed and invaded by the ‘coalition of the w illing’ genuinely critical of the global dynamics leading to violence and conflict? And to what extent are Japanese religious organizations actually cooperating with the hidden geopolitical agenda of the dominant force within the global political subsystem (the United States and its allies), when they pair their activities on behalf of the Tibetan people with their own participation to the strategic sanctification of the Dalai Lama as a champion of peace and human rights? Among other things, to what extent would the support given to

Addressing global problems

141

this religious leader, who is at least ambiguous about the so-called western crusade against terrorism and the use of violence, be compatible with the com­ plete denial of violence and war generally found among most Japanese religious institutions?8 These and other interrogatives, such as those on the policy of con­ servative Japanese NGOs and their political connections (Watts 2005), cast a shadow on the possibility that the antagonism to the dysfunctional forces within the global system, more or less explicitly claimed by religious discourses, may necessarily find a thorough application. What emerges is rather the fact that, under certain conditions, Japanese religions might not only play an ancillary role but even contribute to some degree to the perpetuation of the very global prob­ lems for the solution of which they are mobilizing intellectual and material resources, if they approach global dynamics with an uncritical attitude. To put it in blunt terms, this would amount in the worst case to operating in the spaces left over by the political and economic subsystems once the ‘dirty job’ has been done. And one may imagine that this risk can be especially alive for religious groups engaged in international cooperation, when the need to establish connections with the political and economic world in order to keep on working highly institu­ tionalized organizations may lead them to accommodate the status quo and the logic of the dominant global subsystems.9

Conclusion

This book started with the observation that the jargon of globalization has been progressively incorporated in religious communication within the Japanese con­ text. The case studies analyzed in the previous chapters provide enough evidence to argue that contemporary Japanese religions not only speak of globalization but also act within this process in various roles. Perhaps the most apparent of these is the way Japanese religions provide material to cultural global flows, thus acting as carriers of globalization in a broader sense than that implied by their m is­ sionary activities overseas. However, it is possible to see that the dramatically increased flow of cultural exchanges in the last few decades of accelerated glo­ balization is related to religion in other important ways. To start with, the pro­ gressive relativization of religious values increasingly prompts Japanese religions to reposition themselves on the world religious map in relation to other religions, whose dignity may be acknowledged to various degrees. On another level, Japanese religions respond to global cultural flows by shaping new glocal identi­ ties, whereby the catalyst in the process of glocalization may be provided by external and ‘native’ sources. Paradoxically, these processes of religious change showing the active role of Japanese religions within global dynamics may be closely intertwined with the promotion of cultural chauvinism, which is not infrequently mistaken as implying a complete rejection of globalization. At the same time, this does not exclude that Japanese religions may also resist relativization and oppose change in an attempt to avoid cultural homogenization. Moreover, the involvement of Japanese religions in global dynamics at the sys­ temic level is also relevant. In this connection, on the one hand religion in Japan as part of the global religious subsystem is shown to be engaged in border nego­ tiation with dominant global subsystems such as politics, secular education, and science. On the other hand, the religious subsystem in Japan tries to reposition itself within the global society and to find new legitimation by addressing press­ ing global problems such as war, the environmental crisis, poverty, and social alienation left unsolved by the dominant subsystems. All these aspects have been summarized in the typology illustrated in the Introduction, which has provided the starting point for examining a wide range of contemporary Japanese religions, to show the degree and modality of their involvement in global dynamics in the last few decades. In turn, these analyses

Conclusion

143

have been preceded by the discussion of two sensitive methodological issues, namely, the definition of religion and the periodization of globalization. With reference to the first point, a variety of recent approaches has been critically analyzed to develop a working definition of religion centered on the concepts of authority and super-empirical, which might minimize the risk of cultural bias when dealing with religion in the Japanese context. With regard to the second point, I have attempted to illustrate that the category of globalization may cogently apply to the present Japanese context, and that there are reasons to argue that Japan and Japanese religions have been significantly exposed to global dynamics even prior to the massive influence received by western modernity after the latter half of the twentieth century. In this sense, I have suggested the possibility of identifying different phases of globalization and proto-globalization in Japan. As far as religious communication as such is concerned, I have documented through the analysis of various examples the often acute awareness of Japanese religions of the changes affecting global society and the increasing presence of other religions on the global scene. Activities such as the Hieizan shūkyō Samitto (Religious Summit at Mt Hiei) and those promoted by Risshō Kōseikai even explicitly acknowledge in this regard their indebtedness to events taking place on a global scale, and especially the changes introduced by the Second Vatican Council and Pope John Paul II’s global activism. The institutional repositioning of Japanese religions as ‘true world religions’ among many others (religious pluralism), which may be accompanied by the endorsement of the principle of freedom of religion, and the promotion of interreligious dialogue count in this regard as meaningful responses to the progressive relativization of values pro­ moted by globalization (type 1). On the other hand, in most of the cases analyzed here the acceptance of pluralism tends to remain at a superficial level, and hege­ monic claims surface, where Buddhism and other Japanese traditions are more or less explicitly opposed to non-Japanese religious traditions and presented as hav­ ing a closer relation to the absolute truth (type 2). All this indicates that the acceptance of pluralism in a global society is a difficult exercise that rests upon a delicate balance, and that the formal acceptance of this challenge in the Japanese religious context does not prevent the concomitant presence of inclusivist atti­ tudes. We have also seen how the increased presence of other religions in the global arena may facilitate the emergence of exclusivist approaches (type 3), which can also find their rationale in the idea of being invested by the m is­ sion of saving all humankind, as in the case of the shakubuku campaign in Sōka Gakkai. As has been observed for other religious traditions worldwide, in Japan the impact of global cultural flows and growing expectations to conform to global standards produce a variety of local interpretations and glocal/hybrid forms. It is possible to distinguish here between a glocalization leaning to external sources and another leaning to ‘native’ sources. A phenomenon such as the incorpo­ ration of the discourse of human rights in religious communication found in traditions such as Jōdo Shinshū, Jōdoshū , and Sōtōshū may be understood as

144

Conclusion

glocalization leaning to external sources (type 4). W ithin this context, it is noticeable how the idea of human rights basically originating in European cul­ ture is made to resonate with religious concepts from the Buddhist tradition such as those of “fellow companions” (dōb ō), “wisdom and compassion” (chie to jih i), “the equality of all human beings” (b a m in -b yōd ō), “co-dependent origination” (engi), and the related notion of “harmonious coexistence” (tom oiki). As a result of these selective processes, the religious tradition is increasingly related to the global context and to powerful global ideas, and a reshaping of local religious identities becomes possible. Similarly, in the case of glocalization leaning to ‘native’ sources (type 5) we have seen how the reshaping of Shintō and Sōt ōshū as religions ‘traditionally’ concerned with ecology revolves around ideas such as those focusing on trees and the natural environment in Shintō, and the intercon­ nectedness of all things in Japanese Buddhism. Most importantly, however, the ‘native’ religious tradition is subject here to a creative reading, and, following the worldwide growing awareness of ecology, new identities are shaped that might meet the growing expectations of global society. As the examples of the new religious movements Kōfuku no Kagaku and M ahikari show, the creation of hybrid religious forms may also be tightly connected to another typical reaction given by local players to the dynamics of global society, namely, the emergence of cultural chauvinism (type 6). Thus, the incorporation of Christian themes and still others found in texts related to the Theosophical movement, which reveals a positive attitude toward global cultural flows, may serve at the same time the purpose of emphasizing the superiority of Japanese culture, which counts as a strong and aggressive reassertion of the local within the global.A guarded attitude toward global dynamics may also be seen at work in the case of the critique of individualism as a western value found among various Japanese religious groups, although this does not necessarily entail the endorsement of cultural chauvinism and may simply manifest, in principle, a resistance to homogenization (type 7). While Japanese religions overseas have been characterized, especially until the 1960s, by an analogous resistance to change by acting as identity markers and facilitating the creation of virtual bridges ideally linking immigrant communities with Japan (type 11), processes of hybridization may be observed, with the crea­ tion of new local identities shaped through the use of external but also Japanese ‘native’ sources (types 8-9). These dynamics have been exemplified here through the cases of Jōdo Shinshū and Zen Buddhism in North America. In the former case, meditational techniques from the Zen Buddhist tradition have been incorpo­ rated by a significant sector of the religious community in an attempt to meet the expectations of the North American public, and these changes seem to be influ­ encing, to some degree, attempts to redefine the role of meditation within Japanese Jōdo Shinshū. In the case of Zen Buddhism, we have seen how its diffusion in North America and elsewhere has been characterized by a distinctive emphasis on zazen meditation, inner religious experience – in line with pre-war Japanese images of Zen Buddhism and orientalist ideas – and the prominent role of the laity, aspects that in Japan have generally a secondary (if any) importance for the com­ munity of practitioners. We have also noted how these glocal forms of Japanese

Conclusion

145

Buddhism overseas are not immune to the lure of cultural chauvinism (type 10), especially when Zen Buddhism is presented as a ‘supra-religion,’ namely, as the implicit source of all spirituality, and opposed to western ‘dualism.’ Also in the case of Jōdo Shinshū, there are indications that the incorporation of meditation may go hand in hand with a certain emphasis on the superiority of the Japanese religious tradition over monotheistic religions. On the other hand, it is also appar­ ent how the glocalization of Japanese religions overseas can be significantly related to orientalist approaches, such as those depicting Japanese Zen Buddhism as decadent and the ‘West’ as the ideal setting for reviving the tradition, which also seem to emerge in so-called Engaged Buddhism. This last point is closely linked to the function of Japanese religions as carriers of globalization, which provide material for new local formations worldwide (type 12). In this regard, it is evident that the proselytizing activities of Japanese religions overseas have played a significant role and affected the religious behav­ ior and worldviews of many people around the globe. The increased influence of Japanese religions over other cultures through growing membership overseas, however, represents only one part of a broader picture, since much of this influ­ ence seems to depend on the popularization of selected themes that may also be perceived at the local level as generic forms of spirituality, and contribute together with other sources to the creation of new religious identities. Here, we have focused on a few distinctive ways through which Japanese religions contribute to global cultural flows, such as the emergence of meditational practices for Christians, Macrobiotics, and the work of foundations established by Japanese religious organizations that promote and fund academic work at the international level. Such phenomena are relevant especially because they reveal how Japanese religions have been successful in exercising some form of soft power over other cultures independently from direct proselytization. The first of these, the phe­ nomenon of meditation for Christians, is related to the ‘Zen boom’ and shows how elements of Japanese religiosity may be accepted by Christian practitioners, and used to reshape religious identities without the need to renounce their own faith. Macrobiotics, which is commonly associated with its dietary prescriptions, has also been instrum ental in the international diffusion of elements of Japanese and Chinese religiosity that include not only the prominent ying-yang theory but also distinctive values such as self-cultivation, gratitude, filial piety, and venera­ tion for the ancestors, which are related to the Confucian and Buddhist heritage and occupy an important place in the basic teachings of this movement. At another level, the activities of foundations as diverse as the Bukkyoo Dendoo Kyōkai (Society for the Promotion of Buddhism) and the Shinto Kokusai Gakkai (International Shinto Foundation) have been instrumental in reinforcing the presence of Japanese religious elements in global cultural flows, especially at the academic level. This last case also exemplifies the role played by preemptive processes of selection in the introduction of cultural elements in global cultural flows, and their relation to hidden politico-cultural agendas. As far as the systemic level is concerned, we have observed that Japanese reli­ gions may be considered local expressions of a global religious subsystem, which

146

Conclusion

is engaged in border negotiation with other global subsystems such as politics, education, and science (type 13). In the case of politics, borders with the religious subsystem in Japan are formally set up by the 1947 Constitution, which aimed at guaranteeing freedom of religion and the secularity of the state against any return to State Shintoo. This has not, however, prevented various attempts by right-wing sectors of Japanese society, flanked by Shintō and other religious institutions, to reestablish official ties between elements of wartime State Shintō ideology and the democratic state. Although Shintō has not been alone in this battle, it may be seen how the lobbying of the Jinja Honchō (Association of Shintō Shrines), its political arm Shintō S eiji Renmei (officially, Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership), and other ultranationalist organizations such as the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) have been on various occasions quite effective in weakening the separation between religion and politics. It is also noticeable that there has been resistance to these attempts by other religious organizations such as the Shin-nihon shūkyō-dantai Rengōkai (Federation of New Religious Organizations of Japan) and the Japanese Buddhist world, notably Jōdo Shinshū, which have been very critical of attempts to re-nationalize the Yasukuni Jinja, a Shintō shrine carrying a symbolic significance for the revival of wartime ideology, and have contributed to their failure. It is also apparent that another important way through which the religious subsystem in Japan negotiates borders with the political sub­ system is the more or less direct participation in the election process. Various Japanese religious organizations, including those that would oppose any return to State Shintō, customarily endorse candidates by major political parties, thus becoming pools of voters that can indirectly influence the political process. It may be seen how, through this collaboration, both the political and the religious subsystems are able to get some immediate benefits. In some cases, Diet mem­ bers affiliated with religious organizations have formed or still form pressure groups within the Japanese Diet, such as the aforementioned Shintō Seiji Renmei and the Tsukiji Monshinkai, which act as outposts for border negotiation between politics and religion. In other extreme cases, religious involvement in politics has led to the creation of political parties, such as the very successful Kōmeitō by Sooka Gakkai and the recently established Kōfuku Jitsugentō by Kōfuku no Kagaku. Diverse though their political orientations and objectives may be, these parties ground their legitimacy in participating in national politics on interpreta­ tions of Article 20 of the Constitution (granting freedom of religion) as allowing political activities by religious organizations. It addition, this view, according to which Article 20 is substantially meant to address the interference of politics in religion (and hardly vice versa), finds support in an influential post-war interpre­ tative tradition also endorsed by the Japanese government. This has not prevented other religious groups, among others, from criticizing Sōka Gakkai’s ties to the K ōm eitō despite their formal separation in 1970, and the latter’s activities espe­ cially on the occasion of important political junctures, such as, for example, Kōmeitō’s participation for the first time in the ruling coalition in 1993. This critical attitude by various other religious organizations, on the other hand, may be seen as part of a wider trend within Japanese society, where a certain concern

Conclusion

147

over the political ambitions of religious organizations periodically surfaces. In this regard, it is not excluded that the debate on the involvement of religion in Japanese politics may intensify after the recent creation by Kōfuku no Kagaku of the Kōfuku Jitsugentō, which has (though unsuccessfully) taken part in national and local elections since 2009. In fact, the launch of the Kōfuku Jitsugentō has the potential to make the confrontation between the religious and political subsystems escalate to some degree, since it rests on the ideal of a charismatic leadership sanctioned by a super-empirical agency formulated by founder Okawa Ryūhō. Another issue related to type (13) and border negotiation in global society is the relationship between the religious and educational subsystems in Japan, which is regulated by the Fundamental Law of Education. This law has formally prohibited religious education in public schools since its enactment in 1947, although the institution of classes in moral education in post-war Japan has been effective in introducing pre-war religious values in the classroom. The debate over the separation of religion and public education has especially intensified on the occasion of the recent amendment in 2006 of the Fundamental Law of Education, through which the Liberal Democratic Party has been successful in implement­ ing measures such as the introduction of respect for tradition and patriotism as guideline values in public education. We have seen that before and even after the amendments were approved by the Japanese Diet various religious organizations lobbied to have their views on education recognized by the government. Although the requests advanced by various organizations may differ from each other in many respects, there seems to be a certain convergence at the general level on the need to incorporate the teaching of religious sentiment in public schools, which could act as a source of morality and civic sense for new generations of Japanese. This claim is quite strong within organizations as the Jinja Honcho and the Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai (Japan Buddhist Federation) but may also be seen, for example, underlying the position of the largest umbrella for Japanese religious organizations, the Nihon Shūkyō Renmei (Japanese Association of Religious Organizations). It is apparent that within the Japanese religious world the reac­ tion to these attempts at weakening the borders between religion and public edu­ cation has been limited to a few religious institutions. The amendment of the Fundamental Law of Education exposes the political subsystem as effectively exploiting issues such as juvenile violence to accelerate the return to pre-war ideals, and concurrently most Japanese religions lobby based on the idea that religion communication in public education is superior to the secular as the source of morality. Although in the revised draft of the law reference to religious sentiment is lacking, from the analysis of this issue emerges the strong determi­ nation through which the Japanese religious world as a whole engages in border negotiation with the educational subsystem, and how its effort may be partly supported by sectors of the political subsystem. The third case of border negotiation in global society (type 13) examined here refers to the relationship between religion and the scientific subsystem in Japan. The degree to which the authority claims of the latter may be viewed in a

148

Conclusion

negative way by religion is exemplified by the contemporary debate in bioethics, and most notably by the controversial issue of organ transplant. In the last three decades, the advances in medical knowledge at the international level have exerted decisive pressure on the Japanese political subsystem to conform to international standards and enact legislation about organ transplants. While the 1997 Organ Transplant Law acknowledged the condition of brain death (facilitat­ ing a successful organ transplant) of the donor only if accompanied by written consent, the 2009 amendment removed age limits for donors and finally recog­ nized brain death as legal death, thus facilitating domestic organ donations by children and adults and avoiding further criticism from the World Health Organization (WHO). The claims of authority of the scientific subsystem over issues of life and death have been challenged almost unanimously by the Japanese religious world since the debate began in the 1980s. The core question in this respect is not so much the transplant per se, but the conception of death that is traditionally based in Japan on the “three signs” (sm c h ōkō) (cessation of heart­ beat and respiration, and opening of the pupils), thus allowing the view of brain death as a kind of partial death. A critical attitude related to this specific point is found in most major Japanese religious organizations, though with different tones and emphases. It is also noticeable that a variety of religious motifs under­ lie the aforementioned view, including injunctions to avoid suffering (here referred to the donor), conceptions of the afterlife, and still other notions such as filial piety and the integrity of the body. On these bases, most Japanese religions have vigorously attempted to oppose the advance of the scientific subsystem and the legal codification of its mode of communication, although the pressure exer­ cised by the religious subsystem has not been in this respect very effective, and the two subsystems are more functionally differentiated at present than they were before 1997. Finally, from our analysis emerges enough evidence to argue that Japanese religions are trying to reassert their role in global society through increasing engagement with residual problems such as war, the environmental crisis, and poverty at the international level (type 14). These activities are variously con­ ducted at the denominational level, through interreligious cooperation, and through the establishment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non­ profit organizations (NPOs). While the many groups involved differentiate themselves by the typology and the area of their intervention (especially in Asia), they share a general tendency to justify their global engagement through a binary pattern reminiscent of Buddhism, where (Japanese) religion and its social appli­ cations are presented as the appropriate cure for present-day social illness – namely, the pressing problems generated by other global subsystems such as the economy and politics. Such activism, besides being religiously motivated, is also one way through which Japanese religions try to find an additional source of legitimation at the systemic level and strengthen their public image. This is also suggested by the often acute reflexive awareness of their own task and its sig­ nificance within the global context. There are also indications that, while the reli­ gious subsystem in Japan repositions itself as a corrective to the contradictions

Conclusion

149

generated by other subsystems, it is not necessarily immune from the risk of playing an ancillary role in the global field, and even to contribute to the status quo when global problems and dynamics are approached uncritically or naively. What emerges from the present analysis of Japanese religions within global dynamics in the last few decades is, therefore, quite a complex and multifaceted picture. Phenomena that at first sight may appear completely unrelated to each other such as the promotion of interreligious dialogue, Macrobiotics, and the emergence of a new religious political party in Japan are shown to make sense as parts of the same globalization process. Moreover, it is also evident that the vari­ ous roles played by Japanese religions within globalization may be often found in mixed forms, or even simultaneously in the same religious context. In this sense, the first empirical case analyzed in this book, the Hieizan shūkyō Samitto, may be approached as an expression of religious pluralism and as a repositioning of religion at the systemic level through addressing the global issue of peace left unsolved by the dominant subsystems. Just to cite a few other examples, the glocal image of Shintō as a ‘religion of the forest’ also contains elements of cultural chauvinism, while the religious critique of individualism may reveal a reaction to homogenization, be associated with cultural chauvinism, and emerge within the context of border negotiation between the religious and other subsystems. From the results of our inquiry, it is possible to argue that the attempt to char­ acterize Japanese religions’ relationship with globalization in terms of either ‘acceptance’ or ‘refusal’ would be insufficient to approach the complexity of these dynamics. Rather, globalization in its present-day accelerated phase seems to increasingly provide the framework through which religious communication is conceived and religious change takes place, be it intentionally or unintentionally. W ithin this context, what is characterized as ‘against’ globalization from an emic point of view may instead appear as ‘within’ globalization from an etic and ana­ lytical perspective. This does not imply that we are dealing with a ‘global’ night in which all cows are black. Rather, it means that, with the pervasiveness and rapidity of present-day global dynamics and the unprecedented intensification of worldwide cultural flows, religious change and the repositioning of religion within society are likely to be more and more the outcome of globally minded choices, irrespectively from the extent to which they are perceived as such by the religious actors involved in the process.

Notes

Introd uction

1 See Hannerz (1987,1991), Friedm an (1990), N ederveen Pieterse (1994,2009), Robertson (1995), Kraidy (1999), Tom linson (1996, 2003), Beck (2002), and Roudom etof (2005). 2 See R obertson (1992, 1995, 2007). R obertson affirm s th at the m ajor locus o f origin o f the term glocalization is Japan, and relates it to the Japanese w ord dochakuka 土 着 化 (indigenization) and to 1980s business jargon to indicate m icro-m arketing (R obertson 1995: 28). It should be recalled in this connection th at dochakuka was u sea in religious com m unication in Japan w ith reference to the indigenization or acculturation o f C hris­ tianity as early as the 1960s. Cf. A riga (1963). I am indebted to M artin Repp for this point. 3 See, for exam ple, Seiw ert (1989), B eyer (1994, 2000, 2006), Lehm ann (1998, 2002), T urner (2001), B ochinger (2001), C asanova (2001, 2007), L echner (2003, 2005), Beckford (2003), Riesebrodt (2003), Freiberger (2003), C am pbell (2005), Juergensm eyer (2005), and Beyer and Beaman (2007). 4 A s should be clear from these prem ises, m y analysis here is anim ated by different (com plem entary) concerns than those o f other interesting approaches focusing on the transplantation o f religion, such as B aum ann’s (1994). 1 T h e risk o f cultural bias

1 C f., for exam ple, Fitzgerald (2003). A nalogous reservations about the full applicability o f this deconstructive approach to the Japanese religious context apply to critiques o f the category o f religion such as those elaborated by T alal A sad (1993: 27– 54) and Tomoko M asuzaw a (2005: 319– 20). In this sense, the present approach is rather closer to concerns such as those expressed by Ivan Strenski, w hen he observes th at “ideo­ logical critique needs to m ove forw ard by accepting the provisional and corrigible nature o f hum an know ledge, rather than lusting after absolutes,” because “som e ‘con­ ditioned’ or ideologically inform ed theories m ay be better than others,” and “in som e context are to be p referred over others” (Strenski 2004: 286– /). 2 Cf. G luck (1985: 138), and H ardacre (1989: 114– 32). O n the influence exercised by m ajor B uddhist denom inations upon the religious policy o f the M eiji governm ent see, for exam ple, N itta (2000). 3 “D as P roblem der Sim ultaneitat von U nbestim m barkeit und B estim m theit (oder: Transzendenz undIm m anenz).” Luhm ann (1977: 46). 4 Some scholars have criticized the Luhm annian dichotom y for being dependent on a C hristian self-understanding o f religion. See, for exam ple, Laerm ans and V erschraegen (2001: 18), and R asch (2000: 108). For a m ore positive reception o f Luhm ann’s catego­ ries and their application to the Japanese religious context, see K leine (2012).

