Japan and its Partners in the Indo-Pacific: Engagements and Alignment 2022056702, 2022056703, 9781032491776, 9781032494067, 9781003393634

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JAPAN AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

The book studies the development of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. As strategic competition grows, the lessons from the pandemic, the deepening Sino-US rivalry, and the United States losing grip on the current world strategic environment all compel Japan to focus its attention on the Indo-Pacific region. The volume examines Japan’s foreign policy through an analysis of its strategic agenda, economic calculations, maritime security concerns, and soft-power policies. It looks at Japan’s relations with United States, Australia, India, Vietnam, Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States in the context of Japan’s bilateral and multilateral arrangements. An important contribution to the study of politics in the Indo-Pacific region, the book will be an indispensable resource for students and researchers of political science, international relations, foreign policy, geopolitics, security studies, strategic studies, as well as area studies – namely, East and Southeast Asian studies and Indo-Pacific studies. Srabani Roy Choudhury is Professor of Japanese Studies at the Center for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. For over three decades, she has promoted Japanese studies in India through her teaching, research and supervision. She has conducted research in collaboration with various universities and think tanks in Japan. In light of the power fluidity in the Indo-Pacific region, she currently focuses on understanding the dynamics of India-Japan relations in this region through developmental lenses.

INDO-PACIFIC IN CONTEXT

This series brings together topical research on contemporary and long-standing issues encompassing the Asia-Pacific region. With countries steeped in history, communities diverse in cultures, developing economies and emerging markets, Asia-Pacific has emerged as the key stakeholder in a world order in flux. The region has solidified its presence in the global political discourse through multilateral initiatives, defence agreements, and strategic partnerships. It has emerged as a zone of contestations, conflict, and cooperation. The works published in this series showcase interdisciplinary research in the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences, including a range of subject areas such as politics and international relations, international economy, sociology and social anthropology, women, gender and sexuality studies, history, geo-politics, military studies, area studies, cultural studies, environment and sustainability, development studies, migration studies, urban development, digital humanities, and science and technology studies. Works in the series are published simultaneously in UK/US and South Asia editions, as well as in e-book format. We welcome a range of books aimed at furthering scholarship and understanding of the Asia-Pacific region. Authors and researchers interested in contributing to this series may get in touch with [email protected] HANDBOOK OF INDO-PACIFIC STUDIES Edited by Barbara Kratiuk, Jeroen J. J. Van den Bosch, Aleksandra Jaskólska and Yoichiro Sato JAPAN AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC Engagements and Alignment Edited by Srabani Roy Choudhury For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Indo-Pacific-in-Context/book-series/IPC

JAPAN AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC Engagements and Alignment

Edited by

Srabani Roy Choudhury

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Srabani Roy Choudhury; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Srabani Roy Choudhury to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Roy Choudhury, Srabani, editor. Title: Japan and its partners in the Indo-Pacific : engagements and alignment / edited by Srabani Roy Choudhury. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022056702 (print) | LCCN 2022056703 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032491776 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032494067 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003393634 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Geopolitics--Indo-Pacific Region. | Indo-Pacific Region--Foreign relations--Japan. | Japan--Foreign relations--Indo-Pacific Region. | Indo-Pacific Region--Foreign economic relations--Japan. | Japan--Foreign economic relations--Indo-Pacific Region. | Indo-Pacific Region--Strategic aspects. Classification: LCC DS341.3.J3 J355 2023 (print) | LCC DS341.3.J3 (ebook) | DDC 327.5205--dc23/eng/20230123 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022056702 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022056703 ISBN: 978-1-032-49177-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-49406-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-39363-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634 Typeset in Sabon by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive)

CONTENTS

vii ix xiv xviii xix

List of Illustrations List of Contributors Preface Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations 1 Japan’s Unwavering Commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: Generating Synergy among Partners Toward a Common Vision

1

TOSHIHIDE ANDO

2 Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: The Economic Calculation 14 SRABANI ROY CHOUDHURY

3 The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy: Evolving Japan’s Maritime Security Strategy

36

PRAKASH PANNEERSELVAM

4 The Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Japan’s “Soft” PushShaping Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia and India

53

JANASHRUTI CHANDRA AND MADHURA GANGULI

5 The Japan-US Relationship: Imagining Its Future in the Indo-Pacific Era

77

PETER HARRIS AND MERIEL HAHN

6 Japan and Australia Relations: A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Pacific Century THOMAS WILKINS

v

95

C ontents

7 Japan-India Relations in Japan’s Notion of Indo-Pacific: Genesis, Difference, and Convergence

110

KAZUTOSHI TAMARI

8 Japan-India Relations: Changing Contours for Regional Prosperity 124 SHAMSHAD AHMAD KHAN

9 Japan-Vietnam Relations: Factoring Vietnam in Abe’s Southeast Asia Policy

149

DO THU HA

10 Japan-Indonesia Relations: Counterbalancing Power Play and the Role of Japan

169

YOHANES SULAIMAN

11 Japan-Africa Relations: Looking at a Constructive Engagement

186

YOSHIAKI FURUZAWA

12 Japan-South Korean Relations: Addressing the Deadlock

202

KAN KIMURA

218

Index

vi

ILLUSTRATIONS

Tables 2.1 Disbursement in Yen of JICA Program in Africa (2019) 27 2.2 Disbursement in Yen of JICA Program in the Middle East (2019) 28 3.1 Snapshot of Japan’s MoD Approach to FOIP 42 3.2 Japan’s High-Level Defense Cooperation with Select Indo-Pacific Countries 44 3.3 JMSDF Strategy 46 7.1 Chronological Tabulation of The Early Years of the “Indo-Pacific”114 7.2 Chronological Tabulation of Japan’s Policy Shift on “Indo-Pacific” in 2018 117 11.1 Overview of TICAD (1993–2019) 191 12.1 References to Japan-Related Issues in Chosun Ilbo, 1945–2019205

Figures 2.1 Breakup of Japan’s Current Account 2.2 Japan’s Connectivity Initiatives 2.3 Number and Total Investment Approved by Sector (as of February 2021) 2.4 Japan’s Outward FDI in FOIP Region (Base Year 2000) 2.5 Japan’s Outward FDI Stock in FOIP Region 2.6 Country-Wise Positioning of Japan’s FDI and ODA 2019 (USD Billions) 3.1 Geospatial Distribution of JMSDF Bilateral Maritime Exercise with the United States, India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific Region 4.1 Overall Image of Cool Japan Strategy to Make Large Profits

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17 23 26 30 31 32 49 57

I llustrations

4.2 Country-Wise Breakup of Foreign Students in Japan in 2019 68 4.3 Trends in the Number of Students Going from Foreign Studies to Japan 68 10.1 Comparison of Military Expenditure between China, Indonesia, and ASEAN 176 12.1 Schematic Model of Japan-South Korea Disputes 206 12.2 Share of South Korean Trade 206 12.3 Share of Chinese Trade 209 12.4 Japanese People’s Perception of South Korea 212 12.5 How Do You Understand the Government Policy on the Comfort Women Issue? 213 12.6 How Do You Understand the Government Policy Toward Japan? 214

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CONTRIBUTORS

Srabani Roy Choudhury is Professor of Japanese Studies at the Center for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. For over three decades, she has promoted Japanese studies in India through her teaching, research and supervision. She has conducted research in collaboration with various universities and think tanks in Japan. In light of the power !uidity in the Indo-Paci”c region, she currently focuses on understanding the dynamics of India-Japan relations in this region through developmental lenses. Toshihide Ando currently serves as Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Japan in New Delhi. Before assuming his current position as Minister and DCM, he was Deputy Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs/Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) where his portfolio includes Southeast Asia (including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)), Australia, New Zealand and Pacific island countries, as well as regional policy. He also served as Deputy Press Secretary and Deputy Director-General for Press and Public Diplomacy (2017–18), Director for Public Diplomacy Strategy (2016–17) and Director for Regional Policy in the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2014–16). He has an extensive diplomatic career in wide-ranging fields, including North American, Asia-Pacific and economic affairs. His overseas assignments include Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister-Counselor at the Embassy of Japan in Singapore (2012–14), Political and Public Affairs Counselor at the Embassy of Japan in the United States (2010–12) and Political Counselor at the Embassy of Japan in Australia (2007–10). He also served as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary at the Office of the Prime Minister (2003–05). He received a BA in economics at the University of Tokyo in Japan (1989) and a BA in political science at Williams College in the United States (1992). Janashruti Chandra has been teaching the Japanese language at the Center for Japanese Studies, JNU, New Delhi as an Assistant Professor since 2002. Before that, she was a MEXT scholar and recipient of the Osaka Prefectural ix

C ontributors

Scholarship and has spent considerable time in Japan as a student. Her research interests lie in the fields of sociolinguistics, teaching methodology, translation studies, Japanese culture studies and children’s literature. She was engaged in drafting school textbooks of the Japanese language in collaboration with the Japan Foundation and is at present designing the certificate course program in the online mode for JNU. She has been a Visiting Research scholar at Osaka University under the Japan Foundation Fellow Program and has to her credit several research papers presented in both National and International forums. She has held the post of Secretary at the Japanese Language Association of India (JALTAI) since 2017 and has been actively promoting Japanese language and culture in India. Yoshiaki Furuzawa is Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, Japan. His research interests lie in peacebuilding – especially police reform – in Africa, regionalism in Africa, Japanese policy toward Africa and the issue of collective memory in transitional and post-conflict countries. While numerous errands have taken him to various African countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Africa and Tanzania), he has conducted fieldwork numerous times in Kenya and Sierra Leone. He received his BA in international relations from the University of Tsukuba (Japan), MA in conflict resolution from the University of Bradford (United Kingdom) and PhD from Hiroshima University (Japan). He was a visiting research fellow funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of St. Andrews (United Kingdom) in the winter of 2010. Most of his writings are written in Japanese, but some are written in English. His writings can also be found in the Palgrave Encyclopaedia of Peace and Conflict Studies (forthcoming) and Encyclopaedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict (3rd ed, forthcoming). He is currently writing a book (in English) on policing reform in Africa. Madhura Ganguli is a researcher whose area of interest lies in soft-power diplomacy and its effects on both internal and external policies of the state. Having completed her PhD at JNU (New Delhi) in international relations, on cultural politics of Canadian theater and its implications, she has continued to work in the field of South East Asian soft-power diplomacy and the use of mass media and technology in South Korea and other Southeast Asian countries. She has written on and reviewed research papers on diplomacy, culture and soft-power policies. Recipient of the Canadian Commonwealth Research Fellowship (2012), she is currently working as Assistant Professor at Amity University, Uttar Pradesh. Do Thu Ha is Professor in the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam, and Head of the Department of Indian Studies. She obtained her MA and postdoctorate from the Center x

C ontributors

for Historical Studies, JNU, New Delhi under the ICCR Fellowship. She has a PhD in philosophy from Vietnam National University. A renowned scholar of Indology, she has extensively worked on India and was honored with Asia Fellows Awards by the Asian Scholarship Foundation (ASF) under the Ford Foundation Fellowship and Ananda Coomaraswamy Fellowship, Sahitya Academi 2010. She has been a Visiting Professor at Princeton University; Montana University; Calcutta University, India; Chulalongkorn University, Thailand; KOICA-Korea; Phnom Penh University, Cambodia; and the Institute of Short Term Educations and Sabbaticals, Qom. Iran. She has published a number of research papers and is the editor and author of 18 books. Meriel Hahn is a graduate student at Queen’s University Belfast studying international relations. She holds a BA in international studies from Colorado State University. Her research has focused on the United Nations and feminist international relations. Peter Harris is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, where his teaching and research focus on international security, international relations theory and US foreign policy. His work has appeared in journals such as International Affairs, International Political Sociology, International Politics, Political Science Quarterly and Review of International Studies. He currently edits the “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” series for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Shamshad Ahmad Khan, a recipient of the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award, is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, BITS Pilani Dubai Campus, United Arab Emirates (UAE). After completing his PhD in international relations in 2009 at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi, he researched and taught at Indian and Japanese institutes. In India, he had been associated with the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (June 2009 to September 2013), Indian Council of World Affairs (October 2013 to September 2015) and Institute of Chinese Studies (September 2018 to April 2019). In Japan, he had been associated with Policy Research Institute, Tokyo (May 2019 to August 2019); Keio University (October 2015 to August 2016); Japan Institute of International Relations (November 2014 to January 2015); Institute for Developing Economies (November 2012 to February 2013); Slavic and Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University (December 2010 to March 2011); and Waseda University, Tokyo (April 2007 to March 2008) in different capacities. He was also affiliated with the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi and the Department of International Relations, University of Sharjah, UAE, and taught courses related to East Asian Studies and international relations at these two institutions. xi

C ontributors

Kan Kimura is Professor at the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies at Kobe University in Japan. He was born in Osaka, Japan, in 1966 and has majored in comparative politics and area studies of Northeast Asia. He obtained his PhD from Kyoto University in 2001. He has previously been a lecturer at Ehime University and visiting scholar or visiting professor at Harvard University, Korea University and the Australia National University, the Sejong Institute and the University of Washington. His current principal interests are in developments of historical disputes between Japan and South Korea. He has published more than 17 books, including, The Burden of the Past: Problems of Historical Perception in Japan-Korea Relations (2019) and Rekishininshiki wa Do Katararete Kitaka (The Discourses of Historical Disputes, 2020). He was awarded the Special Prize of the 13th Asian and Pacific Prize by the Asia Society and Mainichi Shimbun newspaper in 2001, the 25th Suntory Academic Prize by the Suntory Foundation in 2003 and the Yomiuri Yoshino Sakuzo Prize by Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper and the Chuokoron Shinsha publishing house in 2015. Prakash Panneerselvam is Assistant Professor with the International Strategic & Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, India. He holds a PhD in Japanese Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). He was the first Visiting Fellow at Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Tokyo. He is a recipient of the Japan Foundation Fellow (2011) and Okita Memorial Fellowship (2008). He was a trained merchant mariner with Poompuhar Shipping Corporation Ltd. Prior to joining NIAS, he was working with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in the Defense and Aerospace Sector where he assisted a committee of experts for amendments of DPP 2013 and formulation of the policy framework for Defense Procurement Procedure. Prakash was also part of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) committee in identifying industry partners for the T-72 engine upgrade and coordinated HIDA Training Program for Aircraft Industry for India in Japan. Yohanes Sulaiman is Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Universitas JenderalAchmad Yani (Cimahi, Indonesia). His interests include Indonesian strategic culture and diplomatic history, East Asian security and politics and civil-military relations. He has a PhD and MA in political science from the Ohio State University and BA from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, USA. His recent publications include “Indonesia Between United States and China in Post-Covid-19 Bipolar World Order,” in Asia Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 2021); “Underbalancing the Dragon: Unstrategic Indonesia,” in Donald K. Emmerson, The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (2020); “What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in xii

C ontributors

South China Sea” in Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (October 2019); “Whither Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Institut français des relations internationales (2019); Indonesia Inc.: Peta Jalan Menuju Poros Maritime Dunia, with Untung Suropati and Ian Montratama (2018); “Why We Must Learn to Live with a Nuclear North Korea,” Global Asia (2017); and “Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: The Legacy of Independence” in Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, eds, Strategic Asia 2016–17: Understanding Strategic Culture in the Asia Pacific (2016). Kazutoshi Tamari is Associate Professor of School of Policy Studies and Graduate School of Economics, Chukyo University (Nagoya, Japan). He received an M.Phil. from JNU in 2010 and a PhD from Chuo University in 2013. His area of expertise is international relations and India’s major power politics. His recent publications include Introduction to Contemporary JAPAN-INDIA Relations (coauthor, 2017, in Japanese), Post-Cold War East Asian Order (coauthor, 2020, in Japanese), India in the Future (coauthor, forthcoming, in Japanese), and “India’s View on the Post-Corona World,” Contemporary India Forum: Quarterly Review, no. 47 (2020, in Japanese). Thomas Wilkins is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Sydney and a Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). He is also affiliated as Senior Fellow (non-resident) with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) and The Pacific Forum, Honolulu. His research specializes in Japanese and Australian foreign policies, bilateral relations, and regional security architecture. He has been a Japan Foundation Fellow and Japan Society of the Promotion of Sciences Fellow at the University of Tokyo. His most recent monograph – Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment – was published with Lynne Rienner Press in 2019. His most recent full-length policy report – Japan’s Security Strategy – was published with ASPI in 2022.

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PREFACE

Japan is an island nation, and its prosperity is closely linked to sea trade. In effect, Japan, with strong maritime interest, is forthright in upholding the maritime order in line with the international norm. The Indo-Pacific region is a vast expanse of sea and landmass with bountiful potential for becoming a region of first-rate economic growth. Undoubtedly, Japan realized its importance when the Asia-Pacific region emerged as the epi-center for world production. Manifestation of this economic growth was felt in the regional order as ASEAN worked to create a politically stable and secure region. China, too, took advantage of this environment, integrating its economic activity with this region. Needless to say, a decade into the twenty-first century, the complexion of this region took a turn as China overtook Japan as the second-largest economy and subsequently threatened the existing “liberal world order.” Japan’s immediate apprehension of maritime security and long-term trepidation of China’s behavior prompted actions to protect the established “rule of law” and serve the “common interest” of the liberal order, which resulted in the call for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). Japan, which sailed on the alliance system and gained international standing through its developmental achievements and economic diplomacy, was faced with the challenge of finding a place in this new scheme of operation. Japan’s size, resources and geographic position made it vulnerable to any conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. It was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who visualized Japan as a champion to the cause of promoting the “liberal order.” He recognized that as the third largest economy, with a sizable SelfDefense Force that works synergistically within the Japan-US security alliance, a technological authority and strong soft-power influence, Japan was able to inspire and show leadership in fostering peace and stability in the region. Abe’s reckoning of the geographical region went beyond the immediate neighborhood as he recognized that securing a transport corridor for its energy and trade necessitated a broader vision. He began formulating the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” when he spoke about the “Confluence of the Two Seas” in his address to the Indian Parliament in 2007. In his second term as prime minister, lasting over six years, he made the "“Indo-Pacific region” central to Japan’s foreign policy. Beginning with xiv

P reface

his declaration of “Two Continents-Two Seas” in Tokyo International Conference on African Development 2016, he began educating like-minded nations. Abe’s formulation of the “FOIP” embedded security apprehension and economic concern in the foreign policy domain. FOIP started as a “strategy” and quickly adapted to a “vision” to assuage the fears of its neighbors. Japan’s version of how it perceives the region and its plans to develop a free and open Indo-Pacific region as “international public goods,” is articulated through a document on FOIP by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Ensuring the rules-based international order in a comprehensive, inclusive and transparent mode meant Japan had to align and engage with likeminded nation-states. While Japan’s economic transformation had necessitated Japan to commit to bilateral and multilateral arrangements with Southeast Asia, the current trajectory has drawn Japan to invest in the relationship with India, Australia and Africa. Abe showed his leadership in keeping the focus trained on the cause of FOIP, working tirelessly to create a platform for security dialogue between the United States, Australia, Japan and India, resulting in the formulation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Similarly, on the economic front, Japan, despite the US exit, carried the torch of creating an international rules-based order by negotiating the Comprehensive Economic Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with nations in Asia and the Pacific. CPTPP negotiation set gold standards in traditional and emerging areas trade, establishing a course for future directions. On the other hand, Japan’s and China’s consistent attempts to create a conducive trade order in the Asia-Pacific region by giving alternative plans necessitated ASEAN to pursue an integration model. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership has untangled complexities maneuvering many Free Trade Agreements signed by the nations in this group, creating a robust production network and opening markets among participating nations. By the end of Abe’s tenure, Japan had established a structure at both fronts – namely, security and economics, for safekeeping of the free and open Indo-Pacific region. This book is an outcome of an international conference on “Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region: Debates, Dialogues and Deliberations” organized by the Center for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, JNU and the Japan Foundation, New Delhi on February 23–26, 2021. Premised on the notion that given Japan’s constraints of being a small nation with constitutional limitations and the changing eco-system of the region, it is critical for its national interest that Japan effectively creates a wide ring of partnership among nations that also aspire to keep this region free of conflict, promote peace and stability and engage constructively for the betterment of the region. The book first positions Japan’s foreign policy by addressing its strategic agenda, economic calculations, maritime security concerns and soft-power policies. The first chapter, which is based on the xv

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keynote address delivered at the international conference, gives an overview of Japan’s version of FOIP. Following this, three chapters detail Japan’s economic, maritime and soft-power engagements in this region. Japan’s partnership in the Indo-Pacific is centered on understanding Japan’s efforts to build a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Addressing partners of Japan in the Indo-Pacific, the Japan-US alliance system comes under scrutiny. The chapter on Japan-US relations focuses on understanding this relationship in light of their commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. It is hoped that this alliance rooted in shared values and common interests will evolve to accommodate changes causing the “liberal world order.” Australia is a significant player in the Pacific region. As a member of the US alliance system, Australia is better equipped to address Japan’s security concerns about China’s territorial claim and strategic undertones. The chapter on Australia-Japan bilateral relations addresses specific concerns about Australia’s equation with Japan. As Japan considered looking beyond Southeast Asia, India’s geographical location is critical for shaping the strategic interest in the Indian Ocean. India is a natural choice as it is a large country sharing its boundaries with China, having the second-largest population in the world, with a strong defense capability and emerging economic power that strongly supports democratic rules-based order. Deepening the relationship with India, a nation that has its agenda as an emerging power and is actively involved in shaping the Indo-Pacific, is what the two chapters address in understanding how the Japan-India relationship aligns and engages in both QUAD and the Indo-Pacific region. Supporting the ASEAN narrative of “Indo-Pacific Centrality” is yet another imperative for Japan to keep the expanse of the sea surrounding this region free and open. The two nations that have therefore gained precedence in Southeast Asia are Vietnam and Indonesia. Given the countries’ geographical locations and scale of economic development, Japan has elevated its bilateral relations with them and supported their cause in the multilateral forum. This book assigns two chapters to understand how Vietnam and Indonesia perceive their role in the Indo-Pacific and their bilateral relationship. Africa, for Japan, has been an unknown territory. The current importance of Africa is rooted in the advantage of Africa’s growing economies for revitalizing the Japanese private sector and ensuring a free and open Indian Ocean as it harbors few choke points of Sea Lanes of Communication. One of the chapter looks at Japan’s engagement in Africa through TICAD and the growing interest of academia in understanding and relating to the African cause. A neighboring country whose dynamics continue to unsettle Japan is the Republic of Korea. However, for both these nations, aligning and engaging is vital. The chapter on the Republic of Korea seeks to throw light on why the relationship with South Korea is troubled and the need for Japan to constantly engage with it. Japan in this century has come a long way from living under US tutelage in the alliance system to inking a place for itself in the international community. The leadership of Abe has enabled this trajectory in which domestic xvi

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necessities, economic and security concerns have found a new connotation. As strategic competition grows, the lessons from the pandemic, the deepening Sino-US rivalry and the United States losing its grip on the current world strategic environment compel Japan to focus its attention on the IndoPacific region. The road has been paved, and as Japan readies itself for new leadership, the commitment to the Indo-Pacific as a fulcrum for its foreign policy will only deepen and strengthen. July 2022

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An edited volume is a partnership between contributors and the editor, built on faith and confidence that both parties will keep their part of the bargain as the book goes through metamorphosis from a manuscript to a published edition. As editor, I acknowledge each contributor with gratitude for their cooperation and contribution. I’m deeply grateful to the Japan Foundation for giving us financial support, which primarily made this journey easier and brought this book to fruition. I thank Koji Sato, director-general of the New Delhi office, and his team for their understanding, patience and cooperation. Team Routledge’s hand-holding exercise to enable this journey is highly appreciated and acknowledged. My friends, Gavan, Sandip, Kumaraswamy, Jayati, Salma, Shankari, and Reena, have in their various capacities, albeit unknown to themselves, facilitated, encouraged and aided this journey. Thank you all for reinstating my faith in friendship. Students past and present – Titli, Debendra, Shahana, Chandrali, Parul, Asmita, Ishan, Prashant and Tunia, who enthusiastically accommodated and assisted with numerous requests put forth at short notice – your contribution has been vital. It reassures me that the teacher-student relationship is for keeps. I cherish your support. Family is an integral part of my life and their understanding goes a long way in fulfilling my dreams. To demonstrably express my gratitude to them is to undermine their invaluable contribution to my endeavors.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACSA ADIZ ADMM AEC AIIB AOIP APEC ARF ASEAN B3W BDN BRI CBA CPTPP DFAT DPJ DR EAS ECS EPQI EU FDI FOIP FTA G7 G20 GDP HA IOC IPEF IPOI ISA

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Air Defence Identification Zone ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting ASEAN Economic Community Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Asia Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Build Back Better World Blue Dot Network Belt and Road Initiative Capacity Building Assistance Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) Democratic Party of Japan Disaster Response East Asia Summit East China Sea Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure European Union Foreign Direct Investments Free and Open Indo-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Group of Seven Group of Twenty Gross Domestic Product Humanitarian Assistance International Olympic Committee Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Information Security Agreement xix

A bbreviations

JAAS JAEPA JAIR JBIC JCG JICA JMSDF JOVC KOICA LDP MDA MOFA NATO NPDI NPT NSS NTS ODA OECD PICs PRC PTA QSD QUAD RAA RBO RECP ROK SCRI SCS SDF SDG SEA SLOCs SME TER TICAD TPP TSD UNCLOS UNCTAD UNESCO VJEPA WTO

Japan Association for African Studies Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement Japan Association for International Relations Japan Bank of International Cooperation Japan Coast Guard Japan International Cooperation Agency Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer Korea International Cooperation Agency Liberal Democratic Party Maritime Domain Awareness Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Secretariat Non-Traditional Secuirty Official Developmental Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Pacific Island Countries People’s Republic of China Preferential Trade Agreements Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Reciprocal Access Agreement Rules-Based Order Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnerships Republic of Korea Supply Chain Resilient Initiative South China Sea Self Defence Force Sustainable Development Goals Southeast Asia Sea Lanes of Communications Small and Medium Enterprise Think about Education in Rwanda Tokyo International Conference on African Development Trans-Pacific Partnership Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (US-Japan-Australia) United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement World Trade Organisation xx

1 JAPAN’S UNWAVERING COMMITMENT TO A “FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” Generating Synergy among Partners Toward a Common Vision* Toshihide Ando

1.1 Introduction In recent years, there is not a single day when we do not hear or read the word “Indo-Pacific.” It is fair to say that “Indo-Pacific” is not just a geographical term anymore but is now a widely accepted concept that embodies the commitment to realizing a peaceful and prosperous region based on shared principles. This is evident when we see more and more countries presenting their own but similar visions for the Indo-Pacific region. One of the best-known among them is India’s vision for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018.1 The United States and Australia have put out their visions for some years now. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) was tabled in June 2019.2 In Europe, France illustrated its policy on defense and security in the Indo-Pacific in June 2018.3 Germany and the Netherlands published their guidelines for the Indo-Pacific in September and November 2020, respectively.4 The United Kingdom announced a deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific in its policy paper in March 2021.5 Most recently, the European Union (EU) approved the European Council’s conclusions on an EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in April 2021.6 *  This chapter is based on the keynote address the author delivered at the international conference titled “Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region: Debates, Dialogues and Deliberations” organized by the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and the Japan Foundation, New Delhi on February 23, 2021. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the organization he belongs to.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-1

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As Japan welcomes growing interests in and commitment to the IndoPacific by countries in the region and beyond, it is paramount to highlight it was in Delhi in August 2007 that then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first pointed to the emerging dynamics of the region by describing the Pacific and the Indian Oceans as “seas of freedom and of prosperity” in his speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas.”7 Then during his visit to Kenya in August 2016, he unveiled Japan’s “Indo-Pacific Vision”: a vision to foster “the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion.”8 The vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has clearly become the core diplomatic concept that Japan stands on. It remained unchanged under Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s administration. Immediately after assuming office, he reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to the vision in numerous phone calls with world leaders, including Prime Minister Modi, Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and President Joe Biden, among others. Consistency is also demonstrated by his first foreign visit destinations- Vietnam and Indonesia in October 2020. In Vietnam, he gave his first major overseas speech as prime minister, titled “Building Together the Future of IndoPacific.” In his speech, Prime Minister Suga, referring to the fundamental commonalities between the AOIP and Japan’s vision for a FOIP, expressed his firm belief that “we can create a peaceful and prosperous future along with ASEAN with these fundamental values in common.”9 Shortly after Suga became the prime minister, Japan hosted the second Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in October 2020. The four foreign ministers “affirmed the importance of broadening cooperation with more countries for the realization of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the vision serves for the peace and prosperity of the region and its importance in the postCOVID world is increasing.”10 Prime Minister Suga’s visit to the United States in April 2021 and his planned but postponed visits to India and the Philippines in May 2021 due to the severe COVID-19 situation also reinforce Japan’s continuing commitment to a FOIP.

1.2  Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision What prompted Japan to present its Indo-Pacific vision? What steps has Japan taken to advance its vision? How has Japan cooperated with its partners to achieve this goal? These questions can be addressed by elaborating on the following three points – namely, opportunities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific, practical cooperation under the three pillars of the vision and close partnerships to generate synergy under this vision. 1.2.1  Opportunities and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific First, it is essential to reflect on the background of Japan’s vision of FOIP. As mentioned earlier, it was in Kenya where then-Prime Minister Abe 2

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revealed Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision, which symbolically shows that, for Japan, the Indo-Pacific covers the vast area stretching from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the American Continents. Here Japan sees Africa with enormous potential and Asia with spectacular growth, accounting for more than half of the global population altogether. Dynamism, forged by the confluence of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, is the driving force for global growth. The maritime routes from Africa and the Middle East through the Indian Ocean and the South and East China Seas to the Pacific constitute critical sea lines of communication where a huge amount of energy resources and commercial goods are transported every day. The Indo-Pacific region is indeed full of enormous opportunities created by robust economic activities. It should be obvious to everyone’s eyes that the center of gravity of the global economy has shifted to the Indo-Pacific in the past decades. This shift makes it all the more important to ensure a rulesbased order that promotes peace and prosperity in the region. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region is full of challenges. We have seen a drastic shift in the regional power balance, as is clear from the complex power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. We have witnessed security challenges, including at India’s northern frontiers, in the East and South China Seas and in cyberspace. Fundamental principles of the international community, including freedom of navigation and the rule of law, have been tested. Sound development is threatened by practices that lead to unsustainable external debt and insufficient technology transfer. We are also faced with such challenges as piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and natural disasters. Against this backdrop of opportunities and challenges, Japan presented the vision of a FOIP, a vision that countries that share common principles could pursue together to make the region more stable and prosperous – the region governed by the rule of law, rather than by force or coercion. Under this vision, Japan has no intention of creating a new institution or competing with existing institutions. Japan has also consistently made it clear that this vision does not target or exclude any particular country. Rather, it is an inclusive concept for those who share the core principles. Accordingly, Japan welcomes and cooperates with any country or region that shares this vision. 1.2.2  Practical Cooperation under Three Pillars What concrete actions has Japan taken to advance this vision? This is where the second theme comes in: practical cooperation under the three pillars of Japan’s vision. They are (i) promotion and consolidation of fundamental principles of the international community, (ii) pursuit of economic prosperity and (iii) commitment to peace and stability. Naturally, these pillars are formed in such a way that they correspond with the challenges we face in the region, as explained earlier. 3

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(i) First, on the promotion of the fundamental principles, such as rule of law at sea, Japan has widely shared with the Indo-Pacific countries its insights and experiences on maritime law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, then-Prime Minister Abe highlighted in his keynote address the three principles of the rule of law at sea. They are (a) states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law, (b) states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims and (c) states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means.11 He then said, “It means making claims that are faithful in light of international law, not resorting to force or coercion, and resolving all disputes through peaceful means.”12 These principles demonstrate the widely shared requirements for actions that states shall take at sea under international law. Seven years later, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi issued a statement on July 12, 2021, on the occasion of the passing of five years since the issuance of the Arbitral Tribunal’s award as to the disputes between the Philippines and China.13 His statement, that the award is “final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” and “the parties to this case…are required to comply with the award”, unequivocally demonstrates Japan’s strong commitment to upholding the rule of law at sea under international law. This statement is clearly consistent with the three principles on the rule of law at sea that thenprime minister Abe delivered seven years before. (ii) Second, on the pursuit of economic prosperity, Japan, as a flagbearer of free trade, has been leading the rule-making efforts to expand a free and fair economic area, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership of 2018 and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership RCEP of 2020. Enhancing connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region through sound infrastructure development, such as the construction of roads and ports, is a crucial element to pursue economic prosperity. Japan took the initiative to articulate critical principles for infrastructure development, which culminated in the “G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment.”14 Among these principles, Japan highlights openness, transparency, economic efficiency, and debt sustainability as priority elements necessary for quality infrastructure investment. In other words, Japan asserts that any infrastructure investments should be open and transparent, taking into account the economic efficiency and the debt sustainability of the recipient countries, which is a view widely shared by the G20 and other countries. (iii) Third, on ensuring peace and stability in the region, maintaining maritime security has become one of the top priorities for countries in the Indo-Pacific region. In order to assist in strengthening maritime capacity against piracy, terrorism or other threats, Japan has provided maritime equipment such as patrol vessels to countries including the Philippines 4

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and Sri Lanka and provided training for enhancing maritime safety by sharing its maritime law enforcement experiences with Malaysia and Indonesia. One of the patrol vessels provided to the Philippines succeeded in capturing pirates after a counter-piracy joint exercise with the Japan Coast Guard around Mindanao in 2017. For assisting counterterrorism efforts, Japan has provided counterterrorism equipment to Bangladesh and terrorism surveillance equipment to Thailand. For assisting disaster risk reduction efforts, Japan has provided equipment for disaster control enhancement to Sri Lanka and disaster prevention equipment to the Maldives. These are a few examples of practical cooperation Japan has extended under the FOIP vision. As nations in the Indo-Pacific region ink their version of FOIP, Japan stands to leverage, cooperate and strengthen this region. 1.2.3  Close Partnerships to Generate Synergy The third point is close partnerships to generate synergy under this vision. A number of like-minded countries have laid out their own visions for the Indo-Pacific: the United States, Australia, India, the ASEAN, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, etc. As one compares the Indo-Pacific visions of these nations, it is well recognized that there are a number of commonalities that they share: common principles, common areas of interest and common means of cooperation. Common principles include the rule of law; freedom of navigation and overflight; peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law; opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion; transparency and openness; debt sustainability, among others. Common areas of interest include connectivity, maritime security, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), etc. Common means of cooperation include the construction of roads and ports, capacity building on fiscal policy and public debt management, provision of patrol boats and training of maritime law enforcement officials, and the like. The vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific cannot be realized by a single country, and it requires the collective efforts of countries that share this vision. The sense of common vision and the need for collective action have naturally prompted Japan to promote partnerships with likeminded countries to generate synergy. In his previous capacity at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the author worked on JapanAustralia-US trilateral cooperation as well as coordination with ASEAN partners toward realizing this vision. Many countries have shared this vision and begun embarking on collaborating on projects with Japan over the past several years. As a diplomat with a posting in Delhi working with India, it was elevating to witness much progress made to date as noted in the following sections. 5

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1.2.3.1 India India is an indispensable partner in Japan’s endeavor to achieve this vision. A FOIP is a natural shared goal for the two Asian maritime and democratic powers. Toward this goal, both nations have been deepening their cooperation in such areas as connectivity, maritime security and HA/DR. In the area of connectivity, Japan is acting in concert with India as well as with other third-world countries such as Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, Japan has been generating synergy with India by cooperation for enhancing connectivity by way of four-laning of roads and reconstruction of bridges on the Ramgarh to Baraiyarhat stretch and providing rolling stock and constructing the Jamuna Railway Bridge over the Jamuna River. India’s Northeast is a gateway to Southeast Asia and an area of strategic importance where India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s vision for a FOIP converge. Japan and India established the Act East Forum in 2017 to conceptualize, evaluate and facilitate Japan-India collaboration in connectivity and developmental projects in and with Northeastern India. The two countries have worked together to complement each other on key connectivity projects by constructing roads and bridges, such as India’s longest Dhubri-Phulbari River bridge. The ongoing Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects supported by Japan to the northeast region of India amount to more than 231 billion yen. These tangible forms of bilateral cooperation will certainly enhance connectivity not just within India but from Bhutan to Bangladesh through Assam and Meghalaya, which will bring prosperity and strategic significance. In addition, Japan commenced an ODA project for the first time in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (apart from humanitarian emergency assistance) in 2021, which provides batteries and related facilities to stabilize the electricity supply and promote effective utilization of electricity generated by solar photovoltaics (PV). It is expected that this assistance will improve the power supply, reliability, and stability of the entire energy system of the strategically important islands. Another example of cooperation between India and Japan is Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). Prime Minister Modi announced the IPOI initiative at the East Asia Summit in 2019 to advance India’s vision for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific he had laid out at Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018. Japan has closely collaborated with India by becoming the leading country in connectivity under this initiative. Since then, Japan has co-hosted international seminars on connectivity in India to promote this initiative. 1.2.3.2 ASEAN Cooperation with ASEAN under the FOIP vision has made significant progress, bearing in mind the importance of ASEAN centrality and unity in the Indo-Pacific. Situated at the center of this region, encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, ASEAN has been the driving force for 6

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developing the Indo-Pacific. In addition, ASEAN-led regional mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum have worked for years as the central regional architecture to promote peace and stability in the region. In this context, Japan particularly welcomes ASEAN’s initiative to present its own vision for the Indo-Pacific and strongly supports the AOIP. At their summit meeting in November 2020, Japanese and ASEAN leaders issued an independent joint statement to advance partnership on AOIP “through enhanced practical cooperation and synergy in the four areas as outlined in the AOIP: maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and economic and other possible areas of cooperation.”15 In accordance with this joint statement, Japan and ASEAN have been engaged in practical cooperation in these four areas. On maritime cooperation, in addition to the provisions of vessels and capacity building of maritime law enforcement officials as mentioned earlier, Japan has assisted ASEAN in building capacity, raising public awareness and promoting public relation activities for the conservation of the environment centered on marine debris reduction. Connectivity projects include the development of roads and bridges along with the Southern Economic Corridor and the East-West Economic Corridor, port development, as well as soft connectivity enhancement such as business practice training. Cooperation on UN Sustainable Development Goals includes support for the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases, which contributes to capacity building in response to public health emergencies and prevention of future pandemics of emerging diseases in ASEAN. Economic and other possible areas of cooperation include strengthening cybersecurity capabilities by providing training to enhance the capacity to draft and implement cybersecurity policy in ASEAN and enhancing economic cooperation based on the ASEAN-Japan Economic Resilience Action Plan adopted in July 2020. Over the years, Japan has also developed close ties with the countries in the Mekong region, and a FOIP has recently become an important element in Mekong-Japan cooperation. For example, in 2018, when Japan hosted the Mekong-Japan summit meeting, the leaders agreed on Tokyo Strategy 2018, in which they “expressed their determination to steadily implement the Mekong-Japan Cooperation projects which contribute to and complement the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”16 These projects include developing the Sihanoukville Port in Cambodia, reconstruction of bridges in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), promotion of economic development and connectivity in the Western region in Thailand and the Lach Huyen port infrastructure construction project in Vietnam. Furthermore, the Joint Statement of the 12th Mekong-Japan Summit on November 13, 2020, reconfirmed the importance of a FOIP for the Mekong region by stating, “The Leaders underscored that the Mekong region, linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, has the geographical advantage of receiving considerable benefits from the realization of peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.”17 7

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1.2.3.3  The United States and Australia When Prime Minister Suga and President Biden had their first phone call in January 2021, the two leaders shared their views on the importance of strengthening the US presence in the Indo-Pacific region and affirmed that they would work side by side to address regional challenges and realize a FOIP. In April 2021, when Prime Minister Suga visited the United States, both leaders agreed that the US-Japan alliance “advances a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific based on our commitment to universal values and common principles, and the promotion of inclusive economic prosperity.” They also “support ASEAN’s unity and centrality in the Indo-Pacific, as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”18 More specifically, Japan and the United States agreed to cooperate to support developing countries in the Indo-Pacific and beyond by tackling climate change and advancing competitiveness and innovation in the digital field. In addition, Japan and the United States have also worked in tandem to enhance the energy sector’s capacity in Vietnam and Indonesia. Japan and Australia have greatly strengthened security and economic cooperation over the years under the Special Strategic Partnership. Sharing a vision to promote a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific, both countries have enhanced cooperation, particularly in the Pacific Island countries. As Japan hosts Pacific Islands Leaders Meetings every three years and Australia promotes its Pacific Step-Up policy, it is natural to find common ground for cooperation in the Pacific. The author, in his previous capacity at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, had policy dialogues on the Pacific Island countries with the Australian counterparts to promote practical cooperation on infrastructure development and maritime security. These dialogues reassured Japan of the high potential for closer partnership by generating synergy. Japan has also strengthened trilateral cooperation with Australia and the United States. For example, the Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding to operationalize the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific was signed in November 2018 to identify infrastructure projects for potential development and financing.19 Based on this partnership, in October 2020, Japan, Australia, the United States and Palau announced their plan to finance an undersea fiber cable to Palau to ensure reliable and secure digital connectivity in this important island nation in the Pacific. This is the first tangible project under the trilateral infrastructure partnership among Japan, Australia and the United States.

1.2.3.4 Europe At the beginning of this chapter, there is a reference to recent developments in Indo-Pacific visions in Europe. France published “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific” in June 2018. Germany announced, “Policy Guidelines 8

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for the Indo-Pacific” in September 2020. The Netherlands published “IndoPacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia” in November 2020. The United Kingdom announced the further engagement in the Indo-Pacific in its “Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy” in March 2021. The EU approved the European Council’s conclusions on an EU Strategy for cooperating in the Indo-Pacific in April 2021, with a view to presenting a Joint Communication on EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific by September 2021. At the heart of a FOIP vision are universal values such as freedom of navigation and the rule of law, which European countries also have promoted in international forums. Realizing this vision requires collective efforts that transcend geographical boundaries. If the law of the sea were to be undermined in one region, its ramifications would equally weigh on the other side of the globe. This is precisely why Japan truly welcomes more and more nations, including those in Europe, to articulate their own visions for the Indo-Pacific. On January 25, 2021, Foreign Minister Motegi became the first Japanese Foreign Minister to address the EU Foreign Affairs Council when he elaborated on Japan’s FOIP vision and welcomed Europe’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. He made it clear that FOIP is an inclusive concept, open to cooperation with countries that share the same values and vision. Then he identified areas of cooperation Japan and EU can promote: promoting and consolidating fundamental principles of the international community, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law; maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trading system and international rule-making; enhancing connectivity in the region; and maritime security, among others.20 Japan looks forward to collaborating with European partners in these areas with a view to realizing a FOIP. 1.2.3.5  The Quad Lastly, the Quad constitutes a vital platform for advancing a FOIP. The significance of the Quad lies in candid discussions on the strategic outlook of the Indo-Pacific region among the four like-minded countries as well as practical cooperation on quality infrastructure, maritime security, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and other relevant fields. After inaugurating their first working-level meeting in 2007, Japan, India, Australia and the United States have accelerated the Quad process since 2017. Following the third Quad ministerial meeting held online in February 2021, the first-ever Quad summit meeting took place online in March 2021. It is significant as well as symbolic in the sense that the Biden administration made these two meetings happen within the first 100 days of his administration. The four leaders announced that they are “united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific” and that 9

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they “commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.” They also reaffirmed their “strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”21 This unequivocally shows the strong commitment of the four leaders to a FOIP, and we expect that the Quad platform will continue to play a critical role in advancing the Indo-Pacific vision by generating synergy among the four countries. The new working groups that the four leaders launched on the vaccine, climate change and critical and emerging technology have further expanded the horizon of Quad cooperation. Among others, the Quad Vaccine Experts Group is aimed to “strengthen and assist countries in the Indo-Pacific with vaccination” through collaborative efforts by the Quad partners, “drawing on each of our strengths.”22 The Quad can provide an effective response to one of the biggest challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic by providing safe and effective vaccines to the people of the whole Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Japan looks forward to further boosting Quad cooperation on this and other emerging issues facing the Indo-Pacific.

1.3  Ways Ahead The COVID-19 pandemic has posed a set of fresh challenges for the IndoPacific region. In addition to a massive health crisis and economic difficulties with vulnerable supply chains brought by worldwide restrictions on the movement of people and goods, we also see opportunistic attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in various corners of the region during the pandemic. Thus, today, when we need to rise from the ordeal posed by COVID-19, it is becoming more critical than ever to attain a FOIP. As described in this chapter, there have been considerable developments in terms of various Indo-Pacific visions and concrete, practical cooperation under these visions, but the progress made to date is yet to keep up with the emerging challenges. Continuous efforts are required to meet these challenges, and here are some possible courses of action to be taken to this end. It is important that more and more countries share visions for the IndoPacific. It is encouraging that like-minded countries have already presented their own visions. Meanwhile, a lot of support has been voiced for Japan’s vision for the Indo-Pacific, which can be applicable to other regions of the globe. It is imperative to share the Indo-Pacific vision with more countries in the world to reinforce its foundation. Moreover, in order to make the most out of the enormous opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region and to meet current and future challenges, one can both deepen and broaden practical cooperation. Deepening cooperation in the areas of connectivity and maritime security by using advanced

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technology will further enhance peace and prosperity in the region. Broadening cooperation to address new challenges such as COVID-19 and new opportunities such as digital transformation will extend the scope of the FOIP vision. Further, one can also enhance cooperation not just bilaterally but in a trilateral, quadrilateral or multilateral framework, which will expand the depth and breadth of cooperation. One can forge complementary partnerships to maximize the effect of cooperation by using the comparative advantages of the countries involved. Such complementary partnerships have been evident in Japan-India cooperation and Japan-Australia-US cooperation, and it is expected to see more in other partnerships. There is no doubt that the challenges posed to the Indo-Pacific region will continue in the foreseeable future. What is required of us is a vision to meet these challenges based on shared principles and means of collective action to advance this vision. Japan’s commitment to a FOIP is unwavering, and Japan will continue to play a leading role to this end, along with all the partners who share this cause.

Notes 1 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 1, 2018) https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+ Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018. In his keynote address, Prime Minister Modi articulated his vision for the Indo-Pacific with the following key elements among others: free, open and inclusive; ASEAN at its center; a common rules-based order; sovereignty and territorial integrity; the rule of law; freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law; rule-based, open, balanced and stable trade environment; and connectivity initiatives based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consultation, good governance, transparency, viability and sustainability. 2 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (June 23, 2019) https://www.asean2019. go.th/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/11c49cba41666e4b9e5d4255186f2923-1. pdf 3 France and Security in the Indo-Pacific (June 2018) https://franceintheus.org/ IMG/pdf/France_and_Security_in_the_Indo-Pacific_-_2019.pdf 4 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific Region (September 2020) https://rangun. diplo.de/blob/2380824/a27b62057f2d2675ce2bbfc5be01099a/policyguidelines-summary-data.pdf; Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia (November 2020) https://www. government.nl/documents/publications/2020/11/13/indo-pacific-guidelines 5 Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (March 2021) https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_ Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf 6 Council Conclusions on an EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7914-2021-INIT/en/pdf

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7 “Confluence of the Two Seas,” Speech by HE Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India (August 22, 2007). https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html Prime Minister Abe said in his speech, “We are now at a point at which the Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being. The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form. Our two countries have the ability – and the responsibility – to ensure that it broadens yet further and to nurture and enrich these seas to become seas of clearest transparency.” 8 Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) (August 27, 2016) https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html 9 Speech by Prime Minister Suga at the Vietnam-Japan University, “Building Together the Future of Indo-Pacific” (October 19, 2020) https://www.mofa.go. jp/s_sa/sea1/vn/page3e_001070.html 10 The Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (October 6, 2020) https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e_000244.html 11 The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit – The Shangri-La Dialogue-Keynote Address by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister, Japan: “Peace and Prosperity in Asia, Forevermore, Japan for the Rule of Law, Asia for the Rule of Law and the Rule of Law for All of Us” (May 30, 2014) https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_ 000086.html 12 Ibid. 13 Statement by Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu: Five Years Since the Issuance of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award as to the Disputes Between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China Regarding the South China Seas (July 12, 2021) https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press3e_000209.html 14 G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment (June 2019) https://www. mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/osaka19/pdf/documents/en/annex_01. pdf. Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment are (i) maximizing the positive impact of infrastructure to achieve sustainable growth and development, (ii) raising economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost, (iii) integrating environmental considerations in infrastructure investment, (iv) building resilience against natural disasters and other risks, (v) integrating social considerations in infrastructure investments and (vi) strengthening infrastructure governance. 15 Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2020) https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/100114942.pdf 16 Tokyo Strategy 2018 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation (October 9, 2018) https:// www.mofa.go.jp/files/000406731.pdf 17 Joint Statement of the 12th Mekong-Japan Summit (November 13, 2020) https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100115097.pdf 18 US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement “U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era” (April 16, 2021) https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100177718.pdf 19 Joint Statement of the Governments of Australia, Japan and the United States of America on the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific (November 17,2018) https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statementgovernments-australia-japan-and-united-states

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20 Foreign Minister Motegi’s Attendance at the EU Foreign Affairs Council (virtual format) (January 25, 2021) https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_ 000168.html 21 Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad” (March 12, 2021) https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100159230.pdf 22 Quad Summit Fact Sheet (March 12, 2021) https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ 100159237.pdf

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2 JAPAN’S “FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” The Economic Calculation Srabani Roy Choudhury

2.1 Introduction Narratives on a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) have two distinct flavors. One, the geostrategic interest in which discussion revolves around securitization of the region for peace and prosperity. The other being geoeconomic relevance scrutinizes how trade and investment can grow among the nations without compromising national interest. Over time, it also addresses the concern of development and looks at understanding how nations are synergizing economic and societal goals through their economic activities. Japan, because of its constitutional limitations, had engaged with nations through economic activities of trade, investment and aid. It prospered by cultivating Southeast Asia and contributed positively to its regional growth. However, world dynamics transformed with the end of the Cold War, giving rise to a multipolar power equation. On the other hand, globalization boosted nation-states to deepen their engagement to harness complementariness for the greater good. As the nations adjusted themselves, the world witnessed the rise of many nations that took advantage of the evolving new order. The subtleties of this change were felt most in the region of Asia-Pacific, which had gained political stability through the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and integrated economically to become the production center of the world. A decade into the twenty-first century, the regional power equation changed as China surpassed Japan to become the second-largest economy and subsequently flexed its muscle, making territorial claims and becoming a security concern for Japan. As Shinzo Abe ascended as the prime minister of Japan for the second time in 2012, he was faced with two critical concerns: the long-drawn economic stagnation and the security concern aggravated by rising China, and the United States’ slow disengagement from this region. Abe was confronting two critical pillars of a nation-state, and his approach was to integrate them

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DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-2

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to serve the purpose of the nation. At first instance, he proposed revitalizing the Japanese economy through Abenomics, which addressed domestic economic concerns and nuanced Japan’s overseas engagement through private-public partnerships in foreign direct investments (FDI). Three critical developments in the form of China’s encroachment into Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (2012), followed by the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) (2013) and China’s rejection of the South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal Award (July 2016) encouraged Abe to put forward a strong and resilient foreign policy that could ensure a counterbalance to China’s rise, keep the involvement of the United States in this region and also address the economic concerns of Japan. The task at hand for Abe was complex, as it required Japan to shred its previous approach of separating its politics from economics in its international outing (seiri bunri) and look toward integrating them, such as to provide an objective for engaging with the world while protecting its national interest. This was articulated through the “Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) vision when Prime Minister Abe announced it in his keynote address at Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Kenya in 2016. FOIP, according to MOFA, is a vision to combine “Two Continents” and “Two Oceans,” i.e. Asia and Africa, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, for “stability prosperity of the international community.” Connecting the two continents, Abe claimed, will create synergy between a rapidly-developing region (Asia) and a potentially huge growth region and ensure free flow of goods and services through the busiest commercial maritime zone of the world, “the Indo-Pacific.” This is pinned on two important diplomatic concepts: (1) diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map and (2) proactive contribution to peace by international cooperation. By this formulation, Abe broadened the horizon of Japanese foreign policy, giving it an overarching and comprehensive notion. Japan’s concept of FOIP is founded on a desire to achieve a “rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific.” An order based on “shared values” and principles such as the “rule of law” and the promotion of free trade. Further, it is inclusive, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA 2020)1 stresses for “Japan to cooperate with any country that supports this idea.” This was so because Japan realized that “country alone can maintain and enhance the international order based on the rule of law.” Thus, when the idea was initially promoted, erring on ruffling the feathers of states in this region, Japan reassured emphatically that FOIP had no intention to “create a new institution nor compete with existing institutions.” In time the MOFA announced the following three pillars to substantiate the vision, which Japan has pursued relentlessly. They are, first, promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade, etc.; second, the pursuit of economic prosperity by enhancing physical, institutional, and people-to-people connectivity; and third, commitment to peace and stability 15

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through Capacity Building Assistance (CBA) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) activities.2 From establishing the concept of FOIP to its deliverables, it is evident that Japan continues to pursue its foreign policy goals by strengthening and deepening its economic ties with nations in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, is FOIP divergent from the role that Japan defined for itself in post-World War II? The government advisory panel report, which describes Japan’s path of integrating with the world post-World War II states, Post-war Japan took the path of economic reconstruction and prosperity based on modern and universal principles of peace, the rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, the free trade system, self-determination, support of economic development of developing countries, etc. within the international political and economic system constructed after the war.3 This description of the post-World War II foreign policy agenda finds strong reflection in the FOIP’s three pillars. However, with a significant shift in the external ecosystem, the continuing economic objective of finding new markets for trade and investment has been interposed with the agenda of securing the free flow of goods and services and maintaining the “rule of law.” Based on this notion that dynamism created by the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans as it integrates land and water housing 38 countries, about 65 percent of the global population with a global Gross Domestic Productivity of about 62 percent and covering sea routes of 11,577 nautical miles and trade movement of 41.8 percent of world export and 38.3 percent of global imports. This chapter will look at the economic engagements that Japan is pursuing in this region through its trade, ODA and FDI. These three arms of economic diplomacy tie themselves with the FOIP’s three pillars in addressing areas of economic prosperity, connectivity, capacity building, the rule of law and enabling stability. To establish this argument, the chapter looks at how Japan uses these economic tools through the prism of the four areas culled out from the three pillars of FOIP. While security concern dominates the discussion on FOIP, nonetheless, for Japan to reach its goal of establishing “rules-based order” in this region, the economic diplomacy will continue to be central for its achievement.

2.2  Economic Calculation To understand the economic calculation of Japan within the FOIP framework, it is important to consider a few terminologies used in the three pillars, as they are open to interpretation. The term “rule of law” in the first pillar not only refers to the international law, institutions and other frameworks established by multilateral institutions but also includes “value of 16

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democracy.” This does not in any way exclude nations that do not follow the ideology but affirms that those nations, too, respect the international order under the United Nations framework. The second term that has drawn the interest of academics and practitioners alike is “connectivity.” By definition, connectivity has “an intrinsic characteristic of (connectivity is) that it is synonymous with networks, which in turn are a set of interconnected nodes. A node can be a person, firm, city, country or other spatial entity.”4 This essentially means that connectivity today refers to physical and virtual networks, with differing scales from the hinterland to the global. Its significance lies in the role a nodal point and its hinterland are expected to play in the larger network. This means creating physical infrastructures to enable connectivity, which is measured by cost-effectiveness and time efficiency. The third term is “capacity building.” The United Nations defines capacity building as “the process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and communities need to survive, adapt, and thrive in a fast-changing world.”5 By definition itself, it gives scope for any country to involve in bilateral or multilateral exercises with another country in a wide range of activities which can be touted as a need to survive, adapt or thrive in the rapidly altering ecosystem. By keeping these definitions broad-based and fluid, Japan has allowed them to be interpreted by policymakers to suit the purpose they want to serve and thus help fulfill the agenda at hand. Along with this understanding, Japan’s current account composition is essential to realize the changing weight of different components in the current account surplus. Traditionally, the major contribution to the current account surplus has been the export-import surplus. But since 2011 (Figure 2.1), this has been in the negative. The balance of trade in the services for Japan has always been negative. The current account surplus has been due

Figure 2.1  Breakup of Japan’s Current Account  Source: JETRO. Compiled by the Author

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to earnings on foreign investment, indicating a move from trade to investment.6 This reflects that there has been a flight of domestic manufacturing firms to other countries. As earnings from FDI gain precedence over earnings from trade, it also echoes that it is in the interest of Japan’s private sector too that peace and stability are maintained in regions where they operate. For Japan, the changing optics of the current account necessitates crafting sound economic diplomacy. Along with the traditional aid program (ODA), Japan enhanced its role in building an environment for FDI and worked on creating a robust trade architecture.

