Ivan the Terrible in Russian Historical Memory since 1991 9781644695883

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IVAN THE TERRIBLE IN RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MEMORY SINCE 1991

Studies in Russian and Slavic Literatures, Cultures, and History Series Editor: Lazar Fleishman (Stanford University)

IVAN THE TERRIBLE IN RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MEMORY SINCE 1991 Charles J. Halperin

BOSTON 2021

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Halperin, Charles J., author. Title: Ivan the Terrible in Russian historical memory since 1991 / Charles J. Halperin. Description: Boston : Academic Studies Press, 2021. | Series: Studies in Russian and Slavic literatures, cultures, and history | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021001475 (print) | LCCN 2021001476 (ebook) | ISBN 9781644695876 (hardback) | ISBN 9781644695883 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781644695890 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Ivan IV, Czar of Russia, 1530-1584--In literature. | Ivan IV, Czar of Russia, 1530-1584--In motion pictures. | Russia--History--Ivan IV, 1533-1584--Historiography. | Muscovy (Grand Duchy)--History--16th century--Historiography. | Russia. Oprichnina--Historiography. | Stalin, Joseph, 1878-1953. | Collective memory--Russia (Federation) Classification: LCC DK106 .H35 2021 (print) | LCC DK106 (ebook) | DDC 947/.043092--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021001475 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021001476 Copyright © Academic Studies Press, 2021 ISBN 9781644696132 (hardback) ISBN 9781644696149 (adobe pdf) ISBN 9781644696156 (epub) Book design by Lapiz Digital Services Cover design by Ivan Grave Published by Academic Studies Press 1577 Beacon Street Brookline, MA 02446, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com

Contents

Acknowledgmentsvii Introductionix Part One: Publications 1. Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography of Ivan the Terrible in Russia 2. Who Was Not Ivan the Terrible, Who Ivan the Terrible Was Not 3. Would You Believe Saint Ivan? Reforming the Image of Tsar Ivan the Terrible 4. Dueling Ivans, Dueling Stalins 5. A Proposal to Revive the Oprichnina 6. Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991 7. Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible 8. Ivan the Terrible from the Point of View of Tatar History 9. A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies 10. Generalissimo Ivan the Terrible

1 3 31 49 71 87 103 121 137 163 179

Part Two: Films 195 11. Eisenstein’s Ivan, Neuberger’s Ivan, Ivan’s Ivan 197 12. The Atheist Director and the Orthodox Tsar: Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible219 13: Ivan the Terrible Returns to the Silver Screen: Pavel Lungin’s Film Tsar′233 Conclusion245 Appendices251 Bibliography267 Index285

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the staff of the Interlibrary Loan departments at the Herman B. Wells Library, Indiana University, and the Slavic Reference Service, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library for their assistance; all the editors of and referees for the venues in which chapters 1, 2, 3, 12, and 13 appeared in print; and Sergei Bogatyrev for reading earlier drafts of chapters 1 and 3. Chapter 1 appeared in print as “Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography about Ivan IV in Russia,” Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography 10 (2017): 3–27, and is republished by permission of Brill Publishers. Chapter 2 is excerpted from “False Identity and Multiple Identities in Russian History: The Mongol Empire and Ivan the Terrible”: 1. “Anatolii Fomenko, the ‘New Chronology,’ and Russian History”; 2. “Who Was Not Ivan the Terrible, Who Ivan the Terrible Was Not”; both in The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 2103 (2011): 1, 7–10, 16–18, 54–64. The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies has ceased publication. A version of chapter 3 was delivered as a paper at the Third Biennial Conference sponsored by the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture, Columbus, OH, October 3, 2009. This chapter appeared in print as “Would You Believe Saint Ivan the Terrible? Reforming the Image of Tsar Ivan IV,” Symposion 16–17 (2011–2012): 1–22. The journal Symposion has ceased publication. I gratefully thank the editors of Ab Imperio for feedback in revising chapter 5 and bringing Il′ia Gerasimov, ed., authors Il′ia Gerasimov, Marina Mogil′ner, and Sergei Glebov, with the participation of Aleksandr Semenov, Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii, part 1, Konkuriruiushchie

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proekty samoorganizatsii VII–XVII vv. (Kazan′: Ab Imperio, 2017)1 to my attention, which led to the writing of chapter 7. I am very grateful to Mikhail Markovich Krom for providing me with a copy of Aleksandr Gennad′evich Ushakov, Ivan Groznyi. Blagochestie na krovi (Moscow: Martin, 2017), without which I could not have written chapter 4. Boris Nikolaevich Morozov graciously provided me with an electronic copy of Epokha Ivana Groznogo i ee otrazhenie v istoriografii, pis′mennosti, iskusstve, arkhitekture: sbornik materialov vserossisskoi s mezhdunarodnym uchastiem nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, 16–17 oktiabria 2017 goda, g. Aleksandrov, vols. 1–2, ed. B. N. Morozov et al. (Vladimir: Tranzit-IKS, 2018), vol. 2, without which I could not have completed chapter 9. Chapter 12 originated as a paper presented to the Seventh Biennial Conference of the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture at Miami University, Oxford, OH, on March 10, 2017. It appeared in print as “The Atheist Director and the Orthodox Tsar: Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan The Terrible,” Revue des études slaves 88, no. 3 (2017): 515– 26, and is republished with the permission of Revue des études slaves. Concerning chapter 13, I wish to thank Ann Kleimola for inviting me to present a talk on Lungin’s Tsar′ to the Seminar on Early Russian History at the University of Illinois at Urbana Summer Research Laboratory on June 21, 2011, and Kevin Platt for reading an earlier draft of this chapter. I participated in the roundtable, “Pavel Lungin’s Film Tsar′ and Our Notions of the Reign of Ivan IV,” at the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies Convention, at New Orleans, November 16, 2012. This chapter appeared in print as “Ivan the Terrible Returns to the Silver Screen: Pavel Lungin’s Film Tsar′,” Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 7, no. 1 (2013): 61–72, and is republished with the permission of the Taylor and Francis Group. Previously published chapters have been revised for inclusion in this venue. I also wish to thank Ekaterina Yanduganova, acquisitions editor for Slavic, East European, and Central Asian Studies at Academic Studies Press, Professor Lazar Fleishman, series editor for Studies in Russian and Slavic Literatures, Cultures, and History, and the three anonymous readers for Academic Studies Press. 1 For convenience I will refer to the authors of this books as “Gerasimov et al.”

Introduction

Ivan the Terrible (Ivan Groznyi, Ivan IV, Ivan Vasil′evich, born 1530, reigned 1533–84) is in many ways Russia’s albatross. Ivan’s reign was so significant that Russians cannot avoid his role in Russian history. In domestic affairs Ivan was the first ruler of Russia crowned as tsar. His reign witnessed significant reform in central and local government. Changes in Russian Orthodox Church practices resulted in the schism of the seventeenth century. Literature, painting, and architecture flourished. In foreign affairs Muscovy conquered the Tatar khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′, signaling Muscovy’s transition from a kingdom to an empire, and lost the Livonian War (1558–83) against Livonia, Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, and Denmark in an attempt to gain territorial access to the Baltic Sea. Although unsuccessful, this war solidified Muscovy’s entrance into the European state system. Yet Ivan’s reign of terror, the oprichnina,1 and the atrocities attributed to him, including responsibility for the death of his son Tsarevich Ivan, together with an economic depression, famine, and epidemic, cast a pall over his reign.2 The paucity of evidence about Ivan IV’s reign—certainly compared to that about Russia’s history in the following century—permits multiple interpretations, as what evidence we do have does not and cannot definitively resolve major questions about Ivan’s personality and rule. Historians disagree on the reliability, even authenticity, of many of the key sources about his reign. As a result Russians cannot agree about Ivan. Indeed, they have never agreed about him. He is the subject of a vast, highly polemical, and partisan historiography, which originated while he was alive 1 The oprichnina was the separate appanage Ivan established in 1565 and abolished in 1572, which became his instrument for imposing a reign of terror on Russia. 2 Charles J. Halperin, Ivan the Terrible: Free to Reward and Free to Punish (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019).

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with non-Muscovite and anti-Muscovite German and Polish propaganda during the Livonian War, and which continued through Russia’s imperial and Soviet periods. On the one hand, some historians have denounced the tsar’s wanton executions and torture of innocent Russians falsely accused of treason as barbaric and politically senseless. The most florid prose expressing this position can be found in the history of Russia by the early nineteenth-century writer Nikolai Karamzin.3 In late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia, psychologists and psychiatrists went beyond arguing that Ivan was evil to propose that he was seriously mentally ill, a conclusion advocated by Pavel Kovalevskii.4 On the other hand, some historians have defended Ivan’s admitted “excesses” as necessary to strengthen the Russian state against real domestic traitors and foreign foes. The politicization of Ivan’s image reached its apex under Joseph Stalin with the perpetration of what has been called a “cult” of Ivan. Stalin’s death in 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech in 1956 unleashed a wave of publications about the tsar in the Soviet Union. Both imperial Russian5 and Soviet historiography6 on Ivan have been well-studied. The flood of publications about Ivan in Russia unleashed by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, has not been examined in full.7 This book provides as comprehensive an analysis of everything published in Russia about Ivan since 1991 as possible. It would appear that Russians, or at least the Russian book-buying and journal-reading public, remain fascinated by Ivan. The creation of private enterprise publishing since 1991 which uses sensationalism to sell books and the abolition of censorship permitted the appearance in print of interpretations of every possible hue. However, the profusion of publications 3 Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskago, vols. 8–9, ed. P. N. Polevoi (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Evgeniia Evdokimova, 1892). 4 Pavel Kovalevskii, “Ivan Groznyi. Psikhiatricheskii eskiz,” in Ivan Groznyi, ed. Ivan Pankeev (Moscow: OLMS-PRESS, 1999), 337–48. 5 For example, G. H. Bolsover, “Ivan the Terrible in Russian Historiography,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 7 (1957): 71–89. 6 Maureen Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Robert O. Crummey, “Ivan the Terrible,” in Windows on the Russian Past: Soviet Historiography since Stalin, ed. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy S. Kollmann (Columbus OH: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1977), 57–74. 7 The brief remarks in Sergei Bogatyrev, “Ivan Vasil′evich Receives a Profession: Studies of Ivan the Terrible in Post-Soviet Russia,” Russian Studies in History 53 (2014): 3–12 are very useful.

Introduction

cannot be attributed solely to the tsar’s prominence in Russian historical memory. The quantitative and qualitative limitations of the sources about Ivan’s reign not only underlie the lack of consensus among Russian historians about him, but also permit the projection of contemporary Russian cultural anxieties onto him. The level of those anxieties rose precipitously after 1991 because of the trauma of economic disaster, imperial collapse, and political chaos, developments that encouraged conspiracy theories, scapegoating, xenophobia, and bigotry. I will indicate in passing some of the connections between Russian culture and images of Ivan, but proper consideration of that particular historiography must be left to cultural historians. Marielle Wijermars has made a significant contribution to work on Ivan from that perspective.8 She concludes that the very deep disagreements among historians about the tsar have made “the memory of Ivan . . . so volatile that only those on the margins of the political debate dare employ it.” In every case he became a weapon to criticize the existing regime, from the left as well as the right. Thus he served divergent political agendas from democratization to restoration of the monarchy to recreating the Soviet Union. Ivan’s place in Russian historical memory remains unstable.9 I had not appreciated the extent to which the tsar, despite his ambiguous legacy, became, ironically, an antiestablishment figure. The subversive potential of Ivan’s image requires further study. Wijermars also raises, without attempting to answer, the question of the impact of different interpretations of Ivan on the Russian public. I will return to this question in the conclusion. Scholarly publications about Ivan, whose audience is professional historians, inspire and influence all other genres of books about the tsar, including textbooks for secondary and university students, surveys of Russian history for the general, educated public, and primarily political books. By and large, these publications do not make original contributions to historical knowledge of Ivan’s personality or reign. Yet they are also part of the Russian historical memory of him. Works with an axe to grind often manipulate the historical evidence to advance a predetermined agenda. Simply dismissing seemingly fantastic theories about Ivan does not suffice. 8 See Marielle Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia: Television, Cinema and the State (London: Routledge, 2018), especially chapter 6, “Ivan the Terrible and the Oprichnina: Subversive Histories” (164–206). The historical validity of the images of Ivan she studies falls outside the scope of her monograph. 9 Ibid., 165 (framework of choice), 205, 224 (“volatile”).

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Their distortions should be refuted by specialists. For this reason, all published works on Ivan, both professional and popular, should be considered together, which would not be appropriate in a study of international scholarship on him.10 Not only “serious” works but all works about Ivan should be taken into account, because even theories that professional historians in Russia, let alone outside Russia, consider ludicrous still constitute part of the cultural environment that influences, even if subconsciously or negatively, scholarly research on the tsar in Russia. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, there is no consistent distinction between the views of academics and amateurs. Some amateurs have historical training and channel the conclusions of professional historians. Some professional historians espouse views that seem “amateurish” in their partisan use of history for polemical purposes. Ivan’s persona is so powerful that it sometimes distorts the scholarship it inspires, and those distortions become maximized in popular works, not just by amateurs. All the more reason, therefore, to examine scholarly and popular works together. My goal in this book was to cover the broadest possible spectrum of nonfiction publications in Russia on Ivan, in scholarly and non-scholarly monographs, textbooks, trade book surveys, and works of political advocacy. I did not develop any great principles of inclusion or exclusion. Unavoidably, what books I read depended upon what books I could access. Fortunately, the generous assistance of colleagues in Russia aided me immeasurably. My choice of reading material, while contingent, was not totally haphazard. I deliberately sought out publications which expressed different interpretations, and omitted even academic works, regardless of their contribution to the substantive history of sixteenth-century Russia, which contributed nothing original to an analysis of images of the tsar. Ivan the Terrible in Russian Historical Memory since 1991 may be best appreciated as a musical piece structured around a theme and variations. The resulting mosaic, to mix metaphors, does not convey a coherent or consistent image because the various publications discussed disagree so much. All published material, however, derives from the same problematic

10 For a selective overview of the entire historical field of study of Ivan the Terrible, see Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV the Terrible, Tsar of Russia,” in Oxford Bibliographies in Renaissance and Reformation, ed. Margaret King (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195399301/ obo-9780195399301-0099.xml.

Introduction

source base and acknowledges the contested nature of Russia’s historical memory of Ivan. Part 1, about published books and articles, contains ten chapters. Chapters 1 and 6 through 10 deal with works by scholars, chapters 2 through 5 with works by amateurs, but the sequence of chapters is somewhat arbitrary. Chapter 1 sets the stage by conceptualizing the variety of judgments of Ivan currently in circulation primarily in scholarly historical works in Russia. The spectrum of opinions of him is organized into five rubrics: apologetic, positive, conflicted, critical, and hostile. Some of the works discussed recur in later chapters. Sadly, it was impossible to explore every theme about the tsar’s reign that would interest specialists in sixteenth-century Muscovite history, let alone even mention every work published in Russia since 1991. Each of the succeeding chapters in part 1 examines books from a specific political, intellectual or ideological perspective, or from a unique genre, or on a different historical theme. Chapter 2 discusses an amateur alternative history school, the New Chronology, that exploits the contradictions in the sources about the tsar’s personality and policies which inspired the polarized views of professional historians discussed in chapter 1 to argue that in the seventeenth century the Romanovs masterminded a total revision of sixteenth-century Russian history by subsuming the reigns of four rulers under the umbrella of a single “the tsar Ivan IV.” Chapter 3 examines the publications that lobbied for and against the canonization of Ivan by the Russian Orthodox Church, adduced in less detail under the apologetic rubric in chapter 1. The campaign to have the tsar canonized failed but the apologies for his actions and whitewashing of his character it generated continue to flourish. Chapter 4 highlights two contrasting interpretations of Ivan, one positive, the other negative, but both equally unreliable in their manipulation of history to make their points. This chapter serves to critique the simplistic assumption that only his defenders take liberties with the historical record. Oftentimes his critics are just as sloppy historically. Comparisons of Ivan to Stalin cut both ways: some authors praise the tsar for being like Stalin while others damn him for the same reason. By doing so, both camps politicize Ivan because they assume that historical judgments about him should be patriotic.

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Chapter 5 discusses publications that share the pro-Stalin interpretation of Ivan discussed in chapter 4 but that advance a secular neo-Stalinist apologetics different from the religious apologetics of chapter 3. Its authors uniquely advocate the recreation of the tsar’s oprichnina as the solution to Russia’s current problems. To do so they denude the oprichnina of all historical context. The next three chapters deal with textbooks and surveys. Chapter 6 examines high school and university textbooks and surveys of Russian history intended for a general audience. It is no surprise that textbooks and trade books ignore the imaginative conclusions of the New Chronology and the one-sided partisanship of the canonize-Ivan movement. But it is a surprise that the range of interpretations of him found is them is significantly narrower than that adumbrated in chapter 1. Textbooks and surveys eschew any idealization of Ivan. Instead, their points of view run from criticism that is balanced, to severe, to over-the-top. Russian history writing has not escaped the imperial turn in recent historiography. Chapter 7 sheds light on this development, by comparing two representative books: the first book is an innovative Russian interpretation of Ivan from an imperial perspective;11 the second is a recent American version of the same.12 The two books define “empire” differently. In both, however, the weight of traditional images of the tsar is so great that it overwhelms the imperial perspective on his reign, which precludes explaining this phenomenon in the Russian study by the particular physiognomy of Russian historiography since 1991 alone because it also occurs in American historiography. Unlike the other chapters in part one, chapter 8 does not examine Ivan’s reign from the point of view of Russian history. It analyzes textbooks and surveys that deal with his reign from the point of view of Tatar history, an important approach because of Ivan’s conquest of the Tatar khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′, which are still part of the Russian Federation. These authors, all writing in Russian but not all ethnic Tatars, judge the tsar critically because he was a Russian imperialist. These authors largely eschew the kinds of criticisms of Ivan’s personality typical of authors of the critical and hostile rubrics in chapter 1. 11 Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia. 12 Nancy Shields Kollmann, The Russian Empire 1450–1801 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

Introduction

The final two chapters in part 1 address specialist research addressed to professional audiences as published in two anthologies. Chapter 9 examines how some historians finesse the highly polemical competing images of Ivan delineated in chapter 1 by sticking to narrowly specialist topics and not drawing wider conclusions, much as some historians of integrity did during the Soviet period to avoid Marxist theory and its political ramifications. This chapter addresses Epokha Ivana Groznogo, the two-volume publication of the papers presented at a scholarly conference held at the first “capital” of the oprichnina, Aleksandrov, the location of the only museum in Russia devoted to Ivan. The contributions cover a large range of issues and have great scholarly value. However, the price for maintaining academic objectivity seems to have been downplaying his personal role in his reign altogether. His presence is notably absent from the anthology. Chapter 10 addresses the issue of the Russian army during Ivan’s reign, a topic that, considering how much of that reign was devoted to warfare, is often overlooked. A two-volume anthology contains critiques of many presentations and replies by the original authors, which gives readers an opportunity to observe how Russian historians at their best engage in a scholarly debate.13 While these volumes are very valuable, the high level of expertise on display elides argument about many of the broader problems of the military history under the tsar. Part two contains three chapters on film. The first two deal with Sergei Eisenstein’s classic Ivan the Terrible. Part 1 was released in 1944, part 2 was not shown publicly until 1958, and only the script and scattered still shots survive from part 3. No historical film ever made in Russia even approaches Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible in influence. Because it is a work of genius it is the only cultural product of Stalin’s “cult” of Ivan to outlive that cult. It continues to inform and mislead the Russian public about the tsar to this day. It can safely be assumed that every author discussed in this book has seen the film. Therefore, a study of Russian historical memory of Ivan since 1991 cannot ignore this movie. Specialists on Eisenstein and Ivan the Terrible disagree about whether the film presents a positive or a negative image of the tsar. Some studies finesse that polarity by arguing that part 1 is positive and part 2 negative. In the texts known to me Eisenstein is either praised for criticizing him or criticized for praising him, as if the question of the 13 Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo: Materialy nauchnoi diskussii k 455-letiiu nachala Livonskoi voiny (St. Petersburg: Shiko-Sevastopol′, 2015), http://www.milhist. info/spec_1.

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tsar’s historical role had been definitively and unequivocally answered in the negative. Film specialists often prefer to avoid historical evaluations of Ivan. Regardless, Eisenstein’s film remains highly relevant to Russian historical memory of Ivan. A monograph by an American historian about a Soviet film would seem to be an even less appropriate topic for a chapter in this book. Chapter 11 discusses the recent analysis—an instant classic—of the film by Joan Neuberger. Just as Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible casts a giant shadow over historical memory of the tsar in Russia, Neuberger’s book has become and will continue to be the starting point of studies of Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible for the foreseeable future. This book could not legitimately disregard it. Neuberger concludes that the “surface narrative” of both parts of the film praise Ivan, but that Eisenstein also subverts any praise and criticizes the tsar throughout. Chapter 12 examines a topic about Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible that Neuberger did not address—Eisenstein’s treatment of religion and the Russian Orthodox Church in the film. I propose that Eisenstein portrays Ivan, his supporters, and his opponents as religious, but all clerics and men affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church as enemies of Russia. If correct, my conclusion would explain the hostile view of the film held by the advocates of the tsar’s canonization discussed in chapter 3, who seem to share Stalin’s view, that in part 2 of the film Eisenstein maliciously maligns the protagonist. Chapter 13 discusses Pavel Lungin’s Tsar′, a film highly critical of the tsar. Lungin’s film is a refutation of the supposedly positive image of Ivan in Eisenstein’s film. In crafting his image of Ivan, Lungin relied exclusively upon critical conceptions of the tsar’s personality and reign discussed in chapter 1, and thus also earned the vehement enmity of the apologists discussed in chapter 3. The conclusion addresses, if briefly, why historical studies of the tsar have become such a popular vehicle for expressing cultural concerns, and calls attention to the influence, once again, of the historical sources for Ivan’s reign. It closes by suggesting areas for future research in Russian historical memory of him by enumerating additional types of relevant evidence beyond nonfiction print works. Such evidence must be taken into consideration in order to arrive at a comprehensive multidisciplinary and multimedia appreciation of Ivan the Terrible’s place in Russian culture today.

Part One

Publications

Chapter 1

Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography of Ivan the Terrible in Russia

Since 1991, an enormous quantity of scholarly publications about Ivan the Terrible has appeared in Russia. Nevertheless, because of the problematic source base for sixteenth-century Muscovite history, this research has not generated a consensus. Indeed, quite the opposite. Newer publications exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the polarization of conceptions of Ivan in Russia, in a manner which far exceeds the divisions over the man during the imperial era, let alone the Soviet period. Still, it is precisely academic publications on Ivan by professional historians that constitute the foundation for all nonacademic authors writing about the tsar. Because the professionals disagree, the amateurs are free to pick and choose which evidence they wish to use or ignore. The results are just as much a part of current Russian historical memory of Ivan as the scholarly studies they expropriate. Consequently, this chapter will encompass both academic and amateur publications. It does not distinguish between these two kinds of writing. In any event the line between professional and amateur publications cannot easily be drawn, and not enough information is available on many authors to reach any conclusion about their training or occupation. In certain instances the distinction between professional and amateur is not helpful for historiographic analysis. For example, Igor′ Froianov is a professional historian, the author of valuable monographs on Kievan (Kyivan) Rus′, but

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reeks of antisemitism and is indistinguishable from the rantings of amateur historian antisemites who have nothing but disdain for the “rational,” “Eurocentric” culture of professional scholarship compared to the eternal spiritual truths of Russian Orthodox Christianity. Andrei Nikitin earns his living as a freelance writer, but he has graduate training in both history and archeology. No one has ever known how to categorize Aleksandr Ianov (Alexander Yanov): some see him as an uninformed political polemicist, others as an objective historian. The television director Edvard Radzinskii’s assessment of the tsar’s behavior and personality is not far removed from the views of professional historians highly critical of him. In short, positive and negative views of the tsar breach the hypothetical professional-amateur divide.1 Russian specialists are far more conscious of amateur historical publications about Ivan than their Western counterparts. Sometimes professional historians respond to amateur studies, sometimes they do not, but they are intimately acquainted with, and cannot avoid being influenced, however unconsciously, by such works. Consequently, amalgamating the views of all authors about Ivan regardless of professional status seems appropriate. I do not try to evaluate the contribution of any publication to scholarly understanding of Ivan or his reign. I do not necessarily even address any author’s main conclusions about sixteenth-century Russian history. Therefore, no comments about any author here should be construed as judging the value of his or her contribution to sixteenth-century Muscovite studies. There is no such thing as a representative sample of historians who have written about Ivan in Russia since 1991. I focus primarily on books, but I have included articles either to articulate a missing point of view or to contextualize a perspective.2 The number of authors and works I assign to each rubric should not be construed as a reflection of its “popularity,” which I have no way to measure. Ivan’s reign is so contentious that no two authors agree with each other on every issue. Doing justice to the complexities of each author’s 1 For brief overviews of Ivan’s image in Russia since 1991 see Natal′ia Nikolaevna Mut′ia, Ivan Groznyi. Istorizm i lichnost′ pravitelia v otechestvennom iskusstve XIX–XX vv. (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2010), 420–49 and Kevin M. F. Platt, Terror and Greatness. Ivan and Peter as Russian Myths (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 253–68. 2 I relied on two online articles to provide a précis of a book that remained inaccessible to me (Vladimir Kukovenko).

Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography of Ivan the Terrible in Russia  •  CHAPTER 1

view would entail considering each separately, which would obscure the forest for the trees. I have therefore created virtual or composite interpretative schools to which I have assigned individual works based upon the most significant elements of their judgment of the tsar. Categorizing an author’s views may be complicated by contradictory statements or the qualifications attached to conclusions. For example, he was a bloody tyrant but he wrote well and sang in the church choir; or, he was a brilliant statesman but at times he tortured and executed innocent men, women, and children. Therefore assigning labels to authors entails unavoidable simplification. I have not attempted to compare the pre-1991 publications of authors to their post-1991 publications. I cannot present all variant opinions within each rubric, but I have selectively identified some and supplied the name of at least one author supporting the alternatives I mention. Where necessary I do refer to individual arguments made by a single author, however briefly. This almost “archetypal” approach to the post-1991 historiography of Ivan runs the risk of “guilt by association” by homogenizing all the authors presented under the same rubric when in fact they often differ significantly in erudition, competence, intelligence, objectivity, and training. I hope that the heuristic utility of the spectrum outweighs its flaws. Finally, my rubrics are somewhat undermined by coincidences in specific judgments among authors of more than one classification, even diametrically opposed classifications. There is no perfect way to encompass the enormous amount of work on Ivan that has appeared in Russia since 1991. A chronological exposition would be quite ghastly and anyone who had not read every publication discussed would very rapidly get totally lost. Because my focus is on composite schools of thought about the tsar, I have eschewed direct quotations and specific page references. Ivan’s image was highly politicized during his lifetime and has remained so to this day. The historical works analyzed here often implicitly or even explicitly present their evaluations of Ivan within the context of contemporary politics. However, this chapter will not deal with the political import of these publications. Every author treated in this chapter claims that his or her presentation strictly adheres to objective historical truth, and I will analyze them as historical scholarship, not political advocacy. I leave the resonance of these publications to specialists in contemporary Russian culture and politics.

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Several criteria guided my selection process. I did not include writing by art historians; reprints of pre-1991 historical works, Soviet or imperial;3 publications of previously unpublished sources and new editions of already known sources; monographs written by non-Russians originally published in Russian or translated from English into Russian;4 or works by Russian émigrés currently not living in Russia.5 I have included works by literary historians (literaturovedy); anthologies about Ivan for the general public; a museum exhibit catalogue; an encyclopedia devoted entirely to the tsar;6 and works originally published in English by Russian émigrés, but then published in Russian after they returned to Russia.7 I treat writing from a range of genres, from specialized scholarly monographs to popular-scholarly surveys and mass-market works, including pamphlets. Of course I have had to make various exceptions to these rules.8

3 Such as Sigurd Ottonovich Shmidt, Rossiia Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Nauka, 1999) and Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, Oprichnina (Moscow: Territoriia, 2001). 4 Of original works, Hieronym Grała: Ieronim Gralia, Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovatyi. Kar′era gosudarstvennogo deiatelia v Rossii XVI v. (Moscow: Radiks, 1994); Nicoletta Marcialis: Nikoletta Marchalis, Liutor “izhe liut”. Prenie o vere tsaria Ivana Groznogo s pastorom Rokytoi (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskoi literatury, 2009); and Gyula Szvák: Diula Svak, Russkaia paradigma. Russofobskie zametki rusofila (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2010). Of translated works, Richard Hellie, Slavery in Russia 1450–1725 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), as Richard Khelli, Kholopstvo v Rossii, 1450–1725 (Moscow: Akademiia, 1998); Nancy Shields Kollmann, By Honor Bound. State and Society in Early Modern Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), as Nensi Sh. Kollmann, Soedinennye chest′iu: Gosudarstvo i obshchestvo v Rossii rannego novogo vremeni, trans. A. B. Kamenskii (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2001), and Isabel de Madariaga, Ivan the Terrible. First Tsar of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), as Isabel′ de Madariaga, Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′, trans. M. Iusim (Moscow: Omega, 2007). 5 Specifically Sergei Bogatyrev. 6 Sergei Viacheslavovich Perevezentsev, ed., Tsar′ Ivan IV Groznyi. Samoderzhavnyi i samovlastnyi. Svidetel′stva prizhiznennye. Da vedaiut potomki . . . (Moscow: Russkii mir, 2005); T. E. Samoilova, comp., Vera i vlast′. Epokha Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Istoriko-kul′turnyi muzei-zapovednik “Moskovskii Kreml′,” 2007); Ivan Groznyi Entsiklopediia (Moscow: AST, Zebra E, 2007); Tsar′ Ivan Groznyi (St. Petersburg: Izdatel′skaia gruppa “Azbuka-Klassika,” 2010). 7 Specifically Alexander Yanov and Alexander Dvorkin. 8 I include a book by Aleksandr Filiushkin published in English; a book co-authored by Andrei Pavlov in English; a book in Russian authored by a Belarusian, Valerii Erchak, who identifies himself and is identified by his publisher as a Russian; works by Boris Uspenskii, who is affiliated both with Russian and Italian academic institutions; and an article by Kobrin and Iurganov in Istoriia SSSR that obviously went to press when there was still a USSR.

Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography of Ivan the Terrible in Russia  •  CHAPTER 1

I have excluded one set of publications from this chapter for an entirely different reason. It is not feasible to incorporate here the interpretation of Ivan by Anatolii Fomenko and Gleb Nosovskii of the New Chronology. They concluded that the man now known as “Ivan IV” is a seventeenth-century Romanov construct that conflates the lives of four men: Ivan IV, the first Tsarevich Dmitrii (the son of Tsaritsa Anastasiia Romanovna Iur′evna, not the second, sainted Tsarevich Dmitrii of Uglich, son of Tsaritsa Mariia Nagaia), Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich, and the converted Chingssid Simeon Bekbulatovich. Fomenko and Nosovskii’s views of each “Ivan” would have to be discussed separately under different rubrics. Chapter 2 deals with the New Chronology. I have included here some books that were part of the canonize-Ivan movement, analyzed in detail in chapter 3, but none of the publications discussed in chapters 4 through 10, amateur or academic. The authors discussed would not necessarily accept the validity of the category to which I have assigned their works (except for one apologist, Viacheslav Maniagin, who titled his book “An Apology for the terrible tsar”).9 The differences between an apologetic and a positive view, or between a critical and a hostile view, are matters of degree. Readers may disagree with my judgment that separating these overlapping positions is more illuminating than conflating them, but conflating these pairs would still leave three rubrics because of the “conflicted” rubric. A simple binary division of views oversimplifies the historiography.10 “Conflicted” applies to works that refuse to resolve contradictions among their subconclusions or whose overall evaluations of Ivan seem disconnected from their exposition. The existence of works that fit this category demonstrates just how difficult it is for Russians to deal with him historically and justifies inclusion of this rubric within my typology. Ideally, one would compare the conception of each rubric on the spectrum of post-1991 Russian historiography about Ivan to a baseline consensus interpretation of the tsar. Unfortunately, that is impossible because no such baseline exists, even in American scholarship. Of course, there are connections between recent Russian studies of Ivan and imperial Russian historiography. However, the experience of seventy-four years of Communist rule has unquestionably influenced the perceptions of post-Communist authors about such subjects as the nature 9 Viacheslav Gennad′evich Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria. Kriticheskii obzor literatury o Tsare Ioanne Vasil′eviche Groznom, 2nd corr. exp. ed. (Moscow: Russkii vestnik, 2002). 10 See Bogatyrev, “Ivan Vasil′evich Receives a Profession,” 3.

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of Russian authoritarianism and the significance of religion in the nation’s life. Moreover, his character and reign remain so problematic that opinions on him seemingly reveal deep intellectual and ideological divides in contemporary Russian thought. For example, religious interpretations of Ivan, by authors who are often adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church, disagree among themselves in their evaluations. Even antisemites reach opposite conclusions. The spectrum of conceptions of the tsar that have appeared since 1991 differs in two main respects from that of recent US scholarship. No historian in the United States endorses the idealized view of him expressed in Russia by advocates of his canonization, and no author in Russia shares the skepticism of the American Edward L. Keenan’s study of the Kurbskii-Ivan correspondence and other literary works attributed to Ivan or Kurbskii.11 This contrast will be explored in greater detail at the conclusion of this chapter. We now proceed to the five rubrics.12

1. Apologetic The apologetic rubric13 includes some works generated by the unsuccessful campaign to persuade the Russian Orthodox Church to canonize Ivan 11 Charles J. Halperin, “Edward Keenan and the Kurbskii-Groznyi Correspondence in Hindsight,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas [hereafter JbfGOE] 46 (1998): 396–98. Recent adherents of Keenan’s views include Brian Boeck, “Eyewitness or False Witness? Two Lives of Metropolitan Filipp of Moscow,” JhfGOE 55 (2007): 161–77; and Donald Ostrowski, “‘Closed Circles’: Edward L. Keenan’s Early Textual Work and the Semiotics of Response,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 48 (2006): 247–68. 12 Although I have eschewed attempting to follow the yearly evolution of Russian historiography on Ivan in Russia over the three decades years, which would require presenting publications from all rubrics simultaneously and repetitiously, I have presented citations within “rubric” footnotes in chronological order. 13 Nikolai Kozlov [pseudonym of Andrei Alekseevich Shchedrin], Oprichnina (n.p.: n.p., 1993); Ioann (Snychev), mitropolit Sankt-Peterburgskii i Ladozhskii, Samoderzhavie dukha. Ocherki russkogo samosoznaniia (St. Petersburg: Izdaniie L. S. Iakovlevoi, 1994); Anatolii Mikhailovich Makeev, Oprichnyi put′. Al′fa i omega russkogo samoderzhaviia ([Moscow]: Oprichnoe bratstvo sv. prep. Iosifa Volotskogo, 2001); Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria; Natal′ia Pronina, Ivan Groznyi. “Muchitel′” ili muchenik? (Moscow: IaUZA, EKSMO, 2005); Viacheslav Gennad′evich Maniagin, Pravda Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Algoritm, EKSMO, 2006); Igor′ Iakovlevich Froianov, Drama russkoi istorii. Na putiakh k oprichnine (Moscow: Parad, 2007); Aleksandr Bushkov, Ivan Groznyi. Krovavyi poet (Moscow: OLMA, Media grupp, 2007); Aleksandr Nikolaevich Bokhanov, Tsar′ Ioann IV Groznyi (Moscow: Veche, 2008); Sergei Fomin, Groznyi Tsar′ Ioann Vasil′evich (Moscow: Forum, 2009); Froianov, Groznaia oprichnina

Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography of Ivan the Terrible in Russia  •  CHAPTER 1

discussed in chapter 3, because apologists continued to defend him without mentioning canonization after the patriarch of Moscow rejected their proposal. The apologists idealize Ivan as a devout Russian Orthodox Christian whose sole goal was to save Holy Rus′ (Sviataia Rus′) and Moscow-the Third Rome. The tsar fought against the enemies of Russian centralization and autocracy. Apologists differ over the role of the Chosen Council (Izbrannaia rada) of gentry-man Aleksei Adashev and the priest Sylvester that supposedly dominated policy-making during the period of reforms (1547–64). Some apologists accept at face value Ivan’s claim after the fact, found in his First Epistle to Prince Andrei Kurbskii, that Adashev and Sylvester ran the government during the reform period contrary to his will and deride the reforms as attempts to weaken the state and the tsar in the interests of the boyars (Maniagin). Others in effect treat Ivan’s assertion as an exaggeration justified by the fact that the reforms could not go far enough and therefore stronger measures were required (Froianov), or because Adashev and Sylvester subsequently changed sides to support the boyars (Metropolitan Ioann [Snychev]). According to the apologists, Ivan was not a despot, tyrant, sadist, promiscuous pervert, homosexual, coward, failure, or filicide. He did not launch a reign of terror against his subjects. He demonstrated Christian mercy toward his enemies more than once, but their recidivist treason mandated more severe actions. Ivan utilized the sacred, spiritual brotherhood of the oprichnina to “sift the wheat from the chaff ” (Metropolitan Ioann [Snychev]) first applied this metaphor to the oprichnina). Because apologists emphasize the tsar’s religious convictions, they have difficulty dealing with his executions of clerics. They insist either that Ivan was not responsible for the deaths of Abbot Kornilii and Elder Vassian Muromtsev of the Pskov Caves Monastery (Metropolitan Ioann [Snychev]), or that these clerics’ treasonous actions merited capital punishment (Natal′ia Pronina). According to the apologists, the tsar did not order the murder of Metropolitan Filipp. Rather, either his enemies (Maniagin) or Filipp’s (Moscow: Algoritm, EKSMO, 2009); Natal′ia Pronina, Pravda ob Ivane Groznom (Moscow: IaUZA, EKSMO, 2009); Valerii Mikhailovich Erchak, Slovo i delo Ivana Groznogo, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Fond razvitiia i podderzhki sledstvennykh organov; zhurnal Natsional′naia bezopasnost′ i geopolitika Rossii, 2010); Sergei Fomin, Pravda o pervom russkom tsare. Kto i pochemu iskazhaet obraz Gosudaria Ioanna Vasil′evicha (Groznogo) (Moscow: Russkii izdatel′skii tsentr, 2010); Natal′ia Pronina, Ivan Groznyi bez lzhi. Muchenik vlasti (Moscow: IaUZA, EKSMO, 2013).

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enemies within the Russian Orthodox Church (Aleksandr Bushkov) instigated Filipp’s removal as metropolitan over the tsar’s objections because Filipp supported the oprichnina (Metropolitan Ioann [Snychev]). In any case Filipp’s death was either accidental or not sanctioned by Ivan. Because their Ivan cannot violate Orthodox canon law, they assert that the tsar did not marry more than the canonical three times. His unconsummated so-called third marriage did not count so his fourth was his third, and his supposed fifth through seventh marriages never occurred. According to the apologists, Ivan’s enemies poisoned him and several of his wives and children. If he inquired about asylum in England he was only launching a trial balloon in a moment of weakness because an Orthodox tsar would never leave Russia. Ivan did not lose the Livonian War because he successfully blunted Papal aggression, the Catholic Drang nach Osten (Pronina), against Russia. The tsar saved Russia from the Reformation, from a worldwide Jewish conspiracy supported by Judaizers in Muscovy that would have subjected Russia to a “kikish yoke” (zhidovskoe igo—Erchak), and from forcible integration into Europe on its path to a form of constitutional government alien to Russia (Froianov). While the apologist position has some roots in imperial Russian historiography, its most direct antecedent is the rhetoric found in sources from Ivan’s reign written in Muscovy under the patronage of the government or the Russian Orthodox Church such as Stepennaia kniga (The book of degrees) that extolled his piety and attributed all of Russia’s successes, such as the conquest of Kazan′, to his faith and leadership. However, apologist writings exceeded even these laudatory panegyrics when they sought to elevate him to actual sainthood. Karamzin’s portrayal of the “good Ivan” cannot be considered an inspiration because Karamzin’s “bad Ivan” is totally absent.14 The tone of these works more closely resembles that of the Stalin cult of Soviet historiography by Sergei Bakhrushin, Robert Vipper, and Ivan Smirnov in attributing everything good that happened in Muscovy during the tsar’s reign to his brilliant leadership and taking it as axiomatic that everyone he executed was guilty. However, Stalinist works did not extol his religious beliefs. Their Ivan acted for the state, not the faith. Even if all the boyars and bureaucrats executed by Ivan were guilty of treason, the apologists completely overlook the collateral damage of the 14 Karamzin’s depiction of the two Ivans—the good Ivan of the reforms, the bad Ivan of the oprichnina—continues to influence scholarship in Russia and the West. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskago, vol. 8.

Anything Goes: Post-1991 Historiography of Ivan the Terrible in Russia  •  CHAPTER 1

murder of thousands of peasants and artisans as he pursued his enemies. The apologist position obviously owes a great deal to the anti-European, antisemitic, and xenophobic elements in Russian intellectual history. These authors claim that the violence committed by Ivan was no worse than that committed by contemporary European rulers who are not subjected to the same opprobrium that Russophobic sixteenth-century authors and modern Western historians direct at him.15 Its antisemitic adherents resurrect the late imperial form of Russian antisemitism, which amalgamated Jews, Catholics, and Freemasons into one satanic enemy of Russia. To deny that Ivan committed any atrocities requires dismissing tout court as biased all European sources hostile to the tsar, including not only the pamphlet literature of the time (Flugschriften, Flugblätter) and Livonian chronicles, but also foreign accounts by men who entered his service and later defected, or who never set foot in Muscovy. Émigré Kurbskii, of course, is disposed of altogether as a traitor because he joined the PolishLithuanian armies invading Russia. However, some Muscovite sources must also be discredited, most often as late, written after Ivan’s death, and tendentious, such as the narrative of the sack of Novgorod in 1569–70, which details his role or the vita of Metropolitan Filipp which recounts the future saint’s opposition to the oprichnina. Apologist authors accept, albeit selectively, the authenticity of the list of the tsar’s victims that he presented to monasteries with gifts for commemorative prayers on their behalf, but insist either that the tsar was not admitting their innocence (an argument discussed below) or that the list contains the names of all of his so-called “victims,” which therefore encompassed far fewer people than the victims of contemporary European rulers. Apologist authors interpret sources arbitrarily. For example, the vita of Metropolitan Filipp declares that Maliuta Skuratov murdered Filipp, but Skuratov made up the excuse that Filipp had been asphyxiated by bad air in his monastic cell. Apologists take Skuratov’s lie as the truth although it is found in a source they reject as biased. Similarly, although apologists support their contention that Ivan was not responsible for Filipp’s death by the omission of his name from the memorial lists, the lists also include the names of Abbot Kornilii and Elder Vassian Muromtsev, who some apologists deny were executed at the tsar’s order. Claiming that Ivan sought to 15 Bogatyrev, “Ivan Vasil′evich Receives a Profession,” 10.

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defend Holy Rus′ or Moscow-the Third Rome ignores a major source problem: he never used either phrase in his writings or speeches. Apologetic authors overlook a major problem in their logic. If Ivan was no worse than many contemporary cruel, violent European rulers, he was no better than them either. He hardly deserves idealization, then. Rather, his equally disreputable contemporaries deserve greater opprobrium. Either from adherence to Russian exceptionalism or isolation from scholarship on early modern Europe in Western languages, no Russian historian of any rubric has provided a comprehensive comparison of the tsar to early modern European rulers or of the tsar’s Muscovy to neighboring realms. Unfortunately, neither has any Western historian.

2. Positive Authors of the positive rubric of Ivan16 invoke themes found in apologetic works, although none goes as far as the apologists. Their Ivan is not perfect. Positive scholars sometimes acknowledge the less edifying aspects of his personality or rule, or concede that he sometimes failed, but they minimize these shortcomings in their final evaluations. Aleksandr Amosov defends the reality of Ivan’s classical library. He suggests that its existence would prove the tsar’s familiarity with the classics and his attempt to preserve their cultural riches while simultaneously disproving the hostile portrayal of him as a cruel, arrogant, and suspicious tyrant opposed to Western civilization. Grigorii Kovalev asserts that 16 Boris Andreevich Uspenskii, Tsar′ i patriarkh. Kharizma vlasti v Rossii (Vizantiiskaia model′ i ee russkoe pereosmyslenie) (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul′tury, 1998); Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Amosov, “Slovo o velikom iskomom,” in Poiski biblioteki Ivana Groznogo, ed. Ignatii Iakovlevich Stelletskii (Moscow: SAMPO, 1999), 361–97; Boris Andreevich Uspenskii, Tsar′ i imperator. Pomazanie na tsarstvo i semantika monarshikh titulov (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul′tury, 2000); Nikolai Nikolaevich Voeikov, Tserkov′, Rus′ i Rim (Minsk: Luchi Sofii, 2000), 370–79, excerpted in Perevezentsev, Tsar′ Ivan IV Groznyi. Samoderzhavnyi i samovlastnyi, 596–202; Andrei Vital′evich Karavashkin, Russkaia srednevekovaia publitsistika: Ivan Peresvetov, Ivan Groznyi, Andrei Kurbskii (Moscow: Prometei, 2000); Grigorii Efimovich Kovalev, Biblioteka Ivana Groznogo i Aleksandrovskii Kreml′ (Aleksandrov: Istoriko-kraevedcheskii klub “Otechestvo,” 2002); Iurii Leont′evich Protsenko, Soslovno-predstavitel′naia monarkhiia v Rossii (seredina XVI–seredina XVII veka) (Volgograd: Volgogradskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2003); Aleksei Vladimirovich Sirenov, Stepennaia kniga. Istoriia teksta (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul′tur, 2007); Aleksei Vladimovich Sirenov, Stepennaia kniga i russkaia istoricheskaia mysl′ XVI–XVIII vv. (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Al′iansArkheo, 2010).

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Ivan’s personality cannot be fully evaluated until scholars find his classical library, but in the meantime he concludes that his conquests, erudition, literary skill, and musical talent outweigh his bloodthirsty behavior. The tsar’s cruelty was typical for his times. Aleksei Sirenov lauds his achievement in strengthening centralization and autocratic rule, destroying the last traces of feudalism, and patronizing cultural creativity. Excessive emphasis upon the barbarity of the oprichnina and Ivan’s unsuccessful political adventures cannot overshadow these achievements. Nikolai Voeikov describes the tsar as a typical sixteenth-century ruler, despite his shortcomings and cruelties, who espoused harmony between church and state. According to Andrei Karavashkin, Ivan’s policies and literary compositions were motivated by the spiritual, mystical, and transcendental concept of the eternal empire of Holy Rus′. The tsar sought the salvation of the Russian people. Because it was better for Russians to suffer here on earth rather than in the eternal fires of hell, and suffering was a prerequisite to salvation, he had to impose proper religious behavior on his subjects. The memorial lists of his victims that the tsar sent to monasteries with donations to support prayers on their behalf suggest that at the end of his life he reevaluated some of his previous actions. Boris Uspenskii does not discuss Ivan’s personal ideology, but his discussion of the influence of Rome and Byzantium upon the charisma of the office of tsar, including the theory of Moscow-the Third Rome, does not impute any negative consequences to it. Iurii Protsenko blames the failure of Ivan’s “good” policies to solve Russia’s problems on circumstances beyond his control. Because of Russia’s backwardness and boyar efforts to limit royal authority, the tsar had to try to create an absolutist state. Boyar opposition to the Livonian War necessitated the use of torture and executions. However, the benefits of the oprichnina proved ephemeral. Although it destroyed the economic base of the boyars, it did not liquidate the feudal system. Ivan lost the Livonian War, exhausted the peasant economy, and killed his son. Nevertheless, Protsenko argues, he had the right idea. Imperial Russian historiography supplies precursors of attempts to provide a balanced appraisal of Ivan’s reign that tilts toward his achievements rather than his failures, his virtues rather than his vices. Sergei Solov′ev minimized the tsar’s excesses compared to the significance of his devotion to building a centralized state. Even if he lost the Livonian War, he inaugurated the Baltic policy completed by Peter the Great, Solov′ev

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claims.17 Sergei Platonov interpreted the oprichnina as a rational and successful attack upon the boyars’ landowning base.18 Whether Ivan possessed a library of classical literature was debated in imperial and Soviet scholarship. Amosov seems unable to imagine an erudite but cruel ruler—a simplistic approach common to apologists such as Sergei Fomin who insist that if the tsar wrote religious hymns he could not have been a monster. The evidence supporting the existence of the tsar’s classical library is highly dubious. Karavashkin and Protsenko seem, naively, to excuse Ivan’s actions because he acted from pure motives—religious or political—as if pure motives guarantee good results. Voeikov does not discuss how Ivan’s executions of clerics reflect upon his conception of harmony between church and state. While the attempt of the positive evaluation to portray Ivan more objectively appears praiseworthy, the argument that his achievements more than compensate for his atrocities comes far too close to the axiom that the ends justify the means.

3. Conflicted Authors of the conflicted evaluations of Ivan19 either present such contradictory judgments about him that no coherent conception of him arises or whose conclusions seem disconnected from their analyses. Boris Floria criticizes the tsar’s dissolute and irresponsible lifestyle before his marriage; the contradictory content of his epistles, written in his ferocious literary style; his use of terror to compensate for his lack of 17 Sergei Mikhailovich Solov′ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, bks 3–4 (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo sotsial′no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1963), bk. 3, vol. 6, 395–714, bk. 4, vol. 7, 7–189. 18 Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, Ivan the Terrible, trans. Joseph L. Wieczynski (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1986). 19 Boris Nikolaevich Floria, Ivan Groznyi (Moscow: Molodia Gvardiia, 1999); Aleksandr Shitkov, Opal′nyi rod kniazei Staritskikh (Staritsa: Tverskoe oblastnoe knizhno-zhurnal′noe izdatel′stvo, 2001); Viacheslav Valentinovich Shaposhnik, Tserkovno-gosudarstvennye otnosheniia v Rossii v 30–80-e gody XVI veka, 2nd exp. ed. (St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskii universitet, 2006); idem, Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′ (St. Petersburg: Vita Nova, 2006); Leonid Iuzefovich, Put′ posla. Russkii posol′skii obychai. Obikhod, etiket, tseremonial, konets XV–pervaia polovina XVII v. (St. Petersburg: Ivan Limbakh, 2007); Viacheslav Valentinovich Shaposhnik, Ivan Groznyi (St. Petersburg: Akademiia issledovaniia kul′tury, 2015).

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popular support; his unsupported excuses to justify his executions, cruelties, and vicious punitive expeditions; and his killing of Tsarevich Ivan. His diplomatic and military mistakes caused Muscovy to lose the Livonian War and led to the Crimean Tatars’ burning of Moscow. Yet Floria denies that the tsar was a coward, applauds his talent as a political tactician and strategist, and interprets the Livonian War as the tsar’s attempt to increase cultural contacts with Western Europe. The historian ultimately concludes that the oprichnina’s success in weakening the boyars and gentry made it impossible for them to unite against royal authority in order to lead Muscovy down the disastrous path to noble oligarchy on the model of eastern Central Europe.20 Aleksandr Shitkov approves of Ivan’s defense of autocracy, his refusal to be the boyars’ puppet, and his support for centralization. However, Shitkov contends that the tsar did not think through his use of repression, dictatorship, and terror against those boyars who conspired against him. He failed to achieve his historical task of securing access to the Baltic and unjustly framed his cousin appanage (udel) Prince Vladimir Staritskii for treason.21 Viacheslav Shaposhnik attributes Ivan’s actions to his belief in the tsar’s religious obligation to lead his people to salvation by creating a Russian Orthodox tsardom, including employing the coercive power of the oprichnina to the fullest. Yet Shaposhnik adds that the tsar was imperfect in his personal life and a failure in his political life. His childhood made him cruel; he sought solace from the death of his first wife Anastasiia in alcohol and debauchery; he violated canon law with his multiple marriages; defeated in the Livonian War, he did not secure a Baltic port necessary for Muscovy’s economy; he committed atrocities, including killing Tsarevich Ivan with his own hands. Some boyars did commit treason, but perhaps they were acting in response to Ivan’s repression. Novgorod opposed the Livonian War out of selfish economic interest. Staritskii’s existence did pose a mortal threat to the tsar’s dynasty. However, historians do not know if he invented the conspiracies against him or if all his victims were innocent. Shaposhnik concludes that the tsar’s policies were correct regardless of his use of brute force to attain them. His greatest achievement was the creation of an autocracy,22 a new type of state, an Orthodox Russian tsardom, free of heretics. 20 Bogatyrev, “Ivan Vasil′evich Receives a Profession,” 7–8. 21 Collateral male members of the dynasty received private estates with political privileges. 22 Cf. Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV as Autocrat (samoderzhets),” Cahiers du monde russe 55 (2014): 197–213.

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Shaposhnik accepts the credibility of sources—such as the accounts of the deaths of boyar Ivan Fedorov-Cheliadnin and Tsarevich Ivan— used by authors of the critical and hostile rubrics, although his appreciation of the religious basis of the tsar’s actions more resembles the approach of authors belonging to the apologist and positive rubrics. No evidence of Novgorod opposition to the Livonian War corroborates Ivan’s accusations against the city. Shaposhnik acknowledges his intellectual debt to Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev). Unfortunately, the historian’s convoluted arguments make analyzing his treatment of the tsar’s reign problematic.23 Leonid Iuzefovich describes in detail the tsar’s rational, masterful, and subtle manipulation of Muscovy’s increasingly rigid diplomatic ritual and ceremony to protect his honor, as well as his willingness, when absolutely necessary, to compromise his principles for the greater good of the Muscovite state. However, Iuzefovich also insists that no other Muscovite ruler ever committed such egregious violations of diplomatic protocol, including diplomatic immunity. He refers to Ivan’s pogrom against his own cities and to the martyrdom of Ivan Viskovatyi, head of the Ambassadorial Bureau (Posol′skii prikaz), tortured to death in Red Square in 1570. He characterizes the tsar as mentally unstable and uncontrollably volatile. The oprichnina contributed to transforming Muscovy into a wasteland. Iuzefovich acknowledges Ivan’s contradictory personality, but goes no further than implying that his rule was equally contradictory. In passing, he attributes to Ivan a desire to hide the oprichnina terror from the English, an assertion at odds with the fact that the tsar admitted the Muscovy Company to the oprichnina. The authors of the conflicted rubric attest that the paradoxes of the tsar’s personality and rule retain their ability to confound historians who try to make sense out of him. Detailing the paradoxes and contradictions of Ivan’s reign is easy. Finding a conceptual framework that integrates those paradoxes and contradictions into a coherent theory of the tsar’s personality and rule is much more difficult. Ivan remains a confusing paradox in the works of authors of the conflicted rubric.

23 Bogatyrev, “Ivan Vasil′evich Receives a Profession,” 9–10. See below, chapter 3, for additional material on Shaposhnik’s views.

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4. Critical Adherents of the critical rubric24 demonize Ivan as everything that the apologists deny he was: a tyrant, an egomaniac, and a despot, brought 24 Andrei L′vovich Iurganov, “U istokov despotizma,” in Istoriia otechestva: liudi, idei, resheniia. Ocherki istorii Rossii IX–nachala XX v. (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1991), 34–75; Vladimir Borisovich Kobrin and Andrei L′vovich Iurganov, “Stanovlenie despoticheskogo samoderzhaviia v srednevekovoi Rusi (K postanovke problemy),” Istoriia SSSR 4 (1991): 54–64; Andrei L′vovich Iurganov, “Oprichnina i strashnyi sud,” Otechestvennaia istoriia 3 (1997): 52–75; Andrei Pavlovich Pavlov, “Sud′by samoderzhaviia i zemstva v Rossii XVI veka (oprichnina Ivana Groznogo),” in Istoriia Rossii. Narod i vlast′. Iz lektsii, prochitannykh v rossiiskikh universitetakh (St. Petersburg: Lan′, 1997), 203–44; Andrei L′vovich Iurganov, Kategorii russkoi srednevekovoi kul′tury (Moscow: MIROS, 1998); Vasilii Vasil′evich Kalugin, Andrei Kurbskii i Ivan Groznyi (Teoreticheskie vzgliady i literaturnaia tekhnika drevnerusskogo pisatelia) (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul′tury, 1998); Aleksandr Il′ich Filiushkin, Istoriia odnoi mistifikatsii. Ivan Groznyi i “Izbrannaia Rada” (Moscow: Voronezhskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1998); Arkhimandrit Makarii (Veretennikov), Zhizn′ i trudy sviatitelia Makariia mitropolita Moskovskogo i vseia Rusi (Moscow: Izdatel′skii sovet Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 2002); Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie, Ivan the Terrible (London: Pearson, Longman, 2003); Aleksandr Dvorkin, Ivan Groznnyi kak religioznyi tip. Stat′i i materialy (Nizhnii Novgorod: Izdatel′stvo Bratstva vo imia sv. Aleksandra Nevskogo, 2005) (see Alexander Dvorkin, Ivan the Terrible as a Religious Type. A Study of the Background, Genesis and Development of the Theocratic Idea of the First Russian Tsar and his Attempts to Establish “Free Autocracy” in Russia [Erlangen: Lehrstuhl für Geschichte und Theologie, 1992]); Arkhimandrit Makarii (Veretennikov), Sviataia Rus′. Agiografiia. Istoriia. Ierarkhiia (Moscow: INDRIK, 2005); Sergei Viacheslavovich Perevezentsev, “Gosudar′ Ivan IV Vasil′evich Groznyi,” in Perevezentsev, Tsar′ Ivan IV Groznyi. Samoderzhavnyi i samovlastnyi, 5–58; Arkhimandrit Makarii (Veretennikov), Iz istorii russkoi ierarkhii XVI veka (Moscow: Moskovskoe podvor′e Sviato-Troitskoi Sergievskoi Lavry, 2006); Elena Iur′evna Gagarina, “Introduction,” 7–8 and Tat′iana Evgen′evna Samoilova, “Tsarskaia tverdynia: Vera gosudareva . . . i krasota tserkovnaia,” 11–30, in Samoilova, Vera i vlast′; Aleksandri Il′ich Filiushkin, Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskii. Prosopograficheskoe issledovanie i germenevticheskii kommentarii k poslaniiam Andreia Kurbskogo Ivanu Groznomu (St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskii universitet, 2007); Alexander Filiushkin, Ivan the Terrible. A Military History (London: Frontline Books, 2008); Aleksandr Il′ich Filiushkin, Andrei Kurbskii (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 2008); Andrei Petrovch Bogdanov, Opal′nye voevody (Moscow: Veche, 2008); Andrei Sergeevich Usachev, Stepennaia kniga i drevnerusskaia knizhnost′ vremeni mitropolita Makariia (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Al′ians-Arkheo, 2009); Vladimir Valentinovich Bovykin, Mestnoe upravlenie v Russkom gosudarstve XVI v. (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2012); Aleksandr Il′ich Filiushkin, Izobretaia pervuiu voinu Rossii i Evropy. Baltiiskie voiny vtoroi poloviny XVI v. glazami sovremennikov i potomkov (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2013); Vladimir Valentinovich Bovykin, Russkaia zemlia i gosudarstvo v epokhu Ivana Groznogo. Ocherki po istorii mestnogo samoupravleniia v XVI v. (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2014); Vladimir Valentinovich Bovykin, Ocherki po istorii mestnogo samoupravleniia epokhi Ivana Groznogo (St. Petersburg: GP LO IPK “Vesti,” 2015).

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up, according to Andrei Iurganov and Vladimir Kobrin, in the traditions of Mongol rule. They claim that Ivan caused the deaths of thousands of innocent people and used Muscovy to achieve personal goals at the expense of the country. They accuse him of being a rapist, a promiscuous degenerate who married outside the laws of the church. He was an incompetent military and diplomatic leader who should have attacked Crimea instead of invading Livonia, stubbornly and disastrously refusing to accept a partial victory in Livonia to save Muscovy from decades of debilitating war which ended, ultimately, in defeat, and who permitted the burning of Moscow by the Crimean Tatars. Iurganov and Kobrin describe the tsar as a sadist and barbarian; as a coward who blamed others for his military defeats and executed victorious generals so that he could take credit for their victories; as a megalomaniac, who used mass terror to achieve absolute authority; and as, if not paranoid or clinically insane, definitely a highly distrustful, arbitrary, malicious, vengeful, and merciless ruler who intentionally or accidentally murdered Tsarevich Ivan. Critical historians assert that Ivan led a selfish life before his coronation and marriage, thereby already demonstrating his violent intolerance of any perceived slights. The tsar contributed nothing to the reforms of the 1550s, which, the historians say, were implemented against his will, a point confirmed by the cessation of all efforts at reform after he assumed unlimited authority with the oprichnina. Authors within the critical rubric disagree about whether Ivan was truly religious and the role of religion in the establishment of the oprichnina. Iurganov argues, and others in this and other rubrics concur, that the oprichnina was more religious than political. Because the end of the world did not occur at the end of the seventh millennium in the year 7000 [1492] in the Byzantine calendar, Ivan expected the apocalypse in year 7070 [1561/1562], the next significant year with sevens. When the Second Coming did not take place in 7070, he feared waiting until 7077 [1568/1569] for the inevitable end-times, so he established the oprichnina to prepare the Russian people for the Day of Judgment by imposing purgative earthly suffering. The oprichnina was a mystery of the faith, a model on earth of the future heavenly kingdom. Iurganov calls it a parody of a monastic order. On the other hand, Aleksandr Dvorkin deems it a genuine imitation of the Dominican Order. Meanwhile, other historians in this rubric assert that the tsar was more superstitious than religious: he was an adept of astrology, magic, and sorcery (Sergei Perevezentsev).

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Almost all authors of the critical rubric conclude that the oprichnina failed in its purpose and that its terror and destruction were calamitous for Muscovy. The exception is Andrei Pavlov, who argues that the oprichnina reversed Muscovy’s transition into an estate-representative monarchy during the reforms. Ivan succeeded in his goal of protecting his unlimited authority, but at great cost. However, his success harmed Russia—the key difference of opinion between Pavlov’s evaluation and Floria’s. Concerning Ivan as a writer, authors of the critical rubric descry the tsar’s contradictions and obfuscation of his moral responsibility for his actions, his distortions of history, his intellectual hypocrisy, and his verbose, unpolished literary style. Andrei Bogdanov labels this style “delirious.” Authors of the critical rubric owe some of their moral condemnation of Ivan to Karamzin’s “bad Ivan” (without Karamzin’s “good Ivan”), but somewhat more to Nikolai Kostomarov, a nineteenth-century populist historian whose works graphically and one-sidedly criticized the tsar.25 On the sanity issue, the critical authors drew their analysis in part from the imperial Russian psychiatrist Kovalevskii, who founded the insanity school of interpretation of Ivan.26 However, in their image of him critical works published in Russia since 1991 often read like sensationalist Western tabloid biographies of him, in the manner of Kazimierz Waliszewski or Robert Payne and Nikita Romanoff rather than imperial Russian scholarship, although it is doubtful that such works, even when available in Russian—such as Waliszewski—had any influence on them. Ivan remains the subject of lurid biographies, even by professional historians, in every language. In terms of source use, the critical historians reverse the polarity of the apologists, accepting more or less every atrocity story about Ivan in foreign or Kurbskii’s works as true. They distrust the tsar’s self-serving polemics and policy justifications. Nevertheless, some of the material in Kurbskii and the German accounts bears obvious signs of fantasy. A story told about Ivan previously told about Dracula (Vlad Tsepesh) does not possess much credibility. The tsar can hardly have drawn his knife and stabbed boyar Ivan 25 Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov, “Lichnost′ tsaria Ivana Vasil′evicha Groznago,” in Sobranie sochinenii N. I. Kostomarova, vols. 14–16: Istoricheskiia monografii i izsledovaniia (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo dlia posobiia nuzhdaiushchimsia literatoram i uchenym, 1905), 395–448. 26 Sergei N. Bogatyrev, “Groznyi tsar′ ili groznoe vremia? Psikhologicheskii obraz Ivana Groznogo v istoriografii,” Russian History 22 (1995): 285–308; Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV’s Insanity,” Russian History 34 (2007): 207–18. (There is a misquotation on page 212: “mentally depraved” should be “mentally deranged.”)

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Fedorov-Cheliadnin if he did not carry one, and it is highly unlikely that he would disrespect the royal regalia by dressing a boyar in them as a joke. The only source to mention the tsar’s dissolute behavior after the death of his first wife in 1560 dates to the early seventeenth century. He did marry a highly uncanonical seven times, but the Russian Orthodox Church tolerated his serial monogamy, and his history of marrying woman after woman makes it very unlikely that Ivan would have bedded, let alone raped, any woman whom he did not consider his legitimate wife. The tales of his killing of Tsarevich Ivan are just that—tales. The pope sent the Jesuit Antonio Possevinoto Muscovy to arbitrate the Livonian War. It was only some time after Possevino had left Muscovy that, perhaps under Polish influence, he wrote that Tsar Ivan had struck Tsarevich Ivan after accosting Tsarevich Ivan’s improperly dressed pregnant wife, thus causing her miscarriage. Apocalyptic imagery appears in virtually all periods of Ivan’s reign, but references to the year 7077 as the possible date of the apocalypse occurred only in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, the epoch of the year 7000. Assertions of his superstitiousness depend heavily upon foreign accounts as evidence. Two reforms can be dated to the period of the oprichnina: the reform of the steppe frontier intelligence service in 1571 and the creation of the Assembly of the Land (zemskii sobor), in this instance a consultative gathering of members of specified elite social classes, which met for the first and only such time during Ivan’s reign in 1566. In addition, the continuity of the anti-brigandage (guba)27 and local government reforms after 156528 impugns any notion of the oprichnina as a “counter-reform,” a concept proposed by Yanov (discussed under the hostile rubric) and others. This circumstantial evidence increases the plausibility of the idea that the tsar played some role during the reforms of the 1550s. This likelihood is further enhanced if we take Ivan’s ascription of nearly unquestioned control over policy during the reforms by Adashev and Sylvester to be an exaggeration. The critical evaluation infers that Ivan, the crowned tsar, a married man in his twenties, a father, most importantly, the father of a male heir, could not 27 Local grand juries were authorized to investigate known bandits and administer punishment on their own authority, even capital punishment. 28 Tat′iana Il′inichna Pashkova, Mestnoe upravlenie v russkom gosudarstve pervoi poloviny XVI veka. Namestniki i volosteli (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2000); Vladimir Anatol′evich Arakcheev, Vlast′ i “zemlia”: pravitel′stvennaia politika v otnoshenii tiaglykh soslovii v Rossii vtoroi poloviny XVI–nachala XVII veka (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2014).

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have vetoed reforms to which he was opposed. At the very least he deserves credit for permitting his advisors to carry out their domestic and foreign policies.

5. Hostile Authors of the hostile rubric29 repeat all the accusations against Ivan of the critical rubric, sometimes with a new twist, such as that he deliberately 29 Ruslan Grigor′evich Skrynnikov, Tsarstvo terrora (St. Petersburg: Nauka, SanktPeterburgskoe otdelenie, 1992); Boris Paramonov, “Zagadka Ivana Groznogo: Gomoseksualizm,” Zvezda 6 (1993): 201–5; Natal′ia Vladimirovna Davydova, Tsar′ Ivan i Pokrovskii khram. Chitaem poslaniia Ivana Groznogo i “Zhitie Vasiliia Blazhennogo.” Uchebnoe posobie (Moscow: MIROS, 1994); Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev, Ot Rusi do Rossii. Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii (Moscow: DI-DIK, 1995) (see Mut′ia, Ivan Groznyi, 392–93, and Aleksandr Ianov, Rossiia: U istokov tragedii 1462–1584. Zametki o prirode i proiskhozhdenii russkoi gosudarstvennosti [Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001], 487); Andrei Leonidovich Nikitin, Satanicheskaia zautrenia (Moscow: Progress, Kul′tura, 1995); Skrynnikov, Velikii gosudar′ Ioann Vasil′evich Groznyi, vols. 1–2 (Smolensk: Rusich, 1996); Andrei Leonidovich Nikitin in Georgii Leonidovich Grigor′ev, Kogo boialsia Ivan Groznyi? K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii oprichniny (Moscow: Intergraf Servis, 1998), 3–6, 77–108; Margarita Vladimirovna Kukushkina, Kniga v Rossii v XVI veke (St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie, 1999); Sergei Eduardovich Tsvetkov, Ivan Groznyi. Belletrizovannaia biografiia (Moscow: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2000); Daniil Al′ (Daniil Natanovich Al′shits), Reformy gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v nachale tsarstvovaniia Ivana Groznogo (St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskii gosudarstvennyi universitet kul′tury i iskusstva, 2000); Andrei Leonidovich Nikitin, “Oprichnina Ivana IV i ‘Orden kromeshnikov,’” in Osnovaniia russkoi istorii. Mifologemy i fakty (Moscow: AGRAF, 2001), 629–47; Aleksandr Ianov, Rossiia: U istokov tragedii 1462–1584 (see also Alexander Yanov, The Origins of Autocracy. Ivan the Terrible in Russian History, trans. Stephen Dunn [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981]); Edvard Stanislavovich Radzinskii, Muchitel′ i ten′ (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001); Daniil Al′, Pisatel′ Ivan Peresvetov i tsar′ Ivan Groznyi. U istokov izvechnoi diskussii—kak obustroit′ Rossiiu (St. Petersburg: BLITs, 2002); Anna Leonidovna Khoroshkevich, Rossiia v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii serediny XVI veka (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2003); Apollon Grigor′evich Kuz′min, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do 1618, bk. 2 (Moscow: Gumanitarnyi izdatel′skii tsentr VLADOS, 2003), 251–68, reprinted in Perevezentsev, Tsar′ Ivan IV Groznyi. Samoderzhavnyi i samovlastnyi, 603–18; Irina Borisovna Mikhailova, Sluzhilye liudi severo-vostochnoi Rusi v XIV–pervoi polovine XVI veka. Ocherki sotsial′noi istorii (St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2003); Venedikt Alekseevich Kolobkov, Mitropolit Filipp i stanovlenie moskovskogo samoderzhaviia. Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2004); Sergei Tsvetkov, Ivan Groznyi 1530–1584 (Moscow: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2005); Vladimir Kukovenko, “Material podgotovlen po knige ‘Ivan Groznyi i oprichnina,’” www.proza.ru/2010/08/29/1411; Vladimir Kukovenko, “Ivan Groznyi i oprichnina,” med.org.ru/article/2249; Andrei Alekseevich Bulychev, Mezhdu sviatymi i demonami. Zametki o posmertnoi sud′be opal′nogo tsaria Ivana Groznogo

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murdered Tsarevich Ivan out of jealousy (Radzinskii). Hostile authors follow the same historiographic predecessors as critical authors and consider the same sources reliable. Some then raise criticism of the tsar to the nth power by according Ivan decisive influence in shaping the course of Russian history. More often than adherents of the critical rubric, authors of the hostile rubric label Ivan insane, a psychopath. Most historians who diagnose him as insane do not infer that he was therefore not responsible for his actions. Nikitin calls Ivan insane and a satanist who founded the oprichnina as a satanic order. Radzynskii detects masochism in Ivan’s servile petition to Simeon Bekbulatovich and paranoia in his desire for asylum in England. Anna Khoroshkevich correlates the tsar’s inferiority complex to his sensitivity about his father’s uncanonical marriage to his mother and his resulting illegitimacy.30 Ruslan Skrynnikov, on the other hand, insists that Ivan endured no childhood trauma that could have induced mental illness or justified his later behavior. His character was formed before he lost his remaining parent, his mother, at the age of seven. Thus Ivan remains fully responsible for his adult actions.31 Daniil Al′ ascribes a persecution (Moscow: Znak, 2005); Daniil Al′, Ivan Groznyi: Izvestnyi i neizvestnyi. Ot legend k faktam (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2005); Dmitrii Mikhailovich Volodikhin, Ivan Groznyi. Bich Bozhii (Moscow: Veche, 2006); Irina Anatol′evna Lobakova, Zhitie mitropolita Filippa. Issledovaniia i teksty (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2006); Daniil Al′, Shagi istorii Rossii iz proshlogo v budushchee (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2007); Ivan Groznyi Entsiklopediia; Ruslan Grigor′evich Skrynnikov, Vasilii III. Ivan Groznyi (Moscow: AST MOSKVA, 2008); Dmitrii Volodikhin, Mitropolit Filipp (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 2009); idem, Voevody Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Veche, 2009); idem, Oprichnina i “psy gosudarevy” (Moscow: Veche, 2010); Irina Borisovna Mikhailova, I zdes′ soshlis′ vse tsarstva . . . Ocherki po istorii gosudareva dvora v Rossiii XVI v.: povsednevnaia i prazdnichnaia kul′tura, semantika etiketa i obriadnosti (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2010); Dmitrii Volodikhin, Ivan IV Groznyi (Moscow: Veche, 2010); Igor′ Vladimirovich Kurukin and Andrei Alekseevich Bulychev, Povsednevnaia zhizn′ oprichnikov Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Molodia Gvardiia, 2010). 30 Because Ivan’s father, Grand Prince Vasilii III, forced his first wife, Solomoniia, to take the veil against her will and she was still alive when he married his second wife, Elena Glinskaia, Ivan’s mother, Vasilii III was guilty of bigamy, and therefore Ivan was illegitimate. 31 Charles J. Halperin, “Ruslan Skrynnikov on Ivan IV,” in Dubitando: Essays in Culture and History in Honor of Donald Ostrowski, ed. Brian J. Boeck, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel B. Rowland (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2012), 193–207; idem, “Ruslan Skrynnikov’s Reign of Terror in the Historiography of Ivan the Terrible,” in Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, Reign of Terror: Ivan IV, trans. Paul Williams (Leiden: Brill, 2015), xviii–xxxi.

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complex and maniacal suspiciousness to the tsar, but not insanity. His Ivan remained sane and mentally alert, and therefore morally responsible, to the end of his life. Boris Paramonov considers Ivan’s homosexuality the key to understanding his behavior. Ivan sublimated his sexual identity when he married Anastasiia, but returned to it upon her death. The oprichnina embodied his sexual fantasy of a monastery. His multiple female sexual partners constituted a rejection of women. His deathbed attempted rape of his daughterin-law, Irina Godunova, wife of Tsarevich Fedor, was a parting cover-up of his sexual preference. Ivan’s fear of his homosexuality induced him to turn his violent tendencies outward upon society. On the other hand, Igor′ Kurukin and Andrei Bulychev characterize the tsar’s sodomy as pseudo-homosexuality characteristic of paranoiacs, not “intellectual” homosexuality. They link his homosexual behavior more to his mental illness than his sexual orientation. Authors of the hostile rubric disagree, as do members of the critical rubric, about Ivan’s religious conviction. Sergei Tsvetkov describes him as a true Christian who sought to sift the wheat from the chaff and to attain Holy Rus′ on earth via the oprichnina. Unfortunately his personality and policies impugned that goal. In his bloodthirsty search for revenge on the boyars for mistreating him as a child, Ivan inflicted great harm upon the Russian Orthodox Church. Dmitrii Volodikhin by contrast finds the tsar guilty of religious hypocrisy because his external piety was bereft of Christian mercy. Several authors attribute his removal and murder of Metropolitan Filipp to a desire to demonstrate state superiority over the church. Radzinskii writes that the tsar chose Filipp as metropolitan with the intention of removing him in order to demonstrate that no one in Muscovy was beyond his authority. Sergei Tsvetkov seems to justify Ivan’s treatment of Filipp by suggesting that Filipp had mistakenly taken up the cause of traitors, leaving the tsar no choice but to remove the metropolitan from office. Irina Mikhailova describes Ivan during the oprichnina as throwing off his facade of piety to give vent to blasphemy, sorcery, witchcraft, and astrology. Ivan did not think that he was bound by divine commandments. Mikhailova, seconded by Tsvetkov and Natal′ia Davydova, concludes that the tsar believed he was a god. Bulychev attributes Ivan’s memorial donations for his victims to his superstitious attempt to prevent Tsarevich Ivan’s unnatural death from turning his soul into an evil spirit under the control of infernal powers. The tsar used religion to avoid the consequences of

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his mass murders.32 According to Davydova, the oprichnina was simply a sadistic game to Ivan. Regardless of Ivan’s personal religious beliefs or lack thereof, all adherents of the hostile evaluation condemn Ivan’s treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church. Hostile authors who interpret the oprichnina not as religious but as political attribute far-reaching consequences to its establishment. Al′ and Ianov, like Floria and Pavlov in other rubrics, see the oprichnina as the central instrument by which Ivan quashed the reforms initiated by the Chosen Council’s policies of the 1550s that had started Russia down the path to bourgeois, democratic development of the European type. Instead the tsar’s oprichnina redirected Russia towards becoming a military-feudal dictatorship based upon serfdom. (Pavlov agreed with the critical authors that this shift was to the detriment of Russian development, but Floria did not.) Ivan sought unlimited individual authority (edinoderzhavie). Russia regressed from civilization to barbarism. His reign was a major, if not the major, turning point in Russian history. To be sure, Al′ somehow manages to argue that given Russian backwardness Ivan had no alternative to the oprichnina, while still assigning moral responsibility to the tsar for deciding to establish it. Xenophobic interpretations of the oprichnina also appear among authors of the hostile rubric of Ivan. Lev Gumilev blames Judaizers for the oprichnina. Vladimir Kukovenko blames the oprichnina on a “Muslim party” of Tatar and Circassian immigrants who arranged the marriage of the easily influenced, weak-willed, emotionally imbalanced and mentally ill tsar to the Circassian Mariia Cherkasskaia, and then manipulated him into establishing the oprichnina to destroy the Russian aristocracy. The questionable methodological legitimacy of diagnosing Ivan’s mental condition hundreds of years after his death without being able to rely upon any private sources of his thoughts, motives, or emotions, let alone to ask him questions about his dreams while he reposed on a couch, impairs conclusions about his sanity. Ivan did not behave like recognized insane rulers of the sixteenth century. Adherents of the hostile rubric amplify the flaws of the authors of the critical rubric in using and abusing sources. Radzynskii misreads the literary proprieties of a Muscovite petition. The only evidence of Ivan’s homosexuality is unreliable court gossip and vague admissions of sin, in sharp 32 On Bulychev see Bogatyrev, “Ivan Vasil′evich Receives a Profession,” 6–7.

