James VI and Noble Power in Scotland 1578-1603 9781351982870, 9781138946064, 9781315270739

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James VI and Noble Power in Scotland 1578–1603

Shedding new light on both familiar and neglected episodes and issues from James’s Scottish reign, this wide-ranging collection considerably enhances our understanding of later sixteenth-century Scottish politics, and of the personality of the first ruler of Scotland, England, Wales and Ireland. Alan MacDonald, University of Dundee, UK James VI and Noble Power in Scotland explores how Scotland was governed in the late sixteenth century by examining the dynamic between King James and his nobles from the end of his formal minority in 1578 until his accession to the English throne in 1603. The collection assesses James’ relationship with his nobility, detailing how he interacted with them and how they fought, co-operated with and understood each other. It includes case studies from across Scotland, from the Highlands to the Borders and burghs, and on major individual events such as the famous Gowrie conspiracy. Themes such as the nature of government in Scotland and religion as a shaper of policy and faction are addressed, as well as broader perspectives on the British and European nobility, bloodfeuds and state-building in the early modern period. The ten chapters together challenge well-established notions that James aimed to be a modern, centralising monarch seeking to curb the traditional structures of power and that the period represented a period of crisis for the traditional and unrestrained culture of feuding nobility. They demonstrate that King James was a competent and successful manager of his kingdom who demanded a new level of obedience as a ‘universal king’. This volume offers students of Stuart Britain a fresh and valuable perspective on James and his reign. Miles Kerr-Peterson recently completed a PhD in history at the University of Glasgow, his thesis being a study of the life and lordship of George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal. His research focuses on early modern Scottish noble and academic cultures. Steven J. Reid is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Glasgow. His previous publications include Humanism and Calvinism: Andrew Melville and the Universities of Scotland, c.1560–c.1625 (2011).

Routledge Research in Early Modern History

In the same series: Penury into Plenty Dearth and the Making of Knowledge in Early Modern England Ayesha Mukherjee Violence and Emotions in Early Modern Europe Edited by Susan Broomhall and Sarah Finn India in the Italian Renaissance Visions of a Contemporary Pagan World 1300–1600 Meera Juncu The English Revolution and the Roots of Environmental Change The Changing Concept of the Land in Early Modern England George Yerby Honourable Intentions? Violence and Virtue in Australian and Cape Colonies, c. 1750 to 1850 Edited by Penny Russell and Nigel Worden Social Thought in England, 1480–1730 From Body Social to Worldly Wealth A. L. Beier Dynastic Colonialism Gender, Materiality and the Early Modern House of Orange-Nassau Susan Broomhall and Jacqueline van Gent The Business of the Roman Inquisition in the Early Modern Era Germano Maifreda Cities and Solidarities Urban Communities in Pre-Modern Europe Edited by Justin Colson and Arie van Steensel James VI and Noble Power in Scotland 1578–1603 Edited by Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid

James VI and Noble Power in Scotland 1578–1603

Edited by Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid for selection and editorial matter, individual contributions © the contributors The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kerr-Peterson, Miles, editor. | Reid, Steven J., editor, author. Title: James VI and noble power in Scotland 1578–1603 / edited by Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid. Description: London: Routledge, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016034111 | ISBN 9781138946064 (hardback: alk. paper) | ISBN 9781315270739 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Scotland—History—James VI, 1567–1625. | Scotland—Politics and government—16th century. | Scotland—Politics and government— 17th century. | James I, King of England, 1566–1625—Influence Classification: LCC DA788 .J36 2017 | DDC 941.105—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016034111 ISBN: 978-1-138-94606-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-27073-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

The Gowrie Conspiracy, 5 August 1600, by Jan Luyken (1649–1712), engraved sometime around 1700.

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Contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations Notes on Contributors Introduction

ix xi xv 1

M iles K err- Peterson and Steven J. R eid

1 James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton

12

A my Blakeway

2 Of bairns and bearded men: James VI and the Ruthven Raid

32

Steven J. R eid

3 Friendship, politics and religion: George Gordon, Sixth Earl of Huntly and King James VI, 1581–1595

57

Ruth G rant

4 James VI, noble power and the burgh of Glasgow, c. 1580–1605

81

Paul G oatman

5 He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’: James VI’s suppression of the Scott-Ker feud

98

A nna G roundwater

6 Noble power in the West Highlands and Isles: James VI and the end of the mercenary trade with Ireland, 1594–96 Ross C rawford

117

viii Contents 7 Rise of a courtier: The Second Duke of Lennox and strategies of noble power under James VI

136

A drienne M c L aughlin

8 ‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’: The rise of James VI’s chamber, 1580–1603

155

A my L . J uhala

9 The Octavians

176

J ulian G oodare

10 The Gowrie Conspiracy: Do we need to wait until the Day of Judgement?

194

J enny Wormald

Index

207

Acknowledgements

The origin of this book was a conference held at the University of Glasgow on 10 and 11 April 2015. Over two days a number of speakers and delegates held an intense but thorough exploration of James’ rule and his relationship to the Scottish nobility. The editors wish to thank all the contributors and attendees for such a fruitful discussion. The conference was one of a series of workshops held as part of the Arts and Humanities Research Council project, ‘Bridging the Continental divide: neo-Latin and its cultural role in Jacobean Scotland, as seen in the Delitiae Poetarum Scotorum (1637)’, which looked at new perspectives on James VI (the fruits of another of these workshops, on ‘Biography and James VI’, were published in volume 67.2 of the Innes Review in late 2016). We gratefully acknowledge the funding provided by the AHRC for both the project itself and the diverse range of public events and conferences on Jacobean culture that it supported. We are glad that this volume comes to publication on the 450th anniversary of James’ coronation in Scotland, although we regret that one of his greatest advocates, Jenny Wormald, is no longer with us to share the occasion. This volume is dedicated to her memory.

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Abbreviations

Akrigg, Letters

G.P.V. Akrigg, ed., Letters of King James VI and I (California: 1984) APS T. Thomson and C. Innes, eds, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, 12 vols (Edinburgh: 1814–1875) BL British Library, London Boardman and Goodare, Steve Boardman and Julian Goodare, eds, Kings, Kings, Lords and Men Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625 (Edinburgh: 2014) Brown, Bloodfeud Keith M. Brown, Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573–1625 (Edinburgh: 1986) Brown, Noble Society Keith M. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland (Edinburgh: 2004) Brown, Noble Power Keith M. Brown, Noble Power in Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution (Edinburgh: 2011) Bruce, Papers J. Bruce, ed., Papers Relating to William, first earl of Gowrie, and Patrick Ruthven (London: 1867) BUK D. Laing and T. Thomson, eds, Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 1839–1841) Calderwood, History David Calderwood, History of the Kirk of Scotland, 8 vols, eds T. Thomson and D. Laing (Edinburgh: 1842–9) CBP J. Bain, ed., Calendar of Letters and Papers Relating to the Affairs of the Borders of England and Scotland, 1560–1603, 2 vols (London: 1894–96) Colville, Letters David Laing, ed., Original Letters of Mr John Colville, 1582–1603 (Edinburgh: 1858) Criminal Trials Robert Pitcairn, Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 1833)

xii Abbreviations CSP Dom.

R. Lemon et al., eds, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 94 vols (London: 1856–) CSP For. W.B. Turnbull et al., eds, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, 25 vols (London: 1861–1950) CSP Ireland Hans Claude Hamilton, ed., Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland of the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, 23 vols (London: 1860–1903) CSP Scot. J. Bain et al., eds, Calendar of State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547–1603, 13 vols (Edinburgh: 1898–1969) CSP Spanish G. Bergenroth et al., eds, Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs Preserved in, or originally belonging to, the Archives of Simancas, 13 vols (London: 1862–1954) CSP Venetian R. Brown et al., eds, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, 38 vols (London: 1864–1940) Dawson, Scotland Jane Dawson, Scotland Re-Formed, 1488–1587 Re-Formed (Edinburgh: 2007) Donaldson, James Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V-James VII V-James VII (Edinburgh: 1965) Donaldson, All the Gordon Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men: Power Queen’s Men and Politics in Mary Stewart’s Scotland (Tiptree: 1983) ER J. Stuart et al., eds, The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, 23 vols (Edinburgh: 1878–1908) Goodare and Lynch, Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, eds, The Reign Reign of James VI of James VI (East Linton: 2000) Goodare and MacDonald, Julian Goodare and Alasdair A. MacDonald, eds, ­Sixteenth-Century Sixteenth-Century Scotland: Essays in Honour of Scotland Michael Lynch (Leiden: 2008) Grant, ‘George Gordon’ Ruth Grant, ‘George Gordon, sixth earl of Huntly and the Politics of the Counter-Reformation in Scotland, 1581–1595’ (University of Edinburgh PhD Thesis, 2010) Highland Papers J. MacPhail, ed., Highland Papers, 4 vols (Edinburgh: 1914–1934)

Abbreviations  xiii HKJVI

Hume, Angus

IR Juhala, ‘Household and the Court’ Lee, John Maitland

Lee, Government by Pen Lee, Great Britain’s Solomon MacDonald, Jacobean Kirk Mar and Kellie Melville, Diary Melville, Memoirs Moysie, Memoirs NLS NRS ODNB Political Writings RSCHS RMS

Anonymous, The historie and life of King James the Sext: being an account of the affairs of Scotland, from the year 1566, to the year 1596; with a short continuation to the year 1617, T. Thomson, ed. (Edinburgh: 1825) David Reid, ed., David Hume of Godscroft’s The History of the House of Angus, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 2005) Innes Review Amy L. Juhala, ‘The Household and Court of King James VI of Scotland, 1567–1603’ (University of Edinburgh PhD Thesis, 2003) Maurice Lee, John Maitland of Thirlestane and the Foundation of Stewart Despotism (Princeton: 1959) Maurice Lee, Government by Pen. Scotland under James VI and I (Urbana: 1980) Maurice Lee, Great Britain’s Solomon: James VI and I in His Three Kingdoms (London: 1990) Alan MacDonald, The Jacobean Kirk 1567–1625 (Fernham: 1998) HMC, Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Mar and Kellie, 2 vols (London: 1904) R. Pitcairn, ed., Mr James Melville, Autobiography and Diary (Edinbrugh: 1843) Sir James Melville of Halhill, Memoirs of his Own Life, ed. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: 1827) David Moysie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, 1577–1603, ed. J. Dennistoun (Edinburgh: 1830) National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh National Records of Scotland, Edinburgh Oxford Dictionary of National Biography J. Stewart and J. Sommerville, eds, King James VI and I Political Writings (Cambridge: 1994) Records of the Scottish Church History Society J.M. Thomson et al., eds, Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scotorum (Register of the Great Seal of Scotland), 11 vols, eds (Edinburgh: 1882–1914)

xiv Abbreviations RPCS

J.H. Burton et al., eds, Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 38 vols (Edinburgh: 1877–98) RPS Keith M. Brown, ed. The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, (2007–2015) RSS M. Livingstone et al., eds, Registrum Secreti Sigilli Regum Scotorum (Register of the Privy Seal of Scotland), 8 vols (Edinburgh: 1908–82) Rogers, Estimate C. Rogers, ed., Estimate of the Scottish Nobility During the Minority of James the Sixth (London: Grampian Club, 1873) Scots Peerage J. Balfour-Paul, ed. The Scots Peerage, 9 vols (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1904–14) Smith, Reign of Alan Smith, ed., The Reign of James VI and I James VI and I (Basingstoke: 1973) SHR Scottish Historical Review Spalding Club J. Stuart, ed., The Miscellany of the Spalding Club, Miscellany 5 vols (Aberdeen: Spalding Club, 1841–1852) Spottiswoode, History John Spottiswoode, History of the Church of Scotland, 3 vols, M. Russell and M. Napier, eds (Edinburgh: 1847–51) TA T. Dickson et al., eds, Accounts of the (Lord High) Treasurer of Scotland, 13 vols (Edinburgh: 1877–1978) TNA The National Archives, London Wormald, Lords and Men Jenny Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442–1603 (Edinburgh: 1985)

Notes on Contributors

Dr Amy Blakeway is a Lecturer in History at the University of Kent. Her publications include: Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland, (St Andrews Studies in Scottish History Series, Boydell and Brewer, 2015), and a number of articles on topics such as printed propaganda, inflation and the privy council. Research interests include all parts of sixteenth-century Scotland’s political history, especially its relations with England and France and the role of texts in political life. Dr Ross Crawford was recently awarded his PhD in Scottish History at the University of Glasgow. His thesis focused on warfare and militarism in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland in the late medieval and early modern periods. Paul Goatman is currently completing his PhD thesis at the University of Glasgow under the working title ‘Glasgow and the Crown: urban politics and society in Scotland, c.1585–1638’. His research interests focus on Scottish political, religious and urban history during the early modern period. He has published articles on politics and religion in early modern Glasgow. Professor Julian Goodare is Reader in History, University of Edinburgh. His most recent book is The European Witch-Hunt (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). He has recently edited Scotland in the Age of Two Revolutions (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2014) (with Sharon Adams) and Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) (with Steve Boardman). Dr Ruth Grant was awarded a doctorate from the University of Edinburgh in 2010, titled ‘George Gordon, sixth earl of Huntly and the Politics of the ­Counter-Reformation in Scotland, 1581–1595’. Her research interests include the politics of the Scottish reign of James VI, particularly the nobility; the politics of the Counter-Reformation and Catholic survival. She is currently identifying Jesuits and Catholic priests who were active in Scotland from 1580–c.1603.

xvi  Notes on Contributors Dr Anna Groundwater is a social and cultural historian of early modern Scotland and Britain at the University of Edinburgh. Her original interests in the Anglo-Scottish Borders before 1603 have led to work on familial, cultural and patronage networks linking London and Edinburgh after the Union of the Crowns. Her publications include The Scottish Middle March, 1573–1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance (2010). Dr Amy L. Juhala is an Associate Professor at Bismarck State College in North Dakota. Her doctoral dissertation, ‘The Court and Household of James VI and I, 1580–1603’, was completed at Edinburgh University under the guidance of Michael Lynch and Julian Goodare. Current research interests lie in the further analysis of James VI’s court and courtiers. Dr Miles Kerr-Peterson recently completed a PhD in history at the University of Glasgow, his thesis being a study of the life and lordship of George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal. His research focuses on early modern Scottish noble and academic cultures. Dr Adrienne McLaughlin received a PhD in Scottish History from the University of Edinburgh in 2016. Her PhD thesis was a prosopographical study of William Graham, seventh Earl of Menteith (c.1590–1661), while her broad research interests include early modern nobility and lordship, local and national patronage networking, court politics and faction and the nature of political counsel. Dr Steven J. Reid is Lecturer in History at the University of Glasgow. He has published a range of articles and books on intellectual and religious culture in early modern Scotland, including Humanism and Calvinism: Andrew Melville and the Universities of Scotland, c.1560–c.1625 (2011). Dr Jenny Wormald, after having a distinguished career at the University of Glasgow and St Hilda’s College, Oxford, was an honorary fellow of the University of Edinburgh. She specialised in medieval and early modern Scottish history, particularly kingship and lordship. She died in December 2015.

Introduction Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid

The frontispiece of this volume is by Dutch engraver and illustrator Jan Luyken. It is a lively late-seventeenth-century imagining of the highest point of the drama of the Gowrie Conspiracy, the strange series of events that took place at the town house of John, Earl of Gowrie, in Perth on 5 August 1600. This ‘conspiracy’ has been variously interpreted as the attempted kidnapping or assassination of the king by the earl and his brother Alexander, Master of Ruthven, or the planned murder of the Ruthven brothers by James, though historians remain at a loss to explain conclusively what happened on that day.1 John Ramsay, one of King James’ pages, is drawn stepping over the corpse of Alexander Ruthven, while running through the armoured and double-sword-wielding earl. Behind him, Thomas Erskine, a gentleman of the king’s bedchamber, fights one of Gowrie’s men. To the right, James stands unarmed, holding only his hunting horn, and looks on helplessly. Some of Gowrie’s men are portrayed in the act of fleeing, while a lone sparrow hawk flies free above. Ramsay and Erskine were well rewarded for their ‘deliverance’ of the king from the Gowries and eventually became the Earls of Holdernesse and Kellie respectively. They are classic examples of what have been termed James’ ‘new men’, lairds and courtiers who were members of a growing number of service nobility and who were wholly dependent on royal favour for their continued good fortune. In many ways this dramatic image – where we see Gowrie, as a member of the traditional aristocracy, yielding (fatally in this case) to them – encapsulates the well-known debate that James’ personal reign in Scotland (1567–1603) marked the end of traditional noble power and the rise of an autocratic, centralised and recognisably ‘modern’ government. The chief aim of this collection of essays is to respond to that debate. For the necessary background to this argument we must go back to its origins in 1959. Maurice Lee argued that James’ rule in Scotland was characterised by a ‘revolution in government’ spearheaded by the chancellor, John Maitland of Thirlestane, which resulted in the creation of a Scottish noblesse de robe and the gradual, although not direct, undermining of noble power. Lee portrayed the great nobles as the main obstacle to the consolidation of royal power and the exercise of the rule of law, whose influence James and Maitland aimed not to

2  Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid destroy exactly, but at the very least to substantially curtail. James had a firm belief in the value of his nobility – we need look no further for evidence of this than the advice he gave to his son Henry in the Βασιλικὸν Δῶρον (Basilikon Doron), where he instructs Henry to make the most of the nobles in his court and government, as ‘vertue followeth oftest noble blood’. However, James also condemned their tendency towards unlawfulness and abuse of their power and cautioned Henry to bring them to heel with the better execution of the law and the provision of checks on their heritable jurisdiction. It is this latter consideration that dominates Lee’s somewhat Whiggish narrative of James’ early personal reign.2 The idea of ‘King James’ Peace’ was one enthusiastically taken up by Gordon Donaldson in his important survey of early modern Scotland 3 and systematically developed by Julian Goodare as part of his research into the processes of state formation in Scotland. Goodare argued that noble power was transformed by the development of what he terms ‘Scottish absolutism’, a gradual process of centralisation between 1560 and 1625 whereby warfare, dispute management and resource extraction were increasingly made with reference to central government, and nobles gave up some degree of regional autonomy in exchange for greater influence at the centre. Nobles were increasingly confined to advising the king and his machinery of state, rather than governing the localities on the king’s behalf. While this was not a uniform, complete or straightforward process,4 the increasing importance of central state service contributed to an overall decline in the powers of the nobles.5 The Union of the Crowns and the king’s removal to England sharpened and intensified these changes but did not cause them. Between 1973 and 1978 there was a lively series of articles between Jenny Wormald and Maurice Lee over the extent to which the decline of noble power and the rise of the ‘new men’ could actually be seen in Scottish politics, an idea Wormald stoutly refuted.6 Lee’s ideas were further challenged by Wormald’s work on bonds of manrent7 and by Keith Brown’s series of studies on bloodfeud and noble culture and power. Collectively, their work offers a dramatically different conception of the nature of noble power in James’ Scotland. Wormald argued that James exercised a traditional style of Scottish kingship, and a highly successful one at that, which owed much more to his Stewart predecessors than it did to any ‘new’ notion of absolute monarchy. Instead, James was a practical politician who encouraged and relied upon personal relationships and local alliances to secure peace and stability.8 James did not undermine the traditional nobles’ position in the localities, which was the most important source of their power. Even in the centre their customary access to the monarch remained. In addition, as most of them had no real desire for laborious and time-consuming governmental positions, any centralising reforms were of little relevance to them. Wormald believed that the changes in James’ reign were due partly to the different approach he took to the exercise of power – his desire was to enhance the prestige of the crown, but not at the expense of oppressing or alienating the nobility he relied upon – and partly to wider societal changes in attitudes and expectations of justice and power sweeping across Europe.9

Introduction  3 Keith Brown also stressed that the continuities in how nobles held and wielded their power were far greater than the changes. Instead of trying to tame the nobles, James was simply attempting to establish a working relationship that benefitted everyone. Overall, the essential fabric of Scottish political life under James remained largely unchanged from the earlier Stewart period until after the Union of Crowns but was injected with a new dynamism in the late sixteenth century, thanks largely to James’ personal style of kingship.10 The most important consequence of this view is deep scepticism, especially on the part of Brown, as to whether there were any actual or lasting transformations in the essentials of Scottish government during James’ reign. The activities of the Covenanters in the 1640s, for example, have been posited as more responsible for the establishment of the structure of a recognisably modern state than any of the minor legislative changes brought in under James or even Charles.11 While the notion of a revolution in government has been much debated, all historians of James’ personal reign in Scotland agree that change was afoot. There was a sharp decline in the making of bonds of manrent and a waning in the traditional culture of bloodfeud by 1600, as well as a noticeable rise in the prominence and importance of cadet branches, lairds and lesser nobles in Scottish society.12 While arguments between proponents of the two positions sketched out above have, if not raged, then pottered back and forth for a number of years, Jenny Wormald suggested that there was a difference in emphasis between the two lines of argument, rather than a fundamental and irreconcilable disagreement.13 Ried Zulager’s 1991 PhD thesis, a close study of the middle-ranking administrators of James’ reign, also argued that the ‘new men’, who were debated over so intensely by Lee and Wormald, were not really new at all, but were advanced through the time-honoured traditions of social patronage as extensions of noble power.14 Perhaps unsurprisingly, perspective has had much to do with which side of the above debate historians have favoured. Those approaching the problem via an exploration of James’ government have favoured, to varying degrees, the ‘revolution in government’ interpretation, whereas those exploring the nobility have tended to favour the view of continuity. Whichever way arguments over the nature, extent, intent, and endurance of the changes of James’ reign are interpreted, few would disagree that he overcame a series of significant challenges to his authority – not just from a series of noble factions and individuals, but from the Kirk and from Elizabeth and the English government – during his early personal reign in Scotland, became an extremely successful and able ruler and left the country in a more settled and recognisably more ‘modern’ state than did any of his predecessors. This volume examines the role that James’ nobility played in this process, as well as the dynamics of James’ relationship with noble power during his personal reign in Scotland. It investigates the array of forms that noble power could take and the locales in which it could manifest, whether in urban centres controlled (or at least heavily influenced) by local magnates, in the regional spheres of noble lords and landowners or at the court itself. The volume also explores the often-generalised but poorly understood distinction between James’ court, the public face of the royal

4  Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid household and government, and his ‘chamber’, the intimate coterie of favourites and power brokers that were often the real driving force behind James’ policies and political decisions, particularly in the years immediately prior to 1603.

I This volume offers a number of case studies along these axes of debate. The chapters are organised in broadly chronological fashion, with Amy Blakeway and Steven Reid exploring (in Chapters 1 and 2) the period between the formal removal of James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton, from the office of regent in 1578 and the end of the Ruthven Raid, the coup d’état led by John Erskine, second Earl of Mar, and William Ruthven, first Earl of Gowrie, in the summer of 1582. While James was still largely under the control of either competing noble factions or favourites throughout this period, a key finding of both chapters is that James personally played a decisive role in noble politics from the formal declaration of his adult rule in early 1578 onwards. Previous assessments of Morton’s fall have suggested that continued support from the English government led to his restoration to power in all but title between May 1578 and December 1580 and that its corresponding withdrawal, when Elizabeth’s attentions were focussed on Ireland and the Continent, left him weak enough to be seized, tried and executed for his supposed involvement in the death of James’ father, Henry Stewart Lord Darnley.15 Blakeway argues that James’ own political objectives had much more direct impact on these events than we are accustomed to thinking and that it was England’s failure to treat the young king as the source of authority in Scotland that ultimately led to Morton’s destruction. James was part of the coup led by the Earls of Argyll and Atholl that removed Morton in March 1578 but then sided with the faction led by the Earl of Mar that rehabilitated him two months later. It was Morton’s resistance to James’ desire to repatriate Claud and John Hamilton from England for trial over the murders of the Regents Moray and Lennox, a stance thrust upon Morton by English pressure, that led to his complete alienation from the king. Even after his seizure in December 1580, James was unwilling to sanction his execution until he heard rumours of a plot in March of the following year to free Morton and seize control of the royal household, at which point his death was assured. While James exerted a large measure of control over Morton’s political fortunes between 1578 and 1581, he was himself stripped of virtually all power and agency during the 10 months of the Ruthven Raid (August 1582–May 1583). The Raiders felt that their actions were entirely justified, as had been the case in so many previous Stewart minorities, on the grounds of saving the king from ‘bad counsel’ and protecting themselves from predatory interests at the heart of the court, in this case James’ favourite, Esmé Stewart, Duke of Lennox, and his ally, Captain James Stewart, Earl of Arran. They also pursued the restoration of good relations with the English government and the reduction of the chronic and massive deficit run up by the royal household. While James was initially powerless to act against the Raiders, at the beginning of 1583 he was able to use the occasion

Introduction  5 of a French diplomatic embassy to Scotland to sow fear and mistrust among the members of the regime and to build up an opposition coalition of nobility that helped him secure his freedom. However, as in his treatment of Morton, James proved equally reluctant to break suddenly from the Raiders, for fear of what this might do to his hopes of being endorsed for the English succession by Elizabeth and peaceably restoring Lennox. It was only when news of Lennox’s death was confirmed in late May 1583, and when James had exhausted his diplomatic options with Elizabeth, that he fled from the Raiders’ control and seized the initiative in government once again, although the Earl of Arran retained an extensive and powerful influence over him for a further two years. A lasting consequence of the fall of the Ruthven regime was the rise of George Gordon, sixth Earl of Huntly. Chief of the extensive and powerful Gordon kindred which reached across both the Highlands and Lowlands, occasional Lieutenant of the North, and sometime leader of the Counter-Reformation in Scotland, Huntly enjoyed the most enduring and influential favour of any nobleman in Scotland before 1603. Ruth Grant’s examination of Huntly’s ‘friendship’, or extended network of kin and political interests (Chapter 3) shows that this favour arose from a close and mutually beneficial relationship with the king. Huntly used James to rebuild the fortunes of his family, which had declined under his predecessors, and to advance an array of territorial interests; James in turn used Huntly to rule the north effectively, as a backdoor channel for international diplomacy with Catholic Europe and as a trusted ally against threats from other members of the Stewart kindred such as the Earls of Moray and Bothwell.16 Grant also powerfully reminds us of the importance of noble women in the wielding of noble power in Scotland, as a large measure of Huntly’s success arose from the efforts of his very able wife, Henrietta Stewart, who was highly adept in advancing her husband’s interests at court with both James and Queen Anna.17 Chapters 4 to 6 provide us with a trio of case studies in the application and usage of noble power in different localities, ranging from the urban and central setting of Glasgow to the margins of Stewart authority in the Borders and Highlands.18 Building on the limited range of studies exploring the relationship between the nobility and the burghs, in Chapter 4 Paul Goatman explores the origins of a violent conflict in Glasgow in the summer of 1606 between Sir George Elphinstone of Blythswood, provost of the town since 1600, and the previous incumbent, Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto. Originally an ecclesiastical burgh of barony controlled by the Archbishop of Glasgow, in the aftermath of the Reformation Glasgow came increasingly under royal control. Under the terms of the 1587 parliamentary act annexing the temporalities of benefices to the crown, it officially became royal property. James granted control of the burgh to Ludovic Stewart, second Duke of Lennox; it was managed on his behalf by Stewart of Minto, who was provost every year between 1586 and 1600, and then by Elphinstone. These two were both, as Goatman notes, examples of James’ ‘new men’: Stewart of Minto held extensive links of kin and patronage in the burgh and its hinterland, while Elphinstone was the son of a merchant burgess

6  Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid who had been a royal favourite prior to his elevation. Elphinstone created a merchants’ guild for the town with the 1605 Letter of Guildry and ceded many of his powers as provost to the town council, but when he tried to arrange for free burgh elections Lennox felt that his own control had been too far eroded. He employed the Mintos in a violent response to end the town’s attempts at ‘democratic’ rule, setting Elphinstone on a path to bankruptcy in the process. However, the kin networks of both Elphinstone and the Mintos had to be carefully managed and integrated into the structures of authority within the town by Archbishop Spottiswoode in the years that followed. The whole episode illustrates the tensions and complexities inherent in burgh governance, in a period when the received wisdom of the role of the nobility within burghs was under greater challenge than ever before. Anna Groundwater’s study of the long roots of the Ker-Scott bloodfeud and its episodic and iterative nature across the sixteenth century, the subject of Chapter 5, show that cultural memory and tradition played as important a role in sustaining feud as short-term triggers such as squabbles over land and patrimony. Feuding in the Borders remained a particular issue for James owing to the intermittent wars between Scotland and England in the first half of the sixteenth century, the occasional fostering of raiding by monarchs on both sides of the border for political purposes, and the general long-term absence of strong noble power.19 By the end of the century, James’ overriding desire was to bring order to this part of the kingdom, due to its proximity to England and as a means by which to demonstrate his ability to govern to his southern neighbours and prospective subjects. James was able to resolve decisively the incarnation of the feud between Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch and Sir William Ker of Cessford that reached its height in the 1590s, through personal mediation of their grievances and by appointing the two men to important positions in the Middle March. He reinforced this amity in the years following 1603 with a range of further rewards and privileges for loyal service to the crown, which had the effect of literally transforming Cessford into a rather dandified courtier in the process, as accounts of his clothing at court in 1610 show. The problems caused by the rival Scott and Ker kindred in James’ time in Scotland were happily resolved through his proactive and careful management of the personalities involved, a skill and care that was sorely lacking in his handling of the nobility in the Highlands and Western Isles. James’ relationship with the Highlands and Islands remains under-explored,20 and in Chapter 6 Ross Crawford highlights James’ apparent lack of a Highland policy before 1603. James preferred to delegate the task of controlling the region to powerful noblemen in the locality, and while he pursued a similar policy with Huntly in the north, he showed visibly less warmth and interest in the far west. It was as an extension of English policy, and only through English pressure, that James was eventually forced between 1594 and 1596 to deal with the considerable body of his Highland subjects who were engaged in the mercenary trade into Ireland. He co-opted a rather unwilling Gilleasbuig Campbell, the young Earl of Argyll, who was eager to restore his political capital following his disastrous handling of the Battle of

Introduction  7 Glenlivet in October 1594, to oversee this campaign. However, the man truly responsible for ending the trade was the islander Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart, who was as willing to negotiate with and take pay from Elizabeth as he was with James. James’ apathy and unwillingness to engage with the mercenary problem shows that not all areas of his realm were equal in his eyes. Chapters 7 to 9 return the focus to politics at court, with a particular emphasis on the final years prior to James’ removal to England in 1603 and the growing role of the ‘chamber’ in James’ day-to-day government. Adrienne McLaughlin’s chapter looks in close detail at the affable, uncontroversial but highly successful Ludovick Stewart, second Duke of Lennox. Lennox was the most prominent courtier of James’ entire reign in Scotland: he was the only member of the peerage to hold a Scottish dukedom, and he held the posts of Lord Great Chamberlain and First Gentleman of the Chamber simultaneously. Like Huntly, his close personal bond with James gave him exceptional power and latitude with the king, to the extent that he was able to marry Sophia Ruthven, daughter of the first Earl of Gowrie, in 1591 against James’ express wishes. Unlike Huntly, Lennox actively avoided the accumulation of power in either the localities or government. Although he held a number of administrative posts in Scotland before 1603, including the role of governor during James’ visit to Denmark in 1589–90 and Lieutenant of the North between 1594 and 1596, he stood aloof from the cut-throat world of politics, only becoming involved when directed to by James. Instead, Lennox was happy to serve as a companion and trusted overseer of the court and chamber, spheres of influence over which he exerted jealous control and enjoyed a long and well-rewarded career as a result. Amy Juhala looks in closer detail (Chapter 8) at the mechanics of the nebulous and changing institution in which Lennox played so central a role, the chamber. The chamber was both the preserve of those courtiers and influence-makers who had closest access to the king’s person and a well of patronage. Juhala’s chapter is the first narrative overview of the evolution of this essential court sphere, from its origins in the household reforms spearheaded by the first Duke of Lennox in the 1580s and designed to restrict access to the king to a select few through its expansion and growth in the 1590s to accommodate a wide range of men – magnates, professionals and ‘new men’ alike – who all earned a place in the chamber for the services they provided to the king. Juhala also explores the composition of the chamber between 1580 and 1603, and James is revealed as having consistently used its personnel as a network of support and advice for his policy decisions and as a repository of manpower and skills he could use to implement them. Together, McLaughlin and Juhala’s chapters provide the most comprehensive study of the personnel of James’ chamber and their role in noble politics to date and give us an important insight into how James wielded influence and personal power at the heart of his court. Another perspective on James’ later court in Scotland is provided by Julian Goodare in Chapter 9, through a study of the political careers of the Octavians, a body of eight men appointed to act as commissioners of the exchequer between 1596 and 1598 and to fill the vacuum of power caused by the death of the

8  Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid chancellor, John Maitland of Thirlestane. As with the chamber, the composition of this group included men from the established noble houses (albeit younger sons, as in the case of James Elphinstone, Alexander Seton and John Lindsay), newer lairdly families and self-made courtiers. What bound them together was their proven record of effective and competent service to the king, primarily in the field of finance but also in law, diplomacy and education. The Octavians were never far from controversy: at least two of their members were known Catholics, and they presided over the short-lived and disastrous ‘privatisation’ of royal income and expenditure in the hands of Thomas Foulis, which resulted in an effective transfer of the crown’s debts to the Edinburgh financier, an act that bankrupted him in the process. The Octavians also found their power diluted almost from the outset by the addition of a range of noble councillors to their ranks and were eventually disbanded in favour of a noble council headed by the Earl of Mar. However, the initial ‘gang of eight’ all went on to prosper in James’ later reign, and their careers indicate clearly the new paths of success available to those who served the king as the machinery of state grew. Given that this volume takes 1603 as its end date, it seems only right that it should conclude (Chapter 10) with Jenny Wormald’s re-assessment of the last great noble crisis that James personally faced in Scotland before his departure south: the Gowrie Conspiracy (briefly outlined above). At the conference held at the University of Glasgow in April 2015 from which this collection of essays originated, Jenny undertook a typically iconoclastic assault against this ‘conspiracy’, arguing instead that the death of Gowrie and his brother Alexander were no more than an unfortunate accident resulting from the latter’s bungling attempt to curry favour with James in the hope of getting preferential treatment at court. The audience was privileged to see Jenny give a tour de force, and often hilarious, account of the event from little more than a handful of notes, despite being gravely ill. In the months prior to her death the editors worked closely with Jenny and with her son Luke to expand and redraft these notes into a full piece. Jenny was able to review and approve an unfinished draft, and in the intervening months since it has been completed with the addition of further notes, additional narrative and contextual discussion and quotes from primary material to underpin the central argument. We have tried to interfere as little as possible with the prose of the version that Jenny approved, but we have had to slightly emend several sentences at points where the meaning was unclear, and there are a number of references that have proved impossible to find. Despite this, the chapter vividly conveys Jenny’s breadth of learning, her warmth and her wit and reminds us forcefully of why she was the doyenne of early modern Scottish History and the guiding light in Jacobean studies for over half a century. All of the studies in this volume, whether they focus on the role of nobility in James’ government, the politics of nobility at court or in the locality or on specific individual nobles, add to, complicate and nuance our understanding of James’ relationship with noble power. They investigate both his personal dealings with the nobility on a one-to-one basis and his institutional ones as King of Scots and head of a developing state. Collectively, the weight of evidence in

Introduction  9 these essays tends to confirm the view that despite advances in the structures and legislation used to govern and administer Scotland, the role of the nobility in every nexus of power remained as embedded and essential as at any time in the reigns of the earlier Stewart monarchs. It is true that noble power was being challenged to conform with the royal government in ways that it never had before, and there was much that was new in the way in which James used and dealt with his nobility. Yet it does indeed seem true that in Jacobean Scotland the continuities in noble power remained greater than the changes, and in all the case studies James’ personal role in noble politics emerges as a decisive and important factor in determining how noble power functioned in Scotland. James did this by engaging with, managing and utilising the old and deep-rooted mechanisms of noble power directly, not through challenging or working against them. James’ greatest successes between 1578 and 1603 – his gradual diminution of bloodfeud, his creation of an effective chamber, his successful management of political faction – all stemmed in part from his relationships with the nobility of his realm, whether from intense personal bonds, such as those with Huntly or Lennox, or mutual bonds of service and reward with his ‘new men’. Where James encountered the most problems – his captivity at the hands of the Ruthven Raiders and his conspicuous lack of a coherent and workable Highland ­policy – we also find a corresponding breakdown in communication with the noble factions that continued to exercise such power in his realm, even when he entered full adulthood. In this respect, the principles of noble power remained the same as for countless generations in the broad span of Scottish history. James perfectly understood his position as King of Scots. As head and manager of the nobility, he used them as instruments of his power and delegated to them accordingly and effectively. The nobles, after decades of disrupted government through civil war and minority, without a king with whom they could work directly, now acknowledged their place in service to their monarch. Even powerful nobles like Huntly or Argyll, essentially little kings in their localities, deferred to James and remembered their place in the hierarchy as his servants. Thus, King James was in the exact mould of his Stewart predecessors in exercising much of his own power and influence through his nobility. What changed in this period, and what in part explains the shift towards a more centralised government in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, was the fact that what James VI, that most able of philosopher kings, was asking them to do with their power was different. He was asking them to serve him and his vision of ‘universal kingship’.

Notes 1 Jenny Wormald offers her own novel view in Chapter 10 of this volume. 2 N Rhodes, J. Richards and J. Marshall, eds, King James VI and I: Selected Writings (Farnham: 2003), 226–227; Lee, John Maitland, 4–7, 121–123, 153, 159; Lee, Government by Pen, 3–9; Maurice Lee, ‘James VI and the Aristocracy’ Scotia 1 (1977), 18–23. 3 Gordon Donaldson, James V-James VII.

10  Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid 4 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999), 1, 6, 7, 37, 63; Julian Goodare, The Government of Scotland 1560–1625 (Oxford: 2004), 5, 14, 128, 175, 299. 5 Julian Goodare, ‘The Nobility and the Absolutist State in Scotland, 1584–1638’, History 78 (1993), 161–182. The notion that the introduction of the lairds to Parliament led to a breakdown of the traditional system of noble power has however been refuted in some quarters. See Brown, Noble Power, 158. 6 Jennifer Brown [Wormald], ‘Scottish Politics 1567–1625’ in A. Smith, ed., The Reign of James VI and I (Basingstoke: 1973), 23–39; Lee, ‘James VI and the Aristocracy’; Jenny Wormald, ‘New Men for Old’, Scotia 2 (1978), 70–76. 7 A form of written obligation that usually took place between a lord and his social inferior and promised mutual service and defence, but often varied wildly from these basic parameters. For full details, and for a calendar of known bonds, see Wormald, Lords and Men. 8 Brown [Wormald], ‘Scottish Politics’, 23–39. 9 Wormald, ‘New Men for Old’, 70–76. 10 Brown, Noble Power, 1–9. 11 Arthur Williamson, ‘Review of Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland’, Albion 33 (2001), 175–177. 12 Julian Goodare, ‘Review of Keith M Brown, Noble Society in Scotland’, SHR 81 (2002), 269–272. 13 Wormald, ‘New Men for Old’, 70–76. For the debate itself also see: Lee, ‘James VI and the Aristocracy’, 18–23; Arthur Williamson, ‘Review of Julian Goodare, State and Society’; Keith Brown, ‘Review of Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland’, SHR 80 (2001), 122–126; Julian Goodare, ‘Review of Keith M. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland’, SHR 81 (2002), 269–272; Keith Brown, ‘Review of Julian Goodare The Government of Scotland’, SHR 86 (2007), 138. 14 Ried Zulager, ‘A Study of the Middle-Rank Administrators in the Government of King James VI of Scotland, 1580–1603’ (University of Aberdeen PhD thesis, 1991), 138, 153–155, 198–199. 15 For Morton’s wider career see George R. Hewitt, Scotland under Morton, 1572–80 (Edinburgh: 1982); for the older view of his fall see Maurice Lee, ‘The Fall of the Regent Morton: A Problem in Satellite Diplomacy’, Journal of Modern History 58 (1956), 111–129. 16 The Earls of Huntly before and after George’s tenure have been explored in Barry Robertson, Lordship and Power in the North of Scotland, The Noble House of Huntly 1603–1690 (Edinburgh: 2011); Anne Forbes, Trials and Triumphs (Edinburgh: 2012) and from a Highland perspective in Alison Cathcart, Kinship and Clientage: Highland Clanship 1451–1609 (Leiden: Brill, 2006). For other individual studies of James’ Scottish nobles see: Peter Anderson, Robert Stewart, Earl of Orkney, Lord of Shetland 1533–1593 (Edinburgh: 1982); Peter Anderson, Black Patie, The Life and Times of Patrick Stewart, Earl of Orkney, Lord of Shetland (Edinburgh: 1992); Peter Anderson, The Stewart Earls of Orkney (Edinburgh: 2012); Keith Brown, ‘A House Divided: Family and Feud in Carrick under John Kennedy, Fifth Earl of Cassillis’, SHR 75 (1996), 168–196; Edward Ives, “‘The Bonny Earl of Murray’ the Ballad as History”, Midwest Folklore 9 (1959), 133–138; Edward Ives, The Bonny Earl of Murray; The Man, the Murder, the Ballad (East Linton: 1997) and Harry Potter, Bloodfeud: The Stewarts and Gordons at War (Stroud: 2002). 17 Unfortunately, a planned paper on Scottish noblewomen could not be included in the volume. There is at least a growing body of literature exploring the roles and functions of noblewomen and noble wives in running households and acting as part of a larger corporate body that made up each lordship. It is hoped that more dedicated biographical and political studies of the noble women of early modern Scotland will follow. See

Introduction  11 in particular Jane Dawson, Campbell Letters 1559–1583 (Edinburgh, 1997), 22–27; Keith Brown, Noble Society, 137–145; Ruth Grant, ‘Politicking Jacobean Women: Lady Ferniehirst, the Countess of Arran and the Countess of Huntly, c. 1580–1603’ in Elizabeth Ewan and Maureen Meikle, eds, Women in Scotland c.1100–c.1750 (East Linton: 1999), 95–104;Amy Blakeway, ‘The Attempted Divorce of James Hamilton, earl of Arran, Governor of Scotland’, Innes Review, 61:1 (2010), 1–23. 18 See also Keith Brown, ‘Burghs, Lords and Feuds in Jacobean Scotland’ in Michael Lunch, ed., The Early Modern Town in Scotland (London: 1987), 102–124 and Michael Lynch and Helen Dingwall, ‘Elite Society in Town and Country’ in Patricia Dennison, David Ditchburn and Michael Lynch, eds, Aberdeen Before 1800: a New History (East Linton: 2002), 181–200. 19 For discussions of the Borders see Maureen Meikle, A British Frontier?: Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders, 1540–1603 (East Linton: 2004) and Anna Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 1573–1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance (Woodbridge: 2010). 20 Notable exceptions include Aonghas MacCoinnich’s articles on the MacLeods of Lewis and the MacKenzies of Strathconon Aonghas MacCoinnich, ‘Sìol Torcail and their Lordship in the Sixteenth Century’ in Crossing the Minch: Exploring the Links between Skye and the Outer Hebrides (Callicvol: 2008), 7–32; Aonghas MacCoinnich, ‘Strathconon and the Mackenzies in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’ in M. Marshall, ed., Strathconon: the History and Archaeology of a North East Highland Glen, (Inverness: 2011), 28–37. Also see Cathcart, Kinship and Clientage. For the preceding generations see especially Jane Dawson, The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary Queen of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and the Struggle for Britain and Ireland (Cambridge: 2002) and Martin MacGregor, ‘A Political History of the MacGregors before 1571’ (University of Edinburgh PhD Thesis, 1989). For the debates on the highland nobility see Brown, Noble Power, 1–24; Goodare, ‘Review of Keith M. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland’, 271, and Ross Crawford, ‘Warfare in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, c.1545–1615’ (University of Glasgow PhD Thesis, 2016). For the debate over the Statutes of Iona see Julian Goodare, ‘The Statutes of Iona in Context’, SHR 77 (1998), 31–57; Martin MacGregor, ‘The Statutes of Iona: Text and Context’, IR 57 (2006), 111–181 and Alison Cathcart, ‘The Statutes of Iona: The Archipelagic Context’, Journal of British Studies 49 (2010), 4–27.

1 James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton Amy Blakeway

Of all James VI’s nobles, James Douglas, Earl of Morton, was perhaps most able to appreciate the difficulties his monarch faced in balancing the conflicting pressures of rule. During his half-decade as James VI’s regent from November 1572 until March 1578, Morton was required to, as contemporaries said, ‘bear the person of the monarch’ – in other words, he was required to fulfil all the monarch’s duties and in return enjoyed almost monarchical rights.1 In the long run, however, Morton’s experience of rule proved a poisoned chalice. Taking as its focus the years between Morton’s loss of the regency in 1578 and his execution for treason in 1581, this chapter argues that Morton’s failure to thrive politically in the early years of James’ majority was due to the legacy of his regency. As regent, Morton had managed Scottish diplomacy as well as domestic affairs. Unfortunately for him, following his loss of the regency, English diplomats and, crucially, the English queen Elizabeth I failed to understand that it was not Morton, but King James, to whom they should direct their diplomatic efforts. This alienated Morton domestically and paved the way for the accusations of treason that led to his death sentence. In suggesting that the English made this profound mistake, this chapter also argues that James VI had greater political significance in this period than either his English contemporaries or modern historians have realised. The period 1578–81 was not one in which the monarch was little more than a puppet in political life. These three years witnessed James’ gradual, but nonetheless discernible, emergence as an influential participant in domestic and international affairs. Arguing that Morton fell because the English failed to recalibrate their diplomatic relations with Scotland to suit James’ emergence as an adult ruler departs from received wisdom on the subject in two ways. In 1956 Maurice Lee argued that during Morton’s regency Scotland had become England’s ‘satellite’, in other words, that Scotland was effectively controlled by England during this period, particularly as regards to her diplomatic alignment. According to Lee, Morton lost the regency and was in due course executed, because Elizabeth ‘abandoned’ him because ‘the menacing state of affairs on the European continent’ precluded her intervention in Scotland.2 Lee’s argument that English agents were aware of and influenced by events in Europe remains convincing; his argument that Morton (or by implication any other Scottish noble) rose or fell on their say-so

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  13 is not. As we shall see, in actual fact the English were extremely interested in both Scotland and Morton throughout this period. At times, however, their lack of willingness to intervene for Morton was dictated not by continental events, but by concerns much closer to home, namely, the situation in Ireland. Moreover, when the English did intervene in Scotland they tended to be successful only when their preferences aligned with those of the dominant group within Scotland. Arguing that English intervention in Scotland antagonised a monarch who was anxious to defend his own growing power concomitantly suggests that James emerged as an adult monarch somewhat earlier than previous accounts suggest. The question of when James’ adult rule commenced is not straightforward to answer, and various dates between 1578 and 1585 have been offered for consideration.3 The reason this question has provoked such confusion is at least in part that it actually needs to be separated into two questions. First, when did James legally, formally and technically begin his adult rule, in other words, his rule in his own name without a regent acting on his behalf? Second, when did James actually start to exert power and impose his will upon the polity? To solve the conundrum of when James VI’s personal rule commenced we need to separate the moment when James theoretically took responsibility for government from the process whereby in practice he started to exert power. Legally, James’ minority ended when Morton demitted the regency. At this juncture, it was made amply clear that James had accepted the ‘burding of the administratioun … upoun him self’, and henceforth no other person had any legal responsibility for fulfilling the monarch’s role in governance.4 The moment Parliament acknowledged that James began to reign without a regent is thus easy to identify. Sadly, identifying a point at which James exerted power as though he were an adult monarch is less clear cut. Moreover, searching for a single date after which James’ rule suddenly changed, a moment when the personal rule began, is an attempt to impose misleading clarity on a complex situation. Instead, we need to think of the period between Morton’s loss of the regency in 1578 and November 1585, the latest date proposed for the start of James’ personal rule, as a period of gradual transition during which the Scottish polity slowly moved from royal minority to personal rule whilst James’ role in governance incrementally grew. Periods of transition at the end of a royal minority, during which a young monarch adopted more responsibility and the polity adapted around him, have been observed in other contexts, notably in the case of Edward VI of England.5 In the conclusion we will consider the parallels that can be drawn between James VI’s emergence as an adult ruler and his grandfather James V’s experience of the same process during the 1520s. Before moving to these arguments, however, it is helpful to consider Morton’s status as an ex-regent in a little more detail and to outline previous interpretations of his fall.6 As regent, Morton was bound by the longstanding convention that regents were debarred from the office of keepership of the monarch’s person: in other words, regents were not permitted to be responsible for the monarch’s upbringing or to dwell in the royal household.7 Moreover, the point of having a regent was that someone should ‘bear the person’ of the monarch. As such,

14  Amy Blakeway regents were required to travel throughout the realm fulfilling monarchical duties. Of James VI’s regents, Morton spent the least time in Stirling, probably due to his lack of a kinship connection within the royal household and to the location of his own lands, particularly Aberdour in Fife and Dalkeith in Midlothian.8 Perhaps the relative tranquillity of post-civil war Scotland lulled Morton into a false sense of security whereby he neglected his relations with James, since Sir James Melville of Halhill observed that ‘ruleing all at his pleasure’ Morton ‘maid na accompt of any of them that wer about the King’, whom he alienated through a failure to distribute patronage.9 The extent of Morton’s alienation from the royal household by early 1578 is starkly demonstrated in the correspondence exchanged between Morton and his kinsman William Douglas of Lochleven the week before he lost the regency.10 Typically, Morton was not even near Stirling. Instead, he was in Holyrood, from whence he complained that Alexander Esrkine of Gogar, Master of Mar, had not informed him of recent events in the royal household. Disturbingly for Morton, Colin Campbell, sixth Earl of Argyll, had arrived and ‘the kingis Majesteis commandit to gif him acces and a chalmer within the castle’.11 Relations between Argyll and Morton had broken down during Morton’s regency, when Morton had demanded that Argyll’s wife, Annas Keith, return some royal jewels in her possession. Annas had acquired these jewels during the regency of her first husband, James Stewart, Earl of Moray, and claimed that these constituted security on unpaid debts the crown owed to her children from their marriage. She now wanted Morton, as regent, to repay the debt from the crown coffers.12 Although the question of the jewels was eventually resolved, Argyll and Morton remained antagonistic. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Argyll’s close access to James aroused Morton’s concern.13 He requested that Lochleven should keep him ‘advertist’ of events.14 Denying accusations of ‘ambicioun’ and ‘avariciousness’, the soon-tobe-ex-regent affirmed that he above all people would support James taking the reins of government himself, ‘Sen I think neuir to sett my face aganis him quhais honour saulftie and preseruatioun hes bene sa deir unto me’.15 This remark is worth pausing over, since Morton’s easy acquiescence to demands he should demit the regency has proved difficult to explain. This avowed desire to obey James could be dismissed as mere rhetorical commonplace or an exercise in self-preservation, but it is perhaps most likely that, as he would in 1581, Morton over-estimated the strength of his relations with James. After all, Morton also declared that ‘I will neuir beleif to find otherwayes at his hand then favour, althogh, all the unfriends I haif in the earthe wer about him to persuaid him to the contrary’.16 If he did indeed esteem his relations with James to be so strong as to resist challenge, Morton miscalculated. Argyll’s arrival in Stirling was the culmination of a process already underway in 1577, when Argyll was esteemed to be ‘especiallie well liked of by all that are about the King’.17 Conversely, throughout the summer and autumn of 1577 English intelligencers reported that Morton was insecure in his position.18 In early 1578, just before Morton lost the regency, the English diplomat Thomas Randolph was ordered to encourage the Scottish nobility, including Argyll, to reconcile amongst themselves behind Morton as regent and to inform

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  15 Morton of rumours that he was disliked.19 Randolph only arrived after Morton had demitted the regency, constraining the latter to explain regretfully that ‘Ther restis not now in me that habilitie to do the gude quhairunto I wes always disposed and inclined, during the quhile that I bure charge’.20 Morton recognised that something had profoundly altered when he lost the regency: it would prove unfortunate for him that his English friends failed to reach the same realisation.

I Although Morton lost the regency in March 1578, he did not remain out of power for long, and by May he had regained James’ favour. This return to power was perhaps given a particularly sweet taste since Morton benefitted from circumstances that mirrored those of his own fall. In early 1578, Argyll and the Master of Mar, John Stewart, fourth Earl of Atholl (who had been feuding with Morton since 1577) and Morton’s other opponents had used their influence over an eleven-­year-old monarch, one perhaps yearning for more control or, at least, susceptible to its lure when it was presented to him, to oust Morton; by April, the sixteen-year-old John Erskine, second Earl of Mar desired in his turn to free himself from the control of his uncle, the Master of Mar. To date, focussing on the question of Morton’s role in planning these events, for which the evidence is not strong enough to answer definitively, has obscured the significance of other factors.21 James was ‘in great feare’ after the Earl of Mar’s coup, and his sleep ‘disquieted’  – unsurprisingly so, since the Master of Mar’s son, who lived in Stirling and whom James presumably knew, had died as a result of injuries he sustained in the crowd of people in Stirling Castle during the coup.22 Probably as a result of James’ anxiety following the fracas, in Edinburgh it was widely believed that the king would request help from either Morton or Morton’s nephew Archibald Douglas, eighth Earl of Angus, to obtain his freedom from Stirling Castle.23 Indeed, despite James’ fear there are hints he attempted to assert his authority in the immediate aftermath of the coup. The Edinburgh burgess David Moysie reported that by early May James had personally commanded Morton to reconcile with Atholl and Argyll. Likewise, the Earl and Master of Mar were required to resolve their differences.24 By the end of May, Morton was in Stirling, and on 12 June he swore the oath of a privy councillor, famously returning to ‘first rowme and place’ at the council board.25 Morton’s biographer G. R. Hewitt has argued that English support helped Morton to return to power and that his return to power was achieved by a comfortable margin.26 Both claims require qualification. First, Morton’s power was far from secure. He had not been returned to power by an overwhelming consensus in his favour: rather, Morton’s return to the privy council was carried with the slender majority of two.27 English spies drew up lists of ‘Malcontents’ and ‘Biencontents’ within Scotland, which bears out the fragility of Morton’s position.28 Fifteen individuals were deemed ‘biencontent’, whilst twenty individuals or groups, such as ‘the Hamiltons’, and ‘the Carrs’ were identified as ‘malcontent’. Amongst these ‘malcontents’, moreover, was James’ tutor, George

16  Amy Blakeway Buchanan, considered to be unhappy ‘in respect of the Erle Mortons cominge again into the King’s favour’.29 What of the claim that it was English intervention that caused Morton’s return? This assumption almost certainly has its basis in the fact that the anonymous English list-maker thought that the former regent had ‘com in by her Majesty’s request and mediation to the great grief of all the malcontents’.30 Certainly, Morton’s return pleased Elizabeth, and she had encouraged it in letters to Argyll and Morton written on 20 May.31 James received a missive of the same date urging him to heed Morton’s advice, whilst Mar was enjoined to take good care of his royal charge.32 However, there is no evidence that these letters actually served to influence the behaviour of their recipients: Argyll ignored his and voted against Morton’s admission to the council.33 If, as it was believed in Edinburgh, James had indeed requested Morton’s presence in the aftermath of the coup and commanded reconciliation in early May, there is no evidence that Morton had ‘com in’ due to Elizabeth’s intervention: her letters arrived only after James had asked Morton to come to Stirling. On this occasion English preferences happened to coincide with those of James and an ascendant group of Scottish nobles but did not cause the eventual outcome. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that although there was a significant degree of overlap between ‘anti-Morton’ and ‘anti-English’ sentiments in the spring of 1578, the two positions were not synonymous. Thus, unlike Argyll, Buchanan was both anti-Morton and well affected to England.34 Hence too the English diplomat Robert Bowes’ ability to defuse tensions, albeit temporarily, between Morton and his more numerous opponents in August.35 This changed considerably by 1581, when Morton’s opponents, including James himself, were vocally anti-English.

II During the summer of 1579, Morton’s position and his relationship with James appeared secure. In May, Morton had headed a short military campaign against the powerful Hamiltons, which resulted in members of the family fleeing into exile or being imprisoned. The Hamiltons were next in the royal succession after James but had fought against Morton and his allies for much of the civil war of 1567 to 1573. In 1570 the Hamiltons had orchestrated the assassination of James VI’s first regent, James Stewart, Earl of Moray, and in September 1571 they were involved in the assassination of Matthew Stewart, Earl of Lennox, James’ grandfather and Moray’s successor as regent. In 1579, these events were raked up to justify a wholescale attack on the family.36 Despite basking in his monarch’s gratitude over the summer, by September the political situation in Scotland, and Morton’s relations with James VI, had begun to change. The catalyst for this was the arrival of James’ cousin, Esmé Stuart, Sieur d’Aubigny, from France. As an adult ruler, a distinctive facet of James’ governance was his dependence on favourites. Esmé has long been identified as James’ first favourite, although as Jenny Wormald observed, James’ reliance on Esmé was an act of political independence rather than simply a teenage crush.37

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  17 By contrast, James’ attempts to encourage concord and reconciliation in the first years of his personal rule have hitherto been ignored. James’ behaviour between 1578 and 1581 suggests that his claim in 1583 that he had ‘longe desiered to drawe [the] nobillyty unto unytie & concord’ was more than rhetorical.38 We have seen the pressure applied to Morton and Argyll in May 1578; likewise, prior to the October 1579 Parliament, James pronounced his intention to settle all disagreements at that meeting.39 Although d’Aubigny’s arrival would prove significant it did not mark the beginning of James’ attempts to direct politics, even if these first steps were intended to achieve the conventional end of noble unity and concord. James’ emergence from his political chrysalis is also visible in the June 1579 distribution of alms to ‘certane aigit and decayit personis sumtyme honest houshaldaris maist masterfull’ to mark his thirteenth birthday.40 There is no record of such a distribution of alms on the royal birthday on previous years, and it is tempting to connect this new ceremony with the elevation of Peter Young, another of James’ tutors, to the role of preceptor and almoner on 25 October 1577.41 In any event, Young’s appointment and the ceremony are further signs of James’ growing public role and the attendant need for greater administrative support. d’Aubigny rose so quickly because he capitalised on existing tendencies. His arrival in September served as a catalyst in speeding up a nascent recalibration of power amongst the Scottish nobility and their monarch, rather than initiating a new direction. The October and November 1579 parliamentary sessions were crucial for this process. Shortly before parliament met, James visited Morton in Dalkeith, where he was entertained ‘with great honour’. Despite Morton’s characteristic failure to give James a large gift, at this stage he remained ‘in gud favour with the King’.42 Events in parliament reflected this. The major business was the forfeiture of the Hamiltons, following the attack on the family and their flight in May.43 Since the financial gains from this were considerable, it is worth emphasising that James’ gratitude towards Morton for his role in destroying the Hamiltons appears to have been provoked by fear rather than merely rapacity.44 In October 1579, James expressed ‘fervent hatred against them & as it wer a feare he hade of them yf they shuld remayne or inhabit within this realme’, which would, ‘be dangerous to his person’.45 In addition to approbation for the attack on the Hamiltons, parliament confirmed an earlier act approving Morton’s actions as regent and provided Morton with an opportunity to deny the accusation that he had poisoned the Earl of Atholl and to offer himself up for trial.46 Morton, along with twenty-six colleagues, was appointed to the privy council.47 Despite sharing booty from the Hamiltons’ fall and enjoying a clear sign of royal favour in being allocated the lodgings closest to the king, d’Aubigny was not appointed to the council, nor, indeed, was he elevated when he was made Earl of Lennox the following March.48 Indeed, d’Aubigny had to wait until June 1580 to receive a seat at the council table.49 The fact that d’Aubigny waited so long to join the privy council raises an interesting broader point about the relationship between council membership and influence. d’Aubigny (hereafter Lennox) became a privy councillor because he was already influential; similarly, when Morton narrowly regained conciliar

18  Amy Blakeway membership in June 1578 it came after his return to favour with James. In both cases, council membership served to endorse, acknowledge and provide institutional structure for existing influence. Despite rumours of Lennox’s imminent recognition as second person in the realm, in October Morton and Mar were ‘yet gretest with the King’. The English observer Nicholas Errington considered that if Morton and Mar reconciled with the Kers and the Homes, they would have sufficient support to be secure.50 Errington suggested that this rapprochement would be best effected by Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, who had long experience of both parties in his capacity as border warden. Yet to the Scots’ disappointment Hunsdon was unable to visit them that autumn as he was in Ireland. Hunsdon’s failure to appear had significant ramifications, since Morton’s alienation from these border families strengthened Argyll.51 Argyll in turn was courting Lennox, who, by the end of October, despite Morton’s continued influence, was being used by Argyll to set business before James.52 By December 1579 Lennox’s influence had grown to the point where Morton was rumoured to have requested permission to go abroad.53 By contrast, at the same time James made ‘greit persuit’ to Argyll and his wife Annas Keith ‘to remane’ with him at Stirling.54 Morton’s decline in influence was largely due to the Argyll-Lennox association and the fact that James enjoyed their company. Nevertheless, another factor requires consideration, namely, Elizabeth’s attempts to help the Hamiltons, who had fled to England. According to James, the 1579 putsch against the Hamiltons was justified because of their involvement in the murders of James VI’s former regents James Stewart, Earl of Moray, in 1570, and Matthew Stewart, Earl of Lennox, in 1571. As a result, he argued that the Hamiltons ought to be repatriated for prosecution.55 Elizabeth, however, refused to comply, citing the Pacification of Perth. The Pacification of Perth had been agreed in February 1573 and marked the beginning of the end of the Marian Civil War, as the Hamiltons and other important supporters of Mary, Queen of Scots, were admitted to James VI’s peace. This meant that any crimes they had committed during the war were remitted, with the exceptions of alleged involvement in the murders of Regent Moray or Regent Lennox. These two heinous acts of treason were reserved to Elizabeth’s judgement.56 Accordingly, Elizabeth considered that even though James had taken the reins of government in 1579, matters concerning the murders of Regent Moray or Regent Lennox continued to devolve to her. She wrote to Morton both before and after the Hamiltons were forfeited to enlist his voice in their favour.57 Tellingly, instructions issued to the English envoy Nicholas Errington in November 1579 not only instructed Errington ‘to deale … with’ Morton, but referred to him as ‘regent’.58 This slip of the pen neatly illustrates the English failure to adequately recalibrate their relationships within Scotland. In response, Morton claimed that his attempts to explain the situation to James fell on deaf ears.59 Why Morton continued to act as a spokesperson for Elizabeth when it put him on a direct collision course with his own monarch is unclear, but Morton’s support for the Hamiltons at Elizabeth’s behest probably contributed to his declining influence between October and December 1579.

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  19

III Elizabeth was Morton’s only option in the international diplomatic scene, but he was not the only noble whom she approached in Scotland. Unfortunately for Morton, Argyll’s influence in Ireland meant that he enjoyed a unique bargaining position with England.60 A conversation between Argyll and Bowes, which took place in November 1579, served as a timely reminder of this. Argyll showed the English ambassador a bond made between one of his predecessors and ‘Doneyl’ of Ireland, offering a yearly pension to Argyll in return for his obligation to provide military support in Ireland. Argyll explained that he had declined the continuation of this alliance.61 This gesture of support for the English came at a critical juncture in their attempts to subdue and convert Catholic Ireland. In July 1579 the Irish Catholic exile James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald launched a small, religiously motivated invasion of his homeland.62 Unrest in Ireland had a direct effect on Scotland because Hunsdon had been redeployed to Ireland and therefore had been unable to visit Scotland to reconcile Morton with the Kers and Homes. By November, when Argyll expressed his loyalty to Bowes, clumsy intervention from English military officials had worsened the Irish situation and forced Gerald fitz James Fitzgerald, fourteenth Earl of Desmond, to join the rebels.63 The following year trouble in Ireland came from within the English pale itself, in the form of the Baltinglass Rebellion.64 This prompted the appointment of a new governor in Ireland, who was still engaged in putting down the rebellion when another rising, led by William Nugent, commenced in 1581.65 It is unsurprising that over these years Elizabeth’s interest in Ireland ‘was exceptional’.66 The English need to placate Argyll had likewise influenced relations with Morton before he lost the regency. In January 1578 English officials in Ireland had been instructed to prepare for ‘forrain invasion’ since ‘the traitorous divices of James FitzMaurice are again revivid’.67 This anxiety explains why that month Randolph was instructed to discuss the state of Ireland with Argyll and why he was to let Morton understand that if he moved against Argyll Elizabeth would not only withdraw her support, but create a party against him in Argyll’s favour.68 Randolph arrived after Morton had demitted the regency, so these instructions were outdated by the time he crossed the border. Nevertheless, this clearly demonstrates where Elizabeth’s priorities lay. By March 1580 Argyll was sufficiently confident in his position to report to James that he had heard rumours that Morton was plotting to capture James and take him abroad to England.69 Argyll’s accusation echoed broader concerns surrounding James’ safety throughout his minority, which later mutated into fears that Lennox would take him to France.70 That this particular manifestation of kidnapping anxiety was credible shows how dangerous Morton’s proximity to the English had become. Initially, Argyll had made the accusation secretly, and when James refused to reveal the identity of the tale-teller ‘Morton departed discontented’, and decided to ‘forbeare the court until he be called’.71 The council’s solution was that in future only claims where the accuser was willing to initiate a trial would be given credence. Predictably, Morton was unsatisfied with

20  Amy Blakeway this result, and its legacy was a ‘deadly inimitie’ with Argyll.72 Nevertheless, throughout this period James was actively attempting to prevent future divisions. In early April James Stewart, commendator of St Colme, was deputed to reconcile Morton with Argyle and Lennox ‘by the Kings especiall mediacion’.73 After a limited form of reconciliation was achieved, James vetoed ‘further mediacion’, apparently because he worried ‘that the further dealing therin’ would only exacerbate matters.74 Despite this royal intervention, the situation was sufficiently unstable that a convention proposed for April was delayed and eventually cancelled. Rumours claimed that Morton had laboured to secure its postponement, and he shortly afterwards attended a council meeting at Stirling accompanied by many friends dressed in armour.75 In May 1580, visiting English diplomats noted James’ vehement dislike of Morton, coupled with James’ awareness of rumours of Morton’s imminent arrest.76 The English attributed Morton’s dire straits to a combination of his refusal to attend court, his quarrel with his nephew, Angus, and the possibility he might temporise with Lennox, which lost him support.77 Morton himself was deemed to have ‘litle desire to come at court or deale in the state’, in part due to the costliness of living at court.78 This thrifty political rectitude was exacerbated by physical incapacity due to illness.79 During the summer of 1580, Scottish politics continued to oscillate between plans revolving around Morton’s exclusion, possibly to be achieved through violence, and reconciliation amongst the nobility. This resulted in a state of dynamic tension, whereby any contingent factors, such as rumours or illness, could push the pendulum in either direction. James’ vocal dislike of Morton was probably fed by his belief that a ‘platt’ was about to be sprung.80 However, it was also only one manifestation of the young monarch’s refusal to countenance dissent. Accordingly, ‘the mooste parte’ of the court had determined ‘for ther best safety to wyne and hold the kinges favour by yelding to the course of his owne affection’.81 Any attempted ‘dissuation of the king from his pleasures and mynyons’ could only bring ‘peril’. When rumours of an intended change of government in Scotland circulated during James’ summer travels Morton believed that he was the target ‘to be shot at’.82 The fact that nothing transpired may have been due to a lack of evidence with which to charge Morton, a problem his enemies hoped would be resolved with the return of Sir James Balfour from France, who possessed a bond that implicated Morton in the murder of James’ father, Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley.83 However, Balfour would not return until December, and by the middle of July Lennox and others of his party had in their turn fallen sick.84 Accordingly, in August, reconciliation was initiated between Morton and his fellow nobles, again at James’ ‘motion’.85 The negotiations were delayed by illness and in the end came to nothing, possibly because Morton was not fully committed – he later denied having achieved any reconciliation with Lennox when questioned by English agents.86 Meanwhile, south of the border, Elizabeth was considering the possibility of some out-of-character action. On 22 June, she signed an extraordinary letter that, carefully corrected in draft by Burghley, requested Morton’s advice on what she could do in Scotland to rescue James VI from the pernicious influence

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  21 of Lennox.87 Throughout his regency, Morton would doubtless have been delighted to receive correspondence from Elizabeth asking what she could do to help. However, Morton was no longer regent, and this missive placed him in a situation that bordered on the treacherous. Unsurprisingly, he was unwilling to commit anything to paper that might compromise his position.88 He expressed gratitude to Elizabeth, but Morton also explained that he was now ‘bot ane of his [James’] nobilitie and counsale’. Therefore, any attempt on his part to advise Elizabeth privately on a course of action that directly concerned James ‘micht be judgit presumptuous and an undewtiful subiect well worth of puneischement for my laboure’.89 An attempt to pre-empt such accusations may have lain behind Morton’s decision to share his English correspondence with James.90 Morton was right to identify Elizabeth’s letter as dangerous: ‘traffiquing’ with England was one of the charges laid against him the following year.91 Distaste for Morton’s southern correspondence reflects James’ broader irritation with Elizabeth’s attempts to steer events in Scotland. We have seen that attempted English intervention on behalf of the Hamiltons was considered ‘unplesand’ by James and those who surrounded him.92 Heavy-handed English strategies in the early months of 1581 had similarly unsuccessful results, a point to which we will return. Frustratingly, exactly what happened in Scotland between August 1580 and the end of the year is not well documented. Bowes returned to Berwick in October, which explains the steep decline in his letters from that month onwards; presumably missives from September and early October were delivered orally or no longer remain extant.93 Morton attended every, bar one, meetings of the privy council for which sederunts survive, present for, amongst other things, Lennox’s appointment to the position of chamberlain in October.94 The altercation between Laurence, Master of Oliphant, and William, fourth Lord Ruthven, that same month was probably the most politically significant of several disputes that required resolution and might be the reason for the urgent message sent to Morton in Dalkeith ‘efter supper’ on 16 October.95 Existing bad blood between the families spilled over into violence when Ruthven and his followers were attacked by the Master of Oliphant and one of Ruthven’s men was killed. Morton’s support for Oliphant alienated Ruthven, who thereafter assumed a prominent role amongst his antagonists.96 This probably played into existing tensions between Ruthven and Morton: Ruthven’s position as royal treasurer left him financially exposed and his responsibility for royal debts certainly influenced his actions on other occasions.97 Since Ruthven drew the council’s attention to the state of crown finances shortly after Morton’s fall, and the summer progress of 1580 might have been initiated as a retrenchment exercise, it is highly likely financial concerns also influenced his decision to back the anti-Morton confederacy.98 Nevertheless, life at the Scottish court in December 1580 showed no signs of the tremors that would shake it on New Year’s Eve. James’ routine continued as usual, and the treasurer’s accounts afford us a glimpse of a gawky and inelegant teenager with a payment of £100 to a dancing master for the ‘extraordinar painis taikin in teiching of his grace to dance’.99 More perplexingly, in early December Morton received one stone and eight pounds of ‘utter fyne gold’, which when coined was

22  Amy Blakeway worth £658.100 Perhaps some people within the regime did not know of Morton’s impending doom, perhaps the conspirators were trying to minimise Morton’s suspicions until they chose to act or perhaps the plan only came together at the last minute.

IV On 31 December, Morton was ‘surprised in his chamber’ in Holyrood and taken to the room above James’ lodgings.101 There he was accused of treason and immediately imprisoned. Rumours of Morton’s imminent arrest had circulated the previous week, but due to ‘his confidence in the King, & of his own innocency’ Morton had ignored them.102 Morton, as he had in 1578, once again miscalculated, since the accusations were made ‘with the privety and especiall commandement from the King’ who was present in council as they were revealed.103 Despite the clear evidence for James’ foreknowledge and at least tacit approbation of the accusation, it is important to recognise that Morton’s subsequent five-month pre-trial imprisonment following these events was not simply an interlude of waiting for the inevitable.104 Events during this period suggest that in January 1581 Morton’s execution was far from a foregone conclusion. Unfortunately, the extant evidence does not offer firm conclusions, so some of the suggestions outlined below remain slightly speculative. The English were pushing for Morton’s trial from the moment of his arrest and in response were told that in order for Morton to be tried, his confidante Archibald Douglas who had fled across the border needed to be returned to Scotland.105 Given English recalcitrance over repatriating the Hamiltons, this was unlikely to result in Douglas’ arrival in Scotland, and as Morton was eventually tried without Douglas, this was probably a delaying tactic.106 However, the request for Douglas’ return highlights the broader problem of a lack of evidence available to convict Morton of any of the crimes with which he had been charged. Papers found ‘in the ryflinge of his [Douglas’] chamber’ failed to produce anything sufficiently incriminating against Morton.107 The conspirators may have hoped that Sir James Balfour, then in France, had evidence sufficient to convict Morton of the murder of James’ father, Lord Darnley. However, when Balfour arrived in Scotland in late December he was found to be ‘not willinge’ to substantiate Captain James Stewart’s accusation that Morton had been more than merely complicit in Lord Darnley’s murder.108 The only item in Balfour’s possession was a document signed by Morton and other nobles approving James Hepburn, fourth Earl of Bothwell’s marriage to Queen Mary. Probably this was a copy of the Ainsley Bond; certainly it was hardly treasonable and implicated many more than Morton alone.109 Since Morton was ill during his sojourn in Dumbarton, perhaps Captain Stewart and his comrades hoped that his disease would accomplish their dirty work for them.110 It is also possible that the conspirators did not find the support they had expected. Morton retained support from his kin, albeit that James VI ‘dealte verie earnestly and by many secrett and subtille ways to persuade Angus to abandon the Earl of Morton and to ioyne firmely with Lennox’.111 However, a lack of

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  23 outright support for Morton did not necessarily equate to actively supporting the new regime, and from this perspective it is significant that immediately after Morton’s capture many other nobles left the court.112 Morton was undoubtedly a divisive political figure – take, for instance, the fact that the official explanation for James’ assumption of his majority was that this was necessary due to ‘the apparent troubles quhilk arrysis throw the mislyking that mony hes in the persoun of his rycht traist cousing James, erll of Mortoun’.113 Nevertheless, whilst a significant proportion of the nobility disliked Morton, this did not mean they supported his imprisonment or execution.114 Rather than seeing Scottish politics of this period as simply a ‘pro-Morton’ and ‘anti-Morton’ dichotomy, a range of positions needs to be acknowledged. It is worth recalling just how unusual Morton’s execution was amongst the higher nobility: no other peer had been executed since 1516.115 Perhaps the reservations expressed by Morton’s fellow-nobles stemmed from a simple reluctance to condemn one of their own. Randolph certainly tried to play on these concerns, warning Argyll that he should ‘beware of so perilous an example’ that a man of low status, such as Captain Stewart, could accuse a peer of treason.116 Indeed, as Argyll had also supported Mary’s marriage to Bothwell, one of the charges laid against Morton, this warning was well founded.117 Royal attempts to manage Edinburgh and the convention held there at the end of February evidence widespread discontent with Morton’s imprisonment. In January 1581 Morton’s supporters were banned from the royal presence, the court and Edinburgh.118 Entry to the February convention was restricted at the gate by Captain James Stewart, accompanied by forty armed supporters, and attendees were only permitted a few token followers.119 Once this vetting process was completed, those men who had gained entry were required to speak to James in person and other, unnamed, individuals, who laid out the faults committed by Queen Elizabeth.120 This tight control mirrors that exerted during the period surrounding Morton’s execution: even after he had been convicted for treason those who adhered to Morton’s cause were believed to be sufficiently numerous to be a potential danger.121 James’ private whispering campaign was reflected in formal diplomacy in the choice of Sir John Seton as ambassador to England. Seton was known to be antagonistic to England and on his arrival in Berwick behaved in a provocative and insulting manner.122 The three factors we have thus far discussed in the months following Morton’s arrest, namely, the weakness of the evidence against Morton, the continued degree of support he enjoyed from his kinsmen and the limited, and so unsuccessful, English intervention on his behalf, were all recognised by Hewitt.123 Whilst all of these aspects played a role in delaying Morton’s trial and execution, it has not yet been recognised that two other factors also helped to delay Morton’s trial. First, that the conspirators were divided amongst themselves. Second, that attempts were once again underway to effect Morton’s reconciliation with Lennox.124 On 11 January the English believed that a conference was taking place in Edinburgh at which Lennox, Argyll and Captain James Stewart, amongst others, were present. Some favoured Morton’s continued imprisonment in Edinburgh, others his transfer to Dumbarton, but the majority wanted to ‘cut him off; in regard that

24  Amy Blakeway they thynke hym so offended by these dealyngs with hym, and his nature so implacable, as he may (not that he can); eschape there hands’. James Stewart was ‘so warm’ on this point that he threatened that if Morton was not killed ‘he will make an end of some of them’.125 Stewart, rather than Lennox, was Morton’s chief antagonist amongst a group of men with divided views.126 By the middle of January, the conspirators remained at odds.127 The wedding of James’ halfcousin, Elizabeth Stewart, Countess of Moray, to another James Stewart, son of the commendator of St Colme, was probably an attempt to consolidate relations between Argyll, Elizabeth’s step father, and St Colme, who was amongst those Captain Stewart threatened when they had been less ‘warm’ against Morton.128 The fact that Captain Stewart’s fervency was not universal meant that in February reconciliation remained possible: James’ visit to Glasgow was rumoured to have been motivated by a desire to move closer to Dumbarton, where Morton was imprisoned, to facilitate discussion.129 The mediation failed, although it is unclear whether negotiations floundered upon Morton’s insistence upon a trial, or his friends’ unwillingness to countenance reconciliation with Lennox.130 At first, it might appear tempting to dismiss this mediation as a simple pretence: after all, in May Morton’s nephew, the Earl of Angus, was offered his uncle’s life in return for humiliating conditions, which the regime knew Angus would be unable to accept honourably.131 However, there is no evidence that the February negotiations were likewise designed to fail – no clear record of the terms offered remains, but equally English reports of the negotiations, although brief, make no suggestion this was anything other than a genuine attempt at concord. It was only after reconciliation had failed that Morton’s servants and friends were threatened with or subjected to torture.132 These interrogations revealed a plot by Angus, which comprised either a plan to release Morton from Dumbarton or an attempt to seize control of the royal household, or both.133 Without the element of surprise the scheme unravelled, but even more damaging was the fact that the plot ‘hath greatly exasperated the King’, and scared him – James took to sleeping in his clothes in response.134 In a reversal of the events of April 1578 and May 1579 when James’ fear pushed him towards Morton, this latest plot, combined with claims that Morton had at least acquiesced to (if not procured) Darnley’s assassination in 1567 hardened James’ stance against him. At the end of March, therefore, it seemed likely that Morton’s death was imminent, and on 27 March Douglas supporters renounced their bonds of loyalty en masse.135 In these circumstances, it is unclear why a further two months passed until Morton’s trial. Frustratingly, our knowledge of this period is scantier than those of the first three months of the year since Randolph had been recalled and his helpful reports ceased.136 Randolph’s departure from Scotland in March 1581 has hitherto been attributed to a failed attempt to assassinate the ambassador.137 In fact, Randolph had already decided to leave before this unsubtle hint was dropped, although since his departure was delayed due to a combination of a bad ‘rheume’ and a letter from Morton, the bullet was doubtless intended to hurry him along.138 Identifying that Randolph wanted to leave before the assassination attempt reveals that

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  25 his departure was not a snap decision based on an anonymous would-be act of violence, but the culmination of a backdrop of anti-English antagonism that had been present throughout the 1581 embassy: by February Randolph already believed that all his efforts were counter-productive.139 After Randolph’s departure, Scottish bans on messengers crossing the border were symptomatic of the extent to which relations between England and Scotland had broken down.140 Some English border officials persisted in a belief that force could have solved everything, an analysis that underlies contentions that Elizabeth ‘abandoned’ Morton.141 Yet, the limited perspective offered by these bellicose border officials ignores the fact that Randolph left as the result of action undertaken by a group of Scots, including James, who convinced him that his mission was impossible. If the lack of extant commentary on Scottish affairs between April and June 1581 reflects reality, this potentially suggests that the Scots’ ban on messengers served to prevent information crossing the border remarkably well. In short, English diplomacy in Scotland on Morton’s behalf did not fail primarily because, as Maurice Lee argued, Elizabeth was prevented from acting in Scotland in order to preserve English relations with France, or even because of divisions amongst Elizabeth’s regime regarding the best course of action, although these were doubtless contributing factors.142 It failed, as Randolph himself recognised, because the Scottish regime that had coalesced around James VI prevented it from succeeding.