2.3  Trade Architecture: Japan’s Leadership Indo-Pacific holds centrality in Japan’s economic consideration as it houses a large pool of human capital, an outstanding natural capital base, centers of financial hubs and nations in varying stages of development. All this creates a stage for business competitiveness due to the expansive factor market and huge product market, reflected in 46 percent of global merchandise originating from this region. Moreover, for Japan, this region serves as the leading trade corridor for its energy requirement and export imports. Japan has championed the rules of the liberal economic order and strived to ink Free Trade Agreements with Asian nations. Japan initiated FTAs in the form of Comprehensive Economic Partnerships in which it went beyond trade and tariffs and looked at investment. This move is amply reflected in the current account surplus shown in Figure 2.1, where the surplus is progressively generated through the investment’s earnings. Japan’s leadership of holding forth liberal economic order was tested when two mega trade agreements were negotiated. The Obama administration proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership and claimed, “With the TPP, we can rewrite the rules of trade to benefit America’s middle class. Because if we do not, competitors who do not share our values, like China, will step in to fill that void.”7 Japan was hesitant to join this group, as the agricultural sector had raised concerns about its survival. However, as the TPP negotiation progressed, leadership changed in Japan, and Abe enabled Japan to join the group due to his political strength. The multilateralism agreement of TPP faced a setback with Trump’s “America First” approach and the withdrawal of the United States from TPP. Abe’s unwavering commitment stood to the challenges and helped conclude the Comprehensive Economic Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) without the United States. While CPTPP is criticized on account of the non-inclusion of the major trading nation yet, it also showed the resilience of Japan’s leadership in bringing the negotiation to a culmination. Another major negotiation in which Japan pursued, cajoled and used its goodwill in bilateral relationships is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Here the issue was to untangle the noodle bowl syndrome and enable a smooth flow of production activity to benefit the region. 18

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Though India’s exit in 2019 was a drawback, two important outcomes are that RCEP applies cumulative rules of origin, and it reinforces the supply chain. During the negotiation phase of CPTPP and RCEP, Japan’s stature in the international community grew, as both these had long years of negotiation. Japan had constructively worked to help accommodate the concerns of other nations, using its bilateral relations to tie down China in RCEP. By ratifying RCEP on June 25, 2021, Japan, for the first time, has a trade agreement with its first and third largest trade partners. Thus, Japan has 80 percent of its trade covered by trade agreements. While China causes concern to Japan strategically and economically, Japan, in understanding China’s intention, countered each move of China to the run-up of the RCEP and held a malleable posture during the negotiation of RCEP. The Japan-European Union (EU) Economic Agreement, which was signed in 2018 and effective since 2019, has been a strategy of Japan to rope in more nations that share the same common interest. MOFA opines, his (Abe) recognition that the signing of the two Agreements is a valuable and epoch-making event that will elevate the Japan-EU relationship to a higher dimension, and explained that amid widening protectionist movements worldwide, the signing of the EPA will vividly demonstrate to the world the firm political will of Japan and the EU to lead the world keeping the flag of free trade waving high.8 Abe’s intentions with the EU were to ensure that while joining the CPTPP may be a long-drawn and exhaustive affair, an Economic Agreement on the sideline would encourage the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific and rope in countries beyond those that share the waters of the Indian Ocean. Japan is steadfast in its objective of involving more nations in the IndoPacific region. In 2021, the United Kingdom, after its exit from the EU, indicated its interest in joining the CPTPP. Japan negotiated within the forum to ensure the United Kingdom’s entry, which is a landmark for the group of nations in CPTPP. The United Kingdom’s presence will enable it to strengthen its global role and allow for cooperation with the Indo-Pacific nations. For Japan, Brexit was seen as an “opportunity to engage more deeply with the U.K. on a bilateral level and as a preferred partner outside the confines of the EU.”9 A strong advocator for a “rules-based order” for Japan, the United Kingdom’s membership will strengthen the cause of maintaining a maritime order as shares they share the same values. As China considers applying for CPTPP, which Japan is bound to object, “as a major global power, Britain’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and strong alignment with powers such as Japan (alongside India, Australia, and the US) could only hinder China’s regional strategy.”10 The believers of CPTPP see it as an agreement that would “unlock opportunities” and advocate that it considers twenty-first-century issues of the 19

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global economy. As the World Trade Organization (WTO) is besieged with issues and finds it difficult to properly regulate the multilateral trade order, CPTPP and the RCEP have the potential to function as rule-setting institutions. The CPTPP set gold standard rules for trade and investment and went beyond the WTO, including rules for e-commerce and a common set of labor and intellectual property rights protection. Further, it sets rules for new industries like e-commerce and the service sector. So far, the service sector is not treated as a goods sector and has no tariff barriers. However, many of the developing countries use nationality requirements and restrictions on investing to protect local businesses. CPTPP members are committed to allow for a free exchange of services, though some nations have sought an extension on this requirement. Both these agreements and the United Kingdom’s entry into CPTPP have strengthened the “rule of law” in the international trading forum. Member­ ship of the United Kingdom, which was orchestrated by Japan, has benefited the group as the United Kingdom becomes the first member outside the region. In its role as a torchbearer, Japan has upheld its FOIP vision and facilitated the creation of this economic architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Japan has stepped up its game to involve as many actors as possible through bilateral and multilateral arrangements to enable a conducive economic fair play. Japan straddles both trade agreements, which can be used resourcefully to handle China. The Indo-Pacific economic architecture is still fluid, and there is scope for the United States and India to join these mega FTAs. China, since the United Kingdom’s entry, has shown interest in seeking membership. It would be interesting how this plays out, as currently, China faces a strong trust deficit among nations. The new initiative of the United States to find its place back in this region is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which brings nations to cooperate in a new platform on four pillars: supply chain resiliency, decarbonization and infrastructure, fair and resilient trade and tax and anti-corruption measures. While it is stated that it is not a trade agreement, clarity of what it will achieve will unfold as negotiations between 14 participating nations unfold. In keeping with Japan’s commitment, Kishida stated, “[T]o ensure that the IPEF becomes an inclusive and sustainable growth platform in the region, Japan will make its greatest possible contribution.”11

2.4  Official Development Assistance Japan’s rapid economic growth and its ascendance into the group of advanced nations have been in part due to the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which led to the establishment of its relationship with its neighboring nations, securing of resources including oil, developing markets abroad and since the 1980s moving production operations to countries with cheap labor. Japan concentrated its ODA mainly in Asia and followed a model of tagging ODA to FDI to reap economic benefits. In so doing, 20

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it concentrated on infrastructure development in the form of roads and ports. However, this commercial approach to ODA came under severe criticism from Southeast Asian nations, the main beneficiary of ODA, leading to Japan revisiting its ODA policy and the formulation of the Fukuda Doctrine,12 which led to the expansion of ODA in terms of geography, volume and consideration for humanitarian and disaster causes. Japan arguably became the largest donor by 198913 and inclination shifted from an “earning strategy” to a “spending strategy.”14 As the post-Cold War world unfolded, Japan established an ODA Charter, clarifying its principles. The shift was visible as ODA focused on quality and incorporating the support of the private sector and nongovernmental organizations. In 2003, though a delayed attempt, Cabinet revised the ODA Charter for the first time and incorporated keywords like “human security” and “peacebuilding,” thus beginning the process of directing ODA toward strategic concern. The year 2015 was the turning point for ODA as the Cabinet formulated the Development Cooperation Charter, which replaced the ODA Charter in concurrence with the National Security Strategy.15 The attempt was to synergize Japan’s need for stability and prosperity of the international community through the use of ODA, which would “serve as a catalyst for mobilizing a wide range of resources in cooperation with various funds and actors.”16 The guiding principle was to promote human security through cooperation for nonmilitary purposes and support developing countries’ initiatives. This would be accomplished through “quality growth (inclusiveness, sustainability, resilience),” supporting “universal values were the rights of individuals are guaranteed,” by sound developmental projects for empowering, fighting against threats stability and security and encouraging public-private partnership with local government. A close look at the Development Cooperation Charter’s objectives and principles shows an alignment with the three pillars of FOIP. This modification in the ODA charter has drawn attention to subtle change of addressing the security concern of Japan through its ODA policy. Implementation of the Development Cooperation Charter is through ODA loan, private-sector investment finance, grant aid and technical cooperation based on projects developed in conjunction with the host nations’ own policies, needs and requirements. For Japan, the ASEAN is the fulcrum of its foreign policy. Till around 2000, Japan concentrated its efforts in the Asia-Pacific, and by Asia, its interest was limited to Southeast Asia. The ASEAN region post-World War II had grown in stature, as most Southeast Asian nations had organized themselves as a forum and have become the hub of production activity of the world as it had a mix of advanced, middle and less developed nations, providing skills and capability to create a supply chain of using cheap labor, sound technology and manufacturing base. Today, this region has nations that have graduated from Japan’s aid programs like Singapore and Hong Kong; and those that have deeply entrenched aid programs like Indonesia and Thailand along with newcomers like Vietnam and Myanmar. Japan 21

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developed a strong relationship with nations of this region and had integrated its economic needs with this region’s well-being and stability. In FOIP, Japan positions ASEAN as “the hinge of the two oceans” connecting Asia and Africa and wishes to “expand ASEAN’s success to other regions such as the Middle East and Africa”17 2.4.1  Connectivity through Infrastructure Projects The connectivity infrastructure is associated with roads, railways, ports and airports. In recent times, digital infrastructure has drawn attention as the world has moved to the digital framework. In addition, the pandemic has boosted its requirements and has many developing nations grappling to get their act together. Unfortunately, Japan has lagged domestically in having a robust digital framework, mainly due to internal politicking between fractions in the Liberal Democratic Party and the reluctance of business. However, with strong technology at hand, Japan has committed to helping nations with aid to upgrade their digital framework. Figure 2.2 illustrates Japan’s commitment to building a strong network of connectivity in pursuit of economic prosperity, the second pillar of FOIP, which in turn will ensure capacity building in maritime law enforcement and HA/DR. The size of the commitment involves initiatives beyond ASEAN (the current concentration is Vietnam, which is seeing rapid infrastructure development to connect East-West through an economic corridor and the other Southern Economic Corridor, which will enable Vietnam to take advantage of the supply chain network) as can be seen in the South Asia Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, the Bay of Bengal Growth Belt in Bangladesh, the Yangon-Mandalay Railway in Myanmar,18 the African continent Northern Corridor connecting East African countries and the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique. The attempt at creating a South Asia connectivity and directing it toward Africa shows Japan’s economic interest. It strongly reflects that the current model is based on the success of the ASEAN venture. Noteworthy completed projects are the construction of Sindhuli Road and the Provision of Ferry in Djibouti, which has robust security concerns and the potential to work toward stability. Along with roads, there is a concentration of port buildings (nine listed), many of which would serve both economic and security needs. Prioritizing infrastructure, Japan set up the Infrastructure Strategy Council in 2013, consisting of the prime minister, MOFA, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Land Infrastructure Transport and Tourism (MLIT), and the minister in charge of economic revitalization. At the helm of the affairs, this council advocates higher investment and use of ODA in a more “Japanese Way,” referring to the traditional development approach of providing primarily loans and private investment for economic infrastructure (Yamamoto, 2020). The appointment of Tanigaki Sadakazu (2014) and Nikai Toshihiro (2016) as Liberal Democratic Party secretaries 22

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23 Figure 2.2  Japan’s Connectivity Initiatives Source: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf

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general indicated that Abe, while engaging in “diplomatic activism,” continued to support economy-oriented general strategy.19 Japan had always invested in infrastructure development through its aid program. However, in light of China’s BRI, Japan raised its bar for investment with Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) in 2016 when Abe presented it at the Group of Seven Ise-Shima Summit. Keeping FOIP and Japan’s growth strategy in his consideration, Abe put forth that by “quality,” the EPQI meant economic efficiency, resilience to natural disasters, environmental concerns and an eye toward social impact. This scheme addressed infrastructure concerns across the Indo-Pacific by expansion and acceleration through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in collaboration with Asia Development Bank and with the purpose to set an international standard. Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga took over as the pandemic panned out in Japan. Therefore, upgrading the digital framework was inevitable, and Japan pushed forward a plan for the domestic platform. In addition, Japan has also put forward a plan to initiate hand-holding exercises for the rapid development of digital technology because an increasing number of emerging nations are keen to adopt new technologies and services to integrate their industry and social services. Digital infrastructure is thus a new addition to the realms of infrastructure development for JICA. It has already been given due consideration by earmarking the budget within the aid program and through public-private partnerships. In 2019, JICA established the Digital Transformation Taskforce, which, together with Keidanren,20 published “Co-creating Digital Development to Achieve Society 5.0 for SDG.” The relevance of digital infrastructure reached a critical need due to the pandemic. Keidanren official 2020 commented that “(Keidanren) seeks to promote digital transformation and conduct policy dialogues between governments and those in JICA network, including multilateral aid agencies, to not only benefit Japan but also support all countries and region around the world.”21 The guiding principles outlined for digital infrastructure partnership is similar to infrastructure development. Embodying the concept of digital development is furthered by a strong approach to solving developing country challenges and partnering with the private sector such that JICA can utilize the acumen of the private sector’s high-quality digital technologies and know-how. JICA has also established a special office for Science Technology and Innovation (STI) and Digital Transformation (DX) within its Governance and Peacebuilding Department. The pilot projects include Cambodia, currency verification; India, a public-private platform to improve loan efficiency digital; Mauritius, a Thailand, assessing the feasibility of operational system using artificial intelligence for water pipeline management; Uganda, using data integration and analysis for refugee support facilities; and Vietnam, facilitating citizens’ behavioral change through predictive modeling of water quality.22 24

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The more recent “Blue Dot Network”23 (BDN), which is a multilateral platform for governments, private companies and civil society to certify developmental projects meeting international best practice standards of “transparency and accountability” will enable Japan to increase its footprint across the Indo-Pacific as it counters China’s BRI projects. In its infancy, this “rating agency” faces huge funding issues. Considering the BDN council pulled off talks among stakeholders on June 13, 2021, reaching a consensus that infrastructure projects will be graded on the basis of debt taken, environmental standards and labor standards, it will gain relevance as the world regains its vitality after the COVID-19 pandemic. BDN piggybacks on the G20 EPQI and G7 Charlevoix Commitment and Japan’s leadership to build common terms in EPQI. Japan continues its commitment to infrastructure development. Figure (2.3) gives us a fair indication of how the projects are disbursed among sectors and the total investment by sector. Most projects are urbanbased as they come under two heads: Urban Development and Urban Railways/Transport System. One can also see that most investment is directed toward infrastructure, which addresses the issue of the “connectivity” part of FOIP policy. 2.4.2  Capacity Building Assistance through Human Resource Development and Infrastructure CBA by JICA comes in many forms, be it education, health, developing the skillset to enhance agricultural or industrial productivity and technological assistance to address environmental concerns. In addition, JICA gives a premium to “human security.” According to the Charter (2015), Japan ensures that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages. Further, JICA works to extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals. While JICA executes such projects through its volunteers and project teams, it also uses public-private partnerships to enable smoother operations. While their CBA has worked remarkably well in Southeast Asia in recent times, JICA has gone beyond and is executing projects in Africa and the Middle East, which is in tandem with the FOIP principle (Table 2.1). Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is the platform through which Japan engages with Africa. Prime Minister Abe presented his vision for FOIP entrenching Africa in Japan’s broad strategy for the region. Shinzo Abe also undertook no less than four official visits to Africa, which is an unprecedented record for a Japanese prime minister directing attention to this continent. According to JICA’s Annual Report 2020, total disbursement to Africa stands at 106,7369 million yen (2019). JICA initiative in Africa spans almost all of its countries, with Kenya topping the list with 23.7 percent. Given the region’s poverty level and poor health conditions, JICA has projects to improve access to primary health 25

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26 Figure 2.3  Number and Total Investment Approved by Sector (as of February 2021)  Source: https://www.joinfuture.co.jp/english/investments/data/. Collated by the author.

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Table 2.1  Disbursement in Yen of JICA Program in Africa (2019)

S. No

Country

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Kenya Mozambique Rwanda Tanzania Ethiopia Nigeria Uganda Ghana Senegal Madagascar Cote d’lvoire Burkina Faso Cameroon South Sudan Zambia Democratic Republic of the Congo Malawi Sudan South Africa Angola Other 29 Countries

17 18 19 20 21

Total Value of JICA Program (Units Millions of Yen)

Composition Ratio %

23,125 14,629 9,054 6,839 6,228 4,374 4,133 3,904 3,538 3,134 2,852 2,565 2,483 1,965 1,950 1,210

21.7% 13.7% 8.5% 6.4% 5.8% 4.1% 3.9% 3.7% 3.3% 2.9% 2.7% 2.4% 2.3% 1.8% 1.8% 1.1%

1,096 982 770 351 11,557

1.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 10.8%

Total 1,06,739 (Unit in Million Yen) Source: Compiled by the author from JICA https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2020/index.html.

care. It joins hands with multiple stakeholders to provide nutrition to children. Primarily an agrarian society, JICA has promoted and skilled farmers to ensure an agricultural sector resilient to climate change. To enable the growth of the industry, which will directly impact unemployment and poor living conditions, under the Africa Business Education Initiative for Youth, since 2019, 1,285 African youth have gained education in Japan, of which about 1,000 are working toward contributing productively to their country (as of March 2020). Making a pitch with the African start-up companies, the Japanese companies are gaining entry into unfamiliar territory. With the help of JICA, Seven Southeast African and Indian Ocean countries launched the Disaster Risk Reduction Management Platform. The attempt was to build the capacity of the African continent compositely. This has the larger interest of these nations to gain business opportunities and participate in industrial development (Table 2.2). The Middle East is in turmoil, and its needs are embedded more in basic needs for civil society. Japan’s major interest in this region has been oil, and 27

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Table 2.2  Disbursement in Yen of JICA Program in the Middle East (2019)

S. No

Name of Country

Total Value of JICA Program (Units Millions of Yen)

1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10

Egypt Iraq Jordan Tunisia Morocco Palestine Iran Syria Other nine countries

33,011 29,720 24624 16,274 5,923 2,785 828 491 197

Composition Ratio % 29.0% 26.1% 21.6% 14.3% 5.2% 2.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%

Total 113,852 (Unit Millions of Yen) Source: Compiled by author from JICA https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2020/index.html.

for a long time, it had followed “resource diplomacy” as part of its foreign policy outreach. It is in this region that Japan defied the alliance system and sought bilateral relations. Currently, while a peace initiative is Japan’s priority, extending the capacity-building projects in this region is seen as an indirect way to help the peace initiative agenda. JICA has, in its capacity, started the initiative to receive Syrian refugees from 2017 as graduate school students in various universities. To encourage the unification of Syrian refugees into Jordan, JICA provides employment support, ensuring social participation. In Turkey, JICA’s ODA Loan projects have developed infrastructure for water supply, sewerage, and solid waste management in the Syrian refugee rehabilitation locality. In Yemen, JICA supports capacity development through the Knowledge Co-Creation Program and Third Country Training Program and educates Yemen government officials on Japan’s economic reconstruction history after World War II. Iraq-Japan relations are rather unique, as Japan has disregarded the United States to protect its national interest. JICA’s strong presence is a sign of Japan’s interest in this country to protect its own national interest. JICA executed ODA Loan projects for rehabilitating and developing critical sectors like electric power, water and sewerage infrastructure, which are essential for people’s livelihoods. Post-pandemic JICA has engaged in educating about COVID19 protocols and dispensation of hand sanitizers across most developing nations of Asia and Africa. It is also helping in the dispensation of vaccinations in countries where Japan is sending COVID-19 vaccines. 2.4.3  Rule of Law: Peace Building Japan has always been unwilling to make political aid a condition for its assistance as a donor nation. Since the end of the Cold War, almost all 28

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Development Assistance Countries members have adhered to the principle of democracy and good governance as a basis for giving assistance. Japan’s approach to peace initiatives is embedded in “addressing the root cause of conflicts” – namely, social disparities and unequal opportunities. While one does see a focus on infrastructure, as mentioned in JICA’s annual report 2020, infrastructure development does not suffice to build peace. Instead, developing institutions and impartially addressing the needs of the society and empowering communities, it is felt, would build peace more effectively. JICA, therefore emphasizes – “a government trusted by its citizens” and “a resilient society” – and provides assistance aimed at developing stable states over the medium to long term.24 Though there are no distinct projects that are earmarked as a peace initiative, if one looks at Japan’s engagement in Myanmar since the political turmoil, one is witness to how resiliently JICA continues its projects like “The Project for Improvement of Magway General Hospital” implemented by the cooperation of Ministry of Health and Sports, the Government of Japan and the JICA. This project completion was opportune for Myanmar as it fights the pandemic. Further, JICA “Sustain Myanmar’s Spirit for economic recovery from COVID-19 epidemic loss – JICA provides 5 billion JPY low-cost financing to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) under a new emergency program.”25 Yet another conflict zone where JICA continues to develop human resources to facilitate the peace process in a long winding move is in Palestine, where JICA works with the Department of Refugee Affairs of the Palestine Liberation Organization to support the development of participatory camp improvement plans and their implementation at three refugee camps in the West Bank.26 Another mode of peace building is by rehabilitation of terror groups. For instance, in the Philippines, in 2019, Japan Ambassador Koji Haneda not only attended the ceremony for decommissioning of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front but through JICA provided 40 motorcycles to support Joint Peace and Security Teams. This kind of outreach is believed to help improve the livelihood of the community. The philosophy of Japan’s work toward peace building is to uplift the society in the conflict zone, provide education, health care and means of livelihood and encourage integration into the society.

2.5  Foreign Direct Investment FDI is yet another economic tool for a country to operate in the international community. However, the government has little control over FDI but can potentially educate, incentivize and guide the private investors to invest in a country or region. OECD defines FDI as follows: Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) to establish a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. 29

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The motivation of the direct investor is a long-term strategic relationship with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a significant degree of influence by the direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise.27 Noteworthy in this definition is the “strategic long-term relationship,” which essentially means the long-lasting interest of the investor and is defined as when the “direct investor owns at least 10 percent of the voting power of the direct investment enterprise.” Japanese companies’ interest in investing in neighboring nations started during the reconstruction period itself. Kojima and Ozawa (1985)28 showed through their study that Japanese companies’ reason for moving abroad was beyond resources and markets. Rather, many domestic companies which were incapable domestically were compelled to move overseas, especially to developing countries. Helpman and others (2004)29 argued that if one looked at the Asian nations, it is evident that firms like to locate in cost-minimizing countries to maximize their profits, but they are also motivated because of the transportation cost and tariffs of the host country. He was the first to divide FDI into horizontal FDI and vertical FDI, and his model predicted that exports are better rather than horizontal FDI when trade frictions are lower or economies of scale are high. If one looks at Japan’s FDI flow to a FOIP region in stock or by fixedbased method (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5) with 2000 as the base year, it is clearly evident that even in the current century, FDI from Japan flows mainly into China, ASEAN, Taiwan and South Korea. This supports the

Figure 2.4  Japan’s Outward FDI in FOIP Region (Base Year 2000)  Source: Compiled by Author from JETRO data.

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Figure 2.5  Japan’s Outward FDI Stock in FOIP Region  Source: Compiled from JETRO data.

explanation given by economists as “geo-cultural affinity.” It is precisely because of this that the Japanese government plays an important role in directing FDI to regions that it identifies as good destinations for economic prosperity. Thus post 2010, India has gained focus and so have some countries of Africa. However, compared to the ASEAN region, it is negligible. Japan’s FDI narrative is also a great example of vertical FDI, where a supply chain was instituted to take advantage of low labor costs, both skilled and unskilled, as well as establishment costs. As the supply chain got entrenched and driven by globalization, most governments intervened and found a solution for the free flow of goods and services in the form of a FTA of varied nature, making it the production hub of the world. If one is to impose a FOIP vision, economic efficiency as paramount to continuing engagement of nations in this region seems inescapable. The intermeshing of Japan government’s economic tool of aid (ODA) and private investment (FDI) movement is showcased in Figure 2.6. In the figure, the disbursement of ODA and foreign investment is reflected in the Xand Y-axis. This shows that while China was high in both ODA and FDI, the other Asian nations fell into two categories: mild or low. Noteworthy is that in Indonesia and India, which are target nations for security and strategic calculations of Japan, ODA disbursement is the highest while investment composition is low, whereas countries like Cambodia and Malaysia are low on both accounts, despite having a similar economic advantage. Going by FOIP considerations and the “Where Will They Go” index, Japan’s security and strategic considerations will be well placed under the ambit of economic consideration.

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Figure 2.6  Country-Wise Positioning of Japan’s FDI and ODA 2019 (USD Billions)  Source: JICA and JETRO data compiled by the author.

2.6  Economic Agenda Post-Pandemic The chaos of the pandemic has affected individuals, organizations and the state and has thrown challenges that require course correction to advance a new equilibrium. Academic writings have generally been pessimistic both in terms of revival and the nature of the new order. Terming it the “valley of death” (both literarily in terms of human lives lost, but also metaphorically for the number of organizations that will disappear),30 the post-pandemic is posed for hardship. However, the International Monetary Fund forecasts (September 2021), though the global economy is projected to shrink by 4.4 percent in 2020, mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, that a 5.2 percent increase is expected for 2021. But Japan, which has been fighting a recession for over three decades, has seen a falling gross domestic product of (−) 4.8 percent in 2020. Factors identified are a sharp decline in domestic consumption and exports fall due to the shrinking of global trade. As in the most advanced country, Prime Minister Suga announced a stimulus package to keep the economy afloat. In December 2020, he announced a package of USD 708 billion to help quick recovery, targeting new growth areas such as green and digital innovation. Speculation is that the fourth extra budget will be announced before the election, in which funds will be directed to new growth sectors and improve people’s livelihood. The new spending would follow three extra budgets already drawn up during the pandemic that added about 70 trillion yen to Japan’s debt pile. Trade and investment are the mainstay of Japan’s economy, which faced severe shock from the first round of the pandemic when China went on a 32

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lockdown. Since then, Japanese businesses in the export-import sector have faced challenges of procurement and sales, which has thrown open yet another vulnerability – “the supply chain.” Thus, a new addition to the security concern is supply chain security which, like food security, calls for diversification of sourcing and markets. The pandemic strongly affected Japan and the East Asia region as the global value chain was shaken and brought forth the weakness of overdependence on China. A call for diversification was put forward by technologically advanced nations like Japan and South Korea as disruptions in the regional supply chain – namely, electronics and automobiles – caused significant economic distress. These were the mainstay of these nations. As the pandemic continued, this disruption was seen in food supply and pharmaceuticals. This economic disruption has been encashed as a geoeconomic strategy led by Indo-Pacific nations, Japan and the United States (though the beginning of the war against China had originated prior to the pandemic). Japan has incentivized Japanese firms to delink from China and has disbursed Y 306 billion to support Japanese companies willing to reshore back to Japan or locate their supply chain in Southeast Asia or South Asia. As the pandemic continues, new sectors like semiconductors, which have a very complex supply chain, are throwing up unforeseen challenges. The Japanese government has continued to diversify and approved 146 applications and has been soliciting more applications with another Y 210.8 ­billion.31 If one goes by the “Where Will They Go” index developed by Dutch firm Rabobank32, it shows Thailand as top-ranked, closely followed by Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan and India, pretty much the nations with which Japan has close bilateral ties.

2.7 Conclusion Japan’s foreign policy directions in the twenty-first century is trained at rising China and initiatives to counter it and draw upon the United States to participate actively in this region. However, it is also true that revitalizing the Japanese economy was also an agenda during Abe’s tenure. Thus if one has to look at FOIP and see its dissemination through the Japanese ODA charter of 2015 and infrastructure commitments (EPQI, Blue Dot Network) followed by the strong leadership that Japan has shown in the trade architecture (CPTPP, RCEP, IPEF), it necessarily points out that Japan has in this century moved from using economic diplomacy for harnessing “commercial power” in the Asia-Pacific region to making use of it to create a regional order of transparent, cooperative a rule -based order in the Indo-Pacific region under the aegis of sustainable development in which economic, social and environmental concerns are well addressed. The pandemic has forced most nations to become protectionist regimes. Japan, too, is facing the challenge of putting forth an economic policy that will secure its economy. Despite the chaos and fight against COVID-19, 33

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Japan has continued to pursue its objective of drawing more nations into the Indo-Pacific region. As the leadership that Japan has shown during the inking of multilateral economic agreements, it is in the interest of Japan to rise to the occasion of upholding these agreements and utilize them to promote stability and prosperity in the region.

Notes 1 MOFA, (2020) “DiplomaticBluebook” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/ bluebook/2020/html/feature/f0104.html, accessed January 2023 2 MOFA (2019), “Towards Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/000407643.pdf, accessed February 8, 2021. 3 “Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and Japan’s Role and World Order in the 21st Century,” Report of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st century, p. 7, August 6, 2015, accessed August 21, 2021. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ singi/21c_koso/pdf/report_en.pdf 4 Japan G20 Development Working Group, p. 1, January 2019, https://www. oecd.org/g20/summits/osaka/G20-DWG-Background-Paper-InfrastructureConnectivity.pdf, accessed September 1, 2021. 5 https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/capacity-building 6 Kikuchi, Tomoo, “An Economic Justification for Japan’s Free and Open IndoPacific Vision,” in Kyle Springer and Tomoo Kikuchi (eds) Implementing the Indo-Pacific: Japan’s Region Building Initiatives (Australia: Perth USAsia Centre, 2019), p. 11. 7 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/economy/trade, accessed September 3, 2021. 8 https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page4e_000877.html, accessed September 3, 2021. 9 “A Reality Check for Japan-UK Ties,” Japan Times, February 19, 2019, https:// www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/02/19/edi-tutorials/reality-check-japan-uk-ties/, accessed August 24, 2021. 10 Panda, Jagannathan (2021), https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2021/04/JapanUK-Progressive-Ties-and-a-Case-for-Britain-in-the-CPTPP-IB-13.04.21.pdf 11 Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the 27th International Conference on the Future of Asia. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202205/_ 00014.html, accessed May 30, 2022. 12 Prime Minister Fukuda’s Aid Doubling Plan (1978–1980). 13 Since 2002 Japan has lost this position to the U.S. and in 2021 stands at number four in the list. 14 Wan, M. (1995) “Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Has Used Its Economic Power in the Past Decade,” International Studies Quarterly, 39(1), 85–108. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600725, accessed August 25, 2021. 15 NSG Policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace (December 17, 2013). 16 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067702.pdf 17 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf, accessed September 3, 2021. 18 Subject to the improvement of the political conditions. 19 Zakowski, K., Bochorodycz, B., Socha, M. (2018). New Pillar of Japan’s Foreign Policy: Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and Values-Oriented Diplomacy. In: Japan’s Foreign Policy Making. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783-319-63094-6_7. pp. 117–36. 20 The Japanese name for Japan Business Federation.

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21 https://www.jica.go.jp/activities/issues/ict/ku57pq00002ma0c1-att/Keidanren_ JICA_Co-Creation_en.pdf, p. 2. 22 https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/jica-selects-accenture-to-applydigital-technologies-to-development-challenges.html, accessed August 31, 2021. 23 Blue Dot Network is a multistakeholder initiative. It has been initiated by the United States of America, Japan and Australia. The project would be providing assessment and certification of various infrastructure development projects across the world. 24 Ibid. 25 https://www.jica.go.jp/myanmar/english/office/topics/press200601.html 26 https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2020/c8h0vm0000f c7q2b-att/2020_15.pdf 27 OECD, OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th ed. (2008), p. 17. 28 Kojima, K., and T. Ozawa (1985), “Towards a Theory of Industrial Restructuring and Dynamic Comparative Advantage,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 135–45. 29 Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple. “Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms,” American Economic Review, vol. 94, no. 1 (2004): 300–16. 30 Strauss, Steven, “Some Emerging Hypotheses on the Economic Opportunities and Challenges of the Post-Pandemic World” (June 22, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3633391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3633391 31 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/03/15/business/corporate-business/ coronavirus-japanese-firms-supply-chains, accessed August 23, 2021. 32 https://www.rabobank.com/knowledge/d011318336-leaving-china-whichcountries-might-benefit-from-a-relocation-of-production. Accessed on August 25, 2021.

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3 THE “FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” STRATEGY Evolving Japan’s Maritime Security Strategy Prakash Panneerselvam

3.1 Introduction The safety and security of maritime common remain one of the core security concerns in post-World War Japan. The Indo-Pacific region is an important gateway for Japanese energy and trade routes. Ninety percent of Japanese energy and a significant amount of trade has to pass through crucial choke points in the region. Therefore, safety and security are the paramount interest of Japanese national security policy. Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which is popularly known as Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), has been described as a “diplomatic strategy” to link development cooperation with multilateral security cooperation.1 The FOIP is also primarily based on the “Free and Open Ocean” concepts. The Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan – 2015 has mentioned that “Open and Stable Seas” constitutes “Global Common,” which should be governed by law and rules and not coercion.2 Further, the Bluebook of Japan – 2015 points out that maintaining order at sea and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight are essential for peace and prosperity for Japan and the international community whose trade and energy depend on the maritime domain. The rise of China as a dominant economic and military power in Asia and the hegemonic competition with the United States at a global level is having a profound impact on the “global commons.” Prof Barry Posen, in his article titled “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony,” published in 2003, argues that the command over the global commons is the foundation of the US military hegemony.3 It is imperative for the United States to possess a command of the global commons to maintain its global power status. However, with the rise of China, a global power in the twenty-first century is not only resisting the US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region but also posing a threat to the US “Command of the Commons.” The great power competition is more likely happening at sea, in

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DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-3

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the air and outer space – which together constitute the key to both the military predominance and economic exchange. Chinese prominence as a naval power is competing with the US Navy and its ally to control the maritime commons, which is crucial to the Chinese grand strategy. Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, in his testimonial to the US Senate, said that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States and there is no guarantee that the US would win a future conflict with China.” The statement from Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, clearly signifies that Chinese naval power is gaining in the control of “maritime common” and key sea lanes connecting the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. China has been heavily investing in building modernized naval forces with new aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and a fleet of the latest destroyers and frigates, which are now deployed in the distant waters to protect the Chinese Belt and Road Initiatives and Maritime Silk Route. China’s investment in ports and maritime infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region has really provided access to the PLA-Navy to engage with the littorals of the Indian Ocean region. The frequent deployment of Chinese Submarine Patrolling major sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and the naval base at Djibouti has enhanced Chinese naval presence in the region. But Chinese assertive maritime policies like the declaration of Air Defense-Identification Zone over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea and Chinese maritime militia trespassing into Senkaku Islands and territorial waters of the Philippines and Vietnam pose a major threat to maritime nations. Since Japan’s maritime security is interlinked with the safety of Sea Lane of Communications (SLOC), the resurgence of Chinese naval power and its active engagement in the South China Sea and the East China Sea is a security concern for Japan. Japan has been actively pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s FOIP has provided a significant leeway to understand Japanese defense and foreign policy, how Japan is revising its policies to engage with other like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific and how the country is creating a network of maritime nations to deter Chinese provocations. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will discuss Japan’s Indo-Pacific discourse; its evolution into a dynamic strategy/vision in 2016 called FOIP. The second part will discuss the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s approach to FOIP and the role of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in achieving the political objective of the FOIP.

3.2  Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategic Discourse Prime Minister Abe lucidly explained the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” in his speech at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on

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African Development (TICAD) in Kenya in 2016.4 In that speech, he stressed the need for better connectivity between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, “quality infrastructure” and a “stable Africa” for better growth of the region. Also, Prime Minister Abe highlighted the larger geoeconomics and geopolitics interests of Japan like “free market,” “maritime commons,” and “rule of law.” The statement underlines some of the basic tenets of the global economy which is fundamentally valuable to Japan: When you cross the seas of Asia and the Indian Ocean and come to Nairobi, you then understand very well that what connects Asia and Africa is the sea lanes. What will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open oceans and two continents. Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion and making it prosperous. Japan wants to work together with you in Africa in order to make the seas that connect the two continents into peaceful seas that are governed by the rule of law.5 Another important aspect of the speech was the assurance that Japan would bear responsibility in safeguarding the value of freedom, the rule of law and the market economy in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Prime Minister Abe’s speech on the TICAD – VI and MOFA Diplomatic Bluebook – 2017 special feature on the “Free and Open Indo-pacific Strategy” elucidates that the FOIP has three critical objectives: 1) promoting the rule of law, freedom of navigation, the market economy, 2) pursuing economic prosperity (improving connectivity) and 3) commitment of peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation, etc.).6 These objectives can be found in the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” advanced by Prime Minister Abe in 2006 when he was first elected to office. However, there are two important inferences one can derive from the FOIP strategy: first, the geoeconomics components, like promoting quality investments and infrastructure projects in the region; second, a geopolitical aim to promote safety and security of maritime common, capacity building on maritime law enforcement agencies in the region to deter Chinese provocation in the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, the FOIP has an important underlining place in evolving Japan’s National Security Strategy. Experts call this one of the most “important organizing ideas in Japan’s contemporary foreign policy.”7 Because we can see the “Indo-Pacific” as a concept has evolved into a much more popular term in foreign policy, major nations have adopted or revised the policy outlook with similar lines to the “FOIP” strategy. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis renamed the AsiaPacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018. In 2019, the 38

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United States announced its own Indo-Pacific strategy document, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.”8 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also released “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” to reinforce the ASEAN-centered regional architecture in June 2019.9 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative at the East Asian Summit in Bangkok in November 2019.10 The spread of such common terminology and concepts like “Indo-Pacific” indicate that Japan was able to share its strategic ideas through bilateral talks and Track-II-level discussion with the major league countries in the region. Therefore, to understand the basic tenets of the FOIP, its origins and its strategic imperative in Japanese security policy, one has to trace further back to understand the Japanese thinking of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical construct.

3.3  Evolution of the Indo-Pacific Framework Prime Minister Abe was the first to popularize the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2007 when addressing a joint session of the Indian Parliament. In the speech, he outlined how “the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity.”11 Prime Minister Abe also reflected on the “Broader Asia” concept and idealized building a network between India, the United States and Australia to protect rulebased order in the region. Prime Minister Abe’s 2007 speech set a tone for much-deeper cooperation between major democracies in the region. Noted commentator Brahma Chellaney argues that this was part of Abe’s broader strategy of “proactive pacifism” to create a partnership with countries in China’s periphery to build prosperity and stability in the region.12 At the same time, the growing congruence between India and Japan led to the important Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 2008, which was a significant step forward in the bilateral relationship. Since then, bilateral ties have steadily strengthened. During this period, India and Japan signed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements, which came into force in 2011. Further in 2011, Prime Minister Abe visiting India spoke at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi, titled “Two Democracies Meet at Sea: For a Better and Safer Asia,” where he once again emphasized the notion of the Indo-Pacific, where he said, “India and Japan must work even harder to keep our great maritime assert open, free, and safe.” In that speech, Prime Minister Abe drew the distinction between the changing geopolitical landscape in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, where the theory of “hegemonic stability” entirely holds.13 The speech underlined the growing importance of the Indian Navy in keeping good order at sea. India-Japan defense has also grown stronger as the term “Indo-Pacific” increasingly becomes popular among scholars and policymakers in the United States, India and Australia. Prime Minister Abe’s speech in ICWA, New Delhi, clearly indicates India’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. The emphasis on maritime security and 39

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call for naval cooperation has gained substantial attention in India as well. Japan Coast Guard and Indian Coast Guard have been conducting joint exercises since 2001, but both countries remained reluctant to expand the cooperation into active naval exercises until 2007, when for the first time, JMSDF participated in the Malabar exercise along with the United States, India and Singapore. India and Japan have formalized naval exercises with the United States, Australia and India. The Japan-India Maritime Exercise draws a special focus on maritime security cooperation. The growing bilateral cooperation also raised an important question of how the two countries will manage growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s growing maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea and the East China Sea has emerged as the new theater of great power competition. Japan and India recognized the importance of building a comprehensive network of maritime nations in the Indo-Pacific, including the United States, Australia and other democratic nations in the region, to protect the peace and stability of the region. Indian strategic expert Rajaram Panda said the reason for India and Japan to play as a champion of navigational freedom across the seas is a surge in Chinese strategic overreach beyond its borders.14 The freedom of navigation emerged as an essential concern for Japan’s post-nationalization of Senkaku Island in 2012. The Senkaku issue emerged as a major flashpoint in the Sino-Japan bilateral relationship and briefly thawed economic cooperation. Even though China and Japan renewed their cooperation in trade and economics, the security issue remained a core concern for Japan as it witnessed a sudden surge of Chinese naval ships, Coast Guard and Chinese maritime militias trespassing the territorial waters of Senkaku Island. The patrolling of Chinese military and fishing vessels close to Senkaku Island has escalated the maritime tension in the East China Sea. This poses a serious concern to Japanese SLOC security, as most of the energy and trade transportation bound for Japanese islands must pass through the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Japanese concern over the safety and security of maritime common was reflected in newly elected Prime Minister Abe’s opinion piece published by Project Syndicate. In the article, Prime Minister Abe addressed growing Chinese maritime assertiveness in the region. He also stated in that article, “the ongoing disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea mean that Japan’s top foreign policy priority must be to expand the country’s strategic horizons.” Therefore, he calls for the United States, India and Australia to form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean Region to the Western Pacific. The article also points out the importance of strategic islands – Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean to counter Chinese hegemony in the region. The call for the formation of a maritime security grouping by Prime Minister Abe clearly indicates Japan’s expanding strategic horizon in the region. In 2013, Prime Minister Abe unveiled Japan’s diplomatic strategy called “Five New Principles of Japanese Diplomacy” to reaffirm strong partnerships 40

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with ASEAN countries.15 Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Southeast Asian countries and Australia signifies that Japan is ready to play a proactive role in regional and global affairs. The review of specific Prime Minister Abe’s policy directives and his reason to pursue defense cooperation with select Indo-Pacific stipulates that the FOIP aims to address regional security concerns. The FOIP proposes strong cooperation with the Indo-Pacific countries to protect the freedom of maritime common and rule-based order in the region, which is crucial to Japanese security and prosperity. Furthermore, the Japanese emerging defense cooperation with the littorals who share similar anxieties about China validates that the FOIP is overtly a containment policy toward China. Along with that, the FOIP would provide Japan with a position on the international stage to maintain leverage in shaping the global environment.16 Overall, suppose the FOIP is a “containment policy” to balance the Chinese threat. In that case, it is an important factor in Japanese national security policy, which required a careful examination of the policies. Prime Minister Abe attached great interest and importance to the national security policy of Japan. Similar to FOIP, Japanese national security policy also evolved into a much more “proactive pacifism” under Prime Minister Abe.

3.4  Japan’s Emerging Security Posture and FOIP The Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD) document Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision Japan Ministry of Defense Approach gives a very comprehensive insight into the MoD agenda on FOIP. The Approach to FOIP document clearly illustrates the role of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) and how it can support the political objectives of Japan’s IndoPacific strategy. It also underpins the leveraging of defense cooperation and exchange activities with like-minded democracies is crucial to FOIP (please refer to Table 3.1).17 To achieve the aforementioned agenda, Japan’s SDF has begun revising its defense doctrine from a static defense posture against Democratic People Republic of Korea DPRK threats in the North and Chinese air and naval incursion from the South into a more “Dynamic Joint Defense Force.” The National Defense Program Guidelines NDPG – 2018 noted that security cooperation is one of the key factors to achieve Japan’s defense objectives. As part of this, Japan has enhanced the scope and frequency of its security cooperation and military exercises to achieve the FOIP. Mainly, since re-election in 2012, Prime Minister Abe’s new policies were primarily aimed at enabling SDF to engage frequently in security cooperation activities abroad, policies including introducing the first National Security Council (NSC), a State Secrecy Law, change in defense export policy – “Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfer” and revised National Defense Program Guidelines – 2013 (aim for Dynamic Joint Defense Forces) gives flexibility to SDF to deal with emerging threats in the region. Furthermore, 41

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Table 3.1  Snapshot of Japan’s MoD Approach to FOIP Three Pillar of FOIP

MoD Approach to FOIP

1. Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade. 2. Pursuit of economic prosperity (e.g. improving connectivity). 3. Commitment to peace and stability.

1. Securing the stable use of major sea lanes by way of defense cooperation and exchange activities. 2. Preventing contingencies through confidence building and mutual understanding. 3. Contributing to peace and stability through active engagement in the region in cooperation with partner countries.

Source: Compiled from Japan MoD.

the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation Development Law and International Peace Support Law is an important legislature that allows the SDF to dispatch troops in support of international peace and security and participate in a multinational coalition under the United Nations mandate. Under this law, SDF has authorized to “use of force” to protect Japanese troops and when an armed attack against a foreign country is in a close relationship with Japan.18 The new amendment has allowed JMSDF to conduct ship inspection operations to ensure peace and stability of the international community.19 At times, Japan’s SDF was engaged in relief and construction missions in South Sudan; the International Peace Support Law provided SDF with greater responsibilities as a security provider.20 Michael MacArthur Bosack, the former deputy chief of government relations at headquarters, US Forces, Japan, claims that Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force deployment in South Sudan has broken several aspects of Japanese security practices, he also explains the importance of the new law as follows: [I]ntroduction of new protection authorities broke the seal on the 2014 constitutional reinterpretation and 2015 Peace and Security Legislation. Although the process of introducing those authorities showed that implementation will continue to be measured and deliberate, the significance of SDF members finally being able to protect others in situations outside of a strictly defense of Japan scenario cannot be understated.21 The Japanese defense policy changes have removed the political constraints and allows the SDF to provide support to the United States and other countries in times of emergency.22 The Security Legislation also opened up a new avenue for Japan to revise the defense cooperation guideline in 2015.23 Under the revised guideline, Japan can take military action to defend its territory against any attack from an enemy state with the support of the United 42

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States. Through the “Alliance Coordination Mechanism,” both countries can cooperate to take military action in response to an armed attack against a country other than Japan.24 The renewed guidelines are also aimed to strengthen cooperation in the fields of ballistic missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, trilateral cooperation, information security and maritime security.25 Amid of COVID-19 pandemic rattling the global economy and trade, the US-Japan Security Consultive Committee (2+2), on March 16, 2021, met to discuss the global security environment.26 The engagement at bilateral is firmly rooted in building stable and secured regional maritime order. Japan’s “NDPG – 2019 Beyond” also underlined the importance of the Japan-US Security relationship in fulfilling the primary objective of FOIP: The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan’s own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. As stated above, Japan’s fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific. (NDPG, 2019) Moreover, Japan’s strategic maritime cooperation with the select IndoPacific countries – Australia, India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam – would significantly boost Japanese efforts in the region (Table 3.2). In the past few years, Japan has engaged in building defense cooperation by visiting and exchanging high-level defense/foreign visits and signing several key military documents, including Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreements, Information Security Agreement and Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement. Japan is also trying to deepen defense engagement with New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan, strategically important but less active and less networked than other countries. Furthermore, Japan is also engaged in discussions with the United Kingdom and European countries regarding the geopolitics trends in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, JMSDF has conducted maritime security exercises with the French Navy and Britain Navy as part of its FOIP outreach with non-regional power. The security cooperation with non-regional power signifies that FOIP has an inclusive vision and encourages Japan to expand cooperation with countries with similar visions. Under FOIP, Japan has taken a greater responsibility to ensure security under the basic defense policy. Japan has also stepped up cooperation with its ally, friends and other concerned countries to face any contingency situation whenever it rises. The nature of the threat requires a comprehensive and collective response from states to neutralize the threat. The role of the SDF is paramount in the FOIP strategy, as Japan is seeking to expand its 43

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Table 3.2  Japan’s High-Level Defense Cooperation with Select Indo-Pacific Countries Category

Australia

India

Indonesia

Philippines

South Korea

High-Level Defense / Foreign Policy Dialog Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreements Security and Defense Cooperation Documents Information Security Agreement Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement Training and Military Exercise

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes*

Yes*

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes**

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Source: Collected from various open sources, *signed memorandum, **agreed to begin negotiations.

role in the region. This enhanced engagement encompasses major waterways in Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Asia, in which key SLOCs are located, vitally important for Japanese energy and maritime security.27 Protecting the “maritime common” is one of the common agendas of Prime Minister Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Also, the MoD, in the strategic document on FOIP, underlined the importance of the maritime domain in protecting Japanese interests abroad.

3.5  Maritime Security Strategy of Japan and FOIP Japanese economic and energy security is closely connected with the safety and security of the International SLOC. The JMSDF has incorporated “protection of SLOC” and defending “areas surrounding Japan” into its overall operation mission based on its experience from World War II. During the Cold War, JMSDF supported the US Navy mission to deter Soviet expansion into the Western Pacific. Post-Cold War, the JMSDF mission adopted more proactive policies and provided more leverage to JMSDF for actively participating in international peacekeeping missions. In the post-9/11 world, the Japanese role both as an ally to the United States and as a regional/ international actor has directly contributed to international security. Japan used this opportunity to expand its maritime cooperation with the United States and other regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region to protect the SLOCs. In 2001, the deployment of JMSDF in the Indian Ocean in support 44

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of Operation Enduring Freedom was a turning point in Japan’s maritime security strategy; despite political pressure, Japan ought to deepen its commitment to the war in Afghanistan.28The JMSDF’s involvement in the replenishment activity in the Indian Ocean is a clear indication that Japan is ready to take part in a larger security role in the region. In 2007, the rising piracy and hijacking of ships for ransom in the Gulf of Aden severely threatened Japanese shipping companies. The attack on several Japanese Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) in the Gulf of Aden has been viewed as a major maritime security threat to Japan. In response to growing piracy activities in the Western Indian Ocean, JMSDF vessels supporting the US coalition in the Indian Ocean have been directed to escort Japanese tankers in the dangerous waters. Based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008), Japan deployed two destroyers in 2009 to protect the Japanese-bound vessels from piracy attacks. In addition, the new anti-piracy law, “Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy” was enacted in June 2009 to enable Japan to respond to the situation swiftly.29 JMSDF and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) started counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden to protect Japanese merchant ships. Since 2013, JMSDF has also begun participating with Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 3 to conduct effective operations with the other navies deployed in the counter-piracy activities in Somalian waters. In addition, Japan has also extended financial and technical assistance worth USD 500 million to Somalia to tackle piracy and ensure human security.30 Japan is also extended support to Djibouti Coast Guard by providing patrol vessels. In addition, Japan constructed the first naval base in Djibouti to support the JMSDF mission in the counter-piracy role in the Gulf of Aden. The JMSDF’s prolonged role in the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden has boosted Japan’s credibility in the international community. Moreover, Japan’s continuous contribution to maritime peacekeeping also provided the opportunity to network with navies in the Indo-Pacific region. The shift in the global political and security environment has called for revising the maritime defense strategy for Japan. In the thinking process, JMSDF set a goal for ensuring Japan’s security by analyzing the international situation over the seas. 1) Defend Japan’s territory and surrounding areas, 2) secure the safety of maritime traffic and 3) create a desirable security environment.31 Based on Prime Minister Abe’s statement on FOIP in 2016, the JMSDF and JCG began to revise their strategic and operational objectives to be consistent with FOIP. Table 3.3 show the JMSDF response, which was categorized under three separate headings “Commit­ ment Strategy,” “Contingency Response Strategy” and “FOIP Strategy.” The strategy explains how to cope with the objective defined by the Japanese security policy. The “Commitment Strategy” and “Contingency Strategy” are the principle and the primary role of JMSDF in defending Japanese territory. This strategy also now expands to deal with China’s gray zone tactics in Senkaku Island; in the last few years, particularly after 45

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Table 3.3  JMSDF Strategy Strategies Objective

Commitment Strategy*

Defend Japan’s territory and surrounding areas

Activities in Japan’s territory, territorial waters and sea lanes in peacetime in order to prevent armed conflict Activities in areas around main energy routes in peacetime

Secure the safety of maritime traffic

Create a desirable security environment

Addressing transnational issues in addition to the above two strategies

Contingency Response Strategy*

FOIP Strategy**

Activities to immediately remove threats when deterrence does not work Activities to immediately remove threats in areas around the main energy route when deterrence does not work

Open use of port infrastructure in the region through a regular port call by JMSDF/JCG vessels Maintain enhanced military presence in the region. Conduct maritime exercises – bilateral/multilateral level with likeminded countries in the region

Source: *Tomohisa Takei, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the New Maritime Era, Hatou Vol. 34, No. 4, **Saito, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Japan’s Inter-Source: Agency Cooperation, Maritime Security Challenges 2018, https://mscconference.com/wp-content/ uploads/MSC18-presentations/Strategic-Resolve-1-Saito-Japan-FOIP.pdf.

Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, China has adopted “hybrid tactics” to harass the Japanese government vessels on the Senkaku Island. The JCG has a primary role in maritime policing the territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands, if the situation demands, the JMSDF will be called into action to stop the maritime incursion in the region. Under the FOIP strategy, JMSDF has begun routine deployment of naval vessels for an extended period in the Indo-Pacific region. The operation is termed the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD), which has two primary objectives: 1) to improve JMSDF tactical capabilities and strengthen cooperation with partner navies in the Indo-Pacific region through conducting joint exercises; and 2) to contribute to the peace and stability of the region and to enhance mutual understanding and relationship with partner countries through the deployment.32 In line with FOIP, JMSDF began deploying ships for an extended period, visiting various ports in Southeast Asia and South Asia to enhance the region’s presence. In 2018, Japan deployed three JMSDF front-line ships – JS Kaga, JS Inazuma and JS Suzutsuki, what it called 46

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Indo-Southeast Asian Deployment – 2018, from August 2018 to October 2018. During this deployment, JMSDF vessels visited India, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Philippines and conducted various maritime exercises to improve their operational capability.33 In 2019, the name was changed to IPD, but the objective remains the same, the JS Izumo and JS Murasame and four carrier-based aircraft were deployed from April to July 2019 to the Indo-Pacific region.34 Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan continued the IPD – 2020 from September 07 to October 17, 2020. JMSDF Escort Flotilla 2 made port calls in Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and Australia, during this voyage, JMSDF ships were also involved in various exercises ranging from replenishment at sea, tactical maneuvring, emergency deck landing practices, vessel inspection drill, gunnery to anti-submarine exercises. Tokuhiro Ikeda, former commandant, Kure District/VADM, JMSDF (Ert.), claims “these activities were conducted in close coordination with the Joint Staff, the National Security Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc., and were exactly the actions needed to realize the FOIP vision.”35 The IPD is not a Freedom of Navigation Operation or meant to assert Japanese Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific region; the IPD is designed to enhance Japan’s maritime security network with navies in the region. The JMSDF deployment will also bring greater visibility and the enhanced presence of Japan in the region; many Southeast Asian countries see Japan’s move to counter-balance China in the region. On the other hand, China is watching the development closely in the South China Sea, and the East China Sea may increase the provocation in the waterways. Japan’s participation in bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises has strengthened interoperability between JMSDF and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India-Japan bilateral cooperation based on maritime domain awareness and information-sharing under the 2018 agreement on “Implementing Arrangements for Deeper Cooperation between the JMSDF and Indian Navy” has strengthened the cooperation between the two navies.36 Japan’s participation in the Malabar series of exercises envisages naval solid cooperation between India, the United States and Australia (Figure 3.1). The Malabar exercise is not a mere diplomatic venture or symbolic gesture for a goodwill relationship. Instead, it is a good opportunity for Japan’s naval forces to derive tangible operational experience from such exercises. Japan has also partnered with India and the United States in the trilateral mine-counter measure exercises in 2018, which bring greater strength to India-Japan-the US trilateral cooperation. Furthermore, with Australia, to further improve interoperability and cooperation in the maritime domain, JMSDF and Royal Australian Navy exercise in the South China Sea to enhance the tactical skills and cooperation with the US Navy.37 In 2020, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison visited Japan amid a pandemic to meet new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and discussed the strategic issues, including expanding strategic cooperation. 47

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The geospatial distribution of Japan’s maritime exercise shows the importance of the security of the SLOC in the Indo-Pacific region. Between 2017 and 2019, Japan conducted 18 bilateral maritime exercises with India and Australia combined. With the United States, Japan conducted 13 bilateral maritime exercises in 2019. Most of the exercises are concentrated in two locations. First, the Triangle Area – Tokyo, Guam and Taiwan – which is strategically important to Japanese energy security. Second, most Japanese tankers from West Asia pass through the Bashi Channel located between the Philippines and Taiwan before entering the Japanese archipelago. Most of the Japan-US maritime exercises were conducted close to the Bashi Channels or in the East China Sea and the South China Sea to check the growth of Chinese assertiveness in the region. The second most preferred maritime exercise location is in the Western Indian Ocean, in the Arabian Sea, close to International SLOCs. This route is frequently used by Japanese tankers and is vitally important for the global supply route. The Somali piracy and unrest in Iran, Iraq and Pakistan make the region highly unstable and vulnerable to maritime trade. The maritime exercise with the Indian Navy in the Arabian Sea and the Andaman Sea close to the straits of Malacca signifies that JMSDF is getting familiar with local conditions. As part of the FOIP strategy, JSMDF’s enhanced presence in the region can be viewed from the map in Figure 3.1, which clearly shows Japan’s maritime security outreach activity in the Indo-Pacific region. In accordance with the vision of FOIP, the JMSDF is also embarked on a modernization plan to cope with emerging new challenges in the region. In accordance with the growing threat in the region, Japan is preparing to add a new class of destroyers/helicopter carriers, which will be modified to carry the F-35 deep-penetrating aircraft purchased from the United States. In the 2020 budget, Japan allocated USD 290 million to retrofit the Izumo class and USD 725 million to purchase six F-35 B fighters. The focus on carrier emphasis represents that Japan is shifting into a more forward defense posture. Japan has upgraded its sub-surface naval capability by inducting a new class of submarines, Taipei- class submarine, the 3,000-ton submarine is larger and stealthier than the Soryu-class submarine lithium-ion batteries can enhance the submarine’s capability to stay longer.38 JMSDF is also inducting a new 3,900-ton destroyer, smaller in size with a lesser crew to patrol and monitor Chinese warships in the East China Sea.39 Japan also raised a new Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade trained by the US Marines and engaged in several exercises with the US Marine Corps for the past several years, strengthening Japan’s maritime capability in protecting the Senkaku Islands in times of a war-like scenario. Given the manpower shortage, Japan’s SDF is adopting smaller vessels and working toward joint operations, as noted in NDPG – 2018. Defense analyst Satake Tomohiko points out that the shortage of personnel invariably affects Japan’s defense posture; FOIP especially would be compromised

48

Source: Created by the author.

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49 Figure 3.1  Geospatial Distribution of JMSDF Bilateral Maritime Exercise with the United States, India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific Region 

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if the security environment surrounding Japan become tense in the future, reducing the operations in the Indo-Pacific can be considered because it would be necessary to deploy many vessels and patrol planes to conduct surveillance and missile defense in the areas surrounding Japan.40 Japan’s FOIP has placed high importance on the maritime security of the region. The maritime strategy clearly explains that Japan is slowly progressing toward achieving “greater security in the Indo-Pacific region, through deploying vessels and cooperating with littorals of the region.” The JMSDF’s port visits, particularly to Southeast Asian countries, would boost Japan’s bilateral relationship with the countries in the region. At the same time, Japan’s proactive role would provide Southeast Asian nations’ navies with a strategic option to rely on JMSDF support in the region, not just for Freedom of Navigation or South China Sea issues but also other emerging maritime challenges in the region. Japan’s emerging cooperation with Sri Lanka in South Asia, JMSDF vessels participating in Amman Exercises conducted in Pakistan, JMSDF’s port visit to Oman and other West Asian countries enhances Japan’s presence as a major maritime power. The maritime base in Djibouti and advanced naval exercises with the Indian Navy on Anti-Submarine Warfare platforms in the Arabian Sea indicate that the Japanese quickly adapted to the new security environment. Given its immediate security concern in East Asia, Japan faces a major challenge in balancing the threat in the region and deploying naval vessels in Indo-Pacific deployments.

3.6 Conclusion Primarily, Japan’s maritime security focuses more on the defense of sea lanes in international water. Under FOIP, Japan is planning to expand the scope of JMSDF from mere protecting the sea lane into a more dynamic role in challenging the Chinese hegemony in the region. The new peace legislature law and revision of Japan-US Defense Guidelines allow SDF to completely engage in military operations abroad, but with limited conditions. The maritime exercises with select Indo-Pacific countries with like-minded democracies act as a deterrence against Chinese provocation in the region. Japan-India maritime security cooperation as the center of FOIP plays an important factor in protecting the “free and open ocean.” Japan’s engagement with the Quad is also based on the fundamental value of FOIP to broaden its scope in protecting the maritime commons and advance its interest with the United States, India and Australia.

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Notes 1 Mr Teruaki Aizawa, Senior Program Advisor of OPRI and former naval officer of JMSDF. 2 MOFA Blue Book 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2015/ html/chapter3/c030105.html 3 https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/posen_ summer_2003.pdf 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016), https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf03 5 Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), https:// www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html 6 Ibid. 7 Rossiter, Ash, “The “Free and Open Indo – Pacific “ Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture,” Rising Powers Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 2 (2018): 113–31. 8 Department of States (2019), A Free and Open Indo-pacific Advancing Shared Vision, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-OpenIndo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf 9 ASEAN Outlook of the Indo-Pacific, https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEANOutlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf 10 Ministry of External Affairs India, Indo-Pacific Division Brief, https://mea.gov. in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2007), https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html 12 “How the Japan-India Alliance Could Redraw the Political Map,” The National UAE, February 1, 2014, https://www.thenationalnews.com/how-the-japan-indiaalliance-could-redraw-the-political-map-1.344356#full, accessed January 1, 2021. 13 Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF), Two Democracies Meet at Sea: For a Better and Safer Asia, https://en.jinf.jp/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ HP-Eインド演説会場配布用916.pdf, accessed January 1, 2021. 14 Panda, Rajaram, India-Japan Relations: Dawn of a New Relationship? Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 9, no. 2 (2014): 178–88. 15 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy,” 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_ abe/statement/201301/18speech_e.html, accessed January 4, 2021. 16 Teraoka, Ayumi, “Japan as a Stable Builder of Force in the Indo-pacific,” in Yuki Tatsumi and Pamela Kennedy (eds), Key Challenges in Japan’s Defense Policy (2020), https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/KeyChallengesIn JapansDefensePolicy-March2020-V3-web.pdf 17 Japan Ministry of Defense, Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision Japan Ministry of Defense Approach, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/ info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/pamphlets/pdf/indo_pacific/ indo_pacific_e.pdf 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016), https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/ page1we_000084.html 19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016), https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ 000143304.pdf 20 Jeffrey, Hornung W., “Japan’s Mistaken South Sudan Withdrawal,” The Rand Blog, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/06/japans-mistaken-south-sudanwithdrawal.html

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21 Michael, B., “What Did Japan Learn in South Sudan? The Significance of the Japan Self Defense Force Deployment to the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan,” The Diplomat, 2017. 22 Hughes, C.W., Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), doi: 10.1057/9781137514257.0006. 23 Japan Ministry of Defense (2015), https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/ pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf 24 Ibid. 25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020), https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ n-america/us/security/arrange.html 26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2021), https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/100161035.pdf 27 Japan’s Ministry of Defense Approach (2020). 28 Richard, T., “The Maritime Self Defense Force Mission in the Indian Ocean: Afghanistan, NATO and Japan’s Political Impasse”, The Asia Pacific Journal, vol. 6, no. 9 (2008): 1–12. 29 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Maritime Bureau, https://www.mlit.go.jp/en/maritime/maritime_fr2_000000.html 30 Cabinet Secretariat The Government of Japan (2021), http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ gaiyou/jimu/pdf/siryou2/counter-piracy2020.pdf 31 Japan Ministry of Defense, https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/about/role/ 32 Japan Ministry of Defense (2020), https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/exercises/ IPD20.html 33 Japan Ministry of Defense (2018), https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/operation/ operation2018.html 34 Japan Ministry of Defense (2019), https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/operation/ IPD19.html 35 Ikeda, Tokuhiro, JMSDF Activities in the Indo-Pacific Region, AJISSCommentary, 2021, http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/ajiss_commentary/jmsdf-activitiesin-the-indo-pacific-region.html 36 India Ministry of Defense, Joint Press Statement on Japan-India Annual Defense Ministerial Dialog, Press Information Bureau, 2018. 37 Ministry of Defense Japan, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2021/03/ 549b434ead05026827a3ce2353dca6ae54c30330.html#1 38 Japan Times, “Japan Unveils a New Submarine in the Face of China’s Growing Assertiveness,” October 12, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2020/10/14/national/japan-new-submarine-taigei-china/, accessed Feb­ ruary 2, 2021. 39 The Japan Times, “MSDF to Launch Smaller-size Destroyer amid Crew Shortage,” October 14, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/10/12/ national/msdf-launch-smaller-size-destroyer-amid-crew-shortage/, accessed Feb­ ruary 2, 2021. 40 Tomohiko, Satake, “Japan Initiatives for a Free and Open Indo-pacific, East Asian Strategic Review 2020,” 2020.