N otes

151

5 See, for exam ple, Luhm ann (1 9 8 2 :1 5 ;1 9 9 2 : 34), M uller and Schm id (1992: 514– 15), W ilson (1998: 154– 5), and K otthoff (2007: 171– 3). 6 “E in K om plex relig iöser P raktiken, die a u f der P räm isse der E xistenz in der R egel unsichtbarer p ersönlicher oder unpersönlicher überm enschlicher M ächte beruhen.” R iesebrodt (2007: 113). 7 F or sim ilar view s on this specific point see, for exam ple, Cox (1999: 272), and Robertson (1970: 50). O n the problem atical status o f the categories o f “superhum an” and “super­ natural,” see, for exam ple, Saler (1977) and Stausberg (2009). 8 See, for exam ple, H anegraaff (1996: 182): “A s a com prehensive etic category for em bracing the full range o f possibilities, I have given preference to the technical term ‘m eta-em p irical’ over such concepts as ‘d iv in e,’ ‘sp iritu al’ or ‘su p ern atu ral.’ Interm ediate beings, such as channeled entities or angels, are no t generally considered as ‘div in ities,，bu t in the b elievers’ daily practice they m ay often function as such. It w ould be artificial and m isleading to treat them as a category com pletely separate from ‘divine’ beings in a strict sense. The term ‘spiritm T is m ore com prehensive, but seem s to suggest an opposition to ‘m aterial’ w hich is p articularly problem atic w hen u sed in m onistic contexts. The sam e applies to ‘su p ern atu ral,’ w hich presupposes an ontological division expressly denied by m any o f our sources. The term ‘m etaem pirical,’ in contrast, sim ply indicates any reality beyond the em pirical w orld acces­ sible to com m on, intersu b jective sense experience (or the extension o f sense experience by scientific technology). The ‘m eta-em pincal’ covers G od, gods, angels, invisible entities, and subjectively experienced presences or non-ordinary realities.” C f. H anegraaff (1999: 371). 9 This qualification is aw arded by the C enter for Education in R eligious C ulture (Shū kyō Bunka Kyōiku Suishin Sentā 宗 教 文 化 教 育 推 進 セ ン タ ー ） “w ith the purpose o f pro­ m oting the qualitative im provem ent o f education in religious culture in Japan.” In p ar­ ticular, as stated in the regulations, “it aim s at fostering elem entary know ledge about, and the capacity to understand Japanese and w orld religious cultures at higher educa­ tion level” (shūkyō Bunka Kyōiku Suishin Sentā 2011). For the discussions especially related to the 2006 revision o f the Japanese Fundam ental Law o f Education th at p re­ ceded the institution o f this exam ination system , see Inoue (2007b), Y am aori et a l. (2007), and T suchiya (2011). 10 Iw anam i Shoten Jiten H enshū bu (1999). The Japanese tex t reads: “K am i m ata wa nanrana no chōetsuteki zettaisha, arui wa hizokuna mono kara bunri sare kinki sareta shinseina m ono ni kansuru shinkō/g y ōji. M ata, sorera no renkanteki taikei. K iesha wa seishinteki kyōdō shakai (kyōdan) o ito n a m u 神 ま た は 何 ら な の 超 越 的 絶 対 者 ， あ る い は 卑 俗 な も の か ら 分 離 さ れ 禁 忌 さ れ た 神 聖 な も の に 関 す る 信 仰 • 行 事 . また , そ れ ら の 連 関 的 体 系 . 帰 依 者 は 精 神 的 共 同 社 会 (教 団 ) を 営 む .” 11 D urkheim defines religion as follow s: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, th at is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions – beliefs and practices th at unite its adherents in a single m oral com m u­ nity called a church” (D urkheim 2001: 46). 12 O n these points, cf., for exam ple, de Bary (2001, 2005), Holcom be (2001), A rnason (2002), and R am belli (1996). 13 O n these points, cf., for exam ple, W illiam s (2005: 7), M ohr (1994: 353), H ur (2005), and H ardacre (2006: 281). 14 O n these topics, see, for exam ple, G luck (1985), H ardacre (1989), K etelaar (1990), and Figal (1999). 15 See, for exam ple, K etelaar (1991), S harf (1993), and Faure (1995). O ther aspects o f secularization in m odern Japan have been analyzed by W inston D avis from a different perspective. See, for exam ple, D avis (1992: 229– 51). 16 O n these issues, cf., for exam ple, C am pbell (2005: 68; 2007: 284), M orris-Suzuki (1998: 171), and R obertson (1992: 57– 60).

152

Notes

2 “One true world religion among many others ” ？ 1 Shoshin isshō has been translated into English with the title Lifetime Beginner: An Autobiography (Niwano 1994). 2 Niwano (1976: 200-1). Reference to “superstitions” is missing in the Japanese text: cf. Niwano (1989: 330-1). 3 See Dessi (2011). The presence of this rhetoric in Soka Gakkai was illustrated in the early 1990s by Anson Shupe (1991). Cf. Kisala (1999: 158-77). 4 Thelle (1987: 146). Article 28 of the 1889 Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Dainippon teikoku kenpō 大日本帝国憲、 法）stated that “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief (shinkyō no jiy ū 信教ノ自由)， ’ (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan 2004a, 2004b). 5 Soka Gakkai ofiicially separated from Nichiren Shōshū in 1991 following a long period of harsh confrontation. 6 Soka Gakkai Kyōgakubu (196 7: 330). The quotation is from Chapter II on Expedient Devices (hōbenbon 力® 品）of the Lotus Sūtra.

3 Shaping new glocal identities 1 See Antoni (2001a). A distinct phenomenon is represented by the increasing popularity of Christian-style chapel weddings in contemporary Japan, which in the last few dec­ ades have largely outnumbered those conducted by Shintō priests. This is actually a borderline case, also because the ceremony is often performed by fake priests at com­ mercial facilities such as wedding parlors and hotels. Thus, Christian-style chapel wed­ dings in Japan may perhaps be better characterized as a general example of cultural hybridization, similarly to the case of the adoption of Christmas (cf. Fisch 2001; Mullins 2011:69; Goldstein-Gidoni 2001; Kimura and Belk 2005). 2 The term dōwa 同和 （ social integration) refers to the hisabetsu buraku especially in administrative language. 3 The full name is ‘Dōwa Mondai’ Mojidai’ ni Torikumu Shūkyō Kyōdan Rentai Kaigi 「 同和問題」 にとりくむ宗教教団連帯会議. 4 Cf. Howard (1999). Although in the following we will specifically refer to the institu­ tional use and adaptation of these ideas, the scope of this rhetoric is by no means lim ­ Shinto institutions. In fact, the theme of Shintō Shinto as a ‘religion of the forest’ may ited to Shintō be considered one of the characteristic marks of the so-called nihonjinron 日本人論 discourse on Japaneseness, implying the strong affirmation of Japanese identity, and nihonkyc>ron 日本教論(discourse on Japanese notably of one of its manifestations, the nihonkyōron Shinto is a religion of the forest has been religion). Within this context, the idea that Shintō vigorously affirmed by intellectuals such as Umehara Takeshi and Nakazawa Shin’ichi (Shimazono 1995a; Prohl 2004). As a brief example, for Umehara, who is perhaps the Shinto has nothing to do with pre-war most representative proponent of these ideas, Shintō nationalism, but “originated as a form of nature worship, rooted in the civilization of the forest.” And, Umehara claims, as a form of Japanese spirituality this provides Japan with a crucial resource for developing a new civilization overcoming the European one and its pitfalls (Umehara 1999: 42, 47). In turn, the historical antecedents of this ideol­ ogy may be traced in formations such as pre-war anti-western rhetoric, the writings of Tetsuro 和迁哲郎（ Watsuji Tetsurō 1889-1960), and, much earlier, Kokugaku 国学 thought. Cf., for example, Rambelli (2001), and Tucker (2003).

4 Glocalization, cultural chauvinism, and resistance to change 1 See for example Ketelaar (1991), Faure (1995), Sharf (1993), Amstutz (1997), Snodgrass (2003), Schalk et al. (2003), Borup (2004), and Porcu (2008). A connection with the

N otes

2

3

4

5 6 7

8 9

10 11

12

153

em ergence o f the so-called new -new religions in Japan is suggested by Ian Reader, w ith specific reference to A um Shinrikyō, A gonshū , and K ōfuku no K agaku (Reader 2002). M ahikari (T rue L ight) is a generic term indicating here tw o relig io u s groups th at share th e sam e basic teachings and practices: Sekai M ahikari B unm ei Kyōdan 世 界 真 光 文 明 教 団 , the original new relig io us m ovem ent; and Sū kyō M ahikari 宗 教 真 光 , a sp lin ter group form ed after O kada’s death by h is daughter Sachiko and m ost o f th e religiou s com m unity. M ahikari’s focus is especially the ro le o f O kada as savior (sukuinushi 救レヽ主) sent by the god Su 主 and on a p u rificatio n ritu al (okiyom e お 清 め ) m eant to cleanse m em bers (and eventually th e w orld) o f evil sp ir­ its, thu s opening the w ay to the realization o f a “civilization o f true lig h t” (m ahikari b u n m e i真 光 文 明 ). See D avis (1980: 80). The them e o f M u had been introduced in the 1860s by the anti­ quarian B rasseur de B ourbourg as indicating the M ayan nam e for the m ythic continent o f A tlantis, and w as later, in the 1890s, taken up by the French archeologist A ugustus LePlongeon (Ram aswam y 2005: 74). See Ram asw am y (2005: 73– 4). For the earlier origins o f the concept o f Lem uria in evolutionary thought and in the w ork o f Philip Sclater (1829– 1913), see Santucci (2008: 61), and Ram asw am y (2005: 21). D avis (1980: 82). For the early reception o f the Theosophical m ovem ent in Japan, see, for exam ple, Y oshinaga (2010). This new religious m ovem ent is currently registered as a religious corporation under the nam e Kō so Kōtai Jingū A m atsukyō 皇 祖 皇 太 神 宮 天 津 教 (Y um iyam a 2006). See K necht (1995: 336– 8), and T sukada (2009: 74); cf. Y am ane (1964, 1994). The sam e connection betw een O kada’s thought and these docum ents is m ade by A ndris T ebecis in one o f the few authoritative (em ic) expositions o f M ahikari’s doctrines in the English language (Tebēcis 1982: 355). For the incorporation o f them es found in the Takeuchi m onjo in Ōm oto and in Fujita H im iko’s 藤 田 妃 見 子 M egam i no Umi 女神ノ海 , see Y oung (1989). For the connection betw een nationalism and the Takeuchi m onjo in M ahikari, see also Tsukada (2009). See Ōkaw a (1997a: 266– 7). The seven incarnations o f Eru K antā re and their respective places o f incarnation a r e :1 ) Ra M u フ•ム ー (L a M u, C ontinent o f M u); 2) Tosu トス (Thoth, C ontinent o f A tlantis); 3) Riento A rn Kuraudo リエント•ア ー ル • 彡ラウド (Rient A rl Croud, ancient Inca Em pire); 4) O fearisu 才フエノリス (O phealis, G reece); 5) H erum esu ヘ ル メ ス （ Herm es, G reece); 6) Gōtam a Shiddāruta ゴータマ•シッダーノレタ (Siddhārtha G autam a, India); and 7) Ōkaw a Ryūhō 大 川 隆 法 (Japan) (Ōkaw a 1997a: 359). A m ong other things, it is barely necessary to recall here the centrality o f H erm es in the tradition o f w estern occultism . This figure evocative o f the future B uddha M aitreya is the dai-nyorai in charge o f regulating the intensity o f the light o f the Eternal Buddha (Ōkaw a 1997b: 272). Cf. C ornille (1999), and R eader (2002). C ornille also notices the link betw een cultural nationalism and econom ic success in the w ritings o f Ōkaw a (C ornille 1999: 235). The link betw een the integration o f foreign cultural elem ents and cultural chauvinism in K ōfuku no K agaku, A um Shinrikyō, and A gonshū w ith reference to N ostradam us’s Prophecies is illustrated in K isala (1998). For the issue o f nationalism in K ōfuku no K agaku and M ahikari in connection w ith th eir ‘divine m ission,’ see also Tsukada (2009). The connection betw een global identity form ation and nationalism in Kōfuku no K agaku is also em phasized in S chrim pf (2008). Kōgakkan D aigaku w as established in 1882 in M ie prefecture near the G rand Shrines o f Ise (Ise Jingū 伊 勢 神 宮 ),，the spiritual center o f Shintō enshrining (in the inner shrine) the sun-goddess A m aterasu Ōm ikam i 天 照 大 御 神 . As an institution training Shintō priests and founded by the state, Kōgakkan D aigaku w as discontinued in 1945 and reopened later in 1952 (Bocking 1997: 60, 99).

154

N otes

5 G localization overseas

1 See Jōdo Shinshū H onganji-ha (2004: 77). Cf. S hinran’s Letters: “Those who feel that their ow n birth [in the Pure Land] is com pletely settled should，m indful o f the B uddha’s benevolence, hold the nem butsu in their hearts and say it to respond in gratitude to that benevolence, w ith the w ish, ‘M ay there be peace in the w orld, and m ay the Buddha’s teaching spread!” ，（ J6do Shinshū H onganji-ha 1997: 560). 2 See Q ueen (1996: 34), and International N etw ork o f Engaged Buddhists (2011). O n the International N etw ork o f Engaged B uddhists’ official w ebsite the follow ing “ Key A reas o f Concern and Engagem ent” are highlighted: “Peace and reconciliation, envi­ ronm ent, gender, alternative education, hum an rights and social ju stice, alternative developm ent and econom ics, com m unity developm ent, reform and revival o f B uddhist institutions, youth and spiritual leadership developm ent” (International N etw ork o f Engaged B uddhists 2011). 6 C arriers o f globalization

1 E nom iya-L assalle’s quotation is from H enri Le Saux’s Sagesse H indoue, M ystique Chrétienne (1965). 2 Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai (2009c, 2009d). The com plete list o f C hair H older U niversities is provided on the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōk ai’s official w ebsite: U niversity o f C alifornia, B erkeley; H arvard U niversity; U niversity o f C hicago; U niversity o f H aw aii; Sm ith College; Institute o f B uddhist Studies; U niversity o f C alifornia, Los A ngeles; U niver­ sity o f C algary; U niversity o f Toronto; M cG ill U niversity; U niversity o f Oxford; U niversity o f London; Leiden U niversity; U niversity o f Vienna; and U niversity o f Ham burg (Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai 2009d). 3 A m ong other things, Fukam i presents him self as the “Leonardo da Vinci o f the tw entyfirst century” (Fukam i 2011). C f., for exam ple, Prohl (2004: 1 4 3 4 ). 4 See, for exam ple, A ntoni (2001b). Cf. A ntoni (2001c). It is w orth m entioning here that on other occasions som e o f the scholars m entioned by A ntoni do analyze the political im plications o f m odern and contem porary Shintō. 7 B ord er negotiation in glob al society (I)

1 See D obbelaere (2000: 24, 28, 31). Cf. D obbelaere (1981). In th is respect, another p ossible factor is th a t o f “ex isten tial security” studied by Pippa N orris and R onald Inglehart, who show in th eir w ork how the grow ing econom ic in eq ualities ch aracterizing m odern society can affect in d iv id u als’ relig io sity (N orris and Inglehart 2004). 2 Cf. A be (1998). Sw yngedouw also translated into Japanese, together w ith Ishii K enji, D obbelaere’s influential report, “ Secularization: A M ultidim ensional C oncept” (D obbelaere 1981, 1992). 3 In this respect, B eyer affirm s th at “ structurally, we are dealing w ith instrum ental sys­ tem s w hose style allow s them to spread all around the globe, not so m uch in disregard o f local and norm ative socio-cultural particularism s, but largely by subsum ing them in these structures” (B eyer 1994: 54). 4 See Saki (1980: 19), and N akano (2004: 153). The R eligious C orporations Law is another im portant way through w hich the boundaries betw een state and religion in Japan have been settled. Enacted in 1951, this piece o f legislation is based on the prin­ ciple o f religious freedom and regulates the secular activities conducted by organiza­ tions recognized as “religious corporations,” granting them , am ong other things, tax exem ption. For the controversies related to the 1995 revisions to the Religious C orporations Law, see LoBreglio (1997), K isala (1997), and Y uki (1997). 5 Q uite understandably, the literature on this specific topic is now considerable. C f., for exam ple, Shim azono (1995b), Repp (2004), and B affelli and R eader (2012).

N otes

155

6 John LoBreglio efficaciously describes these events in detail: “The associating o f Sōka G akkai w ith legal am endm ents putatively directed against the publicly reviled Aum Shinrikyō was a m ove o f tactical political brilliance. The indirect associating o f Sōka G akkai w ith A um took place in the public forum which w as the special com m ittee ses­ sions o f the U pper H ouse to discuss the revisions. T here LDP officials cited ‘increas­ ingly aggressive political activities by a giant religious organization’ and questioned the legality o f the extent o f Sōka G akkai’s influence in the political sphere. This strat­ egy clim axed in the LD P’s attem pt to force Ikeda D aisaku, Sōka G akkai’s honorary chairm an, to testify before the D iet on the proposed revisions. The effort w as thw arted in a dram atic show dow n in w hich Shinshintō and Kōm eitō m em bers physically block­ aded the m eeting room w here a vote concerning the proposal to dem and Ikeda’s testi­ m ony by an U pper H ouse special com m ittee w as to take place. Com m ittee chairm an Sasaki M itsuru w as prevented from entering the room , the vote could not take place, and the session w as adjourned. Faced w ith such resolve on the p art o f its opponents, the LDP was forced to com prom ise, so as not to ‘lead to bloodshed，’ by sum m oning Sōka G akkai chairm an A kiya Einosuke instead o f Ikeda. In fact, though, it w as a clear LDP victory in term s o f public perception. By so vehem ently defending Ikeda, Shinshintō w as m ade to appear as the defender o f Sōka G akkai. Just over one m onth earlier, public opinion polls show ed th at over 60% o f those surveyed believed the Religious C orporations Law should be am ended and criticized Shinshintō’s opposition to the proposed revisions. Shinshintō’s greatest political w eapon w as nim bly transform ed into a liability” (LoB reglio 1997: 40). 7 K ōfuku Jitsugentō (2011b: 1-2; 2011c: 3– 4). The English translation o f this docum ent is provided by K ōfuku Jitsugentō on its official w ebsite. 8 B order n egotiation in global society (II)

1 The Japan B uddhist Federation w as calling for the substitution o f “religious education” (shūkyō kyōiku) w ith “sectarian religious education” (shūha kyōiku) in A rticle 9 (Section 2) o f the Fundam ental Law o f Education. This change w as not enforced in the 2006 am ended draft, but the insertion o f “general know ledge regarding religion” (shūkyō ni kansuru ippantekina kyōy ō) as a p oint to be valued in education in the cur­ rent A rticle 15 (Section 1) conveys a sim ilar m eaning. 2 The Japanese A ssociation o f Religious O rganizations represents the Japan Buddhist Fed­ eration (Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai), the A ssociation o f Shintō Sects (Kyōha Shintō Rengōkai 教 派 神 道 連 合 会 ) , the A ssociation o f Shintō Shrines (Jinja Honchō), the Japan Con­ federation o f C hristian C hurches (N ihon K irisutokyō Rengōkai 日本キリスト教連合会 ), and the Federation o f N ew R eligious O rganizations o f Japan (Snin-nihon shū k y ōdantai R engōk a i 新日 本 宗 教 団 体 連 合 会 ). 3 N ihon shūkyō Renm ei (2003): “ ‘respect’ for life is neglected, ‘concern’ for others has been lost, atrocious crim es and juvenile problem s are increasing, m orality in politics and econom ics is decreasing, m any social problem s are before us. B ehind this situation there are m any causes, but we m ust adm it th at one o f these is unfortunately the decline o f the influence th at religion should exert upon society.” 4 See Jōdo Shinshū H onganji-ha (2006a; 2006b). A n even stronger opposition to the revision process has com e from various groups o f Jōdo Shinshū activists, such as the 2000-nen Tōzai H onganji o M usubu H i-sen/H eiw a Kyōdō Kōdō 2000 年 •東 西 本 願 寺 を 結 ぶ 非 戦 • 平 和 共 同 行 動 （2000: Joint A ction o f East and W est H onganji for A nti-w ar/Peace) and the N enbutsusha Kyūj ō no K ai 念 仏 者 九 条 の 会 (A ssociation o f N enbutsu Practitioners for A rticle 9). For a detailed analysis o f Jōdo Shinshū reactions to the revision to the Fundam ental Law o f Education, see D essì (2009). 5 The tengu 天 狗 are m ountain creatures founa in Japanese folk religion and often related to Shugendō 修 験 道 . They m ay appear like crow s or hum ans w ith long noses and im part their skills, but m ay also be m alevolent.

156

N otes

6 In the E ncyclopedia B ritannica brain death is defined as follow s: “Brain death is syn­ onym ous w ith brainstem death, since the control centres for essential functions such as consciousness, respiration, and blood pressure are located w ithin the brainstem . In m any countries strict criteria for diagnosis o f brain death have been established by common consent am ong m edical, religious, ethical, and legal experts. Signs o f brain death include the presence o f deep com a w ith an established cause, the absence o f any brainstem func­ tions such as spontaneous respiration, pupillary reactions, eye m ovem ents, and gag and cough reflexes. Electroencephalography (EEG) m ay be a useful confirm atory test. W hen brainstem death is confirm ed, the heart usually stops beating w ithin a day or tw o, even when other vital functions are artificially m aintained” (Pryse-Phillips 2011). 7 See A sahi shinbun (2007). In another opinion poll conducted by the A sahi shinbun in 2009, 40 percent agreed w ith the definition o f death as brain death, and 39 percent dis­ agreed. Interestingly enough, the rate o f those who disagreed is m uch low er (28 percent) for those in their sixties (A sahi shinbun 2009b). 9 A d d ressin g global problem s

1 M atsunaga (2010a: 39- 4 0). Cf. M atsunaga (2010b). For a m ore detailed analysis o f M atsunaga’s approach w ithin the context o f the Z en-nihon Bukkyōkai, see Porcu (2010). 2 Dainikai Sekai sh ū k y ō sha no Inori to Fōram u Jim ukyoku (2 0 0 3 :1 0 ,1 2 0 – 1). The English translation o f the Japanese tex t o f the Statem ent o f Purpose is provided by the D ainikai Sekai shū k y ōsha no Inori to Fōram u Jim ukyoku in the sam e volum e o f the proceedings. 3 O ther organizations include the U nited Church o f C hrist in Japan (Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan 日 本 基 督 教 団 )，which publicly adm itted its w artim e cooperation w ith the state early in 1967, the Japan B aptist U nion (N ihon B aputesuto Dōm e i 日本バプテスト同盟） (N ihon B aputesuto Dōm ei 1992), and other representatives o f traditional Japanese B uddhism such as Rinzaishū M yō shinji-ha 臨 済 宗 妙 心 寺 派 (R inzaishū M yōshinji-ha 2001), Tendai Jim onshū 天 台 寺 門 宗 （ 1994) (V ictoria 1997: 157), and Jōdoshū 浄 土 宗 (Jōdoshū 2009). 4 See Sōtōshū (2001; 2007; 2010). For an analysis o f religious activism for peace in the Japanese context from a different perspective, see Ōtani (2009). 5 W atts (2004: 417– 18). Cf. Inaba (2009: 46). W atts individuates other two crucial points in the developm ent o f B uddhist NGO s in Japan, nam ely, the H anshin Earthquake (1995) and the enactm ent o f the N on-Profit O rganization Law (1998). He also notes how , in Japan, the m eaning o f non-profit organization (NPO) is generally broader than th at o f N GO and tends to encom pass “both international and dom estic activities, but w ith an em phasis on the latter” (W atts 2004: 418). 6 N icnirenshū Shū m uin (2004). The translation from the Lotus S ūtra follow s H urvitz (1976: 280). 7 On this topic cf., for exam ple, M ukhopadhyaya (2008). R anjana M ukhopadhyaya sim ­ ilarly notices th at “the social engagem ents o f B uddhists in Japan are m otivated by their attem pt to m aintain their relevance in a m odern globalized w orld” (M ukhopadhyaya 2008: 39). Cf. also N elson (2011). 8 For the w ay a Japanese religious N GO operating in A fghanistan, the Shanti K okusai B orantiakai, tacitly incorporates m ainstream interpretations o f the “w ar on terror” in its official docum ents, see Shanti Kokusai B orantiakai (2006; 2010), and Yamamoto (2011). For the attitude o f Japanese religious N G O s tow ard the D alai Lam a, see Renge K okusai B orantiakai (2009c; 2010) and Shihō Sanga (2010). For the D alai L am a’s am biguities tow ard w ar in A fghanistan and Iraq see, for exam ple, Sautm an (2010), Titm uss (2004) and D alai Lam a (2010). Cf. also Repp (2008). 9 On the m ore general relationship betw een N G O s and the neoliberal m odel, see, for exam ple, Kam at (2004).

