Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order - Masayoshi Ohira's Diplomacy and Philosophy 9789811919015, 9789811919022

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Ryuji Hattori

Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order Masayoshi Ohira’s Diplomacy and Philosophy

Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order

Ryuji Hattori

Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order Masayoshi Ohira’s Diplomacy and Philosophy Edited by Graham B. Leonard

Ryuji Hattori Chuo University Hachi¯oji, Japan

ISBN 978-981-19-1901-5 ISBN 978-981-19-1902-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2 1st edition: © Bungeishunj¯u Ltd 2019 ¯ ¯ First published in Japanese in 2019 by Bungeishunj¯u Ltd., Japan as ZOHOBAN OHIRA MASAYOSHI: ¯ by Ryuji Hattori © 2019 by Ryuji Hattori RINEN TO GAIKO © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Introduction

Diplomacy controls the fate of nations. This is particularly true for Japan, an island nation with few natural resources. If we consider a statesman to be a politician who ¯ has made diplomacy their life’s work, then Ohira Masayoshi can be regarded as the first Japanese statesman of the modern era. Of all postwar prime ministers, only ¯ Ohira and Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o ascended to the office having already held the position of foreign minister twice. ¯ Ohira, who served as the 68th and 69th prime minister of Japan, was born a third son in the rural agricultural village of Wada in Kagawa Prefecture. Working hard, he secured a position in the Ministry of Finance and soon became a member of the House of Representatives. He served as the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Foreign Minister in the Ikeda Hayato Government and, after serving as the Minister of International Trade and Industry and chair of the Liberal Democratic Party’s K¯ochikai faction, he served as the Foreign Minister once again, this time in a government headed by ¯ his long-time ally, Tanaka Kakuei. After becoming prime minister in 1978, Ohira sought to create a new order in the Asia-Pacific region, outlining a plan for solidarity across the Pacific Rim. This ambition remained unfulfilled, however, as he suddenly passed away before he could resolve his intra-party feud with Fukuda Takeo, his predecessor as prime minister. ¯ Although excellent studies on Ohira have begun to emerge—in particular, Fuku¯ naga Fumio’s Ohira Masayoshi—there are still no academic books that empirically discuss his life from the perspective of foreign and security policy. It is not surprising ¯ that Ohira had strong views on matters of public finance, given his origins at the finance ministry, but he was also always conscious of Japan’s place in the world. Given his strong interest in foreign affairs, a biography focusing on his approach to diplomacy is a natural development. ¯ After Ohira volunteered himself as foreign minister in the Ikeda government, he achieved a breakthrough in the stalled Japan-South Korean negotiations. And during his second term as foreign minister, he worked with Prime Minister Tanaka to negotiate the normalization of Japan’s diplomatic relations with China. While the Tanaka government adopted a pro-Arab stance during the 1973 oil crisis, it also ¯ managed to maintain its relationship with the United States. Although Ohira’s sudden v

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Introduction

death prevented the fulfillment of his visions for Pacific Basin Cooperation and comprehensive security, he was one of the few Japanese politicians who possessed a vision for both the contemporary international order and Japan’s future. ¯ Ohira had many achievements in working with foreign relations that went beyond diplomacy. He was the first prime minister to declare the US-Japan security relationship an “alliance,” and was also deeply involved in the “secret nuclear agreements” between the two countries. Concerned that these agreements could give rise to a rift between the government and the public, he seriously considered making them public several times (discussing the idea with his aides) but died before making this a reality. ¯ While Ohira made cooperation with the United States the central point of his foreign policy, he did not want Japan to become overly reliant upon it and sought to balance this relationship with diplomatic outreaches to Asia and the promotion of a new order in the Pacific Rim. Today, more than 40 years after his death, newly ¯ available original documents have made it possible to systematically follow Ohira’s diplomatic vision. By making use of records of his conversations and meetings, as ¯ well as interviews with his associates, I hope to convey the true Ohira and discuss his life from the perspective of his foreign policy. ¯ To discuss Ohira from the perspective of his foreign policy is to follow in the footsteps of the conservative mainstream and examine its philosophy.

Usage Notes

• To reduce ambiguity, the Republic of China is generally referred to as “Taiwan” and the People’s Republic of China as “China”. • Chinese names are romanized using Hanyu Pinyin in the absence of a name in more common use such as Chiang Kai-shek. • Japanese names are listed family name first. • Titles given for interviewees are contemporary.

vii

Contents

1 Distant Memories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Third Son of a Farmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Encountering Christianity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 From the Tokyo University of Commerce to the Ministry of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Experiencing Trials in Mainland China: Joining the Ministry . . . . . . . 1.1 Assignment to the Deposits Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Three Years at the East Asia Development Board . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Defeat and Rebirth: Secretary to the Minister of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The “Eternal Now” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Pacific War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Three-Time Secretary to the Finance Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Transition to the World of Politics: Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Ikeda Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A Member of the House of Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Visiting America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Yoshida Shigeru and Tanaka Kakuei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Merger of the Conservative Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 “Tolerance and Patience”: Chief Cabinet Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Entering the Cabinet for the First Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ 4 The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy: Foreign Minister in the Ikeda Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ 1 Breakthrough in Japan-Korea Relations: The Ohira-Kim Memo . . . . .

1 1 3 4 7 7 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 17 17 17 18 19 22 22 24 27 27

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Contents

2 3 4

5

1.1 “Prime Minister Ikeda’s Herald”: Visiting Europe and America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Japan-Korea Relations and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 “Permanent Neighbors” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ 1.4 Visits to Oiso ........................................... Dollars and Nuclear Weapons: Agonizing Over “Introduction” . . . . . 2.1 Struggling with Dollar Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ The Ohira-Reischauer Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . China and Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 A “Soft Approach” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Between China and Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Meeting Chiang Kai-Shek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP Deputy Secretary-General to K¯ochikai Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 From Ikeda to Sat¯o: Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Ikeda’s Election to a Third Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 “Leaving on a Journey” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 “The Beginning of a Long Winter”: From Ikeda to Sat¯o . . . . . . . 1.4 Thinking and Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Economic Negotiations with the US: Minister of International Trade and Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 US-Japan Frictions Over Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 First Visit to Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Continued Distance from Sat¯o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 “The Opening of a New Century for Japan”: Leader of the K¯ochikai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Returning to the Wilderness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 “A Beacon of Self-reflection” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 “China Wants Me” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era” and a “Maritime Nation in Asia” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Chasing the Horizons of Diplomacy: Foreign Minister in the T.anaka Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 “Multilateral Diplomacy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Establishing Diplomatic Relations with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Visits to Australia, the United States, and the Soviet Union . . . . 2 US-Japan Relations and the Kim Dae-Jung Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 USS Midway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 From Europe to the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Kim Dae-Jung Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The United Nations, the Northern Territories, and the Oil Crisis . . . . .

27 29 30 31 33 33 33 35 35 37 39 49 49 49 50 51 53 55 56 56 57 59 60 60 61 62 63 71 71 71 73 75 77 77 78 79 80

Contents

3.1 Revisiting Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Oil Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Japan–China Aviation Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Reunion with Zhou Enlai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 China’s Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Between China and Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Internal and External Crises: Finance Minister Under Tanaka and Miki, and LDP Secretary-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nuclear Secret Agreements and Currency Diplomacy: Minister of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Fiftieth Minister of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Burden of the Nuclear Secret Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Continuing as Finance Minister: The Miki Government . . . . . . . 1.4 Currency Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Confrontation with Fukuda Takeo: LDP Secretary-General . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The “Daifuku” Secret Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 “A Distinctive Identity as a Nation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 “The Age of Culture”: The LDP Presidential Election . . . . . . . . ¯ 8 Seeking a New Order Along the Pacific Rim: Ohira as Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ 1 Ohira’s Policies: “An Era Beyond the Modern Age” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Comprehensive Security Strategy and the Pacific Basic Cooperation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 “An Era Beyond the Modern Age” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Comparison with the Fukuda Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The US-Japan “Alliance” and the Tokyo Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Indochina and the Sino-Vietnamese War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The US-Japan “Alliance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 UNCTAD and Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Tokyo Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 “Fragile Pottery” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ 3 Yen Loans to China and Ohira’s Visit to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The “40-Day Conflict” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 “Sino-Japanese Relations for a New Century” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¯ 4 Ohira’s Final Travels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Launching the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The “Deception” of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles . . . . . . . . ¯ 4.3 Ohira’s Final US Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Mexico, Canada, Yugoslavia, and West Germany . . . . . . . . . . . .

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80 82 84 84 85 87 99 99 99 100 101 102 104 104 106 108 113 113 113 115 116 117 117 118 120 121 122 123 123 126 128 128 129 130 131

Conclusion: The “Eternal Now” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Acronyms and Source Acronyms

Acronyms ANA EPA GHQ KCIA LDP MITI

All Nippon Airways Economic Planning Agency General Headquarters Korean Central Intelligence Agency Liberal Democratic Party Ministry of International Trade and Industry

Source Acronyms AS FMA MOFA NA NDL

Academia Sinica, Taipei Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo National Archives, College Park National Diet Library, Tokyo

xiii

List of Charts and Tables

¯ Ohira’s Fall 1962 Visits to the US and Europe ¯ Ohira’s August-September 1963 Visits to the US and Europe ¯ Ohira’s Fall 1969 Visit to Europe The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations ¯ Ohira’s Spring 1973 Visit to Europe ¯ Ohira’s Trips Overseas as Finance Minister in the Miki Government ¯ The First Ohira Cabinet (December 7, 1978) ¯ The Second Ohira Cabinet (November 9, 1979)

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Chapter 1

Distant Memories

1 Third Son of a Farmer On the island of Shikoku, on the western edge of Kagawa Prefecture, there used to be a small farming village called Wada that faced out onto the Seto Inland Sea. It disappeared following the end of the Second World War, when it was merged into the town of Toyohama and eventually became part of what today is Kan’onji City. ¯ Ohira Masayoshi was born in Wada on March 12, 1910, the third son of a farming family. He was his parents Rikichi and Saku’s sixth child, having been preceded by his siblings Kiku, Nobuo, Tetsu, Muma, and Kazumitsu (although Kiku and Nobuo had already died by the time he was born). He would be followed by two more children, Yoshikazu and Tomie.1 ¯ Ohira provided the following description of his parents and family: ¯ While the older history of the Ohira family is a little unclear, we seem to be descended from ¯ Ohira Iga-no-kami Kunisuke (possibly read Kokuy¯u), a powerful local lord who moved here from Tosa province during the Sengoku period and brought the region under his control. […] ¯ My father grew up in a branch of the main Ohira family, but as a second son he set up a new household for himself (establishing another branch of the family) and worked as a medium-scale farmer. He held a little more than a hectare of rice fields that he both worked and leased out. The honorary positions he held – member of the village assembly, reservoir and irrigation supervisor, etc., – indicate that he held considerable public trust. He was a healthy, cheerful, hardworking, and kind-hearted man who was happy to help others. […] My mother was the eldest daughter of the Takuma family of Onohara, one of the neighboring villages. She was a spirited, rather sociable woman.2

¯ Visiting Ohira’s birthplace today, you can still get a semblance of what it would have been like during his childhood. While the buildings have all been rebuilt, the oak and pine trees remain, providing vestiges of those days.3 The grounds are not small, but could not be considered particularly large, either. ¯ ¯ With six children, the Ohira family did not live comfortably. Ohira grew up wearing sandals made of rice-straw and eating simple meals of boiled barley and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_1

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1 Distant Memories

rice, as rice was too expensive to eat alone. Despite living so close to the sea, the family rarely enjoyed meals with fresh fish; this was largely limited to special occa¯ sions. In addition to doing his schoolwork, the young Ohira was expected to do his part on the farm, planting rice, cutting grass, and helping care for the cattle. He often overheard his parents whispering about the family’s debts. ¯ On his much-anticipated days off from school, Ohira would have fun with his friends until late at night. He would immerse himself in looking for matsutake mushrooms and bamboo shoots in the mountains near his home, swimming in the sea, and fishing in small creeks.4 When he was three or four years old, he was being rocked back and forth on the back of Oshige, his family’s maid, on the edge of their rice field when she accidentally hit his head on the corner of a cobblestone. His earliest memory was of his mother’s “terrified face as she carried me into the house and carried out first aid using mugwort or something.” The injury left a scar running horizontally across his forehead, although this became less conspicuous as he grew older. A few years later, when Oshige was working as a waitress at a small restaurant on ¯ the outskirts of the village, she brought Ohira there and fawned over him. She fell ill and passed away not long afterwards. Although he had only distant memories of the occasion, he wrote that “every time I pass by the restaurant, I feel as though Oshige is going to call out to me.”5 ¯ In April 1916, Ohira enrolled in Taish¯o Elementary School in his village. Around this same time, his sister Tetsu, who was sixteen, married a man from a village a few miles away. The wedding procession for his sister slowly climbed up the long slope leading out of the village, with its members carrying a nagamochi (the Japanese ¯ equivalent of a hope chest) and paper lanterns. The young Ohira was excited to join in and followed as long as he could despite the cold winter weather. ¯ The Ohira family braided rice and barley straw into rope that could be used to fashion straw hats and other goods as a supplementary source of income, and Tetsu ¯ continued this work even after getting married. Ohira remembered her as a “taciturn and gentle older sister who worked very hard.” Tetsu passed away shortly after giving birth to two children. “Her death was attributed to kidney disease. She had an unusually strong sense of obligation and felt the need to finish the amount of work that she had been assigned or had planned to get done no matter what. I wondered whether one of the causes [of the illness that killed her] was that she would lose herself in her weaving and go to the bathroom as ¯ little as possible, choosing instead to continue to work.” Ohira developed the ability to look at issues like this with a critical mind from a young age. He would later describe the weaving as a “side job from hell” and wrote that “even today, farmers are forced to take on side jobs and then blamed for it [as if it were a failure on their part].”6 ¯ In April 1923, Ohira entered Mitoyo Junior High School in Kan’onji and began commuting by train. There was an unwritten rule that male students rode in the front half of the train and female students sat in the back. He wore traditional Japanese clothes at the school.7 He wrote of this time that, “I was neither very wealthy nor particularly destitute. And though I was not brilliant, neither was I unmanageably

1 Third Son of a Farmer

3

unruly. I was able to have a safe and ordinary childhood. It was a peaceful time for me that provided me with much freedom.” The expansion of rail service to his hometown was accompanied by the electrification of its houses.8 Today, a bust of ¯ Ohira can be found in Kan’onji Daiichi High School, the successor to Mitoyo Junior High.

2 Encountering Christianity ¯ Ohira sat for the naval academy’s entrance examination in March 1927 but failed the physical due to an acute middle-ear infection. That summer, he contracted typhoid and spent four months on the verge of death. While he narrowly escaped that fate, his father, who had cared for him day and night, passed away shortly after his recovery in what he described as “a sudden and fatal misfortune for our family.”9 He had almost given up hope of pursuing higher education following his father’s death when an aunt living on the outskirts of Takamatsu (the prefectural capital) ¯ reached out to him and offered to help. In April 1928, Ohira entered Takamatsu Commercial Higher School (the predecessor to what is today Kagawa University’s economics department). He lived in a dormitory while at school, and it was there that he experienced his first taste of Western food by eating curry and rice. “Having been born and raised in a farming family in western Kagawa, it was this dormitory that taught me what Western food and flavors were like.”10 ¯ It was Ohira’s encounter with Christianity that would prove to be the most significant event of his time in high school, however. During his first year at the school, he attended a lecture by Dr. Sat¯o Sadayoshi, a retired Tohoku Imperial University professor. Sat¯o had formed a student group—the “Servants of Jesus Society”—and worked to spread Christianity. ¯ Moved by Sat¯o’s lecture, Ohira became a devout Christian, so much so that he eventually attended a workshop held at the foot of Mt. Asama and a national convention in Tokyo. Although he was baptized at a church in Kan’onji, he never became affiliated with any particular denomination. He studied the Bible and the writings of prominent Japanese Christians like Uchimura Kanz¯o, the founder of the non-church movement, which rejected the organization of Western churches in favor of Bible ¯ study led by lay teachers. After entering university in Tokyo, Ohira visited Yanaihara Tadao, a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and participated in his Bible study groups. In his actions during this period, we can see glimpses of the man who would go on to become the most well-read figure in Japanese politics.11 He once wrote in a joint letter of the Servants of Jesus Society that “I hope to live to be a hundred so that I can search for the truth.”12 The church where he was baptized still stands in Kan’onji, although only the slightest signs of its contemporary ¯ appearance remain. Ohira later looked back on these days and said, “for a while, I even wanted to become a pastor and dedicate my life to evangelism.” “The Bible is likely the book that has influenced me the most.” “While there were those who became leftists at the time, my involvement in Christianity meant that I did not.”13

4

1 Distant Memories

¯ How did his faith affect Ohira as a politician? US Ambassador Edwin O. Reis¯ chauer, who worked with Ohira while he was foreign minister, wrote that Christianity ¯ gave Ohira “the character and norms of a statesman”: ¯ Ohira stood out because his appearance made him seem passive. He was able to guide others while seeming to follow them. This is because he had a vision for the future. […] ¯ Ohira once told me that he was a Christian. I later learned that he had worked as a street evangelist as a young man and then gone farther, deepening his understanding of nondenominationalism under Yanaihara Tadao. Perhaps it was this Christian background that ¯ gave Ohira the character and norms of a statesman rather than those of a mere politician.14

¯ Ohira had a habit of clutching his hands together as if in prayer. According to his long-time secretary Manabe Kenji, “He almost always clasped his hands together when talking to people or thinking by himself. I think it’s something he picked up from his life as a devout Christian.”15 ¯ During his second year of high school, Ohira became afflicted with pleurisy (an inflammation of the chest membranes) and had to take a leave of absence. He thus graduated late, in the era of the Great Depression and the Manchurian Incident. “Many soldiers were being deployed because of the Manchurian Incident. As I was scrambling to send gift bags for these men, I was summoned by Professor Horie [Muraichi], who warned me against acting rashly.”16

3 From the Tokyo University of Commerce to the Ministry of Finance ¯ Ohira graduated from Takamatsu Commercial Higher School in March 1932 and, at the age of twenty-three, entered the Tokyo University of Commerce (the predecessor to Hitotsubashi University) in April 1933. Despite the name, the university was located in a rural area far from downtown Tokyo: At the time, Musashino [a broad term for the area west of Tokyo] was still highly reminiscent of the features seen in the works of Kunikida Doppo, so it was somewhat incongruous to hear it associated with a “university of commerce” I frequently left to go digging for sweet potatoes in the middle of lectures, and the campus, covered with fallen leaves, was extraordinarily lonely from fall to winter.17

¯ Ohira lived in Kokubunji nearby and studied hard for both his university courses and the higher civil service examination. Walking on campus with his friends, they would quiz one another on exam questions. He also frequently visited his friends’ lodgings.18 One of his professors was Ueda Tatsunosuke. “Professor Ueda was more of a sociologist than an economist. And honestly, he was even more of a linguist than a sociologist. Without his linguistic background, his research on Thomas Aquinas and his other work would have been unthinkable. He frequently held his semi¯ included Sugimura nars at his home in Kichij¯oji.”19 Other professors of Ohira’s

3 From the Tokyo University of Commerce to the Ministry of Finance

5

K¯oz¯o (economic philosophy), Yamaguchi Tokury¯u (history of philosophy), Miura Shinshichi (history of civilization), Makino Eiichi (history of legal thought), and Nakayama Ichir¯o (economic theory). ¯ While Ohira was a student, Sugimura submitted his doctoral dissertation, “Axiological Research on Economic Society,” but he was deprived of the necessary number of votes when a number of professors submitted blank ballots (indicating that they neither supported nor opposed his candidacy) as they felt that its contents were more philosophical than economic. Known as the “Blank Ballot Incident” (Hakuhy¯o Jiken), this event caused widespread division among the school’s faculty and student body. Sugimura ultimately resigned from the university, decrying his dissertation’s reception as revealing “the stagnation of the academic spirit” at the school.20 ¯ Sugimura greatly influenced Ohira, who would continue to carefully read Sugimura’s books like Fundamental Problems of Economic Philosophy and The Structure of Economic Ethics long after he graduated. It was enlightening to be able to come close to understanding the underlying spirit and structures of so many things: capitalism and socialism; his thoughts on currency; the functions and limitations of production, savings, and investment; the orientation of economic principles; and the cultural values behind the idea of an economy. But it was also a great pleasure to be blessed with his perspectives on history and his reflections on the motivations behind life.21

¯ Reflecting on Sugimura’s influence on him, Ohira wrote that “If I can be said to have a personal ideology, the building blocks for its creation were supplied by Sugimura’s ideas.”22 ¯ In October 1935, Ohira passed the administrative affairs division of the higher civil service examination. Despite having overcome this difficult hurdle, however, he secretly found himself drawn to Sumitomo, one of Japan’s largest zaibatsu. As a child, his school had overlooked Shisaka Island in the Seto Inland Sea, and he had seen the smoke rising from the company’s smelter and refinery on the island. He felt a sense of familiarity with Sumitomo. ¯ Undecided about what course to pursue, Ohira paid a visit to Vice-Minister of Finance Tsushima Juichi, another Kagawa native. I’m graduating next year. I’ve already passed the higher civil service exam, but I’m not sure if I want to work for the government. What do you think I should do? Come to the Ministry of Finance. Does that mean you’ll hire me? I’m hiring you right here, right now. You don’t need to apply to anywhere else.

¯ Ohira was thus provisionally accepted by the finance ministry with Tsushima’s backing. ¯ With his future employment secured, Ohira submitted his graduation thesis— “Vocation Societies and Trade Associations”—to Professor Ueda in January 1936. It was a monumental work, coming in at 370 pages.23 One month later, on February 26, a group of young army officers attempted to overthrow the government. While their effort failed, they did succeed in assassinating

6

1 Distant Memories

Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, and Tsushima announced that he would be ¯ resigning out of respect for Takahashi. Ohira rushed to see him upon hearing the news: I’ve heard that you will be resigning. This won’t cause any problems for me, right? What kind of stupid question is that? I made you a promise as a public official. You just study and make sure you can graduate.

¯ Ohira graduated and was able to join the finance ministry without any difficulties.24 Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, ¯ 2010), 99. Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1990), 32, 34. ¯ Ohira 1:10–11. ¯ ¯ Interview with Ohira Masako (daughter of Ohira Kazumitsu), September 11, 2013. ¯ Ohira 1:11–13. Ibid, 1:98–99. Ibid, 1:99–100. Ibid, 3:288–290. Ibid, 1:16. Ibid, 1:17. Ibid, 2:276. Ibid, 1:18–19. Takamatsu “Servants of Jesus” Joint Letters (December 1, 1935), in the collection of the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation. ¯ Ohira 2:277, 6:102, 400. ¯ Edwin O. Reischauer, “J¯o: Ohira Masayoshi to Watashi,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, ¯ and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 3, 5. ¯ Manabe Kenji, Watashi no Mita Ohira Masayoshi: Sono Sugao to Shisei (Tokyo: Image Makers, 1976), 209. ¯ Ohira 2:277, 334–355. Ibid, 1:23–24. ¯ ¯ Nagao Yoritaka, “Ohira S¯ori no Hitogara,” in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 541. ¯ Ohira 1:24. Ibid, 1:25–26. Ibid, 2:239. Ibid, 6:311, 325. Ibid, 1:326–333. Ibid, 4:212.

Chapter 2

The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry

1 Experiencing Trials in Mainland China: Joining the Ministry 1.1 Assignment to the Deposits Bureau ¯ Ohira began working at the Ministry of Finance on April 10, 1936. He was joined by nine other fresh graduates, including Miyakawa Shin’ichir¯o, Fukuda Hisao, and Shinokawa Masatsugu. The ambitious young men, all wearing brand-new suits, paid a visit to Finance Minister Baba Eiichi at his official residence on their first day. He told them: Don’t believe that finishing university means that your education has come to an end. You must push yourself and, in approaching what is to come, adopt the mindset that it is only now that your studies are truly beginning.1

¯ When the new employees went out for lunch together afterwards, Ohira made a proposal: “From here on out, we should all work together and support one another. Let us not speak ill of each other the way the Chinese do. Some of us will go on to hold important positions, such as that of president of the South Manchurian Railway. And when that happens, I want us to be able to rely on one another.” The young officials formed a discussion group in which they studied economic issues diligently, reading a wide variety of authors such as Marx, Keynes, and Yamada Moritar¯o (a contemporary Marxist economist). ¯ Ohira was assigned to the Deposits Bureau (Yokinbu) and to the Secretariat’s Financial and Economic Research Division, where he was given the task of translating Nazi Germany’s resource policies into Japanese.2 ¯ Ohira was the only one of the ministry’s new officials to have not graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. While one might expect this to have caused him to feel isolated among the group, this was not the case:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_2

7

8

2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry People from the University of Tokyo were more broad-minded. That might not be the best way of putting it, but they didn’t put any importance on [the school they came from]. Their alma mater seemed to have only a relatively small place in their minds. I would not be the man I am today if I had graduated from the University of Tokyo. Hitotsubashi helped me in so many ways. There was a very intense feeling that we were all part of a school family. One of the first things I noticed was that people from the University of Tokyo didn’t set a lot of store in that kind of thing.3

¯ On April 15, 1937, Ohira married Suzuki Shigeko in a match arranged by his former professor Ueda Tatsunosuke and his wife. Their first child, Masaki, was born in February, and the couple would go on to have three more children: Hiroshi, Yoshiko, ¯ and Akira. Ohira later contributed a piece to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, entitled “My Madonna,” in which he spoke about his wife: The strongest thing I find in my wife is a consistent and earnest devotion to me and our children. […] My wife worries about my health day and night. She is constantly concerned about my diet and the amount of exercise, rest, and sleep I get. While she is more sensitive to my physical state than anyone else, she is even more sensitive to my mental health. This is truly one of the virtues of women.4

¯ Although Ohira described their match as having been a “run-of-the-mill arranged marriage,” it was actually a rather fortunate match for him as Shigeko was the second daughter of Suzuki Mikinosuke, the founder of Miki Securities.5

1.2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse” On July 7, 1937, the day that the Second Sino-Japanese War began with the Marco ¯ Polo Bridge Incident, Ohira was appointed director of the Yokohama Tax Office at the age of twenty-seven. As the city was still recovering from the Great Kant¯o Earthquake of 1923, it generated little in the way of tax income at the time.6 ¯ The most significant development to come from Ohira’s appointment to Yokohama was that it caused him to make the acquaintance of Ikeda Hayato, a man who would ¯ ¯ have a profound effect on Ohira’s career. Ikeda was Ohira’s predecessor in Yokohama and, having been promoted to director of the Direct Tax Department at the ministry’s Tokyo Tax Supervision Bureau, was also now his direct supervisor. The two men hit it off while Ikeda was touring Yokohama. Ikeda’s work ethic was matched only ¯ by his love of alcohol, and he would invite Ohira for drinks whenever he visited the ¯ city. Many years later, Ohira would serve as Ikeda’s secretary when he was finance minister, and he would join (and ultimately lead) the Ikeda faction of the Liberal Democratic Party after going into politics.7 It was on January 1, 1938, as he briefed his staff at the tax office’s New Year’s ¯ ceremony, that Ohira first systematically laid out his administrative approach:

1 Experiencing Trials in Mainland China: Joining the Ministry

9

Like an ellipse, an administration has two focal points. And it is when a tense balance is maintained between these focal points that we can say that something is being skillfully administered. Let us take the controlled economy that has begun to be implemented following the recent outbreak of war with China as an example. Control is one of its focal points, and freedom is the other. It is only when control and freedom coexist in a tense equilibrium that a controlled economy performs well; one cannot lean too far in either direction. The same applies to matters of taxation, with the authority to tax serving as one focus and the taxpayers as the other. Maintaining a neutral position – leaning neither towards allencompassing taxation nor taxation that makes too many compromises with taxpayers – is the rational approach to taxation.8

¯ This explanation is typical of Ohira’s way of thinking, which tended to favor moderation and maintaining an equilibrium. The idea he put forth in this address came to be known as the “philosophy of the ellipse.”9 ¯ As mentioned earlier, Ohira’s son Masaki was born on February 6, 1938. His naming document (meimeisho) can still be found at Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Hall in Kan’onji, Kagawa, where it reads: May he live a long life ¯ Name: Ohira Masaki Born February 6, 1938

Despite his parents’ prayers, however, Masaki was a sickly boy who often required medical attention. The family lived in a rented house in Isogo Ward, Yokohama, and ¯ Ohira often walked along the beach with Shigeko, carrying Masaki in his arms. He had only spent a year in Yokohama before he was appointed director of the Sendai Regional Taxation Bureau’s Customs Department, however, and the family moved to Sendai in July 1938.

1.3 Three Years at the East Asia Development Board ¯ ¯ In May 1939, Ohira was asked to come to Tokyo by Vice-Minister of Finance Ono ¯ Ry¯uta. Upon his arrival, Ono took him out to a restaurant and attempted to persuade him to accept temporary assignment to the East Asia Development Board (K¯oain) and to take a position in Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province, China. The East Asia Development Board was the central agency for determining occupation policy during the Second Sino-Japanese War and had liaison offices in Beiping (Beijing), Shanghai, Zhangjiakou, and Amoy. ¯ told Ohira ¯ Ono that “Zhangjiakou is cool in the summer and warm in winter. If nothing else, it’s a good place to live. And if you go, it’ll be like you’re the finance minister of Inner Mongolia. You’ll have complete freedom when it comes to the job. It’ll be like drawing on a blank canvas.” Feeling that he “should experience a ¯ wide variety of things while I’m still young,” Ohira made the decision to accept the position without consulting with his family. He was appointed director of the Mengjiang Liaison Department’s Finance Section and departed for China alone.

10

2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry

When he arrived in Zhangjiakou, he found it infested with scorpions. “What I saw was nothing like what I’d been told.” “Zhiangjiakou was, to put it succinctly, a ‘dirt city.’ There were almost no trees… it was a city in the middle of nowhere where everything was the color of dirt.” The Kwantung Army exerted heavy influence over the city. While the Japanese had established the Mengjiang United Autonomous Government in September and the region was nominally governed by Demchugdongrub, a Mongol prince, actual power lay with the Japanese military. “The local Japanese, including the military, looked down on us Japanese government officials and treated us as outsiders.” ¯ Ohira was in charge of planning Japanese investment in China (Inner Mongolia, in particular) and mobilizing its resources. Inner Mongolia was an agricultural area that produced crops like wheat that were then sent to North China. There was a tendency among officials in Tokyo, however, to view Mengjiang as being rich in iron ore, coal, ¯ and livestock. Ohira attempted to correct this perception by publishing an article, “Uncovering the Mengjiang Economy” in a Japanese newspaper and conducting a door-to-door census of Inner Mongolia.10 ¯ Ohira also traveled to Beiping, where he interacted with other young officials in the East Asia Development Board’s offices, men like It¯o Masayoshi, who had been ¯ dispatched to Shanghai by the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry, Okita Sabur¯o of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, and Sasaki Yoshitake of the South Manchurian Railway, and the young men would hold uproarious debates about how Asia could best be managed. It¯o had entered into government service the same ¯ ¯ year as Ohira, and Ohira found that they shared many of the same views. ¯ Ohira would listen patiently as the others argued and, although he spoke little himself, he soon became the center of discussion. At times he boldly criticized the military for its self-righteousness. While he did not seem at first glance to have the qualities of a leader, he possessed a curious charm that drew others to him. Many years later, he would tell It¯o that “for human beings, there is nothing more fulfilling in life than to be understood and acknowledged by other people.”11 ¯ Ohira returned to Japan in late October 1940, where he was assigned to the Second Section of the Economic Department at the East Asia Development Board’s headquarters. His job was to supervise the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, two investment and loan companies created by the Japanese government. The staff of the East Asia Development Board was composed of a wide variety ¯ of people. Ohira gathered eight other young officials around him whom he often ¯ interacted with. In addition to It¯o and Sasaki, the group included Otsuki Yoshihiro, Miyakawa Shin’ichir¯o, and Wakatsuki Katsuhiko of the finance ministry; Murata Hisashi and Kanokogi Noboru of the commerce ministry; and Isozaki Satoshi of the ¯ railway ministry. Ohira dubbed them the “Wise Nine Group” (Ky¯ukenkai). Aichi Kiichi of the finance ministry would also join later. The personal alliances he cultivated with It¯o and the others at the East Asia Development Board would have long ¯ lasting effects on Ohira; when forming his government as prime minister, he named ¯ It¯o, Sasaki, and Okita as chief cabinet secretary, minister of international trade and industry, and foreign minister, respectively.12

1 Experiencing Trials in Mainland China: Joining the Ministry

11

¯ Over the course of his three years at the Board, Ohira developed a network of contacts throughout China and became an authority on the country. He also became convinced that Japan’s future could not lie in “dirt cities” like Zhangjiakou. Critical of Japan’s policies towards China during the war, he looked out over the ocean from the Asian mainland and was inspired by the idea that “Japan’s future lies with the Pacific.” This insight, which would ultimately lead to the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept that he pursued as prime minister, was born from his experiences in China.13

2 Defeat and Rebirth: Secretary to the Minister of Finance 2.1 The “Eternal Now” ¯ One of the books that had the greatest influence on Ohira was Historical Reality by Tanabe Hajime. Tanabe was a philosophy professor at Kyoto Imperial University, and the book was a compilation of a series of six lectures on Japanese culture that he had given at the school. It was published in 1940, three years after the beginning of the war in China that had turned into a quagmire for Japan. Not only did this book make a profound impression on me when I first read it, it would continue to guide my way of looking at things and how I thought about them. Most notably, its idea that our present is unique – the only one of an infinite number of possibilities to have been chosen to come about. It is irreplaceably precious to us, and that means we must be earnest in approaching it.14

¯ This line of thinking led Ohira to his theory of the “eternal now”: Dr. Tanabe Hajime’s theory is that time is not a linear progression running from the past to the present and into the future. Instead, the present represents the point of equilibrium between the pull of the past and the pull of the future, two forces running in opposing directions. Accordingly, the present is truly the “eternal now,” and time is the “eternal present.” The “eternal now” has served as the fulcrum in each stage of my life. And it has blessed me with a sense of determination that is interwoven into the tapestry of my life. This tapestry is something unique to me and without equal. It is precious and irreplaceable. It is not something to be regretted.15

Together with the “philosophy of the ellipse,” this conception of the “eternal now”— endeavoring to live one’s life earnestly and consciously in the present—formed the ¯ ideological pillars of Ohira’s way of thinking.

2.2 The Pacific War ¯ At the time of the beginning of the Pacific War, Ohira was living in Yokohama and commuting to the East Asia Development Board in Tokyo. His daughter Yoshiko was born shortly after the outbreak of war.16

12

2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry

He returned to the finance ministry on July 30, 1942 and became director of the Budget Bureaus for the Ministry of Education and the South Seas Government (Nan’y¯o-ch¯o). A framework for total war was being in put in place by the T¯oj¯o government in power at the time, and a number of areas were being advocated for in education administration—either as a consequence of this framework or in an attempt to take advantage of contemporary trends. These included promoting science and technology education, elevating the status of normal schools [schools for training teachers], promoting education for the gifted and talented, and promoting Eastern culture. ¯ Ohira was involved in the creation of the Greater Japan Scholarship Association (Dai Nippon Ikuei Kai) and devoted himself “wholeheartedly to the task.”17 But when Ikeda learned that he was to be named director of the Tokyo Financial Affairs ¯ Bureau, he asked Ohira to join him. Ikeda was considered the leading candidate to ¯ be the next director of the Tax Bureau and was very excited at the prospect. Ohira accepted this invitation and became director of the Customs Department at the Tokyo Financial Affairs Bureau on November 5, 1943. As the war dragged on, the Japanese public became exhausted, and one common means of diversion—going out for a drink—had been eliminated by government ¯ restrictions on alcohol. Ohira responded to the situation by establishing 300 public bars in Tokyo serving beer and sake. “This modest idea gained unexpected popularity during the gloominess of wartime. For a period of little more than a year, from 1944 to the end of the war, we were able to do at least a little to alleviate the city’s residents’ ¯ secretaries when he thirst.”18 Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, who went on to serve as one of Ohira’s ¯ was prime minister, viewed this effort has having been derived from Ohira’s “usual 19 political tendency to focus on the disadvantaged.” By the beginning of 1945, Japan was on the brink of defeat and the Tokyo Financial Affairs Bureau’s offices were burned down in an Allied air raid on February 23. ¯ Ohira received a certificate of commendation from Ikeda for saving a basement full of important documents by extinguishing a fire.20 On one night in May, he had taken his children to an air raid shelter when, unbeknownst to him, his son Masaki slipped out of the shelter. Outside, bombs rained down on Tokyo, staining the night sky as red as day. Masaki, who was only seven years old and did not understand what was going on, clapped his hands and called ¯ for Ohira to come out, shouting, “Dad, come and look! It’s so pretty!” The innocence ¯ on Masaki’s face in that moment became indelibly etched into Ohira’s memory.21

2.3 Three-Time Secretary to the Finance Minister ¯ On March 19, 1945, Ohira was appointed as one of Finance Minister Tsushima ¯ Juichi’s secretaries. Tsushima’s other secretary, Kurogane Yasumi, would, like Ohira, ¯ go on to become a Diet member belonging to the Ikeda faction. Ohira’s appointment would be short-lived, however, as Tsushima resigned less than a month later following ¯ the formation of a new government under Suzuki Kantar¯o on April 7. Ohira was

2 Defeat and Rebirth: Secretary to the Minister of Finance

13

relieved of his position on April 18 and moved to the Budget Bureau. He continued his association with Tsushima, however. ¯ Ohira and his superiors at the ministry were invited to Tsushima’s home on May 10 and 25. On the second of these evenings, formations of B-29 s arrived from the south. “From a distance, it looked beautiful, like fireworks. But the formations came one after another, dropping incendiary bombs like rain and drawing ever closer to ¯ the city center.” The Tsushima home suffered a direct hit and burned down; Ohira managed to escape with Mrs. Tsushima and a maid. He hurried back to his home in Ushigome, but not even traces remained by the time he arrived. He reluctantly moved into a rented house in Setagaya, the Tokyo neighborhood to which the Budget Bureau had also been evacuated. ¯ The end of the war came abruptly for Ohira. On August 15, he listened to the broadcast of Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration at Sakuraj¯osui Elementary School alongside Budget Bureau Director Nakamura Tateki. “Director Nakamura wept, but I was not particularly moved by the news. Instead, I was filled with relief that the inevitable had finally arrived.”22 Immediately following the Japanese surrender, a new government was formed under Prince Higashikuni. Tsushima once again became finance minister and this in ¯ ¯ turn led to Ohira serving as his secretary for a second time. While Ohira would later reflect that he was “unsuited by nature for the position of secretary,” he enjoyed Tsushima’s trust. In his position, he worked closely with Miyazawa Kiichi, the secretary to the finance minister in charge of administration. ¯ Sent out to find a new official residence for the finance minister, Ohira and Miyazawa ultimately rented a house in Azabu that was connected to the South ¯ Manchurian Railway. As Ohira looked out over the glittering Shibaura Sea in front of the area’s burned-out land, he was struck by a sense of mental numbness. Turning to Miyazawa, he voiced his concerns about the coming reconstruction: There is nothing left for Japan now, Mr. Miyazawa. How are we going to feed the Japanese people? Not just the ones already here… many more will be returning from overseas. Japan may not be able to survive without millions starving to death. Everything in Japan has come to a halt. The only thing working is the railways. Is there some way we could borrow money from the United States, using the railways as collateral?23

The Higashikuni government was short-lived, and when the Shidehara Kij¯ur¯o govern¯ ment was formed in October, Ohira returned to the Budget Bureau. He was very grateful for the food aid being supplied to Japan by the United States and it made a deep impression on him. He would later say that “I have worked with foreign countries for many years, and America is the one that we can place the most trust in and talk with. We can discuss pretty much anything with the US.”24 ¯ With the establishment of the Yoshida Shigeru government in May 1946, Ohira was appointed director of the newly created Renumeration Bureau’s Third Department. In this position, he was involved in drawing up the budget with Finance Minister Ishibashi Tanzan and wrote policy proposals on subjects like “Issues in Government Sector Payments,” “A Memorandum on Countermeasures for the Financial Crisis,” and “Postwar Financial Reconstruction Measures.” Notably, in the second of these

14

2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry

he advocated for the “commercialization of the state itself” as an alternative to “control from above.” He argued for the elimination of excessive regulation and reviving Japan as a trading nation through the power of the private sector.25 ¯ Ohira was now living in Bunky¯o Ward with his wife and father-in-law. His third son Akira was born on September 9.26 It¯o Masayoshi and his wife were also living with them at the time as It¯o (now director of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry’s ¯ Fertilizer Division) had lost his home in the war. Ohira vented to his close friend that “It is because we’re doing stupid things like implementing controls that we can’t increase fertilizer and food production. If we only left it to market forces, the private ¯ sector would work things out.” Ohira was an advocate of small government and trusted the wisdom and energy of the private sector. Ikeda Hayato, now vice-minister ¯ ¯ of finance, was a frequent visitor at the Ohira home and, while Ohira rarely drank, he would sometimes indulge with Ikeda.27 ¯ On July 10, 1948, Ohira was made head of the Public Works Division of the Construction Bureau. This was part of the Headquarters for Economic Stabilization, a central government agency in charge of economic policy that had recently been created at the behest of General Headquarters (GHQ) and was widely feared for ¯ its wide-ranging authority. In his new position, Ohira was responsible for planning and auditing the public works projects being implemented to rebuild the country. The all-powerful Occupation authorities were apathetic towards some areas such as ¯ port development and urban planning, but Ohira tenaciously negotiated with them in support of such work. His experiences in this position helped cultivate his diplomatic senses.28 ¯ Ohira became secretary to the finance minister for the third and final time on June 1, 1949. This time he would be working for Ikeda, who had been elected to the House of Representatives for the first time in January and chosen by Yoshida to serve as ¯ minister the following month. He summoned Ohira to his office and said, “If I’m going to be minister, isn’t it only natural that you’d be my secretary? You don’t have to do anything; you can just sit in the room next door.” Ikeda’s other secretaries were Kurogane and Miyazawa. As Ikeda was not particularly proficient in English, he was always accompanied by ¯ Miyazawa in his negotiations with GHQ. Unlike the quick-witted Miyazawa, Ohira spent most of his time working at a desk in the secretary’s office. His work may have seemed lackluster in comparison but was greatly valued by Ikeda. According ¯ to Ohira, “Ikeda had had a particular affection for me ever since I became director of the tax office [in Yokohama],” and the two had developed a “fateful connection.” He began to consider running for the Diet himself, and he later viewed the three years he spent as Ikeda’s secretary as having served as “an opportunity for me to enter politics and strengthen the bond of mentorship between myself and Ikeda.”29 Notes 1. 2.

¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2010), 114. Ibid, 1:30–31, 115.

2 Defeat and Rebirth: Secretary to the Minister of Finance

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

15

Ibid, 6:313. Ibid, 5:485–486. ¯ Ibid, 1:32. Unno Jinnosuke, “Sanriku Kaigan no Omoide,” in Ohira Shigeko Fujin wo Shinobu, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1991), 136. ¯ Ohira 1:32, 2:194, 235, 3:391. Ibid, 6:241. Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., ¯ Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1990), 78. ¯ Ohira 1:119. Ibid, 3:291. Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., ¯ Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foun¯ dation), 58. K¯oyama Ken’ichi, “Ohira Masayoshi no Seiji Tetsugaku” [The ¯ ¯ Political Philosophy of Ohira Masayoshi], in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 16. ¯ Ohira 1:124–130. ¯ It¯o Masayoshi, “Ohira Masayoshi to iu Seijika,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, ¯ Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 259–261. ¯ ¯ Ohira 1:37–39, 130–133. Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 89–92. Nagatomi Y¯uichir¯o, “Kan Taiheiy¯o Rentai K¯os¯o” [The Pacific Basin Coop¯ eration Concept], in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 326–327. ¯ Ohira 3:99–100, 256–257. Ibid, 2:278–279. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 92. ¯ Ohira 1:133–138. Ibid, 1:42–43, 141–145, 4:206–207. Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru Shisei,” in Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu Kiki¯ gaki Ohira Masayoshi, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 490. ¯ Ohira 1:43–44, 145–148. Ibid, 2:195. ¯ Ibid, 1:44–46. Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o 100–102. Miyazawa Kiichi, “Tsushima, Ikeda Z¯osh¯o ni Hishokan Jidai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bureau of Information and Culture, ed., Korekara ¯ no Nihon no Gaik¯o: Ohira Gaimu Daijin ni Kiku (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), 14. ¯ Ohira 1:160–161, 362–377, 405–406. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 108. It¯o 261.

16

28.

29.

2 The “Philosophy of the Ellipse”: Working for the Finance Ministry

¯ ¯ Ohira 1:50–51, 152–159, 378–382. Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 121–124. Manabe Kenji, “Gaik¯o ni Kanshin ga Fukakatta” [His Deep Interest in Foreign Policy], in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 355. ¯ Ohira 1:52–56, 176–180, 292–293, 297–302, 6:240–241. It¯o Masaya, Ikeda Hayato: Sono Sei to Shi (Tokyo: Shiseid¯o, 1966), 10–11.

Chapter 3

Transition to the World of Politics: Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Ikeda Government

1 A Member of the House of Representatives 1.1 Visiting America ¯ By no later than mid-1951, Ohira had set his sights on entering politics himself after having spent three years as Ikeda’s secretary. That summer, Ikeda sent him on an official trip to the United States to research American science and technology policy, telling him that “it’ll be a good opportunity for you, and you’ll be there during the [San Francisco] peace conference.” ¯ On August 13, Ohira departed for San Francisco from Tokyo’s Haneda Airport, accompanied by members of the Diet. Most of his time in the country was spent in Washington, DC, but he also made trips to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, ¯ and Montgomery, Alabama. This was Ohira’s first opportunity to see America for himself, and the experience made a vivid impression on him. ¯ Ohira wrote a seventeen-part account of his trip for his hometown newspaper back in Kagawa, the Shikoku Shimbun. In this series, he discussed the country’s wealth and diversity and spoke favorably about life in America. The articles covered a wide range of topics, including American cities, trains, Christianity, race, the American temperament, the federal budget, American newspaper coverage of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the ubiquity of automobiles, the respect shown women, and the diverse range of universities available. In the October 16 entry, he discussed the “constructive power” of America: No matter how fertile a land was laid out before them, [for the Americans] to amass so much wealth and cultivate such national strength in a mere two hundred years is a commendable achievement from any perspective. […] It is the concrete embodiment of a truly extraordinary constructive power.

¯ Ohira had already developed pro-American leanings through his experience working with the Occupation authorities, and his time in the United States only © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_3

17

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strengthened these. Many years later, he wrote about the “enormous economic assistance” that Japan had received from the United States: The postwar recovery of the Japanese economy was, first and foremost, the result of the Japanese people being able to exert their industriousness and superb capabilities to the fullest extent amidst a peaceful and free international environment. There can be no question, however, that things would not have gone so smoothly without the enormous financial aid received from the United States. America generously provided Japan with food, raw materials, fuel, clothing, medicine, and other supplies.