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4 THE FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC Japan’s “Soft” Push-Shaping Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia and India Janashruti Chandra and Madhura Ganguli

4.1 Introduction The concept of power in the present-day world is in a flux. The digital revolution transformed the notion of borders ushering in globalization. Globalization is inextricably linked with interdependence, that is, bridging economies and societies. Intergovernmental cooperation has reached new pinnacles, and yet, beneath the surface, the tensions are palpable. Suppose one were to consider the economic ties and growing trade of East Asian nations. It might lead to the erroneous hypothesis that historical tensions in the region are a thing of the past and that no situations of military friction will ever arise. Though the interdependence of East Asian nations may not match up to the European nations, there is truth in that both multilateral and bilateral degree of connectedness in the fields of economics and culture has grown. However, it is also undeniable that there is an increasing budget set apart for defense, and the military buildup by nations in this region is prolific. In the nineteenth century, power meant an outcome in a war precipitated by military strength alone that had favorable economic consequences, but of late, the idea of power is more nuanced. While it cannot be denied that massive military strength has augmented the position of many a country into hegemonies, contemporary power structures use diplomacy and soft power as a constant and pervasive way of supplementing power. Japan has had a unique model by which soft-power diplomacy has successfully led it to sustained growth in economic and international stature. It has been embracing a nuanced and continuous attempt to build relationships with countries by moving away from military and economic diplomacy to culture diplomacy suited to a postmodern and technologically driven world. “The Tokyo Show” at the end of the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Summer Olympics can be cited as a visually appealing symbol

DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-4

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of what Japan stands for today. Packed with endearing animation figures from Hello Kitty, Doraemon, to Prime Minister Abe dressed as Super Mario in “Cosplay” mood, the Tokyo skyline juxtaposed against the old Sensoji temple and the new Tokyo Sky Tree- the two-minute video set the stage for the Tokyo Olympics. The last 1964 Olympics Opening ceremony celebrated Japan’s perspective of war and peace. This time, it was hailed as an event to showcase Japan’s reconstruction from the recent natural disasters, tackling the pandemic and showing the way ahead. The global audience witnessed an orchestrated show of Japan’s soft power at the opening of the Games and can expect the same later this entire year. The spirit of selfless hospitality (omotenashi), venues powered by renewable energy and medals made of recycled material to showcase environmental sustainability have won fans worldwide even if the footfall of tourists amid the pandemic did not meet the 40 million target. At the same time, it was believed that the Tokyo Olympics, having some of the largest mass media coverage, will be an essential part of Japan’s soft-power policy, giving Japan an unprecedented influence over not only sports but also in showcasing Japanese culture and technology as being at the helm of innovation and growth. The Japan Consortium (which includes Japanese public broadcaster NHK and other Japanese Broadcasting corporations), in association with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), has worked out a USD 1 billion deal. It is believed to have an “enormous significance over the future of Japan,” as per NHK president Katsuto Momii (Momii, as cited in Mackay, 2014). The Japanese Consortium was also granted exclusive broadcasting rights of the Olympic Games from 2026 to 2032. Japan has shown that by using sustained soft-power policies, it has greatly influenced the world media and economy in a globalized world. 4.1.1  Defining Soft Power The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye in support of American diplomacy as a tool for persuasion and support garnered from the international sphere, for he pointed out that “[n]ational security has become more complicated as threats shift from the military (that is, threats against territorial integrity) to the economic and ecological” (Nye, 1990, p. 157). He further points out how diplomacy and soft power balance power in the international political sphere. Nevertheless, in contemporary globalized societies, it cannot be denied that the symbiotic relationship of the states is an important factor in sustaining economic growth and international prestige. Japan at present holds the second rank in the world for soft power. The 2021 Global Index report prepared by Brand Finance considers seven pillars namely, Business and Trade, Governance, International Relations, Culture and Heritage, Media and Communications, Education and Science and People and Values. This year an additional factor of pandemic handling 54

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was also assessed. This perception survey revealed that Japan was the topmost Asian nation as far as soft power was concerned. With high levels of business investment, healthy consumer spending and leading in technological innovation, Japan has jumped up two positions since last year. Japan harnesses soft power from any cultural phenomenon that has roots in the nation, be it classical or pop Buddhist iconography, woodblock paintings, movies by legendary directors such as Kurosawa or Ozu or the more recent Miyazaki, culinary delights, cosmetics, fashion, games: all run in parallel to elevate the image of the country. Furthermore, Japan has always been good at customizing soft power. For example, when Osamu Tezuka’s animation, Tetsuwan Atomu, featuring an atomic-powered humanoid, was released to the United States, to avoid any unpleasant connotation of the atomic bomb, the name was changed to Astro Boy. This made it more palatable to the American audience and earned a profit for the Japanese. Joseph Nye initially assessed Japan as deficient in soft power but later corrected himself, maintaining that “Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other country” (2005). Japan had been insular in temperament and had for long taken pride in its uniqueness as a theory (Nihonjinron) to uphold. The low birthrate, aging population and language challenges are some of the constraints Japan faces in developing its soft power. However, Japan has always been strong in the area of creativity, good at adapting, assimilating and indigenizing new learnings, products and concepts and adding to its repertoire of soft power. Nye (2004, p. 136) positions soft power to play for deciding “whose story wins,” a phrase introduced by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001). They claim that the battlefield narrative will shift to ideas, images and values. Positive ideas, images and values can be built through products, concepts, language, tourism, etc. The “Cool Japan” initiative taken by Japan is in line with this objective. This chapter attempts to see how and why Japan uses soft-power resources to shape its foreign policy and discusses its presence in the IndoPacific with a focus on the southeast and the main thrust on India to illustrate the same. Further, it will explore Japan’s success in changing the narrative and reinventing its story. Today, be it the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) block or India, Japan shares a relationship that has moved beyond the apparent formal state visits to the mass impact of food, culture, technology and economics. With non-state actors involved in promoting Japan’s image, diffusion of power has been rapid. 4.1.2  Abe’s Dream for Japan The late Shinzo Abe, before he became the prime minister, in his book Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision for Japan (2006), projected Japan as a country that values culture, tradition, history and nature and one that is trusted, respected and loved in the world and which demonstrates leadership. For the better part of the twentieth century, Japan was derided/ridiculed 55

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as a stable democracy but a power in decline. With the decline in domestic consumption, competition from other countries, the conventional model of mass production and cost competition that Japan used to follow the domestic economy, was facing a challenge. Abe’s economic revitalization program, Abenomics, sought to address this issue to maintain Japan’s significance. To rebuild self-confidence, an international display of Japanese attributes was pertinent to win the hearts and minds of global consumers. Soft-power resources were of utmost importance to offset the decline in hard power. The “Cool Japan” strategy thus was formulated to create new sources of revenue. Identifying and creating a Japan boom in the Asian market were steps charted out by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2012. Japan had three clear goals attached to the “Cool Japan” initiative: 1) acquiring foreign demand amounting to 8 to 11 trillion yen, 2) revitalizing domestic demand and generating employment and 3) attracting foreign tourists to Japan (METI, 2012, p. 5). With this (Figure 4.1) as a road map, Japan crafted the “Japan boom” in Asia and customized it to the market scope it sees in each country. Opinion polls about Japan from ASEAN and India in 2019 have borne out how soft power has benefited Japan and the international community. In the ASEAN region, as well as India, the respondents were of the view that Japan was reliable and an important partner country currently and in the future. Furthermore, the impressions were favorable, as respondents in both ASEAN and India viewed Japan as a strong economy with high technology, a country with a high standard of living, rich in tradition and culture, with beautiful nature and a new culture to introduce to the world. Amid the post-pandemic scenario of the world economy, Japan has been one of the few economies where resilience and rebound have been part of its policies based on a strong response to health measures and a manufacturing boost by the ministry. Moreover, as per Deloitte’s report, Japan’s economy has ridden on the impetus of the Olympics (Wolf, 2021). What is to be noted here is that Japan’s resilience to such a significant pandemic is also based on the soft-power initiatives of the government rather than on conventional diplomacy with the rest of the world and other countries of Southeast Asia. The following section deals with the historical development of Japan and its relations with the rest of Southeast Asia.

4.2  Japan’s Historical Position vis-à-vis Southeast Asia Located between the two colossal civilizations of China and India, the Southeast Asia region is rich in resources and a melting pot of cultures backed by Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Japan enjoyed a boom in maritime trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with Southeast Asia. Sizable Japanese communities (Nihonmachi) consisted of samurais who fled Japan to escape internal strife; Christian refugees and Japanese merchants engaged in the trade of silk and gold were living in the towns of 56

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57 Figure 4.1  Overall Image of Cool Japan Strategy to Make Large Profits  Source: METI website.

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Manila, Hội An, and Ayutthaya. Between the years 1600 to 1635, approximately 350 armed Red sail ships sailed under the Shogunate permit system to the region for commercial purposes until the trade was stopped under the National Seclusion Policy by Japan. 4.2.1  The Beginnings of Power Dreams Once the country reopened after the Meiji Restoration, Japan transformed through the vigorous process of modernization known as Bunmei Kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment). Enlightenment leader, FukuzawaYukichi in his book “The Role of Japan in Asia” (1882), presented Japan as the leader of Asia, initially pressing upon Datsua-Ron (De-Asianization) to remold itself and becoming the first Asian nation to industrialize. In order to impress upon the West and keep itself free from Western colonial clutches and encourage dialogues and trade, it quickly modernized along the Western lines. However, alongside this Meiji foreign policy of Westernization was the counterbalance of Asianism that nurtured its cultural strengths. Fusion of Eastern and Western cultures (wayosetchu) profited Japan, facilitating the trend of bustle dresses with kimono fabric and fusion food developed by Japan like korokke (croquette), tonkatsu (pork cutlet), kareraisu (curry rice) gaining a wide currency in the Asian region. Japonisme was being celebrated in the art world, and even literary figures like Yonezawa Noguchi were making Haiku poems; Noh theater was popular in the world. Promoting Japan through English books authored by the Japanese themselves, the foreign audience was given to understand that the Japanese culture was something unique, profound and spiritual. Works such as Nitobe Inazō’s Bushido: The Soul of Japan (1900), Okakura Tenshin’s The Ideals of the East (1903) and The Book of Tea (1906) can be considered the first few examples of soft power that raised Japan in the Western eyes. Nitobe Inazō was appointed as the first Japanese exchange professor in 1911. At his lecture at Columbia University, he got coverage in the New York Times because of statements such as “Japan Always for Peace.” The Pan-Asian ideal of harmony and cooperation for liberating the Southeast Asian region from Western colonialism was the starting point that quickly transformed into Japan’s own imperialistic designs and territorial expansion to secure natural resources like oil and rubber to consolidate its own economic development. The forays into soft power were short-lived. It was the hard power that won Japan the initial victories over China, Russia and Korea and catapulted the nation into the Second World War. The doctrine of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Dai Tōa Kyōeiken), once turned into imperial propaganda, gave the Japanese military an instrument to afflict brutalities and grab power. Japan initially sought to portray that the war was not an imperialist war but a moral, constructive one for the benefit of Asia. Japan continued to emphasize its long-term commitment to the region and argued with economic rationality 58

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that the Asian countries could not thrive independently without Japan’s technological leadership. The year 1940 was commemorated as the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan since Emperor Jimmu ascended the throne. In this context, the old term “Hakkō Ichiu” (All the world under one roof) rooted in Nichiren Buddhism gained back currency as a war slogan for a region with a Buddhist past. Cultural diplomacy in this way supported political diplomacy by providing a favorable image, enhancing prestige and promoting Japan’s national interests. Puppet governments were set up, and a colonial education system was thrust upon the region for administrative purposes and to ingrain Japanese supremacy into the mentalities of newfound subjects. In 1934, a government agency, Kokusai Bunka Shinkoukai (The Society for International Cultural Relations), was set up. It was the first national institution for formulating foreign cultural policy and was the forerunner of the Japan Foundation. The main task was to transmit Japanese culture and promote the language. Japanese language and culture lessons helped create “loyalty to the modernizing state and replace old patterns of life and work with new skills, habits and disciplines” (Tsurumi, 1984, p. 309). Japan’s presence, however, grew weaker with the Asia-Pacific war chapter as it became an instrument in the hands of the military government. However, the institution did survive the war, though, in the Allied Occupation era, the financial assistance was heavily curtailed. The Kokusai Bunka Shinkoukai was a learning experience for Japan to understand how to conceive, conduct and manage international cultural relations. 4.2.2  Soft Power as Nation Branding and “Image” Creation After defeat in the Second World War, Japan re-aligned itself with the international scenario. Japan and Southeast Asian relations till the end of the 1960s evolved in the framework of the Yoshida doctrine that laid down three parameters – namely, the US-Japan security alliance, emphasis on economic relations and keeping a low profile in international politics. Japan did not try to justify its own objectives, nor did it get critical of other nations’ assertions. Perceptions about Japan had to be changed. Unlike conventional notions of military strength as part of international diplomacy (as was in the case of the USA and China), Japan could not do so without going against Article 9 of its US-imposed Peace Constitution, which stated that Japan would remain a nation committed to an anti-war stance of not maintaining an army for the offense. Neither could it resume cultural diplomacy to avoid any hierarchical relationship. The immediate two goals in front of Japan were security and reconstruction, and so it took the pragmatic step of signing the Japan-US Security Treaty and the pacifist stance. Soon after that, the country focused on rebuilding the economy, and after the catch-up phase and some external help like the Korea War, it found its footing back. Once Japan rejoined the 59

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international community and signed diplomatic treaties, Japan started providing compensation and Official Development Assistance to the Asian countries over which it yielded erstwhile power. First, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 1957 reflected a UN-centered diplomacy and suggested Japan’s leadership role in developing Asian countries. Second, the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) program operated by Japan International Cooperation Agency started in 1965, modeled on the US Peace Corps, to cooperate in the socioeconomic development of the recipient country. Among Southeast Asian nations, Laos was the first country where JOCVs were sent. With the economy booming in Japan by the 1970s, Japanese presence and investment in Southeast Asia were overwhelming. “Made in Japan” goods flooded the Asian markets, and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia penetrated deep into their economy. The result was that by the 1970s, many of the Southeast Asian nations felt exploited, and a boycott of Japanese products was witnessed in 1972. Moreover, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s tour in 1974 was executed against the backdrop of the anti-Japanese riots in Indonesia and Thailand. As a result, Japan realized the need to change its diplomacy. The 1974 Diplomatic Bluebook recorded Southeast Asia’s angst against Japan and observed that these countries wanted to go beyond mere economic relations. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda’s speech in 1977, “Our Country’s Policy towards East Asia,” delivered in Manila, corrected the course of Japan’s economic aggression. The policy speech referred to Japan’s relationship with ASEAN as a “good cooperator” (yoki kyōryokusha) and not a mere spectator. The criticisms levied against Japan were quickly corrected, and Official Development Assistance was extended to education, health and human rights that involved the recipient country people. Japan thus allayed fears from the history of its military past and expressed its willingness to undertake a multidimensional approach that had non-state actors and the narrative more “heart to heart.” This led to the initiation of soft-power diplomacy as a part of Japan’s attempt to provide economic assistance and sustainability to ASEAN countries in an effort to maintain balance in Southeast Asian relations. Following the Fukuda Doctrine, there was a vigorous push in Japan’s foreign policy in nurturing cultural diplomacy as part of a symbiotic relationship between countries. However, the soft-power objectives that Japan pledged to pursue – namely, peace and security, development and human rights – were still aligned with the United Nation’s goals. The erstwhile Kokusai Bunka Shinkoukai had evolved into the Japan Foundation under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1972 and in its early years promoted sober, peaceful images. Tea ceremony, ikebana (flower arrangement), origami (folding paper art), calligraphy and classical theater forms were examples of cultural exports. However, these traditional art forms were contextual and rooted in Zen philosophy and were not 60

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comprehensible to the larger global audience. Shifting from high elitist culture to pop culture became a part of creating an “image” of Japan that was diametrically opposite to the one maintained during the Second World War. The shift in psychological perception of Japan has been a state-driven policy where the MOFA of Japan has stated that it is using pop culture as a part of cultural diplomacy. Again, the point to be noted here is that Japan has taken up cultural ideas of manga and anime as part of this initiative (MOFA, 2017). They serve a twofold purpose. While on the one hand, both manga and anime are based on comprehensibility based on the interpretation of graphic art, on the other hand, they nullify the need for language alone as an interpretive tool. Thus, both manga and anime sustain a universality of crossing over boundaries of language and cultural norms. Again, we see that there is a performative legitimization of knowledge, whereby images and art become knowledge systems producing information. However, not part of political realism as power structures, the oxymoronic notion of the term “soft power” is sustained through this form of knowledge legitimization. The second point to be noted here is that both forms of pop culture are closer to a newer generation in the receiving country and those who have read about the Second World War only in history books. Therefore, their interpretation of Japan as a nation would be based on their understanding of popular culture. Regis Arnaud, in his article, points out that “[o]f the world’s animation, 60 percent is produced in Japan. Manga and anime, once limited to a global coterie of weird teenagers, have gained the status of art that one can find in museums” (Arnaud, 2009, p. 24). Japan had a head start in its use of soft-power diplomacy. As Koichi Iwabuchi points out, under the government of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001–06), the use of media culture for enhancing national interest was firmly instituted. Koizumi was the first prime minister to refer to the advancement of cultural policy that aimed to promote media culture export and nation branding (Iwabuchi, 2015, p. 423). Prime Minister Koizumi, in his address at “At Dinner for International Conference on ‘The Future of Asia’ Organized by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun,” went on to state, Exchanges of culture and people are also gaining strength. … Recently, I myself have become keenly aware of this increased sense of unity of the entire Asian region. Last year, NHK’s singing contest was held in Singapore, and a female Singaporean university student, who was studying Japan, sang a song by MISIA, a Japanese singer, and won the championship. … While cherishing such a sense of closeness in Asia, as well as the attractiveness of the region, I would like to strive hereafter to build a “community that acts together and advances together, based on the harmony and sympathy resulting from this sense of closeness.” (MOFA, 2004) 61

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Japan’s new image in the world was meant to create a new sense of historicity, which led to a constructed notion of the Japanese nation among other world nation-states. This can be seen as what Lyotard termed as legitimizing narratives based on their notions of a culturally and technologically driven world in the postmodern world (Lyotard et al., 1984, p. 8). Noteworthy is that in its effort to create a new consciousness of Japanese people and culture through soft-power diplomacy, Japan has also reiterated the notions of nationalism among its citizens, which are today balanced on the crux of technology and an urbanized idea of the nation. Thus, soft power has led to nation branding in Japan and has sustained itself as a part of cultural diplomacy. What is astonishing is that while Japan as a nation did not start with notions of “soft” power diplomacy and was also not familiar with this kind of diplomacy (conventional diplomacy of the contemporary times dealt with military and imperialist hegemonies), it has surpassed all in not only the adoption but also execution of such diplomatic means. Subverting prewar perceptions of hegemony through military power, Japan has been extremely diligent in portraying itself as a nation based on hegemonies created by knowledge discourse in the contemporary globalized world. As a result, Japan has been able to grasp the tenets of information and technology as a key factor in not only foreign diplomacy but also as part of creating economic hierarchies integral to foreign policy stature. This seems to reiterate Michel Foucault’s thoughts regarding power and knowledge discourse. The newfound use of knowledge as “discourse” or relations between individuals and organizations leads to the creation of newer constructs of knowledge, thereby essentializing power through this discourse. Foucault’s thoughts on power can echo the sentiments that essentialize constructs of “soft” power. He goes on to say, What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault, 1984, p. 61) This attests to the fact of Japan’s use of “soft” power as being essentially able to overcome obstacles of larger economies like the US or China, which have an advantage over larger means of production, because it leads to a creation of pleasure through Japanese culture of kawaii and “cool.” Furthermore, by meticulous and sustained use of soft-power policies and apparatus, Japan has created discourse in pop culture, language, information technology and high “culture” practices, which are part of the aspiration of a newer generation of consumers in various Asian countries.

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4.2.3  “Cool” and Pop Culture as State Foreign Policy In the “Cool Japan” strategy created by the METI, there is a clear summation of Japanese cultural exports that need to take place over a certain period of time, the first being animation, music programs and stores (METI, 2012, p. 6). It is also a thing to take notice of, with Douglas McGray’s article on Japan’s concept of abstract notions of “cool” being given concrete existence through foreign policy legislation as highlighted in his article released in the Foreign Policy Magazine. In recent times, Japanese soft-power policies are running parallel to China and South Korea in the ASEAN countries and facing competition. McGray points out that the transfer of cultural viewpoints post-1970s was possible for Japan because Japan did not adhere to the insularity of a bygone culture. With the onset of Japan’s new “soft-power” policies of culture and economy, Japan promoted an essentially created construct of what was deemed to be “Japanese” to the world. Localized ultra ideas, such as “ikigai” and “origami,” became a part of cultural exports that were seen as part of Japan’s “soft-power” identity. Ironically, this was diametrically opposite to the martial context of prewar Japan. Again, the notion of “martial” Japan was packaged through anime and films, even in Hollywood. Accurate representation of these cultural constructs was not the aim of the state. It was the ideological representation of Japan as a legitimate “cultural” state whereby innovative and expressive interpretations of Japan could be seen. Market economic structures have become the new arena for power diplomacy, contrasted with earlier notions of military strength. In the contemporary world, Japan enjoys a position of contrast as regards its perceptions of insularity. While on the one hand, cultural imports of anime, food and cinema have made it a society representative of a continuing legacy of the Far East, language and its economic implications have been cultivated as part of scientific and technological developments. This has increased the concept of Japan as a country espousing “cool” culture. McGray points out how new age “superpowers” in world hegemonies were being created, and Japan was leading the race by the year 2000. According to him, “What made Japan a superpower, more than just a wealthy country, was the way it’s great firms staked claim to a collective high intellectual ground that left competitors, even in the United States, scrambling to reverse-engineer Japanese successes” (McGray, 2002). Today, Japanese firms are not only eponymous with anime and manga but also with rising virtual reality and real-time gaming products. What is singular to Japan is its persistence in evolving existing notions of popular icons to re-capture markets. Thus, while the phenomenon of McGray’s The Pokemon Hegemon in 2002 was an idea that spoke about the popularity of Japanese pop culture icons in ASEAN countries, Japan re-created that same phenomenon with the “Pokemon Go” in 2016; an augmented reality (AR) mobile game. The innovation of AR gaming for mobile technology in developing countries made this a wildly

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popular icon. Nintendo, the owner of Pokemon Go saw an increase of USD 9 billion in its market value within five days of the release of the game it had created in alliance with Niantic. This not only helped the parent company, but its effect on the Tokyo stock exchange reverberated through other companies, raising their market value. On the other hand, the cultural implications of such soft-power tools saw that the same cultural icon connected two generations of the world’s youth through different mediums of manga, anime and gaming. Officially, as part of soft-power diplomacy, a “Cool Japan Fund Inc.” was made through political legislation by Act 51 in 2013 in Japan’s Legal System. Through this fund, Japan has continued to invest in soft-power diplomacy to date. For example, in 2018, it made investments in the company Tastemade, which created YouTube content on Japanese food, fashion and tourism, depending heavily on the ideas of “cool” and “kawaii.” Today, popular video streaming sites like YouTube, Netflix and Rakuten Viki, although predominantly American in their organization and content, have content wholly based on South Korean, Japanese and Chinese, with offices in Singapore, Tokyo (Japan), and Seoul (South Korea). 4.2.4  “The Medium Is the Message”: Japanese Soft Power and Mass Media In 1967, Marshall McLuhan went on to say in his book The Medium Is the Message, The medium, or process, of our time – electric technology – is reshaping and restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every aspect of our personal life. It is forcing us to reconsider and re-evaluate practically every thought, every action, and every institution formerly taken for granted. (McLuhan, 1964, p. 9) If looked at from the point of view of soft-power constructs, we can see how soft power has been implemented through the mass media, especially the electronic media. Today, Japanese culture is portrayed in its most serene and intellectual form through television shows of NHK World like Japanology, hosted by an Englishman like Peter Barakan. Through television and other forms of mass media, Japan has opened up to the world as a land where cultural and intellectual endeavors form the crux of all social relations. Ironically, Japanese products proliferated in world markets, especially ASEAN and countries under the umbrella of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, where cable television networks aired state-funded channels like NHK World and NHK documentaries. The other effect of the mass media is how television has affected Japan’s cultural and visual images. Quoting McLuhan when he says, “Too many 64

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people know too much about each other. Our new environment compels commitment and participation. We have become irrevocably involved with, and responsible for, each other” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 24), one sees that a sense of camaraderie has grown within the common populace of the recipient countries. It is only through the use of mass media like television and the internet that we realize that the earlier step of negotiation of governmental policies is now wholly obliterated from the perspective of the viewer. The negotiations do occur; the common populace is no longer concerned about those but instead taken in by the profusion of images that start out as exotic but become familiar through constant showcasing. It is here that we see Japanese soft power at play involving more non-state actors. While domestically NHK Television is run by Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai Corporation, NHK Overseas is run by the Japanese government, where the Board of Governors is selected by the Japanese Diet (Parliament) sanctioned by the prime minister. NHK World-Japan extends television service to 380 million households in 160 countries as of March 2020 and runs a flagship Asia24 with a particular focus on Japan and the rest of Asia. NHK World radio service also caters to 17 foreign languages. NHK maintains that it intends to enhance mutual contact and goodwill among countries, regions and people. It is one of the pillars of Japanese public diplomacy and continues to be one of the two large media groups, along with the BBC, on which it is modeled. Media is also in state organizations, educational apparatus, networked associations and individuals who promote Japanese soft power through their websites or social network forums. A cursory look at events organized by Japanese embassies and consulates, websites of alumni associations for individuals who have spent considerable time in Japan, resource persons of Japan Exchange and Teaching Program and JOCV and individuals who have benefited from Japan all contribute to the dissemination of the images to be sent out to obliterate the old images that no longer sell. The networking that Japan stresses expedites image dissemination. Concepts like Ikigai (Purpose for a living) made famous by foreign authors, too, work well for Japan. Like manga/anime that also generates merchandise, the fashion industry can also be cited as one aspect that has an immediate grip on the younger generation. 4.2.5  When Fashion “Designs Dreams” – Soft Power and Japanese Fashion Ralph Lauren said that he did not design clothes but designed dreams, so it seems quite appropriate to look at Japan and its impetus in the world of couture fashion as well as streetwear. From the 1970s till the 1990s, Japan made great inroads into the world of high-couture fashion. Ginza in Tokyo became synonymous with whatever was fashionable the world over. Japan towered over its Southeast Asian and South Asian neighbors in the export of its fashion. However, with the economic decline of the 1990s, it shifted 65

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its focus to street fashion. Today, while Japanese couture is respected, it is Japan’s Harajuku street fashion that has become synonymous with the export of pop culture as part of soft-power diplomacy. Images were first made to conjure up the appearances of something that was absent. Gradually it became evident that an image could outlast what it represented; it then showed how something or somebody had once looked and thus, by implication, how other people had once seen the subject. Later still the specific vision of the image-maker was also recognized as part of the record. (Berger, p. 10) Following this idea of the image by John Berger in his seminal work Ways of Seeing, it can be seen that the image portrayed in the contemporary world of Japanese culture is neatly divided into that of an earlier genteel generation, and that caters to the aspiration of the youth. Over time, fashion in Japan has grown subcultures (Dayman, 2020) that are extremely popular in Southeast Asian and South Asian countries. Subcultures like kireimekei, Mori Gal and Visual Kei starting from neat appearances, to muted colors, to loud hair and makeup styles, respectively, have been funded by the Cool Japan Fund. However, the export of Japanese fashion as part of soft-power diplomacy has been aided by brands like Uniqlo and Muji. By the year 2019, Muji had opened 497 overseas stores. Thus, the Japanese economy is witness to the exponential growth of the effects of soft-power diplomacy. With Japan paving the way for couture fashion and then high street fashion, the contemporary world has unknowingly imbibed Japan’s vision of the “image.” This, in reality, can be attributed to a successful implementation of soft-power diplomacy as the crux of building up an “aspirational” image of a nation. As a result, the “fashion industry” is a big part of not only cultural output but also economic output affecting South East Asia and South Asia.

4.3  Japanese Soft-Power Engagement with Southeast Asia and South Asia ASEAN-Japan Forum, ASEAN Cultural Fund and Japan Scholarship Fund for ASEAN Youth, ASEAN-Japan Center and Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program were the first few initiatives to abet the residual suspicions of an aggressive Japan. Japan is the top donor of ODA to Southeast Asia, but the financial contribution is attached to goodwill gestures. Post the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan’s commitment to soft-power foreign policies has led to a deep and engaging relationship with the ASEAN countries. Japan’s foreign minister, Aso Taro, in 2005, made a statement that Asia stands for optimism, and Japan could be counted upon as a thought leader and as a stabilizer that respects other nations as peers (MOFA, 2005). Today, one can see that the scholarships as part of soft-power diplomacy 66

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have borne fruition in that Japanese as a language has profoundly impacted ASEAN countries. One of the biggest impetuses to this can be seen in the policy of Japan promoting youth activities, whereby young Japanese nationals are sent to teach the Japanese language in recognized institutes and schools of ASEAN countries (The ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action, 2012). In 2017, Japan celebrated 50 years of ASEAN cooperation in Manila, Philippines. What later became known as PM Takeo Fukuda’s “heart-toheart” diplomacy continues even today to be the crux of the Japan-ASEAN relationship. Not only is it aided by economic trade, but cultural and linguistic exchanges have led to an interesting idea of multilateralism, thereby evoking the idea of Asian cooperation and commonality in identity. Even in popular culture, this commonality is noted with idol groups such as Thailand’s BNK48, Indonesia’s JKT48, Philippines’s MNL48 fashioned after Japan’s noted all-female music band AKB48. Following the notion of “heart-to-heart” diplomacy, today, we see soft-power elements like the Japanese language gaining popularity. After the East Asia profile, the maximum learners are from this region. Tourism and culture have affected both Japan and the ASEAN countries positively. By 2018, Japan had seen a marked rise in tourism from ASEAN countries due to the growth of a new middle class with higher economic and spending power. While visitors from China, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong accounted for 73 percent of the total number of foreign arrivals, those from Southeast Asian nations increased at steep rates from the previous year, 26 percent for Vietnamese and 19 percent for Filipinos. (Ogawa, 2019) Culturally, Japan has had a great influence on ASEAN nations. While Japanese pop culture abounds in the streets of these nations, the new middle class is also not left behind where a mixture of high culture and pop culture can be seen in their emulation of Japanese ‘self-help’ authors like Marie Kondo. An example would be people creating businesses of their own after being trained by internet sensations like Kondo. Thus, a woman from Manila, Philippines, spent USD 2,000 for three days to be trained by Kondo and now runs her entrepreneurial venture (ABS-CBN News, 2019). Today, Japan has engaged and enlarged its influence upon a vast and diverse population based on its multilateral soft-power policies. The ASEAN and Japan connection is a shining example. With this, it is not a wonder that from Southeast Asian countries, Japan has been able to successfully influence South Asian countries like India, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Of the 300,000 foreign students Japan boasted of in 2019, above 90 percent were from Asia. The international student profile, as stated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, indicates this trend. As the pie chart shows, 67

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19% 3%

5%

42%

8% 23%

China

Vietnam

Nepal

Korea

Taiwan

Others

Figure 4.2  Country-Wise Breakup of Foreign Students in Japan in 2019 Source: Complied by authors from website statistics; Study in Japan. 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0

2015

2016

2017

China

Veitnam

Nepal

Taiwan

Others

Total

2018

2019

Korea

Figure 4.3  Trends in the Number of Students Going from Foreign Studies to Japan  Statistics Source: Immigration Service Agency, Japan.

the bulk of the students are from China and Vietnam, but other Asian countries are fast catching up. International students are eligible to work up to 28 hours a week, making Japan an accessible destination option for those studying privately but without much funds. The majority of the universities in Japan are private and operate on tuition fees students pay. The demographics of the dwindling Japanese youth population do not help keep these universities afloat, and the universities thus have the incentive to receive international students. Compared to US or UK universities, Japanese private universities are still cheaper. All this has contributed to astounding international student mobility. Japan, too, for its part to keep the trend of 68

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incoming international students meticulously has streamlined work visas for students, support internships and help in the recruitment process on graduation. The drive to internationalize 37 of Japan’s 700 universities had been launched in 2014 to increase global competitiveness, and these universities had targeted consciously courses to be taught partly or entirely in English, hiring special staff to support students, introducing websites to support international students, allowing admission in the fall semester, etc. Understanding students’ needs and well-thought-out steps are bearing fruits, as many international students now flock to Japan for higher studies and employment.

4.4  Japanese Soft-Power Engagement with India The civilizational contracts are 1,400 years old, and the bilateral ties have been maintained without any dispute. The Japan-India Association, set up in 1903, is the oldest international friendship organization in Japan. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the flow of cultural exchange between India and Japan was mostly theological, with Japan mostly at the recipient end. The Japanese knew India as Tenjiku and the land of origin of many deities of the Shinto faith. In the early twentieth century, there was a reverse flow of cultural influences in the form of technology, investment and goods. India was the first Asian country with whom Japan signed the bilateral peace treaty, and yet in the backdrop of the Cold War, Japan’s relationship with India could not be explored much. Except for Buddhist diplomacy with India with the royal couple, Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko visiting Bodh Gaya in 1960 and Japan engaging in preservation, restoration and socioeconomic development of Buddhist sites like Sanchi, Satdhara, Ajanta Ellora caves, Bodh Gaya, not many soft-power footprints can be seen. These two were also pursued, as Buddhism provided a spiritual and peaceful link and would not jeopardize the relationship between the two countries. However, in recent times, with India and China emphasizing Buddhism in their public diplomacy, Japan is slowly distancing itself from this aspect. Suzuki Motor Corporation’s advent to India gave an impetus to the Indian automobile sector and inputs of knowledge discourse in the management domain. When India was plagued by the balance of payments and foreign reserves had dipped, Japan helped the country and earned much goodwill. However, immediately after the Cold War, the bilateral ties between India and Japan suffered a huge blow when Japan suspended its ODA grant following India’s nuclear test in 1998. Despite this contentious issue of India going nuclear, Japan and India, since Prime Minister Narendra Mori’s official visit in 2000, have entered a “Global Partnership” that extends to joint ventures, Research & Development cooperation, maritime security, energy security, etc. The realignment of dynamics materialized because Japan quickly realized that the United States was warming up to 69

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China. The joint statement “India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership” issued in 2008 has proven to be the cornerstone of ensuring the Asia-Pacific Security architecture by balancing military power and economic ties. Japan continues to be the largest bilateral donor to India. In 2015, the bilateral ties were upgraded to “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” To counter the perceived threat of rising China, Japan is trying to promote multilateral institutions in Asia, and India is central to the plan. India has long held an important place in Japan’s strategic leanings, be it the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (MOFA, 2007) or the “Spirit of the Quad.” The high symbolism of the Royal visit in 2013 was a pointer in this direction (MOFA, 2021). The Japanese are acquainted with names like Tagore, Gandhi, Subhash Chandra Bose and the dissenter Judge Radha Binod Pal. However, at a people-to-people level, much ignorance remains. As of December 2019, 40,202 Indians were residing in Japan. Most are living in Tokyo, with 10 percent concentrated in the Edogawa ward, which is nicknamed “Little India.” If we see Japan’s media presence in India, NHK’s international service on TV, radio and the internet, NHK World-Japan radio is accessible to Indians in English, Hindi, Bengali and Urdu. Indians access information about Japan mainly through newspapers and journals and from people-to-people exchanges (MOFA, 2000). Though India is a non-traditional market for manga, the demand for comics and manga is strong, and so for Japan, it is unquestionably the right time to enter. Indian television channels, Pogo, Cartoon Network, Disney Channel, Animax, used to air anime. Many children grew up with Doraemon, Shinchan, Kochikame, etc., till they were taken off the air following the patriotism trend and concerns of the sexual portrayal of underage characters. While anime can deal with kids’ content, it can also feature serious topics like love, death, friendship, and conflicts. The Japan Foundation held a large film festival across India from September 2019 to February 2020. The anime movie Weathering With You was featured, and the director Shinkai Makoto was invited. Weathering With You became the first Japanese anime film commercially screened in 39 cities across India. The beginnings of anime movies in India can be traced back to 1992. To strengthen Indo-Japanese relations, Ramayana—The Legend of Prince Ram was made as a collaboration project between these two countries. In 2020, the first homegrown anime movie in Bangla, Karmachakra, was made and is awaiting release. The story line was created in India, and the anime art was done in Japan. India’s licensing limitations are a bottleneck for the Indian audience, but the fan base has been growing steadily nonetheless. Comic Con India was kicked off in 2011 in Delhi and expanded to Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. A report in the Economic Times stated that at the third Indian Comic Con convention, India was at a stage where the manga was becoming familiar with the new Indian reader and catered to comics based on mythology. The hugely popular “Death

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Note” series has also been translated into regional languages like Hindi and Telugu (Death Note News Articles, 2015). The Japan Foundation in 2012 had a Manga Cafe stall at the New Delhi World Book Fair and received an enthusiastic response, attracting more than 12,000 visitors. The Foundation library now houses a Manga Cafe section. The Indian anime/manga fans or otakus communicate through social media and club members meet to exchange books and videos, hold cosplay (costume play based on animation characters) events and discuss manga trends. Kolkata anime club and Mumbai anime club have been raising awareness about the art form. In 2016, for the first time from South Asia, India participated in the World Cosplay Summit, supported by three ministries of Japan, including the MOFA. All these indicate that the Indian appetite for Japanese soft power remains intact despite the COVID-19 situation and media laws, and Japan has successfully made inroads. The anime/ manga merchandise boom is yet to catch up in India. In 2021, we see that India has come a long way, and manga is now an all-pervading idea with local T-shirts having prints of a “Naruto” or “Vegita” from “Dragon Ball Z.” However, tourists going to Japan because of pop culture only account for 9 percent (Groot, 2018). For Indians, too, pop culture inculcates interest and is a starting point to develop further knowledge that improves their employability and readiness to adjust to a different cultural setting. The manga/anime boom has led to the interesting trend of youngsters wanting to learn the Japanese language. After 2019, with normalization of post-pandemic situations, Indo-Japan film festivals and other cultural events were resumed. The Indo-Japan film festival of June 2022 held in Kolkata and a cosplay festival in Nagaland are indicators of the fact that the importance and influence of Japanese culture have been slowly but steadily moving from metropolitan cities to smaller states and towns of India. Traditionally, great significance is attached to the promotion of the Japanese language. The Japan Foundation’s charter stresses that the more people in the world study the Japanese language, the better they understand Japan (The Japan Foundation, 2015). The Japan Foundation New Delhi office was established in 1994, but language education had started long before, as early as the 1950s. In addition to central universities and state universities, many private institutions also teach Japanese. The total number of institutions imparting Japanese language skills is 340, the highest in South Asia. The Joint Statement of the Japan-India Summit Meeting 2017 committed to launching certificate courses at 100 higher educational institutes and training 1,000 teachers. The number of Japanese companies has grown manifold in recent times, opening up profitable employment opportunities to the youth. In 1991, only 110 Japanese firms had business in India, which by 2010 had risen to 725. The Embassy of Japan and the Japan External Trade Organization reported the number of registered Japanese companies at 1,455 as of October 2020. With Japan reaching out to develop

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many large infrastructure projects, the scope for employment is on the rise, increasing the number of learners. Internships and Japan Career Fairs are also being considered proactively. The latest survey report on Japanese Language Education Abroad by Japan Foundation will be released later this year, but the number of learners was 38,100, up by 58.7 percent compared to the last survey in 2015. The rise in numbers was because of efforts channelized at the school level. The Central Board of Secondary Education that conducts the school passing exams included Japanese as a subject in their curriculum in 2006 (The Japan Foundation, 2020). Under a recent Indian government initiative, Lok Sabha Secretariat in 2021 conducted an online course for many foreign languages, including Japanese, to cater to Members of Parliament, state legislators, etc. It is hoped that the appreciation of the language and cultural learnings from Japan will increase. The Japan Foundation has made many online resources accessible to teachers and learners in the current pandemic situation. It is also engaged in an online course, “IRODORI – Japanese for Life” in Japan. Japan is putting in efforts in the language hurdle to capture the talent pool of the dynamic youth population, which in the future may consider working in Japan to balance out their declining population trends. Knowledge of language that comes embedded with cultural values will help this new pool get assimilated more easily. Japan is making a concerted effort to push a new reinvented culture of late. Swami Vivekananda once mentioned that it would be better for young Indians to pursue their studies in Japan than in England. Q.S. World University rankings of 2019 list five Japanese universities. Japanese universities, as has been mentioned earlier, are introducing degree programs in English under the Global 30 program in both humanities and science and engaging in education fairs and online support to attract more Indian students. In 2013, the number of Indian students studying in Japanese universities was a negligible number of 500, which Japan is keen to raise. For Indians, Japan still ranks 20th on the list of preferred countries to study abroad. In the lifestyle arena, Japan has been making steady inroads. Ten years ago, India had a handful of Japanese restaurants associated with five-star hotels. However, now there are many sushi bars and Japanese eateries in the metropolis and many cities, often customizing the menu to suit Indian vegetarians. The Embassy of Japan in 2019 hosted “An Evening with Japanese Food” to raise awareness about Japanese food and sake, rice wine). Gastro diplomacy is also promoted through digital content such as “Midnight Diner: Tokyo Stories” on Netflix, the Japan Foundation and New Delhi’s Online Culture Course “Window into Japan,” featuring sake, ramen, etc. Since UNESCO declared washoku (Japanese food) to be an intangible cultural heritage, Japan has tried its best to popularize it in India, and it has been well received. In contemporary India, cosmopolitan states like Goa and Bangalore have seen a surge in a demand for Japanese food like “sushi” and “sake.” A similar trend was observed in the fashion industry when Uniqlo entered the Indian market in October 2019. The store made ￡237,000 in two days and opened its second store in Delhi NCR one month later. It 72

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aspires to expand to two- and three-tier cities in the future and go online to tap the middle class with purchasing power. The entry of technology and globalization has created two aspects of soft-power diplomacy. While on the one hand, we see that the cultural diplomacy of Japan is adapting to the various nations in which they have been introduced. On the other hand, they have been creating economic opportunities for Japanese products to be sold in a world market till they become ubiquitous with the culture of the “other” nation. One way of doing so has been an amalgamation of existing companies and markets in India. Japan’s Kokuyo S&T Co. bought 50.3 percent shares of the Indian stationery brand Camlin in 2011 (The Times of India, May 2011). After that, we see that Kokuyo Camlin has become one of the strongest brands in stationery and permeated almost every level of society, starting from school-going children to the corporate world. There have also been direct Japanese investments in culture and economy. In the case of India and the impact of cultural diplomacy of Japan, an example can be seen in the proliferation of YouTube content promoting Japanese brands like “Daiso” and “Uniqlo.” At the same time, mass media festivals such as “Comic con” go out of their way to promote Japanese manga, anime and gaming (especially the use of Nintendo) as an idea of leisure and new aspirations for a trendy lifestyle among the young rising Indian middle class. What needs to be noted here is that the transition of a typically Japanese product has been given a localized tinge, thereby making them more acceptable and economically viable. Thus, soft-power diplomacy for Japan has shown tangible returns in the economy and brand imaging of it as a nation in India. Today, the perception of Japan in India is that of a technologically advanced nation of creative and hardworking people. This is quite in contrast to that of other Southeast Asian countries where Japan has had a direct connection historically and during the World Wars.

4.5 Conclusion In the twenty-first century, Japan’s use of soft-power diplomacy has become synonymous with its relations with other countries of the world. With Article 9 in its Constitution restricting Japan’s diplomatic engagement to economic and cultural diplomacy, we can see that Japan has had continual and ever-growing relations with its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific region of ASEAN countries and South Asian countries. Through its multilateral approach to Asian diplomacy, Japan’s soft power has created an enviable economic stature in power hierarchies. Today, Japanese fashion, food and pop culture of manga and anime are all-pervasive. At the same time, it has also been able to portray itself as a cultural bastion where the literary art of Haiku poetry, the influence of Murakami Haruki and the finesse of technology coincide. However, with time, we can definitely see Japan’s policy of “soft-power” engagements with other nations being challenged by the rising and often 73

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conflicting interests of China and South Korea. The latter two countries have also successfully built up an impressive “soft-power” diplomatic and economic engagement with other Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, including India, but often mimicking Japan’s approaches. While China decided to reinvent its soft-power diplomacy in its National Congress of 2007, South Korea started late with its diplomacy when President Lee Myung-bak gave it an impetus in 2011. However, what needs to be noted is that Japan’s early start in soft-power diplomacy through culture and technology has helped it sustain its growth in diplomatic relations and trade with most Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, including India. With time, Indo-Japan relations have grown beyond the economic to the cultural. While on the one hand, coordination with Japan regarding security and business issues have been foremost in all talks, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan on May 23, 2022, led to discussions with resident Indian diaspora regarding cultural exchanges and way of life leading to greater cooperation between India and Japan. Highlighting the establishment of 70 years of Indo-Japan diplomatic ties. Prime Minister Modi pointed out that Japan was an “indispensable partner” in India’s continued transformation. In India’s case, Japan has successfully reconstructed its “image” as a “nation” through soft-power diplomacy based on the idea of images. While foreign policy pacts were first signed in 1957, 2017 marked the 60th anniversary of the Cultural Agreement between Japan and India. If looked at from the point of view of traditional diplomacy and the creation of hierarchies, Japan has been extremely successful in creating a notion of the Japanese “nation” through what Louis Althusser (1971) had termed “Institutional State Apparatus.” What is more intriguing is the fact that not only has Japanese culture been reinvented domestically, but it has been successful in creating a “reality” of the Japanese nation through cultural icons and norms that have no specific validity for the Indian consumer apart from what Japan has termed as “cool” and “kawaii.” Even here, we see that the ideas of “cool” and “kawaii” have been part of Japan’s foreign policy engagements targeting the rising middle class in Asia and India.

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Ban, Yuna (2020) “South Korea’s Soft Power in Middle Power Diplomacy: Enhancing Popular Culture and its Challenges.” The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies. Retrieved from https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/12/02/south-koreas-soft-powerin-middle-power-diplomacy-enhancing-popular-culture-and-its-challenges/ (Accessed on 29-08-2021). Berger, J., Dibb, M., & BBC Enterprises. (1972) Ways of Seeing. London: BBC Enterprises. Dayman, Lucy (2020) “A Guide to Key Japanese Fashion Subcultures: Lolita, Rockabilly, Gyaru, and More Explained!” Tsunagu Japan. Retrieved from https:// www.tsunagujapan.com/a-guide-to-key-japanese-fashion-subcultures/ (Accessed on 8-6-2021). Death Note News Articles (2015) Retrieved from http://www.deathnotenews.com/ news/viz-at-hyderabad-comic-con-hindi-death-note-paved-the-way-for-moremanga-into-india (Accessed on 10-6-2021). Foucault, Michel (1984) “Truth and Power.” In Paul Rabinow (Ed.) The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books. Fukuda. https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19770818.S1J.html (Speech text in Japanese, accessed on 17-6-2021). Groot, Gerry (2018) “Cool Japan Versus the China Threat: Does Japan’s Popular Culture Mean More Soft Power?” In Kayoko Hashimoto (Ed.) Japanese Language and Soft Power in Asia. Singapore. Palgrave Macmillan. Iwabuchi, Koichi (2015) “Pop-Culture Diplomacy in Japan: Soft Power, Nation Branding and the Question of ‘International Cultural Exchange’” International Journal of Cultural Policy, (21). Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/10286632.2015.1042469 (Accessed on 25-5-2021). “Japan’s Kokuyo to Buy Camlin in Rs366cr Deal.” May 31, 2011. The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/ japans-kokuyo-to-buy-camlin-in-rs366cr-deal/articleshow/8654575.cms (Accessed on 19-06-2021). JASSO (2021) Retrieved from https://www.jasso.go.jp/en/about/organization/__ icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/09/03/e2020_a4_0727s_3.pdf (Accessed on 12-5-2021). Lyotard, J.-F., Bennington, G., & Massumi, B. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Mackay, Duncan (2014) “Japan Consortium Signs a $1 billion Television Deal with IOC that Includes Tokyo 2020.” Retrieved from https://www.insidethegames.biz/ articles/1020820/japan-consortium-signs-1-billion-television-deal-with-ioc-thatincludes-tokyo-2020(Accessed on 1-6-2021). McGray, Douglas (2009) “Japan’s Gross National Cool.” Foreign Policy, November. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/japans-gross-national-cool/ (Accessed on 12-5-2021). McLuhan, M., National Broadcasting Company, & McGraw-Hill Book Company (1967) This is Marshall McLuhan: The Medium is the Message. New York: NBC. METI (2012) Retrieved from https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/mono_info_ service/creative_industries/pdf/121016_01a.pdf) (Accessed on 12-5-2021). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2000) “India’s Public Perceptions About Japan: Public Image of Japan Among India’s Opinion Makers A Public Opinion Survey – 2000.” Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/ survey/2000/section5.html (Accessed on 12-5-2021).

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5 THE JAPAN-US RELATIONSHIP Imagining Its Future in the Indo-Pacific Era Peter Harris and Meriel Hahn

5.1 Introduction The Japan-US relationship has been a cornerstone of East Asian security architecture for more than 70 years. It has weathered major changes in the domestic politics of each country, as well as profound shifts in the structure of the international system. To endure, however, the alliance has been forced to adapt. What was once a one-sided relationship between patron and client has evolved into a complex and much more evenly balanced relationship that spans the domains of national defense, regional security, non-traditional security threats, economic cooperation, and global governance. In the twenty-first century, the Japan-US alliance will face a new challenge: how to survive and remain relevant in an age of multipolarity and expanding multilateralism. What is the future of the Japan-US alliance in the context of the newly conjured Indo-Pacific megaregion that, according to some, stretches from the Hawaiian Islands to the Persian Gulf? What will happen to the Japan-US alliance if the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad”)—the most visible attempt to institutionalize the idea of the IndoPacific in strategic terms—becomes a more formalized collective security organization? Will the Japan-US alliance continue to evolve into a more equal partnership, with Japan assuming more of the burden for its own defense and the security of partner nations? Under what circumstances might Japan or the United States decide to terminate or downsize their obligations to one another? This chapter argues that the Japan-US alliance has already demonstrated a remarkable degree of flexibility in the emerging multipolar age. This is evident, for example, in America’s increasing willingness to be a “taker” of geopolitical ideas from Japan—including, not least of all, the idea of a meaningful Indo-Pacific megaregion—and Japan’s non-trivial material contributions to US-led military operations in theaters as far afield as Southwest Asia and the Arabian Sea. Such adaptations augur well for the future of the alliance, suggesting that Japan and the United States are on a path toward

DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-5

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collaborating as two critical engines of the emerging Indo-Pacific order. However, this outcome is far from assured. It is also possible that the Japan-US alliance will be crushed under the weight of the emerging IndoPacific concept, with the two sides ultimately having to choose between their bilateral relationship and their commitments (or noncommitments) to the wider regional architecture. Much will depend on how international conditions take shape and the future of domestic politics inside each country. Underpinning our analysis is the simple idea that international alliances must be self-reinforcing. That is, both parties to an alliance must want the relationship to endure. Otherwise, they must agree to either dissolve their partnership or allow it to evolve. Under conditions of international anarchy, maintaining a common commitment to each other’s security is difficult to achieve. Certainly, not many alliances have endured for as long as the Japan-US relationship, which began as a bilateral compact to deter Soviet aggression against Japan and has since evolved to facilitate wide-ranging strategic cooperation in the face of challenges from China, North Korea, and Russia—three nuclear-armed states—as well as a host of non-­traditional security threats. For seven decades, Japanese and US leaders have concluded that they are each made more secure by virtue of their obligations to one another. However, this calculation could shift in response to changing international conditions, domestic transformations, or because of a perception in one country that the other side’s commitment has lost credibility. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore what such scenarios might look like and how they are likely to unfold. The chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of the changing domestic and international conditions that have faced the Japan-US relationship since World War II. Second, we explore what is new and different about the present international moment, characterized by the rise of China and India, the emergence of the “Indo-Pacific” as a meaningful geopolitical construct, and a move toward greater multilateral cooperation among democracies like Japan, the United States, India, and Australia (the Quad). Finally, in the third section, we imagine some possible futures for the bilateral alliance in the context of the Indo-Pacific era—namely, its continuation, evolution, and dissolution.

5.2  Adapting the Alliance, 1951–2021 When it was first concluded in the early 1950s, the Japan-US alliance was based upon an explicitly unequal treaty meant to give structure to a profoundly imbalanced relationship. Under its 1947 constitution, Japan had “forever renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation.” This legal prohibition against warfighting ensured that the 1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (which was signed just hours after the peace treaty to end the US-led occupation of 78

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Japan) would never be a partnership of equals. Rather, the early Japan-US alliance more closely resembled a patron-client (if not quasi-imperial) relationship than a true bilateral alliance. The United States assumed responsibility for Japan’s external defense in exchange for generous basing rights on Japanese soil. Indeed, the United States even retained sovereign authority over some portions of Japan for the purpose of maintaining a string of strategically located military bases in East Asia. The Bonin Islands, for example, were only returned to Japanese control in 1968. Likewise, Okinawa (the Ryukyu Islands) was only returned in 1972. To this day, more than 50,000 US troops remain based on Japanese territory, charged with defending Japan against foreign attack but also poised to intervene elsewhere in East Asia (e.g., the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea) should the need arise. Over the course of the Cold War, however, the Japan-US alliance evolved to become a more equal partnership (Schaller 1997). In 1953, Japan established an independent quasi-military force in the form of the Japanese SelfDefense Forces (JSDF). Tokyo also insisted upon revisions to the grossly unequal treaty of alliance, which had been unpopular in Japan for several reasons, including its provisions that the US military might be used (at the request of the Japanese government) to put down domestic rebellions inside Japan, that the United States would be permitted to use its Japanese bases for military operations unrelated to the defense of Japan, and that Washington would have a veto over Tokyo awarding any other nation basing rights on Japanese soil (Packard 1966, 6). These egregiously unequal provisions—each a blatant infringement upon Japan’s national sovereignty—were removed from a revised version of the treaty, which was concluded in 1960 and remains in force today. The reversions of the Bonin Islands and Okinawa to Japanese control can also be considered an important stage in the normalization (equalization) of relations between Japan and the United States. As well as insisting upon formal equality with the United States, Japan’s leaders during the 1960s and 1970s took meaningful (and often controversial) steps to build up their country’s military capabilities (Dian 2014; Smith 2019). In part, this was because decision-makers in Tokyo recognized the need for at least some semblance of an indigenous defensive capability, notwithstanding the anti-militarist clause of the Japanese constitution. But remilitarization was also a response to external conditions, namely the Vietnam War (1955–75), which heightened fears of Japan becoming embroiled in an East Asian conflict; President Nixon’s promulgation in 1969 of the so-called Guam Doctrine (or “Nixon Doctrine”), with which Nixon called on America’s allies to assume more of the burden for their own defense; and the twin Nixon Shocks of 1971.1 By the end of the 1970s, Japan had adopted a National Defense Program Outline to give some structure to Japanese military doctrine and joint Japan-US Defense Guidelines to stipulate how the United States and Japan would cooperate in the event of a war involving their two militaries. 79

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These were important steps to demonstrate that Japan meant to contribute a substantial amount to its alliance with the United States. Even so, US leaders were always eager during the Cold War to see Japan assume even more responsibility for its own defense, as well as for upholding regional security in Northeast Asia more broadly. Yet, US leaders recognized that Japan’s leaders had to be cognizant of what the Japanese public would bear. In the late 1960s, officials inside the Nixon administration even worried that Japan would choose not to renew the US-Japanese treaty of the alliance when that agreement came up for renewal in 1970. Therefore, it was important that Japan not be pushed too hard and be reassured that the United States was only asking for Japan “to deal with limited contingencies, while the United States would provide security against major attack” (Keddell 1993). To compensate for its relative lack of military contributions to the US-led alliance system, Japan took a range of measures to ensure that its foreign policies were commensurate with American designs. Economically, for example, Japan agreed to limit exports that were causing domestic problems for the United States.2 In the diplomatic realm, Japan normalized relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972, following Nixon’s visit to the mainland, China and would later institute sanctions against the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, again following America’s lead in doing so. In the 1990s, Japan’s leaders came to the conclusion that its Cold War– era strategy of “checkbook diplomacy” was fast becoming a liability. Domestic audiences inside Japan were shocked at the international opprobrium heaped upon their country for not assisting in the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi forces in the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, despite Japan having contributed enormous amounts of money to the war and reconstruction efforts (Purrington 1992). In response, Japan enacted its 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law to authorize the limited deployment of military forces for multilateral peacekeeping missions. In 1997, Japan and the United States revised their joint Defense Guidelines to articulate a meatier Japanese contribution to the Japan-US alliance in the event of an outbreak of war. Aside from operations authorized under the 1992 peacekeeping legislation, Japan’s military personnel have only served overseas in a small number of contexts and always under the guise of the Japan-US alliance. For example, Japan allowed its naval forces to provide logistical support to coalition navies involved in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent Operation Enduring Freedom (Ashizawa 2014). In 2004, Japan sent hundreds of soldiers to Samawah, a British-occupied part of Iraq, to assist with the postwar reconstruction effort in that country—a deployment that required the government of Junichiro Koizumi to enact new legislation in the Japanese Diet. In addition, thousands of JSDF personnel would ultimately serve on humanitarian relief missions in Iraq. Furthermore, beginning in 2009, Japan regularly dispatched anti-piracy vessels to the Arabian Sea in an effort to protect international shipping as it passed by the Horn of Africa. 80

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The most recent significant change in Japan’s contributions to the Japan-US alliance came in 2015 when the government of Shinzō Abe secured legislation to allow Japan to participate in the collective security of nations other than the United States, albeit in limited circumstances. This was a major overhaul in how Japanese defense policy had always been constructed: instead of focusing solely on the defense of the Japanese home islands, Japan’s military planners could now busy themselves with preparations for defending third parties against unprovoked attacks from, say, China or North Korea. In addition, Abe also made concerted efforts to boost Japan’s defense budget, efforts that have been continued by Abe’s successor Yoshihide Suga. Under the stewardship of Abe, Suga, and other Liberal Democratic Party leaders, Japan thus remains firmly committed to its security partnership with the United States and continues to evince a real willingness to increase its material contributions to the alliance.