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contrast to the substantial evidence concerning contemporary European homosexual rulers. Ivan did murder bishops and monks, but during the oprichnina he also increased monastic fiscal and judicial immunities and even admitted several monasteries into the oprichnina. Time and time again the tsar insisted that he could be judged only by God and would be judged by God on the Day of Judgment, which would be impossible if he thought he was God. Not even European pamphlets accused him of performing satanic rites. We do not know if Mariia Cherkasskaia was a Muslim. Evidence of the spread of Islam among the Circassians in the Caucasus dates after her death. The hostile evaluation considers the tsar’s violent behavior far worse than that of his contemporaries. Ivan was responsible for sufficient violent acts to justify labeling him cruel, but the evidence for sadism is dubious. Kurbskii probably did not witness the young Ivan throwing animals off walls to watch them die, a Muscovite description of an interrogation session gives the lie to foreign descriptions of Ivan’s physical involvement in torture. Most atrocity stories about him, including accusations of rape, are clichés. The tsar’s violence seems “worse” than that perpetrated elsewhere in sixteenth-century Europe—the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, the repression of the Dutch revolt against Spain, the Peasants’ Revolt in Germany, the Spanish Inquisition—because historians consider his actions senseless and arbitrary, meaning that they cannot attribute them to such “rational” causes as religious bigotry, national hatred, or class war. This interpretation reflects no more than our ignorance of Ivan’s motives. How does one judge relative degrees of violence? Certainly not by numbers. The death of even one innocent is sufficient to condemn any ruler. If the tsar was as bad as his contemporaries, that would be quite bad enough.33

Conclusion This survey of the multiple evaluations of Ivan the Terrible in Russian historical memory after 1991 has illustrated the enormous disagreements among Russian authors about his personality, policies, and legacy. In addition, it has also suggested that many contemporary evaluations of Ivan in Russia have antecedents in previous Russian historiography. 33 Charles J. Halperin, “The Scourge of God: The Mongols and Violence in Russian History,” in Times of Trouble: Violence in Russian Literature and Culture, ed. Tatyana Novikov and Marcus C. Levitt (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 23–29.

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Several patterns characterize the Russian spectrum of evaluations as a whole. Authors of several rubrics, not just authors at the ends of the Russian spectrum, apologists and hostile authors, but also a conflicted author such as Floria, subscribe to the “great man” theory of history. They believe that one man, albeit a tsar, single-handedly determined the future course of Russian history, the direction of the evolution of society and the state, for good or ill. Of course, some historians and intellectuals ascribe influence over Russian history comparable to Ivan to Peter the Great, Lenin, and Stalin as well. Whatever his influence upon his contemporaries and Russian history, Ivan could not have accomplished such a task alone. Whatever impact he had was shaped by his interaction with Muscovite society. Glib assertions that servile Muscovites obeyed the tsar’s every command fly in the face of substantial evidence that he could not even get his officials to carry out orders without repeated reminders and constant threats. Ivan did not possess cosmic powers. Adherents of the apologetic and hostile rubrics magnify the problem of analyzing Ivan as a human being by depicting his character as static and homogeneous. Thanks to Karamzin historians too often proceed from the assumption that at any given time the tsar was either all “good” or all “bad,” rather than a constantly changing mixture of characteristics. One-sided interpretations of Ivan’s character do an injustice to the complexity of his personality. Mixed evaluations of Ivan’s behavior fail to integrate the two sides of his character into a coherent conception that begins with the premise of the man’s complex nature rather than ends with it. While some of the same interpretations of Ivan in contemporary Russian historiography also appear in Western historiography, they do so in different proportions. The most popular Western interpretation remains, I think, that Ivan was insane. No Soviet historian could have published a book or article attributing the tsar’s actions to insanity. After 1991, some historians inside Russia did resort to mental illness to explain him, but a far lower percentage than historians outside the country. Similarly, the concepts of Moscow-the Third Rome34 and Holy Rus′, and the Chosen Council 34 Russian historians who ascribe Third Rome ideology to Ivan IV and sixteenth-century Muscovites invoke a congeries of assertions about the superiority of Russian Orthodox Christianity to all other forms of Christianity, let alone other religions. American historians who deny the influence of Third Rome ideology upon Ivan IV and sixteenthcentury Muscovites focus on the omission of the phrase “Moscow-the Third Rome” from their writings.

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paradigm, retain far more assent inside Russia than outside. Aleksandr Filiushkin is almost alone in rejecting the Chosen Council paradigm in Russia. When Soviet historians wrote about Ivan’s ideology they treated its religious foundation gingerly. That is no longer true among Russian historians, to whom Ivan’s religious identity has become as common a subject of discussion as in the West. Of course, there are still Russian historians, including academic specialists such as Skrynnikov and Floria, who take an essentially secular political approach to the tsar and pay relatively little attention to his religious convictions. My impression is that such historians are currently in a minority among Russian scholars. However, even those authors who assign great importance to Ivan’s religious affiliation cannot reach a consensus about his rule. Advocates of Ivan’s canonization pretend that only rationalist, “unbelieving” historians would criticize the tsar, but in fact historians with unquestionable religious affiliations, “believers,” such as archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov) and Volodikhin, are critical of him. Moreover, some hostile authors, such as Mikhailova and Volodikhin, deem Ivan’s religion—or rather, religiosity—a facade, a mask, an excuse for his actions, an external costume to hide the true man underneath. Other critical (Iurganov and Perevezentsev) and hostile (Kurukin and Bulychev) historians identify Ivan’s sincere religious affiliation as the problem, because it inspired unwarranted repression. Antisemitic authors of the apologetic rubric, like Froianov, invoke Gumilev’s very negative interpretation of the impact of Jews upon the Khazars during the Kievan period of Rus′ history in order to give Ivan’s anti-Jewish policies an historical pedigree. But Gumilev, no mean antisemite himself, belongs to the hostile rubric. The apologetic rubric interprets the oprichnina as the tsar’s means of saving Russia from foreign Europeans as well as Jews, but Gumilev blamed the oprichnina on the Jews and Kukovenko interprets it as the tool of foreign Muslims. Even Russian antisemites cannot agree on Ivan. Advocates of Ivan’s canonization approvingly cited Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev)’s evaluation of him. Apologists and positive authors, as well as Shaposhnik, classified above as conflicted, continue to do so. However, critical authors such as Volodikhin who do not share Metropolitan Ioann’s antisemitism also cite his views respectfully. Metropolitan Ioann’s signature depiction of the oprichnina as Ivan’s attempt to sift the wheat

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from the chaff even appears in works by authors hostile to the tsar, such as Tsvetkov. The metropolitan’s status as an eminent hierarch and theologian is apparently above reproach in Russia. In rejecting proposals for Ivan’s canonization, the patriarch accused its advocates of fostering sectarian strife by misinterpreting Metropolitan Ioann’s writings. Actually, the patriarch chose to ignore Metropolitan Ioann’s bigotry. Finally, the Russian and Western spectra of evaluations of Ivan differ. It would be reassuring, to be sure, if the most professional and prudent Russian historians agreed with English-language scholarship, but that is hardly possible if English-language scholars disagree with each other. There is much mutually beneficial scholarly exchange between Russian and American specialists working on Ivan, with each drawing upon what it finds useful from the other, but there is no meeting of minds. Coincidences on specific issue are not accidental—they are, rather, unsystematic. To a large extent, Western and Russian scholarship on the tsar function within different conceptual frameworks. US historians studying him do not have to contend with the nationalist and patriotic baggage about Ivan embodied in many of the amateur, popular, and political publications discussed in chapters 2 through 5 that Russian historians may not endorse but cannot escape. Moreover, each school on the spectrum has a wing that the other lacks. Among Western scholars there is no equivalent of the apologist, let alone antisemitic, Russian historian. No Western historian justifies Ivan’s atrocities, executions, persecutions, and use of torture. On the other hand, there is no Russian equivalent to those American historians who follow Keenan’s lead and impugn the authenticity not only of Ivan’s correspondence with Kurbskii but of all the literary works ascribed to the tsar (as well as to Kurbskii). Both defenders and critics of Ivan in Russia describe him as a prolific writer, despite differing judgments as to the quality of his prose. If Keenan’s views are mentioned, it is only to refer to their convincing refutation by, among others, Boris Morozov’s discovery of a text of Kurbskii’s First Epistle to Ivan on paper with watermarks from the 1590s in a convolute from the 1620s. Keenan’s supporters contend that 1590s paper was not utilized until the 1620s. If, thirty years after all political restraints on expressing their opinions of Ivan the Terrible disappeared, Russian writers have not yet been persuaded by Keenan’s approach to sixteenth-century Muscovite history, I doubt that they ever

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will be.35 There is even less reason to expect any Western historian ever to endorse the apologist interpretation of Ivan. These limits on convergence between Western and Russian scholarship on Ivan the Terrible seem to be immutable.

35 Evgeniia Alekseevna Kurenkova, “Russkoe srednevekov′e v trudakh Edvarda Kinana” (Candidate’s diss., Moscow University, 2007), treats Keenan’s publications as serious (as some Soviet scholars such as Iakov Solomonovich Lur′e and Zimin did at the height of the controversy), but leaves the authenticity question open.

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Chapter 2

Who Was Not Ivan the Terrible, Who Ivan the Terrible Was Not

Karamzin’s two Ivans—the “good” Ivan of the reforms and the “bad” Ivan of the oprichnina—were rhetorical. Given the contradictory nature of Ivan’s personality traits and actions it is surprising that no one has ever accused him of being bipolar or having multiple personality disorder. The New Chronology reifies the different phases of his life by assigning each to physically different Ivans—four, to be exact. It explains the tsar’s varying behavior by attributing each variation to a different person. It thus finesses the polarity of the spectrum of images of him discussed in chapter 1 by proposing in effect that each rubric examined a different Ivan. Of course, the parallel is not that simple. There is no one-to-one alignment of the four New Chronology Ivans with four of my five rubrics, but the principle is close enough: the good Ivan and the bad Ivan were different men. The image of the tsar in the New Chronology derives from a radical revision of world history, not just Russian history, from ancient times on. To professional historians, the New Chronology is science fiction, not history. However, millions of copies of Fomenko and Nosovskii’s books have been sold in Russia. Therefore the New Chronology cannot be ignored. For this reason its reconstruction of Ivan’s reign must be included in any examination of Russian historical memory of him since 1991.

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Anatolii Fomenko, the New Chronology, and Russian History Mathematicians Anatolii Timofeevich Fomenko and Gleb Vladimirovich Nosovskii begin the self-styled “New Chronology” (novaia khronologiia) reassessment of Ivan with what is now known as the Mongol period of Russian history. To them the Mongol Empire had nothing to do with Mongols from Mongolia, but was a Russian empire called the Horde whose history was later erased in Russia by the pro-Western Romanov dynasty and in Western Europe by the states created by revolts against it. According to Fomenko, the traditional Tsar “Ivan the Terrible” was not a single individual but a composite of four Ivans. Drastic changes in policy during his reign reflect not the decisions of an erratic if not clinically insane ruler but changes in ruler later masked by subsuming them under the rubric of one “Ivan the Terrible.”1 Ivan No. 1, the first Ivan, the son of Vasilii III, ruled from 1547 to 1553. He inherited the Horde-Russian Empire. After his illness in 1553, he recovered physically but not mentally, so he abdicated and became the Holy Fool (iurodivyi) Vasilii Blazhennyi (the Blessed) for whom St. Basil’s Cathedral on the Kremlin square is now named, a transition facilitated by Ivan’s piety. In Greek, “Vasilii” means “Basileus,” so “Vasilii Blazhennyi” just means “the blessed emperor.” The iconic Copenhagen Portrait of Ivan shows that Russians considered Ivan No. 1 a saint. Ivan No. 1 died in 1557 or 1589. That his life span lasted that long led the Romanovs to rewrite the history of the years 1533–84 as a single reign. Moreover, that Vasilii Blazhennyi was the abdicated former tsar explains the record of his death in the official Muscovite military register. Ivan No. 1 was succeeded in 1553 by his infant son Tsarevich Dmitrii under the name Ivan Vasil′evich. Tsarevich Dmitrii could not have died in 1553 because the government after 1553 was ruled by a regency council called the Chosen Council; an adult successor would not have needed a regency council. 1 G. V. Nosovskii and A. T. Fomenko, Novaia khronologiia Rusi (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo “Faktorial,” 1997), 166–82, illustration 6, 171; idem, Vvedenie v novuiu khronologiiu (Kakoi seichas vek?) (Moscow: KRAFT+, LEAN, 1999), 364–72; idem, Bibleiskaia Rus′. Russko–ordynskaia imperiia i Bibliia. Novaia matematicheskaia khronologiia drevnosti, vols. 1–2 (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo “Faktorial,” 1998), 1:108–18; idem, Rekonstruktsiia vseobshchei istorii. Novaia khronologiia (Moscow: Finansovyi izdatel′skii dom “Delovoi ekspress,” 1999), 297–356; Anatoly T. Fomenko and Gleb V. Nosovskiy, History: Fiction or Science? Chronology, vol. 4, Russia, Britain, Byzantium, Rome, trans. Michael Jagger (London, Paris, NY: Delamere Publishing, 2007), 237–49.

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Tsarevich Dmitrii, Ivan No. 2, ruled until 1563 when he died of natural causes at the age of thirteen. To this point the government of Russia had remained in the hands of the Russia-Horde faction. The Livonian War was Russia’s campaign to put down the European revolt against the empire. Although Ivan No. 2 was succeeded by his brother Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich, Ivan No. 3, the Horde lost control of Russia in a civil war, the beginning of the Time of Troubles (Smutnoe vremia), which lasted until 1613. Ivan No. 3’s relatives, the Zakhar′in-Romanovs, came from the Pskov/Polotsk (Polatsk) region and were pro-Western. It was they who were primarily responsible for the oprichnina, which was directed against the Russian boyars who were overwhelmingly loyal to the Horde. Western Europe, trying to weaken Russia so it would not be able to put down their revolt against the empire, sponsored the Zakhar′in regime. The reign of Ivan III is a phantom duplicate of the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Consequently, the story that Ivan III favored Judaizer heretics in Novgorod and Moscow at the turn of the sixteenth century actually belongs to the middle of the sixteenth century. Under Ivan No. 3 (Tsarevich Ivan) and the oprichnina, the pro-Western Romanovs permitted German Lutherans to proliferate in Russia, including in the oprichnina itself. The Russian church called the Lutherans “Judaizers.” Kazan′ was the Judaizers’ center, later transformed by Romanov historiography into the Jewish Khazar Kaganate, supposedly of the early Middle Ages. The Romanovs were therefore descendants of the secret Judaizer Zakhar′ins. The oprichnina printer Ivan Fedorov, Russia’s first printer known by name, was also a Judaizer.2 Once in power, the Romanovs terminated the Livonian War so that “Jews” supported by Western Europe could run Russia. Before 1563 no ruler used terror in Russia. The terror phase of sixteenth-century Russian history began either on the accession of Ivan No. 3 in 1563, his abdication in1564, or the establishment of the oprichnina in 1565.3 The oprichnina sack of “Great Novgorod” was actually directed against the city of Iaroslavl′, which with its surrounding cities was 2 Fomenko and Nosovskii do not clearly distinguish between actual Jews or accused Judaizers on the one hand and Lutherans who were called Judaizers by the Russian Orthodox Church on the other. 3 L. I. Bocharov et al., Zagovor protiv russkoi istorii (Moscow: Anvik K, 2003), 24, dates the Terror to the regency of Grand Princess Elena Glinskaia, Ivan the Terrible’s mother, and her lover Prince Ivan Telepnev-Ovchin-Obolenskii (hereafter “Obolenskii” for short), in which case it began in 1533 and ran under them until 1537 when Elena died and Obolenskii was terminated with extreme prejudice. Implicitly, the Terror was not resumed until 1563–1565.

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known as Novgorod. What is now called Great Novgorod was not founded before 1569–70. Therefore, Ivan No. 3 sacked Iaroslavl′ and then moved “Novgorod” from the Volga River to the Volkhov River. It was to the “new” Novgorod that Ivan No. 3 moved his treasury, nearer the Zakhar′in northwest homeland.4 As a result of civil war, whitewashed in Romanov historiography as Mengli Girei’s burning of Moscow in 1571, Ivan No. 3 was forced to relinquish power in 1572 in favor of Simeon Bekbulatovich, probably Ivan III’s son. The anti-Romanov reaction had actually begun before 1572. Maliuta Skuratov and Vasilii Griaznoi, supposedly oprichnina operatives, were actually anti-oprichnina activists, which is why the Romanovs faced execution in the Moscow “affair” of 1572 run by Skuratov and Griaznoi. Ivan No.  3 did not formally abdicate until 1575 when Simeon was crowned, moved the capital to Tver′, and ruled until 1584 under the “throne name” Ivan Vasil′evich. Ivan No. 3, who was not held responsible for the oprichnina because of his youth, died peacefully in 1581. Ivan No. 4’s (Simeon’s) huge donations in memory of Ivan No. 3 were not motivated by Ivan No. 4’s guilt for accidentally killing him, because there was nothing to be guilty about. The donations permitted Tsarevich Ivan to atone for the atrocities of the oprichnina committed during his reign. Ivan No. 4 tried to resume the Livonian War, but the country’s exhaustion made that impossible. He was able to move the capital back to Iaroslavl′ only briefly. Ivan No. 4 was succeeded by his son, known in history as Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, whose son was Boris Godunov.5 Since Boris Godunov was a member of the pro-Horde faction, the European powers who had instigated the Romanovs in the first place were not pleased that Russia might be strong enough to put down their rebellion. They had instigated the Time of Troubles in 1563 that led to the first, temporary Romanov ascendancy. Now Western interference led to the permanent installation of the Romanov usurpers on the throne in 1613. The Romanovs were consistently pro-Western, so they initiated the rewriting of Russian history to erase all traces of the Russia-Horde Empire, destroying evidence which would have contradicted a virtual past in which Russia was conquered by inferior Inner Asian pagan nomad Mongols, all part of a scheme to exalt the West and denigrate Russia. To hide the Romanov role in the oprichnina, the Romanovs rewrote 4 Nosovskii and Fomenko, Vvedenie v novuiu khronologiiu, 357–60. 5 Idem, Novaia khronologiia Rusi, 183–84, 187.

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the reign of “Ivan the Terrible” as a single ruler who was responsible for the terror. In the process they vilified anyone who had opposed the Zakhar′in faction during that reign. Thus Skuratov and Griaznoi became oprichnina thugs, reversing their actual opposition to the oprichnina propagated by the Zakhar′ins.6 But the empire had not yet completely disappeared. Remnants of the Horde survived in the Cossacks. The Razin and Pugachev revolts were attempts to restore the rightful imperial rulers. What was called “Russian Tartary” on eighteenth-century maps was another successor state of the empire in Siberia and Alaska, whose capital was Tobol′sk.7 Falsifying Russian history was a complicated process. It required destroying evidence of what was as well as creating evidence of what never was. Ivan the Terrible’s library was burned and then “moved” from Aleksandrovskaia sloboda to Alexandria in Egypt to become attributed to Alexander the Great. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich had been told that no earlier chronicles existed on the basis of which a history of Russia could be written. In the late seventeenth century the Germans of Königsberg “discovered,” that is, forged, the Königsberg Chronicle, better known as the Radziwill Chronicle, and presented it to Peter the Great. It became the basis for all later chronicle accounts of East Slavic history from Kievan times on, including the Laurentian and Hypatian Chronicles.8 The destruction of Russia’s history took centuries.9 Even in the nineteenth century anyone who questioned the Romanov version of Russian backwardness and inferiority was dismissed as “unprofessional,” or if necessary the authentic sources they discovered were labeled forgeries, the fate of Aleksandr Sulakadzev.10 The Romanov falsification of history was designed to enhance the pro-Western ideology and policies of the dynasty. In the eighteenth century the Romanovs relied upon imported German scholars such as Gerhard Müller (Fedor Miller) to create their new chronology. Müller complied by doctoring Vasilii Tatishchev’s history, which was of course patriotic, so that the published version reflects Müller’s, not Tatishchev’s, views. By the time Russians like 6 Idem, Vvedenie v novuiu khronologiiu, 372–74. 7 Idem, History: Fiction or Science? Chronology, vol. 4, 250–68, 298–353. 8 Idem, Novaia khronologiia Rusi, 20–46. 9 Marina Zhurinskaia, “Son razuma porozhdaet chudovishch,” http://www.pravoslavie. ru/press/ao_sonrazuma1.htm, accessed July 28, 2009, again and again asks why the falsification of history posited by the New Chronology took place, but that question has been answered at repetitious length in Fomenko and Nosovskii’s works: because of Western and Romanov Russophobia. 10 Fomenko and Nosovskiy, History: Fiction or Science? Chronology, vol. 4, 436–41.

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Mikhail Lomonosov were permitted to address Russian history, it was already too late. Even the first and only volume of Lomonosov’s history was published only posthumously after it had been properly “edited.”11 The “restoration” of “true” Russian history went into hiatus until Fomenko and his associates restored it. This synthesis of the New Chronology version of “Ivan the Terrible’s” reign illustrates several of its salient qualities. Nothing in medieval Russian and Muscovite history before 1613 is what it seems. Duplicates of people and events abound. The Mongol Empire was good because it was not a Mongol Empire but a Russian Empire. The reign of “Ivan the Terrible” witnessed a battle for control of that empire in which a Russophobic pro-Western boyar faction supported the revolt of Western Europe against Russian rule, aided and abetted by Jews and Judaizers. After fits and starts, a new Russophobic pro-Western dynasty ascended the throne in 1613 and rewrote sixteenth-century history. Blame for the atrocities of the oprichnina belongs to the pro-Western Zakhar′in clan, not the patriotic Russians who supported the Horde. The New Chronology delegitimizes the Romanov dynasty from its inception as pro-Western. Conspiracy theory, antisemitism and xenophobia combine to produce an all-encompassing alternative history of Russia.12 Note that the advocates of Ivan’s canonization, the apologists of chapter 1 discussed in detail in chapter 3, share the New Chronology’s antisemitism and xenophobia, but they reinterpret the history of the reign of a single Ivan the Terrible by denying the atrocities which the New Chronology attributes to pro-Western boyars. Mainstream academic Russian historians specializing in the Mongol period reacted vehemently to the New Chronology version of thirteenth- to fifteenth-century Russian history, which they saw as anti-Russian because it eliminated the baneful effects of the Mongol conquest and the Tatar Yoke, but that discussion would take us too far from Ivan the Terrible.13 Instead, let us enumerate the liberties that Fomenko and Nosovskii take with the narrative of the tsar’s reign. 11 Idem, Vvedenie v novuiu khronologiiu, 456–67. 12 For analysis of the New Chronology within the context of other “alternative history” theories in Russia since 1991 see Marlene Laruelle, Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines and Political Battlefield (London: Routledge, 2019), 55–71 (60–65 on the New Chronology); and Konstantin Sheiko and Stephen Brown, History as Therapy. Alternative History and Nationalist Imaginings in Russia (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2014), passim (183–97) on the New Chronology conception of Ivan the Terrible). 13 Halperin. “False Identity and Multiple Identities in Russian History,” 1–50.

Who Was Not Ivan the Terrible, Who Ivan the Terrible Was Not  •  CHAPTER 2

Fomenko and Nosovskii present no direct evidence that Ivan (Ivan No. 1) lost his mind in 1553. They ignore the evidence that Vasilii Blazhennyi existed before 1553 and “Vasilii” was simply a common Christian Russian name, held by many non-tsars. Their alternative date for the death of Ivan No. 1/Vasilii Blazhennyi in 1589 lacks any documentary basis. The Copenhagen portrait of Ivan the Terrible dates to the seventeenth century and cannot reflect sixteenth-century Muscovite perceptions of his piety, although to be sure authentic evidence exists to substantiate Ivan’s religious devotion. To deny that Tsarevich Dmitrii died in 1553 they interpret the Chosen Council as a Regency council for a minor. Much recent scholarship questions whether there ever was such a thing as the Chosen Council or even if the émigré Prince Andrei Kurbskii, the sole author to employ the term, meant Chosen Council or chosen council, not an institution but selected advisors. Even if such a Chosen Council existed institutionally rather than informally it could not have been a Regency council because Muscovite dynastic practice envisioned no such institution. The date Fomenko and Nosovskii assign to Tsarevich Dmitrii’s death is created from thin air in order to explain what they want to see as a change of policy thereafter as a change in ruler. Their assertion that Tsarevich Dmitrii (Ivan No. 2) and Tsarevich Dmitrii of Uglich were one and the same is as baseless as all their “dynastic duplicates.” That Tsarevich Ivan (Ivan No. 3) came to the throne in 1563 overlooks numerous Russian and foreign sources thereafter that name Ivan the Terrible and Tsarevich Ivan as participating in events together. A second Ivan coronation in 1572 cannot be substantiated.14 There is no evidence that the Zakhar′ins were pro-Western or that Western powers interfered in Russia on their behalf. The Livonian War was not directed against European powers rather than Livonia (at least until other Baltic states intervened). There is nothing to link printer Ivan Fedorov to the Judaizers (although he was accused of “heresy” for editing sacred texts). Indeed, no documents substantiate the survival of the Judaizers into the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Fomenko and Nosovskii exaggerate German “influence” during the oprichnina. Only a handful of Germans served in the oprichnina, although a larger number of captured Livonian mercenaries who had entered Ivan’s service fought at Molodi against the Crimean Tatars. It is only by fusing Ivan III 14 This “fact” may be a perversion of Simeon Bekbulatovich’s confused accession in 1575. Ivan “installed” Simeon but there was no coronation ceremony.

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and “Ivan IV” as duplicates that Fomenko and Nosovskii can somehow make the oprichnina an instrument of Judaizers even as they concede that the Russian Orthodox Church just called Lutherans Judaizers. Fomenko and Nosovskii treat German and Jewish/Judaizer influence in Muscovy as a single phenomenon of Western interference in Russian affairs. Antisemitic apologists for Ivan and advocates of Ivan’s canonization also invent a domestic and foreign Jewish/Judaizer threat to Russia during Ivan’s reign. The oprichnina was not directed primarily against Russian boyars, which should be obvious merely from the fact that it included the sack of Great Novgorod. That the punitive campaign against Great Novgorod really attacked Iaroslavl′ has no basis in history or archeology. “Moving” Iaroslavl′ to Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River would have required surmounting technical problems in falsification beyond even Fomenko and Nosovskii’s imagination.15 That Ivan relocated to Novgorod after his looting of the city was hardly the act of a deranged mind, but it does suggest that accounts of Novgorod’s devastation were embellished. The archeology of Moscow precludes Fomenko and Nosovskii’s recreation of its history. It is hardly convincing that Tsarevich Ivan was not imprisoned or executed when he was overthrown because he was not held responsible for policies undertaken in his name. He was in his late teens at the time. Leaving him at large would have been political idiocy because he would still have been a dangerous symbol. He could hardly have been permitted to live out a peaceful retirement until 1581. The Zakhar′ins were not the major objects of the 1572 Moscow executions, which were directed against the Moscow bureaucracy and deportees from Novgorod. Fomenko and Nosovskii do not explain why it took two years for the new Ivan No. 4 to be crowned, and anyway there was no coronation. They also get the Simeon Bekbulatovich episode completely wrong. Simeon Bekbulatovich, before his baptism Sain-Bulat, was the great-grandson of Khan Ahmat of the Juchid ulus. He was probably born in 1545, which would make Ivan III’s parentage difficult since Ivan III died in 1503. Simeon’s attempt as Ivan No. 4 to restore Iaroslavl′ as capital has no foundation. Fomenko and Nosovskii disregard evidence that Ivan the Terrible and Simeon coexisted and that Simeon lived until 1616. Even if “Ivan” (Ivan No. 1) was not directly responsible for Tsarevich Ivan’s death, a position toward 15 V. L. Ianin, “‘Ziiaiushchie vysoty’ akademika Fomenko,” in Anti-istoriia, vychislennaia matematikami. O novoi khronologii Fomenko i Nosovskogo, ed. S. O. Shmidt (Moscow: Rossiisskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2006), 87–96.

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which some legitimate historians now incline, Ivan the Terrible would still have interpreted the death of his heir as God’s punishment for his sins and turned to the synodicals and pious donations to atone. Fomenko and Nosovskii have little appreciation of sixteenth-century Russian Orthodox belief, which is not surprising given their attitude toward religion in general. Their interpretation of the reign of Ivan the Terrible rests upon willful disregard for facts and evidence which contradicts its arbitrary conclusions. Of course Fomenko and Nosovksii dismiss the source base of this narrative as later Romanov falsifications. Somehow the seventeenth-century Romanovs forged the fourteenth-century Laurentian manuscript of the Tale of Bygone Years (Povest′ vremennykh let), the Kievan chronicle. Fomenko and Nosovskii’s theory of the composite Ivan does not, as they claim, resolve all the contradictions in Ivan’s reign, and scarcely makes that reign simple and understandable. There is nothing simple about keeping track of four rulers with the throne name “Ivan IV.” However, this creative writing does accomplish several unacknowledged purposes which shed considerable light upon Fomenko and Nosovskii’s historical prejudices. They date Ivan’s use of terror only to the period of the oprichnina. To make this case they ignore a number of salient and unedifying episodes of Ivan’s behavior before 1563. But in this way the “real” Ivan the Terrible is totally absolved of all responsibility for “Ivan’s” excesses. The “real” Ivan the Terrible also maintains a consistent anti-Western policy in contrast to the demonized Zakhar′in-Romanovs who are responsible for what was later described as the Crimean burning of Moscow. The “real” Ivan neither seeks asylum in England, a very unpalatable act for Russian patriots, nor accidentally murders his son. Moreover, the Livonian War was not Russian aggression against European civilization but a justified attempt to put down a European revolt against the legitimate Great (Russian) Empire. Fomenko and Nosovskii create an Ivan the Terrible, Ivan No. 1, who matches their ideal Russian ruler. The connection of the Great Empire to the Razin and Pugachev revolts or what was called “Great Tartary” on maps rests upon the dubious equation of the Cossacks as the professional army of the Great Empire also known as the Horde. The Romanovs hardly possessed the capacity to rewrite all East Slavic history from the tenth century on, let alone coordinate a worldwide historical project to do the same for Europe and Asia, nor did they even try to undertake such a project. Officials told Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich that no current chronicle carrying Rus′ history up to the

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present existed, not that no earlier Rus′ chronicles existed. The extensive Nikon Chronicle (Nikonovskaia letopis′) about Rus′ history from the Tower of Babel to 1567 derives its name from the fact that Patriarch Nikon owned a sixteenth-century copy in the seventeenth century. To demean the Romanovs as consistently pro-Western Fomenko and Nosovskii disregard all evidence of Patriarch Filaret’s anti-Western views and policies and of seventeenth-century Muscovite anti-Western wars.

“Two, Three, Many Ivan the Terribles”16 Fomenko and Nosovskii describe “traditional” historiography about Ivan as contradictory and confusing. The current depiction of Ivan’s reign, Fomenko and Nosovskii opine, is one of the “most obscure” (temnoe) in Russian history.17 Both characterizations are undoubtedly true. However, their fantasy of four Ivans does not “explain” the twists and turns of “Ivan the Terrible’s” reign. Surprisingly, no historian in Russia specializing in Ivan’s reign, of which there are an abundance, has taken the time to address the infinity of factual errors committed by Fomenko and Nosovskii concerning Ivan. Sigurd Shmidt wrote that after studying Ivan for more than sixty years he could write such a critique,18 but apparently he never did. Iurii Begunov, unlike Shmidt neither a historian nor a specialist on Ivan the Terrible, did attempt such a critique, but his results were decidedly mixed.19 Outside Russia, Konstantin Sheiko and Stephen Brown summarize Fomenko and Nosovskii’s theory of Ivan as a composite very well, but 16 Ernesto Ché Guevara, Marxist revolutionary, guerilla, and author, was born in Argentina, helped Fidel Castro come to power in Cuba, and died fighting in Bolivia in 1967. He said during the Vietnam War that there would be a “bright future should, two, three, many Vietnams flourish throughout the world.” Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara. A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997), 719. 17 Nosovskii and Fomenko, Bibleiskaia Rus′, 1:460. 18 S. O. Shmidt, “‘Fenomen Fomenko’ v kontekste izucheniia sovremennogo obshchestvennogo istoricheskogo soznaniia,” in Shmidt, Anti-istoriia, vychislennaia matematikami, 317. 19 Begunov is a literary specialist (literaturoved). Iu. K. Begunov, Antifomenko. Russkaia istoriia protiv “Novoi khronologii” (Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2001), 89–102. Begunov’s chapter betrays his own suspect knowledge of Ivan’s reign. Historians cannot trace Ivan’s actions hourly for his entire life, since even his whereabouts are unknown for months at a stretch. The Copenhagen portrait is not contemporary. The first Tsarevich Dmitrii did not drown in 1553 because Tsaritsa Anastasiia slipped on the gangway. Dmitrii was being carried by his nurse. Katyrev-Rostovskii’s tale of the Time of Troubles is no longer ascribed to his authorship. Ivan did not lead the Russian

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their lack of expertise on sixteenth-century Muscovite history seriously mars their commentary.20 Fomenko and Nosovskii ignore or distort much academic scholarship on Ivan. By arguing that the oprichnina was directed against the boyars Fomenko and Nosovskii ignore recent scholarship which has disproved that interpretation.21 Their assertion that the boyars were centered in the “old” capital of Iaroslavl′ and surrounding cities is probably a mangled version of Skrynnikov’s identification of the Suzdal′ princely elite, both boyars and gentry, as the object of the first phase of the oprichnina. And yet Fomenko and Nosovskii’s amateur presentation of the reign of Ivan is not totally divorced from professional expositions of that reign. Unfortunately, like even some professional historians, all Fomenko and Nosovskii are earnestly trying to do is accommodate contradictory data from Ivan’s reign to match their own prejudices and preconceptions about how a “true” Russian troops who took Astrakhan′ in 1556. These errors and many more fatally undermine Begunov’s critique. 20 Konstantin Sheiko in collaboration with Stephen Brown, Nationalist Imaginings of the Russian Past: Anatolii Fomenko and the Rise of Alternative History in Post-Communist Russia (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2009), 213–32. There was no “boyar bloodbath” during Ivan’s reign. The boyar clans retained their influence. The real Ivan died before the oprichnina only if we accept one of Fomenko and Nosovskii’s dates of his death, 1557, but not their equally unjustified alternative, 1589. The assertion that “In reality, Ivan the Terrible has not experienced a particularly bad press in Russia, except for the liberal minority who saw continuity between this tsar and Stalin” overlooks the most dominant negative evaluation of Ivan of the nineteenth century, well before Stalin, namely Karamzin, a conservative; and even “minority” “liberals” like Kostomarov and Kliuchevskii did not need Stalin to criticize Ivan. Sheiko and Brown’s assertion badly oversimplifies even judgments of Ivan during and after Stalin’s time. It is very doubtful that Anastasiia was poisoned, although that idea has scholarly supporters. More than “a few documents” survive from Ivan’s reign; Izbrannaia Rada should be translated as “Chosen Council” or “chosen councilors,” but not “Council of Trustees.” Sheiko and Brown assert that the “usual explanation” of Ivan’s second coronation in 1572 is that Ivan was so insecure that he needed constant reassurance of his status. However, this explanation is unrealistic because there was no second coronation. At most, Ivan had seven, not eight, wives and the document in which the Russian Orthodox Church gave Ivan dispensation to marry for the fourth time, canon law notwithstanding, has survived. Vasilii Blazhennyi cannot have been buried in 1552 in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery on Red Square because the monastery is in Zagorsk. Sheiko and Brown omit any discussion of the Judaizer role during Ivan’s reign. I identified these errors in 2011 in Halperin, “False Identity and Multiple Identities in Russian History,” endnote 47 on 38–39, a work Sheiko and Brown cite in their 2014 History as Therapy although they did not revise any of this material. 21 For an early statement of these objections see Richard Hellie, “In Search of Ivan the Terrible,” in Platonov, Ivan the Terrible, ix–xxxiv.

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tsar should act. The New Chronology raises denial of Ivan’s contradictory nature to the ultimate level by denying that the “real” Ivan did anything objectionable. Multiple Ivans permit them to avoid reconciling the tsar’s ever-changing policies, a challenge that led Skrynnikov to argue that the oprichnina alone underwent four phases, in each of which Ivan pursued different policies aided by different political allies against different political enemies.22 Some specialists view Skrynnikov’s analysis as not much more satisfactory than Fomenko and Nosovskii’s, but Skrynnikov’s insistence that the oprichnina did not have a single consistent content reflects the same dilemma of contradictory evidence that animates Fomenko and Nosovskii’s fiction. There is no way to extrapolate a credible concept of a composite Ivan from the surviving sources save by capricious, arbitrary and unsound creative writing. The first Tsarevich Dmitrii, Tsarevich Ivan, and Simeon Bekbulatovich were not Ivan the Terrible.

Ivan the Terrible’s Multiple Identities Karamzin’s two Ivans and Skrynnikov’s multiple phases of the oprichnina constitute only the tip of the iceberg of approaches to the image of Ivan the Terrible structured upon multiplicities. The dichotomy proposed by Fomenko and Nosovskii in the images of Ivan between the “real” reconstructed Ivan and the “invented” Ivan of Romanov historiography (which Fomenko and Nosovskii concede remains dominant in Russia) belongs to a long tradition of theories that ascribe multiple identities to the man. There have always been dichotomies in the image of Ivan the Terrible, beginning in his own lifetime. In Muscovy during his reign, Ivan was the God-ordained autocrat, fountainhead of justice and piety, while in anti-Russian war propaganda, pamphlet literature, Livonian chronicles, and foreigner accounts Ivan was a monstrous despot and tyrant. Karamzin’s contrast of the “good” Ivan of the late 1540s and 1550s and the “bad” Ivan of the 1560s until his death originated during the tsar’s lifetime, in émigré Russian boyar Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskii Kurbsky’s History of the Grand Prince of Moscow23 and was perpetuated soon after Ivan’s death

22 Skrynnikov, Tsarstvo terrora, 203–466. 23 J. L. I. Fennell, trans., Prince A. M. Kurbsky’s History of Ivan IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).

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in Paul Oderborn24 and the early seventeenth-century “Chronograph” (Khronograf).25 Karamzin’s version of that theory became the most widely disseminated theory of Ivan’s reign in nineteenth-century Russia and continues to exert a significant influence on contemporary Russian and Western scholarship, although its interpretation of the roles of the gentry official Aleksei Adashev and the priest Sylvester of the Chosen Council has been subject to considerable criticism in modern scholarship.26 In these theories, the “two Ivans” are metaphorical, that is, there was only one Ivan who changed, a change most often attributed to the death of his first wife Tsaritsa Anastasiia Iur′eva-Zakhar′ina. These contradictory images persisted into modern historiography. Ivan still has his apologists and critics. Confronted with the task of making sense of the actions of (a single) Ivan, more than one historian has taken the path of least resistance and concluded that his reign does not make sense because he did not make sense. Ivan is dismissed as at least paranoid if not an insane sociopath. Of course, to Fomenko and Nosovskii those actions were taken by four men, none of whom was insane. Unfortunately, the insanity theory of Ivan explains nothing. Various historians continue to distinguish between what they think is the “true” Ivan from “false” images of Ivan. Keenan created the “PseudoIvan,” the invented author of apocryphal epistles from the seventeenth century attributed to the (true) Ivan who was illiterate at least in Slavonic if not also in Chancery Russian. Fomenko and Nosovskii take some cognizance of this theory but contradictorily write both that “Ivan’s” letters were authentic but revised in the seventeenth century and that Kurbskii’s First Epistle was written by Semen Shakhovskoi in the seventeenth century, a secondhand

24 I. I. Polosin, “Nemetskii pastor Oderborn i ego pamflet ob Ivane Groznom (1585),” in Sotsial′no-politicheskaia istoriia Rosiii XVI–nachala XVII v. sbornik statei (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963), 191–217. 25 Izbornik slavianskikh i russkikh sochinenii i statei vnesennykh v Khronografy russkoi redaktsii, ed. Andrei Popov (Moscow: Tipografiia A. I. Mamontova, 1869), 182–83. 26 Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskago, vols. 8–9; Anthony N. Grobovsky, The “Chosen Council” of Ivan IV: A Reinterpretation (Brooklyn: Theo. Graus’ Sons, Inc., 1969); Antonii N. Grobovskii, Ivan Groznyi i Sil′vestr (Istoriia odnogo mifa), trans. Izrail and Irina Rabinovich (London: n. p., 1987); Carolyn Johnston Pouncy, “‘The Blessed Sylvester’ and the Politics of Invention in Muscovy, 1545–1700,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 19 (1995): 548–72; Filiushkin, Istoriia odnoi mistifikatsii. Cf. Sergei Bogatyrev, “Micro-Periodization and Dynasticism: Was There a Divide in the Reign of Ivan the Terrible?,” Slavic Review 69 (2010): 398–409.

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allusion to an early conclusion of the unnamed Keenan.27 There is no way in the sixteenth century that Ivan could have written a response to Kurbskii’s First Epistle if Kurbskii’s letter were not written until the seventeenth century. The advocates of Ivan’s canonization contrast the “true” Ivan, a pious martyr for Russia and opponent of Jewish influence, with the “myth” of Ivan created by hostile Westerners and their Russian flunkies. Some of the source dichotomies underlying these conceptions of a “true” and “false” Ivan can be mitigated by underlying convergences. “The personality of Ivan described in the travel accounts—the playful, capricious, mercurial, strong-willed tsar, whether as sadistic tyrant or impartial, stern judge—is identical to the literary persona who wrote Ivan’s First Epistle to Kurbskii.”28 Another version of multiple Ivans applies to his literary compositions. As a writer Ivan assumed pseudonyms. Scholars have proposed most convincingly that Ivan was ghostwriter of at least three of the four Muscovite boyar replies to the invitation to defect by King Sigismund Augustus of Poland-Lithuania.29 Dmitrii Likhachev argued less convincingly that Ivan authored a canon to the Archangel Michael under the pseudonym “Parfenii the Holy Fool.”30 Daniil Al′shits least convincingly nominated Ivan as the anonymous author of the interpolations in the Tsar’s Book (Tsarstvennaia kniga), a segment of the Illustrated Chronicle Compilation (Litsevoi letopisnyi svod) about his illness in 1553.31 It should be noted that Likhachev’s and Al′shits’s attributions retain some popularity among scholars. Again, in this case there is actually only one Ivan who assumed different pen names depending upon varying circumstance. Soviet scholars suggested that Ivan had literary alter egos, characters in current tales who were perceived by the literate Muscovite public to be him. Allegory was a fundamental mode of thought of medieval Christianity, East 27 Cf. Nosovskii and Fomenko, Rekonstruktsiia vseobshchei istorii. Novaia khronologiia, 577–78; idem, Novaia khronologiia Rusi, 167; and idem, Bibleiskaia Rus′, 1:106. 28 Charles J. Halperin, “A Heretical View of Sixteenth-Century Muscovy: Edward L. Keenan, The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha,” JbfGOE 22 (1974): 172. 29 Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo, ed. D. S. Likhachev and Ia. S. Lur′e (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1951), 241–77. 30 D. S. Likhachev, “Kanon i molitva Angelu Groznomu voevode Parfeniia Urodivogo (Ivana Groznogo),” in Rukopisnoe nasledie drevnei Rusi. Po materialam Pushkinskogo doma, ed. A. M. Panchenko (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1972), 10–27. 31 Al′, Ivan Groznyi: Izvestnyi i neizvestnyi, 227–53.

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and West, so allegorical interpretation of a literary work would have come naturally to sixteenth-century Russians. Usually, literary scholars discuss the use of Biblical allegories in sixteenth-century Russian works. Fomenko and Nosovskii as usual turn this approach on its head. According to their inverted reconstruction of the composition of scripture, the Old Testament stories of Samson, Esther, and Judith were allegories written in the seventeenth century about the reign of Ivan the Terrible.32 However, there are also scholarly theories that Ivan had literary alter egos in contemporary Muscovite culture. In these texts Ivan “appears” in the guise of other characters. According to the Soviet literary schlolar Rufina Dmitrieva, Petr in the Tale of Petr and Fevroniia was Ivan’s alter ego, and Fevroniia Anastasiia’s. According to the Soviet scholars Irina Lebedeva and Vadim Koretskii, following the arguments of the imperial Russian historian Ivan Zabelin, Ioasaf in The Tale of Varlaam and Ioasaf was Ivan’s alter ego, and Varlaam the priest was Sylvester’s. However, the differences between biographies of Ivan and his alter egos in the Tale of Petr and Fevroniia and the Tale of Varlaam and Ioasaf far outweigh the supposed parallels.33 These alter ego Ivans were fictional characters, distinct from the multiple physical Ivans of the New Chronology. In 2006 Anna Litvina and Fedor Uspenskii published a stimulating and original monograph on name-culture in Ancient Rus′ that analyzed several names ascribed to Ivan. If Slavonic and Russian are considered different languages rather than different linguistic registers of the same language, then he had always had two names, “Ivan” and “Ioann.” He took a third name, Iona, when he became a monk on his deathbed. Litvina and Uspenskii go further. Imaginatively mobilizing visual and textual evidence they argue that princes were given two Christian names, a public, official, baptismal name and a private, intimate, personal, calendar name for use in church and family life. They reject one nonpublic name which has been attributed to Ivan, Varus (Uar), but assign two new nonpublic names to him, Titus 32 Samson: G. V. Nosovskii and A. T. Fomenko. Rekonstrutsiia vseobshchei istorii. Zhanna d’Ark, Samson i russkaia istoriia. Novaia khronologiia. S prilozheniem “Arki Slavy Imperatora Maksimiliana I,” sozdannoi A. Diurerom; i s prilozheniem svodnykh khronologicheskikh tablits dat i imen pravitelei (Moscow: Finansovyi izdatel′skii dom “Delovoi ekspress,” 2002), 87–116; Esther: idem, Bibleiskaia Rus′, 1:421–64; Judith: idem, Bibleiskaia Rus′, 1:465–82. 33 Halperin, “False Identity and Multiple Identities in Russian History,” 59–61 (Tale of Petr and Fevroniia), 61–63 (Tale of Varlaam and Ioasaf).

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(Tit) and Smaragdus (Smaragd, “The Pearl”).34 Litvina and Uspenskii conclude their treatment of Ivan’s names by declaring that he was known to his contemporaries as Ioann Groznyi.35 The kind of multiple names Litvina and Uspenskii propose is corroborated indirectly by a different naming practice they do not mention, discovered by Russell Martin: the inconsistent adoption of “regal” names by royal brides. The only instance from the reign of Ivan the Terrible is the 1575 case of Pelageia Petrovna-Solova, second wife of Tsarevich Ivan, who became Feodosiia upon her marriage.36 However, the distinction between a name and a nickname remains elusive. Authors often utilized metaphors to describe a ruler as a “New Constantine,” a David, or a Solomon, but this did not mean that the ruler bore that name. Despite Litvina and Uspenskii’s contention, shared far too widely, there is no credible evidence that Ivan was called Ivan “the Terrible” (Groznyi) in his own lifetime or for some time thereafter.37 Ironically, about the only thing Fomenko and Nosovskii get even partially right about Ivan the Terrible is that, pace Litvina and Uspenskii, he did not carry the epithet Groznyi during his reign. The most frequently invoked evidence that Ivan carried this name in the sixteenth century is Russian folklore, whose reliability as an indicator of medieval or early modern Russian mentality Fomenko and Nosovskii rightly doubt.38 Litvina and Uspenskii indirectly raise the fascinating question as to whether in Muscovy different names for the same individual were intended to convey different identities, which works for monastic names and throne names, self-evidently, but perhaps not for princely names. More importantly 34 Anna Feliksovna Litvina and Fedor Borisovich Uspenskii, Vybor imeni u russkikh kniazei v X–XVI vv. Dinasticheskaia istoriia skvoz′ prizmu antroponimiki (Moscow: Indrik, 2006), 551–53, 537–38, 389–96, 202–4, 218–19, 179. 35 Ibid., 200. 36 Russell E. Martin, “Gifts for Kith and Kin: Gift Exchanges and Social Integration in Muscovite Royal Weddings,” in Rude and Barbarous Kingdom Revisited: Essays in Russian History in Honor of Robert O. Crummey, ed. Chester Dunning, Russell Martin, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2008), 89. 37 Charles J. Halperin, “The Metamorphosis of Ivan IV into Ivan the Terrible,” in Miscellanea Slavica. Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu Borisa Andreevicha Uspenskogo, ed. F. B. Uspenskii (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 379–97; Edward L. Keenan, “How Ivan Became ‘Terrible,’” in Rus′ Writ Large: Languages, Histories, Cultures. Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann, Harvard Ukrainian Studies 28 (2006): 521–42. 38 Nosovskii and Fomenko, Vvedenie v novuiu khronologiiu, 366.

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for our discussion, leaving aside any conclusion about whether Ivan bore multiple names, it remains the case that these would have been multiple names of the same man, a single Ivan, unlike Fomenko and Nosovskii’s four Ivans.39

Conclusion: The One and Only Ivan the Terrible If there was no “pseudo-Ivan” in the seventeenth century fabricating epistles in Ivan’s name; if the most scurrilous foreigner accounts by travelers or former oprichniki describe the same man as the most obsequious Muscovite chronicle, tales, or sermon; if the propagandistic idealizations of him as a proto-Stalin or a Russian Orthodox saint are discarded along with equally one-sided and unilluminating psychiatric perorations on his insanity; if Ivan was never named Varus or Titus or Smaragdus; if neither Prince Petr of Murom nor Tsarevich Ioasaf of India were Ivan’s alter egos; if neither the first Tsarevich Dmitrii, nor Tsarevich Ivan, nor Simeon Bekbulatovich played Ivan the Terrible; if the arbitrary division of his reign into the “good” Ivan and the “bad” Ivan is inconsistent with the evidence of the extant sources, then historians of the reign of Ivan the Terrible are left with the one and only Ivan the Terrible, a complex, complicated, paradoxical, and contradictory personage who frequently changed policies and advisors—not a very good or very bad man, but one who was at all times a mixture of good and evil, whose role-playing expressed different facets of his personality and who employed a variety of literary styles in his writing, whether under his own name or that of pseudonyms, each literary “voice” personifying one of his theatrical personae.40 One Ivan the Terrible is more than enough of a challenge for historians to explain.

39 Halperin, “False Identity and Multiple Identities in Russian History,” 56–59. 40 D. S. Likhachev, “Litsedeistvo Groznogo. K voprosu o smekhovom stile ego proizvedeniia,” in Smekh v drevnei Rusi, ed. D. S. Likhachev, A. M. Panchenko, and N. V. Ponyrko (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1984), 25–35.

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Would You Believe Saint Ivan? Reforming the Image of Tsar Ivan the Terrible

Some apologists for Ivan, discussed in chapter 1, exceeded even the fulsome praises of his piety articulated in his lifetime in sermons by advocating his canonization or even asserting that he already possessed saintly status. This assertion inspired a very contentious debate in the Russian Orthodox Church until Patriarch Aleksii II shut down all discussion of the issue by declaring that Ivan could not be granted sainthood. No historian of Ivan’s reign has previously examined the arguments of proponents and opponents of Ivan’s canonization from the point of view of historical scholarship, a lacuna this chapter will fill.1 While the number of Russian Orthodox Christians who support Ivan’s elevation to sainthood cannot be determined, the arguments adduced in favor or against that act resonate with the entire spectrum of images of Ivan in Russia since 1991.

1 Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 179–83, discusses the activities of pro-canonization Orthodox brotherhoods, including the consecration of a chapel to Ivan, and popular songs praising his sainthood. Echoing the Old Believer view of Peter the Great, a brotherhood leader accused the Russian president and the patriarch of serving Anti-Christ.

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Saintly Rus′/Russian Rulers The Russian Orthodox Church has never been averse to canonizing members of the Riurikid dynasty that began to rule in Novgorod the Great and Kiev in the ninth century and remained on the thrones in Vladimir and Moscow until 1598 or 1610 (if we include Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii). Grand Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavovich was canonized for his role in the conversion of Rus′ to Christianity in the tenth century. His sons Boris and Gleb, as well as Grand Prince Mikhail of Chernigov (Chernihiv) and Mikhail’s boyar Fedor, Grand Prince Mikhail of Tver′ and Ivan the Terrible’s son Tsarevich Dmitrii of Uglich, were canonized as martyrs. Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, another son of Ivan’s, also became a saint. More recently the Romanov Nicholas II has joined the cohort of royal martyrs. Among other Riurikids, Prince Fedor “the Black” of Yaroslavl′ and his sons were made saints for posthumous miracles. Grand Prince Alexander Nevskii of Vladimir and Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi of Moscow received canonization for their defense of Orthodox Christianity against Catholics and Muslims respectively. However, given Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s reputation as a sadistic tyrant, lecher, and mass murderer, the phrase “Saint Ivan the Terrible” would strike most people as an oxymoron. Nevertheless, in 1961 Michael Cherniavsky argued that Ivan was perceived as a saint in Muscovy, as evidenced by his inclusion in an early seventeenth-century list of saints and by his iconography. The frescoes of the Novospasskii Monastery portray Ivan as an early Rus′ prelate-saint; the miniatures of the Kazan′ History (Kazanskaia istoriia) paint him as the warrior-saint St. Demetrius of Thessalonika; and the Copenhagen portrait depicts him in the manner of the apostles and great church fathers.2 Cheniavsky’s conclusion enraged Marc Szeftel, who insisted that neither deathbed monastic vows, such as those Ivan took, perhaps posthumously, because they were also available for commoners, nor halos in iconographic representation, because this was a Byzantine convention, nor any other pictorial evidence or rhetoric could constitute proof that believers perceived someone as a saint. The “Tsar Ioann” in one later list of all Orthodox saints might not refer to Ivan the Terrible—although according to Evgenii Golubinskii a list of those who deserved veneration included 2 Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 31n71, 52–53, illustrations and figures 1, 3, 6, 17. Cherniavsky assigns the Copenhagen portrait to the sixteenth century, but currently it is dated to the seventeenth, although some art historians assign it to the nineteenth century.

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Ivan, he was not actually worshiped. To Szeftel, only evidence of formal, official canonization or of popular worship could demonstrate that Ivan was considered a saint.3 Cherniavsky, however, did not argue that the Russian Orthodox Church had formally or officially canonized Ivan. He indicated only the possibility of popular veneration. He admitted that no surviving sources spoke directly to the question of Ivan’s veneration. Cherniavsky also did not claim that the tsar deserved sainthood. These positions distinguish Cherniavsky from advocates of Ivan’s canonization in Russia in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century. That campaign to have Ivan officially canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church ran into objections just as vehement as Szeftel’s reaction to Cherniavsky’s analysis, but from an authority higher than Szeftel.

Ivan’s Apologists Boris Knoppe4 wrote in 2003 that until recently any proposal that Ivan was a saint would have been treated as a fantasy. Only separate groups 3 Marc Szeftel, review of Tsar and People, by Michael Cherniavsky, American Historical Review 67 (1962): 1038–40, Cherniavsky’s reply, American Historical Review 68 (1963): 602–3, and Szeftel’s Rejoinder, ibid., 603–4. Golubinskii unfortunately projected the formal Roman Catholic process of canonization onto the early Rus′ Orthodox Church. Moreover he seems to have shared Karamzin’s evaluation of Ivan. Both considerations would call his judgment into question. Szeftel did not ask to whom (emperors who were the early icons of Christ) Byzantine art ascribed a nimbus. Cherniavsky, who commented that neither he nor Szeftel knew if anyone worshiped Ivan in Muscovy, would probably have extended this comment to Golubinskii. Cherniavsky’s point is that the “casualness” of the lists of ruler-saints demonstrates that “in Russian popular tradition and Russian political theology, all princes were seen as saints,” which would include Ivan the Terrible (Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, 31–32). Cherniavsky followed Golubinskii in identifying “Tsar′ Ioann” with Ivan the Terrible. Only a thorough analysis of all saints in this list could demonstrate that “Tsar′ Ioann” was Byzantine or South Slavic. Research since 1963 has shown a much greater appreciation of unofficial veneration of saints in the Rus′ Orthodox Church and of the significance of iconography, which would tend to impugn Szeftel’s rigid criteria for sainthood. For a more recent critical but respectful appraisal of Cherniavsky’s argument see Jaakko Lehtovirta, Ivan IV as Emperor: The Imperial Theme in the Establishment of Muscovite Tsardom (Turku, Finland: Palnosalama Oy, 1999), 154–93. I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Lehtovirta for providing me with a copy of this printed, but not published, dissertation. 4 Boris Knoppe, “Mif o ‘Sviatom’ Ivane Groznom,” in Ioann Groznyi. Pro et contra, vol. 1 [hereafter Pro et contra 1] (Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda: Izdatel′skaia gruppa VNV, 2003), 3–9, reprinted in Ioann Groznyi. Pro et contra, vol. 2 [hereafter Pro et contra 2] (Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda: Izdatel′skaia gruppa VNV, 2003), 6–13. On the canonization movement see also Aleksandr Shmelev, “Kanonizatsiia Ioanna Groznogo,

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of believer-monarchists endorsed Ivan’s canonization. The godfather5 of this movement was Ioann (Snychev), metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga (1927–95), and its bible was Metropolitan Ioann’s Samoderzhavie dukha. Ocherki russkogo samosoznaniia (Autocracy of the spirit: studies of Russian identity),6 which made a strong impression on Ivan’s apologists. The first declaration of the need to canonize him appeared in 2002, when participants in two conferences, one entitled “Historical Myths7 and Reality,” proposed that Patriarch Aleksii II evaluate the canonization of Ivan. Among those lobbying for canonization were Orthodox Russian newspapers, journals, radio stations, television programs, movie studios, and societies, in particular, the St. Petersburg “Oprichnina Brotherhood of Pious Tsar Ioann the Terrible” (Oprichnoe bratstvo blagovernogo Tsaria Ioanna Groznogo), publisher of Oprichnyi listok, and the “Oprichnina Brotherhood of Holy Reverend Iosif Volotskii” (Oprichnoe bratstvo sviatogo prepodobnogo Iosifa Volotskogo),8 publisher of Tsarskii oprichnik, and singers, actors, painters, and icon-painters of the Orthodox “beau-monde,” along with right-wing politicians who entered the fray, as did, more circumspectly, individual clerics. But Patriarch Aleksii II slammed shut the door through which Ivan had to pass to enter the ranks of the saints. The patriarch declared that canonizing the tsar was unthinkable— that to canonize him would require revoking the canonization of Metropolitan Filipp, for the church could not canonize both a murderer and his victim. The patriarch tried to suppress the movement, but he failed to silence its advocates. Debate over the question did cease.

5 6 7 8

Grigoriia Rasputina i uchenie o russkoi teokratii” in Pro et contra 2, appendix 1, 175–82. A complete list of cited works by the proponents and opponents of canonization can be found in appendix 3.1 and appendix 3.2 respectively. Knoppe and Shmelev belong to the opponents. This phrase is mine, not Knoppe’s. Mitropolit Ioann, Samoderzhavie dukha. The word “myths” here, as in the writings of Metropolitan Ioann, denotes lies, not culturally evocative legends. Note the contrast between “myths” and “reality.” Whether this group takes the name of Iosif of Volokolamsk in vain is problematic. See David M. Goldfrank, “The Deep Origins of Tsar′-Muchitel′: A Nagging Problem of Muscovite Political Theory,” Russian History 32 (2005): 341–54. On this brotherhood see Stella Rock, “Fraternal Strife: Nationalist Fundamentalists in the Russian Orthodox Brotherhood Movement,” in Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe, ed. Jonathan Sutton and Wil van den Bercken (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 333–34.

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Orthodox Paths to Sainthood There are a variety of saints in the Russian Orthodox Church and thus a variety of overlapping criteria to justify canonization. Not all require evidence that the candidate lived a pious Orthodox Christian life. The biographies of individuals canonized as martyrs or whose relics performed posthumous miracles are irrelevant to the legitimacy of their sainthood. This is not the case for candidates whose sainthood rests upon their service on behalf of Orthodoxy. Consequently the case for Ivan’s canonization could have been made on the basis of various factors. Advocates claimed to have evidence of miracles attributed to Ivan’s relics and icons, but this evidence was summarily dismissed by opponents and did not figure centrally in the discussion. The briefs extolling or accusing Ivan depended upon historical evidence of what Ivan did as ruler. Examples of previous and subsequent East Slavic rulers who had been canonized were therefore not germane to the discussion. Proponents emphasized Ivan’s novel status as the first Russian tsar. Advocates and opponents of Ivan’s canonization used and abused history to make their cases.

Historical Factors In view of its seminal importance to the movement to canonize Ivan, it is appropriate to begin with Metropolitan Ioann’s view of the man.9 He wrote that even conservative historians felt the need to indulge the Russophobic, anti-Orthodox stereotype of an insane tsar perpetrating terror on his subjects, as well as the “myth” created by the biased Jesuit Antonio Possevino that Ivan killed his own son. This myth was based upon rumors because Possevino was not an eyewitness. Marxist historians also accepted this story. In fact, Tsarevich Ivan died of natural causes. Generally, historians have believed unreliable foreign sources such as the account by the illiterate adventurer and spy Heinrich von Staden, whose goal was a German “Drive to the East” (Drang nach Osten). The number of Russians supposedly killed in Novgorod is exaggerated. The aggregate deaths attributable to Ivan’s actions pale in comparison to those attributable to contemporary European rulers. His seven “wives” and sexual perversion are “myths.” Ivan’s coronation, the turning point in Russian history, brought together the sobornost′ naroda (conciliarity of the people, meaning the free spiritiual 9 Mitropolit Ioann, Samoderzhavie dukha, 131–71.

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unity of the people) and derzhavnost′ (great power statehood) in the person of the anointed Russian Orthodox tsar. He ruled with his favorites: the leaders of the Chosen Council, the gentry servitor Aleksei Adashev, and the priest Sylvester of the Annunciation Cathedral (Blagoveshchenskii sobor) in the Moscow Kremlin. He acquired the epithet Groznyi from his conquest of Kazan′, demonstrating that he was terrible to his own enemies and to those of Russia.10 The traitor Prince Andrei Kurbskii, who defected to Poland-Lithuania and fought against Russia, slandered him by claiming that Ivan was responsible for the deaths of monks Kornilii of Pskov and Vassian Muromtsev. The passage in the Tale of the Founding of the Pskov Caves Monastery which declared that Ivan sent Kornilii to the Kingdom of Heaven does not mean that Ivan had him executed. The oprichniki helped the tsar achieve a form of state structure more compatible with Ivan’s religious calling. The oprichnina helped him eradicate heresy, separating the wheat from the chaff. The attempts of separatist Novgorod and Pskov to submit to Lithuanian sovereignty were encouraged by Judaizers, a heretical group which originated during the reign of Ivan’s grandfather, Ivan III (the Great);11 Ivan rooted out their last remnants. He was soft and gentle by nature, suffering when he had to take severe measures, but he could not forgive traitors to Holy Rus′. The conspiracies against him were real. The agreement of Metropolitan Filipp on his accession not to interfere in the oprichnina deprived the boyars of a weapon against Ivan. There is no evidence that Filipp ever delivered the anti-oprichnina sermons attributed to him in his vita. Filipp’s selfless honesty threatened unscrupulous hierarchs who then slandered Filipp. Ivan unsuccessfully tried to defend Filipp, yet the tsar was compelled to accept the verdict at Filipp’s trial. But out of office, Filipp remained a dangerous witness against the conspiracy of Novgorod, Pskov, the archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov Pimen, the Judaizers, and the Moscow boyars so that when Ivan as a sign of good faith sent Maliuta Skuratov to Filipp in the Otroch′ Monastery in Tver′ where Filipp was incarcerated, Skuratov found Filipp dead. Ivan was very 10 There is a typographical error here; 1592 should be 1552 (Mitropolit Ioann, Samoderzhavie dukha, 143). 11 The goal of Christianity, to save the world, is the opposite of the goal of Judaism, to rule the world financially. The aim of the Judaizers was to destroy Orthodox Russian society (Mitropolit Ioann, Samoderzhavie dukha, 117).

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conscientious in including in his memorial lists everyone who had died as a result of his own decisions, so the omission of Filipp’s name there shows that the tsar did not give the order to murder him. He used the oprichniki to replace the boyars in administration. There were very few deportations of people and confiscations of land. Moreover, the oprichnina was not exclusively anti-boyar. Nevertheless, the boyars coopted Adashev and Sylvester, who became their tools in trying to turn Ivan into a “boyar tsar.” He was neither a “boyar tsar” nor an “all-estate tsar,” but God’s anointed, ruling by God’s will, carrying out his divine obligation of governing all estates in harmony, responsible personally before God for the salvation of Russia.12 In Samoderzhavie dukha Metropolitan Ioann did not draw the conclusion that Ivan deserved sainthood. He did not even raise the issue. It was only later that other authors invoked Metropolitan Ioann’s rehabilitation of him and personal authority on behalf of his candidacy. Proponents of Ivan’s canonization further developed the metropolitan’s arguments. They had access to diverse media to propagate their views. It is neither possible nor necessary to survey all of their repetitious books, brochures, pamphlets, articles, roundtables, and internet postings. The literature adduced here is representative.13 Against the prevailing “myth” of Ivan’s excesses, the proponents insist that Ivan’s so-called victims were either guilty or that the tsar was not responsible for their deaths. The oprichniki were a sacred order of monkknights defending Russian Orthodoxy from its domestic and foreign enemies. The real Ivan was merciful. This is why for a decade he did not punish the 1553 conspirators who attempted to replace the tsar’s son Tsarevich Dmitrii as heir if Ivan, as expected, died of a serious illness, with Ivan’s cousin Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Staritsa.14 Without the slightest exaggeration, proponents insisted, compared to contemporary European rulers Ivan was among the mildest and most soft-hearted monarchs in

12 Bogatyrev dismisses Metropolitan Ioann’s views as “clerical gibberish” and “nationalist fantasies.” Sergei Bogatyrev, review of Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′, by Viacheslav Shaposhnik, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and European History 10 (2009): 356, 357. 13 It is reasonable to assume that the proponents selected items for inclusion in the two editions of their anthology (see Appendix 3.1) for their efficacy. 14 Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria, 27.

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the sixteenth century.15 Even unsympathetic historians note his kindness, humility, and gentleness.16

Historical Facts To reach such conclusions the advocates of canonization resort, like Metropolitan Ioann, to hopelessly convoluted, incoherent, and contradictory interpretations of the politics of Ivan’s reign. For example, the oprichnina was not directed against the boyars, but Ivan used it to replace the boyars and the boyars coopted Adashev and Sylvester. Separatist Novgorod and Pskov were in league with the Moscow boyars and appanage princes. Such a vast conspiracy sounds familiar because it could have been lifted in toto from Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan Groznyi. Neither Ivan nor Metropolitan Makarii17 ever invoked the concept of “Holy Rus′,” so neither could have fought for it. The concept appears only in seventeenth-century manuscripts of the works of the “traitor” Prince Andrei Kurbskii, where it may be an interpolation. Deportations of military servitors during the oprichnina were massive. And the list goes on. It would be impossible to enumerate all of the historical fallacies contained in the publications of Metropolitan Ioann and the advocates of Ivan’s canonization.

When Ideology Trumps Professional Integrity The proponents of Ivan’s canonization could only plunder history by disregarding or perverting the sources in a way professional historians cannot countenance. Therefore, while it is equally easy to identify convergences18 and divergences19 between proponents of canonization and professional his15 Aleksandr Barkashov, “Pravoslavnyi sviatoi—tsar′ Ivan Groznyi,” in Pro et contra 2, 111. 16 Viktor Saulkin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable, September 21, 2002, among journalist Leonid Bolotin, icon-painter Viktor Saulkin and writer Andrei Khavlin, http://icxc.narod.ru/icons/vologda’agios/htm. 17 Despite Leonid Bolotin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable. 18 Paul Bushkovitch on Filipp’s speeches in the vita of Filipp and whether Ivan killed Tsarevich Ivan, David Miller on Metropolitan Makarii’s influence, Hugh Graham on the number of casualties in Novgorod, Keenan on the bias of the travel accounts and the historical value of Kurbskii’s History, Halperin on the utility of the insanity paradigm and the level of violence in Ivan’s reign compared to others in Europe. 19 Aleksandr Il′ich Filiushkin on Adashev and Sylvester’s influence, Carolyn Johnston Pouncy on Sylvester’s influence, Marshall Poe on the value of the travel accounts

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torians, both catalogues are irrelevant. The former have read a fair sample of secondary works about Ivan but interpret them to suit their own purposes. Boris Veselovskii derided historians who violated their professional craft when it comes to the tsar. His remarks, despite the proponents, were directed at Robert Vipper (Wipper), the proponents’ poster boy historian of Ivan, not the Russophobic perpetrators of the “myth” of Ivan’s despotism. Metropolitan Ioann conceded that his monograph was not a scholarly work “in the strict sense of that word.”20 His followers would not want it any other way. They praise the metropolitan for not addressing the tsar’s reign in a scholarly manner (nauchno) but rather “in a confessional way” (ispodnicheski).21 Secular historians miss the religious mystery at the heart of Ivan’s actions;22 they are wrongly blamed for the neglect of Metropolitan Makarii’s role in Ivan’s reign;23 the best historian of Ivan was Wipper, Estonian by nationality but Orthodox by faith.24 In short, to the proponents of Ivan’s canonization, academic scholarship is profane.25 The Orthodox historian Andrei Khvalin declared that historians should select from the sources about Ivan that which is “in consonance with the heartfelt commandments” of Christ.26 Even Shaposhnik, a scholar writing after the debate over Ivan’s canonization had been closed, opines that while Metropolitan Ioann was not a professional historian, the fact that he was a cleric made it easier for him to abstract (read: manipulate—CJH) the historical material to explain events. Ivan can only be considered a tyrant based upon rationalistic views (read: by professional academic standards—CJH) distant from the Orthodox faith. According to the faith, Ivan was a hero.27 It is no surprise, (though not on legendary atrocity stories about Ivan), Norman W. Ingham and Maureen Perrie on the ambivalence of folklore about Ivan, V. A. Korobkov and I. A. Lobakova on the textual history of vita of Filipp, Cherniavsky on Holy Rus′, Grobovsky on whether there was a “Chosen Council,” Keenan on Ivan’s homicidal tendencies and whether he was poisoned, Halperin and Keenan on when Ivan acquired the epithet Groznyi, Boris Uspenskii on whether Ivan was anointed. 20 Mitropolit Ioann, Samoderzhavie dukha, 46n9. 21 Bolotin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable. 22 Makeev, Oprichnyi put′, 31–32. 23 Bolotin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable. 24 A. Zhukov, “Materialy Kruglogo stola, posvaishchennogo 435-letiiu vvedeniia oprichniny,” in Pro et contra 1, 44. 25 Aleksandr Eliseev, “Oprichnaia eskhatologiia Groznogo Tsaria,” in Pro et contra 1, 58. 26 Quoted by Shmelev, “Kanonizatsiia Ioanna Groznogo, Grigoriia Rasputina i uchenie o russkoi teokratii,” 179–80. 27 Shaposhnik, Ivan Groznyi, 456. Although Bogatyrev’s review of this book is hostile (Bogatyrev, review of Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′, 353–61), he does observe that

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consequently, that professional historians supporting his canonization sacrifice scholarly integrity to ideology. The proponents’ use of foreign accounts illustrates their subjectivity. For all their aversion to the writings of Albert Schlichting, Johann Taube, Elert Kruse, and Henrich von Staden, regarding them as hostile to Russia, some proponents of Ivan’s canonization jump at the chance to accept as unbiased and unvarnished truth assertions by the Venetian envoys Lippomano28 and Marco Foscarini,29 and by merchants from Lübeck—all interested in making money off Ivan.30 These authors asserted that Ivan was just, but their texts were just as biased as the printed “flying leaflets” or pamphlets (Flugschriften, Flugblätter) disseminated in Livonia, Germany, and Poland-Lithuania as anti-Muscovite war propaganda during the Livonian War. The rock upon which the canonization wave crashes is the martyrdom of Metropolitan Filipp,31 whose sainthood its proponents do not impugn. According to them, Filipp supported the oprichnina, for which there is not the slightest shred of evidence. Proponents claim Ivan had nothing to do with the conspiracy led by Novgorod Archbishop Pimen to impeach Filipp. The tsar did not order Maliuta Skuratov to murder Filipp. The history of the vita proposed by the proponents of canonization is pure invention.32 Shaposhnik at least sometimes dissents from Metropolitan Ioann’s views. 28 Proponents never provide a citation for Lippomano, which should be: “Estratto d’una relezioni di Polonia, concernente la Moscovia, del clarissimo messer Girlamo Lippomano, stato ambasciatore della serenissima Republica di Venezia appresso Enrico Re di Polonia MDLXXV” [1575], in Akty istoricheskie otnosiashchiesia k Rossii, iz inostrannykh arkhivov i bibliotek (1075–1584) / Historica Russiae Monumenta ex antiquis exterarum gentium archivis et bibliotecis depromta (1075–1584), vol. 1, Vypiski iz Vatikanskogo tainogo arkhiva a iz drugikh rimskikh bibliotek i arkhivakh s 1075 po 1584, ed. Akeksandr Ivanovich Turgenev (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Eduarda Pratsa, 1841), No. CLXXXIV, 270–71. Girlamo Lippomano never visited Muscovy. He was Venetian ambassador to King Henry IV of Poland in 1575. 29 A later anonymous Venetian, not Foscarini, actually wrote this account. 30 Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria, 31; Sergei Shatokhin, “Provotsiruiut tserkovnye raskoly,” in Pro et contra 2, 57 (quoting from Maniagin). 31 Following Metropolitan Ioann on this issue are notably Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria, 65–69; Khvalin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable; Shatokhin, “Provotsiruiut tserkovnye raskoly,” 50. 32 According to them, boyar chronicles in Novgorod and Pskov originated the accusation that Ivan was responsible for Filipp’s death, a charge later borrowed by Filipp’s vita, written by (or influenced by?) a member of the conspiracy, Filipp’s Tver′ guard Stefan Kobylin, who covered up their own machinations by blaming Ivan and Skuratov. This lie was then borrowed by later Novgorod chronicles. There were no boyar chronicles

Would You Believe Saint Ivan?  •  CHAPTER 3

Even if Filipp’s speeches as recorded in the vita and in Taube and Kruse are not taken literally, the reason Ivan made Filipp agree not to interfere in the oprichnina when he took office was obviously that Filipp wanted to do so. Filipp’s replacement, Metropolitan Kirill, did not have to sign such an agreement. The vita does not literally say that Ivan ordered Skuratov to murder Filipp, but it did not need to. It had already detailed the tsar’s several attempts to cause Filipp’s death and identified Ivan as the New Pharaoh and New Herod. Filipp’s vita, written in the 1590s, is a complicated text. It deliberately ignores his acquiescence to the oprichnina in his accession charter by having him become metropolitan before the oprichnina was established. It confuses the identity of Filipp’s relative whose severed head Ivan sent to him. In order to motivate the later just punishments of Filipp’s accusers, Ivan illogically, according to the vita, learned to his horror after Filipp’s death that the accusations against Filipp at his trial were false, when the tsar had suborned them, of course. The argument for canonization is just as illogical as the vita. Supposedly, Ivan, the anointed of God—the Godcrowned autocrat of Russia—was impotent to protect Filipp from the machinations of his enemies, although Filipp supported the tsar’s oprichnina and the tsar doubted the veracity of the accusations against him. Or one has to accept that Ivan was conned into believing slander against Filipp. Moreover, proponents reject everything in Filipp’s vita except Skuratov’s lie that he found Filipp dead. The omission of Filipp’s name in Ivan’s memorial lists proves only that Ivan stuck to Skuratov’s cover story and abjured responsibility for Filipp’s death. Contradictorily, Metropolitan Ioann denied

in Novgorod and Pskov before or after Moscow’s annexation. In Novgorod, the archbishop’s cathedral of St. Sophia and various other churches and monasteries controlled chronicle writing, and in Pskov the Holy Trinity Cathedral did the same. The description of Ivan’s feud with Filipp in the vita can be confirmed by one Novgorod chronicle and the charge of Ivan’s complicity in Filipp’s death by a second but later chronicle. A. I. Tsepkov, ed., Novgorodskie letopisi, bk. 2 (Riazan′: “Aleksandriia,” 2002), vol. 1, Letopis′ po sborniku Arkhivskomu, ili Malinovskago, 98: “On March 22, 1568 Metropolitan Filipp quarreled with the sovereign in Moscow about the oprichnina.” Translation from Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, Ivan the Terrible, trans. Hugh F. Graham (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1981), 112; and Tsepkov, ed., Novgorodskie letopisi, bk. 2, vol. 2, Letopisets novgorodskii tserkvam bozhiim [to 1722], 336–37, sub anno 7077 [1569]: “Tsar and Grand Prince Ioann Vasil′evich of all Rossiia ubil (murdered) his brother [cousin] Vladimir Andreevich and later had Filipp suffocated in the Otroch′ Monastery in Tver′.”