Bibliography

A be, Y oshiya. 1998. “Secularization: K arel D obbelaere and Japanese Sociology o f R eligion.” In R udi Laerm ans, B ryan W ilson, and Jaak B illiet (eds), Secularization and Social Integration: P apers in H onor o f K arel D obbelaere. Leuven: Leuven U niversity Press, 11– 24. A gonshu. 1995. A gon Shu (brochure). ----------.2002. “A gon Shu’s Social and C ultural A ctivities.” On the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). A itken, Robert. 1988. “The Lay Zen B uddhist Sangha in the W est.” The P acific W orld (New Series) 4: 77– 81. A lliance o f R eligions and C onservation. 2011a. “W hat Does Shintoism T each us A bout Ecology?” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011b. “ Shinto Faith Statem ent.” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). A llison, A nne. 2008. “The A ttractions o f the J-W ave for A m erican Y outh.” In W atanabe Y asushi and D avid L. M cC onnell (eds), S o ft Pow er Superpow ers: C ultural and N ational A ssets o f Japan and the U nited States. N ew York: M. E. Sharpe, 99– 110. A m a, M ichihiro. 2011. Im m igrants to the P ure Land: The M odernization, A cculturation, and G lobalization o f Shin Buddhism , 1898– 1 9 4 1 . H onolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. Am a, Toshim aro 阿 満 利 磨 . 1996. N ihonjin wa naze mushūkyō nanoka 日 本 人 は な ぜ 無 宗 教 な の か . Tokyo: Chikum a Shob5. A m stutz, G alen. 1997. Interpreting A m ida: H istory ana O rientalism in the Study o j Pure Land Buddhism . Albany: State U niversity o f N ew Y ork Press. ----------.2010. “Shin Buddhism a n d B urakum in in the Edo Period.” In Ugo D essì (ed.), The Social D im ension o f Shin Buddhism . Leiden: B rill, 59– 110. A ntoni, Klaus. 2001a. “R eligion and C om m ercialization: The Shin tō W edding R itual (Shinzenshiki) as an ‘Invented T radition’ in Japan.” Japanese R eligions 26/1: 41– 53. ----------. 2001b. Review o f Shinto in H istory: Ways o f the K am i (edited by John Breen and M ark Teeuw en). Journal o f Japanese Studies 27/2: 405– 9. ----------. 2001c. “ ‘Fakten’ kontra ‘W arheit’?: Zur ethnographischen A rbeitsw eise in der Japanologie.” In H ilaria Gö ssm an and A ndreas M rugalla (e d s ), 11 . D eutschprachiger Japanologentag in Trier 1999. M unster: Lit, 631– 43. A ppadurai, A rjun. 1990. “D isjuncture and D ifference in the G lobal C ultural Econom y.” Theory, C ulture & Society 7: 295– 310. A riga, Tetsutaro. 1963. “The Problem o f Indigenization.” Japanese R eligions 3/1: 40– 50.

158

B ibliography

A rigatō K ik in ありがとう基金. 2011. “A rigatō K ikin gaiy ō ありがとう基金概要 .” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). A rnason, Johann P. 2002. “Is Japan a C ivilization Sui G eneris?” Japanstudien 14: 43– 68. A sad, Talal. 1993. G enealogies o f R eligion: D iscipline and Reasons o f Pow er in C hristianity and Isla m . B altim ore: The John Hopkins U niversity Press. A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 . 1954. “G untai soshiki de fukyō undō 軍 隊 組 織 で 布 教 運 動 .” A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 （ 2 9 O ctober). ----------.1 9 5 6 . “B okuhatsuteki shinshutsu no ‘Sōka G akkai’ 操発 的 進 出 の 「 創 価 学 会 」." A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 1（1 July). ----------.19 9 2. “N ōshi w a hito no shi ‘m itom eru’ 47% ‘m itom enu’ 41%: A sahi shinbunsha seron chōs a 脳 死 は 人 の 死 「 認める」4 7 % 「 認 め ぬ 」41%— 朝 日 新 聞 社 世 論 調 査 .” A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 （23 M arch). ----------.1 9 9 7 . “N ihon shūkyō Renm ei, san’in ni ikensho: Zōk i ishokuhō w a shm chō n i’ 日 本 宗 教 連 盟 ，参 院 に 意 見 書 一 「臓 器 移 植 法 は 慎 重 に 」.” A sahi s h in b u n 朝 日 新 聞 (24 M ay). ----------.2 0 0 5 . "Nōshi ishoku, shūkvōkai w a… K okunai dantai ni ankēto: M edatsu ‘jōken tsuki yōn in ’ 脳 死 移 植 , 宗 教 界 は . . . 国内団体にアンケート 一目立つ ‘条 件 付 き 容 認 .” ’ A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 （ 21 Decem ber). ----------.2 0 0 6 . “K enkoku kinen no h i, kakuchi de shūk a i 建 国 記 念 の 日 ，各 地 で 集 会 .” A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 （2 February). ----------.2007. “Honnin ishi sonchō, nezuyoku ‘nōshi wa shi’ 47%: Zōki ishoku, A sashi Shinbunsha chō s a 本 人 意 思 尊 重 ，根強く「 脳 死 は 死 」47% — 臓 器 移 植 • 朝 日 新 聞 社 調 査 .” A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 1（7 O ctober). ----------. 2009a. “A -an, kakekom i hyōgatam e: ‘N ōshi w a hito no sh i’ shū in tsūka A 案 ， 駆け込み票固め一「 脳 死 は 人 の 死 」衆 院 通 過 .’’ A sahi sh in b u n 朝 日 新 聞 (1 9 June). ----------. 2009b. ‘ “N ōshi w a sh i’ to sanpi nibun: K aisei Zōki ishokuhō seiritsu de A sahi Shinbunsha seron chō s a 「 脳 死 は 死 」と 賛 否 二 分 一 改 正 臓 器 移 植 法 成 立 で 朝 日 新 聞 社 世 論 調 査 .” A sahi sh in b u n 朝 日 新 聞 （ 23 July). ----------.2 0 1 0 . “Oe san’in giin ga Kō fuku Jitsugentō o ritō 大 江 賽 院 議 員 が 幸 福 実 現 党 2 8 Decem ber). を 離 党 .，，A sahi shinbun 朝 日 新 聞 （ A sai, Senryō and D uncan R. W illiam s. 1999. “Japanese A m erican Zen Tem ples: C ultural Identity and Econom ics.” In Duncan R. W illiam s and C hristopher Q ueen (eds), A m erican B uddhism : M ethods and F indings in R ecent Scholarship. Richm ond: Curzon Press, 20– 35. A uckland Zen Centre. 2011. “W hat is Zen? FAQ s.” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). A yusu Bukkyō K okusai K yōryoku N ettow āku アーユス仏教国際協力ネットワーク . 2011a. “Soshiki gaiyo 糸且系戠概要.” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011b. “Bukkyo to kokusai ky5ryoku 仏 教 と 国 際 協 力 ." O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). B affelli, Erica and Ian Reader. 2012. “Im pact and R am ifications: The A fterm ath o f the A um A ffair in the Japanese R eligious C ontext.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 39/1: 1-28. Baumann, M artin. 1994. “The T ransplantation o f Buddhism to Germany: Processive M odes and Strategies o f A daptation.” M ethod & Theory in the Study o f R eligion 6/1: 35–61.

B ibliography

159

Beck, Ulrich. 2002. “The C osm opolitan Society and its Enem ies.” Theory, C ulture & Society 19/1– 2: 17-44. Beckford, Jam es A . 2003. Social Theory and R elig io n . Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press. B enediktushof. 2011. P rogram m 2011 (T eil 1 ) : Übungsw ege der A chtsam keit (brochure). B eyer, Peter. 1994. R eligion and G lobalization. London: SAGE Publications. ----------.1997. “Religion, Residual Problem s, and Functional D ifferentiation: A n A m biguous R elationship.” Soziale System e 3/2: 219–35. ----------.1 9 9 8 . “The R eligious System o f G lobal Society: A Sociological Look at C ontem porary R eligion and R eligions.” N um en 45/1: 1–29. ----------.2000. “Secularization from the Perspective o f G lobalization.” In W illiam H. Swatos and D aniel V. A. O lson (eds), The Secularization D ebate. Lanham: Rowm an and L ittlefield, 81– 93. ----------.2 0 0 6 . R eligions in G lobal Society. London: Routledge. Beyer, Peter and Lori Beaman (eds). 2007. Religion, G lobalization, and Culture. Leiden: Brill. B lavatsky, H elena P. 1999 [1888]. The Secret D octrine: The Synthesis o f Science, R eligion, and P hilosophy. Pasadena: Theosophical U niversity Press. B lavatsky, H elena P. and W illiam Q. Judge. 2003 [1915-1916]. Theosophy M agazine, N ovem ber 1915 to O ctober 1916. W hitefish: K essinger Publishing. B ocrnnger，C hristoph. 2001. “G lobalisierung der R eligion? T ranskontinentale A usbreitung lokaler religioser B ew egungen im Schnittpunkt von Indigenisierung und Entgrenzung.” In U lrich B auer (ed.), Interkulturelle B eziehungen und K ulturw andel in A frika: B eitrage zu r G lobalisierungsdebatte. Frankfurt: Lang, 197– 212. B ocking, Brian. 1997. A P opular D ictionary o f Shinto. Richm ond: Curzon. Bodiford, W illiam . 1996. “Zen and the A rt o f Religious Prejudice: E fforst to Reform a T radition o f Social D iscrim ination.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 23/1–2 :1 –27. Borup, J0 rn. 2004. “Zen and the A rt o f Inverting O rientalism : Buddhism ，R eligious Studies and Interrelated N etw orks.” In Peter A ntes, A rm in W . G eertz, and Randi R. W arne (eds), N ew A pproaches to the Study o f R eligion (V o l.1 ) : Regional, C ritical, and H istorical A pproaches. Berlin: W alter de G ruyter, 451– 87. B rannen, N oah. 1964. “False R eligions, Forced C onversions, Iconoclasm .” C ontem porary R eligions in Japan 5/3: 232– 52. B reen, John. 2010a. “R esurrecting the Sacred Land o f Japan: The State o f Shinto in the T w enty-First C entury.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 37/2: 295– 315. ----------. 2010b. “‘C onventional W isdom ’ and the Politics o f Shinto in Postw ar Japan.” P olitics and R eligion 4/1: 68– 81. Breen, John and M ark Teeuwen. 2010. A N ew H istory o f Shinto. Chichester: W iley-Blackwell. B ryce, M io and Jason Davis. 2010. “A n O verview o f M anga G enres.” In Toni JohnsonW oods (ed.), M anga: A n A nthology o f G lobal and C ultural P erspectives. N ew York: C ontinuum , 34–61. Bukkyō D endō Kyōkai 仏教イ石道協会 . 2009a. “M okuteki to jig y ō 目的と事業 .” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 S eptem ber 2011). ----------. 2009b. “The Purpose and Significance o f D istribution o f ‘The Teaching o f B uddha.” ，O n the official w ebsite < http ://w w w .bak-jp.org/english/activity/index.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2009c. “E nglish T ranslation o f the B uddhist C anon and P ublication P roject.” O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011).

160

B ibliography

----------. 2009d. “N um ata Program in B uddhist Studies.” On the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .bak-jp.org/english/activity/course.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Bukkyō NGO N ettow āku 仏 教 NGO ネットワーク. 2004. “Setsuritsu Sōkai 設 立 総 会 ." B ukkyō NG O N ettow aku new sletter 仏 教 NGO ネットワーク new sletter (M arch). ----------. 2011a. “BNN setsuritsu no shushi BNN 設 立 の 趣 旨 ." O n the official w ebsite くhttp://bnn.ne.jp/bnn/outline> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011b. “Kamei dantai加 盟 団 体 ." O n the official website くhttp://bnn.ne.jp/m em ber> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Bukkyō taim usu 佛叙タイムス . 2009a. “Z ennichibutsu 84-nin, K oseikai 198-nin tō sen 全 日 仏 84 人 , 校 成 会 198 人 当 選 .” B ukkyō ta im u su 佛教タイムス （3 Septem ber). ----------. 2009b. “O m oto n on donā k ā do o h aifu 大本ノンドナーカードを配布 .’’ B ukkyō ta im u su 佛教タイムス （9 July). ----------. 2009c. “Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyū sho Konwakai: Jishi taisaku de kyōdankan no rentai t e i a n 薇 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 一 自 死 対 策 で 教 団 間 の 連 携 提 案 .” B ukkyō taim usu 佛教タイムス （ 15 O ctober). ----------. 2009d. “C hō shū ha 23-kaji: Jisatsu b ō shi de jiin ga r e n ta i 超 宗 派 23 力 寺 一 自 殺 防 止 で 寺 院 が 連 携 ." B ukkyd ta im u su 佛教タイムス （22 O ctober). Cam pbell, Bruce F .1980. A ncient Wisdom R evived: A H istory o f the Theosophical M ovem ent. B erkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press. C am pbell, G eorge V an Pelt. 2005. E verything You T hink Seem s W rong: G lobalization and the R elativizing o f Tradition. Lanham: U niversity Press o f A m erica. ----------.2007. “Religion and Phases of G lobalization.” In Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (eds), R eligion, G lobalization, and C ulture. Leiden: B rill, 281-302. Casanova, Jose. 1994. P ublic R eligions in the M odern W orld. Chicago: The U niversity o f C hicago Press. ----------.2 0 0 1 . “R eligion, the N ew M illennium , and G lobalization.” Sociology o f R eligion 62/4: 415– 41. ----------.2 0 0 7 . “R ethinking Secularization: A G lobal C om parative Perspective.” In Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (eds), R eligion, G lobalization, and C ulture. Leiden: B rill, 101-20. C enter for the Pacific Rim. 2011. “ R esearch & Publications.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .usfca.edu/pacificrim /research> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Chaves, M ark. 1994. “Secularization as D eclining R eligious A uthority.” Social F orces 72/3: 749– 74. Chaves, M ark and D avid E. Cann. 1992. “R egulation, Pluralism , and Religious M arket Structure: Explaining R eligion’s V itality.” R ationality and Society 4/3: 272-90. Chū gai nippō 中外日幸. 2009. “Shū insen: K akuhano suisenkekkam o M inshu asshō, Jim in z a n p a i 衆院 選 一 各 派 の 推 薦 結 果 も 民 主 圧 勝 ，自 民 惨 敗 .” C hūg a i nipp ō 中 外 日報 (Septem ber 1). ----------. 2010a. “Kōyasan Shingonshū M atsunaga Yū kei kanchō n i kiku 尚里ナ山真言宗 • 松 長 有 慶 管 長 に 聞 ぐ ."Chūgai nipp ō 中 外 日 報 （January 3). ----------. 2010b. “N ishi H onganji n i Kyōto Jisatsu Bōshi Sentā : NPO to kyōdō shieatsu ni k a is e ts u 西 本 願 寺 に 京 都 自 殺 防 止 セ ン タ — N PO と共同 4 月 に 開 設 .” Chūg a i nippō 中 外 日 報 (January 19). Chūō Gakuiutsu Kenkyū sho 中 央 学 術 研 究 所 （ e d.). 1999. K yōsei to heiwa no ikikata o m otomete: H ōkekycō kara no m essēj i 共生と平和の生き方を求めて•法華経からのメッセ ー ソ . Tōkyō : Kōsei Shuppansha. Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai 中 央 教 育 審 議 会 . 2003. “A tarashii jid ai n i fusaw ashii kyōiku kihonhō to kyōiku shinkō kihon keikaku no arikata n i tsuite 新しい日寺代にふさわ し い 教 育 基 本 法 と 教 育 振 興 基 本 計 画 の 在 り 方 に つ い て .” O n the o fficial w ebsite

B ibliography

161

くhttp://w w w .m ext.go.jp/b _m enu/shingi/chukyo/chukyo0/toushin/030301.htm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 6 . “Chiiki no kyōikuryoku ni kansuru ishiki 地 域 の 教 育 力 に 関 す る 意 識 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .m ext.go.jp/b_menu/snm gi/chukyo/chukyo0/tousnin/ 07020806/008/007.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 8 . “Kyōiku shinkō kihon keikaku n i tsuite: ‘Kyōiku rikkoku’ no jitsugen ni m u k e te 教育 振 興 基 本 計 画 に つ い て 一 「 教 育 立 国 」の 実 現 に 向 け て .” O n the official website くhttp://w ww.m ext.gojp /b —m enu/snmgi/cnukyo/chukvo0/tousnln/08042205.htm> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Churchw ard, Jam es. 2007 [1926]. The L o st C ontinent o f M u. K empton: A dventures U nlim ited Press. C leveland B uddhist Tem ple. 2011. “ B ulletin.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . clevelanabuaanlsttem ple.com /B ulletin.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Colem an, Jam es W .1999. “The N ew Buddhism : Some E m pirical Findings.” In D uncan R. W illiam s and C hristopher Q ueen (eds), A m erican B uddhism : M ethods and F indings in R ecent Scholarship. Richm ond: C urzon Press, 91– 9. C ollcutt, M artin. 1991. “The Legacy o f C onfucianism in Japan.” In G ilbert Rozm an (ed.), The E ast A sian R egion: C onfucian H eritage and its M odern A daptation. Princeton: Princeton U niversity P re s s ,1 丄1– 54. C ornille, C atherine. 1994. “Jesus in Japan: C hristian Syncretism in M ahikari.” In Peter B. C larke and Jeffrey Som ers (eds), Japanese N ew R eligions in the W est. Sandgate: Japan Library, 89– 103. ----------.1 9 9 9 . “N ationalism in N ew Japanese R eligions.” N ova R eligio 2/2: 228– 44. C ovell, Stephen. 2006. “ ‘To Forget the S elf and to Serve O thers ’: Ven. Etai Y am ada and the 1987 R eligious Sum m it M eeting on M ount H iei.” D harm a W orld 33 くhttp:// w w w .kosei-shuppan.co.jp/english/text/m ag/2006/06—101112—7.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Cox, Jam es L . 1999. “Intuiting Religion: A C ase for Prelim inary D efinitions.” In Jan P latvoet and A rie L. M olendijk (eds), The P ragm atics o f D efining R eligion: C ontexts, C oncepts, and C ontests. Leiden: B rill, 267– 84. D ainikai Sekai Shū k y ō sha no Inori to Fōram u Jim ukyoku 第 2 回世界宗教 者の祈りとフ オーラム事務局 . 2003. D ainikai Sekai shūkyōsha no Inori to Foram u hokokusho 第 2 回 世 界 宗 教 者 の 祈 り と フ ォ ー ラ ム 報 告 書 Kameoka: D ainikai Sekai Snūkyōsha no Inori to Fōram u Jim ukyoku. Dake, M itsuya. 2005. “A C ontem porary R e-exam ination o f Shin B uddhist N otions o f Practice.” P acific W orld (Third Series) 7 :1 0 7 – 17. D alai Lama. 2010. “H is H oliness the D alai Lama in N ew Y ork.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .dalailam a.com /new s/post/538-his-holiness-the-darn トlam a-in-new -yorkny-m ay-23-2010> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). D avis, W inston. 1980. D ojo: M agic and E xorcism in M odern Japan. Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press. ----------.1992. Japanese R eligion and Society: Paradigm s o f Structure and Change. Albany: State U niversity o f N ew Y ork Press. De B ary, W m. Theodore, C arol G luck, and A rthur E. Tiedem ann (eds). 2001. Sources o f Japanese Tradition: 1600 to 2000 (V o l.1) . N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press. ----------.20 0 5. Sources o f Japanese Tradition: From E a rliest Tim es to 1600 (Vol. 2). N ew York: Colum bia U niversity Press. Dehn, U lrich. 2002. “ R eiki als ‘spirituelle H eilungs- und B ehandlungsbew egung’.” In Inken Prohl and H artm ut Z inser (eds), Zen, R eiki, K arate: Japanische R eligiosität in E uropa. Hamburg: Lit, 109-24.