¯ After Ohira returned to Japan on October 21, Ikeda encouraged his political ambitions, telling him, “You don’t need to concern yourself with your work at the Ministry of Finance. Spend as much time as you can back home and get to know the people ¯ there. You never know when the House of Representatives might be dissolved.” Ohira began preparing to run and, when a general election was called for October 1, 1952, he won election to the House of Representatives as a candidate for the Liberal Party, receiving the second-highest number of votes in Kagawa’s 2nd district.1

1.2 Yoshida Shigeru and Tanaka Kakuei ¯ Why did Ohira decide to go into politics? Asked by his secretary, “Why would you decide to run for the Diet at the unlucky age of forty-two? You didn’t even know if ¯ you would win or not.” Ohira answered that he had felt like doing something “for the world”: Having reached the critical age of forty, it occurred to me that I had another twenty or so years left (assuming I live to be sixty). I wondered whether there was some way that I could use my abilities to do something more for the world, something that would have more of an impact than remaining a government official would. It was these thoughts that made me decide to go into politics.2

¯ Ohira wrote on the characteristics of Diet members that “There is no business more expensive.” He also noted that “Few jobs require as much nerve as being a member of the Diet,” and that “No one is more conscious of their reputation.”3 Yoshida Shigeru had been president of the Liberal Party, the primary conservative political party, since 1946 and had been serving as prime minister since 1948 (this was ¯ his second time in office). Following in Ikeda’s footsteps, Ohira joined the Yoshida faction and was given a position on the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Yoshida’s years as prime minister included the majority of the Occupation and the initial years following the restoration of Japanese independence, and it was under his watch that the policies that would go on to serve as the “pillars” of postwar conservative politics—a close affiliation with the United States, reliance upon the US-Japan security treaty for defense, and a focus on economic recovery—were established. These policies would become such an embedded part of conservative politics that

1 A Member of the House of Representatives

19

by the mid-1960s, Yoshida and his lineage—politicians like Ikeda, Sat¯o Eisaku, and ¯ Ohira—would come to be referred to as the “conservative mainstream.”4 ¯ Ohira held Yoshida in great esteem: “I believe that Yoshida was an outstanding leader, surely the most outstanding of the postwar period.” Yoshida was not only the man who had brought about the San Francisco Peace Treaty, restoring Japanese ¯ ¯ independence, but he was someone that Ohira could model himself on as, like Ohira, Yoshida was a voracious reader and possessed a strong sense of duty.5 ¯ But while Ohira respected Yoshida, it was Ikeda whom he was closest to. From their initial meeting at the Yokohama Tax Office to his time as Ikeda’s secretary, the two men had a long-standing relationship, and his view of Ikeda was quite different from that of Yoshida: I think that [Ikeda] was an ordinary man. That is, I do not feel that he was a great man. He had many flaws. But what I did admire about him was the way that he was able to grasp things in concrete rather than abstract terms and his ability to respond in the same fashion. He wasn’t satisfied discussing matters of state in the abstract. He was enthusiastic and sincere about bringing about specific solutions to problems.6

¯ Ohira’s closest ally in the Diet was Tanaka Kakuei, a man whose personality was the complete opposite of his own. He compared Tanaka to the sixteenth century warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi: [Tanaka] can be best described as a cheerful, optimistic, and progressive policy maker. It really doesn’t suit him when he starts talking about things like austerity and saving money [laughs]. The image doesn’t fit, does it? After all, his nature reminds you of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. I’m not like Hideyoshi. If anything, [I’m more like] Tokugawa in that I don’t really stand out. My personality isn’t like Tokugawa’s though.7

¯ It was the two men’s differing temperaments that drew them together. Ohira also said of Tanaka that “He is a very charming man possessing a wide range of abilities and a keen sense of intuition. In that sense, everything I lack, he has in abundance.”8 ¯ Every election, Tanaka would rush to Ohira’s district in Kagawa and vigorously ¯ campaign for him. Ohira often said, “Pursue friends rather than treasure, for friends are even more valuable.” Tanaka was the dearest friend he had in the world of politics, and their relationship would continue for the rest of his life.9 ¯ 1952 proved to be a fulfilling year for Ohira not just on a professional level but on a personal one as well, as his son Masaki managed to overcome his poor health and enter Seij¯ogakuen High School.10

1.3 Merger of the Conservative Parties In the years following the restoration of Japanese independence, many of the conservative political figures who had been purged by GHQ returned to politics. Prominent among these were Hatoyama Ichir¯o, Kishi Nobusuke, and Shigemitsu Mamoru.

20

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These men immediately began to challenge Yoshida’s leadership, for reasons both political and personal. Shigemitsu formed the Reform Party, while Hatoyama and Kishi initially joined the Liberal Party and worked against Yoshida from there. The power struggle within the Liberal Party culminated in the exit of the Hatoyama faction, which merged with the Reform Party to form the Democratic Party in November 1954. The Yoshida government fell the following month and Hatoyama became prime minister. In November 1955, the two conservative parties merged ¯ to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). During the merger, Ohira introduced Ikeda to Miki Bukichi, formerly of the Democratic Party (Miki was one of the leading figures behind the merger).11 In August 1955, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu visited the US and issued a joint statement with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that said that the US-Japan security treaty would be amended to be more reciprocal in nature once Japan increased its defense capabilities and became able to contribute to the peace and security of the western Pacific. ¯ What was Ohira’s view of the new government’s foreign policy initiatives? Continuing to believe that Japan’s relationship with America was key, he responded to Shigemitsu’s visit by publishing a magazine article—“Repercussions of the Talks with America on the Negotiations with the Soviet Union.” He was skeptical about pursuing rearmament and authorizing the dispatch of Japanese forces overseas, believing that the country should prioritize its economic recovery instead. He wrote that it was “too early” to make the security relationship with the United States reciprocal. He also suggested that, should the changes promoted by Shigemitsu during his visit be successful, it would serve as “an obstacle to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union” (a primary policy goal of the Hatoyama government).12 ¯ In making these arguments, Ohira was carrying on the policies advocated for by Yoshida: prioritizing the economy, carrying out only light rearmament, and avoiding any hasty constitutional revision. He was simply holding fast to the views of the conservative mainstream. ¯ In December, Ohira became director of the Cabinet Division of the LDP’s Policy Research Council. Also commonly referred to as the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) in English, this was the body through which the party handled issues falling ¯ under the jurisdiction of the prime minister’s office. In his new position, Ohira took on the issues of compensation for overseas property lost by repatriates and increasing ¯ military pensions. His time overseeing these issues allowed Ohira to gain experience 13 in implementing policy. The former Yoshida faction had maintained some degree of solidarity following the conservative merger, but it had increasingly become divided into two groups, one centered around Ikeda and another around Sat¯o Eisaku—a situation exacerbated by disagreement between the two groups over who to support in the December 1956 LDP presidential election.14 In June 1957, Ikeda formally formed his own faction—the K¯ochikai. The upper ranks of the new faction included established political figures like Kosaka Zentar¯o and ¯ Maeo Shigesabur¯o, while Ohira, Suzuki Zenk¯o, Kurogane Yasumi, and Miyazawa

1 A Member of the House of Representatives

21

¯ Kiichi were among its mid-tier members. Over the following year, Ohira consolidated his position within the LDP by serving as deputy chair of the Policy Research Council, a technical expert for the party’s provisional committee on taxation, deputy chair of the Subcommittee on Forestry Measures, and chair of the Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy. Now the leader of his own faction, Ikeda joined the Kishi Nobusuke government as minister of international trade and industry in the June 1959 cabinet reshuffle, thereby helping cement his path forward to the positions of LDP president and ¯ prime minister. Ohira became chair of the Education Committee, where he worked to establish support groups providing education to children with long-term absences from school.15 The leading cause of controversy during the Kishi government was its efforts to revise the US-Japan security treaty. Echoing the goals advocated for by Shigemitsu during his aforementioned discussions with Dulles, Kishi sought to eliminate some of the more unequal aspects of the existing treaty and move the US-Japan security relationship closer to a reciprocal one. While Kishi was ultimately successful in passing a revised treaty, he was only able to do so in the face of massive, unprecedented demonstrations against it. ¯ Ohira felt that the public outcry reflected popular “dissent and dissatisfaction” towards the conservative governments that had been in power since 1948: The Japanese people have only just recovered, at long last, from the material poverty brought about by the lengthy war and the defeat that followed. They feel a sort of spiritual thirst and emptiness. And they have come to harbor dissent and dissatisfaction towards the Occupation and the conservative governments that have carried on its mantle. It would be difficult to dismiss this sentiment as mere resistance to authority or a sense of malaise. And there was no chance that the Left would allow this atmosphere of yearning to pass unchallenged.16

While he interpreted the situation as one where the political left was attempting to take advantage of popular sentiment to topple the LDP government, he was also critical of the position that Kishi had taken, saying that he was “lacking in patriotic zeal and the judgement expected of a leader”: I am one of those who question the short-sighted argument that the treaty’s one-sided and unequal nature is an inherently bad thing. The treaty’s terms may be unequal, but this should be endured for the sake of the nation. If Japan does not possess the qualities required to overcome that one-sidedness now, we should endure until we have obtained the needed strength. […] For all of Prime Minister Kishi’s desire to revise the security treaty, he is passive when it comes to answering questions on the subject in the Diet. He seems to be missing the spirit needed to propel things forward and to convince others to come to his side. He is lacking in patriotic zeal and the judgment expected of a leader.17

¯ At this time, Ohira’s son Masaki was at Keio University’s Faculty of Law and asked his permission to learn aikido. In addition to devoting himself to aikido, Masaki also studied modern international political history under Professor Uchiyama Masakuma. He was a kindhearted young man who volunteered his time reading aloud at a school

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for the blind. “He was meticulous to the point of nervousness when interacting with others and extremely kind. He worried even more about my health than my wife did.” After graduating, Masaki joined the Kanzaki Seishi Company, a paper manufac¯ turer. Ohira’s plan was to have Masaki “spend three or four years learning under Kat¯o Fujitar¯o, the company’s president and a senior who I greatly admired, and then ¯ have him come work under me.” Masaki was widely viewed as Ohira successor.18

2 “Tolerance and Patience”: Chief Cabinet Secretary 2.1 Entering the Cabinet for the First Time Prime Minister Kishi announced his resignation in June 1960, immediately following the ratification of the revised security treaty. As head of one of the largest LDP factions in the House of Representatives, Ikeda was the leading contender to succeed him and had Yoshida’s endorsement and the support of the Sat¯o and Kishi factions. ¯ In preparing for the coming presidential election, Ohira consulted with Tanaka Kakuei (who was now a member of the Sat¯o faction), who gave him a memo in which he outlined the electoral campaign process. “He made sure to write out the important parts in red ink for me.” Ikeda won the election on July 14, defeating Ishii Mitsujir¯o and Fujiyama Aiichir¯o. ¯ Later that day, Ikeda and Ohira worked out their plans for the new government and discussed the future: Did you ever imagine, when you first traveled from Hiroshima to Tokyo, that you might be standing where you are today? Not at all. Then becoming president is an unexpected stroke of good fortune for you. No matter when it comes to an end, you’ll have no regrets. Yes. You’ll have no regrets, even if you should form a government in the morning only for it fall in the evening. Given that, I would ask that you not discuss any long-term plans for your government if at all possible. And I would also request that you refrain, if you can, from playing golf and dining with geisha. From now on, we must share the same joys and sorrows of life as the public.

The Ikeda government made no lofty promises as it took office, instead adopting ¯ “tolerance and patience” as its slogan. Ohira became chief cabinet secretary, entering the cabinet for the first time at the age of fifty. He had also been the one to coin “tolerance and patience,” and the slogan became something of a buzzword at the time. He tried to have the government project an image of being “one with the

2 “Tolerance and Patience”: Chief Cabinet Secretary

23

people” by having Ikeda engage in “normal” activities such as eating curry and rice for lunch. The public was amazed by the change, given that the gaffe-prone Ikeda had had a reputation for being bureaucratic and arrogant, having once infamously responded to concerns about skyrocketing rice prices while he was finance minister by declaring that “the poor can eat barley.”19 The work of the chief cabinet secretary extends to every aspect of an administration. They serve as the government’s spokesperson, holding regular press conferences ¯ twice a day in the morning and afternoon. Ohira was unaccustomed to this kind of work and could be inarticulate at times, causing reporters to sometimes ask him ¯ to speak more clearly. The ever-meticulous Ohira was thorough in carrying out the demands of the position, cutting no corners and regularly meeting with the staff ¯ of each ministry. Even after Ikeda had retired for the day, Ohira would continue working late into the night, and, come morning, he would skim the newspapers for any important developments. He soon became able to handle his press responsibilities well, responding accurately to questions and providing neither too much nor too little information in his answers. His reputation improved.20 On September 5, the LDP announced a new platform with an eye on the general election scheduled for November. Central among its policies was the “income doubling-plan,” an effort to double the average per capita income within ten years that would go on to become the Ikeda government’s signature policy initiative. Under the party’s newly laid out foreign policy, Ikeda rejected being neutral in the Cold War (the position advocated for by the Socialist Party) and stated that Japan would be “a ¯ member of the free world.” Ohira played a central role in formulating this policy, working with Shimomura Osamu, Tamura Toshio, and others in doing so.21 The boldness of the new LDP platform meant that, despite coming only a few months after the wide-spread demonstrations against revision of the security treaty, the central issue of the electoral campaign became the economy, and on November ¯ 20, Ikeda and Ohira led the LDP to victory in the House of Representatives election. ¯ Due to the demands being chief cabinet secretary put on Ohira’s time during the campaign—such as appearing in NHK’s televised debates—he was able to spend little time campaigning in his district. Instead, his son Masaki went in his place and made his first campaign speeches. Despite being only twenty-two and fresh out of university, Masaki was well-received, with people remarking on how much he ¯ resembled his father. Ohira came in first in his district, winning election for the fifth 22 time. The Ikeda government began preparing for the opening of the new Diet session on ¯ January 28, 1961, and Ohira put together Ikeda’s policy speech. In the speech, Ikeda emphasized that the prosperity of the Japanese economy relied upon cooperating with the other free nations of the world and that neutrality was nothing more than an illusory goal.23 ¯ How did Ohira view Ikeda as prime minister? He provided the following assessment: “Ikeda had never been a man of extraordinary genius. Nor was he a cunning political tactician. He was an unrefined man of little charm. But he was well-learned. And he was someone who was willing to stand up for his beliefs, for better or worse.”24

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¯ While this may seem like harsh criticism, it was not. Ohira considered all people to be inherently imperfect. He would often say, “Any person necessarily has both good and bad qualities. Sometimes they will be honest, and sometimes they will try to deceive. It is because human society is built from these people coming into contact with one another that it is so interesting.” He had a “philosophy of the sixty percent” (that is, he did not seek the perfect, just the good enough) and this tolerance attracted people to him.25

2.2 The US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs The first meeting of the US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held at the Kanko Hotel in Hakone from January 2–4, 1961. The Japanese ¯ attendees were Ohira, Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentar¯o, MITI Minister Sat¯o Eisaku, Agricultural Minister K¯ono Ichir¯o, Finance Minister Mizuta Mikio, EPA Director Fujiyama Aiichir¯o, and Labor Minister Fukunaga Kenji. Those from the US included Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges, Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, Under Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller. This meeting of key ministers in both governments was unprecedented in the history of US-Japan relations and reflected the importance with which the Kennedy administration viewed Japan. For its part, the Ikeda government was hoping to improve their trade deficit and support the income-doubling plan by increasing Japanese exports to the United States.26 ¯ Ohira described the meeting’s significance as coming from the way that it “strengthened the bonds of US-Japan friendship”: The Joint Committee is not a forum for negotiating over specific issues or reaching any agreements. It is an attempt to strengthen the bonds of US-Japan friendship by facilitating the free exchange of ideas between us and to contribute to bringing the economic ties between our two countries closer. […] For economic officials from both Japan and the United States to spend two or three days discussing economic and other issues of common interest between us represented a major diplomatic gesture on the part of both countries in and of itself. It had a large impact on the citizens of both countries, to say nothing of its effect on the world.27

¯ Ohira considered it self-evident that Japan’s relations with the US should serve as the cornerstone of its foreign policy; that his first international conference was the Joint Committee is symbolic of this. ¯ Ohira had Masaki resign from his company in the spring of 1962 with the intention of grooming him to eventually become his successor. His wife Shigeko wanted ¯ Masaki to study abroad in West Germany, but Ohira did not approve of the idea. “I did not like the idea of studying abroad in general. Studying abroad is not about

2 “Tolerance and Patience”: Chief Cabinet Secretary

25

learning about a foreign country; the experience does nothing more than provide a means of getting to know Japan better.” Masaki departed on a six-month trip around the world in July. As part of this, he met with his father in New York in September and then accompanied him on his trip ¯ to Europe. Ohira had become foreign minister by this time and his visits to America and Europe marked the beginnings of his diplomatic efforts.28 Notes 1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2010), 57–60, 189–193, 233–291. ¯ Manabe Kenji, Watashi no Mita Ohira Masayoshi: Sono Sugao to Shisei (Tokyo: Image Makers, 1976), 236. The age of forty-two has traditionally been considered an extremely unlucky age (yakudoshi) for men in Japan. ¯ Ohira 1:197–203. Hattori Ry¯uji, Eisaku Sat¯o, Japanese Prime Minister, 1964–72: Okinawa, Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics and the Nobel Prize, trans. Graham Leonard (London: Routledge, 2021), 117–120. ¯ Ohira 6:315–318, 428. Ibid, 6:373. ¯ Ibid, 4:214–215. While Ohira’s comparison of Tanaka to Hideyoshi here is in reference to Hideyoshi’s opulent lifestyle and popular association with money, Tanaka is also frequently compared to Hideyoshi as both men managed to reach the heights of power despite coming from humble backgrounds. In comparing himself to Tokugawa Ieyasu, the man who unified Japan in the ¯ wake of Hideyoshi’s death, Ohira references Tokugawa’s popular perception as a devious man, but one content to wait on the sidelines for a situation to turn to his advantage. Ibid, 6:105. Manabe 119. ¯ Ohira 2:195–196. Ibid, 1:62–65, 223–227, 303–310. Ibid, 1:389–394, 406, 2:214–217. ¯ Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1990), 161–163. Hattori 87–88. Ibid, 165–174. ¯ Ohira 2:12–13. ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, “’Anpo Kaitei’ to Sono Sh¯uhen,” undated, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Collection. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:196–197. Ibid, 1:67–71, 4:207–210. Kosaka Zentar¯o, Arekara Korekara – Taikenteki Sengo Seijishi (Tokyo: Bokuy¯osha, 1981), 13. Shima Keiji, “Kan’y¯o to Nintai ¯ no Hito,” in in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei,

26

20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

3 Transition to the World of Politics …

K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 512–513. Kimura Mitsugu, “Ihin wo Kokoro no Sase ni shite,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, ed., Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu Kiki¯ gaki Ohira Masayoshi (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 513–514. Kimura Mitsugu, S¯ori no Hinkaku – Kantei Hishokan ga Mita Rekidai Saish¯o no Sugao (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2006), 54. Miyazawa Kiichi, “Tsushima, Ikeda Z¯osh¯o ni Hishokan Jidai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 30. Manabe 71–76. Ishikawa Masumi, Jinbutsu Sengo Seiji – Watashi no Deatta Seijikatachi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 3–4. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:280–288. Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council, ed., “Jiy¯u Minshut¯o Shinseseisaku Kaisetsu: Akarui Yutakana Nihon wo Tsukuru tame ni” (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party, 1960) 10, 18, 31, 229. Yoshitsugu K¯osuke. Ikeda Seikenki no Nihon Gaik¯o to Reisen: Sengo Nihon Gaik¯o no Zahy¯ojiku, 1960–1964 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 15–20. Oguni Hiroshi, “Shinnen to Kikubari no Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 497. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 190–193. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:32–33. ¯ ¯ Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, “Ohira Masayoshi no Seiji Shisei” [Ohira Masayoshi’s Polit¯ ical Attitudes] in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, ¯ 248–252. Kat¯o K¯oichi, “Waga Shi: Ohira Masayoshi ni Omou,” in Kumon, ¯ K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 268–269. Hiwatari Yumi, Sengo Seiji to Nichibei Kankei (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1990), 215–222. Kikuchi Kiyoaki, “Ikeda Naikaku no Gaish¯o Jidai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 94–96. Suzuki Hironao, Ikeda Seiken to K¯od¯o Seich¯o-ki no Nihon Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Keio University, 2013), 95–118. Takahashi Kazuhiro, “Doru B¯oei to Nichibei Kankei,” Gaik¯o Shiry¯okanp¯o, No. 24 (2011), 81. Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Daiikkai Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯oiinkai ni Okeru T¯ogi Naiy¯o no Gaiy¯o” [Overview of the Discussions at the First Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs], November 24, 1961, Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯oiinkai Kankei Daiikai Iinkai Honkaigi, E’.2.3.1.17–13, MOFA. United States and Canada Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Daiikkai Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯oiinkai Gigi Gaiy¯o” [Overview of the Proceedings of the First Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs], November 1961, Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯oiinkai Kankei Daiikai Iinkai Honkaigi, E’.2.3.1.17–1-3, MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:76–77. Ibid, 2:198–199.

Chapter 4

¯ The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy: Foreign Minister in the Ikeda Government

¯ 1 Breakthrough in Japan-Korea Relations: The Ohira-Kim Memo 1.1 “Prime Minister Ikeda’s Herald”: Visiting Europe and America On July 14, 1962, Ikeda was reelected as LDP president unopposed. When he reshuf¯ fled his cabinet a few days later, Ohira volunteered to serve as foreign minister. He had been receiving weekly briefings on international issues from Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeuchi Ry¯uji as chief cabinet secretary and felt comfortable with foreign policy from his experiences working in China before the war and his time spent travelling in the US and working with American officials during the Occupation.1 Tanaka Kakuei became finance minister in the same cabinet reorganization, and ¯ Ohira’s colleagues from his time serving as Ikeda’s secretary—Kurogane Yasumi and Miyazaki Kiichi—also joined the cabinet as chief cabinet secretary and director of the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), respectively. Ikeda’s first cabinet had contained several powerful figures like Sat¯o Eisaku, Miki Takeo, and Fujiyama Aiichir¯o (all faction leaders), but these men had all now departed. The new cabinet was ridiculed as the “secretary cabinet” (hishokan naikaku) by some due to the perceived lowered caliber of its members.2 ¯ Shortly after assuming his new position, Ohira humbly described himself as “an amateur in the realm of foreign affairs” at a press conference and asked for the press’ indulgence. As touched on at the end of the previous chapter, he made his first trip as foreign minister that fall, visiting Europe and America. ¯ Ohira addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 21, 1962. In his speech, he discussed eliminating colonialism and racial discrimination and strengthening the United Nations. He also called for ending nuclear testing and increasing aid to developing nations. While the speech was criticized © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_4

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¯ 4 The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy …

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for attempting to appeal to everyone, considerable effort had been put into creating ¯ something suitable for the UN, and its delivery marked the beginning of “Ohira Diplomacy.” ¯ Following his speech, Ohira met with UN Provisional Secretary-General U Thant.3 He also met with Secretary of State Rusk on the 24th and discussed US-Soviet disarmament, the Cuba crisis, Okinawa, and Japan-Korea relations.4 ¯ From New York, Ohira departed for Europe, where he visited the United Kingdom, France, OECD headquarters, West Germany, Italy, the Vatican, Belgium, EEC headquarters, and the Netherlands.5 In his meetings with French President de Gaulle and other European leaders, he sought increased economic ties, their support for Japanese entry into the OECD, and for the countries to no longer apply Article 35 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to Japan. Article 35 allowed ¯ signatories to not apply the agreement’s provisions to certain countries, which Ohira felt contradicted the principles of free trade. ¯ Ohira’s negotiations in Europe were intended to lay the groundwork for Ikeda’s planned visit in the fall. In his meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, he said, “Prime Minister Ikeda will visit Germany in November, and I come as his herald, just as John came before Jesus. I am confident that his visit will bring about great results.” That Ikeda was able to obtain widespread support during his trip for Japanese membership in the OECD and the lifting of Article 35 was due ¯ in no small part to Ohira’s efforts at this time.6 ¯ Ohira had met up with Masaki during his time in New York, and his son accompanied him to Europe as his personal attendant. Masaki greatly resembled his father, ¯ both in terms of his appearance and his character. Even more meticulous than Ohira, Masaki “took care of everything for me, from laying out my changes of clothes to handling the laundry. While his English and French was very poor, he was bold in carrying out his everyday tasks and also enjoyed chatting with foreign ministers and other important dignitaries in the countries we visited.” Father and son went their separate ways at Amsterdam Airport, with Masaki continuing his travels in Europe alone. While in Vienna, however, he found that he had trouble walking—an early symptom of Behcet’s disease, an incurable illness that affects the eyes and skin causing rashes, ulcers, and, frequently, blindness. “The incurable disease that would go on to claim his life was already laying in wait.” Despite his health problems, Masaki would go on to visit Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia before returning to Japan on the day before Christmas.7 ¯ Ohira’s Fall 1962 Visits to the US and Europe September 21

Addressed the 17th UN General Assembly. Met with Provisional Secretary-General U Thant (New York)

September 24

Met with Secretary of State Rusk about Okinawa, import restrictions, and EEC policies (New York)

September 25

Negotiated the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce with Minister of State for Trade Green (London)

September 26

Met with Lord Privy Seal Heath (London) (continued)

¯ 1 Breakthrough in Japan-Korea Relations: The Ohira-Kim Memo

29

(continued) September 27

Met with President de Gaulle and Finance Minister d’Estaing about lifting the application of GATT Article 35 (Paris)

September 28

Met with OECD Secretary-General Kristensen. Spoke with Foreign Minister de Murville about liberalizing trade (Paris)

September 29

Met with Foreign Minister Schröder about Japan’s desire to expand trade with the EEC and join the OECD (Bonn)

October 1

Met with President Sengi, Commerce Minister Columbo, and acting Foreign Minister Russo and requested the expansion of Japan-Italy trade (Rome)

October 2

Met Pope John XXIII at the Vatican

October 3

Met Assistant Foreign Minister Fayat and Prime Minister Lefeyre (Brussels)

October 4

Met Minister of Trade Brasseur and EEC President Hallstein (Brussels)

October 5

Met Dutch Foreign Minister Luns and visited the International Court of Justice (The Hague)

November 30

Travelled to the US for the second meeting of the US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs (returned to Japan on December 8) ¯ ¯ Source “Ohira Gaimu Daijin Obei H¯omon Kankei Ikken (1962.9) Kaidan Kankei,” A’0.1.5.0.8–1, ¯ MOFA. Ohira 7:377–378.

1.2 Japan-Korea Relations and the United States ¯ Ohira’s first major success came in the realm of Japan-Korea relations. South Korea and Japan still lacked diplomatic relations at the time of the Ikeda government, and one of the major issues remaining between the two countries was the Rhee Line, the maritime boundary that had been unilaterally established beyond Korea’s territorial waters by South Korean President Syngman Rhee in 1952. South Korea seized any ¯ Japanese fishing vessels that crossed the Rhee Line, something that Ohira recalled bitterly: South Korea established a military boundary line on the high seas and seized – one after another – all fishing boats and sailors who violated it. Almost every morning, as I arrived at work, I was met with reports of these seizures. Rushing over to the Korean representatives to protest and demand corrective actions became a daily affair.8

Japan and South Korea had already conducted several rounds of negotiations over normalization by this point, but issues such as the Korean monetary claims against Japan had prevented them from reaching an agreement. But after Park Chung-hee came to power, he dispatched Kim Jong-pil, head of the Korean Central Intelligence ¯ Agency (and an acquaintance of Ohira’s from his time as chief cabinet secretary), to Japan. With the South Korean economy doing poorly, Kim was hoping to secure Japanese aid.9 ¯ Ohira also hoped to use economic assistance as a means to break the deadlock between the two countries:

¯ 4 The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy …

30

While South Korea’s claims could be considered in terms of rights and obligations, we would never have been able to find a resolution viewing them in that way. South Korea had achieved independence and established itself as a new country. It was more honest and practical for us to address these issues by having Japan, as Korea’s former suzerain and the neighbor with which it had had the longest history, express its “congratulations" on this accomplishment. By holding discussions in this spirit, we were able to settle the claims issue and open the door for the establishment of diplomatic relations by having Japan provide economic cooperation, largely in the form of $300 million and another $200 million in loans.10

It is important to not overlook the role played by the United States in this break¯ through. As mentioned earlier, Ohira had met with Secretary of State Rusk in New York on September 24, 1962, and Okinawa and Japan-Korea relations were central issues on the agenda during that meeting. ¯ Ohira told Rusk, “I place the highest priority on the Japan-US relationship. I intend to promote it, and I would like cooperation and advice from this friendship. Further, since there are many relationships between Japan and other countries connected ¯ through Japan-US relations, I seek help from them as well.” When Ohira said that Japan was interested in normalizing relations with South Korea, Rusk responded, “I was not asked to do so by Korea, but I think $300 million would be a good solution.”11 By being willing to put forward a specific number, Rusk showed his intention to help ¯ mediate things with the Koreans, which is what Ohira had hoped for.12

1.3 “Permanent Neighbors” ¯ ¯ Banboku and other influAfter returning to Japan from Europe, Ohira visited Ono ential members of the LDP to gather support for a breakthrough in Japan-Korea relations. The party contained both pro-Korean members and those who were more ¯ belonged to the first camp). Ohira’s ¯ skeptical (Ono goal was to bring the two groups together.13 ¯ Ohira met with Kim on October 20 and November 12, and they reached an agreement on an economic cooperation package that included $300 million that was not to be repaid, a long-term, low-interest loan of $200 million, and $100 million in private ¯ credit. This agreement came to be known as the “Ohira-Kim Memo.”14 ¯ In convincing Kim to accept the agreement, Ohira told him, “I will do all I can to get as close to the $300 million as possible, but I will also have to take popular sentiment and annual government expenditures into account.” While the United States had put forth a figure of $300 million as a compromise, the Japanese foreign ministry’s final ¯ plan had only been for $250 million. Ohira’s unilateral decision to accept the higher figure was thus key to reaching an agreement. While the finance ministry was critical of the massive expenditure, Tanaka—as the new finance minister—kept it in check. On the issue of Takeshima, a pair of small islets in the Sea of Japan claimed by ¯ both countries, Ohira emphasized that it was “absolutely necessary for South Korea to promise to respond to the Japanese complaint before the International Court of Justice,” but Kim rejected this by noting that “a case at the International Court of

¯ 1 Breakthrough in Japan-Korea Relations: The Ohira-Kim Memo

31

Justice would take several years to arrive at a verdict, which makes it unsuitable from the perspective of restoring diplomatic relations between our countries. We would prefer to instead entrust the arbitration of this issue to a third-party country.” He seems to have had the United States in mind when he made this suggestion.15 ¯ Why did Ohira agree to a deal with South Korea despite its rejection of Japan’s demand on Takeshima? During his discussions with Kim, he spoke of the two countries’ relationship as “permanent neighbors”: Our countries are permanent neighbors. So let us be bold, cast the past aside like ashes, and look to the future. If you are willing to adopt that perspective, it only makes sense for Japan to do the same. Since you have finally achieved independence and must now undergo the difficult work of establishing a country, Japan – as your permanent neighbor – will help your country move into the future by supplying a substantial amount of economic assistance, some to be repaid and some free.16

¯ Ohira’s view was that neither Japan nor Korea could ever escape the other; they were “permanent neighbors.” And, given that relationship, when Japan assisted Korea with its nation building, it was planning for its own future as well. ¯ Following his final meeting with Kim, Ohira told the assembled reporters that “our negotiations with Korea have crossed the Rubicon. They are nearly complete.” Despite this proclamation, however, the final work on restoring diplomatic relations with South Korea would fall to the Sat¯o government that succeeded Ikeda. Even so, ¯ the Ohira-Kim Memo marked a major milestone in this process.17 ¯ The efforts Ohira made in this area should not be seen as coming out of any particular fondness for South Korea, however. He was not pleased with Park Chunghee, who had come to power in a coup d’etat and established a dictatorship, and criticized him to those around him, saying, “Perhaps it was inevitable given his military background, but does he really need to be so draconian and harsh?”. ¯ With Ikeda still travelling in Europe, he was largely bypassed by Ohira as he ¯ concluded the negotiations. Although Ohira had obtained Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane’s approval for his actions, Ikeda was still angered upon his return, feeling ¯ Memo thus came that he had not been adequately consulted with.18 The Ohira-Kim ¯ at the cost of Ohira’s relationship with Ikeda. Ikeda had been more focused on improving relations with China than Korea, and he was surprised and upset that ¯ Ohira had settled things with South Korea in his absence. He vented this anger to his ¯ ¯ secretary, saying, “What that bastard Ohira did is outrageous.” Ohira told a reporter he was close to that “Ikeda is jealous of me. The one at the top is always wary of ¯ their number two.” Ohira had once served as Ikeda’s secretary but had now come to 19 be seen as a rival.

¯ 1.4 Visits to Oiso ¯ Ohira visited America again in late November 1962 to attend the second meeting of the US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. His experiences

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¯ 4 The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy …

as foreign minister had helped hone his diplomatic skills. But, while he had visited a dizzying number of countries, the United States remained the cornerstone of his foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, he was grateful to the US for helping Japan when it was on the verge of starvation during the Occupation. ¯ Ohira’s placement of the United States at the center of his foreign policy was something that he had consciously inherited from Yoshida Shigeru, who was now ¯ ¯ living a life of seclusion in Oiso, Kanagawa, about an hour from Tokyo. Ohira visited Yoshida whenever the opportunity arose, a practice that he had first adopted after ¯ becoming chief cabinet secretary two years earlier. Yoshida cared for Ohira and even ¯ campaigned for him in Kagawa. Ohira’s frequent visits to Yoshida continued after he became foreign minister, and he never failed to report to Yoshida after returning ¯ brought him fruit as a souvenir, explaining from abroad.20 One time, after Ohira that “it’s something you can eat,” Yoshida narrowed his eyes and said, “Cash isn’t ¯ ¯ particularly bitter, you know.” Yoshida welcomed Ohira’s visits, and Ohira wrote: “I always looked forward to listening to his perfect—or rather, carefree—stories, which were always filled with his unique sense of humor. Even after his retirement, he continued to possess an unspoken political influence and often received visits from influential people, both Japanese and foreign, at his home.”21 Yoshida had had extensive dealings with MacArthur during the Occupation, and ¯ Ohira did his best to learn Yoshida’s approach to diplomacy, which was orthodox in nature and focused on cooperating with the US while maintaining the balance of ¯ power. Ohira’s foreign policy emphasis on cooperation with the US was not merely ¯ an extension of Yoshida’s approach, however. Ohira liked to invoke the idea that the US-Japan relationship should be one that “befits us.” As Japan enjoyed its remarkable economic development, he tried to establish a relationship with America commensurate with Japan’s growing national strength. At the second meeting of the Joint Committee in Washington, he expressed a willingness to be assertive with the United States, telling the press that “We’re going to pin down the American ministers for two days; that’s the only way we’re going to get anywhere.” ¯ Ohira met with US Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer on a regular basis. The ¯ two men were of similar age and quickly became close; Ohira would lose his press detail when he met with Reischauer. Reischauer, a Harvard professor, remembered ¯ Ohira as the most pro-American member of the LDP and someone whom he “trusted wholeheartedly.”22 ¯ While not on good terms with Ikeda for the time being, Ohira still met with him at the prime minister’s residence and spent evenings with him at Sakaeya, a restaurant in Shimbashi. Sakaeya was a regular meeting place for the Ikeda faction, and the ¯ owner dubbed Ohira “Ot¯o-chan.” Ikeda had the seat of honor at these gatherings, which were also attended by major financial figures like Sakurada Takeshi, Kobayashi Ataru, and Nagano Shigeo. The increased prominence among the financial world that ¯ Ohira gained from these evenings would become an important political asset for him later. The meetings also influenced his views on China policy, as he was exposed to the opinions of pro-China Diet members like Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Matsumura Kenz¯o, and Furui Yoshimi, as well as to those of ANA President Okazaki Kaheita.

2 Dollars and Nuclear Weapons: Agonizing Over “Introduction”

33

2 Dollars and Nuclear Weapons: Agonizing Over “Introduction” 2.1 Struggling with Dollar Defense ¯ As mentioned earlier, Ohira attended the second meeting of the Joint Committee from December 3–5, 1962 alongside Finance Minister Tanaka.23 With Japan importing ¯ excessive amounts of goods from the West, Ohira made the following appeal to Rusk and the other American officials: America’s dollar defense and your “Buy American” policy are limiting our possibilities for expanding exports to Asia. Together with the popular push for import restrictions on the US market and demands that Japan implement voluntary export restrictions on a number of products, it has become difficult for us to expand exports. […] We would ask for American understanding regarding the difficult circumstances facing the Japanese economy.24

The US was experiencing a balance of payments deficit and was trying to curb the outflow of dollars. In July 1963, the Kennedy administration announced the creation of an interest equalization tax that taxed Americans on interest gained from foreign investments. This was referred to as its “dollar defense” policy.25 ¯ The tax’s introduction prompted Ohira to make a hasty visit to the United States to negotiate with Kennedy, Rusk, and Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. Afterwards, he said, “The matter is settled for the time being. They have issued a communique saying that they are prepared to take special measures if Japan’s balance of payments becomes a problem, including issuing an exemption from the interest equalization tax.”26 When the third meeting of the Joint Committee was held in Tokyo on January 27– ¯ 28, 1964, Ohira served as chair. He made several remarks regarding Japan’s policies towards Asia during the meeting, such as that “the sooner relations with South Korea can be normalized, the better,” and “we trade with the Chinese mainland on a private commercial basis and permit travel and cultural exchange, but we have no political relationship with them. Which is to say, our policy is to keep politics and economics separate.” Another issue on the meeting’s agenda was the dumping of American cotton goods onto the Japanese market. Having attended all three meeting of the ¯ Joint Committee held up until that point, Ohira had come to play an increasingly 27 prominent role in their proceedings.

¯ 3 The Ohira-Reischauer Meeting ¯ The dollar defense issue was not the issue with the US that most concerned Ohira, ¯ however; that honor belonged to nuclear weapons, something that Ohira would become deeply involved with.

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The revised US-Japan security framework introduced with the new security treaty included a prior consultation system under which bilateral talks would be held prior to any major changes to the disposition of American forces within Japan. During the Kishi’s government’s efforts to establish this system, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichir¯o met with US Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II in 1960 and was informed that the United States had determined that the docking of naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons at Japanese ports would not constitute the “introduction” of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil and would therefore fall outside the scope of any such prior consultation. Confidential American records of the meeting show that Fujiyama accepted the American position, but the contents of this agreement were ¯ never passed on to Ohira when he became foreign minister.28 ¯ As Ohira testified before the House of Councilors’ Budget Committee on March 6, 1963, Nosaka Sanz¯o, a Communist legislator, raised the issue of American nuclear ¯ submarines docking at Japanese ports. Ohira responded by explaining that no such introduction would be permitted without a request for prior consultation from the US: As the carrying of nuclear armaments represents a major modification of equipment, the United States would consult with Japan on it. The United States has no intention to carry out such an act and has never requested any prior consultations with us on the issue. We have followed normal government policy on this and are firmly committed to not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. The United States is well aware of this and has absolutely no intention of doing so either.29

¯ Ohira’s answer did not conform to America’s understanding of the issue. The US ¯ realized that Ohira and Ikeda had not inherited the confidential records on this from ¯ the previous Kishi government and decided to persuade Ohira to accept the Fujiyama¯ MacArthur agreement. On April 4, Reischauer invited Ohira to the ambassadorial residence in Akasaka under the pretext of a breakfast meeting. ¯ According to the American records of the meeting, Reischauer informed Ohira that, while the introduction of nuclear weapons was indeed subject to prior consultation, this referred specifically to the deployment of nuclear weapons on land. The ¯ records also say that Ohira agreed with Reischauer, saying that “under this interpretation, ‘introduce’ would not apply to the hypothetical case of nuclears on a vessel ¯ in Japanese waters or ports.” Reischauer convinced Ohira by presenting the records of the prior confidential discussion. In other words, despite his earlier statement to Nosaka, he now conceded that the docking of nuclear-armed American naval vessels in Japanese ports was beyond the scope of prior consultation.30 ¯ For their part, Japanese foreign ministry records state that “Ohira was unable to express his opinions on any of these matters.” “On September 24, 1964, Ambassador ¯ R[eischauer] asked former minister Ohira whether this matter had been passed on to Prime Minister Sat¯o and Minister Shiina. He was under the impression that it had ¯ not.” Given the gravity of the matter and Ohira’s cautious nature, the portrayal of him in the American records seem to provide too vivid an account of his position.31 ¯ ¯ According to Ohira’s secretary, Morita Hajime, Ohira began to struggle with the issue of “introduction” after informing Ikeda of the confidential records. “From the ¯ first time he had heard the term, Ohira had had the feeling that the English phrase

¯ 3 The Ohira-Reischauer Meeting

35

‘introduction into Japan’ had the nuance of meaning taking nuclear weapons onto land and installing them somewhere and did not include the docking of vessels ¯ equipped with nuclear weapons.” Ikeda was not familiar with the issue, and Ohira did not take him into his confidence.32 It was difficult to believe that American naval vessels would somehow remove ¯ their nuclear weapons prior to docking in Japan, but Ohira did not want to lie to ¯ the public. “Ohira felt that it was wrong to keep secrets from the people about the realities of politics—he thought it obvious that politics should be conducted with their understanding,” Morita said. Even so, he could not publicly admit that nucleararmed ships were docking at Japanese ports. At some point, he developed a habit of ¯ muttering the word “introduction” to himself while sitting in cars. Ohira’s discomfort over this secret nuclear agreement would continue for the rest of his political career, resurfacing during his second term as foreign minister and then once again when he was prime minister.

4 China and Taiwan 4.1 A “Soft Approach” ¯ Ohira was also concerned about China. The two Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei both claimed to be the sole legitimate government and neither was willing to yield: Strong demands are being made in Japan as well that Beijing should be recognized as the legitimate government of China, but it is blindingly obvious that such a move would immediately result in the severing of relations with Taipei. And breaking off relations with Taipei is not something that can just be done out of favoritism or because it would be convenient. This is one of the most important issues facing Japan in terms of both foreign and domestic policy. It is not a decision that can be made lightly without reason or justification.33

Would a day come when Japan recognized the government in Beijing rather than that of Taiwan? The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations was considered one important indicator as to whether such a change was possible, as it was believed that Japan could not recognize Beijing so long as Taiwan held the UN seat. While it was “extremely unnatural” to continue to deny Beijing the right to represent China, this was part of the “legacy of the Yoshida regime.”34 Notwithstanding this lack of recognition, the Ikeda government explored the idea of allowing private trade with China. While Ikeda had initially been more favorable to ¯ ¯ this idea than Ohira, Ohira also came to recognize the necessity of such trade. “We’re talking about having the government expand private trade [with China]. Before we ¯ gathered the get ahead of ourselves debating this, let’s steadily build off that.”35 Ohira foreign ministry leadership together on October 12, 1962 to discuss the trade issue. He also met with Diet Member Takasaki Tatsunosuke and ANA President Okazaki

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Kaheita on the 25th, as the two men had been working to push the government to open negotiations with China.36 With Ikeda’s support, Liao Chengzhi (a member of the pro-Japan faction in Beijing) and Takasaki concluded a trade memorandum on November 9 in Beijing. The trade that was carried out on the basis of this agreement came to be known as “LT Trade” after the two men’s initials. Premier Zhou Enlai said of the memorandum that, “While formally a private agreement, it is in actual fact semi-official in nature. […] Ikeda has said that trade should be kept separate from politics, but ¯ attitude towards China, which we believe that the two are inseparable.”37 Ohira’s focused on promoting trade and gave little thought to opposing communism, was markedly different from that of the United States. The Kennedy administration was wary of China’s nuclear weapons development program, but the Ikeda government did not consider it a serious matter.38 ¯ During Ohira’s December 1962 meeting with Rusk, he had said that “the United States should leave Communist China alone. Making too much fuss about it only served to raise its prestige.” This surprised Rusk, who countered that “the United States will leave the Chinese Communists alone when the Chinese Communists leave others alone. When they put pressures on India or Southeast Asia, the United States must be concerned.”39 ¯ Ohira visited the United States in early 1963 and discussed topics such as the international balance of payments issue; later that month he departed on a trip to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, France, and Iran, where he spoke about the contemporary situation in Asia, Sino-Soviet relations, and trade issues. This was the first official visit by a Japanese foreign minister to northern Europe.40 He briefly returned home before departing once again, this time to attend the UN General Assembly meeting in mid-September. This strenuous travel schedule on the part ¯ of Ohira shows how seriously Japan took becoming internationally accepted as a developed country at the time.41 ¯ Ohira words during his time in Europe provide insight into his contemporary perception of China’s behavior. He told Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange that: From our perspective, Beijing appears to be acting extremely cautiously. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that they have reached border agreements with Pakistan and Burma – even if they have not been able to reach such a consensus with India – and are not providing any material assistance to Laos or Vietnam. Setting aside the subversive activities of the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Chinese government itself is not likely to embark on any adventures given the country’s internal and external circumstances.