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Ivan’s responsibility for the death of Kornilii, whose name is included in the synodical.33 Proponents of Ivan’s canonization fail to compensate for the immense flaws in Metropolitan Ioann’s assertion that the tsar was not guilty of Filipp’s death.

Jew Bashing Proponents of Ivan’s canonization perpetuate the distortions of the oprichnina resulting from Metropolitan Ioann’s obsession with Jews and Judaizers. They posit the existence of a global Jewish conspiracy throughout history to impose a commercial zhidovskoe igo (yoke of the kikes) on the world.34 Russia was not threatened by Jews during Ivan’s reign. Proponents mention Ivan’s orders to massacre Jews who refused to convert to Christianity in Polotsk, conquered during the Livonian War.35 But there were no Jews inside Ivan’s Russia by the time of the oprichnina. Brest-Litovsk merchants, unbeknownst to the historically illiterate proponents, had apparently been allowed into Muscovy in 1545, but their noxious goods, probably tobacco, were burned, and in 1550 Ivan informed King Sigismund of Poland-Lithuania that his Jewish merchants were not welcome. Nor were there any Judaizers in Muscovy then either. Lavrinenko’s reference to the “Judaizer non-oprichnina ‘land’” (zemshchina)36 and Barkashov’s accusation that around 1547 the Judaizer heresy had spread among the boyars because it gave them the right to do anything they wanted to non-Judaizers,37 33 Skrynnikov, Tsarstvo terrora, 539. 34 See Makeev, Oprichnyi put′; Saulkin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable; Nikolai Kozlov, “Geneticheskoe oruzhie,” in Pro et contra 1, 32–38; Igor′ Lavrinenko, “O Sviatoi Rusi,” in Pro et Contra 1, 63–65, reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 116–19; Vladimir Osipov and Anatolii Makeev, “Monarkhicheskoe pravosoznanie i demokraticheskoe skomoroshestvo,” in Pro et contra 1, 66–71, reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 120–25; Vladimir Kozhevnikov, “Ivan Groznyi: Bozhe, Tsaria khrani,” in Pro et contra 1, appendix 2, 80–86, reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 187–94 (the prayer to Ivan to protect Russia from the “Yoke of the Kikes” discussed and printed here also appears on the back cover of Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria); Barkashov, “Pravoslavnyi sviatoi— tsar′ Ivan Groznyi,” 108–9; R. B. [R. Bychkov], “Neobkhodimoe posleslovie (K stat′e ep. Dionisiia [Alferova] ‘Monarkhiia i khristianskoe soznanie’),” in Pro et contra 2, 166–72; “Mitropolit Volokolamskii Pitirim o sviatosti Ivana Groznogo,” interview, appendix 6, in Pro et contra 2, 206. 35 According to Pronina, Ivan Groznyi. “Muchitel′” ili muchenik?, 195n2, the Jews there were usurers and tavern owners. On Pronina see below. 36 Lavrinenko, “O Sviatoi Rusi,” 65. 37 Barkashov, “Pravoslavnyi sviatoi—tsar′ Ivan Groznyi,” 108–9.

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are fantasies. Proponents accept all accusations of Judaizing at face value without any appreciation of the dynamics of Orthodox theological polemic. Whether even the Novgorod-Moscow heretics of the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century were actually “Judaizers” or were just accused of it remains an open question in legitimate historical scholarship. It is not debatable that accusations against those original “Judaizers” of apostasy to Judaism did not occur when the heresy initially appeared but only years later in the polemics against them. There is no evidence that there were any remnants of the Judaizers in Muscovy in the middle of the sixteenth century. Feodosii Kosoi was accused in part of Jewish ideas, but mostly of Protestant leanings. There was no hint of Judaizing in the condemnations of Matvei Bashkin or the elder Artemyi. Proponents blithely assert that anyone who was accused of questioning the Trinity was a Judaizer and blame such heresy on the Jews.38 To be sure, Ivan himself was not immune to this proclivity. In his debate with Jan Roktya, he accused the Bohemian Brethren of being Judaizers for following the Ten Commandments. In 1584–85 Leonid, Bishop of Riazan′, who had taken the cowl at Volokolamsk, complained to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich that at table Evfimii, archbishop of Rostov, had refused to share a bowl with him, insulting all adherents of the monastic rule of Iosif of Volokolamsk, sworn enemy of “Judaizing,” by not calling them “Josephans” (iosifliane), but “Jews” or “Judaizers” (zhidovliane).39 Canonization proponents should study this incident to better understand the polemical nature of accusations of “Judaizing” in the Russian Orthodox Church.

Two Wrongs for a Rite Opponents of Ivan’s canonization, who, like its proponents include in their ranks professional historians, could easily have demolished the case for canonization by citing primary sources. Although the opponents do identify the proponents’ misuse of Filipp’s vita, misinterpretation of the Tale of the Founding of the Pskov Caves Monastery, and omission of the 38 Bogatyrev, Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′, 357, professes not to know whom Shaposhnik has in mind in attributing to Ivan the pursuit of heretics during the oprichnina. From context Shaposhnik and all advocates of Ivan’s canonization assume there were still supporters of Bashkin and Kosoi in Russia then. 39 Poslaniia Iosifa Volotskogo, ed. A. A. Zimin and Ia. S. Lur′e (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959), 96.

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synodical on Kornilii’s death, overall the opponents did not choose to criticize the historical credentials of the proponents. Instead, the opponents resort to generalities and platitudes on the same level as the proponents, and in the process commit almost as egregious historical errors. Archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov), a professional historian and specialist on Metropolitan Makarii and the history of the sixteenth-century Russian Orthodox Church, should have known that Metropolitan Kirill died naturally. He should also know that seventeenth-century sources, such as the Piskarev Chronicle (Piskarevskaia letopis′) or Tsar Alexei’s apology to Metropolitan Filipp’s relics, represent seventeenth-century opinion and should not be applied uncritically to sixteenth-century history.40 By committing these historical blunders, Archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov) thus made himself fair game for Maniagin.41 Iuvenalii, metropolitan of Krutitsa and Kolomna, correctly noted that the proponents of Ivan’s canonization have introduced no new sources on behalf of their cause and ignore contradictory evidence. However, he seems unaware of recent scholarship debunking the myth of the “Chosen Council,” dates the termination of chronicle writing in Moscow to 1568 instead of 1567, invokes the “hagiographic tradition” of St. Filipp epitomized in the redaction of his vita by St. Dmitrii of Rostov from 1689–1705 as authoritative evidence that Ivan ordered Filipp’s murder, and asserts that the execution of innocents in Novgorod was halted not by Ivan but by Vasilii Blazhennyi (whose vita projected onto Vasilii, who died in 1552, the role of the Holy Fool Nikola in the Pskov phase of Ivan’s punitive campaign in1569–70).42 Kirill, metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, locum tenens (mestobliustitel′) of Patriarch Aleksii, celebrated a liturgy over the relics of Metropolitan Filipp in the Dormition Cathedral (Uspenskii sobor) on January 22, 2009 and declared that Filipp had been judged by 40 Archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov), “Po povodu nastroenii v pol′zu kanonizatsii tsaria Ioanna Groznogo,”in Pro et contra 1, 21–28, reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 26–34; Archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov), “Russkie mitropolity v epokhu Sviatitelia Makariia,” in Tsar′ Ivan Vasil′evich: Groznyi ili Sviatoi? Argumenty Tserkvi protiv kanonizatsii Ivana Groznogo i Grigoriia Rasputina [hereafter Groznyi ili Sviatoi?] (Moscow: Izdatel′skii sovet Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 2004), 17–21. 41 V. G. Maniagin, “Retsenziia na retsenziiu. Otkrytoe pis′mo,” in Pro et contra 2, 35–41. 42 “Prilozhenie No. 4 k dokladu mitropolita Krutitskogo i Kolomenskogo Iuvenaliia, Predsedatelia Sinodal′noi kommissii po kanonizatsii sviatykh, na Arkhiereiskom Sobore Russkoi Tserkvi, 3–8 oktiabria 2004 goda,” http://orthodox.etel.ru/2004/38/ rasputin.htm, accessed July 28, 2009 (web link not active in 2020). Despite Metropolitan Iuvenalii, the proponents of Ivan’s canonization do not ignore the attack of Novgorod.

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a court of boyars, whereas in fact Ivan arranged a rigged ecclesiastical court.43

Not Their Concern The opponents are not primarily interested in responding to the proponents on the basis of history because to the opponents, including the professional historians in their ranks, the canonization issue is not essentially historical.44 To the opponents, led by Patriarch Aleksii, the canonization movement required an ecclesiastical and theological response. According to Patriarch Aleksii,45 the proponents were generating interconfessional, interethnic, and interreligious animosity and misusing the memory of Metropolitan Ioann in their propaganda campaign. Metropolitan Iuvenalii “politely,” according to Sergei Bogatyrev, dismissed Metropolitan Ioann’s views of Ivan by noting that the latter was not a specialist in sixteenth-century Russian history.46 Bishop Dionisii (Alferov)47 rightly accused the proponents 1) of aping Zhdanov’s cult of Ivan (despite the proponents’ condemnation of the Communist/Soviet regime as Jewish—CJH), 2) of inventing the Jewish issue in Russia when there were no Jews in in the country, 3) of not explaining why Ivan later executed the leaders of the “monk-knights” the same way Stalin dealt with his purge accomplices, and 4) of ignoring most of the latter part of Ivan’s reign, including the executions of non-boyar professional bureaucrats such as Ivan Viskovatyi and Nikita Funikov. To Bishop Dionisii, Ivan disrespected the office of tsar by his abdication to a Tatar (albeit a convert), Simeon Bekbulatovich. Bishop Dionisii could have added that Ivan’s willingness to seek asylum in a Protestant country similarly insulted the office of Orthodox Christian tsar. But Bishop Dionisii’s description of Ivan’s insanity could have been taken word for word from 43 See “Slovo mestobliustitelia Patriarshego prestola mitropolita Kirilla v den′ pamiati sviatitelia Moskovskogo Filippa,” www.patriarhia.ru/db/text/535360.html, accessed August 1, 2009. 44 E. A. Gazov, “O situatsii vokrug ‘kanonizatsii’ Ivana Groznogo,” http://www.theonoesis. ru/compositions/ivan_groznyi.php, accessed June 11, 2009. 45 Sviateishii Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rusi Aleksii, “O popytkakh psevdorevnitelei pravoslaviia samochinno kanonizovat′ tiranov i avantiuristov,” in Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 3–7. 46 Bogatyrev, Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′, 356; “Prilozhenie No. 4 k dokladu mitropolita Krutitskogo i Kolomenskogo Iuvenaliia.” 47 Bishop Dionisii (Alferov), “Monarkhiia i khristianskoe soznanie,” in Pro et contra 2, 134–65.

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Isabel de Madariaga, and his accusation that the oprichniki were a Satanic cult engaged in Black Masses follows Andrei Nikitin by going over the top. Nor would prudence permit comparing the oprichnina at its worst to the genocidal Pol Pot regime. Metropolitan Iuvenalii accused the proponents of canonization of confusing Russian Orthodox Church dogma, including the mythology of the “sainted tsar,” with “state-political totalitarian ideology.”48

The Religious Right Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev and All Ukraine,49 Archpriest Vladislav Tsypin,50 Deacon Andrei Kuraev,51 and Dvorkin52 treat the proponents’ argument as an ecclesiastical disciplinary issue: they are violating the dictates of the patriarch, engaged in provocation, threatening church schism, and succumbing to sectarianism. They are the Orthodox Christian equivalent of Wahabi Islam. Collectively, the opponents of canonization dismiss prayers to and icons of Ivan as reflections of popular ignorance of the canons of the church: Ivan had not been canonized, so it was entirely improper to pray to him or to icons of him.53 48 “Prilozhenie No. 4 k dokladu mitropolita Krutitskogo i Kolomenskogo Iuvenaliia.” 49 Mitropolit Kievskii i vseia Ukrainy Vladimir, “Ideia kanonizatsii Ivana Groznogo i Grigoriia Rasputina nosit provokatsionnyi kharakter,” in Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 8–17. 50 Protoierei Vladislav Tsypin, “Ideia etoi kanonizatsii—provokatsionnaia,” ibid., 22–27. 51 Diakon Andrei Kuraev, “Grigorii Rasputin kak znamia russkoi reformatsii,” ibid., 28–42. 52 Aleksandr Dvorkin, “Tsar′ Ivan Groznyi i sovremennoe sektanstvo,” ibid., 44–51. 53 Saulkin claims that Archbishop Sergii (Spasskii) included Ivan among local Moscow saints in his 1901 three-volume Pravoslavnyi mesiatseslov vostoka, that some renovation in the Archangel Cathedral (Arkhangel′skii sobor) in the seventeenth century uncovered Ivan’s preserved remains (netlennye moshchi), that records of Ivan’s miracles after commemoration services are kept in that church, that Emperor Alexander III had Ivan painted as a saint in the Palace of Facets (Granovitaia palata), and that Empress Alexandra Feodorovna honored Ivan as a saint. Finally, Metropolitan Ioann prayed to Ivan as a saint (which is not mentioned in Metropolitan Ioann’s book) (Saulkin in the Radio Radonezh roundtable). Eliseev identified Ivan as a locally venerated saint in the Moscow eparchy (Eliseev, “Oprichnaia eskhatologiia Groznogo Tsaria,” 55). Barkashov insists that Ivan was canonized according to canon law at the end of the sixteenth century, for which there is no documentary evidence, and that in the winter of 2000 several monasteries began blessing icons of Ivan as a saint (Barkashov,“Pravoslavnyi sviatoi—tsar′ Ivan Groznyi,” 106). Maniagin claimed that he had never advocated the canonization of Ivan, although indeed he did venerate him as a saint, because the tsar had already been recognized as a saint via local veneration. Of course, given the current situation, insisting on formal canonization now was impossible (Maniagin, “Retsenziia na retsenziiu. Otkrytoe pis′mo,” 36–37). Ironically, the proponents of

Would You Believe Saint Ivan?  •  CHAPTER 3

Misuse or Abuse of Religious Authority? Patriarch Aleksii’s reference to animosity is as close as any opponent of Ivan’s canonization comes to describing the proponents as antisemitic bigots, exacerbating religious intolerance against not only Judaism but Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, and perhaps indulging in ethnic slurs of Ukrainian and Tatar nationalists. But Patriarch Aleksii erred in immunizing Metropolitan Ioann from being labeled a bigot by insisting that the proponents were “misusing” his “moral authority” and writings.54 Unfortunately, the proponents were not misinterpreting Metropolitan Ioann’s views: they understood his message all too well, and had all too much foundation for claiming inspiration from yet another rabid antisemite.

Bending over Backwards to Rewrite History After the close of the debate within the Russian Orthodox Church over Ivan’s canonization, historians with views similar to those of its proponents did not abandon the quest to whitewash Ivan. Pronina55 answers the question in Ivan’s canonization thus advance evidence which would have satisfied Szeftel’s second criteria that Ivan was perceived as a saint, but the Russian Orthodox Church, now committed to the kind of formal canonization procedures Golubinskii prematurely projected on it, shot down that evidence too. Opponents of the tsar’s canonization seem to agree that portrayals of him with a nimbus do not connote sainthood, but disagree on what it does signify: Archimandrite Makarii sees it as a sign of personal sanctity (Arkhimandrit Makarii, “Russkie mitropolity v epokhu Sviatitelia Makariia,” 19), but Kuraev rejects that view and sees it as a reflection of office (Kuraev, “Grigorii Rasputin kak znamia russkoi reformatsii,” 31–32). Piety is an attribute of the office of tsar as it was of basileus, but sanctity goes far beyond mere piety. Metropolitan Iuvenalii attributes Ivan’s occasional nimbus to “etiquette” but seems to argue that if Ivan was not always treated as a saint, he was not a saint (“Prilozhenie No. 4 k dokladu mitropolita Krutitskogo i Kolomenskogo Iuvenaliia”). This is irrelevant to Cherniavsky’s claim that Ivan was sometimes treated as a saint. The opponents do not directly address evidence of so-called miracles attributable to him. Cherniavsky’s pictorial evidence might denote only piety and his list is inferior confirmation of sainthood compared to icons and incidents of veneration. The canonization camp thus advances more convincing evidence that some Russians viewed Ivan as a saint in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than Cherniavsky did for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 54 On the Patriarch’s problematic relationship with Metropolitan Ioann see Wendy Slater, “A Modern-Day Saint? Metropolitan Ioann and the Postsoviet Russian Orthodox Church,” Religion, State and Society 28, no. 4 (2000): 313–25. I wish to thank Michael Hotchkiss for calling this article to my attention. 55 Pronina’s book is a running hatchet job on a book which unfortunately deserved it, apparently a published version of a television documentary devoid of scholarly

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the title of her book—Ivan Groznyi. Muchitel′ ili muchenik?56—by concluding that Ivan was not a “tormentor” (muchitel′57), but a martyr (muchenik). She does not discuss the issue of Ivan’s canonization. Some of her original historical inanities, all lacking in evidence and devoid of historical value, include the following assertions: the death of Tsarevich Dmitrii in 1553 was an intentional plot, since not only the nanny but also the Zakhar′in brothers holding her upright would have had to fall into the river together; the purpose of the Livonian War was to stop the Vatican’s “Drive to the East” (Drang nach Osten); bishops with familial ties to the aristocracy conspired to convince Ivan falsely that Filipp was against the oprichnina, so Skuratov murdered Filipp against Ivan’s wishes; Metropolitan Ioann rejected Taube and Kruse’s narrative of conflicts between Ivan and Filipp because Ivan was too pious to have engaged in such a dispute with the metropolitan; in addition, Kornilii, the Pskov Caves Monastery abbot, who was anti-Moscow, and Kurbskii’s correspondent, Vassian Muromtsev, both lent Kurbskii money, both were guilty, and both were justly executed by Ivan; it is logical to assume, despite the absence of evidence, that Ivan had adequate reason to execute Viskovatyi and Funikov. Finally, according to Pronina, Ivan was murdered by the Tatar Boris Godunov because the tsar wanted Tsarevich Fedor to divorce Irina Godunova.58 In her apologia, Pronina shifts grounds from the proponents on two points—in blaming Skuratov alone for Filipp’s death, as if he were not following Ivan’s instructions, and in accepting Ivan’s responsibility for the deaths of the guilty Kornilii and Vassian Muromtsev.

Separation of Faith and Homeland Volodikhin, another Orthodox conservative, addresses the question of Ivan’s sainthood directly in his Ivan Groznyi. Bich Bozhii (Ivan the Terrible: Scourge of God). He praises Metropolitan Ioann as truly Orthodox in spirit. Although Volodikhin admits that foreign and native sources confirm Ivan’s responsibility for the death of Tsarevich Ivan, other versions sustain the value—Radzinskii, Muchitel′ i ten′—which portrays Ivan as an insane, sadistic despot. 56 The closest alliterative English equivalent might be “saint or sinner.” 57 Muchitel′ is often translated into English as “tyrant,” which to me carries the wrong connotation. “Tyrant” is a “pagan” concept of classical Greek thought, whereas muchitel′ is a religious concept from the church fathers. The concept of “tyrant” carries Aristotelian baggage, not patristic. 58 Pronina, Ivan Groznyi. “Muchitel′” ili muchenik?, 157–58, 162, 257–62, 281–84, 406–15.

Would You Believe Saint Ivan?  •  CHAPTER 3

contrary view of Metropolitan Ioann, and the arguments of academic historians leave room for faith (my emphasis—CJH) in Metropolitan Ioann’s hypothesis. However, Volodikhin’s sympathy for the metropolitan and Ivan himself does not extend to endorsing the latter’s canonization. Volodikhin notes that recently circles “close to the Russian Orthodox Church” have advocated making Ivan a saint, not only in publications but by composing prayers and painting icons. While their intent is understandable, love of the faith and love of the homeland are different matters. The truth of the Holy Trinity is preferable to the truth of national interests. Volodikhin writes forcefully: “this man does not deserve to be canonized” (Volodikhin’s italics). He was responsible for the deaths of Metropolitan Filipp, Kornilii of the Pskov Caves Monastery, and many other martyrs. Even the prestige of Metropolitan Ioann and Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk does not suffice to make the case. When Ivan truly served the church his deeds merit praise. Autocracy was a blessing for Russian civilization, but Ivan was the bad seed (durnym ptentsom v gnezde) of our autocrats. Ivan was a “Scourge” (Volodikhin’s word) to the Russian Volk. We are all sinners, may God forgive us, and may God forgive Ivan.59 Volodikhin is willing to bend history to fit his ideology, but not to break it, and therefore he must, perforce, part company with the advocates of canonization.

Case Dismissed but with Undue Restraint Pronina and Volodikhin demonstrate that the canonization movement failed to makes its case even to all Russian Orthodox activists.60 The 59 Volodikhin, Ivan Groznyi. Bich Bozhii, 153, 191n393, 204–8 (quotation at 205). The same views on Ivan’s canonization appear in Volodikhin, Ivan IV Groznyi, 150–51, 153. That book constitutes a vehement denunciation of Ivan as a bad Orthodox Christian and worse Orthodox Christian tsar. 60 Froianov, Groznaia oprichnina, is in a similar vein. Despite its title it addresses the Chosen Council from 1547 to 1563, ending before the oprichnina because it is an excerpted chapter from idem, Drama russkoi istorii. Na putiakh k Oprichnine, 418– 819. Froianov emphasizes Ivan’s piety, mercy, and forgiveness and demonizes the heretical, pro-Western Chosen Council which tried to murder Ivan in 1553 and did murder Tsarevich Dmitrii, Anastasiia, and Mariia Cherkasskaia (165, 216, 217, 233– 34). Froianov takes potshots at secular, rational historians who do not understand a “true son of the Russian Orthodox Church” like Ivan (220, 483) and cites approvingly the views of Metropolitan Ioann (Snychev) (30n1, 66). Froianov omits episodes of Ivan’s behavior before 1563 which would impugn his apologetic portrait. See also Bokhanov, Tsar′ Ioann IV Groznyi, another devotee of Metropolitan Ioann. According to Bokhanov, Ivan is not “universally respected” as a saint, but should be (42).

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proponents owe a huge debt to the cult of Ivan the Terrible under Stalin, but for religious reasons they enhanced its demonization of a megalomaniac papacy, Russian national chauvinism, and xenophobia. Antisemitic proponents of canonization do not employ the euphemisms of the Soviet anti-cosmopolitan or anti-Zionist campaigns.61 Instead they revert to the rhetoric of the imperial Russian Black Hundreds, which was also infused with opposition to representative government, liberals, and democracy.62 They also blame the ecumenical movement and globalism on the Jews. The antisemitism of the proponents of Ivan’s canonization reeks of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, although they do not cite that forgery by name. There is certainly no shortage of professional historians specializing on Ivan’s reign in Russia today, but none has responded to the challenge of refuting the assertions of the advocates of Ivan’s canonization. One can only speculate on the explanation for this restraint. Professional historians in all fields, including Russian history, did not respond to the New Chronology of Anatolii Fomenko until it became a mass media success. The failure of canonization advocates to do so perhaps meant that it was not worth the grief for a professional historian to stick his nose into a “religious” question.63 61 However, Sergei Bogatyrev pointed out to me in a personal communication that Metropolitan Ioann could take advantage of the Soviet distinction between iudei as religious adherents and evrei as an ethnic group to claim, falsely of course, that he was only against Judaism as a religion but was not an antisemite intolerant of Jews as an ethnic group. 62 Metropolitan Ioann also demonized as satanic the Order of Masons, blaming the February 1917 Revolution on an alliance of the Masons and the Jews, which also reeks of the prerevolutionary far-right mentality (and a little bit of Alexander Kerensky). Obsession with the Masons is widespread among contemporary extreme Orthodox antisemitic groups in Russia. 63 Many proponents of the canonization of Ivan the Terrible also supported the canonization of Grigorii Rasputin and Emperor Nicholas II. Rasputin was not canonized, Nicholas II was. Stella Rock, “Rasputin the New: Mythologies of Sanctity in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Nationalist Myths and Modern Media: Contested Identities in the Age of Globalization, ed. Jan Herman Brinks, Stella Rock, and Edwards Timms (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006), 157–70. Nicholas II was canonized not for his personal or political virtues but as a martyr and a symbol. Stories of miracles substantiating his sainthood are discussed in Nikolaos A. Chrissides, “A Ladies’ Saint: The Miracles of Nicholas II” (paper presented at the Second Biennial Conference of the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, October 5, 2007). It would be illuminating to compare the canonization campaigns for these three men in order to identify why one succeeded but

Would You Believe Saint Ivan?  •  CHAPTER 3

From the point of view of historical scholarship, the debates over Ivan’s canonization are almost entirely worthless. The arguments for canonization might be described by adapting Shakespeare’s definition of a bad play: “They are tales, / Told by antisemites, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing.”64 Bogatyrev describes the canonization campaign as “bizarre.”65 Would that it were really atypical of the current intellectual climate in Russia. Without gainsaying the plausibility that Ivan did, at least sometimes, however infrequently, demonstrate the qualities of justice and mercy, it is to be lamented that the attempt by advocates of canonization to portray a kinder, gentler Ivan transforms him into a colorless, far less interesting figure, devoid even of his trademark temper tantrums.

Good as Gold Online Even though this trial balloon was shot down by the Russian Orthodox Church, the movement to canonize Ivan Groznyi does not only attest to the heterogeneity within the Orthodox fold, but it also proves conclusively that since 1991 in Russia it is possible to think, say, write, or post on the internet anything about Ivan the Terrible. The canonization movement, like Fomenko’s New Chronology, has been the price to be paid for this freedom of expression.

two failed. Note that during the same period as these canonization disputes, Dmitrii Donskoi, icon painter Andrei Rublev, and Metropolitan Makarii were also canonized. Nicholas II was also a rabid antisemite, but unlike Ivan the Terrible, he was murdered and did not order the assassination of a Russian saint. 64 “It is a tale, / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing.” William Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 5, scene 5, lines 26–28. 65 Bogatyrev, Ivan Groznyi. Pervyi russkii tsar′, 356.

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Dueling Ivans, Dueling Stalins

The apologetic defense of Ivan by the advocates of his canonization rests upon a religious foundation, but the rehabilitation of the reconstructed “true” Ivan by the New Chronology, although it also partakes of Russian Orthodox extremism and antisemitism, also derives much of its force from a more secular nationalist and statist approach. Joseph Stalin studied at an Orthodox Christian seminary, but comparing Ivan to Stalin deprives the former’s apologists of much ground to invoke religion in the tsar’s defense. The Ivan-Stalin connection turns the discussion of Ivan’s reign away from religion toward politics. Ever since Stalin patronized the rewriting of the history of the reign of Ivan the Terrible,1 evaluations of the two figures have been inextricably linked. Anything written about Ivan, even by specialists in sixteenth-century Russian history, runs the risk of being perceived by the Russian educated public as about Stalin, a phenomenon aptly dubbed by George Backer the “deadly parallel.”2 However, authors who are not professional historians sometimes do not shy away from the analogy. Rather, they explicitly embrace it. What is not generally appreciated is that after the fall of the Soviet Union the comparison became a double-edged sword that could be wielded by both defenders and critics of Stalin. The tsar can resemble the general secretary if both were bad as well as if both were good. Comparing 1 The most recent study known to me is Boris Ilizarov, Stalin, Ivan Groznyi i drugie (Moscow: Veche, 2019). Ilizarov is a specialist on Stalinism. His knowledge of Ivan’s reign is not always reliable. 2 George Backer, The Deadly Parallel: Stalin and Ivan the Terrible (New York: Random House, 1950).

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two relatively recent popular studies of Ivan reveals how different images of Stalin dovetail with different images of Ivan. Dueling interpretations of the latter derive, not entirely but to a significant degree, from dueling interpretations of the former, or, to put it differently, different conceptions of Russian history generate different conclusions about both Ivan and Stalin. As a result Ivan and his reign become almost unavoidably political, and his proponents and opponents define Russian patriotism in terms of their contrasting images of both rulers.3

The Good Ivan and the Good Stalin Sergei Tarasovich Kremlev (Sergei of the Kremlin), the pseudonym of Sergei Tarasovich Brezkun, is the author of thirty seven books, including books on Stalin and Beria. Ivan Groznyi: tsar′, otvergnutyi tsarizmom (Ivan the Terrible: the tsar rejected by tsarism) appeared in a print run of 2,000 copies. This is a “popular,” not scholarly, monograph, devoid of footnotes or even a bibliography, although it does contain quotations from primary sources and secondary works.4 The title alludes to the ambivalent treatment of Ivan by the imperial Russian regime epitomized by the decision not to include him on the “Monument to a Thousand Years of Russian History” erected in Novgorod, a city Ivan sacked, in honor of the thousandth anniversary of the legendary arrival of Riurik, founder of the Rus′ dynasty, in Rus′ in 862. Kremlev blames Russophobic Russian “liberals” (“liberal” is a curse word in right wing Russian intellectual discourse since 1991; I reproduce Kremlev’s quotation marks below) for this disrespectful insult to Ivan (7). Many lies and slanders have been written about Ivan, but the “true history” of Ivan5 can be found in the works of the Soviet (and post-Soviet— CJH) historian Igor′ Froianov (5).6 According to Kremlev’s unoriginal schema, “Russian [sic] history” (russkaia istoriia) begins with Kievan Rus′ (9), where the veche (town 3 To foreground the contrasting interpretations of Ivan and Stalin in the two books discussed here I forego identifying their historical errors, all of which are corrected elsewhere in this book. 4 Sergei Kremlev, Ivan Groznyi: tsar′, otvergnutyi tsarizmom (Moscow: EKSMO, Iauza, 2018). Page references will be given in parentheses. 5 Kremlev’s book appeared in the Series Pravdivaia istoriia Rossii (The true history of Russia). 6 In Froianov’s view Ivan saved Russia from the Jews, which Kremlev later concedes is debatable (248–50).

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assembly), in the absence of a strong central power, led to arbitrariness, as in the post-Soviet Russian Federation (12). Mykhailo Hrushevsky was a great historian but the biggest ideologue of “Ukrainian” [his quotation marks] bourgeois nationalism (169). Ukrainians are no more than a “branch” (vetv′) of the “Russian people” (russkii narod) (179). Ivan worked for a unified centralized state to save Russia from the kind of gentry-type regime that developed in and doomed Poland (6). Ivan chose “great power greatness” over magnate-rule (32). He solved the problem of princely patrimonial separatism and relied upon the gentry who supported his centralizing predecessors. These gentry became the oprichniki (27, 297). How could Ivan be a tyrant, Kremlev asks rhetorically, if he let the system of precedence (mestnichestvo) inhibit his appointments of boyars to high military and civilian office (25)?7 Yes, Ivan was given to sudden cruel impulses, such as having his kennel-men arrest and murder boyar Prince Andrei Shuiskii, but it was the boyars’ own fault for teaching him to be cruel (48). Cruelty was the norm in the sixteenth century (78). At times, Ivan could be cowardly and cruel, but these were not natural defects. These character flaws were the result of the perversion of his childhood by the boyars. More often, the tsar was brave, and he had to be bloody (138). Ivan’s assault on Novgorod cannot be judged by anachronistic concepts of “good” and “evil.” After all, he borrowed execution by breaking on the wheel (kolesovanie) from Europe (78). The exaggerated numbers of Novgorod victims are anti-historical, reminiscent of the parade of statistics of the quantity of victims of repression by Stalin running into the tens of millions in the accounts of Western and homegrown “liberals.” Albert Schlichting’s atrocity stories about Ivan were the ancestor of the big lies of Josef Göbbels (79). Novgorod was the logical place to finance the antiIvan, anti-Muscovite, in reality anti-Russian conspiracies of the appanage Princes Staritskie. Novgorod was the base of anti-national separatists (85). The acquisition of Kazan′ was not an aggressive “seizure” (zakhvat) but more a (peaceful) “unification” (uniia).8 The Mongols took cities only to loot and burn them, but Ivan conquered Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ to integrate 7 The precedence system dictated who could not be appointed to an office based upon a complicated calculation of their place in their family and the service history of their family compared to anyone who could outrank them in that office. 8 On the potent Soviet concept of villainy encompassed by the concept of zakhvatnichestvo see Charles J. Halperin, “The Tatars and the Term Zakhvatchiki in Soviet Historiography: A Note,” Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, series 2: Istoriia 64, no. 4 (2018): 1429–39.

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them into the Russian state, which brought progress (70, 71). Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ “objectively belonged to Russian geopolitical space” (294). Similarly, Ivan “emancipated” rather than conquered Polotsk, an ancient city of Kievan Rus′ (165). Ivan had the right to insist that Russia retain or acquire “Russian” (russkii) Polotsk, Kiev, Vitebsk (Vitsebsk), and Kanev (219). The guilt of Ivan’s individual victims can be disputed, but his actions were necessary. Metropolitan Filipp deserved execution (93) for opposing the oprichnina, whose purpose was to further centralization and facilitate Russia’s necessary and legitimate expansion to its natural borders (I infer the Baltic Sea—CJH) (100). The pre-capitalist oprichnina was economically progressive, which is why the merchant Stroganovs sought to join it, as opposed to the regressive non-oprichnina “land” (108). Historians have paid too much attention to the negative side of the oprichnina, which had positive effects on foreign trade (112). Historians disagree on how Prince Vladimir Staritskii was killed but Ivan had to have him executed because his continued existence created the unacceptable risk that he would be used by potential enemies of Russia (120). Ivan and Tsarevich Ivan were slowly poisoned by boyars or English merchants (141). (This entails that Ivan did not kill Tsarevich Ivan—CJH.) The boyars begrudged Ivan his victories in the Livonian War and sabotaged the Russian army (158). No records survive to document the assertion, but, quite logically, the pope financed the burning of Moscow in 1571 by the Crimean Tatars to inspire Moscow to join the papal anti-Ottoman coalition (192). The Russians were not cruel occupiers in Livonia, The local population supported them (204–5). The country lost the Livonian War after so much success because all of Europe went to war against it (207–8). The Polish king Stefan Batory, the predecessor of Napoleon and Hitler, invaded Russia (209). Hidden boyar and princely opposition to the tsar, like the elite of the Russian Orthodox Church, withheld their money from the war effort and economic relief (225). The purpose of the Livonian War was not just to further Russia’s Baltic trade but to gain access to European civilization, science, technology, and culture (234). Ivan was not xenophobic (240). Soviet historian Aleksandr Zimin called the plan of Ivan’s German servitor and later turncoat Heinrich von Staden for a German invasion of Russia a “fantasy,” but if someone had discovered a Western plan to destroy Russia in 1980 it too would have been called a fantasy (248–50).

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The Time of Troubles was caused by Ivan’s failure to eliminate all the boyar clans. He repressed tens of people, but hundreds of servitors served him loyally (262) and millions of Russians cooperated with him (264). Under Ivan, Russia expanded to so much territory that external enemies could not determine its fate and there was no risk of catastrophe (301). All in all, Stalin expressed the “most historically accurate” judgment of Ivan (101). Ivan was not Stalin’s hero: Stalin’s hero was Lenin. But Stalin formulated an objective interpretation of the tsar (257). “Liberals” hate patriots who love Russia and Russia’s great rulers—Ivan, Peter the Great, Lenin, and Stalin (283). Kremlev’s conceptions of Ivan and of Stalin derive from a predictable foundation: the Great Russian chauvinist paradigm of “Russian history” which appropriates Kievan Rus′ to the country and denies Ukrainian nationality; an imperialist and Eurocentric belief that Russia had a right to impose coercive “civilization” upon pastoral nomads; a statist apologia for the collateral damage of innocent victims of government aggrandizement; and adherence to anti-European conspiracy theories. To my knowledge, no other post-1991 author in Russia has so bluntly endorsed Stalin’s judgment of Ivan, including blaming the country’s later “troubles” in part upon the tsar’s failure to be more “terrible,” that is, ruthless, in “liquidating” boyars— Stalin’s famous view expressed in his criticism of Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible. Kremlev’s denunciation of Metropolitan Filipp and the Russian Orthodox Church as political traitors illustrates the potential incompatibility of religious and statist apologias for Ivan. Proponents of Ivan’s canonization would have great difficulty finding support for their interpretation of sixteenth-century Muscovite history in Kremlev’s exposition. Coincidentally or not, Eisenstein’s depiction of Filipp and the Russian Orthodox Church matches Kremlev’s in its anticlericalism.9 In the process of elucidating the confluence of Ivan and Stalin, Kremlev criticizes not only Zimin, but also the historian Irina Karatsuba (81),10 the 9 See chapter 12. 10 Karatsuba is a professionally trained historian and political activist. Her opinion of Ivan can be extrapolated from I. V. Karatsuba, I. V. Kurukin, and N. P. Sokolov, “1564. Oprichnina protiv zemshchiny,” in Vybiraia svoiu istoriiu. “Razvilki” na puti Rossii: ot riurikovichei do oligarkhov, ed. I. V. Karatsuba, I. V. Kurukin, and N. P. Sokolov (Moscow: KoLibri, 2005), 105–24—chapters in the book are unnumbered—which estimates the number of victims of Ivan’s campaign against Novgorod at 40,000. (5,000 copies were printed.)

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literary specialist Dmitrii Likhachev (251), the historian Stepan Veselovskii (257), and the writer Aleksandr Ushakov. Kremlev categorizes Ushakov’s book as “malevolent” and rejects his conclusions as examples of anger, hatred, “blind animosity,” and a “pathological unwillingness” or “inability to understand” Ivan (282–83). Ushakov’s monograph provides an interpretation of Ivan and Stalin that is the opposite of Kremlev’s.

The Bad Ivan and the Bad Stalin Ushakov is a professional historian by training, who has authored several books on the East, but also a journalist and novelist who has written books on Hitler and Stalin. Ivan Groznyi. Blagochestie na krovi (Ivan the Terrible: Piety in Blood)11 is a “popular book,” like Kremlev’s, published in 2,500 copies, with no footnotes and only a brief bibliography, although it contains modern Russian translations of quotations from primary sources and passages from secondary works, not always identified. The title conveys the thesis of the book: Ivan, although pious, was a bloody despot. Ushakov indulges in psychiatric diagnosis of the “mentally imbalanced” tsar. Like Kremlev, he explicitly compares the tsar to Stalin, but whereas Kremlev praises both, Ushakov damns both. Ushakov declares that “this book in no way pretends to be an historical investigation, which is the sphere of historians,” but instead a psychological drama. After Solov′ev, Vaslii Kliuchevskii, Kostomarov, George Vernadsky, and “our” contemporaries Froianov and Skrynnikov, “what new can be said of Groznyi’s epoch?” (6).12 Ushakov observes that some authors still try to justify actions by Ivan that in a normal person would justly deserve loathing. Ivan is so controversial because he was “the bloodiest tsar in our [i.e. Russian] history,” whose actions would appear to be of interest to a psychiatrist more than a historian. The blood of hundreds, even thousands, of executions is on his hands. He was surrounded by “loose” (razvratnye) women and bandits. However, 11 Ushakov, Ivan Groznyi. Blagochestie na krovi. “Piety in blood” is not only the subtitle of the book but also the title of “book” 4 (225) on the worst period of Ivan’s reign, from 1560 to his death. Page references will be given in parentheses in the text. 12 This disclaimer confuses me. Either Ushakov is discriminating between an orientalist (vostokoved) and a historian, or by “historian” he means historians specializing in sixteenth-century Muscovite history, or I have misidentified him. No historian conducting research on Ivan and his reign would agree that there is nothing “new” to be said on that subject. The historians Ushakov cites profoundly disagree about Ivan.

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Ushakov disdains any interest in black or white portrayals of Ivan. He seeks to delve into what was going on in the tsar’s soul, the soul of one of most tragic figures in Russian history. Ushakov denies that Ivan can be judged by modern standards (3, 6, 7). Froianov considers any attempt to psychoanalyze someone who has been dead for 400 years useless, but Ushakov insists that anyone who roasts people alive can be labeled a sadist, even after 400 years. Ushakov cites Lenin’s dismissal of the maiming of Stolypin’s daughter in the assassination of her father as an example of an amoral view of violence. The atrocities committed by the Red Army (I infer during the civil war—CJH) were very little different than those perpetrated by the oprichniki. A leader, such as Ivan, Napoleon, or Lenin, should be judged by his deeds, not his personal qualities. If he leaves his country in ruin, the appropriate conclusion is self-evident (8–9). Ushakov manages to impugn Ivan’s biological legitimacy. First he “uncovers” the pope’s hand in the marriage of the much older Vasilii III to the young daughter, Elena, of Vasilii Glinskii. The pope arranged Glinskii’s migration to Muscovy so his daughter could marry Vasilii III as part of a plot to induce church union and a crusade against the Ottoman Empire. For a possible explanation of how Elena’s then and future lover Obolenskii could sneak into the Kremlin’s women’s quarters (terem), Ushakov quotes at length a novel in which Elena seduces Obolenskii. Ushakov claims that this was implicitly done for the good of the state, to supply a much-needed heir (29–33, 41, 42), which the presumably sterile or impotent Vasilii III could not. By protecting herself, her sons, and her uncles, Elena supported absolutism and bureaucracy over the powerful feudal princely appanage aristocracy. Ushakov concurs with the view that Elena was poisoned (24, 40, 53, 60, 62–63). Ushakov is all-in on Kliuchevskii’s theory that Ivan’s minority made him suspicious and emotionally imbalanced (73–74), not just cruel. Per Ushakov, the tsar hated the boyars. Ivan either ordered the arrest and beheading of Prince Andrei Shuiskii (75) or had him thrown to the dogs by his kennel-men (293). As a teenager, Ivan became sexually active, a rapist of virgins and customer of streetwalkers; he also threw dogs and cats from the Kremlin walls and trampled pedestrians when galloping through Moscow’s city streets with his gang of juvenile delinquents (75, 77). He was raised on cruelty, ordered executions at the slightest excuse, and engaged in mass terror, despite his piety (293).

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Ivan included some boyars among his favorites, so he did not hate all of them (78). He scorned but feared them (278). His upbringing lacked any discipline. He was emotionally infantile (79). When confronted by Novgorod gunners petitioning for redress of their grievances, Ivan hid. He lacked physical courage and was ashamed of his cowardice, so he schemed to eliminate any witnesses to his behavior by having several boyars executed (81–82). He remained a coward for life, fleeing the Crimean Tatars in 1571 (375). Ivan was quite unprepared to become ruler, but was saved politically by Metropolitan Makarii (83). Ivan fully supported the autocratic theory that he should have unlimited authority and servile subjects. However, he confused his fantasies with reality (87). Despite Makarii’s guidance, however, Ivan did not change. Neither did he mend his ways as a result of his marriage to Anastasiia, which only temporarily softened his nature. After a two-week respite, the tsar returned to his life of orgies and atrocities (95, 99, 100, 102). It took a miracle to modify his behavior even temporarily. The influence of the priest Sylvester benefitted Russia for thirteen years. Faith and fear of divine displeasure turned the tyrant into a sovereign (104–6). Regardless of Sylvester’s contribution to the tsar’s spiritual development, however, Makarii was responsible, if unintentionally, for the atrocities Ivan committed in the name of the divine authority he had taken upon himself. To Makarii, that Moscow was the Third Rome and New Jerusalem meant that the tsar should protect and obey the church (11–14). The Chosen Council created by Alexei Adashev, to which Sylvester and Makarii belonged, had the greatest impact on Ivan’s behavior (114–15). The tsar had a lively mind but thought only of himself, unlike Peter the Great or Napoleon who studied the world (116). Ivan had a mediocre mind and no character. He was superficial, proud, unfocussed, and inconsistent. He appropriated ideas from others and pretended that they were his own (117). For thirteen years, Adashev and others managed to turn Ivan into a good ruler—something that was in no way innate to him. He was a mystic, a dreamer, a bloodthirsty coward, with no definite views of his own. His mind was adequate only to the task of following Adashev’s guidance (118). Sylvester had no understanding of the true spirit of Orthodoxy. He was more an Old Testament Pharisee than a New Testament Christian. Nevertheless, he did ignite a spark of faith in Ivan and convert Ivan’s hallucinations into visions (119). Sylvester enabled and encouraged Ivan to deal with his doubts about his rule for which he was totally unprepared because

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his intemperate character made him jump from one extreme to another (125).13 Nevertheless, in essence the reforms of the 1550s—such as reorganization of central and local government institutions and the promulgation of a new law code—were directed at exploiting the working masses in the countryside and in the cities (154). Ivan did support the reforms, for which he deserves applause, because they helped modernize the country. By contrast, with a stroke of the pen Stalin eliminated the NEP because he feared that economic reform would lead to political reform. Stalin destroyed the flower of the Russian peasantry, and the nation’s rural economy has still not recovered (155). The conquest of Kazan′ made Ivan one of greatest rulers in Russian history. Neither the Northern War nor the battle of Poltava aroused in every Russian such patriotic feeling for the victory of Orthodox Christianity against the pagan Asiatic hordes (166–67). However, Ushakov does concede that the Tatar “yoke” (igo) was replaced by tsarist “oppression” (gnet) (214). The conquest of Sibir′ made Russia “a great Eurasian power, ruling the largest part of the former territory of the Golden Horde, and permitted the Russian tsar to become legal heir of the Juchids” (516). Ivan felt no sympathy for, and did not trust, the boyars; they, in turn, did not want to be subordinate to him. However, Ivan deserves credit because he knew that he could not get obedience from the boyars until he had proven himself, so he was patient just like Stalin. At the beginning of World War II, Stalin deferred to the generals until he thought that he could claim victory. Then he dumped them and took full credit for himself. Three days after the fall of Kazan′, Ivan told his generals that he needed God’s protection from them and left the city, using the birth of his son as an excuse. Actually, he was just bored and wanted to be praised in Moscow. He overlooked the magical role of his presence in Kazan′ in imposing Russian rule on the region. As a result of his selfish and shortsighted exit, it took five years to pacify the middle Volga region. In the meantime, uninterested in administrative affairs, Ivan maintained his euphoria in Moscow. He was 13 Ushakov’s exposition is confusing. Makarii could not induce Ivan to change his behavior, Sylvester alone did so “miraculously,” but the Chosen Council to which both belonged deserves the credit. Moreover Adashev (indivudally?) guided Ivan’s policies. Sylvester inspired Ivan’s faith although Sylvester was more formalistic than spiritual. Similar confusion and contradiction abounds in Ushakov’s nararative; dissecting all these anomalies would requires more space than it would be worth and would distract the reader from Ushakov’s overall image of Ivan, our main focus.

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tired of the conflict between Adashev and his opponents who opposed the Kazan′ war, so he ran away from Moscow to the Trinity Monastery for the baptism of his son. By his absence, the tsar doomed the Adashev reforms (170–73). As a result, Adashev and Sylvester allied with the boyars during the dynastic crisis of 1553 precipitated by Ivan’s seemingly fatal illness. Sylvester was always close to the Staritskie princes (175, 177). After Ivan recovered his health, he did not wreak vengeance on Adashev and Sylvester, instead waiting until he did not need them anymore (180). He also felt betrayed by Makarii, who had not spoken a single word in Ivan’s defense during the 1553 crisis (182). It seems that Ivan did not understand or did not want to understand that the risk of a Crimean raid made the commitment of all Muscovite forces to Livonia unwise, otherwise he would not have arrested Crimean envoys or redeployed Muscovite forces from the south to Livonia. The Chosen Council opposed all-out war in Livonia. Ivan did not send his best commander Prince Gorbatyi to Livonia because the tsar distrusted him. Instead, he sent Kurbskii (222–23). Ivan was dissatisfied with the role that the Royal Council (Duma) gave him in the war. He wanted to lead himself. He was convinced that boyar sabotage caused Russian defeats. Unfortunately, Ivan had no military talent. He waited until the last minute to throw his troops into storming Kazan′. Ivan was “psychologically incompatible” with his advisors, and he was the problem. How could anyone work with someone who possessed absolute power? The same situation obtained during the first eighteen months of the Second World War with Stalin. In his arrogance and megalomania, the volatile tsar treated any disagreement as treason. He thought of himself as a saint, even a god (226–28). Ivan had no program except arbitrary caprice, so he let the practical problems of state go unresolved. The oprichnina was not part of a political program, just a senseless exercise in killing boyars (229). However, to Ivan the oprichnina purged Russians of sin on the eve of the apocalypse (280), which explains his hellish means of capital punishment by fire, water, and impalement (410), but this was Ivan’s personal idea. No Muscovite source articulated an expectation of the end of the world in the 1560s (411). The oprichniki turned into random looting and extortion (290). Ivan took lowborn gentry with no ties to the boyars into the oprichnina to oppose the feudal-aristocratic opposition (292), but by organizing the oprichnina as an appanage he showed himself to be no more than an appanage prince

Dueling Ivans, Dueling Stalins  •  CHAPTER 4

like his ancestors (292). Without a more extensive administrative apparatus and greater political support, Ivan had to terminate the oprichnina policy of confiscating princely lands to break the power of the powerful aristocracy (299). He expanded the geographic scope of the oprichnina because he was worried that the non-oprichnina “land’s” army outnumbered his oprichnina corps. In 1568, he resumed his anti-princely policy by executing the leaders of the group he had deported to Kazan′ and then forgiven (312). When the oprichnina outlived its usefulness, Ivan replaced its leadership with men who had not taken part in its creation (354). Ivan had no great plan for the oprichnina, which just served to guarantee his personal security. The oprichnina not only stripped boyars of land but exterminated them and built up the gentry (dvorianstvo). However, it did not pursue systematic confiscation of princely or boyar land and sometimes added confiscated land to the court (dvor) property14 rather than giving it to the gentry. The oprichnina was directed against all classes, all of whom Ivan suspected of treason, not just the boyars. It strengthened royal power and weakened feudal division and princely-boyar landowning, but neither objectively nor subjectively did it possess a single goal. It hurt the classes on whom Ivan relied for political support, the gentry and the bureaucrats. It did not eliminate boyar landowning or influence. The oprichnina hurt society but did not change the political or social order (402–5). Moreover, the tsar did not need the oprichnina to fight traitors, as proven by his continued executions after he abolished it (293, 414). Ivan’s murder of Tsarevich Ivan led to the termination of the dynasty. Ivan hated his domineering advisors Adashev and Sylvester. Like all despots, he followed Vassian Toporkov’s advice not to employ anyone smarter than himself. Logically, how could Adashev and Sylvester, who pursued anti-boyar policies, make friends with the boyars? (229–30). Karamzin’s portrait of Ivan’s idyllic married life with Anastasiia cannot be taken seriously (224). Because Sylvester interpreted her illness as God’s punishment of Ivan for not listening to his advisors, the tsar accused Adashev and Sylvester of poisoning her, which was probably correct (235, 244). The story of Adashev’s suicide was probably a cover-up. It is to be expected that, like Skuratov’s murder of Filipp, Adashev had “help” dying (237). Ivan’s advisors feuded with each other like Stalin’s and Boris Yeltsin’s 14 The term dvor referred both to the royal “court,” the political apex of the government, and the royal “household,” the economic foundation of the dynasty. It could also mean any residential complex, such as the oprichnina “court” in Moscow.

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(238). However, in this case by violating tradition the power of the Chosen Council weakened Muscovy’s legal institutions. Ushakov endorses the opinion that Sylvester paralyzed Ivan’s will and Adashev took it over, usurping the tsar’s authority (239). The wisdom and originality of Ivan’s actions after he dismissed the Chosen Council were hardly impressive (242). He probably let Adashev and Sylvester live for old time’s sake (244). For all his suspiciousness and cruelty, Ivan was impressionable. He always sought new advisors only to fall out with and subsequently destroy them mercilessly (252). After Anastasiia’s death Ivan’s orgies resumed (245). His second wife, Maria Cherkasskaia, served as his procurer of beautiful women willing to service him inside the Kremlin’s women’s quarters, while she herself almost daily selected her own new lover (255–56). Unlike Anastasiia, his new wife could influence Ivan. She made him even more suspicious. As a result, Ivan surrounded himself with sycophants and opportunists (285). He eventually lost interest in her sexually. He organized his own harem and ignored her flaunting of Muscovite social propriety by appearing in native dress at banquets and riding in open carriages with her lovers (290–91). Later, he arranged Cherkasskaia’s death because she and her lover, Andrei FedorovCheliadnin, had plotted his assassination (330). Like Cherkasskaia, Ivan’s fourth wife Anna Koltovskaia procured ladies-in-waiting to entertain him in her quarters (390). Maria Nagaia cried so much at having to marry the tsar that he turned to still more orgies, but he only fell asleep during them (471). Ivan was jealous of Viskovatyi, his leading diplomat (263). The tsar’s diplomatic correspondence, for example with the king of Denmark, reflected his personal arrogance and impatience more than his sober consideration. Their purpose was to show that he was in charge (275). He should not be blamed alone for the massacre of Polotsk Jews who refused to convert. Ivan had brought along on campaign the igumen Leonid of the Iosifov Monastery, long an enemy of Judaizers, so the tsar’s action was at least in part a result of Josephan influence (265). Kurbskii’s defection should not be judged. How would his critics react to unjust executions? Aristocratic loyalty was to a ruler, not a country. However, Kurbskii’s willingness to fight his own country does not speak well for him. His ambition exceeded his abilities (277). He opposed Ivan’s despotism and cruelty (281). Kurbskii’s flight may have unhinged Ivan, something the entire country had feared would happen because the tsar was a nervous and

Dueling Ivans, Dueling Stalins  •  CHAPTER 4

imbalanced coward. Ivan’s sick suspiciousness is typical of many tyrants. The more inhuman a dictator, the more afraid he becomes of assassination. This was as true of Ivan as of Lenin and Stalin (283). Just like his best student, Stalin, Ivan wanted absolute power. He wanted to generate general fear and destroy everyone’s will to resist him. He executed tens, hundreds, thousands of people, entire families, the innocent and the guilty. His terror was an admission of weakness. He ordered surprise murders so that victims could not confess their sins, thus destroying their souls as well as their bodies (294–95). Because the records of the prosecution of Ivan’s victims do not survive, it is impossible to tell if the conspiracies for which they were executed were real, but interrogation under torture would not have yielded any reliable information (297–98). The synodical lists of Ivan’s victims cannot be trusted. Like Stalin, Ivan hid the true number of his victims to protect his reputation (338–39). Tsarevich Ivan, who was as sadistic as his father, accompanied Ivan to Red Square to perform the 1571 executions. They personally dismembered victims. The tsar distrusted his son as a tool of the Zakhar′iny, Anastasiia′s family (351, 353). He was upset at Tsarevich Ivan’s popularity. The people saw in Ivan’s son the best hope for the future because he stood for justice and mercy. Despite the evidence to this day, “so-called patriots” deny accusations that the tsar was responsible for the death of his grandchild and son as nefarious slander by Western agents. These “patriots” claim that the history of Russia is written by her enemies, which slanders Solov′ev, Platonov, Vernadsky, Kliuchevskii, and Skrynnikov. “It would be interesting to find out [who] her friends [are].”15 The real cause of Tsarevich Ivan’s death was his father’s hysteria and mental imbalance (194–501, quotes 495, 498). Ivan’s unlimited sadism was far worse than the “usual” sixteenth-century cruelty. It was “semi-Asiatic despotism.” That autopsies revealed high levels of mercury in him and Tsarevich Ivan but not Tsarevich Fedor suggests syphilis from a thousand sex partners. Both the disease and its treatment caused mental degeneration. Sudden mood changes and epileptic seizures result from mercury poisoning. Ivan would have been sadistic even without syphilis. Like Stalin, the tsar suffered from psycho-pathology. Trotskii had every tenth soldier shot if a Red Army unit did not fight well, but he did not torture people for pleasure. Ivan’s morality can be questioned 15 Among the proponents of Ivan’s canonization, historians who qualify as “friends” of Russia would include Froianov.

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(357–58). However, the founder of the oprichnina cannot be accused of lacking willpower or logical consistency. In his youth, the future tsar knew fear but not love. In his mindless passion to dominate people, he, like Peter the Great, manifested no sympathy for anyone. He was not a Norman but an “irritable, cruel and treacherous Mongol” (361–62). Ivan’s repentance for his sins in his testament was purely formal. Repentance without deeds is worthless, even in a religious fanatic. In his own heart he thought himself blameless (391–92, 394). He selected Vorotynskii, whom he hated, to fight the Tatars in 1572, just as his student Stalin selected Zhukov to fight the invading Germans, not to save the country but to save himself. Ivan was a decisive, energetic dictator (395). But like all tyrants sooner or later his ambitions were so divorced from reality that his policies failed, as demonstrated by his losing the Livonian War (448). He could not stop the loss of Polotsk because he took Batory’s threat to the city lightly (460), but he did reinforce Pskov and delay Batory’s invasion of the Russian northwest by raiding Lithuania. The tsar did everything possible to save his country by inducing the pope to arbitrate the war (476, 477, 482). Ivan spent his whole life fighting his elite, but he named the head of the Royal Council, boyar Prince Ivan Mstislavskii, head of the regency council for Tsarevich Fedor because he knew that Fedor would need boyar support upon his succession to the throne (524). Nearly all serious historians in Russia criticized Ivan, but even the country’s best historians overlooked his “spiritual legacy” (dukhovnoe nasledie), which was far worse than the atrocities of the oprichnina and his sadism, namely the destruction of “civic consciousness” (grazhdanskoe soznanie). Stalin established his authority via the GULAG and treated the Russian people as a collection of slaves. Life is sacred. Neither Ivan, nor Lenin, nor Stalin had the right to take it. Russia was worse off than England or France because loss of life in the latter two countries resulted from nationwide conflicts, whereas in Russia just one man caused mass fatalities. Ivan’s reign was one of the darkest periods of Russian history, but, to be fair, during that reign the country became a major power, reformed its administration, expanded its boundaries, saw its economy improve, and enhanced its culture. However, these achievements were produced by wise advisors, by experienced military officers, and most of all by Russia’s “patient people” for which Ivan took and receives credit (539–40). Ushakov’s cookie-cutter pastiche of arguments from the “black book” on Ivan makes up in sensationalism what it lacks in insight. Usachev’s Ivan

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is bright, educated, and pious, but despite the tsar’s intelligence, learning, and religious belief, his actions remain deplorable. Ivan’s virtues cannot ameliorate his crimes. In my exposition I have deliberately, but without commentary, juxtaposed contradictory passages on many themes. Because Ushakov’s book lacks footnotes, it is impossible to source atrocity stories, especially on sex, that go well beyond anything I have ever read. The sole strength of the book, its only virtue, is its morality— itself derivative—in condemning the atrocities Ushakov attributes to Ivan. Murder is murder, and there can be no excuses about collateral damage: the ends do not justify the means. Ushakov seems to elevate the value of human life over state priorities, but in fact he is arguing that inhuman means hurt the state as much as they repress people. Kobrin said it better in 1989,16 but it still merits repeating. It is no wonder that Kremlev took such a dim view of Ushakov’s book.

. . . and the Ugly Both Kremlev and Usachev have written “ugly” books, derivative and highly selective partisan polemics. Neither author makes the slightest contribution to the historical study of Ivan. Neither author, obviously, thought to ask a competent specialist on sixteenth-century Muscovite history to vet his book. As a result, factual errors and misused sources abound, not to mention contradictions. But this is all beside the point. On some issues Ushakov and Kremlev agree. Neither is concerned with Ukrainian sensibilities, although Kremlev’s Great Russian chauvinism is far more blatant. (In passing, Ushakov refers to the “Little Russian” (malorossiiskie), not Ukrainian, Cossacks [209].) Neither worries about the Tatar view of the Muscovite conquest of the Kazan′ Khanate. Both are at least Russian nationalists, although Ushakov tempers his Russian imperialism with an allusion to imperial Russian oppression of Tatars. Ushakov still demonizes Mongols, like the New Chronology. Still, both are Eurocentric elitists, when it comes to Tatars, Muslims, and nomads. (For contrasting Tatar views, see chapter 9.) Both seem to treat Froianov’s publications on Ivan seriously, Kremlev more explicitly, despite Froianov’s antisemitism. Ushakov thinks the massacre of Polotsk Jews was morally wrong, even if he spreads the blame to include Russian Orthodox clergy. Kremlev confines himself to 16 Vladimir Borisovich Kobrin, Ivan Groznyi (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989).

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defending Muscovite claims to the city. These overlapping convergences pale in comparison to the enormous gap between Kremlev and Ushakov in evaluating Ivan. In terms of the typology adduced in chapter 1, the authors occupy opposite extremes—Kremlev to the right in the apologetic rubric, Ushakov to the left in the hostile rubric. Nevertheless, there is something to be learned about Ivan’s place in Russian historical memory since 1991 by contrasting Kremlev’s and Ushakov’s unoriginal views. Both repeatedly and anachronistically link Ivan to Stalin. To Kremlev, Ivan was good and so was Stalin; to Ushakov, Ivan and Stalin were both bad. It is as if it were impossible to praise one without praising the other, to condemn one without condemning the other. Politically, that may well be true, but from the point of view of history it need not be and at least one author, Anton Vasil′ev, praises Ivan but condemns Stalin.17 Kremlev and Ushakov hold totally divergent views of the identity of Russian “patriots.” To Kremlev, the patriots are Stalin’s and Ivan’s defenders, making the “liberals” the “unpatriotic” slanderers of both. To Ushakov, the patriots are the imperial Russian and even Soviet historians who criticized the tsar, and the self-styled “patriots” who defend him are, although the author does not explicitly say so, “unpatriotic” insofar as they are dishonest in glorifying men who wrought devastation on the Russian people. Kremlev and Ushakov, in mutually exclusive ways, think that the historiography of Ivan not only can, but should be judged in terms of Russian patriotism. Both authors assume that Russian history is, and ought to be political—in my terms, politicized. Probably, comparing Ivan to Stalin, good or bad, makes it impossible not to politicize Ivan and his reign, although of course Ivan and his reign were politicized during his lifetime and have remained so uninterruptedly ever since. This premise about national history is not unique to Russia, but it is a premise not shared, or at least that should not be shared, by professional historians anywhere because it severely inhibits, if it does not completely preclude, objective research that will lead us to a better understanding of the “Terrible Tsar.”

17 Anton Aleksandrovich Vasil′ev, Gosudarstvennoe uchenie Ivana IV Groznogo. Monografiia (Moscow: Iulitinform, 2014), 12.

Chapter 5

A Proposal to Revive the Oprichnina

Kremlev’s Stalinist interpretation of Ivan presented Ivan and Stalin as pursuing similar policies to achieve similar statist goals, facing similar obstacles during their rule and suffering similar slander in Russophobic “liberal” historiography. The neo-Stalinist publications which this chapter discusses carry that point of view to a previously unknown level by explicitly advocating the creation of a new oprichnina to solve Russia’s problems at the time of their publication. However, in order to project Ivan’s oprichnina into the twenty-first century its advocates not only take great liberties with history but go further and denude the oprichnina of all historical context. Wijermars identifies references to a “new oprichnina” in public discourse as early as August 1991 (to apply to the Communist Party) which continued during the 2000–2020 period she investigates,1 but such allusions manifested distinct dichotomies. Invocations of a new oprichnina could be figures of speech or proposals for imitation of an institutional model. They could be cautionary warnings of authoritarianism by liberals or slogans to mobilize supporters on behalf of violent authoritarian policies. Alexander Dugin alluded to the concept metaphorically, as a military and political force to impose rotation of personnel within the elite, by violent repression against the majority of the population if needs be. He wrote a paper on the metaphysics and symbolism of the oprichnina. Apparently, he did

1 Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 171–79.

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not publish his presentations, so that material cannot be discussed here.2 An extended intellectual articulation of the neo-Stalinist analysis of a new oprichnina as the solution to Russia’s problems, less militant and less mystical but more technocratic than Dugin’s, did appear in print. In 2010–11, several Russian authors proposed that the solution to the country’s problems was the creation of a new oprichnina. They readily admitted that anyone who considered that institution an expression of Ivan the Terrible’s deranged and sadistic mind for the purpose of terrorizing his subjects would find such a proposal incredible. However, they dismissed this hypothetical objection to their program by insisting that such a conception of the “old” oprichnina was a misconception spread by Russian and foreign Russophobes. Moreover, they asserted, a new oprichnina need not repeat the mistakes, excesses, or errors of Ivan’s oprichnina. The oprichnina was not an exceptional deviation from the natural course of Russian history, but a valuable institutional mechanism that has been followed by a number of subsequent Russian rulers, including Stalin. The two books—an anthology and a monograph—discussed in this chapter date to a specific time and political context.3 In Russia in 2011, Vladimir Putin, after eight years as president from 1999 to 2008, had become prime minister in 2008, while Dmitrii Medvedev became president.4 The almost apocalyptic alarmism in the pronunciamentos in these two publications derived from the global economic crisis that began in 2008 with the collapse of the US mortgage industry, which created near-hysteria in many political circles. Extreme times demanded extreme solutions. This chapter addresses Ivan’s image and the concept of the oprichnina propagated 2 Masha Gessen, The Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia (New York: Riverhead Books, 2017), 244; Wijermars, Memory Politics in contemporary Russia, 173–75. For other invocations of the oprichnina by Dugin and the members of his Euraisianist Union of Youth see Laruelle, Russian Nationalism, 113–14, 123. 3 Maksim Kalashnikov, Vitalii Aver′ianov, and Andrei Fursov, Novaia oprichnina ili modernizatsiia po-russki (Moscow: Folio, 2011) [hereafter Novaia oprichnina]; Mikhail Gennadievich Deliagin, Put′ Rossii. Novaia oprichnina, ili Pochemu ne nuzhno “valit′ iz Rashki” (Moscow: EKSMO, 2011) [hereafter Deliagin]. For simplicity’s sake I will use in-line references to these two publications. Wijermars translates the title of Deliagin’s book as The Path of Russia: The New Oprichnina, or Why You Do Not Have to Get Out of Russia; she dismisses it as superficial compared to the anthology Novaia oprichnina. See Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 175n7. 4 Art activist Oleg Vasil′ev likened Putin’s handover of power to Medvedev in 2008 to Ivan’s “abdication” to Simeon Bekbulatovich in 1575, asking whether Medvedev would return the throne to its rightful owner. Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 179.

A Proposal to Revive the Oprichnina  •  CHAPTER 5

in these 2011 publications. It will not address the authors’ perception of Russia’s current problems or the putative efficacy of their proposed solution to those problems. Although one of the contributors to the anthology was a historian, these volumes were not works of history. They lack any academic scholarly apparatus. These were political works, aimed at the general public. Five thousand copies of each book were printed, not the usual press run for a specialized historical monograph in Russia, even on the oprichnina. The editors of the anthology readily confessed that its contributors did not agree on everything. Contributors to the anthology, including Mikhail Deliagin, the author of the monograph also discussed here, did share a conservative and authoritarian political ideology, an animosity toward the West, and a positive opinion not just of Ivan, but also of Stalin and the Communist period of Russian history as a whole. Therefore, their opinions resonated with the broader problem in Russian culture of conceptualizing the Soviet past, a problem outside the scope of this chapter.5 The New Oprichnina or Modernization Russian-style, as two of its three editors, Maksim Kalashnikov and Vitalii Aver′ianov, explained in their introduction (Novaia oprichnina, 3–6) grew out of a roundtable at the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism (Institut dynamicheskogo konservatisma)6 in Moscow in February 2010 titled “The Oprichnina and the Oprichnina Idea: Myths and Historical Reality.”7 The anthology contains not only the papers delivered at that roundtable but also ancillary material: an introduction; eight chapters (six from the editors’ presentations at the roundtable, the seventh an edited transcript of the resulting discussion, and the last a report on a seminar); a brief conclusion; and a lengthy appendix of summaries of heterogeneous essays. In the introduction, the editors insisted that there are literal parallels between the situation in Russia in the sixteenth century and the present. Then, the state system was paralyzed by the princely-boyar oligarchy, now it is paralyzed by the bureaucratic oligarchy. Then, the solution was the oprichnina, a surgical operation to break the obstacles to the necessary transformation of society. The contributors to the anthology believe that 5

Thomas Sherlock, “Russian Politics and the Soviet Past: Reassessing Stalin and Stalinism under Vladimir Putin,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40 (2016): 45–59. 6 On the Institute see Laruelle, Russian Nationalism, 134–51. 7 Note the identical contrast of “myth” and “reality” in the title of one the conferences of the canonize Ivan movement.

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Ivan intended the oprichnina as a temporary expedient to overcome the princely-boyar aristocracy. The editors did not assert that the oprichnina succeeded in achieving that goal, but implied that the oprichnina would not be worth imitating if it had been a complete failure, although in one chapter of the Novaia oprichnina, one editor, Kalashnikov, allows for the possibility that it failed. To Kalashnikov and Aver′ianov the hereditary landowning aristocracy dominated sixteenth-century Muscovy in the same way the oligarchy dominates early twenty-first-century Russia. This analogy disregards the vast political, social, economic, and cultural distance between the two periods. It ascribes to Ivan as much power as the president of the Russian Federation possesses. While the theory that the oprichnina was directed against the princely-boyar aristocracy was formulated by Platonov before the 1917 Revolution and is still supported by some professional historians, both in Russia and abroad, it disregards the uncontested fact that commoners constituted the overwhelming majority of the oprichnina’s victims. Vitalii Vladimirovich Aver′ianov, a Russian Orthodox philosopher, writer, publicist, and director of the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, born 1973, in Novaia oprichnina, chapter 18 “Shizo-konservatizm i plutokratiia” (Schizo-conservatism and the plutocracy, 7–18), insisted that although some people see the oprichnina as a bloody excess of inhumanity, it was actually a creative exit from a dead-end political crisis caused by princely-boyar aristocratic opposition to modernization. It was, and had to be, authoritarian and autocratic.9 For God and the “people” Ivan had to “restructure people” (perebrat′ liudishek), the phrase Ivan used for relocating people geographically and thereby demoting or promoting them during the oprichnina. Aver′ianov asserted, as did the title of the anthology, that Ivan was trying to “modernize” Russia, but that he could not because of the aristocracy. However, the concept of “modernization” was certainly unknown to the tsar and everyone else in the sixteenth century. He did seek to hire Western technical experts, but he considered Russia superior to Europe by the most 8 To avoid confusion between chapters of Ivan the Terrible in Russian Historical Memory since 1991 and chapters in Novaia oprichnina, I will preface references to chapters in the latter with a mention of the title, Novaia oprichnina. 9 Aver′ianov and his co-authors follow the conventional wisdom on the significance of the theory of autocracy to Ivan’s mentality. However, cf. Halperin, “Ivan IV as Autocrat (samoderzhets).”

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important criterion—religion. Russian Orthodox Christianity was the only true faith. Aver′ianov also implied that Ivan was working for God and the Russian people. The religious element of Ivan’s self-image dovetails with that of many interpretations of his character and policies, but with a major difference from the advocates of his canonization and some historians of various rubrics. Although the proponents of a new oprichnina mentioned religion and religious concepts, they did not conceive of the oprichnina as a religious institution to further the salvation of the Russian people. The proponents of a new oprichnina interpreted it as a statist institution with almost entirely secular goals. However, all the contributors to the anthology shared Aver′ianov’s axiom that Ivan was not acting for himself, out of ego, arrogance, or insanity, but for God, as he always insisted, and for the narod, a word he did not utilize. At most, Ivan’s references to “all Orthodox Christians” could be extrapolated to a concept of the narod, but it is more important that his world view was traditionally hierarchical. He denied that the “people” could restrict his power. He did demagogically manipulate the population of the city of Moscow to support his creation of the oprichnina by pretending to abdicate, but he had nothing but disdain for elected rulers. Aver′ianov assumes that the reforms of the 1550s, which Ivan supported at the time, had reached a political dead-end. Many recent textbooks and surveys of Russian history, to the contrary, concluded that the reforms were working, and working in the direction of limiting autocratic power, but that the tsar, either because he opposed limitations on his power or because he sought much more rapid and thorough reform, chose to abandon gradual reform in favor of a violent revolution from above.10 Novaia oprichnina, chapter 2, “U poslednei cherty? Na poroge novykh 30-kh” (At the last stroke? On the threshold of the new 1930s, 19–48) is by Maksim Kalashnikov, the pseudonym of Maksim Aleksandrovich Kucherenko, born in 1966, a journalist, political activist, and futurologist. He argued that to cure rampant corruption in Russia and to modernize and industrialize Russia’s economy required a regime with oprichnost′, a quality which can be found in Ivan’s oprichnina, Peter the Great’s Imperial Guards, Stalin’s never-created “new knights,” the Schutzstaffel (SS) in Germany, the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, and the Post-Masonic Secret Network that

10 For further allusions to Ivan as a revolutionary see chapters 6 and 11.

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runs the USA.11 The new oprichnina, like its namesake, would eventually expand from its original exclusive territory until it encompassed the entire country, when it would cease being an oprichnina. Clearly, to Kalashnikov, the oprichnina as a political mechanism has no uniquely Russian elements, religious or secular. The oprichnina becomes a phenomenon of world, not just European, history. Moreover, in his estimation, those means are applicable to a variety of goals, because Ivan could hardly have been trying to industrialize Russia. While corruption was one of the issues he raised in his justification of the creation of the oprichnina, treason was by far a more important vice in his pronouncements. Andrei Il′ich Fursov, born 1951 and hence the oldest of the three editors, historian, social philosopher, writer, and crisis specialist (krisisolog), wrote Novaia oprichnina, chapter 3, “Oprichnina v russkoi istorii— vospominanie o budushchem ili kto sozdaet IV Rim?” (The oprichnina in Russian history—remembrance of the future or who creates the Fourth Rome?,” 49–138). Fursov was head of the Center for Methodology and Information of the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, director of the Center of Russian Studies at the Moscow Humanities University, and a professor of Asian and African History (nota bene not Russian history) at Moscow State University. He taught Russian history and the contemporary USSR at the State University of New York-Binghamton and Columbia University in 1990–1991. He is the only professional historian among the contributors to the anthology and provided its most extensive historical analysis of the oprichnina.12 Fursov declares: “The oprichnina is the key event of Russian history of the last five centuries” (Novaia oprichnina, 51). The oprichnina not only laid the foundation for future state authority (vlast′) but constituted the embryonic form of that authority. It opposed autocracy to the princely-boyar principle. The oprichnina, like Ivan, has been slandered in Russian history and culture. Of course, there were some scoundrels within oprichniki ranks, but such men always arise in times of emergency. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, under the rule of the Horde, the Tatars ruled through the Rus′ princes, so the boyars had to 11 The Post-Masonic Secret Network, as my editor Stuart Allen perceptively pointed out, is a fictitious conspiracy, unlike the other groups Kalashnikov names, which at least existed. Of course it is a variant of the worldwide Jewish conspiracy running the West according to antisemitic apologists for Ivan. 12 He also presented a paper at the conference discussed in chapter 9.