5.3  The Indo-Pacific Era As is clear, the Japan-US relationship has evolved over the past 70 years to meet challenges that its original architects could not have anticipated. This is a testament to the enduring geostrategic relevance of the relationship and to the robust foundations that it enjoys in the domestic politics of each country. But it does not mean that the Japan-US relationship is indestructible. On the contrary, the coming decades will present new challenges for the alliance, which will not be easy to overcome. Some of these obstacles pertain to the international realm, including the rise of China, the emergence of new multilateral organizations, and even the construction of an entirely new megaregion (the “Indo-Pacific”) to which the relationship now supposedly belongs. Other challenges relate to the domestic realm, such as calls to retrench from inside the United States and resistance to militarization among the Japanese. Combined, these challenges are sure to be enough to force additional changes upon the Japan-US relationship. It is even possible—indeed, it is prudent for analysts in both states to imagine— that the future might differ so much from the past and present that the Japan-US alliance could disintegrate. The rise of China will pose the most obvious challenge to Japan-US relations. On the one hand, there are powerful reasons to believe that the shifting balance of power in East Asia should push Japan and the United States closer together. After all, it was the external threat presented by the Soviet Union that provided the original impetus for the Japan-US alliance in the 1950s and which kept the two countries aligned during the four decades of the Cold War. Might the growth of Chinese power and influence provide a similar rationale for the alliance going forward? There is evidence to suggest that this will be the case (Grønning 2018). For example, the most recent revisions to the Japan-US Defense Guidelines in 2015 were a direct response to China’s rise. Among other things, the revised guidelines permitted Japan 81

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to participate in the collective defense of allies other than the United States, relaxed restrictions on arms exports, and specified procedures for Japan-US collaboration in new areas such as space policy, cybersecurity, and missile defense (Mohammed 2015). For some Japanese politicians, even these reforms did not go far enough; legislators belonging to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have argued that Japan must prepare for the eventuality of a US-China conflict over Taiwan and ought to participate in freedom of navigation voyages in contested areas of the South China Sea (Tajima 2021). There have also been moves to increase spending on national defense (Kaneko 2021). On the other hand, there are also ways in which China’s rise might create an unpropitious environment for Japan-US relations. Namely, as China approaches parity with the United States in economic and military terms, the ability of Washington and Tokyo to maintain a common approach might weaken. For their part, US leaders are understandably eager to avoid starting a war with China that they might not win. As a result, the credibility of American commitments to defending Japan—or, at least, parts of Japanese territory such as the Senkaku Islands—could easily be called into question if tensions heighten in East Asia.3 Meanwhile, Japan might face its own pressures to abandon the alliance with the United States (or at least curtail its scope) to appease its powerful neighbor, especially if US policy toward China can credibly be portrayed in domestic politics as unnecessarily antagonistic and destabilizing. If these scenarios are difficult to imagine playing out today, they would not be far-fetched in a world where avoiding a calamitous war with China becomes the paramount concern of those in charge of Japanese and US foreign policy. Another international development with implications for the Japan-US alliance is the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept. In decades past, most analysts would have agreed that the Japan-US alliance belonged to Northeast Asia or, more generously, East Asia or the Asia-Pacific. Today, however, the idea of a unified “Indo-Pacific” region is gaining currency in Tokyo, Washington, and other world capitals (Medcalf 2018; Doyle and Rumley 2019). This newly imagined megaregion is supposed to stretch from the Central Pacific to the Western Indian Ocean. If it belongs to the Indo-Pacific, the Japan-US alliance cannot be regarded as a defensive pact meant merely to maintain security in Northeast Asia. Instead, it is but one pillar of a vast regional architecture spanning Asia’s entire southern and eastern rim. It is hard to overstate how different this is from the original formulation of the Japan-US alliance. Nothing less than a complete reimagination of what (and where) the Japan-US alliance is and what it is for might be in order. Japanese prime minister Shinzō Abe (2007) was the first world leader in promoting the idea of an Indo-Pacific region—in his words, a “confluence of the two seas”—in a speech to the Indian Parliament. His immediate concern was to spur strategic collaboration between Japan and India in the 82

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shadow of China’s rise. Nevertheless, Abe’s broader point was to describe how the social, economic, and political connections between the Indian Ocean littoral and the Western Pacific had blurred the distinction between those two geographic spaces. Events on one side of the Strait of Malacca were of direct relevance to actors on the other side; the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean were, for all intents and purposes, part of the same geopolitical and geoeconomic space. It was this material reality that made it necessary for Japan and India to expand their ties. During his second stint as prime minister, Abe (2016) coined the phrase “Free and Open IndoPacific” (FOIP) to capture more precisely his vision for how Japan and its allies should order Indo-Pacific affairs in the twenty-first century (Koga 2020): a rules-based order, based upon a shared commitment to upholding the rule of international law, with a particular emphasis on the defense of the maritime commons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Taken together, these twin ideas—that Japan “belongs to” the Indian Ocean as well as the Western Pacific and that it is the responsibility of Japan and its allies to defend a rules-based maritime order—have the capacity to induce a major reworking of the Japan-US alliance. Abe turned out to be something of a norm entrepreneur in the sense that other international actors subsequently took up his ideas of the Indo-Pacific and a FOIP, not least of all the United States. In October 2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson used the phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in a speech to exalt the US-India relationship. Although he did focus on Japan in this speech, Tillerson made clear that America shared Abe’s vision of a rules-based international order upheld by law-abiding states (Ayres 2017). In 2018, the US military’s Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, an intentional rebranding exercise meant to telegraph that the United States gave parity of esteem to its security operations in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. The following year, the Department of Defense (2019) published a strategy document (the “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report”) that portrayed China as seeking not just regional hegemony but also global preeminence and made clear America’s intentions to deter Chinese adventurism across the Indo-Pacific region. Soon after, the US Department of State (2019) published its own Indo-Pacific strategy document that called for a combination of multilateral engagement and enhanced bilateral partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, including with Japan. Taken together, this amounted to a significant shift in emphasis by strategists in the United States—and, it should be noted, a relatively high degree of rhetorical alignment between Tokyo and Washington. However, it is a potential problem for the Japan-US alliance that both Japan and the United States now view themselves as inhabiting (and shaping) an enlarged Indo-Pacific region. Most obviously, there is a chance that the two sides will disagree over how the region should be defined and managed. Some scholars argue that Japan’s overriding desire for a rules-based international order is in conflict with America’s growing reluctance to serve 83

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as the steward of a liberal world order as opposed to US-dominated world order (e.g., Tamaki 2020). In particular, there might come a time when the United States and Japan disagree on whether the integration of China into a rules-based order is still a viable goal or whether the FOIP should be an unabashedly exclusionary (anti-China) ambition. At least some Japanese leaders seem to believe that détente with China is a necessary precondition for a stable international order, whereas US domestic politics is increasingly being defined by broad-based opposition to any and all forms of cooperation with Beijing. If this gulf widens, it is unclear how the two allies could jointly approach Indo-Pacific affairs while reconciling their differences. Related to the regionalization of the Japan-US alliance is the increasing multilateralization of the Indo-Pacific. This is most apparent with the emergence of the Quad as a multilateral forum for military cooperation between Japan, the United States, India, and Australia. More recently, the Quad has expanded to include several “Quad Plus” partners such as New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam, who consult with the Quad’s core members on a range of traditional and non-traditional security threats. In addition, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Quad (and its various Quad Plus ancillaries) emerged as a focal point for US-led (and often explicitly anti-China) initiatives in the Indo-Pacific (Jash 2021). This experience demonstrated that the Quad as a set of institutions has the capacity to harness the diplomatic, economic, and military power of its members (mostly democracies) toward common goals. The enlargement, multilateralization, and institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific have taken place at the joint behest of Japan and the United States. But even so, this rapidly changing regional context might complicate the Japan-US bilateral alliance in the future. In particular, the ambitions of the wider grouping of Quad and Quad-aligned states may diverge from those of Japan or the United States. India, for example, has modified Abe’s original formulation of FOIP to emphasize the need for a FOIIP—that is, a Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo-Pacific (Roy-Chaudhury 2018). This chimes with the views of most Southeast Asian nations, the governments of which are reluctant to endorse any plan for the Indo-Pacific that will worsen great power competition or which will erode the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the fulcrum of the region (Choong 2019). For its part, Japan has pledged to respect these concerns, which, if taken seriously, will mean tempering the escalating rivalry between the Quad and China. Whether this can be done without alienating the United States is an open question. The overall point is that nurturing unity of purpose among four or more regional powers is much more complicated than maintaining solidarity among just two allied states. Therefore, the Japan-US alliance might become harder to manage if it must be made fit for a region where true multilateralism prevails. As if these international uncertainties were not enough, there are also domestic hurdles that the Japan-US alliance must overcome in the near 84

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future. In Japan, for example, there are questions about whether Japan can continue to evolve into a more “normal” state in terms of its defense and security policies (Dian 2014; Le 2021). In the past, progress toward normalization has been evident—but only slowly, and usually in response to external jolts. There are significant reasons to doubt whether Japanese domestic politics will support any further moves toward “de-pacification” (Le 2021). Reform is possible, but it is difficult to say with confidence what Japan’s political system will permit. This is a problem for the Japan-US alliance because unless Japan can fully jettison the pacific elements of its defense and security policies, there will always be some degree of frustration on the US side regarding Japan’s contributions to the alliance—especially if the alliance comes to be wrapped up in a wider geopolitical struggle for mastery in the Indo-Pacific. While Japanese domestic politics might not be able to change enough, US domestic politics shows signs of changing too much. As the presidency of Donald J. Trump revealed all too clearly, America’s long-standing domestic consensus in favor of deep overseas engagement is in serious trouble. For now, majorities in both major political parties (at least at the elite level) still seem to believe in the value of US leadership and especially military preponderance. But support for alliances and multilateralism is fraying (Trubowitz and Harris 2019). That a figure such as Trump could become the leader of the United States (and develop such a loyal following) was a cause for great concern in Japan and elsewhere, especially because much of Trump’s domestic appeal seemed to be based upon his antipathy toward America’s allies and the liberal (“globalist”) international order. Since Trump, the reliability of US commitments in East Asia—and Japan in particular—can no longer be taken for granted. This is a tectonic shift, raising significant questions about the ability of the United States to project power programmatically (Harris and Trubowitz 2021). It remains to be seen how uncertainty about the future of US foreign policy will intersect with the factors described earlier—a portentous international environment, an expanded set of regional concerns, growing multilateralism, and changes in Japan’s own internal composition. But it is undoubtedly true that the Japan-US alliance ought to be considered vulnerable to Americans’ changing views on international affairs. Taken together, all this makes for an uncertain future for the Japan-US relationship. Politics in both countries will continue to be shaped by changing external circumstances. In turn, these domestic shifts will have the potential to alter some fundamental international dynamics. Perhaps the United States will be galvanized into recommitting to its Asian allies in the face of competition from China. Perhaps Japan’s domestic politics will adapt to permit a more assertive foreign policy, as has happened several times in the past. But it is also possible that the United States will reduce its commitments to East Asia in hopes of avoiding a costly and unwinnable confrontation with China, leaving Japan to assume more of the burden for its own defense or else reach a bilateral modus vivendi with Beijing. As noted 85

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earlier, it is impossible to know precisely how the future will unfold. What is possible, however, is to imagine a set of plausible futures for the alliance—ones grounded in the history of Japan-US relations and an informed assessment of prevailing international trends. We turn to this task in the next section.

5.4  Possible Futures Given these changing international and domestic conditions, maintaining the Japan-US relationship in its current form is not an option for either side. This is for the simple reason outlined in the introduction that bilateral alliances in the anarchic international system must remain in the self-interest of both parties. When circumstances undergo drastic change (as seems destined to be the case in the twenty-first century), so must the terms of the alliance. Otherwise, the relationship will cease to serve the interests of one or both parties, at which point it will stop being a credible force in world politics. For seven decades, Japanese and American leaders have given a masterclass on how to adapt a bilateral alliance such that it continues to meet the needs of their respective states. They have tended to their relationship, paid careful attention to the interests and sensibilities of the other side as well as their own populations, and taken steps to convey credible signals of unity to relevant third parties. As a result, the bilateral alliance has remained in place—indeed, it has strengthened—despite some major international changes. In the coming years, there are two broad futures for the Japan-US alliance: evolution or dissolution. For the past 70 years, successful efforts at evolution have kept the specter of dissolution at bay. Going forward, this might not always be the case. There are two primary dimensions along which the Japan-US alliance has evolved in the past and along which it is likely to continue evolving in the future: geographic scope and the depth of contributions made by each ally. In terms of geographic scope, the most obvious outcome is that the alliance becomes infused with the FOIP concept and thus widens its formal purview to include the whole Indo-Pacific region. At least, it stands to reason that Japan and the United States will calibrate their alliance to cover the entire Indo-Pacific, given that both sides are nominally committed to the construction and defense of a rules-based order across this geographic expanse. The United States, of course, is already engaged in the entire region from the Persian Gulf to the Western Pacific, and so any widening of the Japan-US alliance along these lines would amount to an expansion of commitments by Japan. Is this likely? Such a development would not be entirely new or particularly surprising. After all, it was a Japanese prime minister, Shinzō Abe, who gave life to the idea of a unified Indo-Pacific megaregion and who popularized the FOIP concept, which is now so central to the geopolitics of the region. Moreover, Japan’s military forces have been engaged west of the 86

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Malacca Strait for some time: between 2001 and 2010, Japan provided logistical support to the US-led war effort in Afghanistan; between 2004 and 2006, Japan deployed ground forces to Iraq as part of reconstruction efforts following the American invasion of that country; and Japanese naval forces have long been involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (Teo 2019). In 2011, Japan even established a permanent military base in Djibouti to support its naval operations in the Arabian Sea (Farah 2011). This is not to mention Japan’s involvement in peacekeeping missions in states and territories such as Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and South Sudan. Japan could be encouraged to become an even more proactive participant in the Indian Ocean if ties between the so-called Quad nations—Japan, India, the United States, and Australia—continue to deepen. Strategic cooperation between Japan and India has blossomed over the past 15 years (Khurana 2007), and Japan-Australia relations have also strengthened to a noticeable degree (but cf. Satake and Hemmings 2018). With Japan taking part in Malabar naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal (2007, 2015, 2017, and 2020) and the Arabian Sea (2020), it is not unrealistic to imagine that Japan’s continued membership in the Quad could institutionalize and routinize the idea that Japanese security depends upon the maintenance of favorable international conditions from Northeast Asia to the east coast of Africa. In this scenario, the Japan-US alliance would not dissolve—it would, instead, change to become an essential driver of cooperation among the Indo-Pacific’s democratic powers, perhaps akin to how the Anglo-American and German-American bilateral relationships serve as anchors of the North Atlantic security community. There is some evidence that the Japan-US alliance is already expanding its geographic scope along the lines previously described. In addition to Japan’s frequent participation in the Malabar naval exercises, Japan has devoted a considerable amount of energy toward cultivating strategic partnerships with states beyond Northeast Asia, including in the Indian Ocean littoral. Japan’s outreach to India and Southeast Asian nations is the most obvious example of this (Katagiri 2020). However, Tokyo’s efforts to build support among the Pacific Islands is also a notable case in point (Envall 2020). While some scholars point to Japan’s efforts in this regard as evidence that Japanese leaders want to “hedge” against abandonment by the United States, others have persuasively argued that Japan is motivated by a desire to bolster the Japan-US alliance, which remains the central pillar of Japanese defense and security strategy (Liff 2019). This fits with the historical pattern of Japan subordinating its regional policies to the interests of its alliance with the United States (Zhang 2014). Is it possible that the Japan-US alliance will move in the other direction— that is, become less geographically expansive rather than more so? This has never happened before (the trend has always been toward the alliance adopting a wider geographic scope rather than a more curtailed purview), 87

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and there are no concrete signs that either Japan or the United States are interested in shrinking their shared geographic focus. However, the future possibility should not be dismissed altogether. That is, if the security situation deteriorates in some part of the greater Indo-Pacific region—in the Persian Gulf, for example, or along the Sino-Indian border—then it is eminently possible that domestic forces inside Japan might come to view an expansive Japan-US alliance as inimical to their country’s national interests. In such circumstances, a strictly defensive and narrowly construed alliance might be seen as more conducive to Japanese security than an expansive alliance that exposes Japan to every instance of insecurity from the Persian Gulf, to South Asia, to Taiwan and the South China Sea.4 It is also possible that the geographic focus of the alliance could be narrowed as a result of pressure from US strategists, especially if policymakers in Washington come to be persuaded by arguments currently being made by realist scholars of international relations who accept the need for US alliances with Japan (and South Korea) but caution against more expansive commitments and recommend that the United States trim its definition of core interests (e.g., Glaser 2021). Whatever its geographic scope, the Japan-US alliance is also destined to evolve in terms of the depth of contributions made by each side. If history is any guide, the most likely outcome is that Japan will increase its relative contributions to the relationship in the coming years. This is the story of Japan-US relations over the past 70 years; the relationship was grossly unequal at its inception (effectively consisting of a US security umbrella over a defenseless Japan) but has evolved to become much more evenly balanced than it once was (Dian 2014). It would therefore be quite unsurprising if Japan continued to increase its contributions to the alliance—for example, boosting defense spending, investing in new military technologies, participating in an increasing number and variety of military operations, and otherwise sharing in the burden of deterring adversaries, reassuring allies, and quelling instances of insecurity. Indeed, the threat posed by China seems to be pushing Japanese leaders in precisely this direction, with some scholars pointing to “internal balancing” on behalf of Japan in response to China’s rise (e.g., Koga 2018), and there seems to be strong evidence that Japanese domestic politics will continue to remain broadly supportive of a more assertive foreign policy (Hughes, Patalano, and Ward 2021). Even so, it is worth considering that the alliance will evolve because of increased contributions from the United States—that is, the Japan-US relationship might trend in the direction of becoming more lopsided. For years, this outcome seemed unlikely, as US leaders seemed more interested in shifting burdens onto their allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East rather than assuming burdens on their behalf. However, the US response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 showed that leaders in Washington are still capable of mobilizing enormous amounts of national resources in defense of international stability. It is eminently possible that 88

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the United States would be willing to assume increasingly heavy burdens in East Asia should China initiate a military crisis of a similar magnitude to the war in Ukraine. During the Cold War, after all, US leaders fretted that Japan would choose to abandon the US-led alliance system and adopt a more neutral position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Strategists in Washington knew that the loss of Japan would deal a heavy blow to the US position in East Asia and so advised that America’s leaders do everything in their power to keep Tokyo devoted to the Western alliance—including the generous provision of security commitments. In the near future, it is not inconceivable that similar fears will resurface in the context of China’s rise. Might Japan come to view closeness to the United States as a liability, or else begin to doubt that Americans would be willing to fight and die for Japan’s defense in the event of a war with China? Such anxieties were a major driving force behind the Obama-era “pivot” to Asia, as US leaders scrambled to dispel any suggestion that the United States would ever abandon East Asia. The bottom line is that if US leaders are sufficiently concerned about the rise of China—and if they come to be sufficiently anxious about “losing” Japan as a strategic counterweight to Beijing—then it is certainly possible that US leaders will devote more resources to the defense of Japan as a way to shore up the alliance, which would have the effect of reversing the general trend of the past 70 years which has been toward more symmetrical contributions on behalf of each ally. So far, we have considered some scenarios in which the Japan-US relationship evolves to become more or less expansive in terms of its geographic scope and more or less symmetrical in terms of the relative contributions made by the allies. However, it is important to recognize that there are limits to how far the Japan-US alliance can evolve in response to changing international conditions. For one thing, there are ceilings to what the domestic politics of each country can realistically bear. As noted earlier, the Japanese public has a complex and dynamic relationship with militarism (Le 2021); it is far from a foregone conclusion that the Japanese political system will support the erosion of pacifist norms until those norms have been obliterated. In some ways, the Japan-US alliance has been so successful for 70 years precisely because it has been an asymmetrical partnership. That is, Japan has remained committed to the alliance only because it has not been required to contribute as much as the United States. If it had been a more equal partnership, the alliance might well have broken down years ago. On the other hand, if Japan does continue down the path of becoming a more autonomous security actor (as some of its leaders want), then this might actually lead to the ultimate disintegration of the bilateral alliance as Tokyo comes to value the benefits of strategic independence more than reliance upon the United States (Atanassova-Cornelis and Sato 2019). Of all the ongoing international changes facing the Japan-US alliance, China’s rise promises to place the most stress upon the relationship. If the relationship dissolves, it will be in the shadow of China’s rise. As China 89

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grows in power, the chances of Beijing and Washington becoming embroiled in a military showdown seem to increase. At least, the pages of academic journals and newspapers are now routinely filled with analyses of whether the world’s two largest powers will be able to coexist or whether hegemonic war has become an inevitability. For the time being, it is reasonable to assume that Tokyo will invest in its alliance with the United States as a response to China’s rise and that Washington will continue to have a credible interest in the defense of Japan. Over time, however, this assumption will be put to the test. It is possible, for example, that some Japanese leaders will decide that the risks of entanglement in a US-China conflagration far outweigh the benefits of collective security. To be sure, enthusiasm is waning in the United States for integrating China into the extant (“liberal”) international order, whereas engaging China remains an overall goal of Japanese foreign policy (Sahashi 2020). For its part, China bristles at America’s bilateral alliances in East Asia, regarding them as willfully hostile instruments (Liff 2018), and so can be expected to take any opportunity to exploit divisions that exist between the United States and Japan.5 Already, it is common for actors inside both Japan and the United States to echo Beijing’s concerns—arguing, for example, that overt balancing against China is provocative, counterproductive, and unnecessary. However, should Japanese politics take a more pacifist turn, the door to conciliation with China and a diminution of the Japan-US alliance would be open, if not exactly agape. In the final analysis, it is impossible to know exactly which, if any, of these scenarios will obtain. Part of the problem is that all of the international and domestic factors responsible for causing variation in the scope and depth of the Japan-US alliance are interrelated in complex ways. This makes it hard to anticipate exactly what will happen. Events like the Nixon Shocks and the election of President Trump in 2016 cannot easily be predicted in advance. Neither can international events like the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf War, or Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Nobody knows how a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would affect the Japan-US relationship today, still less in the future. All that can be done is to sketch some possible futures for the alliance. That has been the purpose of this chapter.

5.5 Conclusion The Japan-US relationship has weathered a number of storms over the past 70 years, from the onset of the Cold War to the “Nixon Shocks” of the 1970s to the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. Both countries have undergone tumultuous domestic change as well as the obvious demographic shifts that take place over the course of seven decades. In many respects, Japan and the United States are not the same countries as they were in 1951. Yet through it all, the alliance between Tokyo and 90

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Washington has survived, always serving as a critical lynchpin of Northeast Asia’s international security architecture. That is the past of the Japan-US alliance. What will be its future? There are strong reasons to believe that the United States and Japan will remain close allies for the time being. Their alliance is rooted in shared values and common interests; it is tightly organized and, indeed, routinized. It would take an enormous jolt—a major international crisis or profound domestic upheaval—to overturn what has been built over the past 70 years. While this is certainly possible and cannot be ruled out, it is more likely that the alliance will continue to evolve so that Japan and the United States can jointly face whatever challenges emerge as the twenty-first century wears on. This seems to be the express intent of Japanese and American leaders. There are not many reasons to doubt that they will succeed in this goal. Even so, strategists in both countries (and analysts in all countries) should be attuned to the potential struggles that the bilateral alliance will face in the Indo-Pacific era. In recent years, leaders in both Japan and the United States have seen fit to portray the rise of China as a security threat that should unite freedom-loving nations in the Indian Ocean littoral and Western Pacific. They have promoted the idea of an Indo-Pacific megaregion and cultivated a shared sense of purpose among friendly states, most notably those of the Quad and Quad Plus, intending to stymie Chinese influence entrenching their own preferred vision of international order. Their efforts have met with great success. In this chapter, however, we have argued that the conjuring of the Indo-Pacific might ultimately be at cross-purposes with the Japan-US bilateral alliance. To be sure, it is not written in stone that the advent of the Indo-Pacific era will necessitate the demise of the Japan-US bilateral relationship. It is certainly possible (and perhaps more likely than not) that the alliance will evolve to become a major pillar of the Indo-Pacific order. However, it is also possible that the Japan-US alliance will prove to be a vehicle unfit for the purpose of upholding international order across such a vast and varied geopolitical space. Nothing lasts forever.

Notes 1 In the United States, the term “Nixon Shock” (singular) usually refers to President Nixon’s New Economic Program, which involved abandoning the gold standard and introducing price controls, among other economic policies. In Japan, however, the Nixon Shocks (plural) include these economic changes, to be sure, but also Nixon’s surprise decision to visit the People’s Republic of China, which was announced without prior consultation with Japanese leaders and seemed to suggest that the United States was willing to abandon its Asian allies (the Republic of China on Taiwan, even if not Japan) in pursuit of good relations with Beijing. 2 For a good overview of successive rounds of negotiations over trade policy and other aspects of the relationship, see Schaller (1997). On Japan’s strategic use of economic aid to support US policy goals, see Miyashita (1999), Bowen (1992), and Wan (1995).

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3 Assuring China (and reassuring Japan) that the United States remains committed to defending areas like the Senkaku Islands is a difficult task, one that Beijing will be keen to make more difficult still in the future (Rapp Hooper 2015; Taffer 2020). 4 Japan has traditionally feared abandonment by the United States and has sought to increase its contributions to the bilateral alliance as a way to avoid this fate. The point here, though, is that it is possible to imagine entrapment becoming a bigger fear for Japanese society than abandonment. At least analysts in both countries ought to consider how this will become more likely as US-China competition intensifies. 5 It used to be argued that China had an interest in maintaining the Japan-US relationship as a means of restraining Japan and preventing its militarization or even nuclearization (e.g., Midford 2004). However, in recent years, this logic seems to have weakened, with China is now less interested in restraining Japan than pushing the United States out of East Asia (Sinkkonen 2019).

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Farah, Mohamed Osman (2011). Japan Opens Military Base in Djibouti to Help Combat Piracy, Bloomberg, 8 July 2011, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2011-07-08/japan-opens-military-base-in-djibouti-to-help-combatpiracy. Accessed May 12, 2022. Glaser, Charles L. (2021). Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China. Foreign Affairs, April 28, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-andchina. Accessed May 12, 2022. Grønning, Bjørn Elias Mikalsen (2018). Operational and Industrial Military Integration: Extending the Frontiers of the Japan-US Alliance. International Affairs, 94(4), 755–72. Harris, Peter and Peter Trubowitz (2021). The Politics of Power Projection: The Pivot to Asia, Its Failure, and the Future of American Primacy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 14(2), 187–217. Hughes, Christopher W., Alessio Patalano, and Robert Ward (2021). Japan’s Grand Strategy: The Abe Era and Its Aftermath. Survival, 63(1), 125–60. Jash, Amrita (2021). The Quad Factor in the Indo-Pacific and the Role of India. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 4(2), 78–85. Kaneko, Reito (2021). Japan Ruling Party Seeks Drastic Defense Budget Rise Amid China Threat. The Japan Times, May 25, 2021, https://www.japantimes. co.jp/news/2021/05/25/national/politics-diplomacy/defense-budget-rise/. Accessed May 12, 2022. Katagiri, Nori. (2020). Shinzō Abe’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Japan’s recent achievement and future direction. Asian Security, 16(2), 179–200. Keddell, Joseph P. (1993). The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Khurana, Gurpreet S. (2007). Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation. Strategic Analysis, 31(1), 139–53. Koga, Kei. (2018). The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift. International Studies Review, 20(4), 633–60. Koga, Kei. (2020). Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Countering China or Shaping a New Regional Order? International Affairs, 96(1), 49–73. Le, Tom Phuong. 2021. Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacificism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Liff, Adam P. (2018). China and the US Alliance System. The China Quarterly, 233(1), 137–65. Liff, Adam P. (2019). Unambivalent Alignment: Japan’s China Strategy, the US Alliance, and the ‘Hedging’ Fallacy. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 19(3), 453–91. Medcalf, Rory (2018). Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. In Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds.), International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India (pp. 9–28). Singapore: Springer. Midford, Paul (2004). China Views the Revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 4(1), 113–45. Miyashita, Akitoshi (1999). Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate. International Studies Quarterly, 43(4), 695–731. Mohammed, Arshad (2015). US, Japan Unveil New Defense Guidelines for Global JAPANESE ROLE. Reuters, April 28, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-japan-defense/u-s-japan-unveil-new-defense-guidelines-for-globaljapanese-role-idUSKBN0NI08O20150428. Accessed May 12, 2022.

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6 JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA RELATIONS A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Pacific Century* Thomas Wilkins

6.1  Introduction: From “Quasi-allies” to “Special Strategic Partners” During most of the Cold War period, the bilateral security connection between Tokyo and Canberra effectively ran through Washington – their mutual ally – rendering their alignment in terms of a “quasi-alliance,” in accord with Cha’s (1999) paradigm. In other words, Japan and Australia were indirectly or tacitly “allied” through their shared role as “spokes” in the American regional “hub-and-spoke” alliance system (acting as northern and southern “anchors,” respectively). This meant that direct Japan-Australia relations were primarily confined to pragmatic commercial interaction and diplomatic cordiality. Nevertheless, toward the end of the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War years, tentative steps were made to collaborate on the development of regional security architecture, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and they worked alongside in a number of Peace Keeping Operations. In the mid-2000s as the American “unipolar moment” appeared to dim and new regional challenges emerged, such as the rise of China and North Korean nuclear ambitions, strategic planners in Tokyo started to look at new options for diversifying Japan’s regional/international security posture outside of its traditionally exclusive reliance on the US alliance; a process

*  This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Wilkins, T.S. (13 April 2021) ‘Elevating the Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership to “a New Level”: Challenges and Responses,’ JIIA Policy Brief, Japan Institute for International Affairs. https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/PolicyBrief_Wilkins_210413.pdf. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the official viewpoint of the JIIA or any other organization with which the author is affiliated. Reproduced with permission.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-6

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designated by scholars such as Midford and Vosse (2020) as a “non-US centric evolution.” The result of this “decentring” beyond the United States was the unprecedented promulgation of a strategic partnership with Australia, representing a direct bilateral security alignment between these heretofore “quasi-allies.” This development was doubly significant in that the JapanAustralia partnership also served as the prototype for a range of subsequent strategic partnerships with a range of other actors, including India, Vietnam, and the EU, among others. According to Singh (2013, p. 131), [T]hese strategic partnerships, alongside the US-Japan security relationship, clearly show Japan’s maturation as a responsible actor that contributes actively to the peace and stability of the regional and international environment in cooperation with like-minded allies that share common interest and values. The building of strategic partnerships is just one facet of the more activist security and defense policy now undertaken by Japan; what Oros (2017) calls a “security renaissance.” As the first-mover among these new security alignments, this relationship did much to set the paradigm for future agreements and is thus worthy of close attention as an exemplar of the strategic partnership phenomenon in general (Wilkins, 2020a). The effective “founding” of the strategic partnership in 2007, with the unprecedented Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, signaled the “emergence of a fully rounded and diverse partnership including important political and security objectives” according to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (DFAT: Australia-Japan Bilateral Relationship). Since then the strategic partnership has been progressively institutionalized to include an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (2013/17), Information Security Agreement (ISA) (2013), Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (2014), and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) (2014), and long-awaited Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in 2022, to name the most salient accords. Annual Prime Ministerial summits and Foreign and Defense Minister’s (“2+2”) meetings are now a regularized feature of bilateral relations (Satake & Hemmings, 2018). As a new form of (non-alliance) security alignment, the strategic partnership represents a valuable mechanism through which these two major regional powers, and allies of the United States, can coordinate their policies and engage in practical cooperation aimed at ensuring their mutual security and economic interests (Wilkins, 2012). Indeed, bilateral cooperation through the “Special Strategic Partnership” mechanism (as it is formally designated), has now become entrenched as a “fixture” of both Japanese and Australian foreign, economic, and security policy. Its full scope and remit can now be ascertained through the “Partnership Agenda Between Australia and Japan” document (DFAT: Partnership Agenda), (superseding the earlier 2009 “Action Plan” and 2012 96

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“Common Vision and Objectives Statement”). Scholars, including the author (Wilkins, 2011), have formulated complex conceptual frameworks to capture the structuration, dynamics, and prospects for the partnership, and this chapter draws indirectly upon these to provide an assessment of the current state of bilateral relations. This is of great import as the partnership enters a new Indo-Pacific era, and a new phase in its life cycle, leading the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD, 2020, p. 129) to conclude that Japan’s relationship with Australia is becoming more important than ever before.

6.2  The Japan-Australia Strategic Partnership Enters the Indo-Pacific Century The mutual adoption of the “Indo-Pacific” concept by Tokyo and Canberra to redefine their regional engagement has acted to structure and actuate their partnership collaboration going forward. According to Dobell (2020), “Japan and Australia were the first countries to place the Indo-Pacific atop their foreign policies in a new regional construct.” This concept now serves as the shared strategic framework through which Tokyo and Canberra view their region. Though the Indo-Pacific concept remains subject to variations in its interpretation and still attracts a degree of controversy, it has now become firmly entrenched in the regional discourse (Medcalf, 2020; Wilkins & Kim, 2020). This is reflected in Japanese and Australian official policy documents. Japan’s 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook (p. 19) states, “The Indo-Pacific region is one of the world’s growth centers, and realizing a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific is one of the highest priorities of Japan’s diplomacy,” while the 2020 Australian Strategic Defence Update (foreword) declares, “The IndoPacific is at the centre of greater strategic competition.” Consequently, the strategic partners jointly declare their “shared strategic interests in the security, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region” (Joint Statement, 2018). Reflecting this emphatic (and semantic) change in their joint strategic perspectives, the partners jettisoned the earlier “Asia-Pacific” descriptor in 2017 to replace it with the new “Indo-Pacific” terminology. The partners have embraced the Indo-Pacific concept for several reasons. First, it provides a “mental map” that better captures the locus of economic dynamism and strategic competition than the former “Asia-Pacific” label. Second, it emblematizes the partner’s aspirations for a more balanced and multipolar region by according the rising power of India a more prominent role, and expressly engaging the small and middle powers, while ensuring the United States remains committed to the region. The adoption of this strategic framework allows for more seamless coordination with the respective Indo-Pacific strategies of India and the United States as well. And third, it forms an integral part of joint aspirations to pursue combined and individual policies designed to shape regionalism. In this last respect, it transmutes into a shared endeavor to manage the rise of China and forestall its 97

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potentially hegemonic influence. As countries continue to stagger toward recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, China flexes its geopolitical muscles, and spiraling Sino-American rivalry arguably portends a new Cold War; collaboration is at a premium. This chapter now examines the key issues actuating the strategic partnership at present, as viewed primarily through the Indo-Pacific lens. These issues are complex and intertwined, but for simplicity, the following analysis loosely groups these under the rubrics of (1) rules-based order, (ii) non-traditional security challenges, and (3) regional architectures. The main analysis then culminates in an examination of the all-important “China factor,” looking at how the country’s strategic rise impacts their joint perceptions within the partnership. 6.2.1  A Rules-Based Order One of the most pressing concerns of the partnership, especially through the Indo-Pacific framework, is their joint determination to uphold a rulesbased order. In this sense, Japan, alongside Australia, “intends to counter the rise of China by building a strong, sustainable regional order in which everyone plays by the rules” (Satake & Sahashi, 2021, p. 21). Moreover, as Glosserman (2019) records, Japan now seeks to be a “rule maker rather than a rule taker.” The “mission statement” of the strategic partnership has been recast to express their joint “determination to deepen cooperation to promote a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” (Joint Statement, 2018). This mandate is intrinsically linked to Tokyo’s earlier promulgation of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision (Hosoya, 2019), unveiled in 2016, and to which Canberra de facto subscribes (though without applying the literal “FOIP” terminology in its own documents). According to the 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook (MOFA, 2020b), The core idea of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept is to establish a rules-based international order and consolidate principles such as free trade, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law, which are essential for the stability and prosperity of the region. The FOIP idea emerged mainly in response to challenges posed to this rulesbased order (RBO) by Chinese assertive behavior, including its provocative actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), and its use of economic statecraft to influence smaller countries (“debt-trap diplomacy”), as well as coercive economic practices (MOFA, 2020b). The FOIP is a bid to uphold international law and norms in regional interactions, rather than accede to unilateral or coercive measures to alter the status quo and provide alternative options for building regional connectivity and economic governance (opening special feature, 2020). Furthermore, the FOIP idea is designed to be inclusive and has already been officially adopted by Washington since 2017, 98

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with New Delhi offering more circumspect support. The participation of South East Asian (SEA) countries is particularly encouraged, through synergies with the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (see Wilkins, 2020b). A particular focus of the FOIP and the partnership itself is maritime issues, given the oceanic nature of the Indo-Pacific construct. Beijing continues to assertively expand its maritime space and has ambitious plans for naval modernization (including a third aircraft carrier). Its militarization of artificial features in the disputed South China Sea (SCS) and refusal to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines’s claims in 2016 alerted the strategic partners to parallels in the East China Sea (ECS), where Beijing disputes Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Indeed, the partners have remained in “close communication” as China has ramped up maritime and air incursions into areas surrounding the territory in the ECS, including the use of “maritime militia.” Indeed, Japan’s newly appointed ambassador to Australia, Shingo Yamagami, made calls for closer cooperation on ECS issues in a recent press interview for the Australian Financial Review (Tillett, 2021, January 29). Creeping Chinese economic and political, and potentially strategic, influence in the South Pacific has also been an area of joint concern given Japanese and Australian interests in the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), where they target substantial Official Development Assistance under the FOIP-banner (see Envall, 2020). All of these issues are highlighted as shared concerns in strategic partnership statements from Tokyo and Canberra, and they continue to stress the need to resolve disputes peacefully and in accord with internal law and norms (i.e., UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Increased bilateral cooperation and collaboration with other like-minded partners in SEA to improve capacity and maritime domain awareness (MDA) to foreclose “gray zone” incursions – fishing fleets, drones, etc., have become a priority. Moreover, security alignments are often, at least in part, predicated upon shared values, as well as interests. Indeed, jointly articulated values form an integral part of the strategic partner’s approach to the RBO in the IndoPacific. This can be traced back to former PM Shinzō Abe’s notion of “values-based diplomacy” and former foreign minister Tarō Asō’s “arc of freedom and prosperity” and has now assumed greater prominence due to the emerging ideological division of the region. According to the 2020 Joint Statement, “[T]he Special Strategic Partnership between the two countries is based on shared values, including a commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade and a rules-based order” (Joint Statement, 2018, November 17). (Note that the RBO is itself designated as a “value”). There are many instances where such values appear under threat across the region. Both countries have exceedingly close economic and people-to-people ties with the Hong Kong SAR. Statements from the partners have expressed “grave concerns over the situation in Hong Kong” as Beijing has moved to quash pro-democracy movements and implement the new National Security Law (Kyodo News, 2020, July 9). Both partners have also gone on record about 99

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the alleged human rights infringements occurring in the Xinjiang region of China, where the Uighur ethnic peoples are allegedly being subjected to maltreatment. Likewise, they have “called on North Korea to end human rights violations and abuses and to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately” (Joint Statement, 2018, November 17). A proactive effort to uphold the national and mutual values of the strategic partners is increasingly necessary in the face of authoritarian challenges such as these, and the recent military coup in Myanmar in February 2021. Thus Panagio­ topoulos (2016, p. 6) concludes, “The Australia-Japan relationship is an example of “values-based alignment” which has been supplementing realpolitik calculations.” However, a commitment to and espousal of shared values is not sufficient in and of itself to safeguard Japanese interests in the Indo-Pacific era. To this end, real practical security cooperation is an integral feature of the partnership to enforce the RBO and, if necessary, prepare for future crises or conflict scenarios alluded to earlier. Military interoperability has been incrementally improved through the (upgraded) ACSA, ISA, and now a Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (Japan-Australia RAA) signed in 2022. This appears to be a major breakthrough that would further facilitate military ties such as joint exercises and disaster relief operations by establishing a legal framework for reciprocal visits by the Australian Defense Force and Japan Self-Defense Force to one another’s countries, somewhat similar to the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. Australia also supported Japan’s Peace and Security Legislation of 2016, including the provision for “collective self defense” (in circumscribed situations). This reinforces the progress made through bilateral naval and air exercises such as Nichi-Gō Trident and Bushido-Guardian. Additionally, the countries also participate in a range of multilateral exercises such as MALABAR, with India, as part of the Quad. The countries are also exploring furthering cooperation to the space and cyber domains. Thus, measures are in place or in train for greater defense/military cooperation that would facilitate the operationalization of the partnership in the event of a crisis or conflict scenario, and more broadly support Japan’s “proactive contribution to international peace.” Finally, it should be noted that perceived security threats to the RBO are by no means confined to China. The continued belligerency of nuclear-armed North Korea is also seen as a major destabilizing force in the Indo-Pacific. In 2020, the “[l]eaders reiterated their commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles of all ranges of North Korea” (Joint Statement, 2018). The determination of North Korea to maintain and upgrade its nuclear arsenal was demonstrated during military parades in October 2020 when it unveiled a (supposed) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (Hwasong-16) and in January 2020 when  a new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (Pukkuksong-5) went 100

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on  display for the first time (DuBois, 2021). This comes after the muchtouted Trump-Kim summits of 2018 and 2019, which did nothing to arrest the determination of the rogue state to pursue a credible nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, the strategic partners continue to maintain their strong stance on non-proliferation. According to government sources (MOFA, 2020) “[t]he Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which was launched under the leadership of Japan and Australia, has also proactively contributed to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] review process through realistic and practical proposals.” 6.2.2  Non-traditional Security Challenges As well as more structural and strategic challenges by powerful (China) or rogue (North Korea) states, the Indo-Pacific region faces a plethora of so-called non-traditional security (NTS) challenges that the partners are determined to address in order to preserve stability and the RBO. There are many facets to the NTS problem. The most immediate NTS issue has been in the health security sector. The COVID-19 pandemic has galvanized joint efforts to collaborate more deeply on such challenges. To this purpose, in 2020 (MOFA, 2020, November 17), “[t]he Leaders decided to coordinate efforts to mitigate the health, social and economic impacts of COVID-19, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and to accelerate the development and equitable access to diagnostics, therapeutics, and safe, effective and affordable vaccines for COVID-19.” Not only is there scope for joint collaboration between leading national scientific institutes such as Japan’s “RIKEN” and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, facilitated through the Japan-Australia Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee, but the partners have expressed their intent to seek reform of the World Health Organization (WHO) to better improve its ability to respond to future outbreaks. The potential for cooperation on broader environmental security issues is also being explored. This builds upon prior achievements working together on other NTS issues. For example, Japan and Australia have previously partnered in their approach to responding to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/ DR) issues. They were both involved in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami relief effort (as part of the “Core Group” with the United States and India). More specially, Australian forces contributed in this area during the 3.11 “Triple Disaster” in Japan through Operation Pacific Assist, providing succor to the stricken Fukushima region. Japan was later able to reciprocate with HA/DR during the serious bushfires in Australia in 2019. According to the MOD (2020), “This mission was very meaningful also in deepening the Japan- Australia relationship.” Furthermore, though the immediate danger appears to have receded at present, through a 2011 joint Memorandum of Understanding, the partners remain committed to supporting one another against the threat of international terrorism. 101

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The COVID crisis highlighted the importance of economic security issues more generally for the strategic partners. Thus, their 2020 Leaders’ Summit (MOFA, 2020a) “confirmed that a key element of bilateral security cooperation is to promote coordination in the area of economic security.” Australia and Japan enjoy “mutually complementary economic relationship” (MOFA, 2020) and in 2014 signed the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA) to further boost their trade and investment ties. DFAT records that “JAEPA has supported the rise in our two-way trade of some 31 per cent since the agreement started” (DFAT: Japan-Australia bilateral relationship). It is thus a strong foundation upon which the recent Second Ministerial Economic Dialogue in January 2020 sought to build. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, both countries have become concerned about maintaining secure supply chains for critical goods and services. This concern has been exacerbated by the practice of coercive economic activities by China in response to diplomatic disputes. In 2010, during a tense stand-off over the Senkaku Islands, China restricted the supply of rare earth metals to Japan. Australia is currently embroiled in a spiraling diplomatic dispute as China has interrupted imports of Australian raw materials and placed punitive tariffs on other Australian goods in response to Canberra’s earlier call for an international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 (Wilkins, 2020c). They jointly affirm (Joint Statement, 2018) that “trade should never be used as a tool to apply political pressure. To do so undermines trust and prosperity.” To this purpose, Ambassador Yamagami signaled that “Tokyo was willing to help Australia reduce its trade dependence on China after Japan also endured rough treatment at the hands of Beijing” (Tillett, 2021). This has impelled the strategic partners to leverage the JAEPA to not only deepen bilateral economic exchange but to cooperate on resource and energy security matters, such as the Australian supply of Liquid National Gas through the Japanese-funded Ichthys (“fish” in Greek) project in Darwin, as well as the development of rare earth processing in Australia. In 2019, they signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Energy and Minerals and a joint statement on Cooperation on Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in 2020. Finally, such economic security issues are also reflected in the key role that sub-regional development efforts play in their strategic partnership, intimately linked to the emphasis on RBO noted earlier. The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and parts of Southeast Asia (SEA) are identified as crucial sub-regions where the strategic partners can assist their neighbors to preserve their sovereignty, improve their governance practices, and provide for their economic development and infrastructure needs in a sustainable fashion. In response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Australia and Japan joined with the United States to found the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific in order to promote sustainable infrastructure development and regional connectivity (Joint Statement 102

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of the Governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States of America, 2018). Trilateral collaboration on providing an undersea telecommunications cable for Papua New Guinea is exemplary of these efforts. This is aimed at jointly “promoting quality infrastructure investments in line with the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment and through support for the establishment of maritime security functions” (MOFA, 2020). The partners further coordinate through the 2016 “Strategy for Cooperation in the Pacific,” which involves the promotion of “effective governance, ­economic growth and sustainable development, security and defence cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives” (DFAT: Japan-Australia bilateral relationship). These issues are intently linked as Chinese inroads into the PICs and certain SEA countries which have undermined their governance, exposed them to “debt-trap diplomacy,” and infringed their (maritime) sovereignty, through the use of illegal fishing fleets or disputes over territory in the SCS. In respect to the latter, the provision of coast guard equipment and training assists vulnerable states in improving their MDA and protecting their sovereign rights. 6.2.3  Regional Architectures In addition to their own bilateral efforts, the strategic partnership plays an active role in regional architectures, including multilateral organizations, minilateral groupings, and the US alliance network (Yeo, 2019). Participation in these institutions further supports efforts to uphold the RBO and address NTS challenges, though through different modalities. In effect, the countries aim to support elements of the regional “operating system,” as Campbell (2016) has dubbed it, that favors the RBO. The partnership is dedicated to supporting regional multilateral security and economic organizations. It places strong emphasis on the East Asia Summit as the “region’s premier forum for strategic dialogue” (Joint Statement, 2020). The ARF is likewise seen as an important contributor to conflict prevention and regional confidence building in order to “strengthen habits of dialogue, confidence-building and transparency which contribute to a sense of shared strategic and security interest among regional countries” (DFAT: partnership agenda). Both of these connect with a mutual desire to respect ASEAN “centrality” and access areas of mutual interest between the FOIP and ASEAN’s “Indo-Pacific Outlook”. The partners also maintain that economic governance can be supported by multilateral efforts. This supports their mutual objective of “expanding a free, fair, inclusive and rulesbased trade and investment environment” in the Indo-Pacific (MOFA, 2020a). Both partners have played leadership roles in multilateral initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as well as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which builds upon the APEC forum. The strategic partners have shown little appetite for engagement with Chinese-led or dominated regional 103

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architectures such as the BRI or Shanghai Cooperation Organization (though Australia has joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Indeed, Japan (and Australia’s) preferred institutional architecture seeks to counter such Chinese efforts to write the regional economic and security “rules.” The partners also recognize that minilateral forums have taken on an important role alongside broader pan-regional institutions. Australia and Japan place a strong emphasis on their Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with their US ally and have likewise initiated Australia-JapanIndia trilateral cooperation. Knitting together these trilateral forums is the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (QSD) or “Quad,” which convenes all four of these powers (Lee, 2020). Strengthening minilateral cooperation among allies and partners under the umbrella of the Indo-Pacific concept is proving useful in sharing information and coordinating responses to shared concerns about the regional security order, the FOIP, and the maritime issues discussed earlier. The expansion of the Quad itself to a “Quad-plus” format allows the admission of other like-minded powers, including Britain, France, and Germany, to also contribute to shared security concerns. The enunciation of the Australia-UK-US agreement has bolstered Australian ambitions to contribute further toward redressing the strategic balance of the alliance front toward China and from which Japan indirectly benefits (Corben et al., 2021). Yet, despite the partners’ emphasis on their own bilateral efforts and the role that the partnership itself plays as a joint platform for expanded networks, both countries remain deeply committed to their support of their US ally. The 2020 joint statement (MOFA, 2020a) “stressed the importance of close cooperation with the United States to contribute to the peace and stability of the region.” Their respective US alliances and the wider “huband-spoke” system remain critical to the partners in achieving their shared goals. Despite the damage to American credibility caused by the Trump administration, both countries express their confidence that the new Biden administration will work fast to restore America’s standing in the IndoPacific. Existing American documents such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, (American-)FOIP, and the recently declassified “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” should imbue confidence that, despite its present troubles and its relative decline, the United States remains able, and now willing, to uphold its primacy in the region and resist China as a “revisionist power” (DOD, 2019; DOS, 2019; US Government, 2021). The appearance of the Biden administration’s 2022 iteration of the US IndoPacific Strategy (White House, 2022) has provided this reassurance. There may also be expectations that in addition to security leadership in the region, which is clear in intent, Washington will return to the CPTPP in order to restore its influence upon the region’s economic governance. Thus, despite an element of “decentring” away from the US in Japanese security alignments, the United States remains pivotal to its fundamental security posture, as it does to Australia. 104

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6.3  The “China Factor” in Bilateral Relations As can be clearly discerned from the foregoing analysis of the three major dimensions of bilateral cooperation, in which Beijing looms large, both countries are deeply concerned about the broader implications of China’s strategic rise to power in the Indo-Pacific. Despite the challenges posed by weaker “spoiler” states such as North Korea and Russia, China is the only power that has the capability and (putative) intention to upend the current Indo-Pacific security order upon which both powers implicitly depend for their security (Rudd, 2022). There is strong agreement among Tokyo and Canberra, especially in the US alliance context, that Beijing seeks to remold the regional order in its own image and in line with its own values and interests – a prospect deeply unappealing to the strategic partners. The issues enumerated in this chapter have taken on a shaper edge as Beijing has engaged in relentless pressure upon the island democracy of Taiwan (as well as in the East and South China Seas), leading them to jointly identify their explicit interest “peace and stability” in Taiwan Strait for the first time (Japan Times, 2021), much to the ire of Beijing. This further demonstrates the unity of principle and purpose hardening among the partners. But there is a degree of apparent divergence in context between the partners. In defense terms, Japan considers itself to be on the “front line” of Beijing’s assertive actions due to its far greater proximity, territorial dispute in the ECS, and the legacy of historical animosity directed toward it. This has caused Japan to significantly revise its security posture, restructure its defense architecture, and enhance its military capabilities on a significant scale (Green, 2022; Smith, 2019). As a far more geographically distant power, Australia has typically not felt the same level of intensity of threat as Tokyo, leading (Japanese) analysts to refer to a “China gap” among the partners (Ishihara, 2014). Sino-Japanese disputes seem distant and relatively trivial viewed from Canberra’s vantage point, oceans away, for example. Yet, Australia has been specifically targeted with a campaign of coercive economic measures by Beijing over the past years. Combined with Chinese inroads into the South Pacific, through a security agreement with the Solomons Islands (Birtles, 2022), as Canberra increasingly perceives that the “tyranny of distance” may no longer obtain, it has moved closer toward Japan’s position. Though there has been much activity in increasing military interoperability and joint exercises, as mentioned earlier, neither country has sought to institutionalize the strategic partnership through a mutual defense treaty to create a formal alliance (see conclusion), perhaps due to the lingering divergence just mentioned. But the accumulating steps taken toward greater military/defense collaboration may be a way of surreptitiously creating organizational capabilities to better respond to conflict contingencies sparked by China or laying the foundations to rapidly transform the partnership into a more effective military tool (almost certainly in coalition

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with the US). It is thus the future institutional trajectory of the strategic partnership that we now turn by way of conclusion.

6.4  Conclusions: Toward a Formal “Alliance”? To sum up, the Special Strategic Partnership with Australia has been a significant success with respect to Japan’s sustained efforts to expand its security horizons by adding further security partners to its portfolio that both supplement and complement its central alliance relationship with the United States. The Japan-Australia Strategic Partnership has acted both as a “proving ground” – and hence a model – for further arrangements with regional powers (discussed elsewhere in this volume). It has acquired a deep-rooted and truly multidimensional nature, surviving setbacks such as the failed Japanese bid to supply Australia’s future submarines in 2016 and irritants over whaling issues (now apparently fairly dormant), and being recalibrated to specifically face the challenges emerging in the Indo-Pacific Century. As commentators such as Ishihara (2014) have noted, this tight bilateral is a mechanism for “action” that perhaps contrasts favorably with the wide array of multilateral regional forums sometimes viewed as little more than “talk shops” discussed earlier. For a Japan that under former PM Abe acquired a new sense of strategic purpose and determined to make greater national contributions to regional security, this puts a premium on the partnership. The increased rationale and the relative success of the strategic partnership have invigorated discussion among scholars and strategic analysts in both countries about the desirability of further strengthening cooperation through the promulgation of a formal defense treaty (Wilkins, 2015; Jennings, 2022). Some commentators in Japan (NIDS, 2016) already refer to it as a “quasi-alliance” (jun dōmei) (in the sense that it resembles an alliance or is some form of “virtual” alliance). Yet, despite the challenges posed by China’s resurgence to the RBO, the country does not pose a direct and imminent threat to the existential security of either country (yet) – the real raison d’être for an alliance – and such a move would likely trigger a hostile response from Beijing that would outweigh its potential benefits at the current time. Indeed, this is not the raison d’etre of the partnership, with Satake (2016) noting rather that “both countries have developed their cooperation in order to construct a liberal international order based on institutions, rules, norms and values, rather than simply coping with an external threat.” Fears of provoking Beijing are well-founded, since after the recent RAA, The Global Times declared that “the RAA would set a bad example for Asia-Pacific countries by hyping the so-called China threat” and considered the “bilateral defense pact as a prelude to forming an “Indo-Pacific NATO” against China” (Wang & Xu, 2020). Thus, the current strategic partnership mechanism, for the reasons discussed in this chapter, remains the optimum interim solution to dealing with joint challenges. In 2019, Defense Ministers Tarō Konō and Linda Reynolds noted  that  “as  Indo-Pacific 106

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security dynamics became more challenging, the strategic logic underpinning Japan-Australia cooperation was only getting stronger” (MOD, 2020). In this context, we can expect a further strengthening of the partnership to confront the multifarious challenges of the Indo-Pacific Century.

References Birtles, B. (2022, April 21). China’s Security Pact with Solomon Islands Signals a New Era in the South Pacific for Australia and Its Allies, ABC News. Campbell, K. (2016). The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia. Hachette UK. Cha, V. D. (1999). Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (p. 206). Stanford University Press. Corben, T., Townsend, A., & Patton, S. (2021, September 16). What Is the AUKUS Partnership? Analysis, The United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney. Department of Defense (2019, June 1). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. Washington, DC. Department of State (2019, November 4). A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision. Washington, DC. DFAT. Australia-Japan Bilateral Relationship. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/ Pages/australia-japan-bilateral-relationship DFAT. Partnership Agenda Between Australia and Japan. https://www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/japan/Pages/partnership-agenda-between-australia-and-japan Dobell, G. (2020, October 6). After Abe: Where to for Australia’s Quasi-Alliance with Japan? The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. DOD. (2020). Defence Strategic Update. Canberra: Department of Defence. DuBois, M. (2021, January 30). Night-Time in Pyongyang: Aesthetics and Deterrence Under Kim Jong Un. The Diplomat. Envall, H. D. P. (2020). The Pacific Islands in Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. Security Challenges, 16(1), 65–77. Glosserman, B. (2019). Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions. Georgetown University Press. Green, M. (2022). Line of Advantage: Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Era of Shinzo Abe. Columbia University Press. Hosoya, Y. (2019). FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Asia-Pacific Review, 26(1), 18–28. Ishihara, Y. (2014). Japan-Australia Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. In T. T. William, and Tomonori Yoshizaki (Eds.), Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-Japan Security Cooperation, 93–122. Japan, Australia air “Grave Concern” over China’s H.K. Security Law. (2020, July 9). Kyodo News. Jennings, P. (2018, July 21). Trump Means We Need a “Plan B” for Defence. ASPI Opinion. https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/trump-means-we-need-plan-b-defence. Jennings, P. (2022, January 5). “Deeper Ties with Japan Send Strong Message to China” The Australian [accessed 12/01/22]. Joint Statement of the Governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States of America on the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the IndoPacific, (2018 November 17), www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-governmentsaustralia-japan-and-united-states

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Lee, L. (2020 May 19). Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s Interests. Analyses. The Lowy Institute. Medcalf, R. (2020). Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region. Manchester University Press. Midford, P., & Vosse, W. (Eds.). (2020). New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-US Centric Evolution. Routledge. MOD. (2020). The Defense of Japan, Tokyo. MOFA. (2020a, November 17). Japan-Australia Leaders’ Meeting Joint Statement. MOFA (2020b). Opening Special Feature: FOIP. Diplomatic Bluebook. Tokyo. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2020/html/feature/f0104.html MOFA Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (2020, November 17). https://www.mofa. go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page3e_001080.html National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) (2016). East Asian Strategic Review 2016. Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies. Oros, A.L. (2017). Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-first Century. Columbia University Press. Panagiotopoulos, M., 2016. Australia and Japan Create a New Economic Paradigm. Australia-Japan Foundation Project 2015, 16. Partnership Agenda Between Australia and Japan, DFAT, https://www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/japan/Pages/partnership-agenda-between-australia-and-japan Rudd, K. (2022). The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China. Hachette UK. Satake, T. (2016). The Japan-Australia Contribution to a Liberal and Inclusive Regional Order: Beyond the ‘China Gap’. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70(1), 24–36. Satake, T., & Hemmings, J. (2018). Japan–Australia Security Cooperation in the Bilateral and Multilateral Contexts. International Affairs, 94(4), 815–34. Satake, T., & Sahashi, R. (2021). The Rise of China and Japan’s ‘Vision’ for Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(127), 18–35. Singh, B. (2013). Japan’s Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State (Vol. 45). Routledge. Smith, S.A. (2019). Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power. Harvard University Press. The Japan Times (2021 June 9). Japan and Australia Stress Importance of ‘Peace and Stability’ in Taiwan Strait for First Time. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes. co.jp/news/2021/06/09/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-australia-taiwan/ Tillett, A. (2021 January 29). Japan Urges Australia to Boost East China Sea Presence. The Australian Financial Review. US Government. (2021, January 12). US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. Wang, Q., & Xu, K. (2020, November 11). Japan, Australia Eye Defense Pact; a Potential “Indo-Pacific NATO” Could Be Formed against China. Global Times. White House. (2022, February 11). Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy. pdf. Wilkins, T. S. (2011). Japan’s Alliance Diversification: A Comparative Analysis of the Indian and Australian Strategic Partnerships. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 11(1), 115–55.

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Wilkins, T. S. (2012). “Alignment,” not “Alliance”–the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment. Review of International Studies, 38(1), 53–76. Wilkins, T.S. (2015). From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Alliance? AustraliaJapan Security Ties and the Asia-Pacific. Asia Policy, 20, 81–112. Wilkins, T.S. (2020a). Japan’s “Special” Strategic Partnership with Australia. in Midford & Vosse (Eds.), New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-US Centric Evolution. Routledge. Wilkins, T.S. (2020b, February 11). Searching for a Middle Path: ASEAN and the “Indo Pacific”, JIIA Policy Brief, Japan Institute for International Affairs. Wilkins, T.S. (2020c, June 19). Australia-China Clashes in the COVID-19 Era: Adjusting to a “New Normal” in Bilateral Relations? JIIA Policy Brief. Japan Institute for International Affairs. Wilkins, T., & Kim, J. (2020). Adoption, Accommodation or Opposition? Regional Powers Respond to American-Led Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Pacific Review, 35(3), 1–31. Yeo, A. (2019). Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century. Stanford University Press.

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7 JAPAN-INDIA RELATIONS IN JAPAN’S NOTION OF INDO-PACIFIC Genesis, Difference, and Convergence Kazutoshi Tamari

7.1 Introduction The relatively new term “Indo-Pacific” was introduced into the international political arena by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011/12. However, it was Tokyo’s announcement of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” in 2016 that played the most instrumental role in popularizing the term, leading to its current widespread use. The following year, the Trump administration also adopted the phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” as well as the name of the region and Indo-Pacific quickly became a buzzword in international politics. Another key country in the international politics of the Indo-Pacific is, of course, India, as the term “Indo-Pacific” clearly implies. In the first place, the introduction of the Indo-Pacific by Secretary of State Clinton was also based on the intention to incorporate India into the US strategy toward China. And the “FOIP” strategy, announced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was also born in the context of relations with India. Furthermore, India played a part in the subsequent shift in the Japanese government’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This chapter reviews Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy from the perspective of its relationship with India. It is composed of the following three sections. The first section discusses the “genesis” of Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy, focusing on its relationship with India. The Japanese government officially began using the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2014, not in the often-misunderstood 2007 speech to the Indian Parliament. Initially, Tokyo’s use of the term “Indo-Pacific” was limited to relations with India, and thus Indo-Pacific was a term almost exclusively limited to Japan-India relations. The second section illustrates that Japan and India took different positions on the Indo-Pacific policy when India presented its own “inclusive” Indo-Pacific policy in June 2018. It was a 110

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moment when the two countries shared the term “Indo-Pacific” and also a moment when policy differences became apparent. The third section analyzes a policy change in Japan. Tokyo changed its terminology on the Indo-Pacific from “strategy” to “vision” in the latter half of 2018. This was not just a matter of terminology; it meant a shift in strategy toward China. The process and reasons for the policy shift are discussed there.