V James’ unwillingness to follow Elizabethan ‘advice’ is increasingly acknowledged as a hallmark of his mature kingship, as, indeed, is his preference for unity amongst the nobility.143 A consideration of his relations with Morton reveals that both elements were present in the period 1578–81. The identification of these patterns of behaviour in the very first years of James’ rule without a regent suggests that this period was not simply a continuation of his minority, but rather an important stage in the transition towards his fully adult rule. Moreover, as someone who enjoyed an established relationship with England, and was a divisive figure within Scotland, Morton fell foul of these two emergent monarchical predilections. Nevertheless, it is worth concluding by returning to Morton’s avowed belief, articulated in 1578 when he lost the regency and repeated in 1581 when he was accused of treason, that his relations with James were sufficiently robust to ensure that he would be emerge unscathed. This might have been a rhetorical device, but it draws our attention to the transformation of James’ role at the moment he declared himself capable of governing. Morton knew that regardless of James’ age from the moment he ruled without a regent, his will was a potent political force. James’ agency and ability to direct affairs is revealed in the statement that an action was undertaken at James’ ‘special command’, a phrase which, as we have seen, contemporaries repeatedly used during these years. This is not to argue that James instantaneously obtained the level of control over his polity that he would later enjoy, but rather to emphasise

26  Amy Blakeway that his assumption of majority, and with it the dismantling of the alternative political structures provided by regency, immediately had profound practical and symbolic consequences. We cannot see the years 1578 to 1580 as a sort of continuation of Morton’s ‘administration’.144 A parallel can be drawn between Morton’s loss of the regency in 1578 and the events of 1524, when at the suggestion of his mother Margaret Tudor, James V declared himself capable of ruling aged twelve. As they later did for James VI, the Scots accepted this decision, as, indeed, did most of their neighbours. Compared to his grandfather, however, James VI is often considered to have made a relatively late entry into politics.145 In one sense, this comparison holds good. When the sixteen-year-old James V escaped from Morton’s father, Sir George Douglas, and uncle, Archibald, sixth Earl of Angus, he did indeed immediately dominate the political stage and redirected policy away from their Anglophile agenda. By contrast, James VI’s dominance arguably only emerged to this degree in 1585, aged nineteen, two years after he escaped from the Ruthven Raid.146 However, a comparison between James V, aged twelve in 1524 when John Stewart, Duke of Albany, was ejected from the regency, and James VI in 1578, three months shy of his twelfth birthday when Morton was deposed, suggests rather different conclusions. Following his acquiescence to his mother’s scheme to declare him an adult in the summer of 1524, James V’s first significant moment of political agency was his involvement in the Lennox conspiracy of 1526, designed to free him from the Douglases and to reverse their Anglophile policies.147 By this measure, James VI not only shared his grandfather’s antipathy towards English intervention, but enjoyed greater political influence immediately after the official declaration of his majority than James V did, although it must be recognised the sources are richer for the 1580s than for the 1520s. James VI’s relations with Morton reveal a young monarch fiercely protective of his authority, whether in the face of internal dissent or foreign intervention. In such circumstances, it is unsurprising that a noble whose previous political dominance left him unable to reconcile with his king’s chosen servants, and who had an unusually close relationship to Scotland’s nearest and most overbearing neighbour, was the first political casualty of James VI’s early personal rule.

Notes 1 Amy Blakeway, Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland (Woodbridge: 2015), 3. 2 Maurice Lee, ‘The Fall of the Regent Morton: A Problem in Satellite Diplomacy’, Journal of Modern History 28 (1956), 111–129 at 123. 3 For an overview: Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, ‘James VI: Universal King?’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 1–3. 4 RPS, A1578/3/2 [accessed 9 December 2015]. 5 Stephen Alford, Kingship and Politics in the Reign of Edward VI (Cambridge: 2002), 136–174. 6 For Morton’s regency: G. R. Hewitt, Scotland under Morton: 1572–1580 (Edinburgh: 1982). 7 Blakeway, Regency, 33. 8 Blakeway, Regency, 147–148.

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  27 9 Melville, Memoirs, 263. 10 Only Morton’s letters to Lochleven survive from this exchange. 11 Morton to Lochleven, 2 Mar. 1578, NLS MS 77 f. 28r. 12 Hewitt, Scotland under Morton, 40–42. 13 Jane Dawson, ‘Campbell, Colin, sixth earl of Argyll (c.1542–1584)’, ODNB [4483, accessed 7 September 2015]. 14 Morton to Lochleven, 2 Mar. 1578, NLS MS 77 f. 28r; Morton to Lochleven, 3 March 1578, NLS MS 77 f. 30r; Morton to Lochleven, 4 Mar. 1578, NLS MS 77 f. 32r. 15 Morton to Lochleven, 4 Mar. 1578, NLS MS 77 f. 32r. 16 Morton to Lochleven, 4 Mar. 1578, NLS MS 77 f. 32r. 17 ‘The Present Estate of the Nobilitie in Scotland’, [1577], TNA SP52/27 f. 41r. 18 Bowes to Walsingham, 2 Aug. 1577, BL Caligula C V f. 102r. 19 Instructions to Randolph, 30 Jan. 1578, TNA SP52/27 f. 68v-69r; Copy of instructions to Bowes for Randolph, [Jan. 1578], BL Caligula C V ff. 192r-193v. 20 Morton to Burghley, 28 Mar. 1578 TNA SP 52/27 f. 75. 21 Lee, ‘Satellite Diplomacy’, 115–6; Hewitt, Morton, 58, 180; Moysie, Memoirs, 7; Bowes to Burghley, 28 Apr. 1578, BL Caligula C III f. 567r-v. 22 Bowes to Burghley, 28 Apr. 1578, BL Caligula C III f. 567r-v. 23 Bowes to Burghley, 28 Apr. 1578, BL Caligula C III f. 567r-v; Moysie, Memoirs, 7. 24 Moysie, Memoirs, 7–8; Melville, Memoirs, 264–265. 25 RPS, A1578/3/16, accessed 20 March 2015. 26 Hewitt, Morton, 57–63. 27 Votes with and against the Earl of Morton to be of the Council, [June 1578], TNA SP52/27 f. 88r. The Scottish records of the convention do not record voting patterns, so we are reliant on the English reports of the occasion. However, a high degree of similarity with Scottish sederunts for the convention implies the English list is broadly reliable. The English list records three men who were not on the Scottish sederunt: Tullibarden, Buchanan and Lord Gray. This latter may be a mistake for his son, the Master, who was present. The only individual present according to the Scottish sederunt list whose vote is not recorded was the Earl of Eglinton. For the convention sederunt: RPS, A1578/3/15 [accessed 12 April 2015]. 28 ‘The Malcontentes in Scotland’, [May/June 1578] TNA SP52/27 f. 83r; ‘The Biencontents in this present in Scotlande’, [May/June 1578] TNA SP52/27 f. 84r. 29 ‘The Malcontentes in Scotland’, [May/June 1578] TNA SP52/27 f. 83r. For the cause of their falling out: Melville, Memoirs, 262–263. 30 ‘The names of the councillors as there be at this present in Scotland and how they be well or evill affected against the amity with England’, [June 1578], TNA SP52/27 f. 90r. 31 Elizabeth to Morton, 20 May 1578, TNA SP12/45 f. 25r; Elizabeth to Argyll, 20 May 1578, TNA SP12/45 f. 26r. 32 Elizabeth to James, 20 May 1578, TNA SP12/45 f. 25v; Elizabeth to Mar, 20 May 1578, TNA SP12/45 f. 26r. 33 ‘Votes with and against the Earl of Morton to be of the Council’, [June 1578], TNA SP52/27 f. 88r. 34 ‘The names of the councillors as there be at this present in Scotland and how they be well or evill affected against the amity with England’, [June 1578], TNA SP52/27 f. 90r. 35 Articles Agreed at Stirling, 13 Aug. 1578, BL Caligula C V f. 127; Articles Agreed at Stirling, 14 Aug. 1578, BL Caligula C V f. 128; Hunsdon to Burghley, 19 Aug. 1578, BL Caligula C V f. 129r. For the breakdown of the temporary accord: Bowes to Burghley, 18 Sep. 1578, Hatfield House [HH] Cecil Papers [CP] 10 f. 39v; Bowes to Walsingham, 24 Nov. 1578, BL Caligula C V f. 138v; Bowes to Burghley, 3 Nov. 1578, BL Caligula C V f. 137r. 36 Jamie Reid-Baxter, “‘Judge and revenge my cause’: the earl of Morton, Andro Blackhall, Robert Sempill and the fall of the House of Hamilton in 1579”, in Sally Mapstone, ed., Older Scots Literature (Edinburgh: 2005), 467–492.

28  Amy Blakeway Jenny Wormald, ‘James VI and I (1566–1625)’, ODNB [14592, accessed 13 April 2015]. Bowes to Walsingham, 3 July 1583, BL Caligula C VII f. 260v. Errington, ‘Present Occurents in Scotland’, [early Oct. 1579], BL Caligula C V f. 171v. Treasurer’s Account, 1579–80, NRS E22/3 f. 47v. Davie Horsburgh, ‘Young, Sir Peter (1544–1628)’, ODNB [30277, accessed 16 April 2015]. For Young as James’ tutor: Aysha Pollnitz, Princely Education in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: 2015), 273–274. 42 Bowes to Burghley, 22 Oct. 1579, BL Calig C V f. 173v. Morton’s security at this juncture is also observed in: Errington, ‘Present Occurents in Scotland’, [early Oct. 1579], BL Caligula C V f. 171r. 43 RPS, 1579/10/16; 1579/10/60 [accessed 31 March 2015]. 44 Jamie Reid-Baxter, ‘Judge and revenge my cause’, 467–492. 45 Errington to Walsingham, 10 Oct. 1579, BL Caligula C V f. 168r. 46 RPS, 1579/10/72, 77 [accessed 31 March 2015]. 47 RPS, 1579/10/49 [accessed 5 April 2015]. 48 Errington, ‘Present Occurents in Scotland’, [early Oct. 1579] BL Caligula C V f. 171v. 49 RPCS, iii, 289. 50 Errington, ‘Present Occurents in Scotland’, [early Oct. 1579] BL Caligula C V f. 171r. For Morton’s previous good relations with Manderston: Amy Blakeway, ‘Kinship and Diplomacy in Sixteenth-Century Scotland: The Earl of Northumberland’s Scottish Captivity in its Domestic and International Context, 1569–72’, Historical Research 87 (2014), 229–250 at 249–250. 51 Errington to Walsingham, 10 Oct. 1579, BL Caligula C V f. 168v. 52 Robert Bowes to Burghley, 22 Oct. 1579, BL Caligula C V f. 173r. 53 Memorial on the Estate of Scotland, 31 Dec. 1579, BL Caligula C V ff. 197v-198v. 54 Thomas Fleschour to Robert Fleschour, 29 Dec. 1579, Moray Archive Box 15 Bundle 7 doc. 1169. 55 James to Elizabeth, 5 Oct. 1579, TNA SP52/27 f. 166r. 56 ‘Memorial for Errington to repair to the King of Scots’, Nov. 1579, TNA SP52/27 ff. 172r-176v; Hewitt, Morton, 25–26. 57 Elizabeth to Morton, 13 Sept. 1579, TNA SP52/27 f. 163v; Elizabeth to Morton, 7 Nov. 1579, TNA SP52/27 f. 170r. 58 Memorial for Errington to repair to the King of Scots, Nov. 1579, TNA SP52/27 f. 174v. 59 Morton to Elizabeth, 27 Dec. 1579, TNA SP52/27 f. 180r. 60 Jane Dawson, The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots: the Earl of Argyll and the Struggle for Britain and Ireland (Cambridge: 2002). 61 Bowes to Walsingham, 24 Nov. 1578, BL Caligula C V 138r. It was likely these included the bond discussed in: John Mackechnie, ‘The Treaty Between Argyll and O’Donnell’, Scottish Gaelic Studies 7:1 (1951), 94–102. If this is the case, either Argyll exaggerated the bond’s antiquity or earlier items have been lost. 62 C. Brady, ‘Faction and the Origins of the Desmond Rebellion of 1579’, Irish Historical Studies 22 (1981), 289–312, at 309–310. 63 Brady, ‘Faction and the Origins of the Desmond Rebellion of 1579’; Christopher Maginn, ‘The Baltinglass Rebellion, 1580: English Dissent or a Gaelic Uprising?’, Historical Journal 47 (2004), 205–232, at 208–209. 64 Maginn, ‘Baltinglass Rebellion’. 65 Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British 1580–1650 (Oxford: 2001), 5, 65; Maginn, ‘Baltinglass Rebellion’, 225; Helen Coburn Walshe, ‘The Rebellion of William Nugent, 1581’, in R. V. Commerford, M. Cullen, J. Hill and C. Lennon, eds, Religion, Conflict and Coexistence in Ireland Essays Presented to Monsignor Patrick J. Corish (Dublin: 1990), 26–52. 66 Canny, Making Ireland British, 65. 37 38 39 40 41

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  29 67 [Unknown – Burghley?] to Sidney, 18 Jan. 1577/8, TNA SP63/60 f. 7r. 68 Instructions to Randolph for repair into Scotland, 31 Jan. 1578, Caligula C V ff. 140v–141r. A miscalculation of regnal years led to this document being wrongly calendared as 1578/9. In fact, it is clearly dated to January in the twentieth year of Elizabeth’s reign, i.e., 1577/8. 69 Bowes to Burghley, 29 Mar. 1579, BL Caligula C V f. 149r. 70 Blakeway, Regency, 220. Bowes to Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 115v. The rumours in this letter were prompted by d’Aubigny’s receipt of the keepership of Dumbarton in late July 1580: RPCS, iii, 295, 306; Bowes to Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1580 TNA SP52/28 f. 115v. 71 Bowes to Leicester, 20 Feb. 1579/80, BL Calig C III f. 582. 72 RPCS, iii, 282–3; Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 27 April 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 37; 3 May 1580, TNA SP52/28 ff. 175v-176r; Moysie, Memoirs, 27. Morton and Argyll may also have argued publically: Calderwood, History, iii, 461. 73 Bowes to Walsingham, 5 Apr. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 165r. 74 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 3 May 1580, TNA SP52/28, f. 176v. 75 Bowes to Walsingham, 23 Apr. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 35r; Bowes to Walsingham and Burghley, 27 Apr. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 37r. 76 Bowes to Burghley, 10 May 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 181r. 77 Bowes to Walsingham, 10/12 May 1580 (deciphered), TNA SP52/28 f. 45r. 78 Bowes to Burghley, 10 May 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 181r. 79 Bowes to Walsingham, 15 June 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 69v; Bowes to Walsingham and Burghley, 22 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 228r. 80 Bowes to Walsingham, 10 May 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 117r. 81 Bowes to Walsingham, 16 May 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 190r. 82 Bowes to Walsingham, 9 July 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 85r. 83 Bowes to Walsingham, 2 Apr. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 11r. Peter G. B. McNeill, ‘Balfour, Sir James, of Pittendreich (c.1525–1583)’, ODNB [1188, accessed 31 March 2015]. 84 Bowes to Walsingham and Burghley, 19 July 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 211r-v. 85 Bowes to Burghley, 21 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 133v; Bowes to Walsingham and Burghley, 10 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 117r. 86 Bowes to Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 117; Bowes to Walsingham and Burghley, 22 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 228r. 87 Elizabeth to Morton, 22 June 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 77r-v. For further discussion see: Walsingham to Bowes, 21 June 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 75r-v. 88 Bowes to Walsingham and Burghley, 19 July 1580, TNA SP52/28 ff. 210r; Morton to Bowes 29 July 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 217v. 89 Morton to Elizabeth, 16 July 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 92r. 90 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 2 Aug. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 107r-v. 91 Calderwood, History, iii, 557–559. 92 Hay to Bowes, 29 July 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 109r. 93 English Privy Council to Bowes, 7 Oct. 1580, TNA SP52/28 f. 255r. 94 RPCS, iii, 319–335. 95 Treasurer’s Account, 1580–81, NRS E22/4 f. 66v. 96 Calderwood, History, iii, 479–480, Hewitt, Scotland Under Morton, 75–6; RPCS, iii, 329. 97 Goodare and Lynch, ‘James VI: Universal King?’, 16. 98 RPCS, iii, 340–1, Calderwood, History, iii, 462. 99 Treasurer’s Account, 1580–1, NRS E22/4 f. 75r. 100 Treasurer’s Account, 1580–1, NRS E22/4 f. 75v. This sum does not reappear in the following Treasurer’s Account: NRS E21/62 ff. 1r-31r. 101 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 1 Jan. 1581, TNA SP52/29 f. 1r. 102 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 3 Jan. 1581, TNA SP52/29 f. 2r.

30  Amy Blakeway 103 RPCS, iii, 348; Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 7 Jan. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 4v. See alternative claims that James was not aware of the plan to accuse Morton: P. G. B. McNeill, ‘Sir James Balfour of Pittindreich’, Juridical Review I (1960), 1–28. 104 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 1 Jan. 1581, TNA SP52/29 f. 1r; Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 3 Jan. 1581, TNA SP52/29 f. 3v; Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 14 Jan. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 4v. 105 Randolph to Walsingham, 9 Feb. 1580, BL Harley 6999 f. 60r; Private Instructions to Randolph, Jan. 1581, TNA SP52/29 f. 8r; Council of Scotland’s reply to Randolph’s Instructions, 7 Feb. 1581, TNA SP52/29 doc 29 f. 2v. 106 For Douglas’ summons see: Treasurer’s Account, 1580–1, NRS E22/4 f. 78r. 107 Randolph to Hunsdon, 9 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 44v. 108 Extract from Bowes to Huntington, 16 Jan. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 24r. 109 Calderwood, History, iii, 556. For the Ainsley Bond see Julian Goodare, ‘The Ainsley Bond’, in Boardman and Goodare, Kings, Lords and Men, 301–319. 110 Randolph to Hunsdon, 4 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 32v. 111 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 11 Jan. 1580, BL Harley 6999, f. 8r. 112 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 11 Jan. 1580, BL Harley 6999, f. 8r. 113 RPS, A1578/3/2 [accessed 20 March 2015]. 114 Randolph to Walsingham, 14 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 60v. 115 Brown, Noble Power, 15. 116 Randolph to Hunsdon, 9 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 43r. 117 Calderwood, History, iii, 556. 118 RPCS, iii, 349; Randolph to Hunsdon, 8 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 38v. 119 Randolph to Walsingham, 23 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 69v. 120 Randolph to Walsingham, 23 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 69v. 121 Moysie, Memoirs, 32; Calderwood, History, iii, 556. 122 Hunsdon to Walsingham, 16 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 65r; Hunsdon to Walsingham, 10 April 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 167v; Hunsdon to Walsingham, 10 Apr. 1581 [pm], BL Harley 6999 f. 169r; Randolph to Walsingham, 14 Apr. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 181r; Hunsdon to Lennox, 9 June 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 204r. 123 Hewitt, Scotland under Morton, 188–202. 124 Herries of Terregles to Huntington, 10 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 57r. Herries mistakenly believed Morton’s release had been the subject of negotiation between Argyll and Randolph, see, however, Randolph’s own account of the meeting in which he states that the meeting had ended inconclusively: Randolph to Hunsdon, 9 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 43r-v. 125 Bowes to Hunsdon, 11 Jan. 1580, BL Harley 6999 f. 8r. 126 For claims Lennox was the most active conspirator: Hewitt, Scotland Under Morton, 76, 189. 127 Bowes to Huntington, 16 Jan. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 24r-v. 128 Randolph to Hunsdon, 4 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 32r. 129 A declaration of Thomas Randolph’s 1581 Embassy, TNA SP52/29 no. 55 f. 7. 130 Hunsdon to Walsingham, 9 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 51v. 131 [6/7 May 1581], [Bowes to Walsingham], TNA SP52/29 f. 57r. 132 Randolph to Huntington and Hunsdon, 16 Mar. 1581, Harley 6999 f. 91r; Hunsdon to Walsingham, 20 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 95r; Randolph to Hunsdon, 18 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 ff. 96v-97r; Hunsdon to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 107r. 133 Hunsdon to Walsingham, 20 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 95r; Randolph to Hunsdon, 20 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 100r. 134 Randolph to Walsingham, 30 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 136r; Hunsdon to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 107r.

James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton  31 135 Huntington to Walsingham, 27 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 125r; Hunsdon to Walsingham, 29 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 127r; RPCS, iii, 368. 136 RPCS, iii, 387. Melville, Diary, 116–117; Moysie, Memoirs, 31; for March-June 1581 see Calderwood, History, iii, 566–575. 137 Lee, ‘Satellite Diplomacy’, 127; Hewitt, Scotland Under Morton, 193; Randolph to Walsingham, 25 Mar. 1581, TNA SP52/29 f. 52r. 138 Randolph to Hunsdon and Huntington, 16 Mar. 1580, Harley 6999 f. 91v; Randolph to Hunsdon, 18 Mar. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 96r-v. 139 Bowes to Burghley and Walsingham, 7 Jan. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 5v; Randolph [to Hunsdon?], 8 Feb. 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 39r. Randolph’s critic, Melville of Halhill, identified a similar problem recalling the event some years later: Melville, Memoirs, 266. 140 Hunsdon to English Council, 4 April 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 160r. 141 Huntington to Walsingham, 4 April 1581, BL Harley 6999 f. 154r; Lee, ‘Satellite Diplomacy’, 123. 142 Lee, ‘Satellite Diplomacy’, 128. 143 Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 4. 144 Hewitt, Morton, 188. 145 Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 2–5. 146 Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 4. 147 W. K. Emond, ‘The Minority of King James V, 1513–1528’ (University of St Andrews PhD thesis, 1988), 502–513.

2 Of bairns and bearded men James VI and the Ruthven Raid Steven J. Reid

The Ruthven Raid was a 10-month coup d’état that comprised the seizure of James VI by a coalition of nobility, at the end of August 1582 and his forcible captivity, first outside Perth and then in Stirling and Holyrood, until the end of May 1583. The main targets of the ‘Raiders’ were James’ French cousin, Esmé Stewart, Sieur d’Aubigny and Duke of Lennox, and Captain James Stewart of Ochiltree, the short-lived Earl of Arran. These two men had gradually wrested power from the regent James Douglas, Earl of Morton between 1578 and 1581, and their regime had grown increasingly rapacious of the lands and goods of others and increasingly disdainful of the Protestant and presbyterian settlement in the Scottish Kirk. The Raid resulted in Lennox’s permanent expulsion from Scotland (he left the country on 21 December and died in Paris in May of the following year), while Arran was held in close imprisonment at Ruthven Castle until 2 December and on his release was not allowed in the presence of the king. James accomplished his escape by arranging an extended progress and hunting trip to Linlithgow and Falkland in May 1583; while at the latter he made a daring flight on horseback to St Andrews, where he closed himself up in the castle of a slightly bemused Archbishop Patrick Adamson and held a convention to arrange his liberty. In most accounts of James’ reign the Raid is passed over in just such a summary fashion, despite the obvious and extraordinary fact that in the seven-year period of turmoil between 1578 and 1585, when (as Julian Goodare notes) there were ‘at least six palace coups, five of which were successful’, the Raid was the only one where the king was held under such obvious duress.1 The key image of James associated with the Raid is as a weeping and petulant child at Stirling Castle, where the Raiders had transported him from Perth on 30 August.2 When he put his boots on with the intention of riding straight to Edinburgh, and thus testing how far he was at liberty, the Master of Glamis ‘layed his leg before him’, prompting the king (in one version of the story) to burst into tears. Glamis offered a stinging rebuke to this undignified royal sight: ‘better bairns greet than bearded men’.3 However, another, often-overlooked, perspective on the Raid is that of Sir James Melville of Halhill, who purports to have given the king advice when he was debating whether or not to make his escape from Falkland. Halhill’s

Of bairns and bearded men  33 narrative of events in late sixteenth-century Scotland is often highly suspect,4 but his views echo those of many a historian of the Stewart kings – that minorities, and the deeds carried out in them, were an established fact of not only Scottish political life, but of monarchies everywhere in Europe: I again discoursit unto his Majestie, the commown estait of all contrees during ther princes minorite, stryving for stait and for the cheif handling, wherby to advance them selves and ther frendis; as did the house of Guise, during the yong age of K. Francis 2.; the Prince of Conde, during the ring of Charles the ix. of France, and the king of Navar; lykwayis the Duckis of Somersyd and Northumberland, during the youth of K. Edwart the vj. in England; and asweill in the Quen his mothers tym as now in his awen tym; some till advance ther awen affaires, some to deffend and meantean ther awen estait and surete, enterpryses and stryffes; nane of the parties bearing any euell will to his Majestie … Princes again that ar wyse, when they com to parfyt age, have ever found it ther best to pardone and oversee all sic faltis as ar don at sic hard tymes, be oure gret nomber of subiectis.5 It is the idea of the Ruthven Raid as ‘business as usual’ in Scotland that this chapter explores, and it provides the first detailed examination of who the Raiders were, what triggered them to act, and how they governed Scotland during their 10 months of power. As Keith Brown notes, the lords involved in the Raid saw their actions as an act of redress restoring a ‘political balance’ that had swung too far in the favour of new and unestablished men, while Julian Goodare has argued that the Earl of Gowrie’s personal liability for the crown’s extensive debts was as important a trigger.6 While both interpretations are correct, the Raid also fits the classic pattern of Stewart monarchs negotiating their ascent to full power as they approached their majority, a pattern that had been established in the fifteenth century with the reign of James II and had repeated itself to varying degrees in the reigns of James III, James IV, and James V.7 Moreover, James’ response to his captivity was not as hysterical or weak as the well-known anecdote above suggests. Rather, he handled his captors and wielded what little political power he had in an impressive way, notably by using the spectre of a possible diplomatic rapprochement with France to keep both his rebellious Scottish subjects and their sponsors in the Elizabethan government from completely side-lining him politically and to lay the groundwork for his freedom.8

I Accounts vary considerably as to the narrative of the Raid, but most relate that it took place at Ruthven (now Huntingtower) Castle, on 23 August, where the king was seized after returning from a month’s hunting in highland Perthshire, while the Duke of Lennox was residing at his estates in Dalkeith, and Arran remained at his house at Kinneill.9 Both Calderwood and the anonymous author

34  Steven J. Reid of the Historie of King James the Sext gives the same list of conspirators involved in the initial raid: William Ruthven, fourth Lord Ruthven and first Earl of Gowrie (with whom James had spent most of the month prior to the raid hunting); John Erskine, second Earl of Mar; Thomas Lyon of Auldbar, the Master of Glamis; Laurence Oliphant, Master of Oliphant; William Douglas, Laird of Lochleven; Robert Colville of Cleish; James Colville of Easter Wemyss; Sir Lewis Bellenden of Auchnoule, Justice Clerk; Robert Boyd, Lord Boyd; Patrick Lindsay, sixth Lord Lindsay of the Byres; Robert Pitcairn, commendator of Dunfermline, Secretary; Adam Erskine, commendator of Cambuskenneth, Collector-General; David Erskine, Abbot of Dryburgh; William Erskine, Abbot of Paisley; and James Halyburton, provost of Dundee and commendator of Pittenweem (described as not being present at the event, but who came when written for).10 The author of the Historie suggests that this group had convened with their friends to the number of around 1,000 men in Strathearn and held the king at Ruthven for six days.11 He was then moved to Stirling Castle for the whole of September as the Raiders consolidated their hold on power and from the beginning of October until 20 May 1583 was confined at the palace of Holyrood. However, an anonymous band bringing the conspirators together for the ‘redresse and reformatioun of the enormiteis and abuses in the common wealth’ suggests that the group attached to the initial Raid was much larger and included the Earls of Bothwell, Glencairn, and March, Alexander Lord Home, and an array of minor lairds.12 Some trends are immediately apparent from these collated lists. It has been suggested that the Raid and the murder of David Riccio in 1566 were markedly similar, both described as ‘Protestant, Douglas-inspired protests against undesirable influences on the monarch’.13 It is true that the Douglas family had seen a substantive and rapid decline in its favour at court with the fall of the Regent Morton, and six days after his execution (2 June 1581) the leader of the family, Archibald Douglas, eighth Earl of Angus, had been forced into English exile.14 While Angus was not in Scotland when the Raid occurred, he was aware of plans to seize control of the king from Lennox and Arran as early as the preceding June.15 He had travelled to Berwick just prior to the Raid, living in Cumledge in the Merse just outside the town, where he remained until the English ambassadors Sir Robert Bowes and George Carey came to Scotland to plead (ultimately successfully) in early September for his restoration.16 The extended number of Douglas names involved and his extensive kin affiliations within this network suggest that he was a shadowy presence, perhaps influencing events behind the scenes.17 However, until his restitution was secure, there was little he could take in the way of direct action. The Earls of Mar and Gowrie are the two men consistently credited with the leadership of the Raid. The Erskines were a strong presence in the core group of conspirators, who alongside the second earl included the commendators of Cambuskenneth, Dryburgh, and Paisley, and who served in various governmental capacities. The historians David Moysie and David Calderwood both placed Mar in the top billing and stated that he was decisive in removing Arran and his forces

Of bairns and bearded men  35 from the board. Having gained knowledge of the Raid, Arran took two men with him and rode straight to Ruthven, hoping that he might be able to get access to the king before the Raiders. Both authors note that Arran gained entrance to the castle voluntarily, where ‘he wes let in, and seasit upone’, and the following day sent to Dupplin. Meanwhile, Arran’s brother, William Stewart of Monkton, took the remainder of the cavalry and headed towards Ruthven, but was met by a much larger force commanded by Mar.18 In the ensuing conflict, Stewart was heavily wounded, losing two fingers in the skirmish, and Arran’s forces were crushed.19 Yet, after the Raid itself, Mar took almost no involvement in the administration of the regime.20 The only sitting of the council he attended was that which met on 12 October 1582 and preceded the convention legitimating the Raiders’ actions, and he otherwise appears as an incidental and fleeting presence in the ongoing diplomatic dispatches to England, certainly not in a capacity directing policy.21 At the end of the Raid, Mar was one of the nobles who went on progress with James and who travelled with him to the convention at St Andrews where he secured his freedom.22 Despite Mar’s central and violent involvement in the king’s seizure, the two men maintained the strong amity that had first developed when they were classmates together under George Buchanan at Stirling.23 Although Mar was told to leave the country later in 1583 and collaborated in the raids of 1584 and 1585, he remained a trusted friend and servitor to James throughout his life.24 Thus, while he was ‘ruthlessly assertive’ in his early career, this pattern of behaviour did not last, and what he actually wanted from the Raid remains unclear.25 Gowrie’s role, by contrast, is much more obvious in terms of his day-to-day involvement in the regime. It is also far easier to explain why he might be persuaded to take part in such a drastic action. Gowrie had been one of the first men to flock to Esmé Stewart’s banner shortly after his arrival in Scotland in September 1579, probably because he disputed the award on 20 September 1580 of the wardship of the Earl of Buchan to William Douglas of Lochleven, part of Morton’s kin network.26 Gowrie and Lennox’s relationship until just prior to the Raid was a cordial one – Gowrie had assisted in Morton’s downfall, and his earldom was but one of a number of benefits he received from the Lennox regime, notably described by Donaldson as ‘the only earldom created for a man not of royal blood since the reign of James IV’.27 But Gowrie had also been treasurer for over 10 years, and since the holder of the post was personally liable for crown debt he was understandably unnerved when this jumped from £36,000 to just over £45,000 during Lennox’s ascendancy, thanks to the expansion of the royal household and king’s guard.28 The main source of schism between the two men was over the right of presentation of the coronership of Teviotdale, when Gowrie refused to revoke his award of this position to the Laird of Traquair’s brother in favour of one of Lennox’s men. Lennox then accused Gowrie of sustained embezzlement of treasury funds, and the tension this caused erupted at a justice ayre held at Perth in July 1582, where the two men entered into heated argument and even briefly faced off against one another with a range of adherents in the Perth streets.29

36  Steven J. Reid Thus, Gowrie had ample reason to desire the downfall of Lennox, but evidence that this desire was strong enough for him to collude willingly in the seizure of the king is less concrete. Gowrie had spent the month before the Raid with the king and the Earl of Atholl on the hunt, and it seems probable that he was the one feeding information to the conspirators about the king’s whereabouts. Hume also notes that it was Gowrie who met Arran at the gate of Ruthven Castle, and that he had lunged to kill Arran there and then, had he not been stopped by George Auchinleck, a former servant of the Earl of Morton.30 However, Melville of Halhill claimed that he had received knowledge of the plot from an anonymous ‘gentilman’ and that his source had not ‘named him [Gowrie] with the rest, other of forgetfulness, or elis because he wes bot laitly won to that purpose be [John Cunningham] the lard of Dromwhassel’, who had apparently warned Gowrie that Lennox was intent on killing him, an idea to which ‘over fercely he gave credit, and sa was junit with the rest of the noblemen’. Melville also believed that another reason the planned site for the Raid was moved from Dunfermline to Ruthven at the last minute was ‘to imbark the Erle of Gowrie mair deiply in ther band’.31 The idea that Gowrie was duped or forced out of fear to take part in the Raid is worth considering, not least because towards the end of the Raid in Spring 1583 and in the lead-up to its abortive sequel in April 1584 he repeatedly switched allegiance from the crown to the factions involved in the plots and was the first to surrender to James when both failed.32 In accounts of his deposition after the Stirling Raid, Gowrie firmly held to the view that the Raid had been undertaken for the king’s welfare and that in all his actions he had simply been compelled to act as part of a larger group.33 As we shall see there is strong evidence that his commitment to the Raiders stemmed primarily from his need to deal with his crushing debt and that his loyalties beyond this – either to the crown or to his fellow nobles – were highly flexible. Beyond the lead participants, the conspiracy drew heavily in geographical terms from Perthshire, Angus, and Stirling, with further pockets of support in Mid- and East Lothian and further south.34 Although the Raid had been planned long before its execution, Melville of Halhill suggested that the Raiders had originally intended to seize James and present him with a supplication of their grievances at Dunfermline, but another reason they opted for the far more rural setting of Ruthven Castle, in addition to the supposed entrapment of Gowrie, was fear that the king would learn of the plot before he got there.35 The geographical prominence of men near to Ruthven may suggest that the muster was done rapidly when the opportunity to seize him presented itself and would explain why there was a noticeable lack of Ayrshire adherents accompanying Boyd, Glencairn, and Cunningham of Drumwhassel.36 Yet most importantly, virtually all the men involved in the Raid were bound together by a strong commitment to a Protestant and Anglophile political settlement, and that commitment was the reason they took such radical action. To understand why the Raid happened, we have to look at Lennox’s governance.

Of bairns and bearded men  37

II Melville notes that many of the nobility involved in the Raid had been no friends to Morton, but ‘thocht the wey taking of his lyff ane hard preparatyve’,37 and had grown increasingly aggrieved at Arran in particular for his rapacity and seizure of the lands and goods of others (his earldom, seized from his ward the insane James Hamilton Earl of Arran, being a particular case in point).38 However, while Arran was generally seen as the crueller and more arbitrary of the two, and while the presence of the adulterous Elizabeth Stewart, Countess of Arran, around the young king was a particularly unwelcome one, it is clear that Lennox was seen as a much greater threat to the political and religious settlement in Scotland.39 Lists of his crimes compiled in August and September 1582, the supplication of the Raiders to James upon his seizure, and the declaration justifying their actions further elaborate on why Lennox was so dangerous.40 The Kirk detested Lennox, who was repeatedly accused of the calling home of ‘sundry Papists’ such as James Balfour of Pittendreich (who had played a role in Darnley’s murder) and the support of Jesuits in Scotland, including several recently involved in plots in England. There was a general fear that Lennox was a  Guisian agent who was receiving directions from the exiled James Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow and John Lesley, Bishop of Ross, both of whom were known supporters of Mary; that he was involved in a conspiracy with the Papal Nuncio, the Spanish Ambassador, and ‘sic uther of the catholik papistis of France’ to set Mary back upon the throne in a joint rule with James, the plan known as the ‘association’; and that he aimed ‘to draw the King to carnal lust’, with his house in Dalkeith being a noted hotspot for recusants and women of loose morals.41 Specific assaults by Lennox upon the dignity of the ministry had cemented these general suspicions. He had caused an extended furore with the ministers of the Kirk for his forcible entry in Autumn 1581 of Robert Montgomery, the drunken minister of Stirling, into the archbishopric of Glasgow, in a deal that saw Lennox given all the temporalities of the see in exchange for an annual salary of £1,000;42 John Durie, the minister of Edinburgh, was forcibly removed from his cure after a sermon of 23 May condemning Lennox and Arran;43 and a letter of Archibald Douglas’ on 15 August noted that ‘the Duke has obtained leave of the king for his wife to have a private mass in her chamber’.44 It was little wonder that the Kirk was so supportive of the actions of the Raiders and that the presbyterian reformer Andrew Melville was so willing to defend its actions to his correspondents in Geneva and elsewhere.45 Yet the most significant factors that prompted the move against Lennox were his direct and unwarranted intrusion into justice and burgh administration and his direct control of access to the king. The list of crimes in this regard was extensive. Lennox was central to the reorganisation of James’ household in September 1580, when it was agreed that the king should have a royal court of 24 ordinary and 6 extraordinary noblemen and lairds, under the command of a lord chamberlain, with Lennox as the inaugural post-holder. While it has been argued that

38  Steven J. Reid the new chamber was staffed by ‘political nonentities’,46 Lennox used his influence to ensure his own unrestricted personal access to the king and to control the entry of all others to his presence. He further enhanced his control by taking supervision of the king’s wardrobe on 12 August 1581. The chamber was also extremely expensive, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that wine suppliers to the crown threatened to cut off supply for non-payment in early 1582.47 Lennox and Arran had become acutely aggressive in their extortion of money, land and goods from a wide spectrum of the Scottish political class, and in the immediate run-up to the Raid were taking steps to make this more systematic. The two men had seized and escheated goods before due process, fostered bloodfeud to ensure that escheats would be larger, taken compositions (financial settlements) before men had been ‘impannelled or accused’, and used blank extraordinary commissions signed by the king ‘for apprehension of what persons they would’.48 A letter from Henry Woddrington to Walsingham on 19 July also noted that arbitrary justice ayres were being undertaken by Lennox across Scotland, at which there was: great inquisition of every man’s behaviour and disposition, as well of that which hath been done forty years since, as of things lately done … to the end that no man may escape free of “componitor”, as they term it, rich nor poor, but to be sessed according to their livings and ability, and the accounts and reckonings made to the Duke for the King …49 The largest complaint was that Lennox had set up (or rather restored) a form of inquiry into burgh affairs and governance linked to his office as chamberlain, known as ‘chamberlain ayres’, for the valuing and seizing of goods.50 Thomas Hope’s Major Practicks suggested that the office had originated in the fourteenth century and had been active as late as 1491, where ‘the chamerlane of old wes the king’s officer over all the burrowes of this realme’ and had undertaken an annual assessment into burgh affairs.51 On Monday 6 August the first of Lennox’s chamberlain ayres was announced and scheduled for three weeks later, to which ‘[s]indrie of the brethren of Glasgow were summoned … for whom no releefe under suretie could be had, notwithstanding of suspensioun givin be the Lords of Session’. At the same time, following a large dispute between the merchants and craftsmen of Edinburgh over craft representation upon the town council, Lennox and Arran each took a side in the conflict in the city and played them off against one another. On the same day as the ayre they had apparently planned to seize control of the gates and causeways into Edinburgh using their Catholic confederates, and had intended: [t]o charge that no citicen sould be seene in the streets, but suche as were either sent for by the chamberlain’s officer, or were summouned upon the assises or panel; to have sett a thowsand pund upon the poll of everie one of fortie burgesses, to have hanged other fortie, to have drowned some weomen … or to have done worse.52

Of bairns and bearded men  39 Alongside this extensive and widespread extortion was a suspicion that Lennox intended to assassinate as many of the leading noble opposition as possible. In addition to his account of the justice ayres, Woddrington noted that a major fissure between Lennox and the rest of the nobility had become apparent at a meeting at Perth in June to discuss the Duke’s support of Archbishop Montgomery.53 Criticised for supporting an ex-communicant and an office at complete odds with the newly established presbyterian faith in Scotland, James and Lennox requested a respite of 14 days and issued a furious declaration after the meeting affirming their adherence to the true faith.54 Rumour had it that Lennox intended to use the respite to arrest Gowrie, Mar, Glencairn, and a range of other Protestant nobles and charge them with a conspiracy to have him shot. As a result, an opposition faction had formed, with the Earls of Montrose, Rothes, Argyll, Mar, Glencairn, Eglinton, the Lords Boyd and Lindsay, and the Lairds of Bargany, Lochinvar, Wemyss and Tullibardine all being declared ‘for the religion’.55 Further innuendo fanned the fire of conflict, as the clergy supposedly learned from letters intercepted from the King of Navarre and Prince of Condé on 27 July that Lennox had applied to the Duke of Guise (James’ kinsman through his grandmother Marie de Guise) for a garrison of 500 men.56 The meeting at Perth was recalled in particular by the conspirators in their declaration released after the Raid for ‘how hardlie and unreasonablie they werr used’. They later defended their actions by arguing that the lack of access they had to the king as a result of Lennox’s innovations to the chamber meant that they could find ‘na apperance that your Maieste wes foirwarnit heirof, bot lyk to perisch before ye culd persave the parell’.57 With escalating assaults on their land and finances (the latter being felt acutely by Gowrie as treasurer), a growing fear of Catholic plots, and no means by which to protest to their sovereign, the Raiders were compelled to act.

III In the immediate aftermath of the events at Ruthven the Raiders’ chief priority was to legitimate their actions. The privy council minutes continue in almost unbroken fashion, with the notable difference that Gowrie and the strongly Protestant Earl of Glencairn were the de facto leaders of the council, followed in various combinations by the core group of conspirators named as participants in the Raid.58 In a series of meetings held at Perth and then Stirling between 28 August and 21 September, the Raiders immediately revoked all the previous arbitrary commissions of justiciary set up by the Lennox-Arran regime and despatched letters around the country forbidding their meeting, began the process of legally compelling Lennox to depart from Scotland, and released a statement upholding the liberty of the Kirk.59 At a convention that met in Holyrood on 19 October, the Raiders attempted to further consolidate their hold on power, first by setting down a detailed exoneration of their actions – and those of the Earls of Gowrie, Mar, and Glencairn specifically – as ‘gude, trew and proffitable service for oure soverane

40  Steven J. Reid lord, tending to the preservatioun of the estate of the religioun, his majesties royall persoun and croun’.60 Their seizure of the king was also endorsed by the Kirk in the October General Assembly.61 Finally, the Raiders passed acts ordering the retention of Arran in Gowrie’s custody at Ruthven and Arran’s brother William Stewart in Mar’s at Stirling Castle.62 While these acts gave their regime a fig leaf of legitimacy and warded their most serious opponents with the exception of Lennox, the Raiders’ most important business was the levying of a guard of 200 cavalrymen and 200 foot soldiers, to protect the king and ‘the noblemen presentlie resident with his majestie’ until such time as ‘a quiet and settled ordoure be establesched and all apperance of trouble and commotioun be removit’. In reality, the guard was to maintain James’ confinement in Holyrood at all times, especially when the leaders of the regime could not be present.63 This guard, although expensive to maintain, would prove decisive over the coming months in maintaining James’ captivity and ensured that the nobles outside the charmed circle of the Raiders were deterred from mounting an armed action to rescue the king. With the king secure, the Raiders turned their attention to Lennox. Following the events of the Raid Lennox had first fled to Dumbarton, where the castle’s keeper, William Stewart of Caverston, was an ally. The privy council initially ordered Lennox to depart the realm by 20 September, though this was quickly prorogued by a further five days and then repeatedly delayed as Lennox pleaded the lack of a fair wind. He then sailed from Ayr up to the Gare Loch at the end of the month, where he remained on ‘an ile’ until at least 5 November.64 The regime’s answer was to formally approach Elizabeth for a passport through England to Calais for Lennox on 17 November.65 However, they were placed on high alert on 4 December when they received news that Lennox, pretending to take journey from Callander to Blackness to start his journey out of the country, had planted a range of supporters in strategic positions around Edinburgh, with the intent to approach Holyrood ‘throw ane dur under the long galrey, and enter thairat, tak and inviroun the King, and kill and stik and hang all thame that they micht have apprehendit of the lordis interpryseris and their foloweris’.66 The guard, led by Colonel William Stewart of Houston, ensured that no attempt was made on the abbey, but the threat posed by Lennox caused the Raiders to appoint a general muster the following day, and a suite of new locks and fortifications were added to the king’s lodgings.67 The Edinburgh notary William Stewart, the Captain of Blackness Castle Alexander Stewart of Scotstonhill, and Stewart’s servant William Hunter were also all cautioned to give information concerning the conspiracy.68 On 8 December Lennox was ordered to withdraw from Blackness to either Langton, Broxmouth, or Dunglass69 and was finally compelled on 13 December to go via England. Around 22 December he finally left Scotland for good. A number of pleading letters to James, asking him to confirm that this was what he wanted, were left unanswered.70 Although the Raiders were largely preoccupied with protecting their position at court in the closing months of 1582, they did pursue two major governmental initiatives: restoring the ties with England to the level of amity present during

Of bairns and bearded men  41 Morton’s regency and reducing the royal deficit. The English diplomats George Carey and Robert Bowes arrived in Scotland seeking Angus’ restoration in early September and remained as an influential and powerful presence at court during the regime’s ascendancy.71 In order to improve the links between the two nations the Raiders passed a range of council acts attempting to deal with disorder in the Borders, including a muster of men able to bear arms, the replacement of the Lord Maxwell with John Johnston of that Ilk as warden of the West March, and the ordering of trials of Border reivers in Edinburgh.72 Finally, on 29 December, John Colville (who had been an intelligence gatherer for England for some time prior to the Raid) was despatched to the English court as a formal ambassador.73 His embassy was relatively short – he had returned to Scotland by 8 February – and the business he discussed with Elizabeth was largely limited to banalities.74 Nevertheless, he did secure assurances from the queen that she would provide whatever advice and support the king should require and prepared the way for a much more extensive delegation under Colville and Colonel William Stewart in April 1583. While the Raiders made excellent progress at restoring relations with Elizabeth and her government, they also made vigorous efforts to implement their second main policy. They began on 31 October by issuing a general revocation of all gifts and pensions granted by the crown, whether from crown lands, from church property held by the crown, or from the treasury and its related departments. The intent of the act was to allow the comptroller and the exchequer to undertake a broad review of all grants made by preceding governments for the king and reclaim as many as they could. In practice, the scope of this revocation appears to have been limited, though active enough to have caused the king’s former carer, the Lady Mar, to draft a letter to James requesting assurances that her lands would be exempt.75 On 30 November, the sale of 95 chalders of victual from the earldom of Ross and lordship of Ardmannoch was agreed to provide muchneeded liquid capital for the household, while on 20 December John Gourlaw, the customs officer for Edinburgh, was compelled to pay a total of £1,375 Scots to a range of small debtors on behalf of the crown.76 This action prompted some disquiet among the burghs that the government were intent on seizing control of all town customs. While the council moved on 17 January to confirm that it would not interfere with the current year’s revenue, it announced that it would look to review the intake of goods customs in the year following to see if profit could be recouped for the crown.77 Finally, the confirmation on 3 November 1582 of a charter granted to Gowrie on 1 May 1581 of all the properties and land of the abbey of Holy Cross shows that he intended to ensure direct compensation for the crown debts for which he as treasurer had become personally liable.78 The centrepiece of the financial reforms was the attempt, at the end of November, to subject the household to a far-reaching process of re-organisation in order to rationalise expenditure. The ‘advise of we of youre maiesteis counsale … anent the estait order and provisioun of his hienes hous’ made by the Ruthven lords to the king (and meekly signed by him), advocated reducing the members of the household back to the core staff that had waited upon James V, and provided

42  Steven J. Reid itemised outlays for all their fees and consumables, which were to be strictly adhered to.79 The household was to sustain itself on the silver-mails and produce from royal lands (the full extent of which were expected to return to crown control following the general revocation), and any surplus was to be sold by the comptroller to generate further revenue.80 These proposals were to take effect on 1 December, but to provide interim financial relief, £5,000 from the mails for the Martinmas term and a further £10,000 from the collection of thirds of benefices were to be provided to the Laird of Tullibardine for the household and stable costs for November, which he had taken upon himself as part of his standard obligations as comptroller.81 Neither the rationalisation of the household nor the other financial measures applied to the king’s debt could have hoped in themselves to fill the royal deficit. Yet they show that this was a serious aim the Raiders were working towards and further underscore the fact that economic motives for seizing the king were as powerful as religious or political ones, particularly for the Earl of Gowrie, who had a vested interest in seeing these actions take effect.

IV What was King James’ response to this rapid change of events? In the declaration released by the privy council on 28 August, James allowed the Raid ‘as gude service done to him and to the commoun weill of this thair native cuntre’.82 George Carey’s impression of the situation, following his first formal audience with James on 14 September, was that the king was ‘well pleased to give the possession of his ear and person to those lords about him, declaring the daily increase of his good liking towards them, and consent to the progress of this action’, a view that is mirrored in most accounts of James’ initial response by contemporaries.83 However, Carey also noted that whenever an attempt was made to denigrate Lennox, the king ‘greatly changed colour and entered into passion as discontented to hear his faults’.84 While James learned to hide his feelings regarding Lennox as the months went by, at the beginning of the regime his dismissal from court was clearly the sorest point for James to bear. In this situation, of course, what else could James do? He found himself in the curious position of being a supposed adult monarch, receiving embassies at court, and yet having no seat or part in the dealings of the privy council, all the while being held in a gilded cage at Holyrood. Despite the economic considerations behind the Raid, there is no evidence that his circumstances were straitened – indeed, the treasurer’s accounts show that he continued to be provided with all the fees for clothes he had received before the Raid, and his apartments at Holyrood were renovated to make him more comfortable.85 The Raiders even went so far as to construct a bespoke kennel for the new hunting-hounds he had received from Nicholas Poorhouse, an English huntsman, and to provide them with their own cauldron and dishes.86 These token gestures did not disguise the fact that in the opening months of the Raid James was so closely held that there was no real action he could take to change his situation, particularly after

Of bairns and bearded men  43 Lennox’s attempted rescue in early December, when the Raiders’ muster also called for an extended watch around the king.87 For James to be able to effect an escape, he required political leverage. This materialised with the arrival of two ambassadors in Scotland from France, Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fénélon and François de Roncherolles, Sieur de Maineville, at the beginning of January 1583.88 The two men had a wide-ranging and nebulous public brief from Henri III to ensure that all of James’ subjects had free access to him, that James himself was at liberty, and that the long-held amity between France and Scotland remained intact. Privately, both men were intent on notifying James of his mother Mary’s continued willingness to enter into an ‘association’ of joint rule with her son to legitimate his crown (at least in Catholic eyes); to find the means to restore Lennox, if that was what James really wanted; and most importantly, to assist in the organisation of a convention of nobility in order to restore and unify the government under James’ rule.89 While the Raider’s government appeared (as David Masson noted) to have been in a position of relative strength by early 1583, the threat of Lennox had been the main binding force for Ruthven and his allies.90 Although a shared pro-English and Protestant stance brought additional unity to their diverse interests, underlying tensions remained, and these were expertly picked at by the French ambassadors. De la Mothe met with James on 17 January 1582 and stayed in Scotland for a little over a month, just long enough to hear James roundly dismiss the idea that he needed legitimation from Mary to rule and to satisfy himself that the king was safe, if not fully under his own cognisance.91 However, Maineville stayed until early May. While he was absolutely hated by the Scottish nobility for his insolent manner and his blatant displays of Catholicism,92 James used him, as the author of the Historie of King James the Sext makes clear, ‘verie craftelie’ to pursue a policy of open amity with England while using the threat of a French rapprochement to divide the Ruthven lords.93 By late February it had become apparent to Bowes and his new counterpart William Davison that de la Mothe and Maineville were exploiting the financial difficulties of the Ruthven regime to build up a French faction at court. There were widespread rumours that the ambassadors had seduced a host of leading nobles with promises of French pensions, with a specific allegation reported by Bowes and Davison on 21 February that Gowrie had been offered an annual pension of 2000 crowns and 100,000 crowns for James, with a further lump sum of 10,000 for the earl and full restitution for all debts he incurred as treasurer.94 At the same time, James’ personal relationship with the ambassadors prompted much concern among the Ruthven lords and at the English court. While James repeatedly stressed to the ambassadors publicly that he was at liberty and refused an offer from Henri III to provide victualling and supplies for Dumbarton Castle and other key strategic strongholds in Scotland, it was believed that he had privately complained of his personal circumstances to the ambassadors, and he was reported by de la Mothe as saying that ‘though he had two eyes, two eares, and two handes, yet he had but one heart, which was French’.95

44  Steven J. Reid James used the climate of uncertainty caused by the French embassy to seize the political initiative and to bind the disaffected nobility in Scotland to himself. On 21 February the English ambassadors noted that ‘The King intending a general reconciliation amongst his nobility has framed a special bond, whereunto he has first put his own hand, giving example that all his nobles and persons may follow the same, and the earls of Angus, Huntly and Gowrie have also subscribed’. The king had sent for Argyll and Montrose to sign too, and rumours that a convention of nobility was going to be summoned to effect some change in the governance of the realm was widely anticipated around the beginning of March. Gowrie refused to countenance the summoning of any such convention, as both he and the lords who had been ‘chief enterprisers’ in the Raid feared that any large-scale meeting might result in a voting-out of their regime, or worse.96 However, it is surely no coincidence that the nobles reported as swayed to the ‘French course’ and signing a bond to support James were largely the same men who would help James make his escape from the Raiders in late June. Less than a week after news of the bond emerged, de la Mothe reported to Mary that Angus, Mar, and Gowrie were all wavering in their course as a result of their fear of a possible assembly.97 On 2 March Walsingham related to Bowes that he was so concerned about James’ rapprochement with France that he had tried to arrange for a much wider financial disbursement to the Ruthven lords, an action immediately vetoed by the parsimonious Elizabeth. Walsingham also advised Bowes to look into the possible restoration of Arran and the widening of access to the king for the rest of his nobility.98 On 10 March, the English ambassadors attempted to gently persuade James that a formal meeting of the nobility should be avoided, for its potential to lead to another sudden ‘alteration’ in the government. James’ response provides further evidence that from early 1583 he was intent on resuming political control for himself as the head of a ‘balanced’ coalition of noble interests: In this the king has let them know that upon calling of these noblemen to him in small numbers he will make choice of such of them as shall be found meet to be continued about his person for the safety thereof, and for the government, and also to employ some of either companies for the general satisfaction of them all.99 The proposed convention of nobility ultimately failed to materialise, though the Earls of Crawford, Arran, and Montrose had showed up at court with extensive armed retinues, presumably in anticipation of just such an event. Yet over the course of the month, the pressure applied by the French embassy led to a major split within the ranks of the regime, the temporary dismissal of Gowrie as treasurer, and the ordering of a formal convention to deal with the issue of the king’s debt. Between 10 and 18 March Gowrie was ordered to resign as treasurer and was to be warded if he refused. He was also excluded from the

Of bairns and bearded men  45 commission for auditing the exchequer accounts.100 Gowrie insisted that he would only surrender his office if he was awarded £50,000 to cover his debts and protested to the king that a sub-faction of the Ruthven lords led by Robert Pitcairn the commendator of Dunfermline, Alexander Hay the Clerk Register, and Walter Stewart Prior of Blantyre had engineered his removal on the widely held suspicion that he was negotiating with the French. After hearing Gowrie’s protest, the king temporarily restored him to office.101 In an attempt to defuse the situation, James cited the fact that Gowrie had temporarily demitted the administration of his office to Sir Robert Melville of Murdocairney, the deputy treasurer, in March of the preceding year, and that he was under the impression that this was still the case, thus playing the suspension as a form of misunderstanding.102 In reality, the other members of the regime had grown so concerned about Gowrie’s rumoured interactions with the French that they acted to freeze him out. The convention was thus set to resolve the issue of Gowrie’s outstanding debts, and there is no doubt that more than a few of the Ruthven lords saw it as an opportunity by which they could extricate themselves from the regime without penalty. In a letter to France on 28 March Maineville noted that ‘the lords of the enterprise are after obtaining a Parliament and having a general oblivion, with a restriction of those who are banished, and this being so it doubles their interest’.103 The key issue here was, as we shall see, their desire to secure a parliamentary act legitimating the actions of the Raiders. A day later Maineville also wrote to de la Mothe to say that Gowrie had been disgraced, and his weakness at court was indicated by Walsingham’s dispatch of a letter on 6 April from Queen Elizabeth declaring her support and good will for the earl.104 At the same time, the coalition of disaffected lords first seen in the intrigues of late February was taking on more substance. On 24 March, William Fowler assured Walsingham that some enterprise was to be taken at Lent, by Argyll, Huntly, Atholl, Montrose, Rothes, Morton, Eglinton, Arran, and Bothwell, but possibly also with the support of Glencairn, Crawford, Home, and Seton.105 By the beginning of the following month all eyes were on the upcoming convention, scheduled to meet on 16 April. Bowes and Aston both reported that James had a significant say in how the convention and its agenda were planned. Prior to its meeting the king had called Argyll, Gowrie, Dunfermline, the clerk register, Walter Stewart, and the king’s advocate to set business, where they agreed that the agenda would focus on James’ penurious estate, the granting of tax, satisfaction to Gowrie, the appointment of a parliament, and the confirmation of the embassy of John Colville and Colonel Stewart to England.106 The convention appointed a parliament for 24 October, which would oversee the granting of a tax of £100,000 Scots to cover the expenses of the king’s marriage, with £20,000 to be levied immediately to cover the king’s debts and gathered in by mid-August.107 While correspondence with England had occasionally mentioned the subject of James’ marriage in the year prior to this tax, the search for James’ bride only began in earnest in 1585 when Frederick II of Denmark

46  Steven J. Reid was  approached regarding a potential match with his eldest daughter Elizabeth.108 The fact that negotiations for this started so long after the end of the Raid suggests that the tax was actually being raised for the simple purpose of debt relief. By 23 April, Gowrie had also been restored to the treasurership, and further means to reduce the deficit were implemented after the convention formally ended. On 26 April it was decided that all rebels and those at the horn should have escheats taken as punishment, as should those ‘dilatit and suspect as culpable of birningis, slauchteris, and utheris greit and odious crymes’. These escheats would be used to provide for the king’s expenses in the first instance and then applied to the ‘payment and outred of the bigane debtis’ of the treasurer.109 Gowrie rendered his first set of accounts since March 1581 shortly after the convention, and ensured that every debt he was owed was recorded and placed within a firewall. In addition to the standard lists of monthly expenditures, wages, and messenger costs, he added an extensive rider to the end of the accounts where he noted every item he could think of for which he had been left liable, including £2,490 for providing livery for all the king’s household in the preceding January, £5,180 he had been forced to bear to support the king’s guard established by Lennox between 1580 and September 1582, and miscellaneous payments totalling over £5,000, stretching back to the beginning of 1581, for the king’s hats, tennis equipment, and various other sundries.110 The costs of all this were exorbitant, and despite the attempts to cut household costs after the Raid expenses had still run high in the first half of 1582. Gowrie’s superexpenditure had jumped from £45,376 10s. 5½d. (recorded on 1 March 1582) to £67,488 6s. 2d., of which he was personally liable for £48,063 4s. 8d.111 Gowrie’s final coup de grace was to obtain a supersedere, or inhibition from pursuit by all creditors, of the whole sum of the debts owed by him, which also included any legal actions underway, which was signed by James.112 With the appointment of the tax, the package of financial measures implemented by the regime to date, and the granting of the supersedere, Gowrie had limited his liability for crown debt and set up a number of revenue streams to reduce the outstanding deficit.113 By this point, the threat of Maineville had served its political purpose, and James was suddenly keen to be rid of him. He had already attempted in early April to have the commendator of St Colme and several others quietly ask Maineville to hurry his departure (which he put off, allegedly, due to ill health), but after the convention James became so desperate that Bowes advised him to tell the ambassador that he planned to dismiss the court and council for a short interval – thus if Maineville had any more business he was required to announce it or take this as a cue to leave. As a parting gift, James intended to send him away with a chain and tablet worth £150, but if he did not go the king would show him his displeasure. Maineville took the hint, and the gift, and left with far less to show for his embassy than James did.114

Of bairns and bearded men  47

V After the convention, the record of negotiations and business between the Ruthven lords and James dries up markedly. Evidence for the narrative of events until James’ flight from the Ruthven lords at the end of June relies almost entirely on ambassadorial despatches. However, it is not only possible to glean from this limited evidence how James managed to escape, but also to posit why he chose to escape when he did. From the beginning of May a number of factors conspired together to allow James to mount a bid for freedom. The Raiders had continually struggled to fund the upkeep of the king’s guard, which was the sole force keeping him from full liberty, and by May it was in danger of dispersing due to lack of pay. In April Bowes delivered 2,000 marks to Gowrie and to Colonel Stewart (in his capacity as captain of the guard) out of his own finances, without Elizabeth’s approval or knowledge, just in order to keep the guard up and running.115 In early May John Colville also wrote to Walsingham in the hope of obtaining further money for the guard – noting rightly that ‘the lyif of our causse consistis in thame’116 – and Bowes provided a further £300 on 18 May.117 However, the guard’s dissolution was assured when a miserly Elizabeth refused to reimburse Bowes for his expenditure or to provide any further funds for its maintenance – it had completely broken down by 29 June for want of pay.118 It is little wonder that an exasperated Walsingham wrote bleakly to Bowes that the continued success of the regime would fail because of the English government’s tendency to ‘stick at trifles’.119 By early May the Ruthven lords, with trepidation, had agreed to James taking an extended two-month progress to Linlithgow and then to Falkland to enjoy the summer hunting, which would begin towards the end of the month when the government would scale back on all official business. They were willing for Angus, Bothwell, Marischal, Montrose, and Mar to accompany the king, men thought to be the ‘least dangerous’ in political terms.120 Why did the Raiders allow this? They had the promise of a parliament, which did meet on 24 October as planned. Although it was immediately prorogued until December, when it reconvened James gave a complete – if grudging – remission to all those involved in the Raid.121 It thus seems conceivable that the Raiders were willing to relax their control of James in the premature belief that they had secured their objectives – a promise of the restitution of funds to pay off Gowrie’s massive personal debt and immunity in the meantime, and a promised pardon for their actions in holding the king. James himself also proved hesitant to break fully from the Raiders, due to their close ties with England and the impact that severing from them might have on his securing the English succession. While James had carried out his manouverings with the French ambassadors, he had also pursued diplomatic exchanges with Elizabeth regarding his knowledge of the ‘association’ and French plans to provide military supplies to Scotland. In his response to her questions on these issues he was at pains to point out that he was wholly committed to an alliance

48  Steven J. Reid with England and that he would ‘leif of na gude meanys unused’ in the pursuit of their closer friendship.122 On 24 April, after a lengthy delay caused by Maineville’s extended residence in Scotland, James and Gowrie wrote to Elizabeth to recommend John Colville and Colonel Stewart as ambassadors to the court.123 While both ambassadors were instructed to work for closer Anglo-Scottish amity, Stewart was dispatched with specific instructions to ‘come to a thorough understanding with Elizabeth’ and to test the extent of her support and favour for James.124 James asked for general advice as to how to keep his realm ‘in quietnesse’ but he made a series of impetuous demands – the award of the Lennox estates in England and all legal papers relating to them; a £10,000 subsidy in bullion; and an annual payment of £5,000. In exchange, James would agree to support an Anglo-Scottish league and ensure the furtherance of discussions on the Border situation. These demands were clearly preposterous, and as Julian Goodare has noted the reality of the ‘English subsidy’ that James eventually received was meagre and sporadic.125 However, James clearly hoped that his relationship with Elizabeth would rapidly develop into a more permanent and lasting alliance, and even at this early stage in his career he looked to be provided with some tacit recognition as her potential heir. By 17 May the ambassadors had completed their formal dealings with Elizabeth, and her ‘advice’ to the king fell far short of the response that James hoped for.126 No mention was made of any of his requests regarding lands, titles or pensions, save to note that any financial relief provided by Elizabeth would be treated as a loan and not a gift. The English government then issued a series of demands with which James was to comply. In addition to taking better care of administering the Borders, justice, and his own household, James was to bind himself wholly to England and formally denounce the ‘association’, take Elizabeth’s recommendations regarding his marriage and any other foreign alliances, and leave Scotland only with her consent. Advance news of how the Scottish embassy had fared had reached Scotland by 18 May, when James’ displeasure at their proceedings caused Robert Bowes to note laconically that ‘the King of late has showed sundry tokens that he could be pleased to be rid of him’, and to request an end to his embassy.127 Further demands to formally denounce Lennox and Arran and to restore the Lords John and Claud Hamilton from their English exile were the final trigger that caused James to part company with the Raiders.128 Unbeknownst to him, the Raiders had been carrying out secret discussions from the beginning of May to strip Arran of the Hamilton patrimony and restore it to Lord James, an act that would effectively end Arran’s political career.129 They had intended to formally approach James to accept Hamilton’s restitution at a meeting of the privy council with support from a delegation of the General Assembly, yet the night before the meeting the Earl of Montrose disclosed the entire plan to the king. Given that the king was still formally a captive at this stage, his reaction was surprisingly aggressive. He announced that he would leave for his summer progress immediately, rather than wait until the conclusion of the council business. When he did

Of bairns and bearded men  49 agree to stay (after much pleading from the lords) he proved extremely reluctant to entertain any plot to remove Arran, offering only to ‘advise with such as could best instruct him in the case and judgment of the laws … and thereon take order according to equity and law’.130 Bowes was ordered by Walsingham on 12 June to pursue the acts against Arran and Lennox in a resumption of the talks regarding the Anglo-Scottish amity but found that this topic and the restoration of the Hamiltons still did not ‘favour sweete’ with the king.131 It was while he was pursuing this avenue, on 17 June, that the first reports of Lennox’s death on 26 May came to Scotland. James initially believed that this was another ploy by the Raiders or the English to bridle and confuse him.132 It seems no coincidence that two days later, when the news was verified and James was told that Lennox’s mummified heart and testament would be sent to him, James gave the order for a convention to meet at St Andrews and planned his escape from Falkland Palace.133 James had (perhaps naively) held out hope that by staying nominally under Raider control and pursuing talks with England he could find a way to both gain favour with Elizabeth, perhaps even securing his claim to the English succession, and restore Lennox and Arran. By the end of June, with his closest favourite dead, the other threatened with complete political destruction, and the English government proving dictatorial and wholly unwilling to entertain his requests, James had little left to lose. Once James had made up his mind to escape, the end of the Ruthven regime came about swiftly. On 19 June, James called the Earls of Argyll, March, Eglinton, Montrose, Crawford, and Rothes to attend upon him in St Andrews 10 days later at a convention to discuss the English embassy, with their retinues limited to 6 men each.134 James also invited Lewis Bellenden of Auchnoule, Walter Stewart, and the other administrators of the council to the meeting but conspicuously declined to invite the Earls of Angus, Gowrie, and the other lead conspirators. He had hoped that word of the meeting would not reach them in time, but both the Ruthven lords and the Earl of Arran intercepted news of the planned convention, prompting rumours that Angus and Arran attended to assail it with large armed retinues.135 Taking a radically different approach to self-preservation, by the time the convention met Gowrie had ‘repented him[self] sair’ before the king, claiming he had been led into the plot by John Cunningham of Drumwhassel and seeking to join James’ confederation of lords.136 The night before the convention, all the ferries across the Forth and Tay were laid off, and James fled from the palace on horseback to St Andrews Castle, which had been prepared in advance to receive him by the Earl of March.137 The following day, the ‘haill lordis send for as on send for’ arrived at St Andrews, and a tense military stand-off ensued, with Angus and his adherents placing their men in the stairs and galleries of the castle with the intent of seizing James once more. The situation was only kept from spiralling into violence again thanks to the overwhelming forces assembled by the Earl of March from his own kin and the townsfolk of St Andrews.138 By 2 July the Raiders had accepted defeat, and

50  Steven J. Reid one of James’ first decisions under his own cognisance (in an impressive show of pragmatism) was to retain Gowrie to serve on his council, at the same time as he ordered Mar and Angus to leave court until further notice.139

VI Of course, the story of the Ruthven Raid did not end with the convention at St Andrews. The summer of 1583 was merely a brief respite in a struggle between James and the core conspirators of the Raid that escalated once again with their attack on Stirling Castle in April 1584, the failure of which forced Angus and Mar into an English exile and cost Gowrie his life in a hastily convened treason trial. Angus and Mar then formed the heart of a bizarre ‘rainbow coalition’ of interests (including Lords John and Claud Hamilton and the Earl of Bothwell) that marched on Stirling once again to oust the Earl of Arran in November of the following year, and his flight from the back gate of Stirling Castle marked a rather inauspicious start to James’ first period of rule without a regent or a favourite to control his affairs. Thus the Raid did not mark a formal start to James’ independent rule, any more than the announcement of his ‘accepting the burding of the administratioun’ upon himself in March 1578 or his acceptance of a ‘balanced’ noble council in November 1585 did – instead, they were all incremental points in a process of transition to full adult power so gradual that James himself was probably unaware of it. Yet the Raid does mark several important turning points. First, it shows that while James’ rule was constrained by others – be they regents with formal assent to do so, favourites acting largely for their own interests, or noble opposition – between 1578 and 1585, by the end of the Raid he was clearly aware of the process of factional politics and how to play it and had more political agency than we are accustomed to think. His actions in early 1583 show a young king dominated by a powerful nobility but one who had a clear sense of his own rights, an intent to rule free from faction, and an ability to use the limited opportunities given to him – in this case a French embassy and an unhappy section of his noble subjects – to achieve it in short order. The experience taught him the kind of painful penalties that could occur when a Scottish king chose to allow one or two favourites to wholly dominate at court – a lesson the loss of Lennox made sure he never forgot, at least during his personal reign in Scotland. He also learned the value of using diplomatic channels – both formal and informal – with the states of Catholic Europe to extract as many concessions from Elizabeth as possible in their ongoing negotiations over his succession to the English throne. James was not quite a ‘bearded man’ by the time he rode for St Andrews, but the humiliating experience of being seized and held by his own nobility ensured that he was no longer a ‘bairn’. As for Gowrie and the other nobility involved in the Raid, they had played the age-old game of risk involved in seizing a Stewart king in his minority, and like virtually every faction that had attempted it they had lost. The fact that they must have been well aware of the precedents, and still attempted it, tells

Of bairns and bearded men  51 us several things. First, it shows us how desperately they felt the depredations of Lennox and Arran’s regime, and for the vacillating Gowrie in particular how serious a motivation his indebtedness was. Second, while the Raid followed the pattern of traditional Stewart minorities, the importance of Protestantism as a driver, and a justification, for the actions of the broader coalition of nobility involved should not be underestimated. If we put scepticism to one side when reading their various declarations of intent, perhaps one of the reasons that the Raiders were so willing to seize James is that they actually believed in the right, espoused by George Buchanan, Andrew Melville, and other presbyterian radicals, to call their magistrates to account when the spectre of tyranny reared its head. If this was the case, then it also perhaps explains why they were equally willing to release him when they felt that such a threat had passed – holding onto the king was never an aim in itself, merely his protection, as they openly stated, from ‘bad counsel’. Yet the Raiders were not fools. It is clear that when the risk of keeping James captive began to outweigh the rewards, they focussed their energies on finding a way to protect themselves by whatever legal means they could when the inevitable moment arrived that he gained his freedom, rather than relying on James’ taking an enlightened view of his captivity after the fact. What they did not anticipate, and with hindsight it seems a spectacular failing, was the full-blown restoration of Captain James Stewart, Earl of Arran, to court. Finally, it was John Cunningham (if we believe Melville of Halhill) who induced Gowrie to side with the Raiders, a fact that ultimately led to his demise; and it was Colonel William Stewart of Houston who was credited with putting an end to the Raid by arranging James’ flight from Falkland. Houston would go on to be a loyal and valued servant of James’ and was responsible for capturing Gowrie after a tense siege in Dundee in April 1584.140 The Raid confirmed that in Jacobean Scotland the ‘mean’ and lesser nobility were becoming as potent a force in noble politics as the old aristocracy – a fact that ultimately proved fatal to the lead conspirator of the ‘enterprise at Ruthven’.

Notes 1 Secondary accounts of the Raid are all short, but include: G. R. Hewitt, ‘Ruthven Raiders (act. 1581–1585)’, ODNB [69938, accessed 9 Feb. 2016]; Gordon Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men: Power and Politics in Mary Stewart’s Scotland (London: 1983), 140–144; William L. Mathieson, Politics and Religion: A Study in Scottish History from the Reformation to the Revolution, 2 vols (Glasgow: 1902), i, 226–229; Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 5–6, 35–37; Dawson, Scotland Re-formed, 310–311; Donaldson, James V-James VII, 178–180. 2 Memorably captured in William Baxter Collier Fyfe’s painting, The Raid of Ruthven: An Incident in the Life of James VI of Scotland (1878). 3 Calderwood, History, iii, 643; RPCS, iii, 509. 4 For a useful discussion of Melville’s reliability as a historical witness, see The Memoirs of Sir James Melville of Halhill, ed. Gordon Donaldson (London: 1969), 7–29. 5 Melville, Memoirs, 285.

52  Steven J. Reid 6 Brown, Noble Power, 8. Julian Goodare, ‘The Debts of James VI of Scotland’, The Economic History Review, 62 (2009), 926–952, at 935–936. 7 Christine McGladdery, James II (rev. ed, Edinburgh: 2015), Chapters 1–3; Norman Macdougall, James III (rev. ed, Edinburgh: 2009), Chapters 1–4; Norman Macdougall, James IV (rev. ed, Edinburgh: 2006), Chapters 1–5; W.K. Emond, ‘The Minority of King James V 1513–1528 (University of St Andrews PhD Thesis, 1988). 8 On the ‘Auld Alliance’, see Elizabeth Bonner, ‘Scotland’s “Auld Alliance” with France, 1295–1560’, History 84 (1999), 5–30. 9 According to Moysie, Memoirs, 37, and HKJVI, 189; David Calderwood (Calderwood, History, iii, 637) and the parliamentary ratification of the Raid (RPS A1583/10/4) suggest it was 22 August, but Calderwood notes the supplication legitimating the Raid was presented to the king on 23 August; David Hume says it was 24 August (Hume, Angus, p. 286). Melville of Halhill gives no specific date for the Raid itself (Melville, Memoirs, 276–280). Melville and Moysie affirm that Lennox was at Dalkeith while Arran was at Kinneil; the author of HKJVI states they were both at Dalkeith; and Hume that they were at Dalkeith and Edinburgh. 10 Calderwood, History, iii, 637; HKJVI, 189; RPCS, iii, 507. Both HKJVI and Calderwood name him as prior of Pittenweem and word the text in a way that suggests they thought the prior and provost of Dundee were two separate people. 11 HKJVI, 189. 12 Calderwood, History, iii, 644–646; RPCS, iii, 507; CSP Scot, vi, no. 137 (the latter has the text of the bond only, without list of names). The list of conspirators could be further expanded if one counts all those granted remissions under the Privy Seal for their part in the Raid and could even be extended to include those who took part in the ‘Stirling Raid’ of April 1584. RSS, viii, contains lists of remissions for both, discussed in Gordon Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 141–142. 13 Goodare and Lynch, 16; Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 142–143. There is a direct link between the two events in the persons of the Earl of Gowrie and Adam Erksine, commendator of Cambuskenneth and collector of thirds, who participated in both. 14 G. R. Hewitt, ‘Douglas, James, fourth earl of Morton (c.1516–1581)’, ODNB [7893]; G. R. Hewitt, ‘Douglas, Archibald, eighth earl of Angus and fifth earl of Morton (c.1555–1588)’, ODNB [7868, both accessed 9 Feb. 2016]. 15 CSP Scot, vi, no. 131. 16 Hume, Angus, 287. 17 Hume, Angus, 289–290 notes that ‘Gowrie and Glames were come of his house, Oliphant was of his alliance (having married Margaret Douglas, daughter to William of Loghleven), and Marre was his brother in law, and no lesse his brother in love and affection, which continued without the least breach or diminution, so long as he lived’. 18 Moysie, Memoirs, 37–38; Calderwood, History, iii, 637. Moysie states Mar’s forces were 120, Calderwood 60; Moysie that Arran’s were 80, Calderwood 40; Moysie suggests that the skirmish took place in the fields between Perth and Ruthven; Calderwood that Mar had lain in wait at Kinross for Arran’s forces and then met him ‘neere Perth’. 19 Hume, Angus, 286–287. 20 On Mar, see Julian Goodare, ‘Erskine, John, eighteenth or second earl of Mar (c.1562–1634)’, ODNB [8867, accessed 9 Feb. 2016]. 21 RPCS, iii, 516–519; RPS A1582/10/1-A1582/10/4; CSP Scot, vi, nos 330, 336, 353, 368, 386, 405, 455, 476, 489, 520. 22 Melville, Memoirs, 288; CSP Scot, vi, nos 476, 547. 23 For their early correspondence, see NRS GD/124/10/57-60; HMC, Mar and Kellie, i, 37–38. In April 1583, James’ mother Mary was reported as believing that Mar held considerable sway over her son, even though he was just two years older: CSP Scot, vi, no. 400.

