Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US – Japanese Alliance 9780755623808, 9781350156357

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Many years ago I told my father that I would dedicate my first book to him. He responded with a smile: ‘After all I’ve done for you, I think you should dedicate all of your books to me!’ I can’t really argue with the old man about that one. This book is dedicated with deep love and respect to my father, Gerald Gilbert Penn.

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As they pondered their response to the horrific terrorist attacks in the United States in late September 2001, two intellectuals offered starkly different advice to the Japanese nation. Toshiyuki Shikata, a professor at Teikyo University and a former general, advised, ‘A nation should think of what it should do, rather than what it can do.’1 About a week later, Tetsu Nakamura, a medical doctor and the head of a prominent Japanese nongovernmental organization providing medical aid in Pakistan, counseled, ‘There is too much talk now of what we should do, but there should be more discussion about what we should not do.’2 Shikata and Nakamura were talking past each other; the very starting point of their discussion put them at odds. For Professor Shikata, the key issue was that Japan must give up its constitutional ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. He believed that the time had come to put away the silly self-imposed legal restrictions that were obstructing legitimate efforts to ensure Japan’s national security. Dr Nakamura, on the other hand, was focused on how Japanese military activities would affect and would be perceived by the Afghan people, whom he had served as an aid worker for 17 years. He worried that the Japanese people had no knowledge or understanding of the actual conditions and beliefs of people in the Islamic world, and that hasty support for US military action could contribute to humanitarian disasters.

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The views expressed by these two men encapsulate much of the dilemma that Japan faced in the immediate wake of the September 11 attacks. Shikata was expressing the dominant outlook of Japan’s ruling conservatives, who viewed the issue through the prism of the US– Japan security alliance and felt a keen need to strengthen the Japanese military. Dr Nakamura – in spite of his specialist knowledge – was giving voice to the underlying sentiment of many ordinary Japanese people, who believed that violence would simply beget more violence. This was the crux of the dilemma for Japanese policies toward the War on Terror from its very outset: the Japanese government and the majority of the Japanese people perceived two different political imperatives that led in two entirely different directions. In other words, there was no consensus about Japan’s proper role in the world of the early twenty-first century. The core issue examined in the pages that follow is precisely this struggle for the identity of Japan – a struggle with profound implications for the global role of one of the world’s leading economic powers. Broadly speaking, it began as a three-cornered struggle between, on the one side, the Japanese elite and the American foreignpolicy establishment; and, on the other side, the mass of ordinary Japanese citizens and their spokespeople. This book is the story of how that struggle worked itself out from September 11, 2001, to the death of Osama Bin Laden.

The Japanese Experience of September 11 The horror of the September 11 attacks was a uniquely American occurrence, even while (owing to television) it was a global event. Hundreds of millions of people watched, and watched again, the images of the twin towers collapsing in flames. Most people retain a very clear recollection of where they were and what they were doing when they first saw or heard about the attacks. Certainly those who were present in New York or the Washington DC area, and those who lost or came close to losing loved ones will remember that day more intensely than others; nevertheless, every nation in the world and many millions of people had their own experience of the al-Qaeda

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attacks. The destruction of the World Trade Center will remain an iconic historical event for many years to come. Despite the enormous geographical distance between the Japanese archipelago and the Atlantic coast of the United States, Japan also experienced the attacks with a sense of immediacy. The pictures were right there in everyone’s living room, and instantly the issue of terrorism rose to the top of the public agenda.3 In schoolyards, in offices and on street corners alike, Japanese people exchanged their perceptions with friends and neighbours: Who had done it? Why had it happened? What happens now? The debate provoked by the al-Qaeda attacks briefly drew in a much wider range of public commentators, and much more public interest, than was normally the case for political affairs in Japan. Scholars and journalists and other commentators initially raised a variety of aspects, seeing different levels of significance in what had occurred: Was it a crime or a war? How would the United States retaliate? How should Japan position itself in relation to the American response? After the initial shock had passed, the Japanese government, along with its conservative allies in the media and elsewhere, worked to reshape the public’s view and changing memories of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The government began to forge an official narrative that suited its emerging policy goals. This ideological campaign argued that Osama bin Laden was a serious threat, not only to the United States and its people, but specifically to Japan as well. In this way the groundwork was laid for the view that Japan must stand at the side of the Bush administration and the American people in their time of troubles. Moreover, many Japanese policymakers saw a tightening alignment with US policy, not only as Japan’s duty to their ally, but also as a rare opportunity to promote their own visions of Japanese national interests, which were often at odds with the preferences of the majority of the Japanese people. When American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, it was just before 8:47 a.m. on the Atlantic coast. In Japan the corresponding time was 9:47 p.m. Since it took a while to understand the enormity of what was occurring,

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and because the attack on the South Tower came after 10 p.m. Japan time, most Japanese learned about the terrorist attacks only on the morning of September 12, many hours after most Americans had already spent the day watching the images on their televisions, contacting their friends and relatives, and contemplating what they had seen. We have limited means to reconstruct the precise feelings of the Japanese people at that exact time. With the months and years that have passed, much has happened to alter perspectives. On September 12, no one knew exactly what would come next. Today, we have a much clearer idea of the way events would unfold after the tragedy. For most people around the world, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC had come out of the blue; they seemed both inexplicable and unbelievable. The general public was still largely unaware of the very existence of Osama bin Laden or the al-Qaeda network. It was as if two entirely different worlds had suddenly and unexpectedly collided. Few understood – in Japan or the United States – that the life-and-death struggle between Washington and al-Qaeda had begun many years earlier. It is worthwhile, however, to listen to ordinary Japanese people who commented on the September 11 attacks within a few days after they occurred. These are the voices, not of the policymakers or opinion shapers, but rather of unusually articulate but otherwise ordinary people in Japan. We have, for example, a letter written to a major national newspaper by an 18-year-old female high school student: The images of the destruction of the World Trade Center buildings were shocking. It was difficult just to look at the swirling smoke in the heart of New York, the world’s financial Center. Although I couldn’t really understand what had happened in that brief moment, the one thing that I did realize clearly was that this was something that would leave its mark as a huge event in world history. I have always been attracted to New York. My dream for the future is to speak English, to work just like men do, and to become a career woman. When I have such dreams, I usually tend to see tall buildings as the stage of

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my dreams. With a huge bang, the stage of which I have dreamed has now been broken. All at once, how many people have fallen as victims? What is the meaning of the sacrifice of their lives? And what will become of the world now? I can feel only deep worry. Different people have many different ways of seeing things. As a result of these differences, such a sad thing has just occurred. To my way of thinking, most important is world peace – peace is the really important thing.4 Though not universal in Japan, the reaction expressed by this young woman was shared by a great many Japanese. Among ordinary people – sometimes in rather sharp contrast to the elite opinion makers – this sort of sympathetic, pacific view continues to prevail; it may actually constitute the majority Japanese view. The Japanese citizens who were working or living in New York or visiting the city on that morning, and those who lost loved ones, were touched most deeply by the events of that day. Several published Japanese-language accounts describe various experiences, as the following three will show. Fukiko Aoki, a journalist and writer living with her American husband in New York several blocks from the World Trade Center, told her story in a Japanese magazine article.5 Awakened suddenly by the noise of a collision, she looked at her clock and saw that it was 9:03 in the morning. Her first impression was that a car had crashed into her apartment building. Before she knew it, her husband, who had left for work earlier, burst back into their apartment, shouting, ‘A jet has crashed into the World Trade Center! I just saw the explosion of the South Tower! This has to be a terrorist attack!’ When she went outside, she found that the streets were filling with smoke and the sounds of sirens. She saw a man fall to his death from the North Tower. A nearby policeman received a telephone call and announced in amazement that the Pentagon had also been hit. The bystanders worried about the possibility of other planes falling from the sky. A few minutes later, a crashing sound came from the South Tower, and Aoki realized to her horror that the building was collapsing above her. The policeman at her side shouted, ‘Go! Go!

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Go!’ She ran as fast as she could to escape death herself. Both Aoki and her husband were unharmed, but they had a close call. Tan Ro Mi is a Tokyo-born writer with a Chinese father and a Japanese mother. According to her published account, she was sitting in her apartment in New York watching television when the first reports came on announcing that a plane had crashed into the North Tower.6 In her case, it was only after the further attacks on the South Tower that she realized that this crash was more than mere accident. Her thoughts turned to her husband who had left earlier for his job in Manhattan. His place of employment was far from the World Trade Center, but she decided to telephone him just to make sure that he had not gone in that direction. She became much more worried when he did not answer his phone. Her mind raced through all the horrible possibilities. Before long, however, her own phone rang, and she was relieved to hear her husband’s voice reassuring her that he was fine. When one of the towers collapsed, a woman who worked with Tan’s husband shouted that her sister worked in that building and broke down in tears as her colleagues tried to comfort her. Another account came from 43-year-old Yasuhiro Asai. He gave a newspaper account of his visit to New York’s Central Park on September 12. He described a scene that at first glance looked like any Sunday in the park; closer inspection, however, showed a total absence of smiling faces. Some people were reading newspapers with unusual intensity. Others were clustered in small groups, talking about the tragedy and consoling each other. In the afternoon, a small meditation party involving perhaps half a dozen held hands as they stood in a circle. Soon strangers appeared and asked to join the circle, and they were allowed in. More and more people arrived until the circle included more than a hundred. Asai was deeply moved to see so many, all unknown to each other, holding hands and expressing their sorrow in solidarity.7 These three accounts came from Japanese who suffered no personal harm from the terrorist attacks. Not all Japanese people were so fortunate; among those who died were 24 Japanese nationals. For the friends and families of these, the anxious wait for news ended with the terrible confirmation that their loved ones were gone. The

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Japanese people had nothing to do with the issues that had provoked Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda; but such a ruthless and indiscriminate attack on civilians in the heart of one of the world’s great international cities would and did inevitably victimize the citizens of many nations. The feelings produced in Japan by the terrorist attacks were various. Some felt horror. Others were deeply anxious for people they knew. Still others felt relief to find their own loved ones safe. As in almost every part of the world, the terrorist attacks produced enormous sympathy for the American people. For a brief moment many Japanese would have agreed with the French newspaper Le Monde’s reaction that ‘We Are All Americans’.8 Ordinary Japanese people were not the only ones in the country to experience September 11 – it was also an occurrence that Japanese leaders lived through. We have the image of President George W. Bush sitting in the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, listening to students read The Pet Goat while the second plane crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center; few in Japan or elsewhere are aware of what Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was doing at that time. Fortunately, however, at least one published account is available.9 On the evening of September 11, Prime Minister Koizumi returned to the Kantei (the prime minister’s official residence) shortly before 10 p.m. Within minutes, Koizumi learned of the attacks by watching the first news reports on television. According to his aides, his first words were, ‘This is scary stuff.’ Coincidentally, there was activity in the Crisis Management Center even before the first reports from the United States came in. Officials led by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Teijiro Furukawa were already on alert because of a typhoon that was passing over Tokyo at that very time.10 However, not having any quicker means to gain intelligence, Prime Minister Koizumi received most of his information from television. Senior officials started arriving at the Kantei at around 11 p.m., after the South Tower had collapsed. Among these were Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, Chairman of the Policy Research Council Taro Aso and

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New Komeito Party leader Takenori Kanzaki. At about 11:30 p.m., Abe suggested that there was a need to collect more information, but no one knew precisely what to do. Tokyo was not able to directly contact authorities in the United States, and so they simply continued watching television. At least one political commentator attributed this rather confused reaction to heiwa-boke (early senility brought on by too much peace) and the alleged inability of Japanese leaders to think for themselves.11 At any rate, Prime Minister Koizumi seemed unsure of himself. He asked Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda if it might not be a good idea to address the Japanese nation. The gathered officials could not immediately decide. Finally, at one o’clock in the morning, Fukuda spoke to reporters, and about 30 minutes later Prime Minister Koizumi made himself available. The Japanese leader’s first message to the public was as follows: ‘Scary isn’t it? This was impossible to predict. You just can’t predict terrorism.’12 In regard to their allies in Washington, Koizumi and Fukuda’s first thought that evening was to send condolences to the United States, but the following morning it occurred to them that they should also express strong ‘moral support’. Koizumi, his position gradually hardening as the hours passed, declared: ‘This is a challenge, not only to the United States, but also to all democratic societies, and I feel great anger. . . Japan strongly supports the United States and is determined to offer all possible assistance and cooperation.’13 When asked that evening if he would go so far as to support American ‘retaliation’ against the terrorists (as President George W. Bush was already suggesting), Prime Minister Koizumi declared, ‘Naturally. We support it.’14 Finally, on the evening of September 13, Koizumi spoke to Bush personally by telephone. He vowed that Japan would ‘spare no effort’ in providing assistance and cooperation and that he would ‘strongly support the American position in fighting terrorism’. He further observed, ‘Although it is difficult to deal with a faceless enemy, we must cope with this incident with the understanding that this is not just an attack on the United States, but an attack on freedom, peace, and democracy.’15

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The Public Debate Begins Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda were by no means the only people who failed to have an immediate idea about what Japan should do in reaction to the terrorist attacks in America. Many had assumed that, after the Cold War, global politics were progressing toward greater cooperation rather than conflict. September 11 came as a rude shock. There could be no question that the attacks had happened; but what did they mean? Many ordinary Japanese, no doubt, had a reaction similar to one middle-school teacher, as expressed in a letter to a major daily newspaper: ‘What can Japan do now? I believe that Japan – as a nation of peace – must actively call to America and Israel and Palestine for a peaceful solution. We should work to see that America does not use force in its effort to punish: That would only lead to even more people losing their lives.’16 This sensibility was shared by many Japanese. However, the mass media and most of the opinion makers held different views, ones that were more worldly and sophisticated and, at the same time, distinctly more hawkish. The Asahi Shinbun is a fair place to start examining the reaction among the media. This newspaper, perhaps the paper with the best international reputation of the major Japanese dailies, strives to be the newspaper for intellectuals. With a daily circulation of over eight million copies, it runs second in popularity only to the less expensive and much more conservative Yomiuri Shinbun. Politically, the Asahi tends to represent the Japanese centre-left. How did the paper frame the issue at that crucial moment? Under the title ‘This is a Challenge to the Whole World!’ the Asahi wrote: This is a condition beyond imagination. Perhaps never before in history has such an act of large-scale terrorism taken place before people’s eyes. . . Whatever the identity of the criminal group behind it, it is certain that their aim was to strike America with terror. However, this goes beyond simply a terrorist act against America. The whole world – nay! – the entire course of modern civilization has been challenged.17

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The language of the editorial was stark. The perpetrators were immediately identified as a ‘criminal group’ and the intended target of the brutal attacks was ‘the whole world’ and ‘the entire course of modern civilization’. The moral indignation felt by the Asahi editors was understandable, but we must wonder if they had really thought through the political implications of this interpretation and the wider connotations of their language. First, the Asahi’s framing of the issue as ‘criminals vs. the world’ had the immediate effect of removing the attacks from their historical and political context. For about half a decade, Washington policymakers and the al-Qaeda network had been locked in a life-and-death struggle. Al-Qaeda had killed Americans in several terrorist attacks, and the United States had killed Muslims in missile attacks launched for the clear purpose of assassinating Osama bin Laden. Beyond these events lies the entire question of how Arab and Islamic opinion had become alienated from US policy in the first place. While it is true that most people had not really been paying attention to this struggle, the public record already contained enough incidents for the Asahi editors to have been more nuanced in their expressions.18 The assertion that ‘the whole world’ was being challenged strongly implies that these attacks were aimed at Japan and the Japanese people to almost the same extent that they were directed at Americans. But in fact, the evidence is very clear that Osama bin Ladin and al-Qaeda had a set of particular political grievances that were focused sharply on American, Saudi Arabian and Israeli government policies. There is no evidence that al-Qaeda was concerned with Japan or the rest of the world. By presenting the issue as they did, the Asahi editors, probably inadvertently, put those who favoured a peaceful solution – as well as those who may have felt that Japan should keep a certain distance from US policies – at a serious disadvantage from the outset. Even more problematic was their notion that ‘the entire course of modern civilization has been challenged’. The editors clearly meant to indicate that inflicting mass casualties on ordinary people was completely unacceptable behaviour. Using the word ‘civilization’ (bunmei) to make their case, however, was almost certainly a mistake.

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In politics, to say that ‘civilization’ is being challenged is but a short step from saying that the attackers are barbarians or savages. From there, it takes just one more step to assert the necessity of physically eliminating the barbarians in order to preserve ‘civilization’. The Asahi editors quickly realized that they had overstepped their intended mark. A few days later, they ran an editorial titled, ‘This is Not the Clash of Civilizations’. In this editorial they referred to Samuel Huntington’s thesis about the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, which had originally been enunciated in Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1993 and had provoked a great deal of controversy and criticism.19 The Asahi editors, denying the relevance of Huntington’s thesis to the current issue, suggested that the vast majority of the world’s Muslims were peaceful people, and that a handful of terrorists could not be said to be representative of the whole community.20 It seems likely that this message was the editors’ way of backtracking from the wider implications of their more exuberant September 12 editorial. Their use of the politically potent word ‘civilization’ twice in the same week was certainly striking. Another view raised by the same paper in the very first days after the attacks – more in line with the message that the editors probably intended to send – addressed the reaction of the American president: President Bush has described this crime as an ‘act of war’. Speaking from the point of view of the American people’s anger, we can certainly understand this expression. However, that doesn’t mean that we think rushing along the road to ‘war’ is the method by which this kind of international terrorism can be stamped out. . . Within the American debate there are those criticizing this terrorist event by making reference to ‘states that sponsor terrorism’. But if the goal is to gain wide support and cooperation from the international community, it would be much preferable to treat it along the lines of an ‘international crime’ rather than a ‘war’.21 There were many in the United States and in other parts of the world who expressed this same view. These critics argued that terrorism

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should be treated like any other major crime. It was not an ‘act of war’ that necessitated state-on-state violence, but rather an action by a handful of perpetrators, who should be pursued as fugitives, arrested by established authorities, brought to trial and punished or acquitted as the courts determined.22 Many Japanese were well aware that military action was far from the only plausible alternative open to American leaders in the immediate wake of the attacks. President Bush’s decision to immediately frame the issue as a war was his policy choice, not an absolute inevitability. Many Japanese would have preferred a less unilateral and a genuinely international approach to the question of how to respond to September 11. Based on their own national experience, the very idea of fighting in a war made most Japanese uncomfortable. No one in Washington was asking for their Japanese allies’ opinions about these fundamental policy matters. Indeed, it never seemed to even occur to them that they might consult their Asian allies at all before making a key decision. Instead, the Bush administration assumed that its allies would fall into line with whatever the United States decided to do. They were fortunate in that many Japanese were indeed willing to defer to the United States in this matter, in light of the fact that the American people had been the primary victims of the al-Qaeda attacks.23 Beyond the Asahi editorial page, other interesting Japanese views were being expressed at this time. One of these came from Ryuki Sado, a former teacher at a Self-Defense Forces academy. Sado had been thinking about the question of terrorism long before September 11. He published an opinion article, first in the Asahi Shinbun and then, in a revised and more expanded form, in the monthly magazine Bungei Shunju.24 The shorter, earlier article began, ‘What is terrorism? Terrorism aims at your heart. The terrorists who launched the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States intended that their act would be broadcast to the people of the world through the media. Their ultimate goal was to raise international consciousness and to seize the global agenda.’25 Sado’s view of terrorism elevated its media aspect to the highest level in a manner comparable to Walter Laqueur’s suggestion that terrorists are ‘the super-entertainers of

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our time’.26 But what did Sado see as the purpose of this kind of terrorist media event? Terrorism is carried out by people who hold tightly to their own beliefs. When those beliefs are threatened, they use fear and uncertainty to expel powerholders and to change their policies. But their threat is aimed not at the powerholders alone, but also directly at the general public. By creating public fears which press up from below, the powerholders become constrained, and in this system they are pressured into launching excessive retaliation, and thus the terrorists can succeed in manipulating the international debate.27 Sado asserted that the real danger of terrorism was not that it would weaken public resolve and thus lead directly to the attainment of the terrorists’ political goals; rather, the immediate purpose of terrorism was to stir up public fears in order to provoke a political and military overreaction from government officials. In this way, the targeted nation would overextend and gradually delegitimize itself and thus, at the final stage, allow the political victory of the terrorists. Writing of the Japanese government’s initial reactions, Sado observed that it would have been preferable had Prime Minister Koizumi refrained from immediately expressing support for American ‘retaliation’. He suggested that Koizumi’s declaration was unwise because the Japanese people lacked any real intention to shed their own blood for this cause, and such a commitment would do nothing to solve the fundamental issue of terrorism. He then went on to make his own policy suggestions: In order to escape this negative cycle, the Japanese government should make it clear both domestically and internationally that it will adopt its own independent policies. That policy should be, ‘Japan will expend its efforts for the construction of world peace.’ This would be something different from the old policies of just calling for peace and then doing nothing more. There would be three dimensions to this new policy. First, we would

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contribute to the elimination of the sources of terrorism. Concretely, that would mean that we strengthen our efforts toward providing medical support, digging wells, building bridges and roads, establishing schools, improving agriculture, and doing other things related to humanitarian support. Second, Japan would provide a space in which all sides can talk to each other and negotiate. Third, create a system whereby those terrorists who wish to give up their activities can find a refuge in which to do so. . . These problems will not be solved by retaliation. Every Japanese citizen must now act coolly and calmly. We must establish our own policies by which Japan can contribute to the construction of a path to world peace.28 Ryuki Sado’s relatively well-developed theory of terrorism was highly unusual. Most Japanese do not care to think too deeply about unpleasant matters. On the other hand, Sado’s instinct about the proper role of Japan was well within the mainstream mindset. Most Japanese were uncomfortable with Prime Minister Koizumi’s announcement that Tokyo would support ‘retaliation’ against the terrorists; they shared Sado’s desire to find a peaceful role for Japan. Indeed, before the official term ‘war on terror’ (tai-tero senso) took hold in Japan, the term ‘war of retaliation’ (hofuku senso) was more common in the public debate. Many ordinary Japanese believed that the violent reaction of the American government was not a righteous campaign to eliminate ‘evildoers’ or to put an end to all terrorist groups of global reach, but something motivated by the American people’s desire for revenge. These Japanese had seen too many Hollywood movies about the virtues of national ‘payback’ to believe that Americans preferred non-violent solutions to their political problems.29 As a result, many Japanese felt a sense of ambiguity about the September 11 terrorist attacks: while they could acknowledge the horror and provocative nature of the terrorist act, they also feared that American anger would only make the situation worse. On the other hand, one arguably positive effect of the September 11 attacks was that it led to an increased interest in and desire to learn about the Islamic world. Since few of the usual foreign-affairs

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commentators knew very much about Islamic countries, this new curiosity gave fresh faces a chance to appear as public informants. Professors of Islamic studies who had languished in semi-obscurity in the universities were now invited to write opinion pieces and appear on television to add specialized knowledge to the public debate. In the United States, most television commentators on Islamic affairs are based in a limited number of policy thinktanks and have institutional political agendas. The commentator system in Japan was not nearly as well developed and closed off to non-official views. As a result, many of the commentators who appeared in those days were critical of official policies. For a time, the public cared about, and had access to, a relatively wide spectrum of opinions. Among the most distinguished of these heterodox voices was Yuzo Itagaki, a professor emeritus of Japan’s most prestigious university, the University of Tokyo. Itagaki was, in fact, an unusual case in that he was already quite well known before September 11. Indeed, Professor Itagaki was a key figure supporting what came to be known as the Kono Initiative on the Dialogue Among Civilizations. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, in one of the more creative responses to Huntington’s thesis of the Clash of Civilizations, had transformed the notion into the idea of a Dialogue Among Civilizations, which aimed to use negotiations and mutual recognition as the basis for the peaceful solution of outstanding international political problems. Ironically, 2001 had been proclaimed the United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. In Japan, this theme was taken up seriously in January 2001 by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono. The key Japanese intellectual behind the Kono Initiative was Yuzo Itagaki. Itagaki was thus an obvious person to turn to in the immediate aftermath of September 11. He had both the academic expertise and the establishment connections to make his a major voice in the debate. The liberal monthly magazine Sekai conducted an interview with Professor Itagaki in the weeks after the terrorist attacks. When Itagaki was asked what kind of background came to his mind when he first learned of the terrorist attacks in the United States, he answered,

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At the end of September last year, as a result of Likud Party head Ariel Sharon’s forcible visit to the Islamic holy site in Jerusalem, the Palestinians’ Second Intifada broke out. This, together with the establishment of the new Bush administration in the United States, led to an unraveling of the Middle East framework for peace. . . The Islamic world had reached its limits in terms of hopelessness and anger. Even before it happened, I had felt a sense of foreboding that something big might occur.30 Professor Yuzo Itagaki, like many other academic specialists on the Islamic world, was not greatly shocked by the events of September 11. He expressed sadness, but the idea that a major terrorist event might occur in the United States was not entirely unforeseen. The Arab– Israeli peace process had come to a standstill. Dictatorships were strangling Arab civil societies. The leaders of the United States were showing little inclination to seriously address these problems, and did not even seem to be paying much attention to them. Among specialists, Itagaki was hardly alone in feeling that something had to give way. It is interesting, then, to contrast Yuzo Itagaki’s immediate response to September 11 with that of the Asahi Shinbun editors. Not only was this academic specialist not overly surprised by the terrorist event, but in his own mind, he quickly related it to a very specific set of political issues. Whereas the Asahi viewed events through the generalized and abstract lens of ‘criminals vs. the world’, Itagaki could immediately grasp possible motives, and he was fully aware of the issues lying in the background. As a crucial consequence, people like Itagaki could understand much more clearly than the Asahi editors that Japan was not directly related to what had happened. There was no overarching assault on ‘civilization’, but rather a horrific attack aimed at the United States in connection with a set of specific political disputes.31 At any rate, Itagaki offered some clear ideas about Japan’s best position after the events of September 11. He began by noting that most Muslims had positive feelings toward Japan. This sense of

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closeness derived from issues such as the victory of Japan in the Russo– Japanese War in 1905, shared sadness over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a common sense of victimhood in regard to European colonialism. He also noted the admiration that many Muslims felt for Japan’s successful modernization, which served as a beacon of hope and a model for all non-European developing countries. Guided by his view that Japan enjoyed a positive relationship with the Islamic world, Itagaki suggested what steps Japan should take in response to the September 11 attacks: ‘Japan should make use of these feelings of closeness as a resource for our civilizational strategy. . . We should clarify our civilizational strategy by both criticizing support for terrorism and at the same time engaging Islamic civilization in a dialogue and working together with it in cooperative ways. This should be the core international contribution that only Japan can make.’32 In the end, Professor Yuzo Itagaki’s advice to his nation was very similar to the view of Ryuki Sado. Both agreed that Japan should not remain passive but should respond proactively and dynamically to the September 11 attacks. They agreed that Japan’s main contribution should be the creation of a venue at which the United States and the Islamic world could discuss their differences, find common ground and peacefully resolve the major outstanding political issues. Sado put his emphasis on the logic of terrorism, which thrives in an atmosphere of confrontation and withers in the face of increased prosperity and hope. Itagaki came to a similar conclusion through his awareness that many Muslims felt a degree of affection for Japan and that this affinity could be a useful strategic resource for projects of peace building. Another Japanese scholar of the Islamic world who was outspoken at this time was Osamu Miyata of the University of Shizuoka. Miyata, more than 20 years younger than Yuzo Itagaki and not quite as well known or well-connected, offered a very similar analysis of the September 11 attacks. Like Itagaki, Miyata placed the issue squarely within the context of the history of relations between the US government and the Islamic world. And like Ryuki Sado, Professor Miyata believed that military retaliation by the United States was

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most likely to lead to more anger in the Islamic world and more violence, and that it would not lead to a solution to the problem of terrorism. As for Japan, Miyata made explicit a view that Itagaki only hinted at: America has advanced the view that these terrorist acts have brought us into ‘a state of war’. They have requested Japanese support for military action as an allied nation. However, if Japan adopts a policy that is completely devoted to the American side, then we are inviting the possibility of a strong negative reaction from Islamic countries. . . Japan must adopt a policy that shows consideration for the feelings of Muslims.33 Miyata and many of the other regional specialists perceived a risk to Japan should Tokyo align its policies with the ‘retaliation’ sentiment of the United States. Although the Japanese had received a generally warm reception in the Islamic world for the reasons noted by Itagaki, this general sense of goodwill was a finite resource. Too close an alignment with American military action could well turn Muslim opinion against Japan, ultimately making the Japanese people a target of hostility along with the United States. It is probably fair to say that a large majority of Japanese academic specialists on the Islamic world had views and concerns quite similar to those of Itagaki and Miyata. The scholars of the Islamic world, for all the historical insight and cultural sensitivity that they brought to these issues, were also burdened by two key weaknesses, one theoretical and one practical. The theoretical weakness lay in the paucity of examination of the concept of terrorism itself and of the ways it related to other forms of political violence experienced by the Japanese and others. Ryuki Sado spoke briefly about some of the media and political aspects of terrorism, but there was no full-fledged national debate on the meanings, history, or strategies of terrorism. For most Japanese with a liberal bent, it was enough just to say ‘We shouldn’t kill people’ or ‘We should stop the cycle of violence’. Valuable as those insights may be at a human and moral level, it was curious that the public and the

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liberal intellectuals expressed so little need to conceptualize the issues in more specific terms. The practical weakness is far more significant. Those Japanese who knew the Islamic world best had few links with the top government policymakers – in fact, there was mutual dislike. Most of the scholars had been in opposition to official policies for a long time before September 11. Many of them had quite deliberately distanced themselves from government policy in order to maintain their self-perceived academic neutrality. For their part, mainstream Foreign Ministry officials – who endeavoured to keep a tight hold on Japanese foreign policy – had a generally dismissive attitude toward the advice of the professors. Keiko Sakai, Japan’s leading academic expert on Iraq, explained, The government – and the Foreign Ministry in particular – do not take advice from outside specialists on the Islamic world. They do have their own in-house, non-career Arabists, and many of these people are indeed excellent. We can talk to these Arabists and have a good relationship with them. On some of the smaller, tactical issues, Islamic area specialists do occasionally exercise an influence on policy. However, the mainstream of the Foreign Ministry is dominated by career bureaucrats – especially those of the First North America Division. These people are often willing to make use of some of the specific information offered to them by the Ministry Arabists, but they don’t listen to their advice on any major issues of policy. They make all of the basic decisions themselves, but then they sometimes delegate the policy details back to the Arabists.34 In this way, the fundamental national policies were shaped without serious input from scholars of the Islamic world; they were consulted only after the crucial strategic decisions were already settled. Even the regional specialists of the Arab world within the ministry were largely marginalized. Outside criticism was generally not welcome, and within the government there were no institutional incentives to take academic scholars seriously, nor a palpable inclination to do so.

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In the post-September 11 environment, many of the independent scholars had a chance to appear on television or to write articles for newspapers and magazines, but media exposure had very little impact on the official government policies. The professors may have had a substantial impact on Japanese public opinion, but the Koizumi administration was popular enough on its own merits to be effectively insulated from such concerns. Japanese government officials paid little heed to what its Islamic area specialists were trying to tell them. As a result, they effectively cut themselves off from those who knew the Islamic world best.

Shaping the Debate By no means were all Japanese scholars and public commentators critical toward official policies and without influence in government circles. With only a few exceptions, however, the commentators who were heard knew little of the Islamic world, but a great deal more about the US– Japan alliance. Many of them had built their careers on the notion that Japan depended on the United States for its national security, and this outlook shaped their approach to virtually every foreign policy issue confronting Japan. Not coincidentally, this was also the majority view within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as well as the mainstream Foreign Ministry view.35 It was these forces that combined to shape the public debate in the weeks and months that followed September 11 and that gradually pushed critics of the official policies into the political margin. Japanese scholars and officials of this persuasion do not pay a great deal of attention to the rest of the world through independent analysis; they view it as sufficient that Tokyo– Washington relations remain strong and vibrant. The keener members of this group are well attuned to the power struggles within the American government, and they carefully watch the trends of current and future American foreign policy – especially as it relates to Japan and Asia. For these opinion makers, the very concept of an ‘international community’ seems nearly indistinguishable from the United States. It is America that leads the international community and sets the

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global agenda. If it matters in Washington, then it matters to the world – it’s as simple as that. The messages coming from the Bush administration in the weeks following the September 11 attacks were unmistakable. The threatening tone was delivered, not only privately, but also quite openly. In his September 20, 2001, address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush himself stated: This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. . . An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments.36 At another point in the same address, the President made the highly charged statement, ‘Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.’37 This message was not taken lightly in Tokyo. The implied threat could not be much clearer: there would be no fence-sitting. For the legions of Japanese policymakers and analysts who viewed the world through the Washington prism, this address marked the end of the debate. Was the new American policy clearly understandable? Yes! Were the American people united behind this policy? Yes! If Japan now hesitated or failed to express anything less than complete support, the US– Japan alliance itself could very well be threatened.38 Trembling at the possible implications of that thought – with their deep fear of strategic abandonment by the United States – Tokyo was willing to write a virtual ‘blank cheque’ of support and pray that Washington would exercise moderation when it filled in the blanks.

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Such, however, was merely the view of the conservative ruling elite. The majority of the Japanese people were much more sceptical of American motives and behaviour, and earnestly hoped that Japan would play a peaceful role in whatever was to unfold. Meanwhile, some liberal scholars of the Islamic world were actually going on television to criticize American policy. From the point of view of the alliance conservatives, this perceived effrontery was intolerable. Japan, they felt, had no choice under the prevailing circumstances but to accept the policies of the Bush administration. The American people were in a heated and uncompromising mood. If Japan dragged its feet or offered untimely and unwelcome criticisms, the US administration was quite likely to turn on Tokyo ferociously. The Japanese people and the liberal critics, they believed, were simply naive about the way the world really works. The US– Japan alliance must be preserved for the sake of Japanese national security, and in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, that reality necessitated prompt and near-unconditional support for the Bush administration. For the alliance conservatives, this matter was as clear as daylight, but the problem remained: how to bring the Japanese people along? How could the public aversion to military action be overcome? How could the Japanese people be weaned from their childish devotion to pacifism? One obvious solution, of course, was to stir up public fears. An American scholar later characterized this strategy as ‘scaring the Japanese for their own good’.39 Readers of the popular monthly magazine Bungei Shunju must have indeed been frightened when they read its mid-October special issue entitled ‘This is War!’: A Compilation on the US –Japan Total Struggle. Together with horrifying pictures of the events of September 11, the periodical compiled about 40 short essays from predominantly conservative and even right-wing points of view. One section of the volume, devoted to Japan’s own ‘crisis management’ capabilities, featured Kazuhisa Ogawa’s ‘Zero Sense of Crisis – Japan is a Terrorist’s Paradise’; Suminao Murakami’s ‘What If a Japanese High Rise were Struck by Terrorism? – Would the Number of Victims be Several Times Higher because of Lax Fire

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Safety Measures?’; and Iku Aso’s ‘A Frightful Simulation of a Terrorist Attack on Japan – Prepare for Victimization Caused by Unknown Biological Weapons!’40 As theses titles suggest, the articles were filled with imagined images of innocent Japanese falling victim to cruel terrorists (presumably of Islamic origin) in the heart of their own peaceful communities. Precisely why al-Qaeda or any other Islamic group would choose to target Japan for its next round of terrorist attacks was never spelled out to Bungei Shunju’s anxious readers. Along similar lines, former Cabinet Security Affairs Office Director-General Atsuyuki Sassa – one of Japan’s leading experts on crisis management, among his several other roles – was almost enthusiastic when he publicly declared in mid-September, ‘This is self-defence by civilized people against fanatical believers. It’s a new concept of war, and Japan should definitely offer non-combat support.’41 Later, Sassa began calling for ‘racial discrimination’ against Arabs and Muslims, which he proclaimed to be ‘unavoidable’.42 A more sophisticated academic discourse aimed to explain and legitimize changes in Japanese foreign policy. One of the more aggressive and articulate spokesmen in this regard possessed a potent weapon in the public debate. He is indeed a genuine and serious scholar of the Islamic world; his name is Masayuki Yamauchi. Yamauchi was a professor of the University of Tokyo, the country’s most elite academic institution. Unlike the large majority of ‘Middle East Studies’ specialists in Japan, who tended to gravitate toward critical, liberal political views, Yamauchi was a conservative. Magisterial in his knowledge and broadly supportive of the mainstream official view, Yamauchi was one of the only specialists of the Islamic world the Foreign Ministry would actually listen to. He was even a member of the editorial board of Gaiko Forum, a Foreign Ministry journal published in both Japanese and English that can perhaps be compared to the Council on Foreign Relations journal Foreign Affairs (the word gaiko means ‘diplomacy’). Yamauchi himself held a position in the national debate that might perhaps be seen as analogous to that of Princeton University Professor Bernard Lewis on the American scene. In other words, he had the ear of powerful men

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but was largely estranged from the ‘Middle East Studies’ community from which he had risen. In response to the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, Professor Yamauchi penned a major essay entitled, ‘The Open Society and Its Enemies: Confronting International Terrorism’. This article was presented as the ‘feature essay’ in a volume of Gaiko Forum. As he explained in the text, the title was borrowed from a book by British philosopher Karl R. Popper. In this article, Yamauchi dismissed the Japanese majority view: Some in Japan argue that the events of September 11 took place far away and were not targeted directly at Japan, so they had nothing to do with their country. Their arguments are the product of fear. Others insist that the incident could have been resolved by peaceful means. But what kind of peaceful measures will be effective in dealing with a terrorist organization that has openly launched war against the world’s largest state? Suppose a terrorist group were to slaughter Tokyo citizens in large numbers the way people in New York were sacrificed. What kind of negotiations could the Japanese government or its citizens possibly hold in the spirit of peace with people capable of such horrible mass murder? The advocates of peaceful resolution are engaged simply in fanciful idealism.43 This short passage illuminates several important points. Professor Yamauchi acknowledged that ‘some’ Japanese were inclined to seek peaceful solutions to the dispute between the United States and its terrorist enemies, but he asserted that this view represented nothing more than ‘fanciful idealism’. His notion of how fear affected the Japanese debate was clever. Rather than acknowledging that conservatives were utilizing appeals to fear in order to gain public assent for a military approach, he turned the argument on its head and asserted that those who pointed out that the United States, not Japan, was the intended target of al-Qaeda were themselves the ones who were fearful. Presumably, his notion was that they would rather hide away from conflict rather than fight for human freedom and

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justice. In a later section of the essay, he attempted to explain why Osama bin Laden presented a direct threat to Japan: Perhaps the borders of nation states are to him no more than demarcations created for the convenience of European and American colonialism. He may picture in his mind some ideal world of ‘the Islamic state’. Nowhere on his map would there be a territory called the United States of America or a land named Japan. The expanse of his ‘Islamic world’ with the light of revelation and truth of God radiating from Mecca in all directions transcends the conception of nations and their territories. One is reminded of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a name that did not allow for any demarcation of peoples or territories. Likewise, bin Laden’s world is one governed by his ideology and Islamic faith.44 It is difficult to say whether, as a serious and knowledgeable scholar of the Islamic world, Professor Yamauchi fully believed his own words, but it is certainly true that someone who had previously produced important scholarly works on such historical figures as Enver Pasha and Sultan Galiev should have possessed a much more nuanced view of these matters. His line of argument is prone to several major fallacies. First, he presents no evidence to support his startling assertion that Osama bin Laden was aiming to erase Japan off the global map. Rightly or wrongly, most radical Islamists viewed their jihad as a struggle of self-defence against what they perceived to be the assaults of ‘Crusaders and Jews’ on the Islamic heartland – issues that indeed had little to do with Japan. The expansionistic and proselytizing nature of the Islamic religion is not unique; much the same can be said of Christianity, for example. Moreover, Yamauchi does not attempt to justify his highly questionable comparison of a small band of terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan with the once mighty Soviet Union. Finally, with his own scholarly background in studies of Pan-Turkism and early Pan-Islam, he should have been aware that the legitimacy of the state structures in West Asia are indeed open to question, a situation undeniably linked

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to British and French colonial policies at the conclusion of World War I. Thus, Osama bin Laden and other radical Islamists are hardly alone in questioning the political demarcations of the contemporary West Asian states. Indeed, secular Arab nationalists of the previous generation made precisely the same complaints and at times made their own attempts to revise national borders in the region.45 In sum, this passage represented a potent but fallacious ideological cocktail, stirred up in such a way as to make Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda appear a much more menacing threat to Japan than was justified by the facts. In this same essay, Professor Yamauchi also suggested (though more delicately than did certain other commentators) that the small Muslim community living in Japan was also a source of concern. He wrote that ‘conscientious people of Arab origin’ were partners in the struggle against ‘the terrorist threat to world peace’, he suggested that Japan should encourage these good Arabs ‘to isolate terrorists who are parasites within the Islamic world’. He then observed that ‘Japan, which has an increasing number of Islamic residents, is no different from other nations in being an open society that nevertheless has to deal with such enemies’.46 Although stated in an oblique fashion, his meaning was perfectly clear; the Japanese people had to be on guard against Islamic parasites in their midst. These appeals to fear and prejudice were among the least attractive features of official and semi-official policies at this time. The notion that Japan should oppose terrorism as a matter of ethical principle certainly had some merit – although legitimate questions could be raised about how consistently and even-handedly that principle was applied in practice. On the other hand, the assertions that Tokyo or other Japanese cities were likely targets of al-Qaeda terrorism was beyond the realm of fact. Radical Islamists had no particular grievances toward Japan at the time of the September 11 attacks. From al-Qaeda’s perspective, the attacks were the only effective response to a foreign occupation of Islamic lands perpetrated by the United States and Israel. The attackers were also outraged by the fact that Muslim government leaders were collaborating with those elements. Japan was not even remotely on their minds.

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Many Japanese people understood – though few wished to articulate their insight directly – that the only likely grievance that might make Japan a possible target of al-Qaeda terrorism would be support of American military action in the Islamic world. In October 2001, Tsuneo Isoshima, a former chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, noted, ‘In terms of the rules of common sense in international society, a country becomes a target of attacks if it cooperates with hostile troops.’47 Only if Japan were conspicuous in encouraging American retaliation would it come to al-Qaeda’s attention and enter the danger zone. Radical Islamists would reason that, if Japan were eager to support their most dangerous enemy, then Japan could not be counted as either a friend or as a neutral party. Some of the liberal scholars obliquely alluded to this fact, but the appeals to fear by conservative commentators, such as Masayuki Yamauchi, were aimed precisely at obscuring this elemental political reality from public view. While, in all likelihood, most of these writers understood that many Japanese would prefer safe neutrality to risky international partisanship, by sketching out scenarios of the terrorist destruction of Tokyo or implying that Osama bin Laden wished to rub Japan off the map, they hoped to preempt all discussions of this alternative. To a significant degree, they succeeded in raising Japanese public fears. An Asahi Shinbun poll published at the beginning of October 2001 found that 81 per cent of the respondents expressed uneasiness about the possibility that Japan might be targeted as the United States had been.48 Taking America’s side would be the act that put Japan in harm’s way.49 Most of the Japanese people sensed this reality, but their leaders were entirely unwilling to level with the public on this issue. The conservative establishment had already decided that there was ‘no choice’ but to follow Washington’s lead. These leaders were thus unwilling to provide any opening for their opponents or critics to evaluate in a more reasoned manner the potential costs and benefits of the alliance approach. And because they were reluctant to reveal their true motives, they resorted to fearmongering.

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The Alliance Opportunity Messages aimed at the general public often contained an emphasis on raising fear. One such fear was that al-Qaeda and other radical Muslims would pose a threat to Japanese society or perhaps even launch terrorist attacks in Tokyo. Another fear was that the United States, frustrated by a lack of support from their Japanese allies, might dissolve the alliance and leave Japan alone and adrift in a hostile world. This apprehension was usually referred to as Japan’s fear of abandonment.50 There was, however, another side to the debate within the councils of the Japanese government not based on these fears of terrorism or abandonment or even on some supposed duty to the ‘civilized world’; this particular Japanese establishment view saw the crisis created by the September 11 attacks, not as a disaster for Japan, but as a long-awaited opportunity for Japan and the United States to consolidate their alliance so as to meet what was seen as the new challenges of the twenty-first century. For an even smaller minority on the far right of the political spectrum, this opening also encompassed a chance to overthrow Japanese post-war pacifism itself. The story of the US – Japan alliance reaches back to the defeat of Japan in August 1945 and to policies of the American occupation. The battles over both the scope and limitations of the alliance were red-hot political issues in Japan throughout the 1950s and in early 1960, culminating in a pitched battle over the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, involving massive strikes and public demonstrations, rioting by students and union activists, the cancellation of a planned state visit by then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower and finally the resignation of the arch-conservative Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. For three decades after the bitter confrontation of 1960, an uneasy equilibrium was reached in which Japanese conservatives retreated from their insistence on sweeping political and legal changes, instead focusing their efforts on national economic development. Nevertheless, in a slow and deliberate fashion, alliance conservatives succeeded in strengthening the military aspects of the US – Japan alliance. When the Soviet Union

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collapsed, Japan quietly maintained one of the highest military budgets and the second-strongest navy in the world.51 The turning point came with the Persian Gulf Crisis and War of 1990– 1991. When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait in early August 1990, the Japanese government was unable to formulate a coherent response. The country quickly imposed economic sanctions on Iraq but was unable to react to the changes that had occurred within Washington and in the American public view of Japan. One major factor in this situation of stasis was that the ruling LDP happened to be in a particularly weak phase under the uninspired leadership of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. Indeed, several years later the creaky ruling party itself briefly lost power before making a rather unlikely comeback. The George H. W. Bush administration and the US Congress had demanded that Japan play a major role in the broad international coalition rising to challenge the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. By the end of August 1990, Tokyo had announced a US$1 billion aid package. This aid was, however, derided as insufficient by both American leaders and most of the American public. Throughout the 1980s, Japan had emerged as an economic superpower and, at that time, the United States was suffering an economic malaise as the Cold War rolled to an end. In this situation, many Americans began circulating jokes at the time to the effect that, ‘the Cold War is over and Japan has won’.52 For Japanese leaders, however, the Persian Gulf Crisis was no laughing matter. In early September 1990, US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady held talks with the Japanese government to explain that a much larger financial contribution would be necessary. This meeting was backed up by resolutions and threatening talk from members of the US Congress who made it clear that Japan would suffer stiff penalties unless it started pulling its ‘fair share’ in the international coalition. Within days, Tokyo announced that its contribution would be bumped up to $4 billion. The increased financial contribution did little to assuage the American critics of Japanese policy. Commentators began to dwell on the fairness of young American men and women being sent to sweat

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and die in a faraway desert while the wealthy Japanese just wrote a few cheques and stayed safely at home. Had the American army become some kind of paid mercenary force for the convenience of the Japanese? Weren’t the Japanese themselves among the main beneficiaries of the international order that Americans were sacrificing their very lives to maintain? With the Soviet Union in a state of collapse, precisely what benefit was the United States deriving from its alliance with Japan? The tone coming out of Washington was horrifying to Japanese leaders, who were ill-prepared to respond in a meaningful way. Most of them had failed to grasp the reality that the end of the Cold War required them to rethink their diplomatic and security policies. It wasn’t that they had to come to the same conclusions as their Washington allies; the point was that they had not shown much foresight at all. They were simply reacting to immediate pressures. What resulted was a first-class political fiasco. In early October 1990, the Kaifu cabinet introduced a UN Peace Cooperation Bill allowing for the Self-Defense Forces to be sent abroad on foreign peacekeeping missions. This bill was an attempt to respond to American criticisms, but it quickly ran into a wall of Japanese and Asian faultfinding. The proposed legislation was a radical departure from previous conceptions of the pacifist Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. Furthermore, few understood at that time how easily and rapidly the United States would defeat Iraq when war actually broke out. Around the world, there were many predictions that Iraq would become the new American Vietnam and that the Iraqi war machine, which had held off Iran for eight years, would acquit itself reasonably well in fighting the Americans. The vast majority of the Japanese wanted nothing to do with such a scenario. Battered by criticism from all sides, unable to articulate clearly the reasons why the bill had been introduced in the first place and suffering from a series of verbal gaffes demonstrating insufficient thought and preparation, in early November 1990 the Kaifu administration was ignominiously forced to withdraw the controversial bill from parliamentary consideration. After the extended bombing campaign of Operation Desert Storm was launched on January 17, 1991, Prime

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Minister Kaifu raised the possibility that Air Self-Defense Forces planes might be sent to the Persian Gulf to help in the evacuation of refugees. However, this plan too was quickly scuttled. Lamely, the Japanese government then retreated to the one action that it knew it could accomplish – sending more money. A huge new aid package of $9 billion was announced in early February. This bonus brought Japan’s total contribution to $13 billion, a figure sufficiently massive to force the government to raise the consumption tax. By the time a ceasefire ended the Persian Gulf War on February 28, the Japanese government had achieved little more than sending a huge amount of money to the US-led coalition. It was only then that the Kaifu administration began to recover. With the successful conclusion of the war, Japanese public resistance to deploying the Self-Defense Forces abroad weakened significantly. The American victory seemed both clean and thorough. There was no new Vietnam in Iraq. Kuwaitis were rejoicing about the ‘liberation’ of their country, and some people blamed Japan for not doing enough to help. President Bush had shown restraint and had not allowed the ground fighting to drag on indefinitely. It now appeared to many Japanese that the US administration had acted both wisely and carefully, and that the post-Cold War international order had been effectively secured by American arms. All of this made it possible for Japan to deploy Maritime Self-Defense Forces minesweepers to the Persian Gulf later in 1991. By mid-September this mission had been carried out successfully, and the ships came home.53 The following year Tokyo was finally able to pass a peacekeeping operations bill that allowed for the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to foreign countries to engage in non-combat activities.54 The story of Japan’s experience of the Persian Gulf Crisis and War of 1990– 1991 is significant because it loomed as a major factor in Japanese foreign policymaking in the immediate wake of September 11. In 1991, many mid-level Japanese policymakers were outraged by their country’s response and felt humiliated each time some American commentator trotted out the notion of Japan’s engaging in ‘checkbook diplomacy’, a response that was ‘too little, too late’. These became weary of being called ‘free riders’ on the US – Japan alliance.

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Many of them truly believed that the best policy to secure Japan’s future was to remain closely attached to the United States. The restraint shown by President George H. W. Bush at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, and his skillful handling of the collapse of the Soviet Union, had proven that American leadership was both wise and effective. In consideration of these circumstances, the best Japanese policy would give Washington additional reasons for preserving the alliance. They internalized and came to fundamentally agree with the American notion that Japan was not doing its fair share to maintain the alliance. The scholar Daniel Kliman usefully termed this factor ‘internalized gaiatsu’ – American political pressures that operate internally on Japanese policymakers even in the absence of overt moves by leaders in Washington.55 For this reason, some Japanese policymakers saw in the tragedy of September 11 a political opportunity. They may not have been as exuberant in their expression as Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had been in 1950, when he called the outbreak of the Korean War a ‘gift from the gods’ (in that it had helped Japan’s efforts to secure its initial Cold War alliance with the United States), but a similar sentiment was present among certain Japanese policymakers, a tendency strong enough in late September 2001 to provoke the editors of the Asahi Shinbun to reproach what they called ‘an elated Japanese government’.56 Among the most forthright and articulate of the Japanese bilateralists was Yukio Okamoto, who had been serving as director of the First North American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry at the time of the Persian Gulf War. Okamoto was among those Japanese officials who were outraged and frustrated by his nation’s response to that earlier conflict. Even ten years later he wrote that he had difficulty studying the events of that period objectively because it was still ‘hard to keep one’s emotional response in check’.57 Unlike many others, however, Okamoto had the supreme good fortune of publishing a major article on the topic of Tokyo’s response to the Persian Gulf War on the very eve of the next great crisis. The essay he wrote for Gaiko Forum – published one month before September 11 – began with the following observation, ‘Throughout the year 2001

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Japan has had to face the nagging question: “What will we do if another Gulf war breaks out?” Would Japan be able to act jointly with other countries? Would it be the target of international derision, as it was ten years before? I would like to say by now, that Japan is ready, but I cannot. I think we have to concede that Japan would react basically the same way it did a decade ago.’58 Okamoto’s essay, which went on to describe in some detail his frustrations in dealing with the Japanese bureaucracy in those days, was still fresh in the minds of many policymakers when something very like ‘another Gulf war’ did indeed break out. His fortuitous timing quickly led many policymakers to seek his advice. Even Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi consulted Okamoto and on September 20, 2001, appointed him a special adviser to the Cabinet.59 Okamoto was thus given a rare opportunity to ensure that his own glum prediction about a second inept Japanese response to the crisis would not be fulfilled. Yukio Okamoto had clear views on Japanese foreign policy, and these probably influenced Prime Minister Koizumi at the crucial early stage. Okamoto preached the importance of building strong personal relations with American leaders and called the US– Japan alliance the ‘Essential Alliance’ for Japan and Asia.60 Asserting that Japan and the United States shared ‘a global agenda’, he bemoaned the fact that the security alliance was confined to East Asia.61 He considered the notion that Japan might eventually return to militarism a ‘mythological threat’ and post-war Japanese pacifism a ‘flimsy shield’, a creed that had ‘gone too far’ and ‘had run its course’ in recent Japanese history.62 He also noted that ‘for Japan, the United States is the country’s only ally. Japan concentrates all its attention on smoothing its relations with the United States, routinely making difficult political decisions to keep the alliance on an even keel.’63 Okamoto fiercely criticized earlier Japanese diplomatic policies even after the Koizumi administration had sent military aid to American-led efforts in the Indian Ocean: Japan’s usual line, ‘Our hands are clean, so we are the best suited to act as peace mediator,’ does not win sympathy in the

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international community. If our hands are clean, that is because we have not lifted a finger to help in concrete ways. The person who watches from the bench and then sides with the winning team does not make many friends. This time, Japan has manifestly placed itself in the camp that uses military power for the defense of freedom and justice. That is why Japan now has the right to make demands of the international community, in particular, the United States. This is a position of strength that Japan should exploit for its own vision of international aid.64 For Yukio Okamoto, then, there were ‘no acceptable alternatives’ other than for Japan to fully embrace the developing War on Terror in solidarity with its crucial American ally.65 Taking sides, however, was not merely unavoidable – it was also an opportunity to be seized. This occasion was a chance to turn bilateral relations into genuine friendship. The American side could be defined as ‘the camp that uses military power for the defense of freedom and justice’. Japan would find itself in a newly created ‘position of strength’, which could be used to carry out some undefined, special Japanese vision of international aid. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi himself was never quite as outspoken as Okamoto, nor as much of an intellectual, but that he was largely in sympathy with Okamoto’s views can be surmised from the fact that he employed Okamoto as his main foreign policy adviser in the first years after September 11 and in practice followed most of the advice that Okamoto was preaching in public. The influence of Okamoto’s counsels can, for example, be seen in Koizumi’s national address delivered at the time of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Masayuki Yamauchi is another influential Japanese figure who saw opportunity in the tragedy of September 11. In a commentary written in November 2001, he proposed that Japan use the opportunity of the war against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to create what he called ‘The Twenty-First Century Charter’.66 While he was not specific about precisely what this initiative would entail, he grandly compared his proposal to Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen

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Points, the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations. He asserted that the main shortcoming of those twentieth-century initiatives was that they ‘only reflected Western values and views and excluded their Asian counterparts’.67 To remedy this perceived deficiency, his new Charter would ‘accommodate peace-oriented Chinese philosophy and Islamic religion as well as other Eastern philosophies’.68 Yamauchi felt that Japan’s own history of ‘balancing’ Chinese, Western, and indigenous traditions made it the nation best suited to achieve the needed synthesis. Should this bold endeavour prove successful in its first test case in Afghanistan, Japan would have succeeded in finding ‘an honoured place in the international order’.69 Whatever the merits of Yamauchi’s New Order might have been, in this case his influence seems to have been limited. While the Koizumi administration did indeed make practical use of Yukio Okamoto’s suggestions, it did not issue a ‘Twenty-First Century Charter’ or any comparably grand initiative. The Japanese government showed little interest in proposing a new global vision, being content to simply wait and listen to the Bush administration’s pronouncements about the details of the new global order. That said, Yamauchi may have exercised some influence on the way that the Foreign Ministry presented its much more modest political initiatives. Some of the American ‘alliance managers’ were actively encouraging Tokyo to see the immediate post-September 11 era as an opportunity for policy change. Among these was Brad Glosserman, director of research of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Glosserman was, in fact, one of the more moderate commentators in as much as he demonstrated a clear concern that Tokyo might overplay its hand in late 2001 and activate political opposition from Japan’s Asian neighbours. In spite of his reservations, Glosserman recognized the September 11 attacks as an ‘opportunity’ for Prime Minister Koizumi to change ‘the diplomatic momentum in Northeast Asia’ and to ‘make controversial decisions on security policies’.70 After noting that the burgeoning War on Terror had given the Japanese government the political cover it needed to mute objections from Japanese liberals and other nations

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in East Asia, he gave his opinion that ‘Mr Koizumi’s challenge is seizing the moment without exploiting it. He has the opportunity to move the Japanese security debate forward. He can adjust his country’s defense policies in a way that aids its alliance partner and allows Japan to make a more meaningful contribution to international security.’71 Glosserman, a relative moderate, was concerned that any sort of overreach could lead to a damaging political backlash and he therefore believed that the initial Japanese efforts should remain focused on non-military contributions. He also attempted to make an extremely fine distinction between seizing a political opportunity and political opportunism. His overarching message seemed to be that Tokyo should seize the opportunity of the War on Terror without giving the open impression of being too enthusiastic about seizing it. In spite of Glosserman’s equivocation, his basic approval of the changes taking place in Japanese security policy was clear enough. Indeed, this was the overwhelming consensus of the American ‘alliance managers’.72 It was they, after all, who had planted and patiently watered the seeds of this policy change through their consistent public and private messages to their Japanese colleagues since at least the time of the Persian Gulf War.

The Two Japans Within the first months following September 11, the basic pattern of opinion and policy that emerged in subsequent years was already apparent. The Japanese people as a whole were shocked by the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and felt broad sympathy with its victims. This genuine sympathy, however, was also laced with concern about the United States’ possible reaction. The majority of Japanese felt that the response should not be a violent one. It was their view that military action in the Islamic world would lead to even more lives lost without providing any solution to the problem of terrorism. This popular view was publicly propounded by, among others, Social Democratic Party leader Takako Doi, who stated, ‘Retaliation will trigger more retaliation, which will claim further innocent victims. Resorting to arms will not lead to a solution.’73

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The Japanese Communist Party agreed: ‘Retaliation using military power will create a vicious circle of terrorist acts and military retaliation.’74 Dr Tetsu Nakamura, with his long experience in directly assisting Afghan refugees, argued: ‘Retaliation is not the answer to terrorism. The important thing is to improve their standard of living by providing food, water, and medical support so they will not harbour hostility.’75 Peace groups in Okinawa declared, ‘Mourning the victims and responding to their deaths does not necessarily mean we have to pile up corpses upon other corpses through military retaliation.’76 Among religious leaders, the Buddhist preacher and writer Jakucho Setouchi attempted to turn the conservative Persian Gulf War analogy on its head: ‘The chain of animosity cannot be broken by retaliating against your enemy. Human beings are foolish. How many times are the same mistakes repeated? I went to deliver medicine and other supplies to Iraq during the Gulf War, and it is always the weak who are the victims.’77 Even the father of a young man who died in the World Trade Center attacks tearfully told an interviewer shortly after the tragedy, ‘I am sad and in pain, but a retaliatory war?. . . I want people to stop the useless killing.’78 A number of liberal intellectuals publicly sketched out alternatives to a ‘war of retaliation’. One major line of thought suggested that the September 11 attacks be approached as a grievous international crime rather than the act of war that President Bush perceived. The implication of this view was that the attacks should be treated as a police and judicial matter.79 In fact, one of Japan’s small, liberal political parties – the Social Democratic Party – took as its semi-official policy the statement that the terrorist attacks were ‘a crime and not a war’.80 Another opinion which was voiced in the immediate wake of the attacks asserted that ‘excessive retaliation’ was precisely what Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were hoping for. This view held that the purpose of terrorism was to seize the political agenda and to constrain the non-military options of policymakers by goading them into taking tough and uncompromising stances. This response would only create a cycle of violence that played into the hands of those who had launched the original terrorist attacks. The Japanese government was

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thus urged to adopt an independent policy that emphasized peaceful forms of activism. Yet another idea was propounded by Japan’s cadre of scholars of the Islamic world. In broad terms, they concurred with the notion that Japan’s policy should emphasize peaceful activism and avoid military action. These specialists, however, were distinguished by their greater knowledge of the political context in which the alQaeda attacks had taken place. They did not generally approve of US policy in the Islamic world and they understood more clearly the sources of Muslim discontent. These scholars were therefore unwilling to accept the simple assertion that the United States represented ‘civilization’ struggling in the face of terrorist barbarism. De-historicized notions held little attraction for them. They attempted to educate the public about the background of what had occurred, and they pointed out that Japan was regarded favourably by most of the Islamic world. These specialists worried that Japanese participation in any ‘war of retaliation’ would erode the pro-Japanese sentiment in the Islamic world and lead to negative consequences for both Japanese and Muslims. This broader public debate, however, exercised very little influence on the Koizumi administration and the ruling elements. These leaders did not share the Japanese people’s commitment to peaceful solutions, nor did they feel inclined to question the sources of the terrorist event. To the extent that they considered history at all, they focused overwhelmingly on the history of the US– Japan alliance, most notably the perceived humiliation that many of them had felt at the time of the Persian Gulf Crisis. From the perspective of the Japanese elite, the only relevant lesson of history was that Japan had failed to provide timely and adequate support to its American allies in the previous Gulf War, and they were determined not to make the same mistake twice. In addition to the concern that Japan must avoid a fresh humiliation, however, there were also some conservatives who welcomed September 11 as a crucial opportunity to transform Japanese security policies under cover of the US– Japan alliance. This view was clearly articulated by Yukio Okamoto, who quickly rose to be Prime Minister Koizumi’s principal foreign policy adviser. Others,

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such as conservative commentator Hisahiko Okazaki, were equally clear on this point: ‘This is a rare chance for Japan. There are people in the US administration who are keen to see Japan to take a firm position so bilateral relations can become closer.’81 The broader Japanese public, however, simply did not accept the ‘necessity’ of supporting American military action that the Japanese elite perceived. For most of the political establishment it was perfectly obvious that Japan must follow the American lead into the new order of the War on Terror. They suffered few doubts in this regard. The Japanese people, on the other hand, remained sceptical both about the Bush administration’s intentions and of their own leaders. In order to gain public support – or at least tolerance – of government policies, some conservative commentators stooped to fearmongering about terrorism. They suggested (sometimes in rather graphic terms) that Bin Laden and al-Qaeda were likely to target Japan as they had targeted America. They asserted that Islamist terrorism was an assault on all civilization and that it was only a matter of time before innocent Japanese would wind up in the crosshairs. Did the conservatives win the debate? As far as control of official policies is concerned, they were indeed the winners during the eightyear period between September 2001 and September 2009. On the other hand, the conservatives did not really succeed in convincing the majority of Japanese. Throughout the Bush era, the Japanese people as a whole remained suspicious and sceptical about policies pertaining to the War on Terror. For the most part, they liked and supported Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, but this loyalty was in spite of, rather than because of, his alliance policy. Appreciation of Koizumi was rooted in the attractiveness of his public character, his decisiveness, and the excitement he generated whenever he ran on a reform platform against the establishment. After Koizumi stepped down from office in September 2006, the popularity of the LDP and its leaders plummeted. It was only on account of the Koizumi-led victory in the September 2005 general elections, effectively framed by Koizumi as a referendum on his postal-reform bill, which allowed the conservatives to remain in power until the late summer of 2009. They were badly beaten when the more hawkish but less skillful

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Shinzo Abe led the ruling party into the July 2007 upper house elections, and once again – conclusively – under Taro Aso in the August 2009 general election. In the end, two Japans emerged from September 11. The first was that of its ruling conservatives, which was led rather effectively by Koizumi for the first five years and then much less skillfully thereafter. This Japan knew what it wanted: to strengthen the US– Japan alliance. It also wanted to remove legal and other restrictions on the deployment of Japanese military forces abroad. On its outer wing, it wanted to transform Japanese society in a direction it regarded as being more ‘patriotic’ and willing to sacrifice for what was perceived to be the good of the nation and the world. This faction wanted a self-assured and proud Japan that was unafraid to make ‘international contributions’. Above all, it wanted respect.82 The second Japan – the Japan of the majority of the Japanese people – was unsure of itself. It did not entirely like the Bush administration, with its cocky tone and addiction to violent military solutions. It did not fully trust its own government leaders (though most were attracted to Koizumi’s personal qualities). This majority was not organized and was not motivated to actively oppose the government. The people were confused about, and widely indifferent to, most aspects of foreign policy. They were unengaged in public affairs. They did not like what they were seeing on the television news, but most often they just shrugged off these images with a general sense of their own powerlessness to shape events. Their basic values were not represented by their government leaders, but they were not willing to make a sustained effort to ensure a situation that was more congenial to them. They fluctuated between mildly opposing the government’s new policies and reluctantly tolerating them. The policy area in which the two Japans were most clearly in contradiction between 2001 and 2009 was in the field of military policy.

CHAPTER 2 SHOWING THE FLAG

Japan’s military role in the War on Terror has drawn more domestic and international attention than any other aspect of Japan’s antiterrorism policies. The greater part of what is written about Japan and the War on Terror focuses on its meaning for Japanese security policies, especially in relation to the future of the US –Japan alliance. While the issue of Japanese security policy cannot be neglected, the broader political and social issues tied up in the War on Terror are also crucial. There is near-consensus in the writings of alliance conservatives that what took place in Japan from September 2001 to September 2009 was simply the triumph of ‘realism’ over backward-looking Japanese pacifist norms; but profoundly different interpretations of recent events are equally possible. The effects of the Japanese government’s enthusiastic participation in the War on Terror may not be fully appreciated until many years in the future. The controversy over the recent changes in Japanese security policy stems in large part from the fact that the Japanese constitution and the pacifist ideals that it represents have been abruptly pushed aside and that military limits, once inviolable, have one by one been crossed. The debate over the Japanese constitution has continued for decades and, as such, remains at the very heart of the dispute over the nation’s defence policies. A related question is the nature of the political role played by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Japanese military officers have not always

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been content to await the political decisions of their civilian superiors; they possess a degree of independent political influence, and in the weeks and months following the September 11 attacks, they demonstrated a willingness to exercise their behind-the-scenes power. Once Japan had quietly created one of the most sophisticated military forces in the world, some Japanese felt an urge to utilize it. As one conservative lawmaker stated in regard to a high-tech weapons system Japan had purchased at high cost from the United States, ‘It is better not to let the treasure rot unused.’1 Immediately after September 11, bilateral military concepts that had been discussed by senior US and Japanese officials for many years were dusted off and put into practice. By their very nature, not all of these security plans have been revealed openly to general audiences, but such dialogue as has been projected into public view allows for a broad assessment. Political pressure aiming for a strong Japanese military role in the War on Terror came from both within and without Tokyo. Step by step, alliance conservatives on both sides of the Pacific succeeded in imposing their plans on the Japanese people.

The Constitution and the Self-Defense Forces Japan’s pacifist constitution unquestionably has American roots. During the course of the Pacific War, American animosity toward Japan reached remarkable heights. It was suggested that the entire ‘Japanese race’ should be exterminated, and there was relative consensus that whatever became of Japan at the end of the war, the country should not be left in any position to rise again to challenge American power in the Pacific. If the Japanese nation were to be allowed to exist, at the very least US policymakers were determined that its threatening military power would be abolished ‘forever’. In the early post-war period, after he had become disenchanted by the half-hearted reform efforts of Japanese conservatives, General Douglas MacArthur decided to take matters in hand and have his own team of American experts write a new constitution for Japan. MacArthur’s basic outline, issued in February 1946, included what came to be known as MacArthur’s Three Principles. The second of

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these three stipulated: ‘War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring in the world for its defense and protection. No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese forces.’2 This outline became the basis for the new national charter. In its original form, the intent of what later became the Preamble and Article Nine of the Japanese constitution was clear and unambiguous: Japan would give up all rights of belligerency; it would maintain no military forces; even a war of self-defence would be prohibited. It was envisioned by MacArthur that the new Japanese constitution would be a major step toward the fulfillment of the 1928 Kellogg– Briand Pact, an international treaty which demanded ‘the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy’. This treaty, designed by US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and signed by more than 60 nations, including Japan and the United States, later became a key foundation for the legal concept of ‘crimes against peace’, used to condemn and execute some of the defendants at both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo War Crimes tribunals. However, before MacArthur’s outline was promulgated as the constitution in May 1947, the relevant passages were revised in two ways that opened the door to future disputes about what had actually been intended. The first and most significant of these revisions was made by Colonel Charles L. Kades, one of the key drafters of the constitution. Feeling that General MacArthur’s outline was too sweeping, he eliminated the passage that read ‘and even for preserving its own security’.3 Hitoshi Ashida was responsible for the second revision when he added (in Japanese translation) the phrase ‘In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph’ to the beginning of Article Nine, Section Two. This passage was later used, with complex and sophistical reasoning, to argue that a war of selfdefence was constitutionally permitted.4 The final text of Article Nine reads:

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(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. The Preamble of the constitution explained the broader philosophical basis upon which Article Nine rested: We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. . . We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

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At the time the constitution was promulgated, several key politicians explicitly stated that, in their personal understanding, the new constitution prohibited even wars of self-defence, as had been the clear intent of MacArthur’s original outline. The minister of state in charge of the constitution, Tokujiro Kanamori, in a secret session told the House of Peers: ‘The practical effect of the second paragraph is that even a defensive war cannot be conducted.’5 The conservative Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida maintained for several years that the constitution prohibited the use of any armed force. As late as January 1950, he declared, ‘The right of self-defence in Japan’s case will be the right of self-defence without resorting to force of arms.’6 Later in the 1950s, however, Yoshida changed his tune. In 1954, he himself formally authorized the establishment of the SDF. The three branches of the new service were the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF). Most of the leftist Japanese opposition parties maintained well into the 1990s that the SDF was illegal under Article Nine. While many conservatives wished to revise Article Nine from the beginning, the Japanese as a whole embraced their new Peace Constitution as a much-needed check on their own leaders, and they did not provide the conservatives with an opportunity to revise the charter.7 Aside from the general public and the opposition parties, significant resistance to dramatic new steps also came from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which saw the preservation of the constitution as one of its key mandates.8 Unable to overturn or revise the constitution, Japanese conservatives played a more patient game. They agreed to prioritize Japan’s economic development. Meanwhile, they waited for their occasional chances to ‘reinterpret’ the relevant passages of the constitution to allow them to expand the capabilities and missions of the SDF. Public opinion and the opposition parties did not allow them to directly rewrite the document, but step by careful step they gradually drained Article Nine of practical meaning by denying that it had direct implications for their latest defence policies. They were abetted in this process by a supine Supreme Court that was extremely reluctant to challenge the existing

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government’s legal interpretation of practically any political matter. Gavan McCormack has described this process as a policy of ‘revision by interpretation’.9 One of the crucial factors driving this gradual ‘reinterpretation’ of the constitution was the altered stance of Japan’s allies in Washington. Although it had been the Americans themselves who had imposed the pacifist national charter on Japan, the US administration soon changed its mind. As early as 1950, the US government was already pushing for Japan to rearm as an ally in the Cold War. In 1953, VicePresident Richard Nixon admitted publicly that US leaders had come to view the imposition of Article Nine and the demilitarization of Japan as a ‘mistake’.10 However, when US officials found themselves faced by a Japanese nation that had embraced the earlier, peaceful vision, they resigned themselves to the reality that Tokyo would offer them some forms of assistance but not others. Devious Japanese conservatives like Shigeru Yoshida had even discovered that pacifism and the constitution could be a useful means to limit excessive American demands for expensive Japanese rearmament at a time when economic development was a higher priority.11 When the Japanese economic recovery plans developed into a historic success and Japan’s burgeoning economy challenged even that of the United States, attitudes in Washington changed once again. American political leaders became far more focused on the fact that Japanese companies were outperforming US companies in the production of consumer goods. By the 1980s, American observers commonly asserted that the US military was ‘providing the service’ of military protection to Japan even as the Japanese were free to capture new global markets. Many Americans came to believe that they had been hoodwinked into an unfair bargain in which Americans sweated and died for global security, while the Japanese remained secure, relaxed and wealthy. The Persian Gulf Crisis and War of 1990 – 1991 crystallized and intensified these American complaints and led the Japanese elite to shift its security posture. Although the Japanese government still claimed that it was acting within the constitutional framework, in all but name it had abandoned the highest principle. The nature of the

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discussions about the need to expand and strengthen the capabilities of the SDF indicated that Japanese leaders were no longer ‘trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world’; the elite security debate moved beyond the constitution as if it were no longer the fundamental law of the land. When the Socialist Party followed suit and betrayed its long-held pacifist ideals in 1994 (to allow party chief Tomiichi Murayama to rise to the office of prime minister in coalition with the conservatives), the collapse of official pacifism was nearcomplete. While the Japanese public retained a strong orientation toward nonviolence and pacifism, fewer and fewer representatives in government effectively championed this point of view. Meanwhile, the SDF and Japan’s overall security policies were undergoing substantial practical alterations. In June 1992, the Diet enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law, which allowed the government, under certain rather strict conditions, to deploy the SDF to UN peacekeeping missions abroad, leading to actual troop deployments to Cambodia, Mozambique, Zaire, the Golan Heights and East Timor. In September 1997, the US – Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines were renegotiated. The new agreement formalized mutual tasks and responsibilities if Japan were to be directly attacked, or if there were ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’ that were deemed to seriously impact Japanese security. The stated aim of the Guidelines was to ‘create a solid basis for more effective and credible US– Japan cooperation’.12 Crucially in respect to later developments, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi also made it clear, when questioned in the Diet in April 1999, that events in the Indian Ocean or the ‘Middle East’ lay outside the envisaged geographical scope of the Guidelines.13 Beyond these formal agreements, there were also a number of influential committee reports arguing for broader and more proactive US – Japan military partnerships in the future. In this way, the stage was set for the rapid and unprecedented developments that occurred in Japanese security policy after September 11. What had previously been discussed only in theory before the al-Qaeda attacks quickly became transformed into practical reality.