He also expressed a distaste for America’s containment policy towards China, telling British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home that “Japan’s feelings towards China are neighborly and differ from those of the United States. Furthermore, the Japanese harbor a guilty conscience for what was done during the war. The United States does not have any such feelings, and it will be difficult to overcome this difference in our relative positions.” In explaining Japan’s export of vinylon (a synthetic fiber) plants to China, he described himself as employing a “soft approach” towards China.42

4 China and Taiwan

37

¯ China was not the only area over which Ohira and the United States held differing opinions. When Indonesian President Sukarno opposed the formation of Malaysia and the US froze aid to Indonesia, Ikeda attempted to mediate between the two ¯ countries from a pro-Sukarno position (something that Ohira had advocated for). ¯ Ohira also responded to Burma’s demands for increased reparations.43 ¯ When President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, Ikeda and Ohira traveled to America for the funeral. They also met with Rusk on the 26th and discussed ¯ issues including the fisheries dispute with South Korea. Ohira viewed the dispute as “perhaps […] not as difficult as the claims issues.”44 Almost eighteen months later, in June 1965, the Sat¯o government signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, establishing diplomatic relations between the countries.45 ¯ Ohira’s August–September 1963 Visits to the US and Europe August 25

Departed for Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, France, and Iran

August 26

Received the Order of St. Olav (Grand Cross) from Norway

August 28

Met with Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange

August 29

Met with Swedish Prime Minister Erlander and Foreign Minister Nilsson

August 30

Met with Swedish Trade Minister Lange

September 2

Met with Danish Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Hækkerup

September 3

Met with British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home

September 5

Met with British Minister of State for Trade Erroll. Anglo-Japanese joint communique issued

September 6

Met with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and President de Gaulle. Franco-Japanese joint communique issued

September 9

Met with Iranian Prime Minister Alam

September 10

Returned to Japan

September 15

Attended the 18th UN General Assembly (New York)

September 20

Delivered a speech before the General Assembly (New York)

September 22

Returned to Japan

4.2 Between China and Taiwan ¯ Prior to his sudden trip to the United States for Kennedy’s funeral, Ohira had been busy dealing with the Zhou Hongqing Incident. A Chinese delegation had arrived in Japan on September 6 to attend a hydraulic equipment trade fair and one of its interpreters—the eponymous Zhou Hongqing—had fled to the Soviet embassy on October 7 and requested asylum. He said that he was hoping to go to Taiwan, and Taiwan informed the Japanese that they were willing to take him in. Zhou repeatedly changed his mind, however, before ultimately saying on October 24 that he wanted to ¯ return to China—something that Taiwan placed pressure on Ohira to prevent. When

38

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Japan ultimately decided to allow Zhou to return to China, it led to criticism of the Ikeda government both at home and in Taiwan. The leadership of the ministry’s Asian Affairs Bureau was too concerned about the likely Chinese and Taiwanese reactions to reach a consensus on a course of action, and ¯ ¯ the incident led Ohira to oversee days of tense meetings within the ministry.46 Ohira was ultimately able to push the discussions forward despite the officials’ reservations by having them focus on applying domestic and international law to the situation.47 ¯ In his reflections on the incident, Ohira emphasized the importance of “free will”: The laws of our nation respect the free will of the individual and are based in humanitarian considerations. It is therefore regrettable that there are some in the world who would accuse the Japanese government of, in its handling of this case, having bent the proper application of the law due to Leftist pressure. They criticize us as if we were infringing upon Zhou’s free will.48

¯ After having the Ministry of Justice confirm Zhou’s intentions, Ohira proceeded to handle the case in accordance with domestic law. This approach allowed the issue to be shifted from a serious political problem to a technical one that could be more easily adjudicated.49 On January 27, 1964, China and France issued a joint statement establishing diplomatic relations. Despite American efforts to persuade Taiwan not to break off relations with France, it severed diplomatic relations on February 10 (although it did ¯ met with Reischauer on decide to maintain working level relations).50 When Ohira February 11, he expressed his dissatisfaction with Taiwan, telling him that “Japan wants to be a true friend to the Republic of China. But it is difficult to do so on the premise that China’s Communist regime, which has ruled the mainland for 15 years, still does not exist.”51 In response to a question from the Socialist legislator Hozumi Shichir¯o at the February 12 meeting of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, ¯ Ohira stated, “I believe that, should the Communist Chinese government be admitted to the United Nations with the blessings of the world, our nation would have to make a weighty decision. I believe that would only be natural.” In other words, that Japan would consider normalizing relations with China if it were admitted to the UN. He also added that “It is a hard fact that the Two Chinas policy—the policy of One China, One Taiwan—has been rejected by the Beijing government and has been rejected by the Nationalist government.” He understood that Japan establishing diplomatic relations with China would force it to sever those relations with Taiwan.52 The Ikeda government had approved a loan from the Japan Export–Import Bank for the export of synthetic fiber factories to China, and a vinylon plant constructed by Kurashiki Rayon was about to be exported at this time. In a meeting with Matsumura Kenz¯o and other LDP lawmakers in Beijing, Zhou Enlai said that the Ikeda government’s policies towards China marked a turn for the better from those of the previous Kishi government.53 After obtaining the agreement of Justice Minister Kaya Okinori ¯ and MITI Minister Fukuda Hajime, Ohira approved the opening of a Chinese trading 54 office in Tokyo. ¯ When Taiwan pushed back against the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, Ohira tried to pacify Zhang Lisheng, the Taiwanese ambassador, by saying, “It is difficult

4 China and Taiwan

39

to convince the Japanese people that we are not allowed to trade with Communist China on a level similar to that being carried out by Western Europe.” Zhang resigned and returned home, however, and Japan-Taiwan relations took a marked turn for the ¯ worse. Ikeda and Ohira sent Yoshida Shigeru to Taiwan on February 23 in an attempt to mend ties.55

5 Meeting Chiang Kai-Shek ¯ Ohira visited Taiwan from July 3 to 5, 1964, the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister to the country. Hoping to repair relations with Japan, the Taiwanese gave him a warm welcome. He met with President Chiang Kai-shek, Foreign Minister Shen Changhuan, and Secretary General of the Presidential Office Zhang Qun on the 4th. ¯ Ohira began by exchanging pleasantries with Chiang, telling him that “His Majesty the Emperor sends his best wishes to President Chiang,” to which Chiang replied, ¯ “How fares His Majesty? Please convey my regards.” Ohira spoke modestly of Japan’s place in the world, saying that “Japan has not yet reached a stage where it can make important contributions to its neighbors by playing a leading role in the international community or Asia.” Chiang insisted that “There can be no stability in East Asia until the problem of the Communist Chinese regime has been resolved. […] I earnestly hope that Minister ¯ Ohira will make it a basic policy of the Japanese government to take measures against the Communist regime.” ¯ Ohira concurred: “I agree with the President’s thoughts. Indeed, the issue of the Communist Party is one of life-and-death for Asia. It will determine whether the entirety of Asia is free or slaves.” Chiang added, “I believe that, should Japan and [Taiwan] set goals together and steadily adhere to them, we can oppose the Communist regime. If we do not take sufficient measures to fight the Communist regime now, while we still have the chance, Asia is in danger of turning red five to ten years from now.” ¯ Ohira replied, “The President’s discerning opinions, born of noble insight, have made a profound impression on me. This is an important issue for Japan as well, so when I return home, I will convey them to the prime minister and the LDP leadership.” ¯ The meeting with Chiang lasted seventy-five minutes. While Ohira outwardly worked to establish a closer relationship with Taiwan, his inner thoughts must have been more mixed, given that he had also been a proponent of increasing trade with the mainland. ¯ That evening, Chiang hosted a dinner party for Ohira. When Chiang continued to ¯ emphasize the need to overthrow Communist China at the banquet, Ohira responded carefully: The Japanese government has adopted a democratic political system, and we must work together with the people in conducting politics; the will of the government cannot be imposed upon them. In the same way, communism must be neutralized not through repression, but through understanding and assimilation.

40

¯ 4 The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy …

These words were carefully chosen to parry the claims of Chiang, a man more than ¯ twenty years Ohira’s senior and whom he respected. Chiang, who similarly wanted to mend relations with Japan, refrained from making any allusions to the Zhou ¯ Hongqing Incident during Ohira’s visit.56 After returning to the Grand Hotel, as he ¯ looked out over the city’s nightscape, Ohira told a reporter close to him that, “Today, I met a historical figure.” He never visited Taiwan again.57 Notes 1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

¯ Morita Hajime, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o no Ohira Masayoshi – Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 51–54. Ikeda Shintar¯o, “Ikeda Gaik¯o to Jimint¯o – Seiken Zenhanki wo Ch¯ushin toshite,” in Hatano Sumio, ed., Ikeda-Sat¯o Seiken-ki no Nihon Gaik¯o (Kyoto: Minerva Shob¯o, 2004), 41. Ambassador to the UN Okazaki Katsuo to Acting Foreign Minister Ikeda ¯ ¯ Hayato, September 22, 1962, Ohira Gaimu Daijin Obei H¯omon Kankei Ikken (1962.9) Kaidan Kankei, A’.1.5.0.8–1, MOFA. Foreign Affairs Counselor Takeuchi Harumi, American Affairs Bureau, ¯ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Daijin, Rasuku Ch¯okan Kaidanroku” ¯ [Record of Conversation between Minister Ohira and Secretary Rusk], ¯ ¯ September 25, 1962, Ohira Gaimu Daijin Obei H¯omon Kankei Ikken (1962.9) Kaidan Kankei, A’.1.5.0.8–1, MOFA. ¯ Secretary to the UK Okawa Yoshio, “Ohira Gaish¯o-H¯ısu Kokuji Sh¯osho ¯ Kaidanroku” [Record of Conversation between Foreign Minister Ohira and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Heath], September 28, 1962. Ambassador to France Hagiwara Toru to Ikeda, September 29, 1962. Hagiwara to Ikeda, September 27, 1962. Hagiwara to Ikeda, September 28, 1962. Hagiwara to Ikeda, September 29, 1962. Ambassador to West Germany Narita Katsushir¯o ¯ to Ikeda, September 30, 1962. Narita to Ohira, October 12, 1962. Ambassador to Italy Kadowaki Suemitsu to Ikeda, October 2, 1962. Kodowaki to Ikeda, ¯ October 3, 1962. Kadowaki to Ohira, October 12, 1962. Ambassador to the Vatican Beppu Setsuya to Ikeda, October 3, 1962. Ambassador to Belgium ¯ Shimoda Takezu to Ikeda, October 5, 1962. Shimoda to Ohira, October 13, 1962. Shimoda to Ikeda, October 6, 1962. European Affairs Bureau, Ministry ¯ of Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Daijin to Runsu Oranda Gaish¯o to no Kaidan” ¯ [Conversation between Minister Ohira and Dutch Foreign Minister Luns], ¯ ¯ October 8, 1962. All in Ohira Gaimu Daijin Obei H¯omon Kankei Ikken (1962.9) Kaidan Kankei, A’.1.5.0.8–1, MOFA. Takase Hirofumi, Sengo Nihon no Keizai Gaik¯o: “Nihon Im¯eji” no Saiteigi to “Shin’y¯o no Kaifuku” no D¯oryoku (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2008), 276–279. Suzuki Zenk¯o, “Kur¯o wo Tomo ni shita Aidagara,” in Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu Kiki¯ gaki Ohira Masayoshi, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 136–150, 180–189. ¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, ¯ ¯ 2010), 198–199. H¯ogen Shinsaku, “Ohira-san no Tsuioku,” in Ohira

5 Meeting Chiang Kai-Shek

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

41

Masayoshi Kais¯oroku: Tsuis¯o-hen, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1981), 274. ¯ Ohira 1:76. ¯ ¯ Konno Ky¯osuke, “Epis¯odo wo Tsujite Mita Ohira Z¯o,” in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 530. Ikeda Shintar¯o, “Jimint¯o no ‘Shinkanha’ to ‘Shintaiha’ – Kishi Nobusuke, Ishii Mitsujir¯o, Funada Naka wo Ch¯ushin ni,” in Rekishi toshite no Nikkan Kokk¯o Seij¯oka, Vol. 1, edited by Lee Jong Won, Kimiya Tadashi, and Asano Toyomi (Tokyo: H¯osei University, 2011), 160–161. ¯ Ohira 1:76–77. Foreign Affairs Counselor Takeuchi Harumi, American Affairs Bureau, ¯ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Daijin, Rasuku Ch¯okan Kaidanroku” ¯ [Record of Conversation between Minister Ohira and Secretary Rusk], September 25, 1962, Nichibei Kankei (Okinawa Henkan) 4, 2011–706, MOFA. Ambassador to the Netherlands Miyazaki Akira to Ikeda, September 25, 1962, Beikoku Kanrika no Nansei Shot¯o J¯oky¯o Zakken, Okinawa Kankei, Okinawa J¯umin no Riken Kakudai (Jichiken Kakudai Mondai) 2, A’.3.0.0.7–1, CD-R H22-9, MOFA. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Ohira, September 24, 1962, Digital National Security Archive, htttp://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed January 25, 2012). According to pages 190–192 of Inoue Masayoshi’s Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka no Seijishi, Miyazaki Akira, the Japanese ambassador to the Netherlands, had been dispatched on a diplomatic mission to the UN. Lee Jong-Won, “Nikkan no Shin K¯okai Gaik¯o Bunsho ni Miru Nikkan Kaidan ¯ to Amerika: Paku Chonhi Gunji Seiken no Seiritsu kara ‘Ohira-Kimu Memo’ made,” Rikky¯o H¯ogaku, No. 78 (2010), 121–123. Asano Toyomi, Yoshizawa Fumitoshi, and Lee Dong-jun, eds., Nikkan Kokk¯o Seij¯oka Mondai Shiry¯o Kiso Shiry¯ohen, Dairokkan: Nikkan Kokk¯o Seij¯oka K¯osh¯o no Kiroku (Tokyo: Gendai Shiry¯o Shuppan, 2011), 312. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oraru Hisutor¯ı [Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oral History], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2004), 176–177. Interview with Secretary to the Foreign Minister Kikuchi Kiyoaki, December 24, 2012. Kimiya Tadashi, “Kankoku no Tainichi D¯ony¯u Shikin no Saidaika to Saitekika,” in Rekishi toshite no Nikkan Kokk¯o Seij¯oka, Vol. 1, edited by Lee Jong-Won, Kimiya Tadashi, and Asano Toyomi, (Tokyo: H¯osei University), 1:121–123. Asano, Yoshizawa, and Lee, Nikkan Kokk¯o Seij¯oka, 313–358. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, Yanagiya Kensuke Oraru Hisutor¯ı [Yanagiya Kensuke Oral History], ¯ Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 151–162, 170, 172, 182. Hattori Ry¯uji, “OhiraKimu Jonpiru Kaidan Kiroku: 1962-nen Aki,” Jinbunken Kiy¯o, No. 65 (2009), 202–203, 227. Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “10/20 no ¯ ¯ Ohira Daijin-Kimu Jonpiru Buch¯o Kaidan ni okeru Ohira Daijin no Hatsugen ¯ Y¯oshi (An)” [Summary of Minister Ohira’s Remarks during the Talks with

42

16. 17.

18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

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Director Kim Jong-Pil on October 20 (Draft)], October 15, 1962, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2006– ¯ 1209. Asian Affairs Bureau, “Ohira Daijin-Kimu Jonpiru Buch¯o Kaidan Kiroku Y¯oshi” [Summary of the Talks with Director Kim Jong-Pil], October 20, 1962, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Infor¯ mation Law 2006–1209. Asian Affairs Bureau, “Ohira Daijin-Kimu Jonpiru Kankoku Ch¯uo¯ J¯oh¯o Buch¯o Dainikai Kaidan Kiroku” [Record of the Second ¯ Meeting between Minister Ohira and Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Kim Jong-Pil], November 12, 1962, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2006–1209. Asahi Shimbun (November 13, 1962), 1. ¯ Ohira 2:118. ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, “Nikkan J¯oyaku wa D¯oshite Tsukurareta ka,” Gaik¯o Jih¯o, ¯ No. 1024 (1966), 28. Watanabe Akio, “Kokusai Seijika toshite no Ohira ¯ Masayoshi,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 200. National Diet Library Topic Information Desk, “Kaya Okinori Seiji Danwa Rokuon Sokkiroku,” Vol. 2, 98, National Diet Library Modern Japanese Political History Room. Kim Doo-Sung, Ikeda Hayato Seiken no Taigai Seisaku to Nikkan K¯osh¯o: Naisei Gaik¯o ni okeru “Seiji Keizai Itai Rosen” (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008), 151–168. Kikuchi Kiyoaki, “Ikeda Naikaku no Gaish¯o Jidai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 100–104. Watanabe Tsuneo, Ten’un Tenshoku: Sengo Seiji no Rimenshi, Hansei, Kyojingun wo Akasu (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1999), 120. It¯o Masayoshi, “Yonj¯unichi K¯os¯o,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 83–84. Tamura Shigenobu, Toyoshima Norio, and Koeda Yoshito, Nikka Dank¯o to Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 2000), 238. Mikuriya Takashi, It¯o Takashi, and Iio Jun, eds., Watanabe Tsuneo Kaikoroku (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2007), 245–246. Interview with Sankei Shimbun reporter Atsushi Abe, June 19, 2012. ¯ Yoshida’s name frequently appears in Ohira’s journals during his time as foreign minister, such as on August 28 and September 12, 1962. See “Nisshi” [Journals], July 20 to October 22, 1962, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Collection (transferred to Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, NDL). ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 1:73. ¯ Masayoshi to Watashi,” in Kumon Manabe 84. Edwin O Reischauer, “J¯o: Ohira ¯ Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1990), 17–18. Edwin O Reischauer and Haru Reischauer, Raishaw¯a Taishi Nichiroku, ed. Iriye Akira (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2003), 92–94, 99–101, 103, 108–109, 118, 125, 129–131, 138, 142–143, 145–146, 151–152, 154, 165, 169–170, 182, 187, 205–206, 217, 290–291. Kikuchi, “Ikeda Naikaku,” 88–100. George R Packard, Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan (New York: Columbia University, 2010), 177. Interview with Kikuchi, December 24, 2012.

5 Meeting Chiang Kai-Shek

23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

28.

43

Takahashi Kazuhiro, “Doru B¯oei to Nichibei Kankei,” Gaik¯o Shiry¯okanp¯o, No. 24 (2011), 81–85. Yoshida Shingo, Nichibei D¯omei no Seid¯oka (Nagoya: Nagoya University, 2012), 82–83. “Gidai V Kokusai B¯oeki Keizai no Keik¯o Gaimu Daijin Hatsugen Y¯oshi” [Agenda V: Trends in International Trade and Economic Relations, Summary of Remarks by the Foreign Minister], Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Dainikai Iinkai Honkaigi, E’.2.3.1.17–2-3, MOFA. Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dainikai B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯oiinkai Kiji Gaiy¯o” [Overview of the Second Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs], December 1962, Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯oiinkai Kankei Dainikai Iinkai Honkaigi Gigi Gaiy¯o, E’.2.3.1.17–2-3–1, MOFA. Tadokoro Masayuki, “Amerika” wo Koeta Doru: Kin’yu Gurobaruka to Ts¯uka Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2001), 101–109. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 1:77, 2:82–85, 3:314–315, 348, 4:418. Hiwatari Yumi, Sengo Seiji to Nichibei Kankei (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1990), 241–243, 247. Kikuchi, “Ikeda Naikaku,” 97–98. National Graduate Institute for Policy ¯ Studies COE Oral Policy Research Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oraru Hisutor¯ı [Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oral History], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2004), 166–167, 178– 180. Yoshitsugu K¯osuke, Nichibei D¯omei wa Ika ni Tsukurareta ka: “Anpo Taisei” no Tenkanten 1951–1964 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2011), 135. Memo¯ randum of Conversation between Rusk and Ohira, August 1, 1963, Subject ¯ Numeric Files 1963, Box 3956, RG 59, NA. Letter from Ohira to Rusk, August 6, 1963, Subject Numeric Files 1963, Box 3956, RG 59, NA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:76–79. Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Daisankai Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Giji Gaiy¯o” [Overview of the Third Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs], February 1964, Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Kankei Daisankai Iinkai Honkaigi Gigi Gaiy¯o, E’.2.3.1.17–3-3–1, MOFA. Gabe Masaaki, Okinawa Henkan to wa Nan datta no ka: Nichibei Sengo K¯osh¯oshi no Nakade (Tokyo: Nihon H¯os¯o Shuppan Ky¯okai, 2000), 38. Haruna Mikio, Himitsu no Fairu: CIA no Tainichi K¯osaku, Vol. 2 (Tokyo, Shinch¯osha, ¯ Masakatsu, Meiyaku no Yami: “Kaku no Kasa” to 2003), 311–323. Ota ¯ Masakatsu, Nichibei D¯omei (Tokyo: Nihon Hy¯oronsha, 2004), 73–108. Ota Nichibei “Kaku Mitsuyaku” no Zenb¯o (Tokyo: Chikuma Shob¯o, 2011), 9–10, 201–215, 294–295. Kan Hideki, “Naze Reisengo mo Nichibei Anpo J¯oyaku wa Sonzoku shite iru ka?” in 21 Seiki no Anzen Hosh¯o to Nichibei Anpo J¯oyaku, edited by Kan Hideki and Ishida Masaharu (Tokyo: Minerva Shob¯o, 2005), 39–40. Toyoda Yukiko, “Ky¯ohan” no D¯omei-shi: Nichibei Mitsuyaku to Jimint¯o Seiken (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 82–83, 118–119. Ishii Osamu, Zero kara Wakaru Kaku Mitsuyaku (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shob¯o, 2010), 59–77. Packard 196–197, 243. Orita Masaki, “Nichibei Anpo J¯oyaku no Jizen Ky¯ogi to Kaku Mochikomi ni kan suru ‘Mitsuyaku’ Mondai,” in Jinrui no Michijirube toshite no Kokusaih¯o: Heiwa, Jiy¯u, Han’ei wo Mezashite, Akizuki Hiroko, Nakatani Kazuhiro, and Nishiumi Maki, eds. (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2011), 508. Sakamoto Kazuya, Nichibei D¯omei no Nanmon: “Kanreki” wo

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29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

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Mukaeta Anpo J¯oyaku (Tokyo: PHP Research Institute, 2012), 42–43, 63– ¯ 65. Nakashima Takuma, Okinawa Henkan to Nichibei Anpo Taisei (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012), 125. Nakashima Takuma, K¯od¯o Seich¯o to Okinawa Henkan 1960–1972 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K¯obunka, 2012), 82–85. Diet Proceedings Search System, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp (accessed May 4, 2013). Telegram No. 2335 from Edwin O Reischauer to Dean Rusk, April 4, 1963, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 24, 2013). See also: Mainichi Shimbun (May 18, 1981), 2–3. Hatano Sumio, Rekishi toshite no Nichibei Anpo J¯oyaku: Kimitsu Gaik¯o Kiroku ga Akasu ‘Mitsuyaku’ no Kyojitsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 177–178. Ina Hisayoshi, Sengo Nichibei K¯osh¯o wo Ninatta Otoko – Gaik¯okan T¯og¯o ¯ Fumihiko no Sh¯ogai (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2011), 25–26, 33. Ota, ¯ Masakatsu, Hiroku: Kaku Suk¯upu no Uragawa Kaku Mitsuyaku, 214–215. Ota (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2013), 58–60. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, Nihon Seiji no H¯okai: Daisan no Haisen wo D¯o Norikoeru ka (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2012), 204–205. Security Division, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Kaku Heiki no Mochikomi ni kan suru Jizen Ky¯ogi” [Prior Consulation on the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons], April 13, 1963, Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” Mondai ni kan suru Ch¯osa H¯okoku Taish¯o Bunsho, 1–3, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/mofa/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/t_1960kaku.pdf (accessed May 7, 2013). North American Affairs Bureau Director T¯og¯o Fumihiko, “S¯obi no J¯uy¯o-na Henk¯o ni kan suru Jizen Ky¯ogi no Ken” [On Prior Consultation on Significant Changes to Equipment], January 27, 1968, Iwayuru “Mitsuyaku” Mondai ni kan suru Ch¯osa H¯okoku Taish¯o Bunsho, 1–5, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/mofa/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/t_1960kaku.pdf (accessed May 7, 2013). Telegram No. 5074 from U Alexis Johnson to Rusk, January 26, 1968, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 25, 2012). Kikuchi also made this point in an interview on December 24, 2012. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:86–87. Kikuchi, “Ikeda Naikaku,” 110. Interview with Kikuchi, December 24, 2012. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:94–95, 6:427. “Nisshi”, July 20 to October 22, October 23 to December 24, 1962, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Collection (transferred to Modern Japanese Political History ¯ Materials Room, NDL). Ohira also met with Takasaki on November 15 after he returned home from China. Furumi Tadayuki and J¯ono Hiroshi, Gokuch¯u no Ningengaku (Shins¯oban) (Tokyo: Chichi Shuppansha, 2004), 81–82. Kimura Takakazu, “LT B¯oeki no Kiseki: Kansei Nicch¯u ‘Minkan’ B¯oeki Ky¯otei ga Mezashita Mono,” Historia, No. 216 (2009), 115–116. Hasegawa Takashi, “Nicch¯u LT B¯oeki K¯osh¯o to Gaimush¯o: ‘Okazaki K¯os¯o’ wo Meguru Sh¯onai de no Kent¯o wo Ch¯ushin ni,” Komazawa Daigaku Daigakuin Rekishi Ronsh¯u No. 42 (2012), 111–113. China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Takasaki Tatsunosuke Giin no Hoch¯u ni kan suru Ken (Takasaki-Sh¯u Kaidan Kiroku)”

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[The Matter of Diet Member Takasaki Tatsunosuke’s Visit to China (Records of the Takasaki-Zhou Talks)], December 20, 1962, Honp¯o Taich¯uky¯o B¯oeki Kankei Minkan B¯oeki Ky¯otei Kankei Takasaki-Ry¯o Oboegaki K¯okan (1962), E’.2.5.2.2–1-2, Reel E’-212, MOFA. Nichi-Ch¯uky¯o B¯oeki [Trade Between Japan and Communist China], 2009–763, MOFA. Fumuri Tadayuki-Sh¯u Onrai Kaidan Kiroku [Records of the Furumi Tadayuki-Zhou Enlai Talks], March 1963, Kensei Shiry¯oshitsu Sh¯ush¯u Bunsho, 1349–7, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, NDL. ¯ Meiyaku no Yami, 58–59. Toyoda 72. Yoshitsugu, Ikeda Seikenki, 185– Ota, 189. Yoshitsugu, Nichibei D¯omei 127–128, 156. Inoue Masaya, Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka no Seijishi (Nagoya: Nagoya University, 2010), 201–202. Kanda Yutaka, Reisen K¯oz¯o no Hen’y¯o to Nihon no Taich¯u Gaik¯o – Futatsu no Chitsuj¯okan 1960–1972 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012), 89–91, 107–112. Yoshida 86, 89. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Ohira, December 4, 1962, Digital National Security Archive, htttp://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed January 24, 2012). Western Europe Division, Europe and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of ¯ Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Gaimu Daijin H¯oo¯ Kaidanroku [Meeting Records of ¯ Foreign Minister Ohira’s European Trip] (August 25-September 10, 1963), ¯ ¯ u H¯omon (1968.8), Vol. 1, A’.1.5.3.5, October 1963, Ohira Gaimu Daijin Osh¯ MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 1:77–78, 2:306. Manabe Kenji, Watashi no Mita ¯ Ohira Masayoshi: Sono Sugao to Shisei (Tokyo: Image Makers, 1976), 80– ¯ 83. Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 202–205. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oraru Hisutor¯ı [Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oral History], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2004), 175, 180–182. Western Europe Division, Europe and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of ¯ Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Gaimu Daijin H¯oo¯ Kaidanroku [Meeting Records of ¯ European Trip] (August 25-September 10, 1963), Foreign Minister Ohira’s ¯ ¯ u H¯omon (1968.8), Vol. 1, A’.1.5.3.5, October 1963, Ohira Gaimu Daijin Osh¯ MOFA. Western Europe Division, Europe and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry ¯ of Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Gaimu Daijin Range Noruw¯e Gaimu Daijin Kaidan ¯ Y¯oshi” [Summary of Talks between Foreign Minister Ohira and Norwegian ¯ ¯ u H¯omon Foreign Minister Lange], August 30, 1963, Ohira Gaimu Daijin Osh¯ Noruw¯e no Bu, A’.1.5.3.5–1, MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:67–72. Kikuchi Kiyoaki, “Heij¯oshin de Gaik¯o wo Yaru Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 375. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki, 185. Miyagi Taiz¯o, Sengo Ajia Chitsujo no Mosaku to Nihon (Tokyo: S¯obunsha, 2004), 55–76. Hatano Sumio and Sat¯o Susumu, Gendai Nihon no T¯onan Ajia Seisaku, 1950–2005 (Tokyo: Waseda University,

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56.

¯ 4 The Beginnings of Ohira Diplomacy …

2007), 94–99. Hoshiro Hiroyuki, Ajia Chiikishugi Gaik¯o no Yukue – 1952– 1966 (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2008), 224–227. Yoshitsugu, Ikeda Seikenki, 149–151. Yoshitsugu, Nichibei D¯omei, 167–171. Memorandum of Conversation between Ikeda, Ohira, and Rusk, November 26, 1963, Subject Numeric Files 1963, Box 3958, NA. Hattori Ry¯uji, Eisaku Sat¯o, Japanese Prime Minister, 1964–72: Okinawa, Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics and the Nobel Prize, trans. Graham Leonard (London: Routledge, 2021), 128–130. According to his journals, in late December 1963 alone, meetings were held on the 20th , 21st , 27th , 29th , and 30th . “Nisshi,” October 24, 1963 to January 23, 1964, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Collection (transferred to the Modern Japanese Political History Material Room, NDL). National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki, 163, 165, 182–183. Interview with Kikuchi, December 24, 2012. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:92. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 219–220. Ikeda, Ikeda Gaik¯o, 126. Inoue 269. Kanda 133–134. Fukuda Madoka, Ch¯ugoku Gaik¯o to Taiwan: “Hitotsu no Ch¯ugoku” Gensoku no Kigen (Tokyo: Keio University, 2013), 306–319. Telegram No. 2389 from Reischauer to Rusk, February 11, 1964, Subject Numeric Files 1964–66, Box 2375, NA. Diet Proceedings Search System, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp (accessed May 22, 2013). “Zhou Enlai Zongli Huijian Riben Waibin Songcun Qiansan, Zhushan Youtailang, Gangqi Jiapingtai, Gujing Xishi Dengde Tanhua Jilu” [Record of Premier Zhou Enlai’s Meetings with Foreign Visitors Matsumura Kenz¯o, Takeyama Y¯utar¯o, Okazaki Kaheita, Furui Yoshimi, etc.], April 18, 1964, 105– 01,293-01, FMA. “Zhou Enlai Zongli Huijian Riben Waibin Beicun Detailang, Chuanqi Xiushu, Songben Junyi, Detian Yujilang de Tanhua Jilu” [Records of Premier Zhou Enlai’s Meetings with Kitamura Tokutar¯o, Kawasaki Hideki, Matsumoto Shun’ichi, Tokuda Yokichir¯o], May 14, 1964, 105–01,293-02, FMA. “Zhou Enlai Zongli Jiejian Beicun Detailang Dengren Tanhua Zhaiyao” [Outline of Premier Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Kitamura Tokutar¯o and Others], Diplomatic Bulletin No. 63, May 26, 1964, 105–01,297-02, FMA. Fukuda, Ch¯ugoku Gaik¯o, 144–146. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:94–96, 3:128–130. Watanabe Akio, “Kokusai Seijika ¯ ¯ toshite no Ohira Masayoshi,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 100–102. ¯ Hattori Ry¯uji, “Ohira, Sh¯o Kaiseki, Shin Sh¯okan Kaidan Kiroku: 1964/7,” ¯ Gaik¯o Shiry¯okanp¯o, No. 27 (2013), 115–124. “Sh¯o S¯ot¯o-Ohira Daijin Kaidan ¯ Y¯oshi” [Summary of the Talks between President Chiang and Minister Ohira], ¯ July 4, 1964, Ohira Gaimu Daijin Ch¯uka Minkoku H¯omon Kankei (1964.7), Vol. 1, A’.1.5.1.8, MOFA. “Zongton Jiejian Riben Waimu Dachen Daping Zhengfang Tanhua Jilu” [Records of the President’s Meeting with Japanese

5 Meeting Chiang Kai-Shek

57.

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¯ Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi], July 4, 1964, Daping Zhengfang Fanghua Zhuan Juan, 11-EAP-01018, 012.22/0002, AS. Interview with Fujita Kimio, member of the foreign ministry’s China Division, April 9, 2013. ¯ Abe Atsushi, “’Taiwan’ Mondai ni Kokoro Kudaita Ohira Gaik¯o,” in Kumon, ¯ K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 409. Interview with Abe, June 19, 2012.

Chapter 5

The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP Deputy Secretary-General to K¯ochikai Chairman

1 From Ikeda to Sat¯o: Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council 1.1 Ikeda’s Election to a Third Term ¯ On July 5, 1964, five days after Ohira’s return from Taiwan, Ikeda managed to win a third term as LDP president, narrowly overcoming a strong challenge from Sat¯o Eisaku. ¯ Ohira had not been enthusiastic about the prospect of a third Ikeda term, feeling that four years as prime minister was enough and that it would have been a suitable ¯ time for Ikeda to step down. Ikeda was furious with Ohira’s lack of support: “If I say ¯ I want to run for a third term, why would you, my dear protégé, oppose it?” Ohira again found himself estranged from Ikeda, and others within Ikeda’s inner circle like Kurogane and Miyazawa began working with LDP Secretary-General Maeo against him. ¯ When Ikeda assembled the cabinet for his third term, he replaced Ohira as foreign minister with Shiina Etsusabur¯o. Tanaka, who belonged to the Sat¯o faction, remained ¯ on as finance minister, but Ohira did not receive any position in the cabinet. Instead, he was demoted to deputy secretary-general of the LDP under Miki Takeo, who was ¯ named secretary-general. While both Miki and Ohira were from Shikoku, the two men had had little to do with one another. ¯ Ohira was visibly disappointed at these developments but had no choice but accept them as the decisions were Ikeda’s to make. He dejectedly grumbled to others within the party that, “as in a novel, life has both sunny and cloudy days.”1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_5

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1.2 “Leaving on a Journey” ¯ As Ohira was experiencing these setbacks, his son Masaki’s health took a dramatic turn for the worse. After experiencing bleeding in the eyes, he was examined at University of Tokyo Hospital and diagnosed with Behcet’s disease, an extremely ¯ rare and incurable illness. Ohira immediately had his son admitted to the hospital, but his condition continued to worsen by the day. “We worked hard to explore every treatment option that existed beyond what he received at the hospital: injections, medication, even shiatsu and massages. We went so far as to try faith healing.” The bleeding in his eyes did not stop and he lost almost all vision in his right eye. The nerves in his legs were also affected, making walking difficult. Masaki never complained about his situation, however. “Even on his sickbed, fighting against death every day, he was single-mindedly worried about my health and gave the family detailed instructions about my meals and sleep times.” ¯ Masaki would listen to Ohira answering questions in the Diet on the radio and ¯ give his impressions to Ohira afterwards. He was able to mimic not just his father, but Ikeda and Tanaka as well. Tanaka also visited Masaki in the hospital, bringing two melons from Senbikiya (a luxury fruit store) with him each time. He would slice them into eight pieces and use them to raise Masaki’s spirits. When construction work interfered with his son’s ability to rest at the hospital, ¯ Ohira had him discharged and continued his treatment at home by having his doctor make house calls. Masaki’s eyes and limbs continued to deteriorate, however. “He was not upset in the least; he remained more concerned about others than himself. He was constantly encouraging us.” The morning of August 6, 1964 was bright and clear, and a cool breeze blew ¯ through the trees of the garden. Masaki mentioned that one of his legs hurt, so Ohira rubbed it for a while before announcing that he was leaving for work. As always, Masaki held his hand and said goodbye. His gentle and open nature resembled that of his father exactly. ¯ Shigeko called Ohira around noon to tell him that Masaki had experienced a sudden change in his condition. The disease had reached his internal organs. With his family watching over him, Masaki passed away at about 5 p.m. that afternoon due to complications from a heart attack. His last words, spoken in fevered delirium, were “Lay out my shoes. I am leaving on a journey.” ¯ In the wake of Masaki’s death, Ohira “nearly lost all hope and passion for life”: Parting from Masaki. It was something that I had never even imagined. And yet, it cruelly became harsh reality. I nearly lost all hope and passion for life as an ordinary man. He was irreplaceable; he had been almost everything to me. Heavy, leaden grief continues to pierce my heart like a sharp knife even now. It shows no sign of lessening, even with the passage of time.

Ikeda attended Masaki’s funeral and stayed for an extended period of time. Unable ¯ to bear having Masaki cremated, Ohira decided to have him buried instead. A small ¯ tombstone was erected for him in Tama Cemetery in Tokyo, upon which Ohira had the following carved:

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Paul Miki ¯ Ohira Masaki August 6, 1964 Age 26 ¯ Erected by Ohira Masayoshi, his father and friend

Paul Miki was Masaki’s Christian name. A far too early death had brought his beloved ¯ son’s life to a close while he was still in his prime. Ohira wrote to Masaki’s friends: “At the very least, we take comfort in knowing that, during his life, he was exceptionally loved by you all and was sustained by your affection and close friendship. He was blessed with a colorful and fulfilling, albeit short, life of twenty-six years.”2 When Masaki’s friends gathered to speak in remembrance of him on the first ¯ anniversary of his death, a grief-stricken Ohira wept. Even on the second anniversary, ¯ Ohira found himself unable to speak when he attempted to address everyone at the end.3

1.3 “The Beginning of a Long Winter”: From Ikeda to Sat¯o Shortly after beginning his third term, Ikeda began to feel a pain in his throat. He was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer and admitted to the National Cancer Center ¯ in Tsukiji on September 6, 1964. This illness triggered a reconciliation with Ohira. ¯ Ohira urged Ikeda to undergo radiation therapy, warning him that failure to do so meant risking permanent damage to the cartilage in his throat, but while Ikeda “readily accepted hospitalization, he seemed to believe that he was just suffering from overwork and overuse of his throat.” Ikeda was in no condition to carry out the heavy responsibilities of a prime ¯ minister. When he had first formed his government, he had “sworn to [Ohira] that he would not aspire to a lengthy administration; that he would not mind forming a government in the morning only for it to fall in the evening.” The time for the end of ¯ his government was now fast approaching. When Ohira approached him about this, he “accepted it without complaint.” Ikeda decided to make the Tokyo Olympics— scheduled to begin on October 10—his final accomplishment and announced his ¯ retirement on October 25. Ohira drafted the announcement.4 The issue was, with Ikeda stepping down, who would succeed him as party president? Having done so well in the presidential election a few months earlier, Sat¯o was the likeliest candidate. But there were also those who supported K¯ono Ichir¯o and ¯ Fujiyama Aiichir¯o. Ohira described the situation as one where “a strange spectre called political power wandered back and forth between LDP headquarters in Hirakawach¯o and the National Cancer Center in Tsukiji, looking for a destination.”

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¯ It was during this, Ikeda’s final year, that Ohira and Ikeda finally fully reconciled. “I made it part of my daily routine to visit Ikeda at the National Cancer Center and keep him company for a few hours each day.” Accompanied by LDP Vice President Kawashima Sh¯ojir¯o and Secretary-General ¯ Miki, Ohira visited the hospital early on the morning of November 9 to witness Ikeda formally name Sat¯o Eisaku his successor. Later that day, the Diet elected Sat¯o as prime ¯ visited Ikeda following the session to report on the proceedings, but minister.5 Ohira this was unnecessary; Ikeda had watched the events live on television. He could now ¯ fully concentrate on his treatment. When Ohira said, “November 9 is the best day of our lives,” Ikeda “silently nodded.”6 ¯ As deputy secretary-general and a member of Ikeda’s faction, Ohira played a role in Sat¯o’s nomination as Ikeda’s successor. K¯ono had been Sat¯o’s primary rival for the post; Ikeda had leaned towards choosing him and K¯ono had likewise expected ¯ to get the nod. Ohira disliked K¯ono, however, and had worked to convince Ikeda to ¯ choose Sat¯o. Sat¯o was, like Ikeda, a former member of the Yoshida faction, and Ohira believed that he was the right man for the job. Despite his efforts on Sat¯o’s behalf, however, he was poorly treated when Sat¯o formed his government. This obviously ¯ bothered Ohira, although he did his best to conceal it. He told a reporter close to him that “there are times when a politician must endure.”7 ¯ Sat¯o was aware of the role that Ohira had played in his selection, having been ¯ informed of it by Tanaka. Tanaka had advised Sat¯o that he needed to convince Ohira and Maeo to support him if he wanted Ikeda to designate him as his successor, and ¯ Sat¯o had endorsed this strategy. He referred to the two men as the “Tanaka-Ohira ¯ group” in his diary and wrote that “Tanaka contacted Ohira and learned what was going on at the hospital. He assured me that [my position] is absolutely unshakeable.” Despite this, however, Sat¯o is also said to have felt that “it was only natural for the ¯ position to fall to me, but opposition from Ohira led to the process being prolonged.” ¯ For Ohira, the establishment of the Sat¯o government marked “the beginning of a long winter.” Nonetheless, he never criticized Sat¯o and told those around him that “being in a quiet position is an opportunity to learn, and there is much to be gained from interacting with others. Being in a position of glory may seem glamorous, but you actually gain little from it.” Tanaka, who stayed on as finance minister in the new government, tried to provide ¯ Ohira with encouragement. In the two men’s interactions, their differing natures reflected the proverbial “stillness and motion.” Which is to say, if Tanaka were to ¯ visit Ohira’s Diet office for an hour, almost all of their time together would be spent ¯ ¯ with Tanaka talking and Ohira actively listening. At the end, Ohira would briefly summarize the conversation and state what he believed Tanaka’s ultimate point had been and Tanaka would agree. While these discussions were on general topics and ¯ only rarely involved politics, they helped boost Ohira’s spirits.8

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1.4 Thinking and Reading ¯ On February 2, 1965, Ohira became deputy chairman of the Policy Research Council’s Foreign Policy Research Committee. Having previously served as chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister, this position was a marked step down for him. In marked contrast, Tanaka’s star was on the rise within the Sat¯o government, having been chosen as LDP secretary-general (making him the youngest man to ever be appointed to the position; he would also, until 2021, hold the record for ¯ the most time spent as secretary-general). Ohira must have felt impatient at these developments. Ikeda passed away on August 13 following a reoccurrence of his laryngeal cancer. ¯ According to Ohira, “Ikeda was an unfortunate soul in that he was stricken with an incurable disease and taken from us too soon. Politically speaking, however, he was probably the most blessed and fortunate of us all. […] He was very dear to me.”9 ¯ Ohira had now lost Ikeda, who he had served ever since becoming superintendent of the Yokohama Tax Office at the age of twenty-seven. And it came just a year after the loss of his son. Maeo Shigesabur¯o succeeded Ikeda as head of the K¯ochikai, but ¯ Ohira kept his distance from his new faction leader. ¯ On April 5, 1966, Ohira made one of the era’s most comprehensive outlinings of Japanese foreign policy when he gave a speech entitled, “Our Party’s Foreign Policy” at LDP headquarters. He began with the general argument that “foreign policy is the external expression of domestic policy” and that “it is impossible to achieve superior foreign policy in the absence of established domestic policy.” He then argued that “just as there are no absolutes anywhere else, achieving absolute security is an impossibility […] even when it comes to the US-Japan security treaty, military matters are merely one of its aspects, and a supplemental one at that. We need to consider these problems from a broader perspective.” Here we can see the ¯ seeds of Ohira’s theory of comprehensive security that would blossom later on in his political career. ¯ One problem facing Japan at this time was the question of China, and Ohira touched on this as well: “What should we do if Beijing is granted the right of representing China in a United Nations vote? I believe that this would be a more trouble¯ some development than we expect.” Ohira was already organizing his thoughts in preparation for probable Chinese membership in the UN.10 ¯ Time passed, but Ohira remained distant from the center of power. When the Sat¯o cabinet was reshuffled on August 1, Secretary-General Tanaka attempted to lay the ¯ groundwork for Ohira to be appointed chairman of the Policy Research Council. ¯ Ohira was doubtful that these efforts would be fruitful, however, telling Tanaka that “I appreciate your kindness, but is the chapeau in favor of the idea?” (a reference ¯ to Sat¯o). Ohira’s fears were proven correct when Sat¯o did not appoint him to any position. ¯ On November 5, Ohira moved from the home in Bunky¯o where he had lived for more than twenty years to a new house in Setagaya. His previous house had been close to the center of the city, while Setagaya was a suburban area at the time. Politicians

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often chose to live in locations that provided an easy commute to Nagatach¯o, where ¯ the Diet and many government offices are located, and Ohira’s departure for the suburbs was unique among all postwar prime ministers. The move was motivated by a desire to separate himself from the place where Masaki had breathed his last and to go somewhere where he could make a fresh start and indulge in meditation and reading.11 ¯ Ohira was an avid reader. Even when faced with a busy schedule, he would still stop at bookstores once or twice a week to inquire about any new books that had come in. Rather than reading books on political economy or the law as one might suspect, however, he preferred to peruse the shelves for collections of essays and works on history and social science. “The fresh smell and the soft feel of the pages that one experiences upon opening a new book are tremendously pleasing. It is a moment in which one can appreciate the joys of life.”12 He continually bought books and, ¯ when he could no longer fit them in his home library, he created the Ohira Library ¯ at his office in Kagawa and sent them there. The collection of the Ohira Library grew to around 8,000 volumes, which were available to members of the public for borrowing.13 ¯ Ohira’s favorites included the Chinese classics The Analects of Confucius, The Mencius, and Eighteen Histories in Brief , as well as Genshi Shiroku, by Sat¯o Issai (a Confucian scholar of the late Edo period).14 One book that he repeatedly read was Onda Moku’s Higurashi Suzuri. Onda was a chief retainer of Sanada domain in the eighteenth century, and the book described his achievements in reforming its ¯ chaotic administration. According to Ohira, “The spirit of the book is very ordinary. In short, it cautions against lying, praises showing reverence to farmers, and encourages devoting oneself to solitude.” His favorite contemporary writer was Shiba Ry¯otaru¯o (a novelist who largely wrote historical fiction) and he had read most of his works.15 His absolute favorite book, however, was the Bible, of which he had expert knowl¯ edge. Ohira’s personal study was filled with books on philosophy, ethics, and history from all over the world. Ultimately, however, he was inclined towards Eastern thought and often read the books of Yasuoka Masahiro, a Confucian scholar who both Yoshida Shigeru and Ikeda Hayato had considered a mentor. His favorite motto, “Gaining a new advantage is no match for removing an existing disadvantage,” is one that he had heard from Yasuoka and encountered himself while reading the classics. This was a quote from Yelü Chucai, an official of the Mongol Empire who argued that striving to eliminate harm could have an equal or greater effect than pursuing new endeavors, even if it was not as glamorous an undertaking. ¯ Ohira also loved reading books by scholars and journalists such as Tanabe Hajime, Koizumi Shinz¯o, Yanaihara Tadao, Matsumoto Shigeharu, Nagai Y¯onosuke, Nakayama Ichir¯o, and Sugimura K¯oz¯o. He told those close to him that “politics is an art, so you must read novels” but felt that he did not personally read enough 16 ¯ He spent a great classical novels like those of Natsume S¯oseki and Mori Ogai. deal of time writing and published a collection of essays, Spring Winds, Autumn Rains, to commemorate the marriage of his second son, Hiroshi. Some of these essays touched on politics, such as “Yoshida and Ikeda,” while others involved more personal matters, like “Memories of My Eldest Son Masaki.”17

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1.5 Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council ¯ On February 7, 1967, Tsushima Juichi died. Had Ohira not been brought into the Ministry of Finance by his fellow Kagawa native, his life would have been completely ¯ different. Ohira had also had the chance to serve as Tsushima’s secretary while he was finance minister. He read a eulogy upon Tsushima’s passing in which he said, “I feel pride and pleasure at having had the opportunity to earn my mentor’s favor, and I will tirelessly follow the path of truth that he walked.”18 ¯ A turning point arrived for Ohira later that year. When Sat¯o reshuffled his cabinet on November 25, he was appointed chairman of the Policy Research Council at the urging of Hori Shigeru and other senior members of the Sat¯o faction. Fukuda Takeo remained secretary-general and Hashimoto Tomisabur¯o was appointed chairman of ¯ tackled the problem of fiscal rigidity. the General Council.19 In his new position, Ohira Three areas of expenditure—rice (kome), the Japanese National Railway (Kokutetsu), and health insurance (kenk¯o hoken)—were creating a constant budget deficit (known as the “3 K deficit” from their initials). Rice was subject to a system of agricultural price controls determined by the government and, in June 1968, the LDP established the Research Committee on Rice Prices in response to protests from farmers that the price they were being paid was too low. Tanaka was named committee chairman. The following month, a meeting of the General Council was thrown into disorder over the price that the government set for rice producers. One after another, Diet members closely tied to the agricultural lobby (n¯orinzoku) decried the government’s policy, with one charging that “It is because our party has only a poor understanding of agriculture that we are discussing such a ¯ low price for rice. Chairman Ohira and the others are former elite bureaucrats from the finance ministry, and it is their ignorance about the life of farmers that has created this situation. They should resign immediately and leave.” ¯ Ohira was stunned as he listened. In a rare show of emotion, he was unable to hold himself back and attempted to leave the session. Tanaka, who had been sitting next to him, just barely managed to grab his arm and restrain him. “Are you going to get offended and leave? If you do, you won’t be able to come back.” ¯ Regaining his composure, Ohira focused his attention on the Diet members and began to speak earnestly: ¯ You say that Ohira doesn’t understand the life of farmers. But both of you come from well-established and prestigious families. Both of your fathers served in the Diet before us. Meanwhile, I am the son of a poor Sanuki farmer. When I was a boy, I left home at dawn, made my rounds on our sparsely watered rice fields in the hills, and then took the first morning train to school. My family was poor and could provide little money for tuition, ¯ so I made my way through university on scholarships. It is outrageous to say that Ohira Masayoshi does not understand farmers.