Of bairns and bearded men  53 24 Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 93–95. 25 Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 13–14. 26 RPCS, iii, 311–313; Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 133. 27 Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 140. 28 £45,376 10s. 5d. to be exact, the total that Gowrie claimed to be ‘superexpendit’ by in March 1582. NRS, E21/63, f. 30v. Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 140; James V-James VII, 178; Sharon Adams, ‘Ruthven, William, fourth Lord Ruthven and first earl of Gowrie (c.1543–1584)’, ODNB [24375, accessed 9 Feb. 2016]. 29 Hume, Angus, 285; Calderwood, History, iii, 632–633. 30 Hume, Angus, 286. 31 Melville, Memoirs, 281. 32 Walsingham reported to Bowes on 5 June 1583 that he had seen hard evidence of Gowrie having colluded for some time with the French for the restoration of the Duke of Lennox: CSP Scot, vi, no. 509. On Gowrie’s betrayal of the Ruthven lords, see Melville, Memoirs, 283–284. 33 ‘The manner and forme of examination & death of Wm Earle of Gowrie, & Lord Ruthen & Derleton, great Thresorier of Scottland, the 3rd day of May, & affter eyght howers at night, 1584’, printed in John Bruce, ed., Papers Relative to William, First Earl of Gowrie, and Patrick Ruthven, His First and Last Surviving Son (London: 1887), 29–36, at 30. For the charges against him and sentence, see NRS JC27/23. 34 Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 141. 35 Melville, Memoirs, 281. 36 A point noted by Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 142. 37 Melville, Memoirs, 276. 38 Rosalind K. Marshall, ‘Stewart, James, Earl of Arran (c.1545–1596)’, ODNB [26481, accessed 9 Feb. 2016]. 39 For a detailed account of Arran’s gruesome alleged crimes, see Calderwood, History, iii, 663. Arran’s wife was condemned for her cuckolding of the Earl of March, and because ‘her inordinate lust, ceaseth not yitt to pervert the king’s Majestie’s own youth, by slanderous speech and countenance’ (Calderwood, History, iii, 658). 40 CSP Scot, vi, nos 144, 145, 150, 173; Calderwood, History, iii, 637–640, 651–665; Melville, Memoirs, 278–280. 41 An anonymous missive to Thomas Randolph from 14 March 1582 adds the blunt post-script: ‘The Duk is a verrey commen harlat and hes every weik iij whoores’. CSP Scot, vi, no. 348 (mis-dated in calendar sequence to 1582–3). 42 For details, see Reid, Humanism and Calvinism, 97–102. 43 Calderwood, History, iii, 620. 44 CSP Scot, vi, no. 142. 45 For details, see Steven J. Reid, ‘Andrew Melville and the Law of Kingship’ in Roger A. Mason and Steven J. Reid, eds, Andrew Melville (1545–1622): Writings, Reception, and Reputation (Farnham: 2014), 47–74, at 51–54. 46 Donaldson, Queen’s Men, 136. 47 Although growth in the costs of the chamber were naturally to be expected as James entered his majority; I am grateful to Amy Blakeway for this point. See also Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 28–39. 48 Calderwood, History, iii, 662. 49 CSP Scot, vi, no. 135. 50 Calderwood, History, iii, 663; Hume, Angus, 285–286. 51 Julian Goodare, The Government of Scotland, 1560–1625 (Oxford: 2004), 83–84. 52 Calderwood, History, iii, 635–636. The chamberlain courts were noted by Robert Bowes in the aftermath of the Raid as a particular source of grievance which the Raiders were keen to publicise (8 September 1582). CSP Scot, vi, no. 160. 53 CSP Scot, vi, no. 135. 54 Calderwood, History, iii, 780–783.

54  Steven J. Reid 55 Spottiswoode, ii, 281, 284; CSP Scot, vi, no. 135. 56 Calderwood, History, iii, 634. 57 Calderwood, History, iii, 656. 58 The last recorded council business prior to the Raid took place at Edinburgh on 21 August, and resumed there on 26 August. RPCS, iii, 506. 59 RPCS, iii, 508–13; NRS E21/63, ff. 77r-79v (for the despatch of letters). 60 RPS A1582/10/2; the treasurer’s accounts for October (NRS E21/63, f. 84r-v) shows letters were sent to all major nobility and clergy, presumably with orders to attend. 61 Halhill, Memoirs, 282–283; BUK, ii, 591. 62 NRS, GD124/11/9; RPS A1582/10/3; RPCS, iii, 519. The order for William Stewart’s imprisonment does not form part of the convention record. 63 RPS A1582/10/4; Moysie, Memoirs, 40. 64 RPCS, iii, 509–511, Moysie, Memoirs, 39, 41. 65 CSP Scot, vi, no. 213. 66 Moysie, Memoirs, 41; Calderwood, History, iii, 691. 67 NRS E21/63, ff. 100r-102v, 103r-104v. 68 RPCS, iii, 533, 537; NRS E21/63, f. 103v. 69 RPCS, iii, 533–534. 70 RPCS, iii, 536–538; CSP Scot, vi, nos 230–231. 71 CSP Scot, vi, no. 168 et seq. 72 RPCS, iii, 523–524, 527, 528, 530–531, 534–535, 539–540. 73 Colville, Letters, 15–19. He was provided with £666 13s. 4d. to cover his expenses: NRS E21/63, f. 102v. 74 Colville, Letters, 19–23. However, he did pursue the possibility of the return of Archibald Douglas for trial of his role in the murder of Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley. 75 RPCS, iii, 522; NRS GD125/151/16, draft letters from Lady Mar to Colonel William Stewart and James VI, 15 December 1582. It is unknown, however, if these drafts were ever sent. 76 RPCS, iii, 533, 538. 77 RPCS, iii, 546. 78 RMS, v, no. 456. 79 NRS, E34/36, 1–14. 80 NRS, E34/36, 15–17. 81 NRS, E34/36, 18–19; Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 41. 82 RPCS, iii, 508. 83 CSP Scot, vi, no. 168. Moysie, Memoirs, 37–38; Hume, Angus, 287; Melville, Memoirs, 282. 84 CSP Scot, vi, no. 169. 85 NRS, E21/63, ff. 65r-68v (expenses for August), 75r-76r (September), 81r-83v (October), 86r-93v (November), 100r-102v (December), 106r-107v (January). 86 NRS, E21/63, ff. 82v-83r. 87 NRS, E21/63, f. 103r-v. 88 De la Mothe had been dispatched via England in November 1582, but had been delayed there when his passport was refused due to suspicions over the nature of his mission. He arrived 17 January across land; Maineville arrived at Burntisland, by sea, the following day. Moysie, Memoirs, 43–44; CSP Scot, vi, no. 280. 89 CSP Scot, vi, nos 282–287. 90 RPCS, iii, p. liv. 91 CSP Scot, vi, nos 280–287; Moysie, Memoirs, 44. He left Scotland on 20 February, though Moysie claimed that he arrived on 18 January and left on 10 February. This dismissal of any association chimed well with Fontenay’s own account of his time in Scotland and his interactions with James, where he noted that he had to get James to commit to writing his responses to the questions as otherwise James would pretend

Of bairns and bearded men  55 ignorance of any discussion: CSP Scot, vi, nos 294–299, especially 298, for the account of Fontenay’s dealings with James. 92 CSP Scot, vi, no. 304; HKJVI, 196. 93 HKJVI, 197. 94 CSP Scot, vi, no. 320. 95 CSP Scot, vi, nos 341, 366. 96 CSP Scot, vi, no. 320. The bond is mentioned again on 4 March (no. 335). 97 CSP Scot, vi, no. 330. 98 CSP Scot, vi, no. 333. 99 CSP Scot, vi, no. 342. 100 CSP Scot, vi, no. 342. 101 CSP Scot, vi, no. 356. 102 CSP Scot, vi, no. 356; Goodare, ‘The Debts of James VI’, 935–936. 103 CSP Scot, vi, no. 370. 104 CSP Scot, vi, nos 374, 385. 105 CSP Scot, vi, no. 361. 106 CSP Scot, vi, nos 404–405. 107 RPCS, iii, 562; RPS A1583/4/2 [accessed 25 Feb. 2016]. 108 James ultimately married Frederick’s second daughter, Anne, by proxy on 20 August 1589. For a full history of James’ wedding negotiations, see David Stevenson, Scotland’s Last Royal Wedding: the Marriage of James VI and Anne of Denmark (Edinburgh: 1997), pp. vii–x, 1–62. 109 RPCS, iii, 564–565. 110 E21/63, ff. 30r-137r, esp. ff. 130r-131r, 135r-136v. 111 E21/63, f. 137r; Goodare, ‘Debts of James VI’, 935–936. Sir Robert Melville (as deputy treasurer) bore £14,362 11s. 7d. of the debts, and Thomas Acheson (as master coiner) £592 9s. 2d. 112 E21/63, f. 137v. 113 CSP Scot, vi, no. 411. 114 Maineville was actually provided with a chain, a tablet and a double ring of gold, and a pearl, to the total sum of £119 10s. However, his servant ‘La Roche’ was also awarded clothing and 15 crowns of the sun, worth around £40. ER21/63, f. 124v. 115 CSP Scot, vi, no. 412. 116 CSP Scot, vi, no. 451. 117 CSP Scot, vi, no. 476. 118 CSP Scot, vi, no. 545; HKJVI, 197. 119 CSP Scot, vi, no. 487. 120 CSP Scot, vi, no. 479; Moysie, Memoirs, 44; Moysie added Argyll to this list. 121 RPS, 1583/10/1–5, A1583/12/2. 122 CSP Scot, vi, nos 332, 371. 123 CSP Scot, vi, nos 413–415. 124 James to Elizabeth, 23 April 1583, in Letters of Elizabeth and James VI, no. 3, 5–6. 125 Julian Goodare, ‘James VI’s English Subsidy’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 110–125. 126 CSP Scot, vi, nos 466–473. 127 CSP Scot, vi, no. 474. 128 Claud and John had been in England since 1579. Rosalind K. Marshall, ‘Hamilton, John, first marquess of Hamilton (1539/40–1604)’, ODNB [12103] and Peter Holmes, ‘Hamilton, Claud, first Lord Paisley (1546?–1621)’, ODNB [12057, both accessed 28 Feb. 2016]. 129 CSP Scot, vi, no. 453. 130 CSP Scot, vi, no. 476. 131 CSP Scot, vi, nos 512, 532.

56  Steven J. Reid 32 Moysie, Memoirs, 45. 1 133 On the testament and heart, see Rosalind K. Marshall, ‘Stuart, Esmé, first Duke of Lennox (c.1542–1583)’, ODNB [26702, accessed 28 Feb. 2016]. 134 Some accounts add the Earl Marischal to this list. CSP Scot, vi, no. 534. 135 Melville of Halhill, Memoirs, 283. 136 Melville of Halhill, Memoirs, 284; HKJVI, 198. 137 Melville of Halhill, Memoirs, 287–289; Moysie, Memoirs, 45; HKJVI, 197. 138 Melville of Halhill, Memoirs, 289. 139 CSP Scot, vi, no. 549. Huntly and Crawford were also ordered to leave the king’s presence, but a week later they accompanied him to Falkland and were giving him advice to travel north for his protection: CSP Scot, vi, no. 556. 140 For Stewart’s biography, see Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 220, n.2.

3 Friendship, politics and religion George Gordon, Sixth Earl of Huntly and King James VI, 1581–1595 Ruth Grant

‘Friendship’ in early modern Scotland was an extremely important form of relationship, extending beyond the inter-personal bond as it is understood today to include the entire affinity of a noble and had its own attendant responsibilities and obligations. Friendship was defined as ‘those who would act as kin’ and lords used bonds ‘to extend to those who were not of a lord’s kin the obligations which were understood and unwritten by the kin’.1 A noble’s ‘friendship’ consisted of his kin, friends, allies, partakers, tenants and dependents and extended from his regional base to independent lairds and social equals. His friendship also included bonds made through marriage, which is generally seen by historians as the weakest form of alliance but, as will be seen, could prove to be one of his strongest assets.2 Friendship existed in both an individual and a collective sense. In an individual sense, a lord could be friends, with or without a formal alliance, with another noble or the king. This was a significant element in building and wielding influence, but the idea of a noble’s ‘friendship’ in a collective sense is an extremely important construct in understanding the power of the nobility in early modern Scotland.3 This chapter explores the friendship of George Gordon, sixth Earl of Huntly, and the fundamental role it played in keeping him at the height of political success and favour during King James’ personal reign in Scotland. What follows looks at Huntly’s career in broadly chronological terms, from his return to Scotland after education in France in 1581 until his gradual removal from the centre of power in the later 1590s. Across these two decades, Huntly’s friendship comprised four distinct blocks that operated in different, sometimes overlapping, ways. These comprised the centre (including government, covert Catholic politics, the court and the king’s bedchamber), the locality and those separate and overlapping spheres of his wife, Henrietta Stewart. In regards to the centre, Huntly’s personal relationship with James provided him and his friendship with distinct advantage over other nobles at court. Historians readily refer to men such as Esmé and Ludovic Stewart, first and second Dukes of Lennox, John Erskine, second Earl of Mar, Captain James Stewart of Ochiltree (elevated to Earl of Arran in 1581), Alexander, Lord Spynie and, of course, Huntly himself as James VI’s ‘favourites’. But were they? What defines a royal favourite, and what discerns a favourite from a friend? This then

58  Ruth Grant invites the question as to whether favouritism necessarily denoted friendship: could favouritism be employed as a tool, if an underlying friendship did not exist? Arran, for example, was arguably more of a political instrument than a personal friend. The assumption that favour, even disproportionate favour, bestowed upon a magnate connoted a personal relationship is debatable. What happened, though, when personal friendship between the king and a noble – such as that between James and Huntly – was factored into more structured bonds? Personal friendship could not exist within a vacuum for either party, and it was incumbent upon the noble to use the relationship to promote his affinity and for the king to further his wider political objectives. Huntly was without doubt the most successful and powerful of the men favoured by James during his personal reign in Scotland, enjoying access and reward from the king that would only be surpassed by Robert Carr and George Villiers after 1603. This relationship initially stemmed from Huntly’s unwavering loyalty to the king during the period of the Ruthven Raid and was bolstered in the second half of the 1580s by Huntly’s usefulness to James as an agent for diplomatic negotiations with Catholic Europe, which acted as a check against English dominance of Scottish politics and Spain’s aspirations for the English throne. Good lordship was also predicated upon advancing the interests of one’s affinity, with royal service identified as an assured means of doing so.4 These men were highly influential with the monarch, and it was distinctly advantageous for a noble to have members of his affinity appointed to the bedchamber.5 Not only did Huntly himself often have unlimited access to the king, but a significant number of his adherents were appointed to the chamber. The dominance of Huntly’s men in the chamber also meant reduced access to the king from those outwith Huntly’s orbit. Most magnates, however, did not have the luxury of long residence either in the court or in the chamber. They had responsibilities demanding their presence in their locality, whether administering their estates, overseeing local affairs (which included burgh responsibilities), exercising jurisdictional authority and royal office, or fulfilling a myriad of obligations as head of their kin and friendship. An aristocrat who spent limited time in the locality would find his authority and, by extension, his ability to serve the crown much diminished. It was therefore important that he had supporters in places of influence at court – ideally, within the chamber as well – for when he could not attend, not just to promote but to protect his interests in a highly predatory environment. Huntly excelled at protecting his varying political interests. In addition to his expansive regional friendship and long-term alliances with John Graham, third Earl of Montrose, Francis Hay, ninth Earl of Erroll, and David Lindsay, eleventh Earl of Crawford, he built a series of strong friendships within the court, including Mar and both Dukes of Lennox. His supporters in the chamber were trusted by the king and provided steadfast service to both James and Huntly over many years, affording the earl a decided advantage over his peers. Finally, the network operated by Huntly’s wife especially provided him with a tactical edge over virtually every other Scottish noble in James’ early personal reign. Huntly married Henrietta Stewart, (sister of Ludovic Stewart, second

Friendship, politics and religion  59 Duke of Lennox) in 1588. From then onwards she played a crucial role in personally representing Gordon’s interests in the centre, especially important when he himself was prevented from doing so. Henrietta Stewart was a political force within her own right, an extremely astute and able woman. Without the countess’ confident politicking from 1593 to 1595, Huntly would not have retained such a strong position during this period. She utilised her husband’s existing friendship in court and in the king’s chamber, brought her husband’s inner coterie to court in attendance upon her6 and, most importantly, established her own connections through her kin relationship with James. She also established a close relationship with Queen Anna and built her own networks within the queen’s sphere. Henrietta’s extremely skilful political manoeuvring from 1590–1595 strongly contributed to Huntly’s ability to maintain a consistently dominant position during that period.

I Huntly’s own career started at court when he returned from France in July 1581. Young and untutored in Scottish politics, his political importance was instantly recognised by Esmé Stewart, first Duke of Lennox, who swiftly moved to secure Huntly’s support. The young earl’s role was limited from July 1581 to August 1582, and he was predominantly identified as a Francophile courtier. His most significant immediate political contribution was his alliance with Lennox, where he substantially bolstered the duke’s weak affinity.7 It was a judicious alignment on the part of Huntly, for he never ceased to derive favour from the king through his attachment to the Lennox-Stewarts, an alliance further cemented by his marriage to Lennox’s daughter in 1588. In a letter to James in 1608, the earl reminded the king that he ‘had from my yongest yeiris that good hap and honour, as to be acceptit in your most sacred maiestis seruis be the mediatioun of the last Duk of Lenox, your maiestis most fauorit cousing and seruiteur’.8 The coup that led to the fall of Lennox and the establishment of the Ruthven Regime on 23 August 1582 provided Huntly with his first opportunity for political activism.9 Huntly refused Lennox’s invitation to accompany him abroad and stepped forward to assume a prominent role in the anti-English opposition faction.10 Huntly was described in 1583 as ‘slowe to engage himself in any faction or quarrel of state, but at the king’s pleasure, to whose humor and favour he dothe wholly bende and apply himself’.11 Working with a group of Catholic and politique nobility, Huntly raised troops and helped enforce the regime change following the king’s escape from the Ruthven lords at the end of June 1583.12 While his actions in ending the Raid were particularly remembered later by James as a token of Huntly’s friendship and loyalty, in fact nearly all of Huntly’s political affiliations or actions from 1581 to December 1585 (aside from those consolidating his position in the locality) had been tied steadfastly to the king and his interests. The earl (and his large retinue) remained in close attendance on the king until January 1584.13 Huntly used this as an opportunity to establish his position on the privy council, sitting for the first time on 27 August 1583. He subsequently had

60  Ruth Grant one of the highest attendance rates, delegating to Sir John Gordon of Lochinvar when he was unable to attend.14 Although Huntly’s participation markedly dropped off once the king established independent government following the fall of the Earl of Arran’s regime,15 Huntly assiduously attended the privy council whilst it was an important sphere for him in which to exert personal influence. From the outset of his career at court, Huntly recognised the importance of establishing supporters and dependents in the royal administration and the king’s household, whilst also appointing capable adjutants in the locality and its burghs.16 His efforts in court focussed particularly on the king’s chamber, an exceedingly important component of the court structure since its formation in 1580 as part of the reforms of the household spearheaded by Esmé Stewart. Whilst wider access to the court traditionally was granted to the nobility, access to the chamber was restricted. Admittance to the chamber indicated considerable royal favour, with formal appointments granted to the king’s close friends and companions.17 Huntly placed and cultivated these men, chiefly from the Gordon kindred, within the king’s chamber practically from its inception in October 1580. Both the longevity of their careers and later elevations in rank are indicative of their importance to the king. Consistent advocates for Huntly in the chamber included Alexander, sixth Lord Home, Sir George Home, Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spynie (the younger brother of his long-standing ally, Crawford),18 Thomas Erskine of Gogar (grandson of John, fourth Lord Erskine, created first Earl of Kellie in 1619), Alexander, Master of Elphinstone, Sir John Seton of Barns (master of the king’s horse in 1581, first master of the king’s household, privy councillor and comptroller in 1587), Sir James Chisholm (master of the household), John Chisholm, (steward, 1582–91), Sir Patrick Murray of Gleanis and Laird of Seggie (one of Huntly’s local coterie, appointed an ordinary gentleman of the chamber, 1591–96).19 Contemporaries frequently commented on the dominance of Huntly’s men in the chamber and, from their perspective, the undue influence that these men had with the king both in policy and in insulating Huntly from repercussions from his actions.20 Also commented upon, with increasing concern in the early 1590s, was the fact that the dominance of Huntly’s supporters in the court, the chamber and the king’s guard either prevented access to those outside his faction or intimidated them from coming to court.21 Men, such as Spynie, Home, Lennox and Mar were identified as lobbying on Huntly’s behalf or providing him secret access to the king (such as Sir George Home hiding him in the wardrobe in October 1590).22 They were used as a source of communication between the king and earl as well, with men from the chamber such as Sir John Seton, Alexander, Master of Elphinstone, Sir Thomas Erskine and Sir Patrick Murray acting as couriers.23 At the same time, Huntly devoted significant attention in the mid-1580s to rebuilding and consolidating his regional power in the northeast, which had deteriorated under his grandfather and father.24 In 1583 Huntly formally assumed management of his estates from his uncle, Sir Patrick Gordon of Auchindoun (whom he appointed deputy sheriff in Aberdeen). He began to sit regularly on the Aberdeen sheriff courts in 1584 and began to take bonds of manrent in 1585.25 He also began acting in his capacity as Lieutenant of the North in the summer of

Friendship, politics and religion  61 1584, which he used to so greatly extend Gordon power to the west and southwest of his established territory that his influence encroached upon the earldoms of James Stewart, second Earl of Moray, Archibald Campbell, sixth Earl of Argyll, and John Stewart, fifth Earl of Atholl.26 He offered attentive lordship and stability, features both lacking in Moray’s and Argyll’s domains, and he took advantage of the internal dissent and friction in Atholl’s lands in particular. His outstanding success and conscientious administration as a royal lieutenant enabled him, in turn, to wield more power in the centre, although this was not without its pitfalls. His vicious and protracted bloodfeud with the Stewarts in the 1590s arose partially from resentment at his self-aggrandising infiltration into lands other than his own. Huntly also invested time in mediating between his feuding kin, George Sinclair, fifth Earl of Caithness, and Alexander Gordon, twelfth Earl of Sutherland.27 Thus the period marked by the Arran government was one in which he began to diversify his power base, becoming a serious player in the nation’s politics and a regional magnate of increasing influence. In a meeting with a delegation from the Edinburgh Presbytery on 18 July 1583, James informed them that ‘I am a catholic King of Scotland… and may choose anie that I like best to be in companie with me; and I like them best that are with me for the present’.28 These men were Huntly, Crawford and Montrose, ‘who now find such favour in the Court that trust for the safety of the King’s person is, next the guard, committed to them, their friends and dependers’.29 The issue of the king’s personal ‘safety’ was a recurring point at times of subsequent political stress, and those men who had supported and protected James in his nascent adult reign would remain closest to the king throughout the later 1580s and early 1590s. Thus, the exceedingly close relationship Huntly had established with James, whilst cultivating a strong regional power base for himself in the traditional Huntly affinities, ensured that as he entered his political prime he would maintain a consistent advantage over his adversaries.

II James had learned from the first Duke of Lennox’s downfall that successful independent rule was achieved by the limitation of any particular faction’s power, which he achieved by surrounding himself with men whose loyalties lay primarily with him. Huntly’s personal power and his religious affinity would act as an effective balance to the pro-English Protestants, whilst his actions following the Ruthven Raid cemented a relationship already based on mutual loyalty and trust. This trust was extended to Huntly’s dependents and personal supporters, who were awarded with positions closest to the king, and expected to protect both Huntly’s and the king’s interests. His trust in the men in the chamber was exceedingly important to James – a point that he was at pains to make in the Basilikon Doron: ‘[l]et them that haue the credite to serue in your Chalmer, be trustie and secret’. James also instructed his son to choose ‘your servants for your owne vse and not for the vse of others’.30 The fact that Huntly’s friends were numbered amongst those that the king trusted the most in the kingdom cannot be over-emphasised.

62  Ruth Grant It was a trust, by contrast, that James seemed unable to bestow either upon the Anglo-Protestant faction or Elizabeth herself, and from 1587 to 1589 James used Huntly as a means to protect his political options in his relationships with the English monarch and her supporters. By June 1587, important foreign policy initiatives had been undertaken by James’ government that significantly impacted on Scottish domestic politics. First, a formal defensive alliance had been contracted with England in July 1586 and contact, both overt and covert, had been established by James and Huntly with the leading Catholic powers on the Continent.31 Then, as James attempted to play both sides of international confessional politics in the years dominated by the Spanish Armada, he used Huntly and John Maitland of Thirlestane from mid-1587 onwards as the best means to pursue his divergent interests with Spain and England. Huntly returned to court in April 1587, remaining in close attendance upon the king for the next two years. Once again he turned his attention to the privy council, which was notionally the province of the pro-English head of the administration, Secretary Maitland, but was in fact dominated by Huntly’s faction. Of the 16 extraordinary councillors, 11 were either known Catholics or associated with Huntly’s faction, and those councillors with the highest attendance patterns were also associated with him.32 However, Huntly’s true forté was the court, establishing himself and his supporters in positions close to the king – Erroll, Crawford, Montrose, Bothwell and the Hamiltons populated the court, whilst men such as the Setons, the Chisholms and the Homes settled into the chamber. It was quickly noticed that those closest to James, particularly Huntly, were all openly practising Catholics.33 With unrestricted admittance to the king’s chamber, Huntly sought to build his faction’s influence with the king and limit his adversary’s access to James. By August, the earl’s success was confirmed when it was acknowledged that ‘[m]y lord of Huntley is indeed ane greit curteour and knawis mair of the Kingis secreittis nor ony man at this present doithe’.34 Huntly was elevated to the highest court appointment in the realm on 20 August 1587 when he was appointed acting chamberlain during Ludovick Stewart, second Duke of Lennox’s minority. At the same time, he was made vice-chamberlain for life.35 This was only one month after Maitland had been appointed chancellor, the highest political office in Scotland. Each man was empowered to wield influence in two distinct spheres, one representing the public, institutional face of public policy and the other the king’s riskier ‘unofficial’ policy, the not-so-subtle undercurrent to Scottish politics. This appointment was a key factor in securing Huntly’s emergent position as a major force in Scottish politics. Not only did Huntly now possess the authority to ‘debar all others but those of his faction’,36 but he influenced who had access to the king, who resided at court, and who was in closest attendance upon the king, even receiving their personal oaths. Huntly’s personal relationship with James was represented by the vice-chamberlainship and raised the issue of whether the king would ultimately choose his personal relationship and the ‘unofficial’ policy represented by Huntly over the official government policy spearheaded by Maitland in the rapidly escalating conflict between his chancellor and his chamberlain.

Friendship, politics and religion  63 Low-level friction had been constant between Huntly and Maitland since March 1586 but the polarisation of the court and council factions were caused by Maitland’s attempt to exclude the aristocracy from the privy council’s ordinary members and the king’s dual policies of attempting to pander simultaneously to Anglo-Protestant and Continental Catholic interests. This did not particularly concern James, for it was not always in the king’s best interests to eradicate factions. August 1587 marked the first serious escalation in tensions between Maitland and Huntly, as it was then that the earl used his appointment as chamberlain as an opportunity to bar nobles who supported Maitland from the king’s presence. Although James quickly compelled Huntly to reconcile with Maitland, it was obvious that his personal favour was directed to Huntly’s faction, who were identified as the ‘greatest gyders of the cowrt for the present swa maist specially inwyit’. It was further commented that the king ‘dois mosit cleirlie schyne ower them all, bot in special towards Crafurde and Hwuntlie, qwha now remains ordinarlie at courte, and that be his majesties special command’. Huntly was additionally reported to have ‘his majestes speciall goodwill and favoir’.37 If Maitland placated the Kirk and England through his appointment as chancellor, then Huntly ensured that the king remained on good terms with the Catholics and with France and Spain.38 James himself remarked that if England was defeated, then he would receive from Philip II ‘the same which Polyphemus promised Ulysses, to devour him after all his fellows’.39 The Scottish king needed to neutralise Philip II and contain his ambitions (imperial as well as ecclesiastical) with respect to the English succession. He did this by using Huntly to cultivate a network of Continental Catholics outside Spain. James hoped that their advocacy for his claim to the English throne would keep it to the forefront of discussion, cultivating existing doubts about Spain and the balance of power in Europe – ‘[a]s long as James had champions, he remained a viable candidate, and the succession a confused matter’.40 By the autumn of 1587, Huntly may have outwardly basked in James’ favour and enjoyed full control of the court, but Maitland’s position and policies remained unaffected – the king was still maintaining parity between the two men’s areas of influence. The English administration’s obsession with Huntly’s ascendancy in court blinded them to Maitland’s continuing control of the government and the implementation of his policies. They also failed to notice that the faction opposing Maitland was a multi-faith party, united not by religion but by their objections to government policy and to a chancellor whom they perceived as a deliberate underminer of the power of the nobility. Within the wider international context, Huntly’s dominance at court, combined with the proliferation of Catholics at court and their hostility to the English alliance,41 served to misdirect the English and raise suspicions of James holding secret negotiations with Spain. January to October 1588 was a period of intense factional fighting, with Huntly having established a leading position in Scottish politics. Controlling the court and heavily influencing the king, he used increasingly aggressive attempts to eradicate Maitland’s influence and policies.42 James repeatedly compelled Huntly to reconcile, twice using Sir Patrick Murray of Gleanis, ‘one of his special

64  Ruth Grant courteours’, as his intermediary. Huntly complied only because ‘his majesties word was ane law to him’.43 Despite the numerous challenges to the chancellor and his government policies, the king still overtly favoured Huntly over Maitland, with the earl unremittingly described as ‘chief’ in a Catholic, anti-English court.44 During this period, Sir Patrick Murray of Gleanis was the most common liaison between the king and Huntly. Murray’s primary appointment was as a servant in the bedchamber, but his extended obligations were clearly towards Huntly.45 The first recorded use of Murray being used as a private conduit between James and Huntly was in January 1588 when James sent him to Huntly with ‘clois letters’; in February, James sent Murray, described as one of the king’s ‘speciall courteours,’ from court to Huntly in Linlithgow.46 From this point onwards Murray and others were often noted as being dispatched with ‘clois letters’ from the king to Huntly, providing the earl with exclusive information and serving as a vital intermediary between the two men. This was especially important when James could not publicly contact the earl, an issue that became particularly pertinent during Huntly’s bloodfeud with the Earl of Moray. Huntly maintained his intimacy with the king through 1588, with James confidently reassuring the panicking English ambassador that ‘Huntly shall not stir from him’ when news of the Spanish Armada’s attack at the Battle of Gravelines on 29 July reached Scotland. Huntly’s control of the court was complete – albeit fleeting – when he was appointed captain of the royal guard in November 1588.47 Huntly was in perhaps the most influential and powerful position of his career and from this point onwards was in continuous residence with the king until February 1589. Despite Huntly’s inability to remove Maitland, with the king adamantly refusing repeated petitions for the chancellor’s replacement and repressing any plots to effect the same,48 pressure was nonetheless brought to bear on his rival. This affected both Maitland’s personal relations with England and his pro-English policy. The dominance of Huntly’s friends at court, such as Crawford, Montrose and the Hamiltons, plus Huntly’s own increased authority, compelled Maitland to reach an uneasy accord with the earl.49 When asked why his opposition had secured such advantage at court, Maitland replied that Elizabeth ‘was the cause thereof in that no care was taken either of him or others who were most willing to run her course’. James even commented that ‘the more he ded to plese the Quene the les regard she had of him’. An English informant concluded that ‘I fear Huntly and his faction will draw him [James] upon some course against his will and profit’.50 It was a striking point being made to the English – if Elizabeth did not value James’ friendship, then there were others who would, to her detriment. Despite Huntly’s having the upper hand, factional disputes with Maitland were rife in early 1589.51 The friction between Huntly and the chancellor dominated the political landscape as Huntly relentlessly pressed for complete dominance. The discovery of Huntly’s correspondence with Spain in February 1589 briefly interrupted the intense factional fighting between Huntly and Maitland.52 The nature of the correspondence, offering Scottish assistance to Spain should it attempt another attack on England and requesting financial assistance, alarmed

Friendship, politics and religion  65 both the Kirk and the English, strengthening support for Maitland in Scotland.53 The chancellor espied an opportunity in the furore caused by the Spanish correspondence to have Huntly removed from his appointment as captain of the guard and, ultimately, from court – thereby ending Huntly’s period of greatest political influence.54 The king may have publicly supported Maitland and dismissed Huntly from both the guard and the court on 12 March 1589, yet he continued to surround himself with Huntly’s men. At the end of March Thomas Fowler reported that all the men in the chamber and the stable were Huntly’s and that ‘[t]hese men have the King’s ear and work great effect for Huntly, and the Chancellor cannot mend it, for the King will not change his servants, he loves them so well’.55 James even took Sir John Seton, Alexander, seventh Lord Livingston, and Sir James Chisholm, amongst others, to Aberdeen with him in April. Many of these friends remained in place for many years to come, demonstrating the strength of not only Huntly’s relationship with the king himself but of the network he established on his rise to prominence. James and Huntly maintained a continual correspondence as the affair continued to escalate.56 On 6 April, James was informed that Huntly, Erroll and Crawford were raising troops in the north and that the Earl of Bothwell had declared against the chancellor. It was not a rebellion against the king, neither were religious concerns an issue: this was purely about removing Maitland from power. It was precisely because Huntly perceived the conflict as one between himself and the chancellor that he refused to face the king at the Brig o’ Dee on 18 April, dissolving his troops and removing himself further north instead. Huntly surrendered to James on 26 April 1589. With his wife, Lennox, Lord John Hamilton and the Master of Glamis pleading his case, Huntly received extremely lenient treatment. Upon payment of a 2,000 crown fine in September he was released and returned to his normal freedoms and status.57

III Huntly spent the months between Brig o’ Dee and returning to court in December 1590 in his own lands. During that time, his castle building at Ruthven near his favourite hunting forests brought him into conflict with Lachlan MacKintosh of Dunnachton and Clanchattan; an old feud between the Gordons and Forbeses was renewed; antagonism with the Grants grew; and there was increasing friction with the Earl of Moray.58 Huntly was becoming embroiled in the politics of the locality, which in turn would draw him into a prolonged and vicious bloodfeud. While events in the locality were undoubtedly pivotal to the escalation of the bloodfeud with the Earl of Moray and the Stewarts, court politics was also an important component. He aggressively used his influence at court and favour from James to drive his advantage in the locality and to curtail the power of his antagonists, especially Moray, Atholl and Argyll. Huntly’s successes in the centre, directly attributable to his friendship within the court and chamber and the efforts of his wife, affected his successes and failures in the region. The constant

66  Ruth Grant refrain throughout this period was that Huntly’s friends dominated the court and had undue influence with the king.59 Following two years of exceedingly close attendance upon the king, Huntly’s personal control of the court ended up as a casualty of Brig o’ Dee. However, the extensive friendship network he had established within the court and chamber during this period certainly did not. With the lobbying of his supporters in court, Huntly was re-appointed Lieutenant of the North in 1591 – subsequently, and ruthlessly, wielding the powers of the office in pursuit of his feud. The locality and the court figured dominantly in the politics of the 1590s as Huntly paid little attention to the international connections he had cultivated in the late 1580s. Huntly also profited from the reaction that Francis Stewart, fifth Earl of Bothwell, provoked in the king when in April 1591 Bothwell was accused of intriguing against the king through witchcraft.60 Huntly promptly took advantage of Moray’s and Atholl’s associations with the earl and over the next three years he benefited greatly from the king’s preoccupation with Bothwell. Huntly used James’ indignation, anger, and fear to his own advantage and to strengthen his own position not just at court, but also with regard to his personal standing with the king. During the period when James felt perhaps most personally threatened by Bothwell, Huntly and his men were the people closest to the king.61 It was not just a case of James balancing factions: he truly believed he needed to rely upon Huntly’s protection. The point regarding James’ perception of Huntly’s protective role, in both a political sense and a more personal one, cannot be over-stated. In August 1591 it was reported that Huntly was not just a highly influential courtier but that the earl would prosper even further in return for the royal protection he provided from Bothwell and his supporters. By September, Robert Bowes reported to England that James was ‘accompanied by no nobleman except Huntly’ and in mid-December Huntly was named as one of four men who guided the king.62 Huntly and his wife were still at court when Bothwell raided Holyrood Palace in December. Lennox and Huntly were given a commission to pursue Bothwell, who was harboured by Moray at his mother’s house in Donibristle. Included in this commission was the pursuit of Moray as Bothwell’s supporter.63 Huntly spent January 1592 in pursuit of Bothwell and turned his attention to Moray in February. Huntly’s bloodfeud with Moray had begun in earnest in December 1591, when during the execution of the king’s commission to arrest John Grant for murder (who was sheltering in Moray’s house at Darnaway), one of Huntly’s dependants (Gordon of Cluny’s brother) was fatally shot. The incident was temporarily resolved by all parties having to give caution until the Countess of Huntly obtained a 15-day dispensation from the bond for Huntly, which he used to wreak havoc in Moray’s lands. Whilst the privy council approved Huntly’s actions, Huntly was described as ‘countenanced by the King, comforted  – as is believed – by the Chancellor and Chamber’. Moray consequently aligned with Bothwell; Huntly, in turn, increased his retinue and pursued the feud with vigour.64 In February 1592, Moray was at Donibristle at Andrew Stewart, second Lord Ochiltree’s behest, supposedly in order to reach an agreement with Huntly regarding their feud.65 With 40 men, on 7 February Huntly besieged the house. Moray refused to render himself, and when he attempted escape, he was killed

Friendship, politics and religion  67 by Huntly’s men. Huntly himself was allegedly forced to strike Moray in order to share complicity for his death.66 The response was generally one of palpable anger, especially from the Stewarts and the Kirk; ‘the crown’s reaction to the murder was one of official outrage and actual indifference’. Following the murder, the Stewarts and the Kirk formed a coalition against Huntly, with Stewart faction politics assuming the cloak of a Protestant campaign.67 In March 1592, Huntly voluntarily went into ward in Blackness Castle, assured by James that ‘he sould incurre no danger’. Even though it was noticed that ‘he rather takes his pastimes than endures any imprisonment’, Huntly remained in Blackness for less than a week.68 Prior to Huntly’s entering the ward, the king wrote to him that, ‘[s]ince your passing heerfra, I have beene in suche danger and perrell of my life, as since I was borne’.69 Fearing for his safety, James once again invested his trust in his chamber. By April 1592, the Stewart faction found ‘the credit and means of Huntly’s friends in the King’s chamber to be so great and prevailing that they begin to despair of getting redress’. Atholl even refused to attend James in Perth, his fear of Huntly’s men at court being so great. The king was said to ‘prefer the safety of Huntly’ rather than exercising justice for Moray’s murder.70 In the summer of 1592, Huntly was so focussed on the efforts of his men at court to pursue advantages in his feud with the Stewarts that he began to neglect his regional friendship – the men actually engaging in the feud and suffering its massive repercussions. At the end of June 1592, aware of calls for reform in the chamber aroused by his dominance, Huntly even offered to go abroad in order to deflect some of the pressure from his court friendship.71 This was a serious mistake on the earl’s part for he was perceived as abandoning not just his regional friendship, but his kin and dependents as well. In July 1592 regional representatives, including men from Huntly’s local coterie such as John Gordon of Cluny, Sir William Gordon of Gight and John Stewart, sixth Lord Innermeath, even took the drastic step of informing Huntly that his uncle, Sir Patrick Gordon of Auchindoun (who often deputized for the earl) would be chosen ‘as their chief’ if Huntly would not give assurance that them in all their causes’.72 Huntly was in the impossible position of having to protect the opposing interests of his friendship at court and his friendship in the locality: to those in the locality his proposal to go abroad was a betrayal of his bond to maintain and to protect them; while those in court saw Huntly’s presence as prejudicial to not only the bloodfeud, but, amidst cries for their removal, to themselves as well. The result was that the structure of his local lordship was consequently weakened for an indeterminate period of time.73 The exercise of noble power, therefore, was about finding a way to balance the differing demands of lordship. A noble’s kin and regional friendship was a fundamental part of the successful administration of lordship, thus enabling a lord to engage in national and international politics – where other friendship networks played an equally essential role. Attention was temporarily diverted from the feud in the north when on 27 December 1592 George Ker was apprehended carrying eight blank sheets subscribed individually as well as severally by Huntly, Erroll, Angus and Auchindoun. It was interpreted by the Kirk and privy council as evidence of a Spanish

68  Ruth Grant plot, rather than (as Francis Shearman compellingly argued) letters of credit to be completed whilst the bearer was travelling on the Continent, which was common practice in Europe.74 There was simply no evidence of a Spanish plot. Within a context of ‘fear, faction and intense rivalry, in court and out of it’, the Blanks were ‘a move, one of many, made not by the Catholics, but by their opponents, in the struggle for control of Scotland’.75 The Act of Abolition granted to the earls in November 1593 (which they failed to accept) was an act of appeasement to those clamouring for action from a government simply unable to bring the earls to trial, primarily for lack of evidence.76 It is also evidence of the lack of power and influence of those opposing Huntly as they simply were unable to compel the government to action against the earl. The Blanks did succeed, however, in uniting the Kirk and an embryonic Stewart faction in their pursuit of Huntly. The affair escalated because of the pervasive paranoia of the Kirk, acutely aware of its inability to reach the unconverted masses (especially in the northern hinterland) and because of the embroilment of the affair with the bloodfeud between Huntly and the Stewarts. During a period marked by rising anti-Catholic hysteria and an increasingly politically active presbyterian Kirk, Huntly and James continued to rely upon each other. Throughout the summer of 1592 they had exchanged daily letters, and they continued to correspond throughout the summer of 1593. Huntly’s continual communication with the king was remarkable when compared to other nobles and was one of the keys to his success. At a poorly attended convention of estates in May 1593, the king’s feelings towards Huntly were made abundantly clear. When a comparison ‘in wickedness’ was made between Bothwell and Huntly, ‘the king sought a whinger to throw’ at the man who had made the suggestion.77 In September 1593, angered at the government’s inaction and the distinct lack of repercussions for Huntly, the Synod of Fife excommunicated Huntly, Angus, Erroll, Home, Auchindoun and Sir James Chisholm.78 James was ‘highly offended’ and told Lord John Hamilton that there was ‘no man in whom I may trust more than Huntlie’.79 Trust, a word regularly reiterated by the king: the foundation of the relationship between James and Huntly, the defining characteristic of the chamber and the men who toiled for king and earl therein. Huntly remained virtually insulated from the demands of the Kirk and the Stewart faction: he aggressively pursued the feud with the Stewarts until October 1594 and continued to be effectively unscathed by the Spanish Blanks. It was thought that the king and the General Assembly ‘were now direct and [op]posite and repugnant to ane another’ because the king was intent on restoring Huntly, Erroll and Angus.80 In October 1593, James wrote to Huntly that ‘your honouring of me serued to counteruaile the dishonouring of me be otheris before’ and ‘I trou ye haue proofe of my mynde towardis you at all tymes, and gif of my fauoure to you ye doubt, ye are the onlie man in Scotlande that doubtis thairof, sen all youre enemies will needis binde it on my bake’.81 Although no longer at court by early 1593, Huntly remained in close contact with James. His court friendship continued to protect his interests over the next two years, which included successfully restricting his adversaries’ access

Friendship, politics and religion  69 to the king. In April 1594, the fact that the chief courtiers were Huntly’s men was given as reason to doubt the king’s promise to pursue Huntly if Edinburgh would support James against Bothwell.82 William Troupe ‘diligently’ interceded on Huntly’s behalf in April 1594 and James sent to Huntly in return Sir Thomas Erskine, ‘one of the King’s chamber and in especial credit’. Mar, described as Huntly’s ‘confederate’, was also said to have met with him in May. It was noted in the same month that many nobles were loath to go to Edinburgh ‘whilst the King’s guard is so extraordinary and strong and governed by persons expected to favour overmuch’ Huntly, Erroll and Angus.83 In August 1594 there were still ‘letters weeklie going betwix’ James and Huntly (one of the couriers was once again Sir Patrick Murray). Huntly’s ‘most secreit servandis, daylie hanting at Court’ did not go unnoticed at the end of the summer; he also sent again to Edinburgh Alexander Duff and William Troupe, ‘his old and busy solicitor’.84 But despite, as seen by these examples, the undaunted efforts of his court friendship and the efficacy of his communication network, the period of 1593 to 1595 was especially marked by the influence exercised by the Countess of Huntly, Henrietta Stewart. Supported by and supporting her husband’s regional and court friendships, whilst skilfully manipulating her relationships with both the king and the queen and employing her own networks in both their courts, the countess wielded influence on a truly impressive scale.

IV Huntly’s wife gave him a means to consolidate his position within the centre that was not dependent on political vagaries and could withstand any opponent, from Elizabeth to the Kirk and Protestant nobles to civil servants such as Maitland. The means of doing so had been handed to him by Esmé Stewart. Before Huntly returned to Scotland in 1581, he had become engaged to Stewart’s daughter, Henrietta – a marriage contracted ‘be the Kingis Majestis speciall avise and consent’.85 The advantages that accrued from this affiliation, both personal and political, are an outstanding example of the power of patronage in sixteenth-century Scotland. Huntly’s maternal kin connected him to the Hamiltons, with whom he was already closely aligned. His marriage connected him to the Lennox-Stewarts: he therefore became part of the kin networks of the only two houses that were of the royal line, with his own issue distantly related to the king himself. Huntly married the king’s closest kinswoman on 21 July 1588.86 James referred to Henrietta as ‘his doughter, and beloved of his blud’ and acted in the capacity of father of the bride at their wedding. He provided Henrietta’s tocher (the commendatorship of Dunfermline Abbey), granted 5,000 merks for her journey from France and personally hosted the celebrations, writing his only (incomplete) masque in honour of Huntly and his wife.87 In marrying Henrietta, Huntly not only established a marriage bond with James, but by extension closer connections with her brother, Ludovick, second Duke of Lennox, and with John Erskine, second Earl of Mar, who married Henrietta’s sister, Marie, in 1592. Huntly was now connected to two influential men who were very close the king;

70  Ruth Grant Mar bolstered Huntly’s position, predominantly through supporting Henrietta,88 whilst Lennox wielded his influence on behalf of both Huntly and Henrietta. Huntly’s connection to Lennox, one of the ‘most spectacularly successful courtiers’ of James’ reign,89 yielded exceedingly high dividends in the early 1590s, helping to promote Huntly’s interests in court, as well as protect his regional interests from 1594 to 1595.90 However, the ramifications of the marriage extended beyond Scotland. Via the Lennox alliance, Huntly had strengthened his French connections, and James had tied himself more closely to Catholic politics through his now familial affiliation with Huntly, who was becoming increasingly recognised as the leader of the Scottish Catholics.91 Henrietta was not above using her kinship to the king to her advantage, reminding James in 1594 that he ‘had given her in marriage to Huntly as the King’s own daughter, with promises for advancement of her and her children’, making the point that it was not just about Huntly – she was ambitious for herself and her children too.92 She proved to be a remarkable politician and a formidable adversary, protecting and advancing in equal parts the interests of her house. She repeatedly brazened the hostilities of the Stewart and the Anglo-Protestant factions in the 1590s, ensuring that her husband’s friendship in the court continued to function, whilst making certain that his coterie from the region had a voice in court as well.93 This was particularly important in 1592 to 1593 when Huntly’s regional friendship felt that their interests were secondary to that of his court friendship. Henrietta’s kinship with the king and her own friendship with the queen entitled her to royal audience regardless of her husband’s political standing. Furthermore, her place in Anna’s chamber gave the Gordons another and entirely separate friendship network within the court. Immediately following her husband’s remission for Brig o’ Dee in December 1590,94 the Countess of Huntly hastened to take advantage of her first opportunity to attend court since the queen’s arrival in May. She presented her sister, Marie, to the queen’s service and offered her own attendance upon Anna.95 Still learning Scots, the queen and Henrietta may have bonded through a shared language (French) and the experiences of being young émigrés of high-rank; it is conceivable that the countess, just two years older than Anna, was able to help guide her in acclimatising to her new country. Whatever initially drew them together, a close relationship sprang up between the two women that over time included a shared religion, Catholicism. Ministers and others incessantly petitioned for her removal from the queen’s court, fearing ‘no good fruit in religion coming by her company to the queen’. Whether it is true or not that Henrietta introduced the queen to Catholicism (as one Jesuit claimed), Anna did convert and not only refused to remove the countess from her company, but protected both her and her husband from many of the Kirk’s demands.96 When ministers complained of Henrietta’s Catholicism in 1596, the king informed them that ‘the kirk had the wyte [blame], that dealt not with her’.97 From their very first meeting, it was suspected that the countess would use her relationship with the queen to her husband’s advantage. Sir Robert Bowes, the English ambassador, thought that ‘under the shadow of her abode about the Quene that her husband shall gitt longer tyme to abide here and in courte’.98 Bowes’

Friendship, politics and religion  71 prediction was correct, and at the countess’ request Huntly’s bond to keep the peace in his feud with Moray was suspended for 15 days – whereas Moray’s corresponding bond was still in effect, and he was detained in the south. It was ample time for Huntly to ply his advantage in Moray’s dominions, whilst Moray’s resulting complaints received ‘na redress’.99 This was the first, but assuredly not the last, time that Huntly used his own influence and that of his wife’s in court, and, more specifically, her influence with the queen: it would become a key component of his strategy in the years of feuding with the Stewarts that lay ahead. Even James took advantage of the countess’ unique position. For example, in October 1593, Henrietta was lodged at court and entertained ‘with great favour’, and it was said that although ‘the Queen wrote for her, yet it is said that she did so to please the King’.100 Henrietta extended their influence further when she became a confidant of Queen Anna after 1590, becoming a courtier in her own right at the queen’s, as well as the king’s, court. Irrespective of her husband’s position – at horn, forfeited, exiled – Henrietta had virtually unimpeded access to the court and to both her monarchs. There is only evidence of one instance where the king publicly refused her admittance to court: in June 1594, following her husband’s forfeiture. This was undermined by the fact that she was later spotted exiting through the court gates in ‘base array’, having been smuggled into and out of court in disguise so as not to excite comment.101 The strength of her position and relationship with the queen is evidenced by her attendance of Anna at the birth of Princess Elizabeth in 1596 and subsequently being named the child’s godmother. When the Kirk launched its predictable protest, the king declared that Henrietta ‘was a good discreit ladie, worthie of his affectioun’.102 Both the Earl and Countess of Huntly played a prominent role in the baptism of Prince Charles in 1599, with Henrietta, rather than the nurse, holding the baby for the duration of the sermon.103 It could be argued that the countess’ position derived partially from her being royal kin, but neither her personal relationship with James and Anna nor, just as importantly, her significant political influence can be discounted. Henrietta used her growing friendship network time and again to her family’s advantage, and even made use of her brother, Lennox, in doing so. In early 1593 the 23-year-old Lennox was appointed to examine Huntly’s ‘treasons’, despite protests that he was too young and so ‘nearly allied to Huntly’, which raised doubts about the king’s commitment to the trial.104 In February 1593 her intervention protected her husband’s estates, as she and the Countess of Erroll persuaded the king to grant to them the earls’ principal houses and rents, ‘without any compt or rakning of the rents thereof to be maid to his Majestie or his treasurer for the transgressions of thair husbands’. Lennox arranged for the countess’ appearance at court in May 1593, which instigated repeated petitions for her removal, as she was ‘now come to the Court with greater train and busier heads than are fit to be continued here, and to do offices (as it is suspected) full of danger’. When she removed to Leith in mid-June (the only time James granted petitions for her removal from court), the queen, Mar and numerous courtiers promptly visited her. Bowes reported that the king ‘marvelled to find me [Bowes] so earnest for the removing’ of the countess, whose ‘abode at Court’ had been facilitated by Lennox, Mar and the queen.105

72  Ruth Grant As the feud progressed, taking its toll on all parties, and as the Kirk grew increasingly paranoid about the number of Jesuits in Scotland and the activities of the ‘Catholic earls’, the Countess of Huntly’s influence was undiminished, and her efforts on her husband’s behalf grew more importunate. When Henrietta left court in April 1594, ‘[h]er rewards in the Queen’s chamber were liberal and far exceeding the common order and proportion used here’.106 In June 1594 the ministers of the Kirk even met to discuss ways to prevent the countess from gaining access to both the court and the king.107 That same month, Henrietta rushed to court to intercede with the king. It was said that Huntly and his allies ‘depend wholly … on the success of the Countess of Huntly’.108 At the end of the first week of July, the English ambassador intimated that the countess was still at court, having ‘lately written at great length to her husband’. She had petitioned James to grant Huntly’s lands to herself and her children. When this proved unsuccessful, the queen petitioned the king to grant Huntly’s lands to her, rather than to Henrietta. James refused unless Huntly gave his obedience or went abroad. On 6 July, Henrietta was ordered to leave Edinburgh within four days. She journeyed to Seton and left for Fife on 20 July after extending her best efforts, for the outcome would affect not just her husband but herself and her children as well.109 With pressure from their wives to go abroad, in February 1595, Huntly and Erroll finally gave their remissions to Lennox, agreeing to go into exile. Their livings were given to Lennox ‘by way of factorie’, who then made their wives intromitters, thereby retaining their livings for their own use.110 The Countess of Huntly continued to work strenuously on behalf of her husband and her progeny throughout her husband’s exile. In an exceedingly apt description by a contemporary chronicler, it was stated that she was ‘a virtuous wyff and prudent lady; who providentlie governed her husband’s affairs, and carefullie solicited his business at home during his banishment from Scotland’ from March 1595 until June 1596.111 On 28 June 1597, at the Market Cross in Aberdeen, the Marchmont Herald proclaimed Huntly’s pacification and peace. When Huntly was finally restored by Sir David Lindsay of the Mount, the Lord Lyon, King of Arms, at Edinburgh’s market cross in February 1598, the queen attended with the Countess of Huntly.112 Huntly’s subsequent elevation to marquess on 17 April 1599 at the baptism of Princess Margaret was in part due to the king’s promise to Lennox to advance his sister’s position when Huntly married her.113 It is no wonder that in the extensive renovations to Huntly Castle, which were completed in 1602, her husband paid just tribute to her remarkable political efforts. Henrietta’s name was given equal prominence with her husband’s, engraved on the outside wall in 20-inch Roman letters and, in the magnificent armorial panel over the castle’s main door, her arms were once again given equal bearing with those of her husband.114

V Huntly was at his most powerful from the end of 1588 until early 1589, when he affected government foreign policy and was both chamberlain and captain of the royal guard. However, his power in the early 1590s was still extensive, even

Friendship, politics and religion  73 though he himself held no position of authority and was periodically excluded from court. The friendship networks in the region and the centre that Huntly had established in the 1580s continued to grow and expand. Huntly’s confidence in his men in the chamber was not misplaced. Experienced and trusted by both James and Huntly, they confidently protected and promoted Huntly’s interests – especially important during his prolonged absences. Another powerful force in the early 1590s was Henrietta Stewart. She represented the interests of the Gordons in tandem with her husband, whose attention was increasingly consumed by the bloodfeud with the Stewarts and a progressively more aggressive Kirk. She used her relationship with both James and Anna, her own friendship network in the courts of both monarchs and the friendship Huntly had established within the court (untouched following Brig o’ Dee) to good effect. Huntly thus ensured that not only was his voice heard and his interests protected, but also that he always had a direct conduit to James. Huntly, however, did not just rely on others to ensure he was heard by the king. He established a correspondence with James, which both men avidly maintained. It was unique in its frequency and was linked to the current level of political crisis, with weekly to daily communiqués being recorded. It was much remarked upon by contemporaries, who also noted the men used to courier the letters. Huntly used every resource possible to enhance his position: his established friendship network within the court and chamber, his private correspondence with the king, the men conveying the letters, and his ‘most secreit servandis daylie hanting at Court’, as Colville once exasperatedly commented.115 Even at his darkest hour, Huntly’s men dominated the chamber, and he could always reach out to the king – and James to him. Huntly’s career at the centre of Scottish politics from 1581 to 1595 may have been short in comparison with the length of his life (he died in 1636), but it was an extremely influential one. He significantly directed the course of national politics, and although often described by historians as a rebellious Catholic earl, his more militant demonstrations in 1589 and 1594 were not primarily rebellions against the crown nor predominantly motivated by his Catholicism, but were the product of factional politics and bloodfeud. Huntly served his king in a number of capacities, from balancing factions to playing an essential role in James’ attempt to use Catholic politics to ensure his rights in the English succession. But it was his relationship with James, one in which both men gave and received great loyalty and trust, that truly gave him political success. Huntly never held an office of state: he built his influence solely upon court politics and the ascendancy of the chamber, his and Henrietta’s relationships with the king and his vast regional power. A principal component of his relationship with the king was James’ belief in the earl’s ability to protect him, as well as his rights and prerogatives. Rooted in 1583 when Huntly helped the king obtain not just his personal liberty but the political freedom to set up the new Arran government, the king entrusted his personal security to Huntly, whether he felt physically threatened by errant nobles such as Bothwell or verbally, as James said, ‘by the exclamatioun of the ministrie’.116 Both men were extremely secure in Huntly’s friendship at court; moreover, the men closest to the king in the chamber were

74  Ruth Grant also Huntly’s adherents and were a means to manipulate the king’s trust in order to promote the earl’s own political objectives. Throughout his career Huntly frequently did not agree with James’ policy or choice of men in his government (particularly Sir John Maitland of Thirlestane), blatantly practised Catholicism, was doggedly engaged in factional fighting and, bolstered by an exceptionally large retinue with the command of hundreds at his fingertips, used every opportunity afforded him to promote aggressively his own political objectives and his affinity.117 Yet, in doing so, he never questioned the king’s political prerogative nor attempted to use his dominance of the court and the king’s chamber or his military might to compel James, such as the course taken by the Ruthven lords or latterly Bothwell.118 In 1604 Huntly reminded James that he always was and always would be ‘halie disposit never to be ane contradictour, bot altogidder ane folwar of your most excellent majestis will’.119 To James, who described Huntly in 1599 as one of ‘my trustiest servands’, this fidelity was more important than factional allegiance or the religion to which Huntly adhered.120 This was not a relationship predicated on blind favouritism but one based on trust and loyalty, as well as a pragmatic understanding of politics and aristocratic responsibilities. James’ favour endowed Huntly with overwhelming advantages, but it was an outcome rather than the basis of their relationship.

Notes 1 M. Robinson, ed., The Concise Scots Dictionary (Aberdeen: 1987), 215; Wormald, Lords and Men, 78, 86. 2 Wormald, Lords and Men, 79. 3 Throughout this chapter when reference is made to a noble’s ‘friendship’ it refers to his affinity as a whole: all of the individual bonds and alliances, his kin and dependents, and his supporters who may or may not have formally aligned or bonded with him. 4 Brown, Noble Power, 150. 5 The chamber refers to the men who served within the king’s bedchamber, which was reformed in October 1580 by Esmé Stewart as a base of power to counter the privy council. In 1580, Esmé Stewart was appointed chamberlain, ‘quha sall continewally attend upoun his Hienes’, Alexander Erskine, Master of Mar was appointed vice-chamberlain, 24 ordinary and six extraordinary gentlemen of the chamber (mostly younger sons of the nobility and lairds) were also appointed, RPCS, iii, 322–23. The chamberlain’s purview extended to making the appointments to the stable. Signi­ ficantly, the chamberlain regulated access to the king. Service within the chamber was stable, with a significant number of men serving for long periods of time. 6 For example, CSP Scot., x, 782; xi, 96–97, 99. 7 Esmé Stewart was personally invited to Scotland by James, arriving in September 1579; he was elevated to earl in March 1580 and to duke in August 1581, Rosalind K. Marshall, ‘Stuart, Esmé, First Duke of Lennox (c.1542–1583)’, ODNB [26702, accessed 21 March 2016]; RPCS, ii, 322–23, 412–14. 8 J. Maidment, ed., Letters and State Papers during the Reign of King James the Sixth (Edinburgh: 1838), 145–46. 9 On the Raid, see Steven J. Reid’s chapter in this volume. HKJVI, 188–89; Sir J. Balfour of Denmilne, Historical Works, 4 vols, ed. J. Haig (Edinburgh: 1824–25), i, 376; Calderwood, History, iii, 637–46; CSP Scot., vi, 153; Sir J. H. Dalyell, ed.,

Friendship, politics and religion  75 Fragments of Scottish History (Edinburgh: 1798), 22; Donaldson, James V – James VII, 178–80; Donaldson, All the Queen’s Men, 140–44; Lee, Great Britain’s Solomon, 47–48. 10 RPCS, iii, 511; CSP Scot., vi, 168. 11 Rogers, Estimate, 31. 12 CSP Scot., vi, 177–78, 179, 289, 296, 342, 477, 482, 508, 520, 521–22; Calderwood, History, iii, 699, 715–16; CSP For. Eliz., January – June 1583, 11, 142; CSP Spanish, iii, 450, 491; Moysie, Memoirs, 45; HKJVI, 197–98; Spottiswoode, History, i, 300–01; CSP Venetian, 1581–91, 64, 69–70, 73; Colville, Letters, 27–28. 13 Huntly was only absent was when he had the bloody flux, unable to be moved by litter, CSP Scot., vi, 552, 556. In July, Huntly sent for 50 more horses to either relieve or, as the English believed, to supplement his men with the king, 559. 14 RPCS, iii, 590. Huntly attended 57% of council meetings from 23 August 1583 to 13 December 1585; Arran (chancellor) and Maitland (secretary) attended 66%, Murdocairny (treasurer-depute) attended 60%. Only the Earl of Montrose and Lord Doune (later the Earl of Moray) had similar attendance rates. James attended an average of ten meetings per annum, RPCS, iii, 590, passim; RPCS, iv, 1–38; Calderwood, History, iii, 722; Grant, ‘George Gordon’, 87–88; Brown, Noble Power, 166–70. 15 No longer required for regular administration, the nobility preferred to leave the privy council to those with more legal expertise, Brown, Noble Power, 166–70. 16 Men who served in both the centre and the locality included Sir John Gordon of Lochinvar, Sir John Gordon of Pitlurg, Sir William Gordon of Gight, John Gordon of Cluny, Alexander Gordon of Lesmoir, Francis Cheyne, Sir Walter Ogilvy of Findlater, the Laird of Seggie and Captain Thomas Ker. Calderwood, History, v, 250, 357, 358; CSP Scot., xi, 28, 29–30, 35, 91, 476; Colville, Letters, 137; Spalding Club Miscellany, i, 9. 17 See Juhala, ‘Household and Court’; Brown, Noble Power, Chapter 7. James’ attempt to restrict access in 1590 was untenable. 18 Huntly granted one bond in 1590 at James’ behest. On 18 December, Huntly granted Spynie lands in the bishopric of Moray. In January 1591, Spynie was described as ‘the King’s especiall minion, and one muche favoring the Erle of Huntlay’. Lindsay was created Lord Spynie on 4 November 1590. NRS Gordon Muniments GD44/13/7/34, GD44/8/13/8; Wormald, Lords and Men, 294; CSP. Scot., x, 451. 19 Seton, the Chisholms and Spynie were all introduced to the chamber in August 1587 when Huntly was chamberlain. According to Juhala, a number of the wives of men in the king’s chamber were in the queen’s chamber. More research on this is required for the political impact, especially considering the role of the Countess of Huntly, would have been highly significant. See Amy L. Juhala’s paper in this volume. 20 This was particularly noted from 1587 to 1594. CSP Scot., x, 17, 44, 46, 663; xi, 28, 29–30, 35, 476, 553; Colville, Letters, 90–91, 137; Calderwood, History, v, 357, 358, 363; HKJVI, 343; Spalding Club Miscellany, i, 9. 21 CSP Scot., x, 668, 670; xi, 331, 336–37. 22 CSP Scot., x, 298, 359, 365, 371, 411; xi, 96–97, 99, 176, 180, 183, 185; CBP, i, 498. In October 1590 Huntly had not yet been rehabilitated by the king following Brig o’ Dee in April 1589 and James refused to meet Huntly. Perhaps it was hoped that James would receive Huntly within a more private setting. 23 CSP Scot., ix, 406; x, 1–3, 4–5, 6–7, 8; CBP, i, 308–309, 335–36; CSP Spanish, iv, 227–28; NRS Treasurer’s Accounts, E.21/66, f. 93r., 101v.; T. Thomson, ed., Letters and Papers Relating to Patrick, Master of Gray (Edinburgh: 1835), 145–47; Moysie, Memoirs, 73. 24 The fourth earl rebelled against Queen Mary in 1562 (dying at the Battle of Corrichie) and the forfeited fifth earl, restored in 1566, had insufficient time to repair the regional damage before adhering to the losing Queen’s Party during the Marian Civil War. 25 This was Huntly’s first local activity since returning to Scotland and appointing of 41 landed clients as honorary burgesses of the merchant guild of Aberdeen. Aberdeen

76  Ruth Grant City and Grampian Regional Archives, Guildry Accounts, 1453–1650, i, Michaelmas 1581–1582 (no folio numbers); Aberdeen Sheriff Court Book, i, (Diet Books, vol. iv), 309; Spalding Club Miscellany, v, 52–53. The Diet Books are not extant for 1581 to 1584 but from 1584 onwards the Gordons replaced the Leslies in key seats. See A. White, ‘The Menzies Era: Sixteenth Century Politics’ in E.P.D. Dennison et al., eds, Aberdeen before 1800: A New History (East Linton: 2002). For bonds, see Wormald, Lords and Men, 290–95. 26 See Grant, ‘George Gordon’, Chapters 1 and 4. 27 CSP Scot., vii, 252–53; NRS Warrender Papers GD1/371/3, f. 5v.; BL Add. MS. 35,844, f. 18v.; Sir R. Gordon, A Genealogical History of Sutherland (London: 1813), 181. 28 Calderwood, History, iii, 718. 29 CSP Scot., vi, 524; Calderwood, History, iv, Appendix, 419. Colonel William Stewart, commendator of Pittenweem, who had orchestrated James’ escape from the Ruthven regime, was captain of the guard. 30 Political Writings, 35–36, 51; see Amy L. Juhala’s paper in this volume. 31 CSP Scot., viii, 43–45, 491, 533–37; R. Grant, ‘The Making of the Anglo-Scottish Alliance of 1586’ in Goodare and MacDonald, Sixteenth-Century Scotland; Grant, ‘George Gordon’, Chapter 3. 32 RPCS, iv, note 202; Grant, ‘George Gordon’, 193–94. Huntly’s faction’s membership was varied and somewhat fluid: Lennox, Lords Claud and John Hamilton, Bothwell, Crawford, John, eighth Lord Maxwell, Montrose, Erroll, James Cunningham, sixth Earl of Glencairn, Sutherland, Caithness, Andrew Leslie, fifth Earl of Rothes, Hugh Montgomery, fourth Earl of Eglinton, Robert, sixth Lord Seton and his brothers Sir John Seton and Sir Alexander Seton, James, fifth Lord Ogilvy, John, sixth Lord Fleming, Alexander, Master of Elphinstone, Simon Fraser, sixth Lord Lovat, Robert, fourth Lord Sempill, Alexander, seventh Lord Livingston, Alexander, sixth Lord Home, William Maxwell, sixth Lord Herries, David Graham of Fentry, and latterly Thomas Lyon, Master of Glamis. 33 CSP Scot., ix, 476. The Setons and Chisholms were also involved in James’ Continental covert Catholic politics. 34 CSP Scot., ix, 476; x, 127–28. 35 NRS Gordon Muniments GD44/13/4/8; CSP Spanish, iv, 139. His appointment as acting chamberlain was due to his engagement to Lennox’s sister, Henrietta. 36 CSP Scot., x, 128. 37 CSP Scot., ix, 480–81. 38 Melville, Diary, 271. 39 Spottiswoode, History, ii, 387. 40 T.M. McCoog, The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland and England, 1541–1588: ‘Our Way of Proceeding?’ (Brill: 1996), 242. 41 CSP Scot., ix, 491–93, 505; CBP, i, 287–88. 42 NRS Warrender Papers, vol. B, GD1/371/3, f. 260r.; Calderwood, History, iv, 676–77; Moysie, Memoirs, 66; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 368; CSP For., Eliz., June 1586–June 1588, 554; CBP, i, 322, 333; CSP Scot., ix, 601, 603, 613, 614, 616; Melville, Memoirs, 361; RPCS, iv, note 254, note 332. 43 CSP Scot., ix, 536. 44 Moysie, Memoirs, 66; CBP, i, 315–16, 321; CSP Spanish, iv, 260; CSP Scot., ix, 556; RPC, iv, 268–69; CSP For., Eliz., June 1586–June 1588, 598. 45 Murray was used by Huntly until 1598. According to Juhala’s fragmentary compilation (with only a few entries in the late 1580s), Murray was first and last mentioned as a gentleman server in 1582 and November 1593; as an ordinary gentleman of the chamber, December 1594 to March 1597; a gentleman pensioner to attend upon the king’s riding and passing to the fields, May 1580; Master of the Wardrobe in

Friendship, politics and religion  77 Prince Henry Frederick’s household, 1597–1601, Juhala, ‘Household and the Court’, Appendix I. 46 CBP, i, 308–309; Calderwood, History, iv, 676–77; Moysie, Memoirs, 66; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 368. Both these instances concerned events in which Huntly and other nobles were challenging legislation by the chancellor perceived as designed to curb the power of the nobility. 47 CSP Scot., ix, 592, 621, 627, 635, 638, 647, 653, 655; BL Harleian 4647, f. 55v.; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 390–91; Calderwood, History, iv, 696; Moysie, Memoirs, 72. 48 From the end of the summer to November 1588, NRS Warrender Papers, vol. B, GD1/371/3, ff. 15r., 260r.; Melville, Memoirs, 361; RPCS, iv, note, 332; CSP Scot., ix, 621, 622, 623–24, 627, 628, 629, 634, 638, 647, 653, 655; BL Harleian 4683, f. 14v.-14r., 15r.; BL Add. MS. 35,844; Calderwood, History, iv, 696; Moysie, Memoirs, 71; Brown, Bloodfeud, 118. 49 CSP Scot., ix, 642, 646, 653, 655. 50 CSP Scot., ix, 647, 655, 656. 51 CSP Scot., ix, 677, 678; NRS Warrender Papers, vol B, GD1/371/3, f. 89r.–90r. 52 For a full account, R. Grant, ‘The Brig o’ Dee Affair, the sixth earl of Huntly and the Politics of the Counter-Reformation’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI. 53 Calderwood, History, v, 6, 7–8, copies of the letters, 8–35; CSP Scot., ix, 682–97 passim for copies of the letters; Lee, John Maitland, 181–88. 54 Gordon, History of Sutherland, 212–13; Calderwood, History, v, 36; CSP Scot., ix, 699–700, 701–702, 702, 703, 705, 706, 708, 709; x, 1–3, 3–4, 4–5, 6, 7–8, 9, 13; Moysie, Memoirs, 72; Akrigg, Letters, 89–91. 55 CSP Scot., x, 17, 44, 46; Colville, Letters, 90–91. 56 CSP Scot., x, 1–3, 4–5, 6–7, 8; CBP, i, 335–36; Moysie, Memoirs, 73. 57 For Brig o’ Dee and its aftermath, CSP Scot., x, 1–142, 146; Moysie, Memoirs, 73–75; Colville, Letters, 90–94; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 396–98; Calderwood, History, v, 1–98; HJKVI, 224; Gray, Letters, 155–58, 166, 168; Gordon, History, 213; BL Royal MSS 18A.xvi, ff. 3–14v.; BL Add. MS. 35,844; BL Add. MS. 19, 401, f. 156; BL Cotton Caligula D.i.41, f. 153; NRS Warrender Papers, vol. B, GD1/371/3, f. 260r.; NRS Treasurer’s Accounts E.21/67, f. 138v.–139v.; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, i, part 3, 172–74; NLS Adv. MS 19.1.35, f. 3; RPCS, iv, 412, note 413. 58 Gordon, History, 214; CSP Scot., x, 186–87, 191, 196. The Forbes feud had begun in September 1572 over lands in Monymusk and Keig; it was settled by Decreit Arbitral on 1 September 1582, Brown, Bloodfeud, 110–12. 59 CSP Scot., x, 428–29, 433–34, 437, 450, 460, 469, 497, 547, 557–58, 572, 573, 782; xi, 101, 121, 127, 176, 180, 181, 183, 185, 309, 321, 363–64, 370, 375, 387, 393, 395, 396, 401, 402, 415, 704; CBP, i, 376, 475, 498, 543, 544; Melville, Memoirs, 406–407; Calderwood, History, v, 254–55, 336; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 437–38; Colville, Letters, 110, 112, 117, 118–19, 260, 262. 60 Calderwood, History, v, 127–28; E. J. Cowan, ‘The Darker Version of the Scottish Renaissance: the Devil and Francis Stewart’ in I. B. Cowan and D. Shaw, eds, The Renaissance and Reformation in Scotland (Edinburgh: 1983). 61 See, for example, from July 1591 – November 1592: CSP Scot., x, 552, 557, 565, 569, 663, 668, 670, 782; CBP, i, 390; R.G. Macpherson, ‘Francis Stewart, 5th Earl Bothwell, c 1562–1612: Lordship and Politics in Jacobean Scotland’ (University of Edinburgh PhD Thesis, 1998), 384, passim for discussion of Bothwell from 1591–95. 62 CSP Scot., x, 552, 557, 565, 569; CBP, i, 390. The other three men were Maitland, Spynie and Sir James Sandiland. 63 CSP Scot., x, 593, 632; Gordon, History, 205, 216; Moysie, Memoirs, 88; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 419; Melville, Memoirs, 407. 64 CSP Scot., x, 428–29, 433–34, 437, 450, 460, 469, 497; NRS Treasurer’s Accounts E.21/68, f. 71r.; Melville, Memoirs, 406–407; Brown, Bloodfeud, 152–56. For

78  Ruth Grant analysis of Huntly’s bloodfeud with Moray and the Stewarts, Brown, Bloodfeud, 144–82; Wormald, Lords and Men, 117. 65 Brown, Bloodfeud, 156. 66 Spottiswoode, History, ii, 419–20; Gordon, History, 216–17; Calderwood, History, v, 144–46; CSP Scot., x, 633–36, 637–38; HKJVI, 247–48; Brown, Bloodfeud, 156–60. 67 Brown, Bloodfeud, 157, 158. 68 Calderwood, History, v, 148–49; CSP Scot., x, 654, 656, 658; CBP, i, 391; NRS Treasurer’s Accounts E.21/68, f. 119v. 69 Calderwood, History, v, 146–47. 70 CSP Scot., x, 663, 668, 670. 71 James granted a petition presented to him by Murray on Huntly’s behalf, which included confirmation that Huntly’s son would receive his father’s lands and the earl would be granted letters of credit for travelling to Denmark and Germany, CSP Scot., x, 701. 72 CSP Scot., x, 729–30, 719–20; Grant, ‘George Gordon’, 302–304. 73 Men from his local coterie attended the countess at court by the end of September, CSP Scot., x, 782. Despite vicious feuding in the autumn, Huntly, Atholl and Mackintosh agreed an uneasy truce at the end of 1592, perhaps indicative of Huntly’s local support, CSP Scot., x, 820; W. Fraser, The Douglas Book: Memoirs of the House of Douglas and Angus (Edinburgh: 1885), iii, 309–10, 310–11; iv, 37. 74 In addition to the Blanks, there were relatively innocuous letters from known Jesuits and Catholics in Scotland directed to similar men in Europe and to officers in the Spanish government. F. Shearman, ‘The Spanish Blanks’, IR 3 (1952); T.G. Law, ‘The Spanish Blanks and the Catholic Earls’ in P.H. Brown, ed., Collected Essays and Reviews of Thomas Graves Law, LLD (Edinburgh: 1904); Brown, Bloodfeud, 162–68; CSP Scot., x, 828–33; xi, 3–15, 38–40; Calderwood, History, v, 192–213, 223–24, 251; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 425–26; Gordon, History, 218–20; RPCS, v, 33–36; Moysie, Memoirs, 101; Balfour, Historical Works, i, 393; HKJVI, 267–68. 75 Shearman, ‘The Spanish Blanks’, 85. 76 Spottiswoode, History, ii, 444–45, 447; Calderwood, History, v, 282–88, 291–92; CSP Scot., xi, 229, 239–41, 259–60, 284, 293; RPC, v, 52–53, 108–109; APS, iv, 46–48; RPS 1593/11/4 [accessed 21 March 2016]; Moysie, Memoirs, 108–109; HKJVI, 294–95. Acts of Abolition were not unprecedented: they were granted to the Ruthven Raiders in 1583, the Stirling lords in 1585 and Bothwell tried to obtain one in December 1591. 77 Calderwood, History, v, 249. A whinger was a short stabbing sword hung from the belt. Huntly’s ‘wickedness’ was based on allegations that he was plotting with Spain and regarding Moray’s murder. 78 Calderwood, History, v, 263, 267–68; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 437–38; CSP Scot., xi, 182. 79 Calderwood, History, v, 268–69; HKJVI, 282. 80 BL Cotton, Caligula, D.i.41, f. 151r. 81 Spalding Club Miscellany, iii, 213–14; for Huntly’s men in the chamber, CSP Scot., xi, 217. 82 Colville, Letters, 260; Calderwood, History, v, 296–97; HKJVI, 303–04; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 450; Gordon, History of Sutherland, 224–25. 83 CSP Scot., xi, 309, 331, 336–37. 84 CSP Scot., x, 668, 670, 701; xi, 387, 395; Colville, Letters, 110, 112, 118–19. 85 RPCS, iv, 103. On 28 September 1584, Queen Mary instructed that James be informed of her ‘recommendation for the accomplishment of the marriage’ between Huntly and Henrietta, CSP Scot., vii, 341. 86 The Presbytery of Edinburgh forbade all ministers, especially Patrick Adamson, Archbishop of St Andrews, from marrying them until Huntly subscribed the Confession of Faith. However, royal patronage overcame this obstacle and the

Friendship, politics and religion  79 couple were married by Adamson in Holyrood Chapel on 21 July 1588. RPCS, iv, 103; Moysie, Memoirs, 69; Calderwood, History, iv, 686–87; Row, History, 137; R. Grant, ‘Politicking Jacobean Women’ in E. Ewan and M. M. Meikle, eds, Women in Scotland, c.1100–c.1750 (East Linton: 1999), 100–102. 87 In June, James wrote to the nobility, regarding his intention to have the marriage ‘anserabill in all solemnities baith to our honour and the parties awin estaits’. Because the markets were poor, he requested wedding victuals, such as venison, wild fowl and capons, NRS Abercairny Muniments GD24/5/57/15; NRS Gordon Muniments GD44/66/3; Gray, Letters, 168; CSP Scot., vii, 341; ix, 587; x, 86, 109, 298–99, 334, 552; RMS, no. 126; RPCS, iv, 103; Calderwood, History, iv, 613, 686–87; S. Carpenter, ‘Early Scottish Drama’ in R.D.S. Jack, ed., The History of Scottish Literature, 4 vols (Aberdeen, 1988), i, 203; James VI, Poems of King James VI of Scotland, ed., J. Craigie, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1948–52), ii, 134–45; R.J. Lyall, ‘James VI and the Sixteenth Century Cultural Crisis’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 67–69. Wormald suggests that James himself performed the leading role in the wedding masque, Jenny Wormald, “‘Tis true I Am a Cradle King’: the View from the Throne” in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 253. Dunfermline Abbey provided easy access when the court was based in Edinburgh or Falkland and was used extensively until 1590, when the countess surrendered it to the queen (upon reversion when Anna died). 88 For example, CSP Scot., xi, 28, 29–30, 35, 96–97, 99, 181, 331, 336–37, 476, 553; Calderwood, History, v, 357, 358, 363; HKJVI, 343–44; Spalding Club Miscellany, i, 9; Colville, Letters, 137; NRS Warrender Papers, vol. B, GD1/371/3, f. 235v. 89 Brown, Noble Power, 187. 90 For example, CSP Scot., xi, 28, 29–30, 35, 96–97, 99, 476, 511, 514, 520, 534, 535, 540, 546, 553; Calderwood, History, v, 357, 358, 363; HJKVI, 343–44; Colville, Letters, 137. 91 CSP For., Eliz., July 1588–December 1588, 1, 85; CSP Scot., ix, 575; BL Cotton, Caligula, D.i.302; CSP Spanish, iv, 333; NRS Abercairny Muniments GD24/5/57/16. 92 CSP Scot., xi, 370, 375; CBP, i, 543. 93 Men such as John Gordon of Pitlurg, George Gordon of Carnbarrow, William Gordon of Gight, John Gordon of Newton, Francis Cheyne, John Gordon of Buckie, Sir Walter Ogilvy of Findlater, Gordon of Knockspak, Alexander Gordon of Lesmoir, John Gordon of Cluny, Captain Thomas Ker, Alexander Duff, John Drummond, William Troupe. 94 CSP Scot., x, 424, 434, 438, 439, 443; Moysie, Memoirs, 85. 95 CSP Scot., x, 428–29. Huntly’s request to attend court was granted on 11 December 1590. 96 CSP Scot., x, 429, 591; J. Row, History of the Kirk of Scotland, 1558–1637, ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: 1842), 192, 205–206; M. Dilworth, ‘Three Documents Relating to St John Ogilvie’, IR 34 (1983), 61; BL Cotton, Caligula, D.ii.94; NRS CH2/89/1, f. 3. 97 CSP Scot., xi, 594; Calderwood, History, v, 452. 98 CSP Scot., x, 428–29. 99 CSP Scot., x, 437, 450; Melville, Memoirs, 406–407. 100 CSP Scot., xi, 181. 101 CSP Scot., xi, 363–64. 102 CBP, ii, 226; Calderwood, History, v, 452, 454–56; Spottiswoode, History, iii, 12, 13, 31. 103 Folger Shakespeare Library (Washington, D.C.), N.a. 102, f. 8. I am grateful to Professor Maureen Meikle for this reference. 104 James also received the Laird of Pitlurg on Huntly’s behalf, CSP Scot., xi, 28, 29–30, 35. 105 CSP Scot., xi, 96–97, 99. 106 CSP Scot., xi, 309, 321. 107 Calderwood, History, v, 336. 108 CSP Scot., xi, 363–64. 109 CSP Scot., xi, 370, 375; CBP, i 543.