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support their princes by forming a princely-boyar “combine” (Fursov uses a phonetic transliteration of the English word kombain). This “combine” lasted until the end of Tatar rule. In 1505, Grand Prince Vasilii III began acting like a Byzantine autocrat. To break the power of the “combine,” his father, Grand Prince Ivan III, had confiscated boyar and church lands in conquered Novgorod and assigned them to gentry, which eventually created two contradictions in Russian society: between the ruling princes and the boyars, and between the boyars and the gentry (dvorianstvo). These contradictions within the ruling class (gospodstvuiushchii klass) came fully to the surface during the reign of Ivan IV. To destroy the “combine” and institute one-man rule (edinoderzhavie), Ivan used extraordinary means, the oprichnina. When the princely-boyars agreed to his terms for establishing the oprichnina, he broke the “combine.” The oprichnina was a revolution within the ruling class. He exacerbated class warfare when he appealed to the urban artisans of Moscow (posadskie liudi) against the boyars. To defend himself Ivan needed bodyguards or his revolution would have aborted. In his new appanage, the tsar created a new ruling group, the oprichniki. All social classes contributed to the oprichnina, without differences in social rank. The oprichniki had to renounce all their relatives and friends outside the oprichnina, and swear to serve the tsar like dogs by sweeping traitors out of the land, hence the dogs’ heads and brooms on theirs horses’ necks. Essentially, the oprichnina was a Chrezvychainaia kommissiia (Extraordinary commission). This was not the last time such an instrument was used in Russian history. Peter I had his Imperial Guards and the Bolsheviks had the Cheka, but Ivan was the inventor of the prototype, its general, the genius who conceived it, the most powerful initiator of innovations in Russian state-power relations. The form of the oprichnina copied that of a monastery but the oprichnik attire denoted a secular order of knights. The modest form of the oprichnina did not correspond to its razgul′nyi (wild, fast, loose) content, smashing the opposition. The land terror of confiscating lands from non-oprichniki and oprichnina victims and allocating it to oprichniki facilitated physical terror, but the scope of the physical terror has been exaggerated. The main function of the oprichnina, its primary purpose, was to “restructure people,” not to impose physical terror. Physical terror was hardly its sole purpose. Ivan shed not a little blood compared to Vasilii III, but in comparison to contemporaries he was

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extremely moderate. Ivan was a “hyperbolic [social] engineer” (Novaia oprichnina, 74). Fursov follows Al′shits (Al′) in arguing that Ivan did not abolish the oprichnina in 1572, he just changed its name to the “household” (dvor). Fursov takes extreme umbrage at “baseless” accusations that the oprichniki were better at looting than fighting Russia’s enemies. Ivan did execute some oprichniki after 1572, but not for being oprichniki. Each case had a specific cause, and oprichniki performed the executions. Physical terror was terminated because it was no longer needed. Yet only the name, symbols, and markers of the oprichnina vanished. The oprichnina was transformed into a regular government organization, comparable to renaming the Cheka or the GPU. As the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich and the “Time of Troubles” revealed, the oprichnina had not gone far enough. It had not completed the transformation of the ruling class. To be sure, the Romanov restoration demonstrated that the process of that transformation was irreversible. The boyars could no longer dictate the course of Russian history. Only autocracy could restrain boyar greed so that a sufficient amount of the surplus product remained for distribution to the gentry. The oprichnina was the embryo of autocracy, serfdom was the product of autocracy. The oprichnina was not just an event, it was a principle of the organization of political authority in Russia. The oprichnina resolved the question of which historical path Russia would take. Despite a weak gentry, weak political institutions, and only a small economic surplus, Ivan’s oprichnina overcame the legacy of the Horde and the Horde’s inheritance, the “combine.” Fursov, like all his co-authors, acquired his academic training during the Soviet period. Although not a Marxist, he retained several Marxist concepts such as “ruling class” and “surplus product.” Fursov turned Karamzin’s oft-followed interpretation of the effect of Mongol rule on Muscovy’s political evolution on its head. Usually, the Mongols (and sometimes the Byzantines) are credited or blamed with inspiring Muscovite autocracy, with setting Muscovy on the road to becoming an oriental despotism. Fursov argued the opposite—that the Horde inheritance was oligarchy, a concept that can be found in some recent American scholarship on Muscovy. Fursov assumed that boyar-princely cooperation was detrimental to royal authority and to Russia. However, in the mid-fifteenth century it was the members of the Muscovite dynasty engaged in civil war who threatened

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political unity, not the boyars. Fursov’s aversion to the “combine” derives from his espousal of the conflict model of relations between the ruler and the elite. At the same time, he accepted the conflict model of relations between the boyars and the gentry as two separate classes. The development of serfdom may have been accelerated by the economic depression produced by oprichnina depredations and other factors, but in the seventeenth century the gentry forced the autocrat to establish serfdom. That the oprichnina contained members of all social classes (and the victims of the oprichnina belonged to all classes) testifies that it was not directed exclusively against the boyars and not intended to create a new “ruling class,” let alone to institute a revolution from above. Skrynnikov originated the concept of the oprichnina as an “Extraordinary Commission,” a legal condition operative in late imperial Russia, especially from 1905 to 1917, but his interpretation was hostile to Ivan and the oprichnina, and thus very much at variance with the views of the contributors to Novaia oprichnina. By distinguishing the “essence” of the oprichnina from its semiotic symbols, Fursov deprived the oprichnina of its historical specificity, reducing it to an ahistorical instrument of repression by extraordinary means. If the semiotic markers of the oprichnina disappeared in 1572, then so did the oprichnina proper. Fursov unnecessarily tried to avoid the conclusion that Ivan executed oprichniki as oprichniki. If there were opportunists and criminals among the oprichnik ranks, then Ivan was merely making personnel decisions, not impugning the oprichnina as an institution. Aver′ianov wrote Novaia oprichnina’s chapter 4, “Oprichnina—modernizatsiia po-russki” (The Oprichnina—Russian-style modernization,” 139–98). He began the chapter by asking plaintively: “Why do people hate Ivan?” Why have people loved or hated Ivan for 500 years? Some love Ivan so much that they attempted to persuade the Russian Orthodox Church to canonize him. However, today that issue is not “relevant,” so it would be unproductive to engage the arguments of its proponents and opponents, despite the fact that “many” people instinctively feel that Ivan “crowned” the phenomenon of the “Russian miracle” of geographic expansion and the development of state power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Ivan was a great tsar, but “it is again necessary to demonstrate his greatness” (Novaia oprichnina, 178). People cannot hate Ivan because he supposedly destroyed Russia. Had he done so, there would have been no one left to hate him. Nor do they hate him for insulting the people, because Russian

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folklore remembers Ivan as someone who expressed popular hopes. People hate Ivan because they fear him. Russia is racially, culturally, and religiously comparable to the West, so its success challenges Western superiority (Novaia oprichnina, 142–43). Ivan, Aver′ianov claimed, was “essentially a Russian phenomenon, always intertwined with the Russian soul, [who] became part of the foundation of Russian civilization” (Novaia oprichnina, 144). No (true—CJH) Russian hates Ivan, only rebels and defectors who set themselves against the country such as Yanov. The tsar epitomizes the age in which he lived. He knew the people (narod) and he believed in them. He founded the Muscovite tsarstvo and the imperial system. He defined the principles of autocracy followed by his successors. The oprichnina first demonstrated the requirement of service to the state from the top on down. This is why Ivan is hated and feared by Russophobes. They are trying to bury the historical memory of measures which would overturn a rotting political system (Novaia oprichnina, 147). Filmmaker Pavel Lungin slandered Ivan in the movie Tsar′. The pathetic presentation of Metropolitan Filipp in the film makes it impossible that Lungin did so at the behest of the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, he served the plutocracy, which is afraid that once again, as under Ivan, its power would be undermined by an oprichnina. Many historians agree that Ivan could not have ordered the murder of Metropolitan Filipp. The synodical list of victims that Ivan sent to monasteries with orders to pray for their souls omitted Filipp’s name. Ivan did not lie to God. Aver′ianov cites the conclusion of metropolitan of St. Petersburg Ioann (Snychev) that Filipp was martyred by the clerics who slandered him at his trial and not by the tsar. Ivan is the symbol of transformational creativity. Nowadays he would be called an innovator. He developed new institutions and forms that affected all facets of Russian life, including the anti-brigandage reform. Adashev and Silvester led the first wave of reform, but the second wave, the oprichnina, was not antagonistic to the first. Ivan’s imperial concept inspired the adoption of Kazan′ orphans by Russians in new imperial social relations. New symbolic concepts were introduced into the language such as “Holy Rus′.” Aver′ianov invokes the conclusion of Al′ (Al′shits) that Ivan created the oprichnina not to divide Russia but to raise it to another level, to overcome the division of the land into appanages and clans. The conquests of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ had raised Russia to a fragile equality with its neighbors,

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but to win a war on three fronts (Kazan′ and Astrakhan′, Crimea, and the “West” [Livonia, Poland-Lithuania, Sweden]. My extrapolation—CJH). Russia needed new material and new cadres. The oprichnina generated the resources necessary for Russia’s national (natsional′nyi) development. Inter alia Ivan favored Russian expansion to Siberia and Turkestan. In scope, Ivan’s program resembles Stalin’s Five-Year Plans. The number of Ivan’s victims has been exaggerated and must take into account that he was fighting against treason. Most “responsible historians” are “compelled to acknowledge the fact of conspiracies against Ivan” (Novaia oprichnina, 179). He relied upon members of all social classes. He did not favor the gentry and the bureaucrats over the princes and the boyars, although landowners suffered more than those without land. The oprichnina triumphed strategically, but tactically it was cut short because of the limited capacity of the Muscovite economy for growth and the problems created by overpopulation. Because of inadequate technology, Russia exhausted its resources. Ivan should have deprived landowners of their lands and salary and created a super-oprichnina, but despite his genius and great internal strength, he was still a man of his times and could not conceive of doing so. Nevertheless, the oprichnina established a state and accomplished the national and Christian-imperial transformation of Russia—or at least the transformation of those Russians who supported Ivan’s policies. Those who opposed him were destroyed, although he could not destroy the entire elite. The chef d’oeuvre of his virtuous political leadership was the oprichnina. Ivan used the extraordinary regime (dictatorship) to create an empire. Aver′ianov’s history of Ivan’s reign, like Fursov’s, is largely derivative and selective. His argument that if Ivan had destroyed Russia no one would have been left to criticize him for it, is shamelessly sophistic. The case for popular support for the tsar derives from a selective reading of Russian folklore, recorded long after his death.13 Ivan may have empathized with the Russian “people,” but officially he was of Roman descent from the brother of Augustus Caesar, or Scandinavian descent via Riurik, and he blithely asserted his German origin when it suited his purposes. He deserves little if any credit for Russian expansion into Siberia. He vehemently criticized Ermak’s campaign until after it had succeeded. Russian contacts with 13 Norman W. Ingham, “The Groza of Ivan Groznyi in Russian Folklore,” Russian History 14 (1987): 225–45; Maureen Perrie, The Image of Ivan the Terrible in Russian Folklore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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Turkestan during Ivan’s reign were confined to commercial relations. He and his government never invoked Holy Rus′. For advocates of Ivan’s canonization, it would be blasphemy to assert that Russia was religiously comparable to the West. Only Russian Orthodox Christianity possesses the true faith. However, Aver′ianov does not equate Russian and European political culture, which is far more important to a statist concept of the oprichnina than to the religious interpretation of the oprichnina as a medium to salvation. Ivan may have been essentially Russian, but if we follow Kalashnikov, the oprichnina idea was not. Lungin’s film portrays Metropolitan Filipp as a martyr, not a weakling, and for that very reason, pace Aver′ianov, the Russian Orthodox Church did indeed endorse the film. Like the advocates of Ivan’s canonization, Aver′ianov ignores documentary evidence that Filipp opposed the oprichnina, at first refusing to accept the office of metropolitan unless Ivan abolished it, and then promising not to criticize it. Filipp’s name did not appear in the synodical lists because the tsar stuck to the cover story repeated in Filipp’s vita that he died of smoke inhalation, not strangulation. The anti-brigandage reforms began in the 1530s when Ivan was a child. He had no influence on that policy. The Kazan′ orphans adopted by the Russians after the Kazan′ conquest are fictional. When conquering the city of Kazan′, the Muscovite army massacred the men and enslaved the women and children, some of whom were forcibly converted to Christianity. That is the form that “imperial” social relations took in Ivan’s Muscovy. Ivan did not oppose the appanage system. As Aver′ianov admits, the oprichnina was an appanage, and at different times the tsar envisioned created appanages for his sons. Aver′ianov was as inconsistent in his analysis of Ivan’s social policies as Fursov. Ivan did not displace or replace the boyars as the “ruling class” of Muscovy, nor was he trying to do so. Consequently, the conception of the oprichnina as a top-down “revolution” is not convincing. Aver′ianov was either discrete or disingenuous when he explained his decision not to discuss the effort to have Ivan canonized. The patriarch of Moscow terminated it by declaring the proposal unacceptable because the murderer of a saint could not become a saint. Cadastres from the 1570s make it abundantly clear that Russia suffered from depopulation, not overpopulation. If Ivan thought the oprichnina would provide the resources for Russia to fight wars to victory on three fronts, then he was mistaken, as Aver′ianov almost admitted by blaming unforeseen factors for Russia’s loss of the Livonian War and inability to

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prevent the burning of Moscow by the Crimean Tatars in 1571. The oprichnina diverted resources from the military fronts and from the defense of Moscow. Most professional historians are compelled to concede that many of the accusations of treason against Ivan’s subjects were fictitious and that many of his victims were innocent. The oprichnina had nothing to do with industrialization. It was most certainly not a “plan,” five year of otherwise. Aver′ianov’s tendentious recreation of Ivan’s reign overlooked how much the oprichnina cost Muscovy. In Novaia oprichnina, chapter 6, also by Kalashnkov, “Oprichnina— diktatura razvitiia” (The oprichnina—a dictatorship of development, 227– 56), he observed “Even if Ivan’s oprichnina failed, that does not mean that a new oprichnina would do so,” which begs the question of why anyone would imitate a failed reform. Novaia oprichnina, chapter 7, summarized the “Diskussiia vokrug oprichnoi idei” (Discussion about the oprichnina idea) by Andrei Kobiakov, Vladimir Khomiakov, Igor′ Kholmogorov, Aleksandr Eliseev, Igor′ Boshchenko, Sergei Alferov, and others (252–72). Kholmogorov, director of the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, observed that via the oprichnina Ivan kept the civil wars endemic everywhere in sixteenth-century Europe within limits in Muscovy (Novaia oprichnina, 263). Eliseev noted that an oprichnina carried with it the risk that its members would themselves become a new oligarchy. Ivan and his oprichnina generated “passionateness” (passionarnost′) (Novaia oprichnina, 265–68). It is not clear that the oprichnina wrought less destruction on Russia than the Wars of Religion did on France. “Passionateness” is a key concept in the metaphysics of the neo-Eurasianist Lev Gumilev, but in his exposition it originates in cosmic radiation, not the Russian government.14 Fursov’s comment that an oprichnina could become an oligarchy suggests that the cure for oligarchy might sometimes prove not to be a cure at all, which hardly constitutes a recommendation.15 The book’s conclusion (293–94) opined that although the oprichnina was cruel and painful, it led to the healing of the country and saved Russian civilization. However, evidence of this is conspicuously absent. For the next 14 Mark Bassin, The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016). 15 A possibility reflected in Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan Groznyi when oprichnik and (in the film) low-born Maliuta Skuratov dons the rich robes of a boyar.

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century and a half, Muscovite gentry and boyars blamed the oprichnina for violations of the property and precedence rights of their ancestors. From the point of view of the contributors to the anthology, it appears that Russian civilization is almost always at risk, so Ivan cannot have been as successful as they claim. It would make more sense to argue that the oprichnina threatened Russian civilization. The abolition of the oprichnina, on the other hand, may have saved it. The appendix of Novaia oprichnina (295–428) contains summaries of an eclectic mix of supporting presentations. The contribution here by economist Deliagin will be discussed below with his monograph (354–59). Khomiakov (389) echoed Aver′ianov in invoking Holy Rus′ and quasi-echoes Fursov in alluding to Moscow-Third Rome, although Khomiakov sought to avoid anachronism by insisting that Russia needs both concepts in their current understanding, not the way they were understood in Ivan’s time. Fursov asserted that Ivan used the oprichnina to remove four Suzdal′ princely clans from the oligarchy (Novaia oprichnina, 392). This is a distorted borrowing from Skrynnikov’s theory of the first stage of the oprichnina. However, according to Skrynnikov, in the oprichnina’s last phase Ivan restored some Suzdal′ princes to high positions in the government. Deliagin is an economist and professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a high-level government aide, advisor and representative at international conferences between 1991 and 2003. In Russia, he writes, progress has always occurred according to the principle articulated in the oprichnina: “the leader and his circle enter an informal alliance with the popular masses, expressing their interests and feelings, against the ruling class.” After Ivan the Terrible the same phenomenon recurred under Peter I, Stalin, and “many other, less cruel, rulers” (Deliagin, 30–31). In a section entitled “Novaia oprichnina i komp′iuternoe Srednevekov′e: ot ‘diktatury zakona’ k ‘diktature proizvola’” (The new oprichnina and the computerized middle ages: from “the dictatorship of law” to the “dictatorship of arbitrariness”), Deliagin defined the oprichnina as an extraordinary institution to use coercion to force modernization, an alliance of the ruler with the people against oligarchs, the pattern of Ivan, Peter the Great, Stalin, and even Khrushchev. Deliagin proposed that the mayor of Moscow set up his own oprichnina, a mobile support staff to carry out his orders, on

A Proposal to Revive the Oprichnina  •  CHAPTER 5

the model of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, to coordinate modernization (Deliagin, 371). He praised the “great historian” Lev Gumilev (Deliagin, 75). Pace Deliagin’s high opinion of Gumilev’s scholarship, the latter belonged to the “hostile” school of post-Soviet Russian opinion toward Ivan. Gumilev attributed the oprichnina to the influence of the Judaizers, certainly not an opinion shared by the advocates of Ivan’s canonization, and almost certainly not an opinion shared by the advocates of a new oprichnina. Deliagin thus reiterated the anthology’s tropes of modernization, “popular” support for Ivan, and the equation of the boyar aristocracy with the oligarchs. In fact, Peter the Great and Stalin did not imitate any of the semiotic elements of the oprichnina. The concept of “popular monarchy” is highly suspect.16 Concerning Moscow, all Deliagin has done is trivialize the concept of oprichnina. Advocates of a New Oprichnina did not succeed in resolving the tension between statist and religious interpretations of Ivan’s oprichnina, which affected their ability to find its analogues in post-Ivan Russian history. Analogies outside of Russia impaired any connection between the oprichnina and Russian political culture. Supposed oprichnina copyists like Peter the Great and Stalin could not conceive the oprichnina in the same cultural terms as Ivan, which is why sociological definitions of the oligarchy, plutocracy, or elite displace historical categories. As a whole the advocates of a New Oprichnina distorted Ivan’s reign by adopting a very selective conception of the oprichnina and then applying it mechanically out of all context. Discarded are all sixteenth-century elements: the appanage structure, the symbolism of clothing, dogs’ heads and brooms, the pseudo-monastery, the oath. What remains is the creation of an institutional structure outside the normal chain of command that can carry out its policies via coercion. From the point of view of historical scholarship, the New Oprichnina’s advocates take unwarranted liberties with the evidence and historical scholarship on Ivan and his reign. Because they admit that he committed some mistakes, they seem to be more balanced than either the historians of the Stalin cult or the groups advocating Ivan’s canonization, but they are not. They remain apologists. Ivan and the oprichnina remain political footballs. Ivan the Terrible would not recognize 16 Maureen Perrie, “Popular Monarchism: The Myth of the Ruler from Ivan the Terrible to Stalin,” in Reinterpreting Russia, ed. Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service (London: Arnold, 1999), 156–69.

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the oprichnina that the advocates of a new oprichnina sought to create. To employ Ivan’s reign as a model for current policy, the advocates of a new oprichnina removed the oprichnina from history altogether. According to Wijernars, the various conceptions of a “new” or “neo” oprichnina penetrated the political mainstream only minimally, despite a plethora of conferences, lectures, roundtables, publications, and websites.17

17 Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 173.

Chapter 6

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991

After analyzing high school textbooks on Stalin during the Putin era, Thomas Sherlock concluded that the domestic and international backlash to 2008 textbooks that justified Stalin’s terror as necessary for economic development and national defense left the regime no choice but to replace them in 2015 with a far more critical evaluation of Stalin’s despotism and totalitarianism. The result, partially inspired by divisions of opinion among historians, was a compromise—neither de-Stalinization nor re-Stalinization. Neither negative nor positive judgments could dominate and sometimes the textbooks simply avoided judgments altogether.1 Given the connection between Ivan and Stalin in Russian historical memory, exploited by neo-Stalinists and anti-Stalinists both, it is fully warranted to ask whether history textbooks after Putin’s rise to power attest to a comparable attempt to revive the idealization of Ivan. The post-1991 spectrum of attitudes toward Ivan—from apologetics to positive evaluations, conflicted and contradictory to negative views, and to vehemently hostile judgments of his personality and reign, let alone the additional cacophony of the New Chronology and canonize-Ivan agitation—might pose a serious problem for textbook and survey writers. 1 Thomas Sherlock, “Russian Politics and the Soviet Past,” 45–59.

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How textbooks and surveys of Russian history, written mostly by professional historians but not necessarily by specialists in sixteenth-century Muscovite history, dealt with these conflicting interpretations merits serious attention. Analysis of textbooks and surveys from 1992 to 2018 on Ivan reveals no variation parallel to that on Stalin. Instead, there is a consistent mix of views dominated by attempts at a balanced presentation of Ivan with a strong admixture of severely critical views. Conspicuously, no textbook studied here contains an apologia or even highly favorable view of the tsar. The entire “right wing” of the spectrum in publications about him is absent.2 This chapter will analyze the treatment of Ivan in thirty-seven general works3 published between 1992 and 2018. I defined the category of relevant publications negatively: not only were they not written by professional historians who were addressing other professional historians, neither were they books by professional historians or amateurs who were addressing ideological niche audiences, such as advocates of Ivan’s canonization, adherents of the New Chronology, or neo-Stalinists. As a result, I included surveys of Russian history, whether written by historians or amateurs, along with high school and university textbooks because they were designed for a general audience, like trade books in the United States, for people without an axe to grind or scholarly background. The books recorded in appendix 6.1, “Literature,” do not constitute anything like a representative sample. Simply put, I read what I could find, figuratively and sometimes literally, what was on the shelf (I also used the card catalog by subject and key words). To be sure, I did have access to a major university research collection in Russian history.4 Whether thirty-seven books over twenty-seven years (1991 can be discounted because of the time lag between composition of a book and its publication; 2019 can be omitted because books published that year are too recent to have reached the shelf) is sufficient to justify my conclusions is for the reader to decide.

2 I also found no publications that fit the “Conflicted” centrist category; see below on Floria. 3 “Appendix 6.1 “Literature” contains thirty-nine entries but two contained no relevant contents, which is explained below. 4 The Herman G. Wells Library at Indiana University-Bloomington.

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991  •  CHAPTER 6

The chronological distribution of books pretty much precludes distortions by year. I have imprimaturs from twenty-two different years, leaving only five years unrepresented, never more than two in a row. No year contains more than four books (see table 6.1). Table 6.1: Chronology of Books Discussed Year

Amount

Appendix 6.1 Numbers

1992

0

1993

4

1, 2, 3, 4

1994

2

5, 6

1995

2

7, 8

1996

1

9

1997

2

10, 11

1998

1

12

1999

2

13, 14

2000

1

15

2001

1

16

2002

3

17, 18, 19

2003

1

20

2004

1

21

2005

0

2006

0

2007

1

22

2008

2

23, 24

2009

2

25, 26

2010

1

27

2011

1

28

2012

0

2013

2

2014

0

2015

3

31, 32, 33

2016

1

34

2017

4

35, 36, 37, 38

2018

1

39

2019

0

29, 30

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There are fourteen books from the eight years before Putin, and twenty-five books for the twenty years with Putin, so on average there is at least one book for every year in each period. The division of books by type adequately balances textbooks and surveys (see table 6.2). Table 6.2: Type of Book Consulted Description

Amount

Appendix 6.1 Numbers

Secondary

6

1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 24

University

21

3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 38, 39

12

2, 8, 14, 17, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37

Textbook

Survey

I found twenty-seven textbooks, six for secondary schools and twenty-one for universities. Nearly all the textbooks carried an explicit recommendation from the Ministry of Education (Ministerstvo obrazovaniia) of the Russian Federation, sometimes for history majors, sometimes for non-majors, a distinction that has no bearing on this study. A few books I have counted as university textbooks indicated that they were “courses of lectures.” Twelve books did not qualify as textbooks and were categorized as surveys of Russian history, covering periods of varying length in one or more volumes. The publisher’s blurb on university textbooks often indicates that their expected audience includes not only university students but also members of the general public interested in Russian history, which is precisely the intended audience of surveys. Moreover, many surveys were written by professional historians or by writers with at least some historical training. I classified books into three categories: Balanced Criticism, Severe Criticism, and Over-the-Top Criticism. Two books, both by Aleksandr Guts (appendix 6.1, “Literature,” 13, 15) contained nothing of relevance on Ivan. Guts adheres to the New Chronology, so whatever he would have written would have been useless anyway, as it would apply to only one of the four men the New Chronology asserts were subsumed under the identity of Ivan the Terrible. My categories are approximations; I have duly noted when particular books could have been assigned to a different category.

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991  •  CHAPTER 6

The best way to explain the categories is to begin with Severe Criticism. They contain only criticism, the usual litany of personal characteristics and political actions that constitute the standard “black book” on Ivan—variously, megalomania, suspiciousness to the point of paranoia, cruelty to the degree of sadism, insanity in the form of a persecution complex, and sexual “depravity” (from homosexuality to rape).5 The oprichnina was an unprincipled, senseless experiment during which Ivan launched a full-scale war against the entire population of Russia. Irrational, random terror and punitive expeditions produced bloody, mass executions of thousands of innocent people. Ivan’s reign had disastrous consequences for Russia. He was a tyrant, an oriental despot, an arbitrary, authoritarian demagogue, a liar, and a coward who created a totalitarian regime. The oprichnina contributed to the destruction of the peasantry/peasant flight, which resulted in the Forbidden Years, a key stage in the development of serfdom.6 The oprichnina was directly responsible for the Time of Troubles. Ivan’s personal degeneration in mind and body led to monstrous demonic vices, gluttony, drunkenness, and debauchery. He scapegoated his failures. His personal and political capriciousness attest to mental instability. These are the tropes of the standard critique of Ivan as a person and as a ruler. The depiction of Ivan in books I classified as Balanced Criticism reiterated some, even much, of this Severe Criticism to a greater or lesser degree with greater or lesser emphasis. What distinguishes images of Ivan of this category is their inclusion of some, indeed any, extenuating circumstances to offset his negative characterization. These cliché arguments included that Ivan was abused and neglected as a child; that he was a child of his age, which was extremely cruel and violent; that his murder count was no worse than that of contemporary rulers in Europe; that members of the elite, variously denoted as boyars, princely boyars, or appanage princes, were in fact subverting national security in pursuit of private profit and class privileges; that the Russian Orthodox Church retained its feudal rights to the detriment of the common good; that Novgorod and Pskov regretted their loss of their feudal liberties:7 that Russia was indeed surrounded by enemies who threatened its national existence; that Ivan did further the necessary centralization of the state and increased the power of the ruler; and that 5 Let me emphasize that I am only reporting the view of Ivan’s critics that homosexuality constitutes depravity. 6 During a “forbidden year” peasants could not relocate. 7 References to the church and Novgorod reflect the influence of Zimin and Skrynnikov.

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he expanded the state to the east, conquering the khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′, opening the Volga River to Russian commerce to the Caspian Sea, and began the colonization of Siberia. All these qualifications of his behavior and policies are common currency in the vast historiography of Ivan. On the whole in these works, criticism of Ivan far outweighs such praise. In some cases, the praise is infinitesimal. The works categorized as Over-the-Top Criticism not only reproduced the litany of criticism typical of Severe Criticism publications, but carried it one step further into historical absurdity, mostly by projecting anachronistic concepts from the twentieth century onto the sixteenth. Statistically, the distribution of works by category is as follows (table 6.3). Table 6.3: Categories and Types of Work Category

Amount

Type of Book

1. Balanced Criticism

24

mixed

2. Severe Criticism

9

mixed

3. Over-the-Top Criticism

4

surveys

4. Not categorized

2

The Over-the-Top books comprise only surveys, while the most numerous categories, Balanced Criticism and Severe Criticism, contain a mixture of textbooks and surveys. In short, textbooks, whether secondary school or university, and surveys of Russian history presented overwhelmingly negative portraits of Ivan as a person and ruler, at best partially but never completely offset by praise, not necessarily grudging, for his achievements. Indeed, books in the Severe Criticism category sometimes admitted Ivan’s achievements but argued that the price paid for them was too high. This dominant negative slant of interpretations of Ivan does not vary by any parameter pertaining to these publications. High school textbooks differed from university textbooks in style and format, as one would expect, but not in substance. Surveys manifested no serious differences of opinion from textbooks, regardless of whether their authors were professional historians or not. Works by historians specializing in Muscovite history, or even in the sixteenth century, did not differ from works by historians specializing in other periods of Russian history, if we make allowances for the fact that many multiauthored textbooks did not identify the authors of the

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991  •  CHAPTER 6

chapters on Ivan. For all the differences of opinion on specific issues among the thirty-seven books analyzed, which are not worth pursuing here because they merely regurgitate differences of opinion in the specialist literature, the textbooks and surveys adduced in this chapter manifested a degree of homogeneity in evaluating Ivan’s personality and reign sharply at odds with the raging controversies among historians and amateurs. Of course, as a genre textbooks and surveys do tend toward the common denominator, the “accepted opinion,” the “common wisdom,” but the absence of consensus on Ivan among specialists hardly seems conducive to the generation of such a shared body of conclusions among the authors of textbooks and surveys. Another statistic confirms the “popularity” of the Balanced Criticism approach to Ivan. When available I have reproduced in appendix 6.1 the press runs (tirazhi) of each book. Some are not available. In one book, the part of the page on which the figure appeared was destroyed in binding. The top ten press runs among the books are shown in table 6.4. Table 6.4: Number of Copies and Type of Work Appendix 6.1 Number

Copies

Type of book

Interpretation

1

2,644,000

secondary school textbook

balanced

2

100,000

survey

balanced

34

90,000

survey

balanced

7

50,000

secondary school textbook

balanced

10

11,000

university textbook

balanced

4

10,000

university textbook

balanced

6

10,000

university textbook

balanced

15

10,000

university textbook

balanced

16

10,000

university textbook

not used

21

10,000

university textbook

Balanced

It is no surprise that the only two high school textbooks examined produced by far the largest number of copies. The top ten also include six university textbooks and two surveys. Exempting one university textbook not used in the study, all nine other books disseminated the Balanced Criticism interpretation.

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Examination of selected individual works reveals unique interpretations masked by such statistics. Some of these assertions are intriguing, others merely outlandish, but they convey a more nuanced picture of the universe of discourse about Ivan in textbooks and Russian history surveys.

Balanced Criticism Category Balanced Criticism

Count

Appendix 6.1 Numbers

24

1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39

Repetition renders superfluous describing every treatment of Ivan that qualified as Balanced Criticism. The brevity of some discussions of him undoubtedly explains some omissions. Here I will adduce passages from these works that are more interesting than the standard critical tropes or excuses from extenuating circumstances. No. 2, a survey published in 1993, contained a profusion of blackand-white illustrations, many taken from modern paintings, intended, as its six-figure pressrun indicates, for a large audience. Its anonymous editor denied that Kurbskii was a coward, arguing that he fled Muscovy because he refused to be executed on trumped-up charges. However, Kurbskii should not have led troops against his homeland (although the book does not demean him as a traitor, a ubiquitous occurrence in Russian historiography). His first letter to Ivan backfired. Instead of persuading the tsar to cease his repression of innocent boyars it confirmed his suspicion that there were conspiracies everywhere, motivating him to increase his repression. No. 4, a university textbook also from 1993, with a five-digit pressrun, made the astute observation, repeated in numerous subsequent studies, that Ivan used terror as a political instrument to compensate for Muscovy’s lack of an adequate administrative apparatus. No. 5, a high school textbook from 1994, contained a superb sentence articulating Ivan’s almost Shakespearean tragedy: “The fate of the terrible tsar is a clear example of how a bright, educated, talented man, having devoted his strengths to the service of evil, becomes morally and physically degraded” (40). No. 6, a 1994 university textbook, commented that “autocracy” did not originate with Ivan and was not synonymous with megalomania.

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991  •  CHAPTER 6

No. 7, a 1995 high school textbook, posed a question to students that might very well be directed at specialists in early modern history, European as well as Russian: How did Ivan’s tyranny differ from that of Henry VIII’s? No. 8, a 1995 survey by Fedor Shakhmagonov, asserted that Ivan was never fooled by slanderers—he just used them for his own purposes. Shakhmagonov then injected Great Russian chauvinism and “civilization” theory into the discussion. Whatever else Ivan did, in popular memory his conquest of Kazan′ turned the Tatar people from barbarism to civilization and culture, opening a path to Asia for European civilization. The Muscovite-Kazan′ war was a battle of “two irreconcilable worlds, two ways of life, two ethnoses” (145). Shakhmagonov also invoked the theory by Georgii Leonidovich Grigor′ev, rejected by all specialists because it lacks any supporting evidence, that Vasilii III’s first wife, Solomonia, gave birth to a son Georgii after she was forcibly shorn and that Ivan spent his adult life trying to find his half-brother, the rightful heir to the throne, in order to dispose of him. No. 9, a 1996 secondary school textbook, qualified the usually oversimplified interpretation of Ivan’s image in Russian folklore as positive by concluding that it favored the tsar in his battle against the boyars, but not in his treatment of Novgorod. No. 10, a 1997 university textbook, on the other hand, was even more imbalanced (and inaccurate) in its interpretation of Ivan’s popular image. It declared that when he died the “people” forgot his cruelty and the hated oprichnina and remembered only his great deeds, such as the conquests of Kazan′, Astrakhan′, and Siberia, the 1550 law code, and the construction of St Basil’s Cathedral. No. 14, a 1999 survey, pithily noted that Ivan eventually destroyed all the good he did and melodramatically wrote that the tsar embodied “all the satanic forces that tormented humanity in the sixteenth century” (161). No. 16, a 2001 university textbook, came closest to a positive evaluation of Ivan’s reign. Its list of Ivan’s accomplishments was not, however, consistent. Ivan increased centralization, but Russia lacked the essential social and political preconditions for centralization. Although “on the whole” Ivan’s reign was productive, Ivan was a tyrant. But tyranny was par for the course, (normal, characteristic, literally: law-determined [zakonomerno]) for Europe at the time (86), which is more of an excuse for, rather than an endorsement of, Ivan’s despotic employment of terror.

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No. 19, a 2002 university textbook, repeated a very elegantly expressed older opinion, apparently of Platonov (according to no. 34): “According to the accurate opinion of historians, the moral traits of Ivan the Terrible’s character did not correspond to his intellectual development; his soul was always inferior to his mind [dusha ego byla vsegda nizhe ego uma].” Ivan’s ambivalent personality had “difficult, even tragic, consequences not only for thousands of his subjects, but for the entire country” (126). No. 21, a 2004 university textbook, colorfully declared that “the sinister shadow of Ivan’s personality” (126) cast a pall over Russia during his reign. However, he answered the “needs of the time” by creating the “state-serf system” (gosudarstvenno-krepostnoi stroi), a concept originated by one of the volume’s authors, Andrei Dvornichenko, a turning point in the development of Russian “statehood” (133–34). No. 23, a 2008 university textbook, wrote that although (my emphasis— CJH) Ivan’s program was “progressive” at the time, it also contributed to the ruler’s unlimited authority and to the development of serfdom. Therefore, in context, the textbook was not reviving the obligatory Soviet Party line conclusion that Ivan’s reign was “progressive.” (Other Balanced and Severe Criticism publications explicitly denied that Ivan’s reign was “progressive.”) No. 27 is a 2010 university textbook edited by the distinguished medievalist and early modernist Boris Floria. Its discussion of Ivan (whose author was not identified) was so brief that it barely goes beyond its conclusion that Ivan made contradictory attempts to overcome Russia’s crisis. It did not mention any of the atrocity stories about Ivan. In chapter I placed Floria’s 1999 monograph on Ivan in the category of Conflicted (containing unresolved positive and negative judgments). No. 34, a 2016 survey by Boris Akunin, emphasized Ivan’s sadism and concluded that his terror exceeded similar terrorist policies in Europe because Ivan attacked his entire country. Nevertheless, it also asserted that, during the frightful last days of Ivan’s reign, the Russian people discovered their patriotic devotion to a single “national” (natsional′noe) state. This obiter dictum is not an exaggerated projection of the staunchly loyal behavior of the people of Pskov who defended their city from Stefan Batory, king of Poland, in 1581, but rather an excrescence of Akunin’s statist Romantic nationalist mythology.8 Akunin, then, strayed into Over-the-Top Criticism 8 Il′ia Gerasimov, “L’État, C’est Tout: ‘Istoriia rossiiskogo gosudarstva’ Borisa Akunina i kanon natsional′noi istorii,” Ab Imperio 4 (2013): 219–30.

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991  •  CHAPTER 6

by criticizing Ivan for turning the government over to the Special Services (spetssluzhby), meaning Soviet, probably Stalinist, intelligence services. No. 35, a 2017 survey by the editors of Ab Imperio, wrote that the arbitrariness of Ivan’s tyrannical rule was typical of all early modern European monarchies, the means by which monarchs could demonstrate their freedom from the traditional norms limiting royal authority. Ivan’s cruelty did not distinguish him from other rulers. I will further discuss its “imperial” analysis of Ivan in chapter 7. No. 37, another 2017 survey, written by Leonid Vasil′ev, insisted that the boyars forced Ivan to become a despot. Likening the oprichniki to the Cheka again flirts with transferring this title to the Over-the-Top category for anachronism. Vasil′ev asserted that Ivan created the authoritarian sacral central authority that survives to this day. Russian peasants were not servile enough to want to be slaves, but now at least they could be slaves “to our own,” to a Russian, not a Varangian or Tatar. Ivan was admired by the twentieth-century vozhd′ (Stalin), who minimized the price that Russia paid for Ivan’s successes, which was too high. No. 38, a 2017 university textbook, also placed Ivan’s search for his halfbrother Georgii at the center of his motivation. The editor, Igor′ Ermolaev, speculated that Ivan repressed Novgorod because it supported Georgii. Ermolaev concluded that Ivan should not be criticized for his pathological murderous atrocities because he was just a man of his age, his behavior an example of the low value placed on human life in medieval society.9 No. 39, a 2018 university textbook by Sergei Perevezentsev, claimed that the oprichnina transformed Russia into “Holy Rus′.” The religious oprichnina had to be cruel to “traitors” (his quotation marks). Although Ivan realized that the oprichnina gave him unlimited power, he abolished it when he realized that it did material, moral, and political harm to the country. Perevesentsev is one of only two authors consulted (see no. 31, below) who invoke a religious rationale for the oprichnina.10 Perevezentsev downplayed terror, but his concession to the detrimental effects of the oprichnina on Russia justify including him in the Balanced Criticism category.

9 This idea comes from Skrynnikov; see Halperin, “Ruslan Skrynnikov on Ivan IV,” 207. 10 Perevezentsev, “Gosudar′ Ivan IV Vasil′evich Groznyi,” 5–58, but here he criticized Ivan’s superstitiousness. In chapter 1 I assigned this publication to the Critical rubric.

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Severe Criticism Category

Count

Appendix 6.1 Numbers

Severe Criticism

9

3, 11, 12, 18, 20, 24, 25, 30, 33

No. 12, a 1998 secondary school textbook by specialists in Muscovite history (the volume only goes up to Peter the Great), concluded that the oprichnina had worse consequences for Russia than the Wars of Religion for France (241). No. 20 is a 2002 university textbook by multiple authors. Vladimir Kobrin, a leading specialist on Ivan, wrote the chapter on Ivan. Although he mentioned Ivan’s abuse during childhood and impressive education, I did not include his contribution among the Balanced Critics because his 1989 monograph, hastily written and published during perestroika, was a bombshell of moral condemnation of the tsar, so his genuflection toward Ivan’s education and miserable childhood must be considered perfunctory. No. 25, a 2009 university textbook, claimed that although Ivan lost the Livonian War, it at least stopped Lithuanian expansion. This is a sophistic and short-sighted argument because merely defending Muscovy’s acquisition of territory previously incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would not have been nearly as costly and because the loss of Polotsk compelled Lithuania to join Poland in the Union of Lublin, which created a far more dangerous enemy of Muscovy than it had ever faced on the Western front. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) recovered Polotsk.

Over-the-Top Criticism Description

Count

Appendix 6.1 Numbers

Over-the-Top Criticism

4

17, 26, 31, 36

I created this category especially for works which demonized Ivan by employing egregiously anachronistic terminology or outrageously fantastic accusations. No. 17, a 2002 survey by Sergei Kravchenko, argued that Ivan created a party of lawless idiots. He made the non-party victims of the oprichnina

Ivan the Terrible in Russian History Surveys and Textbooks since 1991  •  CHAPTER 6

agree in advance to their execution. Kravchenko referred to the oprichnina as the Great Oprichnina Revolution. He terms the tsar’s punitive campaign against the northwest a “genocide.” It is usually and erroneously called a “pogrom,” which is bad enough. Kravchenko renamed Repin’s painting Ivan Kills His Son and Grandson, referring to the unborn child (there is no way to know that this was a boy—CJH) miscarried by Tsarevich Ivan’s wife when Ivan struck her. Kravchenko sarcastically compared the stupidity of Ivan’s declarations to that of proclamations of the necessity of class warfare by the smartest preson of all, Mein Führer (guess who). No. 26, a 2009 survey by Vladimir Fortunatov, criticized most historiography for omitting Ivan’s homosexuality and syphilis. Fortunatov observed that one can find people of the same immorality as the oprichniki and the kennel-men who murdered Prince Andrei Shuiskii at Ivan’s order in any country in any period. But he asked rhetorically: Who would want to live in such a country?11 No. 31, a 2015 survey by Petr Riabov, would have qualified for inclusion among Severe Criticism but for its repetition of the accusation that Ivan was an inveterate rapist who deflowered 1,000 virgins. Ivan was deeply hurt by the criticism that he was bloodthirsty because in his own mind he was only preparing the Russian people for the Day of Judgment, an echo of Iurganov’s interpretation of the oprichnina. Riabkov describes the Dvorovaia tetrad′ (Court quire), an incomplete list of members of Ivan’s household/court that included potential replacements for existing personnel, as the nomenklatura. Often, Riabov insisted, the population forgave Ivan’s terror and atrocities because of Russia’s expansion and its military successes, but defeat discredited the regime. The tsar feared a popular uprising, but to the shame of the servile and patient Russian people, there was none. Riabov labels the (oft-violated) social segregation of the oprichniki “apartheid,” comparable to the Norman conquest of England, the Germanic crusaders’ invasion of Prussia, or the Reconquista of Spain, although the oprichniki were not defined racially, ethnically, or religiously.12 No. 36 is a 2017 survey by Andrei Danilov. He accused Ivan of hating Russians more than their foreign enemies. In 2008, the television station Channel One ran a contest, Imia Rossiia (The Name is Russia) to identify, from 500 candidates, the personality who was best qualified to serve 11 Forensic anthropologist Mikhail Gerasimov found no evidence that Ivan had syphilis. 12 See chapter 7 for another statement of this analogy.

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as Russia’s symbol. Voters online and via telephone made Ivan one of the twelve finalists; eventually, Aleksandr Nevskii won the contest.13 That Ivan did so well showed the degradation of the intelligentsia who selected an amoral executioner as finalist and thereby demonstrated their own ignorance of history. These voters thus justified terror against their own people. Thousands of semiliterate Russians followed Stalin and believed that Ivan was a wise ruler. Like Peter the Great, Nicholas I, Stalin, and all tyrants, Ivan made his supporters accomplices in his violence. Reviewing my most debatable categorizations, only one book in the sample, no. 16, labeled Balanced Criticism, is borderline Positive. Two Balanced Criticism (nos. 34 and 37) might have been deemed Over-theTop Criticism. One Over-the-Top Criticism, no. 31, could have been considered Severe Criticism. Altering these classifications would not impugn my conclusions about Ivan’s image in textbooks and surveys. As the above discussion illustrates, textbooks and surveys always attempted to portray Ivan in context. How the authors conceptualized sixteenth-century Muscovy influenced their attitudes toward Ivan. I will now discuss three themes and one phrase of interest. References in parentheses precede each item.

A. Russian backwardness Eight books invoke Russian backwardness in one form or another. I did not expect to see declarations that Russia’s military were inferior to their western antagonists. (No. 2, a 1993 survey: 183, 186) Russian troops were inferior to those of Russia’s Eastern enemies but superior to those of Russia’s Western enemies. Therefore, Russia was unsuccessful in the West, but successful in the East. (No. 6, a 1994 university textbook: 49) Russia lacked the social and economic preconditions to achieve full centralization. (No. 8, a 1995 survey: 235–36) Batory’s professional troops were superior to the larger number of troops in the Muscovite army, which was qualified only to loot. (No. 9, a 1996 secondary school textbook: 74, 76) The Livonian War was necessary because Muscovy needed Baltic access for trade, political, 13 On this contest see the conclusion below.

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and cultural ties with the “advanced countries of Western Europe.” Muscovy lost the war because it was economically backward. In general, Muscovy was economically and culturally backward. (No. 20, a 2003 university textbook: 147) It was difficult for Russia to overcome its backwardness without ties, via the Baltic coast, to the more developed countries of Western Europe. (No. 22, a 2007 university textbook, and no. 28, a 2011 university textbook] Russia lost the Livonian War because of its economic backwardness. [No. 31, a 2015 survey] As a result of its peripheral location in the world economic system and the Livonian War, Russia lagged behind the advanced countries economically, socially, culturally, and politically. Russian backwardness is therefore cited to supply the country with a legitimate motive for engaging in the Livonian War, as well as a legitimate excuse for losing that war. More broadly, Russian backwardness, defined as lack of centralization, motivated Ivan’s push for centralization and its failure.

B. Stalin In some cases, Stalin’s name did not appear, but the object of a given reference is unmistakable. (No. 3, a 1993 university textbook: 172) History repeats itself, so the same absolute despotism of Ivan’s reign recurred during the 1920s to 1950s. (No 8, a 1995 survey: 108, 253, 284, 374) Unlike twentieth-century atheistic rulers, Ivan did fear God. The Soviets justified Ivan’s and Stalin’s terror. Stalin made Eisenstein justify Ivan’s assault on Novgorod.14 The treaty of Yam Zapol′skii, in which Muscovy gave up all its acquisitions in Livonia and Lithuania, was the most embarrassing treaty signed by Russia until the 1918 treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which Soviet Russia gave up the Baltic states, most of Belarus, and Ukraine. (No. 12, a 1998 secondary school textbook) Ivan used fear of foreign enemies to keep his subjects in line and as an excuse to fight “treason,” just as in the twentieth century. (No. 18, a 2002 university textbook: 134–35) Only Stalinists justified Ivan’s atrocities.15 14 The controversy over whether Eisenstein’s Ivan Groznyi was pro-Ivan or anti-Ivan, or both (pro in part 1, anti in part 2) continues. 15 This was written in 2002, before the campaign to have Ivan canonized.

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(No. 26, a 2009 survey) Many advocates of Stalin’s interpretation of Ivan are still around.16 In textbooks and surveys, comparisons of Ivan to Stalin never redound to Ivan’s credit, unlike in neo-Stalinist publications.

C. Zakhvatchiki Soviet historians were extremely averse to describing Russians (as opposed to Russian imperialism or the Russian bourgeoisie) as zakhvatchiki, whose meanings include “invader” and “aggressor,” certainly “villain,”17 Any application of the term to Russians, let alone to Ivan, stands out. All references cited here pertain to Ivan’s reign. (No. 6, a 1994 university textbook: 49) Russia pursued expansionist and zakhvatnicheskie policies.18 (No. 31, a 2015 survey: 273) The actions of Muscovite zakhvatchiki inspired the Baltic population and the inhabitants of Lithuanian Rus′ to oppose the Muscovite invasion.19 (No. 35, a 2017 survey: 264) Ivan treated his own country like a conqueror-zakhvatchik. Given the powerful emotional associations of the concept of zakhvatchik, applying the pejorative concept to Russians would be bad enough to some Russian nationalists, but tarring Ivan with the same brush applied to Chinggis Khan, German Livonian Knights, Napoleon, imperialists, and Nazis would constitute blasphemy.20

16 17 18 19

See chapters 4 and 5. Halperin, “The Tatars and the Term Zakhvatchiki in Soviet Historiography.” Note the absence of a qualifier such as “Russian tsarism.” Much current scholarship in Russia still insists that the Estonians and Latvians welcomed Muscovy’s invasion of Livonia because it freed them from oppression by German knights and bourgeoisie without mentioning that Muscovite occupation policies eventually led those same Estonians and Latvians to rebel against Muscovite rule. Shakhmagonov (No. 8, a 1995 survey: 346–47) explained that Orthodox russkii [Ukrainian—CJH] Prince Konstantin Ostrozhskii helped Poland acquire historically (iskonnye) Rus′ lands in Siver because of Ivan’s atrocities. Ostrozhskii fought Ivan, not Rus′. 20 Aleksandr Andreevich Shapran, Livonskaia voina 1558–1583 (Ekaterinburg: Izdatel′stvo “Sokrat,” 2009), 12, 90, 94, 524, and elsewhere categorizes the Livonian War as an unjust, aggressive zakhvatnicheskaia war, but places almost all the blame on Ivan personally.

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D. Autocracy “with a human face” Three works (No. 22, a 2007 university textbook, 84; No. 28, a 2010 university textbook, 126; and No. 31, a 2015 survey, 247) described the goal of the Chosen Council during the 1550s as the creation of an “autocracy” or “an autocratic monarchy” “with a human face,” a metaphor in imitation of Alexander Dubček’s 1968 Prague Spring slogan for Czechoslovakia— “socialism with a human face.” The phrase was attributed to Kobrin, which I have been unable to confirm. Most assuredly it could not have passed the censors before 1991. This extraordinary if anachronistic formulation has no value in understanding Ivan, but it is too precious a reflection of the mentality of the authors who quoted it to go unmentioned. It speaks volumes as to the humanistic basis of criticism of Ivan.

Conclusion Under Putin, a brief attempt was made to rehabilitate Stalin’s reputation, but it failed—among other reasons, because of divisions of opinion among historians. Historians of Ivan the Terrible are no less divided in their evaluations of his personality and reign that those of Stalin, but despite the incestuous historiographic connections of the images of the two rulers, no attempt seems to have been made to revive Stalin’s cult of Ivan. Nor, from the evidence at my disposal, did the views of the advocates of Ivan’s canonization succeed in intruding into textbooks or surveys of Russian history, perhaps because the campaign to make Ivan a saint failed, although he could have been idealized without sainthood too. As a result, as far as I have seen, textbooks and surveys since 1991 overwhelmingly expressed a critical view of Ivan—to be sure, most often qualified one way or another, but not enough to ameliorate severe depictions of his personality and harsh condemnation of his atrocities. Apologetic portrayals of Ivan were simply absent from textbooks and surveys. Only one book consulted even comes close to qualifying as evincing a positive interpretation of Ivan. Because textbooks and surveys mostly reflect the “common opinion,” the “accepted wisdom,” even the “traditional view” of a country’s history (although there are exceptions, self-consciously innovative or revisionist surveys such as that by the editors of Ab Imperio), this pattern is all the more intriguing. It suggests that the evidence of Ivan’s popularity may have been exaggerated because of the noise generated

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by his apologists, for example when they promoted the construction of statues to Ivan. Protests against idealizing Ivan may be more significant reflections of attitudes toward Ivan and even more significantly what Ivan represents in Russia. However, concern over repeated attempts to rehabilitate Ivan confirm that his place in Russian culture remains as contested as ever.

Chapter 7

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible

One textbook discussed in the previous chapter merits extended analysis. Ivan the Terrible has not escaped the “imperial turn” in world history.1 To be sure, his conquests of the Tatar khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ have long been seen by some historians as markers of the transformation of Muscovy into an empire, thus implicitly denying that Russia only became an empire when Peter the Great called it one. Still, the new imperial history brings into play greater conceptual articulation and a comparative perspective. This chapter will examine the treatment of Ivan in two recent textbooks, but only one written in Russia.2 The first, written by the editors of the Kazan′-based journal Ab Imperio, the epitome of the imperial turn, presents itself as innovative and revisionist.3 The distinguished American specialist in Muscovite history Nancy Shields Kollmann wrote the second.4 Kollmann’s exposition contextualizes that of Gerasimov et al. This chapter compares the two imperial interpretations of Ivan and tries to identify what 1 On the “imperial turn” see Liliya Berezhnaya, “Looking for the Empire: State and Orthodox Church in Russian Religious Films,” in Iconic Turns: Nation and Religion in East European Cinema since 1998, ed. Liliya Berezhnaya and Christian Schnitt (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 99–101. 2 Because these are textbooks, they lack footnotes, although they do contain bibliography and suggestions for further reading. 3 Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia. 4 Nancy Shields Kollmann, The Russian Empire, 1450–1801 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Of course Kollmann has discussed Ivan in many of her articles and monographs, but I will confine myself to the textbook.

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is and is not new in them compared to less self-consciously imperial views of Ivan. Any comparison of Gerasimov et al.’s and Kollmann’s imperial approaches to Ivan must begin with their definitions of empire. Both surveys conceive of empires as multiethnic, multiconfessional, and multilinguistic polities in which center-periphery or mother country-colonial relations play a major role.5 Gerasimov et al. and Kollmann contest the applicability to sixteenth-century Muscovy of the homogeneous nation-state paradigm without gainsaying its sometimes ideological pretense of ethnic and religious uniformity.6 However, the two books emphasize different aspects of empire. For Gerasimov et al., an empire is created by the conquest of lands that “by law”7 do not belong to the conquering country.8 Kollmann follows the definition of Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper9 that an empire is identified by its acknowledgment of differences. The first view defines an empire by the process of its creation, the second by a principle of its administration. These two theories need not be mutually exclusive. One could argue that Muscovy had no “right” to conquer Kazan′ and that it structured its administration of conquered Kazan′ so as to tolerate the essential differences between its population and that of Muscovy proper. Nevertheless, it remains the case that different definitions of empire might lead to different conclusions. Whatever the areas of agreement and disagreement between the two textbooks in viewing Ivan’s reign through the prism of empire, in the last analysis Ivan’s persona overwhelms their imperial perspective. Both textbooks revert to traditional images of Ivan more often than their new conceptual approach to his reign would presuppose. Of course, Ivan and his reign can never be fully understood by viewing them through a single conceptual lens.10 5

This is not the place to engage the terminological conundrum of whether an empire must have or perceive itself to have colonies. 6 Again, this is not the place to engage the credibility of the nation-state paradigm itself. 7 Except where indicated, quotation marks are the authors’, not mine. 8 Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia, 261. Shapran, Livonskaia voina 1558–1583 categorizes the Livonian War as imperialistic because its purpose was to seize foreign land, akin to “colonial robbery.” 9 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). For additional bibliography see Kollmann, The Russian Empire, 7. 10 Charles J. Halperin, “The Nature of the Muscovite State during the Reign of Ivan IV: The Tyranny of Concepts,” in The State in Early Modern Russia: New Directions, ed. Paul Bushkovitch (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2019), 77–95.

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

Gerasimov et al.’s Novaia imperskaia istoriia In Novaia imperskaia Istoriia, Ivan’s imperial aspirations are first, last, and always Mongol in origin. It was “no accident” that Muscovy did not decisively change its policy toward Kazan′ until after Ivan’s 1547 coronation as tsar, which gave him the right as tsar-khan to rule a khanate. He was the first Muscovite ruler to aspire to succeed to rule the Golden Horde (Juchid ulus). He was not fazed by early failures to conquer Kazan′ because “apparently” its conquest was an “absolute priority, tied to his tsar’s title itself.” The “Kazan′ Court” (Kazanskii dvorets) established to administer Kazan′ was a kind of colonial ministry. The Kazan′ Khanate lost its independence but continued a “virtual” existence in administration and in Ivan’s title as “Tsar of Kazan′.” The Crimean Khanate, the Astrakhan′ Khanate, the Nogai Tatars, and Muscovy saw the Kazan′ conquest as a manifestation of Muscovite pretension to the entire Golden Horde inheritance. The Nogai leader Ismail submitted to Moscow, as did the Sibir′ ruler Ediger. Ivan refused to heed the advice of his advisors to conquer Crimea. Devlet Khan of the Crimea perceived the tsar as a rival for the throne of the Golden Horde khans, which Ivan could have claimed if he had taken Crimea. Moscow had as much right to that throne as the Gireids, who were not Chingissids. Ivan elevated Simeon Bekbulatovich to the throne of Moscow because he was a descendant of the Chingissid khans of the Golden Horde.11 The theory of Moscow as a successor state to the Juchid ulus is not new and not necessarily imperial. The Juchid ulus could be categorized as an empire by inheritance, as a successor state of the world Mongol empire. Despite Eurasianism Ivan did not intend to begin recreating the World Mongol Empire from west to east as opposed to the way Chinggis did it, from east to west. Whether Muscovy was a successor state of the Juchid ulus depends upon how one defines “successor state”—a separate issue. However, Ivan was crowned “tsar” in a Byzantine ceremony. Although Gerasimov et al. appreciate the Byzantine contribution to Muscovite political development,12 they did not ask whether a Byzantine coronation could confer steppe legitimacy upon Ivan. Asserting that the Crimean Gireeds were not Chingissids is a gross error. Haci I Giray, who founded the Crimean Khanate in 1441, was a descendant of Toqa Temür, thirteenth son of Jochi, son of Chinggis. The 11 Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia, 253, 254, 257, 258, 260, 262, 267. 12 Ibid., 239–40, 242.

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Muscovites called the rulers of Crimea “khans,” which could only have applied to Chingissids. Various Gireed khans sat on the thrones of the Kasimov and Kazan′ Khanates, which they could not have done if they were not Chingissids. The Muscovites knew very well that Ediger was not a Chingissid, so the Muscovite chronicles called him “prince”(kniaz′) to translate bey or bii, which Novaia imperskaia istoriia obscures by referring to him as a “ruler” of the Sibir′ Khanate.13 Muscovite diplomatic records accorded Chingissid terminology impeccably—tsar, tsarevich, tsarevna, tsaritsa—to the Gireeds.14 Ivan did not have as much claim to the Juchid ulus as the Gireeds. Novaia imperskaia istoriia compared the terms Ivan offered Kazan′ to avoid violent conquest to an Ottoman model. Muscovy would rule the khanate but the Kazanis could rule themselves internally much like an Ottoman millet. However, Gerasimov et al. later observed that to Orthodox Muscovy the Ottoman Empire was not an appropriate model for emulation, so conscious borrowing must be excluded.15 This position undermines any assertion that the works of Ivan Peresvetov, putatively about the Ottoman Empire, could have influenced Ivan or the Muscovite elite, and raises the question of why Moscow would not seek to copy Muslim Istanbul but would be willing to imitate Muslim Sarai. Obviously, in Muscovite eyes all imperial models were not equal. To return to the exposition in Novaia imperskaia istoriia, Ivan correctly inferred that Anastasiia was poisoned, as proven by her autopsy. This realization caused Ivan to alter his relationship toward the elite, court and clerical, in 1560. The reforms of the 1550s typified “normal” European changes imposing limits on royal authority, which he had resisted. He wanted to become an “absolute ruler.” The tsar did not know how to implement that absolute rule. Specialized political and juridical thought was undeveloped in Muscovy, and the absence of wide public discussion inhibited the articulation of innovative political theory. There was no ideological argument over Ivan’s authority. Political disputes and change dealt with practice. Although historians attribute the Livonian War to Ivan’s desire to gain access to the Baltic, Russian documents did not formulate or even imagine 13 Ibid., 257. 14 Charles J. Halperin, “The Khan and the Elite: The Muscovite Perception of the Political Culture of the Crimean Khanate,” in Halperin, Ivan IV and Muscovy (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers Inc., 2020), 255–64. 15 Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia, 255, 260.

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

such a goal. Economically and politically, Muscovy had no need to change the centuries-old system of Baltic trade. It was logically absurd to refuse to invade Crimea in order to invade Livonia over tribute. However, Ivan launched the Livonian War for its symbolic, not real, geography. He was the first ruler of Muscovy in decades who did not try to annex lands belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. From the imperial point of view, Ivan tried to conquer lands that did not “by law” belong to him. He wanted to possess and exert a “true” tsar’s power by conquering lands outside the boundaries of Rus′-Lithuania-the Horde. Only such a foreign (my word— CJH) conquest would validate his autocratic authority. Such acquisitions would take place by God’s will, not by human historical-juridical tradition. If the patriarch of Constantinople recognized Ivan’s coronation as tsar, then Orthodox Christians living in Lithuania and later the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth also had to do so. This requirement led to the Union of Brest in 1596 in which most bishops and some laity of the Ruthenian Orthodox Church accepted union with the papacy. Ivan’s conquests abroad did not alter his authority at home where he was still only Muscovite grand prince. As mentioned in Chapter 6, his arbitrary acts typified the desire of European early modern monarchs to demonstrate the unlimited nature of their authority. His cruelty did not distinguish Ivan from other rulers either. The 1560–1562 Book of Degrees, by accepting Ivan’s descent from Prus, brother of Augustus Caesar, via Riurik, made Ivan a Roman and made Prussia, perhaps Livonia but certainly not Muscovy, his true homeland. In 1565, Ivan told Münster merchant German Pissping that his ancestors originated in Bavaria, that “boyar” meant “Bavarian.” In 1570, he told Magnus, a Danish prince who agreed to serve as Ivan’s vassal (puppet) king of Livonia, that he (Ivan) was of Saxon blood. It is not important whether Ivan believed these versions of his legendary descent, but his claims of “foreign” origin served to distinguish him from the Russian aristocracy and all Muscovites. In 1565, he took the radical step of treating his own country like a “merciless zakhvatchik” (see Chapter 6) Even by sixteenth-century standards the oprichnina constituted mass terror. Each oprichnik sought personal profit from the repression of “traitors.” The symbolic meaning of an oprichnina terror was more important to Ivan than its practical results because it fed his fantasies of authority. Aside from the personal sadistic tendencies of the oprichniki and the psychotic, pathological elements in Ivan’s personality, the oprichnina symbolized Ivan’s conquest of the Russian territory. The

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symbolism of the oprichnina—dogs’ heads, brooms, a pseudo-monastic order—segregated the “occupiers” of the country, the oprichniki, from the “natives” (my term—CJH), also mentioned in Chapter 6. The elite de facto stood outside the law. The Mongols had not practiced such social segregation. Ivan also improvised an imitation of the Catholic spiritual-knightly orders. It is no accident that he formed the oprichniki after the dissolution of the Livonian Order. Many Germans, including those with ties to the Livonian Order, joined the oprichnina. The oprichniki were also the “dogs of God,” akin to the Dominicans. Ivan played the roles of inquisitor and grand master warrior-monk, God’s deputy on earth. The official coronation of Simeon Bekbulatovich is usually labeled a masquerade and seen as evidence of Ivan’s mental degeneration, but the episode had its own logic. Its unprecedented arbitrariness actualized in practice Ivan’s unlimited authority as tsar in theory. Executions accompanied every stage of the oprichnina. Separating Ivan’s personal cruelty or even psychiatric disorder as a motive for murder from political or ideological motivations remains complicated. The cruel boy who threw dogs and cats from the parapets had become an adult executioner. The quantity of executions was not unprecedented for the age in which Ivan lived, but the oprichnina terror stood outside the context of civil (religious or peasant) wars in which similar violence took place in contemporary Europe. Five to fifteen thousand of the thirty thousand residents of Novgorod were massacred, and the rest were left to starve to death. The distinguishing feature of Ivan’s terror was its “structure and character.” There was a “system” in his “insanity”: to emancipate his absolute authority from any restraints by political institutions, the social order, tradition, or morality. This ideological subtext, despite its specifically Muscovite context, made Ivan a typical representative of the political sphere of early modern [European—CJH] times, when tens of thousands died in the name of abstract ideas16 and theoretical disagreements. His misdeeds were insane. He was little interested in the crisis in his own country. His sole concern was his own authority. He could not tolerate any potential rival. In anger against any opposition, he mortally wounded Tsarevich Ivan. The confiscation of land and relocation of its population destroyed the social system. The Livonian War and the oprichnina ruined the economy. 16 See chapter 11 for Neuberger’s assessment of Eisenstein’s portrayal of Ivan as devoted to an “abstract idea,” the Russian state.

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

The Forbidden Years were a decisive step toward serfdom. Ivan’s arbitrariness deprived the throne of its traditional legitimacy. He had violated the law, so the law could no longer legitimize monarchy. The security measures taken when Ivan lay dying were typical for the demise of a dictator. His bloody experiments with higher degrees of tyranny, the oprichnina above all, Gerasimov et al. conclude, exemplified his personality and his rule.17 Turning to an analysis of the portrayal of Ivan and his reign by Gerasimov et al. from an imperial perspective, we need to ask: how much of their treatment of Ivan is imperial, and how much is traditional? I see very little that is “imperial” and much that is traditional. As usual, Ivan’s personal traumas, such as the death of his first wife, influenced his relations with the elite; the Chosen Council sought to limit Ivan’s authority; Ivan resorted to terror to gain autocratic authority; Ivan was sadistic since childhood and became a tyrannical dictator; Ivan’s policies wrecked the economy and destroyed Muscovite society. The symbolic aspects of the oprichnina have been increasingly appreciated in recent scholarship.18 However, is absolute autocratic power necessarily “imperial,” either in theory or in practice? Novaia imperskaia istoriia equated Ivan’s arbitrary tyranny and cruelty with that of other typical sixteenth-century European rulers, but were the states they ruled empires or monarchies? The ruler of the Netherlands lacked unlimited authority but the Dutch eventually built an overseas empire. The Holy Roman emperor presumably, if nominally, ruled an empire, but his authority was highly circumscribed. Novaia imperskaia istoriia does not address the issue of empire and absolutism.19 There are Muscovite documents that attest to Ivan’s goals in Livonia and the Baltic. Ivan’s terms for treaties always insisted on mutually free trade between the Baltic states and Moscow. Ivan was concerned with international trade. His conditions for Livonian subordination to Muscovy always included the right of Muscovite merchants to deal directly in Livonia with non-Livonian merchants and the right of foreign specialists hired by Ivan to transit Livonia without hindrance. Would Livonia have agreed to any of these condition except under the duress of war? The need for specie for 17 Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia, 259–69, 279, 301, 305. 18 Apparently Gerasimov et al. pass over in silence Iurganov’s apocalyptic interpretation of the oprichnina’s purpose. I infer that they did not find it persuasive. 19 The legitimacy in theory or practice of the concept of “absolutism” cannot be discussed here.

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Muscovite coinage (Muscovy had no silver mines at this time) would have been ameliorated if the Livonian monopoly of Muscovy’s foreign trade were broken and their middleman’s profit eliminated. These concrete economic issues, not just the symbolic expressions of his authority, played a role in Ivan’s foreign policy toward Livonia. Ivan did not seek territorial aggrandizement from Lithuania for several decades because, as Gerasimov et al. show, he was busy conquering Kazan′ and Astrakhan′. Later events substantiate that Ivan was hardly averse to continuing his predecessors’ expansion to the west. During the Livonian War Muscovy not only annexed Polotsk but Ivan proposed a partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Holy Roman emperor in which Muscovy would have annexed all of Lithuania, including Kiev and other East Slavic territories that no longer belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the Union of Lublin in 1569. Gerasimov et al. argued that expansion to Livonia symbolically represented the imperial desire to exceed one’s “own” “legal” boundaries. Muscovy expressed multiple excuses for its invasion of Livonia, just as it put forth numerous claims to Kazan′, but among both were assertions of dynastic inheritance which should be deemed “legal.” Ivan was entitled to Livonia because his ancestor Grand Prince Iaroslav of Kiev had founded the city of Iur′ev (Dorpat) and to Kazan′ because his ancestor Grand Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii of Suzdal′ had conquered Kazan′’s ancestor, Grand Bolgar.20 20 Gerasimov et al. are not the only historians in Russia grappling with the issue of Muscovy’s imperial nature. Aleksandr Filiushkin concludes that Muscovy did not see Livonia as a colony but just another patrimony administered the same as all Muscovite acquisitions of East Slavic territory. There were some imperial traits in Ivan’s diplomacy, namely his self-professed superiority as tsar over all rulers save the Holy Roman emperor and the sultan, but this was not an “imperial policy” because Ivan was acting intuitively, without an imperial ideology. He thought in appanage-epoch terms. Filiushkin took exception to Kashtanov’s view (Filiushkin’s book lacks footnotes so Filiushkin did not cite the Kashtanov’s publication in question) that the oprichnina manifested imperial traits because it exploited the zemshchina as a colony. Russia was no more than a “neonatal” (new-born) empire, because it had “no imperial mechanisms of functioning,” it was just a political child and did not know how to function in an imperial manner. Russia became an empire only with the acquisition of lands that could not be justified by patrimonial discourse, the steppe beyond Tula and Siberia, which had never constituted Old Rus′ principalities with Riurikid princes. Aleksandr Filiushkin, Pervoe protivostoianie Rossii i Evropy: Livonskaia voina Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2018), 299–311. However, cf. A. I. Filiushkin and A. V. Kuz′min, Kogda Polotsk byl rossiiskim. Polotskaia kampaniia Ivana Groznogo

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

Novaia imperskaia istoriia’s theory of the motivation of the Ruthenian bishops who joined the Union of Brest seems farfetched. The patriarch of Constantinople did not exert sufficient influence in the commonwealth that his recognition of Ivan’s title as tsar would have compelled them to seek church union. The Orthodox metropolitan of Kiev was directly subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople. Catholic prejudice, the Reformation, and the self-assertion of the Orthodox brotherhoods surely played a more important role in the formation of the Union of Brest than the patriarch’s recognition of Ivan’s tsarist title. As has almost never been appreciated, Ivan’s descent from Prus, brother of Augustus Caesar, expressed in official diplomatic documents, whether Prus was Roman or Saxon, did not differentiate Ivan from all of his subjects and therefore could not have elevated his status over all his subjects. If Ivan were Roman or German, then so were all princes in Muscovy who were supposedly descendants of Riurik, including quite a number of very influential boyars, let alone thousands of gentry. One successor state of the World Mongol Empire did practice social segregation. In Yuan, China there was a strict ethnic hierarchy, with all the social and political discrimination that such a policy entailed. In descending order the four categories were Mongols, Western Peoples (non-Mongol, non-Chinese, mostly inhabitants of steppe regions), Northern Chinese, and Southern Chinese. The intended segregation of oprichniki from non-oprichniki was not ethnic, let alone racial like apartheid, but, loosely speaking, occupational. Whether Ivan was more indifferent toward the welfare of his subjects than contemporary rulers is difficult to establish. All monarchs of the time were elitists. Certainly in England the enclosure movement did not favor the lower classes. Despite the ravages that Ivan inflicted on the elite via the oprichnina in the later years of his reign he did seek to ameliorate the effects of the economic collapse at least upon the gentry not just via tax relief but also by establishing the Forbidden Years, which sought to guarantee the gentry the labor force necessary for them to sustain their military service.

1563–1579 (Moscow: Russkie vitiazi, 2017), 5. The conquest of Polotsk was an “early imperial experience” for Muscovy because of its ethnic and religious heterogeneity and different institutions than Muscovy such as Magdeburg Law and partially Catholic population.

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The symbolism of Ivan’s abdication to Simeon Bekbulatovich, both as a reflection of the tsar’s unlimited discretion in office and of the exalted status of Chingissids, has been fully appreciated, but Simeon was not crowned.21 The oprichnina was a very complicated phenomenon. No doubt there were multiple vectors involved in its creation and evolution, but no more than a handful of oprichniki were foreigners, including Germans. Given the attention that Novaia imperskaia istoriia paid to the symbolism of the oprichnina it should be observed that dogs’ heads cannot be attributed to German, Mongol, or any foreign origin. The use of dogs’ heads on the necks of oprichnik horses has no analogy anywhere at any time. The analogy between the Dominican or crusader knights and the oprichnina has been drawn previously, but no former members of the Livonian Order joined the oprichnina. However, was the oprichnina imperial? Structurally it was an appanage, a traditional Rus′ royal institution, although there were major differences between a traditional appanage and the oprichnina. Whether the oprichnina differed in character from other incidents of mass repression in the sixteenth century is tricky to assess. Ivan claimed that he was punishing traitors, but most historians agree that most of his victims were innocent. The Dutch cities and German peasants had actually revolted against Spanish political and German noble social rule. The semiotic elements of the oprichnina were unique, but not imperial. Novaia imperskaia istoriia linked the oprichnina to Ivan’s megalomania (my word—CJH). His imperialist conquests and treatment of his own subjects as if they were conquered foreigners manifested his unlimited authority. However, Italian condottieri who became dukes or whatnot also treated their subjects like conquered foreigners, but they did not found empires, and kings engaged in foreign conquest as much as emperors. The distinction between Ivan’s authority in domestic and foreign affairs is artificial. No source from the period defined such a difference. No evidence supports the contention that Tsar Fedor Ivanovich lacked legitimacy because of his father’s lawless arbitrariness. The treatment of Ivan in Novaia imperskaia istoriia was less imperial than it purported to be and begs a number of key questions about his imperial identity and policies. In the preceding chapter I categorized its image 21 See the special issue of Russian History: Ivan “the Terrible” and the Career of Simeon Bekbulatovich, Russian History 39 (2012): 269–345.

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

of him as balanced criticism because Gerasimov et al. presented the tsar’s personality and policies in all their seeming contradictoriness, rational and irrational—although sometimes rational only from the skewed perspective of the indomitable Ivan.