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From Within and Without The MSDF – among all the Japanese military services – has long maintained the closest relationship with their American colleagues.14 The MSDF are also best prepared to be deployed abroad on peacekeeping missions. The first MSDF mission abroad nearly occurred in 1987 when the Reagan administration requested that Japanese minesweepers be sent to the Persian Gulf in connection with the Iran– Iraq War. Then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is said to have supported this deployment, but he backed off the proposal under heavy resistance from Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda.15 Nevertheless, the plans that the MSDF had drawn up at that time were later dusted off and actually put into practice as Operation Gulf Dawn in 1991. Just as the MSDF had been the first service to be deployed after the Persian Gulf War, so they would take the lead after the September 11 terrorist attacks. On the morning of September 12, 2001, the Aegis destroyer Kongo left its base at Sasebo to begin an unscheduled patrol of Japanese waters.16 Later, on September 21, several MSDF destroyers escorted the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk out of harbour as it departed from the port of Yokosuka.17 Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani told reporters that the ships were ‘patrolling in waters surrounding Japan because, if a terrorist attack takes place in the region, it would cause a serious impact on the safety of Japan’.18 In reality, however, this was the MSDF’s symbolic demonstration of solidarity with their American naval colleagues at the outset of the new campaign.19 As for the George W. Bush administration and its policy toward Japan, the most crucial role in the early months after the al-Qaeda attacks was played by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was regarded in Washington as a leading ‘Japan hand’. Armitage had previously developed some rather pronounced ideas about the US– Japan alliance. In October 2000, several months before the Bush administration had taken office, Armitage coauthored a major report titled ‘The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership’, commonly referred to as the Armitage Report. Among the other co-authors of this report were Joseph Nye, Michael Green

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and Kurt Campbell – some of the key ‘alliance managers’ from the American side. The report itself asserted that the US – Japan alliance was ‘more important than ever’, even ‘central to America’s global security strategy’.20 In consequence, the report submitted a series of recommendations for strengthening the alliance. Significantly, many of these recommendations were aimed at the Japanese government rather than America’s own policymaking community. Among other recommendations, the report urged Japan to lift the remaining legal restraints on deployments of the SDF, to pass a new law to protect classified information and to reform the Japanese economy. Although it was stated indirectly, one of the basic messages of the Armitage Report was that Japan should play a military role in the alliance that went beyond simply the defence of Japan. The Armitage Report hinted that the defensive US – Japan security alliance might be transformed into both an offensive and a defensive military alliance, and thus might gain a new level of importance for both Washington and Tokyo. Most sensationally and revealingly, the Armitage Report suggested, ‘We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance.’21 This, more than anything else, clarified that Armitage was calling for the end of the pacifist political culture in Japan, and its emergence as a great power ally of the United States. After September 11 and the beginning of the War on Terror, Armitage was deputized as the Bush administration’s point man for Japan issues. The United States demanded that Japan make a contribution to the campaign in Afghanistan over and above diplomatic and financial support. On September 15, Armitage famously commented to Ambassador Shunji Yanai that Japan must ‘show the flag’ in the emerging counterterrorist coalition. A subsequent public effort by US Ambassador Howard Baker and other officials of both governments to play down the notion that the Bush administration was pressuring Japan to make policy changes could not prevail because Richard Armitage’s views were well known. They were revealed even more clearly in a conversation with ruling party lawmaker Hidenao Nakagawa a few years later, when Armitage

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ventured his ‘personal opinion’ that Article Nine of the constitution ‘was becoming an obstacle to the progress of the Tokyo – Washington alliance’.22 The dramatic changes in Japanese behaviour sought by Armitage and the Bush administration after September 11 had bipartisan roots in Washington. The extension of the alliance as far as the Persian Gulf was foreseen well before Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were identified as global menaces. In 1999, the ‘alliance managers’ Patrick Cronin and Michael Green wrote, US and Japanese common security interests also extend to the Persian Gulf, where the world’s largest known oil resources exist, and to global issues such as non-proliferation. . . It is not unrealistic to imagine a future in which Japanese and US forces operate together as far as the Gulf. It is easy to predict the [American] public hue and cry should Japan’s role in a future Gulf War be as limited and as tardy as it was in the last one. Such military cooperation would be the logical extension of increasing bilateral cooperation and a recognition of Japanese global interests.23 The authors also provided the meaningful warning that ‘Japanese divergence on high-profile foreign policy issues leads to questions about the value of the alliance relationship for those in the United States who are not focused on Asia.’24 Consistently prodded in this way, Japanese elites became deeply sensitive to the criticism of their American colleagues. They had been told again and again that the experience of the Persian Gulf War must never be repeated and that Japan must act as a ‘mature’ player on the world stage. The post-September 11 response of the conservative Japanese elite was thus virtually preprogrammed. They acted automatically from their ‘internalized gaiatsu’. Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani gave voice to a widely shared sentiment when he declared, ‘We never want to follow the same path we took in the Gulf War. We should learn lessons from the Gulf War and take firm and decisive measures in response this time.’25 An

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editor of the Yomiuri Shinbun, Nobuo Asaumi, fretted immediately after September 11: ‘Unless Diet members respond promptly. . . they will repeat the mistake they made during the Gulf War and will fail in their international responsibilities.’26 At a later time, Ambassador Shunji Yanai revealed that in his September 15 conversation with Richard Armitage, ‘both he and I had fresh memories of the Gulf War. . . and we both agreed that we didn’t want to make the same mistake.’27 Their American partners hardly needed to say anything at all – just drop a potent phrase, like ‘show the flag’ – in order to provoke a major psychological reaction in Tokyo.28 The kind of support the Bush administration most wanted to see from Japan was military support. Washington did not expect any massive military deployment from Japan, nor did it expect Japanese combat troops, but it was eager for Tokyo to go beyond the limits of the past. In particular, it wanted elements of the SDF to be deployed to provide rear-area support for US military efforts.29 As Washington viewed it, this was the next logical step forward for Japan, and this was how most Japanese leaders interpreted Richard Armitage’s comment to Ambassador Yanai.30 Any lingering doubt was helpfully cleared up by Armitage himself on October 5 when he told a group of Japanese reporters: ‘The meaning of “show the flag” is to show that the government of Japan, representing the people of Japan, is involved fully in this campaign. . . To suggest that there isn’t a role for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is, I think, to put one’s head in the sand. Certainly there is a role.’31

Tokyo Shows the Flag On September 19 – one week after the terrorist attacks in the United States – Prime Minister Koizumi announced his intention to send the SDF to support US military action in Afghanistan.32 This declaration had followed a second Armitage visit to the Japanese embassy in Washington in which he ‘suggested’ that it would be highly advisable that the SDF become involved in the developing campaign. He also casually observed that he did ‘not want Japan to be isolated in the world community’.33 To the ears of Japanese officials,

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the tacit threat would have been unmistakable. The comment certainly snapped Koizumi himself to attention because he was soon repeating it verbatim as his own idea to reporters: ‘Unless Japan takes responsible action in the international community against these acts of terrorism, we will be isolated from the international community.’34 However, even in the first shock of the horrific destruction of the World Trade Center, the Japanese people were not entirely convinced. An Asahi Shinbun poll taken in late September 2001 found that, while the general public did favour some form of support for the United States by a margin of 62 per cent to 25 per cent, it was opposed to any deployment of the SDF by a margin of 46 per cent to 42 per cent. Japanese women tended to be much more opposed to military deployment than the men who were polled.35 On the other hand, the polling results could look rather different depending on how the questions were phrased. When the Asahi asked a couple of weeks later whether the public supported the new anti-terrorism bill proposed by the ruling LDP (which actually authorized the SDF deployment), the polls found 51 per cent in support and 29 per cent opposed.36 Still, this may have reflected popular support for general measures against terrorism rather than a full understanding of what the government’s bill entailed. At any rate, in Okinawa and several other locations around the country, hundreds of protesters gathered to decry the use of violence and Japanese military support for a campaign of retaliation. Said one of the organizers in Sasebo, ‘We cannot forgive the terrorist attacks, but such a problem of terrorism cannot be solved through violence and military means.’37 In Hiroshima, protestors held signs with messages such as ‘Terrorism is Eliminated through Justice, Not Military Force!’38 These concerns, however, were summarily swept aside by a Japanese elite which itself harboured few doubts that the prompt deployment of the SDF was required for the sake of the US– Japan alliance. Prime Minister Koizumi was among those for whom the issue was entirely clear. On September 24, he arrived in Washington on a state visit. In hour-long private talks with President George W. Bush the

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following morning, the Japanese prime minister committed his nation to ‘full’ support for the emerging campaign against terrorism, with the sole exception that Japan could not send troops directly into combat. He did, however, personally pledge to President Bush that the SDF would be deployed in a supporting logistical role. The two leaders also indicated that they would share all intelligence about threatening terrorist groups. Koizumi was quoted as telling Bush, ‘These attacks are a grave challenge to freedom and democracy.’39 In appreciation for Koizumi’s friendship and support, Bush presented the Japanese leader with a High Noon movie poster. (During the previous meeting between the two men, Bush and Koizumi had talked about the 1952 Gary Cooper film and compared themselves to the lead character, Marshal Will Kane, who faced down a band of evil men, while ordinary townsfolk hid from trouble.)40 The first SDF foreign deployment in support of the War on Terror was the now forgotten ASDF transport mission to Pakistan. This deployment was relatively uncontroversial because it was authorized under the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law and involved simply the transport of tents, blankets and other relief supplies for the benefit of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The nine-member advance team landed in Islamabad on September 30.41 The main force, consisting of six ASDF C-130 transport planes, took off from Komaki Airbase in Aichi Prefecture on October 6, made a brief landing to deliver the supplies on October 9 and was back home safely to Japan three days later.42 However, the truly groundbreaking foreign mission was the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean as part of the multinational Operation Enduring Freedom. Immediately after September 11, the top leaders of the MSDF recognized that they would be called upon to take the leading role in the initial anti-terrorist efforts of the Japanese government. They were ready and eager to play their part. In fact, they were much too eager. According to reports that emerged many months later, on September 17, 2001 – two days before Prime Minister Koizumi publicly indicated that Japanese antiterrorist policy would have a military component – officers of the MSDF approached Rear Admiral Robert C. Chaplin, commander of

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US naval forces in Japan, and presented him with an Englishlanguage document that listed five measures the MSDF was willing to perform on behalf of the anti-terrorist coalition. These tasks included escorting battleships, gathering intelligence and refueling services. At the same time, the MSDF leadership mobilized its political friends in the Diet to promote this agenda. The MSDF leaders, independent of the civilian authorities, had decided that they wanted to participate in the anti-terrorist campaign, and they were aggressively lobbying both the American and the Japanese governments to make it happen.43 Although this more complete story was not known at the time, hints about the precipitous nature of the Defense Agency’s posture were available from quite early on. The Asahi Shinbun, for instance, was almost immediately complaining about ‘Defense Agency officials’ gung-ho posture’.44 Additionally, Hiromu Nonaka, who had served as Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s chief cabinet secretary from 1998 to 1999, gave a speech in Kyoto on September 28 in which he voiced his discontent with the thrust of Koizumi’s response to the terrorist attacks in the United States: ‘It’s wrong to have the same policy thinking as that during the Persian Gulf War. . . I am worried that the current policy of making Japan visible and mobilizing the SDF is moving our country in the wrong direction. . . I cannot condone [uniformed military officers] arranging the protection of the US aircraft carrier with the escort of MSDF ships and trying to deploy an Aegis destroyer. . . It’s my responsibility to say what I should say, even if I’m hated and killed.’45 Later, in May 2002, the story of the precipitous actions of MSDF officers was leaked to the media by American officials who, it was said, were unhappy with ‘one-sided’ reporting suggesting that American gaiatsu was the only source of the military changes in Tokyo. These US officials wished to demonstrate that the motives behind Japanese military policies were actually much more complex than had been publicly appreciated.46 Whatever may have been going on behind closed doors, MSDF Chief of Staff Admiral Toru Ishikawa appeared openly before reporters on September 18, the day before Koizumi made his initial

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announcement about SDF support, and declared that his navy was ready for action, should the order come: ‘If Japan exercises the Guidelines law, the amphibious ship Osumi and some destroyers are ready to be loaded with supplies and depart.’47 Lobbying by the MSDF was probably an unnecessary step; they were going to get much of what they wished in any case. Nevertheless, they did face one early disappointment. On September 17, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda indicated that the US– Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines could not be stretched to cover an immediate deployment to the Indian Ocean, as many in the Defense Agency and elsewhere had been arguing.48 Fukuda reasonably observed, ‘The region that is being talked about would be a bit off from what we could call “situations in areas surrounding Japan”.’49 Former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s 1999 comments in the Diet had made it all but impossible to reach any other legal verdict. The ruling parties were thus obliged to draw up entirely new legislation – a step that they were quite willing to take. As a result, the government quickly compiled new legislation and, with what was by Japanese standards a quick and cursory debate in the Diet, on October 18 passed the Special Measures Against Terrorism in the House of Representatives.50 The opposition parties voted against the bill, but were overridden by the governing majority. The bill became law on October 29, when it passed the House of Councillors, once again voting along party lines. On this occasion, Prime Minister Koizumi observed, ‘This completes arrangements for Japan to cooperate with the US and the international community out of its own initiative. The focus of the legislation was on whether we think of the terrorist incidents in New York and Washington on September 11 as other people’s business or as our own affair. What was being questioned was our basic stance – whether or not we can share the sorrow and anger of the American people.’51 Actual deployment of MSDF vessels followed quickly. On November 9, two Japanese destroyers, the Kurama and the Kirisame, and a supply ship, the Hamana, departed Japan for the ostensible purpose of ‘intelligence-gathering operations’ in the Indian Ocean.52 Only a week later, the Koizumi cabinet expanded the number of ships involved in the

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deployment; on November 25, three additional MSDF vessels – the destroyer Sawagiri, the supply ship Towada and the minesweeper Uraga – departed Japan bound for the Indian Ocean. Their primary mission was to provide refueling support for US forces and to deliver relief supplies to Pakistan. This was the first wartime, combat-related mission engaged in by Japanese forces since the nation’s defeat in August 1945.53 The conservative commentator Hisahiko Okazaki exulted, ‘MSDF vessels are – at long last – operating in the Indian Ocean, each flying the Japanese naval flag, the Rising Sun.’54 The American reaction to the deployment of Japanese naval vessels was, of course, overwhelmingly positive. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher announced: ‘We appreciate it, we welcome it, and we’ll cooperate closely with the Japanese as they do this.’55 Ambassador Baker stated that his nation was ‘grateful that Japan has acted so promptly and so well’.56 By March 2002, however, American complaints resurfaced. The largely symbolic support the MSDF mission represented had seemed, at first glance, more than sufficient because of its unprecedented nature. Several months later, however, critical comments arose about the Japanese military forces’ remaining far from the actual combat zones and distant from any substantial, physical danger. Ronald Morse, whose career alternated between academic appointments and US government posts, asserted that ‘Japanese engagement is nothing more than training exercises in non-combat command and control situations.’57 Brad Glosserman added, ‘A number of Americans note that the Japanese so far have gotten off real cheap for the price of a photo opportunity and some timely comments. Whereas Japan had to implement a special tax and raise US$13 billion during the Gulf War, they only have to put up some hundreds of millions now.’58

The Aegis Deployment Controversy The major question that remained was whether or not Tokyo should deploy an Aegis-equipped warship as well. Several issues made the notion of such an action particularly controversial. First of all, these ships were so state-of-the-art that, other than Japan, only the United States possessed this technology at the time. Second, the main

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purpose of an Aegis-equipped vessel is to defend against missile and other air attacks, occurrences that seemed highly unlikely in a struggle against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who were not noted for their hightech weaponry.59 Third, and most importantly, intelligence gathered by the Aegis system could easily be fed by computer to nearby American warships and, in fact, that was its primary purpose.60 In the view of many people, this capability would clearly constitute the exercise of the ‘right of collective self-defence’ – something still prohibited by the government’s official interpretation of the constitution. Within a week of the terrorist attacks in the United States, the Defense Agency was already asserting that an Aegis-equipped vessel could be sent to the Indian Ocean.61 Indeed, the initial MSDF deployment plan floated publicly on September 23 stated that an Aegis would be deployed almost immediately.62 Supporters of the measure included Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani and many in the Foreign Ministry as well.63 In addition, US officials themselves quietly made an informal request in October that the Aegis be deployed.64 However, not everyone was pleased with this proposition. The most outspoken opponent within the ruling party was once again Hiromu Nonaka, who stated publicly that sending the Aegis would be tantamount to fighting a war alongside the United States.65 The intramural political struggle was fierce. The Yomiuri Shinbun – always a good barometer for the opinion of conservative Japanese officials – editorialized that all objections should be dismissed and the Aegis immediately deployed: At the root of the opinions of those who oppose deployment is the notion that sending the SDF abroad will give rise to re-born militarism. However, this War on Terror is not a war of aggression. Today we have democratic politics and civilian control that are firmly established and there is no possibility of a return to prewar militarism. Rather, it is better for us to think of the SDF role as the taking of responsibility in an era of globalization and great changes in international society. Joint action including the SDF is part of a basic commitment to peace and security for the international community. By

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engaging in practical action, we demonstrate our responsibility as a member of international society. The deployment of the Aegis warship is an integral part of this.66 On this occasion, however, the pleas of the Yomiuri and the many government officials it represented did not prevail. In midNovember, when it was becoming clear that the Taliban regime was crumbling, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and LDP Secretary-General Taku Yamasaki, both of whom shared some of Hiromu Nonaka’s concerns that interoperability with US forces could entangle Japan in unwanted political difficulties, moved to quash the proposal to dispatch the Aegis. Additional reasons cited for canceling the proposed deployment included the expectation of strong negative reactions from some high-ranking LDP officials, leftleaning political parties and Asian neighbours. Fukuda and Yamasaki convinced Koizumi to give priority to the passage through the Diet of the necessary anti-terrorism legislation.67 Segments of both the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency, however, were in no mood to give up so easily. Proponents of the Aegis dispatch inside the Foreign Ministry were said to have been ‘appalled’ by the LDP party elders’ rejection of the proposal.68 At the end of November, Defense Agency Director-General Nakatani openly asserted that dispatching Aegis-equipped warships to the Indian Ocean would ‘continue to be studied’.69 Unnamed MSDF officers complained about the ‘judgement by politicians’.70 US officials also made their opinions clear. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly told a press conference in November, ‘An Aegis ship would have provided capabilities that we wouldn’t have had from any other helping countries and I think might have turned out to be useful.’71 In early December, US Ambassador Howard Baker added his authority to this view when told an audience in Nagoya, ‘I am disappointed, perhaps, that the Aegis did not accompany the other forces Japan sent.’72 Sharing the dissatisfaction of US officials, the MSDF once again tried to circumvent civilian politicians some months later. On April 10, 2002, high-ranking MSDF officers paid another call on Rear

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Admiral Chaplin at his Yokosuka office. According to a report, the MSDF officers asked Chaplin to appeal to his superiors. The Japanese military officers wanted Washington to formally request the Japanese government to deploy Aegis warships and P-3C patrol aircraft to the Indian Ocean. Since the Defense Agency had been unable to make headway within the Japanese government, they hoped to reach around it by recruiting more active support from the US government. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz did make such a formal request for an Aegis deployment a few weeks later, on April 29, during a meeting with the visiting secretariesgeneral of the ruling parties.73 This direct request from Wolfowitz was not immediately answered by Yamasaki.74 Tokyo’s informal response came a few days later, on May 1. Former Defense Agency Director-General Fumio Kyuma, who was an influential figure in Japanese defence policy circles, told a symposium at the Heritage Foundation in Washington that sending the Aegis to the Indian Ocean would be ‘very difficult’. He explained that it would not be possible to stretch the Special Measures Against Terrorism law to cover such a contingency: ‘The law is designed for Japan’s assistance to the US-led forces in Afghanistan. If operations are expanded to the Middle East, we cannot do that under the current law.’75 Kyuma was referring to the growing speculation about a military campaign against Iraq, and he indicated that Japan’s deployment to the Indian Ocean was in no way related to that other matter. In the meantime, the whole question of the original MSDF Indian Ocean mission was back on the agenda. The Special Measures Against Terrorism law, the legal basis for the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean, had authorized an initial mission from November 20, 2001 until May 20, 2002. Since the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces had been swept out of the cities of Afghanistan by December 2001, many Japanese officials expected that the naval mission would no longer be needed and would soon be terminated. Beginning in February 2002, however, US officials signaled their desire that the mission be extended.76 On April 16, 2002, Chikahito Harada of the Foreign Ministry and Kohei Masuda of the Defense Agency, during a visit

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to Washington to meet their working-level counterpart, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher LaFleur, were directly asked to allow the MSDF warships to stay in the theatre.77 The American request was quickly granted, but in fact the mission would probably have been continued in a scaled-down fashion even in the absence of a formal US request.78 Once again, however, the MSDF was accused of precipitate behaviour in issuing formal orders for a mission extension beyond the May 20 limit in advance of the actual decision made by the civilian politicians.79 At any rate, the Indian Ocean mission was extended for a further six months until December 2002, and repeatedly thereafter. The MSDF mission and the still percolating question of the deployment of the Aegis warship disappeared from public and press attention for some months; it seemed that there would be no Aegis deployment. Then, on November 5, 2002, the question suddenly resurfaced. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda told the House of Councillors that the MSDF mission would be extended for a third six-month period after December, and he hinted that the deployment of an Aegis-equipped warship was still being studied.80 On the same day, the newly-appointed director-general of the Defense Agency, Shigeru Ishiba, made his own opinion clear: ‘An Aegis destroyer boasts superb intelligence-gathering abilities. It will sharply reduce burdens on our crews and would play a proper role in providing rear support to eradicate terrorism.’81 These unexpected comments brought a sharp reaction from Takenori Kanzaki, the leader of the New Komeito Party; he signaled that his party – a crucial coalition partner of the ruling LDP – would resist a policy that sent an Aegis to the Indian Ocean.82 The government quickly announced that it had once again decided against sending the Aegis; the matter would be reexamined only if the US government made a ‘formal’ request.83 This latest rejection once again annoyed proponents of the dispatch. On November 8, Ishiba asserted that sending the Aegis was a ‘necessary’ step to guarantee the safety of MSDF personnel operating in the Indian Ocean.84 Takeshi Noda, a senior lawmaker in the ruling party, asked his Komeito allies to reconsider their opposition to the Aegis deployment, arguing that ‘the ship has a defensive system

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making use of high technology rather than an offensive system. . . It is better not to let the treasure rot unused.’85 The editors of the Yomiuri Shinbun were once again scandalized: We cannot understand why the deployment of the Aegis has been foregone. . . [T]he Defense Agency has stated that they wish to send the Aegis for the sake of the security of military forces operating in the region who face the possibility of terrorist attacks. The US government too has informally requested the deployment. . . There is simply no need to listen to the baseless arguments of those who are arguing against dispatch. This issue must be concluded quickly from the perspective of military logic.86 In the end, the conservatives won again: At the beginning of December 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi resolved the matter when he announced that Japan could dispatch an Aegis ‘whenever it wants’.87 In the following days, his verdict became official. The government even asserted that the Aegis could be sent without additional legislation, since the matter was completely within its discretion. In a television interview, Taku Yamasaki hinted that the timing of the decision was, in part, related to Richard Armitage’s upcoming visit. By making a decision in advance of the visit, it would be more difficult for critics to link it to American pressure on the question of Iraq.88 The Aegis-equipped warship Kirishima left the naval base at Yokosuka bound for the Indian Ocean on December 16, 2002. Hundreds of supporters, protesters and heavily-armed riot police were on hand for the event.89 This decision-making process, with all its hesitations and reversals, would be repeated in the future. The Japanese elite was itself divided. Some felt strongly that sending the Aegis was unneeded, legally questionable and a potential source for future political problems. Others felt equally strongly that it signified an important step forward for the US – Japan alliance. Furthermore, the deployment would help to protect MSDF forces should they come under attack (from whomever), and it provided practical training for

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Japan’s navy. Prime Minister Koizumi, characteristically, offered no specific legal or political rationale to explain how he reached his final decision. Fumio Kyuma’s earlier assertion that the existing Special Measures Against Terrorism law could not be used to authorize an Aegis dispatch was swept aside and forgotten. Even some members of the ruling party who backed the final decision were annoyed by the opacity of the decision-making process. Among these internal critics was LDP General Council Chairman Mitsuo Horiuchi who felt that the Defense Agency had made its deployment plans without sufficient consultation with civilian authorities; he observed, ‘The military is always doing such things. We know what the old military was like.’90 One part of the Aegis story that has never been revealed is the exact role US officials may have played in late 2002. It seems unlikely that the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry had the political clout on their own to overturn the verdicts of LDP elders such as Hiromu Nonaka, Yasuo Fukuda and Fumio Kyuma. The decision to send the Aegis placed a severe strain on the LDP– Komeito coalition. At the same time, some analysts spoke of ‘intense pressure from Washington’, but the precise form of this pressure is still not known.91 Indeed, it may never be known, because it is usually in the interests of both parties to deny the powerful effect of gaiatsu and to pretend that Tokyo makes all its decisions independently. It was frequently observed that the need for Japan to send the Aegis to the Indian Ocean in late 2002 was to replace the US Navy’s own Aegis ships, which were moving to the Persian Gulf in preparation for the invasion of Iraq. The belief that sending the Aegis was a de facto form of military assistance for the impending Iraq campaign was the basis of Kyuma’s legal objection in early May, and one of the most controversial aspects of the deployment more generally.92 Social Democratic Party leader Takako Doi’s conclusion was harsh: ‘This is an extralegal act that goes against the principles of a country governed by the rule of law.’93 On the other hand, American ‘alliance managers’ such as Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, saw the matter in an entirely different light: ‘Since September 11, we see a real deepening and

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broadening of the security relationship and real efforts by Japan to play a more responsible role in international security, which the United States sees as very supportive of the alliance.’94

The Weakness of the Opposition An Asahi Shinbun poll taken soon after the Aegis dispatch found that the general public opposed the deployment by a margin of 48 per cent to 40 per cent.95 Not for the first time, and not for the last, the government deployed military forces in support of the Bush administration’s War on Terror – in an unprecedented manner – without any genuine public mandate to do so. The policies that prevailed in the battles among the political elite were not embraced by the broader Japanese public. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the general population was disposed to offer much active opposition to government policy. Most people were disengaged and uninterested in matters of high politics or military deployments. After the immediate drama of the September 11 attacks and the Afghan War had passed, public and media attention quickly waned. By early 2002, the media had already abandoned their focus on Afghanistan and the War on Terror, and Japanese society was moving on along its typically self-absorbed pathways.96 The opposition political parties also performed poorly in this period. While the smaller opposition parties, such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), could make sharp public comments criticizing the government, they held few seats in the Diet and could be easily steamrolled by the ruling coalition. The only opposition party of any significant strength was the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). However, this party was an uneasy coalition of conservatives and liberals that behaved schizophrenically under the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama. The DPJ had opposed the Special Measures Against Terrorism when that legislation was introduced in October 2001, but then the party provided support to the government’s MSDF mission plan.97 Even as the smaller opposition parties were arguing fiercely that the MSDF

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dispatch was unconstitutional, the more conservative Hatoyama took the opposite line in solidarity with the ruling regime: ‘The dispatch of the SDF this time does not violate Article Nine of the constitution. . . Our constitution stipulates that Japan will not wage wars of aggression, but can maintain forces for wars of self-defense. . . We will not stand in the front lines, but lending support to those who do is provided for within the limits of the constitution.’98 The 28 members of his own party who opposed Hatoyama’s line in a Diet vote were punished by the party leadership. DPJ Vice-President Takahiro Yokomichi, the leader of the party’s liberal element, was among the rebels, and he was suspended from his leadership post.99 In December 2002, another bout of turmoil within the DPJ led to the resignation of Yukio Hatoyama. This has been cited as a key reason for Prime Minister Koizumi’s feeling able to deploy the Aegis.100 The opposition parties, which held far fewer seats than the ruling parties, were divided, uncertain and weak even among themselves, and thus unable to take a meaningful stand. Within the politically marginalized community of Japanese liberal intellectuals – usually led by the Asahi Shinbun – there were complaints that were typically ignored and warnings that typically went unheeded. At the beginning of December 2001, for example, the editors of the Asahi cautioned their readers that civilian control of the military, which they described as the basis of democracy, was being hollowed out by the vague provisions of the Special Measures Against Terrorism law. They noted that the new law was not specific about what kind of SDF missions could be carried out and that its provisions for oversight by the Diet were extremely weak, with most of the important details being left to future ‘administrative discretion’. The editors felt that this was a dangerous precedent, as did opposition lawmakers in the Diet.101 Subsequently, in November 2002, as the campaign for the US invasion of Iraq was building, the Asahi editors further argued, Since the terrorism of 9.11, the SDF have been providing wartime, rear-area support for the American army. Now it is one year later. The government says that ‘the battle against

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terrorism continues’ and has extended the deployment for another half year. . . What is the current condition of international terrorism? How can we evaluate the activities of the SDF? What is needed hereafter in regard to cooperation against terrorism? It is absolutely necessary that these questions be examined closely by the Diet and the people. . . A ‘check’ on our cooperation against terrorism is supposed to be provided by the opposition parties and by public opinion, but it seems that public interest is much less now compared with when the Special Measures law was first adopted. . . The government must provide the necessary information to the people. In these days, when the ruling party would have us enter the ‘era of new threats’, the role of Japan – as well as the limitations on that role – must be addressed seriously.102 These liberal critiques often complained about process rather than basic substance. Though the editors of the Asahi were alluding to very important issues, they leveled few direct challenges to the official logic, nor was there any real passion about the subject. If genuine concern was felt about the weakening of democracy or a loss of civilian control (which could be expected to have been huge public questions), why did comments about these matters tend to disappear as soon as a government decision was made? Why did months go by without follow-up reports on these ostensibly dire questions of democratic accountability? Why was there so little interest in pursuing the information the Asahi editors and others claimed to be demanding? There was a distinct hollowness, not only in the very poor government explanations for its major decisions, but also in the opposition forces that, despite their complaints about various procedural matters, made very little concerted effort to press for clearer and deeper answers. In sum, as far as Japanese political and military policies were concerned, the first year after the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington was a period in which American and Japanese alliance conservatives ran the table. Ideas they had hatched in the 1990s but had been unable to put into practice were suddenly entirely plausible.

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The Bush administration’s preferences were largely in accord with those of the conservative Japanese lawmakers and the senior officers of the SDF. Although these forces represented only a minority within Japan, the advantages of a clear purpose and a united front allowed them to sweep away their opponents with ease. Japanese opposition forces existed, and they made attempts to speak out and be heard, but they were weak and disunited, and they lacked a common cause around which to rally. They were also put at a severe disadvantage by the personal popularity of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who gave a coherence and an attractive face to official Japanese policy that would not have otherwise existed.103 Everyone understood that indecisive DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama was a poor substitute for the canny Koizumi.104 As a consequence of all these factors, conservative, official Japan grew confident and empowered in the early months of the War on Terror, and anyone who did not like the government’s programme was pushed into the political margins. Conservative Japan had shown its flag and planted it firmly on the American side.

CHAPTER 3 BOOTS ON THE GROUND

Hints that a military campaign against Iraq might also be part of the Bush administration’s War on Terror appeared almost immediately after September 11. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, was known to be an advocate of immediate retaliation against Iraq, and many in Washington and beyond speculated about whether or not the regime of Saddam Hussein may have had a hand in the al-Qaeda attacks. Politicians in Tokyo were sensitive to this issue even in late 2001. In a speech on November 28, 2001, Koichi Kato, who was serving as the head of the House of Representatives’ new terrorism committee, felt compelled to declare that the new Special Measures Against Terrorism law could not be used to authorize any SDF actions related to an attack on Iraq. If such an eventuality should occur, an entirely new law would have to be passed by the Diet.1 And when Defense Agency DirectorGeneral Gen Nakatani met with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon in December 2001, he sought assurances that there would be ‘a good deal of consultation’ before US forces launched any major military campaigns ‘other than Afghanistan, such as Iraq’.2 For that Japanese minority that was attuned to such matters, President George W. Bush’s State of the Union speech of January 29, 2002, provided a reasonably transparent indication that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was next on his agenda after the Taliban’s Afghanistan. The president declared that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq constituted

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an ‘Axis of Evil’ that posed ‘a grave and growing danger’. He went on to assert that ‘the price of indifference would be catastrophic’.3 In this speech, North Korea and Iran were disposed of with only a single sentence each. On the other hand, Iraq’s alleged villainies were described with no less than five sentences by the American president. The message was clear. A few weeks later, during the president’s visit to Japan, Bush pointedly did not exclude the possibility that he might launch military action against Iraq. He also held a private meeting with Koizumi, with only National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Foreign Minister Toshiyuki Takano in attendance. According to a later Mainichi Shinbun report, President Bush informed Koizumi that his administration would be launching a major military campaign against Iraq, and Koizumi was said to have secretly pledged his support.4 If this media report is correct, Prime Minister Koizumi was aware from the beginning that the Bush administration had no intention of seeking a peaceful solution with regard to Iraq and that he had already committed his nation to supporting offensive action without any consultation with the Japanese people, or even the Japanese political establishment. The period from the beginning of the public debate about the prospective invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2002 through the darkest challenge that the Iraq War presented to Japan in April 2004 was the time when the Japanese government was forced to develop a stance on the War on Terror; it was necessary to make a clear choice between loyalty to the multilateral international system of the United Nations or to the US–Japan alliance. In the end, Japan opted for Washington. The Japanese government was also forced to decide between the desires of the Bush administration and the nearly 80 per cent of Japanese that opposed the US attack on Iraq. Once again, Tokyo opted for Washington. From the point of view of Japanese conservatives, this choice was not only the right one, it was the only one.

Overrunning Japan Japan’s march to war began in the spring of 2002. In late April, US Ambassador Howard Baker asked LDP Secretary-General Taku

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Yamasaki to begin lobbying the Iraqi government ‘to stop developing weapons of mass destruction and to accept UN inspections’. Baker also suggested, however, that some time remained before the Bush administration took action.5 In July, it was announced that two SDF officers would be stationed as liaison officers at US Central Command in Tampa, Florida. This assignment led to public speculation that Japan was preparing to offer military support should the Bush administration launch an attack on Iraq.6 Talk of a possible American attack on Iraq began to gather steam in August 2002. In the early days of the month, Richard Armitage held talks with Jin Murai, chairman of Japan’s National Public Safety Commission, at the State Department. According to media reports, Armitage expected to work closely with Japan in any ‘future antiterrorist military operations’. It was understood that Armitage was asking for Japanese support on Iraq.7 A few days later, Prime Minister Koizumi, dining with a number of his predecessors, solicited their views on a prospective Iraq War. Former premiers Yasuhiro Nakasone, Toshiki Kaifu, Kiichi Miyazawa, Ryutaro Hashimoto and Yoshiro Mori each offered his counsel.8 By the end of August, speculation was rife, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda felt compelled to declare at a news conference, ‘The United States has not yet decided on an attack. It is hypothetical. I believe it is not something that is happening today or tomorrow, nor is it something that is happening next month.’9 However, just two days later, Armitage paid a personal visit to Tokyo and conveyed his hope that the United States government would receive ‘a fair amount of international support’ if it decided to go ahead and launch an attack.10 The very next morning, August 29, the Asahi Shinbun responded with its first editorial on the issue under the unequivocal title: ‘Prime Minister, Express Your Opposition!’ The article began, If America should engage in military action, why adopt the position of ‘giving assistance’? We are speaking here of the Japanese government’s response to the Bush administration’s public comments about attacking Iraq. Has any evidence been produced about a link to Al-Qaida? Isn’t support for such an

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attack supposed to be difficult under the Special Measures Against Terrorism law? Does this mean there will be a new law? And what about support for Turkey and other neighbouring countries? It is troubling to watch this government always waiting for things to happen before it does anything. However, most countries are now frowning at America’s unilateralism. Isn’t this what a true ally should do? Attacking Iraq under the current circumstances would be an extremely dubious act. Domestic public support cannot be compared even with the case of Afghanistan.11 Armitage received the same clear message from every Japanese policymaker that he met: the Bush administration must do much more to gain broader international support before any major military action was launched.12 Even most of the ruling Japanese conservatives felt strongly that the United States needed to enhance the legitimacy of its case before the global audience. In addition, the principal opposition party, the DPJ, informed the government in early September that it could not support any attack on Iraq without a clear mandate for military action from the UN Security Council.13 Shortly before the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi paid a visit to New York to speak, in English, to a gathering organized by the Council on Foreign Relations. He declared on that occasion: ‘Iraq’s denial of inspection for weapons is a great concern to the international community. . . The international community must stand together to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.’14 On the anniversary of the attacks, Defense Policy Bureau Director-General Takemasa Moriya told reporters, ‘I believe Japan will be able to provide US forces with logistical support under current legislation without requiring any revisions if military attacks against Iraq are in line with a UN resolution. . . Our basic idea is that we will respond based on the current special anti-terrorism law.’15 Thus, Defense Agency officials were arguing that the Special Measures Against Terrorism law could be stretched to cover any conceivable Iraq contingency much as, in September 2001, they had claimed the authority to deploy ships to

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the Indian Ocean under the existing US –Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. This option was exactly what Koichi Kato had called impossible less than a year earlier. Once again, on a major issue of security policy, the Defense Agency was far ahead of civilian politicians. Scepticism about the wisdom of attacking Iraq was expressed even in senior government circles. On September 9, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda told media representatives that ‘our country does not believe in the measure of attacking Iraq. The degree of our support for that would be extremely limited.’16 However, that very same day, the government announced that it was considering the possibility of writing a new anti-terrorism law. The initial concept was that, while Japan would not directly support US military action against Iraq, it would not be opposed to enhancing its support for operations in Afghanistan as American forces shifted their attention to the Persian Gulf.17 Somewhat in line with this notion, in late September, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman handed Japan’s new ambassador in Washington, Ryozo Kato, a letter calling on Japan to expand its naval mission as far west as the coast of Somalia and to provide oil to vessels from Germany and other countries engaged in maritime inspections in the Indian Ocean.18 This time, Tokyo did not agree.19 Prime Minister Koizumi, however, was personally supportive of the Bush administration’s broader policies in its War on Terror. After the September 11 attacks, he had immediately signaled Japan’s full backing for any retaliatory action that US leaders chose to take. He reaffirmed this stance at a later time by announcing that ‘Japan is always with the United States in the fight against terrorism’.20 Koizumi’s public evaluation of the 2002 State of the Union address was equally positive: ‘[President Bush’s] expression of an Axis of Evil only shows his strong resolve to fight against terrorism.’21 While there is little doubt that the premier did not relish the prospect of an Iraq war (he made some modest efforts in late 2002 to nudge the United States toward a peaceful solution), he appeared resigned from very early on to Japan’s support of the United States in war if that was asked of him.

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In early November, Koizumi was directly challenged in a Diet debate by Takako Doi, the SDP leader. She pointed out that a US ‘preemptive attack’ would be a violation of the UN Charter. Given that Koizumi had promised to obey international law, what would be his view of such an attack? The prime minister refused to answer the question: ‘Japan urges Iraq to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. . . I would like to refrain from commenting on what I think about a preemptive attack at this stage when it is not yet taken into action.’ Doi fired back, ‘It would not make any difference to hear what you think after the United States decides to make a preemptive attack!’22 Even some members of the ruling party became frustrated by the lack of clarity in the government’s fundamental position on Iraq. On November 27, in debate in the Diet, LDP lawmaker Taro Kono asked Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi several times what the Japanese government intended to do in the event of a US attack on Iraq. Her repeated answer was ‘Nothing has been decided yet.’ He then asked if the government believed it could use the current Special Measures Against Terrorism law for the case of Iraq or if the government was considering writing a new bill. Kawaguchi responded, ‘We are considering what role we should play as a member of the international community.’ Kono remarked in disgust, ‘You should voluntarily tender your resignation. . . We will have to get the prime minister to appoint a foreign minister who will not just blandly say that “nothing has been decided yet” at such a late stage.’23 In fact, the Bush administration had quietly made a formal written request for Japanese support of an invasion of Iraq in mid-November. The US embassy delivered this document to the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. Reportedly, it contained three specific requests: first, that when the invasion went forward, Japan would declare its support; second, that Japan should give whatever assistance was possible to US military forces; and third, that Japan would continue to provide diplomatic support for the ‘post-war’ phase, when Iraq was rebuilding. The letter did not specify deployment of the SDF to Iraq; the implication was that Tokyo should make its ‘own decision’ on that aspect.24 Several weeks later, the fruit of these US efforts began to appear. On December 6, government officials suggested to the Japanese

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media that the SDF might be sent to the region in the post-war phase of an Iraq war. Yasuo Fukuda observed, ‘Assistance for post-war rehabilitation is important. . . Our country will see many opportunities to cooperate. Legislation will need to be drafted for that purpose. . . We are preparing for all possibilities.’25 Koizumi himself began talking about this eventuality a few days later: ‘Japan will naturally have to consider what it can do for the reconstruction of Iraq and nation-building efforts in the future. . . It’s natural for a government to think ahead to the extent that it can.’ Reporters asked if he now publicly supported the US plans to invade Iraq. He answered, ‘At this moment, it is premature to say. I will say so if that stage comes.’26 As the year 2003 dawned, great tension arose in Japanese political circles as the crisis was clearly reaching its final stages. Many felt that nothing could prevent the Bush administration from invading Iraq and that the US leaders were not listening to other voices or interested in a peaceful solution. The anti-war movement began to produce huge protests and rallies around the world, but these protests were accompanied by a sense of desperation, without much hope that major military action could be averted. The New Komeito Party was caught between its pacifist principles and its need to remain in coalition with the ruling LDP. Komeito’s opposition to the deployment of the Aegis had been overridden, but it was by no means certain that it would accept a US invasion of Iraq. When Richard Armitage visited Tokyo in late August 2002, initiating his campaign to recruit the Japanese government’s support, he nearly got into a shouting match with Komeito Secretary-General Tetsuzo Fuyushiba. In a meeting attended by senior Japanese politicians, Fuyushiba responded to Armitage’s call for cooperation by expressing annoyance, noting that his party believed ‘it must respect the sanctity of human life’. Fuyushiba added, ‘People’s lives may be compared to diamonds scattered all over the universe. . . You should absolutely refrain from killing innocent people.’27 Armitage, offended by Fuyushiba’s comments, retorted that the victims of the September 11 attacks were also innocent people, and he declared that terrorism must be eradicated. Fuyushiba shot back that the goal of

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eliminating terrorism would be more effectively served using the tools offered by the UN Charter, rather than launching a unilateral attack on Iraq. Other participants in the meeting intervened to douse the flaring tempers.28 Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki later backed Fuyushiba’s basic stance when he suggested that his party’s support for military action would be tied to the question of whether or not it was authorized by the United Nations: ‘The situation is different depending on whether the United States moves with or without a new UN resolution’, he declared.29 Indeed, Japan had traditionally been one of the strongest political and financial supporters of the United Nations. Many Japanese – not simply the New Komeito Party – believed that the nation’s foreign policies should always remain in accordance with UN principles. DPJ SecretaryGeneral Katsuya Okada posed the question directly in late January, ‘Does [Koizumi] think the Japan–US alliance is more important than the UN Charter? We should make a judgement as a country.’30 Koizumi did not want to be forced to openly make that choice if at all possible. He tried to nudge Washington toward gaining UN support: ‘Japan has repeatedly said the United States should be aware of the importance of international cooperation’, he declared.31 At the same time, Japanese government officials were quite willing to follow the American lead in putting the onus for the crisis on the Iraqi government. Echoing the demands from Washington, they acted as if Baghdad had provoked the immediate standoff. Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi asserted, ‘Iraq has failed to respond to calls to abide by resolutions for 12 years, and UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was the last grace period it was given.’32 Some days later she added, ‘What Japan has been saying all along is that the international community should firmly deal with the Iraqi situation.’33 Koizumi’s own demand was startlingly simple and allencompassing: ‘Iraq needs to accept inspections thoroughly, unconditionally, and limitlessly.’34 Meanwhile, many independent Japanese voices were calling on the government to take action to avoid war. Rinjiro Sodei, professor emeritus at Hosei University, spoke out: ‘The prime minister always says that we are the friends of America. If he’s really a friend of

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America, then he should say to Mr Bush, “Stop it! Stop this nonsense!”’ Sodei’s colleague, Professor Shoichi Koseki of Dokkyo University, went further, declaring, ‘The people of Iraq will not be able to gain true freedom and peace through military action. We should not send the SDF and instead must think about how to attain peace and democracy through nonmilitary measures. . . What we must do first and foremost is to stop the war. . . Taking part in humanitarian support without stopping the war is the same as sharing responsibility for the war.’35 On February 5, 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made his famous presentation to the UN Security Council: The facts and Iraqis’ behavior, Iraq’s behaviour, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behaviour show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction. . . We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11 world.36 The Bush administration and its many allies described Powell’s presentation – which included many specific allegations of wrongdoing – as the ‘hard evidence’ that the world was demanding in regard to Iraq’s alleged possession and continued development of weapons of mass destruction. Powell had put his enormous personal

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credibility on the line by declaring unmistakably that the Iraqi government was lying and was concealing programmes to produce dangerous weapons of mass destruction. The political leaders of Japan were among those who declared themselves satisfied with the American case, although they remained characteristically cautious. Kawaguchi said of Powell’s presentation, ‘We highly value the information and attach importance to it. . . Even if we say we are against using military force, if Iraq does nothing at all, the international community will be forced to take such action.’37 Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda found the presentation ‘persuasive’; he added, ‘It is Iraq that is principally responsible for a peaceful solution.’38 Many other prominent Japanese remained unconvinced. Even such a figure as Sadako Ogata, a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (who Koizumi had favoured to assume the post of foreign minister in January 2002), argued publicly at this time, ‘It is necessary for Japan to strongly show its determination to refrain from military action to attain the goal of regional stability. . . We should allow for ample inspections. The inspections system is an important mechanism for peace. . . Iraq is a large country and an oil-producing one. The stability of Iraq is linked to the stability of the region and international peace.’39 On February 6, Prime Minister Koizumi told the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, ‘It is desirable to have an additional new UN Security Council resolution.’40 The following day, at a session of the same committee, however, he began to hint at his real position: ‘I’m not saying that it must adopt one, but it is desirable.’41 About a week later, Naoto Kan, who had become the leader of the DPJ after the December 2002 resignation of Yukio Hatoyama, clarified his party’s stand on the matter: the DPJ would not support an attack on Iraq without explicit UN approval. Kan observed, ‘The premier has only followed US decisions and does not have his own policies.’42 On February 15, 2003, massive popular demonstrations around the world by ordinary people hoped to avert the US invasion of Iraq. In some international cities, literally millions gathered to call for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. In Tokyo, there were at least 10,000 protesters, a crowd that shook the resolve of many ruling

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party lawmakers.43 Prime Minister Koizumi, conversely, was annoyed by these popular demonstrations: ‘They have to be careful lest they send the wrong message that Iraq is right.’44 Although the basic policy of the Japanese government was becoming more transparent as the weeks passed, Koizumi and his cabinet refused to clarify to the Japanese people whether or not they would support a war spearheaded by the United States. When asked for clarification point blank on a Sunday television show in late February, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi responded, ‘We have yet to reach a stage at which we need to make a decision.’45 At this time, Colin Powell paid a two-day visit to Tokyo. In anticipation of meeting with the US Secretary of State, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi commented, ‘I would like to confirm with him the importance of the international community as a whole in getting Iraq to abolish its weapons of mass destruction, which is the essence of the issue.’46 When Powell met with Koizumi, he asked for Japan’s assistance in persuading such countries as France to support American efforts to pass a new UN resolution on Iraq. Koizumi agreed to try.47 Powell also told Koizumi, secretly, that US military action against Iraq might be launched at any time after March 10.48 At the end of February, probably in response to the requests from Powell, the Japanese government began dispatching envoys to other countries asking them to support the US position on Iraq. Former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura was sent to Egypt and Saudi Arabia; he explained, ‘My utmost mission is to ask the two nations to persuade Iraq to remove weapons of mass destruction and prove it positively.’49 Former Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama visited Turkey and Syria with a similar message. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe went so far as to openly criticize France for opposing the American invasion plans rather than wait for more thorough UN weapons inspections: ‘Inspections are made possible only because 200,000 US troops are stationed [in the Gulf region]. To have them stay for months longer, is France going to bear the costs during that period?’50 On March 13, 2003, only days before the war was actually launched, Prime Minister Koizumi invited the heads of the opposition parties

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to a meeting to discuss the issue of Iraq. Astoundingly, even at the eleventh hour, the premier was unwilling to tell these Japanese political leaders whether or not his government was prepared to support an American attack in the absence of a new UN resolution. When one of the opposition leaders asked Koizumi directly what he intended to do, he replied, ‘It depends on the mood.’51 The opposition leaders were appalled. The negotiations at the UN collapsed shortly thereafter. When the United States sought UN approval for military action against Iraq, many countries, led by France, refused to grant immediate authorization. Senior Japanese officials, following the United States, criticized France for its position. Yasuo Fukuda lamented, ‘It is disappointing that France is trying to reject any compromises with its veto.’52 Yoriko Kawaguchi added, ‘This will send the wrong message to Iraq.’53

Koizumi Goes Public Koizumi dispensed with ambiguity only after President Bush announced that the United States, together with a ‘Coalition of the Willing’, would launch an invasion of Iraq. In response, Koizumi declared unequivocally that Japan supported military action. At a press conference on March 18, he stated, If the United States is obliged to resort to the use of force in cooperation with the United Kingdom and other countries, the Japanese government will support this decision. . . Weapons of mass destruction – toxic gas and other chemical weapons, or anthrax and other biological weapons – if they were to fall into the hands of dictators and terrorists, it would not be a matter of tens or hundreds of lives, but rather thousands and tens of thousands of lives that would be threatened. I feel that this is not some other people’s affair. The matter is so extremely dangerous at this juncture that we have no choice but to come to the conclusion that the Hussein regime has no intention of disarming. I therefore deem it appropriate to support the use of force by the United States.54

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In another press conference, held hours after the US invasion of Iraq was launched, Koizumi explained his thinking in more detail: The most important basic policy that has underpinned Japan’s post-war development to date has been our adherence to the Japan – US alliance and to international coordination. Deeply reflecting on the defeat of the Second World War, Japan must never again allow itself to be isolated from the international community. . . In order to ensure its security, Japan formed an alliance with the United States based on the recognition that it was insufficient for Japan on its own to protect itself. . . We can never be sure when a threat may fall upon Japan. In the event that Japan’s own responses are inadequate, we must make every effort to ensure the security of the Japanese nation based upon a strong relationship of trust under the Japan – US security treaty and the Japan – US alliance. The United States has clearly stated that an attack on Japan would be an attack on the United States. . . The people of Japan should not forget that the fact that the United States deems an attack on Japan as an attack on itself, and that this is serving as a major deterrent to any country that might attempt to attack Japan.55 As noted previously, the Japanese people had been overwhelmingly opposed to the use of military force against Iraq. In mid-December 2002 an Asahi Shinbun poll found that 65 per cent opposed the launching of the war, an opposition that rose to nearly 70 per cent by late January 2003.56 As the Bush administration prepared to launch the attack in March, the Japanese public’s opposition came close to 80 per cent. There was no doubt that to ordinary Japanese the case for war had not been successfully made by either the American government or their own. Some Japanese had tried to head off the war by signing petitions and attending anti-war lectures. Others took to the streets; on December 13, 2002, an anti-war demonstration of more than 2,000 citizens marched in the Shibuya district of Tokyo. In February 2003, separate anti-war protests gathered an estimated 5,000 people in both the Shibuya and Hibiya districts of Tokyo.57

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These demonstrations were very calm and orderly, the people carrying signs with such messages as ‘Stop the War!’ On the eve of the launching of the conflict, and even after it was launched, crowds estimated at over 10,000 joined the marchers. There were a few cases of hunger strikes and of candlelight vigils outside the US naval base at Sasebo. The mayor of Hiroshima, Tadatoshi Akiba, sent anti-war letters to world leaders denouncing the United States for ‘trampling on the UN Charter’.58 On the other hand, perhaps the most notable feature of these protests is how small they were, relative to those occurring in other democratic nations. The largest of the global protests in Rome drew in an estimated three million people in opposition to the war. More than one million marched in London. Protests much larger than those found in Japan were also held in a number of US cities, including New York where more than 100,000 gathered – and these American protests occurred in a nation whose people approved of the launching of the war at rates sometimes in excess of 70 per cent. But in Japan, a country in which pacifist sentiment is very strong and where almost 80 per cent of respondents told pollsters that they opposed the war their government supported, only about 10,000 marched in Tokyo – an urban area that is the most populous in the world, with about 35 million residents. This relative lack of active protest was a reflection of the Japanese people’s lack of genuine engagement in political issues. Even at a time when they might have been outraged that their government was clearly defying the popular will on a crucial question of war and peace, there was little open discontent. Though many felt worry or concern, there was little sense of direct responsibility; the war was far away, in a strange and unfamiliar foreign land. The Japanese people sincerely wished for a peaceful solution, but most of them were still too indifferent to take any action beyond the signing of anti-war petitions or attending a lecture. A survey of the opinions of 20 lawmakers, taken soon after the beginning of the war, asked the respondents about their personal reaction to the attack on Iraq and their reaction to the explanations offered by Koizumi. Not surprisingly, LDP members tended to

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support the government policies, while opposition lawmakers were critical. Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori argued that Japan’s peace and prosperity were dependent upon the US–Japan alliance, and he felt, therefore, that Koizumi’s position was absolutely correct. A younger LDP lawmaker, Yoshimasa Hayashi, also cited the US alliance, along with the unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula. Most of the other conservative legislators cited similar concerns. Atypical justifications came from former Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, who blamed Iraq for violating past ceasefires, Yuriko Koike, who connected the issue to the Palestinian problem, and Masao Akamatsu of the coalition New Komeito Party, who justified the attack on the grounds that intervention against ‘terrorism’ was natural. Opposition lawmakers most commonly asserted that the attack on Iraq was simply illegal: Nobuhiko Suto of the DPJ, for one, felt that Prime Minister Koizumi’s open approval of the war was itself a violation of the Peace Constitution. The spiciest response from an opposition lawmaker came from the DPJ’s Takahiro Yokomichi, who asked, ‘Is the United States the only country allowed to be an aggressor? Aren’t President Bush and President Hussein pretty much the same?’59

Debating the Military Role Japan, of course, did not have a combat role in the Iraq War. This major limitation on support for the United States was the only one that Koizumi was still firm about maintaining. Any possible role for the SDF could come only after the war had ended. Defense Agency Director-General Shigeru Ishiba developed the notion of contributing a Japanese hospital ship to aid coalition forces during the fighting, but the idea was not pursued.60 The dispatch of SDF peacekeepers for the post-war phase, however, was already at the top of the agenda; in addition, the idea that Japanese civilian police might be sent to help maintain public order was floated.61 The initial three-week war was itself a major boost for the Koizumi administration and the conservative cause generally. The relatively quick collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the evident pleasure this downfall created for many ordinary Iraqis, served to

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confuse the Japanese people, who had previously been strongly opposed to the war; the fairly intense anti-Iraq War feeling began to dissipate. A Kyodo News-Yahoo Japan poll found that only 41 per cent of respondents said that they opposed the war, while 34 per cent of Japanese now supported it.62 While a plurality was still opposed, this finding was quite a far cry from the roughly 80 per cent of Japanese who had been against the war a month earlier. The position of the Koizumi administration also gained a much higher degree of appreciation. One major area where the Japanese public and the Japanese government were in agreement was in the view that the United Nations should be given the lead role in the rebuilding of post-war Iraq. A Kyodo News poll taken immediately after the fall of Baghdad found that about 79 per cent of Japanese believed the United Nations should take control of Iraq, while only about 17 per cent supported the establishment of a US regime in the country. The same poll found that almost 62 per cent of respondents wanted their government to make the United Nations the overall focus of Japan’s foreign policy, while only about 30 per cent felt that the US – Japan alliance should be given the priority.63 The government was initially sensitive to public opinion on this matter. Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa stated on April 11, ‘The government takes a positive stance on providing aid for the reconstruction in Iraq, but the United Nations should be involved in the process in one way or another. . . We want the United Nations to establish a framework and an environment for reconstruction aid soon.’64 On the same day, Justice Minister Mayumi Moriyama added her view that, from a legal point of view, it was desirable for the United Nations to play the central part.65 Before Saddam Hussein’s regime had even collapsed, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi had telephoned Colin Powell in an attempt to persuade him that it would be best if the United States allowed the United Nations to take the lead role in post-war Iraq. She was politely rebuffed.66 In the event, the Bush administration rejected a major United Nations role in Iraq and instead imposed an occupation regime, led by the US Department of Defense. In its initial form, this plan

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involved the establishment of the US Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by Lieutenant General Jay Garner. Leaders of Japanese opposition parties signaled their caution about participating in this scheme: Naoto Kan, leader of the DPJ, stated, ‘ORHA is a unit of the US Defense Department. Conceptually, it appears to be impossible for Japanese government officials to be part of the body.’ The prominent opposition lawmaker Ichiro Ozawa simply restated what most ordinary Japanese were saying: ‘It would not be a good idea to handle post-war Iraq under the framework of the United States. I believe it is right for reconstruction to be addressed under the UN system.’67 In spite of these concerns, Tokyo opted once again to follow the American lead, apparently after a direct request from Colin Powell.68 In mid-April, the Japanese government announced that several civilian officials would be sent to join ORHA. Kawaguchi elaborated: ‘It is quite important for Japan to send staff at an early stage for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for Iraq.’69 LDP Secretary-General Taku Yamasaki echoed that view: ‘Participating halfway through cannot be taken as full-fledged support. It is vital for Japan to participate from the very start of the entire process.’70 The most heated opposition response came from JCP leader Kazuo Shii, who called Japanese participation in ORHA ‘unacceptable’ and then declared, ‘Trampling on a nation’s right to self-determination and imposing on them by military force an administration that works in its own interests is a new colonialism.’71 Tokyo was eyeing much more than a civilian role in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq; the notion that the SDF might play a major post-war role was mooted well in advance of the war itself. As early as the summer of 2002, the Foreign Ministry began an internal discussion of a possible SDF dispatch to Iraq. Preparations for the necessary legislation were underway by the end of 2002.72 Additionally, the MSDF was once again aggressively lobbying for a role, this time in a partnership with officials of the Foreign Ministry. Unknown to the public and to most of the rest of the government, sometime in February 2003 MSDF officers suggested to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff that Japan might engage in minesweeping operations

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in the Persian Gulf. This idea was thereafter reported by the Japanese embassy in Washington back to the home government as being an American request. According to a later media report, ‘The MSDF and the Foreign Ministry agreed in their thinking that the SDF wanted to show its bond with the US Navy and the Foreign Ministry sought a secure voice in postwar Iraq.’73 In early April, when Richard Armitage made the request, the possibility that the MSDF might engage in minesweeping was first made public.74 The true genesis of the scheme was revealed on April 14, when US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless made a secret visit to Japan and inadvertently let the cat out of the bag in an official meeting. When the MSDF’s actions became more generally known within the government, the minesweeping plan was dropped. The whole affair was eventually reported by Kyodo News a couple of weeks later, but was buried within an analysis that was not accorded a specific headline.75 The broader issue of a SDF deployment to Iraq was still on the agenda, however, with Taku Yamasaki being particularly vocal in support. On May 1, 2003, President Bush, speaking from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, declared major combat operations in Iraq ended. On May 22, UN Security Council Resolution 1483 lifted all economic sanctions on Iraq and recognized the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying authorities. Since this decision removed the direct conflict between American and UN policy, the way was opened for Tokyo to consider a broader programme of support.76 Nevertheless, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda told a news conference at this time, ‘The government has not decided. We will first do whatever we can do within the framework of current legislation.’77 Prime Minister Koizumi was committed to the idea of dispatching the SDF to Iraq. In late May 2003, when Koizumi spent time with President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, Bush reportedly expressed his ‘hope’ that the SDF would be deployed. It was said that Japanese officials took this as a presidential request.78 In fact, however, Koizumi used the occasion to promise the US leader that the SDF would indeed be sent to Iraq. Though his proposal did not go into specifics, the basic commitment was made at this early stage.79

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The promise was not reported to the public; once again, Koizumi had made a secret personal commitment to President Bush on an absolutely critical Japanese policy long before consulting other constituents of the government or seeking a public mandate. The conclusion again came in advance of the debate. On June 2, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited Tokyo and informed the Japanese government that the United States ‘expected’ an SDF deployment to Iraq.80 Armed with this supposed request from Washington, Koizumi met with leaders of the ruling coalition at a Tokyo hotel on the afternoon of June 7 and together they agreed to submit a new bill to the Diet that would allow the SDF to be sent to Iraq to engage in humanitarian assistance and logistical support for US and British forces.81 Koizumi was succeeding in pulling his government into the bargain that he had already, in fact, made. The formal decision to submit the legislation was welcomed, of course, by Richard Armitage when he visited Tokyo a few days later. Armitage expressed his pleasure by using a baseball analogy: ‘It’s about time for Japan to quit paying to see the baseball game and get down on the baseball diamond and play the game. It’s not necessary to be a pitcher or a catcher, where you have to be involved in every play. You can play first base or right field or shortstop or whatever is comfortable to you. But one thing’s for sure, unless you’re on the baseball diamond, you can’t play, you just pay to watch.’82 He also acknowledged for the first time in public a slogan that was already circulating behind the scenes: ‘Japan, if successful in the Diet deliberations coming forward with any assistance or “boots on the ground”, would be a most welcome development, and it would leave me with a great feeling of confidence that Japan is willing to take her place with the major nations of the world and play a positive role for security.’83 This catchphrase, ‘boots on the ground’, would come to be as much associated with the SDF Iraq deployment debate as Armitage’s ‘show the flag’ comment had previously been connected with the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean in late 2001.84 By the early summer of 2003, public opinion was growing more understanding of the government’s desire to enter the Iraqi playing

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field. Indeed, the Koizumi administration was riding high for a brief moment, with support for a SDF deployment to Iraq peaking at an impressive 49.7 per cent, according to a Kyodo News poll. Most Japanese believed that the war was basically over, they were pleased that the United Nations had authorized Japan’s activities and they believed that ‘Japan should also contribute to the reconstruction’ of Iraq.85 However, in late June, growing violence in that country began to reverse this trend, and by the beginning of July most of the Japanese people were clearly turning away from the idea of a SDF dispatch. DPJ leader Naoto Kan commented at this point, ‘Largescale battles have ended in Iraq. But smaller conflicts are still going on. We cannot tolerate the SDF joining an occupation force.’86 In spite of these growing security concerns, the ruling coalition used its parliamentary majority to pass the Iraq SDF bill in both houses of the Diet over the course of July. The focus of the new law was to supply medical services and safe water, to transport miscellaneous materials and to rebuild infrastructure for the Iraq people. The exact location of the SDF deployment was still being considered. Officially, the US government expressed itself pleased: ‘We recognize what an important issue this is and how it’s an important development for Japan, which we welcome. We think that Japan’s ability to play this positive role in Iraq is a reflection of the kind of role it can play in world affairs.’87 However, there was also griping from officials, such as Richard Lawless in the Defense Department, who felt that a great power like Japan should be expected to do more.88 One of the key provisions of the new law was the restriction of SDF deployment to ‘non-combat zones’ in Iraq. Where exactly were those? Naoto Kan scored some political points when he challenged Koizumi on this matter in a heated Diet debate on July 23. Kan asked Koizumi to name any non-combat zone in the country. Unprepared for the question, the premier could only lamely answer, ‘I’m not that familiar with the geography of Iraq, but I think there are non-combat zones. . . There’s no way for me to know that.’89 On the other hand, the Japanese government had figured out early on that the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad was definitely not a

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non-combat zone. An initial US request to send the SDF to Balad, Iraq, was quickly rejected.90 When a visiting delegation of Iraqi Kurdish leaders welcomed the SDF to their northern region, Japanese officials were cautious about that proposal as well.91 While this question was still being debated, the August 19 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad and the death of UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello sent shockwaves through the Japanese government. Even many who had previously been in favour of an SDF deployment began to have second thoughts. Perhaps the actual deployment might be pushed back into 2004, or should it be suspended indefinitely?92 A senior Defense Agency official noted at this time, ‘It is dangerous to send SDF personnel now because the United Nations, which is not a military force, was attacked. I wonder if there really are any non-combat zones.’93 This time, however, US pressure came swiftly and unmistakably. Meeting with a Japanese diplomat at the State Department on August 22, Richard Armitage declared that sending the SDF to Iraq would not be ‘like attending a tea party’, and he demanded, ‘For God’s sake, don’t say anything. . . Don’t walk away.’94 Rarely had the orders from Washington been issued so bluntly – and Tokyo certainly received the message: The SDF deployment was back on the agenda in spite of the growing risks on the ground and declining support from the Japanese people. By early September 2003, President Bush again linked the Iraq War to the War on Terror: ‘Two years ago, I told the Congress and the country that the War on Terror would be a lengthy war, a different kind of war, fought on many fronts in many places. Iraq is now the central front. . . We will do what is necessary, we will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the War on Terror, to promote freedom, to make our nation more secure.’95 The importance of Iraq was underlined to Japanese leaders by a series of American visitors who all nudged Tokyo toward a SDF deployment. The government of Japan was moving slowly and cautiously – but it was nevertheless moving. Surveys of the situation inside Iraq led Japanese officials to place their emphasis on the relatively stable southern part of the country. The two cities of Nasiriya and Samawa were specifically mentioned

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by the media on October 12 as being the most likely locations for an SDF dispatch.96 In mid-October, President Bush paid a visit to Tokyo. His personal relationship with Prime Minister Koizumi was, of course, very close. In Iraq, a regime led by Ambassador Paul Bremer III and the Coalition Provisional Authority had been installed by Washington. In essence, Iraq had become something like a colony of the US Defense Department. Koizumi used this occasion to appeal to President Bush to respect the United Nations. The Japanese premier was quoted as saying, ‘I would like to raise one point. I believe that the United States has the vision and intention of spreading freedom and democracy, along with good will. But for that to be accepted widely, I believe it is necessary for the United States to think about utilizing the United Nations more. I think it is important for the United States to give backing to the United Nations.’97 Koizumi’s appeal to the president was reportedly met with ‘a stern rebuff’, in which Bush stated that ‘the United Nations is old’ and in need of reform.98 Having already risked so much to support Washington, this response must have disappointed Japanese policymakers. Meanwhile, Koizumi faced another hurdle. General elections were scheduled for November 9, 2003, and the ruling LDP’s popularity was sagging. The growing violence in Iraq cast a pall over the July decision to send the SDF. The Koizumi administration did not want Iraq to be the predominant issue during the campaign. Consequently, Koizumi and the LDP played down the matter in favour of political questions closer to home. Even some ordinary voters began to question why there was no vigorous debate on Iraq in the run-up to the election. A woman told Kyodo News, ‘I think there should be much more debate on the SDF issue because things such as security have changed substantially since the decision was made to send them.’99 In the elections themselves, the ruling parties maintained their stable majority, but the opposition DPJ, under the leadership of Naoto Kan, gained 40 seats, solidifying this party’s status as the leading alternative to the LDP. Prime Minister Koizumi – who had

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soft-pedaled the Iraq issue in the weeks prior to the election – one day after the election suddenly declared that the results had vindicated his SDF deployment policy: ‘I take it as a vote of confidence’, he declared.100 On November 12, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda announced the timeframe for the dispatch: ‘We have a firm idea about dispatching troops before the end of the year. . . There are many safe places where they can work on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.’101 Later that same day, Tokyo received another shock. A suicide truck bombing occurred at the Italian military police headquarters in the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriya – one of the two locations specifically mentioned for the possible SDF dispatch – killing 19 Italians and nine Iraqis. Less than two days after announcing that the SDF would be sent by the end of the year, Fukuda walked out before a group of reporters and completely reversed himself: ‘Unfortunately, the situation is not such that our SDF units can work in a sufficiently safe environment. . . We will consider the dispatch carefully by watching the situation. We can’t do what we can’t do.’102 Prime Minister Koizumi told a colleague some days later, ‘Not once did I ever say the SDF will be dispatched by year-end.’103 A visit from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which had been prearranged, did not change this verdict. Koizumi told America’s military chief that the situation was now ‘too severe’. He even attempted to nudge Rumsfeld away from his well-known impulses toward unilateralism: ‘You should make full use of the United Nations so that many nations will understand the justice and goodwill of the United States. It is when the United States and the United Nations come together that a great power is created.’ Rumsfeld’s response to Koizumi’s plea was not recorded.104 In spite of the widespread doubt about the timing and overall wisdom of SDF deployment to Iraq, many conservatives demanded that the government press forward. As was often the case, the Yomiuri Shinbun gave public voice to these sentiments when the newspaper argued, When Prime Minister Koizumi met US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld he declared that ‘We must not bend to terrorism.’ If

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Japan now flinches and fails to deploy the SDF, we will have indeed bent in the face of terrorist threats. This would constitute a withdrawal from the joint international effort to support and rebuild Iraq. We could not escape feelings of contempt from the international community. The deployment of the SDF is Japan’s responsible role in promoting the peace and security of international society. This is also in Japan’s own national interest.105 Identical arguments were no doubt being made behind closed doors in the councils of the ruling party, and government spokesmen quickly recovered their resolve. Thereafter, when reporters challenged the beleagured Fukuda with the view that the decision to invade Iraq had been a mistake, he shot back, ‘Could we allow President Saddam Hussein to stay in power?’106 Defense Agency Director-General Shigeru Ishiba was never a waverer, and he was fully committed to the dispatch. Even at the height of the panic caused by the suicide attack in Nasiriya, Ishiba quietly confirmed to Rumsfeld that the mission was still on: ‘We would like to carry out our responsibility as a member of international society by making use of the SDF’s ability as early as possible.’107 Another consistent hawk was Shinzo Abe, who had been promoted to the position of LDP secretary-general. During a speech in Tokyo in late November, Abe declared, ‘We simply must send the SDF. We must do this not in order to cooperate with the United States, but because it is our responsibility to international society. Furthermore, securing stability in a region of abundent energy resources is part of our national interests.’108 Stiffened by arguments such as these, during Diet debates on November 25, Koizumi confirmed that the mission would indeed move forward.109 At the end of the month, Ishiba declared himself convinced that southern Iraq was ‘safe enough’ for the dispatch to proceed.110 The following day, Japan suffered its first casualties. Two diplomats, Katsuhiko Oku and Masamori Inoue, were ambushed and killed while traveling from Baghdad to Tikrit to attend a reconstruction conference. They were shot to death after they had stopped to buy food and drinks along the roadside.

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This time, however, Koizumi himself moved immediately to cut short any wavering when he stated, ‘Why did this kind of thing happen? I’m filled with anger. . . I have said that Japan will do everything it should regarding Iraq’s reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and dispatch of the SDF, as well as civilians and government officials. Our basic policy remains the same. . . If we retreat from Iraq by saying, “It’s too dangerous” or, “There are no safe places there,” it means we would give in to terrorists.’111 Foreign Minister Kawaguchi confirmed this sentiment when she told Colin Powell by telephone, ‘Japan’s basic policy remains unshakeable – to support the reconstruction of Iraq and actively take part in the War on Terror.’112 Despite the brave faces, however, even many cabinet members were growing queasy about the impending dispatch. Direct pressure was also being applied by the State Department; spokesman Richard Boucher declared, ‘I expect the Japanese government will do what it said. . . I think what’s notable is that all the countries involved have restated their commitment to stay the course, restated their understanding of the bigger purpose that is being served by their involvement in Iraq, and recommitted themselves to the very goals that these people have been working for.’113

Into the Storm On December 9, 2003, Koizumi made the final decision to authorize a dispatch of about 600 GSDF troops to the city of Samawa in southern Iraq. He explained his decision in a press conference: First of all, this dispatch of the SDF is for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. They will not engage in the use of force. They will not participate in combat activities. They are not going to war. The United States of America, the United Kingdom, and other countries are cooperating to create a stable democratic administration in Iraq. I believe that, as a responsible member of the international community, Japan must also fulfill its responsibility in the creation of an environment that will allow the people of Iraq work to rebuild

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their own country with optimism. For that purpose, I have decided that there is a need for Japan to provide not only financial assistance, but also material assistance and personnel assistance, including the dispatch of SDF.114 After explaining that the mission would undoubtedly be risky, Koizumi then turned to the importance of the alliance with the United States: As I have long stated, in order to ensure the peace and security of Japan, and achieve greater prosperity, we must continue to enhance the Japan – US alliance, while simultaneously cooperating with the international community. I believe that the basis of Japan’s foreign policy must lie in the dual maintenance of both the Japan–US alliance and international coordination. We have to decide how we will engage in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. I believe now is the time indeed when we are to be tested, not only in our words, but in our deeds, as we act to maintain both the Japan–US alliance and international coordination. Japan cannot alone secure its own peace and security. It was for such a reason that we concluded the Japan–US Security Treaty and why we must accord the Japan–US alliance the importance it deserves. The United States is a unique ally for Japan. Despite the great sacrifices it has made, the United States now continues to strive on in its efforts to create a stable, democratic administration in Iraq. No call to the United States to ‘withdraw your forces’ has been made by the international community, or any individual nation. In such a situation, we must seek to maintain international coordination. The United States is Japan’s ally, and I believe that Japan must also be a trustworthy ally for the United States. It is from that perspective as well that I recognize the extreme importance of maintaining the relations of trust within the Japan–US alliance.115 Later in the same statement, Koizumi read out the preamble to the Japanese constitution and argued that the SDF deployment to Iraq presented no legal problems:

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I believe that the international community is calling upon Japan, and the people of Japan, to act in accordance with the ideals of our constitution. I call upon the members of the SDF to undertake activities that conform to the spirit and ideals of the constitution. This is fully justified and shows the fact that we are not thinking only of our nation. The stability and peaceful development of Iraq is essential for Iraq itself, as well as necessary for Japan. Indeed, it is necessary for the security of the world.116 Koizumi’s attempt to utilize the preamble of the constitution to justify his point of view received an especially cool reception from critics, even those from within his own party. Former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa icily observed on a television news programme, ‘He read the preamble of the constitution, but there was nothing that made an impression on the people. . . Many in the public wonder if the war in Iraq really has such a close connection with Japan that the government must dispatch GSDF troops. . . I guess that is why Mr Koizumi quoted the constitution’s preamble, but in a way it lacks a sense of reality.’117 A stronger denunciation came from a JCP executive, who called the premier’s use of the preamble ‘shameless’ and ‘an act that destroys the constitution’.118 Yasuo Sugihara, professor emeritus at Hitotsubashi University, described Koizumi’s interpretation of the constitution as ‘unheard of’ and further observed, ‘This is like the premier taking the lead in creating a country without rules. The army is the organization with the largest power in the country and nothing can stop it if it moves arbitrarily. In military issues, it is most dangerous when the rules are not clearly defined.’119 On December 14, more than 5,000 Japanese demonstrated against the dispatch in Tokyo, and a further 2,000 did so near a GSDF base in Hokkaido.120 The reaction in Washington, of course, was entirely different. Scott McClellan, the president’s press secretary, announced, ‘We welcome this commitment. . . We appreciate all Japan has done to support our efforts in Iraq to help Iraq realize a free and prosperous democratic future.’ An unnamed senior official (perhaps Armitage)

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gushed, ‘With this decision, Tokyo is contributing ideas, funds, and sweat to the international community’s efforts to rebuild Iraq. . . Japan is emerging as a core player in the international community.’121 Tokyo and Washington received some unexpectedly positive news at mid-month when Paul Bremer announced the capture of Saddam Hussein in northern Iraq: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, we got him!’ Koizumi responded, ‘It is good news. I hope it serves as a big step forward for the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.’ At the same time, however, Koizumi and other cabinet officials played down the notion that this event would immediately change the security environment inside Iraq.122 The Iraq deployment finally began on December 26, 2003, when ASDF advance units departed for the Persian Gulf. To mark the event, Prime Minister Koizumi traveled to Komaki Airbase to give a pep talk to the assembled troops: ‘Your families are more proud than anyone of your decision to perform the dangerous duty of helping Iraqi people create a democratic government. . . I hope you return safely.’123 On January 16, 2004, the advance teams of the GSDF Samawa mission also departed Japan.

Weapons of Mass Deception Even as the SDF was deploying, however, the key rationale for the entire Iraq War was unraveling. In the run-up to the American invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration and its allies assured the world that the attack was absolutely necessary because of the global threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of State Colin Powell had argued before the UN Security Council that no one could wait for an extended weapons inspection process because ‘leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option’.124 Pleas by some nations, such as France, to give the inspectors more time to work were not only rejected but were met with contempt and disdain. Japanese officials – especially Shinzo Abe, Yoriko Kawaguchi and the Foreign Ministry generally – backed

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this hard-line position to the hilt, even going so far as to join Washington in its criticism of the French government. The leaders in Tokyo might be expected, therefore, to have felt some responsibility for the issue of weapons of mass destruction. It was the basis upon which they had justified their support for the ‘preemptive’ attack on the sovereign nation of Iraq – an act that many still believe to have been a violation both of the UN Charter and of Japan’s constitution. Tokyo had fully expected that illegal weapons would be found in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Japanese leaders had believed the Bush administration and had trusted the US intelligence reports.125 On June 9, 2003, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda announced that the disposal of weapons of mass destruction might become one of the main missions of the SDF in Iraq.126 Some days later, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe echoed these comments and added his conjecture that the United Nations might request Japan’s services for this task.127 When the opposition parties pointed out in a Diet debate that no such weapons had yet been found, Prime Minister Koizumi himself responded that they ‘will be found sooner or later’; he added, ‘President Saddam Hussein has also not been found. But does that mean there was not a president in Iraq?’128 Kazuo Shii challenged this curious logic when speaking to reporters later the same day: ‘His remarks were beyond my imagination. Weapons of mass destruction have no legs and cannot escape.’129 In reality, however, Koizumi’s argument was another case of his parroting the language of Richard Armitage. Just two days before Koizumi’s comments in the Diet, Armitage had told reporters in Tokyo, ‘Before the war, did Saddam Hussein exist? Yes. He did. And we haven’t found him, but we know he existed. Before the war, did weapons of mass destruction exist? Well, of course. He used them.’130 But no weapons of mass destruction were ever found. As months passed without news of their discovery, their absence became increasingly embarrassing. In January 2004, David Kay, the leader of the US team hunting for illegal weapons in Iraq, issued a public report in which he acknowledged that he had not found any such weapons, and he added his personal view, ‘I don’t think they exist’.131 He attempted to blame this ‘failure’ on US intelligence agencies and

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to shift responsibility away from the Bush administration. Japanese reporters challenged Fukuda to explain the government’s reaction to the Kay Report. Fukuda responded by questioning Kay’s judgement: ‘There’s no guarantee that they don’t exist. Rather, it is more likely that they do exist. Or, you can think of the possibility that they have been hidden somewhere in some way.’132 The Japanese government had no independent intelligence about Iraqi weapons other than what could be gleaned from foreign (predominantly American) intelligence services. Fukuda himself came close to admitting as much the same day: ‘How could we alone verify facts? We can’t go to Iraq to search.’133 Fukuda nevertheless felt confident enough in his own opinion that he could dismiss a seven-month in-country survey by people serving the US government but who came to a conclusion that neither the Bush nor the Koizumi administration wanted to hear. Some officials in the Foreign Ministry responded by attacking Kay’s loyalty to his political masters: ‘It is like being betrayed and bitten by a pet dog that you trusted’, one official remarked.134 Fukuda’s successor as chief cabinet secretary, Hiroyuki Hosoda, faced a similar problem in October 2004, when the Duelfer Report, another extensive in-country survey, confirmed Kay’s conclusion that Iraq held no weapons of mass destruction. Hosoda’s response was similar to the earlier reactions: ‘If we had left the matter unattended, it could have developed into a grave threat in terms of nonproliferation of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. The US government has taken a position that this report does not deny the legitimacy of the war. So have we.’ Hosoda also tried to shift the ground of the debate by arguing that it was irrelevant whether or not actual weapons of mass destruction existed, because the paramount issue, supposedly, was that Saddam Hussein had resisted UN resolutions.135 He believed that even if all the Bush administration allegations aimed at the Iraqi regime were patently untrue, Iraq still posed an imminent and immediate threat to the world, and that it deserved invasion for challenging the UN resolutions that (falsely) accused it of illegal weapons development. Koizumi himself made this same argument under questioning in the Diet on October 13, 2004.136

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No public indication ever emerged that Prime Minister Koizumi or any other members of his administration felt any sense of responsibility for backing an invasion launched on false premises. No one was punished or reprimanded. There was no remorse and no accountability of any kind. Even the Japanese public did not seem overly concerned about the issue of weapons of mass destruction.137 Unlike Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who suffered steep declines in their popularity as the truth was exposed, Koizumi was not really damaged in the public eye. The Japanese public – aside from certain liberal intellectuals – appeared indifferent. The population in general seemed to see the question more as a matter of loyalty than of verifiable reality; it was more about whose side you stood on rather than what the facts proved or disproved.

The April Hostage Crisis The SDF deployment to Iraq continued apace. On January 26, 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi gave the final order for the main GSDF unit to enter Iraq and to take up their new duties in Samawa; the deployment of 550 troops was completed in the following two months. Richard Armitage declared, ‘It’s such a historic moment in the life of your nation and indeed of our alliance. . . Indeed today, Japan is putting its skillful hands on the tiller of the international community, no longer content with simply being a passenger.’138 The opposition parties continued to voice the complaint noisily that the deployment violated the constitution, but their appeals were brushed aside. The public, too, was against the dispatch. A Kyodo News poll taken in mid-January 2004 found 52 per cent against the deployment and only 43 per cent in support. More than 82 per cent of the respondents felt that Koizumi had not offered the nation sufficient explanations for his policy, and nearly 90 per cent told pollsters that the prime minister would be to blame for any casualties that might result.139 On January 25, an estimated 6,000 Japanese gathered at Hibiya Park in Tokyo to protest the deployment.140 When an 18-year-old schoolgirl delivered to the Cabinet Office a list of 5,358 signatures of people who she claimed were against the

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GSDF dispatch, Koizumi commented, ‘Teachers should thoroughly explain to their students that the SDF will contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq in a peaceful manner, and the students could learn much from this.’141 By the end of March 2004, the SDF deployment was an accomplished fact. It was then that a major crisis struck from an unexpected direction. On the evening of April 7, 2004 – less than two weeks after the GSDF deployment was completed – three young Japanese civilians were taken hostage in Iraq. Two of them, Nahoko Takato and Noriaki Imai, were private aid workers; the third, Soichiro Koriyama, was an independent journalist. As they were traveling from Amman to Baghdad by taxi and stopped for gasoline near the city of Ramadi, they were abducted. Word of the incident did not reach the government until the evening of April 8. Shortly thereafter, the AlJazeera television station in Qatar broadcast a video of the three terrified hostages as their masked captors brandished a long knife in front of Imai’s throat. The abductors, Sunni Arab tribesmen, were outraged at the large-scale US military operation taking place in nearby Falluja. They demanded that the GSDF be withdrawn from Iraq within three days, or else the young Japanese hostages would be executed. At about the same time, the GSDF unit in Samawa came under mortar fire and the troops retreated into the high-tech fortress they had built. The Tokyo stock market dived. A major political crisis faced the Japanese government. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda held an emergency press conference after 10 p.m. on April 8. He expressed anger that such action had been taken against innocent Japanese. Reporters asked if the Japanese government would withdraw the GSDF in line with the hostage-takers’ demand. Fukuda answered that there was ‘no reason’ for a withdrawal of the forces. Did the government feel any responsibility for this occurrence? No, Fukuda answered, the government bore no special responsibility – terrorism can happen anywhere at anytime.142 The new leader of the SDP, Mizuho Fukushima, took Fukuda to task for his comments: ‘We strongly fear that the incident was caused

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not only because the government has unconditionally supported a war that cannot be justified, but also because it pushed the SDF dispatch in violation of the constitution.’143 She also asserted that Fukuda’s contention that there was ‘no reason’ to consider a GSDF withdrawal was ‘simply wrong’.144 A day or two later, Fukushima began demanding that Koizumi and his cabinet resign. The following morning, however, Prime Minister Koizumi, speaking to assembled reporters, confirmed his government’s tough line. He asserted that he would not give in to the demands. As he put it, ‘We should not yield to such a dirty threat from terrorists.’145 When asked if he was considering a GSDF withdrawal from Iraq, his answer was simple: ‘Nope.’ Did the prime minister feel any responsibility for this crisis? He answered, ‘This is not a problem concerning myself. This is a problem concerning how the whole country should cope with the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.’146 Later the same day, the families of the three young hostages appeared on television. They pleaded for the Japanese government to do what was needed to bring the hostages home safely. Some of them expressed dissatisfaction with the hard-line position taken by Koizumi. They openly questioned why the possibility of a withdrawal of the GSDF should be taken completely off the table. This was the kind of appeal that the Japanese people could strongly identify with. It was not about high politics or foreign affairs; it was about tearful Japanese families appealing for the lives of their loved ones. It was an emotional appeal, and so the government was now in serious trouble. The following day, family members of the hostages went on AlJazeera and other television stations to appeal directly to the Iraqi hostage takers not to kill the three captives.147 Pressure mounted as the three-day deadline came nearer. The families met with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, who sympathized with them: ‘I’m sure you had a sleepless night in anguish. The government will do whatever it can to rescue the hostages.’ They asked her to consider withdrawing the GSDF. Her answer promised nothing; she merely said that she would relay the request to the prime minister.148

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For his part, Koizumi refused to meet with the family members. Although it had become customary for all senior government leaders to repeatedly meet with the North Korea abductees’ families, in this case, some family members did not support government policy; they were asking for a course of action that Koizumi had already ruled out. He refused to meet the families. His refusal was widely regarded as callous, and it raised eyebrows.149 Some officials of the Foreign Ministry evaded responsibility in the affair by turning the question back to implicate the three hostages themselves: ‘The government has been issuing travel warnings to evacuate Iraq, which means that they were on their own. It was very unfortunate that those three Japanese, who had no official mission, entered Iraq.’150 Japanese NGOs expressed their dissatisfaction with this line. Michio Kumaoka, head of the Japan International Volunteer Center, expressed his outrage: ‘The government says it would not withdraw the SDF because they are in Iraq to provide humanitarian aid, but the SDF has its limits in doing humanitarian work for the very reason that it is a military force. . . They are spending billions of yen, and now they have retreated into their fort.’151 April 11 was the day everyone was bracing for: the three-day deadline reached its limit. Would another video appear showing the gruesome deaths of the three young Japanese? No one knew what to expect. The deadline passed. The only news was an unconfirmed report that the hostages would be safely released within 24 hours. What has really happening? The following day came. The hostages were not released. There was no new information. Naoko Imai, the anguished mother of one of the hostages, confessed: ‘We don’t know what to believe. We were in joy at one time, but suddenly fell into depression at another.’ Another mother, Kimiko Koriyama, said, ‘I was expecting to see my son’s face at noon. Please, help my son!’152 Meanwhile, Japanese conservatives were rallying to the government’s defence and denouncing the Japanese hostages themselves. The Yomiuri Shinbun editorialized that the hostages ‘unnecessarily caused a huge burden on the government with their reckless and irresponsible acts’. Minister of the Environment Yuriko Koike, the

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first cabinet-level critic, reproached the hostages: ‘They chose to enter that place knowing that security was deteriorating.’ Vice-Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi added, ‘There is a limit to our ability to protect Japanese nationals.’153 US Vice-President Dick Cheney happened to be visiting Tokyo at that time. US officials praised the tough and uncompromising position taken by Koizumi, and Cheney added his voice to this view in a speech: ‘It is important that our governments not be intimidated by threats or violence, that we not allow terrorists to change or influence the policies of our governments. . . We think the position of the prime minister has been a correct one.’154 On April 14, the crisis deepened further. No news of the fate of the three hostages had arrived. Meanwhile, in western Baghdad, two Japanese journalists – Junpei Yasuda and Nobutaka Watanabe – were also abducted. Was the Koizumi government about to fall? If the five hostages were executed and the Japanese people decided that Koizumi himself was to blame, it seemed a distinct possibility that his administration could collapse.155 For Japanese officials, this was the darkest hour of the Iraq War. But they were very lucky: the following day the three original hostages were safely released in Baghdad. The anguished families shouted and wept with relief and joy when the first news reports hit the television. The black cloud lifted in an instant. Although two other Japanese journalists remained in captivity, the emotional moment had passed. Prime Minister Koizumi was released from his own gathering gloom and emerged as a national hero. Not only had the lives of the three young Japanese been spared, but Koizumi had not negotiated, not bent even an inch. An Asahi Shinbun poll found that 73 per cent of the respondents now approved of the government’s handling of the affair.156 The government’s total victory was confirmed when the final two hostages were safely released on April 17. Koizumi basked in his moment of glory, but certain facts emerged that cast doubt on the quality of his achievement. The release of the hostages had been negotiated by local Sunni religious leaders, in particular by Abd al-Salam al-Qubaisi. In spite of the fact that ViceForeign Minister Ichiro Aisawa and other officials had done their

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earnest best to bring the hostages home safely, the peaceful resolution was an act in which Iraqis, not Japanese government officials, had played the critical roles. Furthermore, the indication that the hostages would be released within 24 hours of April 11 had apparently expressed the genuine intention of the hostage takers, but they had become angry when they heard through the Arabiclanguage media that Koizumi and other Japanese government officials were describing them as terrorists. This response may have led to the three-day delay that that extended the torment of the family members.157 Thus, Koizumi’s own public rhetoric about ‘dirty terrorist threats’ may have put the hostages in additional and unnecessary danger. But once again, the Japanese government and its conservative supporters were riding high. For their part, the original three hostages had, of course, been completely unaware of how their plight and the anguish of their families had captured public attention and electrified the political debate back in their homeland. Since they had been held in captivity, they had no idea how huge and controversial the issue of their abductions had become. As a result, when they were first interviewed on television, before they returned to Japan, they were in a light-hearted mood that many Japanese found jarring and entirely inappropriate. The hostages reported that they had been treated ‘relatively well’ by their captors. Nahoko Takato added, ‘I just cannot hate the Iraqi people.’ When asked if she would return to Iraq, she answered, ‘I will continue.’ Soichiro Koriyama indicated that he was a journalist and that he certainly intended to continue his work in Iraq.158 These remarks brought down a chorus of criticism, led by Koizumi himself. The newly triumphant premier expressed disbelief that the hostages might return to Iraq: ‘No matter how much goodwill they might have had, how can they say such a thing after a large number of people have made desperate efforts to rescue them? I’d like them to have a sense of responsibility.’159 Koizumi’s comments struck at the heart of the gathering political storm, which was the growing notion that the hostages had failed to demonstrate ‘personal responsibility’ in going to Iraq. By the time they arrived back in Japan, the three exhostages were stunned and dismayed at the reactions they

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encountered. They were being denounced as ‘Japan’s shame’. Someone held up a sign at the airport where they landed reading, ‘You Got What You Deserved!’160 Letters and e-mails poured in to their private accounts which included foul language and threats of physical harm. All three of the hostages were soon diagnosed as suffering stress disorders. Nahoko Takato, in particular, had a near-complete psychological breakdown. The homecoming to Japan proved far worse than the actual captivity in Iraq. The government initially did everything it could to strengthen and promote the backlash against the hostages. After all, if the public was not blaming the hostages for their alleged lack of responsibility, then this fierce criticism could very easily have targeted the official policies. Fukuda went so far as to suggest that the convenience of the government should take priority over private aid work and independent journalism: ‘It is undeniable they lacked consideration. . . I assume that members of society will behave in a manner that takes into consideration how their actions affect society or people around them. Common sense should come first before the work of NGOs or war coverage.’161 Some legislators in the ruling party called for formal, legal restrictions on the travel of Japanese citizens abroad. This notion was soon abandoned, however, when it was pointed out that this would be a direct violation of a right enshrined in the Japanese constitution.162 The single most outrageous public comment came from the LDP lawmaker Takeaki Kashimura, who stated in the Diet that the government should not be required to make any efforts on behalf of Japanese citizens who openly criticized official policies. He continued, ‘I cannot help feeling discomfort in, or being strongly against, spending several billion yen of taxpayers’ money on such antigovernment, anti-Japan elements.’ Even Fukuda was forced to describe these particular remarks as inappropriate.163 This brutal treatment of the returned hostages did not go unnoticed either at home or abroad. More than one commentator was puzzled at the treatment of the ex-hostages as pariahs or even like criminals. More than 60 Japanese NGOs banded together and released a statement demanding that criticism of the returnees be put to immediate rest:

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We feel great outrage and sorrow about the government and some mass media saying the recent hostage incidents stem from the behavior of the victims who went to Iraq. They are trying to lay the blame on NGOs and individuals working in the field. The notion of ‘personal responsibility’ will only create a misguided public sentiment that NGO members working in conflict areas are themselves responsible for any event that may occur, even if their lives are threatened. . . This could lead to restricting NGO activities abroad.164 The most notable foreign critic of the conservative backlash was US Secretary of State Colin Powell, who observed that it was a government’s unquestionable responsibility to protect its citizens at all times. He went on to praise the hostages themselves: ‘Everybody should understand the risk they are taking by going into dangerous areas. But if nobody was willing to take a risk, then we would never move forward. We would never move our world forward. And so I’m pleased that these Japanese citizens were willing to put themselves at risk for a greater good, for a better purpose. And the Japanese people should be very proud that they have citizens like this willing to do that.’165 These decent and important words probably restrained the Japanese conservatives from going further. The April 2004 hostage crisis turned out to be the most serious direct challenge that the GSDF mission faced in Iraq. More difficulties would lie ahead, of course, but no other crisis would be so dire for the Koizumi administration. Somehow, the main body of the Japanese people had largely forgiven and forgotten the fact that their opposition to the Iraq War had been pushed aside. They forgot the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The government had made its decisions, and the people fell into line. The Japanese government had thus succeeded in fulfilling Richard Armitage’s vision: Japanese boots were indeed on the ground inside Iraq.