¯ Ohira was saved by Tanaka and the situation settled down. Tanaka later said that “it ¯ was the first time that Ohira said something that deeply struck me.” Ultimately, the issue of rice prices was left to the party’s top leadership and Research Committee on Rice Prices Chairman Tanaka to decide.20

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2 Economic Negotiations with the US: Minister of International Trade and Industry 2.1 US-Japan Frictions Over Textiles Sat¯o won a third term in the LDP presidential election held on November 27, 1968. Miki Takeo came in second and Maeo, leader of the K¯ochikai, was third. In his unsuccessful bid for the presidency, Maeo had called for party reform, “the politics of discussion and persuasion,” the “balanced and efficient development of national land,” and “a foreign policy based on voluntary peaceful coexistence” but had been unable to stir up much enthusiasm.21 Meanwhile, Sat¯o was obsessed with bringing about the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control. A number of mid-ranking and younger members of the K¯ochikai like Sasaki Yoshitake, It¯o Masayoshi, Hattori Yasushi, and Tanaka Rokusuke began to suggest that, with Maeo seeming to have peaked, it was time for leadership of the faction to ¯ ¯ pass to Ohira. Ohira nominally left this up to Maeo, saying that “Maeo can give it some thought and make a decision on his own.” Maeo thus maintained his position for the time being.22 ¯ Ohira did begin holding informal weekly gatherings at this office in clear anticipation of becoming the next leader of the K¯ochikai, however. These were meant to act as a counterbalance to similar meetings held by Maeo at the K¯ochikai’s offices. The press covered both sets of gatherings, and the faction became divided into pro-Maeo ¯ ¯ and pro-Ohira camps. The feud with Ohira exhausted Maeo.23 When Sat¯o reshuffled his cabinet in the wake of the presidential election, he ¯ appointed Ohira as minister of international trade and industry. His long winter had finally come to an end; not only had he returned to the cabinet after an absence of four years, but MITI minister was an important position. His rival Fukuda Takeo was appointed finance minister, Aichi Kiichi became foreign minister, and Hori Shigeru was appointed chief cabinet secretary. Tanaka returned to the position of secretary-general. ¯ Ohira outlined his seven policy priorities as minister at the December 17 meeting of the House of Representatives’ Commerce and Industry Committee: promoting trade, improving Japan’s industrial structure and reinforcing its corporate structure, modernizing small and medium-sized enterprises, cultivating technological development capabilities, addressing energy demands, strengthening pollution regulations, ¯ and stabilizing prices. It was also Ohira who facilitated the merger of Yawata Iron & Steel and Fuji Iron & Steel (two of Japan’s largest steel companies) into Nippon Steel Corporation. He felt that, while any adverse effects of monopolization needed to be avoided, such a large-scale merger was necessary to strengthen competitiveness.24 ¯ The biggest challenge facing Ohira was the ongoing frictions with the United States over textiles. The Nixon administration had asked Japan to restrict its export ¯ of textile products. When Ohira met with Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans in Tokyo on May 12 and 13, he made the following counterargument:

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Japan’s textile exports are mainly in fields where American manufacturers have shown little interest (such as unique products created through technological development) and largely serve to supplement American production. Given America’s large supply capacity, it also seems likely that imports from Japan could be checked by using domestic policy to further aid [American producers].

¯ Ohira also pointed out that “it is shameful both to America’s prestige and the promotion of free trade that the US government is trying to solve this problem by asking countries to voluntarily impose restrictions on their textile exports.” Stans retorted ¯ that “Nixon has pledged to resolve the textile issue and will not back down.”25 Ohira invited Stans to his home in Setagaya, where they continued to discuss the issue ¯ heatedly. When Stans continued to seek export restrictions, Ohira said, “The fact is, the American textile industry is booming and there is no justification for demanding this kind of protectionist measure.”26 ¯ Ohira would soon meet Stans again at the seventh meeting of the US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, which was held in Tokyo from July ¯ 29–31. When the topic of textiles resurfaced, Ohira only promised to investigate any damages. “While I don’t fully understand the rationale behind attempting to resolve this matter by having exporting countries impose restrictions on themselves, I would be fully prepared to participate in a probe into the degree of injury being caused.”27 A MITI delegation visited the United States in September to investigate the issue but concluded that no damage was being caused.28 ¯ In a lecture entitled, “The World Economy and Japan,” Ohira argued that the American demands were “contrary to the course of liberalization”: Isn’t it a bit out of line for the United States to demand that Japan impose textile export restrictions? It is clearly contrary to the course of liberalization and a regrettable development in terms of America’s honor and influence. We are not confident that we would be able to convince our country to accept it. […] I think that it would be beneficial for the United States to gradually withdraw from Vietnam or reconsider its policies in Asia.

¯ While Ohira still considered Japanese relations with the US to be of the highest importance, he regarded its demands for voluntary restrictions to be “out of line” and was unwilling to follow its lead in this case.29

2.2 First Visit to Eastern Europe ¯ On October 17, Ohira departed Haneda for Italy, the first of nine European countries that he would visit over the course of two weeks. His other destinations were Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, West Germany, Britain, and France. The purpose of his visit to Eastern Europe was to observe things on the other side of the Iron Curtain and gain insights into how to diversify Japanese trade.30 In Eastern Europe, he discussed expanding trade, economic ties, and technical ¯ cooperation. In a meeting with the acting Czech prime minister, Ohira said, “I am

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proud that Japan’s level of science and technology has reached a global standard and believe that we have established a good foundation for cooperating with foreign ¯ countries in these fields moving forward.” This was Ohira’s first visit to communist countries, and he came away with the impression that “the countries of Eastern Europe have a deep-seated psychological and economic tendency to rely upon not just the Soviet Union, but Western Europe as well. And, so long as this does not pose a major threat to its safety, the Soviets dare not use coercion to stop their exchanges with the West.” Of the Western European countries he visited, West Germany—where the fledgling Brandt administration had just revalued the Deutschmark—made the strongest impression on him. “As I traveled east to west, observing Europe, I was struck by the growing power of Germany and keenly felt its potential. The economies of Europe, including those of Eastern Europe, are growing increasingly dependent on Germany.” In Britain, Roy Mason, president of the Board of Trade (effectively the country’s commerce minister), sought to have Japan liberalize its whiskey trade, ¯ while Ohira asked the UK to lift its safeguard measures on imports. Each promised to look into the issue raised by the other.31 ¯ Ohira’s Fall 1969 Visit to Europe October 17

Departed from Haneda for Europe

October 18

Arrived in Rome. Attended banquet hosted by Ambassador Takano T¯okichi

October 19

Visited Pompei. Departed Rome for Sofia

October 20

Held talks with Chairman Popov of the Bulgarian National Commission for Science and Technology and key personnel from the Ministry of Trade, including acting Minister Alexeev and Undersecretary Penkoy. Visited Prime Minister Zhivkov and held talks with high-ranking officials from various ministries

October 21

Departed Sofia for Budapest. Met with Hungarian Foreign Trade Minister Biro

October 22

Held talks with Minister of Heavy Industry Horgos, Prime Minister Fock, and Foreign Minister Peter. Departed Budapest for Warsaw

October 23

Met with Polish Foreign Trade Minister Burakiewicz and Foreign Minister Jedrychowski

October 24

Held talks with Minister of the Machine Industry Hrynkiewicz, First Vice-Chair Trampczynski of the National Planning Commission, and Premier Cyrankiewicz. Departed Warsaw for Prague

October 25

Held talks with Czech Minister of Industry Krejci, acting Prime Minister Hruskovic, acting Foreign Trade Minister Barcak

October 26

Departed Prague for Vienna. Toured Vienna. Attended a performance of Strauss’ Der Rosenkavalier

October 27

Visited Schönbrunn Palace. Departed Vienna for Berlin

October 28

Toured West Berlin and the Berlin Wall. Departed Berlin for Bonn. Met with West German Defense Minister Schröder

October 29

Departed Bonn for London. Met ministers including Commerce Minister Mason, pro-Japanese members of parliament, and key British and Japanese businesspeople at a reception hosted by Ambassador Y¯ukawa Morio (continued)

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(continued) October 30

Visited former prime minister Douglas-Home. Held talks with Technology Minister Benn and Mason. Held press conference with Japanese journalists. Attended dinner hosted by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

October 31

Departed London for Paris. Paid courtesy visits to former French prime minister Conve de Murville and Minister of the Economy and Finance d’Estaing. Met with OECD Secretary General van Lennep. Held press conference with Japanese journalists in France

November 1

Toured Parisian suburbs. Held a meeting with top officials from the Japanese embassy on issues related to the European economy. Attended a dinner meeting with members of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Europe

November 2

Departed Paris for Tokyo

November 3 Arrived at Haneda. Held press conference at the airport ¯ ¯ u H¯omon Kankei” [Regarding MITI Minister Ohira’s ¯ Source “Ohira Ts¯usan Daijin Osh¯ Visit to ¯ Europe] (1969.10), A’0.1.5.3.12, MOFA. Ohira 3:134–136, 7:388–390

2.3 Continued Distance from Sat¯o ¯ Ohira returned to Japan on November 3, and Sat¯o departed for America shortly afterwards on the 17th. In Washington, Sat¯o finalized the details for the reversion of Okinawa with President Nixon. Part of this involved a promise from Sat¯o that he would “do his best” to resolve the textiles issue, which was interpreted by the Americans as a tacit agreement to impose voluntary restrictions on textile exports. It was widely suspected in Japan that Sat¯o had agreed to such an arrangement, and he was derided for having “bought rope with thread” (as the word “Okinawa” contains the Chinese character for rope).32 When Sat¯o reported on the Okinawa discussions to the cabinet, he neglected to ¯ mention the secret agreement on textiles. When Ohira asked him, “Is there anything you need to tell me?” following the meeting, Sat¯o said, “No, nothing.” The textile industry was vehemently opposed to any voluntary restrictions on exports and pressured the government to adopt the same stance. In the absence of any clear policy ¯ directives from Sat¯o, Ohira was hard pressed to persuade them to do otherwise.33 He believed that the reversion of Okinawa could be achieved without making any concessions on textiles and that it was therefore better to solve the dispute through ¯ proper application of the rules. Ohira correctly surmised that Sat¯o and Nixon had reached some kind of understanding on textiles, but the only instructions he received from Sat¯o were to prevent the talks from breaking down until the negotiations over ¯ Okinawa had been completed. Ohira vented to his aides that America was being “arrogant” and “selfish.” The remainder of his time as MITI minister was spent buying time until the reversion of Okinawa.34 Generally speaking, politicians prefer to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion so that they can get credit for having accomplished something, even if this means

60

5 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP …

¯ that they have to make concession along the way. But this was not Ohira’s approach. As would also be seen in his later negotiations over the Japan–China Aviation Agreement and on Mexican oil exports, he refused to make concessions that he felt were ¯ unreasonable. Ohira remained alienated from Sat¯o and did not attempt to go to any unreasonable lengths to settle the US-Japan textile negotiations.35

3 “The Opening of a New Century for Japan”: Leader of the K¯ochikai 3.1 Returning to the Wilderness ¯ Ohira published an article, “The Challenges of New International Trade and Industrial Policy,” in the January 1970 issue of Gogy¯o Ronpy¯o (a magazine for regional banks). In it, he wrote that Japan had striven to “catch up with and overtake” the West ever since the Meiji Restoration, but that “today, as we enter the seventies, Japan is finally ending its catch-up phase.” Despite this achievement, however, “neither politicians nor the public have a firm grasp on new creative values” that could define the nation as it moved into a new era. ¯ Ohira laid out four pillars to serve as the basis of future trade and international policy: international development of the economy, qualitative enrichment of the public’s living standards, securing the basic conditions needed for economic development, and reorienting towards creative development. He also argued that management of the economy should be driven by the private sector: “I want to urge companies to be conscious of the fact that they are capable of overcoming tough international competition on their own.” The argument laid out in the article was very typical of ¯ Ohira in that it focused on historical trends.36 ¯ Ohira intended to continue on as MITI minister, but when the third Sat¯o government was formed on January 14, 1970, he was not approached about remaining on. He had served as MITI minister for fourteen months and now, once again, he found himself without any position in the cabinet. To add insult to injury, Sat¯o appointed Miyazawa Kiichi, a more junior member of the K¯ochikai, to succeed him as MITI minister. ¯ The evening before the new cabinet was formed, Ohira received a call from Secretary-General Tanaka assuring him that he would remain on as MITI minister, but he was suspicious that “something was going on.” He went to his office in the Sann¯o Grand Building in Akasaka the following morning and watched the announcement of the new cabinet. When Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori announced that Miyazawa ¯ would be serving as MITI minister, Ohira simply thanked his secretaries for all of their assistance, a clouded expression on his face. ¯ Ohira had played with golf with Miyazawa at the Chigasaki Golf Club just two weeks earlier. Coincidentally, Sat¯o was also at the course that day. Spotting the two men from a distance, he turned to his son Shinji and said, “Look, it’s the old and

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new MITI ministers walking together.” By appointing Miyazawa, Sat¯o rocked the K¯ochikai.37 ¯ Ohira told Ikeda’s widow that “I think Sat¯o associates me too strongly with Prime Minister Ikeda, and he doesn’t like that.”38 Suzuki Zenk¯o, a member of the K¯ochikai ¯ and a future prime minister, said years later that “Ohira’s resentment and rage are ¯ still etched in my mind. Things were never good between Miyazawa and Ohira after that.”39

3.2 “A Beacon of Self-reflection” ¯ Ohira celebrated his sixtieth birthday on March 12, 1970, and he wrote an essay— ¯ “Self-Reflections on Turning Sixty”—to mark the occasion. Ohira wrote many things over the course of his life, but this work stands out as particularly impressive: The sixty years of my life have not been all that wonderful, but I am fortunate to have not experienced all that much discord, either. Both religion and philosophy are concerned with the question of the “eternal now.” The present exists amidst the conflict between two forces – the future and the past – pulling in opposite directions. It is unique, precious, and utterly irreplaceable. […] I believe that we should follow the course of life as it comes to us and leave questions of honor and disgrace to Heaven. This is my beacon of self-reflection for the future; should I lose sight of this, I fear that not only will the rest of my life be without meaning, but it will also eventually end in ruin. I would like to ask all of my friends to continue to provide me with correction and guidance.

¯ Touching on the “eternal now,” Ohira humbly reflected on his life in this piece and expressed an inner determination to live the rest of his life.40 ¯ Ohira may no longer have held a position in the government, but he continued to analyze foreign relations with great enthusiasm. On April 8, he gave a lecture at the Mitsubishi Research Institute on “Japan and the Age of Internationalization.” Tracing the course of the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split, Sino-American relations, and the North–South problem, he described the post-Vietnam War state of the world as “gray and nebulous.” While the content of the lecture was not the kind of thing that made headlines, it showed that he was one of the few politicians capable of speaking about international politics in a truly comprehensive manner.41 Later that month, he met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio, former Socialist Party chairman Sasaki K¯oz¯o, and LDP Diet member Furui Yoshimi to discuss the future of Sino-Japanese relations: The biggest hurdle between Japan and China is the issue of Taiwan. Until we determine the basics of how we will address that problem, we will make no progress in breaking our deadlock with China. The government and LDP have adopted the One China policy, as have the Taiwanese. No one has any intention of moving towards a “Two China” policy. The question is, “How are the Chinese going to handle the Taiwan issue?”

¯ Ohira continued to pay close attention to the situation in China, particularly where Taiwan was concerned.42

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5 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP …

3.3 “China Wants Me” ¯ Sat¯o, who was still distancing himself from Ohira, won his fourth presidential election on October 29, 1970. Maeo, the leader of the K¯ochikai, had not competed in the election on the basis of a promise from Sat¯o that he would have a position in the new cabinet. Sat¯o broke his word, however, and did not assemble a new cabinet following the election. Maeo found himself used and now faced a backlash from mid-level K¯ochikai members like Tanaka Rokusuke.43 ¯ In what was a bold statement by a faction member regarding his leader, Ohira had suggested to the Hokkaido Shimbun on August 21 that Maeo “may not get to hold the reins of government”: He is a great man, unselfish, and possessing a splendid personality. However, given his health and his character, his disposition… it is unlikely that he will be showered with cheers from the public or be able to assembly majority support within the party. So, he may not get to hold the reins of government. But this does not make him any less great.44

¯ Further distancing himself from Maeo, Ohira created the Mokuy¯okai (“Thursday Association”; not to be confused with similar named organizations associated with the Sat¯o faction), rallying young and mid-ranked members of the K¯ochikai like Tanaka Rokusuke, Tazawa Kichir¯o, and Masuoka Hiroyuki behind him. He also raised political funds independently from the K¯ochikai. There was speculation ¯ that Ohira was attempting to incite a revolt by the younger membership, leading to emotional complications with Maeo. Other members of the faction like It¯o Masayoshi, Sasaki Yoshitake, Hattori Yasushi, and Urano Sachio also felt that it ¯ was time for the leadership to pass to Ohira. ¯ When It¯o and the others visited Ohira’s home, they were able to persuade him to take control of the faction. While it briefly seemed likely that the K¯ochikai would end up splitting into multiple factions, the change in leadership was ultimately accomplished peacefully. According to It¯o, “Sometimes, it may be necessary to abandon ¯ one’s honor and humanity to obtain power.” Ohira took this lesson to heart, believing 45 it to be the fate of every politician. ¯ On April 17, 1971, Ohira succeeded Maeo to become the third leader of the K¯ochikai. In a speech at the Okura Hotel, he said, “I will devote all of my energy to ¯ making the K¯ochikai the central force within the LDP.” Ohira clearly had his eye on 46 the position of prime minister. He wrote in his diary that it was “only natural that the baton has been passed,” but also made other notes that day: “the China problem: need to hurry. China wants me. […] Sat¯o’s trip to the US is the end. The retirement timing could be a mistake.”47 ¯ Ohira becoming leader of the K¯ochikai prompted some, like Kosaka Zentar¯o, to ¯ leave the faction. Politicians tend to jealous of one another and to hold grudges. Ohira was fond of saying that “if you put three people together, you’ve made a faction.” He also famously said that “the world of politics is a sea of jealousy.” He viewed this as an inevitable part of human nature, however, and was not opposed to the existence of factions.48

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3.4 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era” and a “Maritime Nation in Asia” Japan’s international environment experienced significant changes in the second half of 1971. First, Nixon announced on July 15 that he would visit China and then, on October 25, Chinese representation in the United Nations was moved from Taipei to Beijing. With the thawing of Sino-American relations and China’s admission to the UN, factors that had long stood in the way of a closer Sino-Japanese relationship fell away.49 ¯ Earlier that year, on April 23, Ohira had held a clandestine meeting with Wang Xiaoyun, deputy secretary-general of the China-Japan Friendship Association, at a restaurant in Tokyo and expressed a willingness to normalize diplomatic relations with China. Wang was in Japan as the deputy head of the Chinese table tennis team; ¯ the meeting with Ohira had been arranged by LDP legislator Furui Yoshimi.50 When a workshop for K¯ochikai Diet members was held at a hotel in Hakone on ¯ September 1, Ohira gave a speech entitled “The Opening of a New Century for Japan: Changing the Tides.” In the speech, he spoke of a “total settlement of the postwar era” and, unusually, an “independent foreign policy” for Japan: Our nation is now approaching a turning point, a sort of total settlement of the postwar era. We have hitherto single-mindedly worked to accumulate wealth, but true happiness and purpose in life cannot necessarily be found in affluence. […] We have avoided participation in international politics, entrusting our fate to our cooperation with the United States. But with the weakening of the dollar system, we have been forced to confront the precarious path of pursuing an independent foreign policy.

¯ Following this introduction, Ohira called for “an end to the distrust of politics,” “the restoration of human solidarity,” “the construction of a nation of garden cities,” and “a vigorous, independent foreign policy of peace.” He also argued that the time had come to settle things with China: Since last fall, there has been a rapidly growing trend among the membership of the United Nations towards granting Beijing the right to represent China. The number of countries establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing has continually increased, a shift echoed in the significant changes in public opinion in our nation. I believe that the time has come for the government to make an accurate assessment of the situation and bring about a resolution to the so-called “China issue.” To be faithful to the state of opinion both at home and abroad, the government should make contact with Beijing as soon as possible, in a manner based on the spirit and principle of Sino-Japanese friendship.

¯ Ohira’s speech promoted normalizing diplomatic relations with China and crit¯ icized the Sat¯o government. Ohira had previously kept his political aspirations to himself, but, with Sat¯o’s presidential term coming to an end in October 1972, he was now focused on a post-Sat¯o political landscape as the leader of one of the LDP’s largest factions.51 ¯ In March 1972, Ohira published a treatise on “Japan’s New Foreign Policy”:

64

5 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP … Japan is, of course, a maritime nation in Asia. It has limited territory, a large population, and scarce resources. Its Asian neighbors are unstable and impoverished. The resources that Japan needs and the markets it pursues are therefore spread far across the sea. Japan’s survival and prosperity – as well as its security and honor – depend, as it were, on the safety of the oceans surrounding it.

This perception of Japan as “a maritime nation in Asia” served as the foundation of ¯ Ohira’s vision for foreign policy. It was an idea that would lead to his Pacific Basic Cooperation Concept years later. ¯ In mid-May, Ohira began preparing for the upcoming LDP presidential election. Consulting with Maeo, he moved forwards with plans to secure majority support in the party. After a meeting at Maeo’s home, he told reporters that “Maeo and I are getting along better; the boss [Maeo] is getting to work and I ask for your cooperation as well.”52 Maeo held a leadership meeting with Niwa Ky¯oshir¯o, Takami Sabur¯o, Kosaka Zentar¯o, Fukunaga Kenji, Koyama Osanori, Araki Masuo, Uchida Tsuneo, and other ¯ set up a committee of staff to explore ways of countering the other factions.53 Ohira fifteen members (including Maeo) to discuss the election and personnel issues.54 ¯ ¯ Ohira attended a general meeting of the Ohira faction on May 24 and called for solidarity: We are a group who once had the honor of holding power. There has been a lot of criticism within our village lately, however, and that is entirely my fault. I spoke with Maeo the other day, and we worked towards unity and mutual communication. The political situation is a tough one, but I want us to fulfill the responsibilities that have been laid upon us.55

¯ The first meeting of the Ohira faction’s new executive committee was held at ¯ Hotel Okura on May 29. With Maeo serving as chair, Ohira decided on the personnel for his presidential election staff (designated substitutes are in parentheses): General Affairs: Kodaira Hisao (Sait¯o Kunikichi, Tsushima Bunji) Information/PR: Fukunaga Kenji (Uchida Tsuneo, Ueki Mitsunori) Government Affairs: Suzuki Zenk¯o (Koyama Osanori, Ogawa Heiji, Sasaki Hideyo, Nishida Shin’ichi, Fujita Masaaki) ¯ Policy: Kosaka Zentar¯o (Miyazawa Kiichi, Okubo Takeo, Isurugi Michiyuki) Finances: Shiomi Shunji (Amano Kimiyoshi)56

¯ According to records of Ohira’s conversations, he was visited by an unidentified Taiwanese dignitary at this time and told that Taiwan would “be independent twenty ¯ years from now.” Ohira rejected this idea, telling the dignitary that “It is naïve to think that that will be the case. If China wants to, it can easily hang Taiwan out to dry. The only way for the Taiwan issue to be resolved is for Japan and the United States to talk with Beijing and establish peace in the region.” While it is difficult to believe that a Taiwanese dignitary would be talking about independence during this

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65

¯ period, Ohira’s remark that Japan and America had no choice but to talk to Beijing is interesting.57 ¯ Ohira announced his candidacy for president in June, laying out “Five Principles for a Peaceful Foreign Policy” as his administration’s concept. These were: absolutely no nuclear attacks or proliferation; no violations of another country’s sovereignty; no encouragement of international conflicts; preventing pollution of the oceans, atmosphere, and water as well as the excessive taking of resources; and preventing world hunger, poverty, and disease. The five principles can be considered to merely be general expressions of common sense. In terms of actual concrete foreign policy ¯ objectives, Ohira’s top priority was the normalization of diplomatic relations with China. ¯ In an interview conducted during the campaign, Ohira said of China that “It’s time for the government to embark on diplomacy [with the People’s Republic of China]. For that to happen, we need to have agreement at home. I believe we are at the stage where we need to consolidate a [national] consensus.”58 As he spoke of China, ¯ Ohira’s thoughts may have turned to his experiences working there thirty-three years earlier as a young official. ¯ Despite Ohira’s electoral efforts, however, the LDP presidential election served as a showdown between his long-time ally Tanaka, who had seized control over the vast majority of the Sat¯o faction in May, and Fukuda Takeo, the serving foreign minister and Sat¯o’s chosen successor. He came in third in the first round of voting, winning 101 votes to Tanaka’s 156 and Fukuda’s 150, before joining with Miki and Nakasone to back Tanaka in the final round and provide him with an overwhelming victory over Fukuda. ¯ Tanaka’s victory had not been unexpected by Ohira, however, and he had in fact been involved in negotiations aimed at securing this result since the spring. A Tanaka ¯ administration would provide Ohira with the opportunity to serve as foreign minister once again and help bring about a normalization of relations with Beijing. As the older of the two men, he was proud enough to believe that he should have served as prime minister first, but he also had no choice but to acknowledge the political acumen and accomplishments that placed Tanaka in the superior position.59 Notes 1.

2. 3.

Watanabe Tsuneo, Seiji no Misshitsu, (Tokyo: Sekkasha, 1966), 71–72. Kuri¯ hara Y¯uk¯o, Ohira Moto S¯ori to Watashi (Tokyo: K¯osaid¯o Shuppan, 1990), 161. ¯ ¯ ¯ Yasuda Masaharu, “Ogata no Seijika: Ohira Masayoshi,” in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 131. Kimura Mitsugu, S¯ori no Hinkaku – Kantei Hishokan ga Mita Rekidai Saish¯o no Sugao (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2006), 79, 81. ¯ Letter of greeting from Ohira Masayoshi, August 1964, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Museum Collection. ¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, ¯ 2010), 199–201. Manabe Kenji, Watashi no Mita Ohira Masayoshi: Sono

66

4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

5 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP …

Sugao to Shisei (Tokyo: Image Makers, 1976), 213–220. Morita Yoshiko, ¯ “Chichi, Ohira Masayoshi Moto Shush¯o,” [My Father, Former Prime Minister ¯ Ohira Masayoshi], Part 3, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (April 15, 2010, evening ¯ edition), 6. The remembrance ceremony for the first anniversary of Ohira ¯ Masaki’s death was held at the Kazan Kaikan. Ohira Masayoshi Letters, July 15, 1965, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Collection. ¯ Ohira 2:96–99, 313–314. Ibid, 1:78–80. Ibid, 2:101–102, 318–319. ¯ Shima Keiji, “Nintaizuyoi Hito deshita,” in Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu Kikigaki Ohira Masayoshi, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 229–230. Mikuriya Takashi, It¯o Takashi, and Iio Jun, eds., Watanabe Tsuneo Kaikoroku (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2007) 261–263. Morita Hajima, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o no ¯ Ohira Masayoshi – Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 78. Manabe 115–119. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral ¯ Policy Research Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oraru Hisutor¯ı [Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oral History], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2004), 190. ¯ Ohira 2:102, 338. ¯ Ibid, 2:121–153. Watanabe Akio, “Kokusai Seijika toshite no Ohira ¯ Masayoshi,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 111–114. Mikuriya Takashi, Kenryoku no Yakata wo Aruku (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 2010), 130–131. ¯ Ohira 2:176, 3:209, 6:305, 398. Ikeda Yukihiko, “Mijika ni Sesshita Tetsujin Seijika,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 199–200. ¯ Manabe 197–198. The Ohira Library’s collection is now held by the Kagawa Prefectural Library. ¯ K¯oyama Ken’ichi, “Ohira Masayoshi no Seiji Tetsugaku,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, ¯ and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 21. Sat¯o Akiko, Tanaka Kakuei (Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2005), 246–247. ¯ Ohira 3:287, 4:361. Letter from Morita Hajime to the author, dated October 8, 2010. ¯ Ohira 2:11–212. ¯ Ohira 3:229. Manabe 120. ¯ Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, ¯ 1990), 250–254. Takeuchi Yasuo, “Ohira Masayoshi no Keizai, Zaisei Un’ei ¯ to Sono Shis¯o,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 148. “Maeo Shigesabur¯o Kisha Kaiken (Sokkiroku): S¯osaisen Shutsuba ni sai shite” [Press Conference with Maeo Shigesabur¯o (Shorthand): On his Presidential Candidacy], November 1, 1968, Tokyo Prince Hotel, Author’s collection. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 257.

3 “The Opening of a New Century for Japan”: Leader of the K¯ochikai

23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

67

Uji Toshihiko, Suzuki Seiken: 863 Nichi (Tokyo: Institute for Administration Affairs Press Office, 1983), 22. Interview with Uji, August 10, 2011. ¯ Ohira 1:80–81, 2:393–395. Interview with Fukukawa Shinji, secretary to the minister of international trade and industry, August 17, 2011. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi to Ambassador to the US Shimoda Takez¯o, May 14, 1969, Nichibei B¯oeki/Sen’i Mondai (Sutansu Beikoku Sh¯omu Ch¯okan H¯onichi), 2010–6232, MOFA. Aichi to Shimoda, May 15, 1969, Nichibei B¯oeki/Sen’i Mondai (Sutansu Beikoku Sh¯omu Ch¯okan H¯onichi), 2010–6232, MOFA. ¯ Ohira 2:436. American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dainanakai Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Giji Gaiy¯o” [Overview of the Seventh Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs], September 1969, Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Dainanakai Iinkai Honkaigi Giji Gaiy¯o, E’.2.3.1.17–8-5–1, MOFA. ¯ ¯ Ohira 3:80–81. Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 263. ¯ Ohira 3:299–300. Interview with Fukukawa, August 17, 2011. ¯ Ohira 1:81, 3:134–139, 4:279. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Ozawa Takeo to ¯ ¯ u H¯omon Kankei (1969.10), Aichi, October 27, 1969, Ohira Ts¯usan Daijin Osh¯ A’.1.5.3.12, MOFA. Ambassador to the UK Y¯ukawa Morio to Aichi, October ¯ ¯ u H¯omon Kankei (1969.10), A’.1.5.3.12, 31, 1969, Ohira Ts¯usan Daijin Osh¯ MOFA. Hattori Ry¯uji, Eisaku Sat¯o, Japanese Prime Minister, 1964–72: Okinawa, Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics and the Nobel Prize, trans. Graham Leonard (London: Routledge, 2021), 210. IM Desler, Fukui Haruhiro, and Sat¯o Hideo, Nichibei Sen’i Funs¯o (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1980), 121–122. Wakaizumi Kei, Tasaku Nakarishi wo Shinzenmu to Hossu (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 1994), 474–527. Ishii Osamu, “Dainiji Nichibei Sen’i Funs¯o (1969–1971) – Meis¯o no Issen Nichi,” Hitotsubashi H¯ogaku 8:2 (2009), 435–442. Morita Hajima, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o ¯ Masayoshi – Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 88. no Ohira Shinobu Takashi, Wakaizumi Kei to Nichibei Mitsuyaku: Okinawa Henkan to Sen’i K¯osh¯o wo Meguru Misshi Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Nihon Hy¯oronsha, 2012), 59– ¯ 118. Nakashima Takuma, Okinawa Henkan to Nichibei Anpo Taisei (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012), 251–269. Nakashima Takuma, K¯od¯o Seich¯o to Okinawa Henkan 1960–1972 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K¯obunka, 2012), 209–230. Interview with Fukukawa, August 17, 2011. Fukukawa Shinji, “Ts¯ush¯o Sangy¯o Daijin Jidai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 117–123. Kikuchi Kiyoaki, “Heij¯oshin de Gaik¯o wo Yaru Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 376. ¯ Ohira 3:246–255.

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37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51.

52.

5 The “Total Settlement of the Postwar Era”: From LDP …

Sat¯o Eisaku, Sat¯o Eisaku Nikki, Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1997), 16. Oguni Hiroshi, “Shinnen to Kikubari no Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 498. Fukukawa, “Ts¯ush¯o Sangy¯o Daijin Jidai,” 124–126. Mikuriya, Watanabe Tsuneo Kaikoroku, 237. Fukumoto Kunio, Omote Butai, Ura Butai – Fukumoto Kunio Kaikoroku (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2007), 103–104. Mikuriya Takashi, Chi to J¯o: Miyazawa Kiichi to Takeshita Noboru no Seijikan (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2011), 24–25, 55, 140–143. Ikeda Mitsue, “Kokoro no Atatakai Kata deshita,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 18. Suzuki Zenk¯o, “Kur¯o wo Tomo ni shita Aidagara,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 45. ¯ Ohira 3:220–226. ¯ Ohira 3:98–111. ¯ Ohira 6:182. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 272–273. ¯ Ohira 6:472. ¯ Manabe 127–128. It¯o Masayoshi, “Ohira Masayoshi to iu Seijika,” in Kumon, ¯ K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 263–264. Suzuki 51–52. Miyazawa Kiichi, “Tsushima, Ikeda Z¯osh¯o ni Hishokan Jidai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 32–33. Yasuda Masaharu, “K¯ochikai Kaich¯o no K¯otaigeki,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 137–146. Kimura, S¯ori no Hinkaku, 100. ¯ ¯ Ohira 1:82, 3:320–321. Arai Shunz¯o and Morita Hajime, Bunjin Saish¯o Ohira Masayoshi (Tokyo: Shunj¯usha, 1982), 36–37. ¯ ¯ Ohira 7:31–33. Fukunaga Fumio, “Ohira Masayoshi Memo (Sh¯o),” Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron 127:10 (July 2012), 22. Kajiwara Taketoshi, “Seikai wa Jerash¯ı no Umi,” in Kimura, S¯ori no Hinkaku, 238. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 137. Masuda Hiroshi, “Beich¯u Sekkin to Nihon: Nihon Seifu (Gaimush¯o) Jimint¯o no Taich¯ugoku Sekkin Seisaku to Shippai,” in Nikuson H¯och¯u to Reisen K¯ozo¯o no Heny¯o – Beich¯u Sekkin no Sh¯ogeki to Sh¯uhen Shokoku, edited by Masuda Hiroshi (Tokyo: Keio University, 2006), 135–142. Tagawa Seiichi, Nicch¯u K¯ory¯u to Jimint¯o Ry¯oshutachi (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1983), 39–41. Wang Taiping, Ano Koro no Nihon to Ch¯ugoku: Gaik¯okan Tokuhain no Kais¯o, trans. by Yamamoto Nobuo and Niko Mayumi (Tokyo: Nihon Ky¯oh¯osha, 2004), 41. Lu Xueying, Furui Yoshimi to Ch¯ugoku: Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka e no Michi (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 2011), 213. ¯ Ohira 4:76–84. Manabe 128–130. Kimura, S¯ori no Hinkaku, 107. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 93–94. According to Koike Seiichi, this speech was drafted by Yasuda Masaharu and Fukushima Masamitsu of the K¯ochikai’s staff and then ¯ refined by Ohira based on comments from the K¯ochikai Policy Committee. Koike Seiichi, Kindai Nihon Bunshogaku Kenky¯u Josetsu (Tokyo: Gendai Shiry¯o Shuppan, 2008), 80. ¯ Record of Meeting between Ohira and Maeo, May 13, 1972. Author’s collection.

3 “The Opening of a New Century for Japan”: Leader of the K¯ochikai

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

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Record of Conversation with Maeo, May 17, 1972. Author’s collection. ¯ Record of Meeting between Ohira and Maeo, May 20, 1972. Author’s collection. ¯ Ohira Faction General Meeting Record, May 24, 1972. Author’s collection. ¯ Ohira Faction Executive Committee Meeting Record, May 29, 1972. Author’s collection. ¯ Record of Ohira’s Conversation, May 18, 1972. Author’s collection. ¯ Ohira 4:84–86, 345–349, 365–377, 483–484. Hattori Ry¯uji, China-Japan Rapprochement and the United States: In the Wake of Nixon’s Visit to Beijing, trans. by Graham B. Leonard (London: Routledge, 2022), 30.

Chapter 6

Chasing the Horizons of Diplomacy: Foreign Minister in the T.anaka Government

1 The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations 1.1 “Multilateral Diplomacy” ¯ With the formation of the Tanaka government on July 7, 1972, Ohira, now sixtytwo, became foreign minister for the second time. Ten years earlier, he had experienced “some difficulty” as foreign minister in the Ikeda government managing the ministry’s personnel because the vice-minister and all bureau directors had been older than him. But now, “everyone, from the vice-minister on down, is younger ¯ than I am.” As he took up the reins for the second time, Ohira was confident in his ability to steer Japan’s foreign policy. And Tanaka, who had promised to hasten the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, had left diplomacy entirely in ¯ Ohira’s hands.1 Bringing about normalization was the greatest task before him. Comparing the relationship between Japan and China to that of New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day, he emphasized that “hard work and patience” would be required in seeing it through: The countries of Japan and China appear to be close, and yet they are distant. We can compare this to the relationship between New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day. […] There are great differences in our ways of thinking, our cultures, and our general ways of life. […] Japan and China have long been neighbors separated by a mere strip of water. This is something that will never change. Whether we like it or not, we need to establish a peaceful relationship and doing so will require good judgement from those on both sides. There are more differences between the Japanese and Chinese peoples than there are similarities, however, and reaching a mutual understanding will be a more difficult task than one might imagine. It is only natural that – so long as we remain permanent neighbors – both sides will need to put in a great deal of hard work and patience.2

¯ Ohira met with Sun Pinghua, deputy secretary-general of the China-Japan Friendship Association, at Hotel Okura on July 22. Sun was in Japan on orders from Premier © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_6

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¯ Zhou Enlai. Ohira told Sun that “as soon as we reach a certain stage, I would like to have our government’s leaders visit China.” Sun replied that China would “welcome” such a visit. Xiao Xiangqian, chief representative of the Tokyo Liaison Office of the ¯ China-Japan Memorandum Trade Office, also told Ohira that “Premier Zhou has long said that when Mr. Tanaka visits Beijing, there will be no need for apologies. To speak of friendship is enough. We must face forward; there is no need to look backwards.”3 ¯ How did Ohira view Japanese foreign relations in the period immediately prior to his visit to China? On August 11, he gave a lecture entitled “An Inquiry into Japan’s Foreign Policy” at a luncheon hosted by the America-Japan Society at the Imperial Hotel. In the speech (given in English as the American ambassador Robert Ingersoll was in attendance), he declared that “As part of Japan’s immediate multilateral diplomacy, Japan intends to promote the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China” but also reassured the audience that “meticulous attention” would be paid during this process to ensure that US-Japan relations remained unaffected. ¯ Ohira rejected the idea that a dichotomy existed between alignment with the United States and pursuing improved diplomatic relations with Asia. And that meant that Sino-Japanese normalization needed to be done in a manner that was compat¯ ible with stable US-Japan relations. This is what Ohira meant when he referred to “multilateral diplomacy” in the speech. While pursuing normalization meant that Japan would be going further than the United States had thus far been willing to, his intention was that Japan’s actions would be able to coexist with its relationship with the US.4 ¯ The problem was Taiwan. Taiwanese Ambassador Peng Mengji visited Ohira on August 16 and fiercely protested against Japan normalizing relations with China. ¯ Ohira responded by speaking of “political responsibilities” and “grief”: Given the Japanese government’s responsibilities and the situation at home and abroad, we have no choice but to consider embarking on a new course with regards to normalizing diplomatic relations with China. The government is not pleased to pursue normalization; it does so with grief. However, dealing with normalization is unavoidable in the present situation, the result of unforgiving political responsibilities.5

¯ Tanaka and Ohira met with Nixon and other American officials in Hawaii on August ¯ 31 and September 1. According to Ohira, “During these talks, the Tanaka government promised the US that it would strictly adhere to the US-Japan security treaty. It was a promise that we would not only adhere to the treaty, but that we would observe the treaty in its entirety without the smallest deviation.”6 ¯ Ohira consulted with Tanaka prior to the meeting with Nixon, writing in his notebook: “Denuclearization (Okinawa) […] (1969) introduction of nuclear weapons in emergency situations—discussion X.” This indicates that he was aware of the secret nuclear agreement that Sat¯o had made with Nixon—that the United States would be permitted to re-introduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa in an emergency— but decided not to bring it up at the summit.7

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1.2 Establishing Diplomatic Relations with China ¯ Ohira kept a close eye on developments in Beijing. He was concerned about the possibility that “even if China accepted the continuation of the [US-Japan security relationship], they would ask that Taiwan be excluded from the treaty’s Far East clause.” This was a reference to Article 6 of the US-Japan security treaty, which stated that American bases in Japan would be used to contribute to “the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” China had fiercely opposed the application of this clause to Taiwan in the past. He received word from Furui Yoshimi and Komeit¯o Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu that China was prepared to be flexible on this point, however, and decided that it would be possible to come to an agreement. ¯ In early September, Ohira visited Tanaka at the Prime Minister’s Office and urged him to make a final formal decision on visiting China so that an itinerary could be sent to the Chinese: “I’m going to go ahead and contact [the Chinese] with this. You’re fine with that, right? I’m going ahead with this. Okay?” As he pressed Tanaka for an answer, the tone of his voice became uncharacteristically high. After a few moments of silence, Tanaka muttered, “Well, we’re both flesh and blood, after all. Shall we go?”.8 ¯ ¯ Ohira and Tanaka departed for China on September 25. During their visit, Ohira carried out negotiations with Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and met Mao Zedong. While there were some points over which the sides had difficult reaching agreement, such as how Taiwan would be handled, the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement was signed by both countries’ leaders on September 29.9 ¯ According to Ohira, Tanaka entrusted the wording of the joint statement to him, his only instruction being that the term “militarism” was to be avoided: The negotiations were easy because I had full authority. The prime minister just said, “I’m leaving the joint statement up to you, so do a good job.” Prime Minister Tanaka felt that, as he had come as a representative of the entire Japanese people, including both militarists and communists, the joint statement couldn’t include language that criticized any part of the population, such as by including a discussion of “militarism.” He felt that it would be better to go home than to include “militarism.” That was his only order. […] The joint statement was a product of compromise. The text contained some logical inconsistencies since the preamble reflected the Chinese position while the actual text itself reflected the Japanese position. But it had the benefit of providing a sense of resolution to the past. […] The Chinese did not bring up the security treaty, considering it a matter between Japan and the United States. […] Regarding Taiwan, the Chinese seemed to have adopted a considerably long-term perspective when looking at the issue. Had they pressed us on the Japanese position, I would have asked them to resolve the issue through negotiations with the US first, but the Chinese did not get too involved in the issue. […] The Chinese had not provided us with any prior assurances that we would be able to meet with Mao Zedong. Mao had the air of an arrogant countryside elder; even Zhou Enlai was deferential toward him and looked small in comparison. His study was neither large nor

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6 Chasing the Horizons of Diplomacy … opulent and was filled with shelves of books bound in the Chinese style. Mao took a book that Prime Minister Tanaka happened to point to [the Chu Ci (a book of classical Chinese poetry)] and gave it to him. He told the prime minister that the Four Books and Five Classics [the most important works of Confucianism] were not good books (as they had been intended to deceive the people) but could still be useful. He related a story about how, as a child, his parents would quote the Analects of Confucius when they scolded him. […] On the compensation issue, the Chinese made clear in the joint statement that they waived their right to claim compensation, as had been outlined in the Japanese proposal. While this was a sore point for the Chinese, they agreed to drop the word “right.”

¯ As Ohira said, Tanaka had fully entrusted the talks in Beijing to him.10 And while his counterpart during the negotiations was Ji Pengfei, Ji was following Zhou’s ¯ instructions. According to his secretary Morita Hajime, “Ohira was aware the entire time that he was actually negotiating with Premier Zhou Enlai. He said it himself: ‘This is a negotiation between Zhou Enlai and I.’”.11 The establishment of diplomatic relations with China was arguably the greatest ¯ achievement of Ohira’s life. And Japan’s actions led to other countries like Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the Philippines recognizing China. It also brought about the disappearance of the Asian and Pacific Council, an organization of non-communist nations including Taiwan.12 The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations February 12, 1964

¯ Foreign Minister Ohira states in Diet testimony that Japan would consider normalizing relations with China if it joined the UN with the “blessings of the world”

Summer 1971

LDP Secretary-General Tanaka begins studying China policy

July 15, 1971

Nixon announces that he will visit Beijing ¯ Ohira delivers “The Opening of a New Century for Japan: Changing the Tides” speech in Hakone

September 1, 1971 October 25, 1971

UN General Assembly approves PRC membership. Taiwan withdraws from the UN

February 21, 1972

Nixon visits China

March 23, 1972

MITI Minister Tanaka states in Diet testimony that Japan caused “great trouble” to China during the war

July 5, 1972

Tanaka convincingly wins LDP presidential election ¯ ¯ Tanaka government formed with Ohira as foreign minister. Ohira instructs Hashimoto Hiroshi, director of the ministry’s China Division, to make preparations for normalizing relations with China

July 7, 1972

July 10, 1972

July 20, 1972 July 25, 1972

Shanghai Ballet Company visits Japan with Sun Pinghua, deputy secretary-general of the China-Japan Friendship Association, as its director (the company returns to China on August 16) ¯ Ohira meets with Sun and Xiao Xiangqian ¯ Ohira expresses his “firm resolve” to normalize relations with China in a meeting with Taiwanese ambassador Peng Mengji (continued)

1 The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations

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(continued) July 27–29, 1972 August 4, 1972

K¯omeit¯o Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu meets with Zhou in Beijing and learns the Chinese positions on normalization ¯ Takeiri reports to Tanaka and Ohira on his meeting with Zhou

August 15, 1972

Tanaka meets with Sun and Xiao, says he will visit China

August 23, 1972

Tanaka appoints LDP Vice President Shiina Etsusabur¯o as special envoy to Taiwan ¯ Tanaka and Ohira meet with Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State Rogers in Hawaii

August 31, 1972 September 13, 1972

Personal letter from Tanaka to Chiang Kai-shek drafted

September 17–20, 1972

Shiina’s party visits Taiwan ¯ Tanaka and Ohira negotiate in Beijing

September 25–28, 1972 September 29, 1972

September 30, 1972 October 10–25, 1972

¯ Sino-Japanese joint statement signed in Beijing. Ohira announces ¯ ending of the Treaty of Taipei. Tanaka, Ohira, and Zhou visit Shanghai. Taiwan severs diplomatic relations with Japan ¯ Tanaka and Ohira return to Japan, report on visit to the LDP’s Diet members ¯ Ohira visits Australia, New Zealand, the US, and the USSR

Source Hattori Ry¯uji, Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka [Sino-Japanese Normalization] (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2011), 260–262. See also: Hattori Ry¯uji, China-Japan Rapprochement and the United States: In the Wake of Nixon’s Visit to Beijing, trans. by Graham B. Leonard (London: Routledge, 2022), xi–xiii

1.3 Visits to Australia, the United States, and the Soviet Union ¯ Ohira decided to visit Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the Soviet Union to explain Japan’s normalization of relations with China. Because the Sino-Japanese joint statement included an “anti-hegemony” clause that seemed to be targeted at ¯ the USSR, Ohira viewed easing any tensions with the Soviets as being of particular importance. But his first visit would be to Australia.13 ¯ Ohira arrived in Australia on October 10, accompanied by MITI Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Transport Minister Sasaki Hideyo, Agriculture Minister Adachi Tokur¯o, and EPA Director-General Arita Kiichi. He attended the first meeting of the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee on the 12th and 13th. This committee had been created by Japan to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship with resource-rich Australia.14 ¯ During the meeting, Ohira told Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen and the other Australian officials that “Any future initiative promoting cooperation across the Pacific Rim region will have Japan and Australia at its heart. It would therefore be desirable for officials of our governments to conduct a long-term study of the idea.”

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¯ The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, which Ohira would advocate for during his time as prime minister, would be the fruition of this proposal. ¯ Ohira also met with Gough Whitlam, the leader of the opposition, while in Australia. When Whitlam asked him about the “Senkaku Islands and the East China continental shelf,” a reference to Japanese controlled islands in the East China Sea ¯ that China also claimed, Ohira answered: We didn’t discuss those issues during my visit to Beijing. The Chinese were reluctant to do so. With the great challenge of normalizing diplomatic relations on the table, the Chinese seem to have judged it unwise to take up such minor issues. I felt that the Chinese were being pragmatic in their approach to diplomacy.15

¯ While the Senkaku Islands had, in fact, been briefly discussed in Beijing, Ohira does not seem to have considered the issue as having been formally raised by China. ¯ Afterwards, Ohira, Sasaki, Adachi, and Arita visited New Zealand from the 14th ¯ to the 16th. Ohira provided Prime Minister Jack Marshall and Foreign Minister Keith Holyoake with the following explanation for Japan’s decision to embark on normalization: China’s recent attitude has become more pragmatic than dogmatic, and they have recognized that reconciliation with Japan is also necessary for China. Except for a very small number of people, the majority of Japanese – including the opposition parties – wanted to normalize relations with China, so the government was under domestic pressure to resolve the issue. With the advent of the Tanaka government, we thus made the decision to move forward on it.16

Both Australia and New Zealand would establish diplomatic relations with China in late December. Their decision to do so was likely significantly influenced by the Japanese experience.17 ¯ Ohira met with Nixon on October 18. As he outlined the talks that had led to normalization, he told Nixon that “the Chinese indicated the Security Treaty is a ¯ matter between Japan and the United States.” Nixon accepted Ohira’s explanation and noted that South Korean stability was also important to the situation in East Asia.18 ¯ Ohira’s negotiations in Moscow, the most important of his foreign visits, proved difficult. He met with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on October 23 and explained that “both countries stated in the joint statement that the normalization of relations between Japan and China is not an act aimed at any third country, and we expressed our opposition to any attempt to seek hegemony in Asia, no matter which country it was by.” ¯ When Gromyko pressed Ohira on who the anti-hegemony clause was meant for, ¯ he replied that “there was no mention of any specific country.” Ohira also proposed bringing the issue of the Northern Territories (four islands off the coast of Hokkaido that had been occupied by the Soviets in the final days of the Second World War) before the International Court of Justice, but Gromyko dismissed the idea of “having a foreign court decide the territorial issues between Japan and Russia” as being “out of the question.”