162

B ibliography

D essì, Ugo. 2006. “The C ritique o f A nthropocentrism and H um anism in Present-day Shin B uaanism .” Japanese R eligions 31/2: 111–25. ----------.2 0 0 7 . E thics and Society in C ontem porary Shin Buddhism . Berlin: Lit. ----------.2 0 0 9 . “Shin Buddhism , A uthority, and the Fundam ental Law o f E ducation.” N um en 56/5: 5 2 3 4 4 . ----------. 2010a. “R eligion, N etw orking, and Social Issues in Japan: The Case o f the Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyū sho K onw akai.” Japanese R eligions 35/1–2: 87– 100. ----------. 2010b. “Shin B uddhism and G lobalization: A ttitudes tow ard the Political Subsystem and Pluralism at the O rganizational and Individual L evels.” In Ugo D essì (ed.), The Social D im ension o f Shin Buddhism . Leiden: B rill, 241–66. ----------.2 0 1 1 . “Japanese R eligions, Inclusivism , and the G lobal C ontext.” Japanese R eligions 36/1– 2: 83– 99. ----------.2 0 1 2 . “R eligion, H ybrid Form s, and C ultural C hauvinism in Japan.” Journal o f R eligion in Japan 1/2: 168– 87. D obbelaere, K arel. 1981. “Secularization: A M ulti-dim ensional C oncept.” C urrent Sociology 29/2: 3– 213. ----------.1 9 9 2 . shūkyō no dainam ikkusu 宗教のタイナミックス. Tokyo: Y orudansha. ----------.2 0 0 0 . “Tow ard an Integrated Perspective o f the Processes Related to the D escriptive C oncept o f Secularization.” In W illiam H. Sw atos and D aniel V. A. O lson (eds), The Secularization D ebate. Lanham: Rowm an and L ittlefield, 21–40. ----------.2 0 0 4 . “A ssessing Secularization T heory.” In P eter A ntes, A rm in W . G eertz, and R andi R. W arne (eds), N ew A pproaches to the Study o f R eligion (Vol. II): Textual, C om parative, Sociological, and C ognitive A pproaches. B erlin: W alter de G ruyter, 229– 53. D obbins, Jam es C. 2002. Jōdo Shinshū: Shin Buddhism in M edieval Japan. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. D urkheim , Em ile. 2001 [1912]. The E lem entary F orm s o f R eligious L ife. O xford: O xford U niversity Press. Edw ards, W alter. 1989. M odern Japan through Its W eddings: G ender, Person, and Society in R itual P ortrayal. Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press. Eisenstadt, Shm uel N . 1999. “M ultiple M odernities in an A ge o f G lobalization.” The C anadian Journal o f Sociology / C ahiers canadiens de sociologie 24/2: 283– 95. ----------.2 0 0 0 . “M ultiple M odernities." D aedalus 129/1: 1–29. Enom iya-Lassalle, Hugo M .1995. Z enM editation f ür C hristen. Bern: O tto W ilhelm Barth. Faure, B ernard. 1995. “The Kyoto School and Reverse O rientalism .” In C harles W ei-hsun Fu and Steven Heine (eds), Japan in T raditional and P ostm odern P erspectives. Albany: State U niversity o f N ew Y ork Press, 245– 81. Figal, G erald. 1999. C ivilization and M onsters: S pirits o f M odernity in M eiji Japan. Durham: Duke U niversity Press. Filus, D orothea. 2006. “ R eligious Education in C ontem porary Japan.” In M arian de Souza, G loria D urka, K athleen Engebretson, Robert Jackson, and A ndrew M cG rady (eds), International H andbook o f the R eligious, M oral, and S piritual D im ensions in E ducation. D ordrecht: Springer, 1039– 53. Finney, H enry C . 1991. “A m erican Z en’s ‘Japan C onnection': A C ritical Case Study o f Z en B uddhism ’s D iffusion to the W est.” Sociological A nalysis 52/4: 379– 96. Fisch, M ichael. 2001. “The Rise o f the C hapel W edding in Japan: Sim ulation and Perform ance.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 28/1– 2: 57– 76. Fitzgerald, Tim othy. 1996. “Religion, Philosophy and Fam ily Resem blances.” R eligion 26: 215– 36.

B ibliography

163

----------.1 9 9 7 . “A C ritique o f ‘R eligion’ as a C ross-C ultural C ategory.” M ethod & Theory in the Study o f R eligion 9/2: 91– 110. ----------.2 0 0 0 . The Ideology o f R eligious Studies. Oxford: O xford U niversity Press. ----------.2 0 0 3 . “ ‘R eligion’ and ‘the Secular’ in Japan: Problem s in H istory, Social A nthro­ pology, and the Study o f R eligion.” E lectronic Journal o f C ontem porary Japanese Studies. On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/ Fitzgerala.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Foard, Jam es H. 1982. “The B oundaries o f Com passion: Buddhism and N ational Tradition in Japanese Pilgrim age.” The Journal o f A sian Studies 41/2: 231– 51. Franz, Dorothee. 2007. “Das revidierte G m ndlagengesetz zum E rziehungsw esen und Japans B em uhungen um eine B ilaungsreform .” Japan aktuell 1 :5 2 – 64. Freeing the Human Spirit. 2008. “W ho W e A re.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . freeingspirit.com /w ho—are.htm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Freiberger, O liver. 2003. “R eligion und G lobalisierung im Lichte von O rientalism us und O kziaentalism us.” In Peter Schalk, M ax Deeg, O liver Freiberger, and C hristoph Kleine (eds), R eligion im Spiegelkabinett: A siatische R eligionsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld zw ischen O rientalism us und O kzidentalism us. U ppsala: U niversity o f U ppsala, 63– 89. Freiberger, O liver and C hristoph K leine. 2011. B uddhism us: H andbuch und kritische E infuhrung. G ottingen: V anaenhoeck & Ruprecht. Friedm an, Jonathan. 1990. “Being in the W orld: G lobalization and L ocalization.” Theory, C ulture & Society 7: 311–28. Fujitani, Takashi. 1996. Splendid M onarchy: Pow er and P ageantry in M odern Japan. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press. Fujiwara, Satoko 祿 原 聖 子 . 2006. “ ‘shūkyō’ to w a n a n ik a 「 宗 教 」とは何か .” In Shimazono Susum u 島 園 進 , Kasai K enta 葛 西 貪 太 , Fukushim a Shinkichi 福 信 吉 ，and Fujiw ara Satoko 祿 原 聖 子 (eds), Shūkyōgaku kī wādo 宗教学キーワード . Tōkyō : Yūhikaku, 184– 5. Fukam i, Tō shū 深 見 東 州 . 2011. “Fukam i Tōshū 深 見 東 州 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .toshu-fhkam i.com > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Fukasaw a, H idetaka 深 澤 英 隆 .2010. “Shū kyō 宗 教 .” In H oshino Eiki 星 野 英 紀 , Ikegam i Y oshim asa 池 上 良 正 ，K eta M asako 風 多 雅 七 Snim azono Susum u 島 園 進 ，and Tsuruoka Y oshio 鶴 岡 賀 雄 （ e ds), Shukydgaku jite n 宗 教 学 事 典 . Tōkyō: M aruzen, 198– 203. G luck, C arol. 1985. Ja p a n ’s M odern M yths: Ideology in the L ate M eiji P eriod. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. G oldstein-G idoni, O fra. 2001. “H ybridity and D istinctions in Japanese Contem porary Com m ercial W edaings.” Social Science Japan Journal 4/1: 21– 38. H abito, Ruben. 1990. “In M em oriam : Y am ada Kōun Rōshi.” B uddhist-C hristian Studies 10: 231– 7. H all, R obert K ing (ed.) and G auntlett, John O w en (tr.). 1949. K okutai no hongi: C ardinal P rinciples o f the N ational E n tity o f Jap a n. C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press. H anegraaff, W outer J. 1996. N ew A ge R eligion and W estern C ulture: E sotericism in the M irror o f Secular Thought. Leiden: B rill. ----------.1 9 9 9 . “D efining R eligion in Spite o f H istory.” In Jan Platvoet and A rie L. M olendijk (eds), The P ragm atics o f D efining R eligion: C ontexts, Concepts, and C ontests. Leiden: B rill, 337– 77. H annerz, U lf. 1987. “The W orld in C reolisation.” A frica 57/4: 546– 59. ----------.1 9 9 0 . “C osm opolitans and Locals in W orld C ulture.” Theory, C ulture & Society 7: 237– 51.

164

B ibliography

----------.1 9 9 1 . “Scenarios for Peripheral C ultures.” In A nthony D. K ing (ed.), Culture, G lobalization and the W orld-System : C ontem porary C onditions fo r the R epresentation o f Identity. London: M acm illan, 107–28. H arada, M arvin. 2005. “M editation as a M om ent o f R eflection.” M etta 33/5 (new sletter o f the B uddhist Study C enter). O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .rrhi.com /bsc/m etta/ sum m er—2005m etta.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). H ardacre, Helen. 1989. Shinto and the State, 1868–1988. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. ----------.1 9 9 4 . “R esponse o f B uddhism and Shintō to the Issue o f B rain D eath and O rgan Transplant.” C am bridge Q uarterly o f H ealthcare E thics 3/4: 585– 601. ----------.20 0 6. “State and R eligion in Japan.” In Paul L. Sw anson and C lark C hilson (eds), N anzan G uide to Japanese R eligions. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press, 274– 88. H eidegger, Sim one. 2006. Buddhism us, G eschlechterverhältnis und D iskrim inierung: D ie gegenw ärtige D iskussion im Shin-Buddhism us Japans. Berlin: Lit. ----------.20 1 0. “Shin B uddhism and G ender: The D iscourse on G ender D iscrim ination and R elated R eform s.” In Ugo D essì (ed.), The Socia l D im ension o f Shin Buddhism . Leiden: B rill, 165– 208. H erm ansen, C hristian M. 2007. “El C an tare’s V iew o f C hrist: A n A nalysis o f the C oncept o f C hrist in R epresentative W orks by K ōfuku no K agaku’s Founder, Ōkaw a Ryū hō .” K ansai G akuin D aigaku K irisutokyō to bunka kenkyū 関西学院大学キリスト教 と 文 化 研 究 9: 69– 115. Hick, John. 1983. “O n C onflicting Religious Truth-Claim s.’’ R eligious Studies 19/4: 485– 91. H irano, Jerry. 2011. “Sitting N am o A m ida B utsu.” W heel o f D harm a 27/3 (official bulletin o f the B uddhist C hurches o f A m erica). O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .bcahq.org/ W O D /M arch2011.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions.” In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention o f Tradition. Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1– 14. Hobsbawm , Eric and Terence R anger (eds). 1983. The Invention o f Tradition. Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. H obson, John M. 2004. The E astern O rigins o f W estern C ivilization . Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. ----------.2 0 0 6 . “East and W est in G lobal H istory.” Theory, C ulture & Society 23: 408– 10. H olcom be, C harles. 2001. The G enesis o f E ast A sia: 221 B .C .–A.D . 907. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. Hori, V ictor S. 1998. “Japanese Zen in A m erica: A m ericanizing the Face in the M irror.” In C harles S. Prebish and K enneth K. Tanaka (eds), The F aces o f Buddhism in A m erica. B erkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 49–78. Howard, Theodore E. 1999. “Japan’s Green Resources: Forest C onservation and Social V alues.” A griculture and H um an Values 16: 421–30. Hur, N am -lin. 2005. “A nti-C hristianity and Funerary B uddhism in Tokugaw a Japan.” C honggyo wa m unhwa 11 :1 7 5 –222. H urvitz, Leon (tr.). 1976. Scripture o f the Lotus B lossom o f the F ine D harm a: The Lotus S u tra. N ew York: Colum bia U niversity Press. Ikeda, D aisaku 池 田 大 作 . 1996. 21-seki bunm ei to D aijō B ukkyō: K aigai sho-daigaku kōen-shū 21 世 紀 文 明 と 大 乗 仏 教 一 海 外 諸 大 学 講 演 集 . Tōkyō : Seikyō Shinbunsha. ----------.1 9 9 7 . “A N ew H um anism for the Com ing C entury.” Lecture delivered at Rajiv G andhi Institute for C ontem porary S tudies, N ew D elhi. On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .daisakuikeda.org/sub/resources/w orks/lect/lect-09.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011).

B ibliography

165

----------.2 0 0 6 . A N ew E ra o f the P eople: F orging a G lobal N etw ork o f R obust Individuals (2006 Peace P roposal). O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .daisakuikeda.org/assets/ files/pp2006.paf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 1 0 . A N ew H um anism : The U niversity A ddresses o f D aisaku Ikeda. London: I. B. Tauris. ----------.20 1 1. Tow ard a W orld o f D ignity fo r A ll: The Trium ph o f the C reative L ife (2011 Peace P roposal). O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sgi.org/assets/pdf/peaceproposal2011.paf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Im oto, Snōkō 井 本 勝 幸 . 2008. “Toransunashonaruna Bukkyōto kyōa ōtai ‘Shihō Sanga’ und ō トランスナショナルな仏教徒共同体「 四 方 僧 伽 」運 動 .” B ukkyō NG O N ettow aku new sletter 仏 教 N G O ネットワーク new sletter (D ecem ber). Inaba, K eishin 手培場圭信. 2009. “ Snū ky ōtek i ritash u g i/sh akai k ōken no kanō sei 宗 教 的 利 他 主 義 •社 会 貢 献 の 可 能 性 .” In Inaba K e is h in 稲 場 圭 信 and Sakurai Y oshihide 樓 井 義 秀 (eds)，Shakai koken suru shūkyō 社 会 貢 献 す る 宗 教 . Kyōto: Sekai Shisosna, 30– 54. Inoue, N obutaka 井 上 順 孝 . 1990. “G urōbaruka kara m ita kindai N ihon shūkyō グローノくノレ 化 か ら 見 た 近 代 日 本 宗 教 .” Tōkyō D aigaku shūkyōgaku nenpō 東 京 大 学 宗 教 学 年 報 6: 1– 18. ----------.1 9 9 7 . “The Inform ation A ee and the G lobalization of R eligion.” In Inoue N obutaka (ed.), G lobalization and Indigenous C ulture. Tōkyō : Institute for Japanese C ulture and C lassics, K okugakuin U niversity, 80– 96. ----------. 2007a. “G lobalization and R eligion: The C ases o f Japan and K orea.” In Peter Beyer and Lori Beam an (eds), R eligion, G lobalization, and C ulture. Leiden: Brill, 453– 71. ----------. 2007b. “The Possibility o f Education about R eligious C ulture in Public Schools.” P olitics and R eligion 1/2: 99– 107. ----------.20 1 1. Zukai zatsugaku: Shūkyō 図 解 雑 学 一 宗 教 . Tōkyō : N atsum esha. Inoue, N obutaka 井 上 順 孝 , U m etsu R eiji 梅 津 礼 司 , and N akano Tsuyoshi 中 野 毅 . 1994. “Seji to no k ōsaku 政 治 と の 交 錯 .” In Inoue N obutaka 井 上 順 孝 ， Kōm oto M itsugi 孝 本 貢 , T sushim a M ichihito 対 馬 路 人 , Nakam aki H irochika 中 牧 弘 允 , and N ishiyam a Shigeru 西 山 茂 （ e ds), Shinshūkyd jite n 新 宗 教 事 典 . Tokyo: K obunao, 562–71. International N etw ork o f Engaged Buddhists. 2011. “C oncept.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .inebnetw ork.org/ineb/concept> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). International Snintō Foundation. 2009a. “W elcom e to the International Shinto Foundation.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .shinto.org/isf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2009b. “Studies in Shinto.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .shinto.org/isf/ stuaies.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Iw am ura, Jane. 2011. Virtual O rientalism , A sian R eligions and A m erican P opular C ulture. Oxford: O xford U niversity Press. Iw anam i Shoten Jiten H enshūbu 岩 波 書 店 辞 典 編 集 部 （ e d.). 1999. G yakubiki k()jien: D aigo-ban 逆 引 き 広 辞 苑 一 第 五 版 . Tōkyō: Iw anam i Shoten. Japan B uddhist Federation. 2004. A G uide to Japanese B uddhism . Tōky ō : Japan B udahist Federation. Jinja H onchō ネ申社本庁. 2009a. “C ivilization o f the D ivine Forest (K am igam i no m ori no bunm ei ネ申々の森の文明 ).” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .jinjahoncho.or.jp/en/ publications/civilization/inaex.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011; also published as pam phlet w ithout date). ----------. 2009b. “N ature, It is D ivine: M essage from Shinto (Shizen, sore w a kam i: Shinō kara no m essēj i 自然，そ れ は 神 一 神道からのメッセージ ).” O n the official w ebsite

166

B ibliography

くh ttp ://w w w .jin jah o n c h o .o r.jp /e n /p u b lica tio n s/n a tu re /in d e x .h tm l> (la st accessed 1 Septem ber 2011; also published as pam phlet w ithout date). ----------. 2009c. “A n Invitation to Shinto Spiritualism ” (Shintō e no izanai 神 道 へ の 誘 い ) .，，O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .jinjahoncho.or.jp/en/publications/invitation/ index.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011; also published as pam phlet w ithout date). ----------. n.d. Jinja eyd koso 神社へようこそ (booklet). ----------.2 0 1 1 . “Shintō: Tsum i to rinri 神 道 一 罪 と 倫 班 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .jinjahoncho.or.jp/en/publications/shinto/jp14.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Jodo Shinshu B uddhist Tem ples o f C anada. 2010a. “M editation and Jodo Shinshu.” りn the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .livingdharm acentre.ca/m editation.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2010b. “Practicing M editation.’，O n the official w ebsite くnttp://w w w .llvlnganarm acentre.ca/m ealtatlon/practlclng-m ealtatlon.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Jōdo Shinshū H onganji-ha 浄 土 真 宗 本 願 寺 派 . 1997. The C ollected W orks o f Shinran (Vol. I). Kyōto: H onganji Shuppansha. ----------.1 9 9 9 . “Tōkalm ura uran kakō shisetsu no h ōshanō m ore jiko n i tal suru kogl 東 海 村 ウ ラ ン 加 工 施 設 の 放 射 能 漏 れ 事 故 に 対 す る 抗 議 .” On the o fficial w ebsite くhttp://w w w .hongw am i.or.jp/new s/seim ei/19991001.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.20 0 1. “Shushō ga Y asukuni Jinja ni sanpai suru koto naku senbotsusha e no tsulto to heiw a e no ketsul o hyōm ei suru koto o m otom eru y ōs e l 首相か靖国ネ申社に参样す ることなく戦没者への追悼と平 和への決意を表明するこ とを求める要請 .’’ O n the o fficial w ebsite くhttp://w w w .hongw anji.or.ip/new s/seim ei/20010813.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 3 . H onganji shinpō 本 願 寺 新 報 （official bulletin, 20 Decem ber). ----------.2 0 0 4 . Jōdo Shinshū hikkei 浄 土 真 宗 必 携 . Kyōto: H onganji Shuppansha. ----------.20 0 5. “Shushō no Y asukuni Jinja sanpai ni tal suru kōgi 首 相 の 靖 国 神 社 賽 拝 に メ す 抗 議 .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .hongw anji.or.jp/new s/seim ei/ 20051017.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2006a. “Kyōiku klhonhō no kaisei ni kansuru kenkal no hyōm ei 教 育 基 本 法 の 改 正 に 関 す る 見 解 の 表 明 .." O n the official w ebsite (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2006b. “ ‘Kycolku kihonhō ’ k aitei ketsugl n i ta l suru k ōg i 「 教 育 基 本 法 」改 定 決 議【 こ対す抗 議 .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .hongw anji.or.jp/new s/seim ei/ 20061220.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2009a. H onganji shinpō 本 願 寺 新 報 (official b u lle tin ,1 June). ----------. 2009b. “Z 6ki ishokuhō k alselan seiritsu ni tsuite (yōs e l) 臓 器 移 械 法 改 正 案 成 立【 こつVヽて（要 請 ).’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .hongw anji.or.jp/new s/seim ei/ post-75.htm l〉 (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). JM osM 浄 土 宗 . 2001a. Jōdoshū shinbun 浄 土 宗 新 聞 （official bulletin, Decem ber). ----------. 2001b. Jōdoshū shinbun 浄 土 宗 新 聞 （official bulletin, January). ----------.2 0 0 6 . B yōdō e no m ezam e 平等へのめさ ' め . Kyōto: Jōdoshū Shūm uch ō . ----------.2 0 0 9 . Jōdoshū shinbun 浄 土 宗 新 聞 （official bulletin, January). Josephson, Jason Ānanda. 2006. “W hen Buddhism Became a ‘R eligion ’：Religion and Superstition in the W ritings o f Inoue Enryo.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 33/1: 143-68. Juergensm eyer, M ark (ed.). 2005. R eligion in G lobal C ivil Society. Oxford: O xford U niversity Press.

B ibliography

167

K am at, Sangeeta. 2004. “The Privatization o f Public Interest: T heorizing N GO D iscourse in a N eoliberal Era.” R eview o f International P o litica l E conom y 11/1: 155-76. K ashim a, Tetsuden. 1990. “The B uddhist C hurches o f A m erica: C hallenges for C hange in the 21st C entury.” The P acific W orld (New Series) 6: 28-40. K aw ase, T akaya 川 瀬 貴 也 . 2010. “K inōron/honshitsuron 機 能 論 •本 質 論 .” In H oshino Eiki 星 野 英 紀 ， Ikegam i Y oshim asa 池 上 良 正 ， Keta M asako 氣 多 雅 子 ， Shim azono Susum u 島 菌 進 , and T suruoka Y oshio 鶴 岡 賀 雄 (eds), Shūkyōgaku jite n 宗 教 学 事 典 . Tokyo: M aruzen, 2 -3 . Kawasoe, Taishin 川 添 泰 信 . 2001. “A m erika J6do Shinshū kyōdan no seiritsu to sono mondai: Jōdo Shinshū no dendō no m o n d ai アメリカ浄土真宗教団の成立とその問題一 浄 土 真 宗 の 伝 道 の 問 題 .” In Ryūkoku D aigaku Tanki D aigakubu 龍 谷 大 学 短 期 大 学 咅B (ed.), B ukkyō bunka to fu ku sh i 仏教文イ匕と福祉. Kyōto: Ryūkoku D aigaku Tanki D aigakubu, 33-86. K etelaar, Jam es E . 1990. O f H eretics and M artyrs in M eiji Japan: Buddhism and Its P ersecution. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. ----------.1 9 9 1 . “Strategic O ccidentalism : M eiji Buddhists at the W orld’s Parliam ent o f R eligions.” B uddhist-C hristian Studies 1 1 :3 7 -5 6 . Khan, Y oshim itsu. 1997. Japanese M oral E ducation P ast and P resent. M adison and London: Fairleigh D ickinson U niversity Press and A ssociated U niversity Presses. K ikan Undō H onbu Jim ukyoku 基 幹 運 動 本 部 事 務 局 （ e d.). 2001. Yasashiku kataru K ikan Undō keikaku: Tomo ni ik ir u やさしく語る基幹運動計画一共に生きる . Kyoto: H onganji Shuppansha. K im ura, Junko and R ussell W . Belk. 2005. “C hristm as in Japan: G lobalization versus L ocalization.” C onsum ption, M arkets and C ulture 8/3: 325-38. K isala, Robert. 1994. “Sōka G akkai, K ōm eitō, and the Separation o f R eligion and State in Japan.” B ulletin o f the N anzan In stitu te fo r R eligion and C ulture 18: 7 -17. ----------.1 9 9 7 . “R eactions to Aum: The R evision o f the R eligious C orporations Law.” Japanese R eligions 22/1: 60-74. ----------.1 9 9 8 . “ 1999 and Beyond: The U se o f N ostradam us’ Prophecies by Japanese N ew R eligions.” Japanese R eligions 23/1-2: 143-57. ----------.1999. P rophets o f Peace: P acifism and C ultural Id entity in Ja p a n ’s N ew R eligions. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. K itaguchi, Sueniro. 1999. A n Introduction to the B uraku Issue: Q uestions and A nsw ers. Richm ond: Japan Library. K jolhede, Bodhin. 2000. “A fterw ord.” In Philip K apleau, The Three P illars o f Zen: Teaching, P ractice, and E nlightenm ent. N ew York: A ncor Books, 375-89. K leine, C hristoph. 2012. “Z ur U niversalitat der U nterscheidung religiö s/säkular: Eine system theoretische B etrachtung.” In M ichael Stausberg (ed.), R eligionsw issenschaft: E in Studienbuch. Berlin: De G ruyter, 65-80. K necht, Peter. 1995. “The C rux o f the Cross: M ahikari’s C ore Sym bol.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 2 2 /3 4 : 321-41. K obayashi, Tetsuya. 1965. “Tokugaw a Education as a Foundation o f M odern Education in Japan.” C om parative E ducation R eview 9: 288-302. K ōfuku Jitsugentō 幸 福 実 現 党 . 2009. ‘Yuki aru h a n !e i! o jitsu g en suru K ōfuku Jitsugentō 「勇 気 あ る 繁 栄 」を 実 現 す る 幸 福 実 現 党 (b rochure). ----------. 2011a. “Kōfuku Jitsugentō no ayumi 幸 福 実 現 党 の あ ゆ み .” O n the official website (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011b. “Kōfuku Jitsugentō k ōryō 幸 福 実 現 党 綱 領 .” On the official website (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011).