Kollmann’s The Russian Empire Despite the difference between Kollmann’s definition of imperial and that of Novaia imperskaia istoriia, there is a great deal of similarity between their treatments of Ivan. Nevertheless, there are also significant differences in emphasis and substance in Kollmann’s presentation of imperial themes. Overall, the traditional image of Ivan, with emendations, still dominates. Kollmann, discussing the entire early modern period, argued that states expanded into empires because they could, in order to acquire resources for state-building. Muscovy, like the Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid empires, did just that, as did European countries building overseas colonial empires in the New World and Asia.22 I wonder if all expansion can be qualified as “imperial expansion” and how the Holy Roman Empire, admittedly a problematic concept, and the Habsburg Empire fit into this “spirit of the [imperial—CJH] times” observation. Like Novaia imperskaia istoriia, Kollmann called attention to Ivan’s conquest of non-Slavic trade centers (implicitly, Kazan′, perhaps Livonia) and to the absence of secular political philosophy. Tsarism, and by inference imperialism, defined itself via practice, not theory.23 Kollmann did not entirely agree with Novaia imperskaia istoriia concerning the baneful effects of the oprichnina and what it tells us about Ivan’s character. The oprichnina was infamous. It threw the country into chaos. Ivan’s attack on the northwest was merciless. The oprichnina was exceedingly violent. There was no method in Ivan’s madness. The oprichnina did not target any single institution, region, or social class. It manifested no discernable social or political goals. It did not establish any new institutions or political practices that survived its abolition. It ravaged the economy. It “undoubtedly [inflicted] a deep psychological wound in individuals and groups,” as attested by the avoidance of violence against the elite by subsequent rulers and “also by an unprecedented emergence 22 Kollmann, The Russian Empire, 5. 23 Ibid., 10, 131.

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of history writing focused on tyranny and legitimacy” (presumably during the Time of Troubles—CJH). Because all rational explanations of the oprichnina have failed, some historians have proposed irrational explanations, for example that Ivan was engaged in “sacred violence.” However, Ivan’s supposedly “sacred violence” was not consistent with the ritualized nature of sacred violence, whose purpose was to maintain social stability. By contrast, Ivan’s violence was “outside of the norm, arbitrary, short-lived, and fundamentally destabilizing.” The violence, destruction, and futility of the oprichnina have not yet been satisfactorily explained, but there must have been an irrational element of some kind involved.24 While excoriating oprichnina violence like Novaia imperskaia istoriia, Kollmann did not share its perspective concerning the symbolic features of the oprichnina. For example, she did not mention dogs’ heads. Nor was Kollmann sympathetic to the argument of Gerasimov et al. that the irrationality of Ivan’s terror was rationally designed to demonstrate Ivan’s absolute authority and was “normal” for early modern European rulers. It might be fair to say that Kollmann did not view the oprichnina as imperial. Kollmann categorized the Book of Degrees as “a cautionary message to an audience of rulers and elites busily pursuing empire and clan self-interest” of the downside of disregarding morality,25 but she did not foreground its fictitious genealogy of Ivan as segregating him from and making him socially superior to his subjects. Literary, visual, and ceremonial sources illustrated Russia’s imperial imaginary. Different rights adhered to each social group in Muscovite society in accordance with Burbank’s conception of an “imperial regime of ranks.”26 Imperial imagery did not prevent conquest.27 The “wanton raising of taxes to pay the costs of state building and warfare” impoverished the country.28 Kollmann’s invocations of Ivan’s Muscovy as an empire differed from those of Gerasimov et al. In Novaia imperskaia istoriia, there was no question of imperial imagery preventing conquest. Conquest, specifically of foreign territory, was the essence of imperial expansion, and a manifestation of the “emperor’s” unconstrained authority. Note that Kollmann refers to 24 25 26 27 28

Ibid., 13, 27, 153–54. Ibid., 134–35. Ibid., 154. Ibid., 155. Ibid., 200.

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

“state building” by warfare, but not “empire building.” To Kollmann empire building was not a goal in itself but merely a tool for the primary objective, state-building. How her conception of the “imperial imaginary” differs from Gerasimov et al.’s interpretation of the “absolute authority” that Ivan sought remains difficult to determine. According to Kollmann, following the bloody conquest of Kazan′ the Muscovites moved the Tatar population out of the city, destroyed mosques, minarets, and fortifications, and constructed new churches and a new fortress in the style of the Moscow Kremlin. State policy allowed Muscovy’s colonial subjects to keep their religion. There was no attempt at coercive mass conversion, which for security reasons would hardly have been pragmatic on the borderlands.29 The politics of difference, however, did not pertain only to empires. Composite states also tolerated different religions and recognized populations of different nationalities speaking different languages. Sixteenthcentury Poland-Lithuania, before and after it became the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was a monarchy, not an empire, but it practiced exactly such a politics of diversity (less so as the Catholic Reformation spread in the seventeenth century), even if not for all social classes. Clearly to Kollmann, Muscovy’s annexation of Kazan′ was imperialistic and created colonists, which was also the view of Gerasimov et al., but her discussion of policy toward Kazan′ illustrates the limits of the toleration of difference as much as toleration itself. Muslims did not have to convert to continue to live on the territory of the Kazan′ Khanate, but could not reside inside the city walls of Kazan′. Kollmann missed an opportunity to illustrate the politics of difference in Ivan’s policy toward Livonia. Initially Ivan offered to let the Livonians retain their freedom of religion, Lutheranism, and their liberties, specifically Magdeburg Law. Even after Livonian revolts resulted in repressive policies, Moscow never banned Lutheranism, although it did, as in Kazan′, favor Orthodoxy. Kollmann did not interpret the Livonian War in the symbolic imperial terms found in Gerasimov et al. Unlike Novaia imperskaia istoriia, Kollmann did not mention any Tatar contribution to Muscovite imperial practice or any Horde inheritance. Any possible German input into the oprichnina eluded comment.

29 Ibid., 43, 162, 262.

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She did however, following Bogatyrev, link the sacrality of the office of tsar to the Apocalypse,30 which Gerasimov et al. did not do. Kollmann interpreted royal marriage as boyar politics. The boyars arranged Ivan’s first marriage to Anastasiia in order to create a balance among competing Royal Council boyar clans: One of Ivan’s most pernicious acts was to marry upward of six times after his first wife, Anastasiia Romanovna, died in 1561. Boyar clans strategized for decades to cultivate connections with the tsar’s in-laws, and constant changes of the tsar’s bride wreaked havoc with status and power among the boyars.31

Such an interpretation, which is quite un-imperial, diverged from that in Novia imperskaia istoriia concerning Ivan’s second marriage. To Gerasimov et al., choosing Kabarda princess Kuchenei proved the point that Muscovy’s influence now exceeded the boundaries of the Muscovite tsardom.32 To them, Ivan’s second choice of bride was dictated by imperial foreign policy, not domestic social and political policy.33 On the destabilizing effects of the oprichnina on Muscovite society and the destabilizing consequences of Ivan’s serial monogamy on the boyar social class, Kollmann did not state whether Ivan intended his actions to produce those effects.34 While Kollmann was no more immune to theories of Ivan’s mental illness than Novaia imperskaia istoriia, unlike Gerasimov et al. she alluded to the possibility, evidenced by the autopsy of Ivan’s skeleton, that Ivan suffered brain damage due to mercury poisoning (either medicinal or homicidal), that he probably limped,35 and that perhaps this health problem played a role in his creation of the oprichnina.36 That Ivan ordered the assassination of the “Staritsa princes” is misphrased. Only appanage Prince Vladimir Andreevich was murdered. His

30 31 32 33

Ibid., 131. Ibid., 149, 210. Gerasimov et al., Novaia imperskaia istoriia, 256. Kollmann correctly identifies Mariia Cherkasskaia as a Kabardinian but later incorrectly calls her a Georgian princess. Kollmann, The Russian Empire, 57, 97. 34 Elsewhere Kollmann asserted that the purpose of Ivan’s multiple marriages was precisely to break the boyar kinship networks that restricted his power. 35 I have never seen any evidence in the sources that Ivan limped, or any assertion that he did in any other secondary work. 36 Kollmann, The Russian Empire, 154.

Two Imperial Interpretations of Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 7

son, Prince Vasilii Vladimirovich, went unharmed, and eventually succeeded to a part of his father’s appanage.37 Curiously, Kollmann, like Gerasimov et al., committed a factual error concerning Simeon Bekbulatovich. Ivan’s did not transfer the tsar’s title to Tsarevich Simeon Bekbulatovich.38 Simeon was a tsar, not a tsarevich, because he had, before his conversion to Christianity, been tsar of the Kasimov Khanate. Ivan accorded him the title of “Grand Prince of All Rus′,” not “Tsar of All Rus′.” Whether Kollmann’s exposition of the imperial aspect of Ivan’s personality and reign complemented as well as contradicted that of Novaia imperskaia istoriia, Ivan’s personality and policies in her narrative owed even less to the imperial turn than those of Gerasimov et al.

Conclusion Gerasimov et al. and Kollmann deserve kudos for highlighting different imperial aspects of Ivan’s reign. Conquest of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ and the attempted annexation of Livonia were imperialist acts. In some ways, new territory outside the limits of Rus′, especially Kazan′, became de facto colonies of the Muscovite empire, although Muscovite sources lacked any concept of “colony.” But we need much more research to determine the dimensions of Muscovy’s imperial nexus during Ivan’s reign and the extent to which Ivan’s actions resulted from imperial impulses, judgments, or motives. The Muscovites denied that any of the territories they coveted were not legally theirs. To Muscovy, what Novaia imperskaia istoriia called “imperial acquisitions” resulted from Kievan irredentism. Of course, historians are accustomed to translating Muscovite terminology into concepts they practiced but did not preach. Whether Ivan’s supposed desire for absolute, autocratic power was driven by imperial motives, rather than pathological ones, depends in part upon our still confused understanding of the difference in Muscovite thought between monarchy and empire. King David in the Old Testament was a tsar′ of a tsarstvo that must be considered a kingdom, but the rulers of Byzantium and the Golden Horde were tsari who ruled tsarstva that were empires. Historians must allow for the polysemanticism endemic to Muscovite thought during Ivan’s reign and the 37 Ibid., 149. 38 Ibid., 153.

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multiple sources of imperial concepts. Both Novaia imperskaia istoriia and Nancy Kollmann’s The Russian Empire made valuable contributions to this task. However, their images of Ivan showed than the imperial element by itself is not a magic bullet which will clarify or obviate the contradictory elements of Ivan’s personality and reign that still break out of their narrative and analytical presentations. Ivan’s persona dominates his empire.

Chapter 8

Ivan the Terrible from the Point of View of Tatar History

We now turn to a different set of textbooks and surveys. Ivan the Terrible’s conquest of the Khanate of Kazan′ in 1552 has long been seen in Russian historiography as a major achievement, unsullied by any of Ivan’s later less admirable actions, which led eventually to Russian control of the entire length of the Volga River. This opinion appears in works that examine the conquest from the point of view of Russian history. This chapter will assess images of Ivan in publications that have appeared since 1991 from the point of view of Tatar history, not just for his role in the conquest of Tatar khanates but in general. Dmitrii Donskoi’s defeat of Emir Mamai at the battle of Kulikovo Field produced no contemporary Tatar sources, so the best we can do to ascertain Tatar attitudes toward that battle is to examine the works of a modern Tatar historian.1 We are in a better position with regard to Kazan′. Although we do not have any Kazan′ Tatar texts from 1552, we do have a text reacting to Ivan’s unsuccessful attempt to conquer Kazan′ in 1550. One would not expect any history of the Tatars written from the Tatar point of view to celebrate the conquest of the Kazan′ Khanate as the greatest event in its history, and none does. However, the extent to which these publications view the Muscovite conquest of Kazan′ in terms of Ivan’s personal dreams of empire or in terms of the broader theme of Muscovite expansionism, despite individual variations, differs from that in the textbooks and surveys 1

Charles J. Halperin, “A Tatar Interpretation of the Battle of Kulikovo Field, 1380: Rustam Nabiev,” Nationalities Papers 44 (2016): 4–19.

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we have already examined. The “black book” Ivan remains present, but he is much more Russian. This chapter does not an attempt to determine the opinion of contemporary Tatars toward Ivan, but of contemporary historians specializing in the Tatars regardless of their ethnicity. I discuss nine volumes, all published in Russian, in the chronological order of their publication. These volumes include one elementary school and three high school textbooks (or two high school textbooks, one of which has two parts by different authors), a course for a gymnasium, one fairly general monograph, an article in a scholarly anthology, and two volumes in a multiauthored, multivolume history of the Tatars.2 I have not included specialized monographs on Kazan′ history because the contributors to the multiauthored, multivolume history wrote many, if not most, of those monographs, and it is more convenient to rely upon their summary expositions. This collection of works is not a sample, let alone a representative sample—just some suggestive, illustrative material that contributes to our understanding of Ivan’s complicated place in Russian-language (indeed, Russian) historiography since the fall of the Soviet Union. Whether the image of Ivan in these works coincides with or differs from the one found in works written from the point of view of Russian history constitutes my central focus. Of course, the authors cited here do not agree on everything about Ivan or even the history of the Kazan′ Khanate, but they do share one overriding conclusion about the conquest of the state: patriotic Kazan′ Tatars heroically defended themselves against Russian aggression. To keep that in mind, I will highlight value judgments on the significance of the Russian conquest and explanations of the failure of the Kazan′ Tatars to protect their independence. All books, let alone all textbooks, get some details wrong, but I do not as a rule discuss factual errors. Most authors frequently rely on the Kazan′ History, although they are aware of its problematic nature, but I do not usually discuss source criticism. Analyzing each work separately makes some repetition unavoidable, but it is the only way to evaluate each work’s picture of Ivan properly. For multiauthored books, I identify individual contributors.

2 Full disclosure: I contributed to an earlier volume in this series but had no role in the composition of the two volumes discussed here. See Ch. Dzh. Gal′perin, “Tsentral′naia vlast′ i russkie kniazhestva,” trans. A. A. Arslanova, in Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh, vol. 3, ed. Mirkasym Usmanov (Kazan′: Rukhiiat, 2009), 432–36.

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Part 1 of the 1995 secondary school textbook by Z. Z. Miftakhov and D. Sh. Mukhamedeeva on the history of Tatarstan and the Tatar people was printed in 68,900 copies.3 The authors take a negative view of Shah ali, a Chingissid who served as Moscow’s puppet khan of Kazan′ three times. The co-authors concede that he was known for skill and bravery in warfare. After a storm demolished the supplies of the Muscovite army besieging Kazan′ in 1552 and impaired morale, his persistent counsel persuaded Ivan to continue the siege. Nevertheless, Shah ali was an instrument of Muscovite aggression who should have known better. When he was arrested in 1533 his people were sent to prisons in various cities where they were starved to death, tortured, or executed. In Pskov alone, the Russian killed seventy-three Tatars, including seven small children. This motif— Russians as cruel murderers—reverses the classic image of the “barbarian” nomads often applied by Russians to Tatars. In 1546, Shah ali violated his promise not to bring Russian troops into Kazan′. He thought that he had achieved his goal when he was installed as khan of Kazan′, but he did not know his “master” (“khoziain”) (quotation marks in the original), Tsar Ivan IV, sufficiently. The tsar had not informed him that his jurisdiction would not extend to the mountain side of the Volga River. Shah ali now realized that he was only a pawn, an instrument of foreign hands, but he had to endure the insult to retain his throne. Before abandoning Kazan′ at Muscovite insistence, he had many of his opponents murdered at a banquet, destroyed the city’s artillery, and as his final evil deed he took other opponents hostage and deported them to the Muscovite outpost of Sviiazhsk. His perfidy left Kazan′ without capable military or political leadership.4 (A contemporary Muscovite source, on the other hand, was willing to overlook Shah ali’s Muslim faith to praise him for his loyalty to Ivan.)5 Under the pseudonym “Ivan Peresvetov,” an unknown author in the late 1540s formulated a general plan to conquer Kazan′. Because of boyar feuds, the tsar had to command the army of conquest in person. From 1547 3 Z. Z. Miftakhov and D. Sh. Mukhamedeeva, Istoriia Tatarstana i tatarskogo naroda, part 1 (Kazan′: Magarif, 1995). 4 Ibid., 197, 203, 180, 188, 192. 5 Janet Martin, “The Mongol Elite in Muscovy, Rhetoric and Reality: the Portrayal of Tsar Shah Ali in the Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy,” in The Book of Royal Degrees and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness / “Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia” i genezis russkogo istoricheskogo soznaniia, ed. Gail Lenhoff and Ann Kleimola (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2011), 217–29.

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on, Metropolitan Makarii, Ivan’s priest, led the government. Ivan and the Muscovite government were not, therefore, improvising in their policy toward Kazan′. They had a grand strategy: to conquer the khanate entirely. They did, however, need foreign specialists—German, English, and Dutch expert sappers—to mine Kazan′’s walls.6 Implicitly, the Russians were militarily backward and needed outside assistance to conquer the city. As we shall see, “Peresvetov” and Makarii are not the only individuals accorded a major role in setting Ivan’s policies. In 1551, Ivan began to implement his “malicious” plan to conquer Kazan′. Moscow pursued a divide and conquer strategy, turning the non-Tatar population of the khanate against the Tatars. The Russians rewarded (bribed) them with tax exemptions and gifts. Mari and Chuvash committed treason by betraying the Kazan′ Khanate. These traitors even included some Tatars. The Russians spread rumors that the purpose of the campaign was to free Russian captives. Russian agents exploited Kazan′ Tatar animosity at their current khan, from Crimea, and his Crimean entourage, claiming that they would free Kazan′ from Crimean oppression. A Tatar deserted to Ivan because he wanted to sell his people into slavery. He disclosed important military secrets to the Russians, including the presence of a Tatar attack force in the forest behind Russian lines. After the fall of the city, the captured khan, Yadiger, betrayed his faith and his people by surrendering and converting to Christianity. When the Crimeans departed Kazan′, the Russians captured, severely tortured, and then executed them. The final stage of the Muscovite plan to seize (zakhvat) Kazan′ was replacing Shah ali with a Muscovite governor, which meant the loss of Kazan′ independence.7 Ivan’s government claimed that the Kazan′ Tatars were traitors because they had previously sworn loyalty to Moscow and had reneged. According to Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva, the traitors were those Tatar and non-Tatar residents of the khanate who supported Moscow, in sharp contrast to loyal Kazanis and pious Muslims who defended with their lives their city, their people, their faith, their homeland, their fatherland, their yurt, their personal honor, and their children.8 By referring to the Muscovite plan to seize Kazan′ as an act of aggression, Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva also reverse the polarity of the image 6 7 8

Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva, Istoriia Tatarstana, 182, 207. Ibid., 184 183, 185, 187, 199, 215, 187, 191, 193. Ibid., 194, 199, 203, 210, 211–12.

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of the Tatars (and other historical villains) as zakhvatchiki, a hangover from Soviet historiography.9 It was not out of character for Ivan to waver in continuing the siege after the storm. Foreigners were amazed that Russians covered their armor with rich clothing, but Ivan used silver or gold brocade and his dress was richer than anyone else’s. His tent was fenced in because he was afraid of cannons, but his soldiers had no such protection. He complained to Kurbskii that his life was at risk in Kazan′. However, to counter sinking morale the tsar took decisive action against the Tatar forest forces.10 He thus displayed both cowardice and military leadership. Ivan was impressed by the beauty of the “jewel of the East,” but had no intention of preserving its unique monuments for future generations. He wanted only to destroy its white palaces and minaret towers, “creations of human intellect and human hands.” If the Kazanis refused to surrender, he threatened to kill women and children too—and, in the end, they and the elderly perished in the Russian bombardment of the city. Particularly under Ivan, Muscovy had an enormous army. It was at that time the “most militarized state in the world.” When Kazan′ would not surrender at his importuning, Ivan ordered 7,000 captives executed, some by impalement, some by being shot. “In their cruelty these repressive measures exceeded the horrors of all the pogroms of antiquity taken together.” Russians killed whoever survived the storming of the city, even old people, except for children, young women, and beautiful girls. The entire male population, twelve years old or older perished, because a twelve-year-old was an adult who could marry and bear arms. The inhabitants of the city were barbarically massacred. In all this the main evildoer was the autocrat “of all Rus′, the Christ-loving tsar′,” Ivan the Terrible.11 Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva’s use of the word “pogrom” to mean any massacre, not specifically a massacre of Jews, is not unique. Russian historiography has long applied that term to Ivan’s sack of Novgorod, although it nowhere appears in the narrative of Ivan’s punitive campaign against the northwest cities. This textbook, however, fails to discuss the sack of Novgorod or any of Ivan’s domestic atrocities, which might legitimately be said to be irrelevant to the history of Tatarstan but which would make the point that the Tatars were not the only victims of Ivan’s violence. 9 Halperin, “The Tatars and the Term Zakhvatchiki in Soviet Historiography.” 10 Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva, Istoriia Tatarstana, 207, 198, 206. 11 Ibid., 199, 203, 204, 205, 207, 213, 215, 211.

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This omission is not accidental. The co-authors’ hyperbole demonizes both the Russians and Ivan as barbarians. Ivan is both a typically cruel Russian and the cruelest Russian, a mass murderer. Ironically, the tsar’s merciless destruction invites comparison with the prototypical Scourge of God Chinggis Khan, the Mongol ancestor of the Tatars responsible for far more deaths. Peculiarly, Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva partially explain the Russian victory by the fact that whereas the Tatars were an ancient race, the Russians were young. The Tatar “nationality” (narodnost′) was already decrepit. It had fallen into the illness of stagnation and lethargy, in part because, beginning in the time of Alexander Nevskii, the most energetic Tatars had entered the service of Russian princes and they and their descendants, such as the Adashevs and Sheremetevs, had fought against Kazan′.12 This organic and metaphysical concept of the history of ethnic groups commits chronological and genealogical errors beyond the scope of this chapter, but it can be said that the co-authors do not idealize the Tatars. Some Tatars were heroic, others venal, cowardly, and disloyal. By the same token, the authors sometimes grant that Ivan had virtues, at least as a general; but without once calling him a tyrant, a despot, or insane, their image of him is overwhelmingly negative. His worst character trait, apparently, is that he is a Russian. K. R. Sinitsyna wrote part 2 of this 1995 secondary school textbook, published in 65,500 copies.13 Her categorization of the “taking” of Kazan′ utilizes three not quite synonymous terms—zavoevanie, pokorenie, and prisoedinenie—variously translated as conquest, subjugation, and annexation,14 discussed more fully below. In any case, there is no hint in any of these words that Kazan′ “voluntarily” submitted to Russia. In Sinitsyna’s narrative, Ivan orders punitive campaigns, receives submission, and organizes the administration of newly conquered territory, even if Alexei Adashev is his “favorite.” The tsar also blames the boyars for the uprising against Russian annexation, although the real culprit was his order to collect the tribute (yasak).15

12 Ibid., 218–19. 13 K. R. Sinitsyna, Istoriia Tatarstana i tatarskogo naroda, part 2, Vtoraia polovina XVI– XVIII vv. (Kazan′: Magarif, 1995). 14 Ibid., 4, 11, 27. I will not cite the appearance of these words in subsequent works. 15 Ibid., 5–8.

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The goal of Ivan’s Christianization campaign was to weaken the national and class unity of the Middle Volga River peoples and to strengthen Russian rule. He rewarded Russian clerical support of the Kazan′ campaigns by his official conversion policy. Note here that he acts from political considerations, not from piety. Ivan feuded with his boyars,16 a traditional trope here devoid of any implication that Ivan saw boyar enemies where there were none and without any allusion to any unwarranted actions he may have taken against them. According to Sinitsyna, the talented Pskov architect Fedor Basma designed St. Basil’s Cathedral and the stone Kremlin in Kazan′. When Queen Elizabeth I of England asked Ivan for Barma’s services to build a church in London, the tsar agreed. However, Barma died suddenly en route. “It is reputed” (shchitaiut) that Ivan ordered Barma poisoned so that he could not construct a church in London more beautiful than St. Basil’s in Moscow.17 I have never seen this legend anywhere else in scholarship, but it plays into the stereotype of Ivan’s black image. The colonial policy of tsarism led to a hiatus in Tatar literature.18 “Tsarism” here is impersonal, not individual. Whether Muscovy, later Russia, was imperial, meaning imperialist-colonialist, remains a hot-button issue in early modern and modern Russian history. From the point of view of the conquered, the answer to that question is obvious. Sinitsyna’s Ivan is in charge, pursuing cruel and destructive policies toward Kazan′. R. G. Rakhrutdinov’s secondary school textbook appeared in 2000 in 60,000 copies.19 It regurgitates several already mentioned themes but also innovates. Shah ali was a monster, a scheming traitor.20 Makarii, the head of the government, and Peresvetov (here not a pseudonym) were the young Ivan’s intellectual tutors, who “played a decisive role in the formation of his extremely militant and aggressive [zakhvatnicheskie]

16 17 18 19

Ibid., 33–34. Ibid., 28–29. Ibid., 32. R. G. Rakhrutdinov, Istoriia tatarskogo naroda i Tatarstana. Drevnost′ i srednevekov′e (Kazan′: Magarif, 2000). 20 Ibid., 228.

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views.”21 Stalin repressed the “greatest” Soviet historian Mikhail Pokrovskii for accurately categorizing Russian aggression toward Kazan′. Here, the young Ivan virtually loses agency in the formation of policy toward Kazan′, the zakhvatchiki theme is enhanced, and the Marxist but too internationalist Pokrovskii is honored for not participating in the Stalinist “nationalist” historiographic turn. The 1550 campaign against Kazan′ did not fail because of spring floods but because of incompetent military organization, so Russia underwent a major military reorganization, using specialists from Western Europe, namely German and English sappers, and military intelligence from Kazan′ turncoats who knew the strong and the weak points of Kazan′’s defenses. The musketeers (strel′tsy) imitated Turkey and Crimea—Janissaries, I would think.22 Not just Western Europe enjoyed military superiority over Russia. When demanding the release of Russian captives in Kazan′, the Russians “forgot” (Rakhrutdinov’s quotation marks) about Tatar captives in Russia.23 When the Tatar counterattack after the Russians breached the city walls threatened to overpower the Russian troops inside the city, who were partially distracted by looting, Ivan led his 20,000 man reserve into the city through the Khan’s Gates under his “holy” (Rakhrutdinov’s quotation marks) banner. These fresh troops turned the tide.24 This narrative accords Ivan a more positive, indeed courageous, role, compared to Kurbskii’s account, in which Ivan has to be dragged on his horse, not quite kicking and screaming, to the gates of the city just to order his own division to attack, and certainly not in the lead. He emerges as a brave and highly competent military leader. With his quotation marks around the word “holy,” Rakhrutdinov gratuitously and snidely denigrates the belief of the tsar and his troops in the efficacy of a Christian banner. Ivan did not simply bribe Nogais to obstruct Nogai assistance to Kazan′. Suyunbike, the wife of the khan, believed that Moscow would not conquer Kazan′ if she volunteered to become a hostage. Her sacrifice would have been exceptionally wise if she were dealing with “a normal, civilized opponent,” but Ivan deceived her and invaded Kazan′ anyway.25 21 Ibid., 226. 22 Ibid., 228. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 231. 25 Ibid., 232, 228.

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Muscovite armies did not spare the women in the khan’s palace. They killed the men and enslaved the women and children. Ivan’s punitive expeditions terrorized the population of the entire khanate. It was defeated by an aggressive, expansionist, hostile Russia driven by a militant Russian Orthodox Church.26 Despite Ivan’s occasional military acumen and courage, Rakhrutdinov declares that the tsar was distinguished by his “immoral life and inhumane actions.” The Russian people suffered first and foremost from his system of terror.27 Of the publications consulted for this chapter, Rakhrutdinov uniquely makes the Russian people, not the Tatars, Ivan’s primary victims. Rashit Galliamov’s 2001 scholarly study of Kazan′ after its conquest28 cites the oft-repeated description (which I have not identified everywhere it appears) that after the storming of Kazan′ corpses were piled high in the city streets. Ivan chose a peaceful over coercive pacification of the khanate because of Russian military losses and potential problems with Muscovy’s foreign neighbors—meaning the Ottomans and Crimeans. He changed his mind primarily because of the anti-colonial, national-liberation uprising against Muscovy.29 Galliamov makes clear that Ivan acted not out of any generous feelings for the conquered Tatars in his “peaceful” intents but from pragmatic self-interest. Like other authors, Galliamov turns against Russia the Soviet reflex endorsement of wars of national liberation, thus demonizing Russian imperialism, an attitude consistent with Rakhrutdinov’s comments on Pokrovskii. Gallianov would have no problem with the “prison of nations” concept. Galliamov excoriates the “cruel” Muscovite policy of expelling Tatars from the Kazan′ kremlin, the “cruel” measures against potential treason, the taking of hostages, use of torture, and banning of blacksmiths and silversmiths. Moscow intended to destroy the Tatar feudal elite or force it to emigrate. Christianization went hand in hand with Russification, ideological warfare to impose Russian rule. However, religion was only an excuse for political goals. Bribery induced conversion. Ivan granted funds to monasteries founded in the former khanate along with full judicial immunities,

26 Ibid., 231, 233. 27 Ibid., 226. 28 Rashit Galliamov, Posle padeniia Kazani . . . Etnosotsial′naia istoriia Predkam′ia (vtoraia polovina XVI–nachalo XVII vv.) (Kazan′: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel′stvo, 2001). 29 Ibid., 12–13.

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money grants, and commercial rights.30 If on the whole Russian policy toward annexed Kazan′ seems impersonal, Ivan’s patronage of Russian Orthodox Christian institutions was very personal, albeit with the implication that political concerns, not piety, motivated his policies. Monasteries and churches in the Kazan′ region served Russian rule. Galliamov’s Ivan is no angel, but he is a rational (if that is the word) political oppressor, cynically mobilizing religion to advance his political goals. Ivan the religious fanatic indoctrinated by Metropolitan Makarii has become a cynical opportunist. F. A. Rashitov’s 2001 richly illustrated survey of Tatar history, replete with study questions, is described as a course rather than a textbook, but it was designed for use in the National Tatar gymnasium in Saratov.31 Like Rakhrutdinov, Rashitov argues that the 1549 and 1550 Muscovite campaigns to conquer Kazan′ failed because of organizational and tactical mistakes by Muscovite leadership, which were corrected. The next attempt followed a detailed, well-thought-out plan that included improved artillery and the new musketeers militarily and detaching the Mordva and the Mountain Side from Kazan′ politically. One of its military-strategic operations was the construction of Sviiazhsk.32 But unlike Rakhrutdinov or Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva, and more like Sinitsyna, Rashitov calls Alexei Adashev the de facto head of the government.33 Calling anyone other than Ivan “head of the government” implicitly suggests that Ivan did not have full control of the state. In 1552, the victorious Ivan organized a “real pogrom” (see Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva) in the city. The Russians killed men, looted homes and mosques, and raped women. Rashitov eloquently declaims that “October 2, 1552 will always be kept in the memory of the Tatar people as the black day of a national [natsional′nyi] catastrophe, a day of mourning.” The Kazan′ Khanate fell to Ivan’s aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. The taking of Kazan′ was just the first step in Ivan’s militant (zavoevatel′naia) policy in the East. The annexation of these territories met strong opposition from the native peoples of the Volga region, the Urals, and Western Siberia. It took decades for Muscovy to win these truly national-liberation wars. The 1553 30 Ibid., 15, 16, 17, 22, 66, 23, 31, 38, 69, 70. 31 F. A. Rashitov, Istoriia tatarskogo naroda s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei (Saratov: Regional′noe Privolzhskoe izdatel′stvo, 2001). 32 Ibid., 110. 33 Ibid., 112.

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punitive expedition to the Kazan′ region lay waste to the land and captured everyone suspected of opposition. Ermak began the incorporation of Sibir′ into Muscovy. Ivan rewarded Tatar traitors, the Newly Baptized (Tatars who covered to Orthodox Christianity), and anyone who served Russian conquest with land. Because he pursued an “extremely cruel anti-Tatar and anti-Muslim policy,” the tsar was called “Evil-doer” (Iavyz, Zlodei) Ivan. His policy led to revolts which were cruelly repressed. The Tatars lost their best and brightest in an unsuccessful war for independence. An urban society became a rural society. Culture declined. They became impoverished. Industry and trade disappeared. The Tatars were isolated from active participation in government and social life.34 If Ivan was part of the leadership that committed the errors that led to the failure of the first two Muscovite campaigns to conquer Kazan′, then he was equally part of the leadership that corrected those errors and successfully conquered the city. Ivan and Russia were equally responsible for the destructive policies that wrecked Kazan′ politically, socially, economically, and culturally. B. F. Sultanbekov edited a 2001 elementary school (osnovnaia shkola) textbook printed in 90,000 copies.35 We are already familiar with the conclusions of the textbook. Moscow fostered disunity among the Kazanis using a divide and conquer tactic, which worked. After the taking of Kazan′, Ivan ordered all surviving men executed and women and children enslaved. The city was given to the soldiers to loot. Widespread looting also accompanied tribute collection. Ivan used deceit and bribery to smash the rebels’ leadership. Punitive expeditions took no prisoners, instituted bloody reprisals, and mercilessly repressed the uprising. Moscow coerced peasants, servitors, and tribute payers into fighting in the Livonian War. Forced conversion triggered the 1580–84 revolt against national-religious oppression. The cultural and economic benefits of integration did not compensate for the catastrophic impact of the Russian conquest. Ivan personally organized the local administration. Although in theory military governors (veovody) were only instruments of Ivan’s rule, in practice they exercised unlimited authority, which resulted in abuses. The government encouraged colonization. Only a small segment of the Tatar population received Ivan’s permission to live in a Kazan′ 34 Ibid., 113 (quotes on pogrom, day of mourning), 114, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124. 35 B. F. Sultanbekov, ed., Istoriia Tatarstana (Kazan′: TaRIKh, 2001).

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city suburb (sloboda) and even they were deprived of self-government. Moscow imposed forced Christianization on the “barbarians.” He ordered all mosques destroyed. Russia wanted to make the Tatars servile. From its content, Ivan’s instruction on conversion emphasized non-violent means because of the threat of uprisings in the area and Muscovy’s hostile Muslim neighbors. The real battle in Kazan′ was not for the faith but for land and wealth coveted by the Russian Orthodox Church.36 The textbook says nothing about the booty collected by Tatar forces in Livonia. By implying that Ivan’s mild instructions were not carried out, it suggests that Ivan could not control the actions of his officials on site, and therefore lacked responsibility for their deleterious consequences, but Sultanbekov does not draw the missing logical connections. The supposedly forced-conversion policy that inspired the 1580–1584 revolt contradicts Ivan’s “ostensibly” mild instruction on conversion, but the text does not mention that Ivan changed his mind, as Galliamov opines. Moreover, the textbook still insists on Ivan’s personal involvement in setting policy and hands-on approach to enforcing it. The cynical view that the Russian Orthodox Church was pursuing material, not heavenly, rewards is not balanced by a comparable assessment of Islamic religious institutions. It is notable that an elementary school textbook acknowledges the argument that Kazan′ benefitted economically and culturally from integration into Russia, a “lesser evil” axiom, but it then goes on to reject that excuse for Russian conquest because the negative consequences outweighed the positive. An article by Il′dus Zagibullin in a 2002 scholarly anthology discussed the celebration of the conquest of Kazan′ in Russia from the second half of the sixteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth century.37 Zagibullin declares that Ivan strengthened state control over the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore religious arguments for conquering Kazan′ derived from the state authorities, who aimed to establish autocracy. Prayers for those who died fighting Kazan′ reflected Muscovy’s imperial pretensions toward Kazan′. Ivan’s “circle” fully understood the significance of victory over a Tatar state for the religious mentality of medieval Russian society. 36 Ibid., 100, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111 (cultural and economic benefits), 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121. 37 Il′dus Zagibullin, “Prazdnovanie v Rossii pokoreniia Kazani vo vtoroi polovine XVI– nachale XX v.,” in Kazanskoe tsarstvo: aktual′nye problemy issledovaniia (Kazan′: Fen, 2002), 4–71.

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Churches constructed in Kazan′ territory after 1552 were “directly tied to the person” of Ivan. Where there had been a mosque in the Kazan′ fortress, he symbolically, “with his own hands,” installed a cross where the altar of a future church would be. The Kazan′ Dormition Cathedral imitated its Moscow Kremlin namesake. Ivan gave 400 rubles for the new Assumption Church in the Zilantov Monastery. The government restored the monastery at its own expense after its destruction during the 1574 native revolt against religious and social oppression. Undoubtedly, the Nikon Chronicle and the Book of Degrees were compiled at Ivan’s order. Their appearance in the 1570s was tied to the “disagreement” between Ivan and the members of the Chosen Council during the Livonian War. The tsar was responsible for the victory in Kazan′ and he used that conquest to increase his power. He and Metropolitan Makarii selected their favorite Gurii as the first archbishop of Kazan′. Ivan organized Gurii’s ceremonial procession to Kazan′ as a display of the state’s sponsorship of religious expansion. The next archbishop of Kazan′, German, was summoned to Moscow to become metropolitan, but his “polemic” with Ivan ended his ecclesiastical career and he died in Moscow in 1568.38 Zagibullin’s Ivan is not a religious fanatic but a power-seeking autocrat who used the church just like he used the conquest of Kazan′ to advance his political agenda. But if that were true then Ivan’s patronage of churches and monasteries in Kazan′ was a facade. Zagibulin’s Ivan apparently brooks no dissent from his policies, hence his break with the Chosen Council and German, Archbishop of Kazan′. In fact, Archbishop German died of natural causes two years after he did not become metropolitan. Only Kurbskii wrote that Ivan supported German’s candidacy and then had German murdered when they disagreed over the oprichnina. This is not mentioned by Zagibullin. German remained archbishop of Kazan′ until his death, so it is difficult to divine how that disagreement “ended” his clerical career. In any event, Zagibullin’s Ivan exercises control not only over the Russian Orthodox Church, making or breaking episcopal careers, but also over literature, that is, propaganda. Volume 4 of the multiauthored History of the Tatars since Ancient Times covering The Tatar States from the Fifteenth to Eighteenth Century appeared in 2008.39 38 Ibid., 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10, 11, 13, 16–17, 18–19. 39 Mirkasym Usmanov, ed., Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh, vol. 4, Tatarskie gosudarstva XV–XVIII vv. (Kazan′: AN RT, 2008). Reproducing chapter titles along with contributors’ names would needlessly clutter this presentation.

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Khatin Minnegulov discusses the contemporary text describing the unsuccessful Muscovite siege of Kazan′ in 1550 referred to above. The poet Sharifi, a participant in the defense of Kazan′, recounted this event in his Zafar-nama-i Vilayat-i Kazani. Some scholars identify Sharifi with another poet—Qolsharif. Regardless, Minnegulov translates Ivan’s goal in the text as the “seizure” (zakhvat) of the city. Minnegulov reinforces the negative connotations of the word by writing that Sharifi criticized Ivan’s “aggressive war” (zakhvatnicheskaia voina). The poet called Ivan a smut′ian (“agitator,” “fomenter of civil strife”) and a zlodei (“evildoer”). Sharifi, a true patriot of his homeland, lauded the bravery of the city’s defenders. He proudly declared that Kazan′ was not “Ivan’s city.” “Unfortunately,” Minnegulov continues, “two years later this ‘flowering’ city, the capital of a large khanate, was converted to ruins and ashes. Among the sacrifices of this bloody war was the author [Sharifi] of these heartfelt lines.” Earlier, another Kazan′ intellectual had also become a victim of Ivan. Mukhammed′iar died in 1549 while a member of a diplomatic delegation to Ivan in the capacity of interpreter. Despite his diplomatic immunity, Ivan ordered him “brutally” killed.40 Minnegulov blames Ivan personally for Mukhammed′iar’s death and for the destruction of Kazan′ in 1552 accompanied by Sharifi’s death. The zakhvatchik Ivan acts in a beastly manner. Aleksandr Nesterov recounts that Khan Kuchum of Sibir′ used a form of address in a letter to Ivan that relegated the tsar to an inferior status, but at the time Moscow did not understand the insult. Possibly to inhibit a Muscovite attack, Kuchum raided Muscovite territories; but that backfired and his foray became an excuse for the Muscovite conquest of Sibir′ by the “half-bandit” expedition of a small Cossack detachment led by Ermak.41 Nesterov’s Ivan was ignorant of the protocols of steppe diplomacy. It is tempting to infer that either Kuchum or Nesterov considered Ivan uncivilized, uncultured, or uncouth. Note that Nesterov’s Kuchum made a fatal policy mistake but from honorable motives. Given Ermak’s heroic, almost legendary status in most Russian historiography, Nesterov’s put-down reduces the “conqueror of Siberia” to little more than a criminal. According to Aleksei Matveev and Sergei Tataurov, in 1581 Ivan admitted that he benefitted from internal Nogai Tatar dynastic disputes, although 40 Ibid., 4:32–34. I have found no mention of Mukhammed′iar’s death in Russian sources. Unfortunately, the Kazan′ “diplomatic papers” (posol′skie knigi) do not survive. 41 Ibid., 4:206, 208.

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he did not take responsibility for fostering internal dissension within the Nogai hordes. He guaranteed access to the fords needed by Nogais loyal to Moscow to nomadize, offering them protection against the Cossacks. In his diplomacy, Ivan violated the Nogai pecking order because they were unable to resist Muscovite power.42 Matveev’s and Tataurov’s Ivan does not act like someone who would not recognize a studied diplomatic insult from Kuchum. The tsar knew the Nogais well enough to incite divisions among them, to offer to succor their need for pastures, and to recognize when he violated the Nogais’ social hierarchy. For the Nogais, the problem with Ivan was that he knew too much about them and therefore became too successful in dealing with them from a position of strength. According to Aleksandr Bakhtin and Bulat Khamidullin, Muscovy’s international position suffered when the boy Ivan ascended the throne because he could not restrain boyar feuding. Contemporaries were correct to suspect that his mother Elena Glinskaia was poisoned, as recently confirmed by an autopsy. The government was paralyzed by boyar discord. In 1545, at the age of fifteen, Ivan took over the reins of government. He had several boyars executed and protected the weakened Russian state from boyar arbitrariness. He also attacked Kazan′, although Bakhtin and Khamidullin disagree with Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva by writing that Ivan had no grand plan for its conquest. When he did take the city, not all Kazan′ males were massacred. Some elite males were deported to enter Ivan’s service if they swore loyalty to him. Many of Ivan’s commanders, led by Kurbskii, advised him to remain in Kazan′ after the conquest and destroy the anti-Muscovite opposition by “cruel terror” which would emasculate their will to resist. The tsar, however, agreed with the minority, comprised of other commanders, his in-laws the Zakhar′ins, and some clergy, that peaceful negotiation would be more successful than military repression. Just as he had previously tried to negotiate with independent Kazan′, he now sought to negotiate with conquered but not yet submissive Kazan′. Ivan hoped to avoid a long, bloody war and great fiscal expense. He did not give native peasants over to Russian feudal lords. Some Tatars and other nationality groups were ready to accommodate Russian rule, but not enough to prevent the national-liberation uprising which was merely a continuation of Kazan′ resistance against the Russian aggressors (zakhvatchiki). 42 Ibid., 4:233, 234, 237.

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Ivan promised religious toleration, but the destruction of mosques and the murder of Muslim clergy undermined his assertion. The Muslim clerical establishment (ulema) resented losing their privileged status and called for a holy war against the infidel Russians. The revolt failed in part because the three-year tax exemption given to the peasants still obtained, so the most negative aspects of tsarist rule had not yet appeared in the Kazan′ region. Moreover, the dynastic crisis of 1553 in Moscow tied Ivan’s hands. Some Muscovites doubted Moscow’s ability to retain the Middle Volga Khanate and others did not view the prospect of difficult fighting with any enthusiasm. The tsar had no intention of abandoning Kazan′, which would have damaged his authority and prestige. To his dissatisfaction, excessive violence by Muscovy’s military and administrators spurred native resistance. Ivan participated in a policy review. When he interrogated captives he learned that generals and governors disobeyed his orders about compromise, about punishing only rebels, and showing mercy to those natives who were loyal. Instead they staged a bloody pogrom in Kazan′. Ivan acted not from excessive humanitarianism but from pragmatic statecraft. He gave Archbishop Gurii of Kazan′ authority to protect peasants from the tsar’s own governors. Nevertheless, in the national-liberation war that ensued the Tatars and other nationalities treated all Russians as enemies, so Russian monks and peasants suffered although they played no role in the repressive measures. Muscovite diplomacy succeeded in preventing the formation of a coalition of Muscovy’s Muslim neighbors in support of Kazan′. Tatar warriors were better trained than the average Muscovite soldier, but Muscovy possessed superior organization and economic resources. Thousands of Tatars and natives served in the Muscovite armed forces. The disunited Tatars were defeated.43 Bakhtin and Khamidullin relied upon a fairly traditional narrative of Russian history in their examination of Ivan’s minority and its consequences in which he is very much the “good guy” in dealing with the boyars who poisoned his mother and damaged the state. Their Ivan is neither a religious fanatic nor a philanthropist, but a practical politician who wants to achieve his goals with as little bloodshed as possible. Bakhtin and Khamidullin do not excoriate him as an aggressor. To be sure, their denial of the massacre of all Tatar males is somewhat feeble. The volume 43 Ibid., 4:311, 314, 318, 330, 337–340, 343, 344, 347, 352, 356–58.

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of lower-class male victims dwarfed the number of spared elite males. However, although Ivan has the last say in deciding policy and the advisors to whom other authors pay so much attention, Makarii and Adashev, go unmentioned, Ivan is impotent in controlling the excessive violence of his representatives on the scene. Bakhtin and Khamidullin, then, echo the elementary school textbook edited by Sultanbekov on the limits of Ivan’s authority. On the other hand, Bakhtin and Khamidullin ascribe the opposition of the Muslim religious establishment to Russian rule both to real fears of religious intolerance and defense of their own vested interests, comparable to Sultanbekov’s greedy Russian Orthodox Church. The authors make Russian peasants and monks “innocent” victims of a legitimate national-liberation revolt, a very mixed image which overlooks the fact that the “innocent” Russian peasants and monks were instruments of Muscovite imperialism. Note that Muscovite diplomacy earns high marks for keeping the Ottomans and Crimea out of Kazan′ affairs. The divide and conquer strategy, not so named, toward the Nogais, the nationalities of the Middle Volga, and the Kazan′ Tatars themselves that Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva so vilify is seemingly praised for its successful application, even as that success, which prevented Kazan′ Tatar unity, is credited as one of the most important reasons for the failure of the Tatars to resist the Russians. Bakhtin and Khamidullin’s article avoids taking partisan positions. They qualify some criticisms of Ivan, praise his political and diplomatic abilities, absolve him of responsibility for some oppressive policies, and dare to impugn the motives of the Islamic clergy and to blame Tatars for excesses against innocent Russians. These nuances preclude extrapolating an overall judgment about Ivan or Muscovite annexation of Kazan′ from their chapter, which parallels the “conflicted” rubric of Russian historiography Damir Iskhakov notes that Ivan insisted that charters from Crimea use the more prestigious seal,44 which hardly sounds like someone who would not notice a put-down in charters from Sibir′. Mikhail Gorelik argues that Ivan’s Kazan′ crown was based upon an Ottoman model,45 echoing Rakhrutdinov’s Ottoman model for the musketeers.

44 Ibid., 4:492. 45 Ibid., 4:599.

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Obviously, to his credit the editor of volume four of the History of the Tatars since Ancient Times did not impose any uniform paradigm upon its contributors. Volume five of the History of the Tatars since Ancient Times covers the same period as the preceding volume, but is titled and of course devoted to The Tatar Nation as Part of the Russian State.46 Iskander Giliazov asserts that the Tatars adapted to their new political situation and contributed to Russian development. He notes that Soviet historiography spoke of the “annexation” (prisoedinenie) of Kazan′ rather than its “military occupation” (zavoevanie)47 because it was silent on the negative impact of the tragedy for Kazan′. Current historiography tries to be objective. Ivan echoed the main clerical ideologue of conquest Makarii in advocating the “holy conquest” of Kazan′ in reprisal for all the Christian blood shed by the Tatars, but actually he wanted to seize (zakhvat) the land and its trade for economic reasons. At first, the Russians acted with moderation, but then increasingly just seized land, hurting Tatar farmers. Ivan personally founded the Old Tatar enclave or suburb (sloboda) at Kazan′ for purely mercantile purposes.48 Giliazov’s Ivan is a pragmatist who uses religion for secular, material purposes. The tsar is not so biased against Muslims as to deny himself the revenues from Tatar commerce. Giliazov omits previously mentioned less favorable judgments of the exclusion of the Tatars from the Kazan′ citadel and the limits on Tatar inclusion in the “suburb,” but retains Ivan’s role in setting policy. B. I. Izmailov concludes that 1990s scholarship saw the Tatars as autonomous players, not just an “obstacle” to Russian expansion. Some historians judged Ivan’s “seizure” (zakhvat) of Kazan′ very negatively but others kept the traditional positive interpretation of a voluntary unification of Kazan′ with Russia or offered more complex justifications of Russian conquest as an act of defense.49 The persistence of imperial Russian and Soviet rationales for the Muscovite conquest of Kazan′ in publications written after 1991 from the point of view of Tatar history cannot be denied, but 46 Mirkasym Usmanov, ed., Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh, vol. 5, Tatarskii narod v sostave Rossiiskogo gosudarstva (vtoraia polovina XVI–XVIII vv.) (Kazan′: AN RT, 2014). 47 Zavoevanie is often translated as “conquest” but I prefer to accent its military aspect (the word is based upon the word for “war” [voina]), reserving “conquest” to translate pokorenie. 48 Usmanov, Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh, 5:3, 4, 6. 49 Ibid., 5:24.

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a more negative, even hostile appraisal of the Russian acquisition of Kazan′ predominates in such works. According to Iskander Izmailov, with Ivan’s coronation as tsar in 154650 Muscovy became an empire and its ruler the equal of the Roman and Byzantine emperors and the khans of the Golden Horde. Ivan pursued the “seizure” (zakhvat) of the lands that had belonged to Kievan Rus′ and fulfillment of the messianic aspirations of Moscow as the Third Rome. The young tsar instituted reforms in concert with his closest advisors, Adashev, Sylvester and Makarii. The musketeers were based on the Janissaries. The Muscovite gentry needed to conquer the Middle Volga region for their economic survival because Muscovy had exhausted its land reserve. The “Chosen Council” (his quotation marks) carried out the policies advocated by Peresvetov, including the annexation of Kazan′, so Peresvetov, either a real man or the man behind the pseudonym, was an influential ideologue. As Makarii’s letters to Ivan demonstrate, according to anti-Islamic Third Rome theory Muscovy’s task was to “civilize” (his quotation marks) the natives. When Moscow abandoned the use of puppet khans and annexed the region outright it violated the principle of Muslim Chinggisid legitimacy. Perhaps Moscow provoked an uprising as an excuse to destroy the Kazan′ military-political elite. Ivan personally commanded the conquest army, in which serving Tatars played more of a political than military role. In the process, Kazan′ lost one-third of its population and the city was looted. The conquest of Kazan′ marks the end of Ivan’s reform policy and the beginning of his imposition of autocratic rule.51 Izmailov’s exposition, like several others already discussed, regurgitates traditional Russian historiography on the Chosen Council and the influence of Moscow-the Third Rome theory on Muscovite state policy. However, traditional historiography dates the beginning of the end of the reform period to no earlier than 1560 and its final termination to 1564. Here, either Ivan is himself an ideologue or he is the instrument of other ideologues—Peresvetov and Makarii. The Muscovite gentry supported the Kazan′ policy for nonideological reasons. Regardless, the result of Ivan’s acquiescence is the much-attested “seizure” (zakhvat) of Kazan′ at the cost of one third of its population. In Izmailov’s article, Ivan’s agency is subdued, 50 A typographical error for “1547.” 51 Usmanov, Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh, 5:62–65, 71.

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but then again he is not held individually responsible for the destruction of Kazan′. Igor′ Ermolaev and Iskander Izmailov refer to the cruel repression of the initial 1553 Kazan′ revolt against Muscovite rule occasioned by the attempt to collect tribute. Either the officials collecting the tribute were ripping people off or the destruction of the conquest made it impossible for the population to pay. In either case tribute-collection and repression aggravated the situation. In 1557, Ivan conditioned administrative tax relief for the Mountain Side upon cooperation with the Muscovite regime.52 This article lacks any hint that Ivan was responsible for, or responsible for not stopping, the destructive conquest itself or administrative malfeasance in collecting tribute. Ermolaev and Izmailov do not criticize Ivan for “bribing” people to recognize Muscovite rule, as Miftakhov and Mukhamedeeva and others do. According to Aleksandr Bakhtin, as many as 20,000–30,000 Middle Volga Tatars served in the Livonian War. This presumably onerous and involuntary service caused the later Kazan′ uprising. As other authors concluded, Ivan had little success curbing administrative arbitrariness in the Middle Volga region. The uprising gave Ivan an excuse to use the oprichnina to accuse hundreds of serving Tatars of treason and then destroy their lands by this “treacherous means” (kovarnym obrazom). In 1573, he became convinced that it would take a major campaign to put down the Cheremis revolt, but as a “meticulous pragmatic politician” he tried to use diplomacy as well as coercion. Before he sent an army he dispatched representatives to ascertain the population’s grievances. In response to those grievances, Ivan offered the rebels a general amnesty in return for delivering the uprising’s leaders to the authorities. When some Cheremis met his terms he greeted their surrendering delegation respectfully and gave them generous gifts. Some Cheremis even agreed to help put down the rest of the rebellion. However, other Cheremis continued resisting until the 1574 expedition ended the rebellion in no uncertain terms. During the Time of Troubles the Polish szlachcic Stanislaw Nemoevsky, while in Moscow, wrote that at a Royal Council meeting in 1582 the tsar ordered the two main military governors of the Kazan′ region, I. M. Vorotynskii and D. I. Khvorostinin, stripped naked and dressed in women’s clothing. Ivan then forced them to twist 52 Ibid., 5:74, 82.

Ivan the Terrible from the Point of View of Tatar History  •  CHAPTER 8

millstones and grind flour, women’s work, until dark for their failure to quell the uprising. He later ordered officials to take sixty-five rubles from the Treasury to feed the Sviiazhsk Tatars.53 Ivan’s practical and flexible willingness to use peaceful as well as coercive means to achieve his goals, noted more than once, stands out, as does his inability to enforce honesty upon his officials. If Nemoevsky’s vignette is not a fantasy, it would demonstrate Ivan’s well-known vicious sense of humor, but even if it is, it resonates with Ivan’s reputation. According to Vadim Trepalov, in the 1540s Ivan resisted installing Derbysh in Astrakhan′ over Iamgurchi (they were rival Chingissids) because of the risk of conflict with Crimea and of possible interference with profitable Volga trade and fishing and the active Astrakhan′ markets. In 1561, Ivan, as a result of Nogai complaints, disgraced and arrested the military governor of Astrakhan′ for administrative abuse. The tsar became violent when he learned that another military governor had incarcerated many Nogais in an Astrakhan′ prison. In 1564, Ivan ordered him to release them all. Instead of returning to the Nogai Horde, they settled around the city. In 1581, Ivan assured mirza Uraz-Muxammed that the military governor would not interfere with Nogais seasonal migration near Astrakhan′. In 1582, a delegation of Nogais from Astrakhan′ met the tsar, who looked after their creature comforts.54 Trepalov’s Ivan is strategically informed, pragmatic, and competent. He responds decisively in the face of administrative impropriety on the part of his governors, but the fact that he had to take extreme measures indicates his previous failure to enforce behavioral norms on them. At least he took action against such miscreants. Why Ivan should have been more effective in protecting Astrakhan′ Nogais than Kazan′ Tatars is not clear. Astrakhan′ was farther away from Moscow than Kazan′, but its governors did not have to deal with hostile natives, in part because the city lacked any substantial native population. After taking note of the politicization of the terminology discussed by Galliamov, Damir Iskhakov and Zaituna Tychinskikh conclude that no one could deny that the Sibir′ Khanate was conquered. It did not submit

53 Ibid., 5:86, 88, 95, 96, 99 (Nemoevsky), 100. 54 Ibid., 5:104, 111–13.

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to Muscovite rule voluntarily.55 They also refer to the bloody conquest of Kazan′.56 They do not mention Ivan’s role in either conquest. Aidar Nogmanov observes that Moscow could not impose its legal norms on conquered Kazan′. It had to adapt to an alien religion, law, language, and culture. During the transitional period immediately after the conquest, two legal systems coexisted in the “seized” (zakhvachennaia) territory. Ivan made the first administrative decision to split the Left Bank Kazan′ district from the Right Bank Sviiazhsk district and other later territorial administrative adjustments. The members of the Kazan′ feudal elite remaining in Kazan′ were physically liquidated in the Kazan′ War, either killed or deported to central Muscovy, but some emigrated to Crimea. Ivan issued grants to monasteries as outposts of Muscovite authority on strategic routes. Because of security concerns no coerced conversions or excesses against Islam took place after the conquest. (Before the conquest some captive Tatars deported to Novgorod were offered the choice of converting or drowning. The men chose the latter, the women and children “chose” the former.) In the Muscovite-ruled Kazan′ region, Muslim and pagan criminals received milder punishments than Russians. The Russian Orthodox Church favored conversion and complained that the provincial administration was lax in promoting it, but the government, sensitive to Ottoman pressure, did not change policy. Nogmanov endorses Andreas Kappeler’s judgment that government policy was restrained and cautious. Tatar gentry received the same rights as Muscovite gentry, but did not merge with them. Kazan′ Tatars served on the western front. Perhaps Ivan planned their high casualties in order to weaken the Tatar elite.57 Nogmanov’s Ivan is pragmatic, employing the Russian Orthodox Church as a means of extending Russian influence in the region but not catering to its missionary impetus. Nogmanov’s interpretation is not compatible with the view of the book edited by Sultanbekov: that the 1580–84 uprising was a response to a coerced conversion campaign. The Russian Orthodox Church advocated coerced conversion rhetorically but in practice recognized that the delicate security situation on the Middle Volga region precluded such a policy. Ivan is again well informed of regional 55 Note that Ishkakov and Tychinskikh dealt only the conquest of Sibir′ in Western Siberia, not the mostly seventeenth-century conquest of Eastern Siberia, which some Russian historians still insist included the “voluntary” submission of some native tribes. 56 Usmanov, Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen v semi tomakh, 5:120, 121. 57 Ibid., 5:144, 145, 146, 148–53.

Ivan the Terrible from the Point of View of Tatar History  •  CHAPTER 8

affairs. Even so, Ivan’s and Russia’s aggression caused the destruction of the Tatar elite. Nogmanov does not ask if Russian casualties on the western front were as high as Tatar losses. Faizulak Islaev notes Ivan’s active participation in the formulation of religious policy toward Kazan′. Ivan attended the 1555 church council that named the first archbishop of Kazan′ and the 1557 church council that decided that monks in the Kazan′ region should not engage in agriculture themselves. The native peasants could do the agricultural labor because the monks had a higher calling—planting the faith. Conversion efforts were to be especially directed at mirzas.58 Islaev’s Ivan devotes his time to religious affairs, but Islaev does not say that state matters like security and international relations influenced Ivan’s actions. One infers that Ivan acted out of piety. Igor′ Ermolaev contends that Ivan and his close advisors worked out the structure and form of administration of Kazan′ before the conquest. At first, Ivan declared that the old administration would be retained, that only the recipient of tribute would be different. Before the native uprising, Ivan wanted to rule the region via joint Russian-local elite cooperation. After the bloody repression and the death, deportation, or emigration of the elite, Ivan had to rely only on Russians to administer his new acquisitions. Ivan’s strong constitution enabled him to recover from what was thought to be a fatal illness in 1553, during which there was a battle around the throne. Afterward, Ivan began a new stage in his political battle for autocracy,59 a traditional interpretation. Ermolaev’s Ivan is administratively engaged, competent, and in charge. He reacts intelligently to changing circumstances.

Conclusion Even with only a small number of case studies in hand, it is clear that there is no general consensus on Ivan’s role in Tatar history beyond the basic narrative: he presided over the conquest of Kazan′, Astrakhan′, and (less so) Sibir′ and he directed relations with the Nogais and fought the Crimeans. Ivan is sometimes seen as his own man, and sometimes as being receptive to the influence of his closest advisors, Makarii, Peresvetov, Adashev, or 58 Ibid., 5:181–83. 59 Ibid., 5:190, 192.

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Sylvester. This dichotomy reproduces the division of opinion in Russian historiography over his agency during the period of reforms. In some cases, Ivan acts out of religious belief, even fanaticism, in others he deals with religious issues pragmatically from a statist point of view. Works about the tsar from the point of view of Tatar history disagree with each other as much as those from the point of view of Russian history on the sincerity of his religious identity. No author echoes the idealized images of Ivan as worthy to be a saint or as a proto-Stalin. In this respect, textbooks and surveys of Tatar history share the tilt of Russian history textbooks and surveys. Some seemingly positive images of Ivan are actually mixed. He wanted to reach a peaceful accommodation with the Tatars, but failed, or his efforts were wrecked by the actions of his officials, whom he could not control. These tropes rarely appear in Russian history publications because the abuses of the Muscovite administration in conquered Kazan′ do not receive as much attention. Ivan wanted to give the Tatars an honest administration, but needed drastic measures to enforce propriety on his governors. He may have been pragmatic, well informed, and flexible, but sometimes he lacked control of the government apparatus. And his pragmatism must be considered within a broader context: Ivan was pursuing an immoral, aggressive, expansionist policy toward the Tatars that deprived their khanates of independence and many Tatars of their lives, freedom, or property. With the sole exception of Rakhrutdinov these discussions of Ivan’s role in Rus′-Tatar relations altogether omit Ivan’s relations with the Russian people, as if the tsar’s dealings with the Tatars can be abstracted from that broader context. His destruction of mosques and the murder of Islamic clergy takes place without reference to the looting of churches and the execution of Russian Orthodox Christian clergy at his orders, especially during the oprichnina. No author discussed here presses the issue of Ivan’s sanity, persecution complex, egomania, arrogance, sadism, or multiple marriages. He is cruel toward Tatars but—again save Rakhrutdinov—not cruel toward Russians. The explanation for this restraint is not a positive image of Ivan, even when he is portrayed as competent and in command, but a myopic conception of the subject of his relations with Tatars. His behavior at times is indistinguishable from that of the Russians in general, and that may be the point. From the point of view of Tatar history, Russians were hostile, aggressive, expansionist, and cruel. Ivan was just another Russian, only more so, and with much more, often decisive, influence over the course of events.

Ivan the Terrible from the Point of View of Tatar History  •  CHAPTER 8

Alternatively, the wannabe autocrat lacked the ability to restrain the greedy and vicious Russians he appointed to administer Kazan′. Neither image flatters Ivan. Because the Tatars lived in the “provinces” works on the history of the Tatars supplement the Moscow-dominated perspective of publications from the Russian point of view. Recent Western historiography pays more attention to Russian provincial history, not just during the sixteenth century. The textbooks and surveys that treat Ivan from the perspective of Tatar history perhaps inadvertently foreground the inability not only of the tsar but of the central government itself to control its personnel at home, not just in Kazan′. This phenomenon speaks to the question of Muscovy as a hypertrophic state and sheds new light on Ivan’s aspirations to supposedly unlimited authority.

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A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies

Textbooks and surveys in general or from an imperial or Tatar point of view addressed to a student or general audience do not shy away from confronting the “big questions” about Ivan’s personality and reign. Uniformly, but not dogmatically, they shade toward the critical wing of the spectrum of opinion. Professional scholars, historians, art historians, or littérateurs specializing in sixteenth-century Muscovite history would have to contend with potential pushback from their colleagues if they wrote as forthrightly about Ivan’s personal shortcomings and political failures. It would seem that to avoid controversy specialists sometimes deliberately eschew such major issues focusing on Ivan, preferring to stick to narrower and more technical subjects. Wary of subjectivity, these authors risk not antiquarianism but isolation from the wider audience of the textbooks and surveys. The next two chapters deal with research by specialists for specialists in the form of two anthologies. Multi-author anthologies offer a wider reflection of the field than single-author monographs and the images of Ivan offered by collectives reflect very well the state of studies of Ivan the Terrible among academics and in this chapter museum scholars. On October 16–17, 2017, a conference on “The Epoch of Ivan the Terrible and Its Expression in Historiography, Writing, Art, Architecture” (Epokha Ivana Groznogo i ee otrazhenie v istoriografii, pis′mennosti,

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iskusstve, arkhitekture) was held at the State Historical-Architectural and Artistic Museum-Reserve “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda” (Gosudarstvennyi istoriko-arkhitekturnyi i khudozhestvennyi muzei-zapovednik “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda”) [hereafter the Sloboda Museum] in Aleksandrov, Vladimir oblast′. The site could hardly have been more appropriate for a conference on Ivan. Aleksandrov was the first “capital” of Ivan’s oprichnina, and the Sloboda Museum there is the only museum in Russia dedicated to Ivan. The occasion was the 470th anniversary of Ivan’s coronation in 1547, which sounds more like an excuse than an occasion. The Sloboda Museum was the main sponsor of the conference. Other sponsors included the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and two institutes of the Russian (Rossiiskaia) Academy of Sciences, World History and Slavic Studies.1 A year later a two-volume anthology appeared under the same title as the eighth entry in the series of “Zubtsov Readings” (Zubtsovskie chteniia), named in honor of Vasilii Pavlovich Zubtsov (1900– 1963), a Renaissance man who published primarily about architecture.2 This chapter will analyze the contents of that anthology as at least a partial reflection of the current state of the study of Ivan the Terrible (groznovedenie) in Russia since 1991. Volume 1 consists of a preface by M. K. Rybakova, assistant to the director of the Sloboda Museum for Scholarly Research (1:3–6), to which I will return, and ceremonial greetings by M. A. Bryzgalov, the director of the Department of Cultural Inheritance of the Ministry of Culture  of the Russian Federation (1:7–9); I. K. Sergeeva, assistant to the head of Aleksandrov raion administration for social policy (1:10); and A. S. Petrukhno, the director of the Sloboda Museum (1:11–14), who conceived the conference in 2000. Volume 1 contains sixteen articles, volume 2 seventeen articles. Each includes a directory of information about contributors (“About the Authors”) to that volume (1:274–75; 2:267–69), but for some reason information on three foreign contributors to volume 1 was included in the directory in volume 2. The contributions appear in alphabetical order of their authors’ last names or the last name of the first author of the three coauthored articles. The articles are not numbered. Each contains an abstract (called “Annotation”) and “Key Words” in Russian and English. 1 The Institute of Russian (russkoi) History was not a sponsor of the conference. 2 Epokha Ivana Groznogo. References to these separately paginated volumes will be given in parentheses in the text by volume and page numbers.

A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies  •  CHAPTER 9

According to a website with information on the conference, 120 scholars, including twenty-five foreigners, attended, and fifty attendees made presentations.3 The program lists forty-three papers but warns that it might be changed. Assuming that there were no changes and all participants delivered their papers as listed, ten conference papers were not included in the published anthology and will neither be included in my statistics nor further discussed, save to mention the obvious fact that they are certainly missed.4 The anthology contains thirty-three articles by thirty-six authors. Rybakova noted that the Sloboda Museum was celebrating its one-hundredth birthday. A hundred years would seem to be a more auspicious interval to justify a conference than 470. She observed that many of the conclusions presented at the conference were unexpected, “even scandalous,” but did not provide any specifics. Rybakova specifically praised the attendance of one rapporteur, Fursov, but failed to note that his paper does not appear in the anthology.5 Attendees of impressive credentials and institutional affiliations came from all over Russia to participate. Scholars attached to museums comprised the largest segment of the presenters. The conference was graced by performances of scenes from Ivan’s life performed by a troupe from the Bol′shoi Theater. Rybakova’s remark on the preponderance of museum personnel at the conference can be confirmed from the contributors to the anthology. Table 9.1, “Participants Affiliations,” shows that fifteen of the thirty-six presenters were affiliated with museums. Twelve were affiliated with institutes or universities, including one attached to an archive and two to libraries; three with ecclesiastical institutions; three were foreigners; and three fell outside these categories. The title of the conference and the anthology epitomizes the multidisciplinary nature of research on Ivan. I have interpreted “Historiography” as history and “Writing” as literature. I have also added “Archeology” as a separate field. As Table 9.2, “Discipline of Articles,” illustrates, over half of the articles, seventeen, pertain to history, ten to literature, three to art, two to architecture, and one to archeology. Obviously these categories are merely suggestive. An article on the illustrations in the Illustrated Chronicle 3 “Epokha Ivana Groznogo i ee otrazhenie v istoriografii, pis′mennosti, iskusstve, arkhitekture,” https://istina.cemi-ras.ru/conferences/82648735/, accessed October 25, 2019. 4 See appendix 9.2 “Unpublished Conference Papers.” 5 On Fursov see chapter 5.

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Compilation could belong to history, art, or literature. I hasten to add that the articles on art, architecture, literature, and printing are replete with black-and-white and color illustrations, with one inexplicable exception, the article on archeology. Table 9.1: Affiliation of Participants Affiliation

Amount

Appendix 9.1 Numbers6

3

2, 14, 25

1

3

1

8

United States

1

1 (2)

Institutes and Universities

12

7 (2), 9, 11. 12, 13, 16, 17 (1, 2), 19, 21, 22, 24

Museums

15

1, 5, 6, 7 (1), 10, 18, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33

Artists’ Union

1

4

Collectors’ Association

1

15 (1)

1

20

Ecclesiastical institutions Czech Republic Foreigners Germany

Other

Writer Total

36

Table 9.2: Discipline of Articles Amount

Appendix 9.1 Numbers

Archeology

Discipline

1

29

Architecture

2

26, 32

Art

3

13, 15, 31

History

17

1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 33

Literature

10

4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20, 25

Total

33

I will discuss the articles by discipline, beginning with the largest and proceeding to the smallest.

6 Numbers in parentheses indicate first or second co-author. Note that numbers 1–16 are in 1, 17–33 in volume 2. Page references to articles can be found in appendix 9.1: “Published Articles.”

A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies  •  CHAPTER 9

History The articles on history, as in all disciplines, do not confine themselves to the chronology of Ivan’s reign. Sometimes they deal with pre-1533 background, sometimes with post-1584 developments. Nor do all authors draw a connection between their topics and Ivan’s reign. Avdeev [1] demonstrates from legends on coins and inscriptions on seals and on church walls dating from the reign of Ivan IV’s grandfather, Ivan III, through that of Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii during the Time of Troubles that in royal titulature gosudar′ and gospodar′ were synonyms, but both had multiple meanings. Archimandrite Makarii (Veretennikov) [2] provides a fairly standard presentation of the relationship of Ivan’s coronation as tsar to church-state relations. He follows existing scholarship in inferring from the absence of anointing in the earlier redaction of Ivan’s coronation that the tsar was not anointed and that his son Tsar Fedor Ivanovich was the first anointed Russian tsar; that the concept of Holy Rus′ dates to the sixteenth century; and that semiotically Muscovy inherited Byzantine traits but territorially and politically inherited attributes of the Golden Horde. Makarii’s only outright error is that Ivan was sixteen years old, not seventeen at the time of his coronation. Boček [3] interprets Ivan’s image as tsar as emblematic of the image of the Muscovite state in medieval historiography. Ivan’s image in Europe was as contradictory as his reign. Europeans wanted Muscovy as an ally against the Ottomans but feared Muscovy as a rival. He insists, unlike Archimandrite Makarii, that the tsar’s image was of domestic origin: the Byzantine and Mongol empires exercised only superficial influence on Muscovy. In terms of rhetoric and symbol, this conclusion clearly underestimates the impact of Byzantine imperial theory, for example, per Avdeev, in Ivan’s coronation, but does make a valid point. Domestic thought also contributed to Ivan’s image. The tsar was a symbol of Russian strength at home and abroad. Boček astutely notes the shift in foreign opinion on Muscovy’s international role. Muscovy was neither isolated nor unknown, which is not a novel idea but is very well expressed. Edovin’s [5] account of Ivan’s reputation in Arkhangel′sk, a city the tsar founded, personifies Russian ambivalence toward him. If in 2012 a proposal to put up a reproduction of Antokol′skii’s statue and to rename a street in Ivan’s honor met opposition from society, arguing that any tyrant, Ivan or

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Stalin, should not be so honored, in 2014 a monument was erected to the tsar based upon Vasnetsov’s painting. Edovin concludes that Ivan played a direct role in promoting Russia’s foreign policy interests by encouraging Dutch trade via the Arctic Ocean. Soldat [8] illustrates how Schlichting discredited Ivan by portraying him in the guise of pagan Roman emperors, especially Nero and Dracula, and accusing the tsar of homosexuality. Neither Schlichting nor any sixteenth-century source diagnosed Ivan as suffering from a psychiatric disorder. Soldat does not note the irony that Schlichting tried to prove that Ivan was not European by comparing him to Europeans. Lavrent′ev [11] devotes his article to the locality in which the conference was held, Aleksandrov. Its status changed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from a royal village to a city and then back to a village. Several versions of its name coexisted. In the middle of the seventeenth century it transformed itself again, into a convent. Lavrent′ev does not explicitly connect the alternation in Aleksandrov’s status after Ivan’s reign to the transient nature of the oprichnina or subsequent Muscovite ambivalence at the tsar’s place in Russian history. Mokshev [16] argues that the number of victims of Ivan’s punitive expedition to the northwest in Torzhok and Tver′ was insignificant because those cities were not devastated as badly as Novgorod and Pskov. No Tverian names appeared in the synodical. There is no way to determine how many of Ivan’s victims in Torzhok actually came from Novgorod or Pskov. Mokshev also criticizes Schlichting’s story that Muslim Tatars fought back against their intended executioner Skuratov, asking how they could have gotten knives and how seriously Skuratov’s wound could have been if he had lived another three years. That Schlichting lists the massacres at Tver′ and Torzhok after, not before, the assault on Novgorod and Pskov speaks against his credibility. Mokshev’s conclusions rest upon an argument from silence, the presumption that the synodical was comprehensive and that the absence of a Russian narrative of the impact of Ivan’s punitive expedition in Tver′ and Torzhok proves the absence of consequences. Orlova [18] traces the history of the Buturlin boyar/gentry clan from the reign of Vasilii III through that of Boris Godunov. Four Buturlins, including a boyar, served in the oprichnina, while six Buturlins perished during the oprichnina. No Buturlins belonged to Ivan’s appanage court during the ascendancy of Simeon Bekbulatovich. The clan survived and produced two associate boyars (okol′nichie), the second highest rank in the

A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies  •  CHAPTER 9

Royal Coucnil, behind “boyar,” during the reigns of Tsars Fedor Ivanovich and Boris Godunov. She also traces the history of Buturlin landed estates. Orlova makes no comment on the presence of Buturlins as both participants in and victims of Ivan’s terror. Pozdeeva [19] notes that the continuing adherence of hundreds of thousands of Old Believers to the decisions of the Council of One Hundred Chapters (Stoglav) validates the relevance of the council, although that issue is not germane to her analysis of the council itself. I cannot vouch for her statistics of the current number of Old Believers. She concludes that the tone and energy of “Ivan’s” suggestions to the council suggest that Ivan himself did write them, an interesting argument. The tsar knew perfectly well that a single council could not definitively solve the problems it identified, such as low literacy levels among the clergy and laity alike. In the seventeenth century the Moscow Printing House began to publish the kinds of pedagogic material that could make a dent in the problem of illiteracy. Pchelov [21] connects the introduction of the unicorn to the small state seal in 1561 to the supposed use of a unicorn horn to anoint David and Solomon in the Old Testament. The unicorn was a polysemantic, even contradictory symbol, for example, attesting to both royal strength and meekness. It entered the royal coronation regalia. Pchelov’s interpretation of the symbolism of the animal as reflective of biblical anointment would remain valid even we accept Archimandrite Makarii’s conclusion that Ivan’s coronation anointment was an ex post facto rewriting of history. Muscovite sources refer rhetorically to Ivan as God’s anointed, physical anointment or no. Reshetnikov [22] examines the well-documented mutual economic relations between the Solovetskii Monastery and the city of Kargopol′. He does not draw any inferences from these data about the economic uniqueness of the Russian North during Ivan’s reign, the Muscovite economy during his reign, or his domestic policies. Rybakova [23] presents a fascinating analysis, full of color illustrations, of the image of Aeksandrovskaia sloboda in the miniatures of the Illustrated Chronicle Compilation as a hunting (also mentioned above by Lavrent′ev) and entertainment site, a fortress, and the venue for diplomatic receptions. She does not comment that miniatures of Aleksandrovskaia sloboda during the oprichnina, such as when Tsaritsa Mariia Cherkasskaia and Ivan’s sons sought refuge there in 1565 from a Tatar raid or the 1566 arrival there of a Swedish envoy, lack any markers that the oprichnina existed. Ivan dresses

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as a tsar, not an oprichnik, and no oprichniki accompany him or his family. Rybakova does not ask whether the scriptorium, printing press, and a choir school at Aleksandrovskaia sloboda existed simultaneously or how Ivan’s less cultural activities there during the oprichnina might have effected their operation. Rykov [24] vigorously contests the idea that the Moscow 1570 executions took place on the “Filthy Puddle” (Poganaia luzha) as asserted by the early seventeenth-century Piskarev Chronicle and another later source, rather than, as in all other sources, a trade area in Kitai-gorod. The later sources reflect unreliable legendary and folkloric influence. Rykov attributes the rarity of written Russian sources about the executions to fear of writing about them during Ivan’s lifetime. He does not relate the absence of contemporary Russian narrative sources to the thorny problem of the termination of Moscow chronicle-writing in 1567, nor does he ask if attributing the silence of Muscovite sources about the mass executions to fear is compatible with the willingness of government census takers in the late 1560s and early 1570s to blame the oprichniki for murder and looting in the northwest or with the composition of the synodical lists of Ivan’s victims.7 Tkachenko [27], relying on Ivan’s supposedly underutilized charters and the insufficiently appreciated history of his pilgrimages, traces Ivan’s relationship toward the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery. He notes that the tsar’s attitude changed. For decades, Ivan made numerous pilgrimages there and treated the monastery with great respect. After 1567, he had its archimandrite removed and imprisoned in another monastery and in 1573 a letter by him described the monastery as in decline. Tkachenko does not relate the tsar’s altered treatment of the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery to the oprichnina. Indeed, he does not attempt to explain Ivan’s flip-flop at all. Tomsinskii [28]8 encapsulates the rise and fall of Aleksandrovskaia sloboda from its creation in 1513 by Vasilii III to the use of the stones from its ruins to construct a convent in 1650. He labels the prominence of Aleksandrovskaia sloboda a “problematic and ephemeral phenomenon” (2:174). Unlike the princely residences of the Kievan and appanage period, in Muscovite times the ruler’s habitat occupied the apex of a hierarchy that reflected the monarch’s absolute authority. Aleksandrovskaia sloboda had a sacral character reflective of the unassailable power of the Muscovite grand 7 Charles J. Halperin, “Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV’s Oprichnina,” Kritika 18 (2017): 95–124. 8 The English-language abstract of this article is virtually incomprehensible.