The Triumph of the ‘No Choice’ Doctrine One of the key debates among scholars and analysts of Japan’s SDF deployments in support of the War on Terror is whether Tokyo’s

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response was driven by pressure from Washington or by the Japanese government’s independent ambition to loosen the legal restrictions on its military deployments. The answer is that both views have some truth to them. The political forces that pushed the deployments into action were a combination of pressures exerted, directly and indirectly, by America’s ‘alliance managers’ as well as by the domestic ambitions of certain interest groups inside the Japanese government. Prime Minister Koizumi was a consistent advocate of the SDF deployments because he considered it both necessary and correct. Recent reforms that had centralized more authority in the hands of the prime minister and his own personal popularity made Koizumi’s role decisive in many cases.166 The Defense Agency – especially the MSDF in the early stages – lobbied aggressively both inside and outside the Japanese government. As for the Foreign Ministry, it typically followed Washington, with no vision other than to keep ties with America close and warm. Other aspects of foreign policy were neglected to such an extent that former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto complained that ‘Japan’s relations with nations other than the United States are like dotted lines.’167 A related debate has focused on whether or not Japanese leaders had a choice in the matter. Did American power and Japanese dependence on that power make Japan’s cooperation in the War on Terror inevitable? Many Japanese argued that, in fact, there was no choice. A senior Foreign Ministry official was quoted as saying in October 2001, ‘How we support the United States this time will determine the course of Japan – US relations for the next 20 years. We have to make it possible to send the SDF this time. There is no other choice... If we don’t support the US in a visible manner, we will be totally left out of international politics.’168 In February 2003, Masahiko Komura, a former and future foreign minister, told an audience in Fukuoka that even if the United States attacked Iraq without UN authorization, Japan ‘won’t have the option of nonsupport’.169 After she had been fired as foreign minister in January 2002 for feuding with Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, Makiko Tanaka wrote an opinion article in which she stated, ‘Japan has relied entirely on the US for its security needs for over 50 years, and the Japanese

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government essentially believes that it has no option but to agree with the US or to keep silent.’170 The notion that Japan had no choice even affects the perspectives of Japanese scholars who were critical of official policy. The Iraq specialist Keiko Sakai put it this way, ‘If the United States really pulled out all the stops and seriously threatened Japan behind the scenes, then, yes, I would say that Japan really had no choice but to follow American policy. How much did the United States threaten Japan behind the scenes over the War on Terror and the Iraq War? I don’t know the answer to that.’171 Both Prime Minister Koizumi and Richard Armitage alluded to this school of thought in some of their public statements. It was what Koizumi was referring to in his March 18, 2003, speech when he said, ‘The most important basic policy that has underpinned Japan’s post-war development to date has been our adherence to the Japan– US alliance.’ It was also what Armitage had been hinting at when he told a Japanese interviewer in December 2003, ‘I would say that the most important document signed by Japan in the post-war era was the US – Japan security treaty back in 1960. Joining the United Nations and signing under the banner of the United Nations would be the second.’172 Japan had been under the protection of the US military since 1945. Nevertheless, the administrations prior to Koizumi’s were never so ready to believe that they had ‘no choice’ in shaping their foreign policy. Though governments in Tokyo had always taken Washington’s view very seriously, this factor was usually balanced against domestic interests that often won out in practice. At no point in Japan’s history had Tokyo shown such willingness to subordinate itself so completely to the demands of their American allies. Foreign Ministry officials later acknowledged that they had never even considered any possibility other than to stand with the United States in the run-up to the Iraq War.173 This inclination to follow the American lead extended to the point that the nation’s prime minister at times parroted in the Japanese Diet the exact same arguments that he had heard from the US deputy secretary of state. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that, other than strengthening the US– Japan alliance, the Japanese nation received few, if any, direct security

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benefits from its participation in these US military campaigns, nor was there ever a sense that Iraq posed any direct threat to Japan.174 Gavan McCormack put it starkly: ‘The Koizumi-Abe “revolution” actually meant the liquidation of some important residual levers of Japanese autonomy, and the acceptance of an even higher level of submission and exploitation within the US global empire.’175 Five major factors contributed to this situation: Koizumi; the Persian Gulf War; North Korea; UN Security Council ambitions; and oil resources. The first two factors have been addressed previously. Prime Minister Koizumi had a considerable amount of independent power during his premiership and, after September 11, he became convinced by Yukio Okamoto and by his own instincts that he needed to develop a close personal relationship with American leaders and maintain those links tenaciously. He never wavered from that point of view. The meaning and impact of the Persian Gulf War factor should also be fully apparent from the preceding discussions.176 That leaves the other three. One of the most crucial factors was the perceived threat posed to Japan by North Korea. Almost all serious analysts have cited North Korea in their explanations of Tokyo’s decision to back the Bush administration so doggedly at this time. The issue concerning North Korea had, in fact, been affecting Japan’s bilateral relations with Iraq from well before the September 11 attacks. In December 1998, when American and British warplanes struck Iraqi targets in Operation Desert Fox, Japan was the first country to declare its support for that action. Then Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura had implicitly linked Iraq and North Korea when he stated, ‘We resolutely oppose the possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by any nation seen as a terrorist state by international society.’177 There is a good deal of evidence that the perceived threat from North Korea weighed heavily in Tokyo’s calculations during the Iraq War. It was referred to repeatedly in early 2003, as the debate raged. Shinzo Abe stated at that time, ‘Japan’s attitude toward the Iraq issue will naturally affect the situation over North Korea. We must make the Japan – US alliance a firm one, so that it will act as a deterrent toward the North.’178 Mikio Aoki, head of the LDP caucus in the

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House of Councillors, told a television audience, ‘The argument that we have either war or peace, and whether or not to follow the United States, is a bit odd. We shouldn’t talk about our relations with the United States without thinking these things through when people across the country are worried about North Korea.’179 At a party meeting, an unnamed LDP lawmaker declared, ‘We have no choice but to support the United States and say, “Please defend Japan if North Korea attacks us”, whether or not there is another UN resolution.’180 Seiji Maehara, a hawkish member of the opposition DPJ, told an audience in Washington, ‘As the problem of the development of nuclear weapons capability and missiles by North Korea deepens, there is a feeling in Japan that we have no choice but to cooperate with the United States on the issue of Iraq. The Foreign Ministry in particular has given itself up to this idea.’181 On March 14, 2003 – less than a week before the US invasion of Iraq was launched – the Yomiuri Shinbun editorialized, ‘The question of Iraq has a deep influence on the progress of North Korean nuclear development. If the disarmament of Iraq were to be terminated while only half finished, it would send the wrong message to North Korea.’182 The significance of the North Korea factor on Japanese decision-making is indisputable. The Japanese leaders’ desire to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council percolated below the political surface throughout the post-September 11 period and beyond. Within a week of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, that aspiration emerged openly. Shinzo Abe, who was looking for a quick reward for Tokyo’s full support of the American invasion, announced at a public forum that Japan was now ‘ready’ for permanent membership. Abe declared, ‘We are prepared and resolved to fulfill our responsibilities as a member of the UN Security Council. . . Japan’s share of contributions to the United Nations is 20 per cent, and I think many Japanese may be feeling frustrated that their country still cannot take part in important decision-making.’183 Abe’s view seemed to be that by utterly subordinating Japanese foreign policy to Washington and supporting (in violation of the UN Charter) a ‘preemptive’ invasion of a sovereign country, Japan demonstrated the sense of

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‘responsibility’ that entitled it to rise to the highest level in the international body.184 The following year, after the GSDF had been deployed to Samawa, the Japanese government went so far as to submit an official paper to participants in an advisory panel to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arguing that Japan was now eligible to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council precisely because the GSDF was participating in the multinational force in Iraq.185 American leaders strongly encouraged this view. US Ambassador Howard Baker stated that ‘the very best thing to happen would be for Japan to be seated as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations’.186 In the coming months, Ambassador Baker followed through with a plea to other nations for Japan’s bid to be accepted.187 Richard Armitage, for his part, had already been manipulating this issue for quite some time. In September 2002, for example, when the Bush administration still had hopes of receiving UN approval for its planned invasion of Iraq, Armitage told the Japanese media, ‘Since the time of the Gulf War, Iraq has complied with none of the resolutions and. . . I think it is a serious challenge to the UNSC. Particularly Japan, who hopes it will have a seat on the UNSC someday, should think carefully through the implications of a nation, such as Iraq, who won’t fulfill her obligations as required by a UNSC resolution.’188 Taking advantage of Japan’s ambitions to attain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council was a clever tactic by Armitage, even as it was dishonest in several respects. Washington’s desire to invade Iraq had little to do with Baghdad’s violations of UN Security Council resolutions, and the Bush administration was not attempting to strengthen the United Nations, as Armitage’s argument implied. Many US officials – Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz and others – made no secret of the fact that they wanted to weaken the United Nations, at least in regard to any influence it might exercise over the US government.189 More to the point, however, is that Armitage himself was holding back on one crucial point: he also believed that in order for Japan to attain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it was first necessary for Japan to revise Article Nine of its constitution.

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In the October 2000 Armitage Report, for example, he and his colleagues had included a recommendation: ‘[Reform] the United Nations as an institution to deal more effectively with conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking activities. The US should continue to support Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council. However, there are obvious obligations of collective security with which Japan must come to grips.’190 The meaning of this passage is rather clear to the extent that it concerns Japan’s pacifist constitution. Collective security and ‘peacemaking’ do not fall within the scope of Article Nine. During a July 2004 meeting with a senior lawmaker of the ruling party, Armitage went on to say, ‘Permanent members of the UNSC sometimes had to deploy their military for the benefit of the international community. If Japan cannot do that. . . it would be difficult for the country to become a permanent member.’191 Secretary of State Colin Powell reinforced this same idea the following month: ‘If Japan is going to play a full role on the world stage and become a full active participating member of the Security Council, and have the kind of obligations that it would pick up as a member of the Security Council, Article Nine would have to be examined in that light.’192 Overall, the ambition to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council played an important, if secondary, role in establishing the widespread view that Japan was required to follow the American lead. In this case, Tokyo was not ultimately able to achieve its ambition to gain permanent membership on the UN Security Council during the Bush era for reasons that should have been apparent all along to Japanese leaders, but somehow were not: Tokyo’s obedience may have won them credibility vis-a`-vis appreciative US officials, but it was not necessarily helpful in convincing other countries who were not themselves US clients. Permanent membership would require more than American gratitude. The fifth and final factor, oil resources, was of a similar nature as the UNSC issue. While not a primary aspect that demanded Japanese obedience, it nevertheless added to the perceived weight of American authority, and it made Japanese business circles more supportive of US policy. Direct evidence of the influence of oil policy, however, is

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difficult to come by for the obvious reason that it was in the strong interest of both the Japanese government and the Japanese business community to avoid talking about this matter openly. Any clear indication that the hunt of oil resources was guiding official policy would have been seized upon by antiwar critics as evidence that money and power, rather than justice and public security, were driving the policy that dictated support for the war. Those Japanese bureaucrats and businessmen who had responsibility for oil matters were therefore motivated to say as little as possible about this aspect of their policy. Nevertheless, occasional hints did emerge, for example, in the speech given by Shinzo Abe in late November 2003. Even earlier, in October 2002, as discussions about an impending Iraq War were gaining steam, the Nihon Keizai Shinbun – the nation’s leading business daily newspaper – ran an article on Iraq’s oil fields, including a graph showing that Iraq was thought to possess the world’s secondlargest reserves of oil and a map indicating where the main oil fields lay. The story stated that US and British oil companies were intending to capitalize on the prospective end of the Hussein regime in order to push Russian, French and Chinese companies out of the market.193 The article made no mention of Japanese oil companies, but the message to the business community was nevertheless quite clear: the United States would be in command of post-war Iraq, and this dominance could create new opportunities for Japanese oil companies. Subsequently, after Koizumi formally announced the GSDF deployment to Samawa in early December 2003, Japan’s top business leaders were among the minority who strongly welcomed the move. Nobuo Yamaguchi, chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, stated, ‘From the viewpoint of reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, the Japan – US Security Treaty, and the anti-terrorism movement, it is natural to cooperate as much as possible as a member of international society.’194 This open support from the business community for the deployment led some outside analysts to conclude that Japan was aiming to develop oil fields in southern Iraq. Sections of the Chinese political establishment saw the GSDF deployment in this light. China took a very sceptical view of Japan’s

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cooperation with the United States and believed that an attempt to snatch away Iraqi oil-development rights from their own country was a key part of Tokyo’s agenda. One Chinese state-run media service declared in December 2003: ‘Other than simply maintaining close US– Japan relations, Japan aims to establish a firm base in Iraq through US power, including the division of oil interests.’195 Some American analysts held the same opinion. For example, a Stratfor report of January 2004 alleged that the ‘primary reason’ for the GSDF deployment was ‘to revive Japanese economic interests in the region’.196 This Stratfor analysis noted the broader context: The United States has enunciated clearly that states with minimal-to-no presence in Iraq will have minimal-to-no involvement in the country’s reconstruction and gain minimalto-no benefit from the country’s oil. Washington has, in effect, bluntly informed everyone that if countries want to protect – or even have – commercial interests in Iraq, they will need to station forces there because the United States will not protect their interests for them. This, of course, encourages other countries to sign on to the US vision of a new Iraq, and with every country that decides it wants a piece of the pie, the United States gets a new foreign force to assist with the occupation.197 The article went on to suggest that Japan probably had its eye on the ‘billion-barrel Al Ghavraf field’, which had been a subject of Japan– Iraq negotiations in the late 1980s and lay only 40 kilometres east of Samawa. Some Japanese analysts also speculated that Samawa was chosen as the site of GSDF deployment in part because of Japan’s presumed ambitions for oil development in the local area.198 Stratfor’s contention that commercial interests were the ‘primary reason’ for the GSDF deployment to Samawa is overstated. At the same time, many Japanese political and business leaders were cognizant of the oil angle, and it should be ranked as a secondary factor pushing them toward support of Bush’s position.199 From the beginning, they believed that, following the Iraq War, oil contracts would largely be decided by Washington, and they looked to get an

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inside track on procuring these potentially lucrative contracts. However, contrary to these initial expectations, Iraqi leaders, such as Ayatollah Ali Sistani, were also very sensitive to the oil issue and did not allow Washington an entirely free hand in this sphere. To a significant degree, the new Iraqi government remained in tenuous control of its oil policy. By 2005, Japanese oil companies were involving themselves in the Iraqi oil sector, but most decisions were apparently made in Baghdad, not in Washington. In various ways Japanese leaders convinced themselves, and a significant portion of the Japanese public, that support for the Iraq War was something that simply could not be avoided. There was ‘no choice’ but to accept Bush administration policy, no matter what the Americans did. The primary source of this sense of helplessness was Japan’s security dependence on US forces, especially in light of regional fears centring on North Korea. Further in the background, but still quite significant, were notions that US approval would be needed to allow Tokyo to achieve its ambition of gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as well as to gain the commercial benefits and economic security associated with the future development of Iraqi oil fields. At a deeper level, Japanese culture quite often encourages the notion that events ‘cannot be helped’. It is not unusual for ordinary Japanese to quickly fall into the belief that major occurrences are beyond their control, and that it is better to adapt than to resist. Kenneth Pyle, for one, has analysed at some length how Japanese foreign policy throughout the modern period has been shaped by the factors of adaptation and accommodation to what Japanese sometimes call ‘the trend of the times’.200 Pyle argues that it has been consistently characteristic of Japan’s conservative leaders that they ‘perceived Japan as vulnerable to historic forces too powerful to tame and control, and they tried to operate in accord with these forces and use them to Japan’s advantage’.201 The characteristics Pyle highlights were certainly observable in the Koizumi administration’s approach to the wars in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq. However, the entire ‘no choice’ doctrine also conveniently relieved Japanese conservatives of any sense of moral responsibility for their

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own actions. If they really had ‘no choice’, it was not possible for them to do anything immoral or wrong in establishing national policies. If there were simply no options, then there were also no legitimate grounds for recrimination when things went wrong. The utter lack of public reflection or public apology for mistaken assertions about weapons of mass destruction and other matters relates to this view. For many Japanese leaders, the issue was never whether the Bush administration was right or wrong, but what the Americans would ‘force’ Japanese policymakers to do for the sake of the alliance. And since the central issue for many of them was always the US– Japan security alliance, there was no misjudgement, no miscalculation, involved in the Iraq War. Senior Japanese policymakers did not consider resistance or disobedience to US policy a practical alternative – such a response was simply unthinkable.202 America was the great power of the age and the leader of the international community. The best that Japan could hope to do was to ride the American wave and seek Japan’s own opportunities along the way. But did the ruling conservatives feel any particular responsibility for the broader consequences of their actions? There is no public evidence that they did. They believed then, and still believe, that they acted in the only possible way: their only international responsibility and only moral responsibility was and is to the US– Japan alliance.203

CHAPTER 4 BEYOND THE LIMITS

Gradually, experience revealed what logic should have foreseen: a major flaw inhabits the ‘no choice’ doctrine – it has no limits. If Japan really had ‘no choice’ but to follow Washington into the Indian Ocean in 2001 and ‘no choice’ but to follow the Americans into Iraq in 2003, at what point would Japan regain the freedom to make its own choices? If American leaders made future policy demands – as they inevitably would – how could Japan ever say no? North Korea was still there. A rising China was still there as well. When was the alliance loyalty test over? When was enough enough? The Bush administration implied that the answer would be ‘never’. A growing insurgency in Iraq and President Bush’s evident determination to ‘stay the course’ did not promise an early ending to the conflict. The ‘War on Terror’ itself was, by definition, openended. Neither could it be precisely defined nor could there ever be any final, decisive ‘victory’ against all ‘terrorism’, short, perhaps, of the extermination of the entire human race. In practical terms, by 2004, the Bush administration’s War on Terror was morphing into what one scholar has usefully described as ‘a state of permanent global martial law’.1 As for the Koizumi administration, it had gone from victory to victory in the domestic struggle against Japanese liberals, leftists and old-line conservatives. MSDF ships were serving as part of an international coalition in the Indian Ocean. The GSDF had been

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successfully deployed to the city of Samawa in Iraq. The ASDF was transporting supplies. In short, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were now operating very much like any other modern military in the world – save only that they would not engage in armed attacks against enemy forces. The conservative triumph, however, was to have profound consequences for the Japanese nation. For decades following the creation of the SDF, most ordinary Japanese had doubted whether the very existence of these services could be justified under a constitution that bans the possession of ‘land, sea, and air forces’. Now the SDF had been deployed thousands of miles away in a foreign land under foreign military occupation and in the grips of a deadly insurgency. Government spokespeople, when occasionally pressed, might contend that the new policies still conformed with the terms of the constitution under the latest strained reinterpretation of its boundaries, but more often they would simply shift the grounds of discussion by citing necessity or national interest or some other vague but dignified-sounding concept. In reality, Japan had by now entered a zone well beyond the limits of its constitution and beyond the limits of the law. Similar to the way in which lawyers in the Bush administration, such as David Addington and John Yoo, argued that in the American system, the power of the executive was unrestrained, so Japanese conservatives – much less forthrightly – exercised an assumed right to ignore or reinterpret the constitution at will.2 The doctrine of ‘no choice’ also suggested lawlessness on the part of ruling party; they asserted that actions the established authorities perceived as being necessary cannot be legitimately challenged, either by opposition parties or the general public: reasons of state are supreme. Japanese politics, of course, did not simply end at this time – but they did become substantially more vicious in tone.

The Samawa Deployment The GSDF units deployed in Samawa initially met a highly favourable local reaction. Just as the deployment began, a newspaper

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poll found that 92 per cent of Samawa residents supported the coming of the Japanese.3 Most of the local people in Samawa were very pleased to have the GSDF come to their city; they imagined that the arrival of the Japanese would bring new jobs and new wealth to their community, where about 70 per cent of the men were unemployed.4 The people of Samawa, whose image of Japanese was that they were all rich and successful, hoped that some of that economic success might rub off on them. More broadly speaking, however, Arab intellectuals viewed the deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq with disappointment and criticism. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa was asked his opinion of the SDF mission while the deployment to Samawa was in process; he replied, ‘We are for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iraq, Americans, Japanese, and others.’5 A Lebanese newspaper, questioning the wisdom of Japan’s participation in the occupation of an Arab country, pleaded, ‘The Arab world has no feelings of enmity toward Japan, so why should the Japanese now start treating the Arab and Islamic world as an enemy?’6 A Muslim leader in Egypt declared, ‘If Japan sends its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq in cooperation with America, it may become a target of jihad together with America as an enemy of Islam.’7 Nevertheless, whenever security conditions in Samawa permitted, the GSDF engaged in various activities to win the support of the local community. Perhaps the most useful of these activities was the supply of purified water, using nine purifying machines installed in the GSDF base camp. The Japanese also hired large numbers of Iraqi labourers for such reconstruction tasks as repaving roads and restoring public buildings. A five-piece military band gave performances to delight the locals. A ‘festival team’ introduced Iraqi children to Japanese traditional culture.8 The Japanese soldiers were unable to carry out any large-scale reconstruction activities but, when it was relatively safe to do so, they attempted to make themselves useful in every way they could. The GSDF presence was not welcomed by everyone, however. A small group of militants threatened and sometimes targeted the Japanese military and its local supporters. While the local

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government, led by men loyal to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), supported and encouraged the Japanese reconstruction activities, those loyal to the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr saw the GSDF as part of the foreign army of occupation and opposed it on Iraqi nationalist grounds.9 It was believed that the militants who threatened the GSDF mission had their origins in the latter group. The first mortar attacks on the GSDF occurred almost simultaneously with the April 2004 hostage crisis. On the night of April 7, 2004, three blasts were heard several hundred metres north of the GSDF camp. Prime Minister Koizumi described the explosions as ‘a terrorist attempt aimed at kicking Japanese troops out of Iraq’.10 On this occasion and every other when GSDF troops were targeted, Koizumi recognized no distinction between insurgent warfare aimed at uniformed soldiers and the kind of terrorism that had occurred on September 11. Implicitly, Koizumi thus agreed with the US State Department that guerilla warfare – even in a country under foreign military occupation after an illegal invasion – should be conflated with terrorism in the heart of an international city such as New York, Madrid, or London. Meanwhile, public interest in the Samawa deployment faded quickly, even when the situation on the ground became tense. The Japanese people, whose appetite for foreign news is always limited, turned their attention to domestic matters. Keiko Sakai, a leading expert commentator on Iraq issues, with frequent media appearances, explained, ‘Over time – I don’t know exactly when – journalists grew tired of reporting about Iraq and other matters connected to the War on Terror. Actually, the root of this reluctance to continue speaking about these matters was that the general public itself was turning off on the issue. Viewer surveys showed that the public was starting to change the channel whenever war matters were televised. News editors naturally responded by reducing their coverage.’11 The government itself contributed to this process of growing indifference. At the time the GSDF deployment began in January 2004, the Defense Agency ‘summoned’ the heads of ten major newspapers and six television stations to its Tokyo headquarters in order to ‘request’ that details about the deployment be held back so as

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to ensure the safety of the troops. News organizations were further asked to send as few reporters and camera crews as possible to Iraq. In return, the Defense Agency promised to hold frequent briefings in Tokyo.12 In case this message was not clear, the agency subsequently released a statement to reporters, threatening that, ‘If the media are deemed an obstacle to the smooth implementation of the mission’s tasks. . . we will refuse all coverage.’13 This was no idle threat; several years later the Asahi Shinbun revealed that its reporters were refused access to areas where the GSDF was working because they declined to accept the restrictive guidelines.14 In retrospect, Yasuhiko Tajima, a professor of Sophia University, who is a specialist in media law, told Kyodo News that mainstream media organizations ultimately chose to accept heavy-handed government censorship. He observed that ‘reports issued by the authorities went unchallenged, just like the news reports issued by the Imperial Military Headquarters during World War II.’15 Equally unhelpful was the fact that the situation on the ground was physically dangerous for reporters. This fact became tragically apparent when one of Japan’s most experienced and bravest journalists, Shinsuke Hashida, was killed on May 27, 2004, by a rocket-propelled grenade shortly after leaving the GSDF base camp. Also killed in the blast was Hashida’s young nephew and assistant, Kotaro Ogawa. Since the Defense Agency refused to guarantee the safety of any Japanese journalists in Samawa, those who remained in country quickly scrambled out, leaving the government in near-complete control of the Samawa story. Other controversial aspects shadowed the GSDF deployment. Over the objections of the opposition parties, at the end of June 2004, after the formal transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to handpicked Iraqi leaders, the Japanese military mission officially became part of the multinational force that was occupying the country. The change had no practical effect on the GSDF’s operations, but it raised Japan’s political support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.16 The Japan Times editorialized, ‘Is revising a Cabinet order and other operating guidelines sufficient to permit SDF participation in what is essentially a military coalition?

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In other words, is the inclusion of the SDF in the multinational force consistent with the aim of Japan’s Iraq assistance law, which limits its humanitarian and reconstruction activities to “non-combat areas”?’17 The authorities would leave this fundamental question unaddressed. The concept of ‘non-combat zones’ lay at the heart of an important legal debate. The Iraq deployment law of July 2003 mandated that the GSDF would operate only in non-combat zones. If mortars were being fired at the GSDF camp, or if there was occasional factional fighting in the city of Samawa involving followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, would the ‘non-combat zone’ designation still apply? The government saw no problem. In May 2004, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda explained the official view: a combat zone was a place where there was fighting ‘between governments or quasigovernments in an organized and systematic manner, with the aim of resolving international disputes’. An uprising by the al-Sadr forces could not be described as ‘combat’ because they were ‘not organized enough to be defined as a quasi-government’.18 Official quarters subsequently refused to offer any concrete guidelines as to what a ‘quasi-government’ might entail. In November 2004, when the Iraqi government declared a state of emergency in regions including Samawa, the Japanese government once again remained unfazed, asserting that a state of emergency was not the same as a ‘combat zone’. Hosoda adopted the view that, since Tokyo ‘lacked information’ about the situation on the ground, the government had no specific reason to make changes.19 Meanwhile, civilian aid for Iraq – originally envisioned as the centrepiece of Japanese aid to post-war Iraq – was nonexistent. In June 2004, Sadako Ogata, president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), ruled out sending officials from her organization to Samawa because the situation was ‘too unstable’.20 Unlike the GSDF, JICA was the one government agency that had actual experience in ‘humanitarian reconstruction’ activities, operating in many locations around the world. According to the official view that developed over the course of 2004, while Samawa was not a ‘combat zone’, it was too dangerous for any civilian

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government agency, too dangerous for any private citizen and too dangerous for journalists. Only for the GSDF was it deemed safe. This tortured official logic did not go unchallenged. In the Diet debate of November 11, 2004, DPJ leader Katsuya Okada, who succeeded Naoto Kan in May of that year, stressed this point and demanded that Prime Minister Koizumi explain precisely what ‘noncombat zone’ meant. Koizumi refused to give a clear answer other than to assert, ‘The areas the Self-Defense Forces are operating in are non-combat zones.’ Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda was perhaps a little too revealing in his defence of Koizumi the next day: ‘He did not say that wherever the SDF go will be a non-combat zone.’21 In fact, however, by the end of the SDF deployment, it did indeed seem that the government’s concept of ‘non-combat zone’ could be best defined as anywhere in Iraq that the SDF happened to be. But the question remained: when should the SDF mission in Iraq end? The Samawa mission was originally authorized to run for one year, with December 14, 2004, marking the terminal point. The GSDF suffered no casualties in the first year but, as a nation, Japan suffered losses. Aside from the diplomats Katsuhiko Oku and Masamori Inoue, who had been killed before the deployment had begun, as well as the journalists Shinsuke Hashida and Kotaro Ogawa, who were slain in May 2004, a young Japanese backpacker named Shosei Koda traveled to Iraq in October 2004, was taken hostage, and was beheaded by the Zarqawi group. Public sympathy for the young man was tempered by the apparent foolishness of his decision to enter Iraq after all the fuss that had occurred during the April 2004 hostage crisis. Nevertheless, Katsuya Okada declared, ‘If the SDF had not been dispatched, the incident would not have occurred.’22 Prime Minister Koizumi was playing a familiar game. Early on, he determined that the GSDF mission would be extended, though he refrained from publicizing his decision.23 Opposition leaders and independent voices called for an end to the mission; but, short of GSDF casualties, such a conclusion was never really on the agenda.24 In November 2004, Koizumi went so far as to voice his support for the massive US assault on Falluja: ‘We must ensure safety, since the

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terrorists are intensifying their moves to throw the country into confusion.’25 By the time the onslaught was finished, thousands of Iraqi civilians had been killed in the fighting, and hundreds of thousands had been forced out of their homes and into refugee camps. There is no indication that Koizumi ever revised his opinion or saw the Second Battle of Falluja as anything other than a necessary struggle against terrorists. The government still refused to level with the people. In late November 2004, Okada argued, ‘It’s Prime Minister Koizumi’s duty to explain the matter to the public, to the SDF personnel, and to their families. If he extends the mission without doing so, he cannot get away with it as a politician and as a human being.’26 Because so many voices were making similar arguments, the Koizumi cabinet thought it necessary to demonstrate that the government was working toward a prudent decision – even though the decision was really already made. This strategy led to curious demonstrations, such as visit by Defense Agency Director-General Yoshinori Ono to Samawa on December 5, 2004; he stayed in the country less than six hours before declaring himself satisfied that the area was ‘stable’ and that SDF reconstruction activities were still badly needed.27 The opposition parties, not surprisingly, denounced Ono’s performance as a ‘political stunt’.28 On December 9, the mission was officially extended for another year. The results of the government’s ‘careful study’ of the question were as predictable as was the outrage of the opposition parties.29 The DPJ lawmaker Yoshito Sengoku blasted the decision and its legal basis: ‘There exists no “non-combat zone” in Iraq now as explained by the government. The public’s trust in the government has crashed as the government makes such a farfetched claim. The government should immediately pull the SDF out with a focus on mid- to longterm relations with the Middle East and the Japan – US alliance, and it should pressure the United States to stop attacking Falluja.’30 An Asahi Shinbun poll found that 76 per cent of the Japanese people thought that Prime Minister Koizumi had failed to present a sufficient explanation to the nation for his cabinet’s decision to extend the mission.31 Koizumi also refused any clear indication of a

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date at which the GSDF mission would end or upon what basis such a decision could be based. He would only say, ‘I will decide when to withdraw by looking at the situation.’32 Many Japanese were unhappy with such a subjective standard. However, as the year 2005 dawned, the GSDF mission in Samawa again slipped off the front pages of the newspapers, and it became difficult to obtain a very clear picture of such activities as were still occurring. The Japanese did not support the mission, but neither were they deeply troubled by it. It became increasingly easy to forget that the mission was still ongoing. A poll taken in February 2005 found that 44 per cent of Japanese university students were unable to locate Iraq on a map.33 A march of about 4,500 protesters, which took place in Tokyo the following month, was only lightly covered by the media and caused little political stir.34 Meanwhile, changes were taking place on the ground. When the Dutch troops that had been guarding the GSDF (the Japanese forces needed to be guarded from local insurgents) pulled out in March 2005, the British and Australian armies took over this responsibility, even as the overall security situation in Samawa was deteriorating. In June, Tokyo was briefly stunned by news that an attack on a GSDF convoy cracked the windshield of one of their vehicles. The small explosion took place less than six kilometres from the base camp as the unit was heading to a ceremony marking the opening of a new road.35 In the following days, the GSDF were confined within their base camp while information about the attackers was sought.36 In spite of these growing security concerns, a fresh extension of the GSDF mission was back on the government’s agenda. In early May 2005, government sources told the media that the mission would end by December 14 of that year, and preparations for withdrawal were already under way. A new Iraqi government under Ibrahim al-Jaafari was in place, and the GSDF was running out of useful tasks to perform.37 These preparations for departure were stopped cold in June, however, when Washington asked the Japanese government to keep the GSDF in Iraq beyond the end of 2005.38 Within days of the US request becoming widely known, Prime Minister Koizumi indicated that the GSDF mission might be extended beyond two

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years: ‘Iraqis themselves are demanding that the Japanese remain. As long as the areas where the SDF operates are non-combat zones, Japan would like to offer support as much as it can.’39 By September, government sources confirmed that the GSDF mission in Samawa would continue beyond December, but that it would definitely end by the summer of 2006.40 The Japanese people’s attention, however, was now focused on a political drama much closer to home. Prime Minister Koizumi was determined to privatize the powerful post office of Japan, and he engaged in a pitched political battle with anti-reform members of his own party. When the House of Councillors rejected Koizumi’s reform bill, he called a snap election and ejected his bitterest opponents from the ruling LDP. All issues of foreign policy, including Iraq, were thrust into the background as the unprecedented political struggle ran its course. The result was Koizumi’s most stunning political victory: not only did he maintain the LDP majority and knock many of his ruling party opponents from office, he also increased the LDP’s House of Representatives majority to over two-thirds of the seats – a supermajority. Koizumi’s great victory would become extremely important for foreign policy matters in late 2007 and 2008. In immediate terms, however, Koizumi’s September 2005 electoral victory made his political position virtually unassailable, and he glided into his last year in office. Koizumi’s dramatic electoral victory, however, could not keep the situation in Samawa from becoming more perilous. In early July 2005, a senior Foreign Ministry official admitted that conditions were deteriorating: ‘The security situation appears different from that in the past. We need to take all possible measures, thoroughly consulting with the Defense Agency.’41 On July 26, hundreds of Samawa residents staged an anti-Japanese protest, in which they burned a Japanese flag and demanded an improvement in living conditions.42 One of the demonstrator’s signs read, ‘We Don’t Need the SDF. We Want Electricity, Water, and Order!’ A pair of reporters from the Mainichi Shinbun, who ventured out to Samawa, asked local people to tell them their complaints. A local store owner said: ‘At first, I was delighted that the SDF had come to Samawa, because I

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thought my son could have a job. But our lives didn’t change. The SDF hide in their far-away camp, and none of them visit my store. They just look down on poor people like us.’ A truck driver added, ‘The SDF set up a monument, but Samawa’s craftsmen can do that. They painted a school building, but that’s also an easy job. Anybody can do it. I don’t think those are things a G-8 member state should bother with.’43 Even while some locals were expressing disappointment in the SDF, because their inflated expectations of major economic development were not being met, the new Iraqi central government provided political cover for both Washington and Tokyo. The Koizumi administration had already decided that the troops would be staying beyond December 2005, but it was not in the government’s interests to make it appear that, once again, direct pressure from the Bush administration had motivated this change. It would be far better if the extension could be portrayed as Tokyo’s response to independent requests from the Iraqi government. As a result, Iraqi leaders began asking for continued aid and then earnestly ‘requested’ a further extension of the GSDF mission. In mid-September, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari met with Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura in New York and made the first of these requests.44 Zebari repeated this call when he visited Tokyo in late November.45 In October, Nisreen Berwari, the Iraqi minister of municipalities and public works, made a similar pitch on a visit to Tokyo.46 Meanwhile, the Koizumi administration remained unwilling to give the Japanese people a forthright explanation of its policies. Because several months were required to make the logistical preparations for a GSDF withdrawal, the first preparations would have to begin sometime in September if the December deadline was really to be met; but September passed without signs of such preparations. Those who closely followed the matter understood that there could not be a December withdrawal.47 Nevertheless, as late as mid-November, top officials denied that any decision about a further extension had been reached. Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga told reporters on November 11, ‘We have absolutely not decided on it.’48

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At the end of November the government finally admitted that another one-year extension would be authorized. Koizumi made the formal announcement on December 8, just a few days before the legal deadline.49 His official statement included specific justifications: The humanitarian and reconstruction activities carried out by the SDF have restored and enhanced the foundation of the lives of local residents and created employment. The activities are highly appreciated by the local people as well as by the Iraqi Transitional Government, as the gratitude for past assistance and the request for continuation of the SDF activities were expressed by Prime Minister Al-Jaafari and Foreign Minister Zebari. . . Not allowing Iraq to become a hotbed of terrorism but rather reconstructing Iraq as a peaceful and democratic country has significant meaning for the stability of the international community, and it meets our own national interest.50 Koizumi’s statement is notable for several reasons. First, unlike his statements during the first years of the War on Terror, the prime minister stopped citing the US – Japan alliance as a reason for his policy decisions. While maintaining the alliance was still his key motive, Japanese conservatives had learned to avoid explicit reference to it. Some American ‘alliance managers’ had been uncomfortable with Koizumi’s explicit references to Washington’s attitudes in explaining his initial support for the Iraq War. They worried that such unvarnished allusions could invite a backlash from the Japanese public. Nor was it conducive to the self-respect of Japanese policymakers to note repeatedly that US policy was shaping and directing their foreign policy to an unprecedented degree. It was much more convenient to frame matters related to Iraq as humanitarian and reconstruction activities and to define all foreign policy issues related to the War on Terror as contributions to the international community. The rhetoric had changed, but the policies remained the same. Another point of interest in Koizumi’s statement is that it ignored the deteriorating security conditions in

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Samawa and the evident disappointment of many Iraqis that SDF aid had done relatively little for the local community. Finally, neither Koizumi nor any other official could explain clearly how sending the GSDF to Iraq was preventing the nation from becoming ‘a hotbed of terrorism’. On the one hand, the GSDF was a military force formally belonging to the occupying force – a fact that was politically provocative to Iraqi nationalists among others; Japanese civilians, not soldiers, would be needed for any major reconstruction tasks. On the other hand, the GSDF did not actually perform any security tasks other than to protect themselves, and therefore they could not be said to be involved in the dismantling of any ‘terrorist’ networks. It can be argued that sending an impotent uniformed military force to Iraq was about the worst thing Japan could possibly have done. The Pentagon was well aware that the GSDF was performing few useful tasks. In late October 2005, the Defense Department asked Tokyo to move from Samawa to another part of Iraq and to help improve local security and administrative capability.51 When Seiji Maehara – the most recent leader of the revolving-door DPJ after Okada took responsibility for Koizumi’s crushing electoral triumph – visited Washington in early December, Defense Undersecretary for Policy Eric Edelman told him that a formal request to move the SDF to another part of Iraq was being considered by US defence officials.52 The real meaning of these requests became considerably clearer when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told Defense Agency Director-General Nukaga that he wanted GSDF troops to be used for security operations and for training the Iraqi military. Nukaga refused this request with the explanation that ‘it is difficult under our existing laws’.53 Tokyo was not willing to take greater risks over its GSDF mission in Iraq because the government was already in a risky position with the disapproving Japanese public – and already well beyond the limits set by the constitution. Symbolic and rhetorical support remained strong, however. On December 14, 2005, President Bush finally acknowledged that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq: ‘When we made the decision to go into

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Iraq, many intelligence agencies around the world judged that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. This judgement was shared by the intelligence agencies of governments who did not support my decision to remove Saddam. And it is true that much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong. As president, I’m responsible for the decision to go into Iraq – and I’m also responsible for fixing what went wrong by reforming our intelligence capabilities. And we’re doing just that.’54 Japanese reporters challenged Koizumi on this matter, and he responded with another defence of the decision to support the invasion of Iraq: ‘If Iraq had proved it possessed no weapons of mass destruction, the war would not have occurred. I wonder why President Hussein hid the facts and did not heed the United Nations.’55 Other officials, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and the mainstream members of the Foreign Ministry, explicitly backed Koizumi’s view.56 Despite the obvious fallacy of their line of argument, this statement stood as Tokyo’s final judgement on the launching of the Iraq War. Although he had extended the legal mandate for the GSDF mission to December 2006, it appears that Prime Minister Koizumi never intended that the assignment would run for quite that long. Koizumi was never too keen to explain his actions to the public, but it appears that he had resolved in his own mind that he would step down as premier in September 2006, and he did not want to leave the risky GSDF deployment hanging over the head of his eventual successor.57 He did not reveal this plan to the public, but by mid-February 2006, he was making such statements as, ‘The SDF is not supposed to operate in Iraq permanently, and therefore we must carefully figure out the timing of the withdrawal.’58 Other government sources let it be known that the pullout would be completed by May.59 The Japanese people in general were given extremely little news about what was occurring in Iraq, and they seemed to have lost all interest. One clear measure of public indifference was provided in January and February 2006, when Stuff Happens, a British play, was performed in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka. The play examined the diplomatic maneouvres that preceded the decision to launch the Iraq

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War. It was very popular in London but fell flat with Japanese audiences. Yoji Sakate, a documentary playwright who directed the Japanese version of the play, described the reasons for the weak public response: ‘One of the main reactions from the audience was to say the material is “difficult” to understand. They appear to feel that the Iraq War is far from their lives, even though Japan still has SDF troops in such a dangerous country. Another kind of reaction was, “Politics, hmm. . .”’60 Yutaka Murakami, a media analyst, added, ‘Events with serious themes are unlikely to catch on in the current mood of society. . . Those who feel society is becoming unstable tend to dislike political issues.’61 SDP lawmaker Nobuto Hosaka commented that the Japanese people were not interested in the play because they had come to take greater interest in searching for excitement than in ‘questioning whether things are logical or make sense’.62 American policymakers, however, had no difficulty maintaining their interest in the Samawa deployment, and they were concerned that the end of the mission would not spell the end of Japanese support for the new Iraq. In February 2006, Washington made a ‘strong request’ for senior GSDF officers to be sent to Basra to participate in US provincial reconstruction teams. Shortly thereafter, this request was revised into a proposal for about 20 Japanese civilians to become part of these teams.63 Japanese officials were wary of renewed involvement, especially in light of the earlier deaths of diplomats Oku and Inoue. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry forwarded the request to JICA, the agency which – far more than the Defense Agency – had actual experience in national reconstruction activities. JICA President Sadako Ogata immediately turned down the request, pointing out that the Foreign Ministry had ranked the danger rating of Iraq at its highest level and was demanding that all Japanese private citizens stay out of Iraq. The physical presence in Iraq of a few civilian NGO workers and journalists had created such furor less than two years earlier and had given rise to much talk about ‘personal responsibility’; if the country was too dangerous for private civilians, why should it be safe enough for JICA staffers?64 The argument had no easy answer, and the proposal was dropped. Though by the beginning of May the decision to withdraw the GSDF from Samawa had apparently been made, it remained unclear

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precisely when the withdrawal would take place. Government officials either had not come to a decision or were unwilling to make their plans public. Media speculation about a May withdrawal was rife, but if there had been such an intention, it was postponed, owing to a delay in the appointments of new Iraqi ministers.65 On June 14, Koizumi, suddenly and for the first time, indicated that the GSDF mission might continue even after his departure from office in September.66 But less than a week later – on June 20, 2006 – Koizumi formally announced that the mission would be completely withdrawn within weeks. It is not clear exactly what happened between June 14 and June 20. Koizumi, of course, never threw any light upon the question. In the final year of his premiership, he seemed to delight in giving no advance notice of his plans. All he said was that ‘the objective of the GSDF’s activities has now been fulfilled’.67 White House National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley gave reporters almost the very same message: ‘the mission of the forces there, the Japanese forces there, has been successfully completed’.68 Circumstantially, it can be inferred that Koizumi’s announcement followed the negotiation of an agreement with the Bush administration, but that the bilateral talks had not always gone smoothly. Perhaps the Pentagon was looking for a still deeper Japanese commitment, but the White House was willing to reward Koizumi for the extraordinary services that had already been rendered. It is clearly known, however, that the Foreign Ministry was much more skittish about the American reaction to the withdrawal than was the Defense Agency and the GSDF, who were ready to leave Iraq.69 The GSDF vehicles began to retreat across the border into Kuwait on June 25. Exactly one month later, all GSDF troops were back on Japanese soil. However, it was in that final stretch that the GSDF suffered their first and last casualties – the most serious mishap of the entire two and a half year mission in Iraq. Three soldiers were hurt, one with a broken shoulder, when a light-armoured vehicle flipped over in a non-combat accident.70 Prime Minister Koizumi had been unbelievably lucky: he had stood firm on a course that had been more likely to end in tragedy

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than in triumph. The April 2004 hostage affair had strengthened the government’s political position in a highly unlikely manner and had given the administration political insulation against any civilian casualties that might occur in Iraq. A lethal attack on GSDF troops, however, would have immediately thrown the government into a serious political crisis. (Even in Japan no one was likely to accept the argument that the GSDF was in Samawa on their own ‘personal responsibility’.) The possibility of GSDF casualties had hovered for more than two years. Somehow, however, the dreaded blow never came. In part this dispensation was related to the careful efforts of the GSDF to avoid all unnecessary risks and to maintain their popularity with the local population. Opinion polls in Samawa showed that most of the locals supported the Japanese mission to the very end, although there was a discontented minority as well. The GSDF went a little too far in their public relations campaign, however, when it emerged that they had secretly requested local Iraqi leaders to write thank you letters that would ‘be made public by the Japanese media’ and would make people ‘aware of your sincere support for our humanitarian and reconstruction assistance’. Once the GSDF’s Arabic-language letter making this request had been unexpectedly obtained and translated by a Japanese media organization, a GSDF spokesman claimed that they had ‘no intention of using it to appeal at home or abroad’.71 What other purpose such letters might have had was not explained. In the meantime, the Defense Agency imposed a news blackout on the GSDF withdrawal, once again citing the security of the troops.72 Media organizations complied.

The Expanded ASDF Transport Mission The end of the GSDF’s Samawa mission in July 2006 was not, however, the end of the SDF’s role in the Iraq conflict. The Bush administration had agreed to let the GSDF mission in Samawa come to an end, but Tokyo realized that conditions were attached to this withdrawal.73 It was important to Washington to prevent any understanding at home or abroad of GSDF withdrawal as Japan’s

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withdrawal from the Coalition of the Willing. In part, this desire resulted in stepped-up Japanese financial aid for the new Iraqi government. As another part of the package, the ASDF transport mission, which had long been overshadowed by the more dramatic GSDF ‘boots on the ground’, was expanded and developed into the new centrepiece of the Japanese military contribution in Iraq. Washington had been requesting an expansion of the ASDF transport mission since at least October 2005.74 The new mission involved the transport of supplies from Ali al-Salim Air Base in Kuwait to both Baghdad and Arbil, whereas previously most ASDF transport operations had run only from Kuwait to Samawa. Unlike the GSDF mission, this operation played a direct role in US military operations by aiding overall logistics – a distinction of which Japanese opposition leaders were well aware. In June 2006, Ichiro Ozawa, who had now joined the DPJ and had quickly become its new leader, stated, ‘In a way, our air troops do not just airlift supplies for the SDF, they also provide support for the US military and others. I think that in terms of substance, their activities would end up going deeper than the level stated by the ruling parties.’75 The JCP leader, Kazuo Shii, observed, ‘They will furnish assistance to the US military as a unit. Japan will be assuming a most dangerous kind of work, and I’m against it.’76 It was only two and a half years later, when the ASDF mission finally ended in December 2008, that the Japanese media finally revealed that more than two-thirds of the ‘cargo’ that the ASDF had transported from Kuwait to Baghdad consisted of armed soldiers of the multilateral forces.77 Another criticism voiced by the opposition concerned the circumstance that the airport in Baghdad was one of the most dangerous areas in Iraq, with frequent attacks on aircraft at that time. The opposition gained early political ammunition on this point in June 2006 when someone noticed that the US Air Force’s official website gratefully described the ASDF mission as bringing needed supplies to ‘combat zones’ in Iraq. What sounded like praise to American ears, however, was a deep embarrassment to the government in Tokyo, which had been insisting for years that it was meeting the legal requirement of operating only in ‘non-combat

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zones’. At a press conference called to draw attention to the Air Force website, Yukio Hatoyama, of the opposition DPJ, declared, ‘Now we can see clearly that these activities are a violation of the constitution.’78 Later the same day, when Prime Minister Koizumi was confronted by reporters, he casually dismissed Hatoyama’s criticism: ‘There is absolutely nothing unusual about my stance that the areas in which the SDF are operating are non-combat areas.’79 Some days later, Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga confirmed the government’s position that the new ASDF mission fell within the scope of the Iraq deployment law.80 Neither the opposition parties nor the media pursued the matter further. Despite the fact the Iraq War had been launched in violation of the UN Charter, the United Nations had gradually taken greater responsibility for the political muddle Iraq had become. The August 19, 2003 bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad that had taken the life of UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and many others did not end the UN role. It was surprising, however, that when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Tokyo in May 2006, he requested that the Japanese government use the ASDF to provide airlift support for UN operations in Iraq. Annan told reporters in Tokyo, ‘It is very important for the international community to stabilize Iraq and prevent it from becoming a divided country.’81 The Koizumi administration welcomed this request, because it added an important layer of plausibility to the argument that Japan’s role in Iraq was aimed at making contributions to the international community, not merely to the US– Japan alliance. The agreement between Japan and the United Nations on ASDF airlift support was signed at the end of August 2006.82 Arguably, the United Nations had now joined the United States in encouraging the Japanese government to violate its own constitution, which had been created on much the same philosophical basis as the UN charter itself.

The Strain Begins to Show The latter half of 2006 brought political changes to both Tokyo and Washington. Junichiro Koizumi fulfilled his intention of

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stepping down, and he was succeeded by Shinzo Abe, a noted hawk. In early November 2006, the US Republican Party suffered a major defeat in the midterm elections and lost control of both houses of Congress. To a large extent, this vote reflected the American people’s growing disenchantment with both the Iraq War in particular and the Bush administration more generally. Although President Bush still retained considerable power and influence, the election was a major blow to his authority, suggesting that major changes in US policy might be forthcoming. The shift became apparent with the immediate dismissal of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who had been one of the prime architects of the Iraq War. Although the Republican Party’s loss was in many ways a defeat for the hawkish foreign policy of Shinzo Abe as well, the new regime put on a brave face. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki replied to reporters who asked about Iraq policy, ‘I believe there will be various kinds of debate in the United States from now on, but regarding Japan’s decisions, we are carrying out reconstruction assistance for Iraq based on policies we have decided on independently from the viewpoint of our national interest. This basic stance will not change.’83 Abe himself maintained the same line: ‘Support for Iraq’s reconstruction has been conducted by the international community. Japan must staunchly continue doing whatever it can. There will not be any change in Japan’s support for Iraq.’84 However, the new head of the Defense Agency, Fumio Kyuma, had difficulty staying on message. Unlike Abe, Kyuma had always had deep reservations about the Iraq War, and he unwisely started giving voice to his views. In December 2006, Kyuma told the House of Councillors’ Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense that Japan had never ‘officially’ declared support for the US-led Iraq War, and that all of former Prime Minister Koizumi’s statements had been made purely for the benefit of the media.85 Kyuma’s comments produced a chorus of criticism from all sides, and the following day Kyuma retracted, explaining that Koizumi’s support for the invasion was indeed official and that he had demonstrated ‘insufficient

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awareness’ in suggesting otherwise. When asked by a reporter whether he himself ‘personally’ supported the Iraq War, however, Kyuma admitted, ‘I am not inclined to do so. I felt at the time that it was premature, and I personally still feel so. I believe there should have been a better alternative.’86 When another reporter pointed out that his view seemed at odds with his responsibility as Abe’s defence chief, Kyuma angrily replied, ‘The SDF has been dispatched to help with the reconstruction of Iraq based on UN resolutions, not to express support for an American war.’87 In spite of his personal reservations about US policy, Kyuma was still obliged to argue that the legal mandate for the ASDF mission in Iraq should be extended through the end of July 2007. The measure passed with the support of the ruling coalition. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki explained, ‘As the United States and the multinational troops continue their aid to Iraq, it is necessary for Japan to carry out responsibilities that are appropriate to our status.’88 Newspapers such as the Japan Times complained, ‘Since the GSDF withdrew from Iraq in July, the nature of the ASDF’s activities in Iraq has changed. It is regrettable that the government made the decision without providing the Diet and the public with concrete information on the ASDF’s activities in Iraq. . . The ASDF’s activities have deviated from the main purpose of the ad hoc law – humanitarian and reconstruction assistance – and crew members aboard the ASDF air transports are in harm’s way. The government must rethink its Iraq policy.’89 Prime Minister Abe, however, remained steadfastly within the camp of the Bush administration. The December 2006 release of the Iraq Study Group Report (the Baker– Hamilton Report) unleashed a fundamental debate on Iraq policy in Washington. The high-profile report advised a staged withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, together with a diplomatic effort to involve neighbouring countries in assuring Iraqi security. President Bush did not support the Baker– Hamilton approach, opting instead for what became known as ‘The Surge’ – sending more US troops to Iraq in order to militarily overwhelm the Iraqi insurgency. As they did on several other occasions, conservative leaders like Abe made it known that they

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preferred the Bush administration approach to any alternatives. On January 10, 2007, Abe reportedly told President Bush in a telephone call, ‘I strongly expect that US efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq will proceed effectively and bring positive results. The Japanese government will continue to provide proactive support for Iraq’s reconstruction, in cooperation with the international community.’90 Later that month, Abe went public with his praise for the Bush administration’s new approach: ‘The increase of troops reflects the strong US commitment to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. Japan, too, will fulfill its responsibility, so that Iraq can recover as soon as possible.’91 By the beginning of 2007, Abe’s faith in President Bush no longer reflected the mainstream view. Once again, it was Fumio Kyuma who could not keep quiet; speaking before the Japan National Press Club, he said, ‘I think President Bush launched the war as if he believed there were nuclear weapons, but I think that decision was wrong. . . In Japan’s case, the United States succeeded in handling the post-war situation by leaving the imperial system intact. But I’ve been worried that the task would be more difficult in Iraq. And looking at the process so far, I think I am right.’92 Opposition leaders pounced on Kyuma’s comment. SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima observed, ‘There is discord among cabinet members. There is no need to extend the special law on the reconstruction of Iraq.’ DPJ Secretary-General Yukio Hatoyama put it even more concisely: ‘Kyuma is right and the government is wrong.’93 Washington, however, reacted threateningly to Kyuma’s comments. James Zumwalt, director of the Office of Japanese Affairs at the US State Department, paid a visit to the Japanese embassy in Washington and let it be known that if this kind of criticism of Bush continued, it ‘may be difficult to arrange’ the next US– Japan ministerial security talks involving the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries.94 There was an immediate effort on both sides of the Pacific to publicly play down Zumwalt’s threat, but Washington’s attitude became perfectly clear when US officials asked the Japanese government to schedule no meetings with Kyuma when

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Vice-President Cheney made his February 2007 visit to Tokyo.95 This unusual request was granted. More was involved here than the indiscretions of a single government minister. Even some sections of the conservative Japanese elite had grown uncomfortable with Iraq policy by this time. It was not clear if President Bush would still be able to govern effectively during his last two years in office. Violence in Iraq was at peak levels, and the situation looked hopeless. Former LDP SecretaryGeneral Koichi Kato, who had long been a rebel on this issue, stated, ‘With President Bush and other US government officials admitting a mistake, and 60 per cent of US citizens opposing the additional troop deployment in Iraq, why should only Mr Kyuma be criticized by the United States? Mr Kyuma merely stated the common understanding of the world.’96 Foreign Minister Taro Aso also commented critically on US policy when he described the Iraq War as ‘a very immature operation that did not work so well’.97 This increasingly vocal opposition to the Iraq War from senior politicians in Tokyo was soon beaten back by the rapidly weakening Abe administration and the fierce response from the Bush administration, but the trickle of highlevel Japanese criticism at that time had very nearly become a flood. In spite of the growing doubts among some Japanese policymakers, in late March 2007, the government proposed a two-year extension of the Iraq–Kuwait airlift mission. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki asserted, ‘There is an international consensus that we should aim for stability and reconstruction in Iraq.’ DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa shot back: ‘The Iraq War is not based on a consensus of the international community.’98 Abe was undeterred. Security issues had long been among his main intellectual and political concerns. Even as his popularity was plummeting and his cabinet was in disarray, Abe remained a determined backer of SDF deployments. On May 1, 2007, Abe became the first Japanese premier to visit Kuwait. The highlight of his stay was his tour of Ali al-Salim Air Base, when he reviewed the troops and encouraged them, ‘You will be the ones who will turn the Iraqi reconstruction work into a glorious chapter in the history of Japan.’99 By the end of June, Abe had succeeded in gaining a twoyear extension of the ASDF mission.

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That, however, was one of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s final victories of that period. In late July 2007, he led the ruling party into one of the worst electoral defeats in LDP history. Only half the House of Councillors seats are contested in any one election, but in the July 2004 elections, Koizumi had also suffered his own worst defeat. The net result was unprecedented in post-war Japanese history: one house of the Diet now came under the firm control of the opposition parties. The DPJ was the big winner, and Abe was thoroughly humiliated. He remained in office because the decisions of the House of Representatives take precedence over the House of Councillors in forming the government, but his administration was critically wounded. This was the beginning of the so-called ‘twisted Diet’ in which opposing forces each controlled one house of the Japanese parliament. The newly empowered political opposition announced an unexpected first target: these parties would put an end to the nearly six-year old MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean.

The MSDF Extension Battle of Late 2007 After the resolution of the Aegis deployment struggle in December 2002, media and political attention on the MSDF refueling mission fell off sharply. Issues connected to the Iraq War and especially domestic affairs had swept it from the public eye. Prime Minister Koizumi had been inclined to end the mission by November 2005, but the combined effect of a request from Washington to extend the mission and his thumping victory in the September 2005 general elections convinced him to extend the legal mandate for an additional year.100 As the November 2006 deadline approached, Pentagon officials once again requested another year for the MSDF mission, and this extension, too, was granted, though in July 2006, Taku Yamasaki complained that it took ‘a lot of political energy’ to keep pushing these extensions through the Diet.101 At the time the opposition parties gained control of the House of Councillors in July 2007, the legal mandate for the MSDF mission was due to expire on November 1, 2007. There was thus considerable

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consternation in Tokyo and Washington when, immediately after the election, DPJ Secretary-General Yukio Hatoyama announced, ‘We have always been fundamentally opposed to extending this law. The upper-house elections have shown that the country agrees, and we will be expected to keep that line.’102 Party leader Ichiro Ozawa confirmed, ‘We expressed our opposition before and we are not going to endorse it.’103 The quickest reaction to the DPJ challenge came not from the stunned and battered Abe administration, nor from any overeager MSDF officers, but from US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, who declared, ‘It would be unfortunate if this [election result] spilled over into issues that hopefully Japan looks on in a nonpartisan way. Japan is a responsible member of the international community and I would really hate for Japan to decide that the issue was not important any more or that they didn’t want to contribute.’104 Schieffer, however, lacked credibility on the argument concerning nonpartisanship because he had never before met with Ichiro Ozawa despite having been posted in Tokyo for more than two years.105 Schieffer had not taken an interest in the Japanese opposition parties until the July elections provided them with real power for the first time. Only at this very late hour did Schieffer suddenly request a meeting with Ozawa, to urge him to change the DPJ’s position on the MSDF deployment. In one sense, however, Ambassador Schieffer’s appeal to nonpartisanship was apt: Ozawa and Hatoyama, conservatives both, were not targeting the Indian Ocean deployment merely out of an attachment to political principle or a new vision of Japan’s foreign policy. A key motive was partisan: the DPJ leadership hoped to force the government to call lower house elections as soon as possible. They calculated that by blocking the extension of the MSDF mission, the LDP would be provoked to dissolve the Diet and move immediately into general elections. For the DPJ leadership, the primary issue at stake was the possibility of ending more than five decades of LDP rule and establishing their own regime.106 This consideration formed the background to a surprising development: Ichiro Ozawa refused to grant Ambassador Schieffer’s

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request for a meeting.107 Japanese leaders had never before rejected an American request in this fashion. Ozawa even offered a clear explanation for his refusal to meet the ambassador: ‘If the meeting is to exchange opinions on diplomacy, it would be acceptable. But if he intends to try to persuade us on the anti-terrorism law, we cannot accept it.’108 DPJ leaders also made a broader critique. Naoto Kan, repeating his earlier criticism of the Iraq War, observed, ‘We need to thoroughly rethink Abe’s foreign policy. . . Japan’s support of US policy has led Tokyo down a path of isolation. . . The Japan– US relationship is obviously very important, but we must make decisions independently instead of blindly following US policy.’109 Hatoyama echoed, ‘Our diplomacy should not be subservient to the United States. We should express Japan’s position more assertively through our diplomatic and defense policies.’110 In response to these critical remarks, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki claimed to find the entire notion incomprehensible: ‘A total of 24 Japanese nationals died in the attacks of September 11, and, since then, Japan has conducted refueling operations as part of the international fight against terrorism. . . Mr Ozawa is saying he opposes the mission. I do not understand how he thinks.’111 Meanwhile, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Tokyo and promoted the American government’s line: There is concern on our part if these refueling operations by Japan were to stop. This is not a bilateral issue between the United States and Japan; this is an issue that affects and interests the international community as a whole. There are numerous countries involved in these patrolling operations in the Arabian Sea. They are acting in the interest of the international community as whole, and to interrupt those refueling operations could negatively affect – and probably would negatively affect – our efforts to prevent terrorism and prevent the passage of undesirable products and people through that area. So I would say that these activities by the government

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of Japan are much appreciated. They’re extremely useful, and in our view, it would be harmful to international interests as a whole if they were to be interrupted. So we hope that it will be possible for them to continue, which, as I understand, it means that we hope that the law – the required law – will be extended.112 In this way, within a week of winning a major electoral victory while demanding an end to the MSDF mission, the DPJ had stirred up a hornet’s nest. Political opinions that had previously remained on the margins of elite debate were now thrust into the open by genuinely competitive political circumstances. The age of ‘internalized gaiatsu’, by which the Japanese political elite automatically jumped at Washington’s bidding, was replaced by a fierce political battle for supremacy between two warring parties in Tokyo. At the same time, subtler forms of intimidation were replaced by open threats and recriminations. The ensuing six-month political struggle over the MSDF deployment laid bare the political dynamics that had guided the previous six years of Japan’s experience in the War on Terror. On August 8, 2007, Ozawa finally met with Ambassador Schieffer to reduce tensions with the Americans, but in substance he used the meeting only to explain his position in greater detail. Ozawa stressed the basic point that, in his view, the US– Japan connection was an alliance of equals, and that it was not Japan’s role to blindly follow commands from Washington; Japan was a full partner in an enterprise that required attention to both nations’ desires and interests. The meeting was cordial, but nothing was resolved.113 Ambassador Schieffer followed his meeting with Ozawa by openly attacking the DPJ: ‘When I think about what happened in the last election, I did not hear foreign policy being debated, I did not hear the US– Japan alliance being debated. . . I think it would be a sad commentary if that election somehow spilled over into the foreignpolicy area, into areas that were previously thought to be pretty much above partisan debate. We hope that the political debate here will not wind up making the US – Japan alliance a political football.’114 Schieffer went so far as to suggest that international terrorists might

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in future strike the Japanese homeland if the DPJ failed to support US policy.115 Not only Schieffer and Negroponte, but many other of the American ‘alliance managers’ were soon rallying to the anti-DPJ banner.116 One part of their campaign was to suggest that the whole ‘international community’ was demanding that the MSDF continued to stay in the Indian Ocean. Another part was to aim not-so-subtle threats at DPJ leaders. In late August, for example, two key ‘alliance managers’, Michael Green and Kurt Campbell, co-wrote an article, published in the Asahi Shinbun, with the title, ‘Ozawa’s Bravado May Damage Japan for Years’. The piece began, It appears that Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) leader Ichiro Ozawa is determined to force a crisis with the government over the counterterrorism bill. This comes as a disappointment to those Americans who remember him as a stalwart defender of the US–Japan alliance from his days as deputy chief cabinet secretary almost two decades ago. . . If Japan pulls out suddenly from the coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, this will lead to inevitable and unfortunate questions for the next administration – whether Republican or Democrat – about Japan’s reliability as an ally. Nor would the damage to Japan’s national interest stop with the bilateral US–Japan relationship.117 They proceeded to spell out exactly what Ozawa was jeopardizing: In the Gulf states, the MSDF and air and ground deployments have also been well received and many leaders in those countries want to see even more Japanese military and diplomatic presence to help bring stability at a time when Iraq’s future is uncertain and China is attempting to increase its access and influence in this rich oil-producing region. The basis of Japan’s relationship with all these countries is diplomatic and economic, but Japan’s readiness to show the flag is viewed across South and Southwest Asia as a metric for how serious Tokyo really is as a strategic player in that region.118

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They moved on to highlight the disappointment that Western allies would feel if the MSDF mission was withdrawn, and they hinted at the specific consequences that such allied disappointment might entail: Major democracies. . . have made a commitment in Afghanistan because their leaders see this as a battle between civilization and terror. These are also nations that have supported a more active role for Japan in Asia and globally. Whether or not Japan stands with them in Afghanistan will inevitably have an impact on how they assess Japan’s future leadership in arenas such as the Group of Eight, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the UN Security Council. . . Would a Minshuto prime minister be able to say that Japan stands firmly with those countries in the War on Terror? Would they be able to make the claim that Japan is ready to play a larger role in the international community? And how does Japan’s ambassador to the United Nations explain that Japan is ready to take the leadership responsibilities of a permanent UN Security Council member the day after the counterterrorism law is killed and Japanese ships pull out of the coalition effort?119 In case the implied threats still were not clear enough, Green and Campbell threw in the highly-charged North Korea issue as well: North Korea’s view of a Minshuto decision to block the counterterrorism law is easier to predict. Alliances are not judged in one region alone, but globally. And North Korea saw a clear signal in Japan’s decision to dispatch the MSDF to the Indian Ocean that the US–Japan alliance is stronger than it realized precisely because it is a global alliance. But if that alliance deflates or drifts because of a withdrawal from the coalition, Pyongyang will be delighted. Pity the diplomats who have to try to negotiate with Pyongyang about the abductee issue after that.120 Green and Campbell were openly threatening Ozawa and the DPJ with retaliation if they did not buckle to the will of Washington and

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agree to re-extend the MSDF mission to the Indian Ocean. Little was left to the imagination. The United States might withdraw its naval protection of vital Japanese sea lanes; it might block Tokyo’s candidacies to lead major international organizations and to join the UN Security Council; and it might leave Japan to negotiate alone with North Korea on the question of the abductions of Japanese citizens and other regional security matters. To top it off, Green and Campbell concluded their opinion piece by once again raising the venerable narrative of the ‘Gulf War humiliation’ that had haunted Japanese conservatives since the 1990s: All of this should sound familiar to Ozawa, because it is precisely what happened after the 1990– 1991 Persian Gulf War. There were growing expectations for Japan’s global leadership until the Kaifu government stumbled in the face of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. At the time, Ozawa did more than anyone in the LDP to try to prevent the collapse of Japan’s diplomatic weight. He put forward a vision of a ‘normal’ Japan that would carry its weight in the international community. But in spite of his efforts, it was ten years before the world began to take Japan seriously again. That is worth remembering. Because even though it may be possible for a coalition to replace two ships, or the opposition to replace the governing party, it can take a nation years to recover a reputation.121 The article encapsulated practically every form of political and security blackmail that American policymakers had for years been much more subtly aiming at Japan. Both Washington and Tokyo had long made efforts not to raise these issues explicitly because neither wished to reveal just how subservient Japanese policy had really become. The DPJ’s direct challenge to the cozy norms of the alliance resulted in panic among the US – Japan ‘alliance managers’. Unaccustomed to the frontal attack the DPJ was now launching, they responded with outrage and open hostility. For a brief period, the reassuring mask of alliance solidarity had slipped.

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However, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was also slipping. After his resounding electoral defeat in July, his hold on power was tenuous; he had even lost the ability to control his own cabinet. He seemed unable to cope with the weakness of his political position and was said to be in poor health. While Ambassador Schieffer and other officials in Washington were attacking Ichiro Ozawa like pit bulls, the Japanese conservatives were disoriented and unsure of their ground.122 On September 12, 2007, Abe resigned as premier and immediately checked himself into a hospital. The event marked a total defeat. Abe’s humiliation, however, did not result in the general election the DPJ had hoped for, but simply the appearance of yet another prime minister from the ruling LDP. The reason for this development lay in the terms of the Japanese constitution as it related to parliamentary affairs. The power of the LDP-controlled House of Representatives (the lower house) was greater than that of the House of Councillors (the upper house), which the DPJ and other opposition parties now controlled. The selection of premier was always decided by the LDP-dominated House of Representatives, and while, in some cases, the House of Councillors can veto legislation, an override provision allowed the lower house to pass bills over the objections of the upper house if such a decision is authorized by a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. This is the point at which Koizumi’s massive September 2005 election victory suddenly became crucially important: it meant that if the LDP and its coalition partner, New Komeito, acted together in the House of Representatives, without significant internal rebellions, that house could still override the opposition of the DPJ-controlled House of Councillors. As result, even though the Japanese public in late 2007 favoured the DPJ position, thanks to the supermajority in the lower house that Koizumi had bequeathed, the parliamentary advantage still lay with old ruling parties. The serious issue of democratic legitimacy, however, remained. While it was clear that the ruling coalition retained the technical ability to override the upper house, was such an action something that they actually should undertake? The House of Councillors had

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not been overridden for more than half a century. Japanese political culture, which has a deep-rooted aversion to parliamentary strongarm tactics, puts a premium on consensus. Moreover, the LDP had just suffered a disastrous electoral defeat. A poll in the Asahi Shinbun found that 53 per cent of the Japanese people actively agreed with Ichiro Ozawa and the DPJ that the MSDF mission should be terminated immediately.123 In such circumstances, what sort of legitimacy would there be if the LDP relied on the results of a general election fought two years earlier, under a different leader and on the basis of an entirely different issue, in order to force though passage of a bill the Japanese people opposed? At any rate, as far as American officials were concerned, the interregnum of September 2007 did not permit a ceasefire. Ambassador Schieffer remained at the head of the anti-DPJ campaign. The day Abe resigned, the US ambassador told reporters, ‘The work that’s going on in the Indian Ocean is an international effort to defeat terrorism. . . I hope that the people of Japan will realize that this measure is important not only to the United States but to the whole international community.’124 In the days and weeks that followed, Schieffer and his colleagues endeavoured to internationalize the issue as much as possible. They hoped to pile even more pressure on the DPJ and to outflank their opponents by convincing the Japanese people that the continuation of the MSDF mission was an expectation, not merely on the part of the United States, but of the entire world. In September, the US embassy gathered diplomats from ten allied countries for ‘a joint briefing session’ for Diet members, asking them to renew the MSDF mission.125 Behind the scenes, US officials encouraged their allies to add their voices to requests for an extension. At times, this frantic campaign produced unintended consequences. A UN resolution extending the legal mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan was scheduled for passage on September 20. American diplomats thought it would be a clever idea to insert into the preamble of the new resolution a message of gratitude to countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom. This statement was meant to be a

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poisoned arrow aimed straight at the heart of Ichiro Ozawa and the DPJ. Washington hoped to demonstrate the international legitimacy of Operation Enduring Freedom by gaining the full sanction of the UN Security Council. In this way, Washington hoped to undermine Ozawa’s contention that the Indian Ocean mission was related mainly to the US – Japan alliance.126 Zalmay Khalilzad, the American representative to the United Nations, stated explicitly, ‘This is an opportunity for the Security Council to underscore the importance of this mission and to express, by that recognition, the appreciation that we all have for the important contribution that Japan is making.’127 Former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura further observed, ‘If the resolution is adopted, then the DPJ will lose its largest grounds for opposing Japan’s participation.’128 To the shock and dismay of senior US and Japanese officials, however, Russia abstained from the vote, and China, too, revealed discomfort with the way the resolution had been drafted. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin explained, ‘Russia strongly backs the ISAF mission to fight terrorism in Afghanistan, but we abstained after the sponsors did not take into account suggestions we and others made to clarify why a certain paragraph was inserted into the text. . . A decision was made to give priority to domestic considerations of some members of the United Nations. The unity of the Security Council has been sacrificed to undue haste.’129 The attempt to use the UN Security Council as a weapon of partisan advantage within Tokyo had backfired. The new LDP prime minister turned out to be Yasuo Fukuda, the former chief cabinet secretary of the early Koizumi years, who had played a critical role in the War on Terror and the Iraq War. Ideologically, Fukuda was more moderate than either of his two immediate predecessors: his cabinet, which he largely inherited from Abe, however, was still quite conservative. The LDP as a whole had become more right-leaning than it had ever been before; while in earlier decades, the LDP had been divided roughly evenly between its moderate and right wing, by 2007, the moderates – including Fukuda himself – had largely been marginalized. Fukuda owed his unexpected promotion, not to any personal following that he had built within the party, but because he was seen by party elders as a

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man who could skillfully and responsibly guide government policy as well as provide a much-needed stabilizing influence in the wake of the Abe debacle. Even before Fukuda had assumed office, however, a new scandal was brewing. In early September, Kenji Eda, an independent House of Representatives member, produced paperwork alleging that the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean provided fuel for American forces in Iraq.130 This allegation, if proved, would constitute a clear violation of the 2001 Special Measures Against Terrorism law, an illegality that would seriously undermine Japanese public trust in the MSDF and the government. In reality, rumours along these lines had emerged as far back as May 2003, when Rear Admiral Matthew Moffit, commander of a US Navy carrier group, issued a statement indicating that MSDF ships had indirectly supplied fuel to the American aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. The Japanese government’s initial reaction to Moffit’s statement had been to deny everything, but some days later, it admitted that on February 25, 2003, the MSDF support ship Tokiwa had supplied 830,000 litres of fuel to the USS Pecos, an American support vessel stationed in the northern Arabian Sea. Later that same day, the USS Pecos in turn provided the Kitty Hawk with 3.03 million litres of fuel. The Kitty Hawk had been heading toward the Persian Gulf as part of the campaign against Iraq. Some commentators argued that this act of refueling was a violation of the law.131 Nevertheless, at the time, Defense Agency Director-General Shigeru Ishiba maintained that the government had no responsibility to reveal to the Diet where its fuel was going: ‘I cannot reveal to which vessels the MSDF ships provided refueling because it would mean making our strategy public.’ Ishiba indicated that the refueling was subject to an agreement made with the US government, and therefore, ‘we do not need to confirm when and to which vessels we have provided refueling to’.132 From May 2003 to September 2007 the story of other possible MSDF refueling operations in support of the Iraq War remained buried. The SDF refused to provide specific information, and the Japanese media let the issue go. When, in late 2007, the story resurfaced that the MSDF may have refueled other US ships involved in Iraq-related operations, the first

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reaction in Tokyo was confusion. Some officials seemed to grudgingly acknowledge the truth of the story; most of the denials were halfhearted. When asked about Iraq refueling in a press conference, Foreign Ministry Deputy Press Secretary Tomohiko Taniguchi stated, ‘So far as what is going on at the moment, there is no question but that the Japanese refueling activity is used solely to help support the activities engaged in by Operation Enduring Freedom.’ What about past activities? ‘The Japanese government is pledging that further investigation will be made’, he replied.133 In the weeks that followed, however, the government’s line hardened. Tightly controlled inhouse investigations were performed, after which the government declared itself innocent and completely vindicated: there was not an ounce of truth to the malicious allegations by the political opposition about refueling for Iraq operations, they claimed.134 Since the DPJ could not produce further evidence of wrongdoing after the Japanese and American governments had closed ranks on this sensitive issue, it could not land the knock-out political punch it needed. At the beginning of October, Prime Minister Fukuda publicly indicated that he intended to pursue the same line as his predecessor on the MSDF: Maintaining the solid Japan – US alliance and promoting international cooperation are the foundation of Japan’s diplomacy. World peace cannot be realized unless the international community works together in solidarity. . . The support activities based on the Special Measures Against Terrorism law are part of the international community’s joint efforts to prevent the proliferation of terrorists. They serve the national interests of Japan which depends on maritime transportation for much of its natural resources, and also constitute the responsibilities that Japan should fulfill in the international community. They are highly appreciated by the international community, including the United Nations, and we have received specific requests to continue these activities from various countries. We will continue to make our utmost efforts to explain in detail the necessity of continuing these

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activities to the people and the Diet, so as to gain their kind understanding.135 In line with this view, Fukuda opted to submit a new MSDF bill to replace the one set to expire on November 1. His draft called for a twoyear extension of the mission and did not include any provisions for oversight by the Diet.136 The obvious intent was to keep the mission as far as possible from DPJ obstruction. DPJ Secretary-General Hatoyama reacted sharply: ‘The public is left in the dark about exactly what the SDF troops are doing. It is just preposterous to ask people to trust the government. . . War does not end terrorism. Terrorism is caused by social ills like poverty, discrimination, and oppression; and getting rid of such social ills and stabilizing peoples’ lives is an important pillar of anti-terrorism measures and the foundation of peace.’137 At the same time, the DPJ leaders were growing sensitive to the criticism that they were merely offering objections to government plans without proposing any constructive policies of their own. Now that they controlled the House of Councillors, it was possible for them to submit their own bills and pass them in at least one house. If the DPJ did not like the MSDF refueling mission, what was its alternative? Ozawa responded by proposing a SDF mission that was far more ambitious than any the government had ever undertaken. Ozawa argued that the SDF could be sent directly into Afghan territory and might even engage in combat operations. The main distinction between Ozawa’s proposal and the government’s existing policy was that the SDF would be under the direct mandate of the UN Security Council, not part of some jury-rigged American coalition. If the SDF had explicit UN authority, Ozawa asserted, it would even be permissible under the Japanese constitution to send the SDF into active combat.138 In an open letter published in the monthly magazine Sekai, Ozawa explained his approach and its differences from that of the ruling party. He began his letter with a consideration of broad issues: I do not see any contradiction between a policy of UN-centrism and the Japan – US alliance. Indeed, I assert that Japan’s security

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will be best preserved through the utilization of both of them. In reality, it is simply impossible for the United States to maintain world peace as the policeman of the international community, based entirely upon its own unilateral power. This reality is perceptible today in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush began the war in Afghanistan with the scathing announcement, ‘This is America’s war of self-defense. No UN resolutions are necessary.’ In spite of these words, did the United States actually operate alone or did it request assistance from the international community?139 Despite his disenchantment with the Bush administration’s military deployment policies and strategic approach, Ozawa made it clear that he was fundamentally supportive of the United States and the general concept of the War on Terror: In regard to the first problem of the struggle against terrorism, I have never once said that Japan should not participate in the War on Terror. In the past, our nation has bent to terrorism and paid ransoms and released criminals from jail – even those facing death sentences. You can probably recall incidents in which the Japan Red Army hijacked Japanese airliners. There is no other country in the world that has been as submissive to such actions as ours has. On that account alone, the Japanese people must maintain a resolute attitude in the War on Terror.140 However, the heart of Ozawa’s letter was the section in which he laid out his personal interpretation of the Japanese constitution. He criticized the government’s ban on the exercise of the ‘right of collective defence’, noting how radically the official interpretations had changed in the ten years between the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2001 Special Measures Against Terrorism law. Ozawa snorted that even children wouldn’t engage in the kind of sophistry seen in the arguments of the ruling party. He then presented his own view:

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My way of thinking about the Japanese constitution is that it is impermissible for Japan to deploy military forces to assist in the self-defense efforts of the United States or any other nation. At the same time, the constitution offers no impediment to positive participation in the activities of the United Nations – even if such participation results in the actual employment of military force. In my view, this approach accords with the principles of the constitution.141 The content of Ozawa’s letter was broadly consistent with arguments that he had been making for decades, and at the same time, was a clever attempt to embarrass and outflank the government. However, it landed him in the midst of dangerous political crossfire. Although his proposal held out the possibility, welcome to Japanese conservatives, that a major ‘advance’ in security policy could be in the offing, such that the SDF could be sent into combat under this scheme, the LDP, acting on strictly partisan reasons, denounced Ozawa’s plan. After all, it wasn’t their plan. Some of the ruling party’s criticism was highly ironic: hawkish politicians and media commentators who had long been on record as wishing to rewrite Article Nine, and who were perfectly comfortable ignoring its provisions in practice, suddenly struck unaccustomed poses as defenders of the national charter and Japanese pacifism.142 For example, the Yomiuri Shinbun, an unfailing advocate for revision of Article Nine and expanded defence policies, rejected Ozawa’s proposal as unrealistic: ‘DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa revealed in his party’s gazette that he would like Japan to participate in the ISAF deployed in Afghanistan. . . In Afghanistan, a plague of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks has killed and wounded many ISAF members. Participating in the ISAF is not a realistic option for Japan at the moment.’143 (Not surprisingly, about a year later, when the Fukuda Cabinet, under subsequent US pressure, began discussing the idea of SDF participation in the ISAF, the Yomiuri Shinbun editors suddenly transformed into enthusiastic supporters of the notion.) The real problem for Ozawa, however, came from within his own party. The DPJ was a collection of politicians with extremely diverse

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views on security issues. While conservatives in the party were energized and excited by their leader’s proposals, the party’s large liberal wing was horrified and demanded that Ozawa renounce his new line of argument.144 For the sake of party unity, Ozawa did so: it was much safer simply to criticize government policy than to try to unify the opposition forces around a specific alternative.145 With the two major Japanese political parties engaged in a ferocious battle for supremacy, many observers felt that Japanese public opinion would ultimately prove decisive in the high stakes contest. The advantage in this field clearly lay with the DPJ, but the threatening statements of US officials and the nonstop arguments of the government and its media allies had led some to change their minds and show an increased understanding of the government view. By this time, many of the independent intellectuals who had been prominent in the national debate after September 11 had again been marginalized, and critical voices were less frequently heard on the airwaves. As public opinion inched somewhat closer to the government’s camp, the leaders of the DPJ and other opposition parties became nervous. Some LDP politicians now indicated that if public support for the MSDF mission could be brought to the 60 per cent level, the use of the lower house supermajority to override the resistance of the DPJ-led House of Councillors would be perfectly acceptable. In mid-October, however, the prospects for such a massive shift in opinion did not look very bright. A Japanese defence bureaucrat glumly confessed, ‘I never like to say zero, but the chances of this bill passing are as close to zero as one can get.’146 Since the legal mandate for the MSDF mission was scheduled to expire on November 1, and the Fukuda administration had been able to submit its new bill to the Diet only on October 17, it was apparent that the refueling ships would have to be withdrawn, at least temporarily, from the Indian Ocean. The DPJ had won a significant round in the struggle. Final victory, however, remained elusive. The DPJ had no means by which to kill the government’s new bill. With their control of the upper house, the DPJ and its allies could certainly slow down passage of the bill for a couple of months, but they had no truly decisive

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weapons at their disposal. They could only hope that the LDP would lose its nerve in the face of massive public disapproval and refrain from forcible passage of the bill by using the lower house supermajority. When it became entirely clear that the MSDF ships would be forced to return to Japan, some conservatives became outraged. Most notably, former Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani, who had been instrumental in sending the MSDF mission back in 2001, blew his top in a national television interview. He demanded that the mission be reauthorized, and then he burst out, ‘Only terrorists would oppose this!’ The host of the television show asked him if he really thought that the DPJ was ‘a group of terrorists’. He replied, ‘I just can’t understand them.’ DPJ Secretary-General Hatoyama quickly responded: ‘Given that about 30 per cent of the public are [strongly] opposed to the refueling activities, then three in ten Japanese must be terrorists. . . It’s outrageous that such horrendous remarks were made before TV cameras.’147 The bill that Prime Minister Fukuda finally submitted to the Diet involved only a one-year extension of the MSDF mission. The LDP’s coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, would not support a two-year extension plan. Since Komeito’s backing would be absolutely necessary in order to use the lower house supermajority override, LDP leaders had no choice but to defer to their smaller coalition partner on this point.148 In this way, the opposition parties won another tactical victory. US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer remained unrelenting, however. When it became clear that the MSDF would have to be withdrawn, he once again inserted himself into the domestic debate: ‘We would hope that the mission can be continuously undertaken. . . We [stand] ready to do anything we [can] to provide information that would allow the Diet to deliberate the issue and to hopefully come to a good conclusion.’149 No one needed to be told any longer what the US ambassador considered to be ‘a good conclusion’. On October 24, Schieffer spoke before the Japan National Press Club. He began with a distinct threat aimed at Tokyo’s UN Security Council ambitions:

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America welcomes Japan’s desire to speak with a louder voice in international affairs. That is why we have said that Japan deserves a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. But, leadership in the international community depends upon more than having a loud voice. Right now, the ships of many nations are in the Indian Ocean in a United Nations sanctioned effort to deny combatants, contraband, narcotics, and weapons to terrorists. . . Japan must decide whether it will continue those efforts or leave the job to others.150 Schieffer pointed to Prime Minister Koizumi as a role model for the alliance, and he hinted at the risks that Japan would be taking should opinion in Washington be alienated from opinion in Tokyo: ‘Former Prime Minister Koizumi used to say that there was no such thing as a US – Japan alliance that was too close. And, he was right. The international order is in the process of redefining itself. The Asian order is in the process of redefining itself. Asia and the world can be a dangerous place. This is no time for America and Japan to be drifting apart.’151 When questioned by Japanese reporters, the US ambassador did not refrain from attacking DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa by name. Referring to the fact that the opposition leader had contended that there was no specific authorization from the UN Security Council for the naval operations in the Indian Ocean, Schieffer retorted, ‘Ozawa-san and I differ on what constitutes a UN resolution.’152 There could be little doubt by this time that Washington was now supporting one Japanese political party against another, in spite of the Japanese people’s elected choice. Meanwhile, the Japanese government was reeling under the impact of fresh scandals. It emerged that Takemasa Moriya – the senior defence bureaucrat who had dominated the Defense Agency for years – had engaged in corrupt practices, accepting bribes from a defence contractor. This revelation was another serious blow to the government, and Shigeru Ishiba, who was now back in charge of the defence portfolio, remarked, ‘I cannot say there will be no impact in terms of the credibility of the defense administration.’153 This

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problem was intensified by new revelations that SDF officials had been involved in a cover-up of the actual amount of fuel provided by the MSDF refueling ship Tokiwa to the USS Pecos in February 2003. Ishiba conceded, ‘This is not about the responsibility of a single official, it is an organizational problem.’154 For his part, Yukio Hatoyama thundered, ‘They seem to be trying to put doubts to rest, making it seem as though it was a mistake by lower-ranked people. . . If the government gives answers based on lies, then it will become impossible for the people to believe in it.’155 The debate over the MSDF Indian Ocean mission raged up to and beyond the November 1 deadline. The MSDF vessels returned to Japan. The intense political battle had now continued for more than two months. Passions were running high on all sides and few were ready for cool reflection. The DPJ had already succeeded in three major respects: the party had crushed the Abe administration, it had pressured the government into proposing a one-year extension of the mission rather than a two-year extension, and it had forced the MSDF to physically withdraw from the Indian Ocean. However, it had not succeeded in what had been the main objective all along; to provoke a general election while circumstances were favourable to the party’s cause. Moreover, the LDP was now united in its anger. Rather than losing their nerve, its members had become increasingly determined not to let Ozawa ‘win’, no matter what the political cost. They were not legally required to call for lower house elections for another two years. If the opposition parties and the public wanted early elections, that was just too bad – they wouldn’t give in. But the LDP had lost sight of the bigger picture. No one remembered that in 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi had come quite close to terminating the MSDF mission on his own initiative. The factors that had led him to change his mind, as far as is known, were a request from the United States to continue the mission and the new burst of confidence he had felt in the wake of his crushing electoral triumph. Two years later, the LDP’s attitude implied that extending the MSDF mission was the most crucial issue facing the Japanese nation. Ordinary Japanese consistently told pollsters that they were primarily concerned

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about their pensions and other bread-and-butter issues closer to home. A gap yawned between the priorities of the Japanese people and those of their government. Nor did the Bush administration’s insistence that the mission must absolutely be extended seem entirely rational. When the MSDF mission ended at the beginning of November, reporters asked Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, what practical impact the departure of the Japanese refueling ships would have on US forces. Morrell replied, ‘I do not expect any operational impact whatsoever. . . We still hope that they will continue to support the mission through their refueling efforts, but if they ultimately choose not to, we will certainly come up with alternative means of making sure that our men and women have the fuel they need to go about their missions.’156 Given that Morrell clearly indicated that there was no practical need for the MSDF presence, American officials must have regarded the mission as ‘vital’ for purely symbolic reasons. Like the SDF missions in Iraq, the MSDF Indian Ocean deployment was a token of Japanese support for America’s War on Terror. The presence of Japanese military forces, even if of little practical use, supported the Bush administration’s assertion, both at home and abroad, that there was a multinational coalition that backed the US goals. In late 2007, the central policy of the Bush administration remained one of ‘stay the course’. These policymakers had seen the Coalition of the Willing slowly melt away, and they had little compunction about tightening the screws on their remaining allies to prevent the trickle of desertions from turning into a flood. By circumstance and by their own psychology of dependence, Japanese conservatives were among the world’s most compliant in the face of American pressure. The DPJ was now in open rebellion against this cozy arrangement, and the LDP was horrified at the possible consequences. Even if dissension meant their own destruction in the next general elections, many Japanese government leaders were determined to fight Ozawa and the DPJ to the bitter end. For their part, leaders in Washington seemed strangely indifferent to the risk their loyal clients in Tokyo were taking on behalf of what was, in the final analysis, a simple loyalty test of little

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practical value to US forces. As a result, the end of the MSDF mission on November 1, 2007, signaled not the final resolution of the political battle, but only the beginning of a new phase – one that began with a critical error on the part of Ichiro Ozawa. The DPJ had been under extreme political pressure for some time. Consequently, when the influential owner of the Yomiuri business empire, Tsuneo Watanabe, offered himself as a discreet mediator between Fukuda and Ozawa, the DPJ leader accepted the invitation and met secretly with the prime minister. Together, they arrived at the stunning decision that they would unite their two parties into a powerful grand coalition. (Privately, Ozawa felt that his own party members required on-the-job training before they would be fit to run the country, although he had never before expressed such a sentiment.) However, when Ozawa returned to DPJ headquarters to inform his party leaders about the political bargain he had just struck, they were appalled and rose up against him in open defiance. They disowned all the agreements Ozawa had made. In a fit of rage, Ozawa immediately resigned as party leader, and Naoto Kan assumed emergency control. Within a couple of days, however, both Ozawa and the other leaders reconciled. Both sides realized that they needed each other. Ozawa apologized for his poor communication skills, and he was asked to return as DPJ leader. There would be no deal with the LDP. The sudden drama ended.157 The public consequences of this embarrassing fiasco were serious, however. Much of the momentum the DPJ had been riding since the July elections evaporated. The public was reminded why Ichiro Ozawa was distrusted. Ozawa’s misstep gave the government a chance to regroup and regain the political initiative. Perhaps most significantly of all, the whole experience convinced Prime Minister Fukuda that compromise with the DPJ was no longer an option. Before this event, Fukuda’s degree of personal commitment to extending the MSDF mission had been in doubt, in spite of his public statements. He was more cautious than many of the officials in his cabinet, and Fukuda always had a clear distaste for confrontation. For this reason, he had entertained the idea of a grand coalition with the DPJ. When the talks collapsed, however, Fukuda came to the

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reluctant conclusion that he would have to fight the battle of extending the MSDF extension to the end. As he put it in later public remarks, ‘I told President Bush I would do my best to resume the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. I feel a great responsibility to do so. . . After speaking with the leaders of many countries, I realized the resumption of the refueling mission is no longer a domestic issue.’158 For his part, Ozawa had now returned to a hard and confrontational line: ‘I told the prime minister what I have repeatedly told him. We will not change our basic position that we are against sending the SDF overseas without any principle, because that will not only mislead the country, but is also against the constitution. . . Even though the prime minister requested cooperation, I told him we cannot make compromises.’159 The extraordinary Diet session had been scheduled to close on November 10. In order to create an opportunity to pass the new MSDF deployment bill, however, Fukuda extended the session to December 15 and signaled that he was determined to press forward. When, at this time, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Tokyo, he added his own considerable weight to the Japanese government’s position. Standing next to Gates at a press conference, Shigeru Ishiba declared, ‘The longer the suspension continues, our posture will be deemed as more negative regarding the War on Terror. This is not something that is desirable for our country. . . So far as the government is concerned, we would like to take a positive attitude concerning the continuation of the supply activities in the War on Terror.’160 Gates followed up by noting, ‘This is not really a bilateral matter between the United States and Japan, but rather Japan’s contribution to a broad international coalition that is involved in trying to bring freedom, and keep freedom, in Afghanistan. . . Japan has the opportunity and an obligation to take on a role that reflects its political, economic, and military capacity. . . That is why we hope and expect Japan will choose to accept more global security responsibilities in the years ahead.’161 In a private meeting with Japanese lawmakers, Gates specifically called for the new MSDF deployment bill to be passed ‘in this Diet session’.162

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By December 2007, both major parties were deeply locked into their confrontation. The US government was strongly and quite clearly backing the government’s position. However, Japanese public opinion was now swinging back in a direction favourable to the opposition DPJ, and polls showed that a plurality supported the opposition parties’ stance. In response to this failure to gain popular consent, the LDP decided it no longer needed 60 per cent public support to use the House of Representatives supermajority. In fact, it stopped caring about Japanese public opinion altogether. It now believed that restarting the MSDF mission was an absolute requirement for the US –Japan alliance. As far as the ruling LDP was concerned, there could be no more debate. Since the constitution allows the House of Councillors to delay a bill for up to 60 days, the DPJ delayed to the legal limit. The ruling coalition answered this delay by extending the Diet session for a second period, until January 15, 2008. The New Komeito Party indicated that it would fully support their LDP coalition partners in the second lower house vote.163 The government was therefore unified. Checkmate. On January 11, 2008, the House of Representatives, for the first time in over 50 years, overrode a House of Councillors veto. Opinion polls showed that the Japanese public opposed the new MSDF bill by a margin of 43 per cent to 37 per cent. Since the Fukuda cabinet was simultaneously neglecting such important domestic concerns as the problem of pensions, overall public support for his administration was plummeting.164 As had been the case in March 2003, when the Iraq War was launched, the Japanese conservatives once again demonstrated that the views of the Bush administration took priority over the views of the Japanese public. The LDP was not representing the Japanese people to the world; it was representing Washington to the Japanese people. Ambassador Schieffer, of course, saw the matter in a different light. He immediately offered a tribute to the ruling party: ‘Terrorism is the bane of our time. By passing this legislation, Japan has demonstrated its willingness to stand with those who are trying to create a safer, more tolerant world.’165 Whether or not a more

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democratic world was being created was a question Schieffer left unaddressed; and he probably wouldn’t have fully understood the issue in any case.