168

B ibliography

----------. 2011c. “Platform for the E stablishm ent o f The H appiness R ealization Party.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .hr-party.jp/en/about/—pdf/H R PStatem entA naM ission. pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). K okuritsu K okkai Toshokan 国立国会図書食官 . 2004a. “The C onstitution o f the Em pire o f Japan.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.htm l#s1> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2004b. “D ainippon teikoku kenpō 大 日 本 帝 国 憲 法 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .ndl.go.jp/constitution/etc/j02.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2004c. “The C onstitution o f Japan.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .ndl. go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2004d. “N ihonkoku kenpō 日 本 国 憲 法 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . ndl.go.jp/constitution/etc/j01.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Kōm eitō 公 明 党 . 2010. “O n Politics and R eligion.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . kom ei.or.jp/en/about/view .htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Konkōkyō 金 光 教 . 2001. Konk ō y ō sengen 金 光 教 宣 言 (leaflet). Konkōkyō H eiw a K atsudō Senta 金 光 教 平 和 活 動 セ ン . 2011. “H ltom e de w akaru KPAC — 目で分かる KPAC.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .konko.org/kpac/2— kpac/kpac.htm l#1> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Kopp, Johannes. 1994. Schneeflocken fa lle n in die Sonne: C hristuserfahrungen a u f dem Zen-W eg. A nnw eller: Ploger. ----------.2 0 1 1 . “Zen und C hrist-Seln.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://zen-kontem plation. de/zen_und_christsein/> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). K otthoff, Herm ann. 2007. “The European W orks C ouncil and the Feeling o f Interdepend­ ence.” In M ichael W hittall, H erm an Knudsen, and Fred H uijgen (eds), Towards a E uro­ pea n Labour Identity: The C ase o f the E uropean W ork C ouncil. London: Routledge, 169-81. K otzsch, R onald E .1985. M acrobiotics: Yesterday and Today. Tōkyō : Japan Publications. K raidy, M arwan M. 1999. “The G lobal, the Local, and the Hybrid: A N ative Ethnography o f G localization.” C ritical Studies in M ass C om m unication 16: 456-76. K ushi Institute o f Japan. 2006. “M lchlo K ushi & M acrobiotics.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .kijapan.jp/english/051.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Kushi, M lchlo. 1986. The B ook o f M acrobiotics: The U niversal Way to H ealth and H appiness. Tokyo: Japan Publications. K yodan Fuchi K enkyū sho K o n w a k a i 教団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 . 2005. D ai yo n -ka i K yodan F uchi K enkyūsho K onw akai: P uroshī dingusu 第 4 回 教 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会一プロシーデ 'イングス （ p roceedings). ----------.2 0 0 9 . 2009-nendo K yōdan F uchi K enkyūsho K onw akai ‘Seim ei R inri K enkyū B u ka i，2009 年度 教 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 「 生 命 倫 理 研 究 部 会 」（ p roceedings). Kyōiku Klhonhō ‘K aisei’ n i H antal Suru K ai 教 育 基 本 法 「 改 正 」に 反 対 す る 会 . 2003. K yōiku kihonhō ‘k a ise i，ni kakaw aru Zen-nihon B ukkyōkai no ta iō ni tsu ite no y ōsei 教 育 基 本 法 「改 正 」に 関 わ る 全 日 本 仏 教 会 の 対 応 に つ い て の 要 請 . On the w ebsite くhttp://park3.w akw ak.com /〜 m yokenJl/gou1a-1 .htm l> (last accessed 丄 Septem ber 2011). Laerm ans, Rudl and G ert V erschraegen. 2 0 0 1 .“ ‘The Late N iklas L uhm ann’ on Religion: A n O verview .” Social Com pass 48/1: 7 -20. L ’U nione Sarda. 2 0 1 1 .“Il G esulta e la Fllosofia Zen.” L ’U nione Sarda (27 February). Lebow itz, A dam and David M cN eill. 2007. “Ham m ering Down the Educational N ail: A be Revises the Fundam ental Law o f Education.” Japan Focus くhttp://w w w .japanfocus. org/-A aam -Lebow ltz/2468> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011).

B ibliography

169

Lechner, Frank J. 2003. “D efining Religion: A Pluralistic A pproach for the G lobal A ge.” In A rthur L. G reil and D avid G. Brom ley (eds), D efining R eligion: Investigating the B oundaries betw een the Sacred and Secular. A m sterdam : JAI Press, 67-83. ----------.2 0 0 5 . “R eligious R ejections o f G lobalization.” In M ark Juergensm eyer (ed.), R eligion in G lobal C ivil So ciety. Oxford: Blackw ell, 115-33. Lehm ann, D avid. 1998. “Fundam entalism and G lobalism .” Third W orld Q uarterly 19/4: 607-34. ----------.2 0 0 2 . “R eligion and G lobalization.” In Linda W oodhead，Paul Fletcher, Hiroko K awanam i, and D avid Sm ith (eds), R eligions in the M odern W orld. London: Routledge, 299-315. LoBreglio, John. 1997. “The R evisions to the R eligious C orporations Law: An Introduction and A nnotated T ranslation.” Japanese R eligions 22/1: 38-59. Luhm ann, N iklas. 1977. F unktion der R eligion. Frankfurt: Suhrkam p. ----------.1 9 8 2 . The D ifferentiation o f Society. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press. ----------.1 9 9 2 . “A rbeitsteilung und M oral: D urkheim s T heorie.” In Ém ile D urkheim , Über soziale A rbeitsteilung: Studie über die O rganisation höherer G esellschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkam p, 19-38. Luo, M ichael. 2006. “B uddhism w ith a N ew M ind-Set.” The N ew York Tim es (13 June). M acInnes, Elaine. 2003. Zen C ontem plation fo r C hristians. Lanham: Sheed & W ard. M ain, Jessica L. 2010. “To Lam ent the Self: The Ethical Ideology o f T akeuchi Ryō ’on (1891-1968) and the Ōtani-ha M ovem ent against Buraku D iscrim ination.” In Ugo Dessì (ed.), The Social D im ension o f Shin Buddhism . Leiden: B rill, 137-63. M artin, Luther. 2000. “Secular Theory and the A cadem ic Study o f R eligion.” In Tim Jensen and M ikael Rothstein (eds), Secular Theories on R eligion: C urrent P erspectives. Copenhagen: M useum Tusculanum Press, 137-48. M asuzaw a, Tom oko. 2005. The Invention o f W orld R eligions: Or, H ow E uropean U niversalism Was P reserved in the Language o f P luralism . Chicago: The U niversity o f C hicago Press. M atsunaga, Yūkei 松 長 有 慶 . 2010a. “Some Suggestions O ffered from Japanese Buddhism .” In W orld Economic Forum (ed.), F aith and the G lobal Agenda: Values fo r the Post-C risis Econom y. Geneva: W orld Econom ic Forum , 39-41. ----------. 2010b. “N ihon B ukkyō kara no teigen 日 本 仏 教 か ら の 提 言 .” On the official w ebsite o f the Z en-nihon B ukkyōkai くhttp://w w w .jbf.ne.jp/2010/01/post_160.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). M atsune, Taka 松 根 鹰 . 1993. “Snūkyō to sabetsu jiken: ‘Dō shūren ’ kessei igo no gaiyō to k a d a i 宗 教 と 差 別 事 件 一 「 同 宗 連 」結 成 以 後 の 概 要 と 課 題 .” Buraku kaihdō kenkyū 部 落 解 放 研 究 90: 44-53. M cFarland, N eill H .1967. The Rush H our o f the Gods: A Study o f N ew R eligious M ovem ents in Japan. N ew York: H arper & Row. M cV eigh, Brian. 1997. Spirits, Selves, and Subjectivity in a Japanese N ew R eligion: The C ultural P sychology o f B e lie f in S ūkydō M ahikari. Lewiston: Edw in M ellen. M eiji Jingū 明 治 神 宮 . 2011. “Kyōiku chokugo 教 育 勅 語 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .m eijijingu.or.jp/about/3-4.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). M erzel, D ennis G enpo. 2003. The P ath o f the H um an B eing: Zen Teachings on the B odhisattva Way. Boston: Sham bala Publications. M idw est B uddhist Tem ple. 2009. “M idw est B uddhist T em ple.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .m idw estbudanisttem ple.org> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). M ohr, M ichel. 1994. “Zen Buddhism during the Tokugaw a Period: The C hallenge to Go beyond Sectarian C onsciousness.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 21/4: 341-72.

170

B ibliography

M onbu K agakusho 文 咅 科 学 省 . 2011. “K alselgo no Kyōiku klhonhō to kalselzen no Kyōiku klhonhō no e ly a k u 改正 後 の 教 育 基 本 法 と 改 正 前 の 教 育 基 本 法 の 英 訳 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .m ext.go.jp/b—m enu/klnon/aata/07080117.htm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). M orrls-Suzukl, Tessa. 1998. R e-inventing Japan: Time, Space, N ation. N ew York: M. E. Sharpe. M ukhopadhyaya, R anjana 2008. “U niversalizing Salvation: M odernization, G lobalization and T ransform ations in B uddhist Social W elfare in Japan.” In Ruben H abito and Inaba K eishin (eds), The P ractice o f A ltruism : C aring and R eligion in G lobal P erspective. London: Cam bridge Scholars Press, 23-42. M uller, H ans-Peter and M ichael Schmid. 1992. “A rbeltstellung, Solldarltät und M oral: Elne w erkgeschichtliche und system atlsche Elnführung in die “A rbeltstellung” von Em ile D urkheim .” In Ém ile D urkheim , Über soziale A rbeitsteilung: Studie über die O rganisation höherer G esellschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkam p, 481-521. M ullins, M ark. 1998. C hristianity M ade in Japan: A Study o f Indigenous M ovem ents. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. ----------.2011. “R eligion in C ontem porary Japanese Lives.” In V ictoria L. Bestor, Theodore C. Bestor, w ith A kiko Y am agata (eds), R outledge H andbook o f Japanese C ulture and Society. London: R outledge ，63-74. M urakam i, Shigeyoshi. 1980. Japanese R eligion in the M odern C entury. Tōkyō : U niversity o f Tokyo Press. M urakam i, Y asutoshi ネ'ナ 上保憂 . 2008. G endai shakai o K ōbō D aishi no shisō deyom itoku 現 代 社 会 を 弘 法 大 師 の 思 想 で 読 み 解 く . Tōkyō: Seruba Shuppan. M urata, K iyoakl. 1969. Ja pa n 's N ew B uddhism : A n O bjective A ccount o^ Soka G akkai. N ew York: W eatherhill. N akam aki, H irochika. 1991. “The Indigenization and M ultinationalization o f Japanese Religion: Perfect Liberty K yodan in B razil.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 18/2-3: 2 1 3 4 2 . N akam aki, H lrochika 中 牧 弘 允 . 1994. “Shinshūkyō no kokusalka 新 宗 教 の 国 際 化 .” In Inoue N obutaka 井 上 順 孝 ， Kōm oto Mits u g l 孝本 貢 ， Tsushim a M ichihito 対 馬 路 人 ， N akam aki H lrochika 中 牧 弘 允 ，and N lshlyam a Shigeru 西 山 茂 (e ds), Shinshūkyō jite n 新 宗 教 事 典 . Tōkyō : Kōbuna ō, 608-11. N akano, T s u y o s h l 中 里 毅 . 2001. “K aruto/sekuto ronsō to shū kyōtekl nashonarizum u: G urōbaruka k atel n i okeru n ash on aru -aiaen tltl no tsulkytū カノレト/ セクト論争と宗教 的ナショナリズム一グローカル化過程におけるナショナル •アイデンティティの追求 .’’ Soshiorojika ソシオロジカ 2 6/1-2: 25-41. ----------.2 0 0 4 . Sengo N ihon no shūkyō to se iji 戦 後 日 本 の 宗 教 と 政 治 . Tōkyō : H ara Shobō . N akasone, Ronald Y. 2006. “Ethics o f A m biguity: A B uddhist R eflection on the Japanese O rgan T ransplant Law.” In D avid E. G uinn (ed.)，H andbook o f B ioethics and R eligion. O xford: O xford U niversity Press, 291-305. N eary, Ian. 1989. P olitica l P rotest and Social C ontrol in P re-W ar Japan: The O rigins o f B uraku L iberation. M anchester: M anchester U niversity Press. ----------.2 0 0 2 . H um an R ights in Japan, South K orea and Taiw an. London: Routledge. N ederveen Pieterse, Jan. 1994. “G lobalization as H ybridisation.” International Sociology 9/2: 161-84. ----------.2 0 0 1 . “H ybrldlty，So W hat? The A nti-hybridity B acklash and the R iddles o f R ecognition.” Theory, C ulture & Society 18/2-3: 219-45. ----------.2 0 0 6 . “O riental G lobalization.” Theory, C ulture & Society 23: 411-13.

B ibliography

171

----------.2 0 0 9 . G lobalization and C ulture: G lobal M elange. Lahnam : R ow m an and L ittlefield. N elson, John. 1996. A Year in the L ife o f a Shinto Shrine. Seattle: U niversity o f W ashington Press. ----------.2 0 1 1 . “G lobal and D om estic Challenges C onfronting B uddhist Institutions in Japan.” Journal o f G lobal Buddhism 12: 1-15. N ew Y ork B uddhist C hurch. 2011. “O ngoing Program s.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .new yorkbuddhistchurch.org/program s.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). N ichirenshū Shūm uin 日 蓮 宗 宗 務 院 . 2004. “N ichirenshū to kokusai kyōryoku katsudō 日 蓮 宗 と 国 際 協 力 活 動 .” B ukkyō NG O N ettow āku n e w sle tte r 仏 教 N G O ネットワーク new sletter (Septem ber). N ihon Baputesuto Dōm ei 日本ノ《プテスト同盟 . 1992. “N ihon B aputesuto Dōm ei ‘sensō sekinin ni kansuru kuiaratam e’ 日本バプテスト同盟「 戦 争 責 任 に 関 す る 悔 い 改 め 」.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .jbu.or.jp> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). N ihon K irisuto Kyōdan 日 本 基 督 教 団 . 1967. “D ainiji sekai taisen n i okeruN ihon K irisuto Kyōdan no sekinin ni tsuite no k o k u h ak u 第二 次 世 界 大 戦 に お け る 日 本 基 督 教 団 の 責 任 に つ い て の 告 白 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .uccj.or.jp/confession.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). N ihon Shūkyō D aihyō sha K aigi 日 本 宗 教 代 表 者 会 議 . 1987. H ieizan ShUkyde Sam itto: Sekai shūkyōsha heiw a no inori no ts u d o i 比敷山宗教サミット•世界宗教者平和の祈り の 集 い . Otsu: Tendai Snum ucho. ----------.19 9 7. H ieizan Shūkyō Sam itto j ū-shūnen kinen: Sekai shūkyōsha heiw a no inori no ts u d o i 比 ® 山宗教サミット10周 年 記 念 •世 界 宗 教 者 平 和 の 祈 り の 集 い . Otsu: Tendai Shūm ucnō . N ihon Shū kyō Renm ei 日 本 宗 教 連 盟 . 2003. “‘A tarashii jid ai n i fusaw ashii Kyōiku kihonhō to kyōiku shinkō kihon keikaku no arikata ni tsu ite’ ni tai suru ik e n s h o 「 新し

い 時 代 に ふ さ わ し い 教 育 基 本 法 と 教 育 振 興 基 本 計 画 の 在 り 方 に つ い て 」に対する意 見 # . ” O n the official w ebsite o f the M onbu K agakushō くhttp://w w w .m ext.so.jp/ b_m enu/shingi/chukyo/cnukyo8/gijiroku/030102b.htm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 9 . “Zōk i ishokuhō kaiseian no sangiin shingi n i tai suru ikensho 蔵 器 移 械 法 改 正 案 の 參 議 院 審 議 に 対 す る 意 見 書 ” On the official w ebsite くh ttp ://w w w .jaoro. or.jp/activity/state—zouki—210701.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). N ippon K aigi 日 本 会 議 . 2011a. “N ippon K aigi to w a 日本会議とは .” O n the official w eb­ site くhttp://w w w .nipponkaigi.org/about> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011b. “Y akuin m eibo 役 員 名 簿 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .nipponkaigi.org/about/yakuin> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). N itta H itoshi，2000. “Sninto as a ‘N on-R eligion ’：The O rigins and D evelopm ent o f an Idea.” In John Breen and M ark Teeuwen (eds), Shinto in H istory: W ays o f the K am i. H onolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press, 252-71. N iw ano, N ichikō . 1990. M odern M editations: A B uddhist Sam pler. Tokyo: K osei Publishing Co. ----------.2 0 0 8 . C ultivating the B uddhist H eart: H ow to F ind P eace and F ulfillm ent in a C hanging W orld. Tōkyō : K osei Publishing Co. N iw ano, N ikkyō 庭 野 日 敬 . 1975. Shoshin isshō 初 心 一 生 . Tōkyō : Kō sei Shuppansha. ----------.1976. Buddhism fo r Today: A M odern Interpretation o f the Threefold L otus Sutra. Tokyo: K osei Publishing Co. ----------.19 7 7. A B uddhist A pproach to Peace. Tōkyō : K osei Publishing Co. ----------.1 9 8 1 . A G uide to the Threefold Lotus Sutra. Tōkyō: K osei Publishing Co.

172

B ibliography

----------.1982. Shinshaku: H oke sanbukyō 8 新 釈 一 法 華 二 部 経 8. Tōkyō: Kōsei Shuppansha. ----------.1 9 8 9 . H okekyō no atarashii kaishaku 法 華 経 の 新 し い 解 釈 . Tōkyō: Kō sei Shuppansha. ----------.1 9 9 4 . L ifetim e B eginner: A n A utobiography. Tōkyō: K osei Publishing Co. ----------.2 0 0 6 . “W hy Interreligious C ooperation is E ssential.” D harm a W orld 33: 33, 46. N orris, Pippa and R onald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: R eligion and P olitics W orldw ide. Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. O badia, Lionel. 2010. “G lobalization and the Sociology o f R eligion.” In Bryan S. T urner (ed.), The N ew B lackw ell C om panion to the Sociology o f R elig io n . Oxford: B lackw ell, 477-97. O gui, K oshin. 1998. Zen Shin Talks. C leveland: Zen Shin B uddhist Publications. O hof Zendo. 2007. “K ontakt.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .ohofzendo.de> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). O hsawa, G eorge. 1965. Zen M acrobiotics. Los A ngeles: O hsaw a Foundation, Inc. ----------.19 7 3. Unique P rinciple: The P hilosophy o f M acrobiotics. Chico: G eorge O hsaw a M acrobiotic Foundation. ----------.1 9 8 0 . The B ook o f Judgm ent. O roville: G eorge O hsaw a M acrobiotic Foundation. Okawa, Ryūn ō 大 川 隆 法 . 1997a. Taiyō no hō : E ru K antōre e no m ichi 太 陽 の 法 一 エ ル カンターレへの道 . Tōkyō : K ōfuku no K agaku Shuppan. ----------. 1997b. Eien no hō: Eru K antāre no sekaikan 永 遠 の 法 一 エル•カンター レ の 世 界 锡 . Tōkyō : Kōfuku no K agaku Shuppan. ----------. 1997c. (Ōgon no hō : E ru K antāre no rekishikan 黄 金 の 法 一 エル•カンター レ の 歴 史 観 . Tōkyō : Kōfuku no K agaku Shuppan. ----------.2 0 0 8 . “The W ay to Success.” H appy Science M onthly 189: 4 -14. ----------. 2009a. K ōfuku Jitsugentō sengen 幸 福 実 現 兄 宣 言 . Tōkyō : K ōfuku no K agaku Shuppan. ----------. 2009b. Shin-N ihonkoku kenpō shian: K ōfuku Jitsugentō sengen 4 新 •日 本 国 憲 法 試 案 一 幸 福 実 現 党 宣 言 4. Tōkyō : K ōfuku no K agaku Shuppan. ----------.2 0 1 0 . Change Your Life, C hange the W orld: A Spiritu a l G uide to L ivin g N ow. Tokyo: IRH Press. O kiniro, G ary Y . 1984. “R eligion and R esistance in A m erica’s C oncentration C am ps.” P hylon 45/3: 220-33. O kubo, M asayuki. 1991. “The A cceptance o f N ichiren Shōshū Sōka G akkai in M exico.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 18/2-3: 189-211. Ōmoto Kyōgaku K ensansho 大 本 教 学 研 鐵 所 （ e d.). 2006. Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyū sho K onw akai ‘Seim ei R inri Kenkyū B ukai’ sniryō -snū ( 1 ) 教 団 付 置 研 究 所 懇 話 会 「 生命 倫 班 研 究 部 会 」資 料 集 (1). Kameoka: Ōm oto Kyōgaku K ensansho. Ōn ishi, K atsuaki 大 西 克 明 . 2009. H onm on B utsuryūkō) to S ōka G akkai no shakaigakuteki kenkyū: Shūkyōteki haitasei to g en sesh u g i本 門 佛 立 講 と 創 価 学 会 の 社 会 学 的 研 究 一 宗 教 的 排 他 性 と 現 世 主 義 . Tōkyō: Ronsō sha. O ranee C ounty B uddhist Church. 2011. “W elcom e to the O range County B uaahist C hurch.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .ocbudahist.org> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). O regon B uddhist Tem ple. 2009. “Frequently A sked Q uestion.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .oregonbudanisttem ple.com /visitors/faq.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). O tani, E iichi 大 谷 栄 一 . 2009. “H eiw a o m ezasu shū kyō shatachi: G endai N ihon no sHūkyō sha heiw a und ō 平和をめさ ' す 宗 教 者 た ち 一 現 代 日 本 の 宗 教 者 平 和 運 動 .” In Inaba K eishin 稲 場 圭 信 and Sakurai Y oshihide 樓 井 義 秀 （ eds)，Shakai kōken suru sh ūkyō 社 会 貢 献 す る 宗 教 . Kyōto: Sekai Shisō sha, 108-32.