80  Ruth Grant 110 Colville, Letters, 137; HJKVI, 261, 343–44; Spottiswoode, History, ii, 429; Calderwood, History, v, 238, 357, 363; CSP Scot., xi, 511, 514, 520, 534, 535, 540, 546, 553; RPCS, v, 207–208; NRS Warrender Papers, vol. B, f. 235v. It was confirmed on 22 March 1595 that Huntly and Erroll had left Scotland. Huntly travelled in Flanders, Germany and Italy, returning in the summer of 1596. 111 Gordon, History, 208; BL Harleian 1423, f. 141r. 112 CSP Scot., xiii, 161. 113 Despite the king’s comment that Huntly’s elevation ‘would comfort him in that good course of loyalty and conformity of religion, which he doubt[ed] not he would continue’, Huntly celebrated with a public mass in his Edinburgh town house, CSP Scot., xiii, 489, 852. 114 It is interesting to note that Henrietta used the Scots rather than French spelling of her surname, perhaps consciously making the link with the royal house. 115 Colville, Letters, 110. 116 Calderwood, History, v, 146–47. 117 For example, CSP Scot., vi, 559; ix, 531–32; x, 469, 497, 654, 656, 658; xi, 331, 336–37, 378, 379, 380, 382, 384–85, 394; CBP, i, 255–56, 307, 308–309, 376, 391, 542, 543; CSP Spanish, iv, 227–28; RPCS, iv, 202, 244; Calderwood, History, v, 6, 7–8, 148–49, 340–41; HKJVI, 331–32; Moysie, Memoirs, 65; Colville, Letters, 108, 11; NRS Treasurer’s Accounts E.21/66, f. 93r., 101v.; E.21/68, f. 119v.; A. Bellesheim, History of the Catholic Church in Scotland, 4 vols (Edinburgh: 1853– 1939), iii, 449–50; NRS Warrender Papers, vol. B, GD1/371/3, f. 231v.-r.; Aberdeen City and Grampian Regional Archives, Dean of Guild Account Books, 1453–1650, i (unnumbered folios); J. Stuart, ed., Extracts from the Council Register of the Burgh of Aberdeen, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1848), ii, 92, 92–93. Huntly’s retinue may have been liveried, carrying gilt halberds, which James wanted his guard to copy in 1590, CSP Scot., x, 261. According to Wormald, ‘there is virtually no evidence’ of livery, Lords and Men, 97. 118 CSP Scot., xi, 89. 119 Maidment, Letters and Papers, 60. Brown finds this ‘ironic’ coming from ‘one of the king’s most persistent rebels’, but he mistakes Huntly’s raising of troops in 1589 and in 1594 as rebellions against the king, rather than the products of factional politics and bloodfeud. Huntly refused in 1589, 1593 and 1594 to take the field against the king himself, making it clear that his altercation was not with James. See Brown, Noble Power, 209. 120 James VI, The Basilikon Doron of King James VI, ed. J. Craigie, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1944–45), ii, 6. Huntly received one of the seven printed copies.

4 James VI, noble power and the burgh of Glasgow, c. 1580–1605 Paul Goatman

In the summer of 1606 a serious political crisis engulfed the burgh of Glasgow. It  comprised a violent clash between the incumbent provost, Sir George Elphinstone of Blythswood, and the previous one, Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto, and their followers. The confrontation was fuelled by on-going animosity between the town’s merchants and craftsmen, but at its core it was a personal contest between the two men over whether or not the town council should have the right to appoint the burgh magistrates, the provost and baillies who sat as judges on the burgh court. Writing in reference to similar clashes in England, Catherine Patterson has argued that: ‘in the later sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth, most of the questions that rocked corporations concerned precedence, honour, office, or even money and property’.1 Glasgow’s crisis embodied the first three of these factors precisely: Minto felt that attempts by Elphinstone and the town to secure municipal independence had damaged him in these terms. The violence escalated over a period of weeks. In early July, Elphinstone had secured a draft act of parliament giving the town the right to choose its magistrates. Minto’s direct attack on Elphinstone was only part of his response to this: he intended to seize de facto power on the ground in Glasgow while at the same time lobbying the Lords of the Articles to postpone the parliamentary act. On 23 July, Minto’s son, Sir Walter Stewart, attacked Elphinstone, killing one of his entourage. Stewart then mustered over 300 supporters and forcibly removed the provost and his men from the town’s tolbooth on the Trongate. He then drove them back along the main road between the market cross and the High Kirk (now Glasgow’s High Street) to the bishop’s castle, where they were forced to seek refuge.2 The crisis had serious political consequences for the burgh, dividing the burgess community and creating factions that lasted for several years and periodically erupted into further violence. The incident has been noted and described in some detail by historians including Laura Stewart and A. S. Wayne Pearce, as well as Glasgow’s Victorian-era town clerks.3 They have all interpreted Elphinstone as representing the merchant elite of the burgh in its quest for municipal independence and Minto’s attack therefore as an example of unwelcome noble interference in urban affairs.4 The incident can certainly

82  Paul Goatman be seen as a bid for burgh independence, but it also reveals much about James VI’s approach to governing his burghs, and wider kingdom, through the exercise of noble power. Elphinstone was one of the king’s favourites at court and his appointment to the provostship was by royal decree. James’ governance of Glasgow during his personal rule touches upon many of the themes highlighted elsewhere in this volume. In particular, it raises issues of whether the policies of James’ adult, personal rule should be seen in terms of change or continuity with the governments that preceded him; whether he ruled in harmony or in conflict with his nobility; and whether the political situation that he left behind on his journey south in 1603 was stable. It also raises questions about the actual extent of his power. James governed Glasgow essentially through an extension of his royal court, and the crisis of 1606 exposed the limits of this approach in the years immediately after the Union of Crowns. The burgh itself became an arena in which James’ use of noble power came into conflict with the interests of the local nobility, and in which tensions between the two played themselves out. A study of noble power as it operated in Glasgow during the reign of James VI also provides an important point of comparison to research that has been carried out on early modern Scottish burghs. Urban studies have generally focused on Edinburgh, which as the capital and dominant centre of trade, with a tax bill 170 times that of some of the smaller burghs, did not represent the wider urban experience.5 Beyond Edinburgh, detailed work taking into account the findings of Michael Lynch’s edited collection of articles, The Early Modern Town in Scotland, has only been done for Aberdeen and Dundee.6 General studies of Glasgow have been completed, but these have tended to focus on trade, with a view to explaining the burgh’s subsequent late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century economic development.7 A detailed study of James’ relationship with Glasgow  – a ‘second-rank’ burgh in this period8 – therefore makes an important contribution to current research into urban Scotland and to the history of the city of Glasgow. Nevertheless, some caution should be exercised when judging how far Glasgow was representative of other towns in Scotland at the time. The burgh’s relationship with the crown and nobility at the end of the sixteenth century depended to a large extent on its own unique foundation and constitution as well as its relationship with its rural hinterland, suggesting that further detailed studies of a sample of individual burghs may be necessary to establish a clear picture of relations between the king, nobility and towns during the reign of James VI. This chapter analyses James’ exercise of noble power in Glasgow from two perspectives. The first part provides a political narrative of events leading up to 1606, to demonstrate the way in which the king governed through his courtiers. The second presents a prosopographical analysis of the burgh magistracy during the period to show that Elphinstone was unable to build a support base in Glasgow to rival that of Minto and that the latter continued to enjoy considerable authority in the burgh once Archbishop John Spottiswood came to appoint the magistrates after 1606.

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  83

I During James’ minority his court was riven by faction.9 This manifested itself in widespread crown interference in burghal elections as each regent in turn tried to shore up his power in the localities.10 In Glasgow, a precedent was set by James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton, who appointed the burgh magistrates in 1573. Morton and the minority governments that followed him also continued to appoint Protestant archbishops and administered the burgh through them, in tandem with their own favoured lay clients. In this period the archbishops’ influence declined in relation to these appointees, and real power in Glasgow came to rest with whoever was in the ascendant at court.11 The magistrates appointed in these elections served on the burgh court, which by the late sixteenth century was the central organ of Glasgow’s administration. Before the Reformation, the burgh court had been managed by the archbishop alongside his barony and commissary courts. It was staffed with the bishop’s men but conducted some of the legal business of the crown; in essence it was responsible for keeping the king’s peace in the burgh. This has led James McGrath to describe it as both a ‘bishop’s court’ and a ‘king’s court’.12 As a consequence of the post-Reformation archbishops’ loss of power it became fully a court of the crown, with its magistrates appointed by the government.13 Prior to the Reformation the archbishops had governed the barony of Glasgow through baillies, and from 1510–11 these had traditionally been the Earls of Lennox. They in turn used their position to dispense patronage. Between the 1540s and 1600, the deputy baillies of the barony and regality of Glasgow and the hereditary provosts of the burgh had typically been the Stewart Lairds of Minto.14 The position of provost could become one of real power when he chose to oversee the business of the burgh court, but this was rare. Between January 1599 and January 1600, for example, Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto was present at meetings of the court on just 12 occasions (the court met every week). Most of the cases he oversaw in person concerned violence – ‘wrangs’ or crimes of ‘trublance’ – or important business that affected the entire burgh community such as the ‘rouping’ or auction of common lands or the appointment of new officers.15 The majority of the court’s work was therefore carried out by the baillies of the burgh, and this included the oversight of all criminal and civil cases affecting burgesses,16 arbitration of heirship disputes, and the regulation of the town’s dynamic property market and credit economy.17 They were the busiest and most important officials in late sixteenth century Glasgow. James’ annexation of the temporalities of ecclesiastical benefices in July 1587 marked a new phase in the crown’s relationship with the burgh, making it a property of the royal demesne under an adult king but not a royal burgh.18 James used the lands gained through the annexation as a reservoir of patronage.19 In so far as this affected Glasgow, he appointed some of his closest courtiers as the burgh’s feudal superiors and then delegated responsibility to them for governing the town in the royal interest. He made no attempt to restore the archbishop between

84  Paul Goatman the resignation of the layman William Erskine in 1587 and the reinstatement of James Beaton in June 1598.20 Instead, he transferred the barony of Glasgow, including the burgh lands and the right to appoint the magistrates, to Walter Stewart, the prior or commendator of Blantyre, in November 1587 and then to Ludovick Stewart, second Duke of Lennox, in July 1593.21 In this volume Julian Goodare and Amy Juhala have drawn attention to Walter Stewart’s responsibilities at court and his role as one of James VI’s most trusted government ministers. As a child, he was educated in the king’s schoolroom by George Buchanan in Stirling Castle. His career benefitted from the trust and intimacy forged among James and his classmates during that period.22 He was the son of Sir John Stewart of Minto and his third wife, Margaret Stewart of Cardonald. He was also a direct relation of the Earls of Lennox through his mother (and also therefore related to the king) and the younger half-brother of Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto.23 He was made commendator of Blantyre in 1580 and that year was also nominated a gentleman of the chamber. He served as a gentleman in the king’s privy chamber between May 1580 and 1594, holding a pension between May 1580 and 1592. He became keeper of the Privy Seal and a member of the privy council in 1582 and served as Lord of the Privy Seal between January 1583 and March 1596. His promotions to these offices indicate that he was a central figure in both the Ruthven government and then James’ own administration. He became an assessor to the treasurer in April 1583 and tutor to Ludovick Stewart following his arrival from France in May of that year. In May 1593 he was appointed a judge extraordinary of the court of session and, in March 1596, one of the Octavians, charged with stabilising the royal finances. From March 1596 to April 1599 he was the royal treasurer and during 1597 the royal comptroller.24 It is little wonder a contemporary joked that the weight of all these offices made it impossible for him to ride his horse.25 He combined these responsibilities at court with managing the affairs of the second Duke of Lennox in the west of Scotland. From 1586, for example, he helped to mediate an on-going feud in the region of the Lennox between the Colquhouns of Luss and the McFarlanes of Arrochar. The Colquhouns were vassals of the duke, although Ludovick’s support for the family during the feud seems to have been inconsistent. During the turbulent chiefship of Sir Humphrey Colquhoun his support was less than forthcoming but became more dependable following Sir Humphrey’s death at the hands of his brother, Alexander, and during Alexander’s more competent chiefship.26 Walter Stewart involved himself in the feud, arbitrating on behalf of Alexander at least twice, in 1595 and 1608.27 In November 1599 he sat on one of the duke’s justice ayres in the Lennox, established to punish the MacFarlanes for previous crimes.28 Walter was a longstanding servant of the duke, managing his affairs before and after the latter moved south to England with the royal court in 1603.29 Similarly, as a result of his elevation to the temporal lordship, Stewart was styled ‘lord feuer’ of Glasgow. He acted as feudal superior of the barony lands, including the burgh, in place of Ludovick, in effect managing them until the latter was old enough to do so himself. In July 1593, an act of parliament provided the

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  85 duke with the superiority of all the temporal possessions of the archbishoprics of Glasgow and St Andrews, although in Glasgow Blantyre continued to appoint the magistrates in the duke’s name for a further three years.30 In this volume, Adrienne McLaughlin has shown that Lennox was the courtier par excellence during James’ reign; the following analysis suggests he was less interested in hands-on management of affairs in his localities, at least in the Glasgow area.31 Recent work focusing on the relationship between nobles and towns in early modern Europe has placed an emphasis on patronage. Towns cultivated a relationship with powerful lords, providing service, gifts and hospitality, and in return their patrons offered security and flexible, non-institutional access to decision making at the centre of government.32 In England, many corporations had room for manoeuvre within these relationships and could choose between powerful lords. In Scotland too, burghs enjoyed success in freeing themselves from relationships with nobles that no longer served their needs and in forging new ones with other noble patrons.33 In the case of Glasgow during the reign of James VI, however, the burgh’s primary relationship with the nobility was with its feudal superiors, the Dukes of Lennox. The few extant charters that do provide information about this relationship tend to detail only the rights and privileges of the dukes. In the period of uncertainty immediately following the Union of Crowns, Ludovick was particularly at pains to clarify his rights.34 For its own part, between 1596 and 1601 the town seems to have done much to cultivate a relationship with the Duke of Lennox and a few episodes noted in the records shed light on this. In December 1597, for example, the burgh provided the duke with men to accompany him to Dumfries to meet with the king. The duke’s entourage on that occasion numbered 200 footmen and 500 horsemen. On their return they were attacked by James Lord Hamilton, who ‘brake their drums and scallit their footmen’. In response, the burgh of Glasgow appealed to the privy council for redress.35 In April 1599, the duke asked the burgh to lay on a banquet for the Earl of Huntly and his wife Henrietta Stewart (who was Ludovick’s sister). Begging poverty, the town council replied that they could not afford to do so and instead offered the duke two tuns of wine. In another example of urban patronage, groups of lairds from within the duke’s affinity were created burgesses of the town in June 1599, September 1600 and May 1601.36 Similarly, in December 1600, the provost, baillies and town council honoured Ludovick with a seat in the High Kirk. In May and June 1601, they laid on a banquet for him ahead of his ambassadorial visit to France, provided a retinue of 40 people to travel with him to Edinburgh and also hired a doctor of European fame, Peter Lowe, to accompany him for the duration of his trip abroad.37 Throughout these years, the town council was keen to ensure that the duke appointed their magistrates in person. In September 1600, Lennox provided the local sheriff’s ayre with a commission to appoint the baillies, but Glasgow’s town council complained that this was unprecedented and that the leets should be presented personally to the duke.38 In May 1601, when Lennox departed for France, the town postponed the presentation of the leets for the magistrates until his return.39 Overall therefore, Glasgow found itself in a

86  Paul Goatman restrictive relationship with the Duke of Lennox; the town actively courted his favour, but his own actions seem largely to have been self-interested. On 30 September 1600, Ludovick handed over day-to-day management of the burgh to Sir George Elphinstone, one of his servitors and a man over whom he had exerted great influence at court. Letters from the king and the duke nominated him provost, and this was accepted without complaint by the baillies and town council. Prior to this, Elphinstone had not been a burgess, and he and his servitors were created such on 2 September, whilst the king was visiting Glasgow, in preparation for his appointment.40 Between the early 1590s and approximately 1610, Sir George Elphinstone of Blythswood’s career enjoyed a meteoric rise followed by a spectacular fall. Walter Stewart was the son of a laird’s third marriage and can perhaps therefore be viewed as one of James’ ‘new men’.41 Elphinstone was the son of a Glasgow merchant and rose to become a courtier, so was consequently of even lower birth. His father had built a fortune in Glasgow and by July 1582 had been elected ‘president’ of the merchants – a title that demonstrates not only his status within the burgh, but also the fact that Glasgow’s merchants were an organised body, if not yet officially a guild, at that time.42 He had profited from the availability of cheap land during the turbulent 1560s and bought the 150-acre estate of Blythswood in 1563 from the parson of Erskine, David Stewart, who had been forced to sell the property due to debt. He was in a strong enough position financially to add to his Blythswood estate in 1579, obtaining a feu of the lands of Gorbals and Bridgend and half of the lands of Woodside from Archbishop James Boyd. On his death in 1585, he left his estates to his son, along with £1,142 to be invested in land.43 This attitude – that wealth gained through trade was most safely invested in property – may have represented the views of many of Glasgow’s elite merchants at the time.44 George Elphinstone junior found his way into royal service, receiving a knighthood at the baptism of Prince Henry in 1594 and becoming a gentleman of the king’s bedchamber in 1596.45 In 1595 he received a crown charter of the lands of Gorbals, Bridgend and Woodside, which the family had previously only held in feu from the crown. Amy Juhala has shown that he became one of the king’s favourites at court, enjoying particular favour in the late 1590s. A privy council entry for August 1598 describes him as a ‘domestic servitor’ to the king, while English reports from March 1599 designated him one of four men at that time, along with Sir Robert Ker, Sir George Home, and Sir Patrick Murray of Geanies, who ‘ruled’ James. In May 1600, the English reports mention him and Sir George Home hurrying to Falkland to attend the king.46 James seems to have been particularly happy with Sir George in August of that year, when he presented George’s bride, Agnes Boyd, with a gold chain worth £580 and a belt set with pearls; James tended to present gifts to the wives of only his favourite courtiers.47 As provost of Glasgow, Sir George Elphinstone was a reformer who made a coordinated effort to formalise Glasgow’s constitution and the burgh’s relationship with government following the Union of Crowns. He is famously regarded

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  87 as one of the architects of the burgh’s 1605 Letter of Guildry, which established a merchants’ guild and the offices of Dean of Guild of the Merchants, Deacon Convenor of the Crafts and Visitor of the Maltmen.48 At around the same time, he also delegated to the town council some of the powers he had previously enjoyed as provost. Due to a gap in the town council records between October 1601 and June 1605, it is difficult to fully discern the nature of his provostship. However, an entry for October 1605 notes that he was chosen by the council to be provost for a sixth consecutive year due to his support in the burgh’s quest to appoint its own magistrates and because he had secured the devolution of ‘unlaws’ [fines paid for legal violations] to the town council. He had therefore already begun to devolve some of the income derived from his office to the town and seems to have been a popular provost.49 Elphinstone’s reforms extended to petitioning the king and the duke that the town council should have the right to appoint the burgh magistrates, which led to the violent clashes of summer 1606. On 4 July 1605, Matthew Trumble, Glasgow’s first Dean of Guild and one of the town’s baillies, travelled to London and returned with a letter from the king agreeing to the proposal in theory.50 Initially, the Duke of Lennox resisted these machinations by appealing to the privy council. In a letter written in July 1604, he had petitioned to retain his right to appoint the magistrates. He complained that he held the lordship of the barony and regality of Glasgow by sasine ‘as freely as any archbishop ever held or bruikit of before’ but that the town council had ignored this and appointed the magistrates itself the previous autumn.51 The letter to some extent accounts for the gap in the council records between 1601 and 1605, showing that the town had chosen the burgh magistrates at the earliest possible election following James’ and Lennox’ journey south to London in April 1603. However, by November 1605 James seems to have convinced the duke to give up this right and wrote to the privy council stating that the burgh should be ‘as free as any burgh of regality whatsoever’.52 The letter made it clear that the duke had given up his right to choose the provost and baillies but added that he should retain his legal offices of justiciary and bailliary of the regality of Glasgow.53 On 7 July 1606, the king signed the draft act of parliament declaring that the burgh of Glasgow should be free to appoint its magistrates, which ignited the violent clash described at the opening of this chapter.54 Although Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto does not seem to have protested when Elphinstone was initially put in place as provost in 1600, he drew the line when it came to enshrining the freedom of the burgh to choose the magistrates in a parliamentary act. At precisely the same time that he petitioned parliament for the act to be overturned, he was raising his men to challenge Blythswood.55 The role played by the Duke of Lennox in the affair is a murky one. Had he given up his right to appoint the magistrates freely, Minto may have been acting on his own initiative in defence of his own privileges; if Lennox felt unfairly treated by the king he could have put Minto up to the rebellion, in an attempt to reclaim his rights by force following the failure of his petition to the privy council.56

88  Paul Goatman Minto summoned his supporters in secret and then read the Lords of the Articles’ ratification of his petition at the market cross on 5 July 1606, two days before the king signed the draft act of parliament in favour of the town. The timing of this in itself points to the difficulty James faced in governing from London and coordinating interactions between privy council and parliament and Minto’s contrasting ease of access to the Lords of the Articles. In one of the cases brought before the privy council by the burgh following the uprising, the town argued that these actions ‘in effect imported a liberty to them [Minto and his men] to do what they pleased without controlment’.57 On 23 July, Minto’s son Walter attacked Sir George Elphinstone, causing him and his men to retreat to the castle. On 27 August, Elphinstone and his baillies brought their action for armed insurrection before the privy council naming Minto, his son Walter, a number of their kin and the representatives of the crafts who had supported them as the main agitators. The Minto faction also lodged its own complaint in response. Combatants on both sides were placed in ward. 58 The incident naturally angered the king, who accurately judged that the violence had broken out due to competition over the provostship and continuing animosity between merchants and craftsmen. At the burgh elections of October 1606 he ordered that Glasgow would have no provost for the foreseeable future, that the town would accept his choice of baillies and that the council was now to be made up of a balance of 12 merchants and 11 craftsmen.59 These events took place about 18 months after John Spottiswood’s arrival in the burgh as Archbishop of Glasgow. He astutely managed the situation to his own advantage, acting as a mediator for the king, magistrates and other aggrieved parties, thereby making himself indispensable to all influential groups within the burgh.60 During negotiations in November 1606, the council requested that the archbishop present leets to the council that they might then be allowed choose the provost. At this point they seem to have still been clinging to the hope that they could salvage some degree of burgh independence.61 However, Spottiswood rejected the proposal and in the presence of the Duke of Lennox the following Michaelmas unilaterally appointed a local laird and vassal of the duke, John Houston of Houston as provost – a decision the now chastened town council of Glasgow had little choice but to accept.62 It seems likely that Sir George Elphinstone’s reforms – the town council’s petition to appoint the burgh magistrates, his delegation of unlaws and the Letter of Guildry – were an attempt to put the constitution of Glasgow on a firmer footing following the Union of Crowns and the removal of the royal court to London. They also reveal James’ policy towards Glasgow and its governance: he placed trusted courtiers with deep-rooted attachments to the burgh in positions of power and delegated to them the responsibility for governing in the royal interest. Elphinstone’s attempts to do this led to the riots, and the crown intervention needed to quell the disorder resulted in a more restrictive and closely monitored government policy.63 On a personal level, the entire episode was a disaster for Sir George Elphinstone of Blythswood. He never regained his influential position at court, fell afoul of the Glasgow town council in 1608 for attempting to seize customs belonging to the market and bridge and was later put to the horn

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  89 for failure to repay his debts. He succumbed to a series of destructive feuds and went on to die a ruined man in 1634, having sold off the vast Blythswood estate, accumulated by his family over two generations, in a failed attempt to repay what he owed.64

II Jenny Wormald has noted that nobles’ kinship networks and personal relationships reached into the towns just as they did across other areas of Scottish society.65 These networks were essential to the exercise of power in Glasgow by Walter Stewart and the second Duke of Lennox. They were the means by which the two men extended their own and the king’s authority and established stability following the factionalism of James’ minority and early reign. They did this by appointing magistrates linked to their families through ties of kinship and marriage, and Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto was central to their success in these endeavours. As noted above, he was a half-brother of Walter Stewart and a kinsman of the duke. He was appointed provost of the burgh every year between 1586 and 1600. Walter and Ludovick were closely linked by kinship and marriage ties to the majority of the baillies they appointed during this period. Elphinstone was also a servitor of the duke, and although he was the son of one of Glasgow’s pre-eminent merchants of the 1570s and 1580s, the success of his career was almost completely reliant on his fortunes at court, while Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto’s power was based entirely on kinship ties, private resources and influence in the locality. The extent to which Elphinstone was able to exercise authority in the burgh after his appointment as provost depended on his ability to win the loyalty of the pre-existing burgh oligarchy. He did enjoy some success in this. He convinced some of the existing elite to support him and succeeded in having his own kindred and servitors appointed to the town council. Viewed from the perspective of competing spheres of authority, Elphinstone’s actions in 1603, which allowed the town to appoint its own magistrates, can perhaps be seen as a power grab, and Minto’s attack in 1606 becomes more understandable. Ultimately, the prosopographical analysis that follows suggests that Minto’s support in Glasgow ran deeper than Elphinstone’s. As John Spottiswood attempted to repair a working burgh oligarchy following the crisis and find a new balance of power on the magistracy and town council between the newly created factions, he relied most heavily on those who had supported Minto, not Elphinstone, in 1606. McGrath has shown that between 1574 and 1586, despite the factionalism that characterised that period, Glasgow’s magistrates were consistently appointed from a pool of 24 elite councillors.66 During this time, 28 men were leeted for the baillieships, but only 12 of these were appointed to office. Of these, three men dominated – William Cunningham, who was leeted nine times and appointed seven, George Elphinstone senior, leeted seven times and appointed six, and Robert Stewart, leeted six times and appointed five. Less successful, but still very influential, were John Graham, a baillie three times, and Robert Rowatt

90  Paul Goatman and Adam Wallace, who held the post four times each.67 All of these men, with the possible exception of Robert Rowatt and Adam Wallace, were linked by ties of marriage or kinship to each other and to the wider affinity that supported the Duke of Lennox and the Colquhouns of Luss in the west of Scotland. Robert Stewart was a younger brother of Walter Stewart of Blantyre and therefore also a younger half-brother of Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto.68 William Cunningham had married Elizabeth Colquhoun, of the Colquhoun surname, in 1554.69 George Elphinstone senior was her son from a previous marriage, and Cunningham was therefore his stepfather.70 The Grahams were also linked to the Stewart family by ties of marriage.71 Between 1574 and 1586, therefore, when the archbishops remained the feudal superiors of the burgh, the Lennox Stewarts extended influence and power in Glasgow by ensuring that members of their kindred were appointed to the magistracy. These were not necessarily agnatic ties; many of the baillies married into the landed Stewart or Colquhoun families, but they owed allegiance to and sought protection from the heads of these families as powerful lords linked to them by ties of kinship.72 When Walter Stewart appointed the Glasgow magistrates, he chose a small group of men from within this kinship group, which in effect narrowed the ruling burgh oligarchy even further. He appointed his half-brother Minto as provost every year between 1588 and 1596, and he would go on to retain the position under Lennox until 1600. Between 1588 and 1594, four men dominated the 20 baillie positions available for those years. They were James Stewart, William Cunningham, Robert Chirnside and Robert Rowatt. James Stewart was appointed six times, William Cunningham four, Robert Chirnside twice and Robert Rowatt four times.73 James Stewart is described in a town council minute for 1581 as another ‘brother’ of Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto74 and was therefore also a brother of Robert Stewart and a half-brother of Walter Stewart of Blantyre. Robert Chirnside married Marion Scott, widow of George Elphinstone of Blythswood senior. In November 1588, Chirnside became closely involved with the affairs of the Colquhoun clan when he was escheated with the ‘lands and heritages’ of Luss as a result of Sir Humphrey’s failure to pay his share of a £40,000 tax. In January 1591, Chirnside transferred the lands to Sir Humphrey’s brother, Alexander and may simply have been charged by the crown with holding the lands while the Colquhouns were out of favour.75 A relative of Robert’s, William Chirnside, was the parson of Luss, suggesting that the Colquhouns were patrons of the Chirnsides.76 Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto also married into the Colquhoun clan; his first wife was Jean Colquhoun.77 Analysis of the testaments of these men sheds further light on their interrelationships and their connections with the Lennox Stewarts’ support base in the west of Scotland. Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto died in 1612, and the executrix of his estate is named as his second wife, Marie Hamilton. Walter Stewart of Blantyre and Alexander Colquhoun of Luss, by then chief of the Colqhoun clan, were nominated to administer the estate on her behalf. Minto’s eldest son, also Matthew, by his first wife Jean Colquhoun, was named as a beneficiary.78

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  91 William Cunningham died in 1598, and his testament names Robert Chirnside as his executor and Walter Stewart, Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto and Sir George Elphinstone of Blythswood as protectors of his wife and children.79 All of the baillies are described in the council records as being merchants in Glasgow, but some also styled themselves as landed men. In the burgh records, for example, James Stewart appears as ‘of Flock’ and Robert Chirnside as ‘of Possil’ or ‘Over Possil’.80 Walter Stewart thus relied on a small, core group of men to act as baillies during his tenure as ‘lord feuer’ of Glasgow. Indeed, there was also very little turnover of personnel on the town council between 1588 and 1594.81 Stewart’s appointments to the magistracy suggest that he made a conscious effort to consolidate a support base in Glasgow and re-establish a working burgh oligarchy under his influence, following the factionalism of the 1570s and early 1580s. The price for stability appears to have been a more narrowly focused ruling oligarchy, bound together by ties of kinship and marriage. At its core were Walter’s Stewart kinsmen and their allies, the Colquhouns of Luss. When Lennox took over responsibility for appointing the magistrates in 1596, he seems to have initially followed the example set by Walter Stewart. For the year 1595–6, Walter had appointed two new men, John Anderson and Thomas Mure (one craftsman and one merchant), alongside regular baillies William Cunningham and Hector Stewart, who was another brother of James and Robert Stewart.82 In 1596 Lennox also appointed Hector Stewart, William Cunningham and Robert Rowatt as baillies. There is a gap in the burgh records between May 1597 and November 1598, but on the evidence of the protocol books of the Glasgow town clerks, the longstanding baillie Robert Rowatt was appointed in 1598, alongside two more new men, James Tempill and Thomas Mure. The following year Rowatt, Tempill and another new man, Thomas Glen, were appointed.83 At the October 1600 election, at which Sir George Elphinstone was appointed provost, Lennox appointed Rowatt and two more new men as baillies, James Forrett and Alexander Baillie. The greater turnover among the magistracy during this period perhaps reflects more flexibility on the part of the Duke of Lennox than Walter Stewart in terms of whom he appointed and maybe even a greater willingness to listen to the suggestions of the burgesses who presented him with the leets each year. It is difficult to identify the magistrates appointed during the provostship of George Elphinstone of Blythswood because of the gap in the town council records between October 1601 and June 1605. As noted above, Elphinstone and the town began to appoint the magistrates as soon as the royal court headed south in 1603. The available evidence does suggest that during his time as provost, Elphinstone was able to build up a support base in Glasgow, both by securing the loyalty of members of the traditional oligarchy that had been appointed by Walter Stewart and the Duke of Lennox and by drawing in new men from outside the burgh who had not held office before. The Andersons were an established Glasgow family who seem to have supported him, at least at first. They are emblematic of the division caused by Elphinstone’s arrival and the fighting

92  Paul Goatman of 1606. William and John Anderson and former baillie Thomas Mure were appointed to the magistracy in October 1604, and William Anderson, Matthew Trumble and Robert Rowatt were appointed in 1605. William stayed loyal to Elphinstone throughout the fighting in 1606, while John seems to have joined Minto’s side.84 The list of men appointed to the town council in October 1605 also shows Elphinstone surrounding himself with his supporters. His brother, James Elphinstone, appears on the council, alongside William Stirling, who is described as a servitor of George and appears on the list of newly appointed burgesses in 1600. All these new men supported George Elphinstone during the fighting in the summer of 1606, as did members of the existing burgh oligarchy that he seems to have drawn successfully to his side, such as James Forrett and Matthew Trumble.85 Following the crisis of 1606, John Spottiswood had to negotiate a difficult power  balance between the two factions that had gathered in support of Elphinstone and Minto. He also had to repair a fractured burgh community. In doing so, he appointed many of Minto’s supporters as baillies. The cases brought before the privy council in the late summer and autumn of 1606, which sought redress following the violence, clearly identify the two factions. In August, the main supporters of Minto were his son, Sir Walter Stewart of Minto, James Braidwood, Ninian and John Anderson, William Mure, Thomas Fawside, Archibald Patterson, Alexander Caldwell, Mr John Ross and James Stewart of Flock, all of whom were ordered to be imprisoned in Perth. Elphinstone’s leading supporters were his brothers James and John Elphinstone, James Forrett, and Archibald Mure, and they were ordered into ward in Dundee.86 In 1607, the first year that Spottiswood had responsibility for appointing the magistrates, he appointed Matthew Trumble, who was Glasgow’s first Dean of Guild and married to Florence Cunningham, daughter to William Cunningham.87 His privileged place in Glasgow society was based on this marriage.88 Trumble had sided with Sir George Elphinstone during the dispute, and his appointment seems to reflect attempts by Spottiswood to find a balance of power on the magistracy after 1606.89 Also appointed were James Inglis and James Braidwood, both of whom were supporters of Minto. Braidwood was one of the ringleaders of the rebels during July 1606, and Inglis was described in the privy council case presented by the town as one of the ‘friends and followers of the House of Minto’.90 He was married to Marian Stewart, who may have been a direct relation of Minto’s, and he was a successful merchant who appears to have made his fortune in Edinburgh.91 In September 1608, he was attacked by a supporter of Elphinstone’s, Robert McGill, in an incident that points to the enmity that remained in the burgh two years after the crisis. Inglis was Spottiswood’s first choice as provost of Glasgow following the parliamentary act of April 1609 that barred all but ‘burgesses, actual traffickers and inhabitants’ from being burgh magistrates, and he held the position for the next four years.92 In October 1609, Spottiswood appointed Trumble, Braidwood and Mure as baillies, and for the following three years in succession he appointed Trumble, Braidwood and James Stewart of Flock.93 The conditions imposed by the king on the burgh in December 1606 included the stipulation

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  93 that 11 members of the crafts be represented on the town council, alongside 12 merchants; it is striking that for the next 5 years, a significant majority of the craftsmen appointed to the council were men who had supported Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto during the fighting.94 Elphinstone’s fall after 1606, and his expulsion from any position of authority in the burgh following his attempts to seize the customs of the ladle and bridge, was largely down to his inability to secure a powerful and lasting support base in Glasgow. As has been seen, he did enjoy limited success in this regard, bringing in new men and winning the loyalty of some from within the pre-existing burgh oligarchy. However, his support base could not match that of Minto, who had been provost of the burgh since the mid-1580s, was closely related to Walter Stewart and a kinsman of the Duke of Lennox and showed himself able to raise a formidable force of over 300 men in the summer of 1606. Because of his extensive following, John Spottiswood had little option but to work with his supporters and appoint them to the burgh magistracy as he attempted to repair the ruling oligarchy in Glasgow and restore stability after the crisis.

III This overview of those appointed to Glasgow’s magistracy between the 1580s and 1610 has highlighted elements of both continuity and change. James Stewart of Flock, for example, a kinsman and firm supporter of Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto, was a magistrate both in the 1580s and in 1609. He would go on to be provost of the burgh in 1613.95 He symbolises Minto’s enduring influence until the end of his life, even after he had lost the provostship. When change did come, it was imposed from above. The king’s appointment of Elphinstone as provost introduced a new power into the burgh, and this created the kind of division perhaps most starkly represented by the members of the Anderson family, John and William. Needless to say, the fighting in 1606, which forced members of the burgess community to choose sides, greatly exacerbated these divisions, and John Spottiswood had to work hard to restore unity and stability after he became feudal superior. Glasgow’s crisis sheds light on many aspects of James’ use of noble power and his approach to the oversight of his burghs. In governing Glasgow, he appointed men to positions of authority who had links to the local community and possessed local knowledge, and he chose them from within the affinity of the second Duke of Lennox. Walter Stewart and Sir George Elphinstone of Blythswood, and, of course, Lennox himself, were prominent courtiers. Lennox and Stewart held far more exalted positions, but Blythswood had been a favourite of the king during the 1590s. Stewart and Elphinstone can perhaps be seen as a further example of James’ tendency to utilise ‘new men’ in national administration. Elphinstone and Minto were both also followers of the Duke of Lennox. Their conflict raises questions about how far lords in this period devolved authority to their men. These two appear to have been left to fight

94  Paul Goatman among themselves over the office of provost, with the crown and the duke only becoming involved to establish order after the event. It is difficult, however, to discern the true extent of the duke’s influence behind the scenes. His interests would have been well represented by either Elphinstone’s or Minto’s retaining the provostship, and he does seem to have been aloof and self-interested in his other dealings with the burgh. Alternatively, he may have been using Minto to re-establish his rights by non-institutional means after the failure of his petition to the privy council. The two protagonists in 1606 were distinctly different types of laird. Elphinstone was a courtier – powerful as long as he remained in favour with the king but weak in the locality. Minto, by contrast, was powerful in the Glasgow area and had little interaction with the court. His strength was based on his private resources and personal networks, and these survived Elphinstone’s rise and fall. On the face of it, James’ experiment of governing Glasgow through his courtiers appears unsuccessful. Following the Union of Crowns and the departure of the royal court, Elphinstone did not have the resources needed to retain power in Glasgow, at least not for long. Again, however, the answer is not a simple one. Glasgow’s 1606 crisis highlights the king’s constant need to work with his nobility and the dangers inherent in doing so. John Spottiswood took up residence in Glasgow as archbishop 18 months before the fighting broke out. The archbishop was practical in his oversight of the crisis and relied heavily on Minto and his supporters to re-establish stability. Spottiswood was a central pillar of James’ post-1603 Scottish administration and would remain the superior of the burgh of Glasgow until his elevation to the archbishopric of St Andrews in 1615. The restitution of the archbishopric meant that the burgh remained under firm government control. An assessment of Spottiswood’s lordship of Glasgow during the first decades of the seventeenth century is beyond the scope of this chapter. His success would however depend on how successfully he could establish working relationships with the local nobility of the kind that had caused such problems for James in Glasgow in 1606.

Notes 1 C. Patterson, ‘Conflict Resolution and Patronage in Provincial Towns, 1590–1640’, Journal of British Studies 31:7 (1998), 25. 2 This incident is outlined most clearly by L. Stewart, ‘Politics and Government in the Scottish Burghs, 1603–1638’ in MacDonald and Goodare, eds, Sixteenth-Century Scotland, 439–40. 3 Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’; A. S. Wayne-Pearce, ‘John Spottiswoode, Jacobean Archbishop and Statesman’ (University of Stirling PhD Thesis: 1998), 133–39; Marwick, ‘Historical Preface’ in Charters and other Documents Relating to the City of Glasgow, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 1894–1897), i, pp. ccxxiii–ccxxxv. 4 Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’, 440; Wayne-Pearce, ‘John Spottiswoode’, 136; Marwick, ‘Historical Preface’, p. ccxxxii. 5 L. Stewart, Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars: Edinburgh, 1617–1653 (Leiden: 2006); M. Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation (Edinburgh: 1981); this point is made precisely by Stewart in ‘Politics and Government’, 430.

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  95 6 M. Lynch, ed., The Early Modern Town in Scotland (London: 1987); E. Dennison, D. Ditchburn and M. Lynch, eds, Aberdeen before 1800 (East Linton: 2002); MacDonald, ‘Dundee and the Crown’, in C. McKean, B. Harris and C. Whatley, eds, Dundee: Renaissance to Enlightenment (Dundee: 2009); a recent study of crime and punishment in an urban context also focused on Aberdeen: J. Falconer, Crime and Community in Reformation Scotland: negotiating power in a burgh society (London: 2013). 7 T. Devine and G. Jackson, eds, Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830 (Manchester: 1995); T. C. Smout, ‘The Glasgow Merchant Community in the Seventeenth Century’, SHR 47 (1968), 53–71 and ‘The Development and Enterprise of Glasgow, 1556–1707’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 6:3 (1959), 194–212. 8 See MacDonald, ‘Dundee and the Crown’, 33, where Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth and Glasgow are placed in this category. 9 See, for example, Blakeway and Reid in this volume. 10 Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’, 434. 11 J. McGrath, ‘The Administration of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1574–1586’, 2 vols (University of Glasgow PhD Thesis, 1986), i, 92–115. 12 McGrath, ‘Administration’, 137. 13 McGrath, ‘Administration’, 149. 14 McGrath, ‘Administration’, 7. 15 Mitchell Library Glasgow [ML], Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/5, ff. 9, 16, 26, 31, 33–34, 38, 45–50, 54–6, 64; see Falconer, Crime and Community in Reformation Scotland for the significance of crimes of ‘trublance’ in challenging authority in a burgh community. 16 These would have excluded the four pleas of the crown: murder, treason, arson and rape. Serious felony crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, abduction, robbery with violence and bestiality would also usually have been tried in the justiciary courts or the king’s High Court; Falconer, Crime and Community, 7. 17 The Glasgow burgh court and town council minutes are incorporated in the same manuscript volumes prior to 1609, after which point they become separated. 18 RPS, 1587/7/18 [accessed 24 March 2016]. 19 Brown, Noble Society, 28, 241. 20 RPS, 1598/6/17 [accessed 24 March 2016]; McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 115–16. 21 RPS, 1593/4/74 [accessed 24 March 2016]; ‘Charter of James VI granting in feu the lands and barony of Glasgow to Walter, Commendator of Blantyre (1587)’ in Marwick, Charters and Documents, ii, 215–25. 22 Juhala, Household and Court, 93–98. 23 Scots Peerage, ii, 80; v, 350. 24 R. Zulager, ‘Stewart, Walter, First Lord Blantyre (d. 1617)’, ODNB [26513, accessed 12 Aug. 2015]; Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 96–97, 312, 322, 336–37. 25 Sir John Scot of Scotstarvet, The Staggering State of Scottish Statesmen, ed. C. Rodgers (Edinburgh: 1872), 56. 26 R. Crawford, ‘Warfare in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, c. 1545–1615’ (University of Glasgow PhD Thesis, 2016). 27 Crawford, ‘Warfare in the Highlands’; CSP Scot., xii, 52; RPCS, viii, 73. 28 W. Fraser, ed., The Lennox, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1874), ii, 340. 29 NRS, Montrose papers, GD20/1/184; GD220/1/F/8/4/3. 30 RPS, 1593/4/74 [accessed 24 March 2016]; NRS, Papers of the Earls of Glasgow (Crawford Priory), GD20/1/145. 31 See McLaughlin’s chapter in this volume. 32 C. Patterson, Urban Patronage in Early Modern England: Corporate Boroughs, the Landed Elite and the Crown, 1580–1640 (Stanford: 1999); S. Annette Finley-Crosswhite, Henry IV and the towns: The Pursuit of Legitimacy in French Urban Society, 1589– 1610 (Cambridge: 1999). M. Breen, Law, City, and King: Legal Culture, Municipal

96  Paul Goatman Politics, and State Formation in Early Modern Dijon (Rochester: 2007); M. Breen, ‘Law, Patronage and Municipal Authority in Seventeenth Century France: The aftermath of the Lanturelu revolt in Dijon’, French History 20 (2006), 138–60. 33 For example, during 1592–3 the burgh of Aberdeen was able to transfer its allegiance from George Gordon, fifth Earl of Huntly, to George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal. See A. White, ‘The Menzies Era: Sixteenth-Century Politics’ in Dennison, Ditchburn and Lynch, Aberdeen before 1800, 234–37. 34 For example, NRS, Montrose papers, GD220/1/F/8/4/1; GD220/1/F/8/2/7. 35 CSP Scot., xiii, part 1, 134. 36 Burgesses and Guild Brethren of Glasgow, 27, 29, 30; Marwick, Extracts, i, 194. 37 Marwick, Extracts, i, 220–21, 223. 38 Marwick, Extracts, i, 213. 39 Marwick, Extracts, i, 221. 40 Marwick, Extracts, i, 211–13. 41 For a discussion of this see the introduction to this volume. 42 McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 70. 43 McGrath, ‘Administration’, i. 70–71. 44 NRS, Edinburgh Commissary Court Testaments, George Elphinstone of Blythswood, CC8/8/17/162; McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 71. 45 RPCS, v, 297, 482, 592, 674; vi, 427, 773; Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 313; G. EyreTodd, History of Glasgow, 123. 46 CSP Scot., xiii, part 1, 436; part 2, 644; Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 67. 47 Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 166; R. Renwick, ed., Abstracts of Protocols of the Town Clerks of Glasgow, 11 vols (Glasgow: 1900), x, 78n. 48 ‘Letter of Guildry and Related Documents’, Charters and Documents, ii, pp. dcv–dcxxii; A. Jackson, Glasgow Dean of Guild Court: A History (Glasgow: 1983), 10. 49 Marwick, Extracts, i, 234. 50 Marwick, Charters and Documents, ii, 271. 51 NRS, Petition to Lords of Council of Ludovick, Duke of Lennox, relating to his claim to right of election of provost, baillies and council of Glasgow, GD220/6/2019. 52 RPCS, vii, 141–42; Wayne-Pearce, ‘John Spottiswoode’, 135. 53 RPCS, vii, 141–42. 54 ‘Draft of an Act of Parliament, superscribed by King James VI., for granting free liberty to the City of Glasgow to elect its Magistrates. 7 July 1606’, Marwick, Charters and Documents, ii, 271. 55 Marwick, ‘Historical preface: 1603–8’, Charters and Documents, i, pp. ccv–ccl; RPCS, vii, 240–41. 56 This interpretation has been suggested by Laura Stewart in Stewart: ‘Politics and Government’, at 440. 57 RPCS, vii, 242–43. 58 RPCS, vii, 234–45, 240–47 and see Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’, 440 for these references; Wayne Pearce, ‘John Spottiswoode’, 135. 59 ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/6, f. 114; Marwick, Extracts, i, 255–56. 60 McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 7–8; Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’, 439–40. 61 Marwick, Extracts, 256–57. 62 ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/6, ff. 114, 155; Marwick, Extracts, i, 255–59, 261, 268–69 and see Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’, 440 for these references. 63 This is also a point made by Stewart in ‘Politics and Government’, at 440. 64 RPCS, viii, 269, 350, 781 for a debt case; 458, 612, 621, 711, 817 for a feud with the Laird of Airth; A. Jackson, Glasgow Dean of Guild Court, 20. 65 Wormald, Lords and Men, 139. 66 McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 62. 67 McGrath, ‘Administration’, ii, 84.

James VI, noble power and Glasgow  97 68 Scots Peerage, ii, 81; McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 72. 69 See Brown, Noble Power, 36–59 for the contemporary importance of the surname and marriage ties in gauging the nature of kinship relationships. 70 R. Renwick Glasgow Protocols, v, 58n. 71 McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 72–73. 72 Keith Brown has made the point that when George Elphinstone of Blythswood senior wrote his testament, he placed his family under the protection of his own lord, the Master of Elphinstone, but also that of his wife’s family, the Master of Eglinton, thereby maximising the protection that could be provided by these two powerful lords and utilising the kinship links that had been established through his marriage; Brown, Noble Power, 46. 73 ML, Glasgow Kirk Session Register, 1583–93, CH2/550/1, ff. 200, 237, 274, 316, 362; ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/3, ff. 1, 100; C1/1/4, f. 1. 74 ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/2, f. 91; McGrath, ‘Administration’, i, 72. 75 W. Fraser, ed., Cartulary of Colquhoun of Colquhoun and Luss (Edinburgh: 1873), 12; W. Fraser, The Chiefs of Colquhoun and Their Country, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1869), i, 149; I would like to thank Dr Ross Crawford for all references to the Colquhouns of Luss in this chapter. 76 NRS, Edinburgh Commissary Court Testaments, James Fleming, CC8/8/25/179; RPCS, vi, 271. 77 NRS, Hamilton and Campsie Commissary Court Testaments, Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto, CC10/5/2/539. 78 NRS, CC10/5/2/539. 79 NRS, Edinburgh Commissary Court Testaments, William Cunningham, CC8/8/39/628. 80 Renwick, Glasgow Protocols, x, No. 3275; J. Anderson and J. Gourlay, eds, The Provosts of Glasgow from 1609 to 1832 (Glasgow: 1942), 6; this is a point made by Smout, ‘Glasgow Merchant Community’ at 66. 81 ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/3, ff. 1, 100; C1/1/4, ff. 1, 73. 82 Anderson and Gourlay, Provosts, 5. 83 ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/4, ff. 1, 73, 129; C1/1/5, ff. 48–50, 103–104, 157; Renwick, Glasgow Protocols, xi, Nos: 3411, 3578, 3580, 3581, 3583. 84 RPCS, vii, 234–35, 246. 85 ML, Glasgow Town Council Minutes, C1/1/6, f. 22; Burgesses and Guild Brethren of Glasgow, 29; RPCS, vii, 234–35. 86 RPCS, vii, 234–35. 87 Renwick, Glasgow Protocols, xi, Nos: 3490, 3507, 3577. 88 Jackson, Glasgow Dean of Guild Court, 19. 89 RPCS, vii, 246. 90 RPCS, vii, 242. 91 Anderson and Gourlay, Provosts, 1. 92 Anderson and Gourlay, Provosts, 1–3; RPS, 1609/4/27 [accessed 24 March 2016]; Marwick, Extracts, i, 304, 316, 322, 331; see Stewart, ‘Politics and Government’, 438–42 for discussion of the parliamentary act. 93 ML, Glasgow Town Council minutes, C1/1/7, ff. 13, 53, 98, 140. 94 ML, Glasgow Town Council minutes, C1/1/6, ff. 114–5, 155, 236–37; C1/1/7, ff. 13, 53, 98, 140. 95 Anderson and Gourlay, Provosts, 5.

5 He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’ James VI’s suppression of the Scott-Ker feud1 Anna Groundwater In 1586, Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch was contracted in marriage to Margaret Ker, daughter of Sir William Ker of Cessford and sister to his heir, Robert.2 However, this happy fact failed to stem the feud between their kindreds that had rumbled on periodically through the sixteenth century and which was to be played out again in the 1590s between Buccleuch and his brother-in-law Robert Ker of Cessford. Despite this, both men continued to hold border-specific offices in the Middle March of the Scottish Borders, where they exercised their authority as leaders of sizeable kindreds. James VI’s increasingly insistent attempts from the late 1580s to suppress the ancient practice of bloodfeud appeared to have had no impact upon their deteriorating relationship. By the mid-1590s the antagonism between them had escalated into outright threats and ultimately a challenge to combat. In 1597, in a furious exchange of letters between Buccleuch and Robert Ker, Buccleuch accused Cessford of having ‘intencion against my life’. Shortly afterwards, in January 1598, it was reported that ‘The declaracion that the lard of Buccleuch hathe made to the challenge brought by [Cessford], is dispersed common here’, and it was thought that ‘without bloode that matter can never end honorably between them’.3 Feuding was a common phenomenon in sixteenth-century Scotland, but it was seen by contemporaries as particularly prevalent in the Borders, where the crown explicitly equated bloodfeud with its deleterious effects on government. In 1599, the privy council attributed ‘the cheiff and onlie caus of the grite misreule and unquietnes of the West Bordour’ to ‘the deidlie feidis and querrellis standing betwixt the principall noblemen and barronis’ there and observed that the Borders would not be ‘quieted and settled … unless the saidis feidis be removeit’.4 Similarly, Sir Robert Cecil thought that ‘the disorders [were] alleged to arise from the abuses in the [Scottish] Wardens government in pursuing particular quarrels in blood’, for instance between Cessford, the Middle March warden, and Buccleuch, the keeper of Liddesdale.5 As the leaders of the extensive Ker and Scott kindreds, this personal enmity unfortunately had significant ramifications for the stability of the region, especially through the subsequent hostility displayed between their wider kindreds. But in the mid-1590s, feuding in the Borders was to be affected by the crown’s growing intolerance to bloodfeud that was being felt throughout Scotland.

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  99 At the same time, James’ succession to the English throne appeared increasingly likely, as the childless Elizabeth I grew old. Where once he had often turned a blind eye towards his Borders officials’ behaviour (even tacitly supporting Buccleuch’s audacious escapade to free Kinmont Willie from Carlisle Castle in 1596), the need to maintain good relations with Elizabeth’s privy councillors led ultimately to James exerting pressure on both Buccleuch and Cessford to answer for their actions to the English wardens.6 Furthermore, James was to make a sustained effort in encouraging the two men to settle their own differences, and by their own example bring their adherents into line with the new crown policies on feuding and cross-border crime. In this, he was to rely upon the bonds of lordship and kinship they exerted within their kindreds and amongst their tenants, which also then gave these leaders the manpower to effect the wider suppression of crime in the region. Thus, in December 1598, it was reported that the ‘King dealt for agreement of Cessford and Buccleuch and made them friends in his cabinet [at Holyrood]’.7 This paper explores the combination of several pressures that led to James VI’s own involvement in ending the feud between them and the wider pattern of feuding among members of the opposing Scott and Ker kindreds in the Borders. It considers how increasing efforts to suppress the feud throughout Scotland coincided with James’ concerns over the English succession (as well as his muchneeded pension from Elizabeth I) and how it was especially the threat to his personal interests that prompted his intervention in this particular feud. From the late 1580s, the crown’s growing intolerance of violent crime could be seen in its insistence on parties at feud finding surety not to harm each other. Such intolerance was to be felt all over Scotland, but the additional diplomatic imperatives in the Borders by the mid-1590s led to a particular targeting of disputes there; even more particular was the dispute between the Middle March’s two most senior officials who were responsible for dealing with Elizabeth’s border officials. The instability this caused so close to the Anglo-Scottish border was detrimental to James’ efforts to convince Elizabeth that he was doing his best to suppress crime in the region. Indeed Elizabeth herself called for the surrender of both Buccleuch and Cessford to her wardens for their cross-border activities more generally.8 Given the consistency of crown measures to suppress feuding was patchy elsewhere, James’ personal intervention in the hostility between Cessford and Buccleuch was notable; Elizabeth’s ire over their behaviour had probably tipped the balance. For James, there was an additional problem: this particular feud was part of a recurrent pattern of violence between Scott and Ker kindreds, which from the early 1500s had been perpetuated through collective memories sustained by contemporary narratives of honour, kinship, lordship and victimization. In order to break this trajectory of memorialised violence, James had to come up with a sufficiently persuasive and effective alternative. This chapter considers that alternative – James’ use of targeted patronage and of the bonds of lordship and kinship – to turn two major proponents of the ancient art of feuding into agents of its suppression in the Borders.

100  Anna Groundwater

I As early as 1524, the Scottish council had reported that ‘thar is variance betwixt the lardis of Cesfurd and Buccleuch’ and ordered them ‘to gif assourance to uthiris for thaim, thar kyn frendis and part takaris’ to refrain from attacking each other.9 This failed to prevent the killing of Sir Andrew Ker of Cessford by a Buccleuch affiliate in 1526 at the Battle of Melrose. Subsequently repeated attempts were made throughout the sixteenth century to settle sporadic outbursts of feuding between the families and descendants of Cessford and Buccleuch. The exact origins of this variance are irrecoverable, as most were for conflicts of this nature, but they probably lay in the competition for lands and offices in the Middle March from at least the mid-fifteenth century following the crown’s destruction of the Earls of Douglas, formerly the most powerful family in that march. The re-distribution that resulted of Douglas lands from Ettrick to Jedburgh fed the emergence of the Buccleuch branch of the Scott surname, and the Cessfords amongst the Kers, as the more prominent of the surname leaders in the march.10 These lands, and the Scott and Ker kindreds that inhabited them, brought Buccleuch and Cessford extensive networks of manpower on which to call. Those could be utilised by a grateful crown in the furtherance of its Borders policies or less helpfully, by their leaders in pursuing more personal vendettas. The social structure of the kindreds, the Borders ‘surnames’ that delineated the rival Scott and Ker groupings, was more or less mapped onto their geographical spread in the Middle March. In the western half, the Scotts held huge swathes of uplands in the shires of Peebles and Selkirk and west Roxburgh, whilst the Kers dominated the lower lands in east Roxburghshire. By 1515, the power the Cessford Kers exercised through their kindred and lands was recognised in Sir  Andrew’s appointment as warden of the Middle March, in which he was assisted by his close kinsmen Andrew Ker of Ferniehirst near Jedburgh, and Mark Ker of Littledean near St Boswells.11 This pattern of familial support was repeated for much of the next few decades, with the Kers’ possession of the wardenship effectively hereditary, though subject to the occasional intervention of external officials during times of heightened crown interest in the region. Similarly, the Scotts’ dominance in the western part of the Middle March was recognised in 1543 by Buccleuch’s appointment to the captaincy of Newark Castle, an office that was combined with the duties of baillie and chamberlain of the crown-owned lordship of Ettrick Forest. As with Cessford’s wardenship, this effectively hereditary captaincy and baillieship remained in the Buccleuchs’ hands from then onwards. In addition, like the Cessfords, the Buccleuchs had the help of their kinsmen amongst the Scotts of Tushielaw, Allanhaugh, Sinton, Haining and other minor cadet branches in the exercise of their office. This carving up of crown-appointed offices in the Middle March along a broadly north-south axis, while suiting a crown that did not want power centred on any one family, had the unfortunate consequence of establishing an antagonistic interface in the march. There was another factor exacerbating this personal competitiveness, and that was the effect of political rivalries at the highest levels of government in

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  101 Scotland.12 The skirmish in 1526 between the Scotts and Kers at Melrose, that brought their enmity so forcefully to the notice of the crown, was the local playing out of a power struggle at the highest levels of government during the minority of James V. Disquiet over Archibald Douglas, sixth Earl of Angus’ physical possession of the young king, and allegedly James’ own appeal for liberation, had led to an attempt by Buccleuch to wrest the king from Angus. Angus’ recent appointment of the Kers of Ferniehirst and Littledean as his deputies in the march meant that the Kers leapt to Angus’ aid when Buccleuch turned up at Melrose. The seesaw of court politics, however, by 1528 had led to Angus’ downfall and Buccleuch’s appointment as warden for the west part of the march, that is, until the Cessford heir reached his majority.13 The effect of national political interests was to be seen again in the appointment of Buccleuch to the Newark captaincy in 1543, whilst the Kers fell into disfavour and Cessford was sacked as Middle March warden. Although the Cessfords recovered their offices in the 1550s, in the 1570s, the Scotts prospered under the regency of James Douglas, Earl of Morton, thanks to the close family ties between them: Morton’s niece Margaret Douglas was married to Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch (d. 1574). During this period, the council tried to prevent any renewal of the Scott-Ker feud by summoning the Buccleuch representatives and the Kers of Cessford for the non-fulfilment of a previous reconciliation. Reflecting their advantageous connections, the Scotts were awarded £1,000 in compensation from the Kers.14 Nevertheless, as ever, the pendulum soon swung back, and Cessford was once again in sole charge of the wardenry by 1578. Factionalism at court as Morton’s power waned led in 1579, it was reported, to the ‘heat borne and hatred betwixt the Earl of Morton [supported by the Scotts and the Douglases] and the Carrs and Humes’ in the Borders. In 1580, the alliance between the Kers and the increasingly powerful Esmé Stuart, Earl of Lennox, was noted to ‘hazard troubles on the Borders’.15 Local competition for power in the Borders, stoked by adherence to adversarial political factions at court that could so easily impact on office and land holding there, combined to perpetuate the enmity between the Ker and Scott surnames. This rivalry was further exacerbated by the English intrusions into the marches in the 1540s and during the Marian Civil War in 1569–70, which the Kers managed in negotiation with English officials to deflect into Buccleuch lands. Ironically, at the same time, the crown’s dependence on the manpower that Buccleuch and Cessford controlled in their kindreds to carry out crown policy in the Borders helped to sustain the social structuring of the Scott-Ker feud in the region through the sixteenth century.16 So, whilst it is possible to view individual instances of this feud as events within the specific political contexts of its time, the outbreaks of the Scott-Ker feud achieved a degree of repetition in the sixteenth century, which meant that each generation had some personal experience of it. This in itself formed the background to any particular outbreak and any attempt to resolve it. Moreover, every settlement referred to past grievance in the terms laid down, the apologies that should be made at which altar and so on, reminding each generation of the longevity of the antagonism. The accretions of memories, sustained by emotive narratives invoking familial obligations and solidarity, simultaneously

102  Anna Groundwater recalled past and legitimised present violence. As a result, the hostility displayed between Robert Ker of Cessford and Walter Scott of Buccleuch in the 1590s, whilst borne out of a particular set of circumstances and personalities, needs to be seen also within this longer-term context. It was not an isolated event peculiar to its own time. Any attempt therefore to settle it had to overcome these formidable obstacles – it would need the sustained efforts of a king.

II English reports repeatedly attributed crime in the Scottish Borders to the ‘greate feedes’ among the surnames; as the English Middle March warden Sir John Forster wrote in 1582, feuding ‘cawseth greate disobedience there’.17 In 1596, an English observer described this practice as ‘deadly foed, the word of enmitye in the Borders, implacable without the blood and whole family distroied’.18 Bloodfeud, they thought, was a bad thing: encompassing whole kindreds in apparently irresolvable retributive violence, perpetuated by the prominent borderers to whom local administration of justice was entrusted and indicative of the weakness of Scottish government in general. This traditional characterisation of feuding has been subject to revision in recent decades. Most crucially, perhaps, Jenny Wormald’s exposition of the codified nature of the bloodfeud, which allowed for its resolution as much as its practice, concluded it could be a ‘force for peace’.19 An understanding existed in early modern Scotland of the processes available for the settlement of disputes, of arbitration, compensation and reconciliation of grievance.20 That said, there had to be sufficient impetus, either from the crown, or within their own kindreds, for the principals within any dispute to agree to such processes being undertaken. Once instigated, though, the practices for resolution were broadly accepted; at the same time, the social structuring of the feud and the obligations of kinship and lordship within each kindred could – paradoxically – help to enforce any settlement. This meant that when the crown began to suppress feud more consistently in the 1590s, the mechanisms were there for it to do so. As Keith Brown has shown, James VI was able to attract the co-operation of the nobles in this endeavour, the very men whose maintenance of armed retinues had enabled them previously to conduct their own feuds.21 Brown concludes that the networks of power exercised by the nobility were to remain politically useful both to themselves and to the crown well into the mid-seventeenth century and should not be interpreted as a sign of weak royal government.22 The crown’s (on the whole) successful use of local elites within regional administration meant more generally that although government in Scotland may not have been as bureaucratically developed as its English counterpart, it could still be effective. Feuding was not necessarily a symptom of the crown’s weakness, and the power of local leaders could be employed by the crown in its suppression. The authority of local elites, and the nobles and greater lairds that comprised them, was based on their control over sizeable groups of men shaped by familial kinship, fictive kinship (ties that replicated those of kinship, but were not familial) and lordship. The connection that these ties provided between lord and

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  103 subordinate were also often based on the tenancy of a subordinate on his superior’s lands; thus an economic relationship between lord and tenant reinforced what was potentially a more notional binding of personal, familial or political allegiance. Bonds of manrent and maintenance, of formalised duties of service by a subordinate to a superior and the latter’s obligation of maintenance to that subordinate, also articulated and consolidated that relationship in written form.23 These linkages bound together networks of power that local elites could call on to fulfil what the crown was asking of them, either in terms of the armed force they could raise through it or through the pressure that the superior could exert over the subordinate to comply, for instance, with the terms of a feud’s settlement. Paradoxically these webs of authority rested on, and were shaped by, the very bonds of obligation within kinship that delineated the social structure of feuding. Evidence indicates that kinship within one surname, or clan, was seen as a determinant of the alliances and enmities that created oppositional forces, with both contemporary reports and the terms of settlement suggesting that bloodfeuds drew in entire kindreds. Wormald has however questioned the reality of ‘haill surnames’ being involved in any one feud, because the ties of kinship were not necessarily always binding and because they tended to decline with more distant relations. In the various permutations of the Buccleuch-Cessford feud, the rhetoric of kinship was commonly invoked, and the Scott and Ker kindreds were often evident in the playing out of their disputes; but the loyalties of kinship were not always a given.24 The internal disputes, for instance, within the Ker surname, between the various branches of Cessford, Ferniehirst and Ancrum, showed how feuding could occur even between families who were quite closely related and not merely sharing the same surname. In 1590, Cessford the younger was involved in the slaughter of William Ker of Ancrum, his kinsman, in a dispute over the provostry of Jedburgh.25 Furthermore, alliances and enmities could change over time: previous enmity resolved between the branch of one kindred with another surname but continued with other branches of the former. Such was the separate understanding eventually reached between the Scotts of Buccleuch and the Kers of Ferniehirst in the 1570s and subsequently with the Kers of Ancrum, whilst their rivalry continued with the Kers of Cessford. Despite these less than kindly examples, in the sixteenth century, ties of kinship were understood as sufficient justification for taking action in any dispute and were routinely invoked. Bonds of manrent promised support from the wider kindreds, as can be seen in a bond made by the Rutherfords of Hunthill to Andrew Ker of Ferniehirst and his son, in which they swore to be ‘reddy at all tymes… to ryde and gang with thame and tak thaire pairt in all actionis’ with their ‘kin frendes servandis my partakeris and all that will do for us In all materis’.26 Agreements made on the resolution of feuds were similarly structured around the opposing kindreds. In 1607, the Jardines of Applegarth promised the cessation of: All rancour and malice of our hairtis feid envy querrell and grudge with all actioun of displeasour [against] … Walter lord of Bukcleughe his surname kin freindis assistaris pairtie or partakeris.27

104  Anna Groundwater In return, Buccleuch signed this reconciliation taking the burden for his kin, friends and allies. The obligations within kinship that bound the social structure of feuding could equally be utilised in the enforcement of its reconciliation and compensation.28 Here too we see the personal authority of the kindred’s leader over those of his name being recognised in a dispute. Leaders such as Buccleuch could be entrusted by the kindred to arbitrate disagreements: for instance, in 1585 at Hawick, Buccleuch signed a bond of maintenance and service with Robert Scott of Allanhaugh, in which Allanhaugh promised on behalf of his kin and friends to ‘serve, manteine, and defend my said cheif … as ane gentilman aucht to do to thair chief’. This understanding of the obligations of kinship was further fortified by those of lordship. In return for Allanhaugh’s commitment, Buccleuch promised to ‘fortifie, manteine, and defend’ Allanhaugh and his dependents and at the same time doing so on behalf of his own Scott kindred.29 Such authority was not always efficacious, and it is clear that in the dispute between the Kers of Cessford and Ferniehirst that Cessford had lost that familial recognition as the rivalry between two powerful branches of the same surname escalated. Despite this setback, Cessford could still draw on the support of much of the rest of the Kers. The recognition that the crown gave to the social structuring of feuds, and the authority of kindred leaders over those of their surname, can be seen in the measures it took to try to stem escalating violence. In 1577, for instance, when the privy council tried to pre-empt a resumption of the Scott-Ker feud, it recalled the contract of 1565 between Buccleuch and Cessford in which both had, ‘on behalf of his surname’, promised to reconcile.30 The ‘Act anent the Highlands and Borders’ of 1587 called for Buccleuch, Ker of Ferniehirst and Cessford’s ally, Ker of Littledean, to assume responsibility for those who ‘dependis upoun the directionis [of] the saidis capitaneis cheiffis and chiftaines (be pretensis of blude or place thair duelling)’. Of specific concern was ‘masterful reiving, theft or reset of theft, depredations open and avowed, [and] fire-raising upon deadly feuds’ whose proponents were ‘protected and maintained by their masters’.31 Periodically the crown asked kindred leaders to sign a ‘General Band’ promising to enforce compliance with government requests and making them accountable for their kindred’s good behaviour. Such bands, and further ordinances for their upholding, were issued in 1572, 1573, 1574, 1576 and 1599.32 In 1602, the general band was signed at Jedburgh by over 120 borderers, including Buccleuch’s kinsmen the Scotts of Harden, Haining, Tushielaw and Goldelands, and his allies, the Elliots of Redheugh and the Stobs. They promised that if ‘we or ony of us be querrellit be ony clan, brensche, or surname’, they would ‘concur and assist with uther aganis [those] … that querrellis, as gif it wer oure proper cause’.33 There was also a more concerted attempt by the crown from the 1580s onwards to suppress feuds throughout Scotland by calling specific combatants to Edinburgh to sign acts of caution and surety. Arguably, this interest impacted more heavily in regions of special concern, such as the Borders. In late 1589, privy councillors meeting in Peebles asked John Lord Maxwell to give details of those ‘amangis quhome deidlie feid standis, that they micht be chargeit to gif and tak assuirance’.34 Typically, the main proponents of any dispute took responsibility

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  105 for their own and their associates’ behaviour in an act of caution, an agreement that was fortified with surety undertaken by other senior members of his kindred to see the cautions upheld. Thus, for example, Buccleuch, in 1590, had become surety for Robert Scott of Allanhaugh, agreeing to ensure that Allanhaugh would answer to the march wardens for any accusation against him. In return, Allanhaugh signed an act of caution, registered by the privy council, to keep Buccleuch ‘skaithless’ (unharmed) through this obligation.35 Kindred leaders were also being asked to find caution themselves for their fulfilment of the obligations they had sworn under the general band. In 1596, Cessford was forced to find caution under the monetary pain of £10,000 for the good behaviour of all for whom he was answerable; Robert Lord Crichton of Sanquhar and Andrew Ker of Romano Grange stood surety for Cessford’s fulfilment of this bond. On the same day, Buccleuch himself had to find similar caution, with Sir James Scott of Balwearie standing surety for him.36 The same caution was exercised by the crown three years later when Buccleuch acknowledged his responsibility for a number of Scotts in the Borders, including Robert Scott of Thirlestane for whom he ‘acknowledged obligation to answer for him’, since Thirlestane ‘holds his lands of him’.37 These onerous duties reflected the crown’s acknowledgement of these lairds’ authority in the Borders and the ways in which obligations of kinship and lordship could be harnessed in the service of the crown. Such expectations seemed justified when, in 1590, Buccleuch with Sir Andrew Ker of Ferniehirst moved quickly to contain any escalation of violence between their men. Following a brawl in Edinburgh when two of Ferniehirst’s were killed, Buccleuch signed bonds of assurance for himself and on behalf of his own men.38 The crown’s recognition of the efficacious and de facto nature of the power exerted by Cessford and Buccleuch over and through their followers, consolidated and legitimised the power in the offices given to them: Cessford, as Middle March warden from the early 1590s, and Buccleuch, as keeper of Liddesdale from 1594.39 Paradoxically, in doing so the crown fuelled a personal rivalry that replicated earlier competition for power between their two families and reignited a pattern of feuding between them that had been such a notable characteristic of life in the Middle March for much of the sixteenth century.

III It is against this background of personal rivalry and recurrent violence that we need to see the altercations between young Walter Scott of Buccleuch (born sometime around 1567) and the Cessford heir, young Robert. Both men’s actions were informed by the circumstances and collective memories of previous events and the reiteration of these during attempts to resolve the Scott-Ker feud. At the same time, the historical competition between the Scotts and Kers for local office was played out again between the current leaders in their own version of a feud that had been socially structured by their kindreds. As the new leader of the Scott kindred by the mid-1580s, Buccleuch’s challenge to Ker power in the region recalled previous rivalries that had ended badly. This was at a time when William Ker of Cessford was getting older; his headstrong

106  Anna Groundwater son Robert Ker was a few years younger than Buccleuch; Cessford would not be ready until the early 1590s to hand over to Robert his leadership of the Kers and the Middle March wardenship. The signs for future peace were not good, with both men reputed to be combative. Robert Ker was said to be ‘ambitious, proude, bloody in revenge, poore and easylie framed to anie purpose in courte or country’, whilst Buccleuch was described variously as ‘proude, malitious, mimitating the Spaniard’, and as ‘a man of energy, prompt in counsel and action, powerful in fortune, force, arms and following’.40 The intense personal rivalry that developed between these two feisty men, both with access to significant manpower and resources in the Middle March, was to continue to stoke the collective memories of the enmity between their surnames. Attempting to settle the disputes of the past, and perhaps anticipating future trouble, Robert Ker’s sister, Margaret, was married to Buccleuch in 1586 in order to encourage warmer relations between the two families. Margaret was subsequently described by her sister as ‘a good Ker, if ever there was’, which must have made life interesting, ensconced as she was in a Scott household.41 However, dispute between such rivals, vying for dominance in the Middle March, was perhaps inevitable – even without such a long tradition of antagonism between their families. Additionally, as ever, court politics were to impact again in the early 1590s, when Buccleuch’s deluded stepfather, Francis Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, rebelled against his cousin James VI. Buccleuch was initially forced into temporary exile for his complicity in Bothwell’s raids, but James’ recognition that he needed the cooperation of the major landholders in the Borders in maintaining order meant that Buccleuch was able to return by 1594.42 Buccleuch and Cessford’s personal rivalry was seen in their competition for the keepership of Liddesdale, which Bothwell had held, and which Cessford had managed to get his hands on briefly between November 1591 and June 1592. In 1594, both profited hugely from the forfeiture of Bothwell, with Buccleuch winning the lordship of Liddesdale and the permanent grant of the keepership, much to the irritation of Cessford. This meant that by the mid-1590s, although Cessford was acting as his father’s deputy as warden of the Middle March, Buccleuch effectively controlled the west part of the march. With his extensive lands in Teviotdale, his powerful relations amongst the Murrays of Selkirkshire and Tweeddale and the keepership of Liddesdale, he held virtual control of the middle part of the AngloScottish frontier. Cessford was soon complaining to the English that he could not answer for Liddesdale, where Buccleuch dominated, or East Teviotdale, which Ker of Ferniehirst, Buccleuch’s ally and Cessford’s enemy, controlled.43 Yet political factionalism, the legacy of previous violence and personal competition were not the only things affecting this ongoing feud. The position of the region on the border with England heightened the tension between the two surnames, the Scottish crown’s need for a defensive force against English incursions justifying the arming of these borderers’ retinues and its financing of their officers. In addition, the English seemed positively to delight in stoking the flames of the Scott-Ker feud: in 1596, Ralph Eure, the Middle March warden, wrote gleefully that Cessford’s ‘quarrel with Buccleuch is a means of peace with

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  107 us, who he fears may join his adversary [Buccleuch]’, noting that he hoped that one of them might ‘wrecke the other’. Robert Bowes, another English official, was ‘assured that ther imulation [feud] wilbe much better for our country then their agreement’. English meddling added an extra level of frisson to the existing tension between them.44 It is perhaps not surprising that in the same year it was reported that ‘the matter stands so hard between the two lairds as friends dare not bring them together to move friendship between them for fear of mischief’. Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of their kinsmen and friends to effect a reconciliation, the English commentator suggested the dispute was irreconcilable. It was also reported that Cessford and Buccleuch were trying to secure allies amongst the non-Cessford Kers.45 The feud between them appears by then to have been on a particularly personal level, with their own kinsmen trying to stop the posturing from escalating into outright violence; ‘some of their friends attend on them and the matter to stay their hands’. Whilst this feud drew on the historic delineation of the ScottKer feud, in this instance it appears that some efforts were being made within the kindreds to stem its spread, at the same time as Buccleuch and Cessford were canvassing for support in those same kindreds. By June 1596 matters had worsened, and it was thought that ‘Buccleuch and Sir Robert so far quarrel as it is looked to be drawn to single combat’, and in July Cessford, it was said, had attempted to provoke Buccleuch into action by showing himself ‘openly in the streets of Edinburgh with a small number’. An undated agreement signed by Buccleuch, probably referring to this point in time, talked of setting out terms for their ‘cuming to the field’.46 The efforts of their friends must have kept them apart, for no contest is recorded as having taken place. Bad feeling remained, though, and in August 1597, the ‘heartburn and hatred betwixt them’ was still being reported.47 Yet despite these personal hostilities, both men had managed to retain the favour of their king. Whilst James needed the manpower that they controlled on the Borders as part of his ongoing bargaining with Elizabeth, he did not intervene.