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When he met Premier Alexei Kosygin on October 24, he again raised the issue, mentioning the “territorial issues that have been a problem since 1956.” He sought to negotiate a peace treaty with the Soviets that could resolve these issues, but the Soviets took a hardline stance and refused to enter into any substantial discussion of the topic.19

2 US-Japan Relations and the Kim Dae-Jung Incident 2.1 USS Midway ¯ As mentioned above, Ohira had met with Nixon and other American leaders in Hawaii on August 31 and September 1 to reaffirm Japan’s commitment to the USJapan security framework. During this same period, the United States wanted to make the US Navy facilities in Yokosuka, Kanagawa the home port for the aircraft carrier USS Midway to ensure efficient aircraft operations during the post-Vietnam War era. This ship was believed to carry nuclear weapons, however, which made its presence a potential political flashpoint. It was Under Secretary of State U Alexis Johnson who raised the idea of making ¯ Yokosuka the ship’s home port, pressing Ohira on the idea on August 31: This would require no increased expense to the Japanese Government but would only bring 800 more families into the neighborhood of Yokosuka. I don’t think there would be any single spectacular event which could call public attention to this move. My own view is that this move does not require prior consultation under the Mutual Security Treaty. So, I am not asking for your approval of this move. As far as your discussion with Ambassador Reischauer in 1963, I don’t think this changes the situation at all.

¯ Ohira only made a brief reply, saying that he would engage in “a very serious study of the subject.”20 He approved moving the ship’s home port to Yokosuka in November 1972 and did not seek prior consultation on its nuclear armaments. In line with the secret agreement ¯ that he had been informed of by Reischauer nearly a decade earlier, Ohira seems to have interpreted “introduction” as meaning the deployment of nuclear weapons on land. When the USS Midway entered Yokosuka on October 3, 1973, it was met by protests, and explaining its presence to the public remained a political challenge for the government.21

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2.2 From Europe to the US ¯ Ohira visited Yugoslavia, France, and Belgium from April 28 to May 6, 1973, meeting with each country’s foreign minister and the European Community leadership. While in France, he also met with President Georges Pompidou, Prime Minister Pierre Messmer, and Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, discussing the situation in Indochina and increasing economic cooperation with Japan with them.22 Just before departing from Belgium, he provided the following summary of his European visit: Compared to my visit to Europe ten years ago, it seems that Japan has become more of a “question mark” here. That is, the strongest impression I have received during this visit to Europe has been that there is a mixture of respect for and fear of Japan here – people are anxious about whether or not Japan will be a country with which they will be able to let their guard down and have a good relationship. […] Naturally, I also felt that there was strong European interest in Japan’s normalization of diplomatic relations with China. I found it interesting that Yugoslavia, one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, was so widely informed. I was impressed by the fact that, despite its unique national character, I felt absolutely no discomfort there.23

With Japan developing into an economic power and having established relations with ¯ China, Europe was taking increased notice. The trip also caused Ohira to pay more attention to the non-aligned Yugoslavia. The ninth US-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held ¯ on July 16th and 17th in Tokyo. Ohira served as its chair. In addition to economic matters, the committee also discussed the progress being made in the “dialogue” between the US and USSR and the ending of the Vietnam War.24 ¯ Ohira visited the United States with Tanaka from July 31 to August 1, meeting with Secretary of State William Rogers to discuss energy issues, Vietnam, and the Korean ¯ Peninsula. The meeting was also used by Ohira to coordinate with the Americans in preparation for his visit to the Soviet Union planned for the fall.25 ¯ Ohira’s Spring 1973 Visit to Europe April 28

Departed from Haneda for Europe; arrived in Anchorage

April 29–30

Arrived in Belgrade via Hamburg and Frankfurt; held talks with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Miloš Mini´c and others

May 1

Japan-Yugoslavia Joint Statement released. Departed Belgrade for Paris

May 2–4

Met with President Pompidou, Foreign Minister Jobert, and others

May 4

Departed Paris for Brussels; held talks with Belgian Foreign Minister and key personnel at EC headquarters. Japan-EC Joint Statement released. Signed Japan-Belgium cultural agreement

May 5–6 Departed Brussels. Arrived at Haneda via London and Anchorage ¯ ¯ Source “Ohira Gaimu Daijin Y¯ugosurabia H¯omon” [Foreign Minister Ohira’s Visit to Yugoslavia], ¯ 2011–769, MOFA. Ohira 7:398

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2.3 The Kim Dae-Jung Incident ¯ After returning home on August 6, 1973, Ohira held a memorial service for the tenth anniversary of Masaki’s death. On August 8, former Korean presidential candidate and democracy activist Kim Dae-jung was abducted from the Grand Palace Hotel in downtown Tokyo in broad daylight (he was released in Seoul five days later, blindfolded). Investigators found the fingerprints of Kim Dong-un, first secretary of the South Korean embassy, in Kim Dae-jung’s hotel room, but he refused to turn himself in.26 ¯ While they had never met in person, Ohira had known Kim Dae-jung for quite some time, and he had given special approval for Kim’s stay in Japan.27 It was discovered that Kim Dong-un was a KCIA agent and that the abduction had been a KCIA operation—and therefore an act of the South Korean state. This violation of Japanese sovereignty became a diplomatic incident between the two countries, ¯ and Ohira repeatedly met with foreign ministry personnel as well as National Police Agency Commissioner General Takahashi Masao to address it. On November 2, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil visited Japan with a formal letter from President Park Chung-hee in an attempt to reach a political ¯ settlement. According to Ohira, “Prime Minister Kim expressed his profound regret over the incident, saying that it had caused great trouble for the Japanese government and people, and provided his absolute assurance that such an incident would never occur again in the future.” ¯ Having decided to settle the incident politically, Ohira spent days struggling to persuade other domestic officials to accept his decision. He needed to prevent the National Police Agency from carrying out a full investigation. “While I cannot say that it is a perfect resolution, it was the result of our best efforts and I ask for the public’s understanding.”28 ¯ As Tanaka had left the handling of the case to Ohira, it fell to him to bring the case to a political conclusion. He had been close to Kim Jong-pil since his time in the Ikeda government and, while he was fully aware that resolving the incident in this way was neither open nor fair, he decided to prioritize long-term stability in relations ¯ with Korea. Now sixty-three, Ohira’s hair turned noticeably grayer following this 29 incident. Tanaka had also been concerned that the incident could cause relations with South Korea to stall.30 The opposition was vocal in their criticism of the government’s handling of the incident, saying that it had been a clear violation of Japan’s national sovereignty. ¯ Ohira said, “the history of Japan-Korean relations is a dark one. I cannot pretend that there is no sentiment that any claim that this matter has been treated in a fair way would ring hollow. However, as we are both independent countries standing on equal footing, we must strive to achieve a diligent and just resolution in the interest of long and friendly relations.”31 ¯ The “dark history” to which Ohira referred was, of course, Japan’s annexation of Korea. From the South Korean perspective, that annexation had been a much more serious violation of sovereignty, something to which the Kim Dae-jung incident could

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¯ not be compared. Ohira once described Japan’s relationship with Korea as “karmic” (g¯o), in the sense that a dark past hung over them, meaning that their relations would never go smoothly. There were rumors that Park Chung-hee had been personally ¯ involved in Kim Dae-jung’s abduction, but Ohira was unable to determine if this was actually the case.32 When the seventh Japan-South Korea Ministerial Meeting was held in Tokyo in December, there were high expectations on the Korean side that Japan would provide economic assistance, expectations that were met when the Tanaka government did indeed move to resume economic aid to South Korea.33

3 The United Nations, the Northern Territories, and the Oil Crisis 3.1 Revisiting Moscow ¯ Ohira departed for the US on September 23, 1973 to address the UN General Assembly. Afterwards he headed for Europe, visiting Italy, Britain, West Germany, ¯ and the Soviet Union (linking up with Tanaka in London). While Ohira placed great importance on both his speech to the UN and his trip to the USSR, it was the latter that he considered the greatest priority, and he used the experience he had gained over the previous year to carefully prepare for it. This would be a lengthy trip—nearly three weeks—and he would not return to Japan until October 11. While in New York, he met with Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-shik and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on September 24, but the highlight of his visit to the city was the speech that he gave to the General Assembly that same day. In ¯ it, Ohira discussed establishing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and the situation in Indochina: Based on the changed international situation after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, Japan established diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 21. I am convinced that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will contribute to the peace and stability of the Indochina region in the future.

Referencing Sino-Japanese normalization and the ongoing North–South dialogue on ¯ the Korean Peninsula, Ohira stressed that the “developments over the past year show that Asia is entering a new era in search of a stable order and the prosperity that can be found in such.” He also announced that Japan would be contributing $10 million towards rebuilding the UN’s finances. The speech—the first by a Japanese foreign minister before the UN in three years—was a success. It went well over the planned thirty minutes, and the delegates from the US and Indonesia requested to shake his hand afterwards. In light of his ¯ upcoming visit, Ohira refrained from making any references to the Soviet Union in ¯ the speech. At the press conference that followed, Ohira said, “I think that it is about

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time that Japan moves away from the era of always carefully keeping one eye on how other countries react to one where it speaks its mind.”34 From New York he travelled to Rome, where he attended the third Japan-Italy Regular Foreign Ministers Conference on September 28 and discussed the American military presence in Asia, European integration, and Sino-Soviet Relations with Foreign Minister Aldo Moro. That same evening, he spoke with President Giovanni Leone and Prime Minister Mariano Rumor about relations with the US and engaging in technical cooperation on nuclear energy.35 ¯ Ohira joined Tanaka in London, and the two men met with Prime Minister Edward Heath on October 1. They discussed issues such as bringing Japan closer to the West, the situations on the Korean Peninsula and in Southeast Asia, and oil in the North ¯ Sea. Ohira left much of the talking to Tanaka.36 ¯ They next visited West Germany, and Ohira attended the sixth Japan-Germany Regular Foreign Minister’s Conference on October 5. His discussion with Foreign Minister Walter Scheel covered the EC’s currency issues, Japan-Europe trade, the situation in Indochina, relations with China, and Soviet foreign policy. On this last ¯ point, Ohira told Scheel that “I have no illusions about my trip to the Soviet Union. However, seeing as I am going, I will need to discuss our unresolved issues with them.” These “unresolved issues” naturally included the Northern Territories.37 ¯ As Ohira and Tanaka rested at the Schlosshotel Kronberg outside Frankfurt on October 6, they received word of the Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack on Israel. These first reports of the Yom Kippur War also presaged the beginning of the 1973 Oil Crisis, as Arab oil producing nations would go on to cut oil production and place embargoes on nations perceived as supporting Israel. After dinner, the two men held a meeting to prepare for the following day’s visit ¯ to the Soviet Union. While Ohira asked the attending foreign ministry officials one ¯ question after another, Tanaka ignored them and drank brandy. When Ohira said, ¯ “Hey, are you paying attention?” Tanaka just said, “Yeah, I’m listening.” Ohira prepared Tanaka’s opening remarks carefully; Tanaka may have been the star of the ¯ show, but it was Ohira who was the choreographer, and the foreign ministry officials had great faith in him.38 ¯ After their arrival in Moscow, Ohira and Tanaka had four meetings with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on October 8 and 9. In these meetings, Tanaka brought up the Northern Territories and the possibility of resource development in Siberia. He pressed the Soviets on the former, saying that “[resolving] the issue of the four islands is a prerequisite to concluding a peace treaty.” Brezhnev deflected on the question of Siberian development, unrolling a map and hitting his desk to emphasize the richness of its resources. The mood in the room was one of distraction; Brezhnev continually received notes updating him on the status ¯ of the Yom Kippur War, and Gromyko departed halfway through (although Ohira 39 met with him for a foreign minister’s meeting afterwards). While the Japan-Soviet Summit had not gone smoothly, it did achieve one important result. Tanaka and Kosygin signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Communique on October 10 and the Japanese managed to obtain a statement from Brezhnev that

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the Northern Territories issue was unresolved. As the Soviets had previously consid¯ ered the matter settled, this was a breakthrough. According to Ohira, the Soviets accepted the use of the phrase “negotiated on various issues” rather than “exchanged ¯ views” in the joint statement. Ohira and Gromyko also signed the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Other Species, an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation, and an agreement on implementing cultural exchanges between the two countries. ¯ Ohira had spent several months meticulously preparing for this day in conjunction ¯ with the ministry’s department heads. Thanks to the close friendship between Ohira and Tanaka, there was perfect coordination between the Prime Minister’s Office and the foreign ministry – a stark contrast to the situation during Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichir¯o’s visit to the Soviet Union seventeen years earlier. On their flight ¯ home, the two men exchanged a toast and Ohira pondered the future of the JapanSoviet relationship.40

3.2 The Oil Crisis ¯ Upon his return home, Ohira had to manage the oil crisis, and he met with Arab ambassadors and Kissinger in Tokyo to discuss it. While most of the cabinet – ¯ including Tanaka and MITI Minister Nakasone—took a pro-Arab stance, Ohira insisted on the need to cooperate with the United States. It was a rare instance ¯ ¯ of Ohira adopting a position that conflicted with Tanaka’s. Ohira’s rationale was based on the premise that even oil-producing countries needed their customers and that Japan, as a large and stable country dependent on oil imports, was therefore important to them.41 ¯ In other words, Ohira viewed the oil crisis as a price problem and believed that, if the developed nations of the world united against dramatic increases in the price of oil, the oil-producing nations would be in trouble. It was thus crucial to ensure that the developed world did not become divided.42 Although Miyazawa Hiromichi, director of the foreign ministry’s Economic Bureau, supported him, they were largely on their own.43 ¯ Ohira was opposed to changing policy towards the Arab nations, but opinions on what to do were divided, even within the foreign ministry. Middle Eastern and African ¯ Affairs Bureau Director Tanaka Hideo backed Ohira, but Vice-Minister H¯ogen Shinsaku and Middle Eastern Division Director Yamamoto Manabu took a more pro-Arab stance. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaid¯o released a media piece in which he expressed pro-Arab sympathies, but this did not garner any response from the Arab world. Kissinger visited Japan on November 14 on his way back from the Middle East, heading directly to the foreign ministry from Haneda Airport. He advocated for unity ¯ among the oil consuming nations, and Ohira was forced into the position of explaining the domestic political difficulties facing the government, saying that “Japan would not easily change its fundamental foreign policy.”

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¯ Ohira was also present for the next day’s meeting between Tanaka and Kissinger. Tanaka disagreed with Kissinger’s position towards the Middle East, believing that becoming closer to the Arab nations was unavoidable if Japan wanted to secure oil for itself. He explained that “Japan’s consumption of oil this year will be 310 million kiloliters; eighty percent of this will be imported from the Middle East.” Unless the United States was prepared to take on the responsibility of supplying that oil, “the [Government of Japan] must act quickly.”44 ¯ Ohira instructed the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau to “draw up a plan that will satisfy both America and Japan at the working-level.” The next day, he called Tanaka and urged him to leave the “outward-facing” diplomacy to him. In the face of demands from the business world, however, Tanaka decided to send a warning to Israel over its continued occupation of Arab territory. This statement, ¯ which was prepared by Ohira, made clear that Japan was adopting a pro-Arab stance. When this statement was issued by Nikaid¯o on November 22, the Arab countries responded by maintaining the status quo for oil exports to Japan, allowing it to ¯ escape any cuts in their supply. Ohira attempted to minimize American backlash by instructing Ambassador to the US Yasukawa Takeshi to obtain American approval for the statement prior to its release. In December, Deputy Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited the Middle East as a special envoy.45 ¯ Ohira visited Washington, DC in February 1974, meeting with Kissinger on the 10th and attending the Washington Energy Conference from the 11th to the 13th. This conference had been organized to unite the developed countries of the world and promote oil conservation and the development of alternative energy sources. The thirteen participants included the US, Japan, various European countries, and representatives from the OECD and EC.46 While Kissinger advocated for Western solidarity, French Foreign Minister Jobert ¯ emphasize the need to engage in a dialogue with the oil-producing nations. Ohira worked to build a consensus between the United States and France by emphasizing that “What is being tested now—through this energy and oil crisis—is the sense of solidarity we have towards the global community; the idea that we are all ‘one world.’ If we can contribute to strengthening this solidarity, this conference will have been of great significance.”47 After the conclusion of the conference, Kissinger thanked ¯ Ohira for having played a “very constructive role.”48 As a result of the conference, an energy coordination group composed of viceminister level officials from each country was formed and met several times, and ultimately, the International Energy Agency (IEA) would be established in November. Under its auspices, oil reserves were increased to ninety days and an oil-sharing program was started in case of emergencies. The IEA was made a sub-organization of the OECD.49 ¯ Ohira reflected on the Washington Energy Conference in a speech to the Kansai Economic Federation: From February 11 to 13, I attended the international energy conference called by President Nixon. […] We tend to believe that the blow to Japan will be harder than that experienced by any other country. But that is not how the world sees it. A country with Japan’s superior level of technology, capacity for organization, and government stability will be able to weather

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6 Chasing the Horizons of Diplomacy … this crisis. It is the countries who are incapable of doing so that are the true problem here, and that is the approach with which this conference took up the issue.50

¯ Ohira went beyond merely cooperating with the US here. He was aiming for a stable post-Oil Crisis international order. His thinking here helped contribute to the idea of comprehensive security that he would promote years later. ¯ Ohira’s February visit to the United States had an unintended consequence. As mentioned above, he had instructed Ambassador Yasukawa to “consult with” the Americans regarding Nikaid¯o’s second statement in which he warned Israel to stop occupying Arab territory. However, he learned that Yasukawa had merely been told to “inform” the Americans of the statement, something completely different. Looking into the matter further, he discovered that Vice-Minister H¯ogen had changed his instructions due to his pro-Arab leanings in an attempt to distance Japan from the American position. Due to the importance he placed on both relations with the United States and ¯ proper discipline within the ministry, Ohira was absolutely furious. He immediately dismissed H¯ogen upon his return home without even giving Tanaka prior notice. This incident was likely the angriest that he ever became during his two terms as ¯ foreign minister. As Tanaka’s views on this issue were closer to H¯ogen’s than Ohira’s, ¯ he was troubled by this turn of events and commented that Ohira was “being very unreasonable.”51

4 The Japan–China Aviation Agreement 4.1 Reunion with Zhou Enlai ¯ Prior to his American trip, however, Ohira had visited Beijing. While diplomatic relations between the two countries had been normalized, concluding working-level agreements with China on trade, aviation, shipping, and fisheries remained on the agenda. As trade between the countries predated normalization, negotiations in this area had proceeded smoothly, and the text of a trade agreement had been finalized ¯ and Ji signed this on January 5. in December of the previous year.52 Ohira The largest remaining obstacle was reaching an agreement on aviation. China refused to fly into any airports serving China Airlines (the flag carrier of Taiwan). It also objected to not only the name “China Airlines” and the airline’s use of the Taiwanese flag, but to Japan granting “beyond rights” to Taiwan—the right to use Japan as an intermediary stop while traveling to or from a third country. As Japan intended to maintain non-governmental ties with Taiwan, it could not prohibit the entry of Taiwanese aircraft.53 Intergovernmental agreements of this type are generally not directly addressed by foreign ministers; they are taken care of at the working level. The controversy caused by the involvement of Taiwan meant that the aviation agreement was elevated to the ¯ ministerial level in this case, however. Ohira played an important role in both the

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negotiations with China over the agreement and the coordination of Japan’s domestic parties in its support.54 At the time of the negotiations, roughly 1,500 people travelled from Japan to Taiwan every day. Taiwan had assured Japan that this would continue: “We shall not yield to the false claims of the Chinese Communists; there will be no effect on aviation relations between Japan and the Republic of China.”55 Deputy Foreign ¯ Minister Mizuno Kiyoshi, a confidante of Ohira, had received his approval to meet with Taiwanese officials in Manila to discuss the aviation negotiations with China. Members of the LDP’s pro-Taiwan faction like Tamaki Kazuo and Fujio Masayuki ¯ placed pressure on the Taiwanese, however, and the meeting was cancelled.56 Ohira was seen as being too pro-Chinese and he became increasingly estranged from the party’s pro-Taiwan faction. ¯ While Ohira’s visit to Beijing was carried out under the pretext of signing the trade agreement reached the previous year, he intended to use it to make progress on the aviation agreement. He told former foreign minister Fujiyama Aiichir¯o that he would personally take the matter up with the Chinese during his time in Beijing.57 ¯ Ohira arrived in Beijing on the evening of January 3, having traveled via Hong Kong. He had been suffering from a cold since December and also experienced hematuria due to kidney stones during his time in China. Several of his meetings were held while he was undergoing medical treatment.58 ¯ Ohira began his talks with Ji early on the morning of the 4th. When he brought up the topic of the aviation agreement, he also proposed discussing “the treaty of peace and friendship very informally at the working level, should circumstances permit.”59 While Japan had no particular reason to rush work on the peace treaty, China wanted ¯ it as part of its strategy of countering the Soviet Union and Ohira’s intention seems to have been to use the treaty as a bargaining chip during the negotiations on the aviation agreement. He received some criticism from the Asian Affairs Bureau for using such an important bargaining chip here.60 ¯ Ohira met Zhou Enlai that afternoon, who told him that “Given Taiwan’s dependence on Japan, Taiwan will ultimately have no choice but to listen to you.” He ¯ also urged Ohira to be considerate of China when negotiating the aviation agree¯ ment, which Ohira found perplexing.61 Returning to the State Guesthouse, he told his secretary, “I have no intention of giving up a single inch on my positions. I will say what I have to say, even if failing to yield means that we are unable to reach ¯ an agreement.” That evening, Ohira offered a toast to Zhou and Ji at a dinner party ¯ hosted by Zhou at the Great Hall of the People. Ohira usually abstained from alcohol, but he drank prodigiously that night, worrying those accompanying him. He finally went to bed at about five in the morning.62

4.2 China’s Compromise ¯ Ohira received an audience with Mao and Zhou at 8:30 a.m. on the 5th.63 It was rare ¯ for Mao to see people this early, and Ohira had not been provided with any prior

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notice of the meeting. It was the second time that he had met Mao alone, and Mao used the opportunity to discuss the threat of the Soviet Union. He expounded on his “one vast territory” (yidapian) concept, an expansion of his earlier “one line” strategy (yitiaoxian), arguing that China would unite with the United States and Japan to check ¯ Soviet expansionism. He also gave Ohira a boost in his negotiations by asking Zhou, “Can’t China make some concessions on the aviation agreement?”.64 The second meeting between the foreign ministers was held at 10:40 a.m. and focused on the aviation relationship between Japan and Taiwan. Ji made the following push during the meeting: “We would like Japan to conclude a civil aviation agreement with Taiwan in order to clarify your relationship on civilian air traffic. We would also like the issue of principles to be settled in the course of reaching that agreement.” ¯ Ohira countered that “There is no disagreement between Japan and China over principles. Having normalized diplomatic relations with China, Japan will always adhere to that principle. We find it difficult to understand how that principle is not being upheld under the thinking we have laid out.” He explained that there was no distance between the Japanese and Chinese positions and that Japan’s relationship with Taiwan was based on the principle that such a relationship was non-governmental in nature. Ji was hesitant to accept this assertion, however, saying, “I am not confident that I will be able to persuade Premier Zhou with your explanation.” The meeting lasted two hours.65 ¯ The Japanese delegation hosted a banquet that evening, and an exhausted Ohira met Zhou for further discussions at 11:30 p.m. He confirmed that Japan’s position was that “working-level relations with Taiwan would be maintained”: In order to fulfill China’s demands, the Japanese government would have to tell the Taiwanese that it would deny access to China Airlines under certain circumstances. But when the government and LDP moved forward with normalization, it did so with the understanding at home that working-level relations with Taiwan would be maintained. We thus cannot accept measures such as denying access to them; if we did, the government would be accused of violating this understanding.

¯ It had been Ohira who had severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the wake of normalization, but he also believed that aviation relations needed to be maintained. And he had been under the impression that this position had been accepted by China. Zhou could only respond, “We hope that when the Japanese government makes its ¯ decision on this issue, it does from a broad perspective.” Ohira’s intensity—despite his illness—was enough to make Zhou hesitate. The meeting lasted nearly two hours, coming to an end sometime after 1 a.m. on the 6th.66 ¯ When Ohira met with Ji later that morning, he unexpectedly announced that he would be returning to Japan. He later wrote: We had held three rounds of negotiations over the Japan-China Aviation Agreement, and yet the discussions hadn’t made an inch of progress. I ultimately made the decision to return home. I said my farewells and returned to my lodgings. […] Things took a sudden turn on the next day, however, and we were able to reach an agreement.

¯ The Chinese were shocked by Ohira’s actions and—just as he wrote—compromised just before he left the country. China proposed dividing Japanese airports between

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China and Taiwan—Taiwan would use Haneda Airport and China would use Narita Airport—and leaving the handling of Taiwanese aircraft to the Japanese government. ¯ Faced with Ohira’s early departure, they had backed down and broadly accepted the Japanese position.67 ¯ Had Ohira’s announcement of his departure been a bluff? No. He had been sincere when he had said that he was leaving. As mentioned earlier, politicians want credit for having accomplished things and are often willing to make concessions to that ¯ end. But that was not the way that Ohira operated. He felt that if the only to achieve an immediate agreement was to make unreasonable concessions, it would be better to instead continue negotiations—even if that meant that he himself would be out of office by the time an agreement was reached. That was the position that he had taken during the textile negotiations with the United States years earlier, and this thinking was also behind his decision here.68

4.3 Between China and Taiwan ¯ Completely exhausted, Ohira lay down in the aisle of the plane during his flight back from Beijing. His condition worsened after he returned home, and he briefly became bedridden. When Treaties Bureau Director Matsunaga Nobuo visited him in ¯ the hospital, Ohira encouraged him to move forward: “It doesn’t matter whether I can get out of bed or not. The Japan–China Aviation Agreement needs to be concluded. Carry on with unyielding determination.”69 ¯ Ohira recovered, but in a seeming follow-up punch, his home in Setagaya burned down on January 12 while he was in Kagawa to support LDP candidates in a byelection. When his secretary called to inform him of the fire, he was seemingly unaffected, merely saying, “Oh? Is everyone alright?” Putting on a cheerful front, he told reporters that “In China, fires are apparently referred to as ‘Zhurong’ [the name of a Chinese folk deity]. Well, it gives me a fresh start, right?” Privately, however, he was devastated by the news.70 ¯ Ohira moved into the Hotel Okura for the time being and focused on solidifying support for the aviation agreement within the LDP. In doing so, he came under fierce attack from the Japan-Taiwan Diet Members’ Forum and Nadao Hirokichi, its chairman. The forum held an emergency general meeting on January 18 and passed ¯ a resolution decrying Ohira’s proposed agreement as “denying the existence of the National Government of the Republic of China.”71 ¯ Ohira had tried to be as considerate of Taiwan as possible while negotiating the agreement, but members of the Seirankai (a fiercely anti-communist group within the LDP) protested that he had injured the dignity of Taiwan. He was subjected to endless and severe criticism from the LDP’s Foreign Affairs Committee and General Council.72 The domestic and international environments under which the agreement was being pushed forward were far more hostile than the congratulatory mood with which Sino-Japanese normalization had been greeted. Tanaka also did not hold the political power that he had enjoyed at that time.73

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When one of his secretaries at the foreign ministry complained that “Prime ¯ Minister Tanaka isn’t defending us at all! Can we really trust him?” Ohira replied briefly but firmly, “Please leave what is between Tanaka and me to us.”74 Tanaka ¯ was working hard at Ohira’s request to lay the groundwork necessary for securing the agreement’s ratification. According to one of the prime minister’s secretaries, Tanaka became a “buttress” for the agreement.75 “The Japan–China Aviation Agreement must be concluded no matter what. I’m more stubborn than I look, and I am determined to push it through no matter what they ¯ come at me with.” Ohira had made his decision, telling Kurihara Y¯uk¯o, a member of his faction, that “I may not be Chief Minister Ii, but I will do this even if it breaks me.”76 This was a reference to Ii Naosuke, a leading official of the Tokugawa shogunate who was assassinated for his part in opening Japan to the West. He felt that, given the Chinese concessions, the negotiations over the agreements had been successful and resulted in a good deal for Japan. ¯ Ohira sent a letter of Ji Pengfei, dated March 31, in which he wrote, “I am faithfully working to implement the treatment of [air] routes between Japan and Taiwan as per the understanding reached with you on January 6. We are working diligently to resolve the political situation so as to allow the Japan–China Aviation Agreement to be signed as quickly as possible.”77 ¯ Ohira visited Sat¯o Eisaku at his home and asked for his help in appeasing the proTaiwan faction. Although the two men had been estranged and could be considered political rivals, Sat¯o agreed to help, saying, “Once the foreign minister has made a decision, there can be no yielding. If there is anything I can do to help, I will.”78 ¯ Ohira also consulted with the top three party leaders and secured their approval for the agreement. After final negotiations over the finer details were concluded, Ji and Ambassador to China Ogawa Heishir¯o signed the Japan–China Aviation Agreement on April 20 ¯ announced that “the Japanese government does in Beijing.79 That same day, Ohira not recognize the flag emblems on Taiwanese aircraft as a national flag and we do not recognize China Airlines as a flag carrier.”80 The agreement was ratified by the two houses of the Diet on May 7 and 15. There was still significant opposition within the LDP, and many members of the Seirankai absented themselves from these sessions. ¯ Ohira had communicated the contents of his announcement to the Taiwanese prior to the agreement’s conclusion, telling him that the Japanese government’s policy would be to “maintain [air routes between Japan and Taiwan] through nongovernmental arrangements.” He also assured them that, while Japan would not recognize China Airlines as a flag carrier or the Taiwanese flag as a national flag, “the Japanese government has absolutely no intention of demanding that you or any third country share that position” and that it would not ask China Airlines to change its name.81 ¯ Despite Ohira’s efforts, Taiwan immediately severed its air routes to Japan, saying ¯ that his statement had injured Taiwan’s dignity.82 This was the opposite of Ohira’s intended result. Nevertheless, Taiwan agreed to restore the air routes in July 1975

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after Miyazawa Kiichi, foreign minister in the newly formed Miki Takeo govern¯ ment, amended Ohira’s statement in Diet testimony by noting that many countries recognized the “blue sky with a white sun” as a national flag.83 ¯ The Japan–China Aviation Agreement was Ohira’s last major task as foreign ¯ minister. With the securing of the working-level agreements under Ohira, SinoJapanese relations entered a new stage. Notes 1. 2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 4 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2010), 401–402. Ibid, 4:253–258. Wang Taiping, “Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Kaifuku” Nikki: Gaik¯obu no “Tokuhain” ga Mita Nihon, trans. by Fukuoka Aiko (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2012), 495– 497. Osawa Takeshi, “Bungakuki Ch¯ugoku no Tainichi Seisaku Kik¯o wo ¯ Taihei Nikki’ no Shiry¯oteki Kachi,” T¯oh¯o, No. 388 (2013), 28. Yomu: ‘O ¯ Taihei/Fukuoka Aiko yaku ‘Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Kaifuku’ Nakajima Hiroshi, “O Nikki: Gaik¯obu no ‘Tokuhain’ ga Mita Nihon,” trans. by Wang Taiping and Fukuoka Aiko], Ch¯ugoku Kenky¯u Gepp¯o 67:4 (2013), 48–49. Sat¯o Susumu and Inoue Masaya, “Kiki no Naka no Nichibei Kankei: 1970 Nendai,” in M¯o Hitotsu no Nichibei K¯ory¯u-shi: Nichibei Ky¯okai Shiry¯o de Yomu 20 Seiki, edited by the America-Japan Society (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, ¯ 2012), 284–285. First North American Director Fukada Hiroshi, “Ohira Daijin ¯ 8-gatsu 11-nichi Nichibei Ky¯okai Sup¯ıchi” [Minister Ohira’s America-Japan Society Speech (August 11)], August 10, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–647-4. ¯ Asian Affairs Bureau Director Yoshida Kenz¯o, “Ohira Daijin-H¯o Taishi ¯ Kaidan” [Conversation between Minister Ohira and Ambassador Peng], August 16, 1972, Nichibei tai Seiji Kankei (Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka no Hanky¯o, 2011–715, MOFA. ¯ Ohira 4:257, 7:56–58. Ishii Osamu, Amerika Gassh¯ukoku Tainichi Seisaku Bunsho Sh¯usei, Collection 25, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shob¯o, 2009), 83–108. Hattori Ry¯uji, “Tanaka Shush¯o-Nikuson Dait¯ory¯o Kaidan Kiroku 1972/8/31, 9/1,” Jinbunken Kiy¯o, No. 68 (2010), 413–444. “Nichibei Shun¯o Kaidan (Daiikkai Kaidan)” [US-Japan Summit (First Meeting)], August 31, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–645. “Daiikkai G¯od¯o Kaidan” [First Joint Meeting], August 31, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–645. “Nichibei Shun¯o Kaidan (Dainikai Kaidan)” [US-Japan Summit (Second Meeting)], September 1, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2008–645. ¯ ¯ Ohira 7:52–53. Fukunaga Fumio, “Ohira Masayoshi Memo (Sh¯o),” Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron 127:10 (July 2012), 24–25. ¯ Ohira 7:47–52, 55–59. Mainichi Shimbun Political Desk, Anpo (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1987), 169–170.

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9.

Hattori Ry¯uji, Understanding History in Asia: What Diplomatic Documents Reveal, trans. by Tara Cannon (Tokyo: Japan Publish Industry Foundation for Culture, 2019), 26–28. Hattori Ry¯uji, “2011/12/22 K¯okai Fairu ‘Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka’ H¯oka,” Gaik¯o Shiry¯okanp¯o, No. 27 (2012), 100–101. Ishii Akira, “Nihon to Seidoku wo Kisowaseru – Sh¯u Onrai no Senryaku-teki Kokk¯o Seij¯oka Gaik¯o,” Sekai, No. ¯ 835 (2012), 126. Research Office, “Nicch¯u Kankei ni kan suru Ohira Daijin ¯ no Naiwa (Memo) (o Kokusai Mondai Kenky¯ujo)” [Minister Ohira’s Internal Talk on Japan–China Relations (Memo) (at the Japan Institute of International Affairs)], February 1, 1973, Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka (J¯uy¯o Shiry¯o), 2011–720, MOFA. The following is taken from the minutes of an October 5, 1972 roundtable ¯ in the author’s collection. Ohira stated the following: Meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong. Not included in Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaid¯o’s statement: Chairman Mao was extremely practical and said, “There is criticism domestically and abroad because I am cooperating with the Right (Tanaka and Nixon), but I am willing to work with the Right as well.”. The Giving of the Chu Ci. He just randomly gave us a book off of the top of a pile on his table. It was a new book. I do not think it was a gift that had been especially prepared or one with any particular significance to it. The Story behind the Joint Statement. The phrasing “the abnormal state” is something that they put forward in the end. We had argued that “an end to the state of war” was problematic as the Treaty of Taipei had already ended the war, and I had proposed “with the release of this joint statement, a complete state of peace between Japan and China will begin.” The Chinese had not been willing to accept this, but when I heard that Chairman Mao wanted to meet us, I privately knew that we had gotten it “done.” We had not agreed on the [joint statement’s] phrasing at that point. A draft of the explanation of the communique and the announcement of the end of the Treaty of Taipei that I gave at the Press Center had been given to the Chinese in advance, and we had received their approval. It took about half a day for them to give us the okay on the explanation. This seems to have improved the Chinese impression. Niigata Nipp¯o, ed., Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka: Ima Akasareru Butaiura (Tokyo: Niigata Nipp¯o, 2012), 134. TBS TV, “Ketsudan no Akushu: Rikai to G¯okai no Nicch¯u 30 Nen Hishi” [The Decisive Handshake: The Secret History of 30 Years of Understandings and Misunderstandings between Japan and China], September 29, 2002. Nagano Nobutoshi, Gaimush¯o Kenky¯u (Tokyo: Simul Shuppankai, 1975), 76. Hirakawa Sachiko, “Futatsu no Ch¯ugoku” to Nihon H¯oshiki: Gaik¯o Jirenma ¯ o (Tokyo: Keis¯o Shob¯o, 2012), 114. Kaiketsu no Kigen to Oy¯

10.

11.

12.

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13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18.

19.

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Wakatsuki Hidekazu, Taikoku Nihon no Seiji Shid¯o, 1972–1989 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2012), 53–57. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaik¯o, edited by Nakajima Takuma, et. al (Tokyo: Shinch¯osha, 2012), 230–231. Oceania Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Daiikkai Nichig¯o Kakury¯o Iinkai (Gaiy¯o H¯okoku)” [The First JapanAustralia Ministerial Committee (Overview Report)], October 28, 1972, Nichig¯o Kakury¯o Iinkai (Daiikkai), 2010–4289, MOFA. Oceania Division, ¯ European and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Daijin to Hoittoramu G¯osh¯u R¯od¯ot¯o T¯oshu to no Kaidan” [Meeting between ¯ Minister Ohira and Australian Labour Party President Whitlam], October 24, ¯ 1972, Nichig¯o Kakury¯o Iinkai (Daiikkai), 2010–4289, MOFA. Ohira gave the keynote speech at the Second Japan-Australia Ministerial Committee ¯ meeting in Tokyo the following year: “Dainikai Nichig¯o Kakury¯o Iinkai Ohira Daijin Kich¯o Enzetsu” [Second Meeting of the Japan-Australia Ministerial ¯ Committee, Minister Ohira’s Keynote Speech], October 29, 1973, 2010–6325, MOFA. Oceania Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign ¯ Affairs, “Ohira Daijin no NZ H¯omon, Adachi N¯orin Daijin, Sasaki Un’y¯u Daijin, Arita Keizai Keikaku-ch¯o Ch¯okan, Ny¯u J¯ırando H¯omon” [Visit to New ¯ Zealand by Minister Ohira, Agriculture Minister Adachi, Transport Minister Sasaki, and EPA Director-General Arita], 2010–6367, MOFA. Interview with Asai Motofumi, secretary at the Japanese embassy in Australia, December 27, 2012. Memorandum of Conversation between Nixon and Ohira, October 18, 1972, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 26, 2012). Niiseki Kin’ya, Nisso K¯osh¯o no Butaiura: Aru Gaik¯okan no Kiroku (Tokyo: Nihon H¯os¯o Shuppan Ky¯okai, 1989), 145–147. Arai Hirokazu, Mosukuwa, Berurin, T¯oky¯o: Ichi Gaik¯okan no Sh¯ogen (Tokyo: Jiji Ts¯ushinsha, 2000), 57. Tanba Minoru, Waga Gaik¯o Jinsei (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2011), 171. First Eastern Europe Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry ¯ of Foreign Affairs, “Ohira Daijin-Guromuiko Daijin Daiikkai Kaidan Kiroku (Nicch¯u Seij¯oka Taiso Setsumei no Bubun)” [A Record of the First Meeting ¯ between Minister Ohira and Minister Gromyko (Explanation to the Soviet Union Regarding Sino-Japanese Normalization)], October 31, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01– ¯ 1376, MOFA. First Eastern Europe Division, “Ohira Daijin-Guromuiko Daijin Daiikkai oyobi Dainikai Kaidan Kiroku (Nissokan Shoken’an no Bubun)” ¯ [Records of the First and Second Talks between Minister Ohira and Minister Gromyko (Various Unresolved Japan-Soviet Issues)], October 31, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1376, MOFA. First Eastern Europe Division, “Daisankai DaijinGuromuiko Kaidan Y¯oroku (Sh¯os¯usha Kaidan)” [Proceedings of the Third Meeting between the Minister and Minister Gromyko (Minority Talks)],

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27. 28.

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October 26, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom ¯ of Information Law 01–1376, MOFA. First Eastern Europe Division, “Ohira Daijin to Kosuigin Shush¯o to no Kaidan Y¯oroku” [Proceedings of the Meeting ¯ between Minister Ohira and Prime Minister Kosygin], November 9, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1376, MOFA. Memorandum of Conversation Between Johnson and Ohira, August 31, 1972, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 26, 2012). ¯ ¯ Masakatsu, Meiyaku no Yami: “Kaku no Kasa” to Nichibei Ohira 7:52–58. Ota D¯omei (Tokyo: Nihon Hy¯oronsha, 2004), 107–108. Kotani Tetsuo, “K¯ubo ‘Middow¯e’ no Yokosuka Bok¯oka wo Meguru Nichibei Kankei,” D¯oshisha Amerika Kenky¯u, No. 41 (2005), 110–113. Toyoda, Ky¯ohan” no D¯omei-shi ¯ 186–187. Morita Hajima, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o no Ohira Masayoshi – ¯ Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 265–266. Fukunaga, “Ohira Masayoshi Memo (Sh¯o),” 24–25. First Western Europe Division, Europe and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Daij¯ukai Nichifutsu Teiki Ky¯ogi Gijiroku” [Minutes of the 10th Japan-France Regular Consultations], May 1973, Nichifutsu Gaish¯o Teiki Ky¯ogi (Daiky¯u-J¯uyonkai), 2010–3599, MOFA. ¯ Ambasador to Belgium Abe Isao to Foreign Minister Ohira, May 7, 1973, ¯ Ohira Gaimu Daijin Yugosurabia H¯omon, 2011–769, MOFA. ¯ ¯ Okawara Yoshio, Oraru Hisutor¯ı Nichibei Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2006), 253. “Daiky¯ukai Nichibei B¯oeki Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Ky¯od¯o Seimei” [Joint Statement of the 9th Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs], July 17, 1973, Nichibei B¯oei Keizai G¯od¯o Iinkai Daiky¯ukai Iinkai Ky¯od¯o Komyunike, E’.2.3.1.17–10-5, MOFA. Memorandum of Conversation ¯ between Rogers and Ohira, July 17, 1973, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 27, 2012). Yasukawa Takeshi, Wasureenu Omoide to Korekara no Nichibei Gaik¯o – ¯ P¯aru H¯ab¯a kara Hanseiki (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugoki, 1991), 207–210. Okawara 254. Ishii, Amerika Gassh¯ukoku Tainichi Seisaku Bunsho Sh¯usei, 3:207–237. Memorandum of Conversation between Rogers and Ohira, July 31, 1973, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 27, 2012). Kim Dae-Jung, Kimu Dejun Jiden I: Shikeish¯u kara Dait¯ory¯o e – Minshuka e no Michi, trans. by Hasaba Kiyoshi and Kang Jon-Hun (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011), 232–255. Interview with Mizuno Kiyoshi, vice-minister of foreign affairs, November 30, 2010. Manabe Kenji, “Gaik¯o ni Kanshin ga Fukakatta,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 359. Furuno Yoshimasa, Kimu Dejun Jiken no Seiji Kecchaku: Shuken H¯oki shita Nihon Seifu (Tokyo: T¯oh¯o Shuppan, 2007), 179–193. Hattori Ry¯uji, “Kimu Dejun Jiken ni kan suru Ichi Shiry¯o,” S¯og¯o Seisaku Kenky¯u, No. 17 (2009), 1–6. Nakae Y¯osuke, Ajia Gaik¯o: D¯o to

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29. 30. 31.

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¯ Sei – Moto Ch¯ugoku Taishi Nakae Y¯osuke Oraru Hisutor¯ı, edited by Wakatsuki Hidekazu et al. (Tokyo: S¯otensha, 2010), 163–166. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 123–124. Machida Mitsugu, Nikkan Interijensu Sens¯o (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 2011), 98. Oikawa Sh¯oichi, Seijika no Ky¯och¯u – Nikusei de Tadoru ¯ Seiji-shi no Genba (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2012), 72–78. Ohira to Ambassador to South Korea Ushiroku Torao, November 2, 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2006–1211, MOFA. Interview with Fujii Hiroaki, secretary to the prime minister, August 20, 2012. Interview with Kiuchi Akitane, secretary to the prime minister, June 19, 2010. ¯ Arai Shunz¯o and Morita Hajime, Bunjin Saish¯o Ohira Masayoshi (Tokyo: ¯ Shunj¯usha, 1982), 217. Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 324. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 124. Yu Son-Hi, Paku Chonhi no Tainichi, Taibei Gaik¯o: Reisen Hen’y¯oki Kankoku no Seisaku 1968–1973 (Tokyo: Minerva Shob¯o, 2012), 237–240. Asahi Shimbun (September 25, 1973 evening edition; September 26, 1973; ¯ September 26, 1973 evening edition). Sad¯o Akihiro, “Ohira Masayoshi: ‘Honshu Honry¯u’ no Shimeikan,” in Jinbutsu de Yomu Gendai Nihon Gaik¯oshi: Konoe Fumimaro kara Koizumi Jun’ichir¯o made, edited by Sad¯o Akihiro, Komiya Kazuo, and Hattori Ry¯uji (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2008), 266. Nobori Amiko, “Betonamu Sens¯o wo Meguru Nihon Gaik¯o: Pakusu Amerikana no Hen’y¯o to Nihon Gaik¯o no ‘Sengo’ no Owari no Hajimari,” Gaik¯o Shiry¯okanp¯o, No. 24 (2011), 33. Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ohira, September 24, 1973, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 27, ¯ ¯ 2012). Ohira Kokuren Enzetsu [Ohira’s Address at the UN], September 25, 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2011–379, MOFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Waga Gaik¯o no Kinky¯o” [The Current Status of our Diplomacy], Vol. 2 (Shiry¯ohen), 1974 Edition (Nπo. 18), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1974_2/ s49-shiryou-3-2.htm (accessed June 7, 2013). Ambassador to the US Yasukawa Takeshi and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush signed the US-Japan Cotton Products Trade Regulation Exchange Notes; Beikoku to no Meiseihin B¯oeki Kisei Torikime, September 26, 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2011–390, MOFA. There ¯ ¯ are no foreign ministry records of the Ohira-Kissinger or Ohira-Kim Yongshik meetings; Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2011–377, 2011–378, MOFA. First Western Europe Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Daisankai Nichii Teiki Ky¯ogi Gijiroku” [Minutes of the Third Japan-Italy Regular Foreign Ministers’ Conference], September 1973, Nichi-Itari Gaish¯o Teiki Ky¯ogi (Daisankai), 2010–3644, MOFA. Ambassador ¯ to Italy Takeuchi Harumi to Ohira, October 2, 1973, Nichi-Itari Gaish¯o Teiki Ky¯ogi (Daisankai), 2010–3644, MOFA.