B ibliography

173

O tto ，Rudolf. 2004 [1917]. D as H eilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum R ationalen. München: C. H. Beck. Passin, H erbert. 1965. Society and E ducation in Ja p an . N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press. Pereira, Ronan A lves. 2008. “The Transplantation o f Soka G akkai to Brazil: B uilding ‘the C losest O rganization to the H eart o f Ikeda-Sensei.”，Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 35/1: 95-113. Platvoet, Jan. 1990. “The D efiners D efined: T raditions in the D efinition o f R eligion.” M ethod & Theory in the Study o f R eligion 2/2: 180-212. ----------.19 9 9. “To D efine or N ot to Define: The Problem o f the D efinition o f R eligion.” In Jan Platvoet and A rie L. M olendijk (eds)，The P ragm atics o f D efining R eligion: Contexts, C oncepts, and C ontests. Leiden: B rill, 245-65. Pope Paul V I .1965. “N ostra A etate: D eclaration on the R elation o f the Church to nonC hrlstlan R eligions.” O n the official w ebsite くh ttp ^ /w w w .vatican.va/archive/hist— councils/ii—vatican—council/docum ents/vat-ii—decl—19651028—nostra-aetate—en.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Porcu, Elisabetta. 2008. P ure Land Buddhism in M odern Japanese C ulture. Leiden: Brill. ----------.2 0 1 0 . “On- and O ff-line R epresentations o f Japanese Buddhism : R eflections on a M ultifaceted R eligious T radition.” P acific W orld 32/1: 91-107. Prohl，Inken. 2004. “R eligion and N ational Identity in C ontem porary Japan.” In G errlt Steunebrink and E vert van der Z w eerde (eds), C ivil Society, R eligion, and th e N ation. M odernization in Intercu ltu ral C ontext: R ussia, Japan, Turkey. A m sterdam : Rodopi, 135-50. Pryse-Phillips，W illiam E. M . 2011. ‘"Nervous System D isease.” E n cyclop edia B ritannica. U ltim ate R eference Suite. Chicago: E ncyclopedia Britannica. Public A ffairs H eadquarters for Shikinen Sengu. 2006. G rand Shrine o f Ise: Spiritual H om e o f th e Japanese (brochure). Q ueen，C hristopher S. 1996. “Introduction: The Shapes and Sources o f Engaged B uddhism .， ， In C hristopher S. Q ueen and Sallle B. King (eds)，E ngaged Buddhism : B uddhist Liberation M ovem ents in A sia. Albany: State U niversity of New Y ork Press ，1 ^ 4 . ----------.1 9 9 9 . “Introduction.” In D uncan R. W illiam s and C hristopher Q ueen (eds )， A m erican B uddhism : M ethods and F indings in R ecent Scholarship. Richm ond: Curzon Press, xiv-xxvii. Ramaswamy ，Sumathi. 2005. The L ost Land o f Lem uria: Fabulous Geographies, C atastrophic H istories. Berkeley: University o f California Press. R am belli，Fablo. 1996. “R eligion，Ideology o f D om ination，and N ationalism : K uroda Toshio on the D iscourse o f Shinkoku•” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 2 3 /3 4 : 3 8 7 4 2 6 . ----------.2 0 0 1 . V egetal B uddhas: Ideological E ffects o f Japanese B uddhist D octrines on the Salvation o f Inanim ate B eings. Kyoto: Italian School o f E ast A slan Studies. R asch ，W illiam . 2000. N iklas L u hm ann’s M odernity: The P aradoxes o f D ifferen tia tio n. Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press. R aw linson ，A ndrew . 1997. The B ook o f E nlightened M asters: W estern Teachers in E astern Traditions. Chicago: Open C ourt. R eader, Ian. 1986. “Z azenless Zen: The Position o f Zazen in Institutional Zen B uddhism .” Japanese R eligions 14/3: 7-27. ----------.2 0 0 2 . “Identity and N ationalism in the ‘N ew ’ N ew R eligions: B uddhism as a M otif for the N ew A ge in Japan.” In K laus A ntoni, H iroshi K ubota, Johann N aw rocki, and M ichael W achutka (eds), R eligion and N ational Id en tity in th e Japanese C ontext. M unster: L it，13-35.

174

B ibliography

一 一 一 . 2004. “Ideology, A cadem ic Inventions and M ystical A nthropology: R esponding to Fitzgerald’s Errors and M isguided Polem ics.” E lectronic Journal o f C ontem porary Japanese Studies くhttp://w w w .japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/R eader.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Reader, Ian and G eorge J. Tanabe, Jr. 1998. P ractically R eligious: W orldly B enefits and the Common R eligion o f Japan. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. Reid, D avid. 1996. “Internationalization in Japanese R eligions.” In Tam aru N oriyoshi and D avid R eid (eds), R eligion in Japanese C ulture. Tōkyō : K odansha International, 184-98. Reiyukai 霊 友 云 . 2009. “ ‘T ogether!， : H ito no ‘in o ch i，to ‘m ira i，ga taisetsu ni sareru kankyō o tsukutte ikō ! ‘T ogether!’一 人 の 「 いのち」と「 未 来 」が大切にされる環境をつく つていこう!" （leaflet). Renge K okusai B orantiakai れんげ国際ボランティア会 . 2009a. “Tōkai no gaiyō 当 会 の 概 要 .” O n the official w ebsite くnttp://renge.asia/m oaules/tinya0> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2009b. “K aigai no katsudo 海 外 の 活 動 .” O n the official w ebsite くnttp://renge. asia/m odules/tinyd1> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2009c. “Ten w am izukara tasukuru m ono o tasuku 天は自ら助くる者を助く .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://renge.asia/modules/m yalDum /photo.phD?lid=34&cid=7> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 1 0 . “A i no h antai w a m ukanshin 愛 の 反 対 は 無 関 心 .” O n the official w eb­ site くn ttp ://renge.asia/m oaules/m yalbum /pnoto.pnp?lia= 41& cia= 7 > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Repp, M artin. 2003. “R eligion, C ulture, and Popular C ulture in Japan: A H istorical Study o f their Interaction.” Inter-R eligio 43: 3-21. 一 一 一 . 2004. “A um Shinrikyo and the A um Incident: A C ritical Introduction.” In Jam es Lewis and Jesper A . Petersen (eds), C ontroversial N ew R eligions. Oxford: O xford U niversity Press, 153-95. ----------.2 0 0 8 . “H.H. the 14th D alai Lam a and the Japanese Buddhists: A n A ccount and A nalysis o f C om plicated Interactions.” Japanese R eligions 33/1-2: 103-25. R iesebrodt, M artin. 2003. “R eligion in G lobal Perspective.” In M ark Juergensm eyer (ed.), G lobal R elig io n s. O xford: O xford U niversity Press, 95-109. ----------.2 0 0 4 . “A Sociological L egitim ation o f the C oncept o f ‘R eligion.’” Paper deliv­ ered at the A nnual Sem inar for Leaders in U niversity o f C openhagen’s R esearch Priority A rea, R eligion in the 21st C entury, 7 -8 Decem ber. 一 一 一 . 2007. C ultus und H eilsversprechen: eine Theorie der R eligionen. M unchen: C. H. Beck. R inzaishū M yō shin ji-ha 臨 済 宗 妙 心 寺 派 . 2001. “H isen to heiw a no sengenbun 非 戦 と 平 和 の 宣 言 文 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .m yoshinji.or.jp/about/ neiw a.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 9 . “Rinzaishū M yōshinji-na jin ken yōgo suishin shishin 臨 済 宗 妙 心 寺 派 人 権 械 護 推 進 指 針 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .m yoshinji.or.jp/about/post—7 . htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Risshō K ōseikai k 正 仪 成 会 . 2004. R issho K osei-kai: Buddhism fo r Today (brochure). ----------.2 0 0 9 . “ ‘Zoki isnokunō k aisei’ n i tai suru kinkyū s e im e i 「 臓 器 移 械 法 改 正 」に対 す る 緊 急 声 明 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .kosei-kai.or.jp/new s/2009/07/ post_1416.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 1 0 . “W hat is A rm s D ow n!” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .rk-w orld.org/ arm sdow n.aspx> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011).

B ibliography

175

R itzer, G eorge. 1998. The M cD onaldization Thesis: E xplorations and E xtensions. London: SAGE Publications. Robertson, Roland. 1970. The Sociological Interpretation o f R elig io n. Oxford: Basil B lackw ell. ----------.1 9 9 1 . “G lobalization ，M odernization，and Postm odernlzatlon: The A m biguous Position o f R eligion.” In Roland R obertson and W illiam R. G arret (eds), R eligion and G lobal O rder. N ew York: Paragon H ouse Publishers, 281-91. ----------.1 9 9 2 . G lobalization: Social Theory and G lobal C ulture. London: SAGE Publications. ----------.1 9 9 5 . “G localization: Tlm e-Space and H om ogeneity-H eterogeneity.” In M ike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland R obertson (eds), G lobal M odernities. London: SAGE Publications ，2 5 4 4 . ----------.2 0 0 7 . “G lobal M lllennlallsm : A Postm ortem on Secularization.” In Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (eds), R eligion, G lobalization, and C ulture. Leiden: B rill, 9-34. Rocha ，C ristina. 2006. Zen in B razil: The Q uest fo r C osm opolitan M odernity. H onolulu: U niversity o f H aw al‘l Press. R ochester Z en C enter. 2008. “FAQ.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .rzc.org/node/8> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Rom an C atholic Church. 1994. C atechism o f the C atholic Church. London: Burns & Oates. R oudom etof, V ictor. 2005. “Transnationalism , C osm opolitanism and G localization.” C urrent Sociology 53/1: 113-35. Saekl，Shungen 佐 伯 俊 源 . 2003. “K okusai fukushl bunya 国 際 福 祉 分 野 ” In H asegawa M asatoshi 货 谷 川 俊 (ed.)，Sengo B ukkyō kei sh a ka ifu ku sh i jig y ō no rekishi to genjo ni kansuru sōg ō kenky ū 戦 後 仏 教 系 社 会 福 祉 事 業 の 歴 史 と 現 状 に 関 す る 総 合 研 究 . Chiba: Shukutoku D aigaku ，247-55. Saki，A klo 佐 木 秋 夫 . 1980. shūkyō to seiji handō 宗 教 と 政 治 反 動 . Tōkyō : Shin N ihon Shuppansha. Saler，Benson. 1977. “Supernatural as a W estern C ategory.” E thos 5/1: 31-53. Salt Lake B uddhist Tem ple. 2011. “Tem ple C alendar.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// slbuddhist.org/calendar.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Sankei shinbun 産 経 新 聞 . 2009. “Shin-N ihonkoku kenpo 新 日 呆 国 憲 法 ." Sankei shin­ bun 産 経 新 聞 （ 2 1 June). S antucci，Jam es A . 2008. “The N otion o f R ace in T heosonhy.” N ova R elig io 11/3: 3 7 -63. Sautm an ，B arry. 2010. “ ‘V egetarianbetw een M eals’: The D alai Lam a ， W ar，and V iolence.， ’ P ositions 18/1: 89-143. Schalk, Peter, M ax Deeg, O liver Freiberger, and C hristoph K leine (eds). 2003. R eligion im Spiegelkabinett: A siatische R eligionsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld zw ischen O rientalism us und O kzidentalism us. U ppsala: U niversity o f U ppsala. Scholte, Jan A art. 2005. G lobalization: A C ritical Introduction. N ew York: Palgrave M acm illan. School o f O riental and A frican Studies. 2011. “His H oliness Seiyu K iriyam a.” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .soas.ac.uk/about/fellow s/his-hollness-seiyu-kinyam a/hisholiness-seiyu-kiriyam a.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Schrim pf，M onika. 2008. 4. Seager, Richard H. 1999. Buddhism in A m erica. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press.

176

B ibliography

Seattle Betsuin. 2011. “Betsuin Events for M ay 2011.” W heel o f the Sangha 28/5 (newsletter). O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .seattlebetsuin.com /w p-content/uploads/2011/05/ calendar0511.pdf〉 (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Seicnō no Ie 生 長 の 家 . 2011. “Seichō no Ie no kankyō hozen katsudō 生 長 の 家 の 環 境 保 全 舌 動 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .jp.seicho-no-ie.org/environm ent/index. htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Seicnō no Ie o-ryōri burogu 生長の家おネ斗班ブ ログ. 2011. “O ishii nō m ī to おいしいノー ミート.” On the w ebsite くhttp://sundial-aiary.cocolog-nifty.com /nom eat> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Seiw ert, Hubert. 1989. “Religion und M oderne Um welt: G lobale Perspektiven R eligiö ser Innovation.” In G isbert Rinschede and K urt Rudolph (eds), G eographia R eligionum . B eiträge zu r R eligion/U m w elt-F orschung I (Vol. 6). Berlin: Reim er, 25-37. Sekai Kyü seikyō Izunom e Kyōdan 世 界 救 世 教 い づ の め 教 団 . 2009. “ Shin bunm ei no sōzō : Sekai Kyū seikyō Izunom e Kyōdan ga m ezasu m ono 新 文 柄の 倉 J造 一 世 界 救 世 教 い づ の め 教 団 が め ざ す も の .” K ōm y ō 光 明 （ official bulletin, Decem ber). Shanti K okusai B orantiakai シヤンティ国際ボランティア会. 2006. “A fuganisutan jig y ō: D aiichi fēzu (2003-2005) jig y ō hyōka アフガニスタン事業一第一フェーズ (2003-2005) 毒 業 評 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sva.or.jp/books/resp/resp12.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 1 0 . “A fuganisutankoku: Tosho fukyū katsudō o tsūjita snotōkyōiku no shitsutekina kaizen jig y ō (10.2007-9.2010 ) ア フガニ ス タン国一図書普及活動を通じた 初 等 教 育 の 質 的 な 改 善 事 業 (2007 年 10 月 2010 年 9 月 ).” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// sva.or.jp/afgnan/plan/afg2008-2010lib-plan.paf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------(ed.). 2011a. Toshokan wa, kokkyō o koeru: K okusai kyōryoku NG O sanjū-nen no k is e k i 図 書 館 は ，国境をこえる一 国 際 協 力 NGO 30 年 の 軌 跡 . Tōkyō :ysōhikruK Shuppankai. ----------. 2011b. “SVA no shimei SV A の 使 命 .” Shanti シヤン テイ (official bulletin, January). Shanti V olunteer A ssociation. 2010. A nnual R eport 2009. A ctivity P lan 2010 (brochure). Sharf, R obert H .1993. “The Zen o f Japanese N ationalism .” H istory o f R eligions 3 3 :1 -4 3 . ----------.1 9 9 5 . “Sanbōkyōaan and the W ay o f N ew R eligions.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 22/2-3: 417-57. Shiho Sanga 四 方 僧 伽 . 2010. “K anōsei to shite no Bukkyō 可能性としての仏教 .” O n the official w ebsite くn ttp://w w w .catuaaisa-sangna.org/buxtukyou_2.ntm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shim azono, Susum u 島 菌 進 . 1991. “The Expansion o f Japan’s N ew R eligions into Foreign C ultures.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 18/2-3: 105-32. ----------. 1995a. “N ihonjin-ron to shiikyō : K okusaika to N ihonjin no kokum inteki aident i t i 日本人論と宗教一国際化と日本人の国民的アイデンティティ .” T (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shinnyoen 真 如 苑 . 2009. Shinnyoen shakai kōken katsudō repōto 真 如 苑 社 会 貢 献 活 動 レポ ー ト (brochure). Shm nyo-en Foundation. 2009. “O ur M ission.， ，O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sef. org/w ho-w e-are/our-m ission〉 (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 1 0 . “ Shinnyo Fellow s Program .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sef.org/ projects/shinnyo-fellow s-program > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2011. “Interview w ith Dr. D uncan W illiam s.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . sef.6rg/2009/06/lntervlew -w ltn-a r-auncan-w llllam s> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shinshū Kyōdan R engō 真 宗 教 団 連 合 . 2000. “ Shinshū Kyōdan Rengō kessel sanjū -shūnen kyōdō sengen 真 宗 教 団 連 合 結 成 30 周 年 共 同 宣 言 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .shrn.gr.jp/about/sengen/30.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.20 0 5. “K oizum i shushō no Y asukuni Jinja sanpai ni tal suru k ōglbun 小 泉 首 相 の 靖 国 神 社 參 拝 に 対 す る 抗 議 文 .” On the official website くhttp://w w w .shin.gr.jp/activity/ offer/doc/20051017.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 8 . “ Shlnshū Kyōdan Rengō yonjū -shūnen kyōdō sengen 真 宗 教 団 連 合 40 周 年 共 同 且 言 .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .shin.gr.jp/about/sengen> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shinshū Ōtani-ha 真 宗 大 谷 派 . 1995. Shinshū 真 宗 （ official bulletin ，A pril). ----------.19 9 7. Shinshū 真 宗 （official bulletin, M ay). ----------.1 9 9 8 . Inochi い のち . Kyōto: Kyōm ura Shuppan Iinkai. ----------.20 0 4. “Kyōiku klhonhō ‘k aisei’ n l hantal suru ketsugi 教 育 基 本 法 「 改 正 」に 反 対 す る 決 藤 .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .higashinonganji.or.jp/lnfo/new s/detail. pnp?ld=86> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shintō K okusai G a k k a i 神 道 国 際 学 会 . 2010a. “Shintō to w a 神道とは .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .shinto.org/shinto- 1.htm> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2010b. “Shintō K okusai G akkai to w a 神 道 国 際 学 会 と は .” On the official w eb­ site くhttp://w w w .shlnto.org/skg.htm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shinto Seiji R e n m e i 神 道 政 治 連 盟 . 2007. “Kyōiku klhonhō no kaisei ga jitsugen 教 育 基 本 法 の 改 正 が 実 現 .” On the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .slnseiren.org/kyoiku— katei/chukyoshm .htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.20 1 1. “Sninselren tte n a n l? 神 政 連 っ て 何 ?" O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . sinseiren.org> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shively，D onald H .1991. “Popular C ulture.” In John W . H all (ed .)，The Cam bridge H istory o f Japan: E arly M odern Japan (Vol. 4). Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press，706-69. Shojl，R aphael. 2003. “ ‘B uddhism in Syncretic Shape’: Lessons o f Shingon in B razil.” Journal o f G lobal Buddhism 4: 70-107. ----------.2 0 0 8 . “The Failed Prophecy o f Shinto N ationalism and the R ise o f Japanese B razilian C atholicism .” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 35/1: 13-38. shūkyō Bunka Kyōiku Suishin Sentā 宗 教 文 化 教 育 推 進 セ ン タ ー . 2011. “Regulations (abstract).” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .cerc.1p/m dex—eng.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shum ei Intanashonaru 秀明インターナショナノU 2011. “Shūm ei Intā nashonaru no katsudō 秀明インターナショナルの活動 .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .nposhum ei.or. jp/info.sw f> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Shupe ，A nson. 1991. “G lobalization V ersus R eligious N ativ ism: Japan’s Soka G akkai in the W orld A rena.” In Roland Robertson and W illiam R. G arret (eds), R eligion and G lobal O rder. N ew York: Paragon H ouse Publisher，183-99.

178

B ibliography

Single Grain o f Sand. 2007. “Single Grain o f Sand Zen M editation Group.” On the official w ebsite くnttp://w ww.causew aynealingarts.com /?p=42> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Sinnett, A lfred P. 1995 [1886]. Incidents in the L ife o f M adam e H .P. B lavatsky. W hitefish: K essinger Publishing. Skidm ore, M ax J. 1991. “O riental C ontributions to W estern Popular C ulture: The M artial A rts.” Journal o f P opular C ulture 25/1: 129-48. Sm art, N inian. 1989. The W orld’s R eligions. Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press. Sm ith, H enry D. 1994. “The H istory o f the Book in Edo and Paris.” In Jam es L. M cClain, John M. M errim an, and U gawa K aoru (eds), Edo and P aris: Urban L ife and the State in the E arly M odern E ra. Ithaca: C ornell U niversity Press, 332-52. Snodgrass, Judith. 2003. P resenting Japanese Buddhism to the W est: O rientalism , O ccidentalism , and the C olum bian E xposition. C hapel Hill: U niversity o f N orth C arolina Press. Sōka G akkai Kyōgakubu 創 価 学 会 教 学 部 （ ed.). 1967. Shakubuku kyōten 折 伏 教 典 . Tōkyō : Sōka Gakkai. Sōka G akkai 創 価 学 会 . 2009. 2009-nen katsudō hōkoku 2009 年 活 動 報 告 . Tōkyō : Sōka G akkai Kōhō shitsu. ----------.2011. “W hy Politics?” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sokaissues.info/hom e/ w hy-politics.htm l〉 (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Soka G akkai International. 2010a. Soka G akkai International: A n Introduction (brochure). ----------. 2010b. “Soka G akkai International: NGO A ctivity R eport.” O n the official w eb­ site くhttp://w w w .sgi.org/assets/pdf/SG IN G O —activity—report2010.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 1 1 . “Peace and D isarm am ent.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sgi.org/ com m unity-initiatives/peace-and-aisarm am ent.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Sonoda, M inoru. 2000. “Shinto and the N atural Environm ent.” In John Breen and M ark Teeuw en (eds), Shinto in H istory: W ays o f the K am i. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press, 32-46. Sōtōs h i 曹 洞 宗 . 1992. “Sanjam on 纖 謝 文 .” O n the official w ebsite くnttp://w w w .sotozennet.or.jp/w p/w p-content/uploads/2011/01/sanjyam on.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.1 9 9 6 . ‘Gurī n p u ra n ， : Seim ei to kankyō no chōwa o m e za sh ite 「 クリーン•プフン」 生命と環境の調和をめさ ' して (leaflet). ----------. 1998a. “Gurī n puran: Kōdō no tam e no Q & A (Jo ) グリーンプラン一行動のため の Q&A (ノ于).” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sotozen-net.or.jp/oshie/kankyo/ qanda/jyo.htm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 1998b. “Gurī n puran: Kōdō no tam e no Q & A (II. Bukkyo n i nani ga dekiru?) グ リ ー ン プ ラ ン 一行 動 の ため の Q &A ( I I . 仏 教 に 何 が で き る ？).” On the official w eb­ site くn ttp ://w w w .sotozen-net.or.ip/osnie/kankyo/qanaa/q2.ntm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 1998c. “Chikyū o sukue!: S eikatsu n i ikasu gurī n raifu gokun 地 球 を 救 え !一 生活にいかすグリーン • ライフ五訓 .” On the official w ebsite くnttp://w w w .sotozen-net. or.jp/osnie/kankyo/life.ntm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 1998d. “G urīn puran: Kōdō no tam e no Q & A (I. K ankyō m ondai w a tanin goto?) グリーンプラン一行動のための Q&A ( I . 環 境 問 題 は 他 人 ご と ？).” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sotozen-net.or.jp/oshie/kanK yo/qanda/q1.ntm > (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 1 . “A m erika gassnūkoku ni okeru dōji tahatsu tero narabi n i A fuganisutan de ten k aich i no tero soshiki e no k ōgeki n i yoru giseisha no katagata ni o-m im ai

B ibliography

179

ア メ リカ 合 衆 国 に お け る 同 時 多 発 テ ロ な ら び に ア フ ガ ニ ス タ ン で 展 開 中 の テ ロ 組 織 へ の 攻 撃 に よ る 犠 牲 者 の 方 々 に お 見 舞 い .’’ O n th e o fficia l w ebsite くh ttp ://w w w . so to zen -n et.o r.jp /w p /w p -co n ten t/u p lo ad s/2 0 1 1 /0 2 /2 0 0 丄1025.pdf> (la st accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 3 . “ Jinken ，heiw a ，kankyō ’ sekai heiw a o m otom eru Sōtōshū no in o r i 「 人権 平 和 • 環 境 」 世 界 平 和 を 求 め る 曹 洞 宗 の 祈 り .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w . sotozen-net.or.jp/w p/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/200304.pdf> (last accessed 1 September 2011). ----------.2 0 0 7 . “N ihonkoku kenpō kyūj ō ni kansuru sōchō danw a 日 本 国 憲 法 9 条 に 関 す る糸忿長P炎H舌.，，O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sotozen-net.or.jp/w p/w p-content/ uploads/2011/02/20071208.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 9 . Zen no tom o 禅 の 友 (official bulletin ，January). ----------.2 0 1 0 . “Shū m usōcnō danw a (kōran shōkyaku m ondal n l ts u ite ) 宗務糸忿長談§古 (コ ー ラ ン 焼 却 問 題 に つ い て ).， ，O n the o fficial w ebsite くh ttp ://w w w .so to zen-n et.o r. jp/w p/w p-content/uploads/2 011/02/sochodanw a—koran—2010—9.pdf> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011a. “Jinken ，heiw a，kankyō 人 撞 • 平 和 • 環 境 .’’ O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sotozen-n et.or.jp/activity> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2011b. “Jinken 人 権 ." O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .sotozen-net.or.jp/ activity/jinken> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ‘Sōtōshū D anshinto H ikkei’ K aitei I in k a i 「 曹 洞 宗 擅 信 徒 必 携 」改 訂 委 員 会 （ed.). 2008. Sdtdshu danshinto hikkei 曹洞宗ネ置信徒必携 . Tōkyō : Sōtōsnū Shūm uchō. Stausberg, M ichael. 2009. “Interventionist Practices and the Prom ises o f Religion: On M artin Riesebrodt, C ultus und H eilversprechen (2007).” In M ichael Stausberg (ed.), C ontem porary Theories o f R eligion: A C ritical Companion. London: R outleage ，264-82. Steiner，Rudolf. 1987 [1904]. C osm ic M em ory: P rehistory o f E arth and M an. G reat B arrington: Steinerbooks. Stone ，Jacqueline. 1994. “R ebuking the Enem ies o f the Lotus: N lchirenlst E xclusivism in H istorical Perspective.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 2 1/2-3: 231-59. Strand ，C lark. 2006. “O rainary Struggles.” Tricycle 15/4. O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .tricycle.c6m /6ralnarv-struggles?page=0 ， 0> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Strenski, Ivan. 2004. “Ideological C ritique in the Study o f R eligion: Real Thinkers, Real C ontexts and a L ittle H u m ility .， ，In Peter A ntes，Armin W . G eertz，and Randl R. W arne (eds)，N ew A pproaches to the Study o f R eligion. Volume 1 : R egional, C ritical, and H istorical A pproaches. Berlin: W alter de G ruyter, 271-93. Suzuki，Shunryū . 1995. Zen M ind, B eginn er’s M ind. N ew York: W eatherhill. T akahashi，S h in ji 尚 橋 信 次 . 1995. K okoro no hakken: K agakuhen 心 の 発 見 一 科 学 篇 . Tōkyō : Sanbō Shuppan. Takeda ，Ryū s e i 武田首I 精 . 2008. “Shinran Jōdokyō saikalshaku no ichlshlza: shūkyō tagen jld al ni okeru Jōdokyō datsu k ōch ik u 親 鸞 浄 土 教 再 解 釈 の 一 視 座 一 宗 教 多 元 時 代 に お け る 浄 土 教 の 脱 構 築 .” Shukyō kenky ū 宗 教 研 究 82/2: 275-300. Tanaka ，Kenneth. 1999. “Issues o f E thnicity in the B uddhist C hurches of A m erica.” In Duncan R. W illiam s and C hristopher Queen (eds), A m erican B uddhism : M ethods and Findings in R ecent Scholarship. Richm ond: Curzon Press, 3-19. ----------.20 0 6. “R esponse.” The P ure L and 22: 51-62. Tanaka， N obum asa 田 中 伸 尚 . 2002. Yasukuni no sengoshi 靖 国 の 戦 後 史 . Tōkyō : Iw anam i Shoten. Taniguchi M asanobu ^ •ロ$ i . 2002. Im a koso shizen kara m anabō: N ingenshijōshugi o k o e te 今こそ自然から学ぼう ~ 人 間 至 上 主 義 を 超 え て . Tōkyō : Seichō no Ie.