No Exit On February 21, 2008, the MSDF supply ship Oumi refueled a Pakistani frigate, thus marking the restart of the Indian Ocean mission after an almost four-month hiatus. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura hailed the event: ‘It is significant indeed to keep peace in the Indian Ocean. . . A mission that meets the nation’s interests has finally been resumed.’166 US State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack added, ‘We very much appreciate what Japan has done in these refueling missions and we’re quite thankful for their efforts and their decisions to participate in that mission.’167 The Yomiuri Shinbun triumphantly reported that loudspeakers on the first Pakistani warship to receive refueling blared out the kimigayo – the Japanese national anthem – as a gesture of appreciation.168 However, the final ‘victory’ of the alliance conservatives in January 2008 meant only that a similar battle would have to have to be fought all over again in the autumn of that same year. The MSDF refueling mission, after all, had only been extended for a further year, to January 2009. Nevertheless, in early 2008, the topic disappeared as a political issue. The DPJ made the political calculation that the public was tired of hearing about faraway foreign policy, being focused instead on pocketbook issues closer to home. The opposition party’s overriding objective had always been to induce the LDP to call an early general election that would, it was hoped, force the ruling party from power. The prospects for success were uncertain. As the year 2008 progressed, Prime Minister Fukuda’s government was harassed by obstruction from the opposition parties. It was also weakened by disunity within the ruling camp itself. Disagreements about domestic policies and electoral strategies raged within the counsels of ruling party lawmakers.169 Public opinion polls showed declining

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support for the government and significant support for the opposition. On the other hand, realizing that a general election might spell doom for the LDP as a whole, the government repeatedly backed away from calling early elections. The law did not require elections until September 2009 and, in spite of gridlock in the Diet and a lapsed popular mandate, the LDP –New Komeito coalition was determined to struggle on, frustrating the DPJ’s plan. In mid-June 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda signaled that he intended to use the government’s lower house supermajority to once again push through another year-long extension of the MSDF mission. The Bush administration, which was still in power, continued to insist that Japan’s refueling efforts remain in place, regardless of the absence of military purpose. From Washington’s perspective, the MSDF mission symbolized Tokyo’s desire to remain engaged in the War on Terror, and it continued to hold its ally’s feet to the fire. The Japanese government, in turn, had somehow convinced itself that the MSDF mission was a relatively modest price to pay for expressing loyalty to its American allies, and many government leaders also felt a visceral hatred for Ozawa and the opposition parties for daring to challenge their authority. If they could stick it down the opposition parties’ throats one last time, then why not? Fukuda, however, attempted to handle the issue with care. He convened an extraordinary Diet session in late August, so as to give the ruling coalition ample time to pass the re-extension bill without incurring another temporary halt to the mission. Fukuda’s most serious challenge, however, came not from Ozawa and the DPJ, but from his own coalition. His lack of personal support within the LDP left him vulnerable to political pressures from various party constituencies. Additionally, the New Komeito Party evidenced renewed signs of skittishness about SDF deployments abroad. If New Komeito bolted from the coalition, the LDP would lack the votes to force through the extension. Even more ominously, Fukuda was under assault from a variety of forces within his own party that wished to hijack his administration for their own various purposes. Worst of all, there was, in fact, no consensus among LDP lawmakers

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about the policies the government should pursue in terms of domestic governance. Different party factions were pushing for policies that at times directly contradicted one another. Fukuda had neither a way to satisfy each constituency, nor sufficient independent power to impose his own ideas. In short, the premier was menaced by rebellious party members, wielded little authority and had no personal solutions to offer. As a result, in early August 2008, Fukuda capitulated to the faction calling for his rival Taro Aso to be brought into his administration. The cabinet was reshuffled to allow Aso to become LDP secretary-general. Aso’s supporters believed that their man could connect with the Japanese people in a way that the staid and colourless figure of Yasuo Fukuda could not. One major flaw in the arrangement, however, was that Fukuda personally disliked his new partner in government. Indeed, the new scheme promised to make him even more of a figurehead than he already was.170 For his part, Taro Aso was eager to rush into action. He exuberantly proclaimed his intention to fight the battle of the MSDF extension to the bitter end: ‘I want the public to realize that we cannot close our eyes and expect others to do Japan’s work when 90 per cent of the oil is brought into Japan through the Indian Ocean. Japan pulling out when international society is joining hands is not necessarily something that can be accepted by the world.’171 (The MSDF in the Indian Ocean had no legal authority to guard Japanese oil tankers, but logical inconsistencies and objective circumstances were never obstacles that could contain Taro Aso’s enthusiasms.) It was still not clear, however, whether or not the government could succeed in its frequently announced desire to extend the mission beyond January 2009.172 The LDP and its allies in the media were still insisting that Japan was required to accede to Washington’s directions. In mid-August, an unnamed senior official stated, ‘Having looked closely at what the United States is likely to do, we’ve concluded that they will withdraw from Iraq, but move toward strengthening counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. Given this, Japan won’t be able to halt refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.’173 The Yomiuri Shinbun added, ‘During the 1991 Gulf War,

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Japan made a huge financial contribution but did not offer any personnel to the US-led effort, provoking criticism from the international community. If Japan decides to halt its refueling activities on the grounds that it does not want to risk doing something that is unpopular with the public, politics in this country will have regressed 17 years.’174 Even at the eleventh hour of the Bush era – long after many Americans had begun openly describing it as a failed presidency – the Japanese government and its allies in the media continued to insist that they had no alternatives other than obedience. For them, the ‘no choice’ doctrine was still very much in effect. Moreover, Japanese conservatives were using the very same arguments in late 2008 that they made in late 2001. Seven years of futility and failure simply had not registered on them. As a result, the LDP’s forced march would continue, but Yasuo Fukuda was done for. At the beginning of September 2008, without informing any of the leaders of his own party, or even his wife, Fukuda called an unscheduled press conference to abruptly announce his resignation.175 He had reached the limits of his patience, blaming the opposition parties for his decision, but most analysts understood that his defeat came from forces within the LDP.176 Resigning without notice was his small measure of revenge.177 Like Shinzo Abe before him, Fukuda had lasted in office only a year. Fukuda’s resignation, though it shocked his colleagues, also presented them with a fresh opportunity to recapture public support. Five candidates vied with each other to succeed him, and throughout September public interest in politics rose. Former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba was a long-shot candidate who, for the first time in Japanese post-war history, made security policy the centrepiece of his campaign. As he launched his effort, he declared hyperbolically, ‘The reason I decided to run is to advocate strongly the need to continue the refueling so that it will become an issue. If we do not continue, this country is finished.’178 The foreign media took greater interest in the candidacy of Yuriko Koike, who would have become Japan’s first female prime minister had she prevailed. Notably, Koike was supported by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Nevertheless, there was never

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much doubt that Taro Aso was the favourite, and it was he who convincingly won the intra-party vote.179 The political strategy the ruling coalition had begun to envision was to take advantage of Taro Aso’s honeymoon period to call immediate general elections. While it was generally acknowledged that the LDP– New Komeito coalition would not be able to maintain its critical lower house supermajority, the ruling parties still hoped to outperform the DPJ and thus renew their public mandate. How all of this would impact the plan to re-extend the MSDF mission was a big question. However, even this modest political objective was thrown into doubt when the nascent Aso regime was immediately struck by a triple blow. First, contrary to most predictions, the new cabinet received only lukewarm support from the Japanese people: Only 48 per cent told pollsters that they supported the new Aso cabinet – a number far below historical levels. Second, Junichiro Koizumi announced his resignation from politics the day after Aso came to power. This move was widely interpreted as his personal vote of no confidence in Taro Aso; Koizumi issued no statements to dispel this impression. Finally, Aso miscalculated by packing his cabinet with his right-wing associates who were by no means the best-qualified candidates. One of these men was forced to resign within days of taking office when he launched a series of verbal gaffes. For the premiership of Taro Aso, there wasn’t much of a honeymoon. These circumstances left Prime Minister Aso with an agonizing first decision: should he still go immediately into elections, as had been planned, and risk having one of the shortest premierships in Japanese history? Or should he delay the polls and hope that some better political opportunity would appear within the remaining year before the law required House of Representatives elections? Taro Aso had run four separate times before he finally succeeded in becoming prime minister and, as the grandson of one of Japan’s most revered political figures, he had actually been running for the office all his life. Not surprisingly, therefore, he opted to stay safely in office, postponing the plans for the general elections.180 Ichiro Ozawa’s DPJ nevertheless tried a clever gambit to force Aso’s hand. The opposition party unexpectedly announced in the

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Diet that it would not delay passage of the MSDF bill as it had done the previous year, but would instead allow the re-extension bill to be voted up or down after only perfunctory debate. Since the threat of delay in the upper house was the most potent weapon in the DPJ arsenal, the practical result of this ploy was allowing the bill to pass in short order. For Ozawa and the DPJ, the entire MSDF Indian Ocean mission was merely one piece on a larger political chessboard: The opposition’s primary objective, as always, was to overthrow LDP rule. By giving way quickly on the MSDF bill and another pending bill, the DPJ hoped to deprive Aso of any plausible excuses to delay the general election.181 The DPJ’s manoeuvre, however, was too clever by half: it was too transparently manipulative and the move was denounced on editorial pages across the political spectrum.182 When Prime Minister Aso signaled that he had, in any case, no intention of calling elections, the DPJ backtracked and began delaying the bill after all. The opposition parties in the House of Councillors stalled as long as they could – until December 2008 – but, in the end, the results were the same as last time: The governing coalition used its supermajority in the House of Representatives to extend the MSDF Indian Ocean mission for a further year. Once again, the government triumphed. But again, it did so at a political cost that seemed out of proportion to what was gained – a pat on the back from the lame-duck administration of George W. Bush. Prime Minister Taro Aso’s public approval rating fell to about 20 per cent, less than half the support rate he began with. The LDP’s political future looked darker than ever. One Japanese political analyst was moved to predict: ‘Aso will become the LDP’s funeral director rather than saving it.’183 The triumph of the ‘no choice’ doctrine among Japanese conservatives had created a situation in which they had trapped themselves. By convincing themselves that Japan could not reject any major demand from the Bush administration, they had lost control of their ability to make independent strategic choices in their foreign policy. When could the GSDF be withdrawn from Samawa? Not after one year. Not even after two years – only when Washington finally

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agreed to a departure; and even then the pullout would come at the price of expanding the ASDF transport mission in Kuwait and Iraq.184 When would the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean complete its duty? Even after six years, American officials were demanding that the ruling party risk the very collapse of its government in order to continue a mission for which there was obviously little practical need. Until the very end of the Bush administration, and even beyond, they could find no way out. There was no exit. And yet, even at high political cost to the LDP government, conservatives proved willing to do the bidding of their American masters. They remained unwilling to rethink the issues in light of fresh experience or to search for alternatives better suited to Japan’s strengths. The Japanese conservatives’ dependence on the United States had gone far beyond the weaknesses of their objective strategic position and had advanced into the realm of psychological captivity. Japanese leaders had even made it clear that they preferred to see the US Republican Party remain in power beyond January 2009. What had once been described as a regrettable necessity had been transformed into a seemingly permanent form of national servitude. The Japanese conservatives were being dominated – and they liked it.

CHAPTER 5 THE DIPLOMACY OF ANTI-TERRORISM

The previous three chapters recounted the main events that occurred between September 2001 and September 2009 through the prism of SDF deployment policies and demonstrated that Japanese foreign policy became highly dependent on the Bush administration. This chapter reinforces and develops that narrative by looking at changes in Tokyo’s diplomatic policies, most especially, the cases of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, North Korea and China. These case studies will demonstrate the validity of the point once voiced by former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, that Tokyo’s relationships with countries other than the United States have become ‘like dotted lines’. Of course, neither the ruling LDP nor the independently-powerful bureaucracy ever described themselves as being hopelessly dependent on Washington. Even as they privately subscribed to the ‘no choice’ doctrine, they continued to maintain the fiction that they were operating according to their own counsels. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was, in many ways, the institutional home of the notion that Japan was required to follow the American lead. It was the duty of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats to articulate policy rationales that justified their behaviour at the same time that they preserved some semblance of national dignity. In other words, the War on Terror required the formulation of a new diplomatic language that

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simultaneously legitimized Japanese policies and preserved the government’s ability to swiftly change direction if commands from Washington demanded it. This new diplomatic language was presented publicly in a variety of forms. Most obviously, it could be found in the official statements and in diplomatic speeches delivered at international events. Although these are important, their very nature requires them to be formulaic. In order to gain a greater degree of both domestic and international credibility, semi-official spokesmen were also employed, because such persons could speak more freely. The fact that they were not formally agents of the government made it possible to create a degree of ‘plausible deniability’, should one of them cause embarrassment with a suggestion resulting in severe public criticism. In this way, public reaction to potential new policies could be tested. The apparent independence of these commentators was also useful in its own right since it suggested that government policy was winning plaudits from a community of supposedly objective experts and scholars.

The Japanese Ideology of Anti-terrorism Though terrorism has existed in all nations in all periods of history, and many aspects of both the terrorist and anti-terrorist phenomena are universal, there are distinctions that can be made in terms of ideology. Non state terrorist groups possess a very wide variety of characteristics. Some are idealistic and have broad support within a larger community, which views them as a sort of modern-day Robin Hood (yet another terrorist, according to the US State Department definition), while other terrorist groups are extremely cynical and are despised outside their own limited circles. Different societies and different regimes have varied perceptions and approaches to antiterrorism as well. Does the Japanese view of the War on Terror differ from the American view? It was the Bush administration that created and popularized the concept of the War on Terror, but was it received in Japan in precisely the same way as it was in the United States? Have

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Japanese government officials truly embraced the notion of a War on Terror, or are they merely complying for the sake of appeasing the sensibilities of their crucial ally? Is there a unique Japanese ideology of anti-terrorism? One school of thought believes that Japanese conservatives never seriously attempted to think these matters through. The scholar Keiko Sakai states, ‘I don’t believe that there is anything that can properly be called an “anti-terrorist ideology” among the Japanese conservatives. They think that terrorism is a bad thing, but there is no special reason or deep thought about it.’1 In this view, there is nothing particularly profound to be discovered in conservative Japanese ideas about terrorism; it is merely that conservatives work with the Americans to eliminate a ‘bad thing’ from international society. In contrast to the view offered by Keiko Sakai, however, I will argue that Japanese conservatives’ view of terrorism is, in fact, distinguishable from the mainstream American view. While Sakai is certainly correct in her belief that most Japanese conservatives have not engaged in deep thinking about the nature of terrorism and how the issue can be most effectively addressed, much the same can be said of the American public or that of any other nation. The conceptualizers are always a small minority. In Japan, Foreign Ministry diplomats are among the leading conceptualizers. It is they who must present public rationales to explain and defend national policy. An early example of this approach came in October 2001 through the medium of Yukio Sato, then ambassador to the United Nations. Speaking of the September 11 attacks, he announced, The government of Japan considers that these terrorist acts must be seen not solely as assaults against the United States, but also as crimes against humanity and a challenge to democracy and freedom all over the world, and that combating terrorism is also Japan’s own responsibility. With this recognition, Japan will make every possible effort, in cooperation with the international community, to bring to justice those responsible for these terrorist attacks.2

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From the very beginning, then, by positing the view that ‘democracy and freedom’ were being challenged, and that Japan, as a democratic and free nation, was obligated to stand up against this global threat, Japanese diplomats assumed responsibility for confronting al-Qaeda. Alternative notions – such as the idea that al-Qaeda was responding inappropriately to specific conflicts with US foreign policy – were immediately rejected as inadmissible. According to the official rhetoric, it was Japan’s responsibility to confront al-Qaeda, both because of the US-Japan alliance and because such a confrontation was the task of all democratic and free nations. There was a further responsibility on behalf of ‘civilization’: All member states of the United Nations must remain in strong solidarity and join together to combat all forms of terrorism. . . In this context, it cannot be overemphasized that it is terrorists whom we must confront, not Muslims or Islamic or Arab countries. It is indeed a matter of grave concern that, despite the anti-terrorism efforts to date of the international community, vicious terrorist acts have increased in recent years. Today there is virtually no country that is not faced with the threat of terrorism. It is therefore imperative that the international community act as one in order to eliminate all forms of terrorism. . . Building upon these experiences. . . the government of Japan is determined to engage itself even more actively in international cooperation, both within and outside the United Nations, to eliminate international terrorism.3 Following the official rhetoric of the Bush administration, Ambassador Sato carefully suggested that the War on Terror had no direct connection to Muslims or Arabs. The enemy, he noted, was something or someone called ‘international terrorism’, and the struggle would end only when that foe was ‘eliminated’. Neither at this early date nor in the future did Japanese diplomats ever indicate precisely how, even theoretically, ‘all forms of terrorism’ could be eliminated from the earth. Was ‘state terrorism’ also a form of terrorism that Japan was pledging to eliminate? Was political

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assassination a form of terrorism? Would the fight continue until there were no more assassinations anywhere in the world? If taken literally, the official rhetoric was meaningless. On the eve of the American invasion of Iraq, Toshimitsu Motegi, then serving as Senior Vice-Foreign Minister, laid out Tokyo’s priorities in combating terrorism more concretely: The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, revealed, in the most striking manner, that non-state entities such as terrorists can threaten the security of a state. . . Japan places importance on the following three points in the global fight against terrorism: firstly, to deny terrorist groups safe havens; secondly, to deny terrorist groups the means to conduct terrorism; and thirdly, to overcome our vulnerabilities against terrorism. In order to achieve these objectives, we have to build cooperative relations and networks among countries in a wide range of areas, including not only military organizations, but also law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations. The effort of capacity-building to strengthen counterterrorism measures by developing countries is also vital. In this respect, Japan attaches particular importance on the Asian region and is collaborating with the Asian countries.4 This statement clarified Japan’s role in the War on Terror in several respects: It offered three areas of priority and indicated that Asia – not the entire world – was the main geographical scope of Tokyo’s efforts. It also revealed that Japan’s concern about terrorism was limited to ‘non-state entities’ rather than the mind-boggling ‘all forms of terrorism’ as referenced in Ambassador Sato’s speech. But even this more circumscribed approach strains plausibility. The first two objectives – ‘to deny terrorist groups safe havens’ and ‘to deny terrorist groups the means to conduct terrorism’ – were likely to be beyond the resources of all nations, not to mention Japan alone. By what means did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intend to deny safe haven to terrorists and to dispossess them of the means of conducting terrorism? Nor is it clear what exactly ‘the means’ of

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terrorism are. It could be almost anything: the September 11 hijackers employed tools no more sophisticated than box cutters. In Japan’s own history, terrorism had been conducted with guns and sticks and even with fists. How were potential terrorists going to be deprived of these means? As the years went by, the official rhetoric of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs evolved. By 2004, the hard line on non state terrorism had become even harder. Shinichi Kitaoka, a right-wing university professor appointed that year as the Japanese ambassador to the United Nations, stated: ‘There can never be any justification whatsoever for terrorism.’5 Later that same year, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi declared that ‘Barbaric terrorist attacks that cruelly target many innocent civilians cannot be justified for any reason.’6 In the following years, almost every statement emanating from the Foreign Ministry regarding an act of terrorism would contain the same formulaic phrase: ‘Terrorism cannot be justified for any reason.’ Ultimately, when Japan hosted the G-8 Summit in Hokkaido in July 2008, the anti-terrorist rhetoric was ratcheted up to yet another level: ‘Conflict, oppression, and poverty do not excuse or justify terrorism.’7 The often repeated contention that ‘terrorism cannot be justified for any reason’ was always more effective as rhetoric than as policy. The statement had a righteous, dignified ring, but it withered under closer examination. What is logically implied by the notion that ‘oppression’ does not excuse or justify terrorism? Surely the term ‘oppression’ is itself a practical synonym for state terrorism. Consider the broader ramifications of the G-8 statement: an autocratic government can smash into people’s houses, destroy furniture, rape, beat and humiliate ordinary citizens with impunity. But should people take up arms against such oppression, they would instantly be designated as ‘terrorists’, whom all civilized people must oppose. This view – that ordinary people suffering oppression possess no right to liberate themselves through their own actions – stands in direct contradiction to the political theory outlined by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. In practical terms, it is a license for governments to oppress their people and a denial of a fundamental principle of popular government.

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The veneer of uncompromising moral rectitude found in the official statements and speeches of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats may have been an attempt to disguise a more profound aimlessness in government circles. The ministry’s ‘International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division’, established in December 2001 with an initial staff of only five, was given the mandate ‘to be in charge of operations pertaining to the protection of the lives, well-being, and property of Japanese citizens in relation to incidents of terrorism overseas, and for work associated with the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.’ In March 2002, the position of ‘Ambassador in Charge of International CounterTerrorism Cooperation’ was created. The ambassadors who have served in this office made speeches at various international conferences and signed international agreements, but their concrete accomplishments are harder to define. One counterterrorism ambassador described the overall task: ‘Counterterrorism is a fight fought by legitimate governments against terrorists to protect humanity and civilizations’ – a definition that covers a lot of ground.8 Japanese diplomats were certainly not alone in using this kind of language. For the most part, they were merely echoing the terminology used by other nations’ diplomats. On the other hand, Japan was one of the Bush administration’s closest allies: the speeches and statements of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats were primarily aimed at expressing solidarity with their American allies.9 The arguments and expressions of the informal agents of official policy further elucidate the Japanese ideology of anti-terrorism. These informal agents included government officials who were retired or speaking in their personal capacity, elite academics participating in ministry projects and editorial writers on the Yomiuri Shinbun, which consistently maintained tight links to the ruling party. One view of the War on Terror, very close to being official, was provided in March 2006 in the Foreign Ministry journal Gaiko Forum. The author, Jun Shinmi, was an active diplomat who served as an anti-terrorism aide to the chief cabinet secretary. He had been in New York on September 11, although his apartment was far from the

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World Trade Center. In his essay, Shinmi echoed the view of Prime Minister Koizumi when he asserted that ‘For the Japanese people, global terrorism is not just someone else’s affair.’10 Shinmi then explained why terrorism was such an issue of concern: The biggest threat to national security used to be wars among nations, which are essentially now units of an international community. Since World War II, peace among nations has been maintained by global harmony and deterrence. Now, however, terrorists without territories and nations to protect have risen as independent actors with both the power and intent to seriously threaten international security. In addition to nation-versusnation conflict, ‘asymmetrical’ conflict, between nations and global terrorists, has become a new and important issue, challenging not only national security but also the stability and order of the international community itself.11 In Shinmi’s view, state-on-state violence had largely been overcome, and the post-1945 era was characterized by ‘peace among nations’ and ‘global harmony’. He asserted that ‘global terrorists’ pose an existential threat and a challenge to the ‘order of the international community’. He went on to describe that threat: ‘Terrorists try both to confuse the international community and divide public opinion by making use of unanticipated violence, threats, and one-sided messages.’12 Shinmi believed that only the use of force would be effective: Global terrorism is a challenge to human society’s existence. In short, for the sake of the peaceful prosperity of human society regardless of races and religion, it is necessary to respect, through law, the most basic of human rights, life, and the physical freedoms of human beings by solving our problems peacefully, though opinions and thoughts may differ. Terrorists, however, do not hesitate to kill or wound innocent citizens for their purposes. They hide their identities and will not follow any rules of international laws. We cannot coexist with such

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global terrorists. As long as the methods of terrorists’ inclinations are anonymity and invisibility, it is almost impossible to cope with terror through dialogue. In distinction to the situation between nations, no deterrence is possible, no diplomatic approach is possible, and it is hard to impose restrictions. Therefore, we cannot help but cope with terror through the use of force.13 Shinmi explicitly rejected the idea that nonviolent solutions can be effective in dealing with terrorism. Implicitly, he suggests that terrorists can represent no valid political causes or legitimate grievances. Their use of violence is predicated on the fact that they have different ‘opinions and thoughts’ and are unwilling to engage in peaceful debate. The possibility that governments practice political oppression or that states may be the perpetrators of terrorism is left unaddressed. Shinmi even goes so far as to describe Japanese who believe in the ‘cycle of violence’ theory as being the unwitting dupes of terrorists: ‘I often hear the insistence, “Fighting against terror brings more terror, and I’m against this cycle of violence and hatred.” Actually, this is the very doctrine which terrorists themselves are spreading around the world.’14 Shinmi concludes his essay with a call for Japan to remain engaged in the War on Terror. He asserts that the struggle is being fought by ‘global society’, which is united in its purpose of ‘wisely and solidly waging a war against global terrorism’. If Japan declined to participate in this effort, it would be equivalent to turning its back on humanity itself: ‘As the international community remains undivided in its struggle against terrorism, Japan’s possible separation from the struggle would signify not only defeat in the battle against terrorism, but also a betrayal of the international community’s resolve.’15 The editors of the Yomiuri Shinbun take a view of the War on Terror that is similar to Jun Shinmi’s. This newspaper has the world’s highest daily circulation. Ruled autocratically by its owner Tsuneo Watanabe, the Yomiuri Shinbun maintains a consistently conservative editorial line, and it may not be too much to suggest that the Yomiuri

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Shinbun serves as an unofficial thinktank for Japan’s ruling conservatives.16 After September 11, the basic messages of this newspaper were hammered home ad nauseam: the US– Japan alliance must be preserved; international contributions are Japan’s national responsibility; the opposition parties cannot be trusted; and Japan’s laws must be changed to allow the government and the SDF stronger authority to defend the state. Presenting one opinion article from this newspaper is to present dozens. This article, written by a senior political editor, Goro Hashimoto, in late October 2001, not long after the War on Terror had been declared, gives something of the flavour of the Yomiuri Shinbun perspective. The title of the piece is ‘Japan Must Revise Constitution to Live Up to Its Responsibilities’. After dismissing the arguments of the opposition parties as ‘a waste of time’, he presents a view making use of the Koizumian theme of ‘common sense’: The September 11 terrorist attacks have dealt a harsh blow to [the] post-war way of thinking over national security in Japan. The questions being asked in the wake of the terrorist attacks is: what independent action should Japan take in response and how should obstacles to that response be overcome? In a crisis situation such as this, we should rely on sound common sense. . . There were some who pointed out what they called the ‘danger of common sense’, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi tried to ride out the Diet debate on the anti-terrorism bill by emphasizing a common-sense approach. It was indeed an absurd criticism. To say that common sense is dangerous is tantamount to praising a lack of common sense. Koizumi should have been criticized for not going further than simply asserting a common-sense approach, and failing to delve deeper into the conventional interpretation of the Constitution.17 Hashimoto felt that the government’s ban on ‘the right of collective self-defence’ was something that was ‘far from sensible’. He wanted Koizumi to challenge all remaining obstacles to the robust employment of the SDF in Japan’s quest to become ‘a state with

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common sense’. Hashimoto’s aim was not simply to reinterpret the constitution, but to rewrite it in line with what he regarded as Japan’s needs and responsibilities: The September 11 terrorist attacks have made it ever more apparent that Japan, as it stands now, cannot meet even its minimum responsibility to the international community. . . It is inexcusable for Japan to evade its international responsibilities under the cover of Article Nine of the Constitution. What is needed now is a thorough review of the conventional interpretation of the Constitution, a reexamination of the ideal shape of the Constitution in light of common sense, and a concerted effort to amend provisions of the Constitution which no longer meet the needs of the times.18 The Koizumi administration did not fully embrace the ambitious agenda Hashimoto advocated. Koizumi understood that public opinion was unlikely to accept a frontal assault on the constitution. Amending the document required a national referendum, with the approval of a majority – a very high hurdle to the objectives of conservative revisionists. Still, year after year, the Yomiuri Shinbun relentlessly preached this cause to its millions of daily readers. By September 2009 the newspaper still had not achieved its most cherished goals, but it did succeed in pushing the national debate in the direction it favoured. Another conservative Japanese view of the War on Terror – one that might be described as ‘neoconservative’ in some respects – was offered by Satoshi Ikeuchi, a young prote´ge´ of the well-connected scholar Masayuki Yamauchi. Like Yamauchi, Ikeuchi had arisen out of Japan’s community of scholars of the Islamic world, but he represented the very small minority that advocated conservative views. This background gave him the intellectual tools to examine the War on Terror from within its ‘Islamic’ context, rather than simply referencing de-historicized and de-contextualized perspectives. In a dialogue published in the right-wing monthly magazine Shokun!, Ikeuchi argued that there was little difference between the views of

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ordinary Muslims and those of the violent extremists. Furthermore, he castigated ‘liberal intellectuals’ in Japan whom he believed unable to deal with Islamist terrorism: Although ‘intellectuals’ in the liberal world have appealed to ‘mutual understanding by dialogue’ as a way to solve problems, it is sheer insolence to believe that Islam has no choice but to bow to our sense of values in the end. Even Muslims who appear assimilated into Western culture cannot contradict the idea of the ‘House of Islam vs. the House of War’, because it is the basis of Islamic law. . . they will be a target of jihad as an ‘apostate’ if they criticize it.19 Ikeuchi believed that all Muslims share core beliefs with Islamist terrorists, and that they cannot therefore be expected to make wholehearted efforts to combat extremism within their own communities. He pushed this argument further and turned it around on the ‘liberals’, whom he believed to be terrorism’s unwitting enablers: We cannot feel secure in thinking that radical fundamentalists are insane people who have nothing to do with normal Muslims. If they are not related, and radical fundamentalists have only their own particular thoughts, then the story is too easy. If that is true, all we have to do is to use force to bottle up a small number of terrorists. However, if radical fundamentalists share a great deal in common with ordinary Muslims, it is ultimately impossible to solve the problem by force. The problem is that when we say such things, we are criticized by self-styled liberals in the Islamic world as well as by Japanese ‘intellectuals’, as if what we are saying was based on discrimination and prejudice and we are arousing hostility toward Muslims. . . We become unable to make a truthful analysis of terrorism, since we are regarded as a target of jihad. This is a strange story, but the ‘intellectuals’ have a selfrighteous and self-centred idea that ‘terrorists are the same if

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we understand their religion properly’. Regrettably, such argument is thought to be both ‘conscientious’ and ‘sophisticated’.20 Ikeuchi’s views are very similar to those of a section of the American right within the context of the debate in the United States, which went further and alleged that liberalism bordered on national treason.21 In Japan, however, such a perspective was quite unusual in this period, since Japanese liberal intellectuals are rarely viewed as an empowered group shaping official policy. Clearly, a major element of Ikeuchi’s agenda was to put critics of the government’s policies on the defensive and to promote the notion that the War on Terror was both justified and necessary. Ikeuchi even denied the relevant history that gave rise to the problem of terrorism: Some argue that the Palestinian dispute and the Iraq War are the cause of terrorism. . . Even if the Palestinian dispute is settled, terrorism will not disappear, and terrorists will find another reason for their actions. I believe that Japan also had a period in which it would not condemn terrorism because of the media’s sympathetic attitudes toward the criminals’ ‘reasons’ of ‘sanction against imperialistic, economic aggression’ – as can be seen when a series of bombings on the buildings of companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industry occurred in the 1970s. In this respect, Japan is ignorant about the fact that terrorism itself is a struggle against freedom.22 There is little doubt that Ikeuchi, for one, was speaking as a true believer in anti-terrorism. His vision was global in the sense that, as a scholar, he was familiar with the Islamic world and could debate political and cultural issues from an informed perspective. At the same time, the target of his passion seemed to be Japanese liberals as much as it was terrorism arising in Muslim communities. It appears that at least a handful of Japanese conservatives developed their own commitment to the cause of the War on Terror that was more than simple flattery of their American allies. The

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Japanese conservative approach was indeed distinguishable from the American approach in several respects. One of the most obvious distinctions is that Japanese antiterrorism contains no Christian crusading overtones, because most Japanese do not share that faith. While many secular Americans have also supported the War on Terror, others, from President Bush to Attorney General John Ashcroft to many ordinary American citizens, have done so with a sense of religious mission that added ideological intensity to the struggle. For this reason, Japanese conservatives never took the idea of an ‘Axis of Evil’ particularly seriously, nor did they refer to terrorists as ‘evildoers’ or use other religious code words.23 If there is an element of the sacred in the Japanese anti-terrorist view, it is order. Japanese culture, as some observers have noted, has an ‘obsession with order’ and ‘an almost religious faith in order’.24 The conservatives’ deep annoyance with terrorism was primarily that it ‘created confusion’, thus disrupting the political and social order. Terrorism must be ‘eliminated’ because it threatens social harmony and political stability. This attitude appears quite clearly in a 2002 essay written by then Ambassador to the United States Ryozo Kato: There are people in the world who tacitly approve of (even if they do not completely or openly condone) terrorist activities. Terrorists argue that terrorism is the last resort of the weak and downtrodden against the strong. Terrorists declare that soul-searching is required of the strong, whose attitudes and actions have invited or elicited terrorism. While there have been conflicts among competing civilizations in the past, terrorism has never been an acceptable solution. . . Giving terrorism any kind of legitimate role in adjusting power relations among civilizations will only unleash the forces of anarchism and nihilism, and make it impossible to secure order in the world. Terrorism cannot be allowed to be part of civilization in any form. Like a cancer cell, its presence can only be pernicious.25

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One of the consequences of this obsession with order is that Japanese anti-terrorism tends to be more defensive (or preservationist) in character than American anti-terrorism, which, in turn, was often driven to offensive action by its underlying passion for conversion and redemption. There is a deeper distinction between the Japanese and American views that is more difficult to document because it lies at an unconscious level. Americans are often guided by a sense of moral righteousness, whose origins can be found in monotheistic religion, even when an individual is ostensibly secular. Americans therefore tend to view political issues through the lens of Good vs. Evil, Justice vs. Injustice, or Heroes vs. Villains. These popular American notions are much weaker in Japanese culture, where the more important distinction is between those who cooperate and those who act in selfcentred and uncooperative ways. For the Japanese, what people believe is less important than how they act in public situations. Terrorism is an outrage because it disrupts public harmony and fails to take into consideration the feelings of others. In other words, terrorism disregards people’s ‘right of living peacefully’ – a characteristic Japanese notion. One other factor, which does not relate directly to the conservative Japanese ideology of anti-terrorism, helps to explain why the political establishment was so quick to embrace the War on Terror. Kenneth Pyle identifies this quality as ‘honorific nationalism’, but here the term ‘prestige diplomacy’ is used in order to highlight its foreign-policy dimensions and its close connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pyle describes this quality: The Japanese response to the international system is a persistent obsession with status and prestige. . . The concern with prestige and a reputation of power [is] more sensitive, fragile, and vulnerable for the Japanese. Throughout its modern history, Japan has measured its standing against other major powers. Its goal was always to be recognized as a first-rank country. . . Moreover, how the great powers perceived Japan was always

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critical. The Japanese needed confirmation that the evaluations of others included the recognition of their superior qualities.26 This conservative craving for international prestige was closely related to Japan’s embrace of the War on Terror, much as it had been the main wellspring of the ‘trauma’ and ‘humiliation’ of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. What wounded conservative Japanese most deeply in that earlier affair were American accusations that Japan had acted dishonourably and had shirked its great-power burden. The obsession of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats and the Yomiuri Shinbun with Japan’s ‘responsibilities’ in the War on Terror reflects the characteristics described by Kenneth Pyle. Japan, as Pyle further notes, ‘repeatedly allied itself with the dominant ascendant power’.27 The Koizumi administration’s eagerness to defend ‘humanity’ and ‘civilization’ in solidarity with its American allies was part and parcel of its longstanding desire to be grouped with the leading power of the age. For a great power such as Japan, assuming the obligations of anti-terrorism is kata – which in this context might be translated as ‘the way things are done’. The Bush administration was eager to create new doctrines and practices to shape a new world order, and the Japanese conservatives were equally eager to accept well-defined guidelines from above so long as Japan was always clearly recognized as being a player at the top-level table. Richard Armitage, who understood his Japanese friends’ craving for prestige, was occasionally masterful at manipulating it. Truth be told, Japanese conservatives are so transparent to those who know them that they are fairly easy to manipulate once the appropriate appeals are discovered. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be the central institution that guards Japan’s international reputation, but it is by no means the only one. The Defense Ministry is also strongly imbued with the samurai spirit and a jealous concern to protect the nation’s honour. This quality can be perceived, for example, in the comments of then Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani in November 2001, shortly after the MSDF mission to the Indian Ocean was launched: ‘This mission is drawing a great deal of scrutiny, not only

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in Japan, but also in foreign countries, as a means to demonstrate our determination to fight terrorism. We should aim to be a nation that is respected by the rest of the world and a nation that can act on behalf of people around the world through active and responsible contributions.’28 By taking up the War on Terror, Japan reaffirmed its membership in the exclusive club of elite nations. Just as conservatives were driven by a psychological need for approval from the most advanced and powerful nation of the age, conservative leaders wished at all costs to avoid the shame of being laughed at by foreigners. In order to comprehend more precisely how the War on Terror altered Japanese foreign policy in a number of contexts, it is necessary to examine specific changes that occurred in the period from September 2001 to September 2009. The objective of these case studies is to demonstrate more concretely the influence of the War on Terror on Japan’s international posture.

Afghanistan In the case of Afghanistan, Japanese conservatives wanted to take centre stage, but could never quite find a way of doing so without subjecting themselves to unbearably high political risks. At the outset of the War on Terror, however, this difficulty was not yet apparent, and Japan initiated its campaign with a moment of triumph. In early November 2001, as the Taliban regime was collapsing, Prime Minister Koizumi named former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata as his special representative for Afghanistan. Ogata was pleased to accept the post, since she had long felt that she had not finished her work of helping Afghan refugees.29 Simultaneously with Ogata’s appointment, it was also announced that the main international conference for rebuilding Afghanistan would be held in Tokyo. This was precisely the kind of high profile international role that made Japanese officials glow with pride. In December 2001, three LDP lawmakers led by Yasuhisa Shiozaki visited Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan to meet the warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, a key figure in the Northern Alliance.30

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Tokyo’s eagerness to recognize the new regime was palpable, with Vice-Foreign Minister Yoshiji Nogami going so far as to suggest that it was not necessary to wait for the actual launch of the Afghan administration before recognizing it.31 Formal diplomatic recognition came on December 26, and the Japanese flag was hoisted over its liaison office in Kabul for the first time in many years. Ogata herself went to Kabul in early January to hold talks with Hamid Karzai, head of the new Afghan government. The main event in Tokyo – the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan – was scheduled for January 21–22, 2002. Japanese leaders received wide praise for their leading role. For example, World Bank President James Wolfensohn offered this tribute: ‘The Japanese government has indicated that it wishes to have a leadership position in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. That is why the conference is being held in Tokyo and why it is one of the four members of the steering committee.’32 In fact, Japan’s initial role was so prominent that the governments of Britain, France and Germany complained bitterly to US officials that their nations’ military contributions to the Afghan campaign should have entitled them to host the conference.33 In terms of financial contributions, however, Tokyo did assume the lead. The pledge of up to US$500 million for the first two years of Afghan reconstruction was the largest single pledge by any country. Although the conference was a big success for Japanese policymakers, their joy was overshadowed by a very public feud between Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka and Vice-Foreign Minister Yoshiji Nogami over the participation of Japanese NGOs. Tanaka was angry that Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, working covertly with an influential LDP lawmaker, had banned two NGOs – Peace Winds Japan and Japan Platform – from participation in the conference because of their alleged ‘antigovernment’ political views. Since her appointment as foreign minister, Tanaka had repeatedly clashed with the powerful bureaucracy, and some Japanese diplomats were openly subverting her authority. At length, Prime Minister Koizumi stepped in and fired both Tanaka and Nogami. His sacking of the popular Makiko Tanaka damaged Koizumi’s standing with the

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general public, and his cabinet’s approval rate fell sharply from the stratospheric heights it had previously enjoyed. Later, it emerged that Nogami was not actually fired, and he remained influential within the ministry. If conservative leaders had been given little chance to savour their leadership role in the Afghan aid conference as a consequence of the Tanaka – Nogami feud, it was only the beginning of their misfortunes. Hosting an international conference and pledging a substantial amount of money was the easy part. What came next was not entirely clear.34 While the Karzai regime established itself in Kabul, security conditions in the country remained unstable. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had been routed, but not completely defeated. They soon reestablished themselves across the border in Pakistan and were able to launch raids into Afghan territory. The world’s attention shifted to Iraq, but the future of Afghanistan remained unclear. Though Tokyo had excellent relations with the Karzai regime and was a key donor, the security problem endured. Japan had few resources to control this situation. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was established in December 2001, slowly expanded its military operations beyond Kabul. Since ISAF missions included combat, and the multinational force was suffering casualties, it was highly unlikely that the SDF could participate in such actions. Or could it? Unlike the more controversial Iraq War, the struggle in Afghanistan was considered legitimate by a much wider international audience. Al-Qaeda, after all, had been based in this country, and was thus directly linked to the September 11 attacks. Furthermore, the Taliban were more genuinely disliked and isolated in world affairs than the Hussein regime had been. Other than certain elements within the Pakistani government, almost no other power wished to see the Taliban regime reconstitute itself in Kabul. The fact that Tokyo therefore felt less constrained in offering Afghanistan assistance may have led Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to suggest in January 2007, while on a visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, that the SDF might play a military role in Afghanistan. He made no

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specific proposal, but stated, ‘If it is for international peace and stability, I will not shy away from overseas activities by the Japanese SDF. . . Japan is currently deliberating about the best way to engage in international peace cooperation activities, including the legal framework.’35 Abe’s comments whetted the appetite of those in Washington and London who were looking for additional military support in Afghanistan. In February 2007, Washington requested that the Japanese government send a GSDF CH-47 military helicopter unit to Afghanistan to support American and British military operations by transporting soldiers and their equipment.36 This US request was declined at first, but in early May Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma indicated that Tokyo was actively considering the possibility of issuing a new law enabling a dispatch of the SDF to Afghan territory.37 Additionally, Japanese proponents of an enhanced role were able to divert some of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to projects overseen by the joint military– civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Finally, Tokyo hosted the Conference on the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups for the Stabilization of Afghanistan which involved the training of Afghan police. These steps brought Japan yet closer to a direct military role.38 However, July 2007 was a disastrous month for the advocates of military participation. First, midway through the month, a South Korean hostage crisis broke out in Afghanistan that sent shivers down the backs of Japanese leaders, who realized that it could easily have been Tokyo rather than Seoul that had to face such a political crisis. More fundamentally, the massive defeat of the ruling parties in the elections to the House of Councillors at the end of July completely altered the political landscape. The prospect for any military deployment to Afghanistan evaporated instantly, the Abe regime crumbled and fell and the following six months were devoted to the titanic political struggle over the continuation of the MSDF Indian Ocean mission.39 During the LDP– DPJ foreign policy battles of late 2007, opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa suggested that Japanese troops could actually be sent into combat in Afghanistan if they were explicitly

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authorized to do so by the United Nations. In the midst of the partisan struggle, his idea was denounced by the government and its allies in the media as being both unrealistic and unconstitutional. By the summer of 2008, however, Washington was once again pushing for an SDF military role in Afghanistan. Specifically, Defense Secretary Robert Gates requested SDF help when he met with Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Singapore on May 31, 2008.40 The Fukuda administration agreed to examine the possibility, and a survey team was dispatched to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. What that survey team apparently discovered, however, was that conditions in Afghanistan were more dangerous than they had realized. The coalition New Komeito Party stepped in and made it clear that it would not support a direct military role inside Afghanistan. Many in the Defense Ministry and elsewhere were also wary of the proposed mission. The plan for SDF deployment was scrapped once again.41 Little more than a month later, a Japanese civilian aid worker, Kazuya Ito, was kidnapped and killed in southern Afghanistan, perhaps in part in response to the rumours of a possible Japanese military deployment.42 In summation, the Afghanistan campaign within the War on Terror garnered wide support both inside and outside Japan. Initially, the success of the January 2002 International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan boosted the morale of Japanese diplomats and seemed tailor-made for their particular talents. However, they faltered at the next step. When the new regime in Kabul was unable to fully secure the country, Tokyo had few original ideas of its own. Some years later, as the security environment deteriorated further, both the Abe administration and the Fukuda administration considered deploying the SDF directly into Afghanistan. Both administrations, however, could not avoid the conclusion that Japanese lives would be lost if they took such a course of action, and it was far from clear that the Japanese public was prepared to accept such an outcome. The LDP, politically weak at home, could not afford a major foreign policy debacle. For conservative Japanese policymakers, Afghanistan ultimately became a situation that resembled a dream unfulfilled.

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Pakistan If Hamid Karzai’s Afghanistan was an unfulfilled dream, then Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan was a conjured illusion. It began with the Pakistani leader’s quick and nimble decision to offer support to the Bush administration in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Taliban regime, which was a creation of Pakistani intelligence services, was regarded as a useful ally against rival India, but General Musharraf perceived almost immediately that the destruction of the World Trade Center had changed the nature of the game and that Pakistan had suddenly been placed at the front line of the new American agenda. He jumped aboard the bandwagon so as not to be crushed beneath it. The Bush administration was grateful to General Musharraf for his quick decision and was eager to demonstrate to the world that friends would be rewarded as much as enemies would be punished. Within days, US officials told Ambassador Shunji Yanai in Washington that they wanted Japan to provide new financial aid for Pakistan to support the emerging anti-terrorist campaign.43 Tokyo assented to the American request, but it did so with considerable reluctance. The problem was that Japan had placed a freeze on all ODA to both India and Pakistan ever since their extralegal nuclear tests of May 1998. As the only country to have suffered atomic bombing, most Japanese saw themselves as natural leaders in the global campaign against nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan had openly defied the provisions of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), and many Japanese officials felt honourbound to maintain a hard line on this matter. On the other hand, Japanese conservatives could not take the requests of the Bush administration lightly; consequently, they were thrust onto the horns of dilemma: how to reward the Musharraf regime for its cooperation in the anti-terrorism campaign while at the same time punishing it for its wayward nuclear weapons policy? Speaking to a reporter of the Yomiuri Shinbun, a LDP leader gave voice to the main concern: ‘The economic sanctions against Pakistan have been put into force as part of Japan’s policy of nuclear

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nonproliferation, and therefore they have nothing to do with the current war on international terrorism. Should Japan lift sanctions now, foreign countries might view our country as giving the go-ahead to develop nuclear arms.’44 Weighing against this consideration, a different ruling party member noted, ‘Providing support to Pakistan will hold the key to the United States’ retaliatory attacks.’45 In late September 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi dispatched Vice-Foreign Minister Seiken Sugiura to Islamabad with a personal letter for General Musharraf. Sugiura’s mission was to encourage the Pakistani leader to offer full support to the American campaign against terrorism and to explain the meaning of the roughly US$40 million in emergency aid that Japan had decided to provide. Most of the aid package was designed for general assistance to the Pakistani economy.46 General Musharraf was not shy in taking advantage of the new political climate. In a telephone conversation with Koizumi he suggested that one of the most useful actions Japan could take to aid the Pakistani economy was to cancel all its debts, which amounted to about US$5 billion. Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa was nonplussed when the request was forwarded to his department.47 Musharraf followed up by sending his finance minister to Tokyo for no less than four days of intensive talks about how Japan could best offer assistance to his nation.48 By the end of October 2001, Koizumi was making positive noises about the prospects for further aid. Speaking during a Diet session, he stated, ‘In terms of assistance to Pakistan, I think Japan can do something that is different from other countries. When we think about the turn of events after the terrorist attacks, we must also think about economic aid.’49 Several weeks later, this suggestion resulted in a major boost in grant aid – US$300 million was added to the original US$40 million package.50 In March 2002, General Musharraf made a personal visit to Tokyo in order to keep the momentum rolling. His entourage included his finance and trade ministers as well as a group of Pakistani industrialists and business leaders. Japanese officials urged him to

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sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but Musharraf asked for more time.51 The Pakistani president was more interested in gaining Japanese support for his nation’s information technology industry.52 Not all aspects of the rapprochement proceeded smoothly. Pakistan continued to test nuclear-capable missiles, an endeavour that antagonized Japanese leaders. When Pakistan conducted a series of missile tests in May 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda commented coolly, ‘It was highly undesirable.’53 Koizumi followed up this condemnation with a 20-minute phone call to Musharraf in which he asked the Pakistani leader to demonstrate ‘selfrestraint’.54 The new relationship, however, would not be derailed. When Koizumi and Musharraf met in New York for the commemoration of the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the Japanese leader indicated that massive yen loans for Pakistani development projects would be forthcoming.55 In fact, these loans were not actually extended until May 2005, but they were at the top of the agenda from that point forward. Although Pakistan had made no significant changes in its nuclear weapons policy, Tokyo ultimately decided to make the War on Terror the overriding issue, in line with the desires of Washington. In January 2004, the two nations held their first joint security talks in Islamabad.56 The growing links between the SDF and the Pakistani military gradually became one of the key institutional drivers of the bilateral relationship. The original point of contact had been the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, where the Pakistani navy was among the navies the MSDF supported. This connection later expanded into joint celebrations of military holidays and other personnel exchanges. The highlight of these exchanges was the June 2007 goodwill visit to Japan by two Pakistani warships.57 By this time, no one in Tokyo was inclined to ask uncomfortable questions about the Pakistani military’s murky human rights record or its powerful role within the Pakistani state. When Shinzo Abe assumed the office of premier in September 2006, Japan– Pakistan relations became intimate. Verbal criticisms of Pakistani nuclear policy were now rarely heard in Japanese diplomatic circles.

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However, this also happened to be the period in which Musharraf’s political behaviour was becoming increasingly desperate and controversial. In March 2007, Musharraf unilaterally suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, alleging that he had committed certain abuses of power. The president has no legal authority to dismiss a chief justice in this fashion, and Musharraf’s action was the beginning of a major democratic crisis. Although Pakistan was ruled by a military dictatorship, it was also a nation that had a long and proud legal history. Indeed, the founding father of the nation – Muhammad Ali Jinnah – had originally risen to prominence as a brilliant lawyer. Much of the Pakistani intelligentsia took a dim view of heavy-handed interference in the nation’s judicial system. In July 2007, the Supreme Court officially and unanimously declared Musharraf’s action to have been illegal, and it ordered that Chaudhry be reinstated to his former position. This verdict seemed a signal victory for the rule of law. However, General Musharraf retaliated in November 2007, when he unilaterally declared a state of emergency (for which there was no constitutional authorization) and suspended the Supreme Court, the Pakistani parliament and even the nation’s constitution itself. He then rewrote the national charter and packed the courts with justices he believed to be loyal to his regime. The Pakistani people were appalled, Musharraf’s approval rating plunged and opinion polls showed a strong majority demanding the leader’s resignation as president. How did Tokyo respond to this crisis of democracy in Pakistan? Since Japanese diplomats knew that Musharraf retained the approval of the Bush administration, they continued Japan’s strong support and ignored the situation. In late June 2007 – well after Chaudhry had been illegally suspended – an official Foreign Ministry spokesman declared, ‘Since Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf took power by a bloodless coup d’etat in 1999, Pakistan has been steadily moving forward to resume democracy. . . Japan will continue to support Pakistan’s effort for the consolidation of democracy.’58 The view of Japanese diplomats seemed to be that General Musharraf was the personal embodiment of Pakistani democracy. They recognized

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no contradictions between the coup that brought him to power, the absence of free elections for president, the military state-within-astate through which he ruled, the illegal suspension of the nation’s chief justice and the concept of democracy. It was as if Japanese diplomats had created their own parallel universe. This line, however, became increasingly difficult to maintain after the declaration of a state of emergency in November 2007. In the immediate wake of the Pakistani president’s action, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura told reporters, ‘I have concerns about the current situation in Pakistan. We have been considering increasing ODA to Pakistan, as the country was thought to be in the midst of a democratization process and was making efforts in the War on Terror, but we may have to examine carefully whether to increase the amount of aid at this point while closely watching the democratization process in the country.’59 Komura’s statement appeared to indicate that Tokyo was fundamentally reassessing its view of General Musharraf, but it soon became apparent that such was not the case. When Musharraf lifted his state of emergency decree on December 15 (having in the interval made the constitutional and personnel changes he desired), Komura issued a second statement praising the action and calling for Pakistani democracy to be ‘further strengthened’.60 When former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated less than two weeks later, Tokyo’s support for Musharraf remained unshaken. The Japanese placed the entire blame for the slaying of Bhutto on ‘terrorists’, overlooking all possibility of a connection with the Pakistani state.61 No Japanese government official publicly criticized the Pakistani president by name at any time during the crisis. All along Tokyo acted as if the problems in the ‘democratization process’ were entirely unrelated to the military dictator who was ruling the country. Even at the eleventh hour, in February 2008, when the political parties supporting Musharraf were badly defeated in parliamentary elections – an unmistakable indication that the Pakistani public wanted him out of office – Tokyo still stood firmly at Musharraf’s side. Symbolizing this loyalty was Foreign Minister Komura’s May 2008 visit to Islamabad, when he showered Musharraf with praise for supporting the War on Terror. Komura even congratulated his host

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on the ‘transition to democracy’.62 Several months later in August 2008, when the Musharraf regime finally collapsed, Japanese leaders remained unfazed. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura declared, ‘Pakistan is of the forefront in the fight against terrorism. . . The stabilization of Pakistan’s political condition is very important for the area and for international society.’63 Japanese conservatives were not alone in burying their heads in the sand as Pervez Musharraf went to war against his nation’s legal system, but their performance was particularly shameless. Tokyo maintained its strong support for the Pakistani government because that was what the Bush administration wanted. The journey had been remarkable. When Musharraf had originally launched his coup in 1999, relations between Japan and Pakistan were at a low ebb because of the issue of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. Japan had refused to provide aid until Islamabad gave satisfaction over its extralegal arsenal of nuclear weapons. This principled stance reflected Japan’s long-term and deeply rooted aversion to nuclear weapons. After September 11, however, Washington gradually succeeded in shifting Tokyo’s policies regarding Pakistan. The dispute over nuclear nonproliferation was effectively set aside. As time went by, a greater degree of cooperation and intimacy developed. What had begun as a dilemma was transformed into a passionate embrace. This embrace, however, was not intended for the Pakistani people as a whole, but only for the dictatorship above them. In service to the Bush administration and the War on Terror, Japanese conservatives proved willing to betray both their commitment to nuclear nonproliferation as well as their commitment to democracy and the rule of law.

Iran If the political imperative created by the War on Terror in Pakistan was to drop all references to the issue of nuclear development, the imperative in the case of Iran became to exaggerate it. At first, however, September 11 promised to be a considerable benefit to Japan– Iran relations, perhaps to American relations with the Islamic Republic as well.

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The Iranian nation responded sympathetically to the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York. Despite years of enmity between the two governments, tens of thousands of Iranians held candlelight vigils for the victims and observed a minute of silence. President Mohammad Khatami and the Iranian government condemned the terrorist attacks and expressed their condolences to the families of those who had died. Their sentiments had the ring of sincerity. However, while Washington was aware that Iranian cooperation would be necessary as the United States launched the military campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in neighbouring Afghanistan, American policymakers remained reluctant to speak directly to the Iranian government. Under these conditions, Japan was well positioned to act as mediator.64 Koizumi dispatched Masahiko Komura as special envoy to request Iranian support for US military actions; the emissary was given a positive reception.65 Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi affirmed his government’s condemnation of the al-Qaeda attacks and pledged to assist any Afghan refugees who entered Iranian territory. At the same time, Kharrazi criticized the lack of a direct response from Washington to Iran’s anti-terrorism declaration, adding, ‘Iran is prepared to participate in anti-terrorism activities under the auspices of the United Nations.’66 Foreign Minister Kharrazi paid a return visit to Tokyo some weeks later. He bore a letter from President Khatami appealing for Japan to support anti-terrorism efforts under the framework of the United Nations, with an emphasis on nonviolent approaches. This appeal had no practical effect on Japanese policy, but it did elicit Junichiro Koizumi’s personal praise for the constructive role Iran was playing.67 This tentative rapprochement soon stalled, however, because of suspicion and hostility toward Iran that continued to be evidenced by the United States. In spite of the fact that Tehran was offering both verbal condolences and practical support on actions in Afghanistan, many Americans believed that Iran was secretly in league with alQaeda and thus responsible in some way for the September 11 attacks. The potential thaw in the relationship was decisively thrust back into the freezer in January 2002 when President Bush declared the existence of an Axis of Evil, naming Iran as one of the three ‘evil’

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nations that all good people must confront. The Khatami administration suffered a double blow. Its efforts to restore cordial relations with Washington had been met with an insulting slap in the face before a global audience, and anti-American conservative forces within Iran were revitalized by the clear demonstration of contempt US leaders had shown to their nation. Japanese leaders met the declaration of the Axis of Evil with a studied silence. Iran had long since been a major economic partner for Japan. During the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and in its aftermath, Tokyo had maintained links with Tehran in spite of considerable US pressure to distance itself. When analysts wished to demonstrate that Japan possessed a foreign policy distinct and independent of the United States, the case of Iran would often be cited.68 Nevertheless, US pressure did persuade Japanese leaders to keep as low a profile as possible as they cultivated a friendship with Tehran, and the bilateral relationship could therefore be described as warm but fragile. The advent of the liberal Khatami regime in 1997 had slowly encouraged Japan to become a little more adventurous. A freeze on aid projects that Tokyo had imposed on Tehran, in deference to the Clinton adminstration’s policy of Dual Containment, was lifted not long after Khatami came to power. In late 2000, President Khatami led the first visit to Japan in 42 years by an Iranian head of state. In order to rebuild bilateral economic cooperation and to symbolize mutual friendship, the Japanese government supported the oil company Inpex Corporation in negotiating for development rights for the massive Azadegan oil field in southwestern Iran. Before the Axis of Evil declaration cast its dark shadow, it had seemed that the Japan–Iran friendship would have a bright future. Now, however, conservative Japanese leaders found themselves less willing to depart from Washington’s script. The final agreement on the development of the Azadegan oil field was slated to be signed in December 2001. The deadline was allowed to quietly lapse.69 When Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited Tehran in May 2002, she used the occasion to criticize Tehran for supporting Palestinian resistance groups.70 For his part, President Khatami, referring to the United States, announced that ‘Iran would not bend to threats, nor would it swallow insult’.71 The Koizumi

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administration was starting to promote the American line more insistently, and this could have no other effect than to sour Japan’s relations with the Iranian government. Certain Japanese officials, however, were still committed to the Azadegan development, which they regarded as important for Japan’s own energy security. The downward spiral of Japan – Iran relations was therefore temporarily contained. After Koizumi threw Japan’s full support behind US policy for the invasion of Iraq, many Japanese officials were convinced that this step had sufficiently proved the country’s loyalty to its ally and thus had earned an accommodation on Iran. The government planned to proceed with signing the Azadegan development contract on June 30, 2003.72 Trouble, however, struck from another direction. On June 19, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had ‘failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to reporting of nuclear material’. At a time when the neighbouring Iraqi regime had been overthrown on the pretext of the development of weapons of mass destruction, Iran’s concealment of nuclear material and unreported attempts to enrich uranium attracted a great deal of attention and criticism. The IAEA report gave sufficient ammunition to the foes of the Japan –Iran oil deal. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage all placed calls to key decision-makers in Tokyo with a blunt message: signing the oil deal would harm US –Japan relations.73 Once again, Tokyo postponed the signing and Iranian officials were angry. Talks continued for months without reaching a conclusion. In early 2004, however, Japanese leaders worked up the courage to reassert themselves. The GSDF was being deployed to Samawa and Washington gave its reluctant consent to tolerate the Japan– Iran oil deal.74 On February 18, 2004, the contract was signed. The Inpex Corporation gained a 75 per cent interest in the Azadegan oil field and became its operator. Prime Minister Koizumi commented, ‘Japan– Iran relations have been strengthening as seen in the agreement to develop the Azadegan oil field, and I very much hope that this will go farther.’75

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After the signing of the contract, Japan –Iran relations seemed to be back on track, but ultimately the strength of conservative forces in all three nations undermined the emerging partnership. In the United States, President Bush was comfortably reelected to office for another four-year term, which began in January 2005. In June 2005, Mahmud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran, signaling that Tehran too had shifted toward confrontation. President Ahmadinejad wasted little time in alienating most of the world with his outrageous public comments. Finally, Prime Minister Koizumi’s victory in the September 2005 general elections devastated the more liberal opposition parties. In all three nations, then, the year 2005 marked the triumph of conservative, nationalist politics. The new political alignment clearly boded ill for Japan – Iran relations. Washington renewed its pressure on Tokyo, and the Koizumi administration responded by once again adopting a go-slow approach. Attitudes on all sides hardened. By September 2006, Iranian negotiators had reached the limits of their patience. One Iranian official declared, ‘In September an agreement is needed, and if [the Japanese] want to be involved, they can come up with the financing. It seems. . . Japan has to get a positive instruction by the US administration before they can do anything. They have to ask the king, and clearly Bush considers himself the king of the world.’76 That same month Shinzo Abe became the new premier of Japan. Practically the first act of his administration was to pull out of the Azadegan contract and to give up most of Japan’s rights to develop the massive oil field. Abe and his colleagues had few qualms about ending the Japan– Iran partnership. Six years of patient effort and long negotiations were thrown overboard in a stunningly casual manner. In the wake of the collapse of the Azadegan partnership, Japan– Iran relations went into freefall. At no point in the previous decades had Tokyo ever subordinated its Persian Gulf energy security policies so completely to concerns about the US alliance. In midFebruary 2007, Tokyo imposed its first economic sanctions on Tehran in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1737. A senior Japanese spokesman explained, ‘Resolute action is needed over the Iran nuclear issue from the viewpoint of maintaining nuclear nonproliferation,

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and in view of the impact on the North Korean nuclear issue and peace in the Middle East.’77 Japanese leaders continued, however, to speak to their Iranian colleagues on a regular and ongoing basis. The tone of these diplomatic discussions was usually cordial but, by 2007, the two sides were, for the most part, just talking past each other. Japanese diplomats insisted that Iran had to prove that it had no military nuclear programme. Iranian diplomats insisted that they had absolutely no desire to build nuclear weapons but that they would never compromise their right to have an independent civilian nuclear power programme, as guaranteed to all nations under the terms of the NPT. Tokyo, in turn, asserted that Iran had the responsibility to clear up all international suspicions. Tehran countered that these suspicions were misplaced, and Iranian diplomats intimated that the only real problem was America’s political vendetta against Iran. In early December 2007, Washington’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for 2007 – the combined judgement of America’s 16 intelligence agencies – concluded that ‘in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. . . Our assessment [is] that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure [and this] indicates [that] Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.’78 Senior officials of the Bush administration downplayed the report as much as they could, but in actuality, it was a devastating blow to their credibility: America’s own risk-averse intelligence agencies had concluded that allegations of Iranian wrongdoing were wildly overblown. For Japanese diplomats, who had accepted with little reservation the Bush administration’s claims that Iran was attempting to build nuclear weapons, the NIE should have been a rude awakening. They had sacrificed elements of their own nation’s energy security, and now it appeared that the sacrifice had all been for nothing: Iran was probably innocent of the charges, just as the Iranian diplomats had been insisting in face-to-face encounters for years. Tokyo’s response was to ignore the NIE. No official statements were issued. Liberal sections of the media mildly criticized the

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government’s silence, but this protest, too, was ignored.79 Iranian diplomats requested that the Japanese policy be reevaluated in light of the new evidence, but Tokyo failed to respond to that request as well.80 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted as if the NIE had never been issued. In April 2008, Tokyo even agreed to impose another round of economic sanctions on Iran. Tokyo ignored the NIE because Japanese leaders understood, correctly, that the release of the report did not indicate any change in the approach of the Bush administration. By this time, Japanese diplomats probably no longer cared whether or not the allegations were true. Japanese foreign policy had become tightly aligned with the policies of the Bush administration across a very wide spectrum of issues. The ‘no choice’ doctrine remained very much in effect. Even if President George W. Bush and his colleagues were guided merely by their own ideological fantasies, such a possibility had little bearing on the degree of support Washington could receive from Tokyo. Japanese diplomats would treat the claims of senior US officials as if they were the consensus of the international community – irrespective of any demonstrable facts to the contrary. Japan was, of course, far from being the only nation demonstrating this behaviour, but as one of the world’s more important global powers, Japan did not acquit itself with any particular distinction. In consequence, at the same time as the Japanese government was effectively jettisoning its long-held antinuclear principles in relations with the Musharraf dictatorship in Pakistan, it was also willing to jettison its traditional friendship with the neighbouring country for the ostensible purpose of maintaining a firm line on illicit nuclear development. This policy was illogical and hypocritical, but it was part of the price Japan paid when it embraced the Bush administration’s War on Terror so completely.

The Israeli –Palestinian Conflict Japan’s involvement in Israeli– Palestinian peace issues was also heavily impacted by the War on Terror. As in the case of Iran, Japan was juggling longstanding relationships. Again, Japan shifted from a

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relatively even-handed approach to a partisan stance in alignment with the Bush administration. Japan had been under US occupation in 1948, when Israel was established and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced into refugee camps. As a nation, Japan had little or no responsibility for the Palestinian tragedy. Relative to other great powers, Japan’s hands were clean. The perception of fairness was always Japan’s greatest asset within the context of this conflict. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the Japanese economy became increasingly dependent on crude oil from the Persian Gulf. In the early post-war decades, Tokyo’s diplomats were able to keep out of any major political entanglements in West Asia, but by the turn of the 1970s, this comfortable era ended. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973 forced Japan to come off the fence and take a stand in support of the rights of the Palestinian refugees – or else lose access to regional oil supplies. Horrified, Japanese leaders acted with uncharacteristic haste, assuring Arab monarchs that Japan would always be a true friend to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This policy was enshrined in the November 22, 1973, statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido: 1. The Government of Japan has consistently hoped that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will be achieved through the prompt and complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and has continued to request the efforts of the parties and countries concerned. It has been prompt in supporting the United Nations General Assembly resolution concerning the rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination. 2. The Government of Japan is of the view that the following principles should be adhered to in achieving a peace settlement: (1) The inadmissibility of acquisition and occupation of any territories by use of force; (2) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war; (3) The respect for the integrity and security of the territories of all countries in the area and the need of guarantees to that end; and

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(4) The recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 3. The Government of Japan urges that every possible effort be made to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in compliance with the above-mentioned principles. Needless to say, it is the intention of the Government of Japan to make as much contribution as possible towards that end. The Government of Japan, deploring Israel’s continued occupation of Arab territories, urges Israel to comply with those principles. The Government of Japan will continue to observe the situation in the Middle East with grave concern and, depending on future developments, may have to reconsider its policy toward Israel.81 The Nikaido Statement became the formal basis of Japan’s policy from that time forward. Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, Tokyo observed the spirit of the Nikaido Statement in practice, which reassured Japan’s Arab economic partners and aggravated Israel and its allies. As a result, Japan was often described as a ‘pro-Arab’ nation in this period.82 In the late 1980s, however, Tokyo established stronger links with Israel, and, while it remained a generous financial donor to Palestinian refugees, it no longer forcefully asserted the need for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, not even the need to respect the national rights of the Palestinian people. This political change was brought about because, on the one hand, Japan was still being pressured by the United States to adopt a pro-Israel stance; and on the other, the solidarity of Arab nations had dissipated (itself related to American pressures), and therefore the need to satisfy the Arab constituency had become much less pressing. The ‘proArab’ policy represented by the Nikaido Statement gradually slipped into ambiguity, and on September 11, 2001, Japan still held this position. The War on Terror pushed Tokyo into a decidedly pro-Israel political stance. In a sense, this attitude was inevitable. At the very

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heart of the concept of the War on Terror is the notion that terrorism is the central political problem of the age. Since the Israelis had a state and national army to defend their interests and the Palestinians were stateless and dependent on subnational organizations often described as terrorist groups, Tokyo’s embrace of the War on Terror could not do other than to privilege the views of the Israeli state over its stateless Palestinian rivals. Furthermore, the growing conviction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that ‘terrorism cannot be justified for any reason’ – including political oppression – logically entailed the axiom that Palestinians were bound to quietly accept harsh treatment from Israel and possessed no right of armed resistance. Whether they acknowledged it or not, the practical effect of Tokyo’s official stance was to deny Palestinians the right of self-defence in the face of any potential Israeli oppression. This position amounted to the inverse of the 1973 Nikaido Statement, which had put the onus on Israel to withdraw from ‘all the territories occupied in the 1967 war’. In practice, Japan’s diplomatic policy towards Israeli – Palestinian peace was not quite as partisan as the official logic suggested. Japanese diplomats had been marginally involved in the peace process for a long time, and they had a reasonably sophisticated grasp of the issues. Tokyo consistently called for Israeli ‘restraint’, and there were occasions when Japanese diplomats still criticized Israeli actions. For example, in March 2004, when the Israeli military carried out an assassination of the Hamas founder and spiritual leader, Shaikh Ahmad Yassin, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda announced at a press conference, ‘We condemn the actions of Israel, which may adversely affect peace efforts in the Middle East.’83 The Israeli ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to hear the condemnation in person. When a reporter pointed out to Prime Minister Koizumi that the Bush administration did not condemn the murder of the elderly, paraplegic shaikh – and even justified it on Israel’s behalf – the Japanese premier responded, ‘The United States has its own situation. That is separate from Japan’s position.’84 Nevertheless, Israeli officials attempted, with some success, to cultivate Japan as an ‘anti-terrorist’ ally. In December 2001, Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Lior took advantage of the growing Japanese

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interest in anti-terrorism by making an appeal: ‘Japan has an influence in the Middle East. Japan is the single biggest contributor to the Palestinian people. . . We believe that on the issue of terrorism, Japan can do much more. . . We think Japan should have a list of terrorist organizations and check whether there are accounts that belong to such organizations in Japan.’85 According to Ambassador Lior, the Palestinian Authority was among the groups Israel expected Japan to sanction for terrorist activities. The following year, Israel dispatched Uzi Dayan, head of the Israeli National Security Council, to Tokyo to discuss points of mutual interest regarding anti-terrorism matters.86 Japanese leaders were influenced by these lobbying efforts. While Tokyo’s first decision to freeze terrorist financial assets after September 11 naturally targeted al-Qaeda and the Taliban, its second freeze impacted the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, which was accused by the Bush administration of funding Hamas, a terrorist organization according to the official American view.87 In later years as well, Japan occasionally targeted Palestinian groups for asset freezes. One new element in Japan’s post-September 11 foreign policies was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ open support of some Palestinian leaders over others. Never before had Japanese diplomats interfered in the internal politics of the Palestinians. One example of the new approach came in 2003, when a US-led effort attempted to push President Yasser Arafat into political irrelevance in support of the Americans’ favourite, Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas. Lending Japan’s weight to this policy, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited the West Bank in April 2003 and urged Arafat to hand over the reins of power to Abbas.88 After Arafat died in late 2004, Abbas was promoted to the office of president of the Palestinian Authority. Tokyo showered the new Palestinian leader with signs of favour and support – all in line with the wishes of the Bush administration. In 2006, Japan’s pro-Israel partisanship reached a new peak. In January, the Palestinian territories’ first full-scale free elections were held. The Bush administration had strongly urged these elections in

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the expectation that their client, Mahmud Abbas, would emerge victorious and thus legitimize US policy. Washington was stunned, however, when the Palestinian people elected Hamas – supposedly a mere terrorist organization – as their democratic representatives to the Palestinian Legislative Council. That outcome was definitely not part of the plan. When Hamas emerged as the undisputed winner at the polls, the Bush administration immediately shifted direction and declared that winning a free election did not make Hamas a legitimate representative for the Palestinian people.89 The sudden and radical turn in US policy took Tokyo by surprise. The Japanese had supported the election process in solidarity with their ally, but now they were expected to quickly disown it, in spite of the fact that all observers agreed that the polling had been conducted fairly. At first, Tokyo balked. A Foreign Ministry spokesman could not deny the obvious: ‘We have no doubt at all that the election was conducted in a very democratic fashion and very much smoothly. So what you can say is the election of Hamas is itself a product of democracy.’90 Furthermore, Tatsuo Arima, Japan’s experienced special envoy to the peace process, indicated that Japan would not cut off financial aid to the Palestinian Authority, as the United States and Israel were demanding. He asserted, ‘The Japanese government will not apply pressure; we will just hope that Hamas will make changes according to their own judgment.’91 This principled position did not last. Behind the scenes, Bush administration pressure on Tokyo to alter its position must have been intense. By April, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had come full circle. A ministry spokesman announced on April 18, ‘Our stance is that we want to see whether [Hamas] will adopt peaceful measures and participate in the peace process. Until we have a clearer picture, there will not be a situation where new aid would be given. . . Hamas has clearly had a hostile policy toward Israel and, if that does not change, we will not be in a situation where we can offer aid.’92 In only two months, Japan had swung from an official position of calling Hamas’ victory ‘a product of democracy’ to the notion that all aid must be cut off because of Hamas’ ‘hostile policy toward Israel’.

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Japanese officials seemed to require Palestinians to renounce any hostility toward their military occupiers – a remarkable demand! Finally, in the summer of 2006, Tokyo announced a new financial aid package for the Palestinians called Assistance to Strengthen the Function of the Presidential Office. The official statement indicated that this package was being offered ‘in support of President Abbas in his unwavering resolve for peace through dialogue’.93 Thus, six months after Japan publicly acknowledged the democratic victory of Hamas, it provided financial assistance to carry out what arguably amounted to a soft coup against the results of those free elections. This shift was yet another example of how the War on Terror had led Japanese foreign policy in the Islamic world to places quite far from where it had begun.

The Two Koreas Whether or not the Bush administration would openly admit it, the main concern of its War on Terror was the Islamic world. For Japanese conservatives, however, the aspect of the conflict closest to their hearts related to North Korea. The Australian scholar Gavan McCormack wrote, ‘Were it not for the “North Korean threat”, Japanese people would have little interest in the “global war on terror”, and would be much less likely to bow to US demands for military and financial contributions supporting the establishment of client regimes in Iraq or elsewhere. Fear and hatred of North Korea dictate support for the US vision.’94 A discussion of a few key developments in Japanese relations with the Korean Peninsula will suggest how they interacted with Japan’s anti-terrorist diplomacy. Japan’s relations with North Korea have been poor for decades. The 1990s witnessed two major downturns. A tense crisis over North Korea’s nuclear programme in 1994 raised the serious prospect of a second Korean War. The Japanese people were even more shocked in 1998 by the provocative launch of a North Korean Taepodong-1 missile over the Japanese archipelago and into the Pacific Ocean. Most Japanese felt that the most immediate security threat to their nation was posed by the North Korean hermit kingdom.