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Yamamoto Takeshi, “’Yoroppa no Toshi’ to Nihon Gaik¯o, 1973–74; Gaik¯o no Tagenka no Mosaku to Nichi¯o Kankei,” Nihon EU Gakkai Nenp¯o, No. 32 (2012), 166. Yamamoto Takeshi, “Y¯oroppa no Toshi’ to Nihon Gaik¯o, 1973– 74; Gaik¯o no Tagenka no Mosaku to Nichibei¯o Kankei,” NUCB Journal of Economics and Information Science 57:2 (2013), 166–167. Ambassador to ¯ the UK Mori Haruki to Ohira, October 2, 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2011–378, MOFA. ¯ Ambassador to West Germany Sono to Ohira, October 23, 1973, NichibeSeidoku Gaish¯o Teiki Ky¯ogi, 2011–764, MOFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dairokkai Nichidoku Gaish¯o Teiki Ky¯ogi Gijiroku” [Minutes of the Sixth Japan-Germany Regular Foreign Ministers’ Conference], October 5, 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2011–409, MOFA. Arai, Mosukuwa, Berurin, T¯oky¯o, 80–83. Fujii Hiroaki, “Nicch¯u K¯ok¯u Ky¯otei K¯osh¯o,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 164. Iwami Takao, Seijika (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 2010), 71. Niiseki Kin’ya, Nisso K¯osh¯o no Butaiura: Aru Gaik¯okan no Kiroku (Tokyo: Nihon H¯os¯o Shuppan Ky¯okai, 1989), 206–212. Wakatsuki Hidekazu, “Zenh¯oi Gaik¯o” no Jidai – Reisen Hen’y¯oki ni Nihon to Ajia, 1971–1980 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hy¯oronsha, 2006), 57–67. Kuriyama Takakazu, Gaik¯o Sh¯ogenroku – Okinawa Henkan/Nicch¯u Kokk¯o Seij¯oka/Nichibei “Mitsuyaku,” edited by Nakajima Takuma, Hattori Ry¯uji, and Et¯o Naoko (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 210–211. First Eastern Europe Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tanaka S¯ori H¯oso Kaidan Kiroku” [Record of Prime Minister Tanaka’s Visit to the Soviet Union], October 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 2011–109, MOFA. ¯ Ohira 4:140, Arai, Mosukuwa, Berurin, T¯oky¯o, 40, 65, 99. Kumon, K¯oyama, ¯ and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 327. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 126. ¯ Ohira 1:89–91, 4:144–155, 485–491. Yanagida Kunio, Okami ga Yatte Kita ¯ Hi (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 1982), 59, 71–72. Okawara 258–259, 266, 274. Takayasu Kensuke, Shus¯o no Kenryoku: Nichiei Hikaku kara Miru Seikent¯o to no Dainamizumu (Tokyo: S¯obunsha, 2009), 152–158. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 127–129. Interview with Fujii, August 20, 2012. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, Miyazaki Hiromichi Oraru Hisutor¯ı (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 152–155. Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ohira, November 14, 1973, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 27, 2012). Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger, Tanaka, and Ohira, November 15, 1973, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 27, 2012). Interview with Konaga Keiichi, secretary to the prime minister, June 11, 2010. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1982) 744–745. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Seiji to Jinsei – Nakasone Yasuhiro Kaikoroku

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(Tokyo: K¯odansha, 1992), 289–297. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi Uj¯o – Goj¯u Nen no Sengo Seiji o Kataru (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 1996), 274. Nakasone Yasuhiro, “Rinen wo Motta Ky¯ud¯o no Seijika,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 308–309. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku – Rekishi H¯otei no Hikoku to shite (Tokyo: Shinch¯osha, 2004), 102–106. NHK Interview Group, NHK Supesharu: Sengo 50 Nen Sono Toki Nihon wa, Vol. 5 (Tokyo: Nihon H¯os¯o Shuppan Ky¯okai, 1996), 44, 73–74, 97–102, 117, 125– 130. Ikegami Mana, “Daiichiji Sekiy¯u Kiki ni okeru Nihon no Gaik¯o – Sekiy¯u Kakuho to Nichibei Kankei,” H¯ogaku Seijigaku Ronky¯u, No. 79 (2008), 174– 189. Shiratori Jun’ichir¯o, “Daiichiji Sekiy¯u Kiki ni Okeru Gaik¯o Saiko – Sh¯ohikokukan Ky¯och¯o Sankaku to Ch¯ut¯o Seisaku ‘Meikakuka,’” H¯ogaku Seijigaku Ronky¯u, No. 89 (2011), 79–80. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976, Vol. 36 – Energy Crisis, 1969–1974 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), 893. ¯ Yasukawa to Ohira, February 11, 1974, Enerug¯ı Washinton Kaigi, 2012–443, ¯ MOFA. Yasukawa to Ohira, February 12, 1974, Enerug¯ı Washinton Kaigi, ¯ 2012–443, MOFA. Yasukawa to Ohira, February 13, 1974, Enerug¯ı Washinton ¯ Kaigi, 2012–1926, MOFA. Yasukawa to Ohira, February 14, 1974, Enerug¯ı Washinton Kaigi, 2012–1926, MOFA. Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ohira, February 13, 1974, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 28, 2012). ¯ ¯ Ohira 4:155–172, Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 330–331. Yasukawa Takeshi, Wasureenu Omoide to Korekara no Nichibei Gaik¯o – P¯aru H¯ab¯a kara Hanseiki (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugoki, 1991), 210–211. Murata Ry¯ohei, Murata Ry¯ohei Kais¯oroku – Tatakai ni Yabureshi Kuni ni Tsukaete, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2008), 235. Shiratori Jun’ichir¯o, “Kokusai Enerug¯ı Kikan no Setsuritsu to Nihon Gaik¯o: Daiichiji Sekiy¯u Kiki ni Okeru Senshinkokukan Ky¯och¯o no Mosaku,” Kokusai Seiji, No. 160 (2010), 21–28. Yamamoto, Nihon Gaik¯o 170. Resources Division, Economics Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dairokkai Enerug¯ı Ch¯osei Gur¯upu Kaig¯o ni Teishutsu sareta Kik¯o Mondai ni kan suru Shiry¯o” [Materials on the Organizational Issues Submitted at the 6th Energy Coordinating Group Meeting], July 10, 1974, Kokusai Enerug¯ı Kikan (IEA) IEP Kinky¯u Y¯uz¯u Kakury¯o Iinaki, 2010–1869, MOFA. ¯ Ohira 4:499–500. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research Project, Miyazaki Hiromichi, 153–155. Interview with Kiuchi, June 19, 2010. ¯ The joint statement issued during Ohira’s visit to the Soviet Union and developments at the ministry regarding Emperor Hirohito’s visit to the US also seem to have played a role in H¯ogen’s dismissal. ¯ Ohira to Ambassador to China Ogawa Heishir¯o, December 15, 1973, Nicch¯u B¯oeki Ky¯otei, 2013–2004, MOFA.

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56. 57.

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59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

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China Division Director Hashimoto Hiroshi to Japan–China Memorandum Trade Office, Beijing Liaison Office Representative Fujita Kimio, November 25, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Infor¯ mation Law 04–1172, MOFA. Head of the Beijing Liaison Office to Ohira, December 5, 1972, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom ¯ of Information Law 04–203, MOFA. Ohira to Embassy Charge d’affaires Hayashi Y¯uichi, September 17, 1973, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 04–204, MOFA. Interview with Hashimoto Hiroshi, councilor at Japanese embassy in Beijing, November 8, 2008. Letter from Hashimoto to the author, December 15, 2008. East Asia Relations Commission Tokyo Office Representative Ma Shuli to Exchange Association Chairman Itagaki Osamu, May 4, 1973, Zhongri Hangkong, 042.1/89014, 11-EAP-01941, AS. Interview with Mizuno, November 30, 2010. Fujiyama Aiichir¯o, Seiji, Waga Michi – Fujiyama Aiichir¯o Kais¯oroku (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1976), 220. Sun Pinghua, Nihon to no 30 Nen: Ch¯unichi Y¯uk¯o Zuis¯oroku, trans. by And¯o Hikotar¯o (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 1987), 206–207. Sun Pinghua, Ch¯ugoku to Nihon ni Hashi wo Kaketa Otoko (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1998), 158–159. Nakae Y¯osuke, “Rekishi Ninshiki Mondai o Megutte,” Gaik¯o F¯oramu Rinji Z¯okan – Ch¯ugoku (1997), 130. Ogawa Heishir¯o, Pekin no 4 Nen (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1977), 23, 40–42. Arai and ¯ Morita, Bunjin Saish¯o Ohira Masayoshi, 189. Manabe, “Gaik¯o ni Kanshin ga Fukakatta,” 357. ¯ Ogawa to Ohira, January 4, 1974, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1919, MOFA. Nakae Y¯osuke, Nokosareta Shakai Shugi Taikoku – Ch¯ugoku no Yukue (Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 1991), 55. Nakae, Ajia Gaik¯o 172–173. ¯ Ogawa to Ohira, January 5, 1974, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1377, MOFA. ¯ Manabe, Watashi no Mita Ohira Masayoshi, 162–163. ¯ Ogawa to Ohira, January 5, 1974, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1377, MOFA. Ogawa 67. Manabe, “Gaik¯o ni Kanshin ga Fukakatta,” 358. Gong Li, “Cong Zhongmei Huanhe dao Shixing ‘Yitianxian’ de Zhanlue: 20 Shiji 60 Niandaimo, 70 Niandichu Zhongguo Duiwai Zhanluede Zhuanbian,” Zhonggon Zhongyangdangxiao Xuebao 6:2 (2002), 75. Japanese Modern ¯ Historical Manuscripts Association, ed., Kunihiro Michihiko Oraru Hisutor¯ı (Tokyo: Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, 2008), 1:202. Kawashima Shin and M¯ori Kazuko, Gur¯obaru Ch¯ugoku e no Michinori – Gaik¯o 150 Nen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 133–134. ¯ Ogawa to Ohira, January 5, 1974, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1919, MOFA. CPC Central Committee Party Literature Research Center, ed, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1997), 642. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research Project,

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71. 72.

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¯ Yanagiya Kensuke Oraru Hisutor¯ı (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 1:289–298. Ogawa ¯ to Ohira, January 6, 1974, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 01–1377, MOFA. ¯ Ohira 1:87. Kunihiro Michihiko, “Nicch¯u K¯ok¯u Ky¯otei K¯osh¯o no Sh¯onenba,” ¯ in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 388–389. Matsunaga Nobuo, Aru Gaik¯okan no Kais¯o (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2002), 72–74. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, Kunihiro Michihiko, 1:203–204. Ogura Kazuo, Kiroku to K¯osh¯o: Nicch¯u Jitsumu Ky¯otei K¯osh¯o (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 49–52. Kikuchi, “Ikeda Naikaku no Gaik¯o,” 105. Kikuchi Kiyoaki, “Heij¯oshin de Gaik¯o wo Yaru Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 376. Fujii 167. Matsunaga 75. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, Kunihiro Michihiko, 1:201, 204. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 333. Fujii 168. Kimura Mitsugu, S¯ori no Hinkaku – Kantei Hishokan ga Mita Rekidai Saish¯o no Sugao (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2006), 114. Nadao Hirokichi, “Moshiire” [Proposal], January 18, 1974, Zhongri Hangkong, 042.1/89009, 11-EAP-01936, AS. ¯ Kurihara, Ohira Moto S¯ori to Watashi, 20–22. Iwate Broadcasting, ed., Moto S¯ori Suzuki Zenk¯o Gekid¯o no Nihon Seiji wo Kataru: Sengo Yonj¯unen no Kensh¯o [(Iwate: Iwate Broadcasting, 1991), 164–166. Kat¯o K¯oichi, “Waga Shi: ¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi ni Omou,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 269. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, Kunihiro Michihiko, 1:204–206. Nakano Shir¯o, Tanaka Seiken 886 Nichi (Tokyo: Gy¯osei Mondai Kenky¯ujo, 1982), 179–187. Xiao Xiangqian, Eien no Ringoku toshite, trans. by Takeuchi Minoru (Tokyo: Simul Shuppankai, 1997), 173. Interview with Fujii, August 20, 2012. Interview with Kiuchi, June 19, 2010. Kurihara Y¯uk¯o, Sh¯ogen, Honne no Seiji – Sengo Seiji no Butaiura (Tokyo: Nagai Shuppan, 2007), 40. Miyamoto Y¯uji, Korekara, Ch¯ugoku to D¯o Tsukiau ka (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011), 63. ¯ Ji Pengfei, “Waga Tomo Ohira Masayoshi Sensei wo Shinonde,” in Kumon, ¯ K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 380. Takeshita Noboru, Seiji to wa Nani ka – Takeshita Noboru Kaikoroku, edited by GRIPS Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2001), 287–288. Li Enmin, Tenkanki no Ch¯ugoku Nihon to Taiwan – 1970 Nendai Ch¯unichi Minkan Keizai Gaik¯o no Keii (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shob¯o, 2001), 82–83. “Nihonkoku to Ch¯uka Jinmin Ky¯owakoku to no Aida no K¯ok¯u Uns¯o Ky¯otei” [Air Transport Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China], April 20, 1974, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 04–1170, MOFA.

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Kazankai, Nicch¯u Kankei Kihon Shiry¯osh¯u 1972–2008 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 2008), 54. Tokyo Office, East Asia Relations Commission to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 5, 1974, Zhongri Hangkong, 042.1/89005, 11-EAP01932, AS. Shiina Etsusabur¯o, “Japan–China Aviation Agreement,” Shiina Etsusabur¯o Kankei Bunsho, 61, NDL. Taipei Office, Cultural Association to East Asia Relations Commission, April 18, 1974, Zhongri Duanjiao, 042.1/89033, 11-EAP-01951, AS. Statement by Shen Changhuan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 20, 1974, Zhongri Hangkong, 042.1/89006, 11-EAP-01933, AS. Huang Zijin, Lin Jinjing Xiansheng Fangwenjilu, edited by Jian Jiahui (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 2003), 96. Shimizu Urara, “Nikka Dank¯o to 72 Nen Taisei no Keisei: 1972–78,” in Nittai Kankeishi 1945–2008, edited by Kawashima Shin, et al. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2009), 120– 121. Chen Guanren, “Nikka Dank¯ogo no K¯ok¯u K¯osh¯o: 1972–75,” trans. by Kawashima Shin, Chikaki ni Arite, No. 56 (2009), 109–112. Fukuda Madoka, “Nicch¯u K¯ok¯u Ky¯otei K¯osh¯o 1973–1975,” in Nicch¯u Kankeishi 1972–2012 I: Seiji, edited by Takahara Akio and Hattori Ry¯uji (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2012), 88–92. Statement by Shen Changhuan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 9, 1975, Zhongri Hangkong Wenti Xinwengao, Tanhua Jiludeng, 042.1/89020, 11-EAP-01947, AS.

Chapter 7

Internal and External Crises: Finance Minister Under Tanaka and Miki, and LDP Secretary-General

1 Nuclear Secret Agreements and Currency Diplomacy: Minister of Finance 1.1 Fiftieth Minister of Finance With the Japan-China Aviation Agreement having successfully made it through the ¯ Diet, Ohira met with Nixon in Washington, DC on May 21, 1974. They discussed ¯ India’s nuclear tests and Ohira made clear that Japan would not develop nuclear weapons.1 ¯ Later that day, Ohira attended a dinner in New York hosted by the Japan Society and gave a speech entitled “Enduring Bonds”: The policy of Japan is to limit the Self-Defense Forces to solely defensive capabilities and to continue to ultimately rely upon the deterrence offered by the United States for its security. Amidst the shockwaves caused by the energy crisis, there seems to have been some speculation that Japan was contemplating large-scale rearmament or even the development of nuclear weapons. By reiterating our defense policy, I want to emphasize that such speculation is entirely unfounded.

¯ Here Ohira reiterated the assurances he had offered Nixon earlier that day that Japan would not develop nuclear weapons. And, truthfully, there is no evidence that he ever gave any serious consideration to such development.2 The LDP suffered a defeat in the July 7 House of Councilors election and only narrowly maintained its majority. Tanaka’s popularity was on the wane, and criticisms of his government’s ties to business had been a major facet of the election. Deputy Prime Minister Miki and Finance Minister Fukuda resigned from the cabinet in the ¯ wake of the election in an effort to distance themselves from Tanaka, and Ohira was given the difficult task of succeeding Fukuda. He suddenly found himself having been “put in charge of overseeing the dire circumstances that followed the Oil Crisis.”3 Kimura Toshio took over as foreign minister.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_7

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1.2 The Burden of the Nuclear Secret Agreements ¯ Back at the finance ministry for the first time in twenty-two years, Ohira visited Canada and the United States from September 25 to October 8. The impetus for this trip was the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Washington. With the global shift to floating exchange rates, it had become more frequent for finance ministers to hold international meetings. ¯ In Washington, Ohira spoke on currency reform and the Japanese economy. He ¯ also had lunch with Kissinger, who—touching on Ohira’s breakthrough mediating between the US and the French at the February energy conference—told him that “Some day you might be Prime Minister. You’re my candidate.”4 ¯ Shortly before Ohira’s departure, shocking news had come from Washington when retired Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque testified before Congress on September 10 that American naval vessels did not offload their nuclear weapons before visiting foreign ports. Then, immediately after he returned to Japan, Tachibana Takashi’s article “Tanaka Kakuei: His Money and Personal Connections” was published in the magazine Bungei Shunj¯u on October 10. Tanaka was now coming under fire for both his handling of nuclear issues and his financial dealings, and this article would ultimately lead to the fall of his government. Tanaka was concerned about whether the Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ “no introduction” principle was tenable without changes, a sentiment shared by Foreign Minister Kimura. These concerns actually predated La Rocque’s testimony, although that obviously raised the issue’s profile.5 Tanaka had learned of the nuclear secret agreements from Kiuchi Akitane, his secretary from the foreign ministry.6 ¯ Ohira had of course been deeply involved in these agreements ever since his first term as foreign minister. When it became clear that it was only a matter of time before the Tanaka government fell, he moved to achieve a breakthrough on the issue. He approached Tanaka and called on him to boldly make the nuclear secret agreements public before resigning. He believed that, with the resignation of the Tanaka government all but certain, there was an opportunity to resolve the situation in a way that contained the political fallout. He also felt that this was the only way that the public’s trust could be regained on the issue. ¯ When Foreign Minister Kimura left for Africa on October 26, Ohira became acting foreign minister for two weeks. According to the diary of his secretary Morita Hajime, ¯ Ohira’s motivation for taking on these additional duties had been “to bring about some sort of resolution to the nuclear issue.” Bypassing formal ministry channels, he invited ¯ Vice-Minister T¯og¯o Fumihiko, Deputy Minister Okawara Yoshio, Treaties Bureau Director Matsunaga Nobuo, and American Affairs Bureau Director Yamazaki Toshio ¯ to Hotel Okura in late October to discuss making the secret agreements public. Ohira was also making progress in bringing Tanaka around to the idea. Morita wrote in his diary that “Prime Minister Tanaka increasingly seems to intend to deal with this issue and then resign.” ¯ Ohira laid out a basic plan of action to the foreign ministry officials, which Matsunaga described as follows:

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¯ [Ohira] announced his intention to discuss this matter with the Americans during the TanakaFord summit. The matter would be settled in an extraordinary Diet session sometime after Ford’s visit to Japan, with working-level negotiations being held in advance. He said that there was no time to wait for Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Kimura to return to Japan, so the negotiations should be initiated under [his] authority and a concrete proposal should be drafted as soon as possible.

Tanaka had left on October 28 to visit New Zealand, Australia, and Burma and was scheduled to return on November 8. President Ford would be visiting Japan later that month.7 Ultimately, however, when Tanaka resigned on November 26, it was without having taken any action on the secret agreements. He believed that he still had a chance of becoming prime minister again in the future and did not want to do ¯ anything to jeopardize that. While this meant that the scenario that Ohira had laid out came to naught, it also meant that Tanaka would maintain his political influence, ¯ something that would eventually lead to Ohira becoming prime minister. The cost of this was that the burden of the nuclear secret agreements would continue to torment ¯ Ohira for the rest of his life.8

1.3 Continuing as Finance Minister: The Miki Government “Tanaka Kakuei: His Money and Personal Connections” was not the only article on Tanaka in the November issue of Bungei Shunj¯u that drove him to step down. The issue also included “The Lonely Queen of the Etsuzankai” by Kodama Takaya, an ¯ article on Sat¯o Aki, Tanaka’s longtime secretary. Ohira had received notice shortly before the issue entered print that it would be focusing on Tanaka’s financial scandals and adopted a “wait and see” attitude, suspecting that the articles had been written to serve as entertainment rather than as any serious investigative journalism. The situation become much more serious than he had expected, however, and ¯ Tanaka fell ill. Ohira told his aides that “I’m the only one who can clean up Tanaka’s mess.” When Tanaka announced on November 26 that he would resign, active nego¯ tiations began within the party over who was to succeed him. Ohira considered ¯ running; if the Ohira and Tanaka factions united behind him, he stood a quite high chance of winning. No election was ever held, however. LDP presidential elections were accompanied by factional bargaining and the liberal spending of money, and the party’s leadership was concerned about how the public would perceive such politicking in the immediate wake of Tanaka’s resignation. Vice President Shiina initially proposed serving as ¯ interim president until the next party election in July and approached Ohira to obtain ¯ his support, but this idea was immediately rejected by Ohira. Instead, it was decided that Shiina would be allowed to choose from four candidates for the presidency: ¯ Ohira, Fukuda, Miki Takeo, and Nakasone Yasuhiro. On December 1, Shiina announced that Miki would be the next party president. Miki was the leader of an only moderately sized faction, and in choosing him Shiina

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sought to prevent the kind of discord that choosing a more powerful faction leader ¯ like Ohira or Fukuda might bring. It also meant, however, that the new government was vulnerable from the beginning and dependent on maintaining the support of more powerful factions within the party.9 ¯ Ohira continued to serve as finance minister in the new Miki government but did not get along well with the new prime minister. In one conversation, he described Miki as being “completely different” from himself: Speaking frankly, we are completely different. He has been conceited ever since gaining power. […] He was under the belief that the LDP is corrupt and that only he could reform it. I believe that the LDP – any political party – is something made up of people and not particularly worthy of praise; nothing in this world is. Though I guess that makes me somewhat nihilistic about reform.10

¯ Faced with inflation and a revenue shortfall, Ohira decided to issue deficit bonds. “When private investment and demand is low, government financing is the only way to support the economy. […] That is also why we have started to take serious action to correct the three major causes of the deficit: Japanese National Railways, [rice subsidies], and [national] health insurance.” ¯ Ohira believed in a limited government with sound public financing that was not reliant on deficit bonds. He was thus very unwilling to use bonds as a means of managing public finances. It was due to this economic philosophy that the law authorized the bonds to be issued for only one year despite the finance ministry wanting this to be for five years.11 Declaring a financial emergency, he also increased the taxes on alcohol and tobacco despite resistance from the opposition parties.12

1.4 Currency Diplomacy ¯ Despite having moved to the finance ministry, Ohira continued to keep an active watch on foreign policy. The negotiations over the peace treaty with China had stalled at ¯ this point, but Ohira remained optimistic. After Diet member Hori Shigeru returned ¯ from China, Ohira met with him to discuss Zhou’s intentions on January 15, 1975. He also met with Hori, former prime minister Tanaka, and President of the House of Councilors K¯ono Kenz¯o on April 30, and they agreed to help the negotiations make progress.13 ¯ Ohira continued to make numerous trips abroad while serving as Miki’s finance minister. In addition to the various finance minister meetings, he also accompanied Miki on summits in France and Puerto Rico. In late 1975, he chaired a meeting of ¯ finance ministers from ten countries in Washington, DC. According to Ohira, “the finance ministry has had to bear the brunt of harsh currency diplomacy.” He wrote the following on the importance of international meetings: International conferences of finance ministers have become more frequent as the dollar has moved away from gold, the world has begun adopting floating exchange rates, and the resource crisis has become apparent. Countries undergoing difficulties with their balance

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of payments are increasingly seeking assistance from the IMF and friendly nations. The problem of dollar recycling – which is becoming ubiquitous among OPEC nations – can no longer be neglected. All of this has meant that assistance from the IMF has become urgent, as has the need to increase its capital. The finance ministers of the United States, Germany, Japan, Britain, and France, and the governors of these countries’ central banks meet frequently to discuss and devise countermeasures for these problems.14

¯ Ohira met with Treasury Secretary William Simon and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll to discuss the oil crisis, economic prospects, increasing the Asian Development Bank’s capital, and how to handle the currency issue at the upcoming summit.15 ¯ In November, Ohira participated in the first G6 summit in France and the accompanying meeting of finance ministers. On the currency issue, he and the finance ministry believed that a system of floating exchange rates would reflect actual market conditions and pushed for an international agreement to be adopted on this at the IMF interim committee meeting to be held in Jamaica in January. Although he did not play an active role in the summit, his participation provided him with experience that would be put to good use when he chaired the G6 summit held in Tokyo four years later.16 ¯ Ohira’s Trips Overseas as Finance Minister in the Miki Government January 12, 1975

Departs from Haneda for Washington, DC

January 13, 1975

Attends G5 finance ministers’ meeting

January 14, 1975

Attends G10 finance ministers’ meeting (IMF)

January 15–16, 1975

Attends IMF Interim Committee meeting

January 17, 1975

Attends IMF and World Bank Development Committee meetings. Departs Washington for Honolulu

January 18–19, 1975

Departs Honolulu for Haneda

April 7, 1975

Departs Haneda for Paris

April 8, 1975

Arrives in Paris, meets with French Finance Minister Jean-Pierre Fourcade

April 9, 1975

Attends OECD Financial Support Fund conference

April 10, 1975

Meets with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac

April 11–12, 1975

Departs Paris for Haneda

August 28, 1975

Leaves for the US. Attends Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry reception (New York)

August 29, 1975

Luncheon with key finance personnel at the Wall Street Club. Arrives in Washington, DC

August 30, 1975

Chairs G10 finance ministers’ meeting. Hosts dinner party for ministers and gives speech

August 31, 1975

Attends IMF Interim Committee meeting

September 1, 1975

Attends IMF annual meeting, opening ceremony, and annual discussion, and gives speech. Hosts luncheon for Asia–Pacific General Affairs and gives speech (continued)

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(continued) September 2, 1975

Departs Washington for Los Angeles. Visits University of California professor Hans Baerwald at this home

September 3–4, 1975

Departs Los Angeles for Haneda

November 13, 1975

Departs Haneda with Prime Minister Miki for Paris

November 14, 1975

Meets with French Finance Minister Fourcade

November 15, 1975

Attends first G6 summit (Château de Rambouillet)

November 16, 1975

Attends finance ministers’ meeting and discusses communique. Leaves summit early to return home

November 17, 1975

Arrives in Haneda

January 4, 1976

Departs from Haneda for Miami

January 5, 1976

Attends dinner hosted by honorary consul-general in Miami

January 6, 1976

Departs Miami for Kingston, Jamaica. Meets with US Treasury Secretary William E. Simon. Attends G10 finance ministers’ meeting

January 9, 1976

Meets with Canadian Finance Minister Donald Macdonald. Attends joint IMF-World Bank Development Committee meeting

January 10, 1976

Departs Kingston for Mexico City

January 11, 1976

Attends banquet hosted by Mexican finance minister

January 12–13, 1976

Departs Mexico City for Haneda

June 25, 1976

Departs Haneda for Los Angeles

June 26, 1976

Departs Los Angeles for San Juan, Puerto Rico. Attends reception hosted by President Gerald Ford

June 27, 1976

Attends G7 summit

June 28, 1976

Attends G7 summit, joint press conference

June 29, 1976

Departs San Juan for Brussels

June 30, 1976

Attends dinner hosted by Ambassador Nishibori Masahiro

July 1, 1976

Meets with Belgian Finance Minister Willy De Clercq and EC President François-Xavier Ortoli

July 2–3, 1976

Departs Brussels and arrives in Haneda

¯ Sources Ohira 7:408–415, etc.

2 Confrontation with Fukuda Takeo: LDP Secretary-General 2.1 The “Daifuku” Secret Pact On February 5, 1976, the Japanese political world was shaken when hearings held by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations exposed the Lockheed scandal— extensive efforts by officials of the aerospace manufacturer Lockheed to bribe foreign

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officials during negotiations for aircraft contracts. Both houses of the Diet passed a resolution on February 23 asking the United States to provide its documents related to the scandal, and Miki sent a letter to President Ford asking him to disclose the ¯ documents, including the list of those involved. Ohira was displeased with Miki’s letter, saying, “Why did he have to make a political matter out of something that should have been left to working-level officials?”.17 He met with Tanaka on May 5. Tanaka told him that Miki would “use every trick in the book to hold onto power” and advised him to “try to have more discussions ¯ with” Fukuda. Tanaka was thus wary enough of Miki to try to bring Ohira together with his rival Fukuda.18 ¯ When Ohira was asked about the Lockheed case two weeks later, he said that “People cannot be permitted to cunningly evade the law. However, we must be careful not to allow a single rumor to bring about the destruction of those who have not done that.” He later amended this statement before it was made public to the somewhat weaker, “If we have determined who has cunningly evaded the law and who has not, we must bring things to a conclusion. That’s only natural. But we cannot destroy a man on the basis of a single rumor.” This was an implicit defense of his ally Tanaka.19 ¯ Tanaka was finally arrested on July 27. That evening, Ohira told Kurihara Y¯uk¯o (a member of his faction) the following: Today is an indescribably lonely day. I would have never dreamed that Tanaka would be arrested on suspicion of taking money from a foreign country. When I was chief cabinet secretary in the Ikeda government, I was approached by the CIA with an offer of campaign funds. I needed the money but was determined not to accept foreign money under any circumstances. When I spoke to Tanaka about it, he agreed. So, if the charges are true, the situation is especially sad. In hindsight, I regret not speaking to Tanaka more forcefully about it.

He also said, “As much as I would like to go see Tanaka, as a public figure, I think I should refrain. My wife will call his tonight.”20 ¯ That Ohira had previously warned Tanaka about getting involved with foreign money made his arrest particularly painful for him. Still, as he explained to a newspaper reporter, “Tanaka is a close friend, and our friendship will not change. I’m not going to break ties with him just because of his involvement in the Lockheed case.”21 ¯ Tanaka’s arrest is said to have caused Ohira to briefly consider deserting him and allying with Fukuda. But he needed the support of Tanaka and his faction if he wanted to become LDP president, so he could not publicly disassociate himself from him.22 Miki’s efforts against Tanaka were politically popular but ultimately cost him his position as they intensified movements within the party to bring down his government. ¯ Ohira and Fukuda agreed to unite the party behind Fukuda’s leadership and pressure Miki to resign. With an overwhelming majority of the party (and his cabinet) now organized against him, Miki—unwilling to take drastic action to save himself—had no choice but to step down. When the Fukuda government was formed on December ¯ 24, Ohira became secretary-general of the LDP.23

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¯ As part of their preparations for bringing down the Miki government, Ohira and Fukuda had formed the “Daifuku” secret pact in November (so-called because it takes one character from each of their names and is the name of a Japanese sweet). ¯ Under this agreement, Ohira would back Fukuda as Miki’s successor; in exchange, Fukuda would only serve as party president for two years (instead of the usual three) ¯ and would hand power over to Ohira at the end of that time. According to Suzuki ¯ Zenk¯o, Ohira willingly yielded the position of president to Fukuda, saying, “You’re my elder, please go ahead,” and Fukuda claimed that he would be satisfied with merely one year as president rather than two. While there are those who assert that ¯ no such secret agreement between Fukuda and Ohira ever existed,24 it is difficult to ¯ believe that Ohira would have unconditionally supported Fukuda as president.25 When Shima Keiji, director of NHK’s United States Bureau, heard rumors of the ¯ pact, he called Ohira: I’ve heard that you made an agreement with Fukuda. How can you rely on something ¯ Banboku. Kishi like that!? Remember the promise between Prime Minister Kishi and Ono reneged on it, didn’t he? If you want to be prime minister, now is the time to fight for it, as hard as you can.

¯ Ohira did not pay Shima’s advice any heed, however, and told him that “Even if it turns out he’s deceiving me, that’s fine as long as it’s in the best interest of the ¯ country.” Shima persisted, telling him, “That’s your blind spot.” Still, Ohira decided 26 to put his trust in Fukuda.

2.2 “A Distinctive Identity as a Nation” ¯ Having been put in charge of the LDP, Ohira’s first task was helping to get a budget passed by the end of the fiscal year. The opposition parties were demanding amend¯ ments to the budget, including income tax cuts. By including these cuts, Ohira was 27 able to get a provisional budget passed in March 1977. ¯ Looking beyond the budget, how did Ohira perform as secretary-general? Okushima Sadao, the head of the secretary-general’s office, described him as a “philosopher in action”: ¯ Ohira’s nickname was “Dongy¯u” [the dull cow], and he was often ridiculed for his distinctive mannerism of saying “ah” and “ooh” when he spoke. But if you ask me, in all of my time serving multiple secretaries-general, there was no politician who adopted as “philosophical” ¯ an approach as Ohira. He was a devout Christian, spoke only after carefully considering his words, and was not prone to making gaffes. His remarks were like slow-cooked meat; they contained deep, flavorful significance. If you removed the “ahs” and “oohs” from the transcript of one of his speeches, it would make an excellent essay. I was also surprised by how much of an academic he was. If Tanaka was dubbed “a computer connected to a ¯ bulldozer” for his ability to make and implement decisions immediately, Ohira could perhaps be described as a “philosopher in action.” […]

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Hearing him called “Dongy¯u” would give you the impression that he was disorganized or ¯ slipshod in his work, but the actual Ohira was nothing like that. He was a meticulous, methodical person who kept his schedule written in his notebook. He even carefully transcribed the contents of the pocket-sized itinerary that the office prepared for him into his notebooks.28

¯ Ohira himself remarked that “’Ah, Ooh’ was both an affectionate nickname and an example of my reputation being damaged. I didn’t speak smoothly while testifying in the Diet and would say ‘ah’ or ‘ooh’ while I was thinking.”29 He had no difficulty speaking clearly while at home, however, and explained to his family that his problems with public speaking were because he tried to “choose words that everyone—foreigners, young people, grandparents—could understand.”30 ¯ In December, Ohira published Miscellanea on Life with Kajima Publishing. The book concludes with a chapter entitled “The Shadow of the Postwar Period”: I believe that there are few countries like Japan, where guilt over the war has persisted for more than thirty years and casts a shadow over every issue to one extent or another. […] By this point, guilt over the war has taken the form of self-indulgent masochism. Or a shelter that can be escaped to. We must try to overcome our reliance on it. […] The current situation demands that we promote the reconstruction of a distinctive identity as a nation by actively participating in the international order.

¯ Ohira wanted Japan to establish a “new identity” and “restore itself to its place as an honorable member of the international order, recognized as such in both name and fact.”31 The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty was the greatest remaining foreign policy concern on the agenda at this time. On April 12, 1978, more than a hundred Chinese fishing boats approached the Senkaku Islands, and several dozen violated Japanese territorial waters. There had been previous violations by the Taiwanese, but this was the first such incidence to involve Chinese ships. ¯ When Ohira came under fire over the incident in the LDP General Council two days later, he rebuked them (albeit in a way that attempted to reason with them): The Senkaku Archipelago made absolutely no appearance on the official agenda while we were normalizing ties with China. However, they informally commented that they would not touch on the issue. It is a fact that both Taiwan and China claimed sovereignty over the Senkakus when the United States returned Okinawa. Both times, the Japanese government declared that the islands were Japanese territory under its effective control. As the Chinese did not bring up the issue [during the negotiations], there was accordingly no need for Japan to reiterate its claim.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed on August 12.32 ¯ On October 24, Ohira received a courtesy call from Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping at Hotel Okura. He offered his “congratulations on China’s recent development and the smooth progress being made in Sino-Japanese relations,” to which Deng replied, “I give my thanks for all of the efforts made by those on the 33 ¯ Japanese side, including you, Secretary-General Ohira.”

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2.3 “The Age of Culture”: The LDP Presidential Election With his experience of having served as chief cabinet secretary, foreign minister, ¯ MITI minister, finance minister, and party secretary-general, Ohira was by all accounts the most likely candidate to be the next prime minister. The “Daifuku” secret pact was nearing its two-year deadline, and Fukuda was expected to yield the ¯ presidency of the LDP to Ohira in the fall of 1978. ¯ Ohira began envisioning what his coming administration would be like. His view of Japan’s contemporary situation was that it was a mistake “to continue to see everything in terms of ‘economic growth.’ We must take the view that the age of the economy is over, that we are no longer in such a simple situation. Is it not time to think about transitioning to an age of culture or religion?”.34 As he laid out plans for this “age of culture,” he repeatedly met with Fukuda. ¯ According to Morita Hajime, while Fukuda made comments to Ohira such as “I will endorse your candidacy” and “I think you should run,” he never explicitly said that ¯ he himself would not run for reelection. Ohira had faith in Fukuda’s words and in their secret agreement. Members of his faction like Suzuki Zenk¯o, Sasaki Yoshitake, and It¯o Masayoshi argued that he should start consolidating votes in case there were multiple rounds of voting, but he refused, telling them that they shouldn’t worry so much and that “Fair winds blow in autumn.” ¯ The situation took a sudden turn in mid-October when Fukuda called Ohira early one morning and told him, “I can no longer control my faction.” Going back on his ¯ ¯ word, he told Ohira that he would be running in the presidential election. Ohira’s face turned red as he held the receiver. Finally, he hung up the phone, merely saying “I understand.” This was the decisive moment that brought about the November 27 presidential election popularly known as the “Daifuku Showdown.” In addition ¯ to Ohira and Fukuda, Nakasone and K¯omoto Toshio also declared themselves as candidates.35 There were some concerns within the party about the secretary-general running against the president. When Tamura Hajime, a member of the Tanaka faction, said it ¯ was “like murdering one’s master,” Ohira turned red and angrily shot back, “So are you all telling me to lay down and die?”.36 ¯ From Ohira’s perspective, he had already yielded the presidency to Tanaka, Miki, and Fukuda despite having had many opportunities to hold the position himself. If he did not win now, he would be putting his political career in jeopardy. Fukuda, ¯ now Ohira’s opponent, was convinced that he would come ahead and argued that the candidate who finished second in the first round of voting should withdraw from the race. ¯ This overconfidence backfired, however, when Ohira came in first with 550,000 ¯ votes to Fukuda’s 470,000. Ohira had worked hard to overcome Fukuda’s lead and had gained the backing of the Tanaka faction. Noting that “Sometimes there are heavenly and unexpected voices,” Fukuda withdrew after the first round. At the press ¯ conference following his victory, Ohira remarked that “There are times when a single moment is meaningful, and times when ten or twenty years are fruitless. History is a

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strange thing.” Fukuda later wrote on the election’s outcome that, “while there was ¯ absolutely never any ‘Daifuku’ secret pact, I was determined that Ohira should be my successor.”37 ¯ Ohira visited Fukuda to pay his respects. “Prime Minister Fukuda looked relieved, as if a weight had been lifted off his shoulders. He thanked me for my two years of support and promised me his full cooperation.”38 The two men could be regarded ¯ as opposites. Ohira was an advocate for smaller government who focused on the market economy and was skeptical of government intervention. He was modest and inconspicuous and recognized internal party factions as having their uses. Fukuda, on the other hand, was confident and wanted to eliminate the factions. He believed that government should serve a greater role and once even said that “politics is the highest morality.”39 ¯ Ohira was sixty-eight when he dethroned Fukuda and became the leading player in Japanese politics. Despite his victory, however, his new government would be marked by lingering resentments from the election. The previous Miki government had been brought down by factional maneuvering and now a sitting prime minister had been defeated in a closely contested election. The infighting within the LDP ¯ would continue and it would serve as a thorn in Ohira’s side for much of his time in 40 office. Notes 1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

Kurosaki Akira, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei: Amerika no Kakufukusan Gaik¯o to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976 (Toyko: Y¯uhisha, 2006), 253. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ny¯u Y¯oku Japan Sosaet¯ı Nenji Bansankai ni ¯ okeru Ohira Gaimu Daijin Sup¯ıchi (Kariyaku)” [Speech by Foreign Minister ¯ Ohira at the New York Japan Society Annual Dinner (Provisional Transla¯ tion)], May 21, 1974, Ohira Gaimu Daijin H¯obei Kankei 1974–75, A’.1.5.2.19, MOFA. ¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2010), 93. ¯ Ohira 4:536–543, 6:318. Toyoda Yukiko, “Ky¯ohan” no D¯omei-shi: Nichibei Mitsuyaku to Jimint¯o Seiken (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 228. Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Ohira, October 5, 1974, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 28, 2012). ¯ Interview with Okawara Yoshio, foreign ministry chief cabinet secretary, January 28, 2012. Interview with Kiuchi Akitane, June 19, 2010. Treaties Bureau Director Matsunaga Nobuo, “Jizen Ky¯ogi Mondai ni tsuite” [Regarding Prior Consultation], October 30, 1974, Gaimush¯o “Mitsuyaku” Ch¯osa H¯okoku Taish¯o Bunsho (1) 94, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mit suyaku/pdfs/k_1960kaku3.pdf (accessed June 30, 2013). Asahi Shimbun (August 24, 1986). Horikoshi Sakuji, Sengo Seiji 13 no Sh¯ogen: Seiji Kishi Shuzai Memo kara (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1989), 112, 116–119.

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9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

7 Internal and External Crises …

Iwami Takao, Seijika (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 2010), 123. Hatano Sumio, Rekishi toshite no Nichibei Anpo J¯oyaku: Kimitsu Gaik¯o Kiroku ga Akasu ‘Mitsuyaku’ no Kyojitsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010) 199–200. Morita ¯ Hajime, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o no Ohira Masayoshi – Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 226–227. Orita Masaki, “Nichibei Anpo J¯oyaku no Jizen Ky¯ogi to Kaku Mochikomi ni kan suru ‘Mitsuyaku’ Mondai,” in Jinrui no Michijirube toshite no Kokusaih¯o: Heiwa, Jiy¯u, Han’ei wo Mezashite, edited by Akizuki Hiroko, Nakatani Kazuhiro, and Nishiumi Maki (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2011), 513. Kimura Mitsugu, S¯ori no Hinkaku – Kantei Hishokan ga Mita Rekidai Saish¯o no Sugao (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2006), 119–120. It¯o Masaya, Jimint¯o Sengokushi, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chikuma Bunko, 2009), 142, 152–156. ¯ Ohira 6:389–390. Interview with Muraguchi Katsuya, LDP staff, March 21, 2013. ¯ Ohira 1:94–95. Kogayu Masami, “Kenzen Zaisei e no Kodawari,” in Kyoka ¯ Sh¯ujitsu Kikigaki Ohira Masayoshi, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 178– 185. Wakatsuki Hidekazu, Taikoku Nihon no Seiji Shid¯o, 1972–1989 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2012), 48–49. Kurihara Y¯uk¯o, Sh¯ogen, Honne no Seiji – Sengo Seiji no Butaiura (Tokyo: Nagai Shuppan, 2007), 42–52. ¯ Ohira 1:95. Ambassador to the US Yasukawa Takeshi to Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, August 30, 1975, Daiikkai G6 Samitto, 2012–769, MOFA. Ministry of Finance, “Rokkakoku Shun¯o Kaigi no T¯ogi Jik¯o to Kangaekata” [Discussion Items and Thoughts on the G6 Summit], October 1975, Daiikkai Shuy¯okoku Shun¯o Kaigi, 2013–1012, MOFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ranbuie Sengen Senritsu no Keii” [The Particulars of Forming the Declaration of Ranbuie], 1975, Daiikkai Shuy¯okoku Shun¯o Kaigi, 2012–770, MOFA. ¯ Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1990), 366. ¯ Ohira 7:120–121. T¯oky¯o Shimbun (May 26, 1976). Uji Toshihiko, “Meiy¯u, Tanaka Kakuei e no Kokorozukai,” in Shush¯o Retsuden: It¯o Hirobumi kara Koizumi Jun’ichir¯o made, edited by Uji Toshihiko (Tokyo: T¯oky¯o Shoseki, 2001), 323. Interview with Uji Toshihiko, August 10, 2011. ¯ Kurihara Y¯uk¯o, Ohira Moto S¯ori to Watashi (Tokyo: K¯osaid¯o Shuppan, 1990), 162–163. ¯ Ohira 6:358, 391, 525–528, 531, 573. Interview with Fukuda Yasuo, October 13, 2012 and January 16, 2013. Kurihara 54–59. Fukuda Takeo, “Watakushi no Rirekisho,” in Kishi Nobusuke et al., Watashi no Rirekisho – Hoshu Seiken no Ninaite (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2007), 197. Interview with Fukuda Yasuo, October 13, 2012.

2 Confrontation with Fukuda Takeo: LDP Secretary-General

25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

36.

37. 38. 39. 40.

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Iwate Broadcasting, ed., Moto S¯ori Suzuki Zenk¯o Gekid¯o no Nihon Seiji wo Kataru: Sengo Yonj¯unen no Kensh¯o (Iwate: Iwate Broadcasting, 1991), 189– 190, 219–220. Suzuki Zenk¯o, “Kur¯o wo Tomo ni shita Aidagara,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 47–50. Iokibe Makoto, It¯o Motoshige, and Yakushiji Katsuyuki, eds., Mori Yoshir¯o: Jimint¯o to Seiken K¯otai (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2007), 51. Shiokawa Masajur¯o, Aru Bonjin no Kokuhaku: Kiseki to Sh¯ogen (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2009), 67. Mori Yoshir¯o, Watashi no Rirekisho: Mori Yoshir¯o Kaikoroku (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2013), 133. Shima Keiji, “Nintaizuyoi Hito deshita,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 231–232. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 398–401. Kurihara 62–64. Okushima Sadao, Jimint¯o Kanjich¯oshitsu no 30 Nen (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2002) 66–68. ¯ Ohira 6:570–571. Tsutsumi Seiji, Kunimasa Takeshige, and Morita Yoshiko, “Sh¯ohizei Z¯ozei ¯ nara Ohira Masayoshi ni Manabe,” Bungei Shunj¯u 88:10 (2010) 129. ¯ Ohira 4:270–271. ¯ Ohira 7:171. Furasawa Ken’ichi, Sh¯owa Hishi Nicch¯u Heiwa Y¯uk¯o J¯oyaku (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 1988), 128, 144–146. Kurihara 22–23, 227–228. Kurihara Y¯uk¯o, Sh¯ogen, Honne no Seiji – Sengo Seiji no Butaiura (Tokyo: Nagai Shuppan, 2007), 53–54. China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “T¯o Sh¯ohei ¯ Fukus¯ori no Ohira Jimint¯o Kanjich¯o Hy¯okei” [Courtesy Call by Deputy Prime ¯ October 24, 1978, Minister Deng Xiaoping on LDP Secretary-General Ohira], Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 04–1022, MOFA. ¯ Ohira 6:12–13. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi Uj¯o – Goj¯u Nen no Sengo Seiji o Kataru (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 1996), 319–320. Morita 258–262, 267. Kimura 130–131. Kurihara, Sh¯ogen, Honne no Seiji, 65–72. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, ed., Tamura Hajime ¯ Oraru Hisutor¯ı, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Asso¯ ciation, 2006), 102. Tamura Hajime, “Ohira Shush¯o Ky¯ushi de K¯os¯o Sh¯usoku,” Yomiuri Shimbun (May 30, 2007), 12. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 447–448. Fukuda 206. ¯ Ohira 7:8. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, Jimint¯o: Seikent¯o no 38 Nen (Tokyo: Ch¯uo¯ K¯oron Shinsha, 2008), 208–209. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, ed. Hosoda Kichiz¯o ¯ Oraru Hisutor¯ı, Vol. 2. (Tokyo: Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, 2006), 31, 34.