7.2  Genesis: Early Years of the “Indo-Pacific” in India-Japan Relations As is well-known, Japan’s “FOIP” was launched in August 2016, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered an address at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. However, the “Indo-Pacific” has a previous history, mainly in its relation with India. It is often said that Prime Minister Abe’s “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech to the Parliament of India in 2007, which was said to have been highly appreciated and contributed to the subsequent developments of Japan-India relations, was the origin of the Indo-Pacific policy. But in fact, the term “Indo-Pacific” itself was not used in the speech. It did not advocate “Indo-Pacific” but rather “Broader Asia” as a new regional concept that included India. As it is argued later, the 2007 speech was a source of ideas that led to the later “FOIP,” but it is wrong to say that this speech was the first example of the Indo-Pacific by Tokyo. One can see that in the following excerpt of the famous opening section of the speech. My friends, where exactly do we now stand historically and geographically? To answer this question, I would like to quote here the title of a book authored by the Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh in 1655. We are now at a point at which the Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being. The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity. A “broader Asia” that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form. Our two countries have the ability – and the responsibility – to ensure that it broadens yet further and nurtures and enriches these seas to become seas of clearest transparence. (Underlined by author)1 The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a new regional concept in international politics, not by Prime Minister Abe, but in a different context. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the most significant contribution to the diffusion of the Indo-Pacific. While details are beyond the scope of this paper the term “Indo-Pacific” became widely known when it was used in her speech in October 2010 and referred to in her “Foreign Policy” article in October 111

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2011 (Scott 2012; Tamari 2015).2 In her paper in 2011, she proposed the “Indo-Pacific” as an “operational concept” to describe the connectivity between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, as China’s increased maritime expansion has led to increased interests in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian waters. Although the term “Indo-Pacific” had been used in India and other countries prior to that, it is commonly acknowledged among experts that the term “Indo-Pacific” has been in vogue since the Clinton paper in 2011 (Scott 2012). In the wake of the Clinton paper, there was a vibrant debate over the Indo-Pacific in India, but the Indian government was reluctant to accept this new concept. For example, in March 2013, Shivshankar Menon, national security advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (National Congress Party), stated that it was not appropriate to use a single concept of IndoPacific to encompass multiple regions of different natures, as follows: I also believe that the Indo-Pacific is not one geopolitical unit, although security is indeed linked across the seas and oceans that encircle the Asian landmass. In geopolitical terms, and in terms of the naval capabilities of the different navies other than the U.S. that operate between Suez and Hawaii, this space still consists of three distinct areas: the Indian Ocean, the western Pacific, and the seas near China (namely, the South China Sea, the East Sea and the Sea of Japan). This becomes clearer when you actually look at the behaviour of the navies that operate in this space.3 Denied by the Indian government at the time, the Indo-Pacific was to disappear in its birthplace, the United States. Clinton resigned as secretary of state in February 2013, and the Indo-Pacific was not seen thereafter in the administration of Barack Obama. In other words, the spread of the IndoPacific was temporarily halted, although some countries such as Australia viewed it positively. In Tokyo, however, a part of the government and researchers interested in the area began to research the Indo-Pacific as a new regional framework.4 Thereafter, Prime Minister Abe, in his second term, announced its new grand strategy of a “FOIP” strategy in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 2016. However, it was two years earlier that Tokyo had begun to use the term “Indo-Pacific” (“Indo Taiheiyou” in Japanese). Scrutiny of the Japanese government’s websites reveals that the first usage of “Indo-Pacific” usage appeared in October 2014. The “Indo-Pacific” was unceremoniously used on a page about a courtesy call from chiefs of staff in the “Indo-Pacific” region and on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office without any explanation of the new terminology.5 It is not known exactly at what point the Japanese government made the decision to adopt the “Indo-Pacific” and began using it, but its first appearance in diplomacy was clear. On the sidelines of the G20 summit being held 112

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in Brisbane, Australia, the Japan-India summit meeting was held on November 14, 2014, where Prime Minister Abe proposed to “add to JapanIndia relations a standpoint of contributing to the stability and development of ‘Indo-Pacific’” to his counterpart Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who had come to power in that year.6 Following is the description of the meeting on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Prime Minister Abe stated that he wanted to add to Japan-India relations a standpoint of contributing to the stability and development of “Indo-Pacific” and mentioned that he attached importance to Japan-U.S.-India and Japan-Australia-India cooperation. Prime Minister Modi expressed his approval for this.7 Subsequently, from the end of 2014 until the release of “FOIP” in August 2016, the Indo-Pacific was utilized almost exclusively in India-Japan relations.8 For example, the term appeared in the 8th Japan-India Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida (the future prime minister) and Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj in January 2015. Kishida also delivered a policy speech titled “Special Partnership for the Era of the Indo-Pacific,” where he used “Indo-Pacific” 16 times.9 The term also appeared exceptionally in interactions between Japan, India, and a third country. For example, at the US-India-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in New York, United States, in September 2015, the term “Indo-Pacific region” was used in the released joint media note.10 Finally, in August 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech at the TICAD Summit,11 and Tokyo declared the “FOIP” as its grand strategy in its media release. In the next year, the Trump administration of the United States also adopted the same term, “FOIP,” after enthusiastic lobbying by the Japanese government (Yamamoto 2021). In the first public statement by the US government, Secretary of State Tillerson used the phrase “free and open Indo-Pacific” in a speech to a think tank in October 2017.12 President Trump, in his speeches in various parts of his subsequent East Asia tour, called for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a phrase that immediately caught the world’s attention. However, while Japan used “FOIP” as a “strategy,” the US government did not add “strategy” and used the Indo-Pacific as the name of the expanded region to replace Asia-Pacific. The details of the contents of the “FOIP” strategy are not the focus here13 but rather to showcase India’s involvement in its conception. Although it is evident that the “Confluence of Two Seas” speech in 2007 did not discuss the Indo-Pacific, it can be said that, as a result, it was a root and inspiration of the FOIP strategy. We can find a lot of commonalities between the 2007 speech and the FOIP strategy. Both were presented under the same prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and the same person in the government was in charge of the articulation. According to Suzuki (2017: 87–98), diplomatic strategies of the first Abe administration were mainly articulated by three officials, 113

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Table 7.1  Chronological Tabulation of the Early Years of the “Indo-Pacific” August 2007 October 2010 October 2011 October 2014 November 2014 August 2016 October 2017

Abe’s “Confluence of Two Seas” address in Delhi Clinton’s speech in Honolulu Clinton’s “Foreign Policy” paper Tokyo’s first usage of “Indo-Pacific” Abe-Modi agreement on adding “Indo-Pacific” “Indo-Pacific” almost exclusively used in Japan-India “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy of Japan “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in Tillerson’s speech

Source: Compiled by author.

Shotaro Yachi, foreign secretary; Tomohiko Taniguchi, deputy press secretary and deputy director-general for public diplomacy, ministry of foreign affairs; and Nobukatsu Kanehara, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.14 As for the speech, Kanehara proposed the combination of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and Taniguchi elaborated on the rhetoric of the “Confluence of the Two Seas” (Suzuki 2017: 137). In the second term of the Abe administration, all three remained at the center of foreign policy formation. Yachi was the national security advisor, and Kanehara became assistant chief cabinet secretary to the prime minister and deputy secretary-general of the National Security Secretariat. Kanehara, who was known to have been responsible for the strategic planning of Abe’s diplomacy, was believed to have been a central figure in the formulation of the “FOIP” strategy. Taniguchi, who conceived the “Confluence” speech, came back to the government as councillor of the Prime Minister’s Office and served as Prime Minister Abe’s speechwriter. In short, although the “IndoPacific” was not used in the Parliament speech in 2007, we can find the germination of the idea there, and it was directly related to the later FOIP strategy. Moreover, testimony by one involved in the policymaking process has made the connection between the 2007 speech and the FOIP strategy. Keiichi Ichikawa, an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, told the inside story of the policy planning on the “FOIP” to Japanese media (Yamamoto 2021). According to him, when he conceived the term “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” the “Confluence of Two Seas” was in his mind. In other words, while Abe’s 2007 speech in India was not the original IndoPacific, it was not merely similar, but directly the inspiration for the FOIP. Therefore, we can say that the FOIP, which would go on to move the world, was born out of the Japan-India relationship.

7.3  Difference: India’s “Inclusive” Indo-Pacific Two years after Japan announced its “FOIP” strategy, India also announced its Indo-Pacific policy in 2018. However, India’s policy direction was somewhat different from the Japanese strategy. This section examines the 114

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Indo-Pacific policy adopted by the Indian government briefly to the extent that it pertains to relations with Japan. As mentioned in the previous section, in November 2014, Prime Minister Modi accepted Prime Minister Abe’s proposal to add a standpoint of the Indo-Pacific, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.15 Nevertheless, not that the Indian government did not sometimes use the term “Indo-Pacific,” but this was almost exclusively in relation to Japan.16 In late 2017, at about the same time that the US government began using the term Indo-Pacific, New Delhi officially began using the term IndoPacific. And eventually, in June 2018, the Indian government announced its Indo-Pacific policy in Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address at the Asia Security Summit of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue. This was the moment when India finally officially adopted the FOIP and in that sense, it joined the Indo-Pacific camp with Japan, the United States, and some other countries. However, the content of this speech showed that India’s view on the Indo-Pacific was different from that of Japan and the United States. The following is an excerpt from the seven items presented by Prime Minister Modi relevant to the discussion in this chapter. One, It stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it. … Six, … On these principles, we are prepared to work with everyone… Finally, All of this is possible if we do not return to the age of great power rivalries.17 Like Japan and the United States, “free and open” is used for India’s IndoPacific policy. But India added “inclusive” to it. At first glance, it does not seem to be much of a difference, but experts found a fundamental difference. While Tokyo originally intended to make the Indo-Pacific “free and open” by preventing China from monopolizing it, the regional cooperation in India’s Indo-Pacific seen in the address seemed kept open even for China. In other words, Japan and the United States were trying to exclude China from Indo-Pacific cooperation, while India tried to keep it inclusive even to China. New Delhi also suggested that India’s Indo-Pacific policy has different nuances from those of Japan and the United States. For example, Dr. S. Jaishankar, who later became the minister of external affairs of India, says, “In essence, this was a call for an Asia of Cooperation, rather than rivalry” regarding the Shangri-La address in his book (Jaishankar 2020: 175). Although Jaishankar does not explicitly say it differs from Japan or 115

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the United States, it is clear that he is suggesting the difference between India’s cooperative approach and rival approach of them. Out of the main scope of this chapter, the stance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the Indo-Pacific also seemed similar to that of India.18 ASEAN countries, while there were differences in approaches among the countries, were negative toward the Indo-Pacific as a regional framework to exclude China. Thus, Japan faced the fundamental difference between India and ASEAN countries regarding the relationship with China over the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo had attempted to build the IndoPacific framework involving India and Southeast Asian countries, but Japan failed to share its Indo-Pacific strategy with its Asian neighbor friends. Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La speech was a moment for the Japanese government to succeed in sharing the term “Indo-Pacific” with New Delhi but at the same time to realize the difference in their policies on China. When India and ASEAN announced their Indo-Pacific policies, there was a sea change in Sino-Japanese relations. At the beginning of the second Abe administration in 2012, Japan-China relations were abysmal, mainly due to the nationalization of Senkaku Islands in the previous Yoshihiko Noda government (Democratic Party of Japan). In 2013, Chinese public opinion toward Japan was the worst in recent years, when only 5.3 percent were favorable or relatively favorable to Japan (Genron NPO 2019: 3). Prime Minister Abe was known as a conservative and a hardliner against China, but his administration steered the country toward a policy of improving relations with China. Consequently, Prime Minister Abe visited China in 2018 for the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan, the first Japanese prime minister to do so in seven years; the event symbolized the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations.19 Public opinion also recovered when the favorable or relatively favorable opinion of Japan rose to 42.2 percent in 2018 (Genron NPO 2019: 3).

7.4  Convergence: Japan’s Policy Change from “Strategy” to “Vision” At the same time as this visit to China by Prime Minister Abe, Japan’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific was also undergoing a major, but quiet, change. As a result, Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy got closer to that of India and ASEAN countries; in other words, the Indo-Pacific policy of Japan and India converged. This section elaborates on Japan’s shift in Indo-Pacific policy and its convergence. The policy shift was subtly indicated in Prime Minister Abe’s remarks at a domestic meeting. On November 12, 2018, he delivered the following address in a regular liaison meeting of the government and ruling parties, In Singapore, I will attend Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-related meetings, including the East Asia Summit (EAS). 116

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I  would like to further strengthen the Japan-ASEAN relations as this year marks the 45th anniversary of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, as well as coordinate with participating countries to address the North Korean issue and to realize the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and communicate a strong message to the world. (Underlined by author)20 At first sight, it appeared to be an ordinary remark before leaving for a foreign trip to the ASEAN summit meeting. But based on this remark, Japanese media reported that the government had replaced the phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy” with “the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2018). In fact, until then, the word “strategy” (“senryaku” in Japanese) had been added immediately after the “FOIP,” but henceforth, the term “vision” has been used instead of “strategy.” In other words, the Japanese government stopped calling the IndoPacific a “strategy” and changed its policy to call it a “vision.” Needless to say, the word “vision” was much more moderate than the word “strategy.” Therefore, the change of language meant to reduce the nuance of the IndoPacific as an encirclement strategy countering China. It was an important policy shift in Tokyo. So why did Tokyo change its terminology from “strategy” to “vision” at that time? Before examining this question, let us look at the timing of this policy change. Several events seemed to be related before and after such a declaration (see Table 7.2). The “vision” speech was preceded by two major events in its foreign relations. First, Prime Minister Abe visited China on October 25–27, 2018. As mentioned earlier, it was an important outing that symbolized the improvement of Japan-China relations in his term. Considering the timing, one might assume that the language change was made at Beijing’s request. Second, on the same day that Prime Minister Abe Table 7.2  Chronological Tabulation of Japan’s Policy Shift on “Indo-Pacific” in 2018 June 1 August–September October 24 October 25–27 October 27–29 November 12

November 14

Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address at Shangri-La Dialogue Decision of policy change from “strategy” to “vision” Prime Minister Abe’s General Policy Speech: no reference to the “Indo-Pacific” Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan Prime Minister Abe’s address “the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

ASEAN-Japan summit meeting

Source: Compiled by author.

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returned from China, Prime Minister Modi, who had presented India’s own “inclusive” Indo-Pacific policy in June 2018, arrived in Japan. PM Abe invited PM Modi to his villa in Yamanashi to show his close relationship with him. The Japan-India summit was the immediately preceding event to the “vision” speech. Moreover, India had presented its Indo-Pacific strategy, which showed differences between Japan and India. Therefore, it is unnatural to suppose that the two leaders did not discuss the Indo-Pacific at that meeting. Some speculated that Prime Minister Abe might have changed his mind after some kind of exchange in the meeting with PM Modi. But it was not valid. Tokyo had decided to change the language before the summit meeting, as is explained later. The consequence of the “vision” speech is of significance. As mentioned in the speech, the Japan-ASEAN summit meeting was scheduled two days after the address. Hence, we may assume that the language change was made for the sake of its relations with ASEAN countries. In fact, the wording of the Japan-ASEAN joint statement uses the word “view” for the IndoPacific, though not “vision,” and similarities can be found. Following is part of the joint statement. We underscore the importance of promoting peace, stability and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region, facing various challenges. We share the view to promote a rules-based Indo-Pacific region that is free and open, embraces key principles such as ASEAN’s unity and centrality, inclusiveness, transparency, and complements ASEAN community-building process. In this regard, ASEAN leaders note with appreciation Japan’s intention to further contribute more proactively to securing regional and international peace, stability and prosperity, as well as Japan’s continued support for ASEAN connectivity, including through its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and its policy on a free and open IndoPacific, which reaffirms ASEAN’s vital role as the bridge connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans in the Indo-Pacific. (Underlined by author)21 These are the events before and after the change of language to “vision” became apparent. As for the timing of the decision of the policy change, a journalist article points out that Tokyo decided to stop using the word “strategy” a little earlier, in September, and the US government was informed of the policy change (Okada 2018). Indeed, Prime Minister Abe did not mention the “Indo-Pacific” in his General Policy Speech in the Diet on October 24, 2018.22 Previously, he had always used the set phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.” For example, the previous General Policy Speech on January 22, 2018, says, “To this end we will promote the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.”23 On the other hand, not only “strategy” but also the “Indo-Pacific” itself did not appear in General Policy Speech 118

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on October 24, 2018. It was uncommon that he did not refer to the IndoPacific in his speech, the key phrase of his diplomacy. Therefore, it meant that the policy change over the Indo-Pacific had been prepared before the summit meetings. According to Okada (2018), Tokyo had decided to separate the connectivity issues from its security rivalry with China and promote cooperation in the area of connectivity. In 2017, Tokyo expressed its support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It was not just words; they agreed to establish a committee for business cooperation with third countries in May 2018, and the first meeting was held on September 25 in Beijing.24 The Japanese government decided to locate the “FOIP” not as a framework for confrontation with China, but as a means of cooperation in connectivity, ultimately aiming to win China’s support for it. The aforementioned is the Chinese factor theory. Tokyo aimed at transforming the relationship with China over connectivity from one of confrontation to one of cooperation, thus improving the relationship. But this played only a part in this policy change. The other is the India/ASEAN factor theory. A Japanese government official under the cover of anonymity opined to the author that there was another important perspective. According to him/ her, Tokyo realized that its Indo-Pacific “strategy” would not align Japan with India and ASEAN countries. According to him/her, therefore, Japan changed the word “strategy” from an intensely colored confrontation with China to a more moderate “vision.” He/she said that this perspective of cooperation with India and ASEAN was more important than the China perspective. As the author of this chapter, I refrain from making a judgment as to whether the India-ASEAN factor or the China factor was more dominant, but I think it is important to point out that there was an India-ASEAN factor as well as a China factor. Ichikawa’s testimony referred to earlier also speaks of the ASEAN factor in the policy change from “strategy” to “vision” (Yamamoto 2021). According to him, it was necessary to make FOIP not just a strategy for Japan, but a vision that could be shared with other countries, including ASEAN. The following is a translation of Ichikawa’s testimony (Yamamoto 2021). Through our interactions with ASEAN and other countries, we have come to an idea that we need to share the vision with them and each country should make its own efforts toward its realization. In other words, we considered every country should have a  sense of ownership of the vision of FOIP sense of ownership. We thought that FOIP should not be a Japan-only strategy. (Yamamoto 2021; translated by the author) These testimonies show that the Japanese policy shift had an aspect not only of relations with China, but also of cooperation with India and 119

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ASEAN countries. In other words, India was involved in this policy shift. Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La speech was apparently one of the factors behind the policy change. Even though Prime Minister Abe’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi was not the direct trigger, the perspective of achieving cooperation with India on the Indo-Pacific has constituted partly due to the policy shift.

7.5 Conclusion This chapter has reviewed the genesis, divergence and convergence on the Indo-Pacific in India-Japan relations, mainly from the Japanese perspective. It has demonstrated some new findings. First, Prime Minister Abe’s “Confluence of Two Seas” speech in the Indian Parliament in 2007 did not use the term “Indo-Pacific” itself, but it was an important source of inspiration for the “FOIP” announced in 2016. Second, before FOIP, Tokyo started using the term “Indo-Pacific” in its diplomatic relationship with India in 2014, and thereafter the Indo-Pacific was used almost exclusively for JapanIndia relations for two years. Third, Japan changed its Indo-Pacific policy from “strategy” to “vision,” due to two major reasons: to enable cooperation on connectivity with China, and to cooperate with India and ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific. In particular, the third point is an important contribution to this chapter. As we have seen in this chapter, India has always been an important element in the development of Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy. The author of this chapter has argued that the shift in Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy in 2018 represented an unprecedented convergence of foreign policies of both countries, not just in the terminology. For both countries, relations with China are their most important challenge, but prior to the 2018 policy shift, there were differences in their basic stances to China. However, the shift from strategy to vision has brought a convergence in their basic thinking on China. Indeed, bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) have deepened rapidly since then with significant progress. When looking back in the future, this small change in terminology over the Indo-Pacific in 2018 may be said to have been an important turning point in the major power politics in Asia. * This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research JP18H03448.

Notes 1 “Confluence of the Two Seas,” Speech by H. E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22, 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/pmv0708/speech-2.html, on February 12, 2021). 2 As for the early discussions on the Indo-Pacific in India, see Chacko (2012).

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3 Text of Speech of Mr. Shivshankar Menon, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Website of Observer Research Foundation, March 4, 2013 (retrieved from http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/ documents/Samudra-Manthan.pdf, on January 10, 2015; linkrot as of February 14, 2021). 4 As for the detail, see Tamari (2021). 5 The Prime Minister Receives a Courtesy Call from the Chiefs of Staff and Other Officials of Air Forces in the Indo-Pacific Region, Website of Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, October 24, 2014 (retrieved from https://japan.kantei. go.jp/96_abe/actions/201410/24article2.html, on April 20, 2019). 6 For the expanding cooperation between Prime Minister Abe’s Japan and Prime Minister Modi’s India, refer to Jain (2021). 7 Japan-India Summit Meeting, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 14, 2014 (retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page24e_ 000065.html, on April 20, 2019). There is no mention of the agreement on the Indo-Pacific on the website of the Ministry of External Affairs of India. 8 For more general backgrounds about the relationship between Japan and India, see Horimoto (2017). 9 Policy speech by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida “Special Partnership for the Era of the Indo-Pacific,” January 18, 2015, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000291.html, on February 14, 2021). 10 Inaugural U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue, September 30, 2015, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (retrieved from https://www. mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/page4e_000325.html, on February 14, 2021). 11 Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html, on February 14, 2021). In fact, the term “Indo-Pacific” was not used in the text of this speech. However, the government explained to the media that the speech was an announcement of a new strategy of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” and it was reported accordingly. 12 “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,” Centre for Strategic & International Stu­ dies, October 18, 2017 (https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationshipindia-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson; retrieved on April 20, 2019). 13 For example, see Oba (2018). 14 At the time, Kanehara was Director of Management and Coordination Division in the Ministry, which meant he was not among top-rank officials. However, he was already known as a prominent strategist and was a key figure in the first Abe administration’s foreign policy planning. 15 No reference can be found on the Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ website. 16 There were some exceptional usages in the multilateral framework, including India. 17 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri-La Dialogue, June 1, 2018, Website of Ministry External Affairs, Government of India (retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+ Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018, on February 13, 2021). 18 ASEAN’s version of the Indo-Pacific policy was officially presented in “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” in June 2019. But “inclusive” stance of ASEAN had been clear before that.

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19 Prime Minister Abe had visited Beijing in November 2014, but it was for the APEC summit and not an official visit. 20 Liaison Meeting of the Government and Ruling Parties, Website of Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, November 12, 2018 (retrieved from https:// japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201811/_00021.html, on February 13, 2021). 21 Joint Statement of the 21st ASEAN-Japan Summit to Commemorate the 45th Anniversary of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 13, 2018 “retrieved from https://www. mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000524336.pdf, on February 13, 2021). In the run-up to his visit to China, it was perceived as showing consideration for China by not using the term “Indo-Pacific.” 22 Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 197th Session of the Diet, October 24, 2018, Website of Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (retrieved from https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement2/20181024shoshinhyomei. html, on April 18, 2021). 23 Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the Diet, January 22, 2018, Website of Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (retrieved from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201801/_00002.html, on April 18, 2021). In earlier General Policy Speeches, “the Free and Open IndoPacific Strategy” had been used. 24 Picchu Minkan Business no Daisangoku Tenkai Suishin ni Kansuru Iinkai no Kaisai [First Committee for Promoting Japan-China Private Business Cooperation in the Third Countries], September 2, 2018, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/ release/press4_006452.html, on February 15, 2021).

References Chacko, P. (2012). India and the Indo-Pacific: An Emerging Regional Vision, IndoPacific Governance Research Centre Policy Brief, 5, November 2012, retrieved from https://www.adelaide.edu.au/indo-pacific-governance/research/policy/Chacko_ PB.pdf, on April 20, 2019. Genron, NPO. (2019). The 15th Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019, retrieved from https://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/ 191024.pdf, on February 14, 2021. Horimoto, T. (Ed.) (2017). Gendai Nichiin Kankei Nyumon [Introduction to Contemporary JAPAN-INDIA]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press [in Japanese]. Jain, P. (2021). Kakutani Suru Indo to Nihon no Kyouryoku Kankei [India’s Expanding Relations with Japan]. In T. Horimoto (Ed.) Korekara no Indo [Future of India]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press [in Japanese]. Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World. New Delhi: HarperCollins India. Nihon Keizai, Shimbun (2018, November 13). Indo Taiheiyou, Kieta “Senryaku” [“Strategy” Disappears from Indo-Pacific]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, retrieved from https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO37648990S8A111C1PP8000/, on Feb­ ruary 12, 2021 [in Japanese] Oba, M. (2018). Nihon No “Indo Taiheiyou” Kousou [Indo-Pacific: from Japan’s Perspective]. Kokusai Anzenhosyo [The Journal of International Security], 46(3), 12–32 [in Japanese]. Okada, M. (2018). Abe Syusyo ga Huin-shita “Senryaku” no 2 Moji [PM Abe Sealed a Word “Strategy”], Business Insider, retrieved from https://www.businessinsider. jp/post-178169, on February 12, 2021 [in Japanese]

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Scott, D. (2012). The ‘Indo-Pacific’―New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US-India Strategic Convergence. Asia-Pacific Review, 19(2), 85–109. Suzuki, Y. (2017). Nihon no Senryaku Gaikou [Japan’s Strategic Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo [in Japanese]. Tamari, K. (2015). “Indo Taiheiyou” Gainen no Fukyu Katei [The Diffusion of the Concept “Indo-Pacific”], Kokusai Anzenhosyo [The Journal of International Security], 43(1), 68–86 [in Japanese]. Tamari, K. (2021). Indo to Nihon no “Indo Taiheiyou”: 2007 Nen kara 2018 Nen made [The “Indo-Pacific” in Japan and India: From 2007 to 2018]. In M. Tadokoro (Ed.) Sugao no Gendai Indo [Reality of Contemporary India]. Tokyo: Keio University Press [in Japanese]. Yamamoto, Y. (2021). Jiyuu de Hirakareta Indo Taiheiyou Tanjou Hiwa [Inside Story of Making of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific], NHK, June 30, 2021, retrieved from https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/62725.html, on July 21, 2021.

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8.1  Introduction: Prelude to Indo-Pacific Partnership The term “Indo-Pacific,” of late, has gained traction in international politics, strategic circles, media, and academia. India and Japan are an integral part of this construct, not only because they are geographically located in the territorial space, now being defined as the Indo-Pacific, but also because this much-talked-about lexicon emerged and was nurtured by both the countries’ academia and leadership. The story of Indo-Pacific started in 2006 when Japan announced a new vision of its foreign policy based on “Value Oriented Diplomacy,” placing the emphasis on the importance of “universal values such as human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and freedom” (Aso 2006). Taro Aso, the then-Japanese foreign minister, termed this vision as an “arc of freedom and prosperity” and made a commitment to incorporate this vision into the country’s foreign policy. As part of this vision, Japan was keen to look beyond the USA and neighboring countries such as South Korea, China, and Russia, which had been the core focus of its post-war foreign policy. He wanted to broaden the focus of Japanese foreign policy by partnering with India and other budding democracies in the Eurasian region and beyond, which he said creates an “arc of freedom and prosperity.” Notably, in the same year, Japan and India elevated the existing partnership into a “global and strategic partnership.” They also institutionalized an annual summit-level dialogue at the prime ministerial level starting in 2006. The India-Japan strategic partnership was a clear manifestation of Japan’s “arc of freedom and prosperity.” The vision of value-based diplomacy was further advanced during Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to New Delhi in 2007. Abe presented the idea of “confluence of the two seas” during his speech in the Indian Parliament. He termed the Pacific and the Indian Oceans as “a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity” (Abe 2007). He further noted that “a ‘broader Asia’ that broke geographical boundaries is 124

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now beginning to take on a distinct form. Our two countries have the ability – and the responsibility – to ensure that it broadens further and nurtures and enriches these seas to become seas of clearest transparency” (Abe 2007). The vision of “confluence of the two seas” presented by Abe in 2007 evolved gradually, and by 2016, it had been transformed into an IndoPacific vision. The Indo-Pacific concept continues to evolve and has been endorsed in separate Indo-Pacific policies by major powers and groupings, including the USA, Australia, ASEAN, France, and Germany. One common factor in their Indo-Pacific strategies is that they are based on the values they espouse and their strategic interests in the region. This very aspect also found mention in Abe’s speech delivered during his visit to India. Abe noted that “we have rediscovered India as a partner that shares the same values and interests and also as a friend that will work alongside us to enrich the seas of freedom and prosperity, which will be open and transparent to all” (Abe 2007). Today, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries consisting of India, Japan, Australia, and the USA complement each other in the IndoPacific regional strategy by preserving an order based on the rule of law, democratic norms, transparency, and a free flow of goods and services. As the concept has gained traction in academia, a section of scholars believed that the Quad countries have recalibrated their efforts to preserve the postWorld War global order, with China trying to build an alternative order based on its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connecting Asia and Europe through road and port networks (He & Feng 2020). Interestingly, in his 2007 speech, Abe prophesied that the coming together of India and Japan will lead to the emergence of a “broader Asia.” According to him, “the region would evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely” (Abe 2007). The present Indo-Pacific visions unveiled by democracies and regional organizations have many similarities and have a striking resemblance with the blueprint of cooperation enunciated during Abe’s much-talked-about speech in the Indian Parliament. However, this new construct, which received attention following Abe’s speech, has not remained static. It continues to evolve. The Indo-Pacific concept is not limited to forging partnerships based on shared values and interests; strategic intent to contain China has also crept in over time and has received backlash from adversary and allies alike. Regarding India-Japan relations, it can be observed that from 2006 onwards, two clear trends in their bilateral relations have emerged: one focused on bilateral cooperation in the areas of mutual interests ranging from trade to maritime security and another on global partnership on value-based diplomacy and mutual interests. The present Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) put forward by Japan encompasses both these trends. This 125

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chapter, against this context, examines India-Japan relations from the IndoPacific perspective. It is divided into five major sections. Following the brief introduction, the first section traces the origin of the Indo-Pacific concept. The second section delves into the evolution of the concept, and the third section investigates India’s response to Japan’s FOIP. The fourth section analyzes various dimensions of the Indo-Pacific (ranging from military to infrastructure) with a particular focus on cooperation between India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region. The fifth section highlights the challenges the two countries are facing in implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy.

8.2  Tracing the Origin of the Indo-Pacific Concept As stated earlier, the Indo-Pacific concept gained traction in international relations following Abe’s speech “Confluence of the Two Seas.” Abe stated that this concept had been taken from Majma Al Bahrain (mingling of the two seas), the book written by Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh. While Dara Shikoh used Majma Al Bahrain to highlight the interface of Indian and Islamic cultures that originated along the Indian and Arab seas which had many commonalities, Abe used this concept as a geostrategic construct says Hiroshi Sato (2019), a retired professor and an expert on India-Japan relations. In the academic circle, however, the term “Indo-Pacific” was first used by an Indian naval expert Gurpreet Khurana in the context of IndiaJapan relations in an article published in Strategic Analysis in January 2007. This predates Abe’s speech made in the Indian Parliament the same year. Khurana (2007) defined the term “Indo-Pacific” as “the maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Littoral to it are the states of Asia (including West Asia/Middle East) and eastern Africa” (Khurana 2007). In the article, Khurana opined that sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific are vital for the economic security and prosperity of India and Japan. He asserted that “the maritime forces of India and Japan have a critical and effective role to play since they complement each other perfectly, in terms of both their capabilities and their area of operations” (Khurana 2007). However, Yoshihide Soyea (2020), a Japanese security expert, attributes the origin of the Indo-Pacific concept to Australian scholars. He writes, “Australian intellectuals were among the first (around 2010) to introduce the concept of Indo-Pacific and depicted it essentially as inclusive, embracing both China and India as the central causes of the Indian Oceans.” It is quite possible that Soeya may not have come across the writing of Indian naval expert Khurana who was the first in the strategic community to introduce the Indo-Pacific concept. Among the Japanese politicians, Taro Aso and Shinzo Abe had been at the forefront to pursue value-based diplomacy to forge rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific (Khan 2015a). There was a temporary derailment, however, in the process of forging the present Indo-Pacific construct, as both these leaders left the political scene. Abe resigned in 2007 because of his ill 126

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health. Subsequently, Aso could not lead the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to victory in the 2009 general elections. The Democratic Party of Japan which assumed power in 2009, did not have a grand strategic design. Instead, it adopted a “security stance ‘equidistant’ between the United States and China” (Snelder & Katz 2009).

8.3  Revival of Value-Based Diplomacy The idea of forging a rule-based order came back on Japan’s agenda when Abe regained power in 2012 snap elections held in December that year. A few days before assuming office, he envisaged the idea of a Democratic Security Diamond, identical to his “confluence of two seas concept.” In an article published by Project Syndicate, Abe stated that he is keen to invest Japan’s capabilities in this security diamond “to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific” (Abe 2012). Amid the rise of China, preserving the rule-based order built after World War II was one of the agendas of the Japanese foreign policy during the second term of Abe’s regime. However, Abe’s foreign policy focus remained on the Indo-Pacific region. In another opinion article, he argued, “[W]e must make the vast seas, stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, a zone of peace and freedom, where all adhere to the rule of law” (Abe 2015). It was evident from these remarks that Abe wanted to construct an “inclusive” Indo-Pacific amid the rise of China. However, he avoided naming China, fearing a backlash from the neighbor. However, strategic experts quickly interpreted that an anti-China bloc was in the making (Khan 2015a), though it was yet to be officially acknowledged as an Indo-Pacific construct. Abe used the term “Indo-Pacific” for the first time in 2016 during his address at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) conference (Hosoya 2019). Addressing the TICAD VI conference in Kenyatta, Abe said, Japan intends to promote peace and prosperity in the region as a whole by promoting the success of Asia, which could be called the leading part of the world, throughout the Middle East and Africa through free and open Indo-Pacific, extracting the latent power of the Middle East and Africa; in other words, by improving the connectivity of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. (Diplomatic Bluebook 2017; Abe 2016) Thereafter, the Indo-Pacific has continuously emerged in Japan’s foreign policy pronouncements and policy documents. The Japanese establishment presents it as “a new foreign policy strategy.” Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), in a document, presented the following argument in support of this strategy: 127

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The Indo-Pacific region is facing various challenges such as piracy, terrorism, a proliferation of WMD, natural disasters and attempts to change the status quo. Under such circumstances, Japan aims to promote peace, stability, and prosperity across the region to make the Indo-Pacific free and open as ‘international public goods’ through ensuring rules-based international order, including the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful settlement of disputes, and promotion of free trade. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017) Japan’s Indo-Pacific is based on the “two continents” and “two oceans” strategy. Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook elaborates that the “two continents”: Asia and Africa, and the “two oceans”: the free and open Pacific and the Indian Oceans, hold the key to stability and prosperity in the international community (Diplomatic Bluebook 2017). The two continents and two oceans strategy sounds very similar to China’s BRI or One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy announced in 2013. The BRI consists of a “Silk Road Economic Belt” which runs over land and connects China to Europe through Central Asia and a sea route that connects Chinese ports with ports in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the East Coast of Africa. Because of the striking similarity between China’s BRI and Japan’s “two continents” and “two oceans” strategy, Tokyo’s connectivity projects are viewed as a counter to Beijing’s connectivity projects by various strategic experts. And, this created a dilemma for various Asian countries vis-àvis Japan’s FOIP. A Japanese expert noted, “[I]f Japan’s initiative is seen as an attempt to isolate China in a broader regional framework of the IndoPacific, a majority of Asian countries would hesitate to participate in that initiative, as China is their largest trading partner” (Hosoya 2019). Among the Japanese strategic partners, India was among the first to voice concern that while it was ready to “work with everyone,” it does not want to “return to the age of great power rivalries” (MEA India 2018). This was clearly stated by Indian Prime Minister Narender Modi during his Shangri-La Dialogue. India’s response has been discussed in detail in a separate section in this chapter.

8.4  Indo-Pacific: From Strategy to Vision Japan was already facing a dilemma over the joining of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), spearheaded by China and a major financer of the China-led infrastructures, including BRI. Various political parties within Japan and business lobbies were in favor of joining AIIB, hoping that it will pave the way for Japanese companies to participate in infrastructure projects leading to economic benefits for the companies and the country. The Abe administration, however, decided not to join the China-led Bank in concert with its security ally the USA, which saw 128

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the AIIB as a rival to western led financial institutions (Khan 2015b). The Japanese domestic constituencies viewed it “as a missed opportunity for Japan” (Khan 2015b). Since the domestic demand within the country for infrastructure projects has already saturated, not joining the AIIB and the BRI was indeed a missed opportunity. Abe did a course correction by announcing a four-point condition paving the way for Japanese companies to join individual infrastructure projects overseas including in BRI. The four-point conditions announced in June 2017 are a) infrastructure projects be open to use by all; b) The projects be developed through procurement that is transparent and fair; c) The projects be economically viable; and d) the projects be financed by debt that can be repaid without harming the recipient country’s financial health. (Abe 2017a; Kitaoka 2019) With reference to the BRI, which was then termed “One Belt One Road,” Abe stated, “[T]he ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative holds the potential to connect East and West as well as the diverse regions found in between” (Abe 2017a). He further noted that “there is a frame of thinking that is widely shared across the international community” (Abe 2017a ). He hoped that OBOR/BRI “will fully incorporate such a common frame of thinking” adding that “Japan is ready to extend cooperation from this perspective” (Abe 2017a). China had a “favorable” reaction (Kitaoka 2019) to Japan’s changing stance vis-à-vis the participation in the BRI. A section of Japanese strategic thinkers was also concerned about the media’s articulations about Japan’s FOIP, especially terming it as “strategy.” For example, Shinichi Kitaoka (2019) observed that the FOIP “vision is not a strategy.” He stated that it is a “guiding principle” for implementing Japan’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. For the survival and development of Japan, a FOIP is absolutely necessary, Kitaoka (2019) noted. Akihiko Tanaka (2018), similarly noted that “it is short sighted” to conceive FOIP as a strategy to counter China’s BRI, noting that FOIP “reflects the long-term development of the global economy.” Amid these developments, Japan allayed the concerns that its FOIP is a China containment strategy during the Japan-China CEO Summit meeting held in December 2017 in Tokyo. Abe delivered a speech at the Summit, stating that under the FOIP, “Japan can cooperate significantly with China which has put forward the One Belt, One Road initiative” (Abe 2017b). In the same meeting, Japan reiterated the “third country” partnership with China stating that the two countries will “work together to develop business in countries other than Japan and China.” Abe noted, “President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang and I were able to reach a shared understanding regarding this” (Abe 2017b). And, following Abe’s visit to Beijing 129

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and meeting with Xi Jinping, the term “strategy” from the “FOIP” is conspicuously missing. There are various interpretations of why Japan dropped the term “strategy” and replaced it with “vision.” However, the most convincing explanation has been given by Shinichi Kitaoka (2019). During the Trump administration, US officials adopted aggressive language in their remarks against China, and the analysts termed these as “portent of New Cold War” (Perlez 2018). Japanese expert Kitaoka (2019) believes that the “confrontational tone [of the US senior officials in Trump administration] was severe.” He further notes that “in order to counter China’s expansion, cooperation with the United States is absolutely necessary. However, it is desirable to avoid unnecessary confrontation.” He observed, “President Trump comes from the business world. It is not implausible that he might suddenly join hands with China, if it appears profitable.” His suggestion to the Japanese administration against this context was to “prepare for such a possibility.” Kitaoka (2019) further noted that “conditional cooperation with Belt and Road Initiative is also desirable.” He expected a quid pro quo from China, hoping that Beijing will “support the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.” In short, to avoid entrapment in the China-US confrontation as well as to prepare for a possible “Trump shock” (Trump joining hands with China after saber rattling), Tokyo changed the nomenclature of its FOIP. Now, instead of using FOIP as a strategy, Japan is using FOIP as a vision in its policy documents. Nonetheless, the change in the nomenclature has helped Japan assuage India’s as well as ASEAN’s concerns, neither of whom wanted to join an anti-China containment strategy.

8.5  India’s Response to Japan’s FOIP On the issue of Indo-Pacific, New Delhi initially did not show much enthusiasm and was not as proactive. It believed, however, that its foreign policy should aim at creating a conducive “global environment” for the country and its people, which is a core principle of Japan’s present FOIP. During the 2006 visit, the Indian prime minister did not comment on Aso’s “value-based diplomacy.” By not committing to Japan’s idea of a broader Asia, India, it seems, wanted to maintain its “strategic autonomy” and to dispel the perception that its strategic ties with Japan are not aimed at containing China (Khan 2017). Slowly but steadily, Indian leadership also seemed to align New Delhi’s foreign policy with Japan’s in the changing global order. For example, the then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh stated that India is “prepared to work with the international community to create a global economic and security environment beneficial to all nations” (MEA 2013b). He noted, without mentioning Japan, that India seeks “stable, long term and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers” (MEA 2013b). After continuous nudging from its counterparts, the Indian prime minister did acknowledge the importance of the Indo-Pacific for the first time in 2013. Addressing the India-Japan Parliamentary Friendship League gathering, 130

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Manmohan Singh stated, “the Indo-Pacific region is witnessing profound social and economic changes on a scale and at speed rarely seen in human history” (MEA India 2013a). Singh described India and Japan as the “major actors in this region” (MEA India 2013a) and suggested three areas of cooperation between the two Asian democracies. First, strengthen regional mechanisms for a consultation to address common challenges. Second, promote regional economic integration and enhance connectivity, and third, maritime security across the linked regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans is essential for regional and global prosperity (MEA India 2013a). The three aforementioned areas of cooperation have many similarities with the Japanese vision of the Indo-Pacific. However, it was not a complete endorsement of the Japanese Indo-Pacific strategy. The three areas of cooperation were largely bilateral and hinted that India was not eager to expand the India-Japan bilateral maritime cooperation to a multilateral arrangement (Khan 2019). With the change of government in New Delhi, it was expected that India would align with Japan in creating regional order more actively. However, India’s response to Japan’s FOIP remained ambivalent during Prime Minister Modi’s policy pronouncement vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. Prime minister of India, Modi, in the Shangri-La Dialogue stated, India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. Furthermore, by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be. India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific Region is, therefore, a positive one. And, it has many elements. (MEA India 2018) Modi’s remarks have been interpreted as India’s hesitation in fully endorsing a Japanese version of the Indo-Pacific in a section of Tokyo’s strategic circles (Horimoto 2018, 2020). While India officially has not revisited its position toward the Indo-Pacific vision, there is greater enthusiasm in New Delhi’s strategic circles vis-à-vis Indo-Pacific and the Quad as a hedging strategy against an assertive China, especially after clashes between Chinese and Indian border security forces in Depsang (in 2013), Doklam (in 2017), and most recently in Galwan Valley (2020 onwards). India has participated in the Quad, which was elevated to a summit-level dialogue in March 2021. India has committed to cooperating with the USA, Australia, and Japan for securing freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. After the March 2021 Quad meeting, Prime Minister Modi has been quoted as saying that the Quad has “come of age.” “It will now remain an important pillar of stability in the region” (Rud 2021). Moreover, at the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum on the sidelines of the Quad 2022 meeting in Tokyo, the Indian prime minister “expressed India’s commitment towards working 131

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with all Indo-Pacific countries for an IPEF” (MEA India 2022). This is a testimony that India is fully committed to realizing the objective of the Indo-Pacific strategy, even though it has not released its own Indo-Pacific vision document as other partners have done.

8.6  Many Dimensions in the Indo-Pacific Region: India and Japan Engagement As the Indo-Pacific strategy continues to evolve, it is not easy to conclude its objective. A group of scholars believes “Japan’s FOIP Strategy is in part directed to counter the rise of China and influence of China through values-based diplomacy” (Lindgren 2019). The Indo-Pacific got a new impetus when the USA, France, and the United Kingdom announced their Indo-Pacific strategy, complementing Japan’s FOIP. The Indo-Pacific doctrines remain ambiguous and vague. However, from the statements, media briefings, and joint statements, it can be deduced that it has three broader dimensions: defense and military, trade and economics, and infrastructure. All three strands of the Indo-Pacific strategy discussed in the following sections have some elements to hedge China. 8.6.1  Defense and Military Dimension The prevailing view in academia and policy circles is that the strategic objective of the Indo-Pacific is clearly aimed at counterbalancing China, especially after the rise of China (Hosoya 2019; Koga 2020). While there is no uniformity of views on how to tackle the rise of China among the various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, the Quad members are firming up their strategies to meet any possible challenges to their security posed by China’s expansionism. To reiterate here, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as Quad in common security parlance and dubbed the Asian NATO in Chinese strategic circles, was launched at the initiative of Shinzo Abe during his first term in office in 2007. However, before it could take a definitive shape, the idea was aborted amid China’s concerns, which termed the initiative China’s encirclement. Change of leadership in Australia and Japan also acted as a dampener in the initiative. But with a changing security scenario, where China has shown assertiveness on the territorial issues with Japan and India on the one hand and with Australia on the issue of trade, the Asian democracies have joined hands to tackle the China challenge. Moreover, while the USA worries that China will replace it as a global leader and has security partnerships with at least two countries – Australia and Japan – it considers the Quad one of the platforms to suit its national security interest to keep China in check. Keeping these broader security interests, the Quad was revived in 2017. Parallel to the evolution of the Quad, India has gained prominence in Japanese strategic thinking. Japan started recognizing India among the 132

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countries that are “primary drivers” of change in the global “balance of power” (MOFA 2013). Given Japan’s fixation on the USA for its security, this can be considered a significant change in Japanese strategic thinking. As a result of changing strategic thinking, Japan has expressed a willingness to “strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as the joint implementation of international peace cooperation activities” (MOD Japan 2014). Going a step ahead, Japan’s National Security Strategy noted, “India is becoming increasingly influential” in the international community, and because of its “geographic location,” it remains “important for Japan” (National Security Strategy 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that India remains an important partner in Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision and the Quad. India and Japan have constituted an annual Maritime Affairs Dialogue at the bilateral level that looks at bilateral naval cooperation. In addition, it signed the Acquisition of Cross Services Agreement in 2020 which will increase the interoperability of Japanese and Indian security forces during disaster relief work as well as during international peacekeeping operations. At the same time, India has also enhanced its bilateral security and defense relationship with the other two members of the Quad, Australia and the USA. To deepen engagement in the Indo-Pacific, the four countries have held various informal meetings. Initially, they had divergent views and interests in the Indo-Pacific region, which is reflected in the fact that Quad members issued separate statements instead of a joint statement following the Quad meetings. Finally, during the Quad meeting in October 2020 in Tokyo, they decided to give a formal shape to this consultative meeting. Following the first summit-level meeting in March 2021, held virtually because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Quad members issued a joint statement stating their commitment to promote “a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond” (MEA 2021). More importantly, the Quad members have expressed commitment to begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the members will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and facilitate collaboration, including maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas. (MEA 2021) As members have given the grouping a formal shape, Quad is also broadening its agenda. The 2022 Quad joint statement states, 133

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We strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, and freedom of navigation and overflight, all of which are essential to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and to the world. We will continue to act decisively together to advance these principles in the region and beyond. We reaffirm our resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion. (MOFA Japan 2022) The Quad has incorporated the security concerns and interests of all the member countries, which is evident from the May 2022 joint statement issued in Tokyo. For example, when the joint statement states that the Quad will champion “the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight, to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas,” it clearly reflects the national security concerns of Japan, especially after China’s assertion of sovereignty claims on Senkaku (known as Diaoyu in China) Islands presently under Japan’s effective administration. Following the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by Japan in 2012, China has enforced its Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea, incorporating Senkaku Islands, and to further assert its sovereignty, it has been sending Chinese fishermen and allowed its companies to extract resources, including natural gas in the disputed maritime waters in the East China Sea. To this effect, the Quad joint statement notes, We strongly oppose any coercive, provocative or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo and increase tensions in the area, such as the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore resource exploitation activities. (MOFA Japan 2022) Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees by North Korea, and halt of Pyongyang’s ballistic missile tests have also found mention in the joint statement. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s long-range missile tests, is also a security concern for the USA and Australia. Similarly, when the Quad joint statement denounces “financial or military support to terrorist groups” and condemns “terrorist attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks,” it clearly reflects India’s security concerns. And when the statement demands that “Afghan territory must never again be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train

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terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks,” it incorporates USA’s and India’s security concerns. As the Quad takes formal shape, the obvious but unstated objective seems to make this grouping a consultative mechanism to realize the strategies of the “FOIP.” The joint statements of Quad 2021 and 2022 suggest that all four countries are on the same page to maintain a USA-led international liberal order which they believe is being challenged by China’s efforts to build an alternative Sino-centric world order. At the operational level, the leading democracies have revived the Malabar naval exercise with an apparent aim to keep the sea lanes of communication free and open so that the flow of trade takes place without interventions from both state and non-state actors. Malabar, situated at the confluence of the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean, is strategically important for the passage of merchant and naval vassals. The exercise continued in a trilateral setup with participation from the Indian, Japanese, and American Navies after Australia opted out of the Quadrilateral naval exercise in 2007. However, after a hiatus of thirteen years, Australia rejoined the Malabar exercise in 2020. Regarding the importance of the revival of the Naval Quad, one of the observers notes that the strategic motivation is to strengthen a collective response to one state’s unilateral actions that are detrimental to good order and stability in the region. From encroachment and militarization of features in the South China Sea to its increased naval presence in proximity of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the growing provocations of its fishing militia across the region, China’s actions in the maritime IndoPacific have not been adequately or effectively countered. (Gopal 2020) As of 2020, the Malabar naval exercise took place in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Now, the four navies have included Guam as a new theater in the Western Pacific in 2021 (The Hindu 2021) with an apparent aim to strengthen its reach beyond the traditional theater. To further strengthen the Quad and increase its outreach, strategic experts are advocating for a Quad plus arrangement with the possible inclusion of New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which will “allow Tokyo to gain on an economic, military and diplomatic scale through greater consensus-building exercises vis-a-vis China” (Panda 2020). Another strategic expert believes that some democratic countries have reservations about joining the Quad plus framework, but Tokyo must strive for it. He notes, “[I]f a new member for the Quad is not forthcoming in the near future, patience and consistency are still required to bear fruit. Until then, we must keep the Quad united” (Miyake 2020).

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Concurrently, the institutionalization of the Quad is also being proposed. Strategic experts are of the view that the Quad states must “invest in capability development efforts to create multi-layered networks,” and they must build a sustained “stronger Indo-Pacific intellectual chorus challenging authoritarian and unilateral ideals and initiatives.” They suggest building a defense university in the region with joint investment by Quad countries to boost an institutionalization process. They state that “an attempt to institutionalize the Quad must be drawn on a practical and soft security framework that can gradually transform into cohesive security (and, perhaps subsequently, a military) unit, shaped by the changing political situation” (Panda & Nishida 2021). 8.6.2  Trade and Economic Dimension Another emerging strand of the Indo-Pacific is focused on a geo-economic strategy aimed at countering China’s growing economic clout in Asia and beyond. This strategy, which seeks China’s economic isolation, stems from the assumption that China has financially benefited from the post-War liberal economic order created by the West after joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 but has not democratized itself as expected by the West. Rather than strengthening the existing liberal order, China is trying to change it through its military modernization and naval expansion as well as creating alternative institutions. This has resulted in reviewing of the USA’s China engagement strategy. The new US strategy is aimed at “curbing” some of China’s “economic clout” (Schneider 2012). As part of the pivot to Asia, also known as “rebalance to Asia,” an earlier version of the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Washington embarked on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was an economic strand of the Pivot to Asia. Under the Obama administration, the USA tried to “build an economic bloc that would virtually encircle China with the US economic allies” (Schneider 2012). The TPP aimed at a minimal-tariff preferential trade agreement complying with high standards in terms of goods and services and safeguarding human rights domestically for the member countries. It will be difficult for China to meet these high standards. It was believed that the TPP would spur intra-regional trade among the member countries, leading to economic isolation for Beijing. A section of Japanese strategic thinkers also pushed for the country to join the TPP considering its “significance for counter-China strategy” (Takubo 2011). A twelve-member TPP was signed in 2015 during the final year of the second term of the Obama administration. Japan, along with leading ASEAN economies, also joined the TPP. While signing the TPP, Obama observed, “[W]e can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets to American products while setting high standards for protecting workers and preserving our environment” (The White House 2015). However, before it could take off, the Trump administration withdrew from the Treaty, 136

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fulfilling his campaign pledge citing that the cost of the Treaty outweighs the benefits for the USA. The TPP, however, has survived, and now it is spearheaded by Japan. It has been transformed into the Comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership and was boosted when the United Kingdom joined it but remains less significant without US participation. Individually also, the countries in the region have made attempts to ease dependence on China. India, on its part, signed various Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA), including with Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, etc. As a result of the PTAs, the tariffs on goods traded between the member countries were slashed, leading to an increase in bilateral trade. However, similar preferential treatment has not been extended to China by India, citing the trade balance heavily in favor of China. Japan also devised strategies to ease its overdependence on China starting with the China+1 strategy by shifting some of its production bases outside China. At the same time, the Japanese government started slashing corporate taxes to encourage Japanese companies to relocate their production within Japan. However, these efforts bore little fruit in easing the dependence on China. The supply chain disruption post-COVID-19, with an epicenter in China, provided a pretext for the Japanese government to announce subsidies for companies intending to shift their production outside China. The government announced USD 2.2 billion for its companies outside China. Initially, it was earmarked for companies eager to locate to Southeast Asian countries; later, India and Bangladesh have also been added to the list. However, the initiative by the leading democracies to build an alternative supply chain independent of China, post-COVID-19, has caught attention as it is also a geo-economic strategy to counter China. Amid the pandemic, Japan, Australia, and India announced the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) consisting of three members of the Quad with the conspicuous absence of the USA. It seems the USA has propped up the three countries to take the leading role so that this initiative is not seen as another economic Quad to contain China. Nonetheless, the USA has also been saying that its high-tech sector, including semiconductor producers based in China, is vulnerable to Intellectual Property theft. Therefore, it has been mulling a diversification strategy to ease its over-reliance on China (Liu, Ly, Sieg & Simanin 2020). A section of analysts view the SCRI as a by-product of the IndoPacific strategy and argues that it could “potentially refashion supply chains in the Indo-Pacific” (Palit 2020). The proposed SCRI “Japan will contribute its manufacturing technology, Australia its abundant natural resources and India its information technology experts to help enhance industrial competitiveness” (Mainichi Japan 2020a). India has “wholeheartedly endorsed the broad concept of working towards ensuring a trustworthy, dependable and reliable supply chain in the Indo-Pacific region” (Press Information Bureau, India 2020). Notably, the SCRI wants to incorporate ASEAN, which is the central focus of the Indo-Pacific, into this geo-economic alliance. However, questions have been raised about the viability of such an initiative based on 137

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geostrategic factors, which ignore the cost efficiency that determines the growth of supply chains. One of the Japanese experts argues that “diversification and localization of their global output bases should not be promoted if it could end up impairing the companies’ cost advantages” (Mainichi Japan 2020b). As Japan is contemplating geo-economic strategy to counter China’s economic dominance in the region, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has thrown another challenge for the country. While RCEP the ASEAN-centered Free Trade Agreement (FTA), of which Japan is a member, provides opportunities for the country, China’s presence has overshadowed Japan. It is obvious that China (having USD 13.6 trillion gross domestic product (GDP)) will gain more benefits than Japan ($5.0 trillion GDP) as the FTA incentivizes supply chains across the region. Observers believe that “if RCEP spurs mutually beneficial growth, its members, including China, will gain influence across the world” (Petri & Plummer 2020). Against the backdrop, Japan and Australia are urging India (which has opted out from the FTA) “to come back to the RCEP as they believe that New Delhi’s return to RCEP would contribute to strengthening the Australia-India-Japan security network vis-à-vis the rising Chinese military presence in the Indo-Pacific region” (Akimoto 2021). India, however, has not shown keenness to rejoin the RCEP. But, it has been quite receptive to the idea of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) for Prosperity launched in Tokyo following the Quad Summit meeting on May 24, 2022. The IPEF, apart from the four Quad members, has thirteen members including seven ASEAN members: Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Brunei. South Korea and New Zealand, USA’s security allies, also joined as founding members of the IPEF. Initially, the IPEF will consist of four pillars “fair and resilient trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure and clean energy as well as tax and ant-corruption.” The member countries will start negotiations on these pillars. According to the joint statement issued by the participating countries, the objective of the IPEF is “to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for our economies” (The White House 2022a). It further adds that the forum “aims to contribute to cooperation, stability, prosperity, development, and peace” (The White House 2022a) in the Indo-Pacific region. Prior to the launch of the IPEF, the US Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo in a press briefing stated that the IPEF presents “an alternative to China” for the Indo-Pacific countries on “critical issues” that the region is grappling with (The White House 2022b). Because of these statements, some observers see IPEF as a political tool of the USA and as a means to “counter China’s economic clout in the Indo-Pacific” (Kang 2022). Prior to the IPEF, the USA’s Indo-Pacific strategy relied heavily on the military component. “[W]ith the IPEF the USA would finally complete its Indo-Pacific strategy by striking a balance between military and economic components” (Kang 2022). Similarly, Mahathir Muhammad 138

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believes that the IPEF is a “political” tool to “exclude” China. Even though Kualalampur has joined the IPEF, the veteran Malaysian politician has stated that the IPEF is “meant to exclude and contest against China. It is very much political” (NHK 2022). Indian Strategic expert Shyam Saran (2022), however, believes that it is not aimed at containing China. He opines that the Quad and IPEF may not be aimed explicitly at the strategic containment of China but clearly seek to offer a credible alternative to a Chinese dominant Asian order. The idea is to offer an alternative set of security and economic arrangements which may expand the room for manouevre for Indo-Pacific countries vis-a vis China. (Saran 2022) As regards India’s official response, it has expressed its commitment to the IPEF believing that “deepening economic engagement among partners is crucial for continued growth, peace, and prosperity.” New Delhi has expressed keenness “to collaborate with partner countries under the IPEF and work towards advancing regional economic connectivity, integration and boosting trade and investment within the region” (MEA India 2022). Opinion, however, is divided in Indian economic communities about IPEF’s utility for the country. One set of experts sees it as an opportunity while other see it as a cause of “concern” for India. For example, Pralok Gupta (2022) views IPEF as an enabler to “enhance India’s economic engagement,” which was dented after New Delhi’s withdrawal from the RCEP (Gupta 2022). On the other hand, a group of economic experts, including Biswajit Dhar, believes that it will increase the friction between India and the USA, especially when the negotiations on the four pillars of the IPEF will begin. The Business Standard, India’s leading economic daily, has stated that India and the USA are at odds on the “fair and resilient trade,” as they have “contrasting views on digital commerce, labor, and environmental standards” (Business Standards 2022). Some experts see IPEF as a revised form of TPP, signed by the Obama administration. The Trump administration withdrew USA’s participation from this FTA. While the TPP offered tariff elimination and market access to member countries, the IPEF does not offer such incentives. A group of observers believes that “Washington’s unwillingness to provide market access incentives could make the IPEF a non-starter in regional capital” (Arasingham and Benson 2022). Given the fact that SCRI and IPEF initiatives are still in a state of flux, it is too early to speculate on the effectiveness of anti-China geo-economic strategy. However, the SCRI and IPEF have added new dimensions to the Indo-Pacific strategy. 8.6.3  Infrastructure Dimension In Asia, Japan has maintained its supremacy and funded various infrastructure projects within the region through Official Development Assistance 139

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and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), where Japan is a major shareholder. These infrastructure projects, in turn, have helped increase Japan’s political clout in the recipient countries. However, the situation started changing when China replaced Japan in 2010 as the number one economy in Asia, and Japan-led ADB could no longer finance the increasing demand for infrastructure in the region. As per an estimate of the ADB, “developing Asia will need to invest USD 1.7 trillion per year in infrastructure until 2030 to maintain its growth momentum, tackle poverty, and respond to climate” (Asian Development Bank 2017). It is evident that Japan alone could not foot all the infrastructure bills, and China was keen to fill the vacuum. Apart from the BRI, China has undertaken various mega projects in the Asian region, outplacing Japan. Japan, for its part, announced a partnership in quality infrastructure to compete with China; however, it could not yield the expected results. Finally, Japan has given a renewed push to undertake infrastructure projects under its FOIP strategy, announcing that over seventy percent of its aid will go to the Indo-Pacific region, and India will continue to be the largest recipient (Nikkei Asian Review 2018). As mentioned previously, the Japan FOIP is based on “two oceans”: the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and “two continents”: Asia and Africa. Japan is prioritizing various infrastructure projects in these regions, partnering with India and other like-minded countries. India has agreed to “align Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy with India’s Act East Policy, including enhancing maritime security cooperation and improving connectivity in the wider Indo-Pacific region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The impact of India-Japan cooperation in infrastructure is visible in India as the work on a high-speed rail project linking Mumbai to Ahmedabad is in progress. A Delhi-Mumbai industrial project is also underway. In addition, a northeast connectivity improvement project is underway in the northeast region, which will establish connectivity with ASEAN, a key area of interest for Japan (Lindgren 2019). Apart from the northeast connectivity improvement project, India and Japan have unveiled a plan to build a network of road, rail, and port links along the Bay of Bengal. Observers believe that “the project is designed to increase connectivity between South and Southeast Asia and in the process, counter the links China is attempting to establish between North and South Asia” (Pant 2019). The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is yet another area of IndiaJapan cooperation in the infrastructure sector in the Indo-Pacific region. Unveiled in 2016, the project envisages a “people-centric sustainable growth strategy” that “will be raised on four pillars of development and Cooperation Projects, Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity, Enhancing Capacities and Skills and People-to-People partnership.” Indian think-tank, the Research and Information System notes that “this would be undertaken to improve growth and interconnectedness between and within Asia and Africa for realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific region” (Research and Information System for Developing Countries 2017). At the leadership 140

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level, a commitment was made between the two prime ministers of Japan and India to “explore the development of industrial corridors and industrial network for the growth of Asia and Africa, which will benefit various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region including Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). However, little progress has been made on the AAGC front. “It seems enthusiasm in both the governments vis-a-vis the AAGC is on the wane” (Khan 2019). Both India and Japan are overstretched on different infrastructure fronts, and COVID-19 has adversely impacted their economic growth. The infrastructure push in the Indo-Pacific region got a major boost with the announcements of Build Back Better World (B3W), as well as the Blue Dot Network (BDN). These two infrastructure projects were announced parallelly by the developed world spearheaded by the USA. While B3W has been endorsed by the G7, the BDN is a flagship project of thirty-eight member Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. B3W has been defined as “the bold new global infrastructure initiative” and will be “a values-driven, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure partnership led by major democracies to help narrow the [US] Dollar 40+ trillion infrastructure need in the developing world, which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic” (The White House 2021). The B3W is being viewed as a “counter to China” (Meek 2021) by a group of experts. As regards the BDN, the vision statement by the US Department of State claims that the BDN “aims to promote quality infrastructure investment that is open and inclusive, transparent, economically viable, Paris Agreement aligned, financially, environmentally and socially sustainable, and compliant with international standards, and laws and regulations.” The BDN is seen as an “alternative” to China’s BRI and is “pitting countries promoting the liberal order against the Chinese authoritarian order” (Sundararaman 2021). While the China-led BRI has reached an advanced stage and some of its projects have already been completed, B3W and BDN remain at the inception stage. However, the blueprints of these projects suggest that the USA, in concert with the leading economies, is keen to invest big in the Indo-Pacific region to overtake China’s infrastructure plans.