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The changes in Japan’s military posture after the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States had a rapid effect on the Japanese stance on North Korea as well. On November 29, 2001, police raided the Tokyo head office of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), allegedly in connection with an investigation of embezzlement. The leaders of Chongryon, however, described the raid as political suppression. Chongryon, which served as the de facto North Korean representative in Japan in the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two states, had never before been raided in this fashion.95 More striking yet was the change in the behaviour of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). For many years, the waters around Japan had been patrolled by suspicious ships, widely believed to be North Korean spy vessels. In March 1999, the JCG discovered one such ship in the Sea of Japan, fired warning shots and chased the intruders away. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, however, Japanese conservatives saw an opportunity to take a tougher line. In early October 2001, a bill was quietly submitted to the Diet allowing new rules of engagement for the JCG. Essentially, the bill authorized the JCG to fire its weapons on any suspicious vessel attempting to flee the authorities. Never before in the post-war period had Japanese forces been granted such wide latitude in the use of deadly force.96 The bill was enacted into law within a matter of weeks. The JCG wasted little time in exercising its new power. On the evening of December 21, 2001, a MSDF patrol plane spotted an unknown vessel about 150 kilometres from the island of AmamiOshima (far to the south of the main islands of Japan but still within its territorial waters). Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani gave an interview describing what happened next: ‘When we first spotted the ship during the evening of December 21, we did not reach an immediate conclusion that it was suspicious. However, following an analysis of photographs, we agreed around 12:30 a.m. on December 22 that it was suspicious, and we immediately informed the premier’s residence and the JCG.’97 The JCG quickly sent patrol ships to the area and located the suspicious vessel. The unidentified ship fled in the direction of the China coast and did not

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respond to commands to halt. Using its new authority, the JCG fired on the ship. The crew of the vessel fired back with guns and even small, Soviet-era rockets. Two Japanese coast guard officials were injured in the fighting. The battle continued until the suspicious ship was sunk and all 15 members of its crew killed. The Korean Central News Agency blasted the JCG’s forceful action: ‘This crime. . . is nothing but brutal piracy and an unpardonable act of terrorism of a modern brand that could only be committed by the samurais of Japan in defiance of international laws.’98 The government of China expressed ‘deep concern’ over the measures employed by the JCG. Certainly, in the history of post-war Japan, there had never been an action quite so aggressive and uncompromising as this one. Traditionally, the Japanese government had endeavoured to avoid violence as much as possible. This attitude was clearly changing. The real turning point in Japan – North Korea relations occurred months later, in September 2002, when Prime Minister Koizumi paid a visit to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il in an attempt to reduce tensions. The meetings between the leaders went well and the two men established a positive rapport. Pyongyang was forthcoming with new information about its past wrongdoings, offering in particular a formal acknowledgement that between 1977 and 1983, clandestine agents had abducted ordinary Japanese citizens from Japanese soil and brought them to Korea for such purposes as the training of spies. Pyongyang furthermore revealed that some of these abductees were still alive, though others had died prematurely. The September 2002 meeting between the two leaders might have been regarded as a diplomatic breakthrough, in which North Korea was finally coming clean on unsavoury aspects of its past behaviour.99 The practical effect of the revelations, however, was highly damaging. The Japanese people were outraged to learn that kidnappings had occurred on their own streets, where a sinister foreign agency had gone so far as to rip a 13-year-old girl, Megumi Yokota, from her family. Few Japanese were interested in international politics, but tearful parents calling for the safe return of their children constituted an emotional appeal that they understood all too well. Like the

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subsequent April 2004 hostage crisis in Iraq, the matter of the abductees was a rare case that caused most Japanese to be genuinely moved by a political matter.100 A crucial difference existed between the problem of abductions by North Korea and the Iraq hostage crisis of April 2004: in the Korean case, Japanese conservatives made common cause with the abductees’ families; in contrast, the families of the Iraq abductees – who were outspokenly critical of government policy – became the target of the Japanese right’s recriminations. Another difference is that the Iraq crisis passed within a few weeks, but the issue of the North Korean abductions festered for many years. Shinzo Abe – the right-wing politician most closely associated with the North Korean abductees’ families – eventually rode the issue all the way to the premiership. In the context of the diplomacy of anti-terrorism, significantly, conservative Japanese politicians made clear that they regarded Pyongyang’s actions as terrorism. The day that Koizumi held his summit with Kim in September 2002, a group of conservative Diet members released a statement condemning the North Korean abductions as ‘state terrorism’. They demanded that the Japanese government take severe punitive steps against Pyongyang, including the suspension of food aid.101 The notion that the abductions constituted terrorism became an article of faith within Japanese right-wing circles. In October 2002, Defense Agency DirectorGeneral Shigeru Ishiba told the US ambassador that ‘Japanese people have now come to realize that North Korea is a horrible terrorist state’.102 In October 2008, after the Bush administration de-listed North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa declared, ‘It’s extremely regrettable, and I believe abductions amount to terrorist acts.’103 Nakagawa’s view is mistaken: while the North Korean abductions between 1977 and 1983 may be described as criminal, by no means can they be described as constituting terrorism. Almost every serious definition of terrorism notes that it is an act performed openly, in order to achieve public political objectives. Even the flawed US State Department definition suggests that terrorism is ‘usually intended to influence an audience’. The al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade

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Center were meant to be viewed globally, and therefore we call them terrorism. These actions are something quite apart from North Korea’s kidnappings of Japanese citizens, done so clandestinely that very few knew that they had occurred until several decades later. North Korea had engaged in espionage, not terrorism.104 In one sense, however, Shoichi Nakagawa and other Japanese rightists were not far wrong in associating the North Korean abductions with the September 11 attacks. Both cases produced public trauma within the targeted nations. Few Japanese openly critiqued either the manner in which the right utilized the issue of North Korean abductions or other planks of Japanese conservative orthodoxy. The handful of Japanese who did speak out against the right met fierce negative reactions and sometimes physical threat. For example, in September 2003 a bomb was found in the house of Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka, the diplomat who had orchestrated Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. Near the bomb the police found a note from a group calling itself The Brigade for Conquering Traitors. Anti-North Korea conservatives expressed little concern about the affair, with the right-wing Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara going so far as to say publicly, ‘[Tanaka] is at North Korea’s beck and call. . . I think he deserved it.’105 The news media reported the basic facts but tended to downplay the full story. Three years later, in August 2006, a lawmaker in the ruling party, Koichi Kato, appeared on a number of television programmes, where he blasted Prime Minister Koizumi for ‘crashing’ Japanese diplomatic ties with its Asian neighbours. The same day Kato denounced the premier’s visits to the nationalist Yasukuni Shrine, a member of a Japanese right-wing group broke into Kato’s home in northern Japan and burned it to the ground. (Kato’s elderly mother lived in the house, but, fortunately, she remained unharmed.) It took ten days before the Koizumi administration finally offered a halfhearted condemnation of this right-wing terrorist act.106 For his part, Kato remained unbowed and continued to speak out against what he called ‘dangerous nationalism’ rising in Japan.107 The editors of the Asahi Shinbun agreed with Kato and solemnly declared, ‘Terrorism must be contained.’108

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The strangest aspect of Tokyo’s stance on the issue of the North Korean abductions was that no nation was more threatened by the possibility of North Korea developing nuclear weapons than Japan. Potentially, the lives of millions of Japanese were at stake. Nevertheless, the Japanese right insisted that clearing up questions about what North Korea had done to a handful of Japanese citizens decades earlier was more crucial than the dismantling of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. Furthermore, as the years passed, it was far from clear that anything the Kim Jong-Il regime could do in connection with the question of the abductions would fully satisfy the Japanese side. It seemed, in fact, that the Japanese right desired no resolution, since its own political influence was enhanced simply by stoking the fires of Japanese outrage. Japan–South Korea relations in this period may be regarded as a sort of ‘clinical control group’ by which Japan–North Korea relations can be more accurately evaluated. South Korea is a democracy and a US ally. Indeed, South Korea is Japan’s nearest neighbour. From the perspective of realpolitik, Tokyo has every incentive to construct friendly and positive relations with South Korea. Such an alignment would keep potential enemies further from Japanese shores, help Japan manage the North Korean threat and give Japan considerably more room to manoeuvre between the United States and China. In spite of these obvious incentives, Japanese diplomats and policymakers made no serious attempts in this period to reconcile with their neighbour. Even worse, they allowed petty issues, such as gratuitous visits to Yasukuni Shrine, neo-nationalist revisions of schoolbooks and disputes over ownership of the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima) to strain the bilateral relationship even further. Though the behaviour of South Korea’s government was by no means beyond reproach, it is nevertheless remarkable that Japanese leaders allowed minor issues of ‘prestige diplomacy’ to trump efforts to strengthen their nation’s comprehensive strategic position within Asia. Three lessons emerge. First, Tokyo’s policies toward both Koreas seemed based more on irrational factors – such as a latent Japanese sense of superiority vis-a`-vis other East Asians – than on any rational calculation of national interest.109 The North Korean abductions of

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Japanese citizens generated horror, not only because of the inherent wickedness of the acts themselves, but also because they were carried out by a people regarded by many Japanese as being semi-civilized inferiors. Second, it was the consolidation of the US– Japan alliance by means of the policies connected to the War on Terror that granted conservative Japanese leaders the leeway they needed to treat their relations with their Asian neighbours in a cavalier and offhand fashion. Finally, the Japanese War on Terror had the peculiar tendency to ignore the fact that most of the terrorism inside Japan was being perpetrated, not by foreigners or leftists, but by the overenthusiastic ideological supporters of the Japanese government itself.110

China A final case, one that cannot be neglected, is that of China. While Beijing was not implicated directly in the War on Terror, the hardening of the conservative line in Tokyo could not but have serious consequences for this bilateral relationship as well. Japan’s relationship with China, which stretches back many centuries, cannot be neatly encapsulated within the framework of the War on Terror. On the other hand, since Japan’s first international war on terror took place in Shanghai in the 1930s, there is an historical link. Furthermore, Tokyo’s embrace of the Bush administration’s War on Terror affected the Japan – China bilateral relationship in subtle but significant ways. Traditionally, China was the centre of East Asian civilization and, according to Chinese belief, the centre of the heavens and the earth. For centuries Japan has had an uneasy relationship with its larger and older continental neighbour. At times in the distant past, Japanese leaders accepted the fact that Chinese civilization enjoyed material superiority over their own culture, and they were willing to import Chinese technologies and practices that seemed beneficial. More often, Japan’s respect for China was only grudging. The Japanese ultimately believed in their own culture’s superiority, and the protection offered by the surrounding seas allowed Japan to develop

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according to its own rhythms. Unlike other states in East Asia, Japan always maintained independence from Chinese rule. After Europe and the United States thrust themselves into East Asia in the nineteenth century and forced both China and Japan into the modern world system, Japan had the opportunity to upend the traditional order. The Japanese quickly borrowed from the West, as they had once borrowed from China, in order to strengthen their nation. It is widely acknowledged that Japan was the most successful of all non-Western states in quickly adapting to the modern European system. In 1894, Japanese leaders launched a successful war against China, demonstrating to the world that the old East Asian order had been overturned and that Tokyo was the new leading capital of the region. The Japanese people reveled in their new status, while the Chinese refused to accept the verdict of the first Sino– Japanese War. Since that time, many rounds have been fought in the Japan– China struggle for supremacy. Japanese elites have been determined to maintain their status as the leading nation of East Asia, while Chinese elites have searched long and hard for the means to restore the ‘natural order’ of the region. ‘Prestige diplomacy’ is a factor that deeply impacts the behaviour of both nations. By 2001, it was generally acknowledged that Japan, as a developed nation, was in the lead, but that China was gaining fast, appearing destined to recapture its primacy over the course of the twenty-first century.111 China’s sheer magnitude and impressive economic growth rate appeared to indicate that Japan’s days as top dog in East Asia were numbered.112 The strengthening of the US – Japan alliance that accompanied the War on Terror boosted Tokyo’s position vis-a`-vis China. Linked to the global empire based in Washington, Japan had much less to fear from any of its mainland neighbours and the Koizumi administration was able to act as it pleased. Among Japanese conservatives, however, there has long been a split between those who feel that Japan’s best strategy is to soothe the strains in the Japan – China bilateral relationship and to try to put the old antagonisms to rest, and those who feel that Japan and China are natural enemies who can never be reconciled. The ruling LDP contained factions supporting both of

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these views. Generally speaking, moderates favouring positive diplomatic relations with Beijing were in the ascendant within the LDP until 2001.113 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and two of his three immediate successors, however, were China hawks.114 A crucial turn came when Koizumi repeatedly antagonized China (and most other East Asian nations) by making official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a religious institution that, among other things, attempts to justify Japan’s aggression in Asia. The premier’s pilgrimages were interpreted by Beijing – not unreasonably – as an indication that Japan’s leaders felt no genuine sense of remorse for the occupation of coastal China. This attitude aggravated the feelings of most Chinese and Korean nationalists, and it was greeted uneasily in parts of Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the Yasukuni dispute was not simply about the past, but also about distrust of Japanese intentions for the future.115 The diplomacy of anti-terrorism strengthened the hand of the Japanese irreconcilables. It was Prime Minister Koizumi’s personal stubbornness and his reliance on nationalist interest groups as a political base that stoked the fires of Japan–China antagonism. The Bush administration was in a position in which it might have cooled these fires, but American leaders were primarily interested in their own demands for political and military support in the Islamic world and therefore refrained from any actions that might undermine their conservative allies in Tokyo. As the scholar Mark Selden puts it, ‘Precisely the Koizumi, Abe, and Fukuda administrations’ support for US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for the Bush administrations’ global “war on terror” buys tacit US acceptance of Yasukuni nationalism and an expansive Japanese military role while inflaming Japan’s relations with her neighbours.’116 In fact, the same Japanese leaders most eager to fight al-Qaeda were also the ones most eager to confront China. War on Terror hawks and China hawks flocked together. Indirectly, then, the War on Terror intensified preexisting tensions between Japan and China. Two broad factors were at play. First, the US– Japan alliance was strengthened, making Japanese leaders feel more secure in their position and thus allowing them to be more dismissive of the concerns of their Asian neighbours. Second, Japan

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was becoming more assertive in its use of military force, suggesting the possibility that one day Japanese leaders would once again turn that force on East Asia. During the Bush era, the practical consequences of these troubling policies were not particularly grave. The long-term ramifications remain to be seen.117

An Assessment of Anti-terrorist Diplomacy One overall lesson that emerges from these case studies is that the War on Terror affected Japan’s foreign policy in diverse and not always predictable ways. It led Japan both to support and to betray democratization in the Islamic world, both to dismiss concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation and to exaggerate them. The War on Terror witnessed Japan’s abandonment of foreign policy independence in regard to distant Islamic countries, while symbolically embracing nationalism and becoming assertive against East Asian neighbours. A distinction should probably be made between an ‘ideal’ effort to reduce global terrorism and the actual policies concerning the War on Terror pursued by the Bush administration and its Japanese allies. Ideally, Tokyo should have been a consistent opponent of nuclear weapons and a consistent proponent of democratization. Such a position would have better served to reduce the threat of terrorism. It was nonsense to argue that terrorism could be ‘eliminated’, but under improved political conditions, terrorism could have been reduced. Rather than adopt a rational and consistent anti-terrorism policy, however, conservative Japanese leaders chose to utilize fears of terrorism for the purposes of boosting the US –Japan alliance, pushing aside legal restrictions on the employment of the SDF and enhancing Japan’s military and political leverage within East Asia. An authentic effort to reduce terrorism would have been far preferable to the policies actually adopted, but even then the diplomacy of anti-terrorism would have remained problematic. While some forms of terrorism may produce large-scale damage – as was witnessed on September 11 – many other threats to the international community make terrorism pale in comparison. A full-scale war in

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East Asia, for example, is a far more horrifying prospect than anything that al-Qaeda can devise. A state detonating a nuclear weapon in its own defence would be more fearsome than any hijacked airliner. Environmental catastrophes pose a greater threat to humanity than bombs planted by a handful of desperadoes. Diseases arising from nature take a heavier toll than does bioterrorism. What, then, is the justification for making terrorism the overriding political issue of the age? The diplomacy of anti-terrorism should not be allowed to overwhelm any nation’s foreign policy, for the simple reason that such a course is a gross distortion of priorities. It emphasizes a second- or third-tier concern at the expense of a number of far more dangerous problems confronting the world. While American outrage over the brutal terrorist acts of September 11 is understandable to a point, it should never have been taken as an excuse to dismiss other international concerns that are actually more threatening to the human future. Japanese conservatives utilized the Bush administration’s obsession with terrorism in ways that were both clever and misguided. They were clever in the sense that they successfully seized the opportunity to strengthen their political and military position by creating intimate links with American policymakers. They were misguided in the sense that the only thing that the conservatives could think to do with their newfound power was to antagonize Asian neighbours and to pursue dead-end foreign policies that weighed against Japan’s long-term interests. The diplomacy of antiterrorism provided Japanese conservatives the latitude to slip into the world of their own ideological fantasies while constructing a geopolitical reality in which Japan was ever more isolated and cut off from the community around it.

CHAPTER 6 THE WAR AT HOME

The issues of SDF deployments abroad and Japan’s diplomatic policies in the War on Terror have received more attention from journalists and scholars than have its implications for the Japanese in their own homeland. This situation is unfortunate, in the sense that, in the long run, it will be changes within Japanese society and domestic politics that will shape the nation’s future much more than the several thousand troops who visited Samawa or patrolled the waters of the Indian Ocean. The disproportionate attention given to foreign policies and military deployments relates, in part, to the fact that the effects of the War on Terror within the Japanese home islands are difficult to measure with precision. How many of the changes in Japanese society between September 2001 and September 2009 were connected directly to the War on Terror, and how many would have occurred in much the same way had there been no al-Qaeda attacks? These questions cannot really be answered, but we can safely assume that the ways in which the War on Terror altered Japanese society will prove to be the area of its heaviest consequence. In this chapter, the war at home will be examined from a variety of angles. First, there is a discussion of the degree of threat posed by alQaeda terrorism to the Japanese home islands. Was Japan actually at risk? If so, how serious was the risk? Next, there is a review of input from conservative Japanese commentators, with a focus on how some of them promoted the idea that Japan was facing an imminent threat

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of terror at home. Following that review, we turn to the practical responses of Japanese government agencies. What kinds of measures did the Japanese government enact in order to protect the Japanese people from terrorism? Did the authorities really believe that Japan was under serious threat? From a different perspective, how did the community of foreign Muslims living in Japan react to the War on Terror? How did they view the new security measures that were in some ways aimed at their own beliefs and religious identity? Finally, over the years that the War on Terror remained in place as a policy priority for the Japanese government, how did it gradually alter the overall political and social climate of the nation in terms of Japanese perceptions of resident foreigners? Did the international conflict impact community relations inside Japan?

Japan Enters the Risk Zone Japan operates under a heavy historical burden in terms of its relationship with its East Asian neighbours, and to a lesser extent, with Western countries and Southeast Asia. Japan was a lateblooming colonial power, noted for its brutal treatment of the peoples under its imperial control from 1895 to 1945. Japan’s historical reputation in the Islamic world, however, is largely positive. Unlike the other major developed countries, Japan does not have a colonial history in Islamic West Asia or Africa. When crucial economic links developed between Japan and the Persian Gulf countries from the 1950s onward, the political slate was comparatively clean. In fact, many Muslims have admired Japan for a long time. In the late nineteenth century, Japan and the Islamic world faced a number of common challenges, creating a community of feeling in some circles. The dominant European powers classified both the Japanese people and Asian Muslims as ‘Easterners’ as opposed to ‘Westerners’. Both Japanese and Asian Muslims struggled to modernize and preserve their independence in the face of European assaults. In 1905, Japan’s defeat of Romanov Russia at the decisive Battle of Tsushima electrified opinion across the Islamic world, where Russia was regarded as a threatening presence; one that had already enslaved

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millions of Muslims in Central Asia. Moreover, Japan’s successful production and use of the implements of modern warfare provided fresh hope to other Asians that, given time and patient effort, they too could successfully face the European threat. Japan was an inspiration to the non-West.1 To a lesser but still significant extent, Japan’s post-war rise from the ashes was also widely respected in the Islamic world. Japan’s emergence as an international merchant nation under the American wing was greeted with ambiguous feelings, but more often than not Muslim attitudes were positive and friendly. The Islamic world has been at odds with Europe and the United States for so long and in so many ways that many wanted to find friends in the non-West. As a result, many Muslims desire strong relations with the Japanese people and usually give them the benefit of the doubt. Japanese scholars of the Islamic world, as well as businesspeople and others who have interacted with Muslims, became aware of these positive feelings in the Japanese–Islamic relationship and reciprocated them. Because such scholars of the Islamic world as Yuzo Itagaki recognized these tendencies, he and his colleagues attempted – unsuccessfully – to persuade the Japanese government to adopt a uniquely ‘Japanese’ perspective on the War on Terror. On the other hand, the vast majority of the Japanese people remained unaware of this attraction, and they have generally met Muslim feelings of friendship with indifference. As a result, respect has tended to run in only one direction: Muslims admired Japan’s modern economic success, while most Japanese have lacked any genuine respect for regions of conflict and for ‘minor countries’. One reason for these Japanese attitudes was that the Japanese people’s knowledge of the Islamic world has usually come, not directly, but through the translation of the West, which is noted for its negative portrayals of Muslim life. In recent decades, Japan’s dependence on Persian Gulf oil required it to maintain friendly diplomatic ties with the Arab world. The Nikaido Statement of 1973, which symbolized this official ‘pro-Arab’ policy by declaring sympathy for the Palestinian cause, helped establish the idea in many Muslim minds that Japan was a friendly power. The minority of Arabs and Muslims who knew Japan well

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understood that this friendship was as much a mirage as it was real, but certainly in comparison with the Arab– American relationship or the Arab – European relationship, the Arab – Japan connection undeniably looked pretty good. For these reasons, the Japanese government and public really had no reason to be alarmed about their own nation’s internal security when al-Qaeda launched its shocking attacks on September 11. The bitterness of Arab and Islamic militants was focused on the West and on Israel. Most Muslims were themselves horrified by the attack on the World Trade Center, even if they had some underlying sympathy for Osama bin Laden’s cause. The majority of the world’s Muslims feel discontent toward US foreign policy, although only a small minority would advocate terrorism as a means for expressing that discontent. Japan was not even remotely on the minds of Islamist militants on September 11. There was essentially zero chance that Japanese interests would be specifically targeted. A handful of Japanese citizens abroad were caught up in the crossfire, but Japan was not on al-Qaeda’s agenda in any way. The Koizumi administration, however, ignored the views of Japanese specialists of the Islamic world and took an explicitly partisan approach in solidarity with its US allies. It was Koizumi’s policy choices after September 11 that created the first genuine risk that Japan too might be targeted. Oddly, the internal assessments of the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry seem to have actually dismissed the possibility that strong support of Bush administration policies could translate into blowback from the Islamic world.2 Japan voluntarily took upon itself the whole 60-year historical legacy of negative US – Muslim relations, and thus the nation’s clean slate was tossed aside. After lining up so conspicuously behind the Bush administration, the Japanese people really did have something to fear. Originally, it appears that Osama bin Laden himself viewed Japan primarily as a victim of American imperialism, especially in the form of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (This is, in fact, a very common understanding among Muslims about Japan.) In a tape released on the Al-Jazeera television station on October 7, 2001, Bin Laden explained the reasons for his campaign against the United States:

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They champion falsehood, support the butcher against the victim, the oppressor against the innocent child. May God mete out to them the punishment they deserve. I say that the matter is clear and explicit. In the aftermath of this event, and now that senior US officials have spoken, beginning with Bush, the head of the world’s infidels, and whoever supports him, every Muslim should rush to defend his religion. They came out in arrogance with their men and horses, and instigated even those countries that belong to Islam against us. They came out to fight this group of people who declared their faith in God and refused to abandon their religion. They came out to fight Islam in the name of terrorism. Hundreds of thousands of people, young and old, were killed in the farthest point on earth in Japan. For them, this is not a crime, but rather a debatable issue.3 At first, Japan existed in Bin Laden’s mind primarily as a nation that had been victimized by American crimes during World War II. Two years later, however – after the Koizumi administration had openly supported the US military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and as the Japanese government was preparing to send the GSDF to Samawa – Bin Laden’s assessment of Japan had clearly changed.4 On an audio tape played on the Al-Jazeera television station on October 18, 2003, a voice believed to be Bin Laden announced: I tell Bush that appealing for help from the world around you and begging for mercenary soldiers from everywhere, even from the small countries, has shattered your pride, insulted your prestige, and exposed your powerlessness after you used to defend the world in its entirety. You are now like the one who used to defend people with his own sword, but now he looks for others to defend him. Let the unjust ones know that we maintain our right to reply, at the appropriate time and place, to all the states that are taking part in this unjust war, particularly Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy. The Islamic world’s states that are taking part in this war,

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particularly the Gulf States, mainly Kuwait, the land base for the Crusader forces, will not be excluded from this.5 In the following years, al-Qaeda spokesmen did not tend to mention Japan in their public statements, but the organization did make it clear that it would feel justified in aiming an attack at the Japanese nation. On April 21, 2008, for example, an audio tape was released containing Ayman al-Zawahiri’s answer to a question posed to him by Kyodo News: was Japan still a target? Zawahiri answered, My answer is: Yes! We believe that any country that participated in the aggression on Muslims must be deterred. . . Japan provided the so-called assistance under the flag of the Crusader coalition as part of the propaganda for the Crusader forces invading the homelands of Islam. It did not provide this assistance through charitable organizations and thus it is participating in the Crusader campaign against the lands of Islam. . . Why did the Japanese start the aggression on us within the alliance of the Americans?. . . If Japan had given up their arms, why did it send troops to our lands under the flag of the Crusader campaign?. . . Our Islamic faith incites us to resist despots and tyrants, even if they were the most powerful force on earth. . . Will Japan learn a lesson from this? I advise Japan to end its alliance with the United States, which has occupied, looted, humiliated, and bombed them with nuclear weapons.6 In this way, Japan became transformed in the minds of senior alQaeda leaders from a peaceful country at ‘the farthest point on earth’ to an aggressor nation invading the homelands of Islam in close alliance with the American enemy.

Measuring the Al-Qaeda Threat Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri both explicitly stated that they reserved the right to strike Japan for its support of US

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military campaigns in the Islamic world. This much is clear: but did the al-Qaeda leadership ever make an actual attempt to carry out terrorism against Japan or Japanese interests? This crucial point remains in doubt. There have been occasional reports of al-Qaeda activity inside Japan. Perhaps the most celebrated case is the one involving Lionel Dumont, a Frenchman who converted to Islam in 1991. Dumont served in the French Army in Djibouti and Somalia before becoming a volunteer fighter in Bosnia. He may have gained al-Qaeda links around this time. In France in 1996, Dumont joined a gang that attempted a car-bomb attack on the G-7 Summit in the city of Lille. Now wanted by the French police as a criminal and Islamic radical, Dumont fled to Bosnia, but he was arrested there the following year on unrelated charges. He escaped from custody shortly before he was to be extradited to France. In the following years, Dumont traveled through Europe and Asia on false passports. From 2002 to 2003, he lived in the rural town of Nishi-Kawaguchi, Niigata Prefecture, working as a car salesman. According to the account given by Dumont himself after his capture in Germany in December 2003, he abandoned Islamic radicalism after September 11 and was simply trying to avoid arrest by keeping a low profile in an out-of-the-way location. Japanese police, however, suspected that he was organizing a terrorist cell for attacks in Tokyo. In May 2004, police arrested five suspects who had dealings with Lionel Dumont in Japan, but it was never apparent that any plot had ever existed.7 An even more shadowy case concerns an unnamed 30-year-old Pakistani man who reportedly entered Japan in 2003. It was alleged that this man had told fellow worshipers at a mosque in Japan that he was recruiting for a Sunni extremist group called the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). This organization is noted for its violent opposition to Shia Islam inside the man’s home country. It remains unclear why he was interested in recruiting SSP members inside Japan. At any rate, it seems that the Muslims he talked to at the mosque told him that they were not interested in his agenda, and they simply brushed him off.8 It is doubtful that this case represented any kind of threat to Japan.

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A third case emerged suddenly on February 12, 2007. Two small explosions occurred outside the US military base at Camp Zama, near Tokyo. No one was hurt and no damage was inflicted. However, the US network ABC News found ‘intelligence reports in Japan and Pakistan’ that identified ‘al-Qaeda in Japan’ as the most likely culprit. According to an unidentified source, about two dozen Pakistani militants entered Japan on student visas in the late 1990s and covertly established ‘a small but powerful presence in Japan’ that was poised to strike terror at the heart of the nation.9 The ABC News narrative fell flat, however, when a Japanese group calling itself the Revolutionary Army declared responsibility, explaining that the purpose of the action was to prevent the realignment of US forces in Japan and to protest US Vice-President Dick Cheney’s upcoming visit to Tokyo. As US Army spokeswoman Major Martha Brooks put it, the whole affair was ‘blown completely out of proportion’.10 Cases such as these do not add up to very concrete evidence. One lone militant who tried to escape attention by lying low in rural Japan; a pathetic and unsuccessful attempt to recruit militants for a cause that may have been entirely unrelated to Japanese security; media hype called attention to a couple of minor explosions: none of these incidents suggest that al-Qaeda made any attempt to follow through on its verbal threats against Japan. Of course, the very nature of clandestine networking means that we would be highly ill-advised to state conclusively that there has never been a substantial threat to Japan. What can be said with a degree of confidence, however, is that the evidence currently on the table does not seem particularly ominous. Nothing reported to date suggests any imminent danger. As of the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, every large-scale act of non-state terrorism inside Japan had been carried out by Japanese nationals, not foreigners.11 Certainly, the small, dispersed communities of Muslims in Japan had much to lose and nothing to gain by participating in violent actions inside the country. In a nation in which all non-East Asians are quite conspicuous and carefully watched by their Japanese neighbours, foreign terrorists can be identified almost immediately. Moreover, for a variety of historical and social reasons, most Muslims in Japan feel little bitterness toward

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their host society. It seems highly unlikely that any long-term Muslim residents with language skills and knowledge of Japanese culture would be willing to participate in a violent scheme in the post-September 11 climate. Theoretically, militant Islamists could be sent from abroad with the predetermined mission to carry out attacks, but the logistical and practical obstacles they would face would be formidable to anyone not familiar with the local scene. If al-Qaeda did choose to attack Japanese interests, such an event is most likely to occur outside Japan, perhaps involving an assault on a Japanese embassy or the offices of a major company. Japanese aid workers and tourists abroad have been attacked on a few occasions, and future attacks would probably be along the same lines. It is in the international realm that Japanese nationals are more exposed and threatened.12

Hyping the Threat The foregoing assessment does not mean that Japanese conservatives and their allies in government and the media will acknowledge such realities. As long as conservative political interests are served by ruling over a fearful and insecure populace, so the conservatives will probably continue to promote public fears. Fear is a powerful political tool. Among the conservative commentators promoting this fearmongering line were Atsuyuki Sassa, Masayuki Yamauchi, Jun Shinmi and Satoshi Ikeuchi. The implications of these men’s public statements affected not only Japan’s foreign policies but also its domestic security policies and community relations between the Japanese people and resident foreigners. The role of these men and their fundamental message to the Japanese public deserves additional consideration. The commentators Terumasa Nakanishi and Kazuhisa Ogawa exemplify this mindset. Kyoto University Professor Terumasa Nakanishi, who was an adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, revealed his attitude shortly after September 11 in an essay entitled, ‘Make a Clean Sweep of Japan’s Unseen Enemy’.13 He announced that while the twentieth century had become known as the ‘American Century’, the twentyfirst century was to be the ‘New War Century’. Given that reality, the

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Japanese people needed to seriously consider what they should do in the case of national crisis. One of his key concerns was ‘cyberterrorism’, which, he explained, could immediately disable computers around the nation and cause airliners to fall out of the sky, Japanese bullet trains to crash, public ‘lifelines’ to gas, electricity, and water to be severed and emergency services to be paralysed.14 The main risk to Japanese security he perceived was the ‘foolish pacifism’ that led many Japanese to underestimate the world of threats that would soon ravage the nation. Five years later, in 2006, Nakanishi’s message to the nation had not changed, in spite of the fact that very little had actually happened inside Japan: ‘After 9/11 and following the Iraq War, the threat of terrorism sprang up all over the world. But it was not as bad as most people expected, and therefore the fear in people’s minds has slowly started to subside, especially in Japan. It is precisely at times like this, when the public starts to become complacent, that the time is ripe for terrorists to strike once again.’15 His message was clear: Japan needed to get on its toes and stay there. Kazuhisa Ogawa, another conservative commentator, was certainly on his toes. One of Japan’s leading analysts of terrorism and military affairs, he frequently appeared on television to offer his ideas. In one opinion article, he expressed a view similar to Nakanishi’s as regards his estimation of the Japanese attachment to pacifism: The Japanese are inclined to have nonsensical discussions, placing an equal emphasis on international peace and their national security and prosperity in defiance of due processes and the road maps they must follow. Their discussions are apt to be unrealistic and go nowhere or are laborious but fruitless. All this makes me wonder if there is a more illogical people in the world than the Japanese. To get things done there must be order, without which you cannot reach a target.16 What particularly annoyed Ogawa was that ‘the Japanese have not tackled the War on Terror in earnest as a real party to it’.17 In Ogawa’s view, the failure of the Japanese general public to enthusiastically embrace the War on Terror was not only a demonstration of hugely

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irresponsible behaviour but also quite detrimental to Japan’s national security and prosperity, as well as to international peace more generally. Although Ogawa was not an expert on Islam or area studies, he was nonetheless entirely convinced that Japan faced an imminent and grave threat from what he called Islamic terrorists: ‘Japan, a typical modern country, is a likely target for al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic fundamentalists who desire to return to the fourteenth-century Islamic world. If such Islamic terrorists can get their hands on the weapons of mass destruction that we suspect Iran and North Korea are developing, we would face a grave national security threat, because such an unholy alliance increases the danger of a country being attacked with such weapons.’18 Such was Kazuhisa Ogawa’s assessment of the threat at the beginning of 2008, almost five years after the Iraq War had been launched. He has been arguing in this manner consistently since September 11, and nothing that occurred (or had not occurred) throughout the Bush years moved his position in the slightest. These two commentators could stand in for many others. There was no dearth of similar voices asserting that radical Muslim terrorists were gathering to strike Japanese society at any moment. Many other countries had comparable commentators, of course; the threat posed by domestic terrorism was hyped in many countries besides Japan, and the shriller voices even asserted that local Muslim communities posed an ‘existential’ threat to the body politic. One point that may distinguish these Japanese commentators from those in the United States or Europe, however, is their clearly expressed disdain for their own people.19 As much as they thought that they were at war with radical Muslims, even more their rage was directed at the Japanese general public, which resisted the employment of violent measures and which the conservative commentators believed was insufficiently supportive of the campaign to guarantee national security.

The Responses of Japanese Security Agencies It is one thing, of course, to present the opinions expressed by a handful of security hawks and quite another to examine the practical

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responses of the Japanese government. It is apparent that Japanese government agencies reacted to September 11 in various ways. Media reports noted anti-terrorist responses from the Kantei, the Defense Agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, the National Police Agency, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and the JCG. The immediate bureaucratic response to September 11 demonstrated clearly that from the outset, Japan regarded itself as a potential target, well before al-Qaeda had actually given any thought to the Japanese role. The September 11 attacks spurred concern for the immediate protection of the US Embassy in Tokyo and US military bases in Japan. The day after the attacks, the Tokyo embassy doubled its security measures and closed its doors to normal business, including such matters as the issuance of travel visas.20 Five police cars were parked in front of the embassy for additional security.21 On September 21, 2001, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport prohibited small planes and helicopters from flying close to the embassy. This no-fly zone was extended to the area over the Diet buildings and other ministries in central Tokyo.22 US military bases in Japan went on maximum alert. Armed soldiers in helmets and camouflage uniforms carefully checked entering vehicles. Some bases restricted access for non-essential personnel.23 Meanwhile, Japanese police forces clad in bulletproof vests and helmets stepped up security around US military facilities.24 On the seas, the JCG deployed patrol boats to monitor waters near US bases and to conduct on-board inspections of unidentified ships.25 All these actions were reasonable, but the issue of whether the SDF should participate in guarding US bases was touchier. If the SDF were to engage in such duties, the legal question would arise of whether or not this activity violated the ban on the exercise of collective selfdefence. This legal question was felt by many conservative lawmakers to be an inconvenient annoyance, but they were nevertheless compelled to grapple with it. Initially, the New Komeito Party resisted the idea of using the SDF to guard US bases, but within

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several days, the party reversed its position and expressed willingness to fast-track the necessary legislation.26 Revisions to the SDF Law were eventually enacted by the Diet on October 29, 2001, but by that time, many weeks had passed without the occurrence of any terrorist events inside Japan, and the whole matter no longer seemed quite so urgent. The Japanese government, however, believed that Japan itself – not just American diplomats and soldiers in Japan – was also a potential target for terrorist attacks. Defense Agency DirectorGeneral Gen Nakatani announced that he was placing the entire SDF on maximum alert in order to guard against possible terrorist attacks.27 Because the safety of Japan’s nuclear plants presented another immediate concern, police guards were added in their vicinity. By early October 2001, it was announced that a total of 580 different facilities had been provided with enhanced security. There was never, of course, any indication that the threat of terrorism on Japanese soil was any higher on September 12 than it had been on September 10, but the television images of the destruction of the World Trade Center had shaken Japanese officials on a psychological level. National Public Safety Commission Chairman Jin Murai noted, ‘Please be advised that, at this present stage, the police do not have any specific information on the possibility of a terrorist attack in Japan, but the possibility is there all the time.’28 A wide-eyed police officer guarding the US Embassy added, ‘Nobody can guarantee that there will not be a terrorist act in Japan.’29 In this way, the issue of terrorism within Japan suddenly became a top priority. Even ministries and government agencies with rather distant concerns took this opportunity to review or create plans for dealing with terrorism. The World Trade Center had been destroyed on the other side of the world, but through the miracle of television, it seemed that the attack had happened next door. It felt as if suddenly Japan was under some special threat. At the Kantei, the first priority was to try to coordinate Japan’s overall anti-terrorism security policy. For this purpose, on October 8, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi established an anti-terrorism task

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force that he placed under his personal direction and that included all members of the cabinet.30 Presumably, this task force was tightly related to the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office, which had a staff of almost 200 and was directly attached to the Kantei.31 In its first month of operation, the new task force established a five-point plan to defend against biological and chemical terrorism, including a plan to increase vaccine stockpiles. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda commented to the media, ‘Based on this policy, the government will establish or strengthen systems that will enable us to deal swiftly and effectively should any incidents of biological or chemical terrorism take place in our country.’32 In later years, Prime Minister Koizumi himself spoke about the possibility of domestic terrorism. In March 2004, for example, he called upon the public to be on guard against possible terrorist attacks inside Japan: ‘There is a possibility of terror attacks in any region. . . I expect people to realize the need to protect our society by ourselves.’33 Several agencies had a clear mandate to conduct anti-terrorist policies. Among these, the ministry most directly concerned was the Ministry of Justice. Not only did this ministry have a responsibility for such areas as immigration and the legal system, it was also home to the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), the civilian intelligence agency with a clear-cut responsibility for preventing terrorism inside Japan.34 Immediately after the September 11 attacks, an immigration crackdown began. As a first step, tighter scrutiny was focused on foreigners entering Japan at airports and other entry points.35 The minister of justice instructed prosecutors to prepare for terrorism-related cases.36 A few weeks later, the Ministry of Justice set up its own anti-terrorism task force that included officials from the ministry’s immigration and criminal affairs bureaus, as well as the PSIA.37 There was action as well. The US government informed Tokyo that 19 ‘Islamic extremists’ were believed to have entered Japan in early September 2001. Some of these alleged extremists were from Kandahar in Afghanistan.38 There does not seem to have been a great deal of evidence for this US claim, but the Japanese authorities nevertheless cut back on the number of Afghans allowed to enter

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Japan, and they deported a few others about whom they felt concern. The immigration authorities also sought an emergency allowance of over US$3 million to develop an online computer network to track potential international terrorists entering the country.39 Two organizations at street level in the hunt for domestic terrorists were the National Police Agency (NPA) and the Tokyo Metropolition Police Department (MPD). The NPA operates under the authority of the National Public Safety Commission, which itself is attached directly to the Cabinet Office. Police officers belong to the various prefectural services, but the role of the NPA, with a staff numbering over 7,500, is to coordinate and oversee national police policy. Most of the NPA’s activities are not revealed to the public. The largest and most influential of the police forces is the MPD. In 2008, it claimed a force of more than 42,000 officers, 1,100 patrol cars, 950 motorcycles, 26 patrol boats and 14 helicopters.40 Outside Tokyo, each of the other 46 prefectures (and other administrative subdivisions) maintains their own police forces. In the weeks following September 11, NPA Director-General Setsuo Tanaka ordered prefectural police forces across the nation to do all they could to prevent terrorist attacks inside Japan: ‘Preventing terrorism is one of the main tasks of security police. I hope you will mobilize all your potential to live up to people’s expectations’, he declared.41 In October 2001, Tanaka made explicit his view that an international terrorist attack on Japan was not a matter of if but of when. He warned officials that ‘terrorists will definitely make an attack by hitting the weak points of the security system. Precise prior information is extremely important.’42 This heightened attention to terrorism also invigorated the NPA’s budget. In November 2001, it was announced that almost 1,400 submachine guns would be purchased and for the first time distributed to conventional police forces. (The 200-member Special Assault Team, the main counterterrorist force, already possessed such weapons.) Emergency budgets were also granted to acquire armoured vehicles, flak jackets, bulletproof helmets and new bomb and biological weapons detectors.43 In large part because of

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terrorism-related matters, the NPA asked for a 6.8 per cent rise in its budget for the 2003 fiscal year. It also asked to hire an additional 4,000 officers, obtain new armoured vehicles to protect nuclear power plants and purchase protective wear for police in the event of nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorist attacks.44 Since Tokyo was generally regarded as the most likely site for any attack, it meant that the responsibility of the MPD was particularly grave. Immediately following September 11, the MPD established a Counterterrorism Commission that would allow the agency’s top brass to discuss ways to deal with potential international terrorist attacks in Tokyo.45 Before long, the MPD began hosting forums for public officials and businessmen to discuss ways to prevent terrorism. Cyber-terrorism – Professor Terumasa Nakanishi’s worry – was a key focus in the first such forum in October 2001.46 Security measures within the city were reexamined, and some of them were tightened. The three buildings that made up the Tokyo metropolitan government complex were given special attention. The main automatic doors on the first floors of the buildings were closed, and people were made to enter through side doors. For the first time, security guards were posted directly outside the governor’s office.47 In the spring of 2002, the MPD unveiled a 100-man police squad to protect the Kantei. Squad members were armed with submachine guns as well as equipment to counter threats from biological and chemical weapons.48 In Tokyo and in various regions around the country, the local police conducted anti-terrorism drills. If the potential for terrorism on land was the main concern, ‘maritime terrorism’ was not neglected. The JCG requested shipping organizations, such as the Japanese Shipowners Association, to report the positions of all vessels using a common position-report system.49 In November 2001, the JCG held a large-scale drill based on a scenario in which anthrax was found on a passenger ship in Tokyo Bay.50 In July 2002, JCG officials traveled to Hawaii to meet with their counterparts from Canada, China, Russia, South Korea and the United States; at this meeting, the attending nations pledged to strengthen mutual organizational ties to fight maritime terrorism.51

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Meanwhile, in October 2001, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications convened an unprecedented meeting of local government officials and warned them to prepare measures to fight terrorism. Vice-Minister Akira Shimazu told the meeting, ‘Terrorism is not an incident taking place far away across the Pacific Ocean but something that could happen in this country. We hope you will take full measures to protect people.’52 The Fire and Disaster Management Agency, an organization under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, translated a textbook used by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which included basic knowledge and emergency measures to deal with domestic terrorist attacks.53 The Ministry of Health focused on preparations to defend against bioterrorism. Within a month of September 11, the ministry established a task force devoted to this topic. Participants in the meetings discussed measures to store medicines and vaccines.54 The ministry followed up by issuing orders to local governments to enhance security at waterworks facilities and reservoirs, including stringent checks of visitors to such places. Additionally, local governments were asked to intensify all inspections of foodstuffs, in order to prevent terrorists from contaminating food with dangerous bacteria during storage and distribution.55 The ministry contacted every laboratory in the nation to make sure that these were taking all appropriate measures to keep dangerous viruses and bacteria out of the hands of terrorists.56 At the same time, the Ministry of Finance addressed the issue of terrorist financing. The government quickly signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism – an act that had not previously been a priority.57 The ministry led a newly-established working team designed to track and gather information on the assets and financing of terrorist groups.58 These measures were followed by practical steps. After the war against the Taliban was launched by US forces, the Japanese government froze 31 Taliban-related domestic bank accounts with total funds of about US$700,000.59 The freeze on Taliban accounts was soon expanded to groups that had no relation to the September 11 attacks, such as

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Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Gamaa al-Islamiyya, the Abu Nidal Organization and the Shining Path guerilla organization of Peru.60 Like the Bush administration, the Japanese government used the al-Qaeda attacks as a justification to crack down on a wide variety of armed resistance organizations. Even ordinary Japanese citizens were subjected to increasingly strict limits on the amounts of money they could withdraw or transfer, and the flow of all cash became more closely monitored. Another major development, largely unnoticed by the Japanese people, was the participation, for the first time, of the SDF in domestic anti-terrorism efforts. Memories of political repression left by the old Imperial Japanese Army had previously made such an engagement unacceptable. In late September 2001, a fierce struggle for power was waged behind closed doors between the SDF and the NPA. At stake was the choice of organization that would be given the lead in securing the homeland. Highly prestigious locations, such as the Imperial Palace and the Diet buildings, needed to be defended, and some of the SDF’s supporters argued that only the military forces had the capability to accomplish this task. Advocates for the NPA, such as National Public Safety Commission Chairman Jin Murai, argued in response that as a basic principle in advanced countries, such duties were reserved for policemen unless these were overwhelmed by a riot or an invasion: No reason currently existed for soldiers to take over the streets. Senior LDP politicians lined up on both sides of the battle.61 In the end, the NPA retained its traditional prerogatives, and the Defense Agency’s power grab was beaten back. Perhaps as a consolation prize, the SDF was granted a key role in defending against bioterrorism.62 Three years later, in September 2004, the Defense Agency and the NPA drew up new guidelines that more clearly defined the division of responsibilities in the event of a major terrorist attack within Japan.63 By that time, however, the two organizations had been working together for some time. In November 2002, the GSDF held its first joint drill with the NPA. The scenario was an armed attack by terrorists that overwhelmed the capabilities of the civilian police. A

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senior GSDF officer observed, ‘We never imagined that such an exercise would really be possible until recently.’64 Similar joint drills were held in subsequent years.65 In March 2004, the GSDF announced that they had established a 300-man undercover antiterrorist unit based at Narashino, Chiba Prefecture, designed to ‘mainly work within Japanese territory’.66 It was said that they were elite airborne troops given special training in intelligence-gathering and the tracking of suspected terrorists.67 One of the key boosters for an increased role for the GSDF in domestic security operations was Prime Minister Koizumi himself. At a ceremony marking the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the SDF in 2004, the premier expressed annoyance that in 1954, the creation of the SDF had been ‘slandered as a revival of the Imperial Japanese Army’.68 Koizumi looked forward to an expanded domestic role for the forces. He told the troops, ‘While carrying out a full review of the existing structure and armaments of the SDF and making it more efficient, we will also make sure it can steadily deal with new threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.’69 Thus, the domestic response to the perceived threat of terrorism encompassed more than simply rhetoric. Immediately after September 11 – before there was even a hint of an al-Qaeda threat aimed at Japan – the Japanese government launched into anxious activity. All of a sudden, anti-terrorism emerged as a top agenda item. Public funds were redirected to new anti-terrorist policies, and public officials abruptly found themselves given the task of securing the nation against terrorism. High-ranking police officials without specialist knowledge of Islam or the Arab world freely expressed the view that international terrorists were ‘certain’ to attack Japan soon and that the peaceful streets of the nation would be struck by terrorist outrages. The Japanese public was largely convinced. In December 2003, the NPA released a poll showing that 80 per cent of the public believed that the likelihood of a terrorist attack was increasing, and 63 per cent admitted to personally experiencing fear about such an eventuality. Almost 10 per cent indicated that their fear of terrorism was both strong and persistent.70

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The Voices of Muslims in Japan A different perspective on the War on Terror was held by Muslims living in Japan, who abruptly found themselves implicated in a global conspiracy and suspected of harbouring violent and seditious intentions against the state. There are not many Muslims in Japan. Recent estimates put the number of foreign Muslims in Japan from 60,000 to perhaps 100,000 – mostly male labourers from such places as Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iran – as well as some thousands of ethnic Japanese converts to Islam.71 These people are spread throughout the country and are in constant contact with their Japanese neighbours. Since the late 1990s, Islam in Japan has gradually become more visible. There are now dozens of mosques throughout the country, even in some remote rural areas. It was these people who were on the other end of the anxious attentions of Japanese security agencies. Their reactions were as diverse as the community itself. Some were annoyed by the heightened scrutiny, while others expressed understanding. A surprisingly large number of Muslims were directly contacted by the Japanese police and asked if they knew any radicals or had knowledge of terrorist plots. These efforts were sometimes very clumsy and were not universally appreciated. Some Muslims interpreted these police actions as official intimidation, while others were more philosophical, occasionally even welcoming visits from the police as opportunities to reassure mainstream Japanese society.72 The NPA and local police agencies clearly contributed to a sense that Muslims posed a threat to Japanese society. For example, a pamphlet entitled The Oncoming Threat of Terrorism, widely distributed by the NPA, undeniably spread a message of fear. The cover of the pamphlet showed a photograph of the destruction of the World Trade Center, and its text (made available in both Japaneseand English-language editions) was as overheated as that of the rightwing commentators. For example, one passage announced, ‘Japan is not immune to the threat of international terrorism. . . Many people from Islamic countries are living and forming communities in Japan.

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It is of concern that in the future, Islamic extremists may take advantage of such communities to procure funds and materials, as well as to take various opportunities to influence youths into becoming extremists.’73 Anti-terrorist divisions at local police agencies also contributed to the atmosphere of official paranoia. The Fukuoka Prefectural Police in western Japan, for instance, printed thousands of copies of posters warning of the threat of terrorism. These posters were placed in public areas, such as train stations. Under the overall Englishlanguage slogan NO TERROR, many of these posters featured a cartoon policeman called Fukkei-kun who rushes to warn the Japanese people about the dangers that await them. In one version of the poster, the Japanese-language text announces, ‘Japan has been named as a terror target by international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda!’ It then continues, ‘We can protect against international terrorism through your information!’ Little Fukkei-kun then advises readers that they should pay close attention to their surroundings: ‘There’s something odd about those people!’ and ‘There’s something strange about that bag!’ While the basic motive behind the Fukuoka NO TERROR campaign may well have been the protection of the Japanese public from possible harm, it was probably more effective in stirring up suspicion of foreigners in general and Muslims in particular. The invitation to give free rein to xenophobic impulses was unmistakable.74 On the other hand, in the weeks following the September 11 attacks, the normally voiceless Muslim community in Japan did receive some sympathetic media attention. A handful of media reports told of harassing phone calls received daily by mosques and prominent local Muslims, and that many Muslims were greeted by cold looks as they passed their Japanese neighbours on the street.75 Resident Muslims commonly explained that Islam is a religion of peace and that the al-Qaeda attacks did not represent their faith. For example, in late September 2001, Khalid Higuchi, the chairman of the Japan Muslim Association, told a reporter, ‘Such inhumane conduct as terrorism has never been in line with our values and way of living, which aspires to peace.’76

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At the same time, many Muslims in Japan also tried to gently point out that all the blame for what had happened should not be heaped upon Muslims, and that US policy had contributed a great deal to the tragedy. An Egyptian engineer living in Tokyo advised, ‘Unless we solve the basic question of why the terrorist attacks were launched in the first place, terrorist acts will never end.’77 The director of a mosque in Tokyo put it more directly: ‘America seems to have paid almost no attention to the tens of thousands of deaths of civilians in Palestine and Iraq, incurred by its firearms, but now seems so upset when its own people are hurt. . . I just want that country to realize that every individual’s life is precious.’78 Media attention to the perspective of Muslims in Japan, however, soon faded. With few exceptions, interest in Islam in Japan was limited to those times and places when Japanese felt fear of terrorism. Otherwise, most Japanese simply had no interest in that faith. Nevertheless, as the years rolled by, the media both inside and outside Japan occasionally reconsidered the matter, especially whenever alQaeda leaders released a new tape or a local Muslim fell under suspicion of wrongdoing. A typical example of this kind of journalism appeared in Time magazine in May 2004, under the inflammatory headline ‘Japan’s Terror Threat’. The story outlined the Lionel Dumont case in the wake of a police arrest of five foreign Muslims suspected of conspiring with Dumont. The perspective of a Muslim leader was introduced: At the Medina Masjid, one town over from Nishi-Kawaguchi, mosque chairman Raees Siddiqui, a 53-year-old Pakistani, is happy to chat about a possible backlash against Muslims due to the arrests. . . Siddiqui recalls meeting only one of the detainees, and that it was just for a few minutes about 18 months ago. Even so, he feels certain they are not terrorists. ‘Perhaps they overstayed their visas, but that is because they wanted to make more money for their families. They are not al-Qaeda. There is no al-Qaeda in Japan.’ That, of course, is for the authorities to determine, but what concerns Siddiqui the most is that the public might begin to see all Muslims in an unfavorable light:

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‘If the media keeps this up, Japanese people will look at Muslims and say, “Oh, he is al-Qaeda”.’ And so the door to a country already famously ambivalent about immigrants could shut a little more.79 Most Muslims in Japan were not arrested, of course, and lived quiet lives with no awareness of any (perhaps nonexistent) al-Qaeda terrorist threat to Japan, but it is likely that each and every one of them was touched by the question of terrorism in some manner. When asked about his own experience, one Tokyo-based Syrian intellectual responded, Personally I have never encountered a problem, but I do have worries about growing tendencies to give ‘special attention’ to Arabs and Muslims in Japan. It is never comforting to get occasional visits by police and public-security personnel asking for information about the situation in the Arab region, something that is happening to many Arabs residing in Japan. Japanese authorities seem careful not to do something that would invoke a strong reaction from ethnic groups that are largely Muslim in Japan. Nor have I heard about any incident where a Muslim was intimidated by the police because of being Muslim. But I can never be sure that the polite attitude of the visiting officers would remain the same if an incident affecting public order takes place in Japan and if that incident is linked to Muslims. Of course, the occasional clumsy dealings with foreigners are something that all foreigners suffer from in Japan. However, I have been hearing about attempts by the ‘koan’ [the PSIA] to gather information about people who pray in mosques and, more disturbingly, about students in Japanese academic institutions who come from Arab and Muslim countries.80 In sum, the worst period for Muslims in Japan was during the weeks immediately following the September 11 attacks. At that time, they were treated coldly by many of their Japanese neighbours, and there were even cases of harassment. Police surveillance of all Muslims in

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Japan increased substantially, and the high level of scrutiny from the authorities was maintained in the following years. Not only were police agencies not particularly sensitive to the risk of a backlash against innocent Muslims in their midst, but the NPA was, in fact, one of the main culprits fanning the flames of suspicion and doubt about resident Muslims. Fortunately for all concerned, however, no acts of terrorism were carried out by Muslims in Japan in this period, and there is no clear evidence of a significant attempt to operationalize al-Qaeda’s verbal threats against Japan. The status and position of the small Muslim community in Japan is already so tenuous that it seems highly unlikely that long-term Muslim residents in Japan would in any way connect with violent actions. The police are already poised to (over) react to any potential threat, all foreigners remain socially conspicuous, and mass deportations are all too conceivable within the Japanese political context.

Kunio Hatoyama’s War on Terror From August 2007 to August 2008, Kunio Hatoyama served as minister of justice. He is the scion of a well-known political dynasty in Japan, his grandfather having been prime minister in the mid1950s. Kunio’s brother, Yukio Hatoyama, was a key leader of the opposition DPJ and future prime minister. Kunio Hatoyama’s year as justice minister, which was, by most measures, a failure, was characterized by gaffes. His relations with the media were antagonistic. Because of his enthusiastic support of the death penalty and the unprecedented number of execution warrants that he signed during his year in office, the Asahi Shinbun famously tagged him the ‘Grim Reaper’.81 While as a single individual, Kunio Hatoyama does not constitute much of a threat, a valid argument can be made that Kunio Hatoyama is symbolic of a crosssection of troubling trends; these may reappear in the future in a more virulent and consequential form. A crucial part of the mix is pressure from Washington. Officials of the Bush administration who supported controversial security

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measures within the United States insisted that other nations follow suit. In April 2002, for example, General Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a press conference told Japan that it should upgrade its anti-terrorist policies: I’ll leave it to Japan to decide what the right answer is, but I think you get the idea that I believe we need to fundamentally reexamine how we’re organized and to deal with this threat. . . I think the security environment we’re in here in the twenty-first century, we knew it was going to be very different from the Cold War that we’ve all come out of. In 1995, sarin gas was used in Tokyo, and in 2001, airliners were used to attack buildings. We know for sure that terrorist groups are very interested in other weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological and even nuclear.82 Over time, a stream of official visitors from US government agencies came to Japan to ask for various changes. The constant refrain was that Japan needed to tighten its procedures and to increase domestic surveillance. In March 2006, there were two such high-profile visitors to Tokyo. First came FBI Deputy Director John Pistole. His basic message to Japanese policymakers was: I think not only Japan but also the United States and our allies who are engaged in the fight against terrorism will benefit any time a country passes a strong anti-terrorism law. . . If it is a Patriot Act-type law, I cannot see any way but for all democracies to benefit, primarily because of the ability to share intelligence in a way that may be precluded at present. . . The current Japanese law does not address terrorism matters, and it will be clearly beneficial if there was a wiretapping law that can be used in terrorism investigations.83 A visit from US Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff followed; he darkly warned his Japanese hosts at a news conference, ‘We know that Bin Laden has talked about Japan as an enemy, a

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country that he wants to punish. We could never assume that something won’t happen.’84 Such messages were not lost on Japanese officials. In 2004, the NPA intimated that it would begin lobbying for new laws that would allow them to collect ‘biometric information’ deemed ‘crucial’ to the fight against terrorism.85 The controversial centrepiece of these efforts was a plan to photograph and fingerprint all non-Japanese citizens entering the country. The bill, which became law in May 2006, was implemented in November 2007, not long after Kunio Hatoyama became justice minister. The new law provided for the fingerprinting of approximately six million foreigners each time they entered the country; these records would be stored for an indefinite period. Japanese officials reserved the right to share this information with foreign governments as they saw fit. A Japanese immigration official justified the new law: ‘We are taking these measures out of necessity and rationality. If we were to collect fingerprints when it is not necessary, that would be unconstitutional. . . We are doing this to protect everyone living in Japan, including foreigners, ensuring their lives and security.’86 The Japan Federation of Bar Associations was among the many civil groups that protested this new measure. The fact that the law targeted only foreigners – including permanent residents who were married to Japanese nationals and had lived in the country for decades – was a particularly controversial element. Critics pointed out that no large-scale terrorist attacks by foreign residents had ever occurred. While Japan had seen many acts of non-state terrorism in its history, in all cases the perpetrators had been Japanese nationals, not foreigners. In this context, it seemed difficult to justify the photographing and fingerprinting of foreigners while leaving the mainstream Japanese public entirely untouched.87 Makoto Teranaka, secretary-general of Amnesty International Japan, observed, ‘By targeting only foreigners, the Immigration Bureau is encouraging discrimination against foreigners. . . The Immigration Bureau is using the word “anti-terrorism” to increase and strengthen control over foreigners in Japan.’88 Many others joined this chorus of criticism. One foreign resident described the new law as the ‘bullying

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of a minority class’.89 Another asserted, ‘The motive of the new biometrics clearly is not stopping terrorism, but rather a new expression of Japan’s deep-seated racism and xenophobia.’90 It was within the context of this swirling debate that Justice Minister Kunio Hatoyama intervened soon after his appointment to office. Hatoyama made several points clear. First, he was a strong supporter of the death penalty. Second, he was determined to crack down on illegal immigrants, noting that a specific goal of his administration would be to reduce the number of illegal immigrants by at least half. Hatoyama also declared himself opposed to legal immigrants. When asked about the relative tolerance that his predecessor had shown in allowing foreign labourers to work in Japan, Hatoyama responded, ‘Considering Japan’s culture, I must question whether that is a good idea. This may not be the right thing to say, but that could provoke an increase in crimes by foreign nationals. . . I am the justice minister now.’91 This attitude, of course, did nothing to endear Hatoyama to the foreign residents of Japan, who were subjected to both insult and injury by the new minister of justice. As a result, when Hatoyama gave an interview at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in October 2007, reporters aggressively challenged him on his controversial statements and on Japan’s new fingerprinting policy, demanding to know why such measures were really necessary. Placed on the defensive, Justice Minister Kunio Hatoyama gave an illadvised response, explaining that a ‘friend of a friend’ of his was an al-Qaeda member involved in one of the Bali bombings. He continued, ‘I have never met this person, but up until two or three years ago, he seems to have visited Japan frequently. Every time this person enters Japan, he uses different passports and mustaches, and therefore customs officials are unable to recognize him. It is undesirable for security reasons that such people can enter Japan so easily.’92 Could it be that the Japanese minister of justice himself has a terrorist link? That was not exactly what Hatoyama was trying to say, but that is the message that some people heard. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura publicly rebuked Hatoyama: ‘It is very regrettable that he gave the impression that Japan’s justice minister knows such terrorists.

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I think his remarks were careless, and I warned him before the cabinet meeting.’ The political analyst Tobias Harris observed, ‘If his friend suggested that he knew a member of al-Qaeda, wouldn’t a sitting member of the Diet feel strongly about finding out whether there was any truth to the idea and putting the resources of the Japanese state to work finding and apprehending this person? And if he inquired further and found there was no truth to it, but still said it aloud, doesn’t that show him to have a lack of judgment rendering him unfit to serve as, of all things, minister of justice?’93 The transparent truth – as almost everyone realized – was that Justice Minister Hatoyama had no ‘friend of a friend’ in al-Qaeda; he came up with this rationalization on the spur of the moment when he could think of no better answer to fend off the questions of hostile foreign reporters. However, his statement indicated that, in Hatoyama’s mind, the ‘terrorist threat’ and the ‘foreign threat’ were close to identical; he imagined that both foreign criminals and foreign terrorists were poised to overrun peaceful Japanese society, and he was convinced that stern measures must be taken by responsible men such as himself to prevent that nightmare from occurring. Although Hatoyama’s lack of judgement was unusual, his tendency to feel threatened by foreigners is a common Japanese trait, as almost any scholar of Japanese culture or any foreign resident can readily attest. When UN Special Rapporteur on Racism Doudou Diene visited Japan, he found what he described as ‘deep and profound’ racism. He pointed out that the Japanese government did not have a domestic law establishing racism as a crime. In regard to the issue of fingerprinting foreigners – which was then still under discussion in the Diet – Diene observed, ‘Doing this in an ideological atmosphere where there is a strong growth of nationalism and xenophobia clearly leads to discrimination against foreigners.’94 However, for the conservative leaders of Japan, cracking down on foreign terrorists (who probably did not exist) was a much higher priority than cracking down on Japanese anti-foreign discrimination (which certainly did exist). Indeed, it was all too apparent that Justice Minister Kunio Hatoyama himself possessed discriminatory and xenophobic impulses.

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US officials had no constructive response to these issues. They issued no official encouragement to adopt antidiscrimination measures in line with the UN recommendations; the Bush administration’s priorities lay elsewhere. In February 2008, Robert Mocny, the head of the US – VISIT programme of the Department of Homeland Security, arrived in Tokyo to request that Japanese immigration authorities begin taking all ten fingerprints of every foreigner arriving in the country, rather than printing only two fingers. He stated that he wanted a dialogue with the government to see if the Japanese would ‘follow what we’ve done’. Mocny continued, ‘It is important to the people of America and the people who visit America that they have a safe and law-abiding society.’95 Concerns about anti-foreign discrimination in Japan were not on the US agenda. As the War on Terror continued for several years and the bureaucracies slowly adapted to the new set of priorities, antiterrorist measures became more routinized and progressively more formidable. In spite of the fact that no international terrorist acts actually occurred in Japan during this period, the responses of security agencies became increasingly heavy-handed. A climax of sorts came in early July 2008, at the time of the G-8 Summit in Lake Toya, Hokkaido. While stringent security measures are called for at such an event, the response of the Japanese security agencies was excessive. More than 20,000 police were deployed to guard the summit, MSDF destroyers patrolled the coast and a no-fly zone was established, with jet fighters crossing the skies. Meanwhile, protesters and journalists were hustled far from the main venue and confined in government-built camps set up to accommodate them.96 Moreover, some activists and others were blocked by immigration authorities at Narita Airport and questioned for many hours. Nineteen South Korean members of an international association of farmers’ organizations were denied entry to Japan when they arrived at New Chitose Airport in Hokkaido; they were forced to return home. Masaki Inaba of NGO Forum commented: ‘Security officials have confused anti-globalization movements with international terrorist activities, but it is a mistake. Most Japanese NGOs just

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advocate opinions, whether they be social issues or opposition to the G-8 Summit, which is a legitimate argument.’97 In the words of Jun Yamamoto of Asian Wide Cooperation Kyoto: ‘The G-8 Summit has provided a dangerous pretext for the authorities to use the prevention of terrorism as an excuse to violate the constitutional rights of Japanese and the human rights of foreigners entering Japan.’98 But by this time, Tokyo had become deaf to any such arguments. The overriding priorities of Japanese officials were clear: security, security and more security. In fairness, compared to the situation in many other countries, the human rights situation in Japan remained reasonably good during the Bush years. Cases of police torture or physical attacks on foreigners were unheard of. Nothing happened in Japan comparable to the horrible acts that were committed in Iraq and other places. There was no Japanese Guantanamo, nor a debate about the waterboarding of recalcitrant foreigners. More subtly, however, there were many signs that should have elicited greater international concern and comment. In spite of the fact that there had been no al-Qaeda terrorist attacks or clear evidence of international terrorist plots, conservative Japanese commentators and security officials put themselves on high alert, in the expectation that the foreign assault would be unleashed at any moment. It is true that there were, in fact, serious acts of terrorism targeting senior Japanese lawmakers and officials during these years, but because they had been committed by Japan’s own rightists rather than by swarthy foreigners crying ‘Allahu Akbar!’, they were quickly waved aside as unimportant by government officials, who would not even describe these assaults as acts of terrorism. Even before September 11, Japanese eyes constantly watched foreigners in particular. Local officials knew almost everyone’s home address and place of work. Police stations monitored residents in their neighbourhoods. After November 2007, foreigners were required to have their fingerprints and other biometric information recorded by the authorities, even though the only Japanese citizens required to do so were criminals. An already marginalized community was thus marginalized even further with the sanction of the state – a state that would not enact laws to protect its citizens

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and foreigners from racism or workplace discrimination. These realities endured with the tacit and sometimes explicit approval of the US government.99 As in the case of the diplomacy of anti-terrorism, the war at home did not catalyse into a major tragedy during the years of the Bush administration. However, the series of measures symbolized by Kunio Hatoyama’s War on Terror set the stage for a future time, when a terrible incident may indeed happen.

CHAPTER 7 DEMOCRACY AND MILITARISM

Not surprisingly, most of the benefits that accrued to Japan through its participation in the War on Terror related to its relationship with the government and people of the United States. From the beginning, Japanese policymakers prioritized their relationship with Washington, and they worked long and hard to keep the alliance on an even keel. Hand in hand with the policy of strengthening the alliance with the United States were Japanese attitudes that were not conducive to positive relations with East Asian neighbours or, for that matter, with most other nations of the world. The previous chapter examined domestic policing measures and their impact on community relations between the Japanese and resident foreigners, including resident Muslims. This discussion has yet to be extended to the question of how the war at home redounded upon the Japanese people themselves, in both the sense of how it reshaped government institutions as well as how it constrained the civil liberties of individual citizens. First, we consider both the broader successes and the failures of Japan’s new international policies under Prime Minister Koizumi’s leadership. Next, we turn our attention one more time to the SelfDefense Forces, Japan’s military institution in all but name. Under the cover of the War on Terror, the Defense Agency found itself in a position to legitimize itself as a primary organ for the formulation of Japanese government policy. Finally, we examine the treatment

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meted out to the handful of Japanese dissidents and critics who dared to challenge these official policies in the public arena. In doing so, we witness not only a bureaucratic transformation within the government administration, but also important and sometimes alarming developments in Japan’s overall political culture.

The Appreciation of Allies When Junichiro Koizumi stepped down as premier in September 2006, he did so as one of the most successful Japanese leaders of the postwar era. Koizumi had dominated the political landscape in Tokyo for more than five years. Analysts of Japanese foreign policy announced that a new era of ‘Kantei Diplomacy’ – foreign policy led decisively by the prime minister and his staff – had arrived.1 His successors were expected to step into a similar role. They said that the age of strong and forceful Japanese leadership had dawned. No one could deny the fact that the working relationship between Koizumi and the Bush administration had been exceptionally warm. Yukio Okamoto had counseled the prime minister to turn US bilateral relations into a genuine friendship, and Koizumi succeeded brilliantly in this objective. The Japanese premier endeared himself to President Bush by speaking of his love for Gary Cooper in High Noon; he shocked and delighted senior American policymakers with his impromptu renditions of Elvis Presley’s ‘I Want You, I Need You, I Love You’; no one had a more disarming smile. Koizumi wanted senior Bush administration officials to like him, and they certainly did. Of all the Japanese leaders of his generation, Junichiro Koizumi is the man who most knows how to charm. He is a genuinely talented politician. ‘Koizumi Theatre’ – as the Japanese media came to call it – brought certain benefits to Japan.2 In the twilight of Koizumi’s regime, one Foreign Ministry official confided to a reporter, ‘Bush has often told his staff that they should not put Koizumi in a difficult position. If we did not have the Koizumi–Bush relationship, the United States might have put more pressure on Japan to send troops to Iraq earlier. They might have implemented sanctions over the BSE

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issue.’3 (Japan had banned imports of American beef out of concern that the meat might be infected with mad cow disease.) The perspective of this Japanese diplomat undoubtedly has a degree of merit. It is certainly the case that the Bush administration, and President Bush himself, were strongly inclined to give Tokyo a free pass on smaller issues so long as Koizumi remained responsive to what US officials perceived as more fundamental matters surrounding the War on Terror. Washington’s relatively tolerant response to the BSE issue is probably a very good example. Summing up Koizumi’s achievement, one American observer noted, ‘The “George–Jun relationship” will be the standard by which all others will be judged.’4 It is almost entirely beyond dispute that the relationship with the United States is Japan’s most crucial bilateral relationship. Relations with China and the Korean Peninsula are also significant, of course, but since 1945 they have not quite achieved the degree of importance of the US – Japan connection. Even if Article Nine and official Japanese pacifism has become more fiction than reality, Japan still depends upon the United States, to some degree, to guarantee its physical security in East Asia and to protect vital sea lanes of communication. Japan needs access to American markets and in return, Japan is badly needed to prop up the American economy through the purchase of US Treasury bonds and other investments. Should the US – Japan alliance be dissolved, both nations would bear heavy costs. In this context, Koizumi’s strategic decision to prioritize alliance relations over other considerations made sense to many observers. Certainly, it was applauded by the mainstream of the Japanese bureaucracy, and it was precisely this factor that gave rise to the ‘no choice’ doctrine. Japan, of course, was not the only member of the so-called Coalition of the Willing. On the other side of the Eurasian landmass is another island nation called the United Kingdom. That nation’s leader, Tony Blair, was, if anything, even more committed to the War on Terror. While most US allies went along with the Bush administration reluctantly, Tony Blair presented himself as a true believer, often to the amazement of many of his countrymen, who did not share his sense of messianic certainty.5 Beyond the unique case of

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Prime Minister Blair, many other nations gathered around Washington’s banner out of a mix of fear and ambition similar to the factors that drove the Japanese. By ‘taking sides’ in the conflict, Japan gained not only the appreciation of the Bush administration but also membership in a broader international community called (not entirely accurately) the Coalition of the Willing. This coalition not only included such European states as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but also many Arab states that had thrown in with the Americans. Global public opinion may have been antagonized, but in the face of the American superpower, more than one national government ran scared. Whatever the underlying motives may have been, they do not change the fact that Japan gained increased acceptance as a partner in a powerful but informal league of likeminded states. This partnership boosted – at least temporarily – Japan’s power in the global arena. In sum, the policies adopted by Junichiro Koizumi were backed by a logic that many people, then and now, find persuasive. The policies brought certain benefits for Japan. Koizumi had created a reservoir of goodwill in Washington, and this political capital gave Japan more options in dealing with its gargantuan ally, allowing Koizumi to wave away some of the smaller bilateral frictions. It also made it more difficult for Japan’s East Asian neighbours to contemplate any serious attempt to intimidate Japan with military power. By embracing the War on Terror, Japan gained an extra layer of security vis-a`-vis conventional threats in East Asia.

Asian Isolation But how much were these gains really worth? Did they outweigh the costs incurred? Could the political and economic problems that struck Japan after Koizumi stepped down have been foreseen? After Koizumi resigned his leadership position, his immediate successor was the hawkish Shinzo Abe. At the time of his accession, it was widely predicted by American analysts that Abe would also have a long and successful reign as prime minister; he was expected to sweep away the remaining cobwebs of backward-looking Japanese

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pacifism. (In alliance-speak, this was described as Japan meeting its ‘international responsibilities’.) Abe was relatively young and supposedly representative of the more confident, more forceful generation of Japanese leaders.6 This was the man of destiny who would make the alliance whole. In the event, Abe was a flop. After a moderately successful visit to China, nothing went right. The Japanese people steadily turned against him. One after another, cabinet ministers became entangled in various scandals. Abe showed remarkably little skill in managing his government, and political control was soon slipping from his grasp. The July 2007 House of Councillors elections were a devastating blow both to the LDP and to Abe personally. After just one year in office, he resigned in humiliation and checked himself into a hospital. The first Abe regime was a stunning failure. But the problems did not end with Abe. His immediate successor, Yasuo Fukuda, did not fare much better, in spite of the fact that he was a moderate and intelligent leader. Fukuda resigned in frustration only a year after he took office. Taro Aso, who came next, was even more hapless. Within weeks of becoming prime minister, he was already polling as one of the most unpopular leaders in Japanese history. By this time, no one was talking about Kantei Diplomacy. The weakness at the centre of the Japanese political system was only too obvious. It had become apparent that Koizumi’s power had sprung from his personal character as much as any institutional reforms. Rather than being the harbinger of a new era, Koizumi appeared more and more as an aberration – as unique as his dance moves at Graceland. Nor could the ‘George– Jun relationship’ be institutionalized. The political capital that Japanese diplomats thought they had won was real, but it was also finite. In addition, there was the problem of rising expectations. If Koizumi had defied old taboos and sent the GSDF to Samawa, some US policymakers reasoned, why shouldn’t Japan be expected to send the SDF into Afghanistan as well?7 Now that Tokyo had effectively gone beyond Article Nine in practice, surely it was time for the next evolution – sending combat troops in support of Japan’s allies. The bar had been raised, and the Pentagon’s

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appetite for active Japanese military support rose. Provided with obedience once or twice, many American policymakers were looking for more. The Coalition of the Willing also seemed to have a distinctly limited shelf-life. Within a few years of its creation, the number of members in the club began to dwindle, and its overall effectiveness proved largely illusory. Cooperation with the US invasion of Iraq did not make ‘normal geopolitics’ disappear. As powerful as the United States was, the entire world would not be reshaped by neoconservative ideology. Dreams of an untouchable American hyperpower bled to death on the streets of Baghdad. The Bush administration watched its formidable capabilities slip into political discredit, overstretched military commitments, and ultimately, financial ruin. By the end of the process, membership in the Coalition of the Willing had become nearly meaningless. The benefits Japan purchased through its cooperation with, and support of, the Bush administration’s War on Terror proved largely ephemeral. In the long run, a more reluctant and stubborn posture might have better served Japanese national interests. Such a stance would certainly have annoyed the Bush administration and perhaps invited some form of US retaliation, but it would also have established Japan as a more independent force rather than merely a stalking horse for American policy. This would have signaled to the world – including Washington – that Japan was not such a pushover when the cause was right. But Tokyo’s strategic blunder was worse than simply the issue of underselling its services to its American ally. Beyond that error, its dealings with East Asian neighbors were characterized by arrogance and contempt. Rather than spending its political gains on projects within Asia that could enhance Japan’s range of future strategic options, the nation instead frittered away its hard-earned political capital on useless posturing over such issues as the Yasukuni Shrine dispute and revisionist school textbooks.8 It is difficult to exaggerate how irrational and counterproductive these policies have been. Japanese conservative leaders allowed pride and symbolism to obstruct the comprehensive security of their nation. As a result, they

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ended up even more dependent on the US alliance than before – even as American power itself was in global decline.9 This triumph of ideology over pragmatism went hand in hand with the policy of George– Jun intimacy. Indeed, it was the flip side of the coin: The Foreign Ministry’s obsession with the notion that the US– Japan alliance comes before all else lured many Japanese policymakers into the fallacy of believing that nothing else really mattered. Koizumi himself promoted this view when he declared, ‘The stronger our ties with the United States, the better relations we can build with China, Korea, and the rest of Asia. . . I do not agree with those who say that Japan should make international cooperation rather than US – Japan relations its first priority. . . There is no such thing as the US– Japan relationship being too close.’10 It was an extreme proposition, and like most such propositions, the charm of its simplicity obscured more than it revealed. As H. L. Mencken once observed in a different context, for every human problem there is a solution that is neat, plausible, and wrong. Koizumi’s notion was rather like that. Its most gaping flaw was that, by all accounts, Japan –China political relations reached a nadir in the Koizumi era. The relationship had been far closer under Koizumi’s immediate predecessors. Although Koizumi had succeeded admirably in making US – Japan relations warmer and friendlier than ever before, his regime was a disaster for Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours. There was no evidence whatsoever to justify Koizumi’s contention that improved US– Japan relations automatically entailed better relations between Japan and mainland Asia.11 Koizumi’s additional point, that ‘there is no such thing as the US– Japan relationship being too close,’ is also problematic. Although the slogan made a positive impression on US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, its logical basis was weak. If it were really such a simple equation, then the course of action recommending itself would be for Japan to completely dispense with its national sovereignty altogether and apply for membership as the 51st state of the union. Anyone who can recognize a problem with this latter proposal should also be able to recognize the fallacy of Koizumi’s simpleminded dictum.

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In sum, there were two comprehensive failures in Japanese foreign policy in the Koizumi era. The first was the wild overestimation of the significance of the US– Japan alliance to the near-exclusion of any other factor. The second was the utter failure to see the weaknesses of the American position and the ideological blinders that were propelling the Bush administration into a major debacle of its own. The concept of the War on Terror was met with scepticism around the world as soon as it was declared. The obvious irrationality of proclaiming war on a tactic – as opposed to a definable nation or group – did not pass unnoticed. Many people immediately perceived that this war was inherently unwinnable. There was quiet speculation about the Bush administration’s true intentions, in large part because the official rationale was so clearly farcical. Many people tried to warn the Japanese government, and they advised Tokyo to reevaluate its embrace of the War on Terror. One prominent voice Japanese leaders might have listened to more carefully was Pulitzer Prize-winning writer John Dower, a leading scholar of Japanese history. Dower counseled anyone who would listen that the Bush administration was on an ideology-driven fool’s errand, with striking parallels to Japan’s own experience in the 1930s. Dower wrote, The points of resonance between the abortive Japanese empire and the burgeoning American one are striking. In each instance, we confront empire-building embedded in a larger agenda of right-wing radicalism. . . In retrospect, we tend to dwell on the hubris and madness of these men. Their shortlived empire is dismissed as little more than a ‘dream within a dream’, to borrow a Japanese phrase, but this is too simple. In their passing moment of devastating triumph, these right-wing radicals not only changed the face of Asia in unanticipated ways but permanently transformed Japan as well. And their grand concerns, aspirations, and accomplishments find eerie echo in much of what we behold in U.S. policy today. Regime change, nation-building, creation of client states, control of strategic resources, defiance of international criticism, mobilization for

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‘total war’, clash-of-civilizations rhetoric, winning hearts and minds, combating terror at home as well as abroad – all these were part and parcel of Japan’s vainglorious attempt to create a new order of ‘co-existence and co-prosperity’ in Asia.12 We might expect that a warning from such a thoughtful and respected historian would stop Japanese leaders in their tracks and force them to reexamine their approach to the War on Terror. They might have reconsidered their own historical experience and the lessons it provides. There is no evidence, however, that Japanese policymakers considered any of their critics – foreign or Japanese – to be anything more than generators of meaningless political noise. The mere thought that the Bush administration might be headed for failure was seen as disloyal. As one wit put it in the US context, loyalty became the new competence.13 As a result, Tokyo remained loyal to the Bush administration long after the signs of its failure had become manifest. Japanese conservatives remained loyal even after a large majority of the American public had turned against the Bush regime. Japanese leaders seemed remarkably determined to show as little foresight as possible. Even when they privately felt that a certain US policy was doomed, they could never quite bring themselves to change course. The depth of their psychological captivity was stunning. As a result, Japanese conservatives failed in their foreign policies across a wide spectrum: They failed to properly assess the weaknesses of the Bush administration; they failed to understand the developing situation in Iraq; they failed to listen to voices calling them back to reason; they failed to establish firm limits on cooperation to protect Japanese national sovereignty; and they failed to understand that they were inviting a backlash from both foreign countries and their own people. However, even as the comprehensive Japanese foreign policy was failing on many accounts in a broader and more objective sense, this did not mean that there were not some political winners within the narrower scheme of bureaucratic competition in Tokyo. Among these, the potentially most significant beneficiary of the Koizumi policies was the command of the uniformed Self-Defense Forces.

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The Rise of the Defense Ministry Japanese military services benefitted politically from the War on Terror and their institutional power was significantly enhanced. For decades after the controversial establishment of the Defense Agency and the SDF in 1954, the agency was among the least prestigious government services. Many Japanese looked askance at the very existence of a uniformed military, and even in the early twenty-first century it was considered a mild taboo to refer to the SDF as a ‘military’ or an ‘army’ or as ‘soldiers’. In May 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi, annoyed by this inhibition, told the Diet that ‘common sense’ dictated that the SDF was a military, saying, ‘The SDF is substantially a military force. It is unnatural that we cannot call it so.’ Although most people in the world would have agreed with Koizumi’s logic, in Japan such openness was still considered unacceptable. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda was forced to disown Koizumi’s view and reaffirm that the official government stance remained unchanged: ‘It is different from the militaries in other countries. . . The SDF’s activities are limited under the constitution.’14 It was the old problem: How do you argue that the GSDF is not a ‘land force’, the MSDF not a ‘sea force’, and the ASDF not an ‘air force’ – which Article Nine of the constitution expressly forbids? Koizumi was understandably impatient with such sophistry, but the government had created this problem for itself by building one of the strongest and most advanced militaries in the world and, at the same time, refusing to admit openly what it was doing.15 The government knew that it risked political defeat in a head-on struggle to revise the constitution. The last premier who had made such an effort, Nobusuke Kishi in 1960, had not done well out of the experience. In reality, government policy concerning the SDF had far outrun the existing law. Although the government and its allies refused to formally admit as much, most thinking people realized that the SDF existed in a sort of extralegal vacuum: It was deemed necessary but not legally legitimate. In short, the SDF was the ‘bastard child’ of the Japanese constitution.