IV At this point, the Cessford-Buccleuch feud appeared as irresolvable as ever, but just over a year later James was to have them shaking hands in his cabinet. In bringing them to this point, and in the subsequent suppression of the wider ScottKer feud, James’ personal intervention was to be paramount. That said, it was not so much James’ interest in their feud per se that occasioned his attention, but the changing diplomatic and governmental contexts in which the feud had become inconvenient. Most persuasive, perhaps, was the carrot of the English succession, which forced, in 1597, a volte face in James’ attitude to dealing with crime in the Borders, of which more below. But there were other pressures at work too: James VI’s government was beginning to crack down on violent crime, in particular feuding, throughout his kingdom. Moreover, for some historians, such as Julian Goodare, this endeavour formed part of wider processes of intensifying

108  Anna Groundwater government, amounting to state formation-in-progress. In this the exercise of violence was to be restricted to the crown; the ‘strang’ hand that their armed retinues had given the nobility and previously used in the pursuit of private justice (or personal enmity) was now to be harnessed to effect newly intrusive government in the regions.48 For many historians, this is an over-statement of both James’ intentions and the efficacy of such moves, although it should be acknowledged that the level of crown interference in local disputes in the late 1500s was unprecedented. For some, including Maurice Lee, these constraints on noble power were about the playing out of historical tensions between magnates and kings, in which James, thanks to his able chancellor, John Maitland, and a new noblesse de robe on the council, triumphed.49 Jenny Wormald and Keith Brown have done much to nuance that old chestnut showing how the king was able to attract the co-operation of those nobles in the suppression of the feud. In doing so, he utilised the mechanisms that Stewart kings had historically used to gain the compliance of their nobility and greater lairds: targeted patronage, recognition of noble counsel, and the bonds of lordship that brought kings the manpower of a noble’s kin and tenants. For Wormald, he was just singularly good at doing it at a time when, as Brown shows, there were multiple other impetuses undermining the legitimacy that previously was supplied by the codification of the feud.50 Whatever the mixture of cultural and religious sea change that had occasioned it, feuding, a practice often hitherto ignored by the crown, was now inescapably being deemed by secular and ecclesiastic critics alike as barbaric, uncivilised, de-stabilising and offensive to God. James and his council repeatedly attributed disorder within the kingdom and more particularly, the ‘commounweill’, to the ‘deidlie feidis and contraverseis standing amangis his Hienes subjectis of all degreis’; further trouble would ensue if ‘the same feidis sall not be removit’.51 As a result, individual instances of feud were being targeted with increasing frequency, the principal combatants being ordered to bring their cases for arbitration and settlement before the court of session or the privy council. The private justice of the feud was slowly being replaced by more formalised settlement in the public courts, though often utilizing the processes of arbitration and compensation characteristic of the ‘private’ resolution of a feud.52 This was to be a lengthy endeavor since centuries-old practices were not going to be dissolved overnight. James himself could at times be a driving force in these attempts at arbitration and reconciliation. In 1587, he had staged in Edinburgh a public reconciliation of a large number of feuds amongst the nobility. Nobles in dispute were made to walk together hand-in-hand to a ‘love banquet’ in the tolbooth, where over copious goblets of wine and platters of sweetmeats, they were to swear an end to their feuds. Inevitably, this display of unity was more symbolic than practical, a triumph of idealism over reality; it did though suggest James’ own commitment to promoting ‘tranquillitie’ within his kingdom by suppressing the vendettas amongst his nobility first, and then using them to repress other feuds.53 He was still advocating this method 12 years later in advising his son in Basilikon Doron to ‘put the laws to due execution’, beginning with the ones ‘that yee loue best,

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  109 and is most oblished vnto you; to make him an example to the rest’.54 For James it was clear that ending the nobility’s own lawlessness was key to suppressing the effects of the feud throughout society. But whilst James advocated the due and impartial execution of the laws, his own actions in doing so were open to criticism. His insistence on the king’s role in dispensing personal justice, and acting himself as mediator in particular cases, could get in the way of that due process; he could be swayed to mercy where punishment was perhaps more appropriate. In February 1596, for instance, James intervened in the feud between the Kers of Ancrum and Fernihirst, and Robert Ker of Cessford over Cessford’s killing of William Ker of Ancrum in 1590, calling the chief protagonists before the council. There they agreed in the king’s presence that ‘thay were content in taikin of concord to tak the said Sir Robert be the hand’ with no further action taken against Cessford. As a result, Ferniehirst was still seething over the affair some six years later.55 As Keith Brown observes, James ‘never lost his impetuous desire to forgive’; and for some, like James Melville of Halhill, James’ proclivity in granting remissions ‘his God offendit’.56 In the mid-1590s it did appear that James, or at least his council, was applying a greater consistency in systematically dealing with feuding, but it was going to take a sustained effort to overcome such an ingrained practice. In December 1595, for instance, the privy council woefully enumerated the continuation of 13 named feuds. In a concerted attempt to deal with these it ordered the 34 principal offenders within them to appear on a specified day before king and council to underlie ‘such order as shall be prescribed for removing the said feuds’. But when an announcement was made at Stirling’s town cross of letters of horning issued against one of those named, Alexander Forrester of Garden, and his sons and associates, Garden and his gang attacked the officer at arms, showing their contempt for the legal process by ripping up the letters in front of him. The matter was still live in April 1598 when Garden was forced to become surety that his sons would stay away from Stirlingshire and Linlithgow; old habits would take time to change.57 By 1598, the privy council appears to have found progress still too slow in suppressing the violence; at a convention of the estates, an act was passed ‘regarding removing and extinguishing of deadly feuds’. This called for all feuds to be submitted for formal arbitration and resolution, and any pursuit for its satisfaction was to be undertaken through legal processes, not private action.58 Despite these measures, in real terms the crown was able only to target individual instances of feuding, and it was not until the early 1600s that any substantive progress was made in suppressing it more generally, in the Borders as elsewhere in the kingdom. Whilst there are a number of reasons cited for the ultimate disappearance of the feud, James’ success in attracting the co-operation of the nobles and lairds whose structures of power had once formed the social structuring of many feuds should not be under-estimated. Those same structures of power, the kindreds, were now to be employed in the kingdom-wide targeting of violent crime.59 This process was employed with extra emphasis in the Borders. Initially, James held back from dealing out anything other than mild rebuke in response

110  Anna Groundwater to the rumours of Buccleuch and Cessford being on the verge of combat, or to English complaints over their behaviour. Indeed, it was reported that the king was ‘no pacifier’ of their feud.60 That said, he was also becoming concerned over Elizabeth I’s refusal to confirm him as her heir to the English throne. From the mid-1590s, he was increasingly keen to prevent any occasion of antagonism between England and Scotland. By 1597, this was to amount to a complete change in his often-ambiguous policy in the Borders, in both a newly consistent policy of suppression of cross-border crime in particular and of violent crime more generally in the Borders.61 Borders lairds were forced to sign as responsible for their affiliates’ actions, the general band was to be subscribed and invoked and judicial raids were made into the Borders in August 1594, October 1595, April and November 1597, April 1598 and September 1599.62 As a result of the king’s changing priorities in the Borders, and the imperatives of the hoped-for English succession, Buccleuch’s and Cessford’s previous favour at court slipped, the king’s dependence on their armed force in the Borders superseded by his need now to placate English concerns. As importantly, the king was also in great need of his annual pension of £3,000, granted personally by Elizabeth, which she had been withholding that year until the king made Buccleuch accountable to the English for the Kinmont Willie escapade. The combination of these pressures led finally, in late 1597, to the king’s insistence on their temporary surrender to English custody to answer the many heated complaints against them.63 The heightened tensions of this moment seem to have brought the ongoing enmity between these men to a breaking point. Whilst Buccleuch quickly complied with the king’s demands, Cessford initially eluded such pressures. Buccleuch lay resentfully alone in ward at Berwick, and in November 1597 this led to a furious exchange of letters: Buccleuch, incarcerated, feared that Cessford, his rival for power in the Middle March, would make the most of his incapacity, accusing Cessford of an attempt to take his life. A series of counter-accusations of dishonesty and dishonour followed in which Cessford wrote that things had reached such a state that ‘honor will not admit me thus privately to resolve you’. The correspondence ended with the rebuttal by Buccleuch of his relationship with Cessford through marriage, ‘Your brother in na termes’.64 All this was too much for a hot-blooded Cessford, and in December 1597 he sent his representative, the equally belligerent Robert Stewart, Master of Orkney, to the imprisoned Buccleuch with a verbal ‘challenge of combate’.65 In January 1598, it was said that ‘without bloode that matter can never end honorably between them’.66 The imperatives of honour and the maintenance of reputation, so central to the rhetoric of feud, continued to frame both men’s responses and bind the apparent deadlock in their positions. Given these tensions, it was to everyone’s relief that Cessford was finally induced by the king to surrender to the English to answer their complaints, which took him out of the picture for a few months. Buccleuch, on James’ personal intervention with Elizabeth, was released, for James needed at least one of his senior officials available to carry out his newly persistent targeting of crime in the Borders.67

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  111

V The dispute may have been expected to flair up on Cessford’s release later that year, but in fact it never came to a violent conclusion.68 So what was it that had induced the combative pair to overcome their personal rivalry and to resist the power of the collective memory of the ancient enmity between the Scott and Ker kindreds? Both seem to have cottoned on quickly to the changed political and diplomatic circumstances that no longer permitted the physical manifestations of their enmity. This was very much thanks to the king. First, James’ intercession on Buccleuch’s behalf with Elizabeth, to secure his early release from English captivity, presumably earned him this borderer’s gratitude. The very fact of Buccleuch’s surrendering at all was a reflection of his willingness to satisfy the king. Similarly, with Cessford, James did not need to have him arrested; he had merely exerted pressure on Cessford to hand himself over to the English. Presumably, there was some private deal between the king and his Borders officials of future support. After all, it was in James’ own interests in the Borders to have the co-operation of the local elites in fulfilling his newly consistent policy of pacifying crime; Buccleuch and Cessford were useless to him imprisoned in Berwick. The sizable followings that these two men had authority over and the manpower that they could therefore attract to help them carry out their duties as keeper and Middle March warden respectively, were immediately to be important forces within the pacification. Thus, it was in James’ diplomatic interests to insist on his officials’ own compliance with the crackdown on violent crime in the region and in the interests of those same men to earn James’ protection and subsequent gratitude in the changed world of increasingly harmonious Anglo-Scottish relations.69 However, as important as suppressing crime more generally was, it was James’ own efforts in reconciling the personal differences between Buccleuch and Cessford that carried special weight. It was not unusual, as Keith Brown observes, for the king to stage such an intervention, especially amongst his nobility. What made this particular case pressing was the diplomatic situation outlined above: James needed their attention focused on the pacification of crime, not the settling of scores. James also placed great emphasis on the personal nature of his role as mediator and conciliator, physically bringing them together in his presence, almost certainly making them take each other by the hand (given the examples of previous such stagings) – a performance of reconciliation made all the more significant since it was done in the king’s private space, his ‘cabinet’.70 It would be too much, of course, to hope that all animosity between Buccleuch and Cessford was immediately resolved, and for the next couple of years fears continued that ‘the old quarrel’ would resume. Crucially, despite the doubt expressed over the permanence of the reconciliation, there was acknowledgement of the force binding them to peace – it was done, it was reported, ‘only for obeying the King.’ Where the efforts of (some of) their kinsmen and friends to bring them together had not succeeded, the king seems to have proved irresistible.71

112  Anna Groundwater James’ personal intervention, the physical performance of friendship, was crucial to the reconciliation itself, but in ensuring its longevity James used a strategy that had worked for him more generally in attracting co-operation from his landed elites – rewards for service in grants of lands, revenue and titles, of inclusion within government in Edinburgh and in crown offices in the regions. These last enticements, conveniently, underpinned the authority that powerful men held over their kindreds and tenants and brought James the manpower they could command within these bodies. In the Borders, after 1597, rewarding Cessford and Buccleuch brought James the manpower at their disposal in the Ker and Scott surnames in his newly consistent policy of pacification of crime; and the pressure that they could exert over their kindreds, and tenants in complying with crown policy. As crown-appointed officials, as warden and keeper respectively, they were responsible for the redress and suppression of internal and crossborder crime that James seemed determined now to eradicate; and increasingly, as leaders of their substantial kindreds, they were held to account for their affiliates’ behaviour. They did this by utilising the traditional obligations of lordship in their lands and kinship within their own and allied surnames. What was new was their adherents’ subscription of officially registered personal bonds of assurance and the increased invocation of the responsibilities of the general band that both Buccleuch and Cessford had signed on behalf of these men. Typical was that promise by the Elliots to uphold Buccleuch’s arbitration of their dispute, one of several such bonds signed by his tenants in Liddesdale swearing to be answerable to him for any English or Scottish complaint against them.72 The king’s gratitude for such cooperation, and for the brothers-in-laws’ handling of their own enmity, was quickly to follow. Both Cessford and Buccleuch were drawn (in Buccleuch’s case, eventually) into central government, with Cessford attending privy council meetings between 12 and 19 times a year to 1603. Buccleuch was to spend a few years serving in the Low Countries but returned by 1607, at which time he began to attend privy council meetings more frequently. In 1611, Buccleuch was sworn in as a privy councillor.73 Any diminution that the two borderers may have felt in the reining-in of their more arbitrary actions in the Borders was to some extent being compensated for by inclusion at the highest levels of government. Back in the Borders, they retained their offices, although Cessford’s wardenship fell into abeyance after 1603, when the whole Scottish border region, now part of the rechristened cross-border ‘Middle Shires’, came under the lieutenancy first of Alexander Lord Home and after 1605 under the Scottish Commission for the Middle Shires. After 1607, Buccleuch, still keeper of Liddesdale, was instrumental in the pacification, and in 1608, he received an approbation of and indemnity for his services, which underlined that the king himself had ‘instructed him verbally, both privately and in public’ to ‘execute justice on the malefactors and settle the country in peace’. That Buccleuch had the power to do so was noted in the ‘fortune, force, arms, and following’ that he continued to command amongst his kindred and tenants. In this, he was utilising the traditional bonds of lordship and kinship, to effect crown policy in ways that were not particularly different from those of old; the diplomatic and governmental contexts in which he was acting had, however, irrevocably changed.74

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  113 Land and honours came his way too from an appreciative king, as they did also to Cessford. Buccleuch, in 1599, received a new confirmation of the barony of Branxholme, with its consolidation of Branxholme, the lordship of Ettrick Forest and the barony of Minto; along with his lordship of Liddesdale, Buccleuch effectively held lands from Ewesdale in the west through to Roxburghshire in the east, encompassing much of Teviotdale. In 1606, James made him Lord Scott of Buccleuch.75 As for Cessford, in 1600 James granted him an annual pension of 650 merks from the abbacy of Kelso, in remembrance of Cessford’s ‘gude honorabill and thankfull service’. Later that year Cessford was made Lord Roxburgh, and in 1602, Roxburgh received the king’s confirmation of the lands that he had been given from the forfeiture of the Earl of Bothwell and consolidation of these with other lands into the new barony of Sprouston.76 In 1603, Cessford accompanied James to London and was eventually to marry Lady Jean Drummond of Queen Anne’s household, at a wedding that reputedly cost £3000, paid for by the queen.77 A list of the new Lord Roxburgh’s clothing in 1610 showed how times had changed. When at Whitehall, no longer did he wear the leather jerkin of the Borders rider, but the rarified clothing of a courtier, including: [A d]oublet of neir whyte satene wrought with gallounes doublet of cloth of gold. One pair of carnatioun taffatie gatrers withe ane riche lace of gold and silver.78 Despite this, there is an indication that these men were not immediately reformed: in 1602, the newly ennobled Roxburgh had to find surety of £2000 from John Spottiswoode of that Ilk not to harm two Lethan brothers in Ellesden.79 And it would take longer for the disputes between some of their kinsmen to settle, collective memories perhaps sustaining enmity amongst those who had not benefited in the same way as their kindred leaders. In 1608, for instance, Sir Andrew Ker of Greenhead successfully pursued Robert Scott of Haining, Buccleuch’s previously trusted lieutenant, for an armed attack on the Ker-owned mill of Selkirk, the rights to which Haining disputed.80 As was said of the similarly long-running feud between the Maxwells and Johnstones of the West March, ‘the hairtburning betuix thair frendis and followeris is not yit fullie extinguishit’.81

VI The inducements of offices, lands, income and titles offered by James were to prove sufficient for these leaders to break the pattern of violence that had helped to define and divide their kindreds for the previous century. In the process, they had stemmed a personal rivalry too, which had looked until 1598 as intractable as ever. In this, Buccleuch and Cessford were affected by a challenge from the crown to traditional models of noble power, in which the landed elites had participated in feuds and exercised their rights of arbitration within nominally private systems of justice. The crown’s increasing insistence on the resolution of feuds in either the court of session or the privy council in Edinburgh, and the

114  Anna Groundwater subscription of various bonds of assurance for future good behavior by nobles and their followers alike, imposed an increasingly public and centrally registered mode of justice. This constrained the nobility’s (or as in the case initially of Buccleuch and Cessford, the greater lairds’) own powers of arbitration and began to negate the need for the large armed retinues that such men maintained to pursue a feud or to enforce its settlement. That said, the crown continued deliberately to use the ‘strang hand’ exerted by the powerful men of the regions to prosecute crown policy, which meant that those traditional models of lordship, and service, and the obligations of kinship and alliance that had helped man the pursuit of a feud were now being used in the suppression of its practice. These were processes happening throughout Scotland, but in particular in areas of governmental concern. In the late 1590s, one of those targeted areas was the Borders, in the face of changing diplomatic objectives. James’ hopes of the English succession prodded into action the one man who could ensure that Buccleuch and Cessford would meet, and, at least in his presence, reconcile. The king’s personal intervention also helped to ensure that the effects of this reconciliation were lasting, no matter how much rivalry may have remained between them. That Buccleuch and Cessford never themselves came to blows was thanks to a combination of James’ and these borderers’ personal interests and the specific diplomatic contexts. These were as important as broader processes underway in the ending of the feud and intensifying intrusion of the crown into the resolution of dispute. The changed times were reflected in the lack of support shown by Buccleuch to his former chief enforcer, Scott of Haining, after 1603. When a fight broke out in 1619 between the followers of the former Cessford, now Roxburgh, and his cousin Ferniehirst, Roxburgh offered to take such measures as Ferniehirst desired ‘to teach’ his affiliates ‘to live more civilly and quietly’.82 Thanks to James, the poachers had truly turned gamekeepers.

Notes 1 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, no. 279. 2 Sir William Fraser, The Scotts of Buccleuch, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1878), ii, no. 204. To avoid confusion, the nomenclature ‘of Buccleuch’ has been used throughout this chapter for the head of the Scott kindred, who was usually resident at Branxholme near Selkirk in Teviotdale, even though the incumbents of this role were variously known as Branxholme or Buccleuch during the sixteenth century. 3 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, no. 109; CBP, ii, no. 891. 4 RPCS, vi, p. 46. 5 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, no. 828. 6 Susan Doran ‘Loving and affectionate cousins? The relationship between Elizabeth i and James vi of Scotland, 1586–1603’, in S. Doran and G. Richardson, eds, Tudor England and Its Neighbours (New York: 2005), 203–33; Anna Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 1573–1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance (Woodbridge: 2010), 180, 182–84. 7 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, no. 279. 8 CBP, ii, no.284; CSP Scot, xii, nos 236, 237, 264, 284, 404, 406, 407; xiii, pt.1, nos 116, 117. 9 Robert Kerr Hannay, Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, 1501–1554 (Edinburgh: 1932), p. 209. 10 Brown, Bloodfeud, 79–80; Michael Brown, The Black Douglases: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, 1300–1455 (East Linton: 1998), 294–96, 300–301;

He ‘made them friends in his cabinet’  115 J.  M.  Gilbert, Hunting and Hunting Reserves in Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh: 1979), 136–37, 158; Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 51–52. 11 Maureen Meikle, A British Frontier? Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders, 1540–1603 (East Linton: 2004), 27; T. Ian Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 1513–1603 (Edinburgh: 1966), 238. 12 Brown, Bloodfeud, 5, 7, 80, 108. 13 Fraser, Buccleuch, i, 79–90; ii, nos 137, 139, 144, 147, 148; Rae, Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 238–39. 14 Fraser, Buccleuch, ii, nos 162, 163; CBP, i, no. 139; ii, no. 192; RPCS, ii, 643–44, 665. 15 Rae, Administration of the Scottish Frontier, app. 2; CSP Scot., v, nos 432, 446, 471, 584. 16 Brown, Bloodfeud, 7, 108–109, 123–24, 127, 130, 133. 17 CBP, i, no. 120. 18 CBP, ii, no. 323. 19 Jenny Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland 1470–1625 (Edinburgh: 1981), 35–38, quote at 36; and Jenny Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud, kindred and government in early-modern Scotland’, Past and Present, 87 (1980), 54–97, at 70–1. 20 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 56, 62, 70, 72–74, 82–83; Groundwater, ‘“We Bund and Obleiss Us Never More to Querrell”: Bonds, Private Obligations and Public Justice in the Reign of James VI’ in Boardman and Goodare, Kings, Lords and Men, 175–76, 181–82; Mark A. Godfrey, ‘Rethinking the justice of the feud in sixteenth-century Scotland’, in ibid., 136–54, and Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: The Origins of a Central Court (Leiden: 2009), 355–56. 21 Brown, Bloodfeud, 268–72; Brown, Noble Power, 32, 34. 22 Brown, Noble Power, 58–60, 61; see also Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community, 19–21, 25–26, 37–38, 40. 23 Alison Cathcart, Kinship and Clientage: Highland Clanship, 1451–1609 (Leiden: 2006), 27–29, 59, 89–92, 99, 112, 213–16; Wormald, Lords and Men, 76–78; Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 56–59, 71; Anna Groundwater, ‘The obligations of kinship and alliance within governance in the Scottish Borders, 1528–1625’, Canadian Journal of History 48:1 (2013), 1–27. 24 Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 67–71, 96. 25 RPCS, iv, 585–6; v, 161, 273; Brown, Noble Power, 29, 56; Brown, Bloodfeud, 79. 26 NRS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/9/78. 27 NRS, Buccleuch Muniments, GD224/906/3. 28 Groundwater, ‘Bonds, Private Obligations and Public Justice’, 174–75, 179–80, 185, 187–88. 29 Fraser, Buccleuch, ii, no. 202. Groundwater, ‘Bonds, private obligations and public justice’, 182. 30 RPCS, ii, 643–34, 665. Fraser, Buccleuch, i, 137–40; ii, no. 192; Brown, Noble Power, 64. 31 RPS, 1587/7/70 [accessed 16 March 2016]. 32 RPCS, ii, 117, 370–73, 547–52; vi, 45–46, 435–36. 33 RPCS, vi, 827‒28. 34 RPCS, iv, 826. 35 RPCS, iv, 809. 36 RPCS, v, 741–42. 37 RPCS, vi, 823–24. 38 NRS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/9, ff. 80, 81, 83–84, 86. 39 Fraser, Buccleuch, ii, no. 211; RPCS, v, 178. 40 CBP, ii, nos 265, 347; RMS, xlvi, no. 15; Brown, Bloodfeud, 24. 41 Fraser, Buccleuch, ii, no. 204; William Fraser, Memorials of the Montgomeries, Earls of Eglington, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1859), i, 252. 42 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999), 257–59, 280, 284; Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, ‘The Scottish state and its Borderlands’, in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 186–207 at 187, 201.

116  Anna Groundwater 43 Rae, Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 215, 240, 245; CBP, ii, no. 187. 44 CBP, ii, no. 265, 347. 45 CSP Scot., xii, nos 115, 120. 46 CSP Scot., xii, nos 197, 212, 224; GD224/1059/17; Brown, Bloodfeud, 25. 47 CSP Scot., xiii, pt 1, no. 52. 48 Goodare, State and Society, 67, 74–6, 97, 100–101, 160; Goodare, ‘Scottish politics in the reign of James VI’, 37–39; Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 128–30, 137–39, 152–53, 206–207. 49 Maurice Lee, ‘James VI and the aristocracy’, Scotia 1 (1977), 18–23. 50 Jenny Wormald, ‘James VI: New Men for Old?’, Scotia 2 (1978), 70–76; Brown, Bloodfeud, 232–34, 258–60, 268–72. 51 RPCS, v, 248; Brown, Bloodfeud, 184–207, 215–19. 52 Groundwater, ‘Bonds, private obligations and public justice’, 174–76, 189–90; Godfrey, Civil Justice, 355–56, 412–13; Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud’, 90. 53 Moysie, Memoirs, 63–64; Brown, Bloodfeud, 216. 54 James, Political Writings, 28. 55 RPCS, v, 273; Brown, Bloodfeud, 79. 56 Brown, Bloodfeud, 215–19, quote at 216; Melville, Memoirs, 391. 57 RPCS, v, 248–49, 261–62, 273, 280, 303–304, 688. 58 RPCS, v, 552; RPS, 1598/6/2; Brown, Bloodfeud, 239–60, 269; Goodare, State and Society, 75–76. 59 Brown, Bloodfeud, on attracting the nobles’ cooperation, 216–19, 225–26, 233–35, 241–44, 268–70, and on the role of religion in transforming attitudes towards feuding, especially ‘Ideology – Christians and Gentlemen’, 184–214; Goodare, State and Society, 74–76, 97, 100. 60 CSP Scot, xii, no. 120. 61 Doran ‘Loving and affectionate cousins?’, 203–33, at 216, 218–21, 227; Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, Chapters 6 and 7. 62 Rae, Administration of the Scottish Frontier, app. 6, 268. 63 Groundwater, The Middle March, 181–84; Julian Goodare, ‘James VI’s English subsidy’, in Goodare and Lynch, The Reign of James VI, 110–25, at 113–16, 120–21; CBP, ii, no. 284; CSP Scot., xii, nos 195–97; xiii, pt.1, nos 50, 63, 96, 105, 147, 149. 64 CBP, ii, no. 842. 65 CBP, ii, nos 866, 878. 66 CBP, ii, no. 891. 67 CSP Scot., xiii, pt. 1, no. 120. 68 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, nos 151–52. 69 Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, Chapter 7. 70 Brown, Bloodfeud, 56–57. 71 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, nos 279, 440, 443; xiii, pt.2, no. 496; CBP, ii, no. 998. 72 NRS, GD224/906/68/4; GD224/906/5/1–7. 73 Fraser, Buccleuch, i, 235, ii, 262; RPCS, vii, 340. 74 Fraser, Buccleuch, i, 231–2; Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 91. 75 NRS, GD224/479/1; GD224/890/14; GD224/917/34; RMS, vi, nos 956, 1527. 76 Roxburgh papers, NRAS1100/728; RMS, vi, nos 1341, 1342. 77 Norman Egbert McClure, ed., The Letters of John Chamberlain, 2 vols (Philadelphia: 1939), i, 487n., 504, 507. 78 NRAS, Roxburgh papers, 1100/1227. 79 RPCS, vi, 733. 80 RPCS, viii, 134. 81 RPCS, xii, 673–75. 82 NRS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/12, f. 50.

6 Noble power in the West Highlands and Isles James VI and the end of the mercenary trade with Ireland, 1594–961 Ross Crawford Throughout the sixteenth century, mercenaries from the Gaelic clans of the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland – known colloquially to the English as ‘redshanks’2 – sailed the narrow strait of the North Channel to offer their services to the highest bidder for the summer months. Generally found in the employ of the chiefs of the O’Neill or O’Donnell clans, these mercenaries were a private military force on the very doorstep of Ulster. Cultural affinity and even a ‘pan-Gaelic sentiment’ may have influenced their traditional allegiance,3 but their loyalty was undoubtedly lubricated by the Irish chiefs’ open-handed pledges of cold, hard cash. For the Elizabethan government, stopping this near-annual influx of mercenaries became a top priority in the last few years of the sixteenth century as the final Tudor conquest of Ireland was resisted by a ‘powerful confederacy’ of Gaelic nobles headed by Aodh Mòr O’Neill, Earl of Tyrone.4 Armies of these ‘redshanks’ were up to 3,000 men strong, a potential game-changer in this conflict as the English only had a permanent military force of around 2,500 men in Ireland.5 Without the mercenaries, Tyrone knew he faced tremendous odds and could not risk a pitched battle with the Elizabethan army. As one of his own followers observed in 1595: ‘if [Elizabeth] lose all [she] can send as many more, but he cannot do so’. Therefore, he was heavily reliant on ‘spare forces’ – mercenaries – to challenge the Tudor establishment.6 Anxious to prevent these reinforcements, the Elizabethan government began lobbying King James VI of Scotland to intervene in the West Highlands and Isles. The famous passage on the ‘Hie-lands’ from 1598’s Basilikon Doron, which presents the inhabitants of the Hebrides as distinctively savage and worthy of extirpation, has become ubiquitous in analyses of James VI’s Highland policy.7 Close assessment of the text in isolation can still prove enlightening, but it must be remembered that this passage forms just one paragraph among many, and was composed more than a decade into James’ personal rule, not at the outset. Consideration of specific case studies, unshackled from Basilikon Doron, facilitates deeper exploration of James’ developing view of the Isles. The Scottish king may have advocated the extermination of Gaelic islanders in 1598, but kingship often required a pragmatic approach – how did James actually view and interact with the nobility of the West Highlands and Isles before 1598?

118  Ross Crawford This chapter will focus primarily on the king’s interactions with three Gaelic nobles – the Earl of Argyll, MacDonald of Sleat, and MacLean of Duart – during an intense period of high politics, diplomacy and warfare between 1594 and 1596. Lynch described James’ reaction to the mercenary trade crisis in these years as ‘vigorous, embattled and at times histrionic’,8 but his approach seems more clearly characterised by passivity and distance, both geographical and personal. This offers a marked contrast to James’ apparent attempts to curb noble power elsewhere in Scotland.9 Yet his laissez-faire attitude towards the Highlands was also a political ploy, allowing him to strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis the English succession. The ambiguous stance adopted by the king also had the knock-on effect of hampering the extension of his authority into the West Highlands and Isles, as the clans had been given little reason to recognise his sovereignty.

I By the early 1590s, the mercenary trade was such a problem for Queen Elizabeth that she made it a problem for James. In December 1593, ‘theis Irische matteris’ loomed large in Scottish national affairs,10 and on 4 January 1594, Queen Elizabeth wrote to King James about preventing certain island clans from sailing to Ireland. Elizabeth downplayed the threat they posed but welcomed James’ idea to deploy the Earl of Argyll in the ‘preventing of such inconvenience’.11 However, James and his court were far more concerned at the time with the rebellion of the Earl of Huntly and the movements of the outlawed Earl of Bothwell.12 By May 1594, the other side was courting the 18-year-old Gilleasbuig Campbell, Earl of Argyll, as the Irish chiefs Aodh Ruadh O’Donnell and O’Neill intensified diplomatic efforts to recruit Scottish mercenaries for the summer campaign. Acquiring Argyll’s support would have been a significant coup as his military strength was unparalleled in the Highlands. However, simply removing him from the equation may have been equally attractive: if he could be convinced to maintain benevolent neutrality, there would be little to stop the island clans from fully committing their forces to the Irish cause. To this end, O’Donnell and O’Neill sent a servant to Argyll to renew the ‘auld frinship’ that had existed between their houses.13 In exchange for the service of an unspecified number of Argyll’s men, the Irish chieftains pledged to pay him a yearly pension of £8,000 Scots. It was initially reported that Argyll was favourably disposed to this arrangement, but he refused due to upheaval within the wider Campbell clan that required his attention. The young earl had only just emerged from a traumatic minority: in 1592, his main guardian, John Campbell of Cawdor, had been assassinated by John Campbell of Ardkinglas, and the conspiracy was said to have intended the death (by poisoning) of Argyll himself.14 Unperturbed by this setback, the Irish changed tack and approached Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat at the beginning of June, who agreed to muster an army (although it is unknown if he was offered the same generous payment).15 He may have been second choice on this occasion, but Dòmhnall Gorm was a chief of prominence in the West Highlands and Isles. During a disagreement with MacKenzie of Kintail

West Highlands and Isles  119 in 1593, he had allegedly declared himself ‘King of the Isles’ and successor to the headship of the forfeited Lordship of the Isles.16 The legitimacy of his claim may have been debatable, but his ambition was not. Dòmhnall Gorm apparently sought to restore the counterbalancing power of the Gaelic lordship or kingdom on the west coast of Scotland. A mercenary campaign in Ireland was an opportunity for Dòmhnall Gorm to make money and important diplomatic connections across the Irish Sea. It would also allow him to demonstrate his ability to lead a confederacy of clans and prove his worthiness to the title of ‘King of the Isles’. On 17 July 1594, Dòmhnall Gorm convened with Ruairidh Mòr MacLeod, the Tutor of Harris,17 for an expedition to Ulster.18 The Scottish government monitored their movements, but no serious preventative action was taken as the impending campaign to suppress Huntly’s rebellion in the north dominated the agenda at the Scottish court. With a combined force of between 1,200 and 2,000 men,19 MacDonald and MacLeod crossed to Ireland, landing in Tyrconnell on 25 July.20 Within a few days, they rendezvoused with O’Donnell to assist in the capture of Enniskillen Castle.21 The two leaders returned to Scotland in early September, leaving behind a band of 300 soldiers to overwinter in the service of Tyrone and O’Donnell.22 The campaign was reported a success: the mercenaries were ‘well entreated in Ireland’ and received ‘great gains and profit’.23 However, fractures had begun to emerge within this confederation of clans. Since about 1590, Dòmhnall Gorm had been married to Màiri MacLeod, the sister of the MacLeod tutor (and later chief) Ruairidh,24 but his growing ambition as the self-proclaimed ‘King of the Isles’ led him to pursue a more politically expedient match. During the 1594 campaign in Ireland, he reportedly hoped to ‘put away his wife, and to marry O’Donel’s daughter’.25 Ruairidh may not have been aware of the intentions of his brother-in-law at this stage, as both he and Dòmhnall Gorm promised to return to Ireland next year.26 In 1594 at least, the islanders sailed to Ireland unchecked, but by the next summer, a visible breach in their alliance had emerged. While the islanders were making an appreciable impact on the war in Ireland, the attention of the king’s court was fixed firmly on the rebellion of Huntly, who was also rumoured to be harbouring the arch-traitor Bothwell.27 On 25 July 1594, Argyll was given a royal commission to serve as Lieutenant of the North, along with the Earl of Atholl and Lord Forbes, for the suppression of Huntly’s ‘public war against God’.28 Some accounts claim that king and privy council were divided over Argyll’s position as leader: …it is certein that the King was very vnwilling that the Earle of Argyle should have been his Majestie’s Lieutenant there, as fearing the insolency (which was thoght naturall to all Hylanders) showld (in caice he had preuailed) bursth furth wnto some worser inconuenient, yet by importunity of the ministers it was yielded vnto.29 The Earl of Mar attempted to dissuade Argyll from pursuing Huntly, perhaps regarding the islanders as the greater threat,30 and soon the two situations coalesced. Wild rumours began to spread that Huntly had not only secured military

120  Ross Crawford aid from the Spanish, but had also enlisted the ‘principals of the Isles’ (including MacDonald of Dunivaig, MacLeod of Harris, MacKenzie of Kintail, and MacLean of Duart) to raise a huge army of 20,000 or 30,000 men within the month.31 This was a significant overestimation of the military might of the Isles but speaks volumes about the nervous atmosphere within the intelligence community at this time.32 Fears about the islanders convening with Huntly proved unfounded, and hundreds actually fought against him at the Battle of Glenlivet on 3 October 1594. The royal army of around 6,000 men led north by Argyll to confront Huntly was composed almost entirely of Gaels.33 Many followed traditional loyalties by adhering to Argyll, but they still marched beneath the king’s banner.34 Admittedly, few came from the clans involved in the mercenary trade,35 and despite being called upon by Argyll, MacDonald of Sleat stayed at home, presumably to avoid looking like a subordinate of the Campbell chief.36 Nevertheless, one of the ironies of Glenlivet is that the king’s most distinguished champion on the battlefield was an islander: Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart. Contemporary sources unanimously agree that he fought fiercely and might have won the battle had he had command of Argyll’s army, not just his vanguard.37 Before the campaign, the mood in the king’s court was one of extreme pessimism. Many thought little of Argyll’s chances, disdaining his army as ‘easy to be overthrown by Huntly’.38 The battle was not quite the disaster they predicted, but it was still an inconclusive outcome, and the human cost certainly weighed more heavily on Argyll’s side: 200–700 dead, compared to Huntly’s 50–100 wounded or dead (including 12–18 prominent lairds).39 In a letter to his wife Queen Anna, the king commented that Huntly had essentially achieved a Pyrrhic victory as he ‘inflicted the defeat but … received the greater loss, through the death and wounding of many … principal gentlemen’.40 This betrays a lack of concern about the hundreds of soldiers from the West Highlands and Isles who had lost their lives, yet the result of the battle was probably ideal for James as both Huntly and Argyll had their wings clipped.41 A poem, originally written in Latin just a few years after the battle, states: The King, as every one knows, was little affected by Argyle’s misfortune; but often spoke to him of the battle with derision.42 According to tradition, the young earl was led weeping from the battlefield.43 Whether this is true or not, his disgrace was very real, and it was soon exploited by the king.

II Three weeks after the battle, Queen Elizabeth sent two letters – one to James and one to Argyll – urging immediate action on the Irish situation, which had been in stasis for much of the year due to the upheavals in the north east. Recognising Argyll as the man of ‘greatest commandment’ in Highland matters, Elizabeth

West Highlands and Isles  121 promised him great reward for his service, assuming the king gave his blessing.44 In her letter to James, Elizabeth implored him to recognise that Argyll’s service would be of mutual benefit for the two kingdoms: …we have thought it not amiss, with your privity, to recommend the reformation of the [Isles] to [Argyll], assuring him that we have no doubt but you will take it as an acceptable service to yourself, being that which may concern the amity of both the kingdoms.45 Receiving the permission of James was not a foregone conclusion and Elizabeth’s request was more than mere courtesy. After all, Elizabeth was a foreign monarch, and procuring the service of the most prominent Gaelic magnate in Scotland without James’ tacit approval would raise serious questions about which monarch truly exerted sovereignty along the west coast. Frustration at James’ passivity lay just below the surface of Elizabeth’s letter. She emphasised the ease with which her forces could crush the Hebrideans, but requested his official cooperation to allow her to demonstrate publicly her ‘great interest in [James’] love and amity’.46 Much was being left unsaid in the correspondence between the two monarchs: just as James knew that Elizabeth clearly needed his help with the islanders, Elizabeth must have been fully aware that James’ passive approach was a calculated political ploy. On 28 November, Argyll was finally given his ‘reward’ (or rather punishment) for his service against Huntly.47 Brought before king and council he was forced to make himself answerable to the law for all with the surname of Campbell.48 Soon he was bombarded with claims ‘for everie licht caus … sumtymes for materis of les importance nor ten pundis’, which threatened to bankrupt him or at least overwhelm his time.49 In December, a thoroughly chastened Argyll was due to meet with King James at Stirling to discuss the Irish situation. Since receiving Elizabeth’s letter in October, the king had been unable to ‘expedye’ the request of the English queen. He claimed (rather unconvincingly) that his hands were tied: the Gaelic chiefs had already been put to the horn yet still refused to obey him – nothing else could be done.50 Argyll pled similarly, apparently too unsettled by recent events to aid the task.51 John Colville’s informant, Seumas Campbell, the heir of Sir Iain Campbell of Lawers, saw it all rather differently.52 Campbell argued that neither the king nor Argyll ‘can or meanis to do [Elizabeth] any good’,53 and that James’ professed powerlessness was a charade. By stalling for time, the king hoped Elizabeth’s ‘fear’ of the islanders’ involvement would compel her to ‘agre to his other desirs’ (presumably an open declaration of his succession) in exchange for his assistance.54 The English queen may have already deduced James’ strategy, hence her direct correspondence with Argyll. Sending a letter to the Campbell chief, and incentivising his support with promise of great reward, was a way of driving a wedge between Argyll and his king. The Campbell chief had his own reasons for prevarication. Concurrent with his letter from Elizabeth, Tyrone and O’Donnell had escalated their attempts to woo Argyll to their camp, increasing the yearly pension to £10,000 in exchange

122  Ross Crawford for 2,000 soldiers.55 Following the example set by his king, he may have been delaying to drive up demand for his services. A less cynical motive was pure self-preservation. James Hill has argued that if Argyll ‘had decided to halt the annual migration of mercenaries to Ulster, then there was virtually no one who could turn the tap on again’.56 However, this overlooks the immediate context of 1595, which must be counted as one of the low points for the powerful Campbell Earls of Argyll: internal conspiracies had fractured the integrity of the wider kindred, and defeat in battle had severely reduced their military prestige. After Glenlivet in October, the pooled might of the islanders’ military forces now presented an immediate threat, and Argyll would immediately be in their firing line if he accepted the task of obstructing their voyage. Argyll’s servant George Erskine alludes to this predicament when conveying his employer’s concern at becoming embroiled in a serious war for upholding Elizabeth’s ‘particular’ interest.57 Soon the Campbell chief found himself with little choice in the matter. On 1 February 1595, Argyll was placed in ward in Edinburgh Castle.58 Ostensibly, this was to arrange reconciliation between him and the Earl of Atholl, as they had fallen out in the aftermath of Glenlivet,59 but it is significant that his imprisonment coincides with the king and privy council being ‘busied upon the Irische mattaris’. Indeed, on the very same day, James shirked all responsibility for the suppression of the islanders, taking ‘order that Argyll should be answerable to it’.60 Upon Argyll’s release on 22 February,61 his new responsibility in the Isles was underscored when James informed the English ambassador Robert Bowes that he would abstain from replying to Elizabeth’s letter ‘not for unwillingnes or dislike’ of its contents, but because he had fully delegated these affairs to Argyll.62 This could be interpreted as a show of faith in Argyll’s abilities, but James was probably using the Campbell chief as a shield. Delegation distanced the king from any failure while leaving him poised to capitalise on, and claim credit for, any success. Delegation also characterised Argyll’s efforts: he entrusted almost everything to his ally, Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart. Much like Argyll, MacLean had been offered generous payment for his service in Ireland, but his personal animosity towards Tyrone made an arrangement almost unthinkable. In 1589, Tyrone had killed his cousin and MacLean ‘purposed to seek revenge by all the means in his power’.63 An enduring feud with the MacDonalds (which had resulted in both clans being accused of treason in 1590/1)64 also made him predisposed to oppose their mercenary endeavours. In correspondence with the English authorities, MacLean devised a sound military strategy to defeat the mercenary company: a coordinated attack on two fronts. While he and Argyll pursued them west from Scotland, the Elizabethan navy would attack east from Ireland, trapping the islanders in the North Channel.65

III Diplomatic negotiations reached a crisis point in the early summer when the warfare in Ireland intensified. Tyrone had won a noteworthy victory over the English at the Battle of Clontibret in late March,66 and the islanders were again amassing their forces to help him capitalise on this momentum. Since delegating

West Highlands and Isles  123 to MacLean in March, Argyll had done nothing about the mercenaries for over a month, prompting an anxious Bowes to prod him for information.67 On April 24 1595, the English diplomat George Nicolson informed Bowes that unless Argyll was assured of recompense for his service he would be tempted by the offers of the Irish chiefs.68 MacLean of Duart made simultaneous pleas for payment.69 Nicolson stressed the dire nature of the situation by providing false reports that MacDonald of Dunivaig’s son was already in Ireland and that ‘those wars will never end to her Majesty’s liking … the state there is dangerous’.70 In April, Tyrone had sent an advance to the MacDonalds consisting of ‘silver and silver work’, and by June, the islanders were almost ready to depart, while Argyll remained an unknown quantity.71 That summer the MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of Harris were joined by the Dunivaig and Clanranald kindreds of the Clan Donald and the MacLeods of Lewis. Together their pooled resources raised a formidable army of around 3,000 men.72 The company was preparing to sail when Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat and his ‘maughe’ (a male connection by marriage, in this case brother-in-law)73 Ruairidh MacLeod of Harris ‘fell out’.74 The reasons for this upset are not known and could simply have been a disagreement over strategy, but the explicit reference to Ruairidh as Dòmhnall Gorm’s ‘maughe’ probably implies the quarrel was related to family affairs. It may be that the marriage pact between Dòmhnall Gorm and O’Donnell’s daughter had been discovered. Whatever the nature of this controversy, it temporarily stalled the mercenaries’ sailing – a reprieve for the English in Ireland – but their sizeable force remained unchallenged on the west coast of Scotland. On 23 June 1595, Nicolson ‘broke the matter to [the king] at length’, who again equivocated, citing once again the rebellious nature of the islanders and the impossibility of definitively preventing their crossing. For the first time, he acknowledged MacDonald of Sleat’s claim to be ‘King of the Isles’, commenting that ‘if he could, he would have Donald Gorm’s pride suppressed’.75 Perhaps sensing he was not making much headway, Nicolson had the king summon Argyll, and the three discussed the matter in further depth. Nicolson’s summary of the discussion was not positive: ‘Let not her Majesty think that nothing will do anything here, nor trust to friendship here before she be covenant for it’.76 It is clear that the English were deeply suspicious of James, and it was later rumoured that the Scottish king had been secretly negotiating with Tyrone during this entire affair, playing both sides to secure political advantage.77 James’ grandfather James V had serious pretensions to the kingship of Ireland, an aspiration James may have inherited,78 but the reality of the political circumstances more than 50 years on was very different. Presumed heir of the childless Elizabeth, James knew he could soon inherit the throne of Ireland (and England) without the need for warfare or bloodshed. Open support of Tyrone at this juncture could easily have jeopardised this prospect. Nevertheless, it remains plausible – even probable – that James was keeping his options open in the event of a challenge to his succession. Maintaining amicable relations with Tyrone and the other Irish chiefs cleared the way for a future alliance, which would have posed serious problems for the English, both militarily and politically, and could have provided James with the leverage he required to secure his claim to succeed Elizabeth.79

124  Ross Crawford Despite these underlying machinations, Nicolson managed to wring a public denunciation of the islanders and Tyrone out of James, finally breaking his assiduous silence on the matter. On July 19, James condemned Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig and Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat for intending to ‘transporte thameselffis ouer to Irland’.80 The main thrust of the king’s proclamation was to denounce Lowland sheriffdoms for supplying Tyrone, O’Donnell and ‘utheris rebellious people’ in Ireland with victuals and weaponry for the past year.81 English diplomats later suspected James had condoned this trade.82 Notably, the proclamation was also a tacit admission from the king that he could not (or would not) prevent the sailing of the islanders. Indeed, it seems to have only made them more eager to depart.83 Moreover, when it became clear that MacLean would refuse all offers of riches, land and marriage-contracts from the islanders and Irish chiefs,84 tensions ran high within the mercenary camp, and his looming presence sowed doubt among the leaders.85 At a parley in Mull, he convinced Torcall Dubh MacLeod of Lewis to abandon the expedition, prompting a furious response from MacDonald of Sleat who captured MacLeod ‘so that he and his forces should not leave them’.86 Argyll also began to make a move. An incident in July provides crucial insight into how noble power could operate in the West Highlands and Isles. Argyll sent his cousin, Gilleasbuig Campbell, provost of Kilmun, to parley with Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig and dissuade him from making his expedition. Negotiations swiftly turned sour when Aonghas gave an ‘evil answer’ with ‘proud language’, compelling an enraged Kilmun to demand single combat with Aonghas on the small island of Inch Kenneth.87 Kilmun was deadly serious about the challenge and attached himself to a large force of around 2,000 men provided by Argyll, which threatened to ravage Aonghas’ lands for ‘surety of fair play’.88 Ultimately, the MacDonald chief managed to extricate himself from the duel, ‘confessing his rash oversight in making such an answer to his messenger and offering amends to him’.89 In doing so, he called Argyll’s bluff, and Argyll disbanded his forces without ravaging the MacDonalds’ lands, perhaps another indication of the vulnerability of his position.90 He could not risk open war. The rapid escalation of this parley is fascinating.91 It initially appears as if Kilmun’s challenge was the hot-blooded action of an outraged kinsman and vassal, but the whole situation may have been a calculated attempt by Argyll to stall the islanders and undermine Aonghas’ leadership. Perhaps Kilmun was instructed to provoke the ‘evil answer’ from Aonghas and set up this unlikely duel, forcing the MacDonald chief either to risk his life in a fight to the death or shame himself in a humiliating climb-down. While less dramatic, the latter scenario would potentially foster discontent about the leadership of the MacDonalds of Dunivaig and the mercenary company as a whole. Even if the situation was not premeditated, Argyll still recognised how it could be spun to his advantage. Rather than requesting the provost retract his challenge, he threw the full weight of his military strength behind his retainer. Overall, this seems to have been an effective, if unorthodox, way of ‘staying’ the mercenaries by Argyll.

West Highlands and Isles  125

IV Unity among the islanders was rapidly fading, but after a month of delay and indecision, they finally departed for Ireland on 18 or 19 July.92 The campaign was a debacle from the outset. In a ‘pretty feat of war’, MacLean ambushed the Clanranald contingent on Mull before they crossed the Irish Sea, capturing 700 soldiers, including the Clanranald chief and Dòmhnall Gorm’s brother.93 The main force fared little better. A large fleet of islanders landed in Carrickfergus to receive supplies from Tyrone, before mooring in the bay of the Copeland Isles off the northeast coast of Ireland.94 On 27 July, they waylaid a merchant ship laden with wine, stole several casks, and that night ‘drank freely’.95 In the morning of 28 July, the MacDonalds were presumably in no state to resist an ambush by Captains George Thornton and Gregory Rigges of the HMS Popinjay and HMS Charles.96 At least two galleys were sunk with all their crew, and the survivors were run aground on the isles.97 Trapped, the MacDonalds were forced to provide pledges to Thornton and Rigges, but went one further, offering to switch sides and fight for the English queen.98 When King James heard about the MacDonalds’ defeat and capitulation his reaction was characteristically hostile, allegedly commenting that he was ‘sorry … that all were not put to the sword’.99 According to Roger Aston, James was nevertheless pleased with the result and rejoiced as if Bothwell himself had been captured.100 The king’s opinion of Argyll also improved considerably. He wrote him a ‘loving letter’ and granted him a tack of the herring customs, which had previously belonged to John Campbell of Ardkinglas and had been denied to Argyll.101 MacLean, the true architect of the plan, received no immediate reward from either the Scottish king or the English queen.102 Among the islanders, only the MacLeods of Harris slipped through the net, but upon landfall in Lough Foyle in Ulster they were attacked by English cavalry, resulting in the death of 16 ‘gentlemen … two or three of them very special gentlemen’.103 On 24 August, Erskine reported that MacLeod of Harris remained in Ireland, so determined to salvage his honour that he ignored the pleas of Argyll’s messenger to return to Scotland.104 MacLean meanwhile claimed that the MacLeods were also incensed by the MacDonalds’ switch of allegiance.105 Considering the high likelihood that some of his closest male family members were among the MacLeod dead (probably the two or three ‘very special gentlemen’), Ruairidh Mòr must have felt betrayed by the limp capitulation and volte-face of his brother-in-law and the other MacDonalds. The MacLeods stayed in Ireland with 600–700 men and joined up with O’Donnell.106 With their aid, O’Donnell captured the castle in Costello, before ravaging Connaught and Galway, carrying off ‘wealth and riches’.107 Upon his return to Scotland after his surrender to the English, Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig sent Tyrone a detachment of his force (around 600 men) under the command of his son, ashamed that ‘materis ar nocht keipit to the erle’.108 By 22 August 1595, the majority of the company had returned to Scotland, many fearful their unprotected lands at home would be harried by MacLean.109 Aside from the MacLeods of Harris’ marked contribution to Tyrone’s cause, the 1595 campaign was a disaster.

126  Ross Crawford The relief among the English in Ireland must have been palpable, but at this point, it seemed the mercenary threat had only been postponed and would re-emerge next year. On 22 August, Nicolson told Bowes that he again sought an audience with James and Argyll ‘for the matters of Ireland are said to be but beginning to trouble the estate of England’.110 Indeed, in March 1596 MacLean reported that the MacDonalds were already ‘making prepara[tions] for mending of their galleys … appointed for transporting of their a[rmed] men’ into Ireland once more.111 Erskine echoed this view, cautioning that the MacDonalds thought little of their pledges to Elizabeth’s captains and advising the queen to provide Argyll with the necessary funds to definitively secure the allegiance of other clans on the west coast.112 Yet the 1595 campaign had emphatically told the islanders that they would no longer be able to sail unchallenged or with the same numbers they had previously mustered. MacLean had been steadily consolidating his power within the Isles, drawing clans away from the Irish mercenary market.113 The marriage of his eldest son, Eachann Mòr, to Janet MacKenzie, the sister of the powerful Coinneach MacKenzie of Kintail, in early 1596 was enough to convince even the king that MacLean held the key to control of the Isles.114 By this time, Elizabeth had made direct contact with MacLean, crucially without the knowledge of Argyll or the king, and in May 1596, Cecil, on behalf of the queen, paid him £150 sterling.115 In December 1596, the English privy council debated an invasion of Ulster led by MacLean of Duart, intended to flush out Tyrone and O’Donnell.116 As has already been shown, James was reportedly powerless without Argyll, but he in turn could not ‘do good but by MacLean’.117 Practical power and ‘greatest commandment’ in the Isles were now possessed by the MacLean chief. After the ignominious mercenary campaign of 1595, the king planned a personal expedition to the Western Isles in July 1596 to underscore their pacification, perhaps in emulation of his grandfather and great-grandfather.118 Such a  ‘progress’ may have been little more than a ‘publicity stunt’,119 but James’ predecessors had recognised the importance of visible displays of kingship and authority. Ultimately, the king decided against his own involvement, allegedly due to concerns about an imminent feud between Lord John Hamilton and the Earl of Argyll.120 Instead, Sir William Stewart of Houston was named as the king’s Lieutenant of the Isles, to be assisted by MacLean, MacKenzie and MacKintosh.121 Dòmhnall Gorm and the other chiefs (with the sole exception of MacDonald of Dunivaig) had recently submitted to the privy council, and it was hoped that ‘great profit’ would be raised for the king through the ‘general obedience of the inhabitants’ of the Isles.122 One Gaelic noble is conspicuous by his absence in these proceedings: the Earl of Argyll. He was reportedly displeased about the appointment of Stewart, as his Campbell ‘ancestors [had] long enjoyed that office’. When summoned to convene with the new lieutenant, he excused himself because of sickness.123 The naming of Stewart of Houston as Lieutenant of the Isles was undoubtedly a major snub, and Lynch argues that he was the first of ‘a new breed of royal lieutenants … from outside the ranks of traditional magnates’, an attempt by James at lessening his reliance on nobles who pursued

West Highlands and Isles  127 their own personal agenda in the Highlands and Isles.124 Like Elizabeth, the king had recognised that MacLean was more ready and willing to act in the Isles, and his animosity to Tyrone made his loyalty more assured, at least when it came to Irish matters. MacLean enjoyed a brief period of favour with the Scottish king,125 but it was not to last. When MacLean was killed in battle against the MacDonalds of Dunivaig in 1598, the king was reportedly relieved. According to Nicolson, there were three key reasons James ‘loved not MacLean’. First, after the Battle of Glenlivet MacLean had asked to be given a few hundred men to allow him to personally apprehend Huntly. This aggravated the king who felt his friend Huntly had already been sufficiently punished. Second, MacLean had attempted to involve Argyll in the attempted presbyterian coup in December 1596126 and had therefore sided with the Kirk against his king.127 Third and perhaps most important of all, the king ‘loved not’ MacLean because he ‘heard he was dealing with the Queen to serve her’.128 This confirms that James was extremely uneasy about the idea of any of the islanders intercommuning with Elizabeth without his consent. MacLean’s efforts against the mercenaries in the summer of 1595 had arguably been for the mutual benefit of Scotland and England, but when the agendas of James and Elizabeth did not align, his loyalty to the Scottish king was more uncertain. From the king’s perspective, MacLean had challenged his authority at almost every opportunity. James tolerated MacLean for his military prowess, which could be exploited to control the Highlands and Isles, but on a personal level, he regarded him as brash, impertinent and disloyal.

V It has been previously argued that the mercenary trade ended in 1601/2,129 or even as late as the ‘Flight of the Earls’ in 1607.130 The mercenary trade died a slow death, but the blow dealt in 1595 was ultimately fatal. The 1594 and 1595 campaigns were the final years of major involvement in the Irish conflict by the island mercenaries. Small bands of islanders continued to cross the North Channel as late as 1601, but their involvement was sporadic and reduced in scale due to tight policing by the English navy.131 It is unlikely that any substantial Hebridean force participated in either the Battle of the Yellow Ford in 1598 – a significant victory for Tyrone – or the Battle of Kinsale in January 1602, which saw the conclusive defeat of Tyrone and O’Donnell by the Elizabethan army.132 The dissolution of the Irish mercenary trade cannot be explained by any one factor – a potent cocktail of contingent circumstances led to its demise. Mutual antagonisms between the MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of Harris fragmented the unity within the loose confederacy of islanders and jeopardised future campaigns, while organised opposition fronted by the English navy was supported on the west coast of Scotland by the formidable MacLean of Duart. Furthermore, the MacLeods of Lewis, another key participant in the trade, were fighting on the home front, resisting the attempted plantation of Lewis from 1598. Only the MacDonalds of Dunivaig maintained a strong presence in Ireland.133

128  Ross Crawford Arguably, the mercenary trade was already past its peak. Early in his career, Tyrone had recognised the need to organise his own professional standing army.134 According to a 1596 report, he trained his men in ‘marshiall dissipline’ in emulation of the English military.135 Hebridean mercenaries were undoubtedly still sought after by Tyrone,136 but due to their unreliability (especially after 1595) they were demoted from a core element of the Irish military resistance (as had been the case in the 1560s) to a useful, but inessential, augmentation of existing strength.137 This new status quo was underlined when Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig sailed to Ireland in June 1596, and it seemed for a brief moment that the mercenaries would have one last hurrah. Rather than provide Tyrone with troops, Aonghas requested the opposite: he asked for Irish soldiers to help him defend against MacLean, who had ‘lately attempted his country of Ile [Islay]’.138 Roles had reversed, and the mercenary trade was no longer a one-way process. Later that year, Stewart of Houston obtained the submission of MacDonald of Dunivaig.139 To bridge the economic shortfall caused by the end of the trade, the islanders tried to adapt by actively marketing themselves to the English queen. In March 1598, Nicolson reported that the ‘Islanders come not in, neither give their obedience, looking for troubles between her Majesty and the King’.140 This shows that the submission of the islanders to the king’s authority in 1596 was ultimately rather short lived. In April, Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat, now self-styled the ‘Lord of the Isles of Scotland and Chief of the whole Clandonell Irishmen’, formally offered his services to Queen Elizabeth, claiming support from most of the major clans in the West Highlands and Isles.141 Sleat has been accused of harbouring ‘delusions of potency’, by the historian MacLean-Bristol,142 but the title of Lord of the Isles still held power and relevance in the Highlands. Previous claimants to the Lordship of the Isles had sought alliances with English monarchs,143 and in this instance, it may have acted as a shield against the Scottish king, allowing Sleat to ‘create the most favourable conditions to further his claim’.144 Therefore, Sleat’s declaration was more politically than fiscally motivated. Ultimately, the Elizabethan government took little notice of the proposal, satisfied that the ‘redshank’ wildcard no longer jeopardised the conquest of Ireland. Such flagrant offers of service to the English can only have entrenched James’ view of the islanders as disloyal and potentially treacherous. The king was not blind to the uses of the highly militarised islanders, but their involvement in Ireland had to be on his terms. In late 1601, James offered Elizabeth the service of certain islanders (probably the MacLeans) for pursuit of Tyrone, but the English were wary of employing this ‘kind of savage’ as most were ‘interlaced’ with their quarry.145 The end of the mercenary trade coincided with (or even caused) an intensification of warfare in the West Highlands and Isles, with long-running feuds culminating in pitched battles between the MacDonalds of Dunivaig and the MacLeans of Duart in 1598 and the MacLeods of Harris and the MacDonalds of Sleat in 1601. A highly lucrative source of external revenue had been removed, but the mercenary trade was also a common goal for many Hebridean clans, perhaps evoking a sense of unity and solidarity that characterised the heyday of the

West Highlands and Isles  129 Lordship of the Isles. Hundreds of professional warriors, now essentially unemployed, turned inward, and dormant feuds reignited. As Martin MacGregor has observed, there was real need for ‘large-scale demobilisation and fundamental social reform’ in the highly militarised Hebrides,146 but the Scottish government did not attempt to offer any serious practical solutions for over a decade. The achievement of ‘general obedience’ in 1596 proved to be a false dawn.

VI Passive and occasionally reactive, James’ approach to the mercenary trade crisis between 1594 and 1596 can be summarised as one of rule by delegation. There was simply little incentive for James to take the initiative as the tense, uncertain situation presented welcome political opportunities, allowing him to put increasing pressure on Elizabeth and possibly even cultivate links with Tyrone. Yet the political stalemate could not continue indefinitely and eventually James was forced to engage in limited cooperation with a Gaelic noble whom he personally disliked – the Earl of Argyll. That dislike may have been founded on prejudice about the natural ‘insolency’ of Highlanders,147 compounded by growing unease about over-mighty nobles.148 In terms of methods and conduct, the noble power wielded by Argyll in the Isles was theoretically unrestricted, but the vulnerability of his position is clear from the fact that he was so easily manipulated into action by James. The four years between 1592 and 1596 were a trial by fire for the young Argyll, and his exhaustion with Scottish politics is perhaps best expressed by the fact that in June 1596 he planned to ‘travel and remain in foreign realms’.149 The ‘grim’ manipulator that later emerged, whose proxy war with the Duke of Lennox led to the bloody Battle of Glen Fruin in 1603,150 was clearly a man hardened by these experiences in the 1590s. Apart from his contact with Argyll, James appeared almost entirely disconnected from the affairs of his other Gaelic subjects during these years. Unlike James IV and V, his exercise of kingship in the West Highlands and Isles was weak and impersonal. Rather than demonstrating his authority in a visit to the Isles, he used the office of Lieutenant of the Isles as a deliberate buffer, especially when given to the likes of Stewart of Houston.151 The clan chiefs on mercenary campaigns in Ireland represented a core part of the nobility of the West Highlands and Isles, but the king seems to have been largely reluctant to accept that they were even his subjects, let alone his aristocracy. The feeling may have been mutual, as the very involvement of the islanders in Ireland proved that crown authority had not achieved uniform recognition in the West Highlands and Isles.152 In response to the king’s lack of authority, some of the islanders went even further. Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat for example, was attempting to carve out his own ‘kingdom’ in the Isles. Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart made overtures of fidelity but was more than willing to sell his allegiance to a foreign monarch, allegiance that James felt belonged unconditionally to him even though he had done little to earn it. For James, issues of loyalty preceded conceptions of barbarity and civility. The islanders were not ‘answerable In-land subjects’: they were autonomous, and that made them ‘barbarous’.153

130  Ross Crawford

Notes 1 My thanks to Dr William Hepburn, Mr Brian Brennan, Dr Alison Cathcart, Prof. Thomas Clancy, Dr Martin MacGregor, Mr Paul Goatman, Dr Aonghas MacCoinnich and the editors of this volume for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 2 The English term ‘redshank’ has been widely used by historians to mean ‘Gaelic mercenary from Scotland’, but in the sixteenth century it was probably a derogatory term roughly synonymous with ‘wild Scot’. See CSP Scot., xii, 198; Wilson McLeod, Divided Gaels: Gaelic Cultural Identities in Scotland and Ireland c.1200–c.1650 (Oxford: 2004), 49–52. 3 Stephen Boardman, The Campbells, 1250–1513 (Edinburgh: 2007), 330–32; Martin MacGregor, ‘Civilising Gaelic Scotland: the Scottish Isles and the Stewart Empire’ in Éamonn Ó Ciardha and Micheàl Ó Siochrú, eds, The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice (Manchester: 2012), 40; cf. McLeod, Divided Gaels. 4 Éamonn Ó Ciardha and Micheàl Ó Siochrú, ‘The plantation of Ulster: ideas and ideologies’ in The Plantation of Ulster, 6. 5 In 1593, the Elizabethan army only numbered 1,500 men, but this rose to 6,000 by the end of 1595. See Ciaran Brady, ‘The captains’ games: army and society in Elizabethan Ireland’ in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey, eds, A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge: 1996), 145–46. 6 CSP Scot., xi, 677. 7 James VI and I, ‘Basilikon Doron, or His Majesties instructions to his dearest sonne, Henry the Prince’ in Neil Rhodes, Jennifer Richards and Joseph Marshall, eds, King James VI and I: selected writings (Farnham: 2003), 222; Michael Lynch, ‘James VI and the Highland Problem’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 208; MacGregor, ‘Civilising Gaelic Scotland’, 33–34. 8 Lynch, ‘Highland Problem’, 215. 9 J. Goodare, ‘The Nobility and the Absolutist State in Scotland, 1584–1638’, History 78 (1993), 161–82. 10 CSP Scot., xi, 250; Colville, Letters, 136; CSP Ireland, v, 173. 11 CSP Scot., xi, 258. 12 CSP Scot., xi, 310, 319–20, 473, 478, 483, 489, 495–97; Colville, Letters, 111–133; Moysie, Memoirs, 114–19. 13 J. MacKechnie, ‘Treaty between Argyll and O’Donnell’, Scottish Gaelic Studies 7 (1951–3), 100–101; Jane Dawson, ‘The fifth earl of Argyle, Gaelic Lordship and Political Power in Sixteenth-Century Scotland’, SHR 67 (1988), 3 n. 3, 6. 14 Highland Papers, ii, 143–94; Gregory, History, 244–56. 15 CSP Scot., xi, 457–58. Cash incentives sent in 1595 were more frugal. See CSP Scot., xi, 581, 591, 650; Gerard Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in Ireland, 1565–1603, (Dublin and London: 1937), 246. 16 CSP Scot., xi, 95, 99. Dòmhnall Gorm himself probably used the Gaelic term ‘Rìgh Innse Gall’, which can be translated as ‘King of the Hebrides’ but was broadly understood as ‘Lord of the Isles’. MacKenzie of Kintail may have maliciously translated ‘rìgh’ as ‘king’ to present his rival in a particularly bad light. My thanks to Dr Aonghas MacCoinnich for discussion of this point. See John Bannerman, ‘The Lordship of the Isles’ in Jennifer M. Brown, ed., Scottish Society in the Fifteenth Century (London: 1977), 211. 17 Clan guardian during the minority of a designated heir. See “Tuto(u)r n.” Dictionary of the Scots Language. 2004. Scottish Language Dictionaries Ltd. [accessed 23 March 2016]. 18 CSP Scot., xi, 391. 19 Initially reported as between 3–4,000 men, the army was later estimated more modestly at 1,200, but this may have been a detachment from the main force. The

West Highlands and Isles  131 total forces of the islanders probably did not exceed 2,000 men in 1594. See CSP Ireland, v, 260, 265; CSP Scot., xi, 391, 458. 20 CSP Ireland, v, 259–60. 21 CSP Ireland, v, 259–60; Karen O’Brien, ed., Annals of the Four Masters, vi (University College, Cork), M1594.7 [accessed 23 March 2016]; Paul Walsh, ed. and trans., The Life of Aodh Ruadh O Domhnaill, 2 vols (Dublin: 1948–1957), i, 70–73. 22 CSP Scot., xi, 457–58. 23 CSP Scot., xi, 477. 24 CSP Scot., xii, 206. By June 3 1595, Iain, the young chief of the MacLeods of Harris had died, and Ruairidh Mòr, his uncle, succeeded him. See R.C. MacLeod, ed., The Book of Dunvegan: Being Documents from the Muniment Room of the MacLeods of MacLeod at Dunvegan Castle, Isle of Skye, 2 vols (1938–1939), i, 22–23, 28, 42. 25 CSP Scot., xi, 422–23. 26 CSP Scot., xi, 477. 27 CSP Scot., xi, 489, 495–97, 499; Moysie Memoirs, 119. 28 CSP Scot., xi, 393; Colville, Letters, 111; National Register of Archives Scotland, 1209, Niall Campbell, Argyll Transcripts, 13 vols (undated), vii, 265. 29 The Spottiswoode Miscellany, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1844), i, 261; Scotish Poems of the Sixteenth Century, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1801), i, 140. Calderwood also claims that Argyll was granted the commission through the ‘instant solicitatioun of the ministers’. See Calderwood, History, v, 348. 30 CSP Scot., xi, 419–20. 31 Colville, Letters, 116–17; CSP Scot., xi, 398. 32 The ‘Description of the Isles of Scotland’ estimates the military capacity of the Isles at about 6–7,000 men. See W. F. Skene, Celtic Scotland, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 1890), iii, 428–40. 33 Calderwood, History, v, 349. 34 CSP Scot., xi, 453, 460. 35 The main participants on Argyll’s side were the island clans of the MacLeans of Duart and the MacNeills of Barra, and Highland clans including the Campbells, the Mackintoshes of Dunnachton, and possibly the MacGregors. See CSP Scot., xi, 459; Spottiswoode Miscellany, i, 261; William Mackay, ed., Chronicles of the Frasers: The Wardlaw Manuscript (Edinburgh: 1905), 225. 36 CSP Scot., xi, 458, 477; CSP Scot., xii, 211. 37 CSP Scot., xi, 460; Calderwood, History, v, 350; Spottiswoode Miscellany, i, 268; Scottish Poems, i, 148. 38 CSP Scot., xi, 450, 453. 39 CSP Scot., xi, 457–60; The History of the Feuds and Conflicts Among the Clans (Glasgow: 1780), 51–52; Chronicles of the Frasers, 228. 40 Akrigg, Letters, 138. 41 Huntly fled to Sutherland for the winter and went into exile in early 1595. By 1596, he was back in Scotland and by May 1597, he was back in the king’s favour. See Chronicles of the Frasers, 229; Brown, Bloodfeud, 168. 42 Scotish Poems, i, 150. 43 Scots Peerage, i, 346; Brown, Bloodfeud, 168. 44 CSP Scot., xi, 467. 45 CSP Scot., xi, 466–67. 46 CSP Scot., xi, 476–77, 500, 518. 47 Calderwood, History, v, 361. 48 RPCS, v, 190; Argyll Transcripts, vii, 265. 49 RPCS, v, 249–50; Calderwood, History, v, 361–2. Eventually on 25 December 1595, it was agreed by the privy council that he should only be answerable in cases of ‘oppin reiffis’ and ‘heirschipis’ in accordance with the general band. See RPCS, v, 250.

132  Ross Crawford 50 CSP Scot., xi, 499. 51 CSP Scot., xi, 499. 52 Colville, Letters, 137 n. 2. 53 Colville, Letters, 135; CSP Scot., xi, 506. 54 Colville, Letters, 135; CSP Scot., xi, 507. Macinnes has argued that James also used the mercenaries to remind Elizabeth that he was ‘unprepared to accept client or supplicant status’. See Allan I. Macinnes, ‘Crown, Clans and Fine: The ‘Civilizing’ of Scottish Gaeldom, 1587–1638’, Northern Scotland 13 (1993), 31–55. 55 CSP Scot., xi, 476–77, 500, 518. 56 J. Michael Hill, ‘The Rift within Clan Ian Mor: The Antrim and Dunyveg Macdonnells, 1590–1603’, The Sixteenth Century Journal 24 (1993), 868. 57 CSP Scot., xi, 656. 58 CSP Scot., xi, 526, 528, 530–31, 537–39. 59 After Glenlivet, Atholl had reconciled with Huntly, prompting one of Argyll’s men to make ‘gret heirschip on Atholl’. See Colville, Letters, 139, 133. 60 CSP Scot., xi, 527. 61 Colville, Letters, 141. 62 Colville, Letters, 144; CSP Scot., xi, 542; Akrigg, Letters, 481. 63 CSP Ireland, iv, 298, 302, 312; CSP Scot., xi, 500, 558, 671; CSP Scot., xii, 27. 64 Criminal Trials, i, 224–30. 65 CSP Scot., xi, 558. 66 Brady, ‘The captains’ games’, 137. 67 CSP Scot., xi, 582. 68 CSP Scot., xi, 582–83, 585. 69 CSP Scot., xi, 573, 581, 592. 70 CSP Scot., xi, 583. 71 CSP Scot., xi, 581, 591. 72 CSP Scot., xi, 648. 73 “Mauch n.1”. Dictionary of the Scots Language. 2004. Scottish Language Dictionaries Ltd. [Accessed 23 March 2016]. 74 CSP Scot., xi, 619. 75 CSP Scot., xi, 620. 76 CSP Scot., xi, 620. 77 CSP Ireland, vii, 128, 140; Hayes-McCoy, Mercenary Forces, 248, 285–92, 297–302. 78 Alison Cathcart, ‘James V, king of Scotland – and Ireland?’ in Seán Duffy, ed., The World of the Galloglass: Kings, warlords and warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200–1600 (Dublin: 2007), 124–43. A poem by the Irish bard Fearghal Óg Mac an Bhaird encourages James to expel the English from Ireland and take ‘Éire’s wondrous crown’. This seems to pre-date the Union of the Crowns and could be read in light of James’ possible negotiations with the Irish chieftains. See Lambert McKenna, ed., Aithdioghluim dána: A Miscellany of Irish Bardic Poetry, 2 vols (Dublin: 1939/40), i, 177–80, ii, 104–106. 79 Even in the event of a smooth succession for James, an amicable relationship with Tyrone had obvious benefits for the future stability of Ireland and the British Isles. 80 RPCS, v, 223–24; CSP Scot., xi, 642. 81 RPCS, v, 223–24; CSP Scot., xi, 642; CSP Scot., xii, 141, 210. 82 CSP Ireland, vi, 362, 383, 390, 429, es 393. Edwards has suggested that towns like Ayr were ‘opposed to closing down the lucrative military trade with Ireland [and] cared little for helping the English’. See David Edwards, ‘Securing the Jacobean succession: the secret career of James Fullerton of Trinity College, Dublin’ in The World of the Galloglass, 206. 83 Colville, Letters, 274.