180

B ibliography

----------.2 0 0 3 . Shinkō ni yo ru heiw a no m ichi: Shinseiki no shūkyō ga m ezasu mono 信 仰 に よ る 平 和 の 道 一 新 世 紀 の 宗 教 が 目 指 す も の . Tōkyō : Seicnō no Ie. ----------.2 0 1 0 . “N ikujiki no onshitsu k ōka w a 51% 肉 食 の 温 室 効 果 は 51% .” Shirohato 白九_ (official bulletin, February). Tebecis, A ndris K .1982. M ahikari: Thank G odfor the A nsw ers at L ast. Tōk y ō: L. H. Yōk ō Shuppan. Teeuwen, M ark. 1996. “Jinja H onchō and Shrine Shintō Policy.” Japan Forum 8/2: 177-88. Tendaishū 天 台 宗 . 1995. “N ōshi oyobi zōki ishoku n i tsuite 脳 死 及 び 臓 器 移 械 に つ い て .” O n the o fficial w ebsite くh ttp://w w w .tendai.or.jp/shuchou /01.php> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------.2 0 0 3 . Tendai j ānaru 天 台 ジ ャ ー ナ ル （official bulletin, N ovem ber). ----------.2 0 0 6 . Tendai j ānaru 天 台 ジ ャ ー ナ ル （official bulletin, N ovem ber). ----------. 2008a. “T ranslating Dengyō D aishi’s W ill into A ction in the Present.” On the offi­ cial w ebsite くhttp://w w w .tendai.or.jp/english/chapter02.php> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). ----------. 2008b. “K aitō 回 答 .” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .tendai.or.jp/qa/19.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Thelle, N otto R. 1987. Buddhism and C hristianity in Japan: From C onflict to D ialogue, 1854-1899. Honolulu: U niversity o f H aw ai‘i Press. 一 一 一 . 2003. “The C hristian Encounter w ith B uddhism .” In M ark M ullins (ed.), H andbook o f C hristianity in Japan. Leiden: B rill, 227-47. Titm uss, C hristopher. 2004. “Has the D alai Lam a Left ‘H istory’ to D eterm ine the V alidity o f W ar?” O n the w ebsite くhttp://w w w .anarm afacilitators.org/index.php/w elcom e/eng/ lefthistory> (last accessed 28 N ovem ber 2011). Tokunaga, M ichio. 2006. “ ‘M editation’ in Jōdo Shinsh ū .” The P ure L and 22: 4 5-9. Tom linson, John. 1996. “C ultural G lobalisation: Placing and D isplacing the W est.” The E uropean Journal o f D evelopm ent R esearch 8: 2 2-35. 一 一 一 . 2003. “G lobalization and C ultural Identity.” In D avid H eld and A nthony G. M cG rew (eds), The G lobal Transform ation R eader. Cam bridge: Polity Press, 269-77. Totten, G eorge O. and H iroshi W agatsum a. 1972. “Em ancipation: G rowth and Transform ation o f a Political M ovem ent.” In G eorge DeV os and W agatsum a H iroshi (eds), Ja p a n ’s In visible Race: C aste in C ulture and P ersonality. B erkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 33-67. Tschannen, O livier. 1991. “The Secularization Paradigm : A System atization.” Journal fo r the Scientific Study o f R eligion 30/4: 395-415. Tsuchiya, H iroshi 土 屋 博 . 2011. “ ‘Shuky6-bm ka-shi’ shikaku nintei seido no hassoku ni a ta tte 「 宗 教 文 化 士 」資 格 認 定 制 度 の 発 足 に あ た っ て .” Chūgai nipp ō 中 外 日 報 （18 January). T sujim ura, Sninobu. 2007. “R eligious Issues in Japan 2006: Tne Potential Social Role o f R eligion.” B ulletin o f the N anzan In stitu te fo r R eligion and C ulture 31: 40-59. Tsukada, H otaka 塚 田 穂 尚 . 2009. "S hin-shinshūkyō n i okeru bunkateki nasnonarizum u no snosō : M anikari to K ōfuku no K agaku n i okeru N ihon/N inonjinkan no ronri to h e n se n 新新宗教における文イ匕的ナショナリズムの諸相一真光と幸福の科学における 日本 * 日 本 人 锡 の 論 班 と 変 遷 .” Shūkyō to sh a k a i宗 教 と 社 会 15: 67-90. Tucker, John A. 2003. “Japanese V iew s o f N ature and the E nvironm ent.” In H elaine Selin (ed.), N ature A cross C ultures: Views o f N ature and the E nvironm ent in N on-W estern C ultures. D ordrecht: K luw er A cadem ic Publishers, 161-83. T urner, B ryan S. 2001. “C osm opolitan V irtue: On R eligion in a G lobal A ge.” E uropean Journal o f Social Theory 4/2: 131-52.

B ibliography

181

Uesugl，Chisato 上 杉 千 郷 . 2007. “Kūgakkan ‘Shintū kyū k u ’ no sninzul: Sokoku no selsul to tom o ni hyaku sanjū-n e n 皇 學 館 「 神 道 教 育 」の 神 髄 一 祖 国 の 盛 衰 と と もに 百 三 十 年 .” In K okusai shūkyō Kenkyū sho 国 際 宗 教 研 究 所 （ ed.), G endai Shūkyō) 2007: Shūkyō) kyōiku no chihei 現 代 宗 教 2007— 宗 教 教 育 の 地 平 . Tōkyō: A klyam a Shoten, 234-50. U m eda, Y oshim i. 2009. “The Role o f Shinto in Japanese C ulture (Past, Present and Future).” K eynote Speech given at the F irst International Sun & Tao C onference, Korea U niversity, Republic o f K orea, 22-25 October. U m ehara, Takeshi. 1999. “The C ivilization o f the Forest.” N ew P erspectives Q uarterly 16/2: 4 0-8. U nited N ations. 1948. The U niversal D eclaration o f H um an R ights. On the official website くhttp://w w w .un.org/en/docum ents/uahr/lndex.shtm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Van B ragt, Jan. 1990. “Salvation and Enlightenm ent: Pure Land Buddhism and C hristian­ ity.” B ulletin o f the N anzan In stitu te fo r R eligion and C ulture 1 4 :1 4 -3 7 . V aporis, C onstantine N . 1995. “The Early M odern O rigins o f Japanese T ourism .” Senri E thnological Studies 38: 2 5-38. V ictoria，Brian D alzen. 1997. Zen at War. N ew York: W eatherhill. W atts, Jonathan S. 2004. “A B rief O verview o f B uddhist N G O s in Japan.” Japanese Journal o f R eligious Studies 31/2: 417-28. ----------.2 0 0 5 . “The Search for Socially Engaged B uddhism in Japan.” Paper presented at The 19th W orld C ongress o f the International A ssociation for the H istory o f Religions (IA H R)，Tōky ō，Japan，29 M arch. W eber，M ax. 1980 [1921]. W irtschaft und G esellschaft. Tübingen: M ohr. W edem eyer，Bernd. 2002. “V on A slen nach Europa: A spekte zur R ezeptionsgeschichte fernostlicher K orperpraktiken.” In Inken Prohl and H artm ut Zinser (eds), Zen, R eiki, K arate: Japanische R elig io sita t in E uropa. Hamburg: L it，249-66. W est Los A ngeles B uddhist Tem ple. 2011. “A sk Sensel.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp:// w w w .w labt.org/features/features—asksensei.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). W est，M ark D. 2005. Law in E veryday Japan: Sex, Sumo, Suicide, and Statutes. Chicago: The U niversity o f Chicago Press. W est-O stliche W eisheit. 2011. “W illigis Jäger: B iography.” O n the o fficial w ebsite くh ttp ://w illigisjaeg er-foundation.com /w illigis-jaeger/biography.htm l> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). W helan, C hristal. 2007. R eligious R esponses to G lobalization in Japan: The C ase o f the God L ight A ssociation. PhD D issertation, Boston U niversity. W illiam s，D uncan Ryūken. 2005. The O ther Side o f Zen: A Social H istory o f S(dto Zen Buddhism in Tokugawa Japan. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. W ilson, Brian C. 1998. “From the L exical to the Polythetic: A B rief H istory o f the D efinition o f R eligion.” In Thom as A. Idinopulos and Brian C. W ilson (eds), W hat is R eligion? O rigins, D efinitions, and E xplanations. Leiden: B rill，141-62. W lndhorse Zen Com m unity. 2011. “G lossary o f D harm a Term s.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .w inanorsezen.org/blog/?page—id=252> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). W orld C onference o f R eligions for Peace. 1970. “K yoto D eclaration o f the F irst W orld A ssem bly.” O n the official w ebsite くhttp://religionsforpeace.org/about/assem blies> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Y am ada，K oun 2002. “Is Z azen a R eligion?， ，In T aizan M aezum i and B ernle G lassm an (eds), On Zen P ractice: Body, B reath, M ind. Som erville: W isdom Publications, 7 3-6. Y am ada，M am oru 山 田 真 茂 留 . 2007. 4 (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011). Zen-nihon Bukkyōk a i 全 日 本 仏 教 会 . 2003. “A tarashll jld al nl fusaw ashll Kyōiku klhonhō to kyōiku shinkō kihon keikaku no arikata nl tsuite no ‘yō selsno’ 新しい日寺代にふさわ し い 教 育 基 本 法 と 教 育 振 興 基 本 計 画 の 在 り 方 に つ い て の 「要 請 書 」.” Z e n b u ts u 全 仏 486: 2. ----------.2 0 0 5 . “Kycoiku klhonho da- k y ū jō Z en-ninon B ukkyōkai no kaisei shian 教 育 基 本 法 第 九 条 全 日 本 仏 教 会 の 改 正 試 案 .” Z en b u tsu 全 ‘ 505: 5. ----------.2 0 0 6 . “Shushō oyobi kakuryō no Y asukuni Jinja k ōshiki sanpai cnū shi no y ōsei 首 相 及 び 閣 僚 の 靖 国 神 社 公 式 参 拝 中 止 の 要 請 .” Z en b u tsu 全 仏 5 2 1 :2. ----------.2007. “Zen-nihon Bukkyōkai no saikin no katsudo 全 日本 仏 教 会 の 最 近 の 活 動 ." O n the official w ebsite くhttp://w w w .jbf.ne.jp/a05> (last accessed 1 Septem ber 2011).

Index

A B uddhist A pproach to Peace 31 A be, Shinzō 116,118 A bu-Lughod, Janet 19 A eba, Jikiaō 110 A fghanistan 137, 140,156 A gonshū 95-6 , 153 A ihara, Herman 91 A itken, R obert 78, 80 A iyagi, Kazuo 102 A kiya, Einosuke 107,155 A lliance o f R eligions and C onservation 52 A m aterasu 103, 153 A m azon Ecological Conservation C enter 136 A m ida see Buddha ancestors 14-15, 17, 38, 41, 69, 71, 77, 83, 9 2-3 , 106,145 anim e 84 A nthroposophical Society 61 A ntoni, K laus 97, 154 A nzai, K enjō 104 A ppadurai, A rjun 85 A rai, T oshikazu 75 A rigatō K ikin 139 A rticle 20 (Japanese C onstitution) 101-2, 104, 107-9, 112, 114,146 A rticle 89 (Japanese C onstitution) 101-2 A sad, T a la l150 A sia Law suit 104 A tlantis 57, 5 9-60, 62 ,15 3 ; see also A torantisu A torantisu 59-60; see also A tlantis Aum Shinrikyō 1 0 ,1 0 6 -7 , 109, 153,155 A yusu Bukkyō K okusai Kyōryoku N ettow āku 137-8 bankyō kiitsu 133 B eat G eneration 85 Bellah, R obert 98 Berger, Peter 98

B eyer, Peter 12-13, 100, 130,154 bioethics 9 ,1 2 2 4 , 126, 128, 134,148 B lavatsky, H elena P. 56, 5 8 -9 , 62 bodhisattva 14-15, 137-8 border negotiation 5 -7 , 9, 98, 100, 114-16, 122, 142, 146-7, 149 brain death 122-8, 148, 156; see also nōshi B razil 6 9-70, 8 3-5 , 94, 136 B reen, John 103 Buddha 25, 3 1 ,4 4 , 54, 5 7 -9 , 64, 7 1 ,7 3 , 7 9 -8 1, 9 3 -4 , 113-14, 154; A m ida 34, 7 1 -5 , 124; buddhas 1 5 ,1 7 , 4 8 ,1 1 0 -1 2 , 138; M aitreya 153; Sakyam uni 3 1 ,3 7 , 54, 58, 60, 79 buddhahood 38,1 27 buddha-nature 33, 5 1,125 B uddhist C hurches o f A m erica 70 Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai 8, 9 4 -7 , 145,154 Bukkyō Kyū en Sentā 137 Bukkyō NGO N ettow āku 137-9 bullying 44, 46, 66,1 1 1 , 115,118 Buraku K aihō Dōm ei 4 2 -5 , 47 Bussho G onenkai 103,105 butsudan 93 byōdō 4 3 -4 ,1 4 4 C am bodia 1 3 5 -7 ,1 4 0 carriers o f globalization 6, 8, 83, 88, 94, 142,145 C asanova, José 98 C atechism o f the C atholic C hurch 29 C atholic B ishops’ C onference o f Japan 125 C enter for Education in Religious C ulture 151 C entral A sia 19 C entral C ouncil for Education 116-18 C ervé, W ishar S. 56 Chandra, Lokesh 36

Index chapel w eddings 152 character-building 118，121 C haves, M ark 14-16, 99 C hina 1 9 -20 ，60 ，65, 75，136 Chōsokabe, N o b u a k i 102 C hristianity 5, 8, 12, 20, 22, 2 4 -5 , 27, 30, 33, 35, 38, 4 0 -1 , 43, 5 6 -8, 6 2 -3 , 66, 70, 7 5 -6 , 7 8 -9 , 83, 85-8 , 103, 105, 112 ，119-21 ，127 ，138 ，144-5 ，150 ，152 ， 155 C hristm as 152 Chūō G akujutsu Kenkyū sho 29 C hurchw ard, Jam es 56, 60 collective identity 14 C om m ittee o f R eligious N on­ governm ental O rganizations 36 com passion 25, 45, 60, 72, 95, 125, 135, 1 37-8, 144 C onfucianism 1 9 -22 ，41 ，6 4 -5 ，68 ，75 ，84 ， 8 9 -9 0 ，9 2 -3 ，115 ，126，145 C onfucius 5 7 -9, 93 C onstitution (o f Japan) 1, 9, 22, 33, 42, 46, 64 ，1 00-2 ，104 ，10 7-8 ，110 ，112 ，114 ， 116 ，133，146 counter-flow s 4 creolization 4 criteria o f death 122 cultural bias 10-11 ，17，143 cultural chauvinism 4 -8 , 5 5 -6 , 64-5, 6 7 -9 ，75 ，80 ，82 ，111 ，142 ，1 4 4-5 ， 149, 153 cultural flow s 3 -5 ，7 ，30 ，35 ，40 ，45 ，47 ， 55 ，65 ，83 ，88 ，9 5 -7 ，142-5，149 cultural im perialism 3 -4 , 11, 42, 6 4 -5, 127 daim oku 36, 38 dai-nyorai 5 8 -9 , 62, 153 Dake, M itsuya 74-5 D alai Lama 140, 156 danka 14, 30 Daoism 126 D avis, W inston 56, 151 De B ourbourg，B rasseur 153 decontextualization 12, 47 de-differentiation 99 ，114，119 definition o f religion 1 0-17 ，98，143 D em ocratic Party o f Japan 102 ，105，110 D enryoku D aietto Undo 133 D harm a 15 ，37 ，39 ，4 5 -6 ，7 1-2 Diam ond Sangha 78, 80 discrim ination 1，4 2 -6 ，66 ，131 ，135 ，138-9 D iscussion G roup on Life and E thics 122 D obbelaere，K arel 1 3-14 ，9 8 -9 ，154 dōbō 43 ，132，144

185

Dōb ōkai Undo 43 dochakuka 150 Dōgen 45 ，5 2 -4 ，75，132 Dō shū ren 45，152 Dōw a Kyōiku Shinkōkai 43 D urkheim , Ém ile 1 3 -14 ，17-18 ，98，151 E ast W est Foundation 91 ecology 8 ，48 ，5 0 -2 ，54 ，1 3 3 4 ，144 Edo period 2 0 -2 1 ，35 ，4 1 -2 ，51 ，89，100 education 7 ，9 ，16，19 ，2 1 -2 ，38 ，47 ，64 ， 67 ，9 8 -1 01 ，111 ，114-21 ，134 ，142 ， 146-7 ，151 ，155; religious education 101 ，106 ，111 ，115 ，117-19 ，147，155 E him e tam agushiryō 104 E ien no hō 112 Eightfold Path 53 eirei 103-4 E isenstadt, Shm uel N . 18 Ekken，K albara 89 Eliade, M ircea 13 em peror 40 ，47 ，50 ，55 ，57 ，69 ，101，103 Em peror Taishō 40 Em peror Tenm u 50 Engaged B uddhism 8 1 -2 ，145 e n g i47 ，53 ，138，144 Enom iya-Lassalle，Hugo M. 8 6 -8 ，154 Enryakuji 25 environm ental crisis 6, 8, 34, 49, 5 1-4, 130 ，133 ，140 ，142，148 equality 41 ，43 ，4 5 -7 ，132 ，135，144 Eru K antāre 5 9 -6 0 ，6 2 -4 ，114，153 ethnic religion 70 Europe 2 ，11，18-20 ，41 ，67 ，76 ，81 ， 8 3 ^ ，8 6 -7 ，90 ，9 4 -5 ，100 ，127 ， 144，152 exclusivism 5 -7 ，35 ，37 ，39，64 existential security 154 Faure, Bernard 32 Fenn, Richard 98 Figal, G erald 121 filial piety 22 ，50 ，92 ，126 ，145，148 Fitzgerald，Tim othy 11-12 Foster, N elson 81 Four N oble Truths 53, 138 France 41, 89 Frank，A ndré G under 19 freedom o f religion 1，12，22 ，33 ， 35 ，1 01-2 ，1 0 4-5 ，108 ，110-11 ， 143, 146 F ujlta，Him lko 153 Fukam i，Tōshū 96，154 Fum iaki, U suki 73

186

Index

functional differentiation 19-22, 98-100, 119-20; o f religion and politics 9, 100-1, 104-5, 108, 112; o f religion and public education 9, 115, 147; see also secularization Fundam ental Law o f Education 9, 22, 67, 115-18, 120, 147, 151,155 fund-raising 135-6 fu se 125,127 Fusen ketsugi 34 G eaatsukai 102 G eorge O hsawa M acrobiotic Foundation 91 Germ any 8 7-8 , 90, 109 G ibbs, G regory 73 global m élange 2, 84 global problem s 6, 26, 34, 129, 131, 133, 135, 1 4 1 -2 ,1 4 9 glocalization 4 -8 , 4 0 -1 , 4 3 -8 , 50, 55-6, 6 9 -70, 80, 8 2 ,1 2 1 , 142-5, 150; leaning to external sources 6-7, 4 0 -1 ,4 5 ,1 4 3 4 ; leaning to ‘native’ sources 6 -7 , 4 7 ,1 2 1 , 1 4 3 4 ; see also hybridization G od Light A ssociation (GLA) 58 gokoku jin ja 104 gratitude 34, 38, 49, 64, 7 1 -2 , 74, 89-90, 9 2 -3 , 145, 154; see also on Green Plan (G urī n puran) 52-3 G unjim a, Tsuneaki 104 gurī n raifu gokun 53 gusha 47 H abito, Ruben 87 H am aya, H idehiro 108 H anegraaff, W outer 15 H annerz, U lf 19 H ansen’s disease 44 H arada, Daiun 86 H arada, M arvin 72 harm ony 29, 52, 54, 64, 8 9 -90, 95, 126,134 H aw aii 57, 69, 74, 8 3 ,1 5 4 heiw a 25, 44, 4 6 -7 , 9 4 ,1 3 1 -3 H erm ansen, C hristian 63 H ick, John 6 H ieizan Shū kyō Sam itto 7, 2 5 ,1 3 1 , 143, 149 Hīnayāna 37 H induism 88 H irano, Jerry 72 hisabetsu buraku 8, 4 2 -5 , 152 H ishiki, M asaharu 104 Hobsbawm , Eric 55-6