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In spite of this unseemly status, after the ‘humiliation’ of the Persian Gulf War and the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, the political stock of the Defense Agency and the uniformed SDF service was clearly on the rise. Public fears about the role of the military were eased substantially after watching it perform humanitarian tasks around the world in support of the United Nations. Most Japanese embraced the view that the SDF’s existence was acceptable so long as the forces were strictly confined to missions of ‘international humanitarian contributions’ that civilians could not easily perform. The majority of Japanese agreed with the view that their nation was required to play a physical role, not merely a financial one, in supporting peace around the world. The point at which the government and the general public still strongly disagreed, however, was whether or not it was acceptable for the SDF to engage in combat operations. The Japanese people as a whole were clearly against this notion, but many Japanese conservatives were nevertheless aiming in this direction. The preferences of the Bush administration and the Pentagon were beyond doubt. The MSDF’s aggressive lobbying after September 11 was surprising. For military officers to attempt to impose their agenda on the civilian government with such insistence was truly remarkable in the Japanese political context, and it was a symbol of things to come. After the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in April 2003 and the decision to deploy the GSDF to Iraq, questions were raised within government counsels about fundamental matters of Japanese security policy. What was the new role of the SDF? What tools were needed for it to perform its role? Within the SDF itself, there was a much clearer prospect that those serving within its ranks might be asked to die for their country. Was this something that Japanese young men and women were willing to do? Some ordinary SDF members complained that, when they had signed up for the service, they had never expected to be deployed into possible combat situations in foreign countries: They had imagined that the SDF was only for ‘humanitarian support’ – after all, the SDF was not a ‘military’ organization. Other SDF members, however, relished the changes. One ASDF officer remarked, ‘I realize that we have an

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important duty here in Japan to defend the country, but when you work overseas you get the feeling that you have Japan on your shoulder. I like that.’16 Other SDF officers went so far as to nurse antagonistic feelings toward the Japanese media. An ASDF lieutenant colonel stated, ‘We had long been an easy target. They knew we could not fight back.’17 In the new era of Prime Minister Koizumi and the War on Terror, however, the military service began to find its chances to ‘fight back.’ Unlike in previous decades, most Japanese conservatives had stopped worrying about ceding too much political power to the SDF. Fears of military interference in policymaking had receded. Some older LDP politicians – many on the verge of retirement – still spoke out, but their views were usually discounted by younger conservatives, who felt that the old men had simply lost touch with the realities of the new age. Instead of worrying about the ‘mythological threat’ of Japanese militarism, there were real threats to deal with like Islamic terrorism, North Korea, and China. As the same ASDF lieutenant colonel quoted above put it: ‘People suddenly started looking at what they had not cared about before and asking us to do something. . . I wonder how many civilians really understand what security is?’18 Many SDF officers thought that they alone knew the real meaning of Japanese security, and the War on Terror provided chances for them to make their opinions known. In regard to the potential threat of terrorism within Japan, the SDF gained a domestic role that they had never had before. This transformation began immediately after September 11 when the SDF were ordered to reinforce security around US military bases.19 On November 18, 2002, the GSDF performed their first-ever joint drill with the National Police Agency. These drills, which were carried out in Hokkaido, involved scenarios in which armed agents landed in Japan and attacked such facilities as nuclear power plants. The police and the GSDF practiced cooperation in communications, searching for enemy agents, transporting personnel, providing equipment, and fighting side by side.20 In 2004, Defense Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya (several years before his disgrace) justified this domestic antiterrorist role as follows: ‘It has become an age in which the SDF exists

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to protect peace in Japan and respond to public trust, and the SDF should also deal with terrorism and other new threats.’21 Prime Minister Koizumi himself echoed this view some months later: ‘While carrying out a full review of the existing structure and armaments of the SDF and making it more efficient, we will also make sure it can steadily deal with new threats, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.’22 In this period the Defense Agency, especially the uniformed officers of the SDF, made substantial institutional advances. In large part, this progress was due to the fact that both Gen Nakatani and Shigeru Ishiba, both of whom had long stints heading the Defense Agency, viewed favourably the strengthening of the role of uniformed officers within the ministry. Although the details were kept from public knowledge, one of the main struggles was between civilian defence counselors and the senior officers of the three military services. In previous times, the ten defence counselors were given strong control over SDF officers and operated as buffers between the military and civilian authorities, including even the director-general of the Defense Agency. Both Nakatani, who had himself been a SDF officer in his earlier career, and Ishiba, had a negative view of these defence counselors and did what they could to enhance the role of the uniformed officers, whom they regarded as being the real experts on security matters.23 In June 2004, Admiral Koichi Furusho launched the first major salvo in the campaign against the civilian defence counselors. He made an open plea that the new office of Joint Chief of Staff have control over all defence operations and should not be subject to the control of the defence counselors. He even suggested that the defence counselors’ positions be abolished. Obviously, civilians within the Defense Agency were not pleased: ‘This is a very dangerous plan, which could shake the foundation of civilian control’, one of them declared.24 Ishiba, who was director-general at that time, did not immediately accept Furusho’s plan, but he did indicate that he was broadly sympathetic to it, admitting that the proposal ‘merits consideration’.25 After Yoshinori Ono replaced Ishiba as chief of the Defense Agency in September 2004, however, he shelved the Furusho

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plan and signaled his wish to keep the system of defence counselors intact.26 But the struggle was by no means over. The military officers received a better response when Fukushiro Nukaga was appointed head of the agency in October 2005. Nukaga signed off on a plan that allowed the Joint Chief of Staff to directly advise him, and he added a uniformed ‘information management’ officer to his personal staff. Although the defence counselors remained in place, this reform made them effectively redundant, since the main purpose of the former system had been to keep uniformed officers separated from the agency chief.27 In 2008, when Shigeru Ishiba returned to his old post and oversaw a defence reform panel, he called for the complete abolition of the defence counselors. In the end, the Furusho plan was more or less put into practice, and civilian control of the defence bureaucracy was effectively left in the hands of the cabinet. Aside from this intramural political struggle, there was an important external dimension to the rising influence of the Japanese military. In the Defense White Paper of 2002 – the year after the War on Terror began – the Defense Agency officially called for its bureaucratic status to be raised from a government agency under the authority of the Cabinet Office to a full ministry coequal with such others as the Foreign Ministry or the Finance Ministry. It may seem odd that an entire government agency should openly lobby to be promoted to a higher level, but that is precisely what happened. In March 2004, as the GSDF was deploying to Samawa, Shigeru Ishiba told a Diet committee that he ‘could not be more grateful’ if the parliament agreed to raise the status of the agency to a ministry. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda responded, ‘We have to upgrade the Defense Agency in time, but I’m not sure that now is an appropriate occasion to do so.’28 Director-General Yoshinori Ono, who had been cautious about eliminating the defence counselor system, had no similar reservations about this plan. In January 2005, he made a call to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan strongly endorsing the upgrade: ‘It should not be an agency, it should be a ministry. An “agency” sounds as if we were an administrative organization engaged in a practical or businesslike field.’ He further explained the limitations of the current arrangement: ‘We cannot submit laws or

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anything to the Diet in the name of the director-general of the Defense Agency.’29 The SDF brass wanted the right to submit bills in the ministry’s own name. Ministry status would also allow them to submit budget requests directly to the Finance Ministry.30 Many sections of the ruling coalition were enthusiastic about the idea of a Defense Ministry from the start, and, in fact, it had been on the agenda since the 1990s; but others worried about public reaction and the effect on other Asian countries. In particular, the ostensibly pacifist New Komeito Party tried to put the brakes on the agency’s elevation.31 In December 2005, however, Prime Minister Koizumi himself announced in favour of the idea of creating a Defense Ministry, observing, ‘It has rather been odd so far that it is an agency.’32 Once again, Koizumi’s main basis for insisting on a crucial change of policy was his individual notion of what constituted ‘common sense’. On the other hand, Koizumi was said to have little genuine personal interest in the issue.33 He did not prioritize the matter and he was unwilling to spend much political capital on it. The Defense Agency was not always helpful to its own cause. A serious incident related to defence procurement emerged in January 2006, exactly when the government was considering the issue of a promotion in status, and in reaction, the New Komeito Party stepped up its opposition against an immediate upgrade.34 Consequently, Koizumi’s attitude towards the notion cooled, ‘It is not an urgent issue. I want to see it discussed slowly.’35 The Defense Agency, outraged by yet another delay, launched a ‘strenuous rollback operation’ in which it mobilized its allies among LDP lawmakers and published and distributed nationally 230,000 copies of a pamphlet appealing for an upgrade to ministry status, but Koizumi himself would not be moved in his final months in office.36 When Shinzo Abe became premier in September 2006, the Defense Agency gained a much stronger ally at the head of government. This issue was precisely the kind Abe prioritized. Abe guided the upgrade bill through the Diet, sweeping aside the objections of those who counseled caution. The bill was given less than 15 hours of deliberations in the House of Representatives Security Committee,

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even as the opposition camp boycotted the proceedings.37 Defense Agency Vice-Minister Takemasa Moriya played an active lobbying role behind the scenes, paying personal calls on lawmakers in the Diet members’ office buildings, stating his case.38 In the media, the case was presented by Toshiyuki Shikata, professor at Teikyo University and a former commander of the Northern Army of the GSDF. Shikata argued, ‘Japan’s defence capability is one of the best in the world. I think it is probably among the five best in the world. If you try to make Japan’s defence capability look smaller than the reality by calling it “an agency” or a “nonmilitary force”, it only causes distrust in other countries because they would only regard it as a deception.’ American alliance managers, such as Patrick Cronin of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, agreed with the proponents, arguing that Japan was ‘ready to usher in a new era with a full Defense Ministry’. He continued, ‘It is ready because its armed forces are well-armed and professional; because it operates within a defensive alliance with the United States, and because it has demonstrated a constructive contribution to international peace operations.’39 But the upgrade to ministry status also had its critics. For example, Tetsuo Maeda, a prominent journalist and academic, argued, ‘The fact that Japan’s defence body is treated as a small organization under the label of an agency instead of a ministry has been an expression of political will that Japan will not build more than the minimum necessary military capability. . . Defense Agency officials and SDF officers who say they cannot hold their head high with agency status do not think about the origins of the SDF.’40 Criticism of this kind did not carry much weight with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who had long ago rejected the traditional postwar Japanese view of military matters. Abe, the grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, saw it as the destiny of his premiership to successfully revise Article Nine of the constitution and so to complete the remilitarization of Japan.41 He wanted to succeed where his grandfather had failed. It was his single-minded pursuit of security policy issues, as opposed to economic and social issues, that led the Japanese public to turn against him and deliver the massive

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defeat to the LDP in the July 2007 upper house elections. Nevertheless, the first Abe regime endured long enough to win this particular battle. Too many of the old politicians who had held deep suspicions of the Japanese military, like Hiromu Nonaka, had died or retired from politics. Furthermore, the New Komeito Party had little appetite to continue its resistance against its larger coalition partner at a time when Prime Minister Abe was in charge and personally committed to these issues. The upgrade bill was passed into law in December 2006, and, on January 9, 2007, the new Defense Ministry was inaugurated by Prime Minister Abe, who declared, ‘I am proud to be prime minister at a time when we were able to establish the Defense Ministry as an organization that plays the role of national defense that is inalienable from state sovereignty.’42 Other items on the wish list, however, remained unmet in Abe era. Among these, a permanent law on SDF deployment abroad – which would obviate the need to write new legislation each time the SDF was deployed around the world – seemed closest to their grasp. Another cherished item was the desire to see the government officially lift its ban on the ‘right of collective self-defence’. In practice, the ban had already been undermined by a number of actions taken since September 11, but formally it remained in place. The Holy Grail of all ‘reforms’ ardently desired by Japanese conservatives would be the revision of Article Nine of the constitution. Like his grandfather Kishi, Abe too failed to achieve this goal. When Abe resigned in September 2007, the prospect of constitutional revision still seemed distant in light of public opinion. More likely, the government would simply continue to ‘reinterpret’ Article Nine into oblivion, as it had, in fact, begun doing decades before the War on Terror emerged. Members of the SDF wanted to feel loved by the Japanese people and wanted to perform their duties with honour. They wanted to be the pride of the Japanese nation rather than the bastard child of a disapproving constitution. To a significant degree, they succeeded. An opinion poll taken by the Cabinet Office in late 2006 found that 26 per cent of the public ‘evaluated highly’ the role the GSDF had played in Samawa, and another 46 per cent indicated that they had a

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‘somewhat positive’ view of that mission. Over 70 per cent of the public, therefore, had at least a grudging acceptance of the reconstruction role played by the uniformed services.43 They had already come a long way. But beyond the growing acceptance for the SDF, the new Ministry of Defense was now a real player within the political structure of Tokyo. Not only had it attained a new bureaucratic status, since May 2000 it was also ensconced in a beautiful new headquarters in the Ichigaya district of Tokyo. The new Defense Ministry complex was centred on an 86-metre tall main building of 19 stories. It is the largest central government ministry that Japan has been built to date. A parade ground for honour guards is located south of the main building, and, furthermore, the SDF’s former Eastern District Army Headquarters complex, where the novelist Yukio Mishima had committed suicide in 1970 after failing to persuade the SDF to launch a coup against the government, is preserved as a memorial.44 Deployment of the SDF to distant nations was no longer the taboo that it had been only two decades earlier. Though the rise of the Defense Ministry began well before September 11, the process was accelerated within the context of the War on Terror. Uniformed military officers, who in decades past had little effective role to play in the management of Japanese government policy, had quietly become powerful enough even to challenge the Foreign Ministry on matters of international policy. In June 2008, the Foreign Ministry and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura were eager to send a substantial GSDF mission to southern Sudan to express Japan’s renewed commitment to Africa. The Defense Ministry, however, felt that the mission might be operationally difficult and too dangerous for its troops. In the midst of this debate, the Asahi Shinbun quoted an unnamed government official as saying, ‘Sudan is a major concern for the international community, and we would like to commit to a Sudan dispatch, but Ichigaya has the final say.’45

Dissenters at Bay In the end, the most crucial arena for Japan and the War on Terror is not the diplomatic sphere or changes in the bureaucratic policy

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process, but the battle for Japan’s identity in the twenty-first century. This book presents the notion that there were two Japans – the Japan of the conservative ruling class, which knows that it wants to overcome pacifism and gain enhanced international respect, and that of the majority of the people, whose opinions are less clearly formed but who are sceptical of their leaders’ intentions. The majority remains attached to pacifist values and is more concerned with local bread-and-butter issues than with questions of foreign policy. President Bush was fond of citing Japan as an example of a successful democracy that was born under the gentle encouragement of an American military occupation. He suggested that the Japanese model would be exported to Iraq: Yesterday’s enemies under a tyrannical regime would become tomorrow’s democratic allies.46 Most historians denounced the comparison, but a related issue deserved more attention than it received: Was the War on Terror not only failing to establish democracy in the Arab world but also undermining the same Japanese democracy that was supposed to be its model? Four troubling episodes illustrate this possibility. The first, in January 2004, began when a tiny peace group called Tachikawa Tent Village decided to distribute antiwar fliers. The members entered a housing complex for SDF families in Tachikawa, western Tokyo, to place their leaflets in mailboxes. The message on the leaflets read, ‘To SDF families and personnel: We are against the SDF deployment to Iraq! Let’s think together and express opposition!’47 Commercial advertisements are placed in apartment mailboxes every day, but apparently this form of political expression was not deemed acceptable by the authorities. Remarkably, the three men who distributed the fliers were later arrested by the police on the charge of trespassing. Even more remarkably, the three men were not released after their indictment but were held in detention without bail for two and a half months. The Tachikawa flier’s case eventually went all the way to the Supreme Court, where the conservative judges – as is usual for the Japanese judiciary – ruled in favour of the authorities and against the defendants. The court ruled that placing antiwar fliers in mailboxes

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‘disturbs the peace of the residents’ private lives’ and was thus beyond the realm of permissible freedom of expression. Most of the conservative press ignored the case, but the more liberal outlets were appalled by both the behaviour of the police and the court rulings that followed. The Asahi Shinbun editorialized, We are greatly disappointed at the Supreme Court ruling, which effectively endorsed and took no issue with an investigation and prosecution that far overstepped the bounds of common sense. We fear the top court decision may serve as a powerful disincentive to anyone considering distributing leaflets for causes of any kind. This ruling narrows the means available for people to communicate alternative opinions. It will undermine the vitality of the nation’s democracy. . . A society cannot be called democratic if its people cannot speak and express opinions freely. A democratic society requires its members to be tolerant of all opinions, whether people disagree with them or not. We must be willing to listen to all people. Such tolerance and open-mindedness are of vital importance for the health of our society.48 The obvious validity of the Asahi editors’ argument did not change the fact that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the case, and that ruling had the force of law. One of the defendants, Nobuhiro Onishi, described the verdict as ‘a crisis for Japan and its democracy’.49 Another defendant, Toshiyuki Obora, opined, Basically, it is reasonable that you cannot exercise your freedom of speech when it interferes with the rights of another person. I suppose that is correct. But no matter how many times I read the ruling, I cannot find specifically how we invaded the peace and rights of the residents. All we did was distribute leaflets. Noodle and pizza delivery shops and other groups do the same thing. I ask: Why aren’t they ever picked up by the police? I was told that we were in the wrong because ours were antiwar leaflets. The problem is the political message. Would it be

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acceptable if, instead, we passed out pro-war fliers with the message, ‘Everyone in the SDF, do your best in Iraq!’? If that is the case, then this is political discrimination. We are being singled out because of our particular ideology.50 Another commentator on this issue, Lawrence Repeta, a professor of law at the Omiya School in Tokyo, remarked, ‘Japan’s transformation to a peaceful and democratic society in the aftermath of World War II surely stands as one of the great success stories in democracy building of all time. But the arrests, the detentions, and the Supreme Court’s summary action in upholding them are reminders that Japan’s democracy remains a work in progress.’51 As far as is known, US government officials never raised this issue in any form with their Japanese counterparts. The second disturbing episode arose suddenly before receding from public attention with equal alacrity. On June 6, 2007, the leader of the Japanese Communist Party, Kazuo Shii, called a press conference and dropped a bombshell revelation: The SDF had monitored, compiled reports, and kept files on groups and individuals opposed to the Iraq War and the GSDF deployment to Samawa. Documentary evidence from inside the SDF proved conclusively that a unit called the Intelligence Security Corps had performed such operations from at least November 2003 to February 2004. The leaked documents showed that the SDF had kept files on 293 groups and individuals, including photographs of antiwar events. The people targeted in these investigations spanned a wide range of professions, such as journalists, photographers, artists, and even high school students. The documents labeled some of these as being ‘anti-SDF’.52 Shii issued a statement: ‘Such activities are clearly unconstitutional acts that violate the constitutional freedom-of-expression guarantees. . . Furthermore, taking down peoples’ names and photographing protesters are acts that infringe on constitutional privacy guarantees. . . Our party demands that the government clarify

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the activities of this military division and stop this sort of illegal surveillance immediately.’53 Defense Ministry spokeswoman Keiko Nakano admitted, ‘It is true that the army has collected information to ensure the safety of personnel dispatched to Iraq and their family members in Japan.’ It was also revealed that the Intelligence Security Corps was established in March 2003 in order to ‘monitor the activities of military personnel and gather information on people attempting to contact them’. The corps had a staff of 927 members, more than two-thirds attached to the GSDF.54 As disturbing as the news of the illegal surveillance of antiwar groups was, even more alarming was the reaction of the government and of the mainstream press. Essentially, there was no reaction. Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, after initially questioning the authenticity of the documents, soon launched an unapologetic defence: ‘If we were to gather information by wiretapping conversations or tailing individuals, it is understandable that some people may consider it impermissible. But we collected information by going to events that were open to the public. That is not wrong. . . The mass media and others also take pictures openly. There are no legal grounds to allow photos to be taken for news-gathering purposes but not by the SDF. It is not illegal to take pictures of protest rallies and movements.’55 Kyuma was apparently unable to recognize any difference between the rights of private news organizations to report a story to the public and the Japanese military covertly collecting information on anyone exercising democratic rights of protest. He also ignored the fact that the documents included some information about the protesters that clearly could not have come simply from observing public demonstrations. Nevertheless, the government fell into line behind Kyuma’s position. No one was held accountable, nor did the media follow up.56 As far as is known, US government officials never raised this issue in any form with their Japanese counterparts. The third episode could not be dismissed quite so easily. A group of concerned citizens took their government to court, alleging that their ‘right to live peacefully’ had been violated by the decision to

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send the SDF to Iraq. The plaintiffs asked for a token amount of damages, but their main objective was to establish the fact that the government was violating the constitution. When the case came before High Court Judge Kunio Aoyama, he shocked the nation. In his April 2008 verdict, Judge Aoyama – who was about to retire from the bench – did rule in favour of the government, as everyone had expected, and denied compensation to the plaintiffs. But as he did so, he quite unexpectedly included an obiter dictum (an observation included in the court’s opinion) which argued, The fighting in Iraq is an extension of the attack on Iraq that began in March 2003. It is an international conflict between a multinational force and armed elements. This is a region where acts are committed to kill and maim people and destroy property as part of an international armed conflict. In modern warfare, supply activities, such as transport, are an important part of combat activities. ASDF airlifts of armed soldiers in the multinational force to the Baghdad combat zone were acts that could be identified as being involved in the use of force by other nations and the ASDF could be said to have conducted use-offorce actions itself. Furthermore, because Baghdad is a combat zone, the ASDF’s transportation mission includes activities that breach the special law to allow the SDF to provide humanitarian support for Iraq’s reconstruction efforts, which limits their activities to non-combat zones, as well as Article Nine of the constitution.57 In other words, Judge Aoyama stated that the ASDF mission violated both the Japanese constitution and the government’s own Iraqdeployment law of 2003. The plaintiffs were overjoyed. For the first time, the courts had spoken directly on the question of the legality of the SDF deployments to Iraq, and they had found the government to be acting illegally. Furthermore, since the case had technically been won by the government in the sense that damages were denied to the plaintiffs, the government could not appeal the case to the Supreme Court.

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The government response to the Nagoya High Court ruling could not have been more arrogant and contemptuous. Leading conservatives reacted with outrage reminiscent of the way they had once treated the young Japanese hostages in Iraq. Judge Aoyama’s obiter dictum struck directly at the heart of the government’s policy, and conservatives responded with fury. Within about an hour of receiving news of the verdict, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura delivered a defiant response: ‘I cannot accept such a court ruling when the Japanese government has determined that Baghdad airport is a non-combat zone. If the airport were a combat zone and truly dangerous, commercial planes would be unable to fly there. . . The ruling will have absolutely no effect on SDF activities.’58 Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba commented, ‘This ruling is extremely regrettable. . . I can’t quite understand why the judge felt compelled to add these side comments. At any rate, we are under no obligation to follow it. . . There is no problem at all in continuing the mission.’59 Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura was even more dismissive: There are many experts in the legal profession, and they hold a variety of views. Although it has often been said that the judgments of the court take precedence over the judgments of the administration, there is only one part of a verdict that the administration must follow. The other parts of a verdict are of no particularly great importance. This obiter dictum by the judge thus represents just one man’s opinion. Perhaps, after I have retired from my post as foreign minister, I will have time to read it.60 Leading conservatives described the Nagoya High Court ruling as being ‘odd’ and out of step with legal norms. Some, such as former Minister of Education Nariaki Nakayama, publicly denounced Judge Aoyama in personal terms: ‘The presiding judge was the problem here, and he is the one who issued this weird verdict. Since he was retiring at the end of March, this was just his last little hurrah.’61 Where conservative politicians left off, the conservative media pressed on: The Yomiuri Shinbun editorialized,

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The High Court’s verdict seems full of problems, including a misinterpretation of laws and facts related to activities of the Self-Defense Forces in Iraq. . . The presiding judge mentioned in an obiter dictum that part of the ASDF’s mission is ‘unconstitutional’. Was this comment really necessary? Mop-up operations against armed insurgents by multinational forces are based on UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which was passed in May 2003, and on other decisions made to help Iraq’s stability and safety. The Iraqi government itself supports the operations. They are legitimate activities to maintain security. . . Even if those operations are considered uses of force, they still do not pose a constitutional problem, as the ASDF’s mission to airlift soldiers of multinational forces is not integral to the use of force. . . We hope ASDF members are not discouraged by the High Court’s ruling and dutifully continue their important mission.62 Sankei News was more full-throated: This is a High Court ruling that looks down on the efforts at peace-building and reconstruction support carried out by the ASDF. . . We cannot forget that the ASDF’s activities are based on resolutions of the UN Security Council that authorize the presence of the multinational army. Japan, together with the international community, shares the determination not to allow Iraq to become a hotbed of terrorism. Article Nine of the constitution’s prohibition on the use of force was intended only in the case of wars of aggression. This judgment that our international peace cooperation activities are unconstitutional, viewed in light of the international environment in which Japan is placed, is difficult to understand. . . The government’s decision to continue the ASDF mission is only natural.63 These arguments did not, however, prevent a cascade of criticism from falling on the conservative government from both the left and the centre of Japan’s political spectrum. The DPJ, which at this time

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controlled the upper house of the Diet, led the condemnation of the government. A joint statement by DPJ Shadow Foreign Minister Yoshio Hachiro and Shadow Defense Minister Keiichiro Asao asserted, The government must take this judgment seriously: The ASDF mission in Iraq should be ended immediately. . . We at the DPJ believe that what the Iraq Special Measures Law calls a ‘noncombat zone’ can, in an instant, be transformed into a combat zone. . . The government still refuses even to clarify the conditions under which the SDF is operating in Iraq. It has not shown us any kind of exit strategy. It just follows the United States. Further, it refuses to acknowledge that the war was launched under the false premise that there were weapons of mass destruction. It needs to own up to its error in judgment.64 The Asahi Shinbun took the Nagoya High Court ruling as a damning verdict on four years of government policy: Four years have passed since the government first sent troops to Iraq. The landmark decision confirmed smoldering doubts among many Japanese about the constitutionality of the operations. . . The ruling addressed key constitutional issues raised by the SDF dispatch. It clearly rejected the argument presented by the government of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi when it decided to send SDF personnel to Iraq – a position that was maintained by the administrations of Koizumi’s successors, Shinzo Abe, and incumbent Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda.65 The editors of the Asahi Shinbun proceeded to call for the judiciary to meet its responsibility as the guardian of the law and protector of Japanese civil liberties: Japanese courts have shown a clear tendency to eschew making constitutional judgments on politically sensitive issues. This has generated criticism that the judiciary is effectively

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confirming the government’s interpretations of the constitution. Because of this background, Thursday’s ruling probably came as a refreshing surprise to many Japanese. It is a key duty of the judiciary to check the government and the Diet. But the High Court surprised the public when it performed this duty only by making a constitutional judgment on the government’s policy initiative.66 The criticism of the government was withering. Critics of the official policy could now document what they had always known to be true: The government’s Iraq policy was patently illegal under the constitution. The one judge who finally worked up the courage to speak to this fundamental issue agreed with the opposition’s contention. All other Japanese courts had avoided making any judgement in deference to the established regime. In the end, however, the government simply defied the court. It refused to withdraw the ASDF mission that had been described as illegal. It refused to call elections so the question could be put to the Japanese people. It gathered all of its remaining political resources and carried on as if nothing had happened. From the very beginning of the Iraq War adventure, the government had demonstrated contempt for Japanese popular opinion. Now it showed an equal degree of disdain for the legal opinion of a High Court judge. As far as is known, US government officials never raised this issue in any form with their Japanese counterparts. Indeed, in light of the fact that Washington had been the primary sponsor of the ASDF Iraq mission all along, it is safe to assume that they supported the Japanese conservatives’ position. The fourth and final disturbing incident arose in the twilight of the George W. Bush era; it centred on an outspoken man named Toshio Tamogami. Within Japan’s defence establishment, General Tamogami had been well known for many years. He was a leading ASDF officer who, by all accounts, never made much of an effort to hide his hard right political views; we may safely assume, in fact, that he continued to be promoted precisely because his superiors

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sympathized with his outlook. At any rate, in March 2007, he was appointed ASDF Chief of Staff, the top officer in the service. Tamogami’s introduction to the national political scene came in April 2008, when he made a comment about the Nagoya High Court’s obiter dictum. At a press conference following the Nagoya ruling, General Tamogami was asked his opinion about its implications. He replied, ‘My feeling is, it doesn’t matter at all [sonna no kankei nee].’ The expression is very informal and is associated with a particular Japanese comedian. In substance, Tamogami not only dismissed the significance of the ruling for the ASDF mission in Iraq but also mocked it as being absolutely meaningless.67 Not surprisingly, the opposition was outraged. More surprisingly, even Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba – a strong defender of the government line – indicated that General Tamogami had gone too far. He told reporters, ‘Although I have no doubt of General Tamogami’s sentiments, and how much he cares about the SDF personnel, I must say that I felt a little uncomfortable with the way he spoke.’68 It was bad enough that conservative politicians disparaged the Nagoya High Court ruling, but this case was several degrees worse. Toshio Tamogami was not an elected official but a uniformed military officer. It was not his place to voice any opinion about the rulings of the judiciary, and certainly not to mock the court at a press conference. The sequel came several months later. General Tamogami responded to the appeal of a hotel chain operator named Toshio Motoya to contribute an essay on the theme of ‘True Modern History’ (the term ‘true’ in this case being a codeword for Japanese right wing historical revisionism). Since Motoya was also a major supporter of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and a booster for right wing political causes more generally, Tamogami not only contributed his own essay but also recruited scores of others from SDF officers under his command. Tamogami’s essay was awarded the grand prize. General Tamogami’s essay, entitled, ‘Was Japan an Aggressor Nation?’ addressed Japan’s history in the run-up to World War II. The general argued that Japan had never been an aggressor nation; its

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position in Korea and China had come as the result of legitimate international treaties, and Japan had been locked in a mortal struggle with international Communism. This Communist conspiracy reached even as far as the US White House, where President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been manipulated by pro-Comintern officials. General Tamogami wrote, In the history of mankind, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is determined only by war. It is impossible for those who are powerful to grant concessions. Those who do not fight must resign themselves to being ruled by others. . . The Tokyo Trials tried to push all of the responsibility for the war onto Japan. And that mind control is still misleading the Japanese people sixty-three years after the war. . . The SDF cannot defend even its own territory, it cannot practice collective self-defense, there are many limitations on its use of weapons, and the possession of offensive weaponry is forbidden. . . Unless our country is released from this mind control, it will never have a system for protecting itself by its own power. We will have no choice but to be protected by America. If we are protected by America, then the Americanization of Japan will accelerate. . . Our country’s traditional culture will be destroyed by the parade of reforms. . . Creating a structure within which we can protect our country by ourselves allows us to preemptively prevent an attack on Japan and at the same time serves to bolster our position in diplomatic negotiations. This is understood in many countries to be perfectly normal, but that concept has not gotten through to our citizens.69 Tamogami’s essay concludes with a ringing call for the Japanese to recognize that their nation is a blessed country, with a long history and exceptional traditions. His final message reads, ‘We must take back the glorious history of Japan. A nation that denies its own history is destined to fall.’70 The uproar that followed the publication of his essay took General Tamogami by surprise, as he himself admitted. He was immediately

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relieved of his position and, because of his age, was automatically sent into retirement. Although many conservatives were in sympathy with Tamogami’s view of Japanese history, the government knew that it was in too weak a position to attempt to defend him.71 Tamogami remained unapologetic – quite unusually so for a Japanese official under such heavy public criticism – declaring, ‘It is necessary to revise the view that Japan did wrong during the war if it wishes to prosper as a nation in the twenty-first century!’72 The Tamogami Affair briefly awoke many Japanese to the possibility that the SDF was no longer under very effective civilian control; the views and attitudes of this man were all too reminiscent of the prewar Imperial Army. This comparison did not escape the commentators. The Asahi Shinbun, for example, editorialized, After World War II, Japan reflected on its mistake of having allowed the military to run amok and destroy the nation. Japan vowed to grow into a pacifist country. When the time came to effectively rearm Japan for self-defence, it was done on the absolute premise that the SDF would not only be subject to strict civilian control but that they would be entirely new entities that had no relation with the former imperial military. . . That is why we cannot possibly defend someone like Tamogami, who has not only willfully undone those SDF efforts in defiance of that premise and the nation’s collective remorse for its past mistake, but additionally had the nerve to claim his ‘right to free speech’.73 Conservative outlets, such as the Yomiuri Shinbun, also took the general to task. In their case, however, the argument was not so much the mistaken substance of Tamogami’s views than his error in not knowing his place. In other words, as a military officer he should not openly criticize government policy. The Yomiuri faulted Tamogami precisely for putting his own agenda – their own agenda – in jeopardy: If Tamogami keeps making self-righteous arguments, these could damage the reputation that the Defense Ministry and the

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Self-Defense Forces have built up, both at home and abroad, through their steady efforts in international peace-cooperation activities and disaster-relief missions. Furthermore, his comments could also undermine the country’s efforts to develop its security agenda, including discussions on the exercising of Japan’s right to collective self-defence and expanding the scope of the use of arms by SDF members.74 Some foreign analysts were stronger in their condemnations of Tamogami’s essay and his subsequent behaviour. On this occasion, the issue was not simply the rearming of Japan in violation of the constitution: Tamogami’s argument was that Japan should rearm, not to become the loyal ‘Britain of the East’ that Richard Armitage dreamed of, but to become a nation strong enough and proud enough to throw off the American shackles and seize control of its own independent destiny. The historian Herbert Bix opined, The views the General expressed did more than simply contravene the official positions of his civilian supervisors. By arguing that Japanese colonial rule was humane and legal, and that Japan was not an aggressor in World War II, Tamogami contradicted the Constitution and the official government stance of apology to the nations that Japan had invaded before and during World War II. . . The impression conveyed is that these ASDF officers are heir to the ‘young officers’ of an earlier era who exploited ideas of a ‘Showa Restoration’ in an effort to accelerate Japanese rearmament and expansion in the 1930s. The difference is that the uniformed officers of today are supposed to be under ‘civilian (bureaucratic and parliamentary) control’, not in spiritual rebellion against the nation’s Peace Constitution.75 Political analyst Tobias Harris added, Go back and read General Tamogami’s essay. The problem for him isn’t just that the Japanese people don’t know the facts (revisionists love that word) of the war. They’ve been

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brainwashed for sixty years into believing that Japan’s wartime behavior was dishonorable, and this belief in turn has handcuffed the SDF and made Japan dependent on the United States for its security. In short, General Tamogami and other revisionists are openly contemptuous of Japanese democracy.76 How did US policymakers respond to the challenge that Tamogami laid down? Once again, as far as is known, US government officials never raised this issue in any form with their Japanese counterparts. The four episodes presented here – the Tachikawa fliers case, the illegal SDF surveillance of peace groups, the denunciation of the Nagoya High Court ruling, and the Tamogami Affair – would seem to constitute prima facie evidence that the War on Terror was exercising detrimental effects on the development of Japanese democracy. The government pursued a military policy that was not supported by the majority of the Japanese, and some of those who protested or challenged the official policies were greeted with anger and intolerance, particularly if their protests had the potential to be effective. Beyond the question of what the Japanese government did is the question of what its American allies failed to do. While the Bush administration asserted that its invasion of Iraq was undertaken in the cause of spreading democracy, there seemed little or no concern for the hollowing out of democracy in one of its most faithful allies – the nation that President Bush had cited as representing the primary model for the democratic development of Iraq.

The Militarist Contagion We must wonder what, short of a military coup d’e´tat or the violent suppression of the political opposition, would have elicited a formal complaint from the Bush administration about the domestic behaviour of its conservative allies in Tokyo. Their public posture gave the consistent impression that the motto ‘With Us or Against Us’ constituted the entire scope of their moral universe.

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There is near-consensus in the publications produced by the alliance conservatives on both sides of the Pacific Ocean that the transformation taking place in Japan was a positive change from ‘sclerotic pacifist ideals’ to a greater sense of realism with eyes open to the true conditions of the world. This turn toward realpolitik – whether we use Michael Green’s formulation ‘reluctant realism’ or Daniel Kliman’s ‘creeping realism’ or any other similar term – is almost universally celebrated in these circles as the long-awaited chance for a more equal and mutually beneficial US– Japan alliance to take shape. But there was a gaping flaw in this view. First of all, while it is true that many senior Japanese officials are sincere bilateralists and genuine realists, there is also a distinct undercurrent of quite a different nature, represented admirably by General Tamogami. These officials are not realists at all but, in fact, a species of right wing idealists. More elements have been ‘creeping’ in Japanese government circles than simply ‘creeping realism’. There has also been a creeping militarism and a creeping nationalism. When alliance conservatives address these factors at all, it has only been to dispose of them quickly, without serious examination, by arguing that Japan is a mature democratic society that has come a very long way from the bad old days of the 1930s and early 1940s.77 However we describe the efforts to intimidate peace movements, the defiance of the Nagoya High Court, or the alarming views expressed by the top officer of the ASDF, the term ‘realism’ does not seem apt. The efforts to overturn the legal restrictions and cultural norms of postwar Japan are not rooted merely in the praiseworthy and responsible realism of the new generation. Why were Bush administration officials, such as Richard Armitage and Michael Green, considered to be keen experts on Japan by their peers, unwilling or unable to grapple with such factors? Even the case of General Tamogami, with its obvious implication that many in the Defense Ministry were chafing to use their new-found power against the United States, did not seem to create alarm in Washington. To explain this odd lack of concern, the Washington-based journalist Ayako Doi offered the following analysis:

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General Tamogami’s views on some of the events in the twentieth century are certainly very troubling to many observers of Japan, but there was very little, if anything, that US policymakers could do in their official capacity. The government of Prime Minister Taro Aso did exactly what it had to under the circumstances; it demoted him and forced him to resign in a timely manner, leaving nothing more for a foreign government to ask for. . . If the US were to raise objections to what it considers unacceptable interpretations of history voiced by agents of the Japanese government, it would most certainly develop into tit-for-tat disputes about justifications of not only Pearl Harbor but also Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and a whole lot of incidents and policies. Once such disputes erupt in public, they can never be brought to a conclusion satisfactory for both sides, and the resulting poisoned atmosphere could do real damage to the alliance.78 Doi went on to explain that it was the proper role of nonofficial agents, not US policymakers, to challenge the views expressed by the general: ‘The only way to deal with fanaticism of the kind voiced by Tamogami is for scholars and other commentators to challenge it in academic forums and policy journals, and try to persuade believers of it with objective data and superior logic. Such efforts will never wipe out fanatics, but it is important to make the effort to set the record straight.79 Doi’s comments implicitly suggest that Washington policymakers viewed the Tamogami Affair as a historical or academic matter rather than as a clear sign that the War on Terror was unleashing problematic political forces within Japan. In fact, a particularly shrill American conservative, Richard Lowry, editor of National Review, had been calling precisely for US policymakers to ‘unleash Japan’ so that it could be ‘the kind of ally we need in Asia’.80 In other words, the Bush administration and its allies were perfectly willing to tell Tokyo what Japanese diplomatic and military policies should be, but as for how those policies might, in turn, impact and reshape the norms and political consciousness of Japanese society was a consideration

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conveniently set aside. Such thinking would lay bare a tangle of issues that they proclaimed no official interest in getting involved with – even when their own unacknowledged influence could be decisive. One possible explanation for Americans’ insensitivity to these issues is that they lost the ability to recognize militarist elements in other countries because they have already become subject to the forces of a militarism of their own. Americans have come to perceive military-first foreign policy responses not as an aberration but as the international norm. James Carroll, a prominent author and newspaper columnist, has reflected at length on the United States’ transformation into ‘a garrison state that [does] not look like one’.81 In a similar vein, in his book The New American Militarism, Professor Andrew Bacevich of Boston University argues that the US people have come to rely on military power as the leading element of American foreign policy: To state the matter bluntly, Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in U.S. history, Americans have come to define the nation’s strength and well-being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals.82 Bacevich traces American militarism to a variety of factors, such as efforts by the US military to rebuild itself after Vietnam, the rise of neoconservative ideology, the crusading impulses of evangelical Christians, and efforts to secure Persian Gulf oil. A multitude of other scholars have pointed out that militarism has become a potent force in American politics and culture.83 If this critique of the United States has merit, then perhaps many Americans did not react to the appearance of militarist elements in Japan because they can no longer distinguish militarism as being

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militarism (at least when it comes to themselves and their close allies). Indeed, it may be that some of the changes observed in Japan are directly attributable to the American example. When General Tamogami writes about his desire to create a system by which ‘we can protect our country ourselves’ and ‘preemptively prevent an attack on Japan’, his words contain echoes of the so-called Bush Doctrine, the notion that ‘the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense’. It could be argued that the contagion of militarist ideologies was being passed from Washington to Tokyo. If it was an acceptable international norm for the United States to unilaterally and preemptively act against threats to the American nation, then why was it not equally acceptable for other allies as well? Why not Japan? This idea seems to be what General Tamogami is reaching for. The Japanese identity as a ‘peaceful people’ has been under assault since 1990, when many Americans, whom Japanese admire for their power and success, told them forcefully and repeatedly that their onecountry pacifism was both self-centred and irresponsible. Not only the US government but even the American people believe in military solutions to terrorism far more than do the Japanese.84 An earlier generation of Americans had counseled Japan to ‘occupy an honored place in international society’ by ‘striving for the preservation of peace’, as phrased in the constitution written by the US occupation forces. In the post-Cold War era, the new message from the world’s remaining superpower has been that there is no honour in pacifism; true honour can only be won by taking the responsibility of war against evildoers. The Japanese need to grow up and join the adult world – they have to learn to kill again.85 There is an echo here from the past: In The Book of Tea, published over a century ago in 1906, Tenshin Okakura observed that the average Westerner ‘was wont to regard Japan as barbarous while she indulged in the gentle arts of peace: he calls her civilized since she began to commit wholesale slaughter on the Manchurian battlefields’.86 The lesson of the Russo– Japanese War and that of the Persian Gulf War may have been the same: Westerners will treat Japan with full respect only when it is a war machine. This perverse incentive is inherent in the political

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logic of the alliance conservatives, although they themselves are unlikely to recognize it. It is interesting to contrast their attitude with the Japanophobia of an older generation. George Ball, a US diplomat of the 1960s, believed that the Japanese people were driven by ‘pride, nationalism, and often downright irrationality’.87 He further observed, ‘Japanese history has never been charted by the same kind of wavering curve that has marked the progress of other countries; instead it resembles more a succession of strait lines, broken periodically by sharp angles as the whole nation, moving full speed, has suddenly wheeled like a well-drilled army corps to follow a new course. There is nothing in all human experience to match it.’88 A similar view has been expressed more recently by Alex Kerr, a lifelong resident of Japan. Speaking of its destruction of the natural environment, Kerr noted that ‘Japan’s cleverly crafted machine of governance lacks one critically important part: brakes. Once it has been set on a particular path, Japan tends to continue on that path until it reaches excesses that would be unthinkable in most other nations.’89 The analysis of both Ball and Kerr suggest that the fundamental issue is Japan’s lack of a well-established tradition of civil disobedience in which the rights of Japanese individuals to contest and challenge bureaucratic decrees is more firmly rooted in the political culture. More than 60 years have passed since the Japanese people were granted their democracy from above by General Douglas MacArthur, but civil society remains fragile in some respects. At the cultural level, a premium is placed on the concept of cooperation, and good Japanese are expected to refrain from interfering in political affairs that are thought to be beyond their comprehension and range of authority.90 Specific examples of how these tendencies played out during the Bush years have already been presented. The deepest concern is the possibility that, if at some future time a regime comes to power in Japan that is both more authoritarian and less than benign, Japanese civil society may have few defence mechanisms available to resist it. More immediately, however, Japan was faced by a very different challenge – a government that can hardly rule at all.

CHAPTER 8 THE FAILURE OF CHANGE

The advent of the administration of Barack Obama promised significant changes in the nature of US foreign policy. Indeed, one of the most prominent slogans of his presidential campaign was ‘Change We Can Believe In’. It was not only the majority of the American public that was aching for change after eight years of Bush– Cheney militarism, but most of the rest of the world too welcomed the turning of the page. In the latter months of 2009, Barack Obama would even be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize primarily due to the fact that he had adopted a softer and more engaging tone in US foreign policy. By the beginning of 2009, the Japanese people too were aching for change. Public opinion polls demonstrated clearly that most ordinary Japanese welcomed the election of Barack Obama and hoped to see a change of leadership in their own nation as well. The ruling LDP was much more comfortable with Republican Party rule in Washington, and so the opposition DPJ soon adopted the slogan ‘Regime Change’ to take advantage of the new political climate. In this final chapter, we examine how Japanese policies changed – and failed to change – after the advent of new governments in both Washington and Tokyo. This was a dramatic period for Japan in particular, as the 54 years of LDP dominance came crashing to an end, signaling unmistakably that a major shake-up was afoot. The new ruling party that came to power in September 2009 was committed

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to a different set of priorities, and this entailed the prospect of a fundamental alteration in the direction of Japan’s foreign policies. Moreover, with the passing of the Bush administration, which had created, defined, and nourished the ‘War on Terror’ policies for more than seven years, there seemed to be an opportunity – both in the United States and Japan – to reshape the nature of these policies in essential respects and to create a new framework for global engagement that didn’t rely on preemptive military attacks and an eternal battle against a constantly mutating set of evildoers. While in any historical era there are elements of both continuity and change, the story recounted in this chapter is, for the most part, one in which entrenched conservative political forces successfully bottled up the liberal changes and, in Japan’s case, almost completely defeated them. The advent of the DPJ regime shifted the political battle lines – more than once – but it did not alter the broader picture of a conservative advance. Indeed, in many ways it confirmed the fundamental trajectory of Japanese policy as it had developed under the rubric of the War on Terror.

The Collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party The Aso administration was eager to build positive ties with the incoming administration of Barack Obama. Uneasy about the possibility of major changes in US policy, they sighed with relief when incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton quickly assured Tokyo that the US– Japan alliance would be a ‘cornerstone’ of her diplomatic strategy, and when reports emerged that Kurt Campbell – who had taken such a hard line against DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa in the autumn of 2007 – would be appointed as Clinton’s top deputy on Asia policy.1 Knowing the value that the LDP regime put on symbolic gestures of alliance solidarity, Clinton chose Tokyo as the destination of her first foreign trip. She explained her choice as follows: ‘I think there has been a general feeling that perhaps we didn’t pay an appropriate amount of attention to Asia over the last years [of the Bush administration], being very preoccupied with other parts of the

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world, so I wanted to start at the very beginning demonstrating our commitment there.’2 When Ms Clinton arrived in Japan, she delighted Prime Minister Aso by delivering an invitation for the Japanese leader to meet with President Obama in Washington in about a week’s time. It was another appeal to Japanese pride and vanity, and as far as the ruling conservatives were concerned, it was very effective. The opposition DPJ was less impressed. When the State Department let it be known that Clinton was interested in meeting with Ichiro Ozawa, the opposition leader did not jump at the opportunity, and even told his colleagues, ‘If the schedule can be arranged, then we’ll meet. Election preparations are my top priority.’ This comment, however, generated criticism, and so Ozawa soon agreed to meet Clinton. In fact, the US request for the meeting had been unusual in itself, since visiting American senior officials rarely met with Japanese opposition leaders. The new Obama administration showered incumbent Prime Minister Taro Aso with signs of support and respect, in perfect continuity with the policies of the former Bush regime. When Aso arrived at the White House in the week following Clinton’s visit, President Barack Obama himself sought to ease the Japanese premier’s troubled mind: ‘The alliance that we have is the cornerstone of security in East Asia, it is one that my administration wants to strengthen’, he said. The president continued, ‘It is for that reason that the Prime Minister is the first foreign dignitary to visit me here in the Oval Office. . . I think it is testimony to the strong partnership between the United States and Japan.’ Aso solemnly responded, ‘We are very honoured to be here as the first foreign guest.’3 No such gestures of alliance solidarity, however, could disguise the fact that the Aso administration was in deep trouble at home. Prime Minister Taro Aso was constitutionally required to call for general elections within the next seven months, and whatever credit Aso may have purchased with the Japanese public for quickly establishing friendly contacts with the popular new American president was squandered by Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa’s drunken performance at a G-7 meeting in Rome in which he slurred his

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speech and could barely stay awake in front of the world’s cameras. The scene was repeatedly broadcast on Japanese television, and it was a major humiliation for Prime Minister Aso, Nakagawa’s close friend and comrade. DPJ Secretary-General Yukio Hatoyama coldly observed, ‘It’s embarrassing. . . This has sent a message to the whole world. He’s damaged the national interest.’4 Nakagawa’s behaviour became a global joke and was politically indefensible.5 The finance minister was forced to resign within days and the Aso administration’s already quite shaky credibility fell to a critical level, with one major public opinion survey showing a 13.4 per cent support rate for the government matched against a 76.6 per cent rate of disapproval.6 A ruling party lawmaker told reporters, ‘The Aso government is finished.’7 But just when it appeared that the Aso administration was on the verge of imploding, a political lifeline was thrown to the ruling party by the Japanese bureaucracy: on March 3, 2009, a special investigative unit of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office suddenly arrested one of DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa’s top aides on charges of violating the political funds control law. The Japanese media redirected its gaze from the failings of the government and began to focus its criticism on Ozawa, who was in effect the premierin-waiting. Ozawa responded with defiance, insisting that his aide had broken no law, and suggesting that the arrest was a politicallymotivated attempt to derail the DPJ’s impending victory. ‘This is an unfair exercise of investigative power, politically and legally. . . If we allow the public authorities to exercise their power on their own terms, we cannot protect our human rights and it will darken our society’, Ozawa said.8 In fact, the unusual aggressiveness of the Tokyo prosecutors’ actions and its suspicious timing led many observers to suspect that a political agenda was indeed involved.9 Ichiro Ozawa’s political position was put in serious jeopardy by the scandal, since much of the Japanese public was inclined to believe that he had done something wrong. Ozawa’s reputation had always been that of a backroom fixer, so the prosecutor’s charges against his aide were judged by most Japanese to be credible. The opposition DPJ’s impressive public support rates began to decline and the Aso

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administration gained its first breathing room. By the end of April, Taro Aso found himself buoyed by support rates near the 30 per cent level. This rebound was attributed almost entirely to the public’s disenchantment with Ichiro Ozawa.10 Some members of the ruling party urged Aso to use this opportunity to call general elections. While the LDP was still trailing the DPJ in the polls, the gap had dramatically narrowed, and it was becoming conceivable that the ruling party might narrowly survive in power if the now scandal-tainted Ozawa was the standardbearer for the opposition. Prime Minister Aso, however, did not accept this advice, apparently judging that a rush into general elections would be seen as too transparently cynical and that the public would not necessarily reward the ruling party for taking advantage of Ozawa’s woes. Aso may also have believed – or at least hoped – that a better opportunity would arise within the five months that remained for him to go to the polls. In fact, his better opportunity never arrived. Throughout March and April, DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa sustained a heavy barrage of criticism from the ruling coalition, as well as the media, but even more alarming to his party colleagues was the fact that the DPJ began to lose a string of local elections that they had expected to win. It was quickly becoming apparent that the Japanese public did not accept Ozawa as a potential national leader and that he was now seriously endangering the prospects for an opposition victory. In early May, Ozawa bowed to the pressure and announced his resignation as DPJ leader. After a hasty intraparty election – stage-managed by Ozawa himself – Yukio Hatoyama became head of Japan’s largest opposition party. Ozawa stayed on in the key position of party secretary-general. This reversal at the head of the DPJ ticket would ultimately prove to have fateful consequences for Japanese political history, but its immediate effect went very much according to plan: party support rates rebounded to their earlier levels and the ruling LDP resumed its decline. The final months of LDP rule were a comedy of errors. In the face of their dim prospects, many of the conservative mandarins seemed to be in denial. Instead of finding fresh issues in an attempt to

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chip away at the DPJ’s substantial advantage in public popularity, the energies of the ruling party were mostly expended on infighting among themselves. High-profile lawmakers of the ruling LDP went public in late June with demands that Taro Aso step down as leader before he called general elections. Aso dismissed their demands, but the deep divisions within the ruling camp were apparent. It was in this frail condition that the ruling party contested the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections in July. The most notable feature of the contest was Prime Minister Aso’s amusing joke that he was sure to secure a ‘narrow defeat’ for the ruling party.11 In fact, however, the LDP was clobbered. Soundly defeated in these key local elections, Aso’s hold over his own party vanished. He made his last, desperate roll of the dice by calling for general elections to be held on August 30. This action forced his opponents within the ruling party to abandon their efforts to remove him as leader. The LDP was divided and dispirited as it headed into the campaign. They could not even present a coherent policy platform to woo over voters. They had been living in contempt of Japanese public opinion for about three years, relying on a long-expired popular mandate won by Junichiro Koizumi’s personal charisma. Their time had run out at last. The LDP was crushed in the August 30 general elections. The 300 seats in the House of Representatives that they had held before the election were reduced to a mere 119. Well-known politicians who had ruled their districts for decades were knocked out of office by fresh-faced opposition candidates who tended to be much younger and, not uncommonly, female. Among the casualties were some of the most senior LDP leaders, including a former prime minister. The New Komeito Party – the crucial allies of the LDP – lost both their party leader and their secretary-general on election night. On the other side of the aisle, the DPJ victory was equally decisive: they leapt from holding 115 seats in the House of Representatives to a total of 308. This was not only a solid majority in the 480-seat chamber, but not far from an impregnable supermajority. For the very first time since the party was founded in 1955, the LDP was no longer the largest political party in the Diet. DPJ

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President Yukio Hatoyama would become the first post-LDP prime minister of Japan. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs immediately released a statement: The people of Japan have participated in an historic election in one of the world’s leading democracies. As a close friend and ally, the United States awaits the formation of a new Japanese government. We are confident that the strong US– Japan Alliance and the close partnership between our two countries will continue to flourish under the leadership of the next government in Tokyo. President Obama looks forward to working closely with the new Japanese Prime Minister on a broad range of global, regional, and bilateral issues.12 Contrary to the White House statement, however, it would soon become apparent that the working relationship between Washington and Tokyo was facing serious trouble.

Change Unwelcomed In January 2009, the ostensibly centre-left Democratic Party came to power in the United States led by Barack Obama and a public mandate to pursue ‘Change We Can Believe In’. That same September, the ostensibly centre-left Democratic Party of Japan came to power led by Yukio Hatoyama with a public mandate to affect ‘Regime Change’ in Tokyo. On the face of it, one might have expected Washington to embrace the DPJ’s crushing victory as a manifestation of the very same progressive movement that President Obama had championed during his impressive 2008 presidential campaign. At the very least, one might have expected considerable appreciation for the fact that the one-party era in Japan had finally come to an end after decades of entrenchment. Power had been transferred in Japan peacefully at the ballot box. This might have been viewed as a tribute to those American men and women who – in 1946– 1947 – had helped to redesign the Japanese government following the horrors of the Pacific War. The reality, however, was

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that in 2009 Barack Obama’s Washington possessed attitudes toward Japan that were not appreciably different from those that had prevailed during the time of the Bush administration. Washington policymakers were quite comfortable with the LDP, which had been content to follow the main lines of American policy even when it suffered serious political costs for doing so. US– Japan policy was shaped by a small band of ‘alliance managers’ who had established personalities and preferences. Dissenters were kept at a safe distance from policymaking. These cozy arrangements transcended the Republican– Democrat divide, and in fact the senior positions of the Obama administration were staffed by individuals who represented, in effect, the long-established ‘Democrat wing’ of the more-or-less united ‘alliance manger’ community. Moreover, the Pentagon – which had come to play a leading role in US foreign policy in general – was still under the same leadership as before. Robert Gates was reappointed as defence secretary, symbolizing the triumph of continuity over change. The shift from Bush to Obama did not entail even a modest rethinking of American policy toward Japan. It was business as usual. The landslide victory of the DPJ, therefore, was greeted not with celebration, but with caution and even suspicion.13 Washington policymakers wanted Japan to follow their lead, and they did want not to waste time dealing with the sensitivities of an untutored ally. Busy American officials had bigger fish to fry in crisis areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the near-meltdown of the US financial system in the wake of the Lehman Shock. These attitudes were reflected, for example, by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who described the DPJ victory in the following terms: ‘It’s a change which is dramatic given 50 years of LDP governmental leadership, but I am very confident that the strength of our relationship and our alliance will stand the test of any political changes.’ Her phrasing inadvertently revealed that Clinton viewed ‘political changes’ in Japan as a ‘test’ that the alliance would have to patiently weather. One could safely assume, therefore, that the DPJ victory wasn’t a positive development for the alliance. Similarly, Admiral Timothy Keating, leader of the Pentagon’s Pacific Command, told the media,

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‘I’m very confident, almost certain, that there will be – maybe some discussions about certain aspects of US – Japan military alliance – but writ large no significant change.’ Again, the subtext was apparent: change is bad.14 The negative attitude of senior Obama administration officials toward the DPJ emerged into fuller public view in October 2009 when the Washington Post published the following, much-discussed passage: A senior State Department official said the United States had ‘grown comfortable’ thinking about Japan as a constant in U.S. relations in Asia. It no longer is, he said, adding that ‘the hardest thing right now is not China, it’s Japan’. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said the new ruling party lacks experience in government and came to power wanting politicians to be in charge, not the bureaucrats who traditionally ran the country from behind the scenes.15 The unfavourable comparison to China and the inference that the DPJ was little more than a pack of amateurs was a slap at the new Japanese ruling party – as well as a potent warning to them. On the other hand, there did seem to be reasonable grounds for hope as well. Barack Obama enjoyed tremendous personal popularity in Japan. Even Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama seemed to have been taken in by Obama’s aura of glamour, expecting that a natural rapport would develop between the two of them. On the surface, the two leaders seemed to have much in common. Moreover, Hatoyama’s own popularity was undoubtedly buoyed by the so-called ‘Obama effect’, with some commentators even asking if he and his party represented ‘Japan’s Obama’.16 Keener observers of US– Japan relations, however, understood from the outset that less change was in the offing than most Japanese seemed to realize. But even so, the full scope of American inflexibility and the degree of their hostility toward Yukio Hatoyama was predicted by few if any observers. Certainly, it was the new Japanese

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prime minister’s great misfortune that he didn’t see the powerful political train hurtling in his direction until it was much too late.

Reaffirming the War on Terror In January 2009, the editors of the Asahi Shinbun looked forward to a reevaluation of the War on Terror, pointing to critical comments made by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband. They observed, ‘Terrorism must be eradicated, but this is a challenge that cannot be approached with a simplistic “friend or foe” mentality. A new wind is blowing, and the world seems to be finally facing this fact squarely.’17 As a candidate for US president, and later in his impressive June 2009 speech at Cairo University, Obama clearly demonstrated his intellectual grasp of the issues bedeviling the American connection with the Islamic world. Referring obliquely to some of the more controversial aspects of the War on Terror, the new president declared, Just as America can never tolerate violence by extremists, we must never alter or forget our principles. 9.11 was an enormous trauma to our country. The fear and anger that it provoked was understandable, but in some cases, it led us to act contrary to our traditions and our ideals. We are taking concrete actions to change course. I have unequivocally prohibited the use of torture by the United States, and I have ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed by early next year.18 Obama never mentioned the term ‘War on Terror’ in his Cairo speech, and in fact his government largely abandoned the rhetoric of the early Bush administration. This rhetorical change had actually begun in the latter years of the Bush regime. Critiques of the ‘War on Terror’ concept had been building potency as the negative dimensions of this approach became clearer. Alternatives such as ‘The Long War’ or ‘The Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism’ or ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ were proposed at various times, but they failed to catch on, and so, for

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lack of a better expression, discussions tended to return to the deeplyengrained and widely-recognized ‘War on Terror’.19 But it was not simply the rhetoric that proved difficult to banish; rather, the Obama administration largely failed to make a clean break from earlier policies. The ‘concrete actions to change course’ that President Obama promised to the Muslim world in June 2009 did not materialize – and even the specific promise to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay was later abandoned. Even a sympathetic observer of the president’s War on Terror policies was forced to admit that, ‘The Obama administration has, for better or worse, maintained almost all of the policies in place by the end of the previous administration, and kept on the same people to run them. It has put those pieces together differently, under a new rhetorical and conceptual framework, but the tools and the strategic objectives remain similar.’20 Since Washington proved incapable of making little more than minor revisions to the early Bush administration’s concept of the War on Terror – and declined to challenge its legal rationales and its methods of operation in any meaningful way – Japanese leaders too were constrained in their attempts to make a fundamental reorientation of foreign policy.

Breaking the Hatoyama Regime As a consequence of these factors, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and the DPJ faced an extraordinarily difficult international environment to make significant foreign policy changes. Still, the new party in power was initially determined to put their stamp on government, and the new premier exuded an easy confidence whose ultimate source was not, at first, easy to pinpoint. One of the first foreign policy battles erupted – not surprisingly – over whether or not the DPJ would fulfill its promise to withdraw the MSDF refueling mission from the Indian Ocean, as it had been strongly demanding for several years. The Obama administration didn’t even wait for the Hatoyama Cabinet to be established before putting a shot across the new

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government’s bow. On September 9, 2010 – a week before Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister – Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell dismissed the DPJ’s foreign policy agenda as ‘a lot of campaign rhetoric’. He also stated, I think that with regards to the Indian Ocean refueling mission, we have greatly benefitted from – as has the world, for that matter – from Japan’s participation in those efforts, and we would very much encourage them to continue those efforts. Japan is a great power, one of the world’s wealthiest countries. And there is an international responsibility, we believe, for everyone to do their share, as best they can, to contribute to this effort to bring about a more peaceful and secure Afghanistan, to avoid it returning to a country that could launch attacks against Japan, the US, any of our friends and allies around the world.21 The conservative media in Japan once again echoed the line coming out of Washington, and even many lawmakers within the DPJ began to waver. However, the fledgling Hatoyama administration also received an important push from the other direction. While the DPJ now had a massive majority in the House of Representatives, they were still a bit short of a majority in the less-powerful House of Councillors. This meant that two small parties were invited into the new government as coalition partners – including the decidedly proArticle Nine SDP. Not surprisingly, SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima demanded the withdrawal of the MSDF mission from the Indian Ocean as a condition for her party’s participation in the new cabinet. Furthermore, the newly-appointed defence minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, made a splash by declaring at his inaugural press conference that the SDF ‘serve only for the purpose of never waging a war’. He then explained that civilian authorities ‘should not repeat their past mistake of losing control of military forces’. As for the MSDF Indian Ocean mission, Kitazawa gave it ‘low marks’ and announced that he had no intention of expanding the mission past its January 2010 deadline. He also ventured: ‘I believe appreciation for

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Japan’s mission is limited.’ Kitazawa’s attitudes were a sharp departure from those of the LDP politicians who had held this post in recent years, the Fumio Kyuma experience notwithstanding. The contradictory political forces operating on the Hatoyama administration led it to a middle path: the MSDF mission to the Indian Ocean would be terminated as the DPJ had long promised, but this withdrawal would be accompanied by an enhanced commitment to Afghanistan in other fields. This meant that Japanese taxpayers were bound to cough up more money for the American project in Central Asia and, beyond that, the Japanese government began to search for alternative symbols of their commitment to Afghanistan. Washington was clearly annoyed by most of the major initiatives coming out of the early Hatoyama administration. The cancellation of Japan’s participation in the Indian Ocean operation was part of that, but so were other issues like the new Japanese prime minister’s sweeping vision of an East Asian Community. For decades, the American strategic position in East Asia depended on the political divisions within the region, especially between Japan and China. Hatoyama’s vision threatened to bring the two East Asian giants together in a way that would leave the United States on the outside looking in. Republican Congressman Kevin Brady gave public voice to these concerns when he said that an East Asian Community ‘that excludes the U.S. would be very damaging’.22 The exact same sentiment guided the Obama administration. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell stated it directly in a September 2009 interview with TV Tokyo: ‘It’s important for Japan and the countries of East Asia that they work closely together, they interact, that they have high level dialogue. It’s not in America’s interest to see a dialogue or a formation come together that excludes the United States.’23 But this senior official wasn’t always so forthright. In an interview with the Asahi Shinbun at around the same time, Campbell painted a picture of US – Japan relations at the outset of the Hatoyama regime that may have been diplomatically correct, but was not a very accurate picture of Washington’s attitude:

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First and foremost, we accept and welcome the idea of an equal partnership. In fact, we think without an equal partnership it won’t be possible to maintain a vibrant and strong relationship, going into the future. So, we accept, welcome and encourage a more active and creative partner that takes the initiative. . . there is some assessment, occasionally, that we are, somehow, adverse to Japan taking extra efforts to build stronger ties with both South Korea and China. Nothing could be further from the truth.24 Campbell’s rather schizophrenic pronouncements in this period reflected Washington’s desire to have the new administration in Japan follow their orders without incurring the political costs of openly making such demands. ‘Internalized gaiatsu’ wasn’t functioning like it did in the past and the ‘alliance managers’ were frustrated that the top Japanese officials weren’t simply reading the signals and falling into line. The public pretence that all was well with the US– Japanese alliance was dropped almost entirely with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ October 2009 visit to Tokyo. The bluntness of Gates’ demeanour was almost universally acknowledged. The flashpoint was the issue of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa, in which the desires of the local Okinawan people and the desires of Washington were seen to be in sharp contrast. As one of its last acts in government, the LDP had rammed through passage of a bill which gave the Japanese government’s formal consent for the long-negotiated agreement to go forward. The DPJ had been clear during the campaign leading up to the August 30 elections that they did not consider themselves bound by the LDP’s agreement and that they would seek to move the US Marines base at Futenma out of Okinawa and preferably out of Japan. Once the DPJ came into power, Washington pretended not to notice these campaign promises and was soon pressing hard for the Hatoyama administration to betray its supporters – and lawmakers – in Okinawa by accepting in full and without further negotiation the earlier agreement. This was the unmistakable message that Secretary Gates brought with him during his October visit. Standing at a press conference beside new Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa,

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Gates declared that it was ‘time to move on’.25 Gates demanded that the Japanese not only implement the agreement in full, but that they did so ‘expeditiously’. As a further gesture emphasizing his displeasure with DPJ foot-dragging, Gates declined an invitation to dine at the Japanese Defense Ministry. Michael Green – once a high level Bush administration official and now holding the position of Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies – did not bother to hide his glee at Gates’ tough stance. Writing for a Foreign Policy magazine blog, he contributed a piece entitled ‘Tokyo Smackdown’, noting with approval that ‘Gates’ message in Japan this week was no-nonsense’ and had ‘sent shudders through Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan’. Green went on to offer the highly questionable analysis that the DPJ’s landslide victory had nothing to do with foreign policy issues, citing only a poll showing that most Japanese still felt that the US–Japan alliance should be preserved in one form or another. He described the DPJ foreign policy position as ‘extreme’ before moving on to conclude: Gates had no choice but to splash cold water on the DPJ... There is some risk that the ever-populist DPJ will now try to use a spat with the United States to increase votes before the election next year. But Gates is a shrewd judge of his counterparts. He knows that a crisis in the US– Japan alliance would split the DPJ and turn much of the media against Hatoyama, particularly given the strong public support for the alliance and the growing menace from North Korea and China. Meanwhile, Hatoyama was letting the DPJ leadership play with firecrackers in a room full of dynamite. Letting the alliance drift posed the greater risk. . . Gates did the DPJ a favour by forcing the debate on national strategy that the party was never willing to have while in opposition, and that Hatoyama was eager to avoid for his first year in power.26 Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and the new Japanese government, however, did not seem to appreciate the ‘favour’ that Defense Secretary Gates had allegedly done them, especially as there was the

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widely-held understanding that the senior officials of the Obama administration were very much on the same wavelength as Michael Green, hoping that the DPJ would either shift its stance or split apart under the pressure that Washington was bringing to bear. Washington relentlessly tried to force Tokyo’s hand by rallying conservative forces into a united criticism of the DPJ’s position. At times the expressions used were remarkably insulting. For example, Bruce Klingner, an expert at the Heritage Foundation, told the Christian Science Monitor in November that ‘Japan today is exhibiting a lot of the characteristics of “failure to launch” – the college kid who’s still living at home under his parents’ wing but complains about being treated as an underling and not as an equal. He wants all the freedoms but is not taking on the responsibilities that being an equal entails.’27 The Hatoyama administration was coming under combined attacks from Washington, the Japanese government bureaucracy, the conservative media and the opposition political parties. But despite the formidable range of enemies they faced, they had won their massive electoral victory against the same opposing coalition and had their own resources to draw upon. Their fatal flaw, however, was the man at the top – Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. The biggest problem with Hatoyama was his indecisive, Hamletlike character. Some people even suggested that he had a tendency to agree with the last person he talked to. Hatoyama appeared to want people to like him and had a soft and affectionate nature. While these qualities may be admirable in a different context, they were little short of disastrous for the leader of a political party seeking nearly revolutionary changes against a long-established regime. As a result, under daily assault from their many enemies and rivals, the Hatoyama administration put up nothing in the way of a coordinated defence and threw no political punches of their own. Rather than push back at their critics, members of the ruling party let their own divisions begin to get the best of them. The most serious internal damage seems to have been done by the elite bureaucrats who had long directed Japanese government policies and were often angered by the DPJ’s paring back of their traditional

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prerogatives. In constant contact with the ministers of Hatoyama’s cabinet, they gradually convinced the politicians who ostensibly led the ministries that almost every policy in the DPJ Manifesto was impractical and had to be reviewed. And as the ruling party quickly started backing away from the policies upon which they had been elected in a landslide victory and returning to the policy positions of their predecessors, their public support dropped. And as their public support dropped, they became increasingly vulnerable to pressures for more compromise. And with more compromise, their public support dropped further. The Hatoyama administration was already beginning the spiral toward its death within roughly a month of coming to power. The first major cabinet member to be turned was Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. The old politician who had declared at his inaugural press conference in September that the SDF ‘serve only for the purpose of never waging a war’ and engage in ‘defensive defence’ was already showing signs of change by October. It was a striking departure from his previous stand when Defense Minister Kitazawa said, ‘When I hear international opinions, including those of Europe, I am a little concerned about whether civilian support [in Afghanistan] would be enough for Japan’s alternative plan.’28 Barely a month into the new regime and Kitazawa’s pacifist line was cracking. It was less than a month later – only two months into the Hatoyama regime – that the party casually threw overboard their years of opposition to the Iraq War. Not only did the DPJ make no move to hold any Iraq War inquiries such as had been held in Britain and elsewhere, but they even made a stunning flip-flop that argued that former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had been right all along about the legality of the GSDF mission to Samawa. Under questioning from Masahisa Sato, a former GSDF officer who was now an LDP politician, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano was asked if the Samawa mission had really been unconstitutional. His reply was, ‘As the current government, we do not consider it unconstitutional. As an opposition party, we could not determine if the area where they were sent was a non-combat zone. But as we

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recognize it is a non-combat zone now, we have judged that the SDF activities there were constitutional.’29 It was another reflection of how the bureaucracy was getting to them, and it was a position that betrayed an entire section of the DPJ support base. But the issue of US forces in Okinawa was where the strands were coming together and the noose around Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama began to draw tighter. Defense Minister Kitazawa was offering no help at all, simply saying that the existing plan to build a new US Marine airbase at Henoko was probably unavoidable.30 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, who had told an audience in August that, ‘If Japan just follows what the United States says, then I think as a sovereign nation that is very pathetic’, was reversing his stance only two months later.31 Okada proposed his own plan that the functions of the US Marine base at Futenma be integrated into the nearby US Air Force base at Kadena, but soon backed off even that degree of independent-mindedness vis-a`-vis the United States. Pathetic or not, Hatoyama’s cabinet ministers were not cooperating with him on the Okinawa base issue even two months into the new regime. On the other hand, retreating from his campaign promises on Okinawa would also cause Hatoyama major difficulties. Not only would it be a betrayal of the Okinawa chapter of his own party, which insisted that the US Marines be moved off their island, but it would also be a direct violation of the coalition agreement that had just been signed with the SDP. Mizuho Fukushima, now serving as a minor minister inside Hatoyama’s cabinet, made it absolutely clear that her party would withdraw from the government if they backtracked on their Okinawa promises under US pressure. Prime Minister Hatoyama, with an air of confidence, asserted that a solution would be found and that there was no rush to make a decision, which, he said, would ‘need months’.32 He acted like he had some ace up his sleeve and many commentators wondered at the plan he had in mind. In early 2010, the people of Okinawa themselves began to make their voices heard. In January came the elections in the city of Nago (where the existing plans called for the Henoko airbase to be built) in

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which the unambiguously anti-US candidate defeated the incumbent to become the new mayor.33 This event guaranteed that there would be no local political support for the construction of the US Marine airbase. Prime Minister Hatoyama responded by telling reporters, ‘The country will start from scratch on this issue and take responsibility to reach a conclusion by the end of May.’ But even mainstream analysts began to realize by this point that Hatoyama had been worked into a no-win situation by, on the one side, the determination of Washington to force the Japanese prime minister to obey their commands to construct the new base and, on the other side, by the absolute refusal of the Okinawan people to allow it. In reference to the results of the Nago mayoral elections, Professor Jeff Kingston noted, ‘It does give Hatoyama a bit of cover: “Hey, I have to listen to the voice of the people.” But I don’t think that’s going to cut much weight with Washington.’34 Indeed, the American political establishment was effectively showing no respect at all for public opinion in Okinawa, nor for the repeated results of the Japanese electoral process. The months that followed represented the unraveling of the Hatoyama administration. The cabinet and party were in disarray, and Hatoyama had no leadership to offer. It became increasingly clear that behind the prime minister’s easy-going manner there was no substance at all. On the crucial question of Futenma relocation, he had no ace up his sleeve and no answers. The denouement came at the end of May when SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima was fired from the cabinet and the ruling coalition was dissolved. Hatoyama also forced Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa out of office and then resigned himself. But shortly before his resignation in utter disgrace, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama completely surrendered to pressure from Washington and reconfirmed the old Futenma relocation plans without any serious revision. Forced to make a clear-cut decision between loyalty to the alliance and loyalty to Japan’s own democratic will, the government responded in the time-honoured fashion of their LDP predecessors – of course it was Washington that needed to be obeyed. The DPJ regime survived for two-and-a-half more years the debacle of the Hatoyama administration. He was followed as prime

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minister by Naoto Kan and then Yoshihiko Noda. However, the post-Hatoyama DPJ governments jettisoned all pretences of seeking a foreign policy more independent of the United States. As an opposition party, the DPJ had fought for years to carve out a space for a two-party political system in Japan. Under Ichiro Ozawa’s leadership from 2006 to 2009, they had developed a distinctive and credible policy platform. But even in the wake of their landslide electoral victory in August 2009, it took only a couple of months of pressure from Washington to completely blunt their reform drive. And a year later, the basis of DPJ diplomacy had become indistinguishable from the LDP diplomacy they had been struggling against for so many years.

The Failure of Change The future is rooted in the present, but it is never completely determined. The Japan of the twenty-first century will be shaped, not only by its past and present, but also by the future choices of men and women. The symptoms of a restored Japanese militarism that appeared in the later Bush years may prove to be the first signs of a tragedy that eventually consumes East Asia in the fires of a horrible war, or it may quickly subside and be forgotten. Or perhaps the future will appear somewhere between these two poles. Thinking people, however, should be able to read danger signs when they arise. They should be able to draw lessons from the past in order to shape a better future. Such is the fundamental purpose for which history books are written. Fantasy books deliver amusing stories; history books teach us something about ourselves. We should be concerned about the future of Japan. We should consider how the War on Terror reshaped identities even in those nations that seem on the margins of the global struggle. No one sees Japan as a top-level player in this conflict, and yet it is just possible that the most pernicious legacy of the War on Terror will appear in East Asia, not the Islamic world. Democratic institutions can only be undermined when public opinion is disregarded callously by national leaders. Almost 80 per cent of the Japanese people opposed the

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launching of the Iraq War in March 2003, and yet their government supported it without reservation. The United States, which was once regarded as the home of democratic government, aligned itself decisively on the side of a conservative Japanese elite against the large majority of the Japanese people. This development is bound to have consequences for the future. Japan is a nation that is tipping toward a new national identity. Perhaps that identity will be one that reaffirms the country’s commitment to peace and combines it with a stronger sense of engagement with the rest of the world. On the other hand, the new Japan may turn out to be a society that favours inward-looking cultural conservatism, with all of the negative effects that this implies. The overarching argument of this book, then, is that the War on Terror has pushed the Japanese political system in the direction of bureaucratic authoritarianism and preserved a wide gap between the policies of the conservative Japanese ruling elite and the majority of the Japanese people. The Bush years did not represent a true alliance between the American people and the Japanese people, but only a narrowly-based partnership between a clique of high-level US officials in Washington and the conservative upper crust that governed Japan.35 The advent of the Obama administration in Washington and the DPJ administrations in Tokyo did not bring about any fundamental changes. From the side of Washington, indeed, it was essentially the same group of men and women who drove policy toward Japan and their attitudes hardly shifted at all. The picture in Tokyo was much more complex as those at the top of the political system battled it out for supremacy, but one thing that became clear was that challenging Washington and reshaping the nation’s basic diplomatic orientation was off the table. As part of that reality, both major political parties, the bureaucracy, and the media had all accepted the necessity and the legitimacy of the War on Terror.

NOTES

Chapter 1

September 11 through the Alliance Prism

1. Toshi Maeda and Kanako Takahara, ‘Japan Must Avoid Treading Gulf War Path’, Japan Times, September 21, 2001. 2. Japan Times, ‘Caution Urged on Backing U.S. Forces’, Japan Times, September 27, 2001. 3. Polling by the Yomiuri Shinbun found that 82.5 per cent of the Japanese public felt ‘great concern’ about the September 11 attacks, and a further 15.5 per cent felt ‘some concern’. Paul Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy’, East-West Centre Washington Policy Studies, No. 27, 2006, p. 20. 4. Asahi Shinbun, September 13, 2001, p. 14. 5. Fukiko Aoki, ‘Zujo ni Tawaa ga Futtekita’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 62 – 67. 6. Tan Ro Mi, ‘Otto no Keitai ga Tsunagarani’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 80 – 83. 7. Asahi Shinbun, September 15, 2001, p. 25. 8. Jean-Marie Colombani, ‘We Are All Americans’, Le Monde, September 12, 2001. An English-language translation of the full article is available in World Press Review, Vol. 48, No. 11, November 2001. 9. Taro Akasaka, ‘9.11 Junichiro to Makiko no Meiso’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 13, November 2001, pp. 224– 228. See also, Asahi Shinbun, September 12, 2001, pp. 4, 37. 10. This coincidence seems to account for the fact that the Kantei emergency task force on the attacks was set up ‘within 45 minutes of the attacks’. Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism’, pp. 22 – 23. 11. Akasaka, ‘9.11 Junichiro to Makiko no Meiso’, pp. 224– 225. 12. Ibid., p. 225.

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13. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Decries Terrorist Attacks, Vows Cooperation’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001; Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Supports Bush’s Hunt for Terrorists’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001. 14. Akasaka, ‘9.11 Junichiro to Makiko no Meiso’, p. 225; Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Supports Bush’s Hunt for Terrorists’. 15. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Supports Hunt for Terrorists, Koizumi Tells Bush’, Kyodo News, September 13, 2001. 16. Asahi Shinbun, September 13, 2001, p. 14. The teacher related the attacks to the Arab – Israeli conflict because in the first day after September 11, a Palestinian group had declared responsibility. This declaration was then quickly retracted, however. 17. Asahi Shinbun, September 12, 2001, p. 2. 18. It should be noted once again that on that very first day, Palestinian groups were also under suspicion of carrying out the September 11 attacks; but that fact only strengthens the argument here. 19. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22 – 49. 20. Asahi Shinbun, September 15, 2001, p. 2. 21. Asahi Shinbun, September 14, 2001, p. 2. 22. Since those days, a growing amount of literature on the terrorism-as-crime vs. terrorism-as-war paradigm has appeared. Most of this debate has taken place in the United States and Europe, not in Japan. 23. ‘In the immediate wake of September 11, the Japanese public felt a sense of genuine concern and they wanted to do what they could to prevent more incidents like this from happening again in the future. However, they were also uncertain about the idea of a “War on Terrorism”. Japanese retain a deeply-felt wariness about the very notion of war-fighting. On the other hand, they could recognize that Americans had been the victims in this affair and they didn’t feel that they had any moral right to deny the American position on this.’ Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 24. Asahi Shinbun, September 16, 2001, p. 17; and Ryuki Sado, ‘Shubosha wa Hofuku Kogeki o Nozondeiru’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 138– 141. 25. Asahi Shinbun, September 16, 2001, p. 17. 26. Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1977, p. 223. 27. Asahi Shinbun, September 16, 2001, p. 17. 28. Ibid. 29. The editors of the Asahi Shinbun alluded to this factor in a later editorial: ‘Foreign policy differs from a Hollywood Western in which heroes stand against villains. Apparently, the Bush administration does not sufficiently appreciate that fact.’ Asahi Shinbun, February 20, 2002, p. 2. The Asahi editors may have been thinking of the High Noon movie poster that Bush gave Koizumi in September 2001. See Chapter Two for details.

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30. Yuzo Itagaki, ‘Kyoi to Hofuku no Akujunkan Yameru tame ni’, Sekai, No. 694, November 2001, p. 46. 31. Japan’s leading academic specialist on Iraq was blunt about this point: ‘The notion that the September 11 attacks were an attack on civilization itself is too stupid to contemplate.’ Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 32. Itagaki, ‘Kyoi to Hofuku no Akujunkan’, p. 50. 33. Osamu Miyata, ‘Isuraamu Kagekiha no Taibei Zoo no Yoin wa nani ka’, Sekai, No. 694, November 2001, p. 62. 34. Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 35. One foreign scholar asserted, correctly, that the Foreign Ministry mainstream behaves as ‘the self-appointed guardian of the bilateral relationship with the US’. Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?’, University of Warwick Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Working Paper No. 104/02, August 2002, p. 11. 36. George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, September 20, 2001. 37. Ibid. 38. This belief was encouraged by many American alliance managers. Note, for example, the observation by Brad Glosserman: ‘Japan’s leaders have acted with the knowledge that they failed to meet their ally’s expectations a decade ago and a similar failure could provide a body blow – perhaps even a fatal one – to an alliance that only weeks ago celebrated its 50th anniversary.’ Brad Glosserman, ‘Japan Battles Gulf War Ghosts’, PacNet Newsletter, No. 38, September 28, 2001. 39. This was the title of a paper scheduled to be delivered by Professor David Leheny, then of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, at an Association for Asian Studies annual conference held in New York in March 2003. 40. Kazuhisa Ogawa, ‘Kikikan Zero – Nihon wa Terorisuto no Rakuen da’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 220– 225; Suminao Murakami, ‘Chokoso Gekitotsu Tero ga Nihon de Okottara’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 170– 173; and Iku Aso, ‘Nihon e Tero Kogeki Senritsu no Shimyureeshon’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 52 – 56. 41. Maeda and Takahara, ‘Japan Must Avoid Treading Gulf War Path’. 42. Atsuyuki Sassa, ‘Chian o Keishi Shitekita tsuke o Ima Harawasareteiru’, Chuo Koron, Vol. 119, No. 2, February 2004, p. 89. 43. Masayuki Yamauchi, ‘The Open Society and Its Enemies: Confronting International Terrorism’, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2002, pp. 4 – 5. 44. Ibid., p. 7. 45. The creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 most notably reflects this movement. 46. Yamauchi, ‘The Open Society and Its Enemies’, p. 6. 47. Kyodo News, ‘Ex-SDF Official Sees Antiterrorism Bill as Entry into War’, Kyodo News, October 22, 2001.