Chapter 8

Seeking a New Order Along the Pacific ¯ Rim: Ohira as Prime Minister

¯ 1 Ohira’s Policies: “An Era Beyond the Modern Age” 1.1 The Comprehensive Security Strategy and the Pacific Basic Cooperation Concept ¯ Ohira had frequently spoken of the future during the runup to the November 1978 LDP presidential election. But what was the “future” that he sought to bring about? Domestically, his focus was on his “garden city” concept (den’en toshi k¯os¯o) and “strengthening the foundation for Japanese families,” two components of his attempt to bring about the new “age of culture” that he had spoken of to Fukuda. Internationally, he wished for Japan to assume a larger role on the world stage and sought the creation of a “comprehensive security strategy” that went well beyond traditional national security policy. This would expand Japan’s engagement in economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and every other area of diplomacy necessary for ensuring Japan’s safety1 : Our nation is almost entirely dependent on foreign resource and markets. That means that any conflict – no matter where in the world it occurs – is a threat to our existence. […] We will firmly adhere to our existing collective security system based on the combination of the US-Japan security treaty and the possession of modest but high-quality self-defense capabilities. But we must complement this with comprehensive domestic policies in areas such as the economy, education, and cultural affairs. And we must strengthen necessary foreign policy initiatives such as economic cooperation and cultural diplomacy. In doing so, we will comprehensively plan for our nation’s security.2

¯ On November 27, four days before he became LDP president, Ohira laid out the policies that he intended to bring to fruition during his tenure in office. In addition to the aforementioned policy goals, he also introduced his Pacific Basic Cooperation Concept: Our friendship with the United States serves as the cornerstone of our diplomacy, and Japan naturally seeks cooperation with all nations of the world. But at the same time, it is only natural that we give special consideration to the Pacific, just as the United States provides to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2_8

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Latin America, West Germany does to the EC, and the EC does to Africa. […] Developing the Pacific region will further the development of the world.3

¯ Decades earlier, during his time at the East Asia Development Board, Ohira had looked out over the Pacific from the Asian mainland and had an intense feeling that “The age of the Pacific has begun. And this is especially true for Japan, as we are surrounded by it on all sides.” The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept was an attempt ¯ by Ohira to turn his epiphany of forty years earlier into something more concrete. It was a call for open regionalism, for cultural, economic, and technological cooperation on a grand geographic scale. While previous Japanese governments had put forth similar ideas (such as the Asia–Pacific Initiative promoted by Foreign Minister Miki Takeo during the Sat¯o ¯ government), Ohira was the first prime minister to make regional cooperation an explicit policy objective, a centerpiece of his foreign policy.4 After formally becoming prime minister on December 7 and forming his first ¯ government, Ohira embarked on one of his signature initiatives, the creation of nine study groups to help flesh out his domestic and international policies. These focused on the following areas: the age of culture, the garden city concept, strengthening the foundation for families, the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, comprehensive security, foreign economic policy, economic management in the age of culture, the historical progress of science and technology, and life in a diversifying society. These study ¯ groups were chaired by eminent academics personally chosen by Ohira, including Umesao Tadao, director of the National Museum of Ethnology, for the garden city ¯ concept study group, Okita Sabur¯o, head of the Japan Center for Economic Research, for the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept study group, and Uchida Tadao, a professor at the University of Tokyo, for the foreign economic policy study group. ¯ While the chairs of these groups were all at least in their fifties, Ohira wanted their membership to include younger people as well and represent “a diverse array of human talent… including hidden talent.” In welcoming the members, he told them that it was “okay if you’re anti-authority or opposed to the LDP” (although he also added with a smile that “if your findings do align with the direction being taken by the LDP, however, all the better”). ¯ Only three of the nine study groups were able to submit their reports before Ohira’s untimely death. The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept study group completed its ¯ interim report in November 1979 (the same month that Okita, the group’s chair, ¯ became Ohira’s second foreign minister) and its final report in May 1980.5 ¯ The First Ohira Cabinet (December 7, 1978) Prime Minister

¯ Ohira Masayoshi

Minister of Justice

Furui Yoshimi

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sonoda Sunao

Minister of Finance

Kaneko Ippei

Minister of Education

Nait¯o Takasabur¯o

Minister of Health and Welfare

Hashimoto Ry¯utar¯o (continued)

¯ 1 Ohira’s Policies: “An Era Beyond the Modern Age”

115

(continued) Prime Minister

¯ Ohira Masayoshi

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery

Watanabe Michio

Minister of International Trade and Industry

Esaki Masumi

Minister of Transport

Moriyama Kinji

Minister of Posts and Telecommunications

Shirahama Nikichi

Minister of Labor

Kurihara Y¯uk¯o

Minister of Construction

Tokai Motosabur¯o

Minister of Home Affairs/Chair of the National Public Safety Commission/Director-General of the Hokkaido Development Agency

Shibuya Naozo

Chief Cabinet Secretary

Tanaka Rokusuke

Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office/Director-General of the Okinawa Development Agency

Mihara Asao

Director-General of the Administrative Management Agency

Kanai Motohiko

Director-General of the Defense Agency

Yamashita Ganri

Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency

Kosaka Tokusabur¯o

Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency

Kankeo Iwaz¯o

Director-General of the Environmental Agency

Uemura Sen’ichir¯o

Director-General of the National Land Agency

Nakano Shir¯o

Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau

Sanada Hideo

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary

Kat¯o Koichi

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary

Okina Ky¯ujir¯o

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary

Akitomi Kimimasa

Source Cabinet Public Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/kak uryo/68.html (accessed November 28, 2020)

1.2 “An Era Beyond the Modern Age” It was not uncommon for prime ministers to call for the “modernization” of Japan’s political parties, meaning the elimination of internal factions and the centralization of ¯ party control over political funds. But Ohira was critical of Miki and Fukuda’s earlier attempts to use modernization of the LDP as a means to increase their popularity and was particularly motivated to surpass Fukuda. He told his aides that, “People say that we need to modernize the [LDP], but modernization is itself out of date now. We have entered an era beyond the modern age.”6 ¯ When Ohira spoke of “an era beyond the modern age,” he was making a reference to Japan’s century-long pursuit of modernization and the need to move beyond that pursuit and enter a new “era of culture.” He made this goal explicit in the first policy speech that he delivered to the Diet on January 25, 1979, in which he advocated for moving from an era focused on economic prosperity to one oriented around culture:

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In the more than thirty years since the war, Japan has striven for economic prosperity and worked single-mindedly in pursuit of that goal. And we have achieved remarkable results, the culmination of the more than a century of Western-oriented modernization that began in the Meiji era. […] But we cannot say that, over the course of this pursuit, we have given adequate consideration to the harmony between nature and humanity, the balance between freedom and responsibility, and the deeply spiritual elements that make life worth living. […] I believe that this shows that we have reached the limits of the materialistic civilization based on urbanization and modern rationalism that our rapid economic growth has brought about. In other words, we have moved from a time of modernization to a new era that transcends the modern age; from an era focused on the economy to one that emphasizes culture. The new society that we strive for now is one that overcomes distrust and conflict, fosters mutual understanding and trust, and pursues the true meaning of life on all levels: family, community, region, and nation.

¯ Ohira’s domestic policy goals were oriented around this perception that the focus of Japanese society needed to change. The garden city concept was meant to correct what he saw as a power imbalance between dense urban areas and more rural regions by increasing connections between them and emphasizing local communities. To have both the productivity of the city but also enjoy the natural wealth of a garden. And “strengthening the foundation for families” was based on the introduction of family-oriented welfare measures. ¯ In the same policy speech, Ohira also advocated for more proactive diplomatic efforts to create a peaceful international environment: The government’s greatest responsibility is securing Japan’s peace and security; to that end, we must steadfastly adhere to a security regime of modest self-defense capabilities supplemented by the US-Japan security treaty. Defensive capabilities alone are insufficient to provide true security, however. It goes without saying that, even as we pursue orderly and vigorous development at home, active diplomatic efforts based on a sober understanding of the realities of the global situation and aimed at the creation of a peaceful international environment will be indispensable. […] We are increasingly interdependent with the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific nations. And our friendly relations with Latin America grow ever closer. I will make every effort to further strengthen our friendships and cooperative relations with these countries.7

He made no explicit mention of either “comprehensive security” or “cooperation along the Pacific Basin” in the speech, but it was intended to promote the philosophies that underlay those policies.8

1.3 Comparison with the Fukuda Doctrine ¯ How does the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept that Ohira pursued compare with the “Fukuda Doctrine,” the Asia-focused foreign policy initiative of his predecessor?

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117

The Fukuda Doctrine was laid out by Fukuda Takeo in an August 10, 1977 speech in Manila and was composed of the following three principles: First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community. Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on “heart-to-heart” understanding with these countries, in wide-ranging fields covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas. Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of the like mind outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina and will thus contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.9

Under the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan rejected the role of a military power and committed to establishing a “relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on ‘heart-to-heart’ understanding” with Southeast Asia and contributing to the building of peace and prosperity across the region. In the sense that both visions sought bilateral relations in the Asia–Pacific and ¯ were free of the power politics thinking that characterized the Cold War, Ohira’s Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept continued the lineage of the Fukuda Doctrine. ¯ But it also differed in approach from that doctrine in that Ohira’s concept emphasized the role of the public over the government in policy formation and implementation. It was also focused on a developed nation—Australia—as a partner and was done in a way that took the United States and its views into consideration.10

2 The US-Japan “Alliance” and the Tokyo Summit 2.1 Indochina and the Sino-Vietnamese War ¯ But even as Ohira promoted the idea of cooperation across the Pacific Basin, tensions in one of the region’s cornerstones—Southeast Asia—would reach the brink due to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Sino-Vietnamese War. Addressing these developments demanded much of his diplomatic attention during his first months as prime minister. ¯ Ohira’s first diplomatic meeting was with Nguyen Duy Trinh, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Vietnam, on December 15, 1978, a week after he became prime minister and at a point when the region was still at peace. He promoted increased Japanese engagement in the region, telling Nguyen that “Japan wishes to expand its policies towards Southeast Asia in a manner that increases its level of cooperation with the members of ASEAN and improves its relations with the nations of Indochina such as Vietnam. While the conflicts and disputes between

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Vietnam, China, and Cambodia all have their underlying causes, it is my earnest hope that these can be resolved, and that peace will return to the Indochinese peninsula.”11 Vietnam invaded Cambodia on December 25, however, overthrowing the Pol Pot regime and establishing a new government under Heng Samrin. Pol Pot had been close to China, and the regime change led to a sharp deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations. With China now urging Japan to not provide Vietnam with any economic ¯ aid, Ohira’s plans for a new order in the Pacific had already gotten off to a rocky start.12 ¯ Ohira hosted Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan in Tokyo from January 17–18, 1979 for his first summit with another national leader. He assured Kriangsak that Japan-Vietnamese relations would be “conducted in a manner that does not come into conflict with either your nation’s response or that of ASEAN.” He also promised to provide Thailand with yen loans for the country’s rural development plan.13 Deng Xiaoping visited Japan again on February 7 and reiterated the Chinese position on Cambodia: “Unless disciplinary action is taken, Vietnam will seize Laos and occupy Cambodia, becoming a threat to the members of ASEAN. The Soviet Union is using Vietnam as a means through which to extend its reach to ASEAN. Its goal is the Finlandization of the region. This demands our attention.” ¯ Even though Deng had called for “disciplinary action” against Vietnam, Ohira advocated patience and attempted to assure him that “Japan has warned Vietnam that economic cooperation will only be possible if it acts peacefully. We fully intend to keep both the concerns of ASEAN and China’s opinion in mind as we address the ¯ situation.” This failed to assuage Deng, however, who continued to stress to Ohira that “We have given them repeated warnings. There can be no question that China will follow through on its words.” Ten days later, on February 17, the Chinese army invaded Vietnam. Despite this ¯ act, Ohira made the decision to proceed with his plans to provide China with yen loans beginning in the fall of that year.14

2.2 The US-Japan “Alliance” ¯ Ohira’s view that the United States was the cornerstone upon which Japanese foreign policy relied had remained consistent from his first term as foreign minister nearly twenty years earlier. And while he had begun advocating for his Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, this perception of the US-Japan relationship remained unchanged. He understood the importance of Japan demonstrating that it belonged to the Western bloc. ¯ Decades earlier, Ohira had put forward his “philosophy of the ellipse,” the idea that everything has two focal points, and that the ideal policy was to seek equilibrium and moderation between those points. That philosophy seems to have been reflected here as well, in the multilayered way he thought of Japan’s foreign policy. And so, ¯ Ohira made efforts towards his nation’s relationship with America even as he also called for open regionalism in Asia.

2 The US-Japan “Alliance” and the Tokyo Summit

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¯ Ohira had had an uneasy involvement with the secret agreements between Japan and the United States on nuclear weapons since his time in the Ikeda government and had unsuccessfully sought to have Tanaka make them public prior to his resignation. Now that he was prime minister, he showed an interest in resolving the issue. A decade earlier, Prime Minister Sat¯o Eisaku had put forward the Three NonNuclear Principles, a declaration that Japan would "neither possess nor produce nuclear weapons, nor permit their introduction” into Japanese territory. This effort contributed to Sat¯o becoming the first Japanese to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but the revelations of the La Rocque testimony discussed in the previous chapter had caused many to question the extent to which those principles represented actual government policy. ¯ Using his secretary Morita Hajime, Ohira indirectly approached It¯o Keiichi, director-general of the National Defense Council (a cabinet advisory body on security matters), about the possibility of officially allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese waters. It¯o responded that, while “America would probably be pleased” by the policy change, “it would become quite a serious political problem at home.” Allowing American naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons to dock at Japanese ports would strike at the foundations of the prior consultation system and ¯ require changing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Ohira seems to have let the idea lie at this point, but his longstanding concerns over the problem of introduction continued and he would return to the issue the following year. ¯ The happy demeanor that had marked Ohira upon his assumption of the premiership soon soured as he continued to be plagued by internal factional disputes within the party and the necessities of the nuclear secret agreements.15 ¯ With the G7 summit scheduled to be held in Tokyo in late June in mind, Ohira decided to make the United States the destination for his first trip abroad as prime ¯ minister. Ohira and US President Jimmy Carter had already become acquainted ¯ during Ohira’s time as finance minister, and he had made a positive impression on Carter in their previous meeting.16 ¯ At the welcome ceremony at the White House on May 2, Ohira simultaneously voiced his commitment to the US-Japan relationship and hinted at an increasing international role for Japan: “In close and productive partnership with the United States, our irreplaceable friend and ally, we have great tasks to perform.” It was rare for a Japanese prime minister to openly describe the United States as an “ally.” The two leaders’ talks would echo this idea that the nature of the relationship between the two allies was changing, with Carter mentioning that, “As Japan comes to play a leading role in Asia and the world, one increasingly commensurate with its significant responsibilities, the relationship between our nations is becoming more ¯ equal.” Ohira replied that, “I believe that it is my responsibility to see that the Japanese archipelago carries out its function as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ on the edge of Eurasia for the United States at an increasingly lower cost.” Other topics of discussion included the ongoing situation in Vietnam, Sino-Japanese relations, and making arrangements for cooperating at the following month’s Tokyo Summit.17 Previously, while serving as chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister in the ¯ Ikeda government, Ohira had avoided making any reference to the military aspects

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of the US-Japan relationship, and even refused to use the term “US-Japan security arrangements.” Japan was perceived as a “handicapped nation” because its pacifist constitution prevented it from deploying troops overseas or possessing nuclear weapons. It was for this reason that, in discussing Japan’s relationship with the United States, the term “partnership” was used rather than “alliance.”18 ¯ But now, almost two decades later, Ohira moved to redefine the role of a much stronger Japan, speaking with Carter of a “more equal partnership” and the economic frictions between them. While the issue of the secret agreements on nuclear weapons was not touched upon, this change represented major progress.19

2.3 UNCTAD and Australia ¯ Ohira headed to the Philippines on May 9, just two days after his return from the US. He met with President Ferdinand Marcos in Manila the following morning and discussed Vietnam’s relations with China and the Soviet Union.20 Later that afternoon, he delivered a speech at the 5th General Assembly of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on resolving the north– south problem and expanding ODA. He spoke on the urgent need to develop human resources in developing nations and emphasized that “nation building” had to stand on a foundation of “people building.” He also told the participants that he wanted to convey the opinions of developing nations at the Tokyo Summit. The venue was packed with representatives from more than a hundred countries and his speech received an applause that continued long after he had finished speaking. Representatives of both developing and developed nations described it as “the best speech of the session.”21 ¯ UNCTAD meetings were rarely attended by Japanese prime ministers and Ohira’s speech had been impressive not just for its content but because he had been able to deliver it in faltering English. When Fukuda, his predecessor, had visited Manila, his address had been dubbed a “tunnel speech” as he had only spoken in English at the beginning and end, relying on his interpreter for the rest. In contrast, the only point ¯ at which Ohira had seemed disconcerted during his speech was when Philippines Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo, the meeting’s chairman, had unexpectedly called ¯ hosted a reception and for applause during the middle.22 Later that evening, Ohira spoke with Papua New Guinean Foreign Minister Ebia Olewale on fisheries issues.23 Australian Prime Minister Malcom Fraser was also in attendance, and the two ¯ leaders met for two hours on the 11th to discuss the international economy and Ohira’s Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept. Fraser would not be at the Tokyo Summit, so ¯ this meeting provided an opportunity for Ohira to obtain Australia’s views. And in fact, the primary reason that Fraser was attending the UNCTAD meeting was so ¯ that he could sit down with Ohira. He expressed concern about global inflation and protectionism, but responded that, “If we look for policy directions for each country to pursue from a medium to long-term perspective as we put forth our design, I believe we can increase confidence in the global economy’s future.”

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Fraser explained Australia’s policies on exporting resources and then turned to ¯ Asian regionalism, telling Ohira that, “I welcome your Pacific Basin initiative but would like to hear your opinion on how it will be implemented moving forward.” ¯ Ohira replied that “Cooperation across the Pacific Basin is a complicated issue, but one we are working seriously on and having our advisory bodies examine. In any case, it is my belief that Australia, the United States, and Japan will serve as the three pillars [of the concept.]” He warmly accepted an invitation to visit Australia and told Fraser that he looked “forward to being your guest at the earliest opportunity.” This ¯ meeting was an effort by Ohira to ensure that the opinions of the Asia–Pacific would be reflected in the discussions at the Tokyo Summit.24

2.4 The Tokyo Summit ¯ On June 28 and 29, 1979, Ohira served as chairman of the 5th G7 summit in Tokyo. While he had previously attended two G7 summits as finance minister, this event had a unique sense of urgency for him as it was held in the midst of the 1979 Oil Crisis, the global energy crisis that followed the Iranian Revolution. He had served as foreign minister during the 1973 Oil Crisis and wanted to leave resolution of the current crisis to the market and avoid any state intervention such as price controls.25 The attendants were divided between the relatively resource-poor European nations and the resource-rich Canada and the United States. MITI Minister Esaki Masumi, the cabinet officer under whose jurisdiction petroleum imports fell, was opposed to the introduction of any drastic import restrictions, and it was expected ¯ that Ohira would have difficulty balancing domestic and international expectations ¯ on oil. Ohira had chosen the Akasaka State Guest House to serve as the summit’s venue but remained concerned about its security and his ability to manage the oil crisis.26 The debate over oil imports was intense from the very beginning of the summit. ¯ As the other leaders discussed oil and alternative energy sources, Ohira spoke of the need for lifestyle changes: “This also means rethinking how we live. While we need to seriously address the issue of oil, we also need to cultivate a mentality, in terms of our civilization and culture, of being able to respond to crises with a light heart.” There was a fierce back-and-forth between Carter, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, French President Giscard d’Estaing, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over the setting of oil import targets. Carter sought to have specific national targets incorporated into the summit’s joint statement, but this was opposed by Schmidt and Thatcher, who claimed that such targets would be damaging to the ¯ economy. Ohira was able to resolve the deadlock by suggesting that the declaration instead say that “while no country-specific targets will be set for West Germany, France, Britain, and Italy, the EC will determine these at a later date and inform the other summit nations at that time.” This was acceptable to Carter and the other leaders.27

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While the United States and Europe were largely exported to maintain the status quo on oil imports, the 1985 import target for Japan—which has no domestic oil fields—was permitted an increase to between 6.3 and 6.9 million a day in the declaration. This figure was derived from Economic Planning Agency forecasts and allowed a certain amount of latitude.28 ¯ Ohira publicly credited the success of his compromise to Carter for being the first to accept the proposal. The reality, however, was that he had already engaged in extensive groundwork on the idea, using Senior Deputy Foreign Minister Miyazaki Hiromichi as a “Sherpa.” He had also spoken with Carter immediately prior to the beginning of the summit on June 25 and 26. This was an occasion in which he benefited from his favorable relationship with America.

2.5 “Fragile Pottery” After drafting a statement on Indochinese refugees, the difficult summit came to a close. Reflecting on the event during a lecture in the Great Hall of the Prime Minister’s ¯ Office, Ohira reiterated just how important it was for the developed countries of the world to work together: The summit agreement was significant not just from the standpoint of the oil economy, but because it demonstrated how important cooperation among the leading nations of the world is for managing the modern global economy, such as by setting import quotas. It established that, moving forward, we will continue to work together on a variety of issues.

¯ Ohira keenly felt that the contemporary global situation was extremely delicate, likening it to “fragile pottery” and warning that “things are such that, should we fail to show adequate caution and care, the world order that we have created could collapse at any moment.”29 He described the difficulties he had faced during the summit to a reporter: I was very nervous during the Tokyo Summit. We had planned for the summit to be held as the culmination of a series of preparatory meetings, but those arrangements were dashed by the OPEC meeting that immediately preceded it. As such, the summit became a working conference in which we set target years and annual oil import targets. The quite significant impact of those decisions meant that it turned out to be an important summit. There was an intense confrontation on the first day between West German Chancellor Schmidt and US President Carter and, as chair, I had to serve as mediator. Then, on the morning of the second day, we were told to produce targets for 1985, something which was quite difficult for Japan. Carter was the one who took the most hardline position on this. I turned pale and desperately pushed back, even telling them that, “If I do this, my government will fall.” As the other leaders enjoyed the delicious lunch served at the Japanese-style annex, I found myself unable to eat. While we Japanese focus on trying to find the “larger points of agreement” (daid¯o) during meetings like this, the Western leaders engaged in extensive debate over “minor differences.”

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In any case, I ultimately had no choice but to produce a number, so I took the plunge and did so. Thankfully, Carter came to my aid and said that he accepted it. Then the other leaders did the same, one after another.30

As obliquely referred to above, there was a point during the summit in which ¯ the other attendees worked to coordinate national oil targets without Ohira being present, leaving the Japanese out of the loop. In order for the existing unstable ¯ international order to be rebuilt, Ohira felt that the Pacific Basic Cooperation Concept needed to begin moving forward. And the first step in that would be building a closer relationship with Australia and making efforts towards ASEAN and China.31

¯ 3 Yen Loans to China and Ohira’s Visit to China 3.1 The “40-Day Conflict” ¯ Ohira met with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Gu Mu at the Prime Minister’s Office on September 3, 1979, a meeting that marked the starting point for Japan’s yen loans ¯ to China, one of Ohira’s signature diplomatic accomplishments.32 ¯ When Gu requested that Japan provide China with ODA, Ohira laid out what would go on to become Japan’s three principles for aid to China: “We will give positive consideration to such aid, but we will want to proceed on the following basis: First, it will be carried out in coordination with the United States and Western Europe. Second, we will take into account our level of aid to other Asian countries, particularly those who belong to ASEAN. And third, we will need your understanding ¯ on our basic policy of not engaging in military cooperation.” Ohira told Gu that Japan would do its best to reach a conclusion on the issue prior to his visit to China in December. ¯ Ohira had worked out these three principles following a briefing from ViceMinister for Foreign Affairs Arita Keisuke and Asian Affairs Bureau Director Yanagiya Kensuke on August 31.33 ¯ In the wake of the Ohira-Gu meeting, officials from MITI, the Economic Planning Agency, and the foreign, finance, and transport ministries held consultations in Beijing and toured the harbor of Qinhuangdao and a planned railway line in ¯ Yanzhou, two of the projects that China sought funding for. Ohira pressed Arita and his colleagues to complete their study of the issue quickly. There were those in Japan ¯ who urged more caution in providing loans to China, but Ohira did not waver in his desire to pursue the policy.34 ¯ Even as Ohira worked to ensure that diplomatic relations with China proceeded smoothly, he was soon beset by political strife at home when the Socialists, Komeit¯o, and Democratic Socialists submitted a motion of no confidence in the House of ¯ Representatives on September 7. Ohira responded by exercising his right to dissolve the body and call a new election. During the ensuing electoral campaign, he initially called for the introduction of a general consumption tax, an act of financial reform that

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he had long supported. He was forced to withdraw the proposal after experiencing first-hand how entrenched opposition to the idea was while campaigning, however. The LDP lost one seat in the October 7 general election and barely managed to secure a majority in the Diet by admitting ten conservative independents into the party. In the wake of the election results, every faction leader with the exception ¯ ¯ of Ohira’s old ally Tanaka demanded that Ohira resign as party leader, attributing the electoral results to his advocacy for a consumption tax. His refusal to resign threatened to split the party and led to an upheaval known as the “40-Day Conflict.” ¯ With the anti-mainstream factions solidifying behind Fukuda, Ohira famously met with him in the presidential office at LDP headquarters and demanded to know ¯ whether “By telling me to resign, are you telling me to die?” Ohira had never been a particularly intense man, and he was becoming thoroughly exhausted by the protracted conflict within the party. But despite his hostility towards Fukuda, he told Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kat¯o Koichi that “If I resign, it would be best for Japan for Fukuda to become prime minister” upon his return to the residence.35 When the House of Representatives finally reconvened on November 6, the LDP failed to unite behind a single candidate for prime minister, an unprecedented situation and the result of a month of failed negotiations between the party’s leaders. With ¯ ¯ the mainstream Ohira and Tanaka factions voting for Ohira and the anti-mainstream ¯ factions backing Fukuda, Ohira was ultimately able to retain his position by a margin of a mere seventeen votes. After returning to his home in Setagaya, he repeatedly told his daughter Yoshiko, ¯ “I beat Fukuda. There’s no doubt. I won.” But while Ohira had been able to maintain his hold on power, rancor within the party remained. This would manifest as another challenge to his leadership less than a year later.36 ¯ In overcoming the difficult situation within the party, Ohira had relied upon the team of Chief Cabinet Secretary It¯o Masayoshi, MITI Minister Sasaki Yoshitake, and ¯ Foreign Minister Okita Sabur¯o, three men whom he had been friends with since his time at the East Asia Development Board before the war. Tanaka Kakuei had pushed him to appoint Nikaid¯o Susumu to one of the primary leadership positions in the ¯ LDP during the conflict, but Ohira had rejected this, telling him that such decisions were “a matter for the prime minister and party president to consider. Please don’t ¯ get involved.” While Ohira relied upon his support to maintain his position as prime minister, he was unwilling to concede that Tanaka had the right to dictate major appointments, such as the party’s three most senior positions.37

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It was shortly before his reelection as prime minister that the Iran hostage crisis ¯ began at the American embassy in Tehran. At America’s request, Ohira imposed sanctions on Iran, reducing the number of permitted embassy personnel and prohibiting exports. He was also the one who made the decision to have Japan boycott the Moscow Olympics in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December.38 ¯ These two decisions derived from the importance which Ohira placed on Japan’s relations with the United States. He told his aides that, “Oil is more important than the Olympics, and the United States is more important than oil.” But even as he sided with America, he caused some to doubt his commitment against the Soviet Union by telling the Japan Correspondents’ Club that, “The Soviet Union is a giant, immeasurable power. It is a defensive, very cautious country, and one skilled in diplomacy. I still believe that such a nation would not act rashly.”39 ¯ The Second Ohira Cabinet (November 9, 1979) Prime Minister

¯ Ohira Masayoshi

Minister of Justice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kuraishi Tadao ¯ Okita Sabur¯o

Minister of Finance

Takeshita Noboru

Minister of Education

Tanigaki Sen’ichi

Minister of Health and Welfare

Noro Ky¯oichi

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery

Mut¯o Kabun

Minister of International Trade and Industry

Sasaki Yoshitake

Minister of Transport

Chizaki Uzabur¯o

Minister of Posts and Telecommunications

Onishi Masao

Minister of Labor

Fujinami Takao

Minister of Construction

Watanabe Eiichi

Minister of Home Affairs/Chair of the National Public Safety Commission/Director-General of the Hokkaido Development Agency

Got¯oda Masaharu

Chief Cabinet Secretary

It¯o Masayoshi

Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office/Director-General of the Okinawa Development Agency

Obuchi Keiz¯o

Director-General of the Administrative Management Agency

Uno Sosuke

Director-General of the Defense Agency

Kubota Enji Hosoda Kichiz¯o (2/4/1980)

Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency

Sh¯oji Keijir¯o

Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency

Osada Y¯uji

Director-General of the Environmental Agency

Tsuchiya Yoshihiko

Director-General of the National Land Agency

Sonoda Kiyomitsu

Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau

Tsunoda Reijir¯o

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary

Kat¯o Koichi (continued)

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¯ 8 Seeking a New Order Along the Pacific Rim: Ohira as Prime Minister

(continued) Prime Minister

¯ Ohira Masayoshi

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary

Okina Ky¯ujir¯o

Deputy Director of the Prime Minister’s Office

Aino K¯oichir¯o

Deputy Director of the Prime Minister’s Office

Kanno Hir¯o

Source Cabinet Public Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/kak uryo/69.html (accessed November 28, 2020)

3.2 “Sino-Japanese Relations for a New Century” ¯ On December 5, Ohira headed for China. There, he met with Premier Hua Guofeng and Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping and announced that Japan would begin providing yen loans to the country. Under the plan he put forward, Japan would provide 50 billion yen of untied loans (loans with no restrictions on the countries that the funds could be used to purchase goods and services from) per year towards the completion of seven projects: three railway lines, two harbors, one hydroelectric power station, and one hospital.40 He explained to Deng that: In examining this issue, we took the position that Japan should cooperate with China’s modernization efforts to the greatest degree possible. We welcome China having extensive interactions with the West. Having reviewed the requests made by Deputy Prime Minister Mu Gu and taken into consideration our cooperation with Europe and the United States, the need to balance our aid to China with that offered to the rest of Asia, particularly ASEAN, and our national policy of not engaging in military cooperation, we have decided to work with China on [six] projects […] The loan for the six projects will be 50 billion yen for 1979, to be repaid over a period of twenty years at an interest rate of 3% (suspended for ten years). In principle, this will be untied. We would also like to cooperate on the construction of a hospital, to serve as a symbol of Sino-Japanese friendship.

Deng welcomed his words, saying that “It is understandable that the Japanese government would take every factor into consideration while examining this matter. Certainly, from our perspective, the more projects and money the better. This is merely the first time we work together, however. Those involved with the projects in China may not be satisfied, but I personally find it fantastic.” ¯ Why was Ohira so enthusiastic about offering aid to China? His interest in promoting the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept is not sufficient to explain it, even if it was along those lines that he explained to Hua that, “While visiting China and meeting the late Premier Zhou, he told me that friendly and cooperative relations between us must contribute to not only the stability and prosperity of our countries, but to that of the entire region as well. Friendly relations between Japan and China are a major requirement for stability in Asia.” ¯ Ohira was grateful to Zhou Enlai for having waived China’s rights to reparations during the normalization of diplomatic relations, but it had not seemed to him to be an

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adequate resolution to Japan’s responsibilities towards China for its conduct during the war. He still had a guilty conscience. While China’s renunciation of reparations and the provision of yen loans to the country were formally unrelated policies, the ¯ two were linked in Ohira’s mind. For their part, the Chinese were well aware of the ¯ efforts that Ohira had made towards normalization while serving as foreign minister, and they held great expectations towards and trust in him. The People’s Daily devoted ¯ extensive coverage to Japan during Ohira’s visit, and Chinese television and radio also actively promoted a positive image of Japan. ¯ On December 7, Ohira gave an hourlong speech entitled “Sino-Japanese Relations for a New Century: Seeking Depth and Expansion” at the hall of the Political Consultative Conference. The event was attended by a massive crowd of some 1,100 figures—government officials and representatives from various organizations. ¯ In the speech, Ohira praised China’s modernization, touched on the achievements of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, and declared that “Japan will spare no expense in actively working with you in your endeavors.” He advocated for increased cultural and educational exchange between China and Japan on the basis that “the most important thing that can be done for the relationship between two countries is to foster an abiding trust in the hearts and minds of their people.” After referencing Jianzhen, a Chinese monk who had helped spread Buddhism in Japan more than a thousand years earlier, he concluded by saying that “I want to work with all of you to ensure that relations between our countries become ever closer and more extensive.” He received a thunderous applause from the audience. ¯ Ohira’s speech was the first time in history that a Japanese prime minister had directly addressed a Chinese audience, and the event was broadcast on Chinese ¯ television and radio. When Ohira left Beijing for Xian, he was warmly welcomed by his citizens. He saw the recently discovered Terracotta Army and visited a monument to Abe no Nakamoro, an 8th-Century Japanese envoy who had become a Chinese official. He left a piece of calligraphy behind in which he written “Explore the old and learn the new” (Wengu Zhixin), a quote from Confucius’ Analects.41 ¯ Ohira’s visit to China and the content of his speech were intended to provide support for Deng Xiaoping’s efforts towards economic reforms, and the views that ¯ Ohira laid out would go to serve as the basis for Japanese policy towards China through the 1980s.42 ¯ During his time in China, Ohira also signed a cultural exchange agreement and proposed that a Japanese language training center be established under the new agreement’s auspices. This initiative would lead to the creation of the Beijing Language and Culture Institute, which trained six hundred Japanese language teachers in its ¯ first five years. Affectionately known as the “Ohira School,” it was renamed the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies in 1985. This school is one of the fruits of ¯ Ohira’s philosophy.43 ¯ The hospital that Ohira proposed serve “as a symbol of Sino-Japanese friendship” opened in Beijing in 1984 as the China-Japan Friendship Hospital. The first grant ¯ aid project between the two countries, it carries on Ohira’s legacy of hoping for a 44 “prosperous and open China.”

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¯ 4 Ohira’s Final Travels 4.1 Launching the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept ¯ Ohira departed for Australia on January 15, 1980 to meet with Prime Minister Fraser. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a month earlier had left the foreign ministry ¯ scrambling to respond, but Ohira had decided to proceed with his trip as planned. It was the first visit to Australia by a Japanese prime minister since Tanaka’s in 1974, ¯ and Ohira’s first since his visit as foreign minister in 1972.45 ¯ In Canberra, Ohira expanded on the Pacific Basic Cooperation Concept that he had previously put forward to Fraser in Manila the year prior: I believe that this initiative should focus on promoting cultural and economic cooperation and collaboration, avoiding political and military issues […] It is intended to provide more of a loose sense of solidarity rather than serve as a solid mechanism. It could provide a venue for discussion and cooperation in areas like culture, natural resources, and trade.

While the core members of the initiative would likely be Japan, the United States, ¯ Australia, and the members of ASEAN, Ohira emphasized that the goal was to seek “open solidarity” in the region and that “there is no need to exclude China or the Soviet Union.” Fraser’s response was more favorable than had been anticipated. He ¯ agreed with Ohira and added that “the situation of the island nations of the South Pacific needs to be considered as well.”46 ¯ On January 17, Ohira traveled to Melbourne and gave a speech entitled “Creative Cooperation in the Pacific Era” at a luncheon hosted by Fraser, effectively a reiteration of the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept. When he explicitly stated at the following press conference that “China and the Soviet Union will not be excluded, should they wish to participate,” a surprised Australian reporter let out a loud whistle. No doubt from the perspective of the Australian press, participation by the Soviet Union was a non-starter, especially given its recent invasion of Afghanistan. ¯ Ohira assured Fraser of the central roles of Japan and Australia in the endeavor and the two leaders’ efforts would directly lead to the creation of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in September of that year. More indirectly, they can also be connected to the subsequent formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum later in the decade.47 ¯ Leaving Australia, Ohira continued to advocate for the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon and Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Michael Somare in the following week to consult with them on the initiative. His visit to Papua New Guinea marked the first such visit by a Japanese prime minister.48 ¯ Back in Japan, Ohira presented a policy speech to the Diet on January 25 in which he again advocated for building cooperation in the Pacific and adopting a comprehensive security strategy. No one could know that this would be the last such speech that he would ever give.49

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4.2 The “Deception” of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles ¯ International crises continued to demand much of Ohira’s attention in 1980. In February, he dispatched his previous foreign minister, Sonoda Sunao, as a special envoy to India, Pakistan, and five Middle Eastern countries with the goal of providing them with economic assistance and preventing unrest from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan spreading in the surrounding region. When the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Iran in April over ¯ the embassy hostage crisis, Ohira followed suit, leading Iran to halt its oil exports to Japan. He responded by scheduling visits to the US, Canada, and Mexico for early May. While promoting Pacific cooperation was a major focus of his travels, diversifying Japan’s oil sources was also a major goal for his visit to Mexico.50 ¯ Oil was not Ohira’s only concern, however. He continued to worry about the state of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and wanted to address them during his meeting with Carter. Immediately before his departure, he gathered Chief Cabinet Secretary It¯o Masayoshi, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kat¯o Koichi, and Chief Secretary Morita Hajime together to ask them to look into the issue. We must strictly adhere to the US-Japan security framework. But I fear that, should things remain as they are, we may run into problems.” His tone became more emphatic as he continued. “The present situation is a sham. Japan is under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, yet we attempt to obscure the existence of those nuclear weapons. What kind of deception is that? We have to do something about the ‘introduction’ issue.

¯ The men had listened quietly as Ohira spoke, but all rejected his proposal as completely untenable under the current political situation. He acknowledged the challenges but pointed out that “If it were an easy problem, I would have dealt with it long ago. It is because it is difficult that I am asking you [to look into the issue].” It was clearly contradictory for Japan to promote its Three Non-Nuclear Principles while enjoying the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, and the Japanese ¯ public was well aware of this fact. Ohira was concerned that—should the principles not be revised in a way that brought them in line with the actual situation—it would ultimately interfere with relations with the United States and cause the public to lose faith in the government. Resolving the contradiction would necessitate a serious ¯ effort on the part of both Japan and America, and Ohira wanted to formulate a policy that he could present Carter with in their meeting. His actions here were part of a personal initiative; they did not come from the foreign ministry. ¯ No conclusion would ever be reached on this issue, however, as those close to Ohira were strongly opposed to the idea of revising the principles. Despite this opposition, he continued to tell his aides that “introduction” is the act of unloading nuclear weapons from ships and bringing them on to land.” This position was consistent with the views that he had held since his time in the Ikeda government.51

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¯ 4.3 Ohira’s Final US Summit ¯ ¯ Accompanied by Foreign Minister Okita, Ohira departed Haneda Airport for North America on April 30. Gathering the staff of the Japanese embassy at the State Guest House upon his arrival in Washington, DC, he provided them with an overview of Japan’s postwar relationship with the United States. It had been due to American backing that Japan had been able to gain membership in GATT and securing financing from the World Bank for infrastructure investments during the Tokyo Olympics. ¯ Ohira concluded his overview by telling the staff that “Postwar Japan is truly indebted to the United States.”52 ¯ The following day, Ohira met with Carter and discussed sanctions on Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter expressed his gratitude and said that, “Under the strong and courageous leadership of the prime minister, Japan has taken the initiative in responding to the alliance. You have served as a model for our other ¯ allies.” Ohira replied that, “The issues of Iran and Afghanistan are troubling not just because of our friendship with America but because they pose a serious challenge to the world order. As such, it was only natural that we offer our cooperation as an ally in dealing with them.” ¯ Carter then invoked Ohira’s defense plan, saying “I think you and I are friends; we can speak frankly […] The sooner Japan expedites the goals of the plans, the more ¯ it will help stabilize Asia and benefit both Japan and the US.” Ohira replied that, “We are currently considering accelerating the Defense Agency’s plan and I would like to consult with the US in our response. I believe that securing the political and economic stability of the nations of Asia is of paramount importance.” When Carter also urged Japan to improve the Self-Defense Forces’ equipment, ¯ Ohira promised to consider it. The two leaders also discussed trade frictions over cars and opening up the materials procurement process for the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (the body that would become NTT after its privatization a few years later). ¯ As the meeting drew to a close, Ohira called Carter’s attention to his handling of the situation in Iran. “The president has responded with great patience thus far, and I would seriously ask that you continue pursuing a peaceful solution.” Carter replied that “I share your hope for a peaceful solution, and I believe that the support we receive from our allies will help facilitate such a solution. The prime minister’s leadership will be important in this matter.”53 This was Carter’s first meeting with a Western leader since his failed attempt to rescue the hostages a week earlier. According to Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kat¯o, “the mood in the room as they spoke was that of a father admonishing a son who had made a mistake or failure of some kind.”54 The two men moved to the Rose Garden south of the White House following the ¯ meeting. Speaking in English, Ohira touched on the situations in Iran and Afghanistan and said that “We Japanese may not be the most eloquent, but we will continue to be one of the strong and reliable friends to your country.”55

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¯ Carter praised Ohira’s speech as “excellent.” He had been on the verge of losing ¯ confidence, and Ohira’s visit to the United States at this vulnerable time strengthened the bond between the two leaders. After their speeches, the leaders signed the US¯ Japan Science and Technology Agreement. Ohira then hurried on to Canada and Mexico. Coming on the heels of hosting the Tokyo Summit and his previous visits to the United States, the Philippines, China, Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New ¯ Guinea, Ohira’s trips to Mexico and Canada were intended to help further his goal of making the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept a reality. His final travels would take a dark turn at this point, however.56

4.4 Mexico, Canada, Yugoslavia, and West Germany ¯ Ohira met with President José López Portillo in Mexico City on May 2. The chief purpose for his visit to Mexico was to lobby for an increase in Mexican oil exports to Japan, and he had had Matsunaga Nobuo, his ambassador to Mexico, make efforts ¯ in this area. Seeking to create a “New Era for Japan and Mexico,” Ohira proposed 57 an increase in exports from 100,000 to 300,000 barrels a day. The meeting Portillo began with discussions of the situations in Iran and ¯ Afghanistan, but Ohira soon turned to the energy issue: “Mexico is one of the largest non-OPEC oil producers and very much has the right to speak its piece on this. Going forward, we would like it to exercise leadership in this area. We need to increase our supply of oil from Mexico, and I am here to make our request in advance.” Portillo did not respond favorably to this request, however. ¯ Ohira again asked for an increase in the supply of oil on the following day, but the Mexicans only alluded to the 100,000 barrels a day that they had previously put forward. When Mexico requested Japanese technical and financial assistance to ¯ improve their steel industry and infrastructure, Ohira agreed to consider a program of economic assistance and cultural exchange. Japanese pressure on the oil issue continued, but Portillo responded coldly: “Japan’s request for 300,000 barrels a day has become a stumbling block. It is ¯ unfortunate that it has caused problems in our thus-far favorable relations.” Ohira could only respond by saying that Japan would “continue to make sincere efforts to promote a mutually-beneficial relationship between our countries.” When the joint statement was released following the end of the summit, its contents were bland and noncommittal.58 ¯ Portillo’s unexpected stubbornness caused Ohira to become thoroughly exhausted and irritated. He had worked long nights with staff from the foreign ministry and MITI in an attempt to devise ways to convince the Mexicans, but these efforts had proven fruitless. Another factor was the location; Mexico City’s elevation is well over ¯ 2,000 m above sea level, and the thin air was hard on the aging Ohira. This was the toughest summit he participated in during his eighteen months as prime minister.59

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He met with Canadian Prime Minister in Ottawa and Vancouver on the 5th and 6th, and the two leaders discussed trade issues and coal purchases. He became the first Japanese prime minister to address the Canadian parliament, giving a clear speech in fluent English (the result of extensive practice the night before).60 The ¯ continual travel was becoming like a forced march for Ohira, and he was exhausted ¯ and reaching his limit. A shiatsu practitioner who treated Ohira in Ottawa confided to Ambassador Suma Michiaki that they had “never seen anyone in such an exhausted state before.”61 And he repeatedly fell asleep during Trudeau’s speech in Vancouver and had to be awoken by his interpreter. ¯ Ohira had learned of Yugoslav President Josip Tito’s death as he traveled to Canada from Mexico and made arrangements to attend his funeral in Belgrade on the 8th via Bonn. Upon his arrival in Belgrade, he headed directly to the funeral despite the searing heat.62 The hourlong funeral was held outdoors under a scorching sun. After expressing his condolences to Yugoslav Prime Minister Veselin Duranovic,63 he spoke with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Hua Guofeng (who he was scheduled to meet with in Tokyo later that month) about the high price of oil and the Afghan situation.64 That evening, he returned to Bonn so that he could meet with West German Chancellor Schmidt and Economic Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff the following day. They discussed energy issues, Iran, and Afghanistan in preparation for the G7 ¯ and Schmidt had previously summit to be held in Venice the following month.65 Ohira met at the Tokyo Summit and, while they had only met briefly, the two men had been ¯ able to establish a rapport. As Ohira left, Schmidt told him that, “From now on, I will ¯ call you Ohira-san in the Japanese style rather than as Herr Prime Minister. Please call me Schmidt-san in the same way!”.66 ¯ Although the other leaders had been impressed by Ohira’s attendance at Tito’s 67 funeral, he privately did not feel positively about it, telling his close aides that “It’s not good to be away from Japan for so long. I’m going back.” He could sense that an alarming situation was growing in Tokyo, a premonition that soon proved true.68 Notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

¯ ¯ Watanabe Akio, “Kokusai Seijika toshite no Ohira Masayoshi,” in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 128– 129. Nakanishi Hiroshi, “S¯og¯o Anzen Hosh¯o-ron no Bunmyaku: Kenryoku Seiji to S¯og¯o Izon no K¯osaku,” Nenpon Seijigaku, Vol. 48 (1997), 107–108. Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon no “Midoru Paw¯a” Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Chikuma Shob¯o, 2005), 153–158. ¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 5 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2010), 170–172. ¯ ¯ “Ohira Masayoshi no Seisaku Y¯ok¯o Shiry¯o [Outline of Ohira Masayoshi’s Policies],” November 27, 1978, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Hall Collection, NDL. International Documents Department, “’Ajia Taihey¯o Chiiki K¯os¯o’ ni tsuite no Dai Ikkai Kanbu Renrakukai Kent¯o Y¯oshi [Summary Review of the First

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5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

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Executive Liaison Meeting for the “Asia–Pacific Regional Vision”],” January 12, 1967, Ajia-Taiheiy¯o Chiiki Ky¯ogikai/Setsuritsu Keii (Fukumu Dai Ikkai Kakury¯o Kaigi), 2010–512, MOFA. International Documents Department, “’Ajia-Taiheiy¯o Chiiki K¯os¯o’ Suishin no tame no T¯omen no Shisaku [Current Policy for the Promotion of the “Asia–Pacific Regional Vision”],” 2010–424, MOFA. Nagatomi Y¯uichir¯o, Kinda wo Koete, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Okura Zaimu Ky¯okai, ¯ 1983), 7–14. Nagatomi Y¯uichir¯o, “Ohira Seisaku Kenky¯ukai no Igi,” in Kyoka ¯ Sh¯ujitsu Kikigaki Ohira Masayoshi, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 388, 392. Nagatomi Y¯uichir¯o, “Kan Taiheiy¯o K¯os¯o no Teish¯o,” in Ajia-Taiheiy¯o Rentai K¯os¯o, edited by Watanabe Akio (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2005), 25–32. Sait¯o Shizuo, Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Simul Shuppankai, 1991), 119. Yamazawa Ippei, “Kantaiheiy¯o Rentai K¯os¯o wa Doredake Shinten shita ka,” in Watanabe, Ajia¯ ¯ Taiheiy¯o Rentai K¯os¯o, 51. Okawara Yoshio, Oraru Hisutor¯ı Nichibei Gaik¯o ¯ (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2006), 287–288. Fukunaga Fumio, Ohira Masayoshi (Tokyo: Ch¯uk¯o Shinsho, 2008), 259. Morita Hajime, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o ¯ no Ohira Masayoshi – Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 167– 173. Terada Takashi, Higashi Ajia to Ajia Taiheiy¯o – Ky¯og¯o suru Chiiki T¯og¯o ¯ (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2013), 41. Okita served as head of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East’s Economic Analysis Division from 1952 to 1953 and, after holding a number of positions such as that of director of the Economic Planning Agency’s Integrated Development Bureau, served a lengthy term as the Japanese chairman of the Japan-Australia Research ¯ ¯ Council. Ohira entrusted the Pacific Basin Cooperation study group to Okita ¯ and he himself became a promoter of the idea of trans-Pacific solidarity. Okita saw Japan-Australia relations as the key to grasping the Asia–Pacific in a longterm and expansive manner and interacted with Nakamura Jun’ichi, director of the foreign ministry’s Oceania Division, for many years. Interview with Nakamura Jun’ichi, October 10, 2013. ¯ Nagatomi, “Ohira Seisaku Kenky¯ukai no Igi,” 386. Konishi Toku¯o, “Miki Takeo no Seijiteki Zettaisei – Kenky¯u no Zenteiteki Shiron,” in Miki Takeo Kenky¯u, edited by the Center for the History of Meiji University and Konishi Toku¯o (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hy¯oronsha, 2011), 46–65. Komiya Hitoshi, “Miki Takeo Kenky¯u Josetsu – ‘Barukan Seijika’ no Seiji Shigen,” Momoyama H¯ogaku, No. 22 (2013), 8–9. Makihara Izuru, Kenryoku Ik¯o: Nani ga Seiji o Antei Saseru no ka? (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2013), 54–55. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:25–30. ¯ Nagatomi, “Kan Taihey¯o Rentai K¯os¯o,” 329. Nagatomi, “Ohira Seisaku Kenky¯ukai no Igi,” 391. “Speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda” https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/doc uments/texts/docs/19770818.S1E.html (accessed February 23, 2022). See also, Iokibe Makoto, et. al., Hy¯oden Fukuda Takeo – Sengo Nihon no Han’ei to Antei o Motomete (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2021), 561–72.