West Highlands and Isles  133 84 Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig had reportedly offered to renounce his claim to lands in Islay, which they had contested since the 1580s, if he joined their company. Marriage alliances were also proposed, with Campbell of Lawers reporting that ‘gret travell is maid to mak concord betuix M’Klen and M’Oneill, be mutuall mariages of eche of thair sonnes and dochteris’. See CSP Scot., xi, 573; Colville, Letters, 152. 85 CSP Scot., xi, 639, 647–48. 86 CSP Scot., xi, 676. 87 CSP Scot., xi, 636, 642–43, 677. 88 CSP Scot., xi, 636, 642–43, 677. 89 CSP Scot., xi, 642–43. 90 CSP Scot., xi, 677. 91 This incident has been highlighted by Maclean-Bristol as proof that ‘the medieval attitude to warfare was still alive’ in the Highlands and Isles, yet duels were not confined to this part of Scotland and nor were they a medieval phenomenon. See Nicholas MacLean-Bristol, Murder under Trust: The Crimes and Death of Sir Lachlan Mor MacLean of Duart, 1558–1598 (East Linton: 1999), 156; Keith Brown, ‘Honour, Honours and Nobility in Scotland between the Reformation and the National Covenant’, SHR 91 (2012), 45, 52–53. 92 CSP Scot., xi, 647. Argyll feared the islanders were poised to invade his lands and rushed back from court to prepare the home defences. See CSP Scot., xi, 655–56. 93 CSP Scot., xi, 661, 667–68. 94 CSP Ireland, v, 350, 353. 95 CSP Scot., xi, 683. 96 CSP Scot., xi, 673, 681, 683; CSP Ireland, v, 364, 369–70. The HMS Popinjay had been specially selected in 1594 for this service against the Scottish galleys. See J. S. Brewer and William Bullen, eds, Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts, Preserved in the Archi-Episcopal Library at Lambeth, 1589–1600 (London: 1867), 107. 97 One report by Rowland Savage claimed that five galleys were sunk and two more were captured. There can be no doubt that this was a serious defeat for the MacDonalds. See CSP Ireland, v, 364. 98 CSP Ireland, v, 364, 369–70; CSP Scot., xi, 683–85. 99 CSP Scot., xi, 683. 100 CSP Scot., xi, 681–82. 101 CSP Scot., xi, 681–82. 102 He was eventually knighted by the former in December 1596 and paid £150 sterling by the latter in May 1596. See CSP Scot., xii, 214, 241, 403. 103 CSP Scot., xi, 683, 687; Annals of the Four Masters, vi, M1595.15; Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces, 254. 104 CSP Scot., xi, 687. 105 CSP Scot., xi, 685. 106 CSP Scot., xi, 684–85, 687. 107 Annals of the Four Masters, vi, M1595.15; Life of Aodh Ruadh O Domhnaill, 98–111. 108 CSP Scot. xi, 684. 109 CSP Scot, xi, 648. 110 CSP Scot., xi, 686. 111 CSP Scot., xii, 169. 112 CSP Scot., xi, 688. 113 MacLeod of Lewis had joined MacLean’s party, and upon his eventual return to Scotland in early March 1596, MacLeod of Harris also seems to have honoured his pact with MacLean. He was captured and imprisoned by an indignant MacDonald of Sleat, but these brute force tactics only widened the divide between the MacDonalds and MacLeods. By January 1597, MacLeod of Harris had been released and was

134  Ross Crawford again found in MacLean’s company. See CSP Scot., xi, 687–88; CSP Scot., xii, 157, 175–76, 196. 114 CSP Scot., xii, 149, 151, 159. 115 CSP Scot., xi, 677–8; CSP Scot., xii, 214, 241. In light of this secret correspondence, MacLean’s alliance with MacKenzie may have been arranged without Argyll’s consent. 116 CSP Ireland, vi, 189. 117 CSP Scot., xi, 619–20. 118 CSP Scot., xii, 149, 211, 222, 237–38; J. Cameron, James V: The Personal Rule, 1528–1542 (East Linton: 1998), 228–54; Cathcart, ‘James V’, 127, 141; N. MacDougall, James IV (Edinburgh: 1989), 100–105, 115–16. 119 Goodare, State and Society, 255–56. 120 CSP Scot., xii, 295. 121 CSP Scot., xii, 270. 122 CSP Scot., xii, 270; Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces, 279. 123 CSP Scot., xii, 281–82, 284, 291, 311–12. 124 Lynch, ‘Highland Problem’, 220; Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999), 275–76. 125 CSP Scot., xii, 244. 126 Julian Goodare, ‘The attempted Scottish coup of 1596’ in Goodare and MacDonald, Sixteenth-Century Scotland, 311–36. 127 The recently knighted MacLean had attempted to defend his actions, claiming that when made a knight he had sworn to ‘maintain the truth by the King…and that the religion was the truth and he would die for it’. The king reportedly ‘scorned and said that Highland men had not that religion’. See CSP Scot., xiii, 260; CSP Scot., xii, 403. 128 CSP Scot., xiii, 260. 129 Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton: 1996), 58, 67–68; Julian Goodare, ‘The Statutes of Iona in context’, SHR 77 (1998), 56; Aonghas MacCoinnich, “‘His spirit was given only to warre”: Conflict and Identity in the Scottish Gaidhealtachd c. 1580–c. 1630’ in Steve Murdoch and Andrew MacKillop, eds, Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550–1900 (Leiden: 2002), 157. 130 Jane Dawson, ‘The Gaidhealtachd and the emergence of the Scottish Highlands’, Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts, eds, British Identity and British Consciousness: The Making of Britain, 1533–1707 (Cambridge: 1998), 266. 131 CSP Scot., xiii, 806–808; Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces, 321–22. On 28 November 1599, Lord Justice George Carey complained to Sir Robert Cecil that the islanders remained a threat, yet acknowledged that they could be countered through the king’s involvement, or by maintaining two patrolling ships in the North Channel. See CSP Ireland, viii, 273. My thanks to James Mitchell for this reference. 132 Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces, 299–304, 333–35; Ciaran Brady, ‘The captains’ games’, 137; Enrique García Hernán, ed., The Battle of Kinsale: Study and Documents from the Spanish Archives (Valencia: 2013), 1–40. 133 In 1601, Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig reportedly passed into Ireland with 400 men to aid Tyrone, yet he appears instead to have become embroiled in a feud with Raghnall MacDonald of Dunluce and later the MacLeans of Duart, who sought to avenge the death of Lachlann in 1598. The other clans were successfully ‘stayed’ by the Earl of Argyll. See CSP Scot., xiii, 806–808, 905, 909, 976, 1037, 1045. 134 Tyrone’s plans were very long term: he reportedly taught children how to shoot with wooden ‘peces [handguns]’ and paid them for this training. See CSP Scot., xi, 620. 135 Joseph Robertson, ed., Miscellany of the Maitland Club, 4 vols (Glasgow: 1847), iv, part i, 51; CSP Scot., xii, 207. 136 CSP Scot., xiii, 966.

West Highlands and Isles  135 137 Brady, ‘The captains’ games’, 146, 158; Donal O’Carroll, ‘Change and Continuity in Weapons and Tactics, 1594–1691’, Pádraig Lenihan, ed., Conquest and Resistance: War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland (Leiden: 2001), 223–25. In the summer of 1599, O’Donnell sent his mother Fionnuala to recruit 1,000 mercenaries, but when he defeated an English army in August, he sent word that they were no longer required. From 1595, O’Donnell and his allies increasingly looked towards the Spanish for military support. See Darren McGettigan, Red Hugh O’Donnell and the Nine Years War (Dublin: 2005), 89–90; Battle of Kinsale, 14–19. 138 CSP Ireland, vi, 30. 139 CSP Scot., xii, 318. 326; Spottiswoode Miscellany, ii, 371–72; Gregory, History, 263–69. 140 CSP Scot., xiii, 182. 141 CSP Scot., xiii, 191. 142 MacLean-Bristol, Murder Under Trust, 231–32. 143 Alison Cathcart, ‘The Forgotten’ 45: Donald Dubh’s Rebellion in an Archipelagic Context’, SHR 91 (2012), 241–42. 144 Aonghas MacCoinnich, ‘Conflict and Identity’, 157; CSP Scot., xiii, 182. 145 Calendar of Carew MSS, 1601–3, 154; CSP Scot., xiii, 889–90. 146 MacGregor, ‘Civilising Gaelic Scotland’, 40. 147 Spottiswoode Miscellany, i, 261. 148 By 1602, it was apparently common knowledge in the king’s court that James ‘loves [Argyll] not but rather fears him (for the King said he looked like the Earl of Gowrie)’. See CSP Scot., xiii, 961. 149 CSP Scot., xii, 238. 150 Criminal Trials, ii, 435–36. 151 MacGregor has argued that Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles, performed the same role between 1605 and 1614. See M.D. MacGregor, ‘The statutes of Iona: text and context’, IR 57 (2006), 151–54, 165, 168 n. 200. 152 In 1596, Dioness Campbell, the Dean of Limerick, (an admittedly partial source) claimed that Argyll was ‘more feared universalie, then the King obeyed, by those ilanders’. See Miscellany of the Maitland Club, i part i, 53. 153 James VI ‘Basilikon Doron’, King James VI and I Selected Writings, 222.

7 Rise of a courtier The Second Duke of Lennox and strategies of noble power under James VI Adrienne McLaughlin

Ludovick Stuart, second Duke of Lennox, was the most prestigious courtier in the later reign of James VI in Scotland.1 The importance of political office in the acquisition of national power is a self-evident truth, and from a young age Lennox obtained high-level government positions, including governor of the kingdom when James travelled to Denmark in 1589, and two Lieutenancies of the North in the 1590s. Lennox’s role in governance was unremarkable, but his skills in the court and his relationship with the king are what set him apart from his contemporaries. He developed a stranglehold over the chamber and bedchamber, having inherited their most high-ranking posts – Lord Great Chamberlain and First Gentleman respectively – from his father, Esmé Stewart, first Duke of Lennox. From within the chamber Lennox established a close personal relationship with James, an important intimacy few other nobles could hope for. He also established a large web of patronage, not only of political dependents but also of artists and poets, spreading his net of influence even wider. By maintaining a presence in each of these arenas of power, Lennox rapidly established himself as the premier noble of the kingdom, using these successes as a template to establish his unique role in the newly unified Britain after 1603. Despite the fact that Lennox matured and developed these skills in Scotland, there is surprisingly little in the existing historiography on his life in Scotland. This chapter will rectify this neglect through an analysis of Lennox’s political, court and chamber careers and of his unique relationship with James VI. This volume sheds valuable light on how James and his nobility lived and worked together in early modern Scotland, and this chapter adds a new dimension to the discussion by highlighting James’ relationship with what can be deemed one of his first favourites. The word ‘favourite’ is used liberally and misapplied frequently when it comes to James, but it cannot be denied that a series of men drew his attention and received the greater portion of his bounty throughout his reign. Upon his accession to the English throne, James VI and I became notorious for his favouritism toward handsome male companions, leading to the elevation of one of the most conspicuous characters in British history, George Villiers, the first Duke of Buckingham. But James’ penchant for favouritism dates back much further: Lennox’s father, Esmé Stuart, was the first person to be generally recognised as a favourite in the mid-1570s, but his time in Scotland was short.

Rise of a courtier  137 It was as James matured that the pattern of his relationships with specific male courtiers began to develop in earnest. His relationship with the second Duke of Lennox set the standard from which all his future favourites followed. This relationship cannot be considered on a par with that of his later ‘British’ favourites, but Lennox certainly enjoyed a much higher degree of favour compared to his fellow Scottish peers. While there were occasional examples of impertinence in his youth, overall Lennox’s behaviour, loyalty, and friendship were precisely the actions and attitudes the king wanted from his nobility.

I Ludovick Stuart was born in France in 1574, the eldest son of Esmé Stuart, sixth Seigneur d’Aubigny. When Ludovick was five his father departed for Scotland at the request of his kinsman, James VI. Esmé was a cousin of James’ father2 and the young king immediately formed a powerful attachment to Esmé. Maurice Lee goes so far as to call it an ‘adolescent crush’,3 and while the exact nature of their relationship is not relevant to the present discussion, it is indisputable that Esmé was the first in a long procession of royal favourites. Esmé, as the first Duke of Lennox, had one tempestuous year in power then fell victim to a political coup that drove him back to France, where he died in 1583.4 Devastated by Esmé’s death, James insisted all his children be brought to Scotland to be raised in the king’s care, but only nine-year-old Ludovick was old enough to make the trip.5 Upon his arrival in Scotland in 1583 James received the newly invested second Duke of Lennox with demonstrative expressions of love. The official memoranda regarding Lennox’s care and maintenance stated that the king was desirous to keep the duke ‘in his highness’ own house and company’, which included sitting at the king’s table and being ‘servit furth of his own kitchene and fra his cupboard’.6 He was the only Scottish duke at this time and remained so his entire life. He was apparently good natured and kind in his youth but also a sturdy boy who had his mother’s independent spirit and his father’s pleasure-loving tastes. He was also an expert hunter with a strong sense of humour, which were qualities that would immediately endear him to the king.7 Lennox was in an enviable position: in many respects he inherited his father’s friendship with the king without having to put in any effort to acquire that intimacy. Favour came swiftly to the duke: he was given the honour of carrying the crown at the openings of parliament in 1584, 1585, and 1587, much to the annoyance of older and established nobles.8 The gesture was symbolic and confirmed Lennox’s controversial status as heir to the throne through his Stewart heritage. The Hamiltons disputed this claim vociferously, but the debate remained academic as an heir, Prince Henry Frederick, was born in 1594. Lennox immediately surprised more experienced Scottish courtiers and the political community with a maturity beyond his years. Thomas Fowler expressed his impressions in very flowery language to Lord Burghley, calling Lennox ‘so proper a youthe, so wyse … actyve on horse and foot, cowrteows … so pleasynge to all men … truly he is a parragon’.9

138  Adrienne McLaughlin Lennox is not known for his role in politics. Julian Goodare, among others, has questioned what function, if any, Lennox performed in James’ administration.10 Reviewing the extent of his political contribution through an analysis of his governmental roles will help determine why and how he kept acquiring high-ranking offices. It will also help to clarify whether his ambitions truly stretched as far as the political realm.

II Lennox was thrown into the political deep-end in October 1589 when James VI suddenly travelled to Denmark to escort his new bride, Anna, sister of the King Christian IV of Denmark and Norway, back to Scotland. Two months earlier James and Anna had been married by proxy, but bad weather had prevented Anna from travelling to Scotland immediately. In a moment of uncharacteristic rashness, James journeyed to Denmark to bring her back personally, and he surprised his privy council by not informing them of his plan to leave until after he was already gone. He took many of his chief state officers with him, including Chancellor John Maitland and over 300 barons and gentlemen.11 The king’s directions for how the government should be run in his absence were not revealed to his council until the day after he sailed from Leith. He divided the government into two temporary seats: one encompassed the central and eastern Lowlands and the Highlands, the other the Borders. Lennox was left as governor of the kingdom and caretaker president of the privy council, while Lord John Hamilton was left as Lieutenant of the Borders based in Dumfries. The Earl of Bothwell was designated as Lennox’s vice-president and other lords and officers of state were ordered to remain in Edinburgh as Lennox’s advisors.12 The support from older magnates in the young duke’s first leadership role did not disguise the fact that the king had shocked the political community with this hastily planned excursion. James left the management of government in the hands of a 15-year-old nobleman who had only lived in Scotland a few years and who had minimal experience of governance. A privy councillor since 1588, he had attended very few sessions of council. His only real first-hand experience of the issues of the day was through riding at the king’s side as he put down a noble rebellion in the north. With little in the way of applicable credentials, being granted the governorship was an exceptionally high mark of favour for Lennox. The king’s absence was expected to be approximately 20 days but stretched to more than six months, during which time the kingdom remained generally peaceful and quiet under Lennox’s governorship.13 It would be difficult to believe Lennox single-handedly ran the kingdom during this period; although he was named primary governor, he also had the support of Bothwell and Hamilton. Bothwell was an aggressive figure, highly active in politics before and after this period, and the security of his Stewart kinship with the king made him almost arrogant in his behaviour.14 It is certain that during Lennox’s governorship Bothwell contributed his influence and experience and was key in helping to maintain stability. However, it

Rise of a courtier  139 was not a puppet regime with Bothwell controlling an incapable Lennox. Lennox used his own influence and kin ties to drive a governmental movement to help quell ongoing feuds between nobles, particularly the Earls of Moray and Huntly. Obviously the efforts to staunch that particular feud were not successful in the long run, given that the former was murdered by the latter in 1592. Lennox performed his duty as the president of the privy council admirably, if erratically. He attended 12 of 18 recorded sederunts, outstripping his previous and later attendance records.15 Scotland’s southern neighbours were especially distressed by James’ choice of caretaker governor, not only because of his young age, but because he was ‘accompanied with noe more constant a person than the Erle Bothwell’.16 Elizabeth ordered her border officials to assist Lennox and to be prepared for any emergencies with military strength if necessary.17 Ambassador William Asheby was able to comfort his queen that: the Duke and Bothwell, being governors, endeavour to show their respect to their office, carrying themselves with seemly gravity, frequenting sermons, and ready to proffer all good offices toward her majesty and her realm.18 Emphasising Lennox’s attendance at sermons is particularly interesting, as religious, not political, tensions caused the only major issues of concern during his governorship. It is impossible to discuss the second Duke of Lennox without acknowledging the controversy and mystery surrounding his religious preferences. Although Scotland was a firmly Protestant nation by the reign of James VI, there were still occasional fearful rumblings of Counter-Reformation and Catholic influences around the king. Although he never outwardly professed to practicing Catholicism in Scotland, Lennox’s French-Catholic upbringing made him a constant target. Rumours percolated implying Lennox was a recusant Catholic based on his family’s religious leanings – not only those of his father, but also of his two sisters, who were both known to be vocal Catholics. As a result, there was a general suspicion, expressed by various ambassadors, that Esmé Stuart’s children could not help but follow in his religious footsteps.19 He did little to help himself against these rumours thanks to the employment in his household of staff with Catholic leanings, such as Henry Ker, former secretary to Mary Queen of Scots, who was an enthusiastic supporter of Mary’s plan to Catholicise her son James.20 Even ambassador Thomas Fowler, one of Lennox’s biggest supporters, believed that ‘[Lennox] is guided by Papists … none of the best sort will trust him without further proof’.21 Despite all of these whispers and rumours, there is no hard extant evidence to determine whether Lennox was privately Catholic or not. His public actions indicate nothing of the sort; James did not question Lennox’s religion nor did it affect his position at the king’s side. But to some in Scotland the Catholic threat was very real, especially in 1589. In that year, just a few months before the king’s departure, an uprising took place in the northeast, led by a group of recusant Catholic earls with Lennox’s

140  Adrienne McLaughlin brother-in-law, the Earl of Huntly, at their head. Although there was no bloodshed at the Brig o’ Dee, and the rebellion had political motivations as well,22 the event heightened fears of Counter-Reformation in Scotland. An English ambassador believed Lennox’s ‘hart was with Huntley and his forces’ during the uprising, but this was pure speculation as Lennox rode at the king’s side to quash it.23 Regardless, the rumours of Catholicism swirling around Lennox did little to ease the minds of those who feared his influence as governor in 1589. Their worst fears seemed to be realised in early 1590 when a Spanish barque was sighted off the coast of Leith. In the king’s absence and with uncertainty surrounding Lennox, fear was rampant in Edinburgh. The barque travelled down to the mouth of the Firth, where the captain had intended to secretly escape, but Lennox discovered this plot and had the provost of Edinburgh seek out and arrest the captain. He was apprehended in Leith, but Lennox withheld judgement, leaving the case for the king to rule on upon his return.24 James wrote to Bowes that he was much relieved to hear of the capture.25 Thus, the biggest threat under Lennox’s governorship ended with a victory for the duke. James and his new queen arrived in Leith on 1 May 1590, and Lennox was involved in their welcome celebration and the festivities that followed. He was the first aboard the king’s ship followed by his vice-president Bothwell and co-­ governor Lord Hamilton, to welcome the king and queen home.26 James wasted little time returning to the leadership of the country, while Lennox immediately shed the mantle of responsibility, attending only two privy council sessions with the king in the summer of 1590 then not returning for another year.27 Upon James’ return, Lennox exhibited no further ambition to political power. In fact, when reports circulated that the chancellorship would be vacant and it was suggested Lennox might fill the void, Lennox dismissed it, believing ‘that office should ‘imbase’ the perception of his estate and person’.28 While there were obvious monetary benefits and prestige to be had from the chancellorship, Lennox’s ambitions did not encompass this realm. The king, however, pushed him into government just the same. The motivation for this could be no more than Lennox, his kinsman, proving himself trustworthy, amiable, and basically competent. James granted Lennox numerous significant commissions from 1591 onwards, a few of which came as a direct result of the forfeiture of his cousin, the Earl of Bothwell, such as the offices of Lord Admiral and sheriff for both Lothian and Dumbarton.29 Lennox’s political education was furthered even more in November 1591, when James arranged for him to be granted a special seat in the court of session, so that he might obtain ‘better sight and knowledge of the affairs of the country, and manner of proceeding in civil causes’. Customarily access to the court of session was restricted solely to the Lords of Session, but it was hoped that this special access might help him better perform his official duties. The lords agreed under the sole proviso that the king would not use their acquiescence as a precedent to appoint any non-official members in the future.30 Whether Lennox took much from his time with the lords is difficult to judge, but he did indeed begin attending sessions of the privy council more regularly thereafter: he was present at 23 sederunts of council from May 1591 through

Rise of a courtier  141 July 1592, though it is notable that at 22 of those sessions the king was also in attendance.31 This trend continued throughout the 1590s: from 1592 through 1599 Lennox attended a total of 81 sessions of council, with the king present at 76. Thus Lennox attended only five sessions without James, and in 1592, 1594 through 1596, and 1600, he did not attend any sessions without the king being present. In the seven-year period between 1592 and 1599 there were 228 total sederunts of council and Lennox only attended 36 per cent of meetings overall.32 It will come as no surprise, however, that Lennox was more likely to attend council sessions without the king if his own interests were at stake. A fine illustration of this is seen in the privy council session of 18 March 1597, when Lennox raised a complaint as the sheriff of Dumbarton against John Buchanan of Carstoun for obtaining a false commission of justiciary in Lennox’s jurisdiction. Lennox was in attendance; the king was not.33 His presence also depended on the nature of the business. For example, in May 1600 the duke raised a complaint against 20 men for murdering some of his servants. Although it was his complaint and important to those who depended on him, Lennox raised the matter through his procurators and did not attend council that day. But nor did the king.34 The earlier complaint against Buchanan involved a question of his own authority and power, while the latter complaint against the assailants related to his staff. Perhaps that is where the difference lies. Lennox was granted the prestigious office of Lord Admiral in July 1591 upon Bothwell’s forfeiture, holding his first admiral court the day after his appointment, followed by two sheriff courts in the same day.35 It was unusual for Lennox to participate personally in these courts, and this was a one-time-only affair: Lennox afterward followed the pattern of like-minded peers, promoting his clients and kin to handle the actual duties of office and exercise authority on his behalf.36 For example, he appointed James Wemyss of Bogie as his vice-­ admiral, who was a cousin of Lennox’s wife, Sophia Ruthven.37 Lennox also appointed another Ruthven in-law to a position under the admiralty: Sophia’s brother, Alexander Ruthven of Pitcairnie, was appointed admiral-depute on the west coast from Peterhead to Caithness in 1591.38 The admiralty performed an important function in the administration of Scotland, and, while deputes were appointed at the Duke’s pleasure, they still had to prove themselves worthy.39 Wemyss obviously did so, as his original commission was for seven years, and he ended up holding the office for 27.40 The other major offices granted to Lennox were various lieutenancies, including the Lieutenancy of the North in November 1594. A lieutenancy was generally a short-term appointment with quasi-military powers and was the most powerful royal office deployed in the localities.41 This particular office was traditionally exercised by the Earl of Huntly, but it had been stripped from him in 1592 following his murder of the Earl of Moray. Lennox’s appointment was prompted by Huntly’s third rebellion against the crown in 1594.42 Lennox was not the king’s first choice for lieutenant since he did not maintain his own power base in the area. The privy council noted that ‘sindrie noblemen’ in the north were approached to take on the lieutenancy, ‘yet few or none could be movit

142  Adrienne McLaughlin thairunto, sum excusing themselves be thair inability, and otheris for want of present preparatioun’. It is possible that none of these nobles wished to anger the powerful Gordons by accepting what had been the post of the Earls of Huntly for generations, but Lennox had no such qualms. The reluctant northern magnates, including the Earl Marischal (who was perhaps most qualified to take the job himself, having briefly and unenthusiastically performed the task in 1593 after Huntly’s second rebellion), were obliged to form a council to assist Lennox with his office. According to the terms of the lieutenancy Lennox needed to consult with this council before taking any action in the name of his commission, but this injunction was rarely obeyed.43 He was assigned two deputes, and the king left 100 horsemen and 100 footmen at his disposal.44 David Calderwood, a harsh critic of Lennox in general, was not impressed with the duke’s term as lieutenant, stating he ‘tooke up rigourouslie the penalties of the commoun people that obeyed not [his] proclamatiouns, but componned easily with the assisters of the rebels’.45 Calderwood, in this case, was correct in his severe judgement of Lennox: the duke was not the most efficient of lieutenants and did little to ease the rampant lawlessness in the north. In fact, he was a detriment to the region’s legal system, as he encouraged the practice of screening offenders under the feudal jurisdictions of the great lords. There are multiple examples of Lennox obstructing national justice by arbitrarily claiming jurisdiction over accused criminals who were dependents of his allies.46 One particular incident involved his protecting a servitor of the (Catholic) Earl of Erroll from an accusation of kidnapping; he claimed jurisdiction over the accused, impeding the trial from going forward. The case only went to trial when Lennox resigned his lieutenancy in August 1596 and, without any more impediments, the court found Erroll’s servitor and his accomplices guilty. 47 They were fined between 100 and 500 merks each.48 Calderwood accused Lennox of further impropriety while lieutenant, saying he frequently consorted with his brother-in-law, the disgraced Earl of Huntly. This was an especially egregious fault since the terms of Lennox’s commission explicitly stated, as its prime objective: To search for and take, and either bring before his Highness and Council or otherwise punish accordingly to the quality of their offences, the following persons and classes of offenders: George, sometime Earl of Huntlie … Frances, sometime Earl of Errole … and all other Jesuits, papists, excommunicates and other treasonable practisers against the true religion.49 Fraternising with Huntly was thus expressly against the terms of office, as was supporting the Earl of Erroll’s servitor in the case mentioned above. Lennox had also been gifted the estates of Huntly and Erroll upon their forfeiture, but he was able to arrange that the livings were at the disposal of the earl’s wives, thus ensuring his sister’s security. Calderwood later expressed disgust in these actions, since through their wives Huntly and Erroll were able to access their fortunes.50 One thing that Calderwood failed to acknowledge is that Lennox, through these

Rise of a courtier  143 illicit dealings with Huntly and Erroll, was able to secure their departure from Scotland. This was enough to exonerate him from any accusations of wrongdoing in the eyes of the king: James had long desired their exile. As such, when the duke returned to Edinburgh in February 1595 to report on his actions, the privy council approved and commended him on his dealings with the northern earls.51 Lennox’s stint as Lieutenant of the North was, overall, uninspiring. However, he pleased the king by ensuring Huntly and Erroll’s departure from Scotland, managing it in his own way, through dinners and social calls, not intense politicking. The core duties of the office were not well executed; regardless, Lennox was issued yet more commissions for short-term lieutenancies in various Highland localities in 1598, 1599, and 1601. As we have seen, Lennox was decidedly disinterested in his various governmental posts. His political skills and ambitions were sorely lacking, but the arena that most captured his interest, and where he truly thrived, was the court.

III The importance of the court in the lives of the nobility cannot be understated.52 Court was the place to see and be seen, where national power was won and lost, where patronage networks developed and blossomed, the place where a person could gain or lose favour with the king through attendance and service. It was in the best interest of those who pursued power to go to court to influence politics, sustain and expand patronage networks, and safeguard their reputation and power. Two general definitions of ‘courtier’ are widely accepted: first, a generic term for everyone at the court, from intimate royal companions down to domestics – state and household servants alike. Second, ‘suave elite characters orbiting the court, forming as well as broadcasting its [style and] manners’.53 Both definitions are applicable to different cross-sections of the court, but the latter relates directly to Lennox. Lennox was the consummate courtier: suave and polished, charming and elegant; he set the standard against which all courtiers were measured. He was highly active in the patronage of poetry and art, including the illustrious poets John Burel and Alexander Montgomery.54 Lennox was in his element at court and revelled in the power he wielded there. While attendance at court was closely related to the acquisition of power and prestige, it often did not elevate the ambitious as highly or as quickly as they wanted. It was through close contact with the king that true power was to be attained, and through the chamber and household that closeness was achieved. As an influential courtier and highest-ranking member of the chamber and bedchamber, Lennox was in an enviable position. Before 1603 the Scottish court encompassed two distinct seats that served the king: the household and the chamber. The chamber accompanied James wherever he travelled, while the household was only at ‘full strength’ when he was in residence at one of the royal palaces.55 The chamber also included the bedchamber, a smaller and more prestigious group of servitors. Lennox was named Lord

144  Adrienne McLaughlin Great Chamberlain – the highest post in the chamber – and First Gentleman of the Bedchamber – the highest post in that department – soon after his arrival in Scotland in 1583. He inherited these positions from his father, who had been central to the development of James’ court and household style. Esmé Stuart brought the French court’s values, manners, and hierarchy to Scotland, which James immediately adopted. The French style became a model to which all courtiers had to conform, even when his court moved to London in 1603.56 Esmé also invented the combined position of Lord Great Chamberlain and First Gentleman of the Bedchamber, a combination of French and Scottish offices that passed on to his son. These combined titles were unique to Scotland and very prestigious; the second Duke of Lennox took great pride in these honours and protected them aggressively. He had the best of both worlds of chamber and bedchamber: as chamberlain he was in charge of inner-sanctum ceremony (such as processions to the chapel), the reception of prestigious guests and ambassadors, and the supervision of the various members of household staff. As First Gentleman he oversaw members of the bedchamber’s staff, had the right to his own chamber as close as possible to the king, and the privilege of sleeping in the king’s chamber.57 Sleeping in the monarch’s chamber was an unparalleled sign of favouritism, since it afforded the closest possible proximity to the king. But, although he had the right to sleep there as frequently as he wished, Lennox did not do so often. He reserved sleeping in the king’s chamber for moments when he needed to press his advantage, as we shall see. Choosing not to stay with the king often can be taken as another sign of his lack of aspirations to political power; later favourites like Buckingham took advantage of this right habitually to influence the king and press their own interests. Lennox rarely saw the need to do so.58 Wise monarchs were conscious that those closest to them should be loyal friends and allies, but James VI was conscious of this perhaps more than most due to his turbulent childhood. James was wary of introducing new people to his inner circle and was very faithful to his intimate noble friends. As he wrote in Basilikon Doron: ‘bee carefull euer to præferre the gentilest natured and trustiest, to the inwardest offices about you; especially in your chalmer’.59 Although the king was loyal to the men of his chamber, it did not necessarily mean that all posts within the chamber were immune from factional infighting. Movement within the middle echelon of the chamber happened much more frequently than in the lower service positions: as Juhala articulates, it was more likely for the master of the guard to find himself out of a job than the master of the wine cellar.60 However, Lennox was one of the highest-level attendants. He and his vice-chamberlain Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spynie, were in little danger of losing their posts, as it was rare for the upper-level servitors to be eclipsed.61 However, these higher-placed men were not immune to fighting among themselves. Lord Spynie was another who benefitted from James’ affectionate attention before 1603, although he never reached the heights enjoyed by Lennox. Spynie and Lennox were notorious for having petty arguments regarding protocol within the chamber. Everyday battles relating to rank were pervasive throughout the

Rise of a courtier  145 court, even in domestic routines, since it was crucial to protect one’s honour through the preservation of rank.62 Through service to the monarch came rewards in various forms: monetary, the granting of a governmental post, or even elevation to a peerage. The benevolence then trickled down from the magnates to their kin and dependents, presenting opportunities for reward through service in the localities. This symbiotic relationship was how the king retained the loyalty of his subjects and integrated the powerful regional magnates into his own administration as staff.63 James revelled in having high-ranking nobles in service around him, as he confessed in Basilikon Doron: be served with men of the noblest blood that may be had: for besides that their seruice shall breede you great good-will and least envy, contrary to that of start-ups; ye shall oft finde virtue followe noble races, as I have saide before speaking of the Nobilities.64 To be served by the only duke in Scotland added distinction to James’ household and court; thus Lennox received favour that he could in turn pass on to his own servitors. One of the greatest privileges of the Scottish nobility at court was the ancient right of access to the king. This right was the cause of great jealousy in the political realm and was under threat from various angles in the 1590s. In Europe, the right to access a monarch was not a guaranteed privilege of the nobility; personal access was a favour the monarch could choose to bestow, thus making the scramble for favour, rank, and proximity to benefits even more difficult.65 The Scottish nobles were fortunate indeed to have such extensive rights of access by comparison. Those fortunate enough to be on the receiving end of these benefits, particularly through the intimacy of the chamber, provoked jealousy from those who were not so privileged. While the bodies of government by necessity also maintained close relationships with the king, these relationships were mainly functional rather than familiar. The chancellor could request an audience and communicate with the king in his outer chamber to discuss administration, while Lennox could approach James in his bedchamber to discuss more personal topics at ease. The intimacy differences are clear and led to frequent and serious tensions between the king’s council and chamber. John Maitland, chancellor of Scotland until 1595, was one of the most vocal proponents of decreasing the privileges of the nobility. He wanted to limit the special rights of the courtiers and economise the household, entrusting public officials to keep a close eye on household expenditure.66 Maitland also wanted to run both the council and the chamber through the exchequer, his own power base, which was an unpopular idea with both parties and with the king as well, who vetoed the proposal.67 Maitland’s most significant strike against the nobility was his attempt to discontinue, in 1590, the nobles’ automatic right of access to the king. The right to attend the king ceremonially was, to the magnates, a birthright and privilege of their ancestry.68 Taking away their right to access the king

146  Adrienne McLaughlin made Maitland unpopular amongst the nobility at large, but most especially with Lennox and his chamber associates. James, in his usual role as peacemaker, desired harmony and unification between his council and his chamber. It was clear that peace was not possible immediately due to entrenched grievances, but he wanted at least to portray harmony between them in public settings. This was shown in his altering of the ceremonial riding of parliament in 1600 to show the alliance of the two bodies. Immediately following the king in the procession was Lennox as great chamberlain, together with the new chancellor, the Earl of Montrose, showing the unity of chamber and council. The impression of harmony was further demonstrated by the various gentlemen of the chamber who followed the king’s councillors in procession.69 While the king focused his attention on healing the breach between his council and chamber, there were other political groups attempting to impose institutional changes to the chamber. The Octavians, formed in 1596, were fiscal advisors brought together to improve the king’s dire finances, particularly to trim excess spending and remove superfluous men from the king’s payroll, including in the household and chamber.70 As part of their reorganisation of the household, the chamberlain was made particularly liable for ensuring that it ran efficiently.71 Within a month of their formation the Octavians had discharged 70 members of the king’s household,72 but the actual overall effect they had on influencing the monetary flow within the household is questionable. A household account from 1596 shows only five gentlemen of the chamber were paid; Lennox and vice-chamberlain Spynie were not among them. On paper this seems to show that the Octavians were victorious in their desire to cut down spending within the household. In reality, Lennox, Spynie, and many other members of the chamber were paid as usual, but were ‘accidentally’ left off the account list.73 The Octavians also tried to institute a commission of noblemen who would be present at all meetings of the exchequer to assist them in their duties.74 Lennox was named as one of these noble representatives, but the commission never fully materialised and the Octavians were disbanded in 1598, when the permanent exchequer was abolished.75 The removal of the confines of the exchequer left the nobility free to have unfettered access again to the king and his patronage.76 This was a decisive moment in the battle between chamber and council, with the chamber coming out victorious; previous restraints on spending and patronage were relaxed.77 While there is no evidence that the duke was directly involved in the dissolution of the Octavians, he and his chamber associates were the direct beneficiaries of the relaxation of their strict financial control.

IV So far we have seen that Lennox was an ambivalent politician but a very successful courtier. This did not necessarily make him unique compared to his fellow nobles; what set him apart was how far he could push the limits of the king’s tolerance. It is a well-known fact that James was loyal to a fault to his kindred and his favourites, but his patience stretched only so far: the Earls of Bothwell and

Rise of a courtier  147 Huntly were repeatedly forgiven, but the day came when both men were driven from power and lived out their days in obscurity. Lennox, on the other hand, never reached that threshold. He married directly contrary to the king’s wishes and was involved in two invasions of the king’s person at the palace of Holyrood but never received more than a perfunctory slap on the wrist. The first instance of Lennox’s testing the limits of his relationship with James was with his choice of bride. Lennox was certainly an attractive man who had ‘shared his pleasur with many Ladis’,78 but inevitably the question arose of his marriage. James wanted the young duke to marry Lady Arbella Stewart, James’ cousin and his closest blood rival for the succession of England. The proposed union was first mentioned in 1589 and was considered by outsiders to be ‘more proffe of love to the … Duke’, as it was the highest match to which he could aspire.79 However, Lennox began pursuing not Lady Arbella but Sophia Ruthven. She was the daughter of the first Earl of Gowrie, the man responsible for kidnapping James in 1582 and for the downfall and eventual death of Lennox’s father. The king, Huntly, and some of Lennox’s other friends attempted to dissuade him from this imprudent match for many months.80 John Burel, a contemporary poet, even dedicated a book of verse to Lennox in which he openly warned the duke about following through with his intended marriage. Burel’s Poems to the Richt High, Ludwik Duke of Lenox, Earl Darnlie, Lord Tarbolton, Methven and Aubigne, &c, gret Chamberlaine of Scotland followed in the tradition of ‘adviceto-princes’ literature such as Machiavelli’s Il Principe and (in a Scottish context) John Ireland’s Merroure of Wyssdom.81 Within the nuances of the text Burel explained the dangers of satisfying ‘furious lufe’, the ‘irrational, irresponsible selfishness … which can destroy whole kingdoms’.82 That type of passion went against the traditional basis of marriage that God intended. The volume goes on to discuss the duties of a prince, especially the ‘selfless behaviour’ expected from them in the face of passion, which was a direct nod towards Lennox’s situation.83 In the ‘Epistle Dedicatory’, Burel reminded Lennox of his duties as ‘the onely sonne and hair, sprung from the synders, of that Phoenix rair’.84 This is a reference to the lament ‘Ane Metaphoricall Invention of a Tragedie called Phoenix’, a poem written by James himself just after the death of Lennox’s father in 1583. According to Burel, as the offspring of the king’s darling Phoenix, it was Lennox’s duty to follow the king’s orders regardless of personal attachment. Lennox’s infatuation was irrepressible, even after such impassioned argument. To solve the problem definitively the king had Lady Sophia warded with the Laird of Wester Wemyss on the far side of the Firth of Forth.85 In response, Lennox abducted Lady Sophia from Wemyss Castle in April 1591, marrying her the next day; as Jamie Reid-Baxter notes, ‘the desires of the human heart can often override all the claims of Reason’.86 The king was understandably appalled and highly offended by his actions and banished Lennox and his new wife from court. Yet James’ anger with Lennox was short lived: not 10 days later it was reported that ‘the Duke [had been] restored to the Kings good countenance’,87 and he and his wife were instructed to return to court. Lennox played a risky game testing and stretching the boundaries of his relationship with James but

148  Adrienne McLaughlin was successful in the end; risking the king’s anger by marrying without royal approval was something few men would attempt. Sadly, Lady Sophia died in May 1592, just one year after the couple had wed, but the precedent of impudence without recourse was set.88 As noted above, Lennox’s cousin, the Earl of Bothwell, was stripped of all his offices in June 1591 and confined in Edinburgh Castle. He escaped this confinement and orchestrated a raid on the palace of Holyrood, with several accomplices, in December 1591. Some of his party attempted to break open the king’s door with hammers, while others went in search of Chancellor Maitland. The purpose of the raid was not malicious, according to one of Bothwell’s more sympathetic biographers; it was a desperate attempt by the earl to reconcile with the king and express the kingdom’s displeasure at Maitland.89 James and Maitland were left unharmed, while Bothwell and the majority of his accomplices escaped without injury, although a master stabler was killed in the fray.90 The stables are where Bothwell and his men had gained entry to the palace: Lennox’s stable, to be precise. This was just one of many reasons it was widely suspected Lennox himself was involved in this conspiracy. There is evidence to implicate Lennox as a silent accomplice in this break-in: he did not come to the king’s aid until after Bothwell had escaped, and during the altercation he tried to separate Chancellor Maitland from his armed guard.91 David Moysie suspected Lennox’s involvement since some of his friends, such as William Stewart, and relatives, such as Bothwell, were conspirators.92 Ambassador Robert Bowes was also convinced of Lennox’s participation and wrote to Lord Burghley explaining the preparatory work done in Lennox’s stable prior to the attack: the horses had been conveniently tied aside so they would not hinder passage, steel caps and weapons were hidden in the stable, and a ladder was laid ready for them.93 Lennox was never officially accused or punished, but gossip continued about his potential involvement with the break-in for months. By that point, though, it was obvious the king was not going to punish Lennox for ‘winking’ at the incident.94 James continued to trust Lennox, and while his participation in the 1591 raid is based on circumstantial evidence, there is no doubt that he was a crucial player in a second Bothwell plot at Holyrood, this time in 1593. The second plot was much better organised: Bothwell was snuck into the palace and admitted to the king’s chamber by the Earl of Atholl. James was greatly surprised and embarrassed, being caught in a state of undress,95 but, before he could escape the chamber, Lennox interceded on Bothwell’s behalf, asking James to give him a chance to explain.96 Bothwell fell to his knees and begged forgiveness for his past crimes and the king was greatly moved, agreeing to a pardon. The episode was Bothwell’s only successful coup, and Lennox’s involvement was critical, although the result was not lasting. Bothwell’s relationship with the king deteriorated, and he was driven out of public life and departed Scotland permanently in 1595, living the remainder of his life on the continent. It was still a shocking – and not a little amusing – incident, but James held no ill will towards Lennox for defending Bothwell. Lennox maintaining his allegiance with the Stewart faction directly in the face of the king was a unique occurrence; his support for his

Rise of a courtier  149 Stewart kin was erratic throughout his life, but when he chose to intercede on their behalf with James the results reflected his influence.97

V Looking forward to 1603, with James’ accession to the English throne, the various members of the court and household clamoured to accompany him on his move to London. Lennox was assured of a place at the king’s side and was even entrusted to transport Prince Henry in his retinue.98 Under pressure from English nobles and civil servants, James generally avoided gifting English administrative posts to Scots, but many new household positions were created and gifted almost solely to James’ native brethren. Lennox was amongst those who benefitted from the newly expanded household: although his Scottish offices of Lord Great Chamberlain and First Gentleman did not exist in London, he was named First Nobleman of the Bedchamber. This position gave him honorific control over the bedchamber but not much else; there is no evidence of Lennox exerting any kind of official supervision.99 Lennox was gifted with the usual displays of favour immediately upon arriving in London – less than one month later he was inducted into the Order of the Garter – but political positions were never forthcoming.100 It was rumoured that James planned to make him Lord President of the English privy council in order to staff it with an even balance of Scots and English counsellors, but this never occurred.101 Lennox remained in London with the king for the rest of his life. The new British court was a very different beast from the Scottish court. There was a whole new group of men competing for the king’s affection; with the English crown came access to English coffers, and James spread his patronage generously and liberally. There were ambitious upstarts like James Hay, Robert Carr and George Villiers, whose relationships with James were on a completely different scale. These newcomers were raised from obscurity to positions of immense political power, and while their own ambitions contributed greatly, there is no questioning that they were entirely dependent on the king’s good graces. This was a new kind of favourite: with the power and monetary backing of a dual monarch, the English and London-based Scots favourites developed monopolies on a scale never seen in Scotland. Lennox was not forgotten, however. He was still an influential courtier, and James continued to give him honours, although he was no longer so far elevated above everyone else. James gifted him the Dukedom of Richmond in the English peerage in 1623, simultaneous with the elevation of Villiers to the Dukedom of Buckingham, in an attempt to illustrate equal treatment of his Scottish and English subjects. With Buckingham the role of the royal favourite was forever changed. The second Duke of Lennox died on 16 February 1624, officially of an apoplexy, although some historians cite court gossip of an aphrodisiac overdose.102 Lennox’s death came as a massive shock to the king, who postponed the meeting of parliament that was to take place that day. He was mourned as ‘a nobleman of excellent parts, whose very aspect and countenance did promise much good’.103

150  Adrienne McLaughlin Even Lennox’s perennial critic Calderwood mourned him, saying his death ‘was dolorous both to English and Scottish. He was weill liked of for his courtesie, meekness, [and] liberalitie to his servants and followers’.104 Lennox was unique in the noble landscape of Scotland. Certainly not an ambitious politico or juggernaut of government leadership, Lennox’s skills were in the realm of the court, and he fulfilled an important role for the king. Like his father before him, he was a friend, companion, and family to James. But Lennox did not pursue a leadership position in government, a fact that perhaps saved him from the same fate as his father. He was content in the role of well-rewarded companion. Lennox served a different function compared to the Huntlys and Mars of the world – they too could be considered friends to James but were not the sort of jovial boon companion that helped the king relax, unwind, and recover from the stresses of government.105 The importance of this sort of service can be underestimated and undervalued, but it is through this medium of friendship that Lennox earned his keep at the king’s side. Lennox’s realm was the court and household, where he thrived and solidified his friendship with James, who in return treated him as a dear friend and trusted companion. As time passed, however, the model of noble courtier Lennox exemplified was no longer valued. Times were changing; newly ennobled men and those who were willing to depend entirely on the king’s favour began to rise. Someone of comparatively lower birth, like George Villiers, needed to fight harder to maintain his position by developing a client network and regional ties and pushed hard for the ennoblement of his family in order to do so. He started at the bottom and worked his way up, while Lennox was born at the top and needed to exert minimal effort to stay there. However, gracefulness, attractiveness, courtly manners, sense of humour, and hunting skills were always valued by James, and while Lennox excelled in all these categories, those who followed him took these courtly qualities to an even higher level, focusing more on sycophancy than wit. Lennox, while a loyal servant, revelled in testing the limits of his friendship with the king, and his occasional impertinence helped keep James humble; he and his fellow nobles in Scotland were infamous for their frankness and honesty. Once James was removed to London, however, the obsequiousness and flattery of those he surrounded himself with was a significant factor in his declining political judgement; the Lennoxes of his court could not compete with the Buckinghams. The second Duke of Lennox is a reminder that the early modern Scottish nobility cannot be painted with the same brush; not all nobles were ambitious politicians, nor were all nobles aspiring courtiers. James VI, unlike his son, understood the value of his Scottish nobles and utilised them to the best of their ability.

Notes 1 Many thanks to Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch for commenting on early drafts of this article, which originated as my MSc dissertation. A debt of gratitude must be acknowledged to the late Jenny Wormald for her feedback and guidance in all aspects of my research.

Rise of a courtier  151 2 Esmé’s father, John Stewart, was the brother of Matthew, fourth Earl of Lennox, James VI’s grandfather and regent from 1570 until his death in 1571. 3 Lee, Great Britain’s Solomon, 236. The debate over James VI’s sexuality rages on, but is not within the scope of this chapter. For the sake of clarifying the nature of James’ interpersonal relationships with his nobles, however, it is important to note that James was a classically educated man whose instruction came at the knee of an intense misogynist, George Buchanan, and whose upbringing took place in a severe, male-dominated household. James was raised to believe that only men were his intellectual, spiritual and psychological equals and saw no logical benefit to maintaining anything but a perfunctory relationship with women. A case in point is when James opined, ‘to educate women was as difficult as taming foxes’. Quoted in Jenny Wormald, ‘Reformations, Unions and Civil Wars, 1485–1660’, in Jonathan Clark. ed., A World by Itself: A History of the British Isles (London: 2010), 237. For some of the discussion of James’ sexuality see David M. Bergeron, King James and Letters of Homoerotic Desire (Iowa City: 1999); for a critique see Jenny Wormald, ‘Review of David M. Bergeron King James and letters of homoerotic desire’, The English Historical Review 115 (2000), 460–61. 4 For more on Esmé Stuart’s political career and his long-standing impact on Scottish court culture see Roderick J. Lyall, ‘James VI and the sixteenth-century cultural crisis’ in Goodare and Lynch, The Reign of James VI, 55–70; Neil Cuddy, ‘Anglo-­ Scottish union and the court of James I, 1603–1625’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 39 (1989), 107–24; Rosalind K. Marshall, ‘Stuart , Esmé, first duke of Lennox (c. 1542–1583)’,  ODNB [26702, accessed 1 April 2016]. 5 Spottiswoode, History, ii, 306. 6 William Fraser, The Lennox, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1874), ii, 453. 7 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of  Salisbury, S.R. Bird et al. eds, 18 vols (London: 1883–1976), iii, 58; Eileen Cassavetti, The Lion and the Lilies: The Stuarts and France (London: 1977), 66–67. 8 Calderwood, History, iv, 62, 465. 9 CSP Scot., x, 17. 10 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999), 80. 11 RPCS, iv, 430. 12 RPCS, iv, 425, 430n. 13 CSP Scot., x, 249. 14 See Robin Macpherson, ‘Francis Stewart, 5th Earl Bothwell, c1562–1612: Lordship and Politics in Jacobean Scotland’ (University of Edinburgh Ph.D. Thesis, 1998). 15 RPCS, iv, 430. 16 CSP Scot., x, 182. 17 Susan Doran, ‘Loving and affectionate cousins? the relationship between Elizabeth I and James VI of Scotland 1586–1603’ in Susan Doran and Glenn Richardson, eds., Tudor England and its Neighbours (New York: 2005), 207. 18 CSP Scot., x, 183. 19 CSP Scot., x, pp. 780, 773. 20 Roderick J. Lyall, Alexander Montgomerie: Poetry, Politics, and Cultural Change in Jacobean Scotland (Tempe: 2005), 59, 178. 21 CSP Scot., x, 216. 22 See Ruth Grant, ‘The Brig o’ Dee Affair, the sixth Earl of Huntly and the politics of the Counter-Reformation’ in Goodare and Lynch, The Reign of James VI, 93–109. 23 CSP Scot., x, 36. 24 CSP Scot., x, 257, 259–60. 25 CSP Scot., x, 260. 26 Maureen M. Meikle, ‘Anna of Denmark’s Coronation and entry into Edinburgh, 1590: Cultural, Religious and Diplomatic Perspectives’ in Goodare and MacDonald, Sixteenth-Century Scotland, 278.

152  Adrienne McLaughlin 27 RPCS, iv, 450–725. 28 Quoted in Brown, Noble Power, 172. 29 CSP Scot., x, 557. 30 William Fraser, Memorials of the Earls of Haddington, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1889), i, 75–76. 31 RPCS, iv, 613–774. 32 RPCS, v, passim. 33 RPCS, v, 373. 34 RPCS, vi, 111. 35 Calderwood, History, v, 139. 36 Brown, Noble Power, 97. 37 Cecilia Ruthven was Sophia’s great-aunt. Scots Peerage, iv, 260. 38 Sir Bruce G. Seton, ‘The vice-admiral and the quest of the “Golden Pennie”’, SHR 20 (1923), 124. 39 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999), 82. 40 Seton, ‘The vice-admiral’, 122. 41 Brown, Noble Power, 97. 42 See Ruth Grant, ‘George Gordon’, Chapter 6. 43 RPCS, v, 188–89. 44 Calderwood, History, v, 357. The remit of the lieutenancy extended through the shires of Aberdeen, Banff, Elgin, Forres, Nairn, Inverness, and Cromarty. RPCS, v, 187. 45 Calderwood, History, v, 357. 46 Fraser, Haddington, i, 59–60. 47 RPCS, v, 309. 48 Fraser, Haddington, i, 60. 49 RPCS, v, 187. 50 Calderwood, History, v, 362–63. 51 RPCS, v, 208. 52 For more on court politics in the contemporary Scottish context see R.G. Asch, Nobilities in Transition 1550–1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe (London: 2003); Keith M. Brown, ‘The nobility of Jacobean Scotland 1567–1625’ in Jenny Wormald, ed., Scotland Revisited (London: 1991); NeilCuddy, ‘Anglo-Scottish Union and the Court of James I, 1603–1625’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 39 (1989), 107–24; Neil Cuddy, ‘Reinventing a monarchy: The changing structure and political function of the Stuart court, 1603–88’, in Eveline Cruickshanks, ed., The Stuart Courts (Stroud: 2000), 59–85; Juhala, ‘Household and Court’; Jenny Wormald, Court, Kirk, and Community (London: 1981), Chapters 10 and 11. 53 Jeroen Duindam, ‘Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires’ in Jeroen Duindam, Tülay Artan, and Metin Kunt, eds, Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires (Leiden: 2011), 2. 54 Jamie Reid-Baxter, ‘Politics, passion and poetry in the circle of James VI: John Burel and his surviving works’, in L.A.J.R. Houwen, Alasdair A. MacDonald, and Sally L. Mapstone, eds, A Palace in the Wild: Essays on Vernacular Culture and Humanism in Late-Medieval and Renaissance Scotland (Leuven: 2000), 212; Lyall, Alexander Montgomerie, 159. 55 Cuddy, ‘Reinventing a Monarchy’, 62. 56 Neil Cuddy, ‘The revival of the entourage: the Bedchamber of James I, 1603–1625’ in David Starkey, ed., The English Court: From the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War (London: 1987), 180; Roderick Lyall, ‘James VI and the sixteenth-century cultural crisis’ in Goodare and Lynch, The Reign of James VI, 59. For more on the Jacobean household see Juhala, ‘Household and court’, passim. 57 Mary Bateson, ‘The Scottish king’s household and other fragments, from a fourteenth century manuscript in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge’,

Rise of a courtier  153 Scottish Historical Society Miscellany, first series, (1904), ii, 3–43; Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’, 179; Cuddy, ‘Reinventing a monarchy’, 68. 58 For more on the career and ambitions of the first Duke of Buckingham see Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592–1628 (London: 1981); Thomas Cogswell, ‘The people’s love: the Duke of Buckingham and popularity’ in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake, eds., Politics, religion and popularity in early Stuart Britain: essays in honour of Conrad Russell (Cambridge: 2002), 211–34. 59 James VI, Basilicon Doron, ed. James Craigie (Edinburgh: 1944), 119. 60 Juhala, ‘Household and court’, 45. For more on the Scottish Jacobean court and household see Amy Juhala’s chapter in this volume. 61 A generation later Endymion Porter is another example of a long-standing, upper-level servitor. See Gervais Huxley, Endymion Porter: The Life of a Courtier 1587–1649 (London: 1959). 62 Jeroen Duindam, Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europe’s Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780 (Cambridge: 2003), 187. 63 Linda L. Peck, Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I (London: 1982), 24. 64 James VI, Basilicon Doron, 117. 65 Duindam, Vienna and Versailles, 214. 66 Lee, John Maitland, 225. 67 Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, ‘James VI: universal king?’ in Goodare and Lynch, The Reign of James VI, 19; Michael Lynch, ‘The reassertion of princely power in Scotland: the reigns of Mary, Queen of Scots and King James VI’ in Martin Gosman, Alasdair MacDonald, and Arjo Vanderjagt, eds, Princes and Princely Culture 1450–1650, 2 vols (Leiden: 2003), i, 230. 68 Goodare, State and Society, 49; Jeroen Duindam, Myths of Power: Norbert Elias and the Early Modern European Court (Amsterdam: 1994), 90–91. 69 RPCS, vi, 170–71; Goodare and Lynch, ‘Universal king?’, 18. 70 For more on the Octavians see Julian Goodare’s chapter in this volume. 71 RPCS, v, 758. 72 Lee, Government by Pen, 18. 73 ER, xxiii, 155; Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, 354–55. 74 Fraser, Haddington, i, 52. 75 See Julian Goodare, ‘The Attempted Scottish Coup of 1596’ in Goodare and MacDonald, Sixteenth-Century Scotland, 311–36. 76 Goodare, ‘Scottish politics’, 42. 77 Lynch, ‘Princely power’, 230. 78 Quoted in G.P.V. Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant: The Court of King James I (London: 1962), 391. 79 CSP Scot., x, 17. 80 CSP Scot., x, 410. 81 Advocates Library, Edinburgh, John Ireland’s Merroure of Wyssdom, MS. 18, 2, 8; Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe (First printed edition 1532). 82 Jamie Reid-Baxter, ‘Politics, passion and poetry’, 212. 83 Jamie Reid-Baxter, ‘Politics, passion and poetry’, 213. 84 John Burel, Poems to the Richt High, Ludwik Duke of Lenox (Edinburgh: 1595), 2. 85 CSP Scot., x, 502. 86 Calderwood, History, v, 128; CSP Scot., x, 502; Reid-Baxter, ‘Politics, passion and poetry’, 248. 87 CSP Scot., x, 507. 88 Scots Peerage, v, 357. 89 Macpherson, ‘Francis Stewart, 5th Earl Bothwell’, 392–93.

154  Adrienne McLaughlin 90 Calderwood, History, v, 140–41, 364. 91 As chamberlain one of Lennox’s privileges was personal quarters with easy access to the king. As such he was also extremely close to Chancellor Maitland’s chamber; in fact, they were connected by a stairway passage. During the altercation Maitland, afraid for his life, ran up the stairs into Lennox’s chamber asking to take refuge there. Lennox said he would only receive Maitland himself and suggested Maitland’s men return to his own chamber to guard the door as long as possible. Maitland was suspicious of the idea since it separated him from his men and refused to comply. After the incident Maitland had the passageway between his quarters and Lennox’s sealed up, which infuriated Lennox. Melville, Memoirs, 400; CSP Scot x, 622; Calderwood, History, v, 141. 92 Moysie, Memoirs, 87. 93 CSP Scot., x, 616–17. 94 CSP Scot., x, 627. 95 Calderwood, History, v, 256; Moysie, Memoirs, 103. 96 CSP Dom., ii, 368; Sir Robert Gordon, A Genealogical History of the Earldom of Sutherland (Edinburgh: 1813), 206. 97 Lennox was also present for the mysterious events at Gowrie House in 1600 as a companion to the king, and while the Ruthven brothers were Lennox’s former ­brothers-in-law there is no evidence of Lennox’s involvement in the Conspiracy or his true reaction to the events. For more on the Gowrie Conspiracy see Jenny Wormald’s chapter in this volume. 98 Calderwood, History, vi, 230–1. A vicious rumour circulated at court in the early 1590s regarding the nature of the queen’s relationship with Lennox, carrying through to the baptism of Prince Henry in August 1594 where it was whispered by some that the prince was actually the son of Lennox. CSP Scot., xi, 73. 99 Brian P. Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union, 1603–1707 (Oxford: 1987), 185. 100 George Crawfurd, Lives and Characters of the Officers of the Crown and of the State in Scotland (London: 1736), 335. 101 RPCS, vi, 569n. 102 Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant, 392. 103 Spottiswoode, History, iii, 269. 104 Calderwood, History, vii, 595. 105 This importance of this is discussed in Jenny Wormald, ‘The happier marriage partner: the impact of the union of the crowns on Scotland’ in Glen Burgess, J. Lawrence, and R. Wymer, eds, The Accession of James I, (New York: 2006), 69–87.

8 ‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’ The rise of James VI’s chamber, 1580–1603 Amy L. Juhala The last decade of James VI’s Scottish residency saw developments in the power and influence of the king’s chamber, a nebulous collection of royal favourites, friends of long-standing, trusted advisors, and lifelong servitors. Some of these men were resident at court while others moved between court and locality. Several owed their personal wealth and position directly to the king and repaid him with their service. Others still were powerful magnates whose influence in the localities was as important to the king as their presence at court. These disparate courtiers guided the king through financial crises, political uncertainty, and personal attacks. It was both a preference for and reliance on these servitors of long standing, combined with ongoing attempts to reform the finances and efficiency of his household, that contributed to the development of the chamber in its most settled and extensive form in the years prior to 1603. Through discussion of the issues facing the court and profiling of the lives and careers of the gentlemen found therein, this chapter charts the evolution of the chamber as it developed into a coterie that James took with him on his transfer to England.

I Before any discussion of the chamber can begin, it is important to mention that the chamber was an ever-changing, ever-evolving institution and certainly not one that has ever received any clear definition from historians of Jacobean Scotland.1 While there were numerous ‘gentlemen of the chamber’, some ‘ordinary’ (who served with pay) and some ‘extraordinary’ (who served without), their duties depended upon the needs of the king. At any time members of the chamber could be asked to serve as companions when riding to the fields, to provide a makeshift guard around the king or to serve in support functions such as greeting guests and bringing them into the king’s presence. The chamber also included men whose positions were largely ceremonial, such as server, cupbearer, and carver. However, there were formal appointments related to the chamber that carried great power and influence, such as the Lord High

156  Amy L. Juhala Chamberlain, who made decisions regarding the assignment of lodgings within the palace. Personal service to the king was only one of the duties of those in the chamber. The great offices of state – the posts of chancellor, treasurer, and Lord Privy Seal – could also be held by chamber men, assuming they were favoured by James. While these positions may appear straightforward and easy to track, the chamber also consisted of the king’s friends, powerful nobles who appeared at court when they were able but who received no payment for their time and service and often held no formal position. Furthermore, influence and position waxed and waned, and while a noble might be embraced by court and chamber one day, a month later that same person could have fallen completely from favour and been removed.2 Considering the constraints outlined above, the difficulty in identifying the names of those in the chamber should be clear. Appointments or payments in the records of the Privy Seal, the exchequer rolls, and treasurer’s accounts help identify who should be at court at any time, but as noted above many of those in the chamber, especially landed nobility, received no direct monetary compensation.3 Many did receive grants of lands or feus, but an influential nobleman would have been identified by his title in the grant rather than by the designation ‘in the king’s chamber’, further complicating the identification of those present. Thus, receiving a grant or feu was not confirmation of a presence in the chamber. To further confuse matters, some gentlemen were appointed to serve in shifts of three or four months at a time. Unfortunately, these ‘rota’ appointments rarely specify how their time was allocated and whether or not these shift limits were strictly applied, as they seem to have been with the masters of the household,4 thus making it difficult to know who was serving at court at any time. As a result of the limits of existing records, much of our understanding of the situation on the ground comes from English agents who regularly reported to Elizabeth and her counsellors on the shifting ambitions of the chamber personnel.5 Not surprisingly, these reports, too, carry their own limitations. Specific names are provided inconsistently, and comments tend to highlight actions or developments only when they appeared worrisome to the English. For instance, in January 1599, George Nicolson, the English agent resident in Scotland, reported that ‘the King is so inclinable to his Chamber and his favourites’ advices … to do anything how inconvenient soever’.6 While this excerpt shows a pervasive and generic fear on Nicolson’s part regarding the influence that the king’s chamber and favourites wielded, the full entry does not identify who these men were. Furthermore, the English agents were often ill-advised or incorrect in their assumptions. An example of this occurred later in January 1599, when it was reported that the king ‘inwardly dislikes my Lord of Mar and in time will take the young prince from him … But this is a secret’.7 James’ affection for Mar was in fact unwavering in his adult reign, and the prince was only removed from Mar’s custody upon the occasion of the royal family’s move to London.8 Thus, while English reports are useful in providing an insight into chamber activities and influence, they too are limited.

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  157

II The primary factor that contributed to the growth of the chamber from the 1590s onwards came from the continual improvements of the household structure that occurred through frequent reforms, allowing James to create an intimate inner circle at court of hand-picked and trusted servitors. James and his advisers had been endlessly altering either the organisation or finances of the chamber – or both – since the time of the Lennox regime, although rarely to any lasting effect. The king’s household bill from May 1568 included a governess, mistress nurse, rockers, master household, steward, three servitors in the chamber, four violers, a minister, and servitors in the kitchen and cellars,9 but at this point there was no established chamber or formal organisation. The chamber began showing adult characteristics in May 1580 when it shifted away from the needs of a juvenile king and began to include a ceremonial element with the creation of the intimate ‘chamber’ offices of servers, cupbearers, and carvers.10 These roles, with their inherent closeness to the king, were highly desirable and were primarily given to sons of the nobility.11 The men initially assigned to these positions included two Elphinstones (Michael and William) and Thomas Erskine of Gogar.12 The number of valets, pages, ushers, porters, and grooms also increased, along with a later addition in October 1580 of a Lord High Chamberlain, deputy chamberlain, 24 ordinary (paid) and 6 extraordinary (honorary and unpaid) gentlemen of the bedchamber who were assigned to quarterly shifts consisting of 8 men each, as designated by the Lord Chamberlain.13 There were four masters of the household identified in the accounts although they, too, served in shifts.14 Thus, an appointment to a position did not guarantee continued residence at court. The adult household also included increased numbers in the wardrobe, laundry, pantry, cellars, larder, spice house, vessel house, musical establishment, furnishings, stables, hunting establishment, and kitchens. With the varied masters, keepers, and their servitors, the numbers could reach well into the hundreds.15 While the court itself became quite large, the chamber itself was far more compact, restricted to the Lord Chamberlain, depute chamberlain, gentlemen of the chamber, servers, cupbearers, carvers, grooms, pages, valets, ushers, and musicians. The only other household appointments that provided close contact with the king were the stables and the king’s guard. In March 1590, while still in Denmark and professing a need to cut costs, James radically reduced the number of gentlemen in his chamber to four.16 Shortly after his return to Scotland, household officers and councillors again established that the chamber was to be served by only four gentlemen (although how this service was defined is not explained), and the numbers of appointments in some offices were limited: two each to the position of master of household, and two cupbearers, two carvers and two servers.17 Revisions continued following James’ marriage, the most immediate of which was the limiting of access to the king. Scottish courtiers had been known to walk in upon the king unannounced, even to the extent of seeing James in various states of undress and disrepair. Unsurprisingly, Anna expressed a wish for James to make his chamber more private,

158  Amy L. Juhala suggesting he follow her example by sometimes permitting no-one entry unless sworn to attend her or of her privy circle.18 This adjustment was the least appreciated by the Scottish nobility, especially those of an age with the king who had been accustomed to unlimited access. James was urged by Chancellor Maitland in 1590 to reform his council, ‘to draw them to less number and of better quality’, disallowing the attendance of all unauthorised councillors and presumably removing those noblemen who had participated in the ‘Brig o’ Dee’ affair, which James refused to do.19 The most unwelcome reforms came with the creation of the Octavians in 1596 and quickly ended with their dissolution two years later.20 However, following the Gowrie Conspiracy of 1600, additional actions were undertaken to ensure the physical protection of the king. Nicolson reported in November of that year that ‘none of the nobility shall lie in the King’s house nor none come into the King’s chamber under degree of lords and barons but the King’s servants’ and three members of the chamber and 24 household servitors would be required to serve as a nightly guard for the king.21 It is unlikely that these security measures were fully upheld, although in early March 1601 Nicolson reported ‘the by passages to the King’s chamber [were] carefully barred up and new orders taken for stay of such access to the King as was wont’, with some courtiers believing these new actions had been taken only due to Queen Anna’s forthcoming visit to the palace of Holyrood.22 That the members of the chamber were to be available to physically protect and defend the king and chamber if needed was a highly unusual step for any royal court. While the king was continually trying to reduce expenditure in his household, he also became far more specific about those whom he chose to serve in his chamber, although the most influential members of the chamber remained his friends from childhood and a handful of lifelong servants. Put simply, the king chose men he trusted. The justifications for his choice of attendant can be found in Basilikon Doron, the advice manual written for his son, Prince Henry. James was very specific about the qualities of men who should serve Prince Henry, and these qualities clearly reflect the men who inhabited the king’s own chamber. The issue of ‘trustworthiness’ was brought up numerous times, as when he notes: ‘Be careful ever to prefer the gentlest natured and trustiest to the inwardest offices about you, especially in your chalmer’.23 He also said ‘let them that have the credit to serve you in your chalmer be trusty and secret … but specially see that those of your chalmer be of sound fame and without blemish’.24 James further advised Henry to ‘love them best that are plainest with you’25 and to assign to offices ‘every man according to his gifts’.26 Assigning a position in the chamber or at court according to a person’s individual talents was something that James did throughout his reign, as will be seen below. Another interesting admonition made by the king was ‘to choose your servants indifferently out of all quarters, not respecting other men’s appetites but their own qualities’.27 This last statement strongly reflects James’ preference for lawyers and professional men whose training and skills could be used to the king’s advantage and who relied solely upon their service to the king as their means of income and advancement in the world.28 This is not to suggest that James eschewed the advice and support of his

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  159 nobility. As has been discussed elsewhere in this volume, James relied heavily upon the friendship, support, and service of his magnates to advise him at court and to advance his cause in the localities. However, his reliance upon men from ‘all quarters’ was crucial to the success of the chamber, as we shall see. Finally, before examining who was present in the chamber after 1590 and the types of power they wielded, it is beneficial to briefly acknowledge one further factor that affected the chamber: the role of John Maitland of Thirlestane in James’ early government. One of the most influential politicians of James VI’s reign, Maitland was first secretary and then chancellor, and from 1587 to 1592 was ‘the most powerful man in Scotland after the king’.29 According to Maurice Lee, Maitland’s attitudes regarding the upper aristocracy, particularly his deeply held prejudice that they were ‘part of the political problem, not the indispensable element in the solution’, impacted heavily upon the young king.30 Maitland built up significant personal power at court during his years of service, but at the cost of his alienation from virtually every one of the major magnates at court.31 He was the probable source of James’ recommendation to Prince Henry to ‘use not one in all things, lest he wax proud and be envied of his fellows’.32 Chancellor Maitland found factionalism, jealousies, and the queen’s enmity to be severely detrimental not only to fulfilling his obligations as chancellor but also to his position at court. By the summer of 1592, it was reported that he dared not come near court, partly due to a royal command to that effect, but also because his enemies there, namely the Duke of Lennox, Earls of Argyll and Mar, Lord Home, and the Master of Glamis, remained about the king at Dalkeith ‘gyding all thingis at ther pleaser’.33 From then until Maitland’s death in 1595, the king consulted with his chancellor at Maitland’s various homes rather than at court. Lee’s opinion is that Maitland, upon his death, left an administrative system that allowed James to rule as he saw fit, one in which Maitland had ‘trained his own successor, in the person of the king himself’.34 It is important to note though that Julian Goodare and Keith Brown do not ascribe to this Maitland-centric view. Goodare argues that the ‘professionalism of government’ carried out ‘under the influence of such administrators as Maitland’ was part of a larger government project to centralise economic relationships, which included drawing the nobles more firmly back into the chamber and privy council between 1590 and 1598.35 Goodare sees this as the development of an absolutist state in Scotland,36 while Keith Brown, on the other hand, argues that the ‘underlying medieval structures’ and the ‘ideals of noble society’, which included their participation in government, continued well into the seventeenth century.37 While James was the beneficiary of Maitland’s political acumen, he also resented the power and influence that the chancellor had held over him. James saw little need to quickly appoint a new chancellor following the death of Maitland; he did not need one. While the possibility of a new chancellor appears with regularity in the accounts of the English agents, several conventions passed with no appointment.38 James in fact ruled without the assistance of a chancellor until January 1599 when he appointed John Graham, Earl of Montrose to the post.39 The years without a chancellor suggest on one hand that James was ready to rule

160  Amy L. Juhala as ‘sole king’, without even the notional backing of a royal adviser or ‘partner’ in government such as Maitland or Captain James Stewart, the ‘quondam’ (‘sometime’) Earl of Arran.40 On the other hand, evidence relating to the services of those in the chamber in this period makes plain that James relied more heavily on their advice and support in the exercise of his rule.

III To best understand the development of the chamber, it is necessary to identify the men who served therein. One of the most noticeable aspects of the chamber was the regular presence of the king’s childhood classmates, primarily the Erskine children who were also resident at Stirling in his youth: John, second Earl of Mar,41 and his cousin, Sir Thomas of Gogar, second son of the Master of Mar. The Erskines benefitted greatly from their close ties to the king with influential appointments, patronage, and grants of land and titles throughout their lives, as did Walter Stewart, future Lord Blantyre, a cousin of the king, who was also a member of the royal schoolroom. John Erskine, second Earl of Mar, was four years older than the king. In addition to being made keeper of Stirling Castle (1578–81 and again in 1585) and Edinburgh Castle (1593), Mar was charged in 1594 with raising Prince Henry.42 By 1596 he had procured the principal bedchamber within the secretary’s lodgings at Holyroodhouse,43 which shows his standing both with the king and with Ludovick Stewart, second Duke of Lennox, Lord High Chamberlain (and Mar’s brother-in-law). Although documentary evidence is sparse, Mar’s position as one of the king’s most trusted friends and servitors seems beyond doubt. The fact that James trusted Mar to raise the young prince is indicative of the king’s feelings for his oldest friend. The fascinating issue regarding Mar is that his participation in the 1578 seizure of Stirling Castle, the Ruthven Raid of 1582, and the Stirling Raid of 1584 never seems to have been viewed by the king as subversive, and no matter his actions or intrigues, he always returned to the king’s favour. Goodare views Mar as ‘a crown servant first and a regional magnate second’,44 and it is certainly true that James needed Mar’s support in the localities and with other magnates. For example, in September 1594, James wrote to Mar asking him to lead a committee of nobles to investigate royal finances, alleging incompetence on the part of Treasurer Glamis and other financial officials.45 In the note, James reminds Mar that he holds the king’s ‘tua greatest strengthis, and (quhilk is maist of all) of my eldest and only sonne’ and that ‘nane can be maire obleist to me’.46 Thus, the king asserts his right to direct Mar, as his subject, where needed, while acknowledging his reliance upon Mar’s position and influence, a clear sign of the king’s respect for noble power. It also highlights the personal importance of Mar in the decisions of the government. His length of service to the king, from his friendship in the schoolroom through to his service as Lord Treasurer, reaffirms his position as one of the most important courtiers during James’ reign. Mar is also the earliest example of James’ reliance upon friends and servitors of long standing in his chamber.

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  161 The second influential classmate was Sir Thomas Erskine of Gogar, second son of Alexander Erskine, Master of Mar, the king’s loved and trusted guardian for much of his childhood.47 Erskine was the same age as the king and retained chamber prominence throughout the reign, starting as king’s server for life in 1579.48 He brutally proved his value as a member of the chamber when he killed Alexander Ruthven during the events of the Gowrie Conspiracy of August 1600. For his actions he was made Laird of Dirleton in November 1600.49 In 1601, he accompanied Lennox on his embassy to France and was admitted as a privy councillor. Erskine held the offices of chamberlain depute, captain of the guard, and ordinary gentleman of the chamber.50 Unlike his cousin, Erskine appeared frequently within household and Privy Seal records for gifts of escheat or ward and assorted payments. He was in close, constant attendance upon the king and on occasion reimbursed for significant amounts which he had ‘deburst in his maiesteis awin particular effairis’.51 Erskine had also reportedly become ‘the only statesman and secretary for secrets’ by April 1601.52 Erskine’s role in the chamber differs from that of his cousin in two ways. First, unlike Mar, Erskine established his position in the chamber through friendship and dedicated service; he did not have the benefit or political clout of a powerful earldom to show his worth to the king. Second, and as a result of his lack of a noble title, Erskine was a far more active courtier. He built a life for himself at court while his cousin split his time between court and locality. The last Stirling classmate to be heavily involved in the chamber was Walter Stewart. Paul Goatman discusses Stewart’s service to the king in the context of burgh politics in Glasgow in this period in Chapter 4 of this volume, but Stewart also held various positions of importance in the household and chamber while James was resident in Scotland. He was a gentleman in the king’s privy chamber, a gentleman pensioner, Lord Privy Seal, an Octavian, and treasurer.53 Stewart’s appearance in the chamber dates to 1580 and continues, uninterrupted, until his resignation in 1599, which places him in a relatively small group of longtrusted courtiers upon whom James relied to guide the chamber and the country. Stewart, Mar, and Erskine are notable as the most prominent examples of men whose service in the chamber provided continuity and support to James throughout his reign. For his part, James knew them well and could trust them to fully support his interests. While Mar, Erskine, and Stewart were all intimates of the king and frequently in the chamber, they were joined by several others, the most important of whom was the king’s cousin, Ludovick Stewart, second Duke of Lennox. As Lord High Chamberlain from 1583 to 1624, Lennox was the only person with the power ‘to appoint and command the lodgings and chambers within his majesties palaces’.54 This in turn gave Lennox absolute control over who was granted access to the king. In August 1600, James combined the offices of Lord High Chamberlain and First Gentleman of the Chamber and confirmed them upon Lennox, with Sir James Sandilands of Slamannan acting as deputy and lieutenant.55 This action further increased Lennox’s power in the chamber and reinforced his position as the most powerful noble in Scotland.56

162  Amy L. Juhala The king’s cousin and his childhood schoolmates were not the only gentlemen to establish themselves in the chamber. Several other men, of varied social standing, started their service to the king around the same time as the chamber first began to appear. The first of these was Sir George Home of Spott, later Earl of Dunbar. Home appeared in the 1580s as a master of the stables, a gentleman of the bedchamber, and a member of the entourage sent to collect Anna of Denmark.57 It was during the journey to Norway that he became master of the king’s wardrobe, replacing Sir William Keith of Delny.58 Home retained this position until James’ move to England, where he was made keeper of the Great Wardrobe. Although of much lower social standing than James’ classmates, Home retained the king’s favour because he was, in the words of Maurice Lee, ‘good company, discreet, cautious, and, above all, loyal’.59 It was as one of James’ ‘special favourites’ that he was knighted in November 1590, at the same time that Alexander Lindsay was created Lord Spynie and Sir James Sandilands of Slamannan was knighted.60 A decade later James’ relationship with Home was still strong, as in 1600 Nicolson reported the king had gone ‘to be merry at Spott with Sir George Home’ along with the duke, Sir Thomas Erskine, the comptroller, and others. By this time Home was identified as ‘the only greatest courtier’ and ‘the only man of all other most inward with the King’.61 Additionally, his wife, Elizabeth Gordon, was one of Anna’s gentlewomen.62 He continued his personal rise with his appointment as Lord Treasurer in October 1601 and followed the king to England. Following Lennox and Erskine, Home is the third most influential and active courtier during the years 1598 to 1603. Another long-serving gentleman within the chamber was the Englishman Roger Aston. Aston had been in the king’s household since 1578,63 was knighted in April 1603, and continued to serve the king in England. Aston was sent to London to procure items in preparation for James’ marriage to Anna and was the first person sent to London to organise the king’s reception following Elizabeth’s death in 1603.64 In neither of these cases was he travelling as an ambassador; his birth as an illegitimate son of an English sheriff was not sufficiently elevated for him to serve in that capacity. However, being sent on these missions shows another of the capacities in which James used members of the chamber, in this case the organisation of festivities and royal occasions. However, Aston differs from the other members of the chamber, in that his closeness to the king did not preclude his serving as an informant for the English government. Whether or not he served as a double agent is unclear. His loyalty to the king never appears to have been seriously questioned, and the favour the king showed him continued after the Scottish court moved to England. Nevertheless, through him, Walsingham, Burghley, Cecil, and their spies were able to follow the precise movements of the king and court and were privy to some of the king’s more intimate conversations.65 It seems unlikely that Aston’s role as an English agent was unknown to James – was another of Aston’s services to the king to pass information, accurate or inaccurate, to the English? Aston’s own words, in a missive to the English court from June 1598, suggest he served Queen Elizabeth and that he was aware that some at court distrusted him:

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  163 I am advertised … there are informers against me and awaits to entrap me. So long as my handwriting cannot be seen I care not. Therefore I beseech your Honour be careful of me for if I be not of credit here I can do her Majesty no service.66 Yet considering James’ own correspondence with Cecil and the political acumen he had gathered under the tutelage of Maitland and his long political ‘apprenticeship’, it seems unlikely that James would be unaware of Aston’s correspondence.67 It also seems unlikely that a man who had chosen a life and career in Scotland would prioritise loyalty to the English queen over James, especially given just how extensive his links to the king were: he was a Stewart through marriage,68 his wife was one of Anna’s ladies-in-waiting,69 his mother-in-law was governess to the king’s children, and one brother-in-law was Lord Ochiltree.70 Furthermore, Aston had served the king’s grandfather, the Regent Lennox, as well as Mary and Darnley.71 Rather than view Aston’s correspondence with England as working against the king, it seems more likely that Aston’s role as an agent for the English was encouraged by James and was one of the core elements of his service in the chamber. Using Aston in this capacity allowed James to control the information that was released, and it provided a way for James to keep abreast of English concerns and interests outside of formal diplomatic channels of communication, in much the same way he used George Gordon the sixth Earl of Huntly to maintain relations with Spain and other Catholic powers in Europe.72 Keith Brown concluded the same, suggesting, in relation to Aston and other Englishmen at court, that ‘it is doubtful if Cecil was hearing anything that James did not want him to hear’.73 English agent or double agent, he was highly trusted within the Scottish household and was one of the longest-serving members of the chamber, most likely valued because of the direct link he provided to Elizabeth’s court. While Home and Aston had served James since the development of the adult court, other courtiers appeared later in the reign. One such servitor was Sir Robert Ker, who had been called to court late in 1591 by his wife’s uncle, John Maitland of Thirlestane, when the latter was attempting to create his own faction at court. Ker’s wife, Jean Drummond, was one of Anna’s ladies.74 In 1594 he was appointed as a bearer of the canopy at Henry’s baptism75 and as warden of the Middle March.76 In 1597, Lord Ralph Eure reported to Cecil that Ker ‘is a principal man, a warden, having the King’s ear and love as one of his chamber’77 and was seen as the only member of the chamber who could help bring peace to the Borders. Two years later, he was again identified as influential in the chamber,78 and that May he was admitted to the privy council. He was raised to the peerage as Lord Roxburgh at Prince Charles’ baptism in 1600.79 He accompanied James to England in 1603, but it is unclear how long he remained at the English court or how frequently he travelled back and forth. Unlike Home and Aston, whose primary service focused on the court and on English diplomacy, Ker brought regional influence to the chamber. Ker was able to use his court connections to serve his own purposes, as can be seen in a 1593 encounter with Bothwell during which the two had an extended skirmish

164  Amy L. Juhala on horseback. Ker returned to court and informed the king, who ordered that Bothwell’s castle at Crichton be razed, although there is no evidence the orders were carried out. Ker had been an earlier recipient of Bothwell’s forfeited lands and had joined in the king’s military actions against the errant earl. In 1594, as warden depute of the Middle March, he was able to muster troops in the Borders in support of the king’s actions against Bothwell.80 Overall Ker, who divided his time between court and locality, benefitted from his service to the king and court, and James benefitted from Ker’s military support. Like Mar, Ker is an example of the king’s and chamber’s need for regional magnates to influence the localities. The Octavians, the king’s committee of exchequer commissioners who held office between 1596 and 1598, were another group of active and influential members in the chamber. Julian Goodare discusses the political trajectory of these eight men in detail in this volume,81 but it is worth adding to his comments on their individual impact on the chamber after their dissolution in 1598. The king continued to trust their individual counsel and kept them involved in government affairs, and as Goodare has noted all of these men were the type of servitor James preferred: honest, hard-working, professional men from the ranks of lairds or younger sons of the peers. They largely relied on the patronage of the king to advance, and advance they did. The former Octavians held numerous influential positions in James’ administration, specifically in relation to the chamber. Alexander Seton was entrusted with the keeping of Prince Charles. In December 1604 he was made chancellor and four months later was installed as Earl of Dunfermline.82 James Elphinstone was made Secretary of State; his influence on the king was noted in June 1598 when Roger Aston wrote to Cecil that ‘… the King will run himself into the “bryes” [presumably ‘byres’, or cowsheds] by following the counsel of dangerous men, chiefly the Secretary who is growing great… He is ambitious [and] greedy’.83 An observation that further supports the increasing influence of Secretary Elphinstone was an observation from Nicolson in 1599: the rising still of the faction of the chamber, the King reposing wholly on them and their service, the Lord Secretary being the very disposer of all, as none here is able to do the good service he can … his brother is now in great place and Treasurer.84 Peter Young had known the king since his childhood and was another example of a trusted servitor who owed his continued position entirely to the king’s favour after his service as James’ deputy schoolmaster. In addition to serving as tutor, he also acted as master almoner and as an ambassador, including three visits to Denmark to arrange the king’s marriage. He followed the king to England, was made tutor to Prince Charles, and was knighted in 1605.85 He treated the king gently and earned James’ ever-lasting respect and trust.86 Young’s family benefitted from his royal connections: his wife, Elspeth Gibb, was a gentlewoman in Anna’s household, as was his daughter.87 James relied, especially in the latter

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  165 part of his years in Scotland, upon these younger sons of his nobles and members of the lesser nobility, mostly trained lawyers, to take responsibility for his finances. These professional, educated men helped provide a counterbalance to the number of nobility in the chamber and helped him avoid a top-heavy administration. By gathering men with differing skills, backgrounds, and connections, James was able to draw upon the best skills available to him and use those to his advantage. There were numerous other members of the chamber, many of whom were granted titles after 1603. David Murray of Gospertie, first Viscount of Stormont, progressed from cupbearer in 1580 to master of the king’s stable in 1583 to privy councillor and comptroller in April 1599.88 Murray was a member of the privy council that issued the ‘official’ report on the events at Gowrie House and was rewarded with a number of former Ruthven properties.89 He accompanied James to England in 1603 and personally advanced funds to make the trip possible.90 John Fleming was restored by Parliament as the sixth Lord Fleming in 1579. He was identified as the king’s great master usher and as an ambassador to Denmark in 1583 and 1590 respectively, and although he does not appear in any household accounts past 1589, he must have remained connected to the court as he was created Earl of Wigtown in London in 1607. Patrick Lindsay, Lord Lindores, progressed from king’s ‘familiaris servitor’ in 1590 to gentleman of the privy chamber in 1596 and from there to his creation as Lord Lindores at the baptism of Prince Charles in December 1600.91 Alexander Home, eldest son of the fifth Lord Home, assumed his father’s duties as warden of the East Marches at the age of 15 in 1581, submitted to a self-imposed exile in 1591–2, then returned to court to hold a variety of chamber positions in the years immediately after,92 including undertaking an embassy to France and carrying the crown in the baptismal celebrations for Prince Henry.93 A member of the chamber who appears irregularly in the exchequer rolls is Sir James Sandilands of Slamannan, previously mentioned in connection with Lennox.94 He appears as a gentleman in the privy chamber in 1590,95 is said to have taken an active role in protecting the king when Bothwell entered the palace of Holyrood,96 and was made depute and lieutenant to the Lord High Chamberlain of Scotland and First Gentleman of the Chamber at Falkland on 2 August 1600.97 Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spynie, progressed from captain of the king’s guard in 1588 to chamberlain depute in 158998 and was identified as ‘ane great courtier’ and ‘the King’s only minion … esteemed of the King most of any man in Scotland … and his nightly bed-fellow’.99 He had been created Lord Spynie in November 1590, but due to his close connections to Bothwell he was removed from the chamber in 1592.100 Spynie reclaimed favour in May 1601 and once again was privileged to lie in the king’s chamber.101 The individual careers of these men are unremarkable in themselves, with their work confined largely to attendance upon the king, diplomatic work, and ceremonial duties. However, taken together they confirm just how far James had come to rely on gentry and sons of the lesser nobility by the turn of the century—men who were just as keen to establish themselves as indispensable to the king.