8.7  Issues and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific As mentioned previously, following Japan’s FOIP doctrine, many leading democracies have announced their own Indo-Pacific visions. This is an indicator of the fact that FOIP is a reality and not merely a pipe dream. However, the FOIP continues to face many challenges. The very first challenge is the divergence in views about the Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US and Australian Indo-Pacific strategy is heavily oriented toward security and defense, Japan’s strategy is focused on securing its economic interests. India is yet to unveil a detailed Indo-Pacific strategy document as has been 141

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done by its other three counterparts in the Quadrilateral Security Initiative. However, through the policy statements released by India, as discussed in the previous section, its Indo-Pacific strategy seems largely inclusive. Containing or hedging China is missing in its policy, and thus it differs from the other three counterparts who are the main drivers of the Indo-Pacific. The divergence of views on the Indo-Pacific construct is not only among the members of the Quad but also among the various partners and democratic allies of Japan and the USA. Various ASEAN members and South Korea have shown hesitance in embracing this strategy. This is largely because China continues to remain their largest trading partner. This suggests that while common values bind the democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific region together, their interests differ, especially on the issue of isolating China. This, therefore, is the biggest challenge in implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy. In almost all the Indo-Pacific visions unveiled by the democracies and regional powers, ASEAN remains at the center of the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, bringing the ASEAN on board over the issue of FOIP remains the next big challenge. Some ASEAN members believe that the revitalized Quad, now spearheaded by the USA, would “diplomatically marginalize ASEAN” (Koga 2020). Apart from losing the diplomatic clout within the region, the ASEAN members are reluctant to embrace the Japanese or the US Indo-Pacific vision because of their economic interdependence with China. A study by Japan External Trade Organization suggests that the volume of trade between China and ASEAN continued to grow, reaching USD 557.4 billion in 2018 (Suzuki 2020). At the same time, China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea poses a security challenge for some of the littoral states in the ASEAN region. Thus, on the one hand, a section of the ASEAN states welcomes the USA’s presence in the region, on the other hand, they face the dilemma of whether to be part of the Indo-Pacific strategy that seeks to alienate China. The third challenge the Indo-Pacific strategy faces is how to overcome China’s “wedging strategy.” Initially, when Quad was being revived in 2017, China termed it “a headline-grabbing idea” and equated it with “seafoam” in the ocean which will “soon dissipate.” However, now as it has been formalized with summit-level meetings, China sees it as a “start of a new Cold War.” The Chinese president denounced the effort to use the Quad as “multilateralism as a pretext to form cliques or stir up ideological confrontation” (Rud 2021). Now, China has embarked on a “wedging strategy” (Rud 2021). While it has taken strong economic measures against Australia by imposing restrictions on imports of various Australian products, it is keen to repair relations with Japan. The Chinese president was keen to meet Abe’s successor Yoshihide Suga (which could not take place due to the COVID-19 pandemic) to improve ties with Japan and agreed to pull back troops from the areas where the security forces of both countries were engaged in recurring clashes (Rud 2021). Moreover, it has redoubled its efforts to enhance further its military and strategic partnership with Russia 142

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as a possible counter to a Quad which steers the Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at isolating China. Finally, the three dimensions of the Indo-Pacific: strategy- and military-centered around the Quad, alternative supply chain, and quality infrastructure projects, would need heavy financial investment. Post-COVID-19, the economies of the Quad countries that spearhead the Indo-Pacific strategy have been affected adversely. Among them, India and Japan have an enormous responsibility to fulfill the poll promises to uplift the lifestyle of the people. While Japan has the responsibility to maintain a health infrastructure and welfare system for its aging population, India needs to increase its health infrastructure as well as provide jobs to its youth with the limited budget they have. On the other hand, China continues its infrastructure push through BRI. It is yet to be seen how the democratic nations will strike a balance between their domestic priorities to fulfill the “social contracts” and strategic aspirations to hedge China with the budgetary constraints they face in the post-COVID-19 world. It is yet to be seen how the countries driving the Indo-Pacific strategy will overcome these challenges.

8.8 Conclusion While delivering the speech “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in 2006, which hinted at a change of course in Japanese foreign policy, Taro Aso told his audience that his thinking might sound like “a pipe dream.” He further added that “every true vision starts out sounding like a pipe dream” (Aso 2006). True to his speculations, Japan’s “arc of freedom and prosperity vision” has transformed over the years and has taken firm shape in the form of the FOIP vision. Shinzo Abe invested his political and financial capital into it to give it firm shape and his successor Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida have carried forward Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy. As the analysis in this chapter suggests, the Indo-Pacific concept continues to evolve, and particularly Japan is amenable to changing it, reflecting the concerns of partners and adversaries alike. By dropping the term “strategy” in its FOIP and changing it into a vision, Japan has paved the way for India’s greater participation in it. Notably, when Japan unveiled its FOIP strategy, India responded that it has no intention to “return to the age of great power rivalries.” At present, India and Japan remain important drivers of the Indo-Pacific vision and are firming up their partnership in the fields of infrastructure, security, and defense, as well as trade. Because of the complementarities Japan and India have, their partnership can be an enabler in realizing the Indo-Pacific vision. It must be noted that China gained a foothold in the infrastructure business as democratic countries could not fulfill the growing demand for infrastructure in the developing countries and many of them entered into a “debt trap” because of China’s aid policy. Moreover, both India and Japan have no hegemonic ambitions in their aid policies. Their development and 143

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infrastructure projects in Asian and African countries have been appreciated by the recipient countries. India has done lots of personal training providing technical and vocational training to youths of Asian and African countries. On the other hand, Japan and its agencies have undertaken both personal training and infrastructure developments in the developing countries. Therefore, both already have expertise in these fields. While Japan has technology and capital, India has manpower and expertise to execute and implement the projects. If both, India and Japan pool their resources and jointly provide nation-building support with a particular focus on the IndoPacific region, the recipient countries will have a better alternative to China. Thus India-Japan cooperation will, on the one hand, be able to hedge China, and on the other hand, will help make the Indo-Pacific a prosperous region.

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Liu, J., Ly, J., Sieg, M. & Simanin, I. (2020, August 21). US Investment in Southeast Asia and Decoupling from China. The Diplomat. Retrieved at https://thediplomat. com/2020/08/us-investment-in-southeast-asia-and-decoupling-from-china/ (August 17, 2021). Mainichi Japan. (2020a, September 1). Japan, Australia, India Beefing Up Supply Chains Amid Pandemic. Mainichi Japan (2020b, May 3). Japan to Help Shift Output to ASEAN from China after virus Disruption. MEA (2013a). Highlights of Prime Minister’s Address at the Annual Conclave of Indian Ambassadors/High Commissioners Abroad in New Delhi,” November 4. Retrieved at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/22428/Highlights+of+Prime+Ministers+address+at+the+Annual+ Conclave+of+Indian+Ambass (August 4, 2021). MEA (2013b). Prime Minister’s address to Japan-India Association, JapanIndia Parliamentary Friendship League and International Friendship Exchange Council, May 28. Retrieved at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/21754/Prime+Ministers (August 16, 2021). MEA (2021). Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’, March 12. Retrieved at https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33620/ Quad+Leaders+Joint+Statement+The+Spirit+of+the+Quad (August 4, 2021). MEA India. (2018). Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue. Retrieved at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+ Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018 (August 16, 2021). MEA India. (2022, May 23). [Indian] Prime Minister Participates in Event to Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. Retrieved at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35345/Prime+Minister+participates+ in+event+to+launch+the+IndoPacific+Economic+Framework+for+Prosperity#: ~:text=Prime%20Minister%20Shri%20Narendra%20Modi,Joseph%20R (July 20, 2022). Meek, W.G. (2021). The Build Back Better World Partnership Could Finally Break the Belt and Road. Foreign Policy, Retrieved at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/28/ the-build-back-better-world-partnership-could-finally-break-the-belt-and-road/ (August 17, 2021). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017). Free and Indo-Pacific. Retrieved at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf (August 16, 2021). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2018). India-Japan Joint Statement: Towards a free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific. Retrieved at https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/100002878.pdf (August 12, 2021). Miyake, K. (2020, October 7). The Quad Security Dialogue in Tokyo: Who Will Join Next? The Japan Times MOD Japan. (2014). National Defence Programmes Guidelines for 2014 and beyond (Summary). Government of Japan, p. 24. MOFA Japan. (2022, May 24). Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Retrieved at https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html (July 21, 2022). National Security Strategy [of Japan]. (2013). Retrieved at http://japan.kantei. go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf (August 16, 2021).

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NHK. (2022, July 11). Ex-Malaysian PM Mahathir Says US Wants to Exclude China. Retrieved at https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/2048/ (July 20, 2022). Nikkei Asian Review. (2018, August 15). Japan Shifts the Focus of Its Development Assistance to Indo-Pacific. Palit, A. (2020, September 10). The Resilient Supply Chain Initiative: Reshaping Economics Through Geopolitics. The Diplomat. Retrieved at https://thediplomat. com/2020/09/the-resilient-supply-chain-initiative-reshaping-economics-throughgeopolitics/ (August 17, 2021). Panda, J. (2020, July 17). The Abe Doctrine on ‘Quad Plus’, The Japan Times. Panda, J. & Nishida, I. (2021). The Quad’s Future Is Tied to Soft Security, PacNet, Pacific Forum, Honolulu. Pant, H. (2019). India, BRI and Delhi’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. In John Hemmings (Ed.), Infrastructure, Ideas, and Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. London: Asia Studies Centre, Henry Jackson Society. Perlez, J. (2018, October 5). Pence’s China Speech Seen as Portent of ‘New Cold War’. New York Times. Retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/ world/asia/pence-china-speech-cold-war.html (August 30, 2021). Petri, P. & Plummer, M. (2020, November 16). RCEP: A New Trade Agreement that Will Shape Global Economics and Politics. Brookings. Press Information Bureau, India. (2020, September 1). Australia-India-Japan Ministers’ Meeting on Supply Chains Resilience (Press Release). Retrieved at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1650328 (August 17, 2021). Research and Information System for Developing Countries. (2017). About AAGC. Retrieved at https://aagc.ris.org.in/about-aagc (August 17, 2021). Rud, K. (2021, August 6). Why the Quad Alarms China. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-06/why-quadalarms-china (August 16, 2021). Sato, H. (2019), The author interviewed Professor Sato on June 11, at International House Japan, Tokyo, Japan. Schneider, H. (2012, November 19). On Asia Trip, Obama Presses Economic Coun­ ter to China. The Washington Post. Retrieved at https://www.washingtonpost. com/business/economy/on-asia-trip-obama-presses-economic-counter-tochina/2012/11/19/3fbeddca-327f-11e2-9cfa-e41bac906cc9_story.html (August 16, 2021). Saran, S. (2022, June 16). Missing the Significance of IPEF. The Business Standards, New Delhi. Snelder, D. & Katz, R. (2009). The New Asianisim. Foreign Policy. Retrieved at https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/the-new-asianism/ (August 16, 2021). Soyea, Y. (2020). Indo-Pacific: From Strategy to Vision. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Retrieved at http://www.cscap.org/uploads/ Regional%20Security%20Outlook%202020.pdf (August 16, 2021). Sundararaman, S. (2021, June 17). Is Blue Dot Network an Alternative to China’s BRI? The New Indian Express. Chennai. https://www.newindianexpress.com/ author/Shankari-Sundararaman/23284. Suzuki, H. (2020). Japan’s leadership role in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Takubo, T. (2011). TPP’s Significance for Counter-China Strategy. Japan Institute for National Fundamentals. Retrieved at https://en.jinf.jp/wp-content/uploads/ 2011/11/11511.14takubo.pdf (August 17, 2021).

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Tanaka, A. (2018, March 8). The Range of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Japan Policy Forum. Retrieved at https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/diplomacy/ pt201803081821337449.html (August 30, 2021). The Hindu. (2021, August 22). Two Indian Naval Ships Arrive in Guam to Take Part in Malabar Exercise. The Hindu, New Delhi. The White House. (2015). Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Press Release). October 5. Retrieved at https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacificpartnership (August 17, 2021). The White House (2021). FACT SHEET: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership, June 12, 2021. Retrieved at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/ fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3wpartnership/ (August 16, 2021). The White House. (2022a, May 23). Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. Retrieved at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economicframework-for-prosperity/ (July 19, 2022). The White House. (2022b, May 23). On-the-Record Press Call on the Launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Retrieved at https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/05/23/on-the-record-press-call-on-thelaunch-of-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework/ (July 20, 2022).

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9 JAPAN-VIETNAM RELATIONS Factoring Vietnam in Abe’s Southeast Asia Policy Do Thu Ha

9.1 Introduction On September 8, 1951, Japan signed the “US-Japan Security Treaty” accepted being placed under the “US nuclear protection box,” allowing the United States to station and build military bases on the Japanese territory. As a result, Japan spends very little on military, enforces a soft foreign policy, and focuses on developing foreign economic relations. Since the 1990s Japan has strived to become a political power to match its status as an economic superpower. In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, wrote in Foreign Affairs that if Japan were caught between the United States and China without certainty of allegiance and mission, it “would be like a beached whale, thrashing helplessly but dangerously.”1 According to Brzezinski, such a situation could spell the end of Japan’s peaceful political and economic development. Japan would be faced with the unpalatable choice of unilateral rearmament or a new submissive relationship with China. Brzezinski believed that a Japan caught between China and the United States without clarity on its global role would undermine the emergence of a stable relationship among the three nations. It would lead, he thought, to insecurity and instability or, even worse, a conflict throughout Asia. Fast-forward two decades and this scenario outlined by Brzezinski became plausible with the election of Donald Trump as he touted “America First” to prioritize national interest. Fear of the weakening of the alliance system created after the Second World War directed Japan to reassess and recalibrate its relationship with its neighbors. So, what has Japan done to cope with the challenges? Shinzo Abe’s policy toward Southeast Asia underwent a series of distinct transformations. More specifically, in his first year in office, in order to assert strategic goals for the region, Prime Minister Abe launched many

DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-9

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initiatives in cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. In terms of diplomatic politics, Prime Minister Abe was the first prime minister to visit all ten regional countries in 2013 officially. In addition, he also committed to a  comprehensive cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan. Furthermore, in terms of security and defense, the turning point in the security policy by Japan in both domestic and foreign aspects also opened up new opportunities for cooperation between Japan and the region. These were major breakthroughs in Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia. The second term of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012) began amid a relatively unstable internal political situation and rising China. Therefore, the security challenges from the surrounding environment and the recovery of economic growth were placed as a top agenda for Prime Minister Abe. As a geographically close neighbor of this region, Japan’s relationship with Vietnam has a long history. In the aftermath of the Second World War, both of these nations had limited engagement, which transformed in the post-Cold War era. Japan and Vietnam are both located within the region, addressed as the “Indo-Pacific” today. Political trust and the cultural similarity between the two countries, alongside impressive achievements of cooperation over the past 47 years, are solid foundations and a strong driving force to lead Japan-Vietnam relations to attain new heights toward the future of a broad strategic partnership. Japan was the first of the G7 countries to establish a strategic partnership with Vietnam. Up till now, it can be said that the relationship between the two countries has developed rapidly in many fields and has entered a new phase in terms of quality and depth. Abe’s understanding of the changing dynamics and complexion of this region resulted in a vision which looked at promoting rules-based order and stability through strategic, economic, and infrastructure cooperation. As this crystalized into the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept, the major partnership was to emerge in the Southeast Asian region as it harbors massive Sea Lanes of Communication and is also a significant production hub. Vietnam-Japan relations blossomed in this environment as Vietnam’s domestic concerns found synergy with Japan’s approach toward the southeast in general and Vietnam in particular under bilateral engagement. This chapter provides an overview of Japan’s relationship with Southeast Asian nations with specific reference to Vietnam.

9.2  Abe’s Policy Toward Southeast Asia Compiled from Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook from 2013 to 2016,2 Japan’s foreign policy during Prime Minister Abe’s second term included the following main directions: First, in terms of goals, like in previous periods, Japan’s foreign policy from 2013 has been pegged at ensuring and strengthening the national interests. Along with this is the extended goal of ensuring 150

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security, maintaining territorial sovereignty and securing territorial waters, and continuing the process of striving to become a normal country, enhancing its position in the international arena. Second, in principle, in line with protecting the interests of the nation, Japan promoted the implementation of a strategic foreign policy called “World-Looking in Panorama” toward upholding global values such as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the law. Third, in terms of the motto, Prime Minister Abe’s administration introduced an effective foreign policy aiming to fulfill national obligations commensurate with Japan’s position in the international community. Along with ensuring its national security and maintaining regional peace and stability, Japan also aimed to ensure the security, peace, and prosperity of the international community. Fourth, the three main pillars of Japanese foreign policy include (1) strengthening the US-Japan alliance; (2) strengthening relations with neighbors, including Korea, ASEAN, Russia, India, Australia; and (3) promoting economic diplomacy as a tool to promote domestic economic growth. In general, Japanese foreign policy during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure was proactive on a regional and global scale, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Abe’s policy toward Southeast Asia also fell within this common framework. The regional policy was aimed at pursuing the goals, ensuring the principles and motto of Japan’s general foreign policy, and was integrated with the pillars mentioned earlier. Generally, under Prime Minister Abe, Japan actively engaged with Southeast Asia by promoting universal values​​ and giving special attention to security and defense, though economic instruments continued their role in developing the economies of this region. Policy promotion within the region contributed to helping Japan achieve the goal of ensuring security and sovereignty and helped Japan improve its position in the international arena. Accordingly, Southeast Asia was considered a strategic deployment area under Prime Minister Abe, as reflected in the first diplomatic activities of his administration. In January 2013, Prime Minister Abe chose Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, as the starting point for his first overseas trip since taking office. In the same month, during his visit to Indonesia, he gave the “Five Principles for the Foreign Policy of the New Government to the Region” (Abe Doctrine) related to strengthening diplomatic relations, national security, and defense between Japan and ASEAN (Michishita 2013). In 2013, Prime Minister Abe completed his visits to all ten countries in Southeast Asia. The following sections will detail the objectives and contents of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy and implementation steps. 9.2.1  Goals and Objectives of Japan’s Southeast Asian Policy A country’s foreign policy cannot fall beyond the three objectives of security, development, and influence. Accordingly, Japan’s Southeast Asian policy under Abe also included the following specific goals. 151

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On the security front, one of Japan’s major goals in increasing engagement with Southeast Asia was to find a common partner in dealing with the negative impact of China’s rise. In fact, Japan is facing more and more challenges coming from the rise of China. In 2010, China officially overtook Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world. Along with the economic growth, the development of China’s defense potential, the increase in defense spending, and especially the lack of transparency in its conduct are also cause for concern. Furthermore, Japan’s immediate concerns about China are its aggressive posture of deploying military power beyond its borders and openly expressing its ambitions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Since 2012, the dispute between Japan and China has revolved around the Diaoyu/Senkaku archipelago, which has become a location of unrest, as China has regularly acted unilaterally. Chinese navigators and boats routinely operate around the disputed island. Furthermore, at the end of 2013, China announced the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Area (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, further increasing tensions and the risk of clashes between the two countries. In addition, Japan is also concerned by China’s show of power in the South China Sea, reflected by the large-scale militarization on the island as reclamation work continues on these islands. In that context, Japan needs to promote relations with countries that share similar challenges and thereby create a counterbalance in relations with China. In addition, Japan is also apprehensive that China’s increasingly dominant attitude in the South China Sea will also create more impetus for it to be tougher in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with Japan. Therefore, increasing cooperation in maritime security with regional countries, especially those that have a dispute with China to ensure freedom of navigation, is a countermeasure to help Japan restrain China in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. When China pulled the rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in May 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaking at NATO headquarters, said, “In the South China Sea,…we cannot accept changes caused by force or coercion. This is a global issue that greatly affects Asia.” Furthermore, on June 11, 2014, the Japan House Foreign Affairs Committee issued a statement on the South China Sea, calling on all parties to exercise restraint, not use force to change the status quo, and impose sovereignty unilaterally in the South China Sea. As for the development target, the Japanese economy needed new opportunities to promote and increase trade and investment after a period of prolonged difficulty and stagnant growth. In order for the economy to grow again, Japan strongly adjusted domestic supply demand and exploited overseas markets, especially Asian markets in general and Southeast Asia in particular, to supplement those domestic industries that are shrinking. As one of the dynamically developing regions of the world and a gateway to international trade, Southeast Asia is indeed an attractive destination for Japanese investors. In 2013, about 7,000 Japanese enterprises were 152

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operating in the area. According to survey results at Japanese companies, among the top 20 priority addresses to establish investment relations in the next few years, there are 8 ASEAN member countries.3 Moreover, with the aging and declining population structure, Southeast Asia, with a population of 620 million and a high proportion of people of working age, really opens up a large consumer market and labor supply, cheap and plentiful services for Japanese businesses wishing to export goods or hire workers. In addition, the process of economic integration in East Asia with the core of ASEAN countries is taking place in a positive direction, multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as ASEAN + 1, ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 6; the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) has promised new and attractive trade and investment opportunities for Japan. In terms of influence goals, Japan sees Southeast Asia as a region where it can strengthen its influence to serve major-country diplomacy, especially gaining support to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In addition, to minimize the impact of difficulties in relations with Northeast Asian countries and more independence from the United States, Japan needs to create a stable environment conducive to Japan in the future. Therefore, expanding its influence in Southeast Asia is one of Japan’s strategic goals. More broadly, the influence of Japan’s policy on the region is also related to disseminating the values of ​​ freedom, democracy, human rights, and the spirit of the rule of law. At the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue, Japanese Prime Minister Abe said, “For peace and prosperity forever in Asia, Japan supports the law, Asia supports the law, the law for all of them.”4 Abe’s Southeast Asian policy also saw a return to two concepts he developed during his first term. One is the concept of value-oriented diplomacy. This concept focuses on the “universal values” that shaped postwar Japan, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and “the rule of law” while also highlighting Japan’s historical, traditional, and cultural values.5 The second is the “arc of freedom and prosperity” concept proposed by Foreign Minister Taro Aso of Abe’s cabinet in 2006. Accordingly, Japan wants to support the  platforms of democracy through economic aid and human exchange (Aso  2006). During his second term, Abe continued to promote the core values ​​of this ideology, albeit under another name, Diamond Security. It follows that Southeast Asia holds an important geostrategic position; enhancing regional cohesion not only helps Japan ensure its security goals but also complements its development goals and strengthens its position in Japanese foreign policy. 9.2.2  Pillars and Implementation of Southeast Asian Policy To serve the aforementioned objectives, Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia under Abe’s regime included the following foundational pillars and specific policy realization measures. First, the Abe administration continued 153

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the direction of the Fukuda Doctrine (1977), which included three main principles: one, Japan would never become a military power; two, promoting relations with ASEAN based on real understanding; and three, cooperation with ASEAN member states as equal partners. However, under the Abe administration, the involvement with the region had many breakthroughs, especially in the field of security and defense. Second, the policy of Southeast Asia under Abe could be seen from different perspectives; namely, on a multilateral level, it was a common policy with ASEAN, and on a bilateral level, it was a country-specific policy tailored to address bilateral concerns. Moreover, twining the regional approach to the bilateral framework gained momentum and resulted in a convergence of interest between Japan and the ASEAN nations 9.2.2.1  Japan’s View on ASEAN as a Unified Entity Prime Minister Abe, in his speech in Jakarta, Indonesia, in January 2013, outlined five principles of cooperation with ASEAN: (i) joint defense and promoting universal values such as freedom, democracy, and fundamental human rights; (ii) jointly secure open and free seas by law and regulation, not by force and welcome the US rebalance in the Asia-Pacific; (iii) promoting investment and trade; (iv) protecting and taking care of ASEAN’s rich cultural heritage and traditions; and (v) promoting exchanges between generations of young people to enhance common understanding.6 It can be seen that these five principles covered aspects from security, politics, economics, to culture and people. While the principles of cooperation with ASEAN were all-encompassing, Abe directed maximum attention to the security aspect of this relationship. This can be gleaned when comparing the Japan-ASEAN joint statements in 2003 and 2013. The 2003 Japan-ASEAN Summit emphasized that “strengthening comprehensive economic partnerships and monetary cooperation and finance” was a key priority in the overall strategy.7 However, in their joint statement in 2013, the two sides committed upfront to maintain regional peace and stability, specifically addressing issues related to maritime security. The Abe administration’s emphasis on greater security cooperation with the region was also explicitly played out in other documents. In Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy, ASEAN was involved in various aspects of dealing with Japan’s security challenges. Accordingly, Japan considered ASEAN a vital security partner.8 In the 2014 “Defense Program Guide” (NDPG) Japan affirmed that it wanted to promote joint training and capacity building with ASEAN countries in addition to cooperation in the field of crisis response and beyond.9 In fact, Japan had actively participated in ASEAN-centered and promoted forums and mechanisms, as well as participating in many security initiatives. Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers Roundtable was held for the first time in 2014 in Myanmar. Discussing maritime security cooperation during this conference, Prime 154

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Minister Abe affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate in areas such as Japan-ASEAN joint exercises, human resource development, and maritime safety. Further, Japan was committed to supporting capacity building in the area of marine security and safety for approximately 700 people over three years. Moreover, the conference also adopted the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration on cooperation in combating terrorism and transnational crime.10 At the 9th East Asia Summit (EAS) (2014) in Myanmar, Prime Minister Abe stressed that the EAS should focus on urgent issues such as Islamic State terrorism and the Ebola epidemic to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the region as well as the world. On the issue of maritime security, Prime Minister Abe emphasized the need to maintain and strengthen order at sea through the “Three Principles of the Maritime Law” and expressed his wish to host the 3rd Open ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) (Diplomatic Bluebook 2015). On the bilateral level, Japan actively implemented the policies with Southeast Asian countries in all three fields: politics-diplomacy, economy, and especially security-defense. As a result, political and economic cooperation forms were also integrated with security and defense issues. This showed a shift in Japan’s policy approach; moreover, it was also evidence that Japan wanted to deepen substantive cooperation with the region. In terms of politics-diplomacy, Japan pursues proactive shuttle diplomacy. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, deputy prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister had many tours to the region in 2013. Most important, bilateral political relations with countries in the region were also raised to new heights. At the end of 2013, Japan and Cambodia agreed to promote defense cooperation and upgraded bilateral relations to a strategic partnership.11 Japan and Vietnam also upgraded their strategic partnership to the “Extensive Strategic Partnership for Asia’s Peace and Prosperity” in August 2014. In 2015, during Indonesian president Joko Wikodo’s visit to Japan, Japan and Indonesia pledged to strengthen the strategic partnership through two pillars of maritime issues and democracy.12 Also, in 2015, the Abe administration completed a strategic partnership agreement with Malaysia, in which the security aspect was also emphasized (Koga 2016, 67–79). In the economic field, in order to contribute to Southeast Asian prosperity, Japan adjusted the use of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategy in the direction of expanding the connection of ODA with the military, environment, and health sectors in Southeast Asian countries. According to Japan’s ODA White Book, the Asian region with many developing countries and close geographic relations has always been a priority area in Japan’s ODA policy since the 1970s. After returning to office following this trend, Prime Minister Abe provided 56.2 percent and 63.9 percent of the total committed ODA in 2012 and 2013 to Asia, respectively. Among the regions and territories in Asia, Southeast Asia is the top priority, with the total amount of ODA that Japan has committed to providing consistently high. Specifically, in 2013, Japan spent USD 9.2 billion, accounting for 74.2 percent of ODA for 155

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ASEAN countries out of the total USD 12.4 billion in ODA for Asia.13 More specifically, the ASEAN countries were identified by Japan as the priority partners to receive ODA in the non-combat military. Accordingly, Japan provided financial assistance to ASEAN maritime countries to develop maritime surveillance capabilities, including radar systems, marine surveillance aircraft, etc. Till date, Japan has provided marine surveillance ships and communication systems to the Philippines in the way of ODA assistance. The military assistance of Japan helps countries in Southeast Asia with step-by-step support to improve surveillance capacity and ensure remote security in the context of Southeast Asian countries with limited resources. Regarding security-defense cooperation, Japan has taken concrete steps to support ASEAN member countries that have disputes with China to improve their maritime surveillance capacity and ensure maritime security. Prominent among them are Vietnam and the Philippines. In 2012, both Vietnam and the Philippines signed with Japan an agreement on defense cooperation in the areas of delegation exchange, personnel training, defense industry, marine rescue, and maritime security. For Vietnam, Japan provided six marine patrol boats with a value of about USD 4.5 million in 2014. During the visit of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to Tokyo in September 2015, the two sides reaffirmed the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation in the region. Up to now, the security-defense relationship between the two countries is still being promoted. Military forces of the two countries have begun to participate in joint naval exercises. In April 2016, two Japanese warships and one submarine of the Japanese marine defense force docked at Cam Ranh port after stopping at Subic Bay, Philippines. For the Philippines, cooperation on maritime security started in late 2011. In July 2013, Prime Minister Abe announced plans to provide the Philippines with ten patrol boats. During his visit to Japan in June 2015, President Benigno Aquino stressed the importance of drafting a visitation agreement between the two countries’ armies, allowing ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to refuel at the Philippine ports and participate in joint exercises. Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed his desire to assist the Philippines in enhancing the capabilities of its coastal defense forces. In February 2016, the two sides signed an agreement to transfer defense equipment (Panda 2015). In addition to Vietnam and the Philippines, Japan also promoted cooperation with other ASEAN countries. In May 2015, Japan and Malaysia started the negotiation of the defense equipment package. For Indonesia, security-defense cooperation with Japan was marked by a cooperation agreement to develop and transfer military equipment and training of the Indonesian army (Fatton 2016). In addition, in its engagement with the region, Japan built up a responsible powerhouse role through substantive activities aimed at contributing to peace and stability. It also participated in the search for the Malaysia aircraft MH370 missing in March 2014. Japan deployed a Disaster Relief Team consisting of 28 members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the 156

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Coast Guard, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency. The assistance in finding the missing aircraft in Japan received great applause and appreciation from Malaysia, as well as from other countries in the region.14 In addition, the response to the catastrophe caused by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the contribution to the democratization of Myanmar, and the Islamic conflict in Mindanao, the Philippines, in 2013 were indications of a positive major and responsible role in the Southeast Asia of Japan. In addition, Japan also strived to facilitate exchanges between the youth generations of other countries. Each year, more than 13,000 ASEAN students come to study in Japan. In 2007, at the initiative of Prime Minister Abe, the program “Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youth” (JENESYS) was launched, attracting over 14,000 young people from Japan and ASEAN to visit each other (Nghiên củu Biển Đông 2013, Nhật và ASEAN sau 40 năm Quan hể). During the second term, Prime Minister Abe continued to launch Genesys 2.0 and planned for 300,000 students to go abroad.15 Japan’s engagement in Southeast Asia under Abe included two directions of deployment with ASEAN as a single bloc and with individual regional countries. The implementation of this policy was conducted spanning all three areas of politics – diplomacy, economics, and defense. However, the highlight was that the Abe administration implemented a new policy roadmap and shifted from a socioeconomic approach to a political-security approach (Mahar 2016). Increased engagement in the political and economic sectors was also integrated with security and defense issues. As a sensitive and challenging area to promote cooperation, the aforementioned Japanese efforts and approaches were the testaments to the desire for substantial and comprehensive cooperation with Southeast Asia.

9.3  Future Policy Direction in Japan’s Policy In the future, Japan’s policy toward the region will continue to be strengthened or at least maintained at the present level as a result of a combination of the following favorable conditions and motivating factors: First, the current Japanese internal politics converge many favorable conditions for policy implementation. In the first quarter of 2017, Japanese support for Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet remained relatively high, at about 60 percent.16 Moreover, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formally adjusted the party chairperson’s rule to allow Prime Minister Abe to extend his term until 2021 (though he resigned earlier). The extended rule period allowed Prime Minister Abe to implement policies more sustainably. In addition, one of the most up-to-date demonstrations of Japan’s commitment to Southeast Asia was that Japan’s defense budget in fiscal year 2017 spent USD 2.9 million on comprehensive capacity-building initiatives for Southeast Asian countries.17 These stable internal factors contribute to the policy of Japan with Southeast Asian countries as well as with ASEAN to continue to be maintained and promoted. 157

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Second, the acceptance and approval of Japan by Southeast Asian nations is also a favorable factor for Japan to promote its policies. Surveys in 2014 showed that 60 percent of the leaders of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar considered Japan the most important country in Asia, outperforming China. Besides, the proportion of people supporting the role of Japan in the region is 96 percent (Dalpino 2015). Most importantly, Japan’s behavior toward Southeast Asian countries is highly dependent on the adjustments of US and Chinese policies toward the region. Under President Donald Trump, US policy prioritized domestic issues, aimed to make America “great again,” and promote national interests (America First), reducing external commitments, leading to many doubts about US policy toward the region. In general, US policy toward the region has not been clearly defined. However, whether the United States neglects the region or pushes for a more robust version of its rebalance policy, Japan needs to continue its trend of increasing engagement with Southeast Asian countries. If the United States maintains a strong presence in the region, Japan needs to maintain good relations with other countries in order to better support and complement the US strategy. On the contrary, if the United States under the new administration does not intend to maintain a strong presence in the region, in order to “save itself,” Japan also needs to increase proactivity, reduce passivity, and support belonging to the US security protection through finding new ways to cooperate and build Japanese partner networks in strategic Southeast Asia. In addition, the outstanding economic development and increased capacity of this region have the potential for China’s need to show off its military strength in this region. More seriously, China inherently tends to engage in aggressive acts, and words are always not associated with employment. Accordingly, China’s aggressive actions will continue, and China will remain the major security challenge to Japan. Besides, for the Senkaku Islands dispute, a definitive solution for both countries may not be reached in the medium term. China’s field actions are difficult to predict. Therefore, Japan still needs relations with Southeast Asian countries, creating a counterbalance with China. In addition, China’s rivalry over influence in East Asia is also a factor that Japan should take into account in future foreign policymaking. In general, at least in the medium term, Japan’s approach to Southeast Asia will remain positive, proactively developing substantial relations. The level of engagement could be strengthened or at least maintained today. Out of all the internal and external factors, developments related to the United States and China gave impetus to Japan’s support for Southeast Asia and brought them closer every time.

9.4  The Impact of Japan’s Policy on Southeast Asia In general, Abe’s new foreign policy showed the image of the most ambitious Japan since World War II, shaping a brand-new role as well as 158

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economic and security games for Japan. This was most apparently visible in the Southeast Asian region. This had a substantial impact on the security landscape in the region, as Japan became an active factor in ensuring US commitment, restraining, balancing influence with China, and promoting regional institutions such as ASEAN. First, through loosening policies, Japan has aimed to assist regional countries, especially ASEAN countries, to strengthen their security-defense capabilities to ensure the region’s common security and promote a balance of power with China. Second, the fact that Japan has actively participated in ASEAN-centered mechanisms such as ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 1, ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, and the EAS helps enhance the effectiveness of dialogue mechanisms and strengthens ASEAN’s leadership roles in evolving the regional architecture. Third, the regional system has been strengthened by Japan actively promoting legal values. Since returning to power in 2012, Prime Minister Abe implemented an active foreign policy, increasing participation in international and regional forums and integrating content-promoting cooperation mechanisms, as well as dispute settlements based on international law. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Prime Minister Abe, in his opening remarks, mentioned the “Three Principles of the Maritime Law” that states that countries need to (i) clarify sovereignty claims based on international law, (ii) refrain from the threat of force or the use of force in disputes, and (iii) seek peaceful solutions. Japan’s contributions to general rules of the game based on common principles and the rules of international law have been essential to maintaining a region of peace, stability, and development. However, Japan’s active engagement with Southeast Asia could lead to some of the following conflicting effects: First, in recent times, Japan’s increasing defense budget and Japan’s strengthening defense-security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries could stimulate an arms race in a region. According to a report dated February 22, 2016, by the StockholmSweden-based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the global arms trade in 2015, Asia and Oceania had the highest military costs, reaching nearly USD 450 billion (up 5.4 percent compared to 2014), equivalent to about a quarter of the total global defense expenditure (SIPRI 2015, Yearbook 2015). Second, Japan’s increased cohesion with Southeast Asia also means that competition for influence between major countries is increasingly fierce, complicated, and overlapping. This easily leads to small and medium countries in the region getting stuck, and the ASEAN consensus will be negatively affected. However, the fact is that Japan is more actively involved in the South China Sea issue and promotes maritime security and defense cooperation with other countries in the region, including Vietnam. This could lead small and medium countries within the region to get entrapped in a power struggle between China and Japan. Besides, another negative effect is that Southeast Asian nations may be under pressure from Japan to 159

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support the new Japanese moves and allow Japan to participate in major infrastructure projects. The previous section delineates Abe’s vision for FOIP and how it unfolded in the Southeast Asian region. To get a better understanding of Japan’s bilateral engagement with the Southeast Asian region, the following section looks at Japan-Vietnam relations, drawing from the historical linkages to the new era of engagement.

9.5  Overview of Japan and Vietnam Relations Vietnam-Japan relations began at the end of the sixteenth century when Japanese traders came to Vietnam to do business. Vietnam officially established diplomatic relations with Japan on September 21, 1973. After a period of stopping aid due to the issues related to Cambodia, in 1992, Japan decided to restart aid to Vietnam. The relationship between Vietnam and Japan has developed rapidly in many fields and has entered a new stage of quality and depth. Political and economic relationships and cultural exchanges have been consistently expanding and formed a relationship framework at the macro-level. Understanding between the two countries is constantly increasing. The two sides have highly appreciated the solid and comprehensive development of Vietnam-Japan relations in recent years, especially after the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia in 2009 and the Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia in Tokyo on March 18, 2014.18 After more than 40 years of diplomatic relations, Japan has become Vietnam’s leading economic partner, the first G7 country to establish a strategic partnership with Vietnam in 2009. Further, it was the first country to recognize the regulation of the market economy of Vietnam in October 2011.19 The two sides signed the Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection, Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (VJEPA), creating a favorable legal framework for developing economic and trade relations between the two countries. Up to now, Japan has been the largest ODA donor country for Vietnam, accounting for about 30 percent of the total ODA commitments of the international community to Vietnam, the number one investor in Vietnam (both in terms of total investment and disbursed capital) and the fourth largest trading partner of Vietnam.20 PM Abe’s 2006 visit received the attention of many business leaders from both countries. In particular, the delegation of 130 members from 74 Japanese companies, accompanying Prime Minister Abe to Vietnam, was a testament that Japanese investors were very interested in Vietnam. Furthermore, during a meeting with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2006, PM Abe agreed to establish a Vietnam-Japan Cooperation Committee chaired by both prime ministers. In addition, Prime Minister Abe also

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agreed to further promote economic cooperation between the two countries. The Japanese side also affirmed to support Vietnam in implementing its commitment to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). While Vietnam-Japan relations flourished during Abe’s regime, the beginning was made through the Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative in April 2003. This was a special outcome of the cooperation between the two governments through establishing a forum for policy dialogues between Japanese and Vietnamese investors with the relevant ministries and branches of Vietnam. The purpose of this joint initiative between the two countries was to establish and create an open and transparent business and investment environment in Vietnam and, at the same time, make constructive, informative policy recommendations that would be referred to in the process of perfecting laws and policies for the Vietnamese authorities. Constructive use of this initiative resulted in Japanese foreign direct investment ranking first (out of 54 countries and territories investing in Vietnam) with a total newly and additionally registered investment capital of USD 5,747 billion (according to Foreign Investment Department, as of December 15, 2013) by 2013. In the first four months of 2014, Japan had 104 new projects and increased capital, with total newly and additionally registered capital reaching USD 531.06 million, ranking second among 36 countries and territories having investment projects in Vietnam up to this period (after Korea).21 By 2016, the Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative had implemented phase V with a total of 441 subitems in the action plan, of which 367 subitems had been implemented on schedule, accounting for 83 percent of the total committed subcategories. On that basis, Vietnam-Japan continued to agree on the content of the phase VI joint initiative, consisting of 7 main groups of problems with 7 categories and 27 subcategories, focusing on issues related to the labor force, salary, logistic service–transportation, services, Small Medium Enterprise support, pharmaceutical distribution, investment law, enterprise law. At the high-level meeting of the Joint Assessment and Initiative Committee between the two countries, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding for the Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative phase VI and agreed on the timeline for implementing phase VI during the period. It was 17 months, starting from August 2016 to mid-2017. At the end of November 2016, Japan was ranked second among investors in 114 countries and territories investing in Vietnam, with 3,242 projects and USD 42 billions of total investment capital.22 In particular, Japan has participated in a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, which aims to promote the projects, such as high-speed railways and nuclear power plants, and wishes to contribute to sustainable development in Vietnam. This initiative continues to be the key pillar in the Vietnam-Japan cooperation framework, and Japan is actively supporting Vietnam in industrial development in Vietnam’s Industrialization Strategy until 2020, with a vision to 2030, especially in the following two aspects.

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•

Supporting the “Industrialization Strategy”

Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan would continue to cooperate closely in the implementation of Vietnam’s action plans for the six key areas under its industrialization strategy within the Japan-Vietnam cooperation framework until 2020 with a vision to 2030: agro-fishery processing, electronics, automobile and its parts, agricultural machinery, environmental industry and energy conservation, and shipbuilding. Furthermore, he stated that the Japanese would continue to cooperate in the development of supporting industries in Vietnam, as well as supporting the Vietnamese side in achieving its modernization and sindustrialization goals by 2020 through assistance for enhancing capacity related to planning and implementing industrial policies. Prime Minister Abe also announced that the Japanese side would cooperate to help improve Vietnam’s industrial capacity, plan and implement industrial policy supporting the industries in Vietnam and assist the Vietnamese side in achieving industrialization and modernization by 2020. He also emphasized that Japan would continue to support the development of two industrial parks in Hai Phong and Ba Ria-Vung Tau at the request of Vietnam by providing management experience and support to attract investment from Japan. •

Engaging in Human Resource Development

The Japanese pledged to actively support Vietnam in training human resources, supporting the promotion of Japanese language teaching in Vietnam, and building Vietnamese occupational skill standards. Furthermore, the two sides decided to continue promoting exchanges between universities, students, and researchers to promote mutual understanding between the two countries’ younger generations and contribute to the development of Vietnamese-Japan relations. The Vietnamese appreciated that the Japanese actively considered upgrading Can Tho University and several selected universities into excellent universities, supporting the development of Japan’s national professional certificates and cooperating in developing a number of Vietnamese vocational schools to reach international standards. Furthermore, the two sides affirmed that the two countries’ governments continue to cooperate in the Vietnam-Japan University Project promoted by relevant organizations. 9.5.1  New Stage of Development of Strategic Partnership During his time in office, Prime Minister Abe left many hallmarks of Japan in the international arena. Japan has strengthened its role and influence in the region and in the world, skillfully handling complex and sensitive issues in Japan’s bilateral relations with the United States and China, increasing the role of Japan in the policy of its partners, and signing many free trade 162

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agreements with other countries. More importantly, under Prime Minister Abe, in 2013, Japan established a National Security Council; the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has also been improved. Since 2014, the SDF has been able to deploy forces to support the United States and its allies in case of need. But on August 28, 2020, Prime Minister Abe officially announced his resignation due to health reasons, causing a great disturbance in Japanese political life. On September 16, 2020, Mr. Yoshihide Suga, leader of the LDP, became the new prime minister of Japan with commitments to focus on controlling the COVID-19 epidemic and promoting the reform policy of his predecessor. After PM Abe, Japan has had two prime ministers (Yoshihide Suga and Kishida Fumio) who continued his policy of engagement, alignment, and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. PM Kishida has favorably sided with Vietnam on specific directions and measures to bring the “deep strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia” into a new stage of development in “the sincere, reliable, substantive, and effective spirit.” The two sides have agreed on an update on cooperation progress and reviewed the implementation of high-level agreements with a number of key results as follows. • The two sides affirmed the importance of promoting the extensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan in the new period, which is more substantive, effective, and far-reaching. They agreed to continue implementing specific measures to enhance the quality and scale of cooperation; building an independent, self-reliant Vietnamese economy with deep, substantive and effective international integration; promoting industrialization, comprehensive cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, science and technology, education-training, politics, national security-defense, and cooperation on regional and international forums to which both parties are members. • The two sides achieved new progress in cooperation in developing Vietnam’s strategic infrastructure; they agreed to continue cooperation to speed up the implementation of transport infrastructure works, such as urban railway lines and new strategic transport infrastructure projects, i.e., the North-South expressway, and strengthening connecting Vietnam and Laos and orienting cooperation in the development of North-South high-speed railway. • The two sides agreed to step up cooperation in post-COVID-19 economic recovery; strengthen the connection between the two economies and the production supply chain; step up cooperation in investment, trade, and development of supporting industries, digital transformation, innovation, smart city, high-tech agriculture, energy transformation; and prioritize the implementation of new initiatives in line with mutual interests, such as “technology innovation cooperation partners,” “strengthening supply chains,” and “digital transformation.” 163

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Especially, the Prime Minister of Vietnam Pham Minh Chinh’s official visit to Japan in November 2021 completed the “Update on the Progress of Cooperation” between the two countries in eight areas, including medical cooperation (COVID-19 prevention), investment and trade, ODA and infrastructure, people-to-people exchanges, environment and climate change response, judicial cooperation, defense and security, cultural cooperation, and education.

9.6  Vietnam Cooperation with Japan: A Way Ahead The Japan-Vietnam relationship stands on solid footing as the two countries do not have conflicts and share many common strategic interests. In recent years, it is in a sound stage with high political confidence. Japan domestically has a high consensus on strengthening relations with Vietnam. PM Kishida and almost all of Japan’s politicians have special feelings for Vietnam, despite the lack of consensus on certain issues. They invested in increasing political trust through annual high-level visits, and strengthening exchanges at all levels, such as ministries, National Assembly channel, party channels. Both countries were also keen on building trust and personal relationships between their leaders. Further, PM Abe and his fellows’ personal affection for Vietnam resulted in forming a pro-Vietnam consensus within Japan’s economic and political circle. Both the ruling and the opposition party at the Diet accepted the benefits of close cooperation between the two countries. As a result, more people-to-people exchanges were encouraged, especially cooperation between the youths. With respect to defense-security cooperation, it is crucial to take advantage of priority issues such as delegation exchange; cooperation in the transfer of defense equipment and technology in national defense; enhancing the capacity of law enforcement at sea (building new ships, transferring used ships, training human resources); increasing intelligence exchange; cooperating in less sensitive such as rescue, peacekeeping forces, clearance; considering the possibility of cooperation in the areas proposed by Japan such as signing a confidential information exchange agreement; transferring P-3C Orion reconnaissance aircraft; increasing the frequency of aircraft and warships entering Vietnam; and taking part in the joint exercise. Both the countries encouraged proactive in cooperation like; coordinating stances at international and regional forums such as ASEAN, ARF, EAS, United Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Vietnam also supported Japanese proposals at international and regional forums such as the Mekong-Japan, ASEAN-Japan. Finally, Vietnam was successful in mobilizing Japan’s support for former’s stand for the position of non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (2020–21) and Vietnamese director-general at UNESCO (2017–21) Vietnam also showed willingness to join tripartite and multilateral cooperation between Japan, India, Philippines, Australia or between Japan and 164

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some ASEAN countries and also proactively and actively participated in Japanese security initiatives in the region. It ensured Japan’s support in the South China Sea issue and proposed Japan to mobilize the United States and other countries to support Vietnam in international legal matters. Thus, forming a legal alliance between Vietnam and Japan in the fight to protect the sovereignty of the sea and islands. Taking advantage of Japanese policy is an attempt to disseminate democratic, liberal, and legal values and the fact that Japan shares a challenge with Vietnam over China’s sovereignty claims; Vietnam can share knowledge, joint application, and dissemination of the legal basis of the United Nations Convention on the Maritime Law with Japan (UNCLOS) 1982. Moreover, Vietnam can ask Japan for advice in terms of experience and legal, human resource development support, and research capacity in this matter. However, the two countries’ bilateral relations still have the following limitations: (i) the two sides’ different priorities and focus on promoting cooperation when Japan prioritizes strengthening politics– security; Vietnam gives priority to taking advantage of economic cooperation for economic development; (ii) the relationship is influenced by the United States and China factors; and (iii) security-defense cooperation remains modest.

9.7 Conclusion The complexity that has emerged due to the pandemic and its aftermath, US-China rivalry, China’s aggressive posturing, and the Taiwan issue necessitates Japan to strategically engage with the world and consider maintaining the advantages of neighboring foreign policy that Abe built. The new Japanese government should continue to affirm that, in the field of diplomacy, their policies will still inherit those of Abe, including continuing to implement policies that attach great importance to the Japan-US alliance and its neighborhood relationships. At its core, it will continue to actively promote the FOIP strategy with the goal of ensuring national interests. In those policies, Vietnam surely plays an important role in the Japan-Vietnam extensive strategic partnership of the new period. Regarding the outlook of Vietnam in relations with Japan, its central foreign policy of “diversification, multi-lateralization,” and “international integration” is in synergy with Japan’s approach. Vietnam needs to continue a broad strategic partnership framework but strengthen political trust and develop substantially and effectively. At the right time, Vietnam should consider the possibility of upgrading its relations to a new level of “comprehensive strategic partnership” or “global strategic partner.” In addition, Vietnam needs to identify Japan as the leading and long-term important partner, harmoniously handling the priorities of each party in the relationship, supporting Japan to play an increasingly active role in the region and the world, and supporting Japan in international and regional affairs. Japan must not deter Vietnam’s interests to enlist economic assistance from Japan. 165

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Notes 1 Carlos Ramirez, “Will Japan Use Trump’s Presidency as Impetus to Commit to a New Asian Security Architecture in the Region?” https://thediplomat. com/2017/03/abes-trump-challenge-and-japans-foreign-policy-choices/, accessed on May 25, 2021. 2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook. 3 Nghiên củu Biển Đông (2013), Nhật và ASEAN sau 40 năm Quan hể. 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013, The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit – The Shangri-La Dialogue – Keynote Address by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister. 5 Behind New Abe Diplomacy, An Interview with Cabinet Advisor Yachi Shotaro. 6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013, The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy. 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003, Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan – ASEAN Partnership in the New Millenium. 8 Japan Ministry of Defense 2014, National Security Strategy and National Defense Guidelines 2015. 9 Japan Ministry of Defense 2013, National Defense Program Guidelines for F.Y. 2014. 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015, Diplomatic Bluebook 2015. 11 The Japan Times 2013, Japan, Cambodia Upgrade Ties to “Strategic Partnership.” 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015, Japan – Indonesia Joint Statement – Towards Further Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership Underpinned by Sea and Democracy. 13 Japan’s Official Development Assistance, White Paper 2014. 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015, Diplomatic Bluebook 2015. 15 Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 19th International Conference on “The Future of Asia.” 16 Kyodo 2017, Abe Cabinet’s support rate dips six points to 55.7 percent amid ongoing Moritomo school scandal: poll). 17 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defend programs and budget of Japan F.Y. 2017). 18 https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000031617.pdf 19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam: http://www.mofahcm.gov.vn. 20 See the website of Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Japan: http:// www.vnembassy-jp.org 21 (TTXVN / VNP, Implementation of the Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative Phase VI, published on Vietnam pictorial Headliners: http://vietnam.vnanet.vn/ vietnamese/trien-khai-sang-kien-chung-viet-male%E2%80%93nhat-ban-bandoan-vi/258803.html, dated 08/23/2016.) 22 Vietnam Department of Foreign Investment.

References Aso, Taro (2006), Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic and Horizon, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html. Behind New Abe Diplomacy, An Interview with Cabinet Advisor Yachi Shotaro, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00089/. Dalpino, Catharin (2015), “Japan – South-East Asia Relations: Abe Open New Fronts,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 17, No. 1, https://cc.pacforum.org/2015/ 05/abe-opens-new-fronts/ Fatton, Lionel P. (2016), “Japan’s New Security Policy: Toward Regional Involvement at Sea?” Strategic Security Analysis – GCSP, No. 4, http://www.gcsp. ch/download/5476/127831.

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Japan Ministry of Defense (2013), National Defense Program Guidelines for F.Y. 2014 and Beyond, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/ pdf/20131217_e2.pdf Japan Ministry of Defense (2014), National Security Strategy and National Defense Guidelines 2015, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_22-1_web.pdf. Japan Ministry of Defense (2017), Defend Programs and Budget of Japan F.Y. 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/281025.pdf. Koga, Kei (2016), “Japans ‘Strategic Coordination’ in 2015 ASEAN, Southeast Asia and Abe’s Diplomatic Agenda,” Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore, pp. 67–79. Kyodo (2017), Abe Cabinet’s support rate dips six points to 55.7 percent amid ongoing Moritomo school scandal: poll, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/12/ national/politics-diplomacy/abe-cabinets-support-rate-dips-six-points-55-7amid-ongoing-moritomo-school-scandal-poll/#.WO5HZWmGPIU. Mahar, Nirmala (2016), “Japan’s New ASEAN Diplomacy: Strategic Goals, Patterns, and Potential Limitations under Abe Administration,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 6, No. 12. 954–55 Michishita, Narushige (2013), “Shinzo Abe: Abe Doctrine to Remake Japan-Asean Relations,” Strait Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asians-theyear-2013/story/shinzo-abe-abe-doctrine-remake-japan-asean-relations-201303. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2003), Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan – ASEAN Partnership in the New Millenium, http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/year2003/summit/tokyo_dec.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013a), Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 19th International Conference on “The Future of Asia,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/page3e_000057.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013b), The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit – The Shangri-La Dialogue - Keynote Address by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013c), The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/ abe/abe_0118e.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013d), Vision Statement on ASEAN – Japan Friendship and Cooperation, Shared Vision, Shared Identity, Shared Future, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/files/000022449.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014), Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page23_000807.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015a), Diplomatic Bluebook 2015, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2015/html/chapter2/c020103.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015b), Diplomatic Bluebook 2015, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2015/html/chapter2/c020103.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015c), Diplomatic Bluebook 2015, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2015/html/chapter2/c020103.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015d), Japan – Indonesia Joint Statement – Towards Further Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership Underpinned by Sea and Democracy, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000072695.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/other/bluebook/index.html. Nghiên củu Biển Đông (2013a), Nhật và ASEAN sau 40 na ̆m quan hể, http:// nghiencuubiendong.vn/quan-h-quc-t/3407-nht-va-asean-sau-40-nm-quan-h.

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Nghiên củu Biển Đông (2013b), Nhật và ASEAN sau 40 năm quan hể, http:// nghiencuubiendong.vn/quan-h-quc-t/3407-nht-va-asean-sau-40-nm-quan-h. Panda, Ankit (2015), Japan to Open Military Aid Channel, http://thediplomat. com/2015/02/japan-to-open-military-aid-channel/. SIPRI (2015), Yearbook 2015, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1602.pdf. The Japan Times (2013), Japan, Cambodia Upgrade Ties to “Strategic Partnership,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/15/national/japan-cambodiaupgrade-ties-to-strategic-partnership/#.WO44nGmGPIU.