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Nakanishi Hiroshi, “Jiritsu-teki Ky¯och¯o no Mosaku – 1970 Nendai no Nihon Gaik¯o,” in Iokibe Makoto, ed., Sengo Nihon Gaik¯o-shi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2014), 176. Hatano Sumio and Sat¯o Susumu, Gendai Nihon no T¯onan Ajia Seisaku, 1950–2005 (Tokyo: Waseda University, 2007), 175–177. First Southeast Asia Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, “Guen Zui Chin Betonamu Shakaishugi Ky¯owakoku Fukushush¯o ken Gaish¯o no H¯onichi (Kiroku) [The Visit to Japan by Nguyen Duy Trinh, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Records)],” January 10, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 01–1234, MOFA. Ambassador to China Yoshida Kenz¯o to Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, August 19, 1979, “Enshakkan/Tai Beitonamu (Dainiji Sh¯ohin Enjo), 2012– 1987, MOFA. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, Yanagiya Kensuke Oraru Hisutor¯ı, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 89–91. First Southeast Asia Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, “Kuriensakku Taikoku Shush¯o H¯onichi no Sai no Nittai Shun¯o Kaidan Y¯oroku [Proceedings of the Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting on the Occasion of the Visit to Japan by Prime Minister Kriangsak of Thailand],” Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 03–118, MOFA. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Yanagiya Kensuke, 2:91–102. Wakatsuki Hidekazu, “Zenh¯oi Gaik¯o” no Jidai – Reisen Hen’y¯oki ni Nihon to Ajia, 1971–1980 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hy¯oronsha, 2006), 255. Hatano 188– 189. Masuo Chisako, Ch¯ugoku Seiji Gaik¯o no Tenkanten: Kaikaku Kaih¯o to “Dokuritsu Jishu no Taigai Seisaku” (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2010), 113. ¯ Hattori Ry¯uji, “Ohira, T¯o Sh¯ohei, Ka Kokuh¯o Kaidan Kiroku 1979/2,12,” Ch¯uo¯ ¯ Daigaku Ronsh¯u, No. 32 (2011), 37–42. Records of the Ohira-Deng Talks, February 7, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2010–268, MOFA. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, It¯o Keiichi Oraru Hisutor¯ı, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2003), 9, 193, 199. Toyoda Yukiko, “Ky¯ohan” no D¯omei-shi: Nichibei Mitsuyaku to Jimint¯o Seiken (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), 224–226. Morita 272. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 6:375. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), 262, 317. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:239; Cornelius K. Iida, “Ts¯uyaku ga Kiita Nichibei Shun¯o Kaidan,” Bungei Shunj¯u 67:5 (1989), 108. Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru Shisei,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 465. Wakatsuki 259–261. Toyoda 227; Ambassador the US T¯og¯o Fumihiko to Sonoda, May 3, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–720, MOFA. Nakajima Shingo, Sengo Nihon no B¯oeki Seisaku: “Yoshida Rosen” wo Meguru Seiji, Gaik¯o, Gunji (Tokyo: Keio University, 2006), 174, 178, 210.

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¯ “Memorandum of Conversation Between Carter and Ohira,” May 2, 1979, DNSA, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed on January 28, 2012). Ambassador to the Philippines Mikanagi Kiyohisa to Sonoda, May 11, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–730, MOFA. Economic Affairs Division, United Nations Bureau, “Dai Gokai UNCTAD de ¯ ¯ no Ohira S¯ori Enzetsu no Hy¯oka [Evaluation of Prime Minister Ohira’s Speech at the 5th UNCTAD],” May 19, 1979, UNCTAD Dai Gokai S¯okai/Ch¯osho ¯ (Ohira S¯ori Daijin Enzetsu, Kekka, Hy¯oka, 2013–1570, MOFA. General State¯ ment by Ohira to the 5th Session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, May 10, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–731, MOFA. Interview with Taniguchi Makoto, June 8, 2012. Mikanagi to Sonoda, May 12, 1979, Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan (UNCTAD Dai Rokkai S¯okai), 2010–6305, MOFA. ¯ Arai Shunz¯o and Morita Hajime, Bunjin Saish¯o Ohira Masayoshi (Tokyo: ¯ Shunj¯usha, 1982), 84–87. Oba Mie, Ajia Taiheiy¯o Chiiki Keisei e no D¯otei: Ky¯okai Kokka Nichig¯o no Aidentiti Mosaku to Chiiki Shugi (Tokyo: Minerva ¯ Shob¯o, 2004), 272–273. Ambassador to Australia Okawara Yoshio to Sonoda, April 11, 1979, Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan (UNCTAD Dai Rokkai S¯okai), 2010–6305, MOFA; Mikanagi to Sonoda, May 11, 1979, Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan (UNCTAD Dai Rokkai S¯okai), 2010–6305, MOFA; Oceania Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, “Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan (Kanbunkai Hokokuy¯o) [Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Report for the Directorial Meeting)],” May 12, 1979, Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan (UNCTAD Dai Rokkai S¯okai), 2010–6305, MOFA; Oceania Division, “Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan Giji Y¯oroku [Proceedings of the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting],” May 14, 1979, Nichig¯o Shun¯o Kaidan (UNCTAD Dai Rokkai S¯okai), 2010–6305, MOFA; Mikanagi to Sonoda, May 11, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–732, MOFA. Sat¯o Susumu, “Gurobaruka to Nihon Gaik¯o: Kokusai Keizai Konran to Ch¯ugoku Tait¯o no “Shokku” no Naka de,” in Reisen Hen’y¯oki no Nihon Gaik¯o: “Hiyowana Taikoku” no Kiki to Mosaku,” edited by Hatano Sumio (Kyoto:Minerva Shob¯o, 2013), 27. Interview with Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, October 2, 2010. Economic Affairs Bureau, “Dai Gokai Shuy¯okoku Shun¯o Kaigi Gijiroku [Minutes of the Fifth G7 Summit],” June 28–29, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–733, MOFA. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy Research ¯ Project, Miyazaki Hiromichi Oraru Hisutor¯ı (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), 233–237. Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, ed., Kunihiro Michi¯ hiko Oraru Hisutor¯ı, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, 2008), 278–280.

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¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:208, 213, 308, 324; 6:410–412. Kumon Shunpei, ¯ K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o, eds., Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1990), 489. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 70–71. Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru Shisei,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 468–469. Fukukawa Shinji, “S¯ori Jidai no Shisaku to Gend¯o,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 428–431. Carter 334–337. ¯ Record of Ohira’s conversation, January 1, 1980, Collection of the author. Miyazaki Hiromichi, “T¯oky¯o Samitto no Shins¯o to Nihon,” Sekai Keizai Hy¯oron 23:9 (1979), 8. Funabashi Y¯oichi, Samiitokurashi (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1991), 124–126. Morita 171–173. Xu Xianfen, Nihon no Taich¯u ODA Gaik¯o: Rieki, Paw¯a, Kachi no Dainamizumu (Tokyo: Keis¯o Shob¯o, 2011), 19. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Yanagiya Kensuke, 2:110–113. Wakatsuki 275–277. Gu Mu, Gu Mu Huiyilu (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2009), 338–339. China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, “Gu Mu Fukus¯ori no H¯onichi (Seifu Shun¯o to no Kaidanroku) [Deputy Prime Minister Gu Mu’s Visit to Japan (Records of Meetings with Heads of Government)],” September 10, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 01–1921, MOFA. Nakamura Jun’ichi, “Taich¯ugoku Shikin Ky¯oryoku no Sut¯ato,” Gekkan APIC, No. 49 (1982), 10–13. Sat¯o, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru Shisei,” 471. Interview with Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, October 2, 2010. Kanemaru Shin, Tachiwaza Newaza (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1988), ¯ ¯ 125–129. Kat¯o K¯oichi, “Waga Shi: Ohira Masayoshi ni Omou,” in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei, K¯oyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 270. Iwami Takao, S¯ori no Musume: Shirarezaru Kenryokusha no Sugao (Tokyo: Hara Shob¯o, 2010), 123. Asahi Shimbun (November 17, 2013). It¯o Masayoshi, “Yonj¯unichi K¯os¯o,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 338. Iokibe Makoto, It¯o Motoshige, and Yakushiji Katsuyuki, eds., Okamoto Yukio: Genbashugi wo Tsuranuita Gaik¯okan (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2008), 50–58. Nakajima Toshijir¯o, Gaik¯o Sh¯ogen Rokush¯u: Nichibei Anpo, Okinawa Henkan, Teanmon Jiken, edited by Inoue Masaya, Nakashima Takuma, and Hattori Ry¯uji (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012), 162–164. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 526, 546. Takayasu Kensuke, Sengo Nihon no Keizai Gaik¯o: “Nihon Im¯eji” no Saiteigi to “Shin’y¯o no Kaifuku” no D¯oryoku (Tokyo: S¯obunsha, 2009), 214–216. Xiao Xiangqian, Eien no Ringoku toshite, trans. Takeuchi Minoru (Tokyo: Simul Shuppankai, 1997), 207–214. So Sung-won, Nihon no Keizai Gaik¯o to Ch¯ugoku (Tokyo: Keio University, 2004), 68–89. Wakatsuki 278–279; Masuo 136. Masuo Chisako, “Ch¯ugoku no Kindaika to Nihon Moderu: T¯o Sh¯ohei Jidai no Nicch¯u Kankei,” in Ch¯ugoku Gaik¯o no Sekai Senryaku: Nichi, Bei,

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Ajia to no K¯ob¯o 30 Nen, edited by Zhao Hongwei, et. al (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2011), 40. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 535–537. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Yanagiya Kensuke, 2:133–136. Huang Hua, Qinli yu Jianwen: Huang Hua Huiyilu (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2007), 244. Kazankai, Nicch¯u Kankei Kihon Shiry¯oshu 1972– ¯ 2008 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 2008), 120–125. Morita 205. Hattori, “Ohira, T¯o Sh¯ohei, Ka Kokuh¯o Kaidan Kiroku 1979/2,12,” 47–69. Ambassador to China ¯ Yoshida Kenz¯o to Foreign Minister Okita Sabur¯o, December 6, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2010– ¯ 269, MOFA. Yoshida to Okita, December 7, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2010–269, MOFA. ¯ China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, “Ohira S¯ori no Ch¯ugoku H¯omon (Igi ¯ to Hy¯oka) [Prime Minister Ohira’s Visit to China (Significance and Evaluation)],” December 10, 1979, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2010–269, MOFA. M¯ori Kazuko, Nicch¯u Kankei – Sengo kara Shinjidai e (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 108–109. ¯ ¯ Xu Yiping, “Ohira Masayoshi to Ch¯ugoku no Nihongo Ky¯oiku,” Ohira ¯ Masayoshi kara Ima Manabu Koto: Ohira Masayoshi Seitan 100 Sh¯unen Kinen, edited by Kawanishi Shigetada, Xu Yiping, and Sasaki Ry¯uchi (Tokyo: Northeast Asia Research Institute, Obirin University, 2011), 39–52. Oguma ¯ Akira and Kawashima Shin, “’Ohira Gakk¯o’ to wa Nani ka (1980 Nen): Nicch¯u Chiteki K¯ory¯u Jigy¯o no Uyokyokusetsu,” in Nicch¯u Kankei-shi 1972–2012 III: Shakai, Bunka, edited by Sonoda Shigeto (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2012), 54–66. Interview with Fujita Kimio, May 17, 2013. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Yanagiya Kensuke, 2:137–138. Tien Kai, “Kantaiheiy¯o Rentai K¯os¯o no Tanj¯o: Ajia Taiheiy¯o Chiiki Keisei wo Meguru Nichig¯och¯u no Gaik¯o Inishiachibu,” Part 2, Hokudai H¯ogaku Ronsh¯u 63:6 (2013), 87–88. ¯ Oceania Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, “Ohira S¯ori no G¯osh¯u, Ny¯u J¯ırando H¯omon (Shun¯o Kaidan t¯o Gijiroku Giji Gaiy¯o) [Prime Minister ¯ Ohira’s Visit to Australia and New Zealand (Overview of Minutes of Summit Meetings, etc.)],” January 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under ¯ the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–721, MOFA. Oceania Division, “Ohira ¯ S¯ori no G¯osh¯u, NZ H¯omon (Igi to Hy¯oka) [Prime Minister Ohira’s Visit to Australia and NZ (Significance and Evaluation)],” January 24, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 03– 201, MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:268–270. Malcom Fraser, “Taiheiy¯o Ky¯od¯otai ¯ Bishion no D¯oshi,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 321–322. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies COE Oral Policy ¯ Research Project, Kikuchi Kiyoaki Oraru Hisutor¯ı, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2004), 169. Nagatomi, “Kan Taiheiy¯o Rentai K¯os¯o no Teish¯o,” 35. Interview

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¯ with Okawara Yoshio, November 28, 2012. Some studies stress the disconnect ¯ between APEC and the role of MITI, such as Oyane Satoshi, Kokusai Rej¯ımu to Nichibei no Gaik¯o K¯os¯o: WTO, APEC, FTC no Tenkan Kyokumen (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012), 120. ¯ Oceania Division, European and Asian Affairs Bureau, “Ohira S¯ori no G¯osh¯u, Ny¯u J¯ırando H¯omon (Shun¯o Kaidan t¯o Gijiroku Giji Gaiy¯o) [Prime Minister ¯ Ohira’s Visit to Australia and New Zealand (Overview of Minutes of Summit Meetings, etc.)],” January 1980, 2011–721, MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:58–59. Wakatsuki 284–285. ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Hito to Shis¯o, 546–547. Mainichi Shimbun (April 21, 1981; May 11, 1981); Morita 272–276. According to a June 27, 2012 interview with former Deputy Chief Cabinet ¯ Secretary Kat¯o K¯oichi, Ohira said that this issue should be considered when discussing the main issues of the reply to the Diet deliberations and that it was difficult to answer on the issues of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the docking of nuclear submarines. Tanaka Hitoshi and Tahara S¯oichir¯o, Kokka to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2005), 93, 193–194. Tanaka Hitoshi, Gaik¯o no Chikara (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2009), 32. ¯ Okawara 309, 325–330. Wakatsuki 290–292. Sat¯o Susumu, “Nihon no Chiiki K¯oso to Ajia Gaik¯o,” in Iwanami K¯oza: Higashi Ajia Kengendai Ts¯ushi, Vol. 9, edited by Wada Haruki, et al., (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011), 80–85. First North America Division, North American Bureau, “Nichibei Shun¯o Kaidan [Japan-US Summit Meeting],” May 2, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–477, MOFA. ¯ Kat¯o K¯oichi, “Ohira Naikaku no Ris¯o to Jittai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 295. Kat¯o K¯oichi, Atarashiki Nihon no Katachi (Tokyo: Daiyamondo-sha, 2005), 132–134. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:273. Morita Hajime, Saigo no Tabi (Tokyo: Institute for Administrative Affairs ¯ Press Office, 1981), 20. Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, “Ohira Shun¯o Gaik¯o no Kaiko,” in ¯ Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 355–356. Nakamura Jun’ichi, “Mekishiko e no Enshakkan Ky¯oyo,” Gekkan APIC, No. ¯ 50 (1982), 11. Ambassador to Mexico Matsunaga Nobuo to Okita, January 26, 1980, Mekishiko Gaik¯o, 2013–346, MOFA. ¯ Records of the Ohira-Portillo Meeting, May 2–3, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–476, MOFA. Japan-Mexico Joint Communique, May 3, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–476, MOFA. ¯ Morita, Saigo no Tabi, 26–28. Kat¯o, “Ohira Naikaku no Ris¯o to Jittai,” 299. Kikuchi Kiyoaki, “Heij¯oshin de Gaik¯o wo Yaru Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 369–372, 276. Sat¯o, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru Shisei,” 479. Fukukawa 434. Matsunaga Nobuo, Aru Gaik¯okan no Kais¯o (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2002), 97–98. Tanaka Rokusuke, MITI minister in the Suzuki Zenk¯o government, and other officials would

¯ 4 Ohira’s Final Travels

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later visit Mexico to discuss oil exports and providing yen loans. Nakamura 10–13. Interview with Nakamura Jun’ichi, November 21, 2013. ¯ Ambassador to Canada Suma Michiaki to Okita, May 5, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–475, ¯ MOFA. Vancouver Consul-General to Okita, May 6, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–475, MOFA. Letter from Haraguchi Kunihiro to the author, March 4, 2010. Interview with Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, October 2, 2010. ¯ ¯ Ambassador to Yugoslavia Nakae Y¯osuke to Okita, May 9, 1980, Ohira S¯ori Ko Chito Yugosurabia Dait¯ory¯o Kokus¯o Shusseki, 2013–983, MOFA. ¯ Muramatsu Masumi, “Ohira-san no Eigo,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, ¯ Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 506–508. Sat¯o, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru ¯ Shisei,” 480–483. Ambassador to West Germany Yoshino Bunroku to Okita, ¯ May 9, 1980, 2011–480, MOFA; Nakae to Okita, May 9, 1980, 2011–479, MOFA. ¯ Yoshino to Okita, May 9, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under ¯ the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–478, MOFA. Yoshino to Okita, May 10, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–478, MOFA. First Western Europe Division, European and ¯ Asian Affairs Bureau, “Ohira S¯ori-Ramusudorufu Seidoku Keizaish¯o Kaidan ¯ [Prime Minister Ohira’s Talk with West German Economics Minister Lambsdorff],” May 10, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–478, MOFA. First Western Europe Divi¯ sion, “Ohira S¯ori-Shumitto Shush¯o Kaidan (Ch¯ushokukai) [Prime Minister ¯ Ohira’s Talk with West German Chancellor Schmidt (Luncheon Meeting)],” May 10, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law, 2011–478, MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:273–287. Interview with a diplomat, April 1, 2010. ¯ Nakae to Okita, May 10, 1980, Chito Yugosurabia Dait¯ory¯o Seikyo, 2013–984, MOFA. ¯ Morita Hajime, “Ohira Naikaku ni Kan suru Shinjitsu,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 270–272. Nakae Y¯osuke, Ajia Gaik¯o: ¯ D¯o to Sei – Moto Ch¯ugoku Taishi Nakae Y¯osuke Oraru Hisutor¯ı, edited by Wakatsuki Hidezau et al. (Tokyo: S¯otensha, 2010), 218–224.

Conclusion: The “Eternal Now”

“They Will Enter When You Ring the Bell” ¯ Ohira finally returned to Japan on May 11, 1980. His constitution was weakening, and this unusually extended bout of foreign travel definitely reduced how long he had to live.1 On May 16, just five days later, the Socialist Party introduced a motion of no confidence against his government. The Fukuda, Miki, and Nakasone factions responded by absenteeing themselves from the Diet session. Fukuda Takeo and others gathered at the House of Representatives’ Second Members Office Building and gave no indication that they would return. When an attempt was made to persuade Fukuda to participate in the vote, he responded, “You think I can leave? Would you have me be a traitor?”. While this was going on, Tanaka Kakuei was reaching out to independent Diet members like Ozawa Ichir¯o and Ishii Hajime in an attempt to regain control of the ¯ situation and save Ohira. Tanaka had left the LDP in the wake of the Lockheed scandal but made a rare appearance here on behalf of his longtime ally.2 ¯ As Ohira waited at the dais, he was sure that the worst would not come to be. Tanaka sent him a message via Chief Cabinet Secretary It¯o Masayoshi: “Don’t show ¯ such weakness. Keep fighting.” Ohira believed that once the bell was actually rung (signaling the start of the session), Fukuda and Miki would join. When Kanemaru Shin, chair of the Diet Affairs Committee, inquired via Deputy Chief Cabinet Secre¯ tary Kat¯o whether Ohira wished to call a recess, he told him, “We’ll continue [the proceedings]. It doesn’t matter if we lose; keep going. Calling a recess now would cause chaos and you’d never be able to reopen the session. Don’t worry about my losing.” But while the members of the opposition parties took their seats after the bell was rung, members of the LDP continued to enter and leave the chamber, leaving their seats unfilled. When Abe Shintar¯o, chairman of the Policy Research Council, left and Nakasone Yasuhiro entered at the last moment, he was met with applause. After the © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 R. Hattori, Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1902-2

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chamber was sealed, the motion of no confidence passed and the body was thrown into an uproar. Not even the opposition parties who had submitted the motion had expected it to actually be successful. ¯ The atmosphere in the chamber was bizarre. Ohira told It¯o to “gather the ministers once the plenary session has ended. I will make my decision on dissolution at that point.” He tried to conceal his distress, but his face was stiff and pale. He committed to memory the names of the members of the Fukuda faction who had not absented themselves. He was greatly displeased not only with the absent LDP members but also with how Nadao Hirokichi, the speaker of the House of Representatives, had handled the motion of no confidence. He told Diet members from his faction that “A man like Nadao is no statesman.”3 The members of the cabinet gathered in their room on the second floor of the ¯ Diet building. With a serious expression, Ohira told them, “While I would like you to leave the decision of whether to dissolve the Diet or resign to me, I want to hear your opinions on the matter.” While Justice Minister Kuraishi Tadao and Finance ¯ Minister Takeshita Noboru merely said that they would leave the decision to Ohira, Home Minister Got¯oda Masaharu stressed that, “We cannot turn a blind eye to what happened today, not from the position of party politics and parliamentary governance. Rather than resign, we should ask the people who they have faith in.” Not a single ¯ member of the cabinet advocated for resigning. Ohira did not hesitate to make his decision: “I understand your views. We will dissolve the Diet.”4 ¯ In announcing his decision, Ohira said, “I truly regret the Socialist Party’s unreasonable introduction of a motion of no confidence and the support given to it by the opposition parties. I also regret the absences by some within the Liberal Democratic Party which disrupted party discipline and allowed this motion to pass.” As not even the opposition parties had expected the motion of no confidence to pass, ¯ Ohira’s dissolution of the Diet was dubbed the “Unexpected Dissolution” (hapuningu kaisan) by the press.5 ¯ Ohira met with Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng on May 27 and 28, and the two leaders discussed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the situation in Cambodia, and Sino-Japanese cultural exchange. He showed his determination to prevail in the coming general election: “The motion of no confidence may have passed, but I have no doubt that, within a month, all of this will have been resolved and it will be a ¯ thing of the past.” This was the first visit to Japan by a Chinese premier and Ohira’s 6 final meeting with a foreign head of government.

“I will be Back” ¯ Ohira’s dissolution of the House of Representatives meant that the first joint election ¯ of the Diet in Japanese history would be held on June 22. Ohira gave his first speech of the campaign from atop a van in Shinjuku on May 30, the same day that the date of the House of Councillors election was announced. His words were primarily focused on foreign policy and national security:

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First of all, our party has a solemn responsibility to ensure the peace and security of our country. […] For us to denounce our current security framework, as the Socialists and Communists demand, would inevitably lead us down the path to becoming a military power. […] Second, the Liberal Democratic Party has the heavy responsibility of protecting the lives of the Japanese people. […] Third, it is my belief that we will be unable to fulfill our generation’s responsibilities if we do not make the preparations needed to provide a secure future for our adorable children.7

¯ In his fifteen-minute-long speech, Ohira repeatedly emphasized “responsibility.” This was because his political life was at stake in this election. According to Kishi ¯ Nobusuke, who was present for the event, Ohira’s speech was “unusually impassioned and excited, so much so that I wondered what was going on.” The speech, which ¯ would be one of Ohira’s last, was breathtaking.8 ¯ About two-thirds of the way through the speech, something happened to Ohira. His voice became hoarse, as if he was having difficulty speaking, and he seemed to cling to the handrail in front of him. He somehow managed to pull himself together and finish the speech, but when he descended from the van, he was in a cold sweat and complained of a pain in the back of his throat. As he was drenched in sweat, he returned to LDP headquarters to change his clothes. While his secretary advised that they should cancel that afternoon’s campaign ¯ events, Ohira rejected the suggestion. “That would be terrible. I’m sure that they’ve already started gathering people for them, so I’m going to go.” He then attended four events, including one at Yokohama Station. He was examined by a doctor after returning home to Setagaya that evening. When the doctor advised “immediate hospi¯ talization and complete rest,” Ohira grudgingly agreed but vowed, “I will be back.” He was admitted to Toranomon Hospital early the following morning.9 ¯ Ohira had suffered a heart attack. He had previously been diagnosed with diabetes and gout, but this was the first indication of any heart problems. He told his secretary, “It was a heart attack? I had absolutely no idea. In that case, it was completely unreasonable of me to have given four speeches in Yokohama.” The pain subsided ¯ after a few days, and Ohira declared himself “better.” Heart attacks cause necrosis and a recurrence can be dangerous, but he believed himself to be on the road to recovery.10 ¯ Ohira was concerned about the coming election and the domestic political situation. When he learned that Suzuki Zenk¯o, chairman of the General Council, had ¯ made a reference to the “post-Ohira” era, he privately vented his anger to It¯o: “So, this is what he thinks of me? What the hell is this?” He also gave his appraisal of Nakasone: “He was present in the chamber during the no confidence vote; he has integrity as a party man.”11 ¯ Ohira invited three reporters to his hospital room on the morning of June 8 with the intention of showing the electorate that he was in good health. Their discussion was brief and innocuous:

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We’re representatives of the Cabinet Press Association. Ah, thank you so much for coming. How are you feeling? I’m feeling well. What have you been thinking about during your stay in the hospital? I’ve thought about nothing but the election. What are you most concerned about right now? I only want to recover as quickly as possible. What is the first thing you want to do, once you’ve recovered and have left the hospital? I haven’t given that any thought. I’ve just focused on getting well quickly and getting back to work… What would you most like to convey to the Japanese people right now? That I hope they will be able to manage the two important elections that I called well. I embarked on this without having made adequate preparations and I hope that the Japanese people can execute them well. There is hope that you will get well and be able to attend the [Venice] summit. Thank you.12

¯ Ohira confided to his secretary that, “the summit is of little importance. What is important is stabilizing the political situation…” Tanaka Kakuei refrained from ¯ visiting Ohira in the hospital as he knew it would cause a scene, but the two men spoke by telephone.13 ¯ As late as June 10, the prognosis for Ohira was considered favorable. He cheerfully told It¯o that he would potentially be able to attend the G7 summit, which was scheduled for June 22. It¯o replied, “The newspapers are acting like you won’t be there, so let’s show them up by having you attend.” It¯o’s assessment at the time was ¯ that there was an eighty to ninety percent chance that Ohira would be able to go.14

5:54 a.m. ¯ On June 11, Ohira met with Secretary-General Sakurauchi Yoshio and Secretary Kimura Mitsugi for a report on the election. He listened intently and commented on candidates who he felt needed special attention. That evening, he met with Sat¯o Yoshiyasu from the foreign ministry to discuss the Venice summit. He seemed to be recovering well and cheerfully told Tanaka Rokusuke later that day that he would be able to go to Venice. He received a foot massage and then fell asleep. He awoke at midnight and, after asking the time, went back to sleep.

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His condition suddenly changed shortly after 2 a.m., when a nurse detected an ¯ abnormality in his electrocardiogram. The medical staff performed CPR, but Ohira ¯ did not regain consciousness. Morita Hajime and Ohira’s family rushed to the room. Shigeko told a close friend over the phone that “Something is wrong with his heart. He’s been put on artificial respiration but may die.” Her voice was heartbreaking to hear. ¯ By the time It¯o and Tanaka Rokusuke arrived, Ohira had stopped breathing, but his heart still showed slight movement. Two doctors climbed on top of his chest and fervently performed chest compressions, but only faint sounds occasionally escaped ¯ Ohira’s mouth. As his family and aides stood watch, it was apparent by 4 a.m. that his death was fast approaching. The doctors continued to provide artificial respiration, but Tanaka, no longer able to bear the situation, shouted, “Stop already! It’s over, isn’t it?” The doctors stopped ¯ and, at 5:54 a.m., Ohira was pronounced dead. The cause of death was acute heart failure due to myocardial infarction and he had suffered two broken ribs.15 ¯ Tanaka and Morita were unable to hold back their tears and clung to Ohira. Tanaka rubbed the limbs of the still-warm body and Morita smoothed his hair with a comb. This was the death of a serving prime minister, ten days before a joint election. He was seventy at the time of death.16 ¯ Immediately before Ohira’s death, It¯o had called Tanaka Kakuei through his secre¯ tary. Tanaka was struck speechless by the news that Ohira’s life was in danger. But ¯ by the time he arrived at the hospital at 6:15 a.m., Ohira had already passed away. Attentive of his surroundings, he asked whether the proper notifications of Ohira’s death had been made. His voice was filled with tears as he called his secretary to inform him of the news. Members of the cabinet such as Mut¯o Kabun arrived as the news spread.17 Tanaka later reflected on these events: I rushed to Toranomon Hospital to see him, but it was all over when I arrived. We had been friends for more than thirty years, and he had wanted to tell me something in his final moments. Why is it that, despite returning to Tokyo to hear those words, I was unable to meet and speak with him while he was still alive? This question will never leave my mind. I cannot stop dwelling on it, no matter how much time passes. It will remain with me for the rest of my days. All I can do now is pray for the repose of my departed friend’s soul.18

¯ Ohira’s eldest daughter, Yoshiko, had been unable to leave her home in Kagawa to see her father in the hospital, as Tanaka Kakuei had advised that the newspapers would ¯ ¯ interpret such a visit as a sign that Ohira’s condition was serious. Ohira worried about her and felt indebted to her for staying away. Morita, who was Yoshiko’s husband, ¯ called her at 2 a.m. on the 12th after Ohira’s condition became critical. “I’m sorry, these are your father’s final moments… I will stay by his side until the very end and watch over him.” Yoshiko immediately readied a brush and began copying Buddhist sutras. She wrote out page after page, praying that “if it is his time, may he at least not suffer.” When she received word of his death at dawn, she gave her thanks to the campaign

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¯ workers who had spent the night in Ohira’s office and then hurried to Toranomon ¯ Hospital. Ohira appeared cramped in his coffin.19

The “Eternal Now” ¯ Ohira’s death caused the LDP to win a crushing victory in the June 22 election. ¯ Among those elected was Morita, who ran on short notice in Ohira’s district. Even ¯ candidates belonging to the factions who had opposed Ohira managed to win election by embracing his memory.20 ¯ A funeral for Ohira was held at the Budokan on July 9 under the joint auspices of the cabinet and the LDP. It¯o served as the funeral’s chairman. While there were those within the party who felt that he deserved a state funeral as he had died in office, It¯o ¯ believed that “a modest approach would suit Ohira better” and thus he adopted the joint cabinet-LDP approach. On the day of the funeral, it was as if the heavens themselves were mourning ¯ Ohira. The skies in downtown Tokyo were heavily overcast and a light drizzling rain fell on and off from the morning. At one point, this turned into a heavy downpour that prevented many of the attendees from advancing. Following a silent prayer at 2 ¯ p.m., a recording of the administrative policy speech that Ohira had delivered to the Diet was played. It¯o then gave a memorial address in which he spoke of carrying on ¯ Ohira’s legacy: “Even if we are lacking in ability, we pledge ourselves to following your spirit, restoring faith in politics, and ushering in a new era.” The funeral was attended by more than six thousand attendees from all walks of life. An imperial envoy was present, as were 254 foreign representatives from 108 countries.21 Heads of state and government from fourteen countries paid their respects, including President Carter, Premier Hua Guofeng, Prime Minister Fraser, and South Korean Prime Minister Park Chung-hoon.22 They were followed by former prime ministers Kishi Nobusuke, Tanaka Kakuei, Miki Takeo, and Fukuda Takeo, all ¯ of whom bowed deeply to Ohira’s portrait. Their appearance here stood in marked contrast to that shown during the 40-Day Conflict and the fierce infighting that had led to the passage of the motion of no confidence just a few weeks earlier. With his ¯ death, Ohira had opened a path to political stability. In the back, 4,000 members of the public formed a long line. Some held incense, while others wished to offer flowers from their homes or oil paintings they had made. Everyone, from students to the elderly, were soaked by the rain.23 ¯ Carter and Hua were among those who paid condolence calls to Ohira’s home in Setagaya. Carter told Shigeko that “We were united not just in our strong friendship; ¯ we were Christian brothers.” And Hua repeated Ohira’s words that “Sino-Japanese friendship should be expanded and developed on so that it may become a shared asset of Asia and the entire world; it should go beyond being wealth that belongs to just China and Japan.” For a Japanese prime minister to establish bonds with American and Chinese heads of state that transcended mere national interest was truly rare.24

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¯ As he paid his respects at Ohira’s house, Tanaka said, “I have lived for sixty-two years, and we were friends for thirty-one or two of them. He was a man full of caution while I was lacking in it. Put the two of us together and you had just the right amount. But while I drank alcohol, he refrained. And that meant that was unable to rid himself of stress.”25 ¯ It¯o had the following epitaph carved on Ohira’s grave: You lived in the eternal now You died while serving as prime minister You never gave up in the pursuit of your ideals Even after falling26

The phrase “the eternal now” that It¯o had written on the gravestone was a reference ¯ to one of Ohira’s earlier writings: When God blessed each of us with the “eternal now,” was it not because He expected us to each do what we could to contribute to eternity? It is important to establish one’s own identity. And there must be a “backbone” that runs through that identity to its very core – an ever-evolving personal methodology born of studying, searching, and reflecting. Without such an identity, we would be alienated from history and disqualified from participating in its formation.

¯ Ohira’s philosophy was that it was possible to view and evaluate things not from the perspective of the masses or the media, but from that of God, and that one could grow by seeking out contributions that could be made to the future.27 ¯ Ohira’s grave can be found in Tama Cemetery in Tokyo alongside where his son Masaki still sleeps.

Responsible Conservatism ¯ What would have happened had Ohira not passed away so suddenly? Perhaps the ¯ LDP would have had a difficult election and lost power. Ohira had decided that, should that be the case, he would resign not just as prime minister, but from the House of Representatives as well. He once said, “Once I stop being prime minister, I will retire from politics. I’m going to spend my old age helping raise the youth of my hometown.”28 ¯ Ohira would perhaps have used his final moments in office to make the nuclear secret agreements public, explaining the security aspects of port calls by nuclearequipped naval vessels and seeking the public’s understanding. He had been persistent in his desire to bring about a resolution to the nuclear issue, and it seems highly likely that he would have taken that responsibility upon himself as he resigned as both prime minister and as a member of the Diet.29 ¯ So, how should Ohira’s time as prime minister be assessed? Few Japanese politi¯ cians have held so many important positions prior to becoming prime minister. Ohira

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had a wealth of experience, having served as chief cabinet secretary, minister of foreign affairs (for two terms), minister of international trade and industry, minister of finance, and party secretary-general. He had also notably served as a de facto deputy prime minister during the Tanaka government and guided it towards the normalization of relations with China during his time as foreign minister. It seems fair to state that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was the greatest ¯ achievement of Ohira’s life. Those who serve well as a second-in-command do not always shine when it is ¯ their turn at the top, however. Ohira drew up plans for the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept as prime minister, but he had few successes in the domestic policies he pursued, such as his failure to introduce a general consumption tax. He had high aspirations, but it is hard to deny the impression that much of his time was spent mired in political disputes (as most notably symbolized by the 40-Day Conflict). It¯o ¯ ¯ remarked that “Ohira was unable to do even a tenth of what he had wanted to.” Ohira had a personal philosophy and was able to earn the respect of everyone around him, but he was also someone that the public found difficult to grasp.30 ¯ In recent years, however, Ohira has been undergoing a reassessment. Despite ¯ belonging to a different political party than Ohira, former prime minister Noda Yoshihiko has argued that there is much to learn from him: Recently I have come to believe that something we need to do today is learn from the way ¯ that Ohira Masayoshi governed. ¯ Ohira tried to guide public opinion rather than pander to it. […] He was a pioneer of the theory of “limited government.” […] I think that we can learn a great deal from the backbone he showed in explaining to the public what needed to be done and his attempts to gain their understanding.31

But what of his foreign policy? According to Kat¯o K¯oichi, “I think that, as one would ¯ expect, Ohira’s real strength lay in diplomacy. He was the longest serving postwar foreign minister, but it was what he accomplished during that time that is impressive, not merely his longevity.” And It¯o said that “on the international level, he adopted a stance that made it clear that Japan belonged to the Western bloc.”32 Serving during the transitory period from détente to the New Cold War, a time marked by the Second Oil Crisis, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion ¯ of Afghanistan, Ohira clearly articulated foreign and security policies that focused on relations with the United States. However, rather than trying to maintain a sole commitment to the US, he sought to balance this with diplomatic initiatives aimed at Asia and proposed the creation of a multilayered order in the Pacific Rim. In this respect, his approach differed greatly from the Fukuda Doctrine put forward by his predecessor which concentrated on the pursuit of friendly relations with ¯ ¯ Southeast Asia. According to Okita Sabur¯o, the Ohira government was the first Japanese government to move beyond bilateral relations and begin acting from a global perspective.33 ¯ Ohira’s actions were supported by the cooperative relations he was able to establish with other important global actors. He was trusted not just by American leaders but by those from China, West Germany, and Australia. In some respects, he anticipated

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Nakasone’s approach to foreign policy, such as his clear statement that the US-Japan relationship was an “alliance” and his reference to Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Underlying these were the sense of responsibility he felt as a member of the conservative mainstream.34 ¯ A defining characteristic of Ohira was that he attempted to follow through on his sense of duty as a responsible conservative rather than focus on the immediate political situation. That this was not accepted by his contemporaries may have been because they were concerned by the reactions of the public and the media. ¯ Ohira’s remains were divided, with some placed in Tama Cemetery and some laid to rest in his hometown of Toyohama. His tombstone in Toyohama is located in a pine grove near the coast, looking out over the Seto Inland Sea’s Hiuchi-nada where he played as a child. Notes 1. 2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

Kat¯o K¯oichi. Ima Seiji wa Nani wo Subeki ka: Shinseiki Nihon no Sekkeizu (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 1999), 207. Iokibe Makoto, It¯o Motoshige, and Yakushiji Katsuyuki, eds., Mori Yoshir¯o: Jimint¯o to Seiken K¯otai (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2007), 76. Mori Yoshir¯o, Watashi no Rirekisho: Mori Yoshir¯o Kaikoroku (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2013), 136. Ikeda Mitsue, “Kokoro no Atatakai Kata Deshita,” in Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu Kiki¯ gaki Ohira Masayoshi, edited by the Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 2000), 197–198. It¯o Masaya, “Ikeda Naikaku no Kajitoriyaku,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 338–340. Oku Akiomi, “Y¯uzei de Nichonch¯u wo Otomoshite,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 454. Fukukawa Shinji, “S¯ori Jidai no Shisaku to Gend¯o,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foun¯ dation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 435. Morita Hajime, Kokoro no Itt¯o – Kais¯o no Ohira Masayoshi – Sono Hito to Gaik¯o (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2010), 272–273. Iwami Takao, S¯ori no Musume: Shirarezaru Kenryokusha no Sugao (Tokyo: Hara Shob¯o, 2010), 124. Takeshita Noboru, Sh¯ogen – Honshu Seiken (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1991) 126–127. Got¯oda Masaharu, J¯o to Ri – Kamisori Got¯oda Kaikoroku, edited by Mikuriya Takashi (Tokyo: K¯odansha Plus Alpha Bunko, 2006), 24. Got¯oda Masaharu, “Watashi no Rirekisho,” in Watashi no Rirekisho – Hoshu Seiken no Ninaite, edited by Kishi Nobusuke et al. (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2007), 313. Gifu Shimbun-sha, ed., Shisei Ikkan: Mut¯o Kabun Hanseiki (Gifu: Gifu Shimbun-sha, 2008), 136. ¯ ¯ Ohira Masayoshi, Ohira Masayoshi Zenchosakush¯u, Vol. 5 (Tokyo: K¯odansha, 2010), 69. Wakatsuki Hidekazu, “Zenh¯oi Gaik¯o” no Jidai – Reisen Hen’y¯oki ni Nihon to ¯ Ajia, 1971–1980 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hy¯oronsha, 2006), 299–300. Okita to Ambassador to China Yoshida Kenz¯o, May 28, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 04–1024, MOFA.

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7. 8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17.

18.

Conclusion: The “Eternal Now”

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ka Kokuh¯o S¯ori H¯onichi Shun¯o Kaidant¯o ni okeru Hatsugen (Komokubetsu)” [Premier Hua Guofeng’s Visit to Japan, Remarks at Summit Meeting, etc. (Itemized)], June 2, 1980, Foreign Ministry Documents Disclosed Under the Freedom of Information Law 02–110, MOFA. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:17–19. Kishi Nobusuke, Yatsugi Kazuo, and It¯o Takashi, Kishi Nobusuke no Kais¯o (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 1981), 256. Iwami Takao, Enzetsu Ryoku (Tokyo: Hara Shob¯o, 2009), 96. Fukukawa, “S¯ori Jidai no Shisaku to Gend¯o,” 437–438. Okuno Seisuke, Ha ni Tayorazu, Gi wo Wsurezu: Okuno Seisuke Kaikoroku (Tokyo: PHP Research Institute, 2002), 259. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 274–276. It¯o Masayoshi, “Yonj¯unichi K¯os¯o,” in Kenryoku no Ch¯us¯u ga Kataru Jimint¯o no Sanj¯unen, edited by the Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, ¯ 1985), 233–235. Kunimasa Takeshige, Kenryoku no By¯oshitsu: Ohira S¯ori Saigo no 14 Kakan (Tokyo: Bungei Shunj¯u, 2007), 94–95. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 5:23–24. Uji Toshihiko, Jissha: 1995 Nen Taisei (Tokyo: Daiichi H¯oki, 2013), 210–213. ¯ ¯ ¯ Yasuda Masaharu, “Ogata no Seijika: Ohira Masayoshi,” in Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, edited by Kumon Shunpei, Koyama Ken’ichi, and Sat¯o Seizabur¯o (Tokyo: Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, 1994), 469. Kunimasa 163, 272. Record of It¯o Masayoshi’s conversation, June 12, 1980, Author’s collection. Death certificate, June 12, 1980, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Hall Collection (transferred to the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, NDL). ¯ Prime Minister’s Secretariat, ed., “Ko Ohira Masayoshi” Naikaku, Jiy¯u Minshu-t¯o G¯od¯o S¯ogi Kiroku (Tokyo: Prime Minister’s Secretariat, 1981), 1. Kimura Mitsugi, “Ihin wo Kokoro no Sasae ni shite,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 524–527. Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, “Yowakimono ni Taisuru Shisei,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 484–489. Shima Keiji, “Nintaizuyoi Hito Deshita,” in Masayoshi ¯ Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 234. Tanaka Kakuei, “Ohira Masayoshi Kimi no Omoide,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, ¯ Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku: Tsuis¯o-hen, 31–36. Tanaka Rokusuke, “Rekishi no Shimei wo Hatashita Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 251–254. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 277–278. Kimura Mitsugi, “Ihin wo Kokoro no Sasae ni shite,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 526. Kimura Mitsugu, S¯ori no Hinkaku – Kantei Hishokan ga Mita Rekidai Saish¯o no Sugao (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2006), 157. Sat¯o Akiko, Tanaka Kakuei (Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2005), 137. Gifu Shimbun-sha, ed., Shisei Ikkan: Mut¯o Kabun Hanseiki (Gifu: Gifu Shimbun-sha, 2008), 139–140. ¯ Tanaka Kakuei, “Ohira Masayoshi Kimi no Omoide,” in Masayoshi Ohira ¯ Memorial Foundation, Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku: Tsuis¯o-hen, 395.

Conclusion: The “Eternal Now”

19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

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¯ Watanabe Mitsuko, “Sofu, Ohira Masayoshi no Shi to Haha no Shaky¯o,” Bungei Shunj¯u 91:10 (2013), 249–250. Oku Akiomi, “Y¯uzei de Nichonch¯u wo Otomoshite,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 459–460. ¯ Prime Minister’s Secretariat 411, 416–421, 435. Kawauchi Issei, Ohira Seiken 554 Nichi: Mizukara no Seimei wo Kakete Hoshu Seiji wo Mamotta (Tokyo: Institute for Administrative Affairs Press Office, 1982), 250. Uji Toshihiko, Suzuki Seiken: 863 Nichi (Tokyo: Institute for Administration Affairs Press Office, 1983) 32. Tanaka Rokusuke, “Rekishi no Shimei wo Hatashita Hito,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 254–255. Fraser also paid a condolence call to the Japanese embassy in Australia. Interview with Ambassador to Australia Tajima Takashi, November 14, 2011. Prime Minister’s Secretariat 413. Kawauchi 250. Okina Ky¯ujir¯o, “S¯ori no ¯ Fukaku” [The Prime Minister’s Dignity], in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira ¯ Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 525–526. Sat¯o Yoshiyasu, “Ohira Shun¯o Gaik¯o no ¯ Kaiko,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 356, ¯ 359. Kat¯o K¯oichi, “Ohira Naikaku no Ris¯o to Jittai,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 298. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), 443–446. Letter from John K. ¯ Emmerson to Ohira Shigeko, June 13, 1980, John K. Emmerson Papers, Box 8, Hoover Institute, Stanford University. ¯ “Ka Kokuh¯o S¯ori no Ohira S¯ori Shitei H¯omen” [Premier Hua Guofeng’s ¯ Visit to Prime Minister Ohira’s Private Residence], July 9, 1980, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Hall Collection (transferred to the Modern Japanese Political ¯ History Materials Room, NDL). “K¯ar¯a Dait¯ory¯o no Ohira S¯ori Shitei H¯omon” ¯ [President Carter’s Visit to Prime Minister Ohira’s Private Residence], July 9, 1980, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Hall Collection (transferred to the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, NDL). Tsutsumi Seiji, Kunimasa Takeshige, and Morita Yoshiko, “Sh¯ohizei Z¯ozei ¯ nara Ohira Masayoshi ni Manabe,” Bungei Shunj¯u 88:10 (2010) 134. Okina 526. ¯ Ohira, Zenchosakush¯u, 2:161, 240, 278–279. ¯ It¯o Masayoshi, “Ohira Masayoshi to iu Seijika,” in Kumon, K¯oyama, and ¯ Sat¯o, Ohira Masayoshi: Seijiteki Isan, 265. It¯o Masaya, Jimint¯o Sengokushi (Tokyo: Chikuma Bunko, 2009) 2:212–213. Iwami Takao, S¯ori no Musume: Shirarezaru Kenryokusha no Sugao (Tokyo: Hara Shob¯o, 2010), 117, 126. ¯ According to It¯o Masayoshi, the LDP would have lost the election if Ohira had not passed away. Record of It¯o’s conversation, November 4, 1999, Author’s Collection. Morita, Kokoro no Itt¯o, 275–276. Based on statement by Morita Hajime on Mainichi Broadcasting Radio, April 6, 2010. Kimura, S¯ori no Hinkaku, 139. Nakasone Yasuhiro, “Rinen wo Motta Ky¯ud¯o no Seijika,” in Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, Kyoka Sh¯ujitsu, 317. Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku,” Voice, No. 406 (2011), 53.

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Conclusion: The “Eternal Now”

32.

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