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48. The survey was conducted by telephone on September 28 – 29. Asahi Shinbun, October 1, 2001, p. 2. 49. Keiko Sakai concurs with this view: ‘The only complaint that Muslims might have toward Japan is its support of US military action in the Islamic world. There is no other grievance that I am aware of.’ Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 50. Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2006, p. 13. 51. For the relative strength of the Japanese navy, see Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971– 2000, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Also note Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 5. 52. Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, PublicAffairs, 2007, pp. 3– 4. 53. For details on the minesweeping mission consult Kunio Nishimura, ‘Operation Gulf Dawn: Making History’, Look Japan, Vol. 37, No. 429, December 1991, pp. 9 – 11; Akihiko Ushiba, ‘The Minesweeping Mission: A Job Well Done’, Japan Echo, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 43 – 50; and Peter J. Woolley, ‘Japan’s 1991 Minesweeping Decision: An Organizational Response’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8, August 1996, pp. 804– 817. 54. Many sources are available on Japan’s response to the 1990– 1991 conflict, most of them from conservative viewpoints. A brief list would include: Kazuo Ijiri, ‘Japan’s Defeat in the Gulf’, Japan Echo, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 1991, pp. 56 – 61; Shinichi Kitaoka, ‘Chronicling Japan’s Crisis Diplomacy’, Japan Echo, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 36 – 42; Courtney Purrington and Akira Kato, ‘Tokyo’s Policy Responses during the Gulf Crisis’, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4, April 1991, pp. 307– 323; and Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview’, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 257– 273. 55. ‘Washington’s expectations exercised a decisive influence over Tokyo’s foreign policy calculus, but U.S. policy acted from within rather than without. Internalized gaiatsu – a one-sided calculation of national interest – compelled Japanese officials to propose new forms of security cooperation to avoid the negative consequences of failing to meet outside expectations.’ Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, pp. 87 – 88. 56. Asahi Shinbun, September 26, 2001, p. 2; and Kyodo News, ‘Deliberation, Not Elation Must Guide Japan’s Support to U.S.’, Kyodo News, September 27, 2001. 57. Yukio Okamoto, ‘Japan’s Response to War Overseas: How Not to Make the Same Mistake Twice’, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2002, p. 10. 58. Ibid. 59. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Appoints Okamoto Foreign Policy Adviser’, Kyodo News, September 20, 2001. 60. Yukio Okamoto, ‘Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 59 – 72. 61. Ibid., p. 59.

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62. Ibid., p. 62. 63. Ibid., p. 63. 64. Yukio Okamoto, ‘Across to the Indian Ocean: Japanese Aid to Afghanistan’, Gaiko Forum, Fall 2002, p. 18. 65. Okamoto, ‘The Essential Alliance’, p. 72. 66. Masayuki Yamauchi, ‘Japan’s Role: From Anti-Terrorism to the Formation of a New Order’, Glocom Platform, Commentary, November 2001. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Brad Glosserman, ‘Another Opportunity for Mr. Koizumi’, PacNet Newsletter, No. 41, October 12, 2001. 71. Ibid. 72. Another such thinker was James Mulvenon of the Rand Corporation: ‘Events of September 11 have presented Japan with a unique opportunity to make necessary revisions in its laws, closing the gap between Japan’s growing geopolitical commitments and the increasingly outdated legal constraints.’ Quoted in Axel Berkofsky, ‘Japan Struggles over How Best to Keep the Peace’, Asia Times Online, November 29, 2001. 73. Maeda and Takahara, ‘Japan Must Avoid Treading Gulf War Path’. 74. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Asks Opposition to Cooperate in Helping U.S.’, Kyodo News, September 20, 2001. 75. Kanako Takahara, ‘Lining Up with U.S. a Bad Move: Use of Troops SelfDefeating for Japan, Aid Worker Says’, Japan Times, October 10, 2001. 76. Kyodo News, ‘Okinawa Civic Groups Urge U.S. to Refrain from Military Action’, Kyodo News, September 18, 2001. 77. Japan Times, ‘Buddhist Author Setouchi Condemns U.S.-led Attacks against Afghanistan’, Japan Times, October 24, 2001. 78. Ibid. 79. Even in mid-2007, Keiko Sakai, a specialist in Iraq studies, held to this view: ‘The attacks of September 11 were first and foremost a criminal matter. This was an issue for policemen to handle. There was nothing at stake here that needed to be treated as a state-on-state conflict.’ Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 80. Nobuo Asaumi, ‘Gulf War Mistake Must Not Be Repeated’, Daily Yomiuri, October 10, 2001. 81. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Aims to Boost Profile in Antiterrorism Drive’, Kyodo News, September 21, 2001. In 2001, Okazaki was an informal foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001. 82. Yukio Okamoto has made this point directly: ‘In its relationship with the United States, Japan has craved respect.’ Okamoto, ‘The Essential Alliance’, p. 64.

NOTES TO PAGES 42 –50

Chapter 2

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Showing the Flag

1. Kyodo News, ‘Ruling Coalition Leader Urges Dispatch of Aegis Destroyer’, Kyodo News, November 27, 2002. 2. Shoichi Koseki, The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, Westview Press, 1998, p. 79. 3. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, Norton, 1999, p. 369. 4. For one of many discussions of the ‘Ashida Amendment’ controversy, see Koseki, The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, pp. 192– 208. 5. Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 396. 6. Ibid., p. 398. 7. In Gavan McCormack’s phrasing, ‘Ever since the US imposed on Japan in 1946 its “peace constitution”, Japan’s leaders have been seeking ways to circumvent or revise it, to delete or neutralize Article 9.’ He also writes, ‘Despite a concerted campaign by conservative political parties, media groups, and bureaucrats, revision remained politically impossible. Popular Japanese commitment to the peace clause held firm.’ Gavan McCormack, ‘Japan’s Afghan Expedition’, Japan in the World, November 5, 2001. 8. Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 236. 9. McCormack, ‘Japan’s Afghan Expedition’. 10. Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 229. 11. Ibid., pp. 233– 238. 12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation’, undated. 13. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, p. 13. 14. For example, Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, p. 17. 15. Okamoto, ‘Across to the Indian Ocean’, pp. 19 – 20. 16. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Military Bases in Japan on Maximum Alert’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001. 17. Yomiuri Shinbun, September 21, 2001, p. E1. 18. Asahi Shinbun, September 21, 2001, pp. E1, E19; and Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Carrier Leaves Yokosuka with MSDF Escort’, Kyodo News, September 21, 2001. 19. See, for example, Yomiuri Shinbun, September 21, 2001, p. E23. 20. Richard Armitage, et al., ‘The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership’, INSS Special Report, National Defense University, October 11, 2000. 21. Ibid. 22. Mainichi Shinbun, ‘Armitage Says War-Renouncing Constitution Blocking Japan –U.S. Alliance’, Mainichi Daily News, July 22, 2004; and Mainichi Shinbun, July 22, 2004, p. E1. 23. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, ‘Conclusion: From Reaffirmation to Redefinition – An Agenda for the Future’, in Michael J. Green and Patrick

312

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

NOTES TO PAGES 50 –53 M. Cronin, eds, The U.S. Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1999, pp. 318– 320. Ibid., p. 319. Maeda and Takahara, ‘Japan Must Avoid Treading Gulf War Path’. Nobuo Asaumi, ‘Gulf War Mistake Must Not Be Repeated’. Junko Takahashi, ‘Japan Makes Pitch for Afghan Peace Role’, Japan Times, November 15, 2001. Yukio Okamoto’s description of Japanese policymaker’s feeling toward the Gulf War period include the phrases ‘old scars’, ‘bitter memories’, ‘sense of failure’, and ‘near-humiliation’. Okamoto, ‘The Essential Alliance’, p. 63. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage specifically requested ‘logistic support from the SDF’ in his September 15 conversation with Ambassador Shunji Yanai. Junko Takahashi, ‘Japan Makes Pitch for Afghan Peace Role’. See also, Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Sounds Out Japan on SDF’s Logistical Role in Strike’, Kyodo News, September 17, 2001. For a concurring view on how Japanese leaders interpreted Armitage’s comment, see Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, p. 11. Gaku Shibata, ‘Japan Perspective: Japanese Media Stuck Up the Flagpole’, Daily Yomiuri, October 30, 2001. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Vows to Send SDF to Support U.S. Military’, Kyodo News, September 19, 2001; Asahi Shinbun, September 20, 2001, p. 1; and Yomiuri Shinbun, September 20, 2001, p. 1. Tim Shorrock, ‘Japan’s Military Role Undergoes a Sea Change’, Asia Times Online, September 26, 2001. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Orders Studies into New Law for Assisting U.S.’, Kyodo News, September 17, 2001; and Asahi Shinbun, September 18, 2001, p. 2. Asahi Shinbun, October 1, 2001, pp. 1 – 2. Asahi Shinbun, October 16, 2001, p. 4. See also, Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism’, p. 24. Kyodo News, ‘Japanese Citizens Protest against Retaliation, SDF Dispatch’, Kyodo News, September 28, 2001. Kyodo News, ‘Hiroshima Peace Groups Urge U.S. to Seek Justice Not War’, Kyodo News, September 25, 2001. Other protests occurred in Tokyo. See Asahi Shinbun, September 24, 2001, p. 31; Asahi Shinbun, September 25, 2001, p. 30; Asahi Shinbun, September 29, 2001, p. 31, and subsequent issues. Asahi Shinbun, September 26, 2001, p. 1. In fact, Koizumi had been saying the same thing in public since the morning of September 12: Yomiuri Shinbun, September 12, 2001, p. E1. Kyodo News, ‘Bush Presents “High Noon” Poster to Koizumi’, Kyodo News, September 25, 2001. See also, Reiji Yoshida, ‘Koizumi – Bush Friendship One for the Ages’, Japan Times, June 29, 2006. Asahi Shinbun, October 1, 2001, p. 3. Asahi Shinbun, October 5, 2001, p. 4.

NOTES TO PAGES 54 –56

313

43. Asahi Shinbun, May 6, 2002, p. 2; Yoshitaka Sasaki, ‘Prod from Japan Raises Eyebrows in Tokyo’, International Herald Tribune – Asahi Shinbun, May 6, 2002; and Axel Berkofsky, ‘Japan Navy’s Salvo Catches Politicians Off Guard’, Asia Times Online, May 16, 2002. 44. Asahi Shinbun, September 26, 2001, p. 2; and Kyodo News, ‘Deliberation, Not Elation’. 45. Kyodo News, ‘Nonaka Raps Koizumi for Moving Japan in “Wrong Direction”’, Kyodo News, September 28, 2001; and Asahi Shinbun, September 29, 2001, p. 4. 46. Asahi Shinbun, May 6, 2002, p. 2; Yoshitaka Sasaki, ‘Prod from Japan Raises Eyebrows’; and Berkofsky, ‘Japan Navy’s Salvo Catches Politicians Off Guard’. 47. Kyodo News, ‘MSDF Ready for Orders to Support U.S. Retaliatory Attacks’, Kyodo News, September 18, 2001. 48. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, pp. 12 – 14. 49. Kyodo News, ‘Fukuda Says 1999 Law Can Not Be Applied for U.S. Retaliation’, Kyodo News, September 17, 2001. Just before September 11, Yukio Okamoto, a strong supporter of SDF deployments, put the matter more forcefully: ‘By no stretch of interpretation could the Persian Gulf region be considered part of the “areas surrounding Japan”.’ Okamoto, ‘Japan’s Response to War Overseas’, p. 16. 50. Tomohito Shinoda described the passage of this bill as being ‘incredibly quick’; Gavan McCormack described it as ‘almost perfunctory’. Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, University of Washington Press, 2007, p. 86; and McCormack, ‘Japan’s Afghan Expedition’. 51. Japan Times, ‘SDF Antiterrorism Bill Wins Quick Diet Passage’, Japan Times, October 30, 2001. The notion that it mattered for Japanese leaders to conspicuously show ‘feelings’ for the United States was a common one in conservative circles at that time. For example, conservative opposition lawmaker Seiji Maehara – who briefly led the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan in 2005 –2006 – stated in September 2001 that ‘the important thing is that Japan, as an ally, grieves with the US and takes specific actions to show that it will fight against terrorism together with the US’. Maeda and Takahara, ‘Japan Must Avoid Treading Gulf War Path’. 52. The real aim of sending this first mission seems to have been to get MSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean as quickly as possible while the formal mission plan was still being drawn up. Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘MSDF Flotilla Has Two Missions’, Daily Yomiuri, November 10, 2001. 53. Okamoto, ‘The Essential Alliance’, p. 59. At the same time the MSDF mission was being launched, ASDF C-130 transport planes also carried supplies for US military personnel to the Indian Ocean military base at Diego Garcia. Japan Times, ‘Cabinet Approves Plan for the Dispatch of SDF’, Japan Times, November 17, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘First Effort in “War on Terror” Sees Airlift of Winter Woolies’, Japan Times, November 30, 2001.

314

NOTES TO PAGES 56 –58

54. Hisahiko Okazaki, ‘Dispatch of MSDF Vessels Historic, But Only First Step’, Daily Yomiuri, November 26, 2001. 55. Japan Times, ‘MSDF Heads for Indian Ocean: Families, Protestors Gather’, Japan Times, November 10, 2001. 56. Japan Times, ‘SDF Antiterrorism Bill Wins Quick Diet Passage’. For more comments by Ambassador Baker, see Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Baker Eyes Japan Afghan Role’, Daily Yomiuri, January 18, 2002. 57. Axel Berkofsky, ‘Japan on the Defensive, Again’, Asia Times Online, March 28, 2002. 58. Ibid. 59. Former LDP Secretary-General Koichi Kato was of the view at this time that there was actually ‘no possibility’ that the MSDF fleet would be attacked in the Indian Ocean. Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Yamasaki’s Aegis Battle Lost to LDP “Pacifists”’, Daily Yomiuri, November 19, 2001. 60. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 136. 61. Axel Berkofsky, ‘Japan Starts to Fall in Line’, Asia Times Online, October 30, 2001; and Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, pp. 17– 18. 62. Kyodo News, ‘MSDF to Send 4 Ships to Indian Ocean’, Kyodo News, September 24, 2001; Kyodo News, ‘Japan Aegis Destroyer to Operate in Indian Ocean’, Kyodo News, September 26, 2001; and Yomiuri Shinbun, September 20, 2001, p. 1. 63. Asahi Shinbun, October 26, 2001, p. 4; and Asahi Shinbun, November 15, 2001, p. E1. 64. Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘U.S. Counting on Aegis Ship’, Daily Yomiuri, October 27, 2001. 65. Asahi Shinbun, October 29, 2001, p. 3. 66. Yomiuri Shinbun, November 9, 2001, p. 3. 67. There are varying accounts of the position that Taku Yamasaki took on the Aegis dispatch. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, pp. 18 – 20; Kyodo News, ‘Japan Suspends Dispatch of Aegis Destroyer’, Kyodo News, September 28, 2001; Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Yamasaki’s Aegis Battle Lost to LDP “Pacifists”’; Yomiuri Shinbun, September 28, 2001, p. 4; and Yomiuri Shinbun, September 29, 2001, p. 2. 68. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, p. 27. See also, Yomiuri Shinbun, October 26, 2001, p. 4; Yomiuri Shinbun, November 8, 2001, p. 4; and Yomiuri Shinbun, November 19, 2001, p. 4. 69. Asahi Shinbun, November 29, 2001, p. E2. Until mid-November, it appears that Nakatani was actually arguing that he had the authority to send the Aegis even without approval from the ruling parties. Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘LDP Dissenters Sink Aegis Plan’, Daily Yomiuri, November 17, 2001. 70. Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Yamasaki’s Aegis Battle Lost to LDP “Pacifists”’. 71. Kyodo News, ‘Japan’s Decision Not to Send Aegis Ship Disappointing: U.S.’, Kyodo News, November 19, 2001.

NOTES TO PAGES 58 – 63

315

72. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Envoy Baker Disappointed by Japan’s Failure to Send Aegis’, Kyodo News, December 3, 2001. 73. Asahi Shinbun, May 6, 2002, p. 1; Asahi Shinbun, ‘MSDF Lobbied for U.S. Aegis Request’, International Herald Tribune-Asahi Shinbun, May 6, 2002; and Berkofsky, ‘Japan Navy’s Salvo Catches Politicians Off Guard’. 74. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Asks Japan to Send Aegis Ship to Help Afghan War’, Kyodo News, April 29, 2002; Asahi Shinbun, April 30, 2002, p. E1. 75. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Unlikely to Send Aegis Ship to Afghanistan’, Kyodo News, May 1, 2002; Asahi Shinbun, May 2, 2002, p. E2. 76. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Seeking to Extend Duration of SDF Antiterrorism Support’, Kyodo News, March 1, 2002; and Kyodo News, ‘U.S. to Cut Arabian Sea Force, But Wants Japan to Keep Helping’, Kyodo News, April 8, 2002. 77. Kyodo News, ‘Japan, U.S. to Agree on Continued SDF Support’, Japan Times, April 16, 2002. 78. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Agency to Scale Down MSDF in Arabian Sea’, Kyodo News, April 10, 2002. 79. Kyodo News, ‘MSDF Orders Mission Extension Prior to Gov’t Move’, Kyodo News, April 10, 2002. 80. Asahi Shinbun, November 6, 2002, p. 3. 81. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Unlikely to Send Aegis Warships to Arabian Sea’, Kyodo News, November 11, 2002. 82. Asahi Shinbun, November 7, 2002, p. 3. 83. Asahi Shinbun, November 7, 2002, p. E1. 84. Asahi Shinbun, November 9, 2002, p. 4. 85. Kyodo News, ‘Ruling Coalition Leader Urges Dispatch of Aegis Destroyer’. 86. Yomiuri Shinbun, November 19, 2002, p. 3. 87. Asahi Shinbun, December 2, 2002, p. E2. 88. Kyodo News, ‘Upcoming Talks with U.S. Had Part in Aegis Decision: Yamasaki’, Kyodo News, November 27, 2002. 89. Associated Press, December 15, 2002. 90. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Defends Plan to Dispatch Aegis Ship’, Kyodo News, December 5, 2002. 91. John de Boer, ‘Interpreting the Decision to Dispatch the Aegis’, GLOCOM Weekly Review, No. 75, December 10, 2002. 92. Ibid. 93. Kyodo News, ‘Opposition Parties Slam Planned Aegis Ship Dispatch’, Kyodo News, December 9, 2002. 94. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Security Policy Likely to Stand at Crossroads’, Kyodo News, January 1, 2003. 95. Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 2002, p. 1. 96. For some degree of confirmation of this assertion, see Tetsuo Ukai, ‘Japan Perspective: Writers Look Beyond Sept. 11’, Daily Yomiuri, January 22, 2002. 97. For more on the early DPJ position, see Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, pp. 25 – 27; and Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, pp. 96 – 98.

316

NOTES TO PAGES 64 –70

98. Kyodo News, ‘Hatoyama Says SDF Dispatch Does Not Violate Constitution’, Kyodo News, November 12, 2001. 99. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ Punishes 28 Members for Not Voting for SDF Dispatch’, Kyodo News, December 4, 2001. 100. Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism’, pp. 27 –28. 101. Asahi Shinbun, December 1, 2001, p. 2; and Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Govt SDF Dispatch Plan Criticized as Too Vague’, Daily Yomiuri, November 24, 2001. 102. Asahi Shinbun, November 20, 2002, p. 2. 103. Paul Midford put it this way: ‘Koizumi, with his phenomenal popularity and political skills, has been better positioned than almost any other politician in the postwar era to ignore public opinion.’ Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism’, p. 39. Christopher Hughes concurred: ‘The relative speed and decisiveness of the SDF dispatch was also facilitated by Koizumi’s own popular standing as Prime Minister.’ Hughes, ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror’, p. 32. See also, Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, pp. 82 – 86. 104. For a typical Yomiuri Shinbun attack on the DPJ in this period, consult, Yomiuri Shinbun, October 5, 2001, p. 3.

Chapter 3 Boots on the Ground 1. Asahi Shinbun, November 29, 2001, p. 4. 2. Kiyohisa Yoshida, ‘Nakatani Seeks Prior Notice If U.S. to Expand Antiterror War’, Daily Yomiuri, December 12, 2001. 3. George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, January 29, 2002. 4. Mainichi Shinbun, June 9, 2002, p. 1. 5. Kyodo News, ‘Baker Asks Japan to Call on Iraq to Accept UN Inspections’, Kyodo News, April 25, 2002. 6. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Station SDF Officials at U.S. Central Command’, Kyodo News, July 24, 2002. 7. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Vows to Work with Japan in Antiterror Military Operation’, Kyodo News, August 5, 2002. 8. Kyodo News, ‘Ex-Premiers Advise Koizumi on Role in Possible U.S.– Iraq War’, Kyodo News, August 9, 2002. 9. Kyodo News, ‘Fukuda Says U.S. Attack on Iraq Not Impending’, Kyodo News, August 26, 2002. 10. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ to Ask Koizumi to Call for U.S. Restraint on Iraq’, Kyodo News, August 29, 2002. 11. Asahi Shinbun, August 29, 2002, p. 2. 12. Asahi Shinbun, August 29, 2002, p. 2; and Yomiuri Shinbun, August 28, 2002, pp. 1, 3. 13. Asahi Shinbun, September 6, 2002, p. 4. 14. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi in N.Y., Urges Iraq to Accept U.N. Inspectors’, Kyodo News, September 10, 2002.

NOTES TO PAGES 70 –75

317

15. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Can Give Support If Attack on Iraq is Backed by U.N.’, Kyodo News, September 11, 2002. 16. Asahi Shinbun, September 9, 2002, p. E1. 17. Ibid. 18. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Expects Japan to Expand Refueling Operation’, Kyodo News, September 26, 2002. 19. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Won’t Expand SDF Support for Antiterror Campaign’, Kyodo News, November 1, 2002. 20. Asahi Shinbun, February 20, 2002, p. 2. 21. CNN, ‘Koizumi Commits to Reforms’, CNN.com, February 15, 2002. 22. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Skirts Question on Japan’s Stance If U.S. Attacks Iraq’, Kyodo News, November 6, 2002. 23. Kyodo News, ‘LDP’s Kono Demands Kawaguchi Quit for Dodging Iraq Questions’, Kyodo News, November 27, 2002; and Asahi Shinbun, November 28, 2002, p. 4. Calls within the ruling party for the ‘lightweight’ Foreign Minister Kawaguchi to be dismissed over the issue of Iraq continued into 2003. See, Yomiuri Shinbun, February 22, 2003, p. 4. 24. Yomiuri Shinbun, November 21, 2002, p. E1. 25. Kyodo News, ‘Dispatch of SDF to Post-Saddam Iraq Considered’, Kyodo News, December 6, 2002; and Asahi Shinbun, December 6, 2002, p. E1. At this same time, the Cabinet Office ordered the Foreign Ministry to begin preparing the necessary legislation. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 128. 26. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Mulling Support Steps to Rebuild Iraq: Koizumi’, Kyodo News, December 10, 2002. 27. Takeshi Uemura, ‘Tempers Flare at Meeting with Armitage’, Daily Yomiuri, September 4, 2002. 28. Ibid. 29. Kyodo News, ‘Komeito Calls for New U.N. Motion before U.S. Attack on Iraq’, Kyodo News, January 5, 2003. 30. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Welcomes Bush Speech, Comments on Iraq, N. Korea’, Kyodo News, January 29, 2003. 31. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Calls U.S. to Consider Int’l Opinions over Iraq’, Kyodo News, January 24, 2003. 32. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Steps Up Calls on Iraq to Clear Weapons Suspicions’, Kyodo News, January 28, 2003. See also Foreign Minister Kawaguchi’s direct appeals to Iraqi envoys. Yomiuri Shinbun, September 16, 2002, p. 2; and Asahi Shinbun, January 30, 2003, p. 4. 33. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Watch Talks at U.N. Security Council over Iraq’, Kyodo News, February 1, 2003. 34. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Calls U.S. to Consider’. 35. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Culpable for War If Unable to Stop U.S. Attacking Iraq’, Kyodo News, January 24, 2003. 36. Colin Powell, ‘Remarks to the United Nations Security Council’, New York City, February 5, 2003.

318

NOTES TO PAGES 76 –81

37. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Sees Need for New Resolution over War with Iraq’, Kyodo News, February 6, 2003; and Kyodo News, ‘Military Attack Unavoidable Unless Iraq Cooperates: Kawaguchi’, Kyodo News, February 9, 2003. 38. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Says It Believes U.S. Rather than Iraq’, Kyodo News, February 7, 2003; and Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Sees Need for New Resolution’. 39. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Should Play Diplomatic Role in Iraqi Issue: Ogata’, Kyodo News, February 7, 2003. 40. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Sees Need for New Resolution’. 41. Kyodo News, ‘Iraq Attack Possible Without New U.N. Resolution: Koizumi’, Kyodo News, February 7, 2003. 42. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ Opposes Attack on Iraq without New U.N. Resolution’, Kyodo News, February 13, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, February 14, 2003, p. 4. 43. Yomiuri Shinbun, February 22, 2003, p. 4. 44. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Says Antiwar Protestors Send Wrong Message to Iraq’, Kyodo News, February 17, 2003. 45. Kyodo News, ‘Too Soon for Japan to Decide on War with Iraq: Kawaguchi’, Kyodo News, February 23, 2003. 46. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Set to Discuss Iraq Issue with Powell’, Kyodo News, February 21, 2003. 47. Kyodo News, ‘Powell Asks Japan to Persuade France on Iraq Resolution’, Kyodo News, February 24, 2003. 48. Kyodo News, ‘Powell Told Japan that Iraq Strike Possible after March 10’, Kyodo News, March 11, 2003. 49. Kyodo News, ‘Envoy Komura to Ask for Peaceful Resolution to Iraq Issues’, Kyodo News, February 27, 2003. 50. Kyodo News, ‘Abe Criticizes France for Advocating Longer Iraq Inspections’, Kyodo News, March 1, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, March 2, 2003, p. 3. 51. Kyodo News, ‘Opposition Frustrated at Koizumi’s Vagueness over Iraq’, Kyodo News, March 13, 2003. 52. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Wait and See Outcome of UNSC Talks on Iraq’, Kyodo News, March 14, 2003. 53. Ibid. 54. Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Interview on the Issue of Iraq’, Kantei website, March 18, 2003. 55. Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq’, Kantei website, March 20, 2003. 56. Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 2002, p. 1; and Asahi Shinbun, January 27, 2003, p. 3. 57. Asahi Shinbun, February 16, 2003, p. 35; Asahi Shinbun, February 20, 2003, p. 33. 58. Kyodo News, ‘Citizens, Local Gov’ts Protest at Imminent War on Iraq’, Kyodo News, March 19, 2003. 59. Asahi Shinbun, March 25, 2003, p. 4.

NOTES TO PAGES 81 –85

319

60. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 126. 61. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Asks Japan to Send SDF to Keep Order in Postwar Iraq’, Kyodo News, March 23, 2003. 62. Kyodo News, ‘Net Poll Shows Split Opinions over Saddam Collapse’, Kyodo News, April 11, 2003. 63. Kyodo News, ‘80% of Japanese Want U.N. Central Role in Iraq’, Kyodo News, April 12, 2003. 64. Kyodo News, ‘Shiokawa Wants U.N. to Play a Major Role in Iraq Reconstruction’, Kyodo News, April 11, 2003. 65. Asahi Shinbun, April 11, 2003, p. E2. 66. Kyodo News, ‘Kawaguchi, Powell Fail to Agree on U.N. Role in Postwar Iraq’, Kyodo News, April 4, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, April 5, 2003, p. 2. 67. Kyodo News, ‘Kan, Ozawa See Legal Problem Sending Officials to ORHA’, Kyodo News, April 14, 2003. 68. Kyodo News, ‘Kawaguchi, Powell Agree to Cooperate in Iraq Rehabilitation’, Kyodo News, April 15, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, April 16, 2003, p. 4. 69. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Send Civilians to ORHA in Iraq’, Kyodo News, April 18, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, April 18, 2003, p. 3. 70. Kyodo News, ‘Yamasaki Calls for Swift Dispatch of Civilian Officials to ORHA’, Kyodo News, April 18, 2003. 71. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ’s Okada Says Civilian Dispatch to ORHA Acceptable’, Kyodo News, April 17, 2003. 72. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 128. 73. Kyodo News, ‘Move to Dispatch SDF to Iraq Stalled’, Kyodo News, April 25, 2003. 74. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Hopes Japan Would Send Minesweepers to Persian Gulf’, Kyodo News, April 3, 2003. 75. Kyodo News, ‘Move to Dispatch SDF to Iraq Stalled’. 76. Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, p. 117. 77. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t Undecided about Bill on Sending SDF to Iraq’, Kyodo News, May 21, 2003. 78. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi to Move Next Week for SDF Dispatch to Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 5, 2003. 79. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 128; Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, p. 118. 80. Kyodo News, ‘Wolfowitz Expects Japan’s Dispatch of SDF to Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 2, 2003; Kyodo News, ‘Wolfowitz to Welcome SDF Support in Rebuilding Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 3, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, June 4, 2003, p. 2. 81. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t to Submit Bill for SDF Dispatch to Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 7, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, June 8, 2003, p. 1. 82. Richard Armitage, ‘Armitage Calls for Multilateral Pressure on North Korea’, Remarks at Tokyo Press Roundtable, June 9, 2003. 83. Ibid.

320

NOTES TO PAGES 85 –89

84. It is not clear whether or not Armitage himself was originally responsible for using the slogan ‘boots on the ground’ in this context. According to the Asahi Shinbun, this language was emanating from the Pentagon as early as April 2003. Asahi Shinbun, June 8, 2003, p. 4. 85. Kyodo News, ‘50% Support Koizumi Cabinet, Sending SDF to Rebuild Iraq: Poll’, Kyodo News, June 15, 2003. 86. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ Opposes SDF Dispatch to Iraq on Security Concerns’, Kyodo News, July 1, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, July 1, 2003, pp. 1, 4. 87. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Welcomes Passage of Bill to Send SDF to Iraq’, Kyodo News, July 25, 2003. 88. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Dissatisfied with Japan’s Planned SDF Missions in Iraq’, Kyodo News, July 4, 2003. 89. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Unable to Name Noncombat Zones in Iraq’, Kyodo News, July 23, 2003; Asahi Shinbun, July 24, 2003, p. 4; and Yomiuri Shinbun, July 24, 2003, p. 4. 90. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Deems Sending SDF to Iraqi City of Balad Too Risky’, Kyodo News, July 17, 2003; Yomiuri Shinbun, July 17, 2003, p. E2; and Asahi Shinbun, July 26, 2003, p. 14. 91. Kyodo News, ‘Kurdish Leaders Request SDF Help in Northern Iraq’, Kyodo News, July 30, 2003. 92. Asahi Shinbun, August 20, 2003, p. 2. 93. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Condemns Fatal Bombing of U.N. Office in Baghdad’, Kyodo News, August 20, 2003. 94. Kyodo News, ‘Armitage Urged Japan to Dispatch SDF to Iraq Soon’, Kyodo News, August 31, 2003. 95. George W. Bush, ‘President Addresses the Nation’, September 7, 2003. 96. Japan Times, ‘Nasiriya, Samawa Cities Eyed for Troop Dispatch’, Japan Times, October 13, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, October 13, 2003, p. 1. 97. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Calls on U.S. to Place More Emphasis on U.N.’, Kyodo News, October 18, 2003. 98. Kanako Takahara and Hiroko Nakata, ‘Koizumi’s Iraq Pledge Wins Thanks from Bush’, Japan Times, October 18, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, October 18, 2003, p. 1. 99. Kyodo News, ‘Some Voters Want More Debate on Iraq during Campaign’, Kyodo News, November 1, 2003. 100. Junko Takahashi, ‘Vote Validates SDF’s Iraq Dispatch: Koizumi’, Japan Times, November 11, 2003. 101. Japan Times, ‘Fukuda Says SDF Will Head to Iraq Before the End of the Year’, Japan Times, November 13, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, November 12, 2003, p. E1. 102. Junko Takahashi, ‘State Flip-Flops Yet Again on SDF Dispatch’, Japan Times, November 14, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, November 13, 2003, p. E1. 103. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Not Bound to Dispatch SDF to Iraq by Year-End’, Kyodo News, November 21, 2003.

NOTES TO PAGES 89 –95

321

104. Kanako Takahara and Junko Takahashi, ‘Rumsfeld Gets the Hint: No SDF Dispatch This Year’, Japan Times, November 15, 2003. 105. Yomiuri Shinbun, November 15, 2003, p. 3. 106. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Condemns Istanbul, Baghdad Blasts, Defends War on Iraq’, Kyodo News, November 21, 2003; Kyodo News, ‘LDP Growing Concerned about Sending SDF to Iraq’, Kyodo News, November 19, 2003. 107. Nao Shimoyachi and Kanako Takahara, ‘Ishiba Reassures Rumsfeld over SDF Commitment to Iraq’, Japan Times, November 16, 2003. 108. Asahi Shinbun, November 29, 2003, p. 4. 109. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Koizumi Again Vows Iraq Dispatch’, Japan Times, November 26, 2003. 110. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘South Iraq Safe Enough for SDF Troops: Ishiba’, Japan Times, November 29, 2003. 111. Kyodo News, ‘2 Japan Diplomats Killed in Iraq, But No Policy Change’, Kyodo News, November 30, 2003; Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Vows to Explain Policy on Iraq, Defends Bank Bailout’, Kyodo News, December 2, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, December 1, 2003, p. 1. 112. Kyodo News, ‘2 Japan Diplomats Killed in Iraq’. 113. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Expects Japan to Send SDF to Iraq Despite Slaying’, Kyodo News, December 1, 2003. 114. Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi: The Basic Plan Regarding the Measures based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq’, December 9, 2003. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid. 117. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Speech on SDF Dispatch Ineffective: Miyazawa’, Kyodo News, December 14, 2003. 118. Ibid. 119. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi’s Constitution Quote Stirs Criticism of Manipulation’, Kyodo News, December 10, 2003. 120. Kyodo News, ‘Thousands Protest Planned SDF Dispatch to Iraq’, Kyodo News, December 14, 2003. 121. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Welcomes Approval of SDF Dispatch’, Japan Times, December 11, 2003. 122. Junko Takahashi and Reiji Yoshida, ‘Japan Pleased But Still Wary of Security Situation’, Japan Times, December 16, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, December 15, 2003, p. E1. 123. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Addresses ASDF Prior to Dispatch to Iraq’, Kyodo News, December 24, 2003. 124. Powell, ‘Remarks to the United Nations Security Council’. 125. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 118. 126. Kyodo News, ‘Japan’s SDF Could Handle WMDs in Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 9, 2003.

322

NOTES TO PAGES 95 –100

127. Kyodo News, ‘SDF May Handle Abandoned WMD Depending on U.N. Resolution: Abe’, Kyodo News, June 15, 2003. 128. Kyodo News, ‘WMD Will Be Found in Iraq Sooner or Later: Koizumi’, Kyodo News, June 11, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, June 12, 2003, p. 3. 129. Kyodo News, ‘WMD Will Be Found in Iraq Sooner or Later’. 130. Armitage, ‘Armitage Calls for Multilateral Pressure on North Korea’. 131. CNN, ‘Kay: No Evidence Iraq Stockpiled WMDs’, CNN.com, January 26, 2004. 132. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Fukuda Refuses to Budge on WMD’, Japan Times, January 30, 2004. 133. Reiji Yoshida, ‘WMD Revelation Has Japan Scrambling for New Excuses’, Japan Times, October 9, 2004. 134. Yoshida, ‘Fukuda Refuses to Budge on WMD’. 135. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Hosoda Defends War in Iraq’, Japan Times, October 8, 2004. 136. Tetsushi Kajimoto, ‘No Apologies for Iraq War – Baghdad Deserved It: Koizumi’, Japan Times, October 14, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, October 14, 2004, p. 2. 137. In fact, the Japanese public never believed that the invasion of Iraq would reduce the global threat of weapons of mass destruction in the first place. See Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism’, p. 42. 138. Kyodo News, ‘Armitage Praises SDF Dispatch to Iraq’, Kyodo News, February 2, 2004. 139. Kyodo News, ‘Majority of Japanese against Sending SDF Troops to Iraq: Kyodo Poll’, Kyodo News, January 18, 2004. 140. Kyodo News, ‘Thousands Rally in Tokyo against Troop Dispatch to Iraq’, Kyodo News, January 25, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, January 26, 2004, p. 34. 141. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Urges Teachers to Win Student Support for SDF Dispatch’, Kyodo News, February 2, 2004. 142. Asahi Shinbun, April 9, 2004, pp. 1 –2. 143. Tetsushi Kajimoto, ‘Opposition Blames Dispatch for Crisis’, Japan Times, April 10, 2004. 144. Asahi Shinbun, April 9, 2004, p. 2. 145. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Koizumi Says No to Hostage-Takers’, Japan Times, April 10, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, April 9, 2004, p. E1. 146. Ibid. 147. Asahi Shinbun, April 11, 2004, pp. 1, 39. 148. Japan Times, ‘Abductees’ Kin Want SDF Out Immediately’, Japan Times, April 10, 2004. 149. Mainichi Shinbun, April 13, 2004, p. 1; Asahi Shinbun, April 10, 2004, pp. 1, 39; and Asahi Shinbun, April 13, 2004, p. 2. 150. Ibid. 151. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Acquaintances of Hostages Express Shock at Abductions’, Japan Times, April 10, 2004.

NOTES TO PAGES 100 –107

323

152. Japan Times, ‘Kin of Hostages Tormented by Info Vacuum’, Japan Times, April 13, 2004. 153. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Families Caught in Cross Fire over Iraq Hostage Ordeal’, Japan Times, April 15, 2004. 154. Kyodo News, ‘Cheney Asks Japan to Continue Efforts in Iraq Despite Threats’, Kyodo News, April 13, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, April 13, 2004, p. 4. 155. A similar assessment is found in David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006, p. 175. 156. Asahi Shinbun, April 17, 2004, p. 1. 157. Asahi Shinbun, April 16, 2004, p. 3. 158. Asahi Shinbun, April 16, 2004, p. E1. 159. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Koizumi Can’t Believe Pair Want to Go Back’, Japan Times, April 17, 2004; Asahi Shinbun, April 16, 2004, p. E3; and Yomiuri Shinbun, April 16, 2004, p. E1. 160. Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Freed from Captivity in Iraq, Japanese Return to More Pain’, New York Times, April 23, 2004. 161. Kyodo News, ‘Fukuda Says Ex-Hostages Failed to Fully Consider Situation’, Kyodo News, April 21, 2004. 162. Mainichi Shinbun, April 17, 2004, p. 5. 163. Kyodo News, ‘Fukuda Chides LDP Lawmaker for Remarks on Ex-Hostages’, Kyodo News, April 27, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, April 27, 2004, p. 34. 164. Kyodo News, ‘Over 60 NGOs Jointly Urge “Gov’t” to Stop “Bashing” Hostage Victims’, Kyodo News, April 26, 2004. 165. Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Freed from Captivity in Iraq, Japanese Return to More Pain’. 166. Koizumi’s power is the main point of Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 2007. See also, Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, pp. 82 –86. 167. Sayuri Daimon, ‘Hashimoto Urges Koizumi to Diversify Diplomacy’, Japan Times, January 1, 2004. 168. Takuya Asakura and Junko Takahashi, ‘Opinions Clash over SDF Role in War on Terror’, Japan Times, October 17, 2001. 169. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Could Support War in Iraq But Not in N. Korea’, Kyodo News, February 28, 2003. 170. Makiko Tanaka, ‘Silent Diplomacy Serves Japan Poorly’, Japan Times, March 5, 2003. 171. Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 172. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, December 25, 2003, pp. 1, 8. 173. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 126. 174. Ibid., pp. 3, 118–119. 175. Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, Verso, 2007, p. 5. McCormack also describes Koizumi as an uncritical follower of George W. Bush.

324

NOTES TO PAGES 107 –112

176. Specifically, the Persian Gulf War factor was addressed in Chapter Two, ‘The Alliance Opportunity’, and Chapter Three, ‘The Constitution and the SelfDefense Forces’ and ‘From Within and Without’. 177. Keiko Sakai, ‘Japan–Iraq Relations: The Perception Gap and Its Influence on Diplomatic Policies’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4, Fall 2001, p. 128. 178. Kanako Takahara, ‘Japan Backs Revised U.N. Resolution against Iraq’, Japan Times, March 9, 2003. 179. Kyodo News, ‘LDP Official Raps Opposition to U.S.-led War as “Odd”’, Kyodo News, March 16, 2003. 180. Kyodo News, ‘Criticism of Japan’s Iraq Policy Erupts among LDP Lawmakers’, Kyodo News, February 14, 2003. 181. Seiji Maehara, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Japan Chair Forum, February 25, 2003. 182. Yomiuri Shinbun, March 14, 2003, p. 3. 183. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Ready to Become U.N. Security Council Member’, Kyodo News, April 14, 2003. 184. In September 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered his opinion that the invasion of Iraq was ‘illegal’ according to the Charter of the United Nations. See, among other sources, Ewan MacAskill and Julian Borger, ‘Iraq War was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan’, The Guardian, September 16, 2004. 185. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Seeks Permanent UNSC Seat Due to Iraq Troop Deployment’, Kyodo News, July 6, 2003. 186. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Ready to Become U.N. Security Council Member’. 187. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Envoy Urges World to Make Japan Permanent UNSC Member’, Kyodo News, June 30, 2003. 188. Mainichi Shinbun, ‘Washington Squeezes Japan on Iraq Invasion’, Mainichi Daily News, September 8, 2002. 189. One unremarked irony is that the American neoconservative desire to weaken the United Nations was itself a violation of Article One of the 1960 US – Japan security treaty: ‘The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.’ 190. Armitage, et al., ‘The United States and Japan’. 191. Mainichi Daily News, ‘Armitage Says War-Renouncing Constitution Blocking Japan – U.S. Alliance’, Mainichi Daily News, July 22, 2004. 192. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Must Examine Article 9 in Quest for UNSC Seat: Powell’, Kyodo News, August 12, 2004. 193. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, October 16, 2002, p. 7. 194. Japan Times, ‘Business Chiefs Welcome SDF Dispatch’, Japan Times, December 11, 2003. 195. Asahi Shinbun, December 10, 2003, p. E3. 196. Stratfor, ‘Japan in Iraq: Deploying Troops, Greasing Hands and Seeking Oil’, Stratfor, January 26, 2004. 197. Ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 112 –119

325

198. See, for example, Kazuo Takahashi, ‘Not the Most Popular Decision, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force Goes to Iraq’, Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University, Working Paper Series No. 19, April 2007. 199. The Iraq specialist Keiko Sakai concurs with this view: ‘Business circles in Japan were positively in favour of supporting US policy on Iraq. They were concerned that if Japan didn’t support American policies, then they would be frozen out of business contracts in the post-war rebuilding phase.’ Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 200. Pyle, Japan Rising, pp. 49– 55. 201. Ibid., p. 51. 202. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 126. 203. Gavan McCormack shares this assessment. Note his discussion of Japanese leaders demonstrating a ‘neglect of any concern for the shared fate of humanity’. McCormack, Client State, pp. 200– 204.

Chapter 4

Beyond the Limits

1. McCormack, Client State, p. 89. 2. For Addington and Yoo, see Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals, Doubleday Publishing Group, 2008; and David Cole, Justice at War: The Men and Ideas that Shaped America’s War on Terror, New York Review of Books, 2008. 3. Asahi Shinbun, January 13, 2004, p. 3. 4. Asahi Shinbun, January 10, 2004, p. 2. 5. Kyodo News, ‘Arab League Critical of Japanese, Other Foreign Troops in Iraq’, Kyodo News, January 22, 2004. 6. Asahi Shinbun, December 10, 2003, p. 2. 7. Ibid. 8. Asahi Shinbun, June 30, 2005, p. E3; and Michael Penn, ‘The SDF in Iraq’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 49, July 29, 2005. 9. Asahi Shinbun, November 27, 2004, p. E3; and Asahi Shinbun, January 13, 2005, pp. 1–2. 10. Asahi Shinbun, April 8, 2004, p. E1; and Japan Times, ‘Shells Land Near GSDF Camp in Samawah’, Japan Times, April 9, 2004. 11. Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 12. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Media Urged to Show Restraint in Reporting on SDF Mission Specifics’, Japan Times, January 10, 2004. 13. Bennett Richardson, ‘Japan’s Iraq Deployment Gets Little Airtime at Home’, Christian Science Monitor, January 20, 2004. 14. Michael Penn, ‘Media Battled Defense Officials for News on Iraq’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 410, October 18, 2006. 15. Kyodo News, ‘GSDF’s Return from Iraq Leaves Challenges for Media on Coverage’, Kyodo News, July 28, 2006.

326

NOTES TO PAGES 119 –123

16. Most of the Japanese people opposed GSDF participation in the multinational force, and Koizumi himself acknowledged that the measure was unpopular. See Asahi Shinbun, June 23, 2004, p. 4. 17. Japan Times, ‘Editorial: SDF’s New Role Raises Questions’, Japan Times, June 19, 2004. 18. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Still Sees Samawah as “Non-Combat” Zone’, Kyodo News, May 17, 2004. 19. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Believes in “Non-Combat” Zone Despite Emergency in Iraq’, Kyodo News, November 15, 2004. 20. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Aid Agency to Stay Away from Iraq at this Point: Ogata’, Kyodo News, May 26, 2004. 21. Kyodo News, ‘Hosoda Defends Koizumi’s Lack of “Noncombat Zone” Explanation’, Kyodo News, November 11, 2004. 22. Kyodo News, ‘1st Hostage Victim in Iraq Weighs on Pro-U.S. Koizumi’, Kyodo News, October 31, 2004. 23. Asahi Shinbun, December 7, 2004, p. 4. 24. Kanako Takahara, ‘Extended Iraq Tour a Given from the Get-Go’, Japan Times, December 10, 2004. 25. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Voices Support for U.S. Assault on Fallujah’, Kyodo News, November 9, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, November 10, 2004, p. 4. 26. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ’s Okada Urges Koizumi to Explain Any SDF Iraq Mission Extension’, Kyodo News, November 27, 2004. 27. Asahi Shinbun, December 6, 2004, p. 3. 28. Asahi Shinbun, December 5, 2004, p. 3; and Japan Times, ‘5 1/2 Hours in Iraq Convinces Ono Area Stable, SDF Needed’, Japan Times, December 7, 2004. 29. Asahi Shinbun, December 10, 2004, p. 4. 30. Kyodo News, ‘Opposition Parties, LDP Heavyweights Blast SDF Mission Extension’, Kyodo News, December 9, 2004. 31. Asahi Shinbun, December 21, 2004, p. 1. 32. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Vague on When to End Troops’ Extended Troop Mission’, Kyodo News, December 9, 2004. 33. Japan Times, ‘44% of University Students Fail to Find Iraq on Map’, Japan Times, February 23, 2005. 34. Asahi Shinbun, March 20, 2005, p. 37; and Mainichi Shinbun, March 20, 2005, p. 30. 35. Asahi Shinbun, June 24, 2005, pp. 1, 38; Reiji Yoshida, ‘GSDF Vehicle Windshield Damaged in Iraq Blast’, Japan Times, June 24, 2005; and Kanako Takahara, ‘Explosion Scare Cranks Up GSDF Security Concerns’, Japan Times, June 25, 2005. 36. Japan Times, ‘GSDF Lying Low after Convoy Attack’, Japan Times, June 29, 2005. 37. Japan Times, ‘Japan to Pull Troops from Iraq by Dec. 14’, Japan Times, May 5, 2005; and Michael Penn, ‘Deteriorating Security in Samawa’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 33, July 7, 2005.

NOTES TO PAGES 123 –128

327

38. Japan Times, ‘U.S. Urges Longer GSDF Role in Iraq’, Japan Times, May 5, 2005. 39. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Willing to Keep Troops in Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 29, 2005. 40. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Set to Extend Troops’ Iraq Mission, Pull Out by Summer’, Kyodo News, September 9, 2005; and Asahi Shinbun, September 30, 2005, p. 2. 41. Kyodo News, ‘Japanese Gov’t Sees Security in Samawah Worsening’, Kyodo News, July 7, 2005; and Japan Times, ‘Samawah Security Deteriorating: Tokyo’, Japan Times, July 8, 2005. 42. Associated Press, ‘Hundreds Stage Anti-Japanese Protest, Demand Japan Remove Troops from Samawah’, Associated Press, July 26, 2005; and Michael Penn, ‘Samawa Protests Escalating’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 60, August 12, 2005. 43. Mainichi Shinbun, August 4, 2005, p. 3; and Michael Penn, ‘Samawa Protests Escalating’. 44. Kyodo News, ‘Iraq Asks Japan to Extend SDF Mission Beyond Mid-Dec’, Kyodo News, September 14, 2005; and Asahi Shinbun, September 15, 2005, p. 2. 45. Kyodo News, ‘Iraqi Minister Reiterates Call for Continued Japanese SDF Deployment’, Kyodo News, November 24, 2005; Kanako Takahara, ‘Zebari Urges Extension of GSDF Deployment’, Japan Times, November 25, 2005; Asahi Shinbun, November 25, 2005, p. 4; and Michael Penn, ‘Iraqi Politicians Provide Cover for Koizumi on Samawa Mission’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 128, November 27, 2005. 46. Japan Times, ‘Iraqi Minister Seeks Continued SDF Deployment’, Japan Times, October 25, 2005. 47. Michael Penn, ‘GSDF Mission in Samawa to be Extended’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 44, July 23, 2005. 48. Japan Times, ‘Government Denies Reaching Decision on GSDF Pullout’, Japan Times, November 12, 2005. 49. Asahi Shinbun, December 9, 2005, p. 1. 50. Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Statement by Prime Minister Koizumi (Extension of the Basic Plan of the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq’, Kantei website, December 8, 2005. 51. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Asks Japan to Move GSDF from Samawah for New Project in Iraq’, Kyodo News, November 19, 2005. 52. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. May Ask Japan to Perform New Iraq Duties, Maybe in Another Area’, Kyodo News, December 6, 2005; and Asahi Shinbun, December 7, 2005, p. E2. 53. Kyodo News, ‘Rumsfeld Asked Japan to Use SDF for Security Work in Iraq’, Kyodo News, January 30, 2006. 54. George W. Bush, ‘President Discusses Iraqi Elections, Victory in the War on Terror’, December 14, 2005.

328

NOTES TO PAGES 128 –132

55. Reiji Yoshida, ‘War Hussein’s Fault: Koizumi’, Japan Times, December 16, 2005. 56. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Defends Anew Support for U.S.-led Iraq Invasion’, Kyodo News, December 15, 2005. 57. Asahi Shinbun, November 11, 2005, p. 1; and Reiji Yoshida, ‘So Far So Good for Koizumi’s Gamble’, Japan Times, June 21, 2006. 58. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Says to Carefully Decide When to Pull SDF Out of Iraq’, Kyodo News, February 16, 2006. 59. Japan Times, ‘Ground Troops to Pull Out of Iraq by the End of May’, Japan Times, January 31, 2006. 60. Kyodo News, ‘British Play on Iraq War Draws Lukewarm Response in Japan’, Kyodo News, February 16, 2006. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Japan Times, ‘U.S. Wants Japanese Civilians in Iraq after SDF Exit’, Japan Times, January 31, 2006. 64. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Mulls Sending Aid Workers to Iraq after Pulling Ground Troops’, Kyodo News, March 28, 2006. 65. Asahi Shinbun, April 6, 2006, p. 4; Asahi Shinbun, April 27, 2006, p. 2; and Kyodo News, ‘Japan Resolves to Unilaterally Withdraw Troops from Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 22, 2006. 66. Associated Press, ‘Japan May Keep Its Troops in Iraq Longer’, Associated Press, June 14, 2006. 67. Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan on the Redeployment of Ground Self-Defense Force Troops from Samawah’, Kantei website, June 20, 2006; Asahi Shinbun, June 20, 2006, p. E1; and Asahi Shinbun, June 21, 2006, p. 4. 68. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Praises Japan’s Decision on Iraq as Positive Step’, Kyodo News, June 20, 2006; and Asahi Shinbun, June 21, 2006, p. E3. 69. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Resolves to Unilaterally Withdraw Troops from Iraq’. 70. Asahi Shinbun, June 27, 2006, p. 38; and Reiji Yoshida, ‘Troops Hurt in Iraq when Vehicle Flips’, Japan Times, June 27, 2006. 71. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Asked Iraqi Officials to Write Letter Thanking for Aid Mission’, Kyodo News, July 15, 2006. 72. Asahi Shinbun, July 16, 2006, p. 34. 73. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Resolves to Unilaterally Withdraw Troops from Iraq’. 74. Japan Times, ‘Japan Asked to Continue Iraq Airlift’, Japan Times, October 22, 2005. 75. Kyodo News, ‘Opposition Expresses Concern over Expanding Airlifting around Iraq’, Kyodo News, June 20, 2006. 76. Ibid. 77. Asahi Shinbun, December 18, 2008, p. 3; and Michael Penn, ‘ASDF Planes Leave, But Controversy Remains’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1225, December 19, 2008.

NOTES TO PAGES 133 –137 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

329

Asahi Shinbun, July 29, 2006, p. 4. Ibid. Japan Times, ‘Change Set for Iraq Deployment’, Japan Times, August 5, 2006. Asahi Shinbun, May 18, 2006, p. 2; and Reiji Yoshida, ‘Annan Asks Koizumi to Give Air Support to U.N. in Iraq’, Japan Times, May 18, 2006. Japan Times, ‘ASDF’s Duties for U.N. in Iraq Set’, Japan Times, August 30, 2006. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Stick to Iraq Policy, U.S. Realignment Plan: Spokesman’, Kyodo News, November 9, 2006. Kyodo News, ‘Republican Setback Not to Affect Japan’s Support for Iraq: Abe’, Kyodo News, November 8, 2006; and Asahi Shinbun, November 9, 2006, p. 2. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Chief Questions Japan’s Support for U.S.-Led Wars’, Kyodo News, December 7, 2006; and Asahi Shinbun, December 8, 2006, p. 3. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Chief Retracts Remark on Koizumi’s Support for Iraq War’, Kyodo News, December 8, 2006; and Asahi Shinbun, December 8, 2006, p. E3. Japan Times, ‘Kyuma Admits Tokyo Backed Iraq Attack’, Japan Times, December 9, 2006. Michael Penn, ‘ASDF Mission Extended through July 2007’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 460, December 8, 2006. Japan Times, ‘Editorial: Clarify ASDF’s Iraq Activities’, Japan Times, December 13, 2006. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Supports Bush’s Revamped Iraq Policy’, Kyodo News, January 11, 2007; and Asahi Shinbun, January 11, 2007, p. E2. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Has High Hopes for New U.S. Iraq Policy, Continues Support for Bush’, Kyodo News, January 24, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘Bush Made “Wrong Decision” over Iraq War: Kyuma’, Kyodo News, January 24, 2007; Asahi Shinbun, January 25, 2007, p. 4; and Asahi Shinbun, January 26, 2007, p. 4. Kyodo News, ‘Bush Made “Wrong Decision” over Iraq War’. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Protests Kyuma’s Criticism of Bush’s Decision to Start Iraq War’, Kyodo News, January 28, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Asks for Cheney Not Meeting Kyuma after Remarks over Iraq War’, Kyodo News, February 12, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘Kyuma’s Remarks on Iraq War Draw Mixed Response from LDP’, Kyodo News, February 1, 2007. Asahi Shinbun, February 5, 2007, p. 3; and Michael Penn, ‘Is Tokyo “Going Wobbly” on Iraq?’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 508, February 6, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t Decides on Bill for 2-year Extension for Airlift Operations in Iraq’, Kyodo News, March 30, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘Abe Meets with ASDF Troops in Kuwait, 1st as Japanese PM’, Kyodo News, May 1, 2007; and Asahi Shinbun, May 2, 2007, p. 4.

330

NOTES TO PAGES 138 –142

100. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Mulls Withdrawal of MSDF Vessels from Indian Ocean’, Kyodo News, September 2, 2005; Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Seek Extended Support of U.S. Antiterror Campaign’, Kyodo News, September 15, 2005; Michael Penn, ‘Koizumi “Changes His Mind”: The Indian Ocean Mission to be Extended’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 79, September 16, 2005; and Asahi Shinbun, September 17, 2005, pp. 1 – 2. 101. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Wants Japan to Extend MSDF Refueling Mission in Indian Ocean’, Kyodo News, July 25, 2006; and Michael Penn, ‘Washington Requests a Further Extension of the MSDF Mission in the Indian Ocean’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 342, July 27, 2006. 102. Associated Press, July 31, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Hatoyama Announces Opposition to MSDF Indian Ocean Mission Extension’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 690, July 31, 2007. 103. Asahi Shinbun, July 31, 2007, p. E1; and Michael Penn, ‘American Ambassador Leans on the Democratic Party of Japan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 692, August 1, 2007. 104. David Pilling, ‘Japanese Poll Stokes US Security Fears’, Financial Times, July 31, 2007; and Penn, ‘American Ambassador Leans’. 105. Ibid. 106. Michael Penn, ‘American Ambassador Leans on the Democratic Party of Japan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 692, August 1, 2007. 107. Asahi Shinbun, August 2, 2007, p. 4. 108. Michael Penn, ‘Ozawa to Schieffer: No Meeting Necessary’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 695, August 3, 2007. 109. Associated Press, August 3, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘A Japanese Retreat from Afghanistan?’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 696, August 3, 2007. 110. Associated Press, August 3, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Ozawa to Meet Schieffer Next Week: Basic Stance Unchanged’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 697, August 4, 2007. 111. Agence France-Presse, August 3, 2007; and Penn, ‘Ozawa to Meet Schieffer’. 112. John Negroponte, ‘Negroponte Speaks at Aug. 3 Press Conference’, Embassy of the United States Japan, August 3, 2007; and Penn, ‘Ozawa to Meet Schieffer’. 113. Asahi Shinbun, August 9, 2007, pp. 1, 4; and Michael Penn, ‘The Democratic Party of Japan Foreign Policy Vision Becomes Clearer’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 704, August 9, 2007. 114. Agence France-Presse, August 14, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Ambassador Schieffer Aggressively Interferes in Japanese Politics’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 709, August 14, 2007. 115. Asahi Shinbun, August 11, 2007, p. 4. 116. Asahi Shinbun, August 10, 2007, p. 4. 117. This opinion article appeared in Japanese in Asahi Shinbun, August 27, 2007, p. 11, and in English two days later on August 29, 2007. 118. Ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 143 –150 119. 120. 121. 122.

123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

331

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. In the final days of the Abe administration, additional calls for the MSDF mission to be extended came from National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and even from President Bush himself. Asahi Shinbun, September 1, 2007, p. 7; Asahi Shinbun, September 2, 2007, p. 2; and Asahi Shinbun, September 8, 2007, p. E1. Asahi Shinbun, August 29, 2007, pp. 1, 3. Washington Times, ‘Mission Unfinished’, Washington Times, September 13, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Abe Resignation Impacts the Future of the MSDF Indian Ocean Mission’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 736, September 13, 2007. Asahi Shinbun, September 27, 2007, p. 2. Asahi Shinbun, September 19, 2007, p. E1. Agence France-Presse, September 19, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Russia Provides Political Cover for Ozawa and the Democrats’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 745, September 20, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘UNSC to Thank Nations for Joining Afghan Antiterror Missions’, Kyodo News, September 19, 2007; and Penn, ‘Russia Provides Political Cover’. Agence France-Presse, September 19, 2007; Asahi Shinbun, September 20, 2007, p. E2; and Penn, ‘Russia Provides Political Cover’. Asahi Shinbun, September 8, 2007, p. E2; Asahi Shinbun, September 12, 2007, p. 1; and Michael Penn, ‘Is the MSDF Secretly Providing Fuel for America’s Iraq War Efforts?’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 737, September 13, 2007. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Agency Admits Indirectly Refueling Kitty Hawk before War’, Kyodo News, May 8, 2003; Asahi Shinbun, May 9, 2003, p. 3; and Asahi Shinbun, May 11, 2003, p. 3. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Chief Withholds Info on U.S. Ships Getting MSDF Fuel’, Kyodo News, May 7, 2003; and Asahi Shinbun, May 17, 2003, p. 4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Conference’, October 5, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: The Battle for Policy and Public Opinion’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 760, October 7, 2007. Asahi Shinbun, October 19, 2007, p. E2; and Asahi Shinbun, October 25, 2007, p. 4. Kyodo News, ‘Full Text of Prime Minister Fukuda’s Policy Speech’, Kyodo News, October 2, 2007; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: The Battle for Policy’. Asahi Shinbun, October 2, 2007, p. 4; Asahi Shinbun, October 3, 2007, p. 1; and Asahi Shinbun, October 4, 2007, pp. 1, 3, 4. Agence France-Presse, October 2, 2007; Masami Ito, ‘Hatoyama Rips into Fukuda, Wants Poll’, Japan Times, October 4, 2007; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: The Battle for Policy’. Asahi Shinbun, October 5, 2007, p. E1; Asahi Shinbun, October 6, 2007, p. 4; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: The Battle for Policy’.

332

NOTES TO PAGES 151 –158

139. Ichiro Ozawa, ‘Ima koso Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Gensoku Kakuritsu o’, Sekai, No. 771, November 2007, p. 148. 140. Ibid., p. 149. 141. Ibid., p. 150. 142. Asahi Shinbun, October 8, 2007, p. 2; Asahi Shinbun, October 11, 2007, p. E1; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Divergent Views and Predictions’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 763, October 12, 2007. 143. Yomiuri Shinbun, October 6, 2007, p. 3; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: The Battle for Policy’. 144. Yoshisuke Iinuma, ‘Giant Flaw: Understanding the Ozawa Mess’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007, p. 4. 145. Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Divergent Views’. 146. Peter Ennis, ‘Mission Impossible: Refueling Legislation to Fail’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 75, No. 10, October 2007, p. 6. 147. Asahi Shinbun, October 15, 2007, p. 2; Kyodo News, ‘Fukuda Raps Nakatani Remark Calling Refueling Opponents “Terrorists”’, Kyodo News, October 15, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 771, October 18, 2007. 148. Asahi Shinbun, October 16, 2007, p. 1; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: One Step Forward’. 149. Associated Press, October 17, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Stumbling to the Edge of Defeat’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 775, October 21, 2007. 150. Thomas Schieffer, ‘Ambassador Schieffer Addresses Japan National Press Club’, Embassy of the United States Japan, October 24, 2007. 151. Ibid. 152. Ibid. 153. Kyodo News, ‘Scandal-Prone Defense Ministry Thwarts Fukuda’s Refueling Bid’, Kyodo News, October 19, 2007; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Stumbling to the Edge’. 154. Asahi Shinbun, ‘Ministry Aims to Increase Civilian Control of the SDF’, International Herald Tribune–Asahi Shinbun, October 22, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Credibility Gaps’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 785, October 28, 2007. 155. Associated Press, October 22, 2007; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Credibility Gaps’. 156. Reuters, ‘Pentagon Plays Down End of Japan’s Afghan Mission’, Reuters, October 30, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission Ends’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 792, November 1, 2007. 157. The story of abortive talks about an LDP – DPJ grand coalition was covered extensively in the Japanese media; a good overview of the backroom manoeuvring is available in Takao Toshikawa, ‘The Watanabe Factor: Yomiuri Baron Orchestrates Fukuda– Ozawa Dance’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007, pp. 5 – 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 159 –164

333

158. Asahi Shinbun, November 22, 2007, p. 4; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Fukuda Showing the Glint of Determination’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 824, November 24, 2007. 159. Setsuko Kamiya and Masami Ito, ‘Opposition Digs In to Frustrate Fukuda’s MSDF Bill Attempts’, Japan Times, November 23, 2007; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Fukuda Showing the Glint’. 160. Robert Gates and Shigeru Ishiba, ‘Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Minister of Defense Ishiba from Tokyo, Japan’, U.S. Department of Defense, November 8, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Life after Death?’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 810, November 11, 2007. 161. Gates and Ishiba, ‘Joint Press Conference’; Asahi Shinbun, November 2, 2007, p. E2; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Life after Death?’ 162. Mainichi Shinbun, November 9, 2007, p. 2; and Penn, ‘Indian Ocean Mission: Life after Death?’ 163. Asahi Shinbun, December 12, 2007, p. E2. 164. Asahi Shinbun, December 21, 2007, p. 4. 165. Linda Sieg, ‘Japan Passes Law to Restart Afghan Naval Mission’, Reuters, January 11, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘A Pyrrhic Victory for the Alliance Conservatives’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 872, January 11, 2008. 166. Asahi Shinbun, February 22, 2008, p. 1. 167. Sean McCormack, ‘Daily Press Briefing’, US Department of State, Washington DC, February 21, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘The MSDF Restarts Refueling Operations in the Indian Ocean’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 920, February 23, 2008. 168. Yomiuri Shinbun, February 22, 2008, p. 4. 169. There are many sources on the weakness and divisions within the ruling camp in this period; one representative article is Richard Katz, ‘Countdown on Fukuda: Symptoms of the Long Transition’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 76, No. 4, April 2008, pp. 1 – 2. 170. Takao Toshikawa, ‘The Dealer Shuffles: Aso Brought into Fukuda Tent’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 76, No. 8, August 2008, pp. 3 – 4. 171. Masami Ito, ‘Key Challenge: Keeping New Komeito on Board’, Japan Times, August 2, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Fukuda Rearranges the Deck Chairs’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1098, August 2, 2008. 172. Asahi Shinbun, August 7, 2008, p. 4. 173. Tetsuya Harada, ‘MSDF Dispatch Proving Divisive’, Daily Yomiuri, August 13, 2008. 174. Ibid. 175. Richard Katz and Takao Toshikawa, ‘Fukuda Out; Aso Front-Runner Again: Elections in November’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 76, No. 9, September 2008, pp. 1 – 2. 176. Ibid. 177. Asahi Shinbun, September 2, 2008, p. 31.

334

NOTES TO PAGES 164 –174

178. Danielle Demetriou, ‘Japan’s Indian Ocean Anti-Terror Mission Extended to 2010’, Telegraph, September 10, 2008; Takao Toshikawa, ‘Third Time a Charm? Taro Aso Tries Again’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 76, No. 9, September 2008, p. 4; and Michael Penn, ‘Shigeru Ishiba and the End of Japan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1139, September 12, 2008. 179. Takao Toshikawa, ‘Third Time a Charm?’, pp. 3 –4. 180. Takao Toshikawa and Richard Katz, ‘End of (LDP) History? LDP Fears It Could Lose Election’, The Oriental Economist, Vol. 76, No. 10, October 2008, pp. 1 – 2; and Michael Penn, ‘Rough Start for the Aso Administration’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1147, September 27, 2008. 181. Asahi Shinbun, October 8, 2008, p. E1; and Michael Penn, ‘Ozawa Will Let the Indian Ocean Mission Extension Pass’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1157, October 9, 2008. 182. For criticism of the DPJ’s ploy, see Asahi Shinbun, October 10, 2008, p. 3. 183. Sachiko Sakamaki and Toko Sekiguchi, ‘Aso May Be LDP “Funeral Director” as Election Delayed’, Bloomberg, November 17, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Opposition Parties to Stall Indian Ocean Mission Passage’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1206, November 18, 2008. 184. The ASDF mission was finally rolled up in December 2008 when the Coalition of the Willing was terminated and Iraq regained full legal sovereignty over its territory.

Chapter 5 The Diplomacy of Anti-terrorism 1. Interview with Keiko Sakai, Fukuoka, July 27, 2008. 2. Yukio Sato, ‘Statement by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Permanent Representative of Japan Mr. Yukio Satoh at the 56th United Nations General Assembly’, October 2, 2001. 3. Ibid. 4. Toshimitsu Motegi, ‘Speech by Mr. Toshimitsu Motegi, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan at the Munich Conference on Security Policy “The Global Challenge of International Terrorism”’, February 8, 2003. 5. Shinichi Kitaoka, ‘Statement by H. E. Mr. Shinichi Kitaoka Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan at the Public Meeting of the Security Council on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts’, July 19, 2004. 6. Yoriko Kawaguchi, ‘Statement by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Terrorist Attack in Jakarta, Indonesia’, September 9, 2004. 7. ‘G-8 Leaders’ Statement on Counterterrorism’, July 8, 2008. 8. Akio Shirota, ‘Remark by H. E. Mr. Akio Shirota, Ambassador in Charge of International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’, February 5, 2005.

NOTES TO PAGES 174 –184

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9. Daniel Kliman has additionally observed that, because of their personal ties with American officials, ‘Japanese diplomats were influenced by U.S. threat perceptions to a greater extent than other [Japanese] officials’. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 70. 10. Jun Shinmi, ‘Kokka Anzen Hosho Mondai toshite no Kokusai Tero’, Gaiko Forum, March 2006, p. 49. Available in English translation as Michael Penn, ‘Global Terrorism as an Issue of National Security’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 301, June 13, 2006. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., p. 50. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., p. 53. 16. Gavan McCormack usefully describes Yomiuri Shinbun as ‘a kind of think-tank for the ruling party’. McCormack, Client State, p. 135. 17. Goro Hashimoto, ‘Japan Must Revise Constitution to Live Up to Its Responsibilities’, Daily Yomiuri, October 31, 2001. 18. Ibid. 19. Katsuhisa Furukawa and Satoshi Ikeuchi, ‘“Jiyu Sekai” wa Terorisuto ni Katteru ka’, Shokun!, October 2005, pp. 131– 132. Available in English translation as Michael Penn, ‘Can the “Liberal World” Beat the Terrorists?’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 107, October 29, 2005. 20. Ibid., pp. 132– 133. 21. To cite just one prominent American example: Ann Coulter, Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism, Three Rivers Press, 2003. 22. Ibid., p. 135. 23. A brief and interesting discussion on the Christian crusading dimensions of the US War on Terror can be found in James Carroll, ‘Religious Comfort for Bin Laden’, Boston Globe, September 15, 2008. 24. The Japanese establishment’s ‘obsession with order’ is a major theme of Karel van Wolferen’s classic examination of the Japanese political and industrial system. Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Vintage Books, 1990. The comment on ‘an almost religious faith in order’ comes from Tamotsu Aoki as quoted in David Leheny, Think Global, p. 42. 25. Ryozo Kato, ‘Change and Post-Cold War Japanese Security: Alliance vs. Community of Shared Destiny’, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2002, p. 22. 26. Pyle, Japan Rising, pp. 62– 65. 27. Ibid., p. 44. 28. Japan Times, ‘Second MSDF Flotilla Sails to War’, Japan Times, November 26, 2001. 29. Sadako Ogata, ‘Unfinished Business in a Forsaken Country: Looking Back and Forward’, Gaiko Forum, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2002. 30. Kyodo News, ‘LDP Lawmakers Meet with Afghan General in Mazar-e-Sharif’, Kyodo News, December 20, 2001.

336

NOTES TO PAGES 185 –188

31. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Recognize Afghan Interim Authority as Gov’t’, Kyodo News, December 19, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘Japan to Give Recognition to New Afghanistan’, Japan Times, December 18, 2001. 32. Kyodo News, ‘World Bank Head Urges Japan to Lead in Afghan Rebuilding’, Kyodo News, January 15, 2002. 33. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Japan’, in Richard J. Ellings; Aaron L. Friedberg; and Michael Wills, eds, Strategic Asia 2002– 2003: Asian Aftershocks, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002, pp. 106– 107. 34. Yukio Okamoto struggled with this question in late 2002 in the following terms: ‘Japan put on an impressive show as host of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in January 2002. The conference, held in Tokyo, raised huge hopes in Afghanistan. Japan cannot now just sit back and do nothing, making people wonder what was the point of all that effort.’ Okamoto, ‘Across to the Indian Ocean’, p. 17. 35. Kyodo News, ‘Abe Tells NATO Japan Won’t Shy for Sending Troops for Int’l Peace’, Kyodo News, January 12, 2007. 36. Kyodo News, ‘U.S., Britain Asked Japan to Send GSDF Chopper Unit to Afghanistan’, Kyodo News, May 27, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘The United States and Britain Push for GSDF Military Role in Afghanistan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 624, May 28, 2007. 37. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Study Law to Enable SDF to Help Afghan Reconstruction’, Kyodo News, May 5, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘The Japanese “Self-Defense Forces” May Be Heading to Afghanistan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 607, May 6, 2007. 38. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Holding of the “Conference on DIAG (Disbandment of the Illegal Armed Groups) for the Stabilization of Afghanistan: Coordination with the Police Reform” and the Visit to Japan of Mr. Abdul Karim Khalili, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and Mr. Tom Koenigs, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)’, June 15, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Sketching the Developments of 2007’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1006, May 6, 2008. 39. Penn, ‘Sketching the Developments of 2007’. 40. Japan Times, ‘Team to Study SDF Role in Afghanistan’, Japan Times, June 6, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Tokyo Eyes Military Role in Afghanistan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1050, June 14, 2008. 41. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Forgoes Sending SDF to Afghanistan for Worsening Security’, Kyodo News, July 18, 2008; Tobias Harris, ‘Don’t Expect Japanese Troops in Afghanistan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1078, July 14, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Searching for the Low-Risk Path to Boost Aid for Afghanistan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1084, July 20, 2008. 42. Michael Penn, ‘The Slaying of Ito Kazuya: Japan in Afghanistan’, Japan Focus, No. 2870, September 2008.

NOTES TO PAGES 189 –194

337

43. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Aid India, Pakistan for Antiterrorism Purposes’, Kyodo News, September 19, 2001. 44. Kazuma Yoshida, ‘Govt Torn on Lifting Pakistan Sanctions’, Daily Yomiuri, October 19, 2001. 45. Kyodo News, ‘LDP Panel to Urge Gov’t to Give Aid to Pakistan, India’, Kyodo News, September 18, 2001. 46. Kyodo News, ‘Sugiura on Way to Pakistan to Deliver Koizumi Letter’, Kyodo News, September 25, 2001. 47. Kyodo News, ‘Shiokawa Cautious about Debt Cancellation to Pakistan’, Kyodo News, October 24, 2001. 48. Kyodo News, ‘Pakistan’s Finance Minister Aziz to Visit Japan Next Week’, Kyodo News, October 26, 2001. 49. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Hints at Lifting of Sanctions on Pakistan’, Kyodo News, October 23, 2001. 50. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Offer Pakistan Additional $300 Mil. In Grant Aid’, Kyodo News, November 14, 2001. 51. Kyodo News, ‘Coalition Heads Vow to Push Japanese Aid Efforts for Pakistan’, Kyodo News, March 13, 2002. 52. Kyodo News, ‘Musharraf Asks Japan for Help in Training IT Experts’, Kyodo News, March 13, 2002. 53. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Raps Pakistan for Missile Tests’, Kyodo News, May 28, 2002. 54. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Phones Musharraf to Call for Self-Restraint’, Kyodo News, May 28, 2002. 55. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Ready to Boost Yen Loans to Pakistan’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2002. 56. Japan Times, ‘Japan, Pakistan Stage Security Talks’, Japan Times, January 26, 2004. 57. Associated Press of Pakistan, ‘Pak Navy Ships on Goodwill-cum-Training Cruise to Japan’, Associated Press of Pakistan, June 12, 2007. 58. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Press Conference’, June 29, 2007. 59. Agence France-Presse, November 12, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Tokyo Finally Hits the Brakes on Musharraf’s Pakistan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 816, November 13, 2007. 60. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Statement by Mr. Masahiko Koumura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Lifting of the State of Emergency in Pakistan’, December 15, 2007. 61. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Statement by Mr. Masahiko Koumura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on Terrorist Attack Targeting Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto’, December 28, 2007. 62. Daily Times, ‘Japan to Apprise G8 of Pakistan’s Anti-Terror Efforts: FM’, Daily Times, May 4, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Stand by Your Man – Musharraf Edition’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 816, May 6, 2008.

338

NOTES TO PAGES 194 –200

63. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Continue to Support Pakistan after President Resigns’, Kyodo News, August 18, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Pakistan Changes – But Tokyo Doesn’t’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1116, August 20, 2008. 64. In the words of Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, ‘Japan found itself poised to seize an epochal opportunity to assist in and benefit from any potential rapprochement between Iran and the United States.’ Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘Japan’, p. 104. 65. Kyodo News, ‘Komura to Visit Saudi Arabia, Iran as Envoy’, Kyodo News, September 28, 2001. 66. Kyodo News, ‘Komura Meets Iranian Minister on Antiterrorism Efforts’, Kyodo News, October 3, 2001. 67. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Praises Iran’s Antiterrorism Efforts’, Kyodo News, November 1, 2001. 68. See, for example, Koichiro Tanaka, ‘Damage Control in Japan – Iran Relations’, Gaiko Forum, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 2007. 69. Misaki Hisane, ‘No Hurry over Iran Oil Deal: Meeting Target Date Could Have Strained U.S. Relations’, Japan Times, February 22, 2002. 70. Michael Penn, ‘Oil and Power: The Rise and Fall of the Japan – Iran Partnership in Azadegan’, Japan Focus, No. 2296, December 19, 2006. 71. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Visit by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Overview and Evaluation)’, May 9, 2002. 72. Penn, ‘Oil and Power’. 73. Guy Dinmore, ‘US Presses Japan over Iran Oil Deal’, Financial Times, June 27, 2003; Kanako Takahara, ‘U.S. Pressure Places Iran – Japan Oil Deal in Doubt’, Japan Times, July 2, 2003; and Hooman Peimani, ‘Americans Stymie Japan – Iran Oil Deal’, Asia Times Online, July 4, 2003. 74. Eric Watkins, ‘Japan Secures Financing to Develop Iran’s Azadegan Oil Field’, Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, Vol. 9, No. 8, April 22, 2004; and Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Traded Iran Oil Deal for SDF in Iraq: Democrat’, Kyodo News, April 1, 2004. 75. Watkins, ‘Japan Secures Financing’. 76. Sally Jones, ‘Iran Parliament Hopes Japan’s Inpex Opts Out of Azadegan Field’, MarketWatch, September 11, 2006; and Michael Penn, ‘The Azadegan Saga: Daneshyar Talks Trash and Nikai Talks Business’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 380, September 12, 2006. 77. Reuters, ‘Japan Imposes Nuclear Trade Sanctions on Iran’, Reuters, February 15, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Tokyo Imposes Economic Sanctions on Iran’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 522, February 17, 2007. 78. New York Times, ‘Key Judgments from a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Activity’, New York Times, December 4, 2007. 79. Asahi Shinbun, December 8, 2007, p. 3; Eric Johnston, ‘Japan Sizes Up “Nonnuclear” Iran’, Japan Times, December 26, 2007; and Shirzad Azad, ‘The

NOTES TO PAGES 200 –206

80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93.

339

American National Intelligence Estimate on Iran and Japanese Foreign Policy’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 868, January 5, 2008. Press TV, ‘Iran Wants Japan’s Cooperation in Oil’, Press TV, December 8, 2007; and Eric Johnston, ‘Time Ripe for Better Ties: Iran Envoy’, Japan Times, December 26, 2007. The text of the Nikaido Statement is widely available in older publications concerning Japan’s policies toward the Arab – Israeli conflict. Two examples are Shuzo Kimura, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy – Impact of the Oil Crisis’, ArabAmerican Affairs, No. 17, Summer 1986; and Manabu Shimizu, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy’, Japan Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, October–December 1988. The ‘pro-Arab’ description is almost universal in the publications of the 1973 to 1990 period, but one specific example is Eisuke Naramoto, ‘Japan Aligned with the PLO’, Japan Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, January– March 1990. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Condemns Israel’s Assassination of Hamas Leader’, Kyodo News, March 23, 2004. Ibid. Kyodo News, ‘Israeli Envoy Urges Japan to Use Influence in Antiterrorism’, Kyodo News, December 5, 2001. Kyodo News, ‘Israel Counterterrorism Mission to Visit Japan Early June’, Kyodo News, May 28, 2002. A later trial threw doubt upon the soundness of the evidence against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. The US government’s view was that funding hospitals for Palestinian refugees managed by Hamas was tantamount to funding terrorism. Other observers are sceptical of this approach. Kyodo News, ‘Cabinet Approves Freezing Assets of Fund for Palestinians’, Kyodo News, December 18, 2001. Kyodo News, ‘Kawaguchi Urges Arafat to Support Abbas’, Kyodo News, April 29, 2003. President Bush’s precise words at the time of Hamas’ victory were, ‘I don’t see how you can be a partner in peace if you advocate the destruction of a country as a part of your platform. And I know you can’t be a partner in peace if your party has got an armed wing.’ Suzanne Goldenberg and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Bush Demands Renunciation of Violence and Recognition of Israel’, The Guardian, January 27, 2006. Tomohiko Taniguchi, ‘Press Conference’, January 31, 2006. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, February 8, 2006, p. E2; Asahi Shinbun, February 8, 2006, p. E2; and Michael Penn, ‘The Arima Mission and Japanese Policy Toward Hamas’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 192, February 10, 2006. Reuters, ‘Japan Says Halts New Aid to Hamas-led Government’, Reuters, April 18, 2006; and Michael Penn, ‘Tokyo Bending on Hamas Policy’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 242, April 19, 2006. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘Japan’s Assistance to the Palestinians on the Occasion of the Visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’, July 13, 2006.

340

NOTES TO PAGES 206 –212

94. McCormack, Client State, p. 119. 95. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t Defends Police Raid on Chongryon Head Office’, Kyodo News, November 30, 2001. 96. Kyodo News, ‘Coast Guard to Submit Bill on Shooting Suspicious Ships’, Kyodo News, October 4, 2001; Reiji Yoshida, ‘State Aims to Let Coast Guard Fire First at Suspected Spy Ships’, Japan Times, October 6, 2001; and Richard J. Samuels, ‘“New Fighting Power!”: Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007– 2008, pp. 95 – 97. 97. Kyodo News, ‘Agency Corrects Time of Recognizing Ship as Suspicious’, Kyodo News, December 25, 2001. 98. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Rejects N. Korea’s Blast over Ship Incident’, Kyodo News, December 27, 2001. 99. Koizumi, for his part, offered apologies for the far worse history of Japanese violence against Koreans that occurred before 1945. 100. Gavan McCormack’s account of the Koizumi – Kim summit is particularly clear and insightful. McCormack, Client State, pp. 97 – 104. For a more detailed account, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution, 2007, pp. 1– 49. 101. Kyodo News, ‘Abductees’ Kin Angered at Deal toward Normalization’, Kyodo News, September 17, 2002. 102. Kyodo News, ‘Ishiba Says Japanese View N. Korea as Terrorist State’, Kyodo News, October 11, 2002. 103. Agence France-Presse, October 12, 2008. 104. For a concurring view, see Leheny, Think Global, p. 151. 105. Japan Times, ‘Official Receives Bomb Threat’, Japan Times, September 11, 2003; and Kyodo News, ‘Ishihara Says Tanaka Deserved Bomb Threat’, Kyodo News, September 10, 2003. 106. McCormack, Client State, pp. 26 – 28. 107. Kyodo News, ‘Koichi Kato, Victim of Arson, Warns of “Dangerous” Nationalism’, Kyodo News, August 18, 2006. 108. Asahi Shinbun, August 17, 2006. The full Asahi editorial is available in English at Asahi Shinbun, ‘Arson: Yasukuni Shrine, Terror, and the Future of Japanese Democracy’, Japan Focus, No. 2196, August 18, 2006. 109. Gavan McCormack also views the Japanese policy as being guided by irrationality: ‘The national mood in Japan was one in which rage over crimes committed against it seemed to triumph over reason.’ McCormack, Client State, p. 104. 110. In McCormack’s words, ‘Perhaps the defining characteristic of Koizumi’s [term in] office was his joining of George W. Bush’s “global war on terror”. Yet, as Japan stepped up its contribution to the global war, at home a kind of terror slowly spread that had nothing to do with Islam or the Middle East.’ McCormack, Client State, p. 20. See also, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘When Is a Terrorist Not a Terrorist?’, Japan Focus, No. 1838, October 10, 2003.

NOTES TO PAGES 213 –222

341

111. ‘The question driving the debate is: Who will lead Asia in the 21st century? For both nations, it is an issue of economics, security, and national pride rolled into one.’ Eric Baculinao and Brian Newbury, ‘Chinese-Japanese Rivalry Heating Up’, NBC News, April 13, 2005. 112. Some Japanese have used the expression Ajia no meishu which Richard J. Samuels translates as ‘top dog’. A more direct but less visceral translation would be ‘leading power of Asia’. Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 36. 113. Ibid., pp. 38 – 85. 114. Yasuo Fukuda was the moderate exception. 115. Much has already been written about the Yasukuni dispute and the downturn in Japan– China relations during the Koizumi years: two useful discussions from different perspectives are Mark Selden, ‘Japan, the United States, and Yasukuni Nationalism: War, Historical Memory, and the Future of the AsiaPacific’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, No. 2892, September 10, 2008; and Kent E. Calder, ‘China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, March– April 2006. 116. Selden, ‘Japan, the United States, and Yasukuni Nationalism’. 117. William Overholt, an experienced Asia hand, sees the same danger: ‘There is a real risk that future historians will look back at our era and say that the decisive foreign policy decisions Washington made at the turn of the new century concerned not Iraq, not the war on terror, but rather the reignition and acceleration of Sino – Japanese rivalry.’ William H. Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 299.