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10 JAPAN-INDONESIA RELATIONS Counterbalancing Power Play and the Role of Japan Yohanes Sulaiman

10.1 Introduction Indonesia holds a strategic position geographically and is one of the key nations in the Indo-Pacific region. What influences Indonesian foreign policy as a middle-power state? Does Indonesia’s strategic culture essentially craft Indonesia’s foreign policy with one goal: to preserve the unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to allow it to increase its power projection capability (Auliya & Sulaiman, 2019)? At the same time, is it also trying to prevent itself from being dragged into conflicts that would threaten its power projection capability? How does it juggle the competing interests of Australia, China, India, Japan, and the United States (Sulaiman, 2019b January)? How do Indonesia and Japan navigate their relationship in this environment? This chapter aims to address these issues and help understand Indonesia’s position as this region becomes the fulcrum of the world order. Rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have disturbed the status quo that Indonesia cherished. The rising power, economic influence, and belligerence of China have caused backlash from countries that are directly threatened by it for the past several years. The then-Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, for instance, in response to the growing China threat (ChanlettAvery, 2018), proposed the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in the Indian Parliament in 2007 under the concept of “a dynamic coupling” of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean as “seas of freedom and prosperity” and a “broader Asia” that included Australia and the United States (Abe, 2007, August 22). The idea, however, lay dormant as Prime Minister Abe resigned in 2007 after his party lost the upper house election. At the same time, the then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was lukewarm to the idea as he was hoping to strengthen the relationship between China and India. Moreover, there was also a lack of enthusiasm in Canberra and Washington, as DOI: 10.4324/9781003393634-10

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Australia and the United States were trying to engage China (Rudd, 2019). The idea of Quad was only revived in 2017, as tension arose between India and China due to a border dispute on the Doklam Plateau, the territorial dispute in the East China Sea between Japan and China, and Canberra’s growing discomfort over Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea (Smith, 2020). In the meantime, the United States, under the new Trump administration, was pushing for the “FOIP” concept in 2017, as the United States acknowledged the need to respond more forcefully to China’s aggressive push in the region (Ford, 2020). Since then, the concept has transformed further into the Quad defense cooperation platform that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (Panda, 2020). President Joe Biden, who succeeded President Donald Trump, also has signaled his willingness to strengthen the Quad (Chan, 2021). As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies, so does the pressure on Southeast Asian states that comprise the ASEAN, which would most likely be the flashpoint of the future conflicts between these two competing powers due to its strategic location in the middle of the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Sulaiman et al., 2021). As a result, the United States and China are trying to increase their power and influence among states in the Indo-Pacific region. Most ASEAN states, however, are averse to the idea of picking sides in this great power competition and saw this development with concerns. They do not wish to lose the economic benefits of having close relations with China, and at the same time, they do not wish to alienate the United States, as they rely upon the United States for military protection (Emmerson, 2016) as they remain wary of China’s ambitions and claims in the South China Sea (Lee, 2020). Furthermore, this attitude is reflected in the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report, which surveyed academics, businesspeople, nongovernmental organizations, the media, people inside government, and people working in regional or international organizations throughout ASEAN. The survey shows that among all of its respondents, only 4 percent agree that ASEAN should pick sides. In contrast, 29.9 percent want ASEAN to continue its policy of not siding with China or the United States, and 53.8 percent state they need ASEAN to “enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from China and the United States. In fact, 69.1 percent are concerned that” ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become proxies of a major power (Seah et al., 2021). With the growing conflict between China and its neighbors, however, sooner or later, the ASEAN may have to pick a position lest it ends up being irrelevant. Already China has been able to pull several ASEAN members into its orbit through its economic largesse and “vaccine diplomacy,” giving away vaccines to countries ravaged by the COVID-19 virus in exchange for political influence (Takashi & Kentaro, 2021). The United States and its defense partners, in the meantime, are playing catch-up due to its perceived neglect of the region in the four years under 170

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the Trump administration, which only in the last year of its administration had started to pay more attention to the region by having former secretary of state Michael Pompeo paying a visit to the region. The new Biden administration created a new post of Indo-Pacific coordinator within the National Security Council under Kurt Campbell. He advocated strengthening relationships with states like India and Indonesia and endorsing former US president Donald Trump’s harsh policies toward China (Brunnstrom, 2021). Essentially, those moves signal the growing focus of the United States on the geopolitical competition from China in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, India has been paying more attention to the region, seeing the region’s importance for both Indian security and trade, especially as tensions are rising between India and China (Gokhale, 2020). Japan also aims to strengthen and institutionalize its security ties with ASEAN states to deepen its ties to the region and promote multilateral security relations (Tomotaka, 2021). Australia too sees the importance of ASEAN for its strategic interest: its 2020 vision for defense bluntly stated that ASEAN played a critical role to maintain regional security and stability (Reynolds, 2020, February 20). Thus, the revival of the Quad is also influencing the dynamics in the Southeast Asia region. This development, in turn, complicates Indonesia’s interest in maintaining a region free of conflicts and threatens its leadership and power in the region. As a “middle power,” a state that has a significant power to influence the region and yet is too weak to challenge the great powers directly (Holbraad, 1984), Indonesia has been trying to shore up ASEAN’s position by stressing the concept of “ASEAN Centrality.” Presented by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi on August 2, 2018, Indonesia aims to reaffirm “an ASEAN-centric regional architecture that is open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based” (Sulaiman, 2019a) in order to play a central role in maintaining peace and exerting its influence (Laksmana, 2018). In a sense, the concept of “ASEAN Centrality” is needed as a way to compensate for Indonesia’s relative weakness; by crafting a common position, Indonesia can get its voice amplified by ASEAN, and with that, Indonesia could, in turn, influence outside powers to play by ASEAN’s rules – and by extension Indonesia’s rules (Auliya & Sulaiman, 2019). A divided ASEAN is simply not in Indonesia’s interest. To understand why Indonesia pushes “ASEAN Centrality” as its policy toward Southeast Asia, attention will be drawn to the linkage between Indonesia’s status as a middle power and its strategic culture. While a theoretical discussion on the concept of middle power is helpful in providing structural context, the concept of “middle power” itself lacks clarity, with too broad a definition and difficult to operationalize. Therefore, the discussion on middle power is followed by a discussion on strategic culture, essentially how choices are being made historically and organizationally, to craft the structure that limits options that states can pick and how the interaction between these two variables influences Indonesia’s decision to focus on the 171

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policy of ASEAN Centrality. This chapter will then ask whether Indonesia’s policy could be maintained in the future, facing growing competition between the United States and China, and how Japan’s relationship with Indonesia is forging under this environment.

10.2  Middle Powers and Strategic Culture Even though the first definition of “middle power” had existed since the sixteenth century when Giovanni Botero defined it as a state that “has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others” (Botero, 1589), currently, there is no consensus on the working definition of “middle powers” in the literature (Ungerer, 2007). It is not surprising, considering that almost every state in the world today has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own – and as a result, the definition is simply unable to explain much, as it covers too many states to make the definition meaningful. Another definition that is theoretically correct but very difficult to operationalize is Holbraad’s definition that middle powers are “states weaker than the great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states” (Holbraad, 1984). This adds another problem of operationalizing the definition: how to define whether a state belongs to the category of minor power, small state, middle power, and great power. For example, in classifying Japan, it is debatable whether it belongs to middle power or great power (Chongkittavorn, 2017, July 2), considering Japan’s economic might, its high rank in 2019 Asia’s Power Index (Bley, 2019, August 23), and the fact that Japan’s military budget is currently the second largest in East Asia. Not surprisingly, some scholars call Japan an “abnormal” power (Hagström, 2015). As a result, discussions on “middle powers” usually try to define them using material factors such as gross domestic product and population (Emmers & Teo, 2015; 2018; Öniş & Kutlay, 2016); ideationally in the sense that they are behaving like middle powers, embracing the identity of a middle power, and thus they are middle powers (Chapnick, 2000; 2011; Cooper & Mo, 2011; Jordaan, 2003; Karim, 2018; Patience, 2014; Ungerer, 2007; Wang & French, 2013); or trying to combine both approaches by looking at the impacts of the actions – in the sense that states are middle power “if they are able to alter or affect specific elements of the international system in which they find themselves” (Carr, 2014). Based on all of the aforementioned definitions, though, Indonesia is a middle power, and despite disagreements on the definition of ways to define “middle power,” virtually all of the aforementioned literature mentioned agrees that Indonesia is a middle power. And based on the literature, since Indonesia is a middle power, then it is expected to behave like a normal middle power state, which is to pursue its national interests and foreign policy goals “by encouraging the adoption of norms and standards of 172

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good international behavior” in order to “shape a rules-based order and establish good governance in international affairs through multilateralism” (Emmers, 2018). The problem with this approach is that, as mentioned earlier, the definition of “middle power” is simply too broad. Not all middle powers pursue their interests through diplomatic means. Some states that are defined as middle powers, like North Korea (Lemahieu & Leng, 2020) and Iran (Conduit & Akbarzadeh, 2019), try to bolster their power by building an arsenal of nuclear weapons. It is clear that North Korea does not behave according to the “standards of good international behavior” considering how North Korea had acted criminally to further its interests – to name a few, manufacturing, selling, and trafficking illicit drugs (Thompson, 2014); counterfeiting currency (Mihm, 2006); cigarette smuggling (Kim & Moon, 2017); illegal weapons trade (Bechtol, 2018); and hacking (Larsen, 2021). Moreover, it is doubtful if both states could be classified as “weak states” or whatever category below “middle power” is in order to justify their actions. Essentially, not all middle powers behave as predicted. As a result, in order to understand what influences Indonesia’s behavior as a middle power in Southeast Asia, aside from looking at Indonesia as a middle power, one also has to look at Indonesia’s strategic culture, which is defined here as an “ideational milieu which limits behavior choices”: The shared assumptions and decision rules impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational, or political environment . (Johnston, 1995) In essence, it is how ingrained assumptions and decision rules within the state’s apparatus limit the choices that a state can make. Thus Anwar (1996) notes that the army’s history of facing internal rebellions forces it to deal with internal affairs. Sulaiman (2016) further supports this conclusion while adding that Indonesia’s domestic political calculations and choices created the myth that Indonesia needs to have a foreign policy that is free from entanglement in alliances or military pacts, thus forcing Indonesian foreign policy to rely solely on a diplomatic approach to deal with global problems. Arif and Kurniawan (2017), while criticizing Anwar’s (1996) and Sulaiman’s (2016) overreliance on the army as the reference point for Indonesia’s strategic culture and suggesting including the navy as the less focused subject of research, ended up with an almost similar conclusion that Indonesian military is simply too inward-looking due to the dominance of Indonesian army in determining strategy and priorities. Dharmaputra, Wardhana, and Pratama (2019) further looked at the foreign policy output of the Yudhoyono administration and investigated how its freedom of action was essentially limited by Indonesia’s strategic culture, as discussed in Sulaiman (2016). Finally, Beeson, Bloomfield, and Wicaksana 173

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(2020) use the concept of strategic culture to discuss the ups and downs of the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship. Even though Australia is one of Indonesia’s closest neighbors, the bilateral relationship between them is marked by frequent misunderstandings and uncertainties – and this is due to their distinctive histories, cultures, and identities. Having discussed the linkage between “middle power” and “strategic culture,” the next section will discuss whether Indonesia’s “strategic culture” would be able to withstand growing tension in the Indo-Pacific region.

10.3  Indonesian Strategic Culture, Great Power Competition, and ASEAN Centrality The roots of Indonesia’s strategic culture, notably its commitment to neutrality, its focus on internal security rather than outside threats, and its foreign policy that focuses on preventing outside powers from interfering in the Southeast Asia region, can only be understood by understanding the history of Indonesia as a state. After Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, it had to deal with the Dutch, its former colonizer, which tried to reestablish its authority in Indonesia. In responding to this threat, the Indonesian government believed that Indonesia, due to its weaknesses, needed to align itself with the United States, whom it believed would be able to pressure the Dutch to end its attempt to reoccupy Indonesia, as both Holland and Indonesia fell in the sphere of influence of the United States (Sjahrir, 2010). This view, however, was opposed by many, especially among the nascent Indonesian army, who believed that the United States was supporting the Dutch reoccupation of Indonesia (McMahon, 1981). Besides, the Indonesian leftists were agitating for the Indonesian government to align itself with the Soviet Union, whom they believed to have far more sympathy with their struggle. However, the Indonesian government was reluctant, fearing that by aligning itself with Moscow, Indonesia would risk incurring the United States’ wrath and that Indonesia would fall into the communist camp while gaining nothing in return (Sulaiman, 2016). In order to quell domestic discontent over Indonesia’s foreign policy, as well as maintain its relationship with the United States, President Mohammad Hatta, in the end, declared that Indonesia would choose neither; it would not align itself with either Moscow or Washington. Rather, Indonesia should stand on its own as an active agent, based on its interest in mind and thus pursuing a free and active foreign policy (Hatta, 1953). While this declaration was, in essence, an attempt to deflect domestic pressure from forcing the government into taking a position it did not want, by the end of the day, the idea of a free and active foreign policy became the main principle of Indonesian foreign policy, that Indonesia should never align itself with any power or join any military alliance (Sulaiman, 2016). This policy was further reinforced after Indonesia experienced several internal rebellions and upheavals, and two of the severe ones were backed by 174

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foreign powers. In 1958, for instance, Indonesia faced the PRRI/Permesta [Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan SemestaRevolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Universal Struggle] rebellion in West Sumatera and North Sulawesi, covertly sponsored by the United States. This rebellion saw the United States provide covert financial support and weaponry, including a squadron of B-26 bombers piloted by CIA agents and mercenaries from South Korea and Taiwan and supplied directly from Clark Airbase in the Philippines (Kahin & Kahin, 1995). From 1963 to 1966, there was a confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the latter was supported by the British and its Australian and New Zealand allies. The violent conflict was seen in Jakarta as the British attempt to maintain its grip in Southeast Asia and thus required Indonesia to challenge its ambition (Gordon, 1963; Mackie, 1974). Besides, the PRRI/ Permesta rebellion mentioned earlier was also funded through a smuggling operation headquartered in Singapore, which was then occupied by the British (Crouch, 1978). Furthermore, in 1965, the People’s Republic of China was accused of supporting the September 30, 1965, failed coup, which was blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (Heriyanto, 2017), leading to a diplomatic freeze that lasted until 1989. Those experiences essentially made Indonesia wary of foreign interference in Indonesian affairs, including in Southeast Asia, from where it would be possible for any hostile powers to launch covert operations to undermine Indonesia. Therefore, for Indonesia to maintain its unity and integrity, it focused on dealing with internal threats – coming from both inside or covertly, from outside Indonesia through the porous borders with its neighbors. Not surprisingly, although Indonesia is an archipelagic state, it spends more money on its army than its navy and air force combined (Sulaiman, 2019b, January). By extension of the previous argument, it has to also push for Southeast Asia to be a region free of foreign influence. As a result, when the five states of Southeast Asia – namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – met to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, one of its original core foundations was the principle of non-interference. Indonesia also stressed that ASEAN needed to achieve a regional resilience, basically independent of outside dominance. Thus, when Malaysia in 1971 proposed to create a neutral zone across Southeast Asia that was guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, Indonesia flatly refused, arguing that ASEAN should develop their inner strength and resilience and should not rely on outside powers (Sulaiman, 2016). For many years, this policy worked. Thanks to its relative strength, Indonesia and the rest of ASEAN managed to keep the region relatively free from outside threats. There were some military actions taken to maintain the status quo. For instance, Indonesia invaded the recently independent East Timor in 1975 to prevent creating a “Southeast Asian Cuba,” as the new country was perceived to become a communist country (Richardson, 2002). Indonesia also prevailed in pushing for an international effort to secure 175

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Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, fearing that China was attempting to “bleed Vietnam white” by embroiling it in a long deadly civil war in Cambodia (Thayer, 1994). More importantly, ASEAN managed to guarantee stability in the region. As noted by Dewi Fortuna Anwar in 1994, ASEAN could magnify the ability of any one Southeast Asian state to make a difference in the region (Anwar, 1994). By strengthening ASEAN, Indonesia could project its power and influence in the region and maintain its foreign policy goal of keeping other great powers at bay. The end of the Cold War, not surprisingly, pushed ASEAN’s expansion to overdrive. With the fall of the Communist bloc, there was an urgency that ASEAN should expand to the rest of the Southeast Asian nations – namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam – in order to prevent China from completely dominating those four ASEAN nations. This fits with Indonesia’s and ASEAN’s original intention of keeping great powers out of the region (Cribb, 1998). By 1999, however, Indonesia’s foreign policy started to unravel. As reflected in Figure 10.1, China has increased its economic and military power, and China’s military spending has outpaced Indonesia’s and ASEAN’s military spending since 1999. As China’s power grows immensely, its influence in the region threatens Indonesia’s foreign policy goals. Therefore, during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia shifted its foreign policy goal to managing great powers’ influence in the region in order not to be too detrimental to the region and to Indonesia’s

Figure 10.1  Comparison of Military Expenditure between China, Indonesia, and ASEAN  Source: Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

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interest. Called “Dynamic Equilibrium,” by pushing this policy, Indonesia essentially tried “aggressively waging peace,” involving all great powers in the region “within a more cooperative framework as a basis for the development of an inclusive regional architecture” (Natalegawa, 2011). In other words, the policy suggests rather than seeing China as a threat, Indonesia should instead pursue a foreign policy with the goal of integrating China into the existing system, changing its behavior into agreeing with the norm of mutual restraints. As a result, this would boost trust among nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Natalegawa, 2013).

10.4  A New Foreign Policy? In 2014, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo unveiled a new Indonesian foreign policy concept called “Global Maritime Fulcrum.” The concept aimed to revive “Indonesia’s archipelagic state identity,” bringing Indonesia back to its past maritime glory, and Indonesia could become the center of maritime interactions in the world due to its geopolitical strength (Nelson & Sulaiman, 2015). However, such a concept only works if Indonesia has the military and economic strength to back it. While being the center of the fulcrum is an admirable goal, the logic of the fulcrum means that Indonesia will have to play a role to balance – militarily – against any power that becomes so threatening that it could upset the balance in the region. Moreover, the problem is that Indonesia simply does not have any military power or political will to do so. Not surprisingly, facing a growing threat from China, the Jokowi administration ends up taking a page from Marty Natalegawa’s playbook that focuses on diplomatic outreach: managing the interests of great powers. This was evident in Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi’s speech in January 2018, when she declared that Indonesia was trying to build “an ecosystem of peace, stability, and prosperity” in the Indo-Pacific region that would advance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. It is hoped that by presenting “ASEAN’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision,” Indonesia, and by extension, ASEAN, could still control the narrative that would allow the region not to pick any side (Sulaiman, 2019a). This arrangement, however, may further be threatened as the tensions between China and the United States increased in the past few years. Under the Trump administration, the United States pursued a confrontational foreign policy against China. The new Biden administration seems to be willing to continue Trump’s hardline approach, as evident in the first meeting under the Biden administration between the United States and China delegates in Alaska, where the meeting ended up in a public spat (Williams & Clark, 2021). More importantly, there is strong support in the United States for pursuing a hard line against China. A Pew survey taken in the summer of 2020 showed that 42 percent of the US population have a very unfavorable view toward China, 31 percent have a somewhat unfavorable view, while 22 percent have a somewhat favorable view toward China (Silver et al., 2020). 177

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On the flip side, the Chinese also view the United States less favorably due to rising nationalism among the Chinese, seeing growing hostility in the United States toward China (Feng, 2020). Facing this growing tension, not surprisingly, both China and the United States have been trying to increase their influence in Southeast Asia by bringing more ASEAN members inside their orbits, especially Indonesia. This is essentially a threat to Indonesia’s de facto foreign policy goals of maintaining peace in Southeast Asia, as the region is becoming the battleground of influence between China and the United States (Sulaiman, Delanova & Jati, 2021). Moreover, with China’s growing assertiveness and belligerence in the South China Sea, combined with the United States’ freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, tension and, worse, war are becoming likelier in the future, notwithstanding arguments that dismissed this concern (Mueller, 2021).

10.5  Role for Japan Indonesia, however, will be unwilling to get dragged into a conflict between great powers. As noted above, its past experience during the Cold War, where Indonesia was a battleground for influence between the Communist and the United States’ bloc remains raw. During the Cold War, Indonesia experienced several serious rebellions backed by great powers, notably the 1948 Soviet-backed Communist Uprising in Madiun, the 1958 US-sponsored PRRI/Permesta rebellion, and the 1965 China-backed Communist rebellion. Not surprisingly, based on that perspective, Indonesia fears that the conflict between China and the United States will again end up being detrimental to Indonesia’s interests and even its unity and sovereignty. Therefore, the role of Japan in the region can become more important in the future thanks to Japan’s wealth and favorability in the region. Unlike China or the United States, Japan has been engaged in quiet diplomacy in the region that focuses on the economic sector with the main goal of reducing its economic dependence on China (Wallace, 2018), making Japan an attractive option for conflict-averse Southeast Asian states, especially Indonesia. In general, despite Japan’s brutal occupation of the region during the Second World War, Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, have a positive view of Japan. This view is evident in the ISEAS’ The State of Southeast Asia 2021 survey, where 61.7 percent of all ASEAN respondents and 56.6 percent of Indonesian respondents consider Japan as the most favored and trusted strategic partner, above the United States (48.3 percent) and even China at 16.5 percent. The same survey also notes that in case ASEAN states have to seek out “third parties” to hedge against uncertainties of the US-China strategic rivalry, they prefer and trust the European Union (40.8 percent), which is followed really closely by Japan at 39.3 percent. Indonesians also to a large degree prefer the European Union (55.8 percent), Japan (23.3 percent), and Australia and South Korea sharing a distant third position at 7.8 percent, 178

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respectively (Seah et al., 2021). This finding is further reinforced in the Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll 2021, which looks at how Indonesians see the world. According to the poll’s feeling thermometer that measures Indonesia’s perceptions about countries, Japan is ranked highly with a score of 64. In comparison, the United States received a score of 60, while China only received a score of 53 (Bland, Laksmana & Kassam, 2022). Already Japan has been taking this opportunity and signaling the importance of the region for Japan. This is evident when in October 2020 Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga visited Vietnam and Indonesia as his first overseas trip as a prime minister, unlike his predecessor Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who visited Washington, DC, as his first overseas trip as a prime minister. In Hanoi, Suga stressed that Vietnam was crucial for achieving Japan’s vision of the “FOIP,” while in Jakarta, aside from promised economic assistance for Indonesia to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, he pledged increasing maritime security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan. By stressing the FOIP and more maritime security cooperation, Japan has basically signaled its growing concerns about China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and tries to expand its security role in the region (Green & Poling, 2020). While Japan’s growing involvement in the region is always welcomed, it needs to avoid being too forceful in pushing its interests. As noted earlier, ASEAN nations, especially Indonesia, loathe getting dragged into a global conflict, and Indonesia, especially, is always wary of anything that may interfere too much with its sovereignty or interest, notably in maintaining its leadership in the region. Indonesia will always accept any foreign policy initiatives from Japan that would help in preventing the region from being overly dominated by China and the United States, but not so many policies that could lead to Japan being too dominant in the region. As a result, Japan needs to maintain a subtle diplomatic overture, not too direct that it would lead to pushback, but at the same time, it should not be seen as too weak either so that Japan could not be seen as a credible partner. Essentially, Japan, considering how high its reputation in the Southeast Asian region is, has the opportunity to play a much bigger role in the region, as a key regional partner in maintaining regional peace and security, and to provide some sort of alternative leadership to the region. As Ben Bland noted, Japan can play a much bigger role in the region simply by being Japan; despite lacking in military and economic power in comparison to China and the United States, it could affect the regional balance of power by providing more options to Southeast Asia (Nobuhiro & Bland, 2020). While Japan is still a part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, which is seen as a part of a US-led security arrangement and has a security alliance with the United States and thus belongs in the US bloc, it never emphasizes that aspect. Rather, Japan always paints itself as a constructive partner for the region, independent of the United States, which is seen as not paying that much attention to the region 179

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(Wallace, 2019). By providing more options, ASEAN states, especially Indonesia could choose another partner to prevent the region from becoming overly reliant and thus dominated by China or the United States. And there is a precedent for this policy option. Back during the Cold War, Indonesia and India were influential in the founding of the non-alignment movement that hoped to provide an alternative to the world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. While the movement is no longer seen as relevant today, back then it was useful for third world states as a way to preserve their strategic autonomy even though it might not matter in the end due to the movement’s inability to develop an action-oriented agenda (Pant, 2016). By being present in Southeast Asia, Japan can help Southeast Asian states to preserve their strategic autonomy and to develop an action-oriented agenda, for real, through its economic and security initiatives that would allow states in the region, especially Indonesia, to remain independent and not be forced to pick sides amid the China-United States rivalry. And Japan’s presence in the region is helpful for Indonesia to maintain its free and active foreign policy.

10.6 Conclusion Indonesia’s focus on ASEAN to increase its power projection capability is not a policy undermined by its middle power stature. Rather, it is heavily influenced by its strategic culture in that its historical background influences the foreign policy that Indonesia picks. First, Indonesia’s foreign policy principle of free and active foreign policy was formed as a response to the domestic pressure that was trying to push Indonesia to join the Soviet Union bloc, putting Indonesia on the path of an independent foreign policy that emphasized non-alignment. This policy is further strengthened by the history of foreign-funded internal rebellions that Indonesians saw as grave threats to its survival as a nation. As a result, despite the fact that around 60 percent of Indonesia’s territory is made up of water, the Indonesian army, which deals with internal threats, dominated its strategic thinking and calculations, making Indonesian security policy have an inward focus. Consequently, lacking power projection capability, Indonesia ends up focusing on diplomacy and, in turn, relying on ASEAN as a way to maintain its influence in the region and at the same time guaranteeing its own security by pushing for ASEAN to agree to its foreign policy goal of keeping the region free from foreign powers’ interference. This is one of the main reasons Indonesia loathes influence of the United States’ or China’s growth in the region, as it looks at those countries as a threat to its leadership, ASEAN’s unity, and by extension, its security. As a result, to face these new challenges, Indonesia may need to rethink its current foreign policy. Perhaps, maintaining its free and active foreign policy is no longer feasible, considering the growing threat and aggression of China, especially in the South China Sea. 180

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Should Indonesia be adamant in maintaining its current foreign policy, it may need to include other powers that may not be as intrusive as either China or the United States. Japan may fit the bill. It could increase its security cooperation with Indonesia. While Japan belongs in the Quad, Japan’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia is marked not by assertiveness. Instead, Japan seems to support ASEAN subtly and, in turn, support Indonesia’s foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the ISEAS’ The State of Southeast Asia 2021 edition shows that Japan gained the most trust from countries in the region at 67.1 percent, with the European Union coming in second at 51 percent, followed by the United States at 48.3 percent, India at 19.8 percent, and China at dead last position at 16.5 percent (Seah et al., 2021). In essence, Japan has the most potential of strengthening its influence both economically and militarily in the region by simply behaving not as aggressively as the rest of the region; rather, Japan’s main goal is to provide a credible option for Indonesia to align itself. Therefore, this is a strong opportunity for Japan to extend its influence, and perhaps to influence the superpower rivalry between China and the United States, so that it could hold the key to Southeast Asia. Perhaps paradoxically, it is by inviting a benign outside power, notably Japan, to get more involved in Southeast Asia, that Indonesia may, in the end, be able to maintain its free and active foreign policy.

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Bley, B. (2019, August 23). A Middle Power Moment. The Interpreter. (https://www. lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/middle-power-moment). Botero, G. (1589, 1956). The Reason of State (Trans. P. J. and D. P. Waley). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Brunnstrom, D. (2021, January 13). Obama-Era Veteran Kurt Campbell to Lead Biden’s Asia Policy. Reuters. (https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-biden-asia-campbell/ obama-era-veteran-kurt-campbell-to-lead-bidens-asia-policy-idUSKBN29I25E). Carr, A. (2014). Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 70–84. doi: 10.1080/ 10357718.2013.840264 Chan, M. (2021, February 13). US and Indian Troops Start Joint Exercise as Joe Biden Seeks to Build Up Quad as a Counterweight to China. South China Morning Post. (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3121665/us-and-indiantroops-start-joint-exercise-joe-biden-seeks-build). Chanlett-Avery, E. (2018, February 14). Japan, the Indo-Pacific, and the “Quad”. The Chicago Council of Global Affairs. (https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/ publication/japan-indo-pacific-and-quad). Chapnick, A. (2000). The Canadian Middle Power Myth. International Journal, Vol. 55, No. 2, Spring, pp. 188–206. doi: 10.2307/40203476 Chapnick, A. (2011). The Middle Power. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 73–82. doi: 10.1080/11926422.1999.9673212 Chongkittavorn, (2017, July 2). Is Japan a Great Power or a Middle Power? The Nation. (https://www.nationthailand.com/opinion/30319723). Conduit, D. & Akbarzadeh, S. (2019). Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: The Case of China and Iran. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, No. 117, pp. 468–81. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2018.1542225 Cooper, A., and Mo, J. (2011, November 4). Middle Powers Can Punch Above Their Weight. The Wall Street Journal. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529 70203716204577015480229858806). Cribb, R. (1998). Burma’s Entry Into ASEAN: Background and Implications. Asian Perspective, Vol. 22, No. 3. pp. 49–62. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704181). Crouch, H. (1978). The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dharmaputra, R., Wardhana, A., & Pratama, M.A. (2019). A Forced Continuity? Tracing Indonesian Strategic Culture in Yudhoyono’s Foreign Policy (2004–2014). Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2, October 1, pp. 81–139. doi: 10.6185/TJIA.V.201910_23(2).0003 Emmers, R. (2018). The Role of Middle Power in Asian Multilateralism. Asia Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4, October, pp. 42–7. doi: 10.1353/asp.2018.0060 Emmers, R. & Teo, S. (2015). Regional Security Strategies of Middle Power in the Asia-Pacific. International Relations of Asia Pacific, Vol. 15. pp. 185–216. doi: 10.1093/irap/lcu020 Emmers, R. & Teo, S. (2018). Security Strategies of Middle Power in the Asia-Pacific. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Emmerson, D.K. (2016, February 23). Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea. YaleGlobal Online. (https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ sunnylands-or-rancho-mirage-asean-and-south-china-sea). Feng, E. (2020, September 23). As US Views of China Grow More Negative, Chinese Support For Their Government Rises. NPR. (https://www.npr.org/2020/ 09/23/913650298/as-u-s-views-of-china-grow-more-negative-chinese-supportfor-their-government-ri).

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Ford, L.W. (2020, May). The Trump Administration and the “Free and Open IndoPacific”. Brookings Institute. (https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trumpadministration-and-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/). Gokhale, V. (2020, June 16). How the South China Sea Situation Plays Out Will Be Critical for India’s Security. The Indian Express. (https://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/columns/south-china-sea-dispute-asean-countries-relationsvijay-gokhale-6460680/). Gordon, B.K. (1963). The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter, pp. 378–93. doi: 10.2307/2754684 Green, M.J. & Poling, G.R. (2020, October 27). Suga in Southeast Asia: Japan’s Emergence as a Regional Security Hub. CSIS. (https://www.csis.org/analysis/ suga-southeast-asia-japan-emergence-regional-security-hub). Hagström, L. (2015). The ‘Abnormal’ State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 1, March, pp. 122–45. doi: 10.1177/1354066113518356 Hatta, M. (1953). Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. doi: 10.2307/20030977 Heriyanto, D. (2017, October 20). Q&A: Was China Behind the September 30, 1965, Failed Coup? The Jakarta Post. (https://www.thejakartapost.com/ academia/2017/10/20/qa-was-china-behind-the-sept-30-1965-failed-coup.html). Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle Powers in International Politics. London: Macmillan Press. Johnston, A.I. (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4. pp. 32–64. doi: 10.2307/2539119 Jordaan, E. (2003). The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers. Politikon, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 165–81. doi: 10.1080/0258934032000147282 Kahin, A. & Kahin, G.M.T. (1995). Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: The New Press. Kahin, G.M.T. (1952). Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Karim, M.F. (2018). Middle Power, Status-Seeking and Role Conceptions: The Cases of Indonesia and South Korea. Australian Journal of International Affairs. doi: 10.1080/10357718.2018.1443428 Kim, J. & Moon, S. (2017, November 16). North Korean Tobacco Factories, Smuggled Cigarettes Bring in Cash For Pyongyang. Radio Free Asia. (https:// www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/tobacco-11162017144519.html). Laksmana, E. (2018, February 6). An Indo-Pacific Construct with Indonesian Characteristics. The Strategist. (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indo-pacificconstruct-indonesian-characteristics/). Larsen, M.S. (2021, March 15). While North Korean Missiles Sit in Storage, Their Hackers Go Rampant. Foreign Policy. (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/ north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-armies-crime/). Lee, H.L. (2020) The Endangered Asian Century. Foreign Affairs, July/August. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loongendangered-asian-century). Lemahieu, H. & Leng, A. (2020). Asia Power Index: Key Findings 2020. Sydney: Lowy Institute. (https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/lowy-institute-2020asia-power-index-key-findings-report.pdf). Mackie, J.A.C. (1974). Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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McMahon, R.J. (1981) Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Mihm, S. (2006, July 23). No Ordinary Counterfeit. The New York Times. (https:// www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/magazine/23counterfeit.html). Mueller, J. (2021). The Stupidity of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Natalegawa, M. (2011). Waging Aggressive Peace: ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific. Strategic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 40–6. Natalegawa, M. (2013, May 20). An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific. The Jakarta Post. (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/20/an-indonesianperspective-indo-pacific.html). Nelson, B. & Sulaiman, Y. (2015). Indonesia Makes Waves. Global Asia, Vol. 10, No.1,Spring.(https://globalasia.org/v10no1/feature/indonesia-makes-waves-a-newmaritime-policy-heralds-a-more-assertive-foreign-policy_brad-nelsonyohanessulaiman) Nobuhiro, A. & Bland, B. (2020, July 1). Japan Is Well-positioned to Counterbalance China in Southeast Asia. Debating Japan, Vol. 3, No. 5. (https://csis-website-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200701_Debating_Japan_Volume3_ Issue5.pdf) Öniş, Z. & Kutlay, M. (2016). The Dynamics of Emerging Middle Power Influence in Regional and Global Governance: The Paradoxical Case of Turkey. Australian Journal of International Affairs. doi: 10.1080/10357718.2016.1183586 Panda, J. (2020, September 1). Will Japan’s Indo-Pacific Activism Survive after Abe? Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2020/09/will-japans-indo-pacific-activismsurvive-after-abe/). Pant, H.V. (2016, September 29). End of the Road for the Non-Aligned Movement? YaleGlobal Online. (https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/end-road-non-alignedmovement) Patience, A. (2014). Imagining Middle Powers. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 210–24. doi: 10.1080/10357718.2013.840557 Reynolds, L. (2020, February 20). Australia’s 2020 Vision for Defence Engagement with ASEAN. Australian Government Department of Defence. (https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/statements/australias2020-vision-defence-engagement-asean) Richardson, M. (2002, May 20). Ford and Kissinger Had Bigger Problems. ‘We Will Understand and Will Not Press You’: How US Averted Gaze When Indonesia Took East Timor. New York Times. (http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/20/news/ 20iht-timor2_ed3_.html). Rudd, K. (2019, March 26). The Convenient Rewriting of the History of the ‘Quad.’ NikkeiAsia. (https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-Convenient-Rewriting-of-theHistory-of-the-Quad). Seah, S. et al. (2021). The State of Southeast Asia: 2021. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. (https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Stateof-SEA-2021-v2.pdf). Silver, L. et al. (2020, October 6). Unfavourable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries. Pew Research Center. (https://www.pewresearch. org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-inmany-countries/). Sjahrir, S. (2010). Perdjoeangan kita [Our Struggle]. Bandung: Anjing Galak Penerbitan.

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Smith, J.M. (2020, August 13). Democracy’s Squad: India’s Change of Heart and the Future of the Quad. Warontherocks.com. (https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/ democracys-squad-indias-change-of-heart-and-the-future-of-the-quad/). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. (https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex). Sulaiman, Y. (2016). Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: The Legacy of Independence. In Tellis, A.J., Szalwinski, A., & Wills, M. (Eds), Strategic Asia 2016-17: Understanding Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific (pp. 168–93). Seattle and Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research. Sulaiman, Y. (2019a, January). Whether Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy? Asia Visions, No. 105. IFRI. (https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ sulaiman_indonesia_indo_pacific_strategy_2019.pdf). Sulaiman, Y. (2019b). What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea. Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4. pp. 606–22. doi: 10.1111/asp.12496 Sulaiman, Y., Delanova, M., & Jati, R.M. (2021). Indonesia between the United States and China in a Post-Covid-19 World Order. Asia Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January), pp. 155–78. doi: 10.1353/asp.2021.0007 Takashi, N. & Kentaro, I. (2021, January 22). ASEAN Courts Biden as China Speeds ‘Vaccine Diplomacy’. Nikkei Asia. (https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ International-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/ASEAN-courts-Biden-as-Chinaspeeds-vaccine-diplomacy). Thayer, C.A. (1994). Sino-Vietnamese Relations. Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 6, pp. 513–28. doi: 10.2307/2645338 Thompson, N. (2014, April 25). North Korea’s Got a Big Crystal Meth Problem. Vice. com. (https://www.vice.com/en/article/438by3/north-koreas-got-a-big-crystalmeth-problem). Tomotaka, S. (2021, February 16). Asian Multilateralism in Uncertain Times – ADMM-Plus: Japan in ASEAN Defence Diplomacy. Singapore: RSIS. (https://www. rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/asian-multilateralism-in-uncertain-times-admmplus-japan-in-asean-defence-diplomacy/#.YC2Fu-gzY2x) Ungerer, C. (2007). The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy. Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 538–51. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00473.x Wallace, C. (2018). Leaving (North-East) Asia? Japan’s Southern Strategy. International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 883–904. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy027 Wallace, C. (2019). Japan’s Strategic Contrast: Continuing Influence Despite Relative Power Decline in Southeast Asia. The Pacific Review, pp. 1–35. doi: 10.1080/09512748.2019.1569115 Wang, H. & French, E. (2013). Middle Power in Global Governance. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 985–99. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2013.802509 Williams, A. & Clark, D. (2021, March 19). Top US, China Diplomats Have Public Spat as Alaska Summit Opens. NBCNews.com. (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ politics-news/top-u-s-china-diplomats-have-public-spat-alaska-summit-n1261490).

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11 JAPAN-AFRICA RELATIONS Looking at a Constructive Engagement Yoshiaki Furuzawa

11.1 Introduction Historically, the link between Japan and Africa has not been strong, and this may be largely due to the geographical distance between the two. For example, even in 2021, a direct flight route between Japan and Africa was only available between Tokyo and Addis Ababa.1 Japanese diplomacy has traditionally emphasized Japan-US relations and relations with its neighbors in Asia; however, Japan-Africa relations have been undergoing a drastic change in the past two decades. While Africa was traditionally perceived as an arena for Japan to contribute to addressing global issues (e.g., conflict, poverty, refugees, climate change), there has been growing interest among the Japanese private sector toward the potential of an African market in recent years. Furthermore, emphasizing that African states make up 54 of 193 United Nations member states, Okamura (2019, p. 37) described African states as “substantial partners” within Japanese multilateral diplomacy. As Mitsugi Endo of Tokyo University explained in an interview with the journal Gaiko (Diplomacy in English), “the African region is starting to hold an important place within Japanese foreign policy” (“Nihon gaiko no,” 2016, p. 34). This chapter will provide an overview of changing Japan-Africa relations by asking the following two questions: How has the relationship between Japan and Africa changed over time? Furthermore, what are the implications of the changing Japan-Africa relations? The first section will provide a historical overview of Japan-Africa relations, including the emergence of African studies in Japan. The second section will examine changes that are visible in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) between 1993 and 2019. TICAD is perceived as the “linchpin” of Japanese foreign policy toward Africa (Fujiu, 2019, p. 139); analysis of changes in TICAD will show us both prospects and challenges for Japanese foreign policy in Africa. In short, the chapter will illustrate how Japan’s interests and its engagements with Africa have diversified over time, while also drawing a

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possible lesson that may be useful for a recent initiative within Japan-Africa relations such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) – which would further deepen broader engagement exemplified by a recent shift in TICAD.

11.2  Historical Overview of Japan-Africa Relations This section will provide a brief historical overview of Japan-Africa relations. While we, unfortunately, do not know exactly when the relationship between Japan and Africa started, the first part will attempt to illustrate Japanese encounters with Africa in the early days, going back as far as 1581. The second part will trace the beginning of African studies in Japan since the 1960s, which has been instrumental in raising awareness of Africa within Japanese society. 11.2.1  Japanese Encounters with Africa The first African who appeared in Japanese history textbooks is Yasuke in 1581. It is not his actual name but a name given to him by the feudal lord Oda Nobunaga. Yasuke – whose real name is not known – arrived in Japan in 1579 in service of the Italian missionary Alessandro Valignano. He accompanied Valignano for a meeting with Nobunaga in 1581, which led Yasuke to meet and eventually work for Nobunaga. While Yasuke may be the first man of African descent who left his name in Japanese history, the first case of Japanese people meeting African people on the African continent is dated to 1586 (Fujita, 2005). In 1582, feudal lords who had converted to Christianity, such as Otomo Sorin, organized and sent the first official emissary called the Tensho embassy to the Pope. It is said the emissary stayed in Mozambique for six months on their way back to Japan in 1586 due to problems with their ship. While the first encounter with Africa can be found in the sixteenth century, due to the closed-door policy that started in 1633 in Japan – and lasted until the coming of the “Black Ships” from the United States in 1853 – exchanges between Japan and Africa do not materialize until the beginning of the twentieth century.2 Business between Japan and Africa grew slowly at the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, one of the early businesses run by the Japanese in Africa was “Mikado Shokai” by Komahei Furuya, who moved to Cape Town, South Africa, in 1898 (Kigatawa, 2014). The Great Depression forced Japanese businesses to seek new markets, including Africa (then Japanese products were known for “cheap and poor quality”). As a result, exports to Africa gradually increased from 1.9 percent of total exports in 1925 to 8.4 percent in 1934, while imports from Africa also increased from 1.6 percent of total imports in 1925 to 5.5 percent in 1937 (Fujita, 2005). For example, Japan Cotton Trading Co, Ltd. (today’s Sojitz Corporation), Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. (today’s Toyota Tsusho Corporation), and Gosho Company (today’s Kanematsu Corporation) were handling cotton businesses 187

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in Kenya and Uganda (Oda, 2009, p. 41). Trade with Africa reached its peak between 1937 and 1939 and was then suspended in 1941 as Japan entered World War II. While business between Japan and Africa grew – although unfortunately for just a short time until World War II – the only means available for ordinary Japanese people at the time to learn about Africa was limited, and Africa remained a distant foreign continent for many ordinary Japanese. One famous Japanese author, Shusaku Endo, recalled his experience on his way to France by ship in 1950: “At that time, my poor brain only recalled the Tarzan film. You may laugh at me, but a majority of Japanese youth in 1950 only knew about Africa from Tarzan films” (Endo, 1980, pp. 38–9). When he boarded the ship for his studies in France, he met a group of soldiers of African descent. He offered them two boxes of tobacco as a gesture of goodwill, and Endo received beer and foreign tobacco in return, which was difficult to come by in Japan at the time. On that occasion, his Japanese friend said to Endo, “They are more civilized than us,” which led to the earlier recollection by Endo about the Tarzan film. There were cases of visits by dignitaries from Africa to Japan even in the early days, but not many. In 1931, then-foreign minister of Ethiopia Heruy Walda-Sellase was sent as a special envoy to Japan by Haile Selassie I, the last emperor of Ethiopia. This was a return reciprocated gesture, as during the coronation of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1930, the Japanese government sent its ambassador to Turkey, Isaburo Yoshida, to Ethiopia (Furukawa, 2007). Heruy is considered the first dignitary to visit Japan from Africa. During his visit, Heruy visited various cities in Japan: Beppu, Hiroshima, Kawasaki, Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, Nara, Nikko, Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokohama. The impeccable manners of Heruy swept away stereotypical images of African people portrayed in entertainment films. However, as these visits were rare, stereotypical images of African people portrayed in popular films plagued many Japanese people. 11.2.2  Beginning of African Studies in Japan In Japan after World War II, academics started to organize academic associations linked to area studies from the 1950s,3 Moreover – while there are a few exceptions linked to Asian studies, such as the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia of the University of Tokyo, which was established much earlier in 1941 – the number of research centers focusing on area studies started to increase significantly from the 1960s (Takeuchi, 2012, p. 8).4 Within this overall trend, the institutionalization of African studies in Japan started from the 1960s with several African studies research hubs, each with different expertise: primate studies and anthropology at Kyoto University, geology at Nagoya University, linguistics and anthropology at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and politics and economics at the Institute of Developing Economies (Takeuchi, 2018, p. 3). 188

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The Japan African Studies Association (JAAS) was established in April 1964,5 its aim was (and still is) “to enhance the development of African studies in Japan through research about the nature, society, and humanities on the African continent and islands nearby.”6 Behind the establishment of JAAS, Kawabata (2015, p. 49) highlighted increasing interest in Africa among the general public in the 1960s, as former colonies in Africa became independent. While some perceive 1964 as a starting point for African studies in Japan, others point to 1958 instead. For example, Nishida (1984, p. 42) once wrote that “Japanese primate research on the African continent started in 1958, and that was also the beginning of African Studies in Japan.” Nishida (1984) referred to a primate research study conducted on the African continent by Kinji Imanishi and Junichiro Itani of Kyoto University, which started in 1958. This statement by Nishida (1984) explains a “multi-disciplinary approach” – including natural sciences – of African studies in Japan (Shigeta, 2014), which is still relevant today. A seed of this multi-disciplinary approach can be found in the 1960s. Imanishi and Umesao (1966, p. 22) explained that researches which originally started purely as primate studies research eventually expanded, and started to incorporate diverse disciplines: natural sciences such as natural anthropology, zoology, botany, limnology, palaeontology, earth science, medicine, and agriculture, as well as social sciences such as social anthropology, cultural anthropology, sociology, and human geography.” Thus, historically, African studies in Japan is composed of not just social sciences but also humanities and natural sciences, which is quite unusual, even compared to other area studies in Japan. Thus, Shiino (2008, p. 106) sums up that JAAS is a platform with “a balanced relationship between humanities and sciences.” It is also interesting to look at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), established in 1958, to learn about situations surrounding African studies, especially those linked to politics and economics. IDE organized the roundtable in 2010 with its former Africanist researchers, and the roundtable revealed that there was a strong concern at the beginning that IDE might become another tool to expand into Asia, just like the Manchurian Railway Investigation Department from the World War II era (Yoshida, Haraguchi, Hayashi, and Shimada, 2010, pp. 56–7). In fact, IDE was “criticized” as a “national policy research institute” when it was first established (Takeuchi, 2012, p. 10). Acknowledging that area studies as a discipline functioned as a tool of the government and was intrinsically linked to the national policy and national interests in the early days, researchers at the IDE eventually led to a research stance that research needs to take a distance from the national policy (Takeuchi, 2012, p. 12). Yano (1993, p. 15) argued that area studies research “needs to draw a clear line that it should not be a policy research 189

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for the national interests,” which meant that area studies must establish itself as a respected academic field. In short, African studies – especially when focusing on politics and economics – was built on reflection on what Japan had done during World War II, which resulted in an intentional distance between policy and research. There were (and are) research outputs connecting social sciences and Africa. For example, Hideo Oda wrote a paper titled “Gendai Afurika to Pan Afurikanism” (Contemporary Africa and Pan-Africanism: written in Japanese) in a peer-reviewed journal published by Keio University in 1964, while Tatsuo Urano wrote a paper titled “Afurika no Kokusai Kankei” (International Relations in Africa: written in Japanese) in the peer-reviewed journal of the Japan Association for International Relations (JAIR) in 1967 (Oda, 1964; Urano, 1967). Furthermore, if one looks at the peer-reviewed journal of the JAIR, in the past, there were four occasions on which a special edition linked to Africa was organized since its first publication in 1957: 1962, 1988, 2000, and 2010.7 As of March 2021, 204 volumes have been published, so 4 out of 204 is only 2 percent. Furthermore, out of 2014 members of JAIR (as of April 2018), 58 members (3 percent) associated their research with “African studies,” while 337 members (17 percent) associated themselves with “International Relations (IR) theory” and 224 members (11 percent) with “East Asian studies” (Takeuchi, 2018, p. 4). Papers linked to Africa and IR can be found since the 1960s, but unlike the US-Japan alliance and/or Japan-China relations, Africa, unfortunately, has not been a mainstream research topic in the Japanese IR community. This section provided a historical overview of Japan-Africa relations by looking at the encounters between Japan and Africa and how African studies emerged in Japan. The next section will bring the focus back to today and provide an overview of TICAD between 1993 and 2019.

11.3  Evolution of Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (1993–2019) While African studies in Japan were multi-disciplinary in nature and took a distance from the policy, as mentioned in the previous section, Oda (2009, p. 40) critiqued that Japanese foreign policy in the 1960s toward Africa had “no principle.” The situation slowly changed in the 1980s partly due to burden-sharing raised by the Reagan administration, as the Japan-US alliance heavily affected overall Japanese foreign policy.8 In 1989, then-Director General of the Middle East and East Africa Affairs of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in an interview in the journal Gaiko Forum (Diplomacy Forum) that “the year 1989 is the beginning of the African Diplomacy” (“Ima Afurika,” 1989, p. 24). TICAD is perceived as the “linchpin” of Japanese foreign policy toward Africa, and it started at that time. As the situation surrounding Africa changed over time, so has the meaning of TICAD for both Japanese and African governments. 190

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11.3.1  TICAD as a Forum for International Development (TICAD I – TICAD III) The idea of TICAD was first proposed by the Japanese government at the United Nations in 1991 and organized as an international conference on African development in 1993. At the time, the initiative was welcomed and considered a “unique and aggressive diplomatic initiative” (Ochiai, 2008, p. 18). However, with the end of the Cold War, while the international community was committed to the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, global interest in Africa was fading at the time due to “aid fatigue.” Characteristics of TICAD can be summarized into the following two points (Takahashi, 2017; Tambo, 2016). First, TICAD was launched by the Japanese government, but there have always been co-organizers for TICAD (see Table 11.1). For example, TICAD I in 1993 was co-organized with the United Nations and Global Coalition for Africa,9 while TICAD 7 in 2019 was co-organized with the United Nations, United Nations Development Program, World Bank, and African Union Commission. TICAD 7 took place in August 2019 with more than 10,000 participants, and it involved not just 53 African countries, including 42 heads of state, but also 53 countries that are partners in international development, as well as 108 partner Table 11.1  Overview of TICAD (1993–2019) Venue

Co-organizers

Keywords/Theme

TICAD I (1993) TICAD II (1998)

Tokyo, Japan Tokyo, Japan

Self-Help Good Governance Ownership Partnership

TICAD III (2003)

Tokyo, Japan

TICAD IV (2008)

Yokohama, Japan

Japan, United Nations, Global Coalition for Africa Japan, United Nations, Global Coalition for Africa, UNDP Japan, United Nations, Global Coalition for Africa, UNDP, World Bank Japan, United Nations, UNDP, World Bank

TICAD V (2013)

Yokohama, Japan

TICAD VI (2016)

Nairobi, Kenya

TICAD 7 (2019)

Yokohama, Japan

Japan, United Nations, UNDP, World Bank, African Union Commission Japan, United Nations, UNDP, World Bank, African Union Commission Japan, United Nations, UNDP, World Bank, African Union Commission

Source: Compiled by the author.

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Human Security South-South Cooperation Towards a Vibrant Africa: A Continent of Hope and Opportunity Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa Advancing Africa’s Sustainable Development Agenda, TICAD Partnership for Prosperity Advancing Africa’s Development Through People, Technology, and Innovation

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organizations in African development (e.g., international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)). According to Okamura (2019, p. 37), TICAD is “an intellectual forum” involving various development partners as well as African states to discuss economic and social development in Africa, which can be observed from the key terms highlighted, such as “ownership” and “partnership” from TICAD II (1998) and “human security” and “south-south cooperation” from TICAD III (2003). Put differently, TICAD promotes high-level policy dialogue on African development with development partners, following the dual principles of African “ownership” and international “partnership,” with “human security” at the core. Second, while similar partnership efforts with African states are now taking place, the difference between TICAD and other partnership efforts is that (at least in its origin) TICAD is not just about trade and investments.10 TICAD is about African development; it also handles issues linked to development in Africa, such as consolidation of peace and good governance, and tackling climate change, environmental conservation, and human resource development with the sustainability of development in mind. As Ochiai (2008, p. 19) pointed out, TICAD did play a “historically important role” in bringing the international community back to Africa; however, as time elapsed, that fact alone became insufficient. For example, the first three TICADs (in 1993, 1998, and 2003) placed emphasis on social development, and that was because the original intent of TICAD was to maintain commitments of the international community regarding poverty eradication on the continent. The coherent message of the first three TICADs was the importance of “tackling poverty, conflict, and marginalization in Africa” via “human development assistance with education and public health at the core” and “governance reform” (Takahashi, 2017, p. 52). Therefore, discussions were naturally linked to the topic of official development assistance. This emphasis on social development, however, was not always perceived favorably by a diplomatic community on the African side, which wanted to see more emphasis on economic development (Tambo, 2016, pp. 44–5). As a result, Japan had to decide how to (re)organize TICAD in the mid-2000s. 11.3.2  TICAD as a Forum for Public-Private Partnership (TICAD IV – TICAD 7) At TICAD III (2003), then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stressed the importance of the economic development agenda – such as agricultural development, infrastructure development, and trade/investment promotion – as “poverty reduction via economic development” (Koizumi, 2003). In addition, the Japanese government also emphasized the importance of the African Union (AU) on numerous occasions.11 However, there was dissatisfaction from the AU side about TICAD. For example, in a meeting with 192

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Japanese officials in November 2007, then-AU Commissioner for Trade and Industry Elizabeth Tankeu expressed concerns that there were no Japanese private-sector participants at the TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference organized in November 2004, and the Japanese government needed to follow up on its words (Shirato, 2008, p. 15). In short, there was a gap in expectations between the Japanese government, which viewed TICAD as an international development framework, and African states, which expected something more tangible (Ampiah, 2008). A turning point came at the TICAD IV in 2008.12 The theme of TICAD IV (2008) was “Towards a Vibrant Africa: A Continent of Hope and Opportunity,” and the Japanese government made the following commitments at TICAD IV: the doubling of official development assistance to Africa up to US$3.4 billion by 2012, US$4 billion to be made available in loans for infrastructure and agriculture development, use of official development assistance to encourage Japanese private-sector investment in Africa, establishment of a US$10 billion global financial mechanism to address the issue of climate change, and emergency food aid amounting to US$100 million, mostly to Africa. This was a clear shift of emphasis to economic development via public-private partnerships (Tambo, 2016; Shirato, 2016). Since TICAD IV, the Japanese government has changed its stance to promote African development in joint efforts with the private sector, often supporting private-sector efforts in African markets when appropriate (Hirano, 2013, p. 21). This is also a realistic choice for the Japanese government since development resources such as official development assistance are limited; thus, working hand in hand with the private sector was a necessary outcome. This change is visible in the following TICAD themes: The theme of TICAD V (2013) was “Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa,” and it was “Advancing Africa’s Development Through People, Technology, and Innovation” for TICAD 7 (2019). A similar message was also sent by the Japanese private sector. For instance, in January 2016, the Japan Business Federation often referred to as Keidanren, released a six-page report titled Making Contributions Toward African Sustainable Development in Japanese. While “maintenance of peace and stability is a priority agenda” for Japanese private sectors to carry out their business on the continent, the report recommended that (i) utilization of both development aid and investments should be a strategy for the Japanese government and also (ii) specifying “strategic priority countries” should be considered since it is not realistic to engage in all African countries (e.g., priority should be given to countries that are proactive in the improvement of the business environment and investment promotion; (Japan Business Federation, 2016, pp. 2–3). At the end of the report, the Japan Business Federation raised the following challenges to be tackled together with the Japanese government: (i) supporting non-resource sectors (e.g., agriculture, etc.), (ii) infrastructure development via public-private partnerships, (iii) improving the business environment (e.g., strengthening 193

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the legal and tax system, optimization of administrative procedures, deregulation), and (iv) human resource development that contributes to sustainable development (Japan Business Federation, 2016, pp. 3–6). In a 2019 policy speech before the Diet, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated, “as 30 years have passed since the launch of TICAD, a vibrant Africa is no longer recipients of aid, and we are partners growing together.” Once TICAD was an intellectual forum on international development for Africa; however, borrowing the words of Shirato (2017, p. 3), Africa is becoming an “equal business partner.” But, how should we understand this shift in TICAD? What are its implications for both Japanese and African people?

11.4  (Re)emergence of Geoeconomics? How can one comprehend the recent changes in Japan-Africa relations, reflected in the shift in TICAD’s focus? Perhaps the analytical framework used in Hentz (2004) may be useful. In order to understand US foreign policy toward Africa, Hentz (2004) highlighted three “competing master narratives” of US foreign policy – the realpolitik (geopolitics), Hamiltonian (geoeconomics), and Meliorism (humanitarian) – and described that “each has a distinct political undercurrent and each treats Africa differently” (Hentz, 2004, pp. 24, 26). While “[t]he pull of these different currents can vary depending on the times,” at the time of writing in 2004, Hentz (2004) explained that the default position of US foreign policy in Africa is geoeconomics – the stance that is driven by material interests of US transnational business – since geopolitics is not (yet) dominant on the continent compared to other regions of the world and the humanitarian stance lacks political leverage (Hentz, 2004, pp. 24–5). While Hentz (2004) centers his argument on US foreign policy, his analytical framework – geopolitics, geoeconomics, and humanitarian – is not necessarily unique to the United States and can be applied to other countries. Going back to the original question, we may find an answer to the recent change in Japan-Africa relations as a (re)emergence of geoeconomics. If one looks back to the relationship before World War II (especially after the end of the closed-door policy starting in 1853 and at the beginning of the twentieth century), a geoeconomic strand may have been dominant at the time (e.g., Mikado Shokai). However, represented by the stance taken by African studies researchers to keep a distance from the national policy – due to regret over what had happened during World War II – the humanitarian strand became dominant in Japan-Africa relations after the end of World War II. Japanese engagement in international development and peacebuilding on the continent can even be perceived as an extension of this strand. In that sense, the first three TICADs can be placed within the humanitarian strand. Therefore, a shift from TICAD IV in the mid-2000s can be understood as a (re)emergence of the geoeconomic strand and the humanitarian strand in Japanese foreign policy toward Africa.13 This shift, however, was 194

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not necessarily endogenous but rather exogenous – represented by pressure from the AU to seek tangible outcomes from TICAD. The next question that naturally comes up to mind is whether this is a welcome change or not. Takahashi (2017, p. 56) perceived this change positively: “Hitherto relationship with Africa was limited to the Japanese government, development agencies, and a limited number of NGOs and companies. It lacked broad engagement. If TICAD VI is strengthening economic partnership with Africa, that should be perceived positively.” There are those – on both the Japanese and African sides – who welcome further economic partnerships. However, there is a legitimate concern about this shift. One notable, controversial example is that of the ProSavana project in Mozambique. ProSavana was once considered Africa’s most extensive agro-industrial program, and it was aiming to turn Mozambique into a global export hub for agro-industrial products (Liberti, 2018). It began as a joint project of the Mozambique government, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency – which was then referred to as triangular cooperation – in 2011. The idea was to replicate Brazil’s experience between 1970 and 1990 of the cerrado – humid tropical savanna, which became known as the world’s most productive soybean-growing area – then supported by Japanese engineers and official development assistance. In Mozambique, it was hoped that “unexploited” land in northern Mozambique would be developed with the assistance of Brazil, and the marketing of its produce was to be handled by Japanese companies. At the same time, JICA provided infrastructure development to support its export toward Asia. At the time, even Bill Gates commended the project as “forging innovative partnerships” (Hongo, 2012). However, it turned out that (i) “unexploited” land was home to five million people; (ii) ProSavana had little to do with the local economy and domestic consumption, but was about food production for a profitable export market; and (iii) the project was decided topdown, without consulting the five million people. In short, due to strong opposition from local civil society organizations with support from the international community, ProSavana was suspended. In the early 2010s, ProSavana was widely publicized as a flagship example of public-private partnerships by Japan in Africa. What is essential is not to create another ProSavana in the future. Historical lessons from the recent past from Japan and its engagement in Asia have shown that large-scale projects should not be implemented top-down, and communication with all parties concerned is essential. For example, there was a controversial case of the Koto Panjang Dam in Indonesia. The dam was created in 1997 with Japanese official development assistance; however, due to a lack of communication between the government of Indonesia and local people affected by the project, 8,396 local people in Koto Panjang filed a lawsuit in Japan.14 The ProSavana project in Mozambique was not utilizing these lessons learned. It is a cliché, but learning from history is essential, so the same 195

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mistake will not be repeated again and again. At the same time, what is at stake here is how African societies will overcome multiple unforeseeable challenges for sustainable development (e.g., agricultural and infrastructure development). Whatever the decisions may be, both African governments and their development partners need to reach out to beneficiaries, even those people with different views/opinions. There are things that cannot be undone, whether one likes them or not, and deepening further economic collaboration between Japan and Africa seems to be one of them. Recent AAGC is another such example. It may be too much of an exaggeration, but Pandora’s box is now open. Whether it will benefit both Japanese and African people is up to both Japanese and African people.