Hobson, John 19-20 Hokekyoō no atarashii kaishaku 30 hom ogenization 3 -8 ,1 9 , 64, 6 8 -9 , 142, 144, 149; resistance to 4 -8 , 64, 6 8-9, 1 4 2 .1 4 4 .1 4 9 Hōnen 46-7 H ori, V ictor 77 Hosokawa, M orihiro 109 House o f C ouncillors 67, 106, 110 House o f R epresentatives 67,110 hum an rights 8, 36, 4 0 -7 , 6 6 ,1 0 1 , 133-4, 136, 138, 140, 143-4, 154; see also jin ken hum anism 34, 37, 6 5 ,1 2 4 hybridization 2 -6 , 9 ,1 9 , 42, 70, 75, 82, 8 8 ,1 4 4 , 152; see also glocalization hyper-religions 2 Ichinyokai 43 identity m arkers 6 9-70, 144 Ikado, Fujio 99 Ikeda, D aisaku 1 ,3 6 -7 , 6 7 -8 , 106-7, 109, 136,155 Im ai, Kyoya 75 im m anence 13 Im m igration A ct 70 Im oto, Snōko 139 Im perial R escript on Education 6 7 ,1 1 7 in ’yology 89 inclusivism 5 -7 , 24, 2 9-32, 3 4 -5 , 37 India 19, 59, 62, 75, 9 0 ,1 3 7 ,1 5 3 indigenization 5, 47, 70, 150 individualism 8, 34, 64-8 , 103, 116, 127, 144, 149; see also kojinshugi Inglehart, R onald 154 inochi 43, 67, 124, 132-3 Inoue, Enryō 4 8 ,1 2 1 -2 Inoue, N obutaka 1-2 International A ssociation for Religious Freedom 27 International A ssociation o f Shin B uddhist Studies 74 International N etw ork o f Engaged B uddhists 8 1,1 54 interreligious dialogue 7, 2 4 -7 , 2 9 -30 , 33, 1 3 2 .1 4 3 .1 4 9 invention o f tradition 5, 55 Ise Jingū 5 0 -1 ,1 5 3 Ise Jingū Shikinen Sengū Kōhō H onbu 50 Ishii, K enji 9 9,1 54 Ishiyam a H onganji 21 Ishizuka, Sagen 89 Islam 5, 24, 112 issei 5

Index Itō, Sninjō 95 Iw am ura, Jane 80, 85 Jäger, W illigis 87 Japanese B uddhism 9, 2 4 -5 , 32, 34, 41-2 , 48, 54, 65, 7 0 -1 ,7 7 , 8 1 ,8 3 , 9 5 ,1 0 4, 120, 122, 129-30, 132, 135, 144,156 Jesuits 86-7 Jesus C hrist 8, 5 6 -9 , 62-3 Jinja e y ōkoso 49 Jinja H onchō 4 8 ,1 0 2 , 105, 116-17, 119, 146-7, 155 jin k en 4 2 -6 , 133; see also hum an rights Jinrui A izenkai 131 jir ik i 71; see also self-pow er Jisatsu Bō sni N ettow āku Kaze 134 Jisha Bugyō 21 Jizō 14 Jodo Shinshu B uddhist Tem ples o f Canada 73 Jōdo Shinshū H onganji-ha 34, 4 3 ^ , 70, 7 3 -4 , 104, 106, 120, 124,132 Jōaosnū 8, 4 5 -7 , 8 3 ,1 0 9 , 125, 143,156 Jōdoshū 21-seiki ekitō sengen 47 Jōdoshū 21-seiki jin ke n apīru 46 Jōdoshū Dōw a Suishin Jim ukyoku 46 Jōdoshū heiw a apīru 47 Jones, Eric 19 Jones, Ken 81 j ōsō kyōiku 115,118 juvenile delinquency 6 6 ,1 1 5 , 1 1 7 -18 ,1 47 K aihō Undō Suishin H onbu 4 3-4 kam i 15, 20, 38, 40, 4 8 -5 0, 6 0 ,1 0 4, 110,151 kam i no ko 110 K am igam i no m ori no bunm ei 48 kankyō 44, 52, 133 K apleau, Philip 78-9 karm a 42, 93 K atagiri, Dainin 71 Kawasoe, Taishin 73 K eizan 5 3 -4 ,1 3 2 Kikan U ndō 43 K iriyam a, Seiyū 95 K isala, Robert 30, 32 K itashirakaw a, M ichihisa 102 K jolhede, Bodhin 79 K ōfuku Jitsugentō 9 ,1 1 0 -1 1 , 114, 146-7, 155 K ōfuku Jitsugentō sengen 110-11 Kō fuku no K agaku 8 -9 , 58-9 , 63, 68, 106, 109-10, 112, 144, 1 4 6 -7 ,1 5 3 Kōgakkan D aigaku 67,153

187

K oizum i, Jun’icnirō 104 kojinshugi 65, 67; see also individualism K okkaigiin Dōb ō no Kai 106 K okugaku 20, 32, 152 kokuritsu kaidan 107 K okutai no hongi 32, 65, 67 Kōm ei Seiji Renm ei 106 K ōm eitō 9, 9 9 ,1 0 6 -9 , 112, 114, 146,155 K ongōbuji 66 Konkōkyō 83,140 K onkōkyō sengen 140 K oot H oom i 59; see also Kūto Fūmī K opp, Johannes 8 7-8 K orea 19-20, 42, 75, 8 3 ,1 1 0 ,1 3 5 kōsen rufu 38 Kōso Kōtai Jingū A m atsukyō 153 K otzsch, R onald 93 Kōyasan Shingonshū 6 5 -6 ,1 2 9 K ubota, Jiun 78 Kūkai 6 5-6 K urozum i, M uneharu 102 K ushi Foundation 91 K ushi Institute 91 K ushi, M ichio 9 1-4 K uto Fūmī 59-61; see also K oot H oomi Kyōdan Fuchi Kenkyū sho K onw akai 25, 126,134 Kyōgoku, Takaharu 102 Kyōha Shintō 8 3,155 Kyōiku K ihonhō ‘K aisei’ ni H antai Suru Kai 120 kyōsei 37 Kyōto Jisatsu Bōshi Senta 135 Kyōto Protocol 52 Kyōto School 32, 76 Law C oncerning the N ational Flag and A nthem 120 Law on Special M easures for Buraku Im provem ent Project 42 L e P rincipe U nique de la P hilosophie et de la Science d 'E xtrêm e-O rient 89 Le Saux, H enri 154 Lechner, Frank 12 Lem uria 56, 59, 153; see also Ramudia LePlongeon, A ugustus 153 Liberal D em ocratic Party 102, 105-7, 109, 114, 118,147 L oBreglio, John 155 Loori, John Daido 80 lost continents 8, 56-9 L otus S ūtra 25, 28, 3 0-1 , 3 6-8 , 138-9, 152,156 loyalty 22, 50

188

Index

Luckm ann, Thom as 98-9 Luhm ann，N iklas 1 2 -13 ，98 ，130，150 M achida Incident 44-5 M achida, M uneo 44-5 M acInnes, Elaine 88 M acrobiotics 8 ，8 9 -9 4 ，145，149 M aitreya see Buddha M ahatm as 5 8-9 M ahāy āna 26 ，37 ，53 ，129-30，137 M ahikari 8 ，5 6 -9 ，63 ，84 ，102 ，144，153 M akiguchl，Tsunesaburō 36 m anagerial Zen 77 m anga 84 m artial arts 84 M artin, David 98 M artin, L uther 14 M arx, K arl 18 M arxism 19 ，43，112 M asuzaw a, Tomoko 150 m aterialism 22 ，3 3 -4 ，6 2 -3 ，82 ，103 ， 111-12 ，118-19，124 M atsunaga，Yū kei 66 ，129-30，156 M cD onaldization 3 m editation 8 ，65 ，7 0 -8 ，82 ，8 4 -8 ，91 ，144-5 M eiji C onstitution 35，152 M eiji period 12 ，2 0 -2 ，30 ，32 ，3 5 -6 ，41 ， 47 ，50 ，56 ，76 ，83 ，121-2 M eiji R estoration 1，19 ，21 ，41 ，55，64 M erzel, D ennis 79 m eta-em pirical 15, 151 M eyer，G undula 88 M iddle E ast 19，62 M iyazaki, Hayao 85 M izutani，Kōsho 4 5-6 m odernization 1，18 ，22 ，55，121 M oham med 57 m onotheistic religions 3 3 -4, 76, 145 m oral com m unity 14，16，151 M orioka, K iyom i 99 M ōriya 59 ，62; see also M orya M orya 59; see also M ōriya M oses 57, 59, 62 M t H iei 7, 2 4 -7 , 143 M t Kōya 65 M u 5 6 -7 ，63 ，153; see also M ū Mū 6 0-4; see also M u M ukhopadnyaya，R anjana 156 M ullins, M ark 41 m ultiple m odernities 18 M urakam i, Shigeyoshi 105 M urakam i, Y asutoshi 66-7 M usashino U niversity 74 M yōchikai Kyōdan 104-105，139

N aganum a，M yōko 27 N akagaki，K enjltsu 72 N akam aki, H irochika 2 N akano，T suyoshl 2 N akazaw a ，Shin’ichi 152 nam u[nam o]-am ida-butsu 34; see also nenbutsu nam u-m yōhō -rengekyō 36 N arita，Yūkō 109 N ational Foundation Day 51 nationalism 2 ，9 ，51 ，56 ，102 ，104 ， 120 ，122 ，133 ，152-3 N eary, Ian 42 N ederveen Pieterse，Jan 2 ，19，84 nenbutsu 34, 46, 7 1 -2 , 74, 155; see also nam u[nam o]-am ida-butsu N eo-C onfuclanism 89-90 N ew A ge 15, 91 N hat H anh, T hich 81 N ichiren 3 7-9 , 135 N ichiren Buddhism 27 ，3 6-8 ，84 ，107，135-7 N ichiren S h ōshū 38 ，106，152 N ichirenshū 125 ，138-9 N ihon Iz o k u k ai102 N ihon K irisuto Kyōdan 156 N ihon K irisutokyō Kyōgikai 103，120 N ihon K irisuto Rengōk a i155 N ihon shūkyō Dalhyō sha K aigi 25，27 N ihon shūkyō Renm ei 25 ，33 ，118-19 ， 1 2 3-4，147 nihonjinron 32 ，65，152 nihonkyōron 152 N ippon K aigi 102 ，116，146 N ippon no K enkoku o Iw au K ai 116 N ippon o M am oru K a i102 N ippon o M am oru K okum in K a lg l102 N lshl H onganji 44 N iw ano，N ichikō 31-2 N iw ano，N ikkyō 2 7 -8 ，30-1 non-governm ental organizations (NGOs) 9 ，96 ，135-41 ，148，156 non-profit organizations (NPOs) 9 ，1 3 4-5 ， 137 ，139-40 ，148，156 non-religious 12, 16 N orris，Plppa 154 N orth A m erica 2 ，8 ，18 ，28 ，6 9 -7 1 ，7 3 -5 ， 7 8 -8 0 ，8 4 -5 ，93 ，95 ，100，144 nc>shi 122; see also brain death N ostradam us 153 N PO Shū m ei Intā nashonaru 140 N um ata, Y ehan 94 O badia, Lionel 4 ōbō-buppō 12

Index ōbutsu-m yōg ō 107 occidentalism 22, 65, 128 Ōgon no hō 63 O gui, K oshin 7 0 -2 , 7 4-6 O hsaw a Foundation 91 O hsaw a, G eorge 89-93 O kada, M itsuo 102 O kada, Y oshikazu 5 6-8 , 153 O kada, M okichi 134 O kano, Seihō 102 (Ōkaw a, Ryūnō 58-64, 6 8 ,1 0 9 -1 4 ,1 5 3 o-m am ori 14 Ōm oto 8 3-4 , 109, 124,153 on 90; see also gratitude O rgan T ransplant Law 9 ,1 2 3 -5 , 128,148 organ transplants 122 -2 8 ,1 4 8 oriental globalization 19-20 orientalism 65 Ōsaka 2 0 -1 ,1 0 4 other-pow er 71; see also tariki O tto, R udolf 11 pacifism 30, 4 2 ,1 0 1 , 107, 132-3 Parliam ent o f the W orld’s R eligions 36 Parsons, T alcott 98 periodization (o f globalization) 11, 22, 143 pilgrim age 21 Piras, Francesco 87 PL Kyōdan 8 4 ,1 0 4 Platvoet, Jan 15 pluralism 2, 5 -7 ,1 2 , 2 3 -4 , 2 6 -30, 3 2-6, 83, 9 9,1 3 0 , 132, 143,149 politics 5 -7 , 9 ,1 4 -1 6 , 2 1 -2 , 33, 4 1 ,5 1 , 60, 8 1 ,9 8 -1 2 1 , 126-7, 134-5, 1 3 9 4 2 , 146-9, 154-5 Pom eranz, K enneth 19 Pontifical C ouncil for Interreligious D ialogue 29 Pope John Paul II 2 5 -6 , 143 Prim al V ow 74 printing 20 proselytizing 29, 3 7-9 , 8 3 4 , 88,145 public schools 115, 1 1 7-2 0 ,14 7 Pure Land 15, 33, 47, 7 1 ,7 3 -4 , 125,154 Ra Mū 57, 60, 64, 153 R am belli, Fabio 51 R am udia 59-69; see also Lem uria Ranger, Terence 55 rational choice theory 99 R aw linson, A ndrew 88 R eader, Ian 12, 76, 153 rebirth 58, 93 R eiha no H ikari 104

189

reiki 84 R eiyūkai 3 8 ,1 0 2 , 105, 109,133 re lie f activities 9, 9 4 ,1 3 5 -7 religion o f the forest 4 9 ,1 4 9 ,1 5 2 religious authority 5 ,1 4 -1 7 , 20, 98-100, 105, 114, 118, 121,143 religious bricolage 84, 99 R eligious C orporations Law 16-7, 102, 107, 154-5 Renge K okusai B orantiakai 137 Repp, M artin 150 residual problem s 6, 9, 130, 138, 140, 148 R iesebrodt, M artin 14 R inzaishū M yōsM nji-ha 125,156 Risshō K ōseikai 1 ,7 , 2 7 -33 , 3 8 ,1 0 4 -5 , 124, 132, 139,143 R itsuryō 12 R itzer, G eorge 3 R obertson, R oland 3 -4 , 20, 4 1 ,5 5 ,1 5 0 R ochester Zen C enter 7 7-9 Roman C atholic Church 29, 87 root-races 56-7 Ryū koku U niversity 73 Saichō 2 5-6 Saikō , M ankichi 43 sakoku 20 Śākyam uni see Buddha Sanbōkyōdan 7 7 -9 , 86-7 sanchōkō 124, 148 sa to ri 78, 86 science 5 -7 , 9 ,1 5 , 22, 3 1 ,4 7 -8 , 56, 62, 89, 98-100, 121-2, 129-30, 142,146 Second V atican C ouncil 2 6 -7 , 29, 143 secularization 14-15, 2 1 ,9 8 -1 0 0 , 151; see also functional differentiation Seichō no Ie 70, 8 3 4 , 102-3, 105,133 Seichō no Ie Seiji Rengō 105 Seim ei R inri Kenkyū Bukai 126 Sekai Kyū seikyō 2, 8 4 ,1 0 3 , 105, 133 -4 ,1 4 0 Sekai M ahikari Bunm ei K yodan 153 Sekai Snūkyōsha no Inori to Fōram u 25, 131,156 Sekiguchi, Sakae 57 self-cultivation 89, 92, 145 self-pow er 71, 7 4-5 ; see also jir ik i shakubuku 7, 3 5-9 , 106,143 Shakubuku kyōten 38 Shanti K okusai B orantiakai 1 3 7 -8 ,1 5 6 Sharf, R obert 32 Shihō Sanga 139 Shindō Renm ei 69 Shinji Shū m eikai 140

190

Index

Shin-nihon Shū kyō-dantai R engōkai 25 ， 27 ，103-4 ，106 ，133 ，146，155 Shinnyoen 95, 140 Shinnyo-en Foundation 95 Shinohara ，E llc h l134 Shinran 34, 43, 71, 74, 104, 106, 132，154 Shinritō 106，109 Shinshinkai 43 Shinshintō 107，155 Shinshū Kyōdan Rengō 104，132 Shinshū Ōtani-ha 34 ，43 ，104 ，106 ，120 ， 124，132 Shinshūren Seiji Rengō 106 Shintō 8 -9 ，12，16-17 ，2 1 -2 ，33 ，40 ， 4 8 -5 2 ，5 5 -7 ，6 6 -7 ，75 ，8 4 -5 ，9 6 -7 ，99 ， 1 01-5 ，126 ，133 ，1 4 4-6 ，149，1 5 2 4 Shintō D irective 100-1 Shintō e no izanai 48 Shinto K okusai G akkai 8 ，52 ，9 6 -7 ，145 Shinto Seiji Renm ei 1 02-3 ，105 ，117，146 Shintō w edding 40 ，55-6 shizen n d h 134 Shizuta，N obuyuki 109 shōju 37 Shokuyōkal 89 Shoshin isshō 27，152 shūkyōteki j ōsō 117 Sinnett, A lfred P. 56, 59 Sivaraksa, Sulak 81 Sm art, N inian 11 Snyder, G ary 81 social w elfare 9 ，47，107 Sōka G akkai 2 ，7 -9 ，3 5 -9 ，67 ，70 ，84 ，99 ， 106-9 ，112，114，135 ，140 ，143，146，152 ， 155; Soka G akkai International 1, 36, 132，135 Sonoda, M inoru 49 Sōtō snū 8 ，4 4 -5 ，5 2 -4 ，71 ，80 ，83 ，125 ， 1 3 2 4 , 137 ，143-4 South A m erica 62, 70 Special C abinet Com m ittee on Brain Death and O rgan Transplant 123-4 square Zen 80 State Shintō 47 ，55 ，57 ，64 ，69 ，9 6 -7 ，102 ， 104 ，112 ，114-15，146 Steiner, R udolf 61 Stone, Jacqueline 39 Sugaw ara，Ryū ken 104 Sugltani，G ijun 26 suicide 111，134 Sukyo M ahikari see M ahikari super-em pirical 1 5 -17 ，9 8 -9 ，114 ，121 ， 124 ，126 ，143，147

superhum an 14-15，151 su p ern atu ral11 ，15，151 superstition 22 ，48 ，1 2 1-2，152 supraem pirical 13 supra-rellglon 8 ，78 ，82，145 Suzuki, D aisetsu 32, 76, 80, 85 Suzuki，Shunryū 71 ，7 7-8 Swyngedouw, Jan 99, 154 Taiko Kenkyū kai 57 Taiyō no hō 60，63 T aizan, M aezum i 79 T akahashi, Shinji 58 Takeuchi m onjo 57，153 Takeuchi, Kiyom aro 57 Tanaka, K enneth 75 Tanaka，Tsunekiyo 103 Tanigaw a，Shū zen 106 Taniguchi, M asanobu 133 ta riki 71; see also other-pow er Tendai Jlm onshū 156 Tendaishū 7 ，2 5 -7 ，33 ，102 ，118 ， 125，127 T enrikyō 1，38 ，8 3 -4 ，109 tenō /ten d ō 15 terakoya 21 Tezuka，O sam u 84 The B ook o f M acrobiotics 91 The Three P illars o f Zen 79 T helle, N otto 35 Theosophy 5 6 -9 ，61 ，144，153 T ibet 75 ，137，140 Toda, Jō sei 36 ，3 8-9 Tōhoku earthquake 10 Tokunaga, M ichio 74 Tōkyō M etropolitan A ssem bly 110 tolerance 2 9 -3 0 ，36 ，38 ，111 ，115，136 T om linson, John 19 tom oiki 47 ，53，144 Toynbee, A rnold J. 36 traditional values 22, 34, 4 9 -50 , 64, 90, 92 ，111 ，122 ，124 ，126，134 transcendence 13 T schannen, O livier 98 T sulkl，Shūgaku 110 T sukljl M onshinkai 106，146 Tu, W eim ing 36 U esugi, C hisato 67 ukiyo 21 U m eda, Y oshim i 96 U m ehara, T akeshi 52 U nique Principle 89-90 U nitarians 27

Index U nited N ations 36, 4 1 ,4 4 , 46, 52, 96,1 07 , 109-10, 135-6; D ecade for Hum an R ights Education 46; High C om m issioner for Refugees 135; U niversal D eclaration o f Human Rights 4 1 ,4 4 U nited States 3, 33, 4 1 ,6 9 -7 3 , 77, 80, 84-5 , 9 0 -1, 94-5 , 112,140 W ārudom eito 96 W atanabe, Eshin 102 W atsuji, T etsurō 152 W atts, A lan 80 W atts, Jonathan 136,156 W eber, M ax 18 w esternization 18-19 W ilson, Bryan 98-9 W orld C onference o f R eligions for Peace 28 W orld Day o f Prayer for Peace 25 W orld Econom ic Forum 129 W orld Fellow ship o f Buddhists 33 W orld’s Parliam ent o f R eligions 76 w orldly benefits 12-13, 48, 84

191

Y am ada, Etai 26 Y am ada, Kōun 78, 86-8 Y am anashi, Yukiko 2 Y am ane, Kiku 57 Y anagaw a, K eiichi 99 Y arnall, Thom as 81 Y asukuni Shrine 9, 5 1 ,1 0 2 -4 , 132, 146; B ill 102; sanpai 104 Y asutani, H akuun 78, 86 Y inger, M ilton 11 ying-yang 8 9 -9 0 ,1 4 5 Yuirna-kyō 53 zazen 7 1 ,7 6 , 8 0 -1 , 8 5 -8 ,1 4 4 Zen boom 85, 145 Zen B uddhism 8, 52, 71, 7 6 -82, 85-6 , 90, 1 3 2,1 44 -5 Zen M editation fu r C hristen 86 Zen no seishin 52, 54 Zen Shin Sangha 71 Zenkoku Suiheisha 43 Z en-nihon B ukkyōkai 1 ,7 , 3 3 -4 , 103-5, 117-20, 129-30, 135, 147, 155-6 zōki ishoku 122-3; see also organ transplants

Taylor & Francis

eBookstore www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk Over 23,000 eBooks available for individual purchase in Humanities, Social Sciences, Behavioural Sciences and Law from some of the world's leading imprints.

“An innovative way o f approaching electronic books ... Recommended." Choice -

ALPSP Award fo r BEST eBOO K PUBLISHER

Taylor & Francis eBooks

2 0 0 9 Finalist

Taylor & Francis G roup

sponsored by

A flexible and dynamic resource for teaching, learning and research.

DIRECT PAPERBACKS

Routledge Paperbacks Direct This exciting new initiative makes the best of our hardback publishing available in paperback fo rm a t for authors and individual customers. Routledge Paperbacks Direct is an ever-evolving program m e w ith new titles being added regularly. To take a look at the titles available, visit our website.

www.routledgepaperbacksdirect.com ROUTLEDGE

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

R OU T L E DGE

Bringing you the cream of our hardback publishing at paperback prices