166  Amy L. Juhala

IV As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, the chamber presents numerous challenges to those trying to understand its nature, especially when it comes to identifying those who inhabited it. Appointments to chamber positions have often not appeared in printed records. Courtiers appeared and departed, depending upon the prevailing faction. Scottish magnates appeared at court when it suited them, then rushed back to their localities when needed. However, this chapter has shown that it is possible to identify many of the gentlemen of the chamber, and understanding who they were helps define the evolution of the chamber during James’ reign in Scotland, particularly in the last decade before his departure to England. James surrounded himself with men who would support him and his decisions rather than take charge, an approach possibly learned from the problems with his nobility that occurred during the years when Chancellor Maitland held office. James’ continual attempts at household reform, particularly the need to cut costs and create at least a notional level of privacy for himself and his family in the 1590s, resulted in a more careful selection of who was chosen to serve in the chamber. These men were a mix of childhood friends and powerful magnates who owed some allegiance to the king, professional men from the lesser nobility who owed their advancement to royal patronage, and a variety of gentlemen whose skills were useful for the king and who had proven themselves through years of trusted service. It was also a model that made little sense to those in England. Nicolson stated in 1599 that ‘the Secretary and Chamber faction are … strong and rule … for the King favours them very strangely’.102 The result of this ‘favour[ing] very strangely’ was an effective, well-oiled political machine that allowed James to rely upon trusted servitors and successfully govern not one country, but eventually two.

Notes 1 But see also Adrienne McLaughlin’s chapter in this volume. 2 For more information about the development of the household and chamber in Scotland see Juhala, ‘Household and Court’, Chapter 2 and Appendices, and A. Thomas, Princelie Majestie: The Court of James V of Scotland, 1528–1542 (Edinburgh: 2005). 3 John Erskine, second Earl of Mar, was identified as ‘great maister household’ but received no compensation in the treasurer’s or comptroller’s accounts. He did receive payments of £800 annually for the keeping of Edinburgh Castle (ER, xxii, 388). Similarly, neither John Fleming, sixth Lord Fleming, ‘great master usher’ nor Patrick Lindsay, Lord Lindores, gentleman in the privy chamber, received compensation in the accounts. 4 For further explanation of serving shifts, see below. 5 See CSP Scot., xii and xiii. Many letters were sent from Robert Bowes, the English ambassador to Scotland, while many others came from Bowes’ secretary George Nicolson or nephew Sir William Bowes. Other correspondents included Roger Aston, an English servitor to James VI, and James Hudson, one of James’ violers. 6 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, 369. 7 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 619. 8 However, on Mar’s earlier career and his disputes with James, see below.

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  167 9 NAS, Mar and Kellie Muniments, GD124/10/25. 10 NAS, Household Accounts, E34/35. 11 For more detail, see Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Chapter 2. 12 RSS, vii, 1292, 1642; RSS, viii, 381, 882. 13 RPCS, iii, 316, 322–23; CSP Scot., v, 631. 14 NAS, Royal Household Books, E31/15: According to surviving Household Books of 1597–98, two men rotated as master household: Sir Michael Elphinstone in November 1597, Andrew Melville of Garvok from January to February 1598, Elphinstone again March through May, Melville from June through August, and Elphinstone September through October. 15 For a full discussion of this evolution, see Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Chapter 2, 18–48 and 64–77, and Appendix 1. 16 CSP Scot., x, 257. 17 CSP Scot., x, 306. Unspecified ‘others’ were noted as attending within the chamber in addition to the four gentlemen and the gentlemen servants. 18 May 30, 1590, Burghley to Bowes: ‘Sometimes she suffers much liberty for noblemen and others to keep her company, at other times she permits neither noble person nor other to come into her privy chamber … and by that means the greatest persons doe knowe that theie owght not to cume thither withowt license’. CSP Scot., x, 303. 19 CSP Scot., x, 416. 20 For further details, see Julian Goodare’s chapter in this volume. 21 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 725. 22 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 779. 23 King James VI and I, The True Law of Free Monarchies and Basilikon Doron. D. Fischlin and M. Fortier, eds, (Toronto: 1996), 136. 24 James VI and I. Basilikon Doron, 158. 25 James VI and I. Basilikon Doron, 137. 26 James VI and I. Basilikon Doron, 133. 27 James VI and I. Basilikon Doron, 134–35. 28 Some examples are Sir Andrew Melville of Garvok, master household; Mr Peter Young of Seton, tutor and master almoner; Mr James Durham of Duntarvie, clerk of expenses; Mr George Young, secretary depute; Mr David McGill of Cranston Riddell, king’s advocate. 29 Lee, Maitland of Thirlestane; Maurice Lee, ‘Maitland, John, first Lord Maitland of Thirlestane (1543–1595)’, ODNB [17826, accessed 17 March 2016]. 30 Lee, ‘Maitland’. 31 J. Wormald, Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland 1470–1625 (Edinburgh: 1992), 155. 32 James VI and I, Basilikon Doron. 137. 33 NLS, Adv MS 35.4.2, f. 606v. 34 Lee, ‘Maitland’. 35 J. Goodare. ‘The nobility and the absolutist state in Scotland, 1584–1638’ History 78 (1993), 166–68. 36 The details of this argument are developed in J. Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999) and J. Goodare, The Government of Scotland, 1560–1625 (Oxford: 2004). 37 K. Brown. ‘The Stewart Realm: changing the landscape’, in Boardman and Goodare, Kings, Lords and Men, 19–33. See also Brown, Noble Society and Brown, Noble Power. 38 March 10, 1596, Bowes to Burghley: The office of the Chancellor is still reserved in the King’s hands (CSP Scot., xii, 163). January 14, 1599, Bowes to Burgley: Since my last here has been much dealing anent the place of Chancellorship, my Lord of Montrose still pressing for it and the Chamberlain, Sir George Home, Sir George Elphinstone, Sir Robert Kerr, the Lord Secretary and whole competitors of my Lord of Mar earnestly labouring to effect it (CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, 381).

168  Amy L. Juhala 39 January 20, 1599, Nicolson to Cecil: The king has made the Earl of Montrose chancellor with a fair harangue that he is not factious but simple and well disposed to justice (CSP Scot., xiii, pt. 1, 386). Montrose was awarded £2000 yearly as part of that office in April 1599 (NAS, PS1/70, f. 243v). 40 Although it could be argued that George Gordon, the sixth Earl of Huntly, did serve informally to some extent in this capacity. See Ruth Grant’s paper in this volume. 41 Scots Peerage, v, 615–22. 42 Mar and Kellie, i, 31, 38, 39, 44. 43 Schaw to Menmuir, 23 October 1596, NLS ACC 9769, 12/5/16. 44 J. Goodare and M. Lynch, ‘James VI: universal king?’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 14. 45 J. Goodare, ‘John Erskine, eighteenth or Second Earl of Mar (c.1562–1634)’, ODNB [8867, accessed 17 March 2016]. 46 Mar and Kellie, i, 36. 47 Scots Peerage, v, 81–82. Alexander Erskine was keeper of Stirling Castle (until 1578), keeper of Edinburgh Castle, and was appointed as deputy high chamberlain to the Earl of Lennox in October 1580. 48 RSS, vii, no.2019; RSS, viii, no.2537; NRS, PS1/59, f. 128v. 49 SP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 725; NLS, Diary of Robert Birrell, Burgess, 1542–1604, Adv. MS 28.3.12, f.35v. Whether this was a gentleman of the chamber or a laird is not clarified in the accounts. 50 NRS, E21/73, f. 51f; E24/22, f. 49v; RSS, vii, no.2019; NRS, PS1/59, f. 128v; PS1/67, f. 228v; Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1. 51 NRS, E21/73, f. 51r. While other gentlemen of the chamber received reimbursement for charges made on behalf of the king, the £333 6s. 8d. reimbursed to Erskine is larger than most other payments. 52 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 795. 53 RPCS, iii, 584; NRS, PS1/64, f. 93r; E34/35; E21/62, f. 142v; E21/70, f. 82v; ER, xxii, 404. 54 Schaw to Menmuir, 23 October 1596, NLS ACC 9769, 12/5/16. 55 NRS, PS1/71, f. 269r-v. 56 For more on Lennox, see Adrienne McLaughlin’s chapter in this volume. 57 NRS, E22/6, f. 147v; PS1/60, f. 128v; Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1; M. Lee, ‘Home, George, Earl of Dunbar (d. 1611)’, ODNB [13642, accessed 17 March 2016]. 58 NRS, PS1/60, f. 125r. 59 Lee, ‘Home, George’. 60 NLS, David Moysie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland 1577–1603, MS 31.7.5, f. 88v. 61 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 720, 723. 62 NRS, E34/41; Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1. 63 NRS, E21/67, f. 144v; E21/70, f. 180r; E21/71, f. 72r; PS1/58, f. 47v; Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1. 64 CSP Scot., x, 150; xiii, at pp. xxvi–xxvii; Robert Bowes, The Correspondence of Robert Bowes of Aske, Esquire, the Ambassador of Queen Elizabeth in the Court of Scotland, Joseph Stevenson, ed. (London: 1842), cl. 65 For instance, in November 1600, Aston reported on the queen’s relationship with the king, following the Gowrie Conspiracy: ‘[the Queen] has now won so far in to the king by her behaviour towards him as no man dare deal in that matter further. She does daily keep the preaching and entertains the King in a more kind and “lovenger” sort than ever she did before. She now will obey the King in whatsoever, and his will shall be obeyed’ (CSP Scot., xiii, pt. 2, 732). 66 CSP Scot., xiii, 218. 67 Dawson, Scotland Re-Formed, 323–25.

‘For the King Favours Them Very Strangely’  169 68 He was married to Marjorie Stewart, daughter of the master of Ochiltree. Scots Peerage, vi, 514–16. 69 NRS, Household Accounts, E34/47. 70 Another was Andrew Ker, through whom he was related to Robert Ker/Carr, future Earl of Somerset. Ker is used here for consistency, although the Ferniehirst/Somerset line of the family is referred to in the ODNB alternately as Ker, Kerr, and Carr. Scots Peerage, v, 77–76; vi, 514–16; Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1. 71 CSP Scot., xiii, 1, xxvi; RSS, viii, 390. How Aston served Lennox or Darnley is never clarified in the accounts. 72 See Grant’s paper in this volume and Grant, ‘George Gordon’. 73 K. Brown, ‘The price of friendship: The “well affected” and English economic clientage in Scotland before 1603’ in R. Mason, ed., Scotland and England (Edinburgh: 1987), 148. 74 NRS, PS1/72, f. 150r. 75 NLS, Adv. MS 35.4.2, f. 621r. 76 A. MacDonald, ‘Ker, Robert, first Earl of Roxburghe (1569/70–1650)’, ODNB [15456, accessed 17 March 2016]. 77 CBP, ii, 385. 78 CSP Scot., xiii, 436–37. 79 MacDonald, ‘Ker’. 80 MacDonald, ‘Ker’. 81 See Chapter 9. 82 M. Lee, ‘Seton, Alexander, first Earl of Dunfermline (1556–1622)’, ODNB [25113, accessed 17 March 2016]. 83 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, 217. 84 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, 496. 85 D. Horsburgh, ‘Young, Sir Peter (1544–1628)’, ODNB [30277, accessed 17 March 2016]. 86 The best evidence of his high standing with the king was a grant of £2,000 in September 1580 ‘to buy sum pece of land and to plenishe the same to be a resting place to him his wyff and bairnis in consideration of his lang trew and thankfull service’. NRS, E21/61, f. 42v. 87 NRS, E21/68, f. 84v; Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1. Young’s daughter was likely the Marie Young who appeared as a servitor in the queen’s chamber; CSP Scot., xi, 531. 88 See the list of gentlemen of the chamber at the end of this chapter: RSS, vii, no.2310B; NRS, PS1/64, f. 31r; PS1/69, f. 272r; PS1/70, f. 239v; PS1/71, f. 313v. 89 A. MacDonald, ‘Murray, David, first Viscount of Stormont (d. 1631)’, ODNB [19599, accessed 17 March 2016]. 90 MacDonald, ‘Murray’. 91 Scots Peerage, v, 382–3. 92 RPCS, iii, 322–23; Meikle, ‘Home, Alexander’. 93 Meikle, ‘Home, Alexander’. 94 Slamannan is near Falkirk, Stirlingshire. 95 NRS, E21/67, f. 229v. 96 Scots Peerage, i, 389. 97 Scots Peerage, viii, 387–90; NRS, PS1/71, f. 269r-v. 98 NRS, PS1/58, f. 57r; E21/68, f. 88r. 99 R. Macpherson, ‘Lindsay, Alexander, first Lord Spynie (c. 1563–1607)’, ODNB [16679, accessed 17 March 2016]. 100 Macpherson, ‘Lindsay, Alexander’. 101 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.2, 829. 102 CSP Scot., xiii, pt.1, 528.

Appendix:  Gentlemen in the Chamber of James VI between 1580 and 1603 Surname

Name/Title

Position

Anstruther Aston

Sir James, of that Ilk Roger (Englishman)

Auchmowtie

John

Balfour Beaton Bruce Carmichael

Sir Michael, of Burleigh David, of Melgund Edward, Abbot of Kinloss Sir John, of that Ilk

Charters Chisholm Cockburn

Henry, of Kinfauns James, of Cromlix/Dundorn Sir Richard, of Clerkington

Crichton Cunningham Drummond Elphinstone Elphinstone Elphinstone Elphinstone

Robert, Lord Crichton of Sanquhar James John, of Slipperfield Alexander, Master of Elphinstone John Sir George, of Blythswood Sir James, of Barnton

Elphinstone

Sir Michael (son of second Lord Elphinstone)

Master household Gentleman pensioner (stables) Gentleman, ordinary Chamber, page of honour Chamber, valet Master household Master household Ambassador to England Captain of King’s Guard Stable, principal master Master household Master household Justice Clerk Lord Privy Seal Gentleman, ordinary Chamber, usher Chamber, inner door usher Treasurer Gentleman, ordinary Gentleman, ordinary Chamber, cupbearer Octavian Secretary of State Chamber, server

1601 1580 1581 1591 1603 1601 Mar 1589 1601 Dec 1592 1585 1601 1582 1591 May 1596 1596 1599 1578 Apr 1599 Apr 1596 1596 May 1580 1596 Jan 1598 1578

Chamber, carver Master household Chamber, server

May 1580 Jun 1592 Nov 1579

Elphinstone

William

First/Last documented 1581 1603 1599 1603 1592 1603 1596 1593 1602 Dec 1591 Oct 1599 May 1603 Aug 1598 Sept 1601 1599 Aug 1599 1596 Apr 1609 1580 Apr 1593 1605 1596

Erskine Erskine Erskine

Alexander of Gogar, master of Mar James (brother of Sir Thomas) John, second Earl of Mar

Erskine

Sir Thomas, of Gogar

Fleming

John, sixth Lord Fleming

Geddie Gibb Gordon Graham Graham Gray Hamilton Hamilton

Mr John John George, Earl of Huntly John, third Earl of Montrose Mungo, of Rathernis (son of second Earl of Montrose) James (son of fifth Lord) John Sir Thomas, of Drumcairn

Hay Herries Home Home

Mr Alexander, of Forrestseat Sir Hugh Alexander, of North Berwick Alexander, sixth Lord Home

Home

John, of Fentonhall/North Berwick

Chamberlain depute Chamber, server ‘Great Maister Household’ Keeper of Prince Henry *given principal bedchamber Captain & keeper of Edinburgh & Stirling Castles Chamber, server, for life Chamberlain depute King’s guard, captain Gentleman, ordinary Ambassador to France Chamber, great master usher Ambassador to Denmark Domestic servitor Chamber, valet King’s guard, captain Chancellor Master household

Sept 1580 1596 1594 1594 1596 Nov 1593 1579 1592 Nov 1600 1594 1601 Aug 1583 1590 1585 Mar 1576 Dec 1588 Apr 1599 1579

Gentleman, ordinary Stables, master Octavian King’s advocate Gentleman, ordinary Gentleman, ordinary Domestic servitor Bedchamber, gentleman Ambassador to France Gentleman, ordinary Stables, master

Oct 1589 1599 1596 Feb 1596 1598 Aug 1600 1580 1592 1589 1599 1596

Mar 1589 Jul 1600

1600 Mar 1601 1603 Sep 1589 Feb 1591 Dec 1601 Mar 1589 Dec 1604 Oct 1589 1591 May 1612 Apr 1600 Jul 1601 1591 1602 Apr 1599 (Continued)

Surname

Name/Title

Position

Home

Sir George, of Spott (Earl of Dunbar)

Stables, master Bedchamber, gentleman Master of the wardrobe Treasurer Comptroller Gentleman, ordinary Musician/Violer Musician/Violer Musician/Violer Musician/Violer Gentleman pensioner (stables) Chamber, carver Treasurer Chamber, page of honour Gentleman, ordinary King’s guard, principal In the Chamber/privy council Musician King’s guard, captain Gentleman, ordinary Chamberlain depute In the chamber Lord Privy Seal Gentleman, ordinary Privy Chamber, gentleman Created Lord Lindores at Charles’ baptism Stable, master

Home Home Hudson Hudson Hudson Hudson Hume

Sir George, of Wedderburn William James Robert Thomas, younger William Patrick, apparent of Polwarth (poet)

Kennedy Ker/Carr Ker Ker

John, Earl of Cassillis Robert (future Earl of Somerset) Sir Andrew, of Ferniehirst Sir Robert, Laird of Cessford

Lauder Lindsay

James Mr Alexander (Lord Spynie)

Lindsay Lindsay

John, Lord Menmuir Patrick, Lord Lindores

Livingston

Alexander, of Pentasken

First/Last documented 1582 1583 Apr 1590 Oct 1601 Dec 1597 Jun 1595 1567 1567 1567 1567 May 1580 1582 Mar 1599 1598 Jan 1592 1593 1599 May 1580 1588 Nov 1588 Oct 1589 1601 Mar 1596 Dec 1591 1596 1600 Oct 1595

Oct 1589 1599 Jan 1611 Apr 1599 1599 1603 1595 1595 1597 Oct 1589 Apr 1599 Mar 1604

1598 Feb 1589 Dec 1591 1596

1599

Livingston Livingston Livingston Lockhart Lyon Maxwell Melville Melville Morton Murray

Alexander, Earl of Linlithgow John, of Abercorn (served Queen Mary) John Mr Alexander Sir Thomas, master of Glamis James Sir Andrew, of Garvock Sir James, of Halhill Mr Patrick Sir David, of Gospertie (Lord Scone)

Murray

George (brother of Sir David)

Murray Murray Murray

John Sir John, of Tullibardine Patrick, of Geanies (brother of Balvaird)

Murray Murray Ogilvie Preston Preston

Sir Patrick, of Tullibardine William Mr Gilbert Mr John, of Fentonbarns Richard, of Haltree

Keeper of princesses Stable, master

1599 1580

Chamber, valet Chamber, usher King’s guard, captain Chamber, usher Master household Gentleman servant Chamber, carver Chamber, cupbearer Stable, master Privy council & Comptroller Chamber, page of honour Chamber, valet Chamber, page of honour Master household Gentleman pensioner (stables)

Apr 1603 Jul 1595 Nov 1585 Jan 1603 Mar 1589 1585 1596 1580 1583 Apr 1599 Dec 1591 Mar 1596 1596 1579 May 1580

Chamber, server Gentleman, ordinary In the Chamber Chamber, 1st valet Chamber, cupbearer Collector General Chamber, carver

1582 Dec 1594 1599 Mar 1568 1596 Dec 1598 1596

1595 Jul 1598 Nov 1588 Mar 1603 1605 1589 1599 Feb 1608 1599 Mar 1603 1599 1592 Nov 1593 Mar 1597 1604 May 1603 (Continued)

Surname

Name/Title

Position

Ramsay

John (1606 Viscount Haddington)

Sandilands

Sir James, of Slamannan

Schaw

James, apparent of Sauchie

Sempill Seton

Sir James, Laird of Beltrees Alexander, Lord Fyvie

Skene

Mr John

Spottiswood Stewart Stewart

Mr James Andrew, Lord Ochiltree Esmé, Duke of Lennox

Stewart Stewart Stewart Stewart

Ludovick, second Duke of Lennox Sir James, Abbot of St. Colme’s Inch John, of Rosland Robert

Chamber, page of honour Gentleman, ordinary Gowrie Conspiracy Privy Chamber, gentleman Gentleman, ordinary Chamberlain depute Gentleman pensioner (stables) Gentleman, ordinary In the Chamber Octavian Keeper of Prince Charles Chancellor Octavian Clerk Register Chamber, usher Gentleman, ordinary High Chamberlain King’s guard, captain High chamberlain In the Chamber Chamber, inner door usher Master household

First/Last documented 1596 Apr 1598 1600 1590 1590 Aug 1600 May 1580 1583 1599 1596 1600 Dec 1604 1596 Sept 1594 May 1590 1596 Sept 1580 Mar 1581 Sept 1583 1599 1587 Mar 1601

1599 1599 1596 Apr 1602 May 1603 Jun 1622 Apr 1612 Jun 1591 1598 May 1583 1583 Feb 1624 1596

Stewart

Walter, Lord Blantyre

Stewart Vaus Young Young Young

Col. William, of Garntullie/Banchrie Sir Patrick, of Barnebarroch Alexander, of Eastfield Mr John Mr Peter

Privy Chamber, gentleman Gentleman pensioner (stables) Lord Privy Seal Octavian Treasurer Gentleman, ordinary Gentleman server Chamber, inner door usher Master almoner depute Master almoner Ambassador to Denmark Octavian

May 1580 1580 Jan 1583 1596 Mar 1596 Nov 1594 1589 Aug 1572 1595 Oct 1577 1589 1596

1594 1592 Mar 1596 Apr 1599 Jan 1603 1591 Apr 1600 1599 1599 1596

Sources: National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh: Treasurer’s Accounts, 1580-1604, E.21/61-76, E.22/6; Comptroller’s Accounts, 1600-1605, E.24/2226; Household Papers & Accounts, E.34/35, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49/5; Yule Collection, GD.90/2/8, 22; Mar and Kellie Muniments, GD.124/10/68; Old Series Privy Seal, Nov 1583–May 1603, PS.1/50-74; T. Dickson and J. Balfour Paul, eds, Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer of Scotland, (Edinburgh: 1877– 1916); CSP Scot., xiii; ER; RSS; J. Gibson Craig, Papers Relative to the Marriage of King James the Sixth of Scotland (Edinburgh: 1828).

9 The Octavians Julian Goodare

But speciallie choose honest, diligent, meane, but responsall men to be your receavers in money matters: meane I say, that ye may when ye please, take a sharpe account of their intromission, without perril of their breeding any trouble to your estate: for this over-sight hath beene the greatest cause of my mis-thriving in money matters. —King James VI, 15981

James VI was not necessarily the best person to diagnose the causes of his own ‘mis-thriving in money matters’, but when he recommended ‘meane, but responsall’ financial administrators he surely had the Octavians in mind. This group of eight exchequer commissioners, appointed in 1596, played a major role in Scottish politics until 1598. They attracted much attention from contemporaries, and their innovations led to a long-term shift in the way in which those in power thought about the collection and management of royal money. A full account of the Octavians’ fiscal policy-making remains to be written; the present chapter will outline their fiscal role briefly but will concentrate mainly on the task of outlining their political influence. This is relevant to the question of ‘noble power’ during James’ reign. James’ remark about ‘meane’ men has been much quoted; by appointing the Octavians, was he undermining the power of the traditional nobility by giving power to ‘meane’ men? Were the Octavians ‘new men’ – another much-discussed idea? What was their role in the changing Scottish state?

I The idea of a group of lesser men as stewards for the king’s affairs goes back at least to 1590, and connections among several future Octavians can be traced back that far. However, the Octavians, as a group, were constituted in the weeks following Chancellor John Maitland’s death on 3 October 1595. It soon became apparent that none of the replacement candidates commanded broad support  – the main names mentioned being Ludovick Stuart, Duke of Lennox, John Graham, Earl of Montrose, and John Erskine, Earl of Mar. Walter Stewart, an associate of Mar who would soon emerge as the Octavians’ joint

The Octavians  177 leader, encouraged the king to leave the office vacant for a while.2 The chancellorship would remain vacant until 1599, though occasional bids for it were made during the Octavian period. In a convention in Linlithgow in early November there was a plan for a permanent council with the king and an exchequer, which sounds like an early version of the Octavian arrangement.3 There ensued a period of feverish factional alignment and re-alignment, and in mid-December the members of the queen’s council emerged as political players. James had appointed this council in 1593 to manage the rents assigned to the queen’s household. Its members in late 1595 were Alexander Seton, James Elphinstone, John Lindsay and Thomas Hamilton. Seton, the council’s head, would soon emerge as the Octavians’ other joint leader. The queen’s council now submitted an offer to improve the king’s rents – an offer resisted by the officers of state.4 It probably included a version of the document that would soon emerge as the Octavians’ famous commission. In late October, Queen Anna had been seeking the chancellorship for Seton, and – perhaps more significantly – Seton at this point had been at odds with Stewart.5 A partnership between Seton and Stewart would be crucial to the cohesion of the Octavians as a group, but that partnership would be created only in the course of the formation of their regime. The decision to institute a new financial regime was taken on or just before 29 December. On that date we have three well-informed reports, by Roger Ashton, John Colville and George Nicolson. Ashton reported that Walter Stewart and the queen’s council were to manage the king’s patrimony and that the comptroller (David Seton of Parbroath) and collector (Robert Douglas) had resigned. This initiative, though resented by those displaced, offered the welcome prospect of the king’s being able to ‘live of his own and be served as a king’. Colville thought that a new regime would be constituted by Sir Robert Melville, Sir George Home and Walter Stewart. Nicolson mentioned only Walter Stewart as a new royal adviser. Both Colville and Nicolson saw the main issue as being enforcement of hornings (outlawries), though this could have financial implications, since the profits of justice were seen as significant.6 Thus, Stewart and Seton struck up an alliance in late December. Stewart had a good personal position – standing well with the king, connected to Mar, connected to Lennox (as his former tutor), a gentleman of the chamber and privy councillor – but his political weight was not enough to dominate the administration by himself. With the expertise and connections of the queen’s council, he would be able to achieve more. Probably, too, Stewart and Seton found that they had similar ideas on how to reform the administration, so their alliance had a good chance of enduring. The queen’s councillors’ importance to the project was symbolically asserted on 1 January 1596, when they gave Queen Anna a ‘purs of gold’, which she passed on to her husband as a New Year’s gift, saying that they had ‘preserved so much of hir leving to that use’.7 Anna herself was not in charge of ‘her’ councillors – they were, as noted, appointed by James – and there is no further evidence of her involvement in fiscal policy. The New Year’s gift was presumably initiated by the

178  Julian Goodare queen’s councillors rather than by Anna personally, but she would occasionally be mentioned in connection with ‘her’ councillors thereafter. The Octavians took their final shape between Saturday 6 January and Monday 8 January. On Saturday, the comptroller and collector-general ‘subscribed their dismission’. Sir Robert Melville, treasurer depute, also offered to resign but was dissuaded by Sir George Home, a leading gentleman of the chamber – perhaps an indication of future rivalry between chamber and Octavians. Stewart and Skene joined the queen’s council, and it was agreed that this six-man council would manage the king’s revenues and household. Then, on Sunday or Monday, Stewart persuaded the king that the four queen’s councillors needed to be balanced by four further appointees rather than two, and David Carnegie and Peter Young were added to the group. They were evidently Stewart’s nominees, having been associated with him before – Carnegie often in the 1590s, Young as tutor in the 1570s of the group that included Stewart, King James and the Earl of Mar. The eight-man financial council had arrived.8 The Octavians’ celebrated commission was issued on 9 January.9 By it, they became joint commissioners of a new permanent exchequer, with full powers over the collection and disbursement of royal revenues. Their appointment was for life and the king was to appoint no further members to the commission without their agreement; nor could he spend money without their prior approval. The exchequer commissioners, as such, supervised the revenue officials rather than handling money themselves, but their ability to authorise payment was crucial. In the past, the exchequer had been a temporary auditing body that exercised no such control. At this point, the Octavians were still intending to direct Melville, the treasurer depute, in his work, rather than replacing him. The commission forbade Melville to act without the concurrence of five of the eight.10 It was soon being observed that the Octavians’ commission ‘in effect takkis away from him the libertie of his said office’.11 In March, Walter Stewart would become treasurer, replacing both the Master of Glamis, nominal treasurer since 1585, and Melville himself, who as treasurer depute had exercised the financial responsibility of the treasurership since 1582.12 The immediate political question in January was: who would lead the group? At this point it consisted of two separate halves: Seton, supported by Lindsay, Elphinstone and Hamilton (the queen’s council), and Stewart, supported by Skene, Carnegie and Young.13 Stewart wanted to be the leader, but Seton put in a counter-bid, pointing out that as Lord President he was superior to Stewart who was an ordinary lord of session.14 The group still consisted of two halves on 25 January. Stewart voiced to Nicolson his suspicions of ‘the 4 of the Queen’s side’ but said that he would co-operate with them so long as he saw them ‘run an upright course’, meaning a Protestant and pro-English one.15 Presumably they did, for no more was heard for some time of internal disputes or of the question of a leader. One of the Octavians’ strengths was their ability to co-operate. The term ‘Octavians’ grew out of the habit of referring to ‘the eight’ or ‘the eight lords’. In late January, Nicolson and Colville were referring to ‘the 8’ – Nicolson indeed wrote of ‘the old faction’ and ‘the new course of the 8’.16

The Octavians  179 In April, Bowes wrote of ‘the 8 Councillors’, and in June of ‘the eight lords of the King’s Council’ and ‘the 8 new Councillors’.17 The earliest recorded use of the term ‘Octavians’ seems to be in July 1596, by James MacCartney, a Scottish physician who sometimes reported to the English on Scottish affairs.18 The commissioners of the General Assembly referred to ‘the counsell nominat Octavianis’ in November 1596.19 By 1598 the term was established enough to be detached from its arithmetical origins. One of the Octavians, Carnegie, died on 19 April, but the term ‘Octavians’ continued in use.20 Three related points can be made about the nature of the group as contemporaries understood them. First, they were – unusually – a group without a leader, once Seton and Stewart decided to co-operate. Had they had a leader, they would have been identified by that person’s name. Second, their status as a group of eight implied that they acted by consensus. A criminal jury, because it could decide by majority vote, had to consist of an odd number. Having been constituted from two groups of four, the Octavians’ structure resembled that of a panel of arbitrators, in which equal numbers would be nominated by each party, and a decision could be reached only by transcending partisan positions. Third, then, the Octavians’ leaderless status enables us to conclude that they were intended to be understood as not being beholden to a noble faction. An individual member like Stewart might be a client of Mar, but the Octavians as a group could be nobody’s clients.

II To understand the Octavians as a group we need to analyse them as individuals and to assess the way in which each individual contributed to the make-up of the group as a whole.21 Key facts about them are listed in the table at the end of this chapter. A near-contemporary account of them named five – Elphinstone, Hamilton, Lindsay, Seton and Stewart – as the group’s active members, characterising Skene, Carnegie and Young as ‘spectouris and consentouris’ to what the first five did.22 However, these perceptions focused on those who were most prominent as politicians, and the Octavians were not simply politicians. Part of their team’s strength lay in its diverse membership, with each member making a distinctive contribution. Together they had social status and connections, political acumen, legal training and financial expertise. This can be illustrated by considering the three Octavians regarded as passive ‘spectouris and consentouris’. Skene was a hard-working bureaucrat, whose researches into the government records in his care seem to have been behind some of the Octavians’ attempts to reassert royal rights. Carnegie’s particular area of expertise was finance – he had long experience as an auditor of exchequer and of other financial commissions, and had personally speculated in government debts.23 Young’s skills were in humanist learning and diplomacy. Two Octavians were closely connected to the king personally. Young had been the king’s tutor (along with George Buchanan) between 1569 and 1580, while Stewart had been one of the four youths whom he educated alongside the royal

180  Julian Goodare pupil. Young had since acted periodically as an ambassador and held the honorific post of royal almoner, while Stewart had become a gentleman of the king’s chamber. This pair’s connections at court and in the chamber were useful attributes for a group that sometimes needed to offend courtiers. Stewart’s education was at least of university standard, and all the other Octavians were university graduates. They were noted as ‘wyse men, learnit and politik’ by Sir James Melville, who had no reason to favour them.24 All but two were judges in the court of session, which required legal expertise and usually significant formal training. The two exceptions, Carnegie and Young, also had legal expertise, having been members of a parliamentary committee on law reform in 1578.25 All were privy councillors, though most had not attended council meetings regularly. Two were already officers of state: Seton had been Lord President of the Court of Session since 1593, and Skene had been clerk register since 1594. Stewart had been keeper of the Privy Seal, a lesser office, since 1582. Three Octavians were younger sons of peers – Elphinstone of the third Lord Elphinstone, Seton of the fifth Lord Seton, and Lindsay of the ninth Earl of Crawford. Seton’s position was enhanced in the king’s eyes through his late father’s distinguished record as a supporter of Mary Queen of Scots. As for Lindsay, his position as ‘son of a peer’ was technical rather than important. His father had attained the earldom of Crawford through a deviation from the main line of descent that had ended at his death in 1558. The head of Lindsay’s family, his elder brother, was Sir David Lindsay of Edzell, and the current, eleventh, earl was a distant cousin.26 If Lindsay should be regarded as belonging to a middle-ranking laird’s family, most other Octavians were clearly of similar status. Stewart and Carnegie were younger sons of middle-ranking lairds. Hamilton was the eldest son of a minor laird. Two were of more modest status still. Skene was the younger son of a man who was not even a laird (though his grandfather had been one), while Young was the son of a burgess. Moreover, not one of the Octavians was the head of his family in lineage terms. Skene and Young came from unlanded families. Hamilton’s father was still alive. For the other five, the head of their lineage was an elder brother. These brothers were mostly politically inactive, an exception being Alexander, Master of Elphinstone, a gentleman of the chamber who would become treasurer in 1599.27 This was a status-conscious age. After the king had sworn the Octavians into office, ‘he was very merry, saying he would no more use Chancellor or other great men in those his causes but such as he might convict and were hangable’.28 Hanging as a method of execution was reserved for those of non-noble status.29 Lairds would under certain circumstances have been considered ‘noble’, though the term was reserved for peers on other occasions. Hercules Stewart, brother of Francis Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, had been hanged in early 1595; in 1615, Patrick, Earl of Orkney would be beheaded, while his illegitimate son Robert was hanged. And, besides the Octavians’ own status as ‘meane’ men, there were further degrees of meanness below them. Sir James Melville recorded the Octavians’ early plan to ‘plant mean responceable men in the saidis offices [of state], and

The Octavians  181 they all to be restrict controllouris of the saidis officers’.30 The Octavians carried out this plan with the comptrollership, transferring most of its revenue to a newly created post of receiver-general, to which they appointed Henry Wardlaw, evidently considered a man of lower status whom they could control.31 Although the Octavians incurred much resentment, hardly any of it seems to have criticised them on the grounds of low birth. Perhaps they were not very lowborn – though the perception of them as ‘meane’ was clear enough for enemies to seize on had they so chosen. However, in the early 1590s such ideas had been proclaimed loudly by the Earl of Bothwell in his campaign against Chancellor Maitland and had failed ignominiously; in 1596, nobody wanted to sound like Bothwell. Moreover, the Octavians’ most vocal critics were the presbyterians, who valued birth less than godliness and concentrated their attacks on the Octavians’ ungodly policies. The relationship between the gentlemen of the chamber and the Octavians is not entirely clear, though at least some chamber gentlemen may well have objected to the Octavians’ cost-cutting. The chamber gentlemen’s birth was generally no more distinguished than the Octavians’ own, but they could still have advocated the Octavians’ replacement by a noble council. As we shall see, this did not happen until 1598.

III The Octavians pursued various policies of fiscal reform, which can be briefly outlined here.32 They attempted to reduce the expenses of the king’s household and to curtail the king’s periodic generosity to courtiers. They enacted rules tightening up the collection of rents from crown lands. They took particular interest in the western Highlands and Isles, seeking to enforce payment of rents from chiefs and even sending a military expedition to the Isles in the summer of 1596. They made reforms in the customs administration and in May 1597 would score perhaps their biggest success when a new set of customs rates was introduced. As well as increasing the duties payable on exports, this measure made imports liable to customs duties for the first time. In November 1597, the Octavians were probably behind a parliamentary tax of 200,000 merks, a larger sum than any previous tax. In the present chapter, however, we need to concentrate on the Octavians’ political career. Politically, the first few months of the Octavians’ regime were unremarkable. Throughout 1596 they worked hard at fiscal reform, but without apparent controversy. In June, an apparent reconciliation between the queen and Mar led to speculation that Mar would gain the office of chancellor, and Bowes reported that ‘some of the 8 new Councillors gape for it’ – presumably Seton and Stewart.33 In July there was a rumour that some Octavians were to be ‘privily murdered’, and they enlisted the aid of Lord Hamilton and the Earl of Crawford in guarding them.34 Such controversy as there was in early 1596 concerned Anglo-Scottish relations. All those in charge of James VI’s government ultimately stood by the English alliance, but the practical details were often difficult. In April a

182  Julian Goodare ‘most strange tempest’ was raised by Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch, keeper of Liddesdale, who dashingly rescued the illegally imprisoned criminal William Armstrong of Kinmont from Carlisle Castle.35 Queen Elizabeth was furious, but patriotic Scots were delighted, and the ‘Kinmont Willie’ dispute dogged much of the rest of the Octavian period. In late June, when James was under pressure to deliver Scott to the English or face the loss of his subsidy, ‘the most of his eight new Councillors’ opposed Scott’s delivery.36 They assured James that they would be able to manage financially without an English subsidy – evidently a popular stance with ‘the whole estate’ of Scotland.37 In September Elizabeth climbed down and authorised an instalment of the subsidy.38 One English correspondent linked the Kinmont Willie affair to another issue in July. He warned that the refusal of a subsidy would hurt none but the king himself and Thomas Foulis and Robert Jowsie who had furnished him with supplies.39 The goldsmith and financier Thomas Foulis and his merchant associate Robert Jowsie had been important creditors of the crown in the years before 1596. Foulis also provided the king with financial services, in particular managing the receipt of the instalments of the subsidy through his London office. The Octavians sidelined Foulis and froze the account that he had been running with the crown but failed to prise the English subsidy away from him. Foulis’ relationship with the Octavians would develop in fresh and dramatic ways in 1597, as we shall see. On 30 November 1596, the Octavians’ commission was diluted by the addition of eight peers and two other administrators: the Duke of Lennox, the Earls of Argyll, Crawford, Montrose and Mar, Lords Livingstone, Home and Seton, Sir Robert Melville (the former treasurer depute) and Sir John Cockburn of Ormiston (the justice clerk). This was formally at the Octavians’ own request, because their work was hard and had led them to be envied. They asked either to be allowed to resign or that some nobles, ‘quha aucht and suld be faders of the commounwele’, should be adjoined to them.40 This presumably indicates political dissatisfaction with their work, or at least political frustration by those whom they had been excluding, but it was far from marking a change of political direction. The new additions represented a range of views; Argyll and Mar were committed Anglophile Protestants, while Livingstone and Seton were Catholic sympathisers, the latter being a leading Octavian’s elder brother. Melville was an Anglophile but had been one of those elbowed aside by the Octavians in January. Overall, though, these new commissioners seem to have made little practical difference to the Octavians’ position. In December 1596, the Octavians’ religious stance, or at least the political stance that allegedly flowed from it, led to an episode of high drama.41 Two of the Octavians, Seton and Elphinstone, were closet Catholics. There is no evidence of Catholic sympathies for any others (accusations against Hamilton merely cited his education in Paris), and several had records as staunch Protestants, notably Stewart, Lindsay, Skene and Young. The crucial issue was a political one: whether to pardon the rebellious Catholic earls, Huntly and Erroll, who had been exiled in 1595. The presbyterian movement and their noble sympathisers became convinced that the Octavians were urging the king to pardon them and

The Octavians  183 that a decision to do so, with a second Spanish Armada looming, would lead to a Spanish and Catholic takeover of Scotland. This led on 17 December to an attempted presbyterian coup, launched through a siege of the Edinburgh tolbooth and culminating in the king fleeing from his capital the next day. Four Octavians had been with the king in the tolbooth: Seton, Elphinstone, Hamilton and Lindsay, the original queen’s councillors. The presbyterians regarded all four as ‘papists’, though they may have reached this conclusion through little more than observing their apparent stance on the Catholic earls. Whatever that stance was, none of the Octavians had a personal relationship with Huntly or Erroll, while Stewart and some others were more closely connected with Mar who had actively opposed the Catholic earls. Elphinstone may have been opposed to Mar, knowing the latter’s longstanding designs on the Elphinstone family lands. At any rate, the four alleged ‘papists’ presumably fled from Edinburgh along with the king on 18 December and kept a low profile thereafter. The coup itself collapsed gradually over the next few days through failure to recruit active noble support. James re-entered his capital on 1 January 1597, intent on re-establishing control through an initial show of force and a longer-term effort at conciliation and rebuilding of consensus. Would the Octavians, either individually or collectively, find a place in this reconstructed regime?

IV The Octavians’ initial move, on 7 January, was to tender their resignation, at the time of a convention of the nobility at Holyrood.42 They received, however, a new commission the next day, naming 21 people but with the Octavians remaining as the core.43 One commentator thought that the intention was to add the Earl of Montrose to the group ‘to make out a novemvirate’.44 Argyll spoke in favour of upholding the Octavians’ original commission, which had appointed them for life (the new commission gave them office only during royal pleasure) and made them responsible for filling vacancies.45 The new commission was slightly revised on 20 January. There were now 22 commissioners, the Octavians themselves remaining as the core of the group. The 10 additional commissioners from the previous November were reappointed except for Argyll, who had attempted to join December’s coup. Five new members were added: Lords Ochiltree and Newbattle, Sir William Stewart of Traquair, Sir John Carmichael of that Ilk and George Young, secretary depute.46 Melville wrote that ‘the maist part of the noblemen taried not, bot cam quhen they wer wreten for to the conventions, as they wer wont; sa all this new devyce tournit to the auld, sicut antea’.47 The new coalition looked much like the old one. One noticeable difference among the Octavians in 1597 concerned the position of Walter Stewart. In 1596 they had all been formally equal, even after they began taking offices of state for themselves (these offices are shown in the table). The harvest of offices was reaped only by four Octavians – Stewart, Lindsay, Elphinstone and Hamilton – but two of the other four (Seton and Skene) already held offices of state, and the remaining two (Carnegie and Young) may not have

184  Julian Goodare wanted them. At any rate this aggrandisement had not led to perceptions of inequality. Now, however, Stewart raised himself decisively above the others. He had obtained the treasurership, one of the two main financial offices, in 1596; to this in January 1597 he added the other office, the comptrollership. In February he made a clean sweep of financial offices by also becoming treasurer of new augmentations and collector general. Not only that, but the Octavians’ new commission named him as an essential member of the quorum. There seems to have been disagreement among the Octavians over this; Bowes reported that Stewart had been much ‘put at’ by four of them, though he did not say who or why.48 The financial offices were the crucial ones for the Octavians as exchequer commissioners. But Stewart, like some other Octavians, also held non-­financial offices. There was a tradition in the next generation that, when Stewart was treasurer, while riding up the street of Edinburgh, he fell and broke his leg, and a courtier said, merrily, that it was no marvel the horse could not bear him, seeing he had so many offices ingrossed in his person; for by that place [i.e. as well as being treasurer] he was a lord of council, session, and exchequer.49 This evidently relates to a fall that Stewart experienced in March 1597. At the time it was no laughing matter, for his life was despaired of. In April he was weaker and weaker, feared bewitched.50 His partial recovery was reported in August.51 He also suffered from other health problems; he had, for instance, been absent through illness in January 1596 when the Octavians were swearing their oath of office.52 For all this, though, he was now the leading Octavian. One of the reasons the Octavians were not mentioned more in 1597 could be that Scottish politics, for once, were fairly stable. More than one English correspondent noted a shortage of political news.53 In September 1597 there was a move against Stewart by the Master of Glamis, one of those whom the Octavians had ousted in 1596. The master now hoped to become chancellor, while his supporters aspired to remove the offices of comptroller and collector from Stewart. However, the king rapidly quashed the move.54 Stewart’s exit from power would come only later and at his own wish.

V The next dramatic episode in the Octavians’ career concerned their relationship with Thomas Foulis.55 Foulis, as we have seen, had informally managed several branches of the revenue before the Octavians’ advent. The Octavians had sidelined him, but he now began to work his way back into favour. In May 1597 Hamilton married Foulis’ sister Margaret. In October, Stewart’s wish to resign his financial offices led him to open negotiations with Foulis. The negotiations had several strands. One of the strands involved Stewart’s handing over the comptrollership to Sir George Home of Wedderburn, while remaining treasurer. A more important strand emerged on 29 December as a new commission of exchequer.

The Octavians  185 At first appearance the commission was little different from the previous one; the membership was similar, with Foulis and his two deputies added. More unusual was a proviso that Foulis’ personal authority was required for all expenditure. Here it should be remembered that the exchequer, as such, did not handle money: that was done by the treasurer and comptroller. The Octavians’ commission had empowered the exchequer to authorise expenditure, and that power now rested solely with Foulis. Even more remarkably, Stewart and Foulis made a private agreement that Stewart, while retaining the title of treasurer, would transfer responsibility for handling money to Foulis. (Presumably Home and Foulis made a similar agreement concerning the comptrollership, though it has not been traced.) Foulis promised to supply the royal household and to repay royal debts – no doubt aware that some of these debts were to himself. Foulis now had full control over the royal revenue, all of which went through his office and was disbursed on his authority. The Scottish royal finances had been privatised. Foulis’ imposing-looking regime soon came crashing down. One Octavian, Lindsay, engineered its destruction with the king’s connivance, by a contrived arrest of funds payable by Home; this triggered a catastrophic failure to meet royal obligations to Foulis. On 17 January 1598 Foulis’ scheme collapsed, and the king charged Stewart to resume his office of treasurer, signalling that there was no longer any immediate intention of repaying the large royal debt to Foulis. This effective royal bankruptcy was one of the main legacies of the Octavian period. Which Octavians played a role in the Foulis scheme, either for or against it? Lindsay was clearly against it. His motive is not recorded, but he may have been attempting to maintain the original Octavian policy of austere hostility to Foulis’ credit-driven approach to finance. Hamilton, by contrast, had made a long-term commitment when he married Foulis’ sister. Elphinstone, too, seems to have had a connection with Foulis; in December 1597 he had been canvassed as a likely joint member with David Foulis (the goldsmith’s brother) of an embassy to England.56 These three had all entered the Octavians via the queen’s council yet were now on different sides – and Hamilton and Elphinstone were on the same side as Stewart, who had initially been separate from the queen’s council. There remain, though, questions about who exactly decided to destroy the Foulis regime, when they decided it, and what exactly they thought they were doing. Did Lindsay know that his arrestment of Home’s funds would topple Foulis into bankruptcy? Probably. Did he intend to do this from the start of the regime in December? We do not know. Did he intend the result to be a royal bankruptcy in which the Foulis debt would languish unpaid for decades? It is hard to be sure that he saw the future so clearly. One can ask similar questions about the king himself, who is less likely to have grasped the implications of a technical legal action concerning the lands of Easter Moriston. He endorsed Lindsay’s initiative in January, but had he been involved in it before then – and, even in January, did he intend the result to be a royal bankruptcy? Probably not. Both Stewart and Foulis evidently advised the king in favour of the scheme in December. When James endorsed the scheme at that point, there is no particular reason to think that he was being duplicitous. Exactly what James did think he  was doing in

186  Julian Goodare January, and how well he understood the financial manoeuvres being carried out around him, are matters that remain enigmatic.

VI One reason the Octavians had kept power for so long was that it was hard to think of an alternative. In February 1598, following the Foulis fiasco, an alternative to the Octavians began to emerge: the idea of a resident council of nobles, probably headed by a noble chancellor. Since 1595 at least the leading nobles had been too factious to unite round a chancellor – and the beginnings of the new idea showed that this problem continued. On 25 February, Nicolson reported: The King finding himself pestered with the multitude of the affairs of his estate and little helped by his Council whose degrees he accounts not able to bear the burden of his great causes is determined to choose a Council assistant for the same of great Earls and Lords. He named Lennox, Angus, Erroll, Montrose, Mar, Home and Livingstone as chief among those who had been named to attend quarterly ‘for the assistance of the Council’, and predicted that Erroll would be made chancellor.57 This list contained several notorious enemies, and the openly Catholic Erroll would have made an extraordinary chancellor, but, if even Nicolson took his prospects seriously, the idea must have carried credibility. Three weeks later, Nicolson reported ‘great grudging’ at the recent parliamentary tax, voted last November and now beginning to bite; some blamed the Octavians for it, others the courtiers. The chamber and some noblemen were beginning to ‘repine’ at the Octavians, and he expected ‘some alterations’ – but Erroll’s bid for the chancellorship had failed.58 So James now perceived problems with ‘meane’ financial officers, if such people’s ‘degree’ was ‘not able to bear the burden of his great causes’. There may be a contradiction here with the James who later that year would be commending ‘meane’ financial officers in Basilikon Doron. But the idea of a council of ‘great Earls and Lords’ now seems to have become more mainstream. Nicolson’s next report, on 29 March, indicates how things were going. Fiscal policy was still controversial, with resentment at recently increased direct taxes and customs rates, and a plan for a new coinage, which the ‘honestest Octavians’ were opposing – an indication of their divisions. The gentlemen of the chamber were ‘platting’ to have some of their noble friends appointed to offices of state.59 This is what led to the Octavians’ end, at a convention of estates that assembled on 24 June. The king and his advisers – whoever these were – were busy preparing for it early in June.60 The various acts were evidently planned as a package, with the king himself playing a major role.61 The Octavians cannot as a group have proposed the abolition of the permanent exchequer, which would have been a death sentence for the group. But possibly one or more of them broke ranks to advocate this measure – bearing in mind that individual Octavians were not necessarily committed to the further existence of ‘the Octavians’ as an

The Octavians  187 institutionalised group. It might, indeed, have required an assurance from one of the Octavians themselves to convince those inexperienced in finance that the king’s government would be able to cope without a permanent exchequer. At any rate, on 29 June, the convention did abolish the permanent exchequer, the Octavians’ power-base. This signalled an end to policies of restraint in royal generosity to the nobility, evidently as a quid pro quo for the convention’s other main measure, the ‘Act anent Feuding’ by which the nobles agreed to submit bloodfeuds to royal justice.62 The Octavians’ demise thus brought some benefit to James who had long sought such an act, though his finances went from bad to worse until 1603. The Octavians’ demise was a remarkably consensual affair. They were emphatically not disgraced in June 1598 – neither as a group, nor as individuals. They had survived previous attempts to disgrace them, and the king’s present advisers, both Octavians and others, evidently agreed to this rearrangement of policy. Mar’s speech in the convention against the Act anent Feuding may indicate a wish to keep the Octavians in being, but this is not certain. At any rate, the transition to a post-Octavian regime, in which some of the gentlemen of the chamber emerged to take over financial offices, occurred smoothly. The six former Octavians who lived into the seventeenth century all continued to enjoy successful careers in royal service. Their principled ideas, too, continued to attract positive comment.

VII Overall, the Octavians stood out as a principled group rather than as a political faction. They owed their advancement to distinct policies and to their perceived skills and experience in implementing them. They wanted the king to live off his own rents, rather than taxing the subjects, borrowing or debasing the coinage. They offered administrative reforms to achieve economy and efficiency, especially in the royal household. While not anti-English, they seem to have been reluctant to rely on the English subsidy. Octavian principles also extended to the methods by which these financial policy aims were to be accomplished. Perhaps the most important principle was that there should be a financial policy. Traditionally there had not always been one. Income was gathered and accounted for as a matter of routine, by separate financial officers who were not required to co-ordinate their activities. Decisions on expenditure were made in an ad hoc way by the king and those around him. The traditional exchequer added up figures but did not routinely take decisions. The Octavians thought that there should be a new body to co-ordinate policy. That principle implied that the king and those around him would no longer have a free hand in expenditure. In particular, the influence of the king’s chamber was to be curtailed. The chamber, erected in 1580, had long been a problem to the privy council and financial administrators because the gentlemen of the chamber got the king to sign gifts of which the administrators disapproved.63 Walter Stewart, keeper of the Privy Seal since 1582, must have been acutely aware of

188  Julian Goodare this; controversial grants passed through his office, and he may well have wished that he had the power to block them. The privy council tended to side with the administrators, and, if the Octavians had not got their special exchequer commission, they might have settled for control of financial decision making via the privy council. The Octavians stood for the importance of lesser men with specialist expertise. Their commission could not have operated effectively if a magnate had been treasurer, even a friendly one like the Earl of Mar; people would have expected Mar and not the Octavians to take the decisions. It was assumed that humble men would have fewer aspirations or opportunities for personal enrichment in royal service. They were also more likely to have risen as a result of their talents. Recently they have been part of a story of ‘new men’, an educated laity of lairds and burgesses, emerging to govern Scotland in place of medieval clerics and nobles.64 This is valid, though it is of course the governmental system, rather than its men, that should be seen as ‘new’. The Octavians’ range of expertise was important because a more active and complex government needed a more active and complex fiscal policy. These themes can be developed further by glancing at what happened after the disbanding of the Octavians in 1598. Several former Octavians continued to serve the king as individuals, notably Elphinstone, Hamilton, Seton and Skene.65 They were joined by a diverse group of further political figures who might also be regarded as ‘new men’, some of whom had roots in the king’s chamber. They included Alexander, Master of Elphinstone (elder brother of an Octavian), treasurer from 1599 to 1601; Sir David Murray of Gospertie, comptroller from 1600 onwards; and Sir George Home of Spott, treasurer from 1601 onwards. Rivalry between council and chamber had to diminish once the chamber gentlemen came out of the chamber to take responsibility for the administration. After 1598, all the administrators would operate through the privy council. The council would aim to include a few traditional nobles willing to do a job of administrative work, while the men with specialist expertise, like the Octavians themselves, would as far as possible share the same aristocratic background and connections. This was a regime developing in administrative complexity, and the fiscal power of central government was growing, but it continued to operate through aristocratic patronage. The Octavians had never been all that ‘meane’. Returning to fiscal policy, a final point may be made that links the Octavians’ specialist expertise with their aim to reduce royal borrowing. If the financial officers were now specialist administrators rather than wealthy landlords, they would not necessarily extend credit to the crown. In the 1580s, some treasurers and comptrollers had run up large superexpenses that were not paid off for decades, if at all.66 Lesser men, however, would not have private resources on which to draw. If the crown was not going to resort to financiers like Foulis either, the question could have been asked: who was the crown going to borrow from? Probably the Octavians would have answered that their reforms were going to make extensive royal borrowing unnecessary. In that respect at least, their austere principles can be seen in retrospect to have been unrealistic for a modernising state.

Table 9.1  The eight Otavians Name (in the order of their commission)

Son of

Head of family in 1596

Education

Offices before 1596

Queen’s council?

Alexander SETON (1556–1622), Commendator of Pluscarden

George, 5th Lord Seton

Robert, 6th Lord Seton

Rome

Lord President of yes Court of Session (1593 to 1605); privy councillor

Walter STEWART (c.1560–1617), Commendator of Blantyre

Sir John Stewart of Minto

Sir Matthew Stewart of Minto

Together with James VI

Keeper of the Privy Seal (1582 to 1596); privy councillor; extraordinary lord of session

David CARNEGIE of Colluthie (c.1535–98) John LINDSAY of Balcarres (1552–98)

Sir Robert Carnegie of Kinnaird David Lindsay of Edzell, 9th Earl of Crawford

Sir John Carnegie of Kinnaird Sir David Lindsay of Edzell

MA from unknown university Paris, Cambridge

Privy councillor Lord of session; yes privy councillor

Offices in Octavian Later career period (Jan 1596 to June 1598)

Treasurer (Mar 1596 to 1599); comptroller (Jan 1597 to Dec 1597); treasurer of new augmentations (Feb 1597 to Dec 1597); collectorgeneral (Feb 1597 to Dec 1597)

Keeper of the Privy Seal (Mar 1596 to Jan 1598); secretary (May 1596 to Jan 1598)

Lord Fyvie (1598); Earl of Dunfermline (1605) Lord Blantyre (1606)

Laird of Kinnaird (1596)

(Continued)

Name (in the order of their commission)

Son of

Head of family in 1596

Education

Offices before 1596

Queen’s council?

James ELPHINSTONE of Barnton (c.1553–1612)

Robert, 3rd Lord Elphinstone

Alexander, Master of Elphinstone

Angers, Poitiers

Lord of session; yes privy councillor

Thomas HAMILTON of Drumcairn (1563–1637)

Thomas Hamilton of Priestfield

Thomas Hamilton of Priestfield

Paris

Lord of session; yes privy councillor

John SKENE of Curriehill (c.1543–1617)

James Skene in Bandodle

unknown

St Andrews, Paris, Wittenberg

Peter YOUNG of Seton (1544–1628)

John Young, burgess of Dundee

unknown

St Andrews, Geneva

Clerk register (1594 to 1612); lord of session; privy councillor; ambassador King’s tutor; privy councillor; ambassador

Offices in Octavian Later career period (Jan 1596 to June 1598) Lord Comptroller (Jan Balmerino 1596 to Jan 1597); (1604) collector-general (June 1596 to Feb 1597); secretary (Jan 1598 to 1609) King’s advocate Lord Binning (Jan 1596 to (1613); Earl 1612) of Melrose (1619); Earl of Haddington (1627) Sir John (1604)

Sir Peter (1605)

The Octavians  191

Notes 1 King James VI and I, Basilicon Doron, 2 vols, ed. James Craigie (Edinburgh: 1946– 50), i, 117. 2 Roger Ashton to Robert Bowes and John Colville to Bowes, 15 Oct. 1595, CSP Scot., xii, 43, 44 (cf. Colville Letters, 183); Ashton to Bowes, 20 & 26 Oct. 1595, CSP Scot., xii, 46, 50. 3 Colville to Bowes, 1 Nov. 1595, Colville Letters, 285 (cf. CSP Scot., xii, 52). 4 Nicolson to Bowes, 15 Dec. 1595, Ashton to Bowes, 16 Dec. 1595, CSP Scot., xii, 90, 93. 5 Ashton to Bowes and Nicolson to Bowes, 26 Oct. 1595, CSP Scot., xii, 50, 51. 6 Ashton to Bowes, Colville to Bowes and Nicolson to Bowes, 29 Dec. 1595, CSP Scot., xii, 99, 100, 102 (cf. Colville Letters, 188–89). 7 Advertisements from Scotland, 7 Dec. 1595 [sic: this document must date from Jan. 1596], Colville Letters, 190 (cf. CSP Scot., xii, 116). James and Anna were accustomed to giving elaborate New Year’s gifts. Their expenditure on jewels alone for such gifts often came to several thousand pounds Scots: Juhala, ‘Household and court’, 165–66. According to Nicolson’s more detailed account, the councillors gave Anna 1,000 onepound pieces and she passed 600 of them on to her husband, commending her councillors’ work: Nicolson to Bowes, 7 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 112. However, if the purse contained one-pound coins, it is not clear what currency these might have been. At this date, the Scottish coinage did not include a one-pound piece, while the French coinage was based on crowns (‘écus’) rather than pounds (‘livres tournois’). If the coins were English sovereigns, a thousand of these might well have had to come from James’ English subsidy, to which it is not clear that the queen’s council had access. 8 Nicolson to Bowes, 7 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 112–15. Although dated 7 Jan., this letter has a later postscript and marginalia referring to events of the next day or two. 9 RPCS, v, 254–58. 10 Nicolson to Bowes, 11 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 117. 11 Colville to Bowes, 12 Jan. 1596, Colville Letters, 191 (cf. CSP Scot., xii, 119–20); Ashton to Bowes, 12 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 119. 12 RMS, vi, no. 415; Bowes to Lord Burghley, 10 & 16 March 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 163, 168. 13 One bridge between the halves was a recent family link between Lindsay and Carnegie. Lindsay’s niece, Margaret Lindsay, married Carnegie’s eldest son, David, by contract of 8 Oct. 1595: Sir William Fraser, History of the Carnegies, Earls of Southesk, and of their Kindred, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1867), i, 70. 14 Nicolson to Bowes, 7 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 115; advertisements from Scotland, 7 [Jan.] 1596, Colville Letters, 190. 15 Nicolson to Bowes, 25 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 134. 16 Nicolson to Bowes, 16 & 29 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 122, 137; Colville to Bowes, 17 Jan. 1596, Colville Letters, 192 (cf. CSP Scot., xii, 125). 17 Bowes to Robert Cecil, 30 April 1596, Bowes to Burghley, 2 & 8 June 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 196, 237, 240. 18 Advices from Scotland, July 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 291. For a similar usage see ibid., 298. 19 NLS, ‘Copie of the minute buik of the actis maid be the commissioneris of the generall assemblie’, Wodrow Quarto, XX, no. 18, fo. 166v. 20 Fraser, Carnegies, i, 68; Nicolson to Burghley, 11 May 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 206. 21 For unreferenced statements in what follows, see the articles on the Octavians individually in the ODNB. 22 NLS, David Johnstone, ‘History of Scotland’ (1655), Adv. MS 35.4.2, f. 627r.-v. 23 Ried R. Zulager, ‘A Study of the Middle-Rank Administrators in the Government of King James VI of Scotland, 1580–1603’ (University of Aberdeen PhD thesis, 1991), 126–28.

192  Julian Goodare 24 Melville, Memoirs, 389–90. Sir James was the brother of the treasurer depute whom the Octavians displaced. 25 APS, iii, 105, c. 18 (RPS, 1578/7/18). 26 [Alexander,] Lord Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsays, 3 vols (London: 1849), i, 202–206. 27 The Elphinstones’ father was still alive, but had consigned the management of his affairs to Alexander through incapacity. Carnegie became head of his lineage upon the death of his elder brother later in 1596. 28 Nicolson to Bowes, 11 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 117. 29 Cf. Brown, Noble Society, 7. 30 Melville, Memoirs, 389–90. 31 ER, xxiii, 134. 32 Their fiscal activities are discussed at greater length in A. L. Murray, ‘Sir John Skene and the exchequer, 1594–1612’, Stair Society Miscellany (1971), i, 125–55, at 127–31. A full account of the subject is much needed. 33 Bowes to Burghley, 8 June 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 240. 34 Advices from Scotland, July 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 291. 35 Bowes to Burghley, 18 April 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 191. 36 Bowes to Burghley, 28 June 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 253. 37 Bowes to Burghley, 3 & 13 July 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 264, 269. 38 Julian Goodare, ‘James VI’s English subsidy’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 110–25, at 119. 39 James Hudson to Cecil, 14 July 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 278. 40 RPCS, v, 336–38. 41 For what follows, see Julian Goodare, ‘The attempted Scottish coup of 1596’ in Goodare and MacDonald, Sixteenth-Century Scotland, 311–36; Julian Goodare, ‘The Scottish presbyterian movement in 1596’, Canadian Journal of History 45 (2010), 21–48. 42 APS, iv, 107–8 (RPS, A1597/1/6/6); RPCS, v, 357. 43 Sir William Fraser, Memorials of the Earls of Haddington, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1889), i, 56. 44 Advices from Edinburgh, 11 Jan. 1597, CSP Scot., xii, 421. 45 Bowes to Burghley, 13 Jan. 1597, CSP Scot., xii, 425–26. 46 Fraser, Haddington, i, 56–57. 47 Melville, Memoirs, 389–90. 48 Bowes to Burghley, 13 Jan. 1597, CSP Scot., xii, 425–26. 49 Sir John Scot of Scotstarvet, The Staggering State of Scottish Statesmen, ed. Charles Rogers (Edinburgh: 1872), 56. 50 Advices from Scotland, March 1597, Ashton to Cecil, 11 April 1597, CSP Scot., xii, 500, 505–506. For the witchcraft panic beginning at this time see Julian Goodare, ‘The Scottish witchcraft panic of 1597’ in Julian Goodare, ed., The Scottish WitchHunt in Context (Manchester: 2002), 51–72. 51 Bowes to Burghley, 15 Aug. 1597, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 73. 52 Nicolson to Bowes, 11 Jan. 1596, CSP Scot., xii, 117. 53 Ashton to Cecil, 21 July 1597, and Bowes to Burghley, 31 July 1597, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 58, 68. 54 Bowes to Burghley, 15 Sept. 1597, and Bowes to Cecil, 20 Sept. 1597, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 87, 89. 55 For what follows, see Julian Goodare, ‘Thomas Foulis and the Scottish fiscal crisis of the 1590s’ in W. M. Ormrod, Margaret Bonney and Richard Bonney, eds, Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130–1830 (Stamford: 1999), 170–97. 56 MacCartney to Cecil, 17 Dec. 1597, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 135. 57 Nicolson to Cecil, 25 Feb. 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 167.

The Octavians  193 58 Nicolson to Burghley, 15 March 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 174. 59 Nicolson to Burghley, 29 March 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 181–82. 60 Ashton to Cecil, 12 June 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 217. 61 Nicolson to Cecil, 1 July 1598, CSP Scot., xiii, I, 228. What follows on the convention is largely drawn from this. 62 The two acts are at APS, iv, 158–59, 165, cc. 1, 7 (RPS, 1598/6/2, 1598/6/8). 63 On the struggle to control royal signatures, see Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 1999), 110–13, supplemented (for non-­financial ­decision-making) by Julian Goodare, The Government of Scotland, 1560–1625 (Oxford: 2004), 199–200. A full study of the chamber is needed to elucidate this and other issues. 64 Jenny Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland, 1470–1625 (London: 1981), 155. 65 As for the others, Carnegie and Lindsay died in 1598, Stewart became less active, possibly through ill-health, and Young retained his honorific position at court. 66 Julian Goodare, ‘The debts of James VI of Scotland’, Economic History Review 62 (2009), 926–52.