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prince/tsar. It was sui generis, neither a “city” nor a “village,” and it was isolated from the capital. Therefore, Aleksandrovskaia sloboda was not traditional: it was an autocratic innovation. By the Time of Troubles, it had become obsolete. The Romanov dynasty in the seventeenth century was not an empire, but in the eighteenth century imperial residences once again gained prominence.9 During the reign of the last tsar, the circle was completed: Nicholas II had an Aleksandrovskii dvorets in Tsarskoe selo. Tomsinskii accurately decries the absence of narrative descriptions of Aleksandrovskaia sloboda and the verisimilitude of Ulfeldt’s famous gravure. However, he would not have written that no other images of Aleksandrovskaia sloboda survive if he had consulted Rybakova’s article which he presumably heard presented at the conference. Moreover, he also completely overlooks the prosaic and hardly sacral functions of the site as a hunting lodge (Rybakova, Lavrent′ev) and a fortress (Rybakova). There is no evidence of any special, let alone sacral, significance to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda except during Ivan IV’s reign and probably except during the oprichnina. Eighteenth-century palaces, let alone Nicholas II’s deliberately archaic revival, derive from a very different cultural context. Still, Tomsinskii deserves kudos for the ambitiousness of his conclusions. Frantsev [30] asks why Ivan’s depredations and other causes such as epidemics and crop failures caused massive depopulation in the northwest when Peter the Great’s exactions, which included drafting large numbers of peasants to serve in his army and to build St. Petersburg, during which most died, did not produce comparable depopulation. He attributes the difference to a shift in peasant social structure as a result of the replacement of taxes based on land to taxes based upon household. Naturally, peasants sought to lower their taxes by shifting from nuclear family households to extended family households. The larger households could better survive the burden of Peter’s reign than they did that of Ivan’s. This dynamic recurred in late imperial times. The breakup of families after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 made smaller households more vulnerable again, destroying the peasant economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, Frantsev does not take into account the imposition of serfdom between Ivan’s and Peter’s reign and the combination of the inequities of the Emancipation Manifesto and demography on the late imperial rural economy. Massive peasant migration to the steppe and to Siberia in the 9 Compare chapter 7.

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last decades of imperial rule did not save the peasant economy. Again, like Tomsinskii, Frantsev deserves credit for thinking big. In both cases, evaluation of their grandiose theories should properly fall to specialists in modern Russian history. Shchutskaia [33] traces Ivan’s relationship to the Zakhar′in-Iur′ev clan, his in-laws via his marriage to Anastasiia. No one in the clan joined the oprichnina, and only one member was disgraced, not executed, during it. In 1570, boyar Semen Vasil′evich Iakovlev-Zakhar′in was arrested, but forgiven and sent to honorable exile in Smolensk.10 But upon his death, Ivan virtually liquidated the interrelated Iakovlevs, Mikhailoviches, and Zakhar′ins, leaving only Nikita Romanovich Iur′ev alive. Amazingly, the lone survivor remained in the Duma. Ivan spent his whole reign, Shchutskaia opines, feuding with the boyars, but he still appointed boyars as guardians to Tsarevich Fedor. Shchutskaia accepts at face value the interpolations in the Tsar’s Book on the succession crisis of 1553, the observation of a seventeenth-century chronicle that upon Anastasiia’s death Ivan’s personal behavior degenerated into orgies, and the accusation in foreigner accounts that Ivan fought with and beat his son Tsarevich Ivan. She refers to the formation of a separate court/household for Tsarevich Ivan in 1570; this may be a typographical error for 1560. Finally Shchutskaia, like Tkachenko, leaves Ivan’s change of attitude toward his first in-laws unmotivated.

Literature Vyshnia [4] connects multiple styles of drawing sketches in the Illustrated Chronicle Compilation to different masters, each an experienced artist. The sketches are not unchanging icons but varying images of nimbi, crowns, hats, and so forth. Each miniature represents a unique and complex system of ideas. This analysis hints at the scale of mobilization of resources that was necessary to undertake the massive Illustrated Chronicle Compilation, which is why I include her article under Literature and not Art. It speaks to a problem of literary history, the composition of the Illustrated Chronicle Compilation. Despite the title of Vyshnia’s article, which ascribes compilation of the text to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda, where the Illustrated Chronicle

10 Skrynnikov concluded that Semen Vasil′evich Iakovlev-Zakhar′in was executed and his name included in the synodical list. Shchutskaia did not cite Skrynnikov’s statements.

A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies  •  CHAPTER 9

Compilation was compiled remains a matter of discussion, although Aleksandrovskaia sloboda remains a popular candidate. Zhilkina [6] describes a 1577 psalter, newly acquired from a private Moscow collector via auction by the Sloboda Museum. Andronik Timofeev Nevezha printed the psalter in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda. This psalter contained more ornaments than that of 1568. Only Ivan could have been responsible for this change. Nevezha printed three books in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda between 1577 and 1580. The other two were a book of hours (chasovnik) and a Gospels. Ivan relocated the printing machinery from Moscow to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda after the Moscow 1571 fire. However, no direct evidence links the relocation of the printing equipment to either the year or fire. Zhilkina does not ask why it took six years after that transfer for Nevezha to print his first book in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda. Zhelenskaia and Sevast′ianova [7] compare the hagiographic topoi of suffering and martyrdom utilized to portray Metropolitan Filipp and Patriarch Nikon, both of whom suffered at the hands of tsars, even though Nikon, unlike FIlipp, was never canonized. The words attributed to Filipp in his vita, Kurbskii’s History, and other sources were bookish but Filipp’s own words in administrative charters were businesslike. Filipp was not a writer. Zhelenskaia and Sevast′ianova could have made the point that although Nikon was not a martyr, his suffering was portrayed in the same phraseology as that applied to Filipp. Zhelenskaia and Sevast′ianova do not notice that, ironically, Filipp did not oppose the liturgical and ritual changes in the Council of One Hundred Chapters that Nikon overturned. Nor did they deem it necessary to mention Nikon’s key role in the translation of Filipp’s relics and propagation of his cult. Isachenko [9] examines the letter of Maksim Grek to Vasilii III on the organization of monasteries on Mt. Athos and the dispatch of Athonite monks to Muscovy. Ivan’s well-known interest in Athos, including his correspondence with the Serbian Hilandar Monastery and his contacts with Maksim Grek, presumably justified the inclusion of this article in the anthology (and the conference program). Kniaz′eva [10] analyzes two sixteenth-century Acts of the Apostles in the Sloboda Museum collection, both printed by Ivan Fedorov, the first in 1564 in Muscovy, discovered by schoolchildren and donated to the Sloboda Museum, the second in 1573–1574 in L′vov (Lviv), both restored. Lifshits [12] asks whether the books with ownership inscriptions by boyar Boris Morozov (1590–1661) constituted a “library” in the proper sense

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of the word. The books included some in European languages, which, Lifshits suggests, Morozov might have spoken. He calls Morozov one of the few educated Muscovites of his time. Lifshits does not contextualize Morozov’s possible library to the history of “libraries” in Muscovy during Ivan’s reign, which would have justified the article’s inclusion in this anthology. The tsar’s archive contained books in European languages, including Latin, but Ivan’s classical library is a legend which still has defenders among Russian historians. Arguably, no boyar during Ivan’s reign owned what could be called a library. Makhan′ko [14] identifies an unusual groups of saints in the Illustrated Chronicle Compilation, martyrs, not all of whom can be identified, to Roman emperors. Such a grouping of saints on historical grounds, in whose reign they lived, was highly unusual in Muscovy. Menologies of course grouped saints by the days on which they were celebrated. Morozov and Khromov [17] examine the frontispiece of an image of King David in the 1577 psalter printed in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda by Nevezha discussed by Zhilkina, noting variation in ornamentation among different copies. The frontispiece was based upon a gravure in Nevezha’s 1568 psalter. The coauthors carry the story forward to seventeenth-century copies of the psalter. Poleznev [20] discusses seventeenth-century Iaroslavl′ townspeople libraries, which, investigation revealed, contained previously unknown editions of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles printed by Nevezha in 1577–1580 in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda. Sister (monakhinia) Sergiia (Kalamkarova) [25] surveys the bibliography on Ivan’s liturgical compositions. He continued the tradition of Byzantine emperors of writing hymns. Sister Sergiia confines herself to bibliographic remarks and publication summaries. Unmentioned is Gail Lenhoff ’s discovery of a troparion to Nikita of Pereiaslavl′, previously attributed to Ivan, in a manuscript written before the tsar was born.11 Sister Sergiia continues to attribute this hymn to Ivan.

Art Markina [13] discusses the icon of the Savior with St. Sergius of Radonezh and Varlaam Khutinskii from Smolensk in the Annunciation Cathedral of 11 Gail Lenhoff, “The ‘Stikhiri Ivana Groznogo’ as a Cultural Myth,” in Poetika, istoriia, literatura, lingvistika. Sbornik k 70-letiiu Viacheslava Vsevolodovicha Ivanova (Moscow: OGI, 1999), 45–54.

A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies  •  CHAPTER 9

the Moscow Kremlin created for Ivan, which became an object of special veneration during his reign. Markina focuses on the theology of the Christ image, but does not engage with its connection to Smolensk nor the selection of Muscovite saints who bow down before Christ. Meliton′ian and Redi [15] donated their collection of over sixty postcards of Ivan and his epoch to the Sloboda Museum. The postcards reproduce art, literary illustrations, photographs of actors portraying Ivan (including Cherkasov in Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, part 1), and architecture. The earliest illustrated cards in the collection date to 1894–1895. Such cards were especially popular from the 1950s to the 1980s. This delightful exercise in deltiology speaks directly to the resonance of Ivan’s image in popular culture. Churgeeva [31] recounts the appearance in 1579 of the Kazan′ Theotokos (Bogoroditsa) icon and its later history from a text written in 1594 by the first metropolitan of Kazan′ St. Hermogen.12 Ivan funded the building of a church to house the icon and an attached convent. The icon is of the Hodegetria type previously unknown in Muscovy. Churgeeva sees in the history of the icon a reflection of Ivan’s respect for the Theotokos. Its history also illustrates Ivan’s role as patron of Russian Orthodox Christianity, of icons, churches, monasteries, and convents. The tsar’s piety contributed to his legitimacy.

Architecture Timofeeva [26] discusses the replacement under Ivan’s patronage of the covering of the roof of the Vladimir Dormition Cathedral after a fire in 1536, which included the introduction of an onion-shaped central dome. The church’s seventeenth-century pear-shaped side domes were replaced in 1888–1891 by onion-shaped domes. Such domes were not previously unknown in Rus′. Frescoes and chronicle miniatures from the middle or end of the thirteenth century already pictured onion-shaped domes. The dissemination in Russian church architecture of these kinds of domes, nowadays so identified with Russian architecture, deserves further study. Some recent scholarship argues that the onion-shaped domes of St. Basil’s 12 After Muscovy conquered Kazan′ in 1552 it established an archbishopric in Kazan′, which was elevated to a metropolitanate in 1589 when the metropolitan of Moscow was raised to the rank of patriarch.

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Cathedral, which are largely responsible for that identification, date from the seventeenth century. Shadunts [32] studies architectural monuments in Pereslavl′ district constructed at Ivan’s expense, the Fedorovskii sobor in 1557 and the Nikitskii sobor in 1560–1564, their dating and architectural characteristics.

Archeology Turova [29] summarizes the results of excavations at Aleksandrovaskaia sloboda conducted between 2005 and 2015 by archeologists from the Hermitage. Additional information about Aleksandrovskaia sloboda can be extracted from the wedding documents of Ivan (to Mariia Sobakina) and Tsarevich Ivan (to Evdokiia Saburova) in 1571 and of Ivan (to Anna Vasil′chikova) in 1575. Turova dates various stone structures to Ivan’s reign after early sixteenth-century fires destroyed the older wooden structures. Astonishingly enough, this article lacks any illustrations such as photographs from the excavations, maps of excavation sites, or sketch reconstructions of long-vanished buildings.

Conclusion The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Epokha Ivana Groznogo is that the multidisciplinary approach to Ivan’s reign is fully justified. History, literature, art, architecture, and archeology all contribute to our understanding of the period. The problem of integrating this evidence remains formidable. A diverse anthology of conference papers on a great variety of subjects could hardly produce a coherent, consistent, or comprehensive image of Ivan’s personality or reign. Even so, the failure of many articles to place their original conclusions within a broader context is almost as frustrating as the authors’ failure to revise their conference presentations for publication by taking into account other presentations published in the same anthology. Nor did the editors compensate for these omissions by cross-referencing articles or identifying contradictions between articles via footnotes. Nevertheless, every article in both volumes of the anthology is worth reading, and that is no small achievement. Of course, themes connected to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda, such as the location itself and its printing press, attracted considerable attention. It is encouraging that new printed books from Ivan’s reign continue to be

A Reflection of the Current State of Ivan the Terrible Studies  •  CHAPTER 9

discovered and new archeological excavations of sites from Ivan’s reign continue to make discoveries. At the same time, some aspects of Ivan’s reign, such as government institutions, law, and administration, warfare and diplomacy largely escaped the attention of the contributors to the anthology. No anthology could provide more than a partial picture of the current state of Ivan the Terrible studies in Russia. Foreign scholars made only a slight contribution to the anthology. Regardless of their quality, their articles shed even less light on the state of current non-Russian studies of Ivan’s personality and reign. An extended introduction by the editors might have alerted the reader to the connections among articles and the broader topics to which they relate. Several articles address printing in Muscovy, but none asks what impact printing had on Muscovite culture at the time. Several articles utilize the Illustrated Chronicle Codex, but none confronts the lack of a scholarly consensus of its dating and attribution. Two articles mention commerce, but none evaluates the role of trade in the Muscovite economy during Ivan’s reign. What Epokha Ivana Groznogo most lacks, unexpectedly, even astonishingly, is Ivan the Terrible’s presence. Despite reference to his religious beliefs and political, economic, and social policies, he remains conspicuously colorless on the pages of the anthology. For example, Rykov discusses the location of Ivan’s executions in 1570, but not his motives. His volatility, almost unhinged literary style, and chaotic marital life escape attention. He gives the epoch his name, but does not impose his personality on it, for good or ill, which does an injustice to his impact on Muscovy during his lifetime and his larger-than-life reputation, again, for good or ill, in Russian historical memory. From this anthology, a novice reader would have difficulty extracting a clear understanding of why Ivan aroused such passionate evaluations in his own time and continues to generate very ambivalent feelings to this day. Of course, not everything that happened in Muscovy during his reign resulted from his agency, but Ivan should not be totally ignored. His persona, his larger-than-life image, his charisma, remain invisible. To be sure, it may be a good thing that the sober contributors to the anthology eschewed engaging the demonized or idealized images of Ivan that attract too great an audience and cast a pall on legitimate scholarship. Their Ivan is neither a sadistic, perverted, megalomaniacal, paranoid, deranged, egomaniac, nor a political genius or canonization

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material. For this reason Epokha Ivana Groznogo i ee otrazhenie v istoriografii, pis′mennosti, iskusstve, arkhitekture generates more light than heat. Such an emotionally neutral approach to Ivan and his reign permits calmer, more objective and productive research. I suspect that the planners of the conference and the editors of the anthology wanted it that way.

Chapter 10

Generalissimo Ivan the Terrible

The second anthology of articles by specialists for specialists discusses a subject completely missing in Epokha Ivana Groznogo—military history. Not surprisingly, the anthologies share no contributors. But perhaps like all such in-field anthologies it shares a micro-historical approach to Ivan’s reign. However, the historians who examine the military history of the period, unlike those published in Epokha Ivana Groznogo, do not avoid Ivan’s presence in his own reign. Neither do they agree on Ivan’s role. Moreover, although they do confront big questions, again unlike the contributors to Epokha Ivana Groznogo, no one boldly engages the biggest question of them all, a macro-conclusion about Ivan’s role in Muscovy’s military history. Ivan the Terrible set something of a record for the percentage of time during his reign in which Muscovy engaged in warfare—thirty-seven of fifty-one years. The Livonian War (or Livonian Wars) occupied twenty-five of those thirty-seven war-plagued years. Most of the years of peace came during Ivan’s minority (1533–1547). From the time he came of age in 1547, the year of his coronation and first marriage, until his death in 1584, only four years were peaceful.1 Moreover, while judgments of Ivan as a ruler derive first and foremost from his use of mass terror for political purposes, historians’ evaluations of Ivan are strongly influenced by military 1 Alexander Filjushkin, Ivan the Terrible: A Military History (London: Frontline Books, 2008), 3–4.

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considerations: the degree to which Ivan deserves credit for Muscovy’s victories, the permanent conquests of the Kazan′ Khanate in 1552 and the Astrakhan′ Khanate in 1556, and the temporary seizure of Polotsk in 1563 (held until 1579); and blame for Muscovy’s defeats, losing the Livonian War and the burning of Moscow by the Crimean Tatars in 1571. Therefore, it is unfortunate that the military history of Ivan’s reign has not been adequately studied. A new anthology Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo: Materialy nauchnoi diskussii k 455-letiiu nachala Livonskoi voiny (The Russian army during the epoch of Ivan the Terrible: Materials of a scholarly discussion on the 455th anniversary of the beginning of the Livonian war)2 successfully redresses this lack of attention. It is a major contribution to understanding the military history, and not just the military history, of Ivan’s reign. The anthology was compiled by the editors of the online journal Istoriia voennogo dela: issledovaniia i istochiniki as a special issue, lacking volume or issue number. Except for a paper copy deposited in the Russian National Library (Moscow), it is available, happily open access, only on the internet. Part 1 consists of an introduction by Filiushkin and eleven articles by ten (other) authors; part 2 (separately paginated) contains nine comments on seven of those articles by four authors of articles (one author commented on three articles) and three historians who did not contribute articles, and five replies by authors to the comments on their articles, for a total of twenty-six essays by fourteen historians (see table 10.1). Table 10.1: Contents of Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo Author Babulin, I. B. Beliakov, I. V. Bentsianov, A. M Filiushkin, A. I. Glaz′ev, V. N. Kurbatov, O. A. Lobin, A. N. Moiseev, V. M. Molochnikov, A. M.

Introduction

Number Number of of Articles Comments 1 1 1

1 1 2 1 1 1

1 3

Number Totals of Replies 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 2

2 Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo. The 455th anniversary occurred in 2013.

Generalissimo Ivan the Terrible  •  CHAPTER 10

Author Penskoi, V. V. Selivestrov, D. A. Skobelkin, O. V. Smirnov, N. V. Volodikhin, D. M. Totals

Introduction

1

Number Number of of Articles Comments 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 9

Number Totals of Replies 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 5 26

The most active participants in the volume, judging by number of essays, not number of pages, were Kurbatov (two articles, one comment, and one reply) and Lobin (one article and three comments). No one commented on three articles. One would not expect the contributors to the anthology to agree on all matters, and they do not. The inclusion in the anthology of comments on the papers and replies by the authors affords the reader the kind of access to scholarly debate in Russia usually available much less conveniently only by tracking polemics in multiple issues of multiple journals. Here everything is readily at hand. Moreover, the discussion was graced, as the participants noted, by a very high level of professionalism, objectivity, civility, and mutual respect. The contributions to Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo raise a plethora of questions concerning the history of Ivan’s reign, not all of which can be elucidated in this chapter. Apart from its value for understanding substantive questions of Russian military history, the anthology’s sometimes conflicting images of Ivan illustrate the dilemma his personality and reign pose for historians in Russia since 1991. In his introduction [0–1],3 Filiushkin praises the inclusion of articles on specifically military topics as a sign of progress in the field of military history, which has been dominated by attention to the social history of the military.4 Filiushkin provides extremely useful nutshell summaries of each article, comment and reply. I will refer to some of his comments below. Filiushkin also calls attention to topics, too numerous to repeat, not discussed in the anthology, which should be the subjects of future research. He rightfully closes his introduction by stating the anthology’s value. I 3 I will reference essays by the codes explained in appendix 10.1. 4 Most of the anthology is still devoted to social history.

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presume that Filiushkin was selected to introduce the volume because of his previously published monograph on the military history of Ivan’s reign, in English, which he cites.5 No other contributor to the anthology cites it, nor are there many references to his publications in Russian. Volodikhin [1–1], drawing upon his previous publications,6 blames Muscovy’s defeat in the Livonian War upon attrition of the high command of the field armies. Before the oprichnina, non-princely old-Muscovite boyars had little chance of receiving the highest military appointments, but the oprichnina gave them that opportunity until they lost Ivan’s political support after the punitive campaign against Novgorod. In Volodikhin’s opinion, Ivan made military appointments based not upon military competence but political reliability, although he implies that the politically reliable non-princely commanders he selected were actually more qualified than their socially superior princely competitors. Politically, Ivan’s actions were rational. Filiushkin objects that Muscovy lost the Livonian War because its armies were outnumbered by the more professional mercenary army of King Stefan Batory of Poland. Kurbatov [2–1] disputes Volodikhin’s contrast of princely versus non-princely nobles as a myth of later historiography. Non-princes largely chose other career paths. Ivan was not nearly that consistent in selecting victims to disgrace, deport, or execute. Politically, Ivan’s actions were irrational. Moreover, despite the loss of officers among the high command, their replacements were not inferior in quality, including in Ivan’s own mind. Even after he made peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ivan still thought that his armies could wage war successfully against Sweden. In his reply, Volodikhin [2–2] insisted that while evidence of group social consciousness among princely and non-princely groups is difficult to come by, it is nevertheless still possible to sense the resentment of the non-princely group at the glass ceiling on their military commissions and fully warranted to describe their newfound career opportunities during the oprichnina and Ivan’s repression of princes as non-princely revenge.7 5 Filjushkin, Ivan the Terrible: A Military History. 6 Volodikhin, Voevody Ivana Groznogo; idem, Oprichnina i “psy gosudarevy”; idem, Sotsial′nyi sostav russkogo voevodskogo korpusa pri Ivane IV (St. Petersburg: Izdatel′stvo “Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie,” 2011); idem, Russkii voevodskii korpus ot oprichniny do semiboiarshchiny. Ocherki istorii (Moscow: Rossiiskii institut strategicheskikh issledovanii, 2015); idem, Ivan Groznyi i ego okruzhenie (Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2016). 7 For Volodikhin’s overall assessment of Ivan the Terrible, see chapters 1 and 3.

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Penskoi [1–2] turns from the upper command corps to the middle and lower command cadres of the Russian army, as analyzed in his monograph published probably after he submitted his article to the anthology, but definitely before the anthology was posted.8 He attributes Muscovite military success to these “centurions,” whose military wisdom accumulated by experience “saved” their superior officers, who spent most of their time in administration, not combat, from mistakes in the field. However, the centurions had no experience commanding large-scale military units in large open-field battles, which negatively affected Russian army performance. Penskoi concedes that talent could sometimes compensate for lack of experience, but fails to discuss whether all officers actually learned from their experience. In his comment, Babulin [2–3] invokes the victories of A. B. Gorbatyi at Kazan′ in 1552 and M. I. Vorotynskii at Molodi to demonstrate that the “generals” won big battles, not the centurions. Babulin blamed Russia’s defeats squarely on Ivan, who invoked his unprecedented personal authority to take command and brooked no disagreement with his decisions. The best generals either died in battle or refused to take the initiative in view of the risks of Ivan’s displeasure. With Ivan in charge, Babulin asks rhetorically, how could one expect Russia’s armies to have high-quality leadership? Yet Ivan receives no credit from Babulin for appointing the gifted generals who won battles or for leading the campaigns that conquered Kazan′ and Polotsk. In his comment, Lobin [2–4] asserts that the generals were more than administrators. If some needed “assistance” from their junior officers, others, militarily talented aristocrats, did not. In his reply, Penskoi [2–5] denied that he intended to denigrate the generals, but asserted that their victories such as Molodi were defensive. Military correspondence shows that Moscow gave field generals little discretion, because it wanted to minimize the risks incurred when generals it knew to be unqualified took the initiative. Penskoi does not ask who in Moscow set policy for such incompetent field commanders, Ivan or those administrator-generals whose combat aptitudes were so limited. Skobelkin [1–3] concludes that the numbers of “serving Germans” in the Russian army under Ivan, hired as individuals or in groups, was not significant—perhaps between 1,000 and 1,500, about 300 at Molodi—but at the same time the scale of foreign mercenaries under Ivan was unprecedented. 8 V. V. Penskoi, “Tsenturiony” Ivana Groznogo: Voevody i golovy moskovskogo voiska vtoroi poloviny XVI v. (Moscow: Tsentropoligraf, 2017).

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Up to the middle of the sixteenth century, Italians predominated, to be replaced by Germans. Foreign artillery specialists disappeared, but native Russians took their places. Skobel′kin’s conclusions are not contradictory. Given the virtual absence of “serving Germans” in the Russian army before the sixteenth century a huge spike in their numbers would still be insignificant compared to the entirety of Russian armed forces. In his comment, Lobin [2–6] criticized Skobelkin for not discussing how Russia recruited foreign mercenaries, to which Skobelkin [2–7] replied that there was no evidence. Lobin [1–4] observes that only a few tens of weapons from Ivan’s time survive in museums. Soviet historians asserted that Russia was ahead of Europe in artillery, but the American historian Marshall Poe, in an article in Russian published in Russia, concluded that the Russian army lost open battles because it was weak on artillery tactics, technology, and military engineers, the only case in the anthology in which an author engages the views of a non-Russian author (even one who published in Russia in Russian).9 Lobin explores at length the complicated terminology for guns. He is ably assisted by color illustrations, both photographs and the detailed drawings done between 1700 and 1706 by the Swede Jacob Thelott of fifteen Ivan-era pieces confiscated by Swedish forces in Livonia. A German trained the most famous late sixteenth-century Russian cannoneer, Andrei Chokhov, but Russia by the end of Ivan’s reign possessed the most powerful and up-to-date artillery park in Eastern Europe. In part, that was the result of Russian capture of guns in Livonia which were not returned at the end of the Livonian War. Even so, Lobin refers to Russian mass production of guns during the 1550s and 1560s in Moscow and Aleksandrovskaia sloboda. He agrees with Skobelkin on the changing ethnicity of Russian artillerymen, from Italians to Germans to Russians. It would interesting to know when guns were manufactured in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda—before, during, or after the oprichnina? Despite Lobin’s assertion, there is no consensus that the Illustrated Chronicle Compilation was compiled at Aleksandrovskaia sloboda or when it was compiled. Ivan established a printing press at Aleksandrovskaia sloboda only after the abolition of the oprichnina. It still seems possible that much more was going on in Aleksandrovskaia sloboda 9 The standard article in English on the subject remains Thomas Esper, “Military SelfSufficiency and Weapons Technology in Muscovite Russia,” Slavic Review 28 (1969): 185–208.

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than Ivan’s pseudo-monastic brotherhood and the torture and execution of supposed traitors. Beliakov [1–5] collects evidence of Finnic Mordvin, Tatar, and other non-Slavic military units in the Russian army who were not full-time soldiers. Each “nationality” unit was based upon a different territorial organization, for example, Mordvin beekeepers by stan. I do not know why Beliakov characterizes these auxiliary military forces as “invisible men.” They were and are certainly visible enough in the Russian sources. No one commented on this article. Moiseev [1–6], utilizing much archival documentation, examines Nogai Tatar-Russian military cooperation. Motivated by famine in the steppe, at their own, not Ivan’s, initiative Nogai Tatars served in the Livonian War, although they did not play a significant role. Moiseev labels the Nogai role in the Russian conquest of Kazan′ episodic and in Russian warfare against Crimea ineffective. Barely 2,000 Nogais relocated to Russia and became serving Tatars. Quantitatively and qualitatively, the Nogais did not play an essential role in Russian warfare. Their diplomatic role was, however, of primary importance. Moiseev overlooks the psychological role of Nogai Tatars, serving Tatars, and other non-Slavic units in the Russian armies that invaded Livonia. As the Livonian chronicles well attest, the “barbaric Asiatics” in Muscovy’s armies terrorized the local population by their raids. No one commented on this article. Several authors of works on the history of the Kazan′ Tatars, discussed above in chapter 7, posit that Ivan coerced them to serve in the Livonian War, unlike Moiseev’s view that the Nogai Tatars volunteered (hunger, not Ivan, compelled their participation). Glaz′ev traces the origin of the Muscovite musketeers to captured Lithuanian and Polish zholnery/zolnierz enrolled in Muscovite service as gunners (pishchal′niki). When infantry slaves with guns could not fire their weapons at Kazan′ in 1550 because of rain, Ivan established the musketeers. Glaz′ev dismisses Horsey’s estimate of 20,000 musketeers as exaggerated. The connection between the failure of the gunners at Kazan′ and the creation of the musketeers is an inference. Creating the musketeers would not solve the problem of firing arquebusiers in the rain. Glaz′ev overlooked valuable data in the military registers that provide reliable numbers of musketeers in 1577.10 In his comment, Lobin [2–8] objects 10 Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV’s Professional Infantry, The Musketeers (strel′tsy): A Note on Numbers,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30 (2017): 96–116.

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that the sources described the musketeer units as “new” and clearly distinguished them from gunners. Perhaps some gunners were recruited as musketeers, but the latter possessed a new organizational structure. The zolnierz were mercenaries, infantry and cavalry, not all of whom had guns, unlike the musketeers, all of whom were infantry and had guns. Lobin traces the musketeers to the Janissaries, although Muscovy copied not the Janissaries per se but the kapykulu, the sultan’s guards. The Italian merchant in Muscovy Tiepolo described the musketeers as Janissaries and the word “Janissaries” occurs in Muscovite sources of the time. Glaz′ev did not reply to Lobin. I do not know the evidence that the gunners at Kazan′ in 1550 were slaves. Unlike the Janissaries, the musketeers were not foreign-born slaves forcibly converted to Islam and originally required to be celibate. While some musketeers were not cavalry but did ride horses, they constituted mounted infantry. Of course, the Russians knew who the Janissaries were, but Tiepolo’s superficial impression merely reflected Russia’s oriental image. Russians could have learned about gunpowder infantry from both the Ottomans and the Poles/Lithuanians, but they did not directly copy the way either recruited or organized units of gunpowder infantry. Molochnikov [1–8] illuminates the fascinating use of “conscripts” (datochnye liudi), in this cases “black” (state) peasants, hunters who fought on skis in winter recruited in the north and fishermen who could travel by boat in the south in spring to block fords utilized by Crimean Tatar raiding parties. Younger relatives of taxpaying heads of household were paid for three-month tours of duty. Probably the maximum number in service at any one time was 5,000, at Molodi. Selivestrov’s comment [2–9], as Molochnikov rightly notes in his reply [2–10], is actually a full-fledged article on all conscripts who came from all classes, not just “black” peasants, and who could, unlike the skiers and sailors, hire substitutes or travel on horseback. Ivan’s military reforms, Selivestrov declares, concentrated all military authority in the hands of the tsar. Ambiguities in the sources create the impression that the terms conscripts, “auxiliary labor units” (pososhnye liudi, who transported supplies, built bridges, cut down trees to create roads, and so forth), “mobilized people” (zbornye liudi), and Cossacks (kazaki) were all applied to the same people. Selivestrov, while praising Molochnikov’s research, politely notes that he discussed only those conscripts who served on skis or in (river) boats and they all came from “black” peasants. His article did not discuss conscripts who did not serve on skis or on boats or all soldiers who served on skis (which included gentry, who outnumbered conscripts

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on skis in the 1563 Polotsk campaign) or on boats. Molochnikov found it impossible to agree that multiple terms all denoted the same people. Taken together, Molochnikov and Selivestrov demonstrate the social and military heterogeneity of Muscovite military personnel, the ubiquity of military service, and the match between military function and occupational background. It would have been helpful if both authors had explained the two meanings of kazak in sixteenth-century Muscovite sources, on the one hand free laborers among the peasants, who could be hired as substitutes for conscripts, and on the other “true” Cossacks, who could be hired permanently from the steppe individually as “state” Cossacks on salary, commanded by gentry officers,11 or temporarily as units commanded by their own atamans attached to Muscovite field armies. Kurbatov’s first article [1–9] contends that gentry cavalry tactics were modernized during Ivan’s reign. Gentry switched from skirmishes (travlia), hand-to-hand combat with sabers, spears (rogatiny), and lances (kop′e) to volley fire by bows. Special noncombatant servants carried the lances (which were longer than spears) in transit and when the gentry fought with other weapons, so only richer gentry could afford them. In the seventeenth century, volley fire by bows was replaced by volley fire by guns. Although Kurbatov calls this change in gentry cavalry tactics “modernization,” cavalry volley fire from bows had been the standard military tactic among Eurasian pastoral nomads for 1,000 years before the Mongols perfected the technique and used it to conquer Russia. In reply, Smirnov [2–11] cited evidence that a gentry-man could be accompanied by multiple servants with a lance, some with armor, so these soldiers were combatants. Kurbatov did not reply to Smirnov. Kurbatov’s second article [1–10] addresses the important question of the extent of the application of the provisions of the 1556 decree on service requiring landowners to supply one fully armed, mounted warrior for each 100 chetverti (135 acres) of land he owned or held as conditional-land (pomest′e) and whether those provisions remained effective or were repealed. According to the chronicle, the 100 chetverti standard was an innovation. However, the low profits of landed estates meant that gentry could buy horses and arms only from their monetary allotments or

11 Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV’s State Cossacks,” Journal of Military History 82 (2018): 357–71.

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from administrative appointments to “feedings” (kormlenie).12 Many gentry had too little land to support even one cavalryman, so the 1556 provision applied only to richer gentry, not the mass of provincial gentry. The 1556 Kashira muster alone reflects application of the 1556 decree standard. After 1556, muster rolls (desiatni) categorized service obligations not by the quantity of land held by a gentry-man but by the quantity of his monetary allotment. Money allotment replaced the landholding provision entirely in the early 1570s. Economically challenged southern gentry served only locally when their residential area was threatened and in less expensive occupations in field armies such as gunners or performed less costly functions such as intelligence gathering and garrison duty. The imposition of military service on gentry remained very unfair. Gentry with fewer than 100 chetverty of land still had to serve. The misdeeds of the oprichnina only made the situation worse. After the burning of Moscow in 1571, Ivan decided not to wait for another crisis to institute change. He replaced the land allotment provision with a money standard and authorized provincial gentry representatives to administer mobilization. Ivan de facto abolished the 1556 decree on service. Depopulation as a result of the economic crisis further depleted the value of land anyway, because there was no one to work it. Use of money allotments to determine service obligation returned to the practices of Vasilii III. Filiushkin praises Kurbatov’s discovery of the overlooked 1571–1573 reform of the decree on service as one of the biggest scholarly achievements of the anthology. Not everyone agreed. In his comment, Bentsianov [2–12] objected that Kurbatov based his conclusions too heavily upon evidence from the Novgorod region, which was not necessarily representative of the gentry elsewhere. Novgorod conditional-land holders did not have and did not need appointments to “feedings” to finance their military service. Cash allotments were too individual to be generalized. Later musters still used the amount of conditional land to determine service. Because there was insufficient land to assign to gentry it took decades for the 1556 decree to be implemented. Indeed the gap between quantity of land formally allotted and quantity of land actually allotted grew. In his comment, Penskoi [2–13] found Kurbatov’s analysis more persuasive, although he conceded that Bentsianov was correct to call attention to regional differences in gentry 12 Instead of a salary, a holder of a “feeding” received gratuitees and fees from the people he administered.

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landholding and service performance. Penskoi thought that the 1556 provisions might not have been that new. Something similar, borrowed from Lithuania, had previously applied in Pskov. On another point, Penskoi invoked the evidence of testaments to demonstrate that gentry were actively engaged in commercial activity from their estates. Besides which, money allocations were highly irregular. Kurbatov [2–14] took the remarks of both commentators seriously. Replying to Bentsianov, he insisted that Novgorod set the norm for all Muscovite gentry. Replying to Penskoi, he rejected the Pskov land-service nexus as situational and disputed any possibility, given their differing economic and social systems, of Lithuanian influence on Muscovite gentry service obligations. Kurbatov noted that the size of Muscovite field armies doubled between 1552 and 1563, which Ivan attributed to his own management. The 1556 reform certainly contributed to that development. However, the 1556 decree on service, Kurbatov insists, was not intended to be permanent for richer or poorer landowners, but constituted a maximum mobilization for a decisive blow against Livonia or Crimea, or even Lithuania. It was not well-thought-out, especially for poorer gentry. The abolition of the 1556 standard coincided with the oprichnina. Ivan liquidated the 1556 decree and the oprichnina simultaneously as a result of the Crimean burning of Moscow in 1571. Regional differences make generalizing about the gentry exceedingly difficult. Even if numerically the Novgorod gentry dominated the gentry class as a whole, it does not mean that Moscow imposed the same policies it used in Novgorod on gentry elsewhere. Despite Bentsianov Novgorod gentry were just as prone to poverty and debt as gentry elsewhere. Traditional scholarship, pace Kurbatov, considers the single most significant feature of the 1556 decree to be its mandating service for owners of patrimonies, not just holders of conditional-land grants. Bentsianov mentions that feature of the decree only in passing. Russia was not the only country in which all landowners owed an obligation to serve proportionate to their landed wealth or served voluntarily, but no historian discussing the 1556 decree offers a comparative perspective on its provisions. There is considerable evidence to support Penskoi’s reference to the commercial activities of the gentry quite apart from testaments. Records of land purchases and money donations to monasteries attest that many gentry disposed of significant amounts of discretionary money which could hardly have come from state monetary allotments, which were not only irregular but frequently, like land allotments, well below the official allocation

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amount.13 Questions of the military and social history of the gentry cavalry thus depend upon analysis of the economic history of Russia during Ivan’s reign, a point well understood by Kurbatov, Bentsianov, and Penskoi. The existence of two parallel systems of material support of servitors, by land and money, occasions no dissent, but Kurbatov’s schema of the chronology of their interaction may be too logical or may simplify very unsystematic and ever-changing practice. Kurbatov’s analysis assigns full agency for the 1556 and 1571–1573 reforms in service obligations to Ivan alone. He treats Ivan’s decision-making process as contradictory: the abolition of the 1556 decree was far better thought out that its issuance. Certainly, the government in the 1550s propagated both temporary (the abolition of precedence in the 1550 Kazan′ campaign) and presumably permanent (the promulgation of the 1550 law code) measures. However, Kurbatov assumes that Ivan in 1556 was already contemplating another major military endeavor whose possible objective remained to be determined. Implicitly, Kurbatov gives credence to the traditional but questionable view that the Muscovite elite debated whether to invade Livonia or Crimea. Ivan’s motives for the 1558 Livonia invasion remain very much in question, but we know that Muscovite diplomats tried to prevent intervention in Livonia by other Baltic powers. Whether Ivan or anyone involved could have anticipated that invading Livionia would inaugurate a quarter-century of warfare and would involve Lithuania remains unknowable. Nothing in the 1556 decree suggests that it was a temporary measure, unlike the Forbidden Years of the 1580s. Kurbatov does not address the purpose of the oprichnina. If the Crimean burning of Moscow convinced Ivan that the oprichnina had to be abolished then he could have thought either that it had failed in its purpose (per Khoroshkevich to pursue the Livonian War) or that in accomplishing or trying to accomplish that purpose (dealing with treason, for example) it had created other problems for national security. The connection of the 1571 catastrophe to the abolition of the decree on service of 1556 seems clearer but is not. Perhaps the latter had not guaranteed mobilization of sufficient troops to prevent Crimean forces from reaching Moscow, but that failure might also have been the result of an inadequate intelligence system, which Ivan was in the process of revising, or of poor military decisions. In any event, in the early 1570s, after five years of the oprichnina, Kurbatov’s 13 Charles J. Halperin, “Lay Cash Land Purchases during the Reign of Ivan IV,” JbfGOE 65 (2017): 177–99; idem, “Lay Donations to the Trinity Sergius Monastery during the Reign of Ivan IV,” Slavonic and East European Review 95 (2017): 271–92.

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Ivan was still capable of making significant and decisive decisions about national issues based upon the course of events. This Ivan is a realist: if it doesn’t work, change it. Smirnov [1–11] creates thirteen tables to corroborate his analysis of military “servants” (boevye slugi, which he prefers to the usual phrase, military slaves [kholopy]) in the conditional-land gentry cavalry. He posits that it is impossible to rule out that the 1556 decree on service specifying standards for gentry to be accompanied by military servants was an innovation (agreeing with Kurbatov). He notes an anomaly of the 100 chetverty standard (in addition to the anomaly mentioned above, that gentry with less than the minimum land still had to serve) in that gentry owning/holding over 100 chetverty but fewer than 200 did not owe service by a second cavalryman. He notes the inconsistency in the sources about enforcing the norms for equipping cavalry in the decree. He also agrees with Kurbatov that some servants were weapons carriers. The ratio of military servitors to gentry in different sources varied considerably. Gentry musters sometimes met the 1556 standard, sometimes exceeded it, and sometimes failed to meet it. The fighting capacity of the Russian army fell during the Livonian War, but at the end of the war military servants were better equipped than the gentry as a whole because rich gentry funded the military servants but poor gentry constituted a large segment of the total gentry. By that time, the number of combat servants outnumbered the number of gentry because so many gentry had so little land that they were not obligated to equip a military servant. Without saying so, Smirnov’s use of sources entails that the 1556 standard continued to apply after Kurbatov proposes that it had been repealed. The number of military servants in a Muscovite field army is a central issue in the continuing debate over the size of the Russian army during Ivan’s reign.14 It is unfortunate that no one commented on Smirnov’s article. All the contributors to Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo address important questions in sixteenth-century Russian military history, but no one directly grappled with the biggest question of all, Ivan’s overall role in Muscovy’s wars during his adulthood. Ivan’s presence on the throne is sometimes felt rather than seen. For example, all contributors seem to share an unspoken opinion that the Livonian War, because Muscovy 14 “Forum / Disputatio,” Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 1–2 (2009): 120–50; M. M. Krom, “Eshche raz o chislennosti russkogo voiska v XVI v. (Po povodu stat′i A. N. Lobina),” ibid., 79–90.

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lost, and the oprichnina were catastrophes. Apparently, the causes of the Livonian War, let alone the oprichnina, fell outside the scope of the anthology (as diplomatic or political history, rather than military?). The image or rather images of Ivan that emerge from the anthology are contradictory, even in the contributions of the same author. Volodikhin does not ask if the attrition of high command officers was “normal” or the result of Ivan’s policies, or whether Ivan should have adjusted his policy to the paucity of reserve officer talent. If Filiushkin is correct that Ivan’s amateur soldiers were no match for Batory’s professional mercenaries, shouldn’t Ivan have appreciated that fact and saved Russian lives in a losing cause by avoiding war with Batory?15 In criticizing Volodikhin, Kurbatov considers Ivan’s repressive measures irrational and inconsistent. In his first article, he does not explicitly attribute the change in gentry cavalry tactics to Ivan, yet in the second military reformer Ivan reacted decisively, rationally, and pragmatically to the burning of Moscow by repealing the 1556 decree and abolishing the oprichnina. Kurbatov does not ask how rational or pragmatic Ivan’s motives were for launching the Livonian War or establishing the oprichnina. In 1556, per Kurbatov, Ivan did not think through the temporary measure he took to maximize mobilization of Russian military resources, but he was already planning ahead for major strategic move in 1558. Penskoi’s Ivan acquiesced to the appointment of high social status generals with low military competence to command positions in field armies to be kept on a short leash by administrative staff members with no combat experience. Glaz′ev’s Ivan pragmatically and competently orders the creation of musketeer units to solve a problem, rain and gunpowder, which it would not solve. Selivestrov does not explain whether Ivan’s concentration of military authority in his own hands proved propitious. Furthermore, Selivestrov overlooks the persistence of military units, both gentry cavalry and musketeers, under the command of serving princes and appanage princes, at least for a while, and of ecclesiastical institutions. In short, no coherent or consistent image of Ivan’s military skills emerges from Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo, perhaps because 15 In his monograph Filiushkin labels Ivan a tyrant and a despot and assigns virtually all military decisions to him. Ivan made many mistakes. Filiushkin insists that Ivan’s evil deeds have overshadowed the personal courage and the high tactical skill of Russian commanders and diminished Russian military victories, especially Ivan’s successful policies toward the east. The “negative characterization” of Ivan, “very often deserved, has been extended to the results of his strategy.” Filjushkin, Ivan the Terrible. A Military History, 243, 258–59.

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like Ivan’s personality and his reign, his military aptitude was neither comprehensive nor consistent. Unlike general textbooks and surveys of Russian history, the contributors to Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo do not all agree on a critical evaluation of Ivan of varying degrees. Although no one wrote an apology for Ivan, some comments would fall in the positive rubric, not just the critical or hostile rubrics, although some authors seem likely candidates for the conflicted rubric for assigning contradictory qualities to Ivan for different decisions. Political affairs intrude into analyses of military history, in assignments of officers and strategic decisions, and the authors evaluated in chapter 1, some of whom appear in this chapter as well, included military affairs in their research, so Ivan the Generalissimo cannot be isolated from Ivan the Tsar. As ever, Ivan’s paradoxical personality and policies defy neat schematization.

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Eisenstein’s Ivan, Neuberger’s Ivan, Ivan’s Ivan

In criticizing advocates of Ivan’s canonization, Bishop Dionisii (Alferov) wrote that Karamzin, who shows that the evil of the second phase of the tsar’s reign wiped out any good accomplished in the first phase, was closer to the truth about Ivan than Eisenstein’s pseudo-historical film, whose falsification of history he equates with that of other cultural products of the Stalin cult, A. N. Tolstoi’s play and V. I. Kostylev’s novel.1 Although all Russians do not agree with this interpretation of Sergei Eisenstein’s classic film Ivan the Terrible,2 Bishop Dionisii’s comment illustrates the continued relevance of the film for Russian historical memory of Ivan since 1991. Joan Neuberger’s long-awaited monograph on Eisenstein’s Ivan Groznyi3 has engaged the active interest of specialists in Soviet cultural history and film studies.4 In her analysis of the film, Neuberger applies both historical and film studies methodologies. She brilliantly integrates 1 Bishop Dionisii, “Monarkhiia i khristianskoe soznanie,” 144–48. 2 In Alexander Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, trans. Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley (New York: Praeger, 1963), 97, prisoner K-123 responds to a description of Eisenstein as a genius and the film as a masterpiece by declaring that “the politics of it is villainous, a vile vindication of a one-man tyranny” and that Eisenstein “carried out orders like a dog.” 3 Joan Neuberger, This Thing of Darkness: Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019). Page references to the book will be given in parentheses in the text. 4 At the 2019 Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies Convention in San Francisco, on November 25 the book was the subject of a roundtable chaired by

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Eisenstein’s theories of film with his practice when making Ivan Groznyi. She also pays considerable attention to historical analysis (2, 72–122), not the historical accuracy of the film, which Eisenstein defended, “despite the film’s almost comically egregious historical distortions” (77), but how Eisenstein used history and how the film reflects the Soviet conception of Ivan’s reign at the time of its production. Neuberger also relates Eisenstein’s concept of Ivan to subsequent historiography on Ivan. This chapter will not address purely film studies questions, such the use of color, shadow, music, or acting or interpretations of the film as autobiographical or about Stalin. I will comment on a number of aspects of the film related to history, especially Neuberger’s overall assessment of Eisenstein’s image of Ivan. This Thing of Darkness is not a monograph on Ivan, but on Eisenstein’s movie about the man. Of necessity, to compare Eisenstein’s Ivan to the historical Ivan, Neuberger has to assume the existence of a base narrative of tsar’s reign, although she knows full well that there is no consensus among early modern Russian historians about him.5 Nor would it be fair to expect Neuberger to have mastered the vast scholarship on Ivan that has appeared since Eisenstein completed his film. Finally, any analysis of Eisenstein’s film is complicated by the fact that we are confronting “a film6 butchered by censorship and self-censorship, that was produced under the terrible privations of war and that was eventually abandoned unfinished by its creator” (336). It does not help that Eisenstein went out of his way to obscure the meaning of its content.7 Eisenstein’s liberties with the historical Ivan are well known and will be mentioned below only when relevant. Neuberger does not correct all of the director’s historical errors and commits some of her own but identifying David Brandenberger. Anne Nesbet, Karen Petrone, Kevin M. P. Platt, and Yuri Tsivian joined Neuberger as members of the roundtable. 5 For example she notes that Edward Keenan challenged the authenticity of some of the most important documents about Ivan, his correspondence with renegade boyar Prince Andrei Kurbsky, but concludes that “intensive research since has largely reaffirmed their authenticity” (77n16). 6 Eisenstein eventually envisioned “the” film as a trilogy. Part 1 was finished and shown, part 2 was finished and banned, part 3 was never finished and much of what had been filmed was destroyed. Nevertheless it is convenient to refer to the film. 7 Joan Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” in Russian Cinema Reader, vol. 1, 1908 to the Stalin era, ed. Rimgaila Salys (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2013), 270: “Eisenstein made the film difficult to read for three reasons: to convey the contradictions in human nature, to defeat censorship, and to defy the conventions of Socialist Realism by raising hard questions without clear answers.”

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these passages would interest specialists in sixteenth-century Muscovite history more than readers wishing to learn more about Ivan in Russian historical memory. For the benefit of the former, I have relegated discussion of such issues to appendix 11.1. After discussing in no particular order a number of discrete issues in This Thing of Darkness that raise issues of historical content and interpretation, I will engage the major conclusions of Neuberger’s stimulating monograph.

Sadism One of the key questions about Eisenstein’s film according to Neuberger is “How does an innocent, vulnerable child become a sadistic, bloody tyrant?” (3). The tragedy of Ivan’s reign was not his sadism (104). Ivan’s sadism was a distinctly un-Machiavellian trait. Eisenstein in his notes describes Ivan’s emotions as he watches the procession of deputees from Moscow to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda, who are going to ask him to resume the throne, as “sadistic” (105). “Eisenstein tells us that we should see sadism in Ivan’s eyes in this scene, the same sadism Ivan will put into words and deeds later on.” (145). The “words” Eisenstein had in mind are Ivan’s comment on the execution of Kolychev boyars: “[T]oo few” (147). In part 3, Ivan eliminates enemies “in particularly cruel fashion” (151). This widely held accusation of sadism against Ivan in Eisenstein’s film8 is problematic, but not because the term “sadist” had not yet been invented until the Marquis de Sade’s behavior of the eighteenth century. How the audience perceives a work of art is not necessarily what the artist intended, so Eisenstein’s interpretation of his scenario and the filmed scenes does not by itself suffice to verify Ivan’s sadism in the film. The look on Ivan’s face as the procession9 approaches Aleksandrovskaia sloboda to appeal to him to return to the throne is one of arrogant satisfaction (undeniably he has demagogically manipulated the people) that his political ploy is succeeding, not sadism. Ivan’s remark after the beheading of the Kolychevs also 8 For example, David Elliot, “Taking A Line for A Dance,” in Eisenstein at Ninety, ed. Ian Christie and David Eliot (Oxford: Museum of Modern Art, 1988), 27, 39; Mikael Enckell, “A Study in Scarlet: Film and Psychoanalysis (2),” in Eisenstein Revisited: A Collection of Essays, ed. Lars Kleberg and Håkan Lövgren (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1987), 128. 9 It is inaccurate to state that the people “abdicated” their own authority to Ivan (Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 282). In sixteenth-century Muscovy, the people had no authority.

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demonstrates satisfaction but accompanied by frustration that more of his enemies remained at large.10 This is political calculation, not sadism. How do we define “sadism”? Not by the commission of cruel acts in and of themselves. Sadism is the enjoyment of cruelty, emotional pleasure at causing and watching human suffering. Do we “see” sadism in Ivan’s eyes in either scene? The members of the procession are not being tortured. In the film, Ivan’s reaction to his supposedly “sadistic” acts, as Neuberger repeatedly reminds us, is remorse, not pleasure. Potentially, Eisenstein might have shown Ivan to be a sadist in part 3 when he orders Fedor Basmanov to kill his father, which certainly sounds like a sadistic thing to do. Unfortunately, we would need to see how Eisenstein filmed the scene to draw such a conclusion. The expression on Ivan’s face as he watched son murder his father would tell all. Accusations of sadism (in concept, not in name) abound in contemporary sixteenth-century sources about the historical Ivan by Muscovite (Kurbskii) and foreigner alike. They illustrate Ivan’s sadism via two kinds of acts: first, the use of torture; and second, particularly vicious forms of capital punishment. Soviet censors would never have let Eisenstein show Ivan torturing people, but regardless of the reason, there are no scenes of torture in his film. This starkly contrasts Eisenstein’s film to an earlier silent film, Iurii Tarich’s Wings of a Serf (1926)11 and Pavel Lungin’s post-Soviet Tsar′ (2008). Neither could Eisenstein have depicted “exotic” forms of capital punishment, such as impalement, which were also attributed with more accuracy to the historical Ivan. The account of the punitive campaign against Novgorod clearly testifies to mass murder, but not necessarily sadistic mass murder, as in the contemporary narrative tale of Ivan’s actions in which victims are drowned. Eisenstein omits the sadistic Red Square torture and executions of 1570, which took place after the campaign against Novgorod but which figure in Lungin’s Tsar′. Neuberger astutely observes that “Eisenstein’s depiction of Ivan’s reign is curiously far less bloody than 10 Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 290 interprets Ivan’s remark to signify that “Ivan’s animal instinct for vengeance will give him no rest.” Is vengeance an animal or human instinct? 11 Kevin M. F. Platt, “Gothic Ivan the Terrible in the 1920s: Iurii Tarich’s Wings of a Serf and the Curious Case of Ignatii Strelletskii,” Russian Literature 106 (2019): 33–60, here 37–44. (Neuberger [88] refers to Platt’s conference paper, without giving the title, and of course without indicating its future publication. Although apparently Wings of a Serf is the standard translation of the film’s title, Kryl′ia kholopa should be translated as “Wings of a Slave.” Serfdom had not yet been established in Muscovy during Ivan’s reign.)

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either the historical Ivan’s or Stalin’s” (193), which needs to be taken into account in evaluating Ivan’s sadism.

Tyranny The above quotation on Ivan’s sadism also refers to Ivan as a “tyrant,” a concept that could be the subject of more extended discussion. Definitions of a tyrant differ, but certainly one aspect of a tyrant is that he punishes the innocent. In Eisenstein’s film everyone Ivan punishes is guilty.12 The most, the worst, that one could say is that Ivan’s punishments are too harsh, making him cruel, but not necessarily tyrannical.13

Paranoia Sometimes Neuberger refers to Ivan’s paranoia directly, sometimes she quotes secondhand reference to his paranoia, and sometimes she takes it for granted in questioning whether a particular action by Ivan may be attributed to his paranoia (124, 151, 295). The term “paranoia” was not employed in the sixteenth century, so the concept appears as suspiciousness in the sources. It is also ubiquitous in the historiography about the historical Ivan. Eisenstein’s presentation calls into question Ivan’s paranoia. At the time of Ivan’s coronation, Neuberger writes that everyone is his enemy (22). Yet she also notes contradictorily that the coronation was attended by boyars who supported him, not just boyars who opposed him. She complicates the contradiction by asserting that only Anastasiia and a group of women at the coronation were not angry at Ivan’s speech denouncing the boyars and the church (135), as if the boyars who supported him were also angry. The scenario notes that Ivan has friends at the coronation, including his fiancée’s relatives. Neuberger criticizes Ivan for not being paranoid enough. 12 Felix Lenz, “Organizing Pictures: The Master’s House and Cinema: A Public Affairs,” in The Flying Carpet: Studies on Eisenstein and Russian Cinema in Honor of Naum Kleiman, ed. Joan Neuberger and Antonio Somaini (Sesto San Giovanni: Éditions Mimésis, 2017), 209–10, refers to the “passion” of Ivan’s murdered adversaries as martyrs, like Vakulinchuk in Potemkin. However, Ivan’s victims are villains, not revolutionary heroes. 13 Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 270 argues that the film’s plot “depicts the events in Ivan’s life in ways that simultaneously seem to praise Ivan as a visionary leader, to damn him as a brutal tyrant, and to sympathize with him as a tragic, divided and lonely man.” Note the qualification (“seem to”).

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Out of clan feeling, he refuses for a long time to believe that the Staritskie are plotting against him, let alone that Evfrosiniia poisoned Anastasiia, and he is also slow to recognize the disloyalty of Kurbskii and the Basmanovs.14 Eisenstein’s Ivan always has allies, even if some of them eventually betray him. Everyone Ivan suspects, including the boyars, clerics, and the people of Novgorod, participates in conspiracies to sabotage his policies or murder him or his wife. If everyone (or nearly everyone) is out to get Ivan, should Ivan be diagnosed as “paranoid” for thinking that everyone was out to get him?15

Who Is Revolutionary? Neuberger refers to the mob that invades Ivan’s wedding as a “revolutionary rabble” (21). She highlights the “tsar’s evolution from young, energetic, revolutionary leader to vengeful, murderous tyrant” (79). She refers to the “results of revolutionary change” (80) in Russia under Ivan. On the other hand, Neuberger points out that, according to Eisenstein, atavistic clan feeling by boyars precluded carrying out a revolution (93) and that the historical Ivan’s and Eisenstein’s oprichnina “failed to eradicate class hierarchy” (99). All revolutions, the director proposes, are doomed by cycles of violence (100), including presumably Eisenstein’s Ivan’s revolution. The allusion to the “revolutionary rabble” greatly exaggerates the rioters’ political consciousness. They were complaining about witchcraft, not class oppression. Actually, they had been manipulated by Evfrosiniia Staritskaia and the boyars to riot in order to weaken Ivan and restore boyar privilege, but except for the boyar flunky and phoney holy fool Nikola they do not know that. Elsewhere, Neuberger writes that the odd-looking Nikola, wrapped in chains, resembles the “stock image of a heroic Revolutionaryera proletarian.”16 Chains are an appropriate attire for a true holy fool, but Nikola’s character makes him less a heroic proletarian than a deceitful provocateur.

14 Cf. Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia, 162 (Vipper’s comment on the screenplay). 15 David Bordwell, The Cinema of Eisenstein (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 233 tries to finesse this problem by writing that Eisenstein presents Ivan’s paranoia in a sympathetic light because everyone is out to get him. 16 Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 279–80.

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Whether the oprichnina constituted a social revolution, whether the historical Ivan or Eisenstein’s Ivan sought to overthrow the social dominance of the boyars by replacing them with commoners, requires further elucidation. Historically, Ivan did not try to do so. The social composition of the oprichnina matched that of the royal court of the non-oprichnina “land.” Eisenstein makes it appear that Ivan favors a social revolution by transforming his favorites and oprichniki the Basmanovs and Skuratov into commoners, whereas historically they belonged to the gentry. The Basmanovs want to replace the boyars, not overthrow the social hierarchy, an ambition that leads them to betray Ivan. However, this does not apply to Skuratov, who remained loyal. In his coronation speech, Ivan declares his intention to end the evil rule of the boyars but not to destroy them as a class. His program is reformist, not revolutionary. Later, he realizes that he has to eliminate the men who are currently boyars. Eisenstein does not show us Ivan destroying whole boyar families, as the historical Ivan did by executing women and children or sending them to monasteries and convents. The tsar defines the oprichniki by their loyalty, not their social origin. At the banquet leading to Prince Vladimir Staritskii’s murder, Basmanov criticizes Ivan for fraternizing with the Staritskie and the “landowners.” By “landowners,” Basmanov must mean the boyars, but no boyars attend that banquet. Ivan objects to Basmanov’s disrespect for the tsar’s relative—Staritskii. Ivan may be doing two things here—putting Basmanov in his place, and aiding and abetting his deception of Staritskii, whom he is setting up, not fraternizing with. In terms of narrative, this scene sets the stage for the later split between the Basmanovs and Ivan.17 In the film, the purpose of the oprichnina is to punish traitors, whether boyars, clerics, or commoners. Eisenstein’s Ivan never proposes a social or political revolution in Russia.

Ivan’s Religious Identity Neuberger impugns Ivan’s religious beliefs by referring to the scene in part 3 in which Ivan nearly strangles his confessor Evstafii with the chain that held his crucifix (52). Neuberger’s interpretation of this scene omits Ivan’s motivation. He has just learned that Evstafii is actually the last remaining 17 Cf. ibid., 291–92.

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member of the boyar Kolychev clan who has been hiding in plain sight by worming his way into Ivan’s confidence as his spiritual father and who is actually a boyar spy conniving at the revolt in Novgorod planned by Pimen to coincide with a Polish invasion led by Kurbskii. Ivan’s treatment of a priest-traitor, like that of a metropolitan-traitor or archbishop-traitor, should not be confused with his confessional identity, discussed in chapter 12.

The Oprichnik Oath According to Neuberger, the oprichnik “dark oath,” a scene not included in the eventual film, is an “unequivocal” portrayal of Ivan as Anti-Christ. The spy/traitor Staden takes the oath, entailing an “inherently inevitable entrapment in betrayal” because it required oprichniki to renounce their family ties. The Basmanovs fell into this trap (144). Ivan “plays both Christ and Anti-Christ” (172). “To some extent,” Neuberger concludes, Eisenstein anticipated recent research on the significance of the apocalypse in Muscovite political culture during Ivan’s reign. Only flimsy evidence suggests that Ivan plays Anti-Christ. Whether the non-Orthodox Staden could take the oprichnik oath remains uncertain. Valerie Kivelson advanced a suitably qualified suggestion that the oath echoes satanic oaths which might assign the role of Anti-Christ to Ivan. In the film, Metropolitan Filipp accuses Ivan of serving the Devil, AntiChrist,18 and in history Kurbskii accused one of Ivan’s minions, probably Alexei Basmanov, of being the Beast of the Apocalypse. However, there is no way the historical Ivan intended in any shape, manner, or form to suggest that he was serving Satan, and there was nothing inevitable about oprichniki violating their oath. Skuratov did not.19 I wonder at the resonance of imagery of the Anti-Christ in an officially atheist state. Specialists do not agree on the apocalyptic mood of the historical Ivan’s epoch.

18 Ibid., 287 claims that Ivan’s sacrilegious assertion that he created the oprichniki in his own image lends credence to Filipp’s accusation. James Goodwin, Eisenstein, Cinema and History (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 199, 203 asserts that Ivan’s reign is like Anti-Christ’s, that Ivan’s “political world is a godless autocracy.” 19 Joan Neuberger, “Not a Film but A Nightmare: Revisiting Stalin’s Response to Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, Part II,” Kritika 19 (2018): 137 concludes that the oprichniki in the film were “for the most part loyal to Ivan.”

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Ivan as God Does Ivan play God? Neuberger quotes Naum Kleiman, the leading Russian specialist on Eisenstein, that Ivan fell into Hell like Lucifer. Ivan tried to replace God, he wanted to be God (151). Ivan “aims to become a God,” but fails because he is human. He “ultimately challenges God himself ” (181). Similar accusations exist in scholarship on the film.20 If Kleiman and Neuberger have correctly interpreted Ivan’s actions as the ultimate arrogance of self-deification, then Eisenstein’s portrayal of Ivan qualifies as exceptionally negative, and ironically so, because in an officially atheistic state God could not exist. Eisenstein’s and the historical Ivan undoubtedly committed blasphemy. The pseudo-monastic oprichnina brotherhood, even if we presume only the very minimum of knowledge about it, non-monks dressed like monks who engaged in violence, was nothing if not blasphemous. Unlike medieval Catholicism, Orthodoxy never sanctioned bishops engaging in battle or the creation of crusader monk orders. Ivan acted “like” God: God created man, Ivan created oprichniki. But this comparison is metaphorical, not literal. Ivan’s autocracy derived from divine grace. Lucifer attempted to take over Heaven. In the film, Ivan questions God’s refusal to grant him absolution, he defies God, he might even be said to curse God, but he never forgets, as the historical Ivan never forgot, that he would be answerable to God on the Day of Judgment. His laments sound more like Job than Mephistopheles. Neither Eisenstein’s Ivan nor the historical Ivan succumbed to self-deification.

Ivan and Skuratov According to Neuberger, Ivan in the film was indifferent to the only servitor who was loyal to him to the very end—Skuratov. Ivan abandons him to die on the battlefield because he was mesmerized by his approach to the

20 Jay Leyda and Zina Voynow, Eisenstein at Work (London: Methuen, 1987), 136 (as the God of Sabaoth Ivan conducts the Last Judgment), 144 (Ivan turns back the waves of the sea like Christ upon the waters); Håkan Lövgren, Eisenstein’s Labyrinth: Aspects of a Cinematic Synthesis of the Arts (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1996), 32n42 (Ivan as martyr, victim, and Christ), 110, 155 (Ivan as false tsar, pretender, and Anti-Christ).

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sea (210–11). In the film script, the tsar carries the dying Skuratov on a stretcher to a hilltop in order to see and smell the sea before he dies.21

Anastasiia According to Neuberger, in the film Anastasiia loves Kurbskii.22 Kurbskii and Anastasiia flirt behind the throne at the wedding (136). The passive Anastasiia is “Ivan’s first and unquestionably loyal supporter,” except for her attraction to Kurbskii. Even if she is tempted, she never gives in (217). Her “fatal flaw” is her attraction to Kurbskii (219). She faints when she hears that Kurbskii had defected because he is “the man she truly loves,” whereas Ivan thinks of her as “the only person left in the world he can trust” (163). “While Anastasiia flirts with Kurbskii throughout Part I, she repeatedly rejects him” (200). Anastasiia is “angry and terrified” at Kurbskii’s marriage proposal if Ivan dies. Anastasiia’s innocence is impugned when she faints at the news of Kurbskii’s defeat and treason (270).23 Eisenstein’s portrayal of Anastasiia is, of course, entirely fiction. She was never linked romantically to Kurbskii. She could hardly faint at the news of Kurbskii’s defection in 1564 when she died in 1560. The question is not whether Eisenstein created an imaginary Anastasiia in the film, but how that creation resonated with Eisenstein’s image of Ivan. That Anastasiia flirts with Kurbskii cannot be denied, but her other actions impugn the conclusion that she was in love with him. True, even an “innocent” flirtation is certainly inappropriate for the tsar’s fiancée. The strongest evidence against her love for Kurbskii is the look of rapt adoration on her face when she watches Ivan’s coronation. It is the glowing glance of 21 Sergei Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, trans. A. E. Ellis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 263–64. 22 Ditto Jacques Aumont, Montage Eisenstein, trans. Lee Hildreth et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 137, 139. Comparing the women’s quarters in the Kremlin, the terem, to the harem (ibid., 118) overlooks Russian monogamy and the absence of concubines. 23 Cf. Joan Neuberger, “Eisenstein’s Cosmopolitan Kremlin: Drag Queens, Circus Clowns, Slugs, and Foreigners in Ivan the Terrible,” in Insiders and Outsiders in Russian Cinema, ed. Stephen M. Norris and Zara M. Torlone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 87: “Anastasia is more mother than lover to Ivan, and while she too loves Kurbskii, she denies herself in order to support her husband and his great cause.” At his wedding, Ivan does not kiss her as a man kisses his mother. She does give birth to Ivan’s son. Anastasiia is not Ilsa Lund, Ivan is not Victor Laszlo, and most of all Kurbskii is not Rick Blaine.

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a woman in love with the man she is viewing.24 The strongest evidence that she has feelings for Kurbskii is her fainting at the news of his defection. Eisenstein is never cavalier, arbitrary, or careless in creating the fictional elements of his narrative. Everyone admits that he invents the “love triangle” of Ivan, Kurbskii, and Anastasiia to heighten the personal element of Ivan’s relationship to Kurbskii. Typically, but frustratingly, Eisenstein provides no clues as to why Anastasiia faints, so the inference that she is in love with Kurbskii, or at least has some affection for him, cannot be dismissed out of hand. In theory, she could have be shocked that an old friend of Ivan’s had betrayed him, but it is pure speculation that she would faint as a result. My lingering, perhaps unjustified, qualms at accepting this theory of Anastasiia’s love of Kurbskii derive from its unexplored implications for Eisenstein’s conception of Ivan. Ivan trusts Anastasiia completely and grieves for her death severely. If she does not love him, then she cuckolds him emotionally, or, to put it another way, he is just another man blinded by love. Presenting the tsar as love’s fool would be melodramatic and simplistic, not what we would expect from Eisenstein. If Anastasiia loves Kurbskii, that would mock Ivan’s love for her and demeans his mourning. That Kurbskii and Filipp fool Ivan, even that the Basmanovs fool him, is one thing, but that Anastasiia does so is another. That Anastasiia’s love for Kurbskii is her “fatal flaw” seems misstated. She does not die because she loves Kurbskii. She is murdered because she marries Ivan.

Ivan’s Illness Ivan’s seemingly fatal illness and the resulting conflict over the succession are crucial elements in the film’s plot. Neuberger writes that everyone was surprised at Ivan’s recovery from a fatal illness. She asserts that there are “a 24 Joan Neuberger, “The Music of Landscape: Eisenstein, Prokofiev, and the Uses of Music in Ivan the Terrible,” in Sound, Speech, Music in Soviet and Post-Soviet Cinema, ed. Lilya Kaganovsky and Masha Salazkina (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 223, Anastasiia gazes at Ivan in the “familiarly worshipful way in socialist realism that people look at Stalin.” Mike O’Mahoney, Sergei Eisenstein (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), 185 views this scene differently. Anastasiia modestly covers her eyes when looking at Ivan but “boldly and knowingly” returns Kurbskii’s flirtatious looks. Mary Peatman, “Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible as a Cinematic Realization of the Concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1975 [which is not in Neuberger’s bibliography]), 101, observes that Kurbskii’s “obvious interest” in Anastasiia is “not totally unrequited either.”

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number of contradictory clues that ask us . . . whether he is indeed ill or whether he is faking it to test the boyars” (137). I have long resisted this interpretation of the deathbed scene. Of course, Ivan is testing the boyars, but I thought that he was doing so because he was actually ill, like the historical Ivan, although the historical validity of the bedroom debates is highly contested. The strongest argument that he is faking remains his miraculous recovery. I am now prepared to concede that, even if the clues are “contradictory,” they are very strong. At one point, Ivan, lying in bed, looks around the room with total lucidity, as if measuring the actions of the people there.25 Eisenstein describes the scene as Ivan’s “fake death,” so this interpretation represents the director’s intentions,26 although as always in film one may question whether a filmed scene actually achieves the director’s intentions. I would still raise questions about the implications of treating Ivan’s illness as completely phony. Ivan has no reason to test Anastasiia. Instead, in pursuit of his political goals, he puts her through hell, terrifying her with the risk to the life of their baby son. This is gratuitously and maliciously cruel. In addition, we know that Ivan took communion, off-camera evidently, because he explicitly attributes his recovery to the Holy Sacrament. Logically, communion had to be preceded by, in effect, deathbed confession. Ivan sometimes denied his victims the opportunity to confess and take communion before their execution, which effectively sentenced them to hell. If Ivan is faking illness, then his confession would be as fraudulent as the pretense that he is mortally ill. Ivan could hardly “confess” that 25 For different formulations compare Nikita Lary, “Eisenstein’s (Anti-) Theatrical Art, From Kino-Fist to Kino-Tragedy,” Slavic and East European Arts 6, no. 2 (1990): 120; idem, “Eiseinstein and Shakespeare,” in Eisenstein Rediscovered, ed. Ian Christie and Richard Taylor (London: Routledge, 1993), 135; O’Mahoney, Sergei Eisenstein, 179; Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia, 168; Yuri Tsivian, Ivan the Terrible: Ivan Groznyi (London: British Film Institute, 2002), 19, 21, 40; Alexander Zholkovsky, “Eisenstein’s Poetics: Dialogical or Totalitarian?,” in Laboratory of Dreams: the Russian Avant-Garde and Cultural Experiment, ed. John E. Bowlt and Olga Matich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 251; Vladislav Mendelevich Tsukerman, “Dvoinaia ‘myshelovka’ ili Samoubiistvo fil′mom,” in S. M. Eizenshtein: Pro et Contra. Sergei Eizenshtein v otechestvennom refleksii. Antologiia, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Izdatel′stvo Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii, 2015), 649; Mira Borisovna Meilakh, Izobrazitel′naia stilistika pozdnikh fil′mov Eizenshteina (Leningrad: Iskusstvo, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1971), 140–41. 26 Joan Neuberger, “Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible as History,” Journal of Modern History 86 (2014), 308; Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia, 149, 155, 168.

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he is making a mockery of the clergy, who seek to avoid Ivan’s anticipated demise with prayers, hymns, and candles.27 Most of the questions I have raised about Neuberger’s finite characterizations of Ivan and episodes in the film arrive at negative conclusions. Eisenstein’s Ivan should not be described as sadistic, paranoid, revolutionary, a tyrant, irreligious, Satanic or Anti-Christ, disloyal (to Skuratov), or self-deifying.28 Accepting the conclusions that Anastasiia loves Kurbskii and Ivan fakes his illness raise issues that require further exploration. We now turn to the major concepts underlying Neuberger’s This Thing of Darkness: surface narrative and the role of emotion and abstraction as motives for Ivan’s actions. These concepts constitute the foundation of Neuberger’s interpretation of Eisenstein’s characterization of Ivan the Terrible in Ivan the Terrible.

Surface Narrative The central conclusion of Neuberger’s analysis is the contrast between the “surface narrative” of Ivan the Terrible and its subtext. Using all of the methodologies of film studies, Neuberger builds a powerful case not based upon a comparison of Eisenstein’s Ivan to the historical Ivan but on the multiple levels of the film. However, Neuberger actually offers two definitions of the “surface narrative.” I will contend that the second definition better fits the film. According to the first conception of the surface narrative, Ivan successfully defended Russia against her very real and very destructive domestic enemies. Ivan’s actions were politically necessary to unite the country. However, the negative subtext of the film destroys that positive surface narrative. Indeed, Ivan’s extreme and gratuitous violence to achieve his goals destroys the country and Ivan himself. The following passages illustrate this thesis: Eisenstein constructed a surface narrative that was politically acceptable . . . and then proceeded to saturate that narrative with misdirection, contradiction, and a visual style that continually invites the viewer to look beyond appearance, until the surface orthodoxy becomes another one of

27 Cf. Jacobs, “A Lesson with Eisenstein,” 30. 28 I will not address here to what extent these attributes apply to the historical Ivan.

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the dialectical contradictions that shape our understanding of Eisenstein’s Ivan (39). Eisenstein “challenges” the viewer to ask if Ivan’s opponents had “good reasons” for their opposition. “With only the slimmest political justification (none served to further the goal of state building), Ivan ordered each of these murders [Staritskii, Basmanovs] in response to betrayals that largely resulted from his own violent actions.” The betrayals were real, personal and political, but Ivan was never in any serious danger (192–93). The opposition of the reactionary, selfish boyars was in part the result of “Ivan’s own ruthless pursuit of power and his confrontational methods for dealing with boyar resistance” (193). Supposedly, Ivan’s autocracy speech is an example of statesmanship. “But what kind of political wisdom is there in immediately alienating the most powerful people in the realm?” Ivan would have faced opposition anyway but he made it worse, he “taunted his opponents,” he lashed out at them “impetuously,” he provoked them (197). Did Ivan “provoke the opposition of feudal elites” that led to Anastasiia’s murder? (151). “If Ivan is responsible for disenfranchising his political opponents, and doing so with such contempt, is their opposition to be seen as nothing but reactionary obstructionism, or is it at least partially justified, at least partially understandable?” Eisenstein did not consider Ivan a “wise or even responsible ruler.” The tsar “takes growing pleasure in confrontations with his opponents; the harder they resist, the more he wants to fight back” (197–98). He treats people as fools; the people follow Ivan “blindly, unthinkingly, or under coercion” (214–16). “The coronation of the childish, incompetent, drunken fool29 [Prince Vladimir] degrades Ivan” (220).

Neuberger’s theory is at once sophisticated and subtle, but also simple, consistent, and coherent. However, in other passages Neuberger undermines this theory by asserting that Eisenstein endorsed that very same “surface narrative”: Eisenstein insisted that Ivan’s violence was progressive and historically necessary (42), “that founding the centralized, modern Russian state was a matter of national progress” and violence a necessary tool for doing so (185).

29 Cf. Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 285, Vladimir is a “drunken, vulnerable child.”

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Eisenstein wanted the audience to sympathize with Ivan because of his difficult childhood, and his loss of his wife and friends (191).30 Unlike Skuratov and Basmanov, who hate boyars but distrust the people, Ivan trusts the people and firmly believes that they will give him power he needs (204).31 Ivan sees that Vladimir “wants it,” that is, to be tsar because “Eisenstein wanted to make sure that the audience saw Vladimir’s guilt so that they wouldn’t think that Ivan punished someone entirely innocent” (221).32 “Eisenstein wanted the audience to feel Ivan’s pain and ask if his grief justified his atrocities” (303). Or, as Neuberger wrote elsewhere, Eisenstein showed that Ivan had “plausible reasons” for forming the oprichnina, murdering boyars, and “laying waste to Novgorod.”33

If Ivan’s domestic enemies are enemies of Russia, are guilty of destroying the country, if the centralization of authority is absolutely necessary and cannot be accomplished without violence, if Ivan trusts the people, then Ivan is “doing the right thing.” For the audience to sympathize with Ivan, the people he punishes must deserve punishment. Otherwise, Ivan is executing the innocent. Eisenstein rejected insanity as an explanation of Ivan’s actions,34 and he dismissed any one-sided portrayal of Ivan as evil. Either Eisenstein’s endorsement of state development was part of the “surface 30 Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia, 178 agrees. 31 Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 278 declares that until the death of Anastasiia Ivan “holds out hope that he can achieve his goal with the support of the people, including some of the boyars.” Ivan’s expression of trust in the people (boyars are unmentioned) comes after the death of Anastasiia, as Neuberger later notes (280). It is an exaggeration to claim that in part 2 Ivan can no longer pretend to have the support of “friends and family” (Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 286). He no longer trusts his family (the Staritskie) or some of his former friends such as Filipp and Kurbskii, but he can rely on Skuratov and most of the oprichniki, as well as on the “people.” 32 Neuberger, “The Music of Landscape,” 225–226, declares that Anastasiia’s feelings for Kurbskii “call into question her innocence.” Anastasiia is as innocent as the “innocent childlike Vladimir” but also as guilty “which is to say, just a little.” But Vladimir conspires to have Ivan assassinated (he is both assassin and victim) [Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 293], whereas Anastasiia never commits any overt act motivated by her love for Kurbskii (at worst her fainting is involuntary). 33 Neuberger, “Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible as History,” 306. 34 Nevertheless, studies of the film claim that Eisenstein’s film demonstrated Ivan’s insanity: Aumont, Montage Eisenstein, 60, and Bordwell, The Cinema of Eisenstein, 205. On the other hand, Katerina Clark, “Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible and the Renaissance: An Example of Stalinist Cosmopolitanism?” Slavic Review 71, no.

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narrative,” a facade, or Eisenstein was fooling himself. Or the need to check boyar abuse of power and the imperative to conquer Kazan′ and to reach the Baltic Sea by invading Livonia do not constitute the “surface narrative” that Eisenstein was undermining. Chronologically, in the film the boyars initiate what becomes their contest for power against Ivan by murdering his mother and selling out their country to foreign interests. Ivan was still a boy at the time and could hardly have provoked the boyars to commit these crimes. He begins his reform efforts by declaring that he will deprive the boyars of authority, not that he will execute the boyars who murdered his mother or acted as foreign agents. Depriving the boyars of their ability to abuse political authority does not at that time entail executing them. At this point in the film, Ivan has not yet resorted to violence against them.35 The turning point, from his point of view, is the boyar disloyalty to his dynasty demonstrated when he was apparently fatally ill. It is after this episode that the tsar turns to the (fictitiously) low-born Aleksei Basmanov to defend the southern frontier and that he demotes Pimen from metropolitan to archbishop of Novgorod. But even then he sends a boyar, Kurbskii, to invade Livonia, which does nothing in the film to assuage boyar insult or outrage. Ivan has other boyars arrested but not yet executed. Protecting their vested interests the boyars, the Staritskie and the church escalate their opposition, try to sabotage his policies, and plan to assassinate his wife. Meanwhile, Kurbskii turns traitor and defects to Poland. Only after Anastasiia’s murder does Ivan cross the Rubicon and create the oprichnina, an instrument of violence to respond to violent opposition. And only then does Ivan authorize executions. He does not “enjoy” escalating the violence of the political war. He ups his own violence because of his frustration at the perpetuation of treason and his increasingly accurate appreciation of the extremes to which his enemies have already gone. It is true that Ivan could have spared Staritskii’s life by interrupting Volynets’s attempt to murder the tsar and simply have imprisoned the Basmanovs instead of forcing the son to kill the father and then ordering the 1 (2012): 57, interprets Eisenstein as minimizing Ivan’s cruelty, paranoia, and even madness. 35 Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 282, concludes that by creating the oprichnina Ivan now wants “limitless power” beyond “original and politically reasonable limits” (I have adjusted punctuation). In other words, until Ivan established the oprichnina, he did not exceed the “original” limits on his authority, meaning that he was not yet a despot or tyrant.

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execution of the son. Nothing in Eisenstein’s film suggests that such mercy would have been efficacious. To the contrary, everything in Eisenstein’s film supports the contention that sparing their lives would have carried great risks. In the film, Ivan’s enemies provoke him, not the other way around.36 Neuberger provides a second, alternative and entirely sufficient, definition of the “surface narrative” that is called into question by the subtext. According to Neuberger, Eisenstein “obliterates the surface narrative” that Ivan is a “positive hero,” the essence of Socialist Realism, by showing that doing what he had to do to repress treason turned the tsar into a monster (340).37 The “surface narrative” is not that Ivan fought real enemies who murdered his wife, planned to murder him, and betrayed their country, but rather that he could fight fire with fire, violence with violence, and remain unaffected by the means he employed to achieve his laudable goals. Eisenstein does not “want us to feel the good in every villain” (304). Eisenstein presents Kurbskii, Evfrosiniia, Pimen, and probably Vladimir and Filipp, as having no redeeming qualities that might mitigate their guilt. Eisenstein’s narrative goes out of its way not to show that Ivan’s policies failed. In the film, the Crimeans do not burn Moscow and Ivan wins the Livonian War. Nor is Russia destroyed. Only Novgorod is “pacified.” The film omits the repression of Tver′, Klin, Pskov, and the entire northwest region. There is no mention of the looting of the estates of boyar Ivan Fedorov-Cheliadnin and his eventual murder by Ivan’s hand (which was accepted in scholarship then and is still accepted, although the story is highly suspect). The 1570 Moscow executions do not take place. The depression in the Russian economy caused by the expense of the Livonian War, crop failures, the oprichnina, and epidemics, leading to major depopulation of much of the countryside, escapes attention. Ivan is not criticized for contributing to the development of serfdom. Elsewhere, Neuberger describes Russia as “devoid of all life and meaning” by the end of Ivan’s reign. “The people are all dead or hiding.” Ivan’s “dog, his brothers and his sons are all gone.”38 This description of Russia 36 Goodwin, Eisenstein, Cinema and History, 193, argues that “in degrees and in explicitness the film gives state violence greater impact than boyar violence.” Ivan’s countermeasures to boyar violence make a “greater dramatic point.” 37 Nikita Lary, “Tragedic Interconnections and Intersections,” in Neuberger and Somaini, The Flying Carpet, 202, raises a fascinating question: “if the ruler is a monster, isn’t the state he creates a monstrous body too?” A positive answer would, as Neuberger sometimes implies, negate all of Ivan’s supposedly positive achievements. 38 Neuberger, “Ivan the Terrible,” 295, 296.

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better fits the end of Lungin’s Tsar′. Eisenstein does not show a devastated Russia. In the film, Ivan’s “dogs” are the oprichniki, who are not all gone by the end of the film, although the most loyal, Skuratov, is. After Tsarevich Dmitrii disappears following Ivan’s deathbed recovery, Ivan has no sons, and in the film he never had a brother. (Prince Vladimir Staritskii is often called Ivan’s “brother” as a shorthand version of the Russian phrase for cousin, dvoiurodnyi brat, and he is gone by the end of the film.) Neuberger’s phrasing is confusing. In the film, Ivan conquers Kazan′ and Livonia, breaks the commercial blockade of Russia by establishing contact with England, and neutralizes all domestic opposition, including even among the oprichniki, all at great, perhaps excessive cost, to himself and Russia; but Eisenstein does not demean those achievements, he only laments the side effects of the violence employed to achieve them.39

Revenge Versus Abstract Concept According to Neuberger Eisenstein faults Ivan on two grounds: his thirst for revenge,40 and his devotion to an abstract concept of state development. She writes: “Every ‘progressive’ step that Ivan takes toward the founding of the modern Russian state is linked with violent conflicts of his own past, raising questions about his mission and his motives, and ultimately undermining his potential for success” (75).41 Ivan wants absolute power to get revenge, triggered by the murder of Elena by the boyars (87, 88). Everyone is pro family, not just Ivan, so that the characters cannot tell if their motives were personal or political (92). To Eisenstein, Ivan was superhuman. Ivan’s tragedy results not from his sadism, “but from the literally impossible conflict between his selfless commitment to the Great Russian State and the human costs of that

39 Cf. Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia, 178. 40 Ivan seeks revenge against the boyars, but not against the church, except insofar as it inhibits his efforts to seek revenge against the boyars. Church refusal to contribute to national defense is purely political. 41 Cf. Neuberger, “Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible as History,” 304: “Elena’s murder prompted Ivan’s lifelong desire for revenge against the boyars who killed her” and led to a violent orgy of violence, mass murder, and the Novgorod massacre.

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commitment: his friends, his family, the devastation of his whole country” (104). “When Ivan rose above the flawed and dangerous realm of human feelings, when he ruled only in the name of an abstraction, the Great Russian State, when he became all-selfless and all-powerful, he became truly monstrous. His human feelings made him less great and more flawed, but also less Terrible” (104). Eisenstein did not see Ivan as Machiavellian ruler. Although on the surface Ivan sounds like Machiavelli, the director’s Ivan displays crucial differences. He never acts from purely rational raison d’état because his motives are rooted in revenge. Sadism is not a Machiavellian trait. Eisenstein rejected a ruler’s being loved or feared as mutually exclusive alternatives. His Ivan wants both. Machiavelli wanted to separate politics and morality, but Ivan cannot disentangle them (104–5). The last scene of part 2 might be seen as triumphant except for the cost (150).

The state is Ivan’s excuse for his revenge (182). Is it possible, Neuberger asks, “to be a decent human being and a decent ruler at the same time?” For the ruler to avoid responsibility to rule “is even worse” (184).

Neuberger’s invocation of Ivan’s desire for revenge and his goal of building the Russian state creates several conundrums. Although she declares that the mixture of personal motives based upon family interest and political goals is so great that even other characters of the film, not just Ivan but the Staritskie, Basmanovs, and others too, cannot separate them, she still declares that to Eisenstein, who creates their overlap, Ivan’s search for revenge was primary. That emotional thirst for revenge dooms Ivan’s political agenda.42 Yet Neuberger (and Eisenstein?) also fault the tsar for pursuing an abstraction, the centralization of the state, regardless of the cost in human terms that must be paid to do so. That cost, the subtext, turns Ivan’s superficial triumph, the “surface narrative,” upside down. Neuberger seemingly presents Ivan as acting from two, mutually exclusive, primary 42 Jean Domarchi, “The Old and the New,” from Cahiers du Cinéma, no. 96, June 1959 (a translated excerpt), in Léon Moussinac, Sergei Eisenstein, trans. D. Sandy Petrey (New York: Crown Publishers Inc, 1970), 173–74, states that “Ivan is torn between respect for traditional aristocratic values and the wholly modern demands of reasons of State.” “His heart is with the nobles, and he is forced to look to the people for support.”

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motivations, at different times criticizing both, but never addressing the apparent paradox: Ivan has two Number One priorities. Yet, conceptually, it would be completely consistent for Eisenstein to argue that the cost of Ivan’s success was his tragic isolation, which validates both elements. In Eisenstein’s mind, Ivan could not avoid the responsibility to rule, and in order to rule he could not avoid paying the price of his own lost humanity. Such an argument would reinforce the conclusion that the “surface narrative” that Eisenstein destroys is the Socialist Realist Positive Hero, not the litany of political and personal sins attributed to Ivan’s enemies or the reality of Ivan’s successes. From the perspective of Eisenstein’s philosophy of history and philosophy of life, the “dialectical unity of opposites,” fully explicated by Neuberger, we can propose a solution to this paradox. Ivan’s emotional, irrational thirst for revenge and his rational adherence to pursuing policies to promote an abstraction, the state, exactly constitute, in his personality and policies, Eisenstein’s “dialectical unity of opposites.”43 If the director’s Ivan wanted to be feared and loved, why could he not act for emotional and logical motives? Ivan is what he is, and does what he does, because of the contradictory rational and irrational impulses that dialectically determine his actions. Of course, Eisenstein could not possibly have phrased his interpretation of Ivan in those terms. To the censors, Ivan acted out of patriotism uncomplicated by conflicting emotional and abstract rationales. Eisenstein reveled in ambiguity, but here he had no choice. Any more direct attention to this issue would never have made it past the cutting floor. Therefore, we can only suggest that this was how Eisenstein would have resolved the dichotomy in Ivan’s motivations if he had been free to do so.

43 Cf. Joan Neuberger, “Visual Dialectics: Murderous Laughter in Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible,” in Picturing Russia: Explorations in Visual Culture, ed. Valerie A. Kivelson and Joan Neuberger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 201: “Eisenstein came to view Ivan as a man tragically divided—a dialectical unity of opposites—between, on the one hand, his commitment to unite Russia against both its predatory neighbors and its own aristocratic elite and, on the other hand, his remorse over the violent means he chose to accomplish this glorious task.” Note the absence of the revenge theme in this formulation, although on the next page Neuberger wrote that the Fiery Furnace episode undermines the “official narrative” by showing that Ivan was willing to embrace “naked, brutal despotism” out of motives of personal vengeance and despair, “not the needs of state” (202).

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Conclusion The complicated, confusing, and problematic source base for studying Ivan’s personality and reign not only permits, but encourages, the development of historical images of Ivan that are equally complicated, confusing, and problematic. Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible honors that messy reality by creating a fictional Ivan that is even messier. Historians seek to create straightforward, consistent, and coherent theories about Ivan, even if in those theories Ivan’s personality and reign remained paradoxical and contradictory, even insane. By contrast, Eisenstein probably intended to produce a contradictory and problematic image of Ivan for two reasons. First, he thought it more historically accurate than the image of Ivan propounded by the Stalin cult (and in this Eisenstein was certainly correct). Second, he tried to protect himself, albeit far too little, from the consequences of the creating the image he did. In Neuberger’s interpretation, Eisenstein transcended the good Ivan/ bad Ivan dichotomy that still permeates Russian historical memory of him since 1991: Ivan became bad because he was trying to do good.

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The Atheist Director and the Orthodox Tsar: Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan The Terrible

Eisenstein, employed as a filmmaker by the government of an officially atheist state, set himself the task of creating a film about a tsar, Ivan the Terrible, who was religious and lived in a confessional age. How Eisenstein treated the religious identities of his characters and the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in sixteenth-century Muscovy, subjects not fully discussed in the literature, even in Neuberger’s monumental monograph, surely became even more relevant since 1991 because of the revival of religion in Russia and growing influence of the independent Russian Orthodox Church. Eisenstein paid considerable attention to religion in his film Ivan the Terrible, which did not go unnoticed. In 1942, a letter from D. I. Eremin in Moscow was hand delivered to Eisenstein in Alma Ata,1 expressing doubts about the prominence of Ivan’s “religious moods [nastroeniia]” in the screenplay.2 The Council of People’s Commissars Committee on Cinema Affairs criticized part 1 for showing “too much religion.” The stenographic account of the committee’s discussion does not record that anyone present raised the issue, so this criticism in the report, written by 1 After the German invasion of the Soviet Union Eisenstein had been evacuated from Moscow to Alma Ata, where he made the movie. 2 Rostislav Nikolaevich Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, vol. 2, 1929– 1948 (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1988), 231.

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its staff, originated either with the committee’s chairman, I. G. Bol′shakov, or its staff.3 Critic I. I. Iuzovskii advised Eisenstein that part 1 should present a more complex relationship between Ivan and the Russian Orthodox Church.4 Scholars have only rarely commented on the role of role of religion in the movie and its depiction of the Russian Orthodox Church.5 Kristen Thompson observed that Eisenstein emphasizes Ivan’s religious leanings.6 Gaston Roberge noted the overall religiousness of the film and referred to the presence of icons in twenty of its twenty-one reels.7 Mira Meliakh supported Roberge’s point about the ubiquity of icons and frescoes in the film.8 Rosamund Bartlett observed that “the general attitude toward the church in the film is a negative one.”9 Mike O’Mahoney generalized about the prevalence of “religious rituals and biblical references” in all of Eisenstein’s films.10 Neuberger notes that to Eisenstein Ivan was too religious and that Stalin told Eisenstein that religion inhibited (the historical) Ivan from acting decisively.11 Despite the accuracy of these conclusions, none of these scholars provided comprehensive corroboration of their observations by analyzing the movie’s presentation of religion and the Russian Orthodox Church Joan Neuberger, Ivan the Terrible (New York: I. B. Tauris, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 14; Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, 2:245–47. 4 Ibid., 247–48. 5 From the enormous bibliography on Eisenstein in general and on Ivan the Terrible in particular I have cited only those works which I found relevant to the topic at hand, not all those I consulted. The article version of this chapter appeared too late for inclusion in Neuberger’s This Thing of Darkness. 6 Kristen Thompson, “Ivan the Terrible and Stalinist Russia: A Re-examination,” Cinema Journal, 17, no. 1 (1977): 37. 7 Gaston Roberge, Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible: An Analysis (Calcutta: Chitrabani, 1980), 12, 142. 8 Meilakh, Izobrazitel′naia stilistika pozdnikh fil′mov Eizenshteina, 114, 156. 9 Rosamund Bartlett, “The Circle and the Line: Eisenstein, Florensky, and Russian Orthodoxy,” in Eisenstein at 100: A Reconsideration, ed. Al LaValley and Barry P. Scherr (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 71. 10 O’Mahoney, Sergei Eisenstein, 9. On religion and religious themes in Eisenstein’s films prior to Ivan the Terrible, consult Rostislav Nikolaevich Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, vol. 1, 1898–1929 (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1985), 128–29, 131, 165, 181, 186, 212–13, 214, 218, 243, 266–67, 272; Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, 2:26, 38–39, 64, 99, 101–2, 119–21, 144–45, 162, 169. Eisenstein’s private religious beliefs, if any, are not germane to an analysis of the presentation of religion in Ivan the Terrible. 11 Neuberger, This Thing of Darkness, 52, 332. 3

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in both the original two-part screenplay and the shooting script of the three-part film. This chapter presents such an analysis. It concludes that by portraying not just Ivan but all of his lay supporters and opponents as equally religious, Eisenstein dramatized the axiom that piety neither guaranteed nor precluded patriotism. By characterizing every cleric and affiliate of the Russian Orthodox Church in the film as a traitor, the director demonstrated that “professional” piety, even that of Metropolitan Filipp, canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church, precluded patriotism and guaranteed treason. Because the Stalin “cult” of Ivan the Terrible did not impose a uniform image of Ivan on historians and artists, Eisenstein chose to present Ivan as religious and the Russian Orthodox Church as politically disloyal. Eisenstein’s uncompromisingly hostile attitude toward the Russian Orthodox Church stands in sharp contrast to the Soviet government’s policy at the time of compromise toward the church in order secure its support during World War II. It must be emphasized that although Eisenstein conducted significant historical research on Ivan before writing the screenplay, he was making a movie, not writing history. His fictional narrative takes considerable liberties with history, which he justified as literary license. With regard to clergy, for instance, Pimen was never metropolitan of Moscow, only archbishop of Novgorod. Had he been metropolitan he could not possibly have been “demoted” to the prestigious office of archbishop of Novgorod, the second highest ranking bishopric in the Russian Orthodox Church at the time. The priest Evstafii, a member of the Kolychev boyar family to which Filipp belonged, who becomes Ivan’s “spiritual father” (dukhovnyi otets, spiritual mentor) in order to hide from Ivan’s repression of his family and to spy on the tsar for the conspirators plotting to overthrow him, is an entirely fictional character. No son from a boyar family could possibly “hide” from Ivan by spending time in his presence because he would have known all male members of boyar families by sight. There were holy fools in Ivan’s Moscow, but the holy fool Nikola is also a fictional character. Of course, paying attention to how Eisenstein “rewrote” history is crucial to understanding Ivan’s image in Ivan the Terrible. Whether there was “too much” religion in part 1 as the cinema committee report insisted is a matter of opinion, but without question religion suffuses the entire film. Much of the action takes place in churches—for example, Ivan’s coronation, his grief at the bier of Tsaritsa Anastasiia, the performance of the Fiery Furnace play, and the murder of his cousin Prince

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Vladimir Andreevich Staritskii in a failed attempt to assassinate the tsar.12 The religious ambience of the film is not confined to churches. Roberge and Meliakh correctly accent the prominence of icons and frescoes which decorated not only churches and ecclesiastical residences but also secular palaces and living quarters, including the headquarters of the oprichnina at Aleksandrovskaia sloboda.13 An entourage of black-clad priests attends then Metropolitan Pimen on all official occasions, including Ivan’s coronation, wedding banquet, and the interment of his wife, Tsaritsa Anastasiia, and accompany Pimen to Ivan’s private quarters to pray for him as he supposedly lay dying.14 Monastic choirs chant in the background at these events. Church bells ring out at Ivan’s coronation and his wedding banquet, during prayers for his recovery from his illness, and at boyar executions.15 Ivan’s life took place in an environment saturated with religious art, music, and ritual, and populated by innumerable clergy. However, that Ivan lived in a religious environment does not prove his religious beliefs. The best evidence of his religious consciousness is the dialogue that Eisenstein attributed to him. The same dictum applies to all characters in the movie.16 Detailed study of the film’s dialogue substantiates the conclusion that not only Ivan and his supporters, but also his opponents, shared belief in Russian Orthodox Christianity. Boyar Fedor Kolychev wishes to take holy orders because he cannot support Ivan’s ecclesiastical policy that monasteries must contribute some of their wealth to support the army. Ivan replies to this request by saying, “You prefer the heavenly to the earthly tsar? Very well, I shall not stand between you and Him. And pray for us sinners.”17 Kolychev becomes the monk Filipp, then abbot of the Solovetskii Monastery, and later metropolitan. On his sickbed, Ivan holds a candle and pronounces “Lord have 12 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 25–34, 103–8, 117, 162, 165–74, 210–19, 234–41. For parts 1 and 2 of Ivan the Terrible, the script in this volume corresponds to that in the film; for part 3, to the script that Eisenstein intended to film. 13 Ibid., 69, 189, 213; Joan Neuberger, “Eisenstein’s Angel,” Russian Review 63 (2004): 390–93. 14 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 42, 72, 73, 103–6. 15 Ibid., 31, 35, 36, 41, 69, 160–61. 16 For a comparable exercise in analyzing religious identity via religious allusions in written documents, see Charles J. Halperin, “The Culture of Ivan IV’s Court: The Religious Beliefs of Bureaucrats,” in The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel B. Rowland, ed. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Kollmann, and Michael Flier (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2009), 101–5. 17 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 32–33 (Ivan on monasteries), 44–45 (Ivan and Kolychev).

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mercy!” three times. He curses boyars who refuse to take an oath of allegiance to his baby son Tsarevich Dmitrii: “You will all be cursed forever, Traitors to the Russian Earth, all of you will be cursed, cursed for all eternity.”18 These “traitors” had violated their oaths of loyalty to the dynasty taken on the cross and now face divine retribution. Ivan attributes his recovery from his near-fatal illness to the sacraments: “The Holy Sacrament has cured me!”19 At Anastasiia’s bier, Ivan reacts to news of boyar defections by asking: “Have I done wrong? Is it God’s punishment?,”20 a reflection of the belief that death, illness, and failure constitute divine punishment for sin. Ivan, planning to create the oprichnina, declares his intention to use the support of the people against his enemies: “The call of the people will express God’s will. I shall accept the sword of vengeance from God’s hand.” Ivan proclaims Moscow to be the Third Rome.21 Ivan identifies the voice of the people with the voice of God. He declares that he can carry the burden of power on his shoulders because “I hear the voice of God” through the people, whose will constitutes his strength. He authorizes his henchman, oprichnik Maliuta Skuratov, to execute boyars from the Kolychev clan by declaring: “By God’s will, be judge and executioner.” When Maliuta pronounces death sentences on those boyars, he quotes Ivan’s invocation of the religious legitimacy of their capital punishment. Ivan, Skuratov informs them, had declared the boyars guilty “in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.”22 When the tsar learns of the possibility, soon confirmed, that his aunt Evfrosiniia poisoned Anastasiia, he declares: “God grant it was not she who was guilty!”23 He ends the festivities of the oprichniki by informing them: “Enough of this ungodly revelry! Brothers, let us address ourselves to the Almighty! Let us think upon our last hour!” by proceeding to prayer.24 After Petr Volynets, acolyte of now Archbishop Pimen, kills Prince Vladimir, Ivan gazes at the cathedral altar and crosses himself as the choir sings Ivan’s political program: “I swear by God to accomplish in Russia my royal mission to purge the Motherland of her savage enemies . . . for the sake of the great land of Russia.”25 When he returns to Moscow after 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Ibid., 86. Ibid., 89. Ibid., 104. Ibid., 117. Ibid., 155, 160. Ibid., 169. Ibid., 208–9. Ibid., 219.

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punishing treason in the city of Novgorod, Ivan expressed his intention to confess his sins to his spiritual father, the priest Evstafii.26 As Ivan lies prostrate before the Last Judgment icon listening to the reading of a list of his victims, he waits for the Celestial Father to approve his actions, but hears only silence.27 Ivan objects to the oprichniks’ singing ribald songs about the demise of his enemies by declaring that the oprichnik cause is “not a subject for laughter.” He criticizes some oprichniki who have betrayed the tsar’s confidence, violating for gold the “holy oath” they took when they joined the oprichnina.28 Without question, therefore, Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible is a “believer” (veruiushchii). Ivan endorses the efficacy of monastic prayer. He believes in heaven, hell, sacred oaths, sin, and divine punishment. He invokes divine patronage for his political policies and seeks divine absolution for his executions. He believes in Holy Scripture.29 Ivan is not the only good Russian Orthodox Christian in the film. His supporters share his devotion to the faith. Anastasiia admonishes boyar Prince Andrei Kurbskii to obey his loyalty oath to Tsarevich Dmitrii because “God will be your judge!”30 An oprichnik recruiter accuses the boyars of being “indifferent to religion” because they shirk their responsibility for national defense against the Tatars and Germans. The boyars oppress the people, which makes them “bad” Christians. Therefore the oprichnik summons those “good Christians” who do not side with the boyar princes to join Ivan’s bodyguard.31 After Ivan’s abdicates in order to muster political support for the establishment of the oprichnina, a procession sets out from Moscow to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda to beseech him to return to the throne. They carry religious banners and, in the screenplay, crosses and icons. A choir in the background enhances the religious pathos of the scene by singing: “Have pity, O Lord” and “Have mercy, O Lord.”32 In 26 Ibid., 232. 27 Ibid., 235–38. 28 Ibid., 249. 29 Viktor Borisovich Shklovskii, Eizenshtein (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1973), 283. 30 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 88. 31 Ibid., 118. 32 Ibid., 119–21; Ivor Montagu and Herbert Marshall, trans., Ivan the Terrible. A Screenplay by Sergei M. Eisenstein (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 136. Montagu and Marshall published the original screenplay, not as it was actually filmed. I cite this publication only when it contains material not found in the filmed version. Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, 2:244 objected that this procession was not religious and should not have been chanting hymns.

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the screenplay men joining the oprichnina swear five times “before God” to renounce their kith and kin, to defend Russia, and to serve Ivan loyally. They swear on their drawn daggers that they should suffer death by those daggers if they violate this oath and go to hell thereafter. Ivan closes the oath ceremony by saying “amen,” as if the oath were a prayer or religious service.33 To enable Ivan to keep his word to allow Filipp as metropolitan to intercede for the disgraced, Skuratov volunteers to go to hell himself as the price for executing Ivan’s enemies, Filipp’s Kolychev boyar relatives, before Filipp can prevent it. After saying so Skuratov crosses himself.34 Demian, a former Staritskii supporter now helping oprichnik Aleksei Basmanov embezzle funds, tells him that “as sure as God is holy,” Aleksei’s son Fedor will betray their criminal activity to Ivan.35 Therefore Ivan’s supporters, his wife Anastasiia, the oprichniki, and the people of Moscow express a religious identity. However, even though salvation depends upon the administration of the sacraments by clergy, Ivan does not shirk from disagreeing with Metropolitan, then Archbishop Pimen, and abbot, then Metropolitan Filipp, when they oppose his policies. He feels no obligation to follow their recommendations if the policies they advocate would harm Russia. Skuratov goes even further. He objects when Ivan grants Filipp, an “ignorant priest,” the power of intercession on behalf of disgraced boyars, a rare articulation of anti-clerical sentiment in the film.36 In the screenplay, Skuratov even swats Evstafii aside when he tries to stop those executions, proclaiming: “I am [the tsar’s] bodily advisor, not his spiritual advisor,” although Evstafii’s treason mitigates Skuratov’s disrespect for his clerical status.37 Skuratov’s objections to a clerical role in politics do not impugn his belief in eternal punishment for sinners. Ivan and his supporters have no monopoly of Russian Orthodox Christian piety in Ivan the Terrible. His lay enemies express the very same religious beliefs. Like the tsar, they expect divine support for their political agenda. Evfrosiniia exclaims that “God is just” and “God is good” when she hears that Ivan is mortally ill.38 Just before Ivan recovers from his illness 33 Montague and Marshall, Ivan the Terrible, 133–35, 201–3. No author seems to have noticed that the oprichnik oath fails to mention a cross. Instead, the oprichniki swear on their daggers, much as “pagan” Rus′ in Kievan times swore on their swords. 34 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 155–56; Tsivian, Ivan the Terrible, 59. 35 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 239. 36 Ibid., 155–56. 37 Montague and Marshall, Ivan the Terrible, 160–61. 38 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 70, 72.

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Kurbskii swears loyalty “by the Holy Writ” to the tsar’s heir Tsarevich Dmitrii “in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost,” signified by his kissing the cross.39 Evfrosiniia detects the “hand of God” in Ivan’s invitation to her son Prince Vladimir to attend an oprichnik banquet because Petr Volynets can accompany him and carry out Ivan’s assassination.40 Kurbskii and Evfrosiniia appear to be as devoted to Russian Orthodox Christianity as the tsar or the tsar’s supporters. The depiction of Ivan’s clerical enemies is more complicated. Because of their clerical status alone bishops, priests, and monks conceive of themselves as carrying out God’s will. However, the dialogue Eisenstein attributes to them suggests that they sometimes act from less than holy motives. The holy fool Nikola tells the Moscow mob that the Glinskie, the family of Ivan’s mother, and the Zakhar’iny, the family of Ivan’s wife, Anastasiia, have bewitched the tsar in order to incite them to riot during his wedding.41 In the screenplay, according to Nikola, these relatives persuade Ivan to lay hands of the treasure of the church and the monasteries. God, Nikola screams, will send fire to punish such sins.42 Aided and abetted by Demian, a lackey of the Staritskie, Nikola cuts the ropes of the bells on Red Square, whose fall he blames on sorcery perpetrated by Ivan’s relatives.43 Nikola is a political shill who exploits his religiosity on behalf of arrogant boyars and greedy monasteries. The boyar Fedor Kolychev asks Ivan’s permission to take holy orders because his religious scruples preclude his endorsing Ivan’s plan to tax the church.44 Taking the cowl presumably represented not just a means of escaping his political dilemma but also a genuine religious calling. Abbot Filipp objects to the creation of the oprichnina. He tells Ivan that “these plans come not from God . . . but from the devil.” The tsar has defied ancestral traditions and will not rule for long. Ivan calls upon his previous friendship with Filipp to elicit understanding and sympathy from him, but the metropolitan will have none of it. “I am not Kolychev,” he declares, “I am Filipp the monk. I carry out the will of God, not the designs of the Tsar.” Filipp instructs Ivan to maintain tradition and share his authority with the 39 Ibid., 89. 40 Ibid., 79, 183, 189. 41 Ibid., 49. 42 Montague and Marshall, Ivan the Terrible, 61, 60. 43 Ibid., 68. 44 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 44.

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boyars. When Ivan refuses, he asks: “You reject the counsel of your spiritual guide?”45 Subsequent dialogue reveals the problematic nature of Filipps’s spiritual calling. In the metropolitan’s cell, archbishop of Novgorod Pimen demands that Metropolitan Philip stop Ivan: “By God’s power invested in you, bring the Tsar to heel. I charge you to excommunicate him.” When Filipp declares that he will return to his monastery Pimen declares that if he does, he “will answer for it to God!” Filipp changes his mind, saying “I take up the sword not for my executed relatives but for the boyars . . . [j]ustice must be done against the Tsar. Beneath my priestly robes beats the heart of a Kolychev. And a Kolychev . . . who is a prince of the church! Even the Tsar can do nothing against the church!” “I shall humble Ivan, I shall crush him with the weight of the church.”46 The screenplay narrates that Evfrosiniia “incites the great wrath of a mutinous warlike boyar beneath Filipp’s meek shepherd’s garb.”47 He told Ivan that he objected to the tsar’s policies as a monk, not a boyar, that the boyar Kolychev had ceased to exist, but he later tells Pimen and Evfrosiniia that he is not Filipp, he is Kolychev, a boyar, who will use the power of the church to defend boyar rights and church property. Pimen and Filipp object to Ivan’s creation of the oprichnina as the work of Satan because he has deprived the boyars of their political influence as much as because he wishes to deprive the church of its material resources. Metropolitan Filipp arranges a performance of the Fiery Furnace play. He thunders at Ivan that an avenging angel descended from heaven to free Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednagoah from Nebuchadnezzar, implicitly threatening that another avenging angel will be sent against Ivan if he does not accede to Filipp’s demands. He then preaches to Ivan: “Submit to the authority of the church, Ivan! Repent! Dissolve the oprichnina! Before it’s too late!”48 In Filipp’s view, the tsar must submit to the church or it will be “too late” for him to achieve salvation, he will be doomed to hell as a sinner. Archbishop Pimen informs Evfrosiniia that Ivan has arrested Metropolitan Filipp. The opposition’s only recourse is to assassinate Ivan, a deed that can be accomplished “only [by] the pure in heart.” Pimen assigns 45 Ibid., 135–36, 147. Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, 2:257, 259 describes Filipp in this scene as gloomy, arrogant, cold, and unbending, all in all a very unsympathetic character. 46 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 162–64. 47 Montague and Marshall, Ivan the Terrible, 167. 48 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 172–73.

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that “sacred mission” to his acolyte, “God’s servant” Petr Volynets. Ivan must be eliminated because he has confiscated church property, he is the Beast (of the Apocalypse).49 Evfrosiniia thinks that because Pimen will judge Filipp he will be acquitted. However, to the contrary Pimen declares that he will find Filipp guilty. Filipp is more useful to the cause dead than alive. “A corpse, a martyr, a saint is more valuable to our struggle.” A dead saint would be invincible against Ivan.50 In the screenplay, Pimen makes the sign of the cross to shield his co-conspirator from the sin of plotting to commit murder.51 Pimen’s readiness to sacrifice Filipp’s life to undermine Ivan’s power horrifies even Evfrosiniia. She exclaims: “His cowl is white, but his soul is black.” Regardless of her reaction to Pimen’s cynical plan,52 she does not object. Later, with equal Machiavellian amorality she plans after her son Prince Vladimir ascends the throne to sacrifice Ivan’s assassin Petr Volynets so that Tsar Vladimir can claim to have punished the regicide. Obviously, Evfrosiniia has no aversion to letting the ends justify the means. However, even she is taken aback that a prince of the church would share her lack of ethics in politics. Playing his role as agent provocateur, the priest Evstafii urges Ivan to launch a “crusade” against treasonous Novgorod, the new Babylon,53 as part of Kurbskii’s plan to invade Russia to come to Novgorod’s aid after Ivan has incited the maximum domestic opposition to his rule. In Novgorod, Archbishop Pimen declares to his boyar supporters: “Blessed by the emblem of the holy cross, we go into battle” against Ivan. He expected his spy Evstafii to warn him when Ivan departed Moscow on the punitive expedition against Novgorod. However, the tsar intercepts Evstafii’s message, arrives in Novgorod unexpectedly, and arrests Pimen and the boyar conspirators who had not yet sent for Kurbskii’s aid.54 The priest Evstafii turns out to be youngest Kolychev, a provocateur and spy hiding from Ivan in the guise of his spiritual father.55 Bartlett was definitely on the right track in declaring that Eisenstein’s portrayal of clerics in Ivan the Terrible was negative, but she underestimates 49 Ibid., 176, 177. 50 Ibid., 178. Historically Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod supported Filipp’s removal from the office of metropolitan. 51 Montague and Marshall, Ivan the Terrible, 181. 52 Ibid., 181. 53 Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, 231. 54 Ibid., 234–35. 55 Ibid., 240.

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the film’s hostility toward the Russian Orthodox Church. As no commentator on the film to my knowledge has ever noted, every cleric, every character in the film associated with the Russian Orthodox Church is an immoral, duplicitous traitor, willing to sacrifice Russia’s national interest to boyar power and ecclesiastical greed. Metropolitan Filipp boasts of using the church as a political weapon. He exploits his ecclesiastical status for material and partisan ends. Archbishop Pimen plans murder. The holy fool Nikola and the priest Evstafii are frauds. The only partial exception is acolyte Petr Volynets, at first a willing church assassin. However, he reforms after Ivan spares his life for murdering Prince Vladimir Staritskii, names his accomplices, and contributes to the Muscovite conquest of Livonia.56 Because part 3 was never completed or shown, only members of the audience of parts 1 and 2 who had read the screenplay would have been aware of his change of heart. Eisenstein unmasked the clergy, the “professionally” pious, as politically suspect. Eisenstein’s treatment of Metropolitan Filipp stands out. No Eisenstein or Ivan the Terrible scholar I have consulted has ever thought it appropriate to point out that in the middle of the seventeenth century the Russian Orthodox Church had canonized Filipp. In his depiction of Filipp as a conniving, reactionary boyar Eisenstein committed sacrilege by defaming an authorized saint of the Russian Orthodox Church. The “cult” of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Soviet Union did not dictate how Eisenstein could present the role of religion and the Russian Orthodox Church in his film. The role of religion and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ivan’s life and in Muscovite politics during his reign in works of the Stalin “cult” of Ivan has not been studied adequately.57 In the 1930s and 1940s, the government and the Communist Party failed to impose uniformity on this question in the works of historians, novelists, and playwrights.58 Neither Robert Wipper (Vipper), nor Ivan Smirnov, nor Sergei Bakhrushkin, the authors of the three most prominent “popular” Stalinist biographies of Ivan, describe him as religious.59 They simply ignore his personal religious

56 Ibid., 230–31. 57 Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia did not discuss this issue. 58 Meliakh, Izobrazitel′naia stilistika, 78–82; Iurenev, Sergei Eizenshtein. Zamysly. Fil′my. Metod, 2:209–10; Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible. 59 Eisenstein’s 1938 film Aleksandr Nevskii ignored the religious beliefs of its title character, canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1547.

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convictions.60 Wipper provides the most extensive treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church and its leaders during Ivan’s reign. He attribute a positive role to the church as a “mighty ally” of the monarchy during the tsar’s minority. The church’s support was essential to his retention of his throne. Wipper praises Metropolitan Makarii for declaring Ivan of age in 1547 and performing his coronation and marriage, and placing him under the “guardianship” of the priest Sylvester of the Kremlin Annunciation Cathedral for six years. Wipper considers the priest Sylvester a member of the Chosen Council of advisors who led the reforms of the 1550s.61 Ecclesiastical authority drove the reform process and patronized autocracy as Muscovy’s political system. Metropolitan Makarii’s leadership imparted “religious solemnity and ecclesiastical scholarship” to the reforms. (Makarii also figures prominently in a positive light in the novels of Valentin Kostylev.)62 According to Wipper, after Ivan had freed himself from Sylvester’s tutelage the priest procrastinated in pursuing the Livonian War, incurring the tsar’s wrath. Wipper notes that the clergy joined the army and merchants in supporting the Livonian War at the Assembly of the Land in 1566. Novgorod clergy conspired with Moscow boyars in a great plot against Ivan in 1567. Metropolitan Filipp was put to death in 1569 for pleading for mercy on behalf of nobles guilty of treason. In 1580, Ivan exploited the enmity of the priesthood against rich monasteries to impose restrictions on monastic landowning and put fiscal pressure on the monasteries. Even a monk, as Wipper explains, the author of the Valaam Discourses (Valaamskaia beseda), expressed shock at the predominance of secular interests among the higher clergy.63 Wipper’s analysis demonstrates that the hierarchy and personnel of the Russian Orthodox Church were not of one mind when it came to Ivan’s political program, some supporting, some opposing Ivan’s policies. At least one cleric, the priest Sylvester, changed camps. 60 Robert Wipper, Ivan Grozny, trans. J. Fineberg (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947); Ivan Ivanovich Smirnov, Ivan Groznyi (Leningrad: OGIZ, 1944); Sergei Vladimirovich Bakhrushin, “Ivan Groznyi” (1942, 1945), in Nauchnye trudy, vol. 2, Stat′i po ekonomicheskoi, sotsial′noi i politicheskoi istorii russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva XV–XVII vv. (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo AN SSSR, 1954), 256–328. On Wipper see Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible, 12, 16. 61 B. Verkhoven, Rossiia v tsarstvovanie Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: OGIZ, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1939), 15 refers to the priest Sylvester and Metropolitan Makarii without comment. 62 Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible, 117–18. 63 Wipper, Ivan Grozny, 59, 72, 92, 98, 106–8, 126, 146, 227, 235.

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Eisenstein chose not to emulate Wipper’s balanced understanding of the complicated position of the Russian Orthodox Church in Muscovite politics during Ivan’s reign.64 He omits Metropolitan Makarii and the priest Sylvester from the film, which necessitated his making Pimen metropolitan before he became archbishop of Novgorod because he needed a metropolitan to perform Ivan’s coronation and wedding and Anastasiia’s funeral.65 Eisenstein’s omission of any potentially positive clerics from his screenplay can hardly have been accidental. Of course, even in his short biography Wipper had space to include far more characters from Ivan’s reign than Eisenstein could incorporate into his film, but neither Wipper nor Eisenstein had to take the positions they did on Ivan’s religious consciousness or the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in his Muscovy. Wipper chose to present a nonreligious Ivan and a politically heterogeneous church, whereas Eisenstein chose to present a religious Ivan and a homogeneously traitorous church. Perhaps Iuzovskii had something like Wipper’s view of the church in mind when he criticized part 1 of the film for its simplistic presentation of the Russian Orthodox Church, but we lack relevant evidence. In conclusion, the Soviet Cinema Committee was correct in concluding that religion infuses Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, as some scholars have also maintained. The tsar lives in a religious world, surrounded by icons, frescoes, and religious murals, frequents churches, listens to church bells and choirs, invokes God, crosses himself, and fears the Day of Judgment. He also engineers the deaths of clerics, a metropolitan, Filipp, and implicitly an archbishop, Pimen, with no more compunction than he arranges the deaths of his own relatives, his cousin Vladimir and his aunt Evfrosiniia, or of boyars, the Kolychevs. Ivan sometimes has doubts about the legitimacy of his executions, but always surmounts those scruples by invoking the need to protect Russia from its enemies. He compartmentalizes his attitudes toward Russian Orthodox Christianity, to which he is devoted, and the Russian Orthodox Church, whose leaders are his enemies.66 Eisenstein’s presentation makes the obvious point that piety did not guarantee

64 Wipper’s book first appeared in 1922 in Moscow. Revised versions appeared in 1942 in Tashkent and 1944 in Moscow. 65 Sylvester’s absence was noticed by Meliakh, Izobrazitel′naia stilistika, 83. 66 Eisenstein’s image of Ivan’s religious identity and Filipp’s character contrasts sharply with that of Pavel Lungin’s 2009 movie Tsar′.

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patriotism.67 Eisenstein’s sole concession to religious identity consists in his implicit concomitant recognition that religious identity did not preclude patriotism either. The case of ecclesiastical opponents of Ivan’s policies is less straightforward. Of course, the “professional” religious men in the film are religious, but every character in the movie who is affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church—Pimen, Filipp, the holy fool Nikola, a layman, Evstafii, and initially Petr Volynets—betrays Ivan and Russia. The Russian Orthodox clergy are reactionary, selfish, and treasonous, and just as unscrupulous, scheming, and dangerous to Russia as lay opponents of Ivan such as Kurbskii, Evfrosiniia, and Vladimir.68 There is a final anomaly in Eisenstein’s treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ivan the Terrible. At the time Eisenstein was writing and directing the film (part 1 was released in 1944, part 2 completed in 1946), the Soviet state, in order to garner support for the war effort, had tempered its hostility toward religion by dissolving the League of the Militant Godless, authorizing the opening or reopening of churches, monasteries, and seminaries, and according the Russian Orthodox Church greater freedom of action. In 1943, the government even permitted the Russian Orthodox Church to elect a new patriarch of Moscow. Eisenstein’s portrayal of the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church during Ivan’s reign was seemingly immune to any influence of this shift in official government policy. He impugned the patriotism of the institutional Russian Orthodox Church precisely when, with the approval of the Soviet state, it was demonstrating that patriotism on a daily basis. Given Eisenstein’s admitted sensitivity to the “relevance” of his films to current events, why he did so, as far as I know, remains an unasked and unanswered question.

67 Sixteenth-century Muscovites, including Ivan, did not draw a distinction between piety and patriotism. Heresy was treason, treason was heresy. 68 An anonymous referee of the article upon which this chapter is based drew a very plausible connection between the anti-clericalism of the film and the release of part 2 in 1958 during Nikita Khrushchev’s violent anti-religious campaign. The release of part 2 might also reflect Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign.

Chapter 13

Ivan the Terrible Returns to the Silver Screen: Pavel Lungin’s Film Tsar′

There is no consensus among specialists on Ivan the Terrible, Eisenstein, and Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, let alone among the Russian educated and film-going public, whether Eisenstein’s film presents a positive or a negative image of the tsar. Neuberger resolves that ambiguity by arguing for positive surface and negative subtext images. However, we may safely infer that Pavel Lungin thought the film pro-Ivan, an error Lungin overcorrected in his 2008 film Tsar′ about Ivan’s relationship with Metropolitan Filipp, whom Ivan eventually had murdered. The film achieved a notoriety that probably exceeded its aesthetic merit.1 This chapter will assess how Lungin utilized primary Muscovite sources as well as Russian historiography in constructing his image of Ivan, a now well-established approach to the relationship of history and film.2 Lungin relied upon the works of post-Soviet Russian historians to articulate the tsar’s self-justification for his actions, but turned to two strands of imperial Russian historiography to fashion his damning critique of Ivan’s character and morality. Lungin consistently 1 On the political resonance of the film as a contradictory commentary on Putin’s image, see Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 192–99. 2 Pierre Sorlin, The Film in History. Restaging the Past (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); Robert A. Rosenstone, History on Film. Film on History, 2nd ed. (Harlow, England: Pearson, 2012).

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eschewed imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet apologias of Ivan’s behavior and rule including Eisenstein’s “Stalinist” whitewash of Ivan.3 Pavel Semenovich Lungin was born 12 July 1949. He has been an innovative director, screenwriter, and producer of both documentaries and art movies for the theater and television, generating both flops and blockbusters. His directorial debut Taksi-bluz/Taxi Blues (1990) won an award at the Cannes Film Festival and his subsequent films, Luna Park/Luna-park (1992), Oligarkh/Tycoon (2000) and Ostrov/The Island (2006), continued to explore major social and political issues of current Russian life. Lungin has never shied away from controversy. Although during the 1970s and 1980s he wrote screenplays for historical films, mostly patriotic action pictures, the only previous historical film he directed was The Island, which dealt with twentieth-century history, World War II, and its aftermath.4 Consequently, Tsar′ is Lungin’s first foray into subject matter as “old” as Muscovite history. The events in Tsar′ take place during the years 1566–1569. As it opens, Ivan has summoned to Moscow Filipp, abbot of the Solovetskii Monastery on an island in the far north White Sea, to become the next metropolitan of Moscow. On the road to Moscow, Filipp meets a young girl named Masha, orphaned by the oprichniki and now fleeing for her life. Upon arriving in Moscow, Filipp is warned by his nephew, Ivan Borisovich Kolychev, about to depart the city with the Russian army to defend Polotsk against the Poles, not to accept the position of metropolitan. At first, Filipp rejects the office unless Ivan abolishes the oprichnina and ceases his cruel persecution of innocent Christians. However, in the face of the tsar’s adamant refusal to terminate the oprichnina Filipp accepts a compromise in which he promises not to “interfere” in the oprichnina but retains the traditional right of the metropolitan to intercede for mercy on behalf of disgraced boyars. The Muscovite commanders, including his nephew, leave Polotsk to return to Moscow thinking they had defeated the Polish-Lithuanian forces besieging it. However, after their departure the city had fallen (in fact Muscovy held Polotsk until 1579, long after Filipp’s death). Filipp, knowing that they 3 Undoubtedly, Tsar′ is also an allegory about Stalin. See Kevin M. F Plattt, review of Tsar′ by Lungin, KinoKultura 28 [2010], www.kinokultura.com/2010/28r-tsar-ko.shtml, not discussed here. For Platt’s interpretation of Tsar′ as a film about Ivan, see Platt, Terror & Greatness, 267–68. 4 Peter Rollberg, The A to Z of Russian and Soviet Cinema (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2010), 422–23.

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now faced Ivan’s wrath, hides them from the tsar. Ivan discovers that Filipp is shielding them from him and has them arrested and tortured. Filipp refuses to sanction the commanders’ executions. After two commanders are mauled to death by a bear,5 Masha tries to dissuade the bear from killing Filipp’s nephew, only, evidently, to lose her life instead. The metropolitan retrieves Masha’s apparently lifeless body.6 His nephew is later publicly beheaded before his eyes after refusing under torture to perjure himself and accuse his uncle of treason. Filipp will not bless Ivan in church and at Ivan’s command is removed from office and imprisoned in the Otroch′ Monastery in Tver′. In his cell, Filipp’s chains miraculously fall off. Ivan visits him to secure a blessing to punish the “treasonous” city of Novgorod, accused of colluding with the king of Poland to betray Russia. When Filipp says he will not, Ivan has his cruelest henchman, the oprichnik Maliuta Skuratov, murder him. The monks disobey Skuratov’s order to deliver Filipp’s body to him and barricade themselves in their church. In retaliation, Skuratov orders the oprichniki to set fire to the church, burning them all alive. Ivan returns to his newly constructed torture “city” (amusement park) but despite his orders, the inhabitants of Moscow do not show up to witness its opening. Because Tsar′ is a movie, not a scholarly monograph, it has no footnotes to indicate what Lungin, who co-wrote the screenplay, read during his research for the film. It is therefore impossible not only to determine which Muscovite sources he read directly and which he accessed indirectly via scholarly literature but even which scholarly monographs most influenced his conception of Ivan’s reign. By default we shall have to rely on inference in drawing connections between Tsar′ and its historical foundations. Lungin’s film reflects selective use of several Muscovite sources about Ivan’s reign and Filipp’s life. The primary historical source for Lungin’s narrative of the relationship between Ivan and Filipp is Filipp’s vita (zhitie)

5 Volodikhin interprets the bear as a pagan symbol. In Volodikhin’s reading of the film Lungin presents Ivan as trying to revive paganism. Volodikhin, Ivan IV Groznyi, 241–47. 6 Masha does not reappear in the film, so I infer she had died, although the movie does not clarify this detail by showing her funeral. Eva Binder, “Rethinking History: Heroes, Saints and Martyrs in Contemporary Russian Cinema,” in Berezhnaya and Schnitt, Iconic Turns, 154, suggests that Masha represents a holy fool but her behavior has nothing in common with that of holy fools. Masha is a pure-hearted innocent and martyr-victim.

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written in the 1590s,7 although Filipp was not officially canonized until the seventeenth century. Obviously, Lungin follows the vita in presenting Filipp as a saint, a man of integrity who will not sacrifice his Christian conscience to satisfy the immoral political demands of a tyrant, but Lungin does not follow its text slavishly.8 Filipp became metropolitan after the establishment of the oprichnina. As mentioned above, at first Filipp refused to accept the office of metropolitan unless Ivan abolished the oprichnina, but later he compromised. In return for his promise not to “interfere” in the oprichnina, Ivan conceded that Filipp could continue the traditional role of metropolitan in petitioning the tsar for mercy for disgraced aristocrats and other people. The vita omits these negotiations and has Filipp become metropolitan before the creation of the oprichnina. Lungin, however, follows history, not the vita, and creatively has Filipp’s agreement to the aforesaid conditions read aloud to the populace of Moscow at the Lobnoe mesto (Golgotha) in Red Square.9 Lungin’s saintly Filipp was therefore not above compromise in Tsar′, although trying to meet Ivan halfway proves impossible and Filipp reverts to opposition sermons very much in the tradition of the vita. Lungin uses a miracle in the vita, repeated in Prince Andrei Kurbskii’s History of the Grand Princes of Moscow, that Filipp’s chains fell off by themselves when he is imprisoned in the Otroch′ Monastery in Tver′.10 Lungin does not directly employ the story in Kurbskii’s History that the metropolitan tamed a hungry bear put in his cell to devour him.11 It remains possible that Lungin adapted this incident in the scene where Filipp goes into the bear pit, discussed below. For narrative effect, Lungin has Ivan visit Filipp in his prison cell when the tsar is marching to punish the supposed “treason” of the city of 7

Paul Bushkovitch, “The Life of Metropolitan Filipp: Tsar and Metropolitan in the Late Sixteenth Century,” in Medieval Russian Culture, vol. 2, ed. Michael S. Flier and Daniel Rowland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 29–46; Kolobkov, Mitropolit Filipp i stanovlenie moskovskogo samoderzhaviia; Lobakova, Zhitie mitropolita Filippa. 8 Lobakova, Zhitie mitropolita Filippa contains texts of several redactions of the vita, of which the most relevant here are the earliest, the short redaction (149–63), the Tulupov Redaction (164–204), and two versions of the Kolychev redaction (205–41). 9 For the text of the agreement of the terms under which Filipp accepted the office of metropolitan, see Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi Kollegii inostrannykh del, part 1 (Moscow: Tipografiia N. S. Vsevolozhskago, 1813), 193, 557–58. 10 Lobakova, Zhitie mitropolita Filippa, 160; Fennell, Prince A. M. Kurbsky’s History, 238–39. 11 Fennell, Prince A. M. Kurbsky’s History, 238–39.

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Novgorod. Ivan tries personally to persuade Filipp to bless the assault on Novgorod, whose current archbishop, Pimen, had led the church council which convicted the metropolitan of wrongdoing and sanctioned his removal from office. Ivan hoped that in retaliation Filipp would sanction Pimen’s removal from office. In the vita, Ivan only sends Skuratov to makes this case to Filipp on Ivan’s behalf. Lungin’s creative license is highly effective dramatically because it stages a personal encounter between the protagonists of the film. After Ivan fails to induce Filipp to provide political support for Ivan’s repression of Novgorod, he signals Skuratov to enter the cell and murder Filipp. In Tsar′, Maliuta Skuratov, after strangling Filipp, complains to the monks that they let Filipp die from starvation rather than following the far more plausible accusation in the vita that the monks let Filipp die of “bad air.”12 The symptoms of asphyxiation would have been more credible in a strangulation victim than death by starvation. Why Lungin departed from the vita on this point is unclear. The refusal of the monks in the film to turn over Filipp’s corpse to Skuratov and their subsequent incineration alive, including Filipp’s jailor who was not only alive and well in the 1590s but supposedly an informant to the author of the vita, does not derive from the vita of Filipp or any other Muscovite source, but it does highlight the piety of the Otroch′ Monastery monks who voluntarily share Filipp’s martyrdom. If Lungin follows Filipp’s vita in spirit in portraying Filipp, he does not do so in portraying Ivan. Ivan is a very ambiguous figure in the vita. In fact, Ivan stage-managed the “trial” of Filipp by clerics which justified Filipp’s removal as metropolitan, but in the vita Ivan is shocked to learn that the clerics who denounced Filipp’s moral shortcomings had committed perjury.13 In the vita, Ivan does not directly order Skuratov to murder Filipp. In Tsar′, Ivan does explicitly give that fatal order, although in the seventeenth century Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich thought Ivan sufficiently guilty that Aleksei publicly repented for Ivan’s guilt. Lungin’s treatment of Ivan as pure evil is far more hostile than his portrayal in the vita of Filipp. Although no additional concrete details in the film are traceable to Kurbskii’s History, Lungin consistently echoes the essential point of the History that all of the tsar’s victims were innocent. Nothing could be further from Eisenstein’s depiction of all of Ivan’s victims as guilty. It is no accident that Eisenstein 12 Lobakova, Zhitie mitropolita Filippa, 161. 13 Ibid., 161.

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never depicts the tsar using torture but that Lungin does, and extremely graphically. In Tsar′, the oprichniki carry brooms and dogs’ heads on the necks of their horses. This detail of their horses’ accouterments appears in an account by Johann Taube and Elert Kruse, Livonian Germans captured by Muscovite troops who then entered Ivan’s service. After their later defection from Russia, they wrote a scathing account of Ivan’s atrocities which describes the mounted oprichniki as they are depicted in the film. Only a seventeenth-century Russian candlestick base engraving corroborates this image.14 The account of Heinrich von Staden, another German serving Ivan but this time truly voluntarily even if he too defected later, describes the oprichniki as carrying only brooms on their horses’ necks. Ironically, as we shall see below, Lungin follows Staden on the architecture of the Moscow oprichnina “court” but not on the oprichniki horse adornments. Eisenstein’s oprichniki carry neither brooms nor dogs’ heads. Lungin’s independent approach to Muscovite sources is matched by his eclectic use of Russian historiography. His overall presentation of Ivan’s reign and Ivan’s motivation corresponds most closely to Iurganov’s conclusions.15 According to the Byzantine calendar utilized in Muscovy from the Creation, the year 1492 was the year 7000. Given apocalyptic concepts of the seventh millennium, the approach of the year 7000 set off a wave of eschatological dread.16 One defense against the argument that the world would end in 1492 was to contend that the Seventh Millennium could also terminate in the year 7070 (1562). Iurganov argues that after 1562 Ivan could not stand the tension of awaiting the Apocalypse and by 1564–1565 he initiated the oprichnina to purge the Russian people of sin in anticipation of the Last Judgment. Ivan conceived the era of the oprichnina in apocalyptic terms,17 but other Muscovites also subscribed to that perspective. 14 Charles J. Halperin, “Did Ivan IV’s Oprichniki Carry Dogs’ Heads on Their Horses?” Canadian-American Slavic Studies 46 (2012): 40–67. 15 For the convenience of the reader I regurgitate Iurganov’s theory from chapter 1. 16 Michael S. Flier, “Till the End of Time: The Apocalypse in Russian Historical Experience before 1500,” in Orthodox Russia: Belief and Practice under the Tsars, ed. Valerie A Kivelson and Robert H Greene (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 127–58. 17 Iurganov, “Oprichnina i strashnyi sud,” was incorporated into Iurganov, Kategorii russkoi srednevekovoi kul′tury, 356–404, and then expanded in Andrei Vital′evich Karavashkin and Andrei L′vovich Iurganov, Opyt istoricheskoi fenomenologii. Trudnyi put k ochevidnosti (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2003), 66–115.

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Lungin appropriates in its entirety Iurganov’s perception of the social and religious “mood” of the time of the oprichnina.18 An apocalyptic atmosphere suffuses Tsar′ from start to finish. However, in the film the subtext of such evocations of the “End of Days” presents Ivan as the Anti-Christ, as Filipp’s conversation with his nephew upon his arrival in Moscow implicitly suggests, an echo of Kurbskii’s terminology. Iurganov adopted the description of the Moscow “court” of the oprichnina in Staden’s account as modeled after the Temple of Jerusalem, structured to await the coming of the Messiah.19 Whereas Iurganov could only argue the point with words, Lungin constructed a “court” in the movie to look like the Temple of Jerusalem. Furthermore in the film Ivan mouths Iurganov’s interpretation in explaining the design of the “court” to the aforementioned Masha. In Tsar′ Ivan assigns construction of the Moscow oprichnina “court” to slave gangs of virginal daughters of the boyars under the direction of oprichniki overseers to keep the “court” “pure,” which is not based upon Staden or any Muscovite source. Lungin similarly incorporates into the film the theory of one of the film’s historical consultants, Andrei Bulychev, that Ivan used execution by wild animals, ad bestiarum, because it gave him plausible deniability.20 According to Bulychev, Ivan could contend that he was not executing anyone by putting him in a bear pit because God decided the accused’s fate. A comparable theory applied to medieval and early Muscovite use of ordeals or trial by combat. In the film, Ivan makes precisely this argument to Filipp.21 In the movie, the bear does not kill Filipp after he has entered the pit to retrieve Masha’s body. This incident may echo the miracle-tale in the Kurbskii’s History in which Filipp tames a hungry bear placed in his Otroch′ Monastery cell in hopes it would eat him.22

18 Binder writes that Lungin unites “two contradictory myths” of Ivan, “the God-fearing doubter and the paranoid ruler with diabolical characteristics who is obsessed with the apocalypse” (Binder, “Rethinking History,” 152). 19 Heinrich von Staden, The Land and Government of Muscovy: A Sixteenth-Century Account, ed. and trans. Thomas Esper (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 48–52. The actions of the character Heinrich von Staden in Tsar′ are entirely fictional and have no relationship whatsoever to the historical Staden. 20 Bulychev, Mezhdu sviatymi i demonami, 108–51. 21 The set of the pit would appear to have been copied from the 1862 painting by M. I. Peskov, Kulachnyi boi pri Ivane Groznom / A Fistfight during Ivan the Terrible’s Time. 22 Fennell, Prince A. M. Kurbsky’s History, 238–39.

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In their semiotic analyses of the religious symbolism of Ivan’s reign, Iurganov and Bulychev generally refrain from assessing Ivan’s character or mental health. By default, their interpretations become Ivan’s justification for his actions. To be sure, in other publications Iurganov and Bulychev characterize Ivan as a cruel despot.23 Lungin’s portrayal of the tsar creates the same impression of him, but goes far beyond it. In Tsar′, Ivan is a sadistic tyrant who mercilessly sentences his innocent nobles to torture and death. Ivan clearly conceives of his own actions in a religious light, invoking the arguments of Iurganov and Bulychev. But Filipp’s opposition undercuts the tsar’s conception of himself as a good Orthodox Christian fulfilling God’s will. Ivan and Filipp agree that Ivan will be judged by God but disagree in their expectations as to that judgment. Ivan’s religious belief in the coming apocalypse may be sincere but, the film argues, he is sincerely wrong that his faith justifies his oppression of his people.24 That Filipp knows God’s opinion of Ivan better than Ivan emanates from the very premise of the movie: that Filipp is a saint. Ivan’s defensive denial of his responsibility for the deaths of his boyars in the bear pit seems glib and unconvincing in the film.25 Despite the ambiguities of Lungin’s treatment of Ivan’s religious convictions Tsar′ shows Ivan’s self-justification to be false, something neither Iurganov nor Bulychev, Lungin’s historical authorities, has ever said point blank, although in Iurganov’s case it would appear to be his view as well. Lungin’s depiction of Ivan’s character in Tsar′ devolves from Karamzin’s passionate moral critique of the “bad” Ivan from the early nineteenth century.26 Lungin, however, presents an additional interpretation which cannot be found in Karamzin, following Kovalevskii that Ivan was insane. At night, the tsar hallucinates, debating the righteousness of his actions 23 Iurganov, “U istokov despotizma,” 34–75. 24 Platt, Terror & Greatness, 267 concludes that in Tsar′ Ivan’s motivations include inter alia “misguided religiosity.” 25 By the middle of the sixteenth century Russian court procedure eschewed the use of the medieval ordeals of fire and water. Although legislation continued to allow for judicial duels, the church opposed them, like ordeals, because they demanded a miracle from God. Litigants demanded judicial duels during Ivan’s reign to illustrate their credibility, but no one actually fought one. Horace W. Dewey, “Trial by Combat in Muscovite Russia,” Oxford Slavonic Papers 9 (1960): 21–31; George G. Weickhardt, “Muscovite Judicial Duels as Legal Fiction,” Kritika 7 (2006): 714–32, reprinted in idem, Early Russian Law (Idyllwild, CA: Charles Schlacks, 2008), chapter 12, 255–76. 26 The chronology of the Tsar′ does not treat the period of Karamzin’s “good” Ivan.

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with the ghosts of his victims. This haunting and horrifying scene might be interpreted as the product of his guilty conscience, but, as I read the film, he does not have a conscience—he only thinks he does. Or hallucinations could reflect more than mere paranoia, frequently ascribed to Ivan in contemporary Western and Russian scholarship, but clinical schizophrenia. Lungin more than hints at this possibility. Eisenstein’s explicitly rejected psychiatric diagnoses of Ivan. If Lungin does adhere to the insanity theory, then once again he does so from his own personal perspective. Psychological explanations of Ivan’s behavior have a long pedigree in scholarship. The major differences among advocates of Ivan’s mental disability result from reliance on differing psychiatric schools. Some historians, such as Richard Hellie, rely on Freud, others, such as Robert Crummey or Isabel de Madariaga, do not. However, a curious difference distinguishes this insanity school as a whole from Lungin’s characterization of Ivan, namely the issue of sex. Invariably, insanity theories diagnose the tsar not only with a persecution complex, delusions of grandeur, paranoia, and even schizophrenia, but also with sexual perversity and both heterosexual and homosexual promiscuity, not just in marrying in one form or another seven wives, but also in rape, both heterosexual and homosexual-bisexual. In Tsar′, Ivan does not even have sex with his young, beautiful trophy wife Mariia Chekasskaia, who sleeps not in the traditional women’s quarters in the Kremlin but in Ivan’s bed, but does so alone as he stays up all night praying for a sign of divine approval, at least when he is not hallucinating. But Lungin qualifies Ivan’s sexual restraint. The tsar informs his wife that because he is praying to God for a sign of divine approval, that Filipp will come to Moscow and assume the office of metropolitan, Ivan is keeping himself pure. Insanity theories of Ivan do not credit him with enough religious fervor to enable him even to imagine, let alone practice, temporary sexual abstinence. Lungin has thus put his own spin on Ivan’s mental health by qualifying it with the tsar’s religious ardor. Such behavior would seem to contradict the notion that Ivan’s religiosity is no more than a cynical rationale for his immorality. Lungin’s historiographic eclecticism drew the line, however, at making any obeisance to apologias for Ivan’s atrocities. In his masterful survey of images of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian culture, Kevin Platt identifies the ambivalent element of the mythology of Ivan, in whom some writers and artists have

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perceived greatness as well as terror.27 Lungin, however, adheres strictly to the “terror” interpretation of the tsar espoused by Karamzin for the “bad” Ivan, the imperial Russian novelist and playwright Aleksei K. Tolstoy, Petr Chaikovskii and Nikolai Rimskii-Korsakov in their operas, and Ilya Repin in his painting of the ruler after he has killed his son Tsarevich Ivan. Lungin alludes to none of the “greatness,” foreign expansion or state-building invoked by historians from the imperial Russian Solov′ev and Nikolai Kavelin through Pavel Miliukov to the Stalinist “cult” as exculpation of, if not justification for, Ivan’s violent “excesses.” In this, Lungin also rejects Eisenstein’s portrayal of a morally ambiguous but politically justified tsar. Within the context of modern Russian cultural conceptions of Ivan, Lungin’s is monochromatic. Along the same lines, Lungin also rejected a trend in current Russian culture, the movement of some extreme Great Russian chauvinists, ultra-Russian Orthodox, antisemitic monarchists to have Ivan canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church, discussed above. Lungin’s Ivan hardly qualifies for sainthood. In other movies, such as Luna Park and Tycoon, the director skewers antisemitism.28 Before making Tsar′, he explained in an interview that although he was born a Jew he was not religious. However, he identified himself as Jewish in response to antisemitism to protest their bigotry.29 As was to be expected, these rabid right-wingers went positively ballistic at the release of Tsar′.30 Maniagin, a Russian Orthodox extremist who had written in favor of Ivan’s canonization,31 demanded that the president of the Russian Federation ban the film from public broadcast (which would have been too little, too late, as it had already not only been shown in movie theaters but also on TV, as well as released on DVD in 2009, and an 27 Platt, Terror & Greatness. 28 Rollberg, The A to Z, 119, 422–23; Peter Pozefsky, “Russian Gangster Films as Popular History: Genre, Ideology and Memory in Pavel Lungin’s Tycoon,” Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 2 (2008): 299–325. 29 Marcia Pally, “Talking about my Generation: Interview with Pavel Loungine,” Cineaste 18, no. 2 (1991): 24–26. 30 According to Binder, Lungin refused to create patriotic history. In Tsar′ the people are a “submissive, bloodthirsty mob demanding gold coins reminiscent of the audience of Roman gladiatorial combats, “a mob that is swept up in Ivan’s madness” by dragging him through the streets on a blanket (Binder, “Rethinking History,” 153, 155). The theme of the “people” in the film merits further study. 31 Maniagin, Apologiia groznogo tsaria. Aleksandr Tiurin, Voina i mir Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Iauza, EKSMO, 2009), 336 dismisses Lungin as Russophobic.

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estimated one million people viewed it),32 confining it to private viewing like pornography.33 Maniagin’s fulminations apparently had no effect. As previously mentioned, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church had quashed the movement to have Ivan canonized by insisting that if he were canonized, Filipp would have to be “un-canonized.” Filipp could not be a saint if his murderer were a saint. Lungin is a favored filmmaker of the Russian Orthodox Church for his positive portrayal of Russian Orthodox Christianity in his other films.34 Lungin received permission from the patriarch to make Tsar′. A priest, Ivan Okhlobystin, received permission to take the role of Ivan’s court jester in the film. He realized afterward that this had been a mistake and resigned his priestly office. Dvorkin, well known to historians for a monograph on Ivan,35 a lay employee of the patriarchate dealing with sectarians and an active opponent of the Ivan’s canonization, played Archbishop Pimen in the film. Two of its historical consultants were the otherwise unknown priests Father Kosma and Father Iov. In Eva Binder’s judgment, the message of the film is that Russia is safe only in the hands of the Russian Orthodox Church.36 Without question, Tsar′ cedes moral superiority to the church over the state. Given the solicitousness of so many politicians in Russia toward the Russian Orthodox Church, the secular authorities would most likely have deferred to their spiritual betters on this matter, rather than humoring the delusions of a monarchist fringe group violently opposed to the current Russian political system. The patriarch’s refusal to tolerate assertions of Ivan’s sanctity ended the canonization campaign but did not silence its advocates. Some subsequent scholarship by “fellow travelers” of the advocates of Ivan’s canonization does not explicitly argue that Ivan should be canonized, but whitewashes his actions in 32 Binder, “Rethinking History,” 141. 33 “Tsar′ (fil′m),” https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A6%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%8C_ (%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BC), accessed March 14, 2011. 34 For differing evaluations of The Island cf. Alexander Etkind, “The tale of two turns: Khrustalev, My Car! and the cinematic memory of the Soviet past,” Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 4 (2010): 48–50; Mark Lipovetsky, “The importance of being pious: Pavel Lungin’s ‘Island,’” KinoKultura 15 (2007), www.kinokultura.com/2007/15r-island. html; Per-Arne Bodin, “The Holy Fool as TV Hero: About Pavel Lungin’s Film The Island and the Problem of Authenticity,” Journal of Aesthetics and Culture 3 (2011): 1–9; idem, “Holy Foolishness and Postmodern Culture,” in Holy Foolishness in Russian: New Perspectives, ed. Priscilla Hunt and Svitlana Kobets (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2011), 363–65. 35 Dvorkin, Ivan the Terrible as a Religious Type. 36 Binder, “Rethinking History,” 155.

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terms of Russian Orthodox Christianity and antisemitism.37 Nikolai Uskov, a medieval historian and then editor in chief of the Russian journal GQ defended Lungin in Nezavisimaia gazeta by attacking advocates of destructive patriotism. Government exists for the people, Uskin declared, not vice versa.38 Eisenstein’s Ivan is a pious, patriotic, and successful defender of the Russian state and the Russian people, who is compelled by circumstance to play the cruel executioner. Lungin’s tsar is a deluded religious hypocrite and sadist who destroys Russia for the sake of his ego. In conclusion, Lungin’s use of Muscovite sources and Russian historiography partakes of some but not all the characteristics of each. Concerning sources, Lungin borrows the miracle of the chains and Filipp’s sanctity from the vita of Filipp but not its rewriting of history to finesse Filipp’s compromise with Ivan on the continuation of the oprichnina. Lungin endorses Staden’s description of the Moscow headquarters of the oprichnina but relies on the description of the “hood ornaments” on the horses of the oprichniki, not by Staden, but by Taube and Kruse. Concerning historiography, Lungin takes his elucidation of Ivan’s self-justification from Iurganov and Bulychev, but his characterization of Ivan more from Kurbskii, Karamzin, and Kovalevskii, even though their criticisms of Ivan reflect different theoretical bases. Lungin’s choices of sources and secondary works illustrate the contradictoriness of the former and the lack of consensus among the latter, which are surely related. What he does most consistently is reject secondary works which apologize for, let alone celebrate, Ivan’s actions. In Tsar′, Ivan’s reign is not just bad, but disastrous for Russia. Its only praiseworthy aspect is the shining star of Filipp’s pure religious faith.

37 For remarks from authors of this orientation on Lungin’s Tsar′ see Fomin, Prava o pervom russkom tsare, 6 (by Fomin), 444 (by Froianov). 38 Wijermars, Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia, 198.

Conclusion

This book has explored the multiple contradictory images of Ivan that the abolition of censorship and the creation of a private publishing industry permitted to appear in print in Russia since 1991. The recalcitrant nature of the extant historical sources about Ivan, their gaps, genre weaknesses, and tendentiousness facilitate the advancement of conflicting interpretations of Ivan, a circumstance maximized by the politicization of his personality and reign. The lack of definitive documentary proof of much of what we think we know about Ivan is conducive to the utilization of his reign as a political foil onto which current cultural anxieties can be projected. Political and economic instability in Russia since 1991 has only exacerbated the distortion of his reign for polemical purposes. Divisions of opinion among professional historians make it impossible for academic scholarship to respond adequately to amateur theories of Ivan that rewrite Russian history as fantasy (the New Chronology) or pervert history in order to propose his canonization. The association of Ivan and Stalin initiated by Stalin himself inspires neo-Stalinist reconceptualizations of Ivan’s reign, sometimes denuded of historical context (the argument for the reestablishment of an oprichnina). Meanwhile, textbooks and surveys seem immune to the blandishments of apologies for Ivan and professional specialists try to do their research without triggering major polemical debates, even at the cost of omitting Ivan from the history of his own reign. The complexity and contradictions of his reign undermine attempts to distinguish “serious” from “non-serious” images of him or to blame only amateurs for the fantasies that abound about him. While xenophobia, antisemitism, and conspiracy theories grace right-wing defenses of Ivan, his apologists differ in privileging religious (Russian Orthodox Christianity) or statist criteria to justify his actions; and critics, right wing and left wing, mobilize those same religious and statist principles to criticize Ivan. Even antisemites

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cannot agree about him. Historians in Russia writing about the tsar face an obstacle that does not trouble non-Russian historians: the weight of his persona in Russian culture, the sheer power of his charisma in the country’s historical memory. That factor overwhelms a laudable attempt to step outside the parameters of the Russian historical paradigm to examine Ivan from an imperial perspective. Politicization of Ivan’s image seems to be assumed by his defenders and critics alike, and infuses studies of Ivan’s personality and reign with an anachronistic orientation. Proponents and critics of the tsar also share, far too much, a Russian national perspective on him when it comes to pastoral nomads, Mongols, and Muslim Tatars, although his critics manage to avoid the excesses of Great Russian chauvinism of his advocates. For this reason, the judgments of Ivan from the point of view of Tatar history are a healthy antidote. I leave to others to extract Ivan’s image from the national histories of former Soviet republics that he invaded during the Livonian War—the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The Great Man theory of history fastens on Ivan as the “poster boy” of whatever an author thinks laudable or deplorable in Russian history. Mutually exclusive posters of Russia’s exceptionalism portray the same “poster boy” as emblem of Russian Orthodox Christian piety or Russian imperialist expansionism. Western historians also fall into this trap, reifying him as a, indeed the most, typical personification of Russian authoritarianism. The unique features of Ivan’s reign, without which it cannot be understood, get lost in the process. I can only speculate on why Russians have projected their cultural anxieties onto Ivan rather than another Russian ruler. It is true that many of the major “big questions” of Russian history come to the fore in examining his reign: the relationships of state and society and church and state, political structure and political culture, relations with the East (here the Muslim Tatar world) and the West, and Russia’s great power status. But that correlation does not suffice to explain Ivan the Terrible’s prominence in Russian historical memory. Grand Prince Ivan III the Great greatly expanded Muscovy’s boundaries and supposedly threw off the “Tatar Yoke.” He married a Byzantine princess. His reign witnessed a major religious crisis over heresy and the Apocalypse and a vicious dynastic struggle over succession. Some Russian historians contrast his successful reign with the failures of Ivan the Terrible. Yet the dramatic events of Ivan III have not received nearly the same attention that Ivan IV’s reign enjoys.

Conclusion

Let me suggest that this same refractory source base that inspires and distorts research on Ivan IV also explains how Russians are so fixated on his personality and reign. Those sources gave rise to his reputation, the persona that demands that he not be ignored. Accounts by foreigners, whether visitors to Muscovy or armchair Russia experts, whether travel accounts, scurrilous pamphlets, or Livonian chronicles, invented the “black book” of the tsar’s despotism and barbarity, aided and abetted by the epistles and History of the Grand Prince of Moscow by the emigre Prince Andrei Kurbskii. The tendentiousness and frequent unreliability of all these sources, let alone the question of the authenticity of Kurbskii’s work, are beside the point. Ivan’s epistles and the other texts he authored, to Kurbskii, to contemporary rulers, to the Kirillo-Beloozero Monastery, to Simeon Bekbulatovich, and his testament, despite verboseness, incoherence, historical distortion, and excess, and regardless of the question of their authenticity, created Ivan’s literary persona that became the leitmotif of his personality. Whether negative or positive, these sources portray him in sharply dramatic terms as a dominant, indeed dominating, figure. Ivan III and other Muscovite rulers seem colorless in comparison. Ivan IV strides through sixteenth-century Muscovite history as a giant, charismatic, a perfect magnet in Russian historical memory for all of the aspirations and desperation of Russia’s past, present, and future. It is no wonder that since 1991, Ivan has remained the center of attention, the fulcrum around which every conceivable interpretation of Russian history rotates. He receives so much attention because the sources for his reign present us with a persona who demands so much attention. This book has analyzed nonfiction publications about Ivan the Terrible that appeared in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. I have used online material only when necessary to fill in gaps as a result of inaccessible publications. Nonfiction publications do not, however, exhaust the images of Ivan produced in Russia. A comprehensive understanding of Ivan the Terrible’s image in Russian culture since the fall of Communism must take into account an enormous amount of additional material. The textual and visual evidence about him posted to the internet would by itself take years to analyze. Wijermars admitted making only limited use of online memory discourse.1 Websites propagate the views of advocates of every political and cultural trend expressed in publications discussed in this book. This material amplifies and supplements print works. 1 Ibid., 5.

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This book has also dealt with two films, one new, which appeared during the period in question, and the other, one that will never grow old. A full appreciation of current Russian historical memory of Ivan must address the legacy of imperial and Soviet culture as well as the contribution of new works of art created since 1991. To be sure, not all pre-1991 works merit continued attention except by specialists. However, even a cursory survey demonstrates the volume of pre-1991 artistic works whose aesthetic quality has earned them a place in Russia culture today. In opera, Rimskii-Korsakov’s Maid of Pskov and perhaps The Tsar’s Bride stand out, and perhaps Tchaikovsky’s Oprichnik remains of interest. In drama, Alexei K. Tolstoy’s Death of Ivan the Terrible might be performed and/or read, in fiction his novel Prince Serebrianyi might still be read. In sculpture, pride of place goes to Antokolsky’s Ivan the Terrible. In painting, of course, the two standouts are Repin’s Ivan the Terrible and His Son on November 16, 1581 and Vasnetsov’s Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Antokolsky’s, Repin’s, and Vasnetsov’s works are readily accessible online or in person at the Tret′iakov Gallery in Moscow, but there are scores of historical paintings of the tsar and his reign in museums in Moscow and St. Petersburg and certainly reproduced on the internet. I do not know if there are any post-1991 plays or novels written about Ivan. Vladimir Sorokin’s science fiction novel Oprichnik is not about Ivan the Terrible, but still propagates an image of the oprichnina reflective of sixteenth-century Russian history. Bulgakov’s play Ivan the Terrible Changes Profession can be performed or read, but also seen on film. In addition to Eisenstein’s old film and Lungin’s new film, documentaries and other “art” films about the tsar have appeared since 1991 (admittedly none as famous as Lungin’s). A 2009 sixteen-episode television film on the state-owned channel Rossiia, directed by Aleksandr Eshpar, replete with graphic torture, rape, and murder, distinguishes Ivan from other tyrants by his willingness at the end of his life to repent, which qualified or at least tried to qualify its standard reiteration of Karamzin’s conception of the good Ivan/bad Ivan. Metropolitan Makarii persuades the tsar to undertake the burden, from which Ivan repeatedly tries to be released, of defending the Third Rome. Ivan is self-sacrificing and does not seek power. The paranoid tsar is misled by false information about conspiracies against him from his entourage, on whom he is dependent, although some conspiracies were real. Ivan sees through papal attempts to subvert Russia by persuading him to convert to Catholicism. He is superstitious but well-educated (his mother gives

Conclusion

him German lessons). The film presents a positive image of the poisoned Anastasiia, but negative views of all other women as manipulative conspirators. A loyal Kurbskii defects because of false allegations against him. Viewer reaction was decidedly mixed, and viewership declined after the first few episodes.2 On the previously mentioned The Name is Russia, painter Il′ia Glazunov defended Ivan by the usual apologetic excuse that other contemporary European rulers caused more deaths than he did.3 On the Trial of Time (Sud vremeni) television talk show in 2005, the liberal Leonid Mlechin debated the conservative Sergei Kurginian in a three-part episode titled “Ivan IV: Bloody Tyrant or Successful Political Actor?” about whether the tsar’s violence was excessive or justified by Muscovy’s territorial expansion. Kurginian “refuted” Ivan’s insanity by calling attention to his intellectual and artistic talents, but Nikolai Svanidze, the “judge” of the show, listed tyrants who were insane and artistic, including Hitler. The audience of the supposedly liberal Channel 5 voted conservatively, causing great discomfort to the program, which Svanidze attributed the vote to Stockholm syndrome: the Russian people identified with their oppressor.4 At the time of the TV shows, photo-shopped memes of Russian paintings, including Repin’s, depicted Ivan as a vampire.5 A memorial plaque in Arkhangel′sk, set up in 2012, acclaims Ivan for founding the city, promoting democratic reforms, and patronizing book publication. At that time it was the only public monument to Ivan. A proposal for a statue in an Orthodox brotherhood village supposedly structured as an oprichnina came to naught. But since 2017 at least three new statues of Ivan, one in Orel (I do not know the name of the sculptor), the second, now in Moscow after protests led to its dismantling in Aleksandrov, created by Vasilii Selivanov, and a third, about which I have little information, in Cheboksary.6 Journalist and television personality Mikhail Leont′ev ran a restaurant in Moscow, Oprichnik, which served “Old Russian” cuisine amid decorative dogs’ heads, brooms, and other oprichnina paraphernalia. In 2008, performance art group War (Voina) (which later gave birth to Pussy 2 3 4 5 6

Ibid., 185–92, seeks to correlate these topoi with the Putin myth. Ibid., 108. Ibid., 199–204. Ibid., 204–5. Ibid., 164, 181, 205. The Cheboksary sculpture appeared too late for inclusion in Wijermars’s book.

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Riot) welded its door shut amid anti-oprichnina slogans, including calling Leont′ev Putin’s “dog.”7 Aleksandrov, as mentioned above, is also the site of the only museum in Russia dedicated to Ivan the Terrible, where visitors may view the famous candlestick base with an engraving of a mounted oprichnik with a dog’s head and broom as accouterments. A different conception of that image of an oprichnik was immortalized in a toy soldier, but at about $6,000 in 2009 it probably had a limited appeal. The sculpted face of Ivan the Terrible appears on a sixteenth-century German cannon on display at the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg. Any historian in Russia studying the tsar, indeed any interested citizen in Russia, can become familiar with all of these works. The diversity of accessible cultural artifacts about Ivan, like the availability of nonfiction publications and digital resources, raises the troublesome issue of how to measure the impact of this material on popular conceptions of him. We can accumulate data on press runs of books or journals, but we do not know how many people read any given book or article. One purchased copy or subscribed issue might be shared among people, and library copies can be accessed by or lent to numerous patrons. Data are probably available for how many people saw films in theaters. Television ratings would estimate how many people watched films on television. Sales of DVD copies of films can be counted but not how many people view the DVDs. We might accrue statistics for how many people visit museums, including the State Historical-Architectural and Artistic Museum-Reserve “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda.” In the last analysis, such evidence would attest only to the extent of interest in Ivan among the Russian public. Sheer numbers do not and cannot convey what readers and viewers thought about what they had read or seen. Opinion polls attest only to how many Russians think that Ivan was important, but no more. If Ivan the Terrible “represents” Russia, then for good or ill? Wijermars concludes that the voting results of Trial of Time cannot be interpreted as a barometer of public opinion.8 The evidence of the books and articles on Russian history discussed in this study would suggest the possibility, probability, or certainty that Russians disagree about Ivan. The parameters of that disagreement nevertheless remain to be established. This book, I hope, will lay the foundation for such studies. 7 8

Ibid., 178. Ibid., 210–11.

Appendices

Appendix 3.1: Pro-Canonization Publications Ioann Groznyi. Pro et contra. Vol. 1. Aleksandrovskaia sloboda: Izdatel′skaia gruppa VNV, 2003.1 Bychkov, Roman. “Slovo o Groznom.” In Pro et contra 1, 10–14. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 14–18. “Chto takoe oprichnik?” In Pro et contra 1, 390–40. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 97–98. ———. Review of Apologiia groznogo tsaria. Kriticheskii obzor literatury o Tsare Ioanne Vasil′eviche Groznom, by V. G. Maniagin. In Pro et contra 1, 29–31. Not reprinted in Pro et contra 2. Erchak, V. M. “Pervyi pomazannik Bozhii na russkom trone.” In Pro et contra 1, 48–53. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 99–105. Eliseev, Aleksandr. “Oprichnaia eskhatologiia Groznogo Tsaria.” In Pro et contra 1, 54–62. Not reprinted in Pro et contra 2. Kozhevnikov, Vladimir. “Ivan Groznyi: Bozhe, Tsaria khrani.” In Pro et contra 1, appendix 2, 80–86. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 187–94. Kozlov, Nikolai. “Geneticheskoe oruzhie.” In Pro et contra 1, 32–38. Not reprinted in Pro et contra 2. Lavrinenko, Igor′. “O Sviatoi Rusi.” In Pro et contra 1, 63–65. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 116–19. Maikov, Apollon. “U groba Groznogo” (1888). In Pro et contra 1, appendix 1, 77–79. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, appendix 1, 183–86. Makeev, Anatolii. “Al′fa i omega russkogo samoderzhaviia.” In Pro et contra 1, 15–20. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 19–25. “Materialy Kruglogo stola, posviashchennogo 435-letiiu vvedeniia oprichniny.” Participants: A. Nevskii and M. Surkov from National Radio, Anatolii Makeev and A. Zhukov from the Oprichnina Brotherhood of Saint Venerable Iosif Volotskii, and Igor′ Lavrinenko, editor of the newspaper Tsarskii oprichnik. In Pro et contra 1, 41–47. Not reprinted in Pro et contra 2. 1 The first edition contains sixteen items, fourteen of them in favor of canonizing Ivan.

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Osipov, Vladimir, and Anatolii Makeev. “Monarkhicheskoe pravosoznanie i demokraticheskoe skomoroshestvo.” In Pro et contra 1, 66–71. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 120–25. Ioann Groznyi. Pro et contra. Vol. 2. Aleksandrovskaia sloboda: Izdatel′skaia gruppa VNV, 2003. [New contributions.]2 Barkashov, Aleksandr. “Pravoslavnyi sviatoi—tsar′ Ivan Groznyi.” In Pro et contra 2, 106–15. Bychkov, R. [R. B.]. “Neobkhodimoe posleslovie (K stat′e ep. Dionisiia [Alferova] ‘Monarkhiia i khristianskoe soznanie’).” In Pro et contra 2, 166–72. ———. “Partizanskoe tsarstvo.” In Pro et contra 2, appendix 4, 195–204. Eliseev, Aleksandr. “Ioann IV: Groznyi i sviatoi.” In Pro et contra 2, 173–174. Iashin, Sergei. Review of Pro et contra 1. In Pro et contra 2, 4–5. Mikhailov, Aleksandr. “Energetika slova.” In Pro et contra 2, 126–33. “Mitropolit Volokolamskii Pitirim o sviatosti Ivana Groznogo.” In Pro et contra 2, interview, appendix 6, 206. Maniagin, V. G. “Retsenziia na retsenziiu. Otkrytoe pis′mo.” In Pro et contra 2, 35–41. Shatokhin, Sergei. “Provotsiruiut tserkovnye raskoly.” In Pro et contra 2, 42–96. Makeev, Anatolii. Oprichnyi put′. Al′fa i omega russkogo samoderzhaviia. Moscow: Oprichnoe bratstvo sviatogo prepodobnogo Iosifa Volotskogo, 2001. Maniagin, V. G. Apologiia groznogo tsaria. Kriticheskii obzor literatury o tsare Ioanne Vasil′eviche Groznom. 2nd corr. and exp. ed. Moscow: Russkii Vestnik, 2002. Roundtable at Radonezh Radio, September 21, 2002. Interlocutors: journalist Leonid Bolotin, icon-painter Viktor Saulkin, and writer Andrei Khavlin.3

Appendix 3.2: Anti-Canonization Publications Ioann Groznyi. Pro et contra. Vol. 1. Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda: Izdatel′skaia gruppa VNV, 2003. Knoppe, Boris. “Mif o ‘Sviatom’ Ivane Groznom.” In Pro et contra 1, 3–9. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 6–13. Makarii (Veretennikov), arkhimandrit. “Po povodu nastroenii v pol′zu kanonizatsii tsaria Ioanna Groznogo.” In Pro et contra 1, 21–28. Reprinted in Pro et contra 2, 26–34.

2 The second edition reprinted eleven of the sixteen items from the first, of which nine favored canonization, and two opposed it. It contains eleven new items, four by authors who had contributed to the first, of which nine favor canonization and two are opposed. In toto then, in the second edition eighteen of the twenty-two items favor canonization. The second edition also includes seven black-and-white illustrations presumably depicting Ivan, without attribution, which appear to be of modern origin (10, 32, 63, 102, 109, 185, 188). 3 Sergei Bogatyrev called attention to this discussion in a posting to H-EarlySlavic on July 13, 2002; web link no longer accessible.

Appendices

Ioann Groznyi. Pro et contra. Vol. 2. Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda: Izdatel′skaia gruppa VNV, 2003. [New contributions.] Dionisii (Alferov), episkop. “Monarkhiia i khristianskoe soznanie.” In Pro et contra 2, 134–65. Shmelev, Aleksandr. “Kanonizatsiia Ioanna Groznogo, Grigoriia Rasputina i uchenie o russkoi teokratii.” In Pro et contra 2, appendix 1, 175–82. Tsar′ Ivan Vasil′evich: Groznyi ili Sviatoi? Argumenty Tserkvi protiv kanonizatsii Ivana Groznogo i Grigoriia Rasputina. Moscow: Izdatel′skii sovet Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 2004. Aleksii, Sviateishii Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rusi. “O popytkakh psevdorevnitelei pravoslaviia samochinno kanonizovat′ tiranov i avantiuristov.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 3–7. Andrei (Kuraev), d′iakon. “Grigorii Rasputin kak znamia russkoi reformatsii.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 28–42. Beglov, Aleksei. “O proiskhozhdenii religioznykh nastroenii, lezhashchikh v osnove pochitaniia Grigoriia Rasputina i Tsaria Ivana Groznogo.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 52–58. Dvorkin, Aleksandr. “Tsar′ Ivan Groznyi i sovremennoe sektanstvo.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 44–51. “Itogovyi dokument sektsii ‘Pravoslavnaia zhurnalistika’ XI Rozhdenstvenskikh obrazovatel′nykh chtenii.” January 29, 2003, Moscow. In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, appendix, 59–62. Makarii (Veretennikov), arkhimandrit. “Russkie mitropolity v epokhu Sviatitelia Makariia.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 17–21. Vladimir, Mitropolit Kievskii i vseia Ukrainy. “Ideia kanonizatsii Ivana Groznogo i Grigoriia Rasputina nosit provokatsionnyi kharakter.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 8–17. Vladislav (Tsypin), protoierei. “Ideia etoi kanonizatsii—provokatsionnaia.” In Groznyi ili Sviatoi?, 22–27. “Prilozhenie No. 4 k dokladu mitropolita Krutitskogo i Kolomenskogo Iuvenaliia, Predsedatelia Sinodal′noi kommissii po kanonizatsii sviatykh, na Arkhiereiskom Sobore Russkoi Tserkvi, 3–8 oktiabria 2004 goda.” http://orthodox.etel.ru/2004/38/rasputin.htm. Web link not active in 2020.

Appendix 6.1: Literature, Textbooks, and Surveys [1] Rybakov, Boris Aleksandrovich, and Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Preobrazhenskii, eds. Istoriia Otechestva. Uchebnik dlia vos′mogo klassa srednei shkoly. Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1993. Pages 119–28. Other authors included Anatolii Mikhailovich Sakharov and Boris Il′ich Krasnobaev, but chapters are not attributed to a single author. 2,644,000 copies—1st ed., 2,200,000 copies [2] Illiustrirovannaia istoriia Rossii do Petra Velikogo. St. Petersburg: “Leningradskaia galareia,” 1993. Pages 156–202.

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I could not identify the name of the editor. 100,000 copies [3] Liutykh, Anatolii Aleksandrovich, Oleg Vladimirovich Skobelskin, and Vladimir Alekseevich Tonkich. Istoriia Rossii (kurs lektsii). Voronezh: Tsentral′no-Chernozemnoe izdatel′stvo “Informator,” 1993. Pages 90–95, 128–36, 169–75. 5,000 copies [4] Munchaev, Sh. M., et al. Istoriia Rossii. Moscow: Rossiiskaia ekonomicheskaia akademiia im. G. V. Plekhanova, Otdelenie istorii, 1993. Pages 50–57. See [10] 10,000 copies [5] Gorinov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, and Leonid Mikhailovich Liashenko. Istoriia Rossii. Part 1, Ot drevnei Rusi k imperatorskoi Rossii (IX–XVIII vv.) (Uchebnoe posobie). Moscow: Obshchestvo “Znanie” Rossii, 1994. Pages 40–44. 25,000 copies [6] Michin, A. N., responsible ed. Istoriia Rossii IX–XX vv. Uchebnoe posobie dlia postupaiushchikh v vuzy. St. Petersburg: Logos, 1994. Pages 44–57. Pages on Ivan by Mikhail Mikhailovich Shumilov. 10,000 copies [7] Iurganov, Andrei L′vovich, and Leonid Aleksandrovich Katsva. Istoriia Rossii XVI– XVII vv. Moscow: MITOD, BENTANA–GRAF, 1995. Pages 7–90. 50,000 copies [8] Shakhmagonov, Fedor Fedorovich. Ot velikogo moskovskogo kniazheniia k rossiiskomu gosudarstvu. Series “Istoriia Rossii.” Moscow: TOO “Shik,” 1995. Pages 62–414. This is the longest discussion of Ivan analyzed in this chapter, virtually an entire monograph. It had previously escaped my attention because Ivan’s name does not occur in its title. 5,000 copies [9] Moriakov, Vladimir Ivanovich, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Fedorov, and Iurii Aleksandrovich Shchetinov. Istoriia Rossii. Posobie dlia starsheklassnikov i abiturientov. Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo iniversiteta, Izdatel′stvo GIS, 1996. Pages 63–80. 15,000 copies [10] Munchaev, Shamil′ Magomedovich, and Viktor Mikhailovich Ustinov. Istoriia Rossii, uchebnik dlia vuzov. Moscow: INFRA, Norma, 1997. Pages 71–80. See [4]. 11,000 copies [11] Sakharov, Andrei Nikolaevich, responsible ed.; co-authors Aleksei Petrovich Novosil′tsev, Vladimir Ivanovich Buganov, and Vladislav Dmitrievich Nazarov. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XVII veka. Moscow: AST, 1997. Pages 399–440, 446–47. 5,000 copies

Appendices

[12] Bogdanov, Andrei, and Aleksandr Stepanishev. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do Petra Veilikogo. Eksperimental′noe uchebnoe posobie dlia srednikh shkol. Moscow: TERRA-Knizhnyi klub, 1998. Pages 210–42. The number of copies is unknown. [13] Guts, Aleksandr Konstantinovich. Podlinnaia istoriia Rossii. Zapiski diletanta. Omsk: Omskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1999. Pages 57–58. 200 copies [14] Sorokina, Nina Matveevna. Istoriia Rossii. Zhenskii vzgliad. Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 1999. Pages 128–61.4 11,000 copies [15] Guts, Aleksandr Konstantinovich. Mnogovariantnaia istoriia Rossii. Moscow: AST; Saint Petersburg: POLIGON, 2000. Pages 332–44. 10,000 copies [16] Zuev, M. N., and A. A. Chernobaev, eds. Istoriia Rossii. Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 2001. Pages 75–87. 10,000 copies [17] Kravchenko, Sergei. Krivaia imperiia. Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo. Kratkii kurs. Moscow: Bystrov, Gelikon Plius, 2002. Pages 153–200. 5,100 copies [18] Perekhov, S. A., responsible ed.; A. V. Venkov, S. A. Kislitsyn, N. A. Mininkov, and I. M. Uznarodov. Istoriia Rossii (IX–XX vv.). Uchebnoe posobie. Moscow: Gardariki, MarT, 2002. Pages 118–39. Chapter on Ivan by Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mininkov. 5,000 copies [19] Potaturov, V. A., G. V. Tugusova, and M. G. Gurina, eds. Istoriia Rossii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia vuzov. Moscow: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2002. Pages 125–51. Chapter on Ivan by M. G. Gurina. 3,000 copies [20] Pavlenko, Nikolai Ivanovich, ed.; co-authors Igor′ L′vovich Andreev, Vladimir Borisovich Kobrin, and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Fedorov. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishkikh vremen do 1861 goda. 2nd corr. ed. Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 2003. Pages 139–57. Chapter on Ivan by V. B. Kobrin. 8,000 copies [21] Dvornichenko, A. Iu., S. G. Kashchenko, and M. F. Florinskii. Otechestvennaia istoriia (do 1917 goda). Moscow: Gardariki, 2004. Pages 118–34. 10,000 copies [22] Semin, Vladimir Prokof′evich. Russkaia istoriia: problemy i spornye voprosy. Uchebnoe posobie dlia vuzov. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2007. Pages 68–86. 2,000 copies 4 I failed to detect a “woman’s perspective” in her discussion of Ivan.

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[23] Orlov, A. S., V. A. Georgiev, N. G. Georgieva, and T. A. Sivokhina, Istoriia Rossii. 2nd ed. Moscow: TK Velbi, Izdatel′stvo Prospekt, 2008. Pages 74–84. 500 copies [24] Samygin, Petr Sergeevich, ed.; authors idem et al. Istoriia Rossii. Srednee professional′noe obrazovanie. Uchebnik. Moscow: PROSPEKT, 2008. Pages 138–46. 500 copies [25] Lapteva, Elena Vasil′evna. Istoriia Rossii. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2009. Pages 51–64. 3,000 copies [26] Fortunatov, Vladimir Valentinovich. Rossiiskaia istoriia v litsakh. Moscow: Piter, 2009. Pages 106–12. 4,000 copies [27] Floria, Boris Nikolaevich, ed. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen to kontsa XVIII veka. Moscow: Izdatel′stvo moskovskogo universiteta, 2010. Pages 211–26. One would expect Floria to have written the chapter on Ivan, but the book does not so indicate. 1,500 copies [28] Orlov, Aleksandr Sergeevich, Vladimir Anatol′evich Georgiev, Natal′ia Georgievna Georgieva, and Tat′iana Aleksandrovna Sivokhina. Istoriia Rossii. Uchebnik. 2nd ed. Moscow: Prospekt, 2011. Pages 108–26. 7,000 copies [29] Sakharov, Andrei Nikolaevich, ed.; authors idem, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Bokhanov, and Vladimir Andreevich Shestakov. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei. Uchebnik. Moscow: PROSPEKT, 2013. Pages 236–61. 2,000 copies [30] Kargalitskii, Boris Iur′evich, and Vsevolod Nikolaevich Sergeev. Istoriia Rossii. Mirosistemnyi analyz, uchebnoe posobie. Moscow: LIBROKOM/URSS, 2013. Pages 96–123. The number of copies is unknown. [31] Riabov, Petr Vladimirovich. Istoriia russkogo naroda i rossiiskogo gosudarstva s drevneishikh vremen do nachala XX veka. Vol. 1. Moscow: Prometei, 2015. Pages 243–77. 500 copies [32] Polnaia istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei. Moscow: Veche, 2015. Pages 128–91. [This is the editor’s introduction to a reprinting of Karamzin.] 3,000 copies [33] Morozov, Sergei Dmitrievich. Piat′ imperii: Fenomen rossiiskoi istorii. Moscow, Penza: IRI RAN, Penza Gosudarstvennyi Universitet Arkhitektury i Stroitel′stva, 2015. Pages 17–20. 500 copies

Appendices

[34] Akunin, Boris [Grigorii Shalvovich Chkhartishvili]. Mezhdu Aziei i Evropoi. Vol. 3, Istoriia Rossiiskogo gosudarstva. Ot Ivana III do Borisa Godunova. Moscow: AST, 2016. Pages 157–272. 90,000 copies [35] Gerasimov, Il′ia, ed.; authors idem, Marina Mogil′ner, and Sergei Glebov, with the participation of Aleksandr Semenov. Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii. Part 1, Konkuriruiushchie proekty samoorganizatsii VII–XVII vv. Kazan′: Ab Imperio, 2017. Pages 253–70, 301–38. The number of copies is unknown [36] Danilov, Andrei Gennad′evich. Rossiia na perekrestkakh istorii XIV–XIX vv. St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2017. Pages 52–83. The number of copies is unknown [37] Vasil′ev, Leonid Sergeevich. Metamorfozy istorii Rossii. Vol. 1, Ot vynuzhdennogo otstavaniia k samoderzhaviiu, dvorianam i krepostnym. Moscow: Nauchnoissledovatel′skii universitet “Vysshaia shkola ekonomiki,” Institut vostokovedeniia RAN; Knizhnyi dom “Universitet,” 2017. Pages 243–58. 1,000 copies [print on demand] [38] Ermolaev, Igor′ Petrovich. Rus′ do votsareniia Romanovykh (s drevneishikh vremen do 1613 g.). Vol. 1 of Polnyi kurs universitetskikh lektsii po istorii Rossii. St. Petersburg: Izdatel′stvo Olega Abyshko, 2017. Pages 453–561. 500 copies [39] Perevezentsev, Sergei Viacheslavovich. Russkaia istoriia: s drevneishikh vremen do nachala XXI veka. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2018. Pages 92–98, 102–7. 300 copies

Appendix 9.1: Published Articles, Epokha Ivana Groznogo [1] Avdeev, A. G., Orthodox Saint Tikhon Humanities University, University of Dmitrii Pozharskii, School-Internet “Intellectual” (Moscow). “‘Gosudar′’ ili ‘Gospodar′’? Ob odnom elemente titulatury pravitelei Moskovskoi Rusi.” 1:15–31. [2] Makarii (Veretennikov), arkhimandrit, St. Sergius Trinity Laura (Sergiev Posad). “Venchanie pervogo Russkogo Tsaria v kontekste gosudarstvenno-tserkovnykh otnoshenii.” 1:32–55. [3] Boček, Pavel, Institute of History, Philosophy Faculty, Masaryk University (Brno, Czech Republic). “Gosudar′ vseia Rusi kak simvol moskovskogo gosudarstva v sredneevropeiskoi istoriografii XVI veka.” 1:56–38. [4] Vyshnia, I. B., Artists Union of the Russian Federation (St. Petersburg). “Deviat′ nabroskov Tsarstvennoi knigi i khod raboty nad Litsevym letopisnym svodom Ivana Groznogo v skriptorii Aleksandrovskoi slobody.” 1:69–80.

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[5] Edovin, A. D., Archangel Regional Museum, State Budget Institution for Culture of the Arkhangel′sk oblast′ (Arkhangel′sk). “Rol′ Ivana Groznogo v osnovanii goroda Arkhangel′ska.” 1:81–94. [6] Zhilkina, E. V., State Historical-Architectural Museum-Reserve “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda” (Aleksandrov). “Ekzempliar Psaltyri slobodskoi iz sobraniia muzeiazapovednika ‘Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda.’” 1:95–122. [7] Zelenskaia, G. M., State Budget Institution for Culture of the Moscow oblast′, Museum “Novyi Ierusalim” (Istra), and S. K. Sevast′ianova, Institute of Philology, Siberian Division, Russian Academy of Sciences (Novosibirsk), Rubtsovsk Industrial Institute Branch, Altai State Technical University named after I. I. Polzun (Rubtsovsk). “‘Sviatitel′’ Filipp i Patriarkh Nikon: tipologicheskie podobiia.” 1:123–48. [8] Soldat, C., Cologne-Bonn Center for Central and East European Studies (Cologne). “Priemy diskreditatsii ‘Velikogo kniazia’ v ‘Kratkom skazanii . . .’ iz Moskovii A. Shlikhtinga.” 1:149–66. [9] Isachenko, T. A., Russian State Library (Moscow). “Poslanie Maksima Greka Vasiliiu III ob ustroistve afonskikh monastyrei v retseptsii pravoslavnykh knizhnikov XVI– XVIII vv.” 1:167–82. [10] Kniaz′eva, S. Iu., Moscow State United Museum-Reserve Kolomenskoe-IzmailovoLiublino (Moscow). “Dva pechatnye ‘Apostola’ XVI veka iz sobraniia muzeiazapovednika ‘Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda.’” 1:183–93. [11] Lavrent′ev, A. V.. National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (Moscow), “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda v XVI–XVII vv.: nazvanie i status.” 1:194–211. [12] Lifshits, A. I., National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (Moscow). “Boiarin Boris Morozov i ego biblioteka.” 1:212–20. [13] Markina, N. Iu., Central Library System of the Western Administrative District (Moscow). “Glavnyi khramovyi obraz Blagoveshchenskogo sobora Moskovskogo Kremlia v pravlenie Ivana Groznogo.” 1:221–33. [14] Makhan′ko, M. A., Central Scholarly Center “The Orthodox Encyclopedia” (Moscow). “Obrazy sviatykh v Litsevom letopisnom svode: na puti k ikonopisnomu podlinniku.” 1:234–45. [15] Meliton′ian, Arsen, Union of Postcard Collectors (Moscow), and Cary Lynn Redi (USA). “Otrazhenie epokhi i lichnosti Ioanna IV Vasil′evicha Groznogo v filokartii.” 1:246–56. [16] Mokshev, S. N., St. Petersburg State University (St. Petersburg). “Torzhok i Tver′ vo vremia Novgorodskogo oprichnogo pokhoda Ivana Groznogo 1569–1570 gg.” 1:257–73. [17] Morozov, B. N., Archeographic Commission, Institute of Slavic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), and O. R. Khromov, V. I. Surikov Moscow State Academic Art Institute, Russian Academy of Art (Moscow). “Osobennosti oformleniia slobodskoi Psaltyri.” 2:3–11.

Appendices

[18] Orlova, I. A., State Historical-Architectural Museum-Reserve “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda” (Aleksandrov). “Rod Buturlinykh v XVI veke,” 2:12–36. [19] Pozdeeva, I. V., Moscow State University (Moscow). “Stoglavnyi sobor Ivana IV, postavlennye im zadachi obucheniia i reshenie ikh v posleduiushchee vremia.” 2:37–51. [20] Poloznev, D. F., (Iaroslavl′). “Slobodskie izdaniia XVI veka v posadskikh bibliotekakh Iaroslavlia.” 2:52–64. [21] Pchelov, E. V., Russian State Humanities University (Moscow), “Edinorog v gosudarstvennoi simvolike Ivana Groznogo: semantika i prichiny poiavleniia.” 2:65–73. [22] Reshetnikov, N. I., Moscow State Institute of Culture (Moscow), “Kargopol′ i ego uezd v dokumentakh Solovetskogo monastyria XVI veka.” 2:76–85. [23] Rybakova, M. K., State Historical-Architectural Museum-Reserve “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda” (Aleksandrov). “Aleksandrovskaia sloboda vremeni Ivana Ivanovicha Groznogo v Litsevom letopisnom svode.” 2:86–114. [24] Rykov, Iu. D., Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (Moscow). “Torgovaia ploshchad′ za stenami Kremlia ili ‘Poganaia luzha’? K voprosu o meste soversheniia massovykh kaznei ‘Gosudarevykh izmennikov’ v Moskve 25 iiulia 1570 g.” 2:115–45. [25] Sergiia (Kalamkarova), monakhinia, Holy Dormition Convent (Aleksandrov). “Istoriia izucheniia liturgicheskogo tvorchestva Ioanna Vasil′evicha.” 2:146–54. [26] Timofeeva, T. P., State Vladimir-Suzdal Museum-Preserve (Vladimir). “O zamene pokrytiia glavy Vladimirskogo Uspenskogo Sobora XII pri Ivane IV.” 2:155–62. [27] Tkachenko, V. A., State Vladimir-Suzdal Museum-Preserve (Vladimir). “Ivan Groznyi i Troitse-Sergiev monastyr′.” 2:163–73. [28] Tomsinskii. S. V., State Hermitage (St. Petersburg). “Velikaia Aleksandrova Sloboda— traditsiia ili innovatsiia?” 2:179–94. [29] Turova, E. A., State Budgetary Institution for Culture, Agency for Management and Use of Monuments of History and Culture, Northwest Federal District (St.  Petersburg). “Perestroiki dvortsa v Aleksandrovskoi slobode pri Ivane Groznom po dannym arkheologicheskikh issledovanii Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha 2005–2015 gg.” 2:195–209. [30] Frantsev, O. L., All-Russian Historical-Ethnographic Museum (Torzhok). “Vliianie oprichniny na khoziaistvennoe sostoianie russkikh zemel′ v seredine–kontse XVI veka. Otrazhenie v istochnikakh i literature.” 2:210–23. [31] Churgeeva, N. N., Andrei Rublev Central Museum of Old Rus′ Culture and Art (Moscow). “Obretenie ikony Bogoroditsy v Kazani v tsarstvovanie Ivana Groznogo.” 2:224–38. [32] Shadunts, E. K., Pereslavl′-Zalesskii Historical-Architectural and Art MuseumPreserve (Pereslavl′-Zalesskii). “Arkhitektura groznenskogo vremeni v Pereslavskom uezde: dvorets Bogomol′e.” 2:239–52. [33] Shchutskaia, G. K., State Historical Museum (Moscow). “Ivan Groznyi i boiare Zakhar′iny-Iur′evy.” 2:253–66.

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Appendix 9.2: Unpublished Conference Papers, Epokha Ivana Groznogo Fursov, A. I., Institute of Strategic-Systematic Analysis; Moscow Humanities University (Moscow). “Ivan Groznyi i ego epokha kak mishen′ v psikhoistoricheskoi voine protiv Rossii: prichiny, mekhanizm, rezul′taty.” Gerasimova, M. M., Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow). “Zakhoronenie Ivana Groznogo: po sledam starykh issledovanii.” Kartasheva, E. I., Museum-Reserve “Island-city Sviiazhsk” (Sviiazhsk). “Vklady tsaria Ivana IV Groznogo v monastyri i khramy Sviiazhska (po materialam Pistsovoi knigi Sviiazhska i Sviiazhskogo uezda 1565–1567 gg.).” Krutova, M. S., Russian State Library (Moscow). “Obrazy tsaria Ioanna Vasil′evicha Groznogo i chlenov ego sem′i v rukopisnykh zhitiiakh pereslavskikh sviatykh.” Nazarov, V. D., Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow). “Ivan IV. itogi pravleniia: predvaritel′nye i okonchatel′nye.” Paramuzina, I. S. Museums of the Moscow Kremlin (Moscow). “O videofiksatsii vskrytiia zakhoronenii Ivana Groznogo i ego synovei.” Pezhemskii, D. V., Moscow State University (Moscow). “Zakhoroneniia blizkikh rodstvennikov Ivana Groznogo: novye issledovaniia.” Sukina, L. B., University of the City of Pereslavl′ (Pereslavl′-Zalesskii) named after A. K. Ailamazian. “Sinodik pereslavskogo Nikitskogo monastyria epokhi Ivana Groznogo v sostave rukopisi-konvoliuta XVI–XVII vv.” Zhurova, D. I., Institute of History, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences (Novosibirsk). “Poslaniia Maksima Greka.” Zviagin, V. I., Russian Ministry of Health (Moscow). “Rezul′taty sudebno-meditsinskogo issledovaniia skeleta tsaria Ivana IV v sravnenii s ostankami ego synovei i kniazia Skopina-Shuiskogo.”

Appendix 10.1: Table of Contents of Russkaia armiia v epokhu Ivana Groznogo5 Part 1 [0–1] Filiushkin, A. I. “Vmesto vvedeniia: rezul′taty i perspektivy izucheniia voennoi istorii Rossii epokhi Ivana Groznogo.” 1:I–XI. [1–1] Volodikhin, D. M. “Vysshii komandnyi sostav russkoi polevoi armii pri Ivane IV.” 1:1–41. 5 Each item is identified by a code indicating what part it belongs to (0 for the “Introduction,” then 1 or 2) and a sequence number. Part number, 1 or 2, precedes pagination.

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[1–2] Penskoi, V. V. “‘Tsenturiony’ Ivana Groznogo (srednii komandnyi sostav russkogo voiska 2-i pol. XVI v.: k postanovke problemy).” 1:42–69. [1–3] Skobelkin, O. V. “Sluzhilye ‘nemtsy’ v russkom voiske vtoroi poloviny XVI v.” 1:69–103. [1–4] Lobin, A. N. “Russkaia artilleriia v tsarstvovanie Ivana Groznogo.” 1:104–58. [1–5] Beliakov, A. V. “‘Nevidimki’ russkoi armii XVI veka.” 1:159–78. [1–6] Moiseev, M. V. “Nekotorye zamechaniia po istorii russko-nogaiskogo voennogo sotrudnichestva.” 1:179–87. [1–7] Glaz′ev, V. N. “Strel′tsy i ikh nachal′niki v XVI v.” 1:188–202. [1–8] Molochnikov, A. M. “Datochnye liudi chernososhnykh zemel′ v voiske Ivana Groznogo: lyzhnaia i sudovaia rat′.” 1:203–26. [1–9] Kurbatov, O. A. “‘Kopeinyi boi’ russkoi pomestnoi konnitsy v epokhu Livonskoi voiny i Smutnogo vremeni.” 1:227–35. [1–10] Kurbatov, O. A. “‘Konnost′, liudnost′ i oruzhnost′’ russkoi konnitsy v epokhu Livonskoi voiny 1558–1583 gg.” 1:236–95. [1–11] Smirnov, N. V. “Boevye slugi v sostave russkoi pomestnoi konnitsy v period Livonskoi voiny.” 1:293–338.

Part 2 [2–1] Kurbatov, O. A. “Otzyv na stat′iu D. M. Volodikhina, ‘Vysshii komandnyi sostav russkoi polevoi armii pri Ivane IV.’” 2:1–20. [2–2] Volodikhin, D. M. “Otvet na otzyv O. A. Kurbatova po povodu stat′i o vysshem komandnom sostave russkoi armii pri Ivane Groznom.” 2:21–35. [2–3] Babulin, I. B. “V zashchitu ‘generalov.’ Otzyv na stat′iu V. V. Penskogo ‘“Tsenturiony” Ivana Groznogo.’” 2:36–41. [2–4] Lobin, A. N. “K polemike o ‘tsenturionakh’ i ‘generalakh’ Ivana Groznogo.” 2:42–45. [2–5] Penskoi, V. V. “Otvet na zamechaniia, vyskazannye I. B. Babulinym i A. N. Lobinym na ‘“Tsenturionov” Ivana Groznogo.’” 2:46–56. [2–6] Lobin, A. N. “Otzyv na stat′iu O. V. Skobelkina, ‘Sluzhilye “nemtsy” v russkom voiske 2-i poloviny XVI v.’” 2:57–61. [2–7] Skobelkin, O. V. “Otvet na otzyv A. N. Lobina na stat′iu O. V. Skobelkina, ‘Sluzhilye “nemtsy” v russkom voiske 2-i poloviny XVI v.’” 2:62–66. [2–8] Lobin, A. N. “K istorii obrazovaniia streletskogo voiska (neskol′ko zamechanii o stat′e V. N. Glaz′eva).” 2:67–72. [2–9] Selivestrov, D. A. “K voprosu o sluzhbe ‘datochnykh liudei’ v voiske Ioanna Vasil′evicha Groznogo (otklik na stat′iu Molochnikova A. M.).” 2:73–93. [2–10] Molochniikov, A. M. “Zamechaniia na otklik D. A. Selivestrova po povodu stat′i o datochnykh liudiakh chernososhnykh zemel′ v voiske Ivana Groznogo.” 2:91–103. [2–11] Smirnov, N. V. “O ‘kopeinom boe’ russkoi pomestnoi konnitsy vtoroi poloviny XVI v. (po povodu stat′i O. A. Kurbatova).” 2:104–11.

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[2–12] Bentsianov, A. M.. “Otzyv na stat′iu O. A. Kurbatova, ‘“Konnost′, liudnost′ i oruzhnost′” russkoi konnitsy v epokhu Livonskoi voiny 1558–1583 gg.’” 2:112–27. [2–13] Penskoi, V. V. “Zametki na poliakh stat′i ‘“Konnost′, liudnost′ i oruzhnost′” russkoi konnitsy v epokhu Livonskoi voiny.’” 2:128–39. [2–14] Kurbatov, O. A. “Otvet retsenzentam: A. M. Bentsianov, ‘Otzyv na stat′iu O. A. Kurbatova, “‘Konnost′, liudnost′ i oruzhnost′’ russkoi konnitsy v epokhu Livonskoi voiny 1558–1583 gg.’; V. V. Penskoi, ‘Zametki na poliakh stat′i “‘Konnost′, liudnost′ i oruzhnost′’ russkoi konnitsy v epokhu Livonskoi voiny.”’” 2:140–63.

Appendix 11.1: Historical Corrections to Neuberger’s This Thing of Darkness Entries in this appendix do not appear in any systematic order. 1.



2.

Neuberger writes that Eisenstein focused on “two historical priests, Pimen and Filipp, who rose to become metropolitans and were associated with conspiracy, betrayal, and execution.” He omitted the historically influential Metropolitan Makarii and priest Sylvester. Eisenstein discovered that “both Filipp and Pimen were linked to the opposition that arose in Novgorod.” Neuberger also refers to “Metropolitan Pimen from Novgorod” (84). These are Eisenstein’s mistakes which Neuberger left uncorrected. Pimen and Filipp should be referred to as monks, not priests. According to Neuberger, Filipp decided to abandon Ivan’s service to become a priest (135) by fleeing to a monastery (148). Of course, later he had to be ordained a priest in order to function as an abbot and then metropolitan, but initially his “holy orders” in the scenario entailed being shorn as a monk. The historical Pimen was never metropolitan. He was archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov. Filipp was igumen of the Solovetskii Monastery before becoming metropolitan.6 Pimen is linked to the opposition in Novgorod in Ivan’s propaganda but Filipp is not, else Ivan could not have attempted to secure Filipp’s blessing for his punitive campaign against Novgorod. It is curious that Eisenstein’s early sketches and notes refer to and depict “wolves’ heads” (34) carried by the oprichniki on the necks of their horses. The sources Eisenstein read

6 Comparable erroneous nomenclature appears in Ian Christie, “Ivan Groznyi (Ivan the Terrible)” [Retrospective], Monthly Film Bulletin 54, no. 647 (1987): 382; Lea Jacobs, “A Lesson with Eisenstein: Rhythm and Pacing in Ivan the Terrible, Part I,” Music and the Moving Image 5, no. 1 (2012): 26; Lövgren, Eisenstein’s Labyrinth, 92; Moussinac, Sergei Eisenstein, 212; Kevin Platt, “Antichrist Enthroned: Demonic Visions of Russian Rulers,” in Russian Literature and its Demons, ed. Pamela Davidson (New York: Berghan Books, 2000), 91; Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia), 156, 171; Tsivian, Ivan the Terrible, 21; Naum Kleiman, Eisenstein on Paper: Graphic Works by the Master of Film (London: Thames & Hudson, 2017), 209.

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refer to dogs, not wolves, to denote that the oprichniki were the “dogs of the tsar.” It is understandable that Eisenstein thought the oprichniki were wolves, but unclear how dogs became wolves in Eisenstein’s imagination. In the film, there are neither dogs’ heads nor wolves’ heads, an image that could never have passed the censor.7 Neuberger does not comment on this historical anomaly. 3. In the film, but not in history, Ivan has his soldiers at Kazan′ deposit coins in a basket before the battle and pick them up after the battle. Consequently, the number of coins remaining in the basket constitutes a count of fatal casualties. Neuberger concludes that by this procedure Ivan denigrated the lives of his soldiers (136).8 I doubt that. This was an ancient practice, although unattested in Russia. No offense was meant and I presume none was taken by the soldiers. On a related military matter, elsewhere Neuberger contends that part 3 of the screenplay portrays foreigners as cowardly and incompetent, and defeated “with laughable ease” in the final battle by the sea. However, Kaspar refuses to flee and dies bravely. Note that in part 1 Kazan′ is conquered only with great difficulty.9 4. Eisenstein wrote and Moskvin filmed a scene, which is lost, of icon-painters at work. Its text, some drawings, and a few frames survive. According to Neuberger, the 1551 Council of One Hundred Chapters (Stoglav) constituted “an effort by Ivan IV’s government to regularize and assert central government authority over some aspects of religious life,” analogous to Stalinist attempts to control artists (170). Historically, however, the Council of One Hundred Chapters was a church council. Yes, Ivan summoned the council and submitted a list of questions (which he may or may not have written), and presided over it, but it was the Russian Orthodox Church, not the government, that regulated icon painters, even if the government employed painters to decorate the Hall of Facets (Granovitaia palata) and the Golden Hall (Zolotaia palata). 5. Neuberger refers to the “annihilation” of and “mass murder” at Novgorod (35). Mass murder there was, probably around 3,000 victims—men, women, and children. But Ivan hardly “annihilated” the entire population of the city. Recent scholarship has qualified exaggerated accounts of the destruction of the city, which survived sufficiently for half of it to be incorporated into the oprichnina after Ivan supposedly depopulated it entirely. 6. According to Eisenstein’s notes, the boyar Andrei Shuiskii punished another boyar, Fedor Vorontsov, for telling Ivan IV about Ivan III’s great power, giving the boy Ivan ideas about his authority (33, 87). At Shuiskii’s instigation, Vorontsov was beaten up and would have been murdered save for Ivan’s intervention. Instead he was exiled. The sources known to me do not mention Vorontsov’s invocation of Ivan III. Shuiskii

7 With no censor to deal with Lungin portrays dogs’ heads. 8 Cf. Meilakh, Izobrazitel′naia stilistika pozdnikh fil′mov Eizenshteina, 138. 9 Neuberger, “Eisenstein’s Cosmopolitan Kremlin,” 85.

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

objected to Vorontsov’s monopolization of Ivan’s presence. Where Eisenstein got his information remains unknown. Neuberger does not question Eisenstein’s exposition. Neuberger is so attentive to the discrepancies between Eisenstein’s portrayal of Ivan’s reign and history that it would not have been amiss for her to quality her description of Aleksei Basmanov as the “founder” of the oprichnina (85) as applying only to the film. In history, there are other candidates for the dubious distinction of dreaming up the oprichnina, including Ivan’s second wife, the Kabarda Circassian Maria Cherkasskaia, who does not appear in the film. The one and only person who should be “credited” with creating the oprichnina is Ivan. Neuberger contests the bifurcated view of Eisenstein’s film, that part 1 was pro-Ivan and part 2 anti-Ivan (8). Because she acknowledges that Eisenstein read Karamzin, she could have noted that the bifurcated interpretation of the film parallels Karamzin’s bifurcated interpretation of the historical tsar, the “good” Ivan of the reforms and the “bad” Ivan of the oprichnina. Commenting on recent historiography about Ivan, Neuberger opines that “The most authoritative recent history in English is de Madariaga” (82n28). Not one reviewer of that book would agree with that judgment, but Neuberger’s evaluation is particularly curious given that de Madariaga categorized Ivan as insane, a theory Eisenstein explicitly rejected. Neuberger notes that the “liberal” Solov′ev was no apologist for Ivan, although he thought that the tsar should have been less violent, a line of thought followed by Platonov. Eisenstein, Neuberger notes, preferred prerevolutionary liberal historians over Soviet historiography (86). However, Solov′ev was a right-wing Hegelian who worshiped the state, hardly a liberal, else the monarchist Platonov could scarcely have agreed with him. The late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century liberal (more accurately populist) Kliuchevskii also espoused Ivan’s irrationality (89), although of course Eisenstein found some of Kluichevskii’s analysis of Ivan’s childhood useful. Neuberger writes that “I do not know if Cherniavsky was thinking of Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible when he wrote about Ivan as a Renaissance Prince” (107).10 The absence of footnotes in Cherniavsky’s article makes finding a direct answer to Neuberger’s question impossible. However, I know that he knew the film: he had no difficulty discussing it with a graduate student in film studies during the summer of 1973. In the 1967 fall semester colloquium on Ivan that Cherniavsky taught at Columbia University, as memory serves me, he never mentioned Eisenstein. He did refer to Jan Kotts’s book, so Shakespeare was on his mind.11 More importantly, Neuberger’s explication of Ivan’s political dilemma, that he could not separate morality and politics as Machiavelli proposed, that he could not be both a good Christian and a good ruler, fits Cherniavsky’s

10 Michael Cherniavsky, “Ivan the Terrible as a Renaissance Prince,” Slavic Review 27 (1968): 195–211. 11 Jan Kott, Shakespeare, Our Contemporary, trans. Boleslaw Taborski (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1966).

Appendices

exposition of the dilemma of a Northern Renaissance prince perfectly (unlike the Italian Renaissance princes who had no qualms of conscience about anything they did). It is not that Eisenstein anticipated Cherniavsky or Cherniavsky borrowed from Eisenstein. Rather, both found the same political theory in Ivan’s First Epistle to Kurbskii that all students of Eisenstein’s Ivan have missed and nearly all historians since the publication of Cherniavsky’s article12 have dismissed. On this issue, Eisenstein’s Ivan, Neuberger’s Ivan, and Cherniavsky’s Ivan are in sync.

12 An exception is Clark, “Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible and the Renaissance,” 50.

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Index

A

Adashev, Aleksei, 9, 20, 43, 54-56, 78, 79n13, 80-82, 96, 142, 146, 153, 155, 159 Akunin, Boris, 112 Al′, Daniil, 22, 24, 44, 94, 96 Alaska, 35 Aleksandrov, xv, 164, 168, 249-50 Aleksandrovskaia sloboda, 35, 164, 169-74, 176, 184, 199, 222, 224, 250 Aleksii II, Patriarch, 49, 52, 62-63, 65 Alexander Nevskii of Vladimir, Grand Prince, 50, 142 Alexander the Great, 35 Alexandria, 35 Alexei Basmanov, 204, 211-12, 225, 264 Alexei Mikhailovich, Tsar, 35, 39 Al′shits, Daniil. See Al′, Daniil Amosov, Aleksandr, 12, 14 Anastasiia Romanovna Iur′evna, Tsaritsa. See Anastasiia Iur′eva-Zakhar′ina Anastasiia Iur′eva-Zakhar′ina, Tsaritsa, 7, 40n19, 43, 221-22 Andrei Rublev, 69n63 anti-brigandage legislation (guba), 20, 96, 98 Antokolsky, Mark, 248 Antonio Possevinoto Muscovy, 20, 53 appanage (udel), ixn1, 15, 56, 73, 77, 80, 93, 96, 98, 101, 107, 128n20, 130, 134-35, 168, 170, 192 Assembly of the Land (zemskii sobor), 20, 230 associate boyar (okol’nichii), 168 Astrakhan′ (khanate), ix, 41n19, 73-74, 96-97, 111, 123, 128, 135, 157, 159, 180. See also Tatar khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ authoritarianism, 8, 87, 246 autocracy, 9, 15, 67, 90n9, 92, 94, 96, 110, 119, 148, 159, 204n18, 205, 210, 230 Aver′ianov, Vitalii, 89-91, 95-100

B

Backer, George, 71 backwardness, 13, 24, 35, 116-17 Bakhrushin, Sergei, 10 Bakhtin, Aleksandr, 151-153, 156 Baltic Sea, ix, 15, 74, 212 Barkashov, Aleksandr, 60, 64n53 Bartlett, Rosamund, 220 Bashkin, Matvei, 61 Basmanov, Fedor, 200, 203 Basmanovs, 202-4, 207, 210, 212, 215 Begunov, Iurii, 40 Binder, Eva, 243 Boček, Pavel, 167 Bogatyrev, Sergei, 6n5, 63, 68n61, 252n3 Bogdanov, Andrei, 19 Bol′shakov, I. G., 220 Boris and Gleb, 50 Boris Godunov, 34, 66, 168-69 Brown, Stephen, 40, 41n20 Bulgakov, Mikhail, 248 Bulychev, Andrei, 23, 24n32, 239-40, 244 Burbank, Jane, 116, 132 Bushkov, Aleksandr, 10

C

Chaikovskii, Petr, 242, 248 Cheboksary, 249 Cherkasskaia, Mariia, 24-25, 67n60, 82, 134n33, 169 Cherniavsky, Michael, 50-51, 65n53, 264-65 Chinggis Khan, 118, 142 Cooper, Frederick, 122 Council of One Hundred Chapters (Stoglav), 169, 173, 263 court (dvor), 24, 63, 81, 115, 124, 168, 172, 203, 238-39, 240n35, 243. See also household

286

Index

Crimea, 18, 97, 123-24, 140, 144, 153, 157-58, 185, 189-90 Crummey, Robert, 241

D

Danilov, Andrei, 115 Davydova, Natal′ia, 23-24 Deliagin, Mikhail , 89, 100-101 delusions of grandeur, 241 de Madariaga, Isabel, 64, 241, 264 Denmark, ix, 82 Dionisii (Alferov), Bishop, 63, 197 Dmitrieva, Rufina, 45 Dmitrii Donskoi of Moscow, Grand Prince, 50, 69n63, 137 Dmitrii, Tsarevich, 7, 32, 33, 37, 40 n. 19, 42, 47, 55, 66, 67 n 60, 214, 223-224, 226 Dmitrii of Uglich, Tsarevich, 7, 37, 50 Dracula (Vlad Tsepesh), 19, 168 Dvorkin, Aleksandr, 6n7, 18, 64, 243 Dugin, Alexander, 87-88

E

Ediger, 123-24 Eisenstein, Sergei, xv-xvi, 75, 99n15, 117, 128n16, 175, 197-217, 219-232, 233-34, 237-38, 241-42, 244, 248, 262-65 Erchak, Valerii, 6n8 Eremin, D. I., 219 Ermak, 97, 147, 150 Ermolaev, Igor′, 113, 156, 159 Eshpar, Aleksandr, 248 Evfimii, archbishop of Rostov, 61 Evfrosiniia, 202, 213, 223, 225-28, 231-32 Evstafii, priest, 203, 221, 224-25, 228-29, 232

F

Fedor, Tsarevich, 23, 66, 83-84, 172. See also Fedor Ivanovich, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, Tsar, 34, 50, 61, 94, 130, 167 See also Fedor, Tsarevich Fedor “the Black” of Yaroslavl′, Prince, 50 Fedorov, Ivan, 33, 37, 173 Fedorov-Cheliadnin, Ivan, 16, 19, 213 feeding (kormlenie), 188 Filaret, Patriarch, 40 Filipp, Metropolitan, 9, 11, 23, 52, 54, 58, 59n32, 62, 67, 74-75, 96, 98, 173, 204, 221, 225, 227, 229-31, 233 Floria, Boris, 14-15, 19, 24, 26-27, 112 Fomenko, Anatolii, 7, 31-32, 33n2, 36-43, 45-47, 68-69 Fomin, Sergei, 14

Forbidden Years (Zapovednye leta), 107, 127, 129, 190 Fortunatov, Vladimir, 115 Foscarini, Marco, 58 Freud, Zigmund, 241 Froianov, Igor′, 3, 9-10, 27, 67n60, 72, 76-77, 83n15, 85 Funikov, Nikita, 63, 66 Fursov, Andrei, 92-100, 165

G

Galliamov, Rashit, 145-46, 148, 157 Gerasimov, Il’ia, 121-24, 127-28, 131-35 Gerasimov, Mikhail, 115 Giliazov, Iskander, 154 Glazunov, Il’ia, 249 Glinskii, Vasilii, 77 Golubinskii, Evgenii, 50, 51n3, 65n53 Gorbatyi, Prince, 80 Gorelik, Mikhail, 153 Griaznoi, Vasilii, 34-35 Grigor′ev, Georgii, 111 Gumilev, Lev, 24, 27, 99, 101 Gurii of Kazan′, Archbishop, 152

H

Hellie, Richard, 241 Henry VIII, 111 Hitler, Adolf, 74, 76, 249 holy fool, 32, 44, 62, 202, 221, 226, 229, 232, 235n6 homosexuality, 23-24, 107, 115, 168 household, 186, 81, 94, 115, 171-72. See also court (dvor) Hrushevsky, Mykhailo, 73 hypertrophic state, 161

I

Ianov, Aleksandr, (Alexander Yanov), 4, 24 Iaroslav of Kiev, Grand Prince, 128 Iaroslavl′, 33-34б 38, 141, 174 Ianov, Aleksandr, (Alexander Yanov), 4, 24 insanity, 19, 23, 26, 43, 47, 56n18, 63, 91, 107, 126, 211, 241, 249 Ioann [Snychev], Metropolitan, 9-10, 16, 27-28, 52-53, 55-57, 58n31, 59-60, 63, 64n53, 65-67, 68nn61-62 Iosif of Volokolamsk, 52n8, 61 Irina Godunova, 23, 66 Iskhakov, Damir, 153, 157 Islaev, Faizulak, 159 Iur′ev (Dorpat), 128

Index

Iurganov, Andrei, 18, 27, 115, 127n18, 238-40, 244 Iuvenalii, metropolitan of Krutitsa and Kolomna, 62-64, 65n53 Iuzefovich, Leonid, 16 Iuzovskii, I. I., 220 Ivan III, 33-34, 37-38, 54, 93, 167, 246-47, 263 Ivan (Ivanovitch), Tsarevich, ix, 7, 15-16, 18, 20, 22-23, 33-34, 37-38, 42, 46-47, 53, 56, 66, 74, 81, 83, 115, 126, 172, 176, 242 Izmailov, B. I., 154 Izmailov, Iskander, 155-56

K

Kalashnikov, Maksim, (pseudonym of Maksim Kucherenko), 89-92, 98 Kanev, 74 Karamzin, Nikolai, x, 10, 19, 26, 31, 41n20, 4243, 51n3, 81, 94, 197, 240, 242, 244, 248 Karatsuba, Irina, 76 Karavashkin, Andrei, 13-14 Kavelin, Nikolai, 242 Kazan′ (khanate), ix, xiv, 10, 33, 54, 73-74, 7981, 85, 96, 98, 111, 121-24, 128, 131, 133, 135, 137-61, 175, 180, 183, 185=86, 190, 212, 214. See also Tatar khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′ Keenan, Edward L., 8, 28, 29n35, 43-44, 56n18, 57n19, 198n5 Khamidullin, Bulat, 151-53 Kholmogorov, Igor′, 99 Khomiakov, Vladimir, 99-100 Khoroshkevich, Anna, 22, 190 Khrushchev, Nikita, x, 100, 232n68 Khvalin, Andrei, 57 Kiev, 50, 64, 74, 128-29 Kirill, Metropolitan, 59, 62 Kirill, metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, 62 Kivelson, Valerie, 204 Kleiman, Naum, 205, 262 Kliuchevskii, Vaslii, 41n20, 77, 83, 264 Knoppe, Boris, 51, 52nn4-5 Kobrin, Vladimir, 18, 85, 114, 119 Kollmann, Nancy Shields, 121-22, 131-36 Kolychevs, 199, 231 Koretskii, Vadim, 45 Kornilii, Abbot, of Pskov, 9, 11, 54, 60, 62, 66 Kosoi, Feodosii, 61 Kostomarov, Nikolai, 19, 41n20, 76 Kostylev, Valentin I., 197, 230 Kovalev, Grigorii, 12 Kovalevskii, Pavel, x, 19, 240, 244

Kravchenko, Sergei, 114-15 Kremlev, Sergei, (pseudonym of Sergei Brezkun), 72-73, 75-76, 85-86 Kruse, Elert, 58-59, 238 Kuchenei, 134 Kuchum of Sibir′, Khan, 150 Kukovenko, Vladimir, 4n2, 24, 27 Kuraev, Andrei, Deacon, 64, 65n53 Kurbskii, Andrei, 8, 11, 19, 25, 28, 37, 42-44, 54, 56, 66, 80, 82, 110, 141, 144, 149, 151, 200, 202, 204, 206-7, 209, 211n31-32, 212-13, 224, 226, 228, 232, 239, 244, 247, 249 Kurbskii-Ivan correspondence, 8 Kurginian, Sergei, 249 Kurukin, Igor′, 23, 27

L

Lavrinenko, Igor’, 60 Lebedeva, Irina, 45 Lenin, 26, 75, 77, 83-84 Leonid, Bishop of Riazan′, 61 Leont′ev, Mikhail, 249-50 Likhachev, Dmitrii, 44, 76 Lippomano, 58 Litvina, Anna, 45-46 Livonia, ix, 18, 37, 58, 74, 80, 97, 117, 118n19, 125, 127-28, 131, 133, 135, 148, 184-85, 189-90, 212, 214, 229 Livonian War (1558–83), ix-x, 10, 13, 15-16, 20, 33-34, 37, 39, 58, 60, 66, 74, 84, 98, 114, 116-18, 122, 124-26, 128, 133, 147, 149, 156, 179-80, 182, 184-85, 190-92, 213, 230, 246 Lomonosov, Mikhail, 36 Lungin, Pavel, xvi, 96, 98, 200, 214, 231n66, 233-244, 248, 263n7 Lur′e, Iakov, 29n35

M

Magnus, prince, 125 Makarii (Veretennikov), archimandrite, 27, 62, 65n53, 167, 169 Makarii, Metropolitan, 56, 62, 69n63, 78, 140, 146, 149, 230-31, 248, 262 Mamai, Emir, 137 Maniagin, Viacheslav, 7, 9, 62, 64n53, 242-43 Matveev, Aleksei, 150-51 Medvedev, Dmitrii, 88 Meliakh, Mira, 220, 222 megalomania, 18, 68, 80, 107, 110, 130, 177 Mengli Girei, 34 Miftakhov, Z. Z., 139-42, 146, 151, 153

287

288

Index

Mikhail of Chernigov, Grand Prince, 50 Mikhail of Tver′, Grand Prince, 50 Mikhailova, Irina, 23, 27 Miliukov, Pavel, 242 Minnegulov, Khatin, 150 Mlechin, Leonid, 249 Mongols, 32, 34, 73, 85, 95, 126, 129, 187, 246 Mukhamedeeva, D. Sh., 139-42, 146, 151, 153 Mukhammed′iar, 150 Müller, Gerhard, (Fedor Miller), 35 Muromtsev, Vassian, 9, 11, 54, 66 Muromtsev, Vassian, Elder, 9, 11 Muscovy, ix, 10-12, 15-16, 18-20, 23, 38, 42, 46, 50, 51n3, 58n28, 60-61, 77, 82, 90, 94, 98, 99, 110, 114, 116-17, 118n19, 121-25, 127-29, 131-35, 139, 141, 143, 145-46, 148, 151-52, 155, 158, 161, 167, 173-75, 177, 179-80, 182, 185-86, 191, 199-200, 219, 230-31, 234, 238-39, 246-47, 249 musketeers (strel’tsy), 144, 146, 153, 155, 185-86, 192

N

Nagaia, Mariia, Tsaritsa, 7 Napoleon, 74, 77-78, 118 Nemoevsky, Stanislaw, 156 Nesterov, Aleksandr, 150 Neuberger, Joan, xvi, 197-217, 219-20, 222-23, 262-264 New Chronology, xiii, xiv, 7, 31-32, 35-36, 42, 45, 68-69, 71, 85, 103-4, 106, 245 Nicholas I, 116 Nicholas II, 50, 68n63, 171 Nikitin, Andrei, 4, 22, 64 Nikola, Holy Fool, 62, 226 Nogmanov, Aidar, 158-59 non-oprichnina “land” (zemshchina), 74. See also non-oprichnina “land” non-oprichnina “land”, 60, 81, 93, 203 Nosovskii, Gleb, 7, 31-32, 33n2, 36-43, 45-47 Northern War, 79 Novgorod, 15-16, 33-34, 38, 50, 53-54, 56, 58, 59n32, 61-62, 72-73, 75n10, 78, 93, 107, 111, 113, 117, 126, 141, 158, 168, 182, 188-89, 200, 202, 204, 211-13, 214n41, 221, 224, 227-28, 230-31, 235, 237, 262 Novospasskii Monastery, 50

O

Oderborn, Paul, 43 Okhlobystin, Ivan, 243 oligarchy, 15, 89-90, 94, 99-101 O’Mahoney, Mike, 220 Orel, 249

P

Paramonov, Boris, 23 paranoia, 12, 22-23, 107, 201, 202n15, 212n1, 241 Pavlov, Andrei, 6n8, 19, 24 Payne, Robert, 19 Peresvetov, Ivan, 139 Perevezentsev, Sergei, 18, 27, 113 persecution complex, 107, 160, 241 Peter the Great, 13, 26, 35, 49n1, 75, 78, 84, 91, 100-101, 114, 116, 121, 171, 241 Pimen, Archbishop, 58, 223, 225, 227-28, 231, 237, 243 Pitirim of Volokolamsk, Metropolitan, 67 Platonov, Sergei, 14, 83, 90, 112, 264 Pokrovskii, Mikhail, 144-45 Poland-Lithuania, ix, 44, 54, 58, 60, 97, 133 Polotsk, 33, 60, 74, 82, 84-85, 114, 128, 129n20, 180, 183, 187, 234 precedence (mestnichestvo), 73, 100, 190 Pronina, Natal′ia, 9-10, 65-67 Protsenko, Iurii, 13-14 Pskov, 33, 54, 56, 58n32, 62, 84, 107, 112, 139, 143, 168, 189, 213, 262 Pugachev, Iemelian, 35, 39 Putin, Vladimir, 88, 103, 106, 119, 233n1, 249n2, 250

R

Radzinskii, Edvard, 4, 22-23 Rakhrutdinov, R. G., 143-46, 153, 160 rape, 20, 23, 25, 107, 146, 241, 248 Rashitov, F. A., 146 Rasputin, Grigorii, 68n63 Razin, Stepan, 35, 39 Repin, Ilya, 115, 242, 248-49 Riabov, Petr, 115 Rimskii-Korsakov, Nikolai, 242, 248 Riurikids, 50 Roberge, Gaston, 220, 222 Romanoff, Nikita, 19 Romanovs, xiii, 7, 32-36, 39-40, 42, 50, 94, 171 Royal Council, 84, 134, 156. See also Royal Council (Duma) Royal Council (Duma), 80, 84, 134, 156 Russian Orthodox Church, ix, xiii, xvi, 8, 10, 20, 23-24, 33n2, 38, 41n20, 49-51, 53, 6162, 64-65, 67, 69, 74-75, 95-96, 98, 107, 145, 148-49, 153, 158, 219-21, 229-32, 242-43, 263 Rybakova, M. K., 164-65, 169-71

Index

S

Sade, Marquis de, 199 sadism, 25, 83-84, 107, 112, 160, 199-201, 214-15 schizophrenia, 241 Selivanov, Vasilii, 249 Shah ali, 139-40, 143 Shakhmagonov, Fedor, 111 Shaposhnik, Viacheslav, 15-16, 27, 57, 58n27, 61n38 Sheiko, Konstantin, 40, 41n20 Sherlock, Thomas, 103 Schlichting, Albert, 58, 73 Shitkov, Aleksandr, 15 Shmidt, Sigurd, 40 Shuiskii, Andrei, Prince, 73, 77, 115, 263 Shuiskii, Vasilii, Tsar, 50, 167 Siberia, 35, 97, 108, 111, 128n20, 146, 150, 158n55, 171 Sigismund Augustus, King, 44, 60 Simeon Bekbulatovich, 7, 21, 34, 37n14, 38, 42, 47, 63, 88n4, 123, 126, 130, 135, 168, 247 Sinitsyna, K. R., 142-43, 146 Sirenov, Aleksei, 13 Skrynnikov, Ruslan, 22, 27, 41-42, 76, 83, 95, 100, 107n7, 113n9, 172n10 Skuratov, Maliuta, 11, 34-35, 54, 58-59, 66, 81, 99n15, 168, 203-6, 209, 211, 214, 223, 225, 235, 237 Smirnov, Ivan, 10, 229 Solov′ev, Sergei, 13, 76, 83, 242, 264 Sorokin, Vladimir, 248 Soviet Union, x-xi, 71, 138, 219n1, 229, 247 Staden, Heinrich von, 53, 74, 238, 239n19 Stalin, Josef, x, xiii, xv-xvi, 10, 26, 41n20, 63, 68, 71-73, 75-76, 79-81, 83-85, 86-89, 91, 97, 100-101, 103-4, 113, 116-19, 144, 160, 168, 197-98, 201, 217, 220-21, 229, 234n3, 245 Staritskie princes, 73, 80, 202-3, 211n31, 212, 215, 226 Stefan Batory of Poland, King, 74, 112, 116, 182 Sulakadzev, Aleksandr, 35 Sultanbekov, B. F., 147-48, 153, 158 Suzdal′, 41, 100, 128 Svanidze, Nikolai, 249 Sviiazhsk, 139, 146, 157-58 Sweden, ix, 97, 182 Sylvester, priest, 9, 20, 43, 45, 54-56, 78, 79n13, 80-82, 155, 160, 230-31, 262 Szeftel, Marc, 50

T

Tatar khanates of Kazan′ and Astrakhan′, ix, xiv, 108, 121, 137 Tataurov, Sergei, 150-51 Tatishchev, Vasilii, 35 Taube, Johann, 58-59, 238 terror, ix, 9, 14-16, 18-19, 23, 33n3, 35, 39, 53, 77, 83, 93-94, 103, 107, 110-16, 125-27, 132, 145, 151, 169, 179, 242 Thompson, Kristen, 220 Time of Troubles (Smutnoe vremia), 33-34, 40n19, 75, 94, 107, 132, 156, 167, 171 Tobol′sk, 35 Tolstoi, Aleksei N., 197, 242, 248 Toporkov, Vassian, 80 Toqa Temür, 124 totalitarianism, 103 Trepalov, Vadim, 157 Tsypin, Vladislav, Archpriest, 64 Tsvetkov, Sergei, 23, 28 Tychinskikh, Zaituna, 157

U

Ushakov, Aleksandr, 76-77, 79, 82, 84-86 Uspenskii, Boris, 6n8, 13, 57n19 Uspenskii, Fedor, 45-46

V

Vasil′ev, Leonid, 113 Vasilii Blazhennyi, 32, 37, 41n20, 62 Vasilii III, 22n30, 32, 77, 93, 111, 168, 170, 173, 188 Vasilii Vladimirovich, Prince, 135 Vasnetsov, Viktor, 248 Vernadsky, George, 76, 83 Veselovskii, Boris, 57 Veselovskii, Stepan, 76 Vipper (Wipper), Robert, 10, 57, 229-31 Viskovatyi, Ivan, 16, 63, 66, 82 Vitebsk, 74 Vladimir (city), 50 Vladimir Andreevich of Staritsa, Prince, 55, 134 Vladimir of Kiev and All Ukraine, Metropolitan, 64 Vladimir Staritskii, Prince, 15, 74, 203, 214, 222, 229 Vladimir Sviatoslavovich, Grand Prince, 50 Voeikov, Nikolai, 13-14 Volga River, 34, 108, 137, 139, 143 Volkhov River, 34, 38 Volodikhin, Dmitrii, 23, 27, 66-67, 181-82, 192, 235n5 Volokolamsk, 61

289

290

Index

W

Waliszewski, Kazimierz, 19 Wijermars, Marielle, xi, 87, 88n3, 247, 249n6, 250 World War II, 79, 221, 234

Y

Yeltsin, Boris, 81

Z

Zabelin, Ivan, 45 Zagibullin, Il′dus, 148-49 Zakhar′ins, 33-39, 66, 83, 151, 172 Zhukov, Georgii, 84 Zimin, Aleksandr, 29n35, 74-75, 107n7 Zubtsov, Vasilii, 164