11.5 Conclusion Both Japanese and African societies have undergone changes in recent years, which naturally influences Japan-Africa relations. Changes that can be observed in TICAD are one example. Moreover, African “ownership” and “partnership” from the international community – including Japan – can benefit African development. Nevertheless, recent experiences have revealed that this collaboration can be a double-edged sword, depending on how projects are being implemented on the ground. Whatever the future of Japanese engagement in Africa may be, how can we prevent it from harming ordinary African people? There may be hints lying around that are closer than one may think. Despite its relatively short history, numerous engagements between Japan and Africa already exist at the civil society level. For example, an NGO called Think About Education in Rwanda (TER) provides education assistance in Rwanda. It connects people in Japan and Rwanda with its message of peace. During the difficult time of COVID-19, TER virtually organized the annual peace concert in August 2020, which was composed of Rwandan music as well as testimonies given by survivors of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the 1945 Atomic bomb in Hiroshima. Another example is that of the Mulindi Japan One Love Project. Since 1996, the Mulindi Japan, “One Love Project” has managed a centre for people with a disability in Rwanda and Burundi – providing artificial limbs as well as vocational training to teach prosthetic-making and handicraft-making. Their activities have supplied artificial limbs and medical devices to more than 6,000 Rwandans and 2,000 Burundians. Both organizations have touched the lives of many ordinary African people and received the, “Award of the Japanese Foreign Minister,” in 2014 and 2017, respectively. Even in the case mentioned about ProSavana, the Japan International Volunteer Center, another NGO, also provided assistance to Mozambican farmers. These are just a few examples of engagements by civil society organizations. 196

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Furthermore, Japan Association for African Studies celebrated its 50th anniversary back in 2014. Even though African studies may not be the mainstream within Japanese academia, since the 1960s, the number of African studies scholars has grown significantly. Courses related to Africa are provided at both undergraduate and graduate levels in Japanese universities. There are also a growing number of students who seek their study abroad experience in Africa. Put differently, there already exist significant amounts of experiences and knowledge about Africa within Japanese society, which are not necessarily utilized effectively. Therefore, communication within Japanese society may be necessary in order to prevent another ProSavana. For a recent initiative such as AAGC, the importance of bringing in a broader civil society on board may be a lesson that can be drawn from looking back on Japan-Africa relations and the case of ProSavana – a triangular collaboration among Brazil, Japan, and Mozambique. If done properly and once differences are resolved, public-private partnerships – enhanced by TICAD and AAGC – can potentially benefit both African and Japanese people, as well as the broader Indo-Pacific region. However, Japanese society is not monolithic, and neither are African societies. Good intentions do not necessarily end in the anticipated result (and perceived as such). There is no “if” in history, but bringing on a broader civil society in the earlier stage may have changed the course of ProSavana. For externally led initiatives such as TICAD and AAGC to take their roots in the soils of Africa, topdown efforts need to be supplemented by bottom-up efforts. And, when bottom-up efforts and actors are incorporated, differences in view/opinions may emerge, however. Differences in views/opinions are not necessarily obstacles to overcome but can be perceived as valuable tips for moving things forward. The beauty is in the difference.

Notes 1 There was once a direct flight route between Tokyo and Cairo, but it appears to be suspended due to COVID-19. 2 The first Japanese who were said to be long-term residents in Africa were females known as “Karayuki-san.” It was the name given to Japanese girls and women in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century who were trafficked from poverty-stricken Japanese rural areas to destinations overseas to serve as prostitutes. While there are not many records about them, they lived in coastal cities along the Indian Ocean in Africa. 3 Out of 19 members of the Japanese Council of Area Studies Associations, 2 were established in the 1950s, 4 in the 1960s, two in the 1970s, 6 in the 1980s, 4 in the 1990s, and 1 in the 2000s (as of July 2021). 4 Takeuchi (2012, p. 17) mentions the following notable research institutes: SlavicEurasian Research Center of Hokkaido University (1953), Institute of Developing Economies (1958), Center for Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto University (1963), Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (1964), National Museum of Ethnology (1974), and Center for Integrated Areas Studies of Kyoto University (1994).

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5 According to Kawabata (2015, p. 98), Afurika Kenkyu (Journal of African Studies) – JAAS’s peer-reviewed journal – did not mention English notation of the association in its first issue published in December 1964. Between its 2nd issue published in April 1965 and 13th issue published in March 1974, the association used “Japanese Association of Africanists,” but this was changed to the current name at the board meeting on July 29, 1974, considering international critiques toward the term “Africanist” at the time. Thus, “Japan Association for African Studies” has been used since the 14th issue of the journal, published in December 1974. 6 The Japan Association for African Studies official website accessed on July 25, 2021. Retrieved from https://african-studies.com/en/about/about-jaas/ 7 Minosuke Momo organized a special edition titled “International Relations and Africa” in 1962; Hideo Oda, “Contemporary African Politics and International Politics” in 1988; Masahisa Kawabata, “Africa in the TwentyFirst Century and New Perspective” in 2000; and Mitsugi Endo, “Africa amid Globalization” in 2010. 8 As Cornelissen (2004, p. 117) pointed out, what would later become the aid diplomacy did start in the 1960s with Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda but was then modest in its amount. In addition, the oil shocks of 1973 did force Japan to seek natural resources in Africa. Efforts, however, were on an ad hoc basis. 9 Global Coalition for Africa was a North-South forum bringing together leaders from Africa and their principal external partners to discuss development issues, which was later disbanded in 2007. 10 For example, the US-Africa Leaders Summit took place in 2014, while the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has been taking place since 2000, KoreaAfrica Forum since 2006, and the India Africa Forum Summit since 2008. 11 Then-Prime Minister Koizumi visited Ethiopia and Ghana in an official capacity in May 2006 and delivered a speech at the AU Headquarters as the first Japanese prime minister. Koizumi visited Ghana because then-Ghanaian president John Kufuor was expected to be Chairperson of the AU from January 2007. 12 From TICAD IV, the venue for TICAD also changed from Tokyo to Yokohama. This was partly because Yokohama had a very large international convention center called the PACIFICO Yokohama (Tambo, 2016, p. 45). 13 Due to limited space, this chapter will not touch upon incremental changes observed in the realpolitik strand since it did not affect Japan-Africa relations as much as the geoeconomic strand. However, since 2009, the Japanese government has dispatched the Self Defence Force to Djibouti to combat piracy off Northeast Africa, and a controversial package of security-related bills, “the Legislation for Peace and Security,” commonly referred to as the Security Legislation, was passed in 2015. For more information on the 2015 Security Legislation, see Fujishige (2016). 14 In 2015, the Supreme Court of Japan rejected the lawsuit because providing compensation to people in Koto Panjang is not the responsibility of the Japanese but of the Indonesian government (Bachyul, 2015).

References Ampiah, K. (2008, June 6). Japan in Africa: A Distant Partnership. openDemocr acy. Retrieved from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/japan-in-africa-paths-topartnership/ (accessed on July 27, 2021).

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Bachyul, S. (2015, May 9). Residents Vow to Keep Fighting over Koto Panjang Dam Damage. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2015/05/09/residents-vow-keep-fighting-over-koto-panjang-dam-damage. html (accessed on July 28, 2021). Cornelissen, S. (2004). Japan-Africa Relations: Patterns and Prospects. In I. Taylor and P. Williams (Eds), Africa in International Politics (pp. 116–35). London and New York: Routledge. Endo, S. (1980). Bokutati no Yoko (Our travels Overseas: Written in Japanese). Tokyo: Kodansha Ltd. Fujishige, A. (2016). New Japan Self-Defense Force Missions under the ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ Policy: Significance of the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security. CSIS Newsletter. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/ new-japan-self-defense-force-missions-under-%E2%80%9Cproactivecontribution-peace%E2%80%9D-policy (accessed on July 29, 2021). Fujita, Midori (2005). Afrika hakken (Discovery of Africa: Written in Japanese). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Publishers. Fujiu, S. (2019). TICAD no Hensen (TICAD in Transition: Written in Japanese). Rippo to Chosa (Legislation and Research), 419, 139–53. Furukawa, T. (2007). Kindai Nihon ni totte no Ethiopia (Japan’s Relations with Ethiopia in the Early Years of the Showa period: Written in Japanese). The Otani Gakuho, 86(2), 1–17. Hentz, J. (2004). The Contending Currents in United States Involvement in SubSaharan Africa. In I. Taylor and P. Williams (Eds), Africa in International Politics (pp. 23–40). London and New York: Routledge. Hirano, K. (2013). Enjoy kara tosi he (From Aid to Investment: Written in Japanese). Africa Report, 51, 21–4. Hongo, J. (2012, January 6). ODA Transforming Mozambique. The Japan Times. Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/01/06/national/odatransforming-mozambique/ (accessed on July 28, 2021). Ima Afurika who kangaroo (Reflect on Africa Today: Written in Japanese). (1989, June) Gaiko Forum (Diplomacy Forum), 22–36. Imanishi, Kinji, & Umesao, T. (Eds) (1966). Afrika shakai no kenkyu (Research about African Society: Written in Japanese). Kyoto: Nishimura Company Limited. Japan Business Federation (2016) Afrika no zizokukano na seicho ni koken surutameni (Making Contributions toward African Sustainable Development). Tokyo: Keidanren. Retrieved from https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2016/005_ vhonbun.pdf (accessed on July 28, 2021). Kawabata, M. (2015). Nihon ni okeru Afurika kenkyu no tanjo (A BIRTH of African Studies in Japan: Written in Japanese). Afrika Kenkyu (Journal of African Studies), 86, 49–150. Kigatawa, K. (2014). The Relationship between Japan and South Africa before World War II. Kansai University Review of Economics, 16, 31–58. Koizumi, J. (2003, September 29). Dai 3 kai Afurika kaihatu kaigi niokeru Koizumi souridaijin kityo enzetu (Keynote Lecture by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the TICAD III: Originally Delivered in Japanese), at Grand Prince Hotel Shin Takanawa. Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/15/ekoi_ 0929.html (accessed on July 27, 2021).

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Liberti, S. (2018, June 12). Mozambique Won’t Be Mato Grosso (trans. Charles Goulden). Le Mond diplomatique. Retrieved from https://mondediplo. com/2018/06/14mozambique (accessed on July 28, 2021). Nihon gaiko no furontia ni kogidasu (Exploring the Frontier of Japanese Foreign Policy: Written in Japanese). (2016). Geiko (Diplomacy), 38, 26–37. Nishida, T. (1984). Afrika kenkyu no kaiko to tenbo (Memoir and Outlook of African Studies: Written in Japanese). Afrika Kenkyu (Journal of African Studies), 25, 42–9. Ochiai, T. (2008). TICAD wo koete (Going beyond TICAD: Written in Japanese). Africa Report, 46, 17–20. Oda, H. (1964). Gendai Afurika to pan Afurikanism (Contemporary Africa and Pan-Africanism: Written in Japanese). Hogaku Kenkyu (Journal of Law, Politics, and Sociology), 37(4), 51–74. Oda, H. (2009). Nihon no Afurika seisaku (Japanese African Policy: Written in Japanese). In Institute for International Studies of Kanazawa Institute of Technology (Ed), Nihon gaiko to Kokusai kankei (Japanese Diplomacy and the International Relations) (pp. 39–60). Tokyo: Naigai Publishing. Okamura, Y. (2019). Takokukan giako no butai tositeno Afrika (Africa as an Arena for Multilateral Diplomacy: Written in Japanese). Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), 678, 34–43. Shigeta, M. (2014). Sosetsu – tiiki kenkyu (General Remarks – Area Studies: Written in Japanese). In Japan Association for African Studies (Ed), Afurkagaku Jiten (Encyclopedia of African Studies) (pp. 570–83). Kyoto: Showado. Shiino, W. (2008). Nihon ni okeru Afurika kenkyu no hajimari to sono tenkai (Beginning and Its Development of the African Studies in Japan: Written in Japanese). Asia Afurika Gengo Bunka Kenkyu (Journal of Asian and African Studies), 75, 97–107. Shirato, K. (2008). TICAD has Afurika de do hyoka sareteirunoka (How Is TICAD Evaluated in Africa? Written in Japanese). Africa Report, 46, 13–16. Shirato, K. (2016). TICAD VI to Nihon no keizaikai (TICAD VI and Japanese Private Sector: Written in Japanese). Africa Report, 54, 67–72. Shirato, K. (2017). Africa to Nihon (Africa and Japan: Written in Japanese). Keizai Doyu (Corporate Executives), February, 2–11. Takahashi, M. (2017). TICAD no hesen to Sekai (Changes in TICADs and the World: Written in Japanese). Africa Report, 55, 47–61. Takeuchi, S. (2012). Tiki kenkyu to disipurin (Area Studies and Discipline: Written in Japanese). Azia Keizai (Asian Economics), 53(4), 6–22. Takeuchi, S. (2018). Nihon no kokusaisejigaku ni okeru Afrika (Africa within Japanese IR: Written in Japanese). Japan Association for International Relations Task Force Report Nihon no Kokusai Seijigaku (Japanese International Politics). Retrieved from https://jair.or.jp/wp-content/uploads/documents/TF_Report06_ Takeuchi.pdf (accessed on July 26, 2021). Tambo, I. (2016). TIVAD IV – Afurika kaisai no haikei to Kadai (TICAD IV – Background and Challenges for Hosting TICAD in Africa: Written in Japanese). Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), 650, 41–54. Urano, T. (1967). Africa no Kokusai kankei (International Relations in Africa: Written in Japanese). Kokusai Seiji (International Politics), 33, 77–84.

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Yano, T. (1993). Tiiki kenkyu toha nanika (What Is Area Studies? Written in Japanese). In T. Yano (Ed), Tiki kenkyu no shuho (Research Methodology for Area Studies) (pp. 3–22). Tokyo: Koubundou Publishers Inc. Yoshida, Masao, Haraguchi, T., Hayashi, K., & Shimada, S. (2010). Aiken no Afurika kenkyu soseiki (Early Days of African Research at IDE: Written in Japanese). Afrika Kenkyu (Journal of African Studies), 51, 55–86.

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12 JAPAN-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Addressing the Deadlock Kan Kimura

12.1 Introduction The foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea held their first talks in more than a year amid soured bilateral ties. However, they failed to narrow gaps over issues involving wartime history and Tokyo’s decision to release treated radioactive water from the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant into the sea.1 (Mainichi, May 5, 2021) Relations between Japan and South Korea are running into roadblocks. The origin of the problems is the issue of the recognition of history on the part of both countries. Despite several attempts to resolve it, the problem of such recognition between the two countries, centring on the comfort women issue, has continued to escalate since the 1990s. The conflict between the two countries entered a new stage in 2019. This was triggered by export control measures invoked by the Japanese government in July of that year surrounding some semiconductor-related products.2 The background to this was the decision by the South Korean Supreme Court on the ex-conscripted worker issue that was issued in October 2018 and its impact on Japan-South Korea relations. The decision differed from the traditional official view of the Korean government, which has limited the problem of historical recognition to a subset of issues such as that of comfort women. The Japanese government and the public perceived the decision as a fundamental expansion of historical recognition issues on the Korean side. This is why the Government of Japan sought a way to put pressure on the Government of South Korea to change this situation. The Prime Minister’s Office of the second Abe administration, in power at that time, called for each ministry and agency to come up with ideas to achieve their aim. As a result, the use of export control measures, which had previously been 202

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discussed exclusively as a means of controlling trade, was adopted. For example, in explaining the reasons why he decided to strengthen export restrictions on South Korea, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga cited the issue of conscripted workers, stating, “By the G20 summit, satisfactory solutions were not presented, and the relationship of trust was seriously impaired.” At the same time, Suga claimed that the government’s actions were not a countermeasure against the conscription problem, but it is clear from a series of remarks made by government officials, including Suga, that this measure was made with the conscription problem in mind.3 Notably, the Government of Japan’s imposition of export control measures in 2019 greatly expanded the scope of confrontation between Japan and South Korea regarding perceptions of history. Contrary to the “expectations” of the Japanese government, these export control measures had little impact on the South Korean economy but instead manifested in solid opposition to the Japanese government, which had attempted to subvert through economic oppression. The backlash emerged via a large-scale boycott movement against Japanese products and trips to Japan, further deteriorating relations between Japan and South Korea. The situation worsened even further from there. This is because the South Korean government proceeded to expand the scope of conflict between the two countries to security. In August 2019, the South Korean government notified the Japanese government of their abandonment of the Japan-South Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement. In November, the South Korean government decided to “suspend” this notification, but this series of events effectively caused the military protection agreement to cease to function. We are in 2022. With the global novel coronavirus pandemic, Japan and South Korea have come to an unusual situation in which summit meetings and meetings between foreign ministers cannot be held smoothly. This situation poses a major obstacle to the security policy of the United States, a common ally of Japan and South Korea. In particular, the Biden administration, which came into power in 2021, has strengthened its confrontational stance toward China centering on “regime differences,” and the confrontation between its two major allies in the Western Pacific region has become a major concern as it indicates a possibility for the breakdown of unity within its own camp. Why then did Japan and South Korea, both allies of the United States with very similar economic statuses and Western-style democracy, come into conflict? What is the current status of this conflict? These will be discussed in further detail in this chapter.

12.2  Long-Term Trends in Relations between Japan and South Korea4 As already mentioned, the underlying factor in the deterioration of relations between Japan and South Korea is the issue of the recognition of history, in 203

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other words, the conflict concerning Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula and historical events during World War II. What is usually cited as the cause is that Japan, unlike Germany, has not offered a clear apology to its neighboring countries, and there is a strong sense of anti-Japanese nationalism in South Korea. However, the actual conflict between Japan and South Korea over recognizing history is not so simple. For example, Table 12.1 analyzes the frequency of articles related to the perception of history in Chosun Ilbo, the conservative newspaper with the largest circulation in South Korea. What is clear is that the figure has changed dramatically since World War II and that the frequency of articles suddenly rose in the 1990s. Thus, the conflict between Japan and South Korea over the historical perception issue today is a clear extension of the increase in the frequency of articles on the issue since the 1990s. What is important is that such changes in circumstances cannot be explained by the lack of apology from Japan, as mentioned earlier, or by the characteristics of Korean nationalism. This is because the passive stance of the Japanese government toward apologizing was consistent after World War II. The 1990s, when the situation began to deteriorate, was a time when the Japanese government, as demonstrated by the Kono Statement of 1993 and the Murayama Statement of 1995, tried to confront its own past in a relatively positive manner. The same can be said of Korea. For example, Rhee Syngman, who became the first President of South Korea in 1948, was known for his career in the independence movement and his anti-Japanese strong sentiment. No matter one’s viewpoint, it is impossible to state that South Korea at that time was more anti-Japanese than in the 1990s, when Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and even Kim Dae-jung sat in the president’s chair. It is only natural that the Korean people, who had once been under Japanese colonial rule, have a negative perception of the past. It is impossible to see any significant change in this regard. What caused these changes to take place? In this regard, the following models can help us better understand the situation (Figure 12.1). Events involving colonial rule or World War II do not change by themselves, as they belong to the past. Nevertheless, if how they are handled changes, it is not the facts of the past itself, but the implications attributed to them and the environment that gives them meaning that changes. The most significant change in the environment surrounding the issue of the recognition of history between the two nations is the “change in the importance of Japan to South Korea.” For example, Figure 12.2 illustrates changes in the share of trade held by the major trading partners of Korea: Japan, the United States, and China. What is clear is that Japan’s share, which reached 40 percent in the 1970s, has declined to around 7 percent in recent years, nearly one-sixth of what it was. Of course, such a change in economic relations significantly impact the way South Korea manages its relationship with Japan. In other words, if Japan is of vital economic importance to South Korea, the deterioration 204

Table 12.1  References to Japan-Related Issues in Chosun Ilbo, 1945–2019 Comfort Woman

Volunteer Labor Corps

Yasukuni

Shinto Shrine + Worship

Dokdo

Independence Movement

Japanese Collaborator

Compensation

0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0555 0.0152 0.0068 0.0077 0.0234 0.0113 0.0130 0.0044

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0980 0.0485 0.0362 0.0308 0.0821 0.0947

0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0008 0.1757 0.0170 0.0056 0.0032 0.0042 0.0016

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0034 0.0020 0.0128 0.0266 0.0223 0.0059

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0004 0.0019 0.0025 0.0180 0.0066 0.0296 0.0187 0.0159 0.0033

0.0243 0.0844 0.0135 0.0112 0.0198 0.0050 0.0185 0.0095 0.0084 0.0327 0.0561 0.0466 0.1647 0.1081 0.0411

0.0089 0.0075 0.0188 0.0130 0.0207 0.0077 0.0090 0.0094 0.0154 0.0484 0.0488 0.0330 0.0367 0.0156 0.0491

0.0251 0.0021 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 0.0056 0.0017 0.0035 0.0077 0.0032 0.0085

0.0380 0.0139 0.0074 0.0049 0.0023 0.0014 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 0.0079 0.0115 0.0029 0.0026 0.0059 0.0087

Note: The figures indicate the ratio of articles with the word “Japan” in the title in the Chosun Ilbo newspaper to articles with titles including words related to problems of understanding history. 1.00 was 100 percent. D.B. Chosun, (last visited June 8, 2021; http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_service/index.jsp). Created by the author.

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205

1945–49 1950–54 1955–59 1960–64 1965–69 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–04 2005–09 2010–14 2015–19

Textbook

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Figure 12.1  Schematic Model of Japan-South Korea Dispute  Soure: Author. Note: The Kimura (2019), p. 36. The vertical axis represents the degree of importance, and the horizontal axis represents the passage of time. Disputes are liable to break out when Japan’s importance to South Korea falls below the importance of territorial and historical issues. 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05

Japan

USA

2021

2019

2017

2015

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2001 2003

1999

1995 1997

1993

1989 1991

1987

1983 1985

1981

1977 1979

1975

1973

1969 1971

1967

1965

0

China

Figure 12.2  Share of South Korean Trade  Source: Statistic Korea, http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/index.action (last visited July 25, 2021).

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of Japan-South Korea relations would have a certain negative impact on the South Korean economy. This is why, in pre-1980s South Korea, when there was a problem with Japan regarding the recognition of history, the economic community made vigorous efforts to improve the situation. At that time, a mechanism was put in place whereby the business community pressured the media and politicians to improve relations. As they responded to this pressure, the situation in South Korea would quickly calm down. A typical example was Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. As is well-known, the Yasukuni Shrine is a religious institution known for enshrining those the Tokyo Tribunal judged as Class A war criminals, as well as Japanese soldiers. Since the 1970s, strong criticism has been directed at how the shrine should operate by neighboring countries, including South Korea. Thus on August 15, 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, the South Korean media reacted strongly to the fact that the prime minister of Japan made his first “official visit” to the shrine in postwar Japanese history. Despite this, what is important is that there is a reason why the figures for the 1980s at Yasukuni Shrine in Table 12.1 were not big. Although the visit was widely reported immediately after the event on that day, the South Korean side, fearing a further deterioration in relations, began to work on de-escalating the situation immediately. As a result, coverage of this issue was short-lived, and the number of articles resulting from it was small. Needless to say, for Japan, a country in which the constitutional provisions newly enacted after World War II clearly prohibit the use of military power as a means of resolving international disputes, its economic importance to a particular country is its greatest resource for ensuring it maintains influence. This is why changes in Japan’s economic importance to such a partner country will naturally have a major impact on international relations as well. What is the cause of this change in Japan’s economic importance? What is important here is that the decline in its importance to South Korea is not necessarily a direct result of the decline in Japan’s economic strength, as is often misunderstood. For example, it can be seen in Figure 12.1 that the United States also reduced its share of trade with South Korea at about the same rate. Furthermore, Japan’s share in the 1980s, when the bubble economy was inflated, was also much lower than in the 1970s when the two oil crises threatened Japan’s economy, so it is clear that the decline is not attributable to Japan’s economic performance. It is overly simplistic to understand this phenomenon as a consequence of Japan’s share being stolen by emerging China, as is often misunderstood too. Until the early 1980s, China and South Korea, which had no diplomatic relations during the Cold War, had no direct economic exchanges either; hence, it is very natural for us to see the rapid growth of Chinese share in South Korean trade after that. However, the share was less than 207

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25 percent even in 2019. In contrast, between the 1970s and the present, Japan and the United States have lost more than 60 percent of their share of South Korean trade. This indicates that the majority of the share lost by these two nations is being taken away by countries other than China. Again, we return to the question, what is the cause? It is concluded that this situation was brought about by three factors. The first is the end of the Cold War. As already seen with China since the 1980s, South Korea, a country on the divided Korean Peninsula that once did not have fully-fledged ties with the former socialist bloc, began to have relations with countries such as China and Russia. Therefore, the emergence of new business partners naturally lowered the share of trade held by Japan and the United States, which were old business partners. The second is South Korea’s own economic development. In the past, Korean companies were small in size, and the scope of their business endeavors was limited to their surroundings. However, the endeavors of Korean companies, which have come to have great power internationally, have naturally spread worldwide. It is, therefore, natural for Korean firms to become less dependent on Japan, for example, for markets or suppliers of intermediate goods. What is more important is globalization, the third factor. By definition, globalization refers to a phenomenon in which people’s activities are easily deployed globally, not just in a particular narrow region. Therefore, in this “ever-smaller world,” exchanges with regions that are further afield, which had been hitherto few in number, will grow faster than those with neighboring countries. In the case of South Korea, for example, exchanges have emerged with Brazil and South Africa. In this context, the importance of Japan as a neighboring country, which had been important up until now, inevitably declines. A similar phenomenon is occurring not only in South Korea but also in China for the same reason. In other words, economic relations with China, which are becoming increasingly important to Japan, are declining significantly, as shown in Figure 12.3. This is because globalization is steadily progressing in China and with it the consequent decline in the importance of its neighboring country Japan. The decline in the importance of neighboring countries or neighboring markets as a result of globalization is a phenomenon that is currently occurring in every part of the world. For example, the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union (EU), which has attracted much attention in recent years, could be cited as a typical example. In the latter half of the 2010s, the United Kingdom, which had joined the EU seeking to enter that market in the 1990s, ceased to recognize the value of the EU market. This is because the importance of this market to the British economy had already been diminishing in the first place. This decline in the economic importance of neighboring countries in a globalizing society is a worldwide phenomenon. South Korea was a divided country formed during 208

J A PA N - S O U T H KO R E A N R E L AT I O N S 0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0

Germany

Japan

Korea, Rep.

Russian Federation

United States

Figure 12.3  Share of Chinese Trade  Source: China Statistical Yearbooks Database, http://tongji.cnki.net/overseas/EngNavi/ NaviDefault.aspx (last visited July 25, 2021).

the Cold War and the rapid economic growth it experienced since the 1960s, coupled with the decline in Japan’s economic importance to South Korea, can be said to have manifested in the dip in this relationship In other words, the decline in Japan’s economic significance to the Republic of Korea is part of a major international change, not primarily due to factors on the Japanese side. Therefore, this situation will not reverse even if the Japanese economy recovers.

12.3  The Accumulation of Distrust So, what happened as a result? As previously mentioned, if Japan is important to South Korea, even if some sort of dispute arises relating to recognizing history or territorial disputes, there is a strong incentive on the South Korean side to resolve this dispute quickly, resulting in the two countries moving to a resolution in an expedient fashion. As a result, a compromise between the two countries will be sought, leading to a diplomatic solution. However, as Japan’s economic importance in South Korea declines, the function of this mechanism wanes. The end of the Cold War reduced the need for security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, with the United States emerging as an ally for South Korea against the threat of the powerful socialist bloc nations. As a result, the incentives for cooperation between the two countries were further lost. 209

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In the 1990s, the situation between Japan and South Korea surrounding the issues of the understanding of history and territorial disputes deteriorated drastically. It should be noted here that this phenomenon was not caused by the “frequent” occurrence of issues surrounding the understanding of history or territorial disputes. We already mentioned the official visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985; however, there had been confrontations between Japan and South Korea over the recognition of history and territory even before the 1980s. However, these problems were resolved politically by prompt efforts of ruling elites in the two countries and so were never prolonged. In the 1990s, conversely, the mechanisms to resolve conflicts quickly ceased to function in both countries, especially in South Korea. Typically, problems revolved around the rapidly deteriorating problems regarding the comfort women issue. In 1992, the Japanese government tried to settle this issue, which had rapidly attracted public attention in Japan and South Korea due to Kim Haku-sun coming forward in August 1991 and expressing apologies during then-Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa’s visit to South Korea. At this time, the governments of the two nations had a common view that the settlement of economic issues related to colonial rule was entirely resolved by the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea concluded in 1965 in its ancillary documents, in particular by the Agreement on Claims between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which stipulates the settlement of economic rights. Therefore, based on this common understanding, the Government of Japan also tried to settle the issue of comfort women with a stance of “no compensation even if an apology is made.” However, such expectations on the part of the Japanese government would not be met. This is because Miyazawa’s apology prompted the South Korean public to demand compensation from Japan for the comfort women issue. As a result, the South Korean government changed its interpretation of the existing treaty completely and shifted its course toward seeking statutory compensation from Japan. Thus, in the past, the mechanisms of coordination between the governments of the two nations, which had been engaged every time a problem occurred, were abandoned, and the problem became entrenched. In figurative terms, there are “triggers” in Japan-South Korea relations, such as recognizing the history and territorial disputes, which continue to “fire” the disputes at a certain frequency. Examples include the revision of Japanese history textbooks about once every three years and the descriptions of Takeshima Island in the Diplomatic Bluebook and the Annual Defense White Papers. Before the 1980s, both countries tried to extinguish these “fires” as quickly as possible, and therefore they did not spread widely. After the 1990s, Japan and South Korea, especially the South Korean government, abandoned their efforts to put out these “fires,” and they 210

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spread widely and for an extended period of time. As we have already seen, in 1992, the Roh Tae-woo administration changed its interpretation of the “Agreement on Claims between Japan and the Republic of Korea” in a way that withstood the heightened public criticism of the comfort women issue. Since then, the Government of South Korea would change its interpretation of the “Agreement on Claims between Japan and the Republic of Korea” many times. In 2005, the Roh Moo-hyun administration closely examined the diplomatic documents leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and its affiliated agreements. As a result, it concluded that the three issues, the comfort women, Korean nationals remaining in Sakhalin, and Korean atomic bomb victims were outside the framework of the Claims Settlement Agreement. However, in 2012, the South Korean Supreme Court decided to acknowledge the demands of the conscripted workers in the form of quashing the judgment of a lower court in response to a case taken by the former conscripted workers against a Japanese company. As is well-known, the trial was concluded in October 2018, and in addition to the aforementioned three issues, that of conscripted workers was deemed outside the scope of the claims agreement. Furthermore, in January 2021, the Seoul Central District Court issued a judgment to grant former comfort women the right to claim compensation from the Japanese government in a trial against the Japanese government. Since the 1990s, repeated changes in interpretations by the South Korean administration and the judiciary concerning the perception of history between Japan and South Korea have greatly bothered the Japanese side. In fact, when issues erupted in Japan-South Korea relations during this period, it was only natural that the Japanese side’s frustrations with South Korea increased because the latter side repeatedly made demands of the former. Even if the Japanese side took measures in response to these demands, the Korean side did not see these measures as sufficient and made further demands, and this process repeated itself. The democratization of South Korea and the consequent divergence between the two countries’ “legal cultures” was behind this. After democratization in 1987, reform of the judiciary was encouraged in South Korea, and it was decided that old legal practices would be reviewed in the process. Against this backdrop, South Korea reviewed its interpretations of laws, regardless of whether these laws were domestic or international. Furthermore, the judiciary was expected to play an active role in democratizing South Korean society. Thus, a stereotypical legal culture of “judicial activism” established itself in South Korea.5 This kind of situation was significantly different from that which existed in Japan, which had a culture of “judicial passivism,” emphasizing the stability of legal interpretation and avoiding the intervention of the judiciary on issues that affect diplomatic relations. As a result, the legal interpretations of the two countries are largely divergent. While Japan believes that “governance by 211

KAN KIMURA 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Like

Dislike

Figure 12.4  Japanese People’s Perception of South Korea  Source: Naikakufu, “Gaiko ni kansuru yoronchosa,” https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r02/r02gaiko/index.html (last visited June 8, 2021).

law” is not entirely entrenched in South Korea, the latter believes that “democratic control” of the judiciary is not functioning in Japan. Thus, the two countries gradually came into conflict and became increasingly distrustful of one another. What was particularly important in this regard was the change on the Japanese side. For example, let us examine Figure 12.4. As is well-known, the perception of Japan in South Korea has not consistently been a positive one, partly due to past colonial rule and the various conflicts that followed. In contrast, perceptions of South Korea had never been bad in Japan in the 1990s and later. Such favorable feelings toward South Korea in Japan formed part of the backdrop to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono’s “Statement” on the comfort women issue in 1993 and that by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995. However, such favorable feelings toward South Korea in Japan would rapidly diminish in the 2010s. A major impetus for this was Lee Myungbak’s visit to Takeshima/Dokdo in August 2012 and his call for the emperor to apologize for the comfort women issue. Unfortunately, the deterioration of sentiment toward the Republic of Korea in Japan triggered by this incident has not reversed, even after a diplomatic agreement was reached between the two nations in 2015, resolving the comfort women issue. The deteriorating sentiment toward South Korea within Japan provided an incentive for the Japanese government to take a hardline stance toward South Korea. As a result, in July 2019, in response to the situation that was 212

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triggered by the Supreme Court decision on the issue of conscripted workers in October of the previous year, the Government of Japan decided to invoke export control measures related to semiconductors and put economic pressure on South Korea. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this measure had little impact on the South Korean economy. However, it did cause an intense backlash from the South Korean public, stoking already high tensions between the two nations. But, the deterioration of national sentiment toward the other country in the two countries had another important meaning in politics. The significance is obvious from Figures 12.5 and 12.6. Figure 12.5 illustrates Japanese people’s attitude toward the comfort women issue as of 2015, separated by party affiliation. It is only natural that supporters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito support the stance of the Japanese government, which is to say that all problems surrounding the comfort women issue have been resolved through the Claims Settlement Agreement. However, what is important is the stance of opposition supporters on this issue. As can be seen, the majority of supporters of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (the predecessor of the current leading opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan) as well as the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, which sometimes vehemently condemn the government over the issue of its perception of history, support the government’s stance on the comfort women issue. In other words, in today’s Japan, there are no significant differences between the ruling and 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Liberal Democratic Party

Democratic Party of Japan

Japan Innovation Party

Komei Party

support

Japanese Communist Party

unsupport

The Party for Future Generations

Social Democratic Party

The People's Life Party

DK.NA

Figure 12.5 How Do You Understand the Government Policy on the Comfort Women Issue?  Source: Dongailbo Guggyojeongsanghwa 50nyeon, dongailbo-asahisinmun gongdong yeolonjosa gyeolgwa bogoseo, Research & Research, June 1, 2015.

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50

40

30

20

10

0 Conservative

Middle Too Hard

Appropriate

Progressive Too Weak

Figure 12.6  How Do You Understand the Government Policy Toward Japan?  Source: Realmeter, http://www.realmeter.net/ (last visited on July 25, 2022).

opposition parties in their stance on the issue of the perception of history as it relates to South Korea. This means that even if a change of government occurs, it will be difficult for the Japanese government to dramatically change its stance on issues related to Japan-South Korea relations. The same can also be said of South Korea. Figure 12.6 shows the South Korean government’s stance on the implementation of export control measures by the Japanese government in July 2019 and organizes voters by ideology: conservative, centrist, or progressive. Again, it is only natural that voters who pride themselves on belonging to the progressive Moon Jae-in administration support the progressive stance; therefore, this point is not particularly important. What is important is how those who pride themselves on being conservatives respond to the progressives led by Moon Jae-in. As is obvious, the option they have chosen is a more robust response against Japan. In other words, even if the regime changes from progressive to conservative, if it follows the wishes of its supporters, and this is a natural phenomenon in a democratic system, it means that it would be complicated for them to take a step forward and attempt to improve relations between Japan and South Korea.

12.4 Conclusion What does this situation suggest to us? Clearly, for example, in the Cold War era, Japan and South Korea, which initially shared mutual values and 214

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therefore maintained cooperative relationships with each other despite having certain problems, gradually began to lose sight of the value of the relationship. As a result, potential conflicts were exposed. In addition, these conflicts affected each other’s interpretations of the law, as well as public opinion, thereby further strengthening and entrenching the conflicts themselves. In this way, since the 1990s, such circumstances have continued for more than 30 years to the present day, gradually solidifying into a structure. It is difficult for politicians in both Japan and South Korea to return to cooperation when such a situation is becoming an entrenched structure. This is because, at least domestically, adopting policies that gel with the mutual increasingly hostile public opinion would be a rational choice for politicians in both countries to expand their levels of support. Moreover, this confrontation between Japan and South Korea poses a major obstacle to the United States, a common ally of the two countries, which is becoming increasingly confrontational toward China, an ascendant nation in terms of regime, economy, and security. So, is there no way to improve this situation? There are two things to note here. The first is the trend in public opinion between the two countries concerning Japan-South Korea relations. As already stated, the decline in South Korea’s consideration of such relations results from the decline in Japan’s importance to the country; this decline continues to this day. As a result, what is emerging today is not only the decline in the political importance of Japan-South Kora relations in South Korea but also the deterioration of relations themselves. In other words, by around 2012, a phenomenon was observed in which the president, the ruling parties, and other parties’ approval ratings would rise if relations with Japan were deliberately taken up in South Korea and nationalist sentiments stoked. However, in South Korea, where interest in Japan has declined significantly, relations have not been taken up to any great extent in the presidential election. This is because people’s interests and expectations regarding Japan-South Korea relations are small, and this has prevented politicians from attracting additional voters’ support based on this issue.6 Similar phenomena can be observed in Japan. In 2019, the second Abe administration took a hardline stance toward South Korea, but this had little effect on cabinet approval ratings. However, in 2020, as the novel coronavirus began to exert its tremendous power, its interest in South Korea declined dramatically. Furthermore, in 2021, due to the Biden administration’s strong stance toward China, the target of Japanese nationalism has turned more toward China than South Korea. A decline in interest in each other means a decline in incentives for cooperation and an increase in the scope of politicians to make choices. This is because compromise will be easier if such a diplomatic compromise does not result in losing one’s own political interests. If such circumstances exist, the other aspect required would be incentives for cooperation. Today, in 215

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Japan and South Korea, people have lost sight of the benefits to be gained from cooperation, and the public has lost hope. This is why it is essential to produce concrete results once again. As the threat posed by China rises sharply, even if Japan and South Korea, which both have significant economic and military power, are in conflict with one another, the security burden will only grow greater. It is obvious that it is impossible for South Korea to regard both Japan and China as imaginary enemies at the same time. For Japan as well, it is impossible to conduct operations in the East China Sea or the South China Sea if forces are stationed in the Tsushima Strait to counter the South Korean Navy, which has grown larger than the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy. It is important for both countries, and for the United States, which is their common ally, to calmly re-calculate “the disadvantages arising from confrontations between Japan and South Korea” and question public opinion in both countries. How do you move away from an emotional, nationalistic “negative spiral” and return to a rational strategy? Questions are now being asked about the capabilities of both Japan and South Korea and their ally, the United States.

Notes 1 “Japan, S. Korea at Odds Over Wartime History, Radioactive Water,” The Mainichi, May 5, 2021. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210505/p2g/00m/ 0na/122000c (last visited June 8, 2021). 2 “Update of METI’s Licensing Policies and Procedures on Exports of Controlled Items to the Republic of Korea,” METI, July 1, 2019. https://www.meti.go.jp/ english/press/2019/0701_001.html (last visited August 2, 2022). 3 “‘Choyokomondai de manzokusuru kaiketsusaku nai’ Suga Kanbochokan kankoku yushutsukisei kyoka de,” Sankei Biz, July 2, 2019, https://www.sankeibiz. jp/macro/news/190702/mca1907021142017-n1.htm (last visited June 8, 2021). 4 On this point, see also Kan Kimura, The Burden of the Past, University of Michigan Press, 2019. 5 Regarding the legal culture of South Korea, see Yuki Asaba, “Judicial Politics in the Constitutional Court of Korea,” Grants in Aid for Scientific Research (Kaken) Reports, https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/file/KAKENHI-PROJECT25380163/25380163seika.pdf (last visited June 8, 2021), for example. 6 For further details, please see Kan Kimura, Rekishininshiki we do katararete kitaka, Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 2020, pp. 268–81, “Will the ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement Reduce Japan-ROK Mutual Distrust?” Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies, 2016, Korea Economic Institute in America, 2016, pp. 160–73.

References Asaba, A. (2016). “Judicial Politics in the Constitutional Court of Korea” Kagakukenkyuhi joseijigyo Kenkyuseika Hokokusho [Research Report for the Grant-in-Aid Research Program], https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/file/KAKENHIPROJECT-25380163/25380163seika.pdf (last visited June 8, 2021). China Statistical Yearbooks Database (2021). http://tongji.cnki.net/overseas/ EngNavi/NaviDefault.aspx (last visited June 8, 2021).

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Chosun. (2021). http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_service/index.jsp (last visited June 8, 2021). Japanese Cabinet. “Gaiko ni kansuru yoronchosa [Survey about International Relations]” https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r02/r02-gaiko/index.html (last visited June 8, 2021) Kimura, K. (2016). “Will the ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement Reduce Japan-ROK Mutual Distrust?” Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies, 2016. Korea Economic Institute in America, 2016, pp. 160–73. Kimura, K. (2019). The Burden of the Past. University of Michigan Press. Kimura, K. (2020). Rekishininshiki we do katararete kitaka [How Has the Story of Historical Recognition been Told]. Tokyo: Chikura Shobo. Kyodo (2021, May 5). “Japan, S. Korea at Odds Over Wartime History, Radioactive Water,” The Mainichi, https://mainichi.jp/english/ (last visited June 8, 2021). OECD Data. (2021). https://data.oecd.org/ (last visited June 8, 2021). Realmeter. (2019). “Ilgyeongjebobok jeongbu daeeung, jeokjeol39% ≒ yakam34% > gangham12%,” http://www.realmeter.net/ (last visited on June 8, 2021). Research & Research. Dongailbo Guggyojeongsanghwa 50nyeon, dongailboasahisinmun gongdong yeolonjosa gyeolgwa bogoseo, June 1, 2015. Shimbun, S. (July 2, 2019). “‘Choyokomondai de manzokusuru kaiketsusaku nai` Suga Kanbochokan kankoku yushutsukisei Kyoka de [There Is No Satisfactory Solution to the Problem of Conscripted Workers, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Strengthens Export Controls on Korea]” Sankei Biz, https://www.sankeibiz.jp/ (last visited June 8, 2021). Statistic Korea (2021). http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/index.action (last visited June 8, 2021).

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INDEX

Pages in bold refer tables, pages in italics refer figures and pages followed by n refer notes. Abe, Shinzo 2, 4, 14, 19, 25, 37–8, 40, 54, 83, 110–13, 116–18, 120, 128–9, 132, 143, 149–60, 162–4, 169, 179, 194, 202; Abenomics 15, 56; African visits 25; in anime 54; “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 38; diplomatic activism 24; dream for Japan 55–6, 81; emergence of “broader Asia” 125; emphasis on maritime security 39–40; freedom of navigation 40; idea of unified Indo-­ Pacific megaregion 86; Japanese foreign policy 15; Japan’s Indo-­ Pacific vision 2–3; policy toward Southeast Asia 149–57; proactive pacifism 41; rule of law at sea 4; Towards a Beautiful Country; My Vision for Japan 55; “World-­ Looking in Panorama” 151; see also Free and Open Indo-­Pacific (FOIP) Africa Business Education Initiative for Youth 27 Africa–Japan relations: African studies research 188–90; business and trade 187–8; defense cooperation 44; Mulindi Japan One Love Project 196; multilateral diplomacy 186; (re) emergence of geoeconomics 194–6 African Union (AU) 192–3 Afurika Kenkyu 198n5 Alliance Coordination Mechanism 43 Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade 48 anime/manga merchandise boom 61, 63–4, 70–1, 73

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna 176 AR gaming for mobile technology 63–4 Asia-­Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) 140–1, 187, 197 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 24, 140 Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 95, 164 Aso, Taro 153 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 1–2, 6–7, 14, 21–2, 30–1, 39, 41, 55–6, 84, 99, 116–20, 125, 130, 136–7, 140, 142, 150–1, 153–4, 159, 169–72, 175–6; ASEAN+ 164; ASEAN + 1 153; ASEAN + 3 153; ASEAN + 6 153; ASEAN Centrality 8, 10, 103, 171–2; ASEAN Cultural Fund 66; ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 153; ASEAN-­ Japan Center 66; ASEAN–Japan Economic Resilience Action Plan, 2020 7; ASEAN-­Japan Forum 66; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 95, 164; Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases 7; cooperation on UN Sustainable Development Goals 7; Japan’s relationship with 40–1, 55–6, 60, 66–7, 138, 140, 142; Japan’s soft-­ power policies in 63; Japan’s view on 154–7; military expenditure 176; Outlook on the Indo-­Pacific (AOIP) 1; popularity of Japanese pop culture icons in 63; Regional Forum 7 Australia 1, 5, 9, 19, 39–40, 78,

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112–13, 125–6, 132–5, 137–8, 142, 151, 169–71, 178; 2020 vision for defense 171; importance of ASEAN 171; naval exercises 40, 43, 47–8; Pacific Step-­Up policy 8 Australia-­Indonesia bilateral relationship 174 Australia–Japan relations 8, 87; Acquisition and Cross-­Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 96; China Factor 105–6; cooperation on infrastructure development and maritime security 8; Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement 96; Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 96; Indo-­Pacific perspective 97–104; Information Security Agreement (ISA) 96; Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 96; Pacific Step-­Up policy 8; “Partnership Agenda Between Australia and Japan” document 96–7; quasi-­alliance 95–6; Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) 96, 106; Special Strategic Partnership 8; “Special Strategic Partnership” mechanism 96 Bay of Bengal Growth Belt 22 Biden, Joe 2, 8–9, 170, 177 Bland, Ben 179 Bluebook of Japan – 2015 36 Blue Dot Network (BDN) 25, 33, 35n23, 141 Brexit 19 Broader Asia concept 12n7, 39, 111, 124–5, 130, 169 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 149 Build Back Better World (B3W) 141 Campbell, Kurt 171 capacity building 17 checkbook diplomacy 80 China 33, 80, 112, 162, 169, 207–8, 214–15; Air Defense Identification Area (ADIZ), establishment of 152; Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 15, 24–5, 37, 119, 125, 128, 141; dispute between Japan over Senkaku/ Diaoyu archipelago 40, 45–6, 82, 99, 102, 116, 134–5, 152, 157; maritime assertiveness in South China Sea 15, 37, 40, 47–8, 50, 79, 82, 88, 98, 105, 112, 133–4, 142,

152, 159, 165, 170, 178–80, 216; maritime policies 37; Maritime Silk Route 37; militarization of artificial islands 37; military expenditure 176; military spending 176; naval power 37; negative impact of rise of 152; relation with South Korea 208, 209; rise of 36; Silk Road Economic Belt 128; Sino-­Japan bilateral relations 40, 116; territorial claims 14, 37, 40, 46, 105, 132, 170; US policy toward 82; wedging strategy 142 China factor 98, 105–6, 119, 165 China+1 strategy 137 Chinh, Pham Minh 164 Clinton, Hillary 110–12 complementary partnerships 11; see also India–Japan relations; US–Australia–Japan relations Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-­Pacific Partnership of 2018 4 Comprehensive Economic Trans-­Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 18–20; free exchange of services 20 confluence of two seas concept 1, 12n7, 111, 113–14, 120, 124–5, 127 connectivity 5, 17, 38, 119; infrastructure for 22–5; projects 128 “Cool Japan Fund Inc.” 64 Cool Japan strategy 55–6, 63–4 counterterrorism 5, 9 COVID-­19 pandemic 10, 25, 28–9, 32–3, 43, 47, 71, 84, 98, 101–2, 133, 141–3, 163–4, 170, 179, 196 cultural exports of Japan 59–61; Buddhist diplomacy 69; calligraphy 60; classical theater forms 60; ideas of manga and anime 61, 63–4, 70–1, 73; ikebana (flower arrangement) 60; ikigai and origami 60, 63; kawaii and “cool” 62–4; pop culture 61–4; tea ceremony 60 cybersecurity 5, 7, 85 Davidson, Philip 37 Delhi-­Mumbai Industrial Corridor 22, 140 Development Cooperation Charter 21 Dhubri-­Phulbari River bridge 6 Digital Transformation Taskforce 24 Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan 36, 38, 60, 97–8, 128, 150, 210

219

I ndex

Disaster Risk Reduction Management Platform 27 Doklam standoff 170 Dung, Nguyen Tan 158 dynamic coupling 169 Dynamic Equilibrium 177 East Asia Summit (EAS) 7, 164 East-­West Economic Corridor 7 Endo, Shusaku 188 Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) 24 ferrry service in Djibouti 22 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 15, 18, 29–31, 31; in FOIP region 30, 30–1; horizontal 30; OECD definition 29–30; vertical 30–1 Foucault, Michel 62 Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo-­Pacific (FOIIP) 84 Free and Open Indo-­Pacific (FOIP) 2, 43–4, 110, 113, 118, 125, 128, 141–2, 169, 179; ASEAN centrality and unity 6–7; diplomatic concepts 15; diplomatic strategy 36; freedom of maritime common and rule-­based order 41; geoeconomic relevance 14; India’s response to Japan’s 130–2; in Mekong region 7; Quad, role of 9–10; see also Japan’s FOIP vision Fukuda, Takeo 60; Fukuda Doctrine 21, 66 Fumio, Kishida 163 G7 Charlevoix Commitment 25 geo-­cultural affinity 31 G20 EPQI 25 globalization 14, 31, 53, 73, 208 Gosho Company (Kanematsu Corporation) 187 G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment 4, 12n14 “Greater East Asia Co-­Prosperity Sphere” (Dai Toa Kyoeiken) 58 Guam Doctrine 79 Haneda, Koji 29 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities 5–6, 9, 16, 22

Ichikawa, Keiichi 114, 119 Inazo, Nitobe 58; Bushido; The Soul of Japan 58 India: Act East Policy 6, 140; Indo-­ Pacific policy 114–16 India-­Japan Parliamentary Friendship League 130 India–Japan relations 11; in connectivity and developmental projects 6; establishment of Act East Forum 6; Indo-­Pacific concept 111–16, 114, 126; on maritime domain awareness and information-­ sharing 47; ODA projects 6; strategic partnership 124–5 India-­Japan-­the US trilateral cooperation 47 Indonesia: ASEAN Centrality 171–2; Communist rebellion 178; concept of middle power and strategic culture 171–4; foreign policy 169, 174–8, 180; Global Maritime Fulcrum policy 177; Japan relations 178–80; military expenditure 176; PRRI/Permesta rebellion 175, 178; “strategic culture” 174–7, 176 Indo-­Pacific concept 114; change from “strategy” to “vision” 116–20, 128–30; defense and military dimension 132–6; India’s “inclusive” concept 114–16; infrastructure dimension 139–41; issues and challenges 141–2; Japan-­India relations and 111–14; Japan’s strategy 1–2, 37–9, 110–12, 116–20, 117; as operational concept 112; origin 126–7; trade and economics dimension 136–9 Indo-­Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) 20, 132, 138–9 Indo-­Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) 6, 39 Indo-­Pacific region 36; common areas of interest 5; common principles 5; in Europe 8–9; EU Strategy 1; evolution of 39–41; India’s centrality in 39–40; infrastructure projects 8; Japan’s strategy 1–2, 37–9, 110; maritime security 4–5, 39–40; opportunities and challenges 3, 10–1; Quad platform 10; rule of law at sea 4; US presence in 8; visions for 1 infrastructure development 4, 7–9, 17, 20–1, 38, 72, 102–3, 126, 128–9, 132, 138–41, 143–4, 150, 160,

220

I ndex

163–4, 193, 195–6; capacity building via 25–8; connectivity via 22–5; G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment 4, 12n14; see also Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Infrastructure Strategy Council 22 Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia 188 Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) 188–9 IRODORI 72 Iwabuchi, Koichi 61 Jae-­in, Moon 214 Japan: Acquisition and Cross-­Serving Agreements 44; anti-­piracy vessels 80; balance of trade 17; boom in Asia 56, 57; boom in Southeast Asia 60; Bunmei Kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment) 58; “Cool Japan” initiative 55–6, 63–4; culture diplomacy 53–4; culture of “judicial passivism” 211; current account composition 17, 17; Datsua-­Ron (De-­Asianization) 58; defense cooperation with Indo-­ Pacific countries 42–3, 44; earnings from FDI 18; economic agenda post-­pandemic 32–3; economic calculation 16–8; economy 56; Five New Principles of Japanese Diplomacy 40; foreign direct investments (FDI) 15; foreign policy 15, 40, 60, 127; Free Trade Agreements with Asian nations 18, 138; fusion of culture 58; Ground Self-­Defense Force deployment in South Sudan 42; Indo-­Pacific Vision 1–2, 37–9, 110–12, 116, 117; Information Security Agreement and Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement 44; International Peace Cooperation Law, 1992 80; leadership 18–20, 25; Meiji foreign policy of Westernization 58; military budget 172; multilateral peacekeeping missions 80; National Defense Program Outline 79; new image in the world 62; ODA projects 6, 16, 18, 20–9; peace initiative 28–9; principles of cooperation with ASEAN 154–7; relationship with

ASEAN 60; security exercises 43; Self-­Defense Forces (SDF) 41–3, 163; Senkaku issue 40; Shogunate permit system 58; trade agreements 18–20 Japan Association for African Studies (JAAS) 189, 197, 198n5 Japan Association for International Relations (JAIR) 190 Japan Business Federation 193 Japan Coast Guard (JCG) 45 Japan Consortium 54 Japan Cotton Trading Co, Ltd. (Sojitz Corporation) 187 Japanese national security policy 36 Japanese restaurants and eateries 72 Japan-­European Union (EU) Economic Agreement 19 Japan Foundation 71–2 Japan-­India Maritime Exercise 40 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 24; in agricultural sector 27; capacity building assistance 25–8, 26; disbursement to Africa 25, 27; disbursement to Middle East 27–8, 28; infrastructure development 29, 195; Knowledge Co-­Creation Program 28; low-­ cost financing 29; peace building 28–9; post-­COVID-­19 28; Project for Improvement of Magway General Hospital 29; support of Joint Peace and Security Teams 29; support of Syrian refugees 28 Japan Maritime Self-­Defense Force (JMSDF) 37, 40, 42–3; bilateral maritime exercise 48, 49; with Combined Task Force (CTF) 45; deployment of naval vessels 46–7; Operation Enduring Freedom 44–5, 80; port visits 50; protection of SLOC 44; replenishment activity in Indian Ocean 45; ships 46–7; strategic and operational objectives 45, 46 Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) program 60 Japan Scholarship Fund for ASEAN Youth 66 Japan’s FOIP vision 15, 24–5, 36; Capacity Building Assistance (CBA) 16; close partnerships 5; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities 5–6, 9, 16; maritime security 4–5, 44–50; in Mekong

221

I ndex

region 7; opportunities and challenges 2–3; practical cooperation under three pillars 3–5; principles for infrastructure development 4; rule of law at sea 4; rules-­based order 16; three pillars 15–6 Japan’s Southeast Asian policy 149–57; as attractive destination 152–3; future direction 157–8; goals and objectives 151–3; impact of 158–60; pillars and realization measures 153–4 Junichiro, Koizumi 61 Kanehara, Nobukatsu 114 Karayuki-­san 197n2 Keidanren 24, 193 Kishida, Fumio 20, 113 Koizumi, Junichiro 192 Kokusai Bunka Shinkoukai (The Society for International Cultural Relations) 59–60 Korean nationalism 204 Koto Panjang Dam controversy 195 labor and intellectual property rights protection 20 Lach Huyen port infrastructure construction project, Vietnam 7 Malabar exercise 40, 47, 87, 100, 135 maritime security and cooperation 4–5, 7, 9, 36, 39–40, 103, 125, 131, 133, 140, 152, 154–6, 159, 179; capacity building in maritime law enforcement 22; concerns of Chinese maritime assertiveness 40; importance of strategic islands 40 Marsudi, Retno 177 Mattis, James 38 McLuhan, Marshall 64 Mekong-­Japan Cooperation projects 7 Menon, Shivshankar 112 middle power 171–4 Modi, Narendra 1, 39, 69, 113, 120, 128, 131 Momii, Katsuto 54 Moro Islamic Liberation Front 29 Morrison, Scott 2 Motegi, Toshimitsu 4 Murayama, Tomiichi 204, 212 Myungbak, Lee 212

Nakasone, Yasuhiro 207 Natalegawa, Marty 177 NHK World-­Japan radio 70 Nichiren Buddhism 59 Nintendo 64, 73 Nixon Shocks 79, 90, 91n1 Nobunaga, Oda 187 Northern Corridor 22 Nye, Joseph 55 Obama, Barack 112 Oda, Hideo 190 ODA Charter 21, 33 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) projects 6, 16, 18, 20–30, 31, 155–6, 164; in ASEAN 21–2; capacity building assistance 25–8, 26; connectivity initiatives 23; digital infrastructure 24; infrastructure development 22–5; loan projects 28; urban development and urban railways/transport system 25 Pacific Islands Leaders Meetings 8 Pacific Step-­Up policy 8 Palestine Liberation Organization 29 Panda, Rajaram 40 “Pokemon Go” 63–4 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) 137 Project Syndicate 40, 127 ProSavana 195 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) 9–10, 77–8, 84, 87, 100, 104, 120, 125, 131–5, 138–9, 142–3, 170–1, 179, 181; defense cooperation platform 170; institutionalization of 135–6; joint statement 133–4; Quad Plus 84, 91; Quad Vaccine Experts Group 10 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 4, 18–20, 138 resource diplomacy 28 rule of law/rules-­based order 16, 19, 125, 127, 153; in international trading forum 20 Sadakazu, Tanigaki 22 Sea Lane of Communications (SLOC) 37, 40, 44, 48

222

I ndex

Senkaku issue 40, 45–6, 82, 99, 102, 116, 134–5, 152, 157 service sector 20 Shangri-­La Dialogue 1, 3–4, 6, 128, 153 Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program 66 Sindhuli Road 22 Singh, Manmohan 112, 130–1, 169 soft-­power diplomacy 53, 61–4; “Cool Japan Fund Inc.” 64; cultural perspective 55, 58–9; definition 54–5; engagement with Southeast Asia and South Asia 66–9; with India 69–73; Japanese fashion and 65–6; mass media 64–5; as nation branding and “image” creation 59–62; seven pillars 54 Sorin, Otomo 187 South China Sea issue 15, 37, 40, 47–8, 50, 79, 82, 88, 98, 105, 112, 133–4, 142, 152, 159, 165, 170, 178–80, 216 Southeast Asian Cuba 175 Southern Economic Corridor 7, 22 South Korea–Japan relations: Claims Settlement Agreement 211, 213; deterioration of national sentiment 213; distrust between countries 209–14; economic dimension 207–9, 209; globalization impact 208; issues with export control measures 202–3, 213–14; Japanese people’s perception of South Korea 212; Kono Statement of 1993 204; model of dispute 206; Murayama Statement of 1995 204; post democratization of South Korea 211; public opinion 214; recognition of history 202–4, 205, 207, 209–10; during Roh Moo-­hyun administration 211; security cooperation 209; share of trade 204, 206; territorial disputes 209–10; Treaty on Basic Relations 210; Yasukuni Shrine visit and deterioration in 207, 210 The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report 170 Suga, Yoshihide 2, 8, 24, 81, 163, 179, 203 Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) 137 Suzuki Motor Corporation 69 Swaraj, Sushma 113

Tae-­woo, Roh 204 Taniguchi, Tomohiko 114 Tarzan film 188 Tenshin, Okakura 58 Tetsuwan Atomu 55 Think About Education in Rwanda (TER) 196 Tillerson, Rex 83 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) 15, 25, 37–8, 111, 113, 127, 186, 190, 191; Asia-­Africa Trade and Investment Conference 193; characteristics 191–2; as a forum for international development 191–2; as a forum for public-­ private partnership 192–4; official development assistance 193; trade and investments 192–3 “The Tokyo Show” 53–4 Toshihiro, Nikai 22 Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. (Toyota Tsusho Corporation) 187 Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP) 18–9, 136 Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment 8 Trump, Donald 149, 170–1, 177; “America first” approach 18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 4, 133, 165 United States’ freedom of navigation operation 178 Urano, Tatsuo 190 US–Australia–Japan relations 5, 8, 11; Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding 8 US–China relations 170 US–Japan relations 8, 18; during Cold War 79–80; Defense Guidelines 81–2; future prospects 86–90; Indo-­Pacific perspective 81–6; normalization (equalization) of 79; return of Bonin Islands and Okinawa to Japan 79; security relations 43, 59, 77, 81, 149; Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1951 78–9; US basing rights on Japanese soil 79 US-­Japan Security Consultive Committee (2+2) 43

223

I ndex

Valignano, Alessandro 187 value-­based diplomacy 124, 127–8, 130, 153 Vietnam–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (VJEPA) 158 Vietnam–Japan relations 149; Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection 158; future prospects 164–5; human resource development 162; industrialization strategy 161–2; infrastructure development 163; Joint Initiative 161; overview 160–4; strategic partnership 150 Vivekananda, Swami 72

Walda-­Sellase, Heruy 188 washoku (Japanese food) 72 “Where Will They Go” index 33 Widodo, Joko “Jokowi” 177 World Trade Organization (WTO) 20, 159 Yachi, Shotaro 114 Yangon-­Mandalay Railway 22 Yasukuni Shrine 207 Yoshida, Isaburo 188 Young-­sam, Kim 204 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 173, 176

224