10 The Gowrie Conspiracy Do we need to wait until the Day of Judgement? Jenny Wormald

The events of 5 August 1600 at Gowrie House, Perth, are certainly one way into a discussion of noble power during the reign of James VI, albeit for all the wrong reasons. There is no good example of noble lordship to see here; no great clash between centralising government and territorial magnates; no struggle in which a godly noble stands up to an ungodly king. No – this famous incident instead illustrates the limits on noble power brought on by the human frailties of incompetence, bad temper and bad luck. The Gowrie Conspiracy revolved around a bungling bid for royal favour that went tragically and, at times, farcically wrong. By its confused nature it could only ever have been presented afterwards as a murder plot. It is important to stress from the outset that we cannot ever know exactly what happened that afternoon; despite many advances in the study of James VI and I over the past four decades, we will, after all, still have to wait patiently for the Day of Judgement to know what happened.1 The following interpretation does not concentrate on the major grand themes outlined in the introduction to this volume, nor does it dwell on finance and the crown’s debts to Gowrie, often seen as a major factor in other studies.2 Instead, it is time to look beyond grand theories and at the day for what it was – a ridiculous, but tragic, series of contingent events. The events of the Gowrie Conspiracy have long held a grip on the historical imagination. Take for instance The Riddle of the Ruthvens, by lawyer and crime writer, William Roughhead. He considered the incident a very serious one. Roughhead was sympathetic to the Ruthvens and disliked James VI immensely for a catalogue of crimes, including ‘his desertion of his mother, his treatment of Raleigh and Arbella Stewart, his betrayal of Somerset, and the vindictiveness with which he pursued the surviving Ruthven boys’.3 It is grim reading, by a pretty grim author. Yet a wholly different view emerges when one looks at the contemporary accounts, especially the early ones unblemished by the almost immediate political spin that followed. Take, for example, the manuscript account of the day in the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington.4 This version is possibly by the Englishman Roger Aston, a bastard son of the Cheshire gentleman Thomas Aston, who was in Scotland as a gentleman of the household to James VI at the time of the conspiracy.5 The newsletter opens with James being accosted at

The Gowrie Conspiracy  195 7AM at Falkland, in the process of setting out on the hunt, by Alexander Master of Ruthven, who: declared that he had taken a man with infinite treasure and had him in close kepinge offeringe the same to his ma[jestie] sayinge his brother the earle knewe not of it, nor noe other creature but onely himself yf his ma[jestie] would goe thither he should deliver the treasure and the man in his hand, sayinge I knowe your ma[jestie] will deale frankly wth me, if I should put it in my brothers handes he woulde take it to himself. The newsletter goes on to give an extraordinary account of a wholly ludicrous day, where events seem to be completely lacking in any kind of raison d’être, planning or organisation – just people rushing around in wonderful confusion, dashing down passages to hurl themselves at locked doors and getting to the king only to find they did not have a dagger with them and having to rush back outside to get one.6 This string of incidents reads less like the machinations of high political drama and more like a farcical tragic comedy – not quite The Ides of March, and perhaps more Carry On Up the Gowrie. It is the sense of complete farce permeating the accounts of events at Gowrie House that this chapter will examine and in doing so suggest that the conspiracy we are dealing with here is not, in fact, a conspiracy at all. The problem with the Gowrie Conspiracy is, of course, precisely that all contemporary accounts of it are confused and confusing, and it is very difficult to get any kind of coherent story out of them. There has been a parade of interpretations, studies and fictional reconstructions of the event, usually taking the conspiracy very seriously. Before Roughhead there was Walter Scott, Peter Hume Brown, David Masson, Louise Barbé and Andrew Lang, and since there have been accounts by Graham Horton-Smith, George Bushnell, G.M. Thomson, Nigel Tranter, John Magee, W.F. Arbuckle and Allanna Knight, to name only a selection.7 Most recently, Maurice Lee’s splendid article in his book of essays, The ‘Inevitable’ Union, which sets the conspiracy into an Anglo-Scottish context, gave us a new and very interesting theory to chew on.8 But there have, throughout all the many discussions of that day, been three major themes. The first is that this was a murder plot – someone was going to kill someone – either James the Ruthvens, or the Ruthvens James. The second is the favourable light given to the godly ministers, the ‘good guys’, after the event, as they seemed to be the only ones with enough backbone to question the veracity of the king’s questionable version. The ministers had been supporters of the Ruthvens and earlier the Earl of Bothwell, which in itself should certainly have encouraged historians to wonder about their judgement, but then the godly have had a long and very successful run in Scottish history. The third theme, which is somewhat inconsistent with the second, is that this is, of course, another piece of evidence that Scotland was an exceptionally violent, barbaric, bloody and feuding society. Scottish royal power was still uniquely under threat when compared to royal power in the more

196  Jenny Wormald civilised and developed societies of Western Europe. We still get this view in the most recent account of Gowrie, J. D. Davies’ Blood of Kings.9 Gowrie has long been seen as a bloodfeud: the revenge of the Gowrie brothers against the king who had killed their father, as was indeed a theme of several accounts of the conspiracy.10 Explaining it as a bloodfeud makes some sense – at least after the event. However, what I have found myself thinking about in pondering this most peculiar of conspiracies, after reading all of the accounts and the subsequent interpretations, are three things: the day itself, horses and the aftermath. We have already encountered some of the key events that took place on Tuesday 5 August 1600 in the account from the Folger above, and it includes many of the broad strokes of what is known to have happened that day.11 Alexander, Master of Ruthven, appeared at Falkland first thing in the morning, just as the king was about to set out and hunt the buck, and told him a tale of a strange man he had apprehended with a large pot of gold. James agreed (with varying levels of scepticism, or because he suspected that the gold and the stranger who held it were part of some foreign Catholic conspiracy, depending on which account you read) to accompany him to Perth after the hunt. At Gowrie House the party was met by John, the third Earl of Gowrie and Alexander’s brother, who seemed both surprised and unhappy to see the king. After taking a mean and hastily improvised dinner in a small room east of the main hall on the first floor, James retreated upstairs to the second floor gallery with Alexander, unaccompanied, while his retinue took their meal in the main chamber. As James’ party finished eating, they were told by Gowrie and his servant George Craigengelt that the king had fled across the Inch of Perth. Although the earl’s porter immediately refuted this statement, Gowrie and the king’s men rushed to the courtyard shouting for their horses, only for the earl to be told that his was at Scone Palace, several miles away. It was in this confused state of affairs that the party spied the king wrestling violently with Alexander at the window of the north-west turret, all the while crying out ‘treason!’ and protesting that the young master was trying to murder him. The Duke of Lennox and Earl of Mar raced back into the main hall and upstairs to the gallery adjoining the north-west turret, which they tried to break into using hammers. However, the wall’s timber board construction absorbed much of the force of their blows, and it was ‘the space of halfe an houre and more’ before they gained entrance.12 Meanwhile, Sir John Ramsay, Dr Hugh Herries and Sir Thomas Erskine ran up a turnpike from the courtyard, unnoticed by Lennox and Mar, which led directly to the room where the king was being held. There they encountered James and Alexander locked in a violent struggle and supposedly witnessed another man in the room, later identified and deposed as Andrew Henderson. Henderson conveniently confirmed the king’s version of events – that Alexander had told the king at knifepoint that he was going to be murdered in retaliation for the execution of his father William, first Earl of Gowrie, in 1584, and that he had attempted to bind him in the turret before the king fought back. If Henderson was there, he fled as soon as the door was opened, and the role of this ‘third man’ in the conspiracy has left historians with an additional mystery to ponder over.13 Ramsay, Herries and Erskine and their servants stabbed

The Gowrie Conspiracy  197 Alexander to death before turning to face his enraged brother, who had donned a steel bonnet and charged them with a sword in each hand, a style of fighting he had learned in Italy. After a close struggle in the turnpike, Ramsay killed Gowrie and the earl’s men were put to flight. Lennox and Mar finally broke through the timber partition to find the king on his knees, giving thanks for his divine deliverance from his would-be murderers. It was several hours before the townsfolk, enraged by the murder of their provost, could be calmed sufficiently to allow the royal party to beat a hasty retreat to Falkland and there to begin the construction of the narrative that painted the event as a conspiracy against the king. We can now turn to pondering some of the details of this story. To start with, that famous pot of gold, with which Alexander Ruthven sought to entice the king away from his hunting. Of course, a freely offered pot of gold was bound to appeal to an impoverished king desperate for money. But did it exist? Well, here is the first thing that should give us pause. Although it is fashionable to dismiss it as fiction, actually it may well have existed; there is, for example, some suggestion that Elizabeth and Robert Cecil had given Gowrie gold when he was in London in April 1600 en route back to Scotland after his travels on the continent. It was James himself, according to Sir John Carey, deputy governor of Berwick, who claimed that Gowrie’s pockets were filled with English gold, and Gowrie who denied it.14 However, the idea that a spendthrift and impoverished king would leap at the chance of lining his own pockets, an idea that has been too readily assumed, is disproved by one of the very few things that emerge clearly from the accounts – that to Ruthven’s fury, James did not leap on a horse and rush to Perth. He was enjoying his hunting far too much and was not going to leave until it was concluded. And this was the case even though the king seems to have believed the gold existed. Perhaps whatever else it does, the Gowrie Conspiracy should make us rethink James’ attitude to money and his lack of it. Then there is confusion over whether this was exclusively a plot, or whatever, dreamt up by the Master of Ruthven, or whether his brother the earl was involved. We have already seen in the Folger account above that the Master’s insistence that James rush to Perth was because his brother did not know about the gold and could not be trusted to share it with Alexander.15 There is a possible explanation for this, to which we will return, though it is highly speculative and does not make much sense. Yet we then come up against an even greater problem: Gowrie’s inability to give the king and, subsequently, his entourage a timely or decent dinner, which the minister Patrick Galloway inflated to be ‘a colde dinner, yea, a verie cold dinner’.16 Indeed, Gowrie’s larders seem to have been pretty bare anyway, even without a visit from the king. This we hear from his unfortunate steward George Craigengelt, whose subsequent action, rushing around with a drawn sword, got him and two other members of Gowrie’s household, Thomas Cranston and John Barron, hanged.17 When he arrived, James was kept waiting and was then invited to dine alone in the chamber situated to the east of the main hall with the earl, who was moody and depressed, and one can hardly say that what was provided was lavish – moorfowl, lamb, and strawberries.18 It is not enough to say that Gowrie was taken unawares. The basic question that has to

198  Jenny Wormald be asked here is why Gowrie – this magnate who was apparently not short of money – did not have a decent household provisioned and fit for an earl at his main residence in the town of Perth. Finally, the whole extraordinary business of James being seen at the window of the upstairs room where he had been taken to get the gold – apparently – in the grip of someone or other, shouting ‘treason’. This of course is the problem historians love to linger over, because if we believe the embittered Antony Weldon, sacked from his office in the king’s household for writing a scurrilous account of Scotland and the Scots, and whose thumbnail sketch of the king has misled generations of historians from the mid-seventeenth century to the present day, James was a pretty pathetic little creature and a rotten coward.19 James was not; he was, in fact, a terrifyingly intrepid horseman, always as vulnerable as his fellow monarchs to the assassin’s knife, and neither unfit nor a coward. But this is not grounds for a dubious debate that the conspiracy was some kind of intrigue dreamed up by a king who would in fact never have risked his person like this. There is really no need to question the fact that he was attacked – and survived. The question of whether there was a plot will be returned to. I said that my second theme was horses. If the humans involved in the events of 5 August 1600 played curious roles, so did the horses. To begin with, the king, having refused to interrupt his hunting when first confronted by Alexander Ruthven, was apparently in such haste when it was finished that he refused to wait for a fresh horse. If this is true, it was a pretty pointless move, because he was easily overtaken, on the way to Perth, by Lennox, Mar and others who did wait for fresh mounts from Falkland. The next peculiar event, as we have already seen, is that while everyone was milling around at Gowrie House, the earl and one of his attendants suddenly announced that the king had ridden over the Perth Inch and was away. No-one else had seen him, and no-one bothered to look in the stables for his horse. But one horse was missing from the Gowrie stables: the earl’s, which was at Scone.20 Again, Gowrie’s ability to provide an adequate household for himself has to be questioned – how many Scottish earls would have kept their horse not only away from one of their principal seats, but a few miles away? If this point were only pertinent to the Gowrie Conspiracy, the horses could of course simply have been lumped in with the other puzzles in the accounts. But I have a particular reason for separating them out, as when this conspiracy is set in the wider context of Scottish conspiracies against kings across the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it is not so much an unusual level of violence, bloodshed or an especial lack of respect and reverence for royalty that marks the events at Gowrie out, but sheer silliness. First of all, horses and stupid kings do tend to come together. As we learn from that wonderfully chatty chronicler Robert Lindsay of Pitscottie, it was a Lindsay horse who kicked and lamed Robert II, and led to his lamentable ineptitude as the first Stewart king of Scots.21 It was another Lindsay horse that proved disastrous for James III. In preparation for taking the field against his own son at Sauchieburn, and in a vain attempt to instil some warlike quality in this miserable king who rather preferred to consort with lowborn builders and musicians than his own thuggish nobility, Lindsay provided him

The Gowrie Conspiracy  199 with the fleetest horse in Scotland. Robert Bruce’s sword was then brought out from Stirling castle and strapped onto him. The inevitable happened – the sword pricked the horse; the horse bolted at terrific speed and thundered down the road to Bannockburn Mill where the king fell off. James was then carried into the mill where the miller’s wife – surely one of the stupidest people in Scottish history – rushed back outside to halt three horsemen thundering down the road after the king, looking for a priest to shrive him. When the supposed priest in the group asked the king ‘gif he might leif gif he had good leiching’, the king answered that he might, but wanted his confession heard just in case. The priest’s response – ‘that sall I do haistelie’ – accompanied by ‘foure or fyue straikis’ to the king’s heart with a dagger marked the end of James III.22 This, of course, was a dramatically written-up version of the legend of James III’s death that developed in the century after his death.23 Yet it is also a clear echo of another astonishing story, the murder of James I in 1437. Here, it seems, a quite remarkable number of people all plunged down into the privy chute where the king was hiding (which would have to have been the largest privy chute ever seen in Scotland) and here Sir Robert Graham, in answer to the king’s request for a confessor, said ‘Thow shalt never haue other confessore bot this same sword’.24 End of James I. These stories are hardly looking towards great literature and great tragedy. They are not ‘sad stories of the death of kings’, but pretty silly ones. Before pursuing this theme of farcical conspiracies against Scottish monarchs, it is worth broadening it out further. In the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there were a considerable number of assassinations and conspiracies against European monarchs. In France there was the Tumult of Amboise in 1559, the Massacre of St Bartholomew in 1572, the assassination of Henri Duc de Guise in 1588, of Henri III in 1589, and of Henri IV in 1610 (in the latter case when François Ravaillac simply climbed into Henri IV’s coach in a Paris traffic jam, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to kill the king, and stabbed him). In the Low Countries, William of Orange was murdered in his home in 1584. There were at least seven separate plots hatched to kill Philip II of Spain. In England there were around 20 rebellions in total against the Tudors, from that of the Stafford brothers in 1486 to the Essex Rising of 1601. The Ridolfi Plot of 1571, the Throgmorton Plot of 1583, and the Babington Plot of 1586 all had the assassination of Elizabeth as their aim.25 Thus, no monarch ever had full security or an adequate bodyguard, and all were ultimately highly vulnerable to the assassin’s knife. Most of these conspiracies were deeply sophisticated plots, with deadly intent. Yet those involving King James were simply not in the same league. Take the incident in 1593 where that great object of James’ contempt, Francis Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, gained access to the royal chambers in Holyrood hoping to restore himself to the king’s favour and found James half-undressed and emerging from his closet (or the privy in some accounts). Bothwell fell to his knees and offered his sword to the bewildered James.26 When James VI became James I of England, he ran immediately into two little plots in 1603 and one huge one in 1605.27 This is not to suggest that there were not serious problems and tensions within the body politic in Scotland. The so-called Catholic

200  Jenny Wormald earls, for instance, rose in arms under the Earl of Huntly on three separate occasions and defeated a royal army at the Battle of Glenlivet in 1594.28 Consider also the huge political storm surrounding Chancellor John Maitland of Thirlestane after 1590, which saw repeated plots to kill him until he was forced to resign in the wake of Huntly’s murder under warrant of the Earl of Moray.29 Indeed, the Ruthvens by themselves were a sufficient threat throughout the sixteenth century: aside from the conspiracy of 1600, Patrick Ruthven, third Lord Ruthven helped murder David Rizzio in 1566 and then William Ruthven, first Earl of Gowrie was the figurehead of the eponymous raid that forcibly held James between August 1582 and June 1583.30 By comparison with English and European plots though, Scotland, as we have already seen, had some very odd and farcical conspiracy stories. It is not clear why the Scots sat on the ground and told funny stories of the death of kings, but that is what they did. As a result, where does the Gowrie Conspiracy fit in? Was there in fact a Gowrie conspiracy? Look at it again. Is it real? If you are going to kill a king, do you allow him to bring along a large and distinguished entourage to the killing ground? When you have him apparently at your mercy, as the master did, with a dagger in your hand, do you stop to have a conversation? Do you decide that instead of just running him through you have to bind his hands? Was this actually a plot at all? Given how poorly it was executed, that is very hard to believe. But there is an alternative explanation. There are some clues to a different reading of the story in the recorded version of the king’s own account, the Discourse of the Unnatural and Vyle Conspiracie attempted against the Kings Maiestis Person at Sanct Johnstoun.31 Here, the king expressed doubts about his right to the gold as it was not ‘found hid under the earth’ – again, not just leaping at it – and asked about the coinage – was it foreign, and therefore Papist? To which Ruthven’s answer was ‘that so farre as he could take leasure to see of them, that they seemed to be forraine, and uncouth strokes of coine; and although that the fellow, both by his language and fashiouns, seemed to be a Scotish fellow, yitt he could never remember that he had seene him before’. After subsequent discussion the king’s suspicions began to be aroused when Ruthven tried to persuade him ‘that he should onlie take three or four of his owne meane servands with him, affirming that if anie noble man followed him, hee could not answere for it’, to which James angrily retorted that he ‘would not mistrust the Duke nor the Earle in a greater purpose nor that, and that hee could not vnderstand what hinder anie man could make in that erand’. But even then – and crucially – James did not think of murder, for Alexander was well known to the king and was highly favoured by Queen Anna, and only recently Alexander had made suit that he should become one of the gentlemen of his chamber.32 Rather, James began to wonder if his brother the earl ‘had handled him so hardlie, that the young gentleman … had taiken suche displeasure, as he was become somwhat by himself’. And James then consulted Lennox, asking if Lennox ‘had ever perceaved him to be subject to anie high apprehensioun’, saying that he himself thought Ruthven ‘not well settled in his wits’.

The Gowrie Conspiracy  201 Is this not a much neglected but extremely important passage, which offers us a real clue, and makes sense of the visible tension between Ruthven and his brother, and indeed the strange and boorish behaviour of the earl when James arrived at Gowrie House? What about the pot of gold? This might be seen as representing something quite different from bait to lure the king to his death. We have to think of how those seeking royal favour would make themselves appealing to kings, and that meant largesse. An extreme example was Leicester’s ruinous entertainment of Elizabeth when she visited him at Kenilworth in 1575, which included a series of plays and entertainments so extravagant they entailed nothing less than the creation of a false lake.33 There was nothing equivalent in Scotland, but consider the fourth Earl of Huntly’s lavish entertainment of Mary of Guise in 1556, so lavish that it caused her French supporters to advise that she clip the wings of the ‘Cock o’ the North’ due to the apparent wealth and resources he could muster; consider Queen Anna’s gift of a quantity of gold to James on behalf of her finance ministers; and consider, by way of contrast, how the Earl of Morton’s continued parsimony did not help him, even after he received his own quantity of gold from the treasurer in 1580.34 There were no plays at Gowrie House, and a pot of gold was very far from a false lake, but the intention was perhaps the same. Here was a younger son of a family whose record with royalty was not good to say the least, and who was anxious to make his way in the world. So why not entice the king to Perth to show him that this Ruthven, whoever his kinsmen were or had been, was indeed worthy of a place in the king’s favour, of position at court? And it all went horribly wrong. The earl was a miserable, stingy and grumpy host. The king was kept hanging around and given dismal fare and dismal company – and James was not known for his equitable temper when displeased. Up that turnpike stair, in that upper room, where the master supposedly took the king to meet the mysterious man and his gold, tempers flared. In this regard, the account of the decisive moment in the day, found by Arbuckle in a letter of Sir William Bowes addressed to Cecil on 2 September 1600, is surely crucial: The k. being readie to take horse was wythdrawen in discourse wyth the Mr of Gourie a learned sweet and hurtless yong gentleman and one other attending. Now were yt by occasion of a picture (as is sayde) or otherwise, speech happening of Earle Gourie his father executed, the k. angrelie sayde he was a traitour. Whereat the youth showing a greived and expostulatorie countenance and happilie Scot-like woords, the k. seeing hymself alone and wythout weapon cryed, ‘Treason, Treason’.35 In one reading the desperate Ruthven, his overblown and elaborate plot in tatters, perhaps simply reached out to calm the king. In another (depending how far you believe the king’s version of events), perhaps he pulled his knife, as a threat, to get by force what he was not getting by blandishments. It was not the first time that a meeting arranged between a king and a noble with no thought of murder ended, thanks to a flare of temper, in exactly that – one needs look no further than the murder of William, the eighth Earl of Douglas (under safe conduct, no less),

202  Jenny Wormald at the ‘Black Dinner’ hosted by James II at Stirling Castle in 1452. Douglas had refused to break a bond of mutual defence with the Earls of Ross and Crawford that circumvented royal authority, and in frustration James set upon him with a knife, before Patrick Gray ‘strak out his branes’ with ‘ane poll ax’ and the king’s retinue each took a turn to inflict no less than 26 wounds upon the unfortunate earl.36 In the case of the Gowries, it was the brothers who ended up dead, with the king’s followers, just like James II’s followers, finishing them off. There is a little more to it. Historians tend to take history very seriously. Men – and women – were good or bad. They are singularly reluctant to admit that they may have been simply very stupid. Even that most tragic creature, the deformed and mentally deficient last Hapsburg king of Spain, Charles II, has found those anxious to redeem him.37 This is not a difficulty I have myself, ever since I decided that Mary Queen of Scots’ chief difficulty was that she was simply stupid – though I know that there are many who do not agree with me.38 And I am at ease with stupid conspiracies and silly people who had a role in them. We should not assume, for example, that Gowrie had ability because Elizabeth showed him favour. It should be remembered that people like Queen Elizabeth and Robert Cecil, who were always happy to destabilise James’ kingship, and the godly ministers, anxious for aristocratic support against their ungodly king, had to make do with the material on offer; the fact that they saw some use in Gowrie does not mean that he was therefore able or intelligent. Indeed, it could mean the opposite. Note that Gowrie was out of Scotland for several years, returning only three months before the ‘Conspiracy’. He was inexperienced in Scottish affairs and perhaps not really much use to anyone. His behaviour at Gowrie House suggests a boor rather than a courtier fashioned, as all educated courtiers sought to be, on the lines of Castiglione. Indeed, while at Padua the Master of Gray called him a ‘pedant rather than courtier’, a description very far removed from that of the perfect courtier who prattled Latin and French effortlessly from his cradle and danced, rode and played to perfection.39 King James himself indicated that Gowrie was not the darling of the godly, or anyone else, when he pointed out that on the earl’s return to Scotland in May 1600 fewer people turned out to greet him in Edinburgh than had been there for his father’s execution. And the Master of Ruthven? I have already cited James’ opinion that he appeared ‘not well settled in his wits’. Ultimately, the scheme that he directed at Gowrie House (and he must have been its director), to get the advancement he sought, was indeed pretty stupid. But a stupid affair turned into a murderous one. However stupid this was, the reality was that something had to be done to explain the two bodies, an earl and a master, lying around in Gowrie House – which brings us finally to the aftermath and a great opportunity that James VI seized brilliantly. In February 1608 John Ramsey, Viscount Haddington, married Elizabeth, daughter of the Earl of Sussex – a splendid occasion attended by the king and his three children. James toasted the couple lavishly and gave them even more lavish gifts, wishing them ‘as much joy and comfort all theyr life, as he receved that day he [the bridegroom John Ramsey] delivered him from the danger

The Gowrie Conspiracy  203 of Gowry’.40 As indeed he had; Ramsey had killed both brothers. By 1608 the Gowrie conspiracy was almost as much of a cause célèbre as the Gunpowder Plot. Yet the difference between the two events was in fact so vast as to make this comparison almost ludicrous. Predictably, the aftermath has been seen as king versus kirk. Immediately, five Edinburgh ministers refused to believe the king’s account. By 11 September 1600 four had given way. Only one, the redoubtable and deeply impressive Robert Bruce, once close to and admired by King James, held out. He was exiled to France and, although allowed to return to Scotland, he would never preach again in Edinburgh – a sad and perplexing story.41 Inevitably the king won. Indeed, in his battle with the godly, he had been winning since 1596, that annus mirabilis that saw the highpoint of godly achievement according to David Calderwood, but also the beginning of ecclesiastical decline and royal control of the church.42 The pulpit and the printing press might be great tools in the hands of the godly – as the Edinburgh pulpit had been in 1596 when the ministers had a wonderful and heady time attacking king, queen and court before the Tolbooth Riot put an end to these festivities.43 But so they were for the king. 5 August became the day of annual sermons on the deliverance of the king from the Ruthvens, just as after 1605 5 November became Gunpowder Day. Both of these added, for the king’s loyal subjects in both his kingdoms, celebration of God’s protection to the accession sermons. These began under Elizabeth and continued under James and celebrated God’s protection for loyal Englishmen. Dates mattered much. Charles Prince of Wales and George Duke of Buckingham arrived in London on 5 October 1623, back from that ludicrous failure, their expedition to Spain in search of a Spanish bride; probably Charles would never again have such a moment of popularity, and another ‘fifth’ was added to annual rejoicing.44 Predictably none of these dates was observed in the interregnum, but the marking of ‘Gowrie Day’, which had already started to fall into abeyance under Charles I, revived briefly in Scotland after the Restoration in 1660.45 Jamie Reid-Baxter, however, has clearly shown that a number of the godly bought into the king’s version of events, including writers who joined the preachers in extolling the delivery of the king from the Gowries. These included John Dykes, in his sonnet sequence on the Conspiracy – a very useful way of getting favour from a monarch he had displeased with his critical comments on Basilikon Doron in 1599 – and Adam King, kirk papist.46 So this mysterious muddle gained life as a great conspiracy against an anointed king, on whose behalf God had clearly spoken. In the ideological battle, James had the better of it, despite the doubts of the kirk. Though far from being effective the kirk was actually pretty wobbly – Dykes wrote his Nine Sonnets to placate  the king he had offended, and it was his brother-in-law James Melville (who was himself quite capable of writing adulatory poetry) who presented them to James. But even James’ supporters – Lennox, Patrick Galloway and the other writers who spun the king’s story for the interested public – did not just buy into the godly king rescued by God from Satan and his henchmen. Despite the propaganda that they issued, they too saw clearly the problems of this story about a monstrous plot.

204  Jenny Wormald Above all, the Gowrie Conspiracy was not the Gunpowder Plot. It was a misconceived and farcical effort to woo a king, led by the unstable Alexander Ruthven, and probably with his brother John having no foreknowledge. Because of its tragic outcome it became – it had to become – a plot of great evil. But it was not that. Rather, the only certain thing about it is that – in a book on noble power – two people who were singularly lacking in noble power, and who suffered for it, were John Earl of Gowrie and Alexander Master of Ruthven.

Notes 1 Andrew Lang referred to an old lady once saying ‘It is a great comfort to think that, at the Day of Judgement, we shall know the whole truth about the Gowrie Conspiracy at last’. My previous thinking on the Gowrie conspiracy was that it was possibly a plot to kidnap James. This is rejected here. Andrew Lang, James VI and the Gowrie Mystery (London: 1902), vii; Jennifer Brown, ‘Scottish Politics 1567–1625’ in Alan Smith, ed., The Reign of James VI and I (London: 1973), 22–39, at 29. 2 Maurice Lee, for example, considers money in his interpretation. Maurice Lee, ‘The Gowrie Conspiracy revisited’ in Maurice Lee, ed., The ‘Inevitable’ Union and Other Essays on Early Modern Scotland (East Linton: 2003), 99–115. For the significance of the crown’s debts to the Ruthvens see Julian Goodare, ‘The debts of James VI of Scotland’, Economic History Review 62 (2009), 926–52, and Chapter 2 in this volume. 3 William Roughhead, The Riddle of the Ruthvens and other Studies (Edinburgh: 1919), 1–31 at 2. 4 Folger Shakespeare Library, ‘Copy of Newsletter from Edinburgh, August 11, 1600’ V.b.142, ff. 54–60. 5 He later went with James to England in 1603, and became the master of the king’s wardrobe. See Juhala, ‘Household and court’, Appendix 1. 6 Jenny is probably referring to Folger Shakespeare Library ‘Copy of Newsletter from Edinburgh, August 11, 1600’ V.b.142, ff. 54–60, although the editors were unable to view a full copy to check this. 7 Lang, Gowrie Mystery; Walter Scott, History of Scotland, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 1829– 1830), ii, pp. 375–99; Peter Hume Brown, A History of Scotland to the Present Time, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1911), ii, pp. 181–86; RPCS, vi, pp. xxi–xxviii; Louise Barbé, The Tragedy of Gowrie House (London, 1887); G. Graham H. Horton-Smith, ‘The Gowrie Conspiracy’, Notes and Queries 184 (1943), 82–84; George Bushnell, ‘On the riddle of the Ruthvens’ in George Bushnell, ed., From Papyrus to Print: a Bibliographical Miscellany (London: 1947), 47–53; John Magee, ‘The Gowrie Conspiracy and the Trotters of Down’, Familia 2 (1991), 31–39; G.M. Thomson, A Kind of Justice: Two Studies in Treason (London: 1970); W.F. Arbuckle, ‘The Gowrie Conspiracy’, SHR 36 (1957), 1–24 and 89–110; Alanna Knight, The Gowrie Conspiracy (London: 2013); Nigel Tranter, Past Master (Edinburgh: 1973). 8 Lee, ‘Gowrie Revisited’. 9 J. D. Davies, The Blood of Kings (Birmingham: 2010). Although this might appear to be the longest single treatment of the Gowrie Conspiracy, it is largely made up of individual sketches of the Ruthven family, James and Queen Anne, and comes to no clear conclusions about the events of the day. Bizarrely, it ends with an exploration of the preposterous theory that James VI may have been half-brother to the Ruthvens following an alleged illicit night of passion between Mary Queen of Scots and their father William. 10 George Nicolson’s account of 6 August states that Alexander ‘drew his dagger, sayeing he [James] had killed his father, and he wolde kill him!’ James’ official account relates

The Gowrie Conspiracy  205 that Alexander said James’ conscience was ‘burthenned, for the murthering of his father’. Patrick Galloway’s sermon declared that Alexander shouted: ‘thou wes the death of my father; and heere is a dager, to be avenged upon thee for that death’. Andrew Henderson’s deposition recalled that Alexander had said: ‘Remember ye of my fathers murder? Yee shall now die for it’. Criminal Trials, ii, 313, 222; Calderwood, History, vi, 37, 53; Gowreis Conspiracie: A Discourse of the Unnaturall and Vyle Conspiracie Attempted Against the Kings Majesties Person at Sanct-Johnstoun upon Twysday the 5. of August. 1600 (Edinburgh: 1600), unpaginated – where possible the page number of Calderwood’s abridged version (History, vi, 28–45) will also be made. 11 For the narrative that follows, see Arbuckle; Calderwood, vi, 28–45; Gowreis Conspiracie. 12 Calderwood, History, vi, 43. 13 Jenny did not develop any discussion of this aspect of the conspiracy in her draft paper. 14 CBP, ii, 659. 15 Gowreis Conspiracie; Calderwood, History, vi, 29. 16 Calderwood, History, vi, 52. 17 RPCS, vi, 149–50; Calderwood, History, vi, 86. 18 Something of the more lavish usual noble meal can be gauged from the kitchen accounts of William Lord Keith from 1615. On Tuesday 14 March 1615, for example the lord enjoyed four dishes of fish, a whole veal roast, six portions of bread and two quarts of ale. On Wednesday 29 March he enjoyed some broth, a dish of fish, another of beef, three portions of bread, a quart of ale and a pint of beer. When the Earl of Mar came to visit this increased to include two types of broth, fish, ‘silver meat’, beef, veal, two hens, two capons, two muirfoul, oranges, bread, ale and wine. NLS MS21176 ff. 40–54; for Gowrie’s dinner, see Davies, Blood of Kings, 24; Criminal Trials, ii, 157. 19 We can forget all of Anthony Weldon’s nonsense about James wearing padded breeches for protection. James wore the fashion of his day. Even if we do accept the argument that padding equates to cowardice, then Elizabeth’s unbelievably voluminous skirts not only severely restricted her movement because of their weight, but therefore made her one of history’s greatest of cowards. Anthony Weldon, A Perfect Description of the People and Country of Scotland (London: 1649); Anthony Weldon, The Court and Character of K. James (London: 1650). For a refutation of these accounts see Jenny Wormald, ‘James VI and I: Two Kings or One?’, History 68 (1983) 187–209. 20 Criminal Trials, ii, 173. 21 For a more positive assessment of Robert II’s reign, however, see Stephen Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and Robert III 1371–1406 (Edinburgh: 2007), 1–193. 22 Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie, The Historie and Cronicles of Scotland, ed A. MacKay, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 1899), i, 207–10. 23 Norman MacDougall, James III: A Political Study (Edinburgh: 2009), 346–49; Norman MacDougall, ‘The sources: a reappraisal of the legend’ in J. M. Brown, ed., Scottish Society in the Fifteenth Century (London: 1977), 10–32. 24 Michael Brown, James I (East Linton: 1994), 183–88, esp. 187; M. Connolly, “‘The dethe of the kynge of scotis’: a new edition”, SHR 71 (1992), 46–69, at 60–62. 25 Scotland in the 1590s compares very favourably with the very dysfunctional court of Elizabeth, who relied on a very narrow group of political managers – namely the Cecil family – while denying an adequate political role to a host of young rising stars such as Essex, Southampton, Oxford, Pembroke, and Raleigh, most of whom hit the headlines at court through secret marriages and pre-marital pregnancies that drove the queen into paroxysms of hysterical fury. The Essex rising was the direct result of the folly of an aged queen still playing an increasingly unhealthy love game, starving her beloved of patronage and consistent access to power. Jacobean Scotland had its problems, but

206  Jenny Wormald was mercifully free from this one, though James had frequent difficulties with royal favourites, such as Overbury and Buckingham, during his English reign. 26 John Spottiswood, The History of the Church of Scotland, ed. David Laing, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 1850–1851), ii, 433–34; Moysie, Memoirs, 102–103. 27 The Main and Bye Plots in 1603, and the Gunpowder Plot in 1605. For details see Jenny Wormald, ‘Gunpowder, treason and Scots’, Journal of British Studies 24 (1985), 141–68, at 159. 28 In 1589 these were George Gordon, sixth Earl of Huntly, Francis Hay, ninth Earl of Erroll and David Lindsay, eleventh Earl of Crawford. Crawford was not involved in the subsequent rebellions with Huntly and Erroll; they were instead joined by William Douglas, tenth Earl of Angus in the second and third rebellions in 1593 and 1594. See Ruth Grant, ‘The Brig o’ Dee Affair, the sixth earl of Huntly and the Politics of the Counter-Reformation’ in Goodare and Lynch, Reign of James VI, 93–109. 29 Lee, Maitland of Thirlestane; Keith Brown, Bloodfeud, Chapter 6. 30 Mary Black Verschuur, ‘Ruthven, Patrick, third Lord Ruthven (c.1520–1566)’, ODNB [24372, accessed 19 March 2016]; see Steven Reid’s chapter in this volume. 31 For what follows, see Gowreis Conspiracie, in particular the thirteenth and fourteenth pages of the text, and Calderwood, History, vi, 30–34. 32 Cited in the texts in the preceding note, and in Amy L. Juhala, ‘Ruthven, Alexander, master of Ruthven (1580?–1600)’, ODNB [24369, accessed 19 March 2016]. 33 Elizabeth Goldring, ‘The Earl of Leicester’s Inventory of Kenilworth Castle, c.1578’, English Heritage Historical Review 2 (2007), 36–59. 34 On Mary of Guise’s visit to Strathbogie see Harry Potter, Bloodfeud: The Stewarts & Gordons at War in the Age of Mary Queen of Scots (Stroud: 2002), 47–48. See Amy Blakeway and Julian Goodare’s chapters in this volume for discussions of Morton and the Octavians respectively. 35 CSP, Scot., lxvi, no. 64; transcribed in full in Arbuckle, ‘Gowrie Conspiracy’, 97–98. 36 In addition to Graham, the retinue included Sir Alexander Boyd, Lord Darnley, Sir Andrew Stewart, Sir William of Cranston, Sir Simon of Glendinning and the Lord Gray. See ‘The “Auchinleck Chronicle”’, in Christine McGladdery, James II (Edinburgh: 2015), 165; see also 66–70. 37 Christopher Storrs, The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–1700 (Oxford: 2006). 38 Jenny Wormald, Mary Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure (London: 1988). For the counter argument see Michael Lynch, ‘Mary Queen of Scots: a new case for the prosecution’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 41 (1990), 69–73. 39 We have been unable to source Jenny’s reference for this. 40 Nina Green, ‘transcript of National Archives State Papers 14/31/26’ (2007) [Accessed 24 November 2015]. 41 James Kirk, ‘Bruce, Robert (1554–1631)’, ODNB [3756, accessed 19 March 2016]. 42 RPCS, vi, pp. 148–49; Calderwood, History, vi, pp. 56–58. 43 Julian Goodare, ‘The Attempted Scottish Coup of 1596’ in Goodare and MacDonald, Sixteenth-Century Scotland, 311–36. 44 Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: the Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592–1628 (Longman: 1981), 163–65. 45 See, for example, the Jan Luyken engraving described in the introduction. 46 Jamie Reid-Baxter, ‘The Nyne Muses, an unknown Renaissance sonnet sequence: John Dykes and the Gowrie Conspiracy of 1600’ in K. Dekker and A. A. MacDonald, eds, Royalty, Rhetoric and Reality (Leuven: 2005), 197–218.

Index

Aberdeen 65, 72, 82, 96; merchant guild 75; sheriff court 60 Aberdour, Fife 14 absolutism see ‘Scottish Absolutism’ access to the king 37–9, 43, 72, 145, 157–8, 161, European parallels 145 Act anent the Highlands and Borders 104 Act of Abolition 68 Act regarding removing and extinguishing of deadly feuds 109, 187 Adamson, Patrick, Archbishop of St Andrews 32, 78–9 Admiral see Lord Admiral Ainsley Bond 22 Albany, Duke of see Stewart Amboise, Tumult of 199 Anderson, John 91–3 Anderson kindred 91, 93 Anderson, Ninian 92 Anderson, William 92–3 Anglo-Scottish League 48–9, 62 Anglophile faction 36, 61–2 Angus 36 Angus, Earls of see Douglas Anna of Denmark, Queen of Scots 5, 59, 70–3, 79, 120, 138–40, 154, 159, 168, 177–8, 191, 201; household 113, 157–8, 162–4, 200; finances see Queen’s Council annexation of the temporalities of ecclesiastical benefices 83 Anstruther, Sir James of that Ilk 170 arbitration 83–4, 102, 104, 108–9, 113–14, 179 Ardmannoch, lordship of 41 Argyll, Countess of see Keith Argyll, Earls of see Campbell Armstrong, William of Kinmont 99, 110, 182 Arran, Earls of see Hamilton and Stewart

Ashby, William 139 Aston, Roger 125, 162–4, 166, 168, 170, 177, 193 Aston, Thomas 193 Atholl, Earls of see Stewart d’Aubigny, Sieur see Stewart Auchinleck, George 36 Auchmowtie, John 170 Auld Alliance 43 Ayr 40, 132 Ayrshire nobles 36 Babington Plot 199 Baillie, Alexander 91 Balfour, Sir James of Pittendreich 20, 22, 37 Balfour, Sir Michael of Burleigh 170 Baltinglass Rebellion 19 bands, political 34 banquet 85, 108 baptism 71, 86, 163, 165 Bargany, Laird of 39 Barron, John 197 Basilikon Doron 2, 60, 108, 117, 144–5, 158, 176, 186, 203 Beaton, David of Melgund 170 Beaton, James, Archbishop of Glasgow 37, 84 bedchamber see chamber Bellenden, Sir Lewis of Auchnoule, Justice Clerk 34, 49 Berwick upon Tweed 20, 23, 34, 110–11 Blackness Castle 40, 67 Blantyre, Commendatorship of 84; see also Stewart of Blantyre bloodfeud 2–3, 6, 9, 38, 61, 64–7, 84, 108–9, 139; perceptions of 102, 195–6; perpetuation in the Borders 98–101, 107; suppression of 102, 107–9, 112, 114; see also arbitration

208 Index bloody flux 75 Blythswood 86, 89 bonds of loyalty 24, 57 bonds of manrent 2–3, 10, 58, 60, 103–4 bonds, other 66, 99, 103–4, 108, 112, 114 bonds, political 19–20 Borders 5–6, 11, 18, 25, 41, 48, 182; administration of 98–100, 105, 109–11, 114, 138, 163; conflicts 100–1, 104, 109–11; English wardens 99, 101 border kindreds 18, 98, 100 Bothwell, Earls of see Hepburn and Stewart Bowes, Sir Robert 16, 19, 20, 34, 41–2, 44, 46–9, 66, 70–1, 107, 122–3, 126, 140, 148, 166, 179, 181, 184 Boyd, Agnes 86 Boyd, James, Archbishop of Glasgow 86 Boyd, Robert Lord 34, 36, 39 Braidwood, James 92 Branxholme 113–14 Bridgend, near Glasgow 86 Brig o’ Dee Rebellion 65–6, 70, 73, 75, 138–40, 158 Brown, Keith 2–3, 33, 80, 102, 108–9, 111, 159, 163 Broxmouth 40 Bruce, Edward, Abbot of Kinloss 170 Bruce, Robert 203 Buchanan, George 15–16, 27, 35, 51, 84, 151, 179 Buchanan, John of Carstoun 141 Buckingham, Duke of, see Villiers Burel, John 143, 147 burgh administration 37–8, 58 Burghley, Lord see Cecil burghs 41, 60, 82 burghs and noble power 81–2, 85, 89, 93 Bye Plot 206 cabinet 111 cadet branches 3 Caithness 141 Caithness, Earls of see Sinclair Calais 40 Calderwood, David 33–4, 142, 150, 203 Caldwell, Alexander 92 Callander 40 Cambuskenneth, commendator of see Erskine Campbell, Archibald/Gilleasbuig, seventh Earl of Argyll 6, 9, 61, 65, 118–29, 133–5, 159, 182–3

Campbell, Colin, sixth Earl of Argyll 4, 14–20, 23–4, 44–5, 49 Campbell, Dioness, Dean of Limerick 135 Campbell, Gilleasbuig, provost of Kilmun 124 Campbell, Sir Iain of Lawers 121, 133 Campbell, John of Ardkinglass 118, 125 Campbell, John of Cawdor 118 Campbell kindred 121–2 Campbell, Seumas 121 Carey, George 34, 41–2 Carey, Henry, Lord Hundson 18 Carey, Sir John 197 Carlisle Castle 99, 182 Carmichael, Sir John of that Ilk 170, 183 Carnegie, David 191 Carnegie, David of Colluthie 178–80, 189, 193 Carnegie, Sir John of Kinnaird 189 Carnegie, Sir Robert of Kinnaird 189 Carr kindred see Ker Carr, Robert, first Earl of Somerset 58, 149, 169, 172, 194 Carrickfergus Castle 125 Cassillis, Earls of see Kennedy Catholic noblemen 57–9, 62–3, 70, 72–3, 182–3, 200, 206 Catholic powers on the Continent 62–3, 70, 73, 163, 183, 196 Catholicism 8, 19, 37, 70 Cecil, Sir Robert 98, 126, 162–4, 197, 202, 205 Cecil, William, Lord Burghley 20, 137, 148, 162 chamber 4, 7–9, 38–9, 57–9, 67–8, 74; dominated by the Earl of Huntly 60, 62, 64, 73; gentlemen of the bedchamber 84, 86, 136, 144–6, 149, 155–7, 177–8, 180–1, 186; difference between chamber, household and bedchamber 143–4; expenditure 144–6, 158, 181, 186, development of 155–60, 166; composition of 156, 160–6, 170–5 chamberlain see Lord Chamberlain chamberlain ayres 38, 53 chancellorship 159–60, 167, 176–7, 181, 184; see also Maitland and Graham Charles I, Prince and King of Scotland and England 3, 71, 163–5, 203 Charles II, King of Spain 202 Charles IX, King of France 33 Charters of Kinfauns, Henry 170 Cheyne, Francis 75, 79

Index  209 Chirnside, Robert of Possil 90–1 Chirnside, William, parson of Luss 90 Chrisholm, Sir James 60, 65, 68 Chrisholm, James of Comlix and Dundorn 170 Chrisholm, John 60 Chrisholm kindred 75–6 Christian IV, King of Denmark and Norway 138 Clanchattan 65 Clontibret, Battle of 122 Cockburn, Sir John of Ormiston 182 Cockburn, Sir Richard of Clerkington 170 coinage 186, 191 Colquhoun, Alexander 84 Colquhoun, Alexander of Luss 90 Colquhoun, Elizabeth 90 Colquhoun, Sir Henry of Luss 84, 90 Colville, James of Easter Wemyss 34 Colquhoun, Jean 90 Colquhoun kindred of Luss 84, 90–1 Colville, Robert of Cleish 34 Colville, John 41, 45, 47–8, 121, 177 commonweal 108 comptroller 41–2, 60, 84, 162, 165–6, 172–3, 177, 181, 184–5, 190 Condé, Prince of 33, 39 Connaught 125 convention of estates 68, 109 convention of the nobility 183 conventions, other 23, 27, 32, 35, 39, 43–7, 49, 177 Copeland Isles 125 Corrichie, Battle of Costello Castle 125 Counter-Reformation 5, 58, 139–40 coups 32, 127, 137, 148, 183 court 3, 7, 21–2, 58, 60–3, 68, 82, 136, 143–6, 155; dominated by the Earl of Huntly 65–6, 69 court of session 84, 108, 113, 140, 178, 180, 184, 189–90; Lord President see Seton, Alexander courtiers 7–8, 94, 136, 143–6, 155, 161, 166, 202; see also chamber Covenanters 3 craftsmen 38, 81, 88, 93 Cranston, Thomas 197 Crawford, Earls of see Lindsay Crichton Castle 164 Craigrngelt, George 196–7 Crichton, Robert of Sanquhar, Lord 105, 170

Cumledge in the Merse 34 Cunningham, Florence 92 Cunningham, James 170 Cunningham, James, sixth Earl of Glencairn 36, 39, 45 Cunningham, John of Drumwhassel 36, 49, 51 Cunningham, William 89–92 customs administration 181 Dalkeith, Midlothian 14, 17, 21, 33, 37, 159 dancing 21 Darnaway 66 Darnley, Lord see Stewart Davison, William 43 Denmark 7, 78, 136, 138–40, 157, 162, 164, 171, 175 Desmond, Earls of see Fitz James Fitzgerald Donaldson, Gordon 2, 35 ‘Doneyl’ of Ireland 19 Donibristle 66 Douglas, Archibald 22, 37 Douglas, Archibald, eighth Earl of Angus, fifth Earl of Morton 15, 20, 22, 24, 34, 41, 44–5, 47, 49–50, 186 Douglas, Archibald, sixth Earl of Angus 26, 101 Douglas, Earls of 100 Douglas, Sir George 26 Douglas, James, fifth Earl of Buchan 35 Douglas, James, fourth Earl of Morton, Regent of Scotland 4–5, 12–5, 19–21, 32, 34–5, 41, 83, 101; loss of regency 15, 25, 160; political enemies 16; fall from influence 17–8, 201, imprisonment and execution 22–4 Douglas kindred 34, 101 Douglas, Margaret 101 Douglas, Robert 177 Douglas, William, eighth Earl of Douglas 201–2 Douglas, William, tenth Earl of Angus 67–8, 206 Douglas, William of Lochleven 14, 34–5 Drummond, Lady Jean 113, 163 Drummond, John 79 Drummond, John of Slipperfield 170 Dryburgh, Abbot of see Erskine Dudley, Robert, first Earl of Leicester 201 duelling 104, 124, 133 Duff, Alexander 69, 79 Dumbarton 22–4, 40, 43, 140–1

210 Index Dumfries 85, 138 Dundee 51, 92 Dundee, Provost of see Halyburton Dunfermline 36, 79 Dunfermline, commendator of see Pitcairn Dunfermline Abbey, commendatorship of 69 Dunfermline, Earl of see Seton Dunglass 40 Dupplin 35 Durham, James of Duntarvie 167 Durie, John, minister of Edinburgh 37 Dykes, John 203 East March, warden of 165 Easter Moriston 185 Edinburgh 15–6, 23, 38, 40–1, 69, 72, 85, 104–5, 107–8, 140, 203, tolbooth riot 183, 203; Castle 122, 148, 160, 166, 168, 171; town council 38, 82; presbytery of 60, 78 Edward VI, King of England 13, 33 Eglinton, Earls of see Montgomery Ellesden 113 Elliot kindred 104, 112 Elphinstone, Alexander, Master of 60, 76, 97, 168, 170, 180, 190, 192 Elphinstone, George of Blythswood 86, 89–90, 97 Elphinstone, Sir George of Blythswood, Provost of Glasgow 5–6, 81–2, 86–94, 167, 170 Elphinstone, Sir James of Barnton, Octavian 8, 164, 170, 177–80, 182–3, 185, 188, 190, 192 Elphinstone, James, brother of Blythswood 92 Elphinstone, John 92, 170 Elphinstone, Sir Michael 157, 167, 170 Elphinstone, Robert, third Lord 180, 190, 192 Elphinstone, William 157, 170 Elizabeth, Princess of Denmark 46 Elizabeth, Princess of Scotland 71 Elizabeth I, Queen of England 3–5, 7, 12–13, 16, 20, 23, 25, 40–1, 44–5, 48, 61, 64, 69, 197, 201–2; support for the Hamiltons 18, 48; interests in Ireland 19, 117–18, 120–9; parsimony 47; focus on the Borders 99, 107, 110–11, 139, 182; rebellions against 199, 205 England, Scottish ambassadors and diplomacy to 23, 35, 40–1, 48, 62–3, 99, 162–6, 181–2, 185

English diplomacy to Scotland 2, 4, 6–7, 12, 14–16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 33, 41, 44, 47–8, 99, 107, 120–6, 139, 156, 162–6, 181–2 English forces in Ireland 117, 121–3, 125–7, 130; see also Tudor conquest of Ireland English subsidy 48, 182–3, 187, 191 English succession 5–6, 47, 49–50, 58, 63, 73; impact on bloodfeud and the Borders 99, 107, 110–11; impact on Highland policy 117–18, 121, 123 Enniskillen Castle 119 Errington, Nicholas 18 Erroll, Countess of 71 Erroll, Earls of see Hay Erskine, Adam, commendator of Cambuskenneth 34, 52 Erskine, Alexander of Gogar, Master of Mar 14–15, 74, 160–1, 171 Erskine, David, Abbot of Dryburgh 34 Erskine, George 122, 125–6 Erskine, James 171 Erskine, John, fourth Lord 60 Erskine, John, second Earl of Mar 4, 8, 15–16, 18, 39–40, 44, 47, 50, 57, 60, 119, 177, 179, 196, 198; government office 176, 181–2, 186–7; relationship with Huntly 69, 71; role in the chamber 156–7, 160–1, 166, 171; role in the Ruthven Raid 34–5 Erskine kindred 34 Erskine, parsonage 86; see also Stewart, David Erskine, Thomas of Gogar, first Earl of Kellie 1, 60, 69, 157, 160–2, 171, 196 Erskine, William, Abbot of Paisley 34 Erskine, William, holder of the bishopric of Glasgow 84 Essex Rising 199 Ettrick Forest, lordship of 100, 113 Eure, Ralph, English Warden of the Middle March 106 Europe 2, 4–5, 12 Ewesdale 113 exchequer 7, 41, 145–6, 164, 176–9, 184–8; rolls 156 exile 16, 19, 34, 37, 48, 50, 71–2, 106, 131, 143, 148, 165, 182, 203 excommunication 68 execution 23, 37 Falkland Palace 32, 47, 49, 51, 86, 196–8 ‘favourites’ 4, 6, 16, 50, 57–8, 136–7, 155–6, 158–9

Index  211 Fawside, Thomas 92 ferries 49 Fife 72 Fife, Synod of 68 financial policy see Octavians First Gentleman of the Chamber see Chamber Firth of Tay 49 Fitz James Fitzgerald, Gerald, fourteenth Earl of Desmond 19 Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, James 19 Fleming, John, sixth Lord (later Earl of Wigtown) 76, 165, 171 ‘Flight of the Earls’ 127 Forbes kindred 65 Forbes, Arthur eighth Lord 119 Forrester, Alexander of Garden 109 Forrett, James 91–2 Forster, Sir John, English Warden of the Middle March 102 Forth, Firth of 49, 140, 147 Foulis, David 185 Foulis, Margaret 184 Foulis, Thomas 8, 182, 184–5, 188 Fowler, Thomas 65, 137, 139 Fowler, William 45 France 19–20, 22, 25, 33 France, Scottish ambassadors and diplomacy to 43–5, 63, 70, 85, 161, 171 Francis II, King of France 33 Francophile faction 60 Fraser, Simon, sixth Lord Lovat 76 Frederick II, King of Denmark 45 French diplomacy to Scotland 43–7 friendship 57–8, 67, 69, 73–4, 150, 155–6, 158–9 Fyfe, William Baxter Collier 51 Fyvie, Lord see Seton Gaelic: lordship 119, 129; nobles 117, 120–1, 129; ‘pan-Gaelic sentiment’ 117 galleys, highland 125–6 Galloway, Patrick 197, 203, 205 Galwey 125 Gare Loch 40 Geddie, John 171 General Band 104–5, 110, 112 General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland 40, 48, 68, 179 Geneva 37, 190 Germany 78 Gibb, Elspeth 164 Gibb, John 171

Glamis, Master of see Lyon Glasgow 5, 24, 38; archbishopric 5, 83, 85, 90; see also Beaton, Boyd and Spottiswood; Bishop’s castle 81, 88; burgh court 83; barony 83–4, 87; commissary court 83; Dean of Guild 87, 92; see also Trumble; High Kirk (cathedral) 85; Letter of Guildry 6, 87–8; merchants’ guild 6, 86–7; provosts 88, 94; see also Elphinstone of Blythswood, Houston of Houston, Stewart of Flock and Stewart of Minto; tolbooth 81; town council 6, 81–4, 86–93, leets 85, 88–9, 91 Glen Fruin, Battle of 129 Glen, Thomas 91 Glencairn, Earls of see Cunningham Glenlivet, Battle of 6–7, 120, 122, 127, 132, 200 gold 21–2, 86, 117–18, 121, 177, 191, 195–6, 198, 200–1 Goodare, Julian 2, 32–33, 107, 138, 159–60, 164 Gorbals, near Glasgow 86 Gordon, Alexander, twelfth Earl of Sutherland 60, 76 Gordon, Alexander of Lesmoir 75, 79 Gordon of Carnbarrow 79 Gordon, John of Buckie 79 Gordon, John of Cluny 66, 75, 79 Gordon, Sir John of Lochinvar 60, 75 Gordon, John of Newton 79 Gordon, Elizabeth 162 Gordon, George, fourth Earl of Huntly 201, 206 Gordon, George, sixth Earl and first Marquess of Huntly 5–7, 9, 44–5, 56, 85, 96, 118–19, 120–1, 127, 131–2, 139–42, 147, 150, 163, 171, 200, 206; conflict with Maitland 63–5, 74; excommunicated 68; exile 80, 182–3; friendship 57–8, 67–9; murder of Moray 66–7, 139; office of chamberlain 63, 72, 75; see also Glenlivet Gordon kindred 5, 59–61, 142 Gordon of Knockspak 79 Gordon, Sir Patrick of Auchindoun 60, 67–8 Gordon, Sir John of Pitlurg 75, 79 Gordon, Sir William of Gight 67, 75, 79 Gourlaw, John, customs officer of Edinburgh 41 government 1–3

212 Index Gowrie Conspiracy 1, 8, 154, 158, 161, 165, 168, 193–206; perceptions of 194–5; comparison to other plots 198–200, 203–4; dinner during 196–7, 201, 205 Gowrie House, Perth 193–8, 202 Gowrie, Earls of see Ruthven Graham, David of Fentry 76 Graham, John 89–90 Graham, John, third Earl of Montrose 39, 44–5, 47–9, 58, 61–2, 64, 75–6, 182–3, 186, chancellor 146, 159, 167, 171, 176 Graham, Mungo of Rathernis 171 Graham, Sir Robert Grant, John 66 Grant kindred 65 Gravelines, battle of 64 Gray, James 171 Gray, Patrick 202 Gray, Patrick, fifth Lord 27 Gray, Patrick, Master of 27, 202 Guise, Henri, Duc de 39, 199 Guise, house of 33, 37, 39 Guise, Marie de 39, 201 Gunpowder Plot 203–4, 206 Halyburton, James, Provost of Dundee and commendator of Pittenweem 34 Hamilton, Lord Claud 4, 48, 50, 76, 126 Hamilton, James, third Earl of Arran 37, 48 Hamilton, Lord John 4, 48, 50, 65, 68, 76, 138, 140, 181 Hamilton, John 171 Hamilton kindred 15–18, 20, 22, 49, 62, 64, 137 Hamilton, Marie 90 Hamilton, Thomas of Drumcairn, Octavian 171, 177–80, 182–5, 188, 190 Hamilton, Thomas of Priestfield 190 hats 46 Hawick 104 Hay, Alexander, Clerk Register 45 Hay, Alexander of Forrestseat 171 Hay, Francis, ninth Earl of Erroll 59, 62, 65, 67–8, 72, 76, 142–3, 182–3, 186, 206 Hay, James 149 Henderson, Andrew 196–7, 205 Henry Frederick, Prince of Scotland 2, 137, 149; baptism 86, 154, 163; custody with the Earl of Mar 156, 158–9, 171; see also Basilikon Doron

Henri III, King of France 43, 199 Henry IV, King of France 199 Hepburn, James, fourth Earl of Bothwell 22–3 HMS Charles 125 HMS Popinjay 125, 133 Herries, Sir Hugh 171, 196–7 Herries, Lord see Maxwell herring customs 125 Hewitt, G. R. 15, 23 Highlands 5–6, 9, 138, 143; nobility 11, 117–18, 124–9; West Highlands and Isles 6, 117–18, 120–2, 124–9, 181 Highlanders 120, 124–9 Hill, James 122 Historie of King James the Sext 34, 43 Holderness, Earls of see Ramsay Holy Cross, Abbey of 41 Holyrood Abbey and Palace 14, 32, 34, 39–40, 42, 99, 158, 160; raids by the Earl of Bothwell 66, 148, 154, 165, 199 Home kindred 18, 101 Home, Alexander sixth Lord 34, 45, 60, 68, 76, 112, 159, 165, 171, 182, 186 Home, Alexander of North Berwick 171 Home, Sir George of Spott (later Earl of Dunbar) 60, 86, 162, 167, 171, 188 Home, Sir George of Wedderburn 172, 177, 184–5 Home, John of Fentonhall 171 Home, William 172 Hope, Thomas 38 hornings 46, 71, 88, 109, 121, 177 horses 196, 198–9 Household see Royal Household Houston of Houston, John, Provost of Glasgow 88 Hudson, James 172 Hudson, Robert 172 Hudson, Thomas 172 Hudson, William 172 Hume, David of Godscroft 36 Hume, Patrick 172 Hundson, Lord, see Carey Hunter, William 40 hunting 32–4, 36, 42, 47, 137, 196–8 Huntly Castle 72 Huntly, Countess of see Stewart Huntly, Earls of 10 see also Gordon Inch Kenneth 124 Inglis, James 92 Innermeath, Lord see Stewart

Index  213 Ireland 4, 6, 13, 18–19, 117–19, 121–2, 124–9; kingship of 123; see also mercenary trade with Ireland, Tudor conquest of Ireland and English forces in Ireland Ireland, John 147 Irish Sea 119, 125 Islay 128, 133 Isles of Scotland see Highlands Isles, Bishops of see Knox James II, King of Scots 199, 202 James II, King of Scots 33 James III, King of Scots 33, 198–9 James IV, King of Scots 33, 126, 129 James V, King of Scots 13, 26, 41, 101, 123, 126, 129 James VI, King of Scots and I of England: administration of the Borders 98–9, 102, 106–9, 111, 114; attitude to and governance of the West Highlands and Isles 117–29, 132; choice in servitors 158–9, 166; dislike of Morton 20; during the Ruthven Raid 42–5; education 84, 160–1, 164–5, 179–80; encouraging concord among his nobility 17, 25, 63, 107–9, 111, 146; end of minority 13, 17, 25, 50; escape from the Ruthven Raid 47–50; fear of kidnap 17; 24; financial management 176–8, 181–2, 185–8, 191; friendship with the Earl of Huntly 57–8, 60–3, 65–8, 70–2; Gowrie conspiracy 194–7, 201–4; marriage 45, 55, 136, 157, 162, 164; relationship with Glasgow 82–3, 86, 88, 93–4; relationship with the second Duke of Lennox 146–51; sexuality 151; see also English Succession Jardine of Applegarth kindred 103 Jedburgh 100, 104, provostry of 103 Jesuits 37, 70, 72, 78, 142 Johnston, John of that Ilk 41 Johnston-Maxwell feud 113 Jowsie, Robert 182 justice administration 37, 39, 48, 58, 99, 107–10, 114, 141–3, 179–80, 189–90; see also bloodfeud justice ayres 35, 38–9, 84–5 Keith, Annas, Countess of Moray and Argyll 14, 18 Keith, George, fourth Earl 47, 96, 142 Keith, Sir William of Delny 162 Keith, William Lord 205

Kellie, Earls of see Erskine Kelso, Abbey of 113 Kenilworth 201 Kennedy, John, fifth Earl of Cassillis 172 Ker of Ancrum kindred 103, 109 Ker, Sir Andrew of Cessford 100 Ker, Sir Andrew of Ferniehurst 100, 103, 105–6, 169, 172 Ker, Andrew of Greenhead 113 Ker of Cessford kindred 100–4, 109 Ker of Ferniehurst kindred 103–4, 109, 114 Ker, George 67 Ker, Henry 139 Ker kindred 15, 18, 99–101, 107, 112 Ker, Mark of Littledean 100, 104 Ker, Margaret 98, 106 Ker, Mark, Lord Newbattle 183 Ker, Robert of Cessford, Lord and later first Earl of Roxburgh 98, 102–3, 105–7, 109–14, 163, 169, 172 Ker, Sir Robert, courtier 86 Ker of Romano Grange 105 Ker-Scott bloodfeud 6, 98–101, 103–7, 110–11 Ker, Captain Thomas 75, 79 Ker, William of Ancrum 103, 109 Ker, Sir William of Cessford 6, 98–9, 103–7 King, Adam 203 ‘King of the Isles’ see Lordship of the Isles and MacDonald of Sleat Kinsale 127 kinship 57, 89, 99, 102–4, 107, 114, 141 ‘Kinmont Willie’ see Armstrong of Kinmont Kinneill 33 Kirk 3, 32, 37, 39–40, 63, 67–72, 127, 195, 202–3 Knox, Andrew, Bishop of the Isles 135 lairds 3, 8, 57, 94, 180–1, 188 Langton 40 Lauder, James 172 Lee jnr, Maurice 1–3, 12, 25, 108, 137, 159, 162, 195 Leicester see Dudley Leith 71, 138, 140 Lang, Andrew 204 Lennox, Earls and Dukes of 83, 85; see also Stewart Lennox estates in England 48 Lennox, Duchess of see Ruthven Lennox, the 84 Lesley, Andrew, fifth Earl of Rothes 45, 49, 76

214 Index Lesley, John, Bishop of Ross 37 lesser nobles 3 Lethan kindred 113 letters of credit 68, 78 Lewis, plantation of 127 Liddesdale 112–13; Keeper of 98, 105–6, 111–12; see also Scott of Buccleuch Lieutenancy of the Borders 138; see also Hamilton, Lord John Lieutenancy of the Isles 126, 129 Lieutenancy of the North 5, 7, 60–1, 66, 119, 136, 141–3 Lindores, Lord see Lindsay, Patrick Lindsay, Alexander, Lord Spynie 57, 60, 75, 144, 146, 162, 165, 172 Lindsay, David, eleventh Earl of Crawford 44–5, 49, 56, 58, 60–5, 76, 180–2, 206 Lindsay, David, ninth Earl of Crawford 180, 189 Lindsay, Sir David of Edzell 180, 189 Lindsay, Sir David of the Mount, Lord Lyon King of Arms 72 Lindsay, John 8 Lindsay, John of Balcarres, Octavian 177–80, 182–3, 185, 189, 193 Lindsay, John, Lord Menmuir 172 Lindsay, Margaret 191 Lindsay, Patrick, sixth Lord Lindsay of the Byres 34, 39 Lindsay, Patrick, Lord Lindores 165, 172 Lindsay, Robert of Pitscottie 198 Linlithgow 109 Linlithgow, Earls of see Livingston Linlithgow Palace 32, 47, 64 livery 46, 80 Livingston of Abercord 173 Livingston, Alexander, seventh Lord and first Earl of 65, 76, 173, 182, 186 Livingston, Alexander of Pentasken 172 Livingston, John 173 Lochinvar, Laird of 39 Lockhart, Alexander 173 Lord Admiral 140–1 Lord Chamberlain (also Lord High Chamberlain or Lord Great Chamberlain) 7, 37–8, 62–3, 74, 76, 136, 144–6, 149, 154, 155–6, 160–1, 165, 174; see also Chamber Lord Lyon King of Arms see Lindsay Lords of the Articles 81, 88 Lords of Session 38, 140, 178, 180, 184, 189–90 lordship 58, 102, 112, 114

Lordship of the Isles 119, 123, 128–30 Lothian 36, 140 Lough Foyle 125 Lovat, Lord, see Fraser ‘love banquet’ 108 Low Countries 112 Lowe, Doctor Peter 85 Luyken, Jan 1 Lynch, Michael 82, 118, 126 Lyon, Thomas of Auldbar, Master of Glamis 32, 34, 65, 76, 159–60, 173, 178, 184 Mac an Bhaird, Fearghal Óg 132 MacDonald, Aonghas of Dunivaig 120, 123–4, 126–8, 133 MacDonald clan 122–6 MacDonald of Clanranald 123, 125 MacDonald, Dòmhnall Gorm of Sleat 118–20, 123–30, 133; see also Lordship of the Isles MacDonald, Raghnall of Dunluce 134 MacDonald, Sir Seumas of Dunivaig 134 MacFarlanes of Arrochar 84 McGill of Cranston Riddell, David 167 McGill, Robert 92 McGrath, James 83, 89 MacGregor Clan 131 MacGregor, Martin 129 Machiavelli 147 MacKenzie, Coinneach of Kintail 118, 120, 130, 134 MacKenzie, Janet 126 Mackintosh, Lachlan of Dunnachton 65, 78, 126, 131 Maclean-Bristol, Nicolas 128 MacLean, Eachann Mòr 126 MacLean, Lachlann Mòr of Duart 7, 118, 120, 122–9, 133–4 MacLeod, Màiri 119 MacLeod, Ruairidh Mòr, Tutor of Harris 119, 120, 123, 124–5, 127–8, 130–1, 133 MacLeod, Torcall Dubh of Lewis 124, 127, 133 MacNeill of Barra 131 Main Plot 206 Mainville, François de Roncherolles, Sieur de 43–6, 48, 54–5 Maitland of Thirlestane, John, Chancellor of Scotland 1, 8, 62, 75, 138, 148, 145, 154, 163, 166, 176, 181, 200; conflict with Huntly 63–5, 69, 74; policies as chancellor 63, 108, 145–6, 158–9; perceptions of 63, 65, 77, 159

Index  215 Major Practicks 38 Mar, Countess of see Murray and Stewart Mar, Earls of see Erskine March, Earls of see Stewart Marchmont Herald 72 Marian Civil War 16, 18, 75, 101 Marischal, Earls see Keith marriage 57, 69–70, 79, 89, 91–2, 106, 110, 119, 123–4, 133, 147, 163, 147 Mary Queen of Scots 18, 22–3, 33, 37, 43–4, 75, 139, 163, 202; ‘association’ for shared sovereignty with James 37, 43–4, 47–8 Masson, David 43 masque 69 Maxwell, James 173 Maxwell, John eighth Lord 41, 76, 104 Maxwell-Johnston feud 113 Maxwell, William, sixth Lord Herries 76 Melrose, Battle of 100–1 Melville, Andrew 37, 51 Melville, Andrew of Garvock 167, 173 Melville, James 203 Melville, Sir James of Halhill 14, 32, 36–7, 51, 109, 173, 180, 183; reliability 51 Melville, Sir Robert of Murdocairney 45, 177–8, 182, 192 Menmuir, Lord see Lindsay, John mercenary trade with Ireland 6–7, 19, 117–20, 122–9 merchants 38, 81, 88, 93, 182 Middle March 6, 98, 100–1, 105–6, 110, 164 Middle March, warden of 98, 100–1, 105–6, 111–12, 163; see also Ker of Cessford Middle March, English wardens 102, 106 ‘Middle Shires’ 112 Minto, barony of 113, Laird of see Stewart of Minto Montgomery, Alexander 143 Montgomery, Hugh, fourth Earl of Eglinton 76, 97 Montgomery, Hugh, third Earl of Eglinton 27, 39, 45, 49 Montgomery, Robert, minister of Stirling and Archbishop of Glasgow 37, 39 Montrose, Earls of see Graham Moray, bishopric of 75 Moray, Earls of see Stewart Moray, Countesses of see Keith and Stewart Morton, Earls of see Douglas

Morton, Patrick 173 Mothe Fénélon, Bertrand de Salignac de la 43–5, 54 Moysie, David 15, 34, 148 Mull 124–5 Murdocairny, treasurer despute 75 Mure, Archibald 92 Mure, Thomas 91–2 Mure, William 92 Murray, Lady Annabella, Countess of Mar 41 Murray, George 173 Murray, Sir John of Tullibardine 27, 39, 42, 173 Murray, Sir David of Gospertie (later first Viscount of Stormont) 165, 173, 188 Murray, John 173 Murray, Sir Patrick of Gleanis and Seggie 60, 63–4, 69, 75–6, 78, 86, 173 Murray, Sir Patrick of Tullibardine 173 Murray of Selkirkshire kindred 106 Murray of Teviotdale kindred 106 Murray, William 173 Navarre, King of 33, 39 ‘new men’ 1–3, 5, 7, 9, 86, 158–9, 164, 176, 179–81, 186–8 Newbattle, Lord, see Ker, Mark Newark Castle, captaincy of 100–1 Nicholson, George 123–4, 126–7, 156, 158, 166, 177, 186 noblesse de robe 1, 108 noble power 67, 82, 93–4, 103, 113, 118, 124, 129, 160, 176, 188, 193, 204 noble women 5, 10–11, 58–9, 69–71 North Channel 117, 122, 127 Northumberland, Duke of 33 Nugent, William 19 Ochiltree, Lord see Stewart, Andrew Octavians 7–8, 84, 146; commission 177–8, 183, 186–8; disbanded 186–7; fiscal policy and powers 176, 178, 181–4, 187–8; forerunners and formation 176–9; impact on the chamber 158, 164; membership 164, 170–1, 174–5, 179–81; name 178–9; political life 181–6 O’Donnell, Aodh Ruadh 118–19, 121, 123–6, 127, 135; daughter 119, 123 O’Donnell clan 117 O’Donnell, Fionnuala 135 Ogilvy, Gilbert 173

216 Index Ogilvy, James fifth Lord 75 Ogilvy, Sir Walter of Findlater 75, 79 Oliphant, Laurence, Master of 21, 34 O’Neill, Aodh Mor, Earl of Tyrone 117–19, 121–9, 132, 134 O’Neill clan 117 Order of the Garter 149 Pacification of Perth (1573) 18 Paisley, Abbot of see Erskine Papal nuncio 37 Paris 32, 182, 189–90, 199 parliament 13, 17, 45, 47; riding of 137, 146; parliamentary legislation 45, 81, 87–8, 104; committees 180 patronage 3, 7, 69, 83, 85, 99, 108, 112, 136, 143, 146, 149, 164, 166, 181, 186–7, 188 Patterson, Archibald 92 Patterson, Catherine 81 pensions 19, 41, 43, 48, 84, 99, 110, 118, 121 Pearce, A. S. Wayne 81 Peebles 104; shire 100 Perth 1, 32, 35, 39, 67, 92, 195–6, 198 Perthshire 33, 36 Peterhead 141 Philip II, King of Spain 63, 199 Phoenix 147 Pitcairn, Robert, commendator of Dunfermline 34, 45 Pittenweem, commendator of see Halyburton plots 195–6, 198–200, 206 poets 136, 143, 147 Poitiers 190 ‘political balance’ 33 Polyphemus 63 Poorhouse, Nicholas 42 Porter, Endymion 153 presbyterians 32, 68, 181–3 Presbyterianism 39 Preston, John of Fentonbarns 173 Preston, Richard of Haltree 173 Privy Council 15, 39, 48, 63, 66–7, 108, 113, 119, 138, 159; attendance and composition 17, 20–1, 59–60, 62, 75, 84, 112, 140–1, 177, 180, 189–90, conflict with chamber 146; petitions and cases to 85, 87–8, 92, 94, 105, 126, 140; rulings 40, 42, 98, 104, 131, 143; suppression of bloodfeud 109; president of 138–9

Privy Seal 156, 161; keeper of 84, 180, 187; Lord of 84, 156, 161, 170, 172, 175 Protestant nobles 39, 43, 61, 67, 69–70, 182 Protestant politics 36 Protestantism, influence on the nobility 51, 67 Queen’s Council 177–8, 183, 191 Queen’s party 75, 180 Radclyffe, Robert, fifth Earl of Sussex 202 Raleigh, Sir Walter 193, 205 Ramsay, John, (later Viscount Haddington and Earl of Holdernesse) 1, 173, 196–7, 202 Randolph, Thomas 14–15, 19, 23–5 Ravaillac François 199 receiver-general 181 recusants 37 ‘redshanks’ 130 see mercenary trade with Ireland Regency, office of 12–14, 25–6 Reid-Baxter, Jamie 147, 203 ‘Revolution in Government’ 1, 3 Riccio, David 34 Richmond, Duke of see Stewart, Ludovick Ridolfi Plot 199 Rigges, Captain Gregory 125 Rizzio, David 200 Robert II, King of Scots 199, 205 Robert II, King of Scots 198 Rome 189 Ross, bishops of see Lesley Ross, earldom of 41 Ross, John 92 Rothes, Earls of see Leslie Rough Wooings 101 Roughhead, William 193–4 Rowatt, Robert 89–92 Roxburghshire 100, 113 royal debt 21, 33, 36, 38, 41–2, 44–7, 155, 164, 176–8, 181–2, 184–9, 193, 204; bankruptcy 185–6 see also Octavians royal guard 40, 46–7, 60, 64, 69, 72, 80, 144, 155, 157–8, 161, 165, 170–3 royal household 4, 7, 14, 24, 37, 41–2, 46, 48; expenditure 145, 158, 164, 185; Gordon dominance of 60; offices and staff 157, see also Chamber royal minorities 4 royal progresses 21, 32, 35, 47, 126 Rutherford of Hunthill kindred 103

Index  217 Ruthven, Alexander, Master of 1, 8, 161, 195–204 Ruthven, Alexander of Pitcairnie 141 Ruthven Castle (now Huntingtower) 32–6, 40 Ruthven, John, third Earl of Gowrie 1, 8, 135, 195–204 Ruthven, Patrick, third Lord Ruthven 200 Ruthven Raid 4–5, 9, 26, 32, 35, 58–9, 84, 137, 160; aftermath 50, 60; perceptions of 33, 51 Ruthven Raiders 34–5, 39–41, 43, 49, 51–2 Ruthven, Sophia, Duchess of Lennox 7, 141, 147–8 Ruthven, William, fourth Lord and first Earl of Gowrie 4, 7, 21, 33, 39, 48, 50–1, 147, 196, 200, 204; role in the Ruthven Raid 35–6; royal treasurer 21, 33–35, 39, 41–7 St Andrews 35, 49, 50; Archbishopric of 85 see Adamson; castle 32, 35, 49; university 190 St Bartholomew, Massacre of 199 St Boswells 100 Sandilands, James of Slamannan 161–2, 165, 174 Sauchieburn, Battle of 198–9 Schaw, James 174 Scone Palace 196, 198 Scott, Sir James of Balwearie 105 Scott-Ker bloodfeud 6, 98–101, 103–7, 110–11 Scott kindred 99–101, 103–5, 112, cadet branches 100, 104 Scott, Marion 90 Scott, Robert of Allanhaugh 104–5 Scott, Robert of Haining 113–14 Scott, Robert of Thirlestane 105 Scott, Sir Walter of Buccleuch (d. 1574) 101 Scott, Sir Walter of Buccleuch (later Lord Scott of Buccleuch) 6, 98–9, 102–7, 110–14, 182 ‘Scottish absolutism’ 2, 159 Selkirk 113; shire 100 Sempill, Sir James of Beltrees 174 Sempill, Robert, fourth Lord 76 Seton 72 Seton kindred 76 Seton, Alexander, Lord Fyvie (later first Earl of Dunfermline) 8, 76, 164, 174; Octavian 177–89

Seton, David of Parbroath 177 Seton, George, fifth Lord 45, 180, 189 Seton, Sir John 76 Seton, Sir John of Barns 23, 60, 65 Seton, Robert, sixth Lord 76, 182, 189 Shearman, Francis 68 sheriff ayres 85 Skene, John 174 silver 123 silver-mails 42 Sinclair, George, fifth Earl of Caithness 61, 76 Somerset, Earl of see Carr Spain, Scottish ambassadors and diplomacy to 62–4, 120 Spanish ambassadors to Scotland 37 Spanish barque 140 Spanish Blanks, plot 67–8, 78 Spanish Armada 61, 64, 183 Spottiswood, James 174 Spottiswood, John, Archbishop of Glasgow 6, 82, 88–9, 92–3 Spottiswood, John of that Ilk 113 Sprouston 113 Spynie, Lord see Lindsay state formation 2, 108 Statutes of Iona 11 Stewart, Alexander of Scotstonhill 40 Stewart, Andrew 66 Stewart, Andrew, Lord Ochiltree 163, 174, 183 Stewart, Lardy Arbella 147, 183 Stewart, David, parson of Erskine 86 Stewart, Elizabeth, Countess of Arran 37, 53 Stewart, Elizabeth, Countess of Moray 24 Stewart, Esmé, Sieur d’ Aubigny, first Duke of Lennox 4–5, 16–17, 19–20, 22–3, 32–3, 42, 48, 57–8, 69, 136–7, 151; chamberlain 21, 74, 144, 157, 174; death 49; downfall 35–6, 39, 60; exile 40, 43; governance 18, 37–9, 59–60, 101, 157; religion 37 Stewart, Francis, fifth Earl of Bothwell 5, 34, 45, 47, 50, 62, 65, 76, 146, 148, 154, 163–5, 180–1, 195, 199; forfeiture 113, 141; James’ pursuit of 66, 69, 73, 106, 118–19; James’ dislike of 125, 148; vice governorship of Scotland 138–40 Stewart-Gordon feud 60, 64–8, 70–3 Stewart, Hector 91 Stewart, Henrietta, Countess of Huntly 5, 57–9, 65–6, 69–73, 80, 85, 139, 142 Stewart, Hercules 180

218 Index Stewart, Henry, Lord Darnley 4, 20, 22, 24, 37, 54, 163 Stewart, James of Flock, baillie and later provost of Glasgow 90–3 Stewart, James, first Earl of Moray, Regent of Scotland 4, 14, 16, 18 Stewart, James, second Earl of Moray 5, 24, 61, 64, 66–7, 71, 75, 200 Stewart, Captain James of Ochiltree, Earl of Arran, Chancellor of Scotland 4–5, 22–4, 32, 36–8, 40, 44–5, 48–9, 50–1, 53, 57–8, 75, 160 Stewart, James, commendator of St Colme 20, 24, 46 Stewart, Sir James, commendator of St Colme 174 Stewart, John, Duke of Albany 26 Stewart, John, fifth Earl of Atholl 36, 45, 61, 65–7, 78, 119, 122, 132, 148 Stewart, John, fourth Earl of Atholl 4, 15, 17 Stewart, John, sixth Lord Innermeath 67 Stewart, Sir John of Minto 84, 189 Stewart, John of Rosland 174 Stewart kingship 9, 33, 51, 82, 108, 195 Stewart, Laura 81 Stewart, Ludovick, second Duke of Lennox 5–7, 9, 129, 160, 177, 196, 200, 203; character 149–51; as a courtier 143–6, 161, 174; government office 138–43, 176, 182, 186; in politics 146–9, 154, 159; relationship with Glasgow 84–7, 89–91, 93–4; relationship with Huntly 57–8, 62, 65–6, 69, 70–2, 75; religion 139–40 Stewart, Marian 92 Stewart, Margaret of Cardonald 84 Stewart, Marie, Countess of Mar 69–70, 139 Stewart, Matthew, fourth Earl of Lennox, Regent of Scotland 4, 16, 18, 151 Stewart, Sir Matthew of Minto, Provost of Glasgow 5–6, 81–4, 87–94, 189 Stewart of Minto kindred 83–4 Stewart, Patrick, second Earl of Orkney 180 Stewart, Robert, magistrate of Glasgow 89–90 Stewart, Robert, Master of the King’s Household 174 Stewart, Robert, Master of Orkney 110, 180 Stewart, Robert, first Earl of March 49 Stewart, Sir Walter 81, 88 Stewart, Walter of Blantyre 45, 49, 84–6, 89–93, 160–1, 175; education 179–80; Octavian 176–89, 193

Stewart, William 148 Stewart, Captain William of Blackness 40 Stewart, William of Caverston 40 Stewart, Colonel William of Houston (also Garntullie and Banchrie) 40–1, 45, 47–8, 51, 126, 128–9, 175 Stewart, William of Monkton 35 Stewart, Sir William of Traquair 183 Stirling 109; Castle 14–16, 18, 20, 32, 34–5, 39–40, 50, 84, 121, 160, 168, 171; Raid 1584 36, 50, 160; shire 109 Stirling, William 92 Strathbogie 206 Strathearn 34 Sussex, Earl of see Radclyffe Sutherland, Earls of see Gordon tax 45–6, 82, 90, 181, 186 Tempill, James 91 tennis 46 Teviotdale 106, 113, coronership of 35 thirds of benefices 42 Thornton, Captain George 125 Throgmorton Plot 199 trade 82 treason 18, 20, 22, 196, 198 treasurer 21, 35, 46, 84, 156, 160, 164, 170, 172, 175, 178, 184; see also Ruthven, Lyon and Octavians; depute 178, 192 treasurer’s accounts 42, 46, 156 Troup, William 69, 79 Trumble, Matthew, Dean of Guild of the Merchants of Glasgow 87, 92 Tudor conquest of Ireland 117, 128 Tudor, Margaret, Queen of Scots 26 Tudors, English rebellions against 199, 205 Tullibardine see Murray Tyrconnell 119 Tyrone, Earls of see O’Neill Ulster 117, 119, 122, 125–6 Ulysses 63 urban studies 82, 85 Union of the Crowns 2–3, 6–7, 82, 85–6, 88, 91, 94, 136, 144, 149–50, 155, 169 Vaus, Sir Patrick of Barnebarroch 175 Villiers, George, Duke of Buckingham 58, 136, 144, 149–50, 153, 203 Wallace, Adam 90 Walsingham, Francis 38, 44–5, 47, 49, 162 Warden of the West March 41

Index  219 Wardlaw, Henry 181 wardrobe 38, 60, 157, master of 76, 162, 172; see also Home of Spott and Keith of Delny Weldon, Anthony 198, 205 Wemyss Castle 147 Wemyss, James of Bogie 141 Wemyss, Laird of 39, 147 West March 113 Western Isles see Highlands whinger 68, 78 William I, Prince of Orange 199 wine 38, 108, 144 witchcraft 66

Wittenberg 190 Woddrington, Henry 38–9 Woodside, near Glasgow 86 Wormald, Jenny 2–3, 8, 16, 89, 102–3, 108 Yellow Ford, Battle of 127 Young of Eastfield, Alexander 175 Young, John 175, 190 Young, George 167, 183 Young, Peter of Seton, tutor, preceptor and almoner to the king 17, 164–5, 167, 175, 178–80, 183, 190, 193 Zulager, Reid 3