Chapter 6 The War at Home 1. A good discussion of these historical issues can be found in Renee Worringer, ed., The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007. 2. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, pp. 70 – 71. 3. BBC, ‘Bin Laden’s Warning: Full Text’, BBC News, October 7, 2001. 4. Journalist Jamie Miyazaki noted: ‘Bin Laden’s initial citation after September 11, 2001, of Japan as the victim of US nuclear terrorism has just two years later morphed into explicit threats against Japan.’ Jamie Miyazaki, ‘Japan, Korea New Terror Fronts’, Asia Times Online, November 22, 2003. Ironically, Miyazaki’s insight was published on the exact 30-year anniversary of the issuance of the ‘pro-Arab’ Nikaido Statement. 5. BBC, ‘“Bin Laden” Messages: Full Text’, BBC News, October 18, 2003. 6. Asahi Shinbun, April 23, 2008, p. E2; and Michael Penn, ‘Ayman al-Zawahiri Renews the Al-Qaida Threat toward Japan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 989, April 23, 2008.

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NOTES TO PAGES 223 –228

7. Craig Whitlock, ‘Trial of French Islamic Radical Sheds Light on Converts’ Role’, Washington Post, January 1, 2006, p. A01; Jim Frederick, ‘Japan’s Terror Threat’, Time, May 31, 2004; and Guido Olimpio, ‘Japan: A Target for AlQaida?’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 5, March 9, 2006. 8. Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Terror: What Japan Has to Fear’, Asia Times Online, January 12, 2006. 9. Kyodo News, ‘Blasts Near U.S. Base in Japan Could be Al-Qaida’s Work: ABC’, Kyodo News, February 12, 2007. 10. Hana Kusumoto, ‘Officials Investigate Two Explosions near Zama’, Stars and Stripes, February 14, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘The Myth of “Al-Qaida in Japan” Gets Busted’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 523, February 18, 2007. 11. There is one possible exception. In July 1991 Professor Hitoshi Igarashi of Tsukuba University was fatally stabbed by an unknown assailant. Most observers believe that Igarashi was killed because he was the Japanese translator of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses and because the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the death of anyone involved in the book’s publication. Several other attacks on the book’s translators occurred in other parts of the world. At the time of writing, the Igarashi case remains unsolved. 12. Many Japanese policymakers quietly shared this assessment in the immediate post-September 11 period: ‘Only certain elements within the bureaucracy considered al-Qaeda a direct security threat. . . To many [Defense Agency] officials and Diet members, terrorism therefore imperiled Japanese nationals abroad, but posed a minimal danger to the Japanese homeland.’ Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy, p. 70. 13. Terumasa Nakanishi, ‘Nihon no Mienai Teki o Isso seyo’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001, pp. 57 – 61. 14. Ibid., p. 57. 15. Shukan Post Watcher, ‘On Board a Narita-LA Flight with Six Sky Marshals’, Japan Today, May 18, 2006. 16. Kazuhisa Ogawa, ‘Peace, Prosperity Come at a Price’, Japan Times, January 1, 2008. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. In the United States, for example, conservative commentators tended to rail against ‘liberals’ rather than the American people as a whole. 20. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Embassy in Tokyo Resumes Operations’, Kyodo News, September 13, 2001; Japan Times, ‘U.S. Embassy Set to Reopen Today’, Japan Times, September 13, 2001;Asahi Shinbun, September 13, 2001, p. 35; and Asahi Shinbun, September 15, 2001, p. 4. 21. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Military Bases in Japan on Maximum Alert’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001. 22. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t Imposes Flying Ban over U.S. Embassy in Tokyo’, Kyodo News, September 21, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘Embassy Flight Ban’, Japan Times, September 22, 2001.

NOTES TO PAGES 228 –231

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23. Asahi Shinbun, September 12, 2001, p. E8; and Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Military Bases in Japan on Maximum Alert’. 24. Kyodo News, ‘Police Beef Up Security around U.S. Bases, Nuke Plants’, Kyodo News, September 20, 2001. 25. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Coast Guard Steps Up Security around U.S. Bases’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘Maintaining Vigilance: SDF Reinforces Security at Bases’, Japan Times, September 13, 2001. 26. Kyodo News, ‘Coalition Agrees to Revise SDF Law to Protect U.S. Bases’, Kyodo News, September 18, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘SDF to Be Tasked with Counterterrorism Duties’, Japan Times, September 19, 2001. 27. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Places Defense Forces on Maximum Alert’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001. 28. Kyodo News, ‘Antiterrorism Security Expanded to 580 Facilities’, Kyodo News, October 9, 2001. 29. Ibid. 30. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Establishes Antiterrorism Task Force’, Kyodo News, October 8, 2001. 31. For an overview of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office, see Andrew L. Oros, ‘Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 5 –7. 32. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Adopts 5-Point Plan on Biological, Chemical Terrorism’, Kyodo News, November 8, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘Steps Drawn Up to Fight Nuclear, Chemical Threat’, Japan Times, October 14, 2001. 33. Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Calls on Public to Be on Guard over Possible Terror Attacks’, Kyodo News, March 26, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, March 27, 2004, p. 1. 34. Oros, ‘Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability’, pp. 7 – 9. 35. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Tightens Immigration Checks Following Attacks in U.S.’, Kyodo News, September 12, 2001. 36. Kyodo News, ‘Moriyama Instructs Prosecutors to Be Alert for Terrorism’, Kyodo News, September 19, 2001. 37. Kyodo News, ‘Justice Ministry Sets Up Counterterrorism Task Force’, Kyodo News, October 10, 2001. 38. Kyodo News, ‘19 Islamic Extremists May Have Entered Japan’, Kyodo News, September 18, 2001; Asahi Shinbun, September 17, 2001, p. 19; and Japan Times, ‘Bin Laden Followers May Be Here’, Japan Times, September 18, 2001. 39. Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Install Online System to Screen Potential Terrorists’, Kyodo News, November 9, 2001; and Asahi Shinbun, November 6, 2001, p. 2. 40. These figures are published on the MPD website. 41. Kyodo News, ‘Police Forces in Japan Put on Antiterrorism Alert’, Kyodo News, September 21, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘Nation’s Police Put on Antiterrorism Alert’, Japan Times, September 22, 2001.

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NOTES TO PAGES 231 – 234

42. Japan Times, ‘NPA Chief Urges Terror Prevention’, Japan Times, October 23, 2001; and Kyodo News, ‘NPA Chief Directs Police to Beef Up Counterterrorism Steps’, Kyodo News, October 21, 2001. 43. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Police to Get 1,400 Submachine Guns to Fight Terrorism’, Kyodo News, November 9, 2001. 44. Kyodo News, ‘NPA Seeks 6.8% Rise in Fiscal 2003 Budget’, Kyodo News, August 27, 2002. 45. Kyodo News, ‘Tokyo Police Hold 1st Meeting of Int’l Terrorism Panel’, Kyodo News, September 26, 2001. 46. Kyodo News, ‘MPD Launches Forum to Discuss Ways to Prevent Terrorism’, Kyodo News, October 23, 2001. 47. Kyodo News, ‘Security Tightened at Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t Buildings’, Kyodo News, September 26, 2001. 48. Kyodo News, ‘New Police Squad Launched to Protect Premier’s Residence’, Kyodo News, April 1, 2002; and Japan Times, ‘Koizumi Residence Gets Special Guard’, Japan Times, February 15, 2002. 49. Kyodo News, ‘Coast Guard Patrolling Near Nuke Power Plants for Terrorism’, Kyodo News, October 1, 2001. 50. This exercise was a reaction, of course, to the anthrax scare wrongly attributed to Islamic radicals that had occurred some weeks earlier in the United States. Kyodo News, ‘1st Bio-Terrorism Drill Held at Sea in Yokohama’, Kyodo News, November 27, 2001. 51. Kyodo News, ‘Coast Guards Pledge Deeper Ties to Fight Maritime Terror’, Kyodo News, July 19, 2002. 52. Kyodo News, ‘Local Gov’ts Asked to Take Tighter Antiterror Measures’, Kyodo News, October 30, 2001. 53. Kyodo News, ‘Fire Agency to Translate FEMA Text to Tackle Terrorism’, Kyodo News, December 5, 2001; and Japan Times, ‘Agency to Translate FEMA Terrorism Response Manual’, Japan Times, December 12, 2001. 54. Kyodo News, ‘Health Ministry Holds 1st Task Force to Discuss Bioterrorism’, Kyodo News, October 10, 2001. 55. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t Orders Stepped-Up Bioterrorism Preparation’, Kyodo News, October 5, 2001. 56. Japan Times, ‘Japan to Check Labs for Biological Agents’, Japan Times, October 11, 2001. 57. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Signs Treaty on Blocking Terror Financing’, Kyodo News, October 31, 2001. 58. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t to Set Up Team to Track Terrorist Funds’, Kyodo News, October 9, 2001. 59. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Freezes 31 Bank Accounts Linked to Taliban’, Kyodo News, October 19, 2001. 60. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Designates 3 More Groups to Freeze Terrorist Assets’, Kyodo News, January 11, 2002; and Kyodo News, ‘Japan to Freeze Funds of 13 More “Terror-Linked” Groups’, Kyodo News, July 5, 2002.

NOTES TO PAGES 234 –241

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61. Asahi Shinbun, September 30, 2001, p. 2. 62. Kyodo News, ‘SDF Medical Officers to Report on Bioterrorism’, Kyodo News, October 11, 2001. 63. Japan Times, ‘Defense Agency, NPA to Handle Riots, Terrorists’, Japan Times, September 10, 2004. 64. Takuya Asakura, ‘GSDF Joins Forces with Police to Combat Terrorism’, Japan Times, November 10, 2002. 65. Japan Times, ‘Police, GSDF Plan Joint Counterterror Drill for Hokkaido’, Japan Times, October 15, 2005. 66. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘GSDF Inaugurates Undercover Antiterrorist Squad’, Japan Times, March 30, 2004. 67. Ibid. 68. Kyodo News, ‘SDF to be More Efficient, Better at Anti-Terror: Koizumi’, Kyodo News, November 7, 2004. 69. Ibid. 70. Japan Times, ‘63% of Pollees Fear Terrorists will Target Japan’, Japan Times, December 19, 2003. 71. See, for example, Keiko Sakurai, ‘Muslims in Contemporary Japan’, Asia Policy, No. 5, January 2008. 72. Michael Penn, ‘Public Faces and Private Spaces: Islam in the Japanese Context’, Asia Policy, No. 5, January 2008, pp. 100–102. 73. National Police Agency, ‘The Oncoming Threat of Terrorism: The Growing Severity of the International Terrorism Situation’, National Police Agency Focus, Vol. 271, December 2005. 74. Copies of these posters are in the author’s possession. 75. Hiroshi Matsubara, ‘Local Muslims Feel Victimized, Misunderstood After Attacks’, Japan Times, September 28, 2001. 76. Ibid.; and Asahi Shinbun, September 13, 2001, p. 35. 77. Kyodo News, ‘Muslims in Japan Condemn U.S. Attack, Demand Evidence’, Kyodo News, October 8, 2001. 78. Hiroshi Matsubara, ‘Local Muslims Feel Victimized’. 79. Jim Frederick, ‘Japan’s Terror Threat’. 80. E-mail interview with a Tokyo-based Syrian intellectual, October 13, 2008. 81. The tag came in a Japanese-language poem that ran on the front page of an evening edition. A loose translation of the poem is: ‘Minister of Justice Hatoyama / So proud of his “confidence and responsibility” / A new two-month record for executions / His new name is the Grim Reaper.’ Asahi Shinbun, June 18, 2008, p. E1; and Agence France-Presse, June 20, 2008. 82. Kyodo News, ‘Myers Asks Japan to be Well Prepared for Terrorist Attacks’, Kyodo News, April 24, 2002. 83. Hiroshi Matsubara, ‘FBI Urges Tokyo to “Get Tough” on Terror’, Asahi Shinbun, March 8, 2006; and Michael Penn, ‘The United States Pushes Japan Down the Road of Nationalism and Authoritarianism’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 209, March 9, 2006.

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NOTES TO PAGES 244 –247

84. United Press International, ‘U.S. Says Japan is Target for Al-Qaida’, United Press International, March 29, 2006; and Michael Penn, ‘The Fear Game Revisited: Homeland Security Chief Chertoff in Tokyo’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 226, March 30, 2006. 85. Japan Times, ‘NPA Wants New Laws on Terror Attacks, Immigration Control’, Japan Times, August 20, 2004. 86. Masami Ito, ‘Diet Passes Bill to Take Foreigners’ Prints, Pics’, Japan Times, May 18, 2006. 87. ‘First, it is not fingerprinting itself that bothers us foreigners, it is the fact it is being done in the name of “fighting terrorism”. Japanese nationals are just as likely (and as history shows, even more likely) to commit terrorist attacks on Japanese soil. Mind you, for my safety, I would like all Japanese nationals to be fingerprinted as well. If that happened, I would be more than glad to offer my biometric data as means of identification.’ Francisco Menendez, ‘Half-Baked Antiterrorist Measure’, Japan Times, November 22, 2007. 88. Ibid. 89. Michael Hassett, ‘Watching Them Watching Us’, Japan Times, November 20, 2007. 90. Donald M. Seekins, ‘New Expression of Xenophobia’, Japan Times, November 22, 2007. 91. Jun Hongo, ‘Hatoyama a Hawk on Death Penalty, Illegal Immigrants’, Japan Times, September 4, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Kunio Hatoyama’s War on Terrorism’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 788, October 30, 2007. 92. Jun Hongo, ‘Hatoyama in Hot Water over “Al-Qaida Connection”’, Japan Times, October 30, 2007; and Michael Penn, ‘Kunio Hatoyama’s War on Terrorism’. 93. Tobias Harris, ‘Hatoyama Kunio’s Ridiculous Argument’, Observing Japan blog, October 30, 2007. 94. Voice of America, ‘UN Envoy Urges Japan to Adopt Anti-Discrimination Legislation’, Voice of America, May 18, 2006. 95. Kyodo News, ‘U. S. Official Hopes Japan Will Shift to 10-Finger Immigration Screening’, Kyodo News, February 6, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘Homeland Security Official: Two Fingers are Not Enough’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 897, February 7, 2008. 96. David McNeill, ‘Japan Creates Fortress for G8’, The Independent, July 7, 2008; and CBC News, ‘“Unprecedented” Security Ahead of Japan G8 Summit Next Week’, CBC News, July 3, 3008. 97. Taro Karasaki and Susumu Maejima, ‘NGOs Struggle to be Heard at G-8 Summit’, Asahi Shinbun, July 7, 2008. 98. Eric Johnston, ‘G8 Security Steps Hit as Dangerous Precedent’, Japan Times, June 28, 2008. 99. Peter Katzenstein and his colleagues have noted, ‘Japanese conservatives have successfully mobilized domestic fears, especially of North Korea, to justify an expanded antiterrorism role alongside the United States. Legitimized by U.S.

NOTES TO PAGES 247 –254

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efforts to remake security as a comprehensive phenomenon, the government has successfully pushed for a more muscular presence overseas while maintaining institutionalized motifs of homogeneity and state responsibility at home to keep at bay fears of a changing region and a changing nation.’ Peter J. Katzenstein, Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions, Routledge, 2008, p. 134.

Chapter 7 Democracy and Militarism 1. Tomohito Shinoda was the leading proponent of this argument. Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy. 2. The Japanese term is Koizumi gekijo. 3. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Koizumi-Bush Friendship One for the Ages’, Japan Times, June 29, 2006. 4. Brad Glosserman, ‘“Sayonara Summit” Saw the Best of Ties’, Japan Times, July 9, 2006. 5. Among the many discussions of the Bush – Blair phenomenon, two of the more interesting short pieces are Andrew Buncombe, ‘Blair Praised by US Media for Talking Tougher than President’, The Independent, October 4, 2001; and Glenn Kessler, ‘Blair and Bush Are Duo Even in Descent’, Washington Post, May 26, 2006. 6. See, for example, Kenneth B. Pyle, ‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change of Course’, NBR Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 2006. 7. Japan Times, ‘Team to Study SDF Role in Afghanistan’, Japan Times, June 6, 2008. 8. At the heart of both the Yasukuni Shrine dispute and the issue of Japanese school textbooks lay the question of whether contemporary Japanese leaders feel any sense of remorse for Japan’s actions in the Pacific War, or even if they still acknowledge that Japan had committed any crimes deserving of special reproach. 9. William Overholt writes that ‘the U.S.– Japan alliance has become a substitute for a nuanced policy toward other Asian countries. As an inevitable consequence, both Japan and the United States have experienced increasing difficulties with other Asian countries, including both allies (e.g., South Korea) and non-allies (e.g., China). . . Tokyo is paying a high price for using the alliance as a substitute for foreign policy, and Washington is paying a high price for betting its whole position in Asia on an inward-looking and increasingly isolated Japan.’ Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics, p. 99. 10. Eric Johnston, ‘Koizumi, Bush Stress Strong Ties’, Japan Times, November 17, 2005. 11. Gavan McCormack goes further. He believes that one of Washington’s strategic goals in maintaining the US – Japan alliance is precisely to divide Japan from Asia. McCormack, Client State.

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NOTES TO PAGES 256 –262

12. John Dower, ‘Is the U.S. Repeating the Mistakes of Japan in the 1930s?’, History News Network, June 30, 2003. 13. Mayer, The Dark Side, p. 180. 14. Asahi Shinbun, May 22, 2003, pp. 2, 4; and Kyodo News, ‘Japan Gov’t Spokesman Says SDF is Not “A Military”’, Kyodo News, May 21, 2003. 15. This is what leads Gavan McCormack to describe Japan as ‘a military superpower in all but name.’ McCormack, Client State, p. 96. 16. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Iraq Gives SDF a Military-Reality Check’, Japan Times, December 10, 2003. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Japan Times, ‘SDF Reinforces Security at Bases’, Japan Times, September 13, 2001; and Asahi Shinbun, September 15, 2001, p. 4. 20. Asahi Shinbun, November 9, 2002, p. 2; and Takuya Asakura, ‘GSDF Joins Forces with Police to Combat Terrorism’, Japan Times, November 10, 2002. 21. Kyodo News, ‘SDF to Deal with Terror, Other New Threats: Top Defense Official’, Kyodo News, July 1, 2004. 22. Kyodo News, ‘SDF to Be More Efficient, Better at Anti-Terror: Koizumi’, Kyodo News, November 7, 2004. 23. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Civilian Controls over Military Matters Seen in the Balance’, Japan Times, December 29, 2004. 24. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Admiral Proposes SDF Less Run by Civilians’, Japan Times, July 3, 2004; Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Defense Agency to Retain Civilian Buffer around Chief’, Japan Times, December 28, 2004; and Asahi Shinbun, July 2, 2004, pp. 1 – 2. 25. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Admiral Proposes SDF Less Run by Civilians.’ 26. Nao Shimoyachi, ‘Defense Agency to Retain Civilian Buffer around Chief.’ 27. Japan Times, ‘SDF Officers to Be Given More Authority’, Japan Times, November 27, 2005. 28. Kyodo News, ‘Fukuda Says Defense Ministry Still Premature But Needed in Future’, Kyodo News, March 9, 2004. 29. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Chief Ono Calls for Upgrading Status of Defense Agency’, Kyodo News, January 7, 2005. 30. Kyodo News, ‘PM Cooler about Elevating Defense Agency to Ministry’, Kyodo News, June 14, 2006. 31. Ibid. 32. Kyodo News, ‘Gov’t Eyes Bill to Upgrade Defense Agency into Ministry Next Year’, Kyodo News, December 5, 2005; and Asahi Shinbun, December 6, 2005, p. 2. 33. Kyodo News, ‘PM Cooler about Elevating Defense Agency to Ministry.’ 34. Asahi Shinbun, December 21, 2005, p. 4. 35. Asahi Shinbun, February 13, 2006, p. E3; and Kyodo News, ‘Koizumi Hints His Gov’t Won’t Submit Bill to Upgrade Defense Agency’, Kyodo News, February 13, 2006.

NOTES TO PAGES 262 –268

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36. Kyodo News, ‘PM Cooler about Elevating Defense Agency to Ministry.’ 37. Kyodo News, ‘Bill to Upgrade Defense Agency to Ministry Passes Lower House’, Kyodo News, November 30, 2006. 38. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Agency to Debut as Ministry amid Big Change in Circumstances’, Kyodo News, December 4, 2006. 39. Patrick M. Cronin, ‘Japan: Ready for a Real Army’, International Herald Tribune, June 15, 2006. 40. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Defense Officials Eager for Status Boost’, Japan Times, December 29, 2004. 41. Kyodo News, ‘Abe Aiming to Realize Constitution Revision During Premiership’, Kyodo News, December 19, 2006. 42. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Ministry Launched, Upgraded from Agency after Half Century’, Kyodo News, January 9, 2007; and Asahi Shinbun, January 9, 2007, p. E1. 43. Kyodo News, ‘Over 70% of Japanese Positive on SDF Activities in Iraq’, Kyodo News, November 2, 2006. 44. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Agency Office to Move to Ichigaya from Roppongi’, Kyodo News, February 3, 2000; Takuya Asakura, ‘Defense Agency Moves HQ to Ichigaya Hill’, Japan Times, April 23, 2000; and Shinji Ogura, ‘Mishima’s Suicide Room a Hot Spot in Defense Ministry Tour’, Kyodo News, April 1, 2009. 45. Taro Karasaki, ‘Japan Stalls on SDF Dispatch to Sudan’, International Herald Tribune – Asahi Shinbun, June 27, 2008, p. 23; and Michael Penn, ‘Ichigaya Has the “Final Say” on GSDF Deployment to Sudan’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1062, June 30, 2008. 46. President Bush never abandoned this analogy. As late as May 2008 he was citing the reconstruction of Japan and of Germany as directly analogous to his administration’s policies: ‘We assumed this obligation before. . . Germany and Japan, once mortal enemies, are now allies of the United States. And people across the world have reaped the benefits from that alliance. Today, we must do the same in Afghanistan and Iraq.’ CNN, ‘Bush Compares Iraq, Afghan Wars to World War II’, CNN.com, May 28, 2008. 47. Asahi Shinbun, ‘Ruling on SDF Leaflet’, International Herald Tribune-Asahi Shinbun, April 15, 2008. 48. Ibid. 49. David McNeill, ‘Martyrs for Peace: Japanese Antiwar Activists Jailed for Trespassing in SDF Compound Vow to Fight On’, Japan Focus, No. 2766, May 31, 2008. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Kyodo News, ‘GSDF Monitoring Groups, Journalists Opposed to SDF Dispatch: JCP’, Kyodo News, June 6, 2007; Kyodo News, ‘GSDF Monitoring Civic Group Activities: Internal Documents,’ Kyodo News, June 6, 2007; Asahi

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53. 54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71.

NOTES TO PAGES 268 –277 Shinbun, June 7, 2007, p. 1; and Michael Penn, ‘The Japanese Military Kept Files on Antiwar Groups’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 640, June 7, 2007. Reuters, ‘Japan’s Military Watched Citizens: Communist Party’, Reuters, June 6, 2007; Mainichi Shinbun, June 7, 2007, p. 26; Mainichi Shinbun, June 18, 2007, p. 27; and Penn, ‘The Japanese Military Kept Files.’ Associated Press, ‘Japan’s Defense Official Defends Monitoring Civic Groups, Individuals Opposed to Iraq Dispatch’, International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2007; and Penn, ‘The Japanese Military Kept Files.’ Kyodo News, ‘Top Defense Officials Say Will Continue Monitoring Anti-SDF Acts’, Kyodo News, June 7, 2007. Years later, in March 2012, some of those who had been monitored won a suit against the government when a judge found that their rights had indeed been violated. However, it was, once again, only the more liberal newspapers that reported the judgement prominently. See Akahata, March 27, 2012, p. 1. Asahi Shinbun, April 18, 2008, p. 33; Kyodo News, ‘High Court Rules ASDF’s Dispatch to Iraq Unconstitutional’, Kyodo News, April 17, 2008; Asahi Shinbun, ‘ASDF Dispatch Said Unconstitutional’, International Herald TribuneAsahi Shinbun, April 18, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘The Rulers and the Ruled’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 983, April 19, 2008. Asahi Shinbun, ‘High Court: ASDF Mission to Iraq Illegal’, International Herald Tribune – Asahi Shinbun, April 18, 2008. Asahi Shinbun, April 19, 2008, p. 4; and Penn, ‘The Rulers and the Ruled.’ Ibid. Mainichi Shinbun, April 19, 2008, p. 2; and Penn, ‘The Rulers and the Ruled.’ Yomiuri Shinbun, April 18, 2008, p. 3. Sankei News, April 18, 2008; and Penn, ‘The Rulers and the Ruled.’ Yoshio Hachiro and Keiichiro Asao, ‘Koku Jieitai no Iraku Hakken ni tai suru Nagoya Kosai no Iken Hanketsu ni tsuite (Danwa)’, Minshuto Nyuusu, April 18, 2008. Asahi Shinbun, April 18, 2008, p. 3. Ibid. Asahi Shinbun, April 19, 2008, p. 34; Shigeru Ishiba, ‘Press Conference by the Defense Minister’, April 22, 2008; Kyodo News, ‘Ishiba Chides ASDF Chief over Remarks on Iraq Mission’, Kyodo News, April 22, 2008; and Michael Penn, ‘More Fallout from the Nagoya Ruling’, Shingetsu Newsletter No. 988, April 22, 2008. Kyodo News, ‘Ishiba Chides ASDF Chief’; and Penn, ‘More Fallout from the Nagoya Ruling.’ Toshio Tamogami, ‘Was Japan an Aggressor Nation?’ Ibid. Ayako Doi notes, ‘All astute observers of Japan know that it wasn’t much of a punishment for Tamogami, who retired with full pension and gained a bully pulpit he didn’t have before. They are also aware that Tamogami has a lot of secret admirers not only among his SDF colleagues and

NOTES TO PAGES 277 –282

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83.

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subordinates, but also among conservative politicians, probably including [Prime Minister Taro] Aso himself, judging from his past affiliations. In fact it is well known that a significant portion of Japanese people always believed, and still believe, that their country was lured into World War II by deliberate moves by Franklin D. Roosevelt, that the Tokyo Tribunal on War Crimes was nothing more than victor’s justice, and that Imperial Japan was actually a liberator of Asia from Western colonialism.’ E-mail interview with Ayako Doi, January 18, 2009. Jun Hongo, ‘Axed ASDF Chief Hawk Till the End; No Apology’, Japan Times, November 4, 2008. Asahi Shinbun, November 12, 2008, p. 3. Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Tamogami Misses the Point on Freedom of Speech’, Daily Yomiuri, November 12, 2008. Herbert Bix, ‘Tamogami’s World: Japan’s Top Soldier Reignites Conflict over the Past’, Japan Focus, No. 2945, November 9, 2008. Tobias Harris, ‘Japan’s Revisionist Problem’, Observing Japan blog, November 6, 2008. A recent example is Richard J. Samuels, who writes, ‘Japan is a robust democracy. . . the Japanese political process has never been more transparent and has never engaged the public more fully than it does today. . . Democracy is functioning well in Japan.’ Reading such words, I have to wonder if Professor Samuels is studying the same country that I am. The fact that different groups of conservatives have alternated in power is not sufficient to demonstrate that ‘robust democracy’ exists in Japan. The overall health of Japanese civil society and participatory politics also needs to be considered. See Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 195– 196. E-mail interview with Ayako Doi, January 18, 2009. Ibid. Lowry explains: ‘As long as the United States is the senior partner in the alliance, it should reassure the [East Asian] region about Japan’s intentions. . . Now, Japan should be increasing its security role in the region, unashamedly. It is a new government, with new norms, in a new time. The traditional restraints on it only serve to hobble what should be one of the world’s key players on the side of decency and civilization.” Richard Lowry, ‘Time for a New Sun to Rise’, National Review, July 4, 2005. James Carroll, House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power, Mariner Books, 2006, p. 429. Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 2. Authors who write in this vein are plentiful. A few of the better known are Carl Boggs, Noam Chomsky, and Chalmers Johnson. Bacevich differs somewhat from these others, however, in the sense that he is conservative in his basic political orientation.

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NOTES TO PAGES 283 –290

84. A 2002 survey found that 87.6% of Americans believed that military force would be effective in suppressing terrorism while only 30.6% of Japanese agreed with this proposition. Midford, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism’, p. 41. 85. ‘Allies perceived as insufficiently warlike became a focus for intense wrath.’ Keen, Endless War?, p. 178. 86. There are many editions of The Book of Tea. This sentence comes early in the first chapter, ‘The Cup of Humanity.’ 87. Quoted in Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 12. 88. Ibid. 89. Alex Kerr, Dogs and Demons: The Fall of Modern Japan, Penguin Books, 2001, pp. 10 – 11. 90. In 1994, Paul Midford conducted an interview in which a Japanese diplomat told him that with the Japanese general public, ‘foreign policy issues simply do not register.’ Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford, ‘Introduction’, in Eldridge and Midford, eds, Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism, p. 10.

Chapter 8 The Failure of Change 1. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Eager to Build Ties with Obama amid Domestic Political Turmoil’, Kyodo News, January 20, 2009. 2. Kyodo News, ‘Japan Awaits Clinton with Hopes for Reassurance, Fears for Demands’, Kyodo News, February 15, 2009. 3. Agence France-Presse, ‘Obama Meets Aso, Breathes New Life into Alliance’, Agence France-Presse, February 24, 2009. 4. BBC, ‘Japan Finance Minister Steps Down’, BBC, February 17, 2009. 5. Although Nakagawa become the target of many jokes at this time, in fact his struggle with alcoholism was very serious. Within months of his resignation, in October 2009, he died under mysterious circumstances, but apparently in connection with his alcohol abuse. He was only 56 years old. 6. Kyodo News, ‘Support Rate for Aso Cabinet Hits New Low after Minister’s Resignation’, Kyodo News, February 18, 2009. 7. Kyodo News, ‘Ruling Parties Concerned about Impact of Nakagawa Resignation on Aso’, Kyodo News, February 17, 2009. 8. Kyodo News, ‘DPJ’s Ozawa to Stay Party Chief despite Secretary’s Arrest’, Kyodo News, March 4, 2009. 9. Among the most convincing of these observers is Karel van Wolferen of the University of Amsterdam, who expected such a development to occur even before it happened. See Karel van Wolferen, ‘Lifting Japan’s Curse of “Muddling Through”’, Jottings 23, May 22, 2009. 10. Kyodo News, ‘Aso Cabinet Approval Rating Rises 5.9 Points to 29.6%: Kyodo Poll’, Kyodo News, April 29, 2009. 11. Kyodo News, ‘Aso Draws Laugh by Pledging to Secure “Close Defeat” in Tokyo Election’, Kyodo News, June 20, 2009.

NOTES TO PAGES 291 –302

353

12. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on Parliamentary Elections in Japan’, August 30, 2009. 13. In Karel Van Wolferen’s words, ‘In Washington they didn’t see this Minshuto [DPJ] government arrive with gladness in their hearts at all.’ Karel Van Wolferen, ‘America’s Tragedy and the Blind Free World’, Professional Luncheon, Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, November 16, 2010. 14. As the well-informed analyst Peter Ennis put it several years later: ‘The US, at best, was not prepared to see the DPJ succeed; many in Washington wanted the DPJ to fail.’ Peter Ennis, ‘The US, Japan, and Okinawa’, Dispatch Japan blog, April 11, 2012. 15. John Pomfret and Blaine Harden, ‘U.S. Pressures Japan on Military Package: Washington Concerned as New Leaders in Tokyo Look to Redefine Alliance’, Washington Post, October 22, 2009. 16. ‘The DPJ people came into office thinking we are basically on the same page with Obama, that we are Japan’s Obama,’ Daniel Sneider, Stanford University, quoted in Yuka Hayashi, ‘Japan Minister Fired in Okinawa Dispute’, Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2010. See also, Michael Auslin, ‘Japan’s Obama Moment’, Forbes, August 31, 2009. 17. Asahi Shinbun, ‘The War on Terror’, Asahi Shinbun, January 21, 2009. 18. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on a New Beginning’, Cairo University, Cairo, June 4, 2009. 19. Note Al Kamen, ‘The End of the Global War on Terror’, Washington Post, March 24, 2009. 20. Mark Lynch, ‘Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama’, Centre for a New American Security, June 2010, p. 14. 21. Geoff Morell, ‘DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell at the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.’, US Department of Defense, September 9, 2009. 22. Kyodo News, ‘U.S. Lawmaker Voices Concern over Hatoyama’s East Asian Community’, Kyodo News, November 12, 2009. 23. Yuka Hayashi, ‘Japan Promotes Asian Economic Bloc’, Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2009. 24. Yoichi Kato, ‘U.S. Won’t Dictate to Japan on Key Policy Issues’, Asahi Shinbun, September 23, 2009. 25. Linda Sieg, ‘Gates Pushes Japan on U.S. Troop Shift Plan’, Reuters, October 21, 2009. 26. Michael Green, ‘Tokyo Smackdown’, Shadow Government blog, Foreign Policy, October 23, 2009. 27. Howard Lafranchi, ‘Newly Assertive Japan to Test Obama’, Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 2009. 28. Kyodo News, ‘Defense Chief to Study SDF Redeployment to Support Afghanistan’, Kyodo News, October 20, 2009. 29. David McNeill, ‘Secrets and Lies: Ampo, Japan’s Role in the Iraq War, and the Constitution’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 7 – 5 – 10, February 15, 2010.

354

NOTES TO PAGES 302 –305

30. Weekly Japan Update, ‘Hatoyama, Key Ministers Split on Futenma’, Weekly Japan Update, October 29, 2009. 31. Simon Tisdall, ‘Japan Tries to Loosen the US Leash’, The Guardian, August 10, 2009. 32. Sachiko Sakamaki and Takashi Hirokawa, ‘Japan Decision on Okinawa Base Will Take Months, Hatoyama Says’, Bloomberg, December 15, 2009. 33. Martin Fackler, ‘Mayor-Elect in Okinawan City Opposes U.S. Base’, New York Times, January 24, 2010. 34. Malcolm Foster, ‘Japan’s Prime Minister Vows to “Start from Scratch” on Okinawa Base Deal, Irking U.S.’, Associated Press, January 15, 2010. 35. For a parallel analysis, see Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics, p. 103: ‘As the 21st century began, the United States decided to bet its entire position in Asia on the alliance with Japan. In effect, it has bet not just on the Japanese nation but in particular on a newly assertive national-security elite that represents a rather narrow and unrepresentative slice of Japanese society.’

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Bacevich, Andrew, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford University Press, 2005. Byas, Hugh, Government by Assassination, A.A. Knopf, New York, 1942. Carroll, James, House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power, Mariner Books, Boston, 2006. Clarke, Richard A., Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, Free Press, New York, 2004. Cole, David, Justice at War: The Men and Ideas that Shaped America’s War on Terror, New York Review of Books, 2008. Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Books, New York, 2004. Coulter, Ann, Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2003. Dower, John W., Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, Norton, 1999. ——— War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, Pantheon Books, New York, 1986. Funabashi, Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, Brookings Institution, 2007 Green, Michael J. and Cronin, Patrick M., eds, The U.S. Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1999. Huffman, James L., Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1997. Katzenstein, Peter J., Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, 1996.

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Keen, David, Endless War? Hidden Functions of the War on Terror, Pluto Press, Ann Arbor, 2006. Kerr, Alex, Dogs and Demons: The Fall of Modern Japan, Penguin Books, 2001 Kliman, Daniel M., Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006. Koseki, Shoichi, The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, Westview Press, 1998. Laqueur, Walter, A History of Terrorism, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1977. Leheny, David, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006. Mayer, Jane, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals, Doubleday Publishing Group, 2008. McCormack, Gavan, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, Verso, 2007. Overholt, William H., Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008. Pyle, Kenneth B., Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, PublicAffairs, 2007. Samuels, Richard J., Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007. Scheer, Robert, The Pornography of Power: How Defense Hawks Hijacked 9/11 and Weakened America, Twelve, New York, 2008. Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, University of Washington Press, 2007. Sinclair, Andrew, An Anatomy of Terror: The History of Terrorism, Pan Books, London, 2003. Van Wolferen, Karel, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Vintage Books, New York, 1990. Wakeman, Frederic, Jr., The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937– 1941, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996. Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971– 2000, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Worringer, Renee, ed., The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 2007. Wright, Lawrence, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Vintage Books, New York, 2006.

Articles Akasaka, Taro, ‘9.11 Junichiro to Makiko no Meiso’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 13, November 2001. Aoki, Fukiko, ‘Zujo ni Tawaa ga Futtekita’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Armitage, Richard, et al., ‘The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership’, INSS Special Report, National Defense University, October 11, 2000. Aso, Iku, ‘Nihon e Tero Kogeki Senritsu no Shimyureeshon’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Berkofsky, Axel, ‘Japan Navy’s Salvo Catches Politicians Off Guard’, Asia Times Online, May 16, 2002. ——— ‘Japan on the Defensive, Again’, Asia Times Online, March 28, 2002.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

357

——— ‘Japan Starts to Fall in Line’, Asia Times Online, October 30, 2001. ——— ‘Japan Struggles over How Best to Keep the Peace’, Asia Times Online, November 29, 2001. Calder, Kent E., ‘China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, March– April 2006. Colombani, Jean-Marie, ‘We Are All Americans’, Le Monde, September 12, 2001. De Boer, John, ‘Interpreting the Decision to Dispatch the Aegis’, GLOCOM Weekly Review, No. 75, December 10, 2002. Dower, John, ‘Is the U.S. Repeating the Mistakes of Japan in the 1930s?’, History News Network, June 30, 2003. Frederick, Jim, ‘Japan’s Terror Threat’, Time, May 31, 2004. Furukawa, Katsuhisa and Ikeuchi, Satoshi, ‘“Jiyu Sekai” wa Terorisuto ni Katteru ka’, Shokun!, October 2005. Glosserman, Brad, ‘Japan Battles Gulf War Ghosts’, PacNet Newsletter, No. 38, September 28, 2001. Hachiro, Yoshio and Asao, Keiichiro, ‘Koku Jieitai no Iraku Hakken ni tai suru Nagoya Kosai no Iken Hanketsu ni tsuite (Danwa)’, Minshuto Nyuusu, April 18, 2008. Heginbotham, Eric and Samuels, Richard J., ‘Japan’, in Richard J. Ellings; Aaron L. Friedberg; and Michael Wills, eds, Strategic Asia 2002– 2003: Asian Aftershocks, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002. Hughes, Christopher W., ‘Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?’, University of Warwick Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Working Paper No. 104/02, August 2002. Huntington, Samuel P., ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993. Ijiri, Kazuo, ‘Japan’s Defeat in the Gulf’, Japan Echo, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 1991. Inoguchi, Takashi, ‘Japan’s Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview’, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1991. Itagaki, Yuzo, ‘Kyoi to Hofuku no Akujunkan Yameru tame ni’, Sekai, No. 694, November 2001. Kato, Ryozo, ‘Change and Post-Cold War Japanese Security: Alliance vs. Community of Shared Destiny’, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2002. Kimura, Shuzo, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy – Impact of the Oil Crisis’, ArabAmerican Affairs, No. 17, Summer 1986. Kitaoka, Shinichi, ‘Chronicling Japan’s Crisis Diplomacy’, Japan Echo, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1992. Kreamer, Todd Alan, ‘Sons of Liberty: Patriots or Terrorists?’, Early America Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1996. Lowry, Richard, ‘Time for a New Sun to Rise’, National Review, July 4, 2005. Maehara, Seiji, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Japan Chair Forum, February 25, 2003. McCormack, Gavan, ‘Japan’s Afghan Expedition’, Japan in the World, November 5, 2001. McNeill, David, ‘Martyrs for Peace: Japanese Antiwar Activists Jailed for Trespassing in SDF Compound Vow to Fight On’, Japan Focus, No. 2766, May 31, 2008.

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Metraux, Daniel A., ‘Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinrikyo’, Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 12, December 1995. Midford, Paul, ‘Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy’, East-West Center Washington Policy Studies, No. 27, 2006. Miyata, Osamu, ‘Isuraamu Kagekiha no Taibei Zoo no Yoin wa nani ka’, Sekai, No. 694, November 2001. Miyazaki, Jamie, ‘Japan, Korea New Terror Fronts’, Asia Times Online, November 22, 2003. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, ‘When Is a Terrorist Not a Terrorist?’, Japan Focus, No. 1838, October 10, 2003. Murakami, Suminao, ‘Chokoso Gekitotsu Tero ga Nihon de Okottara’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Nakanishi, Terumasa, ‘Nihon no Mienai Teki o Isso seyo’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Naramoto, Eisuke, ‘Japan Aligned with the PLO’, Japan Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, January– March 1990. National Police Agency, ‘The Oncoming Threat of Terrorism: The Growing Severity of the International Terrorism Situation’, National Police Agency Focus, Vol. 271, December 2005. Nishimura, Kunio, ‘Operation Gulf Dawn: Making History’, Look Japan, Vol. 37, No. 429, December 1991. Ogawa, Kazuhisa, ‘Kikikan Zero – Nihon wa Terorisuto no Rakuen da’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Ogata, Sadako, ‘Unfinished Business in a Forsaken Country: Looking Back and Forward’, Gaiko Forum, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2002. Okamoto, Yukio, ‘Across to the Indian Ocean: Japanese Aid to Afghanistan’, Gaiko Forum, Fall 2002. ——— ‘Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 2002. ——— ‘Japan’s Response to War Overseas: How Not to Make the Same Mistake Twice’, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2002. Olimpio, Guido, ‘Japan: A Target for Al-Qaida?’, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 5, March 9, 2006. Oros, Andrew L., ‘Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 2002. Ozawa, Ichiro, ‘Ima koso Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Gensoku Kakuritsu o’, Sekai, No. 771, November 2007. Peimani, Hooman, ‘Americans Stymie Japan – Iran Oil Deal’, Asia Times Online, July 4, 2003. Penn, Michael, ‘Oil and Power: The Rise and Fall of the Japan –Iran Partnership in Azadegan’, Japan Focus, No. 2296, December 19, 2006. ——— ‘Public Faces and Private Spaces: Islam in the Japanese Context’, Asia Policy, No. 5, January 2008. ——— ‘The Slaying of Ito Kazuya: Japan in Afghanistan’, Japan Focus, No. 2870, September 2008. Purrington, Courtney and Kato, Akira, ‘Tokyo’s Policy Responses during the Gulf Crisis’, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4, April 1991.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

359

Pyle, Kenneth B., ‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change of Course’, NBR Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 2006. Ramachandran, Sudha, ‘Terror: What Japan Has to Fear’, Asia Times Online, January 12, 2006. Sado, Ryuki, ‘Shubosha wa Hofuku Kogeki o Nozondeiru’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Sakai, Keiko, ‘Japan– Iraq Relations: The Perception Gap and Its Influence on Diplomatic Policies’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4, Fall 2001. Sakurai, Keiko, ‘Muslims in Contemporary Japan’, Asia Policy, No. 5, January 2008. Samuels, Richard J., ‘“New Fighting Power!”: Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007– 2008. Schultz, Jennifer, ‘Koizumi’s Wars’, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 4, 2001. Selden, Mark, ‘A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities and the American Way of War from the Pacific War to Iraq’, Japan Focus, No. 2414, May 2, 2007. ——— ‘Japan, the United States, and Yasukuni Nationalism: War, Historical Memory, and the Future of the Asia-Pacific’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, No. 2892, September 10, 2008. Shimizu, Manabu, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy’, Japan Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, October– December 1988. Shinmi, Jun, ‘Kokka Anzen Hosho Mondai toshite no Kokusai Tero’, Gaiko Forum, March 2006. Shorrock, Tim, ‘Japan’s Military Role Undergoes a Sea Change’, Asia Times Online, September 26, 2001. Stratfor, ‘Japan in Iraq: Deploying Troops, Greasing Hands and Seeking Oil’, Stratfor, January 26, 2004. Takahashi, Kazuo, ‘Not the Most Popular Decision, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force Goes to Iraq’, Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University, Working Paper Series No. 19, April 2007. Tan Ro Mi, ‘Otto no Keitai ga Tsunagarani’, Bungei Shunju, Vol. 79, No. 12, October 2001. Tanaka, Koichiro, ‘Damage Control in Japan – Iran Relations’, Gaiko Forum, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 2007. Telhami, Shibley, ‘2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll’, Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, March 2008. Ushiba, Akihiko, ‘The Minesweeping Mission: A Job Well Done’, Japan Echo, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1992. Woolley, Peter J., ‘Japan’s 1991 Minesweeping Decision: An Organizational Response’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8, August 1996. Yamauchi, Masayuki, ‘Japan’s Role: From Anti-Terrorism to the Formation of a New Order’, Glocom Platform, Commentary, November 2001. ——— ‘The Open Society and Its Enemies: Confronting International Terrorism’, Gaiko Forum, Winter 2002.

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News Services Agence France-Presse Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections Asahi Shinbun Associated Press Associated Press of Pakistan BBC News Boston Globe CBC News Christian Science Monitor CNN Daily Times Daily Yomiuri Financial Times Guardian The Independent International Herald Tribune International Herald Tribune – Asahi Shinbun Japan Times Japan Today Japan Weekly Mail Kyodo News Mainichi Daily News Mainichi Shinbun MarketWatch NBC News New York Times Nihon Keizai Shinbun Observing Japan Press TV Reuters Sankei News Shingetsu Newsletter Stars and Stripes The Oriental Economist The Telegraph Tokyo Asahi Shinbun Voice of America Washington Post Washington Times Yomiuri Shinbun

INDEX

Abbas, Mahmud, 204– 206 ABC News, 224 Abe, Shinzo advisers and supporters of, 225, 275 Afghanistan policy as prime minister, 186– 187 Asian relations as prime minister, 251– 252 as chief cabinet secretary, 128 as deputy chief cabinet secretary, 7, 77 desire for permanent UN Security Council seat of, 108– 109 fall from power of, 145 Iran policy as prime minister, 198– 199 Iraq War policy as prime minister, 133– 138 as LDP secretary-general, 90, 94– 95, 107 on North Korea abduction issue, 209 Pakistan policy as prime minister, 191 promotion of Defense Ministry, 262– 264 views of the US – Japanalliance, 107– 109 Abu Nidal Organization, 234 academia, 15 – 20

Addington, David, 116 Aegis-equipped vessels, 48, 56 – 63 Ahmadinejad, Mahmud, 198– 200 aid, Japanese government financial to Afghanistan, 185, 187 to Iran, 196 to Pakistan, 189– 191, 193 to Palestinian refugees, 202, 204– 206 in Persian Gulf War, 29 – 31 Afghanistan, 184– 188, 195, 230– 231, 292, 296– 297, 301 Aisawa, Ichiro, 101–102 Akamatsu, Masao, 81 Akiba, Tadatoshi, 80 Al-Jazeera, 98 – 99, 220– 222 al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, 57, 186, 195 financial sanctions against, 204 launch of the September 11 attacks, 4, 10, 220 limited capabilities of, 216 possible operations against Japan, 222– 225, 238– 240, 243– 244 theoretical threat to Japan of, 22 – 27, 39, 171, 220– 223 unrepresentative nature of, 237 worldview of, 25 – 26

362

JAPAN AND

THE

Ali al-Salim Air Base (Kuwait), 132, 137 ‘alliance managers’ bipartisanship of, 292 concern about public backlash, 126 praise for Aegis deployment of, 62 –63 response to September 11 attacks of, 21, 35 – 36, 48 – 51 support for promotion of Japan Defense Ministry, 263 threats to Japan of, 51 –52, 87, 142– 144, 197, 299– 300 Amami-Oshima island (Japan), 207 Amman (Jordan), 98 Amnesty International, 242 Ampo Riots, 28 Annan, Kofi, 109, 133 Aoki, Fukiko, 5 – 6 Aoki, Mikio, 107– 108 Aoyama, Kunio, 270– 274 Arafat, Yasser, 204 Arbil (Iraq), 132 Arima, Tatsuo, 205 Armitage Report, 48 – 49, 110 Armitage, Richard argument with Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, 73 –74 ‘boots on the ground’ comment of, 85, 104 efforts to lobby Japan to support the Iraq War, 69 –70, 84 – 85, 93– 95, 97, 109 encouragement to revise Japan constitution, 109– 110 influence on Aegis deployment of, 61 manipulation of Japanese conservatives by, 183 ‘show the flag’ comment of, 49, 51 threats to Japan of, 51 –52, 87, 197 views of the US – Japanalliance, 48 –50, 106, 278, 280 Asahi Shinbun comments on court judgments, 267, 273– 274

WAR ON TERROR criticism of government policies of, 32, 54, 240 criticism of Japanese right-wing terrorism, 210 government denies access to, 119 opposition to the launch of Iraq War, 69 – 70 political orientation of, 9, 64 public opinion polls of, 27, 52, 63, 79, 101, 146 response to September 11 attacks of, 9 – 12, 16 reports of officials’ comments, 265 supports reform of War on Terror, 294 Asai, Yasuhiro, 6 Asao, Keiichiro, 273 Asaumi, Nobuo, 51 Ashcroft, John, 181 Ashida, Hitoshi, 43 Asian Wide Cooperation Kyoto, 246 Aso, Iku, 23 Aso, Taro as chairman of the LDP policy research council, 7 as foreign minister, 137 as LDP secretary-general, 163 as prime minister, 165– 166, 252, 281, 286– 290 Assistance to Strengthen the Function of the Presidential Office (Palestine), 206 Atlantic Charter, 34 – 35 Australia, 123, 221 ‘Axis of Evil’, 67 – 68, 71, 181 Azadegan oil field, 196–198 Bacevich, Andrew, 282 Baker, Howard, 49, 58, 68 – 69, 109 Baker-Hamilton Report, 135– 136 Balad (Iraq), 87 Bali (Indonesia), 243 Ball, George, 284 Bangladesh, 236

INDEX Basra (Iraq), 129 Berwari, Nisreen, 125 Bhutto, Benazir, 193 Bin Laden, Osama conflict with the United States, 10 death of, 224 public awareness of, 4 threat to Japan of, 3, 25 – 27, 39, 241– 242 view of Japan, 220– 223 Bix, Herbert, 278 Blair, Tony, 97, 250– 251 ‘boots on the ground’, 85, 132 Bolton, John, 109 Bosnia, 223 Boucher, Richard, 91 Brady, Nicolas, 29 Bremer, Paul, 88, 94 Briand, Aristide, 43 Brigade for Conquering Traitors (Japan), 210 Brooks, Martha, 224 Buddhism, 37 budget, Japanese military, 28 – 29 Bungei Shunju, 12 – 14, 22 – 23 Bush, George H. W., 29, 31 – 32 Bush, George W. acknowledgement Iraqi WMD did not exist, 127– 128 as advocate of domestic surveillance, 240– 242 ‘Axis of Evil’ declaration of, 67 – 68, 71, 195– 196 Bush Doctrine, 283 compared to Saddam Hussein, 81 decline in popularity of, 97, 134– 137, 164 ideological fantasies of, 200, 255–256 launching of the Iraq War, 67 – 81, 253 launching of the Surge in Iraq, 135– 136 linkage of Iraq War to War on Terror, 87

363 meetings with Junichiro Koizumi, 52 – 53, 68, 84 – 85, 88 premature declaration of the end of Iraq War, 84 public distrust of, 40 reelection of, 198 response to September 11 attacks of, 7, 8, 21 use of Japan analogy for Iraq, 266, 279

Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (Japan), 230 Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Japan), 45 Cabinet Office (Japan), 265 Cairo University (Egypt), 294 Cambodia, 47 Camp Zama (Japan), 224 Campbell, Kurt, 48 – 49, 286, 297–298 Canada, 232 Carroll, James, 282 Center for Strategic and International Studies (United States), 35, 299 censorship, 118 –119, 131 Chaplin, Robert C., 53 – 54, 58 – 59 ‘Checkbook Diplomacy’, 31 Cheney, Dick, 101, 137, 224 Chertoff, Michael, 241– 242 China connection with Yukio Hatoyama diplomacy, 293, 297– 299 criticism of US –Japan diplomacy, 147 international conferences, 232 Japan’s diplomatic policy toward, 211– 215, 252, 254 as a rising power, 115, 142, 259 Toshio Tamogami’s view of, 276 view of Japan’s role in Iraq, 111– 112 Choudhry, Iftikar Muhammad, 192 Christian Science Monitor, 300 Christianity, 25, 181, 282 Churkin, Vitaly, 147

364

JAPAN AND

THE

‘Clash of Civilizations’, 10 –11, 15, 256 Clinton, Bill, 196 Clinton, Hillary, 286–287, 292 ‘Coalition of the Willing’, 34, 78, 132, 157, 250– 251, 253 Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), 88, 119– 120 Cold War, 9, 25, 28 –29, 31 –32, 241, 284 Communism, 276 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 191 Conference on the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (Afghanistan), 187 Congress, United States, 21, 29, 87 Constitution of Japan ASDF mission judged violation of, 270, 272 GSDF Samawa deployment as violation of, 116 history of, 41 – 47, 283 Ichiro Ozawa’s view of, 152 Iraq War violation of, 95, 301– 302 Japanese conservative calls for revision of, 178, 263–264 Junichiro Koizumi’s misuse of, 93 MSDF deployments as violation of, 64, 296 as political fiction, 250 ‘revision by reinterpretation’, 46 Richard Armitage calls for revision of, 50, 109– 110 UN Peace Cooperation Bill as departure from, 30 violations of its provisions, 257, 268– 274 Cooper, Gary, 53, 249 Cossa, Ralph, 62 – 63 Council on Foreign Relations (United States), 70 Counterterrorism Commission (Japan), 232 Crawford (Texas), 84 Cronin, Patrick, 50, 263

WAR ON TERROR Dayan, Uzi, 204 de Mello, Sergio Vieira, 87, 133 Defense White Paper (Japan), 261 Democratic Party (United States), 291–292 Democratic Party of Japan comments on US occupation of Iraq, 83 diverse views within, 152– 153 electoral gains of, 88, 138 ineffective opposition after September 11 of, 63 – 66 as Japan’s ruling party, 291– 304 opposition to launch of Iraq War, 70, 74, 76, 81 opposition to MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 139– 166 reversal on Iraq War policy, 301– 302 rise to power of, 285– 291 support for High Court verdict, 272– 273 Department of Homeland Security (United States), 241– 242, 245 Diene, Doudou, 244 Djibouti, 223 Doi, Ayako, 280– 281 Doi, Takako, 36, 62, 72 Dokkyo University, 75 Dostum, Abdul Rashid, 184 Dower, John, 255– 256 Dual Containment, 196 Duelfer Report, 96 Dumont, Lionel, 223, 238 East Asian Community, 297 East Timor, 47 Eda, Kenji, 148 Edelman, Eric, 127 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 28 Emma E. Booker Elementary School, 7 Enver Pasha, 25 exercise of the right of collective self-defence, 1, 57, 151, 228–229, 264

INDEX Falluja (Iraq), 98, 121– 122 Fire and Disaster Management Agency (Japan), 233 Federal Emergency Management Agency (United States), 233 Foreign Affairs, 11, 23 Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, 243, 261– 262 Foreign Policy, 299 Fourteen Points, 34 – 35 France, 77 – 78, 94 – 95, 111, 185, 223 Fukuda, Yasuo on Aegis deployment, 58, 60 backlash against former hostages, 103 character of, 147– 148, 158– 159 on deployment of SDF to Iraq, 89 on hostage-taking in Iraq, 98 interpretation of US– Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 55 on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 203 on launch of Iraq War, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78, 90 on occupation of Iraq, 84 as prime minister, 147– 164, 188, 252 on relations with Pakistan, 191 response to September 11 attacks of, 7 –8, 230 on status of the SDF and Defense Agency, 257, 261 on weapons of mass destruction, 95 –96 Fukuoka Prefectural Police, 237 Fukushima, Mizuho, 98 – 99, 136, 296, 302– 303 Furukawa, Teijiro, 7 Furusho, Koichi, 260– 261 Futenma airbase (Japan), 298– 299, 302– 303 Fuyushiba, Tetsuzo, 73 – 74 gaiatsu, 32, 50, 54, 62, 141, 298 Gaiko Forum, 23 – 25, 32 – 34, 174

365

Gamaa al-Islamiyya, 234 Garner, Jay, 83 Gates, Robert, 159, 188, 292, 298–299 Gaza Strip (Palestine), 202 General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, 207 Germany, 185, 223 Al-Ghavraf oil field (Iraq), 112 Gibbs, Robert, 291 Glosserman, Brad, 35 – 36, 56 Golan Heights, 47 Green, Michael, 48 – 50, 142– 144, 280, 299– 300 Guantanamo prison, 246, 294– 295 Hachiro, Yoshio, 273 Hadley, Stephen, 130 Hamana (ship), 55 Hamas, 203– 206, 234 Harada, Chikahito, 59 – 60 Harris, Tobias, 244, 278– 279 Hashida, Shinsuke, 119– 120 Hashimoto, Goro, 177–178 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 69, 105, 168 Hatoyama, Kunio, 240– 247 Hatoyama, Yukio as brother to Kunio Hatoyama, 240 criticism of Aso government, 288 criticism of Iraq War, 136 criticism of SDF deployments in Iraq, 133 as opposition leader, 63 –66, 289– 291 opposition to MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 139– 140, 150, 154, 156 as prime minister, 291– 303 Hayashi, Yoshimasa, 81 heiwa-boke, 8 Henoko (Japan), 302–303 Heritage Foundation, 59, 300 High Noon, 53, 249 Higuchi, Khalid, 237 Hirano, Hirofumi, 301–302

366

JAPAN AND

THE

Hitotsubashi University, 93 Hokkaido (Japan), 245– 246, 259 Hollywood, 14 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 204 Horiuchi, Mitsuo, 62 Hosaka, Nobuto, 129 Hosei University, 74 Hosoda, Hiroyuki, 96, 120– 121 House of Councillors (Japan) comments by officials to, 60, 134 passage of legislation by, 55 rejection of postal bill in 2005, 124 secondary to House of Representatives, 145–146, 153–154, 160, 166 strength of DPJ in, 296 2007 elections, 138, 187, 252, 264 House of Representatives (Japan), 296 2005 general elections, 124 2009 general elections, 165, 290 comments by officials to, 76 passage of legislation by, 55, 262– 263 precedence over House of Councillors, 138, 145–146, 153–154, 160, 166 strength of DPJ in, 296 terrorism committee of, 67 Huntington, Samuel, 11, 15 Hussein, Saddam alleged connections to al-Qaeda, 67 alleged weapons of mass destruction, 75, 78, 94 – 96 fall from power, 81 – 82, 90, 108, 259 invasion of Kuwait, 29 Ichigaya (Tokyo), 265 Ikeuchi, Satoshi, 178– 180, 225 Imai, Noriaki, 98 – 104 Immigration Bureau (Japan), 242 Inaba, Masaki, 245– 246 India, 189 Indonesia, 236 Inpex Corporation, 196– 198

WAR ON TERROR Intelligence Security Corps (Japan), 268–269 International Atomic Energy Agency, 197 International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 185, 188 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 174 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 174, 233 International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom), 263 International Peace Cooperation Law, 47, 53, 258 International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan), 146–147, 152, 186 Intifada, 16 Inoue, Masamori, 90, 121, 129 Iran, Islamic Republic of, 67 – 68, 194–200, 236 Iran– Iraq War, 30, 48 Iraq SDF deployment bill, 86– 87, 273 Iraq War Bush administration launching of, 67 – 81 decline of public support for, 134 intensification of violence in, 86 – 87, 137 Japanese hostage crisis, 98 – 104 Koizumi administration support for, 68 – 81 in Obama era, 292 premature declaration of end of, 84 protests against, 73, 76 – 77, 79 – 80 as representative of US violence, 238 the Surge, 135– 136 Ishiba, Shigeru, 275 as candidate for LDP president, 164 defiance of High Court, 271 meetings with Robert Gates, 159, 188 on North Korea, 209

INDEX on promotion of uniformed SDF, 260– 261 proposal to send hospital ship to Iraq War, 81 supports Aegis dispatch, 60 supports GSDF mission to Samawa, 90 supports MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 148, 159 on Takemasa Moriya scandal, 155– 156 on Tamogami Affair, 275 Ishihara, Shintaro, 210 Ishikawa, Toru, 54 – 55 Islamic world, 16 – 17, 38, 171, 178– 180, 206, 218– 220 Isoshima, Tsuneo, 27 Israeli– Palestinian conflict, 10, 16, 180, 196, 200– 206 Itagaki, Yuzo, 15 – 17, 219 Italy, 89, 221 Ito, Kazuya, 188 al-Jaafari, Ibrahim, 123, 126 Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 111 Japan Coast Guard, 207– 208, 228, 232 Japan Communist Party criticism of government policy, 63, 83, 93, 95, 132 response to September 11 attacks of, 37 revelations about SDF domestic spying, 268– 269 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 242 Japan International Cooperation Agency, 120, 129 Japan International Volunteer Center, 100 Japan Muslim Association, 237 Japan National Press Club, 136, 154 Japan Platform, 185

367

Japan Red Army, 151 Japan Times, 119– 120, 135 Japanese Shipowners Association, 232 Jerusalem, 16 jihad, 25, 179 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 192 Kadena airbase (Japan), 302 Kades, Charles L., 43 Kaifu, Toshiki, 29 – 31, 69, 144 Kan, Naoto call for independent foreign policy, 140 gains in 2003 general elections, 88 emergency leadership of DPJ, 158 opposes Iraq War, 76, 83, 86, 121 as prime minister, 304 Kanamori, Tokujiro, 45 Kandahar (Afghanistan), 230 Kantei, 7, 228, 232, 249, 252 Kanzaki, Takenori, 8, 60, 74 Karzai, Hamid, 185– 186 Kashimura, Takeaki, 103 Kato, Koichi, 67, 71, 137, 210 Kato, Ryozo, 71, 181 Kawaguchi, Yoriko on GSDF mission to Samawa, 91 on hostage crisis in Iraq, 99 on launch of Iraq War, 72, 77 – 78 on occupation of Iraq, 82 – 83 on terrorism, 173 visit to Iran, 196 visit to the West Bank, 204 on weapons of mass destruction, 74, 76, 94 – 95 Kay, David, 95 Keating, Timothy, 292 Kellogg, Frank B., 43 Kellogg – Briand Pact, 43 Kelly, James, 58 Kerr, Alex, 284 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 147 Kharrazi, Kamal, 195 Khatami, Mohammad, 15, 195– 196

368

JAPAN AND

THE

Kim Jong-Il, 208– 209, 211 Kirisame (ship), 55 Kirishima (ship), 61 Kishi, Nobusuke, 28, 257, 263– 264 Kitaoka, Shinichi, 173 Kitazawa, Toshimi, 296–299, 301–302 Kliman, Daniel, 32, 280 Klingner, Bruce, 300 Koda, Shosei, 121 Koike, Yuriko, 81, 100–101, 164 Koizumi, Junichiro 2005 election victory of, 124, 145, 198, 290 comments on Special Measures Against Terrorism, 55 deployment of SDF to Afghan mission support, 51 – 52, 61 deployment of SDF to Iraq, 84 –94, 97 –105, 133, 301– 302 firing of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, 185–186 on hostage-taking in Iraq, 99 – 104, 209 influence from Yukio Okamoto, 33 –34, 38, 249 on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 203 meeting with Colin Powell, 77 meeting with former prime ministers, 69 meetings with George W. Bush, 52 –53, 68, 84 – 85, 88 parroting of Richard Armitage, 52, 95 popularity of, 20, 39 –40, 66, 81 –82, 86 reaction to the capture of Saddam Hussein, 94 on relations with China, 214 on relations with Iran, 195– 198 on relations with North Korea, 208– 210 on relations with Pakistan, 190– 191 resignation as prime minister, 133– 134, 249 resignation from politics, 165

WAR ON TERROR response to September 11 attacks of, 7 – 8, 13 – 14, 229– 230 as role model for US– Japan alliance, 155, 249– 254 support for launching the Iraq War, 68, 71, 73 – 74, 76 – 79 support for the War on Terror of, 52 – 53, 71, 220, 235 views of the SDF and Defense Agency, 257, 260, 262 views of the US– Japan alliance, 79, 92, 254 use of Japanese constitution by, 93 Komaki airbase (Japan), 53, 94 Komura, Masahiko, 77, 105, 107, 147, 193–195, 271 Kongo (ship), 48 Kono, Taro, 72 Kono, Yohei, 15 Kono Initiative on the Dialogue Among Civilizations, 15 Korean Central News Agency, 208 Korean War, 32 Koriyama, Soichiro, 98 – 104 Koseki, Shoichi, 75 Kumaoka, Michio, 100 Kurama (ship), 55 Kurdistan, 87 Kuwait Ali al-Salim Air Base, 132, 137 as al-Qaeda target, 222 GSDF withdrawal into, 130 Iraqi invasion of, 29 ‘liberation’ of, 31 visit of Shinzo Abe, 137 Kyodo News interviews by, 88, 119, 222 public opinion polls, 82, 86, 97 reports of, 84 Kyoto University, 225 Kyuma, Fumio, 59, 62, 134– 137, 187, 269, 297 LaFleur, Christopher, 60

INDEX Laqueur, Walter, 12 Lake Toya (Japan), 245– 246 Lawless, Richard, 84, 86 Le Monde, 7 Lehman Shock, 292 Lewis, Bernard, 23 Liancourt Rocks (South Korea-Japan), 211 Liberal Democratic Party diverse views of China within, 213– 214 led by Junichiro Koizumi, 39 – 40, 88, 124 led by Shinzo Abe, 39 – 40, 138, 264 led by Taro Aso, 40, 285– 290 on lifting sanctions against Pakistan, 189– 190 political weakness of, 29, 161– 163, 188 pro-Washington orientation of, 20, 40, 108, 168, 292 support for MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 138– 166 Likud Party, 16 Lille (France), 223 Lior, Yitzhak, 203– 204 Lowry, Richard, 281 MacArthur, Douglas, 42 – 43, 284 Machimura, Nobutaka, 125, 161, 194, 243– 244, 265, 271 Maeda, Tetsuo, 263 Maehara, Seiji, 108, 127 Manchuria, 283 Mainichi Shinbun, 68, 124– 125 Masuda, Kohei, 59 – 60 Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan), 184 McClellan, Scott, 93 McCormack, Gavan, 107, 206 McCormack, Sean, 161 Mecca, 25 Mencken, Henry Louis, 254 Metropolitan Police Department (Japan), 228, 231– 232

369

Miliband, David, 294 militarism, American, 282– 285 militarism, Japanese, 33, 57, 259, 279–284, 304 Ministry of Defense (Japan), 183– 184, 188, 257– 265, 299 Ministry of Finance (Japan), 228, 233–234 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) assessment of its Japan’s anti-terrorist diplomacy, 215– 216, 254 conceptions of terrorism, 170– 174 concern about Samawa security situation, 124 criticism of David Kay, 96 Defense Ministry becomes rival to, 265 diplomatic policy toward Afghanistan, 184–188 diplomatic policy toward China, 212– 215 diplomatic policy toward Pakistan, 189– 194 diplomatic policy toward Iran, 194– 200 diplomatic policy toward the Korean Peninsula, 206– 212 diplomatic policy toward the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict, 200–206 dismissal of consequences of supporting US policy, 220 evades responsibility for hostage-taking in Iraq, 100 influence from Masayuki Yamauchi, 35 marginalization of Islamic area specialists, 19 – 20 pro-Washington orientation of, 20, 84, 94 – 95, 105, 130, 168–216 support for military deployments, 57 – 58, 83 – 84 Yukio Okamoto connection to, 32 Ministry of Health (Japan), 228, 233 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan), 228, 233

370

JAPAN AND

THE

Ministry of Justice (Japan), 228, 230 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (Japan), 228 Mishima, Yukio, 265 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, 180 Miyata, Osamu, 17 – 18 Miyazawa, Kiichi, 69, 93 Mocny, Robert, 245 Moffit, Matthew, 148 Morrell, Geoff, 157, 296 Mori, Yoshiro, 69, 81 Moriya, Takemasa, 70, 155, 259– 260, 263 Moriyama, Mayumi, 82 Morse, Ronald, 56 Motegi, Toshimitsu, 172 Motoya, Toshio, 275 Moussa, Amr, 117 Mozambique, 47 Murakami, Suminao, 22 Murakami, Yutaka, 129 Murai, Jin, 69, 229, 234 Murayama, Tomiichi, 47 Musharraf, Pervez, 189–194, 200 Myers, Richard, 241 Nago (Japan), 302– 303 Nagoya (Japan), 128, 271, 273, 275 Nakagawa, Hidenao, 49 – 50 Nakagawa, Shoichi, 209– 210, 287– 288 Nakamura, Tetsu, 1, 37 Nakanishi, Terumasa, 225–226 Nakano, Keiko, 269 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 69 Nakatani, Gen, 260 deployments of MSDF, 48, 57 –58, 154 description of action against North Korean vessel, 207 domestic deployment of SDF, 229 on the Iraq War, 67 on the lessons of the Persian Gulf War, 50

WAR ON TERROR on promotion of uniformed SDF, 260– 261 on the War on Terror, 183– 184 Nakayama, Nariaki, 271 Nakayama, Taro, 77, 81 Narashino (Japan), 235 Narita Airport (Japan), 245 Nasiriya (Iraq), 87 – 90 National Intelligence Estimate (United States), 199– 200 National Police Agency (Japan), 228, 231–232, 234–237, 240, 242, 259 National Review, 281 Negroponte, John, 140–141 Netherlands, 123, 251 New Chitose Airport (Japan), 245 New Komeito Party in 2009 general election, 165, 290 lawmakers of, 81 on domestic deployment of SDF, 228– 229 reaction to September 11 attacks, 8 resistance to deployment of Aegis vessels, 60, 62 resistance to launch of Iraq War, 73 – 74 resistance to promotion of Defense Agency, 262, 264 role in Indian Ocean deployment struggle, 145, 154, 160, 162 vetoes GSDF military role in Afghanistan, 188 NGO Forum, 245– 246 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 111 Nikaido Statement, 201– 203, 219 Nishi-Kawaguchi (Japan), 223, 238 Nixon, Richard M., 46 Noda, Takeshi, 60– 61 Noda, Yoshihiko, 304 Nogami, Yoshiji, 185–186 Nonaka, Hiromu, 54, 57, 264 ‘non-combat zones’, 86 – 87, 120 – 121, 124, 132 – 133, 270 – 274, 301 – 302

INDEX North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 186 North Korea factor in Japan’s support for Iraq War, 107– 108, 115 Japan’s diplomatic policy toward, 206– 212 nuclear weapons issues of, 199 as part of ‘Axis of Evil’, 67 – 68 threat from, 259, 299 US alliance manager arguments about, 143 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 189, 199 Nuclear Weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 17, 189, 220– 221, 281 in India and Pakistan, 189– 190, 194 in Iran, 194, 197– 200 in North Korea, 199, 206, 211 as terror threat, 241 Nukaga, Fukushiro, 125, 127, 133, 261 Nuremberg trials, 43 Nye, Joseph, 48 – 49 Obama, Barack, 285– 287, 291– 305 Obora, Toshiyuki, 267– 268 Obuchi, Keizo, 47, 54 –55 Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, 83 Ogata, Sadako, 76, 120, 129, 184– 185 Ogawa, Kazuhisa, 22, 225– 227 Ogawa, Kotaro, 119– 120 Oil, 110– 113, 163, 196– 198, 201– 202, 219 Okada, Katsuya, 74, 121– 122, 127, 302 Okakura, Tenshin, 283 Okamoto, Yukio, 32 – 35, 38, 107, 249 Okazaki, Hisahiko, 39, 56 Okinawa, 37, 298– 299, 302– 303 Oku, Katsuhiko, 90, 121, 129 Onishi, Nobuhiro, 267 Ono, Yoshinori, 122, 260–262

371

Operation Desert Fox, 107 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 201 Osaka (Japan), 128 Osumi (ship), 55 Oumi (ship), 161 Ozawa, Ichiro distinctive policies of, 304 forced resignation of, 303 criticism of Iraq War, 83, 137 meeting with Hillary Clinton, 287 opposition to MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 139– 166 political funds scandal of, 288– 289 proposal for SDF combat role in Afghanistan, 150– 153, 187– 188 public distrust of, 158 criticism of SDF missions in Iraq, 132 view of US– Japan alliance, 141 pacifism, Japanese Armitage Report view of, 49 as betrayal, 176, 283 Constitution’s enshrinement of, 41 – 47 ‘flimsy shield’ of, 33 ‘foolish pacifism’, 226– 227, 251– 252 loss of political representation of, 46 – 47, 250 tactical ‘defence’ of, 152 versus ‘realism’, 41, 280 Pakistan, 161, 186, 189–194, 223–224, 236 Palestine, 238 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 234 Palestinian Legislative Council, 205 pan-Islam, 25 – 26 pan-Turkism, 25 – 26 Patriot Act (United States), 241 Peace Winds Japan, 185 Pearl Harbor, 281 Persian Gulf War, 29 – 33, 37 –38, 46– 47, 50 – 51, 54, 283

372

JAPAN AND

THE

‘personal responsibility’, 102– 104, 129, 131 Peru, 234 Pistole, John, 241 Poland, 221 Popper, Karl R., 24 Powell, Colin encouragement to revise Japan constitution, 110 rejection of United Nations lead in postwar Iraq, 82 – 83 support for former Japanese hostages, 104 threats to Japan of, 197 visit to Tokyo of, 77 weapons of mass destruction speech, 75 –76, 94 Presley, Elvis, 249 ‘prestige diplomacy’, 40, 182– 183, 211, 213 protests against Self-Defense Forces deployments, 52, 61, 93, 97 – 98, 123– 125 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghanistan), 187 Public Security Intelligence Agency (Japan), 228, 230, 239 Pyle, Kenneth, 113, 182– 183 al-Qubaisi, Abd al-Salam, 101– 102 Ramadi (Iraq), 98 Reagan, Ronald, 48 Repeta, Lawrence, 268 Republican Party (United States), 134, 167, 285, 292, 297 Revolutionary Army (Japan), 224 Rice, Condoleezza, 68, 197 Robin Hood, 169 Rodman, Peter, 71 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 276 Rumsfeld, Donald, 67, 89 – 90, 109, 127, 134 Russia, 111, 147, 218– 219, 232

WAR ON TERROR Russo –Japanese War, 17, 283 Sado, Ryuki, 12– 14 al-Sadr, Muqtada, 118, 120 Sakai, Keiko, 19, 106, 118, 170 Samawa (Iraq) ASDF transport mission to, 132 attacks on GSDF in, 98, 118, 123 GSDF deployment to, 87 – 94, 97 – 104, 109, 111– 131, 252, 261 proximity to oil fields of, 112 Sankei News, 272 Sasebo Naval Base (Japan), 48, 80 Sassa, Atsuyuki, 23, 225 Satake, Yoji, 129 Sato, Masahisa, 301 Sato, Yukio, 170 Saudi Arabia, 10 Sawagiri (ship), 56 Schieffer, Thomas, 139–142, 154–155, 254 Sekai, 15, 150 Selden, Mark, 214 Self-Defense Forces antagonism toward the media, 259 ASDF transport mission in Iraq, 131– 133, 135, 137, 270–274 closeness to United States of, 48 connection with Afghanistan diplomacy, 252 connection with campaign for UN Security Council seat, 109 connection with Iran diplomacy, 197 deployment after Persian Gulf War of, 30 – 31, 48 deployment inside Japan, 234– 235, 245 deployment to Afghan mission support, 51 – 63 deployment to Indian Ocean, 53 – 54, 115, 138– 167, 295– 297 domestic spying of, 268– 269 escort of USS Kitty Hawk, 48

INDEX establishment of, 45, 235, 257 GSDF deployment to Iraq, 83 –94, 97 –104, 111– 114, 301– 302 GSDF experience in Samawa, 115– 131 interventions in politics of, 53 – 55, 58 –60, 62, 83 – 84, 258 Iraqi attacks on, 98, 118, 123 joint drill with the National Police Agency, 259 liaison to US Central Command of, 69 as ‘occupation force’ in Iraq, 86, 117– 118, 127 political influence of, 41 – 42, 257– 265 proposals for combat role in Afghanistan, 150–153, 186– 188, 252 relationship with Pakistan armed forces, 53, 191 Tamogami Affair, 275– 281 Sengoku, Yoshito, 122 September 11 attacks debate on how to respond to, 11– 20, 22 –27, 36 –40 impact from the media, 3 Japanese public responses to, 1 – 2, 3 –7, 9, 36 – 37 as political opportunity, 32 – 36, 38 –39 US government response to, 21 Setouchi, Jakucho, 37 Shanghai (China), 212 Shii, Kazuo, 83, 95, 132, 268– 269 Shikata, Toshiyuki, 1, 263 Singapore, 188 Shimazu, Akira, 233 Shining Path guerrilla organization, 234 Shinmi, Jun, 174– 176, 225 Shiokawa, Masajuro, 82, 190 Shiozaki, Yasuhisa, 134– 135, 137, 140, 184 Shokun!, 178

373

Siddiqui, Raees, 238– 239 Sino – Japanese War, 213 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, 223 Sistani, Ayatollah Ali, 113 ‘show the flag’, 49, 51 Social Democratic Party, 36–37, 62–63, 72, 296, 302–303 Socialist Party, 47 Sodei, Rinjiro, 74– 75 Somalia, 223 Sophia University, 119 South Korea, 187, 211– 212, 232, 245, 254 Soviet Union, 25, 28 – 30, 32, 208 Spain, 221 Special Assault Team (Japan), 231 Special Measures Against Terrorism law as basis of GSDF deployment, 67, 70, 72 as basis of MSDF deployment, 59, 148 passage of, 55, 63 – 65 relationship to constitutional change, 151 Stratfor, 112 Stuff Happens, 128– 129 Sugihara, Yasuo, 93 Sugiura, Seiken, 190 Sultan Galiev, 25 ‘Sunni Triangle’, 86 – 87 Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, 118 Supreme Court (Japan), 45 – 46, 266–268, 270 Suto, Nobuhiko, 81 Tachikawa Tent Village, 266– 268 Tajima, Yasuhiko, 119 Takano, Toshiyuki, 68 Takato, Nahoko, 98 – 104 Takeuchi, Yukio, 101 Tajikistan, 188 Taliban connection with Iran, 195

374

JAPAN AND

THE

connection with Pakistan, 189 financial sanctions against, 204, 233 military capabilities of, 57 raids in Afghanistan by, 186 regime collapse, 58, 184 Tamogami, Toshio, 274– 281, 283 Tan Ro Mi, 6 Tanaka, Hitoshi, 210 Tanaka, Makiko, 105–106, 185– 186 Tanaka, Setsuo, 231 Taniguchi, Tomohiko, 149 Teikyo University, 1, 263 Teranaka, Makoto, 242 Terrorism assessment of Japan’s anti-terrorist diplomacy, 215– 216 biological and chemical, 230, 232– 234 as crime, 9 – 10, 11 – 12, 37 cyberterrorism, 226, 232 debate on how to respond to, 11– 20, 73 –74, 150, 175– 176 as entertainment, 12 –13 Foreign Ministry conceptions of, 170– 174, 203 ‘Islamic’ terrorism, 227 as Japanese domestic threat, 22 – 23, 26 –27, 39, 142, 218– 247, 259– 260 Japanese ideology of anti-terrorism, 169– 184 Japanese right-wing variety, 210, 212 state-sponsored varieties of, 11, 171, 173, 209– 210 Tokyo sarin gas attack, 241 Yomiuri Shinbun view of, 176– 178 Tikrit (Iraq), 90 Time, 238– 239 Tokiwa (ship), 156 Tokyo District Prosecutors Office, 288 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 290 Tokyo War Crimes trials, 43, 276 Towada (ship), 56

WAR ON TERROR Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 28 Tsushima, Battle of, 218– 219 United Kingdom annoyance at Japan’s high-profile aid role, 185 as guard for the GSDF, 123 Iraq War inquiry of, 301 as member of ‘Coalition of the Willing’, 78, 84, 91, 221, 250–251 as model for US– Japan alliance, 49, 278 oil interests of, 111 United Nations attack on its Baghdad headquarters, 87, 133 encourages Japan to violate its constitution, 133 Ichiro Ozawa’s view of, 150– 151 Iraq War as violation of UN Charter, 72, 74, 80, 95, 108–109, 133 Japan’s ambition for permanent Security Council seat, 108– 110, 143 Junichiro Koizumi prioritizes US alliance over, 68, 74 – 75 Masayuki Yamauchi project compared to UN Charter, 34 – 35 mention of UN Charter in Nikaido Statement, 202 partisan resolution on ISAF, 146–147 resolutions on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 201– 202 role in postwar Iraq of, 82– 84, 86, 88 – 89, 133– 135, 272 SDF deployments in support of, 258 special rapporteur on racism, 244–245 Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations of, 15 UN Peace Cooperation Bill, 30 University of Tokyo, 15 Uraga (ship), 56 US Air Force, 302

INDEX US Embassy in Tokyo, 228– 229 US– Japan alliance after September 11 attacks, 21 –22, 32 –36, 38 –40 as ‘cornerstone’ of Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy, 286– 287 DPJ victory as challenge to, 292–293, 299–300 during and after Persian Gulf Crisis, 29 –32, 38, 144 Ichiro Ozawa’s view of, 141 impact on conservative views of, 28 –32, 104–116 Junichiro Koizumi as role model for, 155, 249– 251 Junichiro Koizumi’s view of, 79, 92, 254 narrow basis of, 304– 305 relationship to China of, 213– 215, 254 Shinzo Abe’s view of, 107– 109 Toshio Tamogami’s view of, 276– 279 trumping of Japan’s energy policy, 198 versus the United Nations, 68, 72, 74 – 75, 82 – 84, 108– 109, 134– 135 Yasuo Fukuda’s view of, 149 Yukio Okamoto’s view of, 33 – 35, 38 US– Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 47, 55, 71 US Marines, 298, 302– 303 USS Abraham Lincoln, 84 USS Pecos, 156 USS Kitty Hawk, 48, 148 Vietnam War, 30, 282 ‘war of retaliation’, 14, 18, 37 – 38 War on Terror assessment of Japan’s anti-terrorist diplomacy, 215– 216, 255– 256

375

attention to military aspects of, 41 domestic aspects of, 218–284 effect on East Asian relations of, 214– 215, 251– 256 failure to reform the concept of, 285– 305 Foreign Ministry conceptions of, 170– 174, 203 as global martial law, 115 Ichiro Ozawa’s view of, 151 irrationality of, 255– 256 Japanese ideology of anti-terrorism, 169– 184 Shanghai war on terror, 212 US alliance manager arguments about, 143 Yomiuri Shinbun view of, 176– 178 Washington Post, 293 Watanabe, Nobutaka, 101– 104 Watanabe, Tsuneo, 158, 176 weapons of mass destruction allegations of Iraqi development, 69 – 70, 74 – 78 failure to find in Iraq, 94 – 97, 127– 128 fears of terrorist use of, 227, 235, 260 West Bank (Palestine), 202, 204 Wilson, Woodrow, 34 – 35 Wolfensohn, James, 185 Wolfowitz, Paul, 59, 67, 85, 109 World Bank, 185 World Trade Center attacks, 3 – 7 World War I, 25 – 26 Yahoo Japan, 82 Yamaguchi, Nobuo, 111 Yamamoto, Jun, 246 Yamasaki, Taku, 58 – 59, 61, 68 – 69, 83– 84, 138 Yamauchi, Masayuki, 23 – 27, 34 – 35, 178, 225 Yanai, Shunji, 49, 51, 189 Yassin, Shaikh Ahmad, 203 Yasuda, Junpei, 101– 104

376

JAPAN AND

THE

Yasukuni Shrine, 210– 211, 214, 253 Yokomichi, Takahiro, 64, 81 Yokosuka Naval Base, 48, 61 Yokota, Megumi, 208 Yomiuri Shinbun criticism of court judgment, 271– 272 criticism of Ichiro Ozawa, 152 criticism of Japanese hostages in Iraq, 100 criticism of Toshio Tamogami, 277– 288 editorials on Persian Gulf War of, 51, 163– 164 interview conducted by, 189– 190 political orientation of, 9

WAR ON TERROR support for the deployment of Aegis, 57 – 58, 61 support for the Indian Ocean mission, 161, 163– 164 support for the SDF deployment to Iraq, 89 –90, 108 support for the War on Terrorism, 176– 178, 183 Yoo, John, 116 Yoshida, Shigeru, 32, 45– 46 Zaire, 47 Zarqawi group, 121 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 222– 223 Zebari, Hoshyar, 125– 126 Zumwalt, James, 136