Italy and the Allies [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674188945, 9780674186835

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italy and the allies

italy and the allies NORMAN

KOGAN

harvard university press, Cambridge 1956

© Copyright, ¡9j6, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College Distributed in Great Britain by Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:

$6-11282

Printed in the United States of America

to Gaetano

Salvemini

foreword

The relations of post-Fascist Italy with the outside world reveal two predominant themes. One concerns the efforts of the Italian people to rise from the ruins of a lost war into which they were plunged against their will by the Fascist government. The other concerns the threat to the Italian social structure created by the rise of the political left. The Allied powers were, and still are, involved in both issues. These were not separate questions; rather they were inextricably bound together. The preservation of Italian national interests would be tied in with the conservation of internal political, legal, and social institutions. The period covered is very recent. A number of references are made to mimeographed and typewritten materials which are not available in documentary collections open to researchers at this time, although it is hoped that this situation will not last too long. Other sources of information in many cases are men, both civilian and military, Allied and Italian, who cannot be cited directly. The reader is requested to accept my veracity as to events or policies for which the usual scholarly documentation cannot be offered in support. A special debt of gratitude is due to Professor Gaetano Salvemini at whose suggestion and with whose aid this work was undertaken. He was a constant source of good advice, keen insight, and helpful comment. The assistance of my wife, vii

Meryl, ovas extremely important. I am very grateful to Messrs. Cassell & Company, Ltd., Houghton Mifflin Company, and Thomas Allen, Ltd. for permission to quote from Sir Winston ChurchilFs Closing The Ring; to The Macmillan Company for permission to quote from The Memoirs of Cordell Hull; and to The Harvard University Press for permission to quote from H. Stuart Hughes's The United States and Italy and to make use of a map appearing in Robert Lee Wolff's The Balkans in Our Time. I also wish to thank the officials of the Widener Library of Harvard University who put their facilities at my disposal. Needless to say all responsibility for anything said herein is borne by myself alone. N O R M A N KOGAN

University of Connecticut Storrs, Connecticut April 5,19 56

viii

contents I II

the fascist period

1

the end of mussolini

13

III

negotiating the armistice

IV

the search for status — /

42

V

the institutional question

50

VI VII VIII IX X XI XII

26

the search for status — II italy and american elections stresses and strains

76

90

the partisan problem settlements

66

99

112

the end of the institutional question the peace treaty

121

132

XIII

reparations, disarmament, colonies

XIV

conclusions

151

169

bibliographical survey

209

notes

213

index

240

map

Venezia giulia—boundary proposals

139

I

the fascist period The risorgimento of the nineteenth century aimed at producing a modern Italy based on the principles of national unity, constitutional liberalism, and economic and political progress. By World War I, considerable economic development had taken place, especially in the north. As a result of that war the last legitimate irredenta, Trento and Trieste, were incorporated into a united Italy. Immediately after the peace, the establishment of universal manhood suffrage and proportional representation promised full popular participation in the affairs of government. At the same time, class lines in Italy were extremely marked. "Its modern, fluid, industrial society is a recent accretion superimposed on a hierarchical, unchanging, quasi-feudal society . . . a society that has remained basically conservative, stratified, and profoundly rooted in the manners of the pre-industrial age." 1 As a consequence of these internal contradictions the stresses of the postwar world were too great for Italian liberalism to survive. The failure to obtain the imperialist objectives in the Balkans, Asia, and Africa, which had partly motivated Italy's entry into the war, induced the people to believe that the peace settlement was a vittoria mutilata. The romantic nationalist D'Annunzio further aggravated the atmosphere with his filibustering expedition to Fiume in 1919. Economic dislocations added to the state of discontent. In 1920 the Socialist workers seized the factories and landless peasants threatened the established proprietors.

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. . . . neither of the contending classes in Italian industrial society honestly subscribed to the give-and-take principles of liberal democracy. The workers were aspiring toward a class dictatorship — perhaps milder than the Soviet, but still intolerant of its class adversaries. The employers were passing from a state of near-panic to a newfound resolve to maintain their rights of ownership at all costs; if it came to a final choice, the greater part of them were prepared to jettison the historic principles [of liberalism] for which their grandfathers had fought on the barricades.2

The combination of foreign and domestic difficulties led in a few years to internal political collapse, the victory of Mussolini's Fascist party, and the destruction of constitutional government in Italy. A totalitarian dictatorship was gradually established, tempered by inefficiency and moderated by the humanism and skepticism of the Italian people, but a totalitarian dictatorship nevertheless. Benito Mussolini was a man of bombast and rhetoric. He was clever and opportunistic; there was no doubt of his journalistic ability. Possessing a love of violence and dramatics, he preferred the showy way of force to the more quiet techniques of patient negotiation. Although very much an Italian, in a sense he despised the Italian people. Fascism had no program and no philosophy; later one was created in order to give it an aura of respectability. Yet this idea of the Corporate State remained a superficial construction; underneath the surface the old social structure maintained its domination. Few Italians understood the doctrines of the Corporate State, fewer believed in it. But it was convenient for the political class to support Mussolini as long as he was successful. Success could be defined as crushing the internal threats to the social structure,3 and as bringing glory and prestige to Italy on the foreign scene. For a number of years both were achieved. Organized anti-Fascist opposition was destroyed in a few years. Foreign glory was somewhat longer delayed. In some respects Fascist foreign policy was new, in others it was traditional. Its covetous attitude towards the Balkans

the fascist period

3

and Africa was a carry-over from pre-Fascist governments. Its uniqueness was essentially the flamboyant approach plus an absence of a sense of limitation. The pre-Fascist state was conscious of Italian weakness. It moved only after the other powers had granted clearance and never dared to challenge formidable enemies. Mussolini was ready to challenge the powers, Britain, for example, and for a time he seemed to succeed. The beginnings were slow. Mussolini could not yet make up his mind whether to act as the leader of a victor state and accept the status quo, or to act as a revisionist and help overthrow it.4 The most profitable areas for action were the Balkan and Central European states, for the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire left a power vacuum which in the 1920's both Russia and Germany were too weak to fill. So Italy began to move in. Mussolini tried to undermine French influence among the successor states (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland), but failed. The best he accomplished was the establishment of a de facto protectorate over Albania plus a paternal influence in the small revisionist states of the area, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. He demanded naval parity with France only to have it rejected. By the end of the 1920's Mussolini was openly revisionist, supporting German demands for arms equality and frontier rectification (but not Anschluss with Austria). In 1929 he came to terms with the Roman Catholic Church by signing the Lateran Accords with Pope Pius XI. Under the stipulations of these treaties a small area in the heart of Rome, Vatican City, was made an independent state, thus restoring the temporal power of the Pope even if only over a few acres. At the same time, a Concordat was signed regulating relations between church and state in Italy. Through these agreements Mussolini obtained considerable support for his policies, both foreign and domestic, among faithful Catholics in Italy and abroad.

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italy and the allies

The victory of Hitler in Germany in January 1933 induced Mussolini to promote the Four Power Pact, aimed fundamentally at creating a quadruple directorate for the continent along the lines of the Concert of Europe. This would restore Germany's position in Europe and give Italy much more bargaining power with France or Germany. The French, not wanting to antagonize Italy, did not reject the idea outright, but pressure exerted by France's allies in eastern Europe, who feared that revision would be principally at their expense, finally brought the pact to nought. Italy's sympathy for German aspirations cooled quickly as a result of the Nazi Putsch in Austria of 1934. Mussolini's encouragement of German revisionism was never intended to threaten Italy's interests. It was as fundamental a necessity that Italy preserve the independence of Austria and Yugoslavia as it was that Britain maintain independence for the Low Countries. Neither wanted the establishment of a great power in these strategic areas of attack against its territory. As a result, Mussolini rushed Italian troops to the Austrian frontier, the Germans were warned not to interfere, and the independence of Austria was preserved for a few more years. Temporarily, Fascist Italy moved closer to France and Britain. Fascism was not content to act vigorously just in defense of the status quo. Mussolini had been for some time building up his fleet and air force and had begun to talk of the Mediterranean as mare nostro, rattling his saber, and verbally challenging British and French power in that area. This might have been written off as bluff, but for the fact that there was an opportunity to take advantage of the French fear of Germany by driving a hard bargain in Africa. The result was the Laval-Mussolini agreement of January 1935, wherein France promised Italy a "free hand" in Abyssinia. The origins of the Fascist demands for Abyssinia have been variously ascribed to a desire for revenge for an earlier Italian defeat in 1896, economic difficulties and population pressures at home, acquisition

the fascist period

5

of raw materials, and a love of glory and violence. In all probability every one of these reasons played some part, but the search for the prestige associated with a military victory was unquestionably prominent. This is not the place to go into the details of the Abyssinian affair. An "incident" was created and Abyssinia appealed to the League of Nations. Britain and France, the dominant powers in the League, were not willing to check Mussolini, certainly not to the extent of going to war over the issue. Sir Samuel Hoare, the British foreign minister, and Pierre Laval conceived a pact, the Hoare-Laval Pact, that would have given two-thirds of Abyssinia to Mussolini if he would leave the remaining third free under Anglo-French protection. Mussolini, preferring to achieve by war what he could have secured by diplomacy, turned down the offer even before the British public rose up in wrath and denounced it. When Italian troops invaded Abyssinia in October 1935, popular pressure forced the British government to call for partial economic sanctions under the League Covenant. In six months the campaign was over and by May 1936, Abyssinia was Italian. Mussolini's prestige at home was at its height for Italy had presumably defeated the world, "fifty nations led by one." But the results were not that glorious. Germany was outside the League and had not participated in sanctions; it had taken advantage of Italy's troubles to carry on an economic invasion of central and eastern Europe which was squeezing Italian political influence out of that area. At the same time, Italy was isolated from Britain and France. Their people refused to permit recognition of the Italian conquest, which was prerequisite to the Establishment of close cooperation. In spite of the potential German danger to the Italian position the Fascists turned towards the Nazis, and the Rome-Berlin Axis was bora. The Spanish Civil War, which Mussolini promoted, tightened the bonds of the Axis. Japan was brought

6

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in to form the anti-Comintern Pact. The Axis was not as solid as it appeared but it held together. The biggest strain was the Nazi annexation of Austria in February 1938. After some hesitation Mussolini did not now oppose what he had prevented four years earlier, and a great power was again perched on the Italian northern frontier. Italy's whole position in central Europe was destroyed. Fascist aspirations for power could be satisfied only in the Mediterranean. The British attempted to come to terms with Mussolini on the basis of preserving the Mediterranean status quo. The Duce made paper agreements and then ignored them. He launched propaganda to undermine the British position in the Moslem countries; he stepped up his troop shipments to aid Franco's forces in Spain. He talked about a new Roman Empire and permitted Fascist deputies to call for French possessions in Africa and for Corsica, Nice, and Savoy. At Munich he helped Hitler destroy Czechoslovakia. In the spring of 1939 his forces openly took Albania in a swift coup. That same spring he signed a military alliance with Hitler — a pact of aggression, not of defense. The Italians were, nevertheless, still too exhausted from the Abyssinian and Spanish campaigns to want an early war. A secret clause contained an agreement not to precipitate a major crisis before 1942. In the summer of 1939, however, Hitler brought the Polish dispute to a head thereby frightening the Fascists, who could not restrain their ally. When World War II broke out at the beginning of September 1939, Mussolini announced that Italy would remain "nonbelligerent." He reached his greatest heights of popularity among his own people that day. The swift German victory in Poland impressed the Fascists. In early 1940 an agreement was signed with Germany dividing much of the Western world between them. Italy's share was to include all the lands surrounding the Mediterranean, in Europe, Asia, and Africa. B y May 1940, after the successful German attack on Norway, Mussolini and his King decided

the fascist period

7

that Hitler had won the war. While France was collapsing under the German attack, on June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on France and Britain, the famous "stab in the back." It seemed that all would be over quickly. Something went wrong. British resistance continued. The Italian attack on Greece in 1941 turned into a fiasco; Hitler had to bail out Mussolini. The Nazi attack on Russia in June 1941, failed to be the expected quick march and German troops were tied down in huge numbers on the steppes. In North Africa a German force was necessary to save Italy from complete defeat. Then America entered the war. In November 1942, the Germans were stalled at Stalingrad and the Allies landed in French North Africa. It was the beginning of the end. The failure of Fascist foreign policy is epitomized in the discrepancy between the ends desired and the means available. Italy did not have the sources of power which could enable it to achieve Mussolini's grandiose ambitions. It lacked material resources, raw materials, industrial capacity, etc.; it was riddled by corruption; its military leadership was inefficient. Above all, however, was the fact that large numbers of Italians had no stake in their country or its policies. The peasants were apolitical, the workers resentful, the middle and upper classes unwilling to take risks. Mussolini could shout, "believe, obey, fight," but the Italian people tend to be skeptics, against any government,5 and more appreciative of deals (combinazioni) than of fighting. He could claim that everything must be for the state, nothing against the state, no one outside the state; the Italians' intensive loyalties tend to be to their individual interests, to their families, to their historic communes. This separation of the people from the regime was the greatest source of Italy's weakness. So Mussolini was dependent on others in order to succeed. He could take advantage of Anglo-French, Franco-German, and other conflicts. He could exploit the fear, held by some

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italy and the allies

conservatives in France, Britain, and the United States, of bolshevism coming to Italy. He could and did upset whatever stability there was in central and eastern Europe, but it was Hitler and ultimately Stalin who benefited. His Mediterranean ambitions depended for success upon the destruction of French and British power, but only a German victory could accomplish this. And was there any reason to suppose that a victorious and dominant Germany would have honored commitments to a weak and ineffective Italy? the anti-fascist opposition

During the long years of Fascist rule it would be difficult to claim that most of the Italian people opposed the regime. If they were not sincere, believing Fascists, neither were they anti-Fascists. Nevertheless, a small opposition always existed, inside and outside Italy, divided in its motivations and in its tactics. A few old Liberals who remained in the Italian Senate occasionally opposed the Fascists publicly. The revered political philosophers, Benedetto Croce and Gaetano Mosca, conservative, politically ineffective, carrying no threat to the regime, could speak on occasion without fear of reprisal. A large number might be classified as the quiet opposition, outwardly conforming, inwardly dissenting. Primarily among intellectuals, both liberal and Catholic, they kept alive some independent thought in the universities. Finally there was the active opposition, the militant opponents, principally from the groups of the Left, Republicans, Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists. From the very beginning there was a stream of political exiles, most of whom went to France. From 1922 to 1924 they were chiefly Socialist, Communist, and Anarchist workers plus a few prominent individuals. Count Carlo Sforza, professional diplomat and former foreign minister, left his homeland as did the former Liberal premier, Francesco Saverio Nitti, and Don Luigi Sturzo, the Sicilian priest who led

the fascist period

9

the Catholic Partito Popolare. After the murder in 1924 of Giacomo Matteotti, the leader of the Socialist opposition, and with the development of the totalitarian state in 1925 and 1926, other noted politicians and scholars left the country. Palmiro Togliatti, the Communist leader, Alberto Tarchiani, the future Italian ambassador to Washington, Gaetano Salvemini, historian and revisionist Socialist, are a few of the names from this period. In 1926, with the creation of the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State and the control of passports, political emigration became clandestine. Leaders of the Left parties and a few left-wing Popolari would continue to escape. In 1927, the Anti-Fascist Concentration was formed in Paris among the left-wing exiles. The Communists, who called the others "social fascists," did not participate. The maximalist (revolutionary) wing of the Socialist party under the direction of Pietro Nenni dominated the Concentration. In 1929 Carlo and Nello Rosselli escaped from imprisonment to Paris and formed the Justice and Liberty Movement, an attempt to synthesize the principles of liberalism and revisionist socialism. Under Carlo Rosselli's dynamic leadership this movement led anti-Fascist activities for a time. In 1934 and 1935 the Soviet Union promoted the policy of the Popular Front; as a result, Italian Communists joined ranks with the Socialists. During the Spanish Civil War the leftist exiles fought in the International Brigade against Franco's forces and the Italian Fascist troops sent to Spain by Mussolini. Many future leaders of the Italian partisan movement received their training here. The Communists gained a more dominant position among the exiles as a result of the Spanish war, especially after the murder of Carlo Rosselli by Cagoulards (French Fascists in the pay of the Italian government) and the consequent decline of the Justice and Liberty group.® Inside Italy, organized anti-Fascism was destroyed within a few years. Only the Communist party was able to maintain

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a few scattered cells during the entire period. There was, however, one powerful institution which never came under the control of the Fascist regime. This was the Catholic Church, and its relation to the government merits some attention. The principal political instrument of the Church had been the Popular party, although officially there was no connection between the two. Under the leadership of Don Sturzo it had a general leftward orientation even though within its membership could be found a variety of economic and social outlooks ranging from the extreme conservative to the Catholic Communist. It was Church discipline that kept this disparate group together, and only when the Vatican made it clear that it was no longer interested in the party did the ranks split. T o many Catholics, Fascism presented itself as an ally not only against the Reds, but against the anticlerical liberals who embodied the principles of the French revolution.7 Thus, between 1923 and 1925, the Popolari were abandoned by high ecclesiastical circles when these came to terms with Mussolini. The higher clergy especially were favorable to the Fascist government, particularly in regions which had been Socialist strongholds, such as Emilia and the Romagna. The conservative factions, those that saw in Catholicism the protector of social hierarchy, would naturally be attracted to a regime which emphasized the same principle. They were blind to the fundamentally antireligious nature of Fascism; even a high cleric such as Cardinal Schuster of Milan could equate the Fascist cause and the Christian cause during the Abyssinian adventure. The failure of the Church to fight against Fascism may have embittered some Catholic intellectuals and Catholic workers who saw their working class institutions destroyed, but the great mass of the Catholics were sincerely in concord with the regime, and even before 1929, desirous of as intimate a collaboration as possible between church and state.8 A small

the fascist period

11

minority from the Popular party remained constantly hostile, but ineffective. The high point in Vatican-State relations came with the signature of the Lateran Accords of 1929. While the Church gained much, the government gained more; Mussolini was praised not only as the restorer of social order but of religious and moral values; the regime received an investiture of legitimacy from on high, the adaptation of Catholic publications and customs to the Fascist style, the support of the Fascist way of life. This support was very valuable in international politics even though the two institutions never had too much faith in each other. Mussolini's attempt at suppressing the Catholic Action organization in 1931 led to a deterioration in relations between church and state. The issue was compromised, however, and in 1935 the Italian clergy lined up behind Mussolini in the Abyssinian campaign although the Vatican did not openly endorse it. It did, however, support Mussolini completely in his aid to Franco during the Spanish Civil War. The passage of the anti-Semitic racial laws in 1938 upset cordial relations between the regime and part of the clergy as well as the Catholic masses. It was not only completely against Catholic doctrine, it wounded the humanism of the Italians and even more indicated the subservience of Italy to Germany.9 Italy's entry into the war in 1940 further estranged the regime from the masses, for the war had no meaning for the bulk of the people. Small groups of opponents began to gather together. As the war went from bad to worse the opposition to it increased. In 1941 and 1942 the peasants, especially those in the south, began to resist the collection of agricultural products. 10 Communism began to make extensive inroads among workers and university students. 11 Slowdowns, strikes, acts of sabotage started. It was easier for the proletarian left than for the more conservative upper-class anti-Fascists to sabotage the war. Many workers and many peasants were not

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Italy and the allies

faced with a conflict between patriotic loyalty to Italy and anti-Fascist sentiments. They had never been brought into the framework of either the old liberal state or the Fascist state. They had never developed a stake in their own country and felt no dismay about acting in a way which would bring about national defeat. The conservative anti-Fascists who had been brought within the social structure of the pre-Fascist liberal state found it much more difficult to overcome their patriotic sentiments and try to effect the defeat of their country, even if such a defeat meant the downfall of Fascism. It was the failure of Mussolini's foreign policy, not the strength of the anti-Fascist opposition which brought down the regime. The Duce had not altered the structure of Italian society. He had bolstered the upper classes who were so frightened by the revolutionary movement of 1 9 1 9 - 2 1 . His government existed at the pleasure of these groups, and when the war was lost they got rid of him.

II

the end of mussolini The landing of Anglo-American troops on the North African shore in November 1942 was the turning point of World War II for Italy. With defeat looming, various segments of the population began maneuvering in anticipation of the future. These elements fall into three broad categories: dissident Fascists; several groups of royalist military leaders; and the anti-Fascist groups already beginning to stir. Fascist unity was disintegrating. The more moderate Fascist leaders, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Dino Grandi, Giuseppe Bottai, all members of the Fascist Grand Council, were looking for a way of breaking with the Germans, getting rid of Mussolini and saving their positions and privileges. They tried to attach themselves to the military men around the monarchy. The Duke of Acquarone, Minister of the Royal Household and principal confidant of King Victor Emmanuel III, hoped to use the dissidents to crack the Fascist regime from the inside. He apparently led the moderate faction to believe that if it behaved properly there could be a future for it in a later government.1 Military men who were loyal to the King were maneuvering for a break with the Nazis and wanted to put anti-German officers into control of the armed forces. In particular they sought to replace Marshal Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of the High Command, reputed to be pro-German.2 The succession of defeats in Africa was a good talking point and on January 31, 1943, the Duce relieved Cavallero of his post. General Vittorio Ambrosio was appointed Chief of the High Com-

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mand with General Giuseppe Castellano as a special aide. Ambrosio considered "either to persuade Mussolini that he should denounce the Alliance or to get rid of Mussolini and face the problem with another government." 3 Mussolini wavered under Ambrosio's arguments, which pointed out that the Germans cared nothing f o r Italy. T h e Duce pleaded with Hitler to send more troops and supplies to the Mediterranean theater, to make a separate peace with the Soviets, or at least to establish a defensive line in Russia that could be held with smaller forces. These requests were rejected. 4 His Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Giuseppe Bastianini, approached him with a Rumanian plan for a concerted break with the Germans by Italy and all the Axis satellites.5 Mussolini would take no action, for although the German armies were retreating on the Russian front, he was not yet convinced that the Nazis had lost the war. T h e military conspirators were further handicapped by the equivocation of the King. Victor Emmanuel hesitated, shifted, delayed, and said nothing. If the plans failed he would be safe. 6 Those generals trying to save the monarchy and the social order it represented from the wreckage of a lost war were never informed of his ideas.7 T h e y waited for the King to make up his mind. T h e y waited in the hope that Mussolini might find the courage to break with the Germans. T h e y waited for the Allies to save them from German vengeance. On May 12, 1943, Tunis fell, the last Axis position in North Africa. It was not certain, however, that the Allies would invade Italy. Without their presence "it was considered impossible to face Germany and therefore impossible to proceed to the arrest of Mussolini without running the risk that Hitler would reëstablish the Fascist regime by force." 8 the origins of the committee of national liberation Even before the beginning of militarist maneuvering, traditional anti-Fascist movements had been covertly reorgan-

the end of mussolini

15

izing. The Allied landings in North Africa were a spur to increased activity. Committees were formed, primarily in northern and central Italy, representing five parties, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Action, Socialist, and Communist. The Italian Communist party was a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist party in the full sense of the term. Its maximum goal was to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. It had, however, a far different minimum goal and appealed to the Italian people on a reformist and patriotic rather than on a revolutionary basis. The party was republican and anticlerical, but as early as 1942, its propaganda omitted antimonarchist attacks and demands for the separation of church and state.9 The Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity was the heir of the strong Socialist party of pre-Fascist days. Its philosophy was classically Marxist in the tradition of the earlier maximalist socialism, but at this time it, too, appealed to the Italians on a reformist basis. The most important point was its tactical position. Pietro Nenni, leading the majority, advocated close cooperation and eventual unity with the Communists, hence the party's name. Giuseppe Saragat, leading a minority, and more in the tradition of French and British revisionist socialism, was wary of such a trend. In the underground days of 1943, this divergence was not significant for all parties were cooperating. Nenni's position was that when Socialists fight Communists, reaction triumphs, and he attributed the original victories of Fascism and Nazism to disunity among the proletarian parties.10 Nenni's concept of unity of action, however, led to Socialist subservience to Communist policies. The Socialists were fundamentally republican and anticlerical but, like the Communists, were understating this. Of the anti-Fascist groups the most republican, and the most resolute against cooperating with the King, was the Action party. It was an outgrowth of the Justice and Liberty Movement organized in France, and contained in addition

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italy and the allies

some revisionist socialists and liberal elements in Italy; it believed in full political and civil liberties, the separation of church and state, and a dual economy, socialist and liberal. It originated partly in the Mazzinian republicanism of the nineteenth century, and partly in the criticisms of orthodox socialist doctrine, especially those advanced by Gaetano Salvemini in pre-Fascist days. It opposed the exclusive orientation of propaganda toward the proletariat and the resultant neglect of the peasantry and lower middle classes exhibited by classical Socialists. For Italy it wanted the immediate socialization of the large industrial, commercial, financial, and insurance combines, side by side with a free, competitive economy composed of small business, cooperatives, and individuals taking risks and exercising initiative. Land reform was essential; the latifondi were to be liquidated without indemnification to former owners.11 It was a party of intellectuals with no base in the masses. There were divisions within the ranks — divisions between those who were fundamentally leftish Liberals and those who were basically Socialists but not rigid Marxists. There were also disagreements between men who would not have anything to do with the monarchy and would prefer to overthrow the House of Savoy the same day Mussolini was ousted, and others who, for tactical, realistic reasons, were willing to cooperate with monarchists to get rid of Fascism. The Christian Democratic party was the descendant of the old Partito Popolare of Don Luigi Sturzo. Bound to the Vatican by strong, although not legal, ties, it supported cooperation between church and state according to the Lateran agreements of 1929; its major raison-d'être was to protect the privileges of the Church. Its economic policy was to encourage a market economy based on the small businessman, the diffusion of private property, and the abolition of the propertyless proletariat. It advocated control over monopolies and socialization of the worst of them. This was the policy of its left, however, for the party was split widely over economic

the end of mussolini

17

and political ideas. It contained big businessmen and large landowners as well as radical proletarians and peasants. Its right wing had no use for such a program. The leadership was both more conservative and closer to the Vatican than was the Partito Popolare of pre-Fascist days. The membership was split on the monarchical question. Most were republicans, but the leadership was monarchist and in the ensuing struggle did all in its power to save the House of Savoy. The Liberal party was the heir of the great liberal tradition of the nineteenth century, the descendant of Cavour and the Destra, the historic "Right." Composed of the few scattered elements of the older Liberalism who had not made peace with Fascism, it espoused classical doctrines of political and personal liberty, separation of church and state, a competitive private economy. On its left fringe were those who might recognize some public regulation of business, some public responsibility for a system of social security and high employment. It was vague on agricultural reform.12 Actually, it was the party of big business and large landowners, relatively uninterested in free competition, plus a few legalists, philosophers, and professors of economics. The party was divided between monarchists and republicans with monarchists prevailing. One more small party later joined the ranks of the united anti-Fascist group, the Democratic Labor party. It was close to the Liberals, descending from the Sinistra, the historic "Left." The party platform was little different from that of the Liberals except, perhaps, for a greater emphasis on small business and a stronger attack on big business and high finance. Led by Ivanoe Bonomi, a pre-Fascist prime minister, it supported tactics designed to save the monarchy despite a republican influence in the ranks. It hardly existed as a party; rather it was Bonomi and a few others. In many parts of the country it had no life and it seems to have been created in Rome to provide a balance between Right and Left in the

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italy and the allies

anti-Fascist movement. The Communists, Socialists, and A c tionists were the L e f t , the others made up the Right. Definition of party principles was not the main job in the underground days of 1942 and 1943. A t this time there were no real anti-Fascist parties, just small groups of men trying to cooperate. If they differed, it was a division over tactics; how to overthrow Fascism and break with the Germans. T h e right-wing parties and the Communists believed success could come only through working with the military, loyal to the King. T h e Socialists went along reluctantly. À group in the Action party, having no faith that the King would move, preferred a direct revolt. A t the end of 1942 they planned an insurrection with the aid of General Raffaele Cadorna. This plan was dropped, however, at the persuasion of other antiFascists. 13 Meanwhile an active propaganda campaign was waged throughout Italy, most effectively in the north and central regions. T h e most important contribution of anti-Fascism was the great wave of strikes of March 1943. Promoted primarily by Communists, the wave began in Turin and spread to Milan and Genoa. Although it was initially a dispute over wages, it developed into a political demonstration against the war and Fascism. It was the largest wartime strike in all Europe and a tremendous blow to the regime; for the first time since 1925 Fascism was really attacked from the inside. T o o weak to crush the strikers, the Fascists bargained with the workers on their wage demands. B y mid-April the strike was over, leaving political fruits to be reaped later. 14 the development of allied policy British policy toward Italy was based on past experience, military plans, and consideration for the future. There was the nineteenth-century record of friendship, but Mussolini's Mediterranean and African policy after 1935 had almost cost Britain an empire, and the British were bitter. Official

the end of mussolini

19

policy was based on the principle of unconditional surrender. Along with this was the assumed destruction of Fascism. But who were the Fascists? Were Victor Emmanuel III and his son Fascists? Could a distinction be made between some Fascists and others? British policy first expressed itself on these subjects in an address by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the Italian people on December 23, 1940. "One man and one man alone," was responsible for Italy's being in the war. 15 Churchill explicitly excluded the monarchy, the people, and the Catholic Church from all responsibility. Implicitly he excluded other ranking Fascists by concentrating on Mussolini. It could mean an intention to tolerate Fascism without Mussolini, or it could be propaganda to cause dissension in the enemy camp. Churchill has since made it clear that Mussolini's great, and it seems only, crime was to enter the war on the side of Germany. He also made it clear to Roosevelt that the preservation of the monarchy was indispensable to save Italy from rampant Bolshevism.16 In the British view of the postwar world, then, a monarchist Italy was a definite feature. Other plans for Italy are not so clear. Commander Stephen King-Hall of the Mediterranean Section of the Admiralty proposed that Italy be reduced to its frontiers of 1914 and stripped of all its colonies and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia.17 King-Hall did not speak for the British government, but his views represent one section of opinion. It is probable, however, that in early 1943 the government was contemplating a peace settlement which would include either a partition of Italian territory or leave Sicily to the Italian Crown but under British control. In the spring of 1943, a Signor Gentili of the Action party came to London offering to coordinate underground activity with Allied plans. He asked for a guarantee of Italy's territorial integrity. The British refused. American policy began from a different position. Tradi-

2o

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tional areas of American predominance had not been endangered by Fascist aggression. There were strong Italian and Catholic communities in the United States which felt that Italy should not be treated too harshly. Available information led President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull to conclude that Italians were not like Germans and Japanese, had not wanted war, and could therefore be treated differently. 18 The first public evidence of this attitude was the removal of Italian aliens in the United States from the classification of enemy aliens.19 When Gentili arrived in Washington in the spring of 1943 he repeated his offer of collaboration and asked for assurances against Italy's dismemberment. The American government promised that Italy's "essential nationhood" would be preserved, a promise later repeated publicly by Adolph Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.20 It did not mean a guarantee of existing boundaries, but rather a guarantee against partition and dismemberment. Radio broadcasts to Italy assured the people that the United States had no intention of imposing a punitive peace, that the United States made a distinction between the Italian people and the Fascist regime.21 For some time the United States followed Britain's lead on questions of Italy's future internal regime. The House of Savoy was praised in broadcasts to Italy. Radio attacks centered on Mussolini rather than on Fascism, to the point where Italian anti-Fascists in America thought that Allied goals were to restore Fascism without Mussolini.22 In the spring of 1943, however, the emphasis began to shift. Broadcasters began encouraging the labor and Socialist movements in Italy and began denouncing the Royal family and the whole Fascist system.23 The American government sent funds to Switzerland where the exiled Italian Socialist novelist, Ignazio Silone, got them channeled to underground leaders in Italy. The State Department had promoted the convocation of an Anti-Fascist Congress in Montevideo, Uruguay in August

the end of mussolini

21

1942. This Congress resolved that Count Carlo Sforza, the pre-Fascist foreign minister, should create a provisional government-in-exile which would form an Italian Legion, similar to the Free French forces, to fight for Italy's freedom. Sforza's committee, however, could never get sufficient unity among the exiles to form even a provisional government, nor could it show representation of any significant forces inside or outside Italy. No volunteers for the Legion were forthcoming. By the spring of 1943, the intention of the Allies was to rule any captured Italian territory by direct military government.24 Determination of policy was based, to a large extent, on purely military considerations. Plans for the invasion of Italy were limited to the capture of Sicily, or at the most, southern Italy up to Rome. The Allies were committed, by May 1943, to making the major attack upon Germany across northern France. Such plans included Italy primarily as a theater to divert German troops from other fronts.25 Under these circumstances the political goal of the Allies would be limited to securing the rear of the fighting lines. While Americans and Britishers were agreed on short-run objectives, there were differences over long-run solutions. The British, bitter over the struggle for the Mediterranean and North Africa, would be inclined toward harsh treatment of Italy while at the same time protecting the monarchy. The Americans could be expected to take a more lenient attitude toward Italy, but while not antimonarchical, nevertheless less willing to fight for the House of Savoy. American policy, however, was limited by agreements recognizing Britain's leadership in the Mediterranean. As Sumner Welles, then Undersecretary of State has written: "The general scheme was frankly based upon the preponderance of British interests in the Italian theater. It was agreed that in the military as well as the political organization, the extent of American representation should be roughly equivalent to British representa-

22

italy and the allies

tion, but that the authority of the United States should be supplementary rather than equal to that of Great Britain." 26 last days of a regime On April 27, 1943, a Committee of Anti-Fascist Parties was formed in Rome under the general leadership of Ivanoe Bonomi. Counsels of moderation prevailed and the Committee decided to work with the Crown to get rid of the Fascist dictatorship.27 The fall of Tunisia on May 12, 1943, ended the African campaign. With the authority of the Fascist regime seriously undermined, the population was in a ferment and a mood of rebellion. The anti-Fascists tried to get the King to act in this atmosphere. Monarchists among them urged Victor Emmanuel to throw out the regime. Retired military leaders such as Marshal Enrico Caviglia and Admiral Thaon de Revel added their exhortations. The King listened in silence, refused to commit himself, or else talked about fictional constitutional limitations on his powers, asserting that only the Chamber and Senate could authorize his intervention.28 From pleas the anti-Fascists turned to threats. In June, old Liberals warned the King that they would abandon the monarchy if he did not act.29 In desperation the Anti-Fascist Committee authorized its Communist member, Concetto Marchesi, to make contacts with various generals and test their feelings about a coup d'état The military wanted to know the chances of success, but since there could be no guarantees they were not interested.30 On July 10, 1943, the Allies attacked Sicily. The collapse of Italian resistance to the Allied landing brought all the various behind-the-scene movements into full activity. Ambrosio, the Chief of the High Command, instructed Castellano to prepare again the plans to depose the Duce although he had not yet given up hope that Mussolini might break with Hitler.31 The main problem the Italians faced was to get out of the

the end of mussolini

23

war completely. Surrender was not enough if the Germans and Anglo-Americans continued to make Italy a battlefield. Bastianini conceived the idea of a separate peace with both German and Allied consent to a neutralized Italian mainland. The Germans had only two and a half divisions in continental Italy at the time. Army men thought Mussolini had the best chance of getting Hitler's assent to such a project. But Francesco Rossi, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, pointed out that the Allies would never permit it since they wanted Italian air bases for bombing central Europe and the Germans would have to resist.32 Mussolini still hoped the Nazis would save him. His General Staff told him to demand large reinforcements from the Germans. If they refused, he must then tell the Nazis that Italy had no choice but to get out of the war.33 A meeting between Hitler and Mussolini and their General Staffs convened on July 19 at Feltre; Ambrosio asked the Germans to send divisions and planes to defend Italy not because he wanted them to do so, but to show Mussolini that they had no intention of doing so. The Germans pleaded the requirements of the Russian front. Mussolini alluded to the possibility of a separate peace with Russia, but said nothing about wanting a separate Italian armistice.34 There were no conclusions. The same day Rome was bombed for the first time. When the King visited the ruins the crowds were hostile.35 On the way back from Feltre, Ambrosio wrote off Mussolini. On July 20 when the Duce arrived in Rome the decision to proceed with his arrest had already been made. After months of hesitation the King finally decided to act. Castellano was notified the next day. Dino Grandi, the dissident Fascist, got wind of the plan and saw the possibility of turning the decision to his own advantage. He had already called for a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council. Castellano wanted to arrest the entire Grand Council, but it was decided to go ahead with the plan of arresting only Mussolini. On the night

24

italy and the allies

of July 24-25, 1943, the Grand Council met and, in spite of Mussolini's warnings, called for the restoration of all powers to the King, by a vote of 19 to 7. Victor Emmanuel chose to regard this vote as an expression of "no-confidence" in the Duce and on July 25, 1943, Mussolini was arrested as he left the King's residence. Twenty-one years of Fascist rule had come to an end. The downfall of Fascism was caused by military defeat and the instrument of overthrow was the army acting at the order of the King. As for the Fascist reaction, there was none. The Fascist Militia did not move. The German reaction would come later. The coup had been long delayed. One reason was the desire to have the Allies close enough to save Italy from an expected German reaction. Another was the King's vacillating nature, his inability and refusal to make decisions until he could no longer delay. A third may have been a desire to see how the war in Russia was going, to know for certain that Germany could not win. It is difficult to assay the influence of the anti-Fascist groups in the overthrow. The King had little use for them; of that there is no doubt. To him they were a few hundred unimportant men. He was right quantitatively, but he underestimated their influence among the people. Their ideas and propaganda pervaded widely, especially in northern and central regions. It was popular disaffection which so weakened the regime that the generals were able to push it over without effort. This the King did not understand then, nor later. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the warnings and threats of the Anti-Fascist Committee were significant in motivating his final decision. The hope that Mussolini would break with Hitler does not seem to have been fostered by a desire to keep the Duce in power, although overthrowing Fascism was secondary to the problem of splitting with the Germans. It is true that Mussolini had given Victor Emmanuel an empire and an Albanian

the end of mussolini

25

Kingdom, yet he had also usurped dynastic privileges. Ambrosio, as a military man, would be hesitant about knifing II Duce, his Commander-in-Chief. If Mussolini could persuade Hitler to let Italy withdraw from the war, he would be serving an important purpose. He could be discarded later, for the Anglo-Americans would obviously not negotiate with him. The Italians were ignorant of Allied plans and had no idea of the limited strength of Anglo-American forces in the Mediterranean area. They hoped the Allies might save Italy from the Germans, whereas the Allies wanted the Germans to be drawn into the peninsula. They underestimated British bitterness towards them. Perhaps the promises of Allied propaganda fooled them for the Atlantic Charter stated that no territorial changes would be made without the consent of the inhabitants concerned, and affirmed the right of peoples to choose their form of government. Roosevelt and Churchill pledged that by surrendering honorably, Italy could have a respected place in the family of European nations.38 All these could induce the Italians to expect something better than unconditional surrender although direct efforts to obtain guarantees had been rebuffed. The Russians were too deeply engaged in a struggle to survive the German onslaught to play an active role in Italian affairs at this time. The Anglo-Americans were ignorant of conditions in Italy. They miscalculated the weakness of Fascism and the strength of unorganized anti-Fascism. "In their political warfare the Anglo-Americans at the same time urged the Italians to overthrow Mussolini and considered such an event as most unlikely." 37 They were politically unprepared for the problems that would face them when they landed on the Italian peninsula. Sforza's Committee had been ignored because it represented no one, but its ideas reflected attitudes and feelings widely diffused throughout the politically conscious portions of the Italian population.

III

negotiating the armistice handling the germans After Mussolini was arrested, Marshal Pietro Badoglio became Chief of Government heading a cabinet of technicians. He ruled by issuing decrees in the name of the King, and his government could quite properly have been called a military dictatorship or absolute monarchy. Most of the cabinet never knew what plans the government had about the war. The public and the world were told the war continued, for the King felt an open break would leave it at the mercy of German retribution.1 Hans von Mackensen, the German ambassador, called on Badoglio the day following the arrest to protest the turn of events and to warn of Hitler's displeasure. Albert Kesselring, the German military commander, was received by Badoglio the same afternoon. T o both the Marshal promised a continuation of the war, and he apparently impressed them with his sincerity.2 Berlin had anticipated some trouble in Italy but was taken by surprise. Hitler's first impulse was to deliver a coup and capture the new government; Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, formerly commanding the Afrika Korps, persuaded him to postpone the project until the Germans had built up more strength in Italy. But on July 27, Kesselring and Admiral Ruge, who was the leading German naval officer in Italy, flew to Hitler's headquarters and opposed any attempt to

negotiating the armistice

27

restore Fascism. They argued that the armed forces and people were against the Fascist party and that both of them believed the new cabinet would carry on the war. 3 In Rome, the Italian government decided that the best procedure was to maintain the appearance of a continuing alliance. Undercover, however, approaches were to be made to the Allies in the hope of getting better terms than unconditional surrender. It was also deemed necessary to wait until Allied armies now in Sicily would be in a position to save the capital and the government.4 Meanwhile, Nazi troops poured into Italy. It was this movement which really paralyzed the Badoglio regime in its attempt to make contact with the Anglo-Americans. B y August 17, Italian divisions were encircled and German troops were ready to enter into action at any moment.5 On August ι, the Fuehrer had asked that a meeting of the Axis Foreign Ministers and Military Chiefs be held at Tarvisio on August 6. The Italians, led by the new Foreign Minister, Raffaele Guariglia, went with the intention of trying to obtain the withdrawal of Italian troops on occupation duty in France and the Balkans, so that as few soldiers as possible would be caught outside Italy when the reversal came. Guariglia claimed that the troops were needed to defend Italy from Allied attack. The Germans came with the hope of discovering what the Italians were up to. But the conversations were inconclusive and no decisions were reached.6 On August 15, Generals Francesco Rossi and Mario Roatta met Marshal Rommel and General Alfred Jodl at Bologna. After sparring for position, this conference ended with an agreement that a few more German planes would be brought to the Italian front and that three divisions of the Italian 4th Army in France could return home.7 Reporting to Hitler on the 19th, the German generals indicated that the conference atmosphere was not cordial. There was still no evidence of Italian treason although there were certain suspicious impli-

28

Italy and the allies

cations. That same day, Von Mackensen was insisting on the reliability of the present Italian cabinet.8 Throughout this period the Germans searched diligently for Mussolini. Near the end of August the Italians became suspicious of a plot and began to round up Fascist strong-arm men who, up to that time, had not been touched. These suspicions were reinforced when von Mackensen and Enno von Rintelen, the military attaché at the German embassy, were replaced by two men who were known experts at staging sudden overthrows. The diplomatic fencing continued up to the announcement of the armistice on September 8. To the end Badoglio and the King repeated their pledges of loyalty to the Axis. There is evidence the Germans, when they learned finally of Mussolini's location, were planning a coup to coincide with the latter's liberation. The armistice announcement came before the plan could be executed.9 handling the anti-fascists

Throughout the country an outburst of joy had swept the population on the news of Mussolini's overthrow. In Milan on July 26, 1943, the Committee of Five Anti-Fascist parties (there was no Democratic Labor party in the north) published a program calling for the establishment of a democratic republic. The Anti-Fascist Committee in Rome called more moderately for the dissolution of the Fascist party and its auxiliary institutions, freedom for all political prisoners, and freedom of the press. The Committee had hoped to be a part of the new government, but the King preferred a cabinet of functionaries. The Committee then decided it might be better not to bear responsibility for signing a surrender document acknowledging Italy's defeat.10 On July 30 the cabinet issued a decree prohibiting all political parties for the duration of the war. The Fascist party had been already declared disbanded. There was no freedom for

negotiating the armistice

29

the press. N o attempt was made to dissolve the Anti-Fascist Committee, however, (there was an "understanding") and contacts continued between the two bodies. The Committee gave Badoglio its tacit aid, recognizing the difficulties of the moment, and suggested some of its important followers for some of the nonpolitical ministries. Leopoldo Piccardi, who became Minister of Commerce and Industry, described the situation as follows: In respect to the cabinet formed on July 25, the political parties which had up to that time constituted the opposition to Fascism, maintained an attitude of waiting, that, within certain limits, can be defined as benevolent. T o say . . . that the parties "sided with" the Badoglio regime, is perhaps, excessive. The truth is that the old opposition, which, on the act of the fall of Fascism believed itself naturally destined to assume power, with the formation of a cabinet of functionaries, left to it every political responsibility, limiting its collaboration to those fields which did not divide political responsibility. This attitude of the parties enabled me to take part, as a functionary, in the cabinet which was constituted without any political consultation.11

In general, the line taken by the Anti-Fascist Committee was to put pressure on the cabinet without creating a rupture. The Committee, however, was worried about the government's failure to break with the Germans and make peace with the Allies. It noted that conditions throughout the country were deteriorating, that in effect a military dictatorship was being imposed on the people, that Fascists and their institutions were not being vigorously disbanded. Resolutions deploring these conditions were passed on August 2 and August 13 and conveyed to Badoglio. In the latter note the Committee disclaimed responsibility for all consequences.12 As time passed and no peace was concluded, the populace became restive. In northern industrial cities there were strikes and threats of revolt. Fascist appointees continued to hold important posts in the bureaucracy and the dissident Fascist hierarchs were not bothered. The King's formula was "neither

3o

italy and the allies 13

Fascism nor anti-Fascism." It was only toward the end of August upon discovery of the German plot to overthrow the government that measures were taken to arrest dangerous Fascist leaders such as Ettore Muti, a former national secretary of the party. Many people became more noticeably republican especially in the north, as indicated by illegal publications circulating there. The King, fearful of too rapid a destruction of Fascism and of the threat of civil war, defined his policy in a memorandum to Badoglio on August 16 — the government had to remain a "military government." N o recriminations against former Fascists would be tolerated. The purge of all former members of the Fascist party from every public activity had to cease. N o party could be permitted to organize publicly. Illegal sheets in circulation had to be suppressed. He continued: If the system initiated here were to fail, one would arrive at the absurdity of implicitly judging and condemning the work of the King himself. T h e honest mass of the former members of the organizations of the Fascist party, at a blow eliminated from every activity without specific demerit, will be easily induced to transfer their organizing ability to the extremist parties augmenting the future difficulties of every government of order. T h e majority of them, seeing themselves abandoned by the King, persecuted b y the Government, ill-judged and offended b y the slender minority of old parties which for twenty years consented to b o w their necks and disguise their opinions, in a short while will flow into the squares in defense of the bourgeoisie to confront communism, but this time they will be decisively oriented to the left and against the monarchy. 1 4

In their efforts to maintain order, the King and government had valuable allies among the dignitaries of the Church. Various cardinals and bishops issued pastoral letters urging their flocks to obey constituted authority. 15 As time went on the population grew more restive over the

negotiating the armistice

31

absence of peace. W o r d came to Rome that a general strike was in prospect in the large northern cities, scheduled for about the first of September. The Anti-Fascist Committee in Rome was then notified that secret negotiations for an armistice were almost complete. T h e Committee denied responsibility for the projected strike. Piccardi and the other antiFascist "functionaries" were rushed to Milan and Turin where they talked to party leaders, advised patience, and perhaps let them in on the secret. The strike never took place. negotiating with the allies The fall of Mussolini's government caught the Allies politically and militarily unprepared. N o w , at one stroke, it seemed possible to obtain all Italy with bases even closer to central Europe than was originally envisaged. Although there were elements in American and British public opinion hostile to the King and Badoglio, if the latter two could deliver all Italy it would be foolish not to deal with them. There were differences between the American and British governments, however, as to how far the door should be held open. The United States thought Badoglio was adequate for purposes of surrender, but not for subsequent rule. Churchill wanted to support the monarchy in the hope of strengthening its position and preserving it.16 Blandishments were offered to the Italians in the form of kind words for the regime and public promises of a peace with honor, including repatriation of Italian prisoners provided the Italians protected and returned Allied prisoners. There was a cessation of heavy aerial bombardments. These inducements provoked a reaction in Allied public opinion, however, and the American and British governments were required to make official statements that the terms were still unconditional surrender and that the peoples of liberated countries would have the right to choose their own form of government at the end of hostilities.17 As no surrender moves appeared forthcoming, bombings

32

ìtaly and the allies

were resumed on August i. With the passage of time more and more German troops moved into Italy. Hope for a quick capture of the entire peninsula receded; a hard fight lay ahead. Guariglia had been Ambassador to Turkey when he was notified on July 26, 1943, of his appointment as Foreign Minister. At that time he hoped Italy could retire to nonbelligerency. The next day, when taking leave of the Turkish Foreign Minister, he requested him to inform the AngloAmericans that while he, Guariglia, had no instructions and was not au courant with the latest developments in Rome, he was convinced that Italy would have to "change her course." It was important the Allies should understand that Italy was already partly occupied by the Germans, large Italian forces were outside Italy and the government did not have complete freedom of action.18 Upon Guariglia's return to Rome, General Ambrosio asked him to conclude an armistice and on July 31, 1943, at a conference attended by the King, Badoglio, Acquarone, Ambrosio, and Guariglia, the decision was taken to negotiate with the Allies. At Guariglia's request Cardinal Maglione of the Vatican staff relayed this news to the British minister at the Vatican. Since the Germans knew his code he could not communicate with London. The American representative was in the same position and it was decided, therefore, to send emissaries to make personal contact with the Allies at Lisbon and Tangier. 19 During all this time the German troops had been pouring into Italy. On August 4, Blasco Lanza D'Ajeta, a godson of Sumner Welles, arrived in Lisbon. The next day Counsel-General Alberto Berio reached Tangier. Both underlined the danger of a Nazi occupation of Italy, stated the possibility of going over to the Allied side, and gave information on the political and military situation inside their country. Both warned of Communism in Italy. They asked for an Allied landing in

negotiating the armistice

33

southern France to draw German troops out of the peninsula. Neither had the power to negotiate but both made political soundings concerning Allied terms. They hinted about guarantees of the Italian frontiers, the pre-Fascist colonies, the position of the monarchy. The Allies refused to negotiate. They insisted upon unconditional military surrender, at the same time emphasizing that the peace settlement would be honorable.20 There is evidence, however, that toward the end of August the British indicated that they would do all they could to support the throne of Savoy. 21 When Rome learned the necessity for military rather than political talks it was decided to send General Castellano to Lisbon. He had inadequate credentials so that he could be disavowed, if necessary. His instructions were to explain the military situation to the Allies, find out their intentions, and warn that no break could be made with the Germans without Allied help. He was to advise the Allies to land one force north of Rome and another north of Rimini on the Adriatic coast to force the Germans to pull back toward the Alpine passes, thereby saving central Italy and Rome.22 On August 19, Castellano met Major General Walter Bedell Smith and Brigadier K. W. D. Strong of General Eisenhower's staff in the British embassy in Lisbon. Smith proceeded to read the military terms of armistice, later called the "Short Armistice." 23 Article 12 bound Italy to accept political, economic, and financial conditions to be imparted subsequently. Castellano replied that he did not have authority to negotiate an armistice; that his function was to represent the situation in Italy to the Anglo-Americans, to offer the participation of Italian troops in the struggle against the Germans, and to agree on ways to make such collaboration most effective.24 Castellano's aim was now clear. It was to jump from one side to the other without surrendering. It was to execute a classic Italian reversal of alliances.

34

italy and the allies

Smith then made it clear that the armistice terms had to be accepted unconditionally. He added, however, that any Italian forces or Italian people who fought or in any way attempted to oppose the Germans would be given Allied aid. He gave Castellano an aide-mémoire drafted by the AngloAmerican chiefs of government then meeting in Quebec which would provide the road to redemption for the Italians. This draft, which was later known as the "Quebec Document," became the basis of Italian postarmistice foreign policy. Aide-Mémoire to accompany conditions of Armistice presented by General Eisenhower to the Italian Commander-in-Chief. These terms [the "short armistice" terms] do not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. T h e extent to which the terms will be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. T h e United Nations, however, state without reservation that wherever the Italian forces or Italians fight the Germans or destroy German property or hamper German movement, they will be given all possible support by the forces of the United Nations. . . ?

The remainder of the conference was primarily occupied with Castellano's requests for clarification of the armistice terms. There were two particularly important points. One was the question of the Italian navy. Castellano warned that the sailors might scuttle the ships rather than surrender them. Smith observed that the Quebec Document apparently attenuated the rigor of the clause on disarming the navy and added that while he could put nothing in writing he could say the Italian flag would continue to fly over the ships. This promise was to become the basis of the nonsurrender of the Italian navy. The second point was the question of governing the Italian peninsula once the Allies were there. The Anglo-Americans were ruling Sicily through military government and the armistice terms called for the extension of this system to the

negotiating the armistice

35

mainland. Castellano insisted this was a derogation of Italian sovereignty. This issue was most grave. Given the attitude of large sections of the Italian population it was important that the King's powers be conserved if he were to retain his position in the difficult days that lay ahead. Castellano apparently wanted all the territory on the peninsula to be exempt from Allied military government rule, to remain under the authority of the Royal government. As this was a political issue no decision was reached at this time. It was agreed since Castellano had no authority to conclude an armistice that the Italian answer would be given by radio or through the British Minister at the Vatican on August 28. The date was later postponed to August 30. Castellano was given a portable radio transmitter to take back to Rome.26 His mission had been delayed. Badoglio, out of contact with him since August 12, feared he might have been caught by the Germans. He decided, without Guariglia's knowledge, to send another emissary, General Giacomo Zanussi, who took along as credentials a British prisoner, General Carton de Wiart. Upon arrival at Lisbon they learned that Castellano was already on his way home. Zanussi was given a copy of the "Long Terms" of the armistice containing the economic, financial, and political obligations to be assumed by the Italian government. From Lisbon, Zanussi was flown to North Africa, and on August 31, flown to Cassibile, Sicily, with General Smith where he met Castellano.27 The Zanussi mission created much suspicion in the Allied camp. The Allies wondered whether Castellano really represented Badoglio. Zanussi (the adjutant of General Roatta, considered by the Allies to be pro-German) was suspected, correctly, of belonging to another faction in Italy, perhaps one playing with the Germans, sent to discover the character and extent of Italian-Allied contacts.28 Inquiries were made; Badoglio reaffirmed Castellano as his representative, and Zanussi's trip was explained. The incident did nothing to alleviate

36

italy and the allies

Allied mistrust of the Italian government and the possibility of treachery remained until the armistice was announced on September 8. Castellano returned to Rome on August 27 and reported to his superiors. Guariglia objected to the General's clear-cut offer to fight on the side of the Allies for he would have preferred this issue to be negotiated later with compensations for Italy.29 For three days the Italians debated what course to follow. On August 29, Fiorello La Guardia, Mayor of New York City, made a short wave broadcast stating, "We don't say that the military government of Sicily is permanent." 30 On August 30, the Allies were notified that Castellano would fly to Cassibile on the following day. His instructions were neither to accept nor reject an armistice but to make clear that Italy could not announce acceptance of an armistice unless sufficient Allied divisions were landed north of Rome to pull back the German troops near the capital thereby saving the government, the Royal family, and the Vatican.31 Upon his arrival the Allied officers were astounded to learn he had no authority to sign the armistice terms. They rejected his program, insisting Italy could not set conditions to its surrender.32 Smith, after consultation with his associates, agreed to send an airborne division to protect Rome if the Italians could provide and control the airfields for the landing. The Italians were given until midnight September 3 to accept an armistice. Castellano and Zanussi flew back to Rome the same day, whereupon Zanussi turned over the copy of the "Long Terms" to his superiors, who would presumably pass it on. The next day the Italian High Command accepted the airborne operation and on September 3 Castellano, again at Cassibile, signed the Short Armistice. At 5:15 p.m. Italy surrendered to the Allies. That evening Smith handed Castellano a copy of the "Long Armistice" which was identical with the one given to Zanussi in Lisbon. Castellano protested the harsh initial clause, "The

negotiating the armistice

37

Italian Land, Sea, and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally." Smith retorted that the Italian government knew this since Zanussi had a copy. In answer to further remonstrances by Castellano, Smith wrote the following note to Badoglio: "The additional clauses have only a relative value insofar as Italy collaborates in the war against the Germans." 33 As the Allies were still doubtful of the ability of the Italian army to fulfill the promises made by Castellano for the airborne operation it was decided to send Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor and Colonel William T . Gardiner to Rome to verify the situation and to make final arrangements. On September 6, secret messages were sent to the Italian capital making arrangements for this mission. The same day General Roatta, the Army Chief of Staff, received two shocks. He received a copy of the outline plan of the airborne operation which he felt to be far beyond the capacity of his forces in the Rome area to carry out.34 He also learned from aerial reconnaissance that Allied convoys were forming in the open seas off Palermo and further intelligence reports confirmed the suspicion that the Allied attack would come in the region of Naples or Apulia. In other words, on September 6 the Italian High Command discovered the main attack would not be near Rome, and they realized they would have to defend the capital themselves with only the help of one American airborne division. "This is the essential fact which explains the contradictory and ambiguous conduct of the Italian Government during the next two days. All along the King and the group associated with him had been unwilling to run any risks but insisted on being rescued by the Allies." 35 During the evening of September 7, General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner arrived in Rome. They learned that the Italians did not expect the Allied invasion for several days. Castellano had mistakenly guessed that the Anglo-American

38

italy and the allies

attack would take place around September 10 or 12. Taylor insisted on seeing General Rossi and General Carboni, in command of Italian troops in the Rome area, immediately. Carboni arrived at 9:30 P.M. and in an alarmingly pessimistic description said it was impossible for the Italian troops to hold the airfields, protect Rome, and give logistical support to the airborne division. If the Allies were not going to make a major landing north of Rome, the only way to save the capital was to avoid overt attacks against the Germans and await the effect of Allied landings in the south. He knew these landings would be at Salerno which was too far away to help in the defense of Rome. 36 Taylor demanded an interview with Badoglio at once. The latter, after talking to Carboni, supported Carboni's point of view, the "wait till they rescue us" philosophy. Then he did something which staggered the two Americans; he called for cancellation of the airborne operation and asked that the armistice be called off for the present. He asked Taylor to return to Allied Force Headquarters and explain the military situation at Rome and the Italian point of view. This Taylor refused to do but he consented to act as a messenger if so instructed by the Allied Command. In the face of Taylor's refusal, Badoglio accepted the responsibility himself and drafted a message to Eisenhower cancelling all his earlier commitments. Due to changes in the situation brought about by the disposition and strength of the German forces in the Rome area, it is no longer possible to accept an immediate armistice as this could provoke the occupation of the Capital and the violent assumption of the government by the Germans. Operation Giant T w o [airborne operation] is no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee the airfields. General Taylor is available to return to Sicily to present the views of the government and await orders.

_ , Badoglio

Taylor later sent two messages of his own describing the military situation and cancelling operation Giant Two. 3 7

negotiating the armistice

39

Badoglio's change of mind had shocked Allied Force Headquarters deeply. Eisenhower went ahead with his plans which could not be delayed, and radioed Badoglio that the Allies would broadcast the armistice at the hour already fixed. He rejected Badoglio's request to call off the armistice, warned him it had been signed by his authorized representative, and concluded: "Any failure on your part to conduct to the finish all the obligations of the signed agreement can have very grave consequences for your country. No future action on your part can then restore any confidence in your good faith and consequently will be followed by the dissolution of your government and of your nation."38 Reluctantly, after several more conferences with the Crown Council, in the early evening of September 8, Marshal Badoglio announced to the Italian people the conclusion of an armistice with the United Nations. T o fail to do so would mean that Italy would have no influence over its future. T o cooperate with the Allies meant the possibility, at least, for some power to protect Italy's interests at a subsequent peace conference. It meant the possibility of saving the Royal government's existence. The last sentence of Badoglio's proclamation ordered Italian military forces not to attack Allied formations but to resist attacks from any other source. A German retreat to the La Spezia-Rimini line in north-central Italy was wishfully expected. But, after some hours of confusion, word was received in Rome that German troops were about to encircle the city. Early in the morning of September 9, the Royal Family, Badoglio, the military leaders, the Duke of Acquarone, and some aides fled from the capital and headed toward Pescara on the Adriatic. The flight of the Royal family and government enraged the people in central and northern Italy. If the monarchy had been on shaky ground before, this last event probably destroyed it. The precipitate flight, the failure to provide for

40

italy and the allies

those left behind was considered inexcusable. On September 9, the Committee of Anti-Fascist Parties changed its name to the Committee of National Liberation (CLN), and called all Italians "to the struggle and to the resistance, and to reconquer for Italy the place it deserves in the community of free nations." Three days later it issued another resolution noting that, "the King and the Head of the Government have not remained at their posts of command and direction and this dereliction has shocked and made vulnerable the resistance to the [German] invader." 39 The announcement of surrender threw Italian troops everywhere into a state of disorganization and confusion. Some efforts had been made to prepare commanders for the switch in sides but they were halfhearted and spotty. The Germans were also temporarily upset but soon recovered. The occasional Italian resistance against the Germans, in the north, in the Balkans, on some of the islands, was local, uncoordinated, and due solely to the initiative of individual commanders. In many cases the officers told the men to go home. Generally, where the men were led by commanders willing to fight, they supported their leaders. After several days, of an Italian army of sixty-one divisions in Italy, France, the Balkans, and the islands, only seven were left to the Allies, ill-equipped and demoralized.40 The collapse of the Italian army was a sore disappointment to the Allies. It would not encourage much desire to use it subsequently. Eisenhower later said, "if the surrendering Italian Army had done its utmost we could have had all of Italy." 4 1 It was not, however, a complete loss. The Italian fleet, with the exception of the flagship "Roma" sunk by the Germans, got away and sailed into Malta with its colors flying. This gave the Allies complete control of the Mediterranean and enabled them to divert large numbers of vessels to other theaters. The Germans were forced to throw divi-

negotiating the armistice

41

sions into Italy and the Balkans that could ill be spared from the eastern front. The Quebec Document indicated the pathway to Italy's salvation, for moderation of the armistice terms implied moderation of peace terms. But the means for implementing the promises of the Quebec Document were practically gone. When, in the course of a few days, seven poorly equipped divisions were all that remained of sixty-one, the Italian government had lost the principal asset to its foreign policy. A good portion of its future energies were to be devoted to the regaining of this as well as other assets. The negotiations for the surrender took place in an atmosphere of confusion and danger. The Italian missions, as well as the descent on Rome of General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner, had all the "cloak and dagger" characteristics of a mystery thriller. The Italians were never able to understand the deep gulf that separated them from the Allies. Castellano and Zanussi were giving full military information to the AngloAmericans before the armistice, but could get nothing definite in return. The Italians failed to appreciate the inflexible nature of the Allied invasion plan nor the difficulties involved in changing the plan. The Allies were suspicious and distrustful of the Italians, fearful of a leak of information or a betrayal. The result was that the Italian surrender was a negligible military, although important political, victory for the Allies. A major Axis power had fallen. The reverberations would shake all of occupied Europe.

IV

the search for status — I to co-belligerency On September 10, the Royal entourage arrived in the southeast coastal town of Brindisi and notified Allied Force Headquarters of its location. Eisenhower, not yet aware of the extent of the Italian collapse, called upon Badoglio to direct active hostilities against the Germans. He affirmed that the future and honor of Italy depended on the subsequent accomplishments of the Italian armed forces. The week of September ro was extremely critical. The Salerno landing was in a precarious position and the next several days would tell the success or failure of the invasion. The Italian government was bombarded, therefore, with Allied appeals, promises, and pleas to use utmost force and authority in this crucial situation. On September 10, Roosevelt and Churchill called on Badoglio to act decisively "to win peace and freedom for the Italian people and to win back for Italy an honorable place in the civilization of Europe." 1 The next day Badoglio issued orders to the Italian troops to consider the German troops enemies.2 On September 13, a similar proclamation was issued to the Italian people.3 Radio broadcasts from the United States and Britain promised aid in postwar reconstruction, the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and in a few scattered instances called the Italians "allies." 4 Similar statements were made by Allied officials sent to Brindisi. Given this encouragement the King and Badoglio took the next logical step; they asked for an alliance. Victor Emmanuel, himself, wrote

the search for status—I

43

directly to Roosevelt and King George. Roosevelt replied it was too soon to consider such a request. Churchill, answering for King George, declared that there never had been any question of an alliance.5 Another grave disappointment involved the restoration of the provinces of liberated Italy to the sovereignty of the Italian Crown.® The Allies decided to return four provinces in the southeast region of Apulia to the King's rule, Taranto, Lecce, Brindisi, and Bari. This area became popularly known as "King's Italy" or the "Kingdom of the South." Here the powers of the Crown were not suspended and Allied officials had supervisory and liaison functions only. Elsewhere in liberated Italy, Allied Military Government ( A M G ) officers ruled directly. The smallness of the territory returned was most displeasing to the King. Given the insecurity of his position it was essential that his authority be recognized in as wide an area as possible. He protested the meagerness of the grant through Badoglio. The protest was rejected. It was important to the Allies that some degree of status be granted, however. For a number of reasons Eisenhower wanted a formal declaration of war against Germany. First, Mussolini had been rescued by the Germans on September 12 and was establishing a puppet Fascist republic in the north. Adequate recognition to the King's government was necessary to offset the Duce's claim to represent the Italian people. In the second place the Royal government had signed an armistice which must be maintained. Further, Eisenhower hoped that a formal declaration might invigorate the apathetic southerners and those Italian forces still fighting the Germans. And finally, the Allies did not have sufficient manpower to govern all liberated Italy by A M G . Eisenhower therefore proposed to his superiors that Italy be recognized as a co-belligerent. Approval was received from Washington and London, although Churchill added, "they must work their passage." 7

44

italy and the allies

The King resisted all efforts to persuade him to issue a formal declaration of war. On September 23, the Allies presented a document which, in addition to promising Italy recognition as a co-belligerent after such a declaration, pledged the continuation of Badoglio's government and support for the King's authority until the end of hostilities. Support for Victor Emmanuel was to be without prejudice to the fact that after the expulsion of the Germans the people would freely choose their form of government. Roosevelt was responsible for this last qualifying clause and insisted, also, that Badoglio must broaden his government to include representatives of the anti-Fascist parties.8 These were important concessions. If the monarchical institution had any vitality, it was to be given the time and means to regain its control and authority over the Italian people. The King, however, still balked. His obstinacy cannot be ascribed to a natural repugnance to attack so recent an ally. D'Ajeta and Castellano at Lisbon had offered the Italian forces in the war against the Nazis. The order to the troops and to the people calling upon them to consider the Germans as enemies was a technical declaration of war. The King's refusal to act formally seems to stem from the following factors: (1) He had asked for an alliance and was getting co-belligerency, something vague and indefinite, with no legal basis; (2) he was being required to risk his throne in an election after the war; no dynasty likes to place its position before a popular vote, especially under the conditions then prevailing; allied support was temporary; (3) he was being asked to take into his cabinet men who had little use for him and for whom he had little use; (4) his realm was restricted to four small provinces; he wanted it extended to include all of liberated Italy; (5) participation of Italian forces was being restricted; he

the search for status—/

45

wanted an Italian army built up, to make a contribution in the war and thereby improve Italy's position at the peace table, and to form a "Royal Guard," to support his position internally.9 Continued Allied pressures, coupled with a promise that at a later date King's Italy would be enlarged, had their effect. 10 On October 13 Badoglio formally announced the King's declaration of war. The Allies recognized Italy as a co-belligerent the same day emphasizing the right of the Italian people to decide ultimately on their form of government.11 There were some discrepancies to be ironed out. Badoglio had said in his proclamation that the Italian people could choose their own government, not form of government, after the war. In Italian the word government is used synonymously with the word cabinet. Badoglio's statement could mean that a Bonomi, or De Gasperi, or Togliatti cabinet would be approved by parliament under the King. It was not necessarily a pledge of a choice between republic and monarchy, although the Allies interpreted and translated it in this sense. In the second place this pledge was made by Badoglio, not the King. Badoglio might later resign or be dismissed. The monarch would not be bound by the pledge of a former premier. The issues needed to be clarified and finally the King did so. On October 21 he wrote a letter to General Noel Mason MacFarlane, Chief of the Allied Military Mission at Brindisi, promising that a parliament freely elected after the end of hostilities could act as a constituent assembly and reform all institutions completely. The King would respect the nation's will as manifested by its elected representatives. He stated that the broadening of the cabinet, however, should be delayed until Rome was captured.12 The Allies rejected such postponement and demanded immediate broadening. What was co-belligerency? It did not give Italy Allied or Associated status. It was not neutrality. Was Italy still an

4ó

italy and the allies

enemy? On October 14, 1943, Viscount Cranborne, speaking for the British government in the House of Lords, stated that "the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union see eye to eye in this. In fact, the [Italian] declaration of war makes no difference to the position as it existed before . . . technically — until a peace treaty is signed between Britain and Italy — the two countries are still at war with each other. . . . " 1 3 Thus Italy was an enemy state, fighting at the side of its enemies, against a former ally.

amending the armistice On September 29 Marshal Badoglio visited General Eisenhower at Malta to sign the Long Armistice. The Italian leaders were most disturbed over the presence of the words "unconditional surrender" in these terms. Castellano had argued this point with General Smith at Cassibile and had received the written promise that these additional terms were only "relative" depending on Italy's future contribution to the war. The Short Terms did not mention the word "surrender" but demanded only an "immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces," (Article 1 ). Badoglio now objected to what he considered additional aggravating military clauses in a document supposedly confined exclusively to economic, financial, and political questions. He protested the inclusion in the Long Armistice of the phrases "surrender of Italy" in the title and "surrender unconditionally" in Article i. 1 4 Generals Eisenhower, Smith, and Mason MacFarlane retired for private consultation. Upon their return MacFarlane informed the Marshal that refusal to sign would result in the gravest consequences for the Italian government. Italy would be regarded simply as a defeated and partially occupied country. This would mean dissolution of the government,

the search for status—I

47

no co-belligerency, no opportunity to contribute to the war. A M G would rule all liberated Italy and the powers of the Crown would be suspended. Smith, softening Mason MacFarlane's hard words, remarked that certain phrases might be altered to bring the document more into the spirit of the September 3 instrument. Eisenhower backed him up by promising to do all he could to get the offensive words amended.15 Given the combination of these threats and assurances Badoglio signed. On October 17 the Italian government was informed that the American, British, and Soviet governments had approved certain amendments. The new protocol was presented on N o vember 9. The title of the Long Armistice was changed from "Instrument of Surrender to Italy" to "Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy." In Article 1 the last word "unconditionally" was deleted so that it read, "the Italian Land, Sea, and Air Forces wherever located hereby surrender." In paragraph six of the preamble, the word "unconditionally" was inserted to make it read, "These terms . . . have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio . . . ." The changes were not significant. For all practical purposes Badoglio's acceptance of the Long Armistice legalized the Allies' control over the life of the Italian people in liberated Italy. Before the protocol was to be signed, however, additional complications arose over the status of the Italian navy. It will be recalled that at Lisbon on August 19 Castellano had sought assurances on the fleet warning that it might be scuttled rather than surrendered. Smith had promised that the Italian flag would continue to fly. At Cassibile on September 4 Castellano again brought up the issue. He had been promised by Commodore Royer Dick, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, that he need have no fears in this regard. 16 The Italian interpretation of these assurances was that the fleet had not surrendered. There had been only a

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italy and the allies

cessation of hostilities as provided in the Short Armistice and the Quebec Document. The agreement had been only to transfer the fleet to safe ports for future uses.17 This interpretation was not held solely by the Italian government. On September 2 3 Viscount Cranborne, speaking for the British government in the House of Lords stated that "The Italian Fleet did not surrender; it moved to designated points under the terms of the Armistice. The future of the Italian Fleet is at present under consideration and much depends on the extent to which the Italian Navy cooperates against the enemy." 18 On this very day Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander of the Allied Mediterranean fleet, met Admiral Raffaele De Courten, the Italian Navy Minister, to discuss the employment of the navy. Cunningham brought with him a draft agreement providing that both naval and merchant vessels would continue to fly the Italian flag. The merchant vessels would be included in the United Nations shipping pool.19 After examining the draft De Courten made several observations. First he indicated that the agreement needed the consent of the Italian government. Then he clarified the point that the Italian fleet would operate only in the Mediterranean. Cunningham agreed to both points but requested the use of Italian ships in the Atlantic. De Courten expressed no objections. The fact that Cunningham felt the necessity of obtaining Italian permission indicates that the Allies had no automatic right to employ the fleet freely. De Courten agreed to put Italian merchant ships in the Allied pool, provided an Italian delegate was admitted to the North African Shipping Board (controlling allocations of shipping in the Mediterranean area). He then telephoned Badoglio and received his approval.20 It then occurred to authorities in London that the approval of the amendments to the Long Armistice plus the agreements between De Courten and Cunningham prejudiced the

the search for status—1

49

complete surrender of the Italian navy. On October 19 Churchill wired Allied Force Headquarters warning against letting "the Italian fleet off the hook." 21 Three days later at a foreign ministers' conference in Moscow the Soviets requested a portion of the Italian navy. It was now more important than ever to make sure of the fleet. Allied officials hurriedly drew up an amendment to the De Courten-Cunningham agreement to the effect that the right of the United Nations to dispose of all Italian ships remained unhampered.22 The final amendments of the Long Armistice were held back. The Allies were in effect saying, "if you want the words 'surrender unconditionally' taken out of the Long Armistice, surrender the navy." The Italian government was stunned. On November 9, it sent a long letter of protest concluding with a request that the wording be changed to give the United Nations the right to employ the fleet in other ways than provided in the agreement.23 The distinction between dispose and employ was clear. The latter left Italian claims to the fleet unprejudiced. The Allies rejected the protest. On November 17, Badoglio was informed that if he did not accept the amendment to the naval agreement the Long Armistice would not be changed and the original terms of Article 1 concerning unconditional surrender would remain in effect.24 Badoglio gave in. The Naval amendment was signed and on November 17, 1943, the Italian navy surrendered. The amendments to the Long Armistice were signed and backdated to November 9. A few weeks later at the Teheran Conference Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed to the division of the Italian fleet after the war.

ν

the institutional

question

One of the Allied conditions for the recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent was the enlargement of the cabinet to include representatives of the anti-Fascist parties. The prominent political leaders not caught in German-occupied Italy were gathered in Naples. The most distinguished of these was the philosopher Benedetto Croce of the Liberal party. Although a confirmed monarchist, he was furious at Victor Emmanuel whom he considered responsible for the ruin of Italy. Croce identified the King with Fascism and was later to say publicly that "as long as the present King remains head of the state, we feel that Fascism is not finished, that it remains attached to us, that it continues to corrode us and to weaken us, that it will resurge more or less camouflaged; and to sum up, this way we cannot breathe and live." 1 News which reached Naples of conditions in King's Italy indicated that the government was still a military dictatorship and that all sorts of ex-Fascists seemed to be rallying around the throne to save themselves. Even worse, the King was accepting their support, demanding only that they be loyal to the monarchy.2 Badoglio, obliged to broaden his government, sent a representative to Naples to interview Croce and others. Croce advised that the King be counselled to abdicate when Rome was retaken.3 (This was expected any day.) From others it was learned that the Crown Prince was not regarded favorably, either.4 Not all the anti-Fascists shared this attitude and several of the Liberals and right-wing Christian Democrats were

the institutional question

51

ready to cooperate with the King. All the parties were subjected to a steady barrage of Allied propaganda urging them to enter the cabinet; even the Communists, influenced by public Soviet support for Anglo-American policy, announced that they would put aside their reservations.5 As a result, the Neapolitan Committee of National Liberation announced its willingness on October 19 to form a cabinet under the King and Badoglio. The only condition was that each of the six parties must be included.6 But the critical period had barely begun. The very next day the exiled Count Carlo Sforza returned to Italy with American backing. 7 He had openly expressed antimonarchical sentiments in the United States but, to overcome British misgivings, had written a note to the State Department pledging support to the Badoglio government as long as it remained acceptable to the Allies. On his return to Europe he stopped in London where he discussed his position with Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. 8 Upon landing at Bari he carried with him the tremendous prestige of his connections with the powers. At Bari he received a written warning from Croce concerning the philosopher's "misgivings about the dangerous political position the King has taken or those who counsel and guide him have made him take." 9 He learned about conditions in King's Italy. When Badoglio sent the Duke of Acquarone to offer him the portfolios of Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, the Count refused them. Shortly afterward he went to Brindisi himself and offered Badoglio his cooperation provided the King and Crown Prince Humbert, Prince of Piedmont, abdicated in favor of the six-year old Prince of Naples, Humbert's son. Sforza suggested that the Marshal act as Regent. 10 On October 28 Sforza went to Naples to see Croce and other leaders. They were swung over to the support of the Regency so that when Robert Murphy and Harold Macmil-

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italy and the allies

lan, the American and British political advisors to Allied Force Headquarters, called on Croce he told them that the anti-Fascists would be happy to enter a cabinet under a Regency for the Prince of Naples. Badoglio himself came to Naples to talk to Croce and the members of the Neapolitan C L N only to learn that they had reversed the earlier offer to join the government.11 The attitude of Croce and Sforza was not the only influence explaining this reversal. On October 16, the Central Committee of National Liberation, now underground in Rome, had issued a resolution denouncing the Royal government. It charged that the Italian people could never unite behind the King and Badoglio and called for the creation of an extraordinary government which would assume all the constitutional powers of the state.12 It took time for news to pass through the fighting lines but when the resolution arrived in Naples at the end of October it reinforced the opposition to participation in a cabinet.13 The King, however, refused to abdicate, and the anti-Fascists now refused to enter the cabinet until he did. This deadlock aggravated the institutional question. The failure to form a political government created a break in Anglo-American unity. The British backed the King while the Americans thought the Regency was a fine solution of the issue. Eisenhower suggested that existing arrangements be continued until the capture of Rome which was expected shortly.14 But the Germans were able to hold in the South, and the Allied drive for Rome bogged down in late November. In a sense the institutional question was far removed from the problems of everyday life in politically apathetic southern Italy. The parties claimed to speak for and in the name of the Italian people but to Allied men on the spot the Committee of National Liberation spoke for itself and a few followers. This little group represented most of the politically

the institutional question

53

conscious and intellectually alert people of southern Italy. For the great masses of the southern peasantry were on the verge of starvation and had little interest in debates over institutions. They went about their daily work and left to others the problem of state policy. T o say, however, that the institutional question was unimportant would be misleading. The issues involved were fundamental to the future political life of Italy. A basic question was Royal complicity with Fascist internal and foreign policy. The King refused to admit responsibility even for his declaration of war of June 10, 1940. 15 To abdicate would be to recognize a responsibility he did not feel. A regime, even a dictatorial one, has to have some roots, some basis of support. These roots can lie in the people generally or in certain specific groups, classes, or interests, but they do lie somewhere. The King was implying that they lay in the people because the Senate, appointed by the King, and the Chamber elected by the people (actually it was not), had refused to act. This rationalization was to be explicitly stated by the Crown Prince in an interview in April 1944. When asked if the King could have prevented Mussolini's declaration of war Humbert replied, "Impossible!" and continued, "Moreover there was no sign that the nation wanted it otherwise. No single voice was raised in protest. No demand was made for summoning parliament. Ostensibly Mussolini had the country with him." 18 The thesis of the anti-Fascist opposition was that the King, the Crown Prince, and the circles around them had sustained the Mussolini government. The C L N drew a clear distinction between the Fascist regime and the people. Consequently, it denounced the Prince's remarks when they became known in Italy, and rejected the imputation cast upon the Italian people concerning the responsibility for the Fascist war. 17 The available evidence indicates many people were aghast and ashamed when the Italian government stabbed France in

54

italy and the allies

the back on June 10, 1940, although many were also indifferent.18 Both republicans and monarchists in the C L N demanded the Regency but with conflicting motives. All realized that decisions made provisionally would, nevertheless, be important determinants of the final outcome. The equivocal nature of Badoglio's pledge on the right of the people ultimately to determine the form of government worried them and they were unaware of the King's clarifying letter to Mason MacFarlane until long afterward. Monarchists sought to save the throne by distinguishing clearly between the person of the King and the institution itself. They wanted to campaign, when the final decision was to be made, with a six-year old boy who could not be held responsible for the Fascist dictatorship and the disastrous war.19 Republicans, on the other hand, undoubtedly hoped the repudiation of Victor Emmanuel and Humbert would weaken the monarchical institution permanently by identifying the House of Savoy with Fascism and the ruin of Italy.20 The left-wing parties saw the institutional struggle as the focus of their assault on the traditional structure of society. The monarchy was the rallying point around which all the forces favoring the preservation of the social order would converge. Like the Roman Catholic church it was the symbol of tradition, order, and stability. T o attack the monarchy, to discredit it by emphasizing its ties to Fascism, to weaken it by divorcing it from the operations of government, would thereby weaken the existing social order. The left-wing parties were attacking more than a political institution; they were driving for social change. All anti-Fascists believed that a war aim of the Allies was the elimination of Fascism. They believed that their chances at a future peace conference would be improved if the head of the state were a person not associated for years with the defeated regime. Thus, Carlo Sforza said that "the elimination

the institutional question

55

of those supremely guilty will permit us to go to the peace negotiations with our heads high. . . . If . . . we can present ourselves at the peace negotiations without the dead weight of a horrible past, I assure you of the strong possibility of coming out with honor." 21 These were the issues underlying the institutional question. the first compromise

Enrico De Nicola, a prominent Neapolitan jurist, had been the last president of the pre-Fascist Chamber of Deputies. He had kept himself outside the polemics of the past months and his position and reputation made him acceptable to both sides. On December 30, 1943, he proposed a compromise, the Lieutenancy, to Sforza and Croce. The King would delegate his power permanently to a Lieutenant General of the Realm, and retire from public affairs without abdicating. Victor Emmanuel would thus remain King in name but would withdraw from the exercise of all public authority. 22 De Nicola thought the King might agree and felt the Crown Prince was the logical choice as Lieutenant. Croce and Sforza, after some hesitation, authorized De Nicola to approach the King on this issue while not committing themselves to its acceptance. The King rejected the idea and Sforza and Croce renewed their intransigence.23 The move had been carried out in utmost secrecy; members of the Neapolitan C L N were unaware of it.24 On January 28 and 29, 1944, a Congress of delegates mostly from local CLN's in liberated Italy met at Bari. A delegation from Rome had crossed the German lines to present another resolution of the Central Committee of National Liberation calling for the creation of an extraordinary government with all constitutional powers. The southerners rejected it as vague and impossible of accomplishment.25 A resolution of the Communist, Socialist, and Action parties called upon the Congress to create itself a representative assembly and form a govern-

56

italy and the allies

ment to run King's Italy until Rome was taken. This resolution went far beyond what the conservative parties would accept. The Liberals introduced a motion which requested Croce and Sforza to find a solution capable of settling the crisis. A Christian Democratic resolution was finally accepted which merely called for the abdication of the King. Compromise was made possible because the Communists did not support the left-wing resolution vigorously.26 An Executive Junta composed of one representative from each of the six parties was created to achieve the new goal.27 The King's position at this time was weaker than ever. Allied observers on the spot were becoming more and more convinced that the Royal government had no support among the people and was a definite hindrance to the restoration of the economy. An economic mission, headed by Adlai Stevenson, had gone to Italy in the winter of 1943-44 t 0 observe conditions and make recommendations for improvements. It returned in January, 1944, to the United States and reported: "It is the Mission's observation that the present Italian government of the King and Marshal Badoglio command little respect or support among the people. . . . The present unhappy political situation will constitute a formidable obstacle to orderly and effective realization of our economic aims and operations." 28 Shortly afterward, Allied officials in the Mediterranean theater concluded that the situation required a settlement. On February 16 several members of the Executive Junta created by the Congress of Bari were approached by Harold Caccia and Samuel Reber, the British and American heads of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission, and requested to draw up a concrete plan proposing their conditions.29 Two days later the Junta proposal was presented to the Allies. It called for the abdication of Victor Emmanuel, the surrender of the authority of the new King Humbert II to a collegiate Lieutenant General of the Realm, and the for-

the institutional question

57

mation of a political government with full powers until general elections could be held after the liberation of all Italy. 30 The plan was approved by the Allied Control Commission in Italy and Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers. It was then sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the highest authority. 31 This acceptance by the Allied Control Commission put the King on the spot. The very next day, February 19, De Nicola warned him that the road he was taking would end in the ruin of the monarchy. The King hesitated, then accepted De Nicola's original compromise, and on February 21 so informed General Mason MacFarlane. The nomination would be made in Rome but the announcement could be made immediately.32 Thus the conflict was narrowed down to the Junta's proposal of abdication and then the creation by Humbert of a Lieutenancy, versus De Nicola's solution which would leave Victor Emmanuel King of Italy but confer authority on his son. The American government recommended acceptance of the Junta's plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. But on February 22, 1944, Winston Churchill, speaking before the House of Commons asserted his support, once again, of the King and Badoglio. He insisted that Rome must be taken before the situation could be reviewed. 33 The Executive Junta was bitter. It looked upon Churchill's words, quite properly, as a rejection of its proposal, which had been invited by Allied authorities. Churchill was ignoring the judgment of his own men on the spot. The Royal government, conversely, was extremely delighted. It looked as if the King might forget about his decision to delegate his powers to a Lieutenant General. 34 Badoglio greeted the news with joy, calling on the Italian people to rally around his government and telling his adversaries to "save their chatter." 35 Churchill, however, had not completely disposed of the Junta's proposal, for the United States government refused to let it die. During the first two weeks of March Roosevelt tried to get Churchill to give in but was rebuffed. 36 The exchange

5Β

Italy and the allies

between the two was still in progress when on March 13, 1944, the Italian Royal government announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The announcement came as a shock to the Anglo-Americans. Actually there had been some indications that something was in the wind. The previous November Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet representative on the Advisory Council,37 had seen Badoglio and expressed the Soviet desire to establish direct relations with Italy. He toured the liberated provinces and, in conversations which reached Brindisi, expressed warm sympathy for Italy. He declared that Italy should recover its former strength and resume its historic role in the Mediterranean. Shortly after, he returned to Moscow. Early in March, Mr. Bogomolof, Vishinsky's successor on the Advisory Council, visited Badoglio. He reminded the Marshal of the conversation with Vishinsky and asked if the Italian government were ready to make a written request to the Soviet government for the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Marshal was ready and the request was made and granted. The announcement of the resumption of diplomatic relations was made on March 13. 38 Badoglio had informed the Allied Control Commission of these conversations but had concealed the nature and extent of the proposed Soviet recognition. The Anglo-Americans were led to believe the Russians merely wanted a representative on the spot. Instead Italy was getting full diplomatic recognition, a status beyond that granted by the AngloAmericans. It was a real diplomatic victory. Mason MacFarlane came thundering in and complained of deception. Badoglio denied the charge; he added that the first sign of friendship shown to Italy by one of the victors could not be refused. T w o days later Mason MacFarlane returned with a memorandum telling the Italian government it had no right to enter into any agreement or understanding with another state without the consent of the Commander-in-

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39

Chief of that theater. Badoglio protested the Allies assertion, claiming it to be an aggravation of the armistice terms. 40 This protest did little to mollify Allied, especially British, displeasure. Italy's gains were whittled down. Russia was persuaded to reduce de jure to de facto recognition, involving just an exchange of "direct representatives," not of ambassadors. On April 5 the Anglo-Americans followed suit and announced that " H i g h Commissioners" would be sent to Italy. T h e y were not accredited to the Italian government and Italy was not permitted to send representatives to the United States or Great Britain. Its position vis-à-vis Russia thus remained slightly better, but the external fruits of Russian recognition were in large measure negated. Internally, however, there was no doubt of the magnitude of the blow to the anti-Fascist parties. T h e y were left floundering. Local Communist leaders attempted to explain the Soviet action as recognition of Italy, not of the R o y a l government. T h e timing of the act made this excuse lame. On March 28, Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist party and former secretary of the Communist International, returned to Italy from Moscow after years of exile. On April 1 he announced the new party policy to the world. T h e Communists had no objections to Victor Emmanuel or Badoglio. T h e K i n g was an institution, not a person, and it had already been agreed by all that the final solution of the institutional question was to be postponed until the end of hostilities. Then the Communists would campaign f o r a republic. Several days later, Togliatti proclaimed that the Communists were ready to subordinate all questions, including the purge of Fascist elements, to achieve a united Italian war effort. 4 1 T h e entire anti-Fascist program was undermined. T h e others hastened to save their own fortunes f o r the demand f o r outright abdication was now a lost cause. Sforza and Croce published the King's agreement to a Lieutenancy f o r Humbert. It had not been revealed earlier because Church-

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ill's February speech apparently postponed all changes until after the capture of Rome. On April 6 the Executive Junta met and agreed to accept Humbert. Vincenzo Calace of the Action party objected to Badoglio's presence in a new cabinet. The Socialist, Oreste Lizzadri, demanded revision of the armistice terms as a condition for forming a government.42 The Junta wanted the transfer of power to take place immediately. Victor Emmanuel refused. He would announce his intentions immediately but would not transfer his powers until he returned to Rome. The six parties unwillingly accepted the King's delay. The Actionists still objected to Badoglio, whom the British wanted, and the Socialists were still talking about revising the armistice. The Allies put tremendous pressure on these two parties to come along. The principal weapon was the promise of greater economic aid if a national unity government were formed.43 The Communists, in a pact of unity with the Socialists, used their influence. Reluctantly the Socialists backed down. At the very last minute a majority of the Action party leaders in Naples voted to go along. On April 24 the new government took the oath of allegiance to the King. Prime Minister Badoglio announced that "all the members of the cabinet have their own political opinions and do not renounce them, but they subordinate them to the common accord so necessary for the supreme interest of the state." 44 In addition to the pledge to the Crown, the new cabinet made two pledges to the Allies. First, the parties promised they would not try to upset the Lieutenancy until the final decision was made by all the Italian people. The Allies did not want the more radical and republican northerners upsetting the settlement as new territory was liberated. The second pledge demanded by the Allies was the provisional abandonment of all goals of social reform for the duration of hostilities. This request was not presented di-

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rectly. Badoglio made it to influential party leaders. 45 It was included by the new government in its declaration of policy. [The cabinet] cannot ignore the fact that two great world wars have overturned the conditions of economic and moral life and changed social relations, which require profound reforms for which all the parties, according to their various tendencies and propositions are prepared. But even these reforms in the character of the state, of politics, of administration, and of economics can be neither completed nor undertaken while the war burns, while Italy is split into two stumps the largest of which is still occupied by the enemy. 46

This was an extremely important concession, especially by the Left parties. In war the "cake of custom" is broken; people's minds are jarred from usual thought patterns and habits; successions of calamities create new situations; people are more receptive to changes in established institutions. Once the war is over, people settle back into the old routines. Habits are reestablished. This is not to say that war leaves no lasting mark, but that the propitious moment for change is during the war itself. Italian reformers or revolutionaries were not contemplating civil war behind the Allied lines. They knew better than to believe the Allies would permit it. They were relinquishing peaceful change, however, as well as revolutionary violence, for the duration. Thus the Allies helped to preserve the social structure in Italy. The preservation of the social structure for its own sake was not the only motive behind Allied demands. Italy was a war theater, and military considerations had to predominate. Stability and order in the communication zones behind the front line were essential. Allied military leaders wanted the Italian government to attend to the everyday housekeeping functions of maintaining order and providing for the minimum needs of the population. Reform and change would mean political conflict and headaches for Allied administrators. So for immediate, practical reasons the Allies threw their weight behind the status quo.

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Furthermore, the new government was informed by the Allied Advisory Council, acting upon Russian suggestion, that it would have to assume formally all the armistice obligations signed earlier.47 Thus, anti-Fascist Italy bound itself to pay for the sins of Fascist foreign policy. Throughout the struggle the C L N parties were in a weak position. T h e y could only make speeches, hold meetings, and write pamphlets. They were not even permitted by the Allies to threaten civil disobedience, far less organize a revolutionary overthrow of the King's government. 48 If it had not been for Roosevelt's intervention the King could have maintained his position indefinitely. In retrospect, it is remarkable that talk produced so much. The anti-Fascists felt, correctly, that the British wanted the King and Badoglio in power because these men were compromised by their past and were unable to protect and assert Italian interests effectively. 49 Dependent on Britain for support, they would keep Italy weak and conservative and thus no threat to the British position in the Mediterranean. In summary, Russian intervention precipitated the solution to the first phase of the institutional conflict and it is interesting to speculate about Soviet motivation. 50 Four explanations seem possible. T h e Russian papers claimed that the Soviets only wanted to have men on the spot to know what was happening. This is hardly tenable. There was a Soviet representative on the Allied Advisory Council and Soviet liaison officers were attached to the Allied Control Commission. Second, it has been said, that the Soviets, famed for their realism, were merely recognizing existing facts. Badoglio and the King were in power; there was no point in not recognizing it. Consideration of the timing of Soviet recognition, however, makes this thesis questionable. T h e de jacto situation at the moment was not stable. Roosevelt was exerting pressure to obtain the Junta's demands. Allied officials in Italy had given up the government as unworkable and unpopular. In

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such circumstances, Soviet action was intervention rather than acceptance of the status quo. A third interpretation is that the Soviets wanted a weak, reactionary government in power which would be less able to resist subsequent pressure from the extreme left, rather than a progressive, democratic, center government interested in providing social amelioration. In other words, Communism can defeat Fascism or reaction in the long run, but not democracy. This view can be defended by examining Communist policy in Europe during the war and after. There have been the attempts either to capture or destroy the Socialist parties of Europe. Capture would lead to later destruction. There have been the campaigns to "polarize" politics in Italy, France, and Germany to make the people feel that the only choice is between Fascism and Communism. There have been the efforts to destroy the center with the concentration of attack upon those parties competing with the Communists for the support of the proletariat, the peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie. A fourth explanation is that Russian support of the King and Badoglio was the result of Big Three dealings on higher levels, involving recognition of a dominant British interest in the Mediterranean area. This interpretation lacks definitive proof but appears to have some backing. The proposition is made that at the Teheran Conference in December 1943, an understanding was reached among the Big Three on respective zones of military security. Evidence is contained in the following passage by Eduard Benes, the late President of Czechoslovakia: A t that time [Teheran talks] a decision was reached concerning the assignment of military zones in Germany and in Central Europe between East and West. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia were incorporated in the Soviet zone. W e were not informed of this then either officially or unofficially. W e learned of it only indirectly and only during the uprising in Slovakia. 51

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The corollary to the above statement would be the recognition of dominant British military and thus political interest in the Mediterranean area. Russian recognition of Badoglio, consequently, is explained as support for British policy in Italy. In Churchill's speech of February 22 (the same address in which he rejected the bid of the Executive Junta for power) he publicly supported the Soviet Union on the question of the revision of the Polish eastern frontiers. He also announced that Marshall Tito, Communist leader of the Partisans, rather than General Michailovich, leading royalist bands, would be the recipient of Allied support in Yugoslavia. Thus, he was openly backing the Russians in an area vital to Soviet policy. Certain facts argue against this interpretation. Most memoirs and other works written by the parties involved avoid mention of such understandings. It can also be recalled that in November 1943, Vishinsky spoke of the Russian desire for a strong Italy which would resume its traditional Mediterranean role. In addition, the granting of full diplomatic recognition gave Italy a status far beyond that which Britain was prepared to concede. These moves seem hardly consonant with the admission of a dominant British position. When examined closely, however, they do not completely invalidate the argument. Vishinsky's remarks were made before the Teheran Conference and perhaps served a useful purpose in Big Three maneuvering. Soviet diplomatic recognition was reduced immediately to a de facto basis once British displeasure became known. Additional verification is found in Vishinsky's insistence that the new Italian government would have to abide by the signed armistice terms. The third and fourth interpretations are not mutually exclusive. British policy was aimed at keeping Italy weak and conservative, consequently dependent on British support and incapable of becoming a threat in the Mediterranean. Russian policy could be aimed at keeping Italy weak and conserva-

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tive, more vulnerable to ultimate overthrow by a Communist regime. For the present, there was no inconsistency. From the Italian point of view, Badoglio's acceptance of the Russian initiative was a drastic error. It strengthened his position vis-à-vis the opposition parties but weakened it in relation to the Allies. He had not kept them informed of the true significance of his talks with Bogomolof, and thereby lessened their faith in his reliability. Shortly after, Sir Noel Charles, the new British High Commissioner, told Badoglio the whole affair had produced a coldness in Anglo-Italian relations. It was interpreted as an Italian attempt to maneuver into a position of status and prestige so that Italy could stand up against British pressure. Y e t such an effort was futile. T h e Italian government was in no position to maneuver. T h e attempt would leave the British more determined than ever to keep Italy weak, thus insuring that no government, conservative or radical, would be a threat to British interests. Italy's prospects at a future peace conference were thus worsened.

VI

the search for status — 11 angling for an alliance It will be recalled that the Italian government had made several attempts to become one of the United Nations. Castellano had tried to reverse alliances at Lisbon. Victor Emmanuel had written King George and President Roosevelt to this effect in September 1943. The best the Italians had achieved, however, was co-belligerency. Upon the outcome of these efforts depended the future of Italy's national interests. If Italy were an ally it would be difficult for the United Nations to deal harshly in terms of boundaries, colonies, and reparations when the peace settlement was made. A n ally must be treated with consideration. If Italy were an ally it could get lend-lease and other economic aid needed so badly, and it could expect relaxation of controls over internal aflairs. The early failures did not deter Italian activity. Badoglio was willing to work for any slight concession to improve the status of his country. When the Mediterranean Advisory Council was formed, he twice requested Italian membership on the Council. He was twice turned down. In December 1943 he asked the Allies for permission to register Italy's adherence to the Atlantic Charter. His letter went unanswered. He applied for permission to have Italy rejoin the International Labor Organization. Again no answer.1 The big goal remained Allied status. In January 1944, Badoglio wrote to President Roosevelt telling him of Italy's ardent desire to become an Ally. Roosevelt's reply expressed

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appreciation for Italy's cooperation. But only the solution of the institutional question, the creation of a democratic government on a broad basis, would enable Italy to maximize its power and contribution to the war effort. Upon constitution of such a government, Roosevelt said, Italy's request could be re-examined.2 With the creation of the enlarged cabinet on April 24, 1944, the necessary prerequisite had been met. Badoglio again wrote to Roosevelt reminding him of his promise. Now the American government was ready to grant the request. What was envisaged was a system whereby Italy would be called an Ally but would still be required to submit to a peace conference at the end of the war; in other words, be ally and enemy at the same time. The British, however, objected strenuously. They had voiced opposition to Italian adherence to the Atlantic Charter claiming that "it would be most inexpedient to take any action that would give even the appearance of creating an obligation to maintain Italian territories intact." 3 When Badoglio's most recent request was made the British opposed it vigorously. " [They] felt that, while Italy's position as a cobelligerent entitled her to better treatment than as merely a defeated enemy, she must not forget her position as a defeated enemy nor claim the privileges of an ally. The greater the concessions now made, they thought, the more difficult it would be to impose such sanctions as the Allies might wish when all Italy [has] been freed, and at the end of the war." 4 The British were supported by the French, Greek, and Royal Yugoslav governments, all of which had claims against Italy, territorial and otherwise. The Americans were caught between conflicting pressures. Their allies were against improving Italy's position at the peace table. At home, strong forces were working for this precise objective. The year 1944 was an election year. In April, Mayor LaGuardia of New York City began a strong

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drive to have Italy recognized as an Ally and made the recipient of lend-lease aid. The Italian-American Labor Council came to LaGuardia's support. On May 5, Congressman Vito Marcantonio introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for resumption of full diplomatic relations with Italy. While the American position was consistently softer, these influences help to explain Roosevelt's actions at that time. The pressure of the European states, however, forced the United States to back down and Badoglio once more had failed. status for the prisoners of ivar

From the time of the armistice the Italian government had requested the return of prisoners of war in Allied hands. The purpose was to use them as troops in a re-formed, co-belligerent army.5 The Allies, on the contrary, wanted to use these prisoners to relieve a serious labor shortage in their home and overseas territories. The prisoners totaled 26,500 officers and 418,000 enlisted men.6 In October 1943, the Chief of the Allied Military Mission approached the Italian government with a request that Italian prisoners be authorized to aid the Allied cause, not as combat troops, but in any other capacity. The Italian government agreed in principle to the request, asking nevertheless, that volunteers among them be organized into combat units. A declaration by Marshal Badoglio urging the prisoners to work for the Allies was sent to the prison camps.7 A barrier to the smooth conclusion of the issue arose over the status of the men. The Allies continued to consider them prisoners of war. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention, however, prohibited the use of prisoners in any work directly connected with the war effort.8 When the American government attempted in November 1943 to recruit Italian prisoners located in the United States, the fat was in the fire. The senior Italian general in its hands protested vigorously over

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this irregularity and recruiting was stopped. The American government entered into a discussion with him concerning the formation of Italian units, commanded by Italian officers under general Allied command. The units would serve either as labor troops or as combatants. Their status would be changed. The discussions were embodied in an agreement submitted to the British and Italian governments for approval. The British, however, were adamant against changing the status of the prisoners and rejected the agreement. Thereupon, in January 1944, the Allies proposed to the Italian government that the prisoners be used as laborers on projects determined by the United Nations and directly connected with the war effort. They were to remain prisoners and the Italian government was asked to renounce the rights and protection of the Geneva Convention. Badoglio indignantly refused and told the Allied Control Commission they could throw him into a prison camp but he would not renounce the protection of the Geneva Convention for his soldiers. Late in March 1944 the Control Commission proposed a new solution. It changed some of the details but not the substance of the January plan. The Italians discussed it with Mason MacFarlane but the talks broke down over the main issue, status. The Italians wanted the men to work for the Allies but not as prisoners. The problem stood at this impasse when in the first week of May 1944 the Italian government learned that units of prisoners were being activated under conditions rejected by Badoglio. On May 10, the Marshal protested vigorously to the Chief of the Allied Control Commission. Mason MacFarlane forwarded the protest to Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers. No answer was received.9 The men worked for the Allies until after the end of the war when they were repatriated. They remained prisoners until the end. British objections to improvement in their status forced the Anglo-Americans to violate the laws of war.

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The Italians made similar proposals to the Russian government urging that Italian prisoners in Soviet hands be formed into units under Italian officers to serve in the common war effort at the disposition of the Soviet High Command. Nothing came of these suggestions.10 Italian efforts to participate in the war

The Quebec Document had promised Allied support for all Italian forces fighting the Germans. In the days immediately following the surrender announcement, much had been hoped from the Italians and some wild propaganda statements had been made in an attempt to encourage them. B y the middle of September, however, it became apparent that the Italian army had collapsed, reduced from sixty-one to seven divisions. General Mason MacFarlane, at Brindisi, wired Allied Force Headquarters on September 15, 1943: "Outside of the acquisition of the Italian fleet we have virtually nothing to gain certainly, from the Army, except as the soldiers may be used as slave labor at ports and on our line of communication. . . . [ T ] h e y are short of boots and ammunition and have 1918 armor." 1 1 He might have added that their morale was low and that they were inadequately led. On September 20, the Allies decided to dispense with their services. The following day Mason MacFarlane told the Italian government that on higher orders, Italian troops on the peninsula would cease combat activity until further instructions were received. 12 Badoglio protested the order on the spot and the next day sent a telegram to Eisenhower declaring that Italian troops wanted to continue fighting. He received no answer. On September 29, at the Malta meeting, Badoglio offered the use of all the available armed forces and the resources of the country. He felt that, given the equipment, eight to ten Italian combat divisions could be made ready in short order. His offer was rejected by General Alexander who remarked,

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"the plans for the Italian campaign are already minutely prepared in great detail, and as a consequence the participation of Italian troops cannot be taken into consideration." 1 3 Eisenhower was in a delicate situation. Policy directives received from the State Department urged that all possible use be made of Italian forces and Italy be given every opportunity to make its contribution.14 Military men in Italy, however, considered the rehabilitation of Italian divisions a waste of scarce supplies and equipment. In addition, there was a natural antagonism toward men who had been enemies up to a few weeks ago. This sentiment was especially strong among the British who had fought the Italians for three years. Eisenhower, caught between conflicting pressures softened Alexander's remarks by promising opportunities for combat in the future. From that time on the Italian government forwarded request after request for participation in combat. In October, the creation of a motorized group of 5,000 men was authorized. Later, Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers authorized the addition of one division. Alexander in Italy cut it to one Alpine group. The motorized group went into action for the first time on December 6, 1943, on the Fifth Army front. The Germans found out about it in advance and gave them an unusually rough time. Losses were high and the group was withdrawn. The experience did nothing to induce Allied Commanders to use more Italian combat troops. In general the Italians received the impression that Eisenhower's promises were whittled down by British officers in Italy. Actually, as time passed, the hostility of those Britons on the spot declined. General Alexander and General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (Eisenhower's successor in the Mediterranean area when he assumed command in Western Europe) became strong supporters of Italian rehabilitation. Obstacles to the expansion of an Italian fighting contribution became less military and more political. These were now centered in London.

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Throughout the spring of 1944, Allied divisions were withdrawn from Italy to prepare for the great invasion of the French channel coast of June 1944. Allied forces in Italy became weaker than usual. Under pressure from military men in Italy, the politicians agreed to an expansion of Italian fighting units to 14,100 men. It was not much, but all they would allow. When the six-party government was formed at the end of April, it continued the efforts of its predecessor. In May, Churchill announced that a small number of Allied planes would be furnished to replace Italian planes that were wearing out. The few Italian planes that had survived the surrender were used almost exclusively in support of partisan operations in the Balkans. They were Marshal Tito's principal means of communication with the outside world. The first consignment of Allied planes arrived at the beginning of July. 15 When Rome was captured in June 1944, a new cabinet was formed under the leadership of Ivanoe Bonomi. It continued to exert pressure, publicly and privately. Leading politicians made speeches,16 and Bonomi wrote a long letter to President Roosevelt. His "Memorial," which reached American officials at the beginning of August, developed the entire argument in great detail. Italy could furnish sufficient qualified personnel to man 1,600 planes rather than the 250 in use. The Allies were not using Italy's five battleships. Only two of them needed even minor repairs. Trained naval personnel was available to make up the crews. The sorest subject was the army. Bonomi surveyed the history of Italian attempts — and Allied refusals — to put more fighting troops on the line. He closed by calling on the Allies to permit Italy to put a real army into the field.17 In August Churchill announced that the army would be permitted an increase in effectives. Bonomi's pleas and the public propaganda campaign were not responsible for this result, however. Credit, it seems, belongs to General Alex-

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ander. Allied troops were being pulled out of the peninsula to form part of the army waiting to attack southern France. Alexander wanted replacements. His attitude had changed considerably from the early days and apparently it was his influence which obtained the concession. The enlarged army was expanded to six combat groups totaling 45,000 men. This roughly equaled three Allied divisions. The army was equipped, trained, and supervised by the British under Major General Browning and was integrated into the British 8th Army. By November 1944, the first of the combat groups was on its way to the front. General Browning commented, "the rank and file are of first-rate quality. Give me two years with British officers and NCO's . . . and we'd have an army as good as any in Europe." 18 It was not until the spring of 1945 that this new army could really go into action. At that time five combat groups participated in the last great drive in northern Italy that brought to a close, together with the final drives in Germany, the war in Europe. Before this final offensive the Italians had made one last appeal to get a real national army. The Central Committee of National Liberation made the call in January 1945. The answer was given immediately by Colonel Clayton P. Kerr of the Allied Commission; it was too close to the end of the war to make it worth while.19 It seems strange that such a request would be made when it was obvious that the war would be over shortly. The reason seems to be that the resolution was pushed through by the Communists, in an attempt to infiltrate the army with its partisans. The other parties could not vote against such a resolution; it would be against national policy. The Allied Commission squelched the maneuver. The Italian government remained bitter to the end over the refusal to let it make a more substantial contribution to the war effort. The total number of combat troops that the

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Italian army furnished the Allied governments reached its maximum in the spring of 1945 with 48,000 men.20 A t the time of the peace conference the government reminded the Allies that "in a just estimate of Italian aid . . . one must take into account that it was given not only by a people deprived of the means and with a national structure profoundly disorganized, but also precisely by a people and by a government tied and immobilized by the same Anglo-American authorities who invited it to act in their favor." 2 1 There was no official attempt to explain the Allies' actions. Individual Italians, however, had their own ideas. Badoglio had recounted to Benedetto Croce the story of Allied rejections of Italian offers and Croce wrote in his diary, "I fear the Anglo-Americans may be hindering . . . Italian proposals to fight in the war in order to have a free hand at the peace conference." 2 2 A review of the three major subjects of this chapter will tend, with one qualification, to confirm this judgment. The Italian attempt to get Allied status, to achive a new position for cooperating prisoners, and to maximize the combat contribution was motivated by the goal of getting into the most favorable position possible at a future peace conference. Other expected results could be the moderation of the armistice terms in accordance with the Quebec Document and a strengthening of the government's internal position. Allied opposition to these attempts would weaken Italy's position on the day of reckoning. It is wrong, however, to characterize this inhibition as "Anglo-American" policy. The American policy was one of encouragement. The United States wished to change the status of both Italy and the prisoners. On September 22, 1943, Secretary of State Hull telegraphed General Eisenhower, "to permit the Italians to wage war against Germany within the limit of their capacities . . . [to] encourage the vigorous use of Italian armed forces. . . ." 23

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It was the British who rejected the Italian request for an alliance, who insisted that the cooperating prisoners must remain in that status. B y the spring of 1944, it was becoming clear that the limited use of combat troops was due to their political opposition. The reason for this consistent policy seems clear. It was expressed to Secretary Hull on April 20, 1944: "The greater the concessions now made . . . the more difficult would it be to impose such sanctions as the Allies might wish when all Italy [has] been freed, and at the end of the war." 24

V I I

italy and american elections establishing the government In May 1944 the Allied drive to capture Rome was resumed. This time it was successful, and on June 5 the citywas in Anglo-American hands. It was now time for Victor Emmanuel III to assign his powers to Humbert as Lieutenant General of the Realm. The King wanted to go to Rome to perform this act, but Mason· MacFarlane absolutely prohibited it. Behind Mason MacFarlane's veto were orders from the United States.1 The Americans feared that the King, once in Rome, might disregard his pledge. The monarch backed down and signed the decree of transfer on June 5, at Ravello, his southern residence.2 On June 5 the Italian cabinet resigned. Humbert invested Badoglio with authority to form a new cabinet. The following day Mason MacFarlane, Badoglio, and one representative of each C L N party flew to the capital to meet the Central Committee of National Liberation. Then the storm broke. The institutional solution of April had not pleased the Roman leaders. It had disregarded their resolution calling for an extraordinary government with full powers. With Rome liberated, the Socialist and Action parties, those most disgusted with the earlier solution, laid down the minimum conditions under which they would enter a cabinet. First, it must be composed solely of representatives of C L N parties. Second, Badoglio was unacceptable. Third, no oath of allegiance would be taken to the monarchy. The Central C L N accepted these conditions "without discussion."3 They meant the elim-

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ination of a constitutional monarch's most important prerogative, the right to invest a cabinet with its authority. The Central CLN now substituted its placet for that of the Lieutenant General. The cabinet would be responsible to it until a new parliament came into existence. When Mason MacFarlane, Badoglio, and the southern partyleaders arrived in Rome they learned that the Central CLN had authorized its chairman, Ivanoe Bonomi, to form a cabinet. Bonomi was the logical choice. He headed the Committee, was a former prime minister and could keep the parties together. As a moderate he was considered acceptable to the Allies. The CLN refused to collaborate with Badoglio, although Togliatti fought for him. The Marshal then went to the Lieutenant General and resigned.4 Humbert had no choice but to call on Bonomi to organize a cabinet. The latter agreed to do so on three conditions: that a decree would be issued providing for a constituent convention at the end of hostilities to settle the institutional question and write a new constitution; that the oath of allegiance would be changed; and that the cabinet would have the sole power to issue decrees until new parliamentary institutions were in existence.5 The Lieutenant General, constrained to accept the terms, gave formal authorization to Bonomi to organize a cabinet. Mason MacFarlane had told Bonomi that any cabinet would require Allied approval and would have to pledge acceptance of the armistice clauses. When the Central Committee acquiesced, Mason MacFarlane approved the new cabinet on his own authority, and a public announcement was made on June io. The same day the new Prime Minister promised the Allies: "The Royal Italian government pledges that it will not reopen the institutional question without the prior consent of the Allied Governments until all Italy is liberated and the Italian people have the opportunity themselves to choose the form of government." 6 Mason MacFarlane had intervened in only one respect in

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the cabinet issue. Bonomi's original list included Carlo Sforza as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On June 9, Mason MacFarlane insisted to Bonomi that Sforza was unacceptable in this position and urged Bonomi to retain this portfolio himself. Bonomi complied and named Giovanni Visconti-Venosta as Undersecretary. Sforza was made Minister without Portfolio. The American government immediately protested this action to the British. It instructed the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater to inform Bonomi that the United States had no objection to Sforza as Foreign Minister.7 American intervention failed to restore the post to the Count, and this first British veto of Sforza remained unknown to the general public. It seemed a short and easy victory. But the crisis was only postponed. Churchill had been in Normandy watching the great Allied invasion of western Europe which began on June 6, 1944. Upon his return to London there was an explosion. In an irate telegram to Roosevelt on June 10 he protested Badoglio's replacement by "this group of aged and hungry politicians." He refused to accept the new cabinet, thereby reversing Mason MacFarlane. 8 He attempted to get Badoglio back into a cabinet which would take the traditional oath of allegiance to the monarchy. The Americans opposed Churchill vigorously on this issue. Roosevelt asked the opinions of Allied representatives in Italy and on the Advisory Council. They supported the new cabinet as the best available expression of the popular will. The surrender terms, hitherto associated with Badoglio's person, would become the obligation of the most representative men in Italy. Supported by their opinions Roosevelt stuck to his position. Churchill, subjected to the pressure of the American government and his own men on the spot, gave in. The alternative would have been the re-establishment of a cabinet of technicians under the Crown, and the renewal of the antiFascist boycott. 9 T o make the pill easier to swallow two concessions were

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made. Bonomi agreed to take the traditional oath of allegiance himself. At the request of British naval authorities De Courten was retained as N a v y Minister, the only nonparty man in the cabinet.10 T w o weeks after the new cabinet had been announced it finally took office. Each minister was shown the armistice terms and agreed to abide by them. Then all except Bonomi took the following oath: "The undersigned Ministers, Secretaries of State, swear on their honor to exercise their functions in the supreme interest of the nation and not to commit, before the calling of the Constituent Assembly, any action which might in any way prejudice the solution of the institutional question." 1 1 On June 25, 1944, Decree-Law 151 was issued providing the cabinet with authority to issue decrees having the force of law in the name of the Lieutenant General, and providing for the convocation of a constituent assembly upon the liberation of the entire country. 12 Shortly after, Mason MacFarlane was relieved of his position as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission because of illness. A bloodless revolution had occurred which transferred effective authority in the state from the Crown to the Central Committee of National Liberation (within the limits permitted by Allied authorities who still retained ultimate powers of decision). It is true that the Lieutenant General still signed decrees and formally invested the cabinet with its powers. The Prime Minister still took the oath of allegiance to the Crown, and under Fascist laws remaining technically in effect, the "Chief of Government" held sole political responsibility and held it at the pleasure of the Crown. Political power, however, lay in the C L N . The new cabinet spent its first weeks getting oriented. After finding its bearings it settled down to continue the work of its predecessors, that is, it requested a change in Italy's status, more economic aid and greater participation in the military campaign. At the end of July, Bonomi wrote a long "Memori-

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al" to President Roosevelt regarding these issues. The military requests have been covered earlier. Action on the other issues, political and economic, was to be influenced by the approaching American elections. the american elections affect Italy's position One of the most important questions covered by Bonomi was Allied financial policy in Italy. T w o aspects were involved, the exchange rate and the responsibility for the lire printed and issued by the Allies in Italy. The Allies on their authority as military occupants arbitrarily set an exchange rate of 100 and 400 lire to the dollar and pound sterling respectively.13 It was discovered that the rate undervalued the lira greatly, contributing to inflationary pressures inside Italy. Bonomi requested a reduction to 50 and 200 lire to the dollar and pound respectively. By this time, however, the inflation had advanced to such a point that the lira, originally undervalued, was now overvalued.14 As a consequence, Bonomi's request was rejected. The Italians claimed that the Allies were responsible for the lire they issued and should reimburse the Italian government. This position had no support in law, for Article 2 3 of the Long Armistice specifically made Italy responsible for the Allied Military lire. Reimbursement was wanted in order to bolster the economy by obtaining dollars and pounds to buy goods.15 The Italian position had been repeatedly rejected by Allied officials. Then on October 10, 1944, the American government announced that a credit in dollars would be granted to the Italian government as reimbursement for lire spent out of their pay by American troops in Italy. The announcement was made suddenly, without notifying Allied officials in the Mediterranean theater and without a detailed exploration of the problem with the other Allies maintaining troops in Italy. 16 The British and French were sufficiently in debt to warrant not taking on another creditor and they refused to follow suit.

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Why was this action taken? Only one answer seems possible. On November 7 a presidential election was to be held and Roosevelt was running for a fourth term. The ItalianAmerican community and Catholic circles were exerting strong pressure in favor of economic and political aid to Italy. In an election year such pressure could not be ignored. Thomas Dewey, the Republican candidate for president was bidding for the same vote. Just the day before, October 9, in a Columbus Day proclamation he stated that Italy must be considered a "friend and ally." 17 Administration supporters had been pressing Roosevelt to act for some time. On June 13, 1944, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives had called open hearings on Congressman Marcantonio's resolution to recognize Italy as a full Ally. These open hearings made a platform available to organizations influenced by Italian sentiments. LaGuardia, Mayor of New York City with one of the largest Italian (or Italian descent) populations in the world, threatened in August 1944 to stop his weekly propaganda broadcasts to Italy unless some concessions could be announced. The principal Italian political problem was the question of status. The principal economic problem was feeding the population. This had been made a political football by the appointment of Colonel William O'Dwyer as Chief of the Economic Section of the Allied Control Commission on June 23, 1944. He spent approximately eight weeks in Italy and returned a Brigadier General. Colonel O'Dwyer, now an exMayor of New York City and ex-Ambassador to Mexico, had been a lawyer, district attorney, and leading Democratic politician in New York, not an economist nor business executive. That the economic state of Italy was deplorable was beyond doubt. It was not necessary to send O'Dwyer to Italy to discover this. Every Italian politician pointed this out to Allied officers and they could see for themselves. The situa-

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tion was partially caused by the snarled operations of A M G . T o a larger extent it was caused by Allied Force Headquarters' failure, until the middle of December 1943, to provide for the feeding of the civilian population. Only on December 19, 1943, was an order issued stating that it was "an overriding military consideration that the civilian population be fed." 18 It was agreed between the American and British governments that the ration standard would be that absolute minimum of subsistence necessary to prevent disease and unrest behind the fighting lines.19 It was justified by the military concept of securing the lines of communication. The Economic Survey Mission, which had been in Italy during the winter of 1943-44, returned convinced that this concept was inadequate. Adlai Stevenson, its chief, felt that emphasis should be shifted from relief to the beginning of "selective rehabilitation of civilian industry and agriculture to increase self-support in food and essential consumer goods." 2 0 In the summer of 1944 the American government adopted this proposal and approached the British with the view of instituting a more generous supply policy than the agreed minimum relief standard. It also wanted a public declaration of the new policy. The British objected vigorously. They argued that other Allies still subject to Axis domination, such as Greece and Yugoslavia, had been victims of Italian aggression, and would not understand reconstructing Italy while they still suffered. They emphasized that British public opinion would not comprehend such generosity. They insisted that such a policy would conflict with what they considered a desirable postwar settlement. They warned the United States against taking an independent course with which they would have to disagree publicly and added that if the United States had to make a public statement, it should not reveal the divergencies in opinion.21 The American government continued to be subjected to

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internal pressure. Added to the weight of the Italian-American community was the influence of the Catholic hierarchy. On September 1, 1944, Pope Pius XII publicly appealed for aid to Italy.22 Three days later O'Dwyer returned from Italy. In addition to reporting to his superiors he reported publicly to the newspapers. The economic situation was calamitous and the death rate had risen precipitously. He urged that immediate action be taken to prevent an economic collapse.23 Shortly after, another Quebec Conference was held between the Anglo-American leaders. Tremendous pressure was exerted on Churchill and Anthony Eden to relent. The American government desired some agreement which could be made public. In addition to economic concessions it wanted certain political ameliorations. Reluctantly the British retreated and finally a compromise position was reached which, although it looked good on paper, gave the Italians nothing concrete. On September 26, 1944, at Hyde Park, the agreement was made public. The Italians were promised that the controls exercised by the Allied Control Commission would be relaxed. The Italian government was invited to send direct representatives to Washington and London. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ( U N R R A ) medical supplies would be forthcoming. The rehabilitation of Italian industries, communications, and power facilities would be promoted to aid in the military effort. These were first steps, to be expanded later. Business contacts would be reestablished between Italy and the Allied world.24 The Italians were joyous. Visconti-Venosta, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, called the statement "an act of justice toward the Italian people." 25 The Vatican, however, considered the political concessions inadequate. Italy must finish the war "as an Ally of the Allies," editorialized the Osservatore Romano on September 29. The assignment of U N R R A supplies to Italy had required tremendous pressure. The European members of U N R R A

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had resisted stubbornly. The Roman Catholic Church, however, lined up support from various countries including the complete Latin-American group. Dean Acheson, the American representative on U N R R A ' s council, told the other delegates: "Italy is the center of the Catholic World. If the United Nations through this organization should express a complete lack of interest that fact would be communicated far and wide and thought about deeply." 26 As the United States was the principal source of U N R R A funds, success was finally obtained. A restrictive relief program of food and medical supplies to Italian children and nursing mothers was approved.27 Pressure was still being exerted to obtain further political concessions. The Roosevelt-Churchill announcement of September 26, had provided for an exchange of "direct representatives." In essence this only brought the Anglo-Americans into line with the Russian position of April 1944. The United States was eager to establish full diplomatic relations with Italy and obtained the support of the Latin-American countries. Britain again objected. Meanwhile, Governor Dewey charged on October 18 that insufficient aid had been granted to Italy. 28 In a telegram on October 20 the British stated their opposition. British public opinion would react unfavorably. N o ambassador was accredited to France, an ally, 29 and it would be curious indeed to send one to Italy, an enemy. A precedent might give rise to similar claims by Bulgaria and Rumania,30 (just "liberated" by the Soviets). In spite of these arguments the American government went ahead, and on October 26 announced the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Italy. The other American republics followed suit, as did the Soviet Union. 31 ( T o establish precedents, perhaps? ) The British did not follow and the Italian envoy sent to London several months later was accepted as a "direct representative."

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Usually full diplomatic relations implies a state of friendly relations between the respective countries. Was Italy now a friendly nation? Decidedly not. For Acting Secretary of State Stettinius said: "The resumption of diplomatic relations does not re-establish peace nor does it settle the many questions that will have to be dealt with before a formal state of peace is declared. . . . " 3 2 Consequently, in spite of a fully accredited ambassador in Washington Italy remained an enemy state. The armistice conditions retained their validity. Italy's position was in no way improved except as the act of recognition might indicate a benevolent attitude on the part of the recognizers. (It did not mean this in the case of the Soviet Union as the peace conference would demonstrate.) In spite of the qualifications indicated by Stettinius the Italians were pleased. Bonomi expressed his gratitude the next day. He asked that this formal action be given concrete demonstration by the relaxation of Allied Commission controls.33 Bonomi's plea was only one indication that the concessions made to Italy in September and October 1944 could not and were not expected to be fulfilled. In spite of the RooseveltChurchill statement of September 26 concerning a reduction of the powers of the Allied Control Commission, this did not happen. The word "Control" was dropped from the title. That was all. The Commission continued to exercise its usual functions. Relaxation of control over appointments to cabinet posts did not come until February 1945. It was not until July 1945, ten months after the September declaration, that a directive was issued spelling out the financial promises made. Italy was given free internal action on finances in the territories under its jurisdiction, but the Allied Commission retained control over external transactions.34 The inconsequential legal nature of the diplomatic recognition has already been cited. The economic pledges were reduced to insignificance when compared with what had

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been or could be done for Italy. The Economic Survey Mission had recommended at least a certain amount of rehabilitation of the civilian economy to make it more self-supporting. The Roosevelt-Churchill statement, however, placed all its emphasis on rehabilitation of industry necessary for war purposes. But such reconstruction had been going on since the day the Allies landed in Italy. One week after Naples was captured in October 1943, its port was restored to operation and soon was handling the largest tonnage of goods in the world. Railroads, utilities, and repair shops had been put into operation from the very beginning. The Allied Commission published a report on October 17, 1944, three weeks after the joint Anglo-American declaration, which recited its accomplishments in the field of military reconstruction of public services in the preceding year.35 A few days earlier, the Commission reported: "In fact, whatever industry is left in Italy of any value is in the hands of the military who employ 200,000 to 300,000 workers in machine shops, cement and brick factories and steel mills. It will take six to nine months before production could benefit the civilian economy; and only if the military had no further use for it." 36 In other words, military reconstruction was an accomplished fact and civilian rehabilitation a practical impossibilty under the prevailing circumstances. The pledge could not be implemented until after the war. The assignment of U N R R A funds was also a paper performance incapable of actuation then or in the near future. Supplies were not available even though credits were provided. Mr. A. G. Antolini, acting head of the Economic Section of the Allied Commission since the return of O'Dwyer to the United States, at a Commission meeting "drew a laugh when he announced that U N R R A had come to Italy with $50,000,000 in credits and nothing else but a request to borrow Allied Commission stocks of food, transport and medical

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37

supplies to start U N R R A distribution." It was to be well into the spring of 1945 before U N R R A would start functioning. An additional burden on the Allied Commission was Roosevelt's public statement of October 4, 1944, that more wheat would be sent to Italy, and the ensuing revelation of a letter sent by him to Secretary of War Stimson on October 31, 1944, asking the Secretary to instruct Allied Force Headquarters to provide a bread ration in liberated Italy of 300 grams a day per person.38 The statement came at a most inopportune moment. Supplies in Italy were at a very critical level. The Commission had learned earlier that wheat imports were scheduled to be cut back from 100,000 to 33,000 tons in November. "In the meantime," Mr. Antolini reported, "there is . . . practically no wheat in the Mediterranean basin on which to draw in an emergency. There was also no sugar programmed and milk imports had been cut." 39 A few weeks later Mr. Antolini informed his colleagues that, "actually the South was getting 300 grams while the North was getting 200," but the Economic Section was "afraid to cut back in view of the President's statement." 40 Local A M G officers were bombarded by Italians wanting to know how soon 300 grams a day would be forthcoming. Supplies were not available and the men on the spot were furious. An Allied Commission staff report read: T h e food situation, forced into the open by President Roosevelt's request that the bread ration should be 300 grams . . . came in for frank* discussion. Mr. Antolini led the chorus with the statement that " w e are practically bankrupt. . . ." November and December imports of wheat were cut back considerably below expectations. . . . American opinion was instanced by a demand that if Mr. Roosevelt could shake anything out of his sleeve it was time for him to shake. A British comment was that if anything could undermine our prestige this sanction by the highest authority for a thing we could not do was surely the way to effect it. 41

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As a consequence, the President's request was countermanded by Allied Force Headquarters. The principal reason for the inability to fulfill these public commitments was the great shipping crisis of 1944-45. There were simply not enough ships to supply the fighting fronts and liberated areas all over the world. Consequently, the Combined Chiefs of Staff curtailed civilian shipments to the bare minimum necessary to preserve security behind the fighting lines. While Roosevelt was calling for increases they were cutting shipments below previous expectations. When analyzing American policy, one sees that promises were made which were incapable of fulfillment. Diplomatic recognition was granted in spite of British objections when such recognition had no legal value. A promise was made to reduce Allied Commission controls but no directive was sent to spell out the pledge. A troop-pay reimbursement credit was established, completely surprising Allied Finance Officers in Italy and disgusting Britain and France who were in no position to follow suit. Rehabilitation commitments emphasized reconstruction for military purposes when this had been in existence from the day the Italian campaign began. The augmentation of relief supplies was impossible because of a world-wide shipping crisis. Yet public promises were issued even over Britain's protest that such commitments seriously endangered the postwar settlement. The key to this capriciousness can only be found in the elections of 1944. The pledges seem to have been made primarily for the benefit of the interested voters. Thomas Dewey was appealing to the Italian-American vote by charging that the administration was not doing enough for Italy. The Administration rose to the challenge. In Italy the publication of the promises was received with joy. Temporarily the prestige of the Italian government was increased. But the good effects were soon followed by disillusion. For as time passed the generalities of the declaration

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were not followed by any specific actions. In early November nobody in Rome knew what the declaration did mean. The Italian government's unity and prestige would again deteriorate. The preceding analysis does not imply that the American government had no real interest in Italian recovery. It definitely did. It demonstrates, however, that the manner and timing of American actions were influenced by internal political considerations. The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration, nevertheless, was of great importance for the future. It meant that America and Britain would not demand reparations from Italy in the postwar settlement — for the payment of reparations retards reconstruction. It marked a permanent American interest in Italy and Europe going beyond the end of the war. It might be called the first American postwar commitment. To obtain British acquiescence the United States obligated itself to bear the major share of the burden, a natural obligation in view of Britain's economic position.42 The reason for this forward step was revealed by the State Department: "if, by our providing help at this critical period, Italy can achieve economic and political conditions favorable to the development of democratic institutions and policies . . . our investment in effort and money may be well worthwhile." 43 It sounds like a forerunner of the Marshall Plan.

Vili

stresses and strains The Roosevelt-Churchill announcement of September 26, 1944, coincided with a cabinet crisis. The parties forming the C L N were splitting. The same day they promised to resolve their differences within the framework of the cabinet.1 Behind the disagreement were three issues; agitation for social change, the institutional question, now transposed from the person of the monarch to the relative position of the monarchical institution versus the CLN, and the purge of Fascists from public life. The Bonomi cabinet was essentially a caretaker government, marking time until the end of hostilities. The Left parties, paced by the Socialists, had begun to take the position that it was time to begin reforming the traditional agrarian and industrial structure, starting with the breakup of the latifondi. This issue was tied to the institutional question because the Socialists insisted that the Left wanted not merely a republic but a socialist republic.2 The newspaper organs of the Left parties, L'Unità, Avanti, and Vitalia libera, had attacked the cabinet even though their parties were represented therein. The Left promised to call off these attacks and delay its demands until the end of hostilities. Since the value of the Roosevelt-Churchill pronouncement was discovered to be illusory, however, the differences which were breaking up cabinet unity reasserted themselves. However, there was one compromise reached. On November 3, over the vigorous protest of the head of the Agriculture Subcommission of the Allied Commission, the cabinet issued a

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decree concerning certain landholdings. Large estates with uncultivated or poorly cultivated land were to be turned over to peasant cooperatives for cultivation. The price would be determined by a committee representing the owners, peasants, and the government. Estates taken from Fascist hierarchs would be given to the peasant cooperatives without compensation.3 This decree was not the final solution to the agrarian problem; but rather a minimum compromise. The purge of the remains of Fascism was a second dividing issue. The Bonomi government had created purge machinery to liquidate the property of Fascist organizations, punish those who had committed Fascist crimes, penalize those who had profited from Fascism, and to eliminate Fascists from the governmental structure. It was the last two categories of the purge which were in dispute. The conservative parties feared that the confiscation of profits of those who had gotten rich from Fascism would lead to a general attack on the profit system and the overthrow of property rights. The decree on agrarian reform is one example of the employment of the purge for such a purpose. The bitter controversy at this time concerned the elimination of Fascists from the governmental administration. Every civil servant, every employee of a semigovernmental organization, every employee of a local government agency had had to hold a Fascist party card to keep his job. This did not mean they were all dyed-in-the-wool Fascists. The necessity of making a living made it imperative to give formal compliance to the rules of Mussolini's Italy. The purge commissioners knew this and were not interested in the small fry. They were after the top men of the administrative structure. Carlo Sforza was the chief of the purge and Mauro Scoccimarro (Communist) was his assistant in charge of purging the public administration. They took the position that the top grades of the administrative services were filled by men who had had to be good Fascists to hold such positions, and called

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for the elimination of these men. They were supported by the three Left parties which argued that Italy's international position could not be improved unless a readiness were shown to clean house.4 The Right parties feared that such widespread clean-ups would end in the elimination of the governing class as well as in the wrecking of the state administration. They held that many top officials had risen to high position through merit, not because of enthusiasm for Fascism. In this they were supported by Prime Minister Bonomi. Major leftist attacks were directed at the leadership of the armed forces. Under this pressure the government instituted an inquest into the failure to defend Rome after the announcement of the armistice on September 8, 1943. It became evident the inquest would soon turn into an inquisition against the monarchy and would involve several high officers who were still leading the small Italian army permitted to fight against the Germans. Bonomi opposed these attacks and finally the Allied Commission stepped in and "advised" the indefinite postponement of the investigation.5 The most important issue in dispute between Right and Left, however, was the relative position of the C L N and the monarchical institution. The capture ôf the government by the Central C L N in June 1944 had shoved the monarchy into the shade. Bonomi still received his official investiture from the Lieutenant General but his power came from the CLN. After becoming Premier, however, Bonomi began to shift. He propounded the view that since the Italian government was in authority over most of liberated Italy the C L N had ceased to serve a useful purpose. He maintained that although nominated originally by six political parties he now represented the nation, not the parties, and was responsible to the Head of the State, not the CLN. 6 In this position Bonomi had the backing of the Liberal party. His thesis ran directly counter to the ideas of the other parties, especially Actionists, Socialists, and Communists.

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They maintained that the CLN, not the Head of the State, represented the Italian people. The government was responsible, in their view, to the CLN. They felt Bonomi was trying to restore the traditional, pre-Fascist constitutional monarchy to which they had no desire to return. The first step in Bonomi's retreat was to nominate the old Vittorio Emanuele Orlando as President of the nonfunctioning Chamber of Deputies and Marquis Della Torretta as President of the defunct Royal Senate. The Left critized the move, not because of objections to the nominees, but as a reactionary attempt to provide the Lieutenant General with councilors representing nonexistent institutions.7 They felt the Lieutenant General needed no other source of advice than the CLN. At the same time attempts were made to broaden the cabinet by the inclusion of individuals or groups to the right of the CLN. Behind these attempts were British officials attempting to bolster the House of Savoy. On September 28, 1944, Churchill publicly supported this effort.8 American policy, however, was to support the six-party coalition.9 While Bonomi was retreating from the position of June 1944, the Left parties, under Nenni's leadership, were pushing for a further advance. In essence they wanted the local officials in liberated Italy to be appointed by the local CLN's. Prefects and provincial councils would be appointed by the provincial CLN's, mayors, police chiefs, and communal councils by the communal CLN's. They were demanding for liberated Italy what the C L N A I (Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy) was accomplishing underground and without authorization in occupied Italy. It was a demand for a revolutionary break with the administrative structure of the centralized Italian government in which prefects and police, career officials, were under the control of national authority. Given the leftward tendencies of many local CLN's, especially in central and northern Italy, the disturb-

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ing potentialities were evident. Where it might lead was made obvious on November 12, 1944, when Pietro Nenni, speaking at a huge mass meeting commemorating the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Russian Revolution, raised the battle cry, "All power to the CLN's," echoing the Bolshevik call of 1917, "All power to the Soviets." 10 Behind Nenni's outburst was a struggle between the Tuscan C L N at Florence and the provincial prefect. Bonomi and the Right parties asserted the traditional authority of the government. They were backed up by the Allied Commission which instructed its regional commissioners to "support properly appointed provincial prefects to the full, even when the Italian officials are under attack by the local Committee of National Liberation." 11 It was at this point that the crisis came. Three events in rapid succession brought the conflicts to a head. In addition, there was the environment of a desperate economic situation and a stalemated military operation with the Germans holding at the LaSpezia-Rimini line in north-central Italy and a gloomy winter in prospect. Event number one was the publication in Italy on November 7 of an interview conceded by Humbert of Savoy to Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times. Humbert stated that the institutional question should be decided by a plebiscite or referendum, although he himself had signed Decree-Law 151 providing for a decision by a constituent assembly. The Socialist and Action parties threatened a crisis and forced the cabinet to reaffirm the original decree.12 It became known that Bonomi had seen the text of the interview and passed on it before publication.13 The disclosure of Bonomi's departure from neutrality was the first cause. Event number two was the descent on Rome of the Tuscan C L N demanding a decision on the legal position of the local committees. Event number three was the climax of the administrative

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purge. Scoccimarro demanded the elimination of certain high officials of the Treasury and several senior officers of the Navy. Treasury Minister Marcello Soleri, of the Liberal party, and Admiral De Courten presented their resignations immediately. Bonomi refused to accept them and supported their point of view. He went to the C L N and demanded the dissolution of the High Commission for Sanctions Against Fascism.14 Bonomi's demand was the final straw. The Left insisted on the purge. The Central C L N unanimously advised Bonomi not to resign. Bonomi, however, without notifying his cabinet or the C L N handed his resignation to the Lieutenant General thereby restoring to the latter the initiative which had been lost in June. The same evening Humbert announced that, in the traditional manner, he would hold "consultations" with leading political figures. The first audiences were given to Orlando and Delia Toretta. The crisis of the C L N was opened. The next day, November 26, the Central C L N met to find a formula for the basis of a new cabinet. The Liberal party said the cabinet should "have the support of the C L N . " The Left parties insisted that the cabinet "be the emanation of the C L N . " The Christian Democrats and Labor Democrats went along with the latter idea and finally the Liberals gave in. Bonomi approved the formula; the battle to save the power of the Central C L N was won. But the battle to extend power to the local CLN's had been lost. Bonomi preferred not to act as chairman of the C L N and Sforza was invited to preside in his place. The C L N set about creating a new cabinet. Bonomi was slated for his old post; Sforza, actually an independent, was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a candidate of the Action party. It was then recalled that the British had vetoed Sforza at an earlier date. A delegation went to the British Embassy where it learned that Sforza was not acceptable as either

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Foreign Minister or Prime Minister.15 Allied approval was still necessary. The veto was more than a rebuff for Sforza. It was a slap at the acting chairman of the Central C L N . It broke up an apparently successful attempt to form a new cabinet. Interparty negotiations temporarily collapsed. The Lieutenant General consulted such men as Badoglio who were outside the parties. The possibility of another "cabinet of technicians" loomed. British intervention made the crisis international. This veto was not kept secret. Eden and Churchill were forced to explain the reasons for the veto to the House of Commons and the story of Sforza's promises of September 1943, was aired.16 On December 5, 1944, the American government publicly criticized the British for intervening in the internal affairs of Italy and other states (Greece and Belgium). 17 The American statement bolstered the position of the C L N . Other forces were coming to its support. First, the Lieutenant General's consultations revealed the absence of any potent political forces outside the CLN. Second, a resolution, initiated by northern Liberal party leaders, was received from the C L N A I in Milan. It demanded that the Crown be prevented "from legitimately calling in groups and camarillas outside the Committees, of which the government must be the emanation." 18 In this atmosphere the parties in Rome began to draw together. The Actionists and Socialists were bitter at Bonomi, and felt that he had not stood up sufficiently for Italian rights in the Sforza affair. The Communists did not take the extreme position of the other two and made it clear that they intended to remain in the cabinet.19 Together with the Christian Democrats they were trying to compromise the extremes. At De Gasperi's suggestion Bonomi wrote a letter to the three mass parties, Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat, copies of which were sent to the other three. He promised to base his

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new government on the platform of the CLN. The Socialists demanded that he formally present his resignation to the C L N and then receive from that body his designation as head of the cabinet. Bonomi refused, insisting that his formal authorization to solve the crisis came from the Lieutenant General.21 The Communists were willing to enter a cabinet on this basis. Nenni, leading the pro-Communist wing in the Socialist party, was hesitant and wavering. Giuseppe Saragat and Ignazio Silone, leading the anti-Communist forces in the Party, were firm in demanding formal recognition of the CLN's position. A majority of the Socialist party Executive Committee sided with Saragat.22 The Socialists, together with the Action party, stayed outside the government on Bonomi's terms. A new cabinet was formed by the other four parties. The two dissidents remained in the CLN. On December 12 the new cabinet was sworn in. Bonomi pledged allegiance to the Lieutenant General as in the preceding June. The others swore allegiance to the nation. The crisis was over. The results can now be analyzed. The Central C L N retained its de jacto position. The local CLN's in liberated Italy failed to get control of local governments. The purge dispute ended in a victory for the conservatives. The purge machinery was taken out of the hands of politicians and turned over to jurists. A purge is a political weapon. The jurists, predisposed against ex post jacto legislation, could find nothing wrong in having been a prominent Fascist when the Fascist government was the legal government of Italy. In liberated Italy the purge became a farce. In occupied Italy the partisans executed the big Fascists when they got their hands on them. The British veto of Sforza was a clear attempt to sway the political scene to their liking. They preferred a solution where power as well as authority was vested in the Crown. The Americans favored the six-party structure although only on the basis that constitutional forms were maintained. Both

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were against granting government authority to the local CLN's. The British government hindered the reforms and purges and encouraged the crisis which led to Bonomi's resignation.23 Both Britain and America opposed attacks on the Italian military hierarchy; in general they were against using the purge as an instrument of political and social change. It is almost impossible to discern the Soviet position on these issues. The Italian Communists let the Socialists and Actionists take the extreme position. It was Nenni, not Togliatti, who cried, "all power to the C L N ' s . " The Communists would not break openly with the position taken by the Soviet Union's allies. In this, there seems to be an indication of Russian policy. Pietro Nenni, explaining the Socialist-Communist split to a closed meeting of the Naples branch of the Socialist party on December 10, 1944, two days after the end of the crisis, declared that the Socialist party was an Italian party. " W e do not receive telephone calls from abroad." 24 The Socialist and Action parties committed an error in remaining outside the cabinet. The issue was one of formality. A month later the Socialists admitted it and were looking for a way to get back into the government.25 More important, the two parties lost their connections with the north, the principal center of their strength. All communication with antiFascist forces behind the German lines was through government controlled channels. The Communist Mauro Scoccimarro was given the post of Minister of Occupied Territories. Through this office he was able to build up the Communist position in the north at the expense of Socialists and Actionists. It was a grave blow to the future of these two parties.

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problem

Relations among the Allies, the Italian government, and the partisans were complex and involved a combination of military and political problems. At first there was the phase of conflict between the Badoglio regime and the anti-Fascist parties, then slow rapprochement after the entrance of the parties into the cabinet on April 24, 1944, and finally full collaboration between government, partisans, and Allies after December 1944. The persistent fear of the Badoglio regime had been an armed overthrow of its authority during or after the end of hostilities in Italy. From the beginning of its existence at Brindisi it showed itself hostile to the possession of arms by any group other than the Royal army and Carabinieri. It had rejected the offer of cooperation given by volunteer formations of the National Front at Bari, a C L N group, and on October 10, 1943, ordered their dissolution. The British 8th Army dissolved them energetically.1 In Naples attempts were being made in anti-Fascist circles to raise a volunteer army in the Garibaldi tradition. In September 1943 Croce talked to General William Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services and proposed the creation of an Italian volunteer corps to fight under the leadership of General Pavone, an Action party adherent. Donovan supported the idea and the two Italians began to organize a combat group. It would have fought under the Italian flag, pledged allegiance to the nation, not the King, and been under direct

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control of the Allied command, not the Italian General Staff at Brindisi.2 There is no evidence that support for this plan ever went beyond OSS circles. When the Royal government discovered the move it used all its influence at Allied Force headquarters to get Pavone's formations dissolved.3 The Allies agreed, and on November 9, 1943, Badoglio published orders disbanding Pavone's troops. At the same time he sent a General Basso to command the military district of Campania (the region in which Naples is located). Basso's principal job was to purge the small regular army of "politically unreliable," that is, republican elements. He issued a secret circular to this effect. The new Italian army appeared more of a Royal guard than a national army, created to defend the Crown by force if necessary. After Churchill's speech of February 22, 1944, defending the Royal government, Basso felt perfectly justified in his attitude. "General Basso, in conversation with an Allied Officer, stated that he regarded the speech [Churchill's] as a complete justification of the secret circular which he had recently issued ordering the elimination of anti-monarchical elements from the army. In the present circumstances, he felt, only officers of undoubted loyalty to the throne could be relied upon from a military standpoint." 4 With the formation of a new government in April 1944, the previous policy was reversed. The anti-Fascist parties put pressure on the Allies to permit the incorporation of volunteers into the Italian combat units. The approaches were unsuccessful. More than enough regular troops were available to make up the severely limited Italian armed force. In June 1944, the Communist party tried to promote a separate Italian "Red Army" but the move got nowhere. The Communists had to announce suspension of the drive.® The partisan movement behind the German lines in central and northern Italy, however, would make the principal Italian

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contribution to the war against the Nazis. The movement can be divided into two categories, disbanded military men who went into the maquis after their units had collapsed, and politically oriented bands under party leadership. The former were stronger in the Rome area, the latter were more efficient and better organized in the north.6 The beginnings of the partisan resistance are found in Piedmont where units of disbanded soldiers from the Italian Fourth Army attacked German communication lines after the debacle of September 8, 1943. On September 12, the first political band was formed: an Action party group "L'Italia libera" which was composed of a few dozen civilians. It became the nucleus of the first "Justice and Liberty" division of the Action party. The first Communist "Garibaldi" battalion was organized in northeast Italy (Friuli) around September 15, and as early as September 27 the Germans reported attacks by units of Slovene partisans working together with Italian Communist groups.7 Contacts were established between political leaders and representatives of the regular army, but relations between them were strained. The military underground, on Badoglio's orders, attempted to take over the leadership of the movement, but failed. Badoglio had the support of Allied intelligence officers in this undertaking.8 Allied military leaders were distrustful of the partisans both because of a natural distaste for irregulars and because of the political complexion of the movement. Yet they wanted the aid the partisans could give them. They were primarily interested in sabotage activities, coups-de-main, and information service, and these the military underground were well prepared to perform. The political underground had larger goals. In the autumn of 1943 meetings took place in Switzerland between Allied intelligence officers and Ferruccio Parri from Milan and Leo Valiani, representing Riccardo Bauer, the chief of the Partisan Military Junta in central Italy. Agreements were made to

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launch arms to the political bands; the latter would furnish information and help Allied prisoners to escape.9 But as the bands expanded, their objectives broadened. They wanted to form large armies to conduct an out-and-out war against the Germans, to have a unified command. In Ferruccio Parri's words, "Only with difficulty can you have an idea of the work we had to do, all the more when we had the feeling that the Allies were trying, instead of helping us to achieve an unified organization, to split us up. . . ." 10 The argument was essentially political. The partisans wanted armies capable of capturing and holding large areas. They wanted to do what Marshal Tito was doing in Yugoslavia. T o the Allies this represented the same danger Tito represented; that the partisans, in capturing large territories would set up governments for these areas and in the end establish a separate government that would challenge the established one in liberated Italy. Tito would successfully wreck the Royal Yugoslavian government-in-exile by such a policy. Such fears would be reduced in Italy after April 1944 when the anti-Fascist parties entered the Royal government, but they would not disappear even then, for the northern partisans did not have too much respect for their political colleagues in the south. 11 During the winter of 1943-44 partisan resistance took the form of strikes and sabotage in the cities, and hit-and-run actions in the countryside. The bands had little political or military coordination. There was suspicion and rivalry between Communist and Actionist partisan units.12 Gradually integration took place. B y November 1943, the Communists organized a headquarters in Milan for all Communist bands with Luigi Longo commanding and Pietro Secchia as chief political commissar.13 Both men were veterans of the Spanish Civil War. Other parties followed suit, adopting similar organizational methods, although the Communists and Actionists controlled by far the largest number of political bands. The Liberal party succeeded in taking over some of the mili-

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tary groups. Negotiations were begun to create a central control organ and were brought to fruition in January 1944 when the Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy (CLNAI) was formed in Milan. It was recognized by the Central C L N as the supreme political directorate of the resistance in the north. One of the first orders issued by the C L N A I revealed clearly two fundamental facts: first, that the five parties in the north (the Democratic Labor party was nonexistent there) were determined to reject all efforts to divide the resistance movement; and second, that this movement was oriented to the left. There will be no place tomorrow among us for a reactionary regime, however masked, nor for a limp democracy. The new political, social, and economic system will not be other than a clear and effective democracy. The C L N of today is a préfiguration of the government of tomorrow. In tomorrow's government this is certain; workers, peasants, artisans, all the popular classes will have a determining weight, and a place adequate to this weight; and a place adequate to this weight will be held by the parties which represent them. . . , 1 4

The politically organized resistance forces were oriented towards a new Italy, determined to break with the past. This was true of sections of the two right parties and the lower clergy. It was the left-wing section of Christian Democracy that was active in the resistance movement. The lower clergy gave strong support to the partisans. The upper clergy feared, and with cause, that the resistance might turn into a revolution against the social order.15 The first object of the partisans was to fight the Germans. They had, also, to face the Fascists. On September 23, 1943, Mussolini had organized a Fascist Social Republic (the illfamed Repubblica di Salò) a puppet state of the Germans. His supreme military commander, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, reorganized Fascist military units and began to draft men for military service and forced labor in Germany. The attempt,

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in the spring of 1944, to draft the youth of the classes 1922-25 led to a tremendous expansion of partisan ranks,16 and required that practically all Fascist units be engaged solely in internal policing. The pseudosocialism of the Repubblica di Salò failed to attract the major part of the working classes in occupied Italy, nor did the refurbished social-Fascist ideology have much appeal for intellectuals, businessmen, or students. During the winter, political strikes which were based on economic pretexts such as inflation or black marketeering slowed down production for the Nazis. Acts of violence were carried out against men of the Nazi S.S. and officials of the Fascist republic. On March 1, 1944, a general strike erupted throughout northern Italy. Initiated by the Communists and supported by the other C L N parties it spread rapidly through the large cities.17 It was the only general strike in all of Nazi-occupied Europe during the war. While political unity of the resistance movement had been achieved with the creation of the C L N A I in January 1944, the partisan bands were still operating as individual detachments. In the spring a military consolidation took place. The detachments were organized into brigades and then into divisions. Allied missions tried to thwart this policy, and, failing, discriminated in favor of partisan bands connected with the right-wing parties. Undoubtedly there was rivalry, and on occasion actual clashes broke out between units associated with different parties. T o put an end to this and to coordinate all military efforts, the C L N A I on June 9, 1944, created a supreme headquarters of the Volunteers of Liberty Corps ( C V L ) . A hierarchical military structure embracing all partisan units associated with the political parties, by this time the great majority, was thus established. Regional military commands were set up to work with the regional CLN's. 18 Events of the spring and summer of 1944 forced the Allies to make some fundamental decisions. The drive on Rome

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having been launched at the end of May, Allied troops were now moving into partisan territory. A military council was formed in Naples to provide the irregulars with daily instructions. On May 22, General Alexander issued the first official communiqué acknowledging their accomplishments. He stated that six of the twenty-five German divisions in Italy had to be diverted to northern regions to fight Italian patriots or to meet Yugoslav partisans on the border of Venezia Giulia.19 As Allied forces liberated partisan territory they disarmed the fighters and tried to find jobs for them. In July 1944 the Italian cabinet, dissatisfied with this solution, urged the Allies to incorporate partisan units into the Italian army. The request was turned down because the Allies did not want the regular army subverted into a leftist force by the creation of political units. In this they were supported by the Italian career generals and, unofficially, by some of the conservative parties in the C L N which, on record, urged such incorporation.20 Instead, the Allies agreed to permit the partisans to volunteer for service in the Italian army as individuals, not as units. The individual enlistment program was a failure. The men did not want to swear allegiance to the King nor serve under disliked regular officers. As of October 31, 1944, a total of eight hundred and seven patriots had been recruited into the regular forces.21 Allied attention to the partisan movement was increased by the substantial number of Anglo-American troops transferred to participate in the invasion of southern France in the summer of 1944. This loss in strength could be offset somewhat by increased underground activity. The great aid given by the maquis in southern France taught the military men the benefits of partisan armies. Finally, the establishment of the C V L was an accomplished fact. Since the Allies could not prevent it, they decided to accept it. To draw the organization closer to Allied authority, General Raffaele Cadorna was sent north to lead the Corps. His vice-commanders were

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Luigi Longo, Communist, and Ferruccio Parri, Actionist, appointed by the CLNAI. There remained strains between partisans and Allies. The C L N A I issued a circular on August 30, 1944, to all regions and provinces in occupied Italy proclaiming that it represented the Italian government and would exercise the powers of government. It authorized regional and provincial CLN's to do likewise.22 In September a delegate of the C L N A I came through the German lines and asked the Allies to recognize the Committee as the representative of the Italian government in occupied territory. The Allies refused. A M G forward groups especially were against it.23 These Allied officers worked directly behind the front lines and were the first governmental authority in a newly liberated area. They did not want their authority or power hamstrung by local organizations insisting on their own prerogatives. Even more important was the implied threat to the authority of the recognized government in liberated Italy, in spite of the fact that the anti-Fascist parties formed its cabinet. The fear was not completely unfounded. In October 1944, partisan units captured Val d'Ossola in the Alps and set up headquarters at the provincial capital, Domodossola. There they proclaimed the Republic of Domodossola and announced their intention of expanding the Republic until it became the Republic of Italy. After several weeks the Germans regained control of the valley. But the danger to Allied policy was not ignored. At an Allied Control Council meeting, Harold Caccia, the British political advisor to the Council, announced that, "publicity on Patriot activities would now be definitely played down particularly behind the Allied lines." The policy would be to take the patriots out of the limelight and give more publicity to the Italian army.24 The partisan movement was of sufficient military value, nevertheless, for the Allies to want to come to terms with it. As a result, in November 1944, Parri and Gian Carlo Pajetta,

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substituting for Luigi Longo, were invited to Allied Force Headquarters. Cordial conversations with Sir Henry Maitland Wilson produced an agreement on December 7.25 The Allies and the Italian government specified the financial aid they would furnish the underground. The partisans agreed to recognize AMG as the governing authority in northern Italy after the defeat of the Germans. They agreed to turn in their arms and disband when requested by the Allied Commander. An additional understanding was reached shortly after. It was agreed that AMG, when it took over in northern Italy, would approve all appointments made by the CLNAI except in the case of men who failed to pass the normal security investigation. Thus AMG could be the recognized government while the men appointed by the CLNAI as prefects, mayors, councilors and so forth, would do the actual governing. A true combinazione. On December 26, 1944, the Bonomi government agreed with CLNAI agents to recognize the CLNAI as its representative in occupied Italy. At the same time it revealed to them the clauses of the armistice. In return, "The National Liberation Committee in North Italy [CLNAI] agrees to act as the delegate of the Italian Government which is recognized and considered by the Allied Governments as the sole successor of the Government which signed the armistice conditions and is the only legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has been, or will later be restored to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government."28 Thus, the last possible threat to the position of the Royal government and the position of the Allies, based on the armistice, seemed to have been eliminated. With this settlement reached, the Italian government was to call on the Allies once again to attach partisan groups as units to the Italian army. This time the Allies would agree,27 and, in the great spring drive of 1945 which brought the war to a close, anti-Fascist units were to fight for the first time on both sides of the lines.

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All problems were, however, not yet resolved. In the winter of 1944-45 General Cadorna challenged the authority of the C L N A I . Cadorna had arrived in the north on August 12, 1944, as "technical consultant" to the C V L . He maintained that he was commander of the C V L under the authority of the Bonomi government in Rome and the Allies. The C L N A I insisted that Cadorna was subordinate to it, and that the C L N A I was responsible for the final direction of the partisan movement. The agreement reached with General Wilson had provided that the chief of the C V L must be acceptable to the Allies. The dispute was finally resolved in the spring of 1945 by an Action party formula whereby Cadorna recognized the C L N A I as his superior as long as he was not given directives which would conflict with orders received from the Allies or the Rome government.28 Another internal wrangle involved the political objectives of the resistance movement. Violent disputes raged as to whether the partisans should launch an insurrection against the Germans and Fascists to coincide with the Allied drive into the Po valley expected in the spring of 1945. The conservatives, especially leading Christian Democrats, feared such an insurrection might bring into being a revolutionary government challenging the legitimate state. In fact, Cardinal Schuster of Milan was promoting the idea of a separate peace between the Allies and Germans in northern Italy to avoid a partisan uprising.29 These fears were not unjustified. In November 1944 Action party leaders in the C L N A I launched an exchange of letters among the parties. The Action party demanded the creation of an extraordinary secret government which would reject the old state.30 The Communists and Socialists temporized while the Christian Democrats and Liberals opposed any revolutionary goal. All finally agreed, however, that an insurrection must be launched against the German occupiers and their Italian collaborators. Allied fears of the partisans had not been completely dissi-

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pated by the agreements of December 1944. They were aggravated by the uprising of the ELAS partisan movement in Greece against the return of the Greek government. The British had put down this revolt firmly, and on February 4, 1945, the British Special Force (the equivalent of the American OSS) in Italy issued an order to its liaison officers to "discourage the indiscriminate expansion of armaments of the partisans"; 31 this in the face of an official policy of nondiscrimination.32 In April 1945 the war in Italy and Germany was drawing to a close. Mussolini tried to negotiate with the CLNAI, but received a demand for unconditional surrender. He attempted to split the CLNAI by issuing orders aiming at a vast socialization of industry in the north, and by trying to turn over his power to the Socialist and Action parties. His attempt failed. On April 25 the insurrection began and Mussolini was captured a few days later and shot by a Communist band. In a couple of days the partisans controlled the major centers of the north. At this moment the Action party leaders called for the establishment of a revolutionary democratic republic. The party newspaper Vitalia libera, published openly in Milan on April 27, asserted that the CLNAI must become the provisional government, and a congress of representatives of the local committees was to be convoked to act as a temporary parliament until a constituent assembly could be elected. The C V L would become the army of the republic. It was hoped that the prestige of the CLNAI and the element of surprise would bring success to the plan, and, further, that the Allies and the recognized government in Rome would not dare react with violence to this fait accompli for fear of precipitating a civil war against the Italian liberation movement.33 The Liberals and Christian Democrats were opposed for the program was clearly republican and socialist in its goals. If the plan had prevailed, a coalition of the Left based on the

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Action, Socialist, and Communist parties would have emerged. The Action party leaders deluded themselves, however, on the democratic unity of the Left, for the Communists and their Socialist comrades rejected the proposal. The leaders of these two parties saw slight chances of success in such an undertaking. A catastrophic example of what could happen had been evidenced in Greece where the British had crushed the E L A S a few months earlier. The Allies were occupying northern Italy. Only if conditions were similar to those in Eastern Europe, where the possibility of Red Army intervention was present, could the Left make a serious bid for revolutionary power. Consequently the Communists preferred the path of legality and participation in a national government based on the CLN. 3 4 The Communists wanted the radical renewal of the country, but said it must come the democratic way, via the constituent assembly.35 The Action party proposal, therefore, came to nought. Many Allied officers felt that for organization and ability the Italian partisan movement was better than most others.36 It made a significant contribution and the American army newspaper Stars and Stripes, Mediterranean section, editorialized: "Our advance guards and armored troops entered cities full of Italian patriots. They were there in an extraordinary number. The Allied soldiers have finally felt that they were fighting to liberate people who really wanted to be free. After long months of the winter war, in the mud and the rain and the ruins, finally the Allied soldiers have seen another Italy." 3 7 The men now had to be disarmed. Dutifully they turned over their weapons as ordered. But they hid enough away to make trouble another day.38 Their exact political coloration is hard to determine, although the vast majority were leftist. In the Allied distribution of funds in the spring of 1945 the Communist brigades received more than 40 per cent, the Actionist brigades a little less than 30 per cent and the others

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the remainder. These figures probably do not represent the true Communist strength. Some have claimed that the partisans were 90 per cent Communist. Two-thirds, by the end of the war, seems a more reasonable figure. Exact data are unavailable. Relations with the partisans demonstrate another aspect of the struggle to preserve the social structure in Italy. Allied efforts to divide the various partisan groups were motivated by the fear that they would follow Tito's example, creating their own government, ignoring the legal one with its signed obligations. They had to be absolutely sure that the effective government in Italy was one which would recognize as binding the armistice terms signed by Badoglio. Furthermore, it was to the Soviet Union's particular interest to have in Italy a government classified as a defeated enemy. The Russians might have been willing to renounce their claims on a Communist-dominated Italy, but the presence of Anglo-American troops made such domination impossible. Since a Communist revolt could not succeed, Moscow policy was to maintain the validity of the armistice. Italian Party members were too well trained to oppose.

χ

settlements some promises fulfilled The second Bonomi cabinet, instituted after the crisis of December 1944, was now free to turn its attention to the everyday business of running the country. Essentially, it marked time until the end of hostilities. In January 1945 the end was expected soon. N o decisive action could be taken until the views of such great centers as Milan, Turin, Genoa, Bologna, and Venice were known. The country waited for the "wind from the north." The government repeated familiar requests. The Big Three met at Yalta in February, and the cabinet renewed the plea for an alliance, for a change in status for the prisoners, and for economic aid.1 Both Britain and Russia opposed granting any new status to Italy. The development of the Russian attitude is interesting. In January, the Yugoslav government had officially put forth open claims to all of Venezia Giulia up to the 1914 Italo-Austrian border, including the city of Trieste.2 Russia could best support these claims if Italy were not an Ally. As a result, the official communiqué from Yalta made no mention whatsoever of Italy. The Italians made another attempt by applying for an invitation to the San Francisco Conference of April 1945 to set up a postwar international organization. The United States tried to get permission for Italy to send an observer, at least, if not a full-fledged delegate. It failed because of British, French, and Russian objections.

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The Anglo-Americans took one step to grant the Italians more formal authority inside their own country. On February 24, 1945, an aide-mémoire was issued by Harold Macmillan, Chief of the Allied Commission, giving the Italians more freedom of action, primarily in the political field. This was the policy directive which had been awaited ever since the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration of the previous September. It did not cover economic problems and a directive on economic affairs was not forwarded until July 1945. All appointments to office from cabinet minister down, except for positions of military and security importance, would no longer need Allied approval. (Sforza could no longer be vetoed.) Decrees and laws would no longer require Allied sanction. The Political Section of the Allied Commission was abolished; relations between Italy and the Allies would be channeled through the embassies. Italy was permitted to resume diplomatic relations with all Allied and neutral powers and could negotiate agreements. The Allied Commission was to be kept informed but could not exercise a veto. It was to withdraw its Regional Commissioners from the territory under Italian government control. None of the foregoing provisions was applicable to territory under direct A M G rule.3 The directive was more honored in the breach than in the observance. At a Regional Commissioners' Conference on March 8 and 9, 1945, Brigadier Maurice S. Lush, Executive Officer of the Commission, stated, "relations between the A C and the Italian government concerning Italian territory problems will be restricted to a high level, that is, between Ministers and Directors [of the Commission], in order to ensure that no idea of control is still in evidence."4 The problem was to hide the mailed fist in the velvet glove. It was not solved successfully and Commission control remained very much in evidence. Gradually the economic promises of the previous autumn

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began to be fulfilled. On March i, 1945, the bread ration was raised to 300 grams. On April 27, 1945, the first U N R R A supplies were distributed at Naples. U N R R A borrowed them from Allied Commission stocks and reimbursed the Commission later. Private relief, which had been collecting in American storehouses since the spring of 1944, began to trickle through. Italian property, industrial and residential, began to be de-requisitioned. The Americans were more liberal in derequisitioning in order to get rehabilitation started. The British clung more to claims of "military necessity" and tended to make fewer concessions. The final result was that de-requisitioning on any appreciable scale was delayed until after V - J Day. 5

the pani government The end of the war was accompanied by the great northern insurrection against the Fascists and Germans. The "wind from the north" blew from the Left and renewed issues that had been suppressed earlier. As soon as the C L N A I gained control of Milan, it called for a reform of the Rome government and the infusion of new, sincerely anti-Fascist, blood. Socialist and Actionist papers in Milan called for the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and Humbert. Luigi Longo, the principal Communist in the north, suggested a Regency. 6 On May 5 a delegation from the C L N A I arrived in Rome. The northern leaders made it clear that Bonomi was unacceptable. They demanded a revitalizing of the purge, financial punishment of those who had profited from Fascism or collaboration, and control by the local C L N ' s in the regions and provinces.7 The Liberal party of southern and central Italy rejected this last point declaring the authority of the state must be maintained. The Left backed down after a struggle and agreed that "the provincial and communal C L N ' s . . . will continue to exercise consultative functions at the side of the prefects until democratic elections will form the normal

settlements organization of local administration." 8 Thus ended the attempt to direct "all power to the C L N ' s . " The Allies had remained outside the squabbles over a program. They exerted their influence, however, to bring the north into line with the rest of Italy by assuring the C L N A I that if it could reach an agreement with the political leaders in Rome and form a coalition government which would abide by the terms of the armistice, the abrogation of that document would be hastened and Italy would the sooner regain its place among free nations.9 This influence undoubtedly played a part in moderating the leftish tendencies of the north. The Allies, however, indirectly influenced the other major problem, the distribution of cabinet posts. The drive for government leadership was carried on by De Gasperi of the Christian Democrats and Nenni of the Socialists. A principal Christian Democratic argument was that Nenni was not favored by the Allies. De Gasperi claimed Nenni's candidacy would embarrass relations with the United Nations powers to the disadvantage of Italy. 10 This claim was accurate. The Anglo-Americans looked upon Nenni with suspicion, not because he was a Socialist but because he was Nenni. And Nenni was two things, violently emotional, and, more important, the leading influence in Italian Socialism working for union with the Communists. With the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union since the Yalta Conference, 11 Nenni as Prime Minister would be all the more unwelcome. This does not mean that he would have been vetoed. First, there was the public reaction to the Sforza veto of the previous December. Second, the Allies had publicly given up the right to veto in the Macmillan memorandum of February 1945. Third, they had protested Russian interference in the Rumanian crisis of February 1945 when Andrei Vishinsky forced King Michael of Rumania to create a new cabinet under Petru Groza. 1 2 But it was not necessary for the Allies to accept Nenni. The Christian Democrats imposed the veto.

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Bonomi had promised Togliatti and Nenni that he would not resign until the C L N had reached agreement on its program and candidates. As no solution was reached he tried to force events by sending a letter on June 5 to the six parties warning them that an understanding must be reached.13 The impasse continued, however, and on June 12 Bonomi resigned. The following day the Lieutenant General began his "consultations." This threat forced the parties to come to some agreement, and the name of Ferruccio Parri, the Action party leader from Milan, was suggested. He had been one of the principal organizers of the partisan movement, a representative of his party on the C L N A I and, with Luigi Longo, he was second in command to General Cadorna of the Volunteers of Liberty. His chief drawback was a lack of political experience. Once Parri was prevailed upon to accept the premiership the other posts were distributed rather quickly. A struggle over the Ministry of the Interior was settled by allocating it to Parri. His choice was not evidence of Action party strength but of the deadlock among the major parties, and his weakness, due to his slim backing, would become evident in a few months. On June 20 the new cabinet was announced. Fifty days had elapsed since the liberation of the north. These days had revealed that the parties of the C L N had little in common once the hostilities were finished. They reaffirmed that there were no other significant political groups in the country to take advantage of the crisis. They also broke the momentum of the northern radical forces. By the time the crisis was resolved the energies reached in the last great insurrection had been dissipated. With the failure of Nenni's candidacy the Left was on the downgrade. Parri's cabinet set to work on foreign and domestic issues. It applied for, and received, permission from the Allies to declare war on Japan. The Italian government had been trying to do this ever since the days of Badoglio's first cabinet,14 only

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to be blocked by British objections. Now that the war in Europe was over, the declaration was finally permitted, although without enthusiasm on the part of most European Allies. It is reasonable to ask why Italians, with all their troubles, should want this additional burden. Actually the reasons are based on long Italian tradition. In 1855 Count Cavour had declared war on Russia, sent the troops of the Kingdom of Sardinia to the distant Crimea, and earned a place at the peace conference of Paris in 1856, enabling him to put the "Italian Question" before the Concert of Europe. In 1940 Mussolini told Badoglio " . . . I need a few thousand dead so as to be able to attend the Peace Conference, as a belligerent." 1 5 The Italian government, if not expecting to sit as an equal, hoped to acquire some rights by fighting against Japan. The victory of the Labor party in Britain in the July 1945 election raised hopes for receiving Allied status. In May 1945 Ernest Bevin, who was to become the Labor Foreign Minister, had said "we must not continue to treat Italy as if Mussolini were still in power." 16 At the Potsdam Conference in July, however, Italy received nothing but an assurance that it would be eligible to apply for membership in the United Nations Organization once the peace settlement were in effect. The Italian peace treaty would be the first item on the agenda of the newly created Council of Foreign Ministers.17 The failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on the peace treaty in the following months led the Italian government to ask for a provisional peace settlement involving a revision of the armistice terms. After months of negotiation the De Gasperi cabinet (which succeeded the Parri government in December 1945) in May 1946 obtained some concessions. Most of the military controls were removed. The Allied Commission was abolished and a small supervisory committee was set up to oversee the Italian armed forces. All prisoners of war were to be repatriated immedi-

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ately. The new document recognized Italy's co-belligerency. T h e Long Armistice became invalid. The occupation costs would be negotiated directly between Italy and the occupying powers. 18 some economic solutions The main problem of both foreign and domestic policy was to find enough food, raw materials, and transportation to keep the people alive and restore the economy. In April 1945 a joint Italian-Allied program was drafted. Relief supplies were classified as an Allied military responsibility provided to allay disease and unrest which might prejudice military operations. T h e y were part of the American and British budgets. In September 1945 after the war against Japan was over the military cut off these supplies. As a substitute the American government granted a credit of one hundred million dollars to buy food and relief needs in the United States. The cost of rehabilitating the economy was to be borne by the Italian government from dollar credits provided by the Americans. These were mostly derived from reimbursement for lire spent by American troops in Italy, emigrant remittances, and the small amount of Italian exports shipped to the United States after September 1943.19 The liberation of the north had been accomplished without the major ruin of the great industrial apparatus of that area, the most productive part of the country. The big problem was to get raw materials of which Italy is chronically deficient. Only the United States could provide them in 1945 and the Italian government made requests for coal and other needed supplies.20 The restoration of the transportation system was begun with the purchase of Allied war surplus in Italy, principally railroad equipment and port machinery. 21 A second vital problem was the restoration of the usual channels of business traffic in international trade. The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration of September 1944 had made promises in this direction, but it was not until June 1945 that Italy

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received permission to trade with Allied or neutral countries. And trade would have to be channeled through the Allied Commission.22 On August 1 Commission control was removed. But exports coming from A M G areas were subject to A M G supervision.23 This injunction was important for A M G controlled the north where most business and commercial activity was centered. It was some time before private trade was to begin. The British lifted the ban on their traders in September, the Americans in November. Thus it was the end of 1945 before Italy had legal freedom to trade abroad. It was an illusory liberty. Economic conditions were such that there was little to export. Most imports were relief and rehabilitation supplies obtained by the government through its credits. Consequently private trade was insignificant. A third major issue was the settlement of outstanding financial claims between Italians and Anglo-Americans. The Italian government continued to insist that the Allies were responsible for all lire they issued during the war on Italian soil. It was February 1946 before the Italians finally capitulated and accepted responsibility. The American government then made a very generous settlement. It had already granted a credit for the lire used as spending money by American troops in Italy. In October 1946 the United States granted a credit for A M lire spent by American agencies in the purchase of supplies in Italy. It waived all charges for the supplies brought in to keep the population alive and in the peace settlement waived all reparations. A n Italian-British settlement was not reached until April 1947. At that time the United Kingdom credited to Italy the sterling value of all lire expended by the British forces in Italy after June 1, 1946, and all services and supplies made available by Italy to their forces after that date. In addition, credits were given for lire paid by Italy to civilians who had helped British prisoners to escape and for supplies shipped to British troops in Austria before June 1, 1946. T o offset these credits Italy agreed to pay for war surplus

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and fixed assets transferred to it by the British (bridges, railroads, etc. built by British troops during the course of operations) . Italy agreed to pay for any military equipment to be transferred in the future and for supplies and equipment furnished the Italian armed forces after September 3, 1943. Britain waived any rights to captured German materiel in Italy. Offsetting credits against debits, Italy ended up by paying Britain eight million pounds sterling as a final figure.24 Reparations were waived in the peace settlement. It was a fair settlement although hardly as liberal as that with the United States. The British gave no credits for all the lire spent by their forces before June 1, 1946. It was this earlier period when the large mass of British troops were in Italy, and British forces constituted three-fourths of all troops in the theater in 1945. The British, however, were in no position to match American generosity, even if they had desired to do so. Their own economic struggle would not permit it. In any case, there was still the policy of keeping Italy weak economically. In spite of Churchill's agreement with Roosevelt that the Italian economy would be rehabilitated, in spite of Bevin's statement that the Labor party would not treat Italy as if Mussolini were still in power, the British government, at the time of the first Marshall Plan Conference in the summer of 1947 tried to have Italy excluded from the European Recovery Program. It was only American and French insistence upon Italian participation that forced Britain to back down. By 1946, consequently, economic relations with the rest of the world were on the road to normality, although the peace treaty had not yet been written. It was a hard road and the way was made possible only through American generosity in the form of gifts and loans which have continued until the present.

XI

the end of the institutional question The institutional question involved more than the person of the King. It involved more than the issue of monarchy versus republic. It involved the preservation of the social structure from the attacks of the Left. For the radicals hoped to overthrow an entire ruling class with the overthrow of the monarchy. Thus questions of law and order, economic controls, and financial purges were part of the struggle. The issues were fought out in a depressing atmosphere. The autumn of 1945 was bitter. The harvest was one of the worst in years. There were tremendous difficulties in importing necessary raw materials to get the factories going. The Council of Foreign Ministers in London was unable to agree on a peace treaty and enough news had filtered into Italy to give the people an idea of some of the harsh terms the victors were demanding. In this atmosphere the Parri government was struggling to regain control of the north. A M G was still running this important part of the country in spite of the fact that the war had ended months previously. The Allied Commission successively promised to withdraw A M G control and successively delayed fulfilling the promise.1 The reason given was fear for public security,2 which was tied up with fear of a revolution. There was undoubtedly considerable turmoil and banditry in Italy but it was not politically directed at the overthrow of society. Even if the revolutionary threat were real, it was Allied troops, not the A M G officer, who would have to suppress a rebellion. Allied troops would remain in

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the north after A M G was withdrawn just as they remained in other parts of the country turned back to Italian jurisdiction. The Left wanted to overturn the social structure but knew better than to attempt it by armed revolt. As Pietro Nenni said, "When the North fell it was impossible to take direct action for a republic with the Allies in Italy. It would have meant risking a conflict with the Allied occupation armies which could have ended only unsuccessfully. Therefore all energy was concentrated on the Constituent Assembly." 3 The continuation of A M G control weakened the position of Parri's ministry.4 At the time of the liberation of the north the partisans had taken over the factories. They created factory councils, threw out managers with Fascist antecedents, and ran the plants themselves. Actually, they only touched men who were clearly accused of collaboration with the Germans. Such activity might have led to a revolutionary overthrow of established capitalistic patterns, but for the fact that the purge was exercised with great restraint. Managers and owners with clean records were members of the councils and participated in the administration of the plants.5 Yet the Allies were worried and tried to restore to their positions those ousted men. The Economic Section of the Allied Commission threatened to withhold coal and other raw materials unless it was guaranteed that they would be used efficiently. The argument of efficiency was used to break the factory councils. Negotiations were opened between A M G and the factory committees to ensure that capable managers ran the plants.6 While the Allies never openly attacked the factory committee system, the councils later ceased to function and former patterns of control and management were restored. The Parri cabinet was pledged to a financial purge of those who had gotten rich through collaboration with Fascism and Nazism. It was a part of Parri's general approach to

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economic problems. His cabinet had a twofold program, reconstruction of the economy and redistribution of the wealth. In November 1945 a new economic plan was drawn up calling for a capital levy and the allocation of raw materials to favor small firms at the expense of the large trusts which had benefited from Fascism.7 The economic plan and the purge went together; the first attacked concentrated wealth in one way, the second in another. Both met the voluble objections of the Liberals and Allied officers.8 The Liberal party organ Risorgimento liberale wrote: "we do not know whether the purge . . . is substantially more lenient and liberal than that of previous decrees; but one thing is certain; it is a purge directed against one class. It aims at the suppression, or if that word is too drastic, replacement of the Italian ruling class. . . ." 9 This Liberal reaction was far too violent. It was really a reaction to the republican drive for a constituent assembly which would settle the question of the monarchy. Parri wanted to finish the matter as quickly as possible. The monarchists, most prominent in the southern wing of the Liberal party, were stalling. The longer they delayed the better were their chances. They hoped that the country, in a republican mood after the partisan insurrection, would settle down in time and return to traditional patterns. In November 1945 Parri finally succeeded in setting a definite date for the election of a constituent assembly. The failure of the Liberals to gain further delay induced them to precipitate a cabinet crisis.10 The Liberals were not the only force working for delay. The leadership of the Christian Democratic and Democratic Labor parties were also playing this monarchist game. They proposed that local, or as the Italians call them, "administrative" elections be held first. This would delay the holding of the "political" elections to the constituent assembly. The three Left parties demanded that political elections be held first.11 The monarchists tried to get the Anglo-Americans to

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take a stand on the issue. The Allies refused to do so officially, but unofficially they were inclined toward the monarchist cause and could let their attitude be known. Newspapermen reported Allied pressure on Parri to postpone political elections.12 De Gasperi, the Christian Democrat, said that the United States wanted municipal elections held first to assure that democracy was established in the towns and villages.13 Parri's friend, Piero Calamandrei, Rector of the University of Florence and Action party leader, revealed an indication by Parri that the Allies were exerting pressure to postpone political elections.14 It was not Allied pressure, however, that provoked the crisis, it was the action of a private American citizen. Amedeo Pietro Giannini, head of the huge Bank of America, was in Italy exploring the possibility of private bankers' loans to that country. He expressed himself strongly and critically about the Parri government. On November 15, 1945, he gave an interview in which he said that no loans would be forthcoming as long as the partisans controlled the factories. He then added that Italy needed a new, strong government led by men such as the conservative old timers, Orlando or Nitti, both pre-Fascist premiers. He finished by saying that a decision on the institutional question could be postponed for two years.15 An interview by an American banker, however prominent, could not by itself overthrow an Italian government. Parri and a number of his associates lacked political and administrative experience. He, himself, was scrupulous to a fault and seemed incapable of rapid decision.1® His party was weak. Giannini's interview, however, provided the occasion for the southern right-wing Liberals, the latifondisti, to pull their party out of the cabinet and force Parri to resign. The crisis which followed was not another typical government crisis; at stake was the issue whether a new Italy based on the generous aspirations of the men who had fought Fascism would have a chance to grow. In the words of Carlo Levi:

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The question now was whether that extraordinary popular movement called the Resistance would actually develop further, remolding the shape of the country, or would be pushed back into historical memory, disavowed as active reality, be relegated, at best, to the depths of the individual conscience, like a spiritual experience without visible fruits, filled only with the promises of a distant future. In these days the movement's strength was being tested, and not only in terms of sheer impulse, motivation, numbers and influence, but in terms of its capacity and ability. 17

The American ambassador could not be reached to confirm or deny that Giannini's viewpoint was that of the American government.18 The Liberals, however, found that they had gone too far. The other parties were not yet ready to wreck a C L N government. Northern Liberals protested the attack on Parri. For a few days it appeared that he might lead a reorganized cabinet with the Liberals left out in the cold. A t this point the State Department intervened to urge publicly the continuation of the six-party cabinet. If the intervention had come earlier it would have been a repudiation of the Liberal attack. Coming when it did, its purpose was to get the Liberals back into the cabinet which, without them, would be weighted to the Left. Then the Christian Democrats suddenly withdrew their support and wrecked Parri's chances of forming a new government. Undoubtedly they saw the chance to get the premiership which they had coveted since the previous spring. Also, they could see that the Allies gave no evidence of desiring an Italy based on the resistance program. Parri was finished and De Gasperi formed a new government. As his last official act Parri called the newspapermen, native and foreign, to his office to tell them the significance of what had happened. "With sober detail and in a gentle, monotonous voice, he told them how the Fifth Column within the government, [the Liberals and Christian Democrats] after systematically undermining its position, was now going to restore to power the social groups that had formed the basis

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of the Fascist regime." 19 De Gasperi denied these accusations and asked the reporters not to print what they had heard. But the journalists refused for the rebuttal did not convince them. Parri's downfall was not solely the work of the Right. The Communists had publicly supported him throughout the crisis,20 but behind the scenes they actually operated to undermine him in an attempt to make a deal with the Christian Democrats. 21 And the Allies, even if only through indifference, bear their share of responsibility for the debacle. As Parri bitterly charged: " T h e Allies have shown almost complete indifference toward Italy, indifference and hostility. . . . Instead of speeding Italian resurgence they have shown little confidence in the Italian people and have done little to aid the birth of Italian democracy. They continue to commit in Italy after World War II the same errors the Allies committed after World War I against the new German democracy of Weimar." 22 The fall of Parri saw the end of the resistance myth, of a new and different Italy. There came a return of the old bureaucrats, the old mental habits, the burial of generous aspirations for a new and better life. 23 The De Gasperi government was formed on December io. The next day word was received at Allied Commission headquarters that A M G would turn the north back to the Italian government on December 31. 24 In a declaration of policy De Gasperi announced that career prefects and other officials would replace C L N A I appointees in the north on January i. He also announced that the High Commission for Sanctions against Fascism would be liquidated not later than March 31, 1946. a5 The new De Gasperi cabinet although still composed of the C L N parties had, nevertheless, shifted its center of gravity to the right. The conservatives succeeded in having administrative elections called first. The local elections were scheduled for the spring of 1946, and the election for the constituent assembly was postponed until June 2, 1946. The conserv-

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atives also succeeded in winning a dispute over the form of the electoral decision. The republicans wanted the constituent assembly to settle the question of monarchy or republic. The monarchists felt that they would do better in a referendum or plebiscite since it was possible for many people to vote traditionally for the House of Savoy while voting for, let us say, a Socialist deputy at the same time. A Socialist member of the constituent assembly, on the other hand, would never vote for the monarchy. In the war years the republican viewpoint had prevailed. Decree-Law 151 issued by the Bonomi government had assigned the decision to the future constituent assembly. In the winter of 1945-46 De Gasperi asked the American government to express an opinion in favor of a referendum. This the United States refused to do. Unofficially, however, American representatives made it clear that a referendum was preferred. The British did likewise. In February 1946 De Gasperi was able to tell his cabinet that "the use of a referendum was held by international circles as the most democratic way of ascertaining the will of the people." 26 A n additional difference between Right and Left concerned the functions of the constituent assembly. The Right wanted it to do nothing but write a constitution while the· cabinet continued to govern by decree. Since each party had a veto in the cabinet all reforms, administrative or economic, could be blocked until a parliament began to function, probably more than a year later. Thus the conservative tactic of delay would be furthered. The Left, on the other hand, wanted the constituent assembly to be an omnipotent body in the tradition of the French Revolutionary Assembly, drafting a constitution, legislating, controlling the cabinet, all at the same time. Thus reforms could be passed by a majority even before the new constitution came into existence. The view of the Left had prevailed in the early days. The Chief Legal Advisor to the Chief Commissioner of the Allied

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Commission prepared an opinion based on the views of four prominent Italian jurists to the effect that Decree-Law 151 provided for a constituent assembly which would be a sovereign body subject to no authority but its own and invested with all power for all purposes. The American State Department concluded, to the contrary, that Decree-Law 151 called for a constituent assembly limited to drafting a constitution. This opinion was presented to the Italian government although there was no insistence that it be adopted. On February 21 it was studied by De Gasperi's inner cabinet.27 One week later the cabinet released the new law on the elections. It was an almost complete victory for the Right. A referendum would be held on the issue of monarchy versus republic. The constituent assembly would be limited to drafting a constitution. One exception was the power given to it to ratify treaties, in anticipation of the peace treaty.28 The monarchists were still unsatisfied. The strength shown by republican forces in the spring administrative elections was alarming. The Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties had emerged as the leaders. The last two were republican. A poll of Christian Democratic party cardholders taken in April 1946 showed 73 per cent to be republican. It is true that the poll overemphasized the republican strength in the party. Large numbers of Christian Democratic voters did not hold party cards. These masses came from the apolitical peasantry strongly bound by tradition and susceptible to the influence of the parish priests.29 In face of this show of republican strength the monarchists took three important steps. King Victor Emmanuel was induced to abdicate on May 10, 1946, to get a stronger candidate. Although the Left protested this action as a violation of the institutional truce, the Allies accepted the abdication and the succession of Humbert to the throne. " A clear letter of Admiral Stone [Chief of the Allied Commission] had reached De Gasperi." 30 Next the monarchists bombarded the

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Allied Commission with petitions to postpone the election date. Admiral Stone refused since the date had been set by the cabinet and could be changed only by the cabinet. 31 Third, the influence of the Church was enlisted directly to aid the monarchist cause. The campaign was turned from the question of monarchy versus republic to monarchy versus communism: "all conservative politicians, whatever party name they bore, in their anxiety as to the wisdom of envisaged reforms found themselves drawn back to support of the Monarchy as an institution with a past, even if disreputable. . . . " 3 2 The Vatican was "technically neutral," but the priesthood, with few exceptions, worked hard and openly on behalf of the House of Savoy. 33 On June 1, 1946, the day before the election, Pope Pius addressed the people of Italy. He did not mention the words monarchy or republic. He did, however, call on the voters to choose between Christianity and materialism, between the champions and wreckers of Christian civilization.34 Given the environment and atmosphere of the election campaign, given the propaganda of the monarchists, the instructions to the voters could not have been misunderstood. On June 2, the Italian people made their choice, and by a majority of over two million, or 54 per cent of the vote, they chose the republic. Had the monarchy won its margin would have been small. Under such circumstances a constitutional monarchy could not be above party strife as it must; instead it would have to throw its weight behind those conservative parties supporting its position. For most monarchists were not true legitimists; they wanted to maintain the monarchy because of the fear of radicalism.35 A constitutional monarchy must be prepared to be either conservative or radical; the king can be a socialist or even a communist king. This was not completely impossible in Italy because Humbert had expressed himself as ready to accept radical, socialistic reforms. 36 The L e f t had little faith in his promises as is evidenced by

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their position in the election campaign. Whether supporting conservatives or radicals the Crown could not be the symbol of national unity because it itself would be one of the factions in the political struggle. The House of Savoy thus paid for Victor Emmanuel's support for Fascism, for the declaration of war he signed on June io, 1940, for the forty-five days of the summer of 1943 when the Germans were permitted to come into Italy unopposed, for the flight from Rome on September 9, 1943. The Anglo-American position as well as that of the Vatican in this last part of the institutional question was one of general support for the monarchy. That Britain, even under a Labor ministry would hold this position is natural. The Laborites are not antimonarchical and in any case the policy and personnel of the Foreign Office does not change overnight. They confused the Italian with the British monarchy and could not see the striking differences in the two situations. The American attitude seemed to be based on the assumption that the monarchy would be a stabilizing force keeping politics in Italy on the side of moderation. The United States did not intervene openly but on the issues of delaying political elections, the referendum, and the role of the constituent assembly, its covert recommendations favored the conservatives. Its position could not be ignored because American support meant "bread, coal, raw materials, and credits, which is to say, bear well in mind, the very possibility for us to live." 37 Don Luigi Sturzo wrote, "the current view in the United States and England among the ruling classes . . . is that Italy must be chained to monarchy." 38 State Department opinion undoubtedly seems to have been influenced by the position of the Vatican and, consequently, of the American Catholic hierarchy. The American prelates supported the monarchy and told the State Department so. Only one simple priest, but one who knew more about the subject than the rest, Don Sturzo, told the State Department that the mon-

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archy was and should be finished. Sturzo wrote: "this matter of the Latin countries has been the particular concern of certain Anglo-Saxon and Irish Catholics who seem to have appointed themselves the special guardians of such countries. Some of them have imagined a kind of Latino-Catholic confederation, with Kings in France and Spain." 3 9 So, for a number of reasons — domestic pressures, concern over the stability of Italy and Europe, and, in the ultimate analysis, to maintain a balance of power — the United States tried to bolster the social structure of Italy. A Communist Italy would have a pro-Soviet foreign policy. 40 Italy's position in the Mediterranean and Europe would affect the balance of power. Not to want Communism in Italy was logical. The question was whether supporting the monarchy and the forces around it would help or hurt the effort to keep Italy out of the Soviet camp. Don Sturzo considered the monarchy a liability; many Liberals, Christian Democrats, Actionists, and Democratic Socialists agreed with him. So does the writer. The indirect influence exerted by the United States in 1946 can be compared to the more forceful intervention of the United States and the Catholic Church in the elections of 1948. The American government openly stated that Italy would be cut off from all economic aid if it voted a proSoviet slate to power. 41 Certain Italian cardinals instructed priests not to administer sacraments to those who voted that slate.42 The Italians were threatened with starvation in this world and damnation in the next; (the threats of denial of sacraments and excommunication were repeated in the 1953 elections). Tactics of this nature seem to be on the borderline of what is permissible in democratic electoral contests, for they appear to be forms of coercion rather than persuasion.43

XII

the peace treaty If the major problem of Italian foreign policy during and after the hostilities was to obtain aid to keep the population alive, an issue of almost equal importance was to reach a satisfactory peace settlement. Italians would accept as adequate a treaty which minimized territorial and colonial losses, avoided economic penalties, and restored Italy's security in the international community. All the Italian efforts to obtain status, to become an Ally, to contribute to the war effort, were designed to improve Italy's position at the peace table. Undoubtedly Italy's biggest asset was the important contribution made in the war against Germany after September 8, 1943. The Italian government listed in detail for the information of Allied statesmen the efforts of the navy, the combat groups and the service troops, the partisan warfare, the prisoners' labor, the supplies and materials contributed, the human and economic losses suffered. 1 A judgment of this effort can be gained from two comments made by the principal British and American leaders of the Italian campaign. Field Marshal Alexander told a press conference on June 21, 1945, that in his opinion Italy had completely rehabilitated itself from the day it placed itself at the side of the United Nations as a cobelligerent.2 On August 23, 1945, General Mark Clark cabled Prime Minister Parri: On leaving Italy after two years of hard campaigns in your country, I wish to salute your people and thank them for the help and collaboration which they always gave me in driving the enemy out of your country. . . .

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It was a great satisfaction to me that your people — soldiers, partisans and civilians — gave me such cordial help and played such an important part in the final campaign of the Po Valley where they completely annihilated the enemy, thus liberating your country. 3

While the military leaders were appreciative there was no particular recognition of Italian efforts from the political leaders of the United Nations with the exception of the United States and a few Latin-American countries. American good will was a product of many factors, among them the pressure of Italian-American organizations in support of the Italian position on various aspects of the peace treaty.4 Another Italian asset was the fear, among the western Allies at least, of writing such a harsh treaty as would cause the breakdown of the Italian polity and economy thus precipitating chaos, revolution, Communism, or perhaps a Fascist resurgence. This possibility was apparent even before the outbreak of the "cold war" between the Western and Soviet blocs. It underlay the Anglo-American position on the institutional struggle. To offset the forces working for moderation was the fact that the "cold war" had not yet reached the point where the contenders were bidding as desperately for Italian support as they would be for Japanese or German support a few years later. Many nations were determined to reduce Italy to the point where it could never again be a threat to its neighbors or in the Mediterranean Sea. France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, and Ethiopia had vivid memories of the Fascist invasions. Italy had almost destroyed the British position in the Mediterranean. As De Gasperi told his fellow citizens: "On the eve of new negotiations . . . my trepidation is great. The British Empire cannot forget that one day Italians threatened to cut her route to India." 6 The desire to keep Communism out of Italy conflicted with the desire to keep Italy weak, and it was difficult for the British to decide

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allies

"whether they want Italy strengthened as a bulwark or weakened into a colony." 6 Another handicap was Soviet support for Yugoslav aspirations which could be realized only at Italy's expense. In addition the Soviets used efforts on the part of the United States to get concessions for Italy as a weapon to get similar concessions for the former German satellites, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, now in the Soviet sphere of influence.7 Such tactics could only work to the disadvantage of Italy. For the peace conferences were not between victors and vanquished, they were between the victors. The problem of the meetings was to reach agreement among Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S., not to reach agreement with Italy. From the Italian position it was a dictated peace. Italy was permitted to present its viewpoint as the conferences succeeded each other, but there is little evidence that its opinions were given much consideration. What follows is a presentation of Italy's position on the principal issues. Reference will be made to the position of the powers in order to clarify and explain the Italian argument. boundaries — the Jugoslav

border

It is an axiom of Italian politics that Italy's natural land frontiers are the crest of the Alps. This axiom, however, conflicts with another strong Italian principle, that of national self-determination. Italy reached the Alpine crest by 1920 at the expense of incorporating substantial Austrian and Yugoslav minorities in the South Tyrol and Venezia Giulia. In 1945, however, Italy was a defeated country and Yugoslavia was one of the victors. The border would have to be revised in Yugoslavia's favor. But how far? Both the Royal Yugloslav government-in-exile and Marshal Tito's partisan regime were agreed in demanding all of Venezia Giulia including the city of Trieste.8 When, in May of 1945, Marshal Tito's soldiers overran this area the Italians

the peace treaty

13 5

pleaded with the Allies to eject them and to put the region under A M G control. The British were reluctant to do so for they hoped to draw Tito out of the Soviet orbit, perhaps at the expense of Italy. The American government insisted that Tito withdraw, arguing that failure to take a stand would lead to a flood of incidents everywhere and thus vitiate any hope of a broad, peaceful settlement in Europe. The American view prevailed; Tito was issued an ultimatum to get out of Trieste and reluctantly the Marshal retreated.9 All parties in Italy were behind the government on this issue. Even the Communists, who until May 1945 had temporized, finally openly came out in defense of the Italian character of Trieste. 10 Gradually the Italian position began to crystallize. In August 1944, Sforza had made a speech calling for a return to the 1920 boundary. Fiume would be made a free city. 1 1 B y 1945 it was realized that this was an untenable position and, in preparation for the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Italian cabinet adopted a less ambitious goal. In a letter to the American Secretary of State, Byrnes, on August 22, 1945, De Gasperi outlined his government's views. He proposed the Wilson line of 1919 as the logical boundary. He asked that a freecity status be provided for the Italian community of Fiume and autonomy for Zara which would go to Yugoslavia. He promised minority guarantees to Yugoslav communities remaining in Italy and assured the readiness of Italy to create a free port in Trieste to aid the commerce of all neighboring countries.12 This position was reaffirmed in De Gasperi's address to the Council of Foreign Ministers on September 18, 1945. 13 The Yugoslavs countered by demanding all of the disputed area. They claimed it was solidly Slavic except for groups of Italians mainly in the coastal towns who had infiltrated the area. They promised that the area would be a part of the federal state of Yugoslavia and the Italian minority would

13 6

italy and the allies

have its cultural and national rights respected. They claimed that Italy, not Fascism, was responsible for the war and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had always been on the side of the Allies. 14 The Foreign Ministers, unable to agree on a solution, decided to send a commission of experts to study the area and make a recommendation. The experts were directed to draw a line based mainly on ethnic divisions, which would take into account local geographic and economic factors. The purpose was to minimize the total number of minorities.15 The Italian government accepted these principles and told the Council of Foreign Ministers that the Wilson line, with modifications favoring Yugoslavia in the north and Italy in the south, would best correspond to the desired goal. From the standpoint of military security, it was argued, the Wilson line offered the last possibility of an adequate defense once the Julian Alps were abandoned.16 The committee of experts returned in April 1946 with four different boundaries.17 The American line, or as it was later called, the Truman line, was the most favorable to Italy even though it was not as generous as the Wilson line. The American experts felt that Wilson had made political concessions in approving the line of 1919. The Russian line gave the Yugoslavs almost all they wanted and would have left almost no Slavs in Italy and about 450,000 Italians in Yugoslavia. The other two lines lay between. On May 3, 1946, the Council of Foreign Ministers asked the Yugoslavs and Italians which of the four lines was most suitable. The Yugoslavs reiterated their original claim but then retreated to the Russian line. The Italians repeated the request for the Wilson line and retreated to the Truman line.18 Then Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, started to bargain. He offered to take a different attitude on colonies and reparations if the others would concede on Trieste. 19 De Gas-

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13 7

peri stated Italy's willingness to pay reparations if the Yugoslavs and Russians would give in on Trieste. On May 13, 1946, Foreign Minister Bevin and Secretary of State Byrnes retreated to the French line, over vigorous Italian protests.20 The Russians still refused to concede and on June 21, 1946, the French suggested the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste as a compromise. The French line would be the eastern boundary of the territory. On June 26 the Russians gave in and accepted the French proposal. On July 18 De Gasperi sent a note to the powers pleading that Gorizia, Trieste, and western and southern Istria be left in Italy. As a subordinate alternative he called for a plebiscite between the Wilson and Russian lines, or between the Truman and Russian lines.21 His note was ignored and the draft treaty of peace contained the boundaries based on the French compromise. In its comments on the draft treaty the Italian government recalled its earlier views but requested that in case the peace conference created a Free Territory of Trieste its borders should be extended to include western Istria. It also asked for some revisions eastward of the boundary north of Trieste in the Isonzo River valley. 22 In his speech before the peace conference on August 10, 1946, De Gasperi charged that the solution abandoned all ethnic, economic, and strategic principles and would always be a threat to the peace. He asked for a one-year postponement of a decision.23 His request was again ignored. On September i l , 1946, Bonomi, representing Italy at the Political and Territorial Commission of the Peace Conference, called for a plebiscite.24 Throughout the preceding year the Italian government had resisted strong internal pressures demanding a plebiscite in Venezia Giulia. The reason was the fear of losing the South T y r o l to the Austrians who had been pressing for a plebiscite in that area. On September 5, 1946, the Austrian government, realizing that the South T y r o l was lost, entered into an agree-

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ment with Italy. Thus Bonomi was able to call forcefully for a plebiscite in Venezia Giulia on September n . His call, however, was rejected. In the meantime direct talks between Italy and Yugoslavia had taken place outside the peace conference. In July 1946 Yugoslavia offered a condominium over the Free Territory, autonomy for Pola, and abandoned its claim to the town of Monfalcone, west of Trieste. In return it wanted Gorizia. The Italians were interested and asked for a grant of autonomy for all of western Istria which would be a part of Yugoslavia under the anticipated treaty. The talks broke down when the Yugoslavs rejected the request to extend autonomy and insisted that the territory between Monfalcone and Trieste must remain in Yugoslavia. The condominium would thus be cut off from Italy by a Yugoslav "corridor." 25 The next occasion for separate negotiations came through Togliatti's private conversation with Tito. The Marshal offered a condominium over Trieste in return for Gorizia. Once more discussions failed when the Italians asked for territorial contiguity between the Free Territory and Italy. 26 The long struggle came to an end in December 1946 with the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers to stick with the Free Territory as conceived by France. A strong governor for the territory was to be appointed by the Security Council of the United Nations. The Security Council was unable to agree on a governor and the area remained under Anglo-American and Yugoslav military occupation.27 If the wishes of the inhabitants are accepted as the standard of justice the decision was unfortunate and unjust. Lands unquestionably Italian were torn away from Italy. It continued to rankle in international relations. In 1948, the United States, Britain, and France, in a propaganda move to bolster the Christian Democrats in a national election, called for the return of the entire Free Territory to Italy. With the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc Western pressure for

i4°

italy and the allies

a pro-Italian settlement decreased. The Western powers tried to compromise the dispute by getting both sides to agree to a partition of the area. In the meantime, Zone A containing the city of Trieste, was coordinated with the Italian economy by the occupying powers, while Zone Β was practically integrated into Yugoslavia. In 1952, over bitter Yugoslav protests, Italian pressures forced the Anglo-Americans to accept Italian advisors and administrative personnel in the administration of Zone A. On October 8, 1953, the occupying powers announced their decision to return Zone A to Italy. Marshal Tito mobilized troops and threatened to fight; this gesture induced the United States and Britain to back down, further reducing Anglo-American prestige in Italy. Subsequent negotiations finally achieved, on October 5, 1954, a de facto partition of the territory based on transferring some small areas from Zone A to Zone B. In addition, newspaper reports indicated that Tito would like the city of Capodistria in Zone Β at a future date to be built up into a major Yugoslav port with new highways and railroads, financed by Anglo-American money. This would aggravate the economic difficulties of Trieste, and consequently Italy was opposed, while the Anglo-Americans appeared to have grave reservations. In the meantime the Italian agitation for Trieste reopened Tyrolese and Austrian discussion of the decision on the South Tyrol. 28 The Italian government tried to force the Western powers to choose between Italy and Yugoslavia, a choice they wished to avoid. The Trieste issue might have provided the spark for a new international conflagration. Inside Italy there has developed a revanche and irredentist sentiment which is not satisfied with the return of Zone A of the Free Territory but demands Istria as well. Neo-Fascists denounce as traitors to Italy anti-Fascists who cooperated with the Allies only to be sold out at the Peace Conference. It was a mistake for Byrnes and Bevin to have retreated so

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far under Russian pressure. The Soviets seem to have forced the issue for reasons of prestige, to show both Yugoslavs and Italians that they could get nowhere without Soviet support. To reinforce their prestige in Italy the Anglo-Americans had to hold firm on other issues where the Italian case was less convincing. They had to reinforce their position by pouring more money into the country and support for anti-Communist politicians was increased.29 The Trieste dispute prevented integration of Western defenses in the area, but its solution, at the time this is written, has not yet led to the desired integration. the french

border

On February 28, 1945, Italy and France resumed diplomatic relations. At that time the Italian government was assured that France intended to make no territorial claims except for the Fezzan area of Tripolitania. The Italians relinquished in return the special position held by Italian settlers in Tunis.30 Nevertheless, during the spring of 1945, French agents were active in the Val d'Aosta on the Italian Alpine frontier trying to win the inhabitants over to the idea of French annexation. The local population spoke a dialect similar to the French dialects on the neighboring side of the Alps. But Aosta, together with Savoy, was the original territory of the House of Savoy and had been part of the Kingdom of Sardinia and later of united Italy. Its Italian connections go back for centuries.31 In the winter of 1944-45 f h e Allies had agreed to permit the French occupation of the border lands up to thirty-five kilometers in order to satisfy French prestige. When the Germans collapsed in Italy at the end of April 1945, DeGaulle moved his troops far beyond the thirty-five kilometer limit. This action was not only a blow to Italy but to the Allies. On the northeast frontier the Yugoslavs were pouring into Italy over Anglo-American protests. The Allies could not

i42

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permit the French to accomplish what they were forbidding the Yugoslavs to do. DeGaulle was ordered to pull out and in June and July he withdrew. 32 Immediately afterward, Prime Minister Parri announced that French-language schools and a certain amount of administrative autonomy would be granted in Aosta. 33 At the Council of Foregn Ministers, in spite of the earlier renunciation of territorial claims, the French demanded border rectifications along the Piedmontese frontier. They gave up demands for Aosta and the Riviera coast to Ventimiglia; however, certain important mountain valleys were claimed. Behind the demands was a desire to get a strategic advantage over Italy, to acquire existing and potential water power sites, and to demonstrate to its people that France was the victor. The position of the Italian government was that the frontier should follow the Alpine watershed. It agreed without protest to the transfer of whatever Italian territory was on the French side of the watershed. More reluctantly it agreed to the transfer of some territories on the Italian side of the watershed, which would shorten communications between Dauphiné and Savoy in France and would improve France's defenses. Vigorous Italian objections were raised, however, to the cession of the Mont Cenis plateau and the Tenda-Briga area. The reasons were economic and strategic. Mont Cenis was completely on the Italian side of the watershed. It was forty kilometers from Turin. It dominated the whole Susa Valley down to the plain of the Po. Between it and Turin there was no natural obstacle worth consideration. On it was located a great artificial reservoir with a capacity of 32,000,000 cubic meters of water. It contained hydroelectric stations providing 60 per cent of Turin's electricity and energy for the railways of northwestern Italy. If the dam holding this water were ever blown up, the Susa Valley down to Turin would be flooded. Even if the dikes were not burst an enemy coming

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down from the Alps would meet no defenses capable of protecting the rich Po Valley. The case for Tenda-Briga was similar. The Roya Valley opened out on the Po plain. The water power in the area generated the electricity supplying a large part of Liguria including the important city of Genoa. The economic life of important centers of Italian industry would be subject to French menace. The Italian government argued, "the transfer of the district of Tenda, and of the plateau of Mont Cenis would add little or nothing to the security of France, but would irreparably prejudice the security of Italy, since the defensive value of the barrier of the Alps would thus be completely abolished." 34 Italian objections were not taken into consideration. The peace conference approved the French requests except for a few very minor rectifications. Provisions were inserted in the final treaty protecting the Italian right to use the hydroelectric power and water from the detached territories. T o the defenseless natural position the victors added a demilitarization clause.35 The French still retained the bitter anger against the Italians at the end of hostilities which was caused by the Italian "stabin-the-back" of June 10, 1940. Gradually this bitterness dissipated so that by 1947 when the peace treaty came into force the French government was actively courting Italian friendship, making plans for a customs union (yet unrealized) and promoting Franco-Italian cooperation as the basis for the unification of western Europe The French cabinet realized subsequently that the territorial demands had been a mistake, that they were hindering Italian-French understanding. The Italians realized the importance of French friendship in improving their position in the international balance of power. 36 But the territorial issue was a continuing reminder of past enmity. The French cabinet was ready to return some of the areas taken, including important water-power installations,

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but the French Assembly has refused to ratify such a transfer.37 the austrian boundary The Italians felt safest in their position on the Austrian frontier. After all, Italy had switched sides and become a cobelligerent. Austria remained with Germany until the Allied occupation. Still there was the fear that the Allies might want to bolster Austria by returning the South Tyrol. There was no question of returning Trento. Consequently in his August 22, 1945, letter to Byrnes, De Gasperi urged the United States to support, Italian retention of the South Tyrol, or as the Italians call it, Alto Adige. In November 1945 the Austrian government requested the return of the South Tyrol. The demand was justified on ethnic and historical grounds. It was argued that strategic borders were no longer valid in view of the developments of modern warfare. The Austrians stated their readiness to guarantee Italy the fruits of past economic investments.38 The Italian rebuttal covered all aspects of the problem. Historically, Italy stated, the Brenner frontier had been the dividing line between the Latin and Germanic worlds. It had been granted to Italy by the Pact of London of April 26, 1915, and established by the Treaty of St. Germain of September 10, 1919. It was recognized by the Nazis as "fixed forever" in the Hitler-Mussolini agreement of 1939. The Brenner frontier followed the crest of the Alps and divided two natural worlds.39 The two main arguments of the Italians, however, were strategic and economic. They insisted that the defensive value of mountainous terrain was still important. The tendency of Austria toward Anschluss with Germany had not been a Nazi phenomenon but an Austrian one supported by the Social Democrats. In the future this tendency might recur; it was not unreasonable to anticipate the reconstruction of a power-

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ful German state, in which case a strategic frontier would be most important.40 And, quoting with approval from an Italian memorandum of July 2, 1919, delivered to the Versailles Conference, they said, "when we bear in mind the necessity for such a frontier and its absolute suitability (corresponding as it does to the line of the watershed), it is obvious that the inclusion of some 200,000 German speaking inhabitants becomes a matter of minor importance." 41 Almost as important was the economic argument. The Italian government had poured large amounts of money into the area during the interwar period, especially in electric power plants and processing industries which serviced Lombardy and the region of Venice.42 Italians were in a minority in the South Tyrol and the government did not deny it, rather it denied the validity of the ethnic principle in this case. For this reason De Gasperi attacked an Austrian request for a plebiscite on the grounds that Italy could not allow a frontier problem affecting the whole country to be entrusted to the vote of a small section of its citizens.43 The Hitler-Mussolini agreement of 1939 had required the German speaking inhabitants to opt for Italy or Germany. Those choosing Italy would be considered Italian and forever hold their peace; those opting for Germany would be transferred to the Reich. The referendum took place in 1940, and of 266,885 persons, 185,365 voted for Germany. Of these 77,772 had left the South Tyrol by 1943. In 1939 Italians had formed 29.2 per cent of the population after years of pushing by Mussolini; by 1943 with many Austrians leaving and Italians coming in to take their place the Italian population of the area was close to 40 per cent.44 The Italian government charged that the South Tyrolians did not deserve consideration of their requests as they were among the most fanatic Nazis. They had been pan-Germans before 1914. They had greeted the German-Austrian Anschluss of 1938 with joy and welcomed the German troops in-

i4ö

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vading Italy after September 8, 1943. Therefore they should not receive concessions.45 Nevertheless, the Italian government thought the people fundamentally good and capable of democratization. It was not requesting their expulsion. Italy was already granting minority rights and a law for regional autonomy was in the drafting process.46 The same combination of condemnation plus encouragement for the future was directed against Austria. In Italian opinion, the Austrian population welcomed the Nazis in 1938 and took full part in the war of aggression on the side of the Germans. In Italy, Austrian troops had rivaled the Germans in cruelty. Ten Nazi divisions were composed mainly of Austrians. This same Austria should have no claim which would work to the disadvantage of democratic Italy, a cobelligerent on the side of the Allies. Nevertheless, Italy welcomed Austrian independence and intended to do all in its power to consolidate such independence in the interest of European peace, and was ready to make comprehensive economic agreements to the advantage of both countries.47 Italy was ready to do all it could to consolidate Austrian independence except give up the South Tyrol. Some of the Allies, especially the French, who were as concerned as Italy with maintaining an independent Austria, felt that the inclusion of the South T y r o l in Austria would make the country more viable economically and thus better able to maintain its independence. Furthermore, the conservative peasants would offset the radicals in Vienna and the industrial cities. The Italians argued vigorously against this thesis. They said the inclusion of the South T y r o l would not contribute to the vitality of Austria. It was a "doubtful assumption that Austria did not have within her 1937 frontiers the possibilities of an autonomous existence." 48 Yet five months earlier, De Gasperi had written to Byrnes, " . . . I am deeply convinced that either it will be possible to set up a large and economically sound Danubian State, in which case the annexation of a few

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Tyrolese will be superfluous, or else a small and anemic Austria could only subsist as the protectorate of a great Power closely interested in the Danubian Basin." 49 Here, De Gasperi had been arguing that Austria even with the South T y r o l was not viable economically and could be only a protectorate of Russia, in which case it was advantageous not to have a Russian spearhead on the southern slopes of the Brenner. He doubted that conservative peasants of the South T y r o l would be of major significance in affecting Austria's future. In March 1946 the Foreign Ministers' Deputies decided that the ethnic claim would not be controlling in the South T y r o l case.50 This meant the Italian cause was won. It was decided, however, that Austria might advance a claim for "minor" rectifications of the frontier. The Austrians asked for the northeastern and eastern parts of the Pusteria and Upper Isarco Valleys. Through this area ran the most direct route from the North to the East Tyrol, both in Austria. The Italians answered promptly pointing out that the rectifications were not minor as they included 42.7 per cent of the area of the South T y r o l and 24.5 per cent of the population. Important power plants were located there and rectification would mean the abandonment of the watershed crest, leaving a far weaker natural defense. Italy was ready to agree to a special convention regulating traffic through the valleys concerned. 51 The Council of Foreign Ministers decided in Italy's favor. In the draft peace treaty no changes were mentioned. An order was issued to Italy to guarantee free movement of traffic between the North and East Tyrol. 5 2 The Austrian government in its comments on the draft again asked for a plebiscite. If this were refused it asked for guarantees of economic, administrative, and cultural autonomy for the region. 53 The Italian government was ready to enter into such a guarantee and an accord was reached on September 5, 1946. This convention became Annex I V of the final peace

i48

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treaty but the Allies made no special pledge to enforce its provisions.84 The retention of the South T y r o l was the major Italian victory at the peace conference. Success was not due to any logic or consistency in the Italian argument for there was little to be found. The greatest inconsistency of all was the abandonment of the ethnic principle as dominating if not exclusive. The Italians protested vehemently because some 350,000 of their compatriots were left outside Italy's northeastern frontier, yet thought the exclusion of more than 200,000 Germans from Austria merely a "matter of minor importance." They abandoned the best strategic line of the Julian Alps for the less desirable Wilson line because they recognized on paper at least that the ethnic rights of the Yugoslavs were more important than absolute strategical protection. Yet they refused to abandon the Brenner for the Salurn Gorge although the latter, admittedly not as good as the Brenner, was still a very good military barrier.55 It had been the linguistic border for centuries. Fear of losing the T y r o l made them refuse to call for a plebiscite in Venezia Giulia until after it was too late. The military argument of defense against renewed German aggression (coupled with the hint of the possibility of Russian penetration) is dubious. In the arguments on disarmament and demilitarization, as will be shown later, the Italian government correctly insisted that a nation's security is related to the power of its neighbors. Austria was no threat to Italy, and the Brenner was not necessary as long as Austria was independent. Faced with a resurgent Greater German Reich, Italy would not be strong enough to hold the Brenner even though it rearmed. And as for Russia, that country and its satellites had better roads of access into the Po Valley. The economic problems were capable of solution in the South T y r o l in the same manner as provided by the treaty in regard to the French and Yugoslav borders. Austria was

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ready to grant the necessary guarantees to water power sites, hydroelectric plants and other industries that France and Yugoslavia were required to give. In the case of the French boundary the decision was wrong because there was no other good reason for taking the territory away. The Italian description of the rabid pan-Germanism and pro-Nazism of the South Tyrolese seems an illogical basis for wanting to clasp them to the family bosom. If they were as terrible as described, the Italians should have been glad to turn the area back to Austria, or at least imitate the expulsion of populations accomplished in other parts of Europe. By the same type of reasoning Yugoslavia could have claimed the Romagna because the worst Fascists came from there. The principal political argument against Austrian claims was Italy's twenty-month fight on the side of the Allies while Austria stuck with Germany to the end. In essence Italy was claiming its rights as one of the victors. Yet in a document presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers on the Venezia Giulia problem, the Italian government quoted President Wilson in asking for "a decision of equity and justice, and not a decision . . . distinguishing the victors from the vanquished." 56 On the South Tyrol issue, however, that distinction was affirmed. On the same basis Yugoslavia's claim to all Venezia Giulia should have been acknowledged by Italy because that nation fought on the side of the Allies from the beginning while Italy was a Johnny-come-lately. If there was little logic and consistency in the Italian argument there was logic and consistency in the Italian motive, the natural one of trying to save as much as possible. The concessions offered in Venezia Giulia and in Piedmont were made because it was impossible to maintain those prewar frontiers. The possibility was better in the South Tyrol and the claim was maintained. It is most improbable that the Allies were affected by or gave much consideration to the Italian argument. It is doubt-

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ful that a logical or consistent presentation by the Italians would have changed the outcome. The Allies seem to have had no principles on the settlement of the territorial questions except to find some solution that could be the basis of agreement. Perhaps the Russians operated on a basic principle, to consolidate Eastern Europe and split Western Europe. The Italian boundary settlement left bitter Italian-Yugoslav hostility, and considerable Italo-French hostility, and, in spite of the agreement of September 5, 1946, Italo-Austrian antagonism. The failure to obtain the South T y r o l was a bitter blow to and weakened the struggling Renner government in Austria. But the Allies had to give it to Italy in order to save the Italian government from a similar blow. So much injustice had been done to Italy in the other settlements that compensation had to be given the Italians somewhere. It was given at the expense of Austria. President Wilson had admitted after the Versailles Peace Conference that the promise of the Brenner frontier to the Italians was a grave mistake. The mistake was perpetuated here.

XIII

reparations, disarmament, colonies the economic settlement The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration of September 26, 1944, concerning the rehabilitation of Italy implied the renunciation of reparations. T o pour money into the country and then take it away in the form of cash, gold, or goods and services, was a contradiction of terms. At the Potsdam Conference the American government waived reparations. At the Foreign Ministers Council meeting in London in September 1945 Britain and France followed suit. The Soviet Union, however, requested reparations of 600 million dollars, 100 million for Russia and the rest to other victims of Fascist aggression. The efforts of other members of the Council failed to dissuade the Soviet representatives.1 The Italian government did not argue against reparations in principle, for it had its own claim against Germany. Its position was twofold. Italy had made a substantial contribution to the war effort in both a military and economic sense, and could not afford to pay reparations without seriously retarding economic recovery and reducing still further the living standard of its people. In the spring of 1946 the Italian government presented its case to the Foreign Ministers' Deputies Conference. It valued its economic contribution in the war against the Germans at 5,543,900,000 dollars at an exchange rate of 225 lire to the dollar. Total damages suffered, mostly after September 8, 1943, were estimated at 13,462,200,000 dollars. In addition, the organic weaknesses of the Italian

15 2

italy and the allies

economy, the lack of raw materials, insufficient agricultural output, and a chronic deficit in the balance of trade were cited. "The only conclusion to be drawn is that of a material impossibility to operate any reconstruction plan envisaging the transference abroad of part of the national income in payment for reparations." 2 The United States was against taking reparations and yet put forward the right to compensation for damage to the property of Allied states or nationals. Compensation would be met by confiscating property of Italian physical or legal nationals in each Allied country.3 The Italian nationals suffering losses would be reimbursed by the Italian government. No distinction was made between the property of Italians resident in Italy and emigrants abroad who had not acquired a new citizenship and were therefore technically Italian nationals. The Italian government protested vigorously pointing out that the emigrants scattered abroad had no hand in the policies of the Fascist regime and should not suffer for it. In addition, Italy could only pay compensation to its nationals who suffered losses at the expense of inflation in Italy and further deterioration of the Italian economy. Future trade possibilities would be reduced.4 Italian pleas of poverty made little impression on the claimants. Russia, Greece, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, and Albania had directly suffered the consequences of Fascist aggression and occupation. If Italy was poor, so were they. The Italian contribution to the war on the peninsula did not restore the destroyed property in their own lands. Italy opposed payments to Albania and Ethiopia arguing that more had been poured into those countries during Italian rule than had ever been destroyed.5 In the case of Yugoslavia and Greece, Italy argued that the value of the territory to be ceded to those countries, parts of Venezia Giulia and the Dodecanese Islands, was sufficient reparation.®

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15 3

The Soviet Union persisted and the United States gave in reluctantly. In effect, America would pay Italy's reparations because part of the money received from the United States, or its equivalent in Italian goods, would be turned over to the claimants. The draft peace treaty provided for reparations payments and compensation for claims through confiscation of Italian property abroad.7 In its observations on the draft document the Italian government repeated its earlier arguments. An additional complaint was registered over the exclusion of the Italian claim against Germany for property taken from Italy after September 8, 1943, plus reparations totaling 3,473,600,000 dollars.8 The final bill was set. Albania was to receive five million dollars, Ethiopia, twenty-five million, Russia, 100 million, Greece, 105 million, and Yugoslavia, 125 million dollars. The USSR was permitted to confiscate Italian assets in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary as part of its reparations claim. Britain, France, and the United States did not touch the property of Italian nationals living in their countries although they were entitled to do so. They waived confiscation of the assets of Italians living in Italy by accepting flat payments from the Italian government, five million dollars to the United States, and fifteen billion lire to France. Britain settled for the payment of private debts due from Italians to persons in the United Kingdom.9 The Italian government paid the debts, saved the property, and then had the job of collecting from the debtors. As a result, with the exception of those in the Balkans and Ethiopia, most of the Italian assets abroad were saved. Although Italy was not permitted to receive reparations from Germany, the Allies made every effort to restore Italian property looted by the Nazis. In some cases, Italians who originally made a bona fide sale to a German later claimed that their property had been stolen and tried to get it back. Italy tried to regain its gold reserve which the Germans had

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stolen and which was recaptured by the Allies intact, but it was forced to accept a proportionate share of the total German gold stolen from all occupied countries.10 On the economic settlement the Western Allies could well earn the gratitude of the Italians for moderation, restraint, and sympathetic treatment. Yet gratitude was not very evident. The Italians felt that the Western Allies had taken their reparations in the financial clauses of the armistice which made Italy responsible for the A.M. lire spent by the Allies. Only the United States ever gave substantial credits in return. When Italian Communist orators countered attacks on the Russian reparations claims by charging that the West got its reparations right in Italy, the conservative opposition agreed with them. But certainly the settlement was a mild and reasonable one. The United States erred in bringing the question of compensation for claims into the discussion. There may be a legal distinction between compensation and reparations but not an economic one; less money was available to bolster the Italian economy. American loans indirectly paid the reparations bill to the claimants; the same loans indirectly paid the claims on behalf of American, British, and French citizens and any other eligibles. It would have been better for the Allied governments to reimburse their citizens directly. The Italian government made a serious mistake in tactics in presenting a reparations claim against Germany. It could have known that other claimants with higher priorities would demand all there was to get. Abstaining from such demands, it could have argued against reparation payments on principle. It could have pointed out that the rehabilitation of Europe was a problem in itself, to be faced on its own merits and to be solved in the context of the rehabilitation problems of all countries, victors and vanquished alike. But because little attention seems to have been paid to Italian arguments in general, it probably did not make much difference.

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15 5

disarmament and demilitarization In 1945 there was complete unanimity in the Council of Foreign Ministers on the strict limitation of the armed forces of the defeated states.11 Italian armed forces were to be sufficient solely to maintain internal public order and local defense of the frontiers. Any aggressive potentiality was to be eliminated. The only problem, therefore, was to determine the strength necessary to meet but not to exceed these requirements. The Italian government stated its case in the spring of 1946. In the memoranda presented to the Allied Powers three principal arguments were stressed: the contribution the Italian armed forces had made in the war against Germany; the guarantees for future peaceful policies implied by the historically peaceful nature of the Italian people and the weakness of the Italian economy; and the right of Italy as a sovereign state and as a future member of the United Nations to a military establishment capable of providing adequately for the defense of its territory.12 The specific proposals were based on adequacy requirements only in the case of the army; those involving the navy and air force were based on the equipment then in Italian hands. The proposals were presented as transitional, to be revised at a later date by the United Nations; for the Italians considered that an adequate defense was possible only when a nation's power was relative to the power of its neighbors.13 The Italian Ministry of War asked for an army of 236,000 men not including Carabinieri or antiaircraft personnel who came under the jurisdiction of the air force. The commissioned and noncommissioned officers were to be professionals with the other ranks on short term duty to be provided by compulsory military service. It asked for modern armaments in proportion to the size of the force and flexibility in its internal organization.14

15 6

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The Air Ministry stated that absolute figures could not be given since it was impossible to determine a priori the future of air defense, and since the economic state of the country prohibited impractical figures. It wanted to keep the units that had fought beside the Allies and presented its immediate requirements as 358 planes, fighters, light bombers, reconnaissance, etc., plus training craft, replacement craft, and service planes. Permission was requested to keep a small aeronautical industry to produce replacements as the planes wore out.15 No program was presented for antiaircraft defense of the national territory. The system had been completely destroyed. It would be so expensive to replace that consideration was out of the question. But it claimed that it was of such an "indisputedly defensive character," that it should be excluded from any limitations imposed on Italy.16 The size of the navy was the most explosive single issue of the disarmament discussions. Next to the boundary question, the navy touched the emotions of the Italian people for they felt that the fleet had never surrendered. The Italians claimed the present strength was inadequate for proper defense and should not be reduced further. Rather, in the future, under the auspices of the United Nations, the navy's strength should be adjusted to the forces allotted to other nations. At the end of the war there remained 266,011 tons of warships. From a qualitative point of view this figure was misleading because of the obsolescence and disrepair of many of them and because of the lack of proportion between the various categories of vessels.17 The five remaining battleships were not included for Italy considered them of little value for its purposes. The government was ready, upon admission to the United Nations, to turn over the two new ones as part of that organization's proposed international fleet. The three older battleships would be used for training purposes. Under these conditions the fleet actually employable at the time approximated 100,000 tons, requiring a force of about 40,000 men.18

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15 7

There were two other questions in connection with the reduction of Italian military power: destruction of war industries, and demilitarization of frontiers. The Italian government opposed both. It claimed that the state of the Italian economy would prevent any expansion of war industry and the lack of raw materials left the Allies a means for regulating Italian armaments through their control over exports. 19 On demilitarization it pointed out that contemplated boundary revisions were destroying natural defensive barriers and that defensive fixed fortifications could hardly threaten others. It offered to dismantle any fortifications which could be considered of an offensive character, although such distinctions are almost impossible to make.20 Such were the proposals advanced by the Italian government. Some of these arguments on the military aspects of the peace settlement were good, others were weak and never should have been made. The argument that before 1922 Italy was a peace-loving nation could be challenged (excluding the wars of unification in the nineteenth century), by citing the record of the attacks against Ethiopia in 1887 and 1896, against Turkey in 1 9 1 1 , against Austria in 1915 when the claim of "sacred egoism" went far beyond the irredentism of Trento and Trieste to encompass the South Tyrol, the Dalmatian coast and part of the Turkish mainland. The economic argument that the weakness of the Italian economy, the lack of raw materials, the dependence on foreign countries for imports of essential commodities, all excluded the possibility of renewed Italian aggression was most invalid. Exactly these same conditions had prevailed when Mussolini's regime attacked Ethiopia, the Spanish Republic, and France, yet they had been no deterrent. The poverty-stricken character of postwar Italy could not be cited as further evidence of pacific future intentions. Italy has always been poor, even when aggressive. The fact that Italy was again a democracy did not automatically mean it was peaceful, unless democracy and

15

8

italy and the allies

pacifism are taken as synonymous. The reckless foreign policy of the Third French Republic before 1914 might cast doubt on the validity of such a conclusion. The belligerency of other democracies before and since might also be cited (the British attack on the Boers, the American attack on Spain in 1898, for example). The request for compulsory military service opened the door to the creation of a large reserve army that could be put into action on short notice. The 236,000 commissioned and noncommissioned officers asked for need only be the cadre of a far larger force. Germany, after 1918, had attempted the same thing. The requested absence of limitations on the Carabinieri could accomplish a similar result in case compulsory military service were not permitted. In war, the Carabinieri are a definite part of the army and could be expanded in peace time far beyond the requirements of internal order. On the other hand, the Italian argument that defense was impossible with a small force, unless it had replacements, was valid. The question was whether there would be time to train replacements after an attack had begun. In the past, the United States and Britain had always depended on time to accomplish such training, and therefore had never had compulsory service. Whether this concept was valid in the present and whether it was valid for Italy in its geographical position was questionable. The two sides of the problem, providing an adequate defense or keeping Italy weak, were in contradiction. One could be picked only at the expense of the other. The same dilemma applied to the antiaircraft question. Absence of limitation was asked on antiaircraft operations because of its purely defensive character. While the equipment might be solely defensive (portable antiaircraft equipment was not), the personnel certainly was not. Soldiers trained in antiaircraft defense also got general military training and could be shifted to other branches of the army on short notice. Without limitations placed on their numbers they could also

reparations, disarmament, colonies

ιs9

become a hidden source for a far larger army than would be permitted by the peace treaty. The Allies paid little attention to the Italian arguments. In addition to the boundary revisions which already stripped Italy of the natural mountain defenses, the French demanded the demilitarization of the Franco-Italian frontier. They even tried to have all the roads in the Alpine regions near the French frontier destroyed. 21 This gave the Yugoslavs the cue to demand the elimination of Italian defense fortifications on the new Yugoslav frontier which also lacked natural defenses. The British were then able to propose the elimination of coastal defenses for Sicily and Sardinia and the demilitarization of the smaller islands. The elimination of the coastal defenses of Sicily and Sardinia was the final result of what in the past may have been a far more drastic plan arising from the separatist movements on those islands. In 1943 some British navy men, such as Commander King-Hall, were arguing for the creation of a separate state composed of various Mediterranean islands to be tied to Britain by a special treaty. Such a situation would give Britain undisputed mastery of the Mediterranean. Whether this plan was ever adopted officially is not known at this time. The British may have been thinking of leaving the islands under the Crown of Savoy but with special privileges for Great Britain to insure effective control. After the Allies captured Sicily the separatist movement broke out in full force. The separatists were primarily financed by rich Sicilian landowners who feared that the Italian government would be captured by radicals at the end of the war and thought they could better protect their latifondi in an independent Sicily which they could control.22 Their leader, Finocchiaro Aprile, definitely gave the impression that the Allies, especially the English, were behind him.23 It was a favorite device of many groups to claim Allied support for anything desired.

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The official Anglo-American position was expressed by Colonel Poletti, the A M G Governor of Sicily, on February 8, 1944, when he said, "we have prepared Sicily for the resumption of her historic mission as an integral and important part of a free Italy." 24 But was there another, unofficial policy? Not for the United States, but perhaps for Britain. This writer has talked to men who swear that British agents encouraged the separatists. Others swear that they did not.25 In any case, by the autumn of 1944 the separatists were so voluble in claiming Allied support that it became necessary to take a stand. Both the American and British governments in October 1944 publicly disclaimed any support.26 From this time forward, although the separatist movement was to flourish for quite a while, Italian fears were allayed. But the reason for this suspicion of British motives was the knowledge of their determination to be absolute master in the Mediterranean. At the peace conference this was accomplished by demilitarizing the smaller islands, such as Pantelleria and Lampedusa, and eliminating the coastal fortifications of Sardinia and Sicily. The publication of the draft peace treaty demonstrated Italy's new military position. The army was limited to 185,000 men for all purposes including antiaircraft defense, while the Carabinieri were restricted to 65,000 men, thus resulting in a total ceiling of 250,000. Only 200 medium or heavy tanks would be permitted. All military training of personnel except the authorized troops was forbidden. The air force, including the naval air arm, was restricted to 200 fighter and reconnaissance planes and 150 noncombat planes; transport, air-sea rescue, training, and liaison craft. These totals included reserve aircraft. All planes would be unarmed except the fighter and reconnaissance planes. Bombers were prohibited. Air force personnel was limited to 25,000 effectives. No other persons were permitted to have military air training.

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The navy was cut away in large quantities. Italy was left with two old battleships, four cruisers, four fleet destroyers, sixteen torpedo boats, and twenty corvettes. The rest of the fleet was to be placed at the disposal of the Big Four. N o more battleships were to be built or acquired; aircraft carriers and submarines were also forbidden. Personnel was limited to 25,000 men. Naval training was forbidden to others. All permanent fortifications within twenty kilometers of the French or Yugoslav frontiers were to be destroyed. N o fortifications capable of handling weapons which could fire on French or Yugoslav territory or territorial waters were to be constructed even beyond the twenty kilometer limit. N o new military, naval, or air installations were to be constructed on the Apulian coast (opposite Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia). Italy was not to construct or experiment with guided missiles, guns with a range of over thirty kilometers, sea-mines of a noncontact type or manned torpedoes. Italian war industry which could not be converted for peace-time production and which was in excess of that necessary to support the new Italian armed forces was to be given as reparations to those nations claiming such payment. 27 The Italian government charged that the draft treaty made it impossible to defend Italy's land frontiers, its sea coast, its independence, and its fundamental rights as a sovereign nation. It pointed out that the navy had not originally surrendered, and the fleet would have been scuttled rather than turned over.28 But these observations had no effect on the peace conference. The final treaty included all the above restrictions plus a few more, such as a ban on experimentation and construction of atomic weapons. A n added clause permitted revision of the military articles by the victors or by the Security Council after Italy became a member of the United Nations. Denying an Italian request, no time limit was set within which revision would take place.29 After signature and ratification of the peace treaty, the

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United States and Great Britain returned their share of the fleet for scrap. It was necessary to scrap the returned vessels as the treaty not only set the maximum tonnage permitted but named the ships Italy was allowed to retain. The gesture was received with warm gratitude by the population. It was an easy gift to make as both Allied nations had excess naval units of their own which were being stored or junked. France, whose fleet had been partially destroyed, and Russia, which had never had a large fleet, were in a different situation. Nevertheless France later returned approximately one-third of its share. Greece renounced a few minor vessels but kept its one substantial acquisition, the modern cruiser, Eugenio di Savoia.30 Yugoslavia and Russia did not renounce their shares. There is no doubt, and De Gasperi pointed this out at the peace conference, that the treaty left Italy defenseless.31 Yet the conferees could do nothing else, for the whole concept of absolute defense figures is completely misleading. As the Italian Foreign Office itself pointed out, . . the criterion of relativity in respect to the forces of other bordering nations . . . is fundamental also from a strictly defence point of view." 32 In other words, in a multi-state world, a nation's security is dependent upon a balance of power, in which its strength or that of its friends is relative to the strength of potential aggressors. Since the peace treaty left Italy defenseless, its security would depend on the strength of its friends or division and balance among potentially belligerent neighbors. T o permit the establishment of an Italian armed force sufficiently strong to balance the power of its neighbors would immediately transform such a force from one capable of defensive action only to one capable of aggression. The peace conference, therefore, had no choice. If Italy was to be made incapable of aggression against its neighbors, it had to be made defenseless. The Italian government, however, gave notice, even before the draft peace treaty was produced, that it would consider all plans which left Italy defenseless as "entirely transitional."

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And it indicated the first device it expected to use for revision, the United Nations Charter. "According to articles 11 and 26 of the United Nation's charter, the armament position of each nation will have to be reviewed on the basis of this criterion of relativity as well as on the economic, geographical and strategic conditions of each nation." 33 It was a repetition of the struggles of Germany after W o r l d W a r I against unilateral disarmament. The Italian economic and political structure was so weak after the war that as late as 1951, after having received substantial aid from the United States for over five years, the armed forces were not up to the level permitted by the peace treaty.34 The inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, however, induced the Western Allies to attempt to relieve Italy of the treaty limitations. The Soviet Union refused to consider revision of the armaments clauses except at the price of Italy's withdrawal from N A T O . 3 5 The Italian government, with the encouragement of the Western Powers, then took the doubtful legal expedient of claiming that the Soviet refusal to vote for Italy's admission to the United Nations relieved that country of its obligations under the peace treaty. On February 8, 1952, it announced its intentions of rearming beyond the treaty limitations.36 Only substantial foreign aid, however, could translate this intention into reality. colonies The Italians made a distinction between pre-Fascist colonies and those acquired by Mussolini. The post-Fascist government made its first semi-official utterance on the colonial question on August 20, 1944. Sforza announced that Italy was ready to recognize Ethiopian and Albanian independence and give the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. Italy would renounce its pre-Fascist colonies to an international organization if all other colonial powers did likewise. Otherwise Italy was entitled to retain Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), Eritrea,

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and Somaliland. It was a safe offer, for Sforza was well aware that Winston Churchill was not His Majesty's Prime Minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire. In essence it was a claim for the return of the pre-Fascist colonies. Italy faced the formidable opposition of Great Britain. On January 8,1942, Anthony Eden had said that under no circumstances would the Senussi tribes of Cyrenaica be returned to Italian rule.38 On September 21, 1943, Churchill had told the House of Commons that the Italian Empire was "irretrievably lost." 39 All Italian territory in Africa was under British occupation except the Fezzan area of Tripolitania which the French ruled in a manner to indicate that it would not be returned.40 In his letter to Byrnes of August 22, 1945, De Gasperi stated the Italian case on the colonies. He advocated their return to Italy, preferably under direct Italian sovereignty, but at least in the form of trusteeships. He was ready to grant strategic bases to Britain in Cyrenaica and to rectify the Eritrean frontier to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea.41 His principal argument for the colonies, one that was to be repeated over and over again in the future, was that they were the only substantial outlet for Italy's surplus population. Italy is undoubtedly overpopulated in relation to its resources and level of economic development.42 After the end of the war a tremendous amount of effort was exerted by the Italian Foreign Office to make it possible for Italians to go abroad, either as contract labor for certain periods or as permanent emigrants. The returns have been disappointing and unemployment in Italy is around the two million mark.43 In presenting Italy's case to the Foreign Ministers' Deputies in 1946, in addition to the demographic argument, historical, sentimental, economic, and political reasons were advanced. It was pointed out that the pre-Fascist colonies had been acquired with the consent of the major powers. It was admitted that while Italy's colonial policies in the past had not been perfect, nevertheless much had been done to advance native wel-

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fare and standards.44 T o illustrate the accomplishments both photographic and written data were presented.45 The Foreign Office rhapsodized about the sentimental ties of Italians to the colonies. Then followed the financial argument: " T o divest Italy of her African territories would mean to deprive her of the legitimate returns of the money she has invested in the last fifty years and which she expects will soon start yielding some substantial profits." 46 Politically, Italy had helped to maintain the international equilibrium in the nineteenth century through acquiring the colonies; their retention by Italy in 1946 would help to preserve the international balance.47 Such were the Italian arguments for the retention of the pre-Fascist colonial empire. Except for the historical description of the consent of the European powers to its acquisition, the information presented was highly misleading. The biggest illusion was the expectation that Africa could solve the Italian demographic problem. In the seventy years of Italian ownership, emigration to the colonies had been a slow trickle; although encouraged by subsidies and propaganda campaigns it had never been substantial. The exact number of settlers in the colonies at the time of their capture by the Allies is unknown. The Fascist government never published any figures on this subject that could be accepted as valid and reliable. At the end of hostilities the British administration sent over 100,000 Italians back to Italy, 48 but a good portion of these were colonial officials, police, and Italians captured in Ethiopia. H o w many of the Italians returned to the homeland were real settlers it is impossible to say, but the number must be significantly below the above total. There were more Italian settlers in the French protectorate of Tunisia than there were in all the Italian colonies. The belief that the colonies could make any substantial contribution to the relief of the unemployment problem in Italy was indeed false. Financially they had been a drain upon the funds of the

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Italian government from the very beginning. "Investigation disclosed that every year Italy had been in control of the colonies she had incurred financial loss, notwithstanding the fact that her civilian employees were paid pitifully small salaries."49 The Italians themselves admitted the poverty of the colonies. "Those territories lacked mineral resources; their native populations, scarce and poor, offered no prospects of trade; the action of large investments was never present there through the establishment of huge capitalistic undertakings: nothing there ever was in those regions to attract workers in large numbers." 50 The lack of attraction for private investment, especially in Cyrenaica, meant that the financial burden of colonization fell on the Italian taxpayer. "The operations of colonization and the settlers themselves had, therefore to be financed almost exclusively with capital furnished by the State and by various public concerns." 51 The return on this investment of Italian public funds had been disappointing. In the opinion of the American Secretary of State, " T h e colonies had proved of no value to her except as a place for military training and, under the treaty we were considering, she would have no need for great areas for training troops." 52 The Italian government admitted the past unprofitableness of the colonies but argued that the huge sums of money already invested were expected to bear fruit in the not too distant future. No proof of this statement was furnished, however, and it appears to be more a pious wish than an economic expectation. The one section of the colonies most favorable for cultivation and which might be considered the most profitable was the Fezzan of Tripolitania for which France had staked out a claim. This small area could hardly balance the negative economic value of the rest. The purported sentimental attachment for the colonies was highly overplayed. In the northern and central sections of Italy the people cared little. What colonial pressure there was came from the overpopulated south and it was not based on senti-

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ment but on the mistaken hope that the colonies could relieve agricultural unemployment. The southern peasant hoped, by obtaining their return to Africa, at least to get rid of his relatives whom the British had shipped back to Italy. Any truly sentimental attraction the colonies held for the people lay not in their intrinsic worth but in their prestige value. Their possession placed Italy on a plane with the other European powers. In Parri's words, "The colonial questions are one of amour propre for a large part of the Italian people . . . but are not of . . . great importance." He defended holding the North African possessions, however, because Italy would always need an open door through the Mediterranean.53 The Foreign Ministers' Council did not pay much attention to the Italian arguments. The British, Russians, and Americans wanted the colonies taken away from Italy. Only the French supported Italian retention, except for the Fezzan; not because of the weight of the Italian argument, but because they objected to any solution which would result in the eventual independence of the Italian colonies. They feared repercussions on their own African territories.54 Since, under the Atlantic Charter, the powers were supposedly bound not to annex the territories themselves, they could only rule as trustees for a limited period of time. The French were unalterably opposed to this solution and therefore called for an Italian trusteeship of unlimited duration. The big fight among the powers came over the Russian request for a ten year trusteeship for Tripolitania. Byrnes reports Bevin's answer in the following words: "Britain, he went on, recognized the interest of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe and had therefore supported Russia's claims, and he expressed his surprise that Russia did not recognize a similar interest on the part of his country in the Mediterranean." The American alternative was a collective United Nations trusteeship, which the other powers opposed.55 The disagreement among the powers lasted from the autumn of 1945 to the spring of 1946.

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At another meeting in April 1946 the Russians finally gave up hope of getting a trusteeship and accepted the French viewpoint, supporting an Italian trusteeship.56 The American government also switched over to the French side but the British absolutely refused to accept such a solution. The United States then reverted to its original position in favor of a collective United Nations trusteeship.57 In addition to the claims of the Big Powers, there were Ethiopian claims for Somaliland and Eritrea, and Egyptian claims to Eritrea. The Arab League wanted the independence of Libya, or, as an alternative, an Egyptian or collective Arab League trusteeship for a limited time.58 The Allies were unable to agree on a solution. As a result the peace treaty took the colonies away from Italy but gave them to no other state. T h e y remained under military administration. The problem was placed in the lap of the United Nations General Assembly which struggled with it for several years. Finally a piecemeal solution was reached. Libya was made an independent state on January 1, 1952. Eritrea was given to Ethiopia with guarantees as to internal autonomy. And Somaliland, perhaps the poorest and most desolate territory of them all, was given to Italy in a ten-year trusteeship. The wisdom of the decisions can be questioned. It is doubtful that Libya is capable of playing the role of an independent state and in all likelihood it will remain under British leadership, more or less disguised. Whether the non-Amharic inhabitants of Eritrea will get along inside Ethiopia remains to be seen; nevertheless this appears the most reasonable of the three solutions. Certainly Somaliland provides no outlet for the Italian population and it is likely to remain a drain on the resources of a nation that can ill afford it. Perhaps a collective United Nations trusteeship was the best theoretical solution, but given the state of international tension it was politically impossible.

XIV

conclusions the peace treaty The disregard for the Italian viewpoint which the victors exhibited was based on two factors. The lesser was the enmity toward Italy, despite twenty months of co-belligerency, borne by most of the Allies except, perhaps, for the United States and some Latin American countries.1 The more important was that, "The negotiations, in fact, were only secondarily negotiations for a treaty of peace with Italy. They were really attempts to reach a modus vivendi between the Eastern and Western Powers." 2 In the process of reaching this modus vivendi, Italian interests were usually sacrificed. What concessions were made seem to have been granted only as part of this East-West struggle. Italy was officially neutral in this conflict for it could not afford to antagonize either side as long as the peace negotiations remained uncompleted. Unofficially, Italy was pro-Western and it was being sustained by the United States. Some Italians, not all from the extreme left, attacked this actual bias by claiming that Italy might have received better treatment had it remained really neutral.3 The failure of the West to support Italy more vigorously on the Trieste question weakened the country as a bastion of defense against the spread of Soviet influence.4 The peace treaty was a hard blow to the anti-Fascists. They were men who had staked their political futures on collaboration with the Allies. They had urged the Italian people to cooperate with the liberating forces to the limit. They had

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allies

thrown themselves into an all-out effort to win the anti-Nazi war. And now the people could only wonder "was it worth it?" When the treaty was finally presented to the Italian government there was some talk of a refusal to sign. The period of hesitation was short, however, for the United States informed the Italians that economic aid would be cut off if their signature were not forthcoming. The treaty was signed in Paris on February 10, 1947. That same day Carlo Sforza, finally Foreign Minister, circulated a message to the Allied Powers calling for a review of the treaty, thus making Italy the first official revisionist nation of World War II. 5 The American government frankly affirmed that the road to revision was open. Others expressed sympathy. The Soviet Union, alone of the Big Four, stated that the treaty was a good one and no revision was necessary.6 In the Constituent Assembly strong language was used. PreFascist Premier Nitti called it a "humiliating and odious diktat." Benedetto Croce fulminated against its iniquity.7 Many urged the Assembly not to ratify, with arguments persuasive in the defense of national honor.8 But the arguments in favor of ratification were persuasive in defense of reality. Not to ratify meant the continuance of the occupation. It meant direct outside intervention in internal affairs. More important, as Sforza pointed out, the British were using Italy's technical enemy status as an argument for excluding Italy from the Marshall Plan Conference of July 1947 in Paris. In Sforza's words, ". . . our ambassadors in London and Paris made me understand in unequivocal terms, that if there was no juridical interdependence, there was, nevertheless, a psychologicalpolitical interdependence between our ratification and our efficacious and fruitful participation at the conference." 9 De Gasperi argued that ratification would make Italy eligible for admission to the United Nations, where treaty revision would be possible in the future. 10 Sforza summed the case up when he said:

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T h e dilemma is this: either ratify to reacquire our sovereignty over our territory, to leave behind the armistice, to obtain the liberty to decide our affairs and put ourselves in condition to make our voice heard among the nations; or else do not ratify, hoping to obtain the same results b y another method. But those w h o are for the second solution should make precise what is, according to them, this method. I only see one and I do not like to mention it: to speculate on discords, on adventures, on international dangers. 1 1

On July 31, 1947, the Constituent Assembly authorized ratification. In granting its permission it stated, perhaps for the last time, the Italian attitude. T h e Constituent Assembly: expresses the sorrow and the protest of Italy because this is not the peace it deserved. . . . N o r does the treaty take into adequate account the insurgence of the people against the Fascist regime, responsible, together with the forces from abroad which sustained it, for the lamentable war; and the fight of the people at the side of the United Powers against Germany for the victory of the democracies. 12

british policy On April 1, 1944, following the advance of Russian troops into Rumania, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, handed Secretary of State Hull a statement promising that "the Soviet Union did not aim a t . . . changing Rumania's social regime." 1 3 In the following years the promise was honored in the breach and Rumania, along with other states of Eastern Europe, underwent a profound reorientation of its social structure with the help and at the instigation of the Soviet Union. 14 The failure of the Russian government to live up to its promise was in violation of the United Nations Declaration of January ι, 1942, to which the Soviet Union was a signatory. Included in this declaration was the principle enunciated in the Atlantic Charter that the peoples of occupied and liberated territories would have the right to choose any type of democratic government they wished. This was spelled out in greater

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detail by President Roosevelt in a message to the Italian people delivered on June 11, 1943. "I think it is fair to say that all of us — I think I can speak for all the United Nations — are agreed that, when the German domination of Italy is ended and the Fascist regime is thrown out, we can well assure the Italian people of their freedom to choose the non-Fascist, nonNazi kind of Government they wish to establish."15 This definition, if it meant anything, meant the Italians could choose either monarchy or republic; either capitalistic, socialistic, or communistic economic and political structures, or any mixture or combination of them. It meant that such a choice, to be a free one, would be exercised without foreign interference or influence. Thus, the corollary to the Russian pledge not to overturn the Rumanian social structure was obviously an Anglo-American pledge not to use influence to preserve the Italian social structure. It should be up to both Rumanians and Italians to determine whether to preserve, modify, or alter radically their institutions. Yet the British government, after the Allied troops landed on the Italian peninsula in September 1943, used all its influence and exercised all its power to preserve the monarchical institution and traditional property relationships. From the time in the late summer or early autumn of 1943 when King George of England sent a letter to Victor Emmanuel of Italy promising support for his shaky throne, to February 1946 when the referendum was suggested as the best way to settle the institutional question, the British government intervened in what were supposedly internal Italian issues. It supported the large landowners arrayed against agricultural and administrative reform.16 Allied Commission authorities opposed the decrees issued by the C L N cabinet in the autumn of 1944 making certain small changes in the sharecroppers' contracts to the advantage of the sharecroppers, and turning over unused land to farmers' cooperatives. Lieutenant Colonel Hartmann, Director of the Agricultural Subcommission of the Allied

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Commission, condemned the decrees in the following language: The change of the laws concerning the Mezzadria [sharecropping] is most inopportune at this delicate stage in the agricultural economy. The existing Mezzadria contracts, which some parties believe to be so necessary are based on an age old experience and up to now have proved to be the most efficient way to obtain satisfactory production results. Possibly the present form may not be the best, but to find something better a legion of experts and several years of study would be necessary.17 The taking over of uncultivated lands by the farmers cooperatives . . . leads to the total revolution of the concept of ownership. This law, also is more than ever "badly timed." On the other hand I refuse to believe that land owners would work against their own best interests to such an extent that they would not try to get the best possible results from their own land. This problem cannot be solved by hurried legislation, which obeys political influences or which serves the same ends. One must consider the fact that if big landowners would have necessary means they would cultivate their land to their own best interests and that of all the others. If the landowners lack water, means and capital the same conditions will be experienced by others. Economics have to be tackled by economic considerations, especially in Italy where agriculture, the fishing industry and forestry employ three-quarters of the available manpower.18 The cabinet insisted, however, and the Colonel's superiors refused to back him up. T h e decrees went into effect. Nevertheless, from the point of view of history and of political analysis, it is wrong to have expected that British, Russians, or Americans would be neutral in any social struggle taking place in important parts of the world. In the first place, the preservation of the social structure of a nation has been an object of foreign policy ever since the neighbors of France tried to restore the Ancien Régime after the French Revolution. Metternich made the principle of legitimacy and preservation of established social orders the basis of his foreign policy after 1815. Second, the Italian government made the institutional problem an international one when it sent emissaries

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abroad in August 1943 to obtain international guarantees for the throne of Savoy. Third, with Allied troops in Italy, with an Allied Control Commission exercising tremendous authority not only in A M G territory but in King's Italy, it was impossible for the Allies not to be involved in the issue. Finally, the distinction between foreign and domestic questions is artificial at best for the two are intertwined. It is wrong, then, to condemn Churchill for intervening in Italian affairs. It is appropriate to question, however, the wisdom of the interventionist policies he followed. His support for the King was based on fear of revolution in Italy, a fear that had paralyzed British foreign policy ever since 1935 when Mussolini attacked Ethiopia. In a dispatch to President Roosevelt on August 5, 1943, Churchill wrote: " T w e n t y years of Fascism has obliterated the middle class. There is nothing between the King, with the patriots who have rallied around him, who have complete control, and rampant Bolshevism." 19 Believing this, and believing that conservative monarchists such as Badoglio would more likely be pro-British, he supported, encouraged, and fought for them. Accepting for the moment Churchill's analysis of the consequences of Fascism, it is difficult to understand how an intelligent statesman could hope to build a political policy in the middle of the twentieth century based on the King and those around him. This landed and financial aristocracy was certainly far too small to give a basis for a democratic regime. If the middle class had been proletarianized it would seem that the only sensible policy would be to support those who could compete against the Communists for the allegiance of the enlarged working class. In Italy, after the liberation, this would have meant supporting the non-Communist Left, whether Socialist, Actionist, or the left-wing sections of Christian Democracy. But all these groups were against Churchill's policy on the monarchy, much more so than the Communists. It is doubtful, however, that Fascism had destroyed the

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Italian middle class. It is true that war, inflation, and depression hurt it terribly. But there are still millions of small clerks, businessmen, professional men, and peasant owners,

who,

while economically degraded, reject psychologically proletarian status and think of themselves as middle class. These form the conservative ranks of Christian Democracy and recently have been giving support to neo-Fascism. T h e y were once impressed b y the trappings of monarchy but the sense of legitimacy had been destroyed. Furthermore, Churchill was unable to comprehend the antiFascists' attitude towards Fascism, and consequently the monarch they associated with Fascism. T o Churchill, Fascism's only crime was the attack on Britain. Thus ended Mussolini's twenty-one years' dictatorship in Italy, during which he had raised the Italian people from the Bolshevism into which they were sinking in 1919 to a position in Europe such as Italy had never held before. A new impulse had been given to the national life. The Italian Empire in North Africa was built. Many important public works in Italy were completed. In 1935 the Duce had by his will-power overcome the League of Nations — "Fifty nations led by one" — and was able to complete his conquest of Abyssinia. His régime was far too costly for the Italian people to bear, but there is no doubt that it appealed during its period of success to very great numbers of Italians. He was, as I had addressed him at the time of the fall of France, "the Italian lawgiver." The alternative to his rule might well have been a Communist Italy, which would have brought perils and misfortunes of a different character both upon the Italian people and Europe. His fatal mistake was the declaration of war on France and Great Britain following Hitler's victories in June, 1940. Had he not done this, he might well have maintained Italy in a balancing position, courted and rewarded by both sides and deriving an unusual wealth and prosperity from the struggles of other countries. Even when the issue of the war became certain, Mussolini would have been welcomed by the Allies. He had much to give to shorten its course. He could have timed his moment to declare war on Hitler with art and care. Instead he took the wrong turning. He never understood the strength of Britain, nor the long-enduring qualities of Island resistance and sea-power. Thus he marched to ruin.

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His great roads will remain a monument to his personal power and long reign.20

Some of these statements are correct, some are not. T h e purpose here is not to argue with them, but to show the narrowness of Churchill's viewpoint. For the anti-Fascists had many more crimes to charge against Mussolini than the attack on Britain. T h e y had the castor oil and the clubs, the nauseous graft and corruption, the inhibition of literary and artistic development, the fundamental Fascist disregard for the welfare of the people, and, for the democrats among them (not all anti-Fascists were democrats) the suppression of those political and civil liberties which give life meaning and opportunity. Because Churchill would not see this in Italian Fascism, he could not comprehend the anti-Fascists' mentality, appreciate their feelings, and work with them politically. In addition to the promotion of monarchical conservatism there was the British intention of keeping Italy weak, of preventing it from becoming a threat ever again. Economically this goal was evidenced in the British objections in 1944 to the rehabilitation of Italy. T h e y were based not only on the pressure of current military requirements, the antagonism of British public opinion and the opposition of other states which had been victims of Fascist aggression, but also on the anticipated postwar European settlement. This policy had not changed after the joint Anglo-American declaration of September 1944, for as late as the summer of 1947 the British tried to exclude Italy from the European Recovery Program. Militarily Britain's plan resulted in stripping Italy of its navy, demilitarizing the small islands in the Mediterranean, and reducing the defenses of the coasts of Sardinia and Sicily. Politically it meant opposition to all Italian attempts to obtain status and to make a more substantial contribution to the war effort, even though the Quebec Document had promised the Italians relaxation of the Armistice terms in proportion to their contribution. T h e determination to keep Italy weak contradicted and ne-

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gated British efforts to help the monarchy and the conservatives. Badoglio, fighting for his political existence against the opposition of the anti-Fascist parties, had no victories to show the people. He could not produce the alliance all Italians wanted; he could not raise economic standards above that minimum of subsistence which was permitted; he was tied in knots by Allied supervision which made his government appear a phantom. He could not show the people any guarantees of boundaries or colonies in a future settlement. He was given nothing to work with, to develop public support for his position. Further, by supporting an unpopular king, the British made Victor Emmanuel dependent on them and kept Italy divided internally. Since a divided Italy was a weak Italy perhaps this benefited Britain in the short run. In the long run, however, weakness could only wreck the monarchy which, in order to play its role effectively, needed the support of the overwhelming majority of the people. The policy of keeping Italy politically and economically weak played into the hands of the radicals, who derived political advantage from the misery of the people. This would not be too dangerous to Britain's Mediterranean position as long as an "understanding" existed among the powers to recognize a predominant British interest there. When such an "understanding" broke down, however, the danger became apparent. american policy Neither the American government nor its representatives had an historical policy for the Mediterranean or a traditional national interest there to which they could refer.21 American interest in Italy was at best fitful — Roosevelt, occupied with weightier problems would let the British take the lead, except perhaps when pressures at home forced him to intervene. T h e President and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed in their early discussions concerning Italy that, the Mediterranean being in general

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a British theater of operations, Britain should have the major degree of control in Italy This applied to the command of the military operations there and also to the conduct of the Allied Control Commission and Allied Military Government. The British occupied most of the key posts in the military command and in civil affairs. 22

Although American attitudes were less hostile to the Italian people and more antagonistic towards Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio, such attitudes found no expression in policy throughout 1943 and the first part of 1944. Underestimating the strength of anti-Fascism and concerned primarily with military security, the American government at the beginning adopted a policy of suppressing political activity as the answer to a problem it was unprepared to handle. Once Allied troops were inside the peninsula, after the negotiations with Badoglio had failed to reap any substantial military results, President Roosevelt encouraged anti-Fascist participation in the Italian government. The subordination to British policy did not mean a blank check to Churchill, and the period from September 1943 to June 1944 was marked by intermittent disagreement. On the issue of Victor Emmanuel the United States supported the anti-Fascist opposition. It was ready to grant Allied status to Italy, once anti-Fascists had been brought into the cabinet. It encouraged the maximum use of Italian forces to permit Italy to obtain the benefits promised in the Quebec Document. It attempted to change the legal status of the cooperating prisoners. But it was not sufficiently concerned to push its position against British objections. The summer of 1944 appears to mark the turning point in the American attitude. The victory of Bonomi over Badoglio in June of that year is the first time that Roosevelt prevailed over Churchill on an issue of Italian politics. Throughout the summer of 1944 American pressure in favor of a more decent Italian economic standard persisted, to culminate in the victory of September 26, 1944, the declaration on the rehabilitation of Italy. Although the immediate results of the declaration

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were pyrrhic, and although the manner and timing of the announcement indicates that domestic American politics were an influential factor in stimulating American pressure, nevertheless the declaration carried portentous omens for the future. It was evidence that American commitments were no longer temporary and based on military considerations but long-run, with objectives extending into the postwar period. T h e victory was only partial, for in spite of American support, all Italian attempts to obtain some political status failed, indicating the continuing importance of British attitudes. Although the American government supported the rule of the C L N in Italy, a rule of groups from conservative rightists to radical leftists, it abandoned its hands-off attitude on questions of the ultimate definition of the Italian social structure. From the point of view of the Allied Control Commission and Allied Force Headquarters, a directive to rehabilitate Italy could only mean rehabilitating her in a form favorable to the interests of the Western Democracies. . . . For a moment, Italy was occupied; but, since permanent occupation was out of the question, it was necessary to anticipate and guard against the vacuum that would appear when Anglo-American force was withdrawn. The obvious practical solution was to strengthen Italy so that no vacuum would form. This solution seemed more and more called for as Yugoslavia frankly proclaimed her ties with the Soviet Union. . . . Against such a background an implicit objective was shaped for Allied policy. Detailed problems of the reconstruction of Italy began to fall into place. A revived Italy would have to be established in the stream of world trade, would have to be assisted to rebuild an adequate industrial potential, and could not be subjected to economically restricting reparations. A revived Italy would have to have adequate power resources to defend her territorial integrity against pressure of her immediate neighbors.23 In economic matters, rehabilitating Italy in a manner favorable to the United States meant influencing Italy to adopt financial practices and economic forms looked upon with approval in America. In the winter of 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 the Italian gov-

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ernment sent an economic mission to the United States headed by Signors Quintieri and Mattioli. The mission returned and presented to the Italian government the views of the United States on Italian economic policy. The American government, the mission reported, was ready to aid in the rehabilitation of agriculture and industry. It hoped that Italy would rebuild its economy according to the type of production best suited to Italy's resources and skills (no autarchy). It hoped that Italy's policy would be one of private enterprise, with as much freedom of international trade as possible and the elimination of discriminatory practices, tariffs, and other barriers to international trade.24 The American recommendations were not presented in imperative form; the United States "hoped," not demanded. Yet, given the Italian dependence on America for the means of survival, such hopes undoubtedly carried weight. There was no indication that Italy would be cut off if the recommended program were not followed, just as at a later date Britain was not cut off because the Labor government nationalized certain industries. Nevertheless the influence was present and it could be exercised more effectively on Italy than on Britain. In January 1946 Ugo La Malfa, the Minister of Foreign Commerce, announced the economic policy of the Italian government. Autarchy, he said, was finished. Italy looked forward to a system of free international trade with private business doing the trading and taking the normal economic risks. This was the ultimate goal; temporarily, however, exchange and import controls would be necessary to conserve foreign exchange and channel imports into those fields most necessary to sustain the population and the economy. 25 Four months later Treasury Minister Epicarmio Corbino told a Liberal party Congress: " W e need the United States. . . . The United States has a market economy and the structure of a free state. Is it conceivable that we can ask the United States for aid . . . if we want to actuate an economy and policy diametrically the opposite of the American?" 28

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In internal politics, rehabilitating Italy in a manner favorable to the United States meant throwing American influence on the side of those parties with a pro-Western orientation. Although supporting the two principles of non-intervention in internal political affairs, and government by the C L N until elections gave an indication of the people's will, the United States gradually swung its support to the monarchy. It never was as violently pro-monarchist as Churchill but it recommended technical electoral regulations for the institutional decision that would give the monarchy its best chance of winning. Gradually, also, it swung its weight behind the Christian Democratic party. That the United States would support the Christian Democrats was natural. Strong political pressures at home urged such a course. The other two mass parties, the Communist and Socialist, were oriented toward Moscow, for Pietro Nenni's pro-Communist policy had the sanction of a substantial majority of the Socialists. It meant, however, the abandonment of the lay, reformist, and center parties which were also pro-Western. Similarly, the British had twice vetoed the appointment of the strongly pro-Western Carlo Sforza as Foreign Minister. The British, especially, did not recognize their own friends. The Action party left the cabinet in December 1944 partly because of British intervention against Count Sforza and against C L N policy. The Socialists pulled out under pressure of pro-Westerners such as Giuseppe Saragat and Ignazio Silone. Support for the monarchy antagonized many individuals and groups who, on all other issues, found their interests linked with those of the West. In external political matters, the concessions the United States made to the other Allies on the peace treaty — the Yugoslav and French boundaries, demilitarization of frontiers, and reparations — served to weaken the Italian government, an American friend on the periphery of the Mediterranean.27 The United States was to a great extent alone in the task of bolstering Italy. It had little support from Britain and, at an

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early stage, from France, both determined to improve their own positions by keeping Italy weak. France, after it was too late, regretted its earlier attitude. The British were slower to change.28 Given the Russian position on the major problems of the treaty a loss in Russian and Communist influence was to be expected; yet this decline was not experienced. The Italians were more bitter at the West for letting them down than at Russia for forcing the West to concede. Italian Communists were able to demonstrate how Russia fought for its friends. They indicated that with the proper orientation of Italian policy the Soviet Union would fight as vigorously for Italy. The peace treaty did nothing to improve the prestige of the United States in Italy. America, determined to strengthen the Italian government and to promote an economically viable Italy, thereby keeping it a bulwark against pressure from the East, would do what it could to mitigate the harshness of the treaty by abandoning claims to Italian property and financial reimbursement, returning naval vessels for scrap, and granting billions of dollars for reconstruction. It could encourage the possibility of treaty revision by the United Nations. Aside from the monetary grants, however, the other mitigations were limited in value (although the return of the warships evoked a sentimental response) and did little to improve Italy's position in the long run. At the same time it has supported a government that has shown little capacity to achieve the goals that are the object of the American grants. Support for Christian Democratic governments may be defended on grounds of lack of choice. It may also be defended with the argument that the Catholic Church is the principal institution in Italy capable of influencing the people. Consequently, if the United States hopes to exercise influence in Italy it must work with the political machinery related to the Church. This position at least has the merit of being more correct than that held by the British, who mistakenly believed the monarchy to be the dominant institution around which the

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loyalties of the people would focus. Nevertheless, the influence of political CathoHcism can be overrated. Italy has a strong anticlerical tradition. The Italian laity live in the ubiquitous Catholic medium of the country but resist the dogmatic pressure of the Church. " [They] will maintain indefinitely their saints and sanctuaries, their Catholic habits and instincts, even without faith and devotion. . . . A widespread 'Catholic atheism' is not felt to be paradoxical, because the Italians cannot help giving a soul even to the Nothing." 29 There is some evidence that this anticlericalism has turned a number of Italians towards the Communists or Left Socialists as a means of resisting what they regard as growing clerical pressures.30 The association of the United States with the governments of the last nine years, has, consequently, pushed such Italians into an anti-American attitude. Whether, in the long run, a successful American policy for Italy can be promoted through the medium of political Catholicism is still an open question. soviet policy

Soviet policy on the major problem of the Italian social structure can be classified as moderate. If the Soviet position can be demonstrated by the actions of the Italian Communist party, no revolutionary threat to Italian society was made.31 The Italian Communists played the most conservative game of all the left-wing parties up to 1947. The Actionists and Socialists were consistently less willing to tolerate the compromises accepted by the Communists on the grounds of wartime unity. Those two parties were much more outspoken in their attacks upon the monarchical institution and upon established property rights. This development of Soviet policy may be explained by the desire of the Russian government not to antagonize its British and American allies during wartime. It also may be explained as a policy of maintaining in power weak, ineffective, and unprogressive groups to improve the prospects of a later successful Communist seizure of power. Communist de-

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mands for agrarian and industrial reform were mainly verbal; efforts made by others to effect some reforms were not vigorously supported. The Communists helped the Christian Democrats undermine the Parri government, the only one in postwar Italy really serious about social progress. The Soviet Union may therefore accept the dubious distinction of wrecking whatever slight prospects there were of progressive liberalism or democratic socialism in Italy. After 1947 when the Communists were excluded from the cabinet, and Italy became a participant in the Marshall Plan program, the party took a more radical line. Political strikes were called to block economic aid and to neutralize the value of Italy's participation in the Western political and defense system. Even at the peak of the "cold war," however, the Communists never made an attempt at direct action to come to power, and the operations of party "activists" were more of a testing of the organization than a showdown or challenge to the government. That has yet to come. Since 1953, following the latest Soviet line, Italian Communists have emphasized "popular front" tactics and cooperation with other organizations having mass support. In the labor-union field the Communist dominated confederation has been working to end competition with Christian Democrat and Socialist labor groups and to restore cooperation of the working class.32 The Soviet Union's attitude toward Italian national interests was defined by a strict conception of promoting its own position. In this sense it can be considered neither pro- nor anti-Italian. As Yugoslav demands for Venezia Giulia were put forth and Russia's own colonial, economic, and military aims were clarified, it became necessary that Italy's position as a defeated enemy be maintained. As a consequence, the Soviets opposed Italy's request in 1945 for Allied status and its later requests for admission to the United Nations Organization. At the peace conference Russia was Italy's worst enemy. The Italian Communists were able to offset this by emphasizing the

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territorial concessions to France, the inflation in Italy supposedly caused by AM lire, the British position on the colonies, and what they called American economic imperialism.33 By supporting decisions which maintained conflicts between Italy and Yugoslavia, Italy and Austria, and Italy and France, the Soviet Union could expect to make unification or even unity of policy in Western Europe more difficult to achieve. italian policy

The misfortune of the Italian people was to have at the positions of leadership at a time when it was necessary to take great risks, two men who were indecisive, vacillating, and fearful, Victor Emmanuel III and Marshal Pietro Badoglio. The King took long months to make up his mind and seemed to have only two fixed ideas — preserve the monarchy and delay the entry of the anti-Fascist parties into the government. Marshal Badoglio had no fixed political or military concepts. He thought the King should abdicate but would do nothing about it. He wanted the anti-Fascist leaders in the government with him but bowed to the refusal of the King to countenance such a suggestion. He had no political experience and depended on Victor Emmanuel for leadership in this field. But the King, far from assuming such a role, sat and listened, hardly ever expressing his own opinion. In military affairs the Marshal was swayed by subordinates, some, such as Castellano urging him to take risks, others, such as Carboni and Roatta urging caution. Under the influence of the latter group Badoglio attempted to call off the Armistice, and thereby jeopardized Italy's future. Only Eisenhower's threat to destroy his government forced him to announce the Armistice on the evening of September 8, 1943. The weak position of the King among his own people was a serious handicap to Italian policy. When Victor Emmanuel sent emissaries to Lisbon to seek support for his throne he was playing into the hands of the Allies who could extort any con-

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cession from him by threatening to break his government and suspend his powers. A king secure in the affections of his people could afford to see his powers suspended, certain that his people would be behind him and welcome him once the war were over. As this was not the case, the King's government, dependent on outside support, was unable to protect the interests of Italy effectively. There were three principal objectives of Italian foreign policy which were evident even before the surrender of Italy and remained constant to the end of the war. When Castellano arrived in Lisbon in August 1943 he wanted to reverse alliances, place Italian forces at the side of the Allies, and protect the sovereignty of the Italian government. From that time forward, every ministry from Badoglio's to Parri's tried to obtain Allied status, make a maximum contribution to the war effort, and resume its proper governing functions. The first two aims were directed at the broader one of putting Italy in the most favorable position possible at the coming peace conference; the third was to gain the respect of and authority over the Italian people. All parties, conservative and radical, were agreed on the fundamental aims of the government in connection with the peace settlement; preservation of as much national and colonial territory as possible, reduction of the economic payments and retention of a minimum military force to protect Italy's territorial integrity. 34 A fourth major policy of all Italian cabinets, supported by every party, was to obtain as much relief and rehabilitation as the Allies could furnish. 35 The disagreements in policy, therefore, were disagreements over the social structure in Italy, signified by the struggle over the institutional question but actually larger than just the issue of monarchy versus republic. The Italian cabinets followed one policy in their attempts to advance and promote Italy's interests, the policy of maximum cooperation with and loyalty to the Allies. Admiral Ellery Stone, the last Chief of the Allied Commission said: "From the

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beginning, that is, immediately after the signature of the A r mistice, the Allies have received the full collaboration of all the Italian cabinets which followed in the next four years. This is valid for the governments presided over by Badoglio, by Bonomi, by Parri, and b y De Gasperi. Every one of these chiefs of government gave me the maximum collaboration possible." 36 T h e recompense for this collaboration was a harsh peace. This immediately raises the question of the correctness of the tactics followed. Should the Italian cabinets, instead of offering maximum collaboration, have pursued the obstreperous techniques of De Gaulle? W e r e they in a position to use such tactics? W o u l d they have received a better settlement? T h e answers can only be in the negative. Italy was a surrendered enemy. Its frontiers, its territory, its future would be determined by Allies who must not be antagonized. France was not in this position. Its borders and possessions were safe from the Allies, at least. Should the Italian anti-Fascist politicians have refused to participate in the government unless they received some guarantees for the future? T h e y were risking their political reputations by throwing themselves wholeheartedly into the war on the Allied side with no assurances that Italy would derive any benefit, other than encouraging speeches from greater and lesser Allied authorities. In April 1944 the Socialist party, especially, had urged that political concessions be granted when the C L N parties entered the cabinet. This was not only a Socialist policy, it was one which all parties and nonparty groups alike could support. But the new cabinet asked no concessions at that time. In June 1944, after the liberation of Rome, the C L N took over the government completely. It accepted the Armistice terms signed by Badoglio and remained in office when Bonomi's attempts at revision failed to produce results. Should the anti-Fascist parties have abandoned the government at this time and gone into opposition? This would have

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forced the Allies to govern all Italy directly through the instrument of A M G or to create another cabinet of technicians. Both alternatives had been found unsatisfactory during the previous year, and this dissatisfaction had been a prime cause for the recommendations of Allied officials in Italy that the proposals of the anti-Fascist Executive Junta be accepted. It is doubtful, however, that the Allies would have paid such a price. Britain, certainly, was opposed to granting any guarantees on the postwar settlement that could have satisfied the Italians. It had refused to make such concessions to Badoglio at a time when they would have strengthened the King's position immensely. American policy was to delay all commitments on territorial problems until after the end of hostilities, as a matter of general principle.37 Under these circumstances the parties would have gained nothing for Italy by boycotting power. Badoglio or others would have been glad to take over under Allied sponsorship and together they somehow would have muddled through. If this solution had delayed military operations, the consequences would not have been disastrous, for the primary purpose of the Italian theater was to draw German troops away from other fronts. That anti-Fascism would have derived a future benefit by following a policy of patriotic opposition is most unlikely. The Republican party remained outside the government until June 1946, because it would not participate in a cabinet under the monarchy. It was in a position to disclaim any responsibility for what happened to Italy during the war and for the peace treaty. This opposition standpoint did not benefit it to any degree and it remains a minor party today. The parties which participated in the governments during the war and suffered the political consequences of a hard peace are the major parties today. To have done otherwise would have been of no advantage either to Italy or to the parties themselves. If the anti-Fascists had remained solidly together in the spring of 1944, however, very possibly they could have ob-

conclusions tained a better provisional solution of the institutional problem than the Lieutenancy of Humbert. The proposal of the Executive Junta for a civilian collegiate Lieutenancy under Humbert as King was approved by the Allied officials on the spot and in Washington. Only London opposed it. If the parties had remained firm, once Rome was won they would have had the vigorous support of the Central C L N which later forced Churchill, with Roosevelt's help, to back down on Badoglio and the pledge of allegiance. Instead the men of the south permitted Togliatti, using the Italian Communist party as an instrument of Soviet policy, to split them wide open and to force them to accept a solution which had great risks for the future. Croce and Sforza must accept the responsibility for this, for they were the important leaders in Naples. They failed to make the best use of their limited but real strength, which was the need, recognized by the Civil Affairs officials in southern Italy, for anti-Fascist participation in the government. The peace treaty punishes Italy for the crimes committed by Fascism. The Allies refused to show substantial appreciation for the contribution to the war effort the Italian people made after September 1943. Yet from the beginning of co-belligerency to the day the treaty was ratified, Italians repeatedly insisted that the Allies must acknowledge a distinction between the Fascist regime and the people. On October 19, 1943, the Neapolitan C L N saluted "the heads of the United Nations who, recognizing Italy as a co-belligerent, solemnly discriminate between the country and the regime that suffocated for more than twenty years its liberty and its life; and by restoring arms to the Italian people so they may participate in the good war, offer Italy the definitive opportunity to redeem itself from the consequences of the unjust alliance concluded to its damage by Fascism against the will of the nation." 38 On July 31, 1947, the Constituent Assembly in authorizing ratification of the peace treaty proclaimed "the sorrow and the protest of Italy because this is not the peace it merited.... Nor does the

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treaty take into adequate account the fact that the Italian people rose against the Fascist regime responsible, together with the forces from abroad which sustained it, for the lamentable war, and fought at the side of the United Powers against Germany for the victory of the democracies." 39 Benedetto Croce expressed the feelings of Italian anti-Fascists in a speech delivered on September 21, 1944. T h e hidden but substantial point of any relation of Italy to presentday international life, the point that non-Italians do not appear to see and that many of us do not dare to formulate clearly, is that Italy, formally defeated according to the laws of w a r and peace, does not feel defeated and does not adapt itself to being considered among the defeated peoples, but affirms its right to stand among the victors. . . . This atrocious war that n o w approaches its end has not been a w a r between nations, but intrinsically a civil war, open or hidden in the bosom of all the nations of Europe. . . . 4 0

Italian anti-Fascism, on the Allied side in the civil war, claimed recognition of its ideological position. The Allies seem to have been sympathetic at first to the effort to distinguish between regime and people. President Roosevelt recognized the distinction in a statement delivered on June 11, 1943: "The responsible acts of which the United Nations complained were not committed by the Italian people. . . . They were acts of Premier Mussolini's personal Fascist regime, which did not actually represent the Italian people." 41 Prime Minister Churchill declared early in the war: "One man and one man alone . . . against the Crown and the Royal Family of Italy, against the Pope and all the authority of the Vatican and of the Roman Catholic Church, against the wishes of the Italian people . . . has arrayed the trustees and inheritors of ancient Rome upon the side of the ferocious pagan barbarians." 42 The Soviet Union, the first state to offer Italy full diplomatic recognition, promulgating a specific denial of affinity between the ruling classes and the people in any but

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a proletarian state, should be the last to assert such a connection in the case of Italy. The Italian Communist party, certainly, proclaimed the distinction. The United States in a general way continued to recognize the divergence maintained by President Roosevelt. Churchill was not consistent with his original statement. He himself on May 24, 1944, stated that "as this war has progressed it has become less ideological in its character. . . . " 4 3 In a farewell address to the Italian people in August 1944 upon leaving Italian soil Churchill proclaimed: "when a nation has allowed itself to fall into a tyrannical regime it cannot be absolved from the faults due to the guilt of that regime, and, naturally, we cannot forget the circumstances of Mussolini's attack on France and Great Britain when we were at our weakest and people thought Great Britain would sink forever." 44 The Soviet Union also denied the Marxist distinction between the peoples and their rulers in a nonsocialist society. At a plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference on July 31, 1946, Foreign Minister Molotov declared: "It should be clear to us that the countries which launched the attack and fought in alliance with Germany should bear responsibility for the crimes of their ruling circles." 45 Why this consistency on the part of the United States and inconsistency on the parts of Great Britain and the Soviet Union? Was it the bitterness engendered by the war against Italian troops in the North African desert and the Russian steppes? But the war was in progress when Churchill proclaimed, "one man and one man alone. . . . " Bitterness and anger alone are insufficient explanations. The major reason seems to be the requirements of the power struggle. In April 1944, when the American government urged approval of Italy's request for admission to the grand alliance of the United Nations, the British government argued: "The greater the concessions now made . . . the more difficult it would be to impose such sanctions as the Allies might wish when all

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Italy had been freed, and at the end of the war." 40 The necessity for imposing sanctions at the end of the war led to the denial of the distinction between the people and the Fascist regime, to the limitation of the Italian war contribution, to the continued refusal to grant status. The purpose of imposing sanctions was to protect and improve the power positions of the victors. France was to demand access to the Po Valley and destruction of roads on the Italian side of the new boundaries. Russia, supporting Yugoslavia, was to demand all of Venezia Giulia for its friend and a North African colony for itself. Britain was to insist on the destruction of the Italian fleet, demilitarization of the islands, and elimination of Italian control over the colonies. Since Fascism had not threatened a vital interest of the United States, America found it easier to be generous. For Great Britain, the defeat of Italy was a different category of victory than for the United States. T o the former, it was a period put to fifteen years of political confusion and strategic anxieties; it was the elimination of a local rival who had come dangerously close to making good his boasts. It was the essential first and major step in the process of restoring a Mediterranean position that had seriously deteriorated. . . . T o the United States, the defeat of Italy was primarily a stage in the war against Germany. It was a defeat administered more in sorrow than in anger. It was vaguely felt that Italy had been liberated and that, generally speaking, she was to be encouraged to return to her pre-Fascist traditions. 47

The Italian people did more than proclaim the dichotomy between Italy and Fascism. They fought and worked to give more than verbal significance to their claim. Their failure was not due to Allied ignorance of their efforts, but to the necessities of preserving and improving power positions among the victors. Concessions granted were not in reluctant recognition of Italian contributions but because larger rivalries made Italian friendship worth cultivating. As these rivalries had not

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yet reached their peak, the concessions granted were not as generous as those later granted to Japan and Germany. The Italian anti-Fascists may be legitimately criticized for having swallowed the encouraging speeches put out by Allied leaders. As inheritors of a long tradition of realistic politics they could have known the power objectives of peace settlements. It is unlikely that a different course of action was available to them, but such knowledge would have spared some disappointments and disillusion. perils to the new democracy Italian policy in the postwar world is affected by serious domestic difficulties. Since 1946 the Christian Democrats have dominated the political scene. The party is comprehensive, obtaining most of its popular support from the lower middle classes, but including adherents ranging from the extreme right to the far left. It proclaims a broad social program which has barely been activated, for big business and the large landowners, recognizing the weakness and inability of the Liberals to protect their interests have scurried into the ranks of the Christian Democrats.48 This conservative infiltration was especially pronounced after the elections of April 1948. "In Italy evidence of the size and importance of the conservative and authoritarian wing of the Christian Democrats is even more striking. In the spring elections of 1948 the great Christian Democratic victory was largely won at the cost of the conservative, monarchist, and neo-fascist parties. . . . In his election victory address De Gasperi found it necessary to insist, 'We are not reactionaries. Every reform we promised will be made.' " 4 9 Most of the reforms are still awaited. The reason is that De Gasperi could keep his party united only by the postponement of all organic reforms and a policy of drift and improvisation. He would make a concession, grant a reform where the pressure was greatest, and then delay and reduce the practical

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allies

50

application of it. This can be illustrated by the land reform act of 1950, 51 put on the law books under the pressure of Communist-stimulated peasant riots and American urging. It is the one significant social advance in postwar Italy and is being applied mainly, though not exclusively, in the south and the islands. Coupled with the distribution of land to the peasants is a ten-year program of public works, roads, reservoirs, aqueducts, land reclamation, and reforestation, financed by the Southern Italy Fund (Cassa del Mezzogiorno). The public works program is now going forward. The land reform, however, was not extensive enough to satisfy the landless peasants. Because of limitations and dodges, only one-third to one-half of the land originally scheduled for redistribution was actually included in the program. 52 A t the same time the reform alienated many of the landowners who had supported the Christian Democrats.53 The administrative elections in southern Italy in the spring of 1952 and the national elections of June 1953 were a test of the land reform project in that area, and the Christian Democrats lost heavily. 54 The failure of the financial and economic purge has left in control the groups which dominated the Italian economy under Fascism.55 These groups have never been too interested in promoting higher living standards for the people, standards which would provide the economic basis for modern democracy. Since World War II, Italy has made considerable progress in increasing production and to a lesser extent in raising standards of living. Much of this, however, is a product of government programs and foreign aid. In recent years the rate of increase has begun to drop and energetic plans are now envisaged by the Italian government to offset this.56 In spite of these programs the average level of consumption has remained appallingly low. The population presses against the country's resources. Italy has the highest rate of unemployment in Europe and one of the highest in the world. Approximately two million, ten per cent, of the working population

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are unemployed and an additional two million, mainly in the south are only partially employed.57 The Italian business community showed little interest in the past in following long run investment and economic policies that would raise overall living standards. T h e low level of private long-term investment is not solely the result of postwar political and economic uncertainties. There is good reason to believe that the private sector of the Italian economy is not geared for expansion. For several decades at least, the Italian industrial system has been characterized by a greater interest in monopolistic restriction to assure the long-term stability of its earnings from the domestic market than in a competitive quest for maximum profits. The power held by the trade associations throttles competition and hinders the use of technological advance for price reduction and market expansion. The expansion of capacity under Fascism was effected largely by direct government investment. Cartel agreements, tariff protection, and government favors were the characteristic ways to business success under Fascism; large, new, privately-financed undertakings were notable for their absence.58

In the course of their operations the industrialists have often placed more obstacles in the path of the democratic labor unions than in the way of the Communist-dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor, and, in fact, have cooperated with the Communist labor movement at the expense of competing labor groups.59 A n explanation might be that the extreme left has actually done little or nothing to improve conditions. Verbally, it stands for the most radical changes to be accomplished in some indefinite future; actually it reinforces the uneconomic status quo, the inefficient industries, the outmoded methods.60 Parallel to the failure of the financial purge was the failure of the administrative purge. The decrees of 1923 are still the basis of the Italian administrative system. The bureaucracy is composed to a great extent of the men who made their careers under Fascism.61 As Professor Max Ascoli has indicated, the bulk of these officials were half-Fascists whose loyalties to

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the regime were far from thoroughgoing.62 In the time of Fascism's crisis they gave no support to the Duce. Their backing of the Republic, however, and the extent of their loyalties to its institutions may also be questioned. One of the serious weaknesses of the Weimar Republic was the bureaucracy inherited from the Hohenzollern empire. When German democracy was in danger in the early 1930's it found little support from its civil servants. If Italian democracy faces a crisis it may also be abandoned by its public servants. This same failure involves those whose position enables them to influence public opinion. The proprietors of the large newspapers under Fascism retain ownership of their journals, the writers of the overthrown regime have resumed their places. The professors of Fascism, including those who signed the anti-semitic racial manifesto of 1938 retain their chairs as well as high posts in the universities.63 Another danger is the renewal of irredentism. The decision on the Yugoslav border revived the familiar slogan Italia irredenta. In addition to the international consequences, it provides the raw material for nationalist and reactionary movements inside Italy to fan peoples' emotions and come to power by exploiting the injustice perpetrated by other states, instead of wrestling with Italy's pressing social and economic problems. Neo-Fascism already affirms that Italy's ruin comes from having lost the war because of the sabotage of the antiFascists.64 The rise of neo-Fascism was most strikingly illustrated in the national elections of June 1953. The results revealed a serious decline in Christian Democratic strength, a small increase in left-wing (Communist and Left Socialist) power, and a considerable increase in extreme right-wing (Monarchist and Italian Social Movement) strength.65 In this last grouping lies the threat of neo-Fascism. Undoubtedly, the neo-Fascists are not yet as strong in the north as in the south. On the other hand, Communists are stronger in northern and central

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Italy although growing in the south. These two groups are clearly antidemocratic in their aims. It would be wrong to consider Christian Democracy in Italy as a wholly democratic party. It is composed of many factions and groups. In the center-left and left-wing factions are found the representatives of the Catholic trade union movement and the believers in the Social Christian doctrines of Pope Leo XIII. 66 If these forces were really dominant in the party it could be characterized as a democratic one. N u merically they are important; they hold key posts on the party's executive committee, but they are not in control in the country. Within the party it is the traditionalists, the conservators of the old social structure who in the last analysis prevail.67 T o cite an example: De Gasperi and the leadership of the party gave a substantially monarchist tone to the campaign prior to the referendum of 1946, in spite of the fact that 73 per cent of the party card holders were for a republic. T h e power of the traditionalists stems from the fact that the great masses of Christian Democratic voters, as distinguished from the party card holders, are found in the apolitical peasantry and status-conscious petite bourgeoisie, fearful of becoming déclassé. Evidence of the development of clericalism can be found in the increasing intervention of the clergy in administration and in the beginnings of censorship. Minor Christian Democratic officials tend towards single-party rule. In the field of education, the "intrusion of Christian Democratic appointees has brought a gradual change from a spirit of free inquiry to a mentality of narrow and routine loyalty to party and Church." 68 This is not an accidental or fortuitous development, but rather the product of fundamental doctrine, expressed in a chirograph of May 30, 1929, sent by Pope Pius XI to Cardinal Gasparri: "in a Catholic state, freedom of conscience and of discussion must be understood and practiced according to Catholic doctrine and law. B y logical necessity it

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must be understood that the full and perfect right to educate is not that of the state but of the Church." 89 The rather weak devotion to democratic principles is exemplified by the failure of the Christian Democratic governments to implement the new constitution which came into effect in January 1948. This has been especially true of the civil rights clauses including the right of freedom of religion. The efforts of protestant denominations to carry on missionary and propaganda work under Article 19 have been hampered by the police when not actually suppressed.70 In other cases, institutions provided by the constitution, such as the constitutional court, have only now (April 1956) been established. This situation has led students of the problem to conclude: T h e Italian Constitution is essentially a liberal Constitution. T h e D e Gasperi government is essentially Roman Catholic in political orientation. It can understand and actively support such welfare measures as a revolutionary land reform, an overhauling of the tax structure, and large public works programs . . . but it has little feeling for liberalism. T h e present government, therefore, is likely in time to implement the institutional changes planned in the Constitution, but it is less likely to implement the civil liberties provisions. O n l y if and when the dormant liberal spirit arises again in Italy, are these provisions apt to become really effective. 7 1

The decline in Christian Democratic strength in recent years led to an attempt to hold on to power by juggling the election laws. In 1953, the bonus law was introduced to grant the coalition which won fifty per cent plus one vote in the country, sixty-four per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.72 It was an attempt to convert a feeble majority in the country into a solid one in the Chamber. The arguments for parliamentary stability used in its defense were similar to the ones advanced by the Fascists in 192 3,73 when the Acerbo Law, giving two-thirds of the seats to the party gaining one-fourth of the votes, set the stage for the legal assumption of total power by Mussolini. The maneuver failed for

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the coalition led b y the Christian Democrats did not get the required number of votes, but it illustrates the totalitarian doctrine of "the ends justify the means." 74 Another weakness of Christian Democracy as a democratic party has been its dependence on Confinindmtria (the association of industrialists) for financial support. A t the same time it depends on the Church and the Catholic Action Society for political action. T h e real campaigners for the party in postwar elections have been the Civic Committees of Catholic Action and the Roman Church hierarchy, who have used the weapons of excommunication and refusal to perform sacraments. Papal allocutions before elections, in spite of the technical neutrality of the Vatican, have been only slightly veiled injunctions to the faithful to vote the Christian Democratic ticket. 75 A danger to Italian democracy lies in the relative rather than the absolute allegiance of the Church to democratic precepts. [The] support given to democratic regimes by the Vatican and the hierarchies is expedtential. Nothing has happened to suggest that the fundamental political principle of the Church has been altered in any way. It supports democratic governments and democratic parties when such a policy will protect or enhance the position of the Church. It will withdraw its support when democratic institutions seem to be seriously threatening Church interests, or when they prove to be too weak a reed on which to rest its fate.7®

T h e efforts of Luigi Gedda, head of the Catholic Action Society have been to push the Christian Democrats towards reaction and authoritarianism.77 Before the May 1952 administrative elections he was urging, with Vatican support, an alliance between the Christian Democrats and Monarchists and neo-Fascists. A t the last minute the Vatican switched and backed the Christian Democratic party alone.78 In the June 1953 national elections the Christian Democrats ran in coalition with the democratic parties of the center, Liberal,

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Republican, and Social Democratic. The failure of this coalition to get the fifty per cent plus one of the popular vote led to the fall of the De Gasperi government and its replacement by a cabinet led by Giuseppe Pella, a right-wing Christian Democrat. This minority government was composed of Christian Democrats alone, and stayed in office with the open support of the Monarchists. A revolt by the left-wing of the Christian Democrats brought it down, but their candidate for the premiership, Amintore Fanfani, the former Minister of Agriculture who pushed through the land reform legislation, failed to get sufficient support. As a result, Mario Scelba, former Minister of the Interior and author of the bonus law, formed a compromise cabinet including the small center parties, which was at the same time satisfactory to the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats. Both this and its successor cabinet of Antonio Segni were essentially a return to the De Gasperi policy, based on holding the center together by not moving vigorously in any direction. The failure of the center coalition to attract majorities has renewed the clamor of those forces within the dominant party who favor a center-right alliance as the only way of stopping the extreme Left. Under Gedda's pressure the Vatican expelled from the Catholic Action organization Mario Rossi, the leader of a group of young men who advocated a centerleft orientation. L'Osservatore Romano stated officially that he had committed "doctrinal deviations." 79 Gedda's position has been strengthened both by such suppression of internal opposition and by some administrative election returns in 1954 and 1956. The center coalition lost control of some of the major cities and will only be able to govern with rightwing help unless the unlikely step is taken of bringing in the Left Socialists.80 The Vatican can drop the Christian Democrats as easily as it dropped Don Sturzo and the Popolari to Fascism in 1923.

conclusions

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Or there might be a fusion, under Catholic Action auspices, of the conservative wing of Christian Democracy, the Monarchists 81 and the more moderate neo-Fascists into a clericalcorporative movement.82 Either result could hardly be defined as democratic. It is far more likely that the Church would come to terms with neo-Fascism than with Communism. The latter possibility, however, is not to be excluded. In extreme circumstances, if a victory of Moscow appeared probable in Europe, the Church could make arrangements with Moscow.83 The hierarchy did it in Poland in the Church-State agreement of April 14, 1950.84 During the two years of the Italian war against Germany there was real cooperation between sections of the clergy and all parties including those of the Left, especially in the resistance movement in the north. Since 1944, Palmiro Togliatti has prevented the Italian Communist party from reviving its traditional anti-clericalism. After the hostilities, the Christian Democrats tended to put elections on a basis of "either with Christ or against Christ." Togliatti has rejected the charge that the Communist party is anti-Christian and has said: "Anticlericalism is, as an ideology, extraneous to the working class and to our party. . . . We have not wanted and do not want religious conflicts. . . . We continue to think that a vast religious conflict with an array of clerical forces on one side and a by now reborn mass anticlericalism on the other would be contrary to the interests of Italy." 85 He has done everything he could to make a deal with the Church; he undermined Parri, he delivered the Communist vote in the Constituent Assembly in favor of including the Lateran Accords of 1929 in the new Italian constitution.86 So far his efforts have been rebuffed. Should the West lose its position in Europe, however, an accord between the Church and the Communists is not out of the question. For the life of the Church is centered in Rome. Only the Italians

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can succeed in running it because it is their tradition to be the heart of Catholicism.87 If two of the leading political groups are antidemocratic and the third is only partially democratic, can we say that democracy exists today in Italy? Some Italian anti-Fascists say "no"; they call the present situation clerical Fascism without Mussolini. This is too extreme. Democracy lives tenuously; it is fighting for its life, and its success will in large measure depend on the turn of events outside the peninsula. It is a product of a balance among undemocratic forces, each not strong enough to overcome the others and not yet ready to come to terms with the others. Either of these two possibilities would overthrow the balance and could extinguish democracy if true democratic forces do not develop in the interim. What are the possibilities of such a development? In Western society, democracy has rested on two principal social bases: a bourgeoisie committed to liberalism; and a revisionist socialism which abandoned the nineteenth-century concepts of revolution and class dictatorship for the doctrine of parliamentary democracy. In Italy, however, both these orientations were restricted. "Italian Liberalism remained a vague idea with a negative content. It belied its name in respect of political liberty, creating time and again, disguised dictatorships such as those of Depretis, Crispí, and Giolitti. It failed to observe the economic postulates of Liberalism, falling into a protectionism ever more vexatious." 88 The crisis of Italian Liberalism came with the rise of the Socialists and the Popolari. "Therefore both Democratic-Liberals and Industrialists and Agrarians [large landowners] turned to Fascism as the only force that could save them. Thus was invented the fable that Fascism in 1922 saved Italy from Bolshevism. There was no peril of Bolshevism in Italy nor did Fascism save her from it." 89 There is little evidence that the Italian bourgeoisie which lost its faith in liberalism has since regained it. Italian Socialism, in contradiction to developments in other

conclusions

203

western European states, did not become firmly revisionist. Italy had its revisionist socialists it is true, but they controlled the party on only few occasions before Fascism came to power. The Maximalists led Italian Socialism, speaking in terms of barricades and the class struggle with the bourgeoisie. Again, since 1943, the Maximalists have been leading Italian Socialism, working in pacts of unity with the Communists. They have denounced as traitors to the working class and as allies of the bourgeoisie Saragat's Social Democrats who split off from them. This splinter group has remained weak and ineffective.80 A third basis for democracy in the West has been the rise of the Catholic social movement which in very recent years has become politically important in several European countries. In Italy, however, this movement while strong in the Catholic party is weaker in the country. The dominant forces in Italian society hold on to the old rules, the old positions, the old institutions. Elites play the important roles in Italian life and extremes are still great. The leading industrial families retain their former holdings; the estate holders their former social and economic eminence, for the land reform program has touched them but lightly. The aristocracy is still a major power. 91 The truly democratic forces in Italy are divided. In their ranks are found some of the Liberals who still believe in their tents, the Social Democrats, the Republicans, and the left wing of the Christian Democrats. They disagree on questions of economics and the role of the Church. The democratic cause is not hopeless but it will require a peaceful and prosperous Italy and world to survive. In facing the major problems of foreign policy Italians are confronted with the necessity of realizing that their country is no longer a great power. This is a difficult readjustment to make, for they feel keenly the disproportion between Italy's standing as a power and the tremendous contribution it has

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made to culture and civilization. Part of the struggle to keep the colonies is due to the desire to retain a certain status, just as the original conquests in Africa sprang from a desire to achieve status. The strong drive for close cooperation with France is an evidence of the desire to regain power status by combination, when the economic and military backbone of strength is lacking. The primary object of Italian foreign policy, like that of every other state, is to provide for the security of the nation. In the past, Italian protection depended on a balance of power on the European continent and close and friendly association with the nation controlling the Mediterranean, Great Britain. Pressure from the European continent was the problem facing Italy for centuries and its history attests to the innumerable invasions from the north. The bane of Italian security before political unification was the constant intervention of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Italian affairs, direct intervention by invasion and the holding of Italian territory, indirect intervention by the influence exercised over various duchies, kingdoms, and the Papacy. The major Italian gain from World War I was not the acquisition of the Brenner frontier or the Julian Alps, but the destruction of a great power, Austria-Hungary. This was the best guarantee of Italian security. The maintenance of an independent Austria and of Italian influence in Yugoslavia should have been cardinal elements of Italian policy. But Mussolini abandoned central Europe to Hitler in 1937 and 1938. Now Italy again faces a great power on its northeastern frontier. This time it is not a single nation but a system of nations revolving around the power center of the Soviet Union. This system touched Italy on the Yugoslav border until the defection of Marshal Tito from the Soviet camp. If the Iron Curtain is not on the Italian frontier today, it is, nevertheless, uncomfortably close. The Italians appear to have little confidence in Yugoslav resistance in the event of a Russian attack

conclusions

205

and believe that a deal between the two is still possible.92 There is little Italy can do to minimize this danger short of becoming a part of the system itself. Internally, this land power exercises an influence, not by means of dukes, princes, or Popes, but by means of the Communist party, large, wellorganized, ably led and supported by friends among the leftwing Socialists. The other area of Italian vulnerability lies in the Mediterranean Sea. Friendship with Britain was a cornerstone of Italian policy in the nineteenth century, but it was friendship based on Italy's recognition of its inferior position in that sea. Mussolini refused to accept this position and changed the concept of naval security from one of friendliness combined with subordination to aggressiveness backed up by a fleet capable of providing a serious threat. World War II brought the destruction of this fleet plus the dismantling of the coastal defenses. The government of Italy was anxious to resume its friendship with Britain and had no pretensions of asserting either Mediterranean supremacy, mare nostro, or parity, even with France. Britain showed little evidence of a willingness to accept the professions of friendship, although it warmed up under American and French proddings.93 Italy by itself is not a threat to Anglo-American power in the Mediterranean, but in combination with another European power it might be a menace. Mussolini was able to take advantage of other threats such as Nazi Germany, or the fear of Communist revolution, to try to make gains and expand at the expense of British and French influence. It is not inconceivable that the Italian republic might attempt to do likewise by playing off the Russian menace for its own advantage. Such a possibility might be diminished if conservatives ruled in Italy; it could be expected that conservatives would not be likely to play ball with the Soviets. Yet the eagerness with which Badoglio grasped Russia's offer of full diplomatic recognition in March 1944 seemed to indicate that even conserva-

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tive Italians could not be trusted. Britain could reason, therefore, that only a weak Italy, whether conservative or radical, would not be a danger again. It would therefore hesitate to bolster Italy, even if weakness increased the danger of radicalism on the peninsula. Supporting a moderate or left-center democratic government in Italy, but one that is capable of solving Italy's problems, would not only lessen the internal threat of Communism but also the probability of an Italian deal with Russia. For Hitler has shown that it is easier for extremists, whether reactionary or radical, to make deals with the Soviet Union, even if only temporarily, than middle-ofthe-road governments. Italy today is defenseless as far as its own power is concerned. Its protection lies in the readiness of outside powers to consider an attack on it, or a challenge to its position, cause for war. On December 13, 1947, President Truman, speaking on the occasion of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Italian soil, stated this proposition clearly: "If . . . it becomes apparent that the freedom and independence of Italy . . . are being threatened directly or indirectly, the United States . . . will be obliged to consider what measures would be appropriate." 94 Italian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization now formalizes this commitment. Present Italian governments have not threatened to join forces with the Soviet Union in order to gain advantages. They have formally committed themselves to the "western orientation" implied by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and by signing the agreement for the European Defense Community (EDC). But the Italian parliament hesitated to ratify the EDC. Part of the delay may have been due to an inclination to wait for a French decision on the same issue. Part may have been due to the opposition to association with Germans, based on a long as well as very recent history. Part, however, was the product of a desire to use the EDC as a means for getting stronger western support for

conclusions

207

Italy's national ambition, Trieste. The Pella government openly made acquisition of Trieste the price for Italian ratification of the EDC. 95 The subsequent Scelba government said that the failure to achieve a solution on Trieste made ratification of E D C "more difficult," a diplomatic modification.96 Meanwhile the United States threatened loss of economic aid.97 The French then disposed of E D C to settle that issue and Italy finally obtained Trieste. T w o conclusions can be drawn from this record. First, nationalism is still a far stronger force in Italy than the ideal of European unity. Second, the Italian governments are perverting the European unity movement from its original object. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the E D C were created to deter and, if necessary, resist Soviet aggression. They were not created to achieve the immediate territorial ambitions of their members, no matter how legitimate. In attempting to use the E D C as a means to achieve a national goal, the Italians repeated the development which took place at the end of the nineteenth century, when Italy converted the Triple Alliance, created by Bismarck for defensive purposes only, into an instrument supporting ambitions in Africa. The more drastic consequences of such an attitude can be comprehended when it is realized that Germany could follow the same tactic, converting a unified Europe into a weapon to achieve a goal that Germans would consider legitimate, the return of the provinces lost to Poland, Silesia, East Prussia, and Pomerania. The threat to the West is not that Italy would embrace a pro-Soviet orientation, but would return to neutralism and indifference. The Communists have been urging a neutralist attitude, the best they can hope for short of coming to power themselves.98 But whether or not the government officially adopts a neutralist policy in the future the serious conditions within the country merely induce in the masses an indifference to broader problems. It is difficult to conceive of the Italian

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people rallying to a great crisis, creating a unified and dynamic public opinion. Until its internal problems can be solved, until its people can be given a stake in their country, Italy can make little contribution to the peace of the world. Though militarily weak and economically impoverished, Italy has a role to play in Europe. The desire to restore a proper proportion between past contributions to culture and civilization and present position is still vigorous. Italy can revive its influence through an intellectual, artistic, political, and social renascence. Or it can try to achieve the coveted revival in a manner analogous to Mussolini's attempt, playing upon the conflicts in the international community, speculating on political adventures, to reestablish political power and make Italy more feared than honored. The role it selects will be of more than Italian or European concern.

bibliographical survey A brief bibliographical essay must of necessity be selective and we shall make no attempt here to be otherwise. It is assumed that the reader already has a general background knowledge of the origins of World War II and a background in Italian politics, especially of the Fascist period. Reference can be made to the excellent book of Gaetano Salvemini, Prelude to World War 11 (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), and to Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). On the war period itself the works produced up to now have paid relatively little attention to Italy, nor to Italian affairs after the armistice. Note can be taken of the general context within which decisions on Italy were made as discussed in such books as Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1952), and William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, Their Cooperation and Conflict 1942-1946, volume 3 in Toynbee and Ashton-Gwatkin, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-1956). Relatively few books have appeared in English on postFascist Italy. Among these are Barbara B. Carter, Italy Speaks (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1947); Muriel Grindrod, The New Italy (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), and The Rebuilding of Italy, Politics and Economics 19451955 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955); Elizabeth Wiskemann, Italy (London: Oxford University Press, 1947); and the excellent work of H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953). There is, of course, an enormous literature in Italian on this period. The reader is referred, for reasons of space, to the bibliographical survey by Rava and

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italy and the allies

Spini in Rivista Storica Italiana, September ΐ949> f ° r the material published up to that time. A major source of information is the memoirs and diaries produced by Allied and Italian military and civilian officials. These are of varying usefulness, quality, and reliability. The most important in English are the memoirs of Winston Churchill, The Second World War, V, Closing the Ring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951); and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, volume II (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948). Others include Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948); Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946); Mark W . Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Henry Maitland Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939194.7 (London: Hutchinson, 1950); James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947); Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948); and Herbert L. Matthews, The Education of a Correspondent (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1946). Most of the Italians connected with the surrender have produced memoirs or diaries. They must all be used with caution. The most valuable is Giuseppe Castellano, Come firmai Y armistizio di Cassibile (Milano: Mondadori, 1945). In addition there are Pietro Badoglio, L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale (Milano: Mondadori, 1946); Raffaele Guariglia, Ricordi 1922-1946 (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1950) ; Mario Roatta, Otto milioni di baionette (Milano: Mondadori, 1946); Francesco Rossi, Come arrivamo αΙΓarmistizio (Milano: Garzanti, 1946); and Giacomo Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe d'Italia, volume 2 (Roma: Corso, 1946). The article of Howard McGaw Smyth, "The Armistice of Cassibile," Military Affairs, Spring 1948, is authoritative. The Italian efforts to amend the armistice and save their fleet can best be

bibliographical survey

211

traced in the official volume Documenti relativi ai rapporti tra ritalia e le Nazioni unite (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1945)· On the institutional question there is the book of Agostino degli Espinosa, Il regno del sud (Roma: Migliaresi, 1946). In addition, there are the important diaries of Benedetto Croce, Quando Γ Italia era tagliata in due (Bari: Laterza, 1948); and Ivanoe Bonomi, Diario di un anno (Milano: Garzanti, 1947); also the records of the Congress of Bari, Congresso Nazionale dei Comitati di Liberazione, Gli atti del Congresso di Bari (Bari: Edizioni Messaggeri Meridionali, 1944); and the typewritten records of the Executive Junta. The efforts of the Italians to increase their contribution to the war effort are set down in the official document Le concours italien dans la guerre contre Γ Allemagne (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1946). Badoglio also covers this in his memoirs cited above. On Italian political parties there is an enormous literature in Italian but relatively little in English. Among the best are Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democracy in Italy and France (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952); and Mario Einaudi et al., Communism in Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951). The evolution of the Communist line can be followed in Palmiro Togliatti, Linea d'una politica (Milano: Milano-Sera, 1948). Socialist politics are traced in Pietro Nenni, Una battaglia vinta (Roma: Leonardo, 1946); Vatican politics in Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni, 3rd ed. (Torino: Einaudi, 1952). A very good critical analysis of the parties can be found in Michele Dipiero, Storia critica dei partiti italiani (Roma: Azienda Editrice Internazionale, 1946). There is little in English on the Italian partisan movement; the most complete work is the unpublished dissertation of C. F. Delzell, "The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance" (Stanford University, 1951). There is an extensive literature in

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Italy and the allies

Italian. Most of the partisan leaders as well as lesser figures have written memoirs, too numerous to mention. A Commission has been established to study the resistance movement and its publication II Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, includes articles, book reviews, etc. The excellent review II Fonte devoted its entire issue of November-December, 1947 to the partisan movement. Probably the most comprehensive history of the resistance movement to date, marred by a Marxist bias, is Roberto Battagliai, Storia della Resistenza italiana, 2nd ed. (Torino: Einaudi, 1953). It contains an excellent bibliography. The Italian government has published the documents used to support its case in the consideration of the peace settlement. As they are numerous the reader is referred to the appropriate chapters where they are cited. The United States government has printed important documents in United States and Italy, 1936-1946 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946). Other relevant American government publications include Paris Peace Conference, 1946, Selected Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947); and Treaty of Peace With Italy, Treaties and other International Acts Series 1648 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947)· In conclusion, we should mention the extensive coverage of Italian affairs in the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune; also the coverage given by various Allied agencies in Italy during and after the war. The weekly report, Allied Force Headquarters, Information and Censorship Section, Psychological Warfare Branch, D Section, "Reports on Conditions in Liberated Italy," the Allied Control Commission's, Weekly Bulletin, and the Office of War Information's, "Italian News Bulletin" all provided on the spot information of the greatest usefulness.

notes abbreviations used in notes Additional Notes

Additional Notes to the Memorandum on the Italian Territories in Africa (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1946)

Armistice with Italy, 1943

Armistice with Italy, 1943, U S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1604 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947)

Economic

Memorandum on the Economic and Financial Questions Connected with the Peace Treaty (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1946)

Memorandum

Enciclopedia Italiana

Enciclopedia Italiana, Appendix II, I-Z (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949)

Fuehrer Conferences

U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Relating to the German Navy, i 943 (Washington: U. S. Navy Department, 1947) General Considerations Regarding the Composition of the Italian Armed Forces with Reference to the Peace Treaty (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1946)

General Considerations

Italian Peace Treaty

U. S. Department of State, Treaty of Peace with Italy, Treaties and other International Acts Series 1648 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947)

Italy and the allies

214 Le concours italien

OWI Peace Conference, Documents

PWB, D Section, "Report on Conditions in Liberated Italy"

United States and Italy, 19361946

chapter I.

Le concours italien dans la guerre contre l'Allemagne (Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1946) U. S. Office of War Information Documents U. S. Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, 1946, Selected Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947) Allied Force Headquarters, Information and Censorship Section, Psychological Warfare Branch, D Section, "Report of Conditions in Liberated Italy" (mimeographed) U. S. Department of State, United States and Italy, 1936-1946 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946)

the fascist period

ι. H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 43. 2. Ibid., pp. 69-70. 3. "From the overblown verbiage of corporatism . . . only two realities emerge: the political dictatorship and the strong position of the employers. The rest was wind." Ibid., p. 88. 4. For an excellent survey of Fascist foreign policy see Gaetano Salvemini, Prelude to World War II (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954).

j. "In the public opinion of Italy the government — il governo — still remained an institution detached from the people, who continued to consider the executive authorities as exploiters and the laws as an imposition and duress." Leonardo Olschki, The Genius of Italy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 451. 6. On the activities of the exiles see Charles F. Delzell, "The Italian Anti-Fascist Emigration, 1922-1943," Journal of Central European Affairs, April 1952, pp. 20-J5.

notes η. Arturo Cario Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni, 3rd ed. (Torino: Einaudi, 1952), pp. 577, 599, 630. The discussion of church-state relations which follows is based mainly on this study. 8. Ibid., p. 682. 9. Ibid., p. 669. 10. Roberto Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana, 2nd ed. (Torino: Einaudi, 1953), p. 58. 11. Hughes, The United States and Italy, p. 176. chapter II.

the end of mussolini

ι. Leonardo Vitetti, "Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime" (typewritten manuscript), p. 6. Count Vitetti, a former high official of the Foreign Office was connected with one of the military groups. 2. Despite this reputation, Cavallero was himself plotting an overthrow of Mussolini and a break with the Germans. His plan is given in Domenico Mayer, La verità sul processo di Verona (Milano: Mondadori, 1945), pp. 91-97. 3. Vitetti, "Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime," p. 3. 4. Leonardo Simoni (Michele Lanza), Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia ¡939-1943 (Roma: Migliaresi, 1946), pp. 320-321; Vittorio Zincone, ed., Hitler e Mussolini lettere e documenti (Milano: Rizzoli, 1946), pp. 151-154. 5. Giuseppe Castellano, Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile (Milano: Mondadori, 1945), pp. 36-37. 6. Domenico Bartoli, Vittorio Emanuele III (Milano: Mondadori, 1946), pp. 227-228. 7. Castellano, Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile, p. 36. 8. Vitetti, "Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime," pp. 4-5. 9. Notiziario italiano (London), August 15, 1942. For a balanced account of the Italian parties see Michele Dipiero, Storia critica dei partiti italiani (Roma: Azienda Editrice Internazionale, 1946). 10. Pietro Nenni, "Che cosa vuole il Partito socialista," Una battaglia vinta (Roma: Leonardo, 1946), p. 18. 11. Rodolfo Sommaruga, Che cosa vogliono i partiti? (Roma: Editoriale Romana, 1944), pp. 127-139. 12. Ibid., pp. 10-13. 13. Vitetti, "Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime," p. 2. 14. Riccardo Levi, "L'azione economica e sociale dei C. L. N. dell'alta Italia," Il Ponte, November-December 1947, p. 994. 15. The Times (London), December 24, 1940. 16. Dispatch dated August 5, 1943. Text in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, V, Closing The Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 100.

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italy and the allies

17. Text in Picture Post (London), November 21, 1942; reprinted in Nazioni unite (New York), January 28, 1943, p. 4. 18. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), II, 1548. 19. Ibid. 20. U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, October 16, 1943, pp. 256-258. 21. Broadcast by Mr. Luigi Antonini of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, November 13, 1942; Notiziario italiano (London), January 23, 1943. 22. Conversation with Gaetano Salvemini. 23. Statements of Antonini, and Vanni Montana, another broadcaster, in The New Leader (New York), April 17 and May 8, 1943. 24. Letter of John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Department of State, to Dr. Pollari of the Free Italy Movement. Reprinted in La Legione (New York), July 1, 1943. 25. The War Reports of General George C. Marshall, General H. H. Arnold, Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947), p. 164. There is no point in reworking here the controversy between Americans and British over the proper invasion route into Europe; across northern France, or through the Mediterranean and the BalRans into Central Europe. 26. Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 130. 27 Ivanoe Bonomi, Diario di un anno (Milano: Garzanti, 1947), pp. xxii-xxxv. 28. Ibid., p. xxxviii. This at a time when both bodies were completely Fascist. 29. Marcello Soleri, Memorie (Torino: Einaudi, 1949), p. 240. 30. Interview with Marchesi by an Allied officer in PWB, D Section, "Report on Conditions in Liberated Italy," January 4, 1945. 31. Castellano, Come firmai Γarmistizio di Cassibile, pp. 48, 52. 32. Text of note in Francesco Rossi, Come arrivarne all'armistizio (Milano: Garzanti, 1946), pp. 114-115. The anti-Fascists also had faith in the possibility of neutralization. Soleri, Memorie, pp. 233-236. 33. Text in Rossi, Come arrivamo all'armistizio, pp. 41-42. 34. Castellano, Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile, pp. 54-56. 35. Bortolo Belotti, L'avventura fascista (Milano: Dall'Öglio, 1945), pp. 141-142. On the Feltre Conference see also Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 301-302. 36. Joint appeal made July 16, 1943, United States and Italy, 1936-1946, pp. 42-44. 37. Max Ascoli writing in the preface to The Fall of Mussolini (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1948), p. 39, a translation

notes

2 1

7

of Benito Mussolini, Storia di un anno (il tempo del bastone e della carota), 2nd ed. (Milano: Mondadori, 1944).

chapter III.

negotiating the armistice

ι. Pietro Badoglio, Vitalia nella seconda guerra mondiale (Milano: Mondadori, 1946), p. 71. Badoglio had resigned in 1941 as Chief of the High Command over the fiasco of the invasion of Greece. Texts of proclamations in Attilio Tamaro, Due anni di storia 1943-1945 (Roma: Tosi, 1948-1949), I, 47. 2. The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, ed. Louis P. Lochner (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), p. 410. 3. Fuehrer Conferences, pp. 104-106. 4. Badoglio, Vitalia nella seconda guerra mondiale, p. 85. 5. Mario Torsiello, "L'agressione germanica all'Italia nella sua fase preliminare, 26 Luglio — Settembre, 1943," Rivista Militare, July 1945, quoted by Giacomo Carboni in Vitalia tradita dalVarmistizio alla pace (Roma: E.D.A., 1947), p. 75. 6. Minutes of this meeting are in Rossi, Come arrivarne all'armistizio, pp. 378-384, and Zincone, Hitler e Mussolini lettere e documenti, pp. 190-209. Also see Raffaele Guariglia, Ricordi 1922-1946 (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1950), pp. 615-630. 7. Minutes in Rossi, Come arrivarne all'armistizio, pp. 385-401. 8. Fuehrer Conferences, pp. 124, 127-128. 9. Speech of General Jodl, November 7, 1943, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), VII, 929-931. 10. Bonomi, Diario di un anno, pp. 35, 45-46. 11. Vitalia del Popolo (Bari), December 11, 1943. 12. Bonomi, Diario di un anno, p. 75. 13. Carlo Sforza in 11 Corriere d'informazione (Milano), February 15, 1946. For a defense of the policy of not vigorously purging Fascists for fear of the threat to the public order, see the memoirs of the chief of the national police at that time: Carmine Senise, Quando ero capo della polizia 1940-1943 (Roma: Ruffolo, 1946), pp. 213-217. 14. Text in Mussolini, Storia di un anno, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 3 . The document was found in Badoglio's office by the Germans after the Marshal fled southward on September 9. It was turned over to Mussolini. Badoglio admits its authenticity. Badoglio, L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale, p. 89. Also see Soleri, Memorie, p. 256. 15. Examples in U. S. Federai Communications Commission, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, "Western European Weekly Radio and Press Intelligence Report," August 15, 1943, p. A-7 (mimeographed).

2 I 8

italy and the allies

16. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1550. 17. The Times (London), August 5, 1943; also see the public statement of Roosevelt reprinted in United States and Italy, 19361946, pp. 44-47. 18. Guariglia, Ricordi 1922-1946, pp. 554-561. 19. Ibid., pp. 586-608. Guariglia also sent Alberto Pirelli, the rubber magnate, to Switzerland to try to enlist the services of the Swiss government as an intermediary. 20. On these missions see Guariglia, Ricordi 1922-1946, pp. 586608; see also Missione segreta (Tangeri: Agosto 1943) by Alberto Berio (Milano: Dali 'Oglio, 1947), pp. 71-74; D'Ajeta's report is given in Tamaro, Due anni di storia